public domain works from the ,university
 of ,michigan ,digital ,libraries47     
,transcriber's note3 ,a few             
typographical errors have been          
corrected3 they are listed at the end of
 the text4  ,,the ,,theories ,,of       
,,darwin4  ,,hall1 ,,stuttgart1 ,april  
#e1 #ahhj4  ,we hereby authorize the    
,rev4 ,dr4 ,g4 ,a4 ,zimmermann to       
translate into ,english the book        
entitled  ,die ,darwin'schen ,theorien  
und ihre ,stellung zur ,philosophie1    
,religion und ,moral von ,rudolf        
,schmid4  ,we declare that we know of no
 other translation of the said book and 
that ,dr4 ,zimmermann's translation will
 be the only one authorized by us for   
the ,united ,states as well as for the  
,british ,empire and its ,dominions4    
7,the ,author7 ,,rudolf ,,schmid4       
7,the ,publisher7 ,,paul ,,moser4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,,the  ,,theories ,,of ,,darwin  ,,and  
,,their ,,relation ,,to  ,,philosophy1  
,,religion ,,and ,,morality4  ,by       

,,rudolf ,,schmid1 ,president of the    
,theological ,seminary at ,schnthal1    
,wrtemberg4  ,,translated ,,from ,,the  
,,german ,,by ,g4 ,a4 ,,zimmermann1     
,,ph4,d4  ,,with ,,an ,,introduction    
,,by ,,the ,,duke ,,of ,,argyll         
,,chicago3 ,,jansen ,mc,c,l,u,r,g4      
,,company #ahhc4         99       99    
99       99       99  ,,copyright ,,by  
,,jansen1 ,,mcclurg  ,,co4 ,a4,d4 #ahhb4
  ,r4 ,r4 ,,donnelley  ,,sons1          
,,printers4         99       99       99
       99       99 #a   ,,author',s     
,,preface         99       99       99  
99       99  ,the movement which        
received its impulse as well as its name
 from ,darwin1 seems to have recently   
passed its distinctest phase2 but the   
more prominent points of opposition1    
religious1 ethical1 and scientific1     
which have been revealed through it1    
remain as sharply contrasted as before4 
,the author of this book desires1 in the
 first place1 to be of service to such  
readers as feel the need of setting     

themselves right upon these questions1  
which touch the highest interests of    
mankind1 but who lack time and          
opportunity to investigate independently
 a realm in which so many and so        
heterogeneous sciences come into mutual 
contact4 ,the illogical and confused    
manner in which some noisy leaders      
confound these sciences and their       
problems and consequences1 renders it   
still more difficult to arrive at a     
satisfactory result2 and thus perhaps   
many readers will look with interest    
upon an investigation designed to       
simplify the different problems and the 
different attempts at their solution1   
and to treat them not only in their     
relations to each other1 but also       
separately4 ,but with this primary      
object1 the author combines another3 to 
render a service to some among the many 
who perceive the harmony between their  
scientific conviction and their         
religious need threatened or shaken by  
the results of science1 and who are     

unwilling to lose this harmony1 or1     
having lost it1 desire to regain it4    
,those voices are indeed becoming       
louder1 and more generally and willingly
 heard1 which proclaim an               
irreconcilability between faith and #b  
knowledge1 between the religious and the
 scientific views of the world2 which   
declare that peace between the two can  
only be had at the price either of      
permitting the religious impulses of the
 heart to be stifled in favor of        
science1 of satisfying the religious    
need of the mind with a nourishment     
which in the light of science proves to 
be an illusion1 or1 as sceptics in      
theory and eclectics in practice1 of    
renouncing with resignation a logical   
connection and foundation to their      
former view of the world4 ,the most     
striking proof of the extent to which   
these voices are heard1 is the fact that
 it has been possible for a one-sided   
pessimism to become the fashionable     
system of philosophy in a ,christian    

nation4 ,the most effective means for   
opposing such discordant voices1 and for
 making amends for the disagreements    
which they have occasioned1 undoubtedly 
consists in the actual proof of the     
contrary of their theories1 in the clear
 presentation of a standpoint from which
 not only the most unrestricted freedom 
of investigation and the most unreserved
 acknowledgment of its results shall be 
in perfect harmony with the undiminished
 care of our entire religious           
possession1 but in which this peace is  
preserved and forever established by the
 very fact that one function of the mind
 directly requires the other1 one       
possession directly guarantees the      
other4 ,this is the standpoint of the   
author1 and from it he has endeavored to
 treat all the questions which are to be
 taken into consideration4 ,should he1  
by his exposition of this standpoint1   
succeed in helping even a few readers in
 reaching the conviction of the actual  
harmony between the scientific1         

religious1 and ethical acquisitions of  
mankind1 or in confirming them anew in  
such conviction1 he would find himself  
amply rewarded for this first extended  
venture before the public4  ,r4 ,s4  #c 
,,author',s ,,preface ,,to ,,american   
,,edition4  ,six years have elapsed     
since ,i wrote the book which is now    
going forth in ,english dress4 ,the     
great leader of the theories in question
 has passed away2 the waves of thought  
he set in motion are assuming smoother  
shape2 and ,i can only add to what ,i   
have already written1 that not only have
 ,i had no occasion to retract any of   
the statements or views laid down in the
 book1 but ,i perceive the religious as 
well as the scientific world growing    
more and more into accord with the views
 ,i have maintained1 and which were at  
first so vehemently opposed4  ,i owe so 
much to the literary men of the ,english
 tongue on both sides of the ,atlantic1 
that ,i shall be glad if1 through the   
devoted labors of the translator1 ,i am 

enabled to pay them a tribute of        
gratitude by aiding them in clearing the
 way for thought in these much disputed 
fields1 or in reconciling in their minds
 the conflict between faith and science4
  ,r4 ,s4  ,,sch,,nthal1 ,w,,rtemberg1  
,september1 #ahhb4         99       99  
99       99       99   #e               
,,introduction ,,to ,,american          
,,edition1  ,,by ,,the ,,duke ,,of      
,,argyll4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,it is well known that ,mr4
 ,darwin's theory on the ,origin of     
,species has been accepted in ,germany  
more widely1 with more absolute faith1  
and with more vehement enthusiasm1 than 
in the country of its birth4 ,in        
,germany1 more conspicuously than       
elsewhere1 it has itself become the     
subject of developments as strange and  
as aberrant as any which it assumes in  
the history of ,organic ,life4 ,the most
 extravagant conclusions have been drawn
 from it--invading every branch of human
 thought1 in ,science1 in ,philosophy1  

and in ,religion4 ,these conclusions    
have been preached1 too1 with a         
dogmatism as angry and as intolerant as 
any of the old theologies4 ,it is the   
fate of every idea which is new and     
fruitful1 that it is ridden to the death
 by excited novices4 ,we can not be     
surprised if this fate has overtaken the
 idea that all existing animal forms    
have had their ancestry in other forms  
which exist no longer1 and have been    
derived from these by ordinary          
generation through countless stages of  
descent4 ,although this is an idea      
which1 whether true or not1 is entirely 
subordinate to the larger idea of       
creation1 it usurps in many minds the   
character of a substitute4 ,this is     
natural enough4 ,the theory1 or at least
 the language1 of ,evolutionists1 puts  
forward a visible order of phenomena as 
a complete and all-sufficient account of
 its own origin and cause4 ,however     
unsatisfactory this may be to the higher
 faculties of the mind1 it is eminently 

#f satisfactory to those other faculties
 which are lower in the scale4 ,it      
dismisses as needless1 or it postpones  
indefinitely1 all thought of the        
agencies which are ultimate and unseen4 
,just as in the physical world1 some    
trivial object which is very near us may
 shut out the whole of a wide horizon1  
so in the intellectual world1 some      
coarse mechanical conception may shut   
out all the kingdom of ,nature and the  
glory of it4  ,two great subjects of    
investigation lie before us4 ,the first 
is to ascertain how far the ,theory of  
,evolution represents an universal fact1
 or only one very partial and           
fragmentary aspect of a great variety of
 facts connected with the origin and    
development of ,organic ,life4 ,the     
second and by far the most important    
inquiry1 is to estimate aright1 or as   
nearly as we can1 the relative place and
 importance of these facts in the       
,philosophy of ,nature4  ,subjects of   
investigation so rich and manifold as   

these may well attract all the most     
varied gifts of the human mind4 ,this   
they have already done1 and there is    
every indication that they will continue
 to do so for generations yet to be4    
,already an immense literature is       
devoted to them2 and every fresh effort 
of observation and of reasoning seems to
 open out new and fruitful avenues of   
thought4 ,the work which is here        
introduced to the ,english reader       
contains an excellent review of this    
literature1 so far as it is represented 
in the ,english and ,german languages4  
,knowing the author personally1 as ,i   
have done for many years1 ,i recognize  
with pleasure in his work all the       
carefulness of inquiry1 and all the     
conscientiousness of reasoning1 which   
belong to a singularly candid and       
patient mind4  ,,argyll4    ,,inverary  
,,castle1 ,,scotland1       ,september1 
#ahhb4         99       99       99     
99       99   #g  ,,note ,,by ,,the     
,,translator4  ,the consideration which 

this work has received from the leaders 
of religious and philosophic thought in 
,germany1 and1 indeed1 wherever it has  
been read in its original form1 has led 
the translator to believe that an       
,english version of it would be         
acceptable4 ,especially in ,america1    
where religious problems and religious  
thought are so intimately connected with
 the processes of scientific and        
philosophic investigation1 and where the
 agitation of these problems is so      
peculiarly active and violent1 it has   
seemed that a work marked by so much    
scholarship1 profundity1 and            
comprehensiveness and originality of    
treatment1 must serve an important      
purpose to the cause of religious no    
less than of scientific truth4 ,it may  
be explained here1 that the author      
resided for some years in the family of 
the ,duke of ,argyll1 and there         
breathed1 to a certain extent1 the      
scientific air of ,darwinism in its very
 origin2 and thus his familiarity with  

all the results of modern scientific    
research1 added to his theological and  
philosophical acquirements1 enable him1 
with a most admirable blending of the   
spirit of fairness and toleration with  
logical severity of treatment1 to bring 
these different domains into their      
proper relation with each other and to  
establish between them that essential   
harmony in which consists the solution  
of these most profound and vital        
problems of man's welfare4  ,of the     
translation it may properly be said     
that1 while the aim has been to give the
 work the clearest possible form        
consistent with that strict fidelity to 
the original which is #h especially     
demanded by the character of its        
material1 the translator has not hoped  
to make the work altogether easy        
reading4 ,peculiarities of the author's 
style have been1 it is believed1 largely
 preserved2 and occasional difficulties 
of apprehension are no doubt to be      
expected1 both from the method of       

treatment and from the profound and     
abstruse character of the topics        
treated4 ,the translator will be well   
satisfied if it shall be found that he  
has succeeded in performing his task    
without adding unduly to the seeming    
obscurities of certain                  
passages--obscurities which1 however1   
will no doubt vanish before that degree 
of mental application without which such
 works may not be read at all           
intelligibly4  ,acknowledgments are     
properly due and are gladly rendered to 
,george ,c4 ,dawson1 ,esq41 of ,chicago1
 and to ,mr4 ,francis ,f4 ,browne1      
editor of ,the ,dial1 for valuable      
assistance in revising and perfecting   
this version4  ,g4 ,a4 ,z4  ,,chicago1  
,october1 #ahhb4         99       99    
99       99       99   #i  ,,contents4  
,,introduction 444 #ag  ,,part ,,first3 
,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories4  ,,book   
,i4 ,,the ,,purely ,,scientific         
,,theories4    ,the ,scientific         
,problem1 444 #bc  ,,chapter ,i4  ,,rise

 ,,of ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories4     
#a4 ,direct ,predecessors1 444 #cj   #b4
 ,indirect ,preparations1 444 #cc       
,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,history ,,of ,,the   
,,darwinian ,,theories4    #a4 ,darwin1 
444 #ch   #b4 ,the ,followers of        
,darwin4--,ernst ,hckel1 444 #de   #c4  
,modifications of the ,theory4--,moriz  
,wagner4 ,wigand1 444 #eb  ,,chapter    
,,iii4  ,,present ,,state ,,of ,,the    
,,darwinian ,,theories4    #a4 ,the     
,theory of ,descent1 444 #fa   #b4 ,the 
,theory of ,evolution4--,archology1     
,ethnography1 ,philology1 444 #gg   #c4 
,the ,theory of ,selection1 444 #ajj    
#aj  ,,book ,,ii4 ,,the ,,philosophic   
,,completions ,,and ,,consequences ,,of 
,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories4    ,the   
,philosophic ,problems1 444 #ajh        
,,chapter ,i4  ,,the                    
,,naturo-,,philosophic ,,supplements    
,,of ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories4      
#a4 ,the ,origin of ,self-,consciousness
 and of ,free ,moral                    
,self-,determination1 444 #aae   #b4    

,the ,origin of ,sensation and of       
,consciousness1 444 #abg   #c4 ,the     
,origin of ,life1 444 #acb   #d4 ,the   
,elements of the ,world2 the ,theory of 
,atoms1 and the ,mechanical       ,view 
of the ,world1 444 #adj  ,,chapter ,,ii4
  ,,metaphysical ,,conclusions ,,drawn  
,,from ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories4    
#a4 ,elimination of the ,idea of ,design
 in the ,world4--,monism1 444 #aeh  #aa 
,,part ,,second3 ,,the ,,position ,,of  
,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories ,,in       
,,reference ,,to ,,religion ,,and       
,,morality4  ,,book ,i4 ,,historical    
,,and ,,critical4    ,plan of           
,treatment1 444 #ahe  ,a4 ,,the         
,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and ,,religion4
  ,,chapter ,i4  ,,more ,,or ,,less     
,,negative ,,position ,,in ,,reference  
,,to ,,religion4    #a4 ,extreme        
,negation3 ,l4 ,bchner and ,consistent  
,materialism1 444 #ahh   #b4            
,replacement of ,religion ,through a    
,religious ,worship of the              
,universe4--,strauss4 ,oskar ,schmidt4  

,hckel1 444 #aij   #c4 ,pious           
,renunciation of the ,knowability of    
,god4 ,wilhelm ,bleek4 ,albert          
,lange4 ,herbert ,spencer1 444 #aic     
#d4 ,spinoza and ,hegel in the ,garb of 
,darwin4--,carneri1 ,ed4 von ,hartmann1 
444 #bjc   #e4 ,recho of ,negation on   
the ,side of the ,christian ,view of the
 ,world1       444 #bjf  ,,chapter ,,ii4
  ,,reform ,,of ,,religion1 ,,or ,,at   
,,least ,,of ,,the ,,science ,,of       
,,religion1 ,,through ,,darwinism4      
#a4 ,heinrich ,lang4 ,friedrich         
,vischer4 ,gustav ,jger1 444 #baj       
,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,peace ,,between     
,,religion ,,and ,,darwinism4    #a4    
,darwin4 ,wallace4 ,owen4 ,asa ,gray4   
,mivart4 ,mc,cosh4 ,anderson4 ,k4 ,e4   
von       ,baer4 ,alexander ,braun4     
,braubach1 and others1 444 #bag  #ab    
,b4 ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and  
,,morality4    ,preliminary ,view1 444  
#bbh  ,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,antagonism     
,,between ,,darwinism ,,and ,,morality4 
#a4 ,objections to ,darwinism from an   

,ethical ,standpoint1 444 #bcj          
,,chapter ,v4  ,,reform ,,of ,,morality 
,,through ,,darwinism4    #a4 ,the      
,materialists and ,monists4 ,darwin and 
the ,english ,utilitarians4             
,gustav ,jger1 444 #bcc  ,,chapter ,,vi4
  ,,neutrality ,,and ,,peace ,,between  
,,darwinism ,,and ,,morality4    #a4    
,mivart4 ,alexander ,braun1 and others1 
444 #bde  ,,book ,,ii4 ,,analytical4    
,preliminary ,view1 444 #bdi  ,a4 ,,the 
,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and ,,religion4
  ,,chapter ,i4  ,,the ,,darwinian      
,,theories ,,and ,,the ,,theistic ,,view
 ,,of ,,the ,,world4  a4 ,the ,position 
of ,purely ,scientific ,darwinism in    
,reference to ,theism4    #a4           
,scientific ,investigation and          
,theism4--,the ,idea of ,creation1 444  
#beb   #ac   #b4 ,the ,descent ,theory  
and ,theism1 444 #bei   #c4 ,the        
,evolution ,theory and ,theism1 444 #bfc
   #d4 ,the ,selection ,theory and      
,theism1 444 #bgj  b4 ,the ,darwinistic 
,philosophies in their ,position        

,regarding ,theism4    #e4 ,the         
,naturo-,philosophic ,supplements of    
,darwinism and ,theism1 444 #bgc   #f4  
,elimination of the ,idea of ,design1 or
 its ,acknowledgment and ,theism1       
444 #bhd  ,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,the        
,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and ,,positive 
,,christianity4    #a4 ,the ,creation of
 the ,world1 444 #bij   #b4 ,the        
,creation of ,man1 444 #cad   #c4 ,the  
,primitive ,condition of                
,man4--,paradise1 the ,fall of ,man1 and
       ,primitive ,history1 444 #cba    
#d4 ,providence1 ,hearing of ,prayer1   
and ,miracles1 444 #cde   #e4 ,the      
,redeemer and the ,redemption1 the      
,kingdom of ,god1 and the               
,receiving of ,salvation1 444 #cgc   #f4
 ,eschatology1 444 #cge  ,b4 ,,the      
,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and ,,morality4
  ,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,darwinism ,,and   
,,moral ,,principles4    #a4            
,darwinistic ,naturalism and ,moral     
,principles1 444 #cgi   #b4 ,scientific 
,darwinism and ,moral ,principles1 444  

#chf  ,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,darwinism ,,and
 ,,moral ,,life4    #a4 ,darwinistic    
,naturalism and ,moral ,life1 444 #cia  
#b4 ,scientific ,naturalism and ,moral  
,life1 444 #cif    ,,conclusion1 444    
#cii         99       99       99       
99       99   #ad  ,,authors ,,cited4   
99       99       99       99       99  
,agassiz1 ,louis1 #ce1 #cg1 #ej1 #cbj4  
,anderson1 #bbe4   ,anonymus1 the       
,unconscious1 etc41 #abh1 #abi1 #aca1   
#acd1 #aei4   ,anonymus1 ,vestiges1     
etc41 #cc4   ,argyll1 ,duke of1 #ej1    
#ia1 #ib1 #ace1 #agb1 #bjb1 #bhh4       
,ausland1 #aei1 #bdj1 #bha4    ,baer1   
,karl ,ernst von1 #cf1 #ed1 #ef1 #ga1   
#gd1 #ha1 #hc1 #ajf1 #acb1 #adi1 #afj1  
#agg1 #bbf1 #bei1 #bha1 #bhh1 #cbj4     
,barrande1 #ed4   ,baumgrtner1          
,heinrich1 #eg1 #agf4   ,blanchard1     
,emil1 #ed1 #ajf4   ,bleek1 ,wilhelm1   
#ag1 #if1 #ig1 #aid1 #aig1 #bcd1 #bcf4  
,boerhave1 #cf4   ,braubach1 #bbf4      
,braun1 ,alexander1 #ee1 #agf1 #bbf1    
#bdf1 #cig4   ,braun1 ,julius1 #ag4     

,buch1 ,leopold von1 #eb4   ,buckle1    
#ag4   ,bchner1 ,ludwig1 #db1 #aah1     
#ada1 #aeh1 #ahh1 #bje1 #bai1 #bcc1     
#cif4   ,buffon1 #ca4    ,carneri1 #bjc1
 #bch4   ,carns1 #cf4   ,christy1 #ij4  
,condillac1 #if4   ,cotta1 ,bernhard    
von1 #ea4   ,curtius1 #if4   ,cuvier1   
#ca1 #cb1 #cd1 #cg1 #cbj4    ,darwin1   
#ag1 #ah1 #be1 #bg1 #ch1 #aah1 #aga1    
#agg1 #bag1 #bdj1 #cbj1 #chi4           
,descartes1 #abg4   ,dillman1 #bie1     
#cja4   ,dohrn1 #hd4                    
,du,bois-,reymond1 ,emil1 #abd1 #abe1   
#abg1 #acj1 #acd1 #adi4    ,ebrard1     
#aei1 #bji4   ,ecker1 #ef4   ,escher1   
von der ,linth1 #ed4    ,farrar1 #if4   
,fechner1 ,gustav ,theodor1 #ace1 #adf4 
,fichte1 ,immanuel ,hermann1 #adb1 #age4
   ,fraas1 ,oskar1 #ee1 #ij4            
,frohschammer1 #age4    ,gegenbaur1 #ef4
   ,geiger1 ,lazar1 #ag1 #if4           
,geoffrey ,st4 ,hilaire1 ,etienne1 #cb1 
#cd4   ,gerhard1 #aig4   ,giebel1 #ed4  
,gppert1 #ed4   ,gthe1 #cc1 #cd1 #ce1   
#cbj4   ,gray1 ,asa1 #bbb4   ,grusebach1

 #ee4   ,grimm1 ,jacob1 #ag1 #ie4       
,hckel1 #ce1 #db1 #dc1 #de1 #ge1 #gh1   
#ajf1 #abc1 #acj1 #acc1 #adi1 #aei1     
#afj1 #aff1       #agj1 #bjd1 #bai1     
#bcd1 #bcg1 #bha1 #cie4   ,hartmann1    
,eduard von1 #ef1 #fj1 #ajf1 #aca1 #adb1
 #afh1 #agf1 #aia1 #bje1 #ccd1          
#cgf4   ,heer1 ,oswald1 #ef1 #agf4      
,hegel1 #abf1 #acf1 #bjd4   ,helmholtz1 
#acf1 #aei4   ,heyse1 #if4              
,hilgendorf1 #hb4   ,his1 ,wilhelm1 #ef1
 #ha1 #ajf4   ,huber1 #age4   ,humboldt1
 ,wilhelm von1 #ag1 #ie4   ,huxley1     
,thomas1 #db1 #ej1 #agg1 #aih1 #bbb1    
#bgi4    ,jger1 ,gustav1 #ea1 #abd1     
#bad1 #bdc4   ,jellinghaus1 #id4    #ae 
,kant1 #aie1 #bhb4   ,keim1 #ah1 #ccg4  
,klliker1 #ef1 #ha1 #agf4   ,kstlin1    
,julius1 #age1 #ahg4   ,kstlin1 ,otto4  
#adi4   ,kowalewsky1 ,a41 #db4          
,kowalewsky1 ,w41 #hc4   ,kurz1 ,johann 
,heinrich1 #cjf4    ,lamarck1 #bg1 #cj1 
#ca1 #cc1 #cbj4   ,lang1 ,heinrich1     
#aig1 #baj4   ,lange1 ,friedrich        
,albert1 #aab1 #afh1 #agc1 #agf1 #aid1  

#aif4   ,lartet1 #if4   ,leibnitz1 #abg1
 #bag4   ,leidy1 #hc4   ,lessing1 #dje1 
#djg4   ,linnaeus1 #cj4   ,livingstone1 
#ic4   ,lotze1 #adb1 #ade1 #adi4        
,lubbock1 ,sir ,john1 #ah1 #ia1 #ic1    
#bdb4   ,lyell1 ,sir ,charles1 #ah1 #cf1
 #ee1 #hi1 #ij1 #bbb4    ,mdler1 #agg1  
#beb4   ,malthus1 #ci4   ,marsh1 #hc4   
,martensen1 #ahg4   ,mayer1 ,robert von1
 #cg1 #abi1 #adi1 #aee4   ,mc,cosh1     
#bbd4   ,mill1 ,john ,stuart1 #bdb4     
,mivart1 #ee1 #ajf1 #bbc1 #bde4         
,moleschott1 #db4   ,mller1 ,fritz1 #gi4
   ,mller1 ,max1 #ah1 #if1 #ih4         
,murchison1 ,sir ,roderick1 #ed4        
,ngeli1 #ef4   ,nitzsch1 ,karl          
,immanuel1 #cfa4   ,noir1 ,ludwig1 #bha4
    ,oken1 #cd1 #cbj4   ,owen1 ,richard1
 #ce1 #ef1 #afd1 #agf1 #bba1 #bbc1 #cbj4
    ,peschel1 ,oskar1 #bgi4   ,pfaff1   
#ed4   ,pfleiderer1 ,otto1 #ahg4        
,planck1 ,carl ,ch41 #aje1 #aaj4        
,preyer1 #acf1 #adf1 #aec4    ,rathke1  
,heinrich1 #ha4   ,reichenbach1 #db4    
,renan1 #ah4   ,rville1 ,albert1 #ccd4  

,ritschl1 #cfd4   ,rtimeyer1 #ef1 #hc4  
,sandberger1 #ee1 #hb4   ,schaaffhausen1
 #ef1 #he1 #agg4   ,schelling1 #aji4    
,schiller1 #ahj4   ,schleicher1 #ag1    
#if4   ,schleiden1 #db1 #ea4            
,schleiermacher1 #aij4   ,schmidt1      
,oskar1 #cc1 #ce1 #ea1 #ge1 #abd1 #aei1 
#afd1 #aia1 #bcd4   ,schopenhauer1 #abh1
 #aij4   ,schrader1 ,eberhard1 #cde4    
,seidlitz1 #ea1 #aei1 #bch4   ,semper1  
,karl1 #hd1 #aca4   ,snell1 ,karl1 #db1 
#bfb4   ,spencer1 ,herbert1 #abh1 #aci1 
#aid1 #bdb1 #bgi4   ,spinoza1 #bjd4     
,stael1 ,madame de1 #bcd4   ,steffens1  
#aji4   ,steinthal1 #ag1 #if4           
,strauss1 ,david ,friedrich1 #ah1 #aab1 
#abe1 #abh1 #aei1 #afc1 #agd1 #age1     
#aij1       #bac1 #bcd1 #ccg1 #cgf1     
#cid4   ,swammerdam1 #cf4    ,tait1     
#ach4   ,thomson1 ,sir ,william1 #ach4  
,trmpelmann1 #bji4   ,tbingen ,school1  
#ah4   ,tylor1 #ia4    ,ulrici1 #adb1   
#add1 #adi1 #age1 #bce4    ,virchow1    
#ef1 #he4   ,vischer1 ,friedrich1 #age1 
#agf1 #bac1 #bfd4   ,vogt1 ,karl1 #db1  

#ef4   ,volkmann1 ,a4 ,w41 #ef1 #aje1   
#agg4    ,wagner1 ,moriz1 #eb1 #ef4     
,wallace1 ,alfred ,russell1 #cg1 #aja1  
#agg1 #bba1 #bfb4   ,wedgewood1 #if4    
,weismann1 #ef4   ,wigand1 ,albert1 #bf1
 #eb1 #ef1 #eg1 #ajf1 #ace1 #adi1 #agj1 
#bbf4   ,wundt1 #adb4   ,wrtemberger1   
#hb4    ,zittel1 #ef4   ,zllner1 #abh1  
#abi1 #aca1 #ach1 #aci4         99      
99       99       99       99   #ag     
,,the ,,theories ,,of ,,darwin1  ,,and  
,,their ,,relation ,,to  ,,philosophy1  
,,religion1 ,,and ,,morality4         99
       99       99       99       99    
,,introduction4  ,with the appearance of
 ,darwin's ,origin of ,species1 on the  
#bdth of ,november1 #ahei1 a new impulse
 began in the intellectual movement of  
our generation4 ,it is true1 the whole  
theory advocated and inaugurated by     
,darwin is1 in the first place1 only one
 of the many links in the long chain of 
phenomena in the realm of the           
intellectual development of our century1
 all of which have the same character1  

and give their stamp to the entire      
mental work of the last decades4 ,this  
stamp consists in the tendency of       
science1 which has nearly become        
universal1 not only to consider all     
phenomena1 both of the physical and the 
mental life1 in connection with their   
preceding conditions in space and time1 
but to trace them back more or less     
exclusively to these conditions1 and to 
explain them exclusively by means of the
 same4 ,what a ,wilhelm von ,humboldt1  
and1 still more1 a ,jacob ,grimm1       
prepared the way for in the realm of    
philology1 a ,lazar ,geiger and a       
,steinthal1 and 7under direct influence 
of ,darwin7 a ,schleicher and a ,wilhelm
 ,bleek further developed2 what ,julius 
,braun did in the realm of the history  
of art2 what a ,buckle and a ,sir #ah   
,john ,lubbock tried to do in the realm 
of the history of civilization2 what a  
,max ,mller did in the realm of the     
history of religion2 what the ,tbingen  
,school began and its disciples carried 

out in the realm of the exegesis of the 
,bible2 what a ,strauss and a ,renan1   
and in a certain sense also a ,keim1 did
 in the realm of christology2 what1     
finally--without being so closely       
connected with individual names--was    
also done in the realm of the world's   
history3 this1 ,darwin did in the realm 
of the history of the organic kingdoms1 
seconded by the geological principles of
 ,sir ,charles ,lyell and by the        
investigations in biology and           
comparative anatomy of a number of      
scientists4 ,from this point of view1   
the movement which was inaugurated by   
,darwin seems to us but the reflex of   
the universal spirit of the present time
 upon a particular realm2 namely1 that  
of natural science4 ,but since1 soon    
after the appearance of the             
before-mentioned work and long before   
the publication of ,darwin's ,descent of
 ,man1 man also was included in the     
consequences of the evolution theory1   
and his existence was explained as a    

wholly natural development out of lower 
animal forms2 since ,darwin himself     
unreservedly adopted this theory of the 
descent of man from the animal world as 
an entirely natural consequence of his  
doctrine of the origin of species1 the  
evolution question has gone far beyond  
the proportionately narrow and limited  
bounds of natural philosophy and of     
merely theoretical scientific           
interest--has surpassed in interest all 
the before-mentioned investigations1    
however lively this interest was and is 
to-day1 and has stirred up the minds of 
all most thoroughly1 not only in their  
scientific but also in their religious  
and ethical depths1 some in #ai         
acknowledgment and admiration1 others in
 aversion and repugnance1 and only a few
 in sober and unprejudiced judgment4    
,while some see in ,darwinism the       
flambeau which now lights mankind to    
entirely new paths of truth1 and also to
 spiritual and moral perfection1 others 
see in it only an unproved hypothesis1  

threatening to become the torch which   
might change the noblest and greatest   
acquirements of the culture of past     
centuries into a heap of ashes2 while   
some date from it a new period of       
culture1 others see in it a deep descent
 of the present from the scientific1    
religious1 and moral height which       
mankind has ascended4  ,under these     
circumstances1 it has become an         
impossibility for religion and the moral
 interest as guardians of the highest   
and most sacred acquisitions of mankind1
 and still more for theology and ethics 
as the scientific representations of    
religion and morality1 to remain idle   
spectators4 ,it would certainly be more 
agreeable to them1 and more profitable1 
if they could delay their judgment until
 the question became better cleared up4 
,for the whole question presented by    
,darwin has not yet passed beyond the   
stage of problems and attempts at       
solution2 and there is always something 
unsatisfactory in being compelled to    

deal with theories which in their       
fundamentals are still hypotheses4 ,but 
since all tendencies of the present     
which are hostile to ,christianity and  
to the theistic view of the world1 from 
the most extreme materialism up to the  
most sublime monism 7as pantheism and   
materialism of to-day have begun to call
 themselves71 seemingly with the        
confidence of complete victory1 take    
possession of ,darwinism as the solid   
ground from which they hope to destroy  
all and every belief #bj connected with 
faith in a living creator and master of 
the world1 it has also become impossible
 for those to whom the religious and    
ethical acquisitions of mankind are a   
sacred sanctuary to take any longer a   
reserved and expectant position4        
,silence now would be looked upon only  
as an inglorious retreat2 and thus      
nothing remains but openly to face the  
question3 ,what position must religion  
and morality take in reference to the   
,darwinian theories8  ,in order to treat

 of the question with that objectivity  
which it requires1 we have to begin with
 a synopsis of the theories themselves4 
,in this representation we have to      
discriminate strictly between the merely
 scientific theories and the            
naturo-philosophical and metaphysical   
supplements and conclusions which have  
been brought into connection with them4 
,for precisely in the mixing of the most
 different problems which are to be     
considered here1 lies the main cause of 
the confused and superficial judgment   
which is so often heard upon these      
questions4         99       99       99 
99       99 #ba   ,,part ,i4         99 
99       99       99       99  ,,the    
,,theories ,,of ,,darwin4         99    
99       99       99       99   #bc     
,,book ,i4  ,,the ,,purely ,,scientific 
,,theories4         99       99       99
       99       99  ,,the ,,scientific  
,,problem4  ,the interesting problem    
which underlies ,mr4 ,darwin's theories 
is the answer to the question3 ,how did 

the different species of organic beings 
on the earth originate8 ,we find        
ourselves in the midst of an endless    
variety of organic beings1 animals and  
plants2 we see ourselves1 so far as     
regards the entire physical part of our 
being1 in relationship with this organic
 world--especially with the organization
 and physical functions of the animal   
body4 ,the organic individuals come and 
go4 ,they originate by being begotten by
 and born of individuals of the same    
kind1 or they spring up through the     
formation of germs and buds2 and they   
produce in the same way new individuals1
 that resemble them in all essential    
characteristics4 ,like always begets    
like1 so far as our observations go4    
,but not only the individuals1 but even 
the species to which they belong1 must  
have originated at some definite period 
of time--and1 indeed1 as geology tells  
us1 not all at once1 but in a long      
series1 which stretched through         
immeasurable epochs of the earth's      

history4 ,thus we come face to face with
 the question1 already put1 which we can
 now formulate more #bd precisely3 ,how 
did the first individuals of each       
organic species come into existence8    
,no human being ever has observed1 nor  
ever could observe1 the origination of a
 new species1 because man1 as it seems1 
did not appear on the earth until all   
the other organisms were in existence4  
,for this reason1 the scientists for a  
long time thought it unprofitable to    
occupy themselves with this question2   
and even in our time a great many of    
them declare the question to be         
absolutely insolvable1 and every attempt
 at answering it to be an unjustifiable 
use of hypotheses4 ,but the impulse     
toward investigation admits of no       
limitation so long as there is any      
probability of extending its field of   
action4 ,especially in the province of  
nature1 so many things which could not  
be discovered by mere observation have  
been traced indirectly1 and so many     

important and established facts have    
been added to our stores of knowledge1  
by first starting from hypothetical     
premises1 that man has again and again  
endeavored to approximate an answer to  
the question of the origin of species by
 taking the indirect course of          
hypothesis and induction1 whenever the  
direct way of observation did not lead  
to any result4 ,religion of course gives
 a solution to the problem by stating   
that the species have been originated by
 the creative act of ,god4 ,it is wrong 
to say that this solution is opposed to 
the above-mentioned impulse toward      
investigation2 for this solution        
suffices for religion1 whether a natural
 progress in the origination of species 
be established or not4 ,for1 to the     
believer in religion1 the whole         
universe1 with all its objective        
phenomena and growth1 is the work of    
,god as well as the individuals of the  
already existing species2 and a #be     
closer acquaintance with the manner of  

their origin is not only no disturbance 
to his ground of belief1 but1 on the    
contrary1 an addition to his knowledge  
of the method of ,god's action4 ,in     
every man of sound mind1 the religious  
faith is not antagonistic or even       
indifferent to the scientific impulse   
toward investigation1 but stands upon a 
most intimate footing with it4 ,hence   
the human intellect again and again     
makes the attempt to find an answer to  
the problem of the origin of species in 
a scientific way1 and each endeavor of  
this kind necessarily ends with the     
dilemma that either the first           
individuals of a species1 no matter     
whether it be the highest or the lowest1
 have been evolved out of inorganic     
matter1 or they originated by descent   
from the most closely related species of
 their predecessors4 ,the denial of the 
first part of our dilemma1 and the      
affirmation of the second1 is the       
,theory of ,descent4  ,but this theory  
of descent leads us at once into another

 dilemma4 ,if the species originated by 
descent from the most closely related   
lower species1 and under certain        
circumstances also from species of the  
same rank1 and even by degeneration from
 the next higher1 it must have occurred 
in one of two ways3 either by           
leaps--called by naturalists            
metamorphosis of germs or heterogenetic 
conception--or by a succession of       
imperceptibly small alterations of the  
individuals from generation to          
generation4 ,each of these changes would
 have been no greater than the          
differences we observe to-day between   
the individuals of the very same        
species1 but became in the course of    
time so massed and strengthened in one  
direction that new species have been    
evolved4 ,this hypothesis is called the 
,theory of ,development1 #bf or         
,evolution4 ,we retain this name1       
although well aware of the fact that the
 authors do not agree in their use of   
the term evolution4 ,professor ,wigand1 

who adopts only the theory of a descent 
from one primordial cell to another1 and
 who positively rejects the idea of a   
progress from one fully developed       
species to another1 claims among other  
things that one value of his own theory 
is that he secures for the idea of      
evolution its full meaning4 ,the        
expression still has a meaning for those
 who reject the real descent of the     
species or their primordial germs one   
from another1 and acknowledge only the  
ideal bond of a common plan in their    
successive manifestations4 ,but as soon 
as we examine more closely the literal  
and logical meaning of the word1 we     
shall find it of most weight when we    
understand by it the before-mentioned   
gradual evolution in opposition to the  
theory of progress by leaps or new      
creations4 ,moreover1 it is well known  
that long before this no other term than
 evolution was used to designate the    
growth of a single organic individual   
from the primordial cell and egg to its 

fully developed form and vital function4
 ,besides1 we find ourselves also in    
harmony with most of the authors1 so far
 as they have distinct conceptions of   
the different scientific problems1 if we
 use the term theory of evolution for   
the gradual development of one species  
from another1 in opposition to the      
hypothesis of a metamorphosis of germs1 
or even of a genealogy of primordial    
cells4  ,but each evolution theory leads
 again to new theories1 as soon as it   
has to be proved in a scientific way4   
,for it can claim a scientific worth    
only when sustained by earnest attempts 
to find and prove the #bg productive    
power1 agencies and laws of such an     
evolution of species4 ,those attempts   
can be made in various ways4 ,as a      
philosophical question1 many attempts at
 solution have been made1 both in       
ancient and modern times2 but being     
mainly in the realm of metaphysics1 they
 do not come within the limits of our   
scientific essay4 ,as a question for    

investigators of natural phenomena1 only
 two attempts of sufficient importance  
to be mentioned have been made4 ,the    
first one was made by ,lamarck1 who1    
taking the really different ideas of    
descent and evolution as one1 made use  
of the hypothesis of transmutation2 thus
 becoming the pioneer of ,darwinism4    
,the other attempt was made by ,darwin  
in his theory of natural selection1 or  
struggle1 for existence1 and is called  
the ,theory of ,selection4  ,in defining
 our problem1 therefore1 we find        
ourselves under the influence of a      
scientific law of development4 ,the     
simple problem which we started from has
 developed into a trinity of problems   
and attempts at solution4 ,the simple   
question of the origin of species led us
 into the dilemma of a generatio        
quivoca1 or a descent2 the hypothesis of
 a descent led to the dilemma of a      
heterogenetic conception1 or an         
evolution2 and the hypothesis of an     
evolution rendered necessary the attempt

 at explaining this evolution1 and      
showed ,darwin's method of explaining it
 by his selection theory4 ,it will be   
well for the reader to keep distinctly  
in mind the difference between these    
problems and theories1 in following our 
investigations1 even if we cannot       
arrange our historical sketch according 
to the natural principle of division    
arising from these differences4  ,for it
 lies in the nature of the question     
itself1 that #bh these theories1 in     
their historical progress1 did not      
appear singly1 but together4 ,those who 
inclined to the theory of a descent of  
species could claim for it the attention
 of scientific investigators only after 
having also made the attempt at         
conceiving this descent in a concrete   
way1 and according to certain analogies 
of observation4 ,the only analogy of the
 kind appeared in the sphere of         
individual development and individual   
differences on the one hand1 and in that
 of closely related characters of allied

 species on the other2 and thus led of  
itself to the evolution theory4 ,as soon
 as the naturalists thought they had    
found the causes of such an evolution of
 the species1 they naturally placed     
these causes in the foreground of their 
demonstrations1 and erected upon them   
the structure of their entire theory2   
thus treating descent1 evolution and    
selection as one single and indissolubly
 connected theory4 ,but this manner of  
treating the question had also its      
dangers1 which have already caused a    
great deal of confusion and             
misunderstanding1 as well as much       
unprofitable controversy4 ,often friends
 and enemies of the theories placed that
 which was in favor of the theory of    
descent to the credit of the evolution  
or selection theory2 and1 on the other  
hand1 that which seemed opposed to the  
selection theory was often held to be a 
weakening of the evolution and descent  
theory2 and this was done1 not only by  
amateurs1 but often enough by the       

highest authorities also4 ,in reality1  
however1 it is quite conceivable that   
the idea of a descent may prove correct1
 and possibly the idea of an evolution  
of the species will have to be replaced 
by that of a heterogenetic generation1  
or by the theory that certain groups in 
the organic system are originated #bi by
 heterogenetic generation1 and others by
 evolution2 and so the evolution theory 
must share with the theory of           
heterogenetic generation1 or of a       
metamorphosis of germs4 ,on the other   
hand1 it is conceivable that even where 
the evolution theory is confirmed1 the  
evolution can be accounted for wholly or
 partly by other reasons than those     
derived from the selection theory4 ,and 
even this result of present             
investigations is not inconceivable3    
that the reasons for and against the    
different theories will be found to     
balance one another to such a degree    
that they will sooner or later lead     
science1 in answering the question of   

the origin of species1 to the old       
confession of ,socrates--,ignoramus4    
,we shall1 therefore1 have to arrange   
our historical sketch according to the  
historical order of the appearance of   
the theories1 and treat the problems    
more or less as an undivided whole4 ,but
 we shall keep in mind1 during our      
historical sketch1 not only the logical 
separation of the problems in question1 
in order not to lose clearness of       
judgment1 but we shall also at the end  
of our review1 if we consider the       
present condition of the problems1 have 
to examine the same once more in detail1
 so far as regards the above mentioned  
separation4         99       99       99
       99       99   #cj  ,,chapter ,i4 
,,rise ,,of ,,the ,,darwinian           
,,theories4   #a4 ,direct               
,predecessors4--,lamarck4  ,the first   
man who gave direct expression to the   
idea of a successive generation of the  
species through transmutation1 and who  
attempted to follow it up in a          

scientific way1 was the ,french         
naturalist and philosopher1 ,jean       
,lamarck1 born #agdd4 ,in the year      
#ahja1 and subsequently1 he published   
his views1 first in smaller essays and  
afterward more in detail in his         
,philosophie ,zoologique1 which appeared
 in #ahji1 and in the first volume of   
his ,histoire ,naturelle des ,animaux   
sans ,vertbres1 published in #ahae4 ,in 
these works ,lamarck upholds fully the  
descent and evolution theory1 and       
maintains that the simplest organisms   
are generated through a generatio       
spontanea1 which is still taking place2 
but that all the more developed         
organisms1 including man1 are descended 
through a gradual change from other     
species4 ,with this theory1 he put      
himself in direct and conscious         
opposition to the old doctrine of the   
immutability of species and their       
characteristics1 which had been ably    
maintained by ,linnus1 and also made    
some attempts at explanation which      

approach very nearly the selection      
theory4 ,a change in the physical       
conditions of life1 especially the force
 of habit in the use or disuse of the   
organs1 the inheritance of physical and 
psychical #ca qualities thus attained1  
and the extension of the process of     
transmutation into extraordinarily long 
periods of time with very slight        
changes1 are also1 in his view1 the     
probable causes of the variation and    
development of the species4 ,he only    
lacks the idea of a natural selection in
 the struggle for existence1 and the    
comparison of the processes in nature   
with the methodical selection of man in 
the breeding of domestic animals and    
plants1 to identify his views with those
 of ,darwin4  ,at first1 ,lamarck met   
only with violent opposition2 but after 
a little while his views ceased to      
attract attention4 ,the time had not yet
 come to make such an attempt at        
observing nature from the standpoint of 
evolution4 ,the sciences which favor    

such a mode of observation1 and even    
demand it--such as comparative anatomy  
and physiology and the history of the   
development of the different plants and 
animals--were only in their infancy1 or 
were--like palontology and the          
comparative geography of plants and     
animals--not yet in existence4 ,the     
influence of ,linnus1 whose views       
diametrically opposed those of ,lamarck1
 predominated over all the              
investigations of natural science2      
,buffon1 who favored the ideas of       
,lamarck1 and loved to trace a unity in 
natural phenomena1 was too instable in  
his investigations and views to arrive  
at a comprehensive principle2 and even  
the eminent naturalist1 ,cuvier1 of     
,montpellier1 showed in his observation 
of nature a predilection for analysis   
rather than synthesis1 and although his 
comprehensive mind inclined to          
generalize and explain1 he placed       
himself in decided opposition to a      
theory which was founded only on a few  

decisive facts4  ,this last mentioned   
deficiency seems to have been #cb the   
main cause of ,lamarck's views soon     
being lost sight of4 ,they nowhere found
 a support in facts2 the force of habit 
played in them an exaggerated and       
unnatural rle2 the different            
illustrations of them--such as the long 
neck of the giraffe explained by the    
permanent and inherited habit of        
browsing on the branches of high trees1 
or the web on the toes of frogs1        
swimming-birds1 etc41 explained by the  
habit of swimming--were talked about and
 laughed at more as curiosities than as 
worthy of serious consideration4  ,only 
twice after this did the question put by
 ,lamarck attract wider attention from  
the learned world4 ,the first time was  
when1 in #ahcj1 the bitter contest arose
 at the ,academy of ,paris1 between     
,cuvier and ,etienne ,geoffrey ,st4     
,hilaire1 the father of ,isidor ,g4 ,st4
 ,hilaire4 ,geoffrey ,st4 ,hilaire had  
views similar to ,lamarck's1 but reached

 them from quite a different            
standpoint--from the observation of the 
analogy and homology of the organs2 and 
accounted for the variation of species1 
not by the use or disuse of the organs1 
but on the one hand by the common       
original type of the organs1 and on the 
other by the varied influence of the    
surroundings--the monde ambiant4        
,lamarck himself seems not to have been 
mentioned in this contest4 ,the         
controversy turned much more on the     
question whether in observing nature we 
can proceed by synthesis and find in the
 analogies of the organisms the         
principles for explaining the real      
connection between the different organic
 forms1 or whether the analytical       
process is the only correct one1 and the
 synthetical should be discarded4 ,the  
solution of it will probably be1 that   
the one process must be supplemented by 
the #cc other1 as ,goethe has already   
shown in his account of this            
controversy2 but at that time it was    

decided in favor of the analytical      
principle1 and the question was for the 
time dropped4 ,it came up for a second  
time1 but created little excitement1 in 
#ahdd1 when an anonymous work1 ,vestiges
 of the ,natural ,history of ,creation1 
directed the attention and the interest 
of scientists again to ,lamarck and his 
doctrine4 ,but this interest also soon  
came to an end1 until through ,darwin's 
first publication the half-forgotten man
 again suddenly attained great honor4   
,those who wish to form a closer        
acquaintance with the different         
advocates of the evolution theory before
 ,darwin's appearance1 will find them   
carefully arranged in the historical    
sketch which ,darwin gives in the       
introduction to his work on ,the ,origin
 of ,species2 and the most important    
extracts of ,lamarck's ,philosophie     
,zoologique are to be found in ,oscar   
,schmidt's ,descent and ,darwinism4#a   
#b4 ,indirect ,preparations4  ,while    
thus the ideas of ,lamarck gradually    

fell into partial oblivion1 yet         
contemporaneous with and following them 
arose several other series of thoughts1 
views1 and investigations1 which1       
although they only indirectly prepared  
for the revival of the evolution theory1
 yet exercised a deeper and more lasting
 influence on the minds of scientists4  
,we refer to the ideas in regard to     
natural phenomena held during the first 
decades of our century2 further1 to the 
principles of comparative anatomy which1
 up to the present time1 partly         
dependent #cd and partly independent of 
natural philosophy1 have been expressed1
 valued1 and admired as leading         
thoughts2 and1 lastly1 to the empiric   
results of comparative anatomical and   
biological investigations in palontology
 and geology1 as attained by the help of
 those very principles4 ,and even       
physics and astronomy had to coperate in
 preparing the way for the idea of      
evolution4  ,the philosophical ideas    
referred to1 together with the points of

 view and results of comparative        
anatomy1 led more and more decisively to
 the idea of an original form1 or type1 
which retains its identity in all the   
modifications of form in plants and     
animals2 and of a ground-plan1 which is 
realized in the systems of the plant and
 animal world in higher and higher      
differentiations and in more and more   
developed modifications1 diverging      
farther and farther from the prototype  
until it reaches its highest form1 still
 reducible to the prototypes1 in the    
most highly organized dicotyledons in   
plants1 and in the animal world in the  
mammalia1 and lastly in man4  ,men like 
,cuvier and ,geoffrey ,st4 ,hilaire1 who
 otherwise stand diametrically opposed  
to each other1 unite in these and       
kindred ideas4 ,the naturalist ,oken    
attains the same result1 tinged with the
 views of ,schelling2 the poet ,goethe1 
from an intuitive knowledge of nature1  
arrived at the same conclusion4 ,the    
former1 during a journey in the ,hartz  

,mountains1 at the sight of a bleached  
deer's skull1 and the latter1 upon      
picking up a sheep's skull in the       
,jewish cemetery at ,venice1 were struck
 by the same thought3 the skull is only 
a modified vertebra4 ,oken founded upon 
this idea and kindred analogies his     
profound philosophy of the system of    
animals and plants which comes very near
 to the evolution #ce theory1 and in his
 cosmogony traces all organisms to a    
protoplasm in such a way as to bring him
 in this respect also very near to      
,darwinism4 ,goethe1 in his             
metamorphosis of plants1 develops ideas 
in which1 in all seriousness1 he makes a
 concrete application of his thought of 
a prototype to the leaf of a plant2 and 
proved for zology the fruitfulness of   
his idea of a type by his well known    
discovery of the mid-jaw bone in man4   
,although ,oscar ,schmidt seems to be   
decidedly right in supposing1 in        
opposition to ,ernst ,hckel1 that       
,goethe did not intend to have his idea 

of unity and development taken in a real
 but in an ideal sense1 and hence could 
not be called a direct representative of
 the evolution theory1 still he is all  
the more decidedly a predecessor of that
 theory in directing attention to the   
unity in plan and metamorphosis of      
plants and animals4 ,louis ,agassiz1    
who1 on the other hand1 continued up to 
his death in opposition to the entire   
doctrine of descent1 made the idea of   
types the principle of his whole        
classification1 and said3 ,man is the   
purpose toward which the whole animal   
creation tends from the first appearance
 of the first paleozoic fish4 ,richard  
,owen1 who rejected the selection theory
 and favored that of descent1 published1
 long before ,darwin's appearance1 some 
most interesting results of his         
anatomical and palontological           
investigations from the point of view of
 the prototype and its modifications4   
,man1 from the beginning of organisms1  
was ideally present upon the earth1 is a

 sentence which we quote from ,owen's   
works4  ,in short1 this ideal momentum  
in the observation of the organic       
kingdoms is not only the most beautiful 
blossom and the ripest fruit of the     
union between #cf laborious and         
comprehensive detailed investigations   
and a generalizing philosophic          
penetration1 but it was also a very     
efficient preparation of the mind for   
the evolution problem1 so far as the    
summing up of the organisms under a type
 and plan is only the ideal reverse of  
its realistic reduction to a common     
pedigree4  ,we have yet to add the      
investigations in regard to the history 
of evolution of the single organisms1 as
 well as those in comparative anatomy1  
which in former centuries were begun by 
scientists like ,swammerdam and         
,boerhave and carried more nearly to    
completion by ,k4 ,e4 von ,baer1 ,carus1
 and others4 ,in reducing all the       
tissues of plants and animals to one    
cell1 and tracing back also their       

individual developments to the first    
differentiation of the simplest cell1   
they followed out the unity of the plan 
of the organic kingdoms--which hitherto 
had been maintained only ideally and    
proclaimed as a philosophic             
postulate--farther and deeper into the  
sphere of empiric reality4 ,we must     
mention1 moreover1 the great            
palontological discoveries which1 from  
the first foraminifera of the ,cambrian 
formations up to the historical period  
of man1 showed a great progressive scale
 in the appearance of the organisms and 
a very wide relationship between this   
scale and the natural systems of botany 
and zology2 and1 finally1 the principles
 of geology1 which1 under the leadership
 of ,sir ,charles ,lyell1 starting from 
the idea of an identity of the powers   
which were active in former times with  
those of the present1 attempted to      
explain the most violent of the changes 
in the earth's crust in former times by 
causes active to-day4 ,this often       

explains prodigious effects--such as the
 elevation and settling of entire       
mountains #cg and continents--by the    
constant and related action of the      
slightest causes and most gradual steps2
 it opens the perspective into vast     
epochs of long and numerous geological  
periods2 and sometimes1 where scientists
 like ,cuvier and ,agassiz have supposed
 the most complete cataclysms and the   
most universal revolutions of the globe1
 there prove to have been only gradual  
changes with revolutions very partially 
and locally limited4  ,finally1 if we   
take into consideration the grand       
discoveries which strikingly illustrate 
the connection in extent and quality    
between the universe and all its        
agencies and powers--such as ,robert von
 ,mayer's discovery of the conservation 
of force and of the mechanical          
equivalent of heat1 or the spectrum     
analysis and the information which it   
gives us by ever-increasing evidences of
 the identity of the cosmic and telluric

 substances--we may venture to say that 
the scientific and intellectual ground  
was well prepared for a theory which    
takes the origin of organisms into this 
common relationship of the essential    
unity and development of the universe4  
,only one thing more remained to        
complete the hypothesis offered by      
,lamarck1 of the fact of a development  
of species by a new and more            
satisfactory answer to the question as  
to the manner of their development4 ,the
 task of answering in a more            
comprehensive and scientific way the    
question as to the manner of development
 has been undertaken by ,darwin in his  
selection theory4 ,alfred ,russell      
,wallace1 who arrived at the same       
results contemporaneously with and      
independently of ,darwin1 has1 with     
praiseworthy modesty1 renounced his     
claim to priority of the discovery1 as  
,darwin had been longer engaged in      
working out his theories and had begun  
to collect materials for proof4         

99       99       99       99       99  
#ch   ,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,history ,,of   
,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories4   #a4     
,darwin4  ,in order to explain the      
development of higher species from lower
 ones in a natural way1 ,darwin starts  
from two facts4 ,the first fact is1 that
 all individuals of the same species    
show1 besides their specific similarity1
 individual differences3 a fact which we
 call the law of individual variability4
 ,the other fact is1 that each          
individual inclines to transmit to his  
offspring all his qualities--not only   
the characteristics of the species1 but 
also those of the individual3 a fact    
which we call the law of heredity4  ,to 
show how the whole basis of explanation 
of the evolution of one species from    
another is given in these two facts1    
,darwin calls attention to the rules    
according to which the often            
extraordinarily great varieties of      
domestic animals and cultivated plants  
are obtained and preserved2 namely1 the 

rules of artificial breeding4 ,the      
breeder simply selects from a species   
those individuals having such individual
 qualities as he wishes to preserve and 
to increase1 and refrains from breeding 
those individuals which do not possess  
the characteristics he wants or which   
possess them only in a small degree4 ,he
 continues the same process with the    
next generation2 and by the constant and
 effectual agency of the two #ci        
before-mentioned laws1 he will1 after   
the lapse of a few generations1 have    
breeded a variety in which the          
characteristics originally belonging    
only to a single individual have become 
common and permanent4  ,it is now       
important to consider whether nature1 in
 natural selection 7whence the name     
,selection ,theory7 does not act        
unconsciously according to the same     
rules1 and attain the same results1 as  
man with his artificial and intentional 
selection2 and1 furthermore1 whether she
 does not reach results which1 according

 to that principle of natural selection1
 finally explain the origin of all1 even
 of the highest and most complicated    
organisms1 from one single original form
 or a few original and simplest forms4  
,darwin finds these questions answered  
in the affirmative2 and arrives at this 
answer through the following            
conclusions4  ,the ,english political   
economist ,malthus 7#agff-ahcd71 in his 
,essay on the ,principles of            
,population1 established a law in regard
 to the growth of the human race1 which 
may be applied just as well to all the  
species of the entire organic world3    
that population tends to increase in a  
geometrical ratio1 although the         
conditions of life for the individual   
remain the same or at most increase in  
an arithmetical ratio4 ,the consequence 
is that if the species is to be         
preserved and the individuals of future 
generations are to continue to find     
sufficient food and other means for     
sustaining life1 a great many           

individuals of each generation must     
perish very early1 and even as germ and 
seed1 and only a minority will be       
preserved and reproduced4 ,this         
exuberant prodigality of life-germs1 of 
which proportionately only a few are    
preserved and reproduced1 takes place in
 the plant and #dj animal world in a    
very marked degree4 ,there a continual  
struggle for existence prevails2 each   
individual has to get access to his     
conditions of life by wresting them from
 a whole series of other individuals of 
his own or other species2 and now the   
question arises3 which individuals will 
survive in this struggle8 which will    
more probably be preserved and procreate
 offspring8 ,evidently1 the answer is1  
those individuals which possess         
individual characteristics more         
favorable to the preservation of the    
individual than those possessed by other
 individuals4 ,these individual         
characteristics are transmitted to the  
next generation4 ,in this there will be 

again individuals that have in a still  
higher degree the characteristics thus  
transmitted and favorable for the       
preservation of the individual1 or that 
add to these favorable characteristics  
new characteristics favorable in another
 direction to the survival of the       
individual in the struggle for          
existence4 ,while these individuals1    
with more probability than the others1  
are thus preserved and reproduced1 they 
transmit to their offspring not only the
 old favorable characteristics          
increased1 but also those newly added4  
,among the favorable individual         
qualities1 ,darwin reckons the          
divergence of character1 the perfection 
of organization1 and the law of         
correlation2 the latter1 however1 can   
not be explained by natural selection1  
since according to this law a variation 
in an organ brings about a corresponding
 variation in entirely different organs 
7e4g41 cats with white fur and blue eyes
 are also deaf74  ,this is natural      

selection by means of the survival of   
the fittest in the struggle for         
existence4 ,changes in the conditions   
and surroundings of life1 and more or   
less #da perfect adaptation of the      
organisms to the new conditions of form1
 color1 food and habit1 are the main    
causes of those individual variations1  
the accumulation of which through many  
generations produces so great effects4  
,if we only have behind us periods long 
enough to permit us to imagine each step
 in the development as an extremely     
small and hardly appreciable one1       
natural selection offers us not the     
exclusive but the main means of         
explaining the evolution of the whole   
animal and plant world out of one or a  
few simple organized original forms4    
,this is the outline of the selection   
theory1 as given by ,darwin in #ahei1   
and still retained in all its           
essentials4 ,it is true1 in his work on 
the origin of man he added as           
supplemental the sexual to the common   

natural selection1 and made it of       
special importance for the presentation 
of the beautiful in nature--for the     
production of beautiful forms1 colors1  
and tones1 and for the development of   
power and intelligence4 ,and in the same
 work he said that there are many       
circumstances of structure which seem to
 be neither beneficial nor detrimental  
to the individual1 and that to have     
overlooked this fact was one of his     
greatest mistakes in his former         
publications4 ,but for the rest1 he     
maintains the selection theory          
unchanged1 with the single modification 
that it explains1 if not the whole      
development of the species through      
descent1 at least that which is of most 
importance in it4  ,that it was only one
 step in the course of reasoning to     
extend the selection theory to the      
descent of man1 was seen by many as soon
 as ,darwin's work on the origin of     
species was published and began to      
attract #db attention2 although not a   

syllable upon this question was         
presented in this work4 ,various persons
 manifested their presentiment or       
perception according to their point of  
view--partly by the most violent        
opposition to the new doctrine1 partly  
by scientific development or            
modification of their anthropogonic     
views1 partly also by revelling in      
imagination in the consequences hostile 
to religious faith which they thought   
could be drawn from this doctrine4 ,we  
remind the reader of the itinerant      
lectures of ,karl ,vogt about the       
ape-pedigree of man1 and of the echo    
they found by assent or dissent in press
 and public2 also of ,huxley in         
,england1 ,karl ,snell1 ,schleiden1     
,reichenbach1 and others2 of the        
materialists1 ,l4 ,bchuer and           
,moleschott1 and of the publications of 
,ernst ,hckel4 ,finally1 ,darwin himself
 made us fully certain of the importance
 which from the beginning he had        
attributed to his theory1 by publishing 

his work on the ,descent of ,man1 in the
 year #ahgj4  ,in this work he explained
 the descent of man fully from the      
before-named principles of the descent1 
evolution1 and selection theories1 of   
which we have given all the essentials  
in the foregoing presentation4 ,he      
carefully enumerates everything in the  
structure of the human body that reminds
 us of our relationship with the        
animals--especially those embryonic     
phenomena and rudimentary organs in man 
which are still to be found in use and  
in a more developed state in different  
animal species1 and which led him to    
imagine our ancestors now with a tail1  
then with sharp ears1 now living in the 
water1 then being hermaphrodites4 ,he   
reviews the spiritual qualities of man1 
and finds for them all analogous        
qualities in the animal world4 ,he finds
 in his work on #dc ,expression of the  
,emotions in ,man and ,animals1         
published in #ahgb1 new confirmation of 
the genealogical relationship of both4  

,he looks over the whole course of the  
zological system and of palontological  
discoveries1 and searches for the points
 where the branches and twigs of the    
animal pedigree of man must have        
diverged4 ,to begin with the lowest     
branches1 he thinks the most important  
divergence took place where the series  
of vertebrates may have been developed  
out of the invertebrates4 ,here he      
adopts the investigations of ,a4        
,kowalewsky1 and the deductions of      
,hckel founded upon them1 concerning the
 larva of the ascidi1 a genus of marine 
mollusca of the order tunicata1 and sees
 in a cord1 to be found in this larva1  
most decided relationship to the spine  
of the lancelet fish or amphioxus1 the  
lowest of all the vertebrates1 it being 
yet doubtful whether it belongs at all  
to the vertebrates4 ,in the transition  
that once took place from one species of
 ascidian larva to a form similar to the
 lancelet fish1 he sees the new branch  
diverging in the series of vertebrates4 

,out of the fish he concludes that the  
amphibia were developed1 and out of     
those the reptilia1 out of one of them  
the marsupialia1 and from them the      
lemurs or half-apes1 the representatives
 of which yet live in ,madagascar and   
the southern part of ,asia4 ,from these 
there branched off on the one side the  
platyrrhini1 or apes with a flat nose1  
on the new continent2 on the other1 the 
catarrhini1 or apes with a narrow nose1 
on the old4 ,among the ancestor of the  
last1 he searches for the common        
progenitors1 from which again two       
branches started--on the one hand the   
ignoble branches of the catarrhine      
species of apes1 always remaining lower 
in #dd development1 to which also belong
 the anthropomorphous apes1 like the    
orang outang and gibbon in ,asia1 the   
gorilla and chimpanzee in ,africa2 on   
the other hand1 that branch which       
represents the ascent of animals to man4
  ,the refining agencies which finally  
raise the animal up to the man are      

essentially the same that on the lowest 
scales of the pedigree have caused the  
development of the lower organisms into 
the higher1 namely3 favorable individual
 variations1 inheritance1               
acclimatization1 survival of the fittest
 in the struggle for existence1 natural1
 and especially1 sexual selection4      
,these are1 if not the exclusive1 still 
the main agencies which finally led the 
primate of the earthly creation upon the
 stage and furnished him with his       
superior faculties4 ,but it is          
particularly by means of his social     
life1 and of the forces which determine1
 transmit1 increase and ennoble the     
various impulses and instincts promoting
 it1 that man has become what he is4    
,through the need and faculty of        
reciprocal help1 through sexual         
selection--which of course is a very    
essential factor of social life--there  
originated language1 and reflection1 and
 all the intellectual qualities2 and    
through these again originated the moral

 qualities1 which are most important in 
constituting the specific worth of man1 
and which were finally developed into   
self-consciousness and free moral       
responsibility4  ,but with the          
description of this attempt to explain  
more in detail these specific           
characteristics of man1 we leave the    
ground of pure natural science and enter
 the region of philosophy1 in which we  
have to take up the #de question again  
7in ,book ,,ii1 ,ch4 ,i7 at the same    
point where we here leave it4   #b4 ,the
 ,followers of ,darwin4--,ernst ,hckel4 
,darwin's theory soon found an          
enthusiastic corps of followers--on the 
continent1 and especially in ,germany1  
almost more than in his own country4    
,the outlook into an entirely new       
explanation of the origin of man1 and   
the probable use of this theory for     
attacks upon faith in a ,creator and    
,master of the world1 called wide-spread
 attention to it2 and the theory opened 
to natural science itself entirely new  

impulses and paths1 and promised the    
solution of many problems before which  
it had hitherto been compelled to stand 
in silence4 ,to be sure1 it threatened  
likewise to allure the mind from the    
slow but sure ways of solid study to the
 entertaining but insecure and aimless  
paths of imagination and hypothesis4    
,among all the ,german followers of     
,darwin who adopted not only the idea of
 an origin of species through descent   
and evolution1 but also the explanation 
of evolution by natural selection1 and  
extended it so as to make the principle 
of selection of exclusive value1 ,ernst 
,hckel occupies the most prominent rank4
  ,in his ,general ,morphology1         
published in #ahff1 and in his ,natural 
,history of the ,creation1 the first    
edition of which appeared in #ahfh1 and 
finally in his ,anthropogeny#b 7why he  
does not say ,anthropogony1 we are      
nowhere informed71 #ahgd1 this scientist
 brought the new theory1 which had been 
presented by ,darwin in an almost       

bewildering flood of details1 into      
connection and order1 and1 analyzing the
 powers active in natural selection1    
combined them into an entire system of  
laws4 ,he #df at once drew the origin of
 man also into the course of reasoning  
on the new theory1 and sustained the    
theory by the discovery of the monera   
and other low organisms of one cell1 as 
well as by special investigations of the
 calcareous sponges4 ,for these labors1 
he was rewarded by the warm and         
unreserved acknowledgment which ,darwin 
made to him in his work upon the origin 
of man1 which was published subsequently
 to the ,natural ,history of the        
,creation4 ,there ,darwin says3 ,if this
 work had appeared before my essay had  
been written1 ,i should probably never  
have completed it4 ,almost all the      
conclusions at which ,i have arrived1 ,i
 find confirmed by this naturalist1     
whose knowledge on many points is much  
fuller than mine4 ,hckel's labors       
rendered still greater service to the   

,darwinian theory by dividing the       
organic world into three kingdoms3 the  
protista kingdom1 the vegetable kingdom1
 and the animal kingdom1--a division    
which solves in a most simple way the   
difficulty that was felt more and more  
of securing for the lowest organisms a  
place among the animals or plants4 ,he  
further aided the theory by leaving the 
choice open to adopt either a uniform or
 multiform pedigree of the organisms and
 their kingdoms and classes1 and by     
treating each class under both points of
 view2 and finally1 by fascinating      
experiments to bring before us in detail
 the hypothetical pedigrees of all      
classes of organisms from the protista  
kingdom up to man4  ,we will try to     
reproduce briefly the pedigree which is 
of most interest--the hypothetical      
pedigree of man4 ,hckel divides it into 
twenty-two stages1 eight of them        
belonging to the series of the          
invertebrates1 and fourteen to that of  
the vertebrates4 ,on this ladder of #dg 

twenty-two rounds1 he leads us from the 
lowest form of the living being1 in     
slight and mostly plausible transitions1
 continually higher and higher1 up to   
man2 and makes our steps easy by        
mentioning at each stage1 on the one    
hand the corresponding state in the     
embryonic development1 on the other the 
still living creature through which1 in 
his opinion1 the former organisms of the
 corresponding round of the ladder are  
still represented1 and which accordingly
 has been a creature that remained on   
its round1 while other members of its   
family have been developed up to man and
 to many other genera and species4  ,he 
begins with the monera1 the organisms of
 the lowest form1 discovered by himself1
 which have not so much as the organic  
rank of a cell1 but are only corpuscules
 of mucus1 without kernel or external   
covering1 called by him cytod1 and      
arising from an organic carbon          
formation4 ,the lowest and most formless
 moneron is the bathybius1 discovered by

 ,thomas ,huxley1 a network of          
recticular mucus1 which in the greatest 
depths of the sea1 as far down as #g1jjj
 metres1 covers stone fragments and     
other objects1 but are also found in    
less depths1 in the ,mediterranean ,sea1
 for instance4 ,from the moneron he     
proceeds to the amoeba--a simple cell1  
with a kernel1 which still corresponds  
to the egg of man in its first state4   
,the third stage is formed by the       
communities of amoeb 7synamoeb71        
corresponding to the mulberry-yolk in   
the first development of the fecundated 
egg1 and to some still living heaps of  
amoeb4 ,to the fourth stage he assigns  
the plana1 corresponding to the         
embryonic development of an albumen and 
the planula or ciliated #dh larva4 ,when
 these ciliated larv are developed1 they
 contract themselves so as to form a    
cavity2 and this fifth stage--especially
 important for his theory--he calls     
gastra4 ,in this form1 he says1 the     
progaster is already developed1 and its 

wall is differentiated for the first    
time into an animal or dermal layer     
7ectoblast71 and into a vegetative or   
intestinal layer 7hypoblast74 ,at the   
sixth stage1 there branched off the     
prothelmis1 or worms1 with the first    
formations of a nervous system1 the     
simplest organs of sense1 the simplest  
organs for secretion 7kidneys7 and      
generation 7sexual organs71 represented 
to-day by the gliding worms or          
turbellaria2 as the seventh stage1 the  
soft worms1 as he called them at        
first--the blood worms1 or coelomati1 as
 he describes them in his               
,anthropogeny--a purely hypothetical    
stage1 on which a true body-cavity and  
blood were formed2 the eighth stage are 
the chorda-animals with the beginning of
 a spinal rod1 corresponding to the     
larva of the ascidi4 ,at the ninth      
stage1 called the skull-less animals    
7acrania71 and corresponding to the     
still living lancelet1 we enter the     
series of the vertebrates4 ,the         

importance of the eighth and ninth      
stages for the theory1 we have already  
pointed out in our remarks upon ,darwin1
 p4 #dc4 ,the tenth stage is formed by  
those low fishes in which the spinal rod
 is differentiated into the skull--and  
the vertebral-column1 called the        
single-nostriled animals 7monorrhini71  
and represented by the cyclostoma of    
today 7hag and lampreys74 ,the eleventh 
stage is formed by the primval fish or  
selachii 7sharks72 the twelfth by the   
mud fish1 of which there still live the 
protopterus in ,africa1 the lepidosiren 
in the tributaries of the ,amazon1 and  
the ceratodus in the swamps of ,southern
 #di ,australia4 ,on the thirteenth     
stage1 there are the gilled amphibians  
7sozobranchia71 proteus and axolotl2 on 
the fourteenth1 the tailed amphibians   
7sozura71 newt and salamander2 on the   
fifteenth1 the purely hypothetical      
primval amniota or protamnia 7amnion is 
the name given to the chorion which     
surrounds the germ-water and embryo of  

the three higher classes of vertebrates7
 on the sixteenth1 the primary mammals  
7promammalia71 to which the present     
monotremes 7ornithorhynchus and echidna7
 stand nearest2 on the seventeenth1 the 
pouched animals or marsupialia2 on the  
eighteenth1 the semi-apes or prosimi    
7loris and maki72 on the nineteenth1 the
 tailed apes1 or menocerca 7nose-apes   
and slender-apes1 or semnopithecus72 on 
the twentieth1 the man-like apes        
7anthropoides7 or tail-less catarrhini  
7gorilla1 chimpanzee1 orang outang and  
gibbon74 ,and now we come to            
twenty-one--ape-like men or speechless  
primval men 7alali7--of whom we are     
reminded to-day by the deaf1 and dumb1  
the cretins and the microcephali2 and   
number twenty-two is homo sapiens1 the  
man4 ,the ,australians and the ,papuans 
are supposed to be the only remaining   
representatives of his first            
stage-development4 ,in like manner1     
,hckel also gives us the stem-branches  
of all the types1 classes and orders of 

the organisms1 and forms from them a    
very acceptable hypothetical pedigree2  
or--if we prefer to suppose a           
polyphyletic rather than a monophyletic 
origin of species--hypothetical         
pedigrees of the whole organic world4   
,the perspicuity and clearness of       
,hckel's deductions1 the extent of his  
knowledge1 and the singleness of his    
aim1 to which he makes them all         
subservient1 lend #ej to his works a    
great charm4 ,but on the other hand we  
dare not conceal that1 even on the      
ground of explanations belonging purely 
to natural history1 the character of    
hypothesis is often lost in that of     
arbitrariness and of the undemonstrable4
 ,even the unlearned in natural science 
often enough get this impression when   
reading his works1 and will find it     
confirmed by scientists who not only    
contradict his assertions in many cases1
 but disclose plain errors in his       
drawings--errors1 indeed1 exclusively in
 favor of the unity-hypothesis2 and in  

other cases they show that drawings     
which are given as pictures of the real1
 represent merely hypothetical opinions4
 ,there is especially evident in his    
works an extremely strong tendency to   
impress on his hypotheses the character 
of an established and proved fact1 by   
giving them the alluring name of laws4  
,entire systems of laws of the selection
 theory are produced1 and all imaginable
 assertions are also immediately called 
laws4 ,for example1 ,huxley1 in his     
anatomical investigations of apes and   
men1 arrives at the conclusion that the 
differences between the highest and the 
lowest apes are greater than the        
differences between the highest apes and
 man4 ,this purely anatomical           
comparison1 ,hckel calls repeatedly     
,huxley's ,law4 ,we are well aware that 
the idea of law is capable of great     
extension in meaning1 and in that       
respect we can refer to nothing more    
instructive than the well-meditated     
inquiry upon this idea in the ,reign of 

