public domain works from the ,university
 of ,michigan ,digital ,libraries47     
,transcriber's ,notes3   #a4 ,several   
misprints 7including ,greek7 were       
corrected4 ,a full list     of          
corrections can be found at the end of  
the text4     ,misspelling and          
inconsistencies in the ,french          
quotations1 unless     otherwise noted1 
have been preserved4   #b4 ,footnotes   
have been renumbered and moved to the   
end of chapters4   #c4 ,footnote #ach   
had no footnote marker within the text2 
the reference     was added in a        
possible place4   #d4 ,symbol of a hand 
pointing right has been replaced with a 
right     arrow3 4                      
,,modern ,,atheism                      
,,under ,,its ,,forms ,,of              
,,pantheism1 ,,materialism1             
,,secularism1             ,,development1
 ,,and ,,natural ,,laws4                
,,by              ,,james ,,buchanan1   
,d4 ,d41 ,,ll4 ,d41  ,,divinity         
,,professor ,,in ,,the ,,new ,,college1 

,,edinburgh1 ,,and ,,author       ,,of  
,,the ,,office ,,and ,,work ,,of ,,the  
,,holy ,,spirit1 ,,etc4                 
,,boston3                 ,,gould ,,and 
,,lincoln1                 #ei          
,,washington ,,street4          ,,new   
,,york3 ,,sheldon1 ,,blakeman  ,,co41   
,,cincinnati3 ,,george ,s4 ,,blanchard4 
#aheg4   ,entered according to ,act of  
,congress1 in the year #ahef1 by        
,,gould ,,and ,,lincoln1  ,in the       
,clerk's ,office of the ,district ,court
 of the ,district of ,massachusetts4    
,electro-,stereotyped by                
,g4 ,j4 ,,stiles  ,,company1            
#bc ,congress ,street1 ,boston4         
,,prefatory ,,note4   ,the contents of  
this volume originally constituted about
 one half of a work1 entitled ,faith in 
,god and ,modern ,atheism compared1 in  
their ,essential ,nature1 ,theoretic    
,grounds1 and ,practical ,influence4    
,simultaneously with the first issue of 
that work in ,scotland1 the five        
principal chapters in this volume were  

published separately1 accompanied with  
the announcement that each was complete 
in itself4 ,the hint thus given by the  
author1 has been acted upon by the      
present publishers4 ,on examining the   
whole work1 it was found to be divided  
into four ,sections4 ,of these1 the     
third was devoted exclusively to ,modern
 ,atheism4 ,it embraced the five        
chapters already alluded to1 together   
with a general introduction and four    
shorter chapters4 ,it appeared1 in fact1
 to be a complete treatise by itself2   
and it is now presented to the ,american
 public in the conviction that such a   
work is peculiarly demanded by the      
present state of religious opinion in   
this country4  ,the author is one of the
 most distinguished divines of the ,free
 ,church of ,scotland4 ,in #ahde1 he was
 appointed ,professor of ,apologetic    
,theology in the ,new ,college1         
,edinburgh2 and1 on the death of ,dr4   
,chalmers1 in #ahdg1 he was translated  
to the ,chair of ,systematic ,theology  

thus made vacant4 ,in the former        
position1 it became his duty to prepare 
a complete course of ,lectures on       
,natural ,religion4 ,his work on ,faith 
in ,god1 c41 contains1 in an altered    
form1 adapted to general readers1 the   
substance of those ,lectures4           
,respecting this work1 the ,british     
press generally has spoken in the       
highest terms4 ,the distinguished       
geologist1 ,hugh ,miller1 says1 in the  
,edinburgh ,witness3 ,it is one of1 at  
once1 the most readable and solid which 
we have ever perused2 and the ,news of  
the ,churches1 the organ of the ,free   
,church1 describes it as a work of which
 nothing less can be said than that1    
both in spirit and substance1 style and 
argument1 it fixes irreversibly the name
 of its author as a leading classic in  
the ,christian literature of ,britain4  
,an ,american critic says3 ,his succinct
 analysis of the doctrines held by the  
various schools of modern atheism are   
admirable1 and his criticisms on their  

doctrines original and profound2 while  
his arguments in defence of the         
,christian faith against philosophical  
objectors are unsurpassed by those of   
any modern writer4 ,clear1 vigorous1    
logical1 learned1 and strong as a       
,titan1 he fairly vanquishes all        
antagonists by pure mental superiority2 
never understating their views or       
evading their arguments1 but meeting    
them in all their force and crushing    
them4 ,another critic says3 ,it is a    
great argument for ,theism and against  
,atheism1 magnificent in its strength1  
order1 and beauty4444 ,the style is     
lucid1 grave1 harmonious1 and every way 
commensurate with the dignity and       
importance of the subject4444 ,the      
chapter on ,pantheism is admirable4     
,regarding it as 'the most formidable   
rival of ,christian ,theism at the      
present day1' ,dr4 ,buchanan seems to   
have specially addressed himself to the 
task of exposing and refuting this      
error4 ,his statement of ,spinoza's     

system is beautifully clear4  ,the      
reader will find that there is no       
exaggeration in these encomiums4 ,hugh  
,miller1 always felicitous in his choice
 of words1 has exactly described the two
 leading characteristics of ,modern     
,atheism1 by the phrase readable and    
solid4 ,every one who begins the book   
will find himself drawn strongly onward 
to the end2 and no one can rise from its
 perusal without a conviction that it   
contains a weight of argument against   
all the forms of ,atheism such as never 
before has been combined in one book4   
,should the reception of this volume by 
the public furnish sufficient           
encouragement1 it is the intention of   
the publishers to issue the remainder of
 the work 7,faith in ,god1 c471 in      
uniform style4       ,,boston1          
,december1 #ahef4     ,,contents4       
,,page  ,,introduction1                 
#i   ,,chapter ,i4 ,,modern ,,atheism1  
#ae   ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,theories ,,of   
,,development1                          

#de    ,,section ,i4   ,,theory ,,of    
,,cosmical ,,development1--,,the        
,,vestiges1        #dg    ,,section     
,,ii4   ,,theory ,,of ,,physiological   
,,development1--,,telliamed1            
--,,physio-,,philosophy1                
#fa    ,,section ,,iii4   ,,theory ,,of 
,,social ,,development1--,,auguste      
,,comte1           #hd    ,,section     
,,iv4   ,,theory ,,of ,,ecclesiastical  
,,development1--,j4 ,h4 ,,newman1   #aaf
   ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,theories ,,of     
,,pantheism1                            
#abi    ,,section ,i4   ,,the ,,system  
,,of ,,spinoza1                         
#adb    ,,section ,,ii4   ,,material    
,,pantheism1                            
#afa    ,,section ,,iii4   ,,ideal      
,,pantheism1                            
#afg   ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,theories ,,of  
,,materialism1                          
#ahi    ,,section ,i4   ,,distinct      
,,forms ,,of ,,materialism1             
#aib    ,,section ,,ii4   ,,propositions
 ,,on ,,materialism1                    

#bjg    ,,section ,,iii4   ,,relations  
,,of ,,materialism ,,to ,,theology1     
#bce   ,,chapter ,v4 ,,theory ,,of      
,,government ,,by ,,natural             
,,laws1--,,volney1--,,combe1   #bdi     
,,section ,i4   ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of   
,,natural ,,laws ,,and ,,second         
,,causes1        #beb    ,,section ,,ii4
   ,,the ,,constitution ,,of ,,man ,,in 
,,its ,,relation ,,to ,,the             
,,government ,,of ,,god1                
#bed    ,,section ,,iii4   ,,the        
,,efficacy ,,of ,,prayer1               
#bhc   ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,theories ,,of  
,,chance ,,and ,,fate1                  
#cjc   ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,theories ,,of 
,,religious ,,liberalism1               
#cbc   ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,theories ,,of
 ,,certitude ,,and ,,skepticism1        
#ccc   ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,theory ,,of    
,,secularism1                           
#cfa     ,,introduction4   ,a ,treatise 
on the ,being and ,perfections of ,god1 
as the ,creator and ,governor of the    
world1 can scarcely be adapted to the   

exigencies of modern society1 unless it 
be framed with express reference to the 
existing forms of unbelief1 and the     
prevailing tendencies both of           
philosophical thought and of popular    
opinion4 ,it is quite possible1 indeed1 
to construct a scheme of evidence on    
this subject out of the ample materials 
which the storehouse of nature affords1 
without entering into any discussion of 
the questions1 whether ,physical or     
,metaphysical1 which have been raised   
respecting it4 ,but this method1        
although it might be sufficient for     
many1 perhaps for most1 of our          
readers--for all1 indeed1 who come to   
the study of the subject with reflective
 but unsophisticated minds--could       
scarcely be expected to meet the case or
 to satisfy the wants of those who stand
 most in need of instruction2 the men1  
and especially the young men1 in all    
educated communities1 who1 imbued with  
the spirit of philosophical speculation1
 and instructed1 more or less fully1 in 

the principles of modern science1 have  
been led1 under the influence of certain
 celebrated names1 to adopt opinions    
which prevent them from seriously       
considering any theological question1   
and to regard the whole subject of      
religion with indifference or contempt1 
as one that lies beyond the possible    
range of science1--the only legitimate  
domain of human thought4 ,in such cases 
7and they are neither few nor           
unimportant71 it may be useful and even 
necessary to neutralize those adverse   
presumptions or prejudicate opinions1   
which prevent them from considering the 
evidence to which ,theism appeals1 and  
to review the various theories from     
which they spring1 so as to show that   
they afford no valid reason for         
discarding the subject1 and no ground   
for alleging that it is not fit to go to
 proof4 ,it is true that we must        
ultimately rely1 for the establishment  
of our main positions1 on that body of  
natural and historical evidence1 which  

depends little1 if at all1 on any of the
 ,theories of ,philosophical            
,speculation1 or even on any of the     
discoveries of ,physical ,science2 but  
it is equally true that the evidence1   
however conclusive in itself1 cannot be 
expected to produce conviction unless it
 be candidly examined and weighed2 and  
if there be anything in the existing    
state of public opinion which leads men 
to regard the whole subject with        
indifference or suspicion1 to conceive  
of it as a problem insoluble by the     
human faculties1 and to treat ,theology 
as a fond fancy or a waking dream1 it   
were surely well to examine the grounds 
of such opinions1 to expose their       
fallacy so as to counteract their       
influence1 and to refute those theories 
which prevent men from judging of the   
evidence as they would on any other     
topic of ,inductive ,inquiry4 ,in       
adopting this course1 we are only       
following the footsteps of the profound 
author of the ,analogy1 who finding it1 

he knew not how1 to be taken for        
granted1 by many persons1 that          
,christianity is not so much as a       
subject of inquiry1 set himself1 in the 
first instance1 to prove that it is not1
 however1 so clear a case that there is 
nothing in it2--this preliminary proof  
being designed to neutralize objections1
 and to disburden the subject of all    
adverse presumptions1 so as to be judged
 on its own proper and independent      
merits4 ,we are imitating1 too1 the     
example of another sagacious writer on a
 kindred theme1 who thought that        
,apologists had paid too little         
attention to the prejudices of their    
opponents1 and had been too confident of
 accomplishing their object at once1 by 
an overpowering statement of the direct 
evidence1 forgetting that the influence 
of prejudice renders the human mind very
 nearly inaccessible to both evidence   
and argument4#a  ,if this method was    
ever necessary or expedient1 it is      
peculiarly so in the present age4       

,opinions are afloat in society1 and are
 even avowed by men of high             
philosophical repute1 which formally    
exclude ,theology from the domain of    
human thought1 and represent it as      
utterly inaccessible to the human       
faculties4 ,they amount to a denial1 not
 merely of its truth1 but of its very   
possibility4 ,they place it among the   
dreams of the past--with the fables of  
the ,genii1 or the follies of ,alchemy1 
or the phantoms of ,astrology4 ,they    
intimate1 in no ambiguous terms1 not    
only that ,catholicism is effete1 and   
,christianity itself dead or dying1 but 
that ,theology of every kind1 even the  
simplest and purest form of ,theism1    
must speedily vanish from the earth4    
,admitting that the religious element   
was necessarily developed in the infancy
 of the species1 and that its influence 
was alike inevitable and salutary during
 the world's minority1 when it was      
placed provisionally under tutors and   
governors1 they proclaim that mankind   

have outgrown the vestments which suited
 them in earlier times1 and that now    
they must put away childish things4     
,that such sentiments have been publicly
 avowed1 that they have been proclaimed 
as the scientific results of speculative
 thought1 and that they have been widely
 circulated in the vehicles both of     
philosophic discussion and of popular   
literature1 will be proved by evidence1 
equally sad and conclusive1 in the      
succeeding chapters2 in the meantime we 
refer to them merely for the purpose of 
showing that1 in so far as their        
influence prevails1 they must           
necessarily tend1 unless they be        
counteracted by some effective antidote1
 to generate such a prejudice against   
the whole scheme of ,theology1 whether  
,natural or ,revealed1 as may be        
expected1 especially in the case of     
young1 inexperienced1 and ardent minds1 
to prevent them from entertaining the   
subject at all1 or examining1 with      
serious and candid interest1 any kind or

 amount of evidence that might be       
adduced in regard to it4 ,for this      
reason1 we propose to review the various
 ,theories or ,systems which may be said
 to embody and exhibit these prevailing 
tendencies1 to meet our opponents on    
their own chosen ground1 and to subject 
their favorite speculations to a        
rigorous and sifting scrutiny2 and this1
 not for the purpose of proving our     
fundamental position1 for that must rest
 on its proper and independent evidence1
 but simply with the view of            
neutralizing the adverse presumptions   
which prevent many from considering its 
claims1 and proving that it is a subject
 that demands and deserves their serious
 and sustained attention4  ,taking a    
comprehensive view of ,european ,science
 and ,literature during the last half   
century1 we may discern the great       
currents1 or chief tendencies1 of       
speculative thought1 in so far as it    
bears on the evidences and doctrines of 
,religion1 in several distinct but      

closely related systems of opinion1     
which1 whether considered severally or  
collectively1 must exert1 in proportion 
to their prevalence1 a powerful         
influence on the side of ,atheism4      
,these systems may be divided generally 
into two great classes1 according as    
they relate to the substance or to the  
evidence of ,theism1 to the truths which
 it involves1 or the proofs to which it 
appeals4 ,the interval between the first
 and second ,french ,revolutions may be 
regarded as the season during which the 
theories to which we refer were         
progressively developed1 and ultimately 
consolidated in their existing forms4   
,the germ of each of them may have      
existed before1 and traces of them may  
be detected in the literature of the    
ancient world1 and even in the writings 
of medival times2 nay1 it might not be  
too much to affirm that in the systems  
of ,oriental ,superstition1 and in the  
,schools of ,grecian ,skepticism1       
several of them were more fully taught  

in early times than they have yet been  
in ,modern ,europe1 and that the recent 
attempts to reconstruct and reproduce   
them in a shape adapted to the present  
stage of civilization1 have been poor   
and meagre in comparison with those more
 ancient efforts of unenlightened       
reason4 ,what modern system of          
,skepticism can rival that of ,sextus   
,empiricus8 ,what code of ,pantheism1   
,french or ,german1 can be said to equal
 the mystic dreams of the ,vedanta      
,school8 ,what godless theory of        
,natural ,law can compete with the      
,epicurean philosophy1 as illustrated in
 the poetry of ,lucretius8 ,the errors  
of these ancient systems have been      
revived even amidst the light of the    
nineteenth century1 and prevail to an   
extent that may seem to justify the     
apprehension1 frequently expressed on   
the ,continent of late years1 of the    
restoration of a sort of ,semi-,paganism
 in ,modern ,europe2 and it is still    
necessary1 therefore1 for the defence of

 a pure ,theism1 to rexamine those      
ancient forms of error which have       
reppeared on the scene after it might   
have been supposed that they had        
vanished for ever4 ,for the very        
tenacity with which they cleave to the  
human mind1 and their perpetual         
recurrence at intervals along the whole 
course of the world's history1 show that
 there must be something in the wants1  
or at least in the weaknesses of our    
nature1 which induces men to tolerate   
and even to embrace them4 ,but the chief
 danger1 as we conceive1 lies in those  
new1 or at least newly organized1       
theories that have only recently        
received their full development in the  
,inductive and ,scientific pursuits     
which constitute the peculiar glory of  
modern times2 and which1 commencing with
 the era of ,bacon and ,descartes1 and  
gradually matured by ,newton1 ,leibnitz1
 and their successors1 have at length   
issued in the construction of a solid   
fabric of ,science4 ,to ,theism there is

 no danger in ,science1 in so far as it 
is true1 for all truth is               
self-consistent and harmonious2 but     
there may be much danger in the use that
 is made of it1 or in the spirit in     
which it is applied4 ,in the hands of   
,bacon1 and ,newton1 and ,boyle1 the    
doctrine of ,natural ,laws was treated  
as an ally1 not as an antagonist1 to    
,theology2 in the hands of ,comte it    
becomes a plea for ,atheism2 and even in
 the hands of ,combe an argument against
 a special ,providence and the efficacy 
of prayer4 ,here the danger is the      
greater just by reason of the           
acknowledged truth and practical value  
of the ,inductive ,philosophy2 for its  
certainty is so well ascertained1 and   
its manifold uses so generally          
appreciated1 that if it shall come to be
 regarded as incompatible with the      
recognition of ,god and ,religion1      
,society will soon find itself on the   
verge of universal ,atheism4 ,and this  
is the fearful issue to which the more  

recent schools of speculation are       
manifestly tending4 ,the first ,french  
,revolution was brought about by the    
labors of men who fought against        
,christianity1 at least ostensibly1     
under the banner of ,deism or ,natural  
,religion2 the second ,revolution was   
consummated under the auspices1 not of a
 ,deistic1 but of an ,atheistic         
philosophy4 ,the school of ,voltaire and
 ,rousseau has given place to the school
 of ,comte and ,leroux4 ,the difference 
between the two indicates a rapid and   
alarming advance4 ,it may not be        
apparent at first sight1 or on a        
superficial survey2 but it will become  
evident to any one who compares the two 
,french ,encyclopdias1 which may be     
regarded as the exponents of the        
reigning philosophy of the two great    
revolutionary eras4 ,the first1 the     
,encyclopedie of ,d',alembert1          
,voltaire1 and ,diderot1 sought to      
malign and extirpate ,christianity1     
while it did frequent homage to ,natural

 ,theology2 the second1 the ,nouvelle   
,encyclopedie of ,pierre ,leroux and his
 coadjutors1 proclaims the deification  
of ,humanity1 and the dethronement of   
,god6  ,,footnotes3  #a ,,bishop        
,,butler1 ,analogy1 ,preface1 p4 ,,ii4  
,,dr4 ,,inglis1 ,vindication of the     
,christian ,faith1 p4 ,,vi4     ,,modern
 ,,atheism4     ,,chapter ,i4  ,,general
 ,,view ,,of ,,atheism4   ,before       
entering on a detailed discussion of the
 theories to which it appeals1 it may be
 useful to offer some general           
reflections on ,,atheism itself1 its    
generic nature and specific varieties1  
its causes and springs1 whether         
permanent or occasional1 and its moral  
and social influence1 as illustrated    
alike by individual experience and by   
public history4  ,by ,atheism we mean   
any system of opinion which leads men   
either to doubt or to deny the          
,existence1 ,providence1 and ,government
 of a living1 personal1 and holy ,god1  
as the ,creator and ,lord of the world4 

,in its practical aspect1 it is that    
state of mind which leads them to       
forget1 disown1 or disobey ,him4  ,we   
are met1 however1 at the outset1 by a   
previous question1 ,whether ,atheism be 
a real or even a possible thing8 a      
question which was wont to be discussed 
by divines under the head1 an dentur    
,athei8#b and which has recently been   
revived by the strong protestations of  
some philosophic writers1 who deny not  
only the existence1 but the very        
possibility of ,atheism4 ,on this point 
the policy which infidels have pursued  
has been widely different at different  
times4 ,on some occasions1 they have    
sought to exaggerate the number of      
,atheists1 claiming as their own        
adherents or allies a large majority of 
the intellectual classes1 as well as    
whole tribes or nations of barbarians1  
in order to impress the public mind with
 the conviction that belief in ,god is  
neither natural nor universal2 at other 
times1 they have sought to allay the    

prejudice which avowed ,atheism seldom  
fails to awaken1 by disclaiming much    
that had been imputed to them1 by       
professing a sort of mystic reverence   
for the ,spirit of ,nature1 and by      
denying that their speculations involve 
a disbelief in ,god4 ,in following these
 opposite courses at different times1   
they have been actuated by a politic    
regard to the exigencies of their       
wretched cause1 and have alternately    
adopted the one or the other1 just as it
 might seem1 in existing circumstances1 
to be more expedient either to brave or 
to conciliate public opinion4 ,it is    
incumbent1 therefore1 on every          
enlightened advocate of ,christian      
,theism to exercise a prudent discretion
 in the treatment of this topic1 and to 
guard equally against the danger either 
of being led to exaggerate the extent1  
or of being blinded to the existence of 
the evil4 ,nor is it difficult to       
discover a safe middle path between the 
opposite extremes3 it is only necessary 

to define1 in the first instance1 what  
we mean when we speak of ,theism or     
,atheism respectively1 and then to      
ascertain1 in the second place1 whether 
any1 and what1 parties have avowed      
principles which should fairly serve to 
connect them with the one system or with
 the other4 ,a clear conception of the  
radical principle or essential nature of
 ,atheism is indispensable2 for without 
this1 we shall be liable1 on the one    
hand1 to the risk of imputing ,atheism  
to many who are not justly chargeable   
with it--a fault which should be most   
carefully avoided2#c and equally liable1
 on the other hand1 to the danger of    
overlooking the wide gulf which         
separates ,religion from ,irreligion1   
and ,theism from ,atheism4 ,there is    
much room for the exercise both of      
,christian candor and of critical       
discrimination1 in forming our estimate 
of the characters of men from the       
opinions which they hold1 when these    
opinions relate not to the vital truths 

of religion1 but to collateral topics1  
more or less directly connected with    
them4 ,it is eminently necessary1 in    
treating this subject1 to discriminate  
aright between systems which are        
essentially and avowedly atheistic1 and 
those particular opinions on cognate    
topics which have sometimes been applied
 in support of ,atheism1 but which may1 
nevertheless1 be held by some salv fide1
 and without conscious1 still less      
avowed1 ,infidelity4 ,and hence ,buddus 
and other divines have carefully        
distinguished between the radical       
principles or grounds of ,atheism1 and  
those opinions which are often1 but not 
invariably1 associated with it4#d  ,but 
it is equally or still more dangerous1  
on the other hand1 to admit a mere      
nominal recognition of ,god as a        
sufficient disproof of ,atheism1 without
 inquiring what conception is           
entertained of ,his nature and          
perfections2 whether ,he be conceived of
 as different from1 or identical with1  

,nature2 as a living1 personal1 and     
intelligent ,being1 distinct from the   
universe1 or as the mere sum of existing
 things2 as a free ,creator and ,moral  
,governor1 or as a blind ,destiny and   
inexorable ,fate4 ,these are vital      
questions1 and they cannot be evaded    
without serious detriment to the cause  
of religion4 ,a few examples will       
suffice to prove our assertion4 ,m4     
,cousin contends that ,atheism is       
impossible1 and assigns no other reason 
for his conviction than this1--that the 
existence of ,god is necessarily implied
 in every affirmation1 and may be       
logically deduced from the premises on  
which that affirmation depends4#e ,his  
reasoning may possibly be quite         
conclusive in point of logic1 in so far 
as it is an attempt to show that the    
existence of ,god ought to be deduced   
from the consciousness of thought2 but  
it cannot be held conclusive as to the  
matter of fact1 that there is no        
,atheism in the world1 unless it can be 

further shown that all men know and     
acknowledge ,his existence as a truth   
involved in1 and deducible from1 their  
conscious experience4 ,yet he does not  
hesitate to affirm that every thought   
implies a spontaneous faith in ,god2    
nay1 he advances further1 and adds that 
even when the sage denies the existence 
of ,god1 still his words imply the idea 
of ,god1 and that belief in ,god remains
 unconsciously at the bottom of his     
heart4 ,surely the denial or the doubt  
of ,god's existence amounts to ,atheism1
 however inconsistent that ,atheism may 
be with the natural laws of thought1 or 
the legitimate exercise of speech4  ,yet
 the bold paradox of ,,cousin was       
neither an original discovery nor an    
unprecedented delusion4 ,it was taught1 
in a different form1 but with equal     
confidence1 by several writers belonging
 to the era of the first ,french        
,revolution4 ,thus ,,helvetius1 in his  
work on ,,man1 says expressly3 ,there is
 no man of understanding who does not   

acknowledge an active power in ,nature2 
there is1 therefore1 no ,atheist4 ,he is
 not an ,atheist who says that motion is
 ,god2 because1 in fact1 motion is      
incomprehensible1 as we have no clear   
idea of it1 since it does not manifest  
itself but by its effects1 and because  
by it all things are performed in the   
universe4 ,he is not an ,atheist who    
says1 on the contrary1 that motion is   
not ,god1 because motion is not a being1
 but a mode of being4 ,they are not     
,atheists who maintain that motion is   
essential to matter1 and regard it as   
the invisible and moving force that     
spreads itself through all its parts1 as
 the universal soul of matter1 and the  
divinity that alone penetrates its      
substance4 ,are the philosophers of this
 last opinion ,atheists8 ,no2 they      
equally acknowledge an unknown force in 
the universe4 ,are even those who have  
no ideas of ,god ,atheists8 ,no2 because
 then all men would be so1 because no   
one has a clear idea of the ,divinity4#f

