,university of ,georgia47        ,,an   
,,inquiry ,,into  ,,the ,,nature ,,of   
,,peace  ,,and  ,,the ,,terms ,,of ,,its
 ,,perpetuation  ,,by  ,,thorstein      
,,veblen   ,new ,york ,b4,w4 ,,huebsch  
#aiai  ,all rights reserved             
,,copyright1 #aiag4 ,,by ,,the          
,,macmillan ,,company4  ,published      
,april1 #aiag3 ,reprinted ,august1      
#aiag4  ,new edition published by ,b4,w4
 ,,huebsch4 ,january1 #aiai4            
,,preface   ,it is now some #abb years  
since ,kant wrote the essay1 ,zum ewigen
 ,frieden4 ,many things have happened   
since then1 although the ,peace to which
 he looked forward with a doubtful hope 
has not been among them4 ,but many      
things have happened which the great    
critical philosopher1 and no less       
critical spectator of human events1     
would have seen with interest4 ,to ,kant
 the quest of an enduring peace         
presented itself as an intrinsic human  
duty1 rather than as a promising        
enterprise4 ,yet through all his        

analysis of its premises and of the     
terms on which it may be realised there 
runs a tenacious persuasion that1 in the
 end1 the rgime of peace at large will  
be installed4 ,not as a deliberate      
achievement of human wisdom1 so much as 
a work of ,nature the ,designer of      
things--,natura daedala rerum4  ,to any 
attentive reader of ,kant's memorable   
essay it will be apparent that the title
 of the following inquiry--,on the      
nature of peace and the terms of its    
perpetuation--is a descriptive          
translation of the caption under which  
he wrote4 ,that such should be the case 
will not1 it is hoped1 be accounted     
either an unseemly presumption or an    
undue inclination to work under a       
borrowed light4 ,the aim and compass of 
any disinterested inquiry in these      
premises is still the same as it was in 
,kant's time2 such1 indeed1 as he in    
great part made it1--viz41 a systematic 
knowledge of things as they are4 ,nor is
 the light of ,kant's leading to be     

dispensed with as touches the ways and  
means of systematic knowledge1 wherever 
the human realities are in question4    
,meantime1 many things have also changed
 since the date of ,kant's essay4 ,among
 other changes are those that affect the
 direction of inquiry and the terms of  
systematic formulation4 ,natura daedala 
rerum is no longer allowed to go on her 
own recognizances1 without divulging the
 ways and means of her workmanship4 ,and
 it is such a line of extension that is 
here attempted1 into a field of inquiry 
which in ,kant's time still lay over the
 horizon of the future4  ,the quest of  
perpetual peace at large is no less a   
paramount and intrinsic human duty today
 than it was1 nor is it at all certain  
that its final accomplishment is nearer4
 ,but the question of its pursuit and of
 the conditions to be met in seeking    
this goal lies in a different shape     
today2 and it is this question that     
concerns the inquiry which is here      
undertaken1--,what are the terms on     

which peace at large may hopefully be   
installed and maintained8 ,what1 if     
anything1 is there in the present       
situation that visibly makes for a      
realisation of these necessary terms    
within the calculable future8 ,and what 
are the consequences presumably due to  
follow in the nearer future from the    
installation of such a peace at large8  
,and the answer to these questions is   
here sought not in terms of what ought  
dutifully to be done toward the desired 
consummation1 but rather in terms of    
those known factors of human behaviour  
that can be shown by analysis of        
experience to control the conduct of    
nations in conjunctures of this kind4   
,february #aiag     ,,contents          
,,chapter ,i  ,,introductory3 ,,on ,,the
 ,,state ,,and ,,its ,,relation ,,to    
,,war ,,and ,,peace                     
#a  ,the inquiry is not concerned with  
the intrinsic merits of peace or war1   
#b4  --,but with the nature1 causes and 
consequences of the preconceptions      

favoring peace or war1 #c4  --,a breach 
of the peace is an act of the           
government1 or ,state1 #c4              
--,patriotism is indispensable to       
furtherance of warlike enterprise1 #d4  
--,all the peoples of ,christendom are  
sufficiently patriotic1 #f4  --,peace   
established by the ,state1 an           
armistice--the ,state is an             
instrumentality for making peace1 not   
for perpetuating it1 #g4  --,the        
governmental establishments and their   
powers in all the ,christian nations are
 derived from the feudal establishments 
of the ,middle ,ages1 #i4  --,still     
retain the right of coercively          
controlling the actions of their        
citizens1 #aa4  --,contrast of          
,icelandic ,commonwealth1 #ab4  --,the  
statecraft of the past half century has 
been one of competitive preparedness1   
#ad4  --,prussianised ,germany has      
forced the pace in this competitive     
preparedness1 #bj4  --,an avowedly      
predatory enterprise no longer meets    

with approval1 #ba4  --,when a warlike  
enterprise has been entered upon1 it    
will have the support of popular        
sentiment even if it is an aggressive   
war1 #bb4  --,the moral indignation of  
both parties to the quarrel is to be    
taken for granted1 #bc4  --,the         
spiritual forces of any ,christian      
nation may be mobilised for war by      
either of two pleas3 7#a7 ,the          
preservation or furtherance of the      
community's material interests1 real or 
fancied1 and 7#b7 vindication of the    
,national ,honour2 as perhaps also      
perpetuation of the national ,culture1  
#bc4   ,,chapter ,,ii  ,,on ,,the       
,,nature ,,and ,,uses ,,of ,,patriotism 
#ca  ,the nature of ,patriotism1 #ca4   
--,is a spirit of ,emulation1 #cc4      
--,must seem moral1 if only to a biased 
populace1 #cc4  --,the common man is    
sufficiently patriotic but is hampered  
with a sense of right and honest        
dealing1 #ch4  --,patriotism is at cross
 purposes with modern life1 #ch4  --,is 

an hereditary trait8 #da4  --,variety of
 racial stocks in ,europe1 #dc4         
--,patriotism a ubiquitous trait1 #dc4  
--,patriotism disserviceable1 yet men   
hold to it1 #df4  --,cultural evolution 
of ,europeans1 #dh4  --,growth of a     
sense of group solidarity1 #di4         
--,material interests of group falling  
into abeyance as class divisions have   
grown up1 until prestige remains        
virtually the sole community interest1  
#ea4  --,based upon warlike prowess1    
physical magnitude and pecuniary traffic
 of country1 #ed4  --,interests of the  
master class are at cross purposes with 
the fortunes of the common man1 #eg4    
--,value of superiors is a prestige     
value1 #eg4  --,the material benefits   
which this ruling class contribute are3 
defense against aggression1 and         
promotion of the community's material   
gain1 #fj4  --,the common defense is a  
remedy for evils due to the patriotic   
spirit1 #fa4  --,the common defense the 
usual blind behind which events are put 

in train for eventual hostilities1 #fb4 
--,all the nations of warring ,europe   
convinced that they are fighting a      
defensive war1 #fb4  --,which usually   
takes the form of a defense of the      
,national ,honour1 #fc4  --,material    
welfare is of interest to the ,dynastic 
statesman only as it conduces to        
political success1 #fd4  --,the policy  
of national economic self-sufficiency1  
#fg4  --,the chief material use of      
patriotism is its use to a limited      
number of persons in their quest of     
private gain1 #fg4  --,and has the      
effect of dividing the nations on lines 
of rivalry1 #gf4   ,,chapter ,,iii  ,,on
 ,,the ,,conditions ,,of ,a ,,lasting   
,,peace                                 
#gg  ,the patriotic spirit of modern    
peoples is the abiding source of        
contention among nations1 #gg4  --,hence
 any calculus of the ,chances of ,peace 
will be a reckoning of forces which may 
be counted on to keep a patriotic nation
 in an unstable equilibrium of peace1   

#gh4  --,the question of peace and war  
at large is a question of peace and war 
among the ,powers1 which are of two     
contrasted kinds3 those which may safely
 be counted on spontaneously to take the
 offensive and those which will fight on
 provocation1 #gi4  --,war not a        
question of equity but of opportunity1  
#ha4  --,the ,imperial designs of       
,germany and ,japan as the prospective  
cause of war1 #hb4  --,peace can be     
maintained in two ways3 submission to   
their dominion1 or elimination of these 
two ,powers2 ,no middle course open1    
#hd4  --,frame of mind of states2 men   
and popular sentiment in a ,dynastic    
,state1 #hd4  --,information1 persuasion
 and reflection will not subdue national
 animosities and jealousies2 ,peoples of
 ,europe are racially homogeneous along 
lines of climatic latitude1 #hh4  --,but
 loyalty is a matter of habituation1    
#hi4  --,derivation and current state of
 ,german nationalism1 #id4              
--,contrasted with the animus of the    

citizens of a commonwealth1 #ajc2--;,a  
neutral peace-compact may be practicable
 in the absence of ,germany and ,japan1 
but it has no chance in their presence1 
#ajf4  --,the national life of ,germany3
 the ,intellectuals1 #ajh4  --,summary  
of chapter1 #aaf4   ,,chapter ,,iv      
,,peace ,,without ,,honour              
#aah  ,submission to the ,imperial      
,power one of the conditions precedent  
to a peaceful settlement1 #aah4         
--,character of the projected tutelage1 
#aah4  --,life under the ,pax ,germanica
 contrasted with the ,ottoman and       
,russian rule1 #abd4  --,china and      
biological and cultural success1 #acj4  
--,difficulty of non-resistant          
subjection is of a psychological order1 
#aca4  --,patriotism of the bellicose   
kind is of the nature of habit1 #acd4   
--,and men may divest themselves of it1 
#adj4  --,a decay of the bellicose      
national spirit must be of the negative 
order1 the disuse of the discipline out 
of which it has arisen1 #adb4           

--,submission to ,imperial authorities  
necessitates abeyance of national pride 
among the other peoples1 #add4          
--,pecuniary merits of the projected    
,imperial dominion1 #ade4  --,pecuniary 
class distinctions in the commonwealths 
and the pecuniary burden on the common  
man1 #aej4  --,material conditions of   
life for the common man under the modern
 rule of big business1 #aef4  --,the    
competitive rgime1 what the traffic will
 bear1 and the life and labor of the    
common man1 #aeh4  --,industrial        
sabotage by businessmen1 #afe4          
--,contrasted with the ,imperial        
usufruct and its material advantages to 
the common man1 #agd4   ,,chapter ,v    
,,peace ,,and ,,neutrality              
#agh  ,personal liberty1 not creature   
comforts1 the ulterior springs of action
 of the common man of the democratic    
nations1 #agh4  --,no change of         
spiritual state to be looked for in the 
life-time of the oncoming generation1   
#ahe4  --,the ,dynastic spirit among the

 peoples of the ,empire will1 under the 
discipline of modern economic           
conditions1 fall into decay1 #ahg4      
--,contrast of class divisions in       
,germany and ,england1 #aib4            
--,national establishments are dependent
 for their continuance upon preparation 
for hostilities1 #aif4  --,the time     
required for the people of the ,dynastic
 ,states to unlearn their preconceptions
 will be longer than the interval       
required for a new onset1 #aig4         
--,there can be no neutral course       
between peace by unconditional surrender
 and submission or peace by the         
elimination of ,imperial ,germany and   
,japan1 #bjb4  --,peace by submission   
not practicable for the modern nations1 
#bjc4  --,neutralisation of citizenship1
 #bje4  --,spontaneous move in that     
direction not to be looked for1 #bac4   
--,its chances of success1 #bai4  --,the
 course of events in ,america1 #bba4    
,,chapter ,,vi  ,,elimination ,,of ,,the
 ,,unfit                                

#bcc  ,a league of neutrals1 its        
outline1 #bcc4  --,need of security from
 aggression of ,imperial ,germany1 #bcd4
  --,inclusion of the ,imperial ,states 
in the league1 #bcg4  --,necessity of   
elimination of ,imperial military       
clique1 #bci4  --,necessity of          
intermeddling in internal affairs of    
,germany even if not acceptable to the  
,german people1 #bdj4  --,probability of
 pacific nations taking measures to     
insure peace1 #bdd-bih4  --,the ,british
 gentleman and his control of the       
,english government1 #bdd4  --,the      
shifting of control out of the hands of 
the gentleman into those of the         
underbred common man1 #bea4  --,the war 
situation and its probable effect on    
popular habits of thought in ,england1  
#beb4  --,the course of such events and 
their bearing on the chances of a       
workable pacific league1 #bee4          
--,conditions precedent to a successful 
pacific league of neutrals1 #beh4       
--,colonial possessions1 #bei4          

--,neutralisation of trade relations1   
#bfc4  --,futility of economic boycott1 
#bff4  --,the terms of settlement1 #bfi4
  --,the effect of the war and the      
chances of the ,british people being    
able to meet the exigencies of peace1   
#bgc4  --,summary of the terms of       
settlement1 #bhj4  --,constitutional    
monarchies and the ,british gentlemanly 
government1 #bha4  --,the ,american     
national establishment1 a government by 
businessmen1 and its economic policy1   
#bib4  --,america and the league1 #bid4 
,,chapter ,,vii  ,,peace ,,and ,,the    
,,price ,,system                        
#bii  ,the different conceptions of     
peace1 #bii4  --,psychological effects  
of the war1 #cjc4  --,the handicraft    
system and the machine industry1 and    
their psychological effect on political 
preconceptions1 #cjf4  --,the machine   
technology and the decay of patriotic   
loyalty1 #caj4  --,summary1 #cac4       
--,ownership and the right of contract1 
#cae4  --,standardised under handicraft 

system1 #cai4  --,ownership and the     
machine industry4 #cbj4  --,business    
control and sabotage1 #cbb4             
--,governments of pacific nations       
controlled by privileged classes1 #cbf4 
--,effect of peace on the economic      
situation1 #cbh4  --,economic aspects of
 a rgime of peace1 especially as related
 to the development of classes1 #ccj4   
--,the analogy of the ,victorian ,peace1
 #cdd4  --,the case of the ,american    
,farmer1 #cdh4  --,the leisure class1   
#cej4  --,the rising standard of living1
 #ced4  --,culture1 #cee4  --,the       
eventual cleavage of classes1 those who 
own and those who do not1 #cfj4         
--,conditioned by peace at large1 #cff4 
--,necessary conditions of a lasting    
peace1 #cfg4   ,,an ,,inquiry ,,into    
,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,peace ,,and ,,the 
,,terms ,,of ,,its ,,perpetuation       
,,on ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,peace ,,and  
,,the ,,terms ,,of ,,its ,,perpetuation 
,,chapter ,i  ,,introductory3 ,,on ,,the
 ,,state ,,and ,,its ,,relation ,,to    

,,war ,,and ,,peace   ,to many          
thoughtful men ripe in worldly wisdom it
 is known of a verity that war belongs  
indefeasibly in the ,order of ,nature4  
,contention1 with manslaughter1 is      
indispensable in human intercourse1 at  
the same time that it conduces to the   
increase and diffusion of the manly     
virtues4 ,so likewise1 the unspoiled    
youth of the race1 in the period of     
adolescence and aspiring manhood1 also  
commonly share this gift of insight and 
back it with a generous commendation of 
all the martial qualities2 and women of 
nubile age and no undue maturity gladly 
meet them half way4  ,on the other hand1
 the mothers of the people are commonly 
unable to see the use of it all4 ,it    
seems a waste of dear-bought human life1
 with a large sum of nothing to show for
 it4 ,so also many men of an elderly    
turn1 prematurely or otherwise1 are     
ready to lend their countenance to the  
like disparaging appraisal2 it may be   
that the spirit of prowess in them runs 

at too low a tension1 or they may have  
outlived the more vivid appreciation of 
the spiritual values involved4 ,there   
are many1 also1 with a turn for         
exhortation1 who find employment for    
their best faculties in attesting the   
well-known atrocities and futility of   
war4  ,indeed1 not infrequently such    
advocates of peace will devote their    
otherwise idle powers to this work of   
exhortation without stipend or subsidy4 
,and they uniformly make good their     
contention that the currently accepted  
conception of the nature of             
war--,general ,sherman's formula--is    
substantially correct4 ,all the while it
 is to be admitted that all this        
axiomatic exhortation has no visible    
effect on the course of events or on the
 popular temper touching warlike        
enterprise4 ,indeed1 no equal volume of 
speech can be more incontrovertible or  
less convincing than the utterances of  
the peace advocates1 whether subsidised 
or not4 ,war is ,bloodier than ,peace4  

,this would doubtless be conceded       
without argument1 but also without      
prejudice4 ,hitherto the pacifists'     
quest of a basis for enduring peace1 it 
must be admitted1 has brought home      
nothing tangible--with the              
qualification1 of course1 that the      
subsidised pacifists have come in for   
the subsidy4 ,so that1 after searching  
the recesses of their imagination1      
able-bodied pacifists whose loquacity   
has never been at fault hitherto have   
been brought to ask3 ,what ,shall ,we   
,say8         99       99       99      
99       99  ,under these circumstances 
it will not be out of place to inquire  
into the nature of this peace about     
which swings this wide orbit of opinion 
and argument4 ,at the most1 such an     
inquiry can be no more gratuitous and no
 more nugatory than the controversies   
that provoke it4 ,the intrinsic merits  
of peace at large1 as against those of  
warlike enterprise1 it should be said1  
do not here come in question4 ,that     

question lies in the domain of          
preconceived opinion1 so that for the   
purposes of this inquiry it will have no
 significance except as a matter to be  
inquired into2 the main point of the    
inquiry being the nature1 causes and    
consequences of such a preconception    
favoring peace1 and the circumstances   
that make for a contrary preconception  
in favor of war4  ,by and large1 any    
breach of the peace in modern times is  
an official act and can be taken only on
 initiative of the governmental         
establishment1 the ,state4 ,the national
 authorities may1 of course1 be driven  
to take such a step by pressure of      
warlike popular sentiment4 ,such1 e4g41 
is presumed to have been the case in the
 ,united ,states' attack on ,spain      
during the ,mc,kinley administration2   
but the more that comes to light of the 
intimate history of that episode1 the   
more evident does it become that the    
popular war sentiment to which the      
administration yielded had been somewhat

 sedulously mobilised with a view to    
such yielding and such a breach4 ,so    
also in the case of the ,boer war1 the  
move was made under sanction of a       
popular war spirit1 which1 again1 did   
not come to a head without shrewd       
surveillance and direction4 ,and so     
again in the current ,european war1 in  
the case1 e4g41 of ,germany1 where the  
initiative was taken1 the ,state plainly
 had the full support of popular        
sentiment1 and may even be said to have 
precipitated the war in response to this
 urgent popular aspiration2 and here    
again it is a matter of notoriety that  
the popular sentiment had long been     
sedulously nursed and mobilised to that 
effect1 so that the populace was        
assiduously kept in spiritual readiness 
for such an event4 ,the like is less    
evident as regards the ,united ,kingdom1
 and perhaps also as regards the other  
,allies4  ,and such appears to have been
 the common run of the facts as regards 
all the greater wars of the last one    

hundred years1--what may be called the  
public wars of this modern era1 as      
contrasted with the private or          
administrative wars which have been     
carried on in a corner by one and       
another of the ,great ,powers against   
hapless barbarians1 from time to time1  
in the course of administrative routine4
  ,it is also evident from the run of   
the facts as exemplified in these modern
 wars that while any breach of the peace
 takes place only on the initiative and 
at the discretion of the government1 or 
,state1#a it is always requisite in     
furtherance of such warlike enterprise  
to cherish and eventually to mobilise   
popular sentiment in support of any     
warlike move4 ,due fomentation of a     
warlike animus is indispensable to the  
procuring and maintenance of a suitable 
equipment with which eventually to break
 the peace1 as well as to ensure a      
diligent prosecution of such enterprise 
when once it has been undertaken4 ,such 
a spirit of militant patriotism as may  

serviceably be mobilised in support of  
warlike enterprise has accordingly been 
a condition precedent to any people's   
entry into the modern ,concert of       
,nations4 ,this ,concert of ,nations is 
a ,concert of ,powers1 and it is only as
 a ,power that any nation plays its part
 in the concert1 all the while that     
power here means eventual warlike force4
  ,footnote #a3 ,a modern nation        
constitutes a ,state only in respect of 
or with ulterior bearing on the question
 of ,international peace or war4  ,such 
a people as the ,chinese1 e4g41 not     
pervaded with an adequate patriotic     
spirit1 comes into the ,concert of      
,nations not as a ,power but as a bone  
of contention4 ,not that the ,chinese   
fall short in any of the qualities that 
conduce to efficiency and welfare in    
time of peace1 but they appear1 in      
effect1 to lack that certain solidarity 
of prowess by virtue of which they      
should choose to be 7collectively7      
formidable rather than 7individually7   

fortunate and upright2 and the modern   
civilised nations are not in a position1
 nor in a frame of mind1 to tolerate a  
neighbor whose only claim on their      
consideration falls under the category  
of peace on earth and good-will among   
men4 ,china appears hitherto not to have
 been a serviceable people for warlike  
ends1 except in so far as the resources 
of that country have been taken over and
 converted to warlike uses by some alien
 power working to its own ends4 ,such   
have been the several alien dynasties   
that have seized upon that country from 
time to time and have achieved dominion 
by usufruct of its unwarlike forces4    
,such has been the nature of the ,manchu
 empire of the recent past1 and such is 
the evident purpose of the prospective  
,japanese usufruct of the same country  
and its populace4 ,meantime the ,chinese
 people appear to be incorrigibly       
peaceable1 being scarcely willing to    
fight in any concerted fashion even when
 driven into a corner by unprovoked     

aggression1 as in the present juncture4 
,such a people is very exceptional4     
,among civilised nations there are1     
broadly speaking1 none of that temper1  
with the sole exception of the          
,chinese1--if the ,chinese are properly 
to be spoken of as a nation4  ,modern   
warfare makes such large and direct use 
of the industrial arts1 and depends for 
its successful prosecution so largely on
 a voluminous and unremitting supply of 
civilian services and wrought goods1    
that any inoffensive and industrious    
people1 such as the ,chinese1 could     
doubtless now be turned to good account 
by any warlike power that might have the
 disposal of their working forces4 ,to  
make their industrial efficiency count  
in this way toward warlike enterprise   
and imperial dominion1 the usufruct of  
any such inoffensive and unpatriotic    
populace would have to fall into the    
hands of an alien governmental          
establishment4 ,and no alien government 
resting on the support of a home        

population trained in the habits of     
democracy or given over to ideals of    
common honesty in national concerns     
could hopefully undertake the           
enterprise4 ,this work of               
empire-building out of unwarlike        
materials could apparently be carried   
out only by some alien power hampered by
 no reserve of scruple1 and backed by a 
servile populace of its own1 imbued with
 an impeccable loyalty to its masters   
and with a suitably bellicose temper1   
as1 e4g41 ,imperial ,japan or ,imperial 
,germany4  ,however1 for the commonplace
 national enterprise the common run will
 do very well4 ,any populace imbued with
 a reasonable measure of patriotism will
 serve as ways and means to warlike     
enterprise under competent management1  
even if it is not habitually prone to a 
bellicose temper4 ,rightly managed1     
ordinary patriotic sentiment may readily
 be mobilised for warlike adventure by  
any reasonably adroit and single-minded 
body of statesmen1--of which there is   

abundant illustration4 ,all the peoples 
of ,christendom are possessed of a      
sufficiently alert sense of nationality1
 and by tradition and current usage all 
the national governments of ,christendom
 are warlike establishments1 at least in
 the defensive sense2 and the           
distinction between the defensive and   
the offensive in international intrigue 
is a technical matter that offers no    
great difficulty4 ,none of these nations
 is of such an incorrigibly peaceable   
temper that they can be counted on to   
keep the peace consistently in the      
ordinary course of events4  ,peace      
established by the ,state1 or resting in
 the discretion of the ,state1 is       
necessarily of the nature of an         
armistice1 in effect terminable at will 
and on short notice4 ,it is maintained  
only on conditions1 stipulated by       
express convention or established by    
custom1 and there is always the         
reservation1 tacit or explicit1 that    
recourse will be had to arms in case the

 national interests or the punctilios of
 international etiquette are traversed  
by the act or defection of any rival    
government or its subjects4 ,the more   
nationally-minded the government or its 
subject populace1 the readier the       
response to the call of any such        
opportunity for an unfolding of prowess4
 ,the most peaceable governmental policy
 of which ,christendom has experience is
 a policy of watchful waiting1 with a   
jealous eye to the emergence of any     
occasion for national resentment2 and   
the most irretrievably shameful         
dereliction of duty on the part of any  
civilised government would be its       
eventual insensibility to the appeal of 
a just war4 ,under any governmental     
auspices1 as the modern world knows     
governments1 the keeping of the peace   
comes at its best under the precept1    
,speak softly and carry a big stick4    
,but the case for peace is more         
precarious than the wording of the      
aphorism would indicate1 in as much as  

in practical fact the big stick is an   
obstacle to soft speech4 ,evidently1 in 
the light of recent history1 if the     
peace is to be kept it will have to come
 about irrespective of governmental     
management1--in spite of the ,state     
rather than by its good offices4 ,at the
 best1 the ,state1 or the government1 is
 an instrumentality for making peace1   
not for perpetuating it4         99     
99       99       99       99  ,anyone  
who is interested in the nature and     
derivation of governmental institutions 
and establishments in ,europe1 in any   
but the formal respect1 should be able  
to satisfy his curiosity by looking over
 the shoulders of the professed students
 of ,political ,science4 ,quite properly
 and profitably that branch of          
scholarship is occupied with the        
authentic pedigree of these             
institutions1 and with the documentary  
instruments in the case2 since          
,political ,science is1 after all1 a    
branch of theoretical jurisprudence and 

is concerned about a formally competent 
analysis of the recorded legal powers4  
,the material circumstances from which  
these institutions once took their      
beginning1 and the exigencies which have
 governed the rate and direction of     
their later growth and mutation1 as well
 as the de facto bearing of the         
institutional scheme on the material    
welfare or the cultural fortunes of the 
given community1--while all these       
matters of fact may be germane to the   
speculations of ,political ,theory1 they
 are not intrinsic to its premises1 to  
the logical sequence of its inquiry1 or 
to its theoretical findings4 ,the like  
is also true1 of course1 as regards that
 system of habits of thought1 that      
current frame of mind1 in which any     
given institutional scheme necessarily  
is grounded1 and without the continued  
support of which any given scheme of    
governmental institutions or policy     
would become nugatory and so would pass 
into the province of legal fiction4 ,all

 these are not idle matters in the      
purview of the student of ,political    
,science1 but they remain after all     
substantially extraneous to the         
structure of political theory2 and in so
 far as matters of this class are to be 
brought into the case at all1 the       
specialists in the field can not fairly 
be expected to contribute anything      
beyond an occasional obiter dictum4     
,there can be no discourteous           
presumption1 therefore1 in accepting the
 general theorems of current political  
theory without prejudice1 and looking   
past the received theoretical           
formulations for a view of the          
substantial grounds on which the        
governmental establishments have grown  
into shape1 and the circumstances1      
material and spiritual1 that surround   
their continued working and effect4  ,by
 lineal descent the governmental        
establishments and the powers with which
 they are vested1 in all the ,christian 
nations1 are derived from the feudal    

establishments of the ,middle ,ages2    
which1 in turn1 are of a predatory      
origin and of an irresponsible          
character4#b ,in nearly all instances1  
but more particularly among the nations 
that are accounted characteristically   
modern1 the existing establishments have
 been greatly altered from the mediaeval
 pattern1 by concessive adaptation to   
later exigencies or by a more or less   
revolutionary innovation4 ,the degree of
 their modernity is 7conventionally7    
measured1 roughly1 by the degree in     
which they have departed from the       
mediaeval pattern4 ,wherever the        
unavoidable concessions have been       
shrewdly made with a view to conserving 
the autonomy and irresponsibility of the
 governmental establishment1 or the     
,state1 and where the state of national 
sentiment has been led to favor this    
work of conservation1 as1 e4g41 in the  
case of ,austria1 ,spain or ,prussia1   
there the modern outcome has been what  
may be called a ,dynastic ,state4       

,where1 on the other hand1 the run of   
national sentiment has departed notably 
from the ancient holding ground of loyal
 abnegation1 and has enforced a measure 
of revolutionary innovation1 as in the  
case of ,france or of the               
,english-speaking peoples1 there the    
modern outcome has been an 7ostensibly7 
democratic commonwealth of ungraded     
citizens4 ,but the contrast so indicated
 is a contrast of divergent variants    
rather than of opposites4 ,these two    
type-forms may be taken as the extreme  
and inclusive limits of variation among 
the governmental establishments with    
which the modern world is furnished4#c  
,footnote #b3 ,the partial and dubious  
exception of the ,scandinavian countries
 or of ,switzerland need raise no       
question on this head4  ,footnote #c3   
,cf41 e4g41 ,eduard ,meyer1 ,england3   
its political organisation and          
development4 ch4 ii4  ,the effectual    
difference between these two            
theoretically contrasted types of       

governmental establishments is doubtless
 grave enough1 and for many purposes it 
is consequential1 but it is after all   
not of such a nature as need greatly    
detain the argument at this point4 ,the 
two differ less1 in effect1 in that     
range of their functioning which comes  
in question here than in their bearing  
on the community's fortunes apart from  
questions of war and peace4 ,in all     
cases there stand over in this bearing  
certain primary characteristics of the  
ancient rgime1 which all these modern   
establishments have in common1 though   
not all in an equal degree of           
preservation and effectiveness4 ,they   
are1 e4g41 all vested with certain      
attributes of sovereignty4 ,in all cases
 the citizen still proves on closer     
attention to be in some measure a       
subject of the ,state1 in that he is    
invariably conceived to owe a duty to   
the constituted authorities in one      
respect and another4 ,all civilised     
governments take cognizance of ,treason1

 ,sedition1 and the like2 and all good  
citizens are not only content but       
profoundly insistent on the clear duty  
of the citizen on this head4 ,the bias  
of loyalty is not a matter on which     
argument is tolerated4 ,by virtue of    
this bias of loyalty1 or civic          
duty--which still has much of the color 
of feudal allegiance--the governmental  
establishment is within its rights in   
coercively controlling and directing the
 actions of the citizen1 or subject1 in 
those respects that so lie within his   
duty2 as also in authoritatively turning
 his abilities to account for the       
purposes that so lie within the         
governmental discretion1 as1 e4g41 the  
,common ,defense4  ,these rights and    
powers still remain to the governmental 
establishment even at the widest        
democratic departure from that ancient  
pattern of masterful tutelage and       
usufruct that marked the old-fashioned  
patrimonial ,state1--and that still     
marks the better preserved ones among   

its modern derivatives4 ,and so         
intrinsic to these governmental         
establishments are these discretionary  
powers1 and by so unfailing a popular   
bias are they still accounted a matter  
of course and of axiomatic necessity1   
that they have invariably been retained 
also among the attributes of those      
democratic governments that trace their 
origin to a revolutionary break with the
 old order4  ,to many1 all this will    
seem a pedantic taking note of          
commonplaces1--as if it were worth while
 remarking that the existing governments
 are vested with the indispensable      
attributes of government4 ,yet history  
records an instance at variance with    
this axiomatic rule1 a rule which is    
held to be an unavoidable deliverance of
 common sense4 ,and it is by no means an
 altogether unique instance4 ,it may    
serve to show that these characteristic 
and unimpeachable powers that invest all
 current governmental establishments    
are1 after all1 to be rated as the marks

 of a particular species of governments1
 and not characteristics of the genus of
 governmental establishments at large4  
,these powers answer to an acquired     
bias1 not to an underlying trait of     
human nature2 a matter of habit1 not of 
heredity4  ,such an historical instance 
is the so-called ,republic1 or          
,commonwealth1 of ,iceland--tenth to    
thirteenth centuries4 ,its case is      
looked on by students of history as a   
spectacular anomaly1 because it admitted
 none of these primary powers of        
government in its constituted           
authorities4 ,and yet1 for contrast with
 these matter-of-course preconceptions  
of these students of history1 it is well
 to note that in the deliberations of   
those ancients who installed the        
,republic for the management of their   
joint concerns1 any inclusion of such   
powers in its competency appears never  
to have been contemplated1 not even to  
the extent of its being rejected4 ,this 
singularity--as it would be rated by    

modern statesmen and students--was in no
 degree a new departure in state-making 
on the part of the founders of the      
,republic4 ,they had no knowledge of    
such powers1 duties and                 
accountabilities1 except as unwholesome 
features of a novel and alien scheme of 
irresponsible oppression that was sought
 to be imposed on them by ,harald       
,fairhair1 and which they incontinently 
made it their chief and immediate       
business to evade4 ,they also set up no 
joint or collective establishment with  
powers for the ,common ,defense1 nor    
does it appear that such a notion had   
occurred to them4  ,in the history of   
its installation there is no hint that  
the men who set up this ,icelandic      
,commonwealth had any sense of the need1
 or even of the feasibility1 of such a  
coercive government as would be involved
 in concerted preparation for the common
 defense4 ,subjection to personal rule1 
or to official rule in any degree of    
attenuation1 was not comprised in their 

traditional experience of citizenship2  
and it was necessarily out of the       
elements comprised in this traditional  
experience that the new structure would 
have to be built up4 ,the new           
commonwealth was necessarily erected on 
the premises afforded by the received   
scheme of use and wont2 and this        
received scheme had come down out of    
pre-feudal conditions1 without having   
passed under the discipline of that     
rgime of coercion which the feudal      
system had imposed on the rest of       
,europe1 and so had established as an   
immemorial usage and a second nature    
among the populations of ,christendom4  
,the resulting character of the         
,icelandic ,commonwealth is sufficiently
 striking when contrasted with the case 
of the ,english commonwealth of the     
seventeenth century1 or the later       
,french and ,american republics4 ,these1
 all and several1 came out of a         
protracted experience in feudalistic    
state-making and ,state policy2 and the 

common defense--frequently on the       
offensive--with its necessary coercive  
machinery and its submissive loyalty1   
consequently would take the central     
place in the resulting civic structure4 
,to close the tale of the ,icelandic    
commonwealth it may be added that their 
republic of insubordinate citizens      
presently fell into default1 systematic 
misuse1 under the disorders brought on  
by an accumulation of wealth1 and that  
it died of legal fiction and            
constitutional formalities after some   
experience at the hands of able and     
ambitious statesmen in contact with an  
alien government drawn on the coercive  
plan4 ,the clay vessel failed to make   
good among the iron pots1 and so proved 
its unfitness to survive in the world of
 ,christian nations1--very much as the  
,chinese are today at the mercy of the  
defensive rapacity of the ,powers4      
,and the mercy that we gave them    ,was
 to sink them in the sea1    ,down on   
the coast of ,high ,barbarie4  ,no      

doubt1 it will be accepted as an        
axiomatic certainty that the            
establishment of a commonwealth after   
the fashion of the ,icelandic ,republic1
 without coercive authority or provision
 for the common defense1 and without a  
sense of subordination or collective    
responsibility among its citizens1 would
 be out of all question under existing  
circumstances of politics and           
international trade4 ,nor would such a  
commonwealth be workable on the scale   
and at the pace imposed by modern       
industrial and commercial conditions1   
even apart from international jealousy  
and ambitions1 provided the sacred      
rights of ownership were to be          
maintained in something like their      
current shape4 ,and yet something of a  
drift of popular sentiment1 and indeed  
something of deliberate endeavour1      
setting in the direction of such a      
harmless and helpless national          
organisation is always visible in       
,western ,europe1 throughout modern     

times2 particularly through the         
eighteenth and the early half of the    
nineteenth centuries2 and more          
particularly among the ,english-speaking
 peoples and1 with a difference1 among  
the ,french4 ,the ,dutch and the        
,scandinavian countries answer more     
doubtfully to the same characterisation4
  ,the movement in question is known to 
history as the ,liberal1 ,rationalistic1
 ,humanitarian1 or ,individualistic     
departure4 ,its ideal1 when formulated1 
is spoken of as the ,system of ,natural 
,rights2 and its goal in the way of a   
national establishment has been well    
characterised by its critics as the     
,police ,state1 or the ,night-,watchman 
,state4 ,the gains made in this         
direction1 or perhaps better the inroads
 of this animus in national ideals1 are 
plainly to be set down as a shift in the
 direction of peace and amity2 but it is
 also plain that the shift of ground so 
initiated by this strain of sentiment   
has never reached a conclusion and never

 has taken effect in anything like an   
effectual working arrangement4 ,its     
practical consequences have been of the 
nature of abatement and defection in the
 pursuit of national ambitions and      
dynastic enterprise1 rather than a      
creative work of installing any         
institutional furniture suitable to its 
own ends4 ,it has in effect gone no     
farther than what would be called an    
incipient correction of abuses4 ,the    
highest rise1 as well as the decline1 of
 this movement lie within the nineteenth
 century4  ,in point of time1 the decay 
of this amiable conceit of laissez-faire
 in national policy coincides with the  
period of great advance in the          
technology of transport and             
communication in the nineteenth century4
 ,perhaps1 on a larger outlook1 it      
should rather be said that the run of   
national ambitions and animosities had1 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth        
centuries1 suffered a degree of decay   
through the diffusion of this           

sentimental predilection for ,natural   
,liberty1 and that this decline of the  
manlier aspirations was then arrested   
and corrected by help of these          
improvements in the technological       
situation2 which enabled a closer and   
more coercive control to be exercised   
over larger areas1 and at the same time 
enabled a more massive aggregate of     
warlike force to strike more effectively
 at a greater distance4 ,this whole     
episode of the rise and decline of      
laissez-faire in modern history is      
perhaps best to be conceived as a       
transient weakening of nationalism1 by  
neglect2 rather than anything like the  
growth of a new and more humane ideal of
 national intercourse4 ,such would be   
the appraisal to be had at the hands of 
those who speak for a strenuous national
 life and for the arbitrament of        
sportsmanlike contention in human       
affairs4 ,and the latterday growth of   
more militant aspirations1 together with
 the more settled and sedulous attention

 to a development of control and of     
formidable armaments1 such as followed  
on through the latter half of the       
nineteenth century1 would then be rated 
as a resumption of those older aims and 
ideals that had been falling somewhat   
into abeyance in the slack-water days of
 ,liberalism4  ,there is much to be said
 for this latter view2 and1 indeed1 much
 has been said for it1 particularly by  
the spokesmen of imperialist politics4  
,this bias of ,natural ,liberty has been
 associated in history with the         
,english-speaking peoples1 more         
intimately and more extensively than    
with any other4 ,not that this amiable  
conceit is in any peculiar degree a race
 characteristic of this group of        
peoples2 nor even that the history of   
its rise and decline runs wholly within 
the linguistic frontiers indicated by   
this characterisation4 ,the ,french and 
the ,dutch have borne their share1 and  
at an earlier day ,italian sentiment and
 speculation lent its impulsion to the  

same genial drift of faith and          
aspiration4 ,but1 by historical         
accident1 its center of gravity and of  
diffusion has lain with the             
,english-speaking communities during the
 period when this bias made history and 
left its impress on the institutional   
scheme of the ,western civilisation4 ,by
 grace of what may1 for the present     
purpose1 be called historical accident1 
it happens that the interval of history 
during which the bias of ,natural       
,liberty made visible headway was also a
 period during which these              
,english-speaking peoples1 among whom   
its effects are chiefly visible1 were   
relatively secure from international    
disturbance1 by force of                
inaccessibility4 ,little strain was put 
upon their sense of national solidarity 
or national prowess2 so little1 indeed1 
that there was some danger of their     
patriotic animosity falling into decay  
by disuse2 and then they were also busy 
with other things4 ,peaceable           

intercourse1 it is true1 was relatively 
easy1 active and                        
far-reaching--eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries--as compared with what had    
been the case before that time2 but     
warlike intercourse on such a scale as  
would constitute a substantial menace to
 any large nation was nearly out of the 
question1 so far as regards the         
,english-speaking peoples4 ,the         
available means of aggression1 as       
touches the case of these particular    
communities1 were visibly and           
consciously inadequate as compared with 
the means of defense4 ,the means of     
internal or intra-national control or   
coercion were also less well provided by
 the state of the arts current at that  
time than the means of peaceable        
intercourse4 ,these means of transport  
and communication were1 at that stage of
 their development1 less well suited for
 the purposes of far-reaching warlike   
strategy and the exercise of            
surveillance and coercion over large    

spaces than for the purposes of         
peaceable traffic4  ,but the continued  
improvement in the means of             
communication during the nineteenth     
century presently upset that situation1 
and so presently began to neutralise the
 geographical quarantine which had      
hedged about these communities that were
 inclined to let well enough alone4 ,the
 increasing speed and accuracy of       
movement in shipping1 due to the        
successful introduction of steam1 as    
well as the concomitant increasing size 
of the units of equipment1 all runs to  
this effect and presently sets at naught
 the peace barriers of sea and weather4 
,so also the development of railways and
 their increasing availability for      
strategic uses1 together with the       
far-reaching coordination of movement   
made possible by their means and by the 
telegraph2 all of which is further      
facilitated by the increasing mass and  
density of population4 ,improvements in 
the technology of arms and armament     

worked to the like effect1 of setting   
the peace of any community on an        
increasingly precarious footing1 through
 the advantage which this new technology
 gave to a ready equipment and a rapid  
mobilisation4 ,the new state of the     
industrial arts serviceable for warlike 
enterprise put an increasingly heavy    
premium on readiness for offense or     
defense1 but more particularly it all   
worked increasingly to the advantage of 
the offensive4 ,it put the ,fabian      
strategy out of date1 and led to the    
doctrine of a defensive offense4        
,gradually it came true1 with the       
continued advance in those industrial   
arts that lend themselves to strategic  
uses1 and it came also to be realised1  
that no corner of the earth was any     
longer secure by mere favor of distance 
and natural difficulty1 from eventual   
aggression at the hands of any provident
 and adventurous assailant1--even by    
help of a modicum of defensive          
precaution4 ,the fear of aggression then

 came definitively to take the place of 
international good-will and became the  
chief motive in public policy1 so fast  
and so far as the state of the          
industrial arts continued to incline the
 balance of advantage to the side of the
 aggressor4 ,all of which served greatly
 to strengthen the hands of those       
statesmen who1 by interest or           
temperament1 were inclined to           
imperialistic enterprise4 ,since that   
period all armament has conventionally  
been accounted defensive1 and all       
statesmen have professed that the common
 defense is their chief concern4        
,professedly all armament has been      
designed to keep the peace2 so much of a
 shadow of the peaceable bias there     
still stands over4  ,throughout this    
latest phase of modern civilisation the 
avowed fear of aggression has served as 
apology1 possibly as provocation in     
fact1 to national armaments2 and        
throughout the same period any analysis 
of the situation will finally run the   

chain of fear back to ,prussia as the   
putative or actual1 center of           
disturbance and apprehension4 ,no doubt1
 ,prussian armament has taken the lead  
and forced the pace among the nations of
 ,christendom2 but the ,prussian policy1
 too1 has been diligently covered with  
the same decorous plea of needful       
provision for the common defense and an 
unremitting solicitude for international
 peace1--to which has been added the    
canny afterthought of the defensive     
offense4  ,it is characteristic of this 
era of armed peace that in all these    
extensive preparations for breaking the 
peace any formal avowal of other than a 
defensive purpose has at all times been 
avoided as an insufferable breach of    
diplomatic decorum4 ,it is likewise     
characteristic of the same era that     
armaments have unremittingly been       
increased1 beyond anything previously   
known2 and that all men have known all  
the while that the inevitable outcome of
 this avowedly defensive armament must  

eventually be war on an unprecedented   
scale and of unexampled ferocity4 ,it   
would be neither charitable nor         
otherwise to the point to call attention
 to the reflection which this state of  
the case throws on the collective       
sagacity or the good faith of the       
statesmen who have had the management of
 affairs4 ,it is not practicable to     
imagine how such an outcome as the      
present could have been brought about by
 any degree of stupidity or incapacity  
alone1 nor is it easier to find evidence
 that the utmost sagacity of the        
statecraft engaged has had the slightest
 mitigating effect on the evil          
consummation to which the whole case has
 been brought4 ,it has long been a      
commonplace among observers of public   
events that these professedly defensive 
warlike preparations have in effect been
 preparations for breaking the peace2   
against which1 at least ostensibly1 a   
remedy had been sought in the           
preparation of still heavier armaments1 

with full realisation that more armament
 would unfailingly entail a more        
unsparing and more disastrous           
war1--which sums up the statecraft of   
the past half century4  ,prussia1 and   
afterwards ,prussianised ,germany1 has  
come in for the distinction of taking   
the lead and forcing the pace in this   
competitive preparation--or             
preparedness--for war in time of peace4 
,that such has been the case appears in 
good part to be something of a          
fortuitous circumstance4 ,the season of 
enterprising force and fraud to which   
that country owes its induction into the
 concert of nations is an episode of    
recent history2 so recent1 indeed1 that 
the ,german nation has not yet had time 
to live it down and let it be forgotten2
 and the ,imperial ,state is            
consequently burdened with an irritably 
uneasy sense of odium and an established
 reputation for unduly bad faith4 ,from 
which it has followed1 among other      
things1 that the statesmen of the       

,empire have lived in the expectation of
 having their unforgotten derelictions  
brought home1 and so have1 on the one   
hand1 found themselves unable to credit 
any pacific intentions professed by the 
neighboring ,powers1 while on the other 
hand they have been unable to gain      
credence for their own voluble          
professions of peace and amity4 ,so it  
has come about that1 by a fortuitous    
conjuncture of scarcely relevant        
circumstances1 ,prussia and the ,empire 
have been thrown into the lead in the   
race of preparedness and have been led  
assiduously to hasten a breach which    
they could ill afford4 ,it is1 to say   
the least1 extremely doubtful if the    
event would have been substantially     
different in the absence of that special
 provocation to competitive preparedness
 that has been injected into the        
situation by this ,german attitude2 but 
the rate of approach to a warlike climax
 has doubtless been hastened by the     
anticipatory policy of preparedness     

which the ,prussian dynasty has seen    
itself constrained to pursue4           
,eventually1 the peculiar circumstances 
of its case--embarrassment at home and  
distaste and discredit abroad--have     
induced the ,imperial ,state to take the
 line of a defensive offense1 to take   
war by the forelock and retaliate on    
presumptive enemies for prospective     
grievances4 ,but in any case1 the       
progressive improvement in transport and
 communication1 as well as in the       
special technology of warfare1 backed by
 greatly enhanced facilities for        
indoctrinating the populace with        
militant nationalism1--these ways and   
means1 working under the hand of        
patriotic statesmen must in course of   
the past century have brought the peace 
of ,europe to so precarious a footing as
 would have provoked a material increase
 in the equipment for national defense2 
which would unavoidably have led to     
competitive armament and an enhanced    
international distrust and animosity1   

eventually culminating in hostilities4  
99       99       99       99       99  
,it may well be that the plea of        
defensive preparation advanced by the   
statesmen1 ,prussian and others1 in     
apology for competitive armaments is a  
diplomatic subterfuge1--there are       
indications that such has commonly been 
the case2 but even if it commonly is    
visibly disingenuous1 the need of making
 such a plea to cover more sinister     
designs is itself an evidence that an   
avowedly predatory enterprise no longer 
meets with the requisite popular        
approval4 ,even if an exception to this 
rule be admitted in the recent attitude 
of the ,german people1 it is to be      
recalled that the exception was allowed 
to stand only transiently1 and that     
presently the avowal of a predatory     
design in this case was urgently        
disclaimed in the face of adversity4    
,even those who speak most fluently for 
the necessity of war1 and for its merits
 as a needed discipline in the manly    

virtues1 are constrained by the         
prevailing sentiment to deprecate its   
necessity4  ,yet it is equally evident  
that when once a warlike enterprise has 
been entered upon so far as to commit   
the nation to hostilities1 it will have 
the cordial support of popular sentiment
 even if it is patently an aggressive   
war4 ,indeed1 it is quite a safe        
generalisation that when hostilities    
have once been got fairly under way by  
the interested statesmen1 the patriotic 
sentiment of the nation may confidently 
be counted on to back the enterprise    
irrespective of the merits of the       
quarrel4 ,but even if the national      
sentiment is in this way to be counted  
in as an incidental matter of course1 it
 is also to be kept in mind in this     
connection that any quarrel so entered  
upon by any nation will forthwith come  
to have the moral approval of the       
community4 ,dissenters will of course be
 found1 sporadically1 who do not readily
 fall in with the prevailing animus2 but

 as a general proposition it will still 
hold true that any such quarrel         
forthwith becomes a just quarrel in the 
eyes of those who have so been committed
 to it4  ,a corollary following from    
this general theorem may be worth noting
 in the same connection4 ,any politician
 who succeeds in embroiling his country 
in a war1 however nefarious1 becomes a  
popular hero and is reputed a wise and  
righteous statesman1 at least for the   
time being4 ,illustrative instances need
 perhaps not1 and indeed can not        
gracefully1 be named2 most popular      
heroes and reputed statesmen belong in  
this class4  ,another corollary1 which  
bears more immediately on the question  
in hand1 follows also from the same     
general proposition3 ,since the ethical 
values involved in any given            
international contest are substantially 
of the nature of afterthought or        
accessory1 they may safely be left on   
one side in any endeavour to understand 
or account for any given outbreak of    

hostilities4 ,the moral indignation of  
both parties to the quarrel is to be    
taken for granted1 as being the         
statesman's chief and necessary ways and
 means of bringing any warlike          
enterprise to a head and floating it to 
a creditable finish4 ,it is a           
precipitate of the partisan animosity   
that inspires both parties and holds    
them to their duty of self-sacrifice and
 devastation1 and at its best it will   
chiefly serve as a cloak of             
self-righteousness to extenuate any     
exceptionally profligate excursions in  
the conduct of hostilities4  ,any       
warlike enterprise that is hopefully to 
be entered on must have the moral       
sanction of the community1 or of an     
effective majority in the community4 ,it
 consequently becomes the first concern 
of the warlike statesman to put this    
moral force in train for the adventure  
on which he is bent4 ,and there are two 
main lines of motivation by which the   
spiritual forces of any ,christian      

nation may so be mobilised for warlike  
adventure3 7#a7 ,the preservation or    
furtherance of the community's material 
interests1 real or fancied1 and 7#b7    
vindication of the national honour4 ,to 
these should perhaps be added as a      
third1 the advancement and perpetuation 
of the nation's ,culture2 that is to    
say1 of its habitual scheme of use and  
wont4 ,it is a nice question whether1 in
 practical effect1 the aspiration to    
perpetuate the national ,culture is     
consistently to be distinguished from   
the vindication of the national honour4 
,there is perhaps the distinction to be 
made that the perpetuation of the       
national ,culture lends a readier       
countenance to gratuitous aggression and
 affords a broader cover for incidental 
atrocities1 since the enemies of the    
national ,culture will necessarily be   
conceived as an inferior and obstructive
 people1 falling beneath the rules of   
commonplace decorum4  ,those material   
interests for which modern nations are  

in the habit of taking to arms are      
commonly of a fanciful character1 in    
that they commonly have none but an     
imaginary net value to the community at 
large4 ,such are1 e4g41 the national    
trade or the increase of the national   
territory4 ,these and the like may serve
 the warlike or dynastic ambitions of   
the nation's masters2 they may also     
further the interests of office-holders1
 and more particularly of certain       
business houses or businessmen who stand
 to gain some small advantage by help of
 the powers in control2 but it all      
signifies nothing more to the common man
 than an increased bill of governmental 
expense and a probable increase in the  
cost of living4  ,that a nation's trade 
should be carried in vessels owned by   
its citizens or registered in its ports 
will doubtless have some sentimental    
value to the common run of its citizens1
 as is shown by the fact that           
disingenuous politicians always find it 
worth their while to appeal to this     

chauvinistic predilection4 ,but it      
patently is all a completely idle       
question1 in point of material          
advantage1 to anyone but the owners of  
the vessels2 and to these owners it is  
also of no material consequence under   
what flag their investments sail1 except
 so far as the government in question   
may afford them some preferential       
opportunity for gain1--always at the    
cost of their fellow citizens4 ,the like
 is equally true as regards the domicile
 and the national allegiance of the     
businessmen who buy and sell the        
country's imports and exports4 ,the     
common man plainly has no slightest     
material interest in the nationality or 
the place of residence of those who     
conduct this traffic2 though all the    
facts go to say that in some            
puzzle-headed way the common man        
commonly persuades himself that it does 
make some occult sort of difference to  
him2 so that he is commonly willing to  
pay something substantial toward        

subsidising businessmen of his own      
nationality1 in the way of a protective 
tariff and the like4  ,the only material
 advantage to be derived from such a    
preferential trade policy arises in the 
case of international hostilities1 in   
which case the home-owned vessels and   
merchants may on occasion count toward  
military readiness2 although even in    
that connection their value is          
contingent and doubtful4 ,but in this   
way they may contribute in their degree 
to a readiness to break off peaceable   
relations with other countries4 ,it is  
only for warlike purposes1 that is to   
say for the dynastic ambitions of       
warlike statesmen1 that these           
preferential contrivances in economic   
policy have any substantial value2 and  
even in that connection their expediency
 is always doubtful4 ,they are a source 
of national jealousy1 and they may on   
occasion become a help to military      
strategy when this national jealousy    
eventuates in hostilities4  ,the run of 

the facts touching this matter of       
national trade policy is something as   
follows3 ,at the instance of businessmen
 who stand to gain by it1 and with the  
cordial support of popular sentiment1   
the constituted authorities sedulously  
further the increase of shipping and    
commerce under protection of the        
national power4 ,at the same time they  
spend substance and diplomatic energy in
 an endeavor to extend the international
 market facilities open to the country's
 businessmen1 with a view always to a   
preferential advantage in favor of these
 businessmen1 also with the sentimental 
support of the common man and at his    
cost4 ,to safeguard these commercial    
interests1 as well as property-holdings 
of the nation's citizens in foreign     
parts1 the nation maintains naval1      
military1 consular and diplomatic       
establishments1 at the common expense4  
,the total gains derivable from these   
commercial and investment interests     
abroad1 under favorable circumstances1  

will never by any chance equal the cost 
of the governmental apparatus installed 
to further and safeguard them4 ,these   
gains1 such as they are1 go to the      
investors and businessmen engaged in    
these enterprises2 while the costs      
incident to the adventure are borne     
almost wholly by the common man1 who    
gets no gain from it all4 ,commonly1 as 
in the case of a protective tariff or a 
preferential navigation law1 the cost to
 the common man is altogether out of    
proportion to the gain which accrues to 
the businessmen for whose benefit he    
carries the burden4 ,the only other     
class1 besides the preferentially       
favored businessmen1 who derive any     
material benefit from this arrangement  
is that of the office-holders who take  
care of this governmental traffic and   
draw something in the way of salaries   
and perquisites2 and whose cost is      
defrayed by the common man1 who remains 
an outsider in all but the payment of   
the bills4 ,the common man is proud and 

glad to bear this burden for the benefit
 of his wealthier neighbors1 and he does
 so with the singular conviction that in
 some occult manner he profits by it4   
,all this is incredible1 but it is      
everyday fact4  ,in case it should      
happen that these business interests of 
the nation's businessmen interested in  
trade or investments abroad are         
jeopardised by a disturbance of any kind
 in these foreign parts in which these  
business interests lie1 then it         
immediately becomes the urgent concern  
of the national authorities to use all  
means at hand for maintaining the       
gainful traffic of these businessmen    
undiminished1 and the common man pays   
the cost4 ,should such an untoward      
situation go to such sinister lengths as
 to involve actual loss to these        
business interests or otherwise give    
rise to a tangible grievance1 it becomes
 an affair of the national honour2      
whereupon no sense of proportion as     
between the material gains at stake and 

the cost of remedy or retaliation need  
longer be observed1 since the national  
honour is beyond price4 ,the motivation 
in the case shifts from the ground of   
material interest to the spiritual      
ground of the moral sentiments4  ,in    
this connection honour is of course to  
be taken in the euphemistic sense which 
the term has under the code duello      
governing affairs of honour4 ,it carries
 no connotation of honesty1 veracity1   
equity1 liberality1 or unselfishness4   
,this national honour is of the nature  
of an intangible or immaterial asset1 of
 course2 it is a matter of prestige1 a  
sportsmanlike conception2 but that fact 
must not be taken to mean that it is of 
any the less substantial effect for     
purposes of a casus belli than the      
material assets of the community4 ,quite
 the contrary3 ,who steals my purse1    
steals trash1 etc4 ,in point of fact1 it
 will commonly happen that any material 
grievance must first be converted into  
terms of this spiritual capital1 before 

it is effectually turned to account as a
 stimulus to warlike enterprise4  ,even 
among a people with so single an eye to 
the main chance as the ,american        
community it will be found true1 on     
experiment or on review of the          
historical evidence1 that an offense    
against the national honour commands a  
profounder and more unreserved          
resentment than any infraction of the   
rights of person or property simply4    
,this has latterly been well shown in   
connection with the manoeuvres of the   
several ,european belligerents1 designed
 to bend ,american neutrality to the    
service of one side or the other4 ,both 
parties have aimed to intimidate and    
cajole2 but while the one party has     
taken recourse to effrontery and has    
made much and ostentatious use of       
threats and acts of violence against    
person and property1 the other has      
constantly observed a deferential       
attitude toward ,american national      
self-esteem1 even while engaged on a    

persistent infraction of ,american      
commercial rights4 ,the first named line
 of diplomacy has convicted itself of   
miscarriage and has lost the strategic  
advantage1 as against the none too      
adroit finesse of the other side4 ,the  
statesmen of this ,european war power   
were so ill advised as to enter on a    
course of tentatively cumulative        
intimidation1 by threats and            
experimentally graduated crimes against 
the property and persons of ,american   
citizens1 with a view to coerce         
,american cupidity and yet to avoid     
carrying these manoeuvres of terrorism  
far enough to arouse an unmanageable    
sense of outrage4 ,the experiment has   
served to show that the breaking point  
in popular indignation will be reached  
before the terrorism has gone far enough
 to raise a serious question of         
pecuniary caution4  ,this national      
honour1 which so is rated a necessary of
 life1 is an immaterial substance in a  
peculiarly high-wrought degree1 being   

not only not physically tangible but    
also not even capable of adequate       
statement in pecuniary terms1--as would 
be the case with ordinary immaterial    
assets4 ,it is true1 where the point of 
grievance out of which a question of the
 national honour arises is a pecuniary  
discrepancy1 the national honour can not
 be satisfied without a pecuniary       
accounting2 but it needs no argument to 
convince all right-minded persons that  
even at such a juncture the national    
honour that has been compromised is     
indefinitely and indefinably more than  
what can be made to appear on an        
accountant's page4 ,it is a highly      
valued asset1 or at least a valued      
possession1 but it is of a metaphysical1
 not of a physical nature1 and it is not
 known to serve any material or         
otherwise useful end apart from         
affording a practicable grievance       
consequent upon its infraction4  ,this  
national honour is subject to injury in 
divers ways1 and so may yield a fruitful

 grievance even apart from offences     
against the person or property of the   
nation's businessmen2 as1 e4g41 through 
neglect or disregard of the conventional
 punctilios governing diplomatic        
intercourse1 or by disrespect or        
contumelious speech touching the ,flag1 
or the persons of national officials1   
particularly of such officials as have  
only a decorative use1 or the costumes  
worn by such officials1 or1 again1 by   
failure to observe the ritual prescribed
 for parading the national honour on    
stated occasions4 ,when duly violated   
the national honour may duly be made    
whole again by similarly immaterial     
instrumentalities2 as1 e4g41 by recital 
of an appropriate formula of words1 by  
formal consumption of a stated quantity 
of ammunition in the way of a salute1 by
 dipping an ensign1 and the             
like1--procedure which can1 of course1  
have none but a magical efficacy4 ,the  
national honour1 in short1 moves in the 
realm of magic1 and touches the         

frontiers of religion4  ,throughout this
 range of duties incumbent on the       
national defense1 it will be noted1 the 
offenses or discrepancies to be guarded 
against or corrected by recourse to arms
 have much of a ceremonial character4   
,whatever may be the material accidents 
that surround any given concrete        
grievance that comes up for appraisal   
and redress1 in bringing the case into  
the arena for trial by combat it is the 
spiritual value of the offense that is  
played up and made the decisive ground  
of action1 particularly in so far as    
appeal is made to the sensibilities of  
the common man1 who will have to bear   
the cost of the adventure4 ,and in such 
a case it will commonly happen that the 
common man is unable1 without advice1 to
 see that any given hostile act embodies
 a sacrilegious infraction of the       
national honour4 ,he will at any such   
conjuncture scarcely rise to the pitch  
of moral indignation necessary to float 
a warlike reprisal1 until the expert    

keepers of the ,code come in to expound 
and certify the nature of the           
transgression4 ,but when once the lesion
 to the national honour has been        
ascertained1 appraised and duly         
exhibited by those persons whose place  
in the national economy it is to look   
after all that sort of thing1 the common
 man will be found nowise behindhand    
about resenting the evil usage of which 
he so1 by force of interpretation1 has  
been a victim4     ,,chapter ,,ii  ,,on 
,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,uses ,,of        
,,patriotism   ,patriotism may be       
defined as a sense of partisan          
solidarity in respect of prestige4 ,what
 the expert psychologists1 and perhaps  
the experts in ,political ,science1     
might find it necessary to say in the   
course of an exhaustive analysis and    
definition of this human faculty would  
presumably be something more precise and
 more extensive4 ,there is no           
inclination here to forestall           
definition1 but only to identify and    

describe the concept that loosely       
underlies the colloquial use of this    
term1 so far as seems necessary to an   
inquiry into the part played by the     
patriotic animus in the life of modern  
peoples1 particularly as it bears on    
questions of war and peace4  ,on any    
attempt to divest this concept of all   
extraneous or adventitious elements it  
will be found that such a sense of an   
undivided joint interest in a collective
 body of prestige will always remain as 
an irreducible minimum4 ,this is the    
substantial core about which many and   
divers subsidiary interests cluster1 but
 without which these other clustering   
interests and aspirations will not1     
jointly or severally1 make up a working 
palladium of the patriotic spirit4  ,it 
is true1 seen in some other light or    
rated in some other bearing or          
connection1 one and another of these    
other interests1 ideals1 aspirations1   
beatitudes1 may well be adjudged nobler1
 wiser1 possibly more urgent than the   

national prestige2 but in the forum of  
patriotism all these other necessaries  
of human life--the glory of ,god and the
 good of man--rise by comparison only to
 the rank of subsidiaries1 auxiliaries1 
amenities4 ,he is an indifferent patriot
 who will let life1 liberty and the     
pursuit of happiness cloud the issue and
 get in the way of the main business in 
hand4  ,there once were1 we are told1   
many hardy and enterprising spirits     
banded together along the ,spanish ,main
 for such like ends1 just as there are  
in our day an even greater number of no 
less single-minded spirits bent on their
 own life1 liberty and pursuit of       
happiness1 according to their light1 in 
the money-markets of the modern world2  
but for all their admirable qualities   
and splendid achievements1 their        
passionate quest of these amenities has 
not entitled these ,gentlemen           
,adventurers to claim rank as patriots4 
,the poet says3     ,strike for your    
altars and your fires6    ,strike for   

the green graves of your sires6         
,god and your native land6  ,but1 again1
 a temperate scrutiny of the list of    
desiderata so enumerated in the poet's  
flight1 will quickly bring out the fact 
that any or all of them might drop out  
of the situation without prejudice to   
the plain call of patriotic duty4 ,in   
the last resort1 when the patriotic     
spirit falls back on its naked self     
alone1 it is not reflection on the      
merits of these good and beautiful      
things in ,nature that gives him his cue
 and enforces the ultimate sacrifice4   
,indeed it is something infinitely more 
futile and infinitely more              
urgent1--provided only that the man is  
imbued with the due modicum of patriotic
 devotion2 as1 indeed1 men commonly are4
 ,it is not faith1 hope or charity that 
abide as the irreducible minimum of     
virtue in the patriot's scheme of       
things2 particularly not that charity   
that has once been highly spoken of as  
being the greatest of these4 ,it may be 

that1 viewed in the light of reason1 as 
,doctor ,katzenberger would say1        
patriotic devotion is the most futile   
thing in the world2 but1 for good or    
ill1 the light of reason has nothing to 
do with the case1--no more than ,the    
flowers that bloom in the spring4  ,the 
patriotic spirit is a spirit of         
emulation1 evidently1 at the same time  
that it is emulation shot through with a
 sense of solidarity4 ,it belongs under 
the general caption of sportsmanship1   
rather than of workmanship4 ,now1 any   
enterprise in sportsmanship is bent on  
an invidious success1 which must involve
 as its major purpose the defeat and    
humiliation of some competitor1 whatever
 else may be comprised in its aim4 ,its 
aim is a differential gain1 as against a
 rival2 and the emulative spirit that   
comes under the head of patriotism      
commonly1 if not invariably1 seeks this 
differential advantage by injury of the 
rival rather than by an increase of     
home-bred well-being4  ,indeed1         

well-being is altogether out of the     
perspective1 except as underpinning for 
an edifice of national prestige4 ,it is1
 at least1 a safe generalisation that   
the patriotic sentiment never has been  
known to rise to the consummate pitch of
 enthusiastic abandon except when bent  
on some work of concerted malevolence4  
,patriotism is of a contentious         
complexion1 and finds its full          
expression in no other outlet than      
warlike enterprise2 its highest and     
final appeal is for the death1 damage1  
discomfort and destruction of the party 
of the second part4  ,it is not that the
 spirit of patriotism will tolerate no  
other sentiments bearing on matters of  
public interest1 but only that it will  
tolerate none that traverse the call of 
the national prestige4 ,like other men1 
the patriot may be moved by many and    
divers other considerations1 besides    
that of the national prestige2 and these
 other considerations may be of the most
 genial and reasonable kind1 or they may

 also be as foolish and mischievous as  
any comprised in the range of human     
infirmities4 ,he may be a humanitarian  
given over to the kindliest solicitude  
for the common good1 or a religious     
devotee hedged about in all his motions 
by the ever present fear of ,god1 or    
taken up with artistic1 scholarly or    
scientific pursuits2 or1 again1 he may  
be a spendthrift devotee of profane     
dissipation1 whether in the slums or on 
the higher levels of gentility1 or he   
may be engaged on a rapacious quest of  
gain1 as a businessman within the law or
 as a criminal without its benefit1 or  
he may spend his best endeavors in      
advancing the interests of his class at 
the cost of the nation at large4 ,all   
that is understood as a matter of course
 and is beside the point4 ,in so far as 
he is a complete patriot these other    
interests will fall away from him when  
the one clear call of patriotic duty    
comes to enlist him in the cause of the 
national prestige4 ,there is1 indeed1   

nothing to hinder a bad citizen being a 
good patriot2 nor does it follow that a 
good citizen--in other respects--may not
 be a very indifferent patriot4  ,many  
and various other preferences and       
considerations may coincide with the    
promptings of the patriotic spirit1 and 
so may come in to coalesce with and     
fortify its driving force2 and it is    
usual for patriotic men to seek support 
for their patriotic impulses in some    
reasoned purpose of this extraneous kind
 that is believed to be served by       
following the call of the national      
prestige1--it may be a presumptive      
increase and diffusion of culture at    
large1 or the spread and enhancement of 
a presumptively estimable religious     
faith1 or a prospective liberation of   
mankind from servitude to obnoxious     
masters and outworn institutions2 or1   
again1 it may be the increase of peace  
and material well-being among men1      
within the national frontiers or        
impartially throughout the civilised    

world4 ,there are1 substantially1 none  
of the desirable things in this world   
that are not so counted on by some      
considerable body of patriots to be     
accomplished by the success of their own
 particular patriotic aspirations4 ,what
 they will not come to an understanding 
about is the particular national        
ascendency with which the attainment of 
these admirable ends is conceived to be 
bound up4  ,the ideals1 needs and aims  
that so are brought into the patriotic  
argument to lend a color of rationality 
to the patriotic aspiration in any given
 case will of course be such ideals1    
needs and aims as are currently accepted
 and felt to be authentic and           
self-legitimating among the people in   
whose eyes the given patriotic          
enterprise is to find favor4 ,so one    
finds that1 e4g41 among the followers of
 ,islam1 devout and resolute1 the       
patriotic statesman 7that is to say the 
politician who designs to make use of   
the popular patriotic fervor7 will in   

the last resort appeal to the claims and
 injunctions of the faith4 ,in a similar
 way the ,prussian statesman bent on    
dynastic enterprise will conjure in the 
name of the dynasty and of culture and  
efficiency2 or1 if worse comes to worst1
 an outbreak will be decently covered   
with a plea of mortal peril and         
self-defense4 ,among ,english-speaking  
peoples much is to be gained by showing 
that the path of patriotic glory is at  
the same time the way of equal-handed   
justice under the rule of free          
institutions2 at the same time1 in a    
fully commercialised community1 such as 
the ,english-speaking commonly are1     
material benefits in the way of trade   
will go far to sketch in a background of
 decency for any enterprise that looks  
to the enhancement of the national      
prestige4  ,but any promise of gain1    
whether in the nation's material or     
immaterial assets1 will not of itself   
carry full conviction to the commonplace
 modern citizen2 or even to such modern 

citizens as are best endowed with a     
national spirit4 ,by and large1 and     
overlooking that appreciable contingent 
of morally defective citizens that is to
 be counted on in any hybrid population1
 it will hold true that no contemplated 
enterprise or line of policy will fully 
commend itself to the popular sense of  
merit and expediency until it is given a
 moral turn1 so as to bring it to square
 with the dictates of right and honest  
dealing4 ,on no terms short of this will
 it effectually coalesce with the       
patriotic aspiration4 ,to give the      
fullest practical effect to the         
patriotic fervor that animates any      
modern nation1 and so turn it to use in 
the most effective way1 it is necessary 
to show that the demands of equity are  
involved in the case4 ,any cursory      
survey of modern historical events      
bearing on this point1 among the        
civilised peoples1 will bring out the   
fact that no concerted and sustained    
movement of the national spirit can be  

had without enlisting the community's   
moral convictions4 ,the common man must 
be persuaded that right is on his side4 
,thrice is he armed who knows his       
quarrel just4 ,the grounds of this      
conviction may often be tawdry enough1  
but the conviction is a necessary factor
 in the case4  ,the requisite moral     
sanction may be had on various grounds1 
and1 on the whole1 it is not an         
extremely difficult matter to arrange4  
,in the simplest and not infrequent case
 it may turn on a question of equity in 
respect of trade or investment as       
between the citizens or subjects of the 
several rival nations2 the ,chinese     
,open ,door affords as sordid an example
 as may be desired4 ,or it may be only  
an envious demand for a share in the    
world's material resources--,a ,place in
 the ,sun1 as a picturesque phrase      
describes it2 or ,the ,freedom of the   
,seas1 as another equally vague and     
equally invidious demand for            
international equity phrases it4 ,these 

demands are put forward with a color of 
demanding something in the way of       
equitable opportunity for the           
commonplace peaceable citizen2 but quite
 plainly they have none but a fanciful  
bearing on the fortunes of the common   
man in time of peace1 and they have a   
meaning to the nation only as a fighting
 unit2 apart from their prestige value1 
these things are worth fighting for only
 as prospective means of fighting4 ,the 
like appeal to the moral sensibilities  
may1 again1 be made in the way of a call
 to self-defense1 under the rule of     
,live and let live2 or it may also rest 
on the more tenuous obligation to       
safeguard the national integrity of a   
weaker neighbor1 under a broader        
interpretation of the same equitable    
rule of ,live and let live4 ,but in one 
way or another it is necessary to set up
 the conviction that the promptings of  
patriotic ambition have the sanction of 
moral necessity4  ,it is not that the   
line of national policy or patriotic    

enterprise so entered upon with the     
support of popular sentiment need be    
right and equitable as seen in          
dispassionate perspective from the      
outside1 but only that it should be     
capable of being made to seem right and 
equitable to the biased populace whose  
moral convictions are requisite to its  
prosecution2 which is quite another     
matter4 ,nor is it that any such        
patriotic enterprise is1 in fact1       
entered on simply or mainly on these    
moral grounds that so are alleged in its
 justification1 but only that some such 
colorable ground of justification or    
extenuation is necessary to be alleged1 
and to be credited by popular belief4   
,it is not that the common man is not   
sufficiently patriotic1 but only that he
 is a patriot hampered with a plodding  
and uneasy sense of right and honest    
dealing1 and that one must make up one's
 account with this moral bias in looking
 to any sustained and concerted action  
that draws on the sentiment of the      

common man for its carrying on4 ,but the
 moral sense in the case may be somewhat
 easily satisfied with a modicum of     
equity1 in case the patriotic bias of   
the people is well pronounced1 or in    
case it is reenforced with a sufficient 
appeal to self-interest4 ,in those cases
 where the national fervor rises to an  
excited pitch1 even very attenuated     
considerations of right and justice1    
such as would under ordinary conditions 
doubtfully bear scrutiny as extenuating 
circumstances1 may come to serve as     
moral authentication for any extravagant
 course of action to which the craving  
for national prestige may incite4 ,the  
higher the pitch of patriotic fervor1   
the more tenuous and more thread-bare   
may be the requisite moral sanction4 ,by
 cumulative excitation some very        
remarkable results have latterly been   
attained along this line4         99    
99       99       99       99           
,patriotism is evidently a spirit of    
particularism1 of aliency and animosity 

between contrasted groups of persons2 it
 lives on invidious comparison1 and     
works out in mutual hindrance and       
jealousy between nations4 ,it commonly  
goes the length of hindering intercourse
 and obstructing traffic that would     
patently serve the material and cultural
 well-being of both nationalities2 and  
not infrequently1 indeed normally1 it   
eventuates in competitive damage to     
both4  ,all this holds true in the world
 of modern civilisation1 at the same    
time that the modern civilised scheme of
 life is1 notoriously1 of a cosmopolitan
 character1 both in its cultural        
requirements and in its economic        
structure4 ,modern culture is drawn on  
too large a scale1 is of too complex and
 multiform a character1 requires the    
cooperation of too many and various     
lines of inquiry1 experience and        
insight1 to admit of its being confined 
within national frontiers1 except at the
 cost of insufferable crippling and     
retardation4 ,the science and           

scholarship that is the peculiar pride  
of civilised ,christendom is not only   
international1 but rather it is         
homogeneously cosmopolitan2 so that in  
this bearing there are1 in effect1 no   
national frontiers2 with the exception1 
of course1 that in a season of patriotic
 intoxication1 such as the current war  
has induced1 even the scholars and      
scientists will be temporarily overset  
by their patriotic fervour4 ,indeed1    
with the best efforts of obscurantism   
and national jealousy to the contrary1  
it remains patently true that modern    
culture is the culture of ,christendom  
at large1 not the culture of one and    
another nation in severalty within the  
confines of ,christendom4 ,it is only as
 and in so far as they partake in and   
contribute to the general run of        
,western civilisation at large that the 
people of any one of these nations of   
,christendom can claim standing as a    
cultured nation2 and even any           
distinctive variation from this general 

run of civilised life1 such as may give 
a local colour of ideals1 tastes and    
conventions1 will1 in point of cultural 
value1 have to be rated as an idle      
detail1 a species of lost motion1 that  
serves no better purpose than a         
transient estrangement4  ,so also1 the  
modern state of the industrial arts is  
of a like cosmopolitan character1 in    
point of scale1 specialisation1 and the 
necessary use of diversified resources1 
of climate and raw materials4 ,none of  
the countries of ,europe1 e4g41 is      
competent to carry on its industry by   
modern technological methods without    
constantly drawing on resources outside 
of its national boundaries4 ,isolation  
in this industrial respect1 exclusion   
from the world market1 would mean       
intolerable loss of efficiency1 more    
pronounced the more fully the given     
country has taken over this modern state
 of the industrial arts4 ,exclusion from
 the general body of outlying resources 
would seriously cripple any one or all  

of them1 and effectually deprive them of
 the usufruct of this technology2 and   
partial exclusion1 by prohibitive or    
protective tariffs and the like1        
unavoidably results in a partial        
lowering of the efficiency of each1 and 
therefore a reduction of the current    
well-being among them all together4     
,into this cultural and technological   
system of the modern world the patriotic
 spirit fits like dust in the eyes and  
sand in the bearings4 ,its net          
contribution to the outcome is          
obscuration1 distrust1 and retardation  
at every point where it touches the     
fortunes of modern mankind4 ,yet it is  
forever present in the counsels of the  
statesmen and in the affections of the  
common man1 and it never ceases to      
command the regard of all men as the    
prime attribute of manhood and the final
 test of the desirable citizen4 ,it is  
scarcely an exaggeration to say that no 
other consideration is allowed in       
abatement of the claims of patriotic    

loyalty1 and that such loyalty will be  
allowed to cover any multitude of sins4 
,when the ancient philosopher described 
,man as a political animal1 this1 in    
effect1 was what he affirmed2 and today 
the ancient maxim is as good as new4    
,the patriotic spirit is at cross       
purposes with modern life1 but in any   
test case it is found that the claims of
 life yield before those of patriotism2 
and any voice that dissents from this   
order of things is as a voice crying in 
the wilderness4         99       99     
99       99       99  ,to anyone who is 
inclined to moralise on the singular    
discrepancies of human life this state  
of the case will be fruitful of much    
profound speculation4 ,the patriotic    
animus appears to be an enduring trait  
of human nature1 an ancient heritage    
that has stood over unshorn from time   
immemorial1 under the ,mendelian rule of
 the stability of racial types4 ,it is  
archaic1 not amenable to elimination or 
enduring suppression1 and apparently not

 appreciably to be mitigated by         
reflection1 education1 experience or    
selective breeding4  ,throughout the    
historical period1 and presumably       
through an incalculable period of the   
unrecorded past1 patriotic manslaughter 
has consistently been weeding out of    
each successive generation of men the   
most patriotic among them2 with the net 
result that the level of patriotic ardor
 today appears to be no lower than it   
ever was4 ,at the same time1 with the   
advance of population1 of culture and of
 the industrial arts1 patriotism has    
grown increasingly disserviceable2 and  
it is to all appearance as ubiquitous   
and as powerful as ever1 and is held in 
as high esteem4  ,the continued         
prevalence of this archaic animus among 
the modern peoples1 as well as the fact 
that it is universally placed high among
 the virtues1 must be taken to argue    
that it is1 in its elements1 an         
hereditary trait1 of the nature of an   
inborn impulsive propensity1 rather than

 a product of habituation4 ,it is1 in   
substance1 not something that can be    
learned and unlearned4 ,from one        
generation to another1 the allegiance   
may shift from one nationality to       
another1 but the fact of unreflecting   
allegiance at large remains4 ,and it all
 argues also that no sensible change has
 taken effect in the hereditary         
endowment of the race1 at least in this 
respect1 during the period known by     
record or by secure inference1--say1    
since the early ,neolithic in ,europe2  
and this in spite of the fact that there
 has all this while been opportunity for
 radical changes in the ,european       
population by cross-breeding1           
infiltration and displacement of the    
several racial stocks that go to make up
 this population4 ,hence1 on slight     
reflection the inference has suggested  
itself and has gained acceptance that   
this trait of human nature must         
presumably have been serviceable to the 
peoples of the earlier time1 on those   

levels of savagery or of the lower      
barbarism on which the ancestral stocks 
of the ,european population first made  
good their survival and proved their    
fitness to people that quarter of the   
earth4 ,such1 indeed1 is the common     
view2 so common as to pass for          
matter-of-course1 and therefore         
habitually to escape scrutiny4  ,still  
it need not follow1 as more patient     
reflection will show4 ,all the ,european
 peoples show much the same animus in   
this respect2 whatever their past       
history may have been1 and whatever the 
difference in past experience that might
 be conceived to have shaped their      
temperament4 ,any difference in the     
pitch of patriotic conceit and          
animosity1 between the several          
nationalities or the several localities1
 is by no means wide1 even in cases     
where the racial composition of the     
population is held to be very different1
 as1 e4g41 between the peoples on the   
,baltic seaboard and those on the       