,law of the ,duke of ,argyll 7,london1  
,strahan  ,co474 ,but if we may venture 
to call purely anatomical comparisons of
 this nature laws1 such a use of        
language destroys all logical reasoning2
 and this mistake appears again in      
,hckel's philosophic #ea discussions1 of
 which we shall have to speak hereafter4
 ,we shall have to refer also hereafter 
to an additional embellishment1 which   
,hckel thinks himself obliged to give to
 his works--namely1 that he makes on    
every occasion the strongest attacks    
upon faith in a personal ,god1 a        
,creator and ,lord of the world2 that he
 traces all the motives of human action 
to self-interest2 that he denies the    
liberty of man and the moral system of  
the world2 that he makes consent to his 
view of things the criterion of the     
intellectual development of a man2 and  
that he thinks to render a service to   
civilization by such a view of the world
 and of ethics4  ,in the consequent     
carrying out of the selection principle 

as the satisfactory key in explaining   
the origin of all species and also of   
man1 ,hckel is indeed1 in spite of the  
approval of his works by the ,british   
master1 more ,darwinian than ,darwin    
himself1 who expressly refuses to give  
exclusive value to this theory of       
explanation4 ,hence there are among     
scientists only a few who go with him to
 this extent4 ,in ,germany1 aside from  
the materialists1 we only know of       
,seidlitz and ,oskar ,schmidt--who in   
the thirteenth volume of the            
,international ,scientific ,series      
treats of ,the ,theory of ,descent and  
,darwinism1 and advocates not only the  
autocracy of the selection theory1 but  
also all the monistic and atheistic     
consequences which are deduced from it4 
,perhaps ,gustav ,jger1 ,schleiden1     
,bernhard ,cotta--at least judging from 
their earlier publications--should be   
mentioned as followers of the pure      
selection theory2 although they do not  
all draw from it the before-mentioned   

philosophic consequences4 ,on the other 
hand1 the number of those is very great 
who1 although inspired #eb by ,darwin to
 adopt the idea of an origin of species 
through descent and evolution1 yet have 
more or less modified1 laid aside1 or   
entirely refused the very doctrine which
 is especially new in ,darwin's         
theory--the selection theory4 ,in the   
following section we shall briefly give 
an account of them4   #c4 ,modifications
 of the ,theory--,moriz ,wagner4        
,wigand4  ,one of the most prominent    
objections to the selection theory1     
which strikes us at once from the       
standpoint of natural history1 is the   
following3 ,the varieties of a          
domesticated species1 obtained by       
artificial breeding1 are lost1 and      
return to the original wild form of the 
species as soon as they are crossed long
 enough with other varieties or are left
 to themselves and to the crossing with 
individuals of the original form of     
their species2 and hence we can not see 

how individual characteristics1 even if 
favorable to the individual1 will not be
 lost again by the crossing which is    
inevitable in a state of nature1 with   
such individuals as do not possess those
 characteristics4 ,besides1 it is an    
established fact1 confirmed by all our  
observations stretching over thousands  
of years1 that the characteristics of   
species are preserved in spite of all   
individual modifications1 and that this 
preservation of the characteristics of  
species has its cause essentially in the
 free crossing of individuals4  ,this   
objection induced ,moriz ,wagner to take
 up again an idea already expressed by  
,leopold von ,buch1 and to complete the 
principle of a selection through natural
 breeding by another1 and partly1       
indeed1 to supplant it by the principle 
of isolation by migration4 ,isolated    
individuals1 who1 from any reason       
naturally to #ec be accounted for1 leave
 the mass of their fellows1 can from the
 very consequence of this isolation     

transmit to their offspring common      
individual characteristics which are not
 destroyed again by the crossing with   
other individuals4 ,they will especially
 fix and transmit these individual      
characteristics1 when they are favorable
 to them for the conditions of existence
 in their new place of living1 and these
 individual characteristics will so much
 the more be increased and developed in 
a direction favorable to the subsistence
 of the individuals in their new place  
of living1 as there are more closely    
connected with this isolation variations
 in the conditions of existence1 in     
climate1 geographical surroundings1     
food1 and so on4 ,he very attractively  
applies this theory also to the         
explanation of the origin of man4       
,according to his opinion1 even the     
nearest animal progenitors of man were  
isolated1 and the isolating power was   
the rise of the great mountains of the  
,old ,world1 which took place previous  
to the glacial period4 ,one pair1 or    

perhaps a few pairs1 of those           
progenitors were driven away from the   
luxurious climate of the torrid zone to 
the northern half of the globe1 and     
found their return cut off by glaciers  
and high mountains2 in place of a       
comfortable life on the trees1 necessity
 urged them to gain support from        
conditions less favorable to existence1 
and necessity1 this mother of so many   
virtues and achievements1 finally made  
man what he is4 ,in following out these 
ideas1 ,moriz ,wagner has gradually and 
more and more decidedly given up the    
selection theory1 and opposed it by     
sharp criticisms4  ,this migration or   
isolation theory also found a degree of 
favor1 but subordinate in its nature4   
,for it #ed can not and will not pretend
 to solve the main problems4 ,it only   
tries to explain how the individual     
variations1 already in existence1 might 
have been preserved and perhaps         
increased1 and how new conditions of    
existence could have roused latent      

powers2 but not how these variations and
 these powers originated4 ,just as      
little is the selection theory able to  
explain this2 but it pretends to do it1 
and hence we can easily comprehend how  
during the last few years a constantly  
increasing number of voices1 and more   
important ones1 have been raised against
 the selection theory4 ,this opposition 
came not only from those who--like      
,agassiz1 ,barrande1 ,emil ,blanchard1  
,escher von der ,linth1 ,gppert1        
,giebel1 ,sir ,roderick ,murchison1     
,pfaff1 and others--directly reject each
 and every idea of descent on account of
 the difficulty in defending the        
selection theory2 or who--like ,karl    
,ernst von ,baer1#c 7the #ee pioneer in 
the region of the history of individual 
development71 like ,oskar ,fraas1       
,griesebach1 ,sandberger1 and           
others--generally take a more reserved  
and neutral position1 because of the    
uncertainty of the facts and the        
inaccessibility of the problems2 but it 

comes especially from those scientists  
who are inclined to adopt an origin of  
species through descent and even through
 development1 yet refuse to explain it  
by the selection principle1 and look for
 the essential cause of the development 
in the organisms themselves1 without    
claiming to have themselves found these 
causes4 ,among the most prominent       
advocates of this view1 we may name the 
late ,sir ,charles ,lyell1 ,mivart1 and 
#ef ,richard ,owen1 in ,england2 and in 
,germany1 ,alexander ,braun1 ,ecker1    
,gegenbaur1 ,oswald ,heer1 ,w4 ,his1    
,ngeli1 ,rtimeyer1 ,schaaffhausen1      
,virchow1 ,karl ,vogt1 ,a4 ,w4          
,volkmann1 ,weismann1 ,zittel1 and here 
also ,moriz ,wagner1 and among the      
philosophers1 ,eduard von ,hartmann4    
,many of these men are but little aware 
of the difference between the two       
questions3 whether1 on the one hand1 the
 adoption of the origin of species      
through descent does not of itself      
involve the idea of a gradual           

development of one species from another1
 almost unobservable in its single      
steps2 or1 on the other hand1 whether a 
descent of species through heterogenetic
 generation in leaps and through a      
metamorphosis of the germs1 could be    
imagined4 ,they consider descent and    
evolution as identical2 and this        
identification is explainable so long as
 we are not in a condition to come      
nearer to the eventual causes of the    
supposed variation of species4 ,but men 
are not wanting who put these questions 
clearly and plainly1 and separate them  
distinctly from one another4 ,among them
 we may mention ,k4 ,e4 von ,baer1 ,ed4 
von ,hartmann and ,wigand2 of the latter
 we will have occasion to speak more in 
detail hereafter4 ,among them we find   
also scientists who answer the question 
in the sense of a new-modeling of the   
species1 of a heterogenetic generation1 
and of a metamorphosis of germs4 ,to    
this class belong especially ,oswald    
,heer--,urwelt der ,schweitz            

7,antediluvian ,world in ,switzerland71 
,zrich1 #ahfe1 p4 #eij-fjd2             
,klliker--,ueber die ,darwin'sche       
,schpfungstheorie1 7,darwin's ,theory of
 ,creation71 ,leipzig1 #ahfd2           
,morphologie und ,entwicklungeschichte  
des ,pennatulidenstammes nebst          
allgemeinen ,betrachtungen zur          
,descendenzlehre1 #eg 7,morphology and  
,history of the ,development of the     
,stem of the ,pennatulid1 together with 
,general ,remarks on the ,descent       
,theory71 ,frankfurt1 #ahgb2 and        
,heinrich ,baumgrtner--,natur und ,gott 
7,nature and ,god71 ,leipzig1           
,brockhaus1 #ahgj4 ,heer has introduced 
into scientific language the term       
new-modeling of the species1 ,klliker   
that of a heterogenetic generation1 and 
,baumgrtner that of a transmutation of  
the types through a metamorphosis of    
germs4 ,baer also is not averse to      
adopting the latter4  ,the botanist1    
,albert ,wigand1 of ,marburg1 takes a   
peculiar position4 ,on one hand1 the    

observation of the relationship of      
organic beings with one another leads   
him to adopt a common genealogy1 a      
descent2 on the other1 the objections to
 adopting a descent of the species one  
from another appear to him              
insurmountable4 ,in the first place1 he 
sees all the species everywhere strictly
 limited--although in the second volume 
of his work1 which appeared after the   
preceding lines were written1 he again  
warns against a one-sided emphasizing of
 the invariability of species4 ,in the  
second place1 he sees so clearly1       
through the whole organic world1 the    
differences1 nay1 the contrasts1 of the 
species1 in their building plan1 in the 
numbers and conditions and positions of 
their parts1 and in their mode of       
development1 that it appears to him     
impossible to assume in the perfected   
organism a production of germs which in 
a course of generations1 by a process   
even as gradual as possible1 would grow 
into such an entirely new phenomenon as 

a new1 even closely related1 species    
would be4 ,but if we adopt the theory of
 a heterogenetic generation1 we explain 
by it the variety but not the similarity
 of species2 #eh for a heterogenetic    
generation would in the new species make
 everything different from the old      
one--a conclusion1 the necessity of     
which it would be difficult to show4    
,for these reasons1 he refers the       
descent of the organic beings1 not to   
the series of the species1 with their   
individuals already specified and       
defined1 but to the series of primordial
 cells living free in the water4 ,the   
earliest primordial cells represented   
only the common character of the whole  
organic world1 and out of them the      
primordial cells of the animal and those
 of the vegetable kingdom were produced 
by dividing the cells2 so that the first
 ones embraced only the general and     
primitive characteristics of the whole  
animal1 the last ones those of the whole
 vegetable kingdom4 ,out of these       

primordial cells of the two kingdoms1   
those of the main types proceeded--7for 
instance1 the primordial cells of the   
radiated animals1 the vertebrates1 etc41
 the gymnosperms1 the angiosperms1      
etc472 out of them those of the         
classes--7for instance1 the mammalia1   
the dicotyledons72 out of them those of 
the orders--7for instance1 the beasts of
 prey1 rosiflor72 out of them those of  
the families 7canina1 rosace72 out of   
them those of the genus 7canis1 rosa72  
and out of them those of the species    
7canis lupus1 rosa canina74 ,only when  
the primordial cells of the species had 
been produced1 were they developed into 
finished representatives of the species2
 and when once these primordial cells of
 the species had been developed into    
finished and full-grown individuals of  
the species1 their transmission took    
place in the manner well known to us4   
,wigand published his criticism of the  
,darwinian ,theories in his larger work1
 ,der ,darwinismus und die              

,naturforschung ,newtons und ,cuviers1  
7,darwinism #ei and the ,natural        
,science of ,newton and ,cuvier71       
,braunschweig1 ,vieweg1 ,vol4 ,i1 #ahgd1
 ,vol4 ,,ii1 #ahgf1 and his own attempt 
at explanation in a smaller book1       
published at the same place in #ahgb3   
,die ,genealogie der ,urzellen als      
,lsung des ,descendenzproblems oder die 
,entstehung der ,arten ohne natrliche   
,zuchtwahl 7,genealogy of the           
,primordial ,cells as a ,solution of the
 ,problem of ,descent2 or the ,origin of
 ,species without ,natural ,selection74 
,whether this genealogy of the          
primordial cells found any followers1 we
 do not know4 ,none of the hypotheses   
thus far mentioned are so very far from 
having analogies in experience4 ,the    
idea of a first development of the      
higher organisms out of their specific  
primordial cell1 through all kinds of   
conditions of larv up to the finished   
form1 demands of us the acceptance of   
monstrous improbabilities--7think1 for  

example1 of the first men1 who1         
originating from a human primordial     
cell1 grow in different metamorphoses of
 larv1 first in the water and then on   
the land1 until they appear as finished 
men74 ,moreover1 the hypothesis1 in     
claiming that a heterogenetic generation
 of one species from another must       
necessarily nullify all similarity      
between the organism of the child and   
that of the mother1 is so little        
convincing1 and shows--in the necessity 
of conceiving the universal type of     
organisms1 the type of kingdoms1 of main
 types1 of classes1 of orders1 of       
families1 of genera1 and of species1 as 
but individual existences which1 in the 
form of cells and before the existence  
of the developed species1 partly through
 many thousands of years1 lead a real   
empiric and concrete life--such an      
abstract synthetical construction of    
nature1 that #fj we are not astonished  
that the theory of the genealogy of     
primordial cells stands almost alone4   

,on the other hand1 ,wigand's larger    
critical work rendered great service in 
clearing up the problems4 ,it is true1  
his judgment appears in many single     
cases not at all convincing1 since he   
often enough fights his adversaries with
 sophisms and deduces from the views of 
,darwin and ,hckel conclusions to which 
they certainly do not lead4 ,but in the 
majority of cases1 his work is full of  
real convincing power1 and with the     
breadth of its philosophical view and   
with the sharpness of its definitions1  
as well as with its abundance of        
philosophic and especially botanical    
teachings and their ingenious           
application1 it is directly destructive 
to the use of the selection theory as   
the principal key to the solution of the
 problems4 ,eduard von ,hartmann        
describes the work in his publication1  
,wahrheit und ,irrthum im ,darwinismus1 
7,truth and ,error in ,darwinism71 as a 
mile-stone which marks the limits where 
,darwinism as such passed the summit of 

its influence in ,germany4         99   
99       99       99       99 #fa       
,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,present ,,state ,,of
 ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories4   #a4    
,the ,theory of ,descent4  ,the         
historical retrospect of the ,darwinian 
theories1 from their purely scientific  
side1 leads us of itself to a critical  
review of their present state4 ,we can  
briefly indicate in advance the result  
to which it will lead us1 viz43 that the
 descent theory has gained1 the         
selection theory has lost ground1 the   
theory of development oscillates between
 both2 but that all three theories have 
not yet passed beyond the rank of       
hypotheses1 although they have very     
unequal hypothetical value4 ,we can best
 arrange our review by beginning with   
that theory which is the most common1   
and which perhaps may still have value  
when both the others find their value   
diminished or lost3 the theory of       
descent4 ,from that we proceed to the   
theory of evolution1 and from this to   

that of selection4  ,the theory of      
descent is indeed at first sight        
exceedingly plausible1 and will probably
 always be the directive for all future 
investigations as to the origin of      
species4 ,the organic species show1     
besides the great variety of their      
characteristics and the unchangeable    
nature of these characteristics1 many   
other qualities which are common to     
them2 and these common characteristics  
are precisely those which are most      
essential4 #fb ,moreover the higher the 
structure of the organisms which are    
differentiated1 the more numerous and   
more valuable will become the evidences 
of similarity1 and the greater also will
 be their distance from the inorganic   
and from the lowest organisms of their  
class1 their type1 or their kingdom4    
,for instance1 rose and apple-tree1     
elder and ash1 wolf and dog1 goat and   
sheep1 ape and man1 are not only a great
 deal farther removed from the mode of  
existence of inorganic bodies than the  

alg1 the monera1 and other low          
organisms1 but they have also1 in spite 
of the great interval which separates   
them from one another and especially    
which separates man from every animal1  
much more numerous and important points 
of contact than1 for instance1 two      
families or genera of alg or of mosses1 
of polyps or of infusoria1 have among   
one another4 ,now our imagination       
refuses to accept the theory that the   
,creator1 or nature1 or whatever we wish
 to call the principle generating the   
species1 in producing the new species1  
laid aside all those points of contact  
which are continually becoming more     
numerous and more important1 and        
produced instead1 by ever widening      
leaps1 the new and higher species from  
the inorganic1 which lies farther and   
farther from them4 ,on the other hand1  
the theory appears to us all the more   
plausible1 that every new species came  
into existence on that stage which is   
the most nearly related to it1 and which

 was already in existence4 ,if we add   
further1 that the two old maxims of the 
natural scientists1 omne vivum ex ovo   
and omne ovum ex ovario1 have not been  
invalidated1 in spite of all the        
searching for a generatio quivoca1 and  
that1 even if the origination of the    
lowest organisms out of the inorganic   
could in future be #fc proved1 yet the  
truth of these maxims for all the higher
 organized individuals is established as
 a fact without exception4 ,moreover1 if
 we take into consideration the fact    
that we can not at all imagine either   
the origin or the first development of a
 higher animal or a human organism      
without the protecting integument and   
the nourishing help of a mother's womb1 
we may venture to say that each and     
every attempt to render the origin of   
the first individuals of the higher     
species conceivable1 leads of necessity 
to the descent theory4 ,we have either  
to reject1 once for all1 such an        
attempt1 as an unscientific playing with

 impossibilities1 or to accept the idea 
of descent4 ,it is certainly the lasting
 merit of ,darwin1 even if his whole    
structure of proofs should in the course
 of time show itself weak1 that he not  
only had the courage 7as others had     
before him71 but also inspired          
scientists with the courage to trace the
 idea of a descent of species in a      
scientific way4  ,to be sure1 so long as
 we have no other proof of the descent  
theory than the circumstance that we can
 imagine it1 it will continue to be     
nothing more than an ingenious          
hypothesis4 ,we have1 therefore1 to look
 to the realm of nature for more direct 
proofs2 and we are there furnished with 
them4 ,they are presented to us by      
geology in connection with the botanical
 and zological systems1 by geology in   
connection with vegetable and animal    
geography1 by comparative anatomy1 and  
by the history of the embryonic         
development of animals4  ,geology finds 
in the strata of the crust of the globe 

a large number of extinct plants and    
animals of extraordinary variety2 but   
all of them1 however much they #fd may  
differ from the organisms of to-day1 are
 completely in harmony with the         
botanical and zological systems in which
 we divide the still living organisms4  
,not only have by far the most of the   
now extinct genera and species their    
family and stem-companions1 and many    
even their genera and species           
companions1 in the living world1 but    
also those genera whose nearer relations
 are now extinct--as1 for instance1 the 
club-moss-trees1 the trilobites1 the    
ammonites1 the belemnites1 the sauria1  
the nummulites1--show still a very      
perceptible relationship with living    
genera1 and can be quite accurately     
included in the botanical and zological 
systems2 nay1 they even fill up gaps in 
it4 ,the anatomical1 morphological1 and1
 so far as we can judge1 the            
physiological and biological            
relationship of the fossil with living  

organisms1 is so great and comprehensive
 that in the present state of science a 
systematic botany or zology1 that should
 only treat of the fossils or of living 
organisms alone1 would be imperfect4    
,but the relationship of the fossil     
organisms with the natural systems of   
botany and zology is apparent not only  
in this respect1 but also in the fact   
that the single species during the long 
periods of time which are shown by      
geology to have elapsed1 came into      
existence in a series1 which again      
pretty closely corresponds to the       
natural system of the organic kingdoms2 
and that the fossil representatives of  
all classes and families1 the nearer    
they come to the present world1 appear  
the more nearly related to the living   
organisms1 so that the fauna and flora  
of the ante-human time are lost in those
 of the human period by transitions     
gliding from the one to the other4 ,for 
instance1 in the ,miocene formation of  
the tertiary epoch #fe we find thirty   

per cent4 of species still living       
to-day2 in the ,pliocene1 even sixty to 
eighty per cent41 and toward its end    
even about ninety-six per cent4 of      
species which are identical with those  
now living4  ,a brief glance may still  
more closely illustrate this analogy    
between the geological series and the   
organic systems4 ,plants and animals    
seem to have appeared nearly at the same
 time1 and at first in the form of the  
very lowest organisms4 ,the earliest    
plants found by geology belong also to  
the lowest stage of the vegetable       
kingdom2 they are the alg4 ,they are    
followed again by higher cryptogamous   
plants1 especially ferns and            
club-mosses4 ,only at a later period    
flowering plants appear1 among them     
being first the plants with naked seeds 
standing lower in the systems1 as the   
cycad-trees and pine-forests2 later1    
those with enclosed seeds1 among them   
being again first the monocotyledons1   
last the dicotyledons1--all of them     

precisely corresponding to the botanical
 system4 ,the same thing is true in the 
animal kingdom4 ,if the eozoon          
,canadense1 found in the laurentian     
slate of the ,cambrian formation in     
,north ,america1 is really an organism  
and not an inorganic form1 the earliest 
vestiges of animal life we can find are 
the rhizopodes or foraminifera2 and     
these organisms belong to the lowest    
stage of life--to that stage which forms
 a kind of undeveloped intermediate     
member between the vegetable and animal 
kingdom1 ,hckel's kingdom of the        
protista4 ,the next oldest animal       
organisms found in the ,cambrian        
formation are the zophytes1 and         
immediately above them the mollusca and 
the crustacea4 ,in the following        
,silurian period we find corals1        
radiata1 worms1 mollusca1 and crustacea1
 in #ff great number1 also all the      
main-types of the invertebrates2 and in 
the highest ,silurian strata there are  
also to be found representatives of the 

lowest class of vertebrates1 of fish1   
but still of very low organization and  
little differentiated4 ,that the five   
main-types of the invertebrates seem to 
have appeared quite contemporaneously1  
yet that the zophytes really appeared   
first1 does not contradict the          
before-mentioned law of a progress in   
the appearance of the organisms from the
 lower to the higher4 ,for in the       
zological system also these main-types  
of the invertebrates do not stand one   
above the other1 but by the side of each
 other3 at most1 the radiata1 the worms1
 the mollusca1 and the articulata1 take 
their places above the zophytes4 ,only  
within the main-types1 in the classes1  
orders1 etc41 do differences in rank    
take effect2 and even here1 not without 
exception4 ,what difference in rank1 for
 instance1 is there between an oyster   
and a cuttle-fish8 between a cochineal  
and a bee or ant8 and yet the first two 
belong to one and the same type--the    
type of mollusca2 and the last three to 

one and the same class--the class of    
insects4 ,the vertebrates rank decidedly
 above the invertebrates2 and in a      
manner wholly corresponding to this1 the
 vertebrates also appear after the      
invertebrates4 ,just as decidedly as to 
their rank1 the main classes of the     
vertebrates do not stand beside1 but    
above one another3 above the fish stand 
the amphibia1 above them the reptiles1  
next the birds1 and above them the      
mammalia4 ,to this series of succession 
also the geological facts seem to       
correspond pretty closely2 only long    
after the fish do the first amphibia and
 reptilia appear--although it can not   
yet be decided which of these #fg two   
classes has left its earliest traces4   
,if the interpretation of the gigantic  
foot-steps in the colored sandstone of  
,north ,america1 as belonging to the    
cursorial birds1 is correct1 the first  
appearance of birds falls in the time   
between the reptilia and mammalia2      
otherwise the first mammalia would have 

appeared before the first birds4 ,for if
 we find the first real bones of birds  
only in the ,jura and in the            
,chalk-formation1 they are birds with   
tail-spines and with teeth in the       
beak--hence still related to the        
reptilia or the sauria4 ,the first      
traces of mammalia to be found in the   
,upper ,keuper formation1 and in the    
,jura1 belong to the order of opossums  
or marsupialia2 i4e41 to that order     
which 7excepting the echidna and the    
ornithorhynchus that1 as so-called      
monotremeta1 stand the very lowest in   
the class of the mammalia1 but are very 
scarce7 occupies the lowest stage among 
the multitude of mammalia4 ,only after  
them do the higher orders of mammalia   
appear2 and last of all organisms1 man4 
,if we follow more in detail the        
appearance of the single organisms1 some
 remarkable modifications show          
themselves in the course of their       
appearance and growth4 ,we have         
heretofore mentioned the possibility of 

the appearance of the mammalia before   
the bird4 ,another fact which deserves  
attention is1 that frequently the lowest
 representatives of a class or an order 
do not at first appear where the highest
 representatives of the next lower class
 or order are in existence1 but with    
lower representatives of a preceding    
class or order1 viz43 such              
representatives of the same as are still
 less differentiated and unite in       
themselves comparatively still more     
generic and less specific               
characteristics--as for instance1 the   
lowest and #fh earliest amphibia1 which 
do not appear at the same time and place
 with the most highly organized fishes1 
but with fishes of still lower          
organization4 ,moreover many groups of  
organisms show in earlier geological    
periods a richness of development from  
which they have now fallen far away4    
,for instance1 among the mammalia the   
pachydermata1 among the reptilia the    
salamander and newt1 among the          

articulata the cephalopoda1 are at      
present remarkably reduced2--compare    
with the legions of ammonites and       
belemnites of the secondary period the  
small number of nautilus and cuttle-fish
 of the seas at the present day4 ,a     
similar fortune was experienced by the  
ferns and club-mosses which formed whole
 forests in the carboniferous period4   
,other groups which once played a great 
rle1 are now wholly extinct2 for        
instance1 the trilobites of the primary1
 the sauria of the secondary1 the       
nummulites of the tertiary periods4     
,now1 all these modifications of        
geological progress would entirely      
correspond to the idea of a pedigree to 
which the descent theory traces back the
 whole abundance of forms of organisms4 
,as soon as we seriously accept the idea
 of a pedigree1 each of the two organic 
kingdoms would throughout form for its  
classes and species not only one single 
straight line of descent1 but a tree1   
the branches of which are again ramified

 in a manifold way2 a tree on which     
single branches--as perhaps that of the 
class of birds--may leave the main-stem 
or a main-branch1 possibly being a      
branch destined to a higher development1
 and on that account held back in the   
process of development2 a tree1 finally1
 on which also branches and twigs can   
wholly or partly die off1 as those of   
the extinct or reduced groups of        
organisms4 #fi  ,from the point where   
the geological formations approach the  
present time1 plant and animal geography
 also assists geology in increasing the 
weight of the reasons for an origin of  
organisms through descent4 ,with the    
tertiary period1 the fauna and flora of 
the globe1 which in former periods had a
 nearly uniform character all over the  
earth and showed no climatic            
differences1 begin to separate according
 to climate1 zones1 and greater         
continents4 ,this separation becomes    
distinctly evident in the middle        
tertiary formations1 the ,miocene1 and  

much more distinctly in the higher      
tertiary formations1 the ,pliocene4 ,the
 animals1 especially the higher         
vertebrates1 of the ,pliocene formation 
on each continent or each larger group  
of islands1 correspond very closely to  
the now living animals of the same      
geographical limit1 with the exception  
of being generally of a much larger     
size4 ,the ,pliocene animal world of    
mammalia of the three old continents1   
for instance1 corresponds exactly1      
through all its orders1 to the present  
fauna of ,europe1 ,asia and ,africa2 and
 that on an average it was built up more
 stupendously than that of to-day1 we   
can see from the cave-bear and the      
mammoth4 ,south ,america is the home of 
a peculiar order of mammalia--of the    
edentata1 to which belong the sloth1 the
 armadillo1 and the like4 ,all its      
predecessors are to be found also in the
 ,pliocene strata of ,south ,america1   
and only there2 and mostly in gigantic1 
but otherwise completely related1 forms4

 ,new ,zealand has no indigenous        
mammalia1 but in their place great      
cursorial birds with but rudimentary    
wings4 ,exactly the same thing is found 
by geology in its tertiary and          
post-tertiary strata3 nowhere a mammal1 
but gigantic birds with rudimentary #gj 
wings1 down to the dinornis1 which      
probably died out in man's time4 ,new   
,holland has merely marsupial and some  
monotrematous1 but no placental1        
mammalia2 even its tertiary strata give 
no placental mammalia1 but marsupialia1 
in analogy with all living genera1      
herbivorous1 and carnivorous4 ,indeed1  
the analogy goes so far that the same   
line which through the ,indian          
,archipelago separates the present      
,australian animal and plant world from 
the ,asiatic1 forms also the separating 
line for the geological zones of the    
,pliocene epoch4 ,all these are facts   
which render quite inevitable the idea  
of an origin of the higher organic      
species of to-day through descent4  ,but

 still1 from another side1 animal       
geography1 though it does not yet speak 
for a common pedigree of the whole      
animal world1 as the facts just         
mentioned also do not1 still at least   
speaks for a descent of related1 though 
at present separated1 genera and species
 from common forefathers4 ,the          
continents of the ,old and ,new ,world  
are so constructed that toward the      
,north ,pole they approach one another  
very closely1 and toward the ,south     
,pole they withdraw from one another4   
,without doubt there existed in the     
,north1 through long periods of time1 a 
land-connection of ,america with ,asia  
and with ,europe4 ,now1 both continents 
have their more or less characteristic  
animal world1 and these characteristics 
are distributed over the two halves of  
the globe in the following extremely    
remarkable way3 ,the fauna of the ,old  
and the ,new ,world1 in those groups of 
animal genera which live only in the    
warmer or tropic zones or only south of 

the equator1 and have no associates of  
genera or families in the higher ,north1
 is in each hemisphere entirely         
characteristic1 and differs in a #ga    
marked way from the fauna of the other  
half of the globe4 ,for instance1 the   
rhinoceros1 the hippopotamus1 the       
giraffe1 the antelope with undivided    
horns1 the hedgehog1 the mole proper1   
are only inhabitants of the ,old ,world1
 whence also the horse originally came1 
the striped ones in ,africa and the     
non-striped in ,asia2 on the other hand1
 the lemur1 the ant-eater1 the          
armadillo1 and others1 are limited to   
,south ,america4 ,the apes of the ,old  
,world have five molar teeth on each    
side of the jaw1 narrow noses1 tails    
usually short and never prehensile1 and 
fleshy protuberances for sitting2 the   
apes of the ,new ,world have six molar  
teeth1 flat noses1 and long prehensile  
tails4 ,and on the contrary1 where      
closely related species are found on    
both parts of the globe1 they belong    

only to genera of which single species  
live or have lived in the far ,north2   
as1 for instance1 the rein-deer1 still  
common to the ,old and the ,new ,world  
in this very ,north which once formed a 
bridge between the two halves of the    
earth4 ,the same is true in regard to   
cattle1 the deer1 the cat1 the dog1 the 
hare4 ,similar facts can also be shown  
of other animal classes4 ,the farther   
the different species of these genera   
withdraw from the ,north ,pole1 the     
greater become the differences between  
the species on the one half of the globe
 and the analogous species of the other4
 ,compare on this point ,k4 ,e4 von     
,baer's ,studien aus dem ,gebiete der   
,naturwissenchaften1 ber ,darwin's      
,lehre1 7,studies from the ,realm of    
,natural ,science upon ,darwin's        
,teachings71 p4 #cef f4 ,if we add1     
further1 the before mentioned fact1 that
 those genera which are exclusively     
peculiar to one or the other continent1 
have their related predecessors in the  

tertiary strata of these continents1 #gb
 the hypothesis of a separate origin for
 each single species1 without           
genealogical connection with the        
anatomically and physiologically related
 species1 becomes neither more nor less 
than a scientific impossibility4        
,moreover1 there are several facts of   
comparative anatomy which have long been
 the joy of all zologists and have      
rewarded the toilsome labors of detailed
 investigations by a delightful view    
over the whole realm of the organic     
world1 but which find a scientific      
explanation only in the descent theory4 
,they are the homology of the organs1   
and to a certain degree also the        
so-called rudimentary organs4 ,by       
homology of organs we mean the fact that
 within one and the same class-group of 
organisms all the organs1 and especially
 the organs in their most solid         
constituents1 in the skeleton1 are built
 after one and the same fundamental     
plan1 and therefore are even in their   

most widely separated modifications     
varied after this one and the same plan4
 ,this is especially true of the vertebr
 and the limbs4 ,this homology goes so  
far within one class1 particularly      
within the class of mammalia1 that1 for 
instance1 the hands and feet of man1 the
 hands of the ape1 the paws of the beast
 of prey1 the hoof of the horse and of  
the ox1 the paws of the mole1 the fins  
of the seal and of the whale1 the       
wing-membranes of the flying-squirrel1  
correspond to one another in their      
smallest parts and ossicles1 and can all
 be registered with the same numbers and
 letters2 i4e41 they are homologous to  
one another even to the minutest detail4
 ,the ideal plan and connection in the  
organisms1 disclosed by these facts1 and
 long ago acknowledged and admired1     
receives at the same time its simple    
material basis through the acceptance of
 a common descent4 #gc  ,a similar      
relation is observed in rudimentary     
organs4  ,many of them1 as the nipples  

of males1 point1 if not to a common     
descent from a lower form1 at least to a
 common plan of the sexes4 ,but when the
 embryo of the whale still has its teeth
 in the jaw1 the grown up whale its     
hip-bones1 when the eye of man still has
 its winking membrane1 the ear and many 
portions of the skin their rudimentary  
muscles of motion1 the end of the       
vertebral column its rudimentary tail1  
the intestinal canal its blind          
intestine2 when sightless animals1      
living in the dark1 still have their    
rudimentary eyes1 blind worms their     
shoulder-blades2 when in like manner the
 plants1 especially in their parts of   
fecundation1 show in great number such  
rudimentary organs as are entirely      
useless for the functions of life1 but  
which are never misleading in           
determining their relationship with     
other plants3--how simply are all these 
facts explained by the descent theory1  
how not at all without it6  ,finally1 if
 we now mention the history of the      

development of animals1 we shall have to
 postpone to the next section the       
consideration of the most essential     
facts furnished by this science2 for the
 individual development of animals is a 
process which could speak not only for a
 descent of the species1 but also for a 
descent of them through gradual         
development4 ,but where1 as in the      
present section1 we treat the descent   
theory apart from the evolution theory1 
we have also to think of the possibility
 that the species or groups of species  
are not originated through gradual      
development1 but nevertheless do        
originate through descent--namely1 in   
leaps through metamorphosis of germs or 
a heterogenetic generation2 and for such
 an idea we find confirmation in the #gd
 observation of the history of          
development of animals1 which we call   
change of generation or metagenesis4#d  
,by this is meant the following         
phenomenon3 ,certain animals1 as the    
salpa and doliolum of the order of the  

tunicata1 as well as certain mites and  
many tape-worms1 produce offspring which
 are wholly dissimilar to the mother    
stock4 ,these offspring have the        
capacity of reproducing themselves--if  
not by sexual means1 as at the first    
generation1 still by the formation of   
sprouts2 and it is only the animals     
originated by the second generation     
7with many species1 even those by the   
third7 which return again to the form of
 the first generation4 ,the plant-lice  
transmit themselves through six1 seven1 
even ten generations by means of        
sprouts1 until a generation appears     
which lays eggs4 ,now it is indeed true 
that the change of generation forms a   
circle in which the form of the last    
generation always returns to that of the
 first1 and therefore leaves the        
species1 as species1 wholly unchanged4  
,but it is nevertheless a process which 
shows that the natural law of an        
identity between generator and product1 
observed in other relations1 is not     

without exception2 and if we once have  
reason to suppose that the generation of
 new species took place in past periods 
of the globe1 but has ceased in the     
present1 such processes in the single   
period open to our direct               
observation--namely1 the present 7in    
which1 however1 according to our        
knowledge1 the species remain           
constant7--are #ge nevertheless hints   
worthy of notice4 ,for they refer us to 
ways in which in those former times1    
when certainly new species did          
originate1 this formation of species    
might possibly have taken place4  ,this 
consideration leads us to treat of the  
main objection raised to every descent  
theory3 namely1 that never yet has the  
origin of one species from another been 
observed1 but that1 on the contrary1 all
 species--so far as our experience goes1
 stretching over thousands of           
years--remain constant4 ,we will give no
 weight to the fact that the constancy  
of species seems by no means to be      

absolutely without exception2 for on the
 whole1 they certainly remain constant4 
,the only example which goes to prove   
such an evolution of species as taking  
place to-day--viz3 the natural history  
of sponges--seems not to have this      
bearing4 ,the transitions of form1      
proven by ,o4 ,schmidt in the siliceous 
sponges and by ,hckel in the            
chalk-sponges1 seem to show1 not the    
genetic coming forth of a new species   
out of another1 and especially not the  
evolution of a higher species out of a  
lower1 but rather the uncertainty of the
 idea of species in general and the     
worthlessness of the skeleton-forms1 for
 this idea1 in such low organizations as
 the sponges4 ,but that objection       
already loses its chief force from the  
consideration that we have not only     
never observed the origin of one species
 from another1 but never even the origin
 of a species itself2 and that          
nevertheless all species have           
successively originated in time4 ,if we1

 therefore1 are not able to observe     
directly their origination1 we have a   
right to make all possible attempts at  
approaching the knowledge of it in an   
indirect way4 ,but we see this objection
 invalidated by still another #gf fact4 
,from all observations1 it seems to be  
evident that those agencies which       
originated the species in general have  
ceased since man appeared4 ,now this    
fact is inconvenient for all those who1 
on metaphysical grounds1 reject aim and 
purpose in the world and accept an      
aimless motion in the universe1 a circle
 in which only identical powers are ever
 active to all eternity4 ,from this     
standpoint1 the scientists cannot1      
except by very artificial hypotheses1   
escape the conclusion that1 if new      
species once originated through descent1
 new species ought still to originate   
through descent4 ,in like manner1 it is 
true1 they are also obliged to accept   
the other conclusion3 that if new       
species once originated through         

primitive generation1 new species ought 
still to originate through primitive    
generation4 ,on the other hand1 those   
scientists who recognize aims in the    
world for which the world and each part 
of it is destined1 and which are        
attained in the world through the       
processes of coming into existence1 have
 to expect in advance that the organic  
kingdoms are also planned with reference
 to those aims4 ,they naturally see the 
aim of the origin of species attained1  
where in the organic world beings appear
 who combine with the highest physical  
organization a self-conscious and       
responsible spiritual life1 and who are 
capable of conceiving the ideal1 even   
the idea of ,god4 ,for1 with the        
appearance of these beings1 there enter 
upon the theatre of the world beings who
 go beyond the value of a purely        
physical organism and of a purely       
somato-psychical life1 and in like      
manner represent again a higher order of
 beings2 just as the first appearance of

 organic life on earth once introduced a
 new and higher stage of #gg existence  
in contrast to the inorganic world4     
,scientists who take this standpoint can
 readily adopt the fact that we do not  
now observe the origination of new      
species2 for it is in full harmony with 
their metaphysical doctrines1 without   
the same being on that account          
essentially dependent upon the          
confirmation or rejection of the        
hypothesis of the present constancy of  
species4 ,with this very fact1 the maxim
 that if new species once originated    
through descent1 new species must still 
originate through descent1 has lost for 
them its truth1 and therefore its power 
of demonstration4 ,so we see even here1 
while in the midst of the discussion of 
a purely scientific problem1 in what    
close correlation metaphysics and       
natural science stand1 and              
moreover--since the metaphysical view is
 most closely connected with the        
religious--in what close relationship   

religion and natural science stand4 ,at 
the same time we also see how little the
 metaphysical interest1 and much more   
how little the religious interest1 has  
reason to avoid the investigation of    
facts in nature4   #d4 ,the ,theory of  
,evolution--,archology1 ,ethnography1   
,philology4  ,the evolution theory      
teaches that the species have developed 
themselves one from another in gradual  
transitions1 each of which was as small 
as the individual differences still     
observed to-day among the individuals of
 the same species4 ,it is not without   
support1 especially in the history of   
the development of plants and animals4  
,each organic being becomes what it is  
by means of organic development4 ,each  
plant1 even the highest organized1      
begins in its seed-germ with a simple   
cell1 #gh and is differentiated in      
constant development up to the fully    
perfected individual4 ,each animal1 even
 the most highly organized 7man         
included71 begins the course of its     

existence as an egg2 and each egg has no
 greater value of form than that of a   
single cell4 ,this egg-cell is          
differentiated1 after fecundation1 in   
gradual and imperceptible transitions1  
farther and farther1 higher and higher1 
until the individual has reached its    
perfect organization4 ,no organ1 no     
function of the body1 no power or       
function of the soul or of the mind1    
appears suddenly1 but all in gradual    
development4 ,since we see all          
individuals thus originating by means of
 gradual development1 the possibility   
lies very near that the different       
organic formations of all the organic   
kingdoms could also have been originated
 by the same means4  ,in still another  
direction does the history of the       
development of single plants and animals
 make this possibility plausible to us4 
,in the animal world1 and partly also in
 the plant world1 the single individuals
 of higher species in their embryonic   
development pass through states of      

development1 in the former stages of    
which not only the individuals of the   
most different species look confusingly 
similar to one another1 but also the    
embryos in their organization remind us 
of the perfected state of much lower    
classes of beings4 ,in order to give a  
clear idea of the first mentioned facts1
 ,hckel1 for instance1 in his ,natural  
,history of ,creation and in his        
,anthropogeny1 represents by engravings 
the embryos of different vertebrates and
 also of man2 representations           
which--although1 according to the       
judgment of competent scientists1       
unfortunately not exact1 but modified1  
after the manner of stencil plates1 in  
favor of #gi greater similarity--yet    
make it quite clear that the similarity 
of the different embryos must be very   
great4 ,we see1 for instance1 on one    
table the embryos of a fish1 a          
salamander1 a turtle1 a fowl2 on a      
second1 those of a pig1 an ox1 a rabbit1
 a man2 on a third1 those of a turtle1 a

 fowl1 a man2 and we find the similarity
 really great4 ,examples of the second  
fact--that individuals of higher classes
 or orders in former states of their    
embryonic development represent an      
organization which corresponds to the   
full-grown individuals of the lower     
classes--are3 the tail of the human     
embryo1 the gill-arches of the embryos  
of reptilia1 of birds1 of mammalia1 and 
of man4 ,now ,hckel here takes up again 
an idea first suggested by ,fritz       
,mller1 and derives from these          
observations the biogenetic maxim1 as he
 calls it3 ,the history of the germ is  
an epitome of the history of the        
descent2 or1 in other words1 ontogeny   
7the history of the germs or the        
individuals7 is a recapitulation of     
phylogeny 7the history of the tribe72   
or1 somewhat more explicitly3 that the  
series of forms through which the       
individual organism passes during its   
progress from the egg-cell to its fully 
developed state1 is a brief1 compressed 

reproduction of the long series of forms
 through which the animal ancestors of  
that organism 7or the ancestral forms of
 its species7 have passed from the      
earliest periods of so-called organic   
creation down to the present time4 ,in  
his latest publication1 ,ziele und ,wege
 der heutigen ,entwicklungsgeschichte1  
7,aims and ,methods of the ,present     
,history of ,evolution71 he admits into 
the formulation of his biogenetic maxim 
also the consideration of those         
phenomena in the ontogenetic development
 which are no recapitulation of the     
history #hj of the stem1 but originated 
by adapting the embryo to its           
surroundings4 ,in the description and   
explanation of this theory1 he uses a   
term which throws upon nature a peculiar
 reproach1 never before made1 namely3   
cenogeny1 or history of falsifications1 
in contrast to palingeny1 or history of 
abridgments4 ,this amended formula now  
reads3 ,the development of germs is an  
abridgment of the development of stems1 

and is the more complete according as   
the development of the abridgment is    
continued by inheritance1 the less      
complete according as the development of
 the false is introduced by adaptation4 
,now1 we ask3 ,is this biogenetic maxim 
correct8 and moreover1 from the fact of 
the organic individuals originating     
through development1 are we entitled to 
draw the conclusion that even the       
species must have originated through    
development8 ,to this question we can no
 longer get an answer from the          
life-processes of living organisms2 for 
we have already mentioned the fact that1
 according to the present state of our  
knowledge1 we can no longer observe the 
origination of a new species4 ,moreover1
 the embryonic states of development    
show also1 in all their similarity1 even
 in the very first stages1 and with     
especial distinctness in these first    
stages1 many differences between the    
single species2 and this is true        
especially of those species which1      

according to the followers of this      
so-called biogenetic maxim1 should lie  
in the same stem-line1--so that the     
direct scientific value of the          
embryological results to the            
palontological investigation1 or of the 
latter to the former1 is so far very    
slight4 ,such a problem1 however1 as the
 one contained in that biogenetic maxim1
 which only gives to investigators the  
direction in which possibly an #ha      
interesting and profitable path can be  
opened1 does not at all deserve the name
 of a law4 ,k4 ,e4 von ,baer1 the       
founder of the whole present science of 
the history of development1 has         
certainly a most competent judgment of  
the correctness of this so-called       
biogenetic maxim2 and he convincingly   
shows1 in his essay on ,darwin's        
,doctrine1 that the embryos never       
represent a former animalic form1 but   
that their development follows the      
principle of representing first the     
common characteristics of the class1    

then those of the order1 etc41 until    
finally the individual characteristics  
appear in the formation4 ,those who wish
 more information about embryology can  
find it in ,heinrich ,rathke's          
,entwicklungsgeschichte der             
,wirbelthiere 7,history of the          
,development of ,vertebrates71 edited by
 ,a4 ,klliker1 ,leipzig1 ,engelmann1    
#ahfa2 and those who wish to inform     
themselves as to the influence of the   
ontogenetic results of the solution of  
the phylogenetic problems1 will find1   
besides the before-mentioned work of    
,wigand1 rich and clearly elaborated    
material in the publication of ,wilhelm 
,his--,unsere ,krperform und das        
physiologische ,problem ihrer           
,entstehung1 ,briefe an einen           
befreundeten ,naturforscher 7,the ,form 
of our ,body and the ,physiological     
,problem of its ,origin2 ,letters to an 
,associate ,scientist71 ,leipzig1       
,vogel1 #ahge4 ,the latter writer1      
although he advocates the descent       

theory1 rejects the hasty assertions of 
,hckel with direct and convincing       
arguments4  ,thus embryology1 having    
from the simple fact of an origin of    
single plants and animals through       
descent at least confirmed the idea of  
the possibility of an origin also of    
species through development1 forsakes us
 in the #hb inquiry as to the reality of
 such a genealogy of development1 and   
refers us to other sciences4  ,such a   
science1 from which we certainly are    
entitled to expect a decided answer1 is 
geology4 ,for if the evolution theory is
 right1 those periods of the history of 
our globe in which new species          
originated--namely1 the periods of      
geology--must show us also the forms of 
transition between the different        
species4 ,and1 indeed1 geology gives us 
an answer2 but it reads contradictorily3
 ,it says yes1 and it says no4  ,geology
 does show us forms of transition1 and1 
indeed1 most frequently in the lower    
classes of animals4 ,who that has once  

studied petrifactions1 does not know the
 mass of forms of the terebratul1 the   
belemnites1 and the ammonites1 in the   
,jura formation8 ,wrtemberger has       
brought light into the perplexing       
division of species of the ammonites by 
simply showing their temporary and      
systematic transitions into one another4
 ,in the fresh water chalk formation of 
,steinheim1 near ,heidenheim1 in        
,wrtemberg1 scientists have found1 on   
the same place1 in an uninterrupted     
series of strata1 the snail valvata or  
paludina multiformis in all imaginable  
transitions--from the flat winding1     
showing the form of a chess-board1 up to
 the sharp form of a tower4 ,and it was 
not1 as ,hilgendorf thought1 in a series
 which can be traced in the strata      
according to time1 but1 as ,sandberger  
says1 in quite a varied mixture1 yet in 
all imaginable modifications4 ,but even 
among the higher and the highest classes
 of animals1 we can trace the           
transitions4 ,the flying sauria1 if not 

in their organs of flying1 which remind 
us more of the bat1 at least in head1   
neck1 and toes1 are closely connected   
with the #hc birds--the oldest birds of 
the ,jura and chalk formations1 with    
their tail-spines similar to the        
reptilia and their teeth in the beak to 
the sauria4 ,the tertiary formations    
especially show the primitive history of
 many vertebrates in very instructive   
forms of transitions--which1 for        
instance1 ,rtimeyer1 a scientist who is 
very cautious in his conclusions1 very  
distinctly traced to the horse1 to the  
ruminating animals1 and lately also to  
the turtles4 ,still more in detail1 ,w4 
,kowalewsky has lately shown us the     
primitive history of the horse1 and     
,leidy and ,marsh have further completed
 it by the addition of ,american forms1 
the former having at the same time      
described the forms which have led to   
the tapir4  ,but to such facts there    
are1 on the other hand1 experiences     
directly contradictory4 ,many lower and 

higher forms of animals and plants      
appear in the geological strata1 so far 
as they have been explored1 in a wholly 
independent way4 ,we have mentioned1 in 
the foregoing section1 that the main    
types of the invertebrates appear       
somewhat contemporaneously and without  
any traceable intermediate form4 ,the   
trilobites1 a quite highly organized    
order of crustacea1 appear in the strata
 of the silurian epoch almost suddenly1 
in very many and very distinctly marked 
species4 ,the uncertainty of our        
knowledge shows itself most clearly when
 we ask for the geneologic relationship 
of the vertebrates4 ,in ,chap4 ,,ii1  #a
 and  #b we have already referred to the
 value which ,darwin1 and more          
especially ,hckel1 lays on the          
relationship of the larva of the ascidia
 to the lancelet fish4 ,now the         
important testimony of ,k4 ,e4 von      
,baer1 in his ,mmoires de l',acadmie de 
,st4 ,ptersbourg1 ,ser4 vii1 ,vol4 #ai1 
,no4 #b1 tells us that the              

nerve-ganglion #hd of the ascidia lies  
on the side of the stomach1 and on that 
account can not be homologous with the  
spine of the vertebrates1 but that the  
cord in the larva of the ascidia is     
nothing more than a support for the tail
 in swimming1 which afterwards          
disappears1 as with many other larv4 ,as
 to the course of reasoning in reaching 
these genealogical conclusions1 he says3
 ,the hypothesis is indeed flexible4    
,according to common reasoning1 that    
which shows itself early in the         
development is an inheritance of the    
first progenitors4 ,therefore the ascid 
ought to descend from the vertebrates1  
and not the reverse4 ,but it was        
necessary to show the descent of the    
vertebrates from the lower forms4 ,in   
order to respond to such a necessity1   
men sometimes reverse their conclusions4
 ,although favorably disposed to the    
doctrine of the transmutation of the    
animalic forms1 ,i want a complete proof
 before ,i can believe in a             

transformation of the vertebrate type   
into that of the mollusca4 ,moreover1   
the zologists ,semper and ,dohrn find in
 the embryonic development of the       
sharks1 the scates1 and other           
cartilaginous fishes1 organs which would
 bring them rather into a nearer        
relationship with the ringed worms than 
with the crustacea4 ,when1 on the other 
hand1 we look around in palontology1 the
 oldest fossil fishes remind us neither 
of the crustacea nor of the ringed      
worms1 but of the crabs3 a class of     
animals which lies entirely outside of  
,hckel's stem-line of vertebrates4 ,also
 the first appearance of mammalia does  
not show transitions4 ,thus far we have 
not found in the geological strata any  
vestiges of the half-apes1 which1       
according to the hypothesis of the      
evolutionists1 as a common stem-line for
 the lines of ape and man development1  
once played such an #he important rle1  
and which have quite numerous           
representatives4  ,but the answer which 

geology gives to our questions as to the
 probable confirmation of the evolution 
theory1 naturally becomes most          
interesting where the origin of man is  
treated of4 ,our attention is1          
therefore1 especially directed to the   
most recent formations of the globe     
which show us the oldest remains of man4
 ,the most instructive are those parts  
of the skeleton which allow us to draw  
the most convincing conclusions as to   
the degree of mental development of an  
individual1 namely3 the parts of the    
skull4 ,although human bones seem to    
have been less easily preserved than    
those of animals1 and are1 comparatively
 speaking1 very scarce1 especially more 
so than prehistoric implements1 still   
there are not wanting such remains1     
which go back far beyond historical     
time4 ,the oldest known skull is the    
celebrated one of the ,neander cave near
 ,dsseldorf1 with its large vault of the
 forehead1 and its low height4 ,although
 ,virchow finds on it evidences of      

rachitis in youth and of gout in old    
age1 as well as of injuries1 it         
nevertheless can not have been changed  
in its fundamental form by any sickness1
 even according to ,virchow4 ,this very 
skull now indisputably shows a still    
lower formation1 which1 although quite  
essentially different from the type of  
the ape1 stands nearer to it than is the
 case with the skulls of men in later   
times4 ,of a later date1 and of a       
correspondingly higher form1 are the    
skull of ,engis1 of ,cannstatt1 the     
skulls of the ,belgian caves 7especially
 ,chauvaux71 of ,france1 and of         
,gibraltar4 ,according to the weighty   
authority of ,schaaffhausen 7note his   
opening address at the ,wiesbaden       
,congress of the #hf ,anthropological   
,society1 #ahgc71 the skulls and the    
remaining parts of the skeleton show    
more indications of a lower formation   
the older they are4 ,he especially calls
 attention to a certain bone of the roof
 of the skull--the ,os interparietale or

 the so-called ,os ,inc--which has only 
recently been recognized as a           
characteristic of a lower formation of  
skulls1 standing nearer to that of      
animals4 ,as late as the summer of      
#ahgc1 two human skeletons were found at
 ,coblenz in a volcanic sand1 of which  
,schaaffhausen says3 ,no less than eight
 anatomic marks of a lower formation1   
which probably have not heretofore been 
found together1 indicate the great age  
of these remains4 ,with all these traces
 of a difference between the former and 
the present state of the physical       
condition of man1 the differences       
between the type of man and that of the 
animal are still great enough to leave  
wide open the possibility of the origin 
of man through some other means than    
that of gradual development4 ,on the    
other hand1 it is more or less in favor 
of the evolution idea1 that so far such 
old remains of man have been found in   
places which certainly can not have been
 the cradle of mankind1 and that those  

parts of the earth which we would       
naturally suppose to be the first       
dwelling place of the earliest human    
genera have been little or not at all   
investigated4 ,and also the hypothesis  
of ,hckel1 that the cradle of mankind   
was a land between ,africa and ,asia1   
now sunk in the sea1 and called         
,lemuria1 can be neither proved nor     
denied4 ,such vague possibilities have  
indeed not the least scientific value4  
,in considering these contradictory     
results of geological investigation1 we 
dare not overlook three points3 ,first1 
our knowledge of the crust of the globe 
is still #hg very fragmentary1 and does 
not yet extend over the whole globe4    
,further1 it lies in the nature of the  
case that the strata in mountain        
formations can only give a very         
incomplete picture of the whole variety 
of the real organic life which may have 
populated the earth and the sea4 ,what a
 poor picture of the present plant and  
animal life would be offered1 for       

instance1 by the soil of our continents1
 the slime1 sand1 and pebbles of our    
coasts and of the bottoms of our lakes  
and seas1 if we had to construct from   
them alone the fauna and flora of the   
present6 ,a third1 but purely           
hypothetical1 consideration is rendered 
of importance particularly by ,darwin   
and ,hckel2 namely1 that the forms of   
transition without doubt existed for a  
shorter period than those forms whose   
organization has established itself in  
fully developed species4  ,thus far we  
have directed our attention to inquiring
 how the organic individuals were       
originated--and have throughout observed
 a successive development2 next1 we have
 questioned geology--and here also have 
observed a progress in the appearance of
 the species1 but have received at the  
same time contradictory answers to the  
question whether this progress presents 
itself as a gradual development of one  
species from another or as a sudden     
appearance4 ,so the reasons for and     

against the evolution theory almost     
balance one another2 and it is not      
improbable that the hypothesis of an    
origin of species through development   
will have to share its authority with   
the hypothesis of a descent of species  
through heterogenetic generation1 as    
well as with the hypothesis of a        
primitive generation of lower organisms1
 still repeating itself at a later time4
 ,thus for the origination of #hh groups
 lying nearer together1 we have the     
evolution theory2 for the other groups1 
and especially for the origination of   
types where no transitions to other     
types can be traced1 the theory of the  
heterogenetic or primitive generation   
recommends itself2 and both theories    
thus far are of a purely hypothetical   
nature4  ,but there is still a third    
realm1 which is just as open to our     
observation as the history of the       
development of organisms and as geology1
 and of which we can also ask1 whether  
it does not open for us an indirect way 

to the knowledge of the origin of       
species1 and especially of man--a       
knowledge which we can no longer        
approach in the direct way of           
observation4 ,this realm is natural     
history and the history of the          
development of the human race4 ,for     
mankind also is engaged in a process of 
development1 and its present members do 
not stand on the same height4 ,now the  
question is1 to what beginning can we   
trace backward the development of       
mankind1 and to what succeeding stages  
of development from this present        
condition8 ,and do we find in these     
earliest periods1 and on these lowest   
stages1 points that are connected with  
still earlier conditions and            
organizations1 and especially points    
which could genealogically join together
 mankind and the animal kingdom8 ,three 
sciences1 still young1 favorite children
 of the present generation1 participate 
in investigating this realm1 namely1    
archology1 comparative ethnology1 and   

comparative philology4  ,archology leads
 us back to far-off times4 ,it is a fact
 that1 chronologically speaking1 man    
lived in the glacial period--according  
to ,french scientists1 even before it2  
and that1 palontologically speaking1 man
 and #hi mammoth lived at the same time1
 and1 according to a discovery made some
 thirty years ago at ,denise in ,middle 
,france1 probably even man and another  
older and defunct form of pachydermata1 
the elephas meridionalis1 in ,north     
,america man and the mastodon4 ,the     
reader may compare the discoveries      
regarding the age of mankind1 as they   
are described most recently by ,sir     
,charles ,lyell in his work upon this   
subject1 in the publications of the     
,anthropological ,congress at ,brussels 
in the year #ahgc1 and in those of the  
fourth ,general ,assembly of the ,german
 ,society for ,anthropology1 ,ethnology 
and ,primitive ,history1 at ,wiesbaden1 
in the year #ahgc4  ,now1 to be sure1   
from the oldest human tools and utensils

 that are found1 we can expect still    
less than from the oldest human bones   
that they will throw direct light upon  
the answer to the question of the origin
 of man4 ,for where man not only uses   
tools1 but manufactures the same for    
use1 a wide breach already exists       
between man and animal4 ,manufactured   
articles1 therefore1 can only throw some
 light on the history of the development
 of the already existing human race4    
,and even this light is less clear than 
we perhaps expected in view of the first
 interesting prehistorical discoveries4 
,it is true1 all these discoveries show 
us an ascent from the simplest and      
roughest forms to the more perfect2 from
 the split but unpolished stone to the  
polished1 and from stone to bronze and  
iron4 ,but a progress of the human races
 in manufacturing and using articles1   
from the simple and rough form to the   
more artificial1 lies so much in the    
nature of the case1 and is so taken for 
granted with every conception of the    

origin of man1 even with that           
contradictory to ,darwinism1 that from  
this simplicity of #ij the earliest     
tools we can not at all conclude that   
there was a condition of mankind lying  
near that of animals2 and especially we 
can draw only general and uncertain     
conclusions as to that which makes man  
man1 as to the spiritual and moral      
qualities of those prehistoric men4     
,moreover1 in discoveries belonging to  
the very oldest1 we come upon drawings  
and engravings from which we recognize  
the man of those primitive times as a   
creature whose life was not entirely    
taken up in the animalic struggle for   
existence1 but was already adorned with 
those ideal pursuits and enjoyments     
which we are accustomed to ascribe to   
the height of civilization4 ,examine1   
for instance1 the drawing of a mammoth  
on a mammoth tooth of ,dordogne1 which  
the ,french scientists ,lartet and      
,christy have reprinted in their        
,reliqui ,aquitanic 7#ahfh71 and which  

,sir ,charles ,lyell has copied in his  
,age of the ,human ,race4 ,how much     
spirit and life in this primitive work  
of art6 ,or read what ,fraas1 in the    
,journal of the ,german ,society for    
,anthropology1 ,march1 #ahgd1 reports   
about the picture of a grazing reindeer1
 engraved on a knife handle made of the 
horns of a reindeer1 which was lately   
found in the cave of ,thayngen near     
,schaffhausen1 and which surpasses in   
beauty all rough drawings thus far      
found4 ,the whole bearing of the        
animal--the muscles of the legs and the 
head1 the form of the many-branched     
antlers1 with the wide-spread eyes1 the 
representation of the hair upon the body
 and under-jaw--all disclose a real     
artist among those savages4  ,this is   
also to be taken into consideration3    
that those men1 whose traces we find1   
could possibly have been the descendants
 of more noble predecessors1 driven #ia 
off and degenerated1 just as well as    
they could have been representatives of 

the whole former condition of culture of
 mankind4 ,in ,england1 where the       
questions of the first condition of     
culture of mankind are very warmly      
discussed1 the ,duke of ,argyll         
particularly1 in his ,primeval ,man1    
advocates these views1 and very forcibly
 calls attention to the fact that thus  
far the places of the discovery of the  
earliest traces of man undoubtedly lie  
very far from the original home of the  
human race2 while ,sir ,john ,lubbock1  
in his ,origin of ,civilization and in  
his ,prehistoric ,times1 and also ,tylor
 in his ,beginning of ,culture and in   
his ,early ,history of ,mankind1 take   
the opposite view of a progress of      
mankind from the most uncultivated      
beginnings4  ,archology1 as a whole1    
seems to do no more than admit that its 
results can be incorporated into the    
theory of an origin of the human race   
through gradual development1 if this    
theory can be shown to be correct in    
some other way1 and that its results can

 just as well be brought into harmony   
with a contradictory theory4            
,comparative ethnology gives us quite a 
similar result4 ,it is true1 there are  
races of mankind in the lowest grades of
 human existence4 ,it is well known how 
,darwin1 in his voyage on board the     
,beagle1 got one of his first vivid     
impressions of the possibility of an    
evolution of man from the animal world1 
by seeing the inhabitants of ,tierra del
 ,fuego2 and it is remarkable that the  
arms1 tools1 and furniture1 used by the 
lowest savages1 are very similar to the 
earliest remains of civilized races     
found on earth4 ,the conclusion lies    
extremely near1 that the savages simply 
remained in earlier stages of human     
culture2 and an ethnographic picture of 
mankind #ib at present would in a       
similar way give an approximately       
correct view of its former development1 
as the natural zological and botanical  
system of the present fauna and flora   
must give us at the same time the key to

 their pedigree2 supposing the          
,darwinian theory to be correct4  ,if it
 were so1 ethnology would be an         
altogether inestimable help for the     
exploration of the descent and          
development of the human race4 ,for the 
extremely few and rare fossil remains of
 man--which1 moreover1 do not give us   
any answer to the most important        
questions in regard to the mental and   
moral quality of the primitive          
man--would be rendered complete by      
living examples of the kind1 which      
remained at the old stages of           
development4  ,but much is still        
wanting1 before the followers of an     
evolution theory dare to use ethnology  
directly as a primitive history of the  
development of mankind1 prepared and    
preserved for them4 ,especially the     
before-mentioned objection of the ,duke 
of ,argyll--that the lowest savages of  
our time can just as well be depraved as
 be men who remained stationary in the  
process of development--has here        

increased weight4 ,moreover1 even with  
the savages of to-day1 a rude state of  
their tools and a low condition of their
 mental and moral life are not so nearly
 parallel as to allow unrestricted      
conclusions to be drawn4 ,finally1 we   
still know too little about the state of
 culture of the savages2 and the deeper 
and higher the intellectual and ethical 
possessions of mankind are1 the presence
 of which among the savages is in       
question1 the more uncertain is our     
knowledge4  ,this is especially true of 
the most important question in this     
connection--the question as to the      
existence #ic or absence of an idea of  
,god1 and the different stages of       
development of religious ideas4 ,while  
some assume as an established fact1 that
 there are savage tribes without any    
idea of ,god or any religion1 and even  
give the names of these tribes1         
especially of some from the interior of 
,south ,america2 while ,sir ,john       
,lubbock systematically enumerates seven

 stages of religious development1 from  
atheism to the connection of religious  
with moral conceptions1 and lets each   
single race run through these stages in 
an identical series until it either     
remains on one of the seven stages or   
arrives at the highest3 yet1 on the     
contrary1 other equally trustworthy     
scientists assert that there is not a   
single human race without some idea of  
religion and of a ,god--indeed1 not a   
single race without a monotheistic      
presentiment--and that all heathenism1  
down to its most degenerate stages1     
consists not so much in a               
non-recognition of a ,god as in ignoring
 him4 ,they call especial attention to  
the difficulty of getting acquainted    
with the ideas of a savage tribe without
 living with it through many years and  
being intimate with its language and    
customs1 and especially without enjoying
 the unrestricted confidence of the     
tribe4 ,mutual misunderstandings1 a     
suspicious reserve1 evasive and untrue  

answers to questions1 are entirely      
unavoidable without those conditions4   
,at any rate1 the fact deserves         
attention1 that those who have been     
longest and most active among savages1  
and who enjoyed their confidence to the 
fullest extent1 all reached this result3
 they found them not only not without   
religion1 but also not without a        
presentiment of the monotheistic idea of
 ,god4 ,livingstone1 for instance1      
expressed this idea decidedly of all the
 ,african tribes #id with which he      
became acquainted2 and ,jellinghaus     
gives the same evidence in regard to the
 ,kols in ,south ,asia4  ,the anatomic  
results of ethnology are more favorable 
to the descent theory1 although they too
 lead no farther than to the conclusion 
that the skull-forms of the lowest      
tribes represent a lower stage of       
formation than those of the higher1 and 
that these lower skull-forms are        
relatively nearer to the ape-form than  
the higher1 but that they are still     

separated from it by a wide interval4   
,it appears1 then1 that even ethnology  
does not lead us essentially nearer the 
solution of the question than archology 
and geological anthropology4  ,the      
relatively strongest support to the     
evolution theory is given by comparative
 philology2 and since language is the   
most important and most decisive of all 
the distinctive characteristics which   
separate man and animal#e1 this science 
deserves especial consideration4  ,in   
the realm of the natural sciences1 the  
enormous progress of palontology on the 
one hand and of systematic zology and   
botany on the other took place step by  
step together1 and thus prepared the way
 for ,darwin's idea--which1 from the    
rich material of analytical             
investigations1 only tries to draw the  
simple synthesis1 and to show at the    
same time in the zological and botanical
 system a representation of the         
zological and botanical history of      
development4 ,in quite an analogous way1

 a process took place in the linguistic 
realm which in independent              
investigations prepared the way for     
,darwinism1 and now1 since ,darwin's    
theory has sought #ie acknowledgment in 
the realm of natural history1 brings    
again ,darwin's ideas to the support of 
philology4  ,linguistic and ethnographic
 investigations1 especially the         
linguistic works of the missionaries1   
long ago resulted in gathering rich     
material from the storehouse of the     
language of races now living1 and the   
latest works in the realm of historical1
 etymological1 and comparative philology
 had traced the branches and twigs of   
the better known languages to stems and 
roots lying far back4 ,the result of the
 comparison soon became the same as in  
the realm of the organic world3 what    
presented itself in the system of the   
living languages as a lower form1 seemed
 to represent itself as the older and   
more original form also in the history  
of languages4 ,therefore1 all the       

prominent linguistic investigators found
 themselves more and more urged to      
accept a theory which declares language1
 this entirely specific characteristic  
of man1 to be subject to the same laws  
of development from the simpler and most
 simple forms as the world of the       
organic4 ,long ago so celebrated a man  
as ,jacob ,grimm1--,ueber den ,ursprung 
der ,sprache 7,the ,origin of           
,language71 ,berlin1 ,dmmler--following 
the footsteps of ,wilhelm von ,humboldt1
 had established a theory1 according to 
which language is not created1 but      
produced by the liberty of the human    
will2 and judging from many of his      
,darwinistic utterances concerning the  
origin and development of language1 he  
had traced its development in such a way
 as to arrive at the conclusion that    
artless simplicity in the unfolding of  
the senses is the first period of its   
appearance4  ,the scientists divide all 
the languages of the earth into three   
great groups3 first1 the monosyllabic1  

#if isolating1 radical1 or asynthetic   
languages2 second1 the agglutinant1     
terminational1 or polysynthetic         
languages2 third1 the inflectional      
languages4 ,they are of the opinion that
 even the languages of highest rank--the
 inflectional--very probably took a     
starting-point from the asynthetic      
languages1 and a course of development  
through the agglutinants1 and that in   
like manner the agglutinants have behind
 them an asynthetic period4 ,thus they  
trace all the languages back to certain 
roots1 which are more or less common to 
the different groups of languages4  ,to 
the question that now arises--,how did  
these roots originate8--the linguists   
give us three different answers4 ,the   
onomatopoetic theory1 called by ,max    
,mller the ,wow-,wow ,theory1 traces    
them to imitations of the sound 7,w4    
,bleek1 ,g4 ,curtius1 ,schleicher1      
,wedgewood1 ,farrar72 the interjectional
 theory1 called by ,max ,mller the      
,pooh-,pooh1 or ,pah-,pah ,theory1      

traces them to expressions of the senses
 7,condillac72 a third theory declares  
the roots to be phonetic types 7,max    
,mller1 ,lazar ,geiger1 ,heyse1         
,steinthal72 while it is still an open  
question1 whether the attempts at       
explanation of these types must here    
come to a stand-still for the present1  
as ,max ,mller thinks1 or whether1      
according to ,lazar ,geiger1 we can     
trace the first root-expressions        
especially to impressions of light and  
color4  ,the reasons from which ,max    
,mller1 in his ,lectures on the ,science
 of ,languages 7,vol4 ,i1 ,lect4 ,,ix71 
rejects the first two theories and      
proves the third1 are quite convincing4 
,even if1 in a purely hypothetical way1 
a language could be thought of in       
abstracto1 the roots of which only      
consist in imitations of sounds or      
interjections1 still in the really      
existing languages1 #ig so far as we can
 trace back and uncover their roots1 the
 roots imitating sounds and the         

interjectional roots form only a small  
and entirely isolated minority1 which   
neither shares in1 nor is capable of    
development2 they stand like dead sticks
 in a live hedge4 ,by far the greater   
number of roots1 and all which are      
capable of development1 express         
abstractions from visible objects1      
conditions and activities1 and therefore
 presume a human intelligence1          
reflecting with self-consciousness1     
which formed and used the roots4  ,now  
,max ,mller sees1 back of this period1  
still open to science1 in which the     
root-elements of the human languages    
were fixed1 a long period of exuberant  
and unhindered growth of the elements of
 language1 in which the roots were      
separated from the multitude of nascent 
tones by elimination or natural         
selection in the struggle for existence4
 ,in this realm1 which is no longer open
 to investigation1 the naturalistic and 
the linguistic friends of the evolution 
theory are now in entire accord4        

,wilhelm ,bleek1 in his small1 but very 
noteworthy essay1 ,ueber den ,ursprung  
der ,sprache 7,origin of ,language71    
,weimar1 ,bhlau1 #ahfh1 p4 #aa1 uses    
this ingenious figure3 what the animal  
world possesses analogous to language1  
takes about the same position as1 in the
 art of printing1 the block-print does  
in relation to printing with movable    
types4 ,on page #ab1 he sees in the     
communication of the emotions among     
animals the sources from which under    
favorable conditions 7in consequence of 
which the separation of language into   
articulated parts became possible7 human
 language might have originated4 ,this  
idea1 which is closely joined to the    
interjectional theory1 ,darwin meets #ih
 with a related idea1 depending upon the
 onomatopoetical theory1 when he says1  
in his ,descent of ,man3 ,since monkeys 
certainly understand much that is said  
to them by man1 and when wild1 utter    
signal-cries of danger to their fellows1
 may not some unusually wise ape-like   

animal have imitated the growl of a     
beast of prey1 and thus told his        
fellow-monkeys the nature of the        
expected danger8 ,this would have been a
 first step in the formation of         
language4  ,but philology1 from the     
point where it goes farther back in     
search of the roots of language1 leaves 
the safe ground of knowledge and commits
 itself to the fluctuating ocean of     
conjectures2 and since also the         
scientific evolution theory has only a  
hypothetical value1 the support of a    
hypothesis in the one science by a      
hypothesis in the other naturally adds  
no weight to its probability1 either for
 the one or the other4 ,besides1 we must
 not overlook the fact that the very    
point in the history of the development 
of languages on which the investigation1
 as it looks backwards1 must at present 
pause--namely1 the existence of         
linguistic roots--presumes a faculty of 
abstraction which can not be thought of 
without self-consciousness4  ,therefore 

archology1 comparative ethnography1 and 
comparative philology1 show us quite    
clearly a development1 but not an origin
 of mankind through development4 ,yet   
they do show an already existing        
development of mankind2 for all three   
sciences lead back to starting-points1  
where mankind already existed with all  
the essential attributes of mankind1 and
 leave us without answer to our         
questions as to the conditions lying    
still farther back4 ,their results we   
can #ii without difficulty harmonize    
with a theory which supposes mankind to 
have originated by evolution1 provided  
such a theory could be confirmed from   
another side2 but they agree just as    
well with a contrary theory1 which      
excludes the origin of mankind by       
gradual development4  ,taking1 thus1    
everything into consideration1 we come  
to the conclusion that the evolution    
theory1 like the descent theory1 is so  
far only a hypothesis--and1 indeed1 a   
hypothesis which as such has a much more

 problematical character than the       
descent theory4 ,for while in regard to 
the latter we had to say that we have   
either this explanation or none of the  
origin of the higher species1 with the  
evolution theory there is not even room 
for this alternative4 ,for even in case 
of its failure1 a descent of one species
 from another through heterogenetic     
generation is certainly very possible4  
,besides1 it is not only possible1 but  
even probable1 that both theories--that 
of heterogenetic generation and that of 
gradual development--may have to share  
with one another in the explanation of  
the origin of species2 and even that1   
especially for the lowest species and   
for the beginnings of the main types1   
primitive generation also has its share 
in the establishment of the paternity4  
,the evolution theory could only pass   
beyond the rank of a hypothesis1 if we  
should succeed in showing the impelling 
forces of such an origin of species     
through development4 ,such an attempt   

can be made in two ways--the            
metaphysical and the                    
scientific-empirical4 ,the first1 the   
metaphysical1 although it may be        
justified in its general principles1    
will always1 from the point at which it 
attempts to approach the concrete       
questions as #ajj to the origin of      
single species1 expose itself to the    
fate of being a priori rejected by      
science as unjustified1 and of being a  
posteriori confuted by facts--a fate    
which it has richly and clearly         
experienced in the first half of our    
century4 ,but the discussion of the     
metaphysical way does not belong to the 
present purely scientific part of our   
investigation2 it will1 however1 be     
shortly taken up again in ,book ,,ii4   
,the other way1 the                     
scientific-empirical1 will have to be   
looked upon as correct when it can show 
the impelling forces of development in  
such powers and laws as are either still
 active to-day or at least have their   

points of connection in powers and laws 
active to-day4 ,such an attempt is the  
selection theory4 ,we have already in   
,chap4 ,,ii1  #a and #b1 given an       
outline of this theory1 and have only   
yet to discuss its present state of     
tenability4   #c4 ,the ,theory of       
,selection4  ,the selection theory also 
is not entirely without support in the  
realm of observed facts4 ,how simply it 
explains the fixedness of the           
differences of closely related species  
arising from their geographical and     
climatical home6 how simply the         
similarity of the color of many animals 
from the color of their abode1 through  
which they have protection against      
persecution6 how simply the so-called   
mimicry--i4e41 the similarity of certain
 species in form and color with form and
 color of entirely different species in 
the midst of which they live1 a         
similarity which often gives them       
protection against persecution6 ,the    
best known examples of this1 in our     

regions1 are the spinning caterpillars1 
which in a state of rest look strikingly
 like a twig of a tree or a shrub on    
which #aja they live4 ,in other regions 
there is a multitude of the most        
striking freaks of nature of this       
kind--for instance1 butterflies and     
other insects1 which at rest look like  
the leaves of plants under which they   
live2 butterflies living among other    
butterflies which1 by an offensive odor1
 are protected against persecution1 and 
although they are themselves a favorite 
food for birds1 carrying the form and   
color of that badly-smelling family of  
butterflies4 ,we can also add the       
orchide1 and their resemblance to bees1 
flies1 butterflies1 spiders1 etc4 ,a4   
,r4 ,wallace and ,darwin themselves     
recur often to these striking           
appearances4  ,but herewith we have     
mentioned nearly every support which the
 selection theory has on the ground of  
observed facts4 ,more numerous and more 
weighty are the objections to it4 ,first

 of all1 we have to state that the      
selection theory no longer enjoys that  
protection which the descent and        
evolution theories can justly claim1    
against the main objection1 mentioned in
 ,chap4 ,,iii1  #a1 to all the ideas of 
descent1 development and selection4     
,that main objection is the permanence  
of species1 observed through thousands  
of years2 and the defense with which the
 descent and evolution theories         
successfully weaken it1 is the statement
 of the fact that1 since man appeared1  
no new species has originated1 and that 
therefore the principle of the          
generation of species seems to have come
 to a stand-still4 ,now this fact is no 
longer in favor of the selection theory1
 but directly repugnant to it4 ,for the 
selection theory expressly declares the 
origin of species through agencies that 
are all active still1 and1 therefore1 if
 they really suffice to explain the     
origin of species1 would not only have  
to generate new species1 #ajb but also  

to develop all the existing species4    
,all those circumstances which1         
according to the selection theory1 have 
led to change of species1 are just as   
active to-day as they are supposed to   
have been from the beginning of organic 
life2 and the effect which we observe is
 not change but permanence of species4  
,the individuals still have individual  
qualities2 they still have the tendency 
to inherit1 in addition to the qualities
 of the species1 those of the           
individual2 the individuals still change
 their abode1 and therewith also their  
conditions of life2 a natural selection 
still takes place in the struggle for   
existence2 and what is the result8 ,from
 an observation stretching over         
thousands of years1 we find nowhere an  
effect of natural selection going       
farther than alterations in growth and  
color and purely external changes in    
form4 ,all the dispositions of organisms
 and their reciprocal action aim not at 
increasing the individual differences1  

but at reducing them to the average     
character of the species4 ,when the     
species change their abode or their     
conditions of life1 they either perish  
or remain constant2 at least1 with the  
exception of the slight modifications   
before mentioned4 ,even those           
alterations which artificial breeding   
produces1 have a tendency to return to  
the original species3 as soon as        
cultivated plants and domestic animals  
are left to themselves1 they run wild1  
i4e41 they reassume their original      
qualities4 ,even the bastard-formations 
either cease to be fertile1 or1         
remaining fertile1 finally return to one
 or the other stem-form of the          
originally crossed species4 ,nor can we 
oppose to these facts the consideration 
that the period of time during which    
mankind has observed the organisms is   
too short4 ,for the permanence of very  
many #ajc species can be traced through 
thousands of years1 and the shortness of
 the period of our observations is amply

 counterbalanced on the one hand by the 
multitude of species from all parts of  
the organic systems which come under our
 notice1 on the other by the immense    
alterations in the conditions of        
existence to which man submits plants   
and animals4 ,how great1 for instance1  
are the alterations in the conditions of
 existence which tropical plants undergo
 in our hot-houses and gardens6 ,and the
 only alteration they show is that they 
are stunted and only bear blossoms with 
difficulty and fruits with still greater
 difficulty4#f ,now1 if the ever-active 
selection principle does not produce in 
thousands of years even minimum         
alterations which can be observed1      
science certainly is justified in       
doubting for the present the asserted   
effect of that principle4  ,thus not    
only are the facts directly opposed to  
the autocracy of the selection          
principle2 but logic is also none the   
less so4 ,for1 under the most favorable 
circumstances1 selection would only     

explain the preservation and perhaps    
also the increase of useful qualities   
and organs1 if the same are already in  
existence and have shown themselves     
useful to the individual2 but would not 
explain their origination4 ,this would  
rather most emphatically be left to     
chance4 ,according to the strict        
selection theory1 it would be pure      
chance that among the thousands and     
thousands of individual qualities of the
 individuals of a species1 such         
qualities are always existing as offer  
advantages to the individual in his     
struggle for existence4 ,and it would be
 a second series of chances1 which from 
generation to generation would #ajd have
 to coincide with the first1 that among 
the individual qualities advantageous to
 the individual and making it victorious
 in the struggle for existence1 there   
should be found always just those       
qualities which develop the species and 
raise it to a higher rank and order in  
the zological and botanical systems4    