  ,a more recent writer1 the ,,abb      
,,lamennais1 is equally explicit1 and   
very much for the same reasons3 ,the    
,atheist himself has his own notion of  
,god1 only he transfers it from the     
,creator to the creation2 he ascribes to
 finite1 relative1 and contingent being 
the properties of the necessary ,being2 
he confounds the work with the workman4 
,matter being1 according to him1        
eternal1 is endowed with certain        
primitive1 unchangeable properties1     
which1 having their own reason in       
themselves1 are themselves the reasons  
of all successive phenomena2 and it     
matters little whether he rejects the   
name of ,god or not1 or whether he has1 
or has not1 an explicit knowledge of    
,him2 he cannot but acknowledge an      
eternal ,first ,cause4#g ,and so a whole
 host of ,pantheistic ,spiritualists    
will indignantly disclaim the imputation
 of ,atheism1 and even attempt to       
vindicate ,spinoza himself from the     
odious charge4#h ,nay1 some of the      

grossest ,materialists1 such as         
,atkinson and ,martineau1 while they    
explicitly deny the existence of a      
living personal ,god1 will affirm that  
,pantheism is not ,atheism4#i ,now1     
unquestionably1 if by ,theism we mean   
nothing more than the recognition of an 
active power in nature1--such a power as
 may or may not be identified with      
motion1 and as may be designated        
indifferently as the ,divinity1 or as   
the ,soul of the world1--the possibility
 of ,atheism may be effectually         
excluded2 but this only serves to show  
the indispensable necessity of a correct
 definition of the terms which are      
employed in this discussion1 since it is
 perfectly manifest that they are not   
used in the same sense by the contending
 parties1 and that consequently the     
disputants are not arguing about the    
same thing4 ,for ,pantheism1 whatever   
form it may assume1 and whatever        
language it may adopt1 can be regarded  
in no other light than as a system of   

,atheism1 by all who have any definite  
conception of what is meant when we     
either affirm or deny the existence and 
government of a living1 intelligent1    
personal ,god4  ,as ,atheism has        
appeared in several distinct forms1 it  
is necessary to consider both its       
generic nature and its specific         
varieties4 ,it may be defined1          
generally1 as that state of mind which  
involves either the denial or the doubt 
of the existence and government of ,god 
as an all-perfect ,being1 distinct from 
the created universe2 or which leads to 
the habitual forgetfulness and wilful   
neglect of ,his claims as our ,creator1 
,preserver1 and ,lord4 ,this state of   
mind1 whether evinced by words or by    
actions1 contains in it the essence of  
,atheism1 and it is recognized in       
,scripture1 in each of its two aspects1 
as an evil alike natural and prevalent4 
,the words of the ,psalmist1 ,the fool  
hath said in his heart1 ,no ,god1#aj    
whether they be interpreted as the      

expression of an opinion or of a wish1  
indicate in either case the existence of
 that state of mind which has just been 
described1 and which may issue either in
 practical or speculative ,atheism1     
according to the temperament of         
individual minds1 and the influences    
which are brought to bear upon them4    
,the same inspired writer has said1#aa  
that ,the wicked through the pride of   
his countenance will not seek after     
,god2 ,god is not in all his            
thoughts2--,he hath said in his heart1  
,god hath forgotten2 ,he hideth his     
face2 ,he will never see it4--,wherefore
 doth the wicked contemn ,god8 he hath  
said in his heart1 ,thou wilt not       
require it2 ,and these words exhibit a  
graphic delineation1 of that state of   
mind in which occasional thoughts of    
,god are neutralized by habitual        
unbelief1 and the warnings of conscience
 silenced by the denial of a supreme    
moral government4 ,in like manner1 when 
the apostle tells the ,ephesian converts

 that at one time they were without ,god
 in the world1#ab and the ,galatians1   
that when they knew not ,god1 they did  
service unto them which by nature are no
 gods2 when he further speaks of some as
 lovers of pleasures more than lovers of
 ,god1 as having a form of godliness1   
but denying the power thereof1 as       
professing that they know ,god1 but in  
works denying ,him2#ac--;in all these   
statements we see the generic nature of 
that ungodliness which cleaves as an    
inveterate disease to our fallen nature1
 and which1 whether it appears only in  
the form of practical unbelief and      
habitual forgetfulness1 or assumes the  
more daring aspect of avowed infidelity1
 contains in it the essence of ,atheism4
  ,while such is its generic nature1 we 
must further discriminate between its   
specific varieties2 for it does not     
always wear the same aspect1 or rest on 
the same grounds4 ,it may be divided1   
first of all1 into speculative and      
practical ,atheism3 the former implying 

a denial1 or a doubt of the existence   
and government of ,god1 either openly   
avowed or secretly cherished2 while the 
latter is perfectly compatible with a   
nominal religious profession1 and       
consists in the habitual forgetfulness  
of ,god and of the duties which arise   
out of ,his relation to us as ,his      
creatures and subjects4 ,speculative    
,atheism is comparatively rare2         
,practical ,atheism is widely prevalent1
 and may be justly regarded as the grand
 parent sin1 the universal              
characteristic of fallen humanity4#ad   
,it is not ,atheism in profession1 it is
 ,atheism in practice4 ,those who are   
chargeable with it may profess that they
 know ,god1 but in works they deny ,him4
 ,as distinguished from theoretical or  
speculative ,atheism1 it is fitly termed
 ungodliness4 ,it does not necessarily  
imply either the denial or the doubt of 
the existence or government of ,god1 but
 consists mainly in the forgetfulness of
 ,his character and claims4 ,speculative

 ,atheism always implies habitual       
ungodliness2 but the latter may exist   
where the former has never been         
embraced1 and has even been openly and  
sincerely disclaimed4 ,yet such is the  
connection between the two1 that        
,speculative ,atheism invariably        
presupposes and perpetuates practical   
ungodliness2 and that the latter has    
also a tendency to produce the former1  
since the habitual disregard of ,god in 
the practical conduct of life indicates 
a state of mind in which men are        
peculiarly exposed to the seductions of 
infidelity and prone to yield to them1  
especially in seasons of revolutionary  
excitement or of prevailing epidemic    
unbelief4 ,it would be wrong to rank    
every ungodly man among professed or    
even conscious ,atheists1 for he may    
never have denied or even doubted the   
existence and government of ,god2 yet it
 were equally wrong to represent or     
treat him as a true believer1 since he  
shows that1 practically1 ,god is not in 

all his thoughts2 and hence the         
necessity of our first distinction      
between ,transcriber's note3 ,original  
had beetween theoretical or speculative1
 and practical or habitual ,atheism4    
,speculative ,atheism1 again1 is either 
dogmatic or skeptical4 ,it is dogmatic1 
when it amounts to an affirmation1      
either that there is no ,god1 or that   
the question of his existence is        
necessarily insoluble by the human      
faculties4 ,atheism has been            
distinguished from ,anti-theism2 and the
 former has been supposed to imply      
merely the non-recognition of ,god1     
while the latter asserts ,his           
non-existence4 ,this distinction is     
founded on the difference between       
unbelief and disbelief2#ae and its      
validity is admitted in so far as it    
discriminates merely between dogmatic   
and skeptical ,atheism4 ,but            
,anti-theism is maintained1 in the      
strictest sense of the term1 where it is
 affirmed either that there is no ,god1 

or that the existence of the ,supreme   
,being cannot in any circumstances      
become an object of human knowledge4 ,in
 each of these forms1 ,atheism is       
dogmatic2 it denies the existence of    
,god1 or it denies the possibility of   
,his being known4 ,but there is also a  
skeptical ,atheism1 which does not      
affirm absolutely either that there is  
no ,god1 or that the knowledge of ,god  
is necessarily excluded by the          
limitations of human reason1 but        
contents itself with saying1            
non-liquet1--i4e41 with denying the     
sufficiency of the evidence4 ,it answers
 every appeal to that evidence by saying
 that1 however satisfactory it may be to
 the minds of some1 it does not carry   
conviction to the minds of all1 and that
 for this reason it may be justly       
regarded as doubtful or inconclusive4   
,these two forms of ,atheism--the       
,dogmatic and the ,skeptical--are widely
 different from each other2 they rest on
 distinct grounds1 and they require1    

therefore1 to be discussed separately1  
each on its own peculiar and independent
 merits4 ,the ,dogmatic ,atheist feels  
no force in the arguments which are     
directed merely against his skeptical   
ally2 for1 strong in his own position   
and confident in his ability to maintain
 it1 he is conscious of no speculative  
doubt1 and affirms boldly what he       
unhesitatingly believes4 ,the ,skeptical
 ,atheist1 again1 feels no force in the 
arguments which are directed against a  
,dogmatic ,system such as he utterly    
disclaims2 he is equally unwilling to   
affirm either that there is1 or that    
there is not1 a ,god3 he takes refuge in
 doubt1 and refuses alike to affirm or  
to deny2 his only plea is1 the want or  
the weakness of evidence on either side4
 ,from this radical difference between  
the two forms of ,speculative ,atheism1 
there arises a necessity for discussing 
each of them on its own merits2 and yet1
 although theoretically they may be     
easily distinguished1 it will be found  

that practically they are often         
conjoined1 since the same mind will     
often fluctuate between the two1 and    
shift its ground by betaking itself     
alternately to the one or the other1    
according to the exigencies of the      
argument4 ,assail the ,dogmatic ,atheist
 with the unanswerable statement of     
,john ,foster1 that it would require    
nothing less than ,omniscience to       
warrant the denial of a ,god1 and he    
will probably defer to it so far as to  
admit that he cannot prove his negative 
conclusion1 but will add that he is not 
bound to do so1 and that all that can be
 reasonably required of him is to show  
that the evidence adduced on the        
opposite side is insufficient to        
establish the ,divine existence1 or that
 the phenomena which supply that        
evidence may be as well1 or more        
satisfactorily1 explained in some other 
way4 ,assail1 in like manner1 the       
,skeptical ,atheist with the            
self-evident truth that1 even on his own

 principles1 he is not entitled to      
assume or to act upon the assumption1   
that there is no ,god1 since the result 
of his reasonings is doubt merely1 and  
such doubt as implies that there may be 
a ,creator1 ,governor1 and ,judge1 he   
will probably defer to it so far as to  
admit that this is the only logical     
result of his system1 but will add that1
 where there is no conclusive evidence  
on either side1 there can be no moral   
obligation to a religious life1 and no  
guilt in living without ,god in the     
world4 ,it will be found1 too1 that1    
distinct as these two forms of          
,speculative ,atheism may appear to be1 
yet they have often been made to rest on
 a common ground1 and the self-same     
arguments have been adduced in support  
of both4 ,thus the doctrine of          
,materialism1 the theory of             
,development1 and the system of ,natural
 ,laws1 have all been applied by the    
,dogmatic ,atheist to justify his denial
 of the existence and government of     

,god1 on the ground that all the        
phenomena of ,nature may be accounted   
for without the supposition of a        
,supreme ,mind2 while the very same     
doctrines or theories have been also    
applied by the ,skeptical ,atheist to   
justify1 not his denial1 but his doubt1 
and to vindicate his verdict of         
non-liquet on the evidence adduced4 ,and
 as the same arguments are often        
employed by both parties in support of  
their respective views1 so they make    
use1 for the most part1 of the same     
objections in assailing the cause of    
,theism2 insomuch that it would be      
impossible1 and even were it possible it
 would be superfluous1 to attempt a     
formal refutation of either1 without    
discussing those more general principles
 which are applicable to both4 ,for this
 reason1 we propose to examine in the   
sequel the various theories which have  
been applied in support alike of        
,dogmatic and of ,skeptical ,atheism1 so
 as to illustrate the grounds that are  

common to both1 while we consider also  
the distinctive peculiarities of the two
 systems1 and more particularly the     
grounds of ,religious ,skepticism4      
,besides the radical distinction between
 ,dogmatic and ,skeptical ,atheism1 we  
must consider the difference between the
 four great leading systems which have  
been applied to account for the existing
 order of ,nature1 without the          
recognition of a living1 intelligent1   
personal ,god4 ,there are many specific 
varieties of ,atheism2 but1 ultimately1 
they may be reduced to four classes4    
,the first system assumes and asserts   
the eternal existence of ,,the ,,cosmos2
 that is1 of the present order of       
,nature1 with all its laws and          
processes1 its tribes and races1 whether
 of vegetable or animal life2 and       
affirms that the world1 as now          
constituted1 never had a beginning1 and 
that it will never have an end4 ,this   
has been called the ,aristotelian       
,hypothesis1 because ,aristotle1 while  

he spoke of a ,supreme ,mind or ,reason1
 maintained not only the eternity of    
matter1 but also the eternity of        
substantial forms and qualities4  ,the  
second system affirms1 not the eternal  
existence of ,,the ,,cosmos1--for the   
commencement of the existing order of   
,nature is admitted to be comparatively 
recent1--but the eternal existence of   
,matter and ,motion2 and attempts to    
account for the origin of the world and 
of the races by which it is peopled1    
either by ascribing it1 with ,epicurus1 
to a fortuitous concourse of atoms1 or1 
with more modern ,speculatists1 to a law
 of progressive development4 ,this has  
been called the ,epicurean ,hypothesis1 
because ,epicurus1 while nominally      
admitting the existence of ,god1 denied 
the creation of the world1 and ascribed 
its origin to atoms supposed to have    
been endued with motion or certain      
inherent properties and powers1 and to  
have been self-existent and eternal4    
,the third system affirms the coxistence

 and coternity of ,god and the ,world2  
and1 while it admits a distinction      
between the two1 represents them as so  
closely and necessarily conjoined1 that 
,god can be regarded only as the ,soul  
of the ,world1--superior to matter1 as  
soul is to body1 but neither anterior to
 it1 nor independent of it1 and subject1
 as matter itself is1 to the laws of    
necessity and fate4 ,this has been      
called the ,stoical ,system2 since the  
,stoics1 notwithstanding all their      
sublime moral speculations and their    
frequent recognition of ,god1 taught    
that ,god sustains the same relation to 
the ,world as the soul of man does to   
his body4  ,the fourth system denies the
 distinction between ,god and the       
,world1 and affirms that all is ,god1   
and ,god is all2 that there exists only 
one substance in the ,universe1 of which
 all existing beings are only so many   
modes or manifestations2 that these     
beings proceed from that one substance1 
not by creation1 but by emanation2 that 

when they disappear1 they are not       
destroyed1 but rebsorbed2 and that thus1
 through endless cycles of change1 of   
reproduction and decay1 it is one and   
the same eternal being that is          
continually modified and manifested4    
,this has been called the ,pantheistic  
,hypothesis1 and it is exemplified1 on a
 large scale1 in the speculations of the
 ,brahmins in ,india1 and1 in ,europe1  
in those of ,spinoza and his numerous   
followers4  ,if this be a correct       
analysis of ,speculative ,atheism1 in so
 far as it assumes a positive or        
dogmatic shape1 we have only to conjoin 
with it the peculiar characteristics of 
that which is merely ,skeptical1 and we 
shall obtain a comprehensive view of the
 whole subject1 which may serve as a    
useful guide in the selection and       
treatment of the topics which demand our
 chief attention in the prosecution of  
this inquiry4  ,it is necessary1        
however1 in discussing this subject1 to 
bear in mind that there is a wide       

difference between ,systems of ,atheism1
 such as we have briefly described1 and 
certain doctrines which have sometimes  
been associated with it1 or even applied
 in its support or vindication4 ,these  
doctrines may have been connected1      
historically1 with the promulgation and 
defence of atheistic views2 they may    
even seem to have a tendency adverse to 
the evidence or truths of ,christian    
,theism2 but they must not on that      
account be summarily characterized as   
atheistic1 nor must those who have at   
any time maintained them be forthwith   
classed among avowed infidels4#af ,the  
doctrine of ,philosophical ,necessity1  
which in the hands of ,jonathan ,edwards
 was applied1 whether consistently or   
otherwise1 in illustration and defence  
of ,christian truth1 became in the hands
 of ,collins and ,godwin an associate   
and ally of anti-,christian error2 the  
doctrine of the natural ,mortality of   
the ,soul1 which in the hands of        
,dodwell was applied1 whether           

consistently or otherwise1 to vindicate 
the peculiar privileges of the          
,christian ,covenant1 has often been    
applied by infidels as a weapon of      
assault against the fundamental articles
 of ,natural ,religion itself2 the      
doctrine of ,materialism1 which in the  
hands of ,priestly was maintained1      
whether consistently or otherwise1 in   
connection with an avowed belief in ,god
 as the ,creator and ,governor of the   
world1 became in the hands of ,baron    
,d',holbach and his associates the      
corner-stone of the atheistic ,system of
 ,nature2 the doctrine of ,natural      
,laws1 which in the hands of ,bishop    
,butler is so powerfully applied in     
proof of a system of ,divine            
,government1 has become in the hands of 
,mr4 ,combe a plausible pretext for     
denying a special ,providence and the   
efficacy of prayer2 and the mere fact   
that these doctrines have been applied  
to such different and even opposite     
uses1 is a sufficient proof of itself   

that they are not in their own nature   
essentially atheistic1 and that they    
should be carefully discriminated from  
the systems with which they have been   
occasionally associated4 ,we are not    
entitled to identify them with ,atheism1
 in the case of those by whom ,atheism  
is explicitly disclaimed2 and yet there 
may be such an apparent connection      
between the two1 and such a tendency in 
the human mind to pass from the one to  
the other1 as may afford a sufficient   
reason for examining these cognate      
doctrines1 each on its proper merits1   
for defining the sense in which they    
should be severally understood1 for     
estimating the evidence which may be    
adduced for or against them             
individually1 and for showing in what   
way1 and to what extent1 they may have a
 legitimate bearing on the grounds of   
our ,theistic belief4 ,for this reason1 
we shall bring under review1 not only   
several systems of avowed ,atheism1 but 
also various theories1 not necessarily  

atheistic1 which have been applied to   
the support and defence of ,atheism1 and
 which have a tendency1 as thus applied1
 to induce an irreligious frame of mind4
  ,the causes and springs of ,atheism   
may easily be distinguished from the    
reasons on which it is founded4 ,in the 
present state of human nature1 there is 
a permanent cause which is abundantly   
sufficient to account for this species  
of unbelief1 notwithstanding all the    
evidence which ,nature affords of the   
being1 perfections1 and providence of   
,god4 ,our ,lord explained in a single  
sentence the whole ,philosophy of       
,unbelief1 when he said that men loved  
the darkness rather than the light1     
because their deeds are evil2 for whoso 
doeth evil hateth the light1 neither    
cometh to the light1 lest his deeds     
should be reproved4 ,no thoughtful man  
can seriously reflect on his own        
conscious experience1 without           
discovering1 in the disordered state of 
his moral nature1 a reason which        

sufficiently explains his natural       
aversion from ,god2 he finds there an   
evidence1 which he can neither overlook 
nor deny1 of his own personal turpitude 
and guilt2 he is self-convinced and     
self-condemned at the bar of his own    
conscience2 he remembers with remorse   
and shame many cases of actual          
transgression in which he resisted the  
dictates of reason1 and resigned himself
 to the dominion of evil passions2 and  
when1 with these convictions and        
feelings1 he is asked to conceive of    
,god as a living1 personal ,being1      
everywhere present1 beholding the evil  
and the good1 whose eyes are as a flame 
of fire1 and can discern the very       
thoughts and intents of the heart2 when 
he conceives of such a ,being as his    
,lawgiver1 ,governor1 and ,judge1 as one
 who demands the homage of the heart and
 the obedience of the life1 and who has 
power to enforce ,his rightful claims by
 the sanctions of reward and punishment1
 he will be sensible1 in the first      

instance1 of an instinctive disposition 
to recoil from the contemplation of his 
character1 and a strong desire to deny1 
or at least to forget1 ,his claims2 and 
just in proportion as the idea of ,god  
becomes more vivid1 or is more          
frequently presented to his mind1 it    
will become the more intolerable1       
insomuch that he will be tempted either 
to banish the subject altogether from   
his thoughts1 or1 if he cannot succeed  
in this1 to alter and modify his view of
 the ,divine character so as to bring it
 into accordance with his own wishes1   
and to obtain some relief from the fears
 and forebodings which it would         
otherwise awaken in his mind4 ,if he    
should succeed in this attempt1 he will 
fall into one or other of two opposite  
states of mind1 which1 however          
apparently different1 do nevertheless   
spring from the same latent source1--a  
state of security1 or a state of        
servitude4 ,in the former1 he either    
forgets ,god altogether1--,god is not in

 all his thoughts2 or he conceives of   
,him as one like unto himself1 indulgent
 to sin1 and neither strict to mark nor 
just to punish it3 in the latter1 he    
either remembers ,god and is troubled1  
or1 if he would allay the remorse and   
forebodings of an uneasy conscience1 he 
has recourse to penance and             
mortification1 to painful sacrifices and
 ritual observances1 in the hope1 that  
by these he may propitiate an offended  
,deity4 ,in the one case1 the conflict  
ends in practical ,atheism1 in the      
other1 in abject ,superstition4 ,and    
these two1 ,atheism and ,superstition1  
however different and even opposite they
 may seem to be1 are really offshoots   
from the same corrupt root1--the evil   
heart of unbelief which departeth from  
the living ,god4 ,in the case of the    
great majority of mankind1 who are      
little addicted to speculative inquiry1 
or to serious thought of any kind1 it   
may be safely affirmed that1 in the     
absence of ,revelation1 they will       

inevitably fall into one or other of    
these two extremes1 or rather1 that they
 will oscillate alternately between the 
two1--in seasons of ease and prosperity 
living without ,god in the world1 and in
 seasons of distress or danger betaking 
themselves for relief to the rites of a 
superstitious worship4 ,the apostle     
describes at once the secret cause and  
the successive steps of this sad        
degeneracy1 when1 speaking of the       
,gentiles1 he says that when they knew  
,god1 they glorified him not as ,god1   
neither were thankful1 but became vain  
in their imaginations1 and their foolish
 heart was darkened2 professing         
themselves wise1 they became fools1 and 
changed the glory of the incorruptible  
,god into an image made like to         
corruptible man4--,and even as they did 
not like to retain ,god in their        
knowledge1 ,god gave them over to a     
reprobate mind4#ag ,the secret cause of 
all these evils was a latent enmity     
against ,god1--they did not like to     

retain ,god in their knowledge4 ,from   
this proceeded1 in the first instance1 a
 practical habit of ,atheism1--they     
glorified him not as ,god1 neither were 
thankful2 and from hence proceeded1 in  
the second instance1 the gross          
superstition of ,polytheistic belief and
 worship1--they changed the glory of the
 incorruptible ,god into an image made  
like to corruptible man1--they changed  
the truth of ,god into a lie1 and       
worshipped and served the creature more 
than the ,creator1 who is blessed       
forever4  ,but1 while practical ,atheism
 and blind ,superstition are the two    
extremes which divide among them the    
great majority of mankind1 there have   
always been some more thoughtful and    
inquiring spirits1 who have sought to   
penetrate the mysteries of their being1 
and to account for the present order of 
things4 ,they have asked1 and have      
attempted to answer1 such questions as  
these3 ,what are we8 what was our       
origin8 what is our destination8 ,whence

 came this stupendous fabric of ,nature8
 ,is it self-existent and eternal8 or   
did it come into being at some definite 
time8 ,if not eternal1 how was it       
produced8 by chance or by design8 by    
inevitable fate or by spontaneous will8 
,whence the order which pervades it1 and
 the beauty by which it is adorned8     
,whence1 above all1 the evil1 moral and 
physical1 by which it is disfigured and 
cursed8 ,and1 in reply to these         
thoughtful questionings1 various        
theories have been invented to account  
for the existing order of things1 while 
not a few of the most daring thinkers   
have abandoned the subject in despair1  
and1 holding it to be an insoluble      
problem1 have resigned themselves to the
 cheerless gloom of ,skepticism4 ,in    
reviewing all these speculations and    
theories1 we must bear in mind that     
their authors and advocates1 although   
more thoughtful and inquisitive than the
 great majority of mankind1 were equally
 subject to the same corrupting         

influence1--the evil heart of           
unbelief1--and that the same cause which
 produced practical ,atheism in some1   
and abject ,superstition in others1 may 
also have operated1 but more            
insidiously1 in producing ,speculative  
,infidelity in the minds of those who   
are more addicted to abstruse           
philosophical inquiries4 ,we must seek  
to get down to the root of the evil1 if 
we would suggest or apply an effectual  
remedy2 we must not deal with the       
symptoms merely1 but search for and     
probe the seat of the disease2 and if   
that be the disordered state of our     
moral nature1 which gives rise to fears 
and forebodings as often as we think of 
,god1 no remedy will be effectual which 
does not remove our distrust1 suspicion1
 and jealousy2 and no argument1 however 
conclusive1 will have any practical     
power which does not present such views 
of ,god as to make him an object of     
confidence1 and trust1 and love4 ,it is 
of vast importance that this fundamental

 truth should be kept steadily in view2 
for1 as the disordered state of our     
moral nature is the rudimental source   
both of practical ,atheism and of       
popular ,superstition1 so it is also the
 prolific parent of ,speculative        
,infidelity in every variety of form3   
and as long as the remedy is not applied
 to the root of the disease1 the        
,atheist1 if forced to relinquish one   
theory1 will only betake himself to     
another1 and after having gone the round
 of them all1 will rather throw himself 
into the vortex of utter and hopeless   
skepticism1 than acknowledge a ,god whom
 he cannot love1 a ,judge whom he cannot
 but dread4 ,christianity alone can     
supply an effectual remedy1 and it is   
such a remedy as is fitted to cure alike
 the habitual ungodliness1 the abject   
superstition1 and the speculative       
infidelity1 which have all sprung from  
the same prolific source4 ,it exhibits  
such a view of the character and will of
 ,god as may relieve us from the fears  