,mediterranean4 ,in point of fact1 in   
this matter of patriotic animus there   
appears to be a wider divergence1       
temperamentally1 between individuals    
within any one of these communities than
 between the common run in any one      
community and the corresponding common  
run in any other4 ,but even such        
divergence of individual temper in      
respect of patriotism as is to be met   
with1 first and last1 is after all      
surprisingly small in view of the scope 
for individual variation which this     
,european population would seem to      
offer4         99       99       99     
99       99  ,these peoples of ,europe1 
all and several1 are hybrids compounded 
out of the same run of racial elements1 
but mixed in varying proportions4 ,on   
any parallel of latitude--taken in the  
climatic rather than in the geometric   
sense--the racial composition of the    
west-,european population will be much  
the same1 virtually identical in effect1
 although always of a hybrid complexion2

 whereas on any parallel of             
longitude--also in the climatic         
sense--the racial composition will vary 
progressively1 but always within the    
limits of the same general scheme of    
hybridisation1--the variation being a   
variation in the proportion in which the
 several racial elements are present in 
any given case4 ,but in no case does a  
notable difference in racial composition
 coincide with a linguistic or national 
frontier4 ,but in point of patriotic    
animus these ,european peoples are one  
as good as another1 whether the         
comparison be traced on parallels of    
latitude or of longitude4 ,and the      
inhabitants of each national territory1 
or of each detail locality1 appear also 
to run surprisingly uniform in respect  
of their patriotic spirit4  ,heredity in
 any such community of hybrids will1    
superficially1 appear to run somewhat   
haphazard4 ,there will1 of course1 be no
 traceable difference between social or 
economic classes1 in point of           

heredity1--as is visibly the case in    
,christendom4 ,but variation--of an     
apparently haphazard description--will  
be large and ubiquitous among the       
individuals of such a populace4 ,indeed1
 it is a matter of course and of easy   
verification that individual variation  
within such a hybrid stock will greatly 
exceed the extreme differences that may 
subsist between the several racial types
 that have gone to produce the hybrid   
stock4 ,such is the case of the         
,european peoples4 ,the inhabitants vary
 greatly among themselves1 both in      
physical and in mental traits1 as would 
be expected2 and the variation between  
individuals in point of patriotic animus
 should accordingly also be expected to 
be extremely wide1--should1 in effect1  
greatly exceed the difference1 if any1  
in this respect between the several     
racial elements engaged in the ,european
 population4 ,some appreciable          
difference in this respect there appears
 to be1 between individuals2 but        

individual divergence from the normal or
 average appears always to be of a      
sporadic sort1--it does not run on class
 lines1 whether of occupation1 status or
 property1 nor does it run at all       
consistently from parent to child4 ,when
 all is told the argument returns to the
 safe ground that these variations in   
point of patriotic animus are sporadic  
and inconsequential1 and do not touch   
the general proposition that1 one with  
another1 the inhabitants of ,europe and 
the ,european ,colonies are sufficiently
 patriotic1 and that the average        
endowment in this respect runs with     
consistent uniformity across all        
differences of time1 place and          
circumstance4 ,it would1 in fact1 be    
extremely hazardous to affirm that there
 is a sensible difference in the        
ordinary pitch of patriotic sentiment as
 between any two widely diverse samples 
of these hybrid populations1 in spite of
 the fact that the diversity in visible 
physical traits may be quite pronounced4

  ,in short1 the conclusion seems safe1 
on the whole1 that in this respect the  
several racial stocks that have gone to 
produce the existing populations of     
,christendom have all been endowed about
 as richly one as another4 ,patriotism  
appears to be a ubiquitous trait1 at    
least among the races and peoples of    
,christendom4 ,from which it should     
follow1 that since there is1 and has    
from the beginning been1 no differential
 advantage favoring one racial stock or 
one fashion of hybrid as against        
another1 in this matter of patriotic    
animus1 there should also be no ground  
of selective survival or selective      
elimination on this account as between  
these several races and peoples4 ,so    
that the undisturbed and undiminished   
prevalence of this trait among the      
,european population1 early or late1    
argues nothing as to its net            
serviceability or disserviceability     
under any of the varying conditions of  
culture and technology to which these   

,europeans have been subjected1 first   
and last2 except that it has1 in any    
case1 not proved so disserviceable under
 the conditions prevailing hitherto as  
to result in the extinction of these    
,europeans1 one with another4#d         
,footnote #d3 ,for a more extended      
discussion of this matter1 cf4 ,imperial
 ,germany and the ,industrial           
,revolution1 ch4 i4 and ,supplementary  
,notes i4 and ii4  ,the patriotic frame 
of mind has been spoken of above as if  
it were an hereditary trait1 something  
after the fashion of a ,mendelian unit  
character4 ,doubtless this is not a     
competent account of the matter2 but the
 present argument scarcely needs a      
closer analysis4 ,still1 in a measure to
 quiet title and avoid annoyance1 it may
 be noted that this patriotic animus is 
of the nature of a frame of mind rather 
than a ,mendelian unit character2 that  
it so involves a concatenation of       
several impulsive propensities          
7presumably hereditary72 and that both  

the concatenation and the special mode  
and amplitude of the response are a     
product of habituation1 very largely of 
the nature of conventionalised use and  
wont4 ,what is said above1 therefore1   
goes little farther than saying that the
 underlying aptitudes requisite to this 
patriotic frame of mind are heritable1  
and that use and wont as bearing on this
 point run with sufficient uniformity to
 bring a passably uniform result4 ,it   
may be added that in this concatenation 
spoken of there seems to be comprised1  
ordinarily1 that sentimental attachment 
to habitat and custom that is called    
love of home1 or in its accentuated     
expression1 home-sickness2 so also an   
invidious self-complacency1 coupled with
 a gregarious bent which gives the      
invidious comparison a group content2   
and further1 commonly if not invariably1
 a bent of abnegation1 self-abasement1  
subservience1 or whatever it may best be
 called1 that inclines the bearer       
unreasoningly and unquestioningly to    

accept and serve a prescriptive ideal   
given by custom or by customary         
authority4         99       99       99 
99       99  ,the conclusion would      
therefore provisionally run to the      
effect that under modern conditions the 
patriotic animus is wholly a            
disserviceable trait in the spiritual   
endowment of these peoples1--in so far  
as bears on the material conditions of  
life unequivocally1 and as regards the  
cultural interests more at large        
presumptively2 whereas there is no      
assured ground for a discriminating     
opinion as touches its possible utility 
or disutility at any remote period in   
the past4 ,there is1 of course1 always  
room for the conservative estimate that1
 as the possession of this spiritual    
trait has not hitherto resulted in the  
extinction of the race1 so it may also  
in the calculable future continue to    
bring no more grievous results than a   
degree of mischief1 without even        
stopping or greatly retarding the       

increase of population4  ,all this1 of  
course1 is intended to apply only so far
 as it goes4 ,it must not be taken as   
intending to say any least word in      
derogation of those high qualities that 
inspire the patriotic citizen4 ,in its  
economic1 biological and cultural       
incidence patriotism appears to be an   
untoward trait of human nature2 which   
has1 of course1 nothing to say as to its
 moral excellence1 its aesthetic value1 
or its indispensability to a worthy     
life4 ,no doubt1 it is in all these     
respects deserving of all the esteem and
 encomiums that fall to its share4      
,indeed1 its well-known moral and       
aesthetic value1 as well as the         
reprobation that is visited on any      
shortcomings in this respect1 signify1  
for the purposes of the present         
argument1 nothing more than that the    
patriotic animus meets the unqualified  
approval of men because they are1 all   
and several1 infected with it4 ,it is   
evidence of the ubiquitous1 intimate and

 ineradicable presence of this quality  
in human nature2 all the more since it  
continues untiringly to be held in the  
highest esteem in spite of the fact that
 a modicum of reflection should make its
 disserviceability plain to the meanest 
understanding4 ,no higher praise of     
moral excellence1 and no profounder test
 of loyalty1 can be asked than this     
current unreserved commendation of a    
virtue that makes invariably for damage 
and discomfort4 ,the virtuous impulse   
must be deep-seated and indefeasible    
that drives men incontinently to do good
 that evil may come of it4 ,though ,he  
slay me1 yet will ,i trust in ,him4  ,in
 the light--and it is a dim and wavering
 light--of the archaeological evidence1 
helped out by circumstantial evidence   
from such parallel or analogous         
instances as are afforded by existing   
communities on a comparable level of    
culture1 one may venture more or less   
confidently on a reconstruction of the  
manner of life among the early          

,europeans1 of early neolithic times and
 later4#e ,and so one may form some     
conception of the part played by this   
patriotic animus among those beginnings1
 when1 if not the race1 at least its    
institutions were young2 and when the   
native temperament of these peoples was 
tried out and found fit to survive      
through the age-long and slow-moving    
eras of stone and bronze4 ,in this      
connection1 it appears safe to assume   
that since early neolithic times no     
sensible change has taken effect in the 
racial complexion of the ,european      
peoples2 and therefore no sensible      
change in their spiritual and mental    
make-up4 ,so that in respect of the     
spiritual elements that go to make up   
this patriotic animus the ,europeans of 
today will be substantially identical   
with the ,europeans of that early time4 
,the like is true as regards those other
 traits of temperament that come in     
question here1 as being included among  
the stable characteristics that still   

condition the life of these peoples     
under the altered circumstances of the  
modern age4  ,footnote #e3 ,cf4         
,imperial ,germany and the ,industrial  
,revolution1 as above4  ,the difference 
between prehistoric ,europe and the     
present state of these peoples resolves 
itself on analysis into a difference in 
the state of the industrial arts1       
together with such institutional changes
 as have come on in the course of       
working out this advance in the         
industrial arts4 ,the habits and the    
exigencies of life among these peoples  
have greatly changed2 whereas in        
temperament and capacities the peoples  
that now live by and under the rule of  
this altered state of the industrial    
arts are the same as they were4 ,it is  
to be noted1 therefore1 that the fact of
 their having successfully come through 
the long ages of prehistory by the use  
of this mental and spiritual endowment  
can not be taken to argue that these    
peoples are thereby fit to meet the     

exigencies of this later and gravely    
altered age2 nor will it do to assume   
that because these peoples have         
themselves worked out this modern       
culture and its technology1 therefore it
 must all be suitable for their use and 
conducive to their biological success4  
,the single object lesson of the modern 
urban community1 with its endless       
requirements in the way of sanitation1  
police1 compulsory education1           
charities1--all this and many other     
discrepancies in modern life should     
enjoin caution on anyone who is inclined
 off-hand to hold that because modern   
men have created these conditions1      
therefore these must be the most        
suitable conditions of life for modern  
mankind4  ,in the beginning1 that is to 
say in the ,european beginning1 men     
lived in small and close groups4        
,control was close within the group1 and
 the necessity of subordinating         
individual gains and preferences to the 
common good was enjoined on the group by

 the exigencies of the case1 on pain of 
common extinction4 ,the situation and   
usages of existing ,eskimo villages may 
serve to illustrate and enforce the     
argument on this head4 ,the solidarity  
of sentiment necessary to support the   
requisite solidarity of action in the   
case would be a prime condition of      
survival in any racial stock exposed to 
the conditions which surrounded these   
early ,europeans4 ,this needful sense of
 solidarity would touch not simply or   
most imperatively the joint prestige of 
the group1 but rather the joint material
 interests2 and would enforce a spirit  
of mutual support and dependence4 ,which
 would be rather helped than hindered by
 a jealous attitude of joint prestige2  
so long as no divergent interests of    
members within the group were in a      
position to turn this state of the      
common sentiment to their own particular
 advantage4  ,this state of the case    
will have lasted for a relatively long  
time2 long enough to have tested the    

fitness of these peoples for that manner
 of life1--longer1 no doubt1 than the   
interval that has elapsed since history 
began4 ,special interests--e4g41        
personal and family interests--will have
 been present and active in these days  
of the beginning2 but so long as the    
group at large was small enough to admit
 of a close neighborly contact          
throughout its extent and throughout the
 workday routine of life1 at the same   
time that it was too small and feeble to
 allow any appreciable dissipation of   
its joint energies in such pursuit of   
selfish gains as would run counter to   
the paramount business of the common    
livelihood1 so long the sense of a      
common livelihood and a joint fortune   
would continue to hold any particularist
 ambitions effectually in check4 ,had it
 fallen out otherwise1 the story of the 
group in question would have been ended1
 and another and more suitably endowed  
type of men would have taken the place  
vacated by its extinction4  ,with a     

sensible advance in the industrial arts 
the scale of operations would grow      
larger1 and the group more numerous and 
extensive4 ,the margin between          
production and subsistence would also   
widen and admit additional scope for    
individual ambitions and personal gains4
 ,and as this process of growth and     
increasing productive efficiency went   
on1 the control exercised by neighborly 
surveillance1 through the sentiment of  
the common good as against the          
self-seeking pursuits of individuals and
 sub-groups1 would gradually slacken2   
until by progressive disuse it would    
fall into a degree of abeyance2 to be   
called into exercise and incite to      
concerted action only in the face of    
unusual exigencies touching the common  
fortunes of the group at large1 or on   
persuasion that the collective interest 
of the group at large was placed in     
jeopardy in the molestation of one and  
another of its members from without4    
,the group's prestige at least would be 

felt to suffer in the defeat or         
discourtesy suffered by any of its      
members at the hands of any alien2 and1 
under compulsion of the ancient sense of
 group solidarity1 whatever material    
hardship or material gain might so fall 
to individual members in their dealings 
with the alien would pass easy scrutiny 
as material detriment or gain inuring to
 the group at large1--in the            
apprehension of men whose sense of      
community interest is inflamed with a   
jealous disposition to safeguard their  
joint prestige4  ,with continued advance
 in the industrial arts the             
circumstances conditioning life will    
undergo a progressive change of such a  
character that the joint interest of the
 group at large1 in the material        
respect1 will progressively be less     
closely bound up with the material      
fortunes of any particular member or    
members2 until in the course of time and
 change there will1 in effect1 in       
ordinary times be no general and        

inclusive community of material interest
 binding the members together in a      
common fortune and working for a common 
livelihood4 ,as the rights of ownership 
begin to take effect1 so that the       
ownership of property and the pursuit of
 a livelihood under the rules of        
ownership come to govern men's economic 
relations1 these material concerns will 
cease to be a matter of undivided joint 
interest1 and will fall into the shape  
of interest in severalty4 ,so soon and  
so far as this institution of ownership 
or property takes effect1 men's material
 interests cease to run on lines of     
group solidarity4 ,solely1 or almost    
solely1 in the exceptional case of      
defense against a predatory incursion   
from outside1 do the members of the     
group have a common interest of a       
material kind4 ,progressively as the    
state of the arts advances1 the         
industrial organisation advances to a   
larger scale and a more extensive       
specialisation1 with increasing         

divergence among individual interests   
and individual fortunes2 and intercourse
 over larger distances grows easier and 
makes a larger grouping practicable2    
which enables a larger1 prompter and    
more effective mobilisation of forces   
with which to defend or assert any joint
 claims4 ,but by the same move it also  
follows1 or at least it appears         
uniformly to have followed in the       
,european case1 that the accumulation of
 property and the rights of ownership   
have progressively come into the first  
place among the material interests of   
these peoples2 while anything like a    
community of usufruct has imperceptibly 
fallen into the background1 and has     
presently gone virtually into abeyance1 
except as an eventual recourse in       
extremis for the common defense4        
,property rights have displaced         
community of usufruct2 and invidious    
distinctions as between persons1        
sub-groups1 and classes have displaced  
community of prestige in the workday    

routine of these peoples2 and the       
distinctions between contrasted persons 
or classes have come to rest1 in an ever
 increasing degree1 directly or         
indirectly1 on invidious comparisons in 
respect of pecuniary standing rather    
than on personal affiliation with the   
group at large4  ,so1 with the advance  
of the industrial arts a differentiation
 of a new character sets in and         
presently grows progressively more      
pronounced and more effectual1 giving   
rise to a regrouping on lines that run  
regardless of those frontiers that      
divide one community from another for   
purposes of patriotic emulation4 ,so far
 as it comes chiefly and typically in   
question here1 this regrouping takes    
place on two distinct but somewhat      
related principles of contrast3 that of 
wealth and poverty1 and that of master  
and servant1 or authority and obedience4
 ,the material interests of the         
population in this way come to be       
divided between the group of those who  

own and those who command1 on the one   
hand1 and of those who work and who     
obey1 on the other hand4  ,neither of   
these two contrasted categories of      
persons have any direct material        
interest in the maintenance of the      
patriotic community2 or at any rate no  
such interest as should reasonably      
induce them to spend their own time and 
substance in support of the political   
7patriotic7 organisation within which   
they live4 ,it is only in so far as one 
or another of these interests looks for 
a more than proportionate share in any  
prospective gain from the joint         
enterprise1 that the group or class in  
question can reasonably be counted on to
 bear its share in the joint venture4   
,and it is only when and in so far as   
their particular material or            
self-regarding interest is reenforced by
 patriotic conceit1 that they can be    
counted on to spend themselves in       
furtherance of the patriotic enterprise1
 without the assurance of a more than   

proportionate share in any gains that   
may be held in prospect from any such   
joint enterprise2 and it is only in its 
patriotic bearing that the political    
community continues to be a joint       
venture4 ,that is to say1 in more       
generalised terms1 through the          
development of the rights of property1  
and of such like prescriptive claims of 
privilege and prerogative1 it has come  
about that other community interests    
have fallen away1 until the collective  
prestige remains as virtually the sole  
community interest which can hold the   
sentiment of the group in a bond of     
solidarity4  ,to one or another of these
 several interested groups or classes   
within the community the political      
organisation may work a benefit2 but    
only to one or another1 not to each and 
several1 jointly or collectively4 ,since
 by no chance will the benefit derived  
from such joint enterprise on the part  
of the community at large equal the     
joint cost2 in as much as all joint     

enterprise of the kind that looks to    
material advantage works by one or      
another method of inhibition and takes  
effect1 if at all1 by lowering the      
aggregate efficiency of the several     
countries concerned1 with a view to the 
differential gain of one at the cost of 
another4 ,so1 e4g41 a protective tariff 
is plainly a conspiracy in restraint of 
trade1 with a view to benefit the       
conspirators by hindering their         
competitors4 ,the aggregate cost to the 
community at large of such an enterprise
 in retardation is always more than the 
gains it brings to those who may benefit
 by it4  ,in so speaking of the uses to 
which the common man's patriotic        
devotion may be turned1 there is no     
intention to underrate its intrinsic    
value as a genial and generous trait of 
human nature4 ,doubtless it is best and 
chiefly to be appreciated as a spiritual
 quality that beautifies and ennobles   
its bearer1 and that endows him with the
 full stature of manhood1 quite         

irrespective of ulterior considerations4
 ,so it is to be conceded without       
argument that this patriotic animus is a
 highly meritorious frame of mind1 and  
that it has an aesthetic value scarcely 
to be overstated in the farthest stretch
 of poetic license4 ,but the question of
 its serviceability to the modern       
community1 in any other than this       
decorative respect1 and particularly its
 serviceability to the current needs of 
the common man in such a modern         
community1 is not touched by such an    
admission2 nor does this recognition of 
its generous spiritual nature afford any
 help toward answering a further        
question as to how and with what effect 
this animus may be turned to account by 
anyone who is in position to make use of
 the forces which it sets free4  ,among 
,christian nations there still is1 on   
the whole1 a decided predilection for   
that ancient and authentic line of      
national repute that springs from       
warlike prowess4 ,this repute for       

warlike prowess is what first comes to  
mind among civilised peoples when       
speaking of national greatness4 ,and    
among those who have best preserved this
 warlike ideal of worth1 the patriotic  
ambition is likely to converge on the   
prestige of their sovereign2 so that it 
takes the concrete form of personal     
loyalty to a master1 and so combines or 
coalesces with a servile habit of mind4 
,but peace hath its victories no less   
renowned than war1 it is said2 and      
peaceable folk of a patriotic temper    
have learned to make the best of their  
meager case and have found              
self-complacency in these victories of  
the peaceable order4 ,so it may broadly 
be affirmed that all nations look with  
complacency on their own peculiar       
,culture--the organised complex of      
habits of thought and of conduct by     
which their own routine of life is      
regulated--as being in some way worthier
 than the corresponding habits of their 
neighbors4 ,the case of the ,german     

,culture has latterly come under a      
strong light in this way4 ,but while it 
may be that no other nation has been so 
naive as to make a concerted profession 
of faith to the effect that their own   
particular way of life is altogether    
commendable and is the only fashion of  
civilisation that is fit to survive2 yet
 it will scarcely be an extravagance to 
assert that in their own secret mind    
these others1 too1 are blest with much  
the same consciousness of unique worth4 
,conscious virtue of this kind is a good
 and sufficient ground for patriotic    
inflation1 so far as it goes4 ,it       
commonly does not go beyond a defensive 
attitude1 however4 ,now and again1 as in
 the latterday ,german animation on this
 head1 these phenomena of national use  
and wont may come to command such a     
degree of popular admiration as will    
incite to an aggressive or proselyting  
campaign4  ,in all this there is nothing
 of a self-seeking or covetous kind4    
,the common man who so lends himself to 

the aggressive enhancement of the       
national ,culture and its prestige has  
nothing of a material kind to gain from 
the increase of renown that so comes to 
his sovereign1 his language1 his        
countrymen's art or science1 his        
dietary1 or his ,god4 ,there are no     
sordid motives in all this4 ,these      
spiritual assets of self-complacency    
are1 indeed1 to be rated as grounds of  
high-minded patriotism without          
afterthought4 ,these aspirations and    
enthusiasms would perhaps be rated as   
,quixotic by men whose horizon is       
bounded by the main chance2 but they    
make up that substance of things hoped  
for that inflates those headlong        
patriotic animosities that stir         
universal admiration4  ,so also1 men    
find an invidious distinction in such   
matters of physical magnitude as their  
country's area1 the number of its       
population1 the size of its cities1 the 
extent of its natural resources1 its    
aggregate wealth and its wealth per     

capita1 its merchant marine and its     
foreign trade4 ,as a ground of invidious
 complacency these phenomena of physical
 magnitude and pecuniary traffic are no 
better and no worse than such immaterial
 assets as the majesty of the sovereign 
or the perfections of the language4     
,they are matters in which the common   
man is concerned only by the accident of
 domicile1 and his only connection with 
these things is an imaginary joint      
interest in their impressiveness4 ,to   
these things he has contributed         
substantially nothing1 and from them he 
derives no other merit or advantage than
 a patriotic inflation4 ,he takes pride 
in these things in an invidious way1 and
 there is no good reason why he should  
not2 just as there is also no good      
reason why he should1 apart from the    
fact that the common man is so          
constituted that he1 mysteriously1 takes
 pride in these things that concern him 
not4         99       99       99       
99       99  ,of the several groups or  

classes of persons within the political 
frontiers1 whose particular interests   
run systematically at cross purposes    
with those of the community at large    
under modern conditions1 the class of   
masters1 rulers1 authorities1--or       
whatever term may seem most suitable to 
designate that category of persons whose
 characteristic occupation is to give   
orders and command deference1--of the   
several orders and conditions of men    
these are1 in point of substantial      
motive and interest1 most patently at   
variance with all the rest1 or with the 
fortunes of the common man4 ,the class  
will include civil and military         
authorities and whatever nobility there 
is of a prescriptive and privileged     
kind4 ,the substantial interest of these
 classes in the common welfare is of the
 same kind as the interest which a      
parasite has in the well-being of his   
host2 a sufficiently substantial        
interest1 no doubt1 but there is in this
 relation nothing like a community of   

interest4 ,any gain on the part of the  
community at large will materially serve
 the needs of this group of personages1 
only in so far as it may afford them a  
larger volume or a wider scope for what 
has in latterday colloquial phrase been 
called graft4 ,these personages are1 of 
course1 not to be spoken of with        
disrespect or with the slightest        
inflection of discourtesy4 ,they are all
 honorable men4 ,indeed they afford the 
conventional pattern of human dignity   
and meritorious achievement1 and the    
,fountain of ,honor is found among them4
 ,the point of the argument is only that
 their material or other self-regarding 
interests are of such a nature as to be 
furthered by the material wealth of the 
community1 and more particularly by the 
increasing volume of the body politic2  
but only with the proviso that this     
material wealth and this increment of   
power must accrue without anything like 
a corresponding cost to this class4 ,at 
the same time1 since this class of the  

superiors is in some degree a           
specialised organ of prestige1 so that  
their value1 and therefore their tenure1
 both in the eyes of the community and  
in their own eyes1 is in the main a     
prestige value and a tenure by prestige2
 and since the prestige that invests    
their persons is a shadow cast by the   
putative worth of the community at      
large1 it follows that their particular 
interest in the joint prestige is       
peculiarly alert and insistent4 ,but it 
follows also that these personages      
cannot of their own substance or of     
their own motion contribute to this     
collective prestige in the same         
proportion in which it is necessary for 
them to draw on it in support of their  
own prestige value4 ,it would1 in other 
words1 be a patent absurdity to call on 
any of the current ruling classes1      
dynasties1 nobility1 military and       
diplomatic corps1 in any of the nations 
of ,europe1 e4g41 to preserve their     
current dignity and command the         

deference that is currently accorded    
them1 by recourse to their own powers   
and expenditure of their own substance1 
without the usufruct of the commonalty  
whose organ of dignity they are4 ,the   
current prestige value which they enjoy 
is beyond their unaided powers to create
 or maintain1 without the usufruct of   
the community4 ,such an enterprise does 
not lie within the premises of the case4
  ,in this bearing1 therefore1 the first
 concern with which these personages are
 necessarily occupied is the procurement
 and retention of a suitable usufruct in
 the material resources and good-will of
 a sufficiently large and industrious   
population4 ,the requisite good-will in 
these premises is called loyalty1 and   
its retention by the line of personages 
that so trade on prestige rests on a    
superinduced association of ideas1      
whereby the national honour comes to be 
confounded in popular apprehension with 
the prestige of these personages who    
have the keeping of it4 ,but the        

potentates and the establishments1 civil
 and military1 on whom this prestige    
value rests will unavoidably come into  
invidious comparison with others of     
their kind2 and1 as invariably happens  
in matters of invidious comparison1 the 
emulative needs of all the competitors  
for prestige are indefinitely           
extensible1 as the phrase of the        
economists has it4 ,each and several of 
them incontinently needs a further      
increment of prestige1 and therefore    
also a further increment of the material
 assets in men and resources that are   
needful as ways and means to assert and 
augment the national honor4  ,it is     
true1 the notion that their prestige    
value is in any degree conditioned by   
the material circumstances and the      
popular imagination of the underlying   
nation is distasteful to many of these  
vicars of the national honour4 ,they    
will incline rather to the persuasion   
that this prestige value is a           
distinctive attribute1 of a unique      

order1 intrinsic to their own persons4  
,but1 plainly1 any such detached line of
 magnates1 notables1 kings and          
mandarins1 resting their notability on  
nothing more substantial than a slightly
 sub-normal intelligence and a          
moderately scrofulous habit of body     
could not long continue to command that 
eager deference that is accounted their 
due4 ,such a picture of majesty would be
 sadly out of drawing4 ,there is little 
conviction and no great dignity to be   
drawn from the unaided pronouncement3   
,we're here because1    ,we're here     
because1    ,we're here because         
,we're here1  even when the doggerel is 
duly given the rhetorical benefit of a  
,tenure by the ,grace of ,god4 ,the     
personages that carry this dignity      
require the backing of a determined and 
patriotic populace in support of their  
prestige value1 and they commonly have  
no great difficulty in procuring it4    
,and their prestige value is1 in effect1
 proportioned to the volume of material 

resources and patriotic credulity that  
can be drawn on for its assertion4 ,it  
is true1 their draught on the requisite 
sentimental and pecuniary support is    
fortified with large claims of          
serviceability to the common good1 and  
these claims are somewhat easily1 indeed
 eagerly1 conceded and acted upon2      
although the alleged benefit to the     
common good will scarcely be visible    
except in the light of glory shed by the
 blazing torch of patriotism4  ,in so   
far as it is of a material nature the   
benefit which the constituted           
authorities so engage to contribute to  
the common good1 or in other words to   
confer on the common man1 falls under   
two heads3 defense against aggression   
from without2 and promotion of the      
community's material gain4 ,it is to be 
presumed that the constituted           
authorities commonly believe more or    
less implicitly in their own professions
 in so professing to serve the needs of 
the common man in these respects4 ,the  

common defense is a sufficiently grave  
matter1 and doubtless it claims the best
 affections and endeavour of the        
citizen2 but it is not a matter that    
should claim much attention at this     
point in the argument1 as bearing on the
 service rendered the common man by the 
constituted authorities1 taken one with 
another4 ,any given governmental        
establishment at home is useful in this 
respect only as against another         
governmental establishment elsewhere4   
,so that on the slightest examination it
 resolves itself into a matter of       
competitive patriotic enterprise1 as    
between the patriotic aspirations of    
different nationalities led by different
 governmental establishments2 and the   
service so rendered by the constituted  
authorities in the aggregate takes on   
the character of a remedy for evils of  
their own creation4 ,it is invariably a 
defense against the concerted           
aggressions of other patriots4 ,taken in
 the large1 the common defense of any   

given nation becomes a detail of the    
competitive struggle between rival      
nationalities animated with a common    
spirit of patriotic enterprise and led  
by authorities constituted for this     
competitive purpose4  ,except on a broad
 basis of patriotic devotion1 and except
 under the direction of an ambitious    
governmental establishment1 no serious  
international aggression is to be had4  
,the common defense1 therefore1 is to be
 taken as a remedy for evils arising out
 of the working of the patriotic spirit 
that animates mankind1 as brought to    
bear under a discretionary authority2   
and in any balance to be struck between 
the utility and disutility of this      
patriotic spirit and of its service in  
the hands of the constituted            
authorities1 it will have to be         
cancelled out as being at the best a    
mitigation of some of the disorders     
brought on by the presence of national  
governments resting on patriotic loyalty
 at large4  ,but this common defense is 

by no means a vacant rubric in any      
attempted account of modern national    
enterprise4 ,it is the commonplace and  
conclusive plea of the dynastic         
statesmen and the aspiring warlords1 and
 it is the usual blind behind which     
events are put in train for eventual    
hostilities4 ,preparation for the common
 defense also appears unfailingly to    
eventuate in hostilities4 ,with more or 
less bona fides the statesmen and       
warriors plead the cause of the common  
defense1 and with patriotic alacrity the
 common man lends himself to the        
enterprise aimed at under that cover4   
,in proportion as the resulting         
equipment for defense grows great and   
becomes formidable1 the range of items  
which a patriotically biased nation are 
ready to include among the claims to be 
defended grows incontinently larger1    
until by the overlapping of defensive   
claims between rival nationalities the  
distinction between defense and         
aggression disappears1 except in the    

biased fancy of the rival patriots4  ,of
 course1 no reflections are called for  
here on the current ,american campaign  
of ,preparedness4 ,except for the degree
 of hysteria it appears to differ in no 
substantial respect from the analogous  
course of auto-intoxication among the   
nationalities of ,europe1 which came to 
a head in the current ,european         
situation4 ,it should conclusively serve
 the turn for any self-possessed        
observer to call to mind that all the   
civilised nations of warring ,europe    
are1 each and several1 convinced that   
they are fighting a defensive war4  ,the
 aspiration of all right-minded citizens
 is presumed to be ,peace with ,honour4 
,so that first1 as well as last1 among  
those national interests that are to be 
defended1 and in the service of which   
the substance and affections of the     
common man are enlisted under the aegis 
of the national prowess1 comes the      
national prestige1 as a matter of       
course4 ,and the constituted authorities

 are doubtless sincere and single-minded
 in their endeavors to advance and      
defend the national honour1 particularly
 those constituted authorities that hold
 their place of authority on grounds of 
fealty2 since the national prestige in  
such a case coalesces with the prestige 
of the nation's ruler in much the same  
degree in which the national sovereignty
 devolves upon the person of its ruler4 
,in so defending or advancing the       
national prestige1 such a dynastic or   
autocratic overlord1 together with the  
other privileged elements assisting and 
dependent on him1 is occupied with his  
own interest2 his own tenure is a tenure
 by prestige1 and the security of his   
tenure lies in the continued maintenance
 of that popular fancy that invests his 
person with this national prestige and  
so constitutes him and his retinue of   
notables and personages its keeper4     
,but it is uniformly insisted by the    
statesmen--potentates1 notables1 kings  
and mandarins--that this aegis of the   

national prowess in their hands covers  
also many interests of a more           
substantial and more tangible kind4     
,these other1 more tangible interests of
 the community have also a value of a   
direct and personal sort to the dynasty 
and its hierarchy of privileged         
subalterns1 in that it is only by use of
 the material forces of the nation that 
the dynastic prestige can be advanced   
and maintained4 ,the interest of such   
constituted authorities in the material 
welfare of the nation is consequently   
grave and insistent2 but it is evidently
 an interest of a special kind and is   
subject to strict and peculiar          
limitations4 ,the common good1 in the   
material respect1 interests the dynastic
 statesman only as a means to dynastic  
ends2 that is to say1 only in so far as 
it can be turned to account in the      
achievement of dynastic aims4 ,these    
aims are ,the ,kingdom1 the ,power and  
the ,glory1 as the sacred formula       
phrases the same conception in another  

bearing4  ,that is to say1 the material 
welfare of the nation is a means to the 
unfolding of the dynastic power2        
provided always that this material      
welfare is not allowed to run into such 
ramifications as will make the          
commonwealth an unwieldy instrument in  
the hands of the dynastic statesmen4    
,national welfare is to the purpose only
 in so far as it conduces to political  
success1 which is always a question of  
warlike success in the last resort4 ,the
 limitation which this consideration    
imposes on the government's economic    
policy are such as will make the nation 
a self-sufficient or self-balanced      
economic commonwealth4 ,it must be a    
self-balanced commonwealth at least in  
such measure as will make it            
self-sustaining in case of need1 in all 
those matters that bear directly on     
warlike efficiency4  ,of course1 no     
community can become fully              
self-sustaining under modern conditions1
 by use of the modern state of the      

industrial arts1 except by recourse to  
such drastic measures of repression as  
would reduce its total efficiency in an 
altogether intolerable degree4 ,this    
will hold true even of those nations    
who1 like ,russia or the ,united        
,states1 are possessed of extremely     
extensive territories and extremely     
large and varied resources2 but it      
applies with greatly accentuated force  
to smaller and more scantily furnished  
territorial units4 ,peoples living under
 modern conditions and by use of the    
modern state of the industrial arts     
necessarily draw on all quarters of the 
habitable globe for materials and       
products which they can procure to the  
best advantage from outside their own   
special field so long as they are       
allowed access to these outlying sources
 of supply2 and any arbitrary limitation
 on this freedom of traffic makes the   
conditions of life that much harder1 and
 lowers the aggregate efficiency of the 
community by that much4 ,national       

self-sufficiency is to be achieved only 
by a degree of economic isolation2 and  
such a policy of economic isolation     
involves a degree of impoverishment and 
lowered efficiency1 but it will also    
leave the nation readier for warlike    
enterprise on such a scale as its       
reduced efficiency will compass4  ,so   
that the best that can be accomplished  
along this line by the dynastic         
statesmen is a shrewd compromise1       
embodying such a degree of isolation and
 inhibition as will leave the country   
passably self-sufficient in case of     
need1 without lowering the national     
efficiency to such a point as to cripple
 its productive forces beyond what will 
be offset by the greater warlike        
readiness that is so attained4 ,the     
point to which such a policy of         
isolation and sufficiency will          
necessarily be directed is that measure 
of inhibition that will yield the most  
facile and effective ways and means of  
warlike enterprise1 the largest product 

of warlike effectiveness to be had on   
multiplying the nation's net efficiency 
into its readiness to take the field4   
,into any consideration of this tactical
 problem a certain subsidiary factor    
enters1 in that the patriotic temper of 
the nation is always more or less       
affected by such an economic policy4    
,the greater the degree of effectual    
isolation and discrimination embodied in
 the national policy1 the greater will  
commonly be its effect on popular       
sentiment in the way of national        
animosity and spiritual                 
self-sufficiency2 which may be an asset 
of great value for the purposes of      
warlike enterprise4  ,plainly1 any      
dynastic statesman who should undertake 
to further the common welfare regardless
 of its serviceability for warlike      
enterprise would be defeating his own   
purpose4 ,he would1 in effect1 go near  
to living up to his habitual professions
 touching international peace1 instead  
of professing to live up to them1 as the

 exigencies of his national enterprise  
now conventionally require him to do4   
,in effect1 he would be functus officio4
  ,there are two great administrative   
instruments available for this work of  
repression and national self-sufficiency
 at the hands of the imperialistic      
statesman3 the protective tariff1 and   
commercial subvention4 ,the two are not 
consistently to be distinguished from   
one another at all points1 and each runs
 out into a multifarious convolution of 
variegated details2 but the principles  
involved are1 after all1 fairly neat and
 consistent4 ,the former is of the      
nature of a conspiracy in restraint of  
trade by repression2 the latter1 a      
conspiracy to the like effect by        
subsidised monopoly2 both alike act to  
check the pursuit of industry in given  
lines by artificially increasing the    
cost of production for given individuals
 or classes of producers1 and both alike
 impose a more than proportionate cost  
on the community within which they take 

effect4 ,incidentally1 both of these    
methods of inhibition bring a degree1   
though a less degree1 of hardship1 to   
the rest of the industrial world4  ,all 
this is matter of course to all economic
 students1 and it should1 reasonably1 be
 plain to all intelligent persons2 but  
its voluble denial by interested        
parties1 as well as the easy credulity  
with which patriotic citizens allow     
themselves to accept the sophistries    
offered in defense of these measures of 
inhibition1 has made it seem worth while
 here to recall these commonplaces of   
economic science4  ,the ground of this  
easy credulity is not so much infirmity 
of intellect as it is an exuberance of  
sentiment1 although it may reasonably be
 believed that its more pronounced      
manifestations--as1 e4g41 the high      
protective tariff--can be had only by   
force of a formidable cooperation of the
 two4 ,the patriotic animus is an       
invidious sentiment of joint prestige2  
and it needs no argument or             

documentation to bear out the           
affirmation that its bias will lend a   
color of merit and expediency to any    
proposed measure that can1 however      
speciously1 promise an increase of      
national power or prestige4 ,so that    
when the statesmen propose a policy of  
inhibition and mitigated isolation on   
the professed ground that such a policy 
will strengthen the nation economically 
by making it economically               
self-supporting1 as well as ready for   
any warlike adventure1 the patriotic    
citizen views the proposed measures     
through the rosy haze of national       
aspirations and lets the will to believe
 persuade him that whatever conduces to 
a formidable national battle-front will 
also contribute to the common good4 ,at 
the same time all these national        
conspiracies in restraint of trade are  
claimed1 with more or less reason1 to   
inflict more or less harm on rival      
nationalities with whom economic        
relations are curtailed2 and patriotism 

being an invidious sentiment1 the       
patriotic citizen finds comfort in the  
promise of mischief to these others1 and
 is all the more prone to find all kinds
 of merit in proposals that look to such
 an invidious outcome4 ,in any community
 imbued with an alert patriotic spirit1 
the fact that any given circumstance1   
occurrence or transaction can be turned 
to account as a means of invidious      
distinction or invidious discrimination 
against humanity beyond the national    
pale1 will always go far to procure     
acceptance of it as being also an       
article of substantial profit to the    
community at large1 even though the     
slightest unbiased scrutiny would find  
it of no ascertainable use in any other 
bearing than that of invidious mischief4
 ,and whatever will bear interpretation 
as an increment of the nation's power or
 prowess1 in comparison with rival      
nationalities1 will always be securely  
counted as an item of joint credit1 and 
will be made to serve the collective    

conceit as an invidious distinction2 and
 patriotic credulity will find it       
meritorious also in other respects4     
,so1 e4g41 it is past conception that   
such a patent imbecility as a protective
 tariff should enlist the support of any
 ordinarily intelligent community except
 by the help of some such chauvinistic  
sophistry4 ,so also1 the various royal  
establishments of ,europe1 e4g41 afford 
an extreme but therefore all the more   
convincing illustration of the same     
logical fallacy4 ,these establishments  
and personages are great and authentic  
repositories of national prestige1 and  
they are therefore unreflectingly       
presumed by their several aggregations  
of subjects to be of some substantial   
use also in some other bearing2 but it  
would be a highly diverting exhibition  
of credulity for any outsider to fall   
into that amazing misconception4 ,but   
the like is manifestly true of          
commercial turnover and export trade    
among modern peoples2 although on this  

head the infatuation is so ingrained and
 dogmatic that even a rank outsider is  
expected to accept the fallacy without  
reflection1 on pain of being rated as   
unsafe or unsound4 ,such matters again1 
as the dimensions of the national       
territory1 or the number of the         
population and the magnitude of the     
national resources1 are still and have  
perhaps always been material for        
patriotic exultation1 and are fatuously 
believed to have some great significance
 for the material fortunes of the common
 man2 although it should be plain on    
slight reflection that under modern     
conditions of ownership1 these things1  
one and all1 are of no consequence to   
the common man except as articles of    
prestige to stimulate his civic pride4  
,the only conjuncture under which these 
and the like national holdings can come 
to have a meaning as joint or collective
 assets would arise in case of a warlike
 adventure carried to such extremities  
as would summarily cancel vested rights 

of ownership and turn them to warlike   
uses4 ,while the rights of ownership    
hold1 the common man1 who does not own  
these things1 draws no profit from their
 inclusion in the national domain2      
indeed1 he is at some cost to guarantee 
their safe tenure by their rightful     
owners4  ,in so pursuing their quest of 
the ,kingdom1 the ,power and the ,glory1
 by use of the national resources and by
 sanction of the national spirit1 the   
constituted authorities also assume the 
guardianship of sundry material         
interests that are presumed to touch the
 common good2 such as security of person
 and property in dealings with aliens1  
whether at home or abroad2 security of  
investment and trade1 and vindication of
 their citizens before the law in       
foreign parts2 and1 chiefly and         
ubiquitously1 furtherance and extension 
of the national trade into foreign      
parts1 particularly of the export trade1
 on terms advantageous to the traders of
 the nation4  ,the last named of these  

advantages is the one on which stress is
 apt to fall in the argument of all     
those who advocate an unfolding of      
national power1 as being a matter of    
vital material benefit to the common    
man4 ,the other items indicated above1  
it is plain on the least reflection1 are
 matters of slight if any material      
consequence to him4 ,the common         
man--that is ninety-nine and a fraction 
in one hundred of the nation's common   
men--has no dealings with aliens in     
foreign parts1 as capitalist1 trader1   
missionary or wayfaring man1 and has no 
occasion for security of person or      
property under circumstances that raise 
any remotest question of the national   
prowess or the national prestige2 nor   
does he seek or aspire to trade to      
foreign parts on any terms1 equitable or
 otherwise1 or to invest capital among  
aliens under foreign rule1 or to exploit
 concessions or take orders1 for        
acceptance or delivery2 nor1 indeed1    
does he at all commonly come into even  

that degree of contact with abroad that 
is implied in the purchase of foreign   
securities4 ,virtually the sole occasion
 on which he comes in touch with the    
world beyond the frontier is when1 and  
if1 he goes away from home as an        
emigrant1 and so ceases to enjoy the    
tutelage of the nation's constituted    
authorities4 ,but the common man1 in    
point of fact1 is a home-keeping body1  
who touches foreign parts and aliens    
outside the national frontiers only at  
the second or third remove1 if at all1  
in the occasional purchase of foreign   
products1 or in the sale of goods that  
may find their way abroad after he has  
lost sight of them4 ,the exception to   
this general rule would be found in the 
case of those under-sized nations that  
are too small to contain the traffic in 
which their commonplace population are  
engaged1 and that have neither national 
prowess nor national prestige to fall   
back on in a conceivable case of        
need1--and whose citizens1 individually1

 appear to be as fortunately placed in  
their workday foreign relations1 without
 a background of prowess and prestige1  
as the citizens of the great powers who 
are most abundantly provided in these   
respects4  ,with wholly negligible      
exceptions1 these matters touch the     
needs or the sensibilities of the common
 man only through the channel of the    
national honour1 which may be injured in
 the hardships suffered by his          
compatriots in foreign parts1 or which  
may1 again1 be repaired or enhanced by  
the meritorious achievements of the same
 compatriots2 of whose existence he will
 commonly have no other or more         
substantial evidence1 and in whose      
traffic he has no share other than this 
vicarious suffering of vague and remote 
indignity or vainglory by force of the  
wholly fortuitous circumstance that they
 are 7inscrutably7 his compatriots4     
,these immaterial goods of vicarious    
prestige are1 of course1 not to be      
undervalued1 nor is the fact to be      

overlooked or minimised that they enter 
into the sum total of the common        
citizen's psychic income1 for whatever  
they may foot up to2 but evidently their
 consideration takes us back to the     
immaterial category of prestige value1  
from which the argument just now was    
hopefully departing with a view to      
consideration of the common man's       
material interest in that national      
enterprise about which patriotic        
aspirations turn4  ,these things1 then1 
are matters in which the common man has 
an interest only as they have a prestige
 value4 ,but there need be no question  
as to their touching his sensibilities  
and stirring him to action1 and even to 
acts of bravery and self-sacrifice4     
,indignity or ill treatment of his      
compatriots in foreign parts1 even when 
well deserved1 as is not infrequently   
the case1 are resented with a vehemence 
that is greatly to the common man's     
credit1 and greatly also to the gain of 
those patriotic statesmen who find in   

such grievances their safest and most   
reliable raw materials for the          
production of international difficulty4 
,that he will so respond to the stimulus
 of these1 materially speaking          
irrelevant1 vicissitudes of good or ill 
that touch the fortunes of his          
compatriots1 as known to him by hearsay1
 bears witness1 of course1 to the high  
quality of his manhood2 but it falls    
very far short of arguing that these    
promptings of his patriotic spirit have 
any value as traits that count toward   
his livelihood or his economic          
serviceability in the community in which
 he lives4 ,it is all to his credit1 and
 it goes to constitute him a desirable  
citizen1 in the sense that he is        
properly amenable to the incitements of 
patriotic emulation2 but it is none the 
less to be admitted1 however            
reluctantly1 that this trait of         
impulsively vicarious indignation or    
vainglory is neither materially         
profitable to himself nor an asset of   

the slightest economic value to the     
community in which he lives4 ,quite the 
contrary1 in fact4 ,so also is it true  
that the common man derives no material 
advantage from the national success     
along this line1 though he commonly     
believes that it all somehow inures to  
his benefit4 ,it would seem that an     
ingrown bias of community interest1     
blurred and driven by a jealously       
sensitive patriotic pride1 bends his    
faith uncritically to match his         
inclination4 ,his persuasion is a work  
of preconception rather than of         
perception4  ,but the most substantial  
and most unqualified material benefit   
currently believed to be derivable from 
a large unfolding of national prowess   
and a wide extension of the national    
domain is an increased volume of the    
nation's foreign trade1 particularly of 
the export trade4 ,trade follows the    
,flag4 ,and this larger trade and       
enhanced profit is presumed to inure to 
the joint benefit of the citizens4 ,such

 is the profession of faith of the      
sagacious statesmen and such is also the
 unreflecting belief of the common man4 
,it may be left an open question if an  
unfolding of national prowess and       
prestige increases the nation's trade1  
whether in imports or in exports4 ,there
 is no available evidence that it has   
any effect of the kind4 ,what is not an 
open question is the patent fact that   
such an extension of trade confers no   
benefit on the common man1 who is not   
engaged in the import or export         
business4 ,more particularly does it    
yield him no advantage at all           
commensurate with the cost involved in  
any endeavour so to increase the volume 
of trade by increasing the nation's     
power and extending its dominion4 ,the  
profits of trade go not to the common   
man at large but to the traders whose   
capital is invested2 and it is a        
completely idle matter to the common    
citizen whether the traders who profit  
by the nation's trade are his           

compatriots or not4#f  ,footnote #f3    
,all this1 which should be plain without
 demonstration1 has been repeatedly     
shown in the expositions of various     
peace advocates1 typically by ,mr4      
,angell4  ,the pacifist argument on the 
economic futility of national ambitions 
will commonly rest its case at this     
point2 having shown as unreservedly as  
need be that national ambition and all  
its works belong of right under that    
rubric of the litany that speaks of     
,fire1 ,flood and ,pestilence4 ,but an  
hereditary bent of human nature is not  
to be put out of the way with an        
argument showing that it has its        
disutilities4 ,so with the patriotic    
animus2 it is a factor to be counted    
with1 rather than to be exorcised4  ,as 
has been remarked above1 in the course  
of time and change the advance of the   
industrial arts and of the institutions 
of ownership have taken such a turn that
 the working system of industry and     
business no longer runs on national     

lines and1 indeed1 no longer takes      
account of national frontiers1--except  
in so far as the national policies and  
legislation1 arbitrarily and partially1 
impose these frontiers on the workings  
of trade and industry4 ,the effect of   
such regulation for political ends is1  
with wholly negligible exceptions1      
detrimental to the efficient working of 
the industrial system under modern      
conditions2 and it is therefore         
detrimental to the material interests of
 the common citizen4 ,but the case is   
not the same as regards the interests of
 the traders4 ,trade is a competitive   
affair1 and it is to the advantage of   
the traders engaged in any given line of
 business to extend their own markets   
and to exclude competing traders4       
,competition may be the soul of trade1  
but monopoly is necessarily the aim of  
every trader4 ,and the national         
organisation is of service to its       
traders in so far as it shelters them1  
wholly or partly1 from the competition  

of traders of other nationalities1 or in
 so far as it furthers their enterprise 
by subvention or similar privileges as  
against their competitors1 whether at   
home or abroad4 ,the gain that so comes 
to the nation's traders from any        
preferential advantage afforded them by 
national regulations1 or from any       
discrimination against traders of       
foreign nationality1 goes to the traders
 as private gain4 ,it is of no benefit  
to any of their compatriots2 since there
 is no community of usufruct that       
touches these gains of the traders4 ,so 
far as concerns his material advantage1 
it is an idle matter to the common      
citizen whether he deals with traders of
 his own nationality or with aliens2    
both alike will aim to buy cheap and    
sell dear1 and will charge him what the 
traffic will bear4 ,nor does it matter  
to him whether the gains of this trade  
go to aliens or to his compatriots2 in  
either case equally they immediately    
pass beyond his reach1 and are equally  

removed from any touch of joint interest
 on his part4 ,being private property1  
under modern law and custom he has no   
use of them1 whether a national frontier
 does or does not intervene between his 
domicile and that of their owner4       
,these are facts that every man of sound
 mind knows and acts on without doubt or
 hesitation in his own workday affairs4 
,he would scarcely even find amusement  
in so futile a proposal as that his     
neighbor should share his business      
profits with him for no better reason   
than that he is a compatriot4 ,but when 
the matter is presented as a proposition
 in national policy and embroidered with
 an invocation of his patriotic loyalty 
the common citizen will commonly be     
found credulous enough to accept the    
sophistry without abatement4 ,his       
archaic sense of group solidarity will  
still lead him at his own cost to favor 
his trading compatriots by the          
imposition of onerous trade regulations 
for their private advantage1 and to     

interpose obstacles in the way of alien 
traders4 ,all this ingenious policy of  
self-defeat is greatly helped out by the
 patriotic conceit of the citizens2 who 
persuade themselves to see in it an     
accession to the power and prestige of  
their own nation and a disadvantage to  
rival nationalities4 ,it is1 indeed1    
more than doubtful if such a policy of  
self-defeat as is embodied in current   
international trade discriminations     
could be insinuated into the legislation
 of any civilized nation if the popular 
intelligence were not so clouded with   
patriotic animosity as to let a         
prospective detriment to their foreign  
neighbors count as a gain to themselves4
  ,so that the chief material use of the
 patriotic bent in modern populations1  
therefore1 appears to be its use to a   
limited class of persons engaged in     
foreign trade1 or in business that comes
 in competition with foreign industry4  
,it serves their private gain by lending
 effectual countenance to such restraint

 of international trade as would not be 
tolerated within the national domain4   
,in so doing it has also the secondary  
and more sinister effect of dividing the
 nations on lines of rivalry and setting
 up irreconcilable claims and ambitions1
 of no material value but of            
far-reaching effect in the way of       
provocation to further international    
estrangement and eventual breach of the 
peace4  ,how all this falls in with the 
schemes of militant statesmen1 and      
further reacts on the freedom and       
personal fortunes of the common man1 is 
an extensive and intricate topic1 though
 not an obscure one2 and it has already 
been spoken of above1 perhaps as fully  
as need be4     ,,chapter ,,iii  ,,on   
,,the ,,conditions ,,of ,a ,,lasting    
,,peace   ,the considerations set out in
 earlier chapters have made it appear   
that the patriotic spirit of modern     
peoples is the abiding source of        
contention among nations4 ,except for   
their patriotism a breach of the peace  

among modern peoples could not well be  
had4 ,so much will doubtless be assented
 to as a matter of course4 ,it is also a
 commonplace of current aphoristic      
wisdom that both parties to a warlike   
adventure in modern times stand to lose1
 materially2 whatever nominal--that is  
to say political--gains may be made by  
one or the other4 ,it has also appeared 
from these considerations recited in    
earlier passages that this patriotic    
spirit prevails throughout1 among all   
civilised peoples1 and that it pervades 
one nation about as ubiquitously as     
another4 ,nor is there much evidence of 
a weakening of this sinister proclivity 
with the passage of time or the         
continued advance in the arts of life4  
,the only civilized nations that can be 
counted on as habitually peaceable are  
those who are so feeble or are so placed
 as to be cut off from hope of gain     
through contention4 ,vainglorious       
arrogance may run at a higher tension   
among the more backward and boorish     

nations2 but it is not evident that the 
advance guard among the civilised       
peoples are imbued with a less complete 
national self-complacency4 ,if the peace
 is to be kept1 therefore1 it will have 
to be kept by and between peoples made  
up1 in effect1 of complete patriots2    
which comes near being a contradiction  
in terms4 ,patriotism is useful for     
breaking the peace1 not for keeping it4 
,it makes for national pretensions and  
international jealously and distrust1   
with warlike enterprise always in       
perspective2 as a way to national gain  
or a recourse in case of need4 ,and     
there is commonly no settled demarkation
 between these two contrasted needs that
 urge a patriotic people forever to keep
 one eye on the chance of a recourse to 
arms4  ,therefore any calculus of the   
,chances of ,peace appears to become a  
reckoning of the forces which may be    
counted on to keep a patriotic nation in
 an unstable equilibrium of peace for   
the time being4 ,as has just been       

remarked above1 among civilised peoples 
only those nations can be counted on    
consistently to keep the peace who are  
so feeble or otherwise so placed as to  
be cut off from hope of national gain4  
,and these can apparently be so counted 
on only as regards aggression1 not as   
regards the national defense1 and only  
in so far as they are not drawn into    
warlike enterprise1 collectively1 by    
their more competent neighbors4 ,even   
the feeblest and most futile of them    
feels in honour bound to take up arms in
 defense of such national pretensions as
 they still may harbour2 and all of them
 harbour such pretensions4 ,in certain  
extreme cases1 which it might seem      
invidious to specify more explicitly1 it
 is not easy to discover any specific   
reasons for the maintenance of a        
national establishment1 apart from the  
vindication of certain national         
pretensions which would quietly lapse in
 the absence of a national establishment
 on whom their vindication is incumbent4

  ,of the rest1 the greater nations that
 are spoken of as ,powers no such       
general statement will hold4 ,these are 
the peoples who stand1 in matters of    
national concern1 on their own          
initiative2 and the question of peace   
and war at large is in effect1 a        
question of peace and war among these   
,powers4 ,they are not so numerous that 
they can be sifted into distinct        
classes1 and yet they differ among      
themselves in such a way that they may1 
for the purpose in hand1 fairly be      
ranged under two distinguishable if not 
contrasted heads3 those which may safely
 be counted on spontaneously to take the
 offensive1 and those which will fight  
on provocation4 ,typically of the former
 description are ,germany and ,japan4   
,of the latter are the ,french and      
,british1 and less confidently the      
,american republic4 ,in any summary     
statement of this kind ,russia will have
 to be left on one side as a doubtful   
case1 for reasons to which the argument 

may return at a later point2 the        
prospective course of things in ,russia 
is scarcely to be appraised on the      
ground of its past4 ,spain and ,italy1  
being dubious ,powers at the best1 need 
not detain the argument2 they are1 in   
the nature of things1 subsidiaries who  
wait on the main chance4 ,and ,austria1 
with whatever the name may cover1 is for
 the immediate purpose to be counted    
under the head of ,germany4  ,there is  
no invidious comparison intended in so  
setting off these two classes of nations
 in contrast to one another4 ,it is not 
a contrast of merit and demerit or of   
prestige4 ,imperial ,germany and        
,imperial ,japan are1 in the nature of  
things as things go1 bent in effect on a
 disturbance of the peace1--with a view 
to advance the cause of their own       
dominion4 ,on a large view of the case1 
such as many ,german statesmen were in  
the habit of professing in the years    
preceding the great war1 it may perhaps 
appear reasonable to say--as they were  

in the habit of saying--that these      
,imperial ,powers are as well within the
 lines of fair and honest dealing in    
their campaign of aggression as the     
other ,powers are in taking a defensive 
attitude against their aggression4 ,some
 sort of international equity has been  
pleaded in justification of their demand
 for an increased share of dominion4 ,at
 least it has appeared that these       
,imperial statesmen have so persuaded   
themselves after very mature            
deliberation2 and they have showed great
 concern to persuade others of the      
equity of their ,imperial claim to      
something more than the law would allow4
 ,these sagacious1 not to say astute1   
persons have not only reached a         
conviction to this effect1 but they have
 become possessed of this conviction in 
such plenary fashion that1 in the       
,german case1 they have come to admit   
exceptions or abatement of the claim    
only when and in so far as the campaign 
of equitable aggression on which they   

had entered has been proved             
impracticable by the fortunes of war4   
,with some gift for casuistry one may1  
at least conceivably1 hold that the felt
 need of ,imperial self-aggrandisement  
may become so urgent as to justify1 or  
at least to condone1 forcible           
dispossession of weaker nationalities4  
,this might1 indeed it has1 become a    
sufficiently perplexing question of     
casuistry1 both as touches the          
punctilios of national honour and as    
regards an equitable division between   
rival ,powers in respect of the material
 means of mastery4 ,so in private life  
it may become a moot question--in point 
of equity--whether the craving of a     
kleptomaniac may not on occasion rise to
 such an intolerable pitch of avidity as
 to justify him in seizing whatever     
valuables he can safely lay hands on1 to
 ease the discomfort of ungratified     
desire4 ,in private life any such       
endeavour to better oneself at one's    
neighbors' cost is not commonly         

reprobated if it takes effect on a      
decently large scale and shrewdly within
 the flexibilities of the law or with   
the connivance of its officers4         
,governing international endeavours of  
this class there is no law so inflexible
 that it can not be conveniently made   
over to fit particular circumstances4   
,and in the absence of law the felt need
 of a formal justification will         
necessarily appeal to the unformulated  
equities of the case1 with some such    
outcome as alluded to above4 ,all that1 
of course1 is for the diplomatists to   
take care of4  ,but any speculation on  
the equities involved in the projected  
course of empire to which these two     
enterprising nations are committing     
themselves must run within the lines of 
diplomatic parable1 and will have none  
but a speculative interest4 ,it is not a
 matter of equity4 ,accepting the       
situation as it stands1 it is evident   
that any peace can only have a qualified
 meaning1 in the sense of armistice1 so 

long as there is opportunity for        
national enterprise of the character on 
which these two enterprising national   
establishments are bent1 and so long as 
these and the like national             
establishments remain4 ,so1 taking the  
peaceable professions of their spokesmen
 at a discount of one hundred percent1  
as one necessarily must1 and looking to 
the circumstantial evidence of the case1
 it is abundantly plain that at least   
these two imperial ,powers may be       
counted on consistently to manoeuvre for
 warlike advantage so long as any peace 
compact holds1 and to break the peace so
 soon as the strategy of ,imperial      
enterprise appears to require it4       
,there has been much courteous          
make-believe of amiable and upright     
solicitude on this head the past few    
years1 both in diplomatic intercourse   
and among men out of doors2 and since   
make-believe is a matter of course in   
diplomatic intercourse it is right and  
seemly1 of course1 that no overt        

recognition of unavowed facts should be 
allowed to traverse this run of         
make-believe within the precincts of    
diplomatic intercourse4 ,but in any     
ingenuous inquiry into the nature of    
peace and the conditions of its         
maintenance there can be no harm in     
conveniently leaving the diplomatic     
make-believe on one side and looking to 
the circumstances that condition the    
case1 rather than to the formal         
professions designed to mask the        
circumstances4         99       99      
99       99       99  ,chief among the  
relevant circumstances in the current   
situation are the imperial designs of   
,germany and ,japan4 ,these two national
 establishments are very much alike4 ,so
 much so that for the present purpose a 
single line of analysis will passably   
cover both cases4 ,the same line of     
analysis will also apply1 with slight   
adaptation1 to more than one of the     
other ,powers1 or near-,powers1 of the  
modern world2 but in so far as such is  

held to be the case1 that is not a      
consideration that weakens the argument 
as applied to these two1 which are to be
 taken as the consummate type-form of a 
species of national establishments4     
,they are1 between them1 the best       
instance there is of what may be called 
a ,dynastic ,state4  ,except as a       
possible corrective of internal         
disorders and discontent1 neither of the
 two ,states desires war2 but both are  
bent on dominion1 and as the dominion   
aimed at is not to be had except by     
fighting for it1 both in effect are     
incorrigibly bent on warlike enterprise4
 ,and in neither case will              
considerations of equity1 humanity1     
decency1 veracity1 or the common good be
 allowed to trouble the quest of        
dominion4 ,as lies in the nature of the 
dynastic ,state1 imperial dominion1 in  
the ambitions of both1 is beyond price2 
so that no cost is too high so long as  
ultimate success attends the imperial   
enterprise4 ,so much is commonplace     

knowledge among all men who are at all  
conversant with the facts4  ,to anyone  
who harbors a lively sentimental        
prejudice for or against either or both 
of the two nations so spoken of1 or for 
or against the manner of imperial       
enterprise to which both are committed1 
it may seem that what has just been said
 of them and their relation to the      
world's peace runs on something of a    
bias and conveys something of dispraise 
and reprobation4 ,such is not the       
intention1 however1 though the          
appearance is scarcely to be avoided4   
,it is necessary for the purposes of the
 argument unambiguously to recognise the
 nature of these facts with which the   
inquiry is concerned2 and any plain     
characterisation of the facts will      
unavoidably carry a fringe of           
suggestions of this character1 because  
current speech is adapted for their     
reprobation4 ,the point aimed at is not 
this inflection of approval or          
disapproval4 ,the facts are to be taken 

impersonally for what they are worth in 
their causal bearing on the chance of   
peace or war2 not at their sentimental  
value as traits of conduct to be        
appraised in point of their goodness or 
expediency4  ,so seen without prejudice1
 then1 if that may be1 this ,imperial   
enterprise of these two ,powers is to be
 rated as the chief circumstance bearing
 on the chances of peace and            
conditioning the terms on which any     
peace plan must be drawn4 ,evidently1 in
 the presence of these two ,imperial    
,powers any peace compact will be in a  
precarious case2 equally so whether     
either or both of them are parties to   
such compact or not4 ,no engagement     
binds a dynastic statesman in case it   
turns out not to further the dynastic   
enterprise4 ,the question then recurs3  
,how may peace be maintained within the 
horizon of ,german or ,japanese         
ambitions8 ,there are two obvious       
alternatives1 neither of which promises 
an easy way out of the quandary in which

 the world's peace is placed by their   
presence3 ,submission to their dominion1
 or ,elimination of these two ,powers4  
,either alternative would offer a       
sufficiently deterrent outlook1 and yet 
any project for devising some middle    
course of conciliation and amicable     
settlement1 which shall be practicable  
and yet serve the turn1 scarcely has    
anything better to promise4 ,the several
 nations now engaged on a war with the  
greater of these ,imperial ,powers hold 
to a design of elimination1 as being the
 only measure that merits hopeful       
consideration4 ,the ,imperial ,power in 
distress bespeaks peace and good-will4  
,those advocates1 whatever their        
nationality1 who speak for negotiation  
with a view to a peace compact which is 
to embrace these ,states intact1 are    
aiming1 in effect1 to put things in     
train for ultimate submission to the    
mastery of these ,imperial ,powers4 ,in 
these premises an amicable settlement   
and a compact of perpetual peace will   

necessarily be equivalent to arranging a
 period of recuperation and recruiting  
for a new onset of dynastic enterprise4 
,for1 in the nature of the case1 no     
compact binds the dynastic statesman1   
and no consideration other than the     
pursuit of ,imperial dominion commands  
his attention4  ,there is1 of course1 no
 intention to decry this                
single-mindedness that is habitually put
 in evidence by the dynastic statesmen4 
,nor should it be taken as evidence of  
moral obliquity in them4 ,it is rather  
the result of a peculiar moral attitude 
or bent1 habitual to such statesmen1 and
 in its degree also habitual to their   
compatriots1 and is indispensably       
involved in the ,imperial frame of mind4
 ,the consummation of ,imperial mastery 
being the highest and ubiquitously      
ulterior end of all endeavour1 its      
pursuit not only relieves its votaries  
from the observance of any minor        
obligations that run counter to its     
needs1 but it also imposes a moral      

obligation to make the most of any      
opportunity for profitable deceit and   
chicanery that may offer4 ,in short1 the
 dynastic statesman is under the        
governance of a higher morality1 binding
 him to the service of his nation's     
ambition--or in point of fact1 to the   
personal service of his dynastic        
master--to which it is his dutiful      
privilege loyally to devote all his     
powers of force and fraud4              
,democratically-minded persons1 who are 
not moved by the call of loyalty to a   
gratuitous personal master1 may have    
some difficulty in appreciating the     
force and the moral austerity of this   
spirit of devotion to an ideal of       
dynastic aggrandisement1 and in seeing  
how its paramount exigence will set     
aside all meticulous scruples of        
personal rectitude and veracity1 as     
being a shabby with-holding of service  
due4  ,to such of these doubters as     
still have retained some remnants of    
their religious faith this attitude of  

loyalty may perhaps be made intelligible
 by calling to mind the analogous       
self-surrender of the religious devotee4
 ,and in this connection it may also be 
to the purpose to recall that in point  
of its genesis and derivation that      
unreserved self-abasement and surrender 
to the divine ends and guidance1 which  
is the chief grace and glory of the true
 believer1 is held by secular students  
of these matters to be only a sublimated
 analogue or counterfeit of this other  
dutiful abasement that constitutes      
loyalty to a temporal master4 ,the deity
 is currently spoken of as ,the         
,heavenly ,king1 under whose dominion no
 sinner has a right that ,he is bound to
 respect2 very much after the fashion in
 which no subject of a dynastic state   
has a right which the ,state is bound to
 respect4 ,indeed1 all these dynastic   
establishments that so seek the         
,kingdom1 the ,power and the ,glory are 
surrounded with a penumbra of divinity1 
and it is commonly a bootless question  

where the dynastic powers end and the   
claims of divinity begin4 ,there is     
something of a coalescence4#g  ,footnote
 #g3 ,to us the state is the most       
indispensable as well as the highest    
requisite to our earthly existence4444  
,all individualistic endeavor 444 must  
be unreservedly subordinated to this    
lofty claim4444 ,the state 444          
eventually is of infinitely more value  
than the sum of all the individuals     
within its jurisdiction4 ,this          
conception of the state1 which is as    
much a part of our life as is the blood 
in our veins1 is nowhere to be found in 
the ,english ,constitution1 and is quite
 foreign to ,english thought1 and to    
that of ,america as well4--,eduard      
,meyer1 ,england1 its ,political        
,organisation and ,development and the  
,war against ,germany1 translated by    
,h4,s4 ,white4 ,boston #aiaf4 pp4       
#cj-ca4  ,the ,kaiser holds dominion by 
divine grace and is accountable to none 
but ,god1 if to ,him4 ,the whole case is

 in a still better state of repair as   
touches the ,japanese establishment1    
where the ,emperor is a lineal          
descendant of the supreme deity1        
,amaterazu 7o mi ,kami71 and where1 by  
consequence1 there is no line of        
cleavage between a divine and a secular 
mastery4 ,pursuant to this more         
unqualified authenticity of autocratic  
rule1 there is also to be found in this 
case a correspondingly unqualified      
devotion in the subjects and an         
unqualified subservience to dynastic    
ends on the part of the officers of the 
crown4 ,the coalescence of dynastic rule
 with the divine order is less complete 
in the ,german case1 but all observers  
bear witness that it all goes far enough
 also in the ,german case4 ,this state  
of things is recalled here as a means of
 making plain that the statesmen of     
these ,imperial ,powers must in the     
nature of the case1 and without blame1  
be drawn out from under the customary   
restraint of those principles of vulgar 

morality that are embodied in the       
decalogue4 ,it is not that the subject1 
or--what comes to the same thing--the   
servant of such a dynastic ,state may   
not be upright1 veracious and humane in 
private life1 but only that he must not 
be addicted to that sort of thing in    
such manner or degree as might hinder   
his usefulness for dynastic purposes4   
,these matters of selfishly individual  
integrity and humanity have no weight as
 against the exigencies of the dynastic 
enterprise4  ,these considerations may  
not satisfy all doubters as to the moral
 sufficiency of these motives that so   
suffice to decide the dynastic statesmen
 on their enterprise of aggression by   
force and fraud2 but it should be       
evident that so long as these statesmen 
continue in the frame of mind spoken of1
 and so long as popular sentiment in    
these countries continues1 as hitherto1 
to lend them effectual support in the   
pursuit of such ,imperial enterprise1 so
 long it must also remain true that no  

enduring peace can be maintained within 
the sweep of their ,imperial ambition4  
,any peace compact would necessarily be1
 in effect1 an armistice terminable at  
will and serving as a season of         
preparation to meet a deferred          
opportunity4 ,for the peaceable nations 
it would1 in effect1 be a respite and a 
season of preparation for eventual      
submission to the ,imperial rule4  ,by  
advocates of such a negotiated compact  
of perpetual peace it has been argued   
that the populace underlying these      
,imperial ,powers will readily be       
brought to realise the futility and     
inexpediency of such dynastic           
enterprise1 if only the relevant facts  
are brought to their knowledge1 and that
 so these ,powers will be constrained to
 keep the peace by default of popular   
support for their warlike projects4     
,what is required1 it is believed by    
these sanguine persons1 is that         
information be competently conveyed to  
the common people of these warlike      

nations1 showing them that they have    
nothing to apprehend in the way of      
aggression or oppressive measures from  
the side of their more peaceable        
neighbours2 whereupon their warlike     
animus will give place to a reasonable  
and enlightened frame of mind4 ,this    
argument runs tacitly or explicitly1 on 
the premise that these peoples who have 
so enthusiastically lent themselves to  
the current warlike enterprise are      
fundamentally of the same racial        
complexion and endowed with the same    
human nature as their peaceable         
neighbours1 who would be only too glad  
to keep the peace on any terms of       
tolerable security from aggression4 ,if 
only a fair opportunity is offered for  
the interested peoples to come to an    
understanding1 it is held1 a good       
understanding will readily be reached2  
at least so far as to result in a       
reasonable willingness to submit        
questions in dispute to an intelligent  
canvass and an equitable arbitration4   