,but the total of improbabilities which 
would have to be overcome continually in
 this theatre of chance1 would in the   
course of generations necessarily amount
 to infinity4 ,thus1 in the very        
beginning1 insuperable doubts arise as  
to how we can explain from two causes   
the world of organisms which is so      
richly1 beautifully1 and systematically 
arranged4 ,the first of these causes is 
the inclination to individual           
alteration1 inherited indeed in the     
organisms1 but in itself absolutely     
indifferent1 for the systematical idea  
in the framework of the organic systems 
and for the progressive element in the  
development4 ,the other is the struggle 
for existence and natural selection1    
which approaches the organisms purely   
from without like individual            
variability1 must as a whole appear a   
necessity1 but in each single case in   
the concrete mixture of coinciding      
circumstances1 would seem a work of     
chance for the individual which is to be

 changed4  ,moreover1 it is a           
demonstrable impossibility to explain   
the origin of just those organs and     
members in the structure of organisms   
which are systematically the most       
significant and functionally the most   
important1 by means of natural          
selection4 ,it is true that many of     
these organs and members1 in their      
perfected state1 offer to the organism  
an immense advantage over lower         
organisms2 but if they had been         
originated through gradual development1 
they would have been in their first #aje
 beginnings and earlier stages of       
development at least quite indifferent1 
often directly obstructive to the       
individual in its struggle for          
existence1 and therefore would have been
 called into existence and developed by 
agencies which had an effect directly   
counteracting natural selection4 ,how   
high1 for instance1 stand the           
vertebrates above the invertebrates6    
,yet how could the first deviation from 

the ganglionic system of the nerves of  
the invertebrates to the cerebro-spinal 
system of the vertebrates have          
occurred8--and1 especially1 how could   
the first deposit of the vertebral      
column have procured any benefit to the 
individual in the struggle for          
existence8 ,we quote this objection from
 ,karl ,planck's ,wahrheit und          
,flachheit des ,darwinismus1 7,truth and
 ,platitude of ,darwinism71 ,nrdlingen1 
,beck1 #ahgb4  ,still more striking is  
the insufficiency of the selection      
theory for the explanation of the origin
 of the organs of motion in the higher  
classes of vertebrates4 ,a4 ,w4 ,volkman
 says of it1 in his instructive lecture1
 ,zur ,entwickelung der ,organismen1    
7,development of the ,organisms7 ,halle1
 ,schmidt1 #ahge1 p4 #c ff43 ,without   
doubt1 animals with extremities will    
come from animals which lacked          
extremities4 ,now if the metamorphosis  
originated in the course of one         
generation1 the animals with extremities

 would have an advantage over the rest1 
which ought to show itself in the       
natural selection2 but if the           
development of an extremity needs       
#aj1jjj generations1 the individual in  
which the process of the development    
begins produces #a_/ajjjj of the        
extremity and the advantage1 resulting  
therefrom is reduced to zero4 ,for an   
organ can only be of advantage when it  
performs its functions2 and on #ajf the 
first of the #aj1jjj stages of          
development the extremity can not       
perform its functions4 ,just think of   
the cetacea6 ,of the hind extremity1    
only its carrier1 the pelvis1 has been  
developed2 and even this is only        
represented by the two hip-bones1       
hanging in the flesh4 ,as to the python1
 the hind extremities are more complete1
 but they lie hidden under the skin1 and
 therefore are of no use for local      
movement4 ,such examples show that in   
the history of the development of an    
organ thousands of years may pass1 and  

numerous generations may arise and      
disappear1 until it reaches that grade  
of perfection where it is of use to its 
owner4 ,how therefore1 can we look upon 
such an organ1 when finally it is       
perfect1 as a product of selection in   
the sense of ,darwin8  ,we find the     
scientific objections to the selection  
theory collected in detail in the       
before-mentioned works of ,wigand1      
,blanchard1 ,his1 von ,baer1 and        
especially in ,mivart's ,genesis of     
,species1 7,london1 ,mac,millan1 #ahga72
 and it is a praiseworthy testimony of  
,darwin's love of truth1 that lately he 
himself1 the originator of the selection
 theory1 willingly admits these weak    
points in his theory1#g while ,hckel and
 many of his followers #ajg in ,germany 
still stoutly reject every doubt of the 
autocracy of the selection principle4   
,in summing up all we have said thus far
 about the theories of descent1 of      
evolution1 and of selection1 we still   
find all three solutions of the         

scientific problems to be hypotheses1   
but hypotheses of very different value4 
,the idea of descent has the most       
scientific ground2 it will1 as a        
permanent presupposition1 govern all    
scientific investigations as to the     
origin of species1 even if it does not  
exclude the idea of an often-repeated   
primitive generation of                 
organisms--especially of those that     
stand still lower in development4 ,more 
uncertain and less comprehensive is the 
position of the evolution theory2 in all
 likelihood1 the idea of an origin      
through development will have to share  
the sovereignty with the idea of origin 
by leaps through metamorphosis of germs4
 ,still more unfavorable is the state of
 the selection theory4 ,it possesses the
 merit of having started the whole      
question as to the origin of species2 it
 may explain subordinary developments2  
natural selection may have coperated as 
a regulator in the whole progress and   
the whole preservation of organic life4 

,ed4 von ,hartmann1 in his essay1 ,truth
 and ,error of ,darwinism1 7,berlin1    
,duncker1 #ahge71 on page #aaa1 compares
 its functions with those of the bolt   
and coupling in a machine2 but that the 
driving principle which called new      
species into existence lay or originated
 in the organisms1 and did not approach 
them from without1 seems to be confirmed
 more and more decidedly with every new 
step of exact investigation as well as  
of reflection4         99       99      
99       99       99 #ajh   ,,book ,,ii4
  ,,the ,,philosophic ,,supplements     
,,and ,,consequences ,,of ,,the         
,,darwinian ,,theories4         99      
99       99       99       99  ,,the    
,,philosophic ,,problems4  ,although1 in
 accordance with the requirements of the
 task before us1 we have to restrict    
ourselves to giving the results of      
natural science only in their general   
outlines1 still we believe that we have 
not overlooked any essential result     
which is of importance to the question  

of the origin of species and of man4 ,we
 have now finished our scientific       
review2 and the conclusion to which we  
see ourselves brought is that natural   
science1 in its investigation of the    
origin of species1 has arrived at       
nothing but problems which it is not    
able to solve4 ,there is a very great   
probability of an origin of species1 at 
least of the higher organized species1  
through descent2 but whether through    
descent by means of gradual development 
or of metamorphosis of germs1 or whether
 with one group of organisms it is in   
this way1 with another in that1 is not  
yet decided4 ,the attempt to explain    
their entire origin exclusively by the  
selection theory1 must be regarded as a 
failure2 all indications rather show    
that1 supposing the descent principle   
correct1 the deciding agencies which    
formed new species did not approach the 
old species out of which the new ones   
originated from #aji without1 but that  
they originated or were already in      

existence within them4 ,but what these  
agencies were1 natural science is at    
present unable to state2 and not only   
those scientists who reject every idea  
of a descent1 but also those who are    
favorable to the ideas of descent and of
 evolution1 rejecting only the selection
 theory1 are at one in silent or open   
acknowledgment of this limit of our     
knowledge1 be it permanent or temporary4
  ,but now the question arises3 does the
 search after these agencies henceforth 
remain the exclusive task of natural    
science1 and have we therefore simply to
 wait and see whether it will succeed in
 finding them8 or have we to look for   
the answer to these questions1 which    
natural science can no longer give1 in  
another science--namely1 philosophy8    
,the first question we will have to     
answer in the affirmative1 the second in
 the negative4 ,it is certainly         
understood that metaphysical principles 
must underlie all physical appearances2 
and the right to define these           

principles1 so far as they can be known1
 is willingly conceded to philosophy by 
the scientists1 with the exception of   
those of materialistic and naturalistic 
tendencies4 ,this mutual re-approaching 
of philosophy and natural science is one
 of the most gratifying1 and1 to both1  
most fruitful evidences of the          
intellectual work of the present        
generation4 ,but these metaphysical     
principles themselves become cognizable 
only when the physical effects1 whose   
cause they are1 become accessible to our
 knowledge2 and every attempt to find   
them a priori1 or only to extend them a 
priori1 will always fail through the    
opposition of empirical facts2 or even  
if this attempt accommodates itself to  
the existing state of knowledge at a    
given time1 it will always be overcome  
by the #aaj progress of the empirical   
sciences4 ,in the most favorable case1  
it can claim the value of a hypothesis  
which has to be put to the proof1       
whether it can be empirically confirmed 

and whether we can successfully operate 
with it in knowing the world of         
realities4 ,but herewith it leaves the  
realm of pure philosophy1 and makes the 
question of its right to exist dependent
 upon the decision of natural science4  
,since the decline of the doctrines of  
nature held by ,schelling1 ,steffens1   
and ,hegel1 there has come to our       
knowledge1 from the domain of           
philosophy1 but one earnest attempt to  
explain the origin and development of   
organisms down to the concrete          
differences between single types1       
classes1 and even orders and families1  
from one single metaphysical principle2 
and this attempt has been made by an    
antagonist of the descent doctrine4 ,k4 
,ch4 ,planck1 in ,seele und ,geist1 oder
 ,ursprung1 ,wesen und ,thtigkeitsform  
der physischen und geistigen            
,organisation von den                   
naturwissenschaftlichen ,grundlagen aus 
allgemein fasslich entwickelt 7,soul and
 ,spirit1 or ,origin1 ,nature1 and ,form

 of ,activity of ,physical and          
,intellectual ,organization1 ,clearly   
,developed from a ,scientific ,basis71  
,leipzig1 ,fues1 #ahga1 and in ,wahrheit
 und ,flachheit des ,darwinismus 7,truth
 and ,platitude of ,darwinism71         
,nrdlingen1 ,beck1 #ahgb1 makes the     
inner concentration the moving principle
 of the whole development of the world4 
,he thinks that what belongs to the     
organism and to the soul has originated 
and developed up to man and his         
spiritual nature thus3 that the creating
 centrum of the earth produces          
individual centra on its periphery1     
which tend more and more to bring into  
view the principle of #aaa              
centralization1 in its contrast to the  
purely peripheral form of existence1    
until it reaches its goal in man1 with  
his centralizing spirit4 ,we have no    
reason to reject the idea of a principle
 of concentration in the world and its  
parts2 it is confirmed by observation1  
and shows itself fruitful in many       

respects4 ,but in spite of the many     
ingenious and often suggestive ideas in 
the works of ,planck1 we have some doubt
 about a system which tries to explain  
the whole concrete abundance of the     
richness of formations and life-forms in
 the world1 rising higher and higher up 
to spiritual existence and moral action1
 from the single idea of concentration1 
and makes this principle the mystical   
and mysteriously acting cause of a whole
 world and its contents4 ,we doubt at   
the outset the success of this argument4
 ,we have especially the strongest      
objections to a philosophical system    
which submits all the contending        
physical theories of the present to the 
measure of that concentration principle1
 and from these purely metaphysical     
reasons takes side exclusively with the 
one or the other of the theories1 or    
establishes new theories--from the      
theories of atoms and ether1 of light   
and heat1 down to geological questions  
as to whether universal revolutions of  

the world or a continual development    
took place4 ,the solution of all these  
questions1 in their full extent1 we do  
not attribute to philosophy1 but to     
natural science2 although to a natural  
science which permits philosophy to     
define the ideas with which it operates 
and the general principles to which it  
comes4 ,for this renunciation--which    
philosophy1 however1 can not at all     
escape--it will be the more richly      
rewarded in this1 that it obtains the   
more certainly for its own work sure and
 sifted material4 ,but all attempts     
which can not #aab submit to this       
renunciation1 give only an apparent     
right to that view which ,albert ,lange1
 in his ,history of ,materialism1       
defends1 when he banishes speculative   
philosophy to the realm of imagination4 
,but in rejecting philosophy in the     
question of the causes of the           
development and organization of the     
organic kingdoms1 we did not reach the  
end of the philosophic problems with    

which we are confronted4 ,this whole    
question is itself only a segment of the
 problems before which we stand1 and    
leads of necessity to other questions4  
,already within the series of           
development of the organic world1 so far
 as it is investigated by natural       
science1 we have found and named a point
 7at the end of  #a1 ,chap4 ,,ii1 ,book 
,i71 where the competency of pure       
natural science comes to an end1 and the
 question arises whether another source 
of knowledge--i4e41 even philosophy--can
 not take up the investigation where    
natural science completes its task4     
,this point was the origin of           
self-consciousness and of free moral    
self-determination2 consequently1 the   
origin of that which makes man man4     
,going still farther back on the        
temporal and ideal scale of organic     
beings1 we arrive at another point1     
which natural science no longer can     
explain1 and that is the origin of      
sensation and of consciousness4 ,with   

the appearance of sensation and         
consciousness1 the animal world came    
into existence4 ,moreover1 the whole    
scientific question as to the origin and
 development of species1 so far as we   
have hitherto treated it1 started from  
initial points where the organic and    
life already existed2 it1 therefore1    
leads of necessity to the further       
question as to the origin of the organic
 and of life itself4 ,d4 ,f4 ,strauss1  
#aac in his ,postscript as ,preface1    
thus clearly and simply characterizes   
these still unfilled blanks in the      
evolution theory3 ,there are1 as is well
 known1 three points in the rising      
development of nature1 to which the     
appearance of incomprehensibility       
especially adheres 7to speak more       
categorically3 which have not been      
explained thus far by anybody74 ,the    
three questions are3 ,how has the living
 sprung from that which is without life8
 the sentient 7and conscious7 being from
 that which is without sensation8 that  

which possesses reason                  
7self-consciousness and free will7 from 
that which is without reason8--questions
 equally embarrassing to thought4 ,but  
even the question as to the origin of   
the organic and of life can not be      
discussed without an investigation1     
leading us farther back to the question 
as to the elements of the world in      
general4 ,the doctrine of atoms1 and the
 mechanical view of the world1 are the  
scientific evidences of the efforts in  
this direction4  ,so far as the attempts
 to solve these four questions start    
from the results of natural science and1
 from this starting-point of the known1 
try to solve the unknown1 we will have  
to assign them in the encyclopdic       
classification of the sciences1 to that 
department of philosophy which treats   
the doctrines of nature2 and since our  
whole investigation starts from the     
,darwinian theories1 and only tries to  
treat of what is properly connected with
 them1 the attempts to solve these four 

questions offer themselves as the       
naturo-philosophic supplements of the   
,darwinian-theories4  ,after concluding 
our treatment of them1 we shall have to 
speak of still another view1 which      
presupposes all these attempts at       
solution to be wholly or nearly #aad    
successful1 and draws an inference from 
them which no longer belongs to the     
realm of natural science1 but is a      
purely metaphysical hypothesis2 it is   
the abolition of the idea of design in  
nature4 ,in connection with this1       
finally1 we shall have to discuss the   
name which this view has lately assumed1
 viz3 ,monism4  ,whatever further       
questions may arise1 belong either to   
the special subdivisions of natural     
science and philosophy1 or to           
theological and ethical problems4       
99       99       99       99       99  
#aae   ,,chapter ,i4  ,,the             
,,naturo-,,philosophic ,,supplements    
,,of ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories4   #a4
 ,the ,origin of ,self-,consciousness   

and of ,free ,moral                     
,self-,determination4  ,if sensation1   
and its most developed form1            
consciousness1 is a reflex of the       
material in something immaterial1 which 
feels itself a unit in contrast to the  
material1 and1 where sensation rises    
into consciousness1 is opposed as a unit
 to the material--self-consciousness    
again is the reflex of this sentient and
 conscious subject in a new and still   
higher immaterial unity2 and this again 
makes this sentient and conscious       
subject1 together with the sum of its   
feelings and ideas1 its object1 changing
 it from a sentient and conscious       
subject into a felt and presented       
object4 ,therefore it is clear1 and will
 be the result of all thought upon these
 concepts1 that as with sensation and   
consciousness1 so also with             
self-consciousness1 something new always
 comes into existence--a higher category
 of being1 different from the merely    
material4 ,the first is the form of     

being of the animal world2 the latter   
that of mankind4  ,it is exactly the    
same with the first appearance of       
voluntary movement1 and again with that 
of free moral self-determination4 ,the  
reaction of the sentient subject upon   
his sensations is something             
qualitatively different from the purely 
mechanical and physical action and #aaf 
reaction of pure matter2 although1 in   
order to understand the possibility of a
 sensation as well as of a voluntary    
movement1 we must admit that the        
physical qualities of matter must be    
such as to afford a basis and condition 
for sentient and reacting beings4 ,that 
reaction is the reaction of something   
immaterial upon the material1 even if it
 is entirely caused by the material and 
bound to the material4 ,now1 with free  
moral self-determination a new subject  
comes into existence and activity in the
 individual1 which makes that subject1  
reacting upon mere sensations and ideas1
 its object1 and1 as a new immaterial   

subjective unity1 acts determiningly    
upon that subject which has just become 
object4 ,this new subject1 considered   
from the side of its receptivity1 we    
call self-consciousness2 from the side  
of its spontaneity1 free moral          
self-determination4 ,whether we consider
 this freedom predetermined or not1 does
 not at all alter the described fact and
 the qualitative difference between the 
form of human moral agency and that of  
purely animal spontaneity4 ,for even    
those advocating determination must     
admit that the morally acting subject   
distinguishes itself from its object1   
and does not take its motives to action 
from the material and from the          
instinctive life which is bound to the  
sensual and dependent on it4  ,now it is
 true that all these circumstances in   
organized individuals which serve       
self-consciousness and free moral       
self-determination as their condition1  
presupposition1 and basis1 all the      
dispositions of the soul and the        

manifestations of life found in the     
animal world1 will be worthy of the     
closest attention even on this account3 
because they form the basis1 the        
condition1 and 7if self-consciousness   
and freedom are once present7 an        
essential #aag part of the contents and 
object of self-consciousness and moral  
self-determination4 ,but where the      
origin of man is discussed1 the central 
point of the investigation is no longer 
the enumeration of those activities of  
the soul of man whose analogies we also 
find in the animal world1 but rather in 
the answer to the question as to how    
that entirely new manifestation1        
self-consciousness and moral            
self-determination1 came into existence 
or could have originated4 ,this question
 is the more decidedly the central point
 of the investigation1 since this new   
form1 when once in existence1 has for   
its object not only what already appears
 in the life of the soul of animals1 but
 also receives a new object1 which can  

only be an object of self-consciousness 
and of moral self-determination1 and not
 of mere consciousness and instinctive  
life4 ,these new objects are the ideas  
leading up to the conception of ,god and
 moral ideals4  ,now this very question 
as to the origin of self-consciousness  
and of free moral self-determination is 
wholly misjudged as to its importance1  
and given remarkably little attention by
 those evolutionists who are well versed
 in the realm of natural science4 ,the  
question as to the origin of            
self-consciousness is either entirely   
ignored--as if self-consciousness must  
originate wholly by itself1 if only     
those first steps of an intellectual and
 social life which the animal world also
 shows1 are once present and properly   
developed--or the solution is put aside 
with the most superficial analogies4    
,the question regarding free moral      
self-determination1 on the other hand1  
is either likewise ignored1 and for the 
same reasons1 or it is supposed that it 

must fail of itself1 if #aah only this  
self-determination is explained in a    
deterministic way4  ,it is true1 ,darwin
 devotes several chapters of his work1  
,descent of ,man1 to a comparison of the
 intellectual powers of man with those  
of animals1 and these chapters are full 
of the most interesting facts and       
comparisons2 but although his work      
comprises two volumes1 he devotes to the
 origin of self-consciousness1          
individuality1 abstraction1 general     
ideas1 etc41 only a single page1 and    
justifies his brief treatment with the  
assertion that the attempt at discussing
 these higher faculties is useless1     
because hardly two authors agree in     
their definitions of these terms4 ,what 
he says about self-consciousness is     
really contained in two sentences1      
namely3 ,but how can we feel sure that  
an old dog with an excellent memory and 
some power of imagination1 as shown by  
his dreams1 never reflects on his past  
pleasures or pains in the chase8 ,this  

would be a form of self-consciousness4  
,on the other hand1 as ,bchner has      
remarked in his ,lectures about         
,darwin's ,theory3 ,how little can the  
hard-working wife of a degraded         
,australian savage1 who hardly ever uses
 abstract words1 and can not count above
 four1 how little can such a woman exert
 her self-consciousness1 or reflect on  
the nature of her own existence6 ,and in
 ,darwin's resum of his chapters on the 
intellectual powers of man and animals1 
he says1 on page #abf3 ,if it could be  
proved that certain high mental powers1 
such as the formation of general        
concepts1 self-consciousness1 etc41 were
 absolutely peculiar to man1 which seems
 extremely doubtful1 it is not          
improbable that these qualities are     
merely the incidental results of other  
highly-advanced intellectual faculties3 
#aai and these again mainly the result  
of the continued use of a perfect       
language4  ,if ,darwin is thus not able 
to show us in the animal world a single 

real analogy which at all approaches    
self-consciousness1 and1 in order to    
supply this want1 must have recourse to 
the purely hypothetical possibility that
 it is not certain whether an old       
hunting-dog does not reflect upon the   
past joys of the chase2 if by the       
uncertainty of the expression that      
self-consciousness might be an          
accompanying result of other faculties1 
he nevertheless gives us to understand  
that he can not find the sufficient     
cause of the origin of                  
self-consciousness in those other       
faculties2 and1 finally1 if he closes   
the last mentioned quotation with a     
sentence which has for its premise the  
wholly illogical thought that language  
might have been able to reach a high    
state of development before the origin  
of self-consciousness and without its   
assistance3 then1 indeed1 the result of 
all this certainly is that he has given 
no adequate consideration to the        
specific nature of self-consciousness4  

,it is only under this supposition that 
it is possible for him to say3          
,nevertheless1 the difference in mind   
between man and the higher animals1     
great as it certainly is1 is one of     
degree and not of quality4 ,the authors 
may possibly not agree in the           
definitions of the idea of              
self-consciousness--we ourselves perhaps
 are only an additional example in      
confirmation of this fact--2 but        
whatever the definition may be1 the fact
 itself remains1 that self-consciousness
 does not stand as one of the           
intellectual faculties beside the others
 and cordinate with them1 but1 as an    
entirely new form of being1 introduces a
 qualitatively new and valuable factor  
into the subject4 ,that which precedes  
the #abj origin of                      
self-consciousness--the purely conscious
 and not yet self-conscious life of the 
soul1 as it shows itself with higher    
animals1 especially with mammals--may   
have been the necessary condition and   

requirement for the origin of           
self-consciousness4 ,it certainly has   
been so2 and from this point of view1   
all these psychological studies of      
animals and psycho-physical             
investigations which are a favorite     
object of modern science1 have a high   
value2 but what has been called into    
existence by means of conditions is not 
on that account the product of those    
conditions4 ,this very fact is one of   
the greatest mistakes of most of the    
modern evolution theories3 that very    
often--and especially where they wish to
 draw metaphysical conclusions from     
their scientific results or             
hypotheses--they confound condition and 
basis with cause4  ,now it appears to us
 that1 in quite an analogous way1       
,darwin overlooks or contests the fact  
that with free moral self-determination 
something specifically new comes into   
existence4 ,he certainly discusses the  
origin of the moral qualities of man    
more in detail than he does the origin  

of his intellectual qualities4 ,he      
derives them1 in their first beginnings1
 from the fixity1 transmission and      
increase of the social impulses and     
instincts4 ,these1 being the basis of   
the whole moral development1 and leading
 in their more mature form to love and  
to sympathy1 originated by natural      
selection2 and the other moral          
qualities1 such as moral sense and      
conscience1 progressed more by the      
effect of custom1 by the power of       
reflection1 instruction1 and religion1  
than by natural selection4 ,higher and  
lower1 common and special1 permanent and
 transitory instincts come into         
collision #aba with one another4 ,the   
dissatisfaction of man when any of the  
lower1 special1 and transitory instincts
 have overcome the higher1 common and   
permanent1 and the resolution to act    
differently for the future1 is          
conscience4 ,darwin considers that one a
 moral being who is capable of comparing
 with one another his past and future   

actions and motives1 of approving some  
of them and of disapproving others2 and 
the fact that man is the only creature  
who can with certainty be ranked as a   
moral being is1 according to ,darwin1   
the greatest of all differences between 
man and animals4  ,here1 again1 the     
whole central point of the investigation
 as to the origin of man does not lie in
 the question of the origin of the      
instincts between which the moral       
subject1 acting in moral                
self-determination1 has to choose4 ,for 
it is clear that the beginnings of these
 instincts are also present in the      
animal world4 ,but the main question is1
 how did this faculty and necessity of  
choosing1 this conscience and           
responsibility1 this moral sense1 as    
,darwin calls it1 originate8 ,now to    
this question we have a plain answer in 
the before-mentioned utterances of      
,darwin3 ,it originated not as a product
 of the social instincts--it only has   
these instincts for its preceding       

condition1 object and instrument2 but it
 originated as a product of other       
agencies1 which act upon these impulses 
and instincts1 operate with them1 choose
 between them2 and as these other       
agencies ,darwin mentions the high      
development of the intellectual powers4 
,that this is his opinion1 we can       
clearly see from an expression with     
which he introduces his essay on the    
origin of moral sense3 ,the following   
proposition seems to me in a high degree
 probable--namely1 that #abb any animal 
whatever1 endowed with well-marked      
social instincts1 would inevitably      
acquire a moral sense or conscience1 as 
soon as its intellectual powers had     
become as well1 or nearly as well       
developed1 as in man4 ,these            
intellectual powers which moral feeling 
and conscience require at their birth1  
are certainly1 according to ,darwin the 
power to distinguish oneself as subject 
from one's impulses and instincts1 and  
to choose between them2 i4e41           

self-consciousness4 ,we shall have to   
admit fully this intimate connection    
between moral self-determination and    
self-consciousness2 but we must admit1  
at the same time1 that moral            
self-determination--this new form of    
activity in which moral activity        
distinguishes itself from all merely    
instinctive activity--finds its         
sufficient explanation in the previous  
stage of the animal world as little as  
self-consciousness2 and that moral      
self-determination has the condition and
 presupposition1 but not the cause1 of  
its existence in that which is also     
found in the previous stage of the      
animal world4 ,the proof that the origin
 of moral self-determination finds its  
sufficient explanation in that which the
 previous stage of the animal world also
 has1 would appear to have been given by
 ,darwin only when he had succeeded in  
explaining the origin of                
self-consciousness from animal          
intelligence2 but that he did not       

succeed in it1 we think we have clearly 
shown4 ,on the other hand1 we willingly 
admit that the study of the social and  
all other instincts and impulses which  
are common to man and animals1 and which
 in man form the object and instrument  
of his moral activity1 has for us the   
highest interest1 inasmuch as the only  
problem is to explain the conditions and
 prerequisites of moral                 
self-determination--or1 historically    
speaking1 the conditions #abc and       
prerequisites of the origin of morally  
acting beings4 ,furthermore we have to  
say here also that condition and        
prerequisite are not identical with     
cause1 and it is precisely the cause of 
moral responsibility and of the origin  
of such morally responsible beings1     
which has not yet been discovered by the
 ,darwinian theory4  ,the followers of  
,darwin enter still less into the       
discussion of the question as to the    
origin of self-consciousness and of     
moral self-determination4 ,hckel--who1  

in his ,natural ,history of ,creation   
and in his ,anthropogeny1 expounds his  
whole evolution theory in all its       
antecedent conditions and               
consequences--has1 indeed1 much to say  
of the different faculties of the soul  
of man and animals4 ,he traces these    
faculties in the case of man down to the
 lowest state of the most degraded      
races1 and in the case of animals from  
the kermes up to the bee1 from the      
lancelet-fish to the dog1 ape1 elephant 
and horse2 and he also treats of the    
so-called a priori knowledge which arose
 only by long-enduring transmission1 by 
inheritance of acquired adaptations of  
the brain1 out of originally empiric or 
experiential knowledge a posteriori1    
7,vol4 ,,ii1 #cde74 ,but we look in vain
 in his works for a treatment of the    
question as to the origin of the        
,ego--of self-consciousness4 ,nowhere   
does he enter into the analysis of the  
psychological ideas2 he only compares   
the psychical utterances of different   

creatures1 and thinks the whole problem 
solved when he says3 ,the mental        
differences between the most stupid     
placental animals 7for instance1 sloths 
and armadillos7 and the most intelligent
 animals of the same group 7for instance
 dogs and apes7 are1 at any rate1 much  
more considerable than the differences  
in the #abd intellectual life of dogs1  
apes1 and men4 ,or3 ,if these brutish   
parasites are compared with the mentally
 active and sensitive ants1 it will     
certainly be admitted that the psychical
 differences between the two are much   
greater than those between the highest  
and lowest mammals--between beaked      
animals1 pouched animals and armadillos1
 on the one hand1 and dogs1 apes1 men1  
on the other4 ,the fact that in the     
human individual consciousness and      
self-consciousness are gradually        
developed1 is to him a proof that in the
 organic kingdom also consciousness and 
self-consciousness came into existence  
gradually1 and1 indeed1 hand-in-hand    

with the development of the nervous     
system2 and with this result he thinks  
that he has relieved himself from the   
task of showing the how of the origin of
 self-consciousness4 ,this becomes      
clearly evident from a remark about the 
origin of consciousness1 in his         
,anthropogeny1 where he says that1 if   
,du,bois-,reymond had thought that      
consciousness is developed1 he would no 
longer have held its origin to be a     
thing beyond the limits of human        
capacity4 ,hckel likewise seems to      
regard the question of the origin of    
moral self-determination as solved or   
rejected1 if only freedom is            
denied--which1 indeed1 is repeatedly    
done by him4  ,a similar defect in the  
treatment of this question by           
evolutionists we find in the works of   
,oscar ,schmidt1 ,gustav ,jger1 and     
others4 ,even ,emil ,du,bois-,reymond1  
who1 in his celebrated and eloquent     
lecture on ,the ,limits of the          
,knowledge of ,nature1 given before the 

assembly of scientists at ,leipzig1     
#ahgb1 asserts so energetically that the
 origin of sensation and consciousness  
is inexplicable 7see next section71     
seems to #abe take the origin of        
self-consciousness for granted1 and as  
needing no further explanation1 if only 
consciousness is once present4  ,since1 
then1 the scientists leave us without a 
sufficient answer to the question       
respecting the origin of                
self-consciousness and of moral         
self-determination1 we shall have to    
turn to the philosophers4 ,here1 indeed1
 we find rich definitions and genetic   
analyses1 but none that lead us any     
farther than to the information that    
consciousness is the necessary condition
 of self-consciousness2 that animal     
instinct is the necessary antecedent    
condition of moral self-determination4  
,yet in the works of these very         
philosophers who are inclined to a      
mechanical and monistic view of the     
world1 we find that they directly avoid 

the question as to the origin of        
self-consciousness and of moral         
self-determination4 ,as soon as they are
 led near it1 in the course of reasoning
 in their works1 they suddenly turn     
aside again to the quite different      
questions of the connection between     
brain and soul1 between physical and    
psychical1 external and internal        
processes1 etc4 ,evidently they feel    
that with this question they have       
arrived at the weak point of their      
system4 ,that here is a weak point1 we  
clearly see in the case of ,d4 ,f4      
,strauss1 a leading advocate of modern  
naturalism1 and the greatest philosophic
 scholar of that school4 ,it is true1 in
 his ,postscript as ,preface1 as we saw 
before1 he mentions the origin of       
self-consciousness as one of the points 
which need special explanation2 but he  
seems to have made this acknowledgment  
more with the purpose of showing that   
,du,bois-,reymond1 in admitting the     
origin of self-consciousness to be      

explainable1 has no longer any reason to
 contest the explicability of the #abf  
origin of sensation and consciousness2  
for in his work on ,the ,old ,faith and 
the ,new1 he did not enter into that    
question at all4 ,on the other hand1 he 
makes in his last-mentioned work a      
remarkable confession4 ,in answering the
 question--how do we determine our rule 
of life8--he comes to speak of the      
position of man in nature1 traces a law 
of progress in nature1 and says3 ,in    
this cumulative progression of life1 man
 is also comprised1 and1 moreover1 in   
such wise that the organic plasticity of
 our planet 7provisionally1 say some    
naturalists1 but that we may fairly     
leave an open question7 culminates in   
him4 ,as nature can not go higher1 she  
would go inwards4 ',to be reflected     
within itself1' was a very good         
expression of ,hegel's4 ,nature felt    
herself already in the animal1 but she  
wished to know herself also4 ,but still 
stronger is the following expression3   

,in man1 nature endeavored not merely to
 exalt1 but to transcend herself4 ,in   
#a1 ,chap4 ,,ii1 we shall have to speak 
of this important acknowledgment of     
teleology in nature1 which such an      
antagonist of teleology as ,strauss     
makes in the above-quoted remarks about 
a progress in nature and a will of      
nature2 but here we are more interested 
in the equally remarkable acknowledgment
 of the fact that man can not be        
explained from nature alone--that he is 
something which transcends nature4 ,for 
that 7according to ,strauss7 nature1 in 
originating man1 not only intended to   
transcend herself1 but really did       
transcend herself and1 that she         
succeeded in her intention1 we can infer
 from the moral precept which ,strauss  
gives3 ,do not forget for a moment1 that
 thou art human2 not merely a natural   
production4  ,the result of our         
investigation1 therefore1 is that #abg  
with self-consciousness and free moral  
self-determination something            

specifically new came into existence    
which had its antecedent condition in a 
previous state of existence1 but has not
 yet found its sufficient explanation in
 this antecedent state4   #b4 ,the      
,origin of ,sensation and of            
,consciousness4  ,the limits of our     
knowledge show themselves still more    
clearly in the attempts to explain the  
origin of consciousness and its lowest  
form--sensation4 ,self-consciousness is 
without doubt ideally nearer to         
consciousness in this1 that both are an 
immaterial activity2 and yet we found no
 demonstrable bridge which leads from   
consciousness to self-consciousness4    
,still broader is the gulf between the  
material and the immaterial1 between the
 unconscious and the conscious1--or1 to 
describe the two realms with names which
 bring them nearest together1 between   
that which is without sensation and that
 which has sensation3 a gulf to bridge  
which philosophy also has vainly exerted
 its utmost efforts1 as has been well   

known since the supernatural assistance 
of ,descartes and the prestablished     
harmony of ,leibnitz4 ,wherein lies the 
real necessity that there should be     
sensation8 ,how does the material become
 something that is felt8 ,what is the   
demonstrable cause 7not the condition1  
but the cause7 of a sentient subject8   
,to these questions1 every science up to
 the present day lacks an answer4 ,as is
 well known1 ,du,bois-,reymond1 in his  
previously-mentioned lecture upon ,the  
,limits of our ,knowledge of ,nature1   
declares the origin of sensation and of 
consciousness to be one of two limits1  
beyond #abh which we have not only to   
say ignoramus1 but ignorabimus4  ,in    
abstracto1 we might think of two        
attempts at bridging over this gulf3 the
 first one is that we try to transform  
sensation itself into something         
material1 and the other is that we      
attribute sensation also to that which1 
according to our observation1 seems to  
be without sensation2 namely1 to matter 

and its elements1 the atoms4 ,both of   
these attempts have been made--the      
former by ,d4 ,f4 ,strauss in his ,the  
,old ,faith and the ,new1 and by the    
,english philosopher1 ,herbert ,spencer1
 in his ,first ,principles of           
,philosophy2 the latter1 first pointed  
out by ,schopenhauer1 was taken up and  
farther developed by ,zllner in his     
work1 ,ueber die ,natur der ,kometen    
7,nature of the ,comets71 ,leipzig1     
,engelmann1 #ahgb1 and with special     
acuteness by an ,anonymus in the work3  
,das ,unbewusste von ,standpunkt der    
,physiologie und ,descendenztheorie     
7,the ,unconscious from the ,standpoint 
of ,physiology and ,descent ,theory71   
,berlin1 ,duncker1 #ahgb4  ,strauss     
says1 in the previously-mentioned work3 
,if1 under certain conditions1 motion is
 transformed into heat1 why may it not1 
under other conditions1 be transformed  
into sensation8 ,and ,herbert ,spencer  
says1 in his ,first ,principles of      
,philosophy1 7page #bag73 ,various      

classes of facts thus unite to prove    
that the law of metamorphosis1 which    
holds among the physical forces1 holds  
equally between them and the mental     
forces4 ,those modes of the unknowable  
which we call motion1 heat1 light1      
chemical affinity1 etc41 are alike      
transformable into each other1 and into 
those modes of the unknowable which we  
distinguish as sensation1 #abi emotion1 
thought3 these1 in their turns1 being   
directly or indirectly retransformable  
into the original shapes4  ,but         
motion--even the finest material motion1
 that of ether1 7which1 in consequence  
of the very important discovery of the  
conservation of force and of the        
mechanical equivalent of heat1 made by  
,robert von ,mayer1 at present is taken 
to be heat7--is so decidedly a material 
process1 the sensation of motion is so  
decidedly a reflex of the material in   
something immaterial1 that the assertion
 of a transformation of motion into     
sensation seems to us only to change the

 point of view1 and not to explain the  
difference1 but to efface it4 ,and we   
think that the appeal of ,strauss from  
his contemporaries1 who do not          
understand him1 to posterity1 who would 
understand him better and esteem him1   
has but little prospect of being        
operative4  ,if that which has sensation
 and that which has it not1 are to be   
brought genetically near one another1   
and hence the difference between the two
 at the point where the lowest sentient 
being has found its first existence1 is 
to be made void or at least bridged     
over1 then it is much more reasonable1  
and also in the line of ,strauss's      
solution1 to deny the difference between
 that which has sensation and that which
 has it not1 and to do this in the sense
 in which we also declare that to be    
sentient which we have hitherto been    
accustomed to regard as without         
sensation2 and we should likewise       
attribute sensation to the original     
elements of the world1 be they called   

atoms or whatever one may wish4 ,this is
 done by ,zllner and by the before      
mentioned ,anonymus4 ,this conclusion is
 logical2 it is even the only possible  
conclusion1 if we once start from the   
axiom that the new1 which comes #acj    
into existence1 must necessarily be     
explainable from agencies previously    
active1 and known to or imagined by us  
through abstractions and hypotheses4    
,zllner is certainly right when1 in his 
work which appeared before the lecture  
of ,du,bois-,reymond1 he puts the       
alternative1 either to renounce forever 
the conceivableness of the phenomena of 
sensation1 or hypothetically to add to  
the common qualities of matter one more1
 which places the simplest and most     
elementary transactions of nature under 
a process of sensation1 legitimately    
connected with it2 as also when he says 
7page #cbg73 ,we may regard the         
intensity of these sensations 7of       
matter7 as little and unimportant as we 
wish2 but the hypothesis of their       

existence is1 according to my           
conviction1 a necessary condition1 in   
order to comprehend the really existing 
phenomena of sensation in nature4 ,only 
we shall do well to choose the first    
alternative for the present1 and1 with  
,du,bois-,reymond1 answer the question  
as to the explanation of the origin of  
sensation with an ignoramus2 indeed1 we 
shall take a surer road with his        
ignorabimus than by a plunge into that  
bottomless ocean of hypotheses--in spite
 of the protest of ,hckel1 who          
7,anthrop41 page ,,xxi7 sees that       
scientist who has the courage to admit  
the limits of our knowledge1 on account 
of this ignorabimus1 walking in the army
 of the black ,international1 and       
marshalled under the black flag of the  
hierarchy1 together with spiritual      
servitude and falsehood1 want of reason 
and barbarism1 superstition and         
retrogression1 and fighting1 spiritual  
freedom and truth1 reason and culture1  
evolution and progress4 ,for a solution 

of the question which simply denies all 
sharply-marked differences in the world1
 and explains #aca the new1 which comes 
into existence with sensation1 by the   
assertion that this new element is not  
new1 but was already present1 and that  
it exists everywhere1 only we do not see
 it everywhere1--such a solution seems  
to us not to be the true way to         
interpret the problem of the sphinx4    
,even ,ed4 von ,hartmann seems to       
infringe the impartiality of the true   
observer1 when1 in his ,philosophy of   
the ,unconscious1 he attributes         
sensation to plants4 ,but when ,zllner  
says 7p4 #cbf73 ,all the labors of      
natural beings and1 as the connection   
indicates1 of all1 even of inorganic    
natural beings are determined by like   
and dislike2 and when ,anonymus         
attributes sensation to all atoms and to
 all complexities composed of them1 even
 to stone1 then all reasonable          
conception of natural things and        
processes certainly vanishes into thin  

air4  ,it will be remembered1 however1  
that in treating the question of the    
origin of self-consciousness1 although  
we were not able to solve the problem1  
nevertheless we had to ascribe high     
value to the investigation of all       
psychical processes on the low stage of 
sensation and consciousness1 since they 
show us not the cause1 but the condition
 and basis1 of self-consciousness4      
,likewise1 in the question as to the    
origin of sensation and of              
consciousness1 although we are not able 
to solve it1 we will willingly admit    
that we observe1 even in that which has 
no sensation1 qualities and processes   
which furnish the absolutely necessary  
condition and basis for sensation4 ,for 
the same reason1 we will also admit the 
manifold analogies of sensation which we
 observe in that which is without       
sensation4 ,the whole system of symbols 
in nature which fills our treasury of   
words and penetrates1 in a #acb         
thousandfold way1 our scientific and    

popular1 our poetical and prosaic       
speech1 our thoughts and feelings1 bears
 witness to the fact that that which is 
without sensation is also a preparatory 
step to sensation1 and feeling both     
active and passive springs from it4     
,however1 a preparatory step1 as such1  
is not necessarily the cause2 and the   
fact and the acknowledgment of a        
correlation is not on that account an   
explanation4   #c4 ,the ,origin of      
,life4  ,the third problem to be solved 
is the origin of life4 ,as is well      
known1 ,darwin himself makes no attempt 
at explaining this problem1 but is      
satisfied with the idea that life was   
infused into one or a few forms by the  
,creator 7,origin of ,species1 #f ed41  
p4 #dbi74 ,his investigations and       
theories only begin where organic life1 
in its first and lowest forms1 is       
already in existence4  ,but lately there
 have been made1 in the realm of the    
organic1 discoveries of beings which    
take the lowest conceivable round on the

 ladder of organisms1 and which in their
 form and structure are so simple that  
from them to the inorganic there seems  
to be but a short step4 ,we can no      
longer mention as belonging to the      
bridges which are said to lead from the 
organic world to the inorganic1 the     
often-named bathybius1 discovered by    
,huxley1 and so strongly relied upon for
 the mechanical explanation of life--a  
slimy net-like growth1 which covers the 
rocks in the great depths of the ocean4 
,for after scientists like ,k4 ,e4 von  
,baer and others had already declared it
 probable that this bathybius is only a 
precipitate of organic relics1 no less a
 person than the discoverer of the      
bathybius1 in the ,annals of ,natural   
,history1 #ahge1 #acc and in the        
,quarterly ,journal of ,microscopical   
,science1 #ahge1 has suggested that the 
whole discovery is but gypsum1 which was
 precipitated in a gelatinous condition4
 ,likewise the utterances concerning the
 simplicity and lack of structure of the

 lowest organisms1 are to be accepted   
only with great reservation2 for most of
 these organisms show very differently  
and very distinctly stamped structures2 
of this fact1 anyone may easily convince
 himself1 who has had the opportunity of
 observing with the microscope low and  
lowest organisms1 and to admire their   
striking and manifold forms4            
,nevertheless1 there are monera whose   
structure seems to be nothing but a     
living clod without kernel and cover1   
and which in that respect represent the 
lowest conceivable form of organic being
 and life4  ,now1 relying on these      
discoveries1 as well as upon the        
successful demonstration1 by inorganic  
means1 of organic acids in chemistry1   
and starting from the supposition that  
the first appearance of life must       
necessarily be explained by those       
agencies which are already active in the
 inorganic nature1 many scientists have 
attempted the so-called mechanical      
explanation of life4 ,this attempt has  

been made most logically and            
systematically by ,hckel4 ,he says that 
organic matter1 organic form1 and       
organic motion1 in the lowest stages of 
the organic1 which are almost the only  
ones to be taken into consideration when
 the problem of the origin of life is   
discussed1 contain nothing at all which 
does not also pertain to the inorganic4 
,in his opinion1 organic matter is an   
albuminous carbon combination1 of which 
we have to presuppose that1 like all    
chemical combinations1 under certain    
physical and chemical conditions it can 
also arise in the realm #acd of the     
inorganic in a purely chemical and      
mechanical way4 ,organic form which1 in 
its lowest stages1 is so simple1 like   
the moneron and the bathybius1 and which
 stands still lower than a cell1 is1    
moreover1 something which there is no   
difficulty in explaining from inorganic 
matter4 ,finally1 organic motion which  
alone is the last and lowest            
characteristic of the organic in its    

lowest stage--in which the process of   
life properly consists1 and in which1   
therefore1 we have to recognize the     
punctum saliens of the whole            
question--is only an increase and       
complication of the merely mechanical   
motion of the inorganic1 likewise       
explainable by mechanical causes4 ,this 
view ,hckel expounds in the thirteenth  
and partly also in the first chapter of 
his ,natural ,history of ,creation1 and 
explains the origin of the first and    
most simple organic individuals either  
through what he calls autogony in an    
inorganic fluid1 or through plasmogony  
in an organic fluid--a plasma or        
protoplasma4 ,in fact1 according to him1
 the only correct idea is that all      
matter is provided with a soul1 that    
inorganic and organic nature is one1    
that all natural bodies known to us are 
equally animated1 and that the contrast 
commonly drawn between the living and   
the dead world does not exist4 ,this is 
but a repetition1 in a more rhetorical  

way1 of the same idea which ,anonymus   
expressed in discussing the question as 
to the origin of sensation4             
,du,bois-,reymond--who1 in his lecture  
at ,leipzig1 pronounced the origin of   
sensation and of consciousness a problem
 of natural science1 never to be        
solved--is also of the opinion that the 
explanation of life from mere mechanism 
of atoms is very probable1 and only a   
question of time4 ,it is well known that
 the experimental #ace attempts at      
originating the organic through         
chemistry are at present pursued with an
 eagerness that can have its stimulus   
only in the hope of success4  ,it is    
clear that the main point of the        
question does not lie in organic matter 
or in organic form1 but in organic      
motion1 for even the specific of the    
organic form originates only first      
through organic motion of life4 ,if1    
therefore1 life is to be explained from 
mechanical causes1 it must also be shown
 that the merely mechanical motion of   

inorganic matter produces that motion   
which we know as organic motion1 and how
 it produces it4 ,the idea of increase  
and complication of the inorganic1      
merely mechanical motion1 with which    
,hckel throws a bridge from the living  
to the lifeless or from the organic to  
the inorganic1 does not yet give us that
 proof2 it seems rather to be one of    
those pompous phrases with which people 
hide their ignorance and make the       
uncritical multitude believe that the   
explanation is found3 a manipulation    
against which1 among others1 ,wigand1 in
 his great work1 repeatedly protests1 as
 also does the ,duke of ,argyll in his  
lecture on ,anthropomorphism in         
,theology1 having especially in his mind
 the deductions of ,spencer4 ,for we may
 review the whole known series of       
mechanical motions and their mechanical 
causes1 and imagine their mechanical    
increase and their mechanical           
complication the largest possible2 and  
still the life-motion of the organic    

will never result therefrom4 ,if such a 
keen psychical and physiological        
investigator and thinker1 and such an   
authority in the realm of the motions of
 atoms and molecules1 as ,gustav        
,theodor ,fechner--,einige ,ideen zur   
,schpfungs- und ,entwicklungsgeschichte 
der ,organismen 7,some ,ideas about the 
,history of the #acf ,creation and      
,development of ,organisms71 ,leipzig1  
#ahgc1 p4 #a1 f4--can find the whole    
lasting and effectual difference between
 the organic and inorganic in nothing   
else than in the way and manner of      
motion--namely1 that the motion of the  
organic molecules is different from that
 of the inorganic molecules--and when he
 traces this difference with            
mathematical exactness1 then an         
assertion which simply denies that      
difference1 without attempting to show  
the identity of the two motions1 to say 
nothing of proving this identity1 is    
nothing more than a clear evidence that 
the mechanical theory has not yet       

succeeded in explaining the origin of   
life1 and that those scientists who so  
haughtily look down upon the abuse of   
vital power1 to the efficacy of which   
their antagonists began to resort when  
their knowledge came to an end1 make    
exactly the same abuse with their       
mechanism4 ,that organic motion1 even   
the organic motion of molecules1 once   
present1 comes into dependence on the   
well known laws of mechanism1 we        
naturally will not deny2 any more than  
that the human body1 when serving the   
will of the mind1 follows in its motions
 the laws of physiology and mechanism4  
,preyer seems to make a mistake similar 
to that of those who efface sensation   
and motion1 when1 in an essay on the    
hypothesis of the origin of life1 in the
 ,deutsche ,rundschau1 ,vol4 ,i1 #g1 he 
even effaces the difference between life
 and sensation1 and simply identifies   
life and motion4 ,self-motion1 called   
life1 and inorganic movement of bodies  
by agencies outside of themselves1 are  

but quantitatively1 intensively1 or     
gradually different forms of motion2 not
 in their innermost being different4444 
,our will changes many kinds of motion  
into heat1 makes #acg cold metal to be  
red-hot simply by hammering4444         
,likewise inversely1 as the law of the  
conservation of force must require1 a   
part of the eternal heat of the metal   
can be now and forever transposed into  
the living motion of our soul4 ,this    
whole manner of investigation and proof 
is one of those numerous unconscious    
logical fallacies which1 introduced by  
,hegel1 have gradually attained a       
certain title by possession4 ,from the  
observation of a process1 they abstract 
a characteristic1 as general as         
possible1--as1 for instance1 from the   
observation of life the characteristic  
of motion2 then they find that the      
process has the characteristic in common
 with still other processes--as1 for    
instance1 the self-motion of the living 
has the general characteristic of motion

 in common with the objective motion of 
the lifeless2 and then they persuade    
themselves that the process which they  
try to explain is really explained by   
having found a quality of this process  
as comprehensive as possible4 ,and in   
order to hide the falsity of the        
conclusion1 they also give to the       
general idea1 which they have found to  
be a characteristic of that process1 the
 same name which the special process    
has1--as1 for instance1 they call motion
 life1 no matter whether it is a motion 
of itself or a being moved1 no matter   
whether it is performed from within or  
in consequence of an impulse from       
without2 and then they say3 ,behold1    
life is explained2 life is nothing but  
motion4 ,but it can be readily seen that
 life is also motion1 and has therefore 
this characteristic in common with      
everything which is moved2 but that the 
specific of that motion called          
life--namely1 self-motion in consequence
 of an impulse renewing itself from     

within1 and1 as ,fechner shows1 #ach    
self-motion in a rotatory direction of  
the molecules1 precisely the same thing 
which in distinction from other motions 
we call life1--is not explained1 but    
simply ignored4  ,there is still another
 bold hypothesis which we have to       
mention--namely1 that the organic germs 
were once thrown from other spheres upon
 the earth by rolites4 ,years ago this  
idea was declared by ,helmholtz to be   
scientifically conceivable2 then it was 
formally asserted and brought into      
general notice by ,sir ,william         
,thompson1 in his opening address before
 the annual assembly of the ,british    
,association at ,edinburgh1 in #ahga1   
but rejected as formally and materially 
unscientific by ,zllner1 in the preface 
to his work1 ,nature of ,comets1 and    
again defended by ,helmholtz in his     
preface to the second volume of a       
translation of ,thompson and ,tait's    
,theoretical ,physics4 ,however1 this   
hypothesis also only defers the solution

 of the question1 and1 supposing its    
scientific possibility1 leads either to 
the remoter question1 how life did      
originate in those other spheres1 or to 
the metaphysical assertion of the       
eternity of life and of the eternal     
continuity of the living in the world1  
and shows therewith very clearly the    
impossibility of its explanation4  ,this
 inexplicability would still exist1 if  
what is quite improbable should happen1 
namely1 that the experimental attempts  
at artificially producing organic life  
should be successful1 and if thus the   
question as to the generatio quivoca1   
which during the past decades so much   
alarmed the minds of scientists and     
theologians1 should be experimentally   
solved and answered in the affirmative4 
,for in view of the hopes of a possible 
explanation of life1 which is expected  
to be the reward for the success of #aci
 these attempts1 ,zllner is fully right 
in saying3 ,that the scientists to-day  
set such an extremely high value on the 

inductive proof of the generatio        
quivoca1 is the most significant symptom
 of how little they have made themselves
 acquainted with the first principles of
 the theory of knowledge4 ,for1 suppose 
they should really succeed in observing 
the origin of organic germs under       
conditions entirely free from objection 
to any imaginable communication with the
 atmosphere1 what could they answer to  
the assertion that the organic germs1 in
 reference to their extension1 are of   
the order of ether-atoms1 and1 with     
these1 press through the intervals of   
the material molecules which form the   
sides of our apparatus8  ,how little    
life is explained1 at least according to
 the present state of our knowledge1    
also follows from the insufficiency of  
all attempts at defining it4 ,the latest
 and most thorough attempt at such a    
definition of life1 with which we are   
familiar1 is that made by ,herbert      
,spencer in his ,first ,principles1     
#be1 and in his ,principles of ,biology1

 ,vol4 ,i1 ,part ,i1 ,chap4 #d and #e4  
,having made thorough investigations1 he
 arrives at the general formula3 ,life  
is the continuous adjustment of internal
 relations to external relations4 ,to   
this definition we will not make the    
objection that it is nothing but a      
logical abstraction from the common     
quality of all processes and phenomena  
of life2 for it certainly lies in the   
nature of a definition that it can be   
nothing else but that4 ,nevertheless1 we
 will state that such a definition of   
life not only does not lead us any      
nearer to the comprehension of its      
processes1 and especially of the        
richness and the organization of its    
forms and functions1 but that it #adj   
clearly shows us how little the origin  
of life is explained4 ,for this very    
definition necessarily and obviously    
leads us to the questions3 ,whence do   
those internal relations originate1     
whence their adjustment to external     
relations1 and whence the continuity of 

this adjustment8 ,the answer to these   
questions this definition still owes us4
  ,therefore1 not only                  
self-consciousness and freedom1 not only
 sensation and consciousness1 but also  
life and the organic1 remain a          
phenomenon which--at least1 according to
 the present state of our knowledge and 
reasoning--enters into the realm of the 
world of phenomena as something new that
 can not be explained from the          
foregoing1 although it presupposes the  
foregoing as the condition1 not the     
cause1 of its appearance2 and no matter 
whether we have to think of the modality
 of its origin as a sudden or as a      
gradual one4   #d4 ,the ,elements of the
 ,world1 the ,theory of ,atoms1 and the 
,mechanical ,view of the ,world4  ,the  
investigating and thinking mind1 when it
 attempts to explain the appearances and
 forms of that which exists1 finds      
itself led further and further back1    
until it finally arrives at the last    
elements of the world and of matter4    

,whether we take the problem of life as 
solved or unsolved1 the living has      
matter and its subordination to the     
efficiency of all its chemical and      
mechanical powers in common with the    
lifeless2 and the organic1 in its first 
beginnings1 stands extraordinarily near 
to1 and is grown on the ground of1 the  
inorganic1--if not according to the     
category of cause and effect1 still     
according to that of condition and      
consequence1 of basis and structure4    
,therefore we stand at last before the  
#ada question of the final elements of  
matter1 which1 indeed1 constitutes      
organic as well as inorganic bodies4    
,the answer to this question is         
attempted by the theory of atoms3 the   
doctrine which teaches that the whole   
material world is composed of simple    
particles which are no farther          
divisible1 and from whose juxtaposition 
the chemical elements--and1 in respect  
to their other forms of existence and   
combination1 the whole world of bodies1 

with all their forms1 states1 and       
changes1--are composed4  ,this theory   
has not only the practical value that   
the physical 7and especially the        
chemical7 sciences can make and use     
their formulas most easily under the    
supposition of such simple primitive    
elements2 but it also has the great     
theoretical merit that it has broken    
down the old barriers between matter and
 force1 and has thus promoted           
considerably our method of regarding the
 world of material substances4 ,toward  
this result1 scientists and             
philosophers--and1 among the latter1 the
 thinkers and investigators of both     
views of the world1 the theistic and the
 pantheistic1 the ideal and the         
materialistic1--have worked with equal  
merit1 and have equally enjoyed its     
fruits1 with perhaps the single         
exception of so pure a materialist as   
,ludwig ,bchner1 who1 it seems1 does not
 like to give up his old doctrine of    
force and matter as the two inseparable1

 equivalent1 and equally eternal        
elements of the universe4 ,that matter  
itself1 even when looked upon from a    
purely physical standpoint1 has an      
incorporeal principle2 that the whole   
world of bodies1 as such1 has but a     
phenomenal character2 that not force and
 matter are the two empirico-physical   
principles of the world1 but that matter
 itself must be a product of elementary 
#adb force active in the atoms2 these   
doctrines have now be pretty nearly     
common property of natural science and  
philosophy4 ,investigators who like     
,wilhelm ,wundt1 rise from natural      
science to philosophy1 or such as take  
their starting-point from               
philosophy--whether they be theists1    
like ,lotze1 ,i4 ,h4 ,fichte1 ,ulrici1  
or occupy the ground of a pessimistic   
pantheism1 as does ,eduard von          
,hartmann1--all share this view and its 
fruits4  ,but in spite of all these     
preferences for the theory of atoms1 we 
should not forget that it still has but 

hypothetical value--that it is but an   
idea of limits1 which indicates1 where  
the scientifically perceptible ceases1  
and that every attempt at moving this   
limit still farther on must either fail 
and lead into unsolvable contradictions1
 or1 if successful1 only leads to new   
difficulties and unsolved problems4     
,already within that realm in which the 
theory of atoms is a supplemental       
hypothesis directly indispensable at    
present--i4e41 within their application 
in physical sciences--we meet           
suppositions which raise great doubts   
and difficulties4 ,such a scientific    
difficulty occurs when the atomism of   
the natural philosophers supposes a     
double complexity of atoms1 material    
atoms and atoms of ether3 complexities  
which both penetrate one another1 and   
are supposed to follow partly totally   
different1 partly the same1 elementary  
laws of force4 ,material atoms are      
subordinate to the law of gravitation1  
while atoms of ether are not2 and yet   

both act legitimately upon one          
another1--as1 for instance1 when heat   
passes into motion and motion into heat1
 which certainly presupposes a law of   
power acting in common for both4        
,another difficulty lies in the atomism 
of the chemists2 and still another #adc 
in the divergency of the aims at which  
the physical theory of atoms on the one 
hand and the chemical theory of atoms on
 the other seem to point4 ,chemistry is 
inclined to explain the difference of   
its numerous elements from the original 
difference of the atoms2 and yet it is  
not at all certain that the elements of 
chemistry themselves are not composed of
 still more simple and less numerous    
primary elements4 ,many indications seem
 to point to such primary elements which
 are more simple in number and quality1 
and investigators even mention an       
element--hydrogen--in the direction of  
which we have to look for the way that  
will lead us to those primitive elements
 of matter4 ,the divergency of aims1    

finally1 consists in the fact that      
physical atomism prevailingly points to 
a conformity of the atoms of bodies2    
chemical atomism1 on the contrary1--at  
least1 according to its present         
state1--points to a dissimilarity among 
these4  ,the hypothetical and           
problematical nature of the theory of   
atoms strikes us still more clearly when
 we try to analyze it philosophically4  
,first1 we meet that antinomy which we  
always find where we try to pass beyond 
the limits of our empirical knowledge by
 means of conception4 ,for1 if the atoms
 still occupy space1 we can not         
understand why they should not be       
further divisible1 and if they do not   
occupy space1 we can not understand how 
any sum of that which does not occupy   
space1 can finally succeed in filling   
space4 ,it is true1 this very antinomy  
has led to the overcoming of that       
dualism of force and matter which so    
long enchained science1 and the         
overcoming of which we greet as a       

progress of our theoretical knowledge of
 nature4 ,we no #add longer look upon   
the atoms as material elements1 but as  
centres of force4 ,the antinomy has the 
further merit that1 in the realm of the 
knowledge of nature1 it brings to our   
consciousness the great advantage of a  
concrete perception and reasoning over  
purely logical abstractions4 ,for       
,ulrici1 in his ,god and ,nature1 is    
right in calling our attention to the   
fact that we must think about the atoms1
 not in an abstractly logical and an    
abstractly mathematical way1 but        
concretely2 that we have to consider    
them1 not as mere quantities1 but as    
qualities2 and that we can then easily  
arrive at the perception of something   
which occupies space1 and which         
therefore1 according to abstract        
conclusions of logic and mathematics1   
could still be thought of as divisible  
in abstracto1 but which1 even as a      
consequence of its quality1 of its      
concrete natural form1 is no longer     

divisible in reality4 ,nevertheless1 in 
spite of all these remarkable attempts  
at overcoming the difficulties of the   
theory of atoms1 that antinomy returns  
as often as we undertake to make that   
clearly perceptible which we have at    
last gained a partial conception of2 and
 thus shows us1 from this side also1    
that even with the theory of atoms we   
have arrived at the limit where not only
 our observation1 but also the          
preciseness and certainty of our        
conceptions1 ceases4  ,by the atomic    
theory1 we do not gain anything for the 
ultimate explanation of the world and   
its contents1 not even if its present   
hypothetical value should be changed    
into a complete demonstration4 ,for the 
whole theory but removes the question as
 to the origin of things from their     
sensible appearance to the elements of  
that appearance1 and leaves us standing 
just as helpless before the elements as 
before the appearances4 ,for #ade whence
 does the whole richness of the         

appearances in the world come8 ,if the  
atoms are all alike1 and their laws of  
force the simplest we can imagine1 then 
their grouping into all the developments
 and formations of which we observe such
 an infinite and regularly arranged     
abundance1 is not less unexplained than 
if we had not gone back to the theory of
 atoms at all4 ,but if the atoms and    
their laws of force are different1 the  
difficulty is not simplified1 but       
doubled4 ,for1 first1 the theory then   
owes us an answer to the questions      
wherein the difference of the atoms     
consists and whence it comes2 and1      
second1 the question we have to consider
 in supposing a uniformity of the atoms1
 is not disposed of or answered--the    
question1 namely1 as to the causes which
 bring these different atoms together to
 form precisely those complexities of   
atoms which we observe as the world of  
phenomena4  ,this insufficiency of the  
theory of atoms in explaining the world 
and its contents1 is another proof to us

 that1 however great the practical value
 of this theory may be for the          
operations of physics and chemistry1 its
 theoretical value consists essentially 
in the fact that it formulates more     
accurately the perception of the limits 
of our exact knowledge4 ,even the idea  
of ,lotze1 that the atoms 7in themselves
 different7 are not really the final    
elements of matter1 but consist of still
 more simple but likewise different     
elements1 seems to us more a decoration 
than an extension of the limits at which
 our perception has arrived2 we stand   
before a double door1 but find both     
doors locked4 ,we agree with            
,du,bois-,reymond1 when he declares1 in 
his before-mentioned lecture1 the       
impossibility of perceiving the last    
elements of the #adf world1 matter and  
force1 to be the other limit of our     
knowledge of nature which1 together with
 the impossibility of the explanation of
 the origin of sensation and            
consciousness1 remains forever fixed4   

,likewise1 the peculiar modification    
which ,g4 ,th4 ,fechner gives to the    
theory of the last elements of the      
world1 cannot escape the charge of      
leaving the problem of the world        
scientifically just as unsolved as      
before4 ,fechner not only finds1 as we  
have already mentioned1 the difference  
between the organic and the inorganic in
 the difference of the mutual motions1  
but he also finds that the character of 
organic motions is exactly the same as  
that which the bodies of the universe   
have among themselves in their motions4 
,thus he distinguishes the cosmorganic  
motion1 which is performed in the whole 
of the universe1 and the                
molecular-organic motion1 which we      
observe in the single organisms of the  
earth2 he makes ,god the personal1      
self-conscious soul of this cosmical    
organism2 and1 in using the law of the  
tendency to stability1 with which he    
completes the ,darwinian selection      
theory1 asserts that the organic in the 

whole of the universe1 as well as in the
 narrow sphere of single bodies on the  
earth1 is the first thing from which the
 inorganic was separated and became     
gradually fixed4 ,thus1 in his opinion1 
the problem which up to the present has 
occupied investigators1--namely1 how did
 the organic originate from the         
inorganic8--would have to be reversed   
to1 how did the inorganic originate from
 the organic8  ,preyer would also reach 
a similar result with his               
above-mentioned theory of the identity  
of life and motion4 ,for according to   
this theory1 the living would #adg be as
 old and common as motion1 and the      
organic but the dregs of life4  ,we may1
 therefore1 say that1 without regard to 
the fact that neither pantheism nor     
theism will ever harmonize with         
,fechner's solution of this contrast    
which gives to ,god exactly the same    
position in the world as the soul has in
 the body1 natural science will         
certainly treat with great reserve a    

cosmo-metaphysical system which so fully
 upsets all results of exact            
investigations into the history of      
origin and development1 and has no other
 proof for itself than the identity1 or 
at least the similarity1 of the abstract
 formula according to which the         
molecular motions of organisms and the  
cosmical motions are performed4         
,although we thus have to deny to the   
proof of this identity or similarity the
 weight which ,fechner gives to it1     
nevertheless it has still no small      
merit1 since it throws new and clearer  
light upon the old thought1 always      
attractive and yet so difficult to      
present1--of a macrocosmus and a        
microcosmus1 which has been often enough
 treated with so much natural mysticism4
  ,thus1 in our inquiry into the        
development of things1 we have          
successively arrived at four points1    
each of which urged us to make the      
confession that here something new came 
into existence1 which can not be        

explained from the preceding conditions 
of its being2 these four points were3   
the origin of self-consciousness1 the   
origin of sensation and consciousness1  
the origin of life1 and finally the     
elements of the universe4 ,arrived at   
the last problem1 we see the confession 
of our ignorance increased to the still 
more comprehensive confession that we   
are really not able fully to explain    
anything in the world4 ,we are able to  
perceive a uniformity of law in the     
states and #adh changes of things1 and  
to abstract therefrom common laws of    
nature2 we can observe single objects1  
and perceive their states and changes in
 their connection with one another and  
in their dependence on those laws4 ,but 
we are not able to explain              
scientifically either the origin of     
these laws or the last physical causes  
of the qualities of things1 which follow
 these laws4  ,we should reach the same 
result if we had not started from the   
objective world of the existing1 as we  

were induced to do by our subject1 but  
from theoretical investigations4 ,here  
also we should immediately find         
ourselves in a world of relations       
between subject and object1 of a        
regularly arranged abundance of         
subjective and objective qualities1     
states and processes1 of which the      
objective only come to our knowledge    
through the medium of the subjective1   
and of regularly arranged laws to which 
both the subjective and the objective   
are commonly subordinate4 ,but why just 
these and no other qualities of the     
subject and of objects exist1 why just  
these and no other laws reign1 why just 
this and no other relation takes place  
between the perceiving subject and the  
perceived object1 would remain          
unanswered as before4  ,amidst a        
generation which is so fond of reveling 
in the thought of an extension of all   
the limits of our knowledge1 and is     
inclined to proclaim as true that which 
it wishes and hopes1 investigators are  

not wholly wanting who very decidedly   
express their consciousness of these    
limits of our knowledge1 and at the same
 time combine it with the most logical  
scientific reasoning and investigation4 
,even when in detail they reach these   
limits from the most varying points of  
view1 and draw #adi them in different   
directions1 they all agree in confirming
 the principle that it is one of the    
first and most indispensable conditions 
of successful investigation always to be
 conscious of the limits of its         
perception4 ,voices which remind mankind
 of these limits1 are perhaps less      
popular1 for man prefers to be reminded 
of the advances rather than of the      
limitations of his knowledge2 but they  
are on that account the more worthy of  
our gratitude1 for they keep us on the  
solid ground of the attainable from     
which alone sure progress in knowledge  
is possible4 ,among such philosophers we
 name ,ulrici1 and especially ,lotze2   
among scientists1 in the first place1   

two pioneers in their                   
departments--namely1 in the department  
of the mechanism of heat1 ,robert von   
,mayer--compare his ,bemerkungen ber das
 mechanische ,aequivalent der ,wrme     
7,remarks on the ,mechanical ,equivalent
 of ,heat71 and ,ueber nothwendige      
,consequenzen und ,inconsequenzen der   
,wrmemechanik 7,necessary ,consequences 
and ,inconsequences of the ,mechanism of
 ,heat71 ,stuttgart1 ,cotta2--and in the
 realm of the development of organisms1 
,k4 ,e4 von ,baer--compare his ,reden   
und kleinere ,aufstze 7,addresses and   
,essays71 #b vols41 ,st4 ,petersburg1   
#ahfd and #ahgf4 ,in this connection we 
have already mentioned the name of      
,du,bois-,reymond4 ,otto ,kstlin        
published two remarkable dissertations  
in this direction--,ueber die ,grenzen  
der ,naturwissenschaft 7,limits of      
,natural ,science71 ,tbingen1 ,fues1    
#b;d ed41 #ahgd1 and ,ueber natrliche   
,entwicklung 7,natural ,development71   
ib41 #ahge4 ,in the latter he especially

 cautions against hastily confounding   
the laws of development of planets1     
development of the organic kingdom1 and 
development #aej of the individual      
organisms4 ,recently1 ,wigand1 in the   
second volume of his work already       
frequently mentioned1 attempts1 with an 
extreme energy which does too little    
justice to the representation and       
investigation of the still unsolved     
problems1 to formulate the limits of the
 knowable4  ,a contrary extreme1 and of 
its kind a still more one-sided         
corrective of this too great stability1 
we have in those investigators who1 by  
reason of the great progress which has  
been made in the realm of the           
theoretical knowledge of nature1 allow  
themselves to be drawn on to the hope of
 still explaining all states and        
processes in the world--the spiritual   
and the ethic processes as well as the  
physical--from the pure mechanism of    
atoms2 and who see in that which thus   
far has been mechanically explained1 the

 only and the infallible way of         
explaining all that is still obscure4   
,they call this view the mechanical view
 of the world2 and1 as monism1 put it in
 opposition to the vitalistic1          
teleological1 and dualistic view of the 
world4 ,in order to obtain a correct    
view of this standpoint1 we quote from  
,hckel's ,natural ,history of ,creation1
 ,vol4 ,i1 page #bc1 the following      
passage3 ,by the theory of descent we   
are for the first time enabled to       
conceive of the unity of nature in such 
a manner that a mechanico-causal        
explanation of even the most intricate  
organic phenomena1 for example1 the     
origin and structure of the organs of   
sense1 is no more difficult 7in a       
general way7 than is the mechanical     
explanation of any physical process2 as1
 for example1 earthquakes1 the courses  
of the wind1 or the currents of the     
ocean4 ,we thus arrive at the extremely 
important conviction that all natural   
bodies which are known to us are equally

 #aea animated1 that the distinction    
which has been made between animate and 
inanimate bodies does not exist4 ,when a
 stone is thrown into the air1 and falls
 to earth according to definite laws1 or
 when in a solution of salt a crystal is
 formed1 the phenomenon is neither more 
nor less a mechanical manifestation of  
life than the growth and flowering of   
plants1 than the propagation of animals 
or the activity of their senses1 than   
the perception or the formation of      
thought in man4 ,here crystallization1  
organic life1 sensation1 and formation  
of thought1 are expressly put in one    
line of mechanism with the falling of a 
stone4  ,in the following section we    
will have occasion to discuss this view 
as a view of the world2 but we believe  
that the presentation of this idea1 and 
the exclusive vindication of it as a    
complete view of the world1 needs just  
here1 where we still stand on the ground
 of the philosophy of natural           
perception1 some critical sifting4  ,in 

the realm of material nature1 mechanical
 explanation and general explanation is 
directly identical2 i4e41 a process of  
nature remains obscure so long and so   
far as its mechanism is not yet         
perceived1 and in the same degree as its
 mechanism is perceived1 the process    
also is explained4 ,the uniformity of   
law in the occurrence of events         
according to the causal principle in the
 realm of material nature1 can be       
approached by us in no other form than  
in that of mechanism1 provided we       
understand by mechanism an activity     
according to law and which can be       
mathematically estimated as to size and 
number4 ,so far1 therefore1 every       
scientific investigator in the knowledge
 of material nature takes his place on  
the standpoint of a mechanical view of  
the world4 #aeb  ,but here we have gone 
to the full extent to which we are      
justified in taking a mechanical view of
 the world1 and have fixed its limits in
 its own proper realm--the realm of the 

scientific perception of the material   
world2 even if we do not join with      
,wigand in resigning scientific inquiry 
in that direction1 and express the      
expectation that these limits are not   
fixed and not to be designated in       
advance1 but will be moved farther and  
farther1 and that not only in regard to 
the knowledge of the quantity of        
phenomena 7which even ,wigand1 as a     
scientific investigator1 naturally      
admits71 but also in regard to their    
quality4 ,in our researches hitherto we 
have often met such limits4 ,we have    
found that in the realm of the material 
world such important phenomena and      
processes as life are at present not yet
 fully explained4 ,by the mechanical    
view of the world1 we have been led back
 to the last elements and to the most   
elementary forces of matter1 but have   
been convinced that we are no longer    
able to find them with scientific       
certainty1 and that consequently not a  
single quality of material existence is 

really explained and traced back to its 
last material causes1 to say nothing of 
the transcendental causes which are     
entirely inaccessible to our exact      
scientific knowledge4  ,now there is    
another realm of existence1 just as     
large as and1 according to its value1   
still larger than1 that of the material 
world1 which1 not on account of its     
scientific inaccessibility1 but in      
conformity with its own peculiar nature1
 entirely withdraws itself from the     
mechanical view4 ,it is the realm of    
psychical life2 and1 still more         
decidedly and more evidently1 the realm 
of mind4 ,as far as our observations go1
 the law of #aec causality reigns here  
also1 and here also nothing takes place 
without a cause4 ,but as here the realm 
in which the causal law reigns is no    
longer material nature1 so even the form
 in which it is active is no longer that
 of mechanism4 ,for we certainly cannot 
understand mechanical effect to be      
anything else than an effect of         

something material upon something       
material1 whose uniformity of law can be
 exactly estimated mathematically as to 
size and number4 ,now if the application
 of mechanism to the psychical and      
spiritual realm does not express        
anything except the certainly quite     
insidious idea that here also causality 
reigns1 it is nothing else but the      
substitution of another idea for the    
word mechanism--an idea which it never  
had in the entire use of language up to 
this time1 and by the substitution of   
which the proof for a mechanism of the  
mind is not given1 but surreptitiously  
obtained in a manner similar to the     
before-mentioned attempt of ,preyer1    
surreptitiously to obtain the proof for 
the origin of life4  ,but if the        
mechanical explanation of the functions 
of the mind really means that they also 
consist in an effect of the material    
upon something material1 and that this  
effect can be mathematically estimated  
as to size and number1 it is an         

assertion which has first to be proven1 
but which cannot be proven and cannot be
 allowed even as an hypothesis1 as a    
problem for investigation1 because it   
contradicts our whole experience4 ,and  
it contradicts not only the conclusions 
drawn from most natural appearances1    
which1 as is well known1 are deceitful  
and even tell us that the sun goes      
around the earth1 but it contradicts the
 philosophical analysis just as much and
 even still more directly and decidedly 
than #aed the direct impression--as     
became clear to us at the lowest point  
of contact between the material and the 
psychical1 viz41 at sensation1 when we  
showed the impossibility of             
scientifically explaining the origin of 
sensation4  ,it is easy to see what     
facts made it altogether possible to    
produce such a materialistic psychology 
and to give it at the first superficial 
view a certain appearance of truth2 but 
it will not be difficult to detect its  
want of truth4 ,according to our whole  

experience1 the human mind is bound to  
the body2 its proper activity1 its whole
 communication with the material and    
immaterial world outside of it1 even its
 whole mutual intercourse with the minds
 of fellow-beings1 is performed by means
 of bodily functions which1 as such1 are
 subordinate to mechanism4 ,therefore   
physiological psychology certainly      
belongs to the most interesting of the  
branches of science which at present    
enjoy special care1 and works in this   
realm1 like those of ,wundt1 are worthy 
of the greatest attention4 ,now if these
 points of contact once exist between   
the material and the psychical and      
spiritual processes1 so that material   
functions causally influence psychical  
and spiritual ones1 and psychical and   
spiritual functions similarly influence 
material ones1 there must also exist    
between the laws of material processes  
and those of psychical and spiritual    
functions a relation which makes        
possible such a mutual effect1 and we   

must be able to abstract from it the    
existence of a common higher law of     
which on the one side the material laws1
 and on the other the psychical and     
spiritual1 are but partial laws4        
,precisely here lie the indications     
which appear to favor materialism in    
psychology4 ,but it is only an          
appearance4 ,for1 from the              
acknowledgment #aee and scientific      
investigation of a reciprocal action1 to
 an identification of the two factors   
which act upon one another1 is still an 
infinite step4 ,if science is not even  
able to identify material motion and    
sensation1 still less can it identify   
material motion and the spiritual and   
ethic activities4 ,when this is done1 it
 is done only in consequence of the same
 confounding of condition and cause     
which we had to expose on the occasion  
of the assertion of the possibility of  
explaining the origin of life or of     
sensation1 and of consciousness or of   
self-consciousness4 ,but we here also   

willingly admit that the realm in which 
causality reigns in the form of         
mechanism1 aims at being the support1   
foundation1 and instrument of another   
realm where causality still reigns1 but 
mechanism ceases4 ,how far investigation
 may still proceed in the direction of  
those interesting points and lines where
 both realms touch one another in causal
 reciprocal action1 we do not know4 ,we 
are hardly able to indicate the         
direction in which the investigation    
must proceed1 and this direction seems  
to be assigned to it by the idea of     
,auslsung4#h ,the idea of ,auslsung1    
which plays such an #aef important rle  
in physics1 seems to be still fruitful  
for the knowledge of psycho-physical    
life3 bodily functions lsen aus         
spiritual ones1 spiritual functions     
bodily ones4 ,but so much the more      
clearly does this theory show the limits
 of mechanism3 mechanism reigns in the  
world of bodies from the ,auslsungen and
 to the ,auslsungen1 with which the mind

 induces the body to activity1 and the  
body the mind2 beyond these limits      
causality still reigns1 but no longer   
mechanism4  ,now if thus the mechanical 
view of the world has within its own    
most proper realm--the realm of material
 phenomena--its limits1 even if they are
 capable of being moved farther2 and if 
it is without any scientific acceptance 
in the realm of soul and mind3 its      
usurpations reach the highest possible  
degree when it pretends to #aeg explain 
the last causes of things4 ,for from its
 very nature it follows that it is only 
able to explain the reciprocal action of
 material things among themselves1 when 
these things in their finalities1 or the
 causes of their qualities and          
conditions1 are already present1 and the
 laws which they follow are already     
active4 ,as to the origin of those      
qualities or their causes1 and of these 
laws1 this view leaves us entirely in   
the dark4         99       99       99  
99       99 #aeh   ,,chapter ,,ii4      