and forebodings of guilt1 and1 by       
revealing a divine method of            
reconciliation1 may place us in a       
position the most favorable for a calm  
and dispassionate consideration of the  
natural evidence in favor of ,his       
,being1 ,perfections1 and ,moral        
,government4  ,but1 while the grand     
parent cause of all ,atheism--whether   
practical or speculative1 dogmatic or   
skeptical--is to be found in the        
disordered state of our own moral       
nature1 there are other subordinate     
causes in operation1 which may be       
regarded either as incidental occasions1
 or as plausible pretexts1 for this form
 of unbelief4 ,the internal causes are  
the primary and most powerful2 but there
 are external influences which coperate 
with these1 and serve to stimulate and  
strengthen them4 ,among the incidental  
occasions of ,atheism1 we might mention 
a defective1 because irreligious1       
education in early life1 the influence  
of ungodly example and profane converse1

 and the authority of a few great names 
in literature or science which have     
become associated with the cause of     
,infidelity2 and among the plausible    
pretexts for ,atheism we might mention  
the inconsistencies of professed        
believers and especially of the clergy1 
the divided state of the religious      
world1 as indicated by the multiplicity 
of sects1 the bitterness of religious   
controversy1 the supposed opposition of 
the ,church to the progress of science  
and the extension of civil and religious
 liberty1 and the gross superstitions   
which have been incorporated with       
,christianity itself in some of the     
oldest and most powerful states of      
,europe4 ,these and similar topics may  
be justly said to be the loci communes  
of ,atheism1 and they are often employed
 in eloquent declamation or indignant   
invective1 so as to make a much deeper  
impression1 especially on young and     
ardent minds1 than their intrinsic      
weight or real argumentative value can  

either justify or explain4 ,infidel     
writers have not been slow to avail     
themselves of these pretexts for        
unbelief1 in regard alike to ,natural   
and ,revealed ,religion2 and have       
artfully identified ,religion with      
,superstition1 and ,christianity with   
,popery1 as if there were no consistent 
or tenable medium between the two4 ,and1
 perhaps1 of all the incidental         
occasions or external inducements to    
,atheism1 none has exerted so much      
influence over reflecting minds as the  
wide-spread prevalence of ,superstition2
 for never was ,atheism more general    
among the cultivated classes in ancient 
times than in the ,states of ,greece1   
whose hospitable ,pantheon enclosed the 
gods of all nations1 and whose          
inhabitants were exceedingly given to   
idolatry2 and nowhere1 in modern times1 
has ,atheism been more explicitly avowed
 or more zealously propagated than in   
those countries of ,europe which are    
most thoroughly subjugated to the       

superstitions of the ,papacy4 ,in the   
graphic words of ,robert ,hall1         
,infidelity was bred in the stagnant    
marshes of corrupted ,christianity4#ah  
,having described the nature1 evinced   
the reality1 and referred to the        
permanent and occasional causes of      
,atheism1 we may briefly advert to its  
moral and social influence4 ,on this    
point three distinct questions have been
 raised3 ,first1 whether ,atheism be    
conducive to personal happiness8        
,secondly1 whether it be compatible with
 pure morality and virtue8 and1 thirdly1
 whether it be consistent with social   
well-being1 with the authority of the   
laws1 and the safety or comfort of the  
community8 ,in considering these        
questions1 it is necessary to remember  
that in no age1 and in no region of the 
world1 has ,speculative ,atheism been   
universal1 or even so prevalent as to   
exhibit on a large scale a full         
development of its legitimate results4  
,it has always been in a minority1 and  

has been continually checked1 modified  
and controlled1 by the prevailing       
beliefs of society2 and1 whether these  
beliefs were purely religious or grossly
 superstitious1 they have exerted a     
powerful influence in counteracting the 
native tendencies of atheistic          
speculation4 ,the effects of ,atheism1  
as ,mr4 ,estlin justly observes1 we have
 not yet in any great degree            
experienced1 as the mental habits of    
those who hold it in speculation were in
 general formed1 before they had adopted
 their present principles1 by the       
imperceptible influence of that religion
 which they now traduce4#ai ,perhaps the
 nearest approach to a state of         
prevailing ,atheism which has ever been 
exhibited in the history of the world1  
is to be found in ,france at the era of 
the first ,revolution1 when             
,christianity was publicly abjured1 and 
the goddess of ,reason substituted for  
the ,god of the ,bible4 ,but that even  
this fearful outburst of impiety did not

 proceed from the universal prevalence  
of ,speculative ,atheism among the great
 body of the people2 that there still   
existed in the heart of society some    
germs of religious feeling1 and certain 
instinctive or traditionary beliefs     
which operated as a restraint and check 
even during that season of revolutionary
 frenzy1 is sufficiently evinced by the 
reaction which speedily occurred in the 
public mind1 and which restored         
,catholicism itself1 as if by magic1 to 
its wonted supremacy2 while the         
anti-social tendency of ,atheism1 in so 
far as it did prevail1 was strikingly   
attested by the fact1 that the leading  
actors in that fearful drama found      
themselves compelled to provide for the 
public safety by restoring at least the 
forms of religious worship1 and to      
acknowledge that if there were no ,god1 
it would be necessary to invent         
one4--,the true light1 says the eloquent
 ,robert ,hall1 in which the ,french    
,revolution ought to be contemplated is 

that of a grand experiment on human     
nature4 ,god permitted the trial to be  
made4 ,in one country1 and that the     
centre of ,christendom1 ,revelation     
underwent a total eclipse1 while        
,atheism1 performing on a darkened      
theatre its strange and fearful tragedy1
 confounded the first elements of       
society1 blended every age1 rank1 and   
sex1 in indiscriminate proscription and 
massacre1 and convulsed all ,europe to  
its centre1 that the imperishable       
memorial of these events might teach the
 last generations of mankind to consider
 ,religion as the pillar of society1 the
 safeguard of nations1 the parent of    
social order1 which alone has power to  
curb the fury of the passions1 and      
secure to every one his rights2 to the  
laborious the reward of their industry1 
to the rich the enjoyment of their      
wealth1 to nobles the preservation of   
their honors1 and to princes the        
stability of their thrones4#bj  ,in the 
case of individuals holding atheistic   

opinions1 but living in the midst of    
,christian society1 the full influence  
of these opinions cannot be felt1 nor   
their effects fully developed1 in the   
presence of those restraints and checks 
which are imposed by the religious      
beliefs and observances of others4 ,we  
cannot estimate their influence either  
on the personal happiness1 or the moral 
character1 or the social welfare of men1
 without taking this circumstance into  
account4 ,to arrive at even a tolerable 
approximation to a correct judgment1 we 
must endeavor to conceive of ,atheism as
 prevailing universally in the          
community1 as emancipated from all      
restraint1 and free to develop itself   
without let or hindrance of any kind1 as
 tolerated by law1 and sanctioned by    
public opinion1 and unopposed by any    
remaining forms either of domestic piety
 or of public worship1 as reigning      
supreme in every heart1 and as forming  
the creed of every household2 and thus  
conceiving of it as an inveterate1      

universal epidemic1 we are then to      
inquire whether1 and on what conditions1
 society would in such a case be        
possible1 and how far the prevalence of 
,atheism might be expected to affect the
 morals and welfare of mankind4  ,the   
question has been raised whether        
,atheism might not be more conducive    
than religion to the personal happiness 
of individuals2 and some1 who have      
confounded ,religion with ,superstition1
 have not hesitated to answer that      
question in the affirmative4 ,the       
conviction that there is no ,god1 and no
 moral government1 and no state of      
future retribution1 could it only be    
steadfastly and invariably maintained1  
might serve1 it has been thought1 to    
relieve the mind of many forebodings and
 fears which disturb its peace1 and1 if 
it could not ensure perfect happiness1  
might act at least as an opiate or      
sedative to a restless and uneasy       
conscience4 ,in the opinion of ,epicurus
 and ,lucretius1 tranquillity of mind   

was the grand practical benefit of that 
unbelief which they sought to inculcate 
respecting the doctrine of ,providence  
and ,immortality4 ,they frequently      
affirmed that fear generated            
superstition1 and that superstition1 in 
its turn1 deepened and perpetuated the  
fear from which it sprung2 that the     
minds of men must necessarily be        
overcast with anxiety and gloom as long 
as they continued to believe in a moral 
government and a future state2 and that 
the only sovereign and effectual        
antidote to superstitious terror is the 
spirit of philosophical unbelief4       
,similar views are perpetually repeated 
in the eloquent but declamatory pages of
 ,the ,system of ,nature4 ,but the      
remedy proposed seems to be subject to  
grave suspicion1 as one that may be     
utterly powerless1 or at the best1      
exceedingly precarious2 for1 first of   
all1 the fears which are supposed to    
have generated ,religion must have been 
anterior to it1 and must have arisen    

from some natural cause1 which will     
continue to operate even after ,religion
 has been disowned4 ,they spring1 in    
fact1 necessarily out of our present    
condition as dependent1 responsible1 and
 dying creatures2 and they can neither  
be prevented nor cured by the mere      
negations of ,atheism2 we can only be   
raised above their depressing influence 
by a rational belief and well-grounded  
trust in the being and character of     
,god4 ,again1 if the denial of a        
,providence and of a future state might 
serve1 were it associated with a full   
assurance of certainty1 to relieve us   
from the fear of retribution hereafter1 
it must equally destroy all hope of     
immortality1 and reduce us to the dreary
 prospect of annihilation at death1--a  
prospect from which the soul of man     
instinctively recoils1 and by which his 
whole life would be embittered just in  
proportion as he became more thoughtful 
and reflective4 ,unbelief can operate as
 a sedative to fear only in so far as it

 is habitual1 uniform1 undisturbed by   
any inward misgivings or apparent       
uncertainty2 but1 in the case of men not
 utterly thoughtless or insensible1 it  
is rarely1 if ever1 found to possess    
this character4 ,it is often shaken1 and
 always liable to be disquieted1 by     
occasional convictions1 which no amount 
of vigilance can ward off1 and no       
strength of resolution repress4 ,it is  
maintained only by a painful and        
sustained conflict1 which is but        
ill-concealed by the vehemence of its   
protestations1 and often significantly  
indicated by the very extravagance of   
its zeal4 ,add to this1 that ,atheism   
itself affords no guarantee against     
future suffering4 ,it may deny a        
,providence here and a judgment         
hereafter1 it may even deny a future    
state of conscious existence1 and take  
refuge in the hope of annihilation that 
it may escape from the dread prospect of
 retribution2 but it cannot affirm the  
impossibility1 it can only doubt the    

certainty of these things2 and in their 
bare possibility there is enough at once
 to impose an obligation to serious     
inquiry1 and to occasion the deepest    
anxiety1 especially in seasons of       
affliction or danger1 which awaken      
reflective thought4 ,atheism1 said the  
acute but skeptical ,bayle1 does not    
shelter us from the fear of eternal     
suffering4 ,but1 even if it did1 what   
influence would it exert on our present 
happiness8 ,would it not limit our      
enjoyments1 by confining our views      
within the narrow range of things seen  
and temporal8 ,would it not deprive us  
of the loftiest hopes8 ,would it not    
repress our highest aspirations1 by     
interdicting the contemplation of the   
noblest ,object of thought1 the ,ideal  
,standard of truth and excellence1 the  
,moral ,glory of the ,universe8 ,would  
it not diminish the pleasure which we   
derive even from earthly objects1 and   
aggravate the bitterness of every trial8
 ,how wretched must be the condition of 

those who are proud of being the        
offspring of chance1 in love with       
universal disorder1 whose happiness is  
involved in the belief of there being no
 witness to their designs1 and who are  
at ease only because they suppose       
themselves inhabitants of a forsaken and
 fatherless world6#ba ,no one in        
creation1 said ,jean ,paul1 is so alone 
as the denier of ,god3 he mourns1 with  
an orphaned heart that has lost its     
great ,father1 by the corpse of ,nature 
which no ,world-,spirit moves and holds 
together1 and which grows in its grave2 
and he mourns by that corpse till he    
himself crumble off from it4 ,the whole 
world lies before him1 like the         
,egyptian ,sphynx of stone1 half-buried 
in the sand2 and the ,all is the cold   
iron mask of a formless ,eternity4#bb   
,but the malign influence of ,atheism on
 personal happiness will become more    
apparent1 if we consider its tendency to
 affect the moral springs of action1 on 
which happiness mainly depends4 ,the    

question whether ,atheism be compatible 
with moral virtue1 or whether an        
,atheist may be a virtuous man1 is one  
of those that can only be answered by   
discriminating aright between the       
different senses of the same term4 ,in  
the ,christian sense of virtue1 which   
comprehends the duties of both tables of
 the ,law1 and includes the love of ,god
 as well as of man1 it is clear that the
 ,atheist cannot be reputed virtuous1   
since he wants that which is declared to
 be the radical principle of obedience1 
the very spirit and substance of true   
morality4 ,but1 in the worldly sense of 
the term1 as denoting the decent        
observance of relative duty1 it is      
possible that he may be so far          
influenced by considerations of prudence
 or policy1 or even by certain natural  
instincts and affections1 as to be just 
in his dealings1 faithful to his word1  
courteous in his manners1 and obedient  
to the laws4 ,but this secular1         
prudential morality1 is as precarious in

 its practical influence as it is       
defective in its radical principle4     
,atheism saps and undermines the very   
foundation of ,ethics4 ,the only law    
which it can recognize 7if that can be  
called a law in any sense which is not  
conceived of as the expression of a     
,supreme ,will7 is1 either the greatest 
happiness of the individual1 or the     
greatest happiness of the greatest      
number2 but1 whether it assumes the form
 of ,felicitarian or of ,utilitarian    
calculation1 it degenerates into a      
process of arithmetic1 and is no longer 
a code of morals4 ,the fundamental idea 
of ,,duty is awanting1 and can only be  
supplied from a source which the        
,atheist ignores4 ,by denying the       
existence of ,god1 he robs the universe 
of its highest glory1 obliterates the   
idea of perfect wisdom and goodness1 and
 leaves nothing better and holier as an 
object of thought than the qualities and
 relations of earthly things4 ,he       
degrades human nature1 by doing what he 

can to sever the tie which binds man to 
his ,maker1 and which connects the earth
 with ,heaven4 ,he circumscribes his    
prospects within the narrow range of    
things seen and temporal1 and thus      
removes every stimulus to dignity of    
sentiment1 and every incentive to       
elevation of character4 ,his wretched   
creed 7if a series of cold negations may
 be called a creed7 must be fatal to    
every disinterested and heroic virtue2  
let it prevail1 and the spirit of       
self-sacrifice will give place to       
,epicurean indulgence1 and the age of   
martyrdom will return no more4          
,substitute ,nature1 or even ,humanity1 
for ,god1 and the eternal standard of   
truth and holiness and goodness being   
superseded1 every moral sentiment will  
be blighted and obscured4 ,conscience   
has a relation to ,god similar to that  
which a chronometer bears to the sun4   
,blot the sun from the sky1 and the     
chronometer is useless2 deny ,god1 and  
conscience is powerless4 ,and the vices 

which1 if not subdued1 were yet curbed  
and restrained by the overawing sense of
 an unseen omnipresent ,power1 will     
burst forth with devastating fury1      
snapping asunder the feebler fetters of 
human law1 and overleaping the barriers 
of selfish prudence itself2 vanity and  
pride1 ambition and covetousness1       
sensual indulgence and ferocious        
cruelty1 will rise into the ascendancy1 
and establish their dark throne on the  
ruins of ,religion4  ,if such be the    
natural and legitimate effect of        
,atheism on the personal happiness and  
moral character of individuals1 we can  
be at no loss to discover what must be  
its influence on society at large4 ,for 
society is composed of individuals1 and 
its character and welfare depend on the 
aggregate sentiments of its constituent 
members4 ,the question whether ,atheism 
might not be consistent with social     
well-being1 with the continued authority
 of the laws1 and the general comfort of
 the community1 is answered historically

 by the fact1 that in modern ,france the
 ,reign of ,atheism was the ,reign of   
,terror1 and that in ancient ,rome its  
prevalence was followed by such scenes  
of proscription1 confiscation1 and      
blood1 as were then unparalleled in the 
history of the world4 ,the truth is     
that1 wherever ,atheism prevails1       
,,government ,,by ,,law must give place 
to ,,government ,,by ,,force2 for law   
needs some auxiliary sanction2 and if it
 be deprived of the sanction of         
,religion1 it must have recourse1 for   
its own preservation1 and the prevention
 of utter anarchy1 to the brute power of
 the temporal sword4 ,it is worse than  
useless to discuss1 in this connection1 
the question1 revived by ,bayle1#bc     
whether ,atheism or ,superstition should
 be regarded as the worst enemy to the  
,commonwealth1 for it has no relevancy  
to our present inquiry2 we are not      
contending for either1 we are objecting 
to both2 and we are under no necessity  
of choosing the least of two evils1 when

 we have the option of pure and         
undefined ,religion4 ,but we may        
observe1 in passing1 that1 historically 
it has been found possible to keep      
society together1 and to maintain the   
authority of law with a greater or less 
measure of civil liberty1 where         
,superstition has been generally        
prevalent2 whereas there is no instance 
on record of anything approaching to    
national ,atheism1 in which government  
by law was not speedily superseded by   
anarchy and despotism4 ,and the reason  
of this difference may be that in every 
system of ,superstition1 whether it be a
 corruption of ,natural or of ,revealed 
,religion1 some faint embers of sacred  
truth remain unextinguished1 some       
convictions which still connect man with
 the spiritual and the eternal1 and     
which are sufficient1 if not to         
enlighten and pacify the conscience1 yet
 to keep alive a sense of responsibility
 and a fear of retribution2 certain     
sparks1 as ,hooker calls them1 of the   

light of truth intermingled with the    
darkness of error1 which may have served
 a good purpose in maintaining civil    
virtue and social order1 although these 
would have been far better secured by   
the prevalence of a purer faith4  ,there
 are some circumstances1 of a novel and 
unprecedented nature1 which impart a    
solemn interest to our present inquiry4 
,at the beginning of the present        
century1 ,robert ,hall1 referring to the
 unbelief which preceded and accompanied
 the first outburst of the ,revolution  
in ,france1 mentioned three             
circumstances which appeared to him to  
be equally new and alarming4 ,he        
regarded it as the first attempt which  
had ever been witnessed on an extensive 
scale to establish the principles of    
,atheism1 as the first attempt to       
popularize these principles by means of 
a literature addressed and adapted to   
the common people1 and as the first     
systematic attempt to undermine the     
foundations1 and to innovate on the very

 substance of ,morals4#bd ,but if we    
compare the first with the new          
,encyclopedie1--the former concocted by 
,voltaire1 ,d',alembert and ,diderot1   
the latter by ,pierre ,leroux and his   
associates1--we shall find that         
,infidelity has assumed greater         
hardihood1 and has appeared under less  
restraint in recent than in former      
times2 while the speculations of ,comte 
and ,crousse are as thoroughly atheistic
 as those of ,d',holbach himself4 ,for1 
however irreligious and profane         
,voltaire and his associates might be1  
and however devoted to their avowed     
object of crushing ,christ and his      
cause1 so significantly indicated by    
their motto and watchword1 ,ecrasez     
l',infame2#be yet they continued1 as a  
party1 to advocate ,deism1 and seemed at
 least to oppose the bolder speculations
 of the author of the ,systeme de la    
,nature4 ,both ,voltaire and ,frederick 
the ,great wrote in reply to its        
atheistic tenets4#bf ,but now1 in       

,france1 these tenets are openly avowed 
and zealously propagated4 ,nor is this  
fatal moral epidemic confined to our    
continental neighbors3 there is too much
 reason to fear that it has infected1 to
 some extent1 the artisans of our own   
manufacturing towns1 and even1 in some  
quarters1 the inhabitants of our rural  
districts4 ,the ,communists of ,france  
have their analogues in the ,socialists 
of ,britain2 and the periodical press1  
although for the most part sound1 or at 
least innocuous1 has lent its aid to the
 dissemination of the grossest          
infidelity which the ,continent has     
produced4 ,the ,leader gives forth      
,lewes's version of ,comte's            
,philosophy2 and the ,glasgow           
,mechanics' ,journal1 a digest of his   
,law of ,human ,progress1 which is      
essentially atheistic4#bg ,nor is       
indigenous ,atheism wanting4 ,mr4       
,mackay in his ,progress of the         
,intellect1 ,atkinson and ,martineau in 
their ,letters on the ,laws of ,man's   

,nature and ,development1 and ,mr4 ,g4  
,holyoake in ,the ,reasoner1 have       
sufficiently proved that if ,atheism be 
an exotic1 it is capable of taking root 
and growing up in the land of ,bacon1   
,newton1 and ,boyle4  ,,footnotes3  #b  
,,budd,i1 ,theses ,theologic de         
,atheismo et ,superstitione1 cap4 ,i4   
#c ,j4 ,c4 ,,wolfius1 ,de ,atheismi     
falso ,suspectis4  #d ,,budd,i1 ,theses 
,theologic1 cap4 ,,iii41 ,de dogmatibus 
qu cum ,atheismo conjuncta sunt1 aut ad 
eum ducunt1 p4 #bdj4  #e ,,cousin1      
,introduction ,generale a l',histoire de
 la ,philosophie1 ,i4 #afi3--,que toute 
pense implique une foi spontane  ,dieu1 
et qu'il n'y a pas d',atheisme naturel4 
,croit-il qu'il existe1 par exemple8    
,s'il croit ela1 ela me suffit1--il a   
donc foi au principe de la pense2--or la
 est ,dieu1--,selon moi1 toute parole   
prononce avec confiance1 n'est pas moins
 qu'une profession de la foi a la       
pense1--a la raison en soi1--c'est a    
dire a ,dieu4  #f ,m4 ,,helvetius1      

,treatise on ,man1 his ,intellectual    
,faculties and ,education3 translated by
 ,w4 ,hooper1 ,m4 ,d41 ,i4 #bdg4  #g ,m4
 ,,lamennais1 ,esquisse d'une           
,philosophie1 ,i4 #ie4  #h ,spinoza is a
 ,god-intoxicated man4--,,novalis1      
quoted in ,t4 ,carlyle's ,essays1 ,,ii4 
#dc4  #i ,letters on the ,laws of ,man's
 ,nature and ,development1 by ,h4 ,g4   
,,atkinson and ,,harriet ,,martineau1 p4
 #bda4  #aj ,psalm #ad3 #a2 #ec3 #a4    
#aa ,psalm #aj3 #d1 #aa1 #ac4  #ab ,eph4
 #b3 #ab1 ,greek3 ,atheoi en t kosm4    
#ac ,gal4 #d3 #h2 #b ,tim4 #c3 #d2      
,titus #a3 #af4  #ad ,,estlin1          
,discourse on ,atheism1 pp4 #h1 #ai1    
#bh4 ,,dr4 ,,chalmers1 ,institutes1 ,i4 
#cge4  #ae ,,dr4 ,,chalmers1 ,works1    
,natural ,theology1 ,i4 #eh4 ,the       
,reasoner1 edited by ,,holyoake1 ,,xi4  
#ae1 #bcb4  #af ,,robert ,,hall',s      
,works1 ,i4 #eh4  #ag ,romans #a3 #ba1  
#bh4  #ah ,,hall',s ,works1 ,i4 #abh4   
#ai ,,estlin',s ,discourse1 p4 #eg4  #bj
 ,,robert ,,hall1 ,modern ,infidelity   

,considered1 ,i4 #ch1 #fg4  #ba ,,robert
 ,,hall on ,modern ,infidelity1 ,i4 #gj4
  #bb ,t4 ,,carlyle1 ,essays1 ,,ii4     
#adb4  #bc ,p4 ,,bayle1 ,penses diverses
 ,ecrites  un ,docteur de ,sorbonne a   
l',occasion de la ,comte1 #d vols4 ,also
 his ,reponse aux ,questions d'un       
,provincial1 ,,ii4 #fhh1 ,,iv4 #aja1    
#aab4  #bd ,,hall on ,modern            
,infidelity1 ,i4 #ei1 #fd4  #be ,,abb   
,,transcriber',s ,,note3 ,,original     
,,had ,,abbe ,,barruel1 ,memoires pour  
servir a l',histoire du ,jacobinisme1   
,i4 #ca1 #aca1 #ace1 #ahd1 #ceg4  #bf   
,,abb ,,barruel1 ,memoires pour servir a
 l',histoire du ,jacobinisme1 ,i4 #bb1  
,,ii4 #aij1 #aic4  #bg ,the ,leader2 a  
series of articles on ,comte's          
,philosophy1 by ,g4 ,h4 ,,lewes1 ,april 
#g1 #aj1 #ag1 etc41 etc41 #aheb4--,the  
,glasgow ,mechanics' ,journal4          
,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,theories ,,of        
,,development4   ,there have been       
various applications of the general     
principle of ,development1 by means of  

which an attempt has been made to       
explain the origin of all things by     
,natural ,laws1 so as to exclude the    
necessity of any ,divine interposition1 
either for the creation of the world1 or
 for the introduction and establishment 
of ,christianity itself4 ,it has been   
applied1 first1 to explain the origin of
 worlds and planetary systems1 by       
showing that1 certain specified         
conditions being presupposed1 there are 
fixed mechanical laws which might       
sufficiently account for the production 
of the earth and of the other planets   
and satellites of our ,solar ,system1   
without any special interposition of    
,divine power at the commencement of the
 existing order of things4 ,it has been 
applied1 secondly1 to explain the origin
 of the various tribes or races of      
vegetable and animal life1 and          
especially the production of the human  
race1 by showing that the existing types
 may have sprung1 by a process of       
gradual development1 from inferior races

 previously existing1 and that these    
again may have been produced by the     
action of chemical agents in certain    
favorable conditions4 ,it has been      
applied1 thirdly1 to explain all the    
most important phenomena of ,human      
,history1 and to illustrate the law     
which is supposed to determine and      
regulate the progressive course of      
civilization1 so as to account1 on      
natural principles1 for the origin and  
prevalence of the various forms of      
,religion1 and even for the             
introduction1 in its appointed season1  
of ,christianity itself1 without having 
recourse to anything so utterly         
unphilosophical as the idea of a ,divine
 ,revelation1 or the supposition of     
supernatural agency4 ,and it has been   
applied1 fourthly1 to explain the order1
 and to vindicate the use1 of those     
additions both to the doctrines and     
rites of primitive ,christianity1 which 
,protestants have denounced as          
corruptions1 but which ,popish and      