,projects for a negotiated peace        
compact1 to include the dynastic        
,states1 can hold any prospect of a     
happy issue only if this line of        
argument1 or its equivalent1 is         
pertinent and conclusive2 and the       
argument is to the point only in so far 
as its premises are sound and will carry
 as far as the desired conclusion4      
,therefore a more detailed attention to 
the premises on which it runs will be in
 place1 before any project of the kind  
is allowed to pass inspection4  ,as to  
homogeneity of race and endowment among 
the several nations in question1 the    
ethnologists1 who are competent to speak
 of that matter1 are ready to assert    
that this homogeneity goes much farther 
among the nations of ,europe than any   
considerable number of peace advocates  
would be ready to claim4 ,in point of   
race1 and broadly speaking1 there is    
substantially no difference between     
these warring nations1 along any        
east-and-west line2 while the           

progressive difference in racial        
complexion that is always met with along
 any north-and-south line1 nowhere      
coincides with a national or linguistic 
frontier4 ,in no case does a political  
division between these nations mark or  
depend on a difference of race or of    
hereditary endowment4 ,and1 to give full
 measure1 it may be added that also in  
no case does a division of classes      
within any one of these nations1 into   
noble and base1 patrician and plebeian1 
lay and learned1 innocent and vicious1  
mark or rest on any slightest traceable 
degree of difference in race or in      
heritable endowment4 ,on the point of   
racial homogeneity there is no fault to 
find with the position taken4  ,if the  
second postulate in this groundwork of  
premises on which the advocates of      
negotiable peace base their hopes were  
as well taken there need be no serious  
misgiving as to the practicability of   
such a plan4 ,the plan counts on        
information1 persuasion and reflection  

to subdue national animosities and      
jealousies1 at least in such measure as 
would make them amenable to reason4 ,the
 question of immediate interest on this 
head1 therefore1 would be as to how far 
this populace may be accessible to the  
contemplated line of persuasion4 ,at    
present they are1 notoriously1 in a     
state of obsequious loyalty to the      
dynasty1 single-minded devotion to the  
fortunes of the ,fatherland1 and        
uncompromising hatred of its enemies4   
,in this frame of mind there is nothing 
that is new1 except the degree of       
excitement4 ,the animus1 it will be     
recalled1 was all there and on the alert
 when the call came1 so that the        
excitement came on with the sweep of a  
conflagration on the first touch of a   
suitable stimulus4 ,the ,german people  
at large was evidently in a highly      
unstable equilibrium1 so that an        
unexampled enthusiasm of patriotic      
self-sacrifice followed immediately on  
the first incitement to manslaughter1   

very much as if the nation had been held
 under an hypnotic spell4 ,one need only
 recall the volume of overbearing       
magniloquence that broke out all over   
the place in that beginning1 when ,the  
,day was believed to be dawning4  ,such 
a popular frame of mind is not a        
transient episode1 to be created at     
short notice and put aside for a parcel 
of salutary advice4 ,the nation that    
will make such a massive concerted move 
with the alacrity shown in this instance
 must be living in a state of alert     
readiness for just such an onset4 ,yet  
this is not to be set down as anything  
in the way of a racial trait            
specifically distinguishing the ,german 
people from those other adjacent        
nationalities that are incapable of a   
similarly swift and massive response to 
the appeal of patriotism4 ,these        
adjacent nationalities are racially     
identical with the ,german people1 but  
they do not show the same warlike       
abandon in nearly the same degree4  ,but

 for all that1 it is a national trait1  
not to be acquired or put away by taking
 thought4 ,it is just here that the line
 of definition runs3 it is a national   
trait1 not a racial one4 ,it is not     
,nature1 but it is ,second ,nature4 ,but
 a national trait1 while it is not      
heritable in the simple sense of that   
term1 has the same semblance1 or the    
same degree1 of hereditary persistence  
that belongs to the national            
institutions1 usages1 conventionalities1
 beliefs1 which distinguish the given   
nation from its neighbors4 ,in this     
instance it may be said more            
specifically that this eager loyalty is 
a heritage of the ,german people at     
large in the same sense and with the    
same degree of permanence as the        
institution of an autocratic royalty has
 among them1 or a privileged nobility4  
,indeed1 it is the institutional        
counterfoil of these establishments4 ,it
 is of an institutional character1 just 
as the corresponding sense of national  

solidarity and patriotic devotion is    
among the neighboring peoples with whom 
the ,german nation comes in comparison4 
,and an institution is an historical    
growth1 with just so much of a character
 of permanence and continuity of        
transmission as is given it by the      
circumstances out of which it has grown4
 ,any institution is a product of habit1
 or perhaps more accurately it is a body
 of habits of thought bearing on a given
 line of conduct1 which prevails with   
such generality and uniformity          
throughout the group as to have become a
 matter of common sense4  ,such an      
article of institutional furniture is an
 outcome of usage1 not of reflection or 
deliberate choice2 and it has           
consequently a character of             
self-legitimation1 so that it stands in 
the accredited scheme of things as      
intrinsically right and good1 and not   
merely as a shrewdly chosen expedient ad
 interim4 ,it affords a norm of life1   
inosculating with a multiplicity of     

other norms1 with which it goes to make 
up a balanced scheme of ends1 ways and  
means governing human conduct2 and no   
one such institutional item1 therefore1 
is materially to be disturbed1 discarded
 or abated except at the cost of serious
 derangement to the balanced scheme of  
things in which it belongs as an        
integral constituent4 ,nor can such a   
detail norm of conduct and habitual     
propensity come into bearing and hold   
its place1 except by force of           
habituation which is at the same time   
consonant with the common run of        
habituation to which the given community
 is subject4 ,it follows that the more  
rigorous1 comprehensive1 unremitting and
 long-continued the habituation to which
 a given institutional principle owes   
its vogue1 the more intimately and      
definitively will it be embedded in the 
common sense of the community1 the less 
chance is there of its intrinsic        
necessity being effectually questioned  
or doubted1 and the less chance is there

 of correcting it or abating its force  
in case circumstances should so change  
as to make its continued rule visibly   
inexpedient4 ,its abatement will be a   
work not of deliberation and design1 but
 of defection through disuse4  ,not that
 reflection and sane counsel will count 
for nothing in these premises1 but only 
that these exertions of intelligence    
will count for relatively very little by
 comparison with the run of habituation 
as enforced by the circumstances        
conditioning any given case2 and        
further1 that wise counsel and good     
resolutions can take effect in the way  
of amending any untoward institutional  
bent only by way of suitable            
habituation1 and only at such a rate of 
change as the circumstances governing   
habituation will allow4 ,it is1 at the  
best1 slow work to shift the settled    
lines of any community's scheme of      
common sense4 ,now1 national solidarity1
 and more particularly an unquestioning 
loyalty to the sovereign and the        

dynasty1 is a matter of course and of   
commonsense necessity with the ,german  
people4 ,it is not necessary to call to 
mind that the ,japanese nation1 which   
has here been coupled with the ,german1 
are in the same case1 only more so4     
,doubtless it would be exceeding the    
premises to claim that it should        
necessarily take the ,german people as  
long-continued and as harsh a schooling 
to unlearn their excess of chauvinism1  
their servile stooping to gratuitous    
authority1 and their eager subservience 
to the dynastic ambitions of their      
masters1 as that which has in the course
 of history induced these habits in     
them4 ,but it would seem reasonable to  
expect that there should have to be some
 measure of proportion between what it  
has cost them in time and experience to 
achieve their current frame of mind in  
this bearing and what it would cost to  
divest themselves of it4 ,it is a       
question of how long a time and how     
exacting a discipline would be required 

so far to displace the current scheme of
 commonsense values and convictions in  
force in the ,fatherland as to          
neutralise their current high-wrought   
principles of servility1 loyalty and    
national animosity2 and on the solution 
of this difficulty appear to depend the 
chances of success for any proposed     
peace compact to which the ,german      
nation shall be made a party1 on terms  
of what is called an honorable peace4   
,the national1 or rather the dynastic   
and warlike1 animus of this people is of
 the essence of their social and        
political institutions4 ,without such a 
groundwork of popular sentiment neither 
the national establishment1 nor the     
social order on which it rests and      
through which it works1 could endure4   
,and with this underlying national      
sentiment intact nothing but a dynastic 
establishment of a somewhat ruthless    
order1 and no enduring system of law and
 order not based on universal submission
 to personal rule1 could be installed4  

,both the popular animus and the        
correlative coercive scheme of law and  
order are of historical growth4 ,both   
have been learned1 acquired1 and are in 
no cogent sense original with the       
,german people4 ,but both alike and     
conjointly have come out of a very      
protracted1 exacting and consistent     
discipline of mastery and subjection1   
running virtually unbroken over the     
centuries that have passed since the    
region that is now the ,fatherland first
 passed under the predaceous rule of its
 ,teutonic invaders1--for no part of the
 ,fatherland is held on other tenure    
than that of forcible seizure in ancient
 times by bands of invaders1 with the   
negligible exception of ,holstein and a 
slight extent of territory adjoining    
that province to the south and          
south-west4 ,since the time when such   
peoples as were overtaken in this region
 by the ,germanic barbarian invasions1  
and were reduced to subjection and      
presently merged with their alien       

masters1 the same general fashion of law
 and order that presently grew out of   
that barbarian conquest has continued to
 govern the life of those peoples1 with 
relatively slight and intermittent      
relaxation of its rigors4 ,contrasted   
with its beginnings1 in the shameful    
atrocities of the ,dark ,ages and the   
prehistoric phases of this ,german      
occupation1 the later stages of this    
system of coercive law and order in the 
,fatherland will appear humane1 not to  
say genial2 but as compared with the    
degree of mitigation which the like     
order of things presently underwent     
elsewhere in western ,europe1 it has    
throughout the historical period        
preserved a remarkable degree of that   
character of arrogance and servility    
which it owes to its barbarian and      
predatory beginnings4         99        
99       99       99       99  ,the     
initial stages of this ,germanic        
occupation of the ,fatherland are       
sufficiently obscure under the cloud of 

unrecorded antiquity that covers them2  
and then1 an abundance of obscurantism  
has also been added by the vapours of   
misguided vanity that have surrounded so
 nearly all historical inquiry on the   
part of patriotic ,german scholars4 ,yet
 there are certain outstanding features 
in the case1 in history and prehistory1 
that are too large or too notorious to  
be set aside or to be covered over1 and 
these may suffice to show the run of    
circumstances which have surrounded the 
,german peoples and shaped their civil  
and political institutions1 and whose   
discipline has guided ,german habits of 
thought and preserved the ,german spirit
 of loyalty in the shape in which it    
underlies the dynastic ,state of the    
present day4  ,among the most engaging  
of those fables that make the           
conventional background of ,german      
history is the academic legend of a free
 agricultural village community made up 
of ungraded and masterless men4 ,it is  
not necessary here to claim that such a 

village community never played a part in
 the remoter prehistoric experiences out
 of which the ,german people1 or their  
ruling classes1 came into the territory 
of the ,fatherland2 such a claim might  
divert the argument4 ,but it is         
sufficiently patent to students of those
 matters today that no such community of
 free and ungraded men had any part in  
the ,germanic beginnings2 that is to    
say1 in the early experiences of the    
,fatherland under ,german rule4 ,the    
meager and ambiguous remarks of ,tacitus
 on the state of domestic and civil     
economy among the inhabitants of        
,germany need no longer detain anyone1  
in the presence of the available        
archaeological and historical evidence4 
,the circumstantial evidence of the     
prehistoric antiquities which touch this
 matter1 as well as the slight allusions
 of historical records in antiquity1    
indicate unambiguously enough that when 
the ,germanic immigrants moved into the 
territories of the ,fatherland they     

moved in as invaders1 or rather as      
marauders1 and made themselves masters  
of the people already living on the     
land4 ,and history quite as             
unambiguously declares that when the    
,fatherland first comes under its light 
it presents a dark and bloody ground of 
tumultuous contention and intrigue2     
where princes and princelings1 captains 
of war and of rapine as well as the     
captains of superstition1 spend the     
substance of an ignominiously sordid and
 servile populace in an endless round of
 mutual raiding1 treachery1             
assassinations and supersession4  ,taken
 at their face value1 the recorded      
stories of that early time would leave  
one to infer that the common people1    
whose industry supported this           
superstructure of sordid mastery1 could 
have survived only by oversight4 ,but   
touched as it is with poetic license and
 devoted to the admirable life of the   
master class--admirable in their own    
eyes and in those of their chroniclers1 

as undoubtedly also in the eyes of the  
subject populace--the history of that   
time doubtless plays up the notable     
exploits and fortunes of its conspicuous
 personages1 somewhat to the neglect of 
the obscure vicissitudes of life and    
fortune among that human raw material by
 use of which the admirable feats of the
 master class were achieved1 and about  
the use of which the dreary traffic of  
greed and crime went on among the       
masters4  ,of the later history1 what   
covers1 say1 the last one thousand      
years1 there is no need to speak at     
length4 ,with transient1 episodic1      
interruptions it is for the ,fatherland 
a continuation out of these beginnings1 
leading out into a more settled system  
of subjection and mastery and a         
progressively increased scale of        
princely enterprise1 resting on an      
increasingly useful and increasingly    
loyal populace4 ,in all this later      
history the posture of things in the    
,fatherland is by no means unique1 nor  

is it even strikingly peculiar1 by      
contrast with the rest of western       
,europe1 except in degree4 ,it is of the
 same general kind as the rest of what  
has gone to make the historical advance 
of medieval and modern times2 but it    
differs from the generality in a more   
sluggish movement and a more tenacious  
adherence to what would be rated as the 
untoward features of mediaevalism4 ,the 
approach to a modern scheme of          
institutions and modern conceptions of  
life and of human values has been slow1 
and hitherto incomplete1 as compared    
with those communities that have1 for   
good or ill1 gone farthest along the    
ways of modernity4 ,habituation to      
personal subjection and subservience    
under the rigorous and protracted       
discipline of standardised service and  
fealty has continued later1 and with    
later and slighter mitigation1 in the   
,fatherland2 so as better to have       
conserved the spiritual attitude of the 
feudal order4 ,law and order in the     

,fatherland has in a higher degree      
continued to mean unquestioning         
obedience to a personal master and      
unquestioning subservience to the       
personal ambitions of the master4 ,and  
since freedom1 in the sense of          
discretionary initiative on the part of 
the common man1 does not fit into the   
framework of such a system of dependence
 on personal authority and surveillance1
 any degree of such free initiative will
 be licence in the eyes of men bred into
 the framework of this system2 whereas  
liberty1 as distinct from licence1 is   
not a matter of initiative and          
self-direction1 but of latitude in the  
service of a master4 ,hence no degree of
 curtailment in this delegated liberty  
will be resented or repudiated by       
popular indignation1 so long as the     
master to whom service is due can give  
assurance that it is expedient for his  
purposes4  ,the age-long course of      
experience and institutional discipline 
out of which the current ,german        

situation has come may be drawn         
schematically to the following effect3  
,in the beginning a turmoil of conquest1
 rapine1 servitude1 and contention      
between rival bands of marauders and    
their captains1 gradually1 indeed       
imperceptibly1 fell into lines of       
settled and conventionalised            
exploitation2 with repeated             
interruptions due to new incursions and 
new combinations of rapacious           
chieftains4 ,out of it all in the course
 of time came a feudal rgime1 under     
which personal allegiance and service to
 petty chiefs was the sole and universal
 accredited bond of solidarity4 ,as the 
outcome of further unremitting intrigue 
and contention among feudal chiefs1 of  
high and low degree1 the populace fell  
into larger parcels1 under the hands of 
feudal lords of larger dominion1 and the
 bias of allegiance and service came to 
hold with some degree of permanence and 
uniformity1 or at least of consistency1 
over a considerable reach of country1   

including its inhabitants4 ,with the    
rise of ,states came allegiance to a    
dynasty1 as distinguished from the      
narrower and more ephemeral allegiance  
to the semi-detached person of a        
victorious prince2 and the relative     
permanence of territorial frontiers     
under this rule gave room for an        
effectual recrudescence of the ancient  
propensity to a sentimental group       
solidarity2 in which the accredited     
territorial limits of the dynastic      
dominion served to outline the group    
that so was felt to belong together     
under a joint dispensation and with     
something of a joint interest in matters
 of fame and fortune4 ,as the same      
notion is more commonly and more        
suggestively expressed1 a sense of      
nationality arose within the sweep of   
the dynastic rule4 ,this sense of       
community interest that is called       
nationality so came in to reenforce the 
sense of allegiance to the dynastic     
establishment and so has coalesced with 

it to produce that high-wrought loyalty 
to the ,state1 that draws equally on the
 sentiment of community interest in the 
nation and on the prescriptive docility 
to the dynastic head4 ,the sense of     
national solidarity and of feudal       
loyalty and service have coalesced1 to  
bring this people to that climax of     
patriotic devotion beyond which there   
lies no greater height along this way4  
,but this is also as far as the ,german 
people have gone2 and it is scarcely to 
be claimed that the ,japanese have yet  
reached this stage2 they would rather   
appear to be1 essentially1 subjects of  
the emperor1 and only inchoately a      
,japanese nation4 ,of the ,german people
 it seems safe to say that they have    
achieved such a coalescence of          
unimpaired feudal fealty to a personal  
master and a full-blown sense of        
national solidarity1 without any        
perceptible slackening in either strand 
of the double tie which so binds them in
 the service of the dynastic ,state4    

,germany1 in other words1 is somewhat in
 arrears1 as compared with those        
,europeans that have gone farthest along
 this course of institutional growth1 or
 perhaps rather institutional           
permutation4 ,it is not that this       
retardation of the ,german people in    
this matter of national spirit is to be 
counted as an infirmity1 assuredly not  
as a handicap in the pursuit of that    
national prestige on which all patriotic
 endeavour finally converges4 ,for this 
purpose the failure to distinguish      
between the ambitions of the dynastic   
statesmen and the interests of the      
commonwealth is really a prodigious     
advantage1 which their rivals1 of more  
mature growth politically1 have lost by 
atrophy of this same dynastic axiom of  
subservience4 ,these others1 of whom the
 ,french and the ,english-speaking      
peoples make up the greater part and may
 be taken as the typical instance1 have 
had a different history1 in part4 ,the  
discipline of experience has left a     

somewhat different residue of habits of 
thought embedded in their institutional 
equipment and effective as axiomatic    
premises in their further apprehension  
of what is worth while1 and why4  ,it is
 not that the difference between these  
two contrasted strains of the ,western  
civilisation is either profound or very 
pronounced2 it is perhaps rather to be  
stated as a difference of degree than of
 kind2 a retardation of spiritual       
growth1 in respect of the prevalent and 
controlling habits of thought on certain
 heads1 in the one case as against the  
other4 ,therefore any attempt to speak  
with sufficient definition1 so as to    
bring out this national difference of   
animus in any convincing way1 will      
unavoidably have an appearance of       
overstatement1 if not also of bias4 ,and
 in any case1 of course1 it is not to be
 expected that the national difference  
here spoken for can be brought home to  
the apprehension of any unspoiled son of
 the ,fatherland1 since it does not lie 

within that perspective4  ,it is not of 
the nature of a divergence1 but rather a
 differential in point of cultural      
maturity1 due to a differential in the  
rate of progression through that        
sequence of institutional phases through
 which the civilised peoples of ,europe1
 jointly and severally1 have been led by
 force of circumstance4 ,in this        
movement out of the ,dark ,ages and     
onward1 circumstances have fallen out   
differently for those ,europeans that   
chanced to live within the confines of  
the ,fatherland1 different with such    
effect as to have in the present placed 
these others at a farther remove from   
the point of departure1 leaving them    
furnished with less of that archaic     
frame of mind that is here in question4 
,possessed of less1 but by no means     
shorn of all--perhaps not of the major  
part--of that barbaric heritage4        
,circumstances have so fallen out that  
these--typically the ,french and the    
,english-speaking peoples--have left    

behind and partly forgotten that        
institutional phase in which the people 
of ,imperial ,germany now live and move 
and have their being4 ,the ,french      
partly because they--that is the common 
people of the ,french lands--entered the
 procession with a very substantial     
lead1 having never been put back to a   
point abreast of their neighbors across 
the ,rhine1 in that phase of ,european  
civilisation from which the peoples of  
the ,fatherland tardily emerged into the
 feudal age4 ,so1 any student who shall 
set out to account for the visible lead 
which the ,french people still so       
obstinately maintain in the advance of  
,european culture1 will have to make up 
his account with this notable fact among
 the premises of his inquiry1 that they 
have had a shorter course to cover and  
have therefore1 in the sporting phrase1 
had the inside track4 ,they measure from
 a higher datum line4 ,among the        
advantages which so have come1 in a     
sense unearned1 to the ,french people1  

is their uninterrupted retention1 out of
 ,roman--and perhaps pre-,roman--times1 
of the conception of a commonwealth1 a  
community of men with joint and mutual  
interests apart from any superimposed   
dependence on a joint feudal superior4  
,the ,french people therefore became a  
nation1 with unobtrusive facility1 so   
soon as circumstances permitted1 and    
they are today the oldest nation in     
,europe4 ,they therefore were prepared  
from long beforehand1 with an adequate  
principle 7habit of thought7 of national
 cohesion and patriotic sentiment1 to   
make the shift from a dynastic ,state to
 a national commonwealth whenever the   
occasion for such a move should arise2  
that is to say1 whenever the dynastic   
,state1 by a suitable conjunction of    
infirmity and irksomeness1 should pass  
the margin of tolerance in this people's
 outraged sense of national shame4 ,the 
case of the ,german people in their     
latterday attitude toward dynastic      
vagaries may afford a term of           

comparison4 ,these appear yet incapable 
of distinguishing between national shame
 and dynastic ambition4  ,by a different
 course and on lines more nearly        
parallel with the life-history of the   
,german peoples1 the ,english-speaking  
peoples have reached what is for the    
present purpose much the same ground as 
the ,french1 in that they too have made 
the shift from the dynastic ,state to   
the national commonwealth4 ,the ,british
 started late1 but the discipline of    
servitude and unmitigated personal rule 
in their case was relatively brief and  
relatively ineffectual2 that is to say1 
as compared with what their ,german     
cousins had to endure and to learn in   
the like connection4 ,so that the       
,british never learned the lesson of    
dynastic loyalty fully by heart2 at     
least not the populace2 whatever may be 
true for the privileged classes1 the    
gentlemen1 whose interests were on the  
side of privilege and irresponsible     
mastery4 ,here as in the ,french case it

 was the habits of thought of the common
 man1 not of the class of gentlemen1    
that made the obsolescence of the       
dynastic ,state a foregone conclusion   
and an easy matter--as one speaks of    
easy achievement in respect of matters  
of that magnitude4 ,it is now some two  
and a half centuries since this shift in
 the national point of view overtook the
 ,english-speaking community4 ,perhaps  
it would be unfair to say that that     
period1 or that period plus what further
 time may yet have to be added1 marks   
the interval by which ,german habits of 
thought in these premises are in        
arrears1 but it is not easy to find     
secure ground for a different and more  
moderate appraisal4  ,the future1 of    
course1 is not to be measured in terms  
of the past1 and the tempo of the       
present and of the calculable future is 
in many bearings very different from    
that which has ruled even in the recent 
historical past4 ,but then1 on the other
 hand1 habituation always requires time2

 more particularly such habituation as  
is to take effect throughout a populous 
nation and is counted on to work a      
displacement of a comprehensive         
institutional system and of a people's  
outlook on life4  ,germany is still a   
dynastic ,state4 ,that is to say1 its   
national establishment is1 in effect1 a 
self-appointed and irresponsible        
autocracy which holds the nation in     
usufruct1 working through an appropriate
 bureaucratic organisation1 and the     
people is imbued with that spirit of    
abnegation and devotion that is involved
 in their enthusiastically supporting a 
government of that character4 ,now1 it  
is in the nature of a dynastic ,state to
 seek dominion1 that being the whole of 
its nature4 ,and a dynastic             
establishment which enjoys the          
unqualified usufruct of such resources  
as are placed at its disposal by the    
feudalistic loyalty of the ,german      
people runs no chance of keeping the    
peace1 except on terms of the           

unconditional surrender of all those    
whom it may concern4 ,no solemn         
engagement and no pious resolution has  
any weight in the balance against a     
cultural fatality of this magnitude4    
99       99       99       99       99  
,this account of the derivation and     
current state of ,german nationalism    
will of course appear biased to anyone  
who has been in the habit of rating     
,german ,culture high in all its        
bearings1 and to whom at the same time  
the ideals of peace and liberty appeal4 
,indeed1 such a critic1 gifted with the 
due modicum of asperity1 might well be  
provoked to call it all a more or less  
ingenious diatribe of partisan malice4  
,but it can be so construed only by     
those who see the question at issue as a
 point of invidious distinction between 
this ,german animus on the one hand and 
the corresponding frame of mind of the  
neighboring peoples on the other hand4  
,there may also appear to the captious  
to be some air of deprecation about the 

characterisation here offered of the    
past history of political traffic within
 the confines of the ,fatherland4 ,all  
of which1 of course1 touches neither the
 veracity of the characterisation nor   
the purpose with which so ungrateful a  
line of analysis and exposition has been
 entered upon4 ,it is to be regretted if
 facts that may flutter the emotions of 
one and another among the sensitive and 
unreflecting can not be drawn into such 
an inquiry without having their cogency 
discounted beforehand on account of the 
sentimental value imputed to them4 ,of  
course no offense is intended and no    
invidious comparison is aimed at4  ,even
 if the point of it all were an         
invidious comparison it would           
immediately have to be admitted that the
 net showing in favor of these others1  
e4g41 the ,french or the                
,english-speaking peoples1 is by no     
means so unreservedly to their credit as
 such a summary statement of the ,german
 case might seem to imply4 ,as bearing  

on the chances of a peace contingent    
upon the temper of the contracting      
nationalities1 it is by no means a      
foregone conclusion that such a peace   
compact would hold indefinitely even if 
it depended solely on the pacific animus
 of these others that have left the     
dynastic ,state behind4 ,these others1  
in fact1 are also not yet out of the    
woods4 ,they may not have the same gift 
of gratuitous and irresponsible         
truculence as their ,german cousins1 in 
the same alarming degree2 but as was    
said in an earlier passage1 they too are
 ready to fight on provocation4 ,they   
are patriotic to a degree2 indeed to    
such a degree that anything which       
visibly touches the national prestige   
will readily afford a casus belli4 ,but 
it remains true that the popular temper 
among them is of the defensive order2   
perhaps of an unnecessarily enthusiastic
 defensive order1 but after all in such 
a frame of mind as leaves them willing  
to let well enough alone1 to live and   

let live4  ,and herein appears to lie   
the decisive difference between those   
peoples whose patriotic affections      
center about the fortunes of an         
impersonal commonwealth and those in    
whom is superadded a fervent aspiration 
for dynastic ascendency4 ,the latter may
 be counted on to break the peace when a
 promising opportunity offers4  ,the    
contrast may be illustrated1 though not 
so sharply as might be desirable1 in the
 different temper shown by the ,british 
people in the ,boer war on the one hand1
 as compared with the popularity of the 
,french-,prussian war among the ,german 
people on the other hand4 ,both were    
aggressive wars1 and both were          
substantially unprovoked4               
,diplomatically speaking1 of course1    
sufficient provocation was found in     
either case1 as how should it not8 ,but 
in point of substantial provocation and 
of material inducement1 both were about 
equally gratuitous4 ,in either case the 
war could readily have been avoided     

without material detriment to the       
community and without perceptible lesion
 to the national honour4 ,both were     
engineered on grounds shamelessly       
manufactured ad hoc by interested       
parties2 in the one case by a coterie of
 dynastic statesmen1 in the other by a  
junta of commercial adventurers and     
imperialistic politicians4 ,in neither  
case had the people any interest of gain
 or loss in the quarrel1 except as it   
became a question of national prestige4 
,but both the ,german and the ,british  
community bore the burden and fought the
 campaign to a successful issue for     
those interested parties who had        
precipitated the quarrel4 ,the ,british 
people at large1 it is true1 bore the   
burden2 which comes near being all that 
can be said in the way of popular       
approval of this war1 which political   
statesmen have since then rated as one  
of the most profitable enterprises in   
which the forces of the realm have been 
engaged4 ,on the subject of this        

successful war the common man is still  
inclined to cover his uneasy sense of   
decency with a recital of extenuating   
circumstances4 ,what parallels all this 
in the ,german case is an outbreak of   
patriotic abandon and an admirable      
spirit of unselfish sacrifice in        
furtherance of the dynastic prestige1 an
 intoxication of patriotic blare        
culminating in the triumphant coronation
 at ,versailles4 ,nor has the sober     
afterthought of the past forty-six years
 cast a perceptible shadow of doubt     
across the glorious memory of that      
patriotic debauch4  ,such is the        
difference of animus between a body of  
patriotic citizens in a modern          
commonwealth on the one hand and the    
loyal subjects of a dynastic ,state on  
the other hand4 ,there need be no       
reflections on the intrinsic merits of  
either4 ,seen in dispassionate          
perspective from outside the turmoil1   
there is not much to choose1 in point of
 sane and self-respecting manhood1      

between the sluggish and shamefaced     
abettor of a sordid national crime1 and 
a ranting patriot who glories in serving
 as cat's-paw to a syndicate of         
unscrupulous politicians bent on        
dominion for dominion's sake4 ,but the  
question here is not as to the relative 
merits or the relative manhood contents 
of the two contrasted types of patriot4 
,doubtless both and either have manhood 
enough and to spare2 at least1 so they  
say4 ,but the point in question is the  
simpler and nowise invidious one1 as to 
the availability of both or either for  
the perpetuation of the world's peace   
under a compact of vigilant neutrality4 
,plainly the ,german frame of mind      
admits of no neutrality2 the quest of   
dominion is not compatible with         
neutrality1 and the substantial core of 
,german national life is still the quest
 of dominion under dynastic tutelage4   
,how it stands with the spirit that has 
repeatedly come in sight in the         
international relations of the ,british 

community is a question harder to       
answer4  ,it may be practicable to      
establish a peace of neutrals on the    
basis of such national spirit as        
prevails among these others--the ,french
 and ,english-speaking peoples1 together
 with the minor nationalities that      
cluster about the ,north ,sea--because  
their habitual attitude is that of      
neutrality1 on the whole and with       
allowance for a bellicose minority in   
all these countries4 ,by and large1     
these peoples have come to the tolerant 
attitude that finds expression in the   
maxim1 ,live and let live4 ,but they are
 all and several sufficiently patriotic4
 ,it may1 indeed1 prove that they are   
more than sufficiently patriotic for the
 purposes of a neutral peace4 ,they     
stand for peace1 but it is peace with   
honour2 which means1 in more explicit   
terms1 peace with undiminished national 
prestige4 ,now1 national prestige is a  
very particular commodity1 as has been  
set out in earlier passages of this     

inquiry2 and a peace which is to be kept
 only on terms of a jealous maintenance 
of the national honour is likely to be  
in a somewhat precarious case4 ,if1 and 
when1 the national honour is felt to    
require an enhanced national ascendancy1
 the case for a neutral peace           
immediately becomes critical4 ,and the  
greater the number and diversity of     
pretensions and interests that are      
conceived to be bound up with the       
national honour1 the more unstable will 
the resulting situation necessarily be4 
,the upshot of all this recital of      
considerations appears to be that a     
neutral peace compact may1 or it may    
not1 be practicable in the absence of   
such dynastic ,states as ,germany and   
,japan2 whereas it has no chance in the 
presence of these enterprising national 
establishments4  ,no one will be readier
 or more voluble in exclaiming against  
the falsity of such a discrimination as 
is here attempted1 between the          
democratic and the dynastic nations of  

the modern world1 than the spokesmen of 
these dynastic ,powers4 ,no one is more 
outspoken in professions of universal   
peace and catholic amity than these same
 spokesmen of the dynastic ,powers2 and 
nowhere is there more urgent need of    
such professions4 ,official and inspired
 professions are1 of course1 to be      
overlooked2 at least1 so charity would  
dictate4 ,but there have1 in the        
historic present1 been many professions 
of this character made also by credible 
spokesmen of the ,german1 and perhaps of
 the ,japanese1 people1 and in all      
sincerity4 ,by way of parenthesis it    
should be said that this is not intended
 to apply to expressions of conviction  
and intention that have come out of     
,germany these two years past 7,december
 #aiaf74 ,without questioning the       
credibility of these witnesses that have
 borne witness to the pacific and genial
 quality of national sentiment in the   
,german people1 it will yet be in place 
to recall the run of facts in the       

national life of ,germany in this       
historical present and the position of  
these spokesmen in the ,german          
community4         99       99       99 
99       99  ,the ,german nation is of a
 peculiar composition in respect of its 
social structure4 ,so far as bears on   
the question in hand1 it is made up of  
three distinctive constituent factors1  
or perhaps rather categories or         
conditions of men4 ,the populace is of  
course the main category1 and in the    
last resort always the main and decisive
 factor4 ,next in point of consequence  
as well as of numbers and initiative is 
the personnel of the control1--the      
ruling class1 the administration1 the   
official community1 the hierarchy of    
civil and political servants1 or        
whatever designation may best suit2 the 
category comprises that pyramidal       
superstructure of privilege and control 
whereof the sovereign is the apex1 and  
in whom1 under any dynastic rule1 is in 
effect vested the usufruct of the       

populace4 ,these two classes or         
conditions of men1 the one of which     
orders and the other obeys1 make up the 
working structure of the nation1 and    
they also between them embody the       
national life and carry forward the     
national work and aim4 ,intermediate    
between them1 or rather beside them and 
overlapping the commissure1 is a third  
category whose life articulates loosely 
with both the others at the same time   
that it still runs along in a           
semi-detached way4 ,this slighter but   
more visible1 and particularly more     
audible1 category is made up of the     
,intellectuals1 as a late1 and perhaps  
vulgar1 designation would name them4    
,these are they who chiefly communicate 
with the world outside1 and at the same 
time they do what is academically called
 thinking4 ,they are in intellectual    
contact and communication with the world
 at large1 in a contact of give and     
take1 and they think and talk in and    
about those concepts that go in under   

the caption of the humanities in the    
world at large4 ,the category is large  
enough to constitute an intellectual    
community1 indeed a community of        
somewhat formidable magnitude1 taken in 
absolute terms1 although in percentages 
of the population at large their numbers
 will foot up to only an inconsiderable 
figure4 ,their contact with the superior
 class spoken of above is fairly close1 
being a contact1 in the main1 of service
 on the one side and of control on the  
other4 ,with the populace their contact 
and communion is relatively slight1 the 
give and take in the case being neither 
intimate nor far-reaching4 ,more        
particularly is there a well-kept limit 
of moderation on any work of            
indoctrination or intellectual guidance 
which this class may carry down among   
the people at large1 dictated and       
enforced by dynastic expediency4 ,this  
category1 of the ,intellectuals1 is     
sufficiently large to live its own life 
within itself1 without drawing on the   

spiritual life of the community at      
large1 and of sufficiently substantial  
quality to carry its own peculiar scheme
 of intellectual conventions and        
verities4 ,of the great and highly      
meritorious place and work of these     
,intellectuals in the scheme of ,german 
culture it is needless to speak4 ,what  
is to the point is that they are the    
accredited spokesmen of the ,german     
nation in all its commonplace           
communication with the rest of civilised
 ,europe4  ,the ,intellectuals have     
spoken with conviction and sincerity of 
the spiritual state of the ,german      
people1 but in so doing1 and in so far  
as bears on the character of ,german    
nationalism1 they have been in closer   
contact1 intellectually and             
sympathetically1 with the intellectual  
and spiritual life of civilised ,europe 
at large than with the movements of the 
spirit among the ,german populace4 ,and 
their canvassing of the concepts which  
so have come under their attention from 

over the national frontiers has been    
carried forward--so far1 again1 as bears
 on the questions that are here in      
point--with the ,german-dynastic        
principles1 logic and mechanism of      
execution under their immediate         
observation and supplying the concrete  
materials for inquiry4 ,indeed1 it holds
 true1 by and large1 that nothing else  
than this ,german-dynastic complement of
 ways and means has1 or can effectually1
 come under their observation in such a 
degree of intimacy as to give body and  
definition to the somewhat abstract     
theorems on cultural aims and national  
preconceptions that have come to them   
from outside4 ,in short1 they have      
borrowed these theoretical formulations 
from abroad1 without the concrete       
apparatus of ways and means in which    
these theorems are embodied in their    
foreign habitat1 and have so found      
themselves construing these theoretical 
borrowings in the only concrete terms of
 which they have had first-hand and     

convincing knowledge4 ,such an outcome  
would be fairly unavoidable1 inasmuch as
 these ,intellectuals1 however much they
 are1 in the spirit1 citizens of the    
cosmopolitan republic of knowledge and  
intelligence1 they are after all1 in    
propria persona1 immediately and        
unremittingly subjects of the           
,german-dynastic ,state2 so that all    
their detail thinking on the aims1 ways 
and means of life1 in all its civil and 
political bearings1 is unavoidably      
shaped by the unremitting discipline of 
their workday experience under this     
dynastic scheme4 ,the outcome has been  
that while they have taken up1 as they  
have understood them1 the concepts that 
rule the civic life of these other1     
maturer nations1 they have apprehended  
and developed these theorems of civic   
life in the terms and by the logic      
enforced in that system of control and  
surveillance known to them by workday   
experience1--the only empirical terms at
 hand4  ,the apex of growth and the     

center of diffusion as regards the      
modern culture in respect of the ideals 
and logic of civic life--other phases of
 this culture than this its civil aspect
 do not concern the point here in       
question--this apex of growth and center
 of diffusion lie outside the           
,fatherland1 in an environment alien to 
the ,german institutional scheme4 ,yet  
so intrinsic to the cultural drift of   
modern mankind are these aims and this  
logic1 that in taking over and further  
enriching the intellectual heritage of  
this modern world the ,intellectuals of 
the ,fatherland have unavoidably also   
taken over those conceptions of civil   
initiative and masterless self-direction
 that rule the logic of life in a       
commonwealth of ungraded men4 ,they have
 taken these over and assimilated them  
as best their experience would permit4  
,but workday experience and its         
exigencies are stubborn things2 and in  
this process of assimilation of these   
alien conceptions of right and honest   

living1 it is the borrowed theorems     
concerning civic rights and duties that 
have undergone adaptation and revision1 
not the concrete system of ways and     
means in which these principles1 so     
accepted1 are to be put in practice4    
,necessarily so1 since in the ,german   
scheme of law and order the major       
premise is the dynastic ,state1 whereas 
the major premise of the modern         
civilised scheme of civic life is the   
absence of such an organ4 ,so1 the      
development and elaboration of these    
modern principles of civic liberty--and 
this elaboration has taken on formidable
 dimensions--under the hand of the      
,german ,intellectuals has uniformly run
 out into ,pickwickian convolutions1    
greatly suggestive of a lost soul       
seeking a place to rest4 ,with          
unquestionably serious purpose and      
untiring endeavour1 they have sought to 
embody these modern civilised           
preconceptions in terms afforded by1 or 
in terms compatible with1 the           

institutions of the ,fatherland2 and    
they have been much concerned and       
magniloquently elated about the ,german 
spirit of freedom that so was to be     
brought to final and consummate         
realisation in the life of a free       
people4 ,but at no point and in no case 
have either the proposals or their      
carrying out taken shape as a concrete  
application of the familiar principle of
 popular self-direction4 ,it has always 
come to something in the way of a       
concessive or expedient mitigation of   
the antagonistic principle of personal  
authority4 ,where the forms of          
self-government or of individual        
self-direction have concessively been   
installed1 under the ,imperial rule1    
they have turned out to be an imitative 
structure with some shrewd provision for
 their coercion or inhibition at the    
discretion of an irresponsible          
authority4  ,neither the sound          
intelligence nor the good faith of these
 ,intellectuals of the ,fatherland is to

 be impugned4 ,that the--necessarily    
vague and circumlocutory--expositions of
 civic institutions and popular liberty 
which they have so often and so largely 
promulgated should have been used as a  
serviceable blind of dynastic statecraft
 is not to be set down to their         
discredit4 ,circumstances over which    
they could have no control1 since they  
were circumstances that shaped their own
 habits of thought1 have placed it      
beyond their competence to apprehend or 
to formulate these alien principles     
7habits of thought7 concretely in those 
alien institutional details and by the  
alien logic with which they could have  
no working acquaintance4  ,to one and   
another this conception of cultural     
solidarity within the nation1 and       
consequent cultural aliency between     
nations1 due to the different habits of 
life and of thought enforced by the two 
diverse institutional systems1 may be so
 far unfamiliar as to carry no          
conviction4 ,it may accordingly not seem

 out of place to recall that the        
institutional system of any given       
community1 particularly for any         
community living under a home-bred and  
time-tried system of its own1 will      
necessarily be a balanced system of     
interdependent and mutually concordant  
parts working together in one           
comprehensive plan of law and order4    
,through such an institutional system1  
as1 e4g41 the ,german ,imperial         
organisation1 there will run a degree of
 logical consistency1 consonant with    
itself throughout1 and exerting a       
consistent discipline throughout the    
community2 whereby there is enforced a  
consistent drift or bent in the         
prevalent habits of life1 and a         
correlative bent in the resulting habits
 of thought prevalent in the community4 
,it is1 in fact1 this possession of a   
common scheme of use and wont1 and a    
consequent common outlook and manner of 
thinking1 that constitutes the most     
intrinsic bond of solidarity in any     

nationality1 and that finally marks it  
off from any other4  ,it is equally a   
matter of course that any other given   
community1 living under the rule of a   
substantially different1 or divergent1  
system of institutions1 will be exposed 
to a course of workday discipline       
running to a different1 perhaps         
divergent1 effect2 and that this other  
community will accordingly come in for a
 characteristically different discipline
 and fall under the rule of a different 
commonsense outlook4 ,where an          
institutional difference of this kind is
 somewhat large and consistent1 so as to
 amount in effect to a discrepancy1 as  
may fairly be said of the difference    
between ,imperial ,germany and its like 
on the one hand1 and the                
,english-speaking nations on the other  
hand1 there the difference in everyday  
conceptions may readily make the two    
peoples mutually unintelligible to one  
another1 on those points of             
institutional principle that are        

involved in the discrepancy4 ,this is   
the state of the case as between the    
,german people1 including the           
,intellectuals1 and the peoples against 
whom their preconceptions of national   
destiny have arrayed them4 ,and the many
 vivid expressions of consternation1    
abhorrence and incredulity that have    
come out of this community of           
,intellectuals in the course of the past
 two years of trial and error1 bear     
sufficient testimony to the rigorous    
constraint which these ,german          
preconceptions and their logic exercise 
over the ,intellectuals1 no less than   
over the populace4  ,conversely1 of     
course1 it is nearly as impracticable   
for those who have grown up under the   
discipline of democratic institutions to
 comprehend the habitual outlook of the 
commonplace ,german patriot on national 
interests and aims2 not quite1 perhaps1 
because the discipline of use and wont  
and indoctrination is neither so        
rigorous nor so consistent in their     

case4 ,but there is1 after all1         
prevalent among them a sufficiently     
evident logical inability to understand 
and appreciate the paramount need of    
national1 that is to say dynastic1      
ascendancy that actuates all ,german    
patriots2 just as these same patriots   
are similarly unable to consider        
national interests in any other light   
than that of dynastic ascendancy4       
,going simply on the face value of the  
available evidence1 any outsider might  
easily fall into the error of believing 
that when the great adventure of the war
 opened up before them1 as well as when 
presently the shock of baffled endeavour
 brought home its exasperating futility1
 the ,intellectuals of the ,fatherland  
distinguished themselves above all other
 classes and conditions of men in the   
exuberance of their patriotic abandon4  
,such a view would doubtless be almost  
wholly erroneous4 ,it is not that the   
,intellectuals reached a substantially  
superior pitch of exaltation1 but only  

that1 being trained in the use of       
language1 they were able to express     
their emotions with great facility4     
,there seems no reason to believe that  
the populace fell short of the same     
measure in respect of their prevalent   
frame of mind4  ,to return to the       
workings of the ,imperial dynastic      
,state and the forces engaged4 ,it      
plainly appears that the ,intellectuals 
are to be counted as supernumeraries1   
except so far as they serve as an       
instrument of publicity and             
indoctrination in the hands of the      
discretionary authorities4 ,the working 
factors in the case are the dynastic    
organisation of control1 direction and  
emolument1 and the populace at large by 
use of whose substance the traffic in   
dynastic ascendancy and emolument is    
carried on4 ,these two are in fairly    
good accord1 on the ancient basis of    
feudal loyalty4 ,hitherto there is no   
evident ground for believing that this  
archaic tie that binds the populace to  

the dynastic ambitions has at all       
perceptibly weakened4 ,and the          
possibility of dynastic ,germany living 
at peace with the world under any       
compact1 therefore translates itself    
into the possibility of the ,german     
people's unlearning its habitual        
deference and loyalty to the dynasty4   
,as its acquirement has been a work of  
protracted habituation1 so can its      
obsolescence also come about only       
through more or less protracted         
habituation under a system of use and   
wont of a different or divergent order4 
,the elements of such a systematic      
discipline running to an effect at cross
 purposes with this patriotic animus are
 not absent from the current situation  
in the ,fatherland2 the discipline of   
the modern industrial system1 for       
instance1 runs to such a divergent      
effect2 but this1 and other conceivable 
forces which may reenforce it1 will     
after all take time1 if they are to work
 a decisive change in the current frame 

of mind of the patriotic ,german        
community4 ,during the interval required
 for such a change in the national      
temper1 the peace of the world would be 
conditioned on the inability of the     
dynastic ,state to break it4 ,so that   
the chances of success for any neutral  
peace league will vary inversely as the 
available force of ,imperial ,germany1  
and it could be accounted secure only in
 the virtual elimination of the         
,imperial ,state as a national ,power4  
,if the gradual obsolescence of the     
spirit of militant loyalty in the       
,german people1 through disuse under a  
rgime of peace1 industry1 self          
government and free trade1 is to be the 
agency by force of which dynastic       
imperialism is to cease1 the chance of a
 neutral peace will depend on the       
thoroughness with which such a rgime of 
self-direction can be installed in this 
case1 and on the space of time required 
for such obsolescence through disuse4   
,obviously1 the installation of a       

workable rgime of self-government on    
peaceable lines would in any case be a  
matter of great difficulty among a      
people whose past experience has so     
singularly incapacitated them for       
self-government2 and obviously1 too1 the
 interval of time required to reach     
secure ground along this line of        
approach would be very considerable4    
,also1 in view of these conditions1     
obviously1 this scheme for maintaining  
the peace of nations by a compact of    
neutrals based on a compromise with an  
aspiring dynastic ,state resolves itself
 into the second of the two alternatives
 spoken of at the outset1 viz41 a       
neutral peace based on the elimination  
of ,germany as a war power1 together    
with the elimination of any materials   
suitable for the formation of a         
formidable coalition4 ,and then1 with   
,imperial ,germany supposedly eliminated
 or pacified1 there would still remain  
the ,japanese establishment1 to which   
all the arguments pertinent in the case 

of ,germany will apply without          
abatement2 except that1 at least        
hitherto1 the dynastic statesmen of     
,japan have not had the disposal of so  
massive a body of resources1 in         
population1 industry1 or raw materials4 
,,chapter ,,iv  ,,peace ,,without       
,,honour   ,the argument therefore turns
 back to a choice between the two       
alternatives alluded to3 peace in       
submission to the rule of the ,german   
dynastic establishment 7and to ,japan71 
or peace through elimination of these   
enterprising ,powers4 ,the former       
alternative1 no doubt1 is sufficiently  
unattractive1 but it is not therefore to
 be put aside without a hearing4 ,as    
goes without saying1 it is repugnant to 
the patriotic sentiments of those       
peoples whom the ,imperial ,german      
establishment have elected for          
submission4 ,but if this unreflecting   
patriotic revulsion can once be made    
amenable to reason1 there is always     
something to be said in favor of such a 

plan of peaceable submission1 or at     
least in extenuation of it2 and if it is
 kept in mind that the ulterior         
necessity of such submission must always
 remain in perspective as a condition   
precedent to a peaceful settlement1 so  
long as one or both of these            
enterprising ,powers remains intact1 it 
will be seen that a sane appraisal of   
the merits of such a rgime of peace is  
by no means uncalled for4 ,for neither  
of these two ,powers is there a         
conclusive issue of endeavour short of  
paramount dominion4         99       99 
99       99       99  ,there should also
 be some gain of insight and sobriety in
 recalling that the ,intellectuals of   
the ,fatherland1 who have doubtless     
pondered this matter longer and more    
dispassionately than all other men1 have
 spoken very highly of the merits of    
such a plan of universal submission to  
the rule of this ,german dynastic       
establishment4 ,they had1 no doubt1 been
 considering the question both long and 

earnestly1 as to what would1 in the     
light of reason1 eventually be to the   
best interest of those peoples whose    
manifest destiny was eventual tutelage  
under the ,imperial crown2 and there    
need also be no doubt that in that time 
7two years past7 they therefore spoke   
advisedly and out of the fulness of the 
heart on this head4 ,the pronouncements 
that came out of the community of       
,intellectuals in that season of        
unembarrassed elation and artless avowal
 are doubtless to be taken as an outcome
 of much thoughtful canvassing of what  
had best be done1 not as an enforced    
compromise with untoward necessities but
 as the salutary course freely to be    
pursued with an eye single to the best  
good of all concerned4  ,it is true1 the
 captious have been led to speak        
slightingly of the many utterances of   
this tenure coming out of the community 
of ,intellectuals1 as1 e4g41 the lay    
sermons of ,professor ,ostwald dating   
back to that season2 but no unprejudiced

 reader can well escape the persuasion  
that these1 as well as the very         
considerable volume of similar          
pronouncements by many other men of     
eminent scholarship and notable for     
benevolent sentiments1 are faithfully to
 be accepted as the expressions of a    
profound conviction and a consciously   
generous spirit4 ,in so speaking of the 
advantages to be derived by any subject 
people from submission to the ,german   
,imperial rule1 these ,intellectuals are
 not to be construed as formulating the 
drift of vulgar patriotic sentiment     
among their compatriots at large1 but   
rather as giving out the deliverances of
 their own more sensitive spirit and    
maturer deliberation1 as men who are in 
a position to see human affairs and     
interests in a larger perspective4      
,such1 no doubt1 would be their own     
sense of the matter4  ,reflection on the
 analogous case of the tutelage         
exercised by the ,american government   
over the subject ,philippinos may       

contribute to a just and temperate view 
of what is intended in the rgime of     
tutelage and submission so spoken for by
 the ,german ,intellectuals1--and1 it   
may be added1 found good by the         
,imperial statesmen4 ,there would1 of   
course1 be the difference1 as against   
the case of the ,philippinos1 that      
whereas the ,american government is     
after all answerable1 in the last resort
 and in a somewhat random fashion1 to a 
popular opinion that runs on democratic 
preconceptions1 the ,german ,imperial   
establishment on the other hand is      
answerable to no one1 except it be to   
,god1 who is conceived to stand in      
somewhat the relation of a silent       
partner1 or a minority stockholder in   
this dynastic enterprise4  ,yet it      
should not be overlooked that any       
presumptive hard usage which the vassal 
peoples might look for at the hands of  
the ,german dynasty would necessarily be
 tempered with considerations of        
expediency as dictated by the exigencies

 of usufruct4 ,the ,imperial            
establishment has shown itself to be    
wise1 indeed more wise than amiable1 but
 wise at least in its intentions1 in the
 use which it has made of subject       
peoples hitherto4 ,it is true1 a        
somewhat accentuated eagerness on the   
part of the ,imperial establishment to  
get the maximum service in a minimum of 
time and at a minimum cost from these   
subject populations1--as1 e4g41 in      
,silesia and ,poland1 in                
,schleswig-,holstein1 in                
,alsace-,lorraine1 or in its ,african   
and ,oceanic possessions1--has at times 
led to practices altogether dubious on  
humanitarian grounds1 at the same time  
that in point of thrifty management they
 have gone beyond what the traffic will 
bear4 ,yet it is not to be              
overlooked--and in this connection it is
 a point of some weight--that1 so far as
 the predatory traditions of its        
statecraft will permit1 the ,imperial   
establishment has in all these matters  

been guided by a singularly unreserved  
attention to its own material advantage4
 ,where its management in these premises
 has yielded a less profitable usufruct 
than the circumstances would reasonably 
admit1 the failure has been due to an   
excess of cupidity rather than the      
reverse4  ,the circumstantial evidence  
converges to the effect that the        
,imperial establishment may confidently 
be counted on to manage the affairs of  
its subject peoples with an eye single  
to its own material gain1 and it may    
with equal confidence be counted on that
 in the long run no unadvised excesses  
will be practised4 ,of course1 an       
excessive adventure in atrocity and     
predation1 due to such human infirmity  
in its agents or in its directorate as  
has been shown in various recent        
episodes1 is to be looked for now and   
again2 but these phenomena would come in
 by way of fluctuating variations from  
the authentic routine1 rather than as   
systematic features of it4  ,that       

superfluity of naughtiness that has     
given character to the current ,german  
,imperial policy in ,belgium1 e4g41 or  
that similarly has characterised the    
dealings of ,imperial ,japan in ,korea  
during the late benevolent assimilation 
of that people into ,japanese-,imperial 
usufruct1 is not fairly to be taken to  
indicate what such an ,imperial         
establishment may be expected to do with
 a subject people on a footing of       
settled and long-term exploitation4 ,at 
the outset1 in both instances1 the      
policy of frightfulness was dictated by 
a well-advised view to economy of effort
 in reducing the subject people to an   
abject state of intimidation1 according 
to the art of war as set forth in the   
manuals2 whereas latterly the somewhat  
profligate excesses of the government of
 occupation--decently covered with      
diplomatic parables on benevolence and  
legality--have been dictated by military
 convenience1 particularly by the need  
of forced labor and the desirability of 

a reduced population in the acquired    
territory4 ,so also the personally      
conducted dealings with the ,armenians  
by use of the ,turks should probably    
also best be explained as an endeavour  
to reduce the numbers of an undesirable 
population beforehand1 without incurring
 unnecessary blame4 ,all these things   
are1 at the most1 misleading indications
 of what the ,imperial policy would be  
like under settled conditions and in the
 absence of insubordination4  ,by way of
 contrast1 such as may serve to bring   
the specific traits of this prospective 
,imperial tutelage of nations into a    
better light1 the ,ottoman usufruct of  
the peoples of the ,turkish dominions   
offers an instructive instance4 ,the    
,ottoman tutelage is today spoken of by 
its apologists in terms substantially   
identical with the sketches of the      
future presented by hopeful ,german     
patriots in the early months of the     
current war4 ,but as is so frequently   
the case in such circumstances1 these   

expressions of the officers have to be  
understood in a diplomatic sense2 not as
 touching the facts in any other than a 
formal way4 ,it is sufficiently evident 
that the ,ottoman management of its     
usufruct has throughout been ill-advised
 enough persistently to charge more than
 the traffic would bear1 probably due in
 great part to lack of control over its 
agents or ramifications1 by the central 
office4 ,the ,ottoman establishment has 
not observed1 or enforced1 the plain    
rules of economy in its utilisation of  
the subject peoples1 and finds itself   
today bankrupt in consequence4 ,what may
 afford more of a parallel to the       
prospective ,german tutelage of the     
nations is the procedure of the         
,japanese establishment in ,korea1      
,manchuria1 or ,china2 which is also    
duly covered with an ostensibly decent  
screen of diplomatic parables1 but the  
nature and purpose of which is overt    
enough in all respects but the          
nomenclature4 ,it is not unlikely that  

even this ,japanese usufruct and        
tutelage runs on somewhat less humane   
and complaisant lines than a            
well-advised economy of resources would 
dictate for the prospective ,german     
usufruct of the ,western nations4       
,there is the essential difference      
between the two cases that while ,japan 
is over-populated1 so that it becomes   
the part of a wise government to find   
additional lands for occupancy1 and that
 so it is constrained by its imperial   
ambitions to displace much of the       
population in its subject territories1  
the ,fatherland on the other hand is    
under-populated-- notoriously1 though   
not according to the letter of the      
diplomatic parables on this head--and   
for the calculable future must continue 
to be under-populated2 provided that the
 state of the industrial arts continues 
subject to change in the same general   
direction as hitherto1 and provided that
 no radical change affects the ,german  
birth-rate4 ,so1 since the ,imperial    

government has no need of new lands for 
occupancy by its home population1 it    
will presumably be under no inducement  
to take measures looking to the partial 
depopulation of its subject territories4
  ,the case of ,belgium and the measures
 looking to a reduction of its          
population may raise a doubt1 but       
probably not a well taken doubt4 ,it is 
rather that since it has become evident 
that the territory can not be held1 it  
is thought desirable to enrich the      
,fatherland with whatever property can  
be removed1 and to consume the          
accumulated man-power of the ,belgian   
people in the service of the war4 ,it   
would appear that it is a war-measure1  
designed to make use of the enemy's     
resources for his defeat4 ,indeed1 under
 conditions of settled occupation or    
subjection1 any degree of such          
depopulation would entail an economic   
loss1 and any well-considered           
administrative policy would therefore   
look to the maintenance of the          

inhabitants of the acquired territories 
in undiminished numbers and unimpaired  
serviceability4  ,the resulting scheme  
of ,imperial usufruct should accordingly
 be of a considerate1 not to say in     
effect humane1 character1--always       
provided that the requisite degree of   
submission and subservience 7law and    
order7 can be enforced by a system of   
coercion so humane as not to reduce the 
number of the inhabitants or materially 
to lower their physical powers4 ,such   
would1 by reasonable expectation1 be the
 character of this projected ,imperial  
tutelage and usufruct of the nations of 
,christendom4 ,in its working-out this  
,german project should accordingly      
differ very appreciably from the policy 
which its imperial ambitions have       
constrained the ,japanese establishment 
to pursue in its dealings with the life 
and fortunes of its recently1 and       
currently1 acquired subject peoples4    
,the better to appreciate in some       
concrete fashion what should1 by        

reasonable expectation1 be the terms on 
which life might so be carried on sub   
pace germanica1 attention may be invited
 to certain typical instances of such   
peace by abnegation among contemporary  
peoples4 ,perhaps at the top of the list
 stands ,india1 with its many and varied
 native peoples1 subject to ,british    
tutelage1 but1 the ,british apologists  
say1 not subject to ,british usufruct4  
,the margin of tolerance in this        
instance is fairly wide1 but its limits 
are sharply drawn4 ,india is wanted and 
held1 not for tribute or revenue to be  
paid into the ,imperial treasury1 nor   
even for exclusive trade privileges or  
preferences1 but mainly as a preserve to
 provide official occupation and        
emoluments for ,british gentlemen not   
otherwise occupied or provided for2 and 
secondarily as a means of safeguarding  
lucrative ,british investments1 that is 
to say1 investments by ,british         
capitalists of high and low degree4 ,the
 current ,british professions on the    

subject of this occupation of ,india1   
and at times the shamefaced apology for 
it1 is that the people of ,india suffer 
no hardship by this means2 the resulting
 governmental establishment being no    
more onerous and no more expensive to   
them than any equally1 or even any less1
 competent government of their own would
 necessarily be4 ,the fact1 however1    
remains1 that ,india affords a much     
needed and very considerable net revenue
 to the class of ,british gentlemen1 in 
the shape of official salaries and      
pensions1 which the ,british gentry at  
large can on no account forego4         
,narrowed to these proportions it is    
readily conceivable that the ,british   
usufruct of ,india should rest with no  
extraordinary weight on the ,indian     
people at large1 however burdensome it  
may at times become to those classes who
 aspire to take over the usufruct in    
case the ,british establishment can be  
dislodged4 ,this case evidently differs 
very appreciably from the projected     

,german usufruct of neighboring         
countries in ,europe4  ,a case that may 
be more nearly in point would be that of
 any one of the countries subject to the
 ,turkish rule in recent times2 although
 these instances scarcely show just what
 to expect under the projected ,german  
rgime4 ,the ,turkish rule has been      
notably inefficient1 considered as a    
working system of dynastic usufruct2    
whereas it is confidently expected that 
the corresponding ,german system would  
show quite an exceptional degree of     
efficiency for the purpose4 ,this       
,turkish inefficiency has had a two-fold
 effect1 which should not appear in the 
,german case4 ,through administrative   
abuses intended to serve the personal   
advantage of the irresponsible          
officials1 the underlying peoples have  
suffered a progressive exhaustion and   
dilapidation2 whereby the central       
authority1 the dynastic establishment1  
has also grown progressively1           
cumulatively weaker and therefore less  

able to control its agents2 and1 in the 
second place1 on the same grounds1 in   
the pursuit of personal gain1 and       
prompted by personal animosities1 these 
irresponsible agents have persistently  
carried their measures of extortion     
beyond reasonable bounds1--that is to   
say beyond the bounds which a well      
considered plan of permanent usufruct   
would countenance4 ,all this would be   
otherwise and more sensibly arranged    
under ,german ,imperial auspices4  ,one 
of the nations that have fallen under   
,turkish rule--and ,turkish             
peace--affords a valuable illustration  
of a secondary point that is to be      
considered in connection with any plan  
of peace by submission4 ,the ,armenian  
people have in later time come partly   
under ,russian dominion1 and so have    
been exposed to the ,russian system of  
bureaucratic exploitation2 and the      
difference between ,russian and ,turkish
 ,armenia is instructive4 ,according to 
all credible--that is                   

unofficial--accounts1 conditions are    
perceptibly more tolerable in ,russian  
,armenia4 ,well informed persons relate 
that the cause for this more lenient1 or
 less extreme1 administration of affairs
 under ,russian officials is a selective
 death rate among them1 such that a     
local official who persistently exceeds 
a certain ill-defined limit of tolerance
 is removed by what would under other   
circumstances be called an untimely     
death4 ,no adequate remedy has been     
found1 within the large limits which    
,russian bureaucratic administration    
habitually allows itself in questions of
 coercion4 ,the ,turk1 on the other     
hand1 less deterred by considerations of
 long-term expediency1 and1 it may be1  
less easily influenced by outside       
opinion on any point of humanity1 has   
found a remedy in the systematic        
extirpation of any village in which an  
illicit death occurs4 ,one will incline 
to presume that on this head the ,german
 ,imperial procedure would be more after

 the ,russian than after the ,turkish   
pattern2 although latterday             
circumstantial evidence will throw some 
sinister doubt on the reasonableness of 
such an expectation4  ,it is plain1     
however1 that the ,turkish remedy for   
this form of insubordination is a       
wasteful means of keeping the peace4    
,plainly1 to the home office1 the ,high 
,command1 the extinction of a village   
with its population is a more           
substantial loss than the unseasonable  
decease of one of its administrative    
agents2 particularly when it is called  
to mind that such a decease will        
presumably follow only on such          
profligate excesses of naughtiness as   
are bound to be inexcusably unprofitable
 to the central authority4 ,it may be   
left an open question how far a         
corrective of this nature can hopefully 
be looked to as applicable1 in case of  
need1 under the projected ,german       
,imperial usufruct4  ,it may1 ,i        
apprehend1 be said without offense that 

there is no depth of depravity below the
 ordinary reach of the ,russian         
bureaucracy2 but this organisation finds
 itself constrained1 after all1 to use  
circumspection and set some limits on   
individual excursions beyond the bounds 
of decency and humanity1 so soon as     
these excesses touch the common or joint
 interest of the organisation4 ,any     
excess of atrocity1 beyond a certain    
margin of tolerance1 on the part of any 
one of its members is likely to work    
pecuniary mischief to the rest2 and     
then1 the bureaucratic conduct of       
affairs is also1 after all1 in an       
uncertain degree subject to some        
surveillance by popular sentiment at    
home or abroad4 ,the like appears not to
 hold true of the ,turkish official     
organisation4 ,the difference may be due
 to a less provident spirit among the   
latter1 as already indicated4 ,but a    
different tradition1 perhaps an         
outgrowth of this lack of providence and
 of the consequent growth of a policy of

 frightfulness1 may also come in for a  
share in the outcome2 and there is also 
a characteristic difference in point of 
religious convictions1 which may go some
 way in the same direction4 ,the        
followers of ,islam appear on the whole 
to take the tenets of their faith at    
their face value--servile1 intolerant   
and fanatic--whereas the ,russian       
official class may perhaps without undue
 reproach be considered to have on the  
whole outlived the superstitious        
conceits to which they yield an         
expedient pro forma observance4 ,so that
 when worse comes to worst1 and the     
,turk finds himself at length with his  
back against the last consolations of   
the faith that makes all things         
straight1 he has the assured knowledge  
that he is in the right as against the  
unbelievers2 whereas the ,russian       
bureaucrat in a like case only knows    
that he is in the wrong4 ,the last      
extremity is a less conclusive argument 
to the man in whose apprehension it is  

not the last extremity4 ,again1 there is
 some shadow of doubt falls on the      
question as to which of these is more   
nearly in the ,german ,imperial spirit4 
,on the whole1 the case of ,china is    
more to the point4 ,by and large1 the   
people of ,china1 more particularly the 
people of the coastal-plains region1    
have for long habitually lived under a  
rgime of peace by non-resistance4 ,the  
peace has been broken transiently from  
time to time1 and local disturbances    
have not been infrequent2 but1 taken by 
and large1 the situation has habitually 
been of the peaceful order1 on a ground 
of non-resisting submission4 ,but this  
submission has not commonly been of a   
whole-hearted kind1 and it has also     
commonly been associated with a degree  
of persistent sabotage2 which has       
clogged and retarded the administration 
of governmental law and order1 and has  
also been conducive to a large measure  
of irresponsible official corruption4   
,the habitual scheme of things ,chinese 

in this bearing may fairly be described 
as a peace of non-resistance tempered   
with sabotage and assassination4 ,such  
was the late ,manchu rgime1 and there is
 no reason in ,china for expecting a    
substantially different outcome from the
 ,japanese invasion that is now under   
way4 ,the nature of this ,japanese      
incursion should be sufficiently plain4 
,it is an enterprise in statecraft after
 the order of ,macchiavelli1            
,metternich1 and ,bismarck4 ,of course1 
the conciliatory fables given out by the
 diplomatic service1 and by the other   
apologists1 are to be taken at the      
normal discount of one-hundred percent4 
,the relatively large current output of 
such fables may afford a hint as to the 
magnitude of the designs which the      
fables are intended to cover4  ,the     
,chinese people have had a more extended
 experience in peace of this order than 
all others1 and their case should       
accordingly be instructive beyond all   
others4 ,not that a ,european peace by  

non-resistance need be expected to run  
very closely on the ,chinese lines1 but 
there should be a reasonable expectation
 that the large course of things would  
be somewhat on the same order in both   
cases4 ,neither the ,european traditions
 and habitual temperament nor the modern
 state of the industrial arts will      
permit one to look for anything like a  
close parallel in detail2 but it remains
 true1 when all is said1 that the       
,chinese experience of peace under      
submission to alien masters affords the 
most instructive illustration of such a 
rgime1 as touches its practicability1   
its methods1 its cultural value1 and its
 effect on the fortunes of the subject  
peoples and of their masters4  ,now1 it 
may be said by way of preliminary       
generalisation that the life-history of 
the ,chinese people and their culture is
 altogether the most imposing           
achievement which the records of mankind
 have to show2 whereas the history of   
their successive alien establishments of

 mastery and usufruct is an unbroken    
sequence of incredibly shameful         
episodes1--always beginning in unbounded
 power and vainglory1 running by way of 
misrule1 waste and debauchery1 to an    
inglorious finish in abject corruption  
and imbecility4 ,always have the gains  
in civilisation1 industry and in the    
arts1 been made by the subject ,chinese1
 and always have their alien masters    
contributed nothing to the outcome but  
misrule1 waste1 corruption and decay4   
,and yet in the long run1 with all this 
handicap and misrule1 the ,chinese      
people have held their place and made   
headway in those things to which men    
look with affection and esteem when they
 come to take stock of what things are  
worth while4 ,it would be a hopeless    
task to count up how many dynasties of  
masterful barbarians1 here and there1   
have meanwhile come up and played their 
ephemeral role of vainglorious nuisance 
and gone under in shame and confusion1  
and dismissed with the invariable       

verdict of ,good ,riddance6  ,it may at 
first sight seem a singular conjuncture 
of circumstances1 but it is doubtless a 
consequence of the same conjuncture1    
that the ,chinese people have also kept 
their hold through all history on the   
,chinese lands4 ,they have lived and    
multiplied and continued to occupy the  
land1 while their successive alien      
masters have come and gone4 ,so that    
today1 as the outcome of conquest1 and  
of what would be rated as defeat1 the   
people continue to be ,chinese1 with an 
unbroken pedigree as well as an unbroken
 line of home-bred culture running      
through all the ages of history4 ,in the
 biological respect the ,chinese plan of
 non-resistance has proved eminently    
successful4  ,and1 by the way1 much the 
same1 though not in the same degree1 is 
true for the ,armenian people2 who have 
continued to hold their hill country    
through good days and evil1 apparently  
without serious or enduring reduction of
 their numbers and without visible lapse

 into barbarism1 while the successive   
disconnected dynasties of their         
conquering rulers have come and gone1   
leaving nothing but an ill name4 ,this  
fable teaches that a diligent attention 
to the growing of crops and children is 
the sure and appointed way to the       
maintenance of a people and its culture 
even under the most adverse conditions1 
and that eventual death and shameful    
destruction inexorably wait on any      
ruling race4 ,hitherto the rule has not 
failed4 ,the rule1 indeed1 is grounded  
in the heritable traits of human nature1
 from which there is no escape4  ,for   
its long-term biological success1 as    
well as for the continued integrity of a
 people's culture1 a peace of           
non-resistance1 under good or evil      
auspices1 is more to be desired than    
imperial dominion4 ,but these things are
 not all that modern peoples live for1  
perhaps it is safe to say that in no    
case are these chief among the things   
for which civilised ,europeans are      

willing to live4 ,they urgently need    
also freedom to live their own life in  
their own way1 or rather to live within 
the bonds of convention which they have 
come in for by use and wont1 or at least
 they believe that such freedom is      
essential to any life that shall be     
quite worth while4 ,so also they have a 
felt need of security from arbitrary    
interference in their pursuit of a      
livelihood and in the free control of   
their own pecuniary concerns4 ,and they 
want a discretionary voice in the       
management of their joint interests1    
whether as a nation or in a minor civil 
group4 ,in short1 they want personal1   
pecuniary and political liberty1 free   
from all direction or inhibition from   
without4 ,they are also much concerned  
to maintain favorable economic          
conditions for themselves and their     
children4 ,and last1 but chiefly rather 
than least1 they commonly are hide-bound
 patriots inspired with an intractable  
felt need of national prestige4  ,it is 

an assemblage of peoples in such a frame
 of mind to whom the pacifists are      
proposing1 in effect1 a plan for        
eventual submission to an alien dynasty1
 under the form of a neutral peace      
compact to include the warlike ,powers4 
,there is little likelihood of such a   
scheme being found acceptable1 with     
popular sentiment running as it now does
 in the countries concerned4 ,and yet1  
if the brittle temper in which any such 
proposal is rejected by popular opinion 
in these countries today could be made  
to yield sufficiently to reflection and 
deliberate appraisal1 it is by no means 
a foregone conclusion that its          
acceptance would not be the best way out
 of a critical situation4 ,the cost of  
disabling and eliminating the warlike   
,power whose dominion is feared1 or even
 of staving off the day of surrender1 is
 evidently serious enough4 ,the merits  
of the alternative should be open to    
argument1 and should1 indeed1 be allowed
 due consideration4 ,and any endeavour  

to present them without heat should     
presumably find a hearing4 ,it appears  
to have been much of the fault of the   
pacifists who speak for the ,peace      
,league that they have failed or refused
 to recognise these ulterior            
consequences of the plan which they     
advocate2 so that they appear either not
 to know what they are talking about1 or
 to avoid talking about what they know4 
,it will be evident from beforehand that
 the grave difficulty to be met in any  
advocacy of peace on terms of           
non-resistant subjection to an alien    
dynastic rule--peace at any price--is a 
difficulty of the psychological order4  
,whatever may be conceived to hold true 
for the ,chinese people1 such submission
 is repugnant to the sentiments of the  
,western peoples4 ,which in turn        
evidently is due to the prevalence of   
certain habitual preconceptions among   
modern civilised men1--certain acquired 
traits of temper and bias1 of the nature
 of fixed ideas4 ,that something in the 

way of a reasonably contented and useful
 life is possible under such a rgime as 
is held in prospect1 and even some      
tolerable degree of well-being1 is made 
evident in the ,chinese case4 ,but the  
,chinese tolerance of such a rgime goes 
to argue that they are charged with     
fewer preconceptions at variance with   
the exigencies of life under these      
conditions4 ,so1 it is commonly         
accepted1 and presumably to be accepted1
 that the ,chinese people at large have 
little if any effectual sense of        
nationality2 their patriotism appears to
 be nearly a negligible quantity4 ,this 
would appear to an outsider to have been
 their besetting weakness1 to which     
their successful subjection by various  
and sundry ambitious aliens has been    
due4 ,but it appears also to have been  
the infirmity by grace of which this    
people have been obliged to learn the   
ways of submission1 and so have had the 
fortune to outlive their alien masters1 
all and sundry1 and to occupy the land  

and save the uncontaminated integrity of
 their long-lived civilisation4         
99       99       99       99       99  
,some account of the nature and uses of 
this spirit of patriotism that is held  
of so great account among ,western      
nations has already been set out in an  
earlier passage4 ,one or two points in  
the case1 that bear on the argument     
here1 may profitably be recalled4 ,the  
patriotic spirit1 or the tie of         
nationalism1 is evidently of the nature 
of habit1 whatever proclivity to the    
formation of such a habit may be native 
to mankind4 ,more particularly is it a  
matter of habit--it might even be called
 a matter of fortuitous habit--what     
particular national establishment a     
given human subject will become attached
 to on reaching what is called years of 
discretion and so becoming a patriotic  
citizen4  ,the analogy of the clam may  
not be convincing1 but it may at least  
serve to suggest what may be the share  
played by habituation in the matter of  

national attachment4 ,the young clam1   
after having passed the free-swimming   
phase of his life1 as well as the period
 of attachment to the person of a carp  
or similar fish1 drops to the bottom and
 attaches himself loosely in the place  
and station in life to which he has been
 led2 and he loyally sticks to his      
particular patch of ooze and sand       
through good fortune and evil4 ,it is1  
under ,providence1 something of a       
fortuitous matter where the given clam  
shall find a resting place for the sole 
of his foot1 but it is also1 after all1 
his own1 his native land etc4 ,it lies  
in the nature of a clam to attach       
himself after this fashion1 loosely1 to 
the bottom where he finds a living1 and 
he would not be a good clam and true if 
he failed to do so2 but the particular  
spot for which he forms this attachment 
is not of the essence of the case4 ,at  
least1 so they say4  ,it may be1 as good
 men appear to believe or know1 that all
 men of sound1 or at least those of     

average1 mind will necessarily be of a  
patriotic temper and be attached by ties
 of loyalty to some particular national 
establishment1 ordinarily the particular
 establishment which is formally        
identified with the land in which they  
live2 although it is always possible    
that a given individual may be an alien 
in the land1 and so may owe allegiance  
to and be ruled by a patriotic          
attachment to another national          
establishment1 to which the             
conventionalities governing his special 
case have assigned him as his own proper
 nation4 ,the analogy of the clam       
evidently does not cover the case4 ,the 
patriotic citizen is attached to his own
 proper nationality not altogether by   
the accident of domicile1 but rather by 
the conventions1 legal or customary1    
which assign him to this or that        
national establishment according to     
certain principles of use and wont4     
,mere legal citizenship or allegiance   
does not decide the matter either2 at   

least not by any means unavoidably2 as  
appears in the case of the ,chinese     
subject under ,manchu or ,japanese rule2
 and as appears perhaps more            
perspicuously in the case of the        
hyphenate ,american citizen1 whose      
formal allegiance is to the nation in   
whose land he prefers to live1 all the  
while that his patriotic affection      
centers on his spiritual ,fatherland in 
whose fortunes he has none but a        
non-resident interest4 ,indeed1 the     
particular national tie that will bind  
the affections--that is to say the      
effectual patriotic attachment--of any  
given individual may turn out on closer 
scrutiny to be neither that of domicile 
or of formal legal allegiance1 nor that 
of putative origin or pedigree1 but only
 a reflex of certain national           
animosities2 which may also turn out on 
examination to rest on putative         
grounds--as illustrated by a subsidiary 
class of hyphenate ,american citizens   
whose affections have come to be bound  

up in the national fortunes of one      
foreign ,power for the simple1 but      
sufficient1 reason that1 on conventional
 grounds1 they bear malice against      
another equally foreign ,power4         
,evidently there is much sophistication1
 not to say conventionalised            
affectation1 in all this national       
attachment and allegiance4 ,it will     
perhaps not do to say that it is        
altogether a matter of sophistication4  
,yet it may not exceed the premises to  
say that the particular choice1 the     
concrete incidence1 of this national    
attachment is in any given case a matter
 of sophistication1 largely tempered    
with fortuity4 ,one is born into a given
 nationality--or1 in case of dynastic   
allegiance1 into service and devotion to
 a 7fortuitously7 given sovereign--or at
 least so it is commonly believed4      
,still one can without blame1 and       
without excessive shame1 shift one's    
allegiance on occasion4 ,what is not    
countenanced among civilised men is to  

shift out of allegiance to any given    
nationality or dynasty without shifting 
into the like complication of gainless  
obligations somewhere else4 ,such a     
shifting of national or dynastic base is
 not quite reputable1 though it is also 
not precisely disreputable4 ,the        
difficulty in the case appears to be a  
moral difficulty1 not a mental or a     
pecuniary one1 and assuredly not a      
physical difficulty1 since the relation 
in question is not a physical relation4 
,it would appear to be of the moral     
order of things1 in that sense of the   
term in which conventional proprieties  
are spoken of as moral4 ,that is to say1
 it is a question of conforming to      
current expectations under a code of    
conventional proprieties4 ,like much of 
the conventional code of behavior this  
patriotic attachment has the benefit of 
standardised decorum1 and its outward   
manifestations are enjoined by law4 ,all
 of which goes to show how very         
seriously the whole matter is regarded4 