,,metaphysical ,,conclusions ,,drawn    
,,from ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories4    
#a4 ,elimination of the ,idea of ,design
 in the ,world4--,monism4  ,from this   
mechanical view of the world1 quite a   
peculiar conclusion has been recently   
drawn--not by ,darwin1 who does not give
 any opinion at all about the mechanical
 view of the world1 as such1 or about   
its extension and influence1 nor1       
indeed1 by ,darwinians1 not even by all 
followers of a mechanical view of the   
world1 but only by a part of them2      
namely1 by those who have in a high     
degree attracted to themselves the      
attention of reading people4 ,this      
conclusion is nothing less than the     
elimination of the idea of design in    
nature4 ,this phenomenon demands our    
attention4 ,heretofore1 the proof of    
plan1 design1 and end in nature1 at     
large and in detail1 was looked upon as 
the most beautiful blossom and fruit of 
a thoughtful contemplation of nature2 it
 was the great and beautiful common     

property1 in the enjoyment of which the 
direct1 the scientific1 and the         
religious contemplation of nature       
peacefully participated4 ,now this view 
is to be given up forever1 in           
consequence of nothing else than        
,darwin's selection theory4 ,with an    
energy--we may say with a passionateness
 and confidence of victory--such as we  
were accustomed to see only in the most 
advanced advocates of materialism1      
,ludwig #aei ,bchner1 ,d4 ,f4 ,strauss1 
,hckel1 ,oskar ,schmidt1 ,helmholtz1 the
 editor of the ,ausland and some of his 
associates1 and our often-mentioned     
,anonymus1--in a common attack1 assail  
every idea of a conformity to an end in 
nature1 every idea of a goal toward     
which the development at large and      
individually strives2 in a word1 the    
whole category of teleology4#i  ,in     
order to be just in our judgment1 we    
shall have to let the advocates of this 
view speak for themselves2--the         
advocates of ,dysteleology1 as ,hckel1  

who is so extremely productive in       
forming new exotic words1 calls it2 or  
of ,aposkopiology1 as ,ebrard1 in his   
,apologetik 7,apologetics71 correcting  
the etymology1 #afj somewhat            
pedantically calls it2 or of            
,teleophoby1 as it is called by ,k4 ,e4 
von ,baer1 in humorous irony4  ,the     
anonymous author of the book called ,the
 ,unconscious from the ,standpoint of   
,physiology and ,descent ,theory1       
asserts that1 while the descent theory  
but puts the teleological principle in  
question by withdrawing the ground for a
 positive proof--an assertion which we  
certainly have to reject most decidedly 
7compare ,part ,,ii1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chap4 
,i1  #b- #f7--the selection theory      
directly rejects it4 ,natural selection1
 he says1 solves the seemingly          
unsolvable problem of explaining the    
conformity to the end in view1 as       
result1 without taking it as an aiding  
principle4 ,and ,helmholtz says3        
,darwin's theory shows how conformity to

 the end in the formation of organisms  
can also originate without any          
intermingling of an intelligence by the 
blind administration of a law of nature4
  ,hckel really revels in these ideas4  
,he says 7,nat4 ,hist4 of ,creat41 ,vol4
 ,i1 p4 #ai73 ,these optimistic views of
 the much-talked-of purposiveness of    
nature or of the much-talked-of         
beneficence of the ,creator have1       
unfortunately1 as little real foundation
 as the favorite phrase1 'the moral     
order of the universe1' which is        
illustrated in an ironical way by the   
history of all nations4444 ,if we       
contemplate the common life and the     
mutual relations between plants and     
animals 7man included71 we shall find   
everywhere1 and at all times1 the very  
opposite of that kindly and peaceful    
social life which the goodness of the   
,creator ought to have prepared for his 
creatures--we shall rather find         
everywhere a pitiless1 most embittered  
,struggle of ,all against ,all4 ,nowhere

 in nature1 no matter where we turn our 
eyes1 does that #afa idyllic peace1     
celebrated by the poets1 exist2 we find 
everywhere a struggle and a striving to 
annihilate neighbors and competitors4   
,passion and selfishness--conscious or  
unconscious--is everywhere the motive   
force of life4444 ,man in this respect  
certainly forms no exception to the rest
 of the animal world4 ,and on page #cc3 
,in the usual dualistic or teleological 
7vital7 conception of the universe1     
organic nature is regarded as the       
purposely executed production of a      
,creator working according to a definite
 plan4 ,its adherents see in every      
individual species of animal and plant  
an 'embodied creative thought1' the     
material expression of a definite first 
cause 7causa finalis71 acting for a set 
purpose4 ,they must necessarily assume  
supernatural 7not mechanical7 processes 
of the origin of organisms4444 ,on the  
other hand1 the theory of development   
carried out by ,darwin1 must1 if carried

 out logically1 lead to the monistic or 
mechanical 7causal7 conception of the   
universe4 ,in opposition to the         
dualistic or teleological conception of 
nature1 our theory considers organic as 
well as inorganic bodies to be the      
necessary products of natural forces4   
,it does not see in every individual    
species of animal and plant the embodied
 thought of a personal ,creator1 but the
 expression for the time being of a     
mechanical process of development of    
matter1 the expression of a necessarily 
active cause1 that is1 of a mechanical  
cause 7causa efficiens74 ,where         
teleological ,dualism seeks the         
arbitrary thoughts of a capricious      
,creator in miracles of creation1 causal
 ,monism finds in the process of        
development the necessary effects of    
eternal immutable laws of nature4       
,hckel's ,anthropogeny also is replete  
with attacks upon a teleological #afb   
view of nature1 which leave nothing     
wanting in distinctness and coarseness4 

,on page #aaa1 ,vol4 ,i1 we read3 ,the  
rudimentary organs clearly prove that   
the mechanical1 or monistic conception  
of the nature of organisms is alone     
correct1 and that the prevailing        
teleological1 or dualistic method of    
accounting for them is entirely false4  
,the very ancient fable of the all-wise 
plan according to which 'the ,creator's 
hand has ordained all things with wisdom
 and understanding1' the empty phrase   
about the purposive 'plan of structure' 
of organisms is in this way completely  
disproved4 ,stronger arguments can      
hardly be furnished against the         
customary teleology1 or ,doctrine of    
,design1 than the fact that all more    
highly developed organisms possess such 
rudimentary organs4 7,compare also ,vol4
 ,,ii1 p4 #dci3 ,the rudimentary organs 
are among the most overwhelming proofs  
against the prevailing teleological     
ideas of creation47 ,according to his   
opinion 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #bde71 comparative
 anatomy may no longer look for a       

pre-arranged plan of construction by the
 ,creator4 ,besides1 he calls it an     
anthropocentric error to look upon man  
as a preconceived aim of creation and a 
true final purpose of terrestrial life2 
and on page #ag1 of ,vol4 ,,ii1 he      
supports this judgment by comparing the 
relative shortness of the existence of  
mankind with the length of the preceding
 geological periods3 ,since the         
awakening of the human consciousness1   
human vanity and human arrogance have   
delighted in regarding ,man as the real 
main-purpose and end of all earthly     
life1 and as the centre of terrestrial  
,nature1 for whose use and service all  
the activities of the rest of creation  
were from the first defined or          
predestined by a 'wise providence4' ,how
 utterly baseless these #afc            
presumptuous anthropocentric conceptions
 are1 nothing could evince more         
strikingly than a comparison of the     
duration of the ,anthropozoic or        
,quaternary ,epoch with that of the     

preceding ,epochs4 ,and on page #bcd1   
,vol4 ,,ii3 ,hence it is that1 in       
accordance with the received            
teleological view1 it has been customary
 to admire the so-called 'wisdom of the 
,creator' and the 'purposive            
contrivances of ,his ,creation'         
especially in this matter4 ,but on more 
mature consideration it will be observed
 that the ,creator1 according to this   
conception1 does after all but play the 
part of an ingenious mechanic or of a   
skillful watchmaker2 just1 indeed1 as   
all these cherished teleological        
conceptions of the ,creator and ,his    
,creation are based on childish         
anthropomorphism4444 ,but it is exactly 
on this point that the history of       
evolution proves most clearly that this 
received conception is radically false4 
,the history of evolution convinces us  
that the highly purposive and admirably 
constituted sense organs1 like all other
 organs1 have developed without         
premeditated aim4  ,strauss1 in his ,the

 ,old ,faith and the ,new1 gives to this
 idea its philosophic and universalistic
 finish4 ,in  #fg- #gj1 he eliminates   
not only the idea of design in          
individual cases1 but also the idea of a
 design in the world as a whole2 allows 
us to speak of design in the world only 
in a subjective sense1 so far as we     
understand it to be what we think we    
perceive as the common final aim of the 
concert of the powers1 active in the    
world2 and finds1 when in such a sense  
it is spoken of as design in the world1 
that the universe reaches its end in    
every instance4 ,only the parts develop 
themselves1 driven by the mechanical    
laws of causality1 and after having     
lived #afd their period of life1 sink   
back again into the universe1 in order  
to make place for new developments and  
to prepare them in their turn4  ,for the
 view of the world which the antagonists
 of teleology construct out of this     
mechanical and causal view1 they1 as we 
have repeatedly seen1 have invented the 

name monism4 ,in contrast to all dualism
 in reasoning about the relation of body
 and soul1 ,god and universe1 time and  
eternity1 and especially in contrast to 
the dualism with which the theistic view
 of the world is said to be loaded1     
monism claims that what was formerly    
divided into ,god and universe1 force   
and matter1 matter and spirit1 body and 
soul1 is but one2 and it thus exhibits a
 reconciliation1 a higher unity1 of     
materialism and idealism1 of pantheism  
and atheism1 which unity in the         
scientific and the practical ethic realm
 has no antagonist to fight more        
energetically1 and none which it is     
better able to fight successfully1 than 
dualism1 which the monistic view of the 
world1 by a queer mistake as to the     
theistic position of ,god in nature1    
especially considers the whole theistic 
view of the world4  ,the scientific     
antagonists of teleology show such a    
scientific intolerance against their own
 associates1 that one of the latest     

exhibitors of ,darwinism1 ,oskar        
,schmidt1 in his ,theory of ,descent and
 ,darwinism1 bluntly classes one of the 
greatest and most deserving             
investigators in the realm of           
comparative anatomy and palontology1    
,richard ,owen1 of ,london1 with the    
',halves' who1 fearing the conclusions1 
with one word come to terms with the    
scientific conscience4 ,and             
why8--because ,owen still sees ends in  
nature1 and by his inclination to the   
acceptance of a descent1 does not allow 
himself to #afe be prevented from giving
 adhesion to a teleological view of the 
world4 ,and this invention of monism is 
proclaimed to the world in such a full  
consciousness of its great importance in
 the history of culture1 that ,hckel    
closes his ,nat4 ,hist4 of ,creat4 with 
the following words3 ,future centuries  
will celebrate our age1 which was       
occupied with laying the foundations of 
the ,doctrine of ,descent1 as the new   
era in which began a period of human    

development1 rich in blessings1--a      
period which was characterized by the   
victory of free inquiry over the        
despotism of authority1 and by the      
powerful ennobling influence of the     
,monistic ,philosophy4 ,at the end of   
the lecture1 next to the last1 in the   
same ,vol4 ,,ii1 page #ccb1 he pays the 
following compliment to the antagonists 
of monism3 ,the recognition of the      
theory of development and the ,monistic 
,philosophy based upon it1 forms the    
best criterion for the degree of man's  
mental development4 ,in his ,generic    
,morphology1 and in the first edition of
 his ,nat4 ,hist4 of ,creat41 he1 in a  
geological scala1 which closes with the 
human period1 even divides the whole    
past1 present1 and future history of    
mankind into two halves3 first part1    
dualistic period of culture2 second     
part1 monistic period of culture4       
,still1 we will not omit to mention1    
with credit1 that this anticipatory     
historiography has discreetly           

disappeared from the geological scala of
 the following editions of his ,natural 
,history of ,creation4  ,as to the      
further scientific consequences to which
 this anti-teleological monism leads1   
the advocates of it are in tolerable    
accord2 although they are subject to the
 most incomprehensible illusions        
regarding the practical consequences of 
it1 as we have seen in the above-quoted 
#aff concluding words of ,hckel's       
,natural ,history of ,creation4 ,as to  
the scientific consequences1 they       
express themselves plainly enough3 the  
belief in a living ,creator and ,lord of
 the world no longer find any place2    
everything1 even all the rich treasures 
of human life and history1 become a     
result of blindly acting forces2 the    
history of the world1 ethics1 and all   
spiritual sciences1 are in the progress 
of perception dissolved into physiology1
 and physiology into chemistry1 physics 
and mechanism4 ,in his ,natural ,history
 of ,creation1 ,vol4 ,i1 page #agj1     

,hckel frankly calls the whole history  
of the world a physico-chemical process4
  ,whoever refers to a view of another  
person1 is in duty bound to enter into  
that view1 if possible objectively1 even
 if he does not agree with it4 ,the     
author of this book tries to comply with
 this obligation in all his             
representations1 but must confess that  
in regard to the just described view of 
the world1 he does not succeed in making
 it conceivable to himself in a manner  
to be justified even from a relatively  
scientific standpoint2 a want for which1
 it is true1 we have beforehand the     
explanatory cause in the quotation from 
,hckel's ,natural ,history of ,creation1
 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ccb1 given above4      
,perhaps it appears relatively          
conceivable1 when it is asserted that   
the observation of an order1 a          
connection1 a development1 a plan1 in   
the world1 leads to the perception of   
such a quality of the laws1 primitive   
elements1 and forces of the world1 that 

something like it had to result from    
them2 but that it does not lead to the  
acknowledgment of a personal author of  
the world4 ,we call such a view         
relatively conceivable1 not because we  
agree with it--for we find a logic      
which1 in #afg contemplating the        
universe1 starts from an intelligent    
author of the world1 infinitely less    
surrounded by difficulties than one     
contrary to it--but because the         
acknowledgment or denial of a living    
,god is in the last instance not the    
result of any scientific investigation  
or logical chain of reasoning1 but the  
moral act of the morally and religiously
 inclined individual1 and because1 if   
the individual has once refused the     
strongest factor of faith in            
,god1--namely1 his self-testimony in the
 conscience1--it is no longer impossible
 for the individual to ignore his other 
testimonies as such1 or to declare them 
deficient4 ,now we certainly can say    
that we see order and many results in   

the world1 which are conformable to the 
object in view1 and in consequence of   
this observation must admit that no     
imaginable quality of primitive         
beginnings1 elements1 and forces of the 
world had caused this result1 but that  
this result must have already been in   
the plan4 ,but there certainly are      
imaginable1 in abstracto1 infinitely    
many possibilities of other elements and
 primitive beginnings of the            
world1--perhaps of some whose result    
would have been but an eternal chaos1 or
 of others whose result would have been 
but an eternal rigidness1 or of still   
others whose result would also have been
 a certain order and variety of         
phenomena and processes1 but less       
beautiful than that of the really       
existing world4 ,thus1 then1 this world 
now exists as a special chance of       
infinitely many chances2 and who knows  
whether1 in the course of thousands of  
millions of terrestrial years in the    
struggle for existence1 it did not      

obtain its existence among infinitely   
many possibilities of worlds through a  
natural world-selection1 and thus1 by   
the result of its existence1 fully      
legitimate its conformity to #afh the   
end in view8 ,with this deduction1 we do
 not make1 as it may seem1 an awkward   
attempt at rendering the whole          
standpoint ridiculous by a wild         
phantasy2 but we quote it from a        
celebrated and otherwise very           
meritorious book1 namely the ,geschichte
 des ,materialismus 7,history of        
,materialism71 by the too early deceased
 ,friedrich ,albert ,lange4 ,the reader 
will find it1 in the second part1 page  
#bge1 simply a little shorter and1 as it
 seems to us1 less clear1 but as the    
only correct teleology which ,lange     
professes4 ,this whole view1 like all   
world-theories and cosmogonies of       
pantheism1 naturalism1 or atheism1 and  
even like the latest of ,eduard von     
,hartmann1 is to us but a proof that the
 rejection of the reality of a living   

,creator and ,lord of the world requires
 of its advocates mysteries and         
mysticisms of atheism compared to which 
the greatest difficulties of the        
,christian view of the world are but the
 merest trifles4  ,therefore1 if that   
first and second step in the rejection  
of the highest intelligence and         
omnipotence as the final cause of the   
world1 are once made1 it is easy for us 
to comprehend still other supports which
 this view of the world draws to itself4
 ,however large the number of things in 
the world for whose existence we can    
give a reason1 or of which we can show  
that that1 which preceded1 aimed at     
their appearance1 still the number of   
those to which we can not ascribe aim   
and design is just as large4 ,there are 
even phenomena enough which in their    
main effects appear to us directly      
irrational2 as1 for instance1 those     
which operate destructively1--all the   
tortures which animals inflict on one   
another1 etc4 ,besides1 we can also find

 imperfections in the degree of the #afi
 conformity to the end in view in all   
those phenomena which appear to us as   
properly planned2 for instance1 the     
organic appears to us higher than the   
inorganic1 and yet it is in its         
existence not only dependent on the     
inorganic1 but is often destroyed       
prematurely by it4 ,of course1 all these
 limits and barriers of our teleological
 perception are abundantly used by all  
antagonists of a teleological view of   
the world for the basis of their        
position4 ,furthermore1 the way and     
manner in which man fixes his ends and  
reaches them1 is essentially different  
from the way and manner in which nature 
acts4 ,man seeks to attain his ends with
 less expenditure of power and means1   
the more he acts conformably to the end 
in view2 while nature1 it often enough  
appears to us1 when we have reason to   
imagine an effect of its processes also 
as the probable end of them1 reaches    
this end only by an immense squandering 

of means--for instance1 the preservation
 of organic species simply by the       
production of thousands of germs and    
eggs1 most of which perish1 and but very
 few of which are developed1 and still  
less are transmitted4 ,this is a        
difference to which ,lange points1 in   
order to reject a theory which          
recognizes a striving toward an end     
7,zielstrebigkeit7 in nature1 or at most
 to allow it a little place as the      
lowest form of teleology1 and to reject 
every attempt to regard it as analogous 
to human striving toward an end1 as     
anthropomorphism4 ,nature1 he says1     
acts1 as if a man1 in order to shoot a  
hare1 should in a large field discharge 
millions of guns in all possible        
directions2 as if he1 in order to get   
into a locked room1 should buy ten      
thousand different keys and try them    
all2 as if1 in order to have a house1 he
 should build up a town and #agj leave  
the superfluous houses to wind and      
weather4 ,nobody should call such       

actions conformable to an end in view1  
and still less should we suppose behind 
this action any higher wisdom1 hidden   
reasons1 or superior sagacity4 ,it is   
true1 ,wigand is right in replying to   
this1 that when we observe such things  
in nature1 we have to draw the          
conclusion that the very end supposed by
 the observing man--in this case1 the   
preservation of the species--is not the 
only end1 but that it has other ends    
besides2 as1 for instance1 richness of  
life1 inexhaustible abundance1          
preservation of other organisms1 etc4   
,besides1 this is but a single side of  
the comparison between the action of man
 and that of nature2 and from this side 
action of man1 conformable to an end in 
view1 appears as a higher form of       
teleology1 that of nature as a lower4   
,but there are other sides of           
comparison1 which just as clearly strike
 the eye2 nature builds from within in  
full sovereignty of its process over    
matter and form4 ,man approaches his    

materials from without2 nature works    
with never-erring certainty 7,hckel's   
latest theory1 that nature falsifies its
 laws and processes1 can surely not be  
meant in earnest672 man often enough    
with error1 false calculation1          
awkwardness1 failure and capricious     
arbitrariness4 ,in these directions1    
teleology of nature is infinitely       
superior to that of man4  ,we must be   
very careful in using anthropomorphism  
as a term of reproach4 ,it may be used  
as a reproach in warning against        
careless reasoning and hasty comparison1
 but the idea of anthropomorphism is so 
extensible that it can be extended over 
all human reasoning and conception4 ,are
 not the reasons on account of which the
 so-called anthropomorphism is to be    
rejected1 often #aga enough just as     
anthropomorphistic as the ideas which   
are attacked8 ,for instance1 when the   
idea of the personality of ,god is      
attacked as an anthropomorphistic one1  
are not the reasons with which it is    

assailed exactly as anthropomorphistic  
as the conceptions which are to be      
assailed8 ,do we not derive all our     
reasoning1 logic1 our views1 and in fact
 everything1 at first from our human    
nature1 and do we not in our most       
abstract reasoning always operate simply
 with the laws1 as they inhere in our   
human nature8 ,is there even a single   
scientific description conceivable      
without its being full of               
anthropomorphisms8 ,even the works of   
,darwin which1 according to the opinion 
of these opponents of anthropomorphism1 
destroy anthropomorphism and teleology1 
are the most striking proof in favor of 
it4 ,the discovery of the general reign 
of the law of causality invalidates1 as 
they say1 the reign of the category of  
teleology2 for the one category         
contradicts the other4 ,suppose it were 
so 7we will1 however1 immediately see   
that the contrary is true7 whence do we 
know that the category of causality has 
the preference over that of finality or 

teleology8 ,the one1 as well as the     
other1 is anthropomorphistic1 and is an 
undoubtedly necessary form of our human 
reasoning4 ,we believe in their         
objective validity1 because we cannot   
believe that the sum of existences and  
the relations between the perceiving    
subject and the perceived object aim at 
deceiving man2 we do not want to be     
robbed of either the one or the other   
category2 but if the question is as to  
the preference of the one category over 
the other 7which we contest71 who knows 
whether the category of finality has not
 more reasons for its superiority than  
causality8 ,compare1 in reference #agb  
to this whole question1 also the clear  
analyses in the second volume of the    
work of ,wigand1 and the instructive    
lecture of the ,duke of ,argyll upon    
anthropomorphism in theology4           
,nevertheless1 all the points against   
teleology thus far quoted can be        
understood by us as attempts at         
rejecting the necessity of acknowledging

 a teleologically acting principle of   
the world--or1 to express ourselves more
 clearly1 of a living ,god--after having
 once rejected the deepest motive for   
this acknowledgment1 namely3 the        
self-testimony of ,god in the human     
conscience and mind4 ,but it is one     
thing to declare that we are not obliged
 to accept a certain conclusion1 and    
quite another to declare that we are    
obliged to accept directly the opposite 
of such a conclusion4 ,it is one thing  
to declare that the phenomena in the    
world do not yet oblige us to suppose an
 author with a preconceived plan1 and   
still another to declare that because ,i
 have found or still hope to find the   
causal connexion of phenomena           
conformable to the end in view1 no      
author with a preconceived plan exists4 
,this last assertion is one which the   
author of this work confesses not to    
understand1 and in whose conclusion he  
cannot agree4 ,knowledge of the origin  
of something certainly does not exclude 

the question wherefore it exists1 and   
does not even take its place1 and when  
,i have answered both questions         
satisfactorily1 then ,i may and must    
justly ask whether both that for which  
something exists and that by which      
something exists1 is intended or not1   
whether that which in the language of   
causality ,i call cause and effect1 also
 belongs to the category of finality1   
according to which that very cause is at
 the same time called means1 and that   
very effect also design4 #agc ,the one  
way of viewing postulates the other as  
its necessary completion2 and the       
teleological point of view is so little 
an impediment for the causal1 that we   
are much more fully convinced           
scientifically of the correctness of the
 teleological way of viewing1 when first
 the causal chain of causes and effects 
lies plain before our perception without
 any wanting links4  ,we still have to  
mention two monstrosities which1 as it  
seems to us1 necessarily result from the

 rejection of teleology1 although the   
opponents of teleology contest the fact4
  ,the one is the reduction to chance of
 all single formations in the world4 ,it
 is true1 necessity reigns in laws and  
their effect2 but if the degree and the 
sum of all qualities in the world are   
not based the one upon the other1 if    
especially the single organizations     
originate by the way of natural         
selection1 every coincidence of each    
single causal chain in the world with   
any other causal chain is something     
accidental for the one as well as for   
the other4 ,now1 an explanation of that 
in the world which is conformable to the
 end in view1 by chance1 is a           
scientifically illogical idea4 ,an      
accidental coincidence of many          
circumstances can in a single case      
produce something which is conformable  
to an end in view2 but the probability  
that the formation conformable to the   
end in view is again nullified by the   
next throw of the dice of chance1 is so 

great1 and with every following throw   
grows so decidedly in geometrical       
progression1 that this probability after
 a few terms becomes a certainty1 and we
 can directly demonstrate mathematically
 that the world without a teleological  
plan would be and remain a chaos4 ,as we
 have seen1 even ,lange finds himself   
obliged to #agd admit this plan1 with   
the exception that he makes this plan   
itself chance--special chance among     
infinitely many possibilities4  ,the    
other consequence of that elimination of
 the idea of design is that it forbids  
every difference between higher and     
lower1 and changes everything into an   
indifferent and equivalent continual    
stream of coming and going4 ,for the    
whole idea of higher and lower belongs  
to the category of teleology4 ,if the   
new which originates is but a product of
 that which was already in existence1   
and if the latter does not aim at the   
production of the new1 then the new is  
equivalent to the preceding2 and it is  

but an illusion of man1 preconceiving an
 end1 when in the products of nature he 
discriminates between higher and lower4 
,a beginning of the acknowledgment of   
this consequence is made1 when ,hckel1  
in his ,anthropogeny1 so violently      
attacks the idea that man is end and    
design of the terrestrial creation4 ,but
 generally the antagonists of teleology 
are guilty of the inconsequence which1  
although from the principles of their   
system to be rejected1 is indelibly     
impressed on our thinking mind and      
especially on our moral consciousness1  
that they still discriminate between    
higher and lower1 and particularly that 
they willingly assign to the moral      
disposition and demand1 and to the      
morally planned individual1 the priority
 among existences4 ,this fact is        
pronounced in a very striking way in the
 concessions of ,strauss1 which we have 
quoted on page #abf1 according to which 
nature1 where it can no longer go beyond
 itself1 wishes to go into itself1 and  

in man has wished to go not only upwards
 but even beyond itself4  ,therefore1   
not only theology1 but also philosophy1 
#age and even natural science1 in their 
most prominent advocates1 have in a     
uniform chorus protested against this   
destruction of the idea of design4 ,that
 it was unanimously done on the part of 
theology1 is quite natural1 and needs no
 further proofs4 ,when we1 nevertheless1
 mention expressly a single essay on    
these questions1 it is done on account  
of the fact that in its energetic       
defense of the teleological point of    
view it is especially effective by      
frankly and impartially admitting the   
strongest positions of the opponent's   
standpoint--a thing which rarely happens
 on the part of theologians4 ,it is the 
essay of ,julius ,kstlin ,ueber die     
,beweise fr das ,dasein ,gottes 7,proofs
 of the ,existence of ,god71 in the     
,theologische ,studien und ,kritiken1   
#ahge1 ,,iv and #ahgf1 ,i2 especially   
#ahgf1 ,i1 p4 #db ff4 ,on the part of   

philosophy1 we have to mention ,ulrici1 
,fichte1 ,huber and ,frohschammer1 who  
have rejected the attack against        
teleology with inflexible criticism4    
,even ,friedrich ,vischer in the sixth  
part of his ,kritische ,gnge 7,critical 
,walks71 has forcibly maintained the    
right of teleology1 especially of its   
highest revelation1 the moral order of  
the world--in contrast to his friend ,d4
 ,f4 ,strauss1 whose ,the ,old ,faith   
and the ,new he criticises2 but it is   
true1 in consequence of his pantheism1  
he reaches the wholly imaginary         
conclusion of supposing a moral order of
 the world without a regulator4 ,and1 to
 be able to make the systematized order 
and beauty of nature conceivable to     
himself without a ,creator1 to be able  
to make conceivable to himself a design 
in nature1 an ideal1 according to which 
nature works as an unconscious artist1  
he gives to philosophy the certainly    
unsolvable problem of finding the idea  
of #agf timeless time1 to which the     

afterward can just as well be a         
beforehand2 he prefers to do this rather
 than to find the equally clear and deep
 solution of that teleological          
difficulty in the simple idea of a      
,creator1 who1 as such1 also stands     
above time4 ,one of the most remarkable 
philosophic testimonies for the right of
 teleology is the philosophic system of 
,eduard von ,hartmann who1 although he  
calls his absolute the unconscious1     
ascribes to it an unconscious           
intelligence and an unconscious will1   
and makes the observation and           
acknowledgment of designs and ends1     
which he sees in the whole realm of the 
world of phenomena1 an essential part of
 his entire system4 ,all attempts of    
this kind1 as those of ,vischer and     
,hartmann1 fully and correctly to       
understand the language of facts on the 
one side and to reject on the other the 
necessary conclusion to which it        
leads--namely1 the acknowledgment of a  
creative intelligence above the facts1  

and having an end in view--only increase
 in like manner as the above-quoted     
cosmogonic idea of ,lange by the        
monstrosities of reasoning to which they
 lead1 the power of demonstration for   
that which they undertake to contest4   
,natural scientists1 finally1 even      
,darwinians1 have not only in casual    
utterances often spoken a weighty word  
in favor of teleology--as1 for instance1
 those who1 like ,oswald ,heer1         
,klliker1 ,baumgrtner1 believe in a     
metamorphosis of germs1 but also men who
 are quite favorable to the idea of an  
origin of the species through           
descent--as1 for instance1 ,richard     
,owen1 at the end of his ,comparative   
,anatomy of the ,vertebrates1 separately
 published as ,derivative ,hypothesis of
 ,life and ,species2 ,alexander ,braun1 
in his lecture ,ueber die ,bedeutung der
 ,entwicklung in der ,naturgeschichte   
#agg 7,on the ,importance of            
,development in ,nature71 ,berlin1      
#ahgb2 ,a4 ,w4 ,volkmann ,ueber die     

,entwicklung der ,organismen 7,on the   
,development of ,organisms71 ,halle1    
#ahge2 ,schaaffhausen1 in his opening   
address to the ,wiesbaden ,anthr4       
,versammlung1 ,braunschweig1 #ahgd1 and 
others2 but they have also given to     
teleology entire treatises4 ,besides a  
more popular treatise of the astronomer 
,mdler in ,westermann's ,monatshefte1   
,october1 #ahgb1 there belong to them   
the frequently mentioned work of        
,wigand1 and especially three essays of 
great importance from the pen of a man  
who in questions of development and its 
extent has among all contemporaries the 
first right to speak1 namely1 ,karl     
,ernst von ,baer4 ,they are the essays  
on the conformity to the end in view in 
general1 on the conformity to the end in
 view in organic bodies1 and on         
,darwin's doctrine1 published together  
with two other essays in the already    
mentioned ,studien aus dem ,gebiete der 
,naturwissenschaften1 7,reden und       
,kleinere ,aufstze1 #bter ,theil71      

,petersburg1 #ahgf4 ,nay1 even the two  
founders of ,darwinism1 ,darwin himself 
and ,a4 ,r4 ,wallace1 as we shall see in
 defining their position in reference to
 religion1 express themselves decidedly 
teleologically2 this is especially true 
of ,wallace1 and likewise of their      
active and able second1 ,huxley4 ,only a
 single utterance of ,darwin in a later 
publication seems to take a sceptical   
position in regard to teleology2 compare
 below ,part ,second1 ,book ,i1 ,chapt4 
,,iii1  #a4  ,finally1 we have to say a 
word concerning the name which the      
anti-teleological view of the world     
gives to itself3 the name monism4 ,the  
view of the world which monism gives us1
 seems hardly comprehensible2 and #agh  
just as little does the name which it   
gives itself1 seem justifiable4  ,if    
this name is to indicate only a maxim of
 investigation--the directive which     
scientific investigation has to take1 in
 order to reach more general points of  
view--we could declare ourselves in full

 accord with it4 ,all investigation     
strives after a unity of principle2 this
 impulse is a scientific leading motive 
of our nature4 ,besides the absolute    
limits of our knowledge1 there are still
 enough relative and provisory limits to
 it2 and there also are enough low      
points of view1 mistakes1 and           
imperfections in science1 to justify us 
when we expressly form and establish    
monism as a maxim of scientific         
investigation4 ,all those theories and  
points of view need such a spur and     
corrective1 which are hastily satisfied 
with a dualistic or a still farther     
expanded limit of our knowledge4 ,among 
them we rank in theology the antique    
heathenish dualism which separates ,god 
and the world in such a way that ,god is
 but the architect of the eternal       
matter1 existing independently of ,god2 
and also the modern deistic dualism     
which considers only the elements1      
principles1 and beginning of the world1 
as dependent on ,god1 but not the entire

 course of their developments as a whole
 and in detail4 ,in philosophy1 taken in
 a narrower sense1 we reckon with them  
the one-sided atomism which can no      
longer find the connecting link between 
the single elements of the world1 or the
 one-sided assertion of realism or      
idealism1 since at this time all views  
of the world which win acceptance from  
the present generation claim the praise 
of showing the reconciliation and higher
 unity of realism and idealism4 ,in     
anthropology1 there belongs to them #agi
 such a treatment of psychology and     
physiology1 that the one science does   
not trouble itself about the other1 and 
the investigation does not seek or keep 
in mind that which is common to both1 or
 that which is higher and superior to   
them2 and in all natural sciences1 every
 mode of investigation belongs to them1 
where the single science retains no     
sympathy with all other sciences and    
with the principles of all scientific   
investigation4 ,in regard to these low  

points of view1 mistakes1 or            
imperfections1 monism certainly is a    
correct and necessary maxim of          
investigation2 but this maxim ought not 
to lead us so far that we--as very often
 happens from the unity or the          
possibility of grouping several forms of
 existence under general                
conceptions--make an identity1 that we  
efface the differences instead of       
explaining them1 and then think the     
effacement is an explanation2 that we   
set forth the assumed form of unity as  
if one we had found1 and in this manner 
falsify the method of knowing4 ,for as  
certainly and as much as man is subject 
to the dangers of error and             
falsification1 just so certainly and so 
little is nature subject to             
falsification4  ,but if the name monism 
is to designate a certain view of the   
world1 it is for such a designation     
either too comprehensive and quite      
applicable to all views which have a    
right to the name of view of the world2 

or it is misleading1 and not applicable 
to any4 ,for the name1 as if it were    
properly called henism1 either expresses
 only the unity of the principle of the 
world1 and designates a quality which is
 the characteristic of every view of the
 world1 and which especially belongs to 
theism in a clearer and more perfect way
 than to any other standpoint2 or the   
name is used to attest that the world   
alone #ahj exists1 and that monism knows
 of but one existence1--namely1 that of 
the world2 while the contrary view of   
the world--that of theism1 which in a   
manner wholly incompetent1 and          
historically wholly unjustified1 is     
called dualism--supposes two existences1
 ,god and the world4 ,but then this name
 does not correctly represent either    
itself or theism4 ,it does not correctly
 represent itself3 for the so-called    
monism does not1 indeed1 suppose that   
that which appears in the world is the  
really existing1 or that the processes  
which come into appearance have again   

their final cause only in the           
appearance1 but it seeks the final      
causes of the phenomena in laws and     
principles which can no longer be       
observed by our senses1 and of those it 
again seeks the common1 highest1 and    
very last principle1 the perception of  
which it either1 with ,hckel1 renounces 
or finds it1 with other theories1 now in
 atomism1 and in attraction and         
repulsion1 then in the law of causality4
 ,thus it has not only a single         
existence and mode of existence1 but it 
does exactly the same thing that theism 
does3 it seeks the final principles of  
the world4 ,and it does not correctly   
represent theism3 for theism also does  
not know of two existences to which the 
idea of existing is applicable in fully 
the same way--namely1 the world and     
,god---but in seeking a cause for the   
existence of the world1 it finds it in  
,god2 the world1 according to its view1 
only exists by the fact that it exists  
in and through ,god4 ,so theism in this 

sense also contests with monism for the 
right of the name4  ,therefore1 when    
teleology allows the opponent's view of 
the world to appropriate the name monism
 exclusively to itself1 it can do this  
only in the same #aha sense as that in  
which1 in order to avoid disputes1 we   
are satisfied with many irrational names
 which have forced themselves upon us2  
as1 for instance1 we can perhaps call   
the clerical party in ,bavaria the      
patriotic1 because it calls itself so1  
or as we accept the title of the        
ultramontane paper ,germania1 at        
,berlin1 without conceding to the       
bearers of those names the care of      
patriotism and of the interests of the  
,german empire in a higher degree than  
to parties and papers of a different    
standpoint4 ,in fact1 this linguistic   
arbitrariness does not particularly tend
 to clearness of conception and to the  
avoidance of obscure phrases4         99
       99       99       99       99    
#ahc  ,,part ,,ii  ,,the ,,position ,,of

 ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories ,,in      
,,reference ,,to ,,religion ,,and       
,,morality4         99       99       99
       99       99   #ahe  ,,book ,i4   
,,historical ,,and ,,critical4          
99       99       99       99       99  
,,plan ,,of ,,treatment4  ,in discussing
 the conclusions which have been drawn  
by ,darwinism in reference to religion  
and morality1 it would seem appropriate 
to treat of the two realms together4    
,for the grouping which we have to give 
to the different conclusions of         
,darwinian tendencies1 in their position
 in reference to religion1 is nearly the
 same which they also receive in their  
position in reference to ethical        
questions4  ,but1 nevertheless1 we      
prefer to separate the two questions2   
not only because in fact one author has 
laid more stress upon the religious     
realm1 another more upon the ethical1   
but because in reality1 and also in the 
solution which we shall try to give to  
the problems presented by them1 both    

realms1 although closely interwoven1 and
 limited by one another1 still are      
theoretically to be treated apart4  ,in 
order not to exceed too much the limits 
of our task1 we must avoid going more   
into the details of the relations       
between religion and morality in        
general1 than is absolutely necessary   
for the solution of our main problem4   
,this restriction we can easily put on  
ourselves4 ,for1 first1 every one who   
reflects at all on human life and       
action1 and on his own religious and    
#ahf moral conduct1 generally has a very
 correct1 instinctive1 and direct       
conception and perception as to the     
realm of the religious as well as of the
 moral--as to their mutual differences1 
as well as to their reciprocal          
relations--even if he has not yet tried 
to bring this conception into ideas and 
formulas2 and1 secondly1 it will not be 
difficult to present a short formula as 
to the ideal relation between the       
religious and the moral1 sufficient for 

the wants of science as well as for the 
practical needs of a more detailed      
investigation4 ,the religious is the    
relation of our personality to ,god2 the
 moral1 the relation of it to the world1
 comprehensively taken1 ourselves       
included4 ,we purposely call it a       
relation of our personality1 and not    
merely a relation of man1 because in the
 religious the ethical moment of        
self-determination which is included in 
the idea of personality1 is an essential
 factor2 and because we gladly make it  
conspicuous1 partly in opposition to the
 one-sidedness of ,schleiermacher's     
feeling of absolute dependence1 partly  
to prevent a contrary misunderstanding  
of our own view1 as if we found the seat
 of religion in the activity of         
knowledge4 ,for when1 in our            
representation of the ,darwinian        
conclusions and in our own              
investigation1 we proceed as objectively
 as possible1 and try to avoid all      
systematization which is unfruitful for 

our task1 in discussing the ,darwinian  
theories in reference to religion1 we   
shall have to take chiefly into         
consideration their relation to religion
 in an objective sense1 and chiefly also
 their relation to the contents of      
religion2 but this would make it appear 
that we supposed religion in a          
subjective sense1 religiousness1 to be  
in the first place an activity and a    
possession of knowledge4 ,nothing lies  
farther from us #ahg than this thought2 
although religiousness certainly has and
 asks for solid1 objectively true1 and  
really possessed salvation1 and however 
little we would overlook the word of the
 ,lord3 ,and this is life eternal1 that 
they might know thee1 the only true     
,god1 and ,jesus ,christ1 whom thou hast
 sent4 7,john xvii1 #c47  ,those who    
wish to inform themselves in regard to  
the relation of religion and morality1  
will find the necessary information in  
,martensen's ,ethik 7,ethics71 in ,otto 
,pfleiderer's monograph1 which partly   

assumes a contrary point of view1 and in
 a thorough essay of ,julius ,kstlin    
7,theol4 ,studien und ,kritiken1 #ahgj1 
,i71 which appeared before the ,ethics  
of ,martensen4  ,in undertaking now to  
represent the conclusions which have    
been drawn from ,darwinism1 we treat of 
the religious realm as the higher1 a    
realm demanding a sound morality prior  
to the moral realm2 and we begin with   
those conclusions which take a hostile  
position in reference to religion1 in   
order to proceed from them to the       
moderate and friendly relations4        
99       99       99       99       99  
#ahh  ,a4 ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories  
,,and ,,religion4  ,,chapter ,i4  ,,more
 ,,or ,,less ,,negative ,,position ,,in 
,,reference ,,to ,,religion4   #a4      
,extreme ,negation4 ,l4 ,bchner and     
,consistent ,materialism4  ,the common  
point of beginning and attack of all    
those who take a negative position      
against religion1 is the rejection of   
teleology4 ,the most advanced of all    

materialists1 ,ludwig ,bchner1 in his   
self-criticism1 which he gives in his   
,natur und ,wissenschaft 7,nature and   
,science71 on page #dfe1 openly         
declares1 and quite correctly1 that with
 the success or failure of the attacks  
upon teleology materialism itself stands
 or falls4  ,now while many1 as we shall
 immediately see1 although opposed to a 
teleological view of the world1 still   
are inclined to give a more or less     
lasting value to certain psychical      
processes which may be called by the    
name religion1 ,bchner1 on the contrary1
 makes a direct attack upon everything  
which is thus called4 ,he does not      
render it difficult for us to review his
 position4 ,for1 after having given it  
openly1 but still with certain relative 
modifications1 in different publications
 7especially in his book ,force and     
,matter1 which appeared in #ahee in the 
first edition1 and in #ahgb in the      
twelfth7 he gives it in cynical         
nakedness in the lectures with which he 

travelled through ,america and #ahi     
,germany in #ahgb-ahgd1 and the contents
 of which he has made public in his     
pamphlet3 ,der ,gottesbegriff und dessen
 ,bedeutung in der ,gegenwart 7,the     
,idea of ,god1 and its ,importance at   
the ,present ,time71 ,leipzig1 #ahgd1   
,theo4 ,thomas4 ,as is said in the      
preface1 the design of the lecture is to
 give a renewed impulse to the final and
 definitive elimination of an idea      
which1 according to the opinion of the  
author1 obstructs our whole spiritual1  
social1 and political development1 as no
 other idea does4 ,he means the idea of 
,god2 not merely the theistic idea of a 
personal ,god1 but the idea of ,god in  
general4 ,for even the pantheistic idea 
of ,god1 which he had formerly treated  
with a certain polite reserve1 finds in 
his eyes even less favor than the       
theistic4 ,he says3 ,if the absurdity is
 already great enough in theism1 it is  
possibly still greater in pantheism1    
which moreover has always played a great

 rle in philosophy2 and1 ,christianity  
has but injured the spiritual and       
material progress of mankind4 ,in       
agreement with ,strauss1 he sees the    
earliest origin of the idea of ,god only
 in ignorance and fear4 ,every creating1
 preserving1 or reigning principle in   
the world is done away with1 and there  
remains as highest spiritual power      
present in the world only human reason4 
,atheism or philosophic monism alone    
leads to freedom1 to reason1 progress1  
acknowledgment of true humanity1--in    
short to humanism4  ,this materialistic 
opposition to everything which is called
 religion1 is certainly independent of  
,darwinism1 and originated before its   
time2 but since ,bchner himself sees in 
,darwinism but a grand confirmation of  
his view of the world1 and believes that
 he has found in it #aij that principle 
which1 with urgent necessity1 banishes  
teleology from the contemplation of     
nature--teleology1 with the defeat or   
victory of which materialism stands or  

falls1--we are entitled and obliged to  
rank even this view of the world among  
the conclusions which in reference to   
religion have been drawn from the       
theories of ,darwin4 ,and1 indeed1 it is
 a most extreme conclusion1 and simply  
puts itself in the category of negation 
to the contents of religion1 as well as 
to religion in a subjective sense1 to   
religious and pious conduct4 ,it can be 
clearly seen how firmly a view of the   
world which makes war against religion  
and the idea of ,god its special        
life-task1 is connected with all those  
destructive elements which lie in human 
nature1 and especially in the social    
circumstances of the present1 and which 
have their only and final ethical limit 
in the consciousness of ,god which1 as a
 power never wholly to be effaced1 lies 
in the depth of the soul of even those  
who wander farthest from a moral and    
spiritual life4   #b4 ,replacement of   
,religion through a ,religious ,worship 
of the ,universe4 ,strauss1 ,oskar      

,schmidt1 ,hckel4  ,strauss1 in that    
testament of his scientific life and    
activity1 ,the ,old ,faith and the ,new1
 takes a somewhat different position in 
reference to religion4 ,even for him1   
the whole idea of ,god is abolished and 
replaced by the idea of the cosmos2 but 
he makes this cosmos the object of      
religious worship1 and has exactly the  
same feeling of absolute dependence in  
regard to it1 which1 according to       
,schleiermacher1 constitutes the nature 
of religion4 ,when ,arthur ,schopenhauer
 or #aia ,eduard von ,hartmann bring    
forth their pessimistic accusations     
against the universe1 his religious     
sensation reacts against it in the same 
manner as the organism against the prick
 of a needle4 ,this pessimism1 he says1 
acts upon reason as an absurdity1 but   
upon sensation as blasphemy4 ,we demand 
the same piety for our cosmos that the  
devout of old demanded for his ,god4 ,if
 wounded1 our feeling for the cosmos    
simply reacts in a religious manner4    

,while1 therefore1 ,strauss1 to the     
question1 ,are we still ,christians8    
gives an emphatic ,no1 he answers the   
question1 ,have we still a religion8    
with ,yes or ,no1 according to the      
spirit of the inquiry4  ,among men of   
science who wrote about ,darwinism1     
,oskar ,schmidt1 in his before-quoted   
publication1 ,the ,doctrine of ,descent 
and ,darwinism1 seems to take exactly   
the same position in reference to       
religion4 ,at least1 he unreservedly    
professes monism1 rejects all           
teleological conceptions as             
imperfections1 speaks of the caprice of 
a personal ,god1 and sees the conception
 that the idea of ,god is immanent in   
human nature invalidated by the fact    
that many millions in the most          
cultivated nations1 and among them the  
most eminent and lucid thinkers1 have   
not the consciousness of a personal     
,god2 those millions of whom the heroic 
,strauss became the spokesman4  ,hckel1 
it is true1 mentions ,strauss only in   

the preface of the fourth edition of his
 ,natural ,history of ,creation1 but    
here he greets ,the ,old ,faith and the 
,new as the confession which he also    
makes1 and thus gives us an express     
right to place him in this class1       
although he calls his worship of the    
universe religion2 #aib it is1 however1 
a classification which his whole        
position compelled us to give him4 ,it  
is true1 he speaks very warmly of his   
own religion1 which is founded on the   
clear knowledge of nature and its       
inexhaustible abundance of              
manifestations1 and which1 as simple    
religion of nature1 will in the future  
act upon the course of development of   
mankind1 ennobling and perfecting it in 
a far higher degree than the various    
ecclesiastic religions of the different 
nations1 resting on a blind belief in   
the vague secrets and mythical          
revelations of a sacerdotal caste4      
7,nat4 ,hist4 of ,cr41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4   
#cfi47 ,he also repeatedly speaks of    

manifestations of nature1 and even of a 
divine ,spirit which is everywhere      
active in nature4 ,in that respect he   
seems to take in reference to religion1 
without regard to the historical form in
 which it appeared as ,christian        
religion1 a still more friendly and less
 problematic position than ,strauss4    
,moreover1 he demands for every         
individual the full right of forming his
 own religion2 among the more highly    
developed species of men1 he says1 every
 independent and highly developed       
individual1 every original person1 has  
his own religion1 his own ,god2 and it  
would certainly1 therefore1 not be      
arrogant if he should also claim the    
right of forming his own conception of  
,god1 his own religion4 ,but when we try
 to form a more complete idea of his    
position in reference to religion1 we   
really do not find any essential        
difference between it and that of       
,strauss4 ,according to repeated        
utterances1 he can not imagine the      

personal ,creator without caprice and   
arbitrariness2 again and again he       
advocates monism with great warmth1 and 
also identifies1 in express words1 ,god 
and the universe1 ,god and nature4 #aic 
,corresponding to our progressive       
perception of nature and our immovable  
conviction of the truth of the evolution
 theory1 our religion can be only a     
religion of nature4 ,in rejecting the   
dualistic conception of nature and the  
herewith connected amphitheistic        
conception of ,god1 444 we certainly    
lose the hypothesis of a personal       
,creator2 but we gain in its place the  
undoubtedly more worthy and more perfect
 conception of a divine ,spirit which   
penetrates and fills the universe4      
,furthermore1 the faith in a personal   
,creator is called a low dualistic      
conception of ,god1 which corresponds to
 a low animal stage of development of   
the human organism4 ,the more highly    
developed man of the present1 he says1  
is capable of and intended for an       

infinitely nobler and sublimer monistic 
idea of ,god1 to which belongs the      
future1 and through which we attain a   
more sublime conception of the unity of 
,god and nature4 ,according to his      
,anthropogeny1 the belief that the hand 
of a ,creator has arranged all things   
with wisdom and intelligence is an      
ancient story and an empty phrase4   #c4
 ,pious ,renunciation of the            
,knowability of ,god4 ,wilhelm ,bleek1  
,albert ,lange1 ,herbert ,spencer4  ,a  
more friendly position in reference to  
religion is taken by those who hold1 not
 directly negative1 but only decidedly  
sceptical views of the existence of     
,god2 who reduce the relative           
unsearchableness of ,god1 which every   
religious standpoint admits1 to an      
absolute unknowability2 and who find the
 nature of religion either in a pious   
acknowledgment of this unknowability1 or
 in a poetical substitute for the       
knowledge of ,god1 i4e41 comprehending  
the unknowable in a figure4 ,the most   

prominent #aid advocates of this        
position are1 on the side of exact      
investigation1 ,wilhelm ,bleek2 and on  
that of philosophy1 ,albert ,lange in   
,germany and ,herbert ,spencer in       
,england4 ,since all three use the      
,darwinian theories for their systems1  
they also belong to the ranks of our    
historico-critical essay4  ,wilhelm     
,bleek1 in the preface to his ,ursprung 
der ,sprache 7,origin of ,language71    
rejects all claims of a positively      
revealed religion to an objective       
truth--not in such a way as to          
substitute the universe in place of     
,god1 but so that he remains sceptical  
in reference to every attempt at forming
 an idea of ,god1 demands a pious and   
modest confession of this               
non-understanding by man1 and sees in   
this reverential modesty the certainly  
not very significant nature of his      
religion4 ,in the preface he says that  
all worship originates in reverence for 
ancestors1 and that even the doctrine of

 the atonement of modern theology has   
its origin there4 ,the next step after  
reverence for ancestors was the worship 
of nature4 ,but the grand turning-point 
at which the mythological mode of view  
gives way--in which mode of view he also
 reckons ,christianity--is the giving up
 of the idea of the necessity of an     
atonement2 for this whole idea is but   
anthropomorphism4 ,it is when man has   
recognized the impossibility of a being1
 similar to man1 as the final cause of  
all existences1 and in reverential      
modesty has admitted his ignorance in   
reference to the nature of the origin of
 things1 that he learns to understand   
how narrow a view he has of ,god when he
 thinks that he understands him4  ,on   
the side of philosophy1 ,albert ,lange  
and ,herbert ,spencer reach similar     
results4 ,albert ,lange1 in his #aie    
,history of ,materialism1 starting      
especially from premises of ,kant1      
reaches the conclusion that the thing   
per se1 the intelligible world1 is      

absolutely hidden to us4 ,what we       
perceive is but the world of            
appearances2 and the fact that we       
perceive it1 and perceive it as we do1  
is originally founded in the human      
organization4 ,by virtue of this        
organization we are bound1 in all our   
knowledge of the world of appearances1  
to the law of causality4 ,science does  
not get beyond this causal chain of     
finite and relative causes and effects2 
to the thing per se there is nowhere to 
be found a bridge1 not even as ,kant    
supposes1 in the categoric imperative1  
nor in ideas4 ,inasmuch as science does 
not get beyond this chain1 it is        
materialistic2 inasmuch as it must      
nevertheless perceive the existence1 or 
at least the possibility of the         
existence1 of a thing per se1 even if it
 does not see any way to its perception1
 it is idealistic4 ,but man also has    
ideal impulses1 and he has to follow    
them just as much as the impulse of     
perception4 ,by virtue of these ideal   

impulses1 he makes in imagination a     
picture of the thing per se in the      
activity of philosophic speculation1    
art1 and religion4 ,philosophic         
speculation is but imaginative          
conceptions4 ,it has always a value in  
the history of culture1 as a summing-up 
of the elements of culture and of the   
spiritual impulses and treasures of a   
certain time2 but it errs as soon as it 
claims to be more than imaginative      
conceptions--namely1 an adequate        
representation of the final cause of all
 things--for it lacks the necessary     
basis of experience4 ,art does not claim
 this1 and therefore is not exposed to  
that danger of deception4 ,religion     
satisfies a need of the heart1 to have a
 home of the spirit in the thing per se2
 but #aif since the thing per se is not 
accessible for us1 religion creates in  
mind that home1 in order to rise above  
the common reality to it4 ,lange finds  
the highest realization of a perfect    
satisfaction of that impulse in the     

philosophic poems of ,schiller4 ,he sees
 the quintessence of religion expressly 
in the elevation of minds above the     
real1 and in the creation of a home of  
the spirit4 ,religion remains untouched 
in its full vital power1 as long as it  
retains that as its quintessence2 but it
 is exposed to all the dangers of a     
destructive criticism as soon as it     
seeks its quintessence in something     
else--for instance1 in certain doctrines
 of ,god1 the human soul1 creation of   
the world1 etc4  ,herbert ,spencer is in
 full accord with ,lange in regard to   
the theory of an absolute               
indiscernibleness of the final cause of 
all things2 but he reaches this result  
in a somewhat different way1 and from   
his premises infers a different         
modification of the nature of religion4 
,in his ,first ,principles he appears to
 be a true scholar of the ,english and  
,scotch schools of philosophy1 from     
which he takes his start in conscious   
and express opposition to the ,german   

modes of speculation1 and begins with an
 empiric comparison of all actual       
contrasts existing in the world and in  
human life4 ,he follows the axiom that a
 particle of truth lies at the basis of 
every error1 and that each contrast     
becomes a contrast only by the fact that
 the two poles of the contrast have     
something in common4 ,now1 in comparing 
with one another all contrasts between  
religion and science1 and all forms of  
religiousness and irreligiousness1 from 
fetishism up to monotheism1 pantheism1  
and atheism1 all imaginable cosmogonies1
 he finds1 as the last truth common to  
all1 and therefore #aig alone absolutely
 certain1 the absolute indiscernibleness
 of the final cause of all things4 ,on  
page #dd he says1 that religions        
diametrically opposed in their overt    
dogmas1 are yet perfectly at one in the 
tacit conviction that there is a problem
 to be solved1 that the existence of the
 world with all it contains is a mystery
 ever pressing for interpretation2 and  

on page #de1 that the omnipresence of   
something which passes comprehension1 is
 that which remains unquestionable4 ,and
 on page #df he concludes3 ,if ,religion
 and ,science are to be reconciled1 the 
basis of reconciliation must be this    
deepest1 widest1 and most certain of all
 facts--that the ,power which the       
,universe manifests to us is utterly    
inscrutable4 ,the acknowledgment of this
 fact is religiousness2 the contrary of 
it is irreligiousness and               
anthropomorphistic arrogance1 even if it
 appears in the name of religiousness4  
,volumes might be written upon the      
impiety of the pious 7p4 #aaj74  ,a     
comparison of the two philosophers is   
interesting4  ,in one direction1 ,lange 
does more justice to the religious need 
than ,spencer does4 ,while he sees in   
religion the metaphorical realization of
 the needs of the heart1 of a creation  
of a home of the spirit1 he gives to the
 heart full play to satisfy its need1   
and to create and arrange for itself a  

spiritual home entirely according to its
 need4 ,he especially acknowledges      
repeatedly the need of the heart for    
atonement1 and vigorously defends this  
need and its satisfaction against       
,liberal ,theologians                   
7,reformtheologen71 like ,heinrich      
,lang2 he also stands1 as we see1 in    
satisfactory contrast to ,wilhelm       
,bleek4 ,without reserve1 he admits into
 the hymn-book of his religion of the   
future hymns like that of ,gerhard3 ,o  
,haupt voll ,blut und ,wunden 7,o       
,sacred ,head1 #aih now wounded74 ,to be
 sure1 all the concessions he makes to  
religion sink again to the value of a   
beautiful illusion1 from the fact that  
for him they are but metaphorical       
approaches to the cause of all things1  
which after all still remains           
inaccessible4 ,but nevertheless1 in     
consequence of that idea of religion1   
religious life1 and especially also     
religious service1 has infinitely more  
room for rich development in ,lange than

 in ,spencer4 ,for1 according to the    
view of the latter1 religiousness       
consists in nothing else but the        
perception and acknowledgment of this   
indiscernibleness of the final cause4   
,all other things which may be still    
connected with religious life and       
reasoning1 are but a misty veil4 ,the   
acknowledgment of the indiscernibleness 
of the final cause of all things alone  
is the quintessence of religion4 ,but   
such a religiousness1 which expressly   
forbids imagining any quality or any    
state of the highest being1 certainly   
would be1 as ,prof4 ,huxley correctly   
says in his ,lay ,sermons1 for the most 
part of the silent sort4  ,while thus   
,lange's conception of religion is      
superior to that of ,spencer in         
admitting a richer development of       
religious life1 a more various          
satisfaction of the religious need1 in  
another direction ,spencer is superior4 
,he comes considerably nearer to a      
correct and full conception of ,god than

 ,lange4 ,his idea of the final cause of
 all things does not lie entirely in the
 conception that it is the absolute     
indiscernible2 but ,spencer is fully in 
earnest with the idea that this         
indiscernible is the real cause of the  
world and of all single existences in   
it4 ,he accordingly forbids giving      
certain attributes to the absolute--not 
because it would be doubtful whether it 
has attributes or not1 but because it   
stands above all these #aii imaginable  
attributes as their real cause4         
,therefore he forbids1 for instance1    
attributing personality1 intelligence1  
will1 to the highest being--not because 
it could also be impersonal1 and in want
 of intelligence and will1 but because  
it stands above all these attributes as 
their highest real cause1 and because we
 can think of all these attributes only 
in human analogy1 and therefore1 when   
attributed to the highest being1 can    
think of them only in rejectable        
anthropomorphism4 ,he says1 on page     

#aji3 ,those who espouse this position  
personality of ,god1 make the erroneous 
assumption that the choice is between   
personality and something lower than    
personality2 whereas the choice is      
rather between personality and something
 higher4 ,is it not just possible that  
there is a mode of being as much        
transcending ,intelligence and ,will1 as
 these transcend mechanical motion8 ,it 
is true that we are totally unable to   
conceive any such higher mode of being4 
,but this is not a reason for           
questioning its existence2 it is rather 
the reverse4444 ,the ,ultimate ,cause   
cannot in any respect be conceived by us
 because it is in every respect greater 
than can be conceived4  ,thus we find in
 ,lange a fuller and richer conception  
of the subject of religion2 but this    
conception is in want of one            
thing--without which it is in want of   
everything--namely1 of nothing less than
 of the objective reality4 ,spencer's   
religiousness has a much more meagre and

 less varied character3 the             
acknowledgment and veneration of the    
indiscernible2 but he nevertheless gives
 us with this content and object a real 
object1 even an object of veneration1 in
 which the abundance of all reality is  
hidden1 with the only conception that   
the indiscernible #bjj does not let us  
look into its cornucopia1 but only lets 
us judge of the abundance of its        
contents by the richness of that which  
it pours over us in the world of the    
relatively perceptible4  ,it will not be
 difficult to show the points at which  
each of these writers would have been   
able1 had he so wished1 to lead his     
conception of religion1 the one to a    
real1 the other to a full content4      
,lange finds the last principle of      
perception which is accessible to us1 in
 our organization4 ,now from our        
organization originate not only all     
modes of the perception of the empirical
 world1 but just as well all our ideal  
impulses1 especially the ethical4 ,which

 one of all those dispositions1         
impulses1 and activities has the        
precedence1 mainly depends upon the     
value which man places upon them4 ,now1 
when man attributes to the ideal and    
ethical a higher value than to the      
empirical1 when in reflecting about     
himself he finds that even in the normal
 individual the empirical1 sensual1 and 
material is subordinate and subject to  
the ideal and especially to the ethical1
 then from the standpoint of ,lange he  
is right1 and obliged to estimate the   
truth of that ideal and ethical as      
higher than the truth of the empirical  
world1 and to look at the whole         
empirical world only as being in the    
service of that ideal world4 ,when1 at  
the same time1 we observe an inner      
harmony in our organization1 this       
observation gives us the right and the  
duty of controlling the truth of our    
empirical perception by the truth of the
 results of our ideal and our ethical   
activity1 and the latter again by the   

former4 ,for if we do not wish to       
suppose that the human organization aims
 at a grand deception of mankind1 we    
have1 in spite of #bja the superiority  
of the ideal and ethical activities1 to 
establish the axiom that the empirical  
and the ideal and ethical cannot remain 
in lasting contradiction4 ,besides1 if  
we should add to this that a religion   
like ,christianity offers to man that   
which it gives to him on the ground of  
historical facts1 then the reports of   
these facts will certainly be subject to
 historical criticism just as surely as 
all historical reports2 but if they are 
confirmed1 the ideal and ethical        
convincing power which lies in this     
religion1 unites for us with the whole  
weight of the convincing power of the   
historical and empirical facts1 although
 the reproduction and systematization of
 its contents is still deficient and    
capable of further development4  ,in    
,spencer's system1 there are two points 
by which his own course of reasoning is 

able to bridge over the poverty of his  
conception of religion4 ,the first      
point1 given on pages #ajg-ajh of his   
,first ,principles1 and also elsewhere  
in his works1 is the acknowledgment that
 the final cause of all things is higher
 than all that we know1 and is of such a
 nature that it really can be the real  
cause of everything1 even the real cause
 of the spiritual and ethical4 ,thus he 
forbids us to think of qualities of the 
highest being1 but he himself thinks of 
them2 for this conception of the highest
 being as an impersonal is certainly    
something else and something much more  
valuable than the mere negation of      
personality4 ,the other point which     
might be able to lead him out of the    
vacuum of his idea of ,god1 lies in the 
method of his own investigation4 ,when  
he seeks the truth by collecting what is
 common in all the contrasts1 he also   
must seek and find something common     
between the highest cause #bjb of all   
things on one side and of the world as a

 whole and in detail on the other2 and  
this something will consist of the      
necessity of the highest cause of all   
things being so qualified that it is    
able to bring into existence the world  
as a whole and in detail4 ,if such ideas
 are also rejected as anthropomorphisms1
 then all reasoning and investigating is
 anthropomorphistic2 and in that respect
 we refer to what we had to say above1  
when treating of teleology 7p4 #agj     
ff474 ,the same ,duke of ,argyll whom we
 there had occasion to quote1 in an     
article in the ,contemporary ,review    
7,may1 #ahga71 upon ,variety as an ,aim 
in ,nature1 has admirably shown that it 
is the mind of man from which we may    
draw conclusions as to the nature of the
 ,creator1 and that the picture which we
 thus get of him1 can at the same time  
be seen true and yet dim1 at the same   
time real and yet from a distance2 for  
the human mind does not feel anything so
 much as its own limitations1 and       
therefore can easily imagine each of his

 powers and talents as being present in 
the highest being in infinite           
perfection4 ,if ,spencer had made this  
comparison1 and drawn the conclusions   
which follow from it for the nature of  
the final cause of all things1 the      
indiscernibleness of ,god would for him 
be reduced to an unsearchableness1 the  
unknowable be changed into an           
unsearchable1 and we could willingly    
acknowledge the humble modesty in regard
 to the infinity of the deity1 which his
 philosophy requires1 as a factor of all
 true religiousness4 ,but we have to    
present to him as an expression1 not    
only of true religiousness1 but also of 
true science1 that passage of the       
,psalms3 ,he that planted the ear1 shall
 he #bjc not hear8 ,he that formed the  
eye1 shall he not see8 7,psalm ,,xciv1  
#i47   #d4 ,spinoza and ,hegel in the   
,garb of ,darwin3 ,carneri4 ,eduard von 
,hartmann4  ,to the ,austrian           
philosopher ,carneri in his             
,sittlichkeit und ,darwinismus          

7,morality and ,darwinism71 three books 
of ,ethics1 ,vienna1 ,braumller1 #ahga1 
we shall have to give a place of his    
own4  ,inasmuch as religion and the     
beautiful are to him but a preliminary  
stage of truth which has to dissolve    
itself into philosophy--a philosophy    
which1 inclined to monism1 prefers to   
call itself pantheism--he takes a       
position in reference to religion       
similar to that toward materialism1     
namely3 a negative position4 ,but       
inasmuch as he still grants to religion 
in a subjective sense1 to religion in   
the form of piety1 a lasting position   
and truth 7religion1 he says1 has truth1
 but the positive ,god of religion has  
no reality1 page #aad71 and inasmuch as 
he ascribes to it not only a transitory 
pedagogical value for the masses1 which 
are not yet elevated to the height of   
philosophic reasoning1 but a value also 
for the philosopher--namely1 the value  
of religiousness and of piety--he rather
 belongs to the second and third of the 

before-mentioned groups4  ,carneri1 in  
his ,three ,books of ,ethics1 gives us a
 whole philosophic encyclopedia4 ,in    
thoughts sometimes rich1 but without    
regularly arranged and quiet reasoning1 
and in full command and employment of   
modern terms which he uses sometimes    
like a genius1 but often superficially  
and unjustly1 he develops a view of the 
world which1 although it appears in an  
independent way #bjd in all its         
fundamentals1 as regards its contents   
takes its origin from ,spinoza1 and as  
regards form and dialectics from ,hegel1
 but sometimes1 it is true1 sinks into  
weaknesses of which these philosophers  
would hardly have been guilty4 ,so1 for 
instance1 when he simply identifies     
religious faith with conjecture1 he     
takes a superficial view which he has in
 common with ,hckel who1 among other    
things1 repeatedly says that faith      
begins where knowledge ceases4          
,dialectical motion is everything to    
him4 ,in pursuing this dialectical      

motion1 he gives us a multitude of      
outlooks into all imaginable realms of  
knowledge and life1 but he always       
follows at the same time the formula of 
dialectical motion1 and1 where the      
difficulties of the real world are most 
invincibly opposed to this dialectics1  
knows1 like his master1 with almost     
chivalric ease1 to mingle and confound  
abstract formalistic reasoning and      
thoughts naturally following from the   
given thought4 ,want of clearness in    
general makes the reading of this       
otherwise not unimportant book very     
difficult4 ,on a ,darwinian foundation  
in his conception of nature and its     
development1 he puts a ,hegelian        
structure into his conception of human  
spiritual life1 but finally lets        
mankind1 although it is the highest form
 of appearance in this development1 sink
 back into death and destruction4  ,the 
,god of this view of the world is the   
causal law2 the conception of this      
causal law is the worship of the        

philosopher--a ,god1 of course1 so      
incapable of filling and quieting a mind
 longing for ,god--a worship so leathern
 that ,carneri himself cannot get rid of
 the opinion that1 with such religious  
ideas of reform1 he will finally lose   
the last reader of his book4 ,the aim of
 the #bje development1 also1 does not   
promise to the mind any substitute for  
the rigidness of ,god1 for the aim of   
the development is death--the death of  
the individual as well as of the        
universe4 ,he who has learned to get    
comfort in the deepest affliction from  
the absolute impartiality of the causal 
law1 is on so good terms with death1    
whose inflexibility he comprehends1 that
 without reluctance he gives to it the  
universe into the bargain4 7p4 #cec47   
,we give these glimpses into the dreary 
waste of the very latest advocate of    
pessimism which1 as it seems1 has fully 
and formally become the fashion1 in     
order to show what monstrosities are    
demanded from thought1 what revolting   

hardness from feeling1 what nonentities 
of ethical striving1 are offered as     
valuable wares1 if man has once begun to
 break the bond between himself and his 
living ,creator and ,master4 ,for this  
reason1 not only the anti-teleological  
monists meet the fate of ,nihilism1     
whether they appear in the plebeian     
roughness of ,bchner or in the          
aristocratic gentility of ,strauss1 but 
also such a brilliant advocate of       
teleology as ,eduard von ,hartmann does 
not know of any other final end to offer
 to the world and mankind than          
nothingness1 because he did not wish to 
be driven from his perception of ends in
 the world to the only conclusion to    
which it leads--namely3 to the          
perception of an absolute intelligent   
and ethical personality that directs    
these ends4 ,he prefers1 rather1 to     
suppose an unconsciously seeing         
substance of the world1 which1 after    
having once in the dark impulse of its  
unconscious will1 made the mistake of   

creating a world1 leads the same by the 
instinct of unconscious teleology in    
sad1 melancholy1 and yet relatively #bjf
 best development1 until it is ripe to  
sink back into nothingness1 and thereby 
to bring the absolute to rest4          
,although we pity the individuals who   
came under the ban of such a pessimism1 
we nevertheless can be glad of the fact 
that the consequences of such a         
separation from ,god are at least       
exposed so clearly1 and return from     
wandering through such barren steppes   
with renewed thankfulness to our        
,christian view of the world1 with its  
divine plan and aim4  ,we have1 next1   
however to review the representatives of
 theism and of the ,christian view of   
the world--which review will show us    
that the song of triumph which monism   
began to raise before its expected      
victory1 came very near disturbing the  
composure of persons here and there4    
#e4 ,re-echo of ,negation on the ,side  
of the ,christian ,view of the ,world4  

,in this condition of affairs1 it       
certainly could not happen otherwise    
than that1 even on the part of the      
theistic and positive ,christian view of
 the world1 some advocates were drawn   
into the contest who thought themselves 
obliged to see two irreconcilable       
antagonists in ,darwinism and           
,christianity4  ,science and religion   
had both been so much accustomed to see 
the origin of species1 and especially   
the appearance of man on the stage of   
earth1 hidden in impenetrable and       
unapproachable secrecy1 that every      
attempt at clearing up this darkness    
very naturally appeared to both as an   
attack upon the creative activity of    
,god4 ,the mode of reasoning to which   
mankind1 in its scientific as well as in
 its religious meditations1 had #bjg    
accustomed itself for hundreds of years1
 was used to exclude from the idea of   
creation the conception of intervening  
agencies2 and this was true not only in 
regard to the idea of the first creation

 of the universe1 where the idea of     
intervening agencies naturally is left  
out1 but also in regard to the idea of  
the creation of single beings4          
,moreover1 mankind was so accustomed to 
see a contrast between origination and  
creation1 that in the same degree in    
which man tried or was able to perceive 
the modalities of the origin of species1
 the divine causality1 or at least the  
idea of creation1 seemed to disappear2  
and for the word of the ,bible1 that    
,god created creatures each after its   
kind1 a place could no longer be found4 
,to this was added the fact that not    
only all materialism took possession of 
,darwinism as the irresistible          
battering-ram which1 as they said1      
forever demolishes the whole fortress of
 theism and buries under its ruins all  
those who take refuge in this decaying  
castle1 but that even naturalists let   
themselves be carried away without      
opposition by this anti-theistic        
current1 and even submitted to be       

heralds and prophets of this new        
anti-theistic wisdom of monism4 ,let the
 reader think of ,hckel's ,natural      
,history of ,creation and ,anthropogeny1
 where he will find the most interesting
 reports from all realms of exact       
natural science1 together with a wholly 
unsolved entanglement of descent1       
selection1 and mechanical view of the   
world1 and this mode of contemplation of
 the world1 with eloquent and           
enthusiastic proclamation of monism and 
with unconcealed derision of the        
capricious arbitrariness of a personal  
,creator1 all thrown together as one    
great entire system1 formed at one      
stroke4 #bjh  ,is it1 then1 to be       
wondered at1 that not only the          
uncritical among believers1 but also    
those who thoughtfully examined the     
movements of the mind1 believed in the  
loudly-proclaimed connection of         
,darwinism with the whole               
anti-,christian view of the world1 and  
therefore protested immediately against 

everything which is called ,darwinism8  
,can we reproach theologians for not    
immediately becoming scientists         
themselves1 in order to form an         
independent judgment in the question1   
when even the most eminent scientists   
declared that amalgamation of the most  
heterogenetic as an inevitable          
consequence of ,darwinism1 and as much  
as possible diminished or concealed     
their want of harmony with a few other  
investigators who1 although small in    
number1 yet by their weight             
counterbalanced dozens of names of the  
second and third rank8  ,thus we could  
read1 in the journals of specialists1 in
 pamphlets1 in religious and political  
journals1 even in local newspapers1 a   
great many articles which were guilty of
 exactly the same confounding of the    
scientific and the religious1 and again 
of the scientific and the philosophic1  
as those who had caused this            
confounding1 and who1 under the         
supposition of this solidarity of wholly

 distinct things1 attacked and contested
 in the interest of religion1 not only  
the anti-religious conclusions of       
,darwinian philosophers1 but also       
,darwinism as a merely scientific       
theory1 and rendered the contrast as    
strong as possible by adhering to that  
above censured1 unmotived1 indefensible1
 and one-sided conception of creation4  
,and although on the part of positive   
,christian theology there was a         
gradually increasing number of voices   
#bji of those who in the idea of an     
origin of species through descent do not
 yet see an injury to the theistic and  
,christian conception of ,god and       
creation1 still as a rule this          
concession was made only to the idea of 
descent1 and not to that of selection   
and to that which is properly called    
,darwinism4 ,as a rule1 in most of the  
theological works which treat in general
 of the ,darwinian questions1 ,darwinism
 and opposition to the ,christian       
conception of ,god and creation were and

 are still taken as identical4 ,for     
instance1 ,ebrard1 in the first part of 
his ,apologetik 7,apologetics71         
,gtersloh1 ,bertelsmann1 #ahgd1         
enumerates among the systems which are  
opposed to ,christianity1 in the same   
line with the doubtless anti-theistic   
and anti-,christian aposkopiology or    
negation of the idea of design1 also the
 mechanistic system1 or the negation of 
the organic vital force1 and the        
,darwinian theory of descent4 ,besides1 
in reading his ,apologetics1 we had     
earnestly wished1 in the interest of    
science as well as of religion1 that a  
theologian who writes a work which      
claims to be scientific and to advocate 
the ,christian standpoint1 had abstained
 from that coarse and disgusting        
contempt and derision of adversaries    
which we meet so often in his book1 and 
which only causes friend and foe to take
 a position contrary to that which the  
author intended4 ,trmpelmann who1 in an 
essay upon ,darwinism1 monistic         

philosophy1 and ,christianity           
7,jahrbcher fr protestantische          
,theologie1 #ahgf1 ,i7 gives a similar  
conception of the relation between      
,darwinism and religion1 but defends his
 whole position with much more          
scientific acuteness and depth1 has also
 not taken the tone which worthily      
treats an opposite opinion and its      
advocates4         99       99       99 
99       99 #baj   ,,chapter ,,ii4      
,,reform ,,of ,,religion1 ,,or ,,at     
,,least ,,of ,,the ,,science ,,of       
,,religion1 ,,through ,,darwinism4   #a4
 ,heinrich ,lang1 ,friedrich ,vischer1  
,gustav ,jger4  ,in passing on to those 
who in ,darwinism do not see a negation 
but a reformation of religion1 or at    
least of theology1 we first meet        
,heinrich ,lang1 the late spiritual     
leader of the ,reformtheologie in       
,switzerland4 ,he treats of ,die        
,religion im ,zeitalter ,darwins        
7,religion in the ,age of ,darwin7 in   
,holtzendorff's and ,oncken's ,deutsche 