,tractarian writers defend as           
developments1 of the system that was    
originally deposited1 like a prolific   
germ or seed1 in the bosom of the       
,catholic ,church4  ,it is the more     
necessary to examine the various forms  
of this theory1 because unquestionably  
it can appeal to not a few natural      
analogies1 which may serve1 on a        
superficial view1 to give it the aspect 
of verisimilitude4 ,for many of the most
 signal works of ,god have been         
manifestly framed on the principle of   
gradual growth1 and matured by a process
 of progressive development4 ,we see in 
the natural world a small seed deposited
 in the earth1 which1 under the agency  
of certain suitable influences1         
germinates and springs up1 producing    
first a tender shoot1 then a stem1 and  
branches1 and leaves1 and blossoms1 and 
fruit2 and every herb or tree1 having   
seed in itself1 makes provision for the 
repetition of the same process1 and the 
perpetuation and indefinite increase of 

its kind4 ,the same law is observed in  
the animal kingdom1 where a continuous  
race is produced from a single pair4    
,and even in the supernatural scheme of 
,revelation itself1 the truth was       
gradually unfolded in a series of       
successive dispensations2 the ,first    
,promise being the germ1 which expanded 
as the ,church advanced1 until it       
reached its full development in the     
,scriptures of the ,new ,testament4     
,these and similar instances may suffice
 to show that1 both in the natural and  
supernatural ,providence of ,god1 ,he   
has been pleased to act on the principle
 of gradual and progressive1 as         
contradistinguished from that of instant
 and perfect production2 and they may   
seem1 at first sight1 to afford some    
natural analogies in favor of the       
radical idea on which the various modern
 ,theories of ,development are based4   
,in such circumstances it would be an   
unwise and dangerous course either to   
overlook the palpable facts which       

,nature and ,revelation equally attest1 
or to deny that they may afford signal  
manifestations of the manifold wisdom of
 ,god4 ,nor is it necessary for any     
enlightened advocate of ,theism to      
betake himself to these expedients2 he  
may freely admit the existence of such  
cases of gradual development1 he may    
even appeal to them as illustrative of  
the order of ,nature1 and the design    
which that order displays2 and the only 
question which he is at all concerned to
 discuss amounts in substance to this3  
,whether the method of production which 
is pursued in the ordinary course of    
,nature can account for the original    
commencement of the present system of   
things8  ,but the state of the question1
 and the right application of the       
argument1 may be best illustrated by    
considering each of the four forms of   
the theory separately and in succession4
   ,,section ,i4  ,,theory ,,of         
,,cosmical ,,development1 ,,or ,,of     
,,the ,,production ,,of ,,worlds ,,and  

,,planetary ,,systems ,,by ,,natural    
,,law4--,,the ,,vestiges4  ,the doctrine
 of a ,nebular ,cosmogony was first     
suggested by some observations of the   
elder ,herschell on those cloud-like    
appearances which may be discerned in   
various parts of the heavens by the aid 
of the telescope1 or even1 in some      
cases1 by the naked eye4 ,it assumed a  
more definite form in the hands of ,la  
,place1 although even by him it was     
offered1 not as an ascertained discovery
 of science1 but simply as a            
hypothetical explanation of the way in  
which the production of the planets and 
their satellites might possibly be      
accounted for by the operation of the   
known laws of ,nature4  ,the explanation
 of the whole theory may be best        
understood by dividing it into two      
parts3 the first being that which       
attempts to account for the formation of
 planets and satellites1 on the         
assumption of the existence of a central
 sun1 and of certain other specified    

conditions2 the second being that which 
undertakes to account for the formation 
of the sun itself1 on the assumption of 
the existence of a diffused nebulous    
matter in space1 or1 as it has been     
aptly called1 a universal               
,fire-,mist4#bh  ,when the theory is    
limited to the explanation of the origin
 of the planets and their satellites1   
the original condition of our solar     
system is assumed to have been widely   
different from what it now is2 the sun  
is supposed to have existed for a time  
alone1 to have revolved upon his axis1  
and to have been surrounded with an     
atmosphere expanded by intense heat1 and
 extending far beyond the limits of our 
system as it now exists4 ,this solar    
atmosphere revolved1 like the sun       
itself1 around its axis2 but its heat1  
constantly radiated into sidereal space1
 gradually diminished1 and the          
atmosphere being contracted in          
proportion as it cooled1 the rapidity of
 its rotation was accelerated1 until it 

reached the point at which the central  
attraction was overcome by the          
centrifugal force1 and then a zone of   
vapor would be detached or thrown off1  
which might either retain its form as a 
nebulous ring1 like the ring of ,saturn1
 or first breaking into fragments1 from 
some want of continuity in its          
structure1 and afterwards coalescing    
into one mass1 might be condensed into a
 planet as the vapor continued to cool4 
,these rings or planets1 thus detached  
from the central atmospheric mass1 would
 continue to revolve1 in virtue of the  
force originally impressed upon them1   
and their motion would be nearly        
circular1 in the same plane and in the  
same direction with that of the sun4    
,the first planet1 so formed1 must have 
been that at the extreme limit of our   
solar system2 the second the next in    
point of remoteness from the centre1 and
 so on2 each resulting from the         
operation of the same natural laws1 and 
emerging into distinct existence at that

 precise point in the gradual cooling   
and contraction of the atmosphere at    
which the centrifugal became stronger   
than the centripetal force4 ,but each   
planet might also be subjected to the   
same process of cooling and contracting1
 and might therefore throw off1 under   
the operation of the same mechanical    
laws1 zones of vapor more or less dense1
 which might consolidate into moons or  
satellites1 and which should also       
revolve1 like the planets1 round their  
primary4 ,thus1 ,uranus has six         
satellites1 and ,saturn seven2 while the
 latter has also thrown off two zones so
 perfectly uniform in their internal    
structure that they remain unbroken1 and
 constitute a double ring around the    
planet4  ,in this first form of the     
theory1 which assumes the existence of  
the sun and its atmosphere1 and the     
rotation of both round an axis1 ,la     
,place sought to give a scientific form 
to the speculations of ,sir ,william    
,herschell on the condensation of       

,nebul1 by proving simply the dynamical 
possibility of the formation of a       
planetary system by such means1         
according to the known laws of matter   
and motion2 but he did not affirm the   
scientific certainty of his conjecture1 
and far less the actual production of   
the solar system in this way4 ,he has   
been followed by ,m4 ,comte1 who has    
attempted to furnish1 if not a complete 
demonstration1 at least a plausible     
mathematical verification1 of the       
hypothesis4#bi ,utterly excluding all   
supernatural agency in the work of      
creation1 he equally excludes from the  
problem which he attempts to solve1 the 
origin of the sun and its atmosphere2   
and confining himself to the task of    
accounting1 in the way not of           
demonstrative certainty1 but merely of  
plausible hypothesis1 for the formation 
of the planets and satellites of our    
solar system1 he conceives the theory of
 ,la ,place to be susceptible of such a 
numerical verification as is sufficient 

to give it a high degree of             
verisimilitude4 ,assuming that the      
periodic time of each planet must be    
equal to that of the portion of the     
solar atmosphere of which it was formed 
at the era when it was thrown off1 and  
combining the theorems of ,huygens on   
the measure of centrifugal forces with  
,newton's law of gravitation1 he        
establishes a simple equation between   
the time of the rotation of each zone or
 section of the solar atmosphere1 and   
the distance of the corresponding       
planets4 ,on applying this equation to  
the various bodies of our system1 he    
found that the periodic time of the moon
 agrees1 at least within the tenth of a 
day1 with the duration of the earth's   
revolution1 when her atmosphere is      
supposed to have extended to the moon2  
and that the periodic times of the      
planets maintain a similar              
correspondence with what must have been 
the duration of the solar revolution    
when they were severally thrown off from

 its atmosphere4 ,it is the less        
necessary1 however1 to enter on a       
detailed exposition of his argument1    
because he admits that it can afford at 
the utmost only a probable proof of an  
hypothesis2 and further1 because it is  
expressly limited to the production of  
the planets and their satellites1 while 
not only is the existence of the solar  
atmosphere presupposed1 but also its    
existence in a certain state1 and with  
several determinate conditions2 while no
 account whatever is given of the origin
 either of the sun or its atmosphere1   
and none of the laws or conditions on   
which the whole process of development  
is confessedly dependent4  ,but the     
author of ,the ,vestiges takes a much   
wider range1 and attempts a more arduous
 task4 ,he seeks to account for the     
origin both of suns and of solar systems
 by the agency of natural laws4 ,not    
content with the more limited form of   
the theory1 which ,m4 ,comte holds to be
 the only legitimate or practical object

 of scientific treatment1 he holds that 
the origin of the sun itself1 and the   
forms1 the positions1 the relations1 and
 the motions1 of all the heavenly       
bodies1 may be accounted for by         
supposing a previous state of matter1   
fluid or gasiform1 subject only to the  
law of gravitation4 ,the ,nebular       
,cosmogony1 which is well characterized 
by himself as his version of the romance
 of ,nature1 is based on the assumption 
that the nebulous matter of space1      
previously to the formation of stellar  
and planetary bodies1 must have been a  
universal ,,fire-,,mist1#cj in other    
words1 a diffused luminous vapor1       
intensely hot1 which might be gradually 
condensed into a fluid1 and then into a 
solid state1 by losing less or more of  
its heat4 ,the existence of such a      
luminous matter being assumed1 and it   
being further supposed that it was not  
entirely uniform or homogeneous1 but    
that it existed in various states of    
condensation1 and that it had certain   

nuclei established in it which might    
become centres of aggregation for the   
neighboring diffused matter1--the author
 attempts to show that on such centres a
 rotatory motion would be established   
wherever1 as was the most likely case1  
there was any obliquity in the lines of 
direction in which the opposing currents
 met each other2 that this motion would 
increase as the agglomeration proceeded2
 that at certain intervals the          
centrifugal force1 acting on the remoter
 part of the rotating mass1 would       
overcome the agglomerating force2 and   
that a series of rings would thus be    
left apart1 each possessing the motion  
proper to itself at the crisis of       
separation4 ,these1 again1 would only   
continue in their annular form1 if they 
were entirely uniform in their internal 
structure4 ,there being many chances    
against this1 they would probably break 
up in the first instance1 and be        
thereafter agglomerated into one or     
several masses1 which would become      

representatives of the primary mass1 and
 perhaps give rise to a progeny of      
inferior masses4 ,in support of this    
theory1 reference is made to the        
existence1 at the present moment1 of    
certain cloud-like nebul1 or masses of  
diffused luminous matter1 exhibiting a  
variety of appearances1 as if they were 
in various degrees of condensation1 and 
which are described as solar systems in 
the process of being formed out of a    
previous condition of matter4 ,and the  
observations of ,m4 ,plateau1 of ,ghent1
 are adduced as affording an            
experimental verification of some parts 
of the theory1 and1 especially1 as      
serving to explain the spherical form of
 the planets1 the flattening at the     
poles1 and the swelling out at the      
equator4  ,it does not belong to our    
proper province1 nor is it necessary for
 our present purpose1 to discuss the    
merits of this theory1 considered as a  
question of science4 ,this has been     
already done1 with various degrees of   

ability1 but with unwonted unanimity1 by
 some of the ablest men of the age1--by 
,whewell1 ,sedgwick and ,mason1 in      
,england1 by ,sir ,david ,brewster and  
,mr4 ,miller1 in ,scotland1 and by      
,professor ,dod and ,president          
,hitchcock1 in ,america4#ca ,but1       
viewing it simply in its relation to the
 ,theistic argument1 we conceive that   
the adverse presumption which it may    
possibly generate in some minds against 
the evidence of ,natural ,theology1 will
 be effectually neutralized by          
establishing the following positions3   
,that it is a mere hypothesis1 and one  
which1 from the very nature of the case1
 is incapable of being proved by such   
evidence as is necessary to establish a 
matter of fact4  ,that the progress of  
scientific discovery1 so far from       
tending to verify and confirm1 has      
served rather to disprove and invalidate
 the fundamental assumption on which it 
rests4  ,that even were it admitted1    
either as a possible1 or probable1 or   

certain explanation of the origin of the
 present planetary systems1 it would not
 necessarily destroy the evidence of    
,theology1 nor establish on its ruins   
the cause of ,atheism4  ,each of these  
positions may be conclusively           
established1 and the three combined     
constitute a complete answer to the     
theory of ,development1 in so far as it 
has been applied in the support or      
defence of ,atheism4  #a4 ,that it is a 
mere hypothesis or conjecture1 designed1
 not to establish the historical fact1  
but to explain merely the dynamical     
possibility of the production of the    
planetary bodies by the operation of    
known natural laws1 must be admitted1 ,i
 think1 even by its most enthusiastic   
admirers4 ,it might have seemed1 indeed1
 to have something like a basis of fact 
to rest upon1 had the conception of the 
elder ,herschell been verified1 when he 
announced the existence of a nebulous   
fluid1 capable of being distinguished1  
by certain well-defined marks1 from     

unresolved clusters of stars2 but even  
then it presupposed so many postulates1 
which could in no way be established by 
experimental or historical evidence1    
that it could scarcely be regarded in   
any other light than as an ingenious    
speculation or a splendid conjecture4   
,for1 let it be considered1 first of    
all1 that the theory proceeds on the    
assumption of the existence and wide    
diffusion of a nebulous fluid of whose  
reality there is no actual proof2       
secondly1 that it necessarily requires1 
also1 the supposed existence of certain 
favorable conditions2 and1 thirdly1 the 
operation of certain invariable laws2   
and it will be manifest at once that it 
is purely hypothetical throughout1 and  
that it includes a variety of topics    
which never have been1 and never can be 
made the subjects of experimental       
verification4 ,for it postulates1 in the
 words of an acute writer1 the          
establishment of nuclei in the body of  
the elemental mass1 as well as the      

action of heat on its substance1 and    
then seeks to explain the concentration 
of the nebulous particles into these    
nuclei by the force of gravitation1 the 
rotation of the bodies so produced by   
the confluence of the nebulous fluid1   
the separation of a portion of the outer
 surface of these revolving masses in   
the form of rings1 the disruption of    
these rings1 and the subsequent         
recomposition of their fragments into   
separate spheres1 answering to the      
planets and satellites of our system4#cb
 ,but even were the existence of a      
nebulous fluid admitted1 we have no     
access to know what was its internal    
structure2 we cannot determine whether  
it was uniform and homogeneous          
throughout1 or whether it contained     
nuclei which might become centres of    
aggregation2 we have no means of        
estimating the intensity of the heat    
which belonged to it1 or of calculating 
the process by which it was dispersed1  
so as to occasion the condensation of   

successive portions of the mass4 ,no eye
 ever saw the separation of any part of 
it in the form of a ring1 or the        
disruption of that ring1 or the         
subsequent recomposition of its         
fragments into a solid sphere4 ,and even
 had all this been matter1 not of mere  
conjecture1 but of actual observation1  
it would still have left much to be     
explained which can only be accounted   
for by ascribing it to a designing      
,intelligent ,cause4  #b4 ,the progress 
of scientific discovery1 so far from    
tending to verify1 has served rather to 
invalidate the fundamental assumption on
 which the whole theory depends4 ,that  
assumption was the existence of a       
,nebulous ,fluid or ,fire-,mist1 capable
 of being distinguished1 by certain     
characteristic marks1 from unresolved   
nebul or clusters of stars4 ,the        
existence of any such fluid has become  
more and more doubtful1 in proportion as
 astronomers have been enabled1 with the
 aid of larger and better constructed   

telescopes1 to resolve several nebul    
which had previously defied the power of
 less perfect instruments4 ,we do not   
affirm that every cluster has been      
already resolved1 nor is it necessary   
for the purposes of our argument to     
suppose that1 at any future time1 this  
stupendous achievement is likely to be  
effected2 for it is a very obvious      
consideration1 that just in proportion  
as our telescopic powers are enlarged so
 as to enable us to resolve many of the 
nearer nebul1 they must also bring      
within the range of our extended vision 
others more remote and hitherto         
unperceived1 which may continue to      
exhibit the same cloud-like appearance  
as the former1 until1 by a new          
improvement of the telescope1 we may    
succeed in separating them into distinct
 stars2 and even then the march of      
discovery is not ended1--we may         
reasonably expect that with every fresh 
increase of telescopic vision1 new      
clusters will be brought into view1 and 

new clouds appear in the utmost verge of
 the horizon4 ,but1 unquestionably1 the 
progress which has already been made in 
this direction affords a strong         
presumption in favor of the idea1 that  
the apparent nebulosity of those masses 
which still appear1 even to our best    
telescopes1 as cloud-like vapors1 is to 
be ascribed rather to the imperfection  
of our instruments than to any          
difference between them and such as have
 been already resolved4 ,sir ,john      
,herschell1 a high authority in such a  
case1 tells us that we have every reason
 to believe1 at least in the generality 
of cases1 that a nebula is nothing more 
than a cluster of stars4#cc ,sir ,david 
,brewster is equally explicit3 ,it was  
certainly a rash generalization to      
maintain that nebul differed essentially
 from clusters of stars1 because        
existing telescopes could not resolve   
them4 ,the very first application of    
,lord ,rosse's telescopes to the heavens
 overturned the hypothesis2 and with    

such unequivocal facts as that          
instrument has brought to light1 we     
regard it as a most unwarrantable       
assumption to suppose that there are in 
the heavenly spaces any masses of matter
 different from solid bodies1 composing 
planetary systems4#cd ,and ,professor   
,nichol1 while he gracefully            
acknowledges that he has somewhat       
altered the views which he formerly gave
 to the public1 as the highest then     
known and generally entertained1        
regarding the structure of the heavens1 
states1 as the result of more mature    
reflection1 that the supposed           
distribution of a self-luminous fluid1  
in separate patches1 through the        
heavens1 has1 beyond all doubt1 been    
proved fallacious by that most          
remarkable of telescopic                
achievements1--the resolution of the    
great nebula in ,orion into a superb    
cluster of stars2 and that this         
discovery necessitates important changes
 in previous speculations on            

,cosmogony4#ce  ,in short1 ,lord        
,rosse's observations at ,parsonstown   
have conclusively proved that what      
appeared to be a nebula was in reality a
 cluster of stars2 and while they still 
leave many nebul unresolved1 they afford
 a strong warrant for believing that    
discoveries in the same direction might 
be indefinitely extended in proportion  
to the increase of telescopic power4    
#c4 ,but even were the ,nebular         
,hypothesis admitted1 and were the      
,theory of ,development by ,natural     
,laws conceived to afford a satisfactory
 explanation of the origin of the       
planetary systems1 it would not follow1 
as a necessary consequence1 that the    
peculiar evidence of ,theism--that on   
which it mainly depends1 and to which it
 makes its most confident appeal--would 
be thereby destroyed1 or even           
diminished4 ,the only legitimate result 
of such a doctrine would seem to be1    
that we must distinguish aright between 
a work of ,mediate1 and a work of       

,immediate ,creation4 ,in the ,bible    
each of these is distinctly recognized4 
,we have a specimen of the one in the   
creation of the first man by the direct 
agency of ,divine power2 we have a      
specimen of the other in the creation1  
less direct but equally real1 of all his
 natural posterity1 through the medium  
of ordinary generation4 ,men do not     
cease to be the creatures of ,god       
because they are born of their parents1 
in virtue of that creative word1 ,be    
fruitful1 and multiply1 and replenish   
the earth2 and hence children are       
admonished to remember their ,creator in
 the days of their youth4#cf ,the work  
of creation is equally real and equally 
,divine1 whether it be effected         
mediately or immediately1 with or       
without the intervention of means1 by   
the direct and instantaneous exertion of
 ,almighty power1 or by the gradual and 
successive operation of second causes   
acting according to established laws4   
,in the ordinary course of ,providence1 

the method of mediate production1       
gradual growth1 and progressive         
development1 may be observed in         
innumerable instances2 but it can never 
be justly held to exclude1 or even to   
obscure1 the evidence of a presiding    
,intelligence and a supernatural ,power4
 ,on the contrary1 it may serve rather  
to enhance that evidence2 since the very
 arrangements and provisions which have 
been made with a view to the            
reproduction of every thing after its   
kind1 may bear on them the legible      
impress of a designing ,mind and an     
ordaining ,will4 ,thus1 year by year    
continually1 the whole inhabitants of   
the world are supported by the fruits of
 harvest1 which are produced and matured
 under the action of natural laws2 yet  
every intelligent ,theist ascribes the  
result ultimately to the goodness1      
wisdom1 and power of ,god1 and sees in  
the very processes by which it is       
brought to pass some of the most signal 
proofs of these ,divine perfections4    

,now1 as this method is followed in the 
work of ,providence1 which may be1 and  
often has been1 described as a          
continuous creation1 and yet has no     
tendency to destroy1 or even to         
diminish1 the evidence of a presiding   
,intelligence in ,nature1 so no good    
reason can be assigned why it might not 
also have been adopted in the production
 of planets and astral systems1 if so it
 had seemed good to ,supreme ,wisdom4   
,if this method was adopted for the     
propagation of plants and animals1 no   
reason can be given why it might not    
also have been adopted for the          
production of planets and moons2 nor    
would it in the latter case1 any more   
than in the former1 impair the evidence 
of ,god's creative wisdom and power4    
,for1 suppose it be possible that1 by a 
marvellous process of self-evolution1   
the material elements of ,nature might  
assume new forms1 so as to originate a  
succession of new worlds and new        
planetary systems1 without the immediate

 or direct interposition of a           
,supernatural ,will2 suppose that the   
earth and the other bodies now belonging
 to our own system1 were generated out  
of a prior condition of matter1 existing
 in a gasiform state and diffused       
through space as a ,fire-,mist1 subject 
to the ordinary action of heat and      
gravitation2 suppose1 in short1 that    
there were ,,laws ,,for ,,the           
,,generation ,,of ,,worlds in the larger
 cycles of time1 just as there ,,are    
,,laws ,,for ,,the ,,generation ,,of    
,,animals in the short ages of          
terrestrial life2--would a provision for
 such a succession of marvellous        
developments necessarily destroy1 or    
even impair1 the evidence for the being 
and perfections of ,god8 ,does the      
generation of the animated tribes       
diminish the evidence of design in the  
actual constitution of the world8 ,and  
why should a similar provision1 if any  
such were found to exist1 for the       
generation of stars and systems1 be     

regarded in any other light than as an  
exhibition1 on a still larger scale1 of 
the manifold wisdom of ,god8  ,let it   
ever be remembered that the ,theistic   
argument depends1 not on the mode of    
production1 but on the character of the 
resulting product4 ,the world may have  
been produced mediately or immediately1 
with or without the operation of natural
 laws2 but if it exhibit such an        
arrangement of parts1 such an adaptation
 of means to ends1 or such a combination
 of collocations and adjustments1 as    
enables us at once to discern the       
distinctive marks of intelligent design1
 the evidence cannot be diminished1 it  
may even be possibly enhanced1 by the   
method of production4 ,provision is     
made1 doubtless1 for the growth and     
development of the eye1 the ear1 and the
 hand1 in the human foetus1 and the     
process by which they are gradually     
formed is regulated by natural laws4    
,but the resulting products are so      
exquisitely constructed1 so admirably   

adapted to the elements of nature1 and  
so evidently designed for the uses of   
life1 that they irresistibly suggest the
 idea of wise and benevolent            
contrivances2 and this idea is as strong
 and clear as it could have been had    
they been produced instantaneously by   
the direct act of creative power4 ,and  
so of the planets and astral systems3   
they may have been generated1 that is1  
produced1 in a way of natural           
development2 yet the resulting products 
are such as to evince the supreme wisdom
 and beneficence which presided over    
their formation4 ,but even this is not  
all4 ,let us suppose1 further1 that     
,philosophy may yet reach its extreme1  
and1 as we humbly conceive1 unattainable
 limit2 let us suppose that it may      
succeed in decomposing all the chemical 
elements now known1 by resolving them   
into ,,one primary basis2 let us even   
suppose that it may succeed in reducing 
all the subordinate laws of ,nature into
 ,,one supreme and universal law2 still 

the development of such a system as we  
see around us out of such materials1 and
 by such means1 would not be necessarily
 exclusive of the idea of ,god1 but     
might afford evidence of a ,supreme     
,mind1 creating1 combining1 and         
controlling all things for the          
manifestation of ,his adorable          
perfections4  ,we have thus seen that   
the ,theory of ,cosmical ,development is
 a mere hypothesis1 incapable of        
experimental or historical proof2 that  
the recent progress of scientific       
discovery has tended to disprove the    
fundamental assumption on which it      
rests2 and that1 even were it admitted  
as a possible1 or1 still more1 as a     
plausible explanation of the origin of  
planets and astral systems1 it would not
 serve to destroy1 and scarcely1 if at  
all1 to diminish the evidence of        
,theism4  ,the last of these positions1 
if well established1 might seem to      
supersede the necessity of discussing   
the hypothesis at all in connection with

