,transcriber's note3     ,page numbers  
in this book are indicated by numbers   
enclosed in    curly braces1 e4g4 #ii4  
,they have been located where page      
breaks occurred in the original book4   
,for its ,index1 a page    number has   
been placed only at the start of that   
section4      ,,the ,,moral ,,economy   
by  ,,ralph ,,barton ,,perry  ,assistant
 ,professor of ,philosophy in ,harvard  
,university  ,author of    ,the ,free   
,man and the ,soldier   ,the ,moral     
,economy   ,the ,approach to ,philosophy
        ,charles ,scribner's ,sons ,new 
,york -- ,chicago -- ,boston -- ,atlanta
 ,san ,francisco -- ,dallas  ,copyright1
 #aiji1 by ,charles ,scribner's ,sons   
,all rights reserved4 ,no part of this  
book may be reproduced in any form      
without the permission of ,charles      
,scribner's ,sons     ,,dedicated ,,to  
,n4  ,,march #cj1 #aiji       ,things   
and actions are what they are1 and the  
consequences of them will be what they  
will be2   why then should we desire to 

be deceived8    ,,bishop ,,butler4      
vii  ,,preface  ,this little book is the
 preliminary sketch of a system of      
ethics4  ,its form differs from that of 
most contemporary books on the subject  
because of the omission of the          
traditional controversies4  ,i have     
attempted to study morality directly1 to
 derive its conceptions and laws from an
 analysis of life4  ,i have made this   
attempt because1 in the first place1 ,i 
believe that theoretical ethics is      
seriously embarrassed by its present    
emphasis on the history and criticism of
 doctrines2 by its failure to resort to 
experience1 where without more ado it   
may solve its problems on their merits4 
,but1 in the second place1 ,i hope that 
by appealing to experience and          
neglecting scholastic technicalities1 ,i
 may connect ethical theory with        
every-day reflection on practical       
matters4  ,morality is1 without doubt1  
the most human and urgent of all topics 
of study2 and ,i should like1 if        

possible1 to make it appear so4  ,the   
references which ,i have embodied in the
 notes are intended to serve the        
,english reader as an introduction to   
accessible and untechnical literature on
 the subjects treated in the several    
chapters4  ,these chapters coincide with
 the main divisions of ethical inquiry3 
,goodness1 ,duty1 ,virtue1 ,progress1   
,culture1 and ,religion4  ,and although 
so brief a treatment of so large a      
programme is impossible without         
sacrifice of thoroughness1 it does      
provide both a general survey of the    
field1 and a varied application of      
certain fundamental ideas4  ,,ralph     
,,barton ,,perry4   ,,cambridge1 #aiji4 
ix  ,,table ,,of ,,contents   ,,chapter 
,i                                      
,,page ,,morality ,,as ,,the            
,,organization ,,of ,,life 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4    #a  ,i4 ,,the ,,general   
,,claims ,,of ,,morality  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4    #a    ,the practical     
necessity of morality1 #a4  ,the        

interplay   of dogmatism and scepticism1
 #d4  ,the fundamental   character of   
morality1 #g4  ,,ii4 ,,goodness ,,in    
,,general  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4    #i    ,the dependence of value
 on life1 #i4  ,definition of the       
simpler terms of value4  ,goodness3 the 
fulfilment of   interest1 #aa4  ,good   
and good for1 #ab4  ,,iii4 ,,moral      
,,goodness  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4   #ac    ,the moral         
organization of life1 #ac4  ,definition 
of the   terms of moral value4  ,moral  
goodness3 the fulfilment of   an economy
 of interests1 #ae4  ,moral goodness and
   pleasure1 #af4  ,rightness or virtue1
 #ah4  ,morality and   life1 #ai4  ,,iv4
 ,,morality ,,and ,,nature  4 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   #bj    ,the   
alleged artificiality of morality1 #bj4 
,morality   and the struggle for        
existence1 #ba4  ,morality and          
adaptation1 #bb4  ,morality is natural  
if life is1 #bd4  ,v4 ,,morality ,,and  
,,conflict 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

 4 4 4   #bd    ,morality and           
competitive struggle4  ,morality the    
condition of strength1 #bd4  ,the value 
of conflict1 #bc4   ,the elimination of 
conflict1 #bf4  ,morality and the love  
of life1 #bg4  ,,vi4 ,,the ,,dignity    
,,and ,,lustre ,,of ,,morality 4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4   #bh    ,the effect of war
 on sentiment and the imagination1 #bh4 
,real power is constructive1 not        
destructive or   repressive1 #bi4       
,moral heroism1 #ca4  ,the saving or    
provident character of morality1 #cb4   
,morality and the   consummation of     
life1 #cc4   ,,chapter ,,ii  ,,the      
,,logic ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,appeal  4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   #cd  ,i4   
,,the ,,stand-,,point ,,of ,,rationalism
 ,,and ,,individualism  4 4 4 4   #cd   
,modern individualism1 #cd4             
,distinguished from   scepticism1 #cf4  
,the individual as the organ of         
knowledge1   #cg4  ,moral individualism 
as a protest against convention1   #ci4 
,duty as the rational ground of action1 

#dj4   ,reasonableness a condition of   
the consciousness of   duty1 #da4  ,,ii4
 ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,prudence  4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   #dc         
,prudence as elementary1 #dc4           
,interest1 action1 and   goodness1 #dc4 
,the alleged relativity of goodness1    
#dc4   ,the conflict of interests solved
 by conciliation1 #dh4   ,the limits of 
prudence1 #di4  ,,iii4 ,,the ,,logic    
,,of ,,preference ,,and ,,purpose 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4   #ej    ,the adoption of 
new interests and the problem of        
preference1 #ej4  ,a hypothetical       
solution of the problem1 #ea4           
,solution in the concrete case through  
the organization   of a purpose1 #ec4   
,the principle of the objective validity
   of interests1 #ed4  ,the principle of
 the quantitative basis   of preference1
 #ee4  ,,iv4 ,,the ,,logic ,,of         
,,impartiality ,,and ,,justice  4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4   #eg    ,the private         
interest1 #eg4  ,the personal factor    
negligible   in counting interests1 #eh4

  ,the refutation of egoism4   ,the     
first proposition of egoism1 #ei4  ,the 
second   proposition of egoism1 #fa4    
,impartiality as a part of   justice1   
#fc4  ,justice as imputing finality to  
the   individual1 #fd4  ,the equality of
 rational beings as organs   of truth1  
#fd4  ,summary of justice1 #ff4  ,v4    
,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,good-,,will  4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   #fg       
,all interests are entitled to          
consideration1 #fg4   ,goodwill and the 
growth of new interests1 #fg4  ,,vi4    
,,duty ,,and ,,the ,,imagination 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   #fi    ,the  
logical imagination1 #fi4  ,rationalism 
and incentive   to action1 #gj4         
,rationalism and faith1 #ga4   ,,chapter
 ,,iii  ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,virtue  4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4    
#gb  ,i4 ,,the ,,virtues ,,and ,,their  
,,classification  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   
#gb    ,summary of the content and logic
 of moral value1 #gb4   ,virtues as     
verified rules of life1 #gc4  ,the      

material and   formal aspects of        
morality1 #gd4  ,materialism and        
formalism due to exaggeration1 #ge4     
,the general importance   of the        
conflict between the material and formal
   motives1 #gf4  ,duty identified with 
the formal motive1 #gf4   ,formalism    
less severely condemned1 #gg4  ,the five
   economies of interest1 #gg4  ,summary
 of virtues and   vices1 #gi4  ,table1  
#ha4  ,,ii4 ,,the ,,economy ,,of ,,the  
,,simple ,,interest 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
4   #hb    ,the simple interest not a   
moral economy1 #hb4  ,satisfaction   the
 root-value1 and intelligence the       
elementary   virtue1 #hb4  ,incapacity1 
#hc4  ,overindulgence the first   form  
of materialism1 #hd4  ,it is due to lack
 of foresight1   #he4  ,or to the       
complexity of interests1 #hf4           
,overindulgence   as the original sin1  
#hf4  ,,iii4 ,,the ,,reciprocity ,,of   
,,interests  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
#hg    ,prudence as a principle of      
organization1 #hg4  ,moderation   and   

thrift1 #hg4  ,honesty1 veracity1 and   
tact of the   prudential form1 #hh4     
,the inherent value of the prudential   
economy4  ,individual and social health1
 #hh4  ,temperance   and reason1 #ij4   
,prudential formalism1 or asceticism1   
#ib4   ,asceticism illustrated by the   
,cynics1 #ib4  ,prudential   materialism
 or sordidness1 #id4  ,aimlessness or   
idleness1 #id4  ,,iv4 ,,the             
,,incorporation ,,of ,,interests 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   #ie    ,purpose as 
a principle of organization4  ,its      
intellectual character1 #ie4  ,the      
virtues subsidiary to   purpose1 #ie4   
,truthfulness in the purposive economy1 
#if4   ,the value of achievement1 #ig4  
,the formalistic error   of             
sentimentalism1 #ih4  ,deferred living1 
#ih4  ,nationalism1   #ii4  ,egoism and 
bigotry as types of materialism4   ,the 
pride of opinion1 #ajj4  ,egoism and    
bigotry involve   injustice1 #ajc4  ,the
 meaning of injustice1 #ajc4  ,v4 ,,the 
,,fraternity ,,of ,,interests 4 4 4 4 4 

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #aje    ,justice as
 a principle of organization1 #aje4     
,justice   conditions rational          
intercourse1 #aje4  ,discussion1        
freedom1   and tolerance1 #ajf4         
,anarchism and scepticism1 #ajg4        
,laissez-faire1 #ajh4  ,justice and     
materialism4   ,worldliness1 #aaj4      
,ancient worldliness due to lack of     
pity1 #aaj4  ,modern worldliness due to 
lack of   imagination1 #aaa4  ,,vi4     
,,the ,,universal ,,system ,,of         
,,interests  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #aab
    ,the economy of good-will1 #aab4    
,good-will as the   condition of real   
happiness4  ,paganism and ,christianity1
   #aac4  ,merely formal good-will is   
mysticism1 #aaf4   ,mysticism perverts  
life by denying this world1 #aah4       
,quietism1 #aai4  ,mystical perversion  
of moral truth1 #abj4  ,,vii4 ,,summary 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4  #aba    ,the interworking of   
the formal and the material             
principles1 #aba4  ,importance of the   

formal principle4   ,manners and        
worship1 #aba4   ,,chapter ,,iv  ,,the  
,,moral ,,test ,,of ,,progress 4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #abc  ,i4     
,,the ,,general ,,theory ,,of ,,progress
  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #abc       
,the philosophy of history1 #abc4  ,the 
meaning of   progress1 #abe4  ,progress 
and the ,quantitative basis of          
preference1 #abg4  ,the method of       
superimposition as a test   of progress1
 #abg4  ,,contents  ,,ii4 ,,the         
,,external ,,and ,,internal ,,principles
 ,,of ,,progress 4 4 4 4  #acj    ,the  
external principle3 the pressure of an  
unfavorable   environment1 #acj4  ,the  
external and the internal   principle1  
#aca4  ,the internally progressive type 
of society4   ,the importance of        
discussion1 #acb4  ,rationality the     
internal principle of progress1 #acd4   
,the positive   motive3 constructive    
reform1 #acd4  ,disinterested reflection
   and the man of affairs1 #acf4        
,success depends on moral   capacity1   

#acg4  ,the negative motive3 revolution1
 #aci4   ,christianity as a social      
revolution1 #adj4  ,the ,french         
,revolution1 #ada4  ,dependence of      
progress on the   historical            
connectedness of human life1 #adc4      
,,iii4 ,,conservatism ,,and ,,radicalism
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #add      
,conservatism values the existing order1
 #add4  ,progress   requires the        
maintenance and use of order1 #ade4     
,the   real radical not the sceptic but 
the rationalist1 #ade4   ,the           
justification of the radical1 #adf4     
,,iv4 ,,progress ,,in ,,the             
,,institution ,,of ,,government  4 4 4 4
 4 4 4  #adg    ,institutions are       
permanent moral necessities1 #adg4      
,government as the interest both of the 
weak and of the   strong1 #adh4  ,the   
moral necessity of government1 #aej4    
,the variable and progressive factor in 
government1   #aea4  ,the principle of  
rationality in government1 #aeb4   ,the 
benefits and cost of government in the  

ancient   military monarchy1 #aeb4      
,solidarity of interest in the   ,greek 
and ,roman oligarchies1 #aed4  ,advance 
in liberality   in ,athenian            
institutions1 #aef4  ,the development   
of modern institutions1 #aeg4  ,the     
modern idea of   democracy1 #aeh4       
,summary of the modern state4  ,it is   
territorial and impersonal1 #afj4  ,the 
representative   method1 #afj4          
,emphasis on internal policy and        
international peace1 #afb4  ,v4 ,,the   
,,quality ,,of ,,contemporary           
,,liberalism  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #afc   
,democracy based not on pity but on     
enlightenment1   #afc4  ,the respect for
 the opinion of those most   interested1
 #afd4  ,the spirit of modern justice1  
#afe4   ,sensitiveness to life1 #aff4   
,the allowance for growth1 #afg4   ,the 
individual and the crowd1 #afh4         
,hopefulness and   the bias of maturity1
 #afi4  ,the work done and the   work to
 do1 #agj4   ,,chapter ,v  ,,the ,,moral
 ,,criticism ,,of ,,fine ,,art  4 4 4 4 

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #aga  ,i4 ,,the    
,,justification ,,of ,,the ,,moral      
,,criticism ,,of ,,art 4 4 4 4 4  #aga  
,the higher activities of civilization1 
#aga4  ,the attempt   to apply aesthetic
 standards to life1 #agb4  ,the claim of
   art to exemption from moral criticism
 is based on   misapprehension4         
,morality not a special interest1 but   
the   fundamental interest1 #agd4       
,morality does not substitute   its     
canons for those of art1 #age4  ,,ii4   
,,definition ,,of ,,art ,,and ,,the     
,,esthetic ,,interest  4 4 4 4 4 4  #agf
    ,art as the adaptation of the       
environment to interest1   #agf4        
,industrial art and fine art1 #agg4     
,the aesthetic   interest3 the interest 
in apprehension1 #agi4  ,the   interest 
in sensation and perception1 #aha4  ,the
 emotional   interest1 #ahb4  ,instinct 
and emotion in the aesthetic            
experience4  ,poetry and music1 #ahc4   
,the interest in   discernment1 #ahe4   
,the representative element in art      

exemplified in ,greek sculpture1 #ahe4  
,and in ,italian   painting of the      
,renaissance1 #ahg4  ,levels and        
blendings   of the aesthetic interest1  
#ahi4  ,the moral criticism of   the    
aesthetic interest1 #aij4  ,,iii4 ,,the 
,,self-,,sufficiency ,,of ,,the         
,,aesthetic ,,interest  4 4 4 4  #aib   
,the aesthetic interest is capable of   
continuous   development1 #aib4  ,and is
 resourceful1 #aib4  ,but tends   on    
that account to be narrow and quiescent1
 #aib4  ,,iv4 ,,the ,,pervasiveness ,,of
 ,,the ,,esthetic ,,interest 4 4 4 4 4 4
 4  #aid    ,the aesthetic interest may 
supply interest where there   is none1  
or enhance other interests1 #aid4  ,but 
it must   not be allowed to replace     
other interests1 #aie4  ,v4 ,,the       
,,vicarious ,,function ,,of ,,the       
,,aesthetic ,,interest  4 4 4 4  #aig   
,other interests may be represented by  
the aesthetic   interest1 #aig4  ,the   
danger of confusing vicarious           
fulfilment with real fulfilment1 #aih4  

,and of being   aesthetically satisfied 
with failure1 #aii4  ,,vi4 ,,art ,,as ,a
 ,,means ,,of ,,stimulating ,,action 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #bja    ,art is a     
source of motor excitation1#bja4  ,but  
such   excitation is morally            
indeterminate1 #bja4  ,such influences  
must be selected with reference to their
 effect on moral   purpose1 #bjb4       
,,vii4 ,,art ,,as ,a ,,means ,,of       
,,fixing ,,ideas  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
4  #bjc    ,the higher practical ideas  
have no other concrete   embodiment than
 art1 #bjc4  ,art both fixes ideas and  
arouses sentiment in their behalf1 #bjd4
  ,but if art is   to serve this end it 
must be true1 #bje4  ,untruth in   art1 
#bjf4  ,universality and particularity  
in art1 #bjg4   ,art may invest ideas   
with a fictitious value1 #bjh4  ,,viii4 
,,the ,,liberality ,,of ,,the           
,,aesthetic ,,interest 4 4 4 4 4 4 4    
#bji    ,art is unworldly1 #bji4  ,the  
aesthetic intercourse   promotes social 
intercourse on a high plane1 #baj4      

,,ix4 ,,conclusion 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #bab    ,when 
subjected to moral control1 art may make
 the   environment harmonious with      
morality1 #bab4   ,,chapter ,,vi  ,,the 
,,moral ,,justification ,,of ,,religion 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #bad  ,i4 ,,the
 ,,definition ,,of ,,religion  4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #bad    ,the sound
 practical motive in religion1 #bad4    
,religion   as belief1 #baf4  ,summary  
definition of religion1 #bah4  ,,ii4    
,,the ,,tests ,,of ,,religion  4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #bah    ,the  
measure of religion1 extensive and      
intensive1 #bah4   ,the test of truth   
the fundamental test1 #bbj4  ,the       
therapeutic test1 and its confusion of  
the issue1 #bbb4   ,the two forms of the
 truth test1 cosmological and ethical1  
#bbd4  ,the working of these critical   
principles1 #bbf4   ,cosmology and      
ethics are independent of religion1     
#bbh4   ,the optimistic bias1 #bca4     
,summary of religious   development1    

#bca4  ,,iii4 ,,superstition  4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #bcb   
,the prudential character of            
superstition1 #bcb4  ,the   ethical idea
 in primitive religion1 #bcc4  ,the     
cosmological idea1 #bcd4  ,the method of
 primitive religion1   #bce4            
,superstition in ,christianity1 #bce4   
,the ethical   and cosmological         
correction of superstition1 #bcf4  ,,iv4
 ,,tutelary ,,religion  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #bcg    ,the     
deity identified with the purpose of the
 worshipper1   #bcg4  ,the national     
religion of the ,assyrians and          
,egyptians1 #bch4  ,the correction of   
tutelary religion1 #bci4  ,v4           
,,philosophical ,,religion4             
,,metaphysical ,,idealism  4 4 4 4 4    
#bda    ,religion formally enlightened1 
#bda4  ,metaphysical and   moral        
idealism1 #bdb4  ,the inherent          
difficulty in   metaphysical idealism1  
#bdb4  ,the swing from formalism to     
materialism4  ,pessimism1               

other-worldliness1 mysticism1           
panlogism and aesthetic idealism1 #bdc4 
,aesthetic   idealism falsifies         
experience and discredits moral         
distinctions1 #bdf4  ,,vi4 ,,moral      
,,idealism 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4  #bdh    ,moral idealism   
reflects moral judgment1 #bdh4  ,evil   
real   but not deliberately perpetrated4
  ,the knowledge of   evil1 #bdi4  ,the 
ground of moral idealism1 #beb4  ,,vii4 
,,the ,,generic ,,value ,,of ,,religion 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  #beb         
,religion morally inevitable1 #beb4     
,the value of the   religious           
generalization of life1 #bec4  ,the     
immediate   reward of service1 #bed4    
,religion and moral   enthusiasm1 #bed4 
,culture and religion1 #bee4  ,,notes  4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4  #beg  ,,index  4 4 4 4 4 4
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
 4  #bfc     #a  ,,the ,,moral ,,economy
   ,,chapter ,i  ,,morality ,,as ,,the  
,,organization ,,of ,,life  ,in the     

words with which this book is inscribed1
 ,bishop ,butler conveys with directness
 and gravity the conviction that        
morality is neither a mystery nor a     
convention1 but simply an observance of 
the laws of provident living4  ,things  
and actions are what they are1 and the  
consequences of them will be what they  
will be3 why then should we desire to be
 deceived8 #a  ,this appeal1 commonplace
 enough1 but confident and true1 sounds 
the note with which through all that    
follows ,i shall hope to keep in unison4
  ,it is because he professes to believe
 that morality is an imposture that must
 be smuggled into society behind the    
back of reason1 that ,nietsche makes a  
merit of its dulness4  ,it is desirable1
 he says1 that as few people as possible
 should reflect upon morals1 and        
consequently it is very desirable that  
morals should not some day become       
interesting6 #b  ,he confesses that he  
sees no occasion for alarm6  ,but the   
dulness of #b morality testifies only to

 its homeliness and antiquity4  ,for to 
be moral is simply to be intelligent1 to
 be right-minded and open-minded in the 
unavoidable business of living4         
,morality is a collection of formulas   
and models based solidly on experience  
of acts and their consequences2 it      
offers the most competent advice as to  
how to proceed with an enterprise1      
whether large or small4  ,it is the     
theory and technique which underlies the
 art of conduct2 that master-workman1 by
 whom kings reign and princes decree    
justice2 possessed by the ,lord in the  
beginning of his way1 and whom to hate  
is to love death4  ,it is worth while to
 remark and proclaim such a conviction  
as this only because mankind has so     
treacherous a memory1 and so fatuous a  
habit of disowning its most precious and
 dearly won possessions4  ,cardinal     
truths are periodically overlaid with   
sophistication1 blended with tentative  
opinion1 and identified with the        
instruments of the day4 ,there results a

 confusion of mind that fails to        
distinguish the essence from the        
accident1 and aims to destroy where     
there is need to rectify4 ,because      
government is clumsy and costly1 it is  
proposed to abolish government2 because 
education is artificial and             
constraining1 society is exhorted to    
return to the easy course of nature2    
metaphysics must be swept away1 because 
the #c metaphysics of some time or      
school has outlived its usefulness2 and 
morality1 because it is hard or         
tiresome1 must give way to the freedom  
and romance of no morality4  ,such blind
 and irresponsible agitation is a       
perpetual menace to the balance of      
impressionable and unsteady minds1 if   
not indeed to the work of civilization4 
,now it is safe to say that these       
venerable institutions have arisen in   
answer to fixed needs2 needs implied in 
life as a general and constant          
situation4  ,there is no other way of   
accounting for them4  ,they have been   

tolerated only because they yield a     
steady return4  ,their loss would be a  
catastrophe which mankind1 obedient to  
the necessities of life1 would fall at  
once to repairing4  ,institutions are   
the very body of civilization2 and while
 they may grow and change without limit1
 if they be abruptly destroyed          
civilization must suffer paralysis in   
some vital part4  ,at once the most     
direct and striking proof of this lies  
in the fact that the revolutionist1     
whether he be propagandist or man of    
action1 invariably commits himself1 and 
ends by executing the very function he  
denied4  ,at the moment when he comes to
 close quarters1 and actually engages   
the object of his attack1 he is swept   
into some current of endeavor that has  
from the most ancient times been        
pressing steadily toward the solution of
 a problem that lies in the centre of #d
 the path of life4  ,he straightway     
commences himself to govern1 educate1   
speculate1 or moralize4  ,and the more  

patiently he labors1 the greater his    
respect for the vested wisdom of his    
time4  ,whereas he first sought utterly 
to demolish1 he is now content to make  
his little difference and hand on the   
work4  ,in the end every purely         
destructive programme is inevitably     
futile1 because it goes against the     
grain4  ,for all conduct is constructive
 in motive1 and forward in direction4   
,but how wasteful is the momentary      
fury--wasteful of high passion and      
distinguished capacity1 and how         
mystifying to the lay intelligence6  ,it
 may1 of course1 be said that there is  
method in this madness2 since man's     
twofold blindness1 his dogmatism and his
 scepticism1 his immobility and his     
wantonness1 tend in the long run to     
neutralize one another4  ,but with the  
perspective required for such           
consolation1 neither the agencies of    
destruction nor those of obstruction    
preserve the same heroic proportions    
which they are wont to assume in their  

day4 ,they seem to be engaged in a sort 
of by-play1 and wear an unmistakable    
aspect of childishness4  ,lo6  ,mankind 
has been a long time on his way1 and    
endures hardily the prospect of endless 
leagues to go4  ,he is the ,patient     
,plodder1 symbol of mature intelligence4
  ,and he has in his company two small  
boys who exhibit an incorrigible #e     
naughtiness4 ,the one of these is called
 ,destruction2 his other names being    
,cynic1 ,sceptic1 and ,nihilist4  ,he it
 is that mocks and cries1 ,go up1 thou  
bald head6 go up1 thou bald head6       
,mankind does not curse him in the name 
of the ,lord1 but invites him to play   
with another small boy1 named           
,obstruction1 and whose other names are 
,vested ,interest1 ,reactionary1 and    
,pedant4  ,this one1 whenever ,mankind  
will lead him1 digs in his heels or lies
 down in his tracks2 until1 pricked and 
goaded by his playfellow1 he at length  
gets up and scrambles after4  ,and so   
these two keep ever by the side or at   

the heels of ,mankind1 whom they neither
 lead nor deflect from his course4      
,paradox serves to dislodge prejudice2  
and blasphemy may rudely but effectually
 bring to their senses those who have   
mistaken the hardness of their hearts   
for loyalty1 and their easy default for 
success4  ,but practical wisdom belongs 
only to those who proceed unwaveringly  
out of the past and into the future1    
correcting mistakes when they may1      
conserving the good already won1 and    
making new conquests4  ,it may be       
remarked1 and should be readily granted1
 that patient plodding is less piquant  
than the by-play of inertia and revolt4 
,the spirit of ,nietsche is doubtless   
even now yawning mightily at such       
tedious moralizing2 fresh proof of the  
dull1 gloomy seriousness1 the hopeless  
#f stupidity of our sublunary virtue4   
,i believe that ,nietsche has frankly   
confessed the real grievance of his     
class of mischief makers4  ,they are    
impatient and easily bored2 while the   

business of establishing a healthful and
 vigorous society is complicated1       
tortuous1 and slow4  ,their talent for  
letters1 their love of vivid pictures1  
sharp contrasts1 and concise dramatic   
situations1 cannot adapt itself to the  
real bulk and complexity of life4       
,civilization is too promiscuous1 too   
prolonged and monotonous1 for these rare
 spirits4  ,and they have their sure    
reward2 for they ease the tension of    
effort1 supplying a recreative release  
from its pangs under the flattering     
guise of higher truth4  ,all the        
impatience and playfulness in the world 
conspires with them4  ,but as one of the
 demos of moral dullards1 ,i get no     
little comfort from applying to         
,nietsche and ,ibsen1 and to certain    
prophet litterateurs of ,england1       
,burke's reproof of ,lord ,bolingbroke4 
,when men find that something can be    
said in favor of what1 on the very      
proposal1 they have thought utterly     
indefensible1 they grow doubtful of     

their own reason2 they are thrown into a
 sort of pleasing surprise2 they run    
along with the speaker1 charmed and     
captivated to find such a plentiful     
harvest of reasoning1 where all seemed  
barren and unpromising4 4 4 4  ,there is
 a sort of gloss upon ingenious         
falsehoods that dazzles the imagination1
 but which neither belongs to1 nor      
becomes the sober aspect of truth4 4 4 4
  ,in such cases1 the writer has a      
certain fire and #g alacrity inspired   
into him by a consciousness1 that let it
 fare how it will with the subject1 his 
ingenuity will be sure of applause4#c   
,it is safe to accept morality as one   
accepts agriculture1 navigation1        
constitutional government1 or any other 
tried solution of an unavoidable        
problem4  ,there is false opinion here  
as elsewhere1 and hollow convention is  
not infrequently paraded as duty and    
wisdom2 but the nucleus of morality is  
verified truth1 the precipitate of      
mankind's prolonged experiment in       

living4  ,i do not propose1 however1 to 
be satisfied with so modest a claim4    
,it might still be contended that       
morality is doubtless true so far as it 
goes1 or well enough for those who care 
for it2 but that it will scarcely       
concern other than the more             
coarse-grained and less adventurous     
minds4  ,it is customary to associate   
high wisdom with the pursuit of some    
special interest1 for its own sake1 and 
under no wider law than a sort of       
professional etiquette or code of honor4
  ,business is business1 art is art1    
truth is truth1 and for one who cares to
 go in for it1 virtue is for virtue's   
sake4  ,those who ride hobbies do not   
object to the moralist1 provided he does
 not intrude4  ,but if he applies his   
rules to other than his own personal or 
domestic affairs1 he is berated as an   
impertinent busybody who is talking of  
things he does not understand4  ,now ,i 
venture to assert that the #h moralist  
in the nature of the case can never be  

impertinent1 though he may be impolite  
or even insulting4  ,he can never be    
impertinent because1 contrary to the    
formula of the day1 there is no such    
thing as virtue for virtue's sake4      
,morality is the one interest that      
virtually represents all interests4  ,it
 is the interest of every man in the    
general tests of success and failure1   
and in the maintenance of the field or  
medium of all interests4  ,there is no  
enterprise which1 if conducted          
efficiently1 is not a verification of   
moral rules2 there is no enterprise     
which does not receive and transmit the 
now of life that circulates through the 
moral system at large4  ,to be          
righteously indignant is to protest     
passionately in behalf of the whole     
good1 and against the clumsy and        
inadvertent evil4  ,to this morality    
owes its universal support1 its         
invincible finality4  ,it need never be 
apologetic1 because it holds no brief2  
it advocates no measure except the      

carrying through to the end of what is  
virtually undertaken by all parties to  
the adventure of life4  ,it follows that
 no man can exempt himself from moral   
liability4  ,he is irrevocably committed
 to life1 and can neglect the laws of   
life only at his absolute or ultimate   
peril4  ,what does it profit a man to   
gain a bit here and a bit there1 if he  
is foreordained to loss on the whole8   
,if he squanders his moral patrimony he 
has no means of #i recouping his        
fortunes2 he has wasted his supporting  
vitality and forfeited his general      
livelihood4  ,and now if this be true it
 is of more than passing or sentimental 
importance4  ,it needs to be vividly    
realized if morality is to make its     
saving appeal4  ,morality is only       
discredited through being sanctioned2   
its proper merits are more eloquent than
 its friends and borrowed auspices4  ,if
 it can be simply proclaimed as it is1  
it cannot be denied4  ,this is one of   
the things which ,i undertake to do4    

,but to understand what morality really 
is1 to recognize its claims1 is to      
understand also its application1 its    
critical pertinence to art and religion1
 to all the great and permanent         
undertakings of men4  ,such application 
,i shall in the later chapters undertake
 to suggest1 partly as an amplification 
of the meaning of morality1 and partly  
as a programme of further reflection    
looking toward a moral philosophy of    
history4  ,i can do no more in the      
present chapter than broadly present the
 structure of morality1 leaving the     
logic of its appeal and its more        
important applications for the chapters 
which follow4   ,,ii  ,the moral affair 
of men1 a prolonged and complicated     
historical enterprise1 is thrown into   
historical relief upon the background of
 a mechanical cosmos4  ,nature1 as      
interpreted by the #aj inorganic        
sciences1 presents a spectacle of       
impassivity4  ,it moves1 transforms1 and
 radiates1 on every scale and in all its

 gigantic range of temporal and spatial 
distance1 utterly without loss or gain  
of value4  ,one cannot rightly attribute
 to such a world even the property of   
neglect or brutality4  ,its indifference
 is absolute4  ,such a world is devoid  
of value because of the elimination of  
the bias of life4  ,where no interest is
 at stake1 changes can make no practical
 difference2 where no claims are made1  
there can be neither fortune nor        
calamity1 neither comedy nor tragedy4   
,there is no object of applause or      
resentment1 if there be nothing in whose
 behalf such judgments may be urged4    
,but with the introduction of life1 even
 the least particle of it1 the rudest   
bit of protoplasm that ever made the    
venture1 nature becomes a new system    
with a new centre4  ,the organism       
inherits the earth2 the mechanisms of   
nature become its environment1 its      
resources in the struggle to keep for a 
time body and soul together4  ,the mark 
of life is partiality for itself4  ,if  

anything is to become an object of      
solicitude1 it must first announce      
itself through acting in its own behalf4
  ,with life thus instituted there      
begins the long struggle of interest    
against inertia and indifference1 that  
war of which civilization itself is only
 the latest and most triumphant phase4  
#aa  ,nature being thus enlivened1 the  
simpler terms of value now find a       
meaning4  ,a living thing must suffer   
calamities or achieve successes2 and    
since its fortunes are good or bad in   
the most elementary sense that can be   
attached to these conceptions1 it is    
worth our while to consider the matter  
with some care4  ,an interest1 or unit  
of life1 is essentially an organization 
which consistently acts for its own     
preservation4  ,it deals with its       
environment in such wise as to keep     
itself intact and bring itself to       
maturity2 appropriating what it needs1  
and avoiding or destroying what         
threatens it with injury4  ,the interest

 so functions as to supply itself with  
the means whereby it may continue to    
exist and function4  ,this is the       
principle of action which may be        
generalized from its behavior1 and      
through which it may be distinguished   
within the context of nature4  ,now the 
term interest being construed in this   
sense1 we may describe goodness as      
fulfilment of interest4  ,the           
description will perhaps refer more     
clearly to human life1 if for the term  
interest we substitute the term desire4 
,goodness would then consist in the     
satisfaction of desire4  ,in other      
words1 things are good because desired1 
not desired because good4  ,to say that 
one desires things because one needs    
them1 or likes them1 or admires them1 is
 redundant2 in the end one simply       
desires certain things1 that is1 one #ab
 possesses an interest or desire which  
they fulfil4  ,there are as many        
varieties of goodness as there are      
varieties of interest2 and to the       

variety of interest there is no end4    
,strictly speaking1 goodness belongs to 
an interest's actual state of           
fulfilment4  ,this will consist in an   
activity1 exercised by the interest1 but
 employing the environment4  ,with a    
slight shift of emphasis1 goodness in   
this absolute sense will attach either  
to interest in so far as nourished by   
objects1 as in the case of hunger       
appeased1 or to objects in so far as    
assimilated to interest1 as in the case 
of food consumed4  ,it follows that     
goodness in a relative sense1 in the    
sense of good for1 will attach to       
whatever conduces to good in the        
absolute sense2 that is1 actions and    
objects1 such as agriculture and bread1 
that lead directly or indirectly to the 
fulfilment of interest4  ,but good and  
good for1 like their opposites bad and  
bad for1 are never sharply              
distinguishable1 because the imagination
 anticipates the fortunes of interests1 
and transforms even remote contingencies

 into actual victory or defeat4         
,through their organization into life1  
the mechanisms of nature thus take on   
the generic quality of good and evil4   
,they either serve interests or oppose  
them2 and must be employed and          
assimilated1 or avoided and rejected #ac
 accordingly4  ,events which once       
indifferently happened are now objects  
of hope and fear1 or integral parts of  
success and failure4   ,,iii  ,but that 
organization of life which denotes the  
presence of morality has not yet been   
defined4  ,the isolated interest        
extricates itself from mechanism2 and1  
struggling to maintain itself1 does1 it 
is true1 divide the world into good and 
bad1 according to its uses4  ,but the   
moral drama opens only when interest    
meets interest2 when the path of one    
unit of life is crossed by that of      
another4  ,every interest is compelled  
to recognize other interests1 on the one
 hand as parts of its environment1 and  
on the other hand as partners in the    

general enterprise of life4  ,thus there
 is evolved the moral idea1 or principle
 of action1 according to which interest 
allies itself with interest in order to 
be free-handed and powerful against the 
common hereditary enemy1 the heavy      
inertia and the incessant wear of the   
cosmos4  ,through morality a plurality  
of interests becomes an economy1 or     
community of interests4  ,i have thus   
far described the situation as though it
 were essentially a social one4  ,but   
while1 historically speaking1 it is     
doubtless always social in one of its   
aspects1 the essence of the matter is as
 truly represented within the #ad group 
of interests sustained by a single      
organism1 when these1 for example1 are  
united in an individual life-purpose4   
,morality is that procedure in which    
several interests1 whether they involve 
one or more physical organisms1 are so  
adjusted as to function as one interest1
 more massive in its support1 and more  
coherent and united in the common task  

of fulfilment4  ,interests morally      
combined are not destroyed or           
superseded1 as are mechanical forces1 by
 their resultant4  ,the power of the    
higher interest is due to a summing of  
incentives emanating from the           
contributing interests2 it can          
perpetuate itself only through keeping  
these interests alive4  ,the most       
spectacular instance of this is         
government1 which functions as one1 and 
yet derives its power from an enormous  
variety of different interests1 which it
 must foster and conserve as the sources
 of its own life4  ,in all cases the    
strength of morality must lie in its    
liberality and breadth4  ,morality is   
simply the forced choice between suicide
 and abundant life4 ,when interests war 
against one another they render the     
project of life1 at best a hard         
adventure1 futile and abortive4  ,i hold
 it to be of prime importance for the   
understanding of this matter to observe 
that from the poorest and crudest       

beginnings1 morality is the massing of  
interests against a reluctant cosmos4   
,life has been attended with discord and
 mutual #ae destruction1 but this is its
 failure4  ,the first grumbling truce   
between savage enemies1 the first       
collective enterprise1 the first        
peaceful community1 the first restraint 
on gluttony for the sake of health1 the 
first suppression of ferocity for the   
sake of a harder blow struck in cold    
blood1--these were the first victories  
of morality4  ,they were moral victories
 in that they organized life into more  
comprehensive unities1 making it a more 
formidable thing1 and securing a more   
abundant satisfaction4  ,the fact that  
life thus combined and weighted1 was    
hurled against life1 was the lingering  
weakness1 the deficiency which attends  
upon all partial attainment4  ,the moral
 triumph lay in the positive access of  
strength4  ,let us now correct our      
elementary conceptions of value so that 
they may apply to moral value4  ,the    

fulfilment of a simple isolated interest
 is good1 but only the fulfilment of an 
organization of interests is morally    
good4  ,such goodness appears in the    
realization of an individual's          
systematic purpose or in the well-being 
of a community4 ,that it virtually      
implies one ultimate good1 the          
fulfilment of the system of all         
interests1 must necessarily follow2     
although we cannot at present deal      
adequately with that conclusion4  ,the  
quality of moral goodness1 like the     
quality of goodness in the fundamental  
sense1 lies not in the nature of any    
class of objects1 but in any #af object 
or activity whatsoever1 in so far as    
this provides a fulfilment of interest  
or desire4  ,in the case of moral       
goodness this fulfilment must embrace a 
group of interests in which each is     
limited by the others4  ,its value lies 
not only in fulfilment1 but also in     
adjustment and harmony4  ,and this value
 is independent of the special          

subject-matter of the interests4        
,moralists have generally agreed that it
 is impossible to conceive moral        
goodness exclusively in terms of any    
special interest1 even such as honor1   
power1 or wealth4#d  ,there is no       
interest so rare or so humble that its  
fulfilment is not morally good1 provided
 that fulfilment forms part of the      
systematic fulfilment of a group of     
interests4  ,but there has persisted    
from the dawn of ethical theory a       
misconception concerning the place of   
pleasure in moral goodness4  ,it has    
been supposed that every interest1      
whatever its special subject-matter1 is 
an interest in pleasure4  ,now while a  
thorough criticism of hedonism would be 
out of place here1 even if it were      
profitable1 a summary consideration of  
it will throw some light on the truth4#e
 ,fortunately1 the ethical status of    
pleasure is much clearer than its       
psychological status4  ,as a moral      
concern1 pleasure is either a special   

interest1 in which case it must take its
 place in the whole economy of life1 and
 submit to principles which adjust it to
 the rest2 or it is an #ag element in   
every interest1 in which case it is     
itself not an interest at all4  ,now    
whether it be proper to recognize a     
special interest in pleasure1 it is not 
necessary here to determine4 ,that this 
should be generally supposed to be the  
case is mainly due1 ,i think1 to a habit
 of associating pleasure peculiarly with
 certain familiar and recurrent bodily  
interests4  ,at any rate it is clear    
that the pleasure which constantly      
attends interests is not that in which  
the interest is taken4  ,interests and  
desires are qualitatively diverse1 and  
to an extent that is unlimited4  ,the   
simpler organisms are not interested in 
pleasure1 but in their individual       
preservation2 while man is interested   
not only in preservation1 but in        
learning1 card-playing1 loving1         
fighting1 bargaining1 and all the       

innumerable activities that form part of
 the present complex of life4  ,now1 it 
is true that it is agreeable or pleasant
 to contemplate the fulfilment of an    
interest2 and that such anticipatory    
gratification in some measure           
accompanies all endeavor4  ,but there is
 an absolute difference between such    
present pleasure and the prospect which 
evokes it4  ,and it is that prospect or 
imagined state of fulfilment which is   
the object of endeavor1 the good sought4
  ,it is also true that the fulfilment  
of every interest is pleasant4  ,but    
this means only that the interest is    
conscious of its fulfilment4  ,in       
pleasure #ah and pain life records its  
gains and losses1 and is guided to      
enhance the one or repair the other4    
,where in the scale of life pleasure and
 pain begin it is not now possible to   
say1 but it is certain that they are    
present wherever interests engage in any
 sort of reciprocity4  ,if one interest 
is to control or engage another it must 

be aware of it1 and alive to its success
 or failure4  ,where life has reached   
the human stage of complexity1 in which 
interests supervene upon interests1 in  
which every interest is itself an object
 of interest1 the consciousness of good 
and evil assumes a constantly increasing
 importance4  ,life is more watchful of 
itself1 more keenly sensitive to the    
fortunes of all of its constituent      
parts4  ,it is proper1 therefore1 to    
associate pleasure with goodness2 and   
happiness1 or a more constant and       
pervasive pleasure1 with the higher     
forms of moral goodness4  ,but pleasure 
and happiness are incidental to         
goodness2 necessary1 but not definitive 
of its general form and structure4  ,in 
addition to goodness thus amplified     
there now enters into life at the moral 
stage a new element of value1 the       
rightness or virtue of action which1    
though moved by some immediate desire1  
is at the same time controlled by a     
regard for a higher or more             

comprehensive interest4  ,this is the   
distinguishing quality of all that wins 
moral approval3 thrift and temperance2  
loyalty #ai and integrity2 justice1     
unselfishness1 and public spirit2       
humanity and piety4  ,to the further    
discussion of these several virtues we  
shall have occasion shortly to return4  
,moral procedure1 then1 differs from    
life in its more elementary form1       
through the fact that interests are     
organized4  ,morality is only life where
 this has assumed the form of the       
forward movement of character1          
nationality1 and humanity4  ,moral      
principles define the adjustment of     
interest to interest1 for the saving of 
each and the strengthening of both      
against failure and death4  ,morality is
 only the method of carrying on the     
affair of life beyond a certain point of
 complexity4 ,it is the method of       
concerted1 cumulative living1 through   
which interests are brought from a      
doubtful condition of being tolerated by

 the cosmos1 to a condition of security 
and confidence4  ,the spring and motive 
of morality are therefore absolutely one
 with those of life4 ,the               
self-preservative impulse of the        
simplest organism is the initial bias   
from which1 by a continuous progression 
in the direction of first intent1 have  
sprung the service of mankind and the   
love of ,god4   #bj  ,,iv  ,there is an 
old and unprofitable quarrel between    
those who identify1 and those who       
contrast1 morality with nature4  ,to    
adjudicate this quarrel1 it is necessary
 to define a point at which nature      
somehow exceeds herself4  ,strictly     
speaking1 it is as arbitrary to say that
 morality1 which arose and is immersed  
in nature1 is not natural1 as to say    
that magnetism and electricity are not  
natural4  ,if nature be defined in terms
 of the categories of any stage of      
complexity1 all beyond will wear the    
aspect of a miracle4  ,it would be      
proper to dismiss the question as only a

 trivial matter of terminology1 did not 
the discussion of it provide an occasion
 for alluding to certain confused       
notions that have obtained wide         
currency4  ,thus there is an ancient    
belief that it is natural to be         
licentious2 that man is at heart unruly 
and wilful1 wearing the artificial good 
behavior of civilization as he wears his
 clothes4  ,nietsche has contributed not
 a little to the glorification of this  
pro-natural and anti-moral monster4     
,and yet no one has recognized more     
clearly than he1 that restraint and law 
are not only in life from the beginning1
 but that they are themselves the very  
sources of its power4   ',the singular  
fact remains1' he says1 'that everything
 of the nature of freedom1 elegance1    
boldness1 #ba dance1 and masterly       
certainty1 which exists or has existed1 
whether it be in thought itself1 or in  
administration1 or in speaking and      
persuading1 in art just as in conduct1  
has only developed by means of the      

tyranny of such arbitrary law2 and in   
all seriousness2 it is not at all       
improbable that precisely this is nature
 and natural--and not laisser-aller6'#f 
,it only remains to drop the terms      
arbitrary and tyranny2 since the        
principle of development in life can    
scarcely be regarded as arbitrary1 or   
its effectual working as tyranny4       
,huxley chose to draw a line between    
nature and morality1 at the point where 
a limit is set to the isolated          
organism's struggle against all comers4 
,the practice of that which is ethically
 best--what we call goodness or         
virtue--involves a course of conduct    
which1 in all respects1 is opposed to   
that which leads to success in the      
cosmic struggle for existence4 ,in place
 of ruthless self-assertion it demands  
self-restraint4#g   ,but ,huxley appears
 momentarily to have overlooked the fact
 that the struggle for existence itself 
puts a premium on self-restraint4  ,for 
there is no stage of evolution in which 

the adjustment and co-operation of      
interests is not an aid to survival4    
,one does not have to rise higher in the
 scale of life than the plants          
fertilized by insects1 to observe the   
working of this principle4  ,it is only 
the crudest and most impotent           
self-assertion that is ruthless4  ,the  
reason for this #bb is simply that the  
real enemy of every vital process is not
 another kindred process1 but the       
mechanical environment4  ,life is       
essentially an assertion1 not against   
life1 but against death4  ,interests    
that expend their energies in destroying
 or crippling one another1 slip back    
toward that primeval lifelessness from  
which they emerged4  ,restraint for the 
sake of organization is therefore only a
 developed and intelligent              
self-assertion4  ,if one insists still  
upon drawing a line between cosmical and
 moral forces1 let it be drawn at the   
point where there first arises that     
unstable complex called life4  ,life    