,zeit- und ,streitfragen1 ,jahrg4 ,,ii1 
,heft #ca1 ,berlin1 ,lderitz1 #ahgc4    
,with a very correct estimate of the    
lasting value of religion as well as of 
natural science1 and with a warm apology
 for the religious realm1 he regulates  
the boundaries of each by asking        
religion not to hinder modern knowledge 
of the world and nature1 and by asking  
knowledge of nature to leave the realm  
of religion untouched in its            
self-certainty4  ,but when he1 evidently
 still dependent on the old             
rationalistic supernaturalistic         
conception of miracle and providence1   
claims to find that as the result of    
modern knowledge of the world and nature
 a special providence is no longer      
conceivable1 and no other hearing of    
prayer is possible than a subjective    
psychological one2 that the processes in
 the world1 in their entire final causal
 connection of causes and effects1      
nowhere leave a place for #baa the      
freely acting hand of a divine ,lord of 

the world1 and that even a moral order  
of the world can only prove itself so   
far as guilt and punishment stand in a  
natural causal connection with one      
another3 then his religiousness makes   
concessions to the modern view of the   
world which it is not at all obliged to 
make or justified in making1 and forces 
upon religion a reform against the      
necessity and usefulness of which not   
only religious feeling and need1 but    
also deeper and more consequent         
reflection on ,god and the world1 just  
as strongly strives4  ,what remains to  
him as an independent realm for religion
 is nevertheless worthy of recognition4 
,as faith of the human mind in a        
transcendental unity which manifests    
itself in the manifold and sensible1 and
 carries through a moral order of the   
world--although one which1 by the       
before-mentioned limitation of the      
natural connection of guilt and         
punishment1 is very much                
reduced--religion gives to the mind     

warmth and worship2 as confidence of the
 heart in an infinite possession in the 
anguish of the finite1 it creates       
confidence in ,god1 gratitude1 devotion1
 energy1 courage of life2 as reverence  
for a holiness which stands             
unimpeachable above the fluctuating     
inclinations of our will1 awakens the   
consciousness of guilt1 and abolishes   
the guilt1 it remains the basis of all  
moral action4 ,lang also sharply and    
correctly points out the insufficiency  
of ,strauss's ,the ,old ,faith and the  
,new1 as well as the conflict between   
his metaphysical naturalism which only  
leads to the struggle for existence1 and
 his demand of self-submission to the   
universe1 and of the moral and spiritual
 self-determination of man as of a being
 which goes beyond nature4 ,nevertheless
 we can not follow ,lang in his #bab    
ways of reform4 ,first--his conception  
of ,god is amazingly meagre1 and of more
 than a ,spencerian unapproachableness4 
,god is to him1 according to his        

,dogmatics1 nothing but the eternal1 in 
itself perfect cause of all being1      
exempted from all changes of the world's
 process4 ,when he gives the name of    
father to this primeval cause1 as he    
does in his sermons and elsewhere1      
without being able to admit relation of 
mutual love of person to person1 he only
 makes it glaringly evident how little  
his abstract metaphysics can satisfy    
religious need4 ,second--that which is  
claimed to be gained by this modern view
 of the world 7namely1 extension of the 
supremacy of religion to everything1    
even to the affairs of daily life71 is  
not at all new1 but is the effect of    
long-existing sound religiousness1 and  
is the essence of all sound religious   
doctrine2 and we therefore can not see  
how a view of the world1 which1 for     
instance1 denies divine providence1 and 
limits the hearing of prayer to its     
psychological effects1 shall have       
greater force to leaven the whole daily 
life religiously1 than our ,christian   

faith in the ,father without whose will 
no sparrow falls to the ground1 and who 
says to his children3 ,call upon me in  
the day of trouble3 ,i will deliver     
thee1 and thou shalt glorify me4        
,third--exactly that which ,lang        
declares a purification of religion     
7namely1 the before-mentioned           
elimination of divine providence and of 
all that which is connected therewith71 
appears to us not at all as a reform1   
but as an immense impoverishment and    
desolation of religion1 which is so far 
from being required by natural science1 
that it turns out to be but a concession
 to the most superficial metaphysicians 
who1 of course1 have become very        
popular4 #bac  ,friedrich ,vischer is   
also to be ranked in this group4 ,in the
 sixth part of his ,kritische ,gnge     
7,critical ,walks71 he speaks of        
,strauss' ,the ,old ,faith and the ,new1
 and takes his determined position in   
reference to the religious question1    
quite essentially differing from        

,strauss4 ,in regard to the aversion to 
miracles1 he stands on the same ground  
with ,strauss and ,lang2 in protesting  
against ,strauss' elimination of the    
idea of design1 and especially in       
demanding a moral order of the world1 he
 is still more energetic than ,lang4 ,he
 particularly does not1 like ,lang1     
limit the moral order of the world to   
the simple empiric causal connection    
between human action and its            
consequences4 ,but on the other hand1 by
 his opposition to the idea of a        
personality of ,god1 he again deviates  
more than ,lang from the true meaning of
 ,christian religiousness4 ,on page #bai
 he says3 ,how1 in spite of the infinite
 crossings of human action1 is inner    
conformity to the end in view in general
 so established through that which we   
call chance1 or rather by means of these
 crossings1 that we can speak of a moral
 order of the world8 ,men1 individuals  
as well as communities1 follow their    
aims4 ,hereby there always results      

something quite different from that     
which they intended and wished4 ,sublime
 laws govern above us1 between us1 full 
of mystery in the midst of life2 one of 
them in reference to guilt1 punishment  
of guilt1 is called nemesis4 ,faith in  
that meaning of the word1 which we      
regard as a low one he means the faith  
which has its dogmas beyond which the   
man of the most recent culture has      
passed1 not knowing that he also carries
 around with him his dogmas1 his new    
faith is in need of a person who founds1
 carries out1 and executes #bad these   
laws4 ,but the faith of the monists has 
no such need4 ,why not8 ,that needs more
 sufficient demonstration4  ,certainly  
it needs more sufficient demonstration4 
,but this demonstration will never be   
possible1 so long as we acknowledge the 
government of a moral order of the      
world4 ,for this leads of necessity to  
faith in a living ,god1 and this faith  
demands from our conception less        
pretensions than the faith in a kind of 

system of spiritual machinery by which  
chance and the wished-for are woven     
together1 without this system proceeding
 from a highly spiritual and ethical    
intelligence4 ,it nevertheless must be  
acknowledged that ,vischer1 from the    
standpoint of ethical need1 vindicates  
the position and truth of religion1 as  
he also beautifully and correctly       
defines its position in reference to    
morality1 in saying that morality makes 
the demand1 religion gives the strength 
to meet it4  ,from another side1 ,gustav
 ,jger makes a compromise between       
,darwinism and religion in his five     
lectures on ,die ,darwinsche ,theorie   
und ihre ,stellung zu ,moral und        
,religion 7,the ,darwinian ,theory and  
its ,position in ,reference to ,morality
 and ,religion71 ,stuttgart1 ,j4        
,hoffmann1 #ahfi4  ,he makes still more 
valid concessions to religion and       
,christianity than ,lang and ,vischer2  
directly opposes materialistic monism2  
leaves to faith in a personal ,god1 in  

the divinity of ,christ1 in individual  
immortality1 in the answer to prayer    
beyond the psychological effect1 in     
miracles1 in short1 to the full contents
 of ,christian religiousness1 their     
weight and truth2 and in that respect we
 would have to rank him in the following
 group1 if he #bae did not by his manner
 of proving these concessions exclude   
himself from it1 and rank himself in    
that group of which we treat in the     
present section4  ,according to his     
opinion1 ,darwinism gives to religion1  
if not new contents 7although these     
contents are entirely subject to        
revision according to ,darwinism71 still
 a wholly new foundation1 and1 indeed1 a
 foundation of subjective religiousness1
 as well as of the objective contents of
 religion1 only from the standpoint of  
its practical usefulness in the struggle
 for existence4 ,the faith in a personal
 ,god1 in immortality1 in redemption by 
the ,god-,man ,jesus ,christ1 in the    
hearing of prayer1 in help in danger    

even to the extent of miracles1         
strengthens man1 gives to him a         
superiority to those who do not have    
that faith and who do not have the habit
 of prayer1 and therefore is so far the 
best weapon in the struggle for         
existence2 and herein lies the truth of 
religion1 especially of the ,christian  
religion1 as the most successful weapon 
in the struggle for existence which     
takes place through the whole creation1 
from the lowest organisms up to the     
highest spiritual life of mankind4  ,we 
willingly admit that ,christianity has  
certainly proved itself by far the      
strongest and most successful means of  
education to mankind1 and that1 if we   
must once express this experience in the
 ,darwinian mode of speaking1 we can    
express it as above4 ,but with the      
attempt to make the truth of religion   
and the truth of its contents1 even if  
only subjective1 dependent only and     
solely upon the proof of its usefulness1
 nobody1 either friend or foe1 will be  

satisfied4 ,the adversaries of religion 
and ,christianity1 perhaps with the     
exception of ,bchner1 will admit that   
,christianity has for some #baf time    
been a quite useful weapon to mankind in
 the struggle for existence2 but they   
will say that they are just about to    
replace it by a still more useful       
weapon2 and the advocates of religion   
and ,christianity likewise can not agree
 upon a mere grounding of their religion
 upon need which puts upon them every   
day the possibility of changing it for  
something still more useful4 ,both      
friend and foe will join in the         
conviction that objective truth is      
always the best guarantee for subjective
 success2 and thus both will pass beyond
 the purely utilitarian apologetics or  
polemics to the questions as to the     
objective reality of the contents of    
,christian religiousness4         99    
99       99       99       99 #bag      
,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,peace ,,between     
,,religion ,,and ,,darwinism4   #a4     

,darwin1 ,wallace1 ,r4 ,owen1 ,asa      
,gray1 ,mivart1 ,mc,cosh1 ,anderson1 ,k4
 ,e4 v4 ,baer1 ,alex4 ,braun1 ,braubach1
 etc4  ,it still remains for us to take 
a glance at those who think religion and
 ,darwinism1 and ,christianity and      
,darwinism1 hold toward one another     
reciprocally amicable relations4  ,in   
the first place1 we have to mention     
,darwin himself4 ,in his earliest work1 
,origin of ,species1 he repeatedly gives
 this opinion1 as on page #dba3 ,i see  
no good reason why the views given in   
this volume should shock the religious  
feelings of any one4 ,it is             
satisfactory1 as showing how transient  
such impressions are1 to remember that  
the greatest discovery ever made by man1
 namely1 the law of the attraction of   
gravity1 was also attacked by ,leibnitz 
'as subversive of natural1 and          
inferentially of revealed1 religion4' ,a
 celebrated author and divine has       
written to me that he 'has gradually    
learned to see that it is just as noble 

a conception of the ,deity to believe   
that ,he created a few original forms   
capable of self-development into other  
and needful forms1 as to believe that   
,he required a fresh act of creation to 
supply the voids caused by the action of
 ,his laws4' ,on page #dbh1 he speaks of
 the laws which ,god has impressed on   
matter2 and at the end of his work1 on  
page #dbi1 he says3 ,there is grandeur  
in this #bah view of life1 with its     
several powers1 having been originally  
breathed by the ,creator into a few     
forms or into one4 ,in his ,descent of  
,man1 he also protests against the      
reproach that his views are irreligious1
 and says3 ,the birth both of the       
species and of the individual are       
equally parts of that grand sequence of 
events which our minds refuse to accept 
as the result of blind chance4 ,in      
treating of the question as to the      
development of the moral instincts1 he  
says3 ,if he man breaks through the     
fixed habits of his life1 he will       

assuredly feel dissatisfaction4 ,he must
 likewise avoid the reprobation of the  
one ,god or gods in whom1 according to  
his knowledge or superstition1 he may   
believe4 ,and furthermore he remarks3   
,the question whether there exists a    
,creator and ,ruler of the ,universe1   
has been answered in the affirmative by 
some of the highest intellects that have
 ever existed4  ,it is true1 all these  
expressions about religion are very     
general2 but since in his works we do   
not find any utterance contrary to them 
and hostile to religion1 we have a right
 to rank the celebrated originator of   
the whole agitation among those         
naturalists who are conscious of the    
limits of the realms of the natural and 
the religious1 and are convinced of the 
possibility of a harmony between the    
two4 ,for his casual utterances against 
a creation of single species always     
combine with the word creation the idea 
of that direct creation out of nothing1 
without intervening agencies1 which is  

entirely correct for the idea of the    
first1 origin of the universe1 but which
 for the origin of the single formations
 within the universe is neither asked   
for by the religious view of the world1 
nor established by the ,holy #bai       
,scriptures1 nor by a cautiously        
reasoning theology1 although it very    
often controls the conceptions of       
naturalists as well as of theologians4  
,now1 while ,darwin rejects the idea of 
a sudden appearance of a new species out
 of nothing--or1 as he once expressed   
himself in his ,origin of ,species1 the 
idea that at innumerable periods in the 
earth's history certain elemental atoms 
have been commanded suddenly to flash   
into living tissues1--and he is no doubt
 right in rejecting it1--still at the   
same time he does not deny the          
dependence of the successive origin of a
 new species on a divine author4 ,but in
 calling that process creation and this 
one not1 he gives the appearance of an  
opposition to the religious idea of     

creation--an appearance of which the    
greater part of the guilt is borne by   
those theologians who define the idea of
 the creation1 even of a single form1 in
 a manner which is only proper for the  
idea of the first origin of the         
universe4  ,it is true1 we could rank   
,darwin still more readily among the    
scientists who are at peace with all the
 claims of religion1 did he not in his  
,descent of ,man1 when enumerating the  
excellent naturalists and philosophers  
who with him reduce the pedigree of man 
to lower forms1 mention names of men who
 in their works firmly unite ,darwinism 
and monistic naturalism or even         
materialism1 and expressly protest      
against a separation of their           
naturo-historical results and their     
philosophic points of view4 ,we mean    
,bchner and ,hckel4 ,the latter's       
,natural ,history of ,creation1 he      
especially praises3 ,if this work had   
appeared before my essay had been       
written1 ,i should probably never have  

completed it4 ,almost all the           
conclusions at which ,i have #bbj       
arrived ,i find confirmed by this       
naturalist1 etc4 ,the entire silence in 
regard to the anti-,christian results   
which these two authors derive from     
their naturo-historical premises1 makes 
,darwin's own position in reference to  
religion again very uncertain4 ,it seems
 that ,darwin in his theology is not    
only inclined to theism1 but1 following 
the traditions of his countrymen of the 
last century1 to a quite cool and       
superficial deism1 and that he permits  
himself to be too much impressed by the 
anti-teleological deductions of many of 
his followers1 and to be induced to     
separate in his later publications the  
,creator and his work more widely than  
he has done in the beginning4 ,for while
 in his ,origin of the ,species1 and in 
his ,descent of ,man he nowhere contests
 a teleological view of nature1 and     
rejects the idea of single creations    
only under the erroneous supposition    

that the idea of the creation of the    
single also excludes the action of      
intervening agencies1 we find1 on the   
other hand1 in ,the ,expression of the  
,emotions in ,man and ,animals a passage
 which1 though in a reserved way1 seems 
to give just as much support to the     
adversaries of teleology as to its      
advocates1 if1 indeed1 not more4 ,he    
says 7page #cch73 ,the belief that      
blushing was specially designed by the  
,creator is opposed to the general      
theory of evolution1 which is now so    
largely accepted2 but it forms no part  
of my duty here to argue on the general 
question4 ,those who believe in design  
will find it difficult to account for   
shyness being the most frequent and     
efficient of all the causes of blushing1
 etc4 ,this inconsistency in his        
utterances has its origin in the fact   
that the strength of this naturalist    
does not seem to lie in logical         
philosophic thought4 #bba  ,a4 ,r4      
,wallace1 the independent and           

contemporaneous co-originator of the    
,darwinian theory1 still more evidently 
and more decidedly expresses himself    
favorably as to the position of this    
theory in reference to religion4 ,in his
 ,natural ,selection1 he says on page   
#cfh3 ,it does not seem an improbable   
conclusion that all force may be        
will-force2 and thus1 that the whole    
universe is not merely dependent on1 but
 actually is1 the ,,will of higher      
intelligences or of one ,supreme        
,intelligence4  ,he pronounces the      
belief that ,god created the new species
 in continual interference with the     
regular process of things1 a lower      
conception1 a limitation of the         
,creator's power 7page #bhj71 hence     
something which he makes objection to   
directly in the interest of religion4   
,moreover1 he sees1 especially in those 
stages which caused the physical        
development of man1 and which became the
 material basis of his spiritual        
productions1 moments of development     

which cannot be explained by natural    
selection or by a coincidence of        
material circumstances1 but only by the 
preformation of the body after a certain
 design and for a certain purpose4      
,richard ,owen1 the celebrated          
anatomist1 and palontologist of         
,england1 who1 after having for a long  
time resisted the ,darwinian theories1  
lately accepted the idea of development 
and rejected that of selection1 takes a 
similar position4 ,in the last part of  
his ,comparative ,anatomy of            
,vertebrates1 which was issued          
separately in #ahfc under the title     
,derivative ,hypothesis of ,life and    
,species1 he sees in the causes which   
produced the new species only the       
servants of a predestinating #bbb       
intelligent will--for instance1 the     
horse predestinated and prepared for    
man2 and on page #ij of vol4 ,v4 of     
,transactions of the ,zological         
,society1 he says1 that natural         
evolution1 through secondary causes1 by 

means of slow physical and organic      
operations through long ages1 is not the
 less clearly recognizable as the act of
 all-adaptive ,mind1 because we have    
abandoned the old error of supposing it 
the result of a primary1 direct and     
sudden act of creational                
construction4444 ,the succession of     
species by continuously operating law is
 not necessarily a 'blind operation4'   
,such law1 however designed in the      
properties and successions of natural   
objects1 intimates1 nevertheless1 a     
preconceived progress4 ,organisms may be
 evolved in orderly succession1 stage   
after stage1 towards a foreseen goal1   
and the broad features of the course may
 still show the unmistakable impress of 
,divine volition4  ,professor ,huxley1  
of ,london1 the zealous and             
oft-mentioned advocate of the descent of
 man from the ape1 says--what is so     
energetically contested by his warmest  
friends in ,germany1 by ,bchner1 ,hckel1
 ,o4 ,schmidt1 and others--that the     

teleological and the mechanical mode of 
viewing nature by no means exclude one  
another4 ,he does this1 of course1      
without going into any details of the   
religious question4  ,asa ,gray1 an     
eminent and highly esteemed ,american   
botanist1 who is particularly respected 
by ,darwin1 and is supported also by    
,sir ,charles ,lyell in ,the ,antiquity 
of ,man1 says in his essay on ,natural  
,selection not ,incompatible with       
,natural ,theology1 a ,free ,examination
 of ,darwin's ,treatise 7,london1       
,trbner1 #ahfa71 on page #bi3 ,agreeing 
that plants and animals #bbc were       
produced by ,omnipotent fiat does not   
exclude the idea of natural order and   
what we call secondary causes4 ,the     
record of the fiat--',let the earth     
bring forth grass1' etc41 'the living   
creature1' etc41--seems even to imply   
them1 and leads to the conclusion that  
the different species were produced     
through natural agencies4 ,and on page  
#ch3 ,darwin's hypothesis concerns the  

order and not the cause1 the how and not
 the why of the phenomena1 and so leaves
 the question of design just where it   
was before4 ,and finally1 in a passage  
which is adopted by ,sir ,charles ,lyell
 7ib4 page #eje73 ,we may imagine that  
events and operations in general go on  
in virtue simply of forces communicated 
at the first1 and without any subsequent
 interference1 or we may hold that now  
and then1 and only now and then1 there  
is a direct interposition of the ,deity2
 or1 lastly1 we may suppose that all the
 changes are carried on by the immediate
 orderly and constant1 however          
infinitely diversified1 action of the   
intelligent efficient ,cause4  ,mivart1 
an ,english ,catholic1 most decidedly   
advocates a reconcilability of          
,darwinian views1 and especially of the 
evolution theory1 as he establishes it  
with the full contents of ,christian    
orthodoxy1 in his remarkable book ,on   
the ,genesis of ,species 7,london and   
,new ,york1 ,macmillan  ,co41 #b;d4 ed4 

#ahga71 in which we find a great many   
independent naturo-historical           
investigations4 ,he assigns to the      
selection theory only a subordinate     
position1 but on the other hand accepts 
an evolution1 and1 in close connection  
with ,r4 ,owen1 explains it from inner  
and innate impulses of development of   
the organisms1 which act now more slowly
 and gradually1 now more by impulses2 he
 places man as to #bbd his physical part
 entirely among the effects of the      
evolution principle1 although1 taking   
into consideration some utterances of   
,wallace1 he thinks it possible1 but not
 probable1 that the creation and the    
preceding stage of his physical nature  
is also different from that of animals4 
,but1 on the other hand1 in fully       
adopting the old scholastic creationism1
 he supposes a special creation of the  
soul1 a separation of body and soul1    
which in this form is very contestable1 
and might better have been replaced by a
 separation of natural and rational or  

of physico-psychical and pneumatical    
parts of his being4 ,with such a view of
 nature1 he finds the fullest harmony   
between the evolution theory and        
religion1 reconciles the plausible      
antagonism of creation and development  
by dividing the idea of creation into a 
primary creation 7creation of the       
beginning out of nothing7 and into a    
secondary creation 7creation through    
intervening agencies1 although that     
which is produced through them is still 
a creation and a work of the ,creator71 
and declares his conviction that what is
 acting according to law in nature also 
stands under the causation and          
government of ,god like the first       
beginning of the universe--a postulate  
of our primary views without which the  
whole universe and our existence in it  
would harden into a cold mechanism      
without consolation or ideality4        
,finally1 at the assembly of the        
,evangelical ,alliance in ,new ,york    
7,october1 #ahgc71 there were heard many

 voices of eminent advocates of a       
theistic and ,christian view of the     
world1 which maintained the full        
consistency of an evolution theory with 
religion and ,christianity4 ,mc,cosh1   
for instance1 as referee in the         
philosophic section as to the relation  
of the evolution theory and #bbe        
religion1 said#aj3 ,i am not sure that  
religion is entitled to insist that     
every species of insects has been       
created by a special fiat of ,god1 with 
no secondary agent employed4 ,and still 
more plainly and more courageously1     
,president ,anderson1 of the ,university
 of ,rochester1 in his very remarkable  
address1 speaks about the unnecessary   
and unworthy fear of many ,christian    
men1 when they see the appearance of    
hypotheses with which science operates4 
,at the end of his address1 he says3    
,the evidence for the existence of a    
personal ,creator cannot be affected by 
any considerations drawn from the mode1 
relative rapidity1 or the nature of the 

proximate antecedents and consequences  
in the creative process4  ,from ,german 
sources1 we can note fewer utterances of
 a friendly or at least neutral position
 between ,darwinism and religion4 ,for  
this fact there are many reasons4 ,one  
may be1 that on the continent in general
 there is a smaller number of those who1
 without being specialists in both      
realms1 unite active religious interest 
and reasoning with a thorough study of  
those naturo-historical questions1 while
 in ,great ,britain physico-theological 
studies have been for generations       
traditional and the object of interest  
for the majority of educated men4 ,a    
second reason1 indeed1 is that some of  
the warmest scientific advocates of     
,darwinism at once attacked also theism 
and ,christianity2 hence with all those 
who did not have time and incitement    
enough to study the questions for       
themselves1 they necessarily created the
 opinion that ,darwinism really attacks 
even the fundamentals of #bbf religion1 

and their whole tendency had but a      
repelling influence even on scientists  
of deeper spiritual and ethical         
disposition and need4 ,finally1 in      
,germany as well as on the whole        
continent1 the number of those who do   
not care for religious questions in     
general1 and who therefore interest     
themselves in the scientific questions  
brought up by ,darwin1 but do not       
trouble themselves farther for their    
position in reference to religion and   
,christianity1 is unfortunately larger  
than in ,great ,britain4  ,nevertheless1
 such friendly voices are not entirely  
wanting in our country4 ,the botanist   
,alex ,braun says1 in his beautiful and 
significant lecture on the importance of
 development in natural history1 p4 #dh3
 ,some said that the descent theory     
denies creation1 and it is true1 the    
,darwinians themselves caused this      
opinion by contrasting creation and     
development as irreconcilable ideas4    
,but this contrast does not actually    

exist1 for as soon as we look upon      
creation as a divine effect1 not merely 
belonging to the past1 or appearing in  
single abrupt movements1 but connected  
and universally present in time1 we can 
seek and find it nowhere else but in the
 natural history of development         
itself4444 ,theologians themselves1     
according to the ,mosaic documents1     
acknowledge a history of creation2      
natural history1 looked upon from its   
inner side1 is nothing else but the     
farther carrying out of the history of  
creation4  ,even ,k4 ,e4 von ,baer1 who 
expressly contests the idea of          
selection1 thinks it only scientifically
 indefensible1 but not anti-religious2  
an opinion also held by ,wigand4  ,a    
similar friendly relation between       
,darwinism and religion is advocated by 
,braubach1 in his publication1 #bbg     
,religion1 ,moral und ,philosophie der  
,darwin'schen ,artlehre nach ihrer      
,natur and ihrem ,character als kleine  
,parallele menschlich-geistiger         

,entwicklung 7,religion1 ,morality1 and 
,philosophy of the ,darwinian ,doctrine 
of ,species1 as to its ,nature and      
,character2 a ,small ,parallel of ,human
 ,intellectual ,development71 ,neuwied1 
,hansen1 #ahfi1 a publication to which  
we pay special attention1 since ,darwin1
 in his ,descent of ,man1 twice paid it 
the honor of a quotation4 ,it is true1  
the essay1 through its peculiar         
dependence on an original and quite     
arbitrarily grouped scheme1 gives the   
impression of something very singular1  
and is not very agreeably and easily    
read2 but it shows such an energetic    
union of respect for science and its    
work and results1 with adhesion to all  
the fundamentals of ,christian truth1   
that it has to be mentioned as one of   
the rare voices which1 even in regard to
 the realm of nature1 pronounce the     
fullest harmony between religion and    
science4 ,braubach finds in the animal  
kingdom the elements of all the         
spiritual life of mankind1 even of      

religion and morality2 but everything is
 still wrapped in the lowest stage of   
sensuality4 ,nevertheless1 he assigns to
 mankind1 by its possession of the idea 
of infinity1 something absolutely new1  
absolutely superior to the animal world1
 and sees the ,darwinian ideas1 even in 
the religious and moral possession of   
mankind1 confirmed by the fact that they
 develop themselves on the way from the 
sensual stage to the rational exactly   
according to the principles of          
,darwin--namely1 through transmission   
with individual variability in the      
struggle for existence1 through         
selection of the fittest4 ,with special 
earnestness1 he pronounces the          
indissoluble unity of religion and      
morality1 #bbh and says that religion1  
as it presents itself upon ,darwinian   
grounds1 is a moral religion4  ,we find 
here and there in periodicals many more 
voices which pronounce the conviction   
that1 out of the present contest of     
minds1 peace between religion and       

science will result4         99       99
       99       99       99   ,b4 ,,the 
,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and ,,morality4
  ,,preliminary ,,view4  ,we can treat  
much more briefly of this portion of our
 task than of the position of the       
,darwinians in reference to the         
religious question1 for the reason that 
the contrasts in the ethical realm are  
far less sharply drawn than in the      
religious realm1 although in principle  
they are not less widely apart4 ,for    
while there are a great many men who    
think that it belongs to good society   
and to the indispensable characteristics
 of high modern education to show either
 cold indifference or direct hostility  
in reference to religion and to the     
whole religious question2 while a great 
many of the much-read works of belle    
lettres never tire of teaching the      
reading public that the religious       
question really no longer exists for the
 educated man1 on the other hand1       
nobody1 not even the extremest atheist  

and enemy of religion1 wishes to        
renounce the reputation of having moral 
principles4 ,thus it happens that the   
positions taken by the ,darwinians in   
reference to the ethical question are   
less varied than those taken by them in 
reference to the religious question4    
,and we may also be brief for another   
reason1 #bbi namely1 that by reviewing  
the position of the ,darwinians in      
reference to the religious question1 we 
have essentially prepared the way for   
the principal questions which will have 
to be treated4  ,we shall group the     
utterances upon the relation of the     
,darwinian theories to morality as we   
did those in regard to the relation of  
,darwinism to religion2 and shall first 
let the advocates of an                 
irreconcilableness between the two      
speak1 then those advocating a          
reformative influence of ,darwinism upon
 morality1 and finally those striving   
for neutrality and peace between the    
two4 ,we shall have no occasion1 except 

incidentally1 to discriminate between   
the different fundamental principles and
 parts of ethics1 but shall in the last 
part of our work treat of the question  
independently4 ,in making subdivisions  
for them here1 we should but cause      
infinite repetitions1 unnecessarily     
complicate our review1 and render it    
more difficult4         99       99     
99       99       99 #bcj   ,,chapter   
,,iv4  ,,antagonism ,,between           
,,darwinism ,,and ,,morality4   #a4     
,objections to ,darwinism from an       
,ethical ,standpoint4  ,from what we    
said at the beginning of the preceding  
preliminary view1 it is evident that we 
have to look for the advocates of an    
irreconcilableness between morality and 
,darwinism1 not in the camp of the      
followers of the latter1 but only in    
that of its adversaries4 ,it is true1   
such advocates were never wanting4 ,in  
pamphlets and journals1 it has been     
often enough said that ,darwinism cuts  
through the nerve of life1 not only of  

religion1 but also of morality4  ,it was
 demonstrated that in making man a mere 
product of nature1 and degrading him to 
a being that is nothing else but a more 
highly developed animal1 ,darwinism     
takes from human personality its value1 
from the realms of morality its dignity1
 and from its demands their autonomy4   
,in making the struggle for existence   
the principle of all development and1 by
 extending it to the development and    
social relations of man1 at the same    
time the human social principle1 it puts
 in place of self-denial and love the   
principle of egoism and boorishness and 
the right of the stronger1 gives full   
course to the unchaining of all animal  
passions1 and coquettes with all the    
emotions which1 flattering the animal   
part of man1 #bca aims at the subversion
 of all that exists and at the          
destruction of the ideal acquisitions of
 mankind4 ,in tracing everything which  
constitutes the higher position and     
dignity of man back to his own work1 and

 permitting it to be worked out of      
physical1 spiritual1 and ethical        
brutishness1 in slow development and    
effort1 closely related to the animal   
kingdom1 it fosters and nourishes       
haughtiness in an intolerable way4 ,and 
finally1 in breaking off and denying the
 dependence of man upon ,god1 and       
leading to mechanical determinism1 it   
destroys the deepest and most effective 
motive to moral action--the tracing of  
the moral law to the authority of the   
divine ,law-giver1 and the consciousness
 of an individual moral responsibility4 
,it cannot be denied that many of the   
most zealous ,darwinians gave too much  
cause for such a conception and         
representation of the ethical           
consequences of their system4 ,in view  
of the fact that they applied the       
selection principle1 with its most      
radical consequences1 to the origin and 
development of mankind1 and that they   
elevated the same to the ethical and    
social principle of mankind and did not 

permit the acceptance of any new and    
higher agencies in mankind except those 
already active in the animal and the    
organic world1 and that they gladly     
treated this selection principle also in
 the social and ethical realm as a      
struggle for existence1 it was simply an
 entirely logical conclusion that the   
advocates of the moral nobility of      
mankind reproached such a reproduced    
,darwinism with degrading the moral     
dignity of man and with replacing love  
by egoism4 ,besides1 in view of the fact
 that they declared materialistic       
monism1 even the most naked atheism1 the
 only conclusion of #bcb ,darwinism1 and
 extended their mechanistic explanation 
of the world to a determinism in the    
highest degree mechanistic1 and1 carried
 to its utmost limit1 to a denial of    
human freedom1 it was not to be wondered
 at that those who recognize in theism  
the basis of all life worthy of man1 and
 in the freedom of man one of the most  
precious pearls in the crown of his     

human dignity and of his creation in the
 image of ,god1 complained of           
,darwinism's taking from morality its   
strongest motive and from moral action  
its responsibility4 ,and1 finally1 in   
view of the fact that those who thus    
express themselves in their works showed
 but rarely1 or not at all1 some of the 
noblest fruits of moral education1 such 
as respectful treatment of adversaries1 
humbleness and tact1 they could not     
themselves reasonably complain that     
there was ascribed to their doctrine an 
influence detrimental to moral          
education4 ,all this we find abundantly 
confirmed in the publications of ,bchner
 and ,hckel1 and in many articles of the
 ,ausland4  ,but the question is1       
whether those ,darwinians who drew these
 conclusions were by their scientific   
investigations obliged to draw them1 or 
whether they did not rather reach their 
religious and ethical view of the world 
by quite other ways1 and whether they   
did not in a wholly arbitrary and       

irresponsible manner make extensive use 
of ,darwinism in this anti-religious and
 ethically objectional direction--a fact
 which we shall try to prove in the last
 part of our investigation4  ,of course 
the ,darwinians who spoke thus1 did not 
intend to injure the moral principle1   
but only to purify and reform it2 and   
therefore we shall have to speak of them
 in the following section4         99   
99       99       99       99 #bcc      
,,chapter ,v4  ,,reform ,,of ,,morality 
,,through ,,darwinism4   #a4 ,the       
,materialists and ,monists4 ,darwin and 
the ,english ,utilitarians4 ,gustav     
,jger4  ,among those who ascribe to     
,darwinism a morally reforming          
influence1 we have to mention in the    
first place the materialists4 ,it is    
true that even before the appearance of 
,darwinism they established their own   
moral principle of naturalistic         
determinism and of the education of man 
only by science and enlightenment1 in   
opposition to a morality which rests on 

the principle of the eternal value of   
the individual1 of full moral           
responsibility1 of the holiness of the  
moral law1 and of a divine author of it2
 they stigmatized the ethical           
requirement of aiming at the eternal    
welfare of the soul as a lower stage of 
morality in comparison with their own1  
which carries in itself the reward of   
virtue2 and they declared ,christianity 
and humanity1 ,christian morality and   
the morality of humanity1 two things    
irreconcilably opposed to one another4  
,but in having taken possession of      
,darwinism as their monopoly1 they have 
made it the basis of new attacks upon   
the present moral principle of          
,christendom2 and therefore we have here
 to mention them with their moral       
system4  ,bchner1 in his lecture on     
,gottesbegriff und dessen #bcd          
,bedeutung 7,the ,idea of ,god and its  
,importance71 replaces the moral        
principle 7which in his opinion is      
nothing innate but something acquired7  

by education1 learning1 freedom and     
well-being2 says that only atheism or   
philosophic monism leads to freedom1    
reason1 progress1 acknowledgment of true
 humanity--to humanism2 that this       
humanism seeks the motives of its       
morality not in the external relations  
to an extramundane ,god1 but in itself  
and in the welfare of mankind2 and that 
infidels often1 even as a rule1 have    
excelled by moral conduct1 while        
,christianity has originated many more  
crimes than it has hindered1 and it     
would no longer be possible to establish
 with real ,christians a vital community
 as at present understood4 ,he declares 
the utterance of ,madame de ,stal1 that 
to comprehend everything means to       
forgive everything1 the truest word ever
 spoken2 and concludes his lecture with 
the remarks that the more man renounces 
his faith and confides in his own power1
 his own reason1 his own reflexion1 the 
happier he will be and the more         
successful in his struggle for          

existence4  ,strauss in ,the ,old ,faith
 and the ,new1 a publication which      
certainly has to be ranked here1 for the
 reason that in it he founds on         
,darwinism his whole knowledge of the   
world1 on the ground of which he wishes 
to arrange life1 appears to be much more
 decent1 and in the practical           
consequences much more conservative1    
than ,bchner2 but essentially stands    
upon quite the same ground4 ,hckel1     
,oskar ,schmidt1 and 7as to his         
linguistic ,darwinism7 ,w4 ,bleek1 group
 themselves around ,strauss1 partly     
with1 partly without express reference  
to his deductions4 #bce  ,strauss       
arrives at a peculiar inconsequence1 but
 one well worthy of notice1 when1 in    
place of the struggle for existence     
which1 according to the conclusions of  
those who also reduce morality to       
,darwinism1 is still the spiritus rector
 of moral development in mankind1 and   
yet cannot of itself possibly lead to   
the morally indispensable requirements  

and virtues of self-sacrifice and of    
mere subordination under the moral idea1
 he suddenly substitutes a going of man 
beyond mere nature1 and herewith a moral
 principle1 which can never be deduced  
from ,darwinism alone1 and which is     
directly opposed to monism and          
pankosmism1 which is to be the basis of 
his ethics4 ,the reader may compare the 
manner in which he metaphysically       
supports his moral principle when he    
says3 ,as nature cannot go higher1 she  
would go inwards4 ,nature felt herself  
already in the animal1 but she wished to
 know herself also4444 ,in man1 nature  
endeavored not merely to exalt1 but to  
transcend herself4 ,ulrici1 the         
philosopher1 in his reply to ,strauss1  
has pointed out in sharp terms this     
inconsequence1 as well as the other1    
that from the ground of a blind         
necessity which does not know anything  
of a higher and a lower1 the difference 
of higher and lower1 good and bad1      
rational and irrational1 cannot at all  

be maintained2 and that the requirement 
of a progress cannot at all be made1 and
 its idea not at all be given4 ,in this 
very perceptible inconsistency1 ,strauss
 calls that morality which he requires1 
the relation of man to the idea of his  
kind4 ,to realize the latter in himself1
 is the summary of his duties toward    
himself2 actually to recognize and      
promote the equality of the kind in all 
the others1 is the #bcf summary of his  
duties towards others4 ,he opposes the  
internal satisfaction which originates  
therein1 to the rough idea of a reward  
of virtue and piety1 coming from        
without1 which1 in order to connect     
both1 is in need of a ,god4 ,and he     
again reaches that inconsequence which  
from his metaphysical standpoint is     
entirely without motive1 but as to      
itself only worthy to be recognized1    
when in another formula of his moral    
imperative he says3 ,ever remember that 
thou art human1 not merely a natural    
production4  ,it is also this           

representation and realization of the   
idea of the kind1 which those who       
combine with their ,darwinism a negation
 of theism have mostly established      
before the appearance of the work of    
,strauss as the highest moral principle1
 and to which they are also led most    
naturally by ,darwin's deduction of     
morality from the social instincts4     
,thus1 ,wilhelm ,bleek1 in the preface  
to his ,ursprung der ,sprache 7,origin  
of ,language71 says 7page ,,xiii73 ,to  
aim at the inner and outer harmony of   
his genus in one or the other way1 and  
to promote the correct relations of the 
different parts to one another in their 
reciprocal connections and in the       
greater parts of the whole organism     
7family1 community1 nation71 are the    
highest visible designs of human        
existence1 which must by themselves     
incite man to noble actions and to      
virtuous deeds4 ,in the performance of  
this task lies the highest happiness    
which seems to be given to our species1 

a happiness accessible by everyone in   
his own way4 ,neither the fruit of      
eternal punishment nor the hope of an   
individual happiness1 is really capable 
as a truly saving idea to elevate man to
 a higher existence2 even if we take no 
account of the fact that #bcg each of   
these two fundamental dogmas of the     
vulgar dogmatism makes but refined      
egoism the lever of its ethics4  ,hckel 
alone1 in his ,natural ,history of      
,creation1 with his utterances as to    
,christianity1 morality1 and the history
 of the world1 again sinks down to the  
level of the coarseness of ,bchner1 and 
even below it4 ,on page #ai1 vol4 ,i1 he
 entirely contests the reality of the   
moral order of the world1 and continues3
 ,if we contemplate the common life1 and
 the mutual relations between plants and
 animals 7man included71 we shall find  
everywhere and at all times1 the very   
opposite of that kindly and peaceful    
social life1 which the goodness of the  
,creator ought to have prepared for his 

creatures--we shall rather find         
everywhere a pitiless1 most embittered  
struggle of all against all4 ,nowhere in
 nature1 no matter where we turn our    
eyes1 does that idyllic peace1          
celebrated by the poets1 exist2 we find 
everywhere a struggle and a striving to 
annihilate neighbors and competitors4   
,passion and selfishness1 conscious or  
unconscious1 is everywhere the motive   
force of life4 ,man in this respect     
certainly forms no exception to the rest
 of the animal world4 ,on page #bcg1    
vol4 ,i1 he professes the most extreme  
naturalistic determinism3 ,the will of  
the animal1 as well as that of man1 is  
never free4 ,the widely spread dogma of 
the freedom of the will is1 from a      
scientific point of view1 altogether    
untenable4 ,and on page #agj1 vol4 ,i1  
he even says3 ,if1 as we maintain1      
natural selection is the great active   
cause which has produced the whole      
wonderful variety of organic life on the
 earth1 all the interesting phenomena of

 human life must also be explicable from
 the same cause4 ,for man is after all  
#bch only a most highly-developed       
vertebrate animal1 and all aspects of   
human life have their parallels1 or1    
more correctly1 their lower stages of   
development1 in the animal kingdom4 ,the
 whole history of nations1 or what is   
called universal history1 must therefore
 be explicable by means of natural      
selection1--must be a physico-chemical  
process1 depending upon the interaction 
of adaptation and inheritance in the    
struggle for life4 ,and this is actually
 the case4 ,that in his ethical         
naturalism he sees a real reform of     
morality1 he expressly declares on the  
page next to the last of his ,natural   
,history of ,creation3 ,just as this new
 monistic philosophy first opens up to  
us a true understanding of the real     
universe1 so its application to         
practical human life must open up a new 
road towards moral perfection4 7,vol4   
,,ii1 p4 #cfg47  ,in the low conception 

of morality and its principle1 ,hckel is
 perhaps seconded only by ,seidlitz who 
says in his ,die ,darwin'she ,theorie   
7,darwin's ,theory71 p4 #aih3 ,rational 
and moral life consist in the           
satisfaction of all physical functions1 
in correct proportion and relation to   
one another4 ,man is immoral through    
excessive satisfaction of one function  
and through neglect of the others4  ,as 
in the religious question1 so in the    
ethical1 ,carneri also takes a peculiar 
position4 ,in reducing all the phenomena
 of existence1 together with the whole  
spiritual life of mankind1 to a close   
development of nature according to the  
causal law1 in expressly grouping also  
the utterances of the will of man under 
this law of an absolute necessity1 in   
fully adopting ,darwin's doctrine as the
 wholly satisfactory key for the        
comprehension of the entire development 
of nature up to the history of #bci     
mankind1 in advocating an absolutely    
monistic determinism and a nearly       

exclusive dependence of the efficacy of 
moral principles on the theoretic       
cultivation of the mind1 on reasoning   
and education1 he1 as before mentioned1 
stands on exactly the same ground with  
materialists and monists among whom he  
expressly ranks himself2 in the         
inconsequence with which he makes       
concessions to the power of the idea and
 the ideal over man--concessions which  
could never be concluded from a mere    
immanent process of nature--he is       
closely related to ,strauss4 ,but it is 
peculiar that1 although entirely        
dependent in his reasoning on that      
monistic view of the world1 and that    
,darwinian view of nature1 he defines   
his ethical developments and his        
reflections on the organizations of     
human life in a relative independence1  
which again separates him as moralist   
from these before-mentioned monists and 
materialists1 and rather ranks him1 as  
we have seen in ,chap4 ,i1  #d1 in the  
line of the disciples of ,spinoza and   

,hegel4 ,from this it can also be       
explained1 how it could happen that in  
criticisms and reviews of ,darwinism and
 its literature the standpoint which he 
takes could find such different and     
diametrically opposed expositions4      
,while1 for instance1 the ,beweis des   
,glaubens1 in the ,march number of      
#ahgc1 thinks that ,carneri wishes to   
seek on ,darwinian ground a new and     
better basis for morality than we had   
heretofore2 while ,hckel in the preface 
to the third edition of his ,natural    
,history of ,creation1 page ,,xxix1     
mentions the publication of ,carneri    
with the greatest praise1 earnestly     
recommends all theologians and          
philosophers to read it1 and greets it  
as the first successful attempt at      
applying fruitfully the monistic view   
#bdj of the world1 as established by    
,darwinism1 to the realm of practical   
philosophy and at showing that the      
immense progress of our knowledge of the
 world caused by the descent theory has 

only the most beneficial effect upon the
 further progressing development of     
mankind in practical life2--a criticism 
in the ,ausland 7#h ,april1 #ahgb1 ,no4 
#ae71 calls the same publication an     
attempt at harmonizing ,darwin's        
hypothesis with the current views of    
ethics1 and at showing that those       
doctrines cannot be sustained which     
result as strictly logical conclusions  
from ,darwin's theory1 and which are    
opposed to the present views of         
morality4  ,in returning from this      
digression to ,darwinism in its purest  
form1 to ,darwin himself1 we have in the
 first place to resume the discussion   
entered upon as to the way and manner in
 which1 according to ,darwin1           
self-determination is originated4 ,love 
and sympathy1 moral feeling 7with this  
definition he seems to point at the     
consciousness of moral freedom of will  
and of responsibility71 and conscience1 
are to him very important elements of   
morality2 and in the moral disposition  

of man he sees the greatest of all      
differences between man and animal4 ,he 
also willingly acknowledges the powerful
 impulse which morality has from        
religion1 when he says 7,descent of     
,man1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 page #cdg73 ,with the 
more civilized races1 the conviction of 
the existence of an all-seeing ,deity   
has had a potent influence on the       
advance of morality4 ,from these and all
 his other deductions1 we see that      
,darwin in no way intends to modify the 
maxims of moral action2 and if under the
 expression reform of morality1 with    
which we have headed the present        
chapter1 we should understand but #bda a
 reform of moral action itself1 we      
should without hesitation have to rank  
,darwin with the next group1 and not    
with that of which we now treat2 just as
 in our review of the position of       
,darwinism in reference to the religious
 question1 we had to rank him with those
 who take a neutral and peaceful        
position in reference to religion4  ,but

 if he does not touch upon morality in  
the maxims1 he nevertheless comes forth 
in the theory of moral action1 in the   
science of morality with reformatory    
claims1--namely1 with the fact that     
reduces the whole moral life to those   
agencies which are already active in the
 preceding animalic stage4 ,it is true1 
he makes1 as we have seen1 a distinction
 in the genetic derivation of morality4 
,he wholly reduces love and sympathy to 
social instincts which man has in common
 with the animal2 and he lets the formal
 motives of moral action1 sense of duty 
and conscience1 originate through the   
high development of intelligence and    
other spiritual forces1 and to be       
increased and transmitted by custom and 
inheritance1 if those are present4 ,but1
 on the other hand1 development of      
intelligence is to him an exclusive     
product of the preceding stage on which 
it was developed1 and thus1 in his      
opinion1 entire morality1               
notwithstanding that double derivation1 

certainly has purely and exclusively the
 natural basis as its origin4 ,if that  
is once the standpoint to which man sees
 himself led1 he has1 in order to reason
 logically1 but a double choice4 ,he    
must either say that a development out  
of a natural basis can possibly be      
consistent with the appearance of a new 
and higher principle1 or must give up   
the autonomy of the moral law1 and leave
 the moral action of #bdb man1 even in  
his maxims1 to the unsteady flowing of  
development1 or even of arbitrariness1  
and to the degree of education and      
intelligence of subjectivity4 ,neither  
the one nor the other is done by        
,darwin4 ,it is true1 on the one hand he
 shows that modesty1 so often exhibited 
by him1 of the investigator who does not
 wish to express any opinion on         
questions regarding which he has not yet
 attained a mature judgment2 but on the 
other hand he also manifests the same   
aversion to going beyond purely         
naturo-historical speculations which1 as

 we have seen in ,part ,i1 ,book ,,ii1  
,chapter ,i1  #a1 hindered him from     
obtaining a clear conception of the     
importance of the question as to the    
origin of self-consciousness and of     
moral self-determination1 and the same  
want of sequence in reasoning1 which1 as
 we have found in ,chap4 ,,iii1         
prevented him from giving an affirmative
 or negative decision in such an        
important question1 as whether a divine 
end is to be observed in the processes  
of the world4  ,in this naturalization  
of ethical principles1 he is closely    
related to that peculiar                
moral-philosophic tendency in ,england1 
which long before ,darwin's appearance1 
took its origin in ,john ,stuart ,mill1 
but which now1 in the closest connection
 with ,darwin's principles1 has its main
 advocate in ,herbert ,spencer1 and is  
commonly called the utilitarian         
tendency4 ,we understand by this that   
conception of the moral motive which    
allows the moral good1 however it may be

 ideally separated from the useful in   
the developed condition of mankind at   
the present time1 in its origin to be   
developed at the outset from the same   
origin as the useful1--namely1 from the 
sensation of like and dislike2 a theory 
of utility which ,sir ,john ,lubbock    
still tried to complete and deepen by   
#bdc the theory of an inheritance of the
 sensation of authority4 ,activities    
which originally proved to be only      
useful1 were inherited as traditional   
instinct by the offspring1 and were thus
 freed from the sensation of the useful1
 and acted as authority2 this is the    
origin of duty1 according to the history
 of development4 ,inasmuch as this      
philosophic system aims at taking from  
ethics the absoluteness of its demands1 
and at drawing down these demands into  
the activities of originating and       
developing1 it is also to be treated of 
in this place4  ,as in the religious    
question1 so in the ethical1 ,gustav    
,jger also stands nearer to a neutral   

relation between ,darwinism and the     
hitherto valid principles4 ,he puts the 
moral principles the same as the        
religious1 into the balance of utility  
to man in his struggle for existence1   
and finds it thus easy and to be taken  
for granted1 that the principles of     
morality1 as they became the common     
property of mankind as influenced by    
,christianity1 really prove themselves  
also the most serviceable to mankind4   
,social life is of more benefit to man  
than hermit life2 this reflection leads 
him to the moral principle of charity4  
,and as1 according to ,darwinism1 rising
 development shows itself in an         
increasing differentiation and more     
richly organized physical development1  
so the organization of society according
 to the principle of the division of    
work is that form of social life which  
proves itself the most practical to man2
 and this reflection leads him to the   
full acknowledgment of the entire       
ethical organization of human life and  

its tasks4  ,but1 as we saw1 in treating
 of the religious question1 that nobody1
 neither friend nor foe1 could possibly 
be #bdd satisfied with the substitution 
of the category of utility for that of  
truth1 we are compelled to say in       
reference to the ethical question1 that 
a moral principle which1 on such a      
foundation1 has its basis and authority 
only in its utility1 is really no       
authority1 and loses its value with     
every individual who is unwilling to    
acknowledge its utility and thinks      
another ground of action may be more    
useful than the moral4         99       
99       99       99       99 #bde      
,,chapter ,,vi4  ,,neutrality ,,and     
,,peace ,,between ,,darwinism ,,and     
,,morality4   #a4 ,mivart1 ,alex4       
,braun1 and ,others4  ,evidently a real 
neutrality between the ,darwinian       
theories of development and the hitherto
 valid and absolute authority of the    
moral principle is possible only1 when  
we deny that the ethical demand is      

simply a natural process--although we   
may perceive its origin within the      
limits of a natural process--and when we
 fail to identify that demand with this 
process1 and do not deduce it from the  
latter as its sufficient ground of      
explanation2 but harmony between the two
 theories1 in spite of all traces of    
,darwinism in the scientific parts of   
anthropology1 is possible when we       
acknowledge the moral demand1 if once   
present and valid1 in its entire and1 so
 to speak1 its metaphysical independence
 in its full value1 far exceeding all   
natural necessity4  ,it is shown by     
,mivart that such an absolute authority 
of the ethical demands1 and such an     
independence of the whole science of    
morality1 may be brought into accord    
with the scientific theories of         
development4 ,in his book on ,the       
,genesis of ,species1 he devotes a whole
 chapter to ethical questions4 ,he      
discriminates1 in the moral good1       
between the formal good 7good with      

consciousness and will of the good7 and 
the #bdf material good 7good without    
consciousness and design71 ascribes only
 the latter to the animal world in its  
moral features1 and the former          
exclusively to mankind1 and thus takes  
ground quite analogous to that held by  
him on the religious question1 where he 
includes in the theory of development   
the physical part of man1 but excludes  
the intellectual part1 with the single  
qualification that in the religious     
question he unnecessarily renders his   
position more difficult by designating  
this intellectual or spiritual part by  
the term soul4  ,german authorities1 who
 see in ,darwinism only a scientific    
question which can be solved by means of
 natural investigation1 and who         
therefore1 think the religious and      
ethical questions but little affected by
 it1 have expressed themselves in regard
 to this neutral position toward        
morality still more rarely than as to   
its neutrality toward religion4 ,the    

reason for this is probably that the    
independence of moral principles and the
 absoluteness of their authority        
entirely result from themselves1 as soon
 as we have once admitted theism and    
left room in general for a freedom      
standing above natural causality--and   
perhaps it is due to the further fact   
that the realm of the moral is more     
palpably urged as a reality and         
necessity upon even the most indifferent
 mind than the realm of religion4  ,on  
the other hand1 we find frequent        
utterances which indirectly refer to the
 ethical realm--for instance1           
expressions in reference to the ethical 
importance of an animal descent of man4 
,alex4 ,braun says3 ,man assents to the 
idea of being appointed lord of the     
creatures1 but then he may also         
acknowledge that he is not placed over  
his subjects as a stranger1 but         
originated from the #bdg beings whose   
lord he wishes to be4 ,it is not an     
unworthy idea1 but rather an elevating  

one1 that man constitutes the last and  
highest member in the ancient and       
infinitely rich development of organic  
nature on our planet1 being connected by
 the most intimate bonds of relationship
 with the other members1 as the latter  
are connected among themselves with one 
another3 not a pernicious parasite on   
the tree of natural life1 but the true  
son of the blissful mother ,nature4 ,in 
reducing descent1 which he accepts1 to a
 development from an inner force1 and in
 ascribing to the ,darwinian selection1 
with its struggle for existence1 the    
value only of a regulator 7he adopts    
this term of ,wallace as a very striking
 one71 ,braun1 in his concluding appeal 
to young students1 calls especial       
attention to the ethical importance of a
 development proceeding from within1    
saying3 ,life has its outer and its     
inner side2 all its works and ways must 
follow mechanical laws1 but its tasks   
and aims belong to a higher realm4 ,we  
are permitted to take a glance into this

 realm through the all-embracing history
 of the development of nature1 which    
leads up into our own inmost being1 up  
to our highest end4 ,truly progressive  
development is the best wish for every  
youth1 etc4  ,inasmuch as that in which 
,alex4 ,braun finds a satisfaction for  
the fulfillment of the ethical          
tasks--namely1 a deeper knowledge of    
man's connection with lower nature1 and 
the pointing to the proper tasks of the 
development of mankind1--has thus far   
been the substance of all sound systems 
of morality1 we did not mention these   
and similar utterances1 of which we     
could gather many more from other       
writers1 in the preceding part of our   
#bdh work--i4e41 in describing those who
 ascribe to ,darwinism a reformatory    
influence upon morality2 but we rank    
these utterances with those which       
predict from the descent theory neither 
injury to morality nor any especial     
enlightenment regarding it4  ,we have   
now reached the end of that part of our 

work which considers and treats of the  
views of others4 ,to our regret1 we have
 been compelled to restrict ourselves1  
in this review1 to the countries of the 
,english and ,german tongues2 the former
 being the home of ,darwin1 the latter  
our own4 ,we should have preferred to   
take into our review also the literature
 of ,france and ,belgium1 ,holland and  
,italy2 but we feared being able to give
 only an incomplete report4 ,besides1 it
 is in ,germany and ,great ,britain--and
 partly also in ,north ,america1 related
 to both in language and origin--where  
the ,darwinian agitation has taken      
deepest hold of the mind2 and1 in       
restricting our report to these         
countries1 we are not likely to have    
omitted any view essential to the       
consideration of the present question4  
,it is true that in the other countries 
named the ,darwinian literature is also 
rich1 and we are well aware of the      
incompleteness of our report in that    
respect4 ,but we believe that we have   

not omitted any essential views and     
evidences1 even if the names of many of 
their advocates have not been mentioned4
  ,it still remains to us to investigate
 independently the position of the      
,darwinian theories1 with their         
philosophic supplements1 in reference to
 religion and morality3 a task for which
 we hope to have essentially prepared   
the way through the preceding           
representations and investigations4     
99       99       99       99       99  
#bdi   ,,book ,,ii4  ,,analytical4      
99       99       99       99       99  
,,preliminary ,,view4  ,in treating the 
religious question1 we proceed from the 
supposition that religion is concerned  
not only in this subjective truth of    
religious impulse and sensation1 but    
also in the objective truth and reality 
of its faith1 although it attains these 
in a different way from natural science4
 ,a religion which should have the      
authorization of its existence only in  
psychology1 and which was not allowed to

 ask whether the object of its faith    
also has objective reality1 would stand 
on a weak basis1 and its end would only 
be a question of time2 for an impulse   
which can only be psychologically       
established1 and to which no real       
objective necessity could correspond1   
must sooner or later either be proven a 
psychological error or be eliminated by 
progressing culture4 ,on the other hand1
 if we find a reconcilableness or an    
irreconcilableness of ,darwin's views   
with the objective substance of         
religion1 the possible question as to   
its reconcilableness or                 
irreconcilableness with subjective      
religiousness on the ground of those    
results wholly answers itself4 ,in no   
way1 not even in the most indirect1 can 
we approve that method of book-keeping  
by which something can be true in regard
 to religion and false in regard to     
science1 or vice-versa2 on the contrary1
 we see #bej in all attempts at healing 
in such a way the rupture which at      

present exists in the minds of so many1 
only a more emphatic avowal of that     
rupture4  ,in treating of the religious 
question as it affects the position of  
,darwinism in reference to the substance
 and the objective truth of the         
religious faith1 without going into a   
detailed treatment of the question of   
the reconcilableness of a purely        
subjective religiousness with the       
,darwinian views1 it will be of         
advantage to speak first of the position
 of the ,darwinian theories in reference
 to the basis of all true and sound     
religion and religiousness--the theistic
 view of the world4 ,in doing this1 we  
shall discriminate the purely scientific
 theories of ,darwin from the           
philosophic supplements and conclusions 
which have been given to and drawn from 
them1 and shall have to consider each of
 them separately in connection with the 
theistic view of the world4 ,if thereby 
we shall discover ,darwinian views which
 can be brought into accord with a      

theistic view of the world1 we shall    
also1 in order to close our             
investigation1 have to consider them    
with those parts of the theology of     
positive ,christianity which can be     
affected by the ,darwinian questions4   
,in treating the question of the        
relation of ,darwinism to morality1 our 
investigation can be somewhat abridged1 
because many of the principal questions 
which have to be considered have found  
their solution in what has been         
previously said1 and partly also because
 they will present themselves in it     
different form4  ,the principal division
 in our discussion we shall most        
appropriately assign to ethics1 and thus
 treat first of the position of         
,darwinism in reference to the moral    
principles1 and then treat of this in   
reference to the concrete #bea moral    
life4 ,where the question as to the     
position of ,darwinism in reference to  
morality occurs1 we shall no longer have
 to treat of it separately as to the    

different aspects of its problems--we   
should otherwise get lost in too many   
repetitions2 but we shall only have to  
separate an ethical naturalism which    
supports itself upon ,darwinian grounds1
 from pure ,darwinism1 and to treat of  
each in turn as to its position in      
reference to morality4         99       
99       99       99       99 #beb   ,a4
 ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and     
,,religion4  ,,chapter ,i4  ,,the       
,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and ,,the      
,,theistic ,,view ,,of ,,the ,,world4   
,a4 ,,the ,,position ,,of ,,purely      
,,scientific ,,darwinism ,,in           
,,reference ,,to ,,theism4   #a4        
,scientific ,investigation and ,theism4 
,the ,idea of ,creation4  ,at the very  
beginning of our investigation1 we have 
to state that the absolute freedom of   
scientific investigation lies not only  
in the interest of natural science1 but 
just as clearly in the direct interest  
of religion2 and that every attempt at  
limiting the freedom of scientific      

investigation in a pretended religious  
interest1 can only have its cause in the
 fullest misapprehension of that which  
the religious interest requires4 ,for   
the religious view of the world consists
 in this3 that it sees in the universe1 
with all its inhabitants and processes1 
the work of an almighty ,creator and    
,ruler of the world2 and therefore it   
cannot be unimportant to it1 whether we 
also have a knowledge of this work1 to a
 certain extent1 whether we make use of 
the means which lead to the knowledge of
 the world1 #bec and whether we make    
progress in the knowledge1 or not4 ,the 
religious view of the world sees in     
every correction and enrichment of our  
scientific knowledge only a correction  
and enrichment of our knowledge of the  
way and manner of the divine creation   
and action2 and every such correction   
and enrichment acts directly as an      
incitement to religiousness--although1  
fortunately for the universal           
destination of religion1 the degree of  

our religiousness is not dependent upon 
the degree of our knowledge of nature4  
,therefore1 the religious view of the   
world does not throw any barriers in the
 way of scientific investigation2 it    
does not prescribe the route by which   
the latter is to reach its aim1 and it  
does not forbid it any scientific       
auxiliary means1 nor1 indeed1 any       
scientific auxiliary hypothesis1 nor    
does it1 so far as the communication of 
scientific knowledge is concerned1      
inquire after the religious or the      
irreligious standpoint of those who     
offer it such knowledge4 ,in all these  
directions1 it knows of but one         
requirement3 that of exact and correct  
presentation2 in a word1 of but one     
requirement of truth4 ,real1            
well-founded1 and certain results of    
natural science can never come into     
antagonism with religion2 for precisely 
the same thing which in the language of 
natural science is called natural causal
 connection1 is in that of religion     

called the way and manner of divine     
action and government4 ,where man has   
adopted any view1 the proving of which1 
according to its nature1 belongs to     
natural science1 and natural science    
should show an error in such a view1 he 
must simply give it up and surrender the
 erroneous opinion1 that such a view is 
to form a constituent part of our       
religious perception4 ,just as          
decidedly1 on the other hand1 religion  
can ask of #bed natural science that it 
should not use speculative views of     
religious character1 the proving of     
which belongs to the science of         
religion1 for the purpose of scientific 
generalizations1 in case the science of 
religion should prove that such views   
are antagonistic to the nature and the  
principles of religion4  ,those who1 on 
religious grounds1 look with suspicion  
upon scientific investigation1 are      
frequently influenced by two erroneous  
notions1 closely related to one another1
 without regard to the well-grounded    

aversion to the atheistic beauty with   
which so many scientific works are      
adorned4 ,one of these errors is the    
notion that any object is remote from   
divine causality in the degree in which 
it has the cause of its origin in the   
natural connection1 and that it would be
 easier for us to trace the origin of an
 object to the authorship of ,god1 if we
 could not find any natural cause of its
 origin1 than if we had knowledge of    
such a natural cause4 ,the other error  
is the notion that the idea of creation 
excludes the idea of the action of      
secondary causes4  ,if the first        
mentioned opinion were correct1 those   
certainly would be right who identify   
the progress of sciences with the       
progress of atheism2 and ignorance would
 then be the most effective protection  
of piety4 ,but this opinion is in direct
 conflict with all sound religious and  
scientific reasoning4 ,it is in conflict
 with sound religious reasoning3 for the
 religious view of the world sees in    

nature itself1 with its whole           
association of causes and effects1 a    
work of ,god2 and as certainly as1      
according to the religious view of      
nature1 a thousand years in the sight of
 ,god are but as yesterday when it is   
past1 just so certainly is an object a  
work of #bee ,god1 whether its origin is
 due to milliards of well-known         
secondary causes1 which all together are
 works of ,god--as well with reference  
to the laws which they obey as to the   
materials and forces in which these laws
 are active--or whether1 when treating  
the question as to the immediate cause  
of its existence1 we see ourselves led  
to an agency unknown to us4 ,and that   
opinion is also in conflict with all    
sound scientific reasoning3 for the fact
 that we do not have any knowledge of   
the immediate cause of a phenomenon1 is 
by no means a proof that this immediate 
cause is the direct action of ,god who  
does not use any secondary causes2 the  
phenomena may just as well have still   

more material or immaterial secondary   
causes1 unknown to us4 ,we will         
illustrate the error1 referred to1 by an
 example which will also reveal its     
relationship to the other error of which
 we shall have to speak immediately4 ,it
 is certainly no evidence of an         
especially intensive piety1 if we build 
the conviction that ,god is the ,creator
 of man1 among other things1 on the     
obscurity in which for us the origin of 
mankind is wrapped4 ,for from this      
obscurity no other conclusion can be    
drawn than increased proofs of the      
limitation of our knowledge2 that piety 
which traces those phenomena whose      
natural causes we know1 just as         
decidedly to the causality of ,god1 is  
much more--we shall not say1 intensive1 
but correctly guided--than that piety   
which traces back those whose natural   
causes are hidden to us4 ,and1 on the   
other hand1 it is also no evidence of   
especial religious coolness or          
indifference1 when we pursue with       

interest and the desire of success the  
attempts at bringing light into the     
history of the origin of mankind4 ,he   
who does the latter can1 according to   
his religious or #bef irreligious       
standpoint1 just as easily connect his  
interest with the hope of an enrichment 
of his knowledge of the ways and works  
of ,god1 as with the hope of a          
confirmation in his atheistic view of   
the world4 ,the reverence with which we 
stand before the action of ,god in those
 works whose existence is in a higher   
degree a mystery to us than the         
existence of others 7for in reality     
everything is a mystery to us71 is      
perhaps a little differently modified   
from the reverence with which we stand  
before the action of ,god in those of   
his works in the mode of whose origin we
 are permitted to get a deeper glance2  
but each is reverence1 and we can get   
from both nutriment for our religious   
nature4  ,those who favor the second    
error--namely1 that the idea of creation

 excludes the idea of secondary         
causes--overlook the facts that the idea
 of the creation of the universe is     
essentially different from the idea of  
the creation of the single elements of  
the universe1 as1 for instance1 of the  
earth1 of the organisms1 of man2 that   
the idea of a creation without secondary
 causes can only be applied to the      
origin of the universe in its elements1 
forces1 and laws1 and that the first    
origin of the single elements in the    
world--as of the single planets1        
organisms1 man--not only admits the     
action of secondary causes1 but even    
requires and presupposes the action of  
conditions4 ,for all single species of  
beings which have originated within the 
already existing world1 have also       
certain elements1 even the whole basis  
and condition of their existence1 in    
common with that which was already      
before in existence2 the planet has its 
elements in common with the elements of 
other planets1 the organic has the same 

material substances as the inorganic1   
man has #beg the elements and the       
organization of his body as well as a   
great part of his psychical activity in 
common with animals4 ,nothing urges us  
to suppose--and the analogy of all that 
we know even forbids us to suppose--that
 with the appearance of a new species of
 beings1 the same matter and the same   
quality of matter which the last        
appearance has in common with the       
already existing1 has each time been    
called anew into existence out of       
nothing4 ,only that which in the new    
species is really new1 comes into       
existence anew with its first           
appearance4 ,but we do not even know    
whether the proximate cause of this new 
does really come into existence for the 
first time1 or whether it was not before
 in existence in a real1 perhaps latent1
 condition1 and is now set free for the 
first time4 ,in the one case as in the  
other1 we shall call the new1 which     
comes into existence1 a new creation4   