 our present theme4 ,but such a         
discussion of it as has been offered may
 be useful to those--and they are not a 
few--who1 superficially acquainted with 
,science in its more popular form1 are  
exposed to the danger of being seduced  
by the authority of a few distinguished 
names which have unfortunately become   
identified with the cause of ,atheism4  
,for1 while the author of ,the ,vestiges
 repudiates the atheistic conclusions   
which some have deduced from his        
hypothesis1 ,m4 ,,comte boldly avows his
 creed in the following revolting terms3
 ,to minds unacquainted with the study  
of the heavenly bodies1 ,astronomy has  
still the reputation of being a science 
eminently religious1 as if the famous   
verse1 ',coeli enarrant gloriam ,dei'   
7',the heavens declare the glory ,,of   
,,god'71 had preserved all its force4   
,and1 he adds1 in a note1 ,at present1  
to minds that have been early           
familiarized with the true astronomical 
philosophy1 the heavens declare no other

 glory than that of ,hipparchus1        
,kepler1 ,newton1 and all those who have
 contributed to the establishment of    
their laws6 ,the reader of these laws   
may become illustrious1 but the ,maker  
of them must be utterly ignored6        
,,section ,,ii4  ,,theory ,,of          
,,physiological ,,development2 ,,or     
,,the ,,production ,,of ,,vegetable     
,,and ,,animal ,,races ,,by ,,natural   
,,law4--,,telliamed4--,,physio-,,philoso
phy4  ,the ,theory of ,development has  
been applied not only to explain the    
origin of worlds and of astral systems  
in the sky1 but also to account for the 
origin of the various tribes of         
vegetable and animal life which exist on
 the earth itself4 ,there is nothing1   
indeed1 in any of the kingdoms of       
,nature that may not be included in it1 
since the formation of all material     
bodies1 organic or inorganic1 is        
supposed to be sufficiently accounted   
for by the sole action of ,chemical or  
,mechanical laws4 ,the wide range of    

this theory is strikingly illustrated by
 the words of one whose powers of       
observation have added some interesting 
discoveries to ,natural ,history1 but   
whose speculations on the origin of     
,nature resemble the distempered ravings
 of lunacy1 rather than the mature      
results of philosophic thought          
,physio-philosophy has to show1 says    
,dr4 ,oken1 how1 and in accordance      
indeed with what laws1 the ,material    
took its origin1 and1 therefore1 how    
something took its existence from       
nothing4 ,it has to portray the first   
periods of the world's development from 
nothing2 how the elements and heavenly  
bodies originated2 in what method1 by   
self-evolution into higher and manifold 
forms1 they separated into minerals1    
became finally organic1 and1 in man1    
attained self-consciousness4444         
,physio-philosophy is1 therefore1 the   
generative history of the world2 or1 in 
general terms1 the history of ,creation1
 a name under which it was taught by the

 most ancient philosophers1 namely1 as  
,cosmogony4 ,from its embracing the     
,universe1 it is plainly the ,genesis of
 ,moses6#cg  ,it will be observed that  
this strange speculation goes far beyond
 the comparatively modest conjecture of 
,la ,place4 ,it postulates nothing1 and 
undertakes to account for everything4   
,in flagrant opposition to the old      
atheistic maxim1 ,ex nihilo1 nihil1 it  
boldly affirms1 ,ex nihilo1 omnia4 ,it  
speaks1 indeed1 of laws in accordance   
with which the world took its origin2   
but these laws must be as abstract as   
those of ,mathematics1 since they       
existed before matter itself2 nay1 more 
abstract1 or1 rather1 more inconceivable
 still1 since they existed1 it would    
seem1 even before ,mind6 ,dr4 ,oken     
attempts to explain the production of   
the world from nothing by comparing it  
to the evolution of ,arithmetical and   
,mathematical ,science1 out of the      
fundamental conception of zero6 ,but1   
waiving this1 we shall direct our       

attention to the only points in this    
theory which1 in the existing state of  
speculative thought1 can be held to have
 any practical interest in connection   
with our great theme4  ,that theory     
attempts to account for the production  
both of the ,,flora and the ,,fauna of  
the natural world by the process of     
,development rather than by the miracle 
of ,creation4 ,it proceeds on the       
assumption1 akin to that of ,epicurus1  
that atoms or monads alone existed in   
the first instance2 and that from these 
were derived1 under the action of       
natural law and by a process of gradual 
development1 all existing substances and
 beings1 whether organic or inorganic1  
mineral1 vegetable1 or animal4 ,no      
organism has been created1 says ,dr4    
,oken1 of larger size than an infusorial
 point4 ,no organism is1 nor ever has   
one been created1 which is not          
microscopic4 ,whatever is larger has not
 been created1 but developed4 ,man has  
not been created1 but developed4 ,on    

this fundamental assumption the whole   
theory is based4 ,but we must carefully 
distinguish between the ,atomic ,theory 
and the application which is here made  
of it4 ,the recent discoveries of       
,chemistry1 by which all material       
compounds have been decomposed into     
their constituent elements1 amounting to
 little more than fifty substances1     
which are either the primary or the     
proximate bases of all existing bodies1 
and the marvellous transformations which
 these elementary principles undergo1 in
 respect alike of form1 of density1 of  
solidity1 and of magnitude1 under the   
action of natural laws1--may serve to   
make it credible that there is no a     
priori impossibility in the assumption  
on which the ,atomic ,theory depends4   
,had it been the will of ,god to call   
into being the various vegetable and    
animal races in the way of gradual      
evolution out of these primary monads1  
no enlightened ,theist will presume to  
say that it was either impossible1 or   

inconsistent with ,his wisdom to do so4 
,it must be observed1 however1 that the 
natural analogies which have sometimes  
been appealed to in support of this     
hypothesis1 labor under a grievous      
defect when they are applied to account 
for the origin of the existing races1   
and that they are extended far beyond   
their legitimate limits when they are   
supposed to prove that these races might
 begin to be without any direct         
interposition of creative power4 ,for1  
while the oak may spring from an acorn1 
and the largest animal from a           
microscopic monad1 yet within the whole 
range of our experience both in the     
vegetable and animal kingdoms1 the seed 
is produced by the organism1 and        
necessarily presupposes it2 whence it   
follows1 either that there must have    
been an eternal succession of organisms 
producing seed1 and thereby perpetuating
 the race1 or if this be inconceivable1 
still more if it can be disproved by    
geological or historical evidence1 then 

that the analogy of our present         
experience leads us up1 not to an       
infusorial point or microscopic monad1  
but to a primary living organism as the 
commencement of each existing tribe4 ,in
 the words of ,dr4 ,barclay1 ,it will   
not be easy1 on any principles exclusive
 of the vital1 to answer these          
questions1 ,what was the origin of the  
first egg1 or what was the origin of the
 first bird8 ,for where is the egg that 
comes not from a bird1 and where is the 
bird that comes not from an egg8 ,to the
 mere materialists1 who exclude every   
species of vitality but that from       
organism1 this problem is nearly as     
embarrassing as the origin of the       
,universe itself4#ch  ,if these views be
 correct1 all the natural analogies     
would lead us to acquiesce1 as ,dr4     
,barclay did1 in the ,mosaic narrative  
as the most philosophical account of the
 commencement of the present order of   
things4 ,it traces up every race to a   
primary organism1 endowed with          

reproductive powers2 for it tells us1 in
 regard to the ,,flora1 that ,god said1 
,let the earth bring forth grass1 the   
herb yielding seed1 and the fruit-tree  
yielding fruit after his kind1 whose    
seed is in itself1 upon the earth2 and  
it was so4 ,and it tells us1 with regard
 to the ,,fauna1 that ,god said1 ,let   
the waters bring forth abundantly the   
moving creature that hath life1 and fowl
 that may fly above the earth in the    
open firmament of heaven4 ,and ,god     
created great whales1 and every living  
creature that moveth1 which the waters  
brought forth abundantly1 after their   
kind1 and every winged fowl after his   
kind4 ,and ,god blessed them1 saying1   
,be fruitful1 and multiply1 and fill the
 waters in the seas1 and let fowl       
multiply in the earth4  ,here the       
distinction between different genera and
 species1 and the provision that was    
made for the perpetuation of different  
races1 are prominently presented2 while 
the production1 in the first instance1  

not of an infusorial point or           
microscopic monad1 but of a living      
organism capable of multiplying its     
kind1 is expressly declared2 and every  
race is traced up to that primary       
organism1 in perfect consistency with   
the only law1 whether of vegetable or   
animal reproduction1 which is known to  
be in operation at the present day4 ,and
 this law of reproduction1 so far from  
being exclusive of a primary act of     
,creation1 seems to presuppose and      
require it2 for there must be a living  
organism before there can be vital      
transmission4 ,but the theory of        
,physiological ,development proceeds on 
a totally different supposition1--a     
supposition for the truth of which we   
have not only no historical evidence1   
but not even the slightest analogical   
presumption1 since we have no instance  
of development anywhere except from a   
germ or seed1 produced by an organism   
prexisting in a state of maturity4  ,but
 the exigencies of that theory demand a 

wide departure from all the familiar    
lessons of experience2 and hence        
recourse has been had to a series of the
 wildest and most extravagant           
conjectures1 such as may well justify   
the opinion of those who have held that 
the creed of certain philosophers makes 
a much larger demand on human credulity 
than that of almost any section of the  
,christian ,church4 ,for1 according to  
that theory1 the origin of the ,,flora  
is first accounted for by the action of 
some element--probably electricity--on a
 certain mucus1 which is supposed to be 
generated at those points where the     
ocean comes into contact with the earth 
and air2 that is1 on the shore of the   
sea at low water mark4 ,,maillet had    
broached the idea of the marine origin  
of all our present herbs1 plants1 roots1
 and grains1#ci at a period when the    
,universal ,ocean1 of which ,leibnitz   
said so much1 was still the creed of    
some speculative minds2 but it has been 
more recently revived1 and exhibited in 

greater detail1 though not with stronger
 evidence1 by some writers of our own   
age4 ,thus ,dr4 ,oken tells us that all 
life is from the sea2 that when the sea 
organism1 by self-elevation1 succeeds in
 attaining into form1 there issues forth
 from it a higher organism2 and that the
 first organic forms1 whether plants or 
animals1 emerged from the shallow parts 
of the sea4 ,and so the author of ,the  
,vestiges attempts to show that new     
races1 both of plants and animals1      
marine and terrestrial1 may be accounted
 for1 without any act of immediate      
creation1 by a change or transmutation  
of species resulting from the agency of 
natural causes4 ,there is1 as he tells  
us1 another set of phenomena presented  
in the course of our history2 the coming
 into existence1 namely1 of a long suite
 of living things1 vegetable and animal1
 terminating in the families which we   
still see occupying the surface4 ,the   
question arises1--,in what manner has   
this set of phenomena originated8 ,can  

we touch at1 and rest for a moment on1  
the possibility of plants and animals   
having likewise been produced in the way
 of ,natural ,law1 thus assigning but   
one class of causes for everything      
revealed to our sensual observation8 ,or
 are we at once to reject this idea1 and
 remain content either to suppose that  
creative power here acted in a different
 way1 or to believe1 unexaminingly1 that
 the inquiry is one beyond our          
powers8#dj ,in reply to these questions1
 he proceeds to show that there is a    
balance of probability from actual      
evidence in favor of an organic creation
 by law1 and that in tracing the actual 
history of organic beings upon the      
earth1 as revealed by ,geology1 we find 
that these came not at once1 as they    
might have been expected to do if       
produced by some special act1 or even   
some special interposition of will1 on  
the part of the ,deity2 they came in a  
long-continued succession1 in the order1
 as we shall afterwards see more        

convincingly1 of progressive            
organization1 grade following grade1    
till1 from an humble starting-point in  
both kingdoms1 the highest forms were   
realized4 ,such is his general          
principle2 and1 without entering into   
the details1 we may sum up his general  
argument by saying1 in the words of     
another1#da that1 according to his      
theory1 dulse and hen-ware became1      
through a very wonderful metamorphosis1 
cabbage and spinach2 that kelp-weed and 
tangle bourgeoned into oaks and willows2
 and that slack1 rope-weed1 and         
green-raw1 shot up into mangel-wurzel1  
rye-grass1 and clover4 ,so much for the 
,,flora2 and now for the ,fauna1 and the
 transition from the one to the other4  
,his views are thus exhibited by ,sir   
,david ,brewster3 ,the electric spark1  
escaping from the wild elements around  
it1 struck life into an elementary and  
reproductive germ1 and sea-plants1 the  
food of animals1 first decked the rude  
pavement of the ocean4 ,the lichen and  

the moss reared their tiny fronds on the
 first rocks that emerged from the deep2
 land-plants1 evolving the various forms
 of fruit and flower1 next arose1--the  
,upas and the bread-fruit tree1 the     
gnarled oak and the lofty cedar4 ,animal
 life appeared when the granary of      
nature was ready with its supplies4 ,a  
globule1 having a new globule forming   
within itself1 which is the fundamental 
form of organic being1 may be produced  
in albumen by electricity2 and as such  
globules may be identical with living   
and reproductive cells1 we have the     
earliest germ of organic life1 the first
 cause of all the species of animated   
nature which people the earth1 the      
ocean1 and the air4 ,born of electricity
 and albumen1 the simple monad is the   
first living atom2 the microscopic      
animalcules1 the snail1 the worm1 the   
reptile1 the fish1 the bird1 and the    
quadruped1 all spring from its invisible
 loins4 ,the human similitude at last   
appears in the character of the monkey2 

the monkey rises into the baboon1 the   
baboon is exalted to the ourang-outang1 
and the chimpanzee1 with a more human   
toe and shorter arms1 gives birth to    
man4#db  ,the remarks which were        
offered1 in the previous section1 on    
,cosmical ,development1 are equally     
applicable1 mutatis mutandis1 to this   
other form of the doctrine of ,creation 
by ,natural ,law4 ,it might be shown1   
with reference to the supposed          
generation of plants and animals1 just  
as it was then shown with reference to  
the generation of planets and astral    
systems1 first1 that the theory rests   
upon a mere hypothesis1 which is utterly
 unsupported by experimental evidence2  
secondly1 that the progress of science  
has hitherto afforded no ground to      
believe that the transmutation of       
species is provided for under the       
established constitution of nature2 and1
 thirdly1 that even were the theory     
admitted1 it would not destroy the      
evidence of ,theism1 any more than the  

propagation of plants and animals under 
the existing system1 which1 so far from 
excluding or impairing1 serves rather to
 enhance and illustrate the proof of    
creative wisdom and power4 ,in support  
of this last position1 we might adduce  
the testimony of the author of ,the     
,vestiges himself2 for1 referring to the
 idea that to presume a creation of     
living beings by the intervention of law
 is equivalent to superseding the whole 
doctrine of the ,divine authorship of   
organic nature1 he takes occasion to    
say1 ,were this true1 it would form a   
most important objection to the ,law    
theory2 but ,i think it is not only not 
true1 but the reverse of the truth4 ,as 
formerly stated1 the whole idea of law  
relates only to the mode in which the   
,deity is pleased to manifest ,his power
 in the natural world4 ,it leaves the   
absolute fact of ,his authorship of and 
supremacy over ,nature precisely where  
it was4 ,he adds1 in the words of ,dr4  
,buckland1 ,such an aboriginal          

constitution1 so far from superseding an
 ,intelligent ,agent1 would only exalt  
our conceptions of the consummate skill 
and power that could comprehend such an 
infinity of future uses under future    
systems1 in the original groundwork of  
,his ,creation4#dc  ,but1 without       
enlarging on those general              
considerations which were formerly      
stated1 and which admit of an easy and  
obvious application to this second form 
of the theory1 we shall offer a few     
remarks bearing directly on its         
distinctive peculiarities1 and directed 
to the exposure of its radical defects4 
,the theory rests on two very precarious
 foundations3 the assumption of         
spontaneous generation1 on the one hand1
 and the assumption of a transmutation  
of species on the other4 ,each of these 
assumptions is necessarily involved in  
any attempt to account for the origin of
 the vegetable and animal races by      
natural law1 without direct ,divine     
interposition4 ,for if1 after the first 

organism was brought into being1 the    
production of every subsequent type may 
be accounted for simply by a            
transmutation of species1 yet the       
production of the original organism     
itself1 or the first commencement of    
life in any form1 must necessarily be   
ascribed either to a creative act or to 
spontaneous generation4 ,a new product  
is supposed to have come into being1    
differing from any that ever existed    
before it1 in the possession of vital   
and reproductive powers2 and this       
product can only be ascribed1 if        
,creation be denied1 to the spontaneous 
action of some element1 such as         
,electricity1 on mucus or albumen4 ,in  
this sense the doctrine of spontaneous  
generation seems to be necessarily      
involved in the first step of the       
process of ,development1 and is1 indeed1
 indispensable1 if any account is to be 
given of the origin of vegetable and    
animal life2 but in the subsequent steps
 of the same process it is superseded by

 a supposed transmutation of species1   
whereby a lower form of life is said to 
rise into a higher1 and an inferior     
passes into a more perfect organism4    
,but we have no experience either of    
spontaneous generation on the one hand1 
or of a transmutation of species on the 
other4 ,observation has not discovered1 
nor has history recorded1 an authentic  
example of either4 ,in regard to the    
first1 the author of ,the ,vestiges     
anticipates this objection1 and attempts
 to answer it4 ,the objection is1 that a
 transition from the inorganic to the   
organic1 such as we must suppose to have
 taken place in the early geological    
ages1 is no ordinary cognizable fact of 
the present time upon earth2 structure1 
form1 life1 are never seen to be        
imparted to the insensate elements2 the 
production of the humblest plant or     
animalcule1 otherwise than as a         
repetition of some parental form1 is not
 one of the possibilities of science4#dd
 ,such is the objection2 and how does he

 attempt to answer it8 ,he endeavors to 
show1 first1 that the work of creation  
having been for the most part           
accomplished thousands of years ago1 we 
have no reason to expect that the       
origination of life and species should  
be conspicuously exemplified in the     
present day2 secondly1 that the         
comparative infrequency1 or even the    
entire absence1 of such phenomena now   
would be no valid reason for believing  
that they have never been exhibited     
heretofore1 if1 on other grounds1 the   
doctrine of 'natural creation' or       
'life-creating laws' can be rendered    
probable2 and1 thirdly1 that even in our
 own times there ,,are facts which seem 
to indicate the reality1 or at least the
 possibility1 of the primitive imparting
 of life and form to inorganic          
elements4#de  ,now1 to this elaborate   
argument in favor of spontaneous        
generation1 or the production of life by
 natural law1 we answer1 in the first   
place1 that the mere fact of its being  

adduced in connection with the ,theory  
of ,development affords a conclusive    
proof that it is indispensable to the   
maintenance of that theory1 that the    
hypothesis would be incomplete without  
it1 and that no account can be given of 
creation by the mere doctrine of a      
transmutation of species4 ,it is the    
more necessary to make this remark1     
because not a few who embrace the latter
 doctrine affect to disown the former1  
and seek to keep it out of view4 ,but   
the one is as necessary as the other to 
a complete theory of ,natural           
,development4 ,the author of ,the       
,vestiges felt this1 and virtually      
acknowledges it when he undertakes the  
task of vindicating the credibility of  
spontaneous generation4 ,but we answer1 
in the second place1 that the method in 
which he performs his self-imposed task 
is singularly curious1 and not a little 
instructive4 ,he had1 it must be owned1 
a difficult game to play4 ,the general  
theory of ,the ,vestiges is founded on  

the fact that1 in the ordinary course of
 ,nature1 the races of plants and       
animals are perpetuated by propagation1 
according to established ,natural       
,laws1--a fact which might seem to      
afford a strong analogical argument in  
favor of the supposition that the same  
order of ,nature is maintained also in  
the few apparently exceptional cases in 
which1 from our defective knowledge1 we 
are unable to trace the connection      
between the parent and the product4 ,and
 yet the author evinces no little       
anxiety to make out a case in favor of a
 non-generative origin of life even at  
the present day2 and he appeals to a    
class of facts1 confessedly obscure1    
which have not been1 as he thinks1      
satisfactorily accounted for by the law 
which usually regulates the production  
of organic beings4 ,he refers us to the 
speculations of ,dr4 ,allen ,thomson on 
the primitive production of             
,infusoria1#df to the facts which modern
 science1 aided by the microscope1 has  

discovered respecting the ,entozoa1 or  
the creatures which live within the     
bodies of others1 and1 above all1 to the
 experiments of ,mr4 ,crosse and ,mr4   
,weekes1 which seemed to result in the  
production of a small species of insect 
7,acarus ,crossii7 from the action of a 
voltaic battery on a saturated solution 
of the silicate of potash1 or the       
nitrate of copper1 or the ferrocyanate  
of potassium4 ,the reason of his anxiety
 to avail himself of these cases is     
evident4 ,the exigencies of his theory  
demanded a method of accounting for the 
primary origin of life different from   
any that can be found in the common     
process of propagation4 ,he saw clearly 
enough that his main argument1 founded1 
as it was1 on the law of hereditary     
transmission1 could not account for the 
production of the first organism2 and   
that1 if he would avoid either the      
doctrine of ,immediate ,creation1 which 
is so offensive to him1 or the idea of  
,eternal ,generation1 which is utterly  

excluded by the clearest lessons of     
,fossil ,geology1 he must have recourse 
to the hypothesis of ,spontaneous       
,generation4 ,hence he attempts to      
account for the commencement of new     
species both of plants and animals1 in  
the course of the world's history1 by a 
transmutation of species2 while1 for the
 origin of the first species1 he has    
recourse to the same law of             
,development1 but acting in widely      
different circumstances1 and giving rise
 to what he calls aboriginal generation1
 whereby the inorganic passes into the  
organic1 and life1 form1 and structure1 
are imparted to hitherto inert materials
 by the action of ,electricity on mucus 
or albumen4 ,to accomplish this twofold 
purpose1 he felt it necessary to insist1
 in the first instance1 on the ordinary 
law of generation as the established    
order of mediate creation2 while he     
found it equally necessary1 in the      
second place1 to insist on those        
apparently exceptional cases in which   

the connection between the germ and the 
product has hitherto eluded             
philosophical research1--and this for   
the purpose of showing that the original
 production of plants and animals was   
not similar to the ordinary method of   
their propagation in any other respect  
than this1 that in both cases the result
 is brought about by ,natural ,laws1    
without the direct interposition of any 
supernatural cause4  ,now1 in so far as 
his argument is founded on the principle
 of analogy1--and it is on this         
principle that it proceeds              
throughout1--we submit that it is       
radically vicious1 and utterly          
inconclusive4 ,for the vast majority of 
cases in which the commencement of life 
and organization falls under our notice 
being confessedly those1 not of primary 
production1 but of mediate reproduction1
 it is reasonable to believe that the   
same law governs all cases alike1       
whether we have been able or not to     
trace the origin of life to the         

principle of propagation1 the few       
apparent exceptions being sufficiently  
accounted for by our imperfect knowledge
 of the causes and conditions on which  
they depend4 ,besides1 the argument from
 analogy in favor of a primary          
production of life by natural causes1 in
 so far as it is founded on the present 
law of hereditary transmission1 is      
radically defective1 since the two cases
 are widely different2 the one          
presupposing a primary organism of the  
same kind1 from which others are evolved
 by a law of natural succession1 the    
other exhibiting life as a new product1 
resulting not from any prior organism1  
but from the action of causes of a      
totally different kind1 which are not   
known to be capable of giving birth     
either to vegetable or animal organisms 
under the actual constitution of        
,nature4  ,but suppose1 even1 that the  
,acarus ,crossii were admitted to be a  
real product of ,galvanic action on the 
silicate of potash1 and an undeniable   

instance of a non-generative origin of  
life1 how would the illustrative example
 accord with the author's general       
theory8 ,it might afford a specimen of  
aboriginal production2 but how would it 
fit in with his favorite doctrine of a  
gradual and progressive advancement from
 the lower to the higher forms of       
organization8 ,the ,acarus1 at first    
supposed to be a new and hitherto       
unknown creature1 is now acknowledged to
 be one of a very familiar species1--a  
species which may have deposited its    
ova1 and propagated its kind1 since the 
commencement of the present order of    
things1 and whose eggs might very well  
resist the action even of nitrate of    
copper1 since the creature itself could 
live in that poisonous mixture4         
,moreover1 it belongs1 in point of      
organization1 to one of the highest     
orders of organisms2 not to the radiata1
 not to the mollusca1 but to the highest
 type of the articulata1 the nearest to 
the vertebrata4 ,had it been a monad1--a

 mere living cell1--which ,galvanism    
evolved from the solution1 and had this 
primary product developed itself        
afterwards in various forms1 according  
to the ascending scale of a             
progressively improving organization1 it
 might have accorded admirably with the 
twofold doctrine of spontaneous         
generation and transmutation of species2
 but1 unfortunately1 the first process  
is so perfect1 in the present instance1 
as to leave little room for the second1 
and we are almost tempted to hope that  
perhaps the clumsy and troublesome      
expedient of a transmutation of species 
may yet be superseded by the discovery  
of some method1--we know not            
what1--whereby not only the articulata1 
but the vertebrata1 and even ,man       
himself1 may be immediately produced by 
some new combination of ,nature's       
elemental laws6#dg  ,we have given      
prominence1 in the first instance1 to   
the doctrine of spontaneous or          
aboriginal production1 because it       

constitutes an indispensable part of the
 ,theory of ,development1 and because we
 believe that1 were this clearly        
understood1 that theory would soon sink 
into general discredit or total         
oblivion1 like the kindred speculations 
of ,anaximander and ,anaxagoras1 of the 
old ,ionic ,school4 ,the experiments of 
,ehrenberg1 instituted with the view of 
testing the doctrine of spontaneous     
generation1 may be said to have decided 
the whole question4 ,they did not       
succeed1 indeed1 in explaining every    
apparently exceptional case1 for some of
 the facts are still obscure1 and will  
probably continue to be so1             
notwithstanding every extension of      
microscopic power1 just as1 in the      
analogous case of the ,nebul1 the       
increase of telescopic power has enabled
 us to resolve not a few of them into   
clusters of stars1 while it has served  
to bring others yet unresolved within   
the range of our vision4 ,but they were 
sufficient1 at least1 to show that1 as  