does in a sense oppose itself to the    
balance of nature4  ,to hold itself     
together1 it must play at parry and     
thrust with the very forces which gave  
it birth4  ,once having happened1 it so 
acts as to persist4  ,but it should be  
remarked that this opposition between   
the careless and rough course of the    
cosmos1 the insidious forces of         
dissolution1 on the one hand1 and the   
self-preserving care of the organism on 
the other1 is present absolutely from   
the outset of life4  ,vegetable and     
animal organisms do1 it is true1 adapt  
themselves to the environment2 but their
 adaptation is essentially a method of  
using and modifying the environment in  
their own favor1 precisely as is the    
case with human action4  #bc ,therefore 
,huxley's sharp distinction between     
natural plant life and man's artificial 
garden is misleading4   ',the tendency  
of the cosmic process1' he says1 'is to 
bring about the adjustment of the forms 
of plant life to the current conditions2

 the tendency of the horticultural      
process is the adjustment of the        
conditions to the needs of the forms of 
plant life which the gardener desires to
 raise4'#h   ,but this is to ignore the 
basal fact1 which is that plant life in 
any form is a defiance of current       
conditions4  ,art has already begun when
 natural processes assume a form that   
feeds itself1 reproduces itself1 and    
grows4  ,the first organisms have only a
 local footing2 they are rooted in the  
soil1 and can turn to their advantage   
only the conditions characteristic of a 
time and place4  ,eventually there      
evolves a more resourceful unit of life1
 like the gardener with his cultivated  
plants1 who is capable of inhabiting    
nature at large4  ,but the method is    
still the same1 that of playing off     
nature against nature2 only it is now   
done on a larger scale1 and in a more   
aggressive and confident spirit4 ,the   
need of concession to the demands of    
locality is reduced1 through a          

concession once and for all to the wider
 processes of nature4  ,but in relation 
to its environment1 life is never wholly
 constructive1 as it is never wholly    
passive4  ,whether it appears in the    
form of vegetation or civilization1 #bd 
it always involves both an adaptation of
 nature to itself and of itself to      
nature4  ,morality1 then1 is natural if 
life is natural2 for it is defined by   
the same essential principles4  ,it is  
related to life as a later to an earlier
 phase of one development4  ,the        
organization of life answers the        
self-preservative impulse with which    
life begins2 the deliberate fulfilment  
of a human purpose is only life grown   
strong enough through organization to   
conduct a larger and more adventurous   
enterprise4   ,v  ,in the light of this 
conception let us examine more fully the
 relation of morality to the competitive
 struggle between individuals and       
communities4  ,there can1 of course1 be 
no doubt that competition forces life up

 in the scale4  ,but it is equally true1
 and more significant1 that in the      
course of that progress competition     
itself is steadily eliminated4  ,the    
stronger units of life prevail against  
the weaker4 ,but the stronger units of  
life are the more inclusive and         
harmonious complexes of interest4  ,they
 are constituted by adjusting interests2
 allowing each a modicum of free play1  
or crushing those that will not submit  
to organization4  ,within such units the
 principle of mechanical survival gives 
way to the principle of moral survival4 
,i mean by this that #be the selection1 
rejection1 and gradation of interests is
 made not on the basis of the           
uncompromising self-assertion of each   
and the survival of the hardy remnant2  
but on the basis of the contribution    
made by each to the life of the         
collective body4  ,the test of survival 
is obedience to a law defined in the    
joint interest of all1 and control is   
vested in the rational capacity to      

represent this interest and conduct it  
to a safe and profitable issue4  ,the   
strength of life thus organized lies in 
its massiveness1 in its effective       
plenitude4  ,when such units wage war on
 one another1 this strength is wasted2  
and the very same principle that        
strength shall prevail1 tends to the    
extension of the organization until it  
shall embrace contentious factions4     
,even where the principle of survival   
does not operate1 conflict has been1 and
 yet remains1 a factor in moral progress
 of enormous and far-reaching           
importance4  ,the more keen and         
unrelenting it is1 the more effectually 
does it expose the weakness of the      
competing units1 the more urgently does 
it require a better concentration and   
economy of effort4  ,in order to fight a
 rival1 it is necessary to leave off    
fighting one's self1 and be healthy and 
single-minded4  ,an industrial          
corporation1 in order to overreach its  
competitors1 is compelled to adjust its 

intricate functions with incredible     
nicety1 to utilize by-products1 and even
 to introduce old-age pensions for the  
promotion #bf of morale among its       
employees4  ,and so a nation1 to be     
strong in war1 must enjoy peace and     
justice at home4  ,war has served       
society by welding great aggregates of  
interest into compact and effective     
wholes1 the enemy providing an object   
upon which collective endeavor can      
unite4  ,but circumstances that press   
life forward will be left behind1 if    
these circumstances are not themselves  
good4  ,and war is not that for which   
men war2 they war for the existence and 
satisfaction of their interests4  ,that 
which is constructive and saving in war 
is not the contact between the warring  
parties1 but their internal coherence   
and harmony4  ,it is that which survives
 when hostility is inhibited by a       
recognition of the cost2 it is that     
which is extended when hostility gives  
way to a wider co-ordination of         

interests4  ,the loss when contending   
currents are redirected and flow        
together is not a loss of power1 but    
only of neutralizing resistance4  ,it is
 true that the lesson of harmony is     
learned through discord2 but harmony is 
none the less in the end exclusive of   
discord4  ,the principle of peace1      
learned at home through the hard        
necessity of war abroad1 finds only a   
more complete justification and         
beneficent application in peace abroad4 
,it is love and not hate that is the    
moving spring of life4  ,it is love     
which is constructive2 hate destroys    
even the very object that evokes and #bg
 sustains it4  ,it is essential1 then1  
to life1 not only to assert and         
reproduce itself1 but to increase itself
 through allying itself with life4      
,where the motive of life thus freely   
expresses itself1 there are no natural  
enemies4  ,i count it to be important   
thus to trace morality back to the      
original love of life1 since only so is 

it possible to understand its urgency1  
and its continuity with every organic   
impulse4  ,it is because morality is    
without warrant dislocated from the     
natural life1 that it is accused of     
being barren and formal4  ,to many minds
 it is best symbolized by the kindly    
lady who gives the small boy a penny1   
and admonishes him not to spend it4     
,but there could be no more outrageous  
travesty4  ,morality in its springs is  
absolutely one with that clinging to    
life which is the most deep-lying of all
 interests1 and with that relish for    
life in which its goodness needs no     
philosopher's approval4  ,the primal    
determination to be and to sell one's   
self dearly1 is not different1 except in
 its limits1 from the moral             
determination to be and to attain to the
 uttermost4  ,the whole force of life is
 behind every moral scruple1 and        
guarantees the sanity even of a         
universal good-will4  ,but the          
identification of morality with the     

organization of life1 serves also to    
demonstrate life in its unity and larger
 auspices4 ,morality harmonizes life and
 eliminates its wanton #bh              
self-destruction2 but life is not       
therefore left without an object of     
conquest4  ,for there is one campaign in
 which all interests are engaged1 and   
which requires their undivided and      
aggressive effort4 ,this is the first   
and last campaign1 the war of life upon 
the routine of the mechanical cosmos and
 its forces of dissolution4  ,to live1  
to let live1 and to grow in life1       
constitute an absorbing and passionate  
task1 in which every human heroism may  
find a proper object4   ,,vi  ,it must  
be admitted that the imagination has not
 yet sufficiently glorified this        
enterprise of civilization4  ,it is hard
 to forget old shibboleths and          
loyalties4  ,and yet precisely that must
 be done with every advance in          
liberality4  ,admiration and passion lag
 behind reason2 are forever backsliding 

and debauching themselves among the     
companions of their youth4  ,but man's  
salvation lies not in degrading his     
reason to the level of his loyalties1   
nor in allowing the two to drift apart1 
but in acquiring a finer loyalty4  ,and 
while one cannot extemporize the symbols
 and imagery of devotion1 these will    
surely grow about any sustained purpose4
  ,we hear much in our day of the       
passing of nobility and enthusiasm with 
the era of war4  ,whatever makes men    
feel young1 says ,chesterton1 #bi is    
great--a great war or a love story4 #i  
,love stories will doubtless continue to
 the end2 but must man cease to feel    
young in the days when cruelty and      
exploitation are obsolete8  ,nietsche#aj
 speaks with passionate regret of a     
certain lordliness1 or assertion of     
superiority1 that has latterly given    
place to the slave morality1 which aims 
at the universal green-meadow happiness 
of the herd4  ,there are no more heroes1
 of lofty spirituality1 but only        

levellers1 timid1 stupid1 mediocre folk1
 sans genie et sans esprit4  ,now there 
is a paradox that does not seem to have 
occurred to ,nietsche1 in the slave     
insurrection by which he accounts for   
this dreary spectacle4  ,it can scarcely
 be a code of slavishness that has      
enabled slaves to overthrow their       
masters4  ,the morality of the modern   
,european democracy is the morality of  
the strong2 of the many1 it is true1 but
 of the many united and impassioned1    
moving toward the general end with good 
heart4  ,and it is this which gave      
mastery to the once ruling class4       
,mastery appears wherever action is     
bold1 united1 and with the pressure of  
interest behind it2 mastery has nothing 
to do with the airs of mastery1 with    
,nietsche's pathos of distance1         
separating class from class4  ,the      
instinct for rank1 and delight in the   
nuances of reverence1 are not signs of  
nobility1 as ,nietsche would have it4   
,there is no nose for them so #cj       

sensitive and discriminating as that of 
the chambermaid or butler4  ,the mere   
pride of an easy mastery over slaves is 
the taint of every society in which     
class differences are recognized as     
fixed4  ,it attaches to all classes2    
whether it be called snobbery or        
obsequiousness1 it is all one4  ,the    
virtue of mastery1 on the other hand1   
lies in the power and in the attainment 
which it represents4  ,and this         
,nietsche himself fully admits in his   
less inspired but more thoughtful       
utterances4  ,it is the constant        
struggle with uniform unfavorable       
conditions that fixes the type he       
admires4  ,when there are no more       
enemies1 the bond and constraint of the 
old discipline severs1 and a rapid decay
 sets in2 which leads inevitably1 after 
a chaos of individualism1 to a period of
 mediocrity such as the present4 ,in    
other words1 so soon as its political   
and social activities are confined to   
lording it1 the aristocracy loses its   

vigor1 and falls an easy prey to        
democratic or other propagandists who   
want something and are united to attain 
it4  ,now it seems that if man is not to
 become spiritually bankrupt1 he must be
 confronted with unfavorable conditions 
that keep him vigilant and alert4       
,nietsche has no imagination for        
resistance1 struggle1 and victory1      
except as these arise in the war of man 
against man4  ,his heroes are           
,alcibiades1 ,caesar1 and ,frederick    
,,ii1 men #ca predestined for conquering
 and circumventing others4  ,but it is  
not easy for us of this day to forget   
the others2 it is the cost to them that 
galls our conscience4  ,we cannot       
sincerely applaud a heroism in which    
life is condemned to feed on itself4    
,shall the only enemy that never fails1 
the condition that is always indifferent
 if not unfavorable1 namely1 the        
perpetual wear and drag of nature1 be   
forgotten in order that men may fall on 
one another8  ,has man no more lordly   

task than that of destroying what he    
holds to be good8  ,is there no more of 
creative plenipotence in man than       
killing and robbing8  ,i am convinced   
that it needs only enlightenment to     
reduce ,nietsche's circumventer of      
others to the proportions of a burglar2 
and to enlarge to truly heroic          
proportions him who circumvents the     
blindness of nature1 brings up the weak 
or faint-hearted who lag behind1 and    
throws himself bravely into the         
enterprise of steady constructive       
civilization4  ,nietsche is beguiled by 
a love of melodrama4  ,he forgets the   
real war for the pageantry of an era    
that will pass4  ,as a misleader of     
youth he conspires with the writers of  
dime-novels to fix the imagination on   
false symbols4  ,the small boy who would
 run away from home for the glory of    
fighting ,indians is deceived2 both     
because there are no longer any ,indians
 to fight1 and because there are more   
glorious #cb battles to be fought at    

home4  ,war between man and man is an   
obsolescent form of heroism4  ,there is 
every reason1 therefore1 why it should  
not be glorified as the only occasion   
capable of evoking the great emotions4  
,the general battle of life1 the first  
and last battle1 is still on2 and it has
 that in it of danger and resistance1 of
 comradeship and of triumph1 that can   
stir the blood4  ,but ,i have not       
undertaken to make morality picturesque4
  ,i shall leave that to other hands4   
,in an age when it has been somewhat out
 of literary fashion1 ,chesterton#aa has
 found it possible even to proclaim     
morality as the latest and most         
enlivening paradox4  ,but ,i propose to 
leave it clad in its own sobriety4  ,its
 appeal in the last analysis must be to 
a sense for reality1 and to an          
enlightened practical wisdom4 ,morality 
is that which makes man1 naked1         
shoeless1 and defenceless in body1 the  
master of the kingdom of nature4        
,morality in this sense has never been  

more simply and eloquently justified    
than in the words which ,plato puts into
 the mouth of ,protagoras4  ,he first   
describes the arts with which men       
contrived barely to sustain themselves1 
in a condition no better than the beasts
 which preyed on them in their          
helplessness4 ,it is then that through  
the gift of ,zeus they are rescued from 
their degradation and invested with the 
forms of civilization4  #cc  ,after a   
while the desire of self-preservation   
gathered them into cities2 but when they
 were gathered together1 having no art  
of government1 they evil-intreated one  
another1 and were again in process of   
dispersion and destruction4  ,zeus      
feared that the entire race would be    
exterminated1 and so he sent ,hermes to 
them1 bearing reverence and justice to  
be the ordering principles of cities and
 the bonds of friendship and            
conciliation4#ab   ,but reverence and   
justice are more even than the ordering 
principles of cities4  ,they are the    

conditions of the maximum of attainment1
 whether this be conceived as that      
supreme excellence which ,plato divined1
 or as that all-saving good which is the
 object of a ,christian devotion to     
humanity4  ,morality is the law of life1
 from its bare preservation to its      
supreme fruition4  ,there is a high     
pretension in morality which is the     
necessary consequence of its motive4    
,but man is not1 on that account1 in    
need of those reminders of failure which
 are so easy to offer1 and which are so 
impotently true2 he needs rather new    
symbols of faith1 through which his     
heart may be renewed1 and his courage   
fortified to proceed with an undertaking
 of which he cannot see the end4  ,faith
 and courage have brought him thus far3 
,till he well-nigh can tame   ,brute    
mischiefs and control   ,invisible      
things and turn   ,all warring ills to  
purposes of good4     #cd  ,,chapter    
,,ii  ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,the ,,moral  
,,appeal  ,there is a phrase1 liberty of

 conscience1 which well expresses the   
modern conception of moral obligation4  
,it recognizes that duty in the last    
analysis is imposed upon the individual 
neither by society nor even by ,god1 but
 by himself2 that there is no authority 
in moral matters more ultimate than a   
man's own rational conviction of what is
 best4  ,we meet here with the          
application to morality of the motive   
which underlies the whole modern        
reaction against medievalism1 the motive
 which ,john ,locke so aptly summarized 
when he said1 ,we should not judge of   
things by men's opinions1 but of        
opinions by things4 #a  ,this is        
individualism of the positive temper1   
the protest against convention and      
authority2 in behalf1 not of license1   
but of knowledge4 ,mediaevalism is      
condemned1 not for its universalism1 but
 for its arbitrariness and untruth2 for 
its mistaking of the weight of          
collective opinion1 or of institutional 
prestige1 for the weight of evidence4   

,this is the characteristic temper of   
the modern #ce individualism1 whether it
 be dominated by a bias for sense or a  
bias for reason4 ,locke1 like his       
forerunner1 ,bacon1 is an individualist 
because it is the individual in his     
detachment from society that alone can  
be open-eyed and open-minded2 who is    
qualified to carry on that proper       
business of the understanding1 to think 
of everything just as it is in itself4  
#b  ,descartes1 although in habit of    
mind and speculative instinct he has so 
little in common with the ,englishman1  
nevertheless finds in the individual's  
self-discipline and concentration the   
only hope of preserving the savor of the
 salt of knowledge4  ,thus he says3   ,i
 thought that the sciences contained in 
books1 7such of them at least as are    
made up of probable reasonings1 without 
demonstrations71 composed as they are of
 the opinions of many different         
individuals massed together1 are farther
 removed from truth than the simple     

inferences which a man of good sense    
using his natural and unprejudiced      
judgment draws respecting the matters of
 his experience4#c   ,spinoza1 who both 
abandoned the world and was abandoned by
 it1 sought an individual philosophy of 
life that should be more universal than 
the opinion of the world on account of  
its greater truth4  ,further reflection 
convinced me1 that if ,i could really   
get to the root of the matter ,i should 
be leaving certain evils for a certain  
good4 #d  ,this was the impulse in which
 modern tolerance of individual opinion 
and appeal to #cf individual conscience 
originated4  ,it was a protest not      
against order1 but against the          
disheartening drag1 the heavy and dull  
constraint1 of an order externally      
imposed4  ,freedom was valued not for   
the sake of lawlessness1 but for the    
sake of a clearer recognition of the    
proper laws of things1 of the principles
 that lie in nature and civilization and
 control them inherently4               

,individualism in this sense is not     
sceptical4  ,even a charge that existing
 codes of morality and systems of       
thought are largely matters of social   
habit1 or rules devised by church and   
state to maintain an arbitrary and      
profitable power1 does not justify the  
inference that there is no truth4  ,for 
there is no dilemma between public      
tyranny and private caprice4  ,on the   
contrary1 it means that tyranny is      
itself a form of caprice1 and that      
caprice in any form must give way before
 reason and experiment4  ,certain       
contemporary popular philosophers1 such 
as ,wells and ,shaw1 appear to believe  
that to repudiate the rigid conventions 
of the day means to abolish absolute    
distinctions utterly and fall back upon 
a general laxity and vagueness4  ,but   
this is to throw out the baby with the  
bath4  ,the evil in convention is the   
substitution of merely habitual         
distinctions for real distinctions1 and 
the only justification for an assault on

 convention is the bringing of such real
 distinctions to light4  #cg  ,the      
individualist virtually claims that an  
individual's belief1 if it be critical1 
is entitled to precedence over public   
belief1 simply because the individual   
mind is a better instrument of knowledge
 than the public mind4  ,it is the      
individual mind that is more directly   
confronted with the evidence1 more      
single and responsive4 ,individualism is
 not1 then1 an appeal to private opinion
 in any disparaging sense4  ,for1 in so 
far as private opinion is independent   
and truthful in motive1 concerning      
itself with its objects rather than with
 the social model of the day1 it is     
self-corrective and tends inevitably    
toward the common truth4  ,it is the    
opinion that is not really individual1  
but imitative1 respectful of persons1   
generally submissive to ulterior motives
 of a social kind1 that is private in   
the bad sense4  ,its privacy lies in its
 artificiality1 in its partisanship1 and

 in its remove from the open daylight of
 experience4  ,if1 therefore1 one must  
in moral matters finally rely on the    
individual's judgment1 this in no way   
implies the breakdown of universal      
principles4  ,it is neither necessary   
nor natural that individual judgment    
should bespeak whim1 hasty impulse1 or  
narrow self-interest4  ,the guardian in 
,plato's ,republic was as much an       
individual as the merchant or the       
soldier4#e  ,in a sense he was more an  
individual than these1 since he was not 
swayed by the crowd1 but thought with   
freedom #ch and independence4           
,nevertheless his thought embraced the  
interests of the entire community1 and  
comprehended the organization and forms 
of adjustment through which they all    
might live and thrive4  ,in moral as in 
other matters the true appeal of        
individualism is to an intelligence     
which1 though emancipated from          
convention1 is on that very account     
committed to the general necessities    

that lie in the field it seeks to know4 
,in view of these considerations1 then1 
we may pronounce legitimate and hopeful 
the moral individualism of the time4    
,it implies the recognition that there  
is a genuine ground for moral action1   
which may be brought home to any        
individual mind that will deal honestly 
and directly with the facts of life4    
,morality is not a useful fiction which 
must be protected against               
inquisitiveness and cherished in        
ignorance and servility2 it is a body of
 compelling truth that will convince    
wherever there is a capacity to observe 
and reason4  ,it requires no higher     
sanction than the individual1 because   
the individual is society's organ of    
truth2 because only in the individual   
mind is society open to rational        
conviction4  ,latitudinarianism and     
tolerance in this sense bespeak a       
confidence in morality's ability to     
justify itself4  ,at the same time they 
represent a protest against replacing   

the intrinsic truth of morality by the  
arbitrary standards of authority #ci and
 convention4  ,now1 while there is      
little need in the present day of       
protecting individual judgment against  
encroachments of authority1 there can be
 no doubt of the great need of          
protecting it against the more insidious
 encroachments of convention4  ,this is 
peculiarly an age of publicity4  ,the   
forces of suggestion and imitation      
operate on a scale unparalleled in the  
history of society4  ,standards and     
types readily acquire an almost         
irresistible prestige1 simply through   
becoming established as models4  ,and   
the sanction of opinion may be gained   
for almost any formula1 from a fashion  
in hats to an article in theology4      
,convention can no longer be accounted  
conservative4  ,it sanctions            
promiscuously usages as venerable as    
civilization itself1 and as transient as
 the fad of the hour4 ,democratic       
institutions and universal educational  

privileges have bred a social mass      
intelligent and responsive enough to be 
modish1 but lacking in discrimination   
and criticism4  ,the tyranny of opinion1
 the fear of being different1 has long  
since been recognized as a serious      
hinderance to the development which     
political freedom and economic          
opportunity ought properly to stimulate4
 ,but the moral blindness to which it   
gives rise has never1 ,i think1 been    
sufficiently emphasized4  ,we require of
 business men only that measure of      
honesty that we #dj conventionally      
expect in that type of occupation4  ,a  
politician is proverbially tricky and   
self-seeking4  ,the artistic temperament
 would scarcely be recognized if it did 
not manifest itself in weakness and     
excess4  ,it is as unreasonable to      
expect either tunefulness or humor in a 
musical comedy as to expect a statement 
of fact in an advertisement4  ,in short1
 where any human activity is            
conventionalized1 standards are         

arbitrarily fixed2 and critical         
discernment grows dull if it does not   
altogether atrophy4  ,it simply does not
 occur to the great majority of men that
 any activity should be judged otherwise
 than by comparing it with the          
stereotyped average of the day4  ,this  
is1 to be sure1 only that blindness of  
the common mind which ,socrates and     
,plato observed in their day1 but it is 
now aggravated through the greater      
massiveness and conductivity of modern  
society4  ,these considerations will    
serve both to introduce and to justify  
my present undertaking4  ,i assume that 
duty is not an arbitrary mandate which  
the individual must obey blindly or from
 motives of fear2 but the conviction of 
moral truth1 the enlightened recognition
 of the good4#f ,hence ,i wish to       
demonstrate morality to an individual   
reflective mind1 open to the facts of   
life and to conviction of truth4  ,i    
shall expound morality out of no book   
but experience1 that universal and      

publick ,manuscript1 that lies #da      
expans'd unto the ,eyes of all4  ,to    
refer morality to custom1 to conscience 
in the sense of individual prepossession
 or institutional authority1 even if    
these be interpreted as the oracles of  
,god1 is to justify the suspicion that  
it is groundless and arbitrary1 at best 
a matter of loyalty or good form4  ,i   
shall present morality as a set of      
principles as inherent in conduct1 as   
unmistakably valid there1 as is         
gravitation in the heavens4  ,i shall   
hope to make it appear that the saving  
grace of morality is directly operative 
in life2 needing no proof from any      
adventitious source1 because it proves  
itself under observation4  ,i shall     
address myself to an individual         
protagonist whom ,i shall designate in  
the second person2 and whom ,i shall    
suppose to exhibit that yielding        
reluctance which is the mark of a mind  
that for very love of truth will not too
 readily assent4  ,as ,i am to prove    

morality to you1 ,i accept the burden of
 proof2 but you are not on that account 
totally without responsibility in the   
matter4 ,as you must not stop your ears1
 or close your bodily eyes1 so you must 
not shut the eye of the mind1 or harden 
your heart4  ,were you to adopt such an 
attitude ,i should be compelled to set  
argument aside1 and resort to such      
practical measures as might shock or    
entice you into reasonableness4  ,or1 ,i
 might abandon you as incorrigible4  ,it
 is #db clear that ,i can as little show
 reasons to a man who will not think    
them with me1 as ,i can show the road to
 one who will not look where ,i point it
 out4  ,a very large amount of moral    
exhortation consists in the attempt to  
overcome apathy and inattention4  ,such 
exhortation cannot in the nature of the 
case be logical1 because the subject's  
logical organ is not as yet functioning4
  ,i doubt if there is any discussion of
 moral matters in common life in which  
this form of appeal is not present in a 

measure sufficient to obscure the merits
 of the question at issue4  ,i desire   
for present purposes to eliminate as far
 as possible all conflict and           
prejudices1 and thus to dispense with   
zeal and eloquence4 ,i shall assume1    
therefore1 that you propose to be       
reasonable concerning this moral affair4
  ,by this ,i mean simply that you shall
 directly observe the facts of life1    
report candidly on these facts1 and     
fully accept the implications of any    
judgment to which you may commit        
yourself4  ,i may phrase your pledge of 
reasonableness thus3 ,show what is      
right1 and that it is right1 and ,i will
 accept it4  ,i mean my action to be    
good1 and ask only to have the good     
demonstrated to me1 that ,i may         
intelligently adopt it4  #dc  ,,ii  ,it 
is commonly believed that whereas the   
logic of prudence is unimpeachable1     
there is a hiatus between this level of 
morality and those above4  ,to drink    
one's self to death is a species of     

folly that the poorest intelligence can 
understand2 but the folly in meanness1  
injustice1 or impiety is a harder       
matter4  ,believing as ,i do that the   
folly is equally demonstrable in all of 
these cases1 ,i propose not to accept   
your ready assent in the simpler case   
until its grounds have been made as     
clear and definite as possible4  ,i feel
 convinced that prudence is not so      
simple a matter as appears2 in fact that
 it involves the whole ethical          
dialectic4  ,i find you1 let us say1    
eating an apple with evident relish2 and
 ,i ask you why4  ,if you are candid1   
and free from pedantry1 you will        
doubtless reply that it is because you  
like to4  ,in this particular connection
 ,i can conceive no profounder          
utterance4  ,but we may obtain a        
phraseology that will suit our          
theoretical purposes more conveniently  
and serve better to fix the matter in   
our minds4  ,your eating of the apple is
 a process that tends within certain    

limits to continue and restore itself1  
to supply the actions and objects       
necessary to its own maintenance4  ,i   
have proposed that we call such a       
process an interest4  ,in that it is a  
part of that very complex physical and  
#dd moral thing called you1 it is your  
interest1 and it also has1 of course1   
its special subject-matter1 in this case
 the eating of an apple4  ,it involves  
specific movements of body1 and makes a 
specific requisition on the environment4
  ,now1 still confining ourselves       
strictly to this interest1 we shall     
doubtless agree to call any phase of it 
in which it is fulfilled1 in which its  
exercise is fostered and unimpeded1     
good4  ,and we shall doubtless agree to 
attach the same term1 although perhaps  
in a less direct sense1 to that part of 
the environment which it requires1 in   
this case the apple1 and to the         
subsidiary actions which mediate it1    
such as the grasping of the apple1 or   
the biting and mastication of it4  ,i   

mean only that these modes or factors of
 the interest are in some sense good2   
qualifications and limitations may be   
adjudicated later4  ,in this case1 which
 so far as ,i can see is the simplest   
possible case of the sort of value that 
enters into life1 the value is supplied 
by a specific type of process which we  
may call an interest1 and it is supplied
 thereby absolutely1 fundamentally4  ,it
 makes both this apple and your eating  
of it good that you should like to eat  
it4  ,if you could explain every action 
as you explain this action1 when it is  
thus isolated1 there would be no moral  
problem4  ,we may now safely open the   
door to the objections that have been   
pressing for admission4  #de ,the first 
to appear is an old friend among        
philosophers2 but one whose reputation  
so far exceeds its merits that it must  
be submitted to vigilant examination4   
,it is objected 7,i am sure that you    
have long wanted to say this7 that your 
repast is good for you1 good from your  

point of view1 but not on that account  
really good4  ,these are the terms with 
which it is customary to confound any   
serious judgment of truth2 and they     
acquire a peculiar force here because we
 seem to have invited their application4
  ,we have agreed that your action is   
good in that it suits your interest1 and
 thus seem to have defined its goodness 
as relative to you4  ,now1 if we are to 
avoid a confusion of mind that would    
terminate our investigation here and    
now1 we must bring to light a latent    
ambiguity4  ,we have1 it is true1       
discovered goodness to be a phase of a  
process called interest1 which is       
qualified further1 through the use of a 
personal pronoun4  ,the nature of       
goodness1 in other words1 is such as to 
involve certain specific relations1 here
 involving a person or subject4         
,goodness is not peculiar in this       
respect2 for there are very few things  
in this world that do not involve       
specific relations4  ,this is the case1 

for example1 with planets1 levers1 and  
brothers4  ,there is no planet without  
its sun1 no lever without its fulcrum1  
no brother who is not somebody's        
brother4  #df  ,but the relationship in 
the case of goodness is supposed to be a
 more serious matter2 sufficiently      
serious to discredit the meaning of     
goodness1 or make all judgments         
concerning goodness merely expressions  
of bias4  ,the supposition is due to the
 confusion of a relativity in the       
subject-matter of the judgment1 with a  
relativity of the judgment itself to the
 individual that gives utterance to it4 
,thus the judgment1 ,you like apples1   
deals with your interest and the objects
 relating to it2 but the judgment itself
 is not therefore biassed4  ,it is no   
more an expression of your opinion than 
it is of mine2 it is a formulation of   
what occurs in the field of experience  
open to all observers4  ,a judgment     
concerning only you1 is utterly         
different from a judgment representing  

only you4  ,the latter1 if there were   
such a thing1 would be ungrounded1 and  
would justify the sceptic's suspicions4 
,the confusion is possible here simply  
because the subject-matter of the       
judgment in question is itself a        
judgment4  ,it could scarcely arise in  
the parallel cases4  ,the lever cannot  
be defined except in relation to its    
fulcrum4  ,this may be loosely          
generalized and made to read3 judgments 
concerning a lever are relative to a    
fulcrum4  ,it might even be said that a 
lever is a lever only from the point of 
view of its own fulcrum4  ,but the most 
unscrupulous quibbler would scarcely    
offer this as evidence against #dg the  
objective validity of our knowledge of  
levers4  ,your brother is necessarily   
related to you2 but the proposition     
defining the relationship is not on that
 account relative1 that is1 peculiarly  
yours or any one else's4  ,fraternity is
 a complex involving a personal         
connection1 but is none the less        

entirely objective4  ,and precisely the 
same thing is true of goodness4  ,to    
observe it adequately one must bring    
into view that complex object called an 
interest1 which may be yours or his or  
mine2 but it will be brought none the   
less into our common view1 and observed 
as any other object may be observed4    
,because goodness is inherent in a      
process involving instincts1 desires1 or
 persons1 it is not one whit less valid 
or objective than it would be if it     
involved the sun or the first law of    
motion4  ,let us now turn to a much more
 fruitful objection4  ,suppose it be    
objected that your action1 though good  
when thus artificially isolated1 will in
 the concrete case have to be considered
 more broadly before any final judgment 
can be pronounced on it4  ,to this      
objection ,i fully assent4  ,it implies 
that although we have fully defined a   
hypothetical case of goodness1 we have  
so far simplified the conditions as to  
make our conclusions inadequate to moral

 experience4  ,accepting this           
qualification1 it is now in order to    
complicate the situation2 but retaining 
our analysis #dh of the elementary      
process1 and employing terms in the     
meaning derived therefrom4  ,let us     
suppose that the apple which you enjoy  
eating1 is my apple1 and that ,i delight
 in keeping it for my own uses4  ,such  
being the case1 we fall to wrangling    
over it1 and your appetite is like to go
 unappeased4 ,i now have evidence to    
show you that your act of violent       
appropriation does not conduce to your  
interest4  ,this is simply an           
experimental and empirical fact4  ,i am 
in a position to show you that the      
character of your action is other than  
you supposed1 that you were under a     
misapprehension as to its goodness4  ,it
 leads not to the enjoyable activity    
which interests you1 but to a series of 
bodily exertions and a state of         
unfulfilled longing in which you have no
 interest at all4 ,indeed your action is

 a hinderance to your interest2 in other
 words1 is bad4  ,but ,i proceed to     
point out to you the further fact that1 
if you will buy the apple and thus      
conciliate me1 you may get rid of my    
interference and proceed with your      
activity4  ,your purchase is now        
justified in precisely the same manner  
as your original seizure of the object4 
,if you are asked why you do it1 you may
 still reply1 ,because ,i like apples4  
,now1 it would accord with the customary
 use of terms to call such action on    
your part prudence2 and prudence is     
commonly regarded as a virtue #di or    
moral principle4  ,but in prudence the  
meaning of morality is as yet only      
partially realized2 it is morality upon 
a relatively low level4  ,hence it is   
desirable to avoid reading too much into
 it4  ,on the one hand1 prudence does   
involve the checking of one interest in 
consequence of the presence of another4 
,you have noted my interest1            
acknowledged it as having its own       

claims1 and made room for it4 ,therein  
your action differs signally from your  
dealings with your mechanical           
environment4  ,and it is this contact   
and adjustment of interests1 this       
practical recognition of the fact that  
the success of one interest requires    
that other interests be respected1 and  
dealt with in a special manner          
appropriate to them as interests1 that  
marks the procedure as moral4  ,on the  
other hand1 while you have acknowledged 
my interest1 you have not adopted it4   
,you have concerned yourself with my    
love of property only in so far as it   
affected your fondness for apples4  ,in 
order to appeal to you ,i have had to   
appeal to this1 as yet your only        
interest4  ,the moral value of your     
action lies wholly in its conduciveness 
to this interest1 because it is         
controlled wholly by it4 ,you are as yet
 only a complex acting consistently in  
such wise as to continue an eating of   
apples4  ,this formula is entirely      

sufficient as a summary of your conduct1
 even after you have learned to respect 
my property4  ,and therein lies #ej its 
merely prudential character4  ,in       
prudence thus strictly and abstractly   
regarded1 there is no preference1 no    
subordination of motives4  ,action is   
controlled by an exclusive and insistent
 desire1 which limits itself only with a
 view to effectiveness4   ,,iii  ,it    
would appear1 then1 that if ,i am to    
justify those types of action which are 
regarded as more completely moral1 ,i   
must persuade you to adopt interests    
that at any given instant do not move   
you4  ,i must persuade you to forego    
your present inclination for the sake of
 another2 to judge between interests1   
and prefer that which on grounds that   
you cannot reasonably deny is the more  
valid4  ,in other words1 ,i must define 
a logical transition from prudence to   
preference1 or moral purpose4  ,let us  
suppose that1 in spite of your liking1  
apples do not agree with you4  ,it is1  

for example1 pertinent to remark that if
 you eat the apple to-day you cannot go 
to the play to-morrow4  ,our parley     
proceeds as follows3  ,just now ,i am   
eating apples4  ,sufficient unto the day
 is the evil thereof4  ,but you         
acknowledge your fondness for the       
theatre4  ,yes1 but that doesn't        
interest me now4  ,nevertheless you     
recognize the interest in #ea play-going
 as a real one1 dormant to-day1         
temporarily eclipsed by another         
interest1 but certain to revive         
to-morrow8  ,i do4  ,and you admit that1
 apart from the chance of your death in 
the meantime1 a chance so small as to be
 negligible1 an interest to-morrow is as
 real as an interest to-day8  ,yes4     
,now1 recognizing these two interests1  
and keeping them firmly in view1 observe
 the consequences of your action if you 
persist in eating the apple1 and        
pronounce judgment upon it4  ,it would  
seem to be both good and bad2 good in   
its conduciveness to the satisfaction of

 my present appetite1 bad in its        
preventing my enjoyment of the play4    
,in your last reply you have fairly     
stated the problem4  ,you are not       
permitted to escape the dilemma by      
simply neglecting the facts1 for this   
would be contrary to the original       
agreement binding you to be and remain  
open-minded4  ,and you are now as       
concerned as ,i to solve the problem by 
defining a reorganization of the        
situation that would permit of an action
 unequivocally good1 that is altogether 
conducive to the fulfilment of interest4
  ,to understand what would constitute a
 solution of this moral problem it is   
important to observe1 #eb in the first  
place1 that an action wholly conducive  
to both interests would take precedence 
of an action which fulfilled the one but
 sacrificed the other4  ,were it        
possible for you to eat the apple now   
and go to the play to-morrow1 your      
rational course would be to allow your  
present impulse free play4  ,you would  

thus be alive to the total situation2   
your action would in reality be         
regulated by both interests1 or rather  
by a larger interest embracing and      
providing for both4  ,an action thus    
controlled would have a more adequate   
justification than an action conceived  
with reference to the one interest      
exclusively1 and merely happening to be 
favorable to the other interest also4   
,or suppose that1 by substituting a     
different species of apple for the one  
first selected1 you could avoid         
disagreeable consequences1 and without  
loss of immediate gratification4 ,in    
this case you would have corrected your 
original action and adopted a course    
that proved itself better1 because      
conducive to the fulfilment of          
to-morrow's interest as well as         
to-day's4  ,we have thus arrived at a   
very important conception1 that of a    
higher interest possessing a certain    
priority in its claims4  ,the higher    
interest as ,i have defined it is simply

 the greater interest1 and greater in   
the sense that it exceeds a narrower    
interest through embracing it and adding
 to it4  ,your interest in the          
fulfilment of #ec to-day's interest and 
to-morrow's1 is demonstrably greater    
than your interest in the fulfilment of 
either exclusively1 because it provides 
for each and more4  ,in this perfectly  
definite sense your preference may be   
justified4  ,let us now apply this      
principle of preference to the more     
complex case in which there is no       
available action which will fulfil both 
interests4 ,suppose that you cannot both
 eat apples to-day and go to the play   
to-morrow4  ,how is one to define a good
 action in the premises8  ,in the first 
place the good act originally conceived 
in terms of the free play of the present
 impulse is proved to be illusory4      
,there is no good act until your        
interests are reorganized4  ,in other   
words1 the higher interest1 which is    
entitled to preference1 requires some   

modification of the participating       
interests4  ,but the higher interest    
owes its title to its liberality or     
comprehensiveness4  ,hence it must      
represent the maximum fulfilment of both
 interests which the conditions allow4  
,such a controlling interest may require
 you altogether to forego the present   
indulgence1 or it may merely require    
that it be severely limited4  ,in any   
case1 the controlling interest will     
represent both interests1 modified1     
postponed1 or suppressed1 as is         
necessary for their maximum joint       
fulfilment4  ,the higher interest which 
thus replaces the original interest1 and
 which is entitled to do so only #ed    
because it incorporates them1 ,i propose
 to call moral purpose4  ,there are two 
highly important principles which we    
have been brought to recognize through  
this analysis of preference1 and it will
 be worth our while briefly to resume   
them4  ,in the first place1 no interest 
is entitled to your exclusive regard    

merely because it happens at any given  
time to be moving you4  ,i shall call   
this the principle of the objective     
validity of interests4  ,i mean simply  
that an interest is none the less an    
interest because it does not coincide   
with an individual's momentary          
inclination4  ,in reminding you of an   
interest overlooked1 ,i have not sought 
to justify it by subsuming it under your
 present interest4  ,i have not tried to
 prove that it is to your interest as an
 epicure that you should go to the play4
  ,i have simply pointed out the other  
interest1 and allowed it to stand on its
 merits4  ,in ethical theories of a     
certain type1 and in much impromptu     
moralizing1 it is assumed that there is 
no legitimate appeal except in behalf of
 interests that are at the instant      
already alive4  ,this is as absurd as to
 suppose that in order to bring you to  
the truth in any purely theoretical     
matter1 ,i must confine myself to       
evidence that you already recognize4    

,in both cases your individual          
experience at any given time may be     
narrow and limited owing to causes that 
are in the highest #ee degree arbitrary4
  ,it may be advisable that ,i should   
solicit your attention by connecting    
what ,i have to offer with what is      
already familiar to you2 but this is a  
psychological expedient4  ,my appeal is 
logically supported by objects1 by      
principles1 by data which are in no wise
 dependent for their claims on their    
connection with your present stock in   
trade4  ,chesterton refers to one who   
had that rational and deliberate        
preference which will always to the end 
trouble the peace of the world1 the     
rational and deliberate preference for a
 short life and a merry one4 #g  ,i     
cannot regard such hedonistic           
opportunism as other than wantonness or 
wilful carelessness4  ,it may be        
deliberate in the sense of being        
consciously persisted in1 but ,i cannot 
find any rationality in it4  ,it arises 

naturally enough through the greater    
vividness of the interests that are     
already adopted and proved2 but all     
prejudices arise from such accidents1   
and they are none the less on that      
account absolutely antagonistic to the  
rational attitude--that willingness that
 things should be for me even as they   
are4  ,in the second place1 it has      
appeared that there is no demonstrable  
priority of one simple interest over    
another differing only qualitatively    
from it4  ,i propose to call this the   
principle of the quantitative basis of  
preference4  ,i know that the term      
quantity has an ugly sound in this      
context4  #ef ,but ,i believe that this 
is due simply to a false abstraction4   
,two good books are not better than one 
because two is better than one1 but     
because in two of a given unit of       
goodness there is more of goodness than 
in one4  ,two is more than one1 but not 
more good1 unless that which is counted 
is itself good4  ,nor is two longer or  

heavier than one1 unless the units      
numbered happen to be those of length or
 weight4  ,to prefer two interests to   
one does not imply that one is a lover  
of quantity1 but a lover of good2 of    
that which if it be and remain good1 the
 more the better4  ,at any rate it seems
 to me a matter of simple candor to     
admit that more is a term implying      
quantity1 whether it be more room1 more 
weight1 more goodness1 or more beauty4  
,it seems to me to be equally evident   
that more implies commensurable         
magnitude2 and that commensurability    
implies the existence of a common unit  
in the terms compared4  ,two inches are 
more than one inch in that they include 
one inch and also another like unit4    
,now in moral matters the unit of value 
is the fulfilment of the simple         
interest2 and in consequence ,i see no  
way of demonstrating that one such      
simple interest is more good than       
another1 as ,i see no way of            
demonstrating that one inch is longer   

than another4  ,but ,i do see that if ,i
 can carry a simple interest over into a
 compound one1 and there both #eg retain
 it and add to it1 ,i shall have        
more--more by what ,i add4  ,such       
comparison is never a simple matter1    
perhaps in any concrete case never      
wholly conclusive4  ,but ,i can conceive
 no more important and more clarifying  
declaration of principle4  ,it means    
that any rational decision as to the    
precedence of social ideals1 or as to   
historical progress from good to better1
 must be based on width of              
representation and weight of incentive4 
,,iv  ,if what ,i have said thus far has
 proved convincing to you1 this may be  
owing to the fact that you have not been
 called upon to adopt any interest      
beyond what are conventionally regarded 
as your own4  ,in moral matters it is   
customary to attach a certain finality  
to personal pronouns4  ,but there are no
 terms in common use which have so rough
 and loose a meaning1 which cover so    

equivocal and confused an experience2   
albeit the necessity and frequency of   
their use has made them standard        
currency and polished them into a sort  
of deceptive smoothness to the touch4   
,there is no term so altogether handy as
 the term ,i1 nor is there any so       
embarrassed when called on to show its  
credentials in the shape of clear and   
verifiable experience4  ,if1 then1 you  
stand upon your interests ,i shall not  
be convinced1 for ,i shall #eh not know 
what you mean4  ,there is no sense in   
which you are a finished and            
demonstrable fact4  ,my dealings with   
you1 and this is peculiarly true of my  
rational dealings with you1 cannot be   
tested by you in any absolute or fixed  
sense1 simply because they may make you1
 as they may make me4  ,let us return to
 our test case4  ,you are the epicure1  
and ,i am the proprietor2 you seize my  
apple1 and ,i protest4  ,but now ,i no  
longer appeal to you merely as one who  
enjoys eating apples1 and warn you that 

you are selecting the wrong means of    
attaining that end4  ,i simply inform   
you that the apple is my property1 and  
that ,i desire to retain it4  ,i appeal 
to you to respect my wishes1 at least to
 the extent of non-interference4  ,if   
you reply that this is no interest that 
you acknowledge1 then ,i am in a        
position to inform you4  ,for on no     
ground can you attach finality to the   
set of interests which at any given time
 you choose to acknowledge4  ,if ,i may 
remind you of a forgotten interest1 ,i  
may inform you of a new interest4  ,in  
the one case1 you acknowledge that there
 is such an interest in that you        
anticipate its revival1 and realize that
 its mere absence is no proof of its    
non-existence4  ,you recognize it as    
having its roots in your organism1 and  
its opportunity for exercise in certain 
definable and predictable circumstances4
  ,this is what you mean when you       
acknowledge that you will desire to go  
to the play #ei to-morrow4  ,but the    

evidence of the existence of still      
another interest1 in this case mine1 is 
no less convincing4  ,like your own     
latent interest1 it does not at the     
instant move you4  ,but it has the      
specific character of an interest1 and  
its place in the existent world through 
its relation to my organism4            
,recognizing it as an interest1 you     
cannot in the given case fail to observe
 that it qualifies your action as good  
or bad1 through being affected by it4   
,if your action fulfils your interest   
and thwarts mine1 it is again mixed1    
both good and bad4  ,in order to define 
the good act in the premises it is      
necessary1 as in the previous case1 to  
define a purpose which shall embrace    
both interests and regulate action with 
a view to their joint fulfilment4  ,it  
is customary to argue this principle of 
impartiality1 according to which the    
merely personal consideration is        
declared to be irrelevant to the        
determination of moral value1 by a      

critique of egoism4  ,the reductio ad   
absurdum of egoism has recently been    
formulated by ,g4 ,e4 ,moore in as      
thorough and conclusive a manner as     
could be desired4#h ,that writer        
analyzes egoism into a series of        
propositions all of which are equivocal1
 false1 or1 so far as true1 non-egoistic
 in their meaning4  ,i shall reduce     
,moore's propositions to two1 and modify
 them to suit my own conception of      
goodness4  #fj  ,as an egoist you may1  
in the first place1 affirm that there   
are no interests but yours4  ,this      
proposition1 however1 is manifestly     
false4 ,accept any definition of an     
interest or desire that you will1 and ,i
 can find indefinitely many cases       
answering your definition and falling   
outside the class of those which you    
claim as your own4  ,none of these1 if  
it conforms fully to your definition1 is
 any the less an interest or desire than
 the one that happens to be moving you  
at the instant4 ,there would be as good 

ground for saying that your brother was 
the only brother1 or your book the only 
book4  ,even if you abate the rigor of  
the proposition1 you cannot escape its  
essential falsity4  ,if you affirm that 
there are no interests but the interests
 of each1 or that each man's interests  
are the only interests1 you flatly      
contradict yourself4  ,if you affirm    
that your interests are of superior     
importance1 that they are exceptional1  
peculiar1 entitled to pre-eminence--this
 is virtually equivalent to your        
original proposition4  ,the respect in  
which your interests seem different from
 all others either enters into your     
definition of interest1 in which case it
 becomes general2 or it is some         
adventitious circumstance that does not 
belong to your interests as such1 some  
accident of proximity which may have    
psychological or instrumental           
importance1 but cannot rightly affect   
your judgment of good4  ,for goodness   
lies in #fa the objective bearing of    

your action on such things as interests2
 precisely as the diagonal is a line    
connecting the vertices of opposite     
angles in a square1 independently of all
 circumstances that do not affect the   
generic character of the square4  ,in   
the second place1 you may affirm that   
for you there are no interests but your 
own4  ,but this is an equivocal         
proposition4  ,it may mean that in your 
opinion there are none1 in which case   
you admit the probable falsity of your  
judgment through contrasting it with the
 consensus of opinion2 through          
attributing it to your narrowness and   
false perspective4  ,your offering it as
 your opinion gives the proposition at  
best a tentative form2 the question of  
its truth remains to be adjudicated4  ,i
 need only present other interests      
answering your description of an        
interest to prove you mistaken4  ,and if
 you were to generalize your proposition
 and say that each man thinks his own   
interests the only interests1 you would 

be doubly wrong1 in that the            
generalization would be unwarranted1 and
 the opinion imputed to each man false4 
,or1 your claim that for you there are  
no interests but your own1 might be     
taken to mean that in some sense you    
must confine your endeavors to the      
fulfilment of your own interests4       
,otherwise1 you may argue1 the practical
 situation would #fb reach a dead-lock1 
a state of hopeless confusion in which  
each individual neglected his own proper
 affairs for the sake of those he had   
neither the means nor the competence to 
serve4 ,now this is indisputably true1  
but it is not egoism4  ,the judgment    
that each individual must labor where he
 may do so most effectively1 that he    
must assume not only a general          
responsibility for all interests        
affected by his action1 but also a      
special responsibility for those with   
whose direct execution he is charged1 is
 an impartial judgment4 ,it expresses a 
broad and intelligent view of the total 

situation4  ,in the fable of the fox and
 the grapes1 the action of the fox is   
due to the folly of a too fluent        
attention4  ,similarly1 he who lets go  
his present hold of the web of interests
 simply because his eye happens to      
alight on another vantage-point1 is as  
much the blind slave of novelty as the  
self-centred man is of familiarity4  ,in
 both cases the fault is one of         
narrowness of range1 of arbitrary       
exclusion4  ,egoists1 then1 are guilty  
of a kind of stupid provinciality4      
,they are like those closet-philosophers
 whom ,locke describes4   ,the truth is1
 they canton out to themselves a little 
,goshen in the intellectual world1 where
 light shines and as they conclude1 day 
blesses them2 but the rest of that vast 
expansum they give up to night and      
darkness1 and so avoid coming near it4  
,they have a pretty traffic with known  
correspondents1 in some little #fc      
creek2 within that they confine         
themselves1 and are dexterous managers  

enough of the wares and products of that
 corner with which they content         
themselves1 but will not venture out    
into the great ocean of knowledge1 to   
survey the riches that nature hath      
stored other parts with1 no less        
genuine1 no less solid1 no less useful  
than what has fallen to their lot1 in   
the admired plenty and sufficiency of   
their own little spot1 which to them    
contains whatsoever is good in the      
universe4#i   ,the impartial or judicial
 estimate of value is properly          
recognized as essential to the meaning  
of justice4  ,i do not here refer to    
justice in the more narrow and familiar 
sense4  ,retributive justice1 or justice
 in any of its special legal aspects1 is
 a political rather than an ethical     
matter4#aj  ,but political justice must 
be based on ethical justice4  ,and to   
the definition of this fundamental      
principle some contribution has now been
 made4  ,there is a parody of justice1 a
 justice of condescension1 that the     

principles already defined do discredit4
  ,for it has sometimes been thought    
that justice required only a deliberate 
estimate of interests by those best     
qualified to judge1 as though the       
settlement of moral issues were a matter
 of connoisseurship4  ,the viciousness  
of this conception lies in the fact that
 qualitatively regarded there is no     
superiority or inferiority among        
interests4  ,the relish of caviare is no
 better1 no worse1 than the relish of   
bread4  ,preference among interests must
 be based on their difference #fd of    
representation1 or their difference of  
compatibility4  ,a wide and safe        
interest is better than a narrow and    
mischievous interest1 better for its    
liberality4  ,it follows that no        
interest can be condemned except upon   
grounds that recognize its claims1 and  
aim so far as possible to provide for it
 among the rest4 ,no interest can       
rationally be rejected as having no     
value1 but only as involving too great a

 cost4  ,but though these considerations
 are sufficient to expose moral         
snobbery1 they do not fully define      
justice4  ,for justice imputes a certain
 inviolability to the claims of that    
unit of life which we term loosely a    
human1 personal1 moral1 free1 or        
rational being4  ,there is some sense in
 which you are a finality2 making it    
improper for me simply to dispose of    
you1 even if it be my sincere intention 
to promote thereby the well-being of    
humanity4  ,you are not merely one      
interest among the rest1 to be counted1 
adjusted1 or suppressed by some court of
 moral appraisement4  ,i think ,i may   
safely assume that there is to-day an   
established conscience supporting       
,kant's dictum1 ,so act as to treat     
humanity1 whether in thine own person or
 in that of any other1 in every case as 
an end withal1 never as means only4 #aa 
,let me state briefly what appears to me
 to be the proper basis of this         
judgment4  ,i have said that ,i am not  

entitled simply to suppress your #fe    
action as may be approved by my own     
judgment4  ,now1 did ,i propose to do   
so1 what justification should ,i offer8 
,i should present1 no doubt1 the facts  
in the case4  ,i should show you the    
incompatibility of your presently       
adopted course with the general good4   
,but let us suppose that you defend your
 action on the same grounds4  ,in that  
case your endorsement of your action has
 precisely the same formal justification
 as my condemnation of it4  ,our        
equality lies in the fact that we are   
both claiming candidly to represent the 
truth4  ,in the last analysis our       
equality is based on the identity of the
 objective content to which we appeal4  
,as witnesses of a specific truth within
 the range of both1 the meanest mortal  
alive and the omniscient intelligence   
are equal2 and simply because the       
identical truth is as valid in the mouth
 of one as in the mouth of the other4   
,where it is a matter of disagreement   

between you and me1 our equality lies in
 the fact that neither can do more than 
appeal to the object4  ,neither has any 
authority2 there is no authority in     
matters of truth1 but only evidence4    
,the only rational solution of          
disagreement is agreement2 that is1 the 
coalescence of opinions in the common   
object to which they refer and toward   
which they converge4  ,the method of    
approximating agreement is discussion2  
which is the attempt of each of two     
knowers to avail himself of all the     
organs #ff and instruments of knowledge 
possessed by the other4  ,discussion    
involves mutual respect1 in which each  
party acknowledges the finality of the  
other as a vehicle of truth4  ,this1 ,i 
believe1 is that moral equality1 that   
dignity and ultimate responsibility     
attaching to all rational beings alike1 
without which justice cannot be         
fulfilled4  ,justice1 then1 embraces    
these two ideas4  ,in the first place1  
in estimating the goodness or evil of   

action1 merely personal or party        
connections must not be admitted in     
evidence4  ,in the second place1 the    
deliberate judgment of any rationally   
minded individual is entitled to respect
 as a source of truth4  ,conflict must  
in the last analysis be overcome by the 
congruence of impartial minds4  ,hence  
the justification of reciprocal respect 
among persons who think honestly2 and of
 a public forum to which all shall have 
access1 and where business shall be     
transacted under the vigilant eye of him
 who is most concerned4  ,a candid mind 
is the last court of jurisdiction4  ,so 
long as the procedure of society is     
questioned or resented by one honest    
conscience1 it is lacking in complete   
verification1 and its findings are open 
to doubt4  #fg  ,v  ,enough has already 
been said to show that the goodness of  
action must be determined with reference
 to nothing less than the totality of   
all affected interests4  ,for this      
highest principle ,i have reserved the  

honored term1 good-will4  ,neither you  
nor ,i can reasonably decline to        
consider the bearing of our actions on  
any interest whatsoever4  ,right        
conduct1 since it is inconsistent with  
the least ruthlessness1 must inevitably 
in the end assume the form of humanity  
and piety4  ,i know that it is not      
customary to suppose that devotion to   
the service of mankind is rational2 it  
is taken to be gratuitous1 if not       
quixotic4 ,but once let it be granted   
that goodness accrues to action in      
proportion to its fruitfulness1 it      
follows that that action is most blessed
 that is dedicated without reservation  
to the general life4 ,there is only one 
course which can recommend itself to    
that fair and open mind to which ,i     
conceive myself to be addressing this   
appeal3 namely1 so to act in fulfilment 
of the interest in hand1 as either to   
promote or make room for all other      
interests4  ,and this is true not only  
of such interests as may be assumed to  

exist1 as constitute one's present      
neighborhood1 near and remote2 it is    
also true of interests that are as yet  
only potentialities1 defined by the     
capacity of living things #fh to grow4  
,if it be unreasonable to neglect the   
bearing of one's action on interests    
which one happens not to be familiar    
with1 it is unreasonable to neglect its 
bearing on interests not yet asserted1  
wherever there is a presumption that    
such may come to be4  ,in other words1  
one's moral account cannot be made up   
without a provision for entries that    
have yet to be made4  ,such a provision 
will take the form of a purpose to grow1
 an ardent spirit of liberality1 an     
eagerness for novelty4  ,good-will      
builds better than it knows2 it is open 
toward the future2 committed to a task  
which requires foresight and also faith4
  ,but such devotion1 with all its      
extravagance1 with its very reverence   
for what is not known but must          
nevertheless be accounted best1 is only1

 after all1 the part of fearless good   
sense4  ,if anything be good1 and if it 
be reasonable to pursue it1 then is the 
maximum of that thing the best1 and the 
pursuit of it wholly reasonable4  ,it   
may even be said that thrift is only a  
lesser form of piety1 and piety the     
whole of thrift4  ,for1 first and last1 
goodness lies in the saving and increase
 of life4  ,the justification of any act
 lies in its being provident2 in its    
yield of immediate fulfilment and its   
generous allowance for the other        
interest1 the remote interest1 and the  
interest that is as yet only surmised4  
,the good will is the will to           
participate productively1 permissively1 
#fi and formally in the total           
undertaking of life4  ,only when this   
intention controls one's decisions can  
one act without fear of one's own       
critical reflection4   ,,vi  ,let me add
 a word concerning the part played by   
the imagination in enforcing the logic  
of morality4  ,an enlightened           

conscience1 or a rational conviction of 
duty1 will consist essentially in the   
viewing of life with a certain remove   
from its local incidents4  ,in conduct1 
as in all matters where validity or     
truth is concerned1 the critical        
consciousness must disengage itself and 
view the course of things in its due    
proportions1 allowing one's dearest     
interests to lie where they lie among   
the rest4  ,i have read so admirable a  
representation of the moral function of 
the logical imagination in a recent     
paper by ,h4 ,g4 ,lord1 that ,i beg     
leave to quote it here in full3   ,as   
between one's self and another the image
 of an impartial outsider who acts as   
our judge is none other than this       
rational insight into the relation      
existing between two who are cognitively
 to each other just this and not        
anything else4  ,it is the vision of the
 actual reciprocity of the two4  ,from  
this comes the ,golden ,rule in its     
various forms3 ,love thy neighbor as    

thyself1 ,do unto others as ye would be 
done by1 ,put yourself in his place4    
,but1 furthermore1 even this simpler    
justice necessitates the power not only 
to see yourself as others see #gj you1  
but even more adequately1 and as we say 
more justly1 to put yourself where you  
belong in a system of many1 in which you
 not only count for one and no more than
 one1 but in which you count for just   
that sort of one1 fulfilling just that  
sort of function which your place in the
 rationally conceived system involves or
 necessitates4 ,and this gives us a form
 of justice much more profound and      
complex than that of the ,golden ,rule1 
and requiring constructive imagination  
and rational insight of the very highest
 order4  ,and with this insight goes    
necessarily an inevitableness1 an       
inexorableness1 and1 as we say          
metaphorically1 an imperativeness1 which
 no amount of twisting and intellectual 
thimble-rigging can avoid4  ,the logic  
of the system cannot be avoided any more

 than a step in a mathematical          
demonstration4 4 4 4 ,so long as it     
stands1 its parts1 elements1 or members 
are placed1 and there is set over each  
of them the imperative of the system in 
which they are members4#ab   ,it has    
sometimes been thought that a fair view 
of life will inhibit action through     
discrediting party zeal4  ,john         
,davidson describes what he calls the   
apathy of intelligence4   ,to be strong 
to the end1 it is necessary to shut many
 windows1 to be deaf on either side of  
the head at will1 to fetter the mind4 4 
4 4  ,the perfect intelligence cannot   
fight1 cannot compete4  ,intelligence1  
fully awake1 is doomed to understand1   
and can no more take part in the        
disputes of men than in the disputes of 
other male creatures4#ac   ,now it is   
true that intelligence inhibits         
wantonness2 for intelligence1 fully     
awake1 knows how unreasonable it is that
 one who loves life should #ga destroy  
it4  ,but because intelligence affirms  

the motive of each combatant1 it must   
move action to the saving of both4      
,where intelligence is directed to the  
inner impulse of life1 it is not        
apathetic1 but sympathetic4  ,its span  
is widened1 while its incentive is not  
divided but multiplied4  ,nor does it   
follow that when duty is interpreted as 
enlightenment1 life must lose its       
romantic flavor and cease to require the
 old high-spirited virtues4  ,it is this
 very linking of life to life1 this     
abandonment of one's self to the        
prodigious of the whole1 that provides  
the true object of reverence1 and       
permits the sense of mystery to remain  
even after the light has come4          
,although the way of morality is evident
 and well-proved in direction1 being    
plain to whomever will look at life with
 a fair and commanding eye1 achievement 
is difficult1 the great victories hard  
won1 and the certain prospect bounded by
 a near horizon4  ,even though life be  
rationalized1 it will none the less call

 for intrepid faith2 for what           
,maeterlinck calls the heroic1          
cloud-tipped1 indefatigable energy of   
our conscience4 #ad     #gb  ,,chapter  
,,iii  ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,virtue  ,i  
,we have thus far dealt with the general
 content of morality1 and with its      
logical grounds4  ,morality is only life
 where life is organized and confident1 
the struggle for mere existence being   
replaced with the prospect of a         
progressive and limitless attainment4   
,the good is fulfilled desire2 the moral
 good the fulfilment of a universal     
economy1 embracing all desires1 actual  
and possible1 and providing for them as 
liberally as their mutual relations     
permit4  ,the moral good is simply the  
greatest possible good1 where good in   
the broad generic sense means any object
 of interest whatsoever1 anything proved
 worth the seeking from the fact that   
some unit of life actually seeks it4    
,whatever is prized is on that account  
precious4  ,the logic of morality rests 

on this objective relation between      
interest and value4  ,the maximum good  
has the greatest weight1 its claims are 
entitled to priority1 because it        
surpasses any limited good in incentive 
and promise of fulfilment4  ,duty in    
this logical sense is simply to #gc     
control of particular actions by a full 
recognition of their consequences4  ,in 
the present chapter the attention is    
shifted from the whole to the parts of  
morality4  ,i am not one of those who   
stake much on the casuistical           
application of ethical principles4      
,every particular action virtually      
involves considerations of enormous     
complexity2 and the individual must be  
mainly guided by general rules of       
conduct or virtues1 which are proved by 
the cumulative experience of the race4  
,life itself is the only adequate       
experiment in living4  ,virtues are     
properly verified only in the history of
 society1 in the development of         
institutions1 and in the evidences of   

progress in civilization at large4  ,i  
shall confine myself1 then1 to such     
verified virtues1 and seek to show their
 relation to morality as a whole4#a     
,virtues vary in generality according to
 the degree to which they refer to      
special circumstance2 and1 since there  
is no limit to the variety of           
circumstance1 there is1 strictly        
speaking1 no final and comprehensive    
order of virtues4  ,the term may be     
applied with equal propriety to types of
 action as universal as justice and as  
particular as conjugal fidelity4  ,we   
shall find it necessary to confine      
ourselves to the more general and       
fundamental virtues4  ,i have adopted a 
method of classification to which ,i    
attach no absolute importance1 but which
 #gd will1 ,i trust1 serve to amplify   
and illuminate the fundamental          
conceptions which ,i have already       
formulated4 ,i shall aim1 in the first  
place1 to make explicit a distinction   
which has hitherto been obscured4  ,i   

refer to the difference between the     
material and the formal aspects of      
morality4  ,on the one hand1 action is  
always engaged in the fulfilment of an  
immediate interest2 this constitutes its
 material goodness4  ,on the other hand1
 every moral action is limited or       
regulated by the provision which it     
makes for ulterior interests2 this      
constitutes its formal goodness4  ,let  
me make this difference more clear4  ,a 
particular action is invariably         
connected with a particular interest2   
and in so far as it is successful it    
will thus be directly fruitful of       
fulfilment4  ,and it matters not how    
broad a purpose constitutes its ultimate
 motive2 for purposes can be served only
 through a variety of activities1 each  
of which will have its proximate        
interest and its own continuous yield of
 satisfaction4  ,life pays as it goes1  
even though it goes to the length of    
serving humanity at large1 and the      
larger enterprises owe their very       

justification to this additive and      
cumulative principle4  ,but if action is
 to be moral it must always look beyond 
the present satisfaction4  ,it must     
submit to such checks as are necessary  
for the realization of a greater good4  
,indeed1 action is not wholly #ge good  
until it is controlled with reference to
 the fulfilment of the totality of      
interests4  ,it follows1 then1 that     
every action may be judged in two       
respects3 first1 in respect of its      
immediate return of fulfilment2 second1 
in respect of its bearing on all        
residual interests4  ,every good action 
will be both profitable and safe2 both  
self-sustaining and also serviceable to 
the whole4  ,the necessity of           
determining the relative weight which is
 to be given to these two considerations
 accounts for the peculiar delicacy of  
the art of life1 since it makes almost  
inevitable either the one or the other  
of two opposite errors of exaggeration4 
,the undue assertion of the             

present-interest constitutes            
materialism1 in the moral sense4        
,materialism is a forfeiture of greater 
good through preoccupation with nearer  
good4  ,it appears in an individual's   
neglect of his fellow's interest1 in his
 too easy satisfaction with good already
 attained1 in short-sighted policy on   
any scale4  ,formalism1 on the other    
hand1 signifies the improvident         
exaggeration of ulterior motives4  ,it  
is due to a misapprehension concerning  
the relation between higher and lower   
interests4  ,i have sought to make it   
clear that higher interests owe their   
eminence1 not to any intrinsic quality  
of their own1 but to the fact that they 
save and promote lower interests4       
,formalism is the #gf rejection of lower
 interests in the name of some good that
 without these interests is nothing4    
,the conflict between the material and  
formal motives in life is present in    
every moral crisis1 and qualifies the   
meaning of every moral idea4 ,it may    

even provoke a social revolution1 as in 
the case of the ,puritan revolution in  
,england4  ,the ,puritan is still the   
symbol of moral rigor and sobriety1 as  
the ,cavalier is the symbol of the love 
of life4  ,the full meaning of morality 
tends constantly to be confused through 
identifying it exclusively with the one 
or the other of these motives4 ,thus    
morality has come1 on the whole1 to be  
associated with constraint and          
discipline1 in both a favorable and a   
disparaging sense4  ,this has led to its
 being rejected as a falsification of   
life by those who insist that every good
 thing is free and fair and pleasant4   
,and1 even among those who recognize the
 vital necessity of discipline1 morality
 is so narrowed to that component1 that 
it commonly suggests only those scruples
 and inhibitions which destroy the      
spontaneity and whole-heartedness of    
every activity4  ,that morality should  
tend to be identified with its formal   
rather than its material aspect is not  

strange2 for it is the formal motive    
which is critical and corrective1       
substituting a conscious reconstruction 
of interests for their initial movement4
  ,it is this fact which gives to duty  
that #gg sense of compulsion which is so
 invariably associated with it4  ,duty  
is opposed to the line of least         
resistance1 whenever life is dominated  
by any motive short of the absolute     
good-will4  ,thus among the ,greeks1 dik
 is opposed to bia4#b  ,this means      
simply that because the principles of   
social organization are not as yet      
thoroughly assimilated1 their adoption  
requires attention and effort4 ,and a   
similar opposition may appear at either 
a higher or lower level1 between the    
momentary impulse and the law of        
prudence1 or between the habit of       
worldliness and the law of piety4  ,in  
connection with this broad difference   
between the material and formal aspects 
of life1 it is interesting to observe a 
certain difference of leniency in the   

popular judgment4  ,materialism is more 
heartily condemned1 because he who is   
guilty of it is not alive to the general
 good4  ,he is morally unregenerate4    
,formalism1 on the other hand1 is       
good-hearted or well-intentioned4  ,he  
who is guilty of it may be ridiculed as 
unpractical1 or pitied for his misguided
 zeal2 but society rarely offers to     
chastise him4  ,for he has submitted to 
discipline1 and if he is not the friend 
of man1 it is not because of any profit 
that he has reserved for himself4  ,in  
the arrangement which follows ,i shall  
use this difference between the material
 and formal #gh aspects of morality to  
supplement the main principle of        
classification1 which is that difference
 of level or range1 of which ,i have    
already made some use in the previous   
chapter1 and which ,i shall now define  
more precisely4  ,in morality life is so
 organized as to provide for interests  
as liberally and comprehensively as     
possible4  ,but the principles through  

which such organization is effected will
 differ in the degree to which they     
accomplish that end4 ,hence it is       
possible to define several economies or 
stages of organization which are        
successively more complete4  ,the simple
 interest1 first1 is the isolated       
interest1 pursued regardlessly of other 
interests2 in other words1 not as yet   
brought under the form of morality4     
,the reciprocity of interests1          
represents that rudimentary form of     
morality in which interests enter only  
into an external relation1 through which
 they secure an exchange of benefits    
without abandoning their independence4  
,in the incorporation of interests1     
elementary interests are unified through
 a purpose which subordinates and       
regulates them4  ,the fraternity of     
interests1 is that organization in which
 the rational or personal unit of       
interest is recognized as final1 and    
respected wherever it is met4  ,but     
there must also be some last economy1 in

 which provision is formally made for   
any interest whatsoever that may assert 
itself4  ,this is the realm of #gi      
good-will1 or1 as ,i shall call it for  
the sake of symmetry1 the universal     
system of interests4  ,i shall so       
construe these economies as to make the 
broader or more inclusive comprehend the
 narrower4  ,now each of these economies
 possesses its characteristic principle 
of organization1 or typical mode of     
action2 and this enables us to define   
five prime virtues3 intelligence1       
prudence1 purpose1 justice1 and         
good-will4  ,from each of these virtues 
there accrues to life a characteristic  
benefit3 from intelligence1             
satisfaction2 from prudence1 health2    
from purpose1 achievement2 from justice1
 rational intercourse2 and from         
good-will1 religion4  ,the absence of   
these virtues defines a group of        
negative vices3 incapacity1 imprudence1 
aimlessness1 injustice1 and irreverence4
  ,finally1 applying the distinction    

between formalism and materialism1 we   
obtain two further series of vices2 for1
 with two exceptions1 it is possible in 
each economy either to exaggerate the   
principle of organization1 and thus     
neglect the constituent interests which 
it is intended to organize2 or to       
exaggerate the good attained1 and thus  
neglect the wider spheres beyond4       
,there will thus be a formalistic series
 of errors3 asceticism1 sentimentalism1 
anarchism1 mysticism2 and a             
materialistic series3 overindulgence1   
sordidness1 bigotry or egoism1          
worldliness4  ,since materialism is in  
each case due to the lack of the next   
higher #hj principle of organization1   
there is no real difference between the 
materialism of one economy and the      
negative vice of the next4  ,but ,i have
 thought it worth while to retain both  
series1 because they represent a        
difference of emphasis which it is      
customary to make4 ,thus there is no    
real difference between overindulgence  

and imprudence2 but one refers to the   
excess1 and the other to the deficiency1
 in an activity which is excessive in   
its fulfilment of a present interest1   
and deficient in its regard for ulterior
 interests4  ,i have thought it best for
 the purpose of clear presentation to   
tabulate these virtues and vices2 and it
 proves convenient1 also1 to adopt a    
fixed nomenclature4  ,it is unfortunate 
that the terms must be drawn from common
 speech2 for it is impossible that the  
meaning assigned to them in the course  
of a methodical analysis like the       
present1 should exactly coincide with   
that which they have acquired in their  
looser application to daily life4  ,but 
,i shall endeavor always to make plain  
the sense in which ,i use them2 and1    
thus guarded1 they will serve to mark   
out a series of special topics which it 
is important briefly to review4  #ha    
,,economy     ,,virtue     ,,value      
,,negative     ,,formalism              
,,materialism                           

,,vice    ,simple      ,intelli-        
,satis-    ,incapacity   ------         
,over-    ,interest    gence            
faction                                 
indulgence    ,recipro-    ,prudence    
,health    ,imprudence   ,ascet-        
,sordidness    city of                  
icism    ,interests    ,incorpor-       
,purpose    ,achieve-  ,aimless-        
,sentiment- ,bigotry    ation of        
ment      ness         alism            
,egoism    ,interests    ,fraternity    
,justice    ,rational  ,injustice       
,anarchism  ,worldliness    of          
,inter-    ,interests                   
course    ,universal   ,good-,will      
,religion  ,irreverence  ,mysticism     
------    ,system of    ,interests   #hb
  ,,ii  ,we have already had occasion to
 remark that no moral value attaches to 
the successes and failures of the       
isolated or simple interest4  ,thus it  
is customary not to apply judgments of  
approval or condemnation to the         
vicissitudes of animal life4  ,so       

wholesale a generalization is           
undoubtedly false2 but at any rate it is
 based on the supposition that the      
motive in animal life is always simple4 
,and similarly1 whenever human action is
 regarded only with reference to the    
impulse it immediately serves1 it is    
judged to be successful or futile1 but  
never right or wrong4  ,these properties
 are reserved for such action as is     
controlled1 or is capable of being      
controlled1 with reference both to an   
immediate and also an ulterior interest4
  ,but since the difference between     
goodness in the wider generic sense and 
goodness in the moral sense is one of   
complexity1 it is proper and            
illuminating to bring them into one     
orderly progression4  ,the root-value1  
then1 of which all the higher moral     
values are compounded1 is the fulfilment
 or satisfaction of the particular      
interest4  ,this fundamental value is   
conditioned by a form of organization1  
which ,i propose in a restricted sense  

to term intelligence4  ,i mean the      
capacity which every living interest    
must possess to #hc utilize the         
environment1 to turn it to its own      
advantage4  ,this is the distinguishing 
and essential capacity of life in every 
form4  ,a plant can continue to exist1  
and a sculptor can model a statue1 only 
through being so organized as to be able
 to assimilate what the environment     
offers4  ,whether it be called tropism  
or technique1 it is all one4            
,intelligence in this sense may be said 
to be the elementary virtue1            
conditioning success on every plane of  
activity4  ,in using such terms as      
satisfaction and success interchangeably
 with so irreproachable a term as       
fulfilment1 ,i may1 until my meaning is 
wholly clear1 seem to degrade morality4 
,but the tone of disparagement in these 
first two terms is due to their having  
acquired certain arbitrary associations4
  ,it is supposed that to be satisfied  
is to be complacent1 and that to be     

successful is to be hard and worldly4   
,now1 a narrow satisfaction and a blind 
success are morally evil2 but           
satisfaction and success may be taken up
 into a life that is wholly wise and    
devoted4  ,they will1 in fact1          
constitute the real body of value in any
 practical enterprise1 from the least to
 the greatest4  ,the absence of         
intelligence1 which ,i shall term       
incapacity1 is the one absolutely fatal 
defect from which life may suffer4      
,incapacity embraces maladaptation1     
dulness1 feebleness1 #hd sickness1 and  
death4 ,like its opposite it does not   
enter into the moral account except in  
so far as it affects a group of         
interests1 through being prejudicial to 
an individual's efficiency or a         
community's welfare2 but it will impair 
and annul attainment upon any plane4    
,the fault of incapacity attaches not   
only to life that is rudimentary or     
defective1 but also to the mechanical   
processes which have not been           

assimilated to any interest and thus lie
 outside the realm of value4            
,incapacity in this sense is that       
metaphysical evil of which philosophers 
speak4  ,it testifies to the fact that  
the cosmos is only partially subject to 
judgments either of good or of evil2    
that value has a genesis and a history  
within an environment that is at best   
plastic and progressively submissive4   
,in terms of intelligence and           
incapacity1 the basal excellence and the
 basal fault1 it is possible to define  
that whole affair of which morality is  
the constructive phase3 the attempt of  
life to establish itself in the midst of
 primordial lifelessness1 to avert      
dissolution and death1 and to extend and
 amplify itself to the uttermost4       
,within the economy of the simple       
interest there is no possibility of     
formalism1 since there is no            
subordination of interest to anything   
higher than itself4  ,but we meet here  
with materialism in its purest form4    

,overindulgence is the fault #he which  
attaches to the exclusive insistence of 
the isolated interest on itself2 when it
 grows head-strong1 and is like to      
defeat itself through being blindly     
preoccupied4  ,the evil of              
overindulgence arises from two natural  
causes4  ,in the first place an interest
 is essentially self-perpetuating2 in   
spite of periodic moments of satiety1 an
 interest fulfilled is renewed and      
accelerated4  ,just in so far as it is  
clearly distinguished it possesses an   
impetus of its own1 by which it tends to
 excess1 until corrected by the protest 
of some other interest which it         
infringes4 ,overindulgence is most      
common where such consequences are      
delayed or obscured by artificial means2
 hence its prevalence among those who   
can afford for a time to dissipate their
 strength1 or have some means of        
replenishing it4  ,and imprudence is    
common where the penalty is insidious4  
,the corruption entailed by gluttony1   

inebriety1 and incontinence may be slow 
and doubtful1 or apparently remitted in 
moments of recovery2 but if one indulge 
himself in foolhardiness or violence1 he
 is like to be repaid on the spot4      
,hence the latter forms of imprudence   
are more rare4  ,to avoid imprudence1 it
 is necessary to discount that aspect   
which the interest wears within the     
period of its immediate fulfilment1 and 
thus avoid the necessity of repeating   
the hard and wasteful lesson of         
experience4  ,this #hf truth1 which is  
the first principle of all practical    
wisdom1 has been graphically represented
 in ,jeremy ,taylor's ,rules and        
,exercises of ,holy ,living3   ,look    
upon pleasures not upon that side that  
is next the sun1 or where they look     
beauteously1 that is1 as they come      
towards you to be enjoyed2 for then they
 paint and smile1 and dress themselves  
up in tinsel and glass gems and         
counterfeit imagery2 but when thou hast 
rifled and discomposed them with        

enjoying their false beauties1 and that 
they begin to go off1 then behold them  
in their nakedness and weariness4 ,see  
what a sigh and sorrow1 what naked and  
unhandsome proportions and a filthy     
carcass they discover2 and the next time
 they counterfeit1 remember what you    
have already discovered1 and be no more 
abused4#c   ,there is a second source of
 overindulgence1 in the ever-increasing 
complexity of the moral economy4  ,the  
more numerous the interests2 the more   
difficult the task of attending to their
 connections and managing their         
adjustment4  ,not only is the need of   
prudence never outgrown2 it steadily    
acquires both a greater urgency and a   
greater difficulty4  ,if incapacity may 
be said to be the metaphysical evil1 the
 taint of the cosmos at large1          
overindulgence may be said to be the    
original sin1 the taint of life itself4 
,it is life's offence against itself1   
the denial of greater life for the sake 
of the little in hand4  ,it is the      

perennial failure of the #hg individual 
interest to unite itself with that      
universal enterprise of which it is the 
microcosmic image4   ,,iii  ,the        
simplest moral economy is that in which 
two or more interests are reciprocally  
adjusted without being subordinated4    
,the principle of organization which    
defines such an economy is prudence4    
,prudence becomes necessary at the      
moment when interests come into such    
contact with one another as provokes    
retaliation4  ,thus1 for example1       
interests react on one another through  
being embodied in the same physical     
organism4  ,each bodily activity depends
 on the well-being of co-ordinate       
functions1 and if its exercise be so    
immoderate as to injure these1 it       
undermines itself4  ,moderation gains   
for special interests the support of a  
general bodily health4  ,but bodily     
health is not the only medium of        
interdependence among the interests of a
 single individual4  ,his interests must

 draw not only upon a common source of  
vitality1 but also upon a common stock  
of material resources4  ,the limitation 
of interests that follows from this fact
 is frugality or thrift1 the practical  
working of the principle that present   
waste is future lack1 and that1         
therefore1 to save now is to spend      
hereafter4  ,thrift involves also a     
special emphasis on #hh livelihood1     
since this is a source of supply for all
 particular interests4  ,the social     
relation makes interests externally     
interdependent in a great variety of    
ways4  ,interests must inhabit one      
space1 exploit one physical environment1
 and employ a common mode of            
communication4  ,if any interest so acts
 as unduly to divert one of these       
mediums to its own uses1 it must suffer 
retaliation from the other interests    
that likewise depend on that medium4    
,it is prudent to give even one's rival 
half the road1 and to divide the spoils 
with him4  ,there is a politic form of  

honesty2 and veracity may be conceived  
only as a kind of caution4  ,thus       
,menander says3 ,it is always best to   
speak the truth in all circumstances4   
,this is a precept which contributes    
most to safety of life4 #d  ,tact is    
only a more refined method of avoiding  
the antagonism of interests that operate
 within the same field of social        
intercourse4  ,the economy of prudence  
has its own characteristic value4       
,indeed1 if this were not so there would
 be no possibility of that form of      
baseness known as being merely prudent4 
,there is a prudential equilibrium2 a   
condition of smooth and harmonious      
adjustment1 within the personal life or 
the community4  ,i propose that this    
equilibrium be termed health4 ,in that  
admirable idealization of renaissance   
morality1 ,castiglione's #hi ,book of   
the ,courtier1 the author refers to the 
immediate reward of self-control that   
comes both from inner harmony and the   
approbation of one's fellows4  ,to      

instil goodness into the mind1 to teach 
continence1 fortitude1 justice1         
temperance1 ,castiglione would give his 
prince a taste of how much sweetness is 
hidden by the little bitterness that at 
first sight appears to him1 who         
withstands vice2 which is always hurtful
 and displeasing1 and accompanied by    
infamy and blame1 just as virtue is     
profitable1 blithe1 and full of praise4 
#e  ,socially1 the healthful equilibrium
 corresponds to that peace which ,hobbes
 praised above all things2#f and which  
is all that is asked for by those who   
wish to be let alone in order that they 
may pursue their own affairs4  ,although
 such peace may be ignominious1 it need 
not be so2 and a sense of security and  
reciprocal adjustment must remain among 
the surviving values1 whatever higher   
achievements be added to it4  ,but the  
inherent value of health is most clearly
 defined by a nice equilibration of     
activities within the medium of the     
individual organism4  ,i borrow the     

following description of health in this 
sense from a recent book by ,h4 ,g4     
,wells3   ,the balance as between       
asceticism and sensuality comes in1 it  
seems to me1 if we remember that to     
drink well one must not have drunken for
 some time1 #ij that to see well one's  
eye must be clear1 that to make love    
well one must be fit and gracious and   
sweet and disciplined from top to toe1  
that the finest sense of all--the joyous
 sense of bodily well-being--comes only 
with exercises and restraints and fine  
living4#g   ,the temperance praised by  
the ,greeks is of like quality1 with a  
further reference to the reasonableness 
which it fosters4  ,a prudence which is 
mastered1 which has become a            
spontaneity1 delivers reason from       
bondage1 and makes the whole of life    
easily conformable to it4  ,thus        
,castiglione1 who is so often           
reminiscent of ,plato and ,aristotle1   
draws a contrast between continence1 as 
the conquest of prudence1 and temperance

 as its beneficent rule4   ,thus this   
virtue does not compel the mind1 but    
infusing it by very gentle means with a 
vehement belief that inclines it to     
righteousness1 renders it calm and full 
of rest1 in all things equal and well   
measured1 and disposed on every side by 
a certain self-accord which adorns it   
with a tranquillity so serene that it is
 never ruffled1 and becomes in all      
things very obedient to reason and ready
 to turn its every act thereto and to   
follow wherever reason may wish to lead 
it1 without the least unwillingness4#h  
,such is that prudence which1 though    
rich in its own right1 is nevertheless  
subordinate to greater good4  ,it is    
proper to regard prudence as inferior in
 principle to purpose and good-will1 or 
even as ignoble when confirmed in its   
narrowness4  ,it #ia denotes an         
organization of life in which as yet no 
interest has risen above the rest2 it   
bespeaks the common populace of         
interests1 disciplined1 but not moved to

 any eminent achievement4  ,the fact    
that the validity of the principle of   
prudence is so readily granted is       
significant of this4  ,prudence requires
 no interest to be other than itself1   
but meets it on its own ground4  ,there 
is no elevation of motive4  ,but        
prudence is the first and most          
instructive lesson in morality4  ,it has
 a peculiar impressiveness1 not only    
because it is so promptly and           
unmistakably verified1 but because it is
 so close to life4  ,its meaning is     
unlikely to be obscured through being   
abstracted from the real interests whose
 saving is the proof of its virtue4     
,furthermore1 although prudence is not  
the highest principle in life1 it is a  
mistake to suppose that it is therefore 
unnecessary in the highest spheres of   
life4  ,there is a problem of prudence  
that underlies every practical problem  
whatsoever4  ,if interests are to be    
organized they must be not only         
subordinated but also co-ordinated1 that

 is1 adjusted within every medium in    
which they meet4  ,without moderation1  
caution1 self-control1 thrift1 and tact 
there is no serving man or ,god4  ,as   
life increases in complexity it is easy 
to forget these basal precepts4  ,nature
 has provided a model1 both simple and  
fundamental1 in physical health4 #ib    
,the body1 says ,burke1 is wiser in its 
own plain way1 and attends its own      
business more directly than the mind    
with all its boasted subtilty4 #i  ,the 
prudential organization of life         
furnishes the first type of formalism4  
,prudence requires that the interest    
shall be limited in order that it may   
not antagonize other interests and thus 
indirectly defeat itself4  ,discipline  
is justified1 in other words1 by its    
fruits4 ,but discipline involves an     
initial moment of negation1 in which the
 movement of the interest is resisted4  
,it must be checked1 and its headway    
overcome1 if it is to be redirected4    
,the exaggeration of this moment of     

negation1 or a steady persistence in it1
 is asceticism4 ,its fault lies in its  
emptiness1 in its destruction or        
perversion of that which it was designed
 only to protect against itself4        
,asceticism appears most frequently as a
 subordinate motive in some general     
condemnation of the world on religious  
grounds1 and must receive further       
consideration in that connection4  ,its 
proper meaning as a purely prudential   
formalism is best exhibited in the      
,greek ,cynics4 ,these philosophers were
 moved to mortify the flesh1 and to deny
 their social interests1 by extreme     
caution4  ,they discovered that the     
safest method of adjustment was         
simplification4  ,if one permits one's  
self no desires1 one need not suffer #ic
 from their conflict1 nor need one treat
 with the desires of others4  ,now this 
would be a very perfect solution of the 
problem of adjustment1 if only there    
were something left to adjust4  ,if a   
,cynic can attain to a state of         

renunciation in which he wants nothing1 
he will be sure of having what he wants2
 only1 unfortunately1 it will be        
nothing4  ,epictetus has thus           
represented the ,cynic's boast3   ,look 
at me1 who am without a city1 without a 
house1 without possessions1 without a   
slave2 ,i sleep on the ground2 ,i have  
no wife1 no children1 no praetorium1 but
 only the earth and heavens1 and one    
poor cloak4  ,and what do ,i want8 am ,i
 not without sorrow8  ,am ,i not without
 fear8  ,am ,i not free8   ,now it is   
clear that the sum of the ,cynics'      
attainments is not large4 ,it consists1 
indeed1 almost wholly in a certain      
hardened complacency1 and a freedom to  
make faces at the world4  ,to the       
onlooker1 whose comment ,epictetus also 
records1 their aspect is mean3   ,no3   
but their characteristic is the little  
wallet1 and staff1 and great jaws2 the  
devouring of all that you give them1 or 
storing it up1 or the abusing           
unseasonably all whom they meet1 or     

displaying their shoulder as a fine     
thing4#aj   ,in other words1 since the  
,cynic continues to live after having   
rejected the proper instruments and     
forms of life1 he must make a living out
 of the charitable curiosity excited by 
his very unfitness4  #id ,and asceticism
 of this prudential type tends always to
 be both empty and monstrous2 empty     
because it denies life1 and monstrous   
because life is not really denied1 but  
only perverted and awkwardly obstructed4
  ,there is a materialistic evil        
corresponding to the prudential         
organization of life which is known as  
meanness1 vulgarity1 or sordidness4  ,it
 denotes a failure to recognize anything
 better than the fulfilment of the      
simple interests in their severalty4    
,although guarded and adjusted these    
still determine the general tone of     
life4 ,the controlling motive1 the      
standard of attainment1 is never        
anything higher than the elementary     
desire with its attendant satisfaction4 

,in its negative aspect this is termed  
aimlessness1 and is identical with the  
,christian vice of idleness1 so         
graphically described by ,jeremy        
,taylor3   ,idleness is called the sin  
of ,sodom and her daughters1 and indeed 
is the burial of a living man1 an idle  
person being so useless to any purposes 
of ,god and man1 that he is like one    
that is dead1 unconcerned in the changes
 and necessities of the world2 and he   
only lives to spend his time1 and eat   
the fruits of the earth3 like a vermin  
or a wolf1 when their time comes they   
die and perish1 and in the meantime do  
no good2 they neither plough nor carry  
burdens2 all they do is either          
unprofitable or mischievous4#aa   ,thus 
aimlessness denotes a failure to attain 
anything of worth2 a lack of            
consecutiveness and #ie unity4  ,the    
correction of this fault lies in a new  
principle of organization4   ,,iv  ,this
 new principle of organization consists 
in the incorporation of interests1 that 

is1 their subordination to a purpose    
that embraces them1 unifies them1 and   
carries the whole to a successful issue4
  ,the incorporation of interests is    
peculiarly an intellectual process4  ,it
 is this to which ,socrates refers when 
he says that knowledge is virtue4       
,purpose requires1 in the first place1  
that one should define and foresee the  
end1 and in the second place1 that one  
should be sagacious and watchful in the 
service of it4  ,purpose is the virtue  
of the understanding1 of a mind which is
 adventurous enough to project an       
enterprise1 but has enough of           
home-keeping wit to judge nicely of     
cause and effect or of part and whole4  
,there are many virtues which contribute
 to purpose1 and of these none is more  
indispensable than patience1 or the     
capacity to labor without hire for a    
prize deferred4  ,better is the end of a
 thing1 says the ,preacher1 than the    
beginning thereof3 and the patient in   
spirit is better than the proud in      

spirit4  ,steadiness of purpose under   
adverse or confusing circumstances is   
called persistence1 courage1 loyalty1 or
 zeal1 with #if differences of meaning  
that reflect the nature either of the   
purpose or the circumstances4  ,but     
since purpose is so much an intellectual
 virtue1 special importance attaches in 
this economy to truthfulness4  ,if one's
 purpose be some form of personal       
achievement1 one must deal honestly with
 one's self4 ,and this is not easily    
done4  ,epictetus told his pupils that  
men were loath to admit any fault that  
they held to be really blameworthy3     
,some things men readily confess1 and   
other things they do not4  ,no one then 
will confess that he is a fool or       
without understanding2 but quite the    
contrary you will hear all men saying1  
,i wish that ,i had fortune equal to my 
understanding4  ,but men readily confess
 that they are timid1 and they say3 ,i  
am rather timid1 ,i confess2 but as to  
other respects you will not find me to  

be foolish4  ,a man will not readily    
confess that he is intemperate2 and that
 he is unjust1 he will not confess at   
all4  ,he will by no means confess that 
he is envious or a busybody4  ,most men 
will confess that they are              
compassionate4#ab   ,now if one is to   
attain anything difficult1 he cannot    
afford to indulge in vanity or          
self-satisfaction2 for action can be    
kept true to its end only when the least
 obliquity is marked and corrected4     
,hence the strong man does not attribute
 his failure to fortune or to his       
amiable virtues1 but to his folly2 for  
he knows that to be the crucial fault   
which it lies within his power to       
remedy4  ,on the other hand1 if the     
purpose be one #ig which involves the   
co-operation of several persons1 it is  
necessary that these should deal openly 
and candidly with one another4          
,truthfulness is a condition of any     
collective undertaking4 ,it is          
interesting to observe the growing      

recognition of the need of publicity    
wherever democratic institutions        
prevail4  ,secrecy is a sort of treason4
  ,if men are to work together for their
 common welfare they must be truly in   
touch with one another2 otherwise there 
is a spy at their councils1 an          
incalculable force that may counterwork 
their plans4  ,achievement1 the value   
which the virtue of purpose conditions1 
needs no moralist's justification4  ,the
 world never tires of praising it1 for  
it is the world's business4  ,by        
achievement ,i mean the fulfilment by   
subordinated and cumulative effort of an
 interest deliberately adopted for its  
greatness of value4  ,life is now       
controlled not by the accident of       
desire1 but by the due preference of the
 better4  ,it has begun to be rational  
not only in its method1 but also in its 
aim4  ,it is now more fruitful1 because 
more broadly conceived1 being engaged in
 enterprises which continue1 and which  
draw from many sources4  ,hence a man   

can better endure the spectacle of his  
own life1 for it seems not to be wholly 
mean or ineffectual4  ,in that his      
conduct is unified1 consistent1 and     
directed to some worthy #ih end1 he is  
possessed of that quality of character  
which is respected in him both by       
himself and by his fellows4  ,it is     
unfortunate that there is no better term
 than sentimentalism with which to      
indicate that variety of formalism which
 is characteristic of the purposive     
economy4  ,the fallacy consists         
essentially in the abstraction of the   
purpose from its constituent interests4 
,the true value of a purpose lies in its
 function of organization2 and is1      
therefore1 inseparable from the         
interests to which it gives unity and   
fulfilment4  ,but its form1 or even its 
mere name1 may1 through association1    
come to acquire a fictitious value4     
,when this fictitious value gives rise  
in contemplation or discourse to a      
certain emotional satisfaction1 we      

employ the term sentimentalism in the   
conventional sense4  ,this is the       
sentimentalism of those    ,who sigh for
 wretchedness1 yet shun the wretched1   
,nursing in some delicious solitude     
,their slothful loves and dainty        
sympathies4   ,i wish1 however1 to      
emphasize a more insidious variety of   
this error1 in which it may be more     
profoundly and fatally confusing4  ,i   
refer1 in the first place1 to what may  
be described as deferred living4  ,there
 is a popular illusion to the effect    
that a life purpose is to be fruitful   
only at the end2 that it is something to
 be prepared for in youth1 worked for in
 maturity1 and attained--well1 #ii it is
 difficult to say when4  ,this is the   
fallacy of heaven transferred to earth4 
,man never is1 but always to be blest4  
,life is conceived as a sentence at hard
 labor1 the only sure compensation being
 the ultimate deliverance4 ,now there is
 but one justification of a life        
purpose1 and that is its conserving of  

the whole of life2 it must save each day
 and each hour4 ,there is no more virtue
 in the future than in the present4     
,the greatest disaster1 says a ,greek   
proverb1 is for a man to be opened and  
found empty2 and this does not refer to 
an autopsy4  ,it is at least one        
function of a life-purpose to make life 
distributively and continuously good4   
,that one's life shall be pointed with a
 purpose does not mean that it shall be 
reduced to a point4  ,the very virtue of
 organization lies in its making room   
for the free play of immediate and      
particular interests1 in its surrounding
 them at a distance with invisible      
safeguards4  ,a second important case of
 sentimentalism is nationalism4  ,the   
value of the state lies in its          
protection and development of the       
concrete life of the community4  ,the   
true object of patriotism is social     
welfare4  ,but for the state as a       
provident economy1 there may be         
substituted as an object of loyalty what

 is only an idea or a name2 and when    
this is done men are easily persuaded to
 play into the hands of unscrupulous    
leaders4  #ajj ,to the abominable       
tyrannies which have thus been made     
possible ,i need not refer4  ,in        
,hegel's philosophy of history1#ac as   
well as in many modern political        
theories1 this error has been           
deliberately affirmed4  ,but for        
illustration ,i prefer to turn to the   
case of ,plato4  ,the ,republic was     
conceived1 it is true1 without bias of  
party or race1 but there is none the    
less a strain of arbitrariness and      
illiberality in it4  ,this is due to the
 fact that the state is conceived by    
itself1 with a quality and perfection of
 its own that displaces the interests of
 its citizens4#ad  ,a state which is    
defined otherwise than as a provision   
for the very diversity of life1 an      
organization responsive to pressure from
 every constituent desire1 fails from   
over-simplification4  ,this ,i take to  

be the meaning of ,aristotle's comment  
on the ,republic3   ,the error of       
,socrates must be attributed to the     
false notion of unity from which he     
starts4  ,unity there should be1 both of
 the family and of the state1 but in    
some respects only4  ,for there is a    
point at which a state may attain such a
 degree of unity as to be no longer a   
state1 or at which1 without actually    
ceasing to exist1 it will become an     
inferior state1 like harmony passing    
into unison1 or rhythm which has been   
reduced to single foot4  ,the state is a
 plurality1 which should be united and  
made into a community by education4#ae  
,there is a chapter in the ,discourses  
of ,epictetus1 entitled3 ,to or against 
those who obstinately ,persist in what  
they have determined4 #aja ,there could1
 ,i think1 be no better formulation of  
purpose grown hard and unworthily       
self-sufficient4  ,this form of         
materialism ,i have termed egoism and   
bigotry1 since the purpose may be either

 personal or social in scope4  ,but in  
either case the diagnosis of ,epictetus 
goes to the root of the evil4  ,he thus 
describes his experience with one of his
 companions1 who for no reason resolved 
to starve himself to death3   ,i heard  
of it when it was the third day of his  
abstinence from food1 and ,i went to    
inquire what had happened4  ,i have     
resolved1 he said4  ,but still tell me  
what it was which induced you to        
resolve2 for if you have resolved       
rightly1 we shall sit with you and      
assist you to depart2 but if you have   
made an unreasonable resolution1 change 
your mind4  ,we ought to keep our       
determinations4  ,what are you doing1   
man8  ,we ought to keep not to all our  
determinations1 but to those which are  
right2 for if you are now persuaded that
 it is right1 do not change your mind1  
if you think fit1 but persist and say1  
we ought to abide by our determinations4
  ,will you not make the beginning and  
lay the foundation in an inquiry whether

 the determination is sound or not      
sound1 and so then build on it firmness 
and security8 4 4 4  ,now this man was  
with difficulty persuaded to change his 
mind4  ,but it is impossible to convince
 some persons at present2 so that ,i    
seem now to know1 what ,i did not know  
before1 the meaning of the common       
saying1 ,that you can neither persuade  
nor break a fool4  ,may it never be my  
lot to have a wise fool for my friend3  
nothing is more untractable4  ,i #ajb am
 determined1 the man says4  ,madmen are 
also2 but the more firmly they form a   
judgment on things which do not exist1  
the more ellebore they require4#af      
,the wise fool is1 as ,epictetus says1  
more intractable than the aimless and   
unwitting fool2 because there is        
substance to his folly4  ,there is at   
least some truth on his side4  ,but his 
folly is folly none the less4 ,he       
hardens himself against that which would
 save him2 while boasting himself a     
lover of light1 he shuts his eyes lest  

any ray of it penetrate to him4  ,thus  
the egoist1 through the atrophy of his  
sympathies and his preoccupation with a 
narrow ambition1 gratuitously           
impoverishes his life2 and it is        
difficult to convince him of his loss1  
because he indubitably has some gain4   
,bigotry consists essentially in the    
failure to employ the method of         
discussion1 in the failure to recognize 
in every rational being a possible      
source of that truth which all need4    
,it is a stupid forfeiture or waste of  
the resources of intelligence possessed 
by one's fellows4  ,the ,king ,creon of 
,sophocles's ,antigone is a masterly    
representation of the futility of this  
pride of opinion4  ,creon angrily       
resents every impeachment of his wisdom1
 insisting on instant and unquestioning 
obedience4  ,but his son ,haemon thus   
attempts to save him from himself3      
,father1 the gods plant wisdom in       
mankind1 which is of all possessions    
highest4  ,in what respects you #ajc    

have not spoken rightly ,i cannot say1  
and may ,i never learn2 and still it may
 be possible for some one else to be    
right too4 4 4 4  ,do not then carry in 
your heart one fixed belief that what   
you say and nothing else is right4  ,for
 he who thinks that he alone is wise1 or
 that he has a tongue and mind no other 
has1 will when laid open be found       
empty4#ag   ,it was once a practice even
 among learned men to set personal pride
 above the truth4  ,the chancellor of   
the ,university of ,paris complains of  
this practice in the ,middle ,ages3     
,what are these combats of scholars1 if 
not true cock-fights1 which cover us    
with ridicule in the eyes of laymen8  ,a
 cock draws himself up against another  
and bristles his feathers4 4 4 4  ,it is
 the same to-day with our professors4   
,cocks fight with blows from their beaks
 and claws2 ,self-love1 as some one has 
said1 is armed with a dangerous spur4   
#ah   ,egoism and bigotry1 then1 consist
 essentially in the exaggeration and    

immobility of an adopted purpose4  ,as  
is the case with every variety of       
materialism1 their fault lies in their  
blindness1 in their fatuous rejection of
 the good that is offered to them4  ,but
 this is not all4 ,for in denying the   
good which is offered to him1 the egoist
 or bigot also virtually denies the     
reason which offers it4  ,it is this    
that constitutes the affront which is   
called injustice4  ,the full meaning of 
injustice has been recognised only      
gradually1 and it is even now by no     
means free from confusion4  ,but ,i     
think that it #ajd will be agreed that  
the sting of it is a failing in respect4
 ,violence may be wholly without this   
taint2 and the most bitter injustice may
 be wholly without violence4  ,to be    
unjust is to be condescending or        
supercilious2 to assume superiority on  
personal grounds1 ignoring the equal    
access to truth which is enjoyed by     
every rational being4  ,the nice quality
 of injustice is most clearly to be     

apprehended where it is accompanied by  
benevolent intent4  ,it is one of the   
princely attributes described in the    
,book of the ,courtier1 and justified in
 a manner that leaves no doubt of its   
implied meaning3   ,true it is that     
there are two modes of ruling3 the one  
imperious and violent1 like that of     
masters toward their slaves1 and in this
 way the soul commands the body2 the    
other more mild and gentle1 like that of
 good princes by means of laws over     
their subjects1 and in this way the     
reason commands the appetite2 and both  
of these modes are useful1 for the body 
is by nature created apt for obedience  
to the soul1 and so is appetite for     
obedience to reason4  ,moreover1 there  
are many men whose actions have to do   
only with the use of the body2 and such 
as these are as far from virtuous as the
 soul from the body1 and although they  
are rational creatures1 they have only  
such share of reason as to recognize it1
 but not to possess or profit by it4    

,these1 therefore1 are naturally slaves1
 and it is better and more profitable   
for them to obey than to command4#ai    
,now the essence of injustice lies in   
this ,platonic manner of classifying    
human beings in terms of #aje limited   
capacities2 in assigning to some the    
degraded status of the appetites1 and to
 others a limited faculty of            
understanding1 while arrogating to a few
 the full power and title of ,reason4   
,the resentment of this arrogance is no 
more than the assertion of that         
potentiality of reason which            
distinguishes the animal man2 it is his 
inevitable coming of age1 his           
determination to play the man's part4   
,v  ,justice is the mutual respect      
through which rational purposes enter   
into a relation of fraternal equality4  
,it is the courteous paying of honor    
where honor is due4  ,in modern times   
justice has very properly been          
identified with tolerance1 which is the 
acknowledgment that one is one's self   

equally liable to error with another1   
and that another is equally liable to   
truth with one's self4  ,justice        
attaches a certain finality to the      
judgment of every individual instrument 
of reason4 ,under the form of justice   
veracity realizes its highest meaning4  
,the truth is not to be administered    
with paternal indulgence or caution2 it 
is to be yielded as a right to every    
free and self-determining mind4  ,the   
practice and the spirit of justice      
pervade every highly developed social   
grouping1 such as marriage1 friendship1 
or fellow-citizenship in a democracy4   
,for ,aristotle a friendship is one #ajf
 soul dwelling in two bodies2#bj that   
is1 the same high capacity uniting two  
individuals in the acknowledgment of its
 common principles1 and in the          
contemplation of its common objects4    
,aristotle's other saying1 that man is a
 political animal1 is inspired with the 
same meaning4  ,to participate in the   
life of a state1 in which one's         

fellow-citizens were one's equals1 in   
which men with equal endowments carried 
on one united activity while            
acknowledging one another's             
independence1 was to an ,athenian the   
very fulness of life4  ,to be banished  
from it was1 even in the eyes of the    
law1 equivalent to death4  ,in a chapter
 of his ,physics and ,politics1 entitled
 ,the ,age of ,discussion1 ,bagehot has 
admirably represented the importance for
 human progress of an open exchange of  
opinion on all matters of great         
consequence3   ,in this manner all the  
great movements of thought in ancient   
and modern times have been nearly       
connected in time with government by    
discussion4 ,athens1 ,rome1 the ,italian
 republics of the ,middle ,ages1 the    
communes and states-general of feudal   
,europe1 have all had a special and     
peculiar quickening influence1 which    
they owed to their freedom1 and which   
states without that freedom have never  
communicated4  ,and it has been at the  

time of great epochs of thought--at the 
,peloponnesian ,war1 at the fall of the 
,roman ,republic1 at the ,reformation1  
at the ,french ,revolution--that such   
liberty of speaking and thinking have   
produced their full effect4#ba   #ajg   
,elsewhere ,bagehot attributes to       
freedom of discussion1 not only the     
deliverance from narrow and conventional
 habits1 but that general elevation of  
tone which is characteristic of such an 
era as the ,elizabethan age in ,england4
  ,in short1 justice or toleration1     
since it encourages men to push on to   
the limit of their powers1 promotes not 
only originality and diversity1 but a   
love of perfection4  ,it will have been 
observed that justice and freedom are   
complementary1 for he who is just       
liberates1 and he who is free receives  
justice4 ,together they constitute the  
basis of all the higher relationships   
between men1 of a progressive society1  
and of the whole constructive movement  
which we call civilization4  ,but it is 

possible to construe justice and freedom
 only negatively1 as meaning that the   
individual is to be allowed to go his   
way in peace4 ,such a misconception is  
formalistic1 in that it rests on a      
failure to recognize the providence or  
fruitfulness of justice4  ,the virtue of
 justice lies not in its disintegration 
of society1 but in its enabling the     
members of society to unite upon the    
highest plane of endeavor4 ,justice is a
 method wherewith men may profit        
collectively1 and in their organized    
effort1 from a sum of enlightenment to  
which every individual contributes his  
best4  ,anarchism rests in the negative 
protest against #ajh conformity2        
forgetting that the only right to       
liberty is founded on the possession of 
a reasonableness that inclines the      
individual to the universal2 and        
forgetting that the only virtue in      
liberty lies in the opportunity for     
union and devotion which it provides4   
,there is a more restricted form of     

anarchism in scepticism which attaches  
finality to differences of opinion1 and 
overlooks the fact that these very      
differences must be regarded as         
converging approaches to the common     
truth4  ,for men can differ only in the 
presence of identical objects which     
virtually annul their difference4  ,to  
be free to think as one pleases cannot  
but mean to think as truly as possible1 
and so to approach as closely as        
possible to what others also tend to    
think4  ,but a larger importance        
attaches to that mild variety of        
anarchism which is commonly called      
laissez-faire1 and which ,matthew       
,arnold calls ,british ,atheism or      
,quietism4  ,the reader will recall     
,arnold's quotation from the ,times3    
,it is of no use for us to attempt to   
force upon our neighbors our several    
likings and dislikings4  ,we must take  
things as they are4 ,everybody has his  
own little vision of religious or civil 
perfection4 ,under the evident          

impossibility of satisfying everybody1  
we agree to take our stand on equal laws
 and on a system as open and liberal as 
is possible4  ,the result is that       
everybody has more liberty of action and
 of speaking here than anywhere else in 
the ,old ,world4   #aji ,and from ,mr4  
,roebuck3   ,i look around me and ask   
what is the state of ,england8  ,is not 
every man able to say what he likes8  ,i
 ask you whether the world over1 or in  
past history1 there is anything like it8
  ,nothing4  ,i pray that our unrivalled
 happiness may last4#bb   ,this is an   
almost perfect representation of the    
sentimental interest in justice4  ,in   
the course of such justice1 none of us  
should see salvation4  ,it leaves wholly
 out of account the fact that when men  
are left free to talk or act or live as 
they will1 they will either stagnate1 or
 they will strive for the best and help 
it to prevail4  ,if the latter1 they    
will be brought back to the state as the
 means of making right reason effective1

 and of extending to all not simply the 
leave to be what they want to be1 of    
following what ,arnold calls their      
natural taste of the bathos1 but the    
opportunity of learning better4         
,justice1 like purpose and prudence1 is 
a principle of organization1 owing its  
virtue to the larger fulfilment of      
interest which it makes possible4       
,through this principle the individual  
is granted independence1 in order that  
his freedom may remove every limit from 
his service4  ,he is delivered from the 
bondage of violence and convention1 but 
he is delivered into the charge of his  
own reason1 which must give bonds not   
only that he will keep the peace1 but   
that he will give #aaj himself wholly to
 that true good which he may now        
discern4  ,in justice the human secular 
society is perfected4  ,by a secular    
society ,i mean a society held to be    
self-sufficient as it is2 a society in  
which only those interests are          
acknowledged which are actually present1

 or have actually been admitted to a    
place of power or prestige4  ,but       
secularism or worldliness in this sense 
suffers from the general error of       
materialism1 the error of mistaking the 
de facto good for the whole good4  ,it  
is only another case of that blindness  
which is the penalty of all             
self-sufficiency4  ,the ancient and the 
modern types of worldliness present an  
interesting difference which will serve 
to illustrate their common fault4       
,greek literature abounds in the        
glorification of the life already       
achieved4  ,thus ,solon asks no more of 
the gods than to be fortunate and       
honored3 ,grant unto me wealth from the 
blessed gods1 and to have alway fair    
fame in the eyes of all men4  ,grant    
that ,i may thus be dear to my friends1 
and bitter to my foes2 revered in the   
sight of the one1 awful in the sight of 
the other4 #bc  ,to this ,pindar adds   
the petition that1 being dead ,i may set
 upon my children a name that shall be  

of no ill report4 #bd  ,even the ideal  
of the philosophers is only a refinement
 of this2 #aaa recognizing the          
superiority of such activities as engage
 the imagination or reason1 but         
nevertheless finding happiness to be    
complete in terms of the fulfilment of  
the dominant desires within the existing
 political community4  ,this conception 
was vaguely distrusted1 it is true2 but 
it represents the characteristic        
enlightenment of the most enlightened   
centre of ,greek life4  ,its            
insufficiency was not clearly           
demonstrated until the advent of        
,christianity2 when it was proved to lie
 in a lack of pity4  ,now pity is not1  
as is sometimes supposed1 a kind of     
weakness2 it is a kind of knowledge1    
wherewith men are reminded of obscure   
and neglected interests4  ,it is easy to
 understand why the ,christian          
revolution should have been regarded as 
destructive of culture4  ,for it meant  
not the qualitative refinement of the   

good1 but the quantitative distribution 
of it4  ,but it none the less marks an  
epoch in moral enlightenment2 since the 
bringing of all men up to one level of  
opportunity and welfare is as essential 
a part of the good as the cultivation of
 distinction4  ,the modern worldliness  
consists not in a lack of pity1 but in a
 lack of imagination4  ,philistinism1 as
 ,matthew ,arnold describes it1 is a    
complacent satisfaction with the kind of
 good that is praised and sought for in 
any given time4  ,such complacency is   
found in its most extreme form among    
those reformers or even religious       
leaders who are #aab devoted to the     
saving of men2 for these come to        
overrate their wares through the very   
act of pressing them upon others4       
,matthew ,arnold never tires of         
illustrating this from the ,liberal     
propaganda of his day3   ,and ,i say    
that the ,english reliance on our       
religious organisations and on their    
ideas of human perfection just as they  

stand1 is like our reliance on freedom1 
on muscular ,christianity1 on           
population1 on coal1 on wealth--mere    
belief in machinery1 and unfruitful2 and
 that it is wholesomely counteracted by 
culture1 bent on seeing things as they  
are1 and on drawing the human race      
onwards to a more complete1 a harmonious
 perfection4#be   ,in other words1 both 
humanism and humanitarianism may be     
lacking in humanity3 humanism1 on       
account of its insensibility to pain and
 hunger and poverty when these lie      
outside a narrow radius of bright       
intensive living2 humanitarianism1 on   
account of its failure to honor the     
highest type of attainment and to       
prefigure a perfection not yet realized4
   ,,vi  ,there is but one economy of   
interests which furnishes the proper    
sphere of moral action1 namely1 the     
universal economy which embraces within 
one system all interests whatsoever1    
present1 remote1 and potential4 ,the    
validity of this economy lies in the    

fact that the goodness of action cannot 
#aac be judged without reference to all 
the interests affected1 whether directly
 or indirectly4  ,to live well is to    
live for all life4  ,the control of     
action by this motive is the virtue of  
good-will4  ,it should be added that the
 good will must be not only             
compassionate1 but just2 offering to    
help1 without failing to respect4 ,and  
it must be not only devoted1 but also   
enlightened2 serving1 but not without   
self-criticism and insight4  ,such a    
programme need not seem bewildering or  
quixotic4  ,if my action does not offend
 those most nearly concerned1 it will   
scarcely offend those removed by space1 
time1 or indirection4  ,charity begun at
 home is spread abroad without my       
further endeavor4  ,furthermore1 it is  
good-will rather than a narrow          
complacency that inspires my assuming of
 the special tasks and responsibilities 
defined by proximity1 descent1 and      
special aptitude4  ,life as a whole is  

built out of individual opportunities   
and vocations4  ,it is required only    
that while ,i live effectively and      
happily1 as circumstance or choice may  
determine1 ,i should conform myself to  
those principles which harmonize life   
with life1 and bring an abundance on the
 whole out of the fruitfulness of       
individual effort4  ,good-will is the   
moral condition of religion1 where this 
is corrected by enlightenment4  ,the    
religion of good-will is best           
illustrated1 from the #aad ,european    
tradition1 in the transition from       
paganism to ,christianity4  ,i have said
 that the ,greeks were not without      
distrust of that natural and worldly    
happiness which they most praised4      
,this1 for example1 is the testimony of 
,euripides3            ,long ago   ,i   
looked upon man's days1 and found a grey
   ,shadow4  ,and this thing more ,i    
surely say1   ,that those of all men who
 are counted wise1   ,strong wits1      
devisers of great policies1   ,do pay   

the bitterest toll4  ,since life began2 
,hath there in ,god's eye stood one     
happy man8   ,fair days roll on1 and    
bear more gifts or less   ,of fortune1  
but to no man happiness4#bf  ,this note 
of pessimism grows more marked among the
 philosophers1 and is at length taken up
 into the ,christian renunciation of the
 world4  ,the philosophers attempted to 
devise a way of happiness which the     
superior individual might follow through
 detaching himself from political       
society and cultivating his speculative 
powers4#bg  ,but the ,christian         
renunciation involved the abandonment of
 every claim to individual              
self-sufficiency1 even the pride of     
reason4  ,it expressed a sense of the   
general plight of humanity1 and looked  
for relief only through a power with    
love and might enough to save all4      
,hence there is this fundamental        
difference between pagan and ,christian 
pessimism3 the pagan confesses his      
powerlessness to make himself           

impregnable #aae to fortune1 while the  
,christian convicts himself of sin1     
confessing his worthlessness when       
measured by the task of universal       
salvation4  ,the one pities and absolves
 himself2 the other condemns himself4   
,now the other-worldliness of           
,christianity was without doubt a grave 
error1 which it found itself compelled  
to correct2 but it was none the less the
 vehicle through which ,european        
civilization became possessed of the    
most important secrets of religious     
happiness4  ,in the first place1 all are
 made sharers1 through sympathy1 in the 
failure of the present2 and1 thus       
distributed1 the burden is lightened4   
,it is an act within the power of       
charity1 says ,sir ,thomas ,browne1 to  
translate a passion out of one breast   
into another1 and to divide a sorrow    
almost out of itself2 for an affliction1
 like a dimension1 may be so divided as1
 if not indivisible1 at least to become 
insensible4 #bh  ,in the second place1  

it is understood that there is no such  
thing as a happiness that is enjoyed at 
the expense of others and by the special
 favor of fortune4  ,there is no promise
 of individual salvation save in the    
salvation of all4  ,a private and       
protected happiness is bound sooner or  
later to be destroyed by an increase of 
sensibility1 by an enlightened awareness
 of the evil beyond4  ,and to experience
 evil1 to realize it1 and yet to be     
content1 lies not within #aaf the power 
of any moral being2 it is not merely    
difficult1 it is self-contradictory4 ,to
 any one who judges himself fairly1 with
 a wide and vivid image of life as it is
 in all its ramifications and           
obscurities1 the evil of the world is   
all one4  ,it follows that1 as there is 
no perfect happiness except in the      
annihilation of evil1 so there can be no
 peace of mind1 no self-respect1 no     
sense of living truly and for the best1 
unless one's action can be conceived as 
wholly saving and up-building1 as       

contributing in its place and in its way
 to the general forward movement4       
,this1 ,i think1 is the deeper          
explanation of the buoyancy of devoted  
people1 of that buoyancy which was a    
source of such great wonder to the      
disillusioned wise men of ancient times4
  ,and this1 ,i think1 is the meaning of
 the ,christian teaching that it is more
 blessed to give than to receive2 and   
that the love of one's ,god is to grow  
out of the love of one's neighbor4  ,i  
have endeavored to show that the highest
 good is the greatest good2 that it may 
not only be inferred from the present   
good1 but that it actually consists of  
the present good1 with more like it1 and
 with the present evil eliminated4  ,by 
mysticism ,i mean that species of       
formalism in which the highest good1 out
 of respect for its exaltation1 is      
divorced from the present good1 and so  
emptied of content4 ,professor ,james   
has said that it is #aag characteristic 
of rationalists and sentimentalists1 to 

extract a quality from the muddy        
particulars of experience1 and find it  
so pure when extracted that they        
contrast it with each and all its muddy 
instances as an opposite and higher1    
nature4 #bi  ,there is a peculiar       
liability to such abstraction in        
religion1 for religion involves a       
judgment of insufficiency against every 
limited achievement4  ,a longing after  
unqualified good is the very breath of  
enlightened religion2 and in order that 
that ideal may be kept pure1 it must not
 be identified with any partial good4   
,indeed1 the office of religion requires
 it to condemn as only partial1 good    
that is commonly taken to be sufficient4
 ,now there is only one way of defining 
a good that shall be universal without  
being merely formal1 and that is by     
defining perfection quantitatively      
rather than qualitatively2 substituting 
for the ,platonic ,absolute ,good1 in   
which the present good is refined away  
into a phrase or symbol1 the maximum    

good1 in which the present good is saved
 and multiplied4  ,he who believes that 
he conceives goodness otherwise than as 
the good which he already possesses1    
deceives himself2 as does the author of 
the ,religio ,medici1 when he says3     
,that wherein ,god ,himself is happy1   
the holy ,angels are happy1 in whose    
defect the ,devils are unhappy1 that    
dare ,i call happiness2 whatsoever #aah 
conduceth unto this may with an easy    
,metaphor deserve that name2 whatsoever 
else the ,world terms ,happiness1 is to 
me a story out of ,pliny1 a tale of     
,boccace or ,malizspini1 an apparition1 
or neat delusion1 wherein there is no   
more of ,happiness than the name4       
,bless me in this life with but peace of
 my ,conscience1 command of my          
affections1 the love of ,thyself and my 
dearest friends1 and ,i shall be happy  
enough to pity ,caesar4#cj   ,now it is 
safe to say that ,sir ,thomas ,browne   
was in fact unable to attribute to ,god 
and the angels any other happiness than 

these same blessings which he covets for
 himself1 saving only that they shall be
 without stint1 and joined with others  
like them4  ,formalism1 as we have seen1
 is never merely negative in its        
consequences2 for any moral untruth1    
since it replaces a truth1 cannot fail  
to pervert life4  ,thus one may be      
persuaded with the author whom ,i have  
just quoted to count the world1 not an  
,inn1 but an ,hospital2 and a place not 
to live1 but to dye in4 #ca  ,i do not  
suppose that any one ever succeeded in  
wholly resisting the hospitality of this
 world1 and one suspects that ,thomas   
,browne partook not a little of its good
 cheer2 but the opinion is false        
notwithstanding1 and if false1 then     
confusing and misleading4  ,this world  
is not a place to suffer in1 nor even a 
place to be mended in1 but the only     
opportunity of achievement and service  
that can be certainly #aai counted on4  
,the good is in the making here1 if it  
is in the making anywhere4  ,to neglect 

life here is equivalent to forfeiting it
 altogether4  ,religious formalism may  
induce not only a default of present    
opportunity and responsibility1 but also
 a substitution for good living of an   
emotional improvisation on the theme of 
absolute perfection1 like that in the   
,book of the ,courtier3   ,if1 then1 the
 beauties which with these dim eyes of  
ours we daily see in corruptible bodies1
 4 4 4 seem to us so fair and gracious  
that they often kindle most ardent fire 
in us1 4 4 4 what happy wonder1 what    
blessed awe1 shall we think is that     
which fills the souls that attain to the
 vision of divine beauty6  ,what sweet  
flame1 what delightful burning1 must    
that be thought which springs from the  
fountain of supreme and true            
beauty6--which is the source of every   
other beauty1 which never waxes nor     
wanes3 ever fair1 and of its own self   
most simple in every part alike2 like   
only to itself1 and partaking of none   
other2 but fair in such wise that all   

other fair things are fair because they 
derive their beauty from it4  ,this is  
that beauty identical with highest      
good4#cb   ,now ,i do not want to be    
understood as condemning this mysticism 
out of hand4  ,i mean only that while it
 is eloquent and purifying1 it is1      
nevertheless1 not illuminating2 and that
 if it be mistaken for illumination1 it 
does in fact hide the light4  ,it has no
 meaning whatsoever except the general  
idea of the superlative1 and if it be   
not attached to some definite content   
drawn from #abj experience of acts and  
their consequences1 it does but         
substitute a phrase for the proper      
objects of action and an emotion for    
provident conduct4  ,there is a further 
moral danger in mysticism1 which ,i need
 only mention here1 because ,i propose  
to discuss it more fully in the chapter 
on religion4  ,since mysticism opposes a
 formal perfection to the concrete good 
of experience1 it tends to obscure the  
distinction between good and evil4      

,that distinction lies within           
experience1 and if experience as a whole
 be discredited1 the distinction is     
discredited with it4  ,if the common1   
familiar good is not to be taken as     
valid1 then finality no longer attaches 
to that common1 familiar evil which the 
moral will has been trained to condemn  
and resist4  ,if the good lie beyond    
good and evil1 then neither is the good 
good nor the evil evil4  ,the result is 
to leave the moral will without         
justification1 supported only by habit  
and custom4  ,the virtue of piety lies  
in its completing1 not in its replacing1
 secular efficiency4  ,it gives to a    
life that is provident and fruitful as  
it goes1 the stimulus of a momentous    
project1 and reverence for a good that  
shall embrace unlimited possibilities4  
#aba  ,,vii  ,in reviewing the several  
levels of life which morality defines1  
we may observe two types of universal   
value4  ,the lower values in relation to
 the higher are indispensable4  ,there  

is no health without satisfaction1 no   
achievement without health1 no rational 
intercourse without achievement1 and no 
true religion except as the perfecting  
and completing of a rational society4   
,the higher values1 on the other hand1  
are more universal than the lower in    
that they surpass these in validity1 and
 are entitled to preference4  ,thus the 
lower values are ennobled by the higher1
 while the higher are given body and    
meaning by the lower4  ,satisfaction    
derives dignity from being controlled by
 the motive of good-will1 while the     
moral kingdom at large derives its      
wealth1 its pertinence to life1 and its 
incentive1 from the great manifold of   
particular interests which it conserves 
and fosters4  ,it is the formal rather  
than the material principle in life     
which defines the direction of moral    
effort4  ,by prudence1 purpose1 justice1
 and good-will life is regenerated and  
urged1 against the resistance of        
inertia1 towards its maximum of         

attainment4  ,hence these are the       
virtues which make men heroes1 and which
 are symbolized in manners and in       
worship4  ,manners are a #abb symbolic  
representation of rational intercourse2 
thus courtesy is a ceremony of respect1 
chivalry of service1 and modesty of     
self-restraint and impersonality4       
,worship is similarly a symbolic        
representation of good-will and hope4   
,upon the cultivation of those outward  
and sensible motions which may express  
or promote an invisible devotion human  
life is dependent not only for its      
graciousness1 but for its discipline and
 growth4     #abc  ,,chapter ,,iv  ,,the
 ,,moral ,,test ,,of ,,progress  ,the   
phrase philosophy of history is at      
present somewhat in disrepute4 ,it      
enjoys much the same unpopularity among 
historians as does the term metaphysics 
among scientists1 and probably for the  
same reason4  ,it is assumed that such a
 discipline must either violate or      
exceed the facts in the interests of    

some a priori conception4  ,doubtless   
some philosophies of history have been  
guilty of this charge2 but they do not1 
,i am sure1 exhaust the possibilities in
 the case4  ,in the present chapter ,i  
shall present an outline of what might  
fairly be regarded as a philosophy of   
history1 but which nevertheless does no 
more than attempt a precise definition  
of principles which even the historian  
is forced to employ4  ,i shall not      
attempt to define the task of history1  
except in the broadest terms4  ,the form
 which its results should finally assume
 is a matter of dispute among historians
 themselves4  ,but it is at least       
possible to indicate the field of       
history in terms that will command      
general assent4  ,in the first place1   
history deals with change1 with the     
temporal sequence of events2 and in the 
second place1 it confines itself to such
 events as belong to what is called     
human conduct4 ,entirely apart from     
theories of method or technique1 it     

seems clear that any established fact   
falling within this description belongs 
properly to that body of knowledge which
 we call history4  ,i wish especially to
 call attention to the fact that history
 deals with human conduct4  ,it deals1  
in other words1 with actions which serve
 interests2 with needs1 desires1 and    
purposes as these are fulfilled or      
thwarted in the course of time4  ,its   
subject-matter1 therefore1 is moral4    
,it describes the clash of interests1   
the failure or success of ambition1 the 
improvement or decay of nations2 in     
short1 all things good and evil in so   
far as they have been achieved and      
recorded4  ,and the broader the scope of
 the historian's study the more clearly 
do these moral principles emerge4  ,the 
present-day emphasis on the accurate    
verification of data somewhat obscures1 
but does not negate the fact1 that every
 item of detail is in the end brought   
under some judgment of good or evil1 of 
gain or loss in human welfare4  ,all    

history is virtually a history of       
civilization2 and civilization is a     
moral conception referring to the sum of
 human achievement in so far as this is 
pronounced good4  ,now there is a branch
 of philosophy called #abe ethics1 to   
which is committed the investigation of 
moral conceptions4  ,these conceptions  
are as much subject to exact analysis as
 conceptions of motion or organic       
behavior4  ,and such an analysis must   
underlie all judgments concerning the   
condition of mankind in any time or     
place1 if these judgments make any claim
 to truth4  ,the application of ethical 
analysis to the recorded life of man is 
a philosophy of history4#a  ,such a     
discipline is charged with the criticism
 of the past in terms of critical       
principles which have been explicitly   
formulated4  ,with a knowledge of what  
it means to be good or evil one may     
conclude in all seriousness whether the 
fortunes of society in any time or place
 were good or evil4  ,one may with      

meaning distinguish between those who   
have been the friends and the enemies of
 society2 and one may refer to the      
growth or decay of nations with some    
notion of what these terms signify4     
,but it will be the main problem of a   
philosophy of history to deliver some   
verdict concerning the progress or      
decline of institutions1 and of         
civilization at large4  ,it is necessary
 that we should at once rid our minds of
 false notions concerning the meaning of
 progress4  ,this conception has been   
greatly confused during recent times    
through being identified with evolution 
in the biological sense4  ,it should be 
perfectly clear that such evolution may 
or #abf may not be progressive2 it means
 only a continuous modification of life 
in accordance with the demands of the   
environment4 ,even where this           
modification takes the direction of     
increasing complexity it does not       
necessarily constitute betterment2 and  
it is entirely consistent with the      

principle of adaptation that it should  
take the reverse direction4  ,biological
 evolution signifies only a steady      
yielding to the pressure of the physical
 environment1 whether for better or for 
worse4  ,it is also important not to    
confuse the conception of progress with 
that of mere change or temporal         
duration4 ,because society has grown    
older it has not necessarily on that    
account grown wiser2 nor because it has 
changed much has it necessarily on that 
account changed for the better4         
,whether the accumulations of the past  
are wealth or rubbish is not to be      
determined by their bulk4  ,progress    
cleared of these ambiguities means1     
then1 a change from good to better2 an  
increase1 in the course of time1 of the 
value of life1 whatever that may be4    
,taken in the absolute sense it means1  
not a gain here or a gain there1 but a  
gain on the whole4  ,it is impossible to
 reach any conclusion whatsoever        
concerning progress except in the light 

of some conception of the total         
enterprise of life4  ,every advance must
 be estimated not merely in relation to 
the interest immediately #abg served1   
but in relation to that whole complex of
 interests which is called humanity4    
,in discussing progress ,i shall        
therefore with right employ those moral 
conceptions which ,i have already       
defined4  ,i shall regard as good       
whatever fulfils interests1 and as      
morally good whatever fulfils all       
interests affected to the maximum       
degree4  ,especial importance now       
attaches to the principle which ,i have 
phrased the quantitative basis of       
preference4  ,since progress involves   
the change from good to better1 it      
implies an increment of value4  ,the    
later age is judged to be as good and   
better4  ,i can see no way of verifying 
such a proposition unless it be possible
 to find in the greater good both the   
lesser good and also something added to 
it and likewise accounted good4 ,in     

other words1 progress involves          
measurement of value1 and this involves 
some unit of value which is common to   
the terms compared4 ,the method must be 
in the last analysis that of            
superimposition4  ,bagehot virtually    
employs this method in the chapter of   
his ,physics and ,politics1 which he    
entitles ,verifiable ,progress          
,politically ,considered4  ,let me      
quote1 for example1 his comparison of   
the ,englishman with the primitive      
,australian4   ,if we omit the higher   
but disputed topics of morals and       
religion1 we shall find1 ,i think1 that 
the plainer #abh and agreed-on          
superiorities of the ,englishmen are    
these3 first1 that they have a greater  
command over the powers of nature upon  
the whole4  ,though they may fall short 
of individual ,australians in certain   
feats of petty skill1 though they may   
not throw the boomerang as well1 or     
light a fire with earthsticks as well1  
yet on the whole twenty ,englishmen with

 their implements and skill can change  
the material world immeasurably more    
than twenty ,australians and their      
machines4  ,secondly1 that this power is
 not external only2 it is also internal4
  ,the ,english not only possess better 
machines for moving nature1 but are     
themselves better machines4 ,mr4        
,babbage taught us years ago that one   
great use of machinery was not to       
augment the force of man1 but to        
register and regulate the power of man2 
and this in a thousand ways civilized   
man can do1 and is ready to do1 better  
and more precisely than the barbarian4  
,thirdly1 civilized man has not only    
greater powers over nature1 but knows   
better how to use them1 and by better ,i
 here mean better for the health and    
comfort of his present body and mind4   
,he can lay up for old age1 which a     
savage having no durable means of       
sustenance cannot2 he is ready to lay up
 because he can distinctly foresee the  
future1 which the vague-minded savage   

cannot4#b   ,it will be observed that in
 each case the superiority of the       
,englishmen lies in the fact that they  
beat the ,australians at their own game4
 ,australians are as much interested as 
,englishmen in obtaining command over   
nature1 in organizing their own powers1 
and in securing health and comfort4     
,the ,englishmen1 however1 can fulfil   
these interests not only up to but also 
beyond #abi the point which marks the   
limit of the ,australians' attainment4  
,the method of superimposition is       
virtually employed in all competitive   
struggle4  ,the glory and fruits of     
victory are sought by both opponents1   
and the success of one is the failure of
 the other4  ,the superiority of the    
victor to the vanquished is beyond      
question only because they had the same 
interest at stake4  ,the application of 
this method to the determination of     
progress is not confined to philosophers
 of history4  ,it is applied by every   
individual who realizes that his advance

 from childhood to maturity has been    
attended with growth and development4   
,for the old boundaries of childhood    
still remain as evidence of the greater 
magnitude of the life which has outgrown
 them4  ,similarly every man may mark   
within himself the various limits which 
once bounded him1 but which he has since
 exceeded in consequence of steady and  
consecutive effort4  ,the progress of   
mankind at large differs only in        
complexity and range4  ,it can be tested
 and determined only because identical  
interests persist4  ,if men had not in  
all times wanted the same things it     
would be impossible to measure their    
attainments4  ,their successes and      
failures would be incommensurable4  ,but
 the old needs and the old hopes yet    
remain4  ,the problem of life which was 
from #acj the beginning is a problem    
still4 ,if it can be shown that the old 
needs are met more easily1 along with   
new needs besides1 that there is better 
promise that the hopes will be          

fulfilled1 and that the general problem 
of life is nearer a solution1 then human
 progress will have been demonstrated4  
,,ii  ,i propose1 in the first place1 to
 discuss two general principles1 the    
operation of which is conducive to      
progress4  ,one of these principles is  
external1 that is1 it relates to the    
environment of life rather than to its  
internal economy2 and to this ,i shall  
turn first4  ,the external environment  
of life is in some respects favorable1  
in other respects unfavorable4  ,now1   
strangely enough1 it is the unfavorable 
rather than the favorable aspect of the 
environment that conduces to progress4  
,progress1 or even the least good1      
would1 of course1 be impossible1 unless 
the mechanical environment was morally  
plastic4  ,the fact that nature submits 
to the organization which we call life  
is a fundamental and constant condition 
of all civilization4 ,but there is      
nothing in the mere compliance of nature
 to press life forward4  ,it is the     

menace of nature which stimulates       
progress4  ,it is because nature always 
remains a source of difficulty and      
danger #aca that life is provoked to    
renew the war and achieve a more        
thorough conquest4  ,nature will not    
permit life to keep what it has unless  
it gains more4  ,the external           
environment of life embraces not only   
mechanical nature1 but also such        
outlying units of life as have not yet  
been brought into harmonious relations4 
,conflict between individuals1 tribes1  
races1 or nations operates in a manner  
analogous to mechanical nature4  ,it    
exerts a constant pressure in the       
direction of greater strength and       
efficiency4  ,in order that man shall   
not be robbed by his enemies of what he 
already has1 he must forever be         
attempting to make himself impregnable  
and formidable4  ,but war and the       
struggle with nature not only put a     
premium on the better organization of   
life2 they also make it a condition of  

permanence4  ,superior individuals      
survive when inferior individuals perish
 in the struggle1 or the superior type  
obtains an ascendency over the inferior4
  ,in human warfare the defeated party  
is rarely if ever utterly annihilated2  
it tends1 however1 to lose its prestige 
or even its identity through being      
assimilated to the victorious party4    
,in either case that form of life which 
in conflict proves itself the stronger1 
tends to prevail1 through the exclusion 
of those forms which prove themselves   
weaker4  ,an unfavorable environment    
has1 then1 operated externally to       
develop coherence and unity #acb in     
life4  ,but the cost has been           
prodigious1 and must be subtracted from 
the gain4  ,for there is no virtue in   
conflict save the strength of the       
victor4  ,man has made a virtue of this 
necessity2 but to obviate so dire a     
necessity becomes one of the first tasks
 which civilization undertakes4  ,the   
attempt to eliminate conflict1 and      

reduce to a minimum the sacrifice of    
special interests1 marks the operation  
of the internal or moral principle of   
progress4 ,during the historical period 
this principle assumes a constantly     
greater prominence4  ,a society may be  
said to be internally progressive when  
it can afford to withdraw some of its   
energies from the struggle for          
existence1 and devote them to the       
improvement of method and the saving of 
waste4  ,its stability and security must
 be so far guaranteed as to make it safe
 to undertake a reconstruction1         
calculated to provide more fully for its
 constituent interests and develop its  
latent possibilities4  ,there now       
obtains1 within limits that tend        
steadily to expand1 what ,bagehot calls 
government by discussion1 that is1 the  
regulation of action by the invention1  
selection1 and trial of the best means4 
,this substitution of rational procedure
 for custom is an irreversible and      
germinal process4  ,let me quote        

,bagehot's account of it3   ,a          
government by discussion1 if it can be  
borne1 at once breaks down the yoke of  
fixed custom4  ,the #acc idea of the two
 is inconsistent4  ,as far as it goes1  
the mere putting up of a subject to     
discussion is a clear admission that    
that subject is in no degree settled by 
established rule1 and that men are free 
to choose in it4 4 4 4  ,and if a single
 subject or group of subjects be once   
admitted to discussion1 ere long the    
habit of discussion comes to be         
established1 the sacred charm of use and
 wont to be dissolved4  ,democracy1 it  
has been said in modern times1 is like  
the grave2 it takes1 but it does not    
give4 ,the same is true of discussion4  
,once effectually submit a subject to   
that ordeal1 and you can never withdraw 
it again2 you can never again clothe it 
with mystery1 or fence it by            
consecration2 it remains forever open to
 free choice1 and exposed to profane    
deliberation4#c   ,the strength of      

custom or established authority lies in 
prompt and undivided action against     
external enemies2 but its weakness lies 
in its excessive cost to the interests  
within4  ,and when there is leisure and 
security for deliberation1 the policy   
and organization of society must respond
 at once to the claims of these         
interests4  ,development is now due to a
 moral rather than to a mechanical      
principle2 that is1 the surviving type  
of life is due not to pressure and      
elimination from without1 but to a      
provident concern that emanates from    
within4  ,there is a deliberate         
intention to promote survival1 those    
interests alone being restricted or     
suppressed which do not comply with this
 intention4 ,there evolves not a        
selected group of strong individuals1   
but a strong community1 strong because  
both full of life1 or rich #acd in      
incentive1 and also harmonious4  ,and   
within such a community the strength of 
individuals lies not in a sheer power to

 resist the strain of competition1 but  
in the rational and moral capacity to   
utilize the resources of the entire     
community4  ,through moral organization 
the strong are made stronger at the same
 time that the weak are made strong4    
,strictly speaking1 there is only one   
internal principle of progress1 namely1 
rationality4  ,by rationality1 in this  
connection1 ,i mean the knowledge of the
 good1 and the correction of existing   
usages through which it is accidentally 
or wantonly frustrated4  ,if fulfilment 
be the motive of life1 and maximum      
fulfilment be the good1 then any        
existing usage stands condemned when it 
is proved to involve unnecessary        
sacrifice4  ,and such usages will be    
condemned1 and in the long run rejected1
 wherever there is an opportunity for   
self-assertion and discussion among the 
various interests concerned4  ,but such 
correction may be initiated either by a 
positive or a negative motive4  ,it may 
result either from the action of those  

who seek constructively to promote the  
general welfare of society1 or from the 
action of those who protest against     
society in behalf of neglected          
interests4  ,the first is constructive  
reform1 the second1 revolution4         
,constructive reform is the work of     
disinterested #ace reflection4 ,it may  
originate in speculation1 as political  
or social theory2 or it may originate in
 the solution of a practical problem4   
,plato has described the type of mind   
which in either case it requires3 a mind
 which is free from individual or party 
bias1 and which represents and          
co-ordinates all the interests of the   
community4  ,now the failure of         
political and social theories as        
measures of reform is proverbial2 none  
failed more completely and conspicuously
 than ,plato's own4  ,and it is not     
difficult to see why this should be the 
case2 for1 as a rule1 they are adapted  
neither to the habits and intelligence  
of the time1 nor to the actual          

instruments of practical efficiency4    
,but it may be observed that the        
distance between the philosopher and the
 man of affairs is considerably shorter 
than it used to be4  ,the method of     
discussion being once generally adopted1
 action1 both individual and social1 is 
pervaded with theory4  ,even the man of 
affairs cannot easily avoid being a     
philosopher4  ,and even in              
distinguishing as sharply as ,i have    
between theory and practice1 ,i have    
simply followed a customary habit of    
thought that is on the whole misleading4
  ,for1 in truth1 it is as impossible   
for the man of affairs to avoid         
disinterested reflection1 as it is for  
the commercial traveller to be          
unsociable4  ,the activity of the one   
has to do with the organization of a    
wide range of #acf interests1 as the    
activity of the other has to do with the
 capitalization of good-fellowship4     
,those of you who are familiar with the 
,first ,book of ,plato's ,republic will 

remember the account given there of the 
forced benevolence of the tyrant4  ,it  
is1 ,i believe1 one of the great        
classics in ethical theory2 and although
 its full meaning will not appear until 
we deal directly with the problem of    
government1 ,i must allude to it here   
for the sake of the principle involved4 
,the sophist of the dialogue1 one       
,thrasymachus1 attempts to overthrow    
,socrates's conclusion that virtue is   
essentially beneficent1 by pointing to  
the case of the tyrant1 who is eminent  
and powerful1 as every one would wish to
 be1 but who is at the same time wholly 
unscrupulous4  ,he is the symbol of     
success1 in that he can on all occasions
 do what it pleases him to do1 and with 
no regard for the feelings of others4   
,now ,socrates in his reply is not      
satisfied to show that even the tyrant  
must have some scruples2 he goes to the 
length of asserting that the tyrant must
 of all persons in the community have   
the most scruples4  ,and the reason     

which ,socrates advances is             
unanswerable4  ,the tyrant is the one   
person in the community who has to      
please everybody4  ,he owes his position
 and power1 not to any directly         
productive activity1 such as            
agriculture1 industry1 or military      
service1 but wholly to his skill in #acg
 organizing and promoting interests that
 are not primarily his own4  ,to be     
sure1 he has his hire2 but to earn it he
 must pay every man his price4  ,now let
 us apply this to the general case of   
the man of affairs4  ,it follows that   
just in so far as action is broad in    
scope1 it must be considerate and just4 
,to conduct enterprises on a large scale
 involves contact with many interests1  
and these interests1 once affected1 must
 either be understood and provided for  
or else antagonized4  ,the greater the  
enterprise1 the more truly does it exist
 by sufferance2 it depends on the       
support of those who profit by it1 and  
if that support be withdrawn1 it        

collapses into absolute impotence4  ,the
 ancient ,cynics were right in thinking 
that the only man who can afford to be  
indifferent to the interests of his     
fellows is the man who renounces        
ambition and retires to his tub4  ,once 
the era of civilization is inaugurated1 
power depends on moral capacity1 that   
is1 the capacity to protect and promote 
a considerable number of interests1 and 
thus win their backing4  ,this is proved
 in every field of human activity1      
military1 political1 religious1         
intellectual1 social1 or commercial4    
,commerce and industry afford at present
 the most striking examples4  ,the man  
who succeeds is the man who can satisfy 
the greatest number of appetites4  ,and 
the more his enterprise grows the more  
it becomes a public concern2 #ach and   
the more1 therefore1 must he be studious
 of public welfare and responsive to    
public opinion4  ,thus manufacturing1   
transportation1 or banking1 when        
conducted on a large scale1 touch life  

at so many points1 that he who seeks to 
gain power or wealth by means of them   
will gradually and without any abrupt   
change of motive approximate the method 
of disinterested service4  ,so every    
station in life1 from that of the ruler 
to that of the shopkeeper1 has its own  
characteristic form of the one problem  
of meeting1 adjusting and fulfilling    
interests4  ,the desire to be successful
 or to attain eminence in one's station 
exerts a constant pressure in the       
direction of the invention1 trial1 and  
selection of methods that will solve    
this problem4  ,and such methods once   
devised are at once supported by the    
interests they serve1 and become        
necessary to the life of the community4 
,now the wise leader anticipates the    
needs and wishes of his followers1 and  
so enjoys their continued support       
without ever seeming to depend on it4   
,but there are very few such wise       
leaders4  ,the reason for their scarcity
 lies in the natural inertia of         

profitable activities4  ,there is a     
universal propensity to let well enough 
alone4  ,so methods are allowed to      
outlive their usefulness1 or remain     
unmodified when more provident and      
fruitful methods could be devised4      
,when leadership #aci thus fails to be  
statesmanlike and far-sighted1 there    
occurs that uprising of the disaffected 
interests which is called revolution4   
,revolution1 then1 is the self-assertion
 of the various constituent interests   
which do not find room or fair measure  
within the existing organization4  ,the 
evidence of the insufficiency of present
 methods being neglected by those in    
charge1 that evidence makes itself      
known4 ,in the long run this is the     
surest principle of progress1 because it
 is brought into operation by those who 
have a nearer or more indispensable     
interest at stake4  ,it is              
unquestionably to the interest of the   
individual who heads an enterprise to   
conduct it rationally1 that is1 to make 

it always as productive as possible for 
all the interests which it serves4  ,but
 if he fails he may not at once incur   
the penalty1 or be conscious of it if he
 does2 he may only forfeit an increase  
of power1 or render his position        
precarious4  ,on the other hand1 to the 
constituent interest which is           
sacrificed1 this same failure may mean  
loss of bread or even loss of life4     
,hence the latter is more sure to move  
in the matter4  ,justice is more        
urgently needed by the slave who rebels1
 than by the master who may be brought  
through enlightenment to liberate him4  
,thus neglected interests have been the 
conscience of every great human reform4 
,let me cite the two greatest cases of  
this in the history of #adj ,european   
civilization1 ,christianity and the     
,french ,revolution4  ,christianity as a
 social revolution was a protest against
 the existing order on the part of      
interests which it did not recognize4   
,i do not mean that these interests were

 not tolerated2 they were1 of course1   
protected1 and even given a legal       
status4  ,but in the reckoning of good  
and evil they were not counted4  ,women 
and slaves1 the poor1 the ill-born1 and 
the ignorant1 were instruments which the
 happy man might use1 or incidents of   
life which might test his charity and   
magnanimity4 ,these classes rose to     
overthrow no single institution1 but a  
whole conception of life1 or standard of
 well-being which was defined to exclude
 them4  ,in paganism1 which did not pass
 with the advent of ,christianity1 but  
still lingers as the creed of the very  
precious souls1 humanity is conceived   
only qualitatively1 and not             
quantitatively4  ,the good of the race  
is conceived to consist in the          
perfection of a few1 chosen for their   
superior endowment and fortune4 ,the    
eminent refinement and nobility of these
 demigods is substituted for the saving 
of lives1 for the general distribution  
of welfare and opportunity4  ,the many  

are to find compensation for their      
hardship in the happiness of the few4   
,but the ,christian principle of        
atonement was the precise opposite of   
this3 one suffered that all might be    
blessed4 ,christianity #ada looked      
towards a good that should number every 
one in the multitude and endure         
throughout all time4  ,now it has since 
appeared that this was no more than the 
truth2 and that it might have been      
conceived and executed by the wise men1 
had they only been more wise4  ,but they
 were wise only within the limits of    
their own conceit4 ,hence it took the   
form of an assault on the established   
enlightenment4 ,the many1 with their    
yearning for a universal happiness1 with
 their deep concern for the greater     
good1 and their jealous compassion for  
all souls1 destroyed the narrow eminence
 of the few4  ,thus ,christianity was a 
revolution1 and not a constructive      
reform4  ,the ,french ,revolution was a 
protest not only against apathy1 but    

against insolence as well4  ,it was a   
demand of the many not merely to be     
happy1 but to have what they called     
their rights respected2 a protest       
against authority1 not only because it  
was cruel1 but because it was arbitrary1
 tyrannical4  ,hence it was aimed       
against priestcraft as well as against  
monarchy4  ,it was based on the         
conviction that no one is so justly     
entitled to pass judgment on a man's    
affairs as a man himself4  ,but it was a
 cry from the depths1 the bitter        
resentment of a long-standing abuse4    
,therefore it took the form of an       
uprising against the established order2 
and while it opened men's eyes1 it was  
not conducted in the spirit of          
enlightenment4  #adb ,in spite of his   
inferences1 ,nietsche has not described 
the matter falsely3   ,the slave 4 4 4  
loves as he hates1 without nuance1 to   
the very depths1 to the point of pain1 4
 4 4 his many hidden sufferings make him
 revolt against the noble taste which   

seems to deny suffering4 ,the scepticism
 with regard to suffering1 fundamentally
 only an attitude of an aristocratic    
morality1 was not the least of the      
causes1 also1 of the last great slave   
insurrection which began with the       
,french ,revolution4#d   ,insurrection1 
in other words1 is the flat1 downright1 
and unqualified affirmation of interests
 to which those in charge of affairs    
have denied existence4  ,it is a flash  
in the eyes of those who will not see2 a
 blast in the ears of those who will not
 hear4  ,insurrection asserts only the  
interests that have been neglected2     
hence1 though it brings new light1 that 
light for lack of which the world went  
in darkness1 it is careless and blind in
 its own way1 and does not concern      
itself with restoring the balance4      
,but1 as ,nietsche prefers not to       
comprehend1 insurrection demonstrates   
beyond question the bankruptcy of       
aristocratic morality2 discredits it as 
effectually1 and in the same way1 as new

 evidence discredits old theories4      
,these1 then1 are the two complementary 
methods through which rationality gets  
itself progressively established3       
through the imagination and foresight of
 constructive minds1 and through the    
protest or uprising of neglected        
interests4  #adc  ,i must mention       
briefly1 before leaving this general    
topic1 an accessory condition on which  
this internal principle of progress     
depends for its effectual working4  ,it 
is necessary that the life of society   
should be unbroken2 that its            
achievements should be preserved and    
accumulated from generation to          
generation4  ,this is provided for in   
the permanence of records1 monuments1   
and institutions2 but these are of less 
consequence than the continuity of      
tradition4  ,generations of men do not  
come into being and pass away like      
regiments in marching order4 ,there is  
no present generation2 unless one       
arbitrarily selects those of a certain  

age to represent the spirit of the day4 
,he who is born now1 enters into the    
midst of a social life in which the     
present is blended with the past through
 the interpenetration of individual     
lives of every stage of maturity4  ,the 
threads are innumerably many1 and their 
length is but threescore years and ten2 
but there is no place at which more than
 a few end1 so that they are woven into 
one continuous and seamless fabric4  ,it
 does not exceed the facts1 then1 to say
 that the life of society is one life1  
which may gather headway1 increase in   
wealth1 and profit by experience4       
,through this continuity society may    
learn1 as the individual organism does1 
by the method of trial and error4       
,costly blunders need not be repeated1  
and the waste involved #add in untried  
experiments may steadily be reduced4    
,furthermore1 the advance is by         
geometrical1 and not merely by          
arithmetical progression4  ,every       
discovery and achievement is multiplied 

in fruitfulness through being added to  
the capital stock and reinvested in     
fresh enterprises4   ,,iii  ,human      
progress1 thus determined by the        
movement of life towards its more       
rational1 that is1 more provident1      
organization1 is attended in all its    
stages with a very significant          
difference of emphasis4  ,i refer to the
 old conflict between conservatism and  
radicalism4  ,if this were merely a     
difference of temperamental bias1 it    
would not need to detain us4  ,but it is
 really an opposition between           
exaggerated truths1 in which each is    
boldly and impressively defined4  ,the  
truth of conservatism lies1 first1 in   
its love of the existing order4  ,every 
established form of social life has had 
a certain wholeness and strength and    
perfection of its own4  ,this is as true
 of savagery as it is of any type of    
civilization4  ,interests are in        
equilibrium1 and are guaranteed security
 within certain limits that are         

generally understood4  ,in other words1 
at least a measure of fulfilment may be 
counted on4  ,the conservative is right 
in valuing this as a prodigious         
achievement4  ,he knows that disorder is
 ruin1 not to #ade any class1 but to    
all2 the paralysis1 if not the absolute 
destruction1 of all fruitful activities4
  ,and secondly1 conservatism proclaims 
the truth that since order conditions   
all activity1 it is impossible to       
promote human welfare except by using   
order4  ,the enemy of order threatens to
 destroy the instruments of power1 and  
so to make himself weak and helpless    
with the rest4  ,the conservative       
understands the real delicacy of these  
instruments1 and the difficulty of      
remodelling them while still forced to  
use them4  ,for nothing puts so great a 
strain on society as progress4  ,it     
tends to destroy its rigidity1 to dull  
its edge1 and to spoil the fine         
adjustment without which so complex an  
organization cannot function4  ,there   

could be no human life whatsoever1 and  
still less a progressive life1 were not 
the great mass of men content to remain 
steadily in their places1 and so form   
parts of a stable structure4  ,an       
organization cannot actually work until 
it is in equilibrium4  ,now while the   
conservative fears to swap horses while 
crossing the stream1 the radical reminds
 him that if he does not do so he will  
never gain the farther shore4  ,the     
conservative is satisfied to sit firmly 
in the saddle1 but the radical thinks   
only of the long distance yet to go4    
,there is a common misconception as to  
who is the real radical1 the real menace
 to this existing order4  #adf ,he is   
not the sceptic1 but the man with a     
purpose2 the man who believes in the    
possibility of better things1 and so has
 a motive impelling him to abolish and  
reconstruct the present things4  ,the   
sceptic1 who holds all order to be      
conventional and arbitrary1 is as well  
satisfied with one system as another4   

,his natural course is a cynical        
acquiescence in the inveterate folly of 
mankind4  ,or1 finding order convenient1
 and fearing that its true              
groundlessness will be exposed if it be 
made a matter for discussion1 he        
advocates blind obedience to the        
authority of the day4 ,hence the        
disillusioned1 especially if they occupy
 positions of power in church or state  
or trade1 may be counted on as the      
leaders of conservative policy4  ,the   
typical radical1 on the other hand1 is  
,socrates1 who censured the men of his  
time because they were satisfied with   
something short of the best2 and who was
 condemned because he offered men a good
 reason for reorganizing life4  ,the    
radical1 like the conservative1 is      
right4  ,he is right1 in the first      
place1 because he points out that the   
stability of the established order is   
not proof of its finality4  ,it may be1 
indeed always will be1 largely due to   
habit4  ,society forfeits a greater good

 through mere inertia1 through the      
tendency of any organization of         
interests which runs smoothly and brings
 a steady return1 to perpetuate itself4 
,the radical is the critic of #adg      
custom1 condemning it for timidly       
clinging to the present good1 and       
abandoning the original intent of life  
to attain to the maximum4  ,the radical 
is right1 secondly1 because he protests 
that so long as there is the least waste
 of life1 the least wanton suppression  
or destruction of interests1 the work of
 civilization is not done4  ,he         
represents those interests which under  
any system are most heavily taxed1 and  
presses for their relief4  ,conservatism
 and radicalism1 then1 are the two      
half-truths into which the principle of 
progress is divided by the propensity of
 every human activity to override the   
mark1 and by the confusion of mind that 
cannot fail to attend so venturesome and
 bewildering an undertaking as          
civilization4   ,,iv  ,i have said that 

it is possible to measure progress      
because of the persistence throughout   
the whole course of human history of    
certain identical interests and         
purposes4  ,when such an interest or    
purpose is sufficiently broad in its    
scope1 and gets itself permanently      
embodied1 it is called an institution4  
,thus government embodies the need of   
the general regulation of interests     
within the social community4 ,education 
is due to the individual's prolonged    
period of helplessness and dependence1  
and the need of assimilating him to the 
order of his time4  ,science is man's   
#adh knowledge of the ways of nature in 
detail1 when this is recorded1          
organized1 and preserved as a permanent 
utility answering to the permanent need 
of adaptation4  ,and religion expresses 
in outer form the human need of         
reckoning with the final day of         
judgment1 of establishing right         
relations with the powers that underly  
and overrule the proximate sphere of    

life4  ,there is no limited number of   
institutions1 but these are notable     
examples4  ,government1 education1      
science1 and religion are fixed moral   
necessities4  ,they arise out of those  
conditions of life which are general and
 constant4 ,hence each has a history    
coextensive with the history of society 
itself4  ,and since the function of each
 remains identical throughout1 the      
adequacy with which at any given time it
 fulfils that function may be taken as a
 measure of civilization4  ,government  
being the most prominent of             
institutions1 and its improvement being 
the deepest concern of society1 ,i shall
 select it for special consideration4#e 
,i have already referred to the         
,platonic account of government1 given  
in the ,republic4  ,it furnishes the    
starting-point of all political         
philosophy4  ,in the ,first and ,second 
,books1 ,plato examines two contrary    
sceptical criticisms of government1 with
 a most illuminating result4 ,in the    

,first ,book the sceptic urges the view 
that government represents the interest 
of the strong2 #adi primarily of the    
ruler himself1 enabling him to          
aggrandize himself at the expense of the
 weak4  ,but in the ,second ,book the   
sceptic is made to suggest that         
government represents rather the        
interest of the weak1 since it affords  
him a protection which he is not strong 
enough to afford himself4  ,now the     
moral of this paradox lies in the fact  
that government represents the interest 
neither of the strong nor of the weak1  
but of the community as a whole4  ,this 
moral is virtually pointed in the reply 
which ,plato makes to the first of these
 two sceptical positions4  ,the ruler   
gains his power and prestige not from   
the exploitation of the interests of his
 subjects1 but from his protection of   
them4  ,his activity touches all the    
interests of the community1 and is      
tolerated only in so far as it          
conciliates them4  ,in other words1 his 

strength is drawn wholly from the       
constituency which he serves4  ,the many
 individual interests1 on the other     
hand1 owe their security to that        
concentration and organization which    
centres in the ruler4  ,they only       
participate in a power which the ruler  
may exercise and enjoy as a unit4  ,but 
unless that power be engaged in their   
service it ceases to exist4  ,it is not 
a personal power1 but a permanent       
function1 through which the many        
interests of society unite1 and so share
 severally the security1 glory1 and     
resourcefulness of the whole body4  #aej
  ,government in this sense is both a   
necessity and an opportunity4 ,suppose  
men to be in contact through propinquity
 or common descent4 ,divided among      
themselves they are prey to natural     
forces1 wild beasts1 or human enemies4  
,but acting as a unit they are          
sufficiently strong to protect          
themselves4  ,he who wields them as a   
unit to this end is for the time-being  

the ruler2 and to submit to his         
leadership is simply to submit to the   
necessity of protection4  ,or1 divided  
among themselves1 they remain in a      
condition of poverty and fear2 while    
united they can wage an aggressive      
campaign against nature1 and against    
those who threaten them or possess what 
they lack4  ,again1 he who settles their
 internal differences1 accomplishes     
their organization1 and makes it        
effective1 is their ruler2 and he owes  
his authority to the opportunity of     
conquest which his leadership affords4  
,the fact that government is thus of    
natural origin1 the inevitable solution 
of an inevitable problem1 has been      
obscured through confusing its general  
necessity with the accidental           
circumstances connected  with the       
selection of rulers4  ,the first ruler  
may have been appointed by ,god2 or1 as 
is more likely1 he may have owed his    
choice to his own brutal self-assertion4
  ,but this has no more to do with the  

origin of the function of government1   
than the present methods of ambitious   
#aea politicians have to do with the    
constitutional office of a republican   
presidency4  ,government meets a moral  
need2 and no man has ever ruled over men
 who has not met that need1 however     
cruel and greedy he may have been in his
 private motives4  ,from the very       
beginning1 then1 government exists by   
virtue of the good that it does4  ,but  
there have been enormous differences in 
the price that men have paid for that   
good2 and this constitutes its variable 
and progressive factor4  ,tyranny is1 in
 the long run1 the most unstable form of
 government1 because it grossly         
overestimates the amount that men will  
pay for the benefit of order4  ,in the  
,antigone of ,sophocles1 ,creon thus    
justifies his rule3   ,than lawlessness 
there is no greater ill4  ,it ruins     
states1 overturns homes1 and joining    
with the spear-thrust breaks the ranks  
in rout4  ,but in the steady lines what 

saves most lives is discipline4         
,therefore we must defend the public    
order4   ,but when his son ,haemon      
protests against his tyranny1 ,creon    
states his understanding of the bargain3
   ,,creon   ,govern this land for      
others than myself8  ,,haemon   ,no city
 is the property of one alone4  ,,creon 
,is not the city reckoned his who rules8
  ,,haemon   ,excellent ruling--you     
alone1 the land deserted6#f   #aeb ,in  
other words1 ,creon does not understand 
that if he exacts everything he will    
possess nothing4  ,there will come a    
point when the cost to the community    
exceeds the gain2 and when that point is
 reached government must either make    
more liberal terms or forfeit its power4
  ,the principle of rationality in      
government is parsimony4  ,when its     
benefit involves a wasteful sacrifice of
 interests and may be purchased more    
thriftily1 the pressure of interest     
inevitably in the long run brings about 
the change4  ,the interests upon which  

the burden weighs most heavily          
constitute the unstable factor1 and     
since1 in order that equilibrium may be 
restored1 these must be relieved1 there 
is necessarily a gradual liberalization 
of governmental institutions4  ,in the  
light of these general considerations ,i
 wish briefly to examine three          
historical types of government1 and then
 to present a summary of present        
tendencies4  ,there is an interesting   
estimate of the benefits and cost of the
 ancient military monarchy in the       
history of ,israel1 as recorded by the  
writer of the ,book of ,samuel4  ,the   
elders have demanded that ,samuel make  
them a king1 to judge them1 like all the
 nations4  ,but he first warns them of  
the price that they will have to pay3   
,and he said1 ,this will be the manner  
of the king that shall reign over you3  
he will take your sons1 and #aec appoint
 them unto him1 for his chariots1 and to
 be his horsemen2 and they shall run    
before his chariots2 and he will appoint

 them unto him for captains of          
thousands1 and captains of fifties2 and 
he will set some to plow his ground1 and
 to reap his harvest1 and to make his   
instruments of war1 and the instruments 
of his chariots4 4 4 4  ,and he will    
take your fields1 and your vineyards1   
and your oliveyards1 even the best of   
them1 and give them to his servants4 4 4
 4  ,and he will take your men servants1
 and your maid-servants1 and your       
goodliest young men1 and your asses1 and
 put them to his work4  ,he will take   
the tenth of your flocks3 and ye shall  
be his servants4  ,and ye shall cry out 
in that day because of your king that ye
 shall have chosen you4   ,but the men  
of ,israel were willing to pay even this
 price1 saying3   ,nay2 but we will have
 a king over us2 that we also may be    
like all the nations2 and that our king 
may judge us1 and go out before us1 and 
fight our battles4#g  ,the benefits of  
monarchy1 in which ,israel sought to    
emulate her neighbors1 were judgment and

 military prowess4  ,even where the     
evils of tyranny were most aggravated   
these benefits actually accrued and     
constituted a rational ground of        
authority4  ,the king was1 at least in a
 measure1 worthy of his hire4  ,but the 
cost was extravagant2 the king exacted a
 disproportionate share of the plunder1 
and reduced his subjects to a condition 
of personal bondage4  ,in the great     
monarchies1 such as ,assyria1 ,egypt1   
,persia1 and the ,roman #aed ,empire in 
its later period1 the benefits of his   
role were greatly attenuated before they
 reached to the depths and extremities  
of his kingdom1 judgment being reduced  
to the caprice of an irresponsible      
officer1 and military prowess to a faint
 reflection of national glory4  ,now the
 weakness of such a polity lay in its   
doubtful value to the governed1 these   
failing to participate fairly in its    
achievements1 and so lacking incentive  
to support it4  ,there was no clear and 
convincing identification of individual 

interest and national purpose4  ,the    
strength of ,greek and ,roman           
oligarchies1 on the other hand1 lay in  
precisely this morale1 or solidarity of 
interest4  ,their small size and racial 
homogeneity brought the ruler into      
direct relations with a constituency    
which was clearly conscious of its      
purpose and held him closely to it4  ,so
 even where the kingship lingered on as 
a form1 this polity was virtually a     
compact self-governing community4  ,the 
benefits of government1 to which every  
other interest was harshly subordinated1
 were still judgment and military       
prowess4  ,but these benefits were      
effectually guaranteed2 and the         
sacrifices which they required became a 
code of honor1 both to be praised and   
gloried in as parts of happiness4 ,those
 who think that the ,spartans felt their
 discipline to be essentially a hardship
 should read the song of ,tyrtaeus1 #aee
 which they recited in their tents on   
the eve of battle3   ,with spirit let us

 fight for this land1 and for our       
children die1 being no longer chary of  
our lives4  ,fight1 then1 young men1    
standing fast one by another1 nor be    
beginners of cowardly flight or fear4   
,but rouse a great and valiant spirit in
 your breasts1 and love not life when ye
 contend with men4  ,and the elders1    
whose limbs are no longer active1 the   
old desert not or forsake4  ,for surely 
this were shameful1 that fallen amid the
 foremost champions1 in front of the    
youths1 an older man should lie low1    
having his head now white and his beard 
hoary1 breathing out a valiant spirit in
 the dust4 4 4 4  ,yet all this befits  
the young while he enjoys the brilliant 
bloom of youth4  ,to mortal men and     
women he is lovely to look upon1 whilst 
he lives2 and noble when he has fallen  
in the foremost ranks4#h   ,but the cost
 is none the less heavy because it is   
not felt4  ,in the first place1 there   
was the cost untold to those whom the   
oligarchy held in subjection1 a hundred 

thousand ,messenians and twice as many  
,helots4 ,their unequal participation in
 the benefits of government1 necessary  
though it may have been1 lent           
instability to the whole polity4  ,it   
was the menace of their resentment that 
forced upon their rulers a policy of    
perpetual vigilance and military        
discipline4  ,and in the second place1  
there was the cost to the ,spartan      
himself of attaining to a physical      
efficiency equal to that of ten ,helots4
  #aef  ,in the rival polity of ,athens1
 the first of these abuses is only in a 
measure corrected4  ,the liberal        
extension of the privileges of          
citizenship is the achievement of a     
later age4  ,but the democracy of       
,athens did demonstrate the internal    
wastefulness of a polity dominated by   
purely military aims4  ,the classic     
representation of this protest against  
sacrificing individual taste and        
capacity1 together with all growth and  
abundance in the arts of peace1 to the  

harsh rigors and passive obedience of a 
soldier's life1 is to be found in       
,thucydides4 ,in the funeral oration    
attributed to ,pericles there is this   
account of the superiority of ,athenian 
institutions3   ,it is true that we are 
called a democracy1 for the             
administration is in the hands of the   
many and not of the few4  ,but while the
 law secures equal justice to all alike 
in their private disputes1 the claim of 
excellence is also recognized2 and when 
a citizen is in any way distinguished1  
he is preferred to the public service4 4
 4 4  ,and we have not forgotten to     
provide for our weary spirits many      
relaxations from toil2 we have regular  
games and sacrifices throughout the     
year2 at home the style of our living is
 refined2 and the delight which we daily
 feel in all these things helps to      
banish melancholy4 4 4 4  ,and in the   
matter of education1 whereas they the   
,spartans from early youth are always   
undergoing laborious exercises which are

 to make them brave1 we live at ease1   
and yet are equally ready to face the   
perils which they face4 4 4 4  ,if then 
we prefer to meet danger with a light   
heart but without laborious training1   
and with a courage which is gained by   
habit and not enforced by law1 are we   
not greatly the gainers8  ,since we do  
not anticipate the #aeg pain1 although1 
when the hour comes1 we can be as brave 
as those who never allow themselves to  
rest2 and thus too our city is equally  
admirable in peace and in war4  ,for we 
are lovers of the beautiful1 yet simple 
in our tastes1 and we cultivate the mind
 without loss of manliness4#i   ,the    
political disorders of later ,athenian  
history illustrate the difficulty of    
reconciling individualism with order and
 stability4  ,but at the same time they 
prove that the task is a necessary one1 
and that until it has been successfully 
performed1 government can enjoy at best 
only a false security4  ,for no         
interests can safely be neglected1 least

 of all those which arise from the      
natural activities of men and lie in the
 direction of the normal growth of human
 capacities4  ,now these ancient        
polities illustrate the inevitable      
pressure in the direction of liberal    
government4  ,the original and always   
the fundamental values of government are
 order and power4  ,but these must be   
obtained with the minimum of personal   
exploitation on the part of the ruler2  
the function of government must be      
clearly understood and vigilantly       
guarded by a body of citizens who       
identify their interests with it4  ,and 
secondly1 order and power must be made  
compatible with individual initiative1  
with playfulness and leisure1 and with  
the free development of all worthy      
interests4  ,this pressure has been     
steadily operative in the evolution of  
modern political institutions4  #aeh    
,but there has also been another force  
at work of equally far-reaching         
importance4  ,this force is the modern  

idea of democracy1 in which justice is  
modified by good-will4  ,with the       
ancients justice meant that every man   
should practise one thing only1 that    
being the thing to which his nature was 
most perfectly adapted4 #aj  ,equality  
upon the highest plane of human capacity
 was limited even in theory to a        
privileged class4  ,but since the advent
 of ,christianity it has never been     
possible for ,european society to       
acquiesce with good conscience in a     
limited distribution of the benefits of 
civilization4  ,for the new             
enlightenment teaches that when men's   
potentialities are considered1 rather   
than their present condition1 there are 
no classes4  ,as a consequence men      
demand representation not for what they 
are1 but for what they may become if    
given their just opportunity4  ,the body
 of citizens whose good is the final end
 of government virtually includes1 then1
 all men without exception4  ,it is no  
longer possible simply to dismiss large 

groups of human beings from             
consideration on grounds of what is held
 to be their unfitness4  ,for they now  
demand that they be made fit4  ,burke   
expresses this enlightenment when he    
says1 in speaking of the lower strata of
 society3   ,as the blindness of mankind
 has caused their slavery1 in return    
their state of slavery is made a        
pretence of keeping them in a state of  
blindness2 for #aei the politician will 
tell you gravely1 that their life of    
servitude disqualifies the greater part 
of the race of man for a search of      
truth1 and supplies them with no other  
than mean and insufficient ideas4  ,this
 is but too true2 and this is one of the
 reasons for which ,i blame such        
institutions4#aa   ,and so does every   
man now demand of the community as a    
whole that he shall be permitted to     
share equally in its benefits1 and also1
 in order that his claims may be        
represented1 that he shall have a voice 
in its councils4  ,do not misunderstand 

me4  ,i do not mean that all men1       
therefore1 must here and now be held to 
be equal2 but only that they must be    
held to be capable of being as good as  
the best until they have demonstrated   
the contrary by forfeiting their        
opportunity4  ,nor do ,i mean that all  
men must therefore be given the ballot4 
,we are discussing a question not of    
instrument1 but of principle4  ,i do    
mean that there is an idea that the best
 of life is for all2 and that if there  
are many that are incapable of entering 
into it1 then they must be helped to be 
capable4  ,and ,i mean1 furthermore1    
that this idea works irresistibly4  ,it 
commands the support of the whole army  
of interests4  ,it will never be        
abandoned because it makes for the      
increase of life on the whole2 and hence
 no social order will from henceforth be
 stable that is not based upon it4      
,this idea that all men alike shall be  
the beneficiaries of government1 when   
taken together #afj with the ancient    

ideas that government shall be directly 
responsible to its beneficiaries1 and   
shall make as liberal an allowance as   
possible for their individual claims and
 opinions1 constitutes the general      
principle upon which the progressive    
modern state is founded4  ,let me       
briefly recapitulate certain            
characteristics of the modern state#ab  
which indicate its recognition of this  
principle1 and hence its advance on the 
whole over earlier types4  #a4  ,in the 
first place1 the modern state is        
essentially a territorial rather than a 
racial or proprietary unit4  ,in other  
words1 it is clearly defined as a       
necessity and utility arising out of the
 circumstance of propinquity4  ,if men  
are to cast in their lot together they  
must submit to organization1 and obey   
laws promulgated in the interest of the 
community as a whole4  ,to-day men      
understand that if they had no          
government it would be necessary to     
invent one2 that the existing           

government1 whatever divinity doth hedge
 it1 is thus virtually the instrument of
 their needs4  #b4  ,secondly1 this     
moral function of government is         
emphasized through being largely freed  
from personal or dynastic connections   
and expressed as a constitutional       
office4  #c4  ,thirdly1 the requirements
 of justice and good-will are reconciled
 with order through the principle of    
representation4  ,without this #afa     
principle it would be impossible for    
societies large enough to afford men    
protection1 to admit all men to a share 
in their positive benefits and to a     
voice in their councils4                
,representative government is a method  
of political procedure through which    
authority is made answerable in the long
 run to all interests within its        
jurisdiction4 ,the more recent          
tendencies in democratic communities to 
modify the representative system        
indicate the direction in which the     
pressure of interests is still urging   

society forward4  ,it is no longer a    
question merely of the extension of the 
suffrage1 but of directness and         
publicity4  ,the procedure of government
 being recognized as of vital importance
 to all citizens1 it must be            
straightforward and businesslike1 with  
its books constantly open to inspection4
  ,the present distrust in elected      
representatives is not a sign of        
reaction1 but of the evolution of the   
democratic intelligence4  ,where the    
machinery of representation becomes     
wasteful and clumsy1 it ceases to serve 
the community4  ,but this may mean      
either direct legislation1 that is1 a   
direct participation in public affairs  
by the people at large1 or the          
intrusting of these affairs to a few    
conspicuously responsible agents        
selected for their businesslike         
competence and owing their tenure of    
office to the consent of their          
constituency4  ,these methods are       
entirely consistent with one another2   

and they owe their #afb adoption        
entirely to their better execution of   
the intent of democracy4 ,both          
presuppose that political authority is  
empowered by all the interests of the   
community to serve them1 and that these 
interests shall in the end decide       
whether or not that service is          
adequately performed4  #d4  ,fourthly1  
the modern state lays a constantly      
greater stress on questions of internal 
policy1 thus emphasizing its basal      
function of conserving and fostering the
 interests directly committed to its    
charge4  ,it is less occupied with war1 
and more occupied with education1       
sanitation1 the conservation of national
 resources1 and the regulation of       
commerce and industry4  #e4  ,fifthly1  
the sequel to this is the growing       
recognition of the folly and            
wastefulness of war4  ,war is becoming a
 last resort1 a hard necessity1 rather  
than an opportunity of national glory4  
,the growth of the idea of international

 peace1 and the improvement and         
extension of the method of arbitration1 
are evidence of a yielding to the weight
 of the collective interests of         
humanity4  ,they prove the priority of  
the principle of construction over that 
of destruction1 and the essentially     
thrifty and provident function of the   
state4  ,the present form of progressive
 political institutions will serve as an
 index of the times and a pledge of the 
future4  ,it reflects better than any   
other element of civilization that      
growth of #afc liberality and           
solidifying of interests which is the   
deep current of progress4  ,human       
society is becoming one enterprise1     
provident of all existing interests and 
covetous of the best4  ,now ,i know that
 this is to many but a dreary spectacle4
  ,there are those who feel diminished  
by it1 overwhelmed by numbers1 and      
degraded to the low level of average    
capacity and average attainment4        
,therefore ,i wish in conclusion to deal

 further with this spirit of the age1 to
 guard it against misunderstanding1 and 
make its fine quality more apparent4    
,v  ,it is charged that modern democracy
 is contrary to enlightenment through   
subordinating the strong man to the     
multitude of weak men1 or the wise man  
to the multitude of ignorant men4  ,but 
the modern idea of justice is based     
fundamentally neither on the mere       
sentiment of pity nor on fear of the    
mob1 but on love of truth1 and respect  
for all organs that mediate it4         
,society cannot afford forcibly to      
repress the judgment of any individual  
or class1 lest her deeds be deeds of    
darkness4  ,the task of good living is a
 task of well-nigh overwhelming         
difficulty1 because it requires that no 
interest shall be ignored1 and yet that 
all interests shall be in unison4       
,interests left out of the account will 
inevitably assert themselves1 and       
through their steady pressure or #afd   
violent impact destroy the organization 

which has excluded them4  ,hence the    
need of an order that shall provide for 
its own gradual correction2 stable      
enough for security1 and pliant enough  
to yield without shock to the claims of 
neglected or abused interests4  ,this   
need underlies the modern sentiment of  
tolerance1 and the love of all the      
liberties that give a hearing to any    
sincere demand3 freedom of speech and   
press1 the wide distribution of the     
franchise1 and of opportunity for power4
  ,contrary to a theory that            
philosophers have done much to support1 
democracy is not a method of confounding
 intelligence with the clamor of many   
voices1 but a method of correcting the  
single intelligence by the report of    
whatever other intelligence may be most 
advantageously related to the matter at 
issue4  ,human intelligence must operate
 from a centre1 and must always overcome
 an initial bias due to familiarity and 
proximity4  ,the consensus of opinion1  
or public opinion1 is not essentially a 

composite opinion1 but a corrected      
opinion in which such accidents of      
locality cancel one another4  ,the      
following justification of democracy1   
formulated by ,matthew ,arnold1 lays    
bare its insistent and wholly           
incontrovertible motive3   ,if          
experience has established any one thing
 in this world1 it has established this3
 that it is well for any #afe great     
class or description of men in society  
to be able to say for itself what it    
wants1 and not to have other classes1   
the so-called educated and intelligent  
classes1 acting for it as its proctors1 
and supposed to understand its wants and
 to provide for them4  ,they do not     
really understand its wants1 they do not
 really provide for them4  ,a class of  
men may often itself not either fully   
understand its own wants or adequately  
express them2 but it has a nearer       
interest and a more sure diligence in   
the matter than any of its proctors1 and
 therefore a better chance of           

success4#ac   ,this conception of       
democracy has come latterly to be as    
fine a point of honor as any article in 
the code of chivalry or noblesse4  ,the 
arrogance that claims a superiority of  
class1 and the obsequiousness that loves
 a lord1 all this ,nietschean pathos of 
distance1 whether felt from the heights 
or the depths1 is sharply repugnant to a
 new gentility1 that embraces all that  
have had the joy of promiscuous social  
intercourse4  ,from this aristocracy no 
one is excluded that does not exclude   
himself through servility or            
superciliousness4  ,its distinction is  
liberality1 that is1 the habit of       
disputing questions and judging persons 
on their merits1 with due allowance for 
that never wholly negligible possibility
 that the other man is right4  ,among   
those who are united by this spirit1    
there is one joke that is an unfailing  
touchstone and bond of union--the       
institution of lse-majest4  ,it is a    
matter for unquenchable laughter1 #aff  

that superiority should require to be   
protected against inferiority by the    
enforced signs of respect1 or by a hedge
 of reserve4  ,it is the ridiculousness 
of the haughty or the prostrate manner  
that is absolutely fatal to it4  ,and   
its ridiculousness appears at the moment
 when you let in the light4  ,class     
elevation is pretence1 not superiority2 
complacence1 not wisdom2 impudence1 not 
power4  ,but the contempt of the just   
man for the unjust is edged with        
knowledge4  ,it arises out of a sense   
for things as they are3 a recognition of
 the breadth and intricacy of life1     
compared with the pitifully small       
understanding of those who propose to   
regulate it on their own authority2 of  
the vivid reality and worth of interests
 that do not exist for those whose      
claims are absolute1 but who are only   
the hapless victims of a narrow and     
warping tradition4  ,many think that the
 modern democracy is too easy-going2 too
 much infected with charity4  ,now it is

 quite true that it means that no       
interest whatsoever shall be cut off    
through being forgotten or lightly      
estimated4  ,the conscience of to-day   
expresses the persuasion that there is  
no stable happiness in any activity     
which entails cruelty1 which has any    
other motive than to save4  ,but this is
 no more than the full meaning of the   
,platonic dictum that the injuring of   
another can be in no case just4 #ad     
,this sensitiveness to #afg life that is
 remote or obscure1 this feeling for the
 whole wide manifold of interests1 is   
not a weakness2 it is enlightenment1 a  
lively awareness of what is really      
relevant to the task of civilization4   
,to imagine and think life collectively1
 with all its interests abreast1 is only
 to measure up roundly and              
proportionately to the practical        
situation as it actually is4  ,upon a   
mind thus alive to the whole spectacle  
there at once flashes the awkwardness   
here1 the waste there1 as of an         

enterprise only begun4  ,let me allow   
another to interpret this latter-day    
conscience4  ,i quote from ,first and   
,last ,things1 written by ,wells3   ,i  
see humanity scattered over the world1  
dispersed1 conflicting1 unawakened4 4 4 
4  ,i see human life as avoidable waste 
and curable confusion4  ,i see peasants 
living in wretched huts knee-deep in    
manure1 mere parasites on their own pigs
 and cows2 ,i see shy hunters wandering 
in primeval forests2 ,i see the grimy   
millions who slave for industrial       
perfection2 ,i see some who are         
extravagant and yet contemptible        
creatures of luxury 4 4 4  ,i see       
gamblers1 fools1 brutes1 toilers1       
martyrs4  ,their disorder of effort1 the
 spectacle of futility1 fills me with a 
passionate desire to end waste1 to      
create order1 to develop understanding4 
4 4 4  ,all these people reflect and are
 part of the waste and discontent of my 
life1 and this coordinating of the      
species in a common general end1 and the

 effort of my personal salvation are the
 social and the individual aspect of    
essentially the same desire4#ae   ,but  
it must not be thought that this is a   
matter of mere creature comfort1 of     
distributing staple #afh benefits for   
which men already have the appetite4    
,for every step in the organization of  
life is attended with the growth of new 
interests1 and especially of interests  
fostered or directly evoked by          
principles that have proved their moral 
virtue4  ,thus the forms of prudence and
 justice are supported by the immediate 
love of these things4  ,and a growing   
rationality involves an increasing      
subtlety and delicacy in desires1 the   
enrichment of life through the          
multiplication of such sources of       
satisfaction as are consistent with     
order and liberality4  ,the true        
democracy is considerate not only of    
present interests1 but also of the      
potentiality and promise of life4  ,only
 when the imagination pictures life in  

these terms is it possible to avoid a   
sense of ignominy and irresponsibility4 
,and1 contrary to a common              
misconception1 there is no other        
attitude that can reconcile one to the  
unavoidable participation in the common 
life of all men4  ,only when thus united
 with one's fellows in a spirited and   
ennobling enterprise can one endure     
their fellowship4  ,comrades in arms are
 not fastidious4  ,if one confines one's
 self1 on the other hand1 to a          
cultivation of one's rarity1 or to a    
company of choice spirits1 not only do  
these values themselves grow stale and  
vanish away1 but the remainder of       
mankind becomes a crowd1 and            
civilization a tumult4  ,the collective 
life of #afi mankind ceases to be       
jarring and repugnant only at the moment
 when one enters into it and becomes    
infused with its morale4  ,there will be
 some in whom this prospect arouses no  
eagerness4  ,the wise men of any day    
are1 of course1 agreed among themselves 

that the times are bad--that they are   
likely to be still worse after they1 the
 remnant1 have departed4  ,but this is  
an opinion which most men acquire when  
they attain to maturity1 and happily the
 world has long since seen that they    
cannot help it1 and learned on that     
account not to take it to heart4  ,the  
part of ,cassandra is always being      
played somewhere by a gentleman of      
middle age with a ripe experience of    
life4  ,but in any serious judgment     
concerning progress this bias of        
maturity must be overcome by the use of 
the imagination1 by a rational estimate 
of human affairs in their broad sweep1  
or1 if necessary1 by an infusion of     
youthfulness4  ,we shall wait long if we
 wait    ,till old experience do attain 
,to something like prophetic strain4    
,there is a more serious cause of       
hopelessness1 in the complexity of      
modern civilization4  ,its very teeming 
life1 its wealth1 its multiplicity of   
activities and passions1 overwhelm the  

mind in its moments of fatigue like a   
devouring chaos4  ,one longs for the day
 when the house of #agj civilization    
shall be completed1 so that one may     
dwell in it in peace4  ,we are1 it is   
true1 in a time when there is still     
rough work to be done4  ,but it is not  
blind work4  ,never has society been so 
clear as to its several special ends1   
never has so little effort been due to  
chance or compulsion4  ,nor is it       
ineffective work2 for man now works with
 good tools and the help of many hands4 
,and there is consolation in the fact   
that the foundations of civilization are
 laid wide and deep in charity and      
welfare4  ,there remains the perpetual  
task of re-establishing a spiritual     
order which has been strained and       
wracked by the heaving of many forces4  
,but when the sanctuaries and altars are
 restored it will prove to be a new     
order1 richer1 more liberal1 and more   
complete than any since men began to    
live4     #aga  ,,chapter ,v  ,,the     

,,moral ,,criticism ,,of ,,fine ,,art   
,there are certain human activities     
which not only are of special interest  
on their own account1 but also hold a   
position of pre-eminence in             
civilization4  ,such are science1       
philosophy1 the love of nature1         
politics1 friendly intercourse1 and fine
 art4  ,the last of these activities    
enjoys a peculiar distinction because it
 is monumental4  ,it not only calls into
 play all of the more refined           
capacities1 but also records itself in  
permanent and worthy form4  ,hence the  
fine art of any period comes to be taken
 as an index of its remove from         
savagery4  ,in submitting fine art to   
moral criticism1 ,i shall use it as the 
best representative of the whole class  
of activities which ,i have just        
described4  ,if we have not been wholly 
astray in our analysis of the good1 it  
should appear that these activities owe 
their pre-eminence not to their bare    
quality or tone1 but to their humanity1 

that is1 to their connection with a     
harmonious1 just1 and progressive state 
of society4  #agb  ,it is hard for a    
moralist to approach such a subject     
without timidity1 especially if he is   
concerned with his reputation for       
enlightenment4 ,for there are many who  
think that it is a mark of intellectual 
emancipation to abandon moral standards 
altogether when dealing with the fine   
arts4  ,life itself1 they remind us1 is 
only the greatest of the fine arts2 and 
if life can be called beautiful1 the    
last word has been said4  ,the man of   
taste and delicate sensibility is thus  
empowered to overrule the moralist1 and 
replace with his ideal of grace and     
symmetry the harsh and clumsy scruples  
of conscience4  ,now it is doubtless    
true that when life is good1 it is also 
beautiful2 a life in which every        
activity is true1 in which the medium of
 opportunity is formed to accord with   
the most noble purpose1 may well exhibit
 a superlative grace and symmetry4  ,but

 to be beautiful1 life must be good in  
its own way2 and the principles which   
define that way are the principles of   
morality4  ,furthermore1 in order that  
life shall be beautiful it must be made 
an object of perception or              
contemplation2 while1 in order to be    
good1 it must be lived4  ,and the       
principles which define the living of   
life are moral4  ,the confusion of      
goodness with beauty is1 therefore1     
doubly stultifying4  ,on the one hand1  
it substitutes for the moral conception 
of value conceptions that morally are   
indeterminate4  ,for #agc grace and     
symmetry may be exhibited by life on any
 plane whatsoever1 provided only that it
 acquires stability4  ,indeed1 one who  
aims above all things to make his life  
beautiful1 ought consistently to abandon
 the moral effort to bring life to its  
maximum of fulfilment1 and cultivate    
perfection of form within the sphere of 
least resistance4  ,it is proverbial    
that many lower forms of life are more  

beautiful than man1 but it is not always
 seen that these are the stationary     
forms of life1 wholly lacking in that   
principle of rational reconstruction    
which is the condition of moral         
goodness4  ,on the other hand1 the      
confusion of goodness with beauty tends 
to substitute appreciation for action1  
and thus to make of life a spectacle    
rather than an enterprise4  ,thus to    
replace ethical with aesthetic          
conceptions is to take the heart out of 
morality4  ,beauty is precisely as      
relevant to moral goodness as it is to  
truth2 and if investigators were taught 
to devise the prettiest theory          
imaginable1 the result would be no more 
fatal to knowledge than is aesthetic    
sentimentalism to life4  ,to think      
conformably with reality is knowledge1  
and to act conformably with all         
interests is life4  ,if beauty is to be 
added unto truth and goodness1 it must  
come as the natural sequel to a         
single-minded fidelity to these motives4

  ,but even if it be true that moral    
standards are absolutely independent of 
the standards proper #agd to art1 it is 
not yet clear that the moralist is      
justified in regarding his standards as 
more fundamental than those of art4  ,he
 may be politely but positively informed
 that he is not to trespass4  ,now ,i   
feel that1 after what has preceded1 ,i  
am fortified against the charge of      
impertinence4  ,art is subject to moral 
criticism1 because morality is nothing  
more nor less than the law which        
determines the whole order of interests1
 within which art and every other good  
thing is possible4  ,it will scarcely be
 denied that art is an expression of    
interest1 that both its creation and its
 enjoyment are activities1 moods1 or    
phases of life2 and it follows that     
before this specific interest can be    
safely or adequately satisfied1 it is   
necessary to fulfil the general         
conditions that underlie the            
satisfaction of all interests4  ,it is  

as absurd to speak of art for art's sake
 as it is to speak of drinking for      
drinking's sake1 if you mean that this  
interest is entitled to entirely free   
play4  ,art1 like all other interests1  
can flourish only in a sound and whole  
society1 and the law of soundness and   
wholeness in life is morality4  ,the    
claim of art to exemption from moral    
criticism is commonly due to one or both
 of these two forms of misapprehension4 
,in the first place1 it is assumed that 
morality1 too1 is a special interest2   
and that if the artist or connoisseur   
lets the moralist alone1 it is no more  
#age than fair that the moralist should 
let him alone4  ,but this assumption is 
false2 as false as though the athlete   
were to chafe at the warnings of his    
medical adviser on the ground that      
general health was irrelevant to        
endurance or strength or agility4  ,now1
 doubtless1 an athlete may for a time   
neglect his general health with no      
noticeable diminution of his skill2 but 

that is only because he already         
possesses the health to abuse4  ,it     
still remains true that the principles  
of health which the trainer represents  
are the principles upon which his skill 
is fundamentally based4  ,nature has    
made him healthy according to these     
principles1 and he simply does not      
recognize his debt to them4  ,similarly1
 art may flourish in spite of the       
neglect of social and individual        
well-being1 so that the pleadings of the
 moral advocate seem irrelevant2 but    
this is possible only because the social
 order is already established1 and the  
personality formed1 according to the    
very principles which the moralist is   
announcing4  ,art may dissipate moral   
health1 but it nevertheless lives only  
by virtue of such a source of supply4   
,the basal condition of art is not the  
element of social evil or morbid        
temperament that may attract attention1 
but the measure of soundness that       
nevertheless remains4  ,the second      

misapprehension that lends plausibility 
to the excuses of art is the assumption 
that #agf the moralist is proposing to  
substitute his canons for those of art4 
,now it is entirely true that moral     
insight in no way equips one for        
connoisseurship4  ,there is a special   
aptitude and training that enables one  
to discriminate in such matters4  ,but  
the moralist is judging art on moral    
grounds4  ,hence he does not say1 ,i see
 that your painting is ugly2 but he does
 say1 ,i see that your painting1 which  
you esteem beautiful 7and ,i take your  
word for it71 is bad4  ,in the same way 
the moralist does not say to the        
self-indulgent man1 ,i see that you are 
not having a good time 7the             
self-indulgent man is likely to know    
better72 but he says1 ,i see that it is 
bad for you to be having this particular
 kind of good time4 ,in other words1 for
 the moralist larger issues are at      
stake1 and he is considering these on   
the grounds proper to them4  ,he is     

charged with defining and applying the  
principles which determine the good of  
interests on the whole2 and while his   
conclusions can never replace those of  
the expert within a special field1 they 
will always possess authority to        
overrule them4   ,,ii  ,since we are to 
be occupied mainly with the bearing of  
art on morality1 ,i wish so far as      
possible to avoid debatable questions   
concerning the origin and ultimate      
meaning of art4  ,but we #agg cannot    
proceed without agreeing on a use of    
terms4  ,i shall attempt1 therefore1 to 
give a straightforward and empirical    
account of that which comes to be called
 art in the history of civilization4#a  
,we have already had occasion to observe
 that from the very beginning life      
adapts the environment to its uses2 that
 is1 gives to matter and to mechanical  
processes a new form in which these     
fulfil interest4 ,thus an area of land  
deforested and cultivated1 or two stones
 so hewn and fitted as to afford a      

grinding surface1 take on the imprint of
 the human need for food4  ,now such    
reorganizations of nature as the farm or
 the mill1 however crude they may be1   
are works of art in the broadest sense4 
,and in this same sense all the tools1  
furniture1 and panoply of civilization1 
from the most primitive to the most     
highly evolved1 whatever without        
exception owes its form to its          
fulfilment of an interest1 may with     
entire propriety be called art4  ,in the
 great majority of cases the work of art
 after being made is used2 that is1 it  
becomes an instrument in the making of  
something else4  ,such art is called    
useful or industrial art4  ,but it      
sometimes happens that the work of art  
is valued1 not as an instrument in the  
ordinary practical sense1 but simply as 
an object to be experienced4 ,in the    
,scriptural account of creation it is   
said that ,god saw everything that he   
had #agh made1 and1 behold1 it was good4
  ,when the products of activity are    

thus found good in the beholding of them
 they become works of fine art4  ,it    
would be improper sharply to divorce    
these two motives1 or to make one any   
more original than the other4  ,the     
interest in the exercise of the         
sensibilities1 or other powers of       
apprehension1 is doubtless as primitive 
as any of the special interests of the  
organism2 and it is improbable that man 
ever made anything without getting some 
satisfaction from looking at it or      
handling it or feeling it4  ,commonly   
the same object is both useful and      
beautiful2 as was the case with the     
primitive religious dance1 which at the 
same time indulged a taste for rhythm   
and served as a means of propitiating   
the gods4  ,but the motive of fine art  
becomes clearer when it is purer4       
,objects are then made with explicit    
reference to the interest taken in      
apprehending them4  ,i do not mean that 
they cannot on that account be useful1  
for without doubt utility itself        

contributes to beauty2 but only that    
they owe their form primarily to the    
aesthetic interest4  ,the motive of fine
 art in its purity appears when special 
materials are selected on account of    
their plasticity and their appeal to the
 more highly developed senses4  ,fine   
arts that employ one medium are now     
separated and perfected through the     
cultivation of expert proficiency4 #agi 
,thus there arise such arts as painting 
and music1 one of which gives form to   
light and appeals to the eye1 while the 
other gives form to sound and appeals to
 the ear4  ,in this way society comes to
 acquire and accumulate objects which   
are designed1 either wholly or in part1 
with reference to the special aesthetic 
interest4  ,they are the creatures of   
this interest1 and their place in life  
is determined by it4  ,to understand    
their importance and to estimate their  
moral value it is therefore necessary to
 isolate this interest and examine it   
with some care4#b  ,by the aesthetic    

interest ,i mean to refer to the        
interest that is taken in the work of   
fine art by the observer4  ,there is    
undoubtedly a special interest in       
creation1 but it is of relatively small 
importance4 ,even the artist is         
controlled largely by the interest in   
observing his own work2 and art is a    
serious social concern only because of  
its appeal to the unlimited number of   
persons who may enjoy it without having 
any hand in the making4  ,now1 in the   
passing allusion which ,i have made to  
the aesthetic interest1 ,i have already 
used the term which is most convenient  
for purposes of general definition4     
,the aesthetic interest is the interest 
in apprehension4  ,what ,i mean by this 
will become clear when ,i compare it    
with two other interests which may also 
be taken in the content of experience4  
,there is1 in the first #ahj place1 what
 is called the practical interest1 that 
is1 the interest in an object on account
 of what can be done with it by         

manipulation or combination with other  
objects4  ,secondly1 there is the       
theoretical interest in the structure of
 reality1 manifesting itself in the     
exploration of the object and its       
context4  ,now the interest in          
apprehension is not an interest in what 
can be done with the object1 nor in its 
real structure1 but in the present      
conscious reaction to it4  ,one may take
 all three of these interests in the    
same object4 ,thus if ,i pluck the      
flower and take it home to my wife1 ,i  
give evidence of a practical interest in
 it2 if ,i kneel down and examine it    
carefully1 ,i suggest the botanist2     
while if ,i continue to gaze at it where
 it lies1 it would appear that ,i enjoy 
simply looking at it4  ,it is this      
interest simply in looking at things1 in
 just the perceiving1 feeling1 thinking1
 or imagining them1 that ,i mean to sum 
up as the interest in apprehension1 or  
the aesthetic interest4  ,when objects  
excite this interest1 when1 that is1 any

 state or process of consciousness of   
which they are the content tends to be  
prolonged for its own sake1 they are    
said to be beautiful4  ,and objects     
which are deliberately and artificially 
invested with a peculiar capacity to    
excite this interest are works of fine  
art4  ,i shall not undertake to explain 
the interest in apprehension further    
than to describe certain #aha typical   
forms which it assumes4  ,these forms   
will serve not only to illustrate its   
general meaning1 but also to amplify    
that meaning in a manner that will prove
 important when we come to the          
discussion of moral questions4  ,the    
forms which ,i shall mention are by no  
means exhaustive of the possible forms  
of the interest in apprehension1 while  
the order that ,i shall follow is only  
roughly the order of increasing         
complexity4  ,there is1 in the first    
place1 an interest in sensation4  ,i do 
not1 of course1 mean to assert that any 
state of purely sensuous enjoyment is   

possible2 but only that the senses have 
a certain bias of their own which will  
modify every state in which they are    
called into play4 ,there is a delight of
 the eye and ear1 a pleasantness to the 
touch1 an agreeableness of taste and    
smell1 wholly without reference to      
anything beyond4  ,the arts which employ
 any of these senses must satisfy their 
bias1 however much they may appeal to   
higher faculties2 nothing which rankly  
offends them can by any possible means  
be made beautiful4  ,thus painting must 
be charming in color1 and music in tone2
 and certain colors and tones are       
charming for no deeper reason than that 
which makes certain foods palatable4    
,the interest in perception#c assumes   
special prominence in the great visual  
art of painting4  ,for the process of   
perception is most elaborated #ahb in   
connection with the sense of vision1    
this being peculiarly the human organ of
 watchfulness and orientation4  ,the    
interest in perception is the interest  

in completing the sensation or rounding 
it into an object or situation with the 
aid of thought and imagination4  ,in    
painting1 as most commonly in life1 the 
stimulus is visual--texture1            
perspective1 or a quality of light4     
,the emotional form of apprehension     
plays the predominant part in           
representations of human action1 in     
music1 and in the appreciation of       
nature4  ,it is in this latter          
connection that we can1 ,i think1 best  
understand it2 and ,i propose for       
purposes of illustration to record an   
experience of my own4  ,i walked one    
night on the deck of a steamer plying   
between ,new ,york and ,bermuda1 and    
gave myself up wholly to the aspect of  
nature4  ,the moon shone brightly       
half-way between the horizon and zenith1
 and opened a path of light from where  
,i stood to the uttermost distance4     
,with half-closed eyes ,i watched the   
hard lustre of the waves1 or turned from
 this to the smooth roll of the foam    

turned up by the steamer's prow4 ,and ,i
 remember that ,i seemed to dwell upon  
these things with an instant relish1    
like that with which my lungs devoured  
the fresh and plentiful air4  ,but when 
,i looked towards the moon along the    
path of light1 there was something that 
stirred me more deeply4  ,the prospect  
of an endless journey opened #ahc out   
before me1 like an invitation to live1  
or a fulness of opportunity4  ,and ,i   
seemed to leap in response1 rejoicing in
 my power4  ,but ,i did not act2 it was 
as though ,i already achieved and       
possessed4  ,presently ,i turned from   
the path of light to the blackness that 
beset it on every side4  ,in this       
blackness there seemed to lurk every    
kind of unknown danger2 ,i was moved    
with a sense of helplessness1 and shrank
 from the thought of being deserted     
there4  ,and yet though ,i was afraid1  
the fear never seemed to possess me1 but
 always to be possessed by me1 as mine  
to prolong and exult in as ,i would4    

,now ,i think that the interpretation of
 my dream is this4  ,deeply implanted in
 the organism are certain co-ordinated  
responses such as courage and fear1 or  
such as love1 hate1 combativeness1 pity1
 and emulation4  ,they may owe their    
present form to habit1 but they are all 
rooted in instinct1 and so call the body
 into play as a unit4#d ,primarily they 
are plans of action1 through which the  
organism promptly deals with practical  
emergencies4  ,but it is possible for   
man to detach himself from overt motor  
relations with his environment2 and in  
this case these responses return as it  
were into the body and reverberate      
there1 taking on a purely emotional form
 which may be valued for itself4  ,thus 
courage and fear may lead to no act of  
bravery or caution1 but #ahd remain     
simply experiences of courage and fear1 
promoted and treasured by the           
imagination4  ,nature will probably     
remain the object which evokes these    
responses most keenly1 because nature is

 the hereditary environment towards     
which they were originally directed4    
,but human action is scarcely less      
moving4  ,hence dramatic art1 or the    
representation of social and moral      
confrontations1 will both arouse and    
prolong the old passions1 thus evoking a
 deeper and more massive response than  
the play of the senses4  ,i fully       
recognize that the value of dramatic art
 is by no means limited to its emotional
 appeal4  ,i contend only that it does  
make such an appeal1 and that it owes to
 that appeal1 to its evoking of         
sympathy1 love1 or hate1 to its stirring
 of incipient action1 the peculiar      
intensity and reverberance of the       
enjoyment which it affords4  ,the same  
holds true1 ,i think1 of poetry         
generally1 where this deals with life4  
,the case of music is more doubtful4    
,it is generally agreed that the        
enjoyment of music has never been       
adequately accounted for1 albeit it is  
probably more ancient than man4  ,but   

that music does arouse the great        
emotions1 and owe its popularity mainly 
to that fact1 can scarcely be           
questioned4  ,it is only necessary to   
add that over and above this appeal1 as 
well as its appeal to the ear and to an 
intellectual apprehension of its        
technical forms1 it seems to #ahe be    
capable of developing emotions of its   
own2 that is1 experiences which do not  
coincide with the instinctive emotions1 
but which have a like massiveness and   
organic reverberation4  ,it may be1 as  
,walter ,pater insists1 that in this    
respect all art constantly aspires      
towards the condition of music4 #e  ,but
 this does not contradict the fact that 
such arts are emotionally stimulating1  
will always stir men as men are capable 
of being stirred1 and in society at     
large will make their main appeal to the
 fundamental and constant emotions1     
cultivating the enjoyment of love1 fear1
 and the other elemental passions for   
the very poignancy and thrill of them4  

,for the intellectual type of           
apprehension ,i propose to employ the   
term discernment4  ,i mean the          
apprehension of an idea when conveyed by
 some sensuous medium2 the finding or   
recovery of some unity of thought in a  
perceptual context4  ,when discernment  
in this sense is directly agreeable     
without any ulterior motive1 it is a    
special case of the aesthetic interest4 
,from this interest the representative  
or pictorial element in art derives its 
value4  ,let me illustrate my meaning by
 referring to what ,taine says of ,greek
 sculpture3   ,here we have the living  
body1 complete and without a veil1      
admired and glorified1 standing on its  
pedestal without scandal and exposed to 
all eyes4  #ahf ,what is its purpose1   
and what idea1 through sympathy1 is the 
statue to convey to spectators8  ,an    
idea which1 to us1 is almost without    
meaning because it belongs to another   
age and another epoch of the human mind4
  ,the head is without significance2    

unlike ours it is not a world of        
graduated conceptions1 excited passions1
 and a medley of sentiments2 the face is
 not sunken1 sharp1 and disturbed2 it   
has not many characteristics1 scarcely  
any expression1 and is generally in     
repose4 4 4 4  ,the contemporaries of   
,pericles and ,plato did not require    
violent and surprising effects to       
stimulate weary attention or to irritate
 an uneasy sensibility4  ,a blooming and
 healthy body1 capable of all virile and
 gymnastic actions1 a man or woman of   
fine growth and noble race1 a serene    
form in full light1 a simple and natural
 harmony of lines happily commingled1   
was the most animated spectacle they    
could dwell on4  ,they desired to       
contemplate man proportioned to his     
organs and to his condition and endowed 
with every perfection within these      
limits2 they demanded nothing more and  
nothing less2 anything besides would    
have struck them as extravagance1       
deformity1 or disease4  ,such is the    

circle within which the simplicity of   
their culture kept them4#f   ,in other  
words1 ,greek art expressed the rare    
quality of ,greek life2 its naturalism1 
its compactness1 its clearness4  ,and it
 did so instinctively both to the artist
 and the spectator4  ,we are not to     
think that because1 in order to         
understand ancient art1 it may be       
necessary for us first to obtain a      
conception of life and then to match it 
in art1 this is essential to its        
appreciation4  ,on the contrary1 the    
object of art is not beautiful #ahg     
until it flashes the idea upon us1      
communicating an ideal unity that is not
 intellectually articulate at all4      
,this must always be the effect upon    
contemporaries1 in whom the idea is so  
assimilated as to be unconscious4  ,but 
the idea is there none the less2 and the
 full beauty cannot exist for any one   
who is incapable of discerning the idea1
 and rejoicing in the apprehension of   
it4  ,the incomparable excellence of    

,greek sculpture is due to a type of    
genius in which clearness of mind and   
delicacy of touch are united4 ,among the
 ,greeks the term infinite was a term of
 disparagement2 they thought roundly and
 cleanly1 thus preferring ideas to vague
 surmises4 ,this was their first gift4  
,and1 adding to it a sensitiveness to   
form1 they were enabled to express      
themselves1 without redundancy and      
exaggeration1 bringing whatever medium  
they employed into accord with the idea4
  ,it is this felicity and luminousness 
that gives to the art of the ,greeks a  
peculiar appeal to the intelligence4    
,for the mind delights in definiteness  
and light4  ,but the ,greek conception  
of life belongs to an age preceding the 
advent of what has proved to be the     
,european religion4  ,and ,christianity 
has so reconstructed the experience of  
the average man through its             
sensitiveness to pain1 and its emphasis 
on what is called the inner life1 that  
,i want further to illustrate the       

meaning of #ahh discernment in art1 by  
referring to the representation of the  
spirit of the ,renaissance in the       
painting of ,leonardo da ,vinci4  ,i    
quote the following from ,pater's       
description of ,la ,gioconda3   ,the    
presence that thus rose so strangely    
beside the waters1 is expressive of what
 in the ways of a thousand years men had
 come to desire4  ,hers is the head upon
 which all the ends of the world are    
come1 and the eyelids are a little      
weary4  ,it is a beauty wrought out from
 within upon the flesh1 the deposit1    
little cell by cell1 of strange thoughts
 and fantastic reveries and exquisite   
passions4  ,set it for a moment beside  
one of those white ,greek goddesses or  
beautiful women of antiquity1 and how   
would they be troubled by this beauty1  
into which the soul with all its        
maladies has passed4  ,all the thoughts 
and experience of the world have etched 
and moulded there1 in that which they   
have of power to refine and make        

expressive the human form1 the animalism
 of ,greece1 the lust of ,rome1 the     
reveries of the middle age with its     
spiritual ambition and imaginative      
loves1 the return of the pagan world1   
the sins of the ,borgias4  ,she is older
 than the rocks among which she sits2   
like the vampire1 which has been dead   
many times1 and learned the secrets of  
the grave2 and has been a diver in deep 
seas1 and keeps their fallen day about  
her2 and trafficked for strange webs    
with ,eastern merchants2 and1 as ,leda1 
was the mother of ,helen of ,troy1 and1 
as ,saint ,anne1 the mother of ,mary2   
and all this has been to her but as the 
sound of lyres and flutes1 and lives    
only in the delicacy with which it has  
moulded the changing lineaments1 and    
tinged the eyelids and the hands4#g     
,the power of ,renaissance painting is  
not wholly a matter of color1 texture1  
modelling1 and composition2 for though  
it contains these and many #ahi sensuous
 and perceptual values besides1 it      

conveys through them with surpassing    
truth and delicacy ideas as evasive as  
they are subtle and profound4  ,there is
 an ecstasy of mind in the discernment  
of these ideas1 and a blend of emotion  
that follows in their train1 both of    
which are conditioned by insight2 that  
is1 by a process that is neither        
sensuous1 perceptual1 nor emotional     
merely1 but1 in an additional sense1    
intellectual4  ,the interest in         
apprehension may thus be exhibited and  
satisfied in divers ways1 differing     
according to the special processes of   
consciousness which they call into play4
  ,and while it may be crude or         
cultivated1 it is safe to say that in   
all of its modes it is present to some  
degree in every individual human life4  
,the simple-minded person who hisses the
 villain of the melodrama1 and he who   
takes pleasure in the inevitableness of 
the ,greek tragedy1 are exhibiting the  
same interest in the emotions evoked by 
the spectacle of life4  ,there is only a

 difference of training and             
sophistication between the man who      
enjoys a cheap chromo for the color or  
the likeness1 and one who appreciates   
,velasquez's treatment of light or the  
characterization of ,franz ,hals4  ,in  
the enjoyment of the highest forms of   
art these various modes of apprehension 
will be united1 each so contributing to 
the enhancement of the #aij rest that it
 is impossible sharply to divide them4  
,nor do ,i venture any opinion as to    
which of these modes1 if any1 is        
fundamental in the different arts or in 
fine art as a whole4  ,it is sufficient 
for our purposes to know that art does  
exercise and develop human nature in all
 of these ways4  ,we are now in a       
position to define a programme of       
criticism4  ,art thrives because it     
fulfils a complex and multiform         
interest4  ,it is supported by an       
interest which it supplies with its     
proper objects4 ,hence it falls within  
the circle of life where questions of   

prudence1 justice1 and good-will are    
paramount4  ,but1 because moral         
considerations must thus in the nature  
of the case take precedence over purely 
aesthetic considerations1 this proves   
nothing whatsoever concerning the way in
 which this precedence should be        
established4  ,it was ,plato's belief   
that society should employ a rigorous   
censorship1 and banish the offending    
poet3   ,we will fall down and worship  
him as a sweet and holy and wonderful   
being2 but we must also inform him that 
there is no place for such as he is in  
our ,state--the law will not allow them4
  ,and so when we have anointed him with
 myrrh1 and set a garland of wool upon  
his head1 we shall send him away to     
another city4#h   ,but there is another 
way of protecting society from whatever 
may be the evil effects of art1 and that
 is to educate the individual and the   
#aia community in their use of art4     
,this would mean1 in place of a         
regulation of the supply1 a regulation  

of the demand4  ,it would mean that the 
aesthetic interest itself1 like every   
other interest within the moral economy1
 should be so controlled as to make it  
as conducive as possible to health and  
abundance of life4  ,the exercise or    
cultivation of the interest in art would
 then1 like the love of nature or of    
social intercourse1 be unlimited so far 
as its objects were concerned1 but      
limited through its relation to other   
interests within the individual or      
community purpose4  ,but with this      
difference concerning the proper remedy1
 the present inquiry will coincide in   
its intent and presuppositions with that
 model of all moral criticisms1 the     
,republic of ,plato4  ,what are the     
possibilities for life of this aesthetic
 interest or love of art8  ,how is it   
liable to abuse or excess8  ,what is its
 bearing on other interests1 and how far
 does it tend to make life gracious and 
happy1 without destroying its balance or
 compromising its truth8  ,these are the

 questions on which ,i hope that ,i may 
be able to throw some light by calling  
attention to the following              
characteristics possessed by the        
aesthetic interest3 self-sufficiency1   
pervasiveness1 vicariousness1           
stimulation of action1 fixation of      
ideas1 and liberality4#i   #aib  ,,iii  
,it has long been pointed out that the  
aesthetic interest1 unlike the bodily   
appetites1 is self-sufficient1 in that  
it is capable of being evenly sustained4
  ,it depends on no antecedent craving1 
and has no definite periodic limit of   
satiety4  ,it engages the capacities    
that are1 on the whole1 the most docile 
and the least liable to progressive     
fatigue1 while through its own internal 
variety it is guarded against monotony4 
,consequently the aesthetic interest is 
peculiarly capable of being continued   
and developed through a lifetime1       
providing a constant and increasing     
source of satisfaction4  ,furthermore1  
the aesthetic interest is resourceful1  

easily supplying itself with the objects
 which it uses4  ,it follows that it    
contributes to independence1 being like 
the speculative activity of             
,aristotle1#aj in giving the individual 
a means of happiness in himself without 
the aid of his fellows or the favor of  
fortune4  ,since the aesthetic interest 
is in these ways self-sufficient1 its   
continuous return of good being         
guaranteed1 it is one of the safest of  
investments4  ,but every special        
interest is a source of danger in direct
 proportion to its isolation4  ,its very
 self-sufficiency may serve to promote a
 narrow concentration1 a blindness to   
ulterior interests #aic and wider       
possibilities4  ,this undue dwelling on 
the given material of life may1 as we   
have seen in an earlier chapter1 attach 
to any interest2 but the aesthetic      
interest is peculiarly liable to it4    
,this is due to the fact that1 in so far
 as an object appeals to the aesthetic  
interest1 it tends not to develop1 but  

to retain some fixed aspect in which the
 apprehension of it is agreeable4  ,the 
various practical interests ramify      
indefinitely through the dynamic        
relations of objects1 and through the   
handling of objects common to a variety 
of interests4  ,once engaged in what is 
called active life one tends to be drawn
 into the main current of enterprise and
 made aware of the larger issues4  ,and 
the theoretical interest also tends to  
lead beyond itself2 for it prompts the  
mind to examine the whole nature of     
objects1 and to explore their context   
without limit in the hope of completer  
truth4  ,but the aesthetic interest     
readily acquires equilibrium1 and feels 
no inducement to leave off an activity  
which1 though its limits may be narrow1 
is free and continuous within them4     
,plato accused art of being essentially 
imitative1 and so of confirming the     
vulgar respect for the surface aspect of
 things4#aa  ,it is truer1 ,i think1 to 
say that the aesthetic interest is      

quiescent1 tending to perpetuate        
experience in any form that is found    
pleasant1 and without respect either to 
practical exigencies or to the order of 
truth4  #aid ,hence this interest on    
account of its very self-sufficiency    
offers a passive resistance to the      
formal principles of moral              
organization--to prudence1 purpose1     
justice1 and good-will4   ,,iv  ,the    
aesthetic interest is the good genius of
 the powers of apprehension1 making them
 fruitful in their own kind4  ,now the  
powers of apprehension are engaged      
during all the waking hours1 and if they
 can be taught to mediate a good of     
their own1 that good will pervade the   
whole of life4  ,it is through the      
cultivation of the aesthetic interest   
that there is most hope of redeeming the
 waste places1 of giving to intervals   
and accidental juxtapositions some      
graciousness and profit4  ,with all the 
world to see and contemplate1 and with  
the eye and mind wherewith to           

contemplate them1 there is a limitless  
abundance of good things always and     
everywhere available4  ,let me quote    
,arthur ,benson's account of this       
discovery3   ,the world was full of     
surprises2 trees drooped their leaves   
over screening walls1 houses had backs  
as well as fronts2 music was heard from 
shuttered windows1 lights burned in     
upper rooms4  ,there were a thousand    
pretty secrets in the ways of people to 
each other4  ,then1 too1 there were     
ideas1 as thick as sparrows in an ivied 
wall4  ,one had but to clap one's hands 
and cry out1 and there was a fluttering 
#aie of innumerable wings2 life was as  
full of bubbles1 forming1 rising into   
amber foam1 as a glass of sparkling     
wine4#ab   ,to this delight which the   
casual environment affords a sensitive  
observer1 art may add through a decorous
 furnishing of city and house4 ,or the  
instruments of other interests may be   
made to give pleasure of themselves1 so 
that there may be no long periods of    

deferred reward4 ,thus to the hire of   
manual labor may be added the immediate 
compensation which comes from a love of 
the tools1 or from the satisfaction     
taken in the aspect of work done2 to    
physical exercise may be added the love 
of nature1 to scholarship the love of   
scientific form1 and to social          
intercourse the love of personal beauty 
or of conversation4  ,in these ways1 and
 in countless ways beside1 the aesthetic
 interest may multiply the richness of  
life4  ,society is1 on the whole1       
protected against the danger of         
overemphasis on the aesthetic interest1 
through the habitual subordination of it
 in public opinion to standards of      
efficiency4  ,men commonly believe1 and 
are justified in so believing1 that a   
life delivered wholly to the aesthetic  
interest is frivolous2 amusing itself   
with bubbles and amber foam1 while      
supported by a community in whose graver
 and more urgent concerns it takes no   
part4  ,probably no one has #aif done   

more than ,pater to persuade men of the 
present generation that it is worth     
while to catch at any exquisite passion1
 4 4 4 or any stirring of the senses2   
and yet he is not a prophet in our day4 
,is it possibly because in that same    
famous conclusion to the ,renaissance he
 said1 ,not the fruit of experience1 but
 experience itself1 is the end1 #ac and 
thus exposed himself to                 
misunderstanding1 if not to refutation1 
at the hands of any one of average moral
 enlightenment8  ,the moral lesson is   
one that none have escaped1 and that    
only a few are permitted to forget4     
,this lesson has taught with unvarying  
reiteration that acts are to be judged  
by their consequences2 that all purposes
 are constructive1 and so far as wise   
fitted into the building of             
civilization2 that experience itself1 in
 ,pater's sense1 is possible only as a  
fruit of experience4  ,a life in which  
the aesthetic interest unduly dominates1
 in which action is transmuted into     

pulses of sensation1 and the means of   
efficiency into the ends of             
contemplation1 is an idle life1         
protected from the consequences of its  
own impotency only by the constructive  
labor of others4  ,he who from prolonged
 gazing at the spoon forgets to carry it
 to his mouth1 must die of hunger and   
cease from gazing altogether1 or be fed 
by his friends4  ,the instruments of    
achievement may be adorned1 and made    
delightful in the using1 but they must  
not #aig on that account be mistaken for
 the achievement2 leisure may be made a 
worthy pastime through the cultivation  
of the sensibilities1 but it must not be
 substituted for vocation1 or allowed to
 infect a serious purpose with decay4   
,v  ,it has always been recognized that 
there is a peculiar massiveness or depth
 in aesthetic satisfaction1 as though it
 somehow carried with it the            
satisfaction of all interests4  ,and    
this is not due merely to the fact that 
other interests tend to fall away or    

remit their claims2 it is due besides to
 the fact that other interests may in a 
sense actually be fulfilled in the      
aesthetic interest4  ,in other words1   
this interest serves a vicarious        
function1 transmuting other interests   
into its own form1 and then affording   
them a fulfilment which they are        
incapable of attaining when exercised in
 their own right4  ,this occurs when    
other interests1 such as love or        
personal ambition1 are imagined or      
represented1 and thus made objects of   
agreeable apprehension4  ,there is in   
this a compensation for failure1 without
 which life would be stripped of one of 
its main barriers against despair4      
,those whom circumstance has provided no
 opportunity for the fulfilment of      
interests so ingenerate as maternal love
 or heroic action1 may1 in a way1 make  
themselves whole #aih through the       
contemplation of these things2 for the  
contemplation of them engages the same  
instincts1 arouses the same emotions1   

but without requiring the existence of  
their objects4  ,the prolongation of    
arduous and uncertain effort is         
compensated through the imaginative     
anticipation of success1 or through the 
apprehension of some symbol of perfect  
fruition4  ,it is through this happy    
illumination of struggle with a vision  
of fulfilment1 that mankind is          
reconciled to such tasks as civilization
 and spiritual wholeness2 tasks in which
 great efforts produce small results1   
and of which the end is not seen4  ,now 
it remains true1 of course1 that such   
vicarious fulfilment is not real        
fulfilment2 and to suppose it to be1 is 
one of the most serious errors for which
 the aesthetic interest is responsible4 
,the man who1 with clenched hands and   
quickened pulse1 is watching some image 
of himself as it triumphs over obstacles
 and arrives at the summit of his       
ambition1 may and doubtless does feel   
like ,alexander1 but he nevertheless has
 not conquered the world2 and if he     

thinks he has1 he will probably never   
conquer any of it4  ,it must be         
remembered that the vicarious aesthetic 
fulfilment of interests is the easiest  
fulfilment of them2 and that it may1    
therefore1 become a form of             
self-indulgence and a source of false   
complacency4  ,a sanguine imagination is
 one of the #aii chief causes of worldly
 failure2 an exaggerated interest in    
representations of virtue is a common   
cause of irresponsibility and of        
hypocrisy4  ,william ,james1 in a       
passage that is frequently quoted1 calls
 attention also to the danger of        
acquiring a chronic emotionality4   ,the
 weeping of a ,russian lady over the    
fictitious personages in the play1 while
 her coachman is freezing to death on   
his seat outside1 is the sort of thing  
that everywhere happens on a less       
glaring scale4 ,even the habit of       
excessive indulgence in music1 for those
 who are neither performers themselves  
nor musically gifted enough to take it  

in a purely intellectual way1 has       
probably a relaxing effect upon the     
character4  ,one becomes filled with    
emotions which habitually pass without  
prompting to any deed1 and so the       
inertly sentimental condition is kept   
up4  ,the remedy would be1 never to     
suffer one's self to have an emotion at 
a concert1 without expressing it        
afterwards in some active way4  ,let the
 expression be the least thing in the   
world--speaking genially to one's aunt1 
or giving up one's seat in a horse-car1 
if nothing more heroic offers--but let  
it not fail to take place4#ad   ,but not
 only is it possible through the        
exaggeration of the aesthetic interest  
to substitute apparent achievement for  
real achievement2 it is possible to     
extract solace from the contemplation of
 failure itself4 ,is there any one who  
has not met the man who is actually made
 buoyant by his consistent misfortune8  
,for it is flattering that an evil fate 
should single one out from the crowd for

 conspicuous attention1 that all the    
#bjj tragedy of existence should centre 
upon one's devoted head4  ,and a certain
 interest attaches even to unredeemed   
misery and abject futility on their own 
account1 if only they can be viewed from
 the right angle1 and with a cultivated 
sense for such things4  ,now thus to    
poetize the tragedy of one's own life is
 fatuous2 it is like enjoying one's     
dizziness on the brink of a precipice1  
or the pangs of sickness without seeking
 a remedy4  ,but to poetize the tragedy 
of others1 to fiddle while ,rome is     
burning1 is brutal4  ,nevertheless1     
though it is not commonly possible to do
 things on ,nero's scale1 precisely the 
same attitude is the commonest thing in 
the world1 and is fostered by the whole 
aesthetic bias of the race4  ,the       
meanness of savage life1 the squalid    
poverty of the slums1 suffice in their  
picturesqueness to make a holiday for   
those who are more occupied with images 
than with deeds4  ,and there is actually

 a philosophy of life in which all      
things are held to be good because they 
afford a tragic1 sublime1 and1          
therefore1 pleasing spectacle4  ,this is
 the very extreme of moral infidelity1  
the abandonment of the will to make good
 for the insidious and relaxing interest
 in making things seem good as they are4
  #bja  ,,vi  ,that a beautiful object  
commonly stimulates a motor response is 
beyond question4  ,even when it does not
 appeal to any definite emotion it is   
generally stimulating1 through its      
affording to the natural powers at some 
point an unusual harmony with their     
environment4  ,and when there is a      
definite emotional appeal1 there is a   
tendency to act4 ,for1 as we have seen1 
originally the fundamental emotions were
 all co-ordinated reactions to the      
environment1 enlisting the whole        
organism to cope with some practical    
emergency4  ,that the emotions should   
become mere emotions is due to the      
modification of instinct by habit4      

,whatever1 then1 arouses the emotions   
does in some degree stir to action4  ,so
 that one of the most important moral   
uses of art is its alliance with other  
interests in order to intensify their   
appeal1 in order to make them more      
instantly moving4  ,art is a means of   
enlivening dormant impulses2 as music is
 a means of rekindling the love of      
country or the love of ,god1 so that men
 may be brought to take up arms with    
enthusiasm or endure reverses without   
complaint4  ,but this motor excitement  
which art stimulates may be morally     
indeterminate2 that is1 it may be       
capable of being discharged in any way  
that accident or bias may select4  ,in  
other words1 #bjb art may communicate   
power without controlling its use1 thus 
merely increasing the disorder and      
instability of life4  ,or it may serve  
to exaggerate the appeal of the present 
interest1 until it becomes ungovernable 
and obscures ulterior interests4  ,this 
tendency to promote dissoluteness is the

 most serious charge which ,plato brings
 against the arts4  ,after referring to 
the unseemly hilarity to which men are  
incited by the comic stage1 he adds3    
,and the same may be said of lust and   
anger and all the other affections1 of  
desire and pain and pleasure which are  
held to be inseparable from every       
action--in all of them poetry feeds and 
waters the passions instead of drying   
them up2 she lets them rule instead of  
ruling them as they ought to be ruled1  
with a view to the happiness and virtue 
of mankind4#ae   ,in an earlier passage 
,plato discusses types of music in      
relation to action1 the ,lydian which is
 sorrowful1 and the ,ionian which is    
indolent2 showing that selection must be
 made if men are not to be at the mercy 
of random influences4  ,it is not       
necessary1 as ,plato would have it1 to  
banish ,lydian and ,ionian harmonies    
from society2 but within one's personal 
economy1 within the republic of one's   
own soul1 one must prefer with ,plato   

those stirrings of the emotions which   
support and re-enforce one's moral      
purpose3   ,of the harmonies ,i know    
nothing1 but ,i want to have one        
warlike1 which will sound the word or   
note #bjc which a brave man utters in   
the hour of danger and stem resolve1 or 
when his cause is failing1 and he is    
going to wounds or death or is overtaken
 by some other evil1 and at every such  
crisis meets fortune with calmness and  
endurance2 and another to be used by him
 in times of peace and freedom of       
action1 when there is no pressure of    
necessity1 and he is seeking to persuade
 ,god by prayer1 or man by instruction  
and advice4 4 4 4  ,these two harmonies 
,i ask you to leave3 the strain of      
necessity and the strain of freedom1 the
 strain of the unfortunate and the      
strain of the fortunate1 the strain of  
courage and the strain of temperance2   
these1 ,i say1 leave4#af   ,,vii  ,where
 art is not employed directly to incite 
action1 it may still be indirectly      

conducive to action through fixing ideas
 and inclining the sentiments towards   
them4  ,this is probably its most       
important moral function4  ,the ideas   
which are of the greatest significance  
for conduct are ideas which receive no  
adequate embodiment in the objects of   
nature4  ,every broad purpose and       
developed ideal requires the exercise of
 the constructive imagination4  ,but the
 immediate images of the imagination are
 fluctuating and transient1 and need to 
be supported through being embodied in  
some enduring medium4  ,thus monuments  
serve as emblems of nationality2 or1 as 
in the thirteenth century1 all the arts 
may unite to represent and suggest the  
objects of religious #bjd faith4        
,poetry and song have always served as  
means of incarnating the more delicate  
shadings of a racial ideal2 and every   
man would be a poet if he could1 and    
trace the outline of that hope which    
stirs him and which is not the hope of  
any other man4  ,but it must be made    

clear that art does more than make ideas
 definite and permanent4  ,it inclines  
the sentiments towards them4  ,the great
 power of art lies in its function of   
making ideas alluring4  ,now whatever is
 loved or admired is1 in the long run1  
sought out1 imitated1 and served4       
,understanding this1 the ancient        
,athenians sought to educate the        
passions1 and employed music to that    
end4  ,this is ,aristotle's             
justification of such a course3   ,since
 then music is a pleasure1 and virtue   
consists in rejoicing and loving and    
hating aright1 there is clearly nothing 
which we are so much concerned to       
acquire and to cultivate as the power of
 forming right judgments1 and of taking 
delight in good dispositions and noble  
actions4  ,rhythm and melody supply     
imitations of anger and gentleness1 and 
also of courage and temperance and of   
virtues and vices in general1 which     
hardly fall short of the actual         
affections1 as we know from our own     

experience1 for in listening to such    
strains our souls undergo a change4     
,the habit of feeling pleasure or pain  
at mere representations is not far      
removed from the same feeling about     
realities4#ag   ,the simple and         
incontestable truth of these statements 
is a standing condemnation of the #bje  
usual environment of youth4  ,virtue    
consists1 as much as it ever did1 in    
rejoicing and loving and hating aright2 
but the guidance of these sentiments to 
their proper objects is left almost     
wholly to chance4  ,it is by making the 
good also beautiful1 by illuminating the
 modes of virtue with jewels1 and       
endearing them to the imagination1 that 
the moral reason may be re-enforced from
 early days by high spirits4  ,it should
 be a task of education1 using this     
means either in the home or the school  
or the city at large1 to inculcate a    
right habit of admiration4  ,if art is  
to serve a moral end in fixing and      
embellishing ideas1 it must be true4    

,what ,i mean by this most important    
qualification ,i must now endeavor to   
make plain4  ,art1 in so far as it is a 
means of representation1 deals either   
with physical nature1 as in landscape   
and figure painting1 or with types and  
incidents of human life1 as in dramatic 
painting and in the greater part of     
poetry4  ,in either case it may1 like   
thought1 either reflect or distort the  
structure of reality4 ,now the real     
structure of human life is moral2       
consisting only in a variety of         
instances of the one law that the wages 
of sin is death4 ,to represent life     
otherwise is to falsify it1 precisely as
 to represent bodies without solidity   
and gravity is to falsify physical      
nature4  ,but in representing physical  
nature art does not1 as science does1   
#bjf formulate merely its geometrical or
 dynamical skeleton2 to do so would be  
contrary to the intent of art to        
represent things in their perceptual    
concreteness4  ,similarly art does not  

represent abstract virtues4             
,nevertheless1 if it is not to depart   
from the truth art must1 at the same    
time that it conveys the color and      
vividness of life1 also conform to its  
proper laws1 and demonstrate the        
consequences of action as they are4     
,and the same standard of clearness and 
fidelity1 which requires that great art 
shall reveal nature as it is1 not to the
 superficial or imitative observer but  
to the thoughtful and penetrating mind1 
requires also that it shall throw into  
relief the profounder and more universal
 forces of life4  ,great art1 therefore1
 is of necessity enlightening4  ,but it 
is possible that untruth should parade  
in the dress and under the auspices of  
art1 and so work to the confusion of the
 moral consciousness4  ,if art were only
 realistic in the full sense1 an        
unequivocal representation of the laws  
of life1 it would invariably justify and
 support the moral will2 it would be    
idealistic4  ,it is the art of desultory

 and irresponsible fancy that is a      
source of danger4  ,there is a species  
of romantic art that is guarded by its  
very excess of fantasy2 it being        
impossible to mistake it for a          
representation of life4  ,but where     
romantic art is not thus clear in its   
motive1 it becomes what is called       
sensational #bjg art1 in which the wages
 of sin are not paid2 in which          
imprudence1 infidelity1 and a mean      
ambition are made to yield success1     
freedom1 and glorious achievement4  ,the
 realities are violated1 with the       
consequence that resolve is weakened and
 the intelligence bewildered4  ,since   
art may be true or untrue1 it may also  
be universal or particular1 profound or 
superficial1 in its apprehension of     
reality4 ,this difference has operated  
to define a scale of importance in art1 
so far as the interest of society is    
concerned4  ,there is at least a measure
 of truth in ,taine's graduated scale by
 which he estimates the greatness of art

 according as it represents the fashion 
of the day1 the type of the generation1 
the type of the age1 the type of the    
race1 or man himself in his immutable   
nature4#ah  ,that art will be the most  
effective instrument of moral           
enlightenment which reflects the        
experience of mankind in the basal and  
constant virtues1 giving quality and    
distinction to truths which might       
otherwise suffer from their very        
homeliness and familiarity4  ,there is a
 kindred consideration to which ,tolsty1
 undiscerning as he is in most of his   
criticism of art1 has very justly called
 attention4 ,in the broad sense1 art is 
liable to untruth from reflecting       
exclusively the bias of a certain       
temperament4  ,the following description
 #bjh of a class of contemporary dramas 
is not wholly inapt3   ,they either     
represent an architect1 who for some    
reason has not fulfilled his former high
 resolves and in consequence of this    
climbs on the roof of a house built by  

him and from there flies down headlong2 
or some incomprehensible old woman1 who 
raises rats and for some unknown reason 
takes a poetic child to the sea and     
there drowns it2 or some blind people1  
who1 sitting at the sea-shore1 for some 
reason all the time repeat one and the  
same thing2 or a bell which flies into a
 lake and there keeps ringing4#ai       
,that a tendency to cultivate           
acquaintance with the curious and rare1 
and communicate it to a narrow group of 
initiated persons1 is characteristic of 
modern times1 and that on the whole it  
is a symptom of decadence1 ,tolsty has1 
,i believe1 proved4  ,at any rate1 the  
effect of such a tendency in art can not
 fail to be morally injurious1 since    
life is not represented proportionately4
  ,art has much to do with the vogue and
 prestige of ideas4  ,thus1 for example1
 though the problem-play may be faithful
 to life where it deals with life1 if   
the stage be given over wholly to this  
form of drama1 there will almost        

inevitably result a false conception of 
the degree to which the incidents       
selected are representative of social   
conditions on the whole4  ,there is one 
further source of moral error in        
connection with this function of art4   
,because art can not only fix ideas but 
also make them #bji alluring1 it may    
invest them with a fictitious value4  ,i
 refer to what is only a different      
aspect of that sentimentalism or chronic
 emotionalism to which ,i have already  
called attention4  ,not only is it      
possible that men should be brought     
through the aesthetic interest to       
replace action with emotion2 they may   
also persuade themselves that the higher
 principles of life owe their validity  
to some quality that is discerned       
immediately in the apprehension of them4
  ,but purpose1 justice1 and good-will  
are essentially principles of           
organization2 their virtue is their     
provident working4  ,to regard them only
 as images with a value inhering in     

their bare essence1 is to forfeit their 
benefits4  ,verbalism1 formalism1       
mysticism1 are given a certain false    
charm and semblance of self-sufficiency 
by the cultivation and exercise of the  
aesthetic interest4  ,hence morality and
 religion must here resist its          
enticements1 and never cease to remind  
themselves that theirs is the task of   
acknowledging all interests according to
 their real inwardness1 and of banishing
 cruelty and blindness in their behalf4 
,,viii  ,finally1 art serves to         
liberalize life1 to make it expansive   
and generous in spirit4  ,this is       
possible because1 in the first place1   
art is unworldly4  ,i mean simply that  
the enjoyment of beauty is not #baj a   
part of ambition2 that it does not call 
into play those habits of calculation   
and forms of skill that conduce to      
success in livelihood or the gaining of 
any of the proximate ends of organized  
social life4  ,it frees the mind from   
its harness and turns it out to pasture4

  ,i suppose that every one has had that
 experience of spiritual refreshment    
which occasionally comes when one has   
gone body and soul out of doors1 or when
 one is delivered over to the           
enchantment of sober and elevating      
music1 and suddenly made aware of the   
better things that have been long       
forgotten4  ,such experiences are a     
moral inspiration4  ,it is as though1   
the clamor of the world being for the   
moment shut out1 one hears at last the  
voices that speak with authority4  ,for 
an instant the broad sweep of truth     
flashes upon eyes that have been too    
intently watchful of affairs near at    
hand4  ,the good-will can be sustained  
only by a mind that now and then        
withdraws itself from its engagements1  
and expands its view to the full measure
 of life4  ,for the momentary inhibiting
 of the narrower practical impulses1 and
 the evoking of this quiet and          
contemplative mood1 the love of nature  
and the love of art are the most        

reliable means4  ,but art promotes      
liberality of spirit in an even more    
definitely moral sense4  ,for art1 like 
all forms of culture1 and like the      
service of humanity1 #baa provides for  
the highest type of social intercourse4 
,the aesthetic interest is one of those 
rare interests which are common to all  
men without being competitive4  ,all men
 require bread1 but since this interest 
requires exclusive possession of its    
objects1 its very commonness is a source
 of suspicion and enmity4  ,similarly   
all men require truth and beauty and    
civilization1 but these objects are     
enhanced by the fact that all may       
rejoice in them without their being     
divided or becoming the property of any 
man4  ,they bring men together without  
rivalry and intrigue1 in a spirit of    
good-fellowship4 ,culture1 says ,matthew
 ,arnold1 is not satisfied till we all  
come to a perfect man2 it knows that the
 sweetness and light of the few must be 
imperfect until the raw and unkindled   

masses of humanity are touched with     
sweetness and light4   ',this1' he      
continues1 'is the social idea2 and the 
men of culture are the true apostles of 
equality4  ,the great men of culture are
 those who have had a passion for       
diffusing1 for making prevail1 for      
carrying from one end of society to the 
other1 the best knowledge1 the best     
ideas of their time2 who have labored to
 divest knowledge of all that was harsh1
 uncouth1 difficult1 abstract1          
professional1 exclusive2 to humanize it1
 to make it efficient outside the clique
 of the cultivated and learned1 yet     
still remaining the best knowledge and  
thought of the time1 and a true source1 
therefore1 of sweetness and light4'#bj  
#bab  ,art1 both in the creation and in 
the enjoyment of it1 is thus true to the
 deepest motive of morality4  ,it is a  
remoulding of nature to the end that all
 may live1 and that they may live       
abundantly4   ,,ix  ,i have sought to   
place before you what art may contribute

 to life4  ,it will have become plain   
that while art is the natural and       
powerful ally of morality1 it does not  
itself provide any guarantee of proper  
control2 in the interests of goodness1  
on the whole1 no man can surrender      
himself to it utterly4  ,the good-will  
is not proved until1 as ,plato said1 it 
is tried with enchantments1 and found to
 be strong and true4  ,goodness can not 
be cast upon a man like a spell2 it is a
 work of rational organization1 and can 
not be had without discipline1          
efficiency1 and service4  ,but it is for
 art to surround life with fit auspices2
 to create an environment that reflects 
and forecasts its best achievements1    
thus both making a home for it and      
confirming its resolves4  ,having       
modelled this moral criticism of art    
upon the method of ,plato1 ,i shall     
conclude with his familiar summary of   
all the wisdom and eloquence that there 
is in the matter3   ,let our artists    
rather be those who are gifted to       

discern the true nature of beauty and   
grace2 then will our youth dwell in the 
land of health1 amid fair sights #bac   
and sounds2 and beauty1 the effluence of
 fair works1 will visit the eye and ear1
 like a healthful breeze from a purer   
region1 and insensibly draw the soul    
even in childhood into harmony with the 
beauty of reason4#ba     #bad  ,,chapter
 ,,vi  ,,the ,,moral ,,justification    
,,of ,,religion#a  ,it is generally     
agreed that religion is either the      
paramount issue or the most serious     
obstacle to progress4  ,to its devotees 
religion is of overwhelming importance2 
to unbelievers it is1 in the phrasing of
 ,burke1 superstitious folly1           
enthusiastical nonsense1 and holy       
tyranny4  ,the difference between the   
friends and the enemies of religion may1
 ,i think1 be resolved as follows3      
,religion recognizes some final         
arbitration of human destiny2 it is a   
lively awareness of the fact that1 while
 man proposes1 it is only within certain

 narrow limits that he can dispose his  
own plans4  ,his nicest adjustments and 
most ardent longings are overruled2 he  
knows that until he can discount or     
conciliate that which commands his      
fortunes his condition is precarious and
 miserable4  ,and through his eagerness 
to save himself he leaps to conclusions 
that are uncritical and premature4      
,irreligion1 on the other hand1         
flourishes among those who are more     
snugly intrenched #bae within the cities
 of man4  ,it is a product of           
civilization4  ,comfortably housed as he
 is1 and enjoying an artificial         
illumination behind drawn blinds1 the   
irreligious man has the heart to        
criticise the hasty speculations and    
abject fear of those who stand without  
in the presence of the surrounding      
darkness4  ,in other words1 religion is 
perpetually on the exposed side of      
civilization1 sensitive to the blasts   
that blow from the surrounding universe2
 while irreligion is in the lee of      

civilization1 with enough remove from   
danger to foster a refined concern for  
logic and personal liberty4  ,there is a
 sense1 then1 in which both religion and
 irreligion are to be justified4  ,if   
religion is guilty of unreason1         
irreligion is guilty of apathy4  ,for   
without doubt the situation of the      
individual man is broadly such as       
religion conceives it to be4  ,there is 
nothing that he can build1 nor any      
precaution that he can take1 that weighs
 appreciably in the balance against the 
powers which decree good and ill        
fortune1 catastrophe and triumph1 life  
and death4 ,hence to be without fear is 
the part of folly4  ,behold1 the fear of
 the ,lord1 that is wisdom4  ,religion  
is man's recognition of the overruling  
control of his fortunes4 ,it is neither 
metaphysical nor mythical1 but urgently 
practical4 ,primeval chaos1 ,chronos1   
the father of ,zeus1 and the long line  
of speculative ,absolutes have no #baf  
worshippers because they take no hand in

 man's affairs4  ,they may be neglected 
with impunity4  ,but not so the gods who
 send health and sickness1 fertility and
 death1 victory and defeat2 or ,he who  
sits in judgment on the last day to     
determine the doom of eternity4         
,religion is the manifestation of       
supreme concern for life1 an alertness  
to the remotest threat of danger and    
promise of hope4  ,a certain            
momentousness attaches to all the       
affairs of religion1 because everything 
is at stake4  ,its dealings are with the
 last court of appeal1 in behalf of the 
most indispensable good4  ,in form1     
religion is a case of belief2 that is1  
of settled conviction4 ,there is no     
religion until some interpretation of   
life1 some accommodation between man and
 ,god1 has been so far accepted as to be
 unhesitatingly practised4  ,the        
absurdity of doubt in matters of        
religion has been pointed out in the    
well-known parody1 ,o ,god1 if there be 
a ,god1 save my soul1 if ,i have a soul4

  ,the quality of religion lies not in  
the entertaining of a speculative       
hypothesis1 but in an assurance so      
confident that its object is not only   
thought but enacted4  ,god is not ,god  
until his unquestioned existence is     
assimilated to life4  ,indeed1 it is    
conceivable that an object thus made the
 basis of action should still remain    
theoretically doubtful4  ,to ,fontenelle
 is attributed the remark that he did   
not believe in ghosts1 but was afraid of
 #bag them4  ,this is a paradox until we
 distinguish theoretical and practical  
conviction2 then it becomes not only    
credible but commonplace4  ,if one prays
 to ,god1 it is not necessary for the   
purposes of religion that one should1 in
 ,fontenelle's sense1 believe in him4   
,but ,i prefer to use the term belief   
more strictly1 to connote such assent as
 expresses itself1 not in a deliberate  
judgment made conformable to one's      
intellectual conscience1 but in fear1   
love1 and purpose1 in habitual imagery1 

in any attitude or activity that        
spontaneously and freely presupposes the
 object with which it deals4  ,by       
conceiving religion as belief we may    
understand not only its air of          
certainty1 but also the variety of its  
forms and agencies4  ,belief sits at the
 centre of life and qualifies all its   
manifestations4  ,hence the futility of 
attempting to associate religion        
exclusively with any single function of 
man4  ,the guises in which religious    
belief may appear are as multiform as   
human nature1 and will vary with every  
shading of mood and temperament4  ,its  
central objects may be thought1         
imagined1 or dealt with--in short1      
responded to in all the divers ways1    
internal and overt1 that the powers and 
occasions of life define4  ,this will   
suffice1 ,i trust1 to lay the general   
topic of religion before us4  ,i shall  
employ the terms and phrases which ,i   
have formulated as a #bah working       
definition3 ,religion is belief on the  

part of individuals or communities      
concerning the final or overruling      
control of their interests4#b  ,i       
propose from this point to keep in the  
forefront of the discussion the         
standards whereby religion is to be     
estimated1 and approved or condemned4   
,on what grounds may a religion be      
criticised8 ,what would constitute the  
proof of an absolute religion8  ,history
 is strewn with discredited religions2  
men began to quarrel over religion so   
soon as they had any2 and it is         
customary for every religious devotee to
 believe jealously and exclusively4     
,there can be no doubt1 then1 that      
religion is subject to justification2 it
 remains to distinguish the tests which 
may with propriety be applied1 and in   
particular to isolate and emphasize the 
moral test4   ,,ii  ,in the first place1
 let me mention briefly a test which it 
is customary to apply1 but which is not 
so much an estimate as it is a measure4 
,i refer to the various respects in     

which an individual or community may be 
said to be more or less religious4      
,thus1 for example1 certain religious   
phenomena surpass others in acuteness or
 intensity4  ,this is peculiarly true of
 the phenomena manifested in conversion 
and in revivals4  ,in this respect the  
mysteries of the ancients exceeded #bai 
their regular public worship4           
,individuals and communities vary in the
 degree to which they are capable of    
enthusiasm1 excitement1 or ecstasy4  ,or
 a religion may be measured extensively4
  ,he whose religion is constant and    
uniform is more religious than he whose 
observance is confined to the ,sabbath  
day1 or he whose concern in the matter  
appears only in time of trouble or at   
the approach of death4  ,this test may  
best be summed up in terms of           
consistency4  ,religion may vary in the 
degree to which it pervades the various 
activities of life4  ,that religion is  
confined and small which manifests      
itself only in words or public deeds or 

emotions exclusively4  ,if it is to be  
effective it must be systematic1 so     
thoroughly adopted as to be cumulative  
and progressive4  ,it must engage every 
activity1 qualify all thought and       
imagination1 in short1 infuse the whole 
of life with its saving grace4  ,it is  
clear1 however1 that a measure of       
religion does not constitute either     
proof or disproof4  ,if a religion be   
good or true1 or on like grounds        
accredited1 then the more of it the     
better4  ,but differences of degree     
appear in all religions4  ,indeed1 the  
quantitative test has been most         
adequately met by forms of religion the 
warrant of which is generally held to be
 highly questionable4  ,we may1         
therefore1 dismiss this test without    
further consideration4  ,the application
 of it must be #bbj based upon a prior  
and more fundamental justification4     
,there is one test of religion which has
 been universally applied by believers  
and critics alike1 a test which1 ,i     

think1 will shortly appear to deserve   
precedence over all others4  ,i refer to
 the test of truth4 ,every religion has 
been justified to its believers and     
recommended to unbelievers on grounds of
 evidence4  ,it has been verified in its
 working1 or attested by either         
observation1 reflection1 revelation1 or 
authority4  ,in spite of the general    
assent which this proposition will      
doubtless command1 it is deserving of   
special emphasis at the present time4   
,students of religion have latterly     
shifted attention from its claims to    
truth to its utility and subjective     
form4  ,this pragmatic and psychological
 study of religion has created no little
 confusion of mind concerning its real  
meaning1 and obscured that which is     
after all its essential claim--the      
claim1 namely1 to offer an illumination 
of life4 ,religious belief1 like all    
belief1 is reducible to judgments4      
,these judgments are not1 it is true1   
explicit and theoretically formulated2  

but they are none the less answerable to
 evidence from that context of          
experience to which they refer4  ,it is 
true that the believer's assurance is   
not consciously rational1 but it is none
 the less liable before the court of    
reason4  ,cardinal ,newman #bba fairly  
expressed the difference between the    
method of religion and the method of    
science when he said that ten thousand  
difficulties do not make one doubt1 that
 difficulty and doubt are               
incommensurate4 #c  ,nevertheless1 the  
difficulties are in each case germane2  
and the fact that every article of faith
 has its besetting doubt is proof that  
the thorough justification of faith     
requires the settlement of theoretical  
difficulties4  ,no religion can survive 
the demonstration of its untruth2 for   
salvation1 whether present or eternal1  
depends on processes actually operative 
in the environment4  ,religion must     
reveal the undeniable situation and     
prepare man for it4  ,it must charge the

 unbeliever with being guilty of folly1 
with deceiving himself through failing  
to see and take heed4 ,every religious  
propaganda is a cry of warning1 putting 
men on their guard against invisible    
dangers2 or a promise of succor1        
bringing glad tidings of great joy4     
,and its prophecy is empty and trivial  
if the danger or the succor can be shown
 to be unreal4  ,the one unfailing bias 
in life is the bias for disillusionment1
 springing from the organic instinct for
 that real environment to which1 whether
 friendly or hostile1 it must adapt     
itself4  ,every man knows in his heart  
that he can not be saved through being  
deceived4  ,illusions can not endure1   
and those who lightly perpetrate them   
are fortunate #bbb if they escape the   
resentment and swift vengeance which    
overtook the prophets of ,baal4  ,the   
grounds of religious truth will require 
prolonged consideration2 but before     
discussing them further let me first    
mention a test of religion which belongs

 to the class of psychological and      
pragmatic tests to which ,i have just   
alluded1 but which has latterly assumed 
special prominence4 ,though realizing   
that ,i use a somewhat disparaging term1
 ,i suggest that we call this the       
therapeutic test4  ,it has been proved  
that the state of piety possesses a     
direct curative value through its       
capacity to exhilarate or pacify1       
according to the needs of a disordered  
mind4  ,as a potent form of suggestion1 
it lends itself to the uses of          
psychiatry2 it may be medicinally       
employed as a tonic1 stimulant1 or      
sedative4  ,now we can afford to remind 
ourselves that1 at least from the point 
of view of the patient1 this use of     
religion bears a striking resemblance to
 certain primitive practices in which   
,god was conceived as a glorified       
medicine-man1 and the healing of the    
body strangely confused with spiritual  
regeneration4  ,bishop ,gregory of      
,tours once addressed the following     

apostrophe to the worshipful ,st4       
,martin3 ,o unspeakable theriac6        
ineffable pigment6 admirable antidote6  
celestial purgative6 superior to all the
 skill of physicians1 more fragrant than
 aromatic drugs1 stronger than #bbc all 
ointments combined6 thou cleanest the   
bowels as well as scammony1 and the     
lungs as well as hyssop2 thou cleanest  
the head as well as camomile6 #d  ,it is
 true that religion is in these days    
recommended for more subtle disorders2  
but even religious ecstasy may be       
virtually equivalent to a mere state of 
emotional exhilaration1 or piety to a   
condition of mental and moral stupor4   
,what does it profit a man to be content
 with his lot1 or to experience the     
rapture of the saints1 if he has lost   
his soul8  ,the saving of a soul is a   
much more serious matter than the       
cessation of worry or the curing of     
insomnia1 or even than the acquiring of 
a habit of delirious joy4  ,tranquillity
 and happiness are1 it is true1 the     

legitimate fruits of religion1 but only 
provided they be infused with goodness  
and truth4  ,if religion is to be a     
spiritual tonic1 and not merely a       
physical tonic1 it must be based on     
moral organization and intellectual     
enlightenment4  ,i do not doubt that    
religion has in all times recommended   
itself to men mainly through its        
contributing to their lives a certain   
peculiar buoyancy and peace4  ,there is 
such a generic value in religion1 which 
can not be attributed wholly to any of  
its component parts4  ,but1 like the    
intensity or extent of religion1 this   
may manifest itself upon all levels of  
development4  ,sound piety1 a           
tranquillity and happiness #bbd which   
mark the soul's real salvation1 must be 
founded on truth1 on an interpretation  
of life which expresses the fullest     
light4  ,again1 then1 we are referred to
 the test of truth for the fundamental  
justification of religion4  ,there is a 
generic value which is deserving of the 

last word1 but that word can be said    
only after a rigorous examination of the
 more fundamental values from which it  
is derived4  ,religious truth is        
divisible into two judgments1 involved  
in every religious belief1 and          
answerable respectively to ethical and  
cosmological evidence4  ,since religion 
is a belief concerning the overruling   
control of human interests1 it involves 
on the one hand a summing up of these   
interests1 a conception of what the     
believer has at stake1 in short1 an     
ethical judgment2 and on the other hand1
 an interpretation of the environment at
 large1 in other words1 a cosmological  
judgment4  ,religion construes the      
practical situation in its totality2    
which means that it generalizes         
concerning the content of fortune1 or   
the good1 and the sources of fortune1 or
 nature4  ,both factors are invariably  
present1 and no religion can escape     
criticism on this twofold ground4  ,the 
ethical implications of religion are    

peculiarly far-reaching1 since they     
determine not only its conception of    
man1 but also1 in part1 its conception  
of ,god4  ,this is due to the fact that 
#bbe the term ,god signifies not the    
environment in its inherent nature1 but 
the environment in its bearing on the   
worshipper's interests4  ,it follows    
that whether ,god be construed as       
favorable or hostile will depend upon   
the worshipper's conception of these    
interests4  ,thus1 for example1 if      
worldly success or long life be regarded
 as the values most eagerly to be       
conserved1 ,god must be feared as cruel 
or capricious2 whereas1 if the lesson of
 discipline and humility be conceived as
 the highest good1 it may be reasonable 
to trust the providence of ,god without 
any change in its manifestation4        
,furthermore1 as we shall shortly have  
occasion to remark1 it is characteristic
 of religion to insist1 so far as       
possible1 upon the favorableness of the 
environment4  ,but this favorableness   

must be construed in terms of what are  
held to be man's highest interests4     
,consequently1 the disposition and      
motive of ,god always reflect human     
purposes4  ,this is the main source of  
the inevitable anthropomorphism of      
religion4  ,conceptions of nature1 on   
the other hand1 define the degree to    
which the environment is morally        
determined1 and the unity or plurality  
of its causes4  ,animism1 for example1  
reflects the general opinion that the   
causes of natural events are wilful     
rather than mechanical4  ,such an       
opinion obtained at the time when no    
sharp #bbf distinction was made between 
inorganic and organic phenomena1 the    
action of the environment being         
conceived as a play of impulses4        
,religion is corrected1 then1 by light  
obtained from these sources3 man's      
knowledge of his highest interests1 and 
his knowledge of nature4  ,as a rule1   
one or the other of these two methods of
 criticism tends to predominate1 in     

accordance with the genius of the race  
or period4  ,thus1 the evolution of     
,greek religion is determined mainly by 
the development of science4  ,xenophanes
 attacks the religion of his times on   
the ground of its crude                 
anthropomorphism4  ,mortals1 he says1   
think that the gods are born as they    
are1 and have perception like theirs1   
and voice and form4  ,but this nave     
opinion ,xenophanes corrects because it 
is not consistent with the new          
enlightenment concerning the arch1 or   
first principle of nature4  ,and he ,god
 abideth ever in the same place1 moving 
not at all2 nor doth it befit him to go 
about1 now hither1 now thither4 #e  ,in 
a later age ,lucretius criticised the   
whole system of ,greek religion in terms
 of the atomistic and mechanical        
cosmology of ,epicurus3   ,for verily   
not by design did the first-beginnings  
of things station themselves each in its
 right place guided by keen             
intelligence1 nor did they bargain sooth

 to say what motions each should assume2
 but because many in number and shifting
 about in many ways throughout the      
universe they are driven and #bbg       
tormented by blows during infinite time 
past1 after trying motions and unions of
 every kind at length they fall into    
arrangements such as those out of which 
this our sum of things has been         
formed4#f   ,in the light of such       
principles ,lucretius demonstrates the  
absurdity of hoping or fearing anything 
from a world beyond or a life to come4  
,in this case1 as in the case above1 the
 religion of enlightenment does not     
differ essentially from the religion of 
the average man in its conception of the
 interests at stake1 but only in its    
conception of the methods of worship or 
forms of imagery which it is reasonable 
to employ in view of the actual nature  
of the environment4  ,if1 on the other  
hand1 we turn to the early development  
of the ,hebrew religion1 we find that it
 is corrected to meet the demands not of

 cosmological but of ethical            
enlightenment4  ,no question arises as  
to the existence or power of ,god1 but  
only as to what he requires of those who
 serve him4  ,the prophets represent the
 moral genius of the race1 its acute    
discernment of the causes of social     
integrity or decay4  ,and when ye spread
 forth your hands1 ,i will hide mine    
eyes from you3 yea1 when ye make many   
prayers1 ,i will not hear3 your hands   
are full of blood4  ,wash you1 make you 
clean2 put away the evil of your doings 
from before mine eyes2 cease to do evil3
 learn to do well2 seek judgment1       
relieve #bbh the oppressed1 judge the   
fatherless1 plead for the widow4 #g     
,but whichever of these two methods of  
criticism predominates1 it is clear that
 they both draw upon bodies of truth    
which grow independently of religion4   
,the history of ,christianity affords a 
most remarkable record of the continual 
adjustment of religious belief to       
secular rationality4 ,the offices of    

religion have availed no more to justify
 cruelty1 intolerance1 and bigotry than 
to establish the ,ptolemaic astronomy or
 the ,scriptural account of creation4   
,this is more readily admitted in the   
case of natural science than in the case
 of ethics1 but only because teachers of
 religion have commonly had a more      
expert acquaintance with moral matters  
than with the orbits of the planets or  
the natural history of the earth4  ,for 
the principles of conduct1 like the     
principles of nature1 must be derived   
from a study of the field to which they 
are applied4  ,they require nothing more
 for their establishment than the       
analysis and generalization of the moral
 situation4  ,if two or more persons    
conduct themselves with reference to one
 another and to an external object1     
their action either possesses or lacks1 
in some degree1 that specific value     
which we call moral goodness4  ,and by  
the principles of ethics we mean the    
principles which truly define and       

explicate this value4  ,now neither the 
truth nor #bbi the falsity of any       
religion affects these fundamental and  
essential conditions4  ,if the teachings
 of religion be accepted as true1 then  
certain factors may be added to the     
concrete practical situation2 but if so1
 these fall within the field of morality
 and must be submitted to ethical       
principles4  ,thus1 if there be a ,god  
whose personality permits of reciprocal 
social relations with man1 then man     
ought1 in the moral sense1 to be prudent
 with reference to him1 and may         
reasonably demand justice or good-will  
at his hands4  ,but the mere existence  
of a ,god1 whatever be his nature1 can  
neither invalidate nor establish the    
ethical principles of prudence1 justice1
 and good-will4  ,were a ,god whose     
existence is proved1 to recommend       
injustice1 this would not affect in the 
slightest degree the moral obligation to
 be just4  ,moral revelation stands upon
 precisely the same footing as          

revelation in the sphere of theoretical 
truth3 its acceptance can be justified  
only through its being confirmed by     
experience or reason4  ,in other words1 
it is the office of revelation to reveal
 truth1 but not to establish it4  ,in   
consequence of this fact it may even be 
necessary that a man should redeem the  
truth in defiance of what he takes to be
 the disposition of ,god4  ,neither     
individual conscience nor the moral     
judgment of mankind can be superseded or
 modified save through a higher insight 
which these may #bcj themselves be      
brought to confirm4  ,whatever a man may
 think of ,god1 if he continues to live 
in the midst of his fellows1 he places  
himself within the jurisdiction of the  
laws which obtain there4 ,morality is   
the method of reconciling and fulfilling
 the interests of beings having the     
capacity to conduct themselves          
rationally1 and ethics is the           
formulation of the general principles   
which underlie this method4 ,the attempt

 to live rationally--and1 humanly       
speaking1 there is no alternative save  
the total abnegation of life--brings one
 within the jurisdiction of these       
principles1 precisely as thinking brings
 one within the jurisdiction of the     
principles of logic1 or as the moving of
 one's body brings one within the       
jurisdiction of the principles of       
mechanics4  ,religion1 then1 mediates an
 enlightenment which it does not of     
itself originate4  ,in religious belief 
the truth which is derived from a       
studious observation of nature and the  
cumulative experience of life1 is       
heightened and vivified4  ,like all     
belief religion is conservative1 and    
rightly so4  ,but in the long run1      
steadily and inevitably1 it responds to 
every forward step which man is enabled 
to take through the exercise of his     
natural cognitive powers4  ,only so does
 religion serve its real purpose of     
benefiting life by expanding its horizon
 and defining its course4  ,i have      

hitherto left out of account a certain  
#bca stress or insistence that must now 
be recognized as fundamental in         
religious development4 ,this ,i shall   
call the optimistic bias4  ,this bias is
 not accidental or arbitrary1 but       
significant of the fact that religion1  
like morality1 springs from the same    
motive as life itself1 and makes towards
 the same goal of fruition and          
abundance4  ,life is essentially        
interest1 and interest is essentially   
positive or provident2 fear is          
incidental to hope1 and hate to love4   
,man seeks to know the worst only in    
order that he may avoid or counterwork  
it in the furtherance of his interests4 
,religion is the result of man's search 
for support in the last extremity4 ,this
 is true1 even when men are largely     
preoccupied with the mere struggle for  
existence4  ,it appears more and more   
plainly as life becomes aggressive1 and 
is engaged in the constructive          
enterprise of civilization4  ,religion  

expresses man's highest hope of         
attainment1 whether this be conceived as
 the efficacy of a fetich or the kingdom
 of ,god4  ,such1 then1 are the general 
facts of religion1 and the fundamental  
critical principles which justify and   
define its development4  ,religion is   
man's belief in salvation1 his confident
 appeal to the overruling control of his
 ultimate fortunes4  ,the reconstruction
 of religious belief is made necessary  
whenever it fails to express the last   
verified truth1 cosmological or ethical4
  ,the #bcb direction of religious      
development is thus a resultant of two  
forces3 the optimistic bias1 or the     
saving hope of life2 and rational       
criticism1 or the progressive revelation
 of the principles which define life and
 its environment4  ,i shall proceed now 
to the consideration of types of        
religion which illustrate this critical 
reconstruction4  ,the types which ,i    
shall select represent certain forms of 
inadequacy which ,i think it important  

to distinguish4  ,they are only roughly 
historical1 as is necessarily the case1 
since all religions represent different 
types in the various stages of their    
development1 and in the different       
interpretations which are put on them in
 any given time by various classes of   
believers4  ,i shall consider in turn1  
using the terms in a manner to be       
precisely indicated as we proceed1      
superstition1 tutelary religion1 and two
 forms of philosophical religion1 the   
one metaphysical idealism1 and the other
 moral idealism4   ,,iii  ,superstition 
is distinguished by a lack of           
organization both in man and his        
environment4  ,it is a direct           
cross-relationship between an elementary
 interest1 passion1 or need1 and some   
isolated and capricious natural power4  
,the deity is externally related to the 
worshipper1 having private interests of 
his own which the worshipper respects   
#bcc only from motives of prudence4     
,religious observance takes the form of 

barter or propitiation--do ut des1 do ut
 abeas4  ,the method of superstition is 
arbitrary1 furthermore1 in that it is   
defined only by the liking or aversion  
of an unprincipled agency4  ,let us     
consider briefly the type of            
superstition which is associated with   
the most primitive stage in the         
development of society4#h  ,the         
worshipper has neither raised nor       
answered the ethical question as to what
 is his greatest good4  ,indeed1 he is  
much more concerned to meet the pressing
 needs of life than he is to co-ordinate
 them or understand to what they lead4  
,he can not even be said to be actuated 
by the principle of rational            
self-interest4  ,like the brute1 whose  
lot is similar to his own1 he feels his 
wants severally1 and is forced to meet  
them as they arise or be trampled under 
foot in the struggle for existence4     
,there is little co-ordination of his   
interests beyond that which is provided 
for in the organic and social structure 

with which nature has endowed him4 ,over
 and above the instinct of              
self-preservation he recognizes in      
custom the principle of tribal or racial
 solidarity4  ,but this is proof1 not so
 much of a recognition of community of  
interest1 as of the vagueness of his    
ideas concerning the boundaries of his  
own self-hood4  ,the very fact that his 
interests are scattering and loosely    
knit prevents him from clearly #bcd     
distinguishing his own4  ,he readily    
identifies himself not only with his    
body1 but with his clothing1 his        
habitation1 and various trinkets which  
have been accidentally associated with  
his life4  ,it is only natural that he  
should similarly identify himself with  
those other beings like himself with    
whom he is connected by the bonds of    
blood and of intimate contact4          
,morally1 then1 primitive man is an     
indefinite and incoherent aggregate of  
interests which have not yet assumed the
 form even of individual and community  

purpose4  ,to turn to the second1 or    
cosmological1 component1 we find that   
primitive man's conception of ultimate  
powers is like his conception of his own
 interests in being both indefinite and 
incoherent4  ,in consequence of the     
daily vicissitudes of his fortune1 he is
 well aware that he is affected for     
better or for worse by agencies which   
fall outside the more familiar routine  
operations of society and nature4  ,so  
great is the disproportion between the  
calculable and the incalculable elements
 of his life that he is like a man      
crouching in the dark1 expecting a blow 
from any quarter4 ,the agencies whose   
working can be discounted in advance    
form his secular world2 but this world  
is narrow and meagre1 and is            
overshadowed by a beyond which is both  
mysterious and terrible4  ,of the world 
beyond he has no single comprehensive   
idea1 but he acknowledges it in his #bce
 expectation of the injuries and        
benefits which he may at any time       

receive from it4  ,it is an abyss whose 
depths he has never sounded1 but which  
he is forced practically to recognize1  
since he is at the mercy of forces which
 emanate from it4  ,the method of       
primitive religion is the inevitable    
sequel4  ,in behalf of the interests    
which represent him man must here1 as   
ever1 make the best terms he can with   
the powers which beset him4  ,he has no 
concern with these powers except the    
desire to propitiate them4  ,he has no  
knowledge of their working excepting as 
respects their bearing upon his         
interests4 ,obeying a law of human      
nature which is as valid now as then1 he
 seeks for remedies whose proof is the  
cure which they effect4  ,let the       
association between a certain action on 
his own part and a favorable turn in the
 tide of fortune once be established1   
and the subsequent course of events will
 seem to confirm it4  ,coincidences are 
remembered and exceptions forgotten4    
,furthermore1 his belief in the         

effectual working of the established    
plan is always justified by the         
difficulty of proving any other         
alternative plan to be better4  ,but1 in
 order to understand superstition1 it is
 not necessary to reconstruct the       
earliest period in the history of       
society1 nor even to study contemporary 
savage life1 for the superstitious      
intelligence and the superstitious      
method survive #bcf in every stage of   
development4 ,they appear1 for example1 
in mediaeval ,christianity2 in ,clovis's
 appeal to ,christ on the battle-field3 
,clotilda says that ,thou art the ,son  
of the living ,god1 and that ,thou dost 
give victory to those who put their     
trust in ,thee4  ,i have besought my    
gods1 but they give me no aid4  ,i see  
well that their strength is naught4  ,i 
beseech ,thee1 and ,i will believe in   
,thee1 only save me from the hands of   
mine enemies4  ,the same period is      
represented by the petition attributed  
to ,st4 ,eloi1 ,give1 ,lord1 since we   

have given6  ,da1 ,domine1 quia dedimus6
 #i  ,in modern life the motive of      
superstition pervades almost all        
worship1 appearing in sundry            
expectations of special favor to be     
gained by service or importunity4  ,the 
application of critical enlightenment to
 this type of religion has already been 
made with general consent4  ,it is      
recognized that morally superstition    
represents the merely prudential level  
of life4  ,it bespeaks a state of panic 
or a narrow regard for isolated needs   
and desires4 ,furthermore1 it tends to  
emphasize these considerations and at   
the same time degrade the object of     
worship through claiming the attention  
of ,god in their behalf4  ,the deity is 
conceived1 not under the form of a broad
 and consecutive purpose1 but under the 
form of a casual and desultory          
good-nature4  #bcg  ,but superstition   
has been corrected mainly by the        
advancement of scientific knowledge4    
,science has pronounced finally against 

the belief in localized or isolated     
natural processes4  ,whether the        
mechanical theory be accepted or not1   
its method is beyond question1 in so far
 as it defines laws and brings all      
events and phenomena under their        
control4  ,in the dealings of nature    
there can be no favoritism1 no special  
dispensations1 no bargaining over the   
counter4   ,,iv  ,the correction of     
superstition brings us to our second    
type1 which ,i have chosen to call      
tutelary religion4  ,it is distinguished
 by the fact that life is organized into
 a definite purpose1 which1 although    
still narrow and partisan with reference
 to humanity at large1 nevertheless     
embraces and subordinates the manifold  
desires of a community4  ,the deity     
represents this purpose in the cosmos at
 large1 and rallies the forces of nature
 to its support4  ,he is no longer      
capricious1 but is possessed of a       
character defined by systematic devotion
 to an end4  ,his ways are the ways of  

effectiveness4  ,furthermore1 since his 
aims are identical with those of his    
worshippers1 he is now loved and served 
for himself4  ,it follows that he will  
demand of his followers only conformity 
to those rules which define the         
realization of the #bch common aim1 and 
that these rules will be enforced by the
 community as the conditions of its     
secular well-being4  ,ritual is no      
longer arbitrary1 but is based on an    
enlightened knowledge of ways and means4
  ,while this type of religion is       
clearly present in the most primitive   
tribal worship1 it is best exemplified  
when a racial or national purpose       
manifests itself aggressively and       
self-consciously1 as in the cases of    
ancient ,assyria and ,egypt4  ,here ,god
 is identified with the kingship1 both  
being symbols of nationality4  ,among   
the ,assyrians the national purpose was 
predominantly one of military           
aggrandizement4  ,istar communicates to 
,esar-haddon this promise of support3   

,fear not1 ,o ,esar-haddon2 the breath  
of inspiration which speaks to thee is  
spoken by me1 and ,i conceal it not4 4 4
 4  ,i am the mighty mistress1 ,istar of
 ,arbela1 who have put thine enemies to 
flight before thy feet4  ,where are the 
words which ,i speak unto thee1 that    
thou hast not believed them8 4 4 4  ,i  
am ,istar of ,arbela2 in front of thee  
and at thy side do ,i march4  ,fear not1
 thou art in the midst of those that can
 heal thee2 ,i am in the midst of thy   
host4 #aj  ,egyptian nationality was    
identified rather with the principles of
 agriculture and political organization4
  ,the deity is the fertilizing ,nile1  
or the judge of right conduct4  ,there  
is recorded in #bci the ,book of the    
,dead the pleading of a soul before     
,osiris1 in which the commands of the   
god are thus identified with the        
conditions of national welfare3     ,i  
have not committed fraud and evil       
against men4   ,i have not diverted     
justice in the judgment hall4   ,i have 

not known meanness4   ,i have not caused
 a man to do more than his day's work4  
,i have not caused a slave to be ill    
treated by his overseer4   ,i have not  
committed murder4   ,i have not spoiled 
the bread of offering in the temple4    
,i have not added to the weight of the  
balance4   ,i have not taken milk from  
the mouths of children4   ,i have not   
turned aside the water at the time of   
inundation4   ,i have not cut off an arm
 of the river in its course4#aa         
,similar illustrations might be drawn   
from the nationalistic phase of         
,hebraism4  ,the same principle appears 
in mediaeval ,christianity1 and is thus 
embodied in the prologue of the ,salic  
,law1 ,long live the ,christ1 who loves 
the ,franks4  ,in more recent times one 
might point to the ,christianity of the 
,puritan revolution1 not wholly         
misrepresented by the maxim popularly   
attributed to ,cromwell1 ,put your trust
 in ,god and keep your powder dry1 or in
 ,poor ,richard's observation that ,god 

helps them that help themselves4  ,such 
is the religion of nationalism1 #bdj    
sectarianism1 of sustained but narrow   
purpose4  ,i shall not attempt to       
formulate exhaustively the ideas through
 which this religion has been corrected4
  ,it is clear that its defect lies in  
its partisanship4  ,all forms of        
partisanship yield slowly but inevitably
 to the higher conception of social     
solidarity4  ,such enlightenment        
reflects a recognition of community of  
interest1 and a widening of sympathy    
through intercourse and acquaintance4   
,tutelary religion1 in short1 is        
corrected through the validity of the   
ethical principles of justice and       
good-will4  ,the cosmological correction
 of this type of religion is due to the 
same enlightenment that discredits      
superstition1 a knowledge1 namely1 of   
the systematic unity of the cosmos4 ,the
 laws of nature are as indifferent to   
private purposes as they are to private 
desires1 and whether these be personal  

or social in their scope4 ,furthermore1 
the universality of ,god is recognized  
in principle in the rules of worship4   
,for a god of war or agriculture or     
politics can not be privately           
appropriated4  ,if the observance of the
 principles proper to these institutions
 brings success to one1 it brings       
success to all4  ,in short1 a god of    
nationality must be a god of all        
nations4   #bda  ,v  ,the correction of 
tutelary religion brings us at length to
 a type which may be said to be formally
 enlightened4  ,both components of      
belief1 the ethical and the             
cosmological1 are universalized4  ,i    
shall call this type1 in its general    
form1 philosophical religion1 since it  
recognizes the unities which systematic 
reflection defines4  ,it recognizes1 on 
the one hand1 the summing up of life in 
a universal ideal1 and on the other     
hand1 a summing up of the total         
environment in some scientifically      
formulated generalization4  ,it affirms 

the priority of justice and good-will   
over party interest1 and the            
determination of the world without      
reference to special privilege4         
,religion is now the issue between the  
good--the highest good1 the good of     
all--and the undivided cosmos4  ,within 
the limits of philosophical religion    
thus broadly defined there is yet       
provision for almost endless variety of 
belief4  ,religions may still differ in 
tradition1 symbolism1 and ritual4  ,they
 may differ as moral codes and          
sentiments differ1 and reflect all      
shades of opinion as this is determined 
by discovery and criticism4  ,but ,i    
propose to confine myself to a          
difference which is at once the most    
broad and fundamental1 and the most     
clearly defined in contemporary         
controversy4  ,this difference relates  
to neither #bdb ethics nor cosmology    
exclusively1 but to the religious       
judgment itself in which these two are  
united4  ,how is the universe in its    

entirety to be construed with reference 
to the good8  ,in both of the answers   
which ,i propose to consider it is      
claimed that goodness in some sense     
possesses the world4  ,hence both may be
 called idealisms4  ,but in one of these
 answers1 which ,i shall call           
metaphysical idealism1 the cosmological 
motive receives the greater emphasis4   
,the good is construed in terms of      
being2 and1 in order that it may be     
absolutely identified therewith1 its    
original nature must1 if necessary1 be  
compromised4  ,in the other1 the moral  
motive predominates4  ,it is held that  
goodness must not lose its meaning1 even
 if it be necessary that its claims upon
 the cosmos should be somewhat abated4  
,metaphysical idealism is the extreme   
form of the optimistic bias4  ,it       
provides a moral individual with a sense
 of proprietorship in the universe2 it  
justifies him in the belief that the    
moral victory has been won from all     
eternity4  ,goodness is held to be the  

very essence and condition of being4    
,let me briefly state the inherent      
difficulty in this philosophy of        
religion4  ,being is judged to be       
identical with good4  ,but the world of 
experience is not good2 it must         
therefore be condemned as unreal4  ,of  
what1 then1 do goodness and being       
consist8  ,if an empty formalism is #bdc
 to be avoided1 the                     
all-good-and-all-real must be restored  
to the world of experience4  ,but as the
 all-real it can not consistently be    
identified with only a part of that     
world2 and if it be identified with the 
whole1 its all-goodness contradicts the 
moral distinction within the world of   
experience1 between good and evil4  ,the
 theory is now confronted with the      
opposite danger1 that of materialism1 or
 moral promiscuousness4 ,let me         
illustrate this full swing of the       
pendulum from formalism to materialism  
by briefly summarizing certain          
well-known types of religious           

philosophy4  ,at the formalistic extreme
 stands the ,buddhistic pessimism1#ab   
which rests on a recognition of the     
inevitable taint of this world1 of the  
implication of evil in life4  ,to avoid 
this taint1 the all-real-and-all-good   
must be freed even from existence4  ,it 
can be conceived and attained only by   
denial4  ,nirvana is at once the        
all-real1 the all-good1 and--in terms of
 the existent world--nothing4           
,other-worldliness is the ,christian    
modification of the ,oriental philosophy
 of illusion4  ,heaven is a world       
beyond1 to be exchanged for this4  ,it  
is not constituted by the denial of this
 world1 as is ,nirvana1 but access to it
 is conditioned by such denial4  ,it is 
goodness and happiness hypostasized1 and
 offered as compensation for martyrdom4 
,but since every natural impulse and    
source #bdd of satisfaction must be     
repudiated1 it remains a purely formal  
conception1 except in so far as the     
worldly imagination unlawfully          

prefigures it4  ,rigorously construed1  
it consists only in obedience1 a willing
 of ,god's will1 whatever that may be4  
,mysticism1#ac which appears as a motive
 in all religions of this type1 defines 
the all-real-and-all-good in terms of   
the consummation of a progression1      
certain intermediate stages of which    
constitute man's present activities4    
,in ,brahmanism1 ,god is the perfect    
unity1 which may be approximated by     
dwelling on identities and ignoring     
differences2 in ,platonism1 ,god is the 
good-for-all1 which may be approximated 
by dwelling exclusively upon the        
utilities and fitness of things4  ,the  
absolute world still remains beyond this
 world and excludes it1 although a hint 
of its actual nature may now be         
obtained4  ,but there at once appears a 
formidable difficulty4  ,so long as the 
absolute world is wholly separated from 
this world1 and therefore purely formal1
 evil need not be imputed to it2 but at 
the moment when it is conceived by      