,and if man thinks that the new only    
deserves the name of creation1 when it  
occurs suddenly and at once1 where      
before only other things were present1  
like a deus ex machina1 certainly such  
an opinion is only a childlike          
conception1 which becomes childish as   
soon as we scientifically reason about  
the process4 ,it cannot be doubtful that
 religious minds which are not          
accustomed to scientific reasoning1 have
 such a conception2 whether theologians 
also favor it1 we do not know1 although 
it is possible4 ,certainly those        
scientists who intend to attack the     
faith in a living ,creator and ,lord of 
the world1 take it as the wholly        
natural1 even as the only possible1     
conception of a ,creator and his        
creation2 and of course it is to them a 
great and cheap pleasure to become      
victorious knights in such a puppet-show
 view of the conception of creation4    
,but the source whence ,christians      
derive their #beh religious knowledge   

tells them precisely the contrary4 ,the 
,holy ,scripture1 it is true1 sees in   
the entire universe a work of ,god4 ,but
 where it describes the creation of the 
single elements of the world1 it        
describes at the same time their        
creation as the product of natural      
causes1 brought about by natural        
conditions4 ,the reader may see1 for    
instance1 the words3 ,and ,god said1    
,let the earth bring forth grass1 the   
herb yielding seed1 etc4 ,and the earth 
brought forth grass and herb1 etc4 ,and 
,god said1 ,let the earth bring forth   
the living creature4 ,even the creation 
of man is thus related3 ,and the ,lord  
,god formed man of the dust of the      
ground4 ,certainly the forming          
presupposes a matter out of which man is
 formed4 ,and1 on the other hand1 where 
the ,bible speaks of single beings in   
the kingdoms long before created and    
perfected1 of the individual man who is 
originated by generation and birth1 of  
single plants and animals--in general1  

of single processes and phenomena in the
 world long before perfected1 of wind   
and waves1 of rain and flames1 which    
altogether have their natural causes of 
origin--it speaks of them all precisely 
in the same way as when describing their
 first creation as works of ,god4 ,the  
expressions create1 make1 form1 cause to
 appear1 are applied to the single      
individuals of the kingdoms long before 
created1 precisely in the same way as   
they are to the first origin of the     
first individuals of those kingdoms4    
,thus1 by the full freedom which        
religious interest gives to scientific  
investigation1 we are well prepared to  
treat with entire impartiality the      
question as to the position of each of  
the ,darwinian theories in reference to 
theism4 #bei   #b4 ,the ,descent ,theory
 and ,theism4  ,in the first part of our
 investigation1 we found that the idea  
of the origin of the species1 especially
 of the higher organized species1       
through descent from the next related   

lower ones1 has a high degree of        
probability1 although it is still not   
proven in a strictly scientific sense1  
and although especially the supposition 
of an often-separated primitive         
generation of single types is not       
excluded by that idea1 and we can hardly
 suppose that the main types of the     
animal kingdom are developed out of one 
another4 ,now we are far from asking of 
religion to decide for itself in favor  
of the one or the other mode of         
conception1 or to place its influence in
 the one or the other balance-scale of  
scientific investigations4 ,it leaves   
the answering of these questions        
exclusively to natural science1 knowing 
beforehand that it will be able to come 
to an understanding with the one as well
 as with the other result of its        
investigations4 ,but we confess frankly 
that it is incomparably easier for us to
 bring the origin of the higher groups  
of organisms in accord with a theistic  
and teleological view of the world      

through descent than the origin of each 
single species of organisms through a   
primitive generation2 and we reach this 
result especially by the attempt at     
teleologically perceiving the           
palontological remains of organic life  
on earth4 ,theism and teleology see in  
the origin of things a striving towards 
a goal1 a rising from the lower to the  
higher1 a development--it is true a     
development really taken only in the    
ideal sense of an ideal connection1 of a
 plan2 or1 as ,k4 ,e4 v4 ,baer1 in      
#ahcd1 in his lecture on the most common
 law of nature in all development1      
expresses #bfj himself1 of a progressive
 victory of mind over matter4 ,such a   
plan and its realization we can much    
more easily conceive when1 in the past  
genera which geological formations show 
us1 a genealogical connection takes     
place between the preceding species and 
the now living species1 than when each  
species perished and beside or after it 
the newly appearing species always      

originated out of the inorganic through 
primitive generation4 ,in the first     
case1 we see in the preceding a real    
preparation for the following1 and also 
easily perceive1 the apparent waste of  
enormous periods of time for the        
successive processes of creation4 ,in   
the second case1 the coming and going of
 genera in innumerable thousands of     
years1 without any exterior connection1 
becomes an incomprehensible problem1 and
 the striving towards an end according  
to a regular plan1 which we observe in  
the development1 of the organic kingdoms
 on earth1 disappears completely in     
metaphysical darkness4  ,precisely      
because so many advocates of a theistic 
view of the world have thought that for 
the sake of the theistic idea of        
creation they were obliged to suppose a 
primitive origin of all the organic     
species1 and because1 nevertheless1 the 
fact is patent that in the course of the
 pre-historic thousands of years myriads
 of species came and perished1 not to   

return again1 they became liable to the 
reproach on the part of the adversaries 
of theism1 that the ,creator1 as they   
supposed him1 makes unsuccessful        
attempts1 which he has to throw away1 as
 the potter a defective vessel1 until he
 finally succeeds in making something   
durable and useful2 and this objection  
was and is still made1 not only to these
 superficial theists and their          
unhappily-selected and indefensible     
position1 but to #bfa the whole view of 
the world of theism itself and to the   
faith in ,god and the ,creator in       
general4  ,for all these reasons1 we can
 from the religious point of view but   
welcome the idea of a descent of        
species4 ,philologists have1 if we are  
correctly informed1 the canon that as a 
rule the more difficult text is the more
 correct one2 but we doubt whether those
 should adopt this canon who try to read
 in the book of nature1 whether with the
 eye of science or with that of         
religion--unless the faculty of         

reasoning is given to us in order to    
conceal the truth4  ,but1 we have also  
to look for a manner of reconciling     
theism with all the different           
possibilities under which a descent is  
at all reasonable and conceivable4 ,one 
of these possibilities is that of an    
entirely successive development of      
species out of one another by           
imperceptibly small transitions2 and of 
this we shall soon speak4 ,another is   
the possibility of a descent by leaps1  
through a metamorphosis of germs or a   
heterogenetic generation4 ,the real     
causes of such a heterogenetic          
generation1 if it took place at all1    
have not yet been found2 therefore we   
have to treat only of the abstract      
possibilities of its conceivableness4   
,there are two such possibilities4  ,the
 birth of a new species took place in   
one of two ways3 ,either to those       
materials and forces which formed the   
germ of the new species1 were added     
entirely new metaphysical agencies which

 did not exist before1 and only the     
basis and the frame within which the new
 appeared1 or that which the new species
 has in common with the old             
mother-species had the cause of its     
existence in the preceding4 ,likewise   
even the original productions #bfb of   
man are always composed of two          
factors--of the given pre-suppositions  
and conditions1 and of the new which on 
their basis and within their frame comes
 into existence4 ,otherwise the causes  
of the new which was to originate       
already lay in all former stages1 but   
were still latent and still hindered in 
their activity1 and only at the time of 
the birth the new impulse came which set
 them free for their activity4 ,this new
 impulse may very well belong to the    
causal connection of the universe1 and  
be caused by something analogous to     
natural selection4  ,in the first case1 
which in its application to the origin  
of man is adopted by ,a4 ,r4 ,wallace   
and ,karl ,snell1 the reconciliation    

between descent and theism has not the  
least difficulty2 for if the agency     
which in the new-appearing species      
produces that which is specifically new 
in it1 came only into existence with the
 first formation of the germs of the new
 species in the mother-species1 this new
 certainly cannot have its origin       
anywhere else than in the supermundane  
prima causa in the ,creator and ,lord of
 the world4  ,in the second case also1  
theism is in no way threatened4 ,for if 
we have to refer the cause of a new     
phenomenon in the world so far back as  
even to the beginning and the first     
elements of all things1 we nevertheless 
have to arrive at last at the cause of  
all causes2 and this is the living ,god1
 the ,creator and ,lord of the world4   
,thus the new form of existence would   
anyhow have the cause of its existence  
in ,god2 and the value1 the importance1 
and the substance of its existence1     
would only commence from where it really
 made its appearance1 and not from where

 its still latent causes existed4 ,as   
little as we attribute to the just      
fecundated #bfc egg of man the value of 
man1 although we know that under the    
right conditions the full man is to be  
developed out of it1 just so little in  
accordance with that view would the     
differences of value within the created 
world be dissolved in a mass of atoms or
 potencies of a similar value4 ,neither 
should we have to fear that from such a 
theory cold deism would be substituted  
for our theism1 full of life4 ,for as   
certainly as theism does not exclude1   
but includes1 all that is relative truth
 in deism1 so certainly the supposition 
that the ,creator had laid the latent   
causes of all following creatures in the
 first germs of the created1 would also 
not exclude the idea of a constant and  
omnipotent presence of the ,creator in  
the world4 ,undoubtedly it belongs to   
our most elementary conceptions of ,god1
 that we have to conceive his lofty     
position above time1 not as an abstract 

distance from finite development1 but1  
as an absolute domination over it2 so   
that for ,god himself1 who creates time 
and developments in time1 there is no   
dependence on the temporal succession of
 created things1 and it is quite the    
same to him whether he instantly calls a
 creature into existence1 or whether he 
prepares it in a short space of time1 or
 years1 or in millions of years4 ,in    
this idea we also find the only possible
 and simple solution of the             
before-mentioned problem of a timeless  
time which ,fr4 ,vischer wishes to      
propose to philosophy4   #c4 ,the       
,evolution ,theory and ,theism4  ,in    
speaking of an evolution theory1 in     
distinction from the descent theory1 we 
mean1 as is evident from the first part 
of our work1 that way and mode of #bfd  
constructing the doctrine of the descent
 of species which permit this descent to
 take place1 not by the leaps of a      
metamorphosis of germs1 but by          
transitions so imperceptably small that 

the difference of two generations which 
lie in the same line of descent1 is     
never greater than those differences    
which always take place between parents 
and children of the same                
species--transitions so gradual that    
only the continuation of these          
individual changes in a single direction
 produces an increase and1 finally and  
gradually1 the new species4 ,the        
treatment of the question as to what    
position this evolution theory takes    
regarding theism1 is even more simple   
than answering the question as to the   
position of the descent idea in         
reference to theism4  ,for now we have  
no longer to discuss the different      
possibilities of a development1 as      
heretofore we have discussed those of a 
descent1 but only the idea of a gradual 
development or of an evolution in       
general4 ,of such possibilities1 it is  
true1 we find several4 ,in the first    
place1 we can look for the inciting     
principle of the development of species 

either in the interior of organisms1 or 
we can see it approaching the latter    
from without4 ,the only scientific      
system which has made any attempt at    
mentioning and elaborating the inciting 
principle of development is that of     
,darwin2 a system that chooses the      
second of the alternatives just stated  
and sees the essential principle that   
makes the transmission of individuals a 
progress beyond one species1 approaching
 the individuals from without4 ,but     
while we shall have to treat of this    
specific ,darwinian theory--the         
selection theory--still more in detail  
in the following section1 we shall also 
there have to point1 out #bfe everything
 that theism has to say in reference to 
a principle of development which        
approaches the organisms from without4  
,another possible explanation of the    
origin of species through development is
 to be found in the fact that we look   
for the inciting principle of           
development in the interior of          

organisms4 ,this is done1 so far as we  
know1 by all those scientists who1      
although inclined to an evolution       
theory1 are adversaries of the selection
 theory2 but none of them claim to have 
found the inciting agencies of          
development4 ,thus1 as in the preceding 
section1 we are again referred only to  
the wholly abstract possibility of      
conceiving these inciting agencies      
either as coming into existence anew in 
the organism with each smallest         
individual modification which leads to a
 development of the species1 or as being
 before present in the organisms1 but   
still latent1 and only coming into      
activity when they are set free4 ,but   
the question whether theism could accept
 the one or the other possibility had to
 be treated of in the preceding section1
 and was there answered in the          
affirmative4  ,thus it only remains to  
treat in general of the question as to  
the reconcilableness of the idea of the 
origin of species through evolution1    

through gradual development1 in general 
with a theistic view of the world4  ,in 
the first place1 we wish to render      
evident the fact which is so often      
overlooked by the friends of monism and 
still more by theistic adversaries of   
the idea of evolution1 that the idea of 
a development of species1 and also of   
man1 does not offer to theistic         
reasoning any new or any other          
difficulties than those which have been 
long present1 and which had found their 
solution in the religious consciousness 
long before any idea of evolution       
disturbed the #bff mind4 ,it is true1   
the question as to the origin of mankind
 is1 to speak in the language of natural
 history1 a still unsolved problem2 and 
the supposition of its gradual          
development out of the animal kingdom is
 still an hypothesis--one of all those  
attempts at solving this problem which  
still wait for confirmation or          
refutation4 ,but there is another quite 
analogous question whose position has   

long ceased to be a mere problem1 and   
whose solution is no longer a mere      
hypothesis2 namely1 the question as to  
the origin of the perfect human or any  
other organic individual4 ,to speak     
again in the language of natural        
history1 this origin is no longer a     
problem--that is1 without regard to the 
obscurity in which the existence and    
origin of every creature1 as to its last
 causes1 is always and will always be   
veiled for us4 ,we know that the human1 
and1 in general1 every organic          
individual1 becomes that which it is    
through development4 ,it begins the     
course of its being with the existence  
of a single cell1 the egg1 and goes     
through all stages of this development  
by wholly gradual and imperceptible     
transitions1 so that the precise moment 
cannot exactly be fixed when any organ1 
any physical or psychical function1     
comes into existence1 until perfect man 
is developed4 ,man has this mode of     
coming into existence in common with all

 organized beings1 down to the lowest   
organisms which stand above the value   
and rank of a single cell4 ,at this     
place1 and with the design of our       
present discussion in view1 we ought not
 to render the importance of this fact  
obscure by a teleological comparison of 
the different eggs and germs with one   
another4 ,if we look upon that which is 
to come out of the germs1 and which     
certainly if prepared and present in the
 first vital functions of the #bfg germ1
 although we are not able to observe1   
prove1 and estimate it by means of the  
microscope and the retort1 then of      
course the difference in the value of   
the germs must be immense2 and from this
 point of view we certainly look upon   
the germ of man differently than upon   
the germ of an oyster4 ,but here the    
question is not as to the differences of
 value of organisms3 no scientist who   
remains within the limits of his realm1 
will ever deny them2 but we treat of the
 question whether such valuable objects 

come into existence suddenly or         
gradually--whether it is possible1 or   
even a fact which repeats itself before 
our eyes1 that a form of being of higher
 value comes forth from a form of being 
of a lower value in gradual development4
 ,and here it is an undisputed fact that
 all qualities of man1 the physical as  
well as the spiritual1 come into        
existence in such a gradual development 
that not in a single one of them can be 
fixed any moment of which it may be     
said3 on the other side of this moment  
it did not exist1 but on this side it   
did exist4 ,all differentiations of his 
body1 from the first differentiation of 
the egg-cell into a complexity of cells 
up to the last formation of his organs1 
take place in the same gliding          
development4 ,all his psychical and     
spiritual functions and forces come into
 existence in this form of gradual      
development4 ,where1 in the development 
of the human individual1 is the moment  
in which consciousness1 language1       

self-consciousness1 memory1 will1 the   
perception of ,god1 moral               
responsibility1 the perception of the   
idea and the ideal1 or whatever else we 
may mention1 came into existence8       
,nowhere2 all this1 and all the rest1 is
 developed in a gradual process4 ,the   
only marked time in this development is 
the time of birth3 #bfh it brings a     
great change into physical life1 and is 
perhaps the beginning epoch of the      
spiritual development of man4 ,but even 
the birth is not absolutely bound to a  
certain time2 the child may be born too 
early1 by weeks or even months1 and its 
development nevertheless takes place2   
and even after birth1 how slowly and    
gradually spiritual development begins  
and continues6  ,with this gradual      
process of individual development which 
we have long known1 we have never found 
any difficulty in bringing two things   
into harmony4 ,first1 we always judged  
the value of the single qualities of man
 only in the proportion in which they   

were really present and came into       
existence1 and in such a way that we    
entirely followed the flowing           
development of the individual4          
,therefore we looked upon the suckling1 
for instance1 not at all as a morally   
responsible individual2 upon the child  
of two years as more responsible1 but to
 a far less degree than the child of    
school-age1 and the latter again to a   
less degree than the man2 and thus we   
have been long accustomed to reason1    
when looking upon all single qualities  
of man4 ,second1 we did not find any    
difficulty in bringing into perfect     
harmony the idea of a gradual process of
 individual development and of the      
dependence of the latter on a complex   
totality of natural causes3 with the    
idea of the absolute dependence on ,god1
 the ,creator1 of that which arose      
through development4 ,every religiously 
reasoning man has always looked upon    
himself as the child of his parents1    
gradually developed under the activity  

of complex natural causes1 as well as   
the creature of ,god1 that owes the     
existence of all its forces and parts of
 body and soul to ,god4 ,should it then1
 be so difficult1 or is it only #bfi    
something new1 to bring into harmony1   
when looking upon the entire species and
 genus1 that which we were long ago able
 to bring into harmony when looking upon
 the individual--it being presupposed   
that the investigation leads us to a    
development of the entire species and   
genus similar to that of the individual 
development8 ,or have we here again to  
ask1 as in  #a3 is it more religious to 
make no attempt at removing the veil    
which covers the natural process of the 
origin of mankind1 than to make it8 ,it 
is true1 the not knowing anything can1  
under certain circumstances1 create and 
increase the sensation of reverence for 
the depth of divine power and wisdom2   
but a perception of the ways of ,god is 
also certainly able to create the same4 
,on that account1 we need not at all    

fear that by such an attempt and its    
eventual success we might get into the  
shallows of superficiality1 to which    
nothing seems any longer to be hidden1  
only because it has no presentiment of  
the depths which are to be sounded4     
,there will always remain enough of the 
mysterious and the uninvestigated1 and  
each new step forward will only lead to 
new views1 to new secrets1 to new       
wonders4  ,but does not a development1  
like that which we here for the moment  
assume hypothetically1 efface and       
destroy the specific value of man and   
mankind from still another side8 ,would 
not a beginning of mankind be really    
lost1 in case that theory of evolution  
should gain authority8 and would not    
there still lie between that which is   
decidedly called animal world and that  
which is decidedly called mankind an    
innumerable series of generations of    
beings which were neither animal nor    
man8 ,we do not believe it4 ,what makes 
man man1 #bgj we can exactly point out3 

it is self-consciousness and moral      
self-determination4 ,now1 in case       
development took place in the above     
sense1 it may have passed ever so       
gradually2 the epochs of preparation    
between that which we know as highest   
animal development and that which       
constitutes the substance of man1 may   
have stretched over ever so many        
generations1 and1 if the friends of     
evolution desire it1 we say over ever so
 many thousands of generations2 yet that
 which makes man man--self-consciousness
 and moral self-determination--must have
 always come into actual reality in     
individuals4 ,those individuals in which
 self-consciousness came into existence 
and activity1 for the first time1 and   
with it the entire possibility of the   
world of ideas--the consciousness of    
moral responsibility1 and with it also  
the entire dignity of moral             
self-determination--were the first men4 
,the individuals which preceded the     
latter may have been ever so interesting

 and promising as objects of            
observation1 if we imagine ourselves    
spectators of these once supposed       
processes2 yet1 they were not men4   #d4
 ,the ,selection ,theory and ,theism4   
,the last scientific theory whose       
position in reference to theism we have 
to discuss1 is the selection theory4    
,we have found but little reason for    
sympathizing with this theory4 ,but     
since we believed that we were obliged  
to suspect it1 not for religious but for
 scientific reasons1 so the completeness
 of our investigation requires us to    
assume hypothetically that the selection
 principle really manifests itself as   
the only and exclusive principle of the 
origin of species1 and to ask now what  
position it would in such a case take in
 reference to theism4 #bga  ,the only   
answer we are able to give is decidedly 
favorable to theism4  ,it is true1      
development would in such a case        
approach the organisms merely from      
without4 ,for the principle lying within

 the organisms1 which would then be the 
indispensable condition of all          
development1 would be first the         
principle in itself1 wholly without plan
 or end1 of individual variability2     
second1 the principle of inheritance    
which for itself and without that first 
principle is indeed no principle of     
development1 but the contrary4 ,the     
causes from which the single individuals
 vary in such or such a way1 would then 
be the outer conditions of life and     
adaptation to them3 i4e41 something     
coming from without4 ,and the causes    
from which one individual1 varying in   
such or such a way1 is preserved in the 
struggle for existence1 and another1    
varying differently1 perishes1 would be 
approaching the individuals also from   
without2 hence they are a larger or     
smaller useful variation for the        
existence of the individual4  ,now if1  
through these influencing causes of     
development1 approaching the most simple
 organisms from without1 a rising line  

of higher and higher organized beings   
comes finally into existence 7a line in 
which sensation and consciousness1      
finally self-consciousness and          
free-will1 appear7 we again reach the   
teleological dilemma3 all this has      
either happened by chance1 or it has    
not4 ,no man who claims to treat this   
question earnestly and in a manner      
worthy of respect1 will assert that it  
happened by chance1 but by necessity4   
,but with this word the materialist only
 hides or avoids the necessity of       
supposing a plan and end in place of    
chance1 as we have convinced ourselves  
in ,part ,i1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chap4 ,,ii1   
#a4 #bgb ,the only exception in this    
case is1 that the bearer and agent of   
this plan would not be the single       
organism 7as is easily possible when we 
accept a descent theory which is more   
independent from the selection theory71 
but the collection of all forces and    
conditions1 acting upon the organism    
from without4 ,and for the question1    

whence this plan and its realization    
comes1 we had again but the one answer3 
from a highest intelligence and         
omnipotence1 from the personal ,god of  
theism4 ,the locus of creation and the  
locus of providence would now1 as ever1 
retain their value in the theological   
system1 with the sole exception that    
most of that which so far belonged to   
the locus of creation would now belong1 
in a higher degree than in the hitherto 
naturo-historical view1 to the locus of 
providence and of the government of the 
world4 ,when looked upon from the       
theocentric point of view1 the new forms
 which we had to suppose as called into 
existence only by selection1 would      
remain products of divine creation3 the 
,god said1 and it was so1 would retain  
its undiminished importance2 but looked 
upon from the cosmic point of view1 they
 would present themselves as products of
 the divine providence and government of
 the world1 still more exclusively than 
in every principal of explanation which 

finds the causes of development in the  
organisms themselves or in an immaterial
 cause acting upon the organisms from   
within4 ,the first as well as the second
 point of view is in full harmony with  
the religious view of things4  ,we do   
not conceal that on the ground of all   
other analogies we sympathize more with 
those who look for the determining      
influences of the origin of new species 
rather within than without nature1 and  
who1 while #bgc looking at that which   
the higher species have in common with  
the lower1 do not forget or neglect the 
new1 the original1 which they possess4  
,but we are indeed neither obliged nor  
entitled1 in the name of religion1 to   
take beforehand in the realm of         
scientific investigation the side of the
 one or the other direction of          
investigation1 or even of the one or the
 other result of investigation1 before  
it is arrived at4 ,let us unreservedly  
allow scientists free investigation in  
their realm1 so long as they do not     

meddle with ethical or religious        
principles1 and quietly await their     
results4 ,these results1 when once      
reached1 may correspond ever so closely 
with our present view and our           
speculative expectations1 or in both    
relations be ever so surprising and new2
 the one case as well as the other has  
already happened3 at any rate they will 
not affect our religious principles1 but
 only enrich our perception of the way  
and manner of divine activity in the    
world1 and thereby give new food and    
refreshment1 to our religious life4     
99       99       99       99       99  
,a4 ,,the ,,darwinistic ,,philosophemes 
,,in ,,their ,,position ,,regarding     
,,theism4   #e4 ,the                    
,naturo-,philosophic ,supplements of    
,darwinism and ,theism4  ,we still have 
to discuss the position of theism in    
reference to the philosophic problems to
 which a ,darwinistic view of nature    
sees itself led1 and in the first place 
its position in reference to the        

naturo-philosophic theories with which  
the descent idea tries to complete      
itself4  ,in the first part of our book1
 we have found that not #bgd a single   
one of the naturo-philosophic problems  
before which the descent idea places us1
 is really solved3 neither the origin of
 self-consciousness and of moral        
self-determination1 nor the origin of   
consciousness and of sensation1 nor the 
origin of life2 and even the theory of  
atoms1 although it is quite important   
and indispensable for the natural       
philosopher and chemist according to the
 present state of his knowledge and     
investigation1 has not yet been able to 
divest itself of its hypothetical       
character4 ,religion might1 therefore1  
refuse to define its position in        
reference to theories which are still of
 a quite problematic and hypothetical   
nature4 ,but by giving such a refusal1  
religion would not act in its own       
interest4 ,the reproach is often made   
that it has an open or hidden aversion  

to the freedom of scientific            
investigation--a reproach which1 it is  
true1 is often enough provoked by its   
own advocates2 often the assertion is   
made by advocates of free investigation1
 that free science has led1 or can lead 
at any moment1 to results which shake or
 even destroy theism and with it the    
objective and scientifically established
 truth of a religious view of the world4
 ,the consequence of this assertion is  
exactly1 as before-mentioned1 that minds
 whose religious possession is to them  
an inviolable sanctuary1 and who lack   
time and occasion1 inclination and      
ability1 to examine scientifically these
 asserted results of science1 really    
suspect free science and contest the    
right of its existence4 ,another        
consequence of this state of war between
 religion and science is the fact that  
so many minds in both camps fall into a 
servile dependence upon battle-cries3   
they confound freedom of investigation  
with license2 science with apathy or    

#bge hostility to faith2 faith with lack
 of scientific perception1 blind        
unreasoning belief1 etc4 ,such a state  
of affairs does not1 indeed1 serve the  
interests of peace and truth2 only a    
correct treatment of philosophy as well 
as of religion can lead to them4  ,such 
a way of peace and truth from the side  
of religion and its scientific treatment
 is entered upon1 when religion sets    
itself right1 not only with all real1   
but also with all conceivable1 possible 
results of the other sciences1 not only 
of the exact1 but also of the           
philosophic sciences4 ,if it finds1 in  
such an investigation1 that such        
conceivable results are reconcilable    
with the theistic view of the world     
which is the basis of religion1 it has  
already shown its relationship to the   
freedom of investigation4 ,but if it    
finds anywhere a possible result which  
is in conflict with its theistic view of
 the world1 it is obliged to examine the
 mutual grounds of dissent1 as to the   

degree of their truth and their power of
 demonstration2 and in case its own     
position is the stronger1 better        
founded1 and more convincing1 to prove  
this fact4 ,if it does this1 it again   
acts according to the principle of free 
investigation--with the single          
difference that in such a case it not   
only makes this allowance to the        
opponent1 but also uses this principle  
for itself in its own realm and         
especially in the border land between   
itself and its opponent2 but at the same
 time it shows in this case 7what1      
indeed1 so many are inclined to deny71  
that religion also has its science1 and 
that theology itself is this science1   
and has the same rights as the sciences 
which are built up in the realm of      
material things or of abstract          
reasoning4  ,we therefore assume        
hypothetically1 that the origin #bgf of 
self-consciousness and of moral         
self-determination is fully explained by
 consciousness2 the origin of           

consciousness and sensation by that     
which has no sensation2 the origin of   
the living and organic by the lifeless  
and inorganic2 and that atomism also is 
scientifically established and proven3  
how1 then1 would such a theory of the   
world and theism stand in respect to    
each other8 ,by this assumption1 we     
think we should simply stand again at   
the point1 the basis of which we had to 
discuss in ,part ,i1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chap4 
,,ii1  #a1 when treating of teleology4  
,we should always see something new1    
something harmoniously arranged3 a      
process of objects of value1 continually
 rising higher and higher1 coming forth 
out of one another in direct causal     
connection2 and should have a choice of 
one of two ways of explaining this      
process4 ,we should either have to be   
satisfied with this final causal        
connection1 and perceive in this process
 itself its highest and last cause1 in  
doing which we should be obliged again  
to deny order and plan in this process1 

to reject the category of lower and     
higher and the acknowledgment of a      
striving towards an end in these        
developments1 and after having climbed  
to that ,faust-height of investigation  
and knowledge1 to throw ourselves in    
spiritual suicide back into the night   
and barbarism of chaos1 or of a rigid   
mechanism to which all development1 all 
life1 all spiritual and ethical tasks1  
are but appearance2 or we should have to
 treat the idea of development seriously
 and recognize a plan and a striving    
towards an end in this world-process1   
and should then find ourselves referred 
to a higher intelligence and a creative 
will as the highest and last cause which
 appoints the end and conditions of this
 process4 ,this would be the case still 
more1 as we actually #bgg see that at   
present the single beings which stand on
 a lower stage of existence no longer   
produce beings of a higher stage1       
although1 according to that theory whose
 correctness we now assume              

hypothetically1 the elements and factors
 for the production of those higher     
forms of existence are fully present in 
the lower ones4 ,inorganic matter no    
longer produces organisms2 the lower    
species of plants or animals no longer  
develop higher ones2 the animal no      
longer becomes man2 and yet there were  
periods1 lying widely apart1 in which1  
according to that theory1 such things   
took place4 ,what else set free those   
active causes1 at the right time and in 
the right place8 ,what else closed again
 at the precise place and moment the    
valves of the proceeding development1   
and brought to rest again the inciting  
force of the rising development8--what  
else but the highest end-appointing     
intelligence and omnipotence8  ,even the
 inherent qualities of the elements1 and
 the products of all the higher forms of
 existence which in the future shall    
arise out of them1 the whole striving   
toward an end of the processes in the   
world1 would present itself to us much  

more vividly than now1 where we are     
still in the dark as to all these       
questions4 ,we should see in atoms the  
real inherent qualities of all things   
and processes which are to be developed 
out of them2 in the inorganic the real  
inherent qualities for the organic and  
living2 in that which has no            
consciousness and sensation the real    
inherent qualities for                  
self-consciousness4 ,instead of being   
now obliged to recur to the ideal and   
metaphysical1 we should see the threads 
of the world's plan uncovered before us 
in empirical reality2 and far from      
bearing with it an impoverishment of our
 #bgh consciousness of ,god1 all this   
would bring us only an immense          
enrichment of its contents2 for with    
such an enlargement of our knowledge1 we
 should only be permitted to take       
glances into the way and manner of      
divine creation and action--glances of a
 depth which at present we are far from 
being permitted to take4  ,even very    

concrete parts of a theistic view of the
 world1 as they present themselves to   
us--e4g41 in the ,holy ,scripture1 from 
its most developed points of view--would
 now find only richer illustrations than
 heretofore4 ,st4 ,paul1 for instance1  
in ,rom4 viii1 speaks of the earnest    
expectation of the creature that waiteth
 for the manifestation of the sons of   
,god4 ,as to the present state of our   
knowledge of nature1 those who adopt    
this view are only entitled to see in   
the sensation of pain of the animal     
world a sensation of this longing1      
unconscious of the end2 but as to all   
soulless and lifeless beings and        
elements in the world1 they can see in  
these words of a sighing and longing    
creation only a strong figurative       
expression used because of its          
suitableness to denote suffering of the 
animal world1 as well as of men1--for   
the destination of the world to another 
and higher existence in which the law of
 perishableness and suffering no longer 

governs4 ,on the other hand1 if1 as we  
assume hypothetically1 all higher forms 
of existence in the world could be      
explained out of the preceding lower    
ones1 and if the before-mentioned       
theorem of a sensation of atoms should  
form a needed and correct link in that  
chain of explanation1 those words of    
sighing and longing would have to be    
literally taken in a still more         
comprehensive sense than now and in     
their directly literal meaning #bgi     
would refer not only to the animal world
 but indeed to everything in the world4 
,therefore1 so long as attempts at      
explaining the different forms of       
existence in the world wholly from one  
another keep within their own limits1   
and do not of themselves undermine      
theism2 and so long as there are men who
 on the one hand favor such a mode of   
explanation and on the other hand still 
adhere firmly to a faith in ,god1       
whether it be the deeper theism or the  
more shallow and superficial deism--so  

long religion has no reason for opposing
 those attempts at explanation4 ,and    
there are such men2 we need only to     
mention ,huxley1 whose position in      
reference to religion we have already   
discussed2 or ,oskar ,peschel1 who1 in  
his ,vlkerkunde 7,ethnology71 says3 ,it 
is not quite clear how pious minds can  
be disturbed by this theory2 for        
creation obtains more dignity and       
importance if it has in itself the power
 of renewal and development of the      
perfect4 ,even ,herbert ,spencer1 with  
his idea of the imperceptibility of the 
super-personal1 of the final cause of   
all things1 is still a living proof of  
the fact that man can trace the         
mechanism of causality back to its last 
consequences and1 as ,spencer does1 even
 derive consciousness and sensation from
 that which is without sensation1 and   
yet not necessarily proceed so far as   
negation of a living ,god1 even if he   
persists in his refusal to perceive in  
general the ultimate cause of things4   

,to meet those attempts1 religion would 
have to take only two precautionary     
measures on two closely related points2 
and in doing this it would indeed make  
use of that before-mentioned right to   
defend freedom of #bhj investigation    
both in its own realm and in the        
border-territory4  ,one precaution would
 consist in the requirement of the      
acknowledgment that even in that purely 
immanent mode of explanation the idea of
 value is fixed1 but that the value of  
the new appears only when the new itself
 really comes into existence2 that we   
therefore do not call1 e4g41 the        
inorganic living1 because according to  
that mode of explanation life develops  
itself out of it2 and that we do not    
ascribe to the animal the value of man1 
because according to that mode of       
explanation it also includes the causes 
of the development of man4 ,such a      
discrimination of ideas is indeed a     
scientific postulate1 as we have had    
occasion to show at many points of our  

investigation2 and we also complied with
 this requirement long ago in that realm
 of knowledge which is related to these 
questions as to the origin of things1   
but is more accessible and open to us1  
namely1 in the realm of the development 
of the individual4 ,we have spoken of   
this at length in  #c4 ,but in the      
interest of religion also we have to    
request that the differences of value of
 things be retained1 even when man      
thinks he is able to explain their      
origin merely out of one another4 ,for  
without this1 all things would finally  
merge simply into existences of like    
value2 man would stand in no other      
relation to ,god than would any other   
creature1 irrational or lifeless2 and   
the quintessence of religious life--the 
relation of mutual personal love between
 ,god and man1 the certainty of being a 
child of ,god--would be illusory when   
there should no longer be a difference  
of value between man and animal1 animal 
and plant1 plant and stone4 #bha  ,many 

a reader thinks1 perhaps1 that with this
 precaution we make a restriction which 
is wholly a matter of course1 and that  
nobody would think of denying these     
differences of value4 ,hckel1 in his    
,anthropogeny1 repeatedly reproaches man
 with the arrogant anthropocentric      
imagination which leads him to look upon
 himself as the aim of earthly life and 
the centre of earthly nature2 this1 he  
says1 is nothing but vanity and         
haughtiness4 ,several writers in the    
,ausland faithfully second him in this  
debasement of the value of man4 ,its    
editor 7,ausland1 #ahgd1 ,no4 #dh1 p4   
#ieg71 for instance1 reproaches ,ludwig 
,noir1 although he otherwise sympathizes
 with him1 that in his book ,die ,welt  
als ,entwicklung des ,geistes 7,the     
,world as ,development of ,mind71       
,leipzig1 ,veit  ,co41 #ahgd1 he still  
takes this anthropocentric standpoint   
and can say3 ,the anthropocentric view  
recognizes in man's mind the highest    
bloom of matter1 which has attained to  

the possession of a soul4 ,this1 ,hckel 
says1 is nothing else but the former    
conception1 not yet overcome1 that man  
is the crown of creation4 ,this pleasure
 in debasing the value of man is also a 
characteristic sign of the times4 ,k4   
,e4 von ,baer is right1 when1 in his    
,studies 7page #dfc71 he says3 ,in our  
days1 men like to ridicule as arrogant  
the looking upon man as the end of the  
history of earth4 ,but it is certainly  
not man's merit that he has the most    
highly developed organic form4 ,he also 
must not overlook the fact that with    
this his task of developing more and    
more his spiritual gifts has only       
begun4444 ,is it not more worthy of man 
to think highly of himself and his      
destination1 than1 fixing his attention 
only upon the low1 to #bhb acknowledge  
only the animalic basis in himself8 ,i  
am sorry to say that the new doctrine is
 very much tainted in this direction of 
striving after the low4 ,i should rather
 prefer to be haughty than base1 and ,i 

well recollect the expression of ,kant1 
',man cannot think highly enough of     
man4' ,by this expression the profound  
thinker especially meant that mankind   
has to set itself great tasks4 ,but the 
modern views are more a palliation of   
all animal emotions in man4  ,the other 
precautionary measure referred to would 
be1 that the realm of mind1 and         
especially the ethical realm1 is not    
dissolved into a natural mechanism4     
,this precaution is also connected with 
the first one1 the latter being its     
condition2 for only where it is         
acknowledged that causes1 so long as    
they are still latent1 do not fall under
 the same category of value as their    
effects1 when these are once realized1  
it can also be acknowledged that the    
realm of mind and morality1 although it 
has grown out of the ground of the      
mechanism of nature1 can still have     
brought something new and higher into   
the world4 ,besides1 this precaution is 
also a postulate of anthropologic       

science4 ,for spiritual and ethical     
facts have at least the same truth and  
reality as the material1 and a still    
higher value1 and can therefore not     
permit any injury to their full         
recognition4 ,but religion also must    
require this acknowledgment4 ,for if the
 specific activity of mind in man is    
endangered1 we also lose his specific   
value1 and thus get into the            
before-mentioned dilemma2 and if the    
moral responsibility of man is          
endangered1 the relation of man to ,god 
loses its ethical character4 ,of the    
consequences in reference to morality1  
we shall have to speak hereafter4 #bhc  
,moreover1 religion does not require    
this acknowledgment without a rich      
compensation4 ,for if that              
naturo-philosophic mode of explanation1 
whose correctness we hypothetically     
assume in this present section1 prove to
 be right1 and if the higher which comes
 anew into existence in the world1 is to
 have the full cause of its origin in   

the preceding lower1 such an admission1 
in accordance with the laws of logic1 by
 which causa quat effectum1 is only     
possible when we either similarly1 as   
above1 invalidate all difference between
 higher and lower1 all difference of    
value of creatures1 and contest the     
possibility that that which appears anew
 can also follow new laws of existence  
and activity2 or when1 in the highest   
cause of all final causes in the world1 
we see the full abundance of all those  
possibilities present as real cause1    
which afterwards appear in succession in
 the world4 ,this highest cause1 then1  
lodges in material things the final     
causes of all which is to come1 as still
 latent causes1 waiting to be set free2 
and such a highest cause as the fullness
 of all that which is successively to be
 developed in the world1 is offered to  
science by religion itself in the idea  
of a living ,god4 ,we say expressly1    
that religion offers this idea to       
science1 and not that science creates   

this idea2 for the acknowledgment of    
,god1 as we have before had occasion to 
point out1 is in the last instance not a
 result of science1 but an ethical      
action of mind1--although from this     
acknowledgment the brightest light falls
 upon science and the whole series of   
its conclusions1 and although science   
owes to precisely this idea of ,god the 
highest points of view to which it sees 
itself led and from which alone it is   
able to survey its entire realm4 #bhd   
#f4 ,elimination of the ,idea of ,design
 or its ,acknowledgment and ,theism4    
,in the whole preceding course of our   
investigation as to the position of     
religion and theism regarding the       
different scientific and                
naturo-philosophic theories1 theism     
could quietly keep the position of a    
friendly and peaceful spectator4 ,the   
degrees of our sympathy with the        
theories which have successively passed 
before our eyes1 were on scientific     
grounds very unequal2 but on religious  

grounds1 and in the interest of a       
theistic view of the world1 we found    
ourselves nowhere induced to take sides 
for or against a theory4 ,but the       
position of religion and theism becomes 
quite different in reference to the     
assertion that the existence of ends and
 designs in nature is refuted by the    
evolution theory or by any other        
hypothetical or real results of science4
 ,with this assertion1 the existence of 
a living and personal ,god1 of a        
,creator and ,lord of the world1 is     
denied2 and every religion which claims 
objective truth for its basis is        
eliminated4 ,it is true1 man can under  
this supposition still speak of a       
religion in the sense of subjective     
religiousness2 but the life-nerve is    
also cut off from this subjective       
religiousness4 ,we have repeatedly had  
occasion to prove this in our historical
 review1 and also in the section in     
which we pointed out the plan of our own
 analysis4  ,but still1 where we have   

had to represent this anti-teleological 
view of the world1 we have happily      
convinced ourselves of the fact that an 
existence of ends and designs in nature 
is not only reconcilable with the       
conformity to law and the causal        
mechanism of its processes1 but is #bhe 
also postulated by scientific           
contemplation of nature1 as soon as the 
latter observes that in these processes1
 acting with lawful necessity1 something
 in general is attained1 and1 moreover1 
when out of them comes forth something  
so infinitely rich and beautifully      
arranged1 such a rising series of higher
 and higher developments1 as the world4 
,on the other hand1 combatting the      
striving towards an end in nature leads 
to such scientific monstrosities1       
destroys so thoroughly the idea of ,god 
and also all ideas of value in the      
world1 even all spiritual and ethical   
acquisitions of mankind1 that we can    
explain the origin of such a doctrine   
only by the determined purpose of       

getting rid1 at any cost1 of the        
dependence on a living ,god3 again a    
proof of the fact that faith1 or want of
 faith1 in its final causes1 is not the 
product of reflecting intelligence1 but 
an ethical action of that centre of     
human personality from which the        
spiritual process of life in the        
individual comes forth--an ethical      
action of mind4  ,herewith the position 
of theism in reference to the           
elimination of the idea of design is    
also soon characterized3 it is the      
position of irreconcilable antagonism4  
,in rejecting the position of its       
opponent1 theism perceives that it is in
 harmony not only with every correctly  
understood religious need1 but equally  
so with every scientific interest--with 
the interest of a correct knowledge of  
nature1 as well as with the interest of 
those sciences which have to take care  
of and try to understand the spiritual  
and ethical endowments of mankind4  ,if 
we now turn our attention to the        

position of theism in reference to the  
idea of design in general1 theism on its
 part also gives an equally firm support
 to that intimate connection1 proven by 
natural science1 between causality #bhf 
and striving toward an end--between     
actiology and teleology1 as they are    
called in the language of the           
philosophical school4 ,while a          
contemplation of nature perceives in    
nature a mechanism governed by laws and 
necessities1 it finds results reached   
through this chain of causality in which
 it must acknowledge ends toward which  
the preceding has striven4 ,now1 theism1
 on its part1 proceeds from the highest 
end-appointing cause of things and      
processes1 and finds that the reaching  
of these ends postulates a mechanism of 
natural conformity to law4 ,in order to 
prove this1 we certainly must take a    
course which is prohibited by many as   
anthropomorphism1 i4e41 we must try to  
study the connection of ends and        
designs1 and the possibility of such a  

connection where we are able to observe 
in general not only the accomplishment  
of purposes1 but also the forming of    
purposes2 and the only realm of this    
kind which we know of1 is the realm of  
human action4 ,he who1 merely through   
fear of anthropomorphism1 shrinks from  
this only possible comparison1 may      
consider that for those who assume a    
highest end-appointing cause 7and we1   
too1 proceed from this standpoint7 man  
also1 who forms his designs and strives 
toward his ends1 is a product of that   
highest end-appointing cause2 and that1 
therefore1 in the human striving toward 
an end1 a certain analogue of the divine
 striving toward an end must occur4 ,we 
are1 indeed1 not obliged on this account
 to identify the two1 and to close our  
eyes against the immense differences    
which exist between them1 and which1    
wholly of themselves1 intrude upon our  
observation4 ,what we mean by that      
analogy may thus be stated4  ,man forms 
for himself designs and ends1 and       

pursues #bhg and reaches them by using  
the objects and forces of nature as     
means4 ,he can do this only because the 
forces in nature act from necessity1    
strictly conformable to law4 ,because1  
and so far as man knows the action of   
forces1 conformable to law1 and the     
inviolable necessity of the connection  
between certain causes and their        
effects1 he can select and make use of  
such causes as means1 by virtue of which
 he reaches those effects as designs    
intended by him4 ,if he could not depend
 on this conformity to law1 on this     
causal connection taking place according
 to simple necessities1 he could not    
select1 make1 and use1 with certainty1  
any tool1 from the club with which he   
defends himself against his enemies or  
cracks the shells of fruit1 up to the   
finest instruments of optics and        
chemistry1 and even to the telegraph and
 steam engine4 ,the conformity to law1  
with which the forces of nature act1 far
 from being an impediment to his        

appointing and reaching his ends is much
 more the indispensable means by which  
he is enabled in general to reach them4 
,now1 if we thus find1 in the only      
action striving towards an end which we 
are able to observe to the extent of the
 appointing of ends and the selection of
 means--namely1 man's end appointing    
action--such a strong dependence of     
finality on causality that the reaching 
of ends is not possible at all unless   
the means act of necessity conformably  
to law1 then we are certainly obliged to
 draw the conclusion that the highest   
author of things has prepared the world 
so1 that the reaching of ends requires  
the action of means1 and that the       
category of finality and the category of
 causality are mutually prepared for    
each other4 ,for1 according to the      
theistic and teleological view of the   
world1 the #bhh laws of nature1 acting  
with causality and necessity1 are       
certainly not laws which the ,creator   
found in some way1 and with which he had

 to calculate as with factors given to  
him from somewhere else1 in order to    
make use of them1 so far as he was      
permitted1 for the accomplishment of his
 designs--this would be the way and     
manner of human teleological action1 and
 transferring it to divine action would 
be an anthropomorphism which we should  
have to reject4 ,on the contrary1 these 
laws themselves are the work of the     
teleologically acting ,creator--he1     
indeed1 will have given to them such a  
quality that with them he is able to    
reach his ends as a whole and in detail4
 ,the inviolability of the laws of      
nature also results from this idea4 ,for
 means which would have to be           
supplemented1 sometimes set aside1      
occasionally replaced by others1 would  
be less perfect than such means as by   
virtue of their quality are able with   
certainty to serve the designs which are
 to be reached by them4 ,how theism can 
reconcile with this view the            
indispensable idea of divine freedom1 we

 shall have occasion to show in ,chap4  
,,ii1  #d4  ,among the writers who      
defend teleology1 we can mention two    
who1 starting from the analogy of human 
teleological action1 have pointed out   
the idea that teleology itself requires 
a necessity1 conformable to law1 in the 
activity of the forces of nature4 ,one  
of the two is ,k4 ,e4 von ,baer1 in his 
oft-quoted essays on striving towards   
end2 and the other is the ,duke of      
,argyll4 ,at a time when the assault    
against teleology had just begun1 this  
noble author perceived the whole        
importance and weight of these attacks1 
and most energetically defended         
teleology4 ,the expression of the       
just-mentioned ideas1 #bhi among others1
 forms one of the fundamentals of his   
work1 ,the ,reign of ,law 7,london1     
,strahan  ,co41 first edition published 
in #ahff1 and since then in frequently  
repeated editions72 a work which is well
 fitted to instruct us1 in the most     
interesting manner1 regarding the       

present state of the related questions  
as they are treated of in ,great        
,britain4         99       99       99  
99       99 #bij   ,,chapter ,,ii4      
,,the ,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and      
,,positive ,,christianity4   #a4 ,the   
,creation of the ,world4  ,now that we  
have come to a clear understanding of   
the position of the ,darwinian theories 
in reference to the basis of all        
religion and of all living              
religiousness1 to theism in general1 it 
remains to be seen what position those  
of the theories which are reconcilable  
with theism take in reference to the    
positive ,christian view of the world4  
,we naturally omit all those objects and
 parts of ,christian dogmatics which    
have no points of contact1 or are very  
indirectly connected with the ,darwinian
 ideas1 or which--as1 e4g41 their       
position in reference to the idea of    
,god in general--have found their       
principal illustration in our           
investigation just finished4 ,we shall  

nevertheless have now to take into      
consideration once more1 although from  
another side1 some objects which we have
 discussed in treating of the relation  
of the ,darwinian ideas to theism1 on   
account of the specific part which      
theism has in ,christianity4 ,this is   
especially the case with those          
,christian facts which belong to the    
first article of the ,apostolic ,creed1 
and immediately also with the doctrine  
of the creation of the world4 #bia  ,at 
first sight it seems that the evolution 
theory and ,christianity are in no other
 place more sharply opposed to each     
other than in that of the history of    
creation4 ,darwinism claims for its     
theory immense periods of time2 and     
geology seems to furnish them according 
to its demand4 ,the ,holy ,scripture1 on
 the other hand1 teaches a creation of  
the world in six days4  ,with the       
attempt to find the right way to end    
this conflict1 we enter upon that part  
of the border-land between theology and 

natural science1 which1 among all       
others1 is most contested1 and which has
 offered to the most luxuriant fancy the
 widest field of action and the one most
 profitably taken advantage of4  ,we    
confess at the outset that we sympathize
 with those who try to keep the peculiar
 realms of religion and natural science 
apart in such a way that a collision    
between the two is impossible4 ,we      
quietly leave the investigation of the  
temporal succession in                  
creation--especially the investigation  
of all that belongs in the finite causal
 connection of natural processes--to    
natural science2 we also do not look to 
the source of our ,christian religion1  
to the ,holy ,scripture1 for a          
scientific manual1 least of all for the 
communication of a knowledge of nature1 
supernaturally manifested and claiming  
divine authority1 the acquisition of    
which is especially the task of         
scientific labor4 ,but we bestow just as
 decidedly upon religion the specific   

task of showing man the way to communion
 with ,god1 especially the way of       
salvation2 a task in which it can as    
little permit itself to be hindered by  
natural science1 as the latter in the   
pursuit of its peculiar tasks can allow 
an objection from any source4 ,on the   
side of religion1 the bond of unity     
which brings #bib into harmony the two  
activities of the human mind--the       
religious and the investigating--in the 
realm of nature1 and1 in general1 in the
 whole realm of exact science1 consists 
in the fact that in all which exact     
science offers to religion as the result
 of its investigation1 the latter       
perceives and shows the works and ways  
of ,god2 and on the side of the exact   
sciences1 the bond consists in the fact 
that they bring within the reach of     
their scientific1 historical1 literary1 
culturo-historical1 and exegetical      
investigations all that which in the    
religious realm appears1 or in the      
written word is fixed1 as historical    

fact4 ,religion1 therefore1 concedes to 
exact sciences the full right of        
examining the biblical records as to all
 the relations of their historical and  
literary connections2 it even makes     
these investigations a quite essential  
and1 at present1 very much favored      
branch of its own science of theology4  
,on the other hand1 religion reserves   
just as decidedly to itself the full    
right of drawing from them1 of          
maintaining1 and of realizing1 the whole
 full religious basis and significance  
of those records4  ,we know very well   
that such a proposition is very simple  
in principle1 but much more difficult in
 practice4 ,for the quintessence of that
 which constitutes the basis of the     
,christian religion--namely1 the leading
 back of mankind to communion with ,god 
by means of salvation--is not only a    
philosopheme1 a theoretical or mystic   
doctrine1 but a fact3 it comes into the 
world as a series of divine facts2 it is
 interwoven by innumerable threads into 

creation and the course of nature and   
history2 and1 as to this whole aspect of
 its appearance in the world of         
phenomena1 it falls under the cognition 
of the exact sciences4 ,but as soon as  
any given fact excites the #bic interest
 of religion as well as that of exact   
science1 collisions are possible from   
both sides4 ,some advocates of religion1
 through mistaken zeal for religious    
interests1 may think it necessary to    
assert and to represent as indispensable
 to religion facts whose cognition as to
 reality belongs only to exact science  
and which are contested by exact        
science2 as1 e4g41 the creation of the  
world in six literal days1 or the       
creation of the single elements of the  
world without the action of secondary   
causes4 ,and some advocates of exact    
science1 from reasons of a superficial  
analogy1 may erroneously think it       
necessary to dispute the reality of     
facts1 otherwise well attested1 but     
wanting analogy1 in which religion has a

 central interest2 as1 e4g41 the reality
 of the resurrection of ,jesus ,christ1 
or the reality of his miracles4 ,or they
 may unjustifiably try1 from our        
experiences in this world1 to forbid    
glances which religion permits us to    
throw beyond the present course of the  
world2 e4g41 the eschatological hope of 
,christians is often enough contested1  
or as the laws of nature are called     
eternal in the absolute sense of the    
word1 although natural science is only  
led to a recognition of the duration of 
the same1 which is congruent with the   
circumstances and duration of this      
present course of the world4  ,we are   
perfectly aware of all these            
possibilities of a collision1 and of all
 the difficulties of their prevention   
and reconciliation2 but we nevertheless 
know of no other way for their avoidance
 than that simple principle of agreement
 which1 on account of its simplicity and
 clearness1 seems to us to be perfectly 
able to maintain the peace between the  

two parties interested1 or where it is  
disturbed1 to restore it4 #bid  ,thus1  
we wholly agree that in the question of 
creation the investigation of the       
succession and of all modalities in the 
appearance of the single elements of the
 world1 is entirely left to natural     
science1 and that the biblical records  
should on the one hand be investigated  
wholly1 and even to their remotest      
consequences1 from a literary1          
historical1 and exegetical point of     
view1 and on the other hand be tested   
with equal fullness and completeness as 
to their religious contents4 ,the       
literary and exegetical examination of  
the ,mosaic account of creation will    
reveal that its conceptions of that     
which in the creation of the world      
belongs entirely to the natural process1
 do not go beyond that which otherwise  
belongs to the sphere of knowledge and  
views of antiquity1 as well as of       
immediate perception of nature in       
general2 and that we cannot expect any  

scientific explanation from it1 because 
man really came last on the stage of    
earth1 and is therefore not able to say 
anything1 founded upon autopsy1 about   
the origin of all the other creatures   
which preceded his appearance4 ,just as 
little could the first men possess and  
deliver to their offspring a remembrance
 of the first beginnings of their own   
existence4 ,moreover1 the literary and  
exegetical interpretation of the ,bible 
will also refer to other passages of the
 ,holy ,scripture which entirely differ 
from the succession of creations1 as    
they are related in ,genesis ,i2 so1    
e4g41 besides ,job ,,xxxviii1 #d-aa1 the
 second account of creation in ,genesis 
,,ii1 #d-be3 again a proof that what we 
read in the ,biblical record of creation
 about the succession in the appearance 
of creatures is not binding upon us4    
,religion can have nothing to say       
against these results2 it will not      
reject the information of man as to the 
#bie succession and the modalities in   

the appearance of the single elements of
 the world1 which it receives from      
natural science1 and will not expect it 
by means of a special supernatural      
manifestation2 it will willingly accept 
it from natural science1 and simply make
 use of it in such a way that in nature 
and its processes it also perceives a   
manifestation of ,god4 ,now1 when it    
examines the different ,biblical        
accounts of creation as to their        
religious substance1 it will find in    
them such a pure and correct idea of    
divine nature and divine action--such a 
pure conception1 equally satisfying to  
mind and to science1 of the nature of   
man1 of his position in nature1 of the  
nature and destination of the two sexes1
 of the ethical nature and the ethical  
primitive history of man1--it will      
especially have to acknowledge in the   
,biblical account of creation1 in spite 
of all points of collision with the     
cosmogonies of paganism1 such an        
elevation above them1 such an exemption 

from all theogony1 with which heathen   
cosmogonies are always mixed up1 that we
 are perfectly right in perceiving in   
these records the full and unmistakable 
elements of a pure and genuine stream of
 manifestation1 which pours into        
mankind4  ,so far we find ourselves in  
full harmony with a theology which1 in  
the manner indicated1 reconciles the    
religious interest with the historical  
and critical interest4 ,we find the     
points of view to which this perception 
leads1 represented with special         
clearness and attractiveness in         
,dillmann's ,revision of ,knobel's      
,commentar zur ,genesis 7,commentary on 
,genesis71 ,leipzig1 ,hirzel1 #ahge4    
,but it seems to us that a readiness to 
be just to historical criticism and     
impartial exegesis has hindered #bif    
theologians occupying this standpoint   
from being just also to the religious   
element1 in its full meaning1 in        
reference to a very important part of   
the ,mosaic account of creation1 in     

which the author of it shows quite a    
decided religious interest4 ,we mean the
 six days of creation1 together with the
 seventh day1 the divine ,sabbath4      
,theologians became too quickly         
satisfied with the exegetical perception
 of these seven days1 as creative1      
earthly days1 of twenty-four hours2 and 
this hindered them from assigning to the
 religious meaning the full importance  
which these days have in that record4   
,that the idea and the number of the    
days in that account have a high        
religious meaning to the author1 is     
clear from the following3 ,the account  
in ,genesis ,i1 #a-bd1 belongs to that  
series of parts of the ,pentateuch which
 we call the original1 and which has the
 ,sinaitical ,law as the centre of its  
belief4 ,the division of the days into  
weeks1 each having six working days and 
one day of rest1 which possibly existed 
before1 but which received obligatory   
importance to ,israel first by the      
,sinaitical legislation1 so far controls

 that account of the creation of the    
world that1 next to the sublime         
perception of the dignity and position  
of man1 it forms its very quintessence4 
,the account makes that divine week of  
creation1 with its six working days and 
its divine day of rest1 the divine      
prototype and model for the human       
division of time2 and the ,decalogue    
also1 in the conception which it has in 
,exodus ,,xx1 directly bases the        
commandment of the ,sabbath on the      
divine week of creation4 ,now1 if we    
suppose that the author took these days 
as earthly days of twenty-four hours1 we
 are first of all obliged to reject as a
 child-like error the idea on which from
 religious #big reasons--not from       
reasons of a mystical idea of ,god1 but 
from direct practical religious         
reasons--he puts great importance2 an   
idea with which he establishes an       
institution of human life which has been
 preserved through many thousands of    
years and is still preserved as the     

exceedingly blissful basis of all social
 life4 ,for that the creation of the    
world1 from the beginning of things up  
to the appearance of man1 demanded more 
than six times twenty-four hours1 is    
beyond any doubt4 ,moreover1 we should  
be obliged to reject the arguments of   
such a central religious custom as      
,sabbath-rest in a record in which we   
have to assign an absolute and lasting  
religious value to all other religious  
elements of it1 as to the ideas of the  
unity1 omnipotence1 and wisdom of ,god1 
of his creation through the creative    
word1 of the perfection of his works1 of
 man bearing the image of ,god4 ,we     
should even see that idea of ,god which 
presents itself to us out of all other  
characteristics of that record in such  
spotless purity and sublime magnitude1  
sink down to a decided insignificance   
through the identification of the divine
 days of creation with our earthly days 
of twenty-four hours4 ,all this         
certainly brings near to us the         

question3 do we make a correct exegesis1
 do we correctly read that record1 when 
we think that the author1 because he    
speaks of days1 must necessarily have   
understood earthly days1 such as we know
 now8  ,we readily perceive how         
interpreters have arrived at this view4 
,the divine sections of creation in the 
,mosaic account show themselves too     
decidedly as days to make possible any  
other interpretation than to take them  
as days4 ,now from experience we do not 
know of any other days than of earthly  
days of twenty-four hours2 #bih and     
therefore the conclusion naturally      
follows1 that the author also took the  
divine days of creation as such earthly 
days of twenty-four hours4 ,a simple    
reference of the same to periods1 so    
that we should again think of fixed     
periods of the earth or of the world1   
would especially pervert the literal    
sense--would entirely remove from the   
account the idea of day which is so     
essential to the author of the record1  

and thereby render obscure the archetype
 of the divine week of creation for the 
human divisions of time2 and the        
looked-for harmony between the ,biblical
 days and the geological periods of the 
earth would by no means be established  
by such an identification of the days of
 creation with the periods of the world3
 for the geological or even the cosmic  
and astronomical periods are nowhere in 
congruity with the ,biblical days of    
creation4  ,but the question1 however1  
is3 are there not evidences in the      
,biblical account itself which show that
 the author did not take these days as  
creative earthly days of twenty-four    
hours8 ,we have to answer this question 
decidedly in the affirmative4  ,in the  
first place1 it is an established fact  
that these days of the week of creation 
were also1 according to the meaning of  
the author1 days of ,god4 ,now that such
 days of ,god1 even with the most       
childish and simple worldly knowledge of
 that early period of mankind1 so soon  

as such a pure idea of ,god1 as appears 
from the whole account1 is at the bottom
 of the conception1 can no longer be    
identical with the days of the creature1
 is to be inferred beforehand with the  
greatest probability from the purity of 
that idea of ,god1 and is even expressly
 #bii confirmed by special evidences in 
the record itself4 ,we have to mention  
no less than four of them4  ,the days of
 creation present themselves as days of 
,god1 which as such differ from the     
creative days of earth by the fact that 
with them the day and the work of the   
day are absolutely identical4 ,in the   
creative days1 the day and the work of  
the day are always different from one   
another2 the days come and go as        
temporal frames which include everything
 that happens during these days1 whether
 we know it or not4 ,now we may turn our
 attention to and mention ever so many  
works of an earthly day3 there always   
happen innumerable other things which   
also belong within the frame of that day

 and which are only not observed by us4 
,it is quite another thing with those   
,biblical days of creation3 here the day
 begins with the beginning of the day's 
work2 it exists and passes on single and
 alone in the course of the work of the 
day1 and it comes to an end when the    
day's work is completed1 and the work of
 the following day begins3 it comes to  
an end with evening and morning4  ,we   
also lay some stress1 though not very   
much1 upon the fact that1 in the        
account1 that which makes and regulates 
the earthly day is created not before   
the fourth day of creation1 ,genesis ,i1
 #ad3 ,and ,god said1 ,let there be     
lights in the firmament of the heaven to
 divide the day from the night2 and let 
them be for signs and for seasons1 and  
for days and years4 ,we admit that if we
 were obliged for other reasons to      
suppose that the author of the account  
took the days of creation as common     
earthly days of twenty-four hours1 we   
must and should find it possible that   

the author had been able to #cjj suppose
 the existence and the course of such   
earthly days even before the creation of
 sun1 moon1 and stars2 for he certainly 
could not yet have the scientific       
perception that the sun with its light  
and the rotation of the earth were the  
only cause of an earthly day4 ,but it is
 easier and more natural for us to bring
 that passage1 ,genesis ,i1 #ad1 into   
accord with the conception that the days
 of creation are divine days which1 as  
such1 are different from creative days1 
and on one of which ,god also created   
that which originates creative days4    
,another evidence in the account is of  
still greater importance for our        
conception of days4 ,these days of      
creation in the ,biblical record have no
 night4 ,the account closes the work of 
each day with the words3 ,and the       
evening and the morning were the first  
day1 the second day1 etc4 ,now1 if we   
have to suppose that the author took    
these days as common earthly days1 it   

would be quite impossible to understand 
why1 after having mentioned at the close
 of the day's work that it now became   
evening1 he omits the long night of     
twelve hours1 and1 although not having  
said anything of the night1 makes the   
morning which follows the latter1 the   
end of the preceding day2 and why he    
does not say1 and it became evening and 
it became night1 the first day1 etc4 ,we
 then could not avoid the question3     
what1 according to the conception of the
 author1 did ,god do in these six nights
 of his week of creation8 ,but if we    
suppose that the author took the days as
 days of ,god1 and therefore1 in his    
conception of the days of creation1     
elevated the same above the common      
earthly days of the creature1 and so    
represented them to himself as he alone1
 through his idea of ,god1 thought he   
might #cja venture to do1 then that mode
 of expression1 so exceedingly strange  
under all other suppositions1 appears   
very simple and natural to us4 ,for the 

author did not mention a night1 because 
these days simply had no night2 and they
 had none1 because as days of ,god they 
could have none--because with ,god there
 is no night2 because the rest of ,god1 
as the seventh day shows1 is only a day 
of rest and not a night of rest4 ,and   
the author saw the morning immediately  
following the evening of his divine day 
of creation1 and recognized in this     
morning together with the evening       
immediately preceding it1 the close of  
the day1 because the accomplishment of  
the day's work 7evening7 already        
contained in itself the preparation of  
the following day's work1 or at least   
pointed to the coming of the latter4    
,finally1 the fact that1 according to   
the ,biblical account1 the seventh day  
still has no end1 is just as decisive   
for us4 ,the end of each of the six days
 is mentioned by the solemn repetition  
of the words3 ,and the evening and the  
morning were the first day1 etc42 but it
 is not mentioned in regard to the      

seventh day4 ,now if1 according to the  
meaning of the author1 the seventh day  
had also had its end like any of the six
 preceding days1 he would at the seventh
 and last day have had double reason for
 mentioning its end2 and the omission of
 that concluding word would indeed be   
inconceivable4 ,when ,dillman says3 ,the
 formula 'and 7it became7 the evening'  
is wanting1 because the account is here 
at an end1 and is no longer to be       
carried over to another day1 and because
 for that reason its designation as     
seventh day is presupposed in v4 #b1 we 
have to reply that1 under the           
supposition of the days of creation     
having #cjb been common earthly days1 a 
carrying over of the account to further 
days was certainly to be expected1 even 
if from nothing else than the formula3  
,and the evening and the morning were   
the first day1 etc4 ,for then the human 
weeks could have followed the week of   
,god1 in which man1 following the divine
 example1 would have had to work six    

days and to rest one4 ,the same         
commentator says 7p4 #bd73 ,the author  
could not even have dared make a        
statement about the life-duration of the
 first men1 if to him the day in which  
he was created had been an indefinitely 
long period of time4 ,but1 according to 
the conception of the ,biblical author  
supposed by us1 only the day of ,god1 in
 which he was created1 would have been  
an indefinitely long period of time     
7although we are not willing to identify
 the days of ,god with certain earthly  
periods of time72 the earthly days and  
the earthly years1 on the other hand1   
would have their existence after the    
fourth day of creation1 and thus1       
according to that view1 we could        
estimate and name the earthly years and 
days of all that which happened before  
the fourth day of creation1 under the   
condition that we have1 or believe we   
have1 the means of estimating them4     
,when ,dillmann continues3 ,on the      
contrary1 the author took these days as 

nothing else than days1 we wholly agree 
with him2 but add to it3 not days of the
 creature1 but days of ,god4  ,by this  
long duration of the seventh day1 we are
 obliged to draw still another          
conclusion2 namely1 that according to   
the conception of the author the six    
preceding days also must have far       
exceeded the duration of earthly days4  
,this leads us to another ,biblical     
analogy1 whose direct power of          
demonstration for a long #cjc duration  
of the ,biblical days of creation is1 it
 is true1 justly contested1 but which1  
as soon as we have to assume for other  
reasons that according to the author the
 days of creation far exceed the earthly
 days as to duration1 becomes a strong  
support of this view4 ,for it is        
certainly not unimportant that in the   
#ijth ,psalm1 the psalm of ,moses1 the  
mediator of the ,sinaitical legislation1
 to the circle of ideas of which that   
account of the creation so entirely     
belongs1 the thought is expressed which 

is also taken up in the second letter of
 ,st4 ,peter1 with its developed        
cosmological conceptions3 namely1 the   
thought that one day is with the ,lord  
as a thousand years1 and a thousand     
years as one day4  ,with that exegesis  
of the seventh day as one still         
remaining up to the present1 we are in  
clear accord with the more developed    
theology of the ,new ,testament1 and    
with the interpretation which it itself 
gives of that divine day of rest4 ,jesus
 himself1 in ,st4 ,john1 ,v4 #ag1 puts  
aside a reproach of the ,pharisees in   
reference to a healing on the ,sabbath1 
with the words3 ,my father worketh      
hitherto1 and ,i work4 ,this answer only
 has a meaning in the sense3 my father  
worketh hitherto1 although1 since the   
accomplishment of the days of creation1 
he enjoys the ,sabbath-rest2 and thus ,i
 also work on the ,sabbath as on a      
work-day4 ,and the ,letter to the       
,hebrews1 in its fourth chapter1 looks  
through the medium of the ninety-fifth  

,psalm back to this ,sabbath of creation
 which1 as a day of rest of ,god1 exists
 to-day1 and the entering into which is 
given and promised to the people of     
,god4  ,by this whole conception of the 
,biblical week of creation1 which       
appears to us exegetically much more    
#cjd natural and unconstrained than any 
other1 we alone reach that conception   
which the author of that record intends 
to reach2 namely1 a conception really   
worthy of ,god1 of his temporal relation
 to the world1 and of the relation of   
human days to the divine days of        
creation2 we get a foundation for the   
commandment to keep the ,sabbath1 the   
idea of which can be completed without  
disturbing the idea of ,god4 ,the       
relation of ,god to the whole temporal  
course of this present world1 from its  
beginning to its end1 for the religious 
mode of contemplation of man who1 as the
 image of ,god1 looks to the creative   
activity of ,god for a prototype and an 
example for his own activity1 can be    

comprised in one single1 great1 divine  
week1 whose first six days last to the  
completion of the creation of man1 and  
whose seventh day still lasts and will  
last to the completion of the course of 
the world--till the latter itself1 and  
mankind with it1 can enter into the     
divine rest4  ,from this religious      
interpretation1 which we have to ascribe
 to that ,biblical idea of the divine   
week of creation1 it by no means follows
 that religion has to demand of natural 
science that it shall reach in its      
cosmogonic investigations the same      
succession in the appearance of things  
as we find in the ,biblical account4    
,this would be nothing else but an      
actual carrying of a pretended religious
 interest over beyond the limits of a   
realm in which the deciding vote belongs
 to natural science4 ,however incomplete
 the cosmogonic knowledge of the latter 
may be1 it nevertheless is at present   
established clearly enough to reject    
forever such a demand4 ,astronomy       

convinces us that it is entirely        
inconceivable that all which belongs to 
the work of the fourth ,biblical day of 
creation1 even #cje the whole formation 
of stars and of our system of planets1  
succeeded the work of the third day1 the
 formation of earthly continents and    
plants4 ,and geology in its strata1     
which exhibit petrifactions1 shows us   
that the relative ,biblical days' works 
in reality did not succeed one another  
alternately in such a way that the one  
began where the other ceased1 but that  
from the beginning of organic life the  
works of the third and the fifth days   
from the carboniferous period1 also the 
works of the third1 fifth1 and sixth    
days1 developed themselves perfectly by 
the side of each other4 ,it would be an 
excess of refinement to identify any    
,biblical day of creation with any      
period or any complex of periods in the 
development of the earth or of the      
world4  ,on the other hand1 for a       
,christianity founded upon the ,holy    

,scripture1 it is still not entirely    
without interest to compare the results 
of natural science and the extent and   
succession of the ,biblical days' works 
with one another4 ,for a declaration    
which undertakes to trace something     
which has so deep a hold on human life  
as the ,sabbath-rest1 back to the       
prototype of directly divine action1 is 
certainly worthy of attention4 ,now if  
we wish to make such a comparison1 we   
can only do it in exact analogy with the
 way and manner in which we compare the 
predictions of the prophetical word with
 their fulfilment4 ,for in so far as the
 declarations of that ,biblical record  
about the circumstances of creation have
 religious value of which we are to take
 notice1 they as declarations concerning
 events of which man certainly cannot   
have historical knowledge of his own1   
come entirely under the point of view of
 the prophetical word2 with the         
exception that they do not contain a    
forward-looking but a #cjf              

backward-looking prophecy4 ,this is one 
of the most correct and fruitful        
thoughts which ,johann ,heinrich ,kurz1 
in his ,bibel und ,astronomie 7,bible   
and ,astronomy71 ,berlin1 ,wohlgemuth1  
#ast edition1 #ahdb1 has expressed1 but 
has fantastically misused1 in that work1
 in general so prolific of indefensible 
positions2 a fate which1 as is well     
known1 the forward-looking prophecy has 
had also often enough to undergo4  ,in  
the same manner as we have to explain   
the forward-looking prophecy from two   
factors--on the one hand1 from the      
circumstances of time1 the knowledge1   
the dispositions1 and the characters of 
prophets2 on the other1 from the        
receptivity of their mind for the mind  
of ,god and the last purposes of his    
actions--we also have explained that    
record of creation from two factors3 on 
the one hand1 from the view and the     
knowledge of its time1 and on the other 
from the receptivity of its author for a
 pure and living idea of ,god and of the

 religious relations of human life4 ,and
 we shall also have to do likewise when 
interpreting it4 ,for the interpretation
 of the forward-looking prophecy1 we    
have behind us the experience of        
thousands of years1 from which the      
following principles1 of treatment and  
interpretation have resulted4 ,as long  
as such a prophetic word is not yet     
fulfilled1 so long1 indeed1 its meaning 
is and remains the object of ,christian 
faith and ,christian hope2 but it is    
difficult and almost impossible to      
distinguish in it1 what is lasting      
substance1 and what is transient form4  
,perhaps many a thing is looked upon as 
substance1 which in the fulfilment      
appears to be only an image and form2   
and perhaps many a thing as form1 which 
in the fulfilment shows itself as a more
 concrete reality than we had supposed4 
#cjg ,and it would even be              
psychologically a violent assumption1 if
 we should presuppose in the mind of the
 prophet a still greater knowledge of   

the future course of things1 than that  
which he expresses2 or if we should     
separate him in his worldly knowledge1  
and even in the form of his prophetic   
utterances1 from the views and limits of
 his time4 ,but by far the most         
fruitless effort of all would be to     
construct beforehand out of his words   
the particulars of the historical course
 of the future4 ,attempts of this kind  
have been defeated whenever they have   
been made4 ,but if the fulfilment of    
such a prophetic word has once taken    
place1 it is a joy and a strengthening  
of faith to all following generations1  
and even after the final fulfilment of  
all prophecy1 it will still be a joy to 
the children of ,god in their           
perfection1 to compare prophecy and     
fulfilment and to allow the prophecy to 
be illumined by the light of fulfilment1
 the fulfilment by that of prophecy4    
,all this finds its full application to 
the ,biblical narrative of creation4    
,that which in the forward-looking      

prophecy is the historical fulfilment1  
is in the backward-looking the          
scientific investigation4 ,so long as   
the latter was not directed at all to   
the prehistoric history of the earth1 it
 was an audacious undertaking to        
separate in the ,biblical six days' work
 substance and form from one another2 it
 was and is still an unpsychological    
violence to suppose in the human author 
of the narrative all possible knowledge 
of psychical and scientific secrets1 and
 to lift him above the child-like views 
of his time concerning the things of    
this world4 ,but it was by far the most 
fruitless undertaking to construct in   
detail from his words a picture of the  
real #cjh circumstances of the creation 
and development of the world4 ,attempts 
of this kind have been often made2 but  
they have produced nothing but dreams4  
,and certainly the attempt to control   
and correct natural investigation by    
means of such dreams would be like      
trying to correct well-established facts

 of history by the prophecies of a still
 earlier period1 or even to prove them  
false4 ,but from the time when natural  
science1 as it is at present1 began to  
pay attention to the prehistoric history
 of the earth and even of the universe1 
such a comparison has been possible4    
,it tells us1 it is true1 that the      
,biblical days' works did not follow    
each other in the course of earthly and 
cosmic developments in such a way1 that 
the one began where the other ceased1   
but that they passed on in the long     
lines of their course1 beside one       
another1 and above one another4 ,but    
looking upon their meridian altitudes1  
they nevertheless1 where we are able to 
undertake certain geological            
comparisons1 follow one another exactly 
in the same order in which the days     
follow one another in that ,biblical    
record4 ,the meridian altitude of the   
third day 7for here the certainty of    
geological knowledge first begins for   
us7 has to be looked for where the      

continents are formed and the vegetable 
life preponderates on earth3 and that is
 the carboniferous period4 ,the meridian
 altitude of the fourth day must have   
been reached where for the first time   
the covering of vapor and clouds of the 
earthly atmosphere permanently parted1  
and sun1 moon1 and stars became visible3
 and geology finds this time in the     
period which lies between the           
carboniferous period and the trias--in  
the ,permian period1 as it is called in 
,england1 in the dyas of the #cji       
fossiliferous and of cupriferous slate  
and ,zechstein1 as we call it in        
,germany4 ,the meridian altitude of the 
fifth day has to be looked for where    
ocean-life1 with its sauria and         
innumerable animals1 gave its impress to
 organic life on earth1 and the air was 
filled with inhabitants3 geology calls  
such a time the secondary period of     
trias1 ,iura1 and chalk4 ,that          
ocean-life preponderated in this period1
 is beyond any doubt2 while in general  

geology gives us more meagre information
 about the inhabitants of the air than  
of the animals of the ocean and land4   
,the flying sauria of ,iura are still   
characteristic enough to leave at least 
the possibility that the winged world1  
which in value still stands below the   
mammalia1 assisted in giving to that    
secondary period its proper type4       
,finally1 the meridian altitude of the  
sixth day cannot be anywhere else than  
where the animals of the land became the
 most characteristic inhabitants of the 
globe1 and where man appeared3 and that 
is the tertiary period of geology1 in   
which mammalia appeared in great numbers
 and variety1 and at the end of which we
 find the first traces of the appearance
 of man4  ,we nevertheless do not assign
 special weight to the establishment of 
such a correspondence4 ,the religious   
value of the idea of a divine week of   
creation is rendered perfectly certain  
to us1 if we only find that it is       
reconcilable with a pure idea of ,god4  

,that would not be the case1 if we had  
to look upon the week of creation as an 
earthly week2 but it is perfectly so1 if
 the divine week stretches over the     
whole temporality of the course of the  
world4 ,therewith we can be satisfied4  
,for we have neither theological nor    
philosophical nor #caj scientific       
evidences enough to draw from these     
,biblical utterances any metaphysical   
conclusions in reference to the         
relations of ,god to the temporal       
development of the world4 ,we should not
 dare to contest directly such          
metaphysical relations3 for the human   
week1 with its day of rest1 is such an  
eminently fortunate and blissful        
invitation1 the observance of this      
command is accompanied by such a        
striking prosperity in all              
life-relations of a people1 its         
non-observance by such an evident curse1
 and1 moreover1 the idea of man bearing 
the image of ,god is such a fruitful    
idea1 satisfying equally spirit and     

mind1 that we have to remember the      
possibility that the institution of the 
human week1 with its day of rest1 is    
certainly founded on the real relations 
of the life-process of that creature    
which bears the image of ,god to the    
activity of its divine prototype upon   
the earth4 ,but nevertheless1 we just as
 little dare to attempt or to challenge 
the establishment of such metaphysical  
relations3 for a theosophistic treatment
 of numbers seems to us no fruitful     
field for the promotion of              
religion--neither for the promotion of  
religious knowledge nor for that of     
religious life4  ,still1 however1 the   
result of our comparison between        
,biblical and scientific interpretation 
seems to us worth mentioning for a      
special reason4 ,it is true1 we have    
found a succession of the meridian      
altitudes of the ,biblical days in the  
same order in which1 according to the   
,biblical relation1 the days' works     
followed one another2 but we have found 

in the total course of the ,biblical    
days that their works in reality passed 
on in long lines contemporaneously with 
one another4 ,now1 since that first part
 of our result--the succession of       
meridian #caa altitudes--is the least we
 have to expect1 if the counting of the 
days shall at all have an objectively   
real ground in the world's process1 on  
the other hand1 the second part of our  
result--the far-reaching contemporary   
existence of the different ,biblical    
days--has an exact analogy with those   
prophecies whose partial or entire      
fulfilment permits us a more certain    
judgment of the character of prophecy   
and a more certain comparison between   
prophecy and fulfilment4 ,even the      
prophetic world knows of a divine day1  
which in the prophecies occupies an     
eminent and central position3 it is the 
day of the ,lord as the day of judgment 
and salvation4 ,this day of the ,lord   
also stands before the eye of the       
prophet1 certainly not as a common      

earthly day of twenty-four hours1 but as
 a day of ,god rising above earthly days
 and embracing an infinite number of    
them1 although it also has its very     
distinct meaning which comes into the   
earthly temporality4 ,but in the        
historic fulfilment1 there happen along 
with it a thousand things which do not  
belong to it2 for two-thirds of mankind 
that day did not dawn at all2 and as to 
its temporal course1 it had its dawn in 
the beginnings of mankind1--its sunrise 
took place eighteen hundred years ago1  
and its meridian altitude is still      
impending4  ,finally1 that even the     
piety of those who composed the         
,biblical records1 and of all those who 
see in them the manifested evidences of 
their faith1 assigns no religious weight
 to the succession of the days' works1  
becomes clear from the before-mentioned 
fact1 that the second account of        
creation1 which makes man and his       
ethical primitive history its centre1   
relates the creation of the inhabitants 

of the earth in quite a different order 
from #cab the first one4 ,we shall treat
 of this point again1 and more in       
detail1 for another reason1 in the      
following section4  ,we still have to   
treat of the question as to what        
position the ,holy ,scripture and       
,biblical ,christianity take regarding a
 development in general3 and here also  
we have only to say that they are very  
favorable to such an idea4 ,the works of
 the six days themselves are in their   
succession nothing else but a           
development1 a permanent differentiation
 of that which was not separated before1
 a continuous unfolding of the more     
simple into the more complex1 an always 
progressing preparation of the globe for
 newer and higher forms of existence1   
until finally man appeared4 ,in the     
,biblical account of creation1 the idea 
which forms the basis of every evolution
 theory1 7namely1 that the new which    
appears has its conditions and          
suppositions1 its creative secondary    

reasons1 in the preceding71 is          
pronounced with special clearness4 ,when
 it says3 ,let the ,earth bring forth   
grass and herb1444 and the earth brought
 forth1 etc42 ,and ,god said3 ,let the  
waters bring forth abundantly the moving
 creature that hath life1 etc42 ,let the
 earth bring forth the living creature2 
and it was so2 and ,god made the beast  
of the earth1--the creative causality   
also is mentioned in the clearest words 
by the side of and under the causality  
of the ,creator1 by means of which the  
latter had made creatures4 ,the friendly
 relation between the ,biblical account 
and the evolution theory even goes so   
far that the ,holy ,scripture1 like that
 theory1 does not permit animals to come
 forth from plants1 although the latter 
represent the lower1 the former the     
higher1 and that1 plants are a #cac     
necessary condition for animals1 but    
that even according to the ,bible both  
kingdoms come forth from the inorganic  
of the earth4 ,when treating of the     

creation of plants1 it says1 ,let the   
earth bring forth grass1 etc42 and when 
treating of that of animals1 it says1   
,let the earth bring forth the living   
creature4 ,at last1 if science should   
once succeed in perceiving more clearly 
than now the origin of the organic from 
the inorganic1 it would have in those   
words the means for a harmony with the  
,biblical conception4  ,now1 just as    
evidently as the ,holy ,scripture is    
favorable1 in general and as a whole1 to
 the idea of evolution1 so certainly it 
seems to reject it precisely at that    
point where the whole interest of our   
question lies2 namely1 in reference to  
the origin of the single species4 ,for  
here1 when treating of the creation of  
plants as well us of animals1 it is said
 in most distinct words3 after his kind4
 ,but the contradiction is only         
apparent4 ,as to the way and manner in  
which ,god created every species1       
whether he used secondary causes or not1
 nothing else is said than that ,god    

created every species1 that the         
creatures exist in distinctly marked    
species1 and that these species are not 
chance1 but lie in the plan of          
,god--that they are his work4 ,this     
fact1 that it was ,god who wished to    
create each species as species1 and in  
reality created it1 is just as firmly   
established1 if the species came forth  
from one another and were developed in  
gradual transitions1 as if they received
 their existence in some other way4 ,as1
 in the fifth day's work1 we find simply
 the words3 ,and ,god said1 ,let the    
earth bring forth the living creature3  
and it was so2 and ,god made the beast  
of the earth1--in precisely the same way
 #cad ,god could indeed create single   
plants and animals after their kind1 in 
such a way that one should come forth   
from another1 that they should be       
developed from one another4   #b4 ,the  
,creation of ,man4  ,the most important 
facts which we have to mention1 as      
bearing upon the position of the        