far as our clear knowledge extends1 the 
one uniform law1 ,omne vivum ex ovo1    
universally prevails1 and that the whole
 analogy of ,nature1 in so far as its   
constitution has been ascertained1 is   
adverse to the doctrine of spontaneous  
generation4 ,ehrenberg detected the     
minute germs of vegetable mould1 and the
 ova of some of the smallest            
animalcules2 and when it is considered  
that these germs and ova are so         
tenacious of vitality that certain      
prolific seeds have come down to us from
 the age of the ,pharaohs in the        
wrappings of the ,egyptian              
mummies1--that they are widely diffused 
in the air and the waters1 insomuch that
 no sooner does a coral reef appear     
above the level of the sea than it is   
forthwith covered with herbage by means 
of seeds wafted by the winds or         
deposited by the waves1--and that it is 
almost impossible to exclude them by any
 artificial expedient1 since they are   
capable of resisting the action of      

boiling water and even of alcohol       
itself1--it cannot1 we think1 be denied 
that the few cases which still remain   
obscure or unexplained may be1 at least1
 probably accounted for in accordance   
with the same natural law which is found
 to be invariably established in every  
department to which our clear knowledge 
extends4  ,in regard1 again1 to the     
supposed transmutation of species1 we   
are equally warranted in affirming that 
it is destitute of all experimental     
evidence1 and unsupported even by any   
natural analogy4 ,as the doctrine of    
spontaneous generation stands opposed to
 the maxim that organic life can be     
produced only by organic life1 so the   
doctrine of a transmutation of species  
stands opposed to the equally certain   
maxim that like produces like1 both in  
the vegetable and animal kingdoms4      
,cuvier has demonstrated1 with reference
 to the birds and reptiles preserved in 
,egypt1 an entire fixity and uniformity 
of species1 in every1 even the least1   

particular1 for at least three thousand 
years4#dh ,in the actual course of      
,nature we see no tendency to change2   
nay1 a barrier seems to have been       
erected in the constitution of ,nature  
itself to prevent the possible confusion
 of races by promiscuous intercourse1   
through that provision which renders the
 mule incapable of reproduction4 ,no    
plant has ever been found in a state of 
transition from a lower to a higher     
form2 no instance has ever been produced
 of one of the alg being transmuted into
 the lowest form of terrestrial         
vegetation2 nor of a small gelatinous   
body developing itself into a fish1 a   
bird1 or a beast2 nor of an             
ourang-outang rising into a man4#di ,it 
is true1 indeed1 that there is a        
capacity in all species to accommodate  
themselves1 to a certain extent1 to a   
change of external circumstances1 this  
extent varying greatly according to the 
species4 ,there may thus arise changes  
of appearance or structure1 and some of 

these changes are transmissible to the  
offspring2 but the mutations thus       
superinduced are governed by constant   
laws and confined within certain limits4
 ,indefinite divergence from the        
original type is not possible1 and the  
extreme limit of possible variation may 
usually be reached in a short period of 
time2 in short1 species have a real     
existence in ,nature1 and a             
transformation from one to another does 
not exist4#ej  ,the whole science of    
,natural ,history is based on the       
existence of distinct species1 capable  
of being discriminated from each other  
by certain characteristic marks2 and the
 whole art of the agriculturist and the 
stockbreeder proceeds on the assumption 
of a law1 invariable in its operation1  
whereby like produces like in the       
vegetable and animal worlds4 ,the       
instances to which the author of ,the   
,vestiges refers in support of his      
theory are utterly frivolous when       
opposed to the copious inductions to    

which they are opposed2 and they may all
 be explained consistently with the law 
of variation within definite limits1 as 
stated by ,dr4 ,whewell1 or by our      
ignorance of all the conditions involved
 in each particular case4 ,nor is his   
argument founded on the limited range of
 our observation1 even with its singular
 illustration derived from ,mr4         
,babbage's calculating engine1 fitted to
 diminish1 in the slightest degree1 our 
confidence in the general results of    
these inductions2 for1 not to mention   
that it amounts to nothing more than an 
appeal from what we do know to what we  
do not know1 from knowledge to          
ignorance1 from the certainties of      
science to the mere possibilities of    
conjecture1 it has been well shown by   
,mr4 ,miller1 that our range of         
observation is not so limited as the    
author of ,the ,vestiges would have us  
to believe1 since extent of space is1 in
 a matter of this kind1 equivalent to   
duration of time4 ,for1 although no man 

has lived five hundred years1 so as to  
observe the gradual development of the  
oak from the acorn in its various stages
 of progress1 yet every man who can     
survey five hundred yards of an ,english
 forest1 can see the oak in every stage 
of its growth1 and need have no doubt as
 to the law of its progressive          
development4 ,and so1 had there really  
been such a transmutation of species as 
is contended for1 we might expect to    
find1 somewhere on the vastly extended  
sea coasts of our islands and           
continents1 some specimens of plants or 
animals in a state of transition from   
the lower to the higher forms4  ,we are 
told1 indeed1 in answer to this         
argument1 that ,mr4 ,babbage's engine   
produces numbers according to a certain 
law up to a particular point1 and then1 
most unexpectedly1 perhaps even         
unaccountably1 the law of the series is 
changed1 and the next term exhibits a   
striking departure from the order       
previously followed2 and so1 it is      

argued1 it may be in nature4 ,each      
organism may propagate after its kind   
for immense periods1 so as to give the  
impression of this being an invariable  
law2 but at a certain stage the order   
may change1 and the next term in the    
series may differ from all that went    
before it4 ,the argument--if it can be  
called an argument--amounts to this3    
,mr4 ,babbage's machine produces a      
series of numbers1 and of numbers only1 
but according to different laws of      
succession2 ergo1 ,nature may produce in
 the same way1 and with similar         
variations1 different races of plants   
and animals4 ,the argument would have   
been perfect if the engine had produced 
something else than numbers2 if1 as     
,professor ,dod supposes1 while watching
 ,mr4 ,babbage's machine1 presenting to 
us successive numbers by the revolution 
of its plates1 we should suddenly see   
one of those plates resolving itself    
into types1 and these types arranging   
themselves in the order of a page of    

',paradise ,lost1' or even of ',the     
,vestiges of ,creation2'--in such a     
case1 there might have been something in
 the argument2 but even then1 the       
withering question remains1 ,is there   
any man in his senses who would not     
immediately conclude that some new cause
 was now at work8  ,in short1 in so far 
as the facts of the case are concerned1 
there is not only no known instance     
either of spontaneous generation or of  
transmutation of species1 but there is  
not even any natural analogy that can   
give the theory the slightest aspect of 
verisimilitude4 ,the author of ,the     
,vestiges thinks that a presumption in  
its favor may be derived from the       
analogy of the inorganic world1--in     
other words1 from the supposed          
conversion of nebul into planets and    
astral systems by the operation of      
natural causes2 but this analogy has    
been conclusively set aside by          
disproving the hypothesis on which it   
depends4 ,he further thinks that a      

favorable presumption may be derived    
from the analogy of the organic         
world1--in other words1 from the process
 of propagation by which the races of   
plants and animals are perpetuated2 but 
the presumption thence derived1 so far  
from being favorable1 is directly       
opposed to his theory1 since all the    
facts which come under our cognizance in
 every department of ,nature serve only 
to establish the two great maxims of    
,natural ,history1--that organic life   
can spring only from organic life1 and  
that like produces like1 both in the    
vegetable and animal world4  ,if we have
 succeeded in disposing of the facts of 
the case1 we shall have little          
difficulty in exposing the fallacy of   
the principles which are involved in the
 author's speculations on this subject4 
,it is of fundamental importance1 in    
this inquiry1 to form a clear and       
correct conception of the precise point 
at issue1 and of the two alternatives   
between which we are called to make our 

choice4 ,it has been well said that the 
great antagonist points in the array of 
the opposite lines are simply the ,,law 
of ,development versus the ,,miracle of 
,creation4#ea ,and the author of ,the   
,vestiges virtually acknowledges this to
 be the real state of the question1 when
 he says that if we can see no natural  
origin for species1 a miraculous one    
must be admitted4#eb ,now1 the grand    
alternative being ,creation by ,miracle 
or ,creation by ,law1 that is1 ,creation
 by a ,natural or by a ,supernatural    
cause1 we affirm that it is utterly     
presumptuous and unphilosophical to     
represent the one as less worthy of     
,god1 or more derogatory to ,his        
infinite perfections1 than the other4   
,yet the author does not hesitate to say
 that the natural ought to be preferred 
to the miraculous method of accounting  
for the origin both of planets and of   
their inhabitants1 for this among other 
reasons1 that the latter would be       
derogatory to the wisdom and power of   

the ,most ,high4 ,his words are         
remarkable3 ,the ,eternal ,sovereign    
arranges a solar or an astral system by 
dispositions imparted primordially to   
matter2 ,he causes1 by the same majestic
 means1 vast oceans to form and         
continents to rise1 and all the grand   
meteoric agencies to proceed in         
ceaseless alternation1 so as to fit the 
earth for a residence of organic beings4
 ,but when1 in the course of these      
operations1 fuci and corals are to be   
for the first time placed in those      
oceans1 a particular interference of the
 ,divine power is required2 and this    
special attention is needed whenever a  
new family of organisms is to be        
introduced1--a new fiat for fishes1     
another for reptiles1 a third for birds2
 nay1 taking up the present views of    
,geologists as to species1 such an event
 as the commencement of a certain       
cephalopod1 one with a few new          
nodulosites and corrugations upon its   
shell1 would1 on this theory1 require   

the particular care of that same        
,almighty who willed at once the whole  
means by which infinity was replenished 
with its worlds8 444 ,is it conceivable1
 as a fitting mode of exercise for      
,creative ,intelligence1 that it should 
be constantly paying a special attention
 to the creation of species1 as they may
 be required in each situation          
throughout those worlds at particular   
times8 ,is such an idea accordant with  
our general conception of the dignity1  
not to speak of the power1 of the ,great
 ,author8 444 ,it would be distressing  
to be compelled to picture the power of 
,god as put forth in any other manner   
than in those slow1 mysterious1         
universal laws which have so plainly an 
eternity to work in4#ec  ,such is the   
author's presumptuous decision on a     
matter which is far too high for him4   
,we offer the following remarks upon it3
  ,first of all1 let it be observed     
that1 unless on the principle of        
absolute ,atheism1 which he professes to

 repudiate1 he cannot but acknowledge   
that once1 at least1 the power of ,god  
must have been put forth in another     
manner than in those slow1 mysterious1  
universal laws of which he speaks2 and  
that1 even if he could succeed in       
disproving repeated interferences of    
creative power1 he could in nowise      
dispense with a primitive act of direct1
 immediate1 supernatural creation1 since
 he does not profess to believe in the  
eternal existence of matter and its     
laws4 ,we find1 indeed1 that even in the
 subsequent acts of a continuous1 but   
mediate creation1 he is compelled to    
acknowledge a supernatural power as     
acting1 in each individual case1        
according to established natural laws2  
for he says expressly1 ,there cannot be 
an inherent intelligence in these laws2 
the intelligence appears external to the
 laws1 something of which the laws are  
but as the expression of the will and   
power4 ,if this be admitted1 the laws   
cannot be regarded as primary or        

independent causes of the phenomena of  
the physical world4 ,we come1 in short1 
to a being beyond ,nature1--its ,author1
 its ,god4 444 ,when we speak of        
,natural ,law1 we only speak of the mode
 in which the ,divine power is          
exercised2 it is but another phrase for 
the action of the ever-present and      
sustaining ,god4#ed ,it is admitted1    
then1 first1 that there must have been a
 primary act of creation1 in the highest
 and strictest sense1 by a direct and   
immediate interposition of ,divine      
power1 at the commencement of created   
existence2 and1 secondly1 that1 even in 
the continuous work of creation1 which  
is supposed to have been subsequently   
carried on after the method of          
development by established natural laws1
 ,divine agency is still equally real1  
although it is differently manifested1  
and is indispensably necessary to       
account for the resulting products4     
,now1 can it be reasonably asserted that
 the direct and immediate creation of   

such a being as ,man would be more      
derogatory to the wisdom and power of   
,god than the primordial production of a
 universal ,fire-,mist1 or even of      
electricity and albumen8 or1 will it be 
pretended that immediate creation of    
molluscs as molluscs1 of fishes as      
fishes1 of reptiles as reptiles1 would  
be less worthy of the great ,author of  
,nature than the establishment of a     
system which must in due time give them 
birth1 and that1 too1 not without the   
concurrence and coperation of the       
,divine will2 for natural law is but    
another phrase for the action of the    
ever-present and sustaining ,god8  ,but1
 while we hold that there is no good    
ground for an affirmative answer to     
these questions1 we would carefully     
guard against rushing to the opposite   
extreme1 and affirming1 either that the 
production of new races by the method of
 natural law was1 on a priori grounds1  
impossible1 or that ,god might not have 
adopted that method1 had ,he so pleased1

 in perfect consistency with the        
manifestation of ,his wisdom and power4 
,we see that ,he has done so1 under the 
actual constitution of ,nature1 so far  
as the production of individuals is     
concerned2 we see not why a similar     
provision might not have been made for  
the production of genera and species4   
,in either way ,his power and ,his      
wisdom might have been displayed4 ,but1 
when we are told that the one is        
derogatory to the ,divine ,majesty1 and 
the other alone consistent with the     
loftiest views of ,his perfections1 we  
denounce the whole speculation as one   
that is alike presumptuous and          
unphilosophical1 on the simple but      
conclusive ground that we are in no     
degree competent judges of the best     
method either of creating or of         
governing the world4 ,had we been asked 
to say whether it was likely that1 under
 the rule of infinite wisdom and        
almighty power1 certain insects1        
reptiles1 and fishes1 that are          

unattractive to the eye1 and loathsome  
to the fastidious taste of many1 could  
find a place at all among the works of  
,god1 we might have thought it          
improbable that they should be created2 
but they exist notwithstanding1 and the 
fact of their existence is enough to    
silence all our presumptive reasonings4 
,and surely it is not less--it is much  
more--presumptuous to affirm that1      
existing as they do1 they could not have
 been brought into being1 without       
disparagement to ,divine wisdom1        
otherwise than by the action of         
established laws1 or by a process of    
natural development2 as if it were      
unworthy of ,god to produce that for    
whose production ,he confessedly did    
make provision4  ,but1 further1 we see  
here very strikingly exemplified the    
tendency of such speculations to exclude
 ,god from all real1 active1 and direct 
connection with ,his works4 ,the        
dominion of ,natural ,law1 which1 as we 
shall afterwards see1 is held by ,m4    

,comte and ,mr4 ,combe to exclude the   
doctrine of a special ,providence and   
the efficacy of prayer1 is here         
extended1 by the author of ,the         
,vestiges1 so as to be exclusive also of
 any direct ,divine interposition in the
 work of ,creation itself1 other than   
what may have been implied in the       
aboriginal production of matter and its 
laws1 or in the subsequent concurrence  
of ,his will with the action of these   
laws in the established order of        
,nature4  ,we have said that the ,theory
 of ,development1 as expounded in ,the  
,vestiges1 is not necessarily atheistic1
 partly because the author professedly  
disclaims ,atheism1 and partly also     
because1 in strict logic1 it might still
 be possible1 even on the basis of that 
theory1 considered simply in itself and 
apart from the speculations with which  
it has been associated1 to construct1   
from the actual phenomena of ,nature1 a 
valid proof for the being and attributes
 of ,god4 ,and yet we have thought it   

necessary to advert to it as one of the 
recent speculations of science1 because1
 whatever may be its professed aim1 its 
practical tendency is unquestionably    
hostile to the influence of religious   
truth4 ,it will be found1 in the great  
majority of cases1 and especially in the
 case of ardent youthful minds1 that    
this theory1 when it is embraced as an  
article of their philosophic creed1 is1 
to all practical purposes1 tantamount to
 ,atheism4 ,for not to insist on the    
consideration1 so forcibly stated by    
others1#ee that the natural argument for
 the ,immortality of ,man1 or for the   
doctrine of a ,future ,life1 as implying
 distinct individuality and continued   
self-consciousness1 must be materially  
weakened1 if not entirely neutralized1  
by a theory of development which traces 
the human lineage up through the monkeys
 and fishes to albumen impregnated by   
electricity1 or1 further still1 to a    
diffused ,nebula or universal           
,fire-,mist1--we think that the         

,sensational and ,materialistic         
speculations with which the work abounds
 have a tendency to weaken the evidence 
for a living1 personal1 spiritual ,god1 
as the ,creator and ,moral ,governor of 
the world1 and to diminish that         
reverence1 confidence1 and love1 which  
these aspects of ,his character alone   
can inspire4 ,the system of ,epicurus1  
although it contained a formal          
recognition of a ,first ,cause1 has     
always been held to be practically      
atheistic1 simply because it removed    
,god from the active superintendence of 
the affairs of the world1 and excluded  
the doctrine of a special providence and
 of a moral government4 ,it was held1 in
 the words of ,cicero1 ,epicurum verbis 
reliquisse ,deos1--re sustulisse4#ef    
,and so1 in ,the ,vestiges1 ,natural    
,law is substituted for ,supernatural   
,interposition1 not only in the common  
course of ,providence1 but in the       
stupendous work of ,creation itself4    
,,section ,,iii4  ,,theory ,,of ,,social

 ,,or ,,historical                      
,,development4--,,auguste ,,comte4  ,it 
might have been thought that the        
principle of ,development had exhausted 
its powers1 and achieved its highest    
triumphs1 when it had been applied      
successively to account1 first1 for the 
creation of planets and astral systems1 
and1 secondly1 for the production of    
vegetable and animal life2 and that     
little could remain for it to do after  
it had succeeded in tracing the         
genealogy of ,,man back1 in a direct    
line through many generations1 to the   
nebulous matter or luminous ,fire-,mist 
which was diffused at the beginning of  
time throughout the ,universe4 ,but1 on 
a more careful study of its last and    
highest product1--,,man1 with his       
intellectual and moral nature1 his      
religious beliefs1 his social history1  
and his immortal hopes1--it seemed as if
 there were still some phenomena which  
remained to be accounted for1 some facts
 of palpable reality and great magnitude

 which had not yet been adequately      
explained4 ,the mental faculties and    
their operations1 the moral laws that   
are universally recognized and appealed 
to1 the social institutions which have  
been established1 the religious beliefs 
and feelings which have generally       
prevailed1 and the rites of worship     
which have been observed in all ages and
 climes1 were so widely different from  
the phenomena of mere vegetable or      
animal life1 that they seemed to demand 
a distinct account of their origin2 and 
it might not be apparent1 at first      
sight1 how they could be reduced under  
the same all-pervading law by which the 
planets were formed1 so as to exclude   
all idea of ,divine supernatural        
interposition4 ,this ,herculean task was
 fearlessly undertaken1 however1 by ,m4 
,,auguste ,,comte1 and it has been      
elaborated with singular ability in his 
ponderous work1 the ,cours de           
,philosophie ,positive4  ,m4 ,comte's   
,course of ,positive ,philosophy began  

to be delivered at ,paris in the winter 
of #ahbi-cj1 and was completed in its   
published form in #ahdb-dc4 ,it         
comprehends a general outline of all the
 branches of ,inductive ,science1 and of
 the relations which they bear to each  
other2 and they are expounded in a style
 singularly copious1 clear1 and         
forcible4 ,he has acquired1 in          
consequence1 a high reputation as a     
philosophical thinker1 and has already  
found1 in our own country1 some able    
allies1 and not a few enthusiastic      
admirers4 ,the ,system of ,logic1 by    
,john ,stuart ,mill1 and ,the           
,biographical ,history of ,philosophy1  
by ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes1 are avowedly indebted
 to his speculations for some of their  
most characteristic contents2 while the 
outline of his theory has been presented
 to the more popular class of readers in
 ,england through the columns of ,the   
,leader1 and in ,scotland through those 
of ,the ,glasgow ,mechanics' ,journal4  
,it is not my intention1 nor is it      

necessary for my present purpose1 to    
offer any remarks on the strictly       
scientific portion of his voluminous    
work4 ,i shall confine myself           
exclusively to those speculations which 
bear1 more or less directly1 on the     
great cause of ,natural and ,revealed   
,religion1 selecting them from all the  
various parts of his work1 and          
exhibiting them1 in one comprehensive   
view1 as a compact theory of absolute   
and avowed ,atheism4  ,the fundamental  
idea of his system is a supposed law of 
the development of human thought1 which 
regulates and determines the whole      
progress of the species in the          
acquisition of knowledge4 ,this law is  
announced with the air of a man who has 
made a great discovery1 and who is      
entitled1 in consequence1 to be regarded
 both as an original thinker1 and as a  
benefactor to the world4 ,i believe1 he 
says1 that ,i have discovered a grand   
fundamental law1--the fundamental law of
 the development of the human mind2 444 

the grand law which ,i have indicated in
 the first part of my system of         
,positive ,politics1 444 where ,i have  
divulged1 for the first time1 the       
discovery of this law4#eg ,now1 what1 it
 may be asked1 is this marvellous       
discovery1 which bids so fair both to   
immortalize its author and to enlighten 
the world8 ,it is stated briefly in the 
first1 and illustrated at greater length
 in the fourth and following volumes of 
his work4 ,the general outline of his   
theory is thus sketched3 ,that law      
consists in this1--that each one of our 
leading conceptions1 every branch of our
 knowledge1 passes successively through 
three different theoretic states3 the   
state theological or fictitious1 the    
state metaphysical or abstract1 and the 
state scientific or positive4 ,in other 
words1 the human mind1 by its nature1   
employs successively1 in each of its    
researches1 three methods of            
philosophizing1 whose character is      
essentially different1 and even         

radically opposed3 first1 the           
,theological method2 then1 the          
,metaphysical2 and1 last of all1 the    
,positive4 ,hence three systems of      
,philosophies1 which mutually exclude   
each other4 ,the first is the necessary 
starting-point of the human mind2 the   
third is its fixed1 ultimate state2 the 
second is purely provisional1 and       
destined merely to serve as an          
intermediate stage4#eh  ,these are the  
three great stages through which the    
collective mind of ,humanity must       
necessarily pass in its progressive     
advancement towards a perfect knowledge 
of truth2 but of these three1 the first1
 or the ,theological ,epoch1 is again   
subdivided1 and exhibited as commencing 
with ,fetishism1 then advancing to      
,polytheism1 and finally consummated in 
,monotheism4  ,,fetishism is supposed to
 have been the first form of the        
,theological ,philosophy2 and it is     
described as consisting in the          
ascription of a life and intelligence   

essentially analogous to our own to     
every existing object1 of whatever kind1
 whether organic or inorganic1 natural  
or artificial4 ,it is traced to a       
primitive tendency1 supposed to exist   
equally in man and in the lower animals1
 to conceive of all external objects as 
animated1 and to ascribe to them the    
same1 or similar1 powers and feelings   
with those which belong to the living   
tribes themselves4#ei ,let an infant1   
for example1 or a savage1 on the one    
hand1 and1 on the other hand1 a dog or a
 monkey1 behold a watch for the first   
time1 there will doubtless be no        
immediate profound difference1 unless in
 respect to the manner of representing  
it1 between the spontaneous conception  
which will represent to the one and the 
other that admirable product of human   
industry as a sort of veritable animal1 
having its own peculiar tastes and      
inclinations2 whence results1           
consequentially1 in this respect1 a     
,fetishism fundamentally common to both1

 the former only having the exclusive   
privilege of being able ultimately to   
get out of it4 ,this instinctive and    
spontaneous belief--the natural1 and1   
indeed1 the necessary result of a       
tendency inherent in living beings--is  
conceived to have been an indispensable 
and a most useful provision for the     
primeval state of man1 and to have      
exerted a highly salutary influence on  
the progressive development of human    
thought4 ,it is contrasted with the     
subsequent but more advanced stage of   
,polytheism2#fj and the latter is held  
to denote a spontaneous belief in       
supernatural beings1 distinct from and  
even independent of matter1 since it is 
passively subject to their will2 while  
the former considers matter itself as   
animated1 and has no idea of any higher 
or more spiritual form of being4 ,it is 
further supposed that idolatry1 properly
 so called1 belongs to ,fetishism only1 
and not at all to ,polytheism1 for this 
singular1 but not very conclusive       

reason1 among others1 that if           
,polytheism be justly chargeable with   
idolatry because it recognizes many     
wills superior to ,nature and having    
power over it1 ,catholicism would be    
equally liable to the same charge in    
respect of the homage which it renders  
to saints and angels6#fa  ,but          
,fetishism is only the initial step in  
the process of our intellectual         
development2 and it passes into         
,polytheism1 not suddenly and per       
salium1 but slowly and gradually1       
through the intermediate stage of       
,astrolatrie1 or the worship of the     
heavenly bodies4 ,the mind is           
imperceptibly divested of the idea that 
everything around it is animated1 and1  
by a process of real1 but as yet        
imperfect generalization1 it rises from 
,fetishism to ,polytheism2 in which     
latter system of belief an order of     
powers superior to ,nature is           
recognized1 while as yet there is no    
conception of a supreme and all-perfect 