completing and perfecting certain       
processes belonging to this world1 it is
 committed to these processes with all  
their implications1 and tends to be     
usurped by them4 ,in other words1       
heaven1 in so far as it obtains meaning1
 grows worldly4  ,in the conception     
which may be termed panlogism1 #bde     
heaven is boldly removed to earth4  ,it 
is identified with laws or other        
universals1 that lie within the scope of
 human intelligence and control the     
course of nature4  ,god is now immanent 
rather than transcendent2 he has        
obtained a certain definable content4   
,but the difficulty which has already   
appeared in mysticism now grows more    
formidable4  ,how can it be said that a 
being that coincides with the known laws
 of nature works only good8  ,among the 
,stoics the attempt was made to conceive
 all necessities as somehow beneficial1 
as somehow good in the commonly accepted
 sense of the term4#ad  ,but even the   
,stoics found themselves compelled to   

abandon the common conception of        
goodness4  ,and in ,spinoza the motive  
of panlogism is clear and               
uncompromising4#ae  ,god as the immanent
 order of the world is good only in that
 he is necessary--good only in so far as
 he satisfies the logical interest and  
enables the mind to understand4  ,in    
panlogism1 then1 we find metaphysical   
idealism already compelled in behalf of 
its cardinal principle to deny the moral
 consciousness4  ,but this is not all4  
,for even were it to be admitted that   
mere system and order constitute the    
good1 wholly without reference to their 
bearing on the concerns of life1 the    
fact remains that even such a good does 
not fairly represent the character of   
this world4  ,for experience conveys not
 only law1 #bdf but also irrelevance and
 chaos2 not only harmony but also       
discord4  ,to meet this last difficulty1
 and at the same time better to provide 
for the complexity of human interests1  
metaphysical idealism finally assumes   

the aesthetic form4  ,the absolute      
world1 the all-real-and-all-good1 is    
boldly construed in terms of the        
historical process itself1 with all its 
concreteness and immediacy4  ,endless   
detail1 contrast1 and even contradiction
 may be brought under the form of       
aesthetic value4  ,the very flux of     
experience1 the very struggles and      
defeats of life1 are not without their  
picturesqueness and dramatic quality4   
,upon this romantic love of tumult and  
privation is founded the last of all    
metaphysical idealisms4#af  ,a strange  
sequel to the doctrine of despair with  
which our brief survey began6  ,i can   
only recapitulate most briefly the      
characteristic limitations of an        
aesthetic idealism4  ,first1 in spite of
 the fact that aesthetic value may be   
extraordinarily comprehensive in its    
content1 as a value it is none the less 
narrow and exclusive4  ,for in order    
that experience may have aesthetic      
value1 an aesthetic interest must be    

taken in it4  ,and even were all        
experience to satisfy some such         
interest1 this would in no wise provide 
for the endless variety of non-aesthetic
 interests that are also taken in it4   
,thus1 were it to be proved that life on
 the whole is picturesque1 this #bdg    
would in no way affect the fact that it 
is also painful1 stultifying1 and       
otherwise abounding in evil4  ,but1 even
 if it were to be granted that aesthetic
 value embraces and subordinates all    
other values1 this higher value would   
still exist only where such an aesthetic
 interest was actually fulfilled4  ,if  
it were assumed that the totality of the
 world is pleasing in the sight of ,god1
 this would in no way affect the fact   
that it is otherwise in the eyes of men4
  ,those who furnish a spectacle which  
has dramatic value for an observer do   
not necessarily themselves share in that
 value4  ,it is an incontrovertible fact
 that the aesthetic interests of men are
 actually defeated2 and this whether or 

no some other aesthetic interest--that1 
for example1 of a divine onlooker--is   
fulfilled4  ,but the radical defect of  
this aesthetic philosophy of religion   
lies in its absolute discrediting of    
moral distinctions4  ,optimism has so   
far overreached itself as to sacrifice  
the very meaning of goodness4  ,in order
 that the ideal may possess the world1  
it has been reduced to the world4  ,god 
is no more than a name for the          
unmitigated reality4  ,like ,hardy's    
,spirit of the ,years1 he is the mere   
affirmation of things as they are3      
,i view1 not urge2 nor more than mark   
,what designate your titles ,good and   
,ill4   ',tis not in me to feel with1 or
 against1   ,these flesh-hinged         
mannikins ,its hand upwinds   #bdh   ,to
 click-clack off ,its preadjusted laws2 
,but only through my centuries to behold
   ,their aspects1 and their movements1 
and their mould4 #ag  ,morally1 there   
could be no more sinister interpretation
 of life4  ,it offers itself as a       

philosophy of hope1 promising the lover 
of good that his purpose shall be       
fulfilled1 nay1 that it is fulfilled    
from all eternity4  ,but when the pledge
 is redeemed1 it is found to stipulate  
that the good shall mean only life as it
 is already possessed4  ,in other words1
 man is promised what he wants if he    
will agree to want what he has4  ,this  
is worse than a sorry jest4  ,it is a   
philosophy of moral dissolution1        
discrediting every downright judgment of
 good and evil1 removing the grounds    
upon which is based every single-minded 
endeavor to purify and consummate life4 
,john ,davidson says3 ,irony integrates 
good and evil1 the constituents of the  
universe4  ,it is that                  
,beyond-,good-and-,evil which somebody  
clamoured for4 #ah  ,irony is indeed the
 last refuge of that uncompromising     
optimism that equates goodness and      
being4   ,,vi  ,but the bankruptcy of   
metaphysical idealism does not end the  
matter4 ,there is another idealism in   

which religious faith both confirms     
moral endeavor and gives it the         
incentive of hope4  ,this #bdi idealism 
establishes itself upon an unequivocal  
acceptance of moral truth4  ,it calls   
good good and evil evil1 with all the   
finality which attaches to the human    
experience of these things1 leaving no  
room for compromise4 ,its faith lies in 
the expectation that the world shall    
become good through the elimination of  
evil2 it manifests itself in the        
resolution to hasten that time4  ,god is
 loved for the enemies he has made4     
,evil is hated without reservation as   
none of his doing1 and man is free to   
reverence the ,lord his ,god with all   
his heart4  ,from the stand-point of    
moral idealism the universe resumes     
something of its pristine ruggedness and
 grandeur4  ,if1 as ,james says1 the    
world appears as something more epic    
than dramatic1 the dignity of life is   
enhanced and not diminished on that     
account4#ai  ,life is not a spiritual   

exercise the results of which are       
discounted in advance2 but is actually  
creative1 fashioning and perfecting a   
good that has never been4  ,and the     
moment evil is conceived as the         
necessary but diminishing complement to 
partial success1 the sting of it is     
gone4  ,evil as a temporary and         
accidental necessity is tolerable2 but  
not so an evil which is absolutely      
necessary1 and which must be construed  
with some hypothetical divine           
satisfaction4  ,this in no way          
contradicts the fact that the #bej      
fullest life under present conditions   
involves contact with evil4  ,innocence 
must be tragic if it is not to be weak4 
,jesus without the cross would possess  
something of that quality of unreality  
which attaches to ,aristotle's          
high-minded man4  ,but this does not    
prove that life involves evil2 it proves
 only that life will be narrow and      
complacent when it is out of touch with 
things as they are4  ,since evil is now 

real1 he who altogether escapes it is   
ignorant and idle1 taking no hand in the
 real work to be done4  ,not to feel    
pain when pain abounds1 not to bear some
 share of the burden1 is indeed cause   
for shame4  ,in that remarkable         
allegory1 ,the ,man ,who ,was ,thursday1
 ,chesterton has most vividly presented 
this truth4  ,in the last confrontation1
 the real anarchist1 the spokesman of   
,satan1 accuses the friends of order of 
being happy1 of having been protected   
from suffering4 ,but the philosopher1   
who has hitherto been unable to         
understand the despair to which he and  
his companions have been driven1 repels 
this slander4   ',i see everything1' he 
cried1 'everything that there is4  ,why 
does each thing on the earth war against
 each other thing8  ,why does each small
 thing in the world have to fight       
against the world itself8 4 4 4  ,so    
that each thing that obeys law may have 
the glory and isolation of the          
anarchist4  ,so that each man fighting  

for order may be as brave and good a man
 as the dynamiter4  ,so that the real   
lie of ,satan may be #bea flung back in 
the face of this blasphemer1 so that by 
tears and torture we may earn the right 
to say to this man1 ,you lie6  ,no      
agonies can be too great to buy the     
right to say to this accuser1 ,we also  
have suffered4  ',it is not true that we
 have never been broken4  ,we have been 
broken upon the wheel4 4 4 4  ,we have  
descended into hell4  ,we were          
complaining of unforgettable miseries   
even at the very moment when this man   
entered insolently to accuse us of      
happiness4  ,i repel the slander2 we    
have not been happy4'#bj   ,but the     
charge of happiness is to be repelled as
 a slander only because there are real  
sufferers in the world to make the      
charge4  ,it is1 after all1 not         
happiness but insensibility which is the
 real disgrace4  ,if the suffering is   
real1 not to see it1 not to feel it1 not
 to heal it1 is intolerable4  ,to say1  

however1 that suffering is wilfully     
caused in order that it may eventually  
contribute to an ultimate               
reconciliation1 is to charge ,god with  
something worse than complacency4  ,if  
life is a real tragedy it can be        
endured1 and to enter into it will bring
 the deep satisfaction which every form 
of heroism affords4  ,but if the tragedy
 of life be preconceived and wilfully   
perpetrated1 it must be resented for the
 sake of self-respect4  ,even man       
possesses a dignity which is not        
consistent with puppetry and mock       
heroics4  ,moral idealism means to      
interpret life consistently with        
ethical1 scientific1 and metaphysical   
truth4  ,it endeavors to justify the    
maximum of #beb hope1 without           
compromising or confusing any           
enlightened judgment of truth4  ,in this
 it is1 ,i think1 not only consistent   
with the spirit of a liberal and        
rational age1 but also with the primary 
motive of religion4 ,there can be no    

religion with reservations1 fearful of  
increasing light4 ,no man can do the    
work of religion without an open and    
candid mind as well as an indomitable   
purpose4  ,i can not here elaborate the 
evidence upon which moral idealism is   
grounded2 but it might be broadly       
classified as ethical1 cosmological1 and
 historical4  ,the ethical ground of    
moral idealism is the virtual unity of  
life1 the working therein of one        
eventual purpose sustained by the       
good-will of all moral beings4  ,the    
cosmological proof lies in the moral    
fruitfulness and plasticity of nature4  
,the historical proof lies in the fact  
of moral progress1 in the advent and    
steady betterment of life4   ,,vii  ,in 
conclusion ,i wish to revert to the     
topic of the generic proof of religion4 
,we have defined the tests which any    
special religion must meet1 and unless  
conformably to such tests it is possible
 to justify some form of idealism1 it is
 clear that the full possibilities of   

religion as a source of strength and    
consolation must fail to be realized4   
,but it may now be affirmed that there  
is a moral #bec value in religion which 
is independent of the cosmological      
considerations which prove or disprove a
 special religion4  ,no scientific or   
metaphysical evidence can controvert the
 fact that man is engaged in an         
enterprise which comprehends all the    
actualities and possibilities of life1  
and that the success of this enterprise 
is conditioned1 in the end1 on the      
compliance of the universe4  ,a summing 
up of the situation as involving these  
two factors is morally inevitable4      
,some solution of the problem1          
assimilated and enacted1 in other words1
 some form of piety1 is no more than the
 last stage of moral growth4  ,the value
 of religious belief1 in this generic   
moral sense1 consists in the enlargement
 of the circle of life4  ,man knows the 
best and the worst2 he walks in the     
open1 apprehending the world in its full

 sweep and just proportions4  ,an       
inclusive view of the universe1 whatever
 it may reveal1 throws into relief the  
lot of man4  ,religion promulgates the  
idea of life as a whole1 and composes   
and proportions its activities with     
reference to their ultimate end4        
,religion advocates not the virtues in  
their severalty1 but the whole moral    
enterprise4  ,with this it affiliates   
all the sundry activities of life1 thus 
bringing both action and thought under  
the form of service of the ideal4  ,at  
the same time it offers a supreme object
 for the passions1 which are otherwise  
divided against #bed themselves1 or     
vented upon unworthy and fantastical    
objects4 ,through being thus economized 
and guided1 these moving energies may be
 brought to support moral endeavor and  
bear it with them in their current4     
,piety carries with it also that sense  
of high resolve without which life must 
be haunted with a sense of ignominy4    
,this is the immediate value of the     

good-will3 the full deliverance of one's
 self to the cause of goodness4  ,this  
value is independent of attainment4  ,it
 is that doing of one's best1 which is  
the least that one can do4  ,having sped
 one's action with good-will1 one can   
only leave the outcome to the confluence
 and summing of like forces4  ,but such 
service is blessed both in the          
eventualities and in a present harmony  
as well4  ,the good of participation in 
the greatest and most worthy enterprise 
is proved in its lending fruitfulness1  
dignity1 and momentousness to action2   
but also in its infusing the individual 
life with that ardor and tenderness     
which is called the love of humanity and
 of ,god1 and which is the only form of 
happiness that fully measures up to the 
awakened moral consciousness4  ,since   
religion emphasizes the unity of life   
and supplies it with meaning and        
dignity1 it is the function of religion 
to kindle moral enthusiasm in society at
 large4  ,religion is responsible for   

the #bee prestige of morality4  ,as an  
institution1 it is the appointed        
guardian and medium of that supreme     
value which is hidden from the world2 of
 that finality which1 in the course of  
human affairs1 is so easily lost to view
 and so infrequently proved4  ,it is    
therefore the function of the religious 
leader to make men lovers1 not of the   
parts1 but of the whole of goodness4    
,embarrassed by their very plenitude of 
life1 men require to have the good-will 
that is in them aroused and put in      
control4  ,this1 then1 is the work of   
religion3 to strike home to the moral   
nature itself1 and to induce in men a   
keener and more vivid realization of    
their latent preference for the higher  
over the lower values4  ,this office    
requires for its fulfilment a           
constructive moral imagination1 a power 
to arouse and direct the contagious     
emotions1 and the use of the means of   
personality and ritual for the creation 
of a sweetening and uplifting           

environment4  ,in culture and religion  
human life is brought to the elevation  
which is proper to it4  ,they are both  
forms of discipline through which is    
inculcated that quality of magnanimity  
and service which is the mark of        
spiritual maturity4  ,but while culture 
is essentially contemplative1           
far-seeing1 sensitive1 and tolerant1    
religion is more stirring and vital4    
,both are love of perfection1 but       
culture is admiration2 religion1        
concern4  #bef ,not he that saith ,lord1
 ,lord1 but he that doeth the will of   
his ,father1 shall be saved4  ,in       
religion the old note of fear is always 
present4  ,it is a perpetual            
watchfulness lest the work of life be   
undone1 or lest a chance for the best be
 forfeited4     #beg  ,,notes  ,,chapter
 ,i  #a ,joseph ,butler3 ,sermon ,,vii1 
edited by ,gladstone1 p4 #aad4  ,cf4    
also ,sermon ,x1 on ,self-,deceit4  #b  
,nietsche3 ,beyond ,good and ,evil1     
translated by ,helen ,zimmern1 p4 #agd4 

#c ,edmund ,burke3 ,a ,vindication of   
,natural ,society1 ,preface1 pp4 #d1 #e4
  7,boston1 #ahjf47  #d ,the classic    
discussion of the whole matter is to be 
found in ,aristotle's ,nicomachean      
,ethics1 ,book ,i1 ,chapters ,i-,,vi1   
translated by ,j4 ,e4 ,c4 ,welldon4     
,cf4 also ,fr4 ,paulsen3 ,system of     
,ethics1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chapters ,i1 ,,ii1
 translated by ,frank ,thilly2 ,g4 ,h4  
,palmer3 ,the ,nature of ,goodness1     
,chapters ,i1 ,,ii2 and ,w4 ,james3 ,the
 ,moral ,philosopher and the ,moral     
,life1 in his ,will to ,believe4  #e    
,the issue is presented clearly and     
briefly in ,paulsen3 ,op4 cit41 ,book   
,,ii1 ,chapter ,,ii1 and in ,james's    
,principles of ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 
pp4 #edi-eei4  #f ,nietsche3 ,op4 cit41 
p4 #ajg4  #g ,huxley3 ,evolution and    
,ethics and ,other ,essays1 pp4 #ha-hb4 
,the first two essays contained in this 
volume1 the ,prolegomena1 and the       
,romanes ,lecture1 contain a very       
interesting study of the relation of    

morality to nature4  #h ,huxley3 ,op4   
cit41 p4 #ac4  #i ,g4 ,k4 ,chesterton3  
,napoleon of ,notting ,hill1 p4 #bia4   
,the whole book is a brilliant satire1  
intended to show that all of the heroic 
sentiments and virtues depend on war and
 local pride4  #aj ,nietsche3 ,op4 cit41
 pp4 #ei1 #afc1 #agf1 #bbc1 #bce1 #bcg1 
#abb4  #aa ,chesterton3 ,heretics1 and  
,orthodoxy4  #ab ,plato3 ,protagoras1 p4
 #cbb 7marginal pagination71 and passim2
 translated by ,jowett4  #beh  ,,chapter
 ,,ii  #a ,locke3 ,the ,conduct of the  
,understanding1 ,bohn's ,library        
,edition1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #gb2 also1       
passim4  #b ,locke3 ,op4 cit41 p4 #ef4  
#c ,descartes3 ,discourse on ,method1   
translated by ,veitch1 pp4 #ac-ad4      
,also1 passim4  #d ,spinoza3 ,the       
,improvement of the ,understanding1     
translated by ,elwes1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #d4
  #e ,cf4 ,plato's ,republic1 ,books    
,v-,,vii1 passim4  #f ,for further      
discussion of the meaning of duty1 cf4  
,kant's ,critical ,examination of the   

,practical ,reason1 ,book ,i1 ,chapter  
,,iii1 translated in ,abbott's ,kant's  
,theory of ,ethics1 p4 #afd2 ,bradley's 
,ethical ,studies1 ,essays ,,ii and ,v2 
and ,sidgwick's ,methods of ,ethics1    
,book ,i1 ,chapter ,,iii4  #g           
,chesterton3 ,napoleon of ,notting      
,hill1 p4 #afb4  #h ,g4 ,e4 ,moore3     
,principia ,ethica1 ,chapter ,,iii1     
,sect4 #eh-fc4  #i ,locke3 ,op4 cit41 p4
 #bi4  #aj ,there is an excellent       
account of the questions that lie on the
 border between ethics and jurisprudence
 in ,s4 ,e4 ,mezes's ,ethics1           
,descriptive and ,explanatory1 ,chapter 
,,xiii4  #aa ,kant3 ,fundamental        
,principles of the ,metaphysic of       
,morals1 translated in ,abbott's ,kant's
 ,theory of ,ethics1 p4 #dg4  #ab ,h4   
,g4 ,lord3 ,the ,abuse of ,abstraction  
in ,ethics1 in ,essays ,philosophical   
and ,psychological in ,honor of ,william
 ,james1 pp4 #cgf-cgg4  #ac ,john       
,davidson3 ,a ,rosary1 pp4 #gg1 #hb4    
#ad ,maurice ,maeterlinck3 ,the ,measure

 of the ,hours1 translated by ,a4 ,t4 de
 ,mattos1 p4 #aea4  ,the essay in this  
volume1 entitled ,our ,anxious          
,morality1 charges rationalism with     
destroying the romantic and mystical    
element in life4   ,,chapter ,,iii  #a  
,a good discussion of the several       
virtues will be found in ,paulsen3 ,op4 
cit41 ,book ,,iii4  #b ,w4 ,h4 ,s4      
,jones3 ,greek ,morality1 p4 #ej4  #c   
,jeremy ,taylor3 ,rules and ,exercises  
of ,holy ,living1 edited by ,ezra       
,abbot1 p4 #gc4  #d ,jones3 ,op4 cit41  
p4 #abd4  #bei  #e ,count ,baldesar     
,castiglione3 ,the ,book of the         
,courtier1 translated by ,opdycke1 p4   
#bej4  #f ,cf4 ,hobbes3 ,leviathan1     
,chapters ,,xiii1 ,,xiv1 ,,xv4  ,in     
,hobbes's account1 morality is reduced  
wholly to the prudential economy4  #g   
,h4 ,g4 ,wells3 ,first and ,last        
,things1 p4 #hb4  #h ,castiglione3 ,op4 
cit41 p4 #beg4  #i ,burke3 ,op4 cit41 p4
 #h4  #aj ,epictetus3 ,discourses1 ,book
 ,,iii1 ,chapter ,,xxii1 translated by  

,long1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #hb1 #hc4  #aa   
,taylor3 ,op4 cit41 p4 #g4  #ab         
,epictetus3 ,op4 cit41 ,book ,,ii1      
,chapter ,,xxi1 translated by ,long1    
,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bbi4  #ac ,cf4 ,hegel3    
,philosophy of ,right1 ,third ,part1    
,third ,section1 translated by ,s4 ,w4  
,dyde2 and ,philosophy of ,history1     
,introduction1 translated by ,j4        
,sibree4  #ad ,cf4 ,plato's ,republic1  
passim1 but especially ,book ,,iv4      
,plato makes the state analogous to the 
individual organism1 requiring baser    
classes that shall permanently supply   
its lower functions1 as well as classes 
that shall supply its higher functions  
and so participate in its full benefits4
  #ae ,aristotle3 ,politics1 ,book ,,ii1
 ,chapter ,v1 translated by ,jowett1 p4 
#ce4  ,cf4 also ,chapter ,,ii4  #af     
,epictetus3 ,op4 cit41 ,book ,,ii1      
,chapter ,,xv1 translated by ,long1     
,vol4 ,i1 p4 #ahi4  #ag ,sophocles3     
,antigone1 translated by ,g4 ,h4        
,palmer1 pp4 #fa1 #fb4  #ah ,munro and  

,sellery3 ,medieval ,civilization1 pp4  
#cdi-cej4  #ai ,castiglione3 ,op4 cit41 
p4 #bfa4  #bj ,quoted from ,diog4       
,laert4 by ,jones1 ,op4 cit41 p4 #fi4   
,for a full account1 cf4 ,aristotle's   
,nicomachean ,ethics1 ,books ,,viii and 
,,ix1 translated by ,welldon1 pp4       
#bde-cad4  #ba ,walter ,bagehot3        
,physics and ,politics1 ,no4 ,v1 in the 
edition of the ,international           
,scientific ,series1 pp4 #afe-aff4  ,cf4
 this chapter passim4  #bb ,matthew     
,arnold3 ,culture and ,anarchy1 p4 #ajj4
  #bc ,quoted by ,jones3 ,op4 cit41 p4  
#abh4  #bd ,ibid4  #be ,arnold3 ,op4    
cit41 pp4 #be-bf4  ,cf4 passim4  #bf    
,euripides3 ,medea1 translated by       
,gilbert ,murray1 pp4 #fg-fh4  #bfj  #bg
 ,cf41 e4 g41 ,aristotle1 ,nicomachean  
,ethics1 ,book ,x4  ,also ,j4 ,a4       
,farrer's ,paganism and ,christianity1  
passim2 and ,paulsen1 op4 cit41 ,book   
,i1 ,chapters ,i-,,iii4  #bh ,sir       
,thomas ,browne2 ,religio ,medici1      
edited by ,j4 ,m4 ,dent  ,co41 p4 #ig4  

#bi ,w4 ,james3 ,pragmatism1 p4 #bcj4   
#cj ,browne3 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #aah-aai4   
#ca ,ibid41 p4 #aaj4  #cb ,castiglione3 
,op4 cit41 pp4 #cjd-cje4   ,,chapter    
,,iv  #a ,the nearest approach to such a
 philosophy of history is ,george       
,santayana's ,life of ,reason4  ,the    
reader will find it the best book of    
reference for this and the following    
chapter4  ,cf4 also1 ,samuel            
,alexander's ,moral ,order and          
,progress4  #b ,bagehot3 ,op4 cit41 ,no4
 ,,vi1 pp4 #bjh-bji4  #c ,ibid41 p4     
#afa4  #d ,nietsche3 ,op4 cit41 pp4     
#fe-ff4  #e ,for a general ethical      
discussion of the function of           
government1 cf4 ,santayana3 ,reason in  
,society1 ,chapters ,,iii-,,viii4  #f   
,sophocles3 ,antigone1 translated by    
,palmer1 pp4 #fj1 #fc-fd4  #g #a        
,samuel1 ,chapter ,,viii4  #h ,quoted in
 ,taine's ,philosophy of ,art in        
,greece1 translated by ,j4 ,durand1 p4  
#acj4  #i ,thucydides3 ,peloponnesian   
,war1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chapters #cg-dj1     

translated by ,jowett1 pp4 #aag-aai4    
#aj ,plato3 ,republic1 ,book ,,iv1 p4   
#dcc1 translated by ,jowett4  #aa       
,burke3 ,op4 cit41 p4 #dc4  #ab ,for a  
brief statement of the elements of      
political science in their application  
to modern institutions1 cf4 ,e4 ,jenks3 
,a ,history of ,politics4  #ab ,arnold3 
,the ,future of ,liberalism1 in the     
volume1 ,mixed ,essays1 ,irish ,essays  
and ,others1 p4 #chc4  ,cf4 also the    
admirable essay on ,democracy in the    
same volume4  #ad ,plato3 ,republic1    
,book ,i1 p4 #cce1 translated by        
,jowett4  #ae ,wells3 ,op4 cit41 pp4    
#acj-aca4   #bfa  ,,chapter ,v  #a ,a   
good account of the meaning of art is to
 be found in ,santayana's ,reason in    
,art1 ,chapters ,i-,,iii4  #b ,for this 
whole topic of the aesthetic interest1  
cf4 ,h4 ,r4 ,marshall's ,pleasure1      
,pain1 and ,aesthetics4  #c ,for an     
interpretation of painting in terms of  
the perceptual process1 cf4 ,b4         
,berenson's ,florentine ,painters of the

 ,renaissance1 pp4 #a-af2 and ,north    
,italian ,painters of the ,renaissance1 
pp4 #ade-aeg4  #d ,the best account of  
the emotions and instincts is to be     
found in ,james's ,principles of        
,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,chapters      
,,xxiv1 ,,xxv4  #e ,walter ,pater3 ,the 
,renaissance1 p4 #adj4  #f ,taine3 ,op4 
cit41 pp4 #aab1 #aad-aae1 and passim4   
#g ,pater3 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #abi-acj2 cf4 
the chapter on ,leonardo da ,vinci1     
entire4  #h ,plato3 ,republic1 ,book    
,,iii1 p4 #cih1 translated by ,jowett4  
,the whole of ,books ,,iii and ,x are   
interesting in this connection4  #i ,in 
connection with the general topic of the
 moral criticism of art1 cf4            
,santayana's ,reason in ,art1 ,chapters 
,,ix-,,xi2 also ,ruskin's ,lectures on  
,art1 ,lectures ,,ii-,,iv4  #aj         
,aristotle3 ,nicomachean ,ethics1 ,book 
,x4  #aa ,cf4 the ,republic1 ,book ,x4  
#ab ,arthur ,benson3 ,beside ,still     
,waters1 pp4 #ach-aci4  ,cf4 also pp4   
#adc-add4  #ac ,pater3 ,op4 cit41 pp4   

#bdi1 #bej2 cf4 the ,conclusion1 passim4
  #ad ,james3 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4  
#abe-abf4  #ae ,republic2 ,book ,x1 p4  
#fjf1 translated by ,jowett4  #af       
,ibid41 ,book ,,iii1 p4 #cii4  #ag      
,aristotle3 ,politics1 ,book ,,viii1    
,chapter ,v1 translated by ,jowett1 p4  
#beb4  #ah  ,taine3 ,the ,ideal in ,art1
 translated by ,j4 ,durand1 pp4 #db sq4 
#ai ,tolsty3 ,what is ,art8  ,x1        
translated by ,leo ,wiener1 p4 #bbg4    
#bj ,arnold3 ,culture and ,anarchy1 pp4 
#cg1 #ch4  ,cf4 ,chapter ,i1 passim4    
#ba ,republic1 ,book ,,iii1 p4 #dja1    
translation by ,jowett4   #bfb          
,,chapter ,,vi  #a ,this chapter is     
reprinted from the ,harvard ,theological
 ,review for ,april1 #aiji4  #b ,i have 
treated this matter more fully in my    
,approach to ,philosophy1 ,chapters     
,,iii and ,,iv4  ,at the close of that  
book the reader will find a selected    
bibliography of the subject4  #c ,john  
,henry ,newman3 ,apologia pro ,vita     
,sua1 p4 #bci4  ,the whole book is of   

interest in this connection4  #d ,munro 
and ,sellery3 ,mediaeval ,civilization1 
p4 #fi4  #e ,fragments of ,xenophanes1  
in ,burnet's ,early ,greek ,philosophy1 
p4 #aae4  #f ,lucretius3 ,de ,rerum     
,natura1 ,book ,i1 lines #ajba-ajbh1    
translated by ,munro4  #g ,isaiah       
#a3ae-ag4  #h ,for a brief account of   
primitive religion1 cf4 ,j4 ,b4 ,pratt's
 ,psychology of ,religious ,belief4     
,for a fuller account1 cf4 ,f4 ,b4      
,jevons's ,introduction to the ,history 
of ,religion4  #i ,munro and ,sellery3  
,op4 cit41 pp4 #hj1 #ge4  #aj ,a4 ,h4   
,sayce3 ,babylonians and ,assyrians1 p4 
#bec4  #aa ,a4 ,wiedemann3 ,religion of 
the ,ancient ,egyptians1 p4 #bej4  #ab  
,cf4 ,h4 ,c4 ,warren's ,buddhism in     
,translation4  #ac ,the reader will find
 a good exposition of mysticism in      
,royce's ,world and the ,individual1    
,first ,series1 ,lectures ,,ii1 ,,iv1   
,v4  #ad ,cf41 e4 g41 ,epictetus3       
,discourses1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chapter       
,,viii4  #ae ,cf4 ,spinoza's ,ethics1   

passim1 translated by ,elwes4  #af ,cf4 
,royce's account of ,romanticism and    
,hegel1 in his ,spirit of ,modern       
,philosophy1 ,lectures ,,vi1 ,,vii4     
,this motive1 together with the motive  
of mysticism1 appears in such writings  
as ,j4 ,mc,t4 ,e4 ,mc,taggart's ,studies
 in ,hegelian ,cosmology1 ,chapter ,,ix2
 and ,a4 ,e4 ,taylor's ,problem of      
,conduct1 ,chapter ,,viii4  #ag ,thomas 
,hardy3 ,the ,dynasts1 ,part ,i1 p4 #e4 
#ah ,john ,davidson3 ,a ,rosary1 p4 #hh4
  #ai ,james3 ,pragmatism1 p4 #add4     
,the whole chapter is a brilliant       
representation of the stand-point of    
moral idealism4  #bj ,g4 ,k4            
,chesterton3 ,the ,man ,who ,was        
,thursday1 pp4 #bgh-bgi4     #bfc       
,,index     ,achievement1 #gi1 #ha1 #ig4
   ,adaptation1 #bb4   ,aesthetic       
,interest1 definition of1 #agi2         
varieties of1 #aha ff41     #ahi2 moral 
limitation of1 #aij2 sell-sufficiency   
of1 #aib2     exaggeration of1 #aib1    
#aie1 #aih ff42 its pervasiveness1      

#aid ff42 vicariousness of1 #aig2       
stimulating character     of1 #bja1 #bjc
 ff42 liberality of1 #bji ff42     in   
religion1 #bdf ff4   ,aimlessness1 #id4 
,anarchism1 #ajg4   ,aristotle1 quoted1 
#ajj1 #ajf1 #aib1 #bjd4   ,arnold1 ,m41 
quoted1 #ajh1 #aji1 #aab1 #afd1 #baa4   
,art1 moral criticism of1 ,ch4 ,v2      
its liability to moral criticism1 #agc  
ff2 definition of1     #agg2 distinction
 between industrial and fine1 #agg ff42 
emotion in1 #ahb ff42 representative    
function of1 #ahe ff41     #bjc ff42    
,greek1 #ahe ff42 of ,renaissance1 #ahg2
     censorship of1 #aij2 stimulating   
character of1 #bja ff42     truth in1   
#bje ff42 universality and particularity
 of1     #bjg ff42 and liberality1 #bji 
ff42 moral function of1 #bab4           
,asceticism1 #gi1 #ha1 #ib ff4          
,bagehot1 quoted1 #ajf1 #abg1 #acb4     
,beauty1 and goodness1 #agb ff4         
,belief1 and religion1 #baf1 #bbj1 #bbh4
   ,benson1 ,a41 quoted1 #aid4          
,bigotry1 #gi1 #ha1 #aja ff4   ,browne1 

,sir ,thomas1 quoted1 #aae1 #aag1 #aah4 
,buddhism1 #bdc4   ,burke1 quoted1 #f1  
#ib1 #aeh1 #bad4   ,butler1 ,j41 quoted1
 #a4    ,castiglione1 quoted1 #hi1 #ij1 
#aai4   ,character1 #ig4   ,chesterton1 
,g4 ,k41 #cb2 quoted1 #bh1 #ee1 #bej4   
,christianity1 #id1 #aaa1 #aad ff41     
#adj1 #aeh1 #ahg1 #bbh1 #bci1 #bdc4     
,civilization1 #c1 #f1 #aj1 #bc1 #cb1   
#abd1 #acg1 #afg1 #agj1 #bae4  ,see     
,progress4   ,competition1 #ad1 #abi1   
#acj2 relation to morality1 #bd ff4     
,conscience1 #cd1 #cf4  ,see ,duty4     
,conservatism1 #add ff4   ,convention1  
#cf1 #ch ff4   ,cosmological1 test of   
religion1 #bbd1 #bbe1 #bcd1 #bcg1       
#bdj1 #bda1 #beb4   ,courage1 #ie4      
,culture1 #baa1 #bec4  ,chap4 ,v1       
passim4   ,cynics1 the ,greek1 #ib ff41 
#acg4    ,davidson1 ,j41 quoted1 #gj1   
#bdh4   ,democracy1 #bi1 #ci2 modern    
idea of1 #aeh ff41 #afc ff4             
,descartes1 quoted1 #ce4   ,desire1 #aa4
  ,see ,interest4   ,discussion1 #ajf1  
#acb4   ,dogmatism1 #d4   ,duty1 ,ch4   

,,ii1 #dj1 #gb2 formalism and1 #gf4     
,egoism1 theoretical1 #ei ff42          
practical1 #gi1 #ha1 #aja4   ,emotion1  
and art1 #ahb ff41 #bja ff4             
,epictetus1 quoted1 #ic1 #if1 #ajj4     
,equality1 #fe1 #ff1 #aeh ff41 #afc ff4 
,ethics1 and history1 #abd2 and         
religion1 #bbd ff41 #bcc1 #bdj1         
#bda1 #beb2 independence of1 #bbh4  ,see
 ,morality4   ,euripides1 quoted1 #aad4 
,evil1 #aa1 #ae1 #hd1 #hf2 religious    
conception of1 #bdc ff41     #bdi ff4   
,see ,good1 ,vice1 ,formalism1          
,materialism4    ,faith1 #cc1 #ga4      
,fine ,art4  ,see ,art4   ,formalism1   
#gd ff41 #ib2 and duty1 #gf1 #gg2       
varieties of1     #gi1 #ha1 #ib1 #ih1   
#ajg1 #aaf1 #bji1 #bdb4   ,freedom1 #cf1
 #ajg1 #afd4    ,god1 #baf1 #bbd ff41   
#bbi1 #bcb1 #bcg1 #bdj1 #bde1 #bdi4     
,good1 basal definition of1 #aa ff41    
#dd2 definition of moral1     #ae ff42  
relativity of1 #de ff42 relation to     
beautiful1     #agb ff41 #bab4          
,good-will1 logic of1 #fg ff42 virtue   

of1 #gi1 #ha1 #aac ff41 #aeh4           
,government1 #ad2 progress in1 #adh ff42
 ,platonic theory of1     #adh2         
definition of1 #aej2 ancient forms of1  
#aeb ff42     summary of modern1 #afj   
ff4   ,greece1 morality of1 #aaj1 #aad2 
government in1 #aed ff42 art     of1    
#ahe ff41 #bjd2 religion of1 #bbf4      
,happiness1 #ah1 #aae1 #aaf ff4         
,hardy1 ,t41 quoted1 #bdg4   ,health1   
#gi1 #ha1 #hh ff4   ,hebrews1 government
 of1 #aeb2 religion of1 #bbg1 #bci4     
,hedonism1 #af4   ,history1 meaning of1 
#abc ff4   ,hobbes1 #hi4   ,honesty1    
#hh4   ,huxley1 theory of morality and  
nature1 #ba ff4    ,idealism1           
metaphysical1 #bdb ff42 aesthetic1 #bdf2
     moral1 #bdh ff4   ,idleness1 #id4  
,imagination1 #bh1 #fi1 #aaa4           
,imprudence1 #gi1 #ha1 #he ff4          
,incapacity1 #gi1 #ha1 #hc4             
,individualism1 #cd ff4   ,injustice1   
#gi1 #ha1 #ajc4  ,see ,justice4         
,institutions1 their necessity1 #c1     
#adg4  ,see ,government4                

,intelligence1 #gi1 #ha1 #hb ff4        
,interest1 definition of1 #aa1 #dc2     
organization of1 #ac1 #ad1 #ai1         
variety of1 #af1 #ag2 the higher1 #eb2  
conflict of1 #ec2     objective validity
 of1 #ed2 private1 #eg ff42 the         
potential1 #fg1 #fh1 #afg2 present and  
ulterior1 #gd ff42     economies of1    
#gh2 simple1 #gh1 #ha1 #hb ff42         
reciprocity     of1 #gh1 #ha1 #hg ff41  
incorporation of1 #gh1 #ha1 #ie ff42    
fraternity of1 #gh1 #ha1 #aje ff42      
universal system     of1 #gi1 #ha1 #aab 
ff42 and progress1 #acb2 and reform1    
#acg2     and revolution1 #aci2 and     
government1 #adh ff42 the     aesthetic1
 #agi2 the theoretical1 #ahj1 #aic2     
varieties of     the aesthetic1 #aha ff4
  ,see ,aesthetic ,interest4    ,james1 
,w41 quoted1 #aaf1 #aii1 #bdi4          
,justice1 meanings of1 #fc1 #gi1 #ha1   
#aje1 #aeh1 #afc2     logic of1 #fc ff4 
,kant1 quoted1 #fd4    ,laissez-faire1  
#ajh4   ,liberality1 #aef2 and art1     
#bji4   ,life1 morality as the          

organization of1 ,ch4 ,i2 versus        
mechanism1 #aj1 #bb2 morality one with1 
#ai1 #bg2 method of1 #bc4   ,locke1     
quoted1 #cd1 #ce1 #fb4   ,logic1 of the 
moral appeal1 ,ch4 ,,ii2 and the        
imagination1 #fi4   ,lord1 ,h4 ,g41     
quoted1 #fi4   ,lucretius1 quoted1 #bbf4
    ,maeterlinck1 quoted1 #ga4          
,manners1 #aba4   ,materialism1 #gd ff41
 #hd2 varieties of1 #gi1 #ha1 #id1 #aja1
     #aaj1 #bdc4   ,mechanical ,nature1 
#ab2 lack of value in1 #i1 #hd2 and     
progress1 #acj4   ,menander1 quoted1    
#hh4   ,metaphysics and religion1 #bdb  
ff4   ,moderation1 #hg4   ,moore1 ,g4   
,e41 critique of egoism1 #ei ff4        
,morality1 as the organization of life1 
,ch4 ,i2 the dulness     of1 #a2 as     
verified truth1 #g2 its universal       
pertinence1     #g ff42 essential to    
life1 #i1 #cb2 natural genesis of1      
#i ff42 basal definition of1 #ac2 and   
nature1 #bj ff42     and competition1   
#bd ff42 the logic of1 ,ch4 ,,ii2       
rational     ground of1 #ch1 #dj ff42   

material and formal aspects of1     #gd 
ff41 #aba2 and progress1 ,ch4 ,,iv2 and 
art1 ,ch4 ,v2 and     aesthetic         
standards1 #agb ff42 and religion1 ,ch4 
,,vi2     and idealism1 #bdh ff4        
,mysticism1 #aaf1 #bdd2 and art1 #bjh4  
,nationalism1 #ii4   ,nature1 genesis of
 morality in1 #i ff42 and morality1     
#bj ff42 theories of1 in religion1 #bbd1
 #bbe1 #bcd1 #bcg1 #bdj4   ,newman1 ,j4 
,h41 quoted1 #bbj4   ,nietsche1 his     
conception of morality1 #a1 #e1 #f1 #bj1
 #bi ff41 #afe4    ,optimism1 #bcj1     
#bdb1 #bdg4   ,other-worldliness1 #aae1 
#bdc4   ,overindulgence1 #gi1 #ha1 #hd  
ff4    ,panlogism1 #bdd4   ,pater1      
quoted1 #ahe1 #ahh2 on the aesthetic    
interest1 #aif4   ,patience1 #ie4       
,pessimism1 #aad1 #bdc4   ,philosophy1  
of history1 #abc ff42 and religion1 #bda
 ff4   ,piety1 #fg1 #fh1 #abj1 #bbc1    
#bec1 #bed4   ,pity1 #aaa1 #afc4        
,plato1 quoted1 #cb2 individualism in1  
#cg2 nationalism in1     #ajj2 account  
of disinterested activity in1 #ace ff42 

theory of government in1 #adh2 on art1  
#aij1 #aic1 #bjb1 #bab2     on religion1
 #bdd4   ,pleasure1 its relation to     
morality1 #af ff4   ,preference1 #ej2   
the quantitative principle of1 #ee ff41 
#abg4   ,progress1 moral test of1 ,ch4  
,,iv1 #abg2 definition of1 #abe ff42    
principles of1 #acj ff42 by constructive
 reform1 #acd ff42     by revolution1   
#aci ff4   ,prudence1  #gi1 #ha1 logical
 ground of1 #dc ff42 limits of1     #di1
 #hh1 #ij1 #ia1 #id2 meaning of1 #hg    
ff42 basal character of1     #ia2 in    
religion1 #bcb4   ,purpose1 logic of1   
#ej ff42 virtue of1 #ie ff4             
,radicalism1 #ade ff4   ,rationality1   
#cg1 #db1 #fe2 and progress1 #acd1 #adb2
 in     government1 #aeb4   ,reform1    
#acd ff4   ,religion1 #gi1 #ha2 and     
good-will1 #aac2 mysticism in1 #aag2 as 
an     institution1 #adh2 and progress1 
#agj2 moral justification     of1 ,ch4  
,,vi2 moral necessity of1 #bad ff42     
definition     of1 #bae ff42            
quantitative tests of1 #bah ff42        

psychological study of1 #bbj2 belief in1
 #baf1 #bbj2 therapeutic     test of1   
#bbb ff42 superstitious1 #bcb ff42      
primitive1     #bcc ff42 and ethics1    
#bbd ff41 #bcc1 #bdj1 #bda1 #beb2       
cosmological test of1 #bbd1 #bbe1 #bcd1 
#bcg1 #bdj1 #bda1     #beb2 tutelary1   
#bcg ff42 ,assyrian1 #bch2 ,egyptian1   
#bch2     ,hebrew1 #bbg1 #bci2          
philosophical1 #bda ff42 generic        
proof of1 #beb ff4  ,see ,piety1        
,good-will1 ,worship and                
,christianity4   ,revolution1 definition
 of1 #aci2 the ,christian1 #adj2 the    
,french1 #ada4   ,rightness1 #ah4  ,see 
,virtue4    ,satisfaction1 #aa1 #gi1    
#ha1 #hc4   ,scepticism1 #d ff41 #cf1   
#ajh4   ,sentimentalism1 #ih ff41 and   
art1 #bji4   ,society1 ,chap4 ,i1       
passim1 #ch2 prudential basis of1 #hi2  
character of modern1 #ci1 #aff2 progress
 in1 #abf1 #acb2     continuity of1     
#adc2 and the aesthetic interest1 #aie1 
#baa4   ,sophocles1 quoted1 #ajb1 #aea4 
,sordidness1 #gi1 #ha1 #id4   ,spinoza1 

quoted1 #ce4   ,stoics1 religion of1    
#bde4  ,see ,epictetus4   ,struggle for 
existence1 #cj2 its relation to         
morality1 #ba ff42     its relation to  
progress1 #acj4   ,superstition1 #bcb   
ff4   ,survival1 #bd1 #aca4    ,tact1   
#hh4   ,taine1 quoted1 #ahe4   ,taylor1 
,j41 quoted1 #hf1 #id4   ,temperance1   
#ij4   ,thrift1 #fh1 #hg4   ,thucydides1
 quoted1 #aef4   ,tolerance1 #ch1 #aje1 
#afd4   ,tolsty1 on art1 #bjg4   ,truth1
 of art1 #bje ff42 of religion1 #bbj ff4
   ,truthfulness1 #if4  ,see ,veracity4 
,tyranny1 #cf1 #ci1 #aea ff4    ,value1 
the simpler terms of1 #aa1 #hb2         
definition of moral1     #ae2 varieties 
of moral1 #gi1 #ha4   ,veracity1 #hh1   
#if1 #aje4   ,vice1 varieties of1 #gi1  
#ha4  ,see ,virtue1 ,formalism1 and     
,materialism4   ,virtue1 the order of1  
,ch4 ,,iii2 verification of1 #gc2       
varieties of1 #gc1 #gi2 classification  
of1 #gc ff42 table     of1 #ha4  ,see   
under particular virtues1 ,prudence1    
etc4    ,war1 and morality1 #bd ff41    

#cj2 the passing of1 #bh1 #afb2 and     
progress1 #aca4   ,wells1 ,h4 ,g41      
quoted1 #hi1 #afg4   ,worldliness1 #gi1 
#ha1 #aaj ff4   ,worship1 #abb1 #bcb1   
#bce1 #bcg1 #bdj4    ,xenophanes1       
quoted1 #cbf4