,christian doctrine of the creation of  
man in reference to the evolution       
theory1 have been treated of in ,chapter
 ,i1 ,a4 ,we have especially convinced  
ourselves of the fact1 that the new1    
even if it has its secondary causes1 and
 comes into existence in gradual        
development1 is no less a creation of   
,god1 and has no less the full value of 
the new1 than if it were created        
instantaneously4 ,likewise man also     
stands before us untouched in the full  
newness and dignity of his being1 in the
 full qualitative and not simply        
quantitative superiority of the highest 
gifts of his mind1 and especially of his
 personality1 his ego1 his liberty1--in 
one word1 in his full image of          
,god1--whether we have to look upon him 
as created in gradual development or as 
created suddenly4  ,there are two       
circumstances in the ,biblical account  
from which we see that1 although it is  
naturally silent as to the descent      
problem1 it not only knows and          

acknowledges the connection of man with 
the lower creatures of the earth1 but   
also expressly directs attention to it4 
,one of these circumstances is          
connecting man's creation with that of  
land-animals1 in a single day's work4   
,we do not lay more stress on this union
 than that of the ,holy ,scripture1     
although it emphasizes so strongly the  
dignity of man in his likeness to ,god  
and in his having entire #cae supremacy 
over the whole earth1 and although it   
could have found therein reasons enough 
for assigning a proper day to the       
creation of man1 to which the whole     
preceding creation pointed1 and whom the
 whole creation on earth should serve1  
yet in its account of the creation it   
evidently desires man to be looked upon 
in his connection as a creature with the
 animal world4 ,moreover1 we should not 
overlook1 in the ,biblical account1 that
 the benediction which ,god gives to the
 animals of the water and the air1 at   
the end of the fifth day1 is in the     

sixth day not pronounced over the       
land-animals--although they certainly   
are as much entitled to it as fish and  
birds--but over man4 ,of course1 it is  
presupposed that the land-animals       
naturally partake of the benediction of 
man1 so far as it can be due to them2   
the benediction1 namely1 of fertility   
and of increase4 ,according to these    
indications and to the ,biblical        
conception1 man stands in still another 
and closer connection with the animal   
world than in that of mere supremacy    
over it4  ,the second circumstance to   
which we have to call attention1 is the 
declaration 7,genesis ,,ii1 #g71 that   
,god created man out of earth2 or       
rather1 as the literal translation says3
 ,and the ,lord ,god formed man 7of7    
dust of the ground4 ,it is of no        
importance whether the accusative dust  
of the ground is1 as some say1 a mere   
appositive1 or1 as others explain it1   
the accusative of matter4 ,when the     
account calls man dust of the ground1 or

 a being formed of dust1 the difference 
is infinitely insignificant1 whether the
 earthly matter out of which ,god formed
 man who is dust of the earth1 was an   
animal organism or not2 whether man was 
formed #caf directly or indirectly out  
of the earth1 and whether the forming   
demanded a longer or a shorter time4    
,for that it did demand time1 and that  
it was not an instantaneous creation1 is
 implied in the expression to form4  ,we
 call attention to this passage for     
still another reason4 ,the second       
account of creation1 as it begins       
,genesis ,,ii1 #d1 and goes on to the   
end of the third chapter1 is strikingly 
different from the first account1       
,genesis ,i-,genesis ,,ii1 #d4 ,it has  
its origin in that author whose book is 
called that of the ,jehovist1 or1 more  
lately1 the judaico-prophetic book2 and 
who1 among all those that have          
contributed stones to the building of   
the ,pentateuch1 gives the deepest      
insight into the nature of sin and      

grace1 and into the divine plan of      
salvation4 ,now in this book1 from the  
religious point of view so extremely    
worthy of attention1 the account of the 
creation is given quite differently4    
,man is the centre of the account2 that 
which does not directly refer to him is 
entirely omitted4 ,the order in which   
the inhabitants of the earth were       
created1 is not only not divided into   
the six day's works of the first        
account1 and in verse #d is not only    
directly taken as the work of a single  
day1 in the expression ,hebrew3 ,,baywom
 7in the day1 in which  when71 without  
especial stress being put upon the      
expression one day1 for ,hebrew3        
,,baywom has become a particle2 but this
 order is entirely different from the   
other4 ,in the second account1 the      
succession is the following3 first1 man2
 then1 the paradise into which man is   
placed2 next1 the trees 7the question at
 what time the rest of the vegetable    
world was created is left entirely      

without answer72 then1 the determination
 to create also an assistant to man2    
next1 the creation of animals2 finally1 
the creation of the woman out #cag of a 
rib of man4 ,now1 although it is wholly 
beyond doubt that the two accounts had  
different authors1 the question will    
nevertheless arise1 how it was possible 
that those who inserted these two       
accounts in the ,holy ,scripture1 one   
after the other1 could so harmlessly put
 side by side and read one after the    
other these two accounts1 so entirely   
contradictory1 without being obliged to 
think that the truth of the one would   
refute the other4 ,they certainly must  
have had in some way the conviction that
 the one account was consistent with the
 other4 ,but such an agreement between  
the two accounts is only possible when  
we either see in them only ideal truths1
 or when one of the two shall represent 
the actual reality of the circumstances 
of creation1 and the other rather their 
ideal character4 ,in case we should have

 to make such a distinction1 it cannot  
be doubtful which of the two accounts   
has more of the real1 and which more of 
the ideal character4 ,in the first      
account nothing is related which does   
not give direct points of connection in 
the real process1 as we can imagine it4 
,in the second account1 we find many    
points which hardly permit a direct     
literal conception1 even on the part of 
the first readers of the account and of 
the editors of the canon of the ,old    
,testament3 for instance1 besides the   
different order in which the first      
account is given1 the creation of the   
woman out of the rib of man3 this       
account1 when ideally taken1 is so      
inexpressibly comprehensive1 pregnant1  
and deep--when taken really1 so         
perfectly improbable4 ,it will be       
likewise difficult to believe that even 
the old readers of the account--at least
 those of them who looked deeper and    
were more enlightened--took with extreme
 #cah literalness the expression1 that  

,god breathed into the nostrils of man  
who is dust of the ground1 the breath of
 life4 ,the third chapter has still     
other features from which we have at    
least to assume that the author did not 
at all intend to give importance to an  
extremely literal conception of it4     
,now1 if the second account is the more 
ideal one1 the meaning of it is3 that   
man1 his being1 his aim1 his primitive  
history1 is made the centre of the      
entire description1 and around him all  
the rest is grouped2 while in the first 
account he appears to be more the end of
 the whole creation--as he presents     
himself to natural investigation in the 
real process of creation1 as the last   
member in the chain1 not as the centre  
in a circle or a star4 ,now if that is  
the case1 if the second account of      
creation1 having man as its centre1 is  
the more ideal1 then we certainly must  
not overlook the fact that in the ideal 
account man is called dust of the       
ground4 ,then the nature of dust also   

belongs1 from the ideal point of view1  
so necessarily to the nature of man that
 the question1 whether the connection of
 this man who is dust of the ground1    
with this ground1 is brought about      
through the form of a preceding animal  
organism1 or not1 is no longer of       
importance4 ,therefore1 if we oppose the
 animal ancestry of man for the general 
reasons that we do not wish to descend  
from something lower1 that lower        
nevertheless is present as dust of the  
ground4 ,and if we oppose such a        
pedigree on account of the ugliness and 
wickedness which exist in the animal    
world1 we have to point to the fact     
that1 on the one hand1 mankind also has 
stains which are uglier than those which
 disfigure the wildest beast of prey1   
and that1 on the other hand1 the animal 
world shows features which #cai are so  
noble that no man need be ashamed of    
them4 ,it is certainly a right feeling  
to which ,darwin1 in his ,descent of    
,man1 gives expression1 when he says3   

,for my own part1 ,i would as soon be   
descended from that heroic little monkey
 who braved his dreaded enemy in order  
to save the life of his keeper1 or from 
that old baboon who1 descending from the
 mountains1 carried away in triumph his 
young comrade from a crowd of astonished
 dogs1 as from a savage who delights to 
torture his enemies1 offers up bloody   
sacrifices1 practices infanticide       
without remorse1 treats his wives like  
slaves1 knows no decency1 and is haunted
 by the grossest superstitions4 ,we have
 but to add3--if only the coming forth  
from the creative hand of ,god1 the     
creation in his own image1 the communion
 with ,him and being a child of ,his1   
are preserved4 ,and that all this can be
 preserved1 even when adopting descent  
and evolution1 we have seen from        
repeated considerations4  ,but we have  
to draw still another conclusion from   
the difference between the two accounts 
of creation4 ,if the succession1 in     
which the inhabitants of the earth      

appear in the first account1 is so      
entirely different from that in the     
second1 as it evidently is1 we have     
necessarily either to give up the       
historical reality of the one or of the 
other account1 or of both1 or to suppose
 that the creation of the inhabitants of
 the earth took place in a way and      
manner which makes it possible to       
perceive a real connection of the       
succession in the first account1 as well
 as in that of the second1 with the real
 processes of creation4 ,now we do not  
at all intend to argue with those who   
choose the first part of the dilemma2 we
 ourselves join with them1 and believe  
that salvation does #cbj not depend upon
 the objective reality of that          
succession1 nor the possession of       
salvation on the faith of such reality4 
,but we leave to the consideration of   
those who1 in their religious           
convictions1 think themselves bound to  
the objective reality of both accounts1 
the following thoughts3 ,if not only    

ideal depth1 but also a connection with 
the empirical and historical reality of 
the process of creation1 is to be       
assigned to the succession of the first 
account as well as to that of the       
second1 it is only possible by assuming 
a descent--namely1 that man1 e4g41 may  
be called in one sense the first of     
creatures1 inasmuch as with the first   
organism that was already given which   
was afterwards developed into man1 and  
inasmuch as all which was otherwise     
created and developed as aspecial       
species1 was only present on account of 
that aim2 and that man in another1 in   
the merely empirico-historical sense1 is
 still also the last of creatures4      
,thus1 then1 the advocates of descent   
would find themselves in the            
unaccustomed position1 equally          
surprising to friend and foe1 of being  
in a much more friendly relation to the 
,biblical belief in revealed religion   
than their opponents4 ,we should see the
 apparent discords not only between     

,scripture and nature1 but also between 
account and account1 dissolved into     
harmony1 and above the double relation  
of the two accounts we should see the   
morphological ideas of ,oken and ,gthe1 
the ideas of types of ,cuvier1 ,agassiz1
 and ,owen1 the laws of development of  
,k4 ,e4 von ,baer1 and finally the ideas
 of descent of ,lamarck and ,darwin1    
reach a friendly hand to one another4   
,and even the old joys of a teleological
 view of nature1 adorned indeed with    
queue and wig1 but at present rejected  
with too much disdain1 even if they #cba
 are called ichthyo-teleological and    
insecto-teleological1 would attain in   
this reconciliation their modest1       
subordinate place4 ,moreover1 we should 
then have the satisfaction of seeing    
again that a religiousness which in its 
own realm gives absolutely free play to 
natural investigation1 and does not find
 it beneath its dignity to learn from   
natural science1 can on that account    
retain its own autonomy in its own realm

 much more uncontestedly2 and that1 as  
it seems to us in the present case1 it  
can go much farther in the use which it 
makes of its autonomy and in the        
extension of the revealed character of  
its religious records to physical       
processes and circumstances1 than is    
either necessary or safe1 and that it   
nevertheless is rewarded for keeping    
peace with natural science by more rich1
 more living1 and more correct glimpses 
into the harmony between the word of    
,god and the work of ,god1 than would be
 the case with a religiousness which1   
without regard to natural science1      
weaves its cosmogonies from the ,holy   
,scripture alone4   #c4 ,the ,primitive 
,condition of ,man3 ,paradise1 the ,fall
 of ,man1 and ,primitive ,history4      
,after the ,holy ,scripture has narrated
 the creation of man in two accounts1   
the second of them gives us a           
continuation in the well-known account  
of ,paradise and of the fall of man1    
with its consequences2 and the further  

development1 of the ,biblical doctrine1 
as well as of ,christian theology1 has  
also taken the substance and            
quintessence of these narratives into   
its representation of the ,christian    
truths of salvation4  ,we shall not     
throw any obstacles in the way of       
bringing about an understanding between 
the ,darwinian views #cbb and the       
,biblical primitive history1 by         
acknowledging the justice of the view   
that ,christian piety might in some way 
contain in itself the demand that also  
the form in which the facts of truth in 
,genesis ,,iii are given to us1 has     
historical reality4 ,he who makes this  
demand has only his own                 
short-sightedness and imprudence to     
blame1 if he also loses the substance   
with the form1 the figurative nature of 
which can be shown to him only too      
certainly4 ,we acknowledge it as a real 
providence of ,god1 which intends       
faithfully to guard believing man       
against a senseless and slavish         

adherence to the letter1 and against    
grounding his means of salvation upon   
insecure foundations1 that at the grand 
and venerable portal of ,holy ,scripture
 two accounts stand peacefully beside   
one another1 which1 if we penetrate     
through the form into their substance1  
complete one another in magnificent and 
profound harmony1 but which1 if we look 
upon the form as their substance1 so    
diametrically contradict each other that
 we cannot do anything else but reject  
the one or the other1 or1 still more    
logically1 both4 ,we think that this    
hint is strong enough to be understood1 
and bears1 like all bowing before truth 
and its power of conviction1 rich fruit 
not only for our knowledge1 but also for
 the purity1 certainty1 and richness of 
our religiousness4 ,we shall not lose by
 this acknowledgment the character of   
revelation and the impression of the    
truth of these ,biblical records1 but   
shall be able through them1 and through 
them alone1 to gain and perceive it4 ,it

 is true1 the first account1 and still  
more the second--the account of the     
creation and of the primitive history of
 man--has in its external form an       
exceedingly close relationship to the   
poetical myths of the ancient nations of
 the ,orient2 but #cbc its difference   
does not consist essentially in the     
form--although this too1 being the form 
of a true and correct substance1 shows  
differences enough from these heathen   
myths--but consists in the substance    
itself4 ,these heathen myths certainly  
contain many beautiful1 deep1 and true  
factors1 but always1 besides1           
fundamental ideas which we have to      
reject as half-true or wholly erroneous3
 sometimes a dualistic conception of    
,god and the world1 sometimes a         
materialization of the divine1 the      
spiritual1 and the ethical1 sometimes   
fatalistic and sometimes magic elements 
in great number4 ,these ,biblical       
representations1 on the other hand1     
certainly appear to us still in a       

picturesque form which is analogous to  
that formation of myth2 for it really   
seems to be the only form in which the  
mind of man1 in his first epoch of life1
 was able to perceive and represent     
supernatural and ethical truth1 as we   
are to-day able to represent the highest
 relations of our mind to the           
supernatural and the ethical only in    
pictures and parables2 but the ,biblical
 representations offer us1 under this   
plastic covering1 a substance which1 in 
view of the most extensive criticism1 of
 the deepest speculation1 and of the    
most enlightened and practically most   
successful piety1 is still established  
as the purest1 the most correct1 and the
 most fruitful representation of the    
nature of ,god1 and of the ethical      
nature and the ethical history of man4  
,moreover1 we shall not make it         
difficult to bring about an             
understanding between the ,darwinian    
theories and the ,biblical doctrine1 by 
supporting the other view taught by the 

,holy ,scripture--that death came into  
the animal world first through the fall 
of man1 and that the fall of man first  
brought the character of perishableness 
#cbd into the condition of the earth or 
even of the universe4 ,there are        
essentially three ,biblical passages to 
which those refer who think that they   
find such a view in the ,holy           
,scripture2 namely1 ,romans ,v1 #ab2    
,romans ,,viii1 #ai-bc1 and ,genesis    
,,iii2 but they are wrong4 ,that the    
,apostle ,paul1 in ,romans ,v1 #ab1 by  
the world1 into which death came through
 sin1 did not mean the universe or the  
globe1 but mankind1 is plain enough from
 the connection1 and is only demanded by
 the difference of meaning which in the 
,greek1 as well as in the ,german       
language1 the word world has according  
to its connection4 ,and in ,romans      
,,viii1 #ai-bc1 where he speaks of the  
subjection of the creature to vanity1 he
 does not mention a certain time in     
which it happened1 nor an historical    

occasion1 as the fall of man1 which     
should have given the impulse to this   
subjection2 but he only says1 in        
general1 that it was ,god who hath      
subjected the creature to vanity1 and   
that he hath subjected the same in hope4
 ,he who reads this passage without     
prepossession1 can be led to no other   
idea than to this3 that ,god has        
subjected the creature to the law of    
vanity from the very beginning of       
creation--not forever1 but from the very
 beginning--with the intention that he  
shall also celebrate his transfiguration
 and deliverance from the yoke of       
perishableness1 together with the       
perfection of mankind1 and with the     
manifestation and transfiguration of the
 children of ,god4 ,and even the curse  
of the ground 7,genesis ,,iii1 #ag7 is  
no cursing of the universe1 or of the   
globe and its creatures1 but only a     
cursing of the ground2 and of this not  
on its own account1 but only in its     
relation1 as a means of subsistence1 to 

man1 and in opposition to the #cbe      
exemption from labor which his life     
hitherto had1 and to the agreeableness  
of his means of support in paradise4    
,after having thus rejected these two   
perversions of the ,biblical doctrine1  
there remains to us as an established   
substance of the latter1 and as an      
essential part of ,christian dogmatics1 
so far as it may come into contact with 
the ,darwinian views1 at least the      
following3 ,man was originally created  
by ,god1 good and happy4 ,to his        
goodness there also belonged the        
possibility of having a sinless         
development1 as he ought to have had2   
and to his happiness there also belonged
 a life amid surroundings wholly        
corresponding to him1 and the           
possibility of obtaining exemption from 
death and all evils by way of a         
self-controlling submission to ,god1    
which resists temptation4 ,we purposely 
express ourselves thus4 ,for the        
,biblical primitive history does not say

 that man was created with exemption    
from the law of death1 but that the     
latter must have been granted to him as 
a reward for his submission3 the tree of
 life stood by the side of the tree of  
the knowledge of good and evil1 and only
 the eating of the fruit of the tree of 
life1 by avoiding the eating of the     
forbidden fruit1 should have given to   
man that immortality which he forfeited 
by disobedience4 ,man became            
disobedient1 and1 in consequence of it1 
subject to death2 the harmony between   
man and his surroundings disappeared2   
the earth became to him a place of labor
 and of death2 and now began for man his
 historical development as a web of     
guilt1 of punishment1 and of education  
and redeeming mercy4  ,now1 in the      
presence of this ,biblical view1 the    
question comes up first of all3 is a    
view according to which man should have 
been able and obliged to take a sinless 
#cbf development1 and1 in case he had   
taken it1 should have been exempt from  

the fate of death and of the ills       
preceding it1 and endowed with          
immortality as to body and soul--is such
 a view in any way reconcilable with the
 ,darwinian ideas of development1       
according to which man came forth from  
the series of lower organisms1 subject  
to death8  ,we could avoid answering    
this question by a deduction similar to 
that which we drew in ,chap4 ,i1  #c1   
when treating of the question of the    
reconcilableness of the idea of         
evolution with theism1 but of which we  
likewise made no use4 ,we could show    
that in this question no other          
difficulties present themselves to the  
religious consciousness1 than such as   
existed long before the appearance of   
the ,darwinian theories and were        
overcome by pious consciousness and     
religious reasoning4 ,for a difficulty  
entirely similar to that which here     
appears to us1 when looking upon the    
whole human species and its origin1     
stood before us heretofore1 when looking

 upon the human individual and his      
origin4 ,from the standpoint of         
,biblical ,christianity1 we ascribe to  
the human individual an immortality of  
the soul and a coming resurrection of   
the body2 but we do not to the human    
embryo at the beginning of its          
development in the womb4 ,now we know   
that the development of man from that   
embryo to perfect man is wholly gradual2
 that we cannot observe and predicate of
 any organ1 of any quality1 of any      
activity of body1 soul1 or mind1 exactly
 the moment when it comes into          
existence2 and that therefore we cannot 
give the moment when we could assume    
that something so decidedly great and   
new as the immortality of the soul and  
the prospect of a #cbg resurrection of  
the body1 begins for the human          
individual4 ,although we know all this1 
nevertheless in all discussions of the  
question whether we have to hope for an 
immortality of the soul and a           
resurrection of the body1 the gradual   

development has hardly ever been1 so far
 as we know1 a weight--in any case1     
never the decisive weight--in the       
balance against the supposition of an   
immortality4 ,if we can look upon the   
idea of an immortality of the soul and  
of a resurrection of the body as        
reconcilable with the fact1 that the    
human individual was only developed     
gradually out of something which was    
still soulless and perishable1 we also  
have to look upon the other fact as     
reconcilable with the gradual           
development of the whole species2       
namely1 that man1 if he should have     
developed himself without sin1 would    
have reached an immortality of body and 
soul4 ,but we shall not enter this path 
which would lead us around the whole    
question4 ,for the objection might be   
made1 that the scientific and           
philosophic impossibility of assuming an
 eternal duration of an individual that 
originated in time1 has1 indeed1 always 
been pointed out1 and only the          

assertion1 not the proof1 of the        
contrary has been opposed to it2 but    
that ,darwinism puts this impossibility 
into new and full light4 ,therefore1 if 
we wish to reach a certain basis for our
 conviction1 nothing else remains to us 
but to enter upon that question wholly  
and exclusively from ,darwinian         
premises4  ,now these premises1 indeed1 
indicate to us a development of things1 
but a development of such a kind that   
there appears to us something new1 and  
always new in a rising line4 ,the rising
 of this line of development consists in
 the fact that the spiritual comes forth
 from the #cbh natural in permanent     
progress and in always higher           
development3 that mind vanquishes       
matter4 ,the first new thing which meets
 us in the development of the globe1 is 
the organic and life2 the second1       
sensation and consciousness2 the third1 
self-consciousness and free-will4 ,now  
let us once suppose imaginary human     
spectators of every first appearance of 

these phenomena4 ,would he who thus far 
had only known inorganic phenomena and  
processes1 have dared1 before the       
appearance of life1 to utter the        
proposition3 matter can also become     
living and live8 ,and who would have    
dared to suggest the further doctrine3  
matter can also feel and get a          
consciousness of things8 ,finally1 who  
would have dared even to say3 matter can
 also become a self-conscious and free  
personality8 ,to every person who would 
have pronounced such dreams of the      
future1 there would have been opposed1  
apparently with full right1 the         
inviolable mechanism of the inorganic   
world4 ,but all this nevertheless took  
place4 ,if something material can be led
 so far that a personality lives in it1 
that1 with the assistance of this       
material basis1 is able to perceive the 
ideas and the eternal1 that can act in  
accordance with aims and designs and can
 set itself the highest aims1 and that  
may even enter upon a loving and        

child-like relation to the highest      
primitive cause of all things1 then we  
are no longer permitted to say that the 
material1 of which the body of such a   
personality consists1 could not have    
been subjected to the service of such a 
personality so far1 that the latter     
could have vanquished the elements of   
the destruction of life in an eternal   
process of spontaneous renewal4  ,it is 
true1 with such a concession alone we   
have not #cbi gained anything directly4 
,for in abstracto everything is finally 
conceivable which does not contradict   
the logical laws of reasoning--even the 
basilisk and the mountain of diamonds in
 stories and fairy tales4 ,but such an  
abstract conceivableness has not the    
least value for the knowledge of the    
real1 nor even for the knowledge of the 
really possible4 ,for in the world of   
being and becoming1 everything in its   
last elements1 forces1 qualities1 and   
laws1 as well as in the last causes of  
its development1 is something so        

absolutely given1 that only afterward   
are we able to analyze that which is    
present1 from our observations1 or to   
follow from the given factors that which
 can be1 or which under other conditions
 would have become different1 and that  
we are not able to synthetically        
construct the one or the other in       
advance1 independently from the factors 
of reality4 ,if1 therefore1 that        
concession shall attain a scientific    
value1 and if the conditional sentence3 
,man would not have been subject to     
death if he had not sinned1 is to become
 an admitted and unassailable part of   
,christian theology1 we have to look in 
the realm of phenomena1 and in the      
course of that which took place1 for    
facts which prove that man1 if he had   
not committed sin1 would not have died1 
and which thus change that merely       
abstract1 possibility into a real one4  
,now we have such a fact in the         
resurrection of the ,lord4 ,if it really
 took place1 then it is the last earthly

 stage in the course of the ,lord's work
 of ,redemption1 and then it permits us 
to draw conclusions backwards as to what
 would have become of man1 if he had not
 been in need of this redemption1 if he 
had had a sinless development instead of
 one with sin4 #ccj  ,we know very well 
that in mentioning this fact we meet not
 only the opposition of those who       
contest a teleological1 theistic1 and   
especially a ,christian view of the     
world1 but also the natural doubts of   
those who defend with warm interest     
teleology and the ethical fundamentals  
and productive forces of ,christianity1 
but who think it more advisable to pass 
over the whole question of the          
resurrection in cautious silence4 ,the  
main consideration which hinders them   
from believing in the reality of the    
resurrection of ,jesus ,christ1 is not  
the want of historical attestation1 but 
rather the absolute want of any attested
 analogy in the other events which have 
taken place on the earth4 ,what we      

commonly see and witness in the dead1 is
 without exception precisely the        
opposite of that which is related about 
the further fate of ,jesus crucified4   
,now we have repeatedly had occasion to 
point out that the want of analogy      
cannot at all be a proof of a fact's not
 having taken place1 supposing it       
otherwise well established4 ,especially 
if a development of events follows aims1
 it lies in the nature of this          
development that in its course in all   
the places where we really and actually 
can speak of a development1 of a        
process1 things appear and must appear  
which were not present before1 and      
which1 even if they once appeared1      
nevertheless need not necessarily be    
repeated1 except at certain times which 
correspond to the plan of development2  
namely1 when their time has come4 ,all  
these are events which are wanting in   
analogy1 but which cannot be doubted at 
all on that account4 ,that was the case 
with the first appearance of organic    

life1 also with the first appearance of 
beings having sensation and             
consciousness2 moreover1 it was the case
 with the first appearance of each of   
the thousands #cca of species of organic
 beings3 all these things1 at the time  
when they first appeared1 lacked every  
analogy in the past1 and were perhaps   
repeated for some time1 in primitive    
generations1 perhaps not2 at any rate1  
they have all ceased to have analogies  
within the memory of man4 ,in an eminent
 degree does the first appearance of man
 want every analogy with what we observe
 elsewhere4 ,we never see men appear on 
the stage of the earth1 who were not    
originated by men2 yet this event1 so   
contrary to all analogy1 did once take  
place1 and stands without parallel and  
analogy in the midst of the series of   
events1 so far as our knowledge can     
reach4  ,thus the resurrection of the   
,lord must also necessarily want        
analogy1 in case it is an event which   
really marks a station of progress in   

the development of earthly creatures and
 their history1 and in case also its    
nature and its importance tend not to   
bring mankind1 or at least those who    
believe in him who has been raised1 at  
once under the influence of its physical
 consequences1 but only so far to       
prepare the way for these consequences  
in intellectual and moral life-forces4  
,and precisely such an event is the     
resurrection of ,jesus1 according to the
 announcement of the ,lord as to himself
 and his work1 and according to the     
development of this personal testimony  
in the minds of his first disciples1 and
 also according to what ,jesus actually 
became for mankind1 and especially for  
,christianity4 ,according to this       
testimony of ,jesus and his apostles1   
and to this actual experience1 ,jesus is
 the ,redeemer1 whose work is to make   
amends for the destruction caused by    
sin1 and thus to originate and establish
 a new creation in mankind which1 from  
inner1 mental1 and spiritual beginnings1

 #ccb renews mankind1 and becomes the   
leaven which1 in long periods of labor1 
leads it to the goal of perfection2 a   
perfection in which the whole creation  
shall participate--with which1 indeed1  
mankind is inseparably connected on the 
whole natural side of its existence4    
,but then it also lies in the nature of 
the resurrection of ,jesus to be single 
in its kind1 and without analogy1 until 
that time shall have come in the        
development of mankind when the last    
enemy1 death1 shall be forever removed  
and overcome4  ,we quite fail to        
conceive how those who acknowledge      
design in the world1 can avoid the      
acknowledgment of the resurrection of   
,jesus--supposing the fact to be        
historically established3 whereof we    
shall have to speak hereafter4 ,it is1  
indeed1 quite impossible to speak of a  
goal of mankind1 if                     
annihilation--annihilation of single    
personalities as well as of mankind as a
 whole--is its certain destiny4 ,where  

and what is this end of mankind1 if the 
last generation of the globe is to      
perish with the destruction of this     
globe1 or languish and die even before  
that destruction1 and if nothing will be
 left of mankind beyond the soulless    
material for new formations in their    
putrifying corpses and desolate homes   
and works of art8 ,where and what is    
this goal1 if all which once set human  
minds and hearts in motion1 and which   
stimulated the intellectual and moral   
work of the human races1 simply ceases  
to exist1 no longer finds anywhere even 
a place of remembrance1 and nowhere has 
a fruit to exhibit1 except perhaps in   
the mind of a ,god who once set the     
cruel play in motion1 and now permits it
 to cease1 in order to procure for      
himself a change in the entertainment8  
,a mere immortality of human #ccc souls1
 without resurrection and without the   
perfection and transfiguration of the   
universe1 is not afforded us by this    
goal1 which we certainly need1 if we are

 to think at all of a goal for mankind4 
,for if all departing souls should be   
carried into another world whose only   
relation to the further course of the   
earthly history of mankind was in the   
fact1 that the dead are always gathered 
in it2 into another world whose only    
relation to the past of the earthly     
history of mankind should be in the     
fact1 that it is divided into a heaven  
and a hell for those who reach it2 if in
 this world everything should move on1  
without end1 in eternal coming and      
going2 and if nothing could be said of  
that other world than that everything   
there is different from ours--even that 
we should there have no possible points 
of contact with this world3 then we     
should have nothing else but a gloomy   
dualism of the world for which neither  
our intellectual1 nor our psychical1 and
 least of all our physical1 organization
 is in any way prepared1 we should have 
in it no satisfaction of our noblest    
instincts1 no goal to which we would be 

led by any of the guides who show us the
 paths which we have to follow on earth4
 ,only a resurrection and               
transfiguration of the earth and the    
universe1 as well as of a glorified     
mankind1 show us such a goal4 ,for this 
aim1 for such a real continuation of    
life of the single personality1 and of  
all mankind1 after the long work of     
moral and intellectual development1 all 
noble and worthy instincts of mankind   
are prepared--from the instinct of      
self-preservation up to the instinct of 
self-sacrifice for ideal purposes and   
the instinct of moral perfection and    
community with ,god4 ,we find that in   
all the rest of creation1 instincts and 
inherent powers #ccd are present to be  
satisfied4 ,the naturalistic tendencies 
which at present control so many minds1 
are very much inclined to found their   
whole view of the world upon this       
correlation of instinct1 function1 and  
satisfaction4 ,should1 then1 the highest
 instincts of the highest creature on   

earth alone make an exception8 ,have    
they originated from illusions1 and do  
they lead to illusions8 ,we cannot      
refrain from quoting a word which ,alb4 
,rville1 of ,rotterdam1 has written in  
the first part of the ,october issue of 
the ,revue des ,deux ,mondes1 #ahgd1 on 
the occasion of a criticism of ,e4 v4   
,hartmann's ,philosophy of the          
,unconscious2 though it was written only
 in defence of theism in general4 ,we   
quote from a report of ,e4 ,p41 in the  
,augsburger ,allgem4 ,zeitung1 ,oct4    
#bg1 #ahgd1 which is all at present at  
our command3 ,when the young bird1      
fluttering its wings on the edge of its 
mother's nest1 launches forth for the   
first time1 it finds the air which      
carries it1 while a passage is opened   
for it4 ,instinct deceived the bird just
 as little as it deceives the multitude 
of large and small beings which only    
live in following its incitations4 ,and 
should man alone1 whom spiritual        
perfection attracts--man whose          

characteristic instinct it is to raise  
himself mentally toward the real-ideal1 
the superiority of which he cannot      
sufficiently describe1 should man1 who  
obeys his nature1 dash his head against 
the wall built of unhewn stones of      
unconscious1 blind1 and deaf force8     
,nature1 indeed1 has too much           
spirit--according to ,hartmann          
himself--to indulge in such an          
absurdity2 and the philosophy of the    
'unconscious ,unconscious' will never   
permit it4 ,it is true1 there is        
actually present in mankind1 and in it  
alone1 such a discord between #cce      
instinct and satisfaction3 man has in   
himself instincts which are opposed to  
sin and death1 and nevertheless sin and 
death exist4 ,but the redemption through
 ,christ1 and especially the knowledge  
of his resurrection1 announces to us    
that this discord is removed4           
,therefore1 he who in general           
acknowledges that mankind in its        
development has had given to it goals   

which correspond to its gifts and       
instincts1 has every reason to look     
about and see whether1 in the course of 
human history1 certain things have      
happened which point at such            
aims--indications which prophetically   
assure mankind1 that it advances toward 
a spiritual and moral perfection1 and   
toward an undiminished participation of 
all members of mankind in this          
perfection4 ,such an assurance is       
offered us in the resurrection of       
,jesus2 and therefore1 all who have not 
abandoned a teleological view of the    
world1 have reason for examining it with
 reference to the degree of its         
historical truth4 ,this degree is the   
highest which we can in general claim of
 any historical event4  ,in order to    
show this with such brevity as is       
necessary in the present book1 and at   
the same time to guard ourselves against
 every danger of prejudice in the       
investigation1 we shall for this        
occasion assume hypothetically that all1

 even the most extreme1 assertions of   
,biblical criticism as to the           
authenticity and inauthenticity of the  
books of the ,new ,testament1 and as to 
the difference of their component parts 
and the time of their composition1 are  
correct and proven2 and see what then   
remains established4 ,in the first      
place1 it is an acknowledged fact1 that 
,peter first1 then the eleven apostles  
at different times1 and between these   
more than five hundred brethren 7i4e41  
nearly or fully all who had preserved   
their #ccf attachment to the ,lord till 
his death71 saw the appearances of the  
risen one1 a few days after his death2  
and1 indeed1 under the most different   
circumstances1 and under mental         
conditions in which they did not at all 
expect any such second appearance4 ,we  
have1 in regard to this1 the most       
authentic written evidence of the       
apostle ,paul1 in the fifteenth chapter 
of his first letter to the ,corinthians3
 a letter whose authenticity no         

criticism has dared to doubt4 ,this     
letter was written in the spring of #eh3
 and ,paul himself had already been     
changed from a persecutor into a        
believer in ,christ in the year         
#cf--;i4e41 one year after the death of 
,jesus1 which took place in #ce2 he went
 to ,jerusalem in #ci1 and here         
everything was related to him by ,peter1
 as we know from his letter 7likewise   
not contested7 to the ,galatians4 ,thus 
the authentic information of the man1   
who in #eh collected the historical     
proofs of the reality of the            
resurrection of ,jesus for his          
,corinthian ,christians1 goes back to   
four years after the death of ,jesus1   
and to the personal witnesses of the    
appearances2 as in that letter he also  
refers to the fact that many of these   
five hundred brethren are still living4 
,moreover1 it is an established fact1   
that the first written evidences of the 
evangelical history from which our      
canonical gospels subsequently          

originated1 likewise contained accounts 
of the appearance of the risen one4     
,finally1 it is an established fact     
that1 from the very beginning1 the whole
 meaning of evangelical preaching turned
 on the two facts of the death and of   
the resurrection of ,jesus1 as on the   
two cardinal points of all preaching of 
salvation2 also that all the faith of   
those who embraced the ,gospel was      
founded upon these two facts1 as upon   
the historical fundamentals of the #ccg 
salvation which comes from ,jesus2 and  
that thus ,christianity1 with all its   
effects1 which have unhinged the old    
world and diffused streams of blessing  
over mankind1 has its historical basis  
in faith in the death of ,jesus and his 
resurrection4 ,this is our historical   
chain of proof4 ,and that evidence which
 gives certainty to its most important  
link1 on which everything depends--the  
appearance of the risen one--is the     
entire failure of all the attempts at   
explaining that appearance from a       

seeming death1 from an intended         
deception1 from a self-delusion1 from a 
vision and an ecstasy1 from a poetic    
myth2 in short1 from any other cause    
than1 that the ,lord really appeared to 
his disciples as the man who was dead1  
but who is risen and lives4 ,we cannot  
follow ,keim in all his methods of      
reconstructing the life of ,jesus1 and  
we believe that he is much too timid    
regarding the consequences which follow 
from an objective1 real appearance of   
,jesus after his death2 but we          
acknowledge it as a high merit of his   
christological works1 that although he  
is willing to use criticism to the      
utmost1 he has so thoroughly and        
strikingly shown the impossibility of   
explaining the appearance of ,jesus     
after his death differently from the    
real manifestations of his still living 
person4 ,it is well that ,strauss1 in   
his ,the ,old ,faith and the ,new1      
declares the history of the resurrection
 of ,jesus a historical humbug2 for it  

may open the eyes of many1 if the       
tendency1 of which ,strauss is leader1  
is no longer able to explain            
,christianity--the noblest1 purest1 and 
most successful religion which has come 
into existence in the whole history of  
mankind--otherwise than by calling it a 
humbug4 ,with him who is pleased with   
this manner of explaining the most      
perfect blossom and fruit of #cch the   
tree of mankind1 we certainly can find  
no common ground of mutual              
understanding4  ,we have been led to all
 these discussions1 by looking for      
something actual which should be able to
 throw its light back upon the earliest 
primitive history of mankind--a history 
which can no longer be historically     
investigated4 ,we have found this       
reality in the resurrection of ,jesus2  
and the light which it throws upon the  
primitive history of man1 we have       
perceived in the conclusion to which it 
leads us3 that man1 if he had taken a   
sinless development1 would also have    

been exempt from death4  ,the           
resurrection of ,jesus throws its light 
upon still another side of the ,biblical
 doctrine of the primitive condition of 
man3 namely1 upon that which is the     
religious quintessence of the ,biblical 
doctrine of ,paradise4 ,as now the      
resurrection of the ,lord is the        
beginning and the prophecy of a new     
creation on the basis of the old1 and as
 we now hope1 with ,st4 ,paul1 that this
 beginning shall manifest its           
comprehensive cosmic effects1 when the  
,lord shall manifest them in the        
resurrection of the children of ,god3   
so1 in case of a sinless development of 
man1 the beginning of this new and      
glorified stage of creation would       
certainly have been perceptible at the  
beginning of the history of mankind and 
in the relation of man to his earthly   
surroundings4 ,but we are of course not 
permitted to make or to pursue such a   
suggestion at present1 since a sinful   
development of mankind1 with its        

consequences1 actually took place4  ,we 
have no reason to enter into the        
discussion of another often and much    
debated question1 which is connected    
with the primitive history of man2      
namely1 #cci whether mankind is         
descended from one or more pairs of men4
 ,we pass it by2 because it has no      
connection whatever with the acceptance 
or rejection of the ,darwinian ideas1   
and since it is not yet archologically  
and scientifically solvable4 ,there are 
,darwinians who think monogenetically1  
and others who think polygenetically2   
and there is still a third class--and   
they speak most correctly--who          
acknowledge that they know nothing about
 it4 ,besides1 we can also pass by this 
question1 for the reason that in spite  
of the important place which it occupies
 in the theological system of ,st4      
,paul1 we have no right to assign to it1
 in the form in which we put it1 the    
decisive dogmatic importance which it   
still occupies in many conceptions of   

,christian theology4 ,for we cannot     
question the right of the natural       
sciences to enter into the discussion of
 this question1 and to look for a       
solution of it4 ,as soon as we make this
 concession1 it necessarily and         
naturally follows from it1 that we must 
no longer make the substance and truth  
of our religious possession1 even in a  
subordinate manner1 dependent on the    
results of exact investigations3 for our
 religious possessions have too deep a  
basis of truth1 to permit us to ground  
them on the results of investigations in
 a realm so dark for science and so far 
removed from religious interest4 ,as to 
this question1 we may hope for a future 
solution in the monogenetic sense3 we   
may rejoice over the fact that1         
according to the present state of       
knowledge1 the needle of the scale      
rather inclines in favor of a oneness of
 origin of mankind2 but we must also be 
prepared to accept the possibility of a 
contrary result1 without being afraid   

that in such a case we should have to   
abandon at once that religious factor   
#cdj for whose sake the advocates of a  
monogenetic descent might defend their  
view4 ,this religious 7and1 we may add1 
quite as strong ethic7 factor consists  
in the idea of the intimate unity and   
brotherhood of mankind4 ,we must        
absolutely adhere to this idea2 for it  
is in opposition to the particularism   
which1 quite without exception1 governed
 the entire old world1 even its most    
highly developed nations1 and which was 
only penetrated by some beams of hope   
and prediction in the prophecy of       
,israel--one of the most beautiful and  
blissful gifts of ,christianity to      
mankind4 ,this idea still contains1 as  
ethical motive1 one of the strongest1   
most indispensable1 and most promising  
forces in the world4 ,if this idea shall
 be a real and lastingly effective one1 
it certainly must also have its real    
basis in the history of the origin of   
mankind4 ,but1 we must ask1 is the only 

conceivable reality of this basis a     
monogenetic pedigree1 and do we lose    
this reality if science should once find
 that mankind came into existence not   
only in one single pair1 but in several 
pairs1 even in different places1 and at 
different times8 ,even in such a case1  
the idea of the unity of mankind would  
only lose its real basis1 if at the same
 time we were permitted to think also   
anti-teleologically--if we were         
permitted to suppose that that which    
came into existence1 repeatedly1 and in 
different places1 had each time entirely
 different causes without a common aim  
and a common plan4 ,if we think         
teleologically1 we see the unity of     
mankind1 also in case of a polygenetic  
origin1 in the unity of the metaphysical
 and teleological cause which called    
mankind into existence2 and to rational 
beings1 endowed with mind1 as men are1  
the metaphysical bond is certainly      
stronger than the physical4 #cda        
,precisely the ,darwinian ideas of the  

origin of species through descent would 
show us in such a case the real bond    
which unites mankind4 ,for then we      
should only have to go back from the    
different points on the stem-lines of   
the prehistoric generators of these     
primitive men1 at which men originated  
otherwise than by generation1 in order  
to arrive finally at a common root of   
all these stem-lines3 the members of    
mankind would even then remain          
consanguineous among one another1 not   
only in an ideal1 but in a real sense4  
,now that the idea of the unity of      
mankind was holy and important to ,st4  
,paul1 is to be inferred in advance from
 such a universal mind4 ,and when in    
,acts ,,xvii1 #bf1 he expresses this    
idea before the ,athenians1 so proud of 
their autochthony1 with the words that  
of one blood all nations of men dwell on
 all the face of the earth2 or when1 in 
,romans ,v1 and #a ,corinthians ,,xv1 he
 makes use of the idea in order to      
explain and to glorify the universal    

power of redemption of ,christ by       
putting ,adam and ,christ in opposition 
to one another1 as the first and the    
second ,adam1 so that he sees sin and   
death coming forth from ,adam1 grace and
 justice and life from ,christ and      
extending over mankind2 then we find    
this idea quite convincing and natural1 
and adhere firmly to the quintessence of
 these truths1 even if we acknowledge   
neither in these passages1 nor in       
,genesis ,i and ,,ii1 the intention of  
,god to give us a supernatural          
manifestation of the exterior process of
 the creation of man4 ,paul himself     
gives us a hint not to follow slavishly 
a literal interpretation1 when he says1 
in ,romans ,v1 as by one man sin entered
 into the world and death by sin1 and   
calls this man ,adam1 although he knows 
that according to the #cdb ,biblical    
relation1 ,eve was the one who was first
 seduced1 and although he expressly     
points out and makes use of this        
priority of the sin of ,eve in another  

connection1 and for another reason4     
,finally1 we may here also take into    
consideration the contradictions which  
have come up by reason of more recent   
investigations1 in reference to the     
prehistoric conditions of man1 and      
which1 especially in ,england1 have been
 designated as the contradiction between
 the elevation theory and the           
depravation theory4  ,in general1 this  
contradiction is looked upon as if a    
conception of the primitive history of  
man1 remaining conformable to the       
,bible1 could only be brought into      
harmony with a depravation theory1 and  
not with an elevation theory2 but       
certainly without reason4  ,the         
,biblical and ,christian conception of  
the primitive history of man does not at
 all demand the conception of a gradual 
sinking down of mankind from a          
supernatural height--of a gradual       
depravation of our species--which many  
representations seem to assume4 ,for1   
according to it1 the fall of man had    

already taken place with the first pair 
of mankind2 they were driven from       
,paradise1 to long hard labor and       
development2 and ,paradise was taken    
from earth4 ,even the paradisaical      
condition1 with its short duration1 was 
deficient in all the various gifts of   
life which are a product of human       
inventive faculty and skill1 and which  
can leave behind vestiges and remains4  
,but what the ,holy ,scripture relates  
or indicates of the after-paradisaical  
primitive history of man1 wholly        
corresponds to the idea of a gradual    
development out of the more simple and  
rough1 which is demanded by the         
evolution theory in its #cdc application
 to history4 ,that1 even according to   
the ,biblical conception1 goodness and  
progress in outer culture1 sin and      
intellectual stagnation1 are not        
identical1 we see from the fact1 that by
 the ,holy ,scripture the most          
successful inventions of man are not    
assigned to the more pious ,sethites1   

but to the ,titan-like1 rebellious      
,kainites4 ,likewise1 the evolution     
theory does not at all require a        
constant1 general1 and exclusive        
progress of mankind in all its members4 
,as in the realm of irrational          
organisms1 so in the history of mankind2
 it has to assume the most various      
ramifications with progress1            
stand-still1 and retrogradation4 ,it is 
true1 it sees in the nations of culture 
progress in an upward rising line2 but  
besides1 stand-still and retrogradations
 in great variety4 ,it also sees in     
mankind in general a labor of upward    
rising development2 but it also sees    
many hindrances of development1 and many
 shavings which the work throws to one  
side4 ,but exactly the same thing was   
also seen in every religious or profane 
contemplation of history1 long before   
the evolution theory was born4          
,therefore1 the different views of the  
earliest primitive history of man1 the  
theory of depravation and that of       

elevation1 do not stand so opposed to   
one another--the former representing the
 ,biblical and religious1 the latter the
 anti-religious1 view of the            
history--but the question as to the     
primitive history is not yet solved in  
that respect2 the depravation theory1 as
 well as the elevation theory1 indicates
 rather the directions in which         
investigation has to put its questions  
to the archological sources4            
,investigation1 on the other hand1 has  
free scope in both directions2 and the  
primitive history of man shows itself to
 be a realm in which religious and      
scientific interest1 #cdd opponents and 
advocates of the descent theory1 can    
peacefully join hands for common labor4 
,up to the present1 the investigations  
reach results which seem to fall now    
more into one1 now more into the other1 
scale of the balance4 ,on the one hand1 
the older the products of human skill   
are1 the more simple they are2 on the   
other hand1 even the oldest remains show

 man in full possession of that which   
distinguishes him from the animal1 and  
attests a spiritual life4 ,the reader   
may think of the before mentioned       
sketches of the reindeer and mammoth    
7page #ij74 ,if we finally come down to 
historic times1 and to the present1 in  
order to try to draw conclusions from   
the comparisons of the remotest times of
 which we have historic knowledge1 with 
the present1 as to prehistoric times1 we
 likewise find on the one side vestiges 
of the lowest barbarism in the past and 
present2 but on the other side we find  
that the oldest written monuments afford
 a glance into a perfection of          
intellectual reflection and into a      
nobility of moral and religious views   
which permits us to draw the highest    
conclusions as to the intellectual worth
 of earliest mankind4 ,the very oldest  
records of the ,holy ,scripture give    
evidence of this intellectual height2   
and even the royal programmes of        
,assyrian monarchs1 which the wonderful 

diligence and ingenuity of recent       
investigators have deciphered from the  
cuneiform inscriptions1 not only        
relatively correspond to the height of  
culture which we find in the ruins of   
,assyrian palaces1 but even1 when looked
 upon absolutely and aside from the     
morality of conquest which they indulge1
 are inspired by a nobility of mind1 and
 permeated by a religiousness1 which no 
potentate of recent times would need to 
be ashamed of4 ,they have #cde been made
 accessible to the public by the work of
 ,eberhard ,schrader3 ,die              
,keilinschriften und das ,alte          
,testament 7,cuneiform ,inscriptions and
 the ,old ,testament71 ,giessen1 #ahgb4 
#d4 ,providence1 ,hearing of ,prayer1   
and ,miracles4  ,before we enter into   
the special christological realm1 we    
have yet to glance at the realm of the  
more common relations between ,god and  
the creature1 as they have found1 in    
faith in a divine providence1 in hearing
 of prayer1 and in divine miracles1     

their reflection in ,christian          
consciousness4  ,it is true1 we had to  
discuss the chief basis of an           
understanding in this matter when       
treating of the position of the         
,darwinian theories in reference to     
theism in general2 but we have a double 
reason for entering again into the      
consideration of the concrete form which
 this faith has obtained in             
,christianity4  ,one reason is the fact1
 that faith in a special providence of  
,god1 in a hearing of prayer1 and in a  
connection of the human history of      
salvation with miracles1 forms a very   
essential part of the ,christian view of
 the world and of ,christian            
religiousness4 ,all ,holy ,scripture is 
interwoven with assurances of a         
providence of ,god1 going even into     
details2 with the most distinct and     
solemn promises of the hearing of our   
prayers2 and with the most emphatic     
reference to the miracles which it      
relates4 ,the ,lord himself not only    

found all these doctrines1 and left them
 untouched1 but he developed them in the
 most pregnant way1 and brought them    
into the most intimate connection with  
the quintessence and centre of his      
doctrine4 ,according to his teaching1   
#cdf a sparrow shall not fall to the    
ground without the will of your heavenly
 ,father2 but the very hairs of your    
head are all numbered4 ,he encourages us
 to pray1 with the words3 ,verily1      
verily1 ,i say unto you1 ,whatsoever ye 
shall ask the ,father in my name1 he    
will give it you2 and he proves himself 
to be the ,redeemer1 through signs and  
wonders1 and refers to the greatest sign
 which was to be manifested in him--the 
sign of the resurrection4  ,the other   
reason for entering upon the discussion 
of these questions1 lies in the         
incredible thoughtlessness with which a 
great part of modern educated people1   
even of such men as do not at all wish  
to abandon faith in a living ,god1      
permit themselves to be governed by the 

leaders of religious infidelity1 and to 
be defiled and robbed of everything1    
which belongs to the nature of a living 
,god4 ,by many1 it is considered as good
 taste1 and as an indispensable sign of 
deep scientific learning and high       
education1 and it forms a seldom        
contested part of correspondence in     
newspapers1 which have for their public 
a wide circle of educated people1 that  
in referring to the inviolableness of   
the laws of nature they declare faith in
 a special providence of ,god to be a   
view long ago rejected1 and which is    
only consistent with half-civilized     
individuals2 that they look down with a 
compassionate and self-conscious smile  
upon the egoistic implicit faith of     
congregations who still pray for good   
harvest-weather1 and see in the damage  
done by a hailstorm a divine affliction2
 that they criticise it as a sad token  
of ecclesiastical darkness1 when even   
church-authorities order such prayers in
 case of wide-spread calamities2 that   

they fall into a passion over the #cdg  
narrowness and the dulling influence of 
pedagogues who see in the histories     
which they relate to their pupils or put
 into their hands for reading1 the      
government of an ethical order of the   
world which goes a little farther than  
the rule that he who deceives injures   
his good name1 and he who gets          
intoxicated injures his health2 that    
they give a man who still believes in   
the resurrection of ,jesus1 to          
understand that he has not yet learned  
the first elements of the theory of     
putrefaction and perishableness4 ,that  
the adversaries of faith in a ,god thus 
express themselves1 and try to conquer  
as much ground as possible for their    
frosty doctrine1 is certainly quite     
natural2 but that even advocates of     
theism should permit such stuff to be   
presented to them1 and can keep silent  
in regard to it--nay1 that even         
preachers offer it to their             
congregations as ordinary ,sabbath      

edification1 and that their hearers can 
gratefully accept it--is certainly a    
suggestive and alarming evidence of the 
rapidity with which1 in many men who    
still do not wish consciously and       
certainly to be thought godless 7i4e41  
to be separated from ,god71 their       
connection with the source of light and 
life is decreasing1 and of how strongly 
the fear that they may be looked upon as
 unscientific and imperfectly educated1 
overbalances the fear of losing the     
living ,god and ,father1 and therewith  
the support of both mind and life4      
,now1 that this faith in a special      
providence1 in a hearing of prayer1 and 
in divine miracles1 forms an essential  
part of ,christian religiousness1 we do 
not need to show more in detail2 it is  
an established historical fact1 and an  
object of direct ,christian knowledge4  
,on the other hand1 we have still to say
 a word concerning #cdh that which1 on  
the part of those just described1 is so 
strongly contested2 namely1 about the   

scientific worth of such a faith1 and   
also about its reconcilableness with the
 ,darwinism theories4  ,in the first    
place1 as to the faith in a special     
providence of ,god1 and1 in connection  
with it1 as to the possibility of a     
hearing of human prayer1 such a faith is
 by itself the inevitable consequence of
 all theism2 nay1 it is precisely       
identical with theism2 it is that which 
makes theism theism1 and distinguishes  
it from mere deism--i4e41 from an idea  
of ,god1 which merely makes ,god the    
author of the world1 and lets the world1
 after it was once created1 go its own  
way4 ,now1 the theistic idea of ,god1   
which sees the ,creator in an           
uninterrupted connection with his       
creation1 is in itself the more         
scientific one3 for a ,god who1 although
 the author of the world1 would not know
 how to find1 nor intend to find1 a way 
of communication with his creation1     
would certainly be an idea theologically
 inconceivable4 ,we should1 therefore1  

still have to adhere to the idea of a   
special providence of ,god1 even if in  
our discursive reasoning and exact      
investigation of the processes in the   
world we should not find a single guide 
referring us to the scientific          
possibility of such a direct and        
uninterrupted dependence of the world on
 its author4 ,we should then have simply
 to declare a conviction of the         
providence of ,god to be a postulate of 
our reasoning1 which is given with the  
idea of ,god itself2 and would just as  
little call this conviction unscientific
 on account of the fact1 that we are not
 able to show the modalities of divine  
providence1 as in reference to the exact
 sciences we should contest the         
character of their #cdi scientific value
 on account of the fact that they are no
 longer able to give us an answer       
exactly where our questions become most 
important and interesting4  ,but the    
ways in which we are able to realize    
scientifically the idea of a divine     

providence are1 indeed1 not entirely    
closed for us4 ,we have several of them2
 one starts from the idea of ,god1      
others from the empiric created world4  
,it belongs to the idea of ,god1 that we
 have to think of the sublimity of ,god 
over time and space1 of his eternity and
 omnipresence1 in such a way that ,god1 
in his being1 life1 and activity1 does  
not stand in time nor within any limits 
or differences of space1 but absolutely 
above time and above all limits and     
differences of space2 that he is present
 in his world everywhere and at any     
time4 ,he who objects to this1 can only 
do it with weapons to which we have to  
oppose the objection which the          
adversaries of the ,christian idea of   
,god so often raise against it--namely1 
the objection of a rejectable           
anthropomorphism4 ,in contesting the    
possibility of the idea of an           
uninterrupted presence of a personal and
 living ,god in the entire realm of the 
universe1 the adversaries seem to permit

 themselves to be daunted by the        
difficulty which is offered to man in   
controlling the realms of his own       
activity4 ,the greater such a realm1 the
 more difficult becomes a comprehensive 
survey1 the more the human influence has
 to restrict itself to the greater and  
more common and to neglect the little   
and single4 ,the more removed is the    
past which helps to constitute the      
circumstances of the present1 the       
greater is the human ignorance and      
oblivion2 the more removed is the       
future1 the greater is the human        
incapability of #cej influencing it     
decisively4 ,such measures ought to     
disappear1 even in their last traces1   
when we reflect on ,god and divine      
activity4 ,if once the idea is          
established for us of a living ,god1 who
 is always present in the world created 
by him1 and in whose sight a thousand   
years are but as yesterday when it is   
past1 and as a watch in the night1 the  
final causal chain of causes and effects

 may be ever so long1 and stretching    
over this course of the world from its  
beginning to its end2 the single        
phenomena may be woven together of ever 
so many thousands and thousands of      
millions of different causal chains3 we 
nevertheless see above them all the     
regulating hand of ,god from whom they  
all come1 and who not only surveys and  
controls their texture in all its       
threads1 but who himself arranged1 wove1
 and made it4 ,such a view is not only  
more satisfactory to the religious need 
of man1 but it also seems to us more    
scientific1 than a view which traces    
everything back to a blind and dead     
cause1 or even to no ultimate cause at  
all1 and thinks it has entirely removed 
the last veil1 if it pronounces the     
great word causal law4  ,now1 while our 
idea of ,god thus tells us that ,god has
 in his hand all causal chains in the   
world1 and its million-threaded web in  
constant omni-surveying presence and in 
all-controlling omnipotence1 our        

reflection on the world and its         
substance and course also leads us from 
the a posteriori starting-point of      
analytical investigation precisely to   
the same result2 it even leads us to a  
still more concrete conception of this  
idea--namely1 to the result1 that not   
only the causal chains1 in their        
totality and in their web1 but also all 
single links of these chains1 #cea have 
their force and existence only by virtue
 of a transcendental1 or what is the    
same1 of a metaphysical1 cause4  ,for if
 we analyze the single phenomena in the 
world1 we certainly observe in the      
activity of their qualities and forces  
such a conformity to law1 that1 in our  
reflection on these phenomena1 we can go
 from one phenomenon to the necessity of
 another as its cause or its effect1 and
 thus form those particular causal      
chains and causal nets in whose arranged
 representation natural science         
consists4 ,but that those qualities and 
forces exist and act precisely thus1 and

 not otherwise1 and why1 we are no      
longer able to explain4 ,we can only    
say3 the material and the apparent is no
 longer their cause1 but their effect2  
therefore1 the cause of that which comes
 into existence lies beyond the         
phenomenon--i4e41 in the transcendental1
 in the metaphysical4  ,this becomes    
evident in the inorganic world and in   
those qualities which are common to all 
matter4 ,such common qualities of the   
latter are1 for instance1 cohesion and  
gravitation4 ,that all matter has the   
quality of cohesion1 we can only say    
because we observe it2 but that it must 
be so1 and why1 we are not able to say4 
,this becomes still more evident in     
gravitation4 ,gravitation is so         
decidedly an action in space1 that it   
appears to us1 together with cohesion1  
as precisely the bond which binds the   
entire material world together4 ,each   
single material atom is subject to its  
force2 but how and why1 and especially  
how and why matter acts upon the matter 

in space1 physics can no longer tell us1
 but refers us to a metaphysical cause4 
,this dependence of each single being1  
and of all its qualities and forces1 on 
a transcendental and #ceb metaphysical  
cause of its existence1 becomes most    
clear to us in the world of the organic1
 and especially in the transmission and 
development of organisms4 ,that         
individuals originate new individuals of
 their species2 that the fecundated     
germs1 if the necessary conditions are  
present1 develop themselves out of the  
first germ and egg-cell in continually  
progressive and distinct                
differentiations1 each after its kind1  
into the full-grown condition1 so that  
individuals endowed with a soul and     
intellectual life are also developed out
 of such beginnings2--these are facts   
which are continually repeated before   
our eyes1 and men of science have not   
yet reached the end in pursuing the     
actual in these processes into its      
finest ramifications4 ,but how it is    

that individuals must transmit          
themselves--that the seeds and eggs must
 have this force of germination and     
development--they have not yet been able
 to explain1 and will never be able to  
do so4 ,the word inheritance1 which is  
to solve the problem1 is only a name for
 the fact which we observe1 and for the 
regularity of its repetition2 but for   
this fact of inheritance itself1 we seek
 in vain a physical explanation3 we are 
referred to a metaphysical cause4 ,thus1
 not only the first origin of life on   
earth is an enigma to us 7as we have    
seen in ,part ,i1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chapter  
,i1  #c71 but organic life itself1 in   
its whole existence and course1 is a    
process which1 at every step1 and in    
every place of its course1 remains to us
 in its last causes physically          
unexplained1 and refers us to           
metaphysical causes4  ,if we finally see
 in all these inorganic and organic     
processes a striving towards ends--and  
we must see it1 as soon as we in general

 observe order1 the category of higher  
and lower1 and the appearance of the    
higher on #cec the basis of the         
lower--we are1 with all our teleological
 observations1 again referred to the    
metaphysical1 and still more decidedly  
to the goal-setting metaphysical2 and a 
metaphysical which sets and reaches     
goals is nothing else than that in      
philosophic language which in the       
language of religion we call a living   
,creator and ,ruler of the world and the
 activity of his providence4  ,from     
still another side1 the knowledge of the
 world1 even in a scientific way1 leads 
us to the acknowledgment of a divine    
providence which controls with absolute 
freedom every process in every place and
 in every moment of the world's course4 
,we see continually1 in the midst of    
nature1 and in its causal course        
conformable to law1 something           
supernatural1 transcendental1 and       
metaphysical1 acting decisively upon the
 course of nature2 and that is the free 

activity of man4 ,every man carries in  
the freedom of the determinations of his
 will something transcendental and      
metaphysical in himself1 which we can   
call natural only when we mean by nature
 the summary of all that which exists1  
but which we have to call supernatural  
when we mean by nature the summary of   
that which belongs to the world of      
phenomena in its traceable causes as    
well as in its traceable effects4 ,the  
scale of life-activities1 from the      
lowest arbitrary motions1 from the      
impulses and instincts of the animal up 
to the highest moral action of the will 
of man1 shows us in indistinct          
transitions all stages which lead from  
the natural to the supernatural1 until1 
in the ethical and religious motives of 
man1 we arrive at superphysical 7i4e41  
supernatural7 motives which daily and   
hourly invade the natural1 and in this  
invasion consciously and unconsciously  
use the forces of nature #ced and their 
activity1 conformable to law1 and in    

spite of their metaphysical and         
transcendental origin1 from the moment  
of their activity1 join the natural     
causal connection of the world's course4
 ,this observation of an invasion of the
 physical by the supernatural1 as it    
continually takes place in the free     
action of man1 leads us in a triple way 
to the acknowledgment of an action of   
divine providence upon the course of the
 world4  ,in the first place1 this      
observation shows us1 in a very direct  
way1 points where the free disposition  
of ,god acts determinatingly upon the   
course of things1 and where this action 
becomes accessible to our observation4  
,these points are the human             
personalities1 in so far and inasmuch as
 they permit themselves to be influenced
 and determined by the will of ,god in  
the ethical and religious motives of    
their action1 and1 when these motives   
become actions1 determinately act upon  
the course of things4  ,in the second   
place1 this observation further leads1  

by way of two conclusions1 to the       
acknowledgment of a divine providence4  
,one conclusion is the following3 ,if   
there exist in the world free and       
intelligent beings which1 through their 
free determinations1 guided by          
reflection1 decisively act upon the     
course of nature1 and if these beings1  
on account of these very qualities of   
freedom and intelligence1 occupy the    
highest stage among the creatures which 
we know1 the last metaphysical cause of 
their existence must also have qualities
 which are able to produce such free and
 intelligent beings--at least the       
qualities of freedom and intelligence in
 the highest degree4 ,and this highest  
metaphysical cause which produces free  
and intelligent personalities in the    
world1 can at least be no #cee more     
dependent upon the entire world1 whose  
author it is1 than those personalities  
are dependent upon that realm in the    
world in which they have their          
existence4 ,we call such a metaphysical 

cause1 to which we have to ascribe      
freedom and intelligence in the highest 
degree1 ,god2 and we call its free      
position in reference to the world1 the 
government of the world1 or providence4 
,the other conclusion leads us to the   
acknowledgment of a connection of       
providence with conformability to law in
 the actions of all forces and qualities
 in the world4 ,it is the same          
conclusion to which we had to refer in  
,chap4 ,i1  #f1 but which now1 as we    
draw from theism the conclusion of the  
acknowledgment of a special divine      
providence1 falls with increased weight 
into the scale4 ,it is the following3   
,on the one hand1 we observe in the     
processes of the world a striving       
towards ends2 on the other1 we know in  
the world itself only one single        
creature which acts according to aims1  
which sets itself its ends and reaches  
them with freely chosen means4 ,this one
 creature is man4 ,now man can1 as we   
pointed out in ,chap4 ,i1  #f1 choose   

and use the means with which he wishes  
to reach his ends1 only because he can  
rely on the conformity to the end in    
view and the regularity in the effect of
 all the qualities and forces of things4
 ,if he could not rely on them1 he      
certainly could set himself ends2 but   
the reaching of them he would have to   
leave to the play of chance4 ,now if we 
see1 on the one side1 that the only     
creature known to us which sets itself  
ends is able to reach these ends by     
virtue of inviolable conformity to law  
in the forces and effects of its means1 
and if we see1 on the other1 that in the
 course of the world ends are also      
reached1 and that at the same time #cef 
all secondary causes which lead to these
 ends act with a necessity conformable  
to law1 we certainly are right in       
drawing the conclusion that the highest 
metaphysical cause of all things--we now
 say1 the living ,god--has so prepared  
the whole universe that his free but    
regular and systematic goal-setting and 

end-reaching action upon the course of  
all things rests1 as a whole as well as 
in detail1 directly upon the conformity 
to law of all forces and their effects4 
,the observation of a free action of the
 human personality upon the course of   
things1 once more leads us back to a    
reflection on the idea of ,god4 ,for if 
we have reason to acknowledge a freedom 
of the determinations of human will--and
 the consciousness of ethical           
responsibility will be a proof of this  
freedom which cannot be invalidated by  
any contrary reflection--the question   
comes up3 how is this freedom of a      
creature reconcilable with the idea of  
,god8 ,far be it from us to claim to    
have found a solution of these last and 
most important problems of the human    
mind4 ,for all meditations on them but  
lead to antinomies in the presence of   
which we dare not churn to remove all   
difficulties of reflection still less to
 solve the difficulties by pursuing only
 one chain of reasoning and ignoring the

 other4 ,the way of science leads rather
 to mere compromises1 and these         
compromises consist in the fact1 that on
 every side of our observations or      
arguments we look for and adhere to that
 which results for us in incontestable  
fact or indispensable postulate1 and    
that we adhere to all results or        
postulates thus found even when we are  
no longer able to trace their unity and 
harmony back to their last sources4 ,now
 if1 on the one hand1 our idea of #ceg  
,god is established as a self-testimony 
of ,god to our ethical consciousness and
 as a result of our teleological        
reasoning1 and if1 on the other1 is     
established the fact of the world and of
 its processes going on conformably to  
law1 and likewise the fact of human     
freedom and its actions upon the course 
of things1 and finally the fact of the  
admission of the human will and action  
into a higher teleology which is        
superior to human will1 and which1 in   
the history of mankind1 of individuals1 

and nations1 reaches its higher ends1   
now by affirming1 now by denying1 human 
will2 then we have simply to account for
 all these facts as mere facts1 and the 
scientific attempt at pursuing them into
 their inner connection is nothing else 
but a more or less successful           
compromise4 ,we have to be satisfied    
with these indications1 for the further 
discussion of them would lead us far    
beyond the task of the present          
publication4 ,we shall only point out   
the fact1 that precisely the knowledge  
of the image of ,god in man shows us the
 way to the knowledge of how it is      
conceivable that ,god can create        
personalities through whose freedom of  
will he relatively limits the           
absoluteness of his own will4  ,in all  
our discussions hitherto1 the scientific
 basis of a faith in the possibility of 
an answer to prayer has been evident4   
,all reasons for a divine providence1   
also speak with the same force of       
persuasion for the hearing of our       

prayers1 as soon as the idea of being a 
child of ,god has become an integral    
part of our idea of ,god4 ,and this     
idea--the idea of ,god as the father1   
and of a relationship of love between   
the divine and the human                
personalities--is so much a part of the 
,christian idea of ,god1 that it belongs
 to its very essence4 ,only one #ceh    
consideration might offer scientific    
difficulties to our faith in the hearing
 of prayer3 namely1 if ,god hears the   
prayers of his children1 in the course  
of time new motives for his action      
present themselves to him2 now1 is it   
reconcilable with the idea of ,god1 that
 ,god makes himself in any such way     
dependent on that which first appeared  
in time1 and on the changing moods of   
the creature8 ,but this difficulty is   
precisely the same which we met1 when   
acknowledging human freedom and its     
reconcilableness with a divine          
providence2 and we have tried to        
indicate above the path which leads to  

its solution4  ,it is the principal idea
 which penetrates all our reasoning     
about the relation of ,god and the      
world--namely1 the idea of a teleology  
in the world--which is to lead us to a  
correct conception of the miracles and  
their reconcilableness with a mechanism 
of nature and with the ,darwinistic     
ideas of development4 ,in the much      
discussed contest about the problem of  
miracles1 clearer results would         
certainly have been attained1 if one had
 questioned more closely what the record
 of the ,christian religion means by    
miracles1 and what position1 according  
to it1 these miracles have to take in   
the order of the world and in the divine
 plan of salvation2 and after having    
satisfied himself as to this position1  
had further asked what position they    
take in reference to our exact science  
and our theistic view of the world4     
,instead of doing this1 we have often   
enough seen friend and foe of the idea  
of miracles1 as soon as the question was

 even touched upon1 at once set to work 
with the insufficient conceptions of old
 rationalism and supernaturalism1 and   
thus raising objections and attempting  
solutions which could satisfy nobody4   
,especially every inadequate idea #cei  
which was put forth by the advocates of 
faith in miracles1 was gladly accepted  
by its adversaries2 for thereby they    
were furnished with a caricature of the 
idea of miracles1 the tearing to pieces 
of which was an easy and agreeable sport
 to them4  ,the very ideas of the       
natural and the supernatural are a      
category which is to be treated with    
caution4 ,when discussing the question  
of divine providence1 we have seen that1
 with every free act of the will of man 
springing from an ethical motive1       
something supernatural invades the      
natural1 so that in every normal human  
life we always see supernatural and     
natural by the side of and in one       
another4  ,the distinction between the  
direct and the indirect action or       

invasion of ,god is also to be used with
 great caution and restriction4 ,for    
where we are no longer able to find     
secondary causes1 who can assert that   
,god no longer uses any8 ,where the     
realm of visible causes ceases and that 
of the invisible begins1 who can exclude
 secondary causes8 ,and on the other    
hand1 where ,god acts directly1 who can 
deny the concurrence of his direct      
presence and his direct action1 or      
reduce the value of that which was      
indirectly produced8  ,moreover1 the    
often-returning conceptions of a        
breaking of the laws of nature1 or the  
compromises which were made between a   
breaking and a non-breaking of the laws 
of nature by assuming a supernatural    
acceleration of the process of nature1  
were still more misleading4 ,in the     
whole world1 infinitely many higher and 
lower forces act according to laws and  
order4 ,in every process1 a part of the 
forces which in the single case surround
 it1 become active1 and thereby hinder  

#cfj another part from its activity4    
,but the laws of this other part of     
forces are not thereby invalidated or   
broken4 ,when a man acts with moral     
freedom1 from mere moral motives1 the   
highest of the conceivable forces over  
which we have control comes into direct 
action upon the natural4 ,but therewith 
those forces1 with their laws1 which    
would have been active if another motive
 had determined him1 are not yet        
overcome1 but only hindered from their  
activity in exactly the same way as one 
part of forces can be active and another
 not1 where mere mechanical actions take
 place4 ,thus1 in miracles1 no law of   
nature is overcome1 but only a force    
which otherwise would have been active  
according to the law of its activity1 is
 for the time hindered from action by   
another force becoming active4          
,moreover1 through the conscious and    
unconscious connection of the idea of   
irregularity and lack of plan with the  
idea of miracles1 not only the idea of a

 ,god who works miracles1 but also that 
of a personal ,creator and ,ruler of the
 world1 in general1 has come into       
discredit4 ,for that reason1 ,hckel1 for
 instance1 when he attacks the          
,christian idea of creation1 never fails
 to speak of the capricious             
arbitrariness of the ,creator2 and      
,oskar ,schmidt also speaks of the      
caprice of the ,god of ,christians4     
,with these criticisms1 which we have   
made in reference to the treatment of   
the question of miracles1 we certainly  
have undertaken only to characterize the
 superficial skirmishing which took     
place between the two opposing views of 
the world1 but not the labors of more   
recent theological science4 ,but that   
skirmish has made1 like all             
superficiality1 the most noise in the   
world2 and since the adversaries of the 
faith in #cfa miracles endeavored almost
 exclusively to reflect in this manner1 
and almost ignored the deeper deductions
 of theological science1 they succeeded 

in making the idea of miracles almost   
the most dreaded object of antipathy to 
modern education1 and many of those who 
feel that the conceptions of traditional
 dogmatics are in need of revision1 and 
religion and science of a               
reconciliation1 endeavor to find that   
revision and reconciliation especially  
in the fact1 that religion gives up     
miracles4 ,on the other hand1 theology  
as science1 in its main advocates1 long 
ago gave up these insufficient and      
misleading categories and conceptions1  
and established a conception of miracles
 which can easily be received into the  
science of the processes of nature1 as  
well as into our reasoning about ,god   
and the divine4 ,the first who adopted  
this mode of treatment1 is one of the   
pioneers of more recent positive        
theology1 and of a theology still       
uninfluenced by science--,karl ,immanuel
 ,nitzsch4 ,it is certainly interesting 
to read what this man1 as early as      
#ahbi1 said1 in the first edition of his