,mind4 ,the ,polytheistic system1 which 
prevailed so universally in the ancient 
world1 and which still prevails among   
,heathen nations1 is supposed to have   
been1 not a declension from a purer and 
better state1 not a corruption either of
 natural or revealed religion1 but a    
step in advance of the primary faith of 
mankind1 a result of growing            
intelligence1 a vast and most beneficial
 change in the right direction4 ,it was 
the first great product of the          
metaphysical spirit1 the result of an   
early but imperfect generalization2 it  
constituted the principal era of the    
theological history of mankind2 it was  
admirably adapted1 and1 indeed1         
indispensably necessary1 to the         
exigencies of society at the time when  
it prevailed2 it was more intensely     
religious than ,monotheism itself1 since
 it brought man habitually into contact 
with a multitude of gods1 whose symbols 
were always present and visible to the  
eye1 while it exerted a wholesome       

influence on ,science1 on ,poetry1 on   
,industry1 on ,morals1 and1 indeed1 on  
the whole process of man's mental and   
social development4#fb  ,but            
,polytheism1 although indispensable and 
salutary as a provisional belief1 was   
not destined to be permanent2 it was to 
be superseded in due time1 at least in  
the case of the lite of humanity1 by the
 higher and still more abstract system  
of ,monotheism1 which is regarded as the
 natural and inevitable product of human
 intelligence1 independently of all     
supernatural teaching1 at a certain     
stage of its development4 ,but here1 as 
in the former instance1 the change is   
not effected suddenly2 the human mind   
advances gradually from ,polytheism to  
,monotheism1 through the intermediate   
stage of the idea of ,immutability or   
,destiny1--an idea suggested partly by  
the study of the invariable order of    
,nature1 and partly by the irresistible 
domination of one great temporal power1 
such as the iron empire of ,rome4#fc    

,historically1 indeed1 ,monotheism is   
said to have spread in ,europe through  
the ,jews1 who derived it from ,egypt2  
but it is added that1 had there been no 
,jews1 others would have given birth to 
a system so necessary for the           
development of human thought4 ,the      
prevalence of ,monotheism1 for a limited
 time1 was useful1 and even necessary1  
as the natural result of the great law  
of human progress1 and the indispensable
 precursor of a new and brighter era2   
but it was temporary and provisional    
merely1--a stage in the onward march of 
development1 not the ultimate           
landing-place of human thought4 ,it is  
conceived to be radically incompatible  
with the recognition of invariable      
natural laws1 and even with the exercise
 of the industrial arts4#fd ,it is1     
however1 the last and highest form of   
the ,theological ,philosophy2 and1      
having reached this stage1 the human    
mind necessarily advances beyond it1    
until it arrives at a point where all   

theology disappears1 and where it is    
entirely and forever emancipated from   
all the beliefs1 the hopes1 and the     
fears which have any reference to an    
invisible spiritual world4  ,the        
ultimate goal of speculative thought is 
the ,positive ,philosophy1 which treats 
only of the ,facts of ,nature1 and of   
their cordination under general laws1 to
 the utter exclusion of all supernatural
 powers1 and of all knowledge of causes1
 whether efficient or final4 ,but this  
goal cannot be reached1 it seems1 by a  
sudden or abrupt transition from the    
,theological to the ,atheistic creed4   
,there must be an intermediate          
stage1--the era1 in short1 of           
,metaphysics1--during which the process 
of ,criticism will operate as a solvent 
on all previous beliefs1 and by         
producing ,skepticism1 in the first     
instance1 in regard to all other        
systems1 will tend at length to         
concentrate the attention of mankind    
exclusively on the truths of ,inductive 

,science4 ,the ,metaphysical ,philosophy
 is held to be the necessary1 but       
temporary stage of transition from the  
theological to the positive method in   
science4 ,it is destined to supersede   
the one1 and to introduce the other4 ,it
 is conceived to be equally at variance 
with both2 and the era of its ascendency
 is described as a critical1            
destructive1 revolutionary age1 useful  
only as it delivers mankind from the    
shackles of former beliefs1 and prepares
 them for the adoption of a new and     
purely natural system of thought4       
,during this era of decomposition there 
will commence the reconstruction of     
human opinion on new and more solid     
foundations2 and the transition from    
,monotheism to ,positive ,science will  
be the greatest achievement of the race1
 greater far than the advancement from  
,fetishism to ,polytheism1 or even from 
,polytheism to ,monotheism itself4 ,the 
culminating point of human progress is  
absolute and universal ,atheism4#fe     

,surely such a prospect may well arrest 
the most thoughtless1 and prompt them to
 inquire1 with some measure of moral    
earnestness1 ,what is this ,positive    
,philosophy1 this ultimate landing-place
 of human thought1 this final goal of   
human progress8 ,is it nothing else than
 the ,inductive ,science of ,bacon1 but 
under a new and less attractive name8 or
 is it a philosophy radically different 
from it1 and entitled1 therefore1 to be 
regarded as an original method8 ,the    
author tells us that he might have      
called it ,natural ,science1 or the     
,philosophy of ,nature1 since it treats 
of ,facts and their ,laws2 but that he  
had been induced to prefer the          
distinctive title of positive1 as one   
better fitted to mark the contrast      
between it and the negative character of
 those metaphysical and theological     
systems which it is destined to         
supersede4 ,and yet it will be found    
that1 in so far as it differs at all    
from the ,inductive ,science of ,bacon1 

it is purely negative1 since its chief  
characteristic is the negation of all   
,theology1 and the entire exclusion from
 the domain of human knowledge1 of      
,causes1 whether efficient or final4 ,it
 adds nothing to the sum of human       
thought which might not be reached by   
,bacon's method2 it only subtracts      
whatever has reference to the ,divine   
and ,supernatural1 and especially       
everything connected with the theory of 
,causation4 ,it makes no new            
contribution to the general stock1      
unless1 indeed1 it be the hitherto      
unknown law of development which is     
supposed to regulate and determine the  
progress of humanity from primeval      
,fetishism to ultimate ,atheism2 and it 
takes away ,theology1 with all its      
ennobling beliefs and blessed hopes1 not
 by grappling with and solving1 but by  
merely discarding the problem both of   
the origin and end of the world4  ,that 
this is a correct account of the new    
theory is evident from his own words3   

,the fundamental character of the       
,positive ,philosophy is1 to regard all 
phenomena as subjected to invariable    
natural laws1 the precise discovery of  
which1 and their reduction to the least 
possible number1 is the end of all our  
efforts2 while we regard the            
investigation of what are called causes1
 whether first or final1 as absolutely  
inaccessible and void of sense for us4  
444 ,we have no pretension to expound   
the producing causes of the phenomena1  
for in that we can never do more than   
push back the difficulty2 we seek only  
to analyze with exactitude the          
circumstances of their production1 and  
to connect them with one another by the 
normal relations of succession and      
similitude4--,in the positive state of  
science1 the human mind1 acknowledging  
the impossibility of obtaining absolute 
knowledge1 abandons the search after the
 origin and destination of the universe1
 and the knowledge of the secret causes 
of phenomena4#ff  ,it is thus plainly   

announced that the ,positive ,philosophy
 is the science of facts and their laws1
 exclusive of all reference to causes1  
efficient or final2 and it is even      
admitted that ,theology could not be    
excluded1 were it deemed legitimate or  
possible for the human mind to          
investigate the causes of phenomena4    
,viewing the theory in this light1 we   
submit the following remarks as a       
sufficient antidote to this daring but  
impotent attempt to exclude ,theology   
from the domain of human knowledge4  #a4
 ,it is worthy of notice how completely 
the ,infidel party have shifted their   
ground and changed their tactics since  
the era of the first ,french            
,revolution2 and how utterly            
inconsistent are the arguments of ,m4   
,comte and the ,positive ,school with   
those of ,voltaire and the              
,encyclopedists4 ,formerly1 ,religion   
was wont to be ascribed to priestcraft2 
it was supposed to have been invented by
 fraud1 supported by falsehood1 and     

professed in hypocrisy2 and the ,church1
 but especially the hierarchy of ,rome1 
was the object of incessant ridicule or 
malignant abuse4 ,but now1 ,religion is 
discovered to be the natural1 necessary1
 and salutary result of the legitimate  
action of the human faculties in the    
earlier stages of their development1 the
 initial impellent of social progress1  
the indispensable condition of advancing
 civilization2 and1 on the broad1       
general principle that sincerity of     
conviction is essential to wide-spread  
success1 the theory which ascribes its  
origin to the fraud or the policy1      
whether of kings1 or priests1 or        
fanatics1 is scouted as a mere delirium 
of ,voltaire1 or as one of those        
revolutionary prejudices of his         
disastrous era which were alike         
irrational and injurious4 ,and the      
,church1 so far from being ridiculed or 
maligned1 is lauded above measure as the
 highest extant product of human wisdom2
 ,catholicism is even preferred to      

,christianity itself1 as a manifest     
improvement on the more primitive form  
of faith and worship2 it is declared to 
be the indispensable basis of the future
 reorganization of society1 which1 when 
it shall have been freed from all       
theological influence1 its only point of
 weakness1 will still survive1 with its 
separate speculative class1 its imposing
 public forms1 and its splendid         
hierarchy1--an ,atheistic society1 but  
still ,catholic and ,one4#fg ,the       
change1 in this respect1 between the    
opinions which prevailed1 respectively1 
at the era of the first and that of the 
second ,revolution1 is at once striking 
and instructive4 ,it shows how variable 
and vacillating is the wretched creed of
 ,infidelity1 and how the firm          
maintenance of truth will eventually    
compel the homage1 even where it may not
 succeed in carrying the convictions1 of
 speculative minds4 ,that ,religion in  
all its successive forms1 from the      
rudest ,fetishism up to the sublimest   

,christian ,monotheism1 has been the    
natural and genuine product of human    
intelligence1 working ever onward and   
upward to a still higher stage of       
development1--that its existence was    
inevitable1 and its influence1 on the   
whole1 highly beneficial1--and that1    
even when it shall have passed away1    
society will still be largely indebted  
to it for the impulse1 yet unspent1     
which it has imparted to the cause of   
civilization and progress1--all this is 
admitted and even maintained by ,m4     
,comte1 in direct and often derisive    
opposition to the theorists who once    
ascribed its origin to fraud1 and its   
prevalence to priestcraft2 nay1 he      
elevates it to the rank of a primordial 
and indispensable element of human      
progress1 a necessary and legitimate    
result of the great law of human        
development4 ,we know of no parallel    
instance of a change of opinion so great
 and sudden1 unless it be the marvellous
 transition of certain modern           

,rationalists who were wont to ridicule 
the doctrine of the ,trinity as absurd  
and incomprehensible1 but who have now  
arrived at the conclusion that it is the
 fundamental law of human thought6#fh   
,still1 with all this outward homage to 
,religion1 considered as a mere matter  
of history1 the theory of ,m4 ,comte is 
essentially and even avowedly           
,atheistic4 ,it is mainly designed to   
account for the origin of all ,religion1
 whether ,natural or ,revealed1 without 
having recourse to the supposition      
either of the existence of ,god1 or of  
his interposition at any time in the    
affairs of men4 ,he seems to have       
proposed to himself a twofold object3   
first1 to account for the prevalence of 
the various forms of natural religion   
and superstition1 without recognizing   
any valid evidence for the existence of 
supernatural powers2 and1 secondly1 to  
account for the origin of ,judaism and  
,christianity1 or1 as he calls it1 of   
,monotheism1 without recognizing the    

reality of any ,divine ,revelation4 ,and
 he attempts to accomplish both objects 
by means of the same law--a law of      
development which1 in primitive times1  
produced ,fetishism--which then produced
 ,polytheism2 then ,monotheism2 then the
 ,metaphysical transition era1 during   
which all ,theology is undergoing a     
process of disintegration and decay2    
and1 last of all 7the noblest1 because  
the latest1 birth of time71 the         
,positive ,philosophy1 under whose      
predicted ascendancy all ,theology must 
die and be buried in everlasting        
oblivion4 ,his theory is not merely     
,anti-,protestant1 although it is       
bitterly so2#fi nor merely              
,anti-,christian1 as opposed to all     
,revelation2 but it is                  
,anti-,theological1 as opposed to all   
,religion4 ,it proposes to eliminate    
,theology from the scheme of our        
knowledge1 by showing that it is utterly
 inaccessible to our faculties1 and     
neither necessary to society nor useful 

to morals4#gj ,it anticipates the time1 
as being near at hand1 when it shall    
have no existence1 save on the historic 
page4  #b4 ,this ,atheistic theory rests
 entirely on a supposed discovery of ,m4
 ,comte1--the discovery of a law of     
human development1 which serves at once 
to account for the origin and prevalence
 of ,theological beliefs in the past1   
and to insure their utter disappearance 
in the future2 a law which1 like the    
magician's wand1 can raise the          
apparition1 and then lay it again6 ,now1
 of this law we affirm and undertake to 
prove that it is utterly groundless2    
that it has no solid basis of evidence  
on which it can be established2 that it 
is contradicted by the history of the   
world1 and opposed to our own experience
 at the present day4  ,it can scarcely  
be imagined that a man accustomed1 as   
,m4 ,comte has been1 to the severe      
pursuits of ,science1 could give        
publicity to a law of this kind1 and    
claim the credit of a great original    

discovery1 without having some plausible
 reasons to plead for it2 and he does   
assign certain reasons for his belief1  
which are1 it may be safely affirmed1 as
 frivolous and inconclusive as any that 
have ever been offered in support of the
 most baseless revery4 ,they may be     
reduced to ,,three2 the first1 derived  
from our cerebral organization2 the     
second1 from the history of a certain   
portion of our species2 the third1 from 
the analogy of our individual           
experience4#ga  ,he founds1 in the first
 instance1 on our cerebral organization4
 ,he is an ardent admirer of ,drs4 ,gall
 and ,spurzheim1 and has no scruple in  
avowing himself a decided ,materialist4 
,it is unnecessary here to enter on a   
discussion of ,materialism1 or even of  
,phrenology1--that will be done         
hereafter2 in the mean time it is enough
 merely to indicate the fact that the   
theory proceeds on that ground1 and then
 to inquire how the fundamental law of  
,development is deduced from it4 ,how   

does the theory of ,materialism1 or even
 of ,phrenology1 were it assumed on the 
one side and admitted on the other1     
contribute to the establishment or      
verification of that law8 ,suppose it to
 be conceded that every mental faculty  
or propensity has a distinct cerebral   
organ1 or1 more generally1 that the     
brain may be divided into three parts1  
representing1 respectively1 the animal  
propensities1 the more elevated         
sentiments1 and the intellectual        
faculties2 could it be rationally       
inferred from this concession that human
 nature must necessarily develop itself 
after a certain order or method1 and    
especially in the precise way that is   
indicated in ,m4 ,comte's law8 ,would it
 prove that ,man must needs pass1 in the
 process of his mental and social       
development1 through three distinct and 
successive stages1--the preparatory     
,theological state1 the transitory      
,metaphysical state1 and the final      
,positive state8 ,would it prove that   

,religion must first exist as           
,fetishism1 then as ,polytheism1 then as
 ,monotheism1 and thereafter disappear  
from the earth altogether on the advent 
of ,m4 ,comte8 ,he seems to think that  
there is a real connection between the  
cerebral theory and his great           
fundamental law2 but it is not easy for 
a common reader to discern or to explain
 it4 ,considering the cranium1 according
 to what he conceives to be the true    
anatomical theory1 as simply a          
prolongation of the vertebral           
column1--the primitive centre of the    
whole nervous system1--he argues that   
the functions1 intellectual and         
emotional1 which are proper to the upper
 and anterior parts of it1 are less     
energetic than the animal propensities1 
whose organs lie in the lower and       
posterior region1 just in proportion as 
they are further removed from the spine2
 and that1 for this reason1 the latter  
must first come into action1 then the   
intermediate organs of sentiment1 and1  

last of all1 the intellectual powers4   
,and this doctrine he applies to the    
verification both of his otherwise      
admirable classification of the         
,sciences1 and of his far more doubtful 
law of human development4 ,we conceive  
that if it were applicable at all to the
 problem of human progress1 it might    
possibly be applied to indicate the     
probable development of an individual   
mind1 in the successive stages of       
infancy1 youth1 and manhood2 but that it
 does not admit of the same application 
to the history of the race1 otherwise   
than by the aid of a very fanciful      
analogy4 ,we have no faith in the a     
priori methods of constructing the chart
 of human history1 and tracing the      
necessary course of social progress1    
which have recently become so popular in
 ,germany and ,france4 ,we cannot1 with 
,m4 ,comte1 undertake to solve the      
problem1--,given three lobes of the     
brain1 representing the propensities1   
affections1 and intellectual powers1 but

 differing from each other in size and  
situation1 what will be the future      
history of the race1--religious1        
sthetic1 industrial1 metaphysical1      
social8 ,we cannot1 with ,m4 ,cousin1   
undertake to solve the problem1--,given 
three terms1 the finite1 the infinite1  
and the relation between the two1 what  
will be the development of human        
thought1 first1 in the experience of    
individuals1 and1 secondly1 in the      
history of society8#gb ,all such        
problems are too high for us4 ,the      
history of the human race must be       
ascertained from the authentic records  
and extant monuments of the past1 not   
constructed by theories1 or divined by a
 priori speculations4  ,but ,m4 ,comte  
does appeal1 in the second instance1 to 
history in confirmation of his views4   
,he is far from affirming1 however1 that
 the progress of the race1 under the    
operation of his great law of           
development1 has been either uniform or 
invariable2 on the contrary1 he admits1 

with regard to ,india1 ,china1 and other
 nations1 comprising probably the       
majority of mankind1 whose state1       
intellectually and socially1 has been   
stationary for ages1 that they afford   
little or no evidence in support of his 
theory2 and for this1 among other       
reasons1 he confines himself to the     
history of what he calls the lite1 or   
advanced guard of humanity1 and in this 
way makes it a very abstract history    
indeed6#gc ,beginning with ,greece1 as  
the representative of ancient           
civilization1 and surveying the history 
of the ,roman empire1 and of its        
successors in ,western ,europe1 he      
endeavors to show that the actual       
progress of humanity has been1 on the   
whole1 in conformity with his general   
law4 ,he gives no historical evidence1  
however1 of the prevalence of ,fetishism
 in primitive times2 that is an         
inference merely1 depending partly on   
his theory of cerebral organization1 and
 partly on the assumption that in the   

savage state1 which is gratuitously     
supposed to have been the primitive     
condition of man1 there must have been a
 tendency to regard every object1       
natural or artificial1 as endowed with  
life and intelligence4 ,polytheism1     
again1 he conceives to have been a step 
in advance1 an improvement on the       
prexisting state of things1 instead of  
being1 as it really was1 a declension   
from a purer and better faith1 an       
aberration from the light of ,nature1   
not less than from the lessons of       
,revelation4 ,he conceives ,monotheism1 
whether as taught1 to the ,jews by      
,moses1 or to the world at large by     
,christ and his apostles1 to have been  
the natural product of man's unaided    
intelligence2 and he assumes this1      
without making a single reference to the
 supernatural events by which its       
publication1 in either instance1 is said
 to have been accompanied1 or to the    
sacred books in which they are recorded2
 nay1 he does not even name the ,founder

 of the ,christian faith1 otherwise than
 by describing him as the founder1 real 
or imaginary1 of this great religious   
system4#gd  ,in treating1 again1 of the 
,critical or destructive system of      
,metaphysics1 and of the ,positive or   
reconstructive system of the ,new       
,philosophy1 he adduces no evidence to  
show that the same element is negatived 
by the one and restored by the other2 on
 the contrary1 were his statement true  
in all respects1 it would only serve to 
prove that the ,theological element1    
which is slowly dissipated by           
,metaphysics1 is formally and finally   
abjured by ,positivism4 ,he assumes and 
asserts1 on very insufficient grounds1  
that there is a real1 radical1 and      
necessary contrariety between the facts 
and laws of ,science and the first      
principles of ,theology1 whether natural
 or revealed2 and he anticipates1       
therefore1 that in proportion as        
,science advances1 ,theology must       
recede1 and ultimately quit the field4  

,he ought to have known that there are  
minds in every part of ,europe as       
thoroughly scientific as his own1 and as
 deeply imbued with the spirit of modern
 ,inductive ,philosophy1 who1 so far    
from seeing any discordance between the 
results of scientific inquiry and the   
fundamental truths of ,theology1 are in 
the habit of appealing to the former in 
proof or illustration of the latter2 and
 who1 the further they advance in the   
study of the works of ,nature1 are only 
the more confirmed in their belief of a 
,creative ,intelligence and a ,governing
 ,power4 ,it may be that1 in his own    
immediate circle at ,paris1 there is a  
tendency towards ,atheism2 but1         
assuredly1 no such tendency exists in   
the highest and most scientific minds of
 modern ,europe4 ,the faith of ,bacon1  
,newton1 and ,boyle1 of ,descartes1     
,leibnitz1 and ,pascal1 in regard to the
 first principles of ,theology1 is still
 the prevailing creed of the ,sedgwicks1
 the ,whewells1 the ,herschells1 and the

 ,brewsters of the present day4  ,the   
only plausible part of his ,historical  
,survey1 and that which1 in our         
apprehension1 is the most likely to make
 some transient impression on the       
popular mind1 is his elaborate attempt  
to show1 with regard to each branch of  
,science1 in detail1 that it was        
enveloped during its infancy in a cloud 
of superstition2 and that just in       
proportion as the light shone more      
clearly1 or was more distinctly         
discerned1 the cloud was gradually      
dissipated and dispersed1 until1 one    
after another1 they were all emancipated
 from their supposed connection with    
supernatural causes1 and reduced under  
fixed natural laws4 ,confounding        
,theology with ,superstition1 or        
failing1 at least1 to discriminate duly 
between the two1 ,m4 ,comte draws a     
vivid picture of the successive inroads 
which ,science has made on the          
consecrated domain of ,religion1 and    
represents the one as receding just in  

proportion as the other advances4 ,for  
as the darkness disappears before the   
rising sun1 whose earliest rays gild    
only the loftier mountain peaks1 but    
whose growing brightness spreads over   
the lowly valleys and penetrates the    
deepest recesses of nature1 so ,theology
 gradually retires before the advance of
 ,science1 which first conquers and     
brings under the rule of natural law the
 simplest and least complicated         
branches1 such as ,mechanics and        
,astronomy2 then attacks the more       
complex1 such as ,chemistry and         
,physiology2 and1 last of all1 advances 
to the assault of the most difficult1   
such as ,ethics and ,sociology2 until1  
having emancipated each of them         
successively from their previous        
connection with supernatural beliefs1 it
 effects the entire elimination of      
,theology1 first from the philosophic1  
and afterwards from the popular creed of
 mankind4 ,m4 ,comte conceives that the 
religious spirit has been steadily      

decreasing throughout the whole course  
of human development1 from the time when
 it was universal1 in the form of       
,fetishism1 till it reached its most    
abstract1 but least influential form in 
,monotheism2 and that now the period of 
its decline and fall has arrived1 when  
it is subjected to the powerful solvent 
of a ,metaphysical and ,skeptical       
,philosophy1 and when its ultimate      
extinction is certain under the action  
of ,positive ,science4  ,we deem this by
 far the most dangerous1 because it is  
the most plausible part of his          
speculations2 so plausible that1 even   
where his reasonings in support of it   
may fail to carry the full conviction of
 the understanding1 they may yet leave  
behind them a certain impression        
unfavorable to faith in ,divine things1 
since they appeal to many palpable facts
 in the history of ,science1 too well   
attested to be doubted1 and too         
important to be overlooked4 ,the theory 
itself--whatever may be thought of the  

peculiar form which it has assumed in   
the hands of ,m4 ,comte--cannot be      
regarded1 in its main and essential     
features1 as one of his original        
discoveries2 for the general idea on    
which it rests had been announced with  
equal brevity and precision by the      
celebrated ,,la ,,place3 ,let us survey 
the history of the progress of the human
 mind and of its errors2 we shall there 
see final causes constantly pushed back 
to the boundaries of its knowledge4     
,these causes1 which ,newton pushed back
 to the limits of the solar system1     
were1 even in his time1 placed in the   
atmosphere to explain meteoric          
appearances4 ,they are nothing else1    
therefore1 in the eyes of a philosopher1
 than the expression of our ignorance of
 the true causes4 ,supposing this to be 
a correct account of the fact1 the      
inference which ,m4 ,comte deduces from 
it might seem to follow very much as a  
matter of course1--the inference1 viz41 
that in proportion as ,science advances 

and succeeds in subjecting one          
department of ,nature after another to  
fixed and invariable laws1 ,theology1 or
 the doctrine of ,final ,causes1 must   
necessarily recede before it1 and1 at   
length1 disappear altogether1 when human
 knowledge has reached its highest      
ultimate perfection4 ,but is it a       
correct account of the fact8 ,is it true
 that the doctrine of ,final ,causes is 
less generally admitted1 or more        
dubiously maintained1 in regard to those
 sciences which have already reached    
their maturity1 than in regard to those 
other sciences which are still          
comparatively in their infancy8 ,or is  
it true that it has lost instead of     
gaining ground by the progress of       
scientific discovery1 so as to occupy a 
narrower space and to hold a more       
precarious footing1 now1 than it did in 
the earlier ages of ignorance and       
superstition8 ,did ,final ,causes       
disappear from the view of ,newton when 
he discovered the law which regulates   

the movements of the heavenly bodies8   
,did ,galen or did ,paley discard them  
when they surveyed the human frame in   
the light of scientific anatomy8 or     
,harvey1 when1 impelled and guided by   
this doctrine as his governing          
principle1 he discovered the circulation
 of the blood8 ,in what departments of  
,nature1 and in what branches of        
,science1 does the ,theistic philosopher
 or the ,christian divine find the      
clearest and strongest proofs of order1 
adaptation1 and adjustment8 ,is it not  
in those very departments of ,nature    
whose laws have been most fully         
ascertained8 in those very branches of  
,science which have been most thoroughly
 matured8 ,did we believe ,comte and ,la
 ,place1 we should expect to find that  
the doctrine of ,final ,causes and the  
science of ,theology could now find no  
footing in the domain of ,astronomy1 of 
,physics1 or of ,chemistry1 since in    
these departments the phenomena have    
been reduced1 by many successive        

discoveries1 to rigorous general laws2  
and that they could only survive for a  
brief time by taking refuge in the yet  
unconquered territory of ,meteorology1  
,biology1 and ,social ,science4 ,but is 
it so8 ,examine the ,series of          
,bridgewater ,treatises1 or any other   
recent philosophical exposition of the  
,evidence of ,natural ,theology1 and it 
will be apparent1 on the most cursory   
review1 that in point of fact the       
arguments and illustrations are derived 
almost entirely from the more advanced  
sciences2 and that1 so far from receding
 or threatening to disappear1 ,final    
,causes have only become more prominent 
and more striking in proportion as      
inquiring men have succeeded in removing
 the vail from any department of        
,nature4  ,it were easy1 indeed1 to cull
 from the records of the past many facts
 which might seem to give a plausible   
aspect to the theory of ,m4 ,comte4 ,we 
might be told of the early history of   
,astronomy1 when the astrologer gazed   

upon the heavens with a superstitious   
eye1 and spoke of the mystic influence  
of the planets1 and constructed the     
horoscope for the calculation of        
nativities and the prediction of future 
events4 ,we might be told of the early  
history of ,anatomy1 when1 from the     
entrails of birds and animals1 the      
haruspex prognosticated the fate of     
empires and the fortunes of battle4 ,we 
might be told of the early history of   
,chemistry1 when alchemists sought in   
their concoctions a panacea for all     
human evils1 and in their crucibles an  
alkalest or universal menstruum4 ,we    
might be told of the early history of   
,zology1 when the augur watched the     
flight1 the singing1 the feeding of     
birds1 and applied them to the purposes 
of divination4 ,we might be told of     
,aromancy as the earliest form of       
,meteorology1 and of ,geomancy as the   
earliest form of ,geology4#ge ,and we   
might be told of the popular            
superstitions which lingered1 till a    

very recent period1 among the peasantry 
of our own country1 and which are now   
gradually disappearing in proportion as 
the light of ,religion and ,science is  
diffused4#gf ,these facts1 which appear 
on the surface of human history1 do     
unquestionably prove that there has been
 a process of gradual advancement1 by   
which each of the sciences has been1 in 
succession1 purged of its earlier       
errors1 and placed on a more solid and  
enduring basis4 ,but they prove nothing 
more than this3 they do not prove that  
these sciences must ultimately supersede
 ,theology1 or that they have a         
necessary tendency towards ,atheism4 ,on
 the contrary1 we hold that they afford 
a valid presumption from analogy on the 
other side4 ,for suppose1 even1 that    
,religion1 following the same law of    
development which determines the        
progress of every other branch of human 
knowledge1 had become incorporated1 in  
its earlier stages1 with many fond and  
foolish superstitions1 the analogy of   

the other sciences would lead us to     
conclude that1 just as the reveries of  
,astrology had passed away and given    
place to a solid system of              
,astronomy1--and as the vain            
speculations of ,alchemy had been       
superseded by the useful discoveries of 
,chemistry1--and as the arts of ,augury 
and ,divination had finally issued in   
the inductive science of true ,natural  
,history1--so ,theology might also purge
 itself from the fond conceits which had
 been for a time incorporated with it1  
and still survive1 after all            
superstition had passed away1 as a sound
 and fruitful branch of the tree of     
knowledge4  ,this is not the precise    
light1 however1 in which ,m4 ,comte     
regards ,theology1 ,he does not speak of
 it as a distinct and independent       
science1 but rather as a method of      
,philosophy1 which has been applied to  
the explanation of all the departments  
of ,nature2 and1 viewed in this light1  
he objects to it on the ground that     

,positive ,science peremptorily demands 
the elimination of all causes1 efficient
 and final1 and1 consequently1 the      
exclusion of all reference to ,god1 or  
to any supernatural power1 in connection
 with the laws either of the material or
 moral world4 ,this is the fundamental  
basis of his theory4 ,it is assumed that
 the recognition of natural laws is     
incompatible with the belief in         
supernatural powers1 and that these laws
 must be invariable and independent of  
any superior will4 ,hence the supposed  
antagonism between ,theology and        
,physical ,science1 which is strongly   
affirmed by ,m4 ,comte#gg2 as if the    
laws of ,nature could not exist unless  
they were independent of the ,divine    
will1 or as if the arts of industry     
could not be pursued1 on the supposition
 of a ,providence1 without sacrilegious 
presumption4 ,the laws for which he     
contends must have had no author to     
establish1 and can have no superior will
 to control them2 they had no beginning1

 and can have no end2 they cannot be    
reversed1 suspended1 or interfered with2
 they are necessary1 immutable1 and     
eternal1 not subordinate to ,god1 but   
independent of ,him2 they are1 in short1
 nothing less than ,destiny or ,fate1   
the same that ,cudworth describes as the
 ,democritic1 ,physiological1 or        
,atheistic ,fate1 which consists in the 
material necessity of all things without
 a ,god4#gh ,now1 we have no jealousy of
 natural laws4 ,we believe in their     
existence2 we believe1 also1 in their   
regular operation in the ordinary course
 of ,nature2 but we deny that they must 
needs be independent of a supreme will1 
and affirm that1 being subordinate to   
that will1 they are not necessarily     
invariable4 ,they are expressly         
recognized and cordially maintained by  
divines1 not less than by men of        
science2 but in such a sense as to be   
perfectly compatible both with the      
doctrine of a primitive creation1 and   
also with the possibility of a          

subsequent miraculous interposition4    
,the ,westminster ,divines explicitly   
declare that ,god1 the ,first ,cause1 by
 ,his providence1 ordereth all things to
 fall out according to the nature of    
second causes1 either necessarily1      
freely1 or contingently2 and that in    
,his ordinary providence1 ,he maketh use
 of means1 but is free to act without1  
above1 and against them at ,his         
pleasure4#gi ,but ,m4 ,comte will have  
no laws1 however regular1 unless they be
 also invariable1 and independent of any
 superior will4 ,and1 doubtless1 if this
 were the sense in which ,science has   
established the doctrine of natural     
laws1 it would be at direct variance    
with ,theology1 both ,natural and       
,revealed2 and the antagonism between   
the two might afford some ground for the
 belief that1 sooner or later1 ,theology
 must quit the field4 ,but it is not the
 existence of these natural laws1 nor   
even their regular operation in the     
common course of ,providence1 that is   

hostile to our religious beliefs1--it is
 only the supposition that they are     
unoriginated1 independent1 and          
invariable2 and to assume this without  
proof1 as if it were a self-evident or  
axiomatic truth1 or to apply it in a    
process of historical deduction         
respecting either the past development  
or the future prospects of the race1 is 
such a shameless begging of the whole   
question1--that we know of no parallel  
to it except in the kindred speculations
 of ,strauss1 who assumes the same      
radical principle1 and gravely tells us 
that whatever is supernatural must needs
 be unhistorical4#hj  ,there is         
absolutely no evidence1 properly        
historical1 that there is any necessary 
tendency in the recognition of          
established natural laws to supersede   
,theology1 or to introduce an era of    
universal ,atheism4 ,some such tendency 
might exist were these laws conceived of
 as necessary1 independent1 and         
invariable4 ,but this hypothesis1       

equally unphilosophical and irreligious1
 is not and never has been maintained by
 the great body of ,inductive inquirers1
 who see no contradiction either between
 the established order of ,nature and   
the supposition of its ,divine origin1  
or between the operation of natural laws
 and the recognition of a supreme1      
superintending ,providence4 ,nor should 
it be forgotten1 in this connection1    
that the evidence in favor of ,theism   
depends not so much on the mere laws as 
on the dispositions and adjustments that
 are observable in ,nature4#ha ,there   
is1 therefore1 no historical proof to   
establish the supposed law of human     
development1 and no rational ground to  
expect that the progress of ,inductive  
,science will ever supplant or supersede
 ,theology4 ,it is true that ,theology1 
although a distinct and independent     
science1 is so comprehensive in its     
range that it gathers its proofs and    
illustrations from every department of  
,nature1 and that1 were it excluded from

 any one of these1 it might1 for the    
same reason1 be excluded from all the   
rest2 but it is not true that there is  
any real or necessary antagonism between
 the laws of ,nature and the            
prerogatives of ,god4 ,on the contrary1 
let our knowledge advance until all the 
phenomena both of the ,material and     
,moral worlds shall be reduced under so 
many general laws1 even then            
,superstition might disappear1 but      
,theology would remain1 and would only  
receive fresh accessions of evidence and
 strength1 in proportion as the wise    
order of ,nature is more fully unfolded1
 and its most hidden mysteries          
disclosed4  ,we scarcely know whether it
 is needful to advert at all to the     
argument in favor of his theory which   
,m4 ,comte founds on the analogy of     
individual experience4 ,it is a         
transparent fallacy4 ,he tells us that  
the race is1 like an individual man1    
,religious in infancy1 ,metaphysical in 
youth1 and ,positive--that is1          

,scientific1 without being              
,religious--in mature manhood4#hb ,now1 
this analogical argument1 to have any   
legitimate weight1 must proceed on the  
assumption of two facts4 ,the first is1 
that the law of individual development  
commences1 in the case1 at least1 of all
 who belong to the lite of humanity1    
with ,theology1 and terminates in       
,atheism2 and the second is1 that the   
individual is1 in this respect1 the type
 or pattern of his race1 and that the   
experience of the one is only an outline
 in miniature of the history of the     
other4 ,it would be difficult1 we think1
 to establish the truth of either of    
these positions by evidence that could  
be satisfactory to any reflecting mind4 
,we cannot doubt1 indeed1 for experience
 amply attests1 that the religious      
sensibilities of childhood have often   
been sadly impaired in the progress from
 youth to manhood1 and that1 after the  
tumultuous excitements1 whether of      
speculation or of passion1 not a few    

have sought a refuge from their fears in
 the cold negations of ,atheism4 ,but is
 this the law of development and        
progress8 ,is it a law that is uniform  
and invariable in its operation8 ,are   
there no instances of an opposite kind8 
,are there no instances of men whose    
early religious culture had been        
neglected1 and who passed through youth 
without one serious thought of ,god and 
their relation to ,him1 but who1 as they
 advanced in years1 began to reflect and
 inquire1 and ultimately attained to a  
firm religious faith8 ,if such          
diversities of individual experience are
 known to exist1 then clearly the result
 is not determined by any necessary or  
invariable law of intellectual          
development2 but must be ascribed to    
other causes1 chiefly of a moral and    
practical kind1 which exert a powerful  
influence1 for good or evil1 on every   
human mind4 ,montaigne speaks of an     
error maintained by ,plato1 that        
children and old people were most       

susceptible of ,religion1 as if it      
sprung and derived its credit from our  
weakness4#hc ,and we find ,m4 ,comte    
himself complaining1 somewhat bitterly1 
that his quondam friend1 the celebrated 
,st4 ,simon1 had exhibited1 as he       
advanced in years 7cette tendance banale
 vers une vague religiosit71 a tendency 
towards something like ,religion4#hd    
,cases of this kind are utterly fatal to
 his supposed law of individual         
development1 and they must be equally   
fatal to his theory of the progress of  
the human race4  ,hitherto we have      
considered merely the reasons which ,m4 
,comte urges in support of his theory1  
and have endeavored to show that they   
are utterly incapable of establishing it
 as a valid scientific doctrine4 ,it may
 be useful1 however1 to advert1 in      
conclusion1 to some considerations which
 afford decisive objections against it1 
arising from the testimony of authentic 
history and the plainest principles of  
reason4  ,in so far as the testimony of 

history and tradition is concerned1     
nothing can be more certain than that   
the progress of the race has followed a 
very different course from that which   
,m4 ,comte has traced out for it by his 
grand fundamental law4 ,the theory of a 
primitive state of ignorance and        
barbarism1 in which a rude ,theology    
existed1 in the form of ,fetishism1 is  
opposed not more to the authority of    
,scripture1 the earliest record of our  
race1 than to the unanimous voice of    
antiquity1 which attests the general    
belief of mankind in a primeval state of
 light and innocence4 ,there is a sad   
but striking contrast between the views 
which are generally held by the         
,christian ,theist1 and those which are 
avowed by ,m4 ,comte on this subject4   
,the ,christian ,theist admits the      
doctrine of a primeval ,revelation and a
 pristine state of purity and peace2 ,m4
 ,comte maintains the doctrine of a     
primitive barbarism and a natural       
aboriginal ,superstition4 ,the          

,christian ,theist believes in a fall   
subsequent to the creation of man1 and  
ascribes the ignorance and error1 the   
superstition and idolatry which ensued1 
to the perversion and abuse of his      
intellectual and moral powers2 ,m4      
,comte affirms that man did not fall1   
that he did actually rise by a process  
of slow but progressive self-elevation1 
and that1 in advancing from ,fetishism  
to ,polytheism1 and from ,polytheism to 
,monotheism1 and from ,monotheism to    
,atheism1 he has all along been         
determined by the law of his normal     
development4 ,in the view of the        
,christian ,theist1 ,revelation was the 
sun which shed its cheering rays on the 
first fathers of mankind1 and which1    
after having been obscured1 for a time1 
by the clouds and darkness of           
,superstition1 shines out again1 clear  
and strong1 under the dispensation of   
the ,gospel2 in the view of ,m4 ,comte1 
,science is the only sun that is        
destined to enlighten the world1--a sun 

which has not yet fully risen1 but which
 has sent before1 as the harbingers of  
its speedy advent1 a few scattered rays 
to gild the lofty mountain peaks1 while 
all beneath is still buried in          
,cimmerian darkness4 ,the ,christian    
,theist anticipates the time when the   
true light which now shineth shall cover
 the whole earth2 ,m4 ,comte predicts   
its utter and final extinction1 when    
,positive ,science shall have risen into
 the ascendant4 ,his theory is          
contradicted by the history of the past2
 let us hope that the events of the     
future will equally belie his           
prediction4 ,for ,christianity is the   
only hope of the world4 ,the prospects  
of man would be dark indeed on the      
supposition of its being abolished4     
,there might remain among a few of the  
more enlightened some occasional        
glimpses of religious truth1 as we find 
to have been the case in the ,pagan     
world2 but the degradation of the great 
mass of the people to that ignorance1   

and idolatry1 and superstition1 out of  
which the ,gospel had emancipated them1 
would be certain and complete4 ,this    
retrograde movement might be retarded by
 the advantages which we have derived   
from that system1 whose influence we    
should continue to feel long after we   
had ceased to acknowledge the divinity  
of its source4 ,but these advantages    
would by degrees lose their efficacy1   
even as mere matters of speculation1 and
 give place to the workings of fancy1   
and credulity1 and corruption4 ,a       
radiance might still glow on the high   
places of the earth after the sun of    
,revelation had gone down2 and the      
brighter and the longer it had shone1   
the more gradual would be the decay of  
that light and warmth which it had left 
behind it4 ,but every where there would 
be the sad tokens of a departed glory   
and of a coming night4 ,twilight might  
be protracted through the course of many
 generations1 and still our unhappy race
 might be able to read1 though dimly1   

many of the wonders of the eternal      
,godhead1 and to wind a dubious way     
through the perils of the wilderness4   
,but it would be twilight still2 shade  
would thicken after shade2 every        
succeeding age would come wrapped in a  
deeper and a deeper gloom2 till1 at     
last1 that flood of glory which the     
,gospel is now pouring upon the world   
would be lost and buried in impenetrable
 darkness4#he  ,m4 ,comte's theory is   
liable to another objection1 the force  
of which he seems1 in some measure1     
although inadequately1 to have felt and 
acknowledged4 ,the three states or      
stages1 which he describes as           
necessarily successive1 are1 in point of
 fact1 simultaneous4 ,they do not mark  
so many different eras in the course of 
human progress1--they denote the natural
 products of man's intelligence1 the    
constituent elements of his knowledge in
 all states of society4 ,the            
,theological1 the ,metaphysical1 and the
 ,scientific elements have always       

coxisted4 ,diverse as they may be in    
other respects1 they resemble each other
 in this1--they are all the natural and 
spontaneous products of man's           
intelligent activity4 ,that they were1  
to a certain extent1 simultaneous at    
first1 and that they are simultaneous   
still1 is actually admitted by ,m4      
,comte1 while he conceives1             
nevertheless1 that they are radically   
incompatible with each other2#hf and    
their coexistence hitherto is felt by   
him to be a serious objection to his    
fundamental law1 which represents them  
not only as necessarily successive1 but 
also as mutually exclusive4 ,the fact is
 admitted1 and that fact is fatal to his
 whole theory4 ,for if the three methods
 have coexisted hitherto1 why may they  
not equally coexist hereafter8 ,and what
 ground is left for the reckless        
prediction that ,theology is doomed1 and
 must fall before the onward march of   
,positive ,science8 ,if man was able    
from the beginning to observe1 to       

compare1 to abstract1 and to generalize1
 and if the fundamental laws of human   
thought have been ever the same1 it     
follows that there must have been a     
tendency1 coeval with the origin of the 
race1 towards ,theological1             
,metaphysical1 and ,inductive           
,speculation1 and that the same tendency
 must continue as long as his powers    
remain unchanged4 ,it can only1         
therefore1 be a preponderance1 more or  
less complete1 of one of the three      
methods over the other two1 that we     
should be warranted in expecting1 even  
under the operation of ,m4 ,comte's     
favorite law2 and yet he boldly         
proclaims the utter exclusion of        
,metaphysics1 and the entire and        
everlasting elimination of ,theology1 as
 branches of human knowledge6  ,m4      
,comte's theory is still more vulnerable
 at another point4 ,the fundamental     
assumption on which it is based is      
utterly groundless4 ,it amounts to this1
 that all knowledge of causes1 whether  

efficient or final1 is interdicted to   
man1 and incapable of being reached by  
any exertion of his faculties4#hg ,he   
tells us that ,theology is impossible1  
for this reason1 that1 in the view of   
the ,positive ,philosophy1 all knowledge
 of causes is absolutely excluded2 nay1 
he admits that ,theology is inevitable  
if we inquire into causes at all4 ,we   
know of no simpler or more effectual    
method of dealing with his specious     
sophistry on this subject1 than by      
showing that1 if his general principle  
be conclusive against the knowledge of  
,god1 it is equally conclusive against  
the knowledge of any other being or     
cause2 just as ,sir ,james ,mackintosh  
dealt with the skeptical philosophy of  
,hume1 when1 with admirable practical   
sagacity1 he said3 ,as those dictates of
 experience which regulate conduct must 
be the objects of belief1 all objections
 which attack them1 in common with the  
principles of reasoning1 must be utterly
 ineffectual4 ,whatever attacks every   

principle of belief1 can destroy none4  
,as long as the foundations of knowledge
 are allowed to remain on the same level
 with the maxims of life1 the whole     
system of human conviction must continue
 undisturbed4444 ,skepticism has        
practical consequences of a very        
mischievous nature4 ,this is because its
 universality is not steadily kept in   
view and constantly borne in mind4 ,if  
it were1 the above short and plain      
remark would be an effectual antidote to
 the poison4 ,but1 in practice1 it is an
 armory from which weapons are taken to 
be employed against some opinions1 while
 it is hidden from notice that the same 
weapons would equally cut down every    
other conviction4 ,it is thus that ,mr4 
,hume's theory of causation is used as  
an answer to arguments for the existence
 of the ,deity1 without warning the     
reader that it would equally lead him to
 expect--that the sun will not rise     
to-morrow4#hh  ,the exclusion of all    
knowledge of causes is so indispensable 

to ,m4 ,comte's theory that he admits   
the inevitable tendency of our          
intelligence towards a philosophy       
radically ,theological1 as often as we  
seek to penetrate1 on whatever pretext1 
into the intimate nature of the         
phenomena4#hi ,the exclusion of such    
knowledge would1 of course1 be fatal to 
,theology1 since1 without taking some   
account of causes1 efficient and final1 
we cannot rise to ,god as the author of 
the universe4 ,but did it never occur to
 ,m4 ,comte that the self-same principle
 may possibly be destructive of his     
present1 or1 at least1 of his posthumous
 fame1 as the author of the ,positive   
,philosophy8 ,for1 if we can know       
nothing of efficient causes1 in what    
sense1 or on what ground1 shall any one 
presume to ascribe the authorship of    
this system to ,m4 ,comte8 ,true1 it may
 be said1--,here is an effect which     
exhibits manifest signs of intelligence1
 order1 and scientific skill2 its parts 
are regularly adjusted and all directed 

to a common end2 and1 reasoning after   
the teleological method1 we must infer  
that it proceeded from a very clever1   
but somewhat eccentric mind2 but1       
unfortunately1 final causes are as      
expressly interdicted as efficient ones2
 and1 on the principles of his own      
theory1 the ,course of ,positive        
,philosophy can never be warrantably    
ascribed to the authorship of ,m4       
,comte4  ,a still more serious objection
 to ,m4 ,comte's theory respecting the  
law of human development arises from the
 false view which it exhibits of the    
nature and history of ,truth1 considered
 as the object of human knowledge4 ,it  
is a favorite opinion with him1 that man
 can have no absolute knowledge2 that   
truth is not fixed1 but fluctuating2    
that what was believed in one age1 and  
believed necessarily1 according to the  
fundamental laws of thought1 is as      
necessarily disbelieved in the next2 and
 that there is no standard of truth at  
any time better or surer than the public

 opinion1 or general consent1 of the    
most advanced classes of society4#ij    
,this theory of ,truth1 as necessarily  
mobile and fluctuating1 has a tendency1 
we think1 to engender universal         
skepticism1 even when it is stated1 with
 various important modifications1 by    
such writers as ,lamennais and ,morell2 
but1 in the hands of ,m4 ,comte1 it     
becomes more dangerous still1 since it  
represents the human race as having been
 from the beginning1 through a long     
series of ages1 subject to a law of     
development which not only permitted1   
but actually compelled them to believe a
 lie2 and thus casts a dark shade of    
suspicion both on the constitution of   
man and on the government of ,god4      
,such a theory would seem also to       
preclude all rational calculations      
respecting the future progress and      
prospects of the race4 ,for what ground 
can exist for any prognostication in    
regard to the ulterior advancement or   
ultimate destiny of man1 if it be true  

that1 in his past history1 ,fetishism   
has passed into ,polytheism1 and        
,polytheism into ,monotheism1 without   
any extraneous instruction1 and by the  
mere action of those inherent laws to   
which humanity is subject8 ,and1 still  
more1 if it be further true that even   
now the human mind is in a state of     
transition1 passing through the crisis  
of ,metaphysical doubt towards the goal 
of ,positive ,atheism1 who shall assure 
us that this will be its last and final 
metamorphosis8 ,it does appear to us to 
be one of the most singular and         
perplexing anomalies of his elaborate   
system1 that he can dogmatize so        
confidently on the terminus ad quem of  
human progress1 when from the terminus a
 quo there has been1 according to his   
own account1 a series of variations so  
wonderful1 and a succession of states so
 diverse and opposite1 as those which he
 describes4 ,and yet he pronounces      
oracularly that ,positive ,science is   
the ultimate landing-place of human     

thought1 and that universal ,atheism is 
the final barrier which must needs close
 and terminate the long series of       
developments4  ,we have spoken sternly  
of his system2 we have no wish to speak 
harshly of the man4 ,had we any         
disposition to do so1 there is more than
 enough in the personal explanation1    
prefixed to the closing volume of his   
work1 effectually to disarm us4 ,we have
 too much sympathy with the trials of a 
vigorous but eccentric mind1 struggling 
in untoward circumstances1 and against  
an adverse tide1 to maintain a position 
of honorable independence1 to say a word
 that could wound the feelings or injure
 the prospects of a man of science4 ,but
 it is not unkind to add that his life  
might have been a more prosperous one   
had he devoted himself to the pursuits  
of ,science1 without assailing the      
truths of ,religion2 and that his fame  
would have been at once more extensive  
and more enduring had it been left to   
repose on his ,classification or        

,hierarchy of the ,sciences1 without    
being associated with the more doubtful 
merits of his fundamental law of ,man's 
,development4   ,,section ,,iv4         
,,theory ,,of ,,ecclesiastical          
,,development4--,j4 ,h4 ,,newman4  ,this
 particular phase of the general theory 
bears less directly on the subject of   
our present inquiry than either of the  
three which have already passed under   
review1 and yet it has recently been    
applied in such a way as may entitle it 
to a passing notice4  ,for while the    
theory of ,ecclesiastical ,development  
has a direct relation only to the       
question in regard to the ,rule of      
,faith1 it has also an indirect or      
collateral relation to the truths of    
,natural as well as of ,revealed        
,religion2 and this relation demands for
 it1 especially in the existing state of
 theological speculation1 the earnest   
attention of all who are concerned for  
the maintenance even of the simplest and
 most elementary articles of ,divine    

truth4  ,the most elaborate and         
systematic exposition of this theory is 
exhibited in the ,essay on the          
,development of ,christian ,doctrine1 by
 ,,john ,,henry ,,newman2 an ,essay     
primarily directed to the discussion of 
the points of difference between the    
,popish and the ,protestant ,churches1  
but which will be found to have an      
important bearing1 also1 on some        
doctrines which are common to both1 and 
especially on the fundamental articles  
of ,natural ,religion itself4  ,it is   
thus stated by ,mr4 ,newman3#ia ,that   
the increase and expansion of the       
,christian ,creed and ,ritual1 and the  
variations which have attended the      
process in the case of individual       
writers and churches1 are the necessary 
attendants on any philosophy or polity  
which takes possession of the intellect 
and heart1 and has had any wide or      
extended dominion2 that1 from the nature
 of the human mind1 time is necessary   
for the full comprehension and          

perfection of great ideas2 and that the 
highest and most wonderful truths1      
though communicated to the world once   
for all by inspired teachers1 could not 
be comprehended all at once by the      
recipients1 but1 as received and        
transmitted by minds not inspired1 and  
through media which were human1 have    
required only the longer time and deeper
 thought for their full elucidation4    
,this may be called the ,theory of      