,and yet it is also a matter of common  
notoriety that large aggregates of men1 
not to speak of sporadic individuals1   
will on occasion shift their allegiance 
with the most felicitous effect and with
 no sensible loss of self-respect or of 
their good name4 ,such a shift is to be 
seen in multiple in the ,german nation  
within the past half-century1 when1 for 
instance1 the ,hanoverians1 the ,saxons1
 and even the ,holsteiners in very      
appreciable numbers1 not to mention the 
subjects of minuscular principalities   
whose names have been forgotten in the  
shuffle1 all became good and loyal      
subjects of the ,empire and of the      
,imperial dynasty1--good and loyal      
without reservation1 as has abundantly  
appeared4 ,so likewise within a similar 
period the inhabitants of the ,southern 
,states repudiated their allegiance to  
the ,union1 putting in its place an     
equivalent loyalty to their new-made    
country2 and then1 when the new national
 establishment slipped out from under   

their feet they returned as             
whole-heartedly as need be to their     
earlier allegiance4 ,in each of these   
moves1 taken with deliberation1 it is   
not to be doubted that this body of     
citizens have been moved by an          
unimpeachable spirit of patriotic       
honour4 ,no one who is in any degree    
conversant with the facts is likely to  
question the declaration that it would  
be a perversion1 not to say an          
inversion1 of fact to rate their        
patriotic devotion to the ,union today  
lower than that of any other section of 
the country or any other class or       
condition of men4  ,but there is more1  
and in a sense worse1 to be found along 
the same general line of evidence       
touching this sublimated sentiment of   
group solidarity that is called         
nationalism4 ,the nation1 of course1 is 
large2 the larger the better1 it is     
believed4 ,it is so large1 indeed1 that 
considered as a group or community of   
men living together it has no sensible  

degree of homogeneity in any of their   
material circumstances or interests2 nor
 is anything more than an inconsiderable
 fraction of the aggregate population1  
territory1 industry1 or daily life known
 to any one of these patriotic citizens 
except by remote and highly dubious     
hearsay4 ,the one secure point on which 
there is a 7constructive7 uniformity is 
the matter of national allegiance2 which
 grows stronger and more confident with 
every increase in aggregate mass and    
volume4 ,it is also not doubtful1 e4g41 
that if the people of the ,british      
,dominions in ,north ,america should    
choose to throw in their national lot   
with the ,union1 all sections and       
classes1 except those whose pecuniary   
interest in a protective tariff might be
 conceived to suffer1 would presently   
welcome them2 nor is it doubtful that   
,american nationality would cover the   
new and larger aggregate as readily as  
the old4 ,much the same will hold true  
with respect to the other countries     

colonised under ,british auspices4 ,and 
there is no conclusive reason for       
drawing the limit of admissible national
 extension at that point4  ,so much1    
however1 is fairly within the           
possibilities of the calculable future2 
its realisation would turn in great     
measure on the discontinuance of certain
 outworn or disserviceable institutional
 arrangements2 as1 e4g41 the remnants of
 a decayed monarchy1 and the legally    
protected vested interests of certain   
business enterprises and of certain     
office-holding classes4 ,what more and  
farther might practicably be undertaken 
in this way1 in the absence of marplot  
office-holders1 office-seekers1         
sovereigns1 priests and monopolistic    
business concerns sheltered under       
national animosities and restraints of  
trade1 would be something not easy to   
assign a limit to4 ,all the minor       
neutrals1 that cluster about the ,north 
,sea1 could unquestionably be drawn into
 such a composite nationality1 in the   

absence1 or with due disregard1 of those
 classes1 families and individuals whose
 pecuniary or invidious gain is         
dependent on or furthered by the        
existing division of these peoples4     
,the projected defensive league of      
neutrals is1 in effect1 an inchoate     
coalescence of the kind4 ,its purpose is
 the safeguarding of the common peace   
and freedom1 which is also the avowed   
purpose and justification of all those  
modern nations that have outlived the   
rgime of dynastic ambition and so of    
enterprise in dominion for dominion's   
sake1 and have passed into the neutral  
phase of nationality2 or it should      
perhaps rather be said that such is the 
end of endeavour and the warrant of     
existence and power for these modern    
national establishments in so far as    
they have outlived and repudiated such  
ambitions of a dynastic or a            
quasi-dynastic order1 and so have taken 
their place as intrinsically neutral    
commonwealths4  ,it is only in the      

common defense 7or in the defense of the
 like conditions of life for their      
fellowmen elsewhere7 that the citizens  
of such a commonwealth can without shame
 entertain or put in evidence a spirit  
of patriotic solidarity2 and it is only 
by specious and sophistical appeal to   
the national honour--a conceit surviving
 out of the dynastic past--that the     
populace of such a commonwealth can be  
stirred to anything beyond a defense of 
their own proper liberties or the       
liberties of like-minded men elsewhere1 
in so far as they are not still imbued  
with something of the dynastic animus   
and the chauvinistic animosities which  
they have formally repudiated in        
repudiating the feudalistic principles  
of the dynastic ,state4  ,the nation1   
without the bond of dynastic loyalty1 is
 after all a make-shift idea1 an        
episodic half-way station in the        
sequence1 and loyalty1 in any proper    
sense1 to the nation as such is so much 
of a make-believe1 that in the absence  

of a common defense to be safeguarded   
any such patriotic conceit must lose    
popular assurance and1 with the passing 
of generations1 fall insensibly into    
abeyance as an archaic affectation4 ,the
 pressure of danger from without is     
necessary to keep the national spirit   
alert and stubborn1 in case the pressure
 from within1 that comes of dynastic    
usufruct working for dominion1 has been 
withdrawn4 ,with further extension of   
the national boundaries1 such that the  
danger of gratuitous infraction from    
without grows constantly less menacing1 
while the traditional rgime of          
international animosities falls more and
 more remotely into the background1 the 
spirit of nationalism is fairly on the  
way to obsolescence through disuse4 ,in 
other words1 the nation1 as a           
commonwealth1 being a partisan          
organisation for a defensive purpose1   
becomes functa officio in respect of its
 nationalism and its patriotic ties in  
somewhat the same measure as the        

national coalition grows to such a size 
that partisanship is displaced by a     
cosmopolitan security4  ,doubtless the  
falling into abeyance through disuse of 
so pleasing a virtue as patriotic       
devotion will seem an impossibly        
distasteful consummation2 and about     
tastes there is no disputing1 but tastes
 are mainly creations of habit4 ,except 
for the disquieting name of the thing1  
there is today little stands in the way 
of a cosmopolitan order of human        
intercourse unobtrusively displacing    
national allegiance2 except for vested  
interests in national offices and       
international discriminations1 and      
except for those peoples among whom     
national life still is sufficiently     
bound up with dynastic ambition4  ,in an
 earlier passage the patriotic spirit   
has been defined as a sense of partisan 
solidarity in point of prestige1 and    
sufficient argument has been spent in   
confirming the definition and showing   
its implications4 ,with the passing of  

all occasion for a partisan spirit as   
touches the common good1 through        
coalescence of the parts between which  
partisan discrepancies have hitherto    
been kept up1 there would also have     
passed all legitimate occasion for or   
provocation to an intoxication of       
invidious prestige on national          
lines1--and there is no prestige that is
 not of an invidious nature1 that being1
 indeed1 the whole of its nature4 ,he   
would have to be a person of            
praeternatural patriotic sensibilities  
who could fall into an emotional state  
by reason of the national prestige of   
such a coalition commonwealth as would  
be made up1 e4g41 of the ,french and    
,english-speaking peoples1 together with
 those other neutrally and peaceably    
inclined ,european communities that are 
of a sufficiently mature order to have  
abjured dynastic ambitions of dominion1 
and perhaps including the ,chinese      
people as well4 ,such a coalition may   
now fairly be said to be within speaking

 distance1 and with its consummation1   
even in the inchoate shape of a         
defensive league of neutrals1 the       
eventual abeyance of that national      
allegiance and national honour that     
bulks so large in the repertory of      
current eloquence would also come in    
prospect4  ,all this is by no means     
saying that love of country1 and of use 
and wont as it runs in one's home area  
and among one's own people1 would suffer
 decay1 or even abatement4 ,the         
provocation to nostalgia would          
presumably be as good as ever4 ,it is   
even conceivable that under such a      
7contemplated7 rgime of unconditional   
security1 attachment to one's own       
habitat and social circumstances might  
grow to something more than is commonly 
seen in the precarious situation in     
which the chances of a quiet life are   
placed today4 ,but nostalgia is not a   
bellicose distemper1 nor does it make   
for gratuitous disturbance of peaceable 
alien peoples2 neither is it the spirit 

in which men lend themselves to warlike 
enterprise looking to profitless        
dominion abroad4 ,men make patriotic    
sacrifices of life and substance in     
spite of home-sickness rather than by   
virtue of it4         99       99       
99       99       99  ,the aim of this  
long digression has been to show that   
patriotism1 of that bellicose kind that 
seeks satisfaction in inflicting damage 
and discomfort on the people of other   
nations1 is not of the essence of human 
life2 that it is of the nature of habit1
 induced by circumstances in the past   
and handed on by tradition and          
institutional arrangements into the     
present2 and that men can1 without      
mutilation1 divest themselves of it1 or 
perhaps rather be divested of it by     
force of circumstances which will set   
the current of habituation the contrary 
way4  ,the change of habituation        
necessary to bring about such a decay of
 the bellicose national spirit would    
appear to be of a negative order1 at    

least in the main4 ,it would be an      
habituation to unconditional peace and  
security2 in other words1 to the absence
 of provocation1 rather than a coercive 
training away from the bellicose temper4
 ,this bellicose temper1 as it affects  
men collectively1 appears to be an      
acquired trait2 and it should logically 
disappear in time in the absence of     
those conditions by impact of which it  
has been acquired4 ,such obsolescence of
 patriotism1 however1 would not         
therefore come about abruptly or        
swiftly1 since the patriotic spirit has 
by past use and wont1 and by past       
indoctrination1 been so thoroughly      
worked into the texture of the          
institutional fabric and into the       
commonsense taste and morality1 that its
 effectual obsolescence will involve a  
somewhat comprehensive displacement and 
mutation throughout the range of        
institutions and popular conceits that  
have been handed down4 ,and             
institutional changes take time1 being  

creations of habit4 ,yet1 again1 there  
is the qualification to this last1 that 
since the change in question appears to 
be a matter1 not of acquiring a habit   
and confirming it in the shape of an    
article of general use and wont1 but of 
forgetting what once was learned1 the   
time and experience to be allowed for   
its decay need logically not equal that 
required for its acquirement1 either in 
point of duration or in point of the    
strictness of discipline necessary to   
inculcate it4  ,while the spirit of     
nationalism is such an acquired trait1  
and while it should therefore follow    
that the chief agency in divesting men  
of it must be disuse of the discipline  
out of which it has arisen1 yet a       
positive1 and even something of a       
drastic discipline to the contrary      
effect need not be altogether           
ineffectual in bringing about its       
obsolescence4 ,the case of the ,chinese 
people seems to argue something of the  
sort4 ,not that the ,chinese are simply 

and neutrally unpatriotic2 they appear  
also to be well charged with disloyalty 
to their alien rulers4 ,but along with a
 sense of being on the defensive in     
their common concerns1 there is also the
 fact that they appear not to be        
appreciably patriotic in the proper     
sense2 they are not greatly moved by a  
spirit of nationality4 ,and this failure
 of the national spirit among them can  
scarcely be set down to a neutral disuse
 of that discipline which has on the    
other hand induced a militant           
nationalism in the peoples of           
,christendom2 it should seem more       
probable1 at least1 that this relative  
absence of a national ambition is       
traceable in good part to its having    
been positively bred out of them by the 
stern repression of all such aspirations
 under the autocratic rule of their     
alien masters4         99       99      
99       99       99  ,peace on terms of
 submission and non-resistance to the   
ordinary exactions and rulings of those 

,imperial authorities to whom such      
submission may become necessary1 then1  
will be contingent on the virtual       
abeyance of the spirit of national pride
 in the peoples who so are to come under
 ,imperial rule4 ,a sufficient1 by no   
means necessarily a total1 elimination  
or decadence of this proclivity will be 
the condition precedent of any          
practicable scheme for a general peace  
on this footing4 ,how large an allowance
 of such animus these prospectively     
subject peoples might still carry1      
without thereby assuring the defeat of  
any such plan1 would in great measure   
depend on the degree of clemency or     
rigor with which the superior authority 
might enforce its rule4 ,it is not that 
a peace plan of this nature need        
precisely be considered to fall outside 
the limits of possibility1 on account of
 this necessary condition1 but it is at 
the best a manifestly doubtful matter4  
,advocates of a negotiated peace should 
not fail to keep in mind and make public

 that the plan which they advocate      
carries with it1 as a sequel or         
secondary phase1 such an unconditional  
surrender and a consequent rgime of     
non-resistance1 and that there still is 
grave doubt whether the peoples of these
 ,western nations are at present in a   
sufficiently tolerant frame of mind1 or 
can in the calculable future come in for
 such a tolerantly neutral attitude in  
point of national pride1 as to submit in
 any passable fashion to any alien      
,imperial rule4  ,if the spiritual      
difficulty presented by this prevalent  
spirit of national pride--sufficiently  
stubborn still1 however inane a conceit 
it may seem on sober reflection--if this
 animus of factional insubordination    
could be overcome or in some passable   
measure be conciliated or abated1 there 
is much to be said in favor of such a   
plan of peaceable submission to an      
extraneous and arbitrary authority1 and 
therefore also for that plan of         
negotiated peace by means of which      

events would be put in train for its    
realisation4  ,any passably             
dispassionate consideration of the      
projected rgime will come unavoidably to
 the conclusion that the prospectively  
subject peoples should have no          
legitimate apprehension of loss or      
disadvantage in the material respect4   
,it is1 of course1 easy for an          
unreflecting person to jump to the      
conclusion that subjection to an alien  
power must bring grievous burdens1 in   
the way of taxes and similar            
impositions4 ,but reflection will       
immediately show that no appreciable    
increase1 over the economic burdens     
already carried by the populace under   
their several national establishments1  
could come of such a move4  ,as bearing 
on this question it is well to call to  
mind that the contemplated imperial     
dominion is designed to be very         
wide-reaching and with very ample       
powers4 ,its nearest historical         
analogue1 of course1 is the ,roman      

imperial dominion--in the days of the   
,antonines--and that the nearest        
analogue to the projected ,german peace 
is the ,roman peace1 in the days of its 
best security4 ,there is every warrant  
for the presumption that the            
contemplated ,imperial dominion is to be
 substantially all-inclusive4 ,indeed   
there is no stopping place for the      
projected enterprise short of an        
all-inclusive dominion4 ,and there will 
consequently be no really menacing      
outside power to be provided against4   
,consequently there will be but little  
provision necessary for the common      
defense1 as compared1 e4g41 with the    
aggregate of such provision found       
necessary for self-defense on the part  
of the existing nations acting in       
severalty and each jealously guarding   
its own national integrity4 ,indeed1    
compared with the burden of competitive 
armament to which the peoples of ,europe
 have been accustomed1 the need of any  
armed force under the new rgime should  

be an inconsiderable matter1 even when  
there is added to the necessary modicum 
of defensive preparation the more       
imperative and weightier provision of   
force with which to keep the peace at   
home4  ,into the composition of this    
necessary modicum of armed force slight 
if any contingents of men would be drawn
 from the subject peoples1 for the      
reason that no great numbers would be   
needed2 as also because no devoted      
loyalty to the dynasty could reasonably 
be looked for among them1 even if no    
positive insecurity were felt to be     
involved in their employment4 ,on this  
head the projected scheme unambiguously 
commends itself as a measure of economy1
 both in respect of the pecuniary       
burdens demanded and as regards the     
personal annoyance of military service4 
,as a further count1 it is to be        
presumed that the burden of the         
,imperial government and its            
bureaucratic administration--what would 
be called the cost of maintenance and   

repairs of the dynastic establishment   
and its apparatus of control--would be  
borne by the subject peoples4 ,here     
again one is warranted in looking for a 
substantial economy to be effected by   
such a centralised authority1 and a     
consequent lighter aggregate burden on  
the subjects4 ,doubtless1 the overhead  
charges would not be reduced to their   
practicable minimum4 ,such a            
governmental establishment1 with its    
bureaucratic personnel1 its civil list  
and its privileged classes1 would not be
 conducted on anything like a           
parsimonious footing4 ,there is no      
reason to apprehend any touch of modesty
 in the exactions of such a dynastic    
establishment for itself or in behalf of
 its underlying hierarchy of gentlefolk4
  ,there is also to be counted in1 in   
the concrete instance on which the      
argument here turns1 a more or less     
considerable burden of contributions    
toward the maintenance and augmentation 
of that culture that has been the topic 

of so many encomiums4 ,at this point it 
should be recalled that it is the       
pattern of ,periclean ,athens that is   
continually in mind in these encomiums4 
,which brings up1 in this immediate     
connection1 the dealings of ,periclean  
,athens with the funds of the ,league1  
and the source as well as the           
destination of these surplus funds4 ,out
 of it all came the works on the        
,acropolis1 together with much else of  
intellectual and artistic life that     
converged upon and radiated from this   
,athenian center of culture4 ,the vista 
of ,denkmler that so opens to the vision
 of a courageous fancy is in itself such
 a substance of things hoped for as     
should stir the heart of all humane     
persons4#h ,the cost of this subvention 
of ,culture would doubtless be          
appreciable1 but those grave men who    
have spent most thought on this         
prospective cultural gain to be had from
 the projected ,imperial rule appear to 
entertain no doubt as to its being worth

 all that it would cost4  ,footnote #h3 
,denk 'mall  ,any one who is inclined to
 rate the prospective pecuniary costs   
and losses high would doubtless be able 
to find various and sundry items of     
minor importance to add to this short   
list of general categories on the side  
of cost2 but such additional items1 not 
fairly to be included under these       
general captions1 would after all be of 
minor importance1 in the aggregate or in
 detail1 and would not appreciably      
affect the grand balance of pecuniary   
profit and loss to be taken account of  
in any appraisal of the projected       
,imperial rgime4 ,there should evidently
 be little ground to apprehend that its 
installation would entail a net loss or 
a net increase of pecuniary burdens4    
,there is1 of course1 the ill-defined   
and scarcely definable item of          
expenditure under the general head of   
,gentility1 ,dignity1 ,distinction1     
,magnificence1 or whatever term may seem
 suitable to designate that consumption 

of goods and services that goes to      
maintain the high repute of the ,court  
and to keep the underlying gentlefolk in
 countenance4 ,in its pecuniary         
incidence this line of 7necessary7      
expenditure belongs under the rubric of 
,conspicuous ,waste2 and one will always
 have to face the disquieting           
flexibility of this item of expenditure4
 ,the consumptive demand of this kind is
 in an eminent degree indefinitely      
extensible1 as the phrasing of the      
economists would have it1 and as various
 historical instances of courtly        
splendor and fashionable magnificence   
will abundantly substantiate4 ,there is 
a constant proclivity to advance this   
conventional standard of living to the  
limit set by the available means2 and   
yet these conventional necessities will 
ordinarily not1 in the aggregate1 take  
up all the available means2 although now
 and again1 as under the ,ancien ,rgime1
 and perhaps in ,imperial ,rome1 the    
standard of splendid living may also    

exceed the current means in hand and    
lead to impoverishment of the underlying
 community4  ,an analysis of the        
circumstances governing this flexibility
 of the conventional standard of living 
and of pecuniary magnificence can not be
 gone into here4 ,in the case under     
consideration it will have to be left as
 an indeterminate but considerable item 
in the burden of cost which the         
projected ,imperial rule may be counted 
on to impose on the underlying peoples4 
,the cost of the ,imperial court1       
nobility1 and civil service1 therefore1 
would be a matter of estimate1 on which 
no close agreement would be expected2   
and yet1 here as in an earlier          
connection1 it seems a reasonable       
expectation that sufficient dignity and 
magnificence could be put in evidence by
 such a large-scale establishment at a  
lower aggregate cost than the aggregate 
of expenditures previously incurred for 
the like ends by various nations working
 in severalty and at cross purposes4    

,doubtless it would be altogether a     
mistaken view of this production of     
dignity by means of a lavish expenditure
 on superfluities1 to believe that the  
same principle of economy should apply  
here as was found applicable in the     
matter of armament for defense4 ,with   
the installation of a collective        
national establishment1 to include      
substantially all the previously        
competing nations1 the need of defensive
 armament should in all reason decline  
to something very inconsiderable indeed4
 ,but it would be hasty to conclude that
 with the coalescence of these nations  
under one paramount control the need of 
creating notoriety and prestige for this
 resulting central establishment by the 
consumption of decorative superfluities 
would likewise decline4 ,the need of    
such dignity and magnificence is only in
 part1 perhaps a minor part1 of a       
defensive character4 ,for the greater   
part1 no doubt1 the motive to this      
conspicuously wasteful consumption is   

personal vanity1 in ,imperial policy as 
well as in the private life of          
fashion1--or perhaps one should more    
deferentially say that it is a certain  
range of considerations which would be  
identified as personal vanity in case   
they were met with among men beneath the
 ,imperial level4 ,and so far as the    
creation of this form of good-will by   
this manner of advertising is traceable 
to such1 or equivalent1 motives of a    
personal incidence1 the provocation to  
economy along this line would presumably
 not be a notable factor in the case4   
,and one returns perforce to the        
principle already spoken of above1 that 
the consumptive need of superfluities is
 indefinitely extensible1 with the      
resulting inference that nothing        
conclusive is to be said as to the      
prospective magnitude of this item in   
the ,imperial bill of expense1 or of the
 consequent pecuniary burdens which it  
would impose on the underlying peoples4 
99       99       99       99       99  

,so far the argument has run on the     
pecuniary incidence of this projected   
,imperial dominion as it falls on the   
underlying community as a whole1 with no
 attempt to discriminate between the    
divergent interests of the different    
classes and conditions of men that go to
 make up any modern community4 ,the     
question in hand is a question of       
pecuniary burdens1 and therefore of the 
pecuniary interests of these several    
distinguishable classes or conditions of
 men4 ,in all these modern nations that 
now stand in the article of decision    
between peace by submission or a        
doubtful and melancholy alternative1--in
 all of them men are by statute and     
custom inviolably equal before the law1 
of course2 they are ungraded and        
masterless men before the law4 ,but     
these same peoples are also alike in the
 respect that pecuniary duties and      
obligations among them are similarly    
sacred and inviolable under the         
dispassionate findings of the law4 ,this

 pecuniary equality is1 in effect1 an   
impersonal equality between pecuniary   
magnitudes2 from which it follows that  
these citizens of the advanced nations  
are not ungraded men in the pecuniary   
respect2 nor are they masterless1 in so 
far as a greater pecuniary force will   
always1 under this impersonal equality  
of the law1 stand in a relation of      
mastery toward a lesser one4  ,class    
distinctions1 except pecuniary          
distinctions1 have fallen away4 ,but all
 these modern nations are made up of    
pecuniary classes1 differing from one   
another by minute gradations in the     
marginal cases1 but falling1 after all1 
and in the large1 into two broadly and  
securely distinguishable pecuniary      
categories3 those who have more and     
those who have less4 ,statisticians have
 been at pains to ascertain that a      
relatively very small numerical minority
 of the citizens in these modern nations
 own all but a relatively very small    
proportion of the aggregate wealth in   

the country4 ,so that it appears quite  
safe to say that in such a country as   
,america1 e4g41 something less than ten 
percent of the inhabitants own something
 more than ninety percent of the        
country's wealth4 ,it would scarcely be 
a wild overstraining of its practical   
meaning to say that this population is  
made up of two classes3 those who own   
the country's wealth1 and those who do  
not4 ,in strict accuracy1 as before the 
law1 this characterisation will not     
hold2 whereas in practical effect1 it is
 a sufficiently close approximation4    
,this latter class1 who have            
substantially no other than a fancied   
pecuniary interest in the nation's      
material fortunes1 are the category     
often spoken of as ,the ,common ,man4   
,it is not necessary1 nor is it desired1
 to find a corresponding designation for
 the other category1 those who own4     
,the articulate recognition of this     
division into contrasted pecuniary      
classes or conditions1 with             

correspondingly 7at least potentially7  
divergent pecuniary interests1 need     
imply no degree of approval or          
disapproval of the arrangement which is 
so recognised4 ,the recognition of it is
 necessary to a perspicuous control of  
the argument1 as bears on the possible  
systematic and inherent discrepancy     
among these men in respect of their     
material interests under the projected  
,imperial rule4 ,substantially1 it is a 
distinction between those who have and  
those who have not1 and in a question of
 prospective pecuniary loss the man who 
has nothing to lose is differently      
placed from the one who has4 ,it would  
perhaps seem flippant1 and possibly     
lacking in the courtesy due one's       
prospective lord paramount1 to say with 
the poet1 ,cantabit vacuus coram latrone
 viator4  ,but the whole case is not so 
simple4 ,it is only so long as the      
projected pecuniary inroad is conceived 
as a simple sequestration of wealth in  
hand1 that such a characterisation can  

be made to serve4 ,the ,imperial aim is 
not a passing act of pillage1 but a     
perpetual usufruct2 and the whole       
question takes on a different and more  
complex shape when it so touches the    
enduring conditions of life and         
livelihood4 ,the citizen who has        
nothing1 or who has no capitalisable    
source of unearned income1 yet has a    
pecuniary interest in a livelihood to be
 gained from day to day1 and he is yet  
vulnerable in the pecuniary respect in  
that his livelihood may with the utmost 
facility be laid under contribution by  
various and sundry well-tried           
contrivances4 ,indeed1 the common man   
who depends for his livelihood on his   
daily earnings is in a more immediately 
precarious position than those who have 
something appreciable laid up against a 
rainy day1 in the shape of a capitalised
 source of income4 ,only that it is     
still doubtful if his position is       
precarious in such a fashion as to lay  
him open to a notable increase of       

hardship1 or to loss of the amenities of
 life1 in the same relative degree as   
his well-to-do neighbour4  ,in point of 
fact it may well be doubted if this     
common man has anything to apprehend in 
the way of added hardship or loss of    
creature comforts under the contemplated
 rgime of ,imperial tutelage4 ,he would 
presumably find himself in a precarious 
case under the arbitrary and            
irresponsible authority of an alien     
master working through an alien master  
class4 ,the doubt which presents itself 
is as to whether this common man would  
be more precariously placed1 or would   
come in for a larger and surer sum of   
hard usage and scant living1 under this 
projected order of things1 than what he 
already is exposed to in his pecuniary  
relations with his well-to-do           
compatriots under the current system of 
law and order4  ,under this current     
rgime of law and order1 according to the
 equitable principles of ,natural       
,rights1 the man without means has no   

pecuniary rights which his well-to-do   
pecuniary master is bound to respect4   
,this may have been an unintended1 as it
 doubtless was an unforeseen1 outcome of
 the move out of feudalism and          
prescriptive rights and immunities1 into
 the system of individual liberty and   
manhood franchise2 but as commonly      
happens in case of any substantial      
change in the scheme of institutional   
arrangements1 unforeseen consequences   
come in along with those that have been 
intended4 ,in that period of history    
when ,western ,europe was gathering that
 experience out of which the current    
habitual scheme of law and order has    
come1 the right of property and free    
contract was a complement and safeguard 
to that individual initiative and       
masterless equality of men for which the
 spokesmen of the new era contended4    
,that it is no longer so at every turn1 
or even in the main1 in later time1 is  
in great part due to changes of the     
pecuniary order1 that have come on since

 then1 and that seem not to have cast   
their shadow before4  ,in all good      
faith1 and with none but inconsequential
 reservations1 the material fortunes of 
modern civilised men--together with much
 else--have so been placed on a         
pecuniary footing1 with little to       
safeguard them at any point except the  
inalienable right of pecuniary          
self-direction and initiative1 in an    
environment where virtually all the     
indispensable means of pecuniary        
self-direction and initiative are in the
 hands of that contracted category of   
owners spoken of above4 ,a numerical    
minority--under ten percent of the      
population--constitutes a conclusive    
pecuniary majority--over ninety percent 
of the means--under a system of law and 
order that turns on the inalienable     
right of owners to dispose of the means 
in hand as may suit their convenience   
and profit1--always barring recourse to 
illegal force or fraud4 ,there is1      
however1 a very appreciable margin of   

legal recourse to force and of legally  
protected fraud available in case of    
need4 ,of course the expedients here    
referred to as legally available force  
and fraud in the defense of pecuniary   
rights and the pursuit of pecuniary gain
 are not force and fraud de jure but    
only de facto4 ,they are further1 and   
well known1 illustrations of how the    
ulterior consequences of given          
institutional arrangements and given    
conventionalised principles 7habits of  
thought7 of conduct may in time come to 
run at cross purposes with the initial  
purpose that led to the acceptance of   
these institutions and to the           
confirmation and standardisation of     
these habitual norms of conduct4 ,for   
the time being1 however1 they are       
fundamentally and eternally right and   
good4  ,being a pecuniary majority--what
 may be called a majority of the        
corporate stock--of the nation1 it is   
also fundamentally and eternally right  
and good that the pecuniary interests of

 the owners of the material means of    
life should rule unabated in all those  
matters of public policy that touch on  
the material fortunes of the community  
at large4 ,barring a slight and         
intermittent mutter of discontent1 this 
arrangement has also the cordial        
approval of popular sentiment in these  
modern democratic nations4 ,one need    
only recall the paramount importance    
which is popularly attached to the      
maintenance and extension of the        
nation's trade--for the use of the      
investors--or the perpetuation of a     
protective tariff--for the use of the   
protected business concerns--or1 again1 
the scrupulous regard with which such a 
body of public servants as the          
,interstate ,commerce ,commission will  
safeguard the legitimate claim of the   
railway companies to a reasonable rate  
of earnings on the capitalised value of 
the presumed earning-capacity of their  
property4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,again1 in view of the     

unaccustomed freedom with which it is   
here necessary to speak of these        
delicate matters1 it may be in place to 
disclaim all intention to criticise the 
established arrangements on their merits
 as details of public policy4 ,all that 
comes in question here1 touching these  
and the like features of the established
 law and order1 is the bearing of all   
this on the material fortunes of the    
common man under the current rgime1 as  
contrasted with what he would reasonably
 have to look for under the projected   
rgime of ,imperial tutelage that would  
come in1 consequent upon this national  
surrender to ,imperial dominion4        
99       99       99       99       99  
,in these democratic countries public   
policy is guided primarily by           
considerations of business expediency1  
and the administration1 as well as the  
legislative power1 is in the hands of   
businessmen1 chosen avowedly on the     
ground of their businesslike principles 
and ability4 ,there is no power in such 

a community that can over-rule the      
exigencies of business1 nor would       
popular sentiment countenance any       
exercise of power that should traverse  
these exigencies1 or that would act to  
restrain trade or discourage the pursuit
 of gain4 ,an apparent exception to the 
rule occurs in wartime1 when military   
exigencies may over-rule the current    
demands of business traffic2 but the    
exception is in great part only         
apparent1 in that the warlike operations
 are undertaken in whole or in part with
 a view to the protection or extension  
of business traffic4  ,national         
surveillance and regulation of business 
traffic in these countries hitherto1    
ever since and in so far as the modern  
democratic order of things has taken    
effect1 has uniformly been of the nature
 of interference with trade and         
investment in behalf of the nation's    
mercantile community at large1 as seen  
in port and shipping regulations and in 
the consular service1 or in behalf of   

particular favored groups or classes of 
business concerns1 as in protective     
tariffs and subsidies4 ,in all this     
national management of pecuniary        
affairs1 under modern democratic        
principles1 the common man comes into   
the case only as raw material of        
business traffic1--as consumer or as    
laborer4 ,he is one of the industrial   
agencies by use of which the businessman
 who employs him supplies himself with  
goods for the market1 or he is one of   
the units of consumptive demand that    
make up this market in which the        
business man sells his goods1 and so    
realises on his investment4 ,he is1 of  
course1 free1 under modern principles of
 the democratic order1 to deal or not to
 deal with this business community1     
whether as laborer or as consumer1 or as
 small-scale producer engaged in        
purveying materials or services on terms
 defined by the community of business   
interests engaged on so large a scale as
 to count in their determination4 ,that 

is to say1 he is free de jure to take or
 leave the terms offered4 ,de facto he  
is only free to take them--with         
inconsequential exceptions--the         
alternative being obsolescence by       
disuse1 not to choose a harsher name for
 a distasteful eventuality4  ,the       
general ground on which the business    
system1 as it works under the           
over-ruling exigencies of the so-called 
big business1 so defines the terms of   
life for the common man1 who works and  
buys1 is the ground afforded by the     
principle of charging what the traffic  
will bear2 that is to say1 fixing the   
terms of hiring1 buying and selling at  
such a figure as will yield the largest 
net return to the business concerns in  
whom1 collectively or in severalty1 the 
discretion vests4 ,discretion in these  
premises does not vest in any business  
concern that does not articulate with   
the system of big business1 or that does
 not dispose of resources sufficient to 
make it a formidable member of the      

system4 ,whether these concerns act in  
severalty or by collusion and           
conspiracy1 in so defining the pecuniary
 terms of life for the community at     
large1 is substantially an idle         
question1 so far as bears on the        
material interest of the common man4    
,the base-line is still what the traffic
 will bear1 and it is still adhered to1 
so nearly as the human infirmity of the 
discretionary captains of industry will 
admit1 whether the due approximation to 
this base-line is reached by a process  
of competitive bidding or by collusive  
advisement4  ,the generalisation so     
offered1 touching the material          
conditions of life for the common man   
under the modern rule of big business1  
may seem unwarrantably broad4 ,it may be
 worth while to take note of more than  
one point in qualification of it1       
chiefly to avoid the appearance of      
having overlooked any of the material   
circumstances of the case4 ,the system  
of large business1 working its material 

consequences through the system of      
large-scale industry1 but more          
particularly by way of the large-scale  
and wide-reaching business of trade in  
the proper sense1 draws into the net of 
its control all parts of the community  
and all its inhabitants1 in some degree 
of dependence4 ,but there is always1    
hitherto1 an appreciable fraction of the
 inhabitants--as1 e4g41 outlying        
agricultural sections that are in a     
backward state--who are by no means     
closely bound in the orderly system of  
business1 or closely dependent on the   
markets4 ,they may be said to enjoy a   
degree of independence1 by virtue of    
their foregoing as much as may be of the
 advantages offered by modern industrial
 specialisation4 ,so also there are the 
minor and interstitial trades that are  
still carried on by handicraft methods2 
these1 too1 are still somewhat loosely  
held in the fabric of the business      
system4 ,there is one thing and another 
in this way to be taken account of in   

any exhaustive survey1 but the          
accounting for them will after all      
amount to nothing better than a gleaning
 of remnants and partial exceptions1    
such as will in no material degree      
derange the general proposition in hand4
  ,again1 there runs through the length 
and breadth of this business community a
 certain measure of incompetence or     
inefficiency of management1 as seen from
 the point of view of the conceivable   
perfect working of the system as a      
whole4 ,it may be due to a slack        
attention here and there2 or to the     
exigencies of business strategy which   
may constrain given business concerns to
 an occasional attitude of watchful     
waiting in the hope of catching a rival 
off his guard2 or to a lack of perfect  
mutual understanding among the          
discretionary businessmen1 due sometimes
 to an over-careful guarding of trade   
secrets or advance information2 or1 as  
also happens1 and quite excusably1 to a 
lack of perfect mutual confidence among 

these businessmen1 as to one another's  
entire good faith or good-will4 ,the    
system is after all a competitive one1  
in the sense that each of the           
discretionary directors of business is  
working for his own pecuniary gain1     
whether in cooperation with his fellows 
or not4 ,an honest man will bear        
watching4 ,as in other collusive        
organisations for gain1 confederates are
 apt to fall out when it comes to a     
division of what is in hand4 ,in one way
 and another the system is beset with   
inherent infirmities1 which hinder its  
perfect work2 and in so far it will fall
 short of the full realisation of that  
rule of business that inculcates        
charging what the traffic will bear1 and
 also in so far the pressure which the  
modern system of business management    
brings to bear on the common man will   
also fall short of the last             
straw--perhaps even of the              
next-to-the-last4 ,again it turns out to
 be a question not of the failure of the

 general proposition as formulated1 but 
rather as to the closeness of           
approximation to its theoretically      
perfect work4 ,it may be remarked by the
 way that vigilant and impartial        
surveillance of this system of business 
enterprise by an external authority     
interested only in aggregate results1   
rather than in the differential gains of
 the interested individuals1 might      
hopefully be counted on to correct some 
of these shortcomings which the system  
shows when running loose under the      
guidance of its own multifarious        
incentives4  ,on the opposite side of   
the account1 it is also worth noting    
that1 while modern business management  
may now and again fall short of what the
 traffic will bear1 it happens more     
commonly that its exactions will exceed 
that limit4 ,this will particularly be  
true in businessmen's dealings with     
hired labour1 as also and perhaps with  
equally far-reaching consequences in an 
excessive recourse to sophistications   

and adulterants and an excessively      
parsimonious provision for the safety1  
health or comfort of their              
customers--as1 e4g41 in passenger       
traffic by rail1 water or tramway4 ,the 
discrepancy to which attention is       
invited here is due to a discrepancy    
between business expediency1 that is    
expediency for the purpose of gain by a 
given businessman1 on the one hand1 and 
serviceability to the common good1 on   
the other hand4 ,the business concern's 
interest in the traffic in which it     
engages is a short-term interest1 or an 
interest in the short-term returns1 as  
contrasted with the long-term or        
enduring interest which the community at
 large has in the public service over   
which any such given business concern   
disposes4 ,the business incentive is    
that afforded by the prospective net    
pecuniary gain from the traffic1        
substantially an interest in profitable 
sales2 while the community at large1 or 
the common man that goes to make up such

 a community1 has a material interest in
 this traffic only as regards the       
services rendered and the enduring      
effects that follow from it4  ,the      
businessman has not1 or at least is     
commonly not influenced by1 any interest
 in the ulterior consequences of the    
transactions in which he is immediately 
engaged4 ,this appears to hold true in  
an accentuated degree in the domain of  
that large-scale business that draws its
 gains from the large-scale modern      
industry and is managed on the modern   
footing of corporation finance4 ,this   
modern fashion of business organisation 
and management apparently has led to a  
substantial shortening of the term over 
which any given investor maintains an   
effective interest in any given         
corporate enterprise1 in which his      
investments may be placed for the time  
being4 ,with the current practice of    
organising industrial and mercantile    
enterprises on a basis of vendible      
securities1 and with the nearly complete

 exemption from personal responsibility 
and enduring personal attachment to any 
one corporate enterprise which this     
financial expedient has brought1 it has 
come about that in the common run of    
cases the investor1 as well as the      
directorate1 in any given enterprise1   
has an interest only for the time being4
 ,the average term over which it is     
7pecuniarily7 incumbent on the modern   
businessman to take account of the      
working of any given enterprise has     
shortened so far that the old-fashioned 
accountability1 that once was depended  
on to dictate a sane and considerate    
management with a view to permanent     
good-will1 has in great measure become  
inoperative4  ,by and large1 it seems   
unavoidable that the pecuniary interests
 of the businessmen on the one hand and 
the material interests of the community 
on the other hand are diverging in a    
more and more pronounced degree1 due to 
institutional circumstances over which  
no prompt control can be had without    

immediate violation of that scheme of   
personal rights in which the            
constitution of modern democratic       
society is grounded4 ,the quandary in   
which these communities find themselves1
 as an outcome of their entrance upon   
the simple and obvious system of        
,natural ,liberty1 is shown in a large  
and instructive way by what is called   
labor trouble1 and in a more recondite  
but no less convincing fashion by the   
fortunes of the individual workman under
 the modern system4  ,the cost of       
production of a modern workman has      
constantly increased1 with the advance  
of the industrial arts4 ,the period of  
preparation1 of education and training1 
necessary to turn out competent workmen1
 has been increasing2 and the period of 
full workmanlike efficiency has been    
shortening1 in those industries that    
employ the delicate and exacting        
processes of the modern technology4 ,the
 shortening of this working-life of the 
workman is due both to a lengthening of 

the necessary period of preparation1 and
 to the demand of these processes for so
 full a use of the workman's forces that
 even the beginning of senescence will  
count as a serious disability1--in many 
occupations as a fatal disability4 ,it  
is also a well ascertained fact that    
effectual old age will be brought on at 
an earlier period by overwork2 overwork 
shortens the working life-time of the   
workman4 ,thorough speeding-up          
7,scientific ,management87 will unduly  
shorten this working life-time1 and so  
it may1 somewhat readily1 result in an  
uneconomical consumption of the         
community's man-power1 by consuming the 
workmen at a higher rate of speed1 a    
higher pressure1 with a more rapid rate 
of deterioration1 than would give the   
largest net output of product per unit  
of man-power available1 or per unit of  
cost of production of such man-power4   
,on this head the guiding incentives of 
the businessman and the material        
interest of the community at large--not 

to speak of the selfish interest of the 
individual workman--are systematically  
at variance4 ,the cost of production of 
workmen does not fall on the business   
concern which employs them1 at least not
 in such definite fashion as to make it 
appear that the given business concern  
or businessman has a material interest  
in the economical consumption of the    
man-power embodied in this given body of
 employees4 ,some slight and exceptional
 qualification of this statement is to  
be noted1 in those cases where the      
processes in use are such as to require 
special training1 not to be had except  
by a working habituation to these       
processes in the particular industrial  
plant in question4 ,so far as such      
special training1 to be had only as     
employees of the given concern1 is a    
necessary part of the workman's         
equipment for this particular work1 so  
far the given employer bears a share and
 an interest in the cost of production  
of the workmen employed2 and so far1    

therefore1 the employer has also a      
pecuniary interest in the economical use
 of his employees2 which usually shows  
itself in the way of some special       
precautions being taken to prevent the  
departure of these workmen so long as   
there is a clear pecuniary loss involved
 in replacing them with men who have not
 yet had the special training required4 
,evidently this qualifying consideration
 covers no great proportion of the      
aggregate man-power consumed in         
industrial enterprises under business   
management4 ,and apart from the         
instances1 essentially exceptional1     
where such a special consideration comes
 in1 the businessmen in charge will1    
quite excusably as things go1 endeavour 
to consume the man-power of which they  
dispose in the persons of their         
employees1 not at the rate that would be
 most economical to the community at    
large1 in view of the cost of their     
replacement1 nor at such a rate as would
 best suit the taste or the viability of

 the particular workman1 but at such a  
rate as will yield the largest net      
pecuniary gain to the employer4  ,there 
is on record an illustrative1 and indeed
 an illustrious1 instance of such       
cannily gainful consumption of man-power
 carried out systematically and with    
consistently profitable effect in one of
 the staple industries of the country4  
,in this typical1 though exceptionally  
thoroughgoing and lucrative enterprise1 
the set rule of the management was1 to  
employ none but select workmen1 in each 
respective line of work2 to procure such
 select workmen and retain them by      
offering wages slightly over the        
ordinary standard2 to work them at the  
highest pace and pressure attainable    
with such a picked body2 and to         
discharge them on the first appearance  
of aging or of failing powers4 ,in the  
rules of the management was also        
included the negative proviso that the  
concern assumed no responsibility for   
the subsequent fortunes of discharged   

workmen1 in the way of pension1         
insurance or the like4  ,this enterprise
 was highly successful and exceedingly  
profitable1 even beyond the high average
 of profits among enterprises in the    
same line of business4 ,out of it came  
one of the greater and more illustrious 
fortunes that have been accumulated     
during the past century2 a fortune which
 has enabled one of the most impressive 
and most gracious of this generation's  
many impressive philanthropists1 never  
weary in well-doing2 but who1 through   
this cannily gainful consumption of     
man-power1 has been placed in the       
singular position of being unable1 in   
spite of avowedly unremitting endeavour1
 to push his continued disbursements in 
the service of humanity up to the figure
 of his current income4 ,the case in    
question is one of the most meritorious 
known to the records of modern business1
 and while it will conveniently serve to
 illustrate many an other1 and perhaps  
more consequential truth come to        

realisation in the march of ,triumphant 
,democracy1 it will also serve to show  
the gainfulness of an unreservedly canny
 consumption of man-power with an eye   
single to one's own net gain in terms of
 money4         99       99       99    
99       99  ,evidently this is a point 
in the articulation of the modern       
economic system where a sufficiently    
ruthless outside authority1 not actuated
 by a primary regard for the pecuniary  
interests of the employers1 might       
conceivably with good effect enforce a  
more economical consumption of the      
country's man-power4 ,it is not a matter
 on which one prefers to dwell1 but it  
can do no harm to take note of the fact 
for once in a way1 that these several   
national establishments of the          
democratic order1 as they are now       
organised and administered1 do somewhat 
uniformly and pervasively operate with  
an effectual view to the advantage of a 
class1 so far as may plausibly be done4 
,they are controlled by and administered

 in behalf of those elements of the     
population that1 for the purpose in     
hand1 make up a single loose-knit       
class1--the class that lives by income  
rather than by work4 ,it may be called  
the class of the business interests1 or 
of capital1 or of gentlemen4 ,it all    
comes to much the same1 for the purpose 
in hand4  ,the point in speaking of this
 contingent whose place in the economy  
of human affairs it is to consume1 or to
 own1 or to pursue a margin of profit1  
is simply that of contrasting this      
composite human contingent with the     
common man2 whose numbers account for   
some nine-tenths or more of the         
community1 while his class accounts for 
something less than one-tenth of the    
invested wealth1 and appreciably less   
than that proportion of the             
discretionary national                  
establishment1--the government1 national
 or local1 courts1 attorneys1 civil     
service1 diplomatic and consular1       
military and naval4 ,the arrangement may

 be called a gentlemen's government1 if 
one would rather have it that way2 but a
 gentleman is necessarily one who lives 
on free income from invested            
wealth--without such a source of free1  
that is to say unearned1 income he      
becomes a decayed gentleman4 ,again1    
pushing the phrasing back a step farther
 toward the ground facts1 there are     
those who would speak of the current    
establishments as capitalistic2 but this
 term is out of line in that it fails to
 touch the human element in the case1   
and institutions1 such as governmental  
establishments and their functioning1   
are after all nothing but the accustomed
 ways and means of human behaviour2 so  
that capitalistic becomes a synonym for 
businessmen's government so soon as it  
is designated in terms of the driving   
incentives and the personnel4 ,it is an 
organisation had with a view to the     
needs of business 7i4e4 pecuniary7      
enterprise1 and is made up of           
businessmen and gentlemen1 which comes  

to much the same1 since a gentleman is  
only a businessman in the second or some
 later generation4 ,except for the      
slightly odious suggestion carried by   
the phrase1 one might aptly say that the
 gentleman1 in this bearing1 is only a  
businessman gone to seed4  ,by and      
large1 and taking the matter naively at 
the simple face value of the material   
gain or loss involved1 it should seem   
something of an idle question to the    
common man whether his collective       
affairs are to be managed by a home-bred
 line of businessmen and their          
successive filial generations of        
gentlemen1 with a view to accelerate the
 velocity and increase the volume of    
competitive gain and competitive        
spending1 on the one hand1 or by an     
alien line of officials1 equally aloof  
from his common interests1 and managing 
affairs with a view to the usufruct of  
his productive powers in furtherance of 
the ,imperial dominion4  ,not that the  
good faith or the generous intentions of

 these governments of gentlemen is      
questioned or is in any degree          
questionable2 what is here spoken of is 
only the practical effect of the        
policies which they pursue1 doubtless   
with benevolent intentions and          
well-placed complacency4 ,in effect1    
things being as they are today in the   
civilised world's industry and trade1 it
 happens1 as in some sort an unintended 
but all-inclusive accident1 that the    
guidance of affairs by business         
principles works at cross purposes with 
the material interests of the common    
man4  ,so ungraceful a view of the      
sacred core of this modern democratic   
organisation will need whatever evidence
 can be cited to keep it in countenance4
 ,therefore indulgence is desired for   
one further count in this distasteful   
recital of ineptitudes inherent in this 
institutional scheme of civilised life4 
,this count comes under the head of what
 may be called capitalistic sabotage4   
,sabotage is employed to designate a    

wilful retardation1 interruption or     
obstruction of industry by peaceable1   
and ordinarily by legally defensible1   
measures4 ,in its present application1  
particularly1 there is no design to let 
the term denote or insinuate a recourse 
to any expedients or any line of conduct
 that is in any degree legally dubious1 
or that is even of questionable         
legitimacy4  ,sabotage so understood1 as
 not comprising recourse to force or    
fraud1 is a necessary and staple        
expedient of business management1 and   
its employment is grounded in the       
elementary and indefeasible rights of   
ownership4 ,it is simply that the       
businessman1 like any other owner1 is   
vested with the right freely to use or  
not to use his property for any given   
purpose4 ,his decision1 for reasons of  
his own1 not to employ the property at  
his disposal in a particular way at a   
particular time1 is well and blamelessly
 within his legitimate discretion1 under
 the rights of property as universally  

accepted and defended by modern nations4
 ,in the particular instance of the     
,american nation he is protected in this
 right by a constitutional provision    
that he must not be deprived of his     
property without due process of law4    
,when the property at his disposal is in
 the shape of industrial plant or       
industrial material1 means of           
transportation or stock of goods        
awaiting distribution1 then his decision
 not to employ this property1 or to     
limit its use to something less than    
full capacity1 in the way for which it  
is adapted1 becomes sabotage1 normally  
and with negligible exceptions4 ,in so  
doing he hinders1 retards or obstructs  
the working of the country's industrial 
forces by so much4 ,it is a matter of   
course and of absolute necessity to the 
conduct of business1 that any           
discretionary businessman must be free  
to deal or not to deal in any given     
case2 to limit or to withhold the       
equipment under his control1 without    

reservation4 ,business discretion and   
business strategy1 in fact1 has no other
 means by which to work out its aims4   
,so that1 in effect1 all business       
sagacity reduces itself in the last     
analysis to a judicious use of sabotage4
 ,under modern conditions of large      
business1 particularly1 the relation of 
the discretionary businessman to        
industry is that of authoritative       
permission and of authoritative         
limitation or stoppage1 and on his      
shrewd use of this authority depends the
 gainfulness of his enterprise4  ,if    
this authority were exercised with an   
eye single to the largest and most      
serviceable output of goods and         
services1 or to the most economical use 
of the country's material resources and 
man-power1 regardless of pecuniary      
consequences1 the course of management  
so carried out would be not sabotage but
 industrial strategy4 ,but business is  
carried on for pecuniary gain1 not with 
an unreserved view to the largest and   

most serviceable output or to the       
economical use of resources4 ,the volume
 and serviceability of the output must  
wait unreservedly on the very particular
 pecuniary question of what quantity and
 what degree of serviceability will     
yield the largest net return in terms of
 price4 ,uneconomical use of equipment1 
labor and resources is necessarily an   
everyday matter under these             
circumstances1 as in the duplication of 
plant and processes between rival       
concerns1 and in the wasteful use of all
 resources that do not involve          
expenditure on the part of the given    
concern4  ,it has been the traditional  
dogma among economists and publicists in
 these modern communities that free     
competition between the businessmen in  
charge will indefeasibly act to bring   
the productiveness of industry to the   
highest practicable pitch and would lead
 to the most unreserved and vigilant    
endeavour to serve the community's      
material needs at all points4 ,the      

reasons for the failure of this genial  
expectation1 particularly under         
latterday business management1 might be 
shown in some detail1 if that were      
needed to enforce the argument as it    
runs in the present connection4 ,but a  
summary indication of the commoner      
varieties and effects of sabotage as it 
is systematically applied in the        
businesslike conduct of industry will   
serve the purpose as well and with less 
waste of words and patience4  ,it is    
usual to notice1 and not unusual to     
deplore the duplication of plant and    
appliances in many lines of industry1   
due to competitive management1 as in    
factories engaged in the same class of  
manufacture1 in parallel or otherwise   
competing railways and boat lines1 in   
retail merchandising1 and in some degree
 also in the wholesale trade4 ,the      
result1 of course1 is sabotage2 in the  
sense that this volume of appliances1   
materials and workmen are not employed  
to the best advantage for the community4

 ,one effect of the arrangement is an   
increased necessary cost of the goods   
and services supplied by these means4   
,the reason for it is competition for   
gain to be got from the traffic4 ,that  
all this is an untoward state of things 
is recognised on all hands2 but no      
lively regret is commonly spent on the  
matter1 since it is commonly recognised 
that under the circumstances there is no
 help for it except at the cost of a    
more untoward remedy4  ,the competitive 
system having been tried and found      
good--or at least so it is assumed--it  
is felt that the system will have to be 
accepted with the defects of its        
qualities4 ,its characteristic qualities
 are held to be good1 acceptable to the 
tastes of modern men whose habits of    
thought have been standardised in its   
terms2 and it would be only reluctantly 
and by tardy concession that these      
modern men could bring themselves to    
give up that scheme of ,natural ,liberty
 within the framework of which runs this

 competitive system of business         
management and its wasteful manifolding 
of half-idle equipment and nugatory     
work4 ,the common man1 at the worst1    
comforts himself and his neighbour with 
the sage reflection that ,it might have 
been worse4 ,the businessmen1 on the    
other hand1 have also begun to take note
 of this systematic waste by duplication
 and consequent incompetence1 and have  
taken counsel how to intercept the waste
 and divert it to their own profit4 ,the
 businessmen's remedy is consolidation  
of competing concerns1 and monopoly     
control4  ,to the common man1 with his  
preconceptions on the head of restraint 
of trade1 the proposed remedy seems more
 vicious than the evil it is designed to
 cure4 ,the fault of the remedy plainly 
is not that the mismanagement of affairs
 due to competitive business can not be 
corrected by recourse to monopoly1 but  
only that the community1 it is presumed1
 would still suffer all the burdens and 
discomforts of the rgime of competition 

and sabotage1 with1 possibly1 further   
inconveniences and impositions at the   
hands of the businesslike monopoly2     
which1 men are agreed1 may fairly be    
depended on to use its advantage        
unsparingly under the business principle
 of charging what the traffic will bear4
  ,there is also this other singular    
phenomenon in this modern industrial    
world1 that something not very far short
 of one-half the industrial equipment   
systematically lies idle for something  
approaching one-half the time1 or is    
worked only to one-half its capacity    
half the time2 not because of           
competition between these several       
industrial concerns1 but because        
business conditions will not allow its  
continued productive use2 because the   
volume of product that would be turned  
out if the equipment were working       
uninterruptedly at its full capacity    
could not be sold at remunerative       
prices4 ,from time to time one          
establishment and another will shut down

 during a period of slack times1 for the
 same reason4  ,this state of things is 
singular only as seen from the point of 
view of the community's material        
interest1 not that it is in any degree  
unfamiliar or that any serious fault is 
found with the captains of industry for 
so shutting off the industrial process  
and letting the industrial equipment lie
 waste4 ,as all men know1 the exigencies
 of business will not tolerate          
production to supply the community's    
needs under these circumstances2        
although1 as is equally notorious1 these
 slack times1 when production of goods  
is unadvisable on grounds of business   
expediency1 are commonly times of       
wide-spread privation1 hard times1 in   
the community at large1 when the failure
 of the supply is keenly felt4  ,it is  
not that the captains of industry are at
 fault in so failing1 or refusing1 to   
supply the needs of the community under 
these circumstances1 but only that they 
are helpless under the exigencies of    

business4 ,they can not supply the goods
 except for a price1 indeed not except  
for a remunerative price1 a price which 
will add something to the capital values
 which they are venturing in their      
various enterprises4 ,so long as the    
exigencies of price and of pecuniary    
gain rule the case1 there is manifestly 
no escaping this enforced idleness of   
the country's productive forces4  ,it   
may not be out of place also to remark1 
by way of parenthesis1 that this highly 
productive state of the industrial arts1
 which is embodied in the industrial    
plant and processes that so are         
systematically and advisedly retarded or
 arrested under the rule of business1 is
 at the same time the particular pride  
of civilised men and the most tangible  
achievement of the civilised world4  ,a 
conservative estimate of this one item  
of capitalistic sabotage could scarcely 
appraise it at less than a twenty-five  
percent reduction from the normally     
possible productive capacity of the     

community1 at an average over any       
considerable period2 and a somewhat     
thorough review of the pertinent facts  
would probably persuade any impartial   
observer that1 one year with another1   
such businesslike enforced idleness of  
plant and personnel lowers the actual   
output of the country's industry by     
something nearer fifty percent of its   
ordinary capacity when fully employed4  
,to many1 such an assertion may seem    
extravagant1 but with further reflection
 on the well-known facts in the case it 
will seem less so in proportion as the  
unfamiliarity of it wears off4          
,however1 the point of attention in the 
case is not the precise1 nor the        
approximate1 percentages of this arrest 
and retardation1 this partial           
neutralisation of modern improvements in
 the industrial arts2 it is only the    
notorious fact that such arrest occurs1 
systematically and advisedly1 under the 
rule of business exigencies1 and that   
there is no corrective to be found for  

it that will comport with those         
fundamental articles of the democratic  
faith on which the businessmen          
necessarily proceed4 ,any effectual     
corrective would break the framework of 
democratic law and order1 since it would
 have to traverse the inalienable right 
of men who are born free and equal1 each
 freely to deal or not to deal in any   
pecuniary conjuncture that arises4  ,but
 it is at the same time plain enough    
that this1 in the larger sense untoward1
 discrepancy between productive capacity
 and current productive output can      
readily be corrected1 in some           
appreciable degree at least1 by any     
sufficient authority that shall         
undertake to control the country's      
industrial forces without regard to     
pecuniary profit and loss4 ,any         
authority competent to take over the    
control and regulate the conduct of the 
community's industry with a view to     
maximum output as counted by weight and 
tale1 rather than by net aggregate      

price-income over price-cost1 can       
readily effect an appreciable increase  
in the effectual productive capacity2   
but it can be done only by violating    
that democratic order of things within  
which business enterprise runs4 ,the    
several belligerent nations of ,europe  
are showing that it can be done1 that   
the sabotage of business enterprise can 
be put aside by sufficiently heroic     
measures4 ,and they are also showing    
that they are all aware1 and have always
 been aware1 that the conduct of        
industry on business principles is      
incompetent to bring the largest        
practicable output of goods and         
services2 incompetent to such a degree1 
indeed1 as not to be tolerable in a     
season of desperate need1 when the      
nation requires the full use of its     
productive forces1 equipment and        
man-power1 regardless of the pecuniary  
claims of individuals4         99       
99       99       99       99  ,now1 the
 projected ,imperial dominion is a power

 of the character required to bring a   
sufficient corrective to bear1 in case  
of need1 on this democratic situation in
 which the businessmen in charge        
necessarily manage the country's        
industry at cross purposes with the     
community's--that is the common         
man's--material interest4 ,it is an     
extraneous power1 to whom the continued 
pecuniary gain of these nations'        
businessmen is a minor consideration1 a 
negligible consideration in case it     
shall appear that the ,imperial usufruct
 of the underlying nation's productive  
forces is in any degree impaired by the 
businessmen's management of it for their
 own net gain4 ,it is difficult to see  
on what grounds of self-interest such an
 ,imperial government could consent to  
tolerate the continued management of    
these underlying nations' industries on 
business principles1 that is to say on  
the principle of the maximum pecuniary  
gain to the businesslike managers2 and  
recent experience seems to teach that no

 excessive1 that is to say no           
inconvenient1 degree of consideration   
for vested rights1 and the like1 would  
long embarrass the ,imperial government 
in its administration of its usufruct4  
,it should be a reasonable expectation  
that1 without malice and with an        
unprejudiced view to its own usufruct of
 these underlying countries1 the        
,imperial establishment would take due  
care that no systematically1 and in its 
view gratuitously1 uneconomical methods 
should continue in the ordinary conduct 
of their industry4 ,among other         
considerations of weight in this        
connection is the fact that a contented1
 well-fed1 and not wantonly over-worked 
populace is a valuable asset in such a  
case4 ,similarly1 by contraries1 as an  
asset in usufruct to such an alien      
power1 a large1 wealthy1 spendthrift1   
body of gentlefolk1 held in high esteem 
by the common people1 would have but a  
slight value1 conceivably even a        
negative value1 in such a case4 ,a wise 

administration would presumably look to 
their abatement1 rather than otherwise4 
,at this point the material interest of 
the common man would seem to coincide   
with that of the ,imperial              
establishment4 ,still1 his preconceived 
notions of the wisdom and beneficence of
 his gentlefolk would presumably hinder 
his seeing the matter in that reasonable
 light4  ,under the paramount           
surveillance of such an alien power1    
guided solely by its own interest in the
 usufruct of the country and its        
population1 it is to be presumed that   
class privileges and discrimination     
would be greatly abated if not          
altogether discontinued4 ,the point is  
in some doubt1 partly because this alien
 establishment whose dominion is in     
question is itself grounded in class    
prerogatives and discrimination1 and so1
 not improbably1 it would carry over    
into its supervision of the underlying  
nations something of a bias in favor of 
class privileges4 ,and a similar order  

of things might also result by choice of
 a class-system as a convenient means of
 control and exploitation4 ,the latter  
consideration is presumably the more    
cogent1 since the ,imperial             
establishment in question is already1 by
 ancient habit1 familiar with the method
 of control by class and privilege2 and1
 indeed1 unfamiliar with any other      
method4 ,such a government1 which       
governs without effectual advice or     
formal consent of the governed1 will    
almost necessarily rest its control of  
the country on an interested class1 of  
sufficient strength and bound by        
sufficiently grave interest to abet the 
,imperial establishment effectually in  
all its adventures and enterprises4     
,but such a privileged order1 that is to
 be counted in to share dynastic        
usufruct and liabilities1 in good days  
and evil1 will be of a feudalistic      
complexion rather than something after  
the fashion of a modern business        
community doing business by investment  

and pecuniary finesse4 ,it would still  
be a reasonable expectation that        
discrimination between pecuniary classes
 should fall away under this projected  
alien tutelage2 more particularly all   
such discrimination as is designed to   
benefit any given class or interest at  
the cost of the whole1 as1 e4g41        
protective tariffs1 monopolistic        
concessions and immunities1 engrossing  
of particular lines of material         
resources1 and the like4  ,the character
 of the economic policy to be pursued   
should not be difficult of apprehension1
 if only these underlying peoples are   
conceived as an estate in tail within   
the dynastic line of descent4 ,the      
,imperial establishment which so is     
prospectively to take over the          
surveillance of these modern peoples    
under this projected enterprise in      
dominion1 may all the more readily be   
conceived as handling its new and larger
 resources somewhat unreservedly as an  
estate to be administered with a shrewd 

eye to the main chance1 since such has  
always been its relation to the peoples 
and territories whose usufruct it       
already enjoys4 ,it is only that the    
circumstances of the case will admit a  
freer and more sagacious application of 
those principles of usufruct that lie at
 the root of the ancient ,culture of the
 ,fatherland4         99       99       
99       99       99  ,this excessively 
long1 and yet incomplete1 review of the 
presumptive material advantages to      
accrue to the common man under a rgime  
of peace by unconditional surrender to  
an alien dynasty1 brings the argument   
apparently to the conclusion that such  
an eventuality might be fortunate rather
 than the reverse2 or at least that it  
has its compensations1 even if it is not
 something to be desired4 ,such should  
particularly appear to be the           
presumption in case one is at all       
inclined to make much of the cultural   
gains to be brought in under the new    
rgime4 ,and more particularly should a  

policy of non-resistant submission to   
the projected new order seem expedient  
in view of the exceedingly high1 not to 
say prohibitive1 cost of resistance1 or 
even of materially retarding its        
fulfillment4     ,,chapter ,v  ,,peace  
,,and ,,neutrality   ,considered simply 
on the face of the tangible material    
interests involved1 the choice of the   
common man in these premises should seem
 very much of a foregone conclusion1 if 
he could persuade himself to a sane and 
perspicuous consideration of these      
statistically apparent merits of the    
case alone4 ,it is at least safely to be
 presumed that he has nothing to lose1  
in a material way1 and there is reason  
to look for some slight gain in creature
 comforts and in security of life and   
limb1 consequent upon the elimination1  
or at least the partial                 
disestablishment1 of pecuniary necessity
 as the sole bond and criterion of use  
and wont in economic concerns4  ,but man
 lives not by bread alone4 ,in point of 

fact1 and particularly as touches the   
springs of action among that common run 
that do not habitually formulate their  
aspirations and convictions in extended 
and grammatically defensible documentary
 form1 and the drift of whose impulses  
therefore is not masked or deflected by 
the illusive consistencies of set       
speech1--as touches the common run1     
particularly1 it will hold true with    
quite an unacknowledged generality that 
the material means of life are1 after   
all1 means only2 and that when the      
question of what things are worth while 
is brought to the final test1 it is not 
these means1 nor the life conditioned on
 these means1 that are seen to serve as 
the decisive criterion2 but always it is
 some ulterior1 immaterial end1 in the  
pursuit of which these material means   
find their ulterior ground of valuation4
 ,neither the overt testimony nor the   
circumstantial evidence to this effect  
is unequivocal2 but seen in due         
perspective1 and regard being had       

chiefly to the springs of concerted     
action as shown in any massive movement 
of this common run of mankind1 there is1
 after all1 little room to question that
 the things which commend themselves as 
indefeasibly worth while are the things 
of the human spirit4  ,these ideals1    
aspirations1 aims1 ends of endeavour1   
are by no means of a uniform or         
homogeneous character throughout the    
modern communities1 still less          
throughout the civilised world1 or      
throughout the checkered range of       
classes and conditions of men2 but1 with
 such frequency and amplitude that it   
must be taken as a major premise in any 
attempted insight into human behaviour1 
it will hold true that they are of a    
spiritual1 immaterial nature4  ,the     
caution may1 parenthetically1 not be out
 of place1 that this characterisation of
 the ulterior springs of action as      
essentially not of the nature of        
creature comforts1 need be taken in no  
wider extension than that which so is   

specifically given it4 ,it will be found
 to apply as touches the conduct of the 
common run2 what modification of it     
might be required to make it at all     
confidently applicable to the case of   
one and another of those classes into   
whose scheme of life creature comforts  
enter with more pronounced effect may be
 more of a delicate point4 ,but since it
 is the behaviour1 and the grounds of   
behaviour1 of the common run that are   
here in question1 the case of their     
betters in this respect may conveniently
 be left on one side4  ,the question in 
hand touches the behavior of the common 
man1 taken in the aggregate1 in face of 
the quandary into which circumstances   
have led him2 since the question of what
 these modern peoples will do is after  
all a question of what the common man in
 the aggregate will do1 of his own      
motion or by persuasion4 ,his betters   
may be in a position to guide1 persuade1
 cajole1 mislead1 and victimise him2 for
 among the many singular conceits that  

beset the common man is the persuasion  
that his betters are in some way better 
than he1 wiser1 more beneficent4 ,but   
the course that may so be chosen1 with  
or without guidance or persuasion from  
the superior classes1 as well as the    
persistence and energy with which this  
course is pursued1 is conditioned on the
 frame of mind of the common run4  ,just
 what will be the nature and the        
concrete expression of these ideal      
aspirations that move the common run is 
a matter of habitual preconceptions2 and
 habits of thought vary from one people 
to another according to the diversity of
 experience to which they have been     
exposed4 ,among the ,western nations the
 national prestige has come to seem     
worth while as an ulterior end1 perhaps 
beyond all else that is comprised in the
 secular scheme of things desirable to  
be had or to be achieved4 ,and in the   
apprehension of such of them as have    
best preserved the habits of thought    
induced by a long experience in feudal  

subjection1 the service of the sovereign
 or the dynasty still stands over as the
 substantial core of the cultural       
scheme1 upon which sentiment and        
endeavour converge4 ,in the past ages of
 the democratic peoples1 as well as in  
the present-day use and wont among      
subjects of the dynastic ,states--as    
e4g41 ,japan or ,germany--men are known 
to have resolutely risked1 and lost1    
their life for the sake of the          
sovereign's renown1 or even to save the 
sovereign's life2 whereas1 of course1   
even the slightest and most nebulous    
reflection would make it manifest that  
in point of net material utility the    
sovereign's decease is an idle matter as
 compared with the loss of an           
able-bodied workman4 ,the sovereign may 
always be replaced1 with some prospect  
of public advantage1 or failing that1 it
 should be remarked that a regency or   
inter-regnum will commonly be a season  
of relatively economical administration4
 ,again1 religious enthusiasm1 and the  

furtherance of religious propaganda1 may
 come to serve the same general purpose 
as these secular ideals1 and will       
perhaps serve it just as well4 ,certain 
principles1 of personal liberty and of  
opportunity for creative self-direction 
and an intellectually worthy life1      
perhaps may also become the idols of the
 people1 for which they will then be    
willing to risk their material fortune2 
and where this has happened1 as among   
the democratic peoples of ,christendom1 
it is not selfishly for their own       
personal opportunity to live untroubled 
under the light of these high principles
 that these opinionated men are ready to
 contend1 but rather impersonally for   
the human right which under these       
principles is the due of all mankind1   
and particularly of the incoming and of 
later generations4  ,on these and the   
like intangible ends the common man is  
set with such inveterate predilection   
that he will1 on provocation1 stick at  
nothing to put the project through4 ,for

 such like ends the common man will lay 
down his life2 at least1 so they say4   
,there may always be something of       
rhetorical affectation in it all2 but1  
after all1 there is sufficient evidence 
to hand of such substance and tenacity  
in the common man's hold on these ideal 
aspirations1 on these idols of his human
 spirit1 as to warrant the assertion    
that he is1 rather commonly1 prepared to
 go to greater lengths in the           
furtherance of these immaterial gains   
that are to inure to someone else than  
for any personal end of his own1 in the 
way of creature comforts or even of     
personal renown4  ,for such ends the    
common man1 in democratic ,christendom  
is1 on provocation1 willing to die2 or  
again1 the patient and perhaps more     
far-seeing common man of pagan ,china is
 willing to live for these idols of an  
inveterate fancy1 through endless       
contumely and hard usage4 ,the          
conventional ,chinese preconceptions1 in
 the way of things that are worth while 

in their own right1 appear to differ    
from those current in the ,occident in  
such a way that the preconceived ideal  
is not to be realised except by way of  
continued life4 ,the common man's       
accountability to the cause of humanity1
 in ,china1 is of so intimately personal
 a character that he can meet it only by
 tenaciously holding his place in the   
sequence of generations2 whereas among  
the peoples of ,christendom there has   
arisen out of their contentious past a  
preconception to the effect that this   
human duty to mankind is of the nature  
of a debt1 which can be cancelled by    
bankruptcy proceedings1 so that the man 
who unprofitably dies fighting for the  
cause has thereby constructively paid   
the reckoning in full4  ,evidently1 if  
the common man of these modern nations  
that are prospectively to be brought    
under tutelage of the ,imperial         
government could be brought to the frame
 of mind that is habitual with his      
,chinese counterpart1 there should be a 

fair hope that pacific counsels would   
prevail and that ,christendom would so  
come in for a rgime of peace by         
submission under this ,imperial         
tutelage4 ,but there are always these   
preconceptions of self-will and         
insubordination to be counted with among
 these nations1 and there is the ancient
 habit of a contentious national        
solidarity in defense of the nation's   
prestige1 more urgent among these       
peoples than any sentiment of solidarity
 with mankind at large1 or any ulterior 
gain in civilisation that might come of 
continued discipline in the virtues of  
patience and diligence under distasteful
 circumstances4  ,the occidental        
conception of manhood is in some        
considerable measure drawn in negative  
terms4 ,so much so that whenever a      
question of the manly virtues comes     
under controversy it presently appears  
that at least the indispensable minimum1
 and indeed the ordinary marginal       
modicum1 of what is requisite to a      

worthy manner of life is habitually     
formulated in terms of what not4 ,this  
appearance is doubtless misleading if   
taken without the universally understood
 postulate on the basis of which        
negative demands are formulated4 ,there 
is a good deal of what would be called  
historical accident in all this4 ,the   
indispensable demands of this modern    
manhood take the form of refusal to obey
 extraneous authority on compulsion2 of 
exemption from coercive direction and   
subservience2 of insubordination1 in    
short4 ,but it is always understood as a
 matter of course that this             
insubordination is a refusal to submit  
to irresponsible or autocratic rule4    
,stated from the positive side it would 
be freedom from restraint by or         
obedience to any authority not          
constituted by express advice and       
consent of the governed4 ,and as near as
 it may be formulated1 when reduced to  
the irreducible minimum of concrete     
proviso1 this is the final substance of 

things which neither shame nor honour   
will permit the modern civilised man to 
yield4 ,to no arrangement for the       
abrogation of this minimum of free      
initiative and self-direction will he   
consent to be a party1 whether it       
touches the conditions of life for his  
own people who are to come after1 or as 
touches the fortunes of such aliens as  
are of a like mind on this head and are 
unable to make head against invasion of 
these human rights from outside4  ,as   
has just been remarked1 the negative    
form so often taken by these demands is 
something of an historical accident1 due
 to the fact that these modern peoples  
came into their highly esteemed system  
of ,natural ,liberty out of an earlier  
system of positive checks on            
self-direction and initiative2 a system1
 in effect1 very much after the fashion 
of that ,imperial jurisdiction that     
still prevails in the dynastic          
,states--as1 e4g41 ,germany or          
,japan--whose projected dominion is now 

the immediate object of apprehension and
 repugnance4 ,how naively the negative  
formulation gained acceptance1 and at   
the same time how intrinsic to the new  
dispensation was the aspiration for free
 initiative1 appears in the confident   
assertion of its most genial spokesman1 
that when these positive checks are     
taken away1 ,the simple and obvious     
system of ,natural ,liberty establishes 
itself of its own accord4  ,the common  
man1 in these modern communities1 shows 
a brittle temper when any overt move is 
made against this heritage of civil     
liberty4 ,he may not be altogether well 
advised in respect of what liberties he 
will defend and what he will submit to2 
but the fact is to be counted with in   
any projected peace1 that there is      
always this refractory residue of terms 
not open to negotiation or compromise4  
,now it also happens1 also by historical
 accident1 that these residual          
principles of civil liberty have come to
 blend and coalesce with a stubborn     

preconception of national integrity and 
national prestige4 ,so that in the      
workday apprehension of the common man1 
not given to analytic excursions1 any   
infraction of the national integrity or 
any abatement of the national prestige  
has come to figure as an insufferable   
infringement on his personal liberty and
 on those principles of humanity that   
make up the categorical articles of the 
secular creed of ,christendom4 ,the fact
 may be patent on reflection that the   
common man's substantial interest in the
 national integrity is slight and       
elusive1 and that in sober common sense 
the national prestige has something less
 than a neutral value to him2 but this  
state of the substantially pertinent    
facts is not greatly of the essence of  
the case1 since his preconceptions in   
these premises do not run to that       
effect1 and since they are of too hard  
and fast a texture to suffer any serious
 abatement within such a space of time  
as can come in question here and now4   

99       99       99       99       99  
,the outlook for a speedy settlement of 
the world's peace on a plan of          
unconditional surrender to the projected
 ,imperial dominion seems unpromisingly 
dubious1 in view of the stubborn temper 
shown by these modern peoples wherever  
their preconceived ideas of right and   
honest living appear to be in jeopardy2 
and the expediency of entering into any 
negotiated compact of diplomatic        
engagements and assurances designed to  
serve as groundwork to an eventual      
enterprise of that kind must therefore  
also be questionable in a high degree4  
,it is even doubtful if any allowance of
 time can be counted on to bring these  
modern peoples to a more reasonable1    
more worldly-wise1 frame of mind2 so    
that they would come to see their       
interest in such an arrangement1 or     
would divest themselves of their present
 stubborn and perhaps fantastic         
prejudice against an autocratic rgime of
 the kind spoken for4 ,at least for the 

present any such hope of a peaceable    
settlement seems illusive4 ,what may be 
practicable in this way in the course of
 time is of course still more obscure2  
but argument on the premises which the  
present affords does not point to a     
substantially different outcome in the  
calculable future4  ,for the immediate  
future--say1 within the life-time of the
 oncoming generation--the spiritual     
state of the peoples concerned in this  
international quandary is not likely to 
undergo so radical a change as to       
seriously invalidate an argument that   
proceeds on the present lie of the land 
in this respect4 ,preconceptions are a  
work of habit impinging on a given      
temperamental bent2 and where1 as in    
these premises1 the preconceptions have 
taken on an institutionalised form1 have
 become conventionalised and commonly   
accepted1 and so have been woven into   
the texture of popular common sense1    
they must needs be a work of protracted 
and comprehensive habituation impinging 

on a popular temperamental bent of so   
general a prevalence that it may be     
called congenital to the community at   
large4 ,a heritable bent pervading the  
group within which inheritance runs1    
does not change1 so long as the racial  
complexion of the group remains passably
 intact2 a conventionalised1 commonly   
established habit of mind will change   
only slowly1 commonly not without the   
passing of at least one generation1 and 
only by grace of a sufficiently         
searching and comprehensive discipline  
of experience4 ,for good or ill1 the    
current situation is to be counted on   
not to lose character over night or with
 a revolution of the seasons1 so far as 
concerns these spiritual factors that   
make or mar the fortunes of nations4    
,at the same time these spiritual       
assets1 being of the nature of habit1   
are also bound to change character more 
or less radically1 by insensible        
shifting of ground1 but                 
incontinently1--provided only that the  

conditions of life1 and therefore the   
discipline of experience1 undergo any   
substantial change4 ,so the immediate   
interest shifts to the presumptive rate 
and character of those changes that are 
in prospect1 due to the unremitting     
change of circumstances under which     
these modern peoples live and to the    
discipline of which they are unavoidably
 exposed4 ,for the present and for the  
immediate future the current state of   
things is a sufficiently stable basis of
 argument2 but assurance as to the      
sufficiency of the premises afforded by 
the current state of things thins out in
 proportion as the perspective of the   
argument runs out into the succeeding   
years4 ,the bearing of it all is        
two-fold1 of course4 ,this progressive1 
cumulative habituation under changing   
circumstances affects the case both of  
those democratic peoples whose fortunes 
are in the hazard1 and also of those    
dynastic ,states by whom the projected  
enterprise in dominion is to be carried 

into effect4         99       99        
99       99       99  ,the case of the  
two formidable dynastic ,states whose   
names have been coupled together in what
 has already been said is perhaps the   
more immediately interesting in the     
present connection4 ,as matters stand1  
and in the measure in which they        
continue so to stand1 the case of these 
is in no degree equivocal4 ,the two     
dynastic establishments seek dominion1  
and indeed they seek nothing else1      
except incidentally to and in           
furtherance of the main quest4 ,as has  
been remarked before1 it lies in the    
nature of a dynastic ,state to seek     
dominion1 that being the whole of its   
nature in so far as it runs true to     
form4 ,but a dynastic ,state1 like any  
other settled1 institutionalised        
community of men1 rests on and draws its
 effectual driving force from the habit 
of mind of its underlying community1 the
 common man in the aggregate1 his       
preconceptions and ideals as to what    

things are worth while4 ,without a      
suitable spiritual ground of this kind  
such a dynastic ,state passes out of the
 category of formidable ,powers and into
 that of precarious despotism4  ,in both
 of the two ,states here in question the
 dynastic establishment and its         
bodyguard of officials and gentlefolk   
may be counted on to persevere in the   
faith that now animates them1 until an  
uneasy displacement of sentiment among  
the underlying populace may in time     
induce them judiciously to shift their  
footing4 ,like the ruling classes       
elsewhere1 they are of a conservative   
temper and may be counted on so to      
continue4 ,they are also not greatly    
exposed to the discipline of experience 
that makes for adaptive change in habits
 of life1 and therefore in the          
correlated habits of thought4 ,it is    
always the common man that is           
effectually reached by any exacting or  
wide-reaching change in the conditions  
of life4 ,he is relatively unsheltered  

from any forces that make for adaptive  
change1 as contrasted with the case of  
his betters2 and however sluggish and   
reluctant may be his response to such   
discipline as makes for a displacement  
of outworn preconceptions1 yet it is    
always out of the mass of this common   
humanity that those movements of        
disaffection and protest arise1 which   
lead1 on occasion1 to any material      
realignment of the institutional fabric 
or to any substantial shift in the line 
of policy to be pursued under the       
guidance of their betters4  ,the common 
mass of humanity1 it may be said in     
parenthesis1 is of course not a         
homogeneous body4 ,uncommon men1 in     
point of native gifts of intelligence1  
sensibility1 or personal force1 will    
occur as frequently1 in proportion to   
the aggregate numbers1 among the common 
mass as among their betters4 ,since in  
any one of these nations of             
,christendom1 with their all-inclusive  
hybridisation1 the range1 frequency and 

amplitude of variations in hereditary   
endowment is the same throughout all    
classes4 ,class differentiation is a    
matter of habit and convention2 and in  
distinction from his betters the common 
man is common only in point of numbers  
and in point of the more general and    
more exacting conditions to which he is 
exposed4 ,he is in a position to be more
 hardly ridden by the discipline of     
experience1 and is at the same time held
 more consistently to such a body of    
preconceptions1 and to such changes only
 in this body of preconceptions1 as fall
 in with the drift of things in a larger
 mass of humanity4 ,but all the while it
 is the discipline which impinges on the
 sensibilities of this common mass that 
shapes the spiritual attitude and temper
 of the community and so defines what   
may and what may not be undertaken by   
the constituted leaders4 ,so that1 in a 
way1 these dynastic ,states are at the  
mercy of that popular sentiment whose   
creatures they are1 and are subject to  

undesired changes of direction and      
efficiency in their endeavors1          
contingent on changes in the popular    
temper2 over which they have only a     
partial1 and on the whole a superficial 
control4  ,a relatively powerful control
 and energetic direction of the popular 
temper is and has been exercised by     
these dynastic establishments1 with a   
view to its utilisation in the pursuit  
of the dynastic enterprise2 and much has
 visibly been accomplished in that way2 
chiefly1 perhaps1 by military discipline
 in subordination to personal authority1
 and also by an unsparing surveillance  
of popular education1 with a view to    
fortify the preconceptions handed down  
from the passing order as well as to    
eliminate all subversive innovation4    
,yet in spite of all the well-conceived 
and shrewdly managed endeavors of the   
,german ,imperial system in this        
direction1 e4g41 there has been evidence
 of an obscurely growing uneasiness1 not
 to say disaffection1 among the         

underlying mass4 ,so much so that hasty 
observers1 and perhaps biased1 have     
reached the inference that one of the   
immediate contributory causes that led  
to the present war was the need of a    
heroic remedy to correct this untoward  
drift of sentiment4  ,for the ,german   
people the government of the present    
dynastic incumbent has done all that    
could 7humanly speaking7 be expected in 
the way of endeavoring to conserve the  
passing order and to hold the popular   
imagination to the received feudalistic 
ideals of loyal service4 ,and yet the   
peoples of the ,empire are already      
caught in the net of that newer order   
which they are now endeavoring to break 
by force of arms4 ,they are inextricably
 implicated in the cultural complex of  
,christendom2 and within this ,western  
culture those peoples to whom it fell to
 lead the exodus out of the ,egypt of   
feudalism have come quite naturally to  
set the pace in all the larger          
conformities of civilised life4 ,within 

the confines of ,christendom today1 for 
good or ill1 whatever usage or customary
 rule of conduct falls visibly short of 
the precedent set by these cultural     
pioneers is felt to fall beneath the    
prescriptive commonplace level of       
civilisation4 ,failure to adopt and make
 use of those tried institutional       
expedients on which these peoples of the
 advance guard have set their mark of   
authentication is today presumptively a 
mistake and an advantage foregone2 and a
 people who are denied the benefit of   
these latterday ways and means of civic 
life are uneasy with a sense of         
grievance at the hands of their rulers4 
,besides which1 the fashion in articles 
of institutional equipage so set by the 
authentic pioneers of culture has also  
come to be mandatory1 as a punctilio of 
the governmental proprieties2 so that no
 national establishment which aspires to
 a decorous appearance in the eyes of   
the civilised world can longer afford to
 be seen without them4 ,the forms at    

least must be observed4 ,hence the      
representative and pseudo-representative
 institutions of these dynastic ,states4
  ,these dynastic ,states among the rest
 have partly followed the dictates of   
civilised fashion1 partly yielded to    
the1 more or less intelligent1          
solicitations of their subjects1 or the 
spokesmen of their subjects1 and have   
installed institutional apparatus of    
this modern pattern--more in point of   
form than of substance1 perhaps4 ,yet in
 time the adoption of the forms is      
likely to have an effect1 if changing   
circumstances favor their taking effect4
 ,such has on the whole been the        
experience of those peoples who have    
gone before along this trail of         
political advance4 ,as instance the     
growth of discretionary powers under the
 hands of parliamentary representatives 
in those cases where the movement has   
gone on longest and farthest2 and these 
instances should not be considered idle1
 as intimations of what may             

presumptively be looked for under the   
,imperial establishments of ,germany or 
,japan4 ,it may be true that hitherto1  
along with the really considerable      
volume of imitative gestures of         
discretionary deliberation delegated to 
these parliamentary bodies1 they have as
 regards all graver matters brought to  
their notice only been charged with a   
7limited7 power to talk4 ,it may be true
 that1 for the present1 on critical or  
weighty measures the parliamentary      
discretion extends no farther than      
respectfully to say3 ,ja wohl6 ,but     
then1 ,ja wohl is also something2 and   
there is no telling where it may all    
lead to in the long course of years4    
,one has a vague apprehension that this 
,ja wohl6 may some day come to be a     
customarily necessary form of           
authentication1 so that with-holding it 
7,beht' es ,gott67 may even come to     
count as an effectual veto on measures  
so pointedly neglected4 ,more           
particularly will the formalities of    

representation and self-government be   
likely to draw the substance of such    
like free institutions into the         
effectual conduct of public affairs if  
it turns out that the workday           
experiences of these people takes a turn
 more conducive to habits of            
insubordination than has been the case  
hitherto4  ,indications are1 again1 not 
wanting1 that even in the ,empire the   
discipline of workday experience is     
already diverging from that line that   
once trained the ,german subjects into  
the most loyal and unrepining           
subservience to dynastic ambitions4 ,of 
course1 just now1 under the shattering  
impact of warlike atrocities and        
patriotic clamour1 the workday spirit of
 insubordination and critical scrutiny  
is gone out of sight and out of hearing4
  ,something of this inchoate           
insubordination has showed itself       
repeatedly during the present reign1    
sufficient to provoke many shrewd       
protective measures on the side of the  

dynastic establishment1 both by way of  
political strategy and by arbitrary     
control4 ,disregarding many minor and   
inconsequential divisions of opinion and
 counsel among the ,german people during
 this eventful reign1 the political     
situation has been moving on the play of
 three1 incipiently divergent1 strains  
of interest and sentiment3 7a7 the      
dynasty 7together with the ,agrarians1  
of whom in a sense the dynasty is a     
part72 7b7 the businessmen1 or          
commercial interest 7including          
investors72 and 7c7 the industrial      
workmen4 ,doubtless it would be easier  
to overstate than to indicate with any  
nice precision what has been the nature1
 and especially the degree1 of this     
alienation of sentiment and divergence  
of conscious interest among these       
several elements4 ,it is not that there 
has at any point been a perceptible     
faltering in respect of loyalty to the  
crown as such4 ,but since the crown     
belongs1 by origin1 tradition1 interest 

and spiritual identity1 in the camp of  
the ,agrarians1 the situation has been  
such as would inevitably take on a      
character of disaffection toward the    
dynastic establishment1 in the          
conceivable absence of that strong      
surviving sentiment of dynastic loyalty 
that still animates all classes and     
conditions of men in the ,fatherland4   
,it would accordingly1 again1 be an     
overstatement to say that the crown has 
been standing precariously at the apex  
of a political triangle1 the other two  
corners of which are occupied by these  
two divided and potentially recalcitrant
 elements of the body politic1 held     
apart by class antipathy and divergent  
pecuniary interest1 and held in check by
 divided counsels2 but something after  
that fashion is what would have resulted
 under similar conditions of strain in  
any community where the modern spirit of
 insubordination has taken effect in any
 large measure4  ,both of these elements
 of incipient disturbance in the        

dynastic economy1 the modern commercial 
and working classes1 are creatures of   
the new era2 and they are systematically
 out of line with the received dynastic 
tradition of fealty1 both in respect of 
their pecuniary interests and in respect
 of that discipline of experience to    
which their workday employment subjects 
them4 ,they are substantially the same  
two classes or groupings that came      
forward in the modernisation of the     
,british community1 with a gradual      
segregation of interest and a consequent
 induced solidarity of class sentiment  
and class animosities4 ,but with the    
difference that in the ,british case the
 movement of changing circumstances was 
slow enough to allow a fair degree of   
habituation to the altered economic     
conditions2 whereas in the ,german case 
the move into modern economic conditions
 has been made so precipitately as to   
have carried the mediaeval frame of mind
 over virtually intact into this era of 
large business and machine industry4 ,in

 the ,fatherland the commercial and     
industrial classes have been called on  
to play their part without time to learn
 their lines4  ,the case of the         
,english-speaking peoples1 who have gone
 over this course of experience in more 
consecutive fashion than any others1    
teaches that in the long run1 if these  
modern economic conditions persist1 one 
or the other or both of these creatures 
of the modern era must prevail1 and must
 put the dynastic establishment out of  
commission2 although the sequel has not 
yet been seen in this ,british case1 and
 there is no ground afforded for        
inference as to which of the two will   
have the fortune to survive and be      
invested with the hegemony4 ,meantime   
the opportunity of the ,imperial        
establishment to push its enterprise in 
dominion lies in the interval of time so
 required for the discipline of         
experience under modern conditions to   
work out through the growth of modern   
habits of thought into such modern 7i4e4

 civilised7 institutional forms and such
 settled principles of personal         
insubordination as will put any         
effectual dynastic establishment out of 
commission4 ,the same interval of time1 
that must so be allowed for the decay of
 the dynastic spirit among the ,german  
people under the discipline of life by  
the methods of modern trade and         
industry1 marks the period during which 
no peace compact will be practicable1   
except with the elimination of the      
,imperial establishment as a possible   
warlike power4 ,all this1 of course1    
applies to the case of ,japan as well1  
with the difference that while the      
,japanese people are farther in arrears1
 they are also a smaller1 less          
formidable body1 more exposed to outside
 forces1 and their mediaevalism is of a 
more archaic and therefore more         
precarious type4  ,what length of time  
will be required for this decay of the  
dynastic spirit among the people of the 
,empire is1 of course1 impossible to    

say4 ,the factors of the case are not of
 a character to admit anything like     
calculation of the rate of movement2 but
 in the nature of the factors involved  
it is also contained that something of a
 movement in this direction is          
unavoidable1 under ,providence4 ,as a   
preliminary consideration1 these peoples
 of the ,empire and its allies1 as well 
as their enemies in the great war1 will 
necessarily come out of their warlike   
experience in a more patriotic and more 
vindictive frame of mind than that in   
which they entered on this adventure4   
,fighting makes for malevolence4 ,the   
war is itself to be counted as a        
set-back4 ,a very large proportion of   
those who have lived through it will    
necessarily carry a warlike bent through
 life4 ,by that much1 whatever it may   
count for1 the decay of the dynastic    
spirit--or the growth of tolerance and  
equity in national sentiment1 if one    
chooses to put it that way--will be     
retarded from beforehand4 ,so also the  

,imperial establishment1 or whatever is 
left of it1 may be counted on to do     
everything in its power to preserve the 
popular spirit of loyalty and national  
animosity1 by all means at its disposal2
 since the ,imperial establishment      
finally rests on the effectual body of  
national animosity4 ,what hindrance will
 come in from this agency of retardation
 can at least vaguely be guessed at1 in 
the light of what has been accomplished 
in that way under the strenuously       
reactionary rule of the present reign4  
,again1 there is the chance1 as there   
always is a chance of human folly1 that 
the neighboring peoples will undertake1 
whether jointly or severally1 to        
restrict or prohibit trade relations    
between the people of the ,empire and   
their enemies in the present war2       
thereby fomenting international         
animosity1 as well as contributing      
directly to the economic readiness for  
war both on their own part and on that  
of the ,empire4 ,this is also1 and in an

 eminent degree1 an unknown factor in   
the case1 on which not even a reasonable
 guess can be made beforehand4 ,these   
are1 all and several1 reactionary       
agencies1 factors of retardation1 making
 for continuation of the current        
international situation of animosity1   
distrust1 chicane1 trade rivalry1       
competitive armament1 and eventual      
warlike enterprise4         99       99 
99       99       99  ,to offset these  
agencies of conservatism there is       
nothing much that can be counted on but 
that slow1 random1 and essentially      
insidious working of habituation that   
tends to the obsolescence of the        
received preconceptions2 partly by      
supplanting them with something new1 but
 more effectually by their falling into 
disuse and decay4 ,there is1 it will    
have to be admitted1 little of a        
positive character that can be done     
toward the installation of a rgime of   
peace and good-will4 ,the endeavours of 
the pacifists should suffice to convince

 any dispassionate observer of the      
substantial futility of creative efforts
 looking to such an end4 ,much can      
doubtless be done in the way of         
precautionary measures1 mostly of a     
negative character1 in the way          
especially of removing sources of       
infection and 7possibly7 of so          
sterilising the apparatus of national   
life that its working shall neither     
maintain animosities and interests at   
variance with the conditions of peace   
nor contribute to their spread and      
growth4  ,there is necessarily little   
hope or prospect that any national      
establishment will contribute materially
 or in any direct way to the            
obsolescence of warlike sentiments and  
ambitions2 since such establishments are
 designed for the making of war by      
keeping national jealousies intact1 and 
their accepted place in affairs is that 
of preparation for eventual hostilities1
 defensive or offensive4 ,except for the
 contingency of eventual hostilities1 no

 national establishment could be kept in
 countenance4 ,they would all fall into 
the decay of desuetude1 just as has     
happened to the dynastic establishments 
among those peoples who have 7passably7 
lost the spirit of dynastic aggression4 
,the modern industrial occupations1 the 
modern technology1 and that modern      
empirical science that runs so close to 
the frontiers of technology1 all work at
 cross purposes with the received       
preconceptions of the nationalist order2
 and in a more pronounced degree they   
are at cross purposes with that dynastic
 order of preconceptions that converges 
on ,imperial dominion4 ,the like is     
true1 with a difference1 of the ways1   
means and routine of business enterprise
 as it is conducted in the              
commercialised communities of today4    
,the working of these agencies runs to  
this effect not by way of deliberate and
 destructive antagonism1 but almost     
wholly by force of systematic1 though   
unintended and incidental1 neglect of   

those values1 standards1 verities1 and  
grounds of discrimination and conviction
 that make up the working realities of  
the national spirit and of dynastic     
ambition4 ,the working concepts of this 
new1 essentially mechanistic1 order of  
human interests1 do not necessarily     
clash with those of the old order1      
essentially the order of personages and 
personalities2 the two are              
incommensurable1 and they are           
incompatible only in the sense and      
degree implied in that state of the     
case4 ,the profoundest and most         
meritorious truths of dynastic politics 
can on no provocation and by no sleight 
of hand be brought within the logic of  
that system of knowledge and appraisal  
of values by which the mechanistic      
technology proceeds4 ,within the        
premises of this modern mechanistic     
industry and science all the best values
 and verities of the dynastic order are 
simply incompetent1 irrelevant and      
impertinent4  ,there is accordingly no  

unavoidable clash and no necessary      
friction between the two schemes of     
knowledge or the two habits of mind that
 characterise the two contrasted        
cultural eras4 ,it is only that a given 
individual--call him the common         
man--will not be occupied with both of  
these incommensurable systems of logic  
and appreciation at the same time or    
bearing on the same point2 and further  
that in proportion as his waking hours  
and his mental energy are fully occupied
 within the lines of one of these       
systems of knowledge1 design and        
employment1 in much the same measure he 
will necessarily neglect the other1 and 
in time he will lose proficiency and    
interest in its pursuits and its        
conclusions4 ,the man who is so held by 
his daily employment and his life-long  
attention within the range of habits of 
thought that are valid in the           
mechanistic technology1 will1 on an     
average and in the long run1 lose his   
grip on the spiritual virtues of        

national prestige and dynastic primacy2 
for they are foolishness unto him2      
neither can he know them1 because they  
are spiritually discerned4  ,not that   
the adepts in this modern mechanistic   
system of knowledge and design may not  
also be very good patriots and devoted  
servants of the dynasty4 ,the artless   
and1 on the whole1 spontaneous riot of  
dynastic avidity displayed to the       
astonished eyes of their fellow         
craftsmen in the neutral countries by   
the most eminent scientists of the      
,fatherland during the early months of  
the war should be sufficient warning    
that the archaic preconceptions do not  
hurriedly fly out of the window when the
 habits of thought of the mechanistic   
order come in at the door4 ,but with the
 passage of time1 pervasively1 by       
imperceptible displacement1 by the decay
 of habitual disuse1 as well as by      
habitual occupation with these other and
 unrelated ways and means of knowledge  
and belief1 dynastic loyalty and the    

like conceptions in the realm of        
religion and magic pass out of the field
 of attention and fall insensibly into  
the category of the lost arts4          
,particularly will this be true of the  
common man1 who lives1 somewhat         
characteristically1 in the mass and in  
the present1 and whose waking hours are 
somewhat fully occupied with what he has
 to do4  ,with the commercial interests 
the ,imperial establishment can probably
 make such terms as to induce their     
support of the dynastic enterprise1     
since they can apparently always be made
 to believe that an extension of the    
,imperial dominion will bring           
correspondingly increased opportunities 
of trade4 ,it is doubtless a mistake1   
but it is commonly believed by the      
interested parties1 which is just as    
good for the purpose as if it were true4
 ,and it should be added that in this1  
as in other instances of the quest of   
larger markets1 the costs are to be paid
 by someone else than the presumed      

commercial beneficiaries2 which brings  
the matter under the dearest principle  
known to businessmen3 that of getting   
something for nothing4 ,it will not be  
equally easy to keep the affections of  
the common man loyal to the dynastic    
enterprise when he begins to lose his   
grip on the archaic faith in dynastic   
dominion and comes to realise that he   
has also--individually and in the       
mass--no material interest even in the  
defense of the ,fatherland1 much less in
 the further extension of ,imperial     
rule4  ,but the time when this process  
of disillusionment and decay of ideals  
shall have gone far enough among the    
common run to afford no secure footing  
in popular sentiment for the            
contemplated ,imperial enterprise1--this
 time is doubtless far in the future1 as
 compared with the interval of          
preparation required for a new onset4   
,habituation takes time1 particularly   
such habituation as can be counted on to
 derange the habitual bent of a great   

population in respect of their dearest  
preconceptions4 ,it will take a very    
appreciable space of time even in the   
case of a populace so accessible to new 
habits of thought as the ,german people 
are by virtue of their slight percentage
 of illiteracy1 the very large          
proportion engaged in those modern      
industries that constantly require some 
intelligent insight into mechanistic    
facts1 the density of population and the
 adequate means of communication1 and   
the extent to which the whole population
 is caught in the web of mechanically   
standardised processes that condition   
their daily life at every turn4 ,as     
regards their technological situation1  
and their exposure to the discipline of 
industrial life1 no other population of 
nearly the same volume is placed in a   
position so conducive to a rapid        
acquirement of the spirit of the modern 
era4 ,but1 also1 no other people        
comparable with the population of the   
,fatherland has so large and well-knit a

 body of archaic preconceptions to      
unlearn4 ,their nearest analogue1 of    
course1 is the ,japanese nation4  ,in   
all this there is1 of course1 no        
inclination to cast a slur on the       
,german people4 ,in point of racial     
characteristics there is no difference  
between them and their neighbours4 ,and 
there is no reason to question their    
good intentions4 ,indeed1 it may safely 
be asserted that no people is more      
consciously well-meaning than the       
children of the ,fatherland4 ,it is only
 that1 with their archaic preconceptions
 of what is right and meritorious1 their
 best intentions spell malevolence when 
projected into the civilised world as it
 stands today4 ,and by no fault of      
theirs4 ,nor is it meant to be intimated
 that their rate of approach to the     
accepted ,occidental standard of        
institutional maturity will be unduly   
slow or unduly reluctant1 so soon as the
 pertinent facts of modern life begin   
effectively to shape their habits of    

thought4 ,it is only that1 human        
nature--and human second nature--being  
what it always has been1 the rate of    
approach of the ,german people to a     
passably neutral complexion in matters  
of international animosity and          
aggression must necessarily be slow     
enough to allow ample time for the      
renewed preparation of a more unsparing 
and redoubtable endeavour on the part of
 the ,imperial establishment4  ,what    
makes this ,german ,imperial            
establishment redoubtable1 beyond       
comparison1 is the very simple but also 
very grave combination of circumstances 
whereby the ,german people have acquired
 the use of the modern industrial arts  
in the highest state of efficiency1 at  
the same time that they have retained   
unabated the fanatical loyalty of feudal
 barbarism4#i ,so long1 and in so far1  
as this conjunction of forces holds     
there is no outlook for peace except on 
the elimination of ,germany as a power  
capable of disturbing the peace4        

,footnote #i3 ,for an extended          
discussion of this point1 see ,imperial 
,germany and the ,industrial            
,revolution1 especially ch4 v4 and vi4  
,it may seem invidious to speak so      
recurrently of the ,german ,imperial    
establishment as the sole potential     
disturber of the peace in ,europe4 ,the 
reason for so singling out the ,empire  
for this invidious distinction--of merit
 or demerit1 as one may incline to take 
it--is that the facts run that way4     
,there is1 of course1 other human       
material1 and no small volume of it in  
the aggregate1 that is of much the same 
character1 and serviceable for the same 
purposes as the resources and man-power 
of the ,empire4 ,but this other material
 can come effectually into bearing as a 
means of disturbance only in so far as  
it clusters about the ,imperial dynasty 
and marches under his banners4 ,in so   
speaking of the ,imperial establishment 
as the sole enemy of a ,european peace1 
therefore1 these outlying others are    

taken for granted1 very much as one     
takes the nimbus for granted in speaking
 of one of the greater saints of ,god4  
99       99       99       99       99  
,so the argument returns to the         
alternative3 ,peace by unconditional    
surrender and submission1 or peace by   
elimination of ,imperial ,germany 7and  
,japan74 ,there is no middle course     
apparent4 ,the old-fashioned--that is to
 say nineteenth-century--plan of        
competitive defensive armament and a    
balance of powers has been tried1 and it
 has not proved to be a success1 even so
 early in the twentieth century4 ,this  
plan offers a substitute 7,ersatz7 for  
peace2 but even as such it has become   
impracticable4 ,the modern1 or rather   
the current late-modern1 state of the   
industrial arts does not tolerate it4   
,technological knowledge has thrown the 
advantage in military affairs           
definitively to the offensive1          
particularly to the offensive that is   
prepared beforehand with the suitable   

appliances and with men ready matured in
 that rigorous and protracted training  
by which alone they can become competent
 to make warlike use of these suitable  
appliances provided by the modern       
technology4 ,at the same time1 and by   
grace of the same advance in technology1
 any well-designed offensive can        
effectually reach any given community1  
in spite of distance or of other natural
 obstacles4 ,the era of defensive       
armaments and diplomatic equilibration1 
as a substitute for peace1 has been     
definitively closed by the modern state 
of the industrial arts4  ,of the two    
alternatives spoken of above1 the       
former--peace by submission under an    
alien dynasty--is presumably not a      
practicable solution1 as has appeared in
 the course of the foregoing argument4  
,the modern nations are not spiritually 
ripe for it4 ,whether they have reached 
even that stage of national sobriety1 or
 neutrality1 that would enable them to  
live at peace among themselves after    

elimination of the ,imperial ,powers is 
still open to an uneasy doubt4 ,it would
 be by a precarious margin that they can
 be counted on so to keep the peace in  
the absence of provocation from without 
the pale4 ,their predilection for peace 
goes to no greater lengths than is      
implied in the formula3 ,peace with     
,honour2 which assuredly does not cover 
a peace of non-resistance1 and which1 in
 effect1 leaves the distinction between 
an offensive and a defensive war        
somewhat at loose ends4 ,the national   
prestige is still a live asset in the   
mind of these peoples2 and the limit of 
tolerance in respect of this patriotic  
animosity appears to be drawn           
appreciably closer than the formula     
cited above would necessarily presume4  
,they will fight on provocation1 and the
 degree of provocation required to upset
 the serenity of these sportsmanlike    
modern peoples is a point on which the  
shrewdest guesses may diverge4 ,still1  
opinion runs more and more consistently 

to the effect that if these modern--say 
the ,french and the                     
,english-speaking--peoples were left to 
their own devices the peace might fairly
 be counted on to be kept between them  
indefinitely1 barring unforeseen        
contingencies4  ,experience teaches that
 warlike enterprise on a moderate scale 
and as a side interest is by no means   
incompatible with such a degree of      
neutral animus as these peoples have yet
 acquired1--e4g41 the ,spanish-,american
 war1 which was made in ,america1 or the
 ,boer war1 which was made in ,england4 
,but these wars1 in spite of the        
dimensions which they presently took on1
 were after all of the nature of        
episodes1--the one chiefly an extension 
of sportsmanship1 which engaged the best
 attention of only the more             
sportsmanlike elements1 the other       
chiefly engineered by certain business  
interests with a callous view to getting
 something for nothing4 ,both episodes  
came to be serious enough1 both in their

 immediate incidence and in their       
consequences2 but neither commanded the 
deliberate and cordial support of the   
community at large4 ,there is a         
meretricious air over both2 and there is
 apparent a popular inclination to      
condone rather than to take pride in    
these faits accomplis4 ,the one         
excursion was a product of sportsmanlike
 bravado1 fed on boyish exuberance1     
fomented for mercenary objects by       
certain business interests and          
place-hunting politicians1 and incited  
by meretricious newspapers with a view  
to increase their circulation4 ,the     
other was set afoot by interested       
businessmen1 backed by politicians1     
seconded by newspapers1 and borne by the
 community at large1 in great part under
 misapprehension and stung by wounded   
pride4  ,opinions will diverge widely as
 to the chances of peace in a community 
of nations among whom episodes of this  
character1 and of such dimensions1 have 
been somewhat more than tolerated in the

 immediate past4 ,but the consensus of  
opinion in these same countries appears 
to be setting with fair consistency to  
the persuasion that the popular spirit  
shown in these and in analogous         
conjunctures in the recent past gives   
warrant that peace is deliberately      
desired and is likely to be maintained1 
barring unforeseen contingencies4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,in the large1 the measures conducive to
 the perpetuation of peace1 and         
necessary to be taken1 are simple and   
obvious2 and they are largely of a      
negative character1 exploits of omission
 and neglect4 ,under modern conditions1 
and barring aggression from without1 the
 peace is kept by avoiding the breaking 
of it4 ,it does not break of itself1--in
 the absence of such national           
establishments as are organised with the
 sole ulterior view of warlike          
enterprise4 ,a policy of peace is       
obviously a policy of                   
avoidance1--avoidance of offense and of 

occasion for annoyance4  ,what is       
required to insure the maintenance of   
peace among pacific nations is the      
neutralisation of all those human       
relations out of which international    
grievances are wont to arise4 ,and what 
is necessary to assure a reasonable     
expectation of continued peace is the   
neutralisation of so much of these      
relations as the patriotic self-conceit 
and credulity of these peoples will     
permit4 ,these two formulations are by  
no means identical2 indeed1 the         
disparity between what could            
advantageously be dispensed with in the 
way of national rights and pretensions1 
and what the common run of modern       
patriots could be induced to relinquish1
 is probably much larger than any       
sanguine person would like to believe4  
,it should be plain on slight reflection
 that the greater part1 indeed          
substantially the whole1 of those       
material interests and demands that now 
engage the policy of the nations1 and   

that serve on occasion to set them at   
variance1 might be neutralised or       
relinquished out of hand1 without       
detriment to any one of the peoples     
concerned4  ,the greater part of these  
material interests over which the       
various national establishments keep    
watch and hold pretensions are1 in point
 of historical derivation1 a legacy from
 the princely politics of what is called
 the ,mercantilist period2 and they are 
uniformly of the nature of gratuitous   
interference or discrimination between  
the citizens of the given nation and    
outsiders4 ,except 7doubtfully7 in the  
,english case1 where mercantilist       
policies are commonly believed to have  
been adopted directly for the benefit of
 the commercial interest1 measures of   
this nature are uniformly traceable to  
the endeavours of the crown and its     
officers to strengthen the finances of  
the prince and give him an advantage in 
warlike enterprise4 ,they are kept up   
essentially for the same eventual end of

 preparation for war4 ,so1 e4g41        
protective tariffs1 and the like        
discrimination in shipping1 are still   
advocated as a means of making the      
nation self-supporting1 self-contained1 
self-sufficient2 with a view to         
readiness in the event of hostilities4  
,a nation is in no degree better off in 
time of peace for being self-sufficient4
 ,in point of patent fact no nation can 
be industrially self-sufficient except  
at the cost of foregoing some of the    
economic advantages of that             
specialisation of industry which the    
modern state of the industrial arts     
enforces4 ,in time of peace there is no 
benefit comes to the community at large 
from such restraint of trade with the   
outside world1 or to any class or       
section of the community except those   
commercial concerns that are favored by 
the discrimination2 and these invariably
 gain their special advantage at the    
cost of their compatriots4              
,discrimination in trade--export1 import

 or shipping--has no more beneficial    
effect when carried out publicly by the 
national authorities than when effected 
surreptitiously and illegally by a      
private conspiracy in restraint of trade
 within a group of interested business  
concerns4  ,hitherto the common man has 
found it difficult to divest himself of 
an habitual delusion on this head1      
handed down out of the past and         
inculcated by interested politicians1 to
 the effect that in some mysterious way 
he stands to gain by limiting his own   
opportunities4 ,but the neutralisation  
of international trade1 or the          
abrogation of all discrimination in     
trade1 is the beginning of wisdom as    
touches the perpetuation of peace4 ,the 
first effect of such a neutral policy   
would be wider and more intricately     
interlocking trade relations1 coupled   
with a further specialisation and mutual
 dependence of industry between the     
several countries concerned2 which would
 mean1 in terms of international comity1

 a lessened readiness for warlike       
operations all around4  ,it used to be  
an argument of the free-traders that the
 growth of international commercial     
relations under a free-trade policy     
would greatly conduce to a spirit of    
mutual understanding and forbearance    
between the nations4 ,there may or may  
not be something appreciable in the     
contention2 it has been doubted1 and    
there is no considerable evidence to be 
had in support of it4 ,but what is more 
to the point is the tangible fact that  
such specialisation of industry and     
consequent industrial interdependence   
would leave all parties to this relation
 less capable1 materially and           
spiritually1 to break off amicable      
relations4 ,so again1 in time of peace  
and except with a view to eventual      
hostilities1 it would involve no loss1  
and presumably little pecuniary gain1 to
 any country1 locality1 town or class1  
if all merchant shipping were registered
 indiscriminately under neutral colors  

and sailed under the neutral no-man's   
flag1 responsible indiscriminately to   
the courts where they touched or where  
their business was transacted4  ,neither
 producers1 shippers1 merchants nor     
consumers have any slightest interest in
 the national allegiance of the carriers
 of their freight1 except such as may   
artificially be induced by              
discriminatory shipping regulations4 ,in
 all but the name--in time of peace--the
 world's merchant shipping already comes
 near being so neutralised1 and the     
slight further simplification required  
to leave it on a neutral peace footing  
would be little else than a neglect of  
such vexatious discrimination as is     
still in force4 ,if no nation could     
claim the allegiance1 and therefore the 
usufruct1 of any given item of merchant 
shipping in case of eventual            
hostilities1 on account of the domicile 
of the owners or the port of registry1  
that would create a further handicap on 
eventual warlike enterprise and add so  

much to the margin of tolerance4 ,at the
 same time1 in the event of hostilities1
 shipping sailing under the neutral     
no-man's flag and subject to no national
 allegiance would enjoy such immunities 
as still inure to neutral shipping4 ,it 
is true1 neutrality has not carried many
 immunities lately4  ,cumulatively      
effective usage and the exigencies of a 
large1 varied1 shifting and extensive   
maritime trade have in the course of    
time brought merchant shipping to       
something approaching a neutral footing4
 ,for most1 one might venture to say for
 virtually all1 routine purposes of     
business and legal liability the        
merchant shipping comes under the       
jurisdiction of the local courts1       
without reservation4 ,it is true1 there 
still are formalities and reservations  
which enable questions arising out of   
incidents in the shipping trade to      
become subject of international         
conference and adjustment1 but they are 
after all not such as would warrant the 

erection of national apparatus to take  
care of them in case they were not      
already covered by usage to that effect4
 ,the visible drift of usage toward     
neutralisation in merchant shipping1 in 
maritime trade1 and in international    
commercial transactions1 together with  
the similarly visible feasibility of a  
closer approach to unreserved           
neutralisation of this whole range of   
traffic1 suggests that much the same    
line of considerations should apply as  
regards the personal and pecuniary      
rights of citizens traveling or residing
 abroad4 ,the extreme1--or1 as seen from
 the present point of view1 the         
ultimate--term in the relinquishment of 
national pretensions along this line    
would of course be the neutralisation of
 citizenship4  ,this is not so sweeping 
a move as a patriotically-minded person 
might imagine on the first alarm1 so far
 as touches the practical status of the 
ordinary citizen in his ordinary        
relations1 and particularly among the   

,english-speaking peoples4 ,as an       
illustrative instance1 citizenship has  
sat somewhat lightly on the denizens of 
the ,american republic1 and with no     
evident damage to the community at large
 or to the inhabitants in detail4       
,naturalisation has been easy1 and has  
been sought with no more eagerness1 on  
the whole1 than the notably low terms of
 its acquirement would indicate4        
,without loss or discomfort many        
law-abiding aliens have settled in this 
country and spent the greater part of a 
life-time under its laws without        
becoming citizens1 and no one the worse 
or the wiser for it4 ,not infrequently  
the decisive inducement to              
naturalisation on the part of immigrant 
aliens has been1 and is1 the            
desirability of divesting themselves of 
their rights of citizenship in the      
country of their origin4 ,not that the  
privilege and dignity of citizenship1 in
 this or in any other country1 is to be 
held of little account4 ,it is rather   

that under modern civilised conditions1 
and among a people governed by          
sentiments of humanity and equity1 the  
stranger within our gates suffers no    
obloquy and no despiteful usage for     
being a stranger4 ,it may be admitted   
that of late1 with the fomentation of a 
more accentuated nationalism by         
politicians seeking a raison d'tre1     
additional difficulties have been       
created in the way of naturalisation and
 the like incidents4 ,still1 when all is
 told of the average ,american citizen1 
qua citizen1 there is not much to tell4 
,the like is true throughout the        
,english-speaking peoples1 with         
inconsequential allowance for local     
color4 ,a definitive neutralisation of  
citizenship within the range of these   
,english-speaking countries would       
scarcely ripple the surface of things as
 they are--in time of peace4  ,all of   
which has not touched the sore and      
sacred spot in the received scheme of   
citizenship and its rights and          

liabilities4 ,it is in the event of     
hostilities that the liabilities of the 
citizen at home come into the           
foreground1 and it is as a source of    
patriotic grievance looking to warlike  
retaliation that the rights of the      
citizen abroad chiefly come into the    
case4  ,if1 as was once1 almost         
inaudibly1 hinted by a well-regarded    
statesman1 the national establishment   
should refuse to jeopardise the public  
peace for the safeguarding of the person
 and property of citizens who go out in 
partes infidelium on their own private  
concerns1 and should so leave them under
 the uncurbed jurisdiction of the       
authorities in those countries into     
which they have intruded1 the result    
might in many cases be hardship to such 
individuals4 ,this would1 of course1 be 
true almost exclusively of such         
instances only as occur in such         
localities as are1 temporarily or       
permanently1 outside the pale of modern 
law and order4 ,and1 it may be in place 

to remark1 instances of such hardship1  
with the accompanying hazard of national
 complications1 would1 no doubt1 greatly
 diminish in frequency consequent upon  
the promulgation of such a disclaimer of
 national responsibility for the        
continued well-being of citizens who so 
expatriate themselves in the pursuit of 
their own advantage or amusement4       
,meantime1 let it not seem inconsiderate
 to recall that to the community at     
large the deplorable case of such       
expatriates under hardship involves no  
loss or gain in the material respect2   
and that1 except for the fortuitous     
circumstance of his being a compatriot1 
the given individual's personal or      
pecuniary fortune in foreign parts has  
no special claim on his compatriots'    
sympathy or assistance2 from which it   
follows also that with the definitive   
neutralisation of citizenship as touches
 expatriates1 the sympathy which is now 
somewhat unintelligently confined to    
such cases1 on what may without offense 

be called extraneous grounds1 would     
somewhat more impartially and humanely  
extend to fellowmen in distress1        
regardless of nativity or               
naturalisation4  ,what is mainly to the 
point here1 however1 is the fact that if
 citizenship were so neutralised within 
the range of neutral countries here     
contemplated1 one further source of     
provocation to international jealousy   
and distrust would drop out of the      
situation4 ,and it is not easy to detect
 any element of material loss involved  
in such a move4 ,in the material respect
 no individual would be any the worse   
off1 with the doubtful and dubious      
exception of the expatriate             
fortune-hunter1 who aims to fish safely 
in troubled waters at his compatriots'  
expense4 ,but the case stands otherwise 
as regards the balance of immaterial    
assets4 ,the scaffolding of much        
highly-prized sentiment would collapse1 
and the world of poetry and             
pageantry--particularly that of the     

tawdrier and more vendible poetry and   
pageantry--would be poorer by so much4  
,the ,man ,without a ,country would lose
 his pathetic appeal1 or would at any   
rate lose much of it4 ,it may be1 of    
course1 that in the sequel there would  
result no net loss even in respect of   
these immaterial assets of sentimental  
animation and patriotic                 
self-complacency1 but it is after all   
fairly certain that something would be  
lost1 and it is by no means clear what  
if anything would come in to fill its   
place4  ,an historical parallel may help
 to illustrate the point4 ,in the       
movement out of what may be called the  
royal age of dynasties and chivalric    
service1 those peoples who have moved   
out of that age and out of its spiritual
 atmosphere have lost much of the       
conscious magnanimity and conviction of 
merit that once characterised that order
 of things1 as it still continues to    
characterise the prevalent habit of mind
 in the countries that still continue   

under the archaic order of dynastic     
mastery and service4 ,but it is also to 
be noted that these peoples who so have 
moved out of the archaic order appear to
 be well content with this change of    
spiritual atmosphere1 and they are even 
fairly well persuaded1 in the common    
run1 that the move has brought them some
 net gain in the way of human dignity   
and neighbourly tolerance1 such as to   
offset any loss incurred on the heroic  
and invidious side of life4 ,such is the
 tempering force of habit4 ,whereas1    
e4g41 on the other hand1 the peoples of 
these surviving dynastic ,states1 to    
which it is necessary continually to    
recur1 who have not yet moved out of    
that realm of heroics1 find themselves  
unable to see anything in such a        
prospective shift but net loss and      
headlong decay of the spirit2 that      
modicum of forbearance and equity that  
is requisite to the conduct of life in a
 community of ungraded masterless men is
 seen by these stouter stomachs as a    

loosening of the moral fiber and a loss 
of nerve4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,what is here tentatively  
projected under the phrase1             
neutralization of citizenship1 is only  
something a little more and farther     
along the same general line of movement 
which these more modern peoples have    
been following in all that sequence of  
institutional changes that has given    
them their present distinctive character
 of commonwealths1 as contrasted with   
the dynastic ,states of the mediaeval   
order4 ,what may be in prospect--if such
 a further move away from the mediaeval 
landmarks is to take effect--may best be
 seen in the light of the later moves in
 the same direction hitherto1 more      
particularly as regards the moral and   
aesthetic merits at large of such an    
institutional mutation4 ,as touches this
 last previous shifting of ground along 
this line1 just spoken of1 the case     
stands in this singular but significant 
posture1 in respect of the spiritual    

values and valuations involved3 ,these  
peoples who have1 even in a doubtful    
measure1 made this transition from the  
archaic institutional scheme1 of fealty 
and dynastic exploit and coercion1 to   
the newer scheme of the ungraded        
commonwealth1 are convinced1 to the     
point of martyrdom1 that anything like a
 return to the old order is morally     
impossible as well as insufferably      
shameful and irksome2 whereas those     
people1 of the retarded division of the 
race1 who have had no experience of this
 new order1 are equally convinced that  
it is all quite incompatible with a     
worthy life4  ,evidently1 there should  
be no disputing about tastes4           
,evidently1 too1 these retarded others  
will not move on into the later         
institutional phase1 of the ungraded    
commonwealth1 by preconceived choice2   
but only1 if at all1 by such schooling  
of experience as will bring them        
insensibly to that frame of mind out of 
which the ideal of the ungraded         

commonwealth emerges by easy            
generalisation of workday practice4     
,meantime1 having not yet experienced   
that phase of sentiment and opinion on  
civic rights and immunities that is now 
occupied by their institutionally       
maturer neighbours1 the subjects of the 
,imperial ,fatherland1 e4g41 in spite of
 the most laudable intentions and the   
best endeavour1 are1 by failure of this 
experience1 unable to comprehend either 
the ground of opposition to their       
well-meaning projects of dominion or the
 futility of trying to convert these    
their elder brothers to their own       
prescriptive acceptation of what is     
worth while4 ,in time1 and with         
experience1 this retarded division of   
,christendom may come to the same       
perspective on matters of national usage
 and ideals as has been enforced on the 
more modern peoples by farther          
habituation4 ,so1 also1 in time and with
 experience1 if the drift of            
circumstance shall turn out to set that 

way1 the further move away from         
mediaeval discriminations and constraint
 and into the unspectacular scheme of   
neutralisation may come to seem as      
right1 good and beautiful as the        
democratic commonwealth now seems to the
 ,english-speaking peoples1 or as the   
,hohenzollern ,imperial ,state now seems
 to the subjects of the ,fatherland4    
,there is1 in effect1 no disputing about
 tastes4  ,there is little that is      
novel1 and nothing that is to be rated  
as constructive innovation1 in this     
sketch of what might not inaptly be     
called peace by neglect4 ,the legal     
mind1 which commonly takes the          
initiative in counsels on what to do1   
should scarcely be expected to look in  
that direction for a way out1 or to see 
its way out in that direction in any    
case2 so that it need occasion no       
surprise if the many current projects of
 pacification turn on ingenious and     
elaborate provisions of apparatus and   
procedure1 rather than on that simpler  

line of expedients which the drift of   
circumstance1 being not possessed of a  
legal mind1 has employed in the sequence
 of institutional change hitherto4 ,the 
legal mind that dominates in the current
 deliberations on peace is at home in   
exhaustive specifications and meticulous
 demarkations1 and it is therefore prone
 to seek a remedy for the burden of     
supernumerary devices by recourse to    
further excesses of regulation4  ,this  
trait of the legal mind is not a bad    
fault at the worst1 and the quality in  
which this defect inheres is of the     
greatest moment in any project of       
constructive engineering on the legal   
and political plane4 ,but it is less to 
the purpose1 indeed it is at cross      
purposes1 in such a conjuncture as the  
present2 when the nations are held up in
 their quest of peace chiefly by an     
accumulation of institutional apparatus 
that has out-stayed its usefulness4 ,it 
is the fortune even of good institutions
 to become imbecile with the change of  

conditioning circumstances1 and it then 
becomes a question of their             
disestablishment1 not of their          
rehabilitation4 ,if there is anywhere a 
safe negative conclusion1 it is that an 
institution grown mischievous by        
obsolescence need not be replaced by a  
substitute4  ,instances of such         
mischievous institutional arrangements1 
obsolete or in process of obsolescence1 
would be1 e4g41 the ,french monarchy of 
the ancient rgime1 the ,spanish         
,inquisition1 the ,british corn laws and
 the rotten boroughs1 the ,barbary      
pirates1 the ,turkish rule in ,armenia1 
the ,british crown1 the ,german         
,imperial ,dynasty1 the ,european       
balance of powers1 the ,monroe          
,doctrine4 ,in some sense1 at least in  
the sense and degree implied in their   
selective survival1 these various       
articles of institutional furniture1 and
 many like them1 have once presumably   
been suitable to some end1 in the days  
of their origin and vigorous growth2 and

 they have at least in some passable    
fashion met some felt want2 but if they 
ever had a place and use in the human   
economy they have in time grown imbecile
 and mischievous by force of changing   
circumstances1 and the question is not  
how to replace them with something else 
to the same purpose after their purpose 
is outworn4 ,a man who loses a wart off 
the end of his nose does not apply to   
the ,ersatz bureau for a convenient     
substitute4  ,now1 a large proportion1  
perhaps even substantially the whole1 of
 the existing apparatus of international
 rights1 pretensions1 discriminations1  
covenants and provisos1 visibly fall in 
that class1 in so far as concerns their 
material serviceability to the nation at
 large1 and particularly as regards any 
other than a warlike purpose1 offensive 
or defensive4 ,of course1 the national  
dignity and diplomatic punctilio1 and   
the like adjuncts and instrumentalities 
of the national honour1 all have their  
prestige value2 and they are not likely 

to be given up out of hand4 ,in point of
 fact1 however solicitous for a lasting 
peace these patriotically-minded modern 
peoples may be1 it is doubtful if they  
could be persuaded to give up any       
appreciable share of these appurtenances
 of national jealousy even when their   
retention implies an imminent breach of 
the peace4 ,yet it is plain that the    
peace will be secure in direct          
proportion to the measure in which      
national discrimination and prestige are
 allowed to pass into nothingness and be
 forgot4         99       99       99   
99       99  ,by so much as it might    
amount to1 such neutralisation of       
outstanding interests between these     
pacific nations should bring on a degree
 of coalescence of these nationalities4 
,in effect1 they are now held apart in  
many respects by measures of precaution 
against their coming to a common plan of
 use and wont4 ,the degree of           
coalescence would scarcely be extreme2  
more particularly it could not well     

become onerous1 since it would rest on  
convenience1 inclination and the neglect
 of artificial discrepancies4 ,the more 
intimate institutions of modern life1   
that govern human conduct locally and in
 detail1 need not be affected1 or not   
greatly affected1 for better or worse4  
,yet something appreciable in that way  
might also fairly be looked for in time4
  ,the nature1 reach and prescriptive   
force of this prospective coalescence   
through neutralisation may perhaps best 
be appreciated in the light of what has 
already come to pass1 without design or 
mandatory guidance1 in those lines of   
human interest where the national       
frontiers interpose no bar1 or at least 
no decisive bar1 whether by force of    
unconcern or through impotence4         
,fashions of dress1 equipage and        
decorous usage1 e4g41 run with some     
uniformity throughout these modern      
nations1 and indeed with some degree of 
prescriptive force4 ,there is1 of       
course1 nothing mandatory1 in the       

simpler sense1 about all this2 nor is   
the degree of conformity extreme or     
uniform throughout4 ,but it is a        
ready-made generalisation that only     
those communities are incorporated in   
this cosmopolitan coalescence of usage  
that are moved by their own incitement1 
and only so far as they have an         
effectually felt need of conformity in  
these premises4 ,it is true1 a          
dispassionate outsider1 if such there   
be1 would perhaps be struck by the      
degree of such painstaking conformity to
 canons of conduct which it frequently  
must cost serious effort even to        
ascertain in such detail as the case    
calls for4 ,doubtless1 or at least      
presumably1 conformity under the        
jurisdiction of the fashions1 and in    
related provinces of decorum1 is        
obligatory in a degree that need not be 
looked for throughout the scheme of use 
and wont at large1 even under the       
advisedly established non-interference  
of the authorities4 ,still1 on a point  

on which the evidence hitherto is       
extremely scant it is the part of       
discretion to hold no settled opinion4  
,a more promising line of suggestion is 
probably that afforded by the current   
degree of contact and consistency among 
the modern nations in respect of science
 and scholarship1 as also in the        
aesthetic or the industrial arts4 ,local
 color and local pride1 with one thing  
and another in the way of special       
incitement or inhibition1 may come in to
 vary the run of things1 or to blur or  
hinder a common understanding and mutual
 furtherance and copartnery in these    
matters of taste and intellect4 ,yet it 
is scarcely misleading to speak of the  
peoples of ,christendom as one community
 in these respects4 ,the sciences and   
the arts are held as a joint stock among
 these peoples1 in their elements1 and  
measurably also in their working-out4   
,it is true1 these interests and        
achievements of the race are not        
cultivated with the same assiduity or   

with identical effect throughout2 but it
 is equally true that no effectual bar  
could profitably be interposed1 or would
 be tolerated in the long run in this   
field1 where men have had occasion to   
learn that unlimited collusion is more  
to the purpose than a clannish          
discrimination4         99       99     
99       99       99  ,it is1 no doubt1 
beyond reasonable hope that these       
democratic peoples could be brought     
forthwith to concerted action on the    
lines of such a plan of peace by        
neutralisation of all outstanding       
national pretensions4 ,both the ,french 
and the ,english-speaking peoples are   
too eagerly set on national aims and    
national prestige1 to allow such a plan 
to come to a hearing1 even if something 
of the kind should be spoken for by     
their most trusted leaders4 ,by settled 
habit they are thinking in terms of     
nationality1 and just now they are all  
under the handicap of an inflamed       
national pride4 ,advocacy of such a     

plan1 of course1 does not enter         
seriously into the purpose of this      
inquiry2 which is concerned with the    
conditions under which peace is sought  
today1 with the further conditions      
requisite to its perpetuation1 and with 
the probable effects of such a peace on 
the fortunes of these peoples in case   
peace is established and effectually    
maintained4  ,it is a reasonable        
question1 and one to which a provisional
 answer may be found1 whether the drift 
of circumstances in the present and for 
the immediate future may be counted on  
to set in the direction of a progressive
 neutralisation of the character spoken 
of above1 and therefore possibly toward 
a perpetuation of that peace that is to 
follow the present season of war4 ,so   
also is it an open and interesting      
question whether the drift in that      
direction1 if such is the set of it1 can
 be counted on to prove sufficiently    
swift and massive1 so as not to be      
overtaken and overborne by the push of  

agencies that make for dissension and   
warlike enterprise4  ,anything like a   
categorical answer to these questions   
would have to be a work of vaticination 
or of effrontery1--possibly as much to  
the point the one as the other4 ,but    
there are certain conditions precedent  
to a lasting peace as the outcome of    
events now in train1 and there are      
certain definable contingencies         
conditioned on such current facts as the
 existing state of the industrial arts  
and the state of popular sentiment1     
together with the conjuncture of        
circumstances under which these factors 
will come into action4  ,the state of   
the industrial arts1 as it bears on the 
peace and its violation1 has been spoken
 of above4 ,it is of such a character   
that a judiciously prepared offensive   
launched by any ,power of the first rank
 at an opportune time can reach and lay 
waste any given country of the habitable
 globe4 ,the conclusive evidence of this
 is at hand1 and it is the major premise

 underlying all current proposals and   
projects of peace1 as well as the       
refusal of the nations now on the       
defensive to enter into negotiations    
looking to an inconclusive peace4 ,this 
state of the case is not commonly       
recognised in so many words1 but it is  
well enough understood4 ,so that all    
peace projects that shall hope to find a
 hearing must make up their account with
 it1 and must show cause why they should
 be judged competent to balk any        
attempted offensive4 ,in an inarticulate
 or inchoate fashion1 perhaps1 but none 
the less with ever-increasing certitude 
and increasing apprehension1 this state 
of the case is also coming to be an     
article of popular knowledge and belief1
 wherever much or little thought is     
spent on the outlook for peace4 ,it has 
already had a visible effect in         
diminishing the exclusiveness of        
nationalities and turning the attention 
of the pacific peoples to the question  
of feasible ways and means of           

international cooperation in case of    
need2 but it has not hitherto visibly   
lessened the militant spirit among these
 nations1 nor has it lowered the tension
 of their national pride1 at least not  
yet2 rather the contrary1 in fact4  ,the
 effect1 upon the popular temper1 of    
this inchoate realisation of the        
fatality that so lies in the modern     
state of the industrial arts1 varies    
from one country to another1 according  
to the varying position in which they   
are placed1 or in which they conceive   
themselves to be placed4 ,among the     
belligerent nations it has put the spur 
of fear to their need of concerted      
action as well as to their efforts to   
strengthen the national defense4 ,but   
the state of opinion and sentiment      
abroad in the nation in time of war is  
no secure indication of what it will be 
after the return to peace4 ,the         
,american people1 the largest and most  
immediately concerned of the neutral    
nations1 should afford more significant 

evidence of the changes in the popular  
attitude likely to follow from a growing
 realisation of this state of the case1 
that the advantage has passed           
definitively to any well prepared and   
resolute offensive1 and that no         
precautions of diplomacy and no         
practicable measures of defensive       
armament will any longer give           
security1--provided always that there is
 anywhere a national ,power actuated by 
designs of imperial dominion4  ,it is1  
of course1 only little by little that   
the ,american people and their spokesmen
 have come to realise their own case    
under this late-modern situation1 and   
hitherto only in an imperfect degree4   
,their first response to the stimulus   
has been a display of patriotic         
self-sufficiency and a move to put the  
national defense on a war-footing1 such 
as would be competent to beat off all   
aggression4 ,those elements of the      
population who least realise the gravity
 of the situation1 and who are at the   

same time commercially interested in    
measures of armament or in military     
preferment1 have not begun to shift     
forward beyond this position of         
magniloquence and resolution2 nor is    
there as yet much intimation that they  
see beyond it1 although there is an     
ever-recurring hint that they in a      
degree appreciate the practical         
difficulty of persuading a pacific      
people to make adequate preparation     
beforehand1 in equipment and trained    
man-power1 for such a plan of           
self-sufficient self-defense4 ,but      
increasingly among those who are1 by    
force of temperament or insight or by   
lack of the pecuniary and the placeman's
 interest1 less confident of an appeal  
to the nation's prowess1 there is coming
 forward an evident persuasion that     
warlike                                 
preparations--preparedness--alone and   
carried through by the ,republic in     
isolation1 will scarcely serve the turn4
  ,there are at least two lines of      

argument1 or of persuasion1 running to  
the support of such a view2 readiness   
for a warlike defense1 by providing     
equipment and trained men1 might prove a
 doubtfully effectual measure even when 
carried to the limit of tolerance that  
will always be reached presently in any 
democratic country2 and then1 too1 there
 is hope of avoiding the necessity of   
such warlike preparation1 at least in   
the same extreme degree1 by means of    
some practicable working arrangement to 
be effected with other nations who are  
in the same case4 ,hitherto the farthest
 reach of these pacific schemes for     
maintaining the peace1 or for the common
 defense1 has taken the shape of a      
projected league of neutral nations to  
keep the peace by enforcement of        
specified international police          
regulations or by compulsory arbitration
 of international disputes4 ,it is      
extremely doubtful how far1 if at all1  
popular sentiment of any effectual force
 falls in with this line of             

precautionary measures4 ,yet it is      
evident that popular sentiment1 and     
popular apprehension1 has been stirred  
profoundly by the events of the past two
 years1 and the resulting change that is
 already visible in the prevailing      
sentiment as regards the national       
defense would argue that more           
far-reaching changes in the same        
connection are fairly to be looked for  
within a reasonable allowance of time4  
,in this ,american case the balance of  
effectual public opinion hitherto is to 
all appearance quite in doubt1 but it is
 also quite unsettled4 ,the first       
response has been a display of patriotic
 emotion and national self-assertion4   
,the further1 later and presumably more 
deliberate1 expressions of opinion carry
 a more obvious note of apprehension and
 less of stubborn or unreflecting       
national pride4 ,it may be too early to 
anticipate a material shift of base1 to 
a more neutral1 or less exclusively     
national footing in matters of the      

common defense4  ,the national          
administration has been moving at an    
accelerated rate in the direction not of
 national isolation and self-reliance   
resting on a warlike equipment          
formidable enough to make or break the  
peace at will--such as the more         
truculent and irresponsible among the   
politicians have spoken for--but rather 
in the direction of moderating or       
curtailing all national pretensions that
 are not of undoubted material          
consequence1 and of seeking a common    
understanding and concerted action with 
those nationalities whose effectual     
interests in the matters of peace and   
war coincide with the ,american4 ,the   
administration has grown visibly more   
pacific in the course of its exacting   
experience1--more resolutely1 one might 
even say more aggressively pacific2 but 
the point of chief attention in all this
 strategy of peace has also visibly been
 shifting somewhat from the maintenance 
of a running equilibrium between        

belligerents and a keeping of the peace 
from day to day1 to the ulterior and    
altogether different question of what is
 best to be done toward a conclusive    
peace at the close of hostilities1 and  
the ways and means of its subsequent    
perpetuation4  ,this latter is1 in      
effect1 an altogether different question
 from that of preserving neutrality and 
amicable relations in the midst of      
importunate belligerents1 and it may    
even1 conceivably1 perhaps not unlikely1
 come to involve a precautionary breach 
of the current peace and a taking of    
sides in the war with an urgent view to 
a conclusive outcome4 ,it would be going
 too far to impute to the               
administration1 at the present stage1   
such an aggressive attitude in its      
pursuit of a lasting peace as could be  
called a policy of defensive offense2   
but it will shock no one's sensibilities
 to say that such a policy1 involving a 
taking of sides and a renouncing of     
national isolation1 is visibly less     

remote from the counsels of the         
administration today than it has been at
 any earlier period4  ,in this pacific  
attitude1 increasingly urgent and       
increasingly far-reaching and           
apprehensive1 the administration appears
 to be speaking for the common man      
rather than for the special interests or
 the privileged classes4 ,such would    
appear1 on the face of the returns1 to  
be the meaning of the late election4 ,it
 is all the more significant on that    
account1 since in the long run it is    
after all the common man that will have 
to pass on the expediency of any settled
 line of policy and to bear the material
 burden of carrying it into effect4  ,it
 may seem rash to presume that a        
popularly accredited administration in a
 democratic country must approximately  
reflect the effectual changes of popular
 sentiment and desire4 ,especially would
 it seem rash to anyone looking on from 
the point of view of an undemocratic    
nation1 and therefore prone to see the  

surface fluctuations of excitement and  
shifting clamor4 ,but those who are     
within the democratic pale will know    
that any administration in such a       
country1 where official tenure and      
continued incumbency of the party rest  
on a popular vote1--any such            
administration is a political           
organisation and is guided by political 
expediency1 in the tawdry sense of the  
phrase4 ,such a political situation has 
the defects of its qualities1 as has    
been well and frequently expounded by   
its critics1 but it has also the merits 
of its shortcomings4 ,in a democracy of 
this modern order any incumbent of high 
office is necessarily something of a    
politician1 quite indispensably so2 and 
a politician at the same time           
necessarily is something of a demagogue4
 ,he yields to the popular drift1 or to 
the set of opinion and demands among the
 effective majority on whom he leans2   
and he can not even appear to lead1     
though he may surreptitiously lead      

opinion in adroitly seeming to reflect  
it and obey it4 ,ostensible leadership1 
such as has been staged in this country 
from time to time1 has turned out to be 
ostensible only4 ,the politician must be
 adroit2 but if he is also to be a      
statesman he must be something more4 ,he
 is under the necessity of guessing     
accurately what the drift of events and 
opinion is going to be on the next reach
 ahead2 and in taking coming events by  
the forelock he may be able to guide and
 shape the drift of opinion and         
sentiment somewhat to his own liking4   
,but all the while he must keep within  
the lines of the long-term set of the   
current as it works out in the habits of
 thought of the common man4  ,such      
foresight and flexibility is necessary  
to continued survival1 but flexibility  
of convictions alone does not meet the  
requirements4 ,indeed1 it has been      
tried4 ,it is only the minor            
politicians--the most numerous and      
long-lived1 it is true--who can hold    

their place in the crevices of the party
 organisation1 and get their livelihood 
from the business of party politics1    
without some power of vision and some   
hazard of forecast4 ,it results from    
this state of the case that the drift of
 popular sentiment and the popular      
response to the stimulus of current     
events is reflected more faithfully and 
more promptly by the short-lived        
administrations of a democracy than by  
the stable and formally irresponsible   
governmental establishments of the older
 order4 ,it should also be noted that   
these democratic administrations are in 
a less advantageous position for the    
purpose of guiding popular sentiment and
 shaping it to their own ends4          
99       99       99       99       99  
,now1 it happens that at no period      
within the past half-century has the    
course of events moved with such        
celerity or with so grave a bearing on  
the common good and the prospective     
contingencies of national life as during

 the present administration4 ,this      
apparent congruity of the               
administration's policy with the drift  
of popular feeling and belief will      
incline anyone to put a high rating on  
the administration's course of conduct1 
in international relations as well as in
 national measures that have a bearing  
on international relations1 as          
indicating the course taken by sentiment
 and second thought in the community at 
large1--for1 in effect1 whether or not  
in set form1 the community at large     
reflects on any matters of such gravity 
and urgency as to force themselves upon 
the attention of the common man4  ,two  
main lines of reflection have visibly   
been enforced on the administration by  
the course of events in the             
international field4 ,there has been a  
growing apprehension1 mounting in the   
later months to something like the rank 
of a settled conviction1 that the       
,republic has been marked down for      
reduction to a vassal state by the      

dynastic ,empire now engaged with its   
,european adversaries4 ,in so saying    
that the ,republic has been marked down 
for subjection it is not intended to    
intimate that deliberate counsel has    
been had by the ,imperial establishment 
on that prospective enterprise2 still   
less that a resolution to such effect1  
with specification of ways and means1   
has been embodied in documentary form   
and deposited for future reference in   
the ,imperial archives4 ,all that is    
intended1 and all that is necessary to  
imply1 is that events are in train to   
such effect that the subjugation of the 
,american republic will necessarily find
 its place in the sequence presently1   
provided that the present ,imperial     
adventure is brought to a reasonably    
auspicious issue2 though it does not    
follow that this particular enterprise  
need be counted on as the next large    
adventure in dominion to be undertaken  
when things again fall into promising   
shape4 ,this latter point would1 of     

course1 depend on the conjuncture of    
circumstances1 chief of which would have
 to be the exigencies of imperial       
dominion shaping the policy of the      
,empire's natural and necessary ally in 
the ,far ,east4 ,all this has evidently 
been coming more and more urgently into 
the workday deliberations of the        
,american administration4 ,of course1 it
 is not spoken of in set terms to this  
effect in official utterances1 perhaps  
not even within doors2 that sort of     
thing is not done4 ,but it can do no    
harm to use downright expressions in a  
scientific discussion of these          
phenomena1 with a view to understanding 
the current drift of things in this     
field4  ,beyond this is the similar     
apprehension1 similarly though more     
slowly and reluctantly rising to the    
level of settled conviction1 that the   
,american commonwealth is not fit to    
take care of its own case single-handed4
 ,this apprehension is enforced more and
 more unmistakably with every month that

 passes on the theatre of war4 ,and it  
is reenforced by the constantly more    
obvious reflection that the case of the 
,american commonwealth in this matter is
 the same as that of the democratic     
countries of ,europe1 and of the other  
,european colonies4 ,it is not1 or at   
least one may believe it is not yet1    
that in the patriotic apprehension of   
the common man1 or of the administration
 which speaks for him1 the resources of 
the country would be inadequate to meet 
any contingencies of the kind that might
 arise1 whether in respect of industrial
 capacity or in point of man-power1 if  
these resources were turned to this     
object with the same singleness of      
purpose and the same drastic procedure  
that marks the course of a national     
establishment guided by no              
considerations short of imperial        
dominion4 ,the doubt presents itself    
rather as an apprehension that the cost 
would be extravagantly high1 in all     
respects in which cost can be counted2  

which is presently seconded1 on very    
slight reflection and review of         
experience1 by recognition of the fact  
that a democracy is1 in point of fact1  
not to be persuaded to stand under arms 
interminably in mere readiness for a    
contingency1 however distasteful the    
contingency may be4  ,in point of fact1 
a democratic commonwealth is moved by   
other interests in the main1 and the    
common defense is a secondary           
consideration1 not a primary            
interest1--unless in the exceptional    
case of a commonwealth so placed under  
the immediate threat of invasion as to  
have the common defense forced into the 
place of paramount consequence in its   
workday habits of thought4 ,the         
,american republic is not so placed4    
,anyone may satisfy himself by          
reasonable second thought that the      
people of this nation are not to be     
counted on to do their utmost in time of
 peace to prepare for war4 ,they may be 
persuaded to do much more than has been 

their habit1 and adventurous politicians
 may commit them to much more than the  
people at large would wish to undertake1
 but when all is done that can be       
counted on for a permanency1 up to the  
limit of popular tolerance1 it would be 
a bold guess that should place the      
result at more than one-half of what the
 country is capable of4 ,particularly   
would the people's patience balk at the 
extensive military training requisite to
 put the country in an adequate position
 of defense against a sudden and        
well-prepared offensive4 ,it is         
otherwise with a dynastic ,state1 to the
 directorate of which all other         
interests are necessarily secondary1    
subsidiary1 and mainly to be considered 
only in so far as they are contributory 
to the nation's readiness for warlike   
enterprise4  ,america at the same time  
is placed in an extra-hazardous         
position1 between the two seas beyond   
which to either side lie the two        
,imperial ,powers whose place in the    

modern economy of nations it is to      
disturb the peace in an insatiable quest
 of dominion4 ,this position is no      
longer defensible in isolation1 under   
the later state of the industrial arts1 
and the policy of isolation that has    
guided the national policy hitherto is  
therefore falling out of date4 ,the     
question is as to the manner of its     
renunciation1 rather than the fact of   
it4 ,it may end in a defensive          
copartnership with other nations who are
 placed on the defensive by the same    
threatening situation1 or it may end in 
a bootless struggle for independence1   
but the choice scarcely extends beyond  
this alternative4 ,it will be said1 of  
course1 that ,america is competent to   
take care of itself and its ,monroe     
doctrine in the future as in the past4  
,but that view1 spoken for cogently by  
thoughtful men and by politicians       
looking for party advantage1 overlooks  
the fact that the modern technology has 
definitively thrown the advantage to the

 offensive1 and that intervening seas   
can no longer be counted on as a        
decisive obstacle4 ,on this latter head1
 what was reasonably true fifteen years 
ago is doubtful today1 and it is in all 
reasonable expectation invalid for the  
situation fifteen years hence4  ,the    
other peoples that are of a neutral     
temper may need the help of ,america    
sorely enough in their endeavours to    
keep the peace1 but ,america's need of  
cooperation is sorer still1 for the     
,republic is coming into a more         
precarious place than any of the others4
 ,america is also1 at least potentially1
 the most democratic of the greater     
,powers1 and is handicapped with all the
 disabilities of a democratic           
commonwealth in the face of war4        
,america is also for the present1 and   
perhaps for the calculable future1 the  
most powerful of these greater ,powers1 
in point of conceivably available       
resources1 though not in actually       
available fighting-power2 and the       

entrance of ,america unreservedly into a
 neutral league would consequently be   
decisive both of the purposes of the    
league and of its efficiency for the    
purpose2 particularly if the            
neutralisation of interests among the   
members of the league were carried so   
far as to make withdrawal and           
independent action disadvantageous4  ,on
 the establishment of such a neutral    
league1 with such neutralisation of     
national interests as would assure      
concerted action in time of stress1 the 
need of armament on the part of the     
,american republic would disappear1 at  
least to the extent that no increase of 
armed force would be advisable4 ,the    
strength of the ,republic lies in its   
large and varied resources and the      
unequalled industrial capacity of its   
population1--a capacity which is today  
seriously hampered by untoward business 
interests and business methods sheltered
 under national discrimination1 but     
which would come more nearly to its own 

so soon as these national               
discriminations were corrected or       
abrogated in the neutralisation of      
national pretensions4 ,the              
neutrally-minded countries of ,europe   
have been constrained to learn the art  
of modern war1 as also to equip         
themselves with the necessary           
appliances1 sufficient to meet all      
requirements for keeping the peace      
through such a period as can or need be 
taken into account1--provided the peace 
that is to come on the conclusion of the
 present war shall be placed on so      
conclusive a footing as will make it    
anything substantially more than a      
season of recuperation for that warlike 
,power about whose enterprise in        
dominion the whole question turns4      
,provided that suitably substantial     
guarantees of a reasonable quiescence on
 the part of this ,imperial ,power are  
had1 there need be no increase of the   
,american armament4 ,any increased      
armament would in that case amount to   

nothing better than an idle duplication 
of plant and personnel already on hand  
and sufficient to meet the requirements4
  ,to meet the contingencies had in view
 in its formation1 such a league would  
have to be neutralised to the point that
 all pertinent national pretensions     
would fall into virtual abeyance1 so    
that all the necessary resources at the 
disposal of the federated nations would 
automatically come under the control of 
the league's appointed authorities      
without loss of time1 whenever the need 
might arise4 ,that is to say1 national  
interests and pretensions would have to 
give way to a collective control        
sufficient to insure prompt and         
concerted action4 ,in the face of such a
 neutral league ,imperial ,japan alone  
would be unable to make a really serious
 diversion or to entertain much hope of 
following up its quest of dominion4 ,the
 ,japanese ,imperial establishment might
 even be persuaded peaceably to let its 
unoffending neighbours live their own   

life according to their own light4 ,it  
is1 indeed1 possibly the apprehension of
 some such contingency that has hurried 
the rapacity of the ,island ,empire into
 the headlong indecencies of the past   
year or two4     ,,chapter ,,vi         
,,elimination ,,of ,,the ,,unfit   ,it  
may seem early 7,january #aiag7 to offer
 a surmise as to what must be the manner
 of league into which the pacific       
nations are to enter and by which the   
peace will be kept1 in case such a move 
is to be made4 ,but the circumstances   
that are to urge such a line of action1 
and that will condition its carrying out
 in case it is entered on1 have already 
come into bearing and should1 on the    
whole1 no longer be especially obscure  
to anyone who will let the facts of the 
case rather than his own predilections  
decide what he will believe4 ,by and    
large1 the pressure of these            
conditioning circumstances may be seen1 
and the line of least resistance under  
this pressure may be calculated1 with   

due allowance of a margin of error owing
 to unknown contingencies of time and   
minor variables4  ,time is of the       
essence of the case4 ,so that what would
 have been dismissed as idle vapour two 
years ago has already become subject of 
grave deliberation today1 and may rise  
to paramount urgency that far hence4    
,time is needed to appreciate and get   
used to any innovation of appreciable   
gravity1 particularly where the         
innovation depends in any degree on a   
change in public sentiment1 as in this  
instance4 ,the present outlook would    
seem to be that no excess of time is    
allowed in these premises2 but it should
 also be noted that events are moving   
with unexampled celerity1 and are       
impinging on the popular apprehension   
with unexampled force1--unexampled on   
such a scale4 ,it is hoped that a       
recital of these circumstances that     
provoke to action along this line will  
not seem unwarrantably tedious1 and that
 a tentative definition of the line of  

least resistance under pressure of these
 circumstances may not seem             
unwarrantably presumptuous4  ,the major 
premise in the case is the felt need of 
security from aggression at the hands of
 ,imperial ,germany and its auxiliary   
,powers2 seconded by an increasingly    
uneasy apprehension as to the           
prospective line of conduct on the part 
of ,imperial ,japan1 bent on a similar  
quest of dominion4 ,there is also the   
less articulate apprehension of what1 if
 anything1 may be expected from         
,imperial ,russia2 an obscure and       
scarcely definable factor1 which comes  
into the calculation chiefly by way of  
reenforcing the urgency of the situation
 created by the dynastic ambitions of   
these other two ,imperial ,states4      
,further1 the pacific nations1 the      
leading ones among them being the       
,french and ,english-speaking peoples1  
are coming to recognise that no one     
among them can provide for its own      
security single-handed1 even at the cost

 of their utmost endeavour in the way of
 what is latterly called preparedness2  
and they are at the same time unwilling 
to devote their force unreservedly to   
warlike preparation1 having nothing to  
gain4 ,the solution proposed is a league
 of the pacific nations1 commonly spoken
 of at the present stage as a league to 
enforce peace1 or less ambitiously as a 
league to enforce arbitration4 ,the     
question being left somewhat at loose   
ends1 whether the projected league is to
 include the two or three ,imperial     
,powers whose pacific intentions are1   
euphemistically1 open to doubt4  ,such  
is the outline of the project and its   
premises4 ,an attempt to fill in this   
outline will1 perhaps1 conduce to an    
appreciation of what is sought and of   
what the conditioning circumstances will
 enforce in the course of its           
realisation4 ,as touches the fear of    
aggression1 it has already been         
indicated1 perhaps with unnecessary     
iteration1 that these two ,imperial     

,powers are unable to relinquish the    
quest of dominion through warlike       
enterprise1 because as dynastic ,states 
they have no other ulterior aim2 as has 
abundantly appeared in the great volume 
of expository statements that have come 
out of the ,fatherland the past few     
years1 official1 semi-official1         
inspired1 and spontaneous4 ,assurance of
 the nation's future is not translatable
 into any other terms4 ,the ,imperial   
dynasty has no other ground to stand on1
 and can not give up the enterprise so  
long as it can muster force for any     
formidable diversion1 to get anything in
 the way of dominion by seizure1 threat 
or chicane4  ,this is coming to be      
informally and loosely1 but none the    
less definitively1 realised by the      
pacific nations2 and the realisation of 
it is gaining in clearness and assurance
 as time passes4 ,and it is backed by   
the conviction that1 in the nature of   
things1 no engagement on the part of    
such a dynastic ,state has any slightest

 binding force1 beyond the material     
constraint that would enforce it from   
the outside4 ,so the demand has been    
diplomatically phrased as a demand for  
substantial guarantees4 ,any gain in    
resources on the part of these ,powers  
is to be counted as a gain in the ways  
and means of disturbing the peace1      
without reservation4  ,the pacific      
nations include among them two large    
items1 both of which are indispensable  
to the success of the project1 the      
,united ,states and the ,united         
,kingdom4 ,the former brings in its     
train1 virtually without exception or   
question1 the other ,american republics1
 none of which can practicably go in or 
stay out except in company and collusion
 with the ,united ,states4 ,the ,united 
,kingdom after the same fashion1 and    
with scarcely less assurance1 may be    
counted on to carry the ,british        
colonies4 ,evidently1 without both of   
these groups the project would not even 
make a beginning4 ,beyond this is to be 

counted in as elements of strength1     
though scarcely indispensable1 ,france1 
,belgium1 the ,netherlands and the      
,scandinavian countries4 ,the other     
west-,european nations would in all     
probability be found in the league1     
although so far as regards its work and 
its fortunes their adhesion would       
scarcely be a matter of decisive        
consequence2 they may therefore be left 
somewhat on one side in any             
consideration of the circumstances that 
would shape the league1 its aims and its
 limitations4 ,the ,balkan states1 in   
the wider acceptance1 they that frequent
 the ,sign of the ,double ,cross1 are   
similarly negligible in respect of the  
organisation of such a league or its    
resources and the mutual concessions    
necessary to be made between its chief  
members4 ,russia is so doubtful a       
factor1 particularly as regards its     
place and value in industry1 culture and
 politics1 in the near future1 as to    
admit nothing much more than a doubt on 

what its relation to the situation will 
be4 ,the evil intentions of the         
,imperial-bureaucratic establishment are
 probably no more to be questioned than 
the good intentions of the underlying   
peoples of ,russia4 ,china will have to 
be taken in1 if for no other reason than
 the use to which the magnificent       
resources of that country would be      
turned by its ,imperial neighbour in the
 absence of insurmountable interference 
from outside4 ,but ,china will come in  
on any terms that include neutrality and
 security4  ,the question then arises as
 to the ,imperial ,powers whose dynastic
 enterprise is primarily to be hedged   
against by such a league4 ,reflection   
will show that if the league is to      
effect any appreciable part of its      
purpose1 these ,powers will also be     
included in the league1 or at least in  
its jurisdiction4 ,a pacific league not 
including these ,powers1 or not         
extending its jurisdiction and          
surveillance to them and their conduct1 

would come to the same thing as a       
coalition of nations in two hostile     
groups1 the one standing on the         
defensive against the warlike           
machinations of the other1 and both     
groups bidding for the favor of those   
minor ,powers whose traditions and      
current aspirations run to national     
7dynastic7 aggrandizement by way of     
political intrigue4 ,it would come to a 
more articulate and accentuated form of 
that balance of power that has latterly 
gone bankrupt in ,europe1 with the most 
corrupt and unreliable petty monarchies 
of eastern ,europe vested with a casting
 vote2 and it would also involve a      
system of competitive armaments of the  
same general character as what has also 
shown itself bankrupt4 ,it would1 in    
other words1 mean a virtual return to   
the status quo ante1 but with an overt  
recognition of its provisional          
character1 and with the lines of        
division more sharply drawn4 ,that is to
 say1 it would amount to reinstating the

 situation which the projected league is
 intended to avert4 ,it is evidently    
contained in the premises that the      
projected league must be all-inclusive1 
at least as regards its jurisdiction and
 surveillance4 ,the argument will return
 to this point presently4  ,the purpose 
of the projected league is peace and    
security1 commonly spoken of under      
patriotic preconceptions as national    
peace and security4 ,this will have to  
mean a competent enforcement of peace1  
on such a footing of overmastering force
 at the disposal of the associated      
pacific nations as to make security a   
matter of ordinary routine4 ,it is true1
 the more genial spokesmen of the       
project are given to the view that what 
is to come of it all is a comity of     
neutral nations1 amicably adjusting     
their own relations among themselves in 
a spirit of peace and good-will4 ,but   
this view is over-sanguine1 in that it  
overlooks the point that into this      
prospective comity of nations ,imperial 

,germany 7and ,imperial ,japan7 fit like
 a drunken savage with a machine gun4   
,it also overlooks the patent fatality  
that these two are bound to come into a 
coalition at the next turn1 with        
whatever outside and subsidiary         
resources they can draw on2 provided    
only that a reasonable opening for      
further enterprise presents itself4 ,the
 league1 in other terms1 must be in a   
position to enforce peace by            
overmastering force1 and to anticipate  
any move at cross purposes with the     
security of the pacific nations4  ,this 
end can be reached by either one of two 
ways4 ,if the dynastic ,states are left 
to their own devices1 it will be        
incumbent on the associated nations to  
put in the field a standing force       
sufficient to prevent a recourse to     
arms2 which means competitive armament  
and universal military rule4 ,or the    
dynastic ,states may be taken into      
partnership and placed under such       
surveillance and constraint as to       

practically disarm them2 which would    
admit virtual disarmament of the        
federated nations4 ,the former          
arrangement has nothing in its favour1  
except the possibility that no better or
 less irksome arrangement can be had    
under existing circumstances2 that is to
 say that the pacific nations may not be
 able to bring these dynastic states to 
terms of disarmament under surveillance4
 ,they assuredly can not except by      
force2 and this is the precise point on 
which the continued hostilities in      
,europe turn today4 ,in diplomatic      
parable the ,german ,imperial spokesmen 
say that they can accept 7or as they    
prefer to phrase it1 grant7 no terms    
that do not fully safeguard the ,future 
of the ,fatherland2 and in similarly    
diplomatic parable the spokesmen of the 
,entente insist that ,prussian          
militarism must be permanently put out  
of commission2 but it all means the same
 thing1 viz4 that the ,imperial         
establishment is to be 7or is not to be7

 disabled beyond the possibility of its 
entering on a similar warlike enterprise
 again1 when it has had time for        
recuperation4 ,the dynastic statesmen1  
and the lay subjects of the ,imperial   
establishment1 are strenuously set on   
securing a fair opportunity for         
recuperation and a wiser endeavour to   
achieve that dominion which the present 
adventure promises to defeat2 while the 
,entente want no recurrence1 and are    
persuaded that a recurrence can be      
avoided only on the footing of a present
 collapse of the ,imperial power and a  
scrupulously enforced prostration of it 
henceforth4  ,without the definitive    
collapse of the ,imperial power no      
pacific league of nations can come to   
anything much more than armistice4 ,on  
the basis of such a collapse the league 
may as well administer its affairs      
economically by way of an all-around    
reduction of armaments1 as by the       
costlier and more irksome way of        
preparedness4 ,but a sensible reduction 

of armaments on the part of the neutral 
nations implies disarmament of the      
dynastic ,states4 ,which would involve a
 neutral surveillance of the affairs of 
these dynastic ,states in such detail   
and with such exercise of authority as  
would reduce their governments to the   
effective status of local administrative
 officials4 ,out of which1 in turn1     
would arise complications that would    
lead to necessary readjustments all     
along the line4 ,it would involve the   
virtual1 if not also the formal1        
abolition of the monarchy1 since the    
monarchy has no other use than that of  
international war and intrigue2 or at   
least it would involve the virtual      
abrogation of its powers1 reducing it to
 the same status of faineantise as now  
characterises the ,british crown4       
,evidently this means a serious         
intermeddling in the domestic concerns  
and arrangements of the ,fatherland1    
such as is not admissible under the     
democratic principle that any people    

must be left free to follow their own   
inclinations and devices in their own   
concerns2 at the same time that this    
degree of interference is imperative if 
the peace is to be kept on any other    
footing than that of eternal vigilance  
and superior armed force1 with a people 
whose own inclinations and devices are  
of the kind now grown familiar in the   
,german case1--all of which also        
applies1 with accentuation1 in the case 
of ,imperial ,japan4         99       99
       99       99       99  ,some such 
policy of neutral surveillance in the   
affairs of these peoples whose pacific  
temper is under suspicion1 is           
necessarily involved in a plan to       
enforce peace by concert of the pacific 
nations1 and it will necessarily carry  
implications and farther issues1        
touching not only these supposedly      
recalcitrant peoples1 but also as       
regards the pacific nations themselves4 
,assuming always that the prime purpose 
and consistent aim of the projected     

league is the peace and security of     
those pacific nations on whose          
initiative it is to be achieved1 then it
 should be reasonable to assume that the
 course of procedure in its             
organisation1 administration and further
 adaptations and adjustments must follow
 the logic of necessities leading to    
that end4 ,he who wills the end must    
make up his account with the means4     
,the end in this case is peace and      
security2 which means1 for practical    
purposes1 peace and good-will4 ,ill-will
 is not a secure foundation of peace4   
,even the military strategists of the   
,imperial establishment recommend a     
programme of frightfulness only as a    
convenient military expedient1          
essentially a provisional basis of      
tranquility4 ,in the long run and as a  
permanent peace measure it is doubtless 
not to the point4 ,security is finally  
to be had among or between modern       
peoples only on the ground of a common  
understanding and an impartially common 

basis of equity1 or something           
approaching that basis as nearly as     
circumstances will permit4 ,which means 
that in so far as the projected         
peace-compact is to take effect in any  
enduring way1 and leave the federated   
nations some degree of freedom from     
persistent apprehension and animosity1  
as well as from habitual insecurity of  
life and limb1 the league must not only 
be all-inclusive1 but it must be        
inclusively uniform in all its          
requirements and regulations4  ,the     
peoples of the quondam ,imperial nations
 must come into the league on a footing 
of formal equality with the rest4 ,this 
they can not do without the virtual     
abdication of their dynastic            
governmental establishments and a       
consequent shift to a democratic form of
 organisation1 and a formal abrogation  
of class privileges and prerogatives4   
,however1 a virtual abdication or       
cancelment of the dynastic rule1 such as
 to bring it formally into the same     

class with the ,british crown1 would    
scarcely meet the requirements in the   
case of the ,german ,imperial           
establishment2 still more patently not  
in the case of ,imperial ,japan4 ,if1   
following the outlines of the decayed   
,british crown1 one or the other of     
these ,imperial establishments were by  
formal enactment reduced to a state of  
nominal desuetude1 the effect would be  
very appreciably different from what    
happens in the ,british community1 where
 the crown has lost its powers by       
failure of the requisite subordination  
on the part of the people1 and not by a 
formal abdication of rights4 ,in the    
,german case1 and even more in the      
,japanese case1 the strength of the     
,imperial establishment lies in the     
unimpaired loyalty of the populace2     
which would remain nearly intact at the 
outset1 and would thin out only by      
insensible degrees in the sequel2 so    
that if only the ,imperial establishment
 were left formally standing it would   

command the fealty of the common run in 
spite of any formal abrogation of its   
powers1 and the course of things would1 
in effect1 run as before the break4 ,in 
effect1 to bring about a shift to a     
democratic basis the dynastic slate     
would have to be wiped very clean       
indeed4 ,and this shift would be        
indispensable to the successful conduct 
of such a pacific league of nations1    
since any other than an effectually     
democratic national establishment is to 
be counted on unfailingly to intrigue   
for dynastic aggrandizement1 through    
good report and evil4  ,in a case like  
that of ,imperial ,germany1 with its    
federated ,states and subsidiaries1     
where royalty and nobility still are    
potent preconceptions investing the     
popular imagination1 and where loyal    
abnegation in the presence of authority 
still is the chief and staple virtue of 
the common man1--in all such cases      
virtual abdication of the dynastic      
initiative under constitutional forms   

can be had only by a formal and         
scrupulously complete abrogation of all 
those legal and customary arrangements  
on which this irresponsible exercise of 
authority has rested and through which  
it has taken effect4 ,neutralisation in 
these instances will mean reduction to  
an unqualified democratic footing2 which
 will1 at least at the outset1 not be   
acceptable to the common people1 and    
will be wholly intolerable to the ruling
 classes4 ,such a rgime1 therefore1     
while it is indispensable as a working  
basis for a neutral league of peace1    
would from the outset have to be        
enforced against the most desperate     
resistance of the ruling classes1 headed
 by the dynastic statesmen and warlords1
 and backed by the stubborn loyalty of  
the subject populace4 ,it would have to 
mean the end of things for the ruling   
classes and the most distasteful        
submission to an alien scheme of use and
 wont for the populace4 ,and yet it is  
also an indispensable element in any    

scheme of pacification that aims at     
permanent peace and security4 ,in time1 
it may well be believed1 the people of  
the ,fatherland might learn to do well  
enough without the gratuitous domination
 of their ruling classes1 but at the    
outset it would be a heartfelt          
privation4  ,it follows that a league to
 enforce peace would have to begin its  
rgime with enforcing peace on terms of  
the unconditional surrender of the      
formidable warlike nations2 which could 
be accomplished only by the absolute and
 irretrievable defeat of these ,powers  
as they now stand4 ,the question will1  
no doubt1 present itself1 ,is the end   
worth the cost8 ,that question can1 of  
course1 not be answered in absolute     
terms1 inasmuch as it resolves itself   
into a question of taste and            
prepossession4 ,an answer to it would   
also not be greatly to the purpose here1
 since it would have no particular      
bearing on the course of action likely  
to be pursued by these pacific nations  

in their quest of a settled peace4 ,it  
is more to the point to ask what is     
likely to be the practical decision of  
these peoples on that head when the     
question finally presents itself in a   
concrete form4  ,again it is necessary  
to call to mind that any momentous      
innovation which rests on popular       
sentiment will take time2 that          
consequently anything like a plbiscite  
on the question today would scarcely    
give a safe index of what the decision  
is likely to be when presently put to   
the test2 and that as things go just    
now1 swiftly and urgent1 any            
time-allowance counts at something more 
than its ordinary workday coefficient4  
,what can apparently be said with some  
degree of confidence is that just now1  
during these two years past1 sentiment  
has been moving in the direction        
indicated1 and that any growing         
inclination of the kind is being        
strongly reenforced by a growing        
realisation that nothing but heroic     

remedies will avail at this juncture4   
,if it comes to be currently recognised 
that a settled peace can be had only at 
the cost of eradicating privilege and   
royalty from the warlike nations1 it    
would seem reasonable to expect1 from   
their present state of mind1 that the   
pacific nations will scarcely hesitate  
to apply that remedy1--provided always  
that the fortunes of war fall out as    
that measure would require1 and provided
 also that the conflict lasts long      
enough and severe enough to let them    
make up their mind to anything so       
drastic4         99       99       99   
99       99  ,there is a certain side   
issue bearing on this question of the   
ulterior probabilities of popular       
sentiment and national policy as to what
 is to be done with the warlike nations 
in the event that the allied nations who
 fight for neutrality have the disposal 
of such matters4 ,this side issue may   
seem remote1 and it may not unlikely be 
overlooked among the mass of graver and 

more tangible considerations4 ,it was   
remarked above that the ,united ,kingdom
 is one of the two chief pillars of the 
projected house of peace2 and it may be 
added without serious fear of           
contradiction or annoyance that the     
,united ,kingdom is also the one among  
these pacific nations that comes nearest
 being capable1 in the event of such an 
emergency1 to take care of its own case 
single-handed4 ,for better or worse1    
,british adhesion to the project is     
indispensable1 and the ,british are in a
 position virtually to name their own   
terms of adhesion4 ,the ,british        
commonwealth--a very inclusive phrase in
 this connection--must form the core of 
the pacific league1 if any1 and ,british
 sentiment will have a very great place 
in the terms of its formation and in the
 terms which it will be inclined to     
offer the ,imperial coalition at the    
settlement4  ,now1 it happens that the  
,british community entered on this war  
as a democratic monarchy ruled and      

officered by a body of                  
gentlemen--doubtless the most correct   
and admirable muster of gentlemen1 of   
anything approaching its volume1 that   
the modern world can show4 ,but the war 
has turned out not to be a gentlemen's  
war4 ,it has on the contrary been a war 
of technological exploits1 reenforced   
with all the beastly devices of the     
heathen4 ,it is a war in which all the  
specific traits of the well-bred and    
gently-minded man are a handicap2 in    
which veracity1 gallantry1 humanity1    
liberality are conducive to nothing but 
defeat and humiliation4 ,the death-rate 
among the ,british gentlemen-officers in
 the early months1 and for many months1 
ran extravagantly high1 for the most    
part because they were gallant gentlemen
 as well as officers imbued with the    
good1 old class spirit of noblesse      
oblige1 that has made half the tradition
 and more than half the working theory  
of the ,british officer in the          
field1--good1 but old1 hopelessly out of

 date4 ,that generation of officers     
died1 for the most part2 being unfit to 
survive or to serve the purpose under   
these modern conditions of warfare1 to  
which their enemy on the other hand had 
adapted themselves with easy facility   
from beforehand4 ,the gentlemanly       
qualifications1 and the material        
apparatus of gentility1 and1 it will    
perhaps have to be admitted1 the        
gentlemen1 have fallen into the         
background1 or perhaps rather have      
measurably fallen into abeyance1 among  
the officers of the line4 ,there may be 
more doubt as to the state of things in 
respect of the gentility of the staff1  
but the best that can confidently be    
said is that it is a point in doubt4    
,it is hoped that one may say without   
offense that in the course of time the  
personnel has apparently worked down to 
the level of vulgarity defined by the   
ways and means of this modern warfare2  
which means the level on which runs a   
familiar acquaintance with large and    

complex mechanical apparatus1 railway   
and highway transport and power1        
reenforced concrete1 excavations and    
mud1 more particularly mud1 concealment 
and ambush1 and unlimited deceit and    
ferocity4 ,it is not precisely that     
persons of pedigree and gentle breeding 
have ceased to enter or seek entrance to
 employment as officers1 still less that
 measures have been taken to restrain   
their doing so or to eliminate from the 
service those who have come into        
it--though there may present itself a   
doubt on this point as touches the more 
responsible discretionary positions--but
 only that the stock of suitable        
gentlemen1 uncommonly large as it is1   
has been overdrawn2 that those who have 
latterly gone into service1 or stayed   
in1 have perforce divested themselves of
 their gentility in some appreciable    
measure1 particularly as regards class  
distinction1 and have fallen on their   
feet in the more commonplace role of    
common men4  ,serviceability in this    

modern warfare is conditioned on much   
the same traits of temperament and      
training that make for usefulness in the
 modern industrial processes1 where     
large-scale coordinations of movement   
and an effective familiarity with       
precise and far-reaching mechanical     
processes is an indispensable           
requirement1--indispensable in the same 
measure as the efficient conduct of this
 modern machine industry is             
indispensable4 ,but the ,british        
gentleman1 in so far as he runs true to 
type1 is of no use to modern industry2  
quite the contrary1 in fact4 ,still1 the
 ,british gentleman is1 in point of     
heredity1 the same thing over again as  
the ,british common man2 so that1       
barring the misdirected training that   
makes him a gentleman1 and which can    
largely be undone under urgent need and 
pressure1 he can be made serviceable for
 such uses as the modern warfare        
requires4 ,meantime the very large      
demand for officers1 and the insatiable 

demand for capable officers1 has brought
 the experienced and capable common man 
into the case and is in a fair way to   
discredit gentility as a necessary      
qualification of field officers4  ,but  
the same process of discredit and       
elimination is also extending to the    
responsible officials who have the      
administration of things in hand4       
,indeed1 the course of vulgarisation    
among the responsible officials has now 
been under way for some appreciable time
 and with very perceptible effect1 and  
the rate of displacement appears to be  
gathering velocity with every month that
 passes4 ,here1 as in the field         
operations1 it also appears that        
gentlemanly methods1 standards1         
preconceptions1 and knowledge of men and
 things1 is no longer to the purpose4   
,here1 too1 it is increasingly evident  
that this is not a gentlemen's war4 ,and
 the traditional qualifications that    
have sufficed in the past1 at least to  
the extent of enabling the ,british     

management to muddle through1 as they   
are proudly in the habit of             
saying1--these qualifications are of    
slight account in this technological    
conjuncture of the nation's fortunes4   
,it would perhaps be an under-statement 
to say that these gentlemanly           
qualifications are no longer of any     
account1 for the purpose immediately in 
hand1 and it would doubtless not do to  
say that they are wholly and            
unreservedly disserviceable as things   
run today2 but captious critics might   
find at least a precarious footing of   
argument on such a proposition4         
,through the course of the nineteenth   
century the ,british government had     
progressively been taking on the        
complexion of a gentlemen's agreement2 a
 government by gentlemen1 for gentlemen1
 and of gentlemen1 too1 beyond what     
could well be alleged in any other known
 instance1 though never wholly so4 ,no  
government could be a government of     
gentlemen exclusively1 since there is no

 pecuniary profit in gentlemen as such1 
and therefore no object in governing    
them2 more particularly could there     
never be any incentive in it for        
gentlemen1 whose livelihood is1 in the  
nature of the case1 drawn from some one 
else4 ,a gentlemen's government can     
escape death by inanition only in so far
 as it serves the material interest of  
its class1 as contrasted with the       
underlying population from which the    
class draws its livelihood4 ,this       
,british arrangement of a government by 
prudent and humane gentlemen with a view
 to the conservation of that state of   
things that best conduced to the        
material well-being of their own class1 
has on the whole had the loyal support  
of the underlying populace1 with an     
occasional floundering protest4 ,but the
 protest has never taken the shape of an
 expressed distrust of gentlemen1       
considered as the staple ways and means 
of government2 nor has the direction of 
affairs ever descended into the hands of

 any other or lower class or condition  
of men4  ,on the whole1 this ,british   
arrangement for the control of national 
affairs by a body of interested         
gentlemen-investors has been1 and       
perhaps still is1 just as well at home  
in the affectionate preconceptions of   
the nineteenth-century ,british as the  
corresponding ,german usufruct by       
self-appointed swaggering aristocrats   
has been among the underlying ,german   
population1 or as the ,american         
arrangement of national control by      
business men for business ends4 ,the    
,british and the ,american arrangements 
run very much to the same substantial   
effect1 of course1 inasmuch as the      
,british gentlemen represent1 as a      
class1 the filial generations of a      
business community1 and their aims and  
standards of conduct continue to be such
 as are enforced by the pecuniary       
interests on which their gentility is   
conditioned4 ,they continue to draw the 
ways and means of a worthy life from    

businesslike arrangements of a vested   
character1 made and provided with a view
 to their nourishment and repose4 ,their
 resulting usufruct of the community's  
productive efforts rests on a vested    
interest of a pecuniary sort1 sanctioned
 by the sacred rights of property2 very 
much as the analogous ,german dynastic  
and aristocratic usufruct rests on      
personal prerogative1 sanctioned by the 
sacred rights of authentic prescription1
 without afterthought4 ,the two1 it will
 be noted are very much alike1 in       
effect1 under the skin4 ,the great      
distinguishing mark being that the      
,german usufructuary gentlemen are1 in  
theory at least1 gentlemen-adventurers  
of prowess and proud words1 whose place 
in the world's economy it is to glorify 
,god and disturb the peace2 whereas     
their ,british analogues are            
gentlemen-investors1 of blameless       
propriety1 whose place it is more simply
 to glorify ,god and enjoy ,him forever4
  ,all this arrangement of a usufruct   

with a view to the reputable consumption
 of the community's superfluous         
production has had the cordial support  
of ,british sentiment1 perhaps fully as 
cordial as the ,german popular          
subservience in the corresponding       
,german scheme2 both being well embedded
 in the preconceptions of the common    
man4 ,but the war has put it all to a   
rude test1 and has called on the        
,british gentlemen's executive committee
 to take over duties for which it was   
not designed4 ,the exigencies of this   
war of technological exploits have been 
almost wholly1 and very insistently1 of 
a character not contemplated in the     
constitution of such an executive       
committee of gentlemen-investors        
designed to safeguard class interests   
and promote their pecuniary class       
advantage by a blamelessly inconspicuous
 and indirect management of national    
affairs4 ,the methods are of the class  
known colloquially among the            
vulgar-spoken ,american politicians as  

pussyfooting and log-rolling2 but always
 with such circumstance of magnitude1   
authenticity and well-bred deference to 
precedent1 as to give the resulting     
routine of subreption1 trover and       
conversion1 an air not only of          
benevolent consideration but of austere 
morality4  ,but the most austere        
courtesy and the most authentically     
dispassionate division of benefits will 
not meet the underbred exigencies of a  
war conducted on the mechanistic lines  
of the modern state of the industrial   
arts4 ,so the blameless1 and for the    
purpose imbecile1 executive committee of
 gentlemen-investors has been insensibly
 losing the confidence and the          
countenance of the common man2 who1 when
 all is said1 will always have to do    
what is to be done4 ,the order of       
gentlemanly parleying and brokery has1  
therefore1 with many apprehensions of   
calamity1 been reluctantly and tardily  
giving ground before something that is  
of a visibly underbred order4           

,increasingly underbred1 and thereby    
insensibly approaching the character of 
this war situation1 but accepted with   
visible reluctance and apprehension both
 by the ruling class and by the         
underlying population4 ,the urgent      
necessity of going to such a basis1 and 
of working out the matter in hand by an 
unblushing recourse to that             
matter-of-fact logic of mechanical      
efficiency1 which alone can touch the   
difficulties of the case1 but which has 
no respect of persons1--this necessity  
has been present from the outset and has
 been vaguely apprehended for long past1
 but it is only tardily and after the   
chastening of heavy penalties on this   
gentlemanly imbecility that a           
substantial move in that direction has  
been made4 ,it has required much        
,british resolution to overcome the     
night-fear of going out into the        
unhallowed ground of matter-of-fact1    
where the farthest earlier excursions of
 the governmental agencies had taken    

them no farther than such financial     
transactions as are incident to the     
accomplishment of anything whatever in a
 commercial nation4 ,and then1 too1     
there is a pecuniary interest in being  
interested in financial transactions4   
,this shifting of discretionary control 
out of the hands of the gentlemen into  
those of the underbred common run1 who  
know how to do what is necessary to be  
done in the face of underbred           
exigencies1 may conceivably go far when 
it has once been started1 and it may go 
forward at an accelerated rate if the   
pressure of necessity lasts long enough4
 ,if time be given for habituation to   
this manner of directorate in national  
affairs1 so that the common man comes to
 realise how it is feasible to get along
 without gentlemen-investors holding the
 discretion1 the outcome may conceivably
 be very grave4 ,it is a point in doubt1
 but it is conceivable that in such a   
case the gentlemanly executive committee
 administering affairs in the light of  

the gentlemanly pecuniary interest1 will
 not be fully reinstated in the         
discretionary control of the ,united    
,kingdom for an appreciable number of   
years after the return of peace4        
,possibly1 even1 the rgime may be       
permanently deranged1 and there is even 
a shadowy doubt possible to be          
entertained as to whether the vested    
pecuniary rights1 on which the class of 
gentlemen rests1 may not suffer some    
derangement1 in case the control should 
pass into the hands of the underbred and
 unpropertied for so long a season as to
 let the common man get used to thinking
 that the vested interests and the      
sacred rights of gentility are so much  
ado about nothing4  ,such an outcome    
would be extreme1 but as a remote       
contingency it is to be taken into      
account4 ,the privileged classes of the 
,united ,kingdom should by this time be 
able to see the danger there may be for 
them and their vested interests1        
pecuniary and moral1 in an excessive    

prolongation of the war2 in such        
postponement of peace as would afford   
time for a popular realisation of their 
incompetence and disserviceability as   
touches the nation's material well-being
 under modern conditions4 ,to let the   
nation's war experience work to such an 
outcome1 the season of war would have to
 be prolonged beyond what either the    
hopes or the fears of the community have
 yet contemplated2 but the point is     
after all worth noting1 as being within 
the premises of the case1 that there is 
herein a remote contingency of losing1  
at least for a time1 that unformulated  
clause in the ,british constitution     
which has hitherto restricted the       
holding of responsible office to men of 
pedigree and of gentle breeding1 or at  
least of very grave pecuniary weight2 so
 grave as to make the incumbents virtual
 gentlemen1 with a virtual pedigree1 and
 with a virtual gentleman's accentuated 
sense of class interest4 ,should such an
 eventuality overtake ,british popular  

sentiment and belief there is also the  
remote contingency that the rights of   
ownership and investment would lose a   
degree of sanctity4  ,it seems necessary
 to note a further1 and in a sense more 
improbable1 line of disintegration among
 modern fixed ideas4 ,among the best    
entrenched illusions of modern economic 
preconceptions1 and in economic as well 
as legal theory1 has been the           
indispensability of funds1 and the hard 
and fast limitation of industrial       
operations by the supply or with-holding
 of funds4 ,the war experience has      
hitherto gone tentatively to show that  
funds and financial transactions1 of    
credit1 bargain1 sale and solvency1 may 
be dispensed with under pressure of     
necessity2 and apparently without       
seriously hindering that run of         
mechanical fact1 on which interest in   
the present case necessarily centers1   
and which must be counted on to give the
 outcome4 ,latterly the case is clearing
 up a little further1 on further        

experience and under further pressure of
 technological exigencies1 to the effect
 that financial arrangements are        
indispensable in this connection only   
because and in so far as it has been    
arranged to consider them indispensable2
 as in international trade4 ,they are an
 indispensable means of intermediation  
only in so far as pecuniary interests   
are to be furthered or safeguarded in   
the intermediation4 ,when1 as has       
happened with the belligerents in the   
present instance1 the national          
establishment becomes substantially     
insolvent1 it is beginning to appear    
that its affairs can be taken care of   
with less difficulty and with better    
effect without the use of financial     
expedients4 ,of course1 it takes time to
 get used to doing things by the more   
direct method and without the accustomed
 circumlocution of accountancy1 or the  
accustomed allowance for profits to go  
to interested parties who1 under the    
financial rgime1 hold a power of        

discretionary permission in all matters 
that touch the use of the industrial    
arts4 ,under these urgent material      
exigencies1 investment comes to have    
much of the appearance of a gratuitous  
drag and drain on the processes of      
industry4  ,here1 again1 is a sinister  
contingency2 sinister1 that is1 for     
those vested rights of ownership by     
force of which the owners of capital are
 enabled to permit or withhold the use  
of the industrial arts by the community 
at large1 on pain of privation in case  
the accustomed toll to the owners of    
capital is not paid4 ,it is1 of course1 
not intended to find fault with this    
arrangement2 which has the sanction of  
time immemorial and of a settled        
persuasion that it lies at the root of  
all civilised life and intercourse4 ,it 
is only that in case of extreme need    
this presumed indispensable expedient of
 industrial control has broken down1 and
 that experience is proving it to be1 in
 these premises1 an item of borrowed    

trouble4 ,should experience continue to 
run on the same lines for an appreciable
 period and at a high tension1 it is at 
least conceivable that the vested right 
of owners to employ unlimited sabotage  
in the quest of profits might fall so   
far into disrepute as to leave them     
under a qualified doubt on the return of
 normal conditions4 ,the common man1 in 
other words1 who gathers nothing but    
privation and anxiety from the owners'  
discretionary sabotage1 may conceivably 
stand to lose his preconception that the
 vested rights of ownership are the     
cornerstone of his life1 liberty and    
pursuit of happiness4         99        
99       99       99       99  ,the     
considerations recited in this lengthy  
excursion on the war situation and its  
probable effects on popular habits of   
thought in the ,united ,kingdom go to   
say that when peace comes to be         
negotiated1 with the ,united ,kingdom as
 the chief constituent and weightiest   
spokesman of the allied nations and of  

the league of pacific neutrals1 the     
representatives of ,british aims and    
opinions are likely to speak in a       
different1 chastened1 and disillusioned 
fashion1 as contrasted with what the    
,british attitude was at the beginning  
of hostilities4 ,the gentlemanly        
,british animus of arrogant             
self-sufficiency will have been somewhat
 sobered1 perhaps somewhat subdued4     
,concession to the claims and           
pretensions of the other pacific nations
 is likely to go farther than might once
 have been expected1 particularly in the
 way of concession to any demand for    
greater international comity and less   
international discrimination2           
essentially concession looking to a     
reduction of national pretensions and an
 incipient neutralisation of national   
interests4 ,coupled with this will      
presumably be a less conciliatory       
attitude toward the members of the      
dynastic coalition against whom the war 
has been fought1 owing to a more mature 

realisation of the impossibility of a   
lasting peace negotiated with a ,power  
whose substantial core is a warlike and 
irresponsible dynastic establishment4   
,the peace negotiations are likely to   
run on a lower level of diplomatic      
deference to constituted authorities1   
and with more of a view to the interests
 and sentiments of the underlying       
population1 than was evident in the     
futile negotiations had at the outbreak 
of hostilities4 ,the gentle art of      
diplomacy1 that engages the talents of  
exalted personages and well-bred        
statesmen1 has been somewhat            
discredited2 and if it turns out that   
the vulgarisation of the directorate in 
the ,united ,kingdom and its associated 
allies and neutrals will have time to go
 on to something like dominance and     
authenticity1 then the deference which  
the spokesmen of these nations are      
likely to show for the prescriptive     
rights of dynasty1 nobility1            
bureaucracy1 or even of pecuniary       

aristocracy1 in the countries that make 
up the party of the second part1 may be 
expected to have shrunk appreciably1    
conceivably even to such precarious     
dimensions as to involve the virtual    
neglect or possible downright abrogation
 of them1 in sum and substance4         
,indeed1 the chances of a successful    
pacific league of neutrals to come out  
of the current situation appear to be   
largely bound up with the degree of     
vulgarisation due to overtake the       
several directorates of the belligerent 
nations as well as the popular habits of
 thought in these and in the neutral    
countries1 during the further course of 
the war4 ,it is too broad a             
generalisation1 perhaps1 to say that the
 longer the war lasts the better are the
 chances of such a neutral temper in the
 interested nations as will make a      
pacific league practicable1 but the     
contrary would appear a much less       
defensible proposition4 ,it is1 of      
course1 the common man that has the     

least interest in warlike enterprise1 if
 any1 and it is at the same time the    
common man that bears the burden of such
 enterprise and has also the most       
immediate interest in keeping the peace4
 ,if1 slowly and pervasively1 in the    
course of hard experience1 he learns to 
distrust the conduct of affairs by his  
betters1 and learns at the same move to 
trust to his own class to do what is    
necessary and to leave undone what is   
not1 his deference to his betters is    
likely to suffer a decline1 such as     
should show itself in a somewhat        
unguarded recourse to democratic ways   
and means4  ,in short1 there is in this 
progressive vulgarisation of effectual  
use and wont and of sentiment1 in the   
,united ,kingdom and elsewhere1 some    
slight ground for the hope1 or the      
apprehension1 that no peace will be made
 with the dynastic ,powers of the second
 part until they cease to be dynastic   
,powers and take on the semblance of    
democratic commonwealths1 with          

dynasties1 royalties and privileged     
classes thrown in the discard4  ,this   
would probably mean some prolongation of
 hostilities1 until the dynasties and   
privileged classes had completely       
exhausted their available resources2    
and1 by the same token1 until the       
privileged classes in the more modern   
nations among the belligerents had also 
been displaced from direction and       
discretion by those underbred classes on
 whom it is incumbent to do what is to  
be done2 or until a juncture were       
reached that comes passably near to such
 a situation4 ,on the contingency of    
such a course of events and some such   
outcome appears also to hang the chance 
of a workable pacific league4 ,without  
further experience of the futility of   
upper-class and pecuniary control1 to   
discredit precedent and constituted     
authority1 it is scarcely conceivable1  
e4g41 that the victorious allies would  
go the length of coercively discarding  
the ,german ,imperial dynasty and the   

kept classes that with it constitute the
 ,imperial ,state1 and of replacing it  
with a democratic organisation of the   
people in the shape of a modern         
commonwealth2 and without a change of   
that nature1 affecting that nation and  
such of its allies as would remain on   
the map1 no league of pacific neutrals  
would be able to manage its affairs1    
even for a time1 except on a war-footing
 that would involve a competitive       
armament against future dynastic        
enterprises from the same quarter4      
,which comes to saying that a lasting   
peace is possible on no other terms than
 the disestablishment of the ,imperial  
dynasty and the abrogation of all       
feudalistic remnants of privilege in the
 ,fatherland and its allies1 together   
with the reduction of those countries to
 the status of commonwealths made up of 
ungraded men4         99       99       
99       99       99  ,it is easy to    
speculate on what the conditions        
precedent to such a pacific league of   

neutrals must of necessity be2 but it is
 not therefore less difficult to make a 
shrewd guess as to the chances of these 
conditions being met4 ,of these         
conditions precedent1 the chief and     
foremost1 without which any other       
favorable circumstances are             
comparatively idle1 is a considerable   
degree of neutralisation1 extending to  
virtually all national interests and    
pretensions1 but more particularly to   
all material and commercial interests of
 the federated peoples2 and1            
indispensably and especially1 such      
neutralisation would have to extend to  
the nations from whom aggression is now 
apprehended1 as1 e4g41 the ,german      
people4 ,but such neutralisation could  
not conceivably reach the ,fatherland   
unless that nation were made over in the
 image of democracy1 since the ,imperial
 ,state is1 by force of the terms1 a    
warlike and unneutral power4 ,this would
 seem to be the ostensibly concealed    
meaning of the allied governments in    

proclaiming that their aim is to break  
,german militarism without doing harm to
 the ,german people4  ,as touches the   
neutralisation of the democratically    
rehabilitated ,fatherland1 or in default
 of that1 as touches the peace terms to 
be offered the ,imperial government1 the
 prime article among the stipulations   
would seem to be abolition of all trade 
discrimination against ,germany or by   
,germany against any other nationality4 
,such stipulation would1 of course1     
cover all manner of trade               
discrimination1--e4g41 import1 export   
and excise tariff1 harbor and registry  
dues1 subsidy1 patent right1 copyright1 
trade mark1 tax exemption whether       
partial or exclusive1 investment        
preferences at home and abroad1--in     
short it would have to establish a      
thoroughgoing neutralisation of trade   
relations in the widest acceptation of  
the term1 and to apply in perpetuity4   
,the like applies1 of course1 to all    
that fringe of subsidiary and outlying  

peoples on whom ,imperial ,germany      
relies for much of its resources in any 
warlike enterprise4 ,such a move also   
disposes of the colonial question in a  
parenthesis1 so far as regards any      
special bond of affiliation between the 
,empire1 or the ,fatherland1 and any    
colonial possessions that are now       
thought desirable to be claimed4 ,under 
neutralisation1 colonies would cease to 
be colonial possessions1 being          
necessarily included under the general  
abrogation of commercial                
discriminations1 and also necessarily   
exempt from special taxation or         
specially favorable tax rates4          
,colonies there still would be1 though  
it is not easy to imagine what would be 
the meaning of a ,german ,colony in such
 a case4 ,colonies would be free        
communities1 after the fashion of ,new  
,zealand or ,australia1 but with the    
further sterilisation of the bond       
between colony and mother country       
involved in the abolition of all        

appointive offices and all              
responsibility to the crown or the      
imperial government4 ,now1 there are no 
,german colonies in this simpler        
,british sense of the term1 which       
implies nothing more than community of  
blood1 institutions and language1       
together with that sense of solidarity  
between the colony and the mother       
country which this community of pedigree
 and institutions will necessarily      
bring2 but while there are today no     
,german colonies1 in the sense of the   
term so given1 there is no reason to    
presume that no such ,german colonies   
would come into bearing under the       
conditions of this prospective rgime of 
neutrality installed by such a pacific  
league1 when backed by the league's     
guarantee that no colony from the       
,fatherland will be exposed to the      
eventual risk of coming under the       
discretionary tutelage of the ,german   
,imperial establishment and so falling  
into a relation of step-childhood to the

 ,imperial dynasty4  ,as is well known1 
and as has by way of superfluous        
commonplace been set forth by a sometime
 ,colonial ,secretary of the ,empire1   
the decisive reason for there being no  
,german colonies in existence is the    
consistently impossible colonial policy 
of the ,german government1 looking to   
the usufruct of the colonies by the     
government1 and the fear of further     
arbitrary control and nepotic           
discrimination at the pleasure of the   
self-seeking dynastic establishment4 ,it
 is only under ,imperial rule that no   
,german colony1 in this modern sense of 
the term1 is possible2 and only because 
,imperial rule does not admit of a free 
community being formed by colonists from
 the ,fatherland2 or of an ostensibly   
free community of that kind ever feeling
 secure from unsolicited interference   
with its affairs4  ,the nearest approach
 to a ,german ,colony1 as contrasted    
with a ,colonial ,possession1 hitherto  
have been the very considerable1 number 

of escaped ,german subjects who have    
settled in ,english-speaking or         
,latin-speaking countries1 particularly 
in ,north and ,south ,america4 ,and     
considering that the chief common trait 
among them is their successful evasion  
of the ,imperial government's heavy     
hand1 they show an admirable filial     
piety toward the ,imperial              
establishment2 though troubled with no  
slightest regret at having escaped from 
the ,imperial surveillance and no       
slightest inclination to return to the  
shelter of the ,imperial tutelage4 ,a   
colloquialism--hyphenate--has latterly  
grown up to meet the need of a term to  
designate these evasive and yet         
patriotic colonists4 ,it is scarcely    
misleading to say that the              
,german-,american hyphenate1 e4g41 in so
 far as he runs true to form1 is still a
 ,german subject with his heart1 but he 
is an ,american citizen with his head4  
,all of which goes to argue that if the 
,fatherland were to fall into such a    

state of democratic tolerance that no   
recidivist need carry a defensive hyphen
 to shield him from the importunate     
attentions of the ,imperial government1 
,german colonies would also come into   
bearing2 although1 it is true1 they     
would have no value to the ,german      
government4  ,in the ,imperial colonial 
policy colonies are conceived to stand  
to their ,imperial guardian or master in
 a relation between that of a step-child
 and that of an indentured servant2 to  
be dealt with summarily and at          
discretion and to be made use of without
 scruple4 ,the like attitude toward     
colonies was once familiar              
matter-of-course with the ,british and  
,spanish statesmen4 ,the ,british found 
the plan unprofitable1 and also         
unworkable1 and have given it up4 ,the  
,spanish1 having no political outlook   
but the dynastic one1 could of course   
not see their way to relinquish the only
 purpose of their colonial enterprise1  
except in relinquishing their colonial  

possessions4 ,the ,german 7,imperial7   
colonial policy is and will be          
necessarily after the ,spanish pattern1 
and necessarily1 too1 with the ,spanish 
results4  ,under the projected neutral  
scheme there would be no colonial       
policy1 and of course1 no inducement to 
the acquisition of colonies1 since there
 would be no profit to be derived1 or to
 be fancied1 in the case4 ,but while no 
country1 as a commonwealth1 has any     
material interest in the acquisition or 
maintenance of colonies1 it is otherwise
 as regards the dynastic interests of an
 ,imperial government2 and it is also   
otherwise1 at least in the belief of the
 interested parties1 as regards special 
businessmen or business concerns who are
 in a position to gain something by help
 of national discrimination in their    
favor4 ,as regards the pecuniary        
interests of favored businessmen or     
business concerns1 and of investors     
favored by national discrimination in   
colonial relations1 the case falls under

 the general caption of trade           
discrimination1 and does not differ at  
all materially from such expedients as a
 protective tariff1 a ship subsidy1 or a
 bounty on exports4 ,but as regards the 
warlike1 that is to say dynastic1       
interest of an ,imperial government the 
case stands somewhat different4         
,colonial ,possessions in such a case   
yield no material benefit to the country
 at large1 but their possession is a    
serviceable plea for warlike            
preparations with which to retain       
possession of the colonies in the face  
of eventualities1 and it is also a      
serviceable means of stirring the       
national pride and keeping alive a      
suitable spirit of patriotic animosity4 
,the material service actually to be    
derived from such possessions in the    
event of war is a point in doubt1 with  
the probabilities apparently running    
against their being of any eventual net 
use4 ,but there need be no question that
 such possessions1 under the hand of any

 national establishment infected with   
imperial ambitions1 are a fruitful      
source of diplomatic complications1     
excuses for armament1 international     
grievances1 and eventual aggression4 ,a 
pacific league of neutrals can evidently
 not tolerate the retention of colonial 
possessions by any dynastic ,state that 
may be drawn into the league or under   
its jurisdiction1 as1 e4g41 the ,german 
,empire in case it should be left on an 
,imperial footing4 ,whereas1 in case the
 ,german peoples are thrown back on a   
democratic status1 as neutralised       
commonwealths without a crown or a      
military establishment1 the question of 
their colonial possessions evidently    
falls vacant4  ,as to the neutralisation
 of trade relations apart from the      
question of colonies1 and as bears on   
the case of ,germany under the projected
 jurisdiction of a pacific league of    
neutrals1 the considerations to be taken
 account of are of much the same nature4
 ,as it would have to take effect1 e4g41

 in the abolition of commercial and     
industrial discriminations between      
,germany and the pacific nations1 such  
neutralisation would doubtless confer a 
lasting material benefit on the ,german 
people at large2 and it is not easy to  
detect any loss or detriment to be      
derived from such a move so long as     
peace prevails4 ,protective1 that is to 
say discriminating1 export1 import1 or  
excise duties1 harbor and registry dues1
 subsidies1 tax exemptions and trade    
preferences1 and all the like devices of
 interference with trade and industry1  
are unavoidably a hindrance to the      
material interests of any people on whom
 they are imposed or who impose these   
disabilities on themselves4 ,so that    
exemption from these things by a        
comprehensive neutralisation of trade   
relations would immediately benefit all 
the nations concerned1 in respect of    
their material well-being in times of   
peace4 ,there is no exception and no    
abatement to be taken account of under  

this general statement1 as is well known
 to all men who are conversant with     
these matters4  ,but it is otherwise as 
regards the dynastic interest in the    
case1 and as regards any national       
interest in warlike enterprise4 ,it is  
doubtless true that all restraint of    
trade between nations1 and between      
classes or localities within the        
national frontiers1 unavoidably acts to 
weaken and impoverish the people on     
whose economic activities this restraint
 is laid2 and to the extent to which    
this effect is had it will also be true 
that the country which so is hindered in
 its work will have a less aggregate of 
resources to place at the disposal of   
its enterprising statesmen for          
imperialist ends4 ,but these restraints 
may yet be useful for dynastic1 that is 
to say warlike1 ends by making the      
country more nearly a self-contained    
economic whole4 ,a country becomes a    
self-contained economic whole by        
mutilation1 in cutting itself off from  

the industrial system in which          
industrially it belongs1 but in which it
 is unwilling nationally to hold its    
place4 ,national frontiers are          
industrial barriers4 ,but as a result of
 such mutilation of its industrial life 
such a country is better able--it has   
been believed--to bear the shock of     
severing its international trade        
relations entirely1 as is likely to     
happen in case of war4  ,in a large     
country1 such as ,america or ,russia1   
which comprises within its national     
boundaries very extensive and very      
varied resources and a widely           
distributed and diversified population1 
the mischief suffered from restraints of
 trade that hinder industrial relations 
with the world at large will of course  
be proportionately lessened4 ,such a    
country comes nearer being a miniature  
industrial world2 although none of the  
civilised nations1 large or small1 can  
carry on its ordinary industrial        
activities and its ordinary manner of   

life without drawing on foreign parts to
 some appreciable extent4 ,but a country
 of small territorial extent and of     
somewhat narrowly restricted natural    
resources1 as1 e4g41 ,germany or        
,france1 can even by the most drastic   
measures of restraint and mutilation    
achieve only a very mediocre degree of  
industrial isolation and                
self-sufficiency1--as has1 e4g41        
appeared in the present war4 ,but in all
 cases1 though in varying measure1 the  
mitigated isolation so enforced by these
 restraints on trade will in their      
degree impair the country's industrial  
efficiency and lower the people's       
material well-being2 yet1 if the        
restrictions are shrewdly applied this  
partial isolation and partial           
self-sufficiency will go some way toward
 preparing the nation for the more      
thorough isolation that follows on the  
outbreak of hostilities4  ,the present  
plight of the ,german people under war  
conditions may serve to show how nearly 

that end may be attained1 and yet how   
inadequate even the most unreserved     
measures of industrial isolation must be
 in face of the fact that the modern    
state of the industrial arts necessarily
 draws on the collective resources of   
the world at large4 ,it may well be     
doubted1 on an impartial view1 if the   
mutilation of the country's industrial  
system by such measures of isolation    
does not after all rather weaken the    
nation even for warlike ends2 but then1 
the discretionary authorities in the    
dynastic ,states are always1 and it may 
be presumed necessarily1 hampered with  
obsolete theories handed down from that 
cameralistic age1 when the little       
princes of the ,fatherland were making  
dynastic history4 ,so1 e4g41 the        
current1 nineteenth and twentieth       
century1 economic policy of the         
,prussian-,imperial statesmen is still  
drawn on lines within which ,frederick  
,,ii1 called the ,great1 would have felt
 well at home4  ,like other preparation 

for hostilities this reduction of the   
country to the status of a              
self-contained economic organisation is 
costly1 but like other preparation for  
hostilities it also puts the nation in a
 position of greater readiness to break 
off friendly relations with its         
neighbors4 ,it is a war measure1        
commonly spoken for by its advocates as 
a measure of self-defense2 but whatever 
the merits of the self-defenders'       
contention1 this measure is a war       
measure4 ,as such it can reasonably     
claim no hearing in the counsels of a   
pacific league of neutrals1 whose       
purpose it is to make war impracticable4
 ,particularly can there be no          
reasonable question of admitting a      
policy of trade discrimination and      
isolation on the part of a nation which 
has1 for purposes of warlike aggression1
 pursued such a policy in the past1 and 
which it is the immediate purpose of the
 league to bind over to keep the peace4 
,there has been a volume of loose talk  

spent on the justice and expediency of  
boycotting the trade of the peoples of  
the ,empire after the return of peace1  
as a penalty and as a preventive measure
 designed to retard their recovery of   
strength with which to enter on a       
further warlike enterprise4 ,such a     
measure would necessarily be somewhat   
futile2 since ,business is business1    
after all1 and the practical limitations
 imposed on an unprofitable boycott by  
the moral necessity to buy cheap and    
sell dear that rests on all businessmen 
would surreptitiously mitigate it to the
 point of negligibility4 ,it is         
inconceivable--or it would be           
inconceivable in the absence of imbecile
 politicians and self-seeking           
businessmen--that measures looking to   
the trade isolation of any one of these 
countries could be entertained as a     
point of policy to be pursued by a      
league of neutrals4 ,and it is only in  
so far as patriotic jealousy and        
vindictive sentiments are allowed to    

displace the aspiration for peace and   
security1 that such measures can claim  
consideration4 ,considered as a penalty 
to be imposed on the erring nations who 
set this warlike adventure afoot1 it    
should be sufficiently plain that such a
 measure as a trade boycott could not   
touch the chief offenders1 or even their
 responsible abettors4 ,it would1       
rather1 play into the hands of the      
militarist interests by keeping alive   
the spirit of national jealousy and     
international hatred1 out of which wars 
arise and without which warlike         
enterprise might hopefully be expected  
to disappear out of the scheme of human 
intercourse4 ,the punishment would fall1
 as all economic burdens and            
disabilities must always fall1 on the   
common man1 the underlying population4  
,the chief relation of this common run1 
this underlying population of ,german   
subjects1 to the inception and pursuit  
of this ,imperial warlike enterprise1 is
 comprised in the fact that they are an 

underlying population of subjects1 held 
in usufruct by the ,imperial            
establishment and employed at will4 ,it 
is true1 they have lent themselves      
unreservedly to the uses for which the  
dynasty has use for them1 and they have 
entered enthusiastically into the       
warlike adventure set afoot by the      
dynastic statesmen2 but that they have  
done so is their misfortune rather than 
their fault4 ,by use and wont and       
indoctrination they have for long been  
unremittingly1 and helplessly1          
disciplined into a spirit of dynastic   
loyalty1 national animosity and servile 
abnegation2 until it would be nothing   
better than a pathetic inversion of all 
the equities of the case to visit the   
transgressions of their masters upon the
 common run2 whose fault lies1 after    
all1 in their being an underlying       
population of subjects1 who have not had
 a chance to reach that spiritual level 
on which they could properly be held    
accountable for the uses to which they  

are turned4 ,it is true1 men are        
ordinarily punished for their           
misfortunes2 but the warlike enterprise 
of the ,imperial dynasty has already    
brought what might fairly be rated as a 
good measure of punishment on this      
underlying populace1 whose chief fault  
and chief misfortune lies in an habitual
 servile abnegation of those traits of  
initiative and discretion in man that   
constitute him an agent susceptible of  
responsibility or retribution4  ,it     
would be all the more of a pathetic     
mockery to visit the transgressions of  
their masters on these victims of       
circumstance and dynastic mendacity1    
since the conventionalities of          
international equity will scarcely      
permit the high responsible parties in  
the case to be chastised with any       
penalty harsher than a well-mannered    
figure of speech4 ,to serve as a        
deterrent1 the penalty must strike the  
point where vests the discretion2 but   
servile use and wont is still too well  

intact in these premises to let any     
penalty touch the guilty core of a      
profligate dynasty4 ,under the wear and 
tear of continued war and its incident  
continued vulgarisation of the          
directorate and responsible staff among 
the pacific allies1 the conventional    
respect of persons is likely to suffer  
appreciable dilapidation2 but there need
 be no apprehension of such a loss of   
decent respect for personages as would  
compromise the creature comforts of that
 high syndicate of personages on whose  
initiative the ,fatherland entered upon 
this enterprise in dominion4  ,bygone   
shortcomings and transgressions can have
 no reasonable place in the arrangements
 by which a pacific league of neutrals  
designs to keep the peace4 ,neither can 
bygone prerogatives and precedents of   
magnificence and of mastery1 except in  
so far as they unavoidably must come    
into play through the inability of men  
to divest themselves of their ingrained 
preconceptions1 by virtue of which a    

,hohenzollern or a ,hapsburger is       
something more formidable and more to be
 considered than a recruiting sergeant  
or a purveyor of light literature4 ,the 
league can do its work of pacification  
only by elaborately forgetting          
differences and discrepancies of the    
kind that give rise to international    
grievances4 ,which is the same as saying
 that the neutralisation of national    
discriminations and pretensions will    
have to go all the way1 if it is to     
serve4 ,but this implies1 as broadly as 
need be1 that the pacific nations who   
make the league and provisionally       
administer its articles of agreement and
 jurisdiction1 can not exempt themselves
 from any of the leveling measures of   
neutralisation to which the dynastic    
suspects among them are to be subject4  
,it would mean a relinquishment of all  
those undemocratic institutional        
survivals out of which international    
grievances are wont to arise4 ,as a     
certain ,danish adage would have it1 the

 neutrals of the league must all be     
shorn over the same comb4         99    
99       99       99       99  ,what is 
to be shorn over this one comb of       
neutralisation and democracy is all     
those who go into the pacific league of 
neutrals and all who come under its     
jurisdiction1 whether of their own      
choice or by the necessities of the     
case4 ,it is of the substance of the    
case that those peoples who have been   
employed in the campaigns of the        
,german-,imperial coalition are to come 
in on terms of impartial equality with  
those who have held the ground against  
them2 to come under the jurisdiction1   
and prospectively into the copartnery1  
of the league of neutrals--all on the   
presumption that the ,imperial coalition
 will be brought to make peace on terms 
of unconditional surrender4  ,let it not
 seem presumptuous to venture on a      
recital of summary specifications       
intended to indicate the nature of those
 concrete measures which would logically

 be comprised in a scheme of            
pacification carried out with such a    
view to impartial equality among the    
peoples who are to make up the projected
 league4 ,there is a significant turn of
 expression that recurs habitually in   
the formulation of terms put forth by   
the spokesmen of the ,entente           
belligerents1 where it is insisted that 
hostilities are carried on not against  
the ,german people or the other peoples 
associated with them1 but only against  
the ,imperial establishments and their  
culpable aids and abettors in the       
enterprise4 ,so it is further insisted  
that there is no intention to bring     
pains and penalties on these peoples1   
who so have been made use of by their   
masters1 but only on the culpable master
 class whose tools these peoples have   
been4 ,and later1 just now 7,january    
#aiag71 and from a responsible and      
disinterested spokesman for the pacific 
league1 there comes the declaration that
 a lasting peace at the hands of such a 

league can be grounded only in a present
 peace without victory4  ,the mutual    
congruity of these two declarations need
 not imply collusion1 but they are none 
the less complementary propositions and 
they are none the less indicative of a  
common trend of convictions among the   
men who are best able to speak for those
 pacific nations that are looked to as  
the mainstay of the prospective league4 
,they both converge to the point that   
the objective to be achieved is not     
victory for the ,entente belligerents   
but defeat for the ,german-,imperial    
coalition2 that the peoples underlying  
the defeated governments are not to be  
dealt with as vanquished enemies but as 
fellows in undeserved misfortune brought
 on by their culpable masters2 and that 
no advantage is designed to be taken of 
these peoples1 and no gratuitous        
hardship to be imposed on them4 ,their  
masters are evidently to be put away1   
not as defeated antagonists but as a    
public nuisance to be provided against  

as may seem expedient for the peace and 
security of those nations whom they have
 been molesting4  ,taking this position 
as outlined1 it should not be extremely 
difficult to forecast the general line  
of procedure which it would logically   
demand1--barring irrelevant regard for  
precedents and overheated resentment1   
and provided that the makers of these   
peace terms have a free hand and go to  
their work with an eye single to the    
establishment of an enduring peace4 ,the
 case of ,germany would be typical of   
all the rest2 and the main items of the 
bill in this case would seem logically  
to run somewhat as follows3  7#a7 ,the  
definitive elimination of the ,imperial 
establishment1 together with the        
monarchical establishments of the       
several states of the ,empire and the   
privileged classes2  7#b7 ,removal or   
destruction of all warlike equipment1   
military and naval1 defensive and       
offensive2  7#c7 ,cancelment of the     
public debt1 of the ,empire and of its  

members--creditors of the ,empire being 
accounted accessory to the culpable     
enterprise of the ,imperial government2 
7#d7 ,confiscation of such industrial   
equipment and resources as have         
contributed to the carrying on of the   
war1 as being also accessory2  7#e7     
,assumption by the league at large of   
all debts incurred1 by the ,entente     
belligerents or by neutrals1 for the    
prosecution or by reason of the war1 and
 distribution of the obligation so      
assumed1 impartially among the members  
of the league1 including the peoples of 
the defeated nations2  7#f7             
,indemnification for all injury done to 
civilians in the invaded territories2   
the means for such indemnification to be
 procured by confiscation of all estates
 in the defeated countries exceeding a  
certain very modest maximum1 calculated 
on the average of property owned1 say1  
by the poorer three-fourths of the      
population1--the kept classes being     
properly accounted accessory to the     

,empire's culpable enterprise4  ,the    
proposition to let the war debt be      
shared by all members of the league on a
 footing of impartial equality may seem 
novel1 and perhaps extravagant4 ,but all
 projects put forth for safeguarding the
 world's peace by a compact among the   
pacific nations run on the patent1      
though often tacit1 avowal that the     
,entente belligerents are spending their
 substance and pledging their credit for
 the common cause4 ,among the           
,americans1 the chief of the neutral    
nations1 this is coming to be recognised
 more and more overtly4 ,so that1 in    
this instance at least1 no              
insurmountable reluctance to take over  
their due share of the common burden    
should fairly be looked for1            
particularly when it appears that the   
projected league1 if it is organised on 
a footing of neutrality1 will relieve   
the republic of virtually all outlay for
 their own defense4  ,of course1 there  
is1 in all this1 no temerarious         

intention to offer advice as to what    
should be done by those who have it to  
do1 or even to sketch the necessary     
course which events are bound to take4  
,as has been remarked in another        
passage1 that would have to be a work of
 prophesy or of effrontery1 both of     
which1 it is hoped1 lie equally beyond  
the horizon of this inquiry2 which is   
occupied with the question of what      
conditions will logically have to be met
 in order to an enduring peace1 not what
 will be the nature and outcome of      
negotiations entered into by astute     
delegates pursuing the special          
advantage1 each of his own nation4 ,and 
yet the peremptory need of reaching some
 practicable arrangement whereby the    
peace may be kept1 goes to say that even
 the most astute negotiations will in   
some degree be controlled by that need1 
and may reasonably be expected to make  
some approach to the simple and obvious 
requirements of the situation4          
99       99       99       99       99  

,therefore the argument returns to the  
,united ,kingdom and the probable limit 
of tolerance of that people1 in respect 
of what they are likely to insist on as 
a necessary measure of democratisation  
in the nations of the second part1 and  
what measure of national abnegation they
 are likely to accommodate themselves   
to4 ,the ,united ,kingdom is            
indispensable to the formation of a     
pacific league of neutrals4 ,and the    
,british terms of adhesion1 or rather of
 initiation of such a league1 therefore1
 will have to constitute the core of the
 structure1 on which details may be     
adjusted and to which concessive        
adjustments will have to be made by all 
the rest4 ,this is not saying that the  
projected league must or will be        
dominated by the ,united ,kingdom or    
administered in the ,british interest4  
,indeed1 it can not well be made to     
serve ,british particular interests in  
any appreciable degree1 except at the   
cost of defeat to its main purpose2     

since the purposes of an enduring peace 
can be served only by an effectual      
neutralisation of national claims and   
interests4 ,but it would mean that the  
neutralisation of national interests and
 discriminations to be effected would   
have to be drawn on lines acceptable to 
,british taste in these matters1 and    
would have to go approximately so far as
 would be dictated by the ,british      
notions of what is expedient1 and not   
much farther4 ,the pacific league of    
neutrals would have much of a ,british  
air1 but ,british in this connection is 
to be taken as connoting the            
,english-speaking countries rather than 
as applying to the ,united ,kingdom     
alone2 since the entrance of the        
,british into the league would involve  
the entrance of the ,british colonies1  
and1 indeed1 of the ,american republic  
as well4  ,the temper and outlook of    
this ,british community1 therefore1     
becomes a matter of paramount importance
 in any attempted analysis of the       

situation resulting after the war1 or of
 any prospective course of conduct to be
 entered on by the pacific nations4 ,and
 the question touches not so much the   
temper and preconceptions of the        
,british community as known in recent   
history1 but rather as it is likely to  
be modified by the war experience4 ,so  
that the practicability of a neutral    
league comes to turn1 in great measure1 
on the effect which this war experience 
is having on the habits of thought of   
the ,british people1 or on that section 
of the ,british population which will   
make up the effectual majority when the 
war closes4 ,the grave interest that    
attaches to this question must serve as 
justification for pursuing it farther1  
even though there can be no promise of a
 definite or confident answer to be     
found beforehand4  ,certain general     
assertions may be made with some        
confidence4 ,the experiences of the war1
 particularly among the immediate       
participants and among their immediate  

domestic connections--a large and       
increasing proportion of the people at  
large--are plainly impressing on them   
the uselessness and hardship of such a  
war4 ,there can be no question but they 
are reaching a conviction that a war of 
this modern kind and scale is a thing to
 be avoided if possible4 ,they are1 no  
doubt1 willing to go to very            
considerable lengths to make a          
repetition of it impossible1 and they   
may reasonably be expected to go farther
 along that line before peace returns4  
,but the lengths to which they are ready
 to go may be in the way of concessions1
 or in the way of contest and           
compulsion4 ,there need be no doubt but 
a profound and vindictive resentment    
runs through the ,british community1 and
 there is no reason to apprehend that   
this will be dissipated in the course of
 further hostilities2 although it should
 fairly be expected to lose something of
 its earlier exuberant malevolence and  
indiscrimination1 more particularly if  

hostilities continue for some time4 ,it 
is not too much to expect1 that this    
popular temper of resentment will demand
 something very tangible in the way of  
summary vengeance on those who have     
brought the hardships of war upon the   
nation4  ,the manner of retribution     
which would meet the popular demand for 
justice to be done on the enemy is      
likely to be affected by the fortunes of
 war1 as also the incidence of it4      
,should the governmental establishment  
and the discretion still vest in the    
gentlemanly classes at the close of     
hostilities1 the retribution is likely  
to take the accustomed gentlemanly shape
 of pecuniary burdens imposed on the    
people of the defeated country1 together
 with diplomatically specified surrender
 of territorial and colonial            
possessions1 and the like2 such as to   
leave the de facto enemy courteously on 
one side1 and to yield something in the 
way of pecuniary benefit to the         
gentlemen-investors in charge1 and      

something more in the way of new        
emoluments of office to the             
office-holding class included in the    
same order of gentlemen4 ,the           
retribution in the case would manifestly
 fall on the underlying population in   
the defeated country1 without seriously 
touching the responsible parties1 and   
would leave the defeated nation with a  
new grievance to nourish its patriotic  
animosity and with a new incentive to a 
policy of watchful waiting for a chance 
of retaliation4  ,but it is to be noted 
that under the stress of the war there  
is going forward in the ,british        
community a progressive displacement of 
gentlemanly standards and official      
procedure by standards and procedure of 
a visibly underbred character1 a        
weakening of the hold of the gentlemanly
 classes on the control of affairs and a
 weakening of the hold which the sacred 
rights of property1 investment and      
privilege have long had over the        
imagination of the ,british people4     

,should hostilities continue1 and should
 the exigencies of the war situation    
continue to keep the futility of these  
sacred rights1 as well as the fatuity of
 their possessors1 in the public eye1   
after the same fashion as hitherto1 it  
would not be altogether unreasonable to 
expect that the discretion would pass   
into the hands of the underbred1 or into
 the hands of men immediately and       
urgently accountable to the underbred4  
,in such a case1 and with a constantly  
growing popular realisation that the    
directorate and responsible enemy in the
 war is the ,imperial dynasty and its   
pedigreed aids and abettors1 it is      
conceivable that the popular resentment 
would converge so effectually on these  
responsible instigators and directors of
 misfortune as to bring the incidence of
 the required retribution effectually to
 bear on them4 ,the outcome might1 not  
inconceivably1 be the virtual erasure of
 the ,imperial dynasty1 together with   
the pedigreed-class rule on which it    

rests and the apparatus of irresponsible
 coercion through which it works1 in the
 ,fatherland and in its subsidiaries and
 dependencies4  ,with a sufficiently    
urgent realisation of their need of     
peace and security1 and with a          
realisation also that the way to avoid  
war is to avoid the ways and means of   
international jealousy and of the       
national discriminations out of which   
international jealousy grows1 it is     
conceivable that a government which     
should reflect the ,british temper and  
the ,british hopes might go so far in   
insisting on a neutralisation of the    
peoples of the ,fatherland as would     
leave them without the dynastic         
apparatus with which warlike enterprise 
is set afoot1 and so leave them also    
perforce in a pacific frame of mind4 ,in
 time1 in the absence of their dearly   
beloved leavings of feudalism1 an       
enforced reliance on their own          
discretion and initiative1 and an       
enforced respite from the rant and      

prance of warlike swagger1 would        
reasonably be expected to grow into a   
popular habit4 ,the ,german people are  
by no means less capable of tolerance   
and neighbourly decorum than their      
,british or ,scandinavian neighbours of 
the same blood1--if they can only be    
left to their own devices1 untroubled by
 the maggoty conceit of national        
domination4  ,there is no intention     
herewith to express an expectation that 
this out-and-out neutralisation of the  
,fatherland's international relations   
and of its dynastic government will come
 to pass on the return of peace1 or that
 the ,german people will1 as a          
precaution against recurrent ,imperial  
rabies1 be organised on a democratic    
pattern by constraint of the pacific    
nations of the league4 ,the point is    
only that this measure of neutralisation
 appears to be the necessary condition1 
in the absence of which no such neutral 
league can succeed1 and that so long as 
the war goes on there is something of a 

chance that the ,british community may  
in time reach a frame of mind combining 
such settled determination to safeguard 
the peace at all costs1 with such a     
degree of disregard for outworn         
conventions1 that their spokesmen in the
 negotiations may push the              
neutralisation of these peoples to that 
length4  ,the achievement of such an    
outcome would evidently take time as    
well as harsh experience1 more time and 
harsher experience1 perhaps1 than one   
likes to contemplate4  ,most men1       
therefore1 would scarcely rate the      
chance of such an outcome at all high4  
,and yet it is to be called to mind that
 the war has lasted long and the effect 
of its demands and its experience has   
already gone far1 and that the longer it
 lasts the greater are the chances of   
its prolongation and of its continued   
hardships1 at least to the extent that  
with every month of war that passes the 
prospect of the allied nations making   
peace on any terms short of             

unconditional surrender grows less4 ,and
 unconditional surrender is the first   
step in the direction of an             
unconditional dispossession of the      
,imperial establishment and its war     
prophets1--depending primarily on the   
state of mind of the ,british people at 
the time4 ,and however unlikely1 it is  
also always possible1 as some contend1  
that in the course of further war       
experience the common man in the        
,fatherland may come to reflect on the  
use and value of the ,imperial          
establishment1 with the result of       
discarding and disowning it and all its 
works4 ,such an expectation would       
doubtless underrate the force of ancient
 habit1 and would also involve a        
misapprehension of the psychological    
incidence of a warlike experience4 ,the 
,german people have substantially none  
of those preconceptions of independence 
and self-direction to go on1 in the     
absence of which an effectual revulsion 
against dynastic rule can not come to   

pass4  ,embedded in the common sense of 
the ,british population at large is a   
certain large and somewhat sullen sense 
of fair dealing4 ,in this they are not  
greatly different from their neighbours1
 if at all1 except that the body of     
common sense in which this ,british     
sense of fair dealing lies embedded is a
 maturer fashion of common sense than   
that which serves to guide the workday  
life of many of their neighbours4 ,and  
the maturity in question appears to be  
chiefly a matter of their having        
unlearned1 divested themselves of1 or   
been by force of disuse divested of1 an 
exceptionally large proportion of that  
burden of untoward conceits which       
western ,europe1 and more particularly  
middle ,europe1 at large has carried    
over from the ,middle ,ages4 ,they have 
had time and occasion to forget more of 
what the exigencies of modern life make 
it expedient to have forgotten4 ,and yet
 they are reputed slow1 conservative4   
,but they have been well placed for     

losing much of what would be well lost4 
,among other things1 their preconception
 of national animosity is not secure1 in
 the absence of provocation4 ,they are  
now again in a position to learn to do  
without some of the useless legacy out  
of the past1--useless1 that is1 for life
 as it runs today1 however it may be    
rated in the setting in which it was all
 placed in that past out of which it has
 come4 ,and the question is whether now1
 under the pressure of exigencies that  
make for a disestablishment of much     
cumbersome inherited apparatus for doing
 what need not be done1 they will be    
ruled by their sense of expediency and  
of fair dealing to the extent of        
cancelling out of their own scheme of   
life so much of this legacy of          
conventional preconceptions as has now  
come visibly to hinder their own        
material well-being1 and at the same    
time to defeat that peace and security  
for which they have shown themselves    
willing to fight4 ,it is1 of course1 a  

simpler matter to fight than it is to   
put away a preconceived1 even if it is a
 bootless1 superstition2 as1 e4g41 the  
prestige of hereditary wealth1          
hereditary gentility1 national          
vainglory1 and perhaps especially       
national hatred4 ,but if the school is  
hard enough and the discipline          
protracted enough there is no reason in 
the nature of things why the common run 
of the ,british people should not       
unlearn these futilities that once were 
the substance of things under an older  
and outworn order4 ,they have already   
shown their capacity for divesting      
themselves of outworn institutional     
bonds1 in discarding the main substance 
of dynastic rule2 and when they now come
 to face the exigencies of this new     
situation it should cause no great      
surprise if they are able to see their  
way to do what further is necessary to  
meet these exigencies4         99       
99       99       99       99  ,at the  
hands of this ,british commonwealth the 

new situation requires the putting away 
of the ,german ,imperial establishment  
and the military caste2 the reduction of
 the ,german peoples to a footing of    
unreserved democracy with sufficient    
guarantees against national trade       
discriminations2 surrender of all       
,british tutelage over outlying         
possessions1 except what may go to      
guarantee their local autonomy2         
cancelment of all extra-territorial     
pretensions of the several nations      
entering into the league2 neutralisation
 of the several national establishments1
 to comprise virtual disarmament1 as    
well as cancelment of all restrictions  
on trade and of all national defense of 
extra-territorial pecuniary claims and  
interests on the part of individual     
citizens4 ,the naval control of the seas
 will best be left in ,british hands4   
,no people has a graver or more         
immediate interest in the freedom and   
security of the sea-borne trade2 and the
 ,united ,kingdom has shown that it is  

to be trusted in that matter4 ,and then 
it may well be that neither the national
 pride nor the apprehensions of the     
,british people would allow them to     
surrender it2 whereas1 if the league is 
to be formed it will have to be on terms
 to which the ,british people are       
willing to adhere4 ,a certain provision 
of armed force will also be needed to   
keep the governments of unneutral       
nations in check1--and for the purpose  
in hand all effectively monarchical     
countries are to be counted as          
congenitally unneutral1 whatever their  
formal professions and whether they are 
members of the league or not4 ,here     
again it will probably appear that the  
people of the ,united ,kingdom1 and of  
the ,english-speaking countries at      
large1 will not consent to this armed   
force and its discretionary use passing 
out of ,british hands1 or rather out of 
,french-,british hands2 and here again  
the practical decision will have to wait
 on the choice of the ,british people1  

all the more because the ,british       
community has no longer an interest1    
real or fancied1 in the coercive use of 
this force for their own particular     
ends4 ,no other power is to be trusted1 
except ,france1 and ,france is less well
 placed for the purpose and would       
assuredly also not covet so invidious an
 honour and so thankless an office4     
99       99       99       99       99  
,the theory1 i4e4 the logical           
necessities1 of such a pacific league of
 neutral nations is simple enough1 in   
its elements4 ,war is to be avoided by a
 policy of avoidance4 ,which signifies  
that the means and the motives to       
warlike enterprise and warlike          
provocation are to be put away1 so far  
as may be4 ,if what may be1 in this     
respect1 does not come up to the        
requirements of the case1 the           
experiment1 of course1 will fail4 ,the  
preliminary requirement1--elimination of
 the one formidable dynastic ,state in  
,europe1--has been spoken of4 ,its      

counterpart in the ,far ,east will cease
 to be formidable on the decease of its 
natural ally in ,central ,europe1 in so 
far as touches the case of such a       
projected league4 ,the ever increasingly
 dubious empire of the ,czar would      
appear to fall in the same category4 ,so
 that the pacific league's fortunes     
would seem to turn on what may be called
 its domestic or internal arrangements4 
,now1 the means of warlike enterprise1  
as well as of unadvised embroilment1 is 
always in the last analysis the         
patriotic spirit of the nation4 ,given  
this patriotic spirit in sufficient     
measure1 both the material equipment and
 the provocation to hostilities will    
easily be found4 ,it should accordingly 
appear to be the first care of such a   
pacific league to reduce the sources of 
patriotic incitement to the practicable 
minimum4 ,this can be done1 in such     
measure as it can be done at all1 by    
neutralisation of national pretensions4 
,the finished outcome in this respect1  

such as would assure perpetual peace    
among the peoples concerned1 would of   
course be an unconditional              
neutralisation of citizenship1 as has   
already been indicated before4 ,the     
question which1 in effect1 the spokesmen
 for a pacific league have to face is as
 to how nearly that outcome can be      
brought to pass4 ,the rest of what they 
may undertake1 or may come to by way of 
compromise and stipulation1 is          
relatively immaterial and of relatively 
transient consequence4  ,a              
neutralisation of citizenship has of    
course been afloat in a somewhat loose  
way in the projects of socialistic and  
other undesirable agitators1 but nothing
 much has come of it4 ,nor have specific
 projects for its realisation been set  
afoot4 ,that anything conclusive along  
that line could now be reached would    
seem extremely doubtful1 in view of the 
ardent patriotic temper of all these    
peoples1 heightened just now by the     
experience of war4 ,still1 an undesigned

 and unguided drift in that direction   
has been visible in all those nations   
that are accounted the vanguard among   
modern civilised peoples1 ever since the
 dynastic rule among them began to be   
displaced by a growth of free           
institutions1 that is to say            
institutions resting on an accepted     
ground of insubordination and free      
initiative4  ,the patriotism of these   
peoples1 or their national spirit1 is   
after all and at the best an attenuated 
and impersonalised remnant of dynastic  
loyalty1 and it amounts after all1 in   
effect1 to nothing much else than a     
residual curtailment or partial atrophy 
of that democratic habit of mind that   
embodies itself in the formula3 ,live   
and let live4 ,it is1 no doubt1 both an 
ancient and a very meritorious habit4   
,it is easily acquired and hard to put  
away4 ,the patriotic spirit and the     
national life 7prestige7 on which it    
centers are the subject of untiring     
eulogy2 but hitherto its encomiasts have

 shown no cause and put forward no claim
 to believe that it all is of any       
slightest use for any purpose that does 
not take it and its paramount merit for 
granted4 ,it is doubtless a very        
meritorious habit2 at least so they all 
say4 ,but under the circumstances of    
modern civilised life it is fruitful of 
no other net material result than damage
 and discomfort4 ,still it is virtually 
ubiquitous among civilised men1 and in  
an admirable state of repair2 and for   
the calculable future it is doubtless to
 be counted in as an enduring obstacle  
to a conclusive peace1 a constant source
 of anxiety and unremitting care4  ,the 
motives that work out through this      
national spirit1 by use of this         
patriotic ardor1 fall under two heads3  
dynastic ambition1 and business         
enterprise4 ,the two categories have the
 common trait that neither the one nor  
the other comprises anything that is of 
the slightest material benefit to the   
community at large2 but both have at the

 same time a high prestige value in the 
conventional esteem of modern men4 ,the 
relation of dynastic ambition to warlike
 enterprise1 and the uses of that       
usufruct of the nation's resources and  
man-power which the nation's patriotism 
places at the disposal of the dynastic  
establishment1 have already been spoken 
of at length above1 perhaps at excessive
 length1 in the recurrent discussion of 
the dynastic ,state and its quest of    
dominion for dominion's sake4 ,what     
measures are necessary to be taken as   
regards the formidable dynastic ,states 
that threaten the peace1 have also been 
outlined1 perhaps with excessive        
freedom4  ,but it remains to call       
attention to that mitigated form of     
dynastic rule called a constitutional   
monarchy4 ,instances of such a          
constitutional monarchy1 designed to    
conserve the well-beloved abuses of     
dynastic rule under a cover of          
democratic formalities1 or to bring in  
effectual democratic insubordination    

under cover of the ancient dignities of 
an outworn monarchical system1--the     
characterisation may run either way     
according to the fancy of the speaker1  
and to much the same practical effect in
 either case1--instances illustrative of
 this compromise monarchy at work today 
are to be had1 as felicitously as       
anywhere1 in the ,balkan states2 perhaps
 the case of ,greece will be especially 
instructive4 ,at the other1 and far1 end
 of the line will be found such other   
typical instances as the ,british1 the  
,dutch1 or1 in pathetic and droll       
miniature1 the ,norwegian4  ,there is1  
of course1 a wide interval between the  
grotesque effrontery that wears the     
,hellenic crown and the undeviatingly   
decorous self-effacement of the ,dutch  
sovereign2 and yet there is something of
 a common complexion runs through the   
whole range of establishments1 all the  
way from the quasi-dynastic to the      
pseudo-dynastic4 ,for reasons           
unavoidable and persistent1 though not  

inscribed in the constituent law1 the   
governmental establishment associated   
with such a royal concern will be made  
up of persons drawn from the kept       
classes1 the nobility or lesser         
gentlefolk1 and will be imbued with the 
spirit of these better classes rather   
than that of the common run4  ,with what
 may be uncanny shrewdness1 or perhaps  
mere tropismatic response to the        
unreasoned stimulus of a consciousness  
of kind1 the ,british                   
government--habitually a syndicate of   
gentlefolk--has uniformly insisted on   
the installation of a constitutional    
monarchy at the formation of every new  
national organisation in which that     
government has had a discretionary      
voice4 ,and the many and various        
constitutional governments so           
established1 commonly under ,british    
auspices in some degree1 have invariably
 run true to form1 in some appreciable  
degree4 ,they may be quasi-dynastic or  
pseudo-dynastic1 but at this nearest    

approach to democracy they always1 and  
unavoidably1 include at least a         
circumlocution office of gentlefolk1 in 
the way of a ministry and court         
establishment1 whose place in the       
economy of the nation's affairs it is to
 adapt the run of these affairs to the  
needs of the kept classes4  ,there need 
be no imputation of sinister designs to 
these gentlefolk1 who so are elected by 
force of circumstances to guard and     
guide the nation's interests4 ,as things
 go1 it will doubtless commonly be found
 that they are as well-intentioned as   
need be4 ,but a well-meaning gentleman  
of good antecedents means well in a     
gentlemanly way and in the light of good
 antecedents4 ,which comes unavoidably  
to an effectual bias in favor of those  
interests which honorable gentlemen of  
good antecedents have at heart4 ,and    
among these interests are the interests 
of the kept classes1 as contrasted with 
that common run of the population from  
which their keep is drawn4  ,under the  

auspices1 even if they are only the     
histrionic and decorative auspices1 of  
so decorous an article of institutional 
furniture as royalty1 it follows of     
logical necessity that the personnel of 
the effectual government must also be   
drawn from the better classes1 whose    
place and station and high repute will  
make their association with the ,first  
,gentleman of the ,realm not too        
insufferably incongruous4 ,and then1 the
 popular habit of looking up to this    
,first ,gentleman with that deference   
that royalty commands1 also conduces    
materially to the attendant habitual    
attitude of deference to gentility more 
at large4  ,even in so democratic a     
country1 and with so exanimate a crown  
as is to be found in the ,united        
,kingdom1 the royal establishment       
visibly1 and doubtless very materially1 
conduces to the continued tenure of the 
effectual government by representatives 
of the kept classes2 and it therefore   
counts with large effect toward the     

retardation of the country's further    
move in the direction of democratic     
insubordination and direct participation
 in the direction of affairs by the     
underbred1 who finally pay the cost4    
,and on the other hand1 even so         
moderately royal an establishment as the
 ,norwegian has apparently a sensible   
effect in the way of gathering the reins
 somewhat into the hands of the better  
classes1 under circumstances of such    
meagerness as might be expected to      
preclude anything like a better class1  
in the conventional acceptation of that 
term4 ,it would appear that even the    
extreme of pseudo-dynastic royalty1     
sterilised to the last degree1 is       
something of an effectual hindrance to  
democratic rule1 and in so far also a   
hindrance to the further continued      
neutralisation of nationalist           
pretensions1 as also an effectual       
furtherance of upper-class rule for     
upper-class ends4  ,now1 a government by
 well-meaning gentlemen-investors will1 

at the nearest1 come no nearer          
representing the material needs and     
interests of the common run than a      
parable comes to representing the       
concrete facts which it hopes to        
illuminate4 ,and as bears immediately on
 the point in hand1 these gentlemanly   
administrators of the nation's affairs  
who so cluster about the throne1 vacant 
though it may be of all but the bodily  
presence of majesty1 are after all      
gentlemen1 with a gentlemanly sense of  
punctilio touching the large proprieties
 and courtesies of political life4 ,the 
national honor is a matter of punctilio1
 always2 and out of the formal          
exigencies of the national honor arise  
grievances to be redressed2 and it is   
grievances of this character that       
commonly afford the formal ground of a  
breach of the peace4 ,an appeal on      
patriotic grounds of wounded national   
pride1 to the common run who have no    
trained sense of punctilio1 by the      
gentlemanly responsible class who have  

such a sense1 backed by assurances that 
the national prestige or the national   
interests are at stake1 will commonly   
bring a suitable response4 ,it is       
scarcely necessary that the common run  
should know just what the stir is about1
 so long as they are informed by their  
trusted betters that there is a         
grievance to redress4 ,in effect1 it    
results that the democratic nation's    
affairs are administered by a syndicate 
composed of the least democratic class  
in the population4  ,excepting what is  
to be excepted1 it will commonly hold   
true today that these gentlemanly       
governments are conducted in a          
commendably clean and upright fashion1  
with a conscious rectitude and a        
benevolent intention4 ,but they are     
after all1 in effect1 class governments1
 and they unavoidably carry the bias of 
their class4 ,the gentlemanly officials 
and law-givers come1 in the main1 from  
the kept classes1 whose living comes to 
them in the way of income from          

investments1 at home or in foreign      
parts1 or from an equivalent source of  
accumulated wealth or official          
emolument4 ,the bias resulting from this
 state of the case need not be of an    
intolerant character in order to bring  
its modicum of mischief into the        
national policy1 as regards amicable    
relations with other nationalities4 ,a  
slight bias running on a ground of      
conscious right and unbroken usage may  
go far4 ,so1 e4g41 anyone of these      
gentlemanly governments is within its   
legitimate rights1 or rather within its 
imperative duty1 in defending the       
foreign investments of its citizens and 
enforcing due payment of its citizens'  
claims to income or principal of such   
property as they may hold in foreign    
parts2 and it is within its ordinary    
lines of duty in making use of the      
nation's resources--that is to say of   
the common man and his means of         
livelihood--in enforcing such claims    
held by the investing classes4 ,the     

community at large has no interest in   
the enforcement of such claims2 it is   
evidently a class interest1 and as      
evidently protected by a code of rights1
 duties and procedure that has grown out
 of a class bias1 at the cost of the    
community at large4  ,this bias favoring
 the interests of invested wealth may   
also1 and indeed it commonly does1 take 
the aggressive form of aggressively     
forwarding enterprise in investment     
abroad1 particularly in commercially    
backward countries abroad1 by extension 
of the national jurisdiction and the    
active countenancing of concessions in  
foreign parts1 by subventions1 or by    
creation of offices to bring suitable   
emoluments to the younger sons of       
deserving families4 ,the protective     
tariffs to which recourse is sometimes  
had1 are of the same general nature and 
purpose4 ,of course1 it is in this      
latter1 aggressive or excursive1 issue  
of the well-to-do bias in favor of      
investment and invested wealth that its 

most pernicious effect on international 
relations is traceable4  ,free income1  
that is to say income not dependent on  
personal merit or exertion of any kind1 
is the breath of life to the kept       
classes2 and as a corollary of the      
,first ,law of ,nature1 therefore1 the  
invested wealth which gives a legally   
equitable claim to such income has in   
their eyes all the sanctity that can be 
given by ,natural ,right4               
,investment--often spoken of            
euphemistically as savings--is          
consequently a meritorious act1         
conceived to be very serviceable to the 
community at large1 and properly to be  
furthered by all available means4       
,invested wealth is so much added to the
 aggregate means at the community's     
disposal1 it is believed4 ,of course1 in
 point of fact1 income from investment  
in the hands of these gentlefolk is a   
means of tracelessly consuming that much
 of the community's yearly product2 but 
to the kept classes1 who see the matter 

from the point of view of the recipient1
 the matter does not present itself in  
that light4 ,to them it is the breath of
 life4 ,like other honorable men they   
are faithful to their bread2 and by     
authentic tradition the common man1 in  
whose disciplined preconceptions the    
kept classes are his indispensable      
betters1 is also imbued with the        
uncritical faith that the invested      
wealth which enables these betters      
tracelessly to consume a due share of   
the yearly product is an addition to the
 aggregate means in hand4  ,the         
advancement of commercial and other     
business enterprise beyond the national 
frontiers is consequently one of the    
duties not to be neglected1 and with    
which no trifling can be tolerated4 ,it 
is so bound up with national ideals1    
under any gentlemanly government1 that  
any invasion or evasion of the rights of
 investors in foreign parts1 or of other
 business involved in dealings with     
foreign parts1 immediately involves not 

only the material interest of the nation
 but the national honour as well4 ,hence
 international jealousies and eventual  
embroilment4  ,the constitutional       
monarchy that commonly covers a modern  
democratic community is accordingly a   
menace to the common peace1 and any     
pacific league of neutrals will be      
laying up trouble and prospective defeat
 for itself in allowing such an         
institution to stand over in any        
instance4 ,acting with a free hand1 if  
such a thing were possible1 the         
projected league should logically       
eliminate all monarchical               
establishments1 constitutional or       
otherwise1 from among its federated     
nations4 ,it is doubtless not within    
reason to look for such a move in the   
negotiations that are to initiate the   
projected league of neutrals2 but the   
point is called to mind here chiefly as 
indicating one of the difficult passages
 which are to be faced in any attempted 
formation of such a league1 as well as  

one of the abiding sources of           
international irritation with which the 
league's jurisdiction will be burdened  
so long as a decisive measure of the    
kind is not taken4  ,the logic of the   
whole matter is simple enough1 and the  
necessary measures to be taken to remedy
 it are no less simple--barring         
sentimental objections which will       
probably prove insuperable4 ,a monarchy1
 even a sufficiently inane monarchy1    
carries the burden of a gentlemanly     
governmental establishment--a government
 by and for the kept classes2 such a    
government will unavoidably direct the  
affairs of state with a view to income  
on invested wealth1 and will see the    
material interests of the country only  
in so far as they present themselves    
under the form of investment and        
business enterprise designed to         
eventuate in investment2 these are the  
only forms of material interest that    
give rise to international jealousies1  
discriminations and misunderstanding1 at

 the same time that they are interests  
of individuals only and have no material
 use or value to the community at large4
 ,given a monarchical establishment and 
the concomitant gentlemanly governmental
 corps1 there is no avoiding this       
sinister prime mover of international   
rivalry1 so long as the rights of       
invested wealth continue in popular     
apprehension to be held inviolable4     
,quite obviously there is a certain tu  
quoque ready to the hand of these       
gentlemen of the old school who see in  
the constitutional monarchy a ,god-given
 shelter from the unreserved            
vulgarisation of life at the hands of   
the unblest and unbalanced underbred and
 underfed4 ,the formally democratic     
nations1 that have not retained even a  
pseudo-dynastic royalty1 are not much   
more fortunately placed in respect of   
national discrimination in trade and    
investment4 ,the ,american republic will
 obviously come into the comparison as  
the type-form of economic policy in a   

democratic commonwealth4 ,there is      
little to choose between the economic   
policy pursued by such republics as     
,france or ,america on the one side and 
their nearest counterparts among the    
constitutional monarchies on the other4 
,it is even to be admitted out of hand  
that the comparison does no credit to   
democratic institutions as seen at work 
in these republics4 ,they are1 in fact1 
somewhat the crudest and most singularly
 foolish in their economic policy of any
 peoples in ,christendom4 ,and in view  
of the amazing facility with which these
 democratic commonwealths are always    
ready to delude themselves in everything
 that touches their national trade      
policies1 it is obvious that any league 
of neutrals whose fortunes are in any   
degree contingent on their reasonable   
compliance with a call to neutralise    
their trade regulations for the sake of 
peace1 will have need of all the        
persuasive power it can bring to bear4  
,however1 the powers of darkness have   

one less line of defense to shelter them
 and their work of malversation in these
 commonwealths than in the              
constitutional monarchies4 ,the         
,american national establishment1 e4g41 
which may be taken as a fairly          
characteristic type-form in this        
bearing1 is a government of businessmen 
for business ends2 and there is no tabu 
of axiomatic gentility or of certified  
pedigree to hedge about this working    
syndicate of business interests4 ,so    
that it is all nearer by one remove to  
the disintegrating touch of the common  
man and his commonplace circumstances4  
,the businesslike rgime of these        
democratic politicians is as undeviating
 in its advocacy and aid of enterprise  
in pursuit of private gain under shelter
 of national discrimination as the      
circumstances will permit2 and the      
circumstances will permit them to do    
much and go far2 for the limits of      
popular gullibility in all things that  
touch the admirable feats of business   

enterprise are very wide in these       
countries4 ,there is a sentimental      
popular belief running to the curious   
effect that because the citizens of such
 a commonwealth are ungraded equals     
before the law1 therefore somehow they  
can all and several become wealthy by   
trading at the expense of their         
neighbours4  ,yet1 the fact remains that
 there is only the one line of defense  
in these countries where the business   
interests have not the countenance of a 
time-honored order of gentlefolk1 with  
the sanction of royalty in the          
background4 ,and this fact is further   
enhanced by one of its immediate        
consequences4 ,proceeding upon the      
abounding faith which these peoples have
 in business enterprise as a universal  
solvent1 the unreserved venality and    
greed of their businessmen--unhampered  
by the gentleman's noblesse oblige--have
 pushed the conversion of public law to 
private gain farther and more openly    
here than elsewhere4 ,the outcome has   

been divers measures in restraint of    
trade or in furtherance of profitable   
abuses1 of such a crass and flagrant    
character that if once the popular      
apprehension is touched by              
matter-of-fact reflection on the        
actualities of this businesslike policy 
the whole structure should reasonably be
 expected to crumble4 ,if the present   
conjuncture of circumstances should1    
e4g41 present to the ,american populace 
a choice between exclusion from the     
neutral league1 and a consequent        
probable and dubious war of             
self-defense1 on the one hand2 as       
against entrance into the league1 and   
security at the cost of relinquishing   
their national tariff in restraint of   
trade1 on the other hand1 it is always  
possible that the people might be       
brought to look their protective tariff 
in the face and recognise it for a      
commonplace conspiracy in restraint of  
trade1 and so decide to shuffle it out  
of the way as a good riddance4 ,and the 

rest of the ,republic's businesslike    
policy of special favors would in such a
 case stand a chance of going in the    
discard along with the protective       
tariff1 since the rest is of            
substantially the same disingenuous     
character4  ,not that anyone need       
entertain a confident expectation of    
such an exploit of common sense on the  
part of the ,american voters4 ,there is 
little encouragement for such a hope in 
their past career of gullibility on this
 head4 ,but this is again a point of    
difficulty to be faced in negotiations  
looking to such a pacific league of     
neutrals4 ,without a somewhat           
comprehensive neutralisation of national
 trade regulations1 the outlook for     
lasting peace would be reduced by that  
much2 there would be so much material   
for international jealousy and          
misunderstanding left standing over and 
requiring continued readjustment and    
compromise1 always with the contingency 
of a breach that much nearer4 ,the      

infatuation of the ,americans with their
 protective tariff and other            
businesslike discriminations is a       
sufficiently serious matter in this     
connection1 and it is always possible   
that their inability to give up this    
superstition might lead to their not    
adhering to this projected neutral      
league4 ,yet it is at least to be said  
that the longer the time that passes    
before active measures are taken toward 
the organisation of such a league--that 
is to say1 in effect1 the longer the    
great war lasts--the more amenable is   
the temper of the ,americans likely to  
be1 and the more reluctantly would they 
see themselves excluded4 ,should the war
 be protracted to some such length as   
appears to be promised by latterday     
pronunciamentos from the belligerents1  
or to something passably approaching    
such a duration2 and should the         
,imperial designs and anomalous         
diplomacy of ,japan continue to force   
themselves on the popular attention at  

the present rate2 at the same time that 
the operations in ,europe continue to   
demonstrate the excessive cost of       
defense against a well devised and      
resolute offensive2 then it should      
reasonably be expected that the         
,americans might come to such a         
realisation of their own case as to let 
no minor considerations of trade        
discrimination stand in the way of their
 making common cause with the other     
pacific nations4  ,it appears already to
 be realised in the most responsible    
quarter that ,america needs the succor  
of the other pacific nations1 with a    
need that is not to be put away or put  
off2 as it is also coming to be realised
 that the ,imperial ,powers are         
disturbers of the peace1 by force of    
their ,imperial character4 ,of course1  
the politicians who seek their own      
advantage in the nation's embarrassment 
are commonly unable to see the matter in
 that light4 ,but it is also apparent   
that the popular sentiment is affected  

with the same apprehension1 more and    
more as time passes and the aims and    
methods of the ,imperial ,powers become 
more patent4  ,hitherto the spokesmen of
 a pacific federation of nations have   
spoken for a league of such an          
7indeterminate7 constitution as to leave
 all the federated nations undisturbed  
in all their conduct of their own       
affairs1 domestic or international2     
probably for want of second thought as  
to the complications of copartnership   
between them in so grave and unwonted an
 enterprise4 ,they have also spoken of  
,america's share in the project as being
 that of an interested outsider1 whose  
interest in any precautionary measures  
of this kind is in part a regard for his
 own tranquility as a disinterested     
neighbour1 but in greater part a humane 
solicitude for the well-being of        
civilised mankind at large4 ,in this    
view1 somewhat self-complacent it is to 
be admitted1 ,america is conceived to   
come into the case as initiator and     

guide1 about whom the pacific nations   
are to cluster as some sort of          
queen-bee4  ,now1 there is not a little 
verisimilitude in this conception of    
,america as a sort of central office and
 a tower of strength in the projected   
federation of neutral nations1 however  
pharisaical an appearance it may all    
have in the self-complacent utterances  
of patriotic ,americans4 ,the ,american 
republic is1 after all1 the greatest of 
the pacific nations of ,christendom1 in 
resources1 population and industrial    
capacity2 and it is also not to be      
denied that the temper of this large    
population is1 on the whole1 as pacific 
as that of any considerable             
people--outside of ,china4 ,the         
adherence of the ,american republic     
would1 in effect1 double the mass and   
powers of the projected league1 and     
would so place it beyond all hazard of  
defeat from without1 or even of serious 
outside opposition to its aims4  ,yet it
 will not hold true that ,america is    

either disinterested or indispensable4  
,the unenviable position of the         
indispensable belongs to the ,united    
,kingdom1 and carries with it the       
customary suspicion of interested       
motives that attaches to the stronger   
party in a bargain4 ,to ,america1 on the
 other hand1 the league is              
indispensable1 as a refuge from         
otherwise inevitable dangers ahead2 and 
it is only a question of a moderate     
allowance of time for the ,american     
voters to realise that without an       
adequate copartnership with the other   
pacific nations the outlook of the      
,republic is altogether precarious4     
,single-handed1 ,america can not defend 
itself1 except at a prohibitive cost2   
whereas in copartnership with these     
others the national defense becomes a   
virtually negligible matter4 ,it is for 
,america a choice between a policy of   
extravagant armament and aggressive     
diplomacy1 with a doubtful issue1 on the
 one side1 and such abatement of        

national pretensions as would obviate   
bootless contention1 on the other side4 
,yet1 it must be admitted1 the patriotic
 temper of the ,american people is of   
such a susceptible kind as to leave the 
issue in doubt4 ,not that the ,americans
 will not endeavor to initiate some form
 of compact for the keeping of the      
peace1 when hostilities are concluded2  
barring unforeseen contingencies1 it is 
virtually a foregone conclusion that the
 attempt will be made1 and that the     
,americans will take an active part in  
its promotion4 ,but the doubt is as to  
their taking such a course as will lead 
to a compact of the kind needed to      
safeguard the peace of the country4 ,the
 business interests have much to say in 
the counsels of the ,americans1 and     
these business interests look to        
short-term gains--,american business    
interests particularly--to be derived   
from the country's necessities4 ,it is  
likely to appear that the business      
interests1 through representatives in   

,congress and elsewhere1 will disapprove
 of any peace compact that does not     
involve an increase of the national     
armament and a prospective demand for   
munitions and an increased expenditure  
of the national funds4  ,with or without
 the adherence of ,america1 the pacific 
nations of ,europe will doubtless       
endeavour to form a league or alliance  
designed to keep the peace4 ,if ,america
 does not come into the arrangement it  
may well come to nothing much more than 
a further continued defensive alliance  
of the belligerent nations now opposed  
to the ,german coalition4 ,in any case  
it is still a point in doubt whether the
 league so projected is to be merely a  
compact of defensive armament against a 
common enemy--in which case it will     
necessarily be transient1 perhaps       
ephemeral--or a more inclusive coalition
 of a closer character designed to avoid
 any breach of the peace1 by disarmament
 and by disallowance and disclaimer of  
such national pretensions and punctilio 

as the patriotic sentiment of the       
contracting parties will consent to     
dispense with4 ,the nature of the       
resulting peace1 therefore1 as well as  
its chances of duration1 will in great  
measure be conditioned on the fashion of
 peace-compact on which it is to rest2  
which will be conditioned in good part  
on the degree in which the warlike      
coalition under ,german ,imperial       
control is effectually to be eliminated 
from the situation as a prospective     
disturber of the peace2 which1 in turn1 
is a question somewhat closely bound up 
with the further duration of the war1 as
 has already been indicated in an       
earlier passage4     ,,chapter ,,vii    
,,peace ,,and ,,the ,,price ,,system    
,evidently the conception of peace on   
which its various spokesmen are         
proceeding is by no means the same for  
all of them4 ,in the current ,german    
conception1 e4g41 as seen in the        
utterances of its many and urgent       
spokesmen1 peace appears to be of the   

general nature of a truce between       
nations1 whose ,god-given destiny it is1
 in time1 to adjust a claim to          
precedence by wager of battle4 ,they    
will sometimes speak of it1             
euphemistically1 with a view to         
conciliation1 as assurance of the       
national future1 in which the national  
future is taken to mean an opportunity  
for the extension of the national       
dominion at the expense of some other   
national establishment4 ,in the same    
connection one may recall the many      
eloquent passages on the ,state and its 
paramount place and value in the human  
economy4 ,the ,state is useful for      
disturbing the peace4 ,this ,german     
notion may confidently be set down as   
the lowest of the current conceptions of
 peace2 or perhaps rather as the notion 
of peace reduced to the lowest terms at 
which it continues to be recognisable as
 such4 ,next beyond in that direction   
lies the notion of armistice2 which     
differs from this conception of peace   

chiefly in connoting specifically a     
definite and relatively short interval  
between warlike operations4  ,the       
conception of peace as being a period of
 preparation for war has many adherents 
outside the ,fatherland1 of course4     
,indeed1 it has probably a wider vogue  
and a readier acceptance among men who  
interest themselves in questions of     
peace and war than any other4 ,it goes  
hand in hand with that militant         
nationalism that is taken for granted1  
conventionally1 as the common ground of 
those international relations that play 
a part in diplomatic intercourse4 ,it is
 the diplomatist's mtier to talk war in 
parables of peace4 ,this conception of  
peace as a precarious interval of       
preparation has come down to the present
 out of the feudal age and is1 of       
course1 best at home where the feudal   
range of preconceptions has suffered    
least dilapidation2 and it carries the  
feudalistic presumption that all        
national establishments are competitors 

for dominion1 after the scheme of       
,macchiavelli4 ,the peace which is had  
on this footing1 within the realm1 is a 
peace of subjection1 more or less       
pronounced according as the given       
national establishment is more or less  
on the militant order2 a warlike        
organisation being necessarily of a     
servile character1 in the same measure  
in which it is warlike4  ,in much the   
same measure and with much the same     
limitations as the modern democratic    
nations have departed from the feudal   
system of civil relations and from the  
peculiar range of conceptions which     
characterise that system1 they have also
 come in for a new or revised conception
 of peace4 ,instead of its being valued 
chiefly as a space of time in which to  
prepare for war1 offensive or defensive1
 among these democratic and             
provisionally pacific nations it has    
come to stand in the common estimation  
as the normal and stable manner of life1
 good and commendable in its own right4 

,these modern1 pacific1 commonwealths   
stand on the defensive1 habitually4     
,they are still pugnaciously national1  
but they have unlearned so much of the  
feudal preconceptions as to leave them  
in a defensive attitude1 under the      
watch-word3 ,peace with honour4 ,their  
quasi-feudalistic national prestige is  
not to be trifled with1 though it has   
lost so much of its fascination as      
ordinarily not to serve the purposes of 
an aggressive enterprise1 at least not  
without some shrewd sophistication at   
the hands of militant politicians and   
their diplomatic agents4 ,of course1 an 
exuberant patriotism may now and again  
take on the ancient barbarian vehemence 
and lead such a provisionally pacific   
nation into an aggressive raid against a
 helpless neighbour2 but it remains     
characteristically true1 after all1 that
 these peoples look on the country's    
peace as the normal and ordinary course 
of things1 which each nation is to take 
care of for itself and by its own force4

  ,the ideal of the nineteenth-century  
statesmen was to keep the peace by a    
balance of power2 an unstable           
equilibrium of rivalries1 in which it   
was recognised that eternal vigilance   
was the price of peace by equilibration4
 ,since then1 by force of the           
object-lesson of the twentieth-century  
wars1 it has become evident that eternal
 vigilance will no longer keep the peace
 by equilibration1 and the balance of   
power has become obsolete4 ,at the same 
time things have so turned that an      
effective majority of the civilised     
nations now see their advantage in      
peace1 without further opportunity to   
seek further dominion4 ,these nations   
have also been falling into the shape of
 commonwealths1 and so have lost        
something of their national spirit4     
,with much reluctant hesitation and many
 misgivings1 the statesmen of these     
pacific nations are accordingly busying 
themselves with schemes for keeping the 
peace on the unfamiliar footing of a    

stable equilibrium2 the method preferred
 on the whole being an equilibration of 
make-believe1 in imitation of the       
obsolete balance of power4 ,there is a  
meticulous regard for national          
jealousies and discriminations1 which it
 is thought necessary to keep intact4   
,of course1 on any one of these slightly
 diversified plans of keeping the peace 
on a stable footing of copartnery among 
the pacific nations1 national jealousies
 and national integrity no longer have  
any substantial meaning4 ,but statesmen 
think and plan in terms of precedent2   
which comes to thinking and planning in 
terms of make-believe1 when altered     
circumstances have made the precedents  
obsolete4 ,so one comes to the singular 
proposal of the statesmen1 that the     
peace is to be kept in concert among    
these pacific nations by a provision of 
force with which to break it at will4   
,the peace that is to be kept on this   
footing of national discriminations and 
national armaments will necessarily be  

of a precarious kind2 being1 in effect1 
a statesmanlike imitation of the peace  
as it was once kept even more           
precariously by the pacific nations in  
severalty4  ,hitherto the movement      
toward peace has not gone beyond this   
conception of it1 as a collusive        
safeguarding of national discrepancies  
by force of arms4 ,such a peace is      
necessarily precarious1 partly because  
armed force is useful for breaking the  
peace1 partly because the national      
discrepancies1 by which these current   
peace-makers set such store1 are a      
constant source of embroilment4 ,what   
the peace-makers might logically be     
expected to concern themselves about    
would be the elimination of these       
discrepancies that make for embroilment4
 ,but what they actually seem concerned 
about is their preservation4 ,a peace by
 collusive neglect of those remnants of 
feudalistic make-believe that still     
serve to divide the pacific nations has 
hitherto not seriously come under       

advisement4  ,evidently1 hitherto1 and  
for the calculable future1 peace is a   
relative matter1 a matter of more or    
less1 whichever of the several working  
conceptions spoken of above may rule the
 case4 ,evidently1 too1 a peace designed
 to strengthen the national             
establishment against eventual war1 will
 count to a different effect from a     
collusive peace of a defensive kind     
among the pacific peoples1 designed by  
its projectors to conserve those        
national discrepancies on which         
patriotic statesmen like to dwell4      
,different from both would be the value 
of a peace by neglect of such useless   
national discriminations as now make for
 embroilment4 ,a protracted season of   
peace should logically have a somewhat  
different cultural value according to   
the character of the public policy to be
 pursued under its cover4 ,so that a    
safe and sane conservation of the       
received law and order should presumably
 best be effected under cover of a      

collusive peace of the defensive kind1  
which is designed to retain those       
national discrepancies intact that count
 for so much in the national life of    
today1 both as a focus of patriotic     
sentiment and as an outlet for national 
expenditures4 ,this plan would involve  
the least derangement of the received   
order among the democratic peoples1     
although the plan might itself undergo  
some change in the course of time4      
99       99       99       99       99  
,among the singularities of the         
latterday situation1 in this connection1
 and brought out by the experiences of  
the great war1 is a close resemblance   
between latterday warlike operations and
 the ordinary processes of industry4    
,modern warfare and modern industry     
alike are carried on by technological   
processes subject to surveillance and   
direction by mechanical engineers1 or   
perhaps rather experts in engineering   
science of the mechanistic kind4 ,war is
 not now a matter of the stout heart and

 strong arm4 ,not that these attributes 
do not have their place and value in    
modern warfare2 but they are no longer  
the chief or decisive factors in the    
case4 ,the exploits that count in this  
warfare are technological exploits2     
exploits of technological science1      
industrial appliances1 and technological
 training4 ,as has been remarked before1
 it is no longer a gentlemen's war1 and 
the gentleman1 as such1 is no better    
than a marplot in the game as it is     
played4  ,certain consequences follow   
from this state of the case4 ,technology
 and industrial experience1 in large    
volume and at a high proficiency1 are   
indispensable to the conduct of war on  
the modern plan1 as well as a large1    
efficient and up-to-date industrial     
community and industrial plant to supply
 the necessary material of this warfare4
 ,at the same time the discipline of the
 campaign1 as it impinges on the rank   
and file as well as on the very numerous
 body of officers and technicians1 is   

not at cross purposes with the ordinary 
industrial employments of peace1 or not 
in the same degree as has been the case 
in the past1 even in the recent past4   
,the experience of the campaign does not
 greatly unfit the men who survive for  
industrial uses2 nor does it come in as 
a sheer interruption of their industrial
 training1 or break the continuity of   
that range of habits of thought which   
modern industry of the technological    
order induces2 not in the same degree as
 was the case under the conditions of   
war as carried on in the nineteenth     
century4 ,the cultural1 and particularly
 the technological1 incidence of this   
modern warfare should evidently be      
appreciably different from what has been
 experienced in the past1 and from what 
this past experience has induced        
students of these matters to look for   
among the psychological effects of      
warlike experience4  ,it remains true   
that the discipline of the campaign1    
however impersonal it may tend to       

become1 still inculcates personal       
subordination and unquestioning         
obedience2 and yet the modern tactics   
and methods of fighting bear somewhat   
more on the individual's initiative1    
discretion1 sagacity and self-possession
 than once would have been true4        
,doubtless the men who come out of this 
great war1 the common men1 will bring   
home an accentuated and acrimonious     
patriotism1 a venomous hatred of the    
enemies whom they have missed killing2  
but it may reasonably be doubted if they
 come away with a correspondingly       
heightened admiration and affection for 
their betters who have failed to make   
good as foremen in charge of this       
teamwork in killing4 ,the years of the  
war have been trying to the reputation  
of officials and officers1 who have had 
to meet uncharted exigencies with not   
much better chance of guessing the way  
through than their subalterns have had4 
,by and large1 it is perhaps not to be  
doubted that the populace now under arms

 will return from the experience of the 
war with some net gain in loyalty to the
 nation's honour and in allegiance to   
their masters2 particularly the ,german 
subjects1--the like is scarcely true for
 the ,british2 but a doubt will present 
itself as to the magnitude of this net  
gain in subordination1 or this net loss 
in self-possession4 ,a doubt may be     
permitted as to whether the common man  
in the countries of the ,imperial       
coalition1 e4g41 will1 as the net       
outcome of this war experience1 be in a 
perceptibly more pliable frame of mind  
as touches his obligations toward his   
betters and subservience to the         
irresponsible authority exercised by the
 various governmental agencies1 than he 
was at the outbreak of the war4 ,at that
 time1 there is reason to believe1 there
 was an ominous1 though scarcely        
threatening1 murmur of discontent       
beginning to be heard among the working 
classes of the industrial towns4 ,it is 
fair to presume1 however1 that the      

servile discipline of the service and   
the vindictive patriotism bred of the   
fight should combine to render the      
populace of the ,fatherland more        
amenable to the irresponsible rule of   
the ,imperial dynasty and its subaltern 
royal establishments1 in spite of any   
slight effect of a contrary character   
exercised by the training in            
technological methods and in            
self-reliance1 with which this          
discipline of the service has been      
accompanied4 ,as to the case of the     
,british population1 under arms or under
 compulsion of necessity at home1       
something has already been said in an   
earlier passage2 and much will          
apparently depend1 in their case1 on the
 further duration of the war4 ,the case 
of the other nationalities involved1    
both neutrals and belligerents1 is even 
more obscure in this bearing1 but it is 
also of less immediate consequence for  
the present argument4         99        
99       99       99       99  ,the     

essentially feudal virtues of loyalty   
and bellicose patriotism would appear to
 have gained their great ascendency over
 all men's spirit within the ,western   
civilisation by force of the peculiarly 
consistent character of the discipline  
of life under feudal conditions1 whether
 in war or peace2 and to the same       
uniformity of these forces that shaped  
the workday habits of thought among the 
feudal nations is apparently due that   
profound institutionalisation of the    
preconceptions of patriotism and        
loyalty1 by force of which these        
preconceptions still hold the modern    
peoples in an unbreakable web of        
prejudice1 after the conditions favoring
 their acquirement have in great part   
ceased to operate4 ,these preconceptions
 of national solidarity and             
international enmity have come down from
 the past as an integral part of the    
unwritten constitution underlying all   
these modern nations1 even those which  
have departed most widely from the      

manner of life to which the peoples owe 
these ancient preconceptions4 ,hitherto1
 or rather until recent times1 the      
workday experience of these peoples has 
not seriously worked at cross purposes  
with the patriotic spirit and its bias  
of national animosity2 and what         
discrepancy there has effectively been  
between the discipline of workday life  
and the received institutional          
preconceptions on this head1 has        
hitherto been overborne by the          
unremitting inculcation of these virtues
 by interested politicians1 priests and 
publicists1 who speak habitually for the
 received order of things4  ,that order 
of things which is known on its         
political and civil side as the feudal  
system1 together with that era of the   
dynastic ,states which succeeds the     
feudal age technically so called1 was1  
on its industrial or technological side1
 a system of trained man-power organised
 on a plan of subordination of man to   
man4 ,on the whole1 the scheme and logic

 of that life1 whether in its political 
7warlike7 or its industrial doings1     
whether in war or peace1 runs on terms  
of personal capacity1 proficiency and   
relations4 ,the organisation of the     
forces engaged and the constraining     
rules according to which this           
organisation worked1 were of the nature 
of personal relations1 and the          
impersonal factors in the case were     
taken for granted4 ,politics and war    
were a field for personal valor1 force  
and cunning1 in practical effect a field
 for personal force and fraud4 ,industry
 was a field in which the routine of    
life1 and its outcome1 turned on the    
skill1 dexterity and judgment of the    
individual workman1 in the words of     
,adam ,smith4  ,the feudal age passed1  
being done to death by handicraft       
industry1 commercial traffic1 gunpowder1
 and the state-making politicians4 ,but 
the political ,states of the            
statemakers1 the dynastic ,states as    
they may well be called1 continued the  

conduct of political life on the        
personal plane of rivalry and jealousy  
between dynasties and between their     
,states2 and in spite of gunpowder and  
the new military engineering1 warfare   
continued also to be1 in the main and   
characteristically1 a field in which    
man-power and personal qualities decided
 the outcome1 by virtue of personal     
skill1 dexterity and judgment4 ,meantime
 industry and its technology by         
insensible degrees underwent a change in
 the direction of impersonalisation1    
particularly in those countries in which
 state-making and its warlike enterprise
 had ceased1 or were ceasing1 to be the 
chief interests and the controlling     
preconception of the people4  ,the logic
 of the new1 mechanical industry which  
has supplanted handicraft in these      
countries1 is a mechanistic logic1 which
 proceeds in terms of matter-of-fact    
strains1 masses1 velocities1 and the    
like1 instead of the skill1 dexterity   
and judgment of personal agents4 ,the   

new industry does not dispense with the 
personal agencies1 nor can it even be   
said to minimise the need of skill1     
dexterity and judgment in the personal  
agents employed1 but it does take them  
and their attributes for granted as in  
some sort a foregone premise to its main
 argument4 ,the logic of the handicraft 
system took the impersonal agencies for 
granted2 the machine industry takes the 
skill1 dexterity and judgment of the    
workmen for granted4 ,the processes of  
thought1 and therefore the consistent   
habitual discipline1 of the former ran  
in terms of the personal agents engaged1
 and of the personal relations of       
discretion1 control and subordination   
necessary to the work2 whereas the      
mechanistic logic of the modern         
technology1 more and more consistently1 
runs in terms of the impersonal forces  
engaged1 and inculcates an habitual     
predilection for matter-of-fact         
statement1 and an habitual preconception
 that the findings of material science  

alone are conclusive4  ,in those nations
 that have made up the advance guard of 
,western civilisation in its movement   
out of feudalism1 the disintegrating    
effect of this matter-of-fact animus    
inculcated by the later state of the    
industrial arts has apparently acted    
effectively1 in some degree1 to         
discredit those preconceptions of       
personal discrimination on which        
dynastic rule is founded4 ,but in no    
case has the discipline of this         
mechanistic technology yet wrought its  
perfect work or come to a definitive    
conclusion4 ,meantime war and politics  
have on the whole continued on the      
ancient plane2 it may perhaps be fair to
 say that politics has so continued     
because warlike enterprise has continued
 still to be a matter of such personal  
forces as skill1 dexterity and judgment1
 valor and cunning1 personal force and  
fraud4 ,latterly1 gradually1 but        
increasingly1 the technology of war1    
too1 has been shifting to the           

mechanistic plane2 until in the latest  
phases of it1 somewhere about the turn  
of the century1 it is evident that the  
logic of warfare too has come to be the 
same mechanistic logic that makes the   
modern state of the industrial arts4    
,what1 if anything1 is due by           
consequence to overtake the political   
strategy and the political              
preconceptions of the new century1 is a 
question that will obtrude itself1      
though with scant hope of finding a     
ready answer4 ,it may even seem a rash1 
as well as an ungraceful1 undertaking to
 inquire into the possible manner and   
degree of prospective decay to which the
 received political ideals and virtues  
would appear to be exposed by           
consequence of this derangement of the  
ancient discipline to which men have    
been subjected4 ,so much1 however1 would
 seem evident1 that the received virtues
 and ideals of patriotic animosity and  
national jealousy can best be guarded   
against untimely decay by resolutely    

holding to the formal observance of all 
outworn punctilios of national integrity
 and discrimination1 in spite of their  
increasing disserviceability1--as would 
be done1 e4g41 or at least sought to be 
done1 in the installation of a league of
 neutral nations to keep the peace and  
at the same time to safeguard those     
national interests whose only use is to 
divide these nations and keep them in a 
state of mutual envy and distrust4      
99       99       99       99       99  
,those peoples who are subject to the   
constraining governance of this modern  
state of the industrial arts1 as all    
modern peoples are in much the same     
measure in which they are modern1 are1  
therefore1 exposed to a workday         
discipline running at cross purposes    
with the received law and order as it   
takes effect in national affairs2 and to
 this is to be added that1 with warlike 
enterprise also shifted to this same    
mechanistic-technological ground1 war   
can no longer be counted on so          

confidently as before to correct all the
 consequent drift away from the ancient 
landmarks of dynastic1 pseudo-dynastic1 
and national enterprise in dominion4    
,as has been noted above1 modern warfare
 not only makes use of1 and indeed      
depends on1 the modern industrial       
technology at every turn of the         
operations in the field1 but it draws on
 the ordinary industrial resources of   
the countries at war in a degree and    
with an urgency never equalled4 ,no     
nation can hope to make a stand in      
modern warfare1 much less to make       
headway in warlike enterprise1 without  
the most thoroughgoing exploitation of  
the modern industrial arts4 ,which      
signifies for the purpose in hand that  
any ,power that harbors an imperial     
ambition must take measures to let its  
underlying population acquire the ways  
and means of the modern machine         
industry1 without reservation2 which in 
turn signifies that popular education   
must be taken care of to such an extent 

as may be serviceable in this manner of 
industry and in the manner of life which
 this industrial system necessarily     
imposes2 which signifies1 of course1    
that only the thoroughly trained and    
thoroughly educated nations have a      
chance of holding their place as        
formidable ,powers in this latterday    
phase of civilisation4 ,what is needed  
is the training and education that go to
 make proficiency in the modern fashion 
of technology and in those material     
sciences that conduce to technological  
proficiency of this modern order4 ,it is
 a matter of course that in these       
premises any appreciable illiteracy is  
an intolerable handicap4 ,so is also any
 training which discourages habitual    
self-reliance and initiative1 or which  
acts as a check on skepticism2 for the  
skeptical frame of mind is a necessary  
part of the intellectual equipment that 
makes for advance1 invention and        
understanding in the field of           
technological proficiency4  ,but these  

requirements1 imperatively necessary as 
a condition of warlike success1 are at  
cross purposes with that unquestioning  
respect of persons and that spirit of   
abnegation that alone can hold a people 
to the political institutions of the old
 order and make them a willing          
instrument in the hands of the dynastic 
statesmen4 ,the dynastic ,state is      
apparently caught in a dilemma4 ,the    
necessary preparation for warlike       
enterprise on the modern plan can       
apparently be counted on1 in the long   
run1 to disintegrate the foundations of 
the dynastic ,state4 ,but it is only in 
the long run that this effect can be    
counted on2 and it is perhaps not       
securely to be counted on even in a     
moderately long run of things as they   
have run hitherto1 if due precautions   
are taken by the interested             
statesmen1--as would seem to be         
indicated by the successful conservation
 of archaic traits in the ,german       
peoples during the past half century    

under the archaising rule of the        
,hohenzollern4 ,it is a matter of       
habituation1 which takes time1 and which
 can at the same time be neutralised in 
some degree by indoctrination4  ,still1 
when all is told1 it will probably have 
to be conceded that1 e4g41 such a nation
 as ,russia will fall under this rule of
 inherent disability imposed by the     
necessary use of the modern industrial  
arts4 ,without a fairly full and free   
command of these modern industrial      
methods on the part of the ,russian     
people1 together with the virtual       
disappearance of illiteracy1 and with   
the facile and far-reaching system of   
communication which it all involves1 the
 ,russian ,imperial establishment would 
not be a formidable power or a serious  
menace to the pacific nations2 and it is
 not easy to imagine how the ,imperial  
establishment could retain its hold and 
its character under the conditions      
indicated4  ,the case of ,japan1 taken  
by itself1 rests on somewhat similar    

lines as these others4 ,in time1 and in 
this case the time-allowance should     
presumably not be anything very large1  
the ,japanese people are likely to get  
an adequate command of the modern       
technology2 which would1 here as        
elsewhere1 involve the virtual          
disappearance of the present high       
illiteracy1 and the loss1 in some       
passable measure1 of the current        
superstitiously crass nationalism of    
that people4 ,there are indications that
 something of that kind1 and of quite   
disquieting dimensions1 is already under
 way2 though with no indication that any
 consequent disintegrating habits of    
thought have yet invaded the sacred     
close of ,japanese patriotic devotion4  
,again1 it is a question of time and    
habituation4 ,with time and habituation 
the emperor may insensibly cease to be  
of divine pedigree1 and the syndicate of
 statesmen who are doing business under 
his signature may consequently find     
their measures of ,imperial expansion   

questioned by the people who pay the    
bills4 ,but so long as the ,imperial    
syndicate enjoy their present immunity  
from outside obstruction1 and can       
accordingly carry on an uninterrupted   
campaign of cumulative predation in     
,korea1 ,china and ,manchuria1 the      
patriotic infatuation is less likely to 
fall off1 and by so much the decay of   
,japanese loyalty will be retarded4     
,yet1 even if allowed anything that may 
seem at all probable in the way of a    
free hand for aggression against their  
hapless neighbours1 the skepticism and  
insubordination to personal rule that   
seems inseparable in the long run from  
addiction to the modern industrial arts 
should be expected presently to overtake
 the ,japanese spirit of loyal          
servitude4 ,and the opportunity of      
,imperial ,japan lies in the interval4  
,so also does the menace of ,imperial   
,japan as a presumptive disturber of the
 peace at large4         99       99    
99       99       99  ,at the cost of   

some unavoidable tedium1 the argument as
 regards these and similar instances may
 be summarised4 ,it appears1 in the     
7possibly doubtful7 light of the history
 of democratic institutions and of      
modern technology hitherto1 as also from
 the logical character of this          
technology and its underlying material  
sciences1 that consistent addiction to  
the peculiar habits of thought involved 
in its carrying on will presently induce
 a decay of those preconceptions in     
which dynastic government and national  
ambitions have their ground4 ,continued 
addiction to this modern scheme of      
industrial life should in time eventuate
 in a decay of militant nationalism1    
with a consequent lapse of warlike      
enterprise4 ,at the same time1 popular  
proficiency in the modern industrial    
arts1 with all that that implies in the 
way of intelligence and information1 is 
indispensable as a means to any         
successful warlike enterprise on the    
modern plan4 ,the menace of warlike     

aggression from such dynastic ,states1  
e4g41 as ,imperial ,germany and         
,imperial ,japan is due to their having 
acquired a competent use of this modern 
technology1 while they have not yet had 
time to lose that spirit of dynastic    
loyalty which they have carried over    
from an archaic order of things1 out of 
which they have emerged at a very       
appreciably later period 7last half of  
the nineteenth century7 than those      
democratic peoples whose peace they now 
menace4 ,as has been said1 they have    
taken over this modern state of the     
industrial arts without having yet come 
in for the defects of its qualities4    
,this modern technology1 with its       
underlying material sciences1 is a novel
 factor in the history of human culture1
 in that addiction to its use conduces  
to the decay of militant patriotism1 at 
the same time that its employment so    
greatly enhances the warlike efficiency 
of even a pacific people1 at need1 that 
they can not be seriously molested by   

any other peoples1 however valorous and 
numerous1 who have not a competent use  
of this technology4 ,a peace at large   
among the civilised nations1 by loss of 
the militant temper through addiction to
 this manner of arts of peace1          
therefore1 carries no risk of           
interruption by an inroad of warlike    
barbarians1--always provided that those 
existing archaic peoples who might pass 
muster as barbarians are brought into   
line with the pacific nations on a      
footing of peace and equality4 ,the     
disparity in point of outlook as between
 the resulting peace at large by neglect
 of bootless animosities1 on the one    
hand1 and those historic instances of a 
peaceable civilisation that have been   
overwhelmed by warlike barbarian        
invasions1 on the other hand1 should be 
evident4         99       99       99   
99       99  ,it is always possible1    
indeed it would scarcely be surprising  
to find1 that the projected league of   
neutrals or of nations bent on peace can

 not be brought to realisation at this  
juncture2 perhaps not for a long time   
yet4 ,but it should at the same time    
seem reasonable to expect that the drift
 toward a peaceable settlement of       
national discrepancies such as has been 
visible in history for some appreciable 
time past will1 in the absence of       
unforeseen hindrances1 work out to some 
such effect in the course of further    
experience under modern conditions4 ,and
 whether the projected peace compact at 
its inception takes one form or another1
 provided it succeeds in its main       
purpose1 the long-term drift of things  
under its rule should logically set     
toward some ulterior settlement of the  
general character of what has here been 
spoken of as a peace by neglect or by   
neutralisation of discrepancies4  ,it   
should do so1 in the absence of         
unforeseen contingencies2 more          
particularly if there were no effectual 
factor of dissension included in the    
fabric of institutions within the       

nation4 ,but there should also1 e4g41 be
 no difficulty in assenting to the      
forecast that when and if national peace
 and security are achieved and settled  
beyond recall1 the discrepancy in fact  
between those who own the country's     
wealth and those who do not is presently
 due to come to an issue4 ,any attempt  
to forecast the form which this issue is
 to take1 or the manner1 incidents1     
adjuncts and sequelae of its            
determination1 would be a bolder and a  
more ambiguous1 undertaking4 ,hitherto  
attempts to bring this question to an   
issue have run aground on the real or   
fancied jeopardy to paramount national  
interests4 ,how1 if at all1 this issue  
might affect national interests and     
international relations1 would obviously
 depend in the first instance on the    
state of the given national             
establishment and the character of the  
international engagements entered into  
in the formation of this projected      
pacific league4 ,it is always           

conceivable that the transactions       
involving so ubiquitous an issue might  
come to take on an international        
character and that they might touch the 
actual or fanciful interests of these   
diverse nations with such divergent     
effect as to bring on a rupture of the  
common understanding between them and of
 the peace-compact in which the common  
understanding is embodied4         99   
99       99       99       99  ,in the  
beginning1 that is to say in the        
beginnings out of which this modern era 
of the ,western civilisation has arisen1
 with its scheme of law and custom1     
there grew into the scheme of law and   
custom1 by settled usage1 a right of    
ownership and of contract in disposal of
 ownership1--which may or may not have  
been a salutary institutional           
arrangement on the whole1 under the     
circumstances of the early days4 ,with  
the later growth of handicraft and the  
petty trade in ,western ,europe this    
right of ownership and contract came to 

be insisted on1 standardised under legal
 specifications1 and secured against    
molestation by the governmental         
interests2 more particularly and        
scrupulously among those peoples that   
have taken the lead in working out that 
system of free or popular institutions  
that marks the modern civilised nations4
 ,so it has come to be embodied in the  
common law of the modern world as an    
inviolable natural right4 ,it has all   
the prescriptive force of legally       
authenticated immemorial custom4  ,under
 the system of handicraft and petty     
trade this right of property and free   
contract served the interest of the     
common man1 at least in much of its     
incidence1 and acted in its degree to   
shelter industrious and economical      
persons from hardship and indignity at  
the hands of their betters4 ,there seems
 reason to believe1 as is commonly      
believed1 that so long as that          
relatively direct and simple scheme of  
industry and trade lasted1 the right of 

ownership and contract was a salutary   
custom1 in its bearing on the fortunes  
of the common man4 ,it appears also1 on 
the whole1 to have been favorable to the
 fuller development of the handicraft   
technology1 as well as to its eventual  
outgrowth into the new line of          
technological expedients and            
contrivances that presently gave rise to
 the machine industry and the           
large-scale business enterprise4  ,the  
standard theories of economic science   
have assumed the rights of property and 
contract as axiomatic premises and      
ultimate terms of analysis2 and their   
theories are commonly drawn in such a   
form as would fit the circumstances of  
the handicraft industry and the petty   
trade1 and such as can be extended to   
any other economic situation by shrewd  
interpretation4 ,these theories1 as they
 run from ,adam ,smith down through the 
nineteenth century and later1 appear    
tenable1 on the whole1 when taken to    
apply to the economic situation of that 

earlier time1 in virtually all that they
 have to say on questions of wages1     
capital1 savings1 and the economy and   
efficiency of management and production 
by the methods of private enterprise    
resting on these rights of ownership and
 contract and governed by the pursuit of
 private gain4 ,it is when these        
standard theories are sought to be      
applied to the later situation1 which   
has outgrown the conditions of          
handicraft1 that they appear nugatory or
 meretricious4 ,the competitive system  
which these standard theories assume as 
a necessary condition of their own      
validity1 and about which they are      
designed to form a defensive hedge1     
would1 under those earlier conditions of
 small-scale enterprise and personal    
contact1 appear to have been both a     
passably valid assumption as a premise  
and a passably expedient scheme of      
economic relations and traffic4 ,at that
 period of its life-history it can not  
be said consistently to have worked     

hardship to the common man2 rather the  
reverse4 ,and the common man in that    
time appears to have had no misgivings  
about the excellence of the scheme or of
 that article of ,natural ,rights that  
underlies it4  ,this complexion of      
things1 as touches the effectual bearing
 of the institution of property and the 
ancient customary rights of ownership1  
has changed substantially since the time
 of ,adam ,smith4 ,the competitive      
system1 which he looked to as the       
economic working-out of that simple and 
obvious system of natural liberty that  
always engaged his best affections1 has 
in great measure ceased to operate as a 
routine of natural liberty1 in fact2    
particularly in so far as touches the   
fortunes of the common man1 the         
impecunious mass of the people4 ,de     
jure1 of course1 the competitive system 
and its inviolable rights of ownership  
are a citadel of ,natural ,liberty2 but 
de facto the common man is now1 and has 
for some time been1 feeling the pinch of

 it4 ,it is law1 and doubtless it is    
good law1 grounded in immemorial usage  
and authenticated with statute and      
precedent4 ,but circumstances have so   
changed that this good old plan has in a
 degree become archaic1 perhaps         
unprofitable1 or even mischievous1 on   
the whole1 and especially as touches the
 conditions of life for the common man4 
,at least1 so the common man in these   
modern democratic and commercial        
countries is beginning to apprehend the 
matter4  ,some slight and summary       
characterisation of these changing      
circumstances that have affected the    
incidence of the rights of property     
during modern times may1 therefore1 not 
be out of place2 with a view to seeing  
how far and why these rights may be due 
to come under advisement and possible   
revision1 in case a state of settled    
peace should leave men's attention free 
to turn to these internal1 as contrasted
 with national interests4  ,under that  
order of handicraft and petty trade that

 led to the standardisation of these    
rights of ownership in the accentuated  
form which belongs to them in modern law
 and custom1 the common man had a       
practicable chance of free initiative   
and self-direction in his choice and    
pursuit of an occupation and a          
livelihood1 in so far as rights of      
ownership bore on his case4 ,at that    
period the workman was the main factor  
in industry and1 in the main and        
characteristically1 the question of his 
employment was a question of what he    
would do4 ,the material equipment of    
industry--the plant1 as it has come to  
be called--was subject of ownership1    
then as now2 but it was then a secondary
 factor and1 notoriously1 subsidiary to 
the immaterial equipment of skill1      
dexterity and judgment embodied in the  
person of the craftsman4 ,the body of   
information1 or general knowledge1      
requisite to a workmanlike proficiency  
as handicraftsman was sufficiently      
slight and simple to fall within the    

ordinary reach of the working class1    
without special schooling2 and the      
material equipment necessary to the     
work1 in the way of tools and           
appliances1 was also slight enough1     
ordinarily1 to bring it within the reach
 of the common man4 ,the stress fell on 
the acquirement of that special personal
 skill1 dexterity and judgment that     
would constitute the workman a master of
 his craft4 ,given a reasonable measure 
of pertinacity1 the common man would be 
able to compass the material equipment  
needful to the pursuit of his craft1 and
 so could make his way to a livelihood2 
and the inviolable right of ownership   
would then serve to secure him the      
product of his own industry1 in         
provision for his own old-age and for a 
fair start in behalf of his children4   
,at least in the popular conception1 and
 presumably in some degree also in fact1
 the right of property so served as a   
guarantee of personal liberty and a     
basis of equality4 ,and so its          

apologists still look on the            
institution4  ,in a very appreciable    
degree this complexion of things and of 
popular conceptions has changed since   
then2 although1 as would be expected1   
the change in popular conceptions has   
not kept pace with the changing         
circumstances4 ,in all the              
characteristic and controlling lines of 
industry the modern machine technology  
calls for a very considerable material  
equipment2 so large an equipment1       
indeed1 that this plant1 as it is       
called1 always represents a formidable  
amount of invested wealth2 and also so  
large that it will1 typically1 employ a 
considerable number of workmen per unit 
of plant4 ,on the transition to the     
machine technology the plant became the 
unit of operation1 instead of the       
workman1 as had previously been the     
case2 and with the further development  
of this modern technology1 during the   
past hundred and fifty years or so1 the 
unit of operation and control has       

increasingly come to be not the         
individual or isolated plant but rather 
an articulated group of such plants     
working together as a balanced system   
and keeping pace in common1 under a     
collective business management2 and     
coincidently the individual workman has 
been falling into the position of an    
auxiliary factor1 nearly into that of an
 article of supply1 to be charged up as 
an item of operating expenses4 ,under   
this later and current system1          
discretion and initiative vest not in   
the workman but in the owners of the    
plant1 if anywhere4 ,so that at this    
point the right of ownership has ceased 
to be1 in fact1 a guarantee of personal 
liberty to the common man1 and has come 
to be1 or is coming to be1 a guarantee  
of dependence4 ,all of which engenders a
 feeling of unrest and insecurity1 such 
as to instill a doubt in the mind of the
 common man as to the continued         
expediency of this arrangement and of   
the prescriptive rights of property on  

which the arrangement rests4  ,there is 
also an insidious suggestion1 carrying a
 sinister note of discredit1 that comes 
in from ethnological science at this    
point2 which is adapted still further to
 derange the common man's faith in this 
received institution of ownership and   
its control of the material equipment of
 industry4 ,to students interested in   
human culture it is a matter of course  
that this material equipment is a means 
of utilising the state of the industrial
 arts2 that it is useful in industry and
 profitable to its owners only because  
and in so far as it is a creation of the
 current technological knowledge and    
enables its owner to appropriate the    
usufruct of the current industrial arts4
 ,it is likewise a matter of course that
 this technological knowledge1 that so  
enables the material equipment to serve 
the purposes of production and of       
private gain1 is a free gift of the     
community at large to the owners of     
industrial plant2 and1 under latterday  

conditions1 to them exclusively4 ,the   
state of the industrial arts is a joint 
heritage of the community at large1 but 
where1 as in the modern countries1 the  
work to be done by this technology      
requires a large material equipment1 the
 usufruct of this joint heritage passes1
 in effect1 into the hands of the owners
 of this large material equipment4      
,these owners have1 ordinarily1         
contributed nothing to the technology1  
the state of the industrial arts1 from  
which their control of the material     
equipment of industry enables them to   
derive a gain4 ,indeed1 no class or     
condition of men in the modern          
community--with the possible exception  
of politicians and the clergy--can      
conceivably contribute less to the      
community's store of technological      
knowledge than the large owners of      
invested wealth4 ,by one of those       
singular inversions due to production   
being managed for private gain1 it      
happens that these investors are not    

only not given to the increase and      
diffusion of technological knowledge1   
but they have a well-advised interest in
 retarding or defeating improvements in 
the industrial arts in detail4          
,improvements1 innovations that heighten
 productive efficiency in the general   
line of production in which a given     
investment is placed1 are commonly to be
 counted on to bring obsolescence by    
supersession to the plant already       
engaged in that line2 and therefore to  
bring a decline in its income-yielding  
capacity1 and so in its capital or      
investment value4  ,invested capital    
yields income because it enjoys the     
usufruct of the community's             
technological knowledge2 it has an      
effectual monopoly of this usufruct     
because this machine technology requires
 large material appliances with which to
 do its work2 the interest of the owners
 of established industrial plant will   
not tolerate innovations designed to    
supersede these appliances4 ,the bearing

 of ownership on industry and on the    
fortunes of the common man is           
accordingly1 in the main1 the bearing   
which it has by virtue of its monopoly  
control of the industrial arts1 and its 
consequent control of the conditions of 
employment and of the supply of vendible
 products4 ,it takes effect chiefly by  
inhibition and privation2 stoppage of   
production in case it brings no suitable
 profit to the investor1 refusal of     
employment and of a livelihood to the   
workmen in case their product does not  
command a profitable price in the       
market4  ,the expediency of so having   
the nation's industry managed on a      
footing of private ownership in the     
pursuit of private gain1 by persons who 
can show no equitable personal claim to 
even the most modest livelihood1 and    
whose habitual method of controlling    
industry is sabotage--refusal to let    
production go on except it affords them 
an unearned income--the expediency of   
all this is coming to be doubted by     

those who have to pay the cost of it4   
,and it does not go far to lessen their 
doubts to find that the cost which they 
pay is commonly turned to no more urgent
 or useful purpose than a conspicuously 
wasteful consumption of superfluities by
 the captains of sabotage and their     
domestic establishments4  ,this may not 
seem a veracious and adequate account of
 these matters2 it may1 in effect1 fall 
short of the formulation3 ,the truth1   
the whole truth1 and nothing but the    
truth2 nor does the question here turn  
on its adequacy as a statement of fact4 
,without prejudice to the question of   
its veracity and adequacy1 it is        
believed to be such an account of these 
matters as will increasingly come easy  
and seem convincing to the common man   
who1 in an ever increasing degree1 finds
 himself pinched with privation and     
insecurity by a run of facts which will 
consistently bear this construction1 and
 who perforce sees these facts from the 
prejudiced standpoint of a loser4 ,to   

such a one1 there is reason to believe1 
the view so outlined will seem all the  
more convincing the more attentively the
 pertinent facts and their bearing on   
his fortunes are considered4 ,how far   
the contrary prejudice of those whose   
interest or training inclines them the  
other way may lead them to a different  
construction of these pertinent facts1  
does not concern the present argument2  
which has to do with this run of facts  
only as they bear on the prospective    
frame of mind of that unblest mass of   
the population who will have opportunity
 to present their proposals when peace  
at large shall have put national        
interests out of their preferential     
place in men's regard4  ,at the risk of 
what may seem an excessively wide       
digression1 there is something further  
to be said of the capitalistic sabotage 
spoken of above4 ,the word has by usage 
come to have an altogether ungraceful   
air of disapproval4 ,yet it signifies   
nothing more vicious than a deliberate  

obstruction or retardation of industry1 
usually by legitimate means1 for the    
sake of some personal or partisan       
advantage4 ,this morally colorless      
meaning is all that is intended in its  
use here4 ,it is extremely common in all
 industry that is designed to supply    
merchantable goods for the market4 ,it  
is1 in fact1 the most ordinary and      
ubiquitous of all expedients in business
 enterprise that has to do with         
supplying the market1 being always      
present in the businessman's necessary  
calculations2 being not only a usual and
 convenient recourse but quite          
indispensable as an habitual measure of 
business sagacity4 ,so that no personal 
blame can attach to its employment by   
any given businessman or business       
concern4 ,it is only when measures of   
this nature are resorted to by          
employees1 to gain some end of their    
own1 that such conduct becomes          
7technically7 reprehensible4  ,any      
businesslike management of industry is  

carried on for gain1 which is to be got 
only on condition of meeting the terms  
of the market4 ,the price system under  
which industrial business is carried on 
will not tolerate production in excess  
of the market demand1 or without due    
regard to the expenses of production as 
determined by the market on the side of 
the supplies required4 ,hence any       
business concern must adjust its        
operations1 by due acceleration1        
retardation or stoppage1 to the market  
conditions1 with a view to what the     
traffic will bear2 that is to say1 with 
a view to what will yield the largest   
obtainable net gain4 ,so long as the    
price system rules1 that is to say so   
long as industry is managed on          
investment for a profit1 there is no    
escaping this necessity of adjusting the
 processes of industry to the           
requirements of a remunerative price2   
and this adjustment can be taken care of
 only by well-advised acceleration or   
curtailment of the processes of         

industry2 which answers to the          
definition of sabotage4 ,wise business  
management1 and more particularly what  
is spoken of as safe and sane business  
management1 therefore1 reduces itself in
 the main to a sagacious use of         
sabotage2 that is to say a sagacious    
limitation of productive processes to   
something less than the productive      
capacity of the means in hand4          
99       99       99       99       99  
,to anyone who is inclined to see these 
matters of usage in the light of their  
history and to appraise them as         
phenomena of habituation1 adaptation and
 supersession in the sequence of        
cultural proliferation1 there should be 
no difficulty in appreciating that this 
institution of ownership that makes the 
core of the modern institutional        
structure is a precipitate of custom1   
like any other item of use and wont2 and
 that1 like any other article of        
institutional furniture1 it is subject  
to the contingencies of supersession and

 obsolescence4 ,if prevalent habits of  
thought1 enforced by the prevalent      
exigencies of life and livelihood1 come 
to change in such a way as to make life 
under the rule imposed by this          
institution seem irksome1 or            
intolerable1 to the mass of the         
population2 and if at the same time     
things turn in such a way as to leave no
 other and more urgent interest or      
exigency to take precedence of this one 
and hinder its being pushed to an issue2
 then it should reasonably follow that  
contention is due to arise between the  
unblest mass on whose life it is a      
burden and the classes who live by it4  
,but it is1 of course1 impossible to    
state beforehand what will be the       
precise line of cleavage or what form   
the division between the two parties in 
interest will take4 ,yet it is contained
 in the premises that1 barring          
unforeseen contingencies of a formidable
 magnitude1 such a cleavage is due to   
follow as a logical sequel of an        

enduring peace at large4 ,and it is also
 well within the possibilities of the   
case that this issue may work into an   
interruption or disruption of the peace 
between the nations4  ,in this          
connection it may be called to mind that
 the existing governmental              
establishments in these pacific nations 
are1 in all cases1 in the hands of the  
beneficiary1 or kept                    
classes1--beneficiaries in the sense in 
which a distinction to that effect comes
 into the premises of the case at this  
point4 ,the responsible officials and   
their chief administrative officers1--so
 much as may at all reasonably be called
 the ,government or the                 
,administration1--are quite invariably  
and characteristically drawn from these 
beneficiary classes2 nobles1 gentlemen1 
or business men1 which all comes to the 
same thing for the purpose in hand2 the 
point of it all being that the common   
man does not come within these precincts
 and does not share in these counsels   

that assume to guide the destiny of the 
nations4  ,of course1 sporadically and  
ephemerally1 a man out of the           
impecunious and undistinguished mass may
 now and again find his way within the  
gates2 and more frequently will a       
professed ,man of the ,people sit in    
council4 ,but that the rule holds       
unbroken and inviolable is sufficiently 
evident in the fact that no community   
will let the emoluments of office for   
any of its responsible officials1 even  
for those of a very scant               
responsibility1 fall to the level of the
 habitual livelihood of the             
undistinguished populace1 or indeed to  
fall below what is esteemed to be a     
seemly income for a gentleman4 ,should  
such an impecunious one be thrown up    
into a place of discretion in the       
government1 he will forthwith cease to  
be a common man and will be inducted    
into the rank of gentleman1--so far as  
that feat can be achieved by taking     
thought or by assigning him an income   

adequate to a reputably expensive manner
 of life4 ,so obvious is the antagonism 
between a vulgar station in life and a  
position of official trust1 that many a 
selfmade man has advisedly taken        
recourse to governmental position1 often
 at some appreciable cost1 from no      
apparent motive other than its known    
efficacy as a ,levitical corrective for 
a humble origin4 ,and in point of fact1 
neither here nor there have the         
underbred majority hitherto learned to  
trust one of their own kind with        
governmental discretion2 which has never
 yet1 in the popular conviction1 ceased 
to be a perquisite of the gently-bred   
and the well-to-do4  ,let it be presumed
 that this state of things will continue
 without substantial alteration1 so far 
as regards the complexion of the        
governmental establishments of these    
pacific nations1 and with such allowance
 for overstatement in the above         
characterisation as may seem called for4
 ,these governmental establishments are1

 by official position and by the        
character of their personnel1 committed 
more or less consistently to the        
maintenance of the existing law and     
order4 ,and should no substantial change
 overtake them as an effect of the war  
experience1 the pacific league under    
discussion would be entered into by and 
between governments of this complexion4 
,should difficulties then arise between 
those who own and those who do not1 in  
any one of these countries1 it would    
become a nice question whether the      
compact to maintain the peace and       
national integrity of the several       
nations comprised in the league should  
be held to cover the case of internal   
dissensions and possible disorders      
partaking of the character of revolt    
against the established authorities or  
against the established provisions of   
law4 ,a strike of the scope and         
character of the one recently           
threatened1 and narrowly averted1 on the
 ,american railroads1 e4g41 might easily

 give rise to disturbances sufficiently 
formidable to raise a question of the   
peace league's jurisdiction2            
particularly if such a disturbance      
should arise in a less orderly and less 
isolated country than the ,american     
republic2 so as unavoidably to carry the
 effects of the disturbance across the  
national frontiers along the lines of   
industrial and commercial intercourse   
and correlation4 ,it is always          
conceivable that a national government  
standing on a somewhat conservative     
maintenance of the received law and     
order might feel itself bound by its    
conception of the peace to make common  
cause with the keepers of established   
rights in neighboring states1           
particularly if the similar interests of
 their own nation were thought to be    
placed in jeopardy by the course of     
events4  ,antecedently it seems highly  
probable that the received rights of    
ownership and disposal of property1     
particularly of investment1 will come up

 for advisement and revision so soon as 
a settled state of peace is achieved4   
,and there should seem to be little     
doubt but this revision would go toward1
 or at least aim at the curtailment or  
abrogation of these rights2 very much   
after the fashion in which the analogous
 vested rights of feudalism and the     
dynastic monarchy have been revised and 
in great part curtailed or abrogated in 
the advanced democratic countries4 ,not 
much can confidently be said as to the  
details of such a prospective revision  
of legal rights1 but the analogy of that
 procedure by which these other vested  
rights have been reduced to a manageable
 disability1 suggests that the method in
 the present case also would be by way  
of curtailment1 abrogation and          
elimination4 ,here again1 as in         
analogous movements of disuse and       
disestablishment1 there would doubtless 
be much conservative apprehension as to 
the procuring of a competent substitute 
for the supplanted methods of doing what

 is no longer desirable to be done2 but 
here as elsewhere1 in a like            
conjuncture1 the practicable way out    
would presumably be found to lie along  
the line of simple disuse and           
disallowance of class prerogative4      
,taken at its face value1 without       
unavoidable prejudice out of the past1  
this question of a substitute to replace
 the current exploitation of the        
industrial arts for private gain by     
capitalistic sabotage is not altogether 
above a suspicion of drollery4  ,yet it 
is not to be overlooked that private    
enterprise on the basis of private      
ownership is the familiar and accepted  
method of conducting industrial affairs1
 and that it has the sanction of        
immemorial usage1 in the eyes of the    
common man1 and that it is reenforced   
with the urgency of life and death in   
the apprehension of the kept classes4   
,it should accordingly be a possible    
outcome of such a peace as would put    
away international dissension1 that the 

division of classes would come on in a  
new form1 between those who stand on    
their ancient rights of exploitation and
 mastery1 and those who are unwilling   
longer to submit4 ,and it is quite      
within the possibilities of the case    
that the division of opinion on these   
matters might presently shift back to   
the old familiar ground of international
 hostilities2 undertaken partly to put  
down civil disturbances in given        
countries1 partly by the more archaic1  
or conservative1 peoples to safeguard   
the institutions of the received law and
 order against inroads from the side of 
the iconoclastic ones4         99       
99       99       99       99  ,in the  
apprehension of those who are speaking  
for peace between the nations and       
planning for its realisation1 the       
outlook is that of a return to1 or a    
continuance of1 the state of things     
before the great war came on1 with peace
 and national security added1 or with   
the danger of war eliminated4 ,nothing  

appreciable in the way of consequent    
innovation1 certainly nothing of a      
serious character1 is contemplated as   
being among the necessary consequences  
of such a move into peace and security4 
,national integrity and autonomy are to 
be preserved on the received lines1 and 
international division and              
discrimination is to be managed as      
before1 and with the accustomed         
incidents of punctilio and pecuniary    
equilibration4 ,internationally         
speaking1 there is to dawn an era of    
diplomacy without afterthought1 whatever
 that might conceivably mean4  ,there is
 much in the present situation that     
speaks for such an arrangement1         
particularly as an initial phase of the 
perpetual peace that is aimed at1       
whatever excursive variations might     
befall presently1 in the course of      
years4 ,the war experience in the       
belligerent countries and the alarm that
 has disturbed the neutral nations have 
visibly raised the pitch of patriotic   

solidarity in all these countries2 and  
patriotism greatly favors the           
conservation of established use and     
wont2 more particularly is it favorable 
to the established powers and policies  
of the national government4 ,the        
patriotic spirit is not a spirit of     
innovation4 ,the chances of survival1   
and indeed of stabilisation1 for the    
accepted use and wont and for the       
traditional distinctions of class and   
prescriptive rights1 should therefore   
seem favorable1 at any rate in the first
 instance4  ,presuming1 therefore1 as   
the spokesmen of such a peace-compact   
are singularly ready to presume1 that   
the era of peace and good-will which    
they have in view is to be of a piece   
with the most tranquil decades of the   
recent past1 only more of the same kind1
 it becomes a question of immediate     
interest to the common man1 as well as  
to all students of human culture1 how   
the common man is to fare under this    
rgime of law and order1--the mass of the

 population whose place it is to do what
 is to be done1 and thereby to carry    
forward the civilisation of these       
pacific nations4 ,it may not be out of  
place to recall1 by way of parenthesis1 
that it is here taken for granted as a  
matter of course that all governmental  
establishments are necessarily          
conservative in all their dealings with 
this heritage of culture1 except so far 
as they may be reactionary4 ,their      
office is the stabilisation of archaic  
institutions1 the measure of archaism   
varying from one to another4  ,with due 
stabilisation and with a sagacious      
administration of the established scheme
 of law and order1 the common man should
 find himself working under conditions  
and to results of the familiar kind2 but
 with the difference that1 while legal  
usage and legal precedent remain        
unchanged1 the state of the industrial  
arts can confidently be expected to     
continue its advance in the same general
 direction as before1 while the         

population increases after the familiar 
fashion1 and the investing business     
community pursues its accustomed quest  
of competitive gain and competitive     
spending in the familiar spirit and with
 cumulatively augmented means4          
,stabilisation of the received law and  
order will not touch these matters2 and 
for the present it is assumed that these
 matters will not derange the received  
law and order4 ,the assumption may seem 
a violent one to the students of human  
culture1 but it is a simple matter of   
course to the statesmen4  ,to this      
piping time of peace the nearest        
analogues in history would seem to be   
the ,roman peace1 say1 of the days of   
the ,antonines1 and passably the        
,british peace of the ,victorian era4   
,changes in the scheme of law and order 
supervened in both of these instances1  
but the changes were1 after all1 neither
 unconscionably large nor were they of a
 subversive nature4 ,the scheme of law  
and order1 indeed1 appears in neither   

instance to have changed so far as the  
altered circumstances would seem to have
 called for4 ,to the common man the     
,roman peace appears to have been a     
peace by submission1 not widely         
different from what the case of ,china  
has latterly brought to the appreciation
 of students4 ,the ,victorian peace1    
which can be appreciated more in detail1
 was of a more genial character1 as     
regards the fortunes of the common man4 
,it started from a reasonably low level 
of hardship and de facto iniquity1 and  
was occupied with many prudent          
endeavours to improve the lot of the    
unblest majority2 but it is to be       
admitted that these prudent endeavours  
never caught up with the march of       
circumstances4 ,not that these prudent  
measures of amelioration were nugatory1 
but it is clear that they were not an   
altogether effectual corrective of the  
changes going on2 they were1 in effect1 
systematically so far in arrears as     
always to leave an uncovered margin of  

discontent with current conditions4 ,it 
is a fact of history that very          
appreciable sections of the populace    
were approaching an attitude of revolt  
against what they considered to be      
intolerable conditions when that era    
closed4 ,much of what kept them within  
bounds1 that is to say within legal     
bounds1 was their continued loyalty to  
the nation2 which was greatly1 and for  
the purpose needfully1 reenforced by a  
lively fear of warlike aggression from  
without4 ,now1 under the projected pax  
orbis terrarum all fear of invasion1 it 
is hopefully believed1 will be removed2 
and with the disappearance of this fear 
should also disappear the drag of       
national loyalty on the counsels of the 
underbred4  ,if this ,british peace of  
the nineteenth century is to be taken as
 a significant indication of what may be
 looked for under a rgime of peace at   
large1 with due allowance for what is   
obviously necessary to be allowed for1  
then what is held in promise would      

appear to be an era of unexampled       
commercial prosperity1 of investment and
 business enterprise on a scale hitherto
 not experienced4 ,these developments   
will bring their necessary consequences 
affecting the life of the community1 and
 some of the consequences it should be  
possible to foresee4 ,the circumstances 
conditioning this prospective era of    
peace and prosperity will necessarily   
differ from the corresponding           
circumstances that conditioned the      
,victorian peace1 and many of these     
points of difference it is also possible
 to forecast in outline with a fair     
degree of confidence4 ,it is in the main
 these economic factors going to        
condition the civilisation of the       
promised future that will have to be    
depended on to give the cue to any      
student interested in the prospective   
unfolding of events4  ,the scheme of law
 and order governing all modern nations1
 both in the conduct of their domestic  
affairs and in their national policies1 

is in its controlling elements the      
scheme worked out through ,british 7and 
,french7 experience in the eighteenth   
century and earlier1 as revised and     
further accommodated in the nineteenth  
century4 ,other peoples1 particularly   
the ,dutch1 have of course had their    
part in the derivation and development  
of this modern scheme of institutional  
principles1 but it has after all been a 
minor part2 so that the scheme at large 
would not differ very materially1 if    
indeed it should differ sensibly1 from  
what it is1 even if the contribution of 
these others had not been had4 ,the     
backward nations1 as e4g41 ,germany1    
,russia1 ,spain1 etc41 have of course   
contributed substantially nothing but   
retardation and maladjustment to this   
modern scheme of civil life2 whatever   
may be due to students resident in those
 countries1 in the way of scholarly     
formulation4 ,this nineteenth century   
scheme it is proposed to carry over into
 the new era2 and the responsible       

spokesmen of the projected new order    
appear to contemplate no provision      
touching this scheme of law and order1  
beyond the keeping of it intact in all  
substantial respects4  ,when and in so  
far as the projected peace at large     
takes effect1 international interests   
will necessarily fall somewhat into the 
background1 as being no longer a matter 
of precarious equilibration1 with heavy 
penalties in the balance2 and diplomacy 
will consequently become even more of a 
make-believe than today--something after
 the fashion of a game of bluff played  
with irredeemable chips4 ,commercial1   
that is to say business1 enterprise will
 consequently come in for a more        
undivided attention and be carried on   
under conditions of greater security and
 of more comprehensive trade relations4 
,the population of the pacified world   
may be expected to go on increasing     
somewhat as in the recent past2 in which
 connection it is to be remarked that   
not more than one-half1 presumably      

something less than one-half1 of the    
available agricultural resources have   
been turned to account for the civilised
 world hitherto4 ,the state of the      
industrial arts1 including means of     
transport and communication1 may be     
expected to develop farther in the same 
general direction as before1 assuming   
always that peace conditions continue to
 hold4 ,popular intelligence1 as it is  
called1--more properly popular          
education1--may be expected to suffer a 
further advance2 necessarily so1 since  
it is a necessary condition of any      
effectual advance in the industrial     
arts1--every appreciable technological  
advance presumes1 as a requisite to its 
working-out in industry1 an augmented   
state of information and of logical     
facility in the workmen under whose     
hands it is to take effect4  ,of the    
prescriptive rights carried over into   
the new era1 under the received law and 
order1 the rights of ownership alone may
 be expected to have any material       

significance for the routine of workday 
life2 the other personal rights that    
once seemed urgent will for everyday    
purposes have passed into a state of    
half-forgotten matter-of-course4 ,as    
now1 but in an accentuated degree1 the  
rights of ownership will1 in effect1    
coincide and coalesce with the rights of
 investment and business management4    
,the market--that is to say the rule of 
the price-system in all matters of      
production and livelihood--may be       
expected to gain in volume and          
inclusiveness2 so that virtually all    
matters of industry and livelihood will 
turn on questions of market price1 even 
beyond the degree in which that         
proposition holds today4 ,the           
progressive extension and consolidation 
of investments1 corporate solidarity1   
and business management may be expected 
to go forward on the accustomed lines1  
as illustrated by the course of things  
during the past few decades4 ,market    
conditions should accordingly1 in a     

progressively increased degree1 fall    
under the legitimate discretionary      
control of businessmen1 or syndicates of
 businessmen1 who have the disposal of  
large blocks of invested wealth1--big   
business1 as it is called1 should       
reasonably be expected to grow bigger   
and to exercise an increasingly more    
unhampered control of market conditions1
 including the money market and the     
labor market4  ,with such improvements  
in the industrial arts as may fairly be 
expected to come forward1 and with the  
possible enhancement of industrial      
efficiency which should follow from a   
larger scale of organisation1 a wider   
reach of transport and communication1   
and an increased population1--with these
 increasing advantages on the side of   
productive industry1 the per-capita     
product as well as the total product    
should be increased in a notable degree1
 and the conditions of life should      
possibly become notably easier and more 
attractive1 or at least more conducive  

to efficiency and personal comfort1 for 
all concerned4 ,such would be the first 
and unguarded inference to be drawn from
 the premises of the case as they offer 
themselves in the large2 and something  
of that kind is apparently what floats  
before the prophetic vision of the      
advocates of a league of nations for the
 maintenance of peace at large4 ,these  
premises1 and the inferences so drawn   
from them1 may be further fortified and 
amplified in the same sense on          
considering that certain very material  
economies also become practicable1 and  
should take effect in the absence of    
disturbing causes1 on the establishment 
of such a peace at large4 ,it will of   
course occur to all thoughtful persons  
that armaments must be reduced1 perhaps 
to a minimum1 and that the cost of these
 things1 in point of expenditures as    
well as of man-power spent in the       
service1 would consequently fall off in 
a corresponding measure4 ,so also1 as   
slight further reflection will show1    

would the cost of the civil service     
presumably fall off very appreciably2   
more particularly the cost of this      
service per unit of service rendered4   
,some such climax of felicities might be
 looked for by hopeful persons1 in the  
absence of disturbing causes4  ,under   
the new dispensation the standard of    
living1 that is to say the standard of  
expenditure1 would reasonably be        
expected to advance in a very           
appreciable degree1 at least among the  
wealthy and well-to-do2 and by pressure 
of imitative necessity a like effect    
would doubtless also be had among the   
undistinguished mass4 ,it is not a      
question of the standard of living      
considered as a matter of the           
subsistence minimum1 or even a standard 
of habitually prevalent creature        
comfort1 particularly not among the     
wealthy and well-to-do4 ,these latter   
classes have long since left all        
question of material comfort behind in  
their accepted standards of living and  

in the continued advance of these       
standards4 ,for these classes who are   
often spoken of euphemistically as being
 in easy circumstances1 it is altogether
 a question of a standard of reputable  
expenditure1 to be observed on pain of  
lost self-respect and of lost reputation
 at large4 ,as has been remarked in an  
earlier passage1 wants of this kind are 
indefinitely extensible4 ,so that some  
doubt may well be entertained as to     
whether the higher productive efficiency
 spoken of will necessarily make the way
 of life easier1 in view of this need of
 a higher standard of expenditure1 even 
when due account is taken of the many   
economies which the new dispensation is 
expected to make practicable4  ,one of  
the effects to be looked for would      
apparently be an increased pressure on  
the part of aspiring men to get into    
some line of business enterprise2 since 
it is only in business1 as contrasted   
with the industrial occupations1 that   
anyone can hope to find the relatively  

large income required for such an       
expensive manner of life as will bring  
any degree of content to aspirants for  
pecuniary good repute4 ,so it should    
follow that the number of businessmen   
and business concerns would increase up 
to the limit of what the traffic could  
support1 and that the competition       
between these rival1 and in a sense     
over-numerous1 concerns would push the  
costs of competition to the like limit4 
,in this respect the situation would be 
of much the same character as what it   
now is1 with the difference that the    
limit of competitive expenditures would 
be rather higher than at present1 to    
answer to the greater available margin  
of product that could be devoted to this
 use2 and that the competing concerns   
would be somewhat more numerous1 or at  
least that the aggregate expenditure on 
competitive enterprise would be somewhat
 larger2 as1 e4g41 costs of advertising1
 salesmanship1 strategic litigation1    
procuration of legislative and municipal

 grants and connivance1 and the like4   
,it is always conceivable1 though it may
 scarcely seem probable1 that these     
incidents of increased pressure of      
competition in business traffic might   
eventually take up all the slack1 and   
leave no net margin of product over what
 is available under the less favorable  
conditions of industry that prevail     
today2 more particularly when this      
increased competition for business gains
 is backed by an increased pressure of  
competitive spending for purposes of a  
reputable appearance4 ,all this applies 
in retail trade and in such lines of    
industry and public service as partakes 
of the nature of retail trade1 in the   
respect that salesmanship and the costs 
of salesmanship enter into their case in
 an appreciable measure2 this is an     
extensive field1 it is true1 and        
incontinently growing more extensive    
with the later changes in the customary 
methods of marketing products2 but it is
 by no means anything like the whole    

domain of industrial business1 and by no
 means a field in which business is     
carried on without interference of a    
higher control from outside its own     
immediate limits4  ,all this generously 
large and highly expensive and          
profitable field of trade and of        
trade-like industry1 in which the       
businessmen in charge deal somewhat     
directly with a large body of customers1
 is always subject to limitations       
imposed by the condition of the market2 
and the condition of the market is in   
part not under the control of these     
businessmen1 but is also in part        
controlled by large concerns in the     
background2 which in their turn are     
after all also not precisely free       
agents2 in fact not much more so than   
their cousins in the retail trade1 being
 confined in all their motions by the   
constraint of the price-system that     
dominates the whole and gathers them all
 in its impersonal and inexorable net4  
,there is a colloquial saying among     

businessmen1 that they are not doing    
business for their health2 which being  
interpreted means that they are doing   
business for a price4 ,it is out of a   
discrepancy in price1 between purchase  
and sale1 or between transactions which 
come to the same result as purchase and 
sale1 that the gains of business are    
drawn2 and it is in terms of price that 
these gains are rated1 amassed and      
funded4 ,it is necessary1 for a business
 concern to achieve a favorable balance 
in terms of price2 and the larger the   
balance in terms of price the more      
successful the enterprise4 ,such a      
balance can not be achieved except by   
due regard to the conditions of the     
market1 to the effect that dealings must
 not go on beyond what will yield a     
favorable balance in terms of price     
between income and outgo4 ,as has       
already been remarked above1 the        
prescriptive and indispensable recourse 
in all this conduct of business is      
sabotage1 limitation of supply to bring 

a remunerative price result4  ,the new  
dispensation offers two new factors     
bearing on this businesslike need of a  
sagacious sabotage1 or rather it brings 
a change of coefficients in two factors 
already familiar in business management3
 a greater need1 for gainful business1  
of resorting to such limitation of      
traffic2 and a greater facility of ways 
and means for enforcing the needed      
restriction4 ,so1 it is confidently to  
be expected that in the prospective     
piping time of peace the advance in the 
industrial arts will continue at an     
accelerated rate2 which may confidently 
be expected to affect the practicable   
increased production of merchantable    
goods2 from which it follows that it    
will act to depress the prices of these 
goods2 from which it follows that if a  
profitable business is to be done in the
 conduct of productive industry a       
greater degree of continence than before
 will have to be exercised in order not 
to let prices fall to an unprofitable   

figure2 that is to say1 the permissible 
output must be held short of the        
productive capacity of such industry by 
a wider margin than before4 ,on the     
other hand1 it is well known out of the 
experience of the past few decades that 
a larger coalition of invested capital1 
controlling a larger proportion of the  
output1 can more effectually limit the  
supply to a salutary maximum1 such as   
will afford reasonable profits4 ,and    
with the new dispensation affording a   
freer scope for business enterprise on  
conditions of greater security1 larger  
coalitions than before are due to come  
into bearing4 ,so that the means will be
 at hand competently to meet this more  
urgent need of a stricter limitation of 
the output1 in spite of any increased   
productive capacity conferred on the    
industrial community by any conceivable 
advance in the industrial arts4 ,the    
outcome to be looked for should         
apparently be such an effectual recourse
 to capitalistic sabotage as will       

neutralise any added advantage that     
might otherwise accrue to the community 
from its continued improvements in      
technology4  ,in spite of this          
singularly untoward conjuncture of      
circumstances to be looked for1 there   
need be no serious apprehension that    
capitalistic sabotage1 with a view to   
maintaining prices and the rate of      
profits1 will go all the way1 to the    
result indicated1 at least not on the   
grounds so indicated alone4 ,there is in
 the modern development of technology1  
and confidently to be counted on1 a     
continued flow of new contrivances and  
expedients designed to supersede the    
old2 and these are in fact successful1  
in greater or less measure1 in finding  
their way into profitable use1 on such  
terms as to displace older appliances1  
underbid them in the market1 and render 
them obsolete or subject to             
recapitalisation on a lowered           
earning-capacity4 ,so far as this       
unremitting flow of innovations has its 

effect1 that is to say so far as it can 
not be hindered from having an effect1  
it acts to lower the effectual cost of  
products to the consumer4 ,this effect  
is but a partial and somewhat uncertain 
one1 but it is always to be counted in  
as a persistent factor1 of uncertain    
magnitude1 that will affect the results 
in the long run4  ,as has just been     
spoken of above1 large coalitions of    
invested wealth are more competent to   
maintain1 or if need be to advance1     
prices than smaller coalitions acting in
 severalty1 or even when acting in      
collusion4 ,this state of the case has  
been well illustrated by the very       
successful conduct of such large        
business organisations during the past  
few decades2 successful1 that is1 in    
earning large returns on the investments
 engaged4 ,under the new dispensation1  
as has already been remarked1 coalitions
 should reasonably be expected to grow  
to a larger size and achieve a greater  
efficiency for the same purpose4  ,the  

large gains of the large corporate      
coalitions are commonly ascribed by     
their promoters1 and by sympathetic     
theoreticians of the ancient line1 to   
economies of production made practicable
 by a larger scale of production2 an    
explanation which is disingenuous only  
so far as it needs be4 ,what is more    
visibly true on looking into the        
workings of these coalitions in detail  
is that they are enabled to maintain    
prices at a profitable1 indeed at a     
strikingly profitable1 level by such a  
control of the output as would be called
 sabotage if it were put in practice by 
interested workmen with a view to       
maintain wages4 ,the effects of this    
sagacious sabotage become visible in the
 large earnings of these investments and
 the large gains which1 now and again1  
accrue to their managers4 ,large        
fortunes commonly are of this           
derivation4  ,in cases where no         
recapitalisation has been effected for a
 considerable series of years the yearly

 earnings of such businesslike          
coalitions have been known to approach  
fifty percent on the capitalised value4 
,commonly1 however1 when earnings rise  
to a striking figure1 the business will 
be recapitalised on the basis of its    
earning-capacity1 by issue of a stock   
dividend1 by reincorporation in a new   
combination with an increased           
capitalisation1 and the like4 ,such     
augmentation of capital not unusually   
has been spoken of by theoretical       
writers and publicists as an increase of
 the community's wealth1 due to savings2
 an analysis of any given case is likely
 to show that its increased capital     
value represents an increasingly        
profitable procedure for securing a high
 price above cost1 by stopping the      
available output short of the productive
 capacity of the industries involved4   
,loosely speaking1 and within the limits
 of what the traffic will bear1 the     
gains in such a case are proportioned to
 the deficiency by which the production 

or supply under control falls short of  
productive capacity4 ,so that the       
capitalisation in the case comes to bear
 a rough proportion to the material loss
 which this organisation of sabotage is 
enabled to inflict on the community at  
large2 and instead of its being a       
capitalisation of serviceable means of  
production it may1 now and again1 come  
to little else than a capitalisation of 
chartered sabotage4  ,under the new     
dispensation of peace and security at   
large this manner of capitalisation and 
business enterprise might reasonably be 
expected to gain something in scope and 
security of operation4 ,indeed1 there   
are few things within the range of human
 interest on which an opinion may more  
confidently be formed beforehand4 ,if   
the rights of property1 in their extent 
and amplitude1 are maintained intact as 
they are before the law today1 the hold 
which business enterprise on the large  
scale now has on the affairs and        
fortunes of the community at large is   

bound to grow firmer and to be used more
 unreservedly for private advantage     
under the new conditions contemplated4  
,the logical result should be an        
accelerated rate of accumulation of the 
country's wealth in the hands of a      
relatively very small class of wealthy  
owners1 with a relatively inconsiderable
 semi-dependent middle class of the     
well-to-do1 and with the mass of the    
population even more nearly destitute   
than they are today4 ,at the same time  
it is scarcely to be avoided that this  
wholly dependent and impecunious mass of
 the population must be given an        
appreciably better education than they  
have today4 ,the argument will return to
 the difficulties that are liable to    
arise out of this conjuncture of facts1 
in the way of discontent and possible   
disturbance4         99       99        
99       99       99  ,meantime1 looking
 to the promise of the pacific future in
 the light of the pacific past1 certain 
further consequences1 particularly      

consequences of the economic order1 that
 may reasonably be expected to follow   
will also merit attention4 ,the         
experience of the ,victorian peace is   
almost as pointed in its suggestion on  
this head as if it had been an          
experiment made ad hoc2 but with the    
reservation that the scale of economic  
life1 after all1 was small in the       
,victorian era1 and its pace was slack1 
compared with what the twentieth century
 should have to offer under suitable    
conditions of peace and pecuniary       
security4 ,in the light of this most    
instructive modern instance1 there      
should appear to be in prospect a growth
 of well-bred families resting on       
invested wealth and so living on        
unearned incomes2 larger incomes and    
consequently a more imposingly well-bred
 body of gentlefolk1 sustained and      
vouched for by a more munificent        
expenditure on superfluities1 than the  
modern world has witnessed hitherto4    
,doubtless the resulting growth of      

gentlemen and gentlewomen would be as   
perfect after their kind as these       
unexampled opportunities of gentle      
breeding might be expected to engender2 
so that even their ,british precursors  
on the trail of respectability would    
fall somewhat into insignificance by    
comparison1 whether in respect of       
gentlemanly qualities or in point of    
cost per unit4  ,the moral1 and even    
more particularly the aesthetic1 value  
of such a line of gentlefolk1 and of the
 culture which they may be expected to  
place on view1--this cultural side of   
the case1 of course1 is what one would  
prefer to dwell on1 and on the spiritual
 gains that might be expected to accrue 
to humanity at large from the steady    
contemplation of this meritorious       
respectability so displayed at such a   
cost4  ,but the prosaic necessity of the
 argument turns back to the economic and
 civil bearing of this prospective      
development1 this virtual bifurcation of
 the pacified nation into a small number

 of gentlemen who own the community's   
wealth and consume its net product in   
the pursuit of gentility1 on the one    
hand1 and an unblest mass of the        
populace who do the community's work on 
a meager livelihood tapering down toward
 the subsistence minimum1 on the other  
hand4 ,evidently1 this prospective      
posture of affairs may seem fraught with
 danger to the common weal1 as a public 
spirited citizen might phrase it4 ,or1  
as it would be expressed in less        
eloquent words1 it appears to comprise  
elements that should make for a change4 
,at the same time it should be recalled1
 and the statement will command assent  
on slight reflection1 that there is no  
avoiding substantially such a posture of
 affairs under the promised rgime of    
peace and security1 provided only that  
the price-system stands over intact1 and
 the current rights of property continue
 to be held inviolate4 ,if the known    
principles of competitive gain and      
competitive spending should need        

enforcement to that effect by an        
illustrative instance1 the familiar     
history of the ,victorian peace is      
sufficient to quiet all doubts4  ,of    
course1 the resulting articulation of   
classes in the community will not be    
expected to fall into such simple lines 
of sheer contrast as this scheme would  
indicate4 ,the class of gentlefolk1 the 
legally constituted wasters1 as they    
would be rated from the economic point  
of view1 can not be expected personally 
to take care of so large a consumption  
of superfluities as this posture of     
affairs requires at their hands4 ,they  
would1 as the ,victorian peace teaches1 
necessarily have the assistance of a    
trained corps of experts in unproductive
 consumption1 the first and most        
immediate of whom would be those whom   
the genial phrasing of ,adam ,smith     
designates menial servants4 ,beyond     
these would come the purveyors of       
superfluities1 properly speaking1 and   
the large1 indeed redundant1 class of   

tradespeople of high and low            
degree1--dependent in fact but with an  
illusion of semi-dependence2 and farther
 out again the legal and other          
professional classes of the order of    
stewards1 whose duty it will be to      
administer the sources of income and    
receive1 apportion and disburse the     
revenues so devoted to a traceless      
extinguishment4  ,there would1 in other 
words1 be something of a substantial    
middle class1 dependent on the wealthy  
and on their expenditure of wealth1 but 
presumably imbued with the ,victorian   
middle-class illusion that they are of  
some account in their own right4 ,under 
the due legal forms and sanctions this1 
somewhat voluminous1 middle-class       
population would engage in the traffic  
which is their perquisite1 and would    
continue to believe1 in some passable   
fashion1 that they touch the substance  
of things at something nearer than the  
second remove4 ,they would in great part
 appear to be people of independent     

means1 and more particularly would they 
continue in the hope of so appearing and
 of some time making good the           
appearance4 ,hence their fancied1 and   
therefore their sentimental1 interest   
would fall out on the side of the       
established law and order2 and they     
would accordingly be an element of      
stability in the commonwealth1 and would
 throw in their weight1 and their voice1
 to safeguard that private property and 
that fabric of prices and credit through
 which the income stream flows to the   
owners of preponderant invested wealth4 
,judged on the state of the situation as
 it runs in our time1 and allowing for  
the heightened efficiency of large-scale
 investment and consolidated management 
under the prospective conditions of     
added pecuniary security1 it is to be   
expected that the middle-class          
population with independent means should
 come in for a somewhat meager          
livelihood1 provided that they work     
faithfully at their business of managing

 pecuniary traffic to the advantage of  
their pecuniary betters1--meager1 that  
is to say1 when allowance is made for   
the conventionally large expenditure on 
reputable appearances which is          
necessarily to be included in their     
standard of living4 ,it lies in the     
nature of this system of large-scale    
investment and enterprise that the      
7pecuniarily7 minor agencies engaged on 
a footing of ostensible independence    
will come in for only such a share in   
the aggregate gains of the community as 
it is expedient for the greater business
 interests to allow them as an incentive
 to go on with their work as purveyors  
of traffic to these greater business    
interests4  ,the current1 and still more
 this prospective1 case of the          
quasi-self-directing middle class may   
fairly be illustrated by the case of the
 ,american farmers1 of the past and     
present4 ,the ,american farmer rejoices 
to be called ,the ,independent ,farmer4 
,he once was independent1 in a meager   

and toil-worn fashion1 in the days      
before the price-system had brought him 
and all his works into the compass of   
the market2 but that was some time ago4 
,he now works for the market1 ordinarily
 at something like what is called a     
living wage1 provided he has independent
 means enough to enable him by steady   
application to earn a living wage2 and  
of course1 the market being controlled  
by the paramount investment interests in
 the background1 his work1 in effect1   
inures to their benefit2 except so much 
as it may seem necessary to allow him as
 incentive to go on4 ,also of course1   
these paramount investment interests are
 in turn controlled in all their        
manoeuvres by the impersonal exigencies 
of the price-system1 which permits no   
vagaries in violation of the rule that  
all traffic must show a balance of      
profit in terms of price4  ,the         
,independent ,farmer still continues to 
believe that in some occult sense he    
still is independent in what he will do 

and what not2 or perhaps rather that he 
can by shrewd management retain or      
regain a tolerable measure of such      
independence1 after the fashion of what 
is held to have been the posture of     
affairs in the days before the coming of
 corporation finance2 or at least he    
believes that he ought to have1 or to   
regain or reclaim1 some appreciable     
measure of such independence2 which     
ought then1 by help of the independent  
means which he still treasures1 to      
procure him an honest and assured       
livelihood in return for an honest      
year's work4 ,latterly he1 that is the  
common run of the farmers1 has been     
taking note of the fact that he is1 as  
he apprehends it1 at a disadvantage in  
the market2 and he is now taking        
recourse to concerted action for the    
purpose of what might be called rigging 
the market to his own advantage4 ,in    
this he overlooks the impregnable       
position which the party of the second  
part1 the great investment interests1   

occupy2 in fact1 he is counting without 
his host4 ,hitherto he has not been     
convinced of his own helplessness4 ,and 
with a fine fancy he still imagines that
 his own interest is on the side of the 
propertied and privileged classes2 so   
that the farmer constituency is the     
chief pillar of conservative law and    
order1 particularly in all that touches 
the inviolable rights of property and at
 every juncture where a division comes  
on between those who live by investment 
and those who live by work4 ,in         
pecuniary effect1 the ordinary ,american
 farmer1 who legally owns a moderate    
farm of the common sort1 belongs among  
those who work for a livelihood2 such a 
livelihood as the investment interests  
find it worth while to allow him under  
the rule of what the traffic will bear2 
but in point of sentiment and class     
consciousness he clings to a belated    
stand on the side of those who draw a   
profit from his work4  ,so it is also   
with the menial servants and the        

middle-class people of independent      
means1 who are1 however1 in a position  
to see more clearly their dependence on 
the owners of predominant wealth4 ,and  
such1 with a further accentuation of the
 anomaly1 may reasonably be expected to 
be the further run of these relations   
under the promised rgime of peace and   
security4 ,the class of well-kept       
gentlefolk will scarcely be called on to
 stand alone1 in case of a division     
between those who live by investment and
 those who live by work2 inasmuch as1   
for the calculable future1 it should    
seem a reasonable expectation that this 
very considerable fringe of dependents  
and pseudo-independents will abide by   
their time-tried principles of right and
 honest living1 through good days and   
evil1 and cast in their lot unreservedly
 with that reputable body to whom the   
control of trade and industry by        
investment assigns the usufruct of the  
community's productive powers4          
99       99       99       99       99  

,something has already been said of the 
prospective breeding of pedigreed       
gentlefolk under the projected rgime of 
peace4 ,pedigree1 for the purpose in    
hand1 is a pecuniary attribute and is1  
of course1 a product of funded wealth1  
more or less ancient4 ,virtually ancient
 pedigree can be procured by            
well-advised expenditure on the         
conspicuous amenities2 that is to say   
pedigree effectually competent as a     
background of current gentility4        
,gentlefolk of such syncopated pedigree 
may have to walk circumspectly1 of      
course2 but their being in this manner  
put on their good behavior should tend  
to heighten their effectual             
serviceability as gentlefolk1 by        
inducing a single-mindedness of         
gentility beyond what can fairly be     
expected of those who are already secure
 in their tenure4  ,except              
conventionally1 there is no hereditary  
difference between the standard         
gentlefolk and1 say1 their menial       

servants1 or the general population of  
the farms and the industrial towns4     
,this is a well-established commonplace 
among ethnological students2 which has1 
of course1 nothing to say with respect  
to the conventionally distinct lines of 
descent of the ,best ,families4 ,these  
,best ,families are nowise              
distinguishable from the common run in  
point of hereditary traits2 the         
difference that makes the gentleman and 
the gentlewoman being wholly a matter of
 habituation during the individual's    
life-time4 ,it is something of a        
distasteful necessity to call attention 
to this total absence of native         
difference between the well-born and the
 common1 but it is a necessity of the   
argument in hand1 and the recalling of  
it may1 therefore1 be overlooked for    
once in a way4 ,there is no harm and no 
annoyance intended4 ,the point of it all
 is that1 on the premises which this    
state of the case affords1 the body of  
gentlefolk created by such an           

accumulation of invested wealth will    
have no less of an effectual cultural   
value than they would have had if their 
virtually ancient pedigree had been     
actual4  ,at this point1 again1 the     
experience of the ,victorian peace and  
the functioning of its gentlefolk come  
in to indicate what may fairly be hoped 
for in this way under this prospective  
rgime of peace at large4 ,but with the  
difference that the scale of things is  
to be larger1 the pace swifter1 and the 
volume and dispersion of this           
prospective leisure class somewhat      
wider4 ,the work of this leisure        
class--and there is neither paradox nor 
inconsistency in the phrase--should be  
patterned on the lines worked out by    
their prototypes of the ,victorian time1
 but with some appreciable accentuation 
in the direction of what chiefly        
characterised the leisure class of that 
era of tranquility4 ,the characteristic 
feature to which attention naturally    
turns at this suggestion is the         

tranquility that has marked that body of
 gentlefolk and their code of clean and 
honest living4 ,another word than       
tranquility might be hit upon to        
designate this characteristic animus1   
but any other word that should at all   
adequately serve the turn would carry a 
less felicitous suggestion of those     
upper-class virtues that have           
constituted the substantial worth of the
 ,victorian gentleman4 ,the conscious   
worth of these gentlefolk has been a    
beautifully complete achievement4 ,it   
has been an achievement of faith without
 works1 of course2 but1 needless to say1
 that is as it should be1 also of       
course4 ,the place of gentlefolk in the 
economy of ,nature is tracelessly to    
consume the community's net product1 and
 in doing so to set a standard of decent
 expenditure for the others emulatively 
to work up to as near as may be4 ,it is 
scarcely conceivable that this could    
have been done in a more unobtrusively  
efficient manner1 or with a more        

austerely virtuous conviction of        
well-doing1 than by the gentlefolk bred 
of the ,victorian peace4 ,so also1 in   
turn1 it is not to be believed that the 
prospective breed of gentlefolk         
derivable from the net product of the   
pacific nations under the promised rgime
 of peace at large will prove in any    
degree less effective for the like ends4
 ,more will be required of them in the  
way of a traceless consumption of       
superfluities and an unexampled         
expensive standard of living4 ,but this 
situation that so faces them may be     
construed as a larger opportunity1 quite
 as well as a more difficult task4  ,a  
theoretical exposition of the place and 
cultural value of a leisure class in    
modern life would scarcely be in place  
here2 and it has also been set out in   
some detail elsewhere4#aj ,for the      
purpose in hand it may be sufficient to 
recall that the canons of taste and the 
standards of valuation worked out and   
inculcated by leisure-class life have in

 all ages run1 with unbroken            
consistency1 to pecuniary waste and     
personal futility4 ,in its economic     
bearing1 and particularly in its        
immediate bearing on the material       
well-being of the community at large1   
the leadership of the leisure class can 
scarcely be called by a less derogatory 
epithet than untoward4 ,but that is not 
the whole of the case1 and the other    
side should be heard4 ,the leisure-class
 life of tranquility1 running detached  
as it does above the turmoil out of     
which the material of their sustenance  
is derived1 enables a growth of all     
those virtues that mark1 or make1 the   
gentleman2 and that affect the life of  
the underlying community throughout1    
pervasively1 by imitation2 leading to a 
standardisation of the everyday         
proprieties on a presumably1 higher     
level of urbanity and integrity than    
might be expected to result in the      
absence of this prescriptive model4     
,footnote #aj3 ,cf4 ,the ,theory of the 

,leisure ,class1 especially ch4 v4-ix4  
and xiv4  ,integer vitae scelerisque    
purus1 the gentleman of assured station 
turns a placid countenance to all those 
petty vexations of breadwinning that    
touch him not4 ,serenely and with an    
impassive fortitude he faces those      
common vicissitudes of life that are    
impotent to make or mar his material    
fortunes and that can neither impair his
 creature comforts nor put a slur on his
 good repute4 ,so that without          
afterthought he deals fairly in all     
everyday conjunctures of give and take2 
for they are at the most inconsequential
 episodes to him1 although the like     
might spell irremediable disaster to his
 impecunious counterfoil among the      
common men who have the community's work
 to do4 ,in short1 he is a gentleman1 in
 the best acceptation of the            
word1--unavoidably1 by force of         
circumstance4 ,as such his example is of
 invaluable consequence to the          
underlying community of common folk1 in 

that it keeps before their eyes an      
object lesson in habitual fortitude and 
visible integrity such as could scarcely
 have been created except under such    
shelter from those disturbances that    
would go to mar habitual fortitude and  
integrity4 ,there can be little doubt   
but the high example of the ,victorian  
gentlefolk has had much to do with      
stabilising the animus of the ,british  
common man on lines of integrity and    
fair play4 ,what else and more in the   
way of habitual preconceptions he may1  
by competitive imitation1 owe to the    
same high source is not immediately in  
question here4         99       99      
99       99       99  ,recalling once   
more that the canon of life whereby folk
 are gentlefolk sums itself up in the   
requirements of pecuniary waste and     
personal futility1 and that these       
requirements are indefinitely           
extensible1 at the same time that the   
management of the community's industry  
by investment for a profit enables the  

owners of invested wealth to divert to  
their own use the community's net       
product1 wherewith to meet these        
requirements1 it follows that the       
community at large which provides this  
output of product will be allowed so    
much as is required by their necessary  
standard of living1--with an unstable   
margin of error in the adjustment4 ,this
 margin of error should tend continually
 to grow narrower as the businesslike   
management of industry grows more       
efficient with experience2 but it will  
also continually be disturbed in the    
contrary sense by innovations of a      
technological nature that require       
continual readjustment4 ,this margin is 
probably not to be got rid of1 though it
 may be expected to become less         
considerable under more settled         
conditions4  ,it should also not be     
overlooked that the standard of living  
here spoken of as necessarily to be     
allowed the working population by no    
means coincides with the physical       

subsistence minimum1 from which in fact 
it always departs by something          
appreciable4 ,the necessary standard of 
living of the working community is in   
fact made up of two distinguishable     
factors3 the subsistence minimum1 and   
the requirements of decorously wasteful 
consumption--the decencies of life4     
,these decencies are no less requisite  
than the physical necessaries1 in point 
of workday urgency1 and their amount is 
a matter of use and wont4 ,this         
composite standard of living is a       
practical minimum1 below which          
consumption will not fall1 except by a  
fluctuating margin of error2 the effect 
being the same1 in point of necessary   
consumption1 as if it were all of the   
nature of a physical subsistence        
minimum4  ,loosely speaking1 the        
arrangement should leave nothing        
appreciable over1 after the requirements
 of genteel waste and of the workday    
standard of consumption have been met4  
,from which in turn it should follow    

that the rest of what is comprised under
 the general caption of culture will    
find a place only in the interstices of 
leisure-class expenditure and only at   
the hands of aberrant members of the    
class of the gently-bred4 ,the working  
population should have no effectual     
margin of time1 energy or means for     
other pursuits than the day's work in   
the service of the price-system2 so that
 aberrant individuals in this class1 who
 might by native propensity incline1    
e4g41 to pursue the sciences or the fine
 arts1 should have 7virtually7 no chance
 to make good4 ,it would be a virtual   
suppression of such native gifts among  
the common folk1 not a definitive and   
all-inclusive suppression4 ,the state of
 the case under the ,victorian peace    
may1 again1 be taken in illustration of 
the point2 although under the presumably
 more effectual control to be looked for
 in the pacific future the margin might 
reasonably be expected to run somewhat  
narrower1 so that this virtual          

suppression of cultural talent among the
 common men should come nearer a        
complete suppression4  ,the working of  
that free initiative that makes the     
advance of civilisation1 and also the   
greater part of its conservation1 would 
in effect be allowed only in the erratic
 members of the kept classes2 where at  
the same time it would have to work     
against the side-draught of conventional
 usage1 which discountenances any       
pursuit that is not visibly futile      
according to some accepted manner of    
futility4 ,now under the prospective    
perfect working of the price-system1    
bearers of the banners of civilisation  
could effectually be drawn only from the
 kept classes1 the gentlefolk who alone 
would have the disposal of such free    
income as is required for work that has 
no pecuniary value4 ,and numerically the
 gentlefolk are an inconsiderable       
fraction of the population4 ,the supply 
of competently gifted bearers of the    
community's culture would accordingly be

 limited to such as could be drawn by   
self-selection from among this          
inconsiderable proportion of the        
community at large4  ,it may be recalled
 that in point of heredity1 and         
therefore in point of native fitness for
 the maintenance and advance of         
civilisation1 there is no difference    
between the gentlefolk and the populace 
at large2 or at least there is no       
difference of such a nature as to count 
in abatement of the proposition set down
 above4 ,some slight1 but after all     
inconsequential1 difference there may   
be1 but such difference as there is1 if 
any1 rather counts against the          
gentlefolk as keepers of the cultural   
advance4 ,the gentlefolk are derived    
from business2 the gentleman represents 
a filial generation of the businessman2 
and if the class typically is gifted    
with any peculiar hereditary traits1    
therefore1 they should presumably be    
such as typically mark the successful   
businessman--astute1 prehensile1        

unscrupulous4 ,for a generation or two1 
perhaps to the scriptural third and     
fourth generation1 it is possible that a
 diluted rapacity and cunning may       
continue to mark the businessman's      
well-born descendants2 but these are not
 serviceable traits for the conservation
 and advancement of the community's     
cultural heritage4 ,so that no          
consideration of special hereditary     
fitness in the well-born need be        
entertained in this connection4  ,as to 
the limitation imposed by the           
price-system on the supply of candidates
 suited by native gift for the human    
work of civilisation2 it would no doubt1
 be putting the figure extravagantly    
high to say that the gentlefolk1        
properly speaking1 comprise as much as  
ten percent of the total population2    
perhaps something less than one-half of 
that percentage would still seem a gross
 overstatement4 ,but1 to cover loose    
ends and vagrant cases1 the gentlefolk  
may for the purpose be credited with so 

high a percentage of the total          
population4 ,if ten percent be allowed1 
as an outside figure1 it follows that   
the community's scientists1 artists1    
scholars1 and the like individuals given
 over to the workday pursuits of the    
human spirit1 are by conventional       
restriction to be drawn from one-tenth  
of the current supply of persons suited 
by native gift for these pursuits4 ,or  
as it may also be expressed1 in so far  
as the projected scheme takes effect it 
should result in the suppression of nine
 7or more7 out of every ten persons     
available for the constructive work of  
civilisation4 ,the cultural consequences
 to be looked for1 therefore1 should be 
quite markedly of the conservative      
order4  ,of course1 in actual effect1   
the retardation or repression of        
civilisation by this means1 as          
calculated on these premises1 should    
reasonably be expected to count up to   
something appreciably more than         
nine-tenths of the gains that might     

presumably be achieved in the           
conceivable absence of the price-system 
and the rgime of investment4 ,all work  
of this kind has much of the character  
of teamwork2 so that the efforts of     
isolated individuals count for little1  
and a few working in more or less of    
concert and understanding will count for
 proportionally much less than many     
working in concert4 ,the endeavours of  
the individuals engaged count           
cumulatively1 to such effect that       
doubling their forces will more than    
double the aggregate efficiency2 and    
conversely1 reducing the number will    
reduce the effectiveness of their work  
by something more than the simple       
numerical proportion4 ,indeed1 an undue 
reduction of numbers in such a case may 
lead to the total defeat of the few that
 are left1 and the best endeavours of a 
dwindling remnant may be wholly         
nugatory4 ,there is needed a sense of   
community and solidarity1 without which 
the assurance necessary to the work is  

bound to falter and dwindle out2 and    
there is also needed a degree of popular
 countenance1 not to be had by isolated 
individuals engaged in an unconventional
 pursuit of things that are neither to  
be classed as spendthrift decorum nor as
 merchantable goods4 ,in this connection
 an isolated one does not count for one1
 and more than the critical minimum will
 count for several per capita4 ,it is a 
case where the minimal dose is wholly   
inoperative4  ,there is not a little    
reason to believe that consequent upon  
the installation of the projected rgime 
of peace at large and secure investment 
the critical point in the repression of 
talent will very shortly be reached and 
passed1 so that the principle of the    
minimal dose will come to apply4 ,the   
point may readily be illustrated by the 
case of many ,british and ,american     
towns and neighbourhoods during the past
 few decades2 where the dominant        
price-system and its commercial         
standards of truth and beauty have      

over-ruled all inclination to cultural  
sanity and put it definitively in       
abeyance4 ,the cultural1 or perhaps the 
conventional1 residue left over in these
 cases where civilisation has gone stale
 through inefficiency of the minimal    
dose is not properly to be found fault  
with2 it is of a blameless character1   
conventionally2 nor is there any        
intention here to cast aspersion on the 
desolate4 ,the like effects of the like 
causes are to be seen in the ,american  
colleges and universities1 where        
business principles have supplanted the 
pursuit of learning1 and where the      
commercialisation of aims1 ideals1      
tastes1 occupations and personnel is    
following much the same lines that have 
led so many of the country towns        
effectually outside the cultural pale4  
,the ,american university or college is 
coming to be an outlier of the          
price-system1 in point of aims1         
standards and personnel2 hitherto the   
tradition of learning as a trait of     

civilisation1 as distinct from business1
 has not been fully displaced1 although 
it is now coming to face the passage of 
the minimal dose4 ,the like1 in a       
degree1 is apparently true latterly for 
many ,english1 and still more evidently 
for many ,german schools4  ,in these    
various instances of what may be called 
dry-rot or local blight on the civilised
 world's culture the decline appears to 
be due not to a positive infection of a 
malignant sort1 so much as to a failure 
of the active cultural ferment1 which   
has fallen below the critical point of  
efficacy2 perhaps through an unintended 
refusal of a livelihood to persons given
 over to cultivating the elements of    
civilisation2 perhaps through the       
conventional disallowance of the pursuit
 of any other ends than competitive gain
 and competitive spending4 ,evidently it
 is something much more comprehensive in
 this nature that is reasonably to be   
looked for under the prospective rgime  
of peace1 in case the price-system gains

 that farther impetus and warrant which 
it should come in for if the rights of  
ownership and investment stand over     
intact1 and so come to enjoy the benefit
 of a further improved state of the     
industrial arts and a further enlarged  
scale of operation and enhanced rate of 
turnover4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,to turn back to the point 
from which this excursion branched off4 
,it has been presumed all the while that
 the technological equipment1 or the    
state of the industrial arts1 must      
continue to advance under the conditions
 offered by this rgime of peace at      
large4 ,but the last few paragraphs will
 doubtless suggest that such a          
single-minded addiction to competitive  
gain and competitive spending as the    
stabilised and amplified price-system   
would enjoin1 must lead to an effectual 
retardation1 perhaps to a decline1 of   
those material sciences on which modern 
technology draws2 and that the state of 
the industrial arts should therefore    

cease to advance1 if only the scheme of 
investment and businesslike sabotage can
 be made sufficiently secure4 ,that such
 may be the outcome is a contingency    
which the argument will have to meet and
 to allow for2 but it is after all a    
contingency that need not be expected to
 derange the sequence of events1 except 
in the way of retardation4 ,even without
 further advance in technological       
expedients or in the relevant material  
sciences1 there will still necessarily  
ensue an effectual advance in the       
industrial arts1 in the sense that      
further organisation and enlargement of 
the material equipment and industrial   
processes on lines already securely     
known and not to be forgotten must bring
 an effectually enhanced efficiency of  
the industrial process as a whole4  ,in 
illustration1 it is scarcely to be      
assumed even as a tentative hypothesis  
that the system of transport and        
communication will not undergo extension
 and improvement on the lines already   

familiar1 even in the absence of new    
technological contrivances4 ,at the same
 time a continued increase of population
 is to be counted on2 which has1 for the
 purpose in hand1 much the same effect  
as an advance in the industrial arts4   
,human contact and mutual understanding 
will necessarily grow wider and closer1 
and will have its effect on the habits  
of thought prevalent in the communities 
that are to live under the promised     
rgime of peace4 ,the system of transport
 and communication having to handle a   
more voluminous and exacting traffic1 in
 the service of a larger and more       
compact population1 will have to be     
organised and administered on           
mechanically drawn schedules of time1   
place1 volume1 velocity1 and price1 of a
 still more exacting accuracy than      
hitherto4 ,the like will necessarily    
apply throughout the industrial         
occupations that employ extensive plant 
or processes1 or that articulate with   
industrial processes of that nature2    

which will necessarily comprise a larger
 proportion of the industrial process at
 large than hitherto4  ,as has already  
been remarked more than once in the     
course of the argument1 a population    
that lives and does its work1 and such  
play as is allowed it1 in and by an     
exactingly articulate mechanical system 
of this kind will necessarily be an     
intelligent people1 in the colloquial   
sense of the word2 that is to say it    
will necessarily be a people that uses  
printed matter freely and that has some 
familiarity with the elements of those  
material sciences that underlie this    
mechanically organised system of        
appliances and processes4 ,such a       
population lives by and within the      
framework of the mechanistic logic1 and 
is in a fair way to lose faith in any   
proposition that can not be stated      
convincingly in terms of this           
mechanistic logic4 ,superstitions are   
liable to lapse by neglect or disuse in 
such a community2 that is to say        

propositions of a non-mechanistic       
complexion are liable to insensible     
disestablishment in such a case2        
superstition in these premises coming to
 signify whatever is not of this        
mechanistic1 or materialistic character4
 ,an exception to this broad            
characterisation of non-mechanistic     
propositions as superstition would be   
matters that are of the nature of an    
immediate deliverance of the senses or  
of the aesthetic sensibilities4  ,by a  
simile it might be said that what so    
falls under the caption of superstition 
in such a case is subject to decay by   
inanition4 ,it should not be difficult  
to conceive the general course of such a
 decay of superstitions under this      
unremitting discipline of mechanistic   
habits of life4 ,the recent past offers 
an illustration1 in the unemotional     
progress of decay that has overtaken    
religious beliefs in the more civilised 
countries1 and more particularly among  
the intellectually trained workmen of   

the mechanical industries4 ,the         
elimination of such non-mechanistic     
propositions of the faith has been      
visibly going on1 but it has not worked 
out on any uniform plan1 nor has it     
overtaken any large or compact body of  
people consistently or abruptly1 being  
of the nature of obsolescence rather    
than of set repudiation4 ,but in a slack
 and unreflecting fashion the divestment
 has gone on until the aggregate effect 
is unmistakable4  ,a similar divestment 
of superstitions is reasonably to be    
looked for also in that domain of       
preconceptions that lies between the    
supernatural and the mechanistic4 ,chief
 among these time-warped                
preconceptions--or superstitions--that  
so stand over out of the alien past     
among these democratic peoples is the   
institution of property4 ,as is true of 
preconceptions touching the supernatural
 verities1 so here too the article of   
use and wont in question will not bear  
formulation in mechanistic terms and is 

not congruous with that mechanistic     
logic that is incontinently bending the 
habits of thought of the common man more
 and more consistently to its own bent4 
,there is1 of course1 the difference    
that while no class--apart from the     
servants of the church--have a material 
interest in the continued integrity of  
the articles of the supernatural faith1 
there is a strong and stubborn material 
interest bound up with the maintenance  
of this article of the pecuniary faith2 
and the class in whom this material     
interest vests are also1 in effect1     
invested with the coercive powers of the
 law4  ,the law1 and the popular        
preconceptions that give the law its    
binding force1 go to uphold the         
established usage and the established   
prerogatives on this head2 and the      
disestablishment of the rights of       
property and investment therefore is not
 a simple matter of obsolescence through
 neglect4 ,it may confidently be counted
 on that all the apparatus of the law   

and all the coercive agencies of law and
 order1 will be brought in requisition  
to uphold the ancient rights of         
ownership1 whenever any move is made    
toward their disallowance or            
restriction4 ,but then1 on the other    
hand1 the movement to disallow or       
diminish the prerogatives of ownership  
is also not to take the innocuous shape 
of unstudied neglect4 ,so soon1 or      
rather so far1 as the common man comes  
to realise that these rights of         
ownership and investment uniformly work 
to his material detriment1 at the same  
time that he has lost the will to       
believe in any argument that does not   
run in terms of the mechanistic logic1  
it is reasonable to expect that he will 
take a stand on this matter2 and it is  
more than likely that the stand taken   
will be of an uncompromising            
kind1--presumably something in the      
nature of the stand once taken by       
recalcitrant ,englishmen in protest     
against the irresponsible rule of the   

,stuart sovereign4 ,it is also not      
likely that the beneficiaries under     
these proprietary rights will yield     
their ground at all amicably2 all the   
more since they are patently within     
their authentic rights in insisting on  
full discretion in the disposal of their
 own possessions2 very much as ,charles 
,i or ,james ,,ii once were within their
 prescriptive right1--which had little  
to say in the outcome4  ,even apart from
 time immemorial and the patent         
authenticity of the institution1 there  
were and are many cogent arguments to be
 alleged in favor of the position for   
which the ,stuart sovereigns and their  
spokesmen contended4 ,so there are and  
will be many1 perhaps more1 cogent      
reasons to be alleged for the           
maintenance of the established law and  
order in respect of the rights of       
ownership and investment4 ,not least    
urgent1 nor least real1 among these     
arguments is the puzzling question of   
what to put in the place of these rights

 and of the methods of control based on 
them1 very much as the analogous        
question puzzled the public-spirited men
 of the ,stuart times4 ,all of which    
goes to argue that there may be expected
 to arise a conjuncture of perplexities 
and complications1 as well as a division
 of interests and claims4 ,to which     
should be added that the division is    
likely to come to a head so soon as the 
balance of forces between the two       
parties in interest becomes doubtful1 so
 that either party comes to surmise that
 the success of its own aims may depend 
on its own efforts4 ,and as happens     
where two antagonistic parties are each 
convinced of the justice of its cause1  
and in the absence of an umpire1 the    
logical recourse is the wager of battle4
  ,granting the premises1 there should  
be no reasonable doubt as to this       
eventual cleavage between those who own 
and those who do not2 and of the        
premises the only item that is not      
already an accomplished fact is the     

installation of peace at large4 ,the    
rest of what goes into the argument is  
the well-known modern state of the      
industrial arts1 and the equally        
well-known price-system2 which1 in      
combination1 give its character to the  
modern state of business enterprise4 ,it
 is only an unusually broad instance of 
an institutional arrangement which has  
in the course of time and changing      
conditions come to work at cross        
purposes with that underlying ground of 
institutional arrangements that takes   
form in the commonplace aphorism1 ,live 
and let live4 ,with change setting in   
the direction familiar to all men today1
 it is only a question of limited time  
when the discrepancy will reach a       
critical pass1 and the installation of  
peace may be counted on to hasten this  
course of things4  ,that a decision will
 be sought by recourse to forcible      
measures1 is also scarcely open to      
question2 since the established law and 
order provides for a resort to coercion 

in the enforcement of these prescriptive
 rights1 and since both parties in      
interest1 in this as in other cases1 are
 persuaded of the justice of their      
claims4 ,a decision either way is an    
intolerable iniquity in the eyes of the 
losing side4 ,history teaches that in   
such a quarrel the recourse has always  
been to force4  ,history teaches also1  
but with an inflection of doubt1 that   
the outworn institution in such a       
conjuncture faces disestablishment4 ,at 
least1 so men like to believe4 ,what the
 experience of history does not leave in
 doubt is the grave damage1 discomfort  
and shame incident to the displacement  
of such an institutional discrepancy by 
such recourse to force4 ,what further   
appears to be clear in the premises1 at 
least to the point of a strong          
presumption1 is that in the present case
 the decision1 or the choice1 lies      
between two alternatives3 either the    
price-system and its attendant business 
enterprise will yield and pass out2 or  

the pacific nations will conserve their 
pecuniary scheme of law and order at the
 cost of returning to a war footing and 
letting their owners preserve the rights
 of ownership by force of arms4  ,the   
reflection obviously suggests itself    
that this prospect of consequences to   
follow from the installation of peace at
 large might well be taken into account 
beforehand by those who are aiming to   
work out an enduring peace4 ,it has     
appeared in the course of the argument  
that the preservation of the present    
pecuniary law and order1 with all its   
incidents of ownership and investment1  
is incompatible with an unwarlike state 
of peace and security4 ,this current    
scheme of investment1 business1 and     
sabotage1 should have an appreciably    
better chance of survival in the long   
run if the present conditions of warlike
 preparation and national insecurity    
were maintained1 or if the projected    
peace were left in a somewhat           
problematical state1 sufficiently       

precarious to keep national animosities 
alert1 and thereby to the neglect of    
domestic interests1 particularly of such
 interests as touch the popular         
well-being4 ,on the other hand1 it has  
also appeared that the cause of peace   
and its perpetuation might be materially
 advanced if precautions were taken     
beforehand to put out of the way as much
 as may be of those discrepancies of    
interest and sentiment between nations  
and between classes which make for      
dissension and eventual hostilities4    
,so1 if the projectors of this peace at 
large are in any degree inclined to seek
 concessive terms on which the peace    
might hopefully be made enduring1 it    
should evidently be part of their       
endeavours from the outset to put events
 in train for the present abatement and 
eventual abrogation of the rights of    
ownership and of the price-system in    
which these rights take effect4 ,a      
hopeful beginning along this line would 
manifestly be the neutralisation of all 

pecuniary rights of citizenship1 as has 
been indicated in an earlier passage4   
,on the other hand1 if peace is not     
desired at the cost of relinquishing the
 scheme of competitive gain and         
competitive spending1 the promoters of  
peace should logically observe due      
precaution and move only so far in the  
direction of a peaceable settlement as  
would result in a sufficiently unstable 
equilibrium of mutual jealousies2 such  
as might expeditiously be upset whenever
 discontent with pecuniary affairs      
should come to threaten this established
 scheme of pecuniary prerogatives4      
,,books ,,by ,,thorstein ,,veblen       
,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,leisure     
,,class  ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,business 
,,enterprise  ,,the ,,instinct ,,of     
,,workmanship  ,,imperial ,,germany     
,,and ,,the ,,industrial ,,revolution   
,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,peace ,,and ,,the 
,,terms ,,of ,,its ,,perpetuation  ,,the
 ,,higher ,,learning ,,in ,,america