 ,system der ,christlichen ,lehre       
7,system of ,christian ,doctrine71 and  
also in the succeeding edition printed  
without alteration4 ,he says1 on page   
#fd3 ,the miracles of revelation are1 in
 spite of all objective                 
supernaturalness1 derived from their    
central origin1 something really        
conformable to law3 partly in relation  
to the higher order of things to which  
they belong and which is also a world1 a
 nature in its kind1 and acts upon the  
lower in its way2 partly in reference to
 the similarity to common nature which  
they retain in any way2 partly on       
account of their teleological           
perfection2 and they must not only be   
expected as the homogeneous phenomenon  
from the inner miracle of #cfb          
redemption1 from the standpoint of      
perfect ,christian faith1 but also by   
virtue of the union between spirit and  
nature1 be looked upon as the natural in
 its kind4 ,in these words we find the  
fruitful germs of a sound dogmatic      

development which the idea of miracles  
has found on the part of more recent    
theology4  ,let us1 in the first place1 
try to keep free from all preconceived1 
correct or incorrect1 opinions1 and ask 
how the miracles appear to us1 when they
 present themselves with a claim to     
acknowledgment as integral parts of a   
divine revelation of salvation1 namely1 
in the religion of redemption and its   
record4 ,in regard to their name1 they  
appear to us in the ,holy ,scriptures as
 amazing bright processes1 as great     
deeds and signs2 and in regard to their 
nature1 as signs which are destined to  
call the attention of man to the        
government in grace and in judgment of a
 living ,god1 to the salvation of       
redemption which ,god gives to man1 and 
to the human instruments which he uses  
for that purpose4 ,now1 in a view of the
 world which1 like the ,biblical1 so    
decidedly sees a revelation of ,god in  
all that which takes place1 in a view of
 the world to which everything natural  

has also1 as a work of ,god1 its        
supernatural cause1 and everything      
supernatural1 at present1 or in the     
future1 is transposed again into nature 
and history1 not only all those above   
rejected conceptions of miracles lose   
their significance1 but all remaining   
conceptions with which one otherwise    
tries to distinguish the miracles from  
all that is not miraculous1 or to       
classify the different species of       
miracles1 also diminish in importance1  
as do also all those distinctions of    
direct and indirect actions of ,god--the
 distinctions of relative and absolute1 
of subjective and objective miracles3   
and there #cfc remains hut a single     
inviolable kernel and central point of  
the ,biblical conception of miracles1   
and that is the above mentioned         
teleological character of miracles4     
,indeed1 we are not willing to reject   
all these logical distinctions and      
investigations as worthless3 they have  
helped to render clear our conceptions  

and ideas1 and they still help4 ,but a  
deeper investigation of the idea of     
miracles and its relation to a          
scientific knowledge of the world may   
perhaps finally lead our more developed 
reflection back to the fact that we find
 the quintessence and the nature of     
miracles only where the pious people of 
the ,bible found it4 ,and this          
quintessence of miracles consists       
precisely in their teleological nature1 
and not at all in the fact that they    
cannot be explained physically3 it      
consists in the fact that miracles are  
signs through which ,god manifests      
himself and his government over man1 and
 actually shows the latter that he      
wishes to bring him to the pursuit of   
perfection by the way of redemption4    
,ritschl1 in an essay which appeared in 
the ,jahrbcher fr ,deutsche ,theologie1 
as early as #ahfa1 pointed out this     
decidedly teleological character of     
,biblical miracles and the indifference 
shown by pious men in the ,bible as to  

the question whether these deeds and    
signs can be explained naturally or not4
  ,the profit which we derive from this 
reverting to the ,biblical conception of
 the idea of miracles is by no means    
small4  ,in the first place1 we help to 
establish the full recognition of that  
direct religious consciousness and      
sensation which is not only             
characteristic of the pious men of      
,scripture1 but which yet characterizes 
all genuine religiousness2 and this     
consists in the fact that the religious 
man sees #cfd miracles of ,god in all   
that turns his attention to ,god's      
government1--in the sea of stars1 in    
rock and bush1 in sunshine and storm1 in
 flower and worm1 just as certainly as  
in the guidance of his own life and in  
the facts and processes of the history  
of salvation and of the kingdom of the  
,lord4 ,in this idea of miracles1 the   
essential thing is not that the         
phenomena and processes are             
inconceivable to him--although certainly

 in all that comes into appearance there
 is still an incomprehensible and       
uncomprehended remainder4 ,for a form of
 nature1 e4g41 which turns his attention
 to a creator1 is of course a miracle1  
even if he is able to look upon it with 
none other eye than that of the         
unlearned3 but it even then remains a   
miracle1--nay1 it is increased to a     
still greater miracle1 if he has learned
 to contemplate and investigate it with 
all the auxiliary means of science4 ,a  
hearing of his prayers remains a        
miracle1 whether or not he is able to   
perceive the natural connection of the  
process in which he sees his prayers    
answered1 or even to trace it back to   
the remotest times which preceded his   
prayers4 ,the events and facts of the   
history of salvation remain miracles to 
him1 whether the history of nature and  
the world offers to him auxiliary means 
of explaining them or not4 ,the pious   
man1 therefore1 does not find the       
essential characteristic of miracles in 

their relative inconceivableness1 but in
 the fact that they refer him to a      
living ,god who stands above this       
process1 whether perceived or           
unperceived in its relative causal      
connection1 and unites it with the      
course of things in order to reach his  
ends and to manifest himself to man4    
,now1 in our attempt at a scientific    
reproduction of the idea of miracles1 if
 we return to that ,biblical conception1
 we see no longer in this just #cfe     
mentioned religious conception of       
miracles a pious sophistry which avoids 
the difficulty of the idea1 or a        
child-like navet worthy of being partly 
envied and partly pitied1 which does not
 at all see the difficulties and remains
 on the child-stage of ,biblical        
conceptions2 but we only perceive in it 
a confirmation and fulfilment of that   
profound and beneficent word of our     
,lord3 ,verily ,i say unto you1         
,whosoever shall not receive the kingdom
 of ,god as a little child1 he shall not

 enter therein4 ,of course1 piety as    
well as science makes distinctions among
 miracles4 ,the former separates the    
mere products and processes of nature   
which1 through what is explicable as    
well as what is inexplicable in their   
qualities and processes1 point to an    
almighty and all-wise ,creator1 and     
thereby become miracles to the religious
 view of the world1 from the historical 
events which1 by their newness and      
uniqueness1 and by their pointing toward
 divine ends1 manifest ,god and his     
teleological government to man1 and     
calls them miracles in a still more     
specific sense than science does4 ,and  
among historical events1 piety as well  
as science assigns the name miracle1 in 
the most pregnant sense1 to those events
 which belong to the history of         
salvation1 and1 by their newness and    
uniqueness1 introduce new stages into   
it1 render legitimate its new           
instruments1 or bring new features of   
redemption to our knowledge4 ,our       

religiousness has the greatest and      
deepest interest in this history3 for it
 is the history of the leading back of  
man into communion with ,god by the way 
of redemption2 and therefore the events 
of this history are precisely those     
miracles upon which our deepest         
religious interest is concentrated4 ,but
 in spite of all these distinctions in  
degree1 that natural relationship and   
that #cff common character of the       
miraculous between the miracles of      
nature1 the miracles of the history of  
man1 and the miracles of the history of 
salvation1 remain established2 and we   
render a service to religious           
consciousness1 as well as to the        
scientific conception of the idea of    
miracles1 if by returning to the        
,biblical idea of miracles1 as we       
propose1 we make a more comprehensive   
definition of miracles possible4        
,another advantage which we derive from 
returning to the ,biblical idea of      
miracles consists in the fact that it   

preserves us from the magical and       
necromantic in our conceptions of       
miracles2 that it allows us a grouping  
of miracles according to value1 which   
corresponds with the idea of ,god and of
 the divine government as well as with  
the idea of miracles itself2 and that in
 the presence of all single relations of
 miracles it summons us to criticise and
 investigate the real state of the case4
 ,for the nature of miracles does not   
consist in the inconceivable--at least  
not in the planless and arbitrary1--but 
in the fact that they call the attention
 of man to ,god and his government2 and 
this leads to the reverse of all that is
 magical and necromantic1 because the   
magical is unworthy of the idea of ,god 
and contradicts all the other           
self-testimony of ,god4 ,now if the     
nature of miracles consists in the fact 
that they call my attention to ,god and 
his government1 an event will become a  
miracle to me1 and increase its value1  
in the degree in which it refers me to  

,god and his government1 and especially 
in the degree in which it refers me to  
that government of ,god which is the    
most important to me--namely1 to the    
action of ,god in me and mankind1 with  
which he is bringing about his ends in  
salvation2 #cfg but in the degree in    
which an event loses this character1 it 
becomes to me an event without          
miraculous or religious significance4   
,this gives a quite definite grouping of
 miracles according to value1 from those
 which belong to the central            
manifestations of the divine plan of    
salvation and way of redemption1 to     
those which lie in the extreme periphery
 of religious interest4 ,it is a        
grouping which corresponds with the idea
 of ,god just as much as with the idea  
of miracles2 while all other divisions  
or groupings of miracles according to   
value1 which might take their principle 
of division and their weight from the   
greater or smaller conceivableness of   
the causal connection1 from the greater 

or smaller difference of a miraculous   
event from all other events1 are        
indifferent in reference to the idea of 
,god1 and change the centre of gravity  
in the idea of miracles4 ,besides1 if   
these miracles are to be real signs to  
me which refer me to ,god1 his          
government1 and his ways of salvation1  
they must1 in the first place1 in order 
to secure my conviction1 be real events 
and facts and not mere falsifications   
and fictions2 and this point leads us to
 the duty and right of criticising and  
investigating actual circumstances4 ,in 
presence of all ,biblical and           
non-,biblical miracles1 we have the full
 right and the full duty of using       
criticism in reference to the           
confirmation of actual circumstances1   
and where the latter cannot be          
established with certainty1 the question
 is in order whether the related event  
is really of such a character as to     
legitimate itself as a sign of ,god and 
his government4 ,in the preceding       

section1 we have had occasion to use    
this principle in reference to the      
investigation of that event which1 next 
to the coming of the ,redeemer1 offers  
itself to us as the #cfh central miracle
 of the history of salvation and        
redemption3 namely1 in reference to the 
history of the resurrection of the      
,lord4  ,we have by no means the wish to
 avoid difficulties which meet us1 when 
trying to bring miracles1 and especially
 the specific and pregnant miracles of  
the history of salvation1 into harmony  
with our scientific knowledge of the    
world3 only we can no longer admit that 
these difficulties consist in the       
inconceivableness or in the             
supernaturalism of miracles4 ,for to the
 religious view of the world--which     
traces equally the explicable as well as
 the inexplicable back to ,god1 which   
even derives the natural from the       
supernatural causality of ,god--neither 
the occasional inexplicability nor the  
supposed supernaturalness of an event   

can be that which makes the event a     
miracle4 ,but an event in the history of
 salvation becomes a miracle from the   
fact that something extraordinary1      
something new1 happens in it1 which by  
its newness and its extraordinary       
character presents itself to man as the 
manifestation of certain divine ends in 
salvation1 and can be explained at first
 sight1 but only at first sight1 from   
nothing else than from the service which
 it renders to the plan of redemption4  
,whether afterwards these extraordinary 
and new features can or cannot be       
perceived in their natural connection1  
or explained out of it1 does not at all 
change anything in the miraculous       
character of the event1 as soon as it   
has once had the before-mentioned       
effect4 ,the only task and the only     
difficulty which meets us in the        
question of miracles1 is to show that   
such extraordinary and new things really
 happen1 and to bring the reality and   
possibility of such new things into our 

perception of the #cfi causal connection
 of the course of the world1 conformable
 to law4 ,but it ceases to be a         
difficulty1 so soon as we acknowledge a 
teleology in the course of the world and
 a teleology in the history of mankind1 
and especially as soon as we acknowledge
 that teleology in the history of       
mankind which1 by the way of the divine 
means of redemption1 leads man back to  
,god4 ,where there are no ends1 nothing 
can happen which calls the attention of 
men to these ends2 nor1 indeed1 can     
anything new happen2 for nothing        
prevails in more absolute sovereignty to
 all eternity than the maxims causa quat
 effectum and effectus quat causam4 ,but
 where ends are appointed and reached1  
something new also happens2 and every   
new thing refers to its end4 ,for each  
step leading nearer such an end is      
something new1 and refers1 as soon as we
 compare it with preceding steps1 to the
 end towards which it strives4 ,all ends
 to which the course of things refers   

us1 are to the religious view of the    
world ends which are appointed by ,god2 
all means which serve to reach the ends1
 are means which ,god created and chose2
 and every phenomenon and every event   
which manifests this teleological       
government of ,god to our mind1 is a    
miracle to us4 ,now this whole course of
 the world is interwoven with such new  
things1 in events which manifest to us1 
now more clearly1 now more dimly1 the   
striving of the course of the world     
towards an end1 because the latter is   
really striving towards an end4 ,even   
prehistoric times show us new things    
which1 from a scientific and historical 
point of view1 we have to place in the  
line of the course of the world2 and    
from a religious point of view1 in the  
line of miracles4 ,the first appearance 
of organic life on earth was new1 and   
indicated new ends2 the first #cgj      
appearance of each single species of    
animals and plants was new2 new1 also1  
and indicating the highest end of       

creative life1 was the first appearance 
of man4 ,all these things we call       
miracles of creation2 and we especially 
place the creative miracle of the       
appearance of man on a level with the   
greatest miracles of which we have      
knowledge1 and use the name miracle for 
all before mentioned newly appearing    
formations1 whether or not we are able  
to explain those originations from the  
preceding connection of the course of   
nature and its forces4 ,now1 in the     
history of mankind1 where the           
intellectual and ethical motives of that
 which happens become active1 where also
 the greatest ends which come up for    
consideration are spiritual and ethical 
ends1 where man himself acts freely     
according to ends1 and where1 therefore1
 human and divine teleology come        
alternately into play1 the manifestation
 of a striving toward an end1 in which  
religious consciousness immediately sees
 also ends and means of ,god1 is        
repeated in an eminent degree4 ,every   

event which brings about a progress in  
the history of mankind as well as of    
individuals1 is as to this side         
something new1 extraordinary1           
teleological3 i4e41 a miracle to the    
religious mode of contemplation2 and    
this miracle is the greater as is more  
important the end under consideration1  
and the greater and the more decisive   
the step towards this end which the     
event accomplishes4 ,now1 if we         
recognize the return of mankind into a  
communion with ,god as the highest goal 
of the general and individual history of
 mankind1 and if we find in the latter  
facts which lead to this goal1 then     
these facts are the great central       
miracles of history4 ,as such1 the facts
 of redemption present #cga themselves  
with all that for which it once prepared
 the way2 and1 now that it has come1    
leads to full and complete              
perfection--and among them all1 the     
coming1 the person1 and the history of  
,jesus ,christ1 stands as central fact  

and central miracle in the midst of all 
events in the history of salvation1 and 
forms the central point of all religious
 interest4 ,we see how unjust it is when
 one urges1 as an objection to a belief 
in miracles1 that it assigns to ,god    
arbitrary and capricious actions4 ,we   
call the manifestations of divine       
teleology miracles4 ,but striving       
towards an end and conformity to a      
regular plan is not arbitrariness or    
caprice1 but the contrary2 and the      
greater our estimate of the highest     
cause of all things1 the greater will   
appear to us the conformity to a plan   
and to law of all which presents itself 
as miracles in the course of events4    
,there is perhaps one objection which is
 about as equally unjust as the         
objection of caprice2 and that is the   
objection that faith in miracles1 in    
teaching a belief in supernatural       
things1 lends to introduce into the     
course of events something which is     
against nature4 ,but since miracles1 as 

a sign of divine teleology1 manifest    
ends for which nature also is prepared1 
and through which the fallen nature of  
man1 fallen by sin1 is again restored2  
and since to the religious view of the  
world all natural phenomena and         
processes expressly rank among miracles1
 the faith in miracles teaches the      
contrary of an opposition to nature4 ,it
 is incontestible--and will become still
 clearer and more certain to us through 
all farther investigation of the        
subject--that the acknowledgment of the 
idea of miracles as a necessary and a   
justified part of religiousness #cgb    
stands and falls with the acknowledgment
 of a teleological view of the world4   
,we certainly do not indulge in the     
foolish hope that with the deductions of
 this section we should be able suddenly
 to win over any of the decided         
adversaries of faith in providence and  
miracles4 ,for1 as we have had occasion 
to remind the reader1 the acknowledgment
 or the non-acknowledgment of ,god and  

his living government in the world is   
not the result of this or that          
reflection and chain of conclusions1 but
 rather an ethical action of the centre 
of human personality in which ,god      
discovers himself in his                
self-manifestation4 ,now1 if this       
centre1 in the freedom of its decision1 
has once denied the acknowledgment of   
,god and his government1 then the       
intellectual actions of the soul offer  
themselves to this atheistic and        
anti-theistic standpoint1 and build up  
atheistic systems in which the ideas of 
providence and miracles naturally find  
no place4 ,thus system is opposed to    
system1 although the one is not able to 
overcome the other4 ,for the last and   
deepest power of conviction lies1       
neither for one nor the other system1 in
 its chains of conclusions1 in its      
superstructure1 but in its foundation1  
its standpoint1 and its principles2 and 
the choosing of one or the other        
standpoint1 the theistic or atheistic1  

is an ethical action which precedes     
methodical reasoning--or if it takes    
place at the same time or precedes it1  
has still deeper motives than those of  
more or less clear forms of mere        
reasoning4 ,but we believe1 and we wish 
and hope in our modest way to have shown
 by our present investigation1 that the 
standpoint of faith also has its logical
 and justified science1 and that it is  
able to appreciate the #cgc world of the
 real more universally and candidly1 and
 offers to logical reasoning fewer and  
less important difficulties1 than the   
systems of atheism4  ,we have now       
discussed all the essential and direct  
points of contacts between ,christianity
 and the theory of evolution4 ,but a    
remaining part1 still more closely      
related to the centre of the ,christian 
view of the world1 yet offers some      
indirect points of contact which demand 
treatment4   #e4 ,the ,redeemer and the 
,redemption4 ,the ,kingdom of ,god and  
the ,acceptance of ,salvation4  ,as soon

 as it is once an established fact that 
an evolution theory of the origin of man
 as a merely scientific theory permits  
all the valuable qualities of man1 when 
they have once come into existence1 to  
show themselves undiminished in their   
entire greatness and importance1 and    
must so permit them1 then the whole     
,christian view of the world1 of the    
,redeemer1 his person1 his course of    
redemption1 and his work1 remains       
entirely untouched by all these         
scientific theories of evolution4 ,yet  
the ,biblical representation1 the       
orthodox perception1 and the actual     
history of the ,redeemer and his work1  
present us with some evidences which are
 rather in sympathy than in antipathy   
with these scientific theories4 ,first1 
the long preparation for his birth1     
which began immediately after the fall  
of man and stretched over at least four 
thousand years1 perhaps over a much     
longer period1 the special preparation  
of his human genealogy1 the selection1  

separation1 and guidance of the ancestor
 and of the people of ,israel1 of the   
tribe1 the family1 and finally of the   
mother of ,jesus--all these are         
manifestly #cgd just as favorable to the
 idea of evolution as they would have   
been to the idea of a sudden creation of
 man out of nothing1 if ,christ1 the    
second ,adam1 had come into existence by
 a sudden creation4 ,moreover1 the      
,redeemer himself was wholly subject to 
the ordinary laws of development of the 
human individual1 and was1 from his     
annunciation and conception1 developed  
entirely like man in the long process of
 evolution from the egg and its still   
absolutely indifferent spiritual worth  
through all the imperceptible stages of 
development before and after the birth  
up to the full age of man4 ,likewise the
 result of his course of salvation1     
redemption1 and entrance into the       
kingdom of ,god1 underwent the same     
process of gradual development4 ,it     
began with a few disciples1 and was     

slowly propagated2 it has to-day reached
 but a small part of mankind1 and even  
where it took root1 it sees infinitely  
many things by its side which it has not
 yet been able to penetrate with its    
leaven3--facts which have much more     
elective affinity with the scientific   
ideas of development than with those of 
sudden creations4  ,finally1 precisely  
the same analogy forces itself upon us  
in the ,christian doctrine of the way of
 salvation4 ,the work of the ,holy      
,spirit in the human individual is      
nothing less than a new birth2 its aim  
is the revival of the entire man1 in    
mind1 soul1 and body4 ,in most men1 this
 work takes place by a slow process1    
advancing step by step4 ,this gradual   
course is even the rule in              
,christianized nations2 although a      
decisive change of mind often enough1   
though by no means always1 takes place  
in marked epochs of the inner history of
 life4 ,and in all ,christians--even in 
those whose conversion takes place by a 

sudden awakening1 like that of          
,paul--the #cge transformation of the   
entire man into the similarity of       
,christ1 and the full restoration of the
 image of ,god1 is certainly a process  
of development1 and must await its      
completion in the resurrection4 ,this   
view is also confirmed by the ,lord's   
parable of the seed1 growing up         
imperceptibly4  ,every believing        
,christian knows these facts1 and judges
 and acts according to them3 therefore1 
when in the realm of nature1 which ,god 
certainly submitted to the free         
investigation of the human mind1 he     
meets similar views1 what right has he  
to protest against them as being hostile
 to religion8   #f4 ,eschatology4  ,in  
our discussion of the preceding         
questions1 we have seen that an entirely
 neutral1 not to say friendly1          
relationship is taking place between    
religion and the theories of            
development1 which will continue so long
 as the latter keep within the limits of

 their proper realm1 the perception of  
nature2 and that a hostile relation     
takes place1 and anti-religious attacks 
are to be guarded against1 only when a  
disbelieving system of metaphysics1     
which has grown on other ground1 in an  
uncalled-for way1 tries to connect      
itself closely with the theory of       
descent4 ,this is in an eminent degree  
the case with the great eschatological  
hopes of ,christianity4 ,the evolution  
theory so exclusively contents itself   
with the attempts at perceiving the     
causal circumstances of organisms in the
 present world1 that it does not at all 
wish to1 and cannot1 express itself     
concerning the end and goal of the world
 and the laws and circumstances which   
may reign in a future on1 and that it   
gives free scope to every perception of 
the ultimate which might come from      
another source4 #cgf  ,on the other     
hand1 ,christian eschatology is alone   
able to do most essential service to the
 evolution theory1 in case it should be 

verified1 by giving an answer to        
questions to which the evolution theory 
tends more decidedly than any other     
scientific theory--namely1 to the       
questions as to the end of the world and
 mankind1 with such distinctions as no  
philosophy which treats of the doctrines
 of nature1 is able to give1 although   
natural science itself demands the      
answer to these questions the more      
peremptorily1 the higher the points of  
view are to which it leads us4  ,the    
world shows to every investigating eye a
 development1 whether we have to take   
this development as descent or as       
successive new creation2 and therefore  
we shall take1 in the following         
discussion1 the idea of development in  
this broad sense which comprises all    
conceivable attempts at explanation4    
,all nature--its most comprehensive     
cosmic realms as well as the realms of  
its smallest organisms--together with   
the corporeal1 psychical1 and spiritual 
nature of man1 shows a harmony1 a       

conformity to the end in view1 and a    
striving toward an end of its           
development1 the denial of which will   
certainly not add to the laurels which  
transmit the scientific fame of our     
present generation to posterity4 ,now1  
what is this end8 ,the answer which we  
receive from those who reject ,christian
 eschatology1 may be given by two       
scientific antipodes3 by ,strauss and   
,eduard von ,hartmann4 ,strauss takes   
sides with those who reject all striving
 toward an end in nature2 and his answer
 to the question 7which still asserts   
itself in his system of the world71 is3 
eternal circular motion of the universe1
 death of all individuals and of all    
complexes of individuals1 even of #cgg  
mankind4 ,eduard von ,hartmann1 on the  
other hand1 is filled by the knowledge  
of the teleological1 but he rejects the 
hope of ,christians and the end which   
offers itself to him in the place of the
 rejected end of ,christian hope1 is    
destruction--destruction of all         

individuals and destruction of the      
world4 ,in view of such ends1 is not the
 ,christian's hope the answer which not 
only satisfies the deepest ethical and  
religious need1 but also all heights and
 depths of the most faithful1 most      
devoted1 and most enlightened           
investigation of nature8  ,finally1 we  
have still another eschatological       
conclusion to mention and reject2 a     
conclusion which is drawn from this     
theory by the advocates of the evolution
 theory4 ,it opens the perspective into 
a future development of still higher    
beings out of man4 ,in abstracto1 we can
 naturally make no objection to the     
possibility of such a development1 as   
soon as we once accept the evolution    
theory2 but we have to object to the    
supposition of such a process in        
infinitum4 ,for such a process would    
certainly be interrupted by the final   
destruction of the globe2 and in case   
the mechanico-naturalistic view of the  
world should be right1 this destruction 

would be only the more cruel as would be
 more highly organized the beings which 
should find their destruction in this   
inevitable catastrophe4 ,moreover1 as we
 have repeatedly seen1 a development in 
infinitum suffers from a                
self-contradiction3 for development     
involves an end1 and this end must      
certainly have been once reached4 ,now1 
if we have reason to assume that this   
end has been reached in the development 
of the inhabitants of the globe1 by the 
creature being in the image of ,god and 
his child1 and that it is also reached  
in fallen man through redemption #cgh   
and its perfection1 then the idea of    
development1 it is true1 allows and     
postulates a relative development of    
mankind1 so long as this takes place    
within the limits of the now valid laws 
of the universe1--a development towards 
the perfection of this likeness to ,god 
and filial relationship2 but that idea  
of development has no longer an         
influence that would lead to the        

production of new beings which should be
 more than man4  ,with the foregoing1 we
 believe that we have discussed all     
essential points of the relation between
 religion and ,darwinism2 and we now    
proceed to the last part of our         
investigation4         99       99      
99       99       99   #cgi  ,b4 ,,the  
,,darwinian ,,theories ,,and ,,morality4
  ,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,darwinism ,,and   
,,moral ,,principles4   #a4 ,darwinistic
 ,naturalism and ,moral ,principles4    
,if we consider the ethical consequences
 of a view of the world which1          
proceeding from ,darwinism1 permits the 
universe1 man included1 to be taken up  
into a mechanism of atoms--a mechanism  
in which everything1 even the ethical   
action of man1 finds its sufficient     
explanation--we certainly cannot        
perceive how such a view of the world is
 able to arrive at firm moral           
principles4 ,if man1 even in his        
spiritual life and moral action1 is a   
mere product of nature1 originated      

through descent1 and if his whole       
spiritual life is fully consumed by     
these merely mechanical factors1 then   
all moral principles are also nothing   
else than inherited customs founded upon
 those instincts which in the struggle  
for existence have proven to be the most
 beneficial to man4 ,then their         
influence is subject to continual       
change1 always corresponding to the     
existing state of human development4 ,as
 these moral instincts have displaced   
the former instincts of the animal      
predecessors of man--say1 e4g41 of      
sharks1 of marsupialia1 of lemurides--so
 they must #chj also expect it any time 
to be displaced in turn by new and still
 more useful instincts4 ,and even in the
 same period of the development of      
mankind1 the moral or immoral principles
 which have actual authority in each    
nation or tribe1 have their full right  
of existence as long as they are not    
displaced by still more advantageous    
instincts4 ,moral principles in which   

infanticide1 prostitution1 and          
cannibalism have a place1 are inferior  
to the highest form of ,christian       
morality only so far as they do not hold
 their own in the struggle for          
existence1 when nations having those low
 views come into collision with nations 
of higher moral culture2 but in         
themselves they have full value and full
 right1 so long as they attain the end  
of all instincts1 and so far as we can  
speak of ends at all2 in such           
naturalism1 apart from human activity1  
the end consists only in the            
preservation of the individual and the  
species in the struggle for existence4  
,under these suppositions1 moral        
principles not only lose their objective
 and solid consistency in the mass of   
mankind1 but they also become           
irrevocably subject to the arbitrariness
 of the single individual4 ,an          
individual who either has not1 or       
asserts that he has not1 a determined   
moral instinct1 or who allows it to be  

smothered by some other instinct which  
in a normal individual is subordinate1  
but in him stronger1 is fully justified 
in his immoral action so long as he is  
successful with it4 ,every individual is
 entirely his own master and his own    
judge4 ,if man is morally good1 it may  
be the consequence of an especially     
happy individual disposition1 or of an  
especially clear perception1 or of happy
 circumstances and influences2 but it is
 not the consequence of a free          
subordination under the authority #cha  
of a moral law2 for there is neither    
freedom nor an objective moral          
authority4 ,the single man is but the   
product of a certain sum and mixture of 
powers of nature1 acting of necessity1  
which may with him turn out fortunately 
or unfortunately4 ,if1 on the other     
hand1 man is morally perverted1 society 
may defend itself against his           
perversity2 wisdom may try to convince  
him of the bad consequences of his      
perversity for himself and society2 the 

effect of his perversity may make him   
sensible of the bad consequences of his 
actions3 but there is no other          
objectively valid corrective of his     
perversity4 ,if he is successful in his 
immoral action1 and if he silences his  
conscience1 this voice of the unobserved
 higher instinct in favor of the        
preferred lower--which unfortunately1 as
 is well known1 succeeds oftenest and   
most easily in the case of those whose  
perversity has become the most habitual1
 and in whom another grouping of        
instincts would be most desirable--then 
the whole affair is settled1 and he is  
absolved4 ,let us be understood         
correctly4 ,we do not say that all      
advocates of mechanical or monistic     
ethics draw these conclusions in        
reality2 we know very well that many a  
man is better than his system2 but it   
seems to us inevitable that the logical 
pursuit of that naturalistic principle  
leads to this dissolution of all solid  
fundamentals of moral principles1 and   

that it is but an inconsequence1        
certainly worthy of honor and of notice1
 if all the advocates of naturalism do  
not profess this dissolution of all     
moral principles with the same cynic    
frankness that is shown by many of their
 partisans4  ,we do not say too much1   
when we charge ethical naturalism with  
dissolution of all moral principles4    
,let #chb us examine them1 for a moment1
 according to the old but still         
fundamental division into duty1 virtue1 
and highest good4  ,according to the    
principles of that ethical naturalism1  
there can be no duty at all1 no         
objective moral law1 binding absolutely 
and in general4 ,the motives of action  
are either the strongest and most       
durable instincts1 or1 in case of high  
culture1 conventional agreement of that 
which benefits society4 ,in the one as  
well as in the other case1 when the duty
 is neglected1 the appeal is not made to
 something absolutely objective and     
binding1 but either to the highest      

instinct 7and to this every individual  
has the right to answer with a ,quod    
nego71 or to agreement and custom2 and  
as to this1 every individual has the    
right to make his reformatory or        
revolutionary attempt at change--of     
course only upon the condition that his 
attempt is successful1 and that it      
stands proof4  ,relatively it is easiest
 for ethical naturalism to establish a  
principle of virtue1 inasmuch as we have
 to look upon virtue as the principle of
 individual perfection1 and inasmuch as 
even naturalism1 by means of the        
indestructible impulse of man to attain 
moral ideas1 can postulate an ideal of  
human action4 ,but on closer examination
 even the naturalistic idea of virtue   
vanishes under our hands4 ,virtue1 as   
individual morality1 is constituted of  
the factors of duty and of the highest  
good1 which form the motives of virtuous
 action4 ,now a system of morality      
which1 as we have seen1 is entirely     
wanting in an objective solid principle 

of duty as the motive of action1 and    
which likewise1 as we shall see         
immediately1 is wanting in an           
objectively established highest good as 
the end of action1 cannot possibly #chc 
produce any other idea of virtue than an
 abstract formal one4 ,in ethical       
naturalism1 even this form is subject to
 change4 ,for1 according to this system1
 not only the motive and end but also   
the form of moral action depend on that 
which in every circle of society and at 
every time proves to be the most        
successful form4 ,it is the proof of    
success or failure which gives this form
 a certain traditional authority and a  
relative solidity--but only a relative  
one1 and only until it is displaced by a
 still more successful form4  ,that1    
finally1 ethical naturalism is also     
wanting in an objective end of moral    
action1 in the idea and meaning of the  
highest good1 is indeed not denied by   
naturalism itself4 ,it is true it speaks
 with predilection of the idea of       

species1 which man is to represent and  
to realize1 and in that respect we can  
say that the highest good of            
naturalistic ethologists is the species 
or the idea of species4#aa ,but the idea
 of species is only the empty vessel    
which first becomes valuable by reason  
of its contents4 ,now1 if we ask ethical
 naturalism the properties with which   
that idea of species is to be endowed1  
it certainly mentions properties1 but   
those which are too rich2 namely1 it    
mentions the idea of all that is good in
 human life and the forms of human life1
 in concreto1 the whole sum of all the  
conditions and acquisitions of the      
culture of mankind1 art1 nature1 and    
science3 the comprehensive idea of these
 acquisitions1 the enjoyment of them1   
the work at them1 is the highest good4  
,now1 since no human individual can     
enjoy them all and work at them all at  
the same time1 every individual1 as #chd
 to disposition1 inclination1 and       
circumstances1 has to enjoy a part of   

them1 to work at a part of them1 and to 
renounce a part of them4 ,and since each
 single one of these good things1       
however valuable to the individual1 may 
be refused to or taken away from him1 he
 has again to learn to be satisfied with
 that idea of species1 however little it
 is able to offer him1 when separated   
from the empiric possessions of this    
earthly life4 ,thus with naturalism the 
highest good is either mentioned in an  
abstraction which does not offer us     
anything1 or which1 if we ask the       
meaning of that abstraction1 is         
instantly drawn down into the low sphere
 and the varied multiformity of         
empirical and individual life1 left to  
the chance of individual taste1 and     
confounded with that which is connected 
with the highest good only in the second
 line and in a derived manner--namely1  
with the formations and actions of life 
which strive at and serve the           
realization of the highest good4        
,ethical naturalism is not able to      

produce out of itself an objective      
highest good which is for each          
individual alike attractive1 rich1 and  
comprehensive4  ,moreover1 since ethical
 naturalism proves itself insufficient  
for the principles of any and all       
morality1 it is but a natural conclusion
 that it is still less able to produce  
those principles which are              
characteristic of the highest           
representation of human morality known  
to mankind1 namely3 ,christian morality4
 ,ethical monism has no room for three  
ethical fundamental views1 whose full   
possession morality owes to             
,christianity1 and which gives to       
,christian morality its highest motive  
power4 ,one of these is a deeper        
conception of evil as a sin1 as a       
positive rebellion against the good2    
another is faith in a future #che       
absolute realization of the highest good
 in an end sometime to be reached by    
mankind and the individual and by means 
of a moral order of the world2 and the  

third is the acknowledgment of the full 
worth of personality4 ,evil--to which of
 course no objective valid moral law1   
but only one conventionally established1
 stands opposed--is to ethical          
naturalism nothing but the action of an 
instinct which in this given case is not
 beneficial to man in his struggle for  
existence2 the category of good and evil
 is entirely replaced by the category of
 the useful and detrimental4 ,with the  
disappearance of the idea of sin as a   
transgression of the divine law1 the    
correlated idea of holiness also        
disappears from the system of ethical   
naturalism4 ,besides1 blessedness1      
complete harmony of the outer and inner 
man with the ideal in the state of      
mankind as well as of every individual1 
complete realization of the highest good
 for the whole as well as for the single
 through the means of moral work and    
perfection on the part of man and of    
holy and loving guidance and endowment  
on the part of ,god1 is an aim which    

naturalism is not able to acknowledge1  
since1 according to it1 mankind and     
individuals continue in the ever-flowing
 stream of earthly incompletion until   
both reach their destiny in             
annihilation4 ,a moral order of the     
world is an impossibility to it1 since  
no holy and loving ,ruler and ,governor 
of the world1 but only a blind          
mechanism1 causes the course of things4 
,finally1 the personality of man can be 
only perceived in its worth and in its  
full importance1 when1 in the first     
place1 it is in the possession of       
freedom1 of full moral responsibility2  
and when1 in the second place1 it lives 
beyond the span of its short earthly    
existence and may hope for a full       
realization of #chf all its ideals of   
virtue and the highest good for itself  
as well as for mankind4 ,both these     
points must be contested by monism and  
naturalism4 ,the place of freedom is    
taken by absolute determinism2 even man 
is only a natural product1 the highest  

which naturalism knows1 but still no    
more than a product of nature2 his      
personality and his life1 bound to the  
material body1 cease with the death of  
this body1 and therefore never reach the
 ideal of either morality or            
blessedness4 ,all ideals are and must   
forever remain objective illusions which
 came forth out of the power of the     
corresponding noble impulse1 imaginative
 objective conceptions of the moral     
impulses4   #b4 ,scientific ,darwinism  
and ,moral ,principles4  ,whilst        
,darwinistic naturalism surely injures  
the moral principles1 the ,darwinistic  
theories are friendly to them1 if they1 
as mere scientific theories1 restrain   
themselves within the limits of natural 
science4 ,but in no other point of the  
entire realm of contact between the     
natural and intellectual sciences is it 
more difficult to observe the           
boundary-line than in reflecting upon   
the moral self-determination of man2    
here natural science is always in danger

 of going beyond its limits4  ,in the   
question as to the relation of the      
evolution theories to religion1 the     
boundary-line can everywhere be easily  
drawn in theory and easily observed in  
practice4 ,for it is entirely natural   
for man to look upon the phenomena of   
the visible world on the one hand1 with 
a religious mind1 as works and actions  
of an almighty ,creator and ,ruler of   
the world1 on the other1 with his       
observing and reflecting mind1 as       
products of natural causes4 ,with this  
double view1 man by no means feels #chg 
himself dragged hither and thither      
between two conflicting views2 he is    
able in his logical contemplation of the
 world scientifically to establish and  
arrange each for itself and both in     
their harmony1 and has the full         
consciousness that the one1 like the    
other1 has subjective as well as        
objective truth4 ,or1 if a single       
individual does not have this           
consciousness1 he must at least admit   

that it is not ,darwinism primarily     
which created the difficulty of this    
combined view of the world1 but that the
 latter existed for man in the past as  
well as in the present4  ,but the       
relation of the ,darwinian theories to  
ethical problems is quite a different   
thing4 ,here1 in the first place1 it is 
not the same process which is to be     
explained as well in regard to its      
natural conditions as to its moral      
cause4 ,it is true that this double view
 deserves attention in so far as we can 
look upon every action which results    
from a moral determination also in      
reference to its natural side4 ,if ,i   
have to raise my arm in consequence of a
 moral determination1 then physiology   
and mechanism can demonstrate with it   
the whole theory of the motion of       
members4 ,but this is not the question1 
when we treat of the relation between   
the natural and the ethical4 ,in this   
example1 the moralist examines the      
motives of my action1 the scientist     

describes and explains the activity of  
the nerves and muscles of my arm1 and as
 long as the scientist is not guilty of 
going beyond the boundary to which he is
 tempted1 and which even now we are     
endeavoring to make clear1 as long as he
 does not include the ethical motives in
 his physiological attempts at          
explanation1 the one keeps himself      
neutral with reference to the other2    
each of them knows that he is #chh      
operating in a field which at first has 
nothing in common with that of the      
other4 ,in a moral action1 as such1 the 
question is no longer as to a process   
which is to be explained as well in     
regard to its natural conditions as to  
its ethical cause1 but of a process     
which either has its ethical cause1 and 
then in its ethical value no natural    
cause1 or which even in its ethical     
motives belongs to the causal connection
 of empirical nature with its           
indestructible chain of natural causes  
and natural effects4 ,now at this point 

the scientist1 as such1 is always       
exposed to the danger of denying the    
first part of our dilemma and affirming 
the second4 ,for1 in moral action1      
something which is elevated above nature
 and its causal connection always makes 
its way into this causal connection of  
nature1 and with its action and the     
effects of this action wholly enters    
into this connection3 and natural       
science which has to deal particularly  
with this causal connection of nature   
and with it alone1 is on that account   
nevertheless always tempted to explain  
everything that it sees coming into this
 connection1 in all its causes 7even in 
those which no longer belong to this    
natural causal connection71 out of it4  
,it is therefore always tempted to trace
 even ethical action which1 with its    
deeds1 makes its way and enters into    
this causal connection1 but which with  
its motives stands above it1 as to its  
motives1 back to a natural causal       
connection2 and thus to contest the     

independence of ethical motives and     
their principles--which independence is 
not dependent on nature1 but1 on the    
contrary1 frequently contradicts it4    
,ethics must adhere to the fact that the
 ethical determination of the will has  
its origin not in a natural condition1  
but in the ethical centre of            
personality2 although all the conditions
 under which the ethical motive #chi    
originates and acts1 belong completely  
to the causal connection of natural     
life1 in which man himself stands as to 
the whole natural part of his being4    
,the ethical realm stands above the     
natural realm1 and shows its superiority
 partly by the category of moral demands
 whose imperativeness cannot have grown 
out of the mechanical necessity of the  
natural law1 because it often enough    
contradicts the latter and carries out  
its demands in opposition to it1 partly 
by the consciousness of individual      
responsibility which cannot be got rid  
of even by him who mentally establishes 

a system of determinism that denies     
responsibility1 partly by the voice of  
the injured conscience which cannot     
merely be the dislike of a dissatisfied 
higher natural impulse1 when it can     
speak of the same action for years1 even
 for an entire human life1 and even1    
where man has counterbalanced that once 
felt dissatisfaction of the higher      
impulse1 by an oft-repeated satisfaction
 of it4 ,in ,book ,i1 ,chapter ,v1  #a1 
we tried to show that even ,darwin seems
 not to have entirely avoided this      
danger of explaining the moral from     
physical causes2 while at the same time 
we acknowledge that he otherwise esteems
 the realm of the moral1 and that he    
even finds the lofty position of man    
above the animal world still more       
decidedly expressed in his moral than in
 his intellectual qualities4  ,but such 
an intrusion of the physical into the   
ethical is by no means a necessary      
consequence of scientific               
,darwinism--only an ever-present        

temptation of it4 ,he who once admits   
that even by means of development       
something new can originate1 that even  
under the full influence of the         
evolution theory there appeared in the  
series of creation entirely new         
phenomena with the #cij appearance of   
life and the organic1 and of sensation  
and consciousness1 and still more with  
the appearance of self-consciousness and
 freedom1 which phenomena no evolution  
theory is able to explain2 and he who   
takes into consideration the weight of  
that other obvious fact that1 in the    
origin and the growth of each single    
man1 a time in which he acts with moral 
responsibility follows in gradual       
development a time in which he had but  
the value and the life of a cell1--such 
an one can explain the whole origin of  
mankind according to the evolution      
theory1 and yet see something absolutely
 new coming forth with the appearance of
 moral determination4 ,all conditions of
 the moral determinations of the will   

may be and are naturally conditioned1   
as1 indeed1 in this world the entire    
spiritual life of man is certainly bound
 to the conditions of his corporeal     
life2 all preliminary stages of moral   
types which preceded the temporal       
appearance of moral beings1 and which   
surround us still1 those stages which   
appear in the animal world1 may have    
preceded and prepared the way for the   
introduction of morally responsible     
beings into the world3 the moral        
determination of the will itself        
nevertheless remains something new and  
independent--something which transcends 
nature4  ,if this fact is once admitted1
 then ethics also has free play to      
establish independently and render valid
 its principles4 ,and then we have no   
longer any reason to treat of the       
relation of the different ethical       
principles to naturo-historical         
,darwinism2 for this relation is that of
 absolute mutual peace4         99      
99       99       99       99 #cia      

,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,darwinism ,,and      
,,moral ,,life4   #a4 ,darwinistic      
,naturalism and ,moral ,life4           
,precisely the same relationship between
 ,darwinism and morality1 which we found
 in treating of moral principles1       
presents itself when we ask about the   
relationship of ,darwinistic ideas and  
moral life in its concrete reality4 ,he 
who builds a system of monistic         
naturalism upon his ,darwinism1 if he is
 logical1 and not better than his       
system1 comes into inevitable collision 
with concrete moral life2 while he who  
limits his ,darwinism to the realm of   
natural science1 remains in concrete    
life in peace with morality4  ,that     
,darwinistic ethical naturalism also    
comes into conflict with concrete moral 
life1 becomes evident from the joy with 
which the advocates of subversion and   
negation greet the new principle of the 
struggle for existence1 and make it the 
principle of their own actions and      
social theories4 ,this is not chance    

sympathy1 but is founded upon the nature
 of ethical naturalism4 ,of him who     
learns to look upon himself only as a   
product of nature1 though highly        
ennobled1 we cannot expect any other    
principle than that of following his    
nature3 not1 indeed1 the ideal nature of
 man--for this is an abstraction which  
man reaches only by means of a long #cib
 process of reflection--but his own     
empirical nature1 as he finds it present
 in himself2 for this is indeed that    
natural product as which man has to     
consider himself according to that      
theory4 ,where this leads to1 everybody 
knows who knows human nature4 ,if these 
consequences are not to be found in all 
ethical naturalists1 and if they are    
perhaps the least evident in the system 
and life of the very ones who otherwise 
teach naturalism the most logically     
7,strauss1 for example71 we again most  
cheerfully admit that many men are      
better than their systems1 and that in  
making objection to a system1 even an   

ethical system1 we in the first place do
 not say anything at all about the      
advocates of this system and their moral
 value4 ,often enough some noble and    
fruitful truth has been advocated by men
 who are personally contemptible1 and   
often enough some dangerous error is    
propagated by men who are personally    
very amiable and moral1 although the    
damage which such an error carries with 
it1 must become evident in their lives1 
on closer observation4 ,besides1 we must
 not overlook the fact1 that what in a  
perverse system is still relatively     
true1 and the thing which gives it a    
relative vitality1 is borrowed from     
truth and from the correct system2 and  
that all those who oppose the present   
fundamentals of morality1 and especially
 of ,christian morality1 in a thousand  
ways live upon and consume the          
possessions which they owe to the same  
influences against which they contend4  
,but to whatever relative height the    
moral nobility of single advocates of   

ethical naturalism may rise1 it is not  
able1 at least not from its own         
principles1 to produce thoroughly moral 
and truly cultivated characters2 such   
are only produced where that which forms
 the character1 #cic flows out of a     
spring of life whose origin is above    
nature and its series of causes4  ,from 
this we see that for the most part a    
very low idea of personality1 a very low
 derivation of the motives of human     
action1 is found in the works of        
,darwinistic moralists--as1 e4g41 we    
have seen in the works of ,hckel that to
 him the idea of a personality of ,god  
is inseparably connected with the idea  
of capricious arbitrariness1 and that he
 derives all actions of all men from the
 motives of egoism4  ,but we also see1  
from still more common evidences1 the   
fact that some of the very highest      
blossoms and noblest fruits of human    
virtue1 as they ripen on the ground of  
,christian morality1 are not even       
acknowledged1 much less required1 by    

ethical naturalism4 ,we think           
particularly of the virtues of love1 of 
self-denial1 and of humility4           
,certainly1 we do not deny that men who 
are inclined toward naturalism can and  
do possess love to a certain degree1 but
 the highest exemplification of love1   
the love of enemies in the fullest sense
 of the word--not only compassion on the
 battle-field1 but the full1 forgiving1 
blessing love which renders good for    
evil1 and even intercedes for a personal
 enemy1 although he may be the          
intentional and successful destroyer of 
our whole earthly happiness--such a love
 may perhaps be demanded and admired by 
a naturalistic moralist under the       
imposing influence of the presence of   
such a love and in unconscious          
dependence on the motives of            
,christianity which surround him2 but he
 will never be able to show from what   
point of his system it is to be deduced4
 ,on the other hand1 it is easy to show 
him more than one point of his system   

which1 far from requiring such love1    
#cid stigmatizes it as simple           
foolishness4 ,such a fruit only ripens  
under the care of him who gave his life 
for us while we still were enemies1 and 
under the influence of the remission of 
our sin by our ,heavenly ,father4       
,moreover1 an ethical naturalist can    
also accomplish much in self-denial3 he 
can make many great sacrifices1 if he   
can thereby reach a desirable end that  
cannot be reached without acts of       
self-denial2 he can show great strength 
and patience in a resigned endurance of 
the inevitable2 and if we take into     
consideration the possibility of its    
being logically at variance with his    
system1 he may perform all that which   
the highest morality requires4 ,but a   
renunciation which is more than silent  
resignation1 and which under certain    
circumstances can also become a joyful  
renunciation of all that was beloved and
 dear to man on earth1 does not grow out
 of the soil of naturalism1 and is      

possible only there where man carries in
 himself a possession which would render
 him still more fortunate and happy than
 the idea of species1 and where he knows
 the cross of ,jesus1 and understands   
the word of the ,lord3 ,he that loveth  
his life shall lose it2 and he that     
loseth his life for my sake1 shall find 
it4 ,strauss is a striking proof that   
naturalism is not able to estimate the  
tasks of self-denial at their full      
importance4 ,in his ,the ,old ,faith and
 the ,new1 although he speaks with great
 earnestness of moral demands1 yet he   
deeply degrades that which is connected 
with a ,christian renunciation of self  
and the world1 when he reproaches       
,christianity with a thorough cult of   
poverty and mendicity 767 and1 regarding
 its demand for self-denial1 he denies  
that it has any comprehension of the    
tasks of #cie industry1 of the virtues  
of home and family life1 of patriotism  
and civil virtue4  ,finally1 we may make
 a similar statement in regard to       

humility4 ,there certainly are ethical  
naturalists also who are modest4 ,but   
when the prophets of ethical naturalism 
again and again announce that the great 
aim of all the discoveries of the       
evolution theory is to show us how far  
mankind has fortunately progressed2 when
 their spirit of devotion is nourished  
by ,gthe's ,promethean word3 ,hast thou 
not thyself accomplished all1 thou holy 
glowing heart8--and even when ,hckel    
prints as the leading motto of his      
,anthropogeny ,gthe's poem ,prometheus2 
when the struggle of selection is also  
elevated to a moral principle1 and the  
life-task of an individual is limited to
 creating elbow-room for himself3 then  
humility1 indeed1 is a virtue which a   
naturalist may acquire1 not through his 
naturalism1 but in spite of it2 and the 
great navet with which1 in books of that
 tendency1 haughtiness and passion for  
glory are treated as something          
necessarily understood1 and their own   
ego is glorified1 is a much more logical

 result4 ,we are proud of having so     
immensely out-stripped our lower animal 
ancestors1 and derive from it the       
consoling assurance that in future also1
 mankind1 as a whole1 will follow the   
glorious career of progressive          
development1 and attain a still higher  
degree of mental perfection4 7,hckel1   
,hist4 of ,creat47 ,this is the theme   
which is repeated in many variations in 
all books of similar tendency4 ,in the  
same book already referred to1 we read3 
,each free and highly developed         
individual1 each original person1 has   
his own religion1 his own ,god2 so it is
 certainly not arrogance when we also   
claim the #cif right of forming our own 
idea of ,god4 ,or1 ,the recognition of  
the theory of development and the       
monistic philosophy based upon it forms 
the best criterion for the degree of    
man's mental development4 ,l4 ,bchner1  
in his collection of essays1 ,aus ,natur
 und ,welt 7,from ,nature and the       
,world71 dedicates a long chapter to    

self-glorification1 and finds confirmed 
in himself the word of the poet1 ,great 
destinies are always preceded by spirit 
messengers2 and he1 still living1       
prefaces his own biography in the latest
 edition of ,kraft und ,stoff 7,force   
and ,matter71 and on the first page of  
the same publishes the testimonial which
 he received1 when leaving the          
gymnasium3 ,the bearer of this          
testimonial excelled in the thorough    
study of literature1 philosophy1 and    
poetry1 and as regards style in his     
productions showed an excellent talent4 
,in view of these things1 we certainly  
do no injustice to this tendency when we
 deny to it the conception of the idea  
and the practice of humility4   #b4     
,scientific ,darwinism and ,moral ,life4
  ,it is evident from the peace-relation
 between mere scientific ,darwinism and 
moral principles1 that naturo-historical
 ,darwinism also remains in peace with  
moral life4 ,we therefore have no longer
 to treat of any question of competency 

in the realm of concrete moral life1 but
 only to mention the points of contact  
in which both realms1 fully             
acknowledging their mutual independence1
 yet in an inferior way exercise some   
beneficial influence upon each other4   
#cig  ,moral life influences ,darwinism 
in so far as1 by its mere existence1 it 
cautions the advocate of the scientific 
evolution theory against effacing the   
differences between the moral and the   
natural1 and against degrading man to   
the level of animals on account of his  
connection with the animal world4 ,the  
naturo-historical idea of evolution1 in 
case it should turn out to be correct1  
would exercise an influence upon moral  
life in a three-fold direction3 ,first1 
it would add to all the motives of the  
humane treatment of the animal          
world--which certainly without it       
already has moral demands--a new one1   
and establish them all more firmly4 ,man
 would then recognize in the animal     
world which surrounds him branches of   

his own natural pedigree1 and exercise  
his right of mastery only in the sense  
which ,alex4 ,braun expresses1 when he  
says3 ,man consents to the idea of being
 appointed master of animals2 but then  
he must also acknowledge that he is not 
placed over his subjects as a stranger1 
but proceeded from the people itself1   
whose master he wishes to be4 ,a second 
service which the idea of evolution     
would have to render to the forming of  
moral life1 would consist in the fact   
that it would favor all those ethical   
modes of contemplation and those maxims 
which regard the gradual process of     
development and the growth of character 
as the relative power of influences and 
conditions1 and that it would give them 
hints for the perception of moral       
growth1 in like manner as1 in the       
before-mentioned parable1 the ,lord     
illustrates the imperceptible and       
continual growth of the kingdom of ,god 
with the growth of a plant4 ,a third    
service which the evolution theory might

 be able #cih to render to moral life1  
would consist in the fact that it would 
give to the motive of perfection and    
progress1 which is always and everywhere
 a moral lever1 a new illustration and a
 new weight by pointing at the progress 
which development has to show in the    
life of nature4         99       99     
99       99       99 #cii               
,,conclusion4  ,if now1 having reached  
our goal1 we look back upon the way     
which we have traversed1 we find a      
justification of the regret expressed at
 the beginning1 that a scientific       
treatment of religion and morality is   
compelled to take a position in regard  
to theories which are not yet           
established4 ,we found the most         
different problems--scientific1         
naturo-philosophical1 metaphysical1     
religious and ethical--inextricably     
mixed1 and were obliged1 as one of our  
first tasks1 to make an attempt at      
finding the clew and at examining and   
testing each single problem1 together   

with attempts at its solution1          
separately1 although keeping constantly 
in mind its connection with all other   
problems and their attempts at solution4
 ,we found ourselves led into the       
presence of a series of the most        
interesting problems1 but not a single  
solution finished4 ,that very attempt at
 solution which brought up this whole   
question1 and which was repeatedly      
announced as the infallible key to the  
solution of all scientific problems--the
 selection theory--we found a decided   
failure1 at least in the direction of   
the extension and importance which was  
given to this theory4 ,and yet in spite 
of the hypothetical nature of all       
attempts at solution1 we see            
investigators in all the realms of      
natural science strongly attracted by   
the very promising character of these   
problems and busily engaged in making   
attempts at solution2 #djj and we see   
even philosophy strongly attracted by   
its interest in these works4 ,such a    

diligent work can certainly not be      
without gain2 but wherein will this gain
 consist8 ,will it1 as its antagonists  
prophecy1 be like that which in former  
times alchemy brought to science1 which1
 indeed1 enriched chemistry by an entire
 series of new discoveries1 but did not 
find what it sought1 the one fundamental
 element from which all the rest are    
derived1 which only confirmed1 with a   
power acknowledged even to-day1 the old 
doctrine of the elementary difference of
 the elements8 ,will the ,darwinian     
investigations thus also make all       
possible discoveries by the way1 but in 
place of that which they look for1 in   
place of a common pedigree or of a few  
pedigrees for all organisms1 finally    
only give additional strength to the    
permanence of species and the           
unapproachableness of the secret of     
their origin8 ,or can we derive from the
 reasons which the investigators urge in
 favor of the idea of an origin of      
species through descent and evolution1  

the hope that that mysterious darkness  
of prehistoric times upon which the     
works of our century have shed so much  
light1 will still be illuminated even to
 the sources from which organic species 
came1 and from which mankind also       
originated8 ,we must leave the decision 
of these questions to the future and to 
scientists4  ,but we have to note one   
gain1 which is so great that on its     
account1 we willingly cease our regret  
in regard to the unfinished condition of
 these theories2 for we owe the full    
enjoyment of this gain to that very     
unfinished condition4 ,it is the gain   
which religion and morality get from    
these investigations1 and which consists
 in the new and comprehensive           
confirmation of the conviction1 #dja    
which1 indeed1 was established before1  
that religion and morality--,christian  
religion and ,christian morality--rest  
on foundations which can no longer be   
shaken by any result of exact           
investigation4  ,the triumph with which 

the ,darwinian theories were greeted by 
many as the new sun before whose rising 
all that mankind had thus far called    
light and sun turns pale1 and the       
antipathy with which1 on that very      
account1 many to whom their religious   
and ethical acquisitions are a sacred   
sanctuary1 turn away from these         
theories1 urged us to investigate their 
position in reference to religion and   
morality4 ,now1 if these theories had   
produced a certain undoubted result1 we 
should unquestionably have been         
satisfied with the examination of the   
position of religion and morality in    
reference to this certain result4 ,but  
since not a single result of those      
investigations is really established1 we
 have found ourselves obliged to give   
our investigation a much greater        
extension and to discuss even all       
imaginable possibilities4 ,the          
beneficial result of this comparison    
was1 that religion and morality not only
 remain at peace with all imaginable    

possibilities of scientific theories1   
but can also1 in the realm of the       
philosophy of the doctrines of nature1  
be passive spectators of all            
investigations and attempts1 even of all
 possible excursions into the realm of  
fancy1 without being obliged to         
interfere4 ,it is in the realm of mere  
metaphysics that we first perceive an   
antagonist whose victory would indeed be
 fatal to the religious and ethical     
acquisitions of mankind3 this antagonist
 is called elimination from nature of   
the idea of design4 ,fortunately1 this  
metaphysical idea is in such striking   
opposition not only to the whole world  
of facts but also to all logical #djb   
reasoning1 it has everywhere1 where man 
perceives organization and a difference 
between lower and higher1 especially in 
the contemplation of the world1 of this 
cosmos of wonderful order and beauty1 so
 decidedly all philosophical as well as 
all exact sciences as its adversaries1  
it lays its hands so rudely and so      

destructively not only upon the         
religious and ethical acquisitions but  
also upon all ideal remaining           
acquisitions of mankind1 that religion  
and morality know1 when fighting this   
adversary1 they are in firm accord with 
all the spiritual interests of mankind4 
,this1 in its most essential features1  
is the pleasing result of our critical  
examination2 and such a demonstration of
 the immovably solid foundation1 secure 
from all the change of opinions and all 
the progress of discoveries on which    
morality and religion rest1 has still an
 entire series of further pleasing      
consequences in its train4  ,in the     
first place1 it is a living and actual  
proof of the fact that religion and     
morality give to all sciences the full  
freedom of investigation4 ,the religious
 and ethical interest itself not only   
gives1 but even requires1 this freedom  
of investigation4 ,it requires it in    
consequence of that impulse of truth    
which religion has in common with every 

impulse of knowledge1 and which in      
itself is an ethical impulse4 ,in       
consequence of this impulse1 religion   
must found its possession on nothing    
else than subjective and objective      
truth1 and can look upon all the paths  
which lead through even the remotest    
realm of knowledge to the establishment 
of truth1 only with sympathetic         
interest4 ,precisely those who see in   
religion more than a mere expression of 
emotion1 and all those who require that 
their religious life and the object of  
#djc their religious faith shall possess
 truth1 subjective and objective1 cannot
 commit any greater folly than treating 
search for truth in any other realm with
 suspicion1 or even ignoring it4 ,they  
only injure that which they meant to    
defend1 by rendering the purity of their
 own religious interest suspected1 and  
by establishing more firmly the breach  
between religious life and faith and the
 other acquisitions of culture and      
interests of their time1 of which       

neither religion nor science1 but only a
 misguided tendency of their minds and  
hearts1 is guilty4 ,how much unfriendly 
and unjust judgment has already found   
utterance by means of the pen and voice1
 in reference to honest and meritorious 
workers1 on the part of religious       
zealots who fail to recognize that close
 relationship of the religious with the 
scientific impulse of truth6 ,how often 
and how much does such a judgment gain  
great consideration from a public of    
which but a few are able to form an     
independent opinion of the men and works
 which are thus abused before their eyes
 and ears1 and how much of the aversion 
to the form in which the religious life 
of the present offers itself1 on the    
part of those men who are thus          
suspected1 is in the last instance to be
 attributed neither to be               
irreligiousness of these men nor to the 
deficiency of the present form of our   
religious life1 but to the repelling    
effect of that unjust treatment6        

,another gain of our discussion1        
correlated to that just mentioned1      
consists in the proof that religion and 
morality have their autonomous principle
 and realm which is not at all obliged  
to borrow the proof of its truth from   
the present condition and degree of our 
knowledge1 but carries it in itself1    
although it stands in #djd fruitful     
reciprocal action with all the other    
realms of knowledge and life4 ,just as  
decidedly as we had to caution the      
advocates of religion against keeping   
themselves indifferent1 suspicious1 or  
even hostile1 regarding the advances    
into the realm of secular knowledge1 so 
decidedly do we like to see the workers 
in the realm of the knowledge of nature 
cautioned against confusing points of   
view1 in thinking that they can through 
their scientific knowledge purify and   
reform the religious and ethical realms4
 ,they may purify and reform as much as 
they please1 but only in their own      
realm4 ,the only thing they are able to 

reform is our knowledge of nature1 and  
in our religious and ethical life and   
perception only that which belongs to   
this natural part2 but this is only the 
outer part of religious and ethical     
life3 the source of our religion and    
morality springs from quite another     
ground than that which they cultivate4  
,a third gain from our discussion is the
 actual proof of the harmony between    
faith and knowledge1 between the        
religious and the scientific views of   
the world4 ,in our investigation we had 
no occasion for psychological or        
theoretical investigations as to faith  
and knowledge and their mutual relation2
 but if our discussion is not an entire 
failure1 perhaps the actual exposition  
of a standpoint on which faith and      
knowledge may live at peace with one    
another1 which is not bought by a       
sacrifice on either side1 and which does
 not consist in a compromise of the two1
 but which has its reason in the deepest
 and most active interest of the one1 in

 the full and unconstrained freedom of  
the other1 a stronger proof for the     
intimate relationship of these brothers1
 between whom the present generation    
wishes too often to sow discord1 than if
 we #dje had undertaken long            
religio-philosophical and theoretical   
investigations4  ,finally1 the results  
of our analysis have given us still     
another gain3 they have led us beyond   
,lessing's ,nathan and his parable of   
the ,three ,rings4 ,we call this a gain1
 without the least intention of         
discrediting by it the motives of       
tolerance and the points of view for the
 judgment of the character and          
religiousness of human individuals1     
which lay in that parable1 or suspecting
 the motives of so many of our          
contemporaries whose                    
religio-philosophical judgment is       
entirely expressed in that parable4 ,we 
saw ourselves compelled to make a choice
 either of accepting or of rejecting    
ends in the world1 and found that the   

world resolves itself into a senseless  
game at dice1 and that the phenomena    
become more unintelligible the more     
important they are1 if we ignore or even
 reject teleology4 ,the acknowledgment  
of the latter prevented us from seeing  
in the world and its events merely the  
eternal stream of planless coming and   
going2 it prevented us from accepting   
such an endless stream of appearance and
 disappearance1 and therefore also an   
endless stream of the appearance and    
disappearance of new forms of religion  
in that creature for whose appearance we
 see all other creatures are only a     
preparation1 and are even obliged to    
look upon them as a preparation in      
accordance with no other theory more    
than that of evolution4 ,it also urged  
us to inquire as to the ends and designs
 of mankind1 and we found this end in   
the disposition of man for a communion  
with ,god1 for the state of bearing his 
image and of being his child4 ,now we   
have fully to acknowledge that          

,christianity1 like all religions which 
claim truth and universal acceptance1   
#djf is to be analyzed with the very    
same means of science as all phenomena  
in the world of facts1 and that         
therefore it is especially subject to   
all investigations of                   
religio-philosophical1                  
religio-historical1 and historical      
criticism1 to its fullest extent4 ,but  
precisely such an analysis of           
,christianity leads us to a result which
 elevates ,christian religion high above
 all other forms4 ,it also confirms by  
means of science what1 indeed1 is       
established to a ,christian mind as     
certainty from his own direct           
experience1 that the quintessence of    
that which ,christianity offers us1 is  
truth and gives full satisfaction to    
soul and mind4 ,for that analysis       
establishes1 in the first place1 that   
,christianity shows us the idea of ,god 
and the nature and destiny of man in a  
purity such as no other religion does1  

and in such a life-creating power that  
it is able to satisfy most completely   
all the nobler desires and impulses of  
soul and mind1 and to overcome most     
successfully all ignoble ones4          
,furthermore1 it shows us that these    
gifts of ,christianity offered          
themselves1 and still offer themselves1 
not only in philosophemes and doctrines1
 in parables and myths1 in postulates   
and prophecies1 but what1 indeed1 is not
 the case in any other religion1 in an  
arranged course of deeds and facts      
which1 in everything that is necessary  
and essential for the acquisition of    
that idea of ,god and for the           
realization of that ideal of mankind1   
legitimate themselves to criticism as   
historical facts1 and which legitimate  
themselves as actions of divine         
manifestation by the fact1 that they and
 their consequences also are really able
 to fulfill what they promise1 and to   
bring mankind nearer to the             
accomplishment of that goal which they  

set up for it4 ,finally1 it shows us1   
when it reviews and compares the        
development of #djg culture among all   
mankind1 that the ,christian nations    
have really borne the richest blossom   
and fruit which has appeared hitherto on
 the tree of mankind1 and that          
,christianity1 for the life of nations1 
has not only1 like other religions1     
powers of preservation1 but also powers 
of renovation and renewal which other   
religions are wanting4 ,even all the    
errors of superstition and immorality1  
of intolerance and lust of power1 of so 
many of its advocates and confessors1 at
 which the adversaries of the ,christian
 view of the world so willingly point1  
are but a confirmation of its value4    
,for they show us how divine and        
heavenly the gift must be1 if even such 
errors were not able to smother its     
fruits4 ,if we do not wish to suppose   
that mankind has foundations and ends   
which up to the present it is not yet   
allowed to know1 we certainly must look 

for these foundations and ends where we 
find the best which has so far been     
given to mankind and which has been     
accomplished by it4  ,this              
acknowledgment of ,christianity as the  
only true and only really universal     
religion leads us beyond another        
sentiment of ,lessing1 which has found  
an equally strong or perhaps still      
stronger echo in the mind4 ,we mean the 
expression that1 if he had to choose1 he
 would prefer the continual search for  
truth to the possession of truth itself4
 ,we emphatically acknowledge the holy  
right and the high nobility of this     
impulse of investigation and activity1  
but we need not buy its acknowledgment  
and satisfaction at the price of being  
obliged to renounce a consciousness or  
the hope of a consciousness which is    
equally indispensable to our inner      
happiness as that impulse of            
investigation1 and which first gives to 
this impulse its overwhelming           
power--namely1 the #djh consciousness   

and the hope of really possessing the   
truth4 ,for1 in fact1 we are not        
required to make this choice4 ,there is 
a possession of truth which does not    
exclude1 but requires1 the search for   
truth3 that is the possession of truth  
in the answer to the questions as to the
 starting point and the goal of our     
life1 the possession of truth in the    
fundamentals of our religious view of   
the world4 ,it is the certainty about   
the starting-point and goal of our life1
 which lastingly and effectively invites
 us also to look for and perceive all   
the ways which1 in theory as well as in 
practice1 lead from a firm              
starting-point to a certain end1 and    
only the possession of truth in the     
fundamentals of our religious view of   
the world gives value and satisfaction  
to investigation in a world which1      
without this possession1 contains for us
 only transitory and fleeting1 and      
therefore only unsatisfactory1 things1  
but which stands before us as the work  

and the theatre of revelation of a ,god 
and ,father1 and therefore gives to     
investigation inexhaustible joy and     
satisfaction when we look upon it from  
those stand-points4  ,in like manner as1
 at the outset of our investigation1 we 
perceived in organic species creations  
of ,god1 and in spite of this1 or rather
 on account of it1 looked upon the      
attempts at exploring their origin with 
so much deeper interest1 we also see    
ourselves1 in the still more direct     
religious realm1 not at all condemned to
 stagnation when we acknowledge         
,christianity as absolute religion4     
,this very acknowledgment alone makes a 
real progress possible for us4 ,for     
every progress1 in order to be a real   
progress1 needs a firm starting-point   
and a certain goal2 hence that which is 
shown and offered to mankind in         
,christianity4 ,from this #dji          
starting-point and toward this end there
 are tasks enough for religious         
progress4 ,the ever more definite       

investigation of the facts and doctrines
 of ,christianity1 the improvement and  
ever more complete reproduction of the  
scientific image in which these facts   
and doctrines are reflected in the mind 
of man the progressing adaptation of    
ecclesiastical life in divine service1  
and organization to the substance and   
the need of ,christian religiousness1   
the harmonizing of our possession of    
faith with all other elements of culture
 of each period1 the working up of that 
which is given to us in ,christianity   
into the spiritual and ethical          
acquisition of a single personality and 
its ever more complete representation   
and realization in the individual and   
the common life1 the progressing        
penetration of generations by the       
transfiguring light of religion and     
morality1 and the progressive overcoming
 of the likewise progressingly          
developing kingdom of evil--in short1   
all that which the language of religion 
calls the growth of the kingdom of ,god1

 is work and progress enough1 but       
certainly work and progress on the      
ground of a certain basis as the        
starting-point given to us by ,god1 and 
work and progress toward a certain goal 
set for us by ,god4  ,it is only from   
this basis of a possession of truth as  
it is offered to us by ,christian       
theism1 and by the facts of redemption  
and of a reconciliation of man with     
,god1 that the breach between faith and 
knowledge1 between religion and the life
 of culture1 which at present takes     
place in so many a heart and mind1 can  
be healed2 and1 far from seeking to     
cripple or hinder those who stand on    
this basis1 it alone gives to their     
theoretical and practical activity its  
joyous strength and certain end1 to #daj
 their sphere of knowledge its universal
 breadth4 ,the ,apostle ,paul1 at the   
end of #a ,corinthians1 ,,xv1 when he   
takes a comprehensive view from the     
highest points of ,christian hope to    
which he found himself led from those   

fundamentals1 knows of no fitter words  
to conclude with and to give it a       
practical application than these3       
,wherefore1 my beloved brethren1 be ye  
steadfast1 unmoveable1 always abounding 
in the work of the ,lord1 forasmuch as  
ye know that your labour is not vain in 
the ,lord4         99       99       99 
99       99   ,notes  #a ,the           
,international ,scientific ,series4 ,no4
 ,,xiii4  #b ,evolution of ,man4  #c ,it
 was only when the manuscript of this   
work was nearly finished and the first  
part of it had gone to the press1 that  
the author received the second part of  
,k4 ,e4 von ,baer's ,studien aus dem    
,gebiete der ,naturwissenschaften       
7,studies in the ,realm of ,natural     
,sciences74 ,it contains another essay  
on teleology1 ,ueber ,zielstrebigkeit in
 den organischen ,krpern insbesondere1  
and a treatise on ,darwin's doctrine1   
,ueber ,darwin's ,lehre1 which ,baer had
 promised long ago and which the public 
had anxiously awaited4 ,it is no little 

satisfaction to find that ,i1 from my   
modest premises1 reached results        
regarding the naturo-philosophical      
problems and their weight in the        
religious realm which so fully harmonize
 with the views of this first authority 
in the realm of the history of          
development4 ,i shall still have        
occasion here and there to avail myself 
of a study of this latest and most      
important publication upon the question 
of ,darwinism1 and shall confine myself 
here to the remark that von ,baer1      
although he rejects the selection theory
 and the superficial treatment of the   
principle of evolution on the part of   
materialists1 is by no means disinclined
 to the idea of the origin of species   
through descent1 whether in gradual     
development or in leaps2 and that in    
this respect he could no longer be      
counted among the advocates of the group
 above referred to1 but among those     
which we mention farther on1 had he not 
repeatedly and forcibly confessed1 with 

a modesty worthy of acknowledgment1 his 
total ignorance concerning the manner in
 which certain forms of life1 especially
 the higher ones1 originated4 ,the      
origin of higher species without the    
supposition of a descent is to him      
unexplainable1 because the individuals  
of these species are1 in their first    
development of life1 so dependent on the
 mother4 ,furthermore1 he points out the
 fact that in early periods of the earth
 the organic forming power which ruled1 
must have been a higher one than it is  
at the present time2 in like manner as  
the first period in the embryonic       
development of individuals is to-day the
 most productive4 ,this higher power of 
organization1 he says1 could consist in 
a higher power of changing organisms    
into new species1 as well as in a higher
 power of producing new species through 
primitive generation2 or it could       
consist in both4 ,in general1 there is  
no reason to suppose that primitive     
generations which took place at the     

first origination of life on earth1     
could not have been repeated later and  
oftener4 ,the nearer a generation was to
 these individuals originated through   
primitive generation1 the greater was   
undoubtedly its flexibility and         
changeableness2 the farther1 the greater
 the fixity of type4  #d ,after the     
completion this manuscript1 the author  
found that ,k4 ,e4 von ,baer1 in his    
treatise upon ,darwin's doctrine1 pays  
especial attention to the change of     
generation and also to the metamorphosis
 of plants and animals in exactly the   
same sense and reaches the same         
conclusion4  #e ,compare ,max ,mller1   
,lectures on the ,science of ,language1 
#fth ed41 ,london1 #ahga1 vol4 ,i1 p4   
#djc4  #f ,compare v4 ,baer1 ,studies1  
etc41 p4 #bid ff4  #g ,darwin says1 on  
page #adf1 ,eng4 ,ed41 of his ,descent  
of ,man3 ,in the earlier editions of my 
',origin of ,species'1 ,i perhaps       
attributed too much to the action of    
natural selection or the survival of the

 fittest4444 ,i did not formerly        
sufficiently consider the existence of  
structures which1 as far as we can at   
present judge1 are neither beneficial   
nor injurious2 and this ,i believe to be
 one of the greatest oversights as yet  
detected in my work4444 ,an unexplained 
residuum of change1 perhaps a large one1
 must be left to the assumed uniform    
action of those unknown agencies1 which 
occasionally induce strongly-marked and 
abrupt deviations of structure in our   
domestic productions4  #h ,this word1   
which is of recent coinage in ,germany1 
has been found so incapable of being    
rendered by an exact ,english           
equivalent1 that it has been thought    
best to retain it and to give the       
author's own explanation of the meaning 
which he desired it to express4 ,he     
says1 in a note to the translator3 ,i   
was led to this idea of ,auslosung in a 
small essay of ,robert von ,mayer       
7,ueber ,auslsung1 #ahgf74 ,afterwards  
,mayer personally stated to me that he  

heartily approved the emphasis ,i had   
given to this idea1 and said that he had
 only thought of the fact that psychical
 processes1 like the action of the will1
 losen aus 7release7 physiological      
processes1 like the action of the       
muscles1 and that ,i had carried the    
idea farther1 in saying that psychical  
processes are ausgelost 7released7 by   
physiological processes1 and that this  
is a very important step farther on the 
way of investigation4 ,mayer himself    
thought it would be necessary to call   
the attention to this1 when he further  
developed the ideas he had given in the 
before-mentioned essay2 his intention to
 do so was prevented by his death4      
,auslosung is a word originated by      
modern mechanical science1 and means3   
7#a47 ,slight mechanical operations of  
detaching and the like1 by which another
 and more important action1 whose forces
 were heretofore restrained1 can be set 
into activity3 e4g41 the pressure which 
sets in motion a machine1 previously at 

rest1 is ,auslosung2 the pressure on the
 trigger of a gun is ,auslosung2 the    
friction of a match which is the        
beginning of a great fire is ,auslosung4
 7#b47 ,this idea may now be applied to 
chemical processes3 e4g41 a glass of    
sugar-water will remain sweet unless    
some foreign element is introduced into 
it1 but the moment it receives a        
fermenting substance either by chance1  
from the air1 or with intention1 then   
the sugar water is brought into a       
process of chemical decomposition1 and  
from this there results ,auslosung2 but 
the introduction of the fermenting agent
 into the sugar-water is ,auslosung4    
7#c47 ,von ,mayer applies this idea to  
psycho-physical relations of life1 and  
says3 when the will acting through the  
agency of the motor nerves sets in      
motion the muscles1 this is             
,auslosung4--,,trans4  #i ,for the use  
of readers who do not understand ,greek1
 we may state that the word teleology is
 derived from the ,greek word telos1    

,gen4 teleos3 end1 purpose1 aim2 and    
means the doctrine of design or a       
conformity to the end in view1 or1 as   
,k4 ,e4 von ,baer prefers and wishes to 
have introduced into scientific         
language1 the doctrine of the striving  
toward an end 7,zielstrebigkeit74 ,it   
seems to be quite a superficial         
treatment of an idea on whose reception 
or rejection no less a thing than an    
entire view of the world with all its   
most important and deepest questions    
depends1 when ,dr4 ,g4 ,seidlitz1 in an 
essay on the success of ,darwinism      
7,ausland1 #ahgd1 ,no4 #cg71 states     
incidentally that teleology is derived  
from the ,greek ,greek3 teleos perfect4 
,it is true that the ,greek adjective   
for perfect is also derived from that   
noun1 ,greek3 telos1 which has the same 
root as the ,german word ,ziel1 and     
there is even an ,ionic form for that   
adjective which is ,greek3 teleos1 but  
the ,attic form is ,greek3 teleios2 and 
since modern languages1 when a choice is

 allowed1 do not derive their ,greek    
foreign words from the ,ionic1 but from 
the ,attic dialect1 that word--were it  
really derived from that adjective and  
did it express doctrine of              
perfection--would have to be teleiology1
 or1 in ,latinized form1 teliology4 ,as 
far as we know1 the word1 since it was  
introduced into scientific language1 has
 never been derived from any other root 
than from ,greek3 telos1 ,gen4 ,greek3  
teleos1 end1 and has never been used in 
any other sense than to express the     
doctrine of a purpose and end in the    
world4  #aj ,compare ,history1 ,essays1 
and ,orations of the #fth ,general      
,conference of the ,evangelical         
,alliance1 ,new ,york1 ,harper ,bros41  
#ahgd1 p4 #bfd-bga4  #aa ,compare ,d4   
,f4 ,strauss1 the most celebrated moral 
philosopher of ,monism1 in  #gd of his  
,the ,old ,faith and the ,new4          
99       99       99       99       99  
,corrections made to printed original4  
p4 #dc4 the whole course of the         

zological system - zoloogical in        
original4  p4 #fe4 corals1 radiata1     
worms1 mollusca1 and crustacea - radita 
in original4  p4 #gc4 many portions of  
the skin - the the 7across line break7  
in original4  p4 #hf4 forsakes us in the
 inquiry - inqury in original4  p4 #aab4
 even philosophy can not take up the    
investigation - phi-osophy 7across line 
break7 in original4  p4 #adg4 the origin
 of self-consciousness - conciousness in
 original4  p4 #bfe4 the origin of      
species through development -           
developement in original4  p4 #big4 any 
other interpretation than to take them -
 then in original4  p4 #cdc4 the        
,titan-like1 rebellious ,kainites -     
,titian in original4  ,note #c4 ,the    
nearer a generation was - a a 7across   
line break7 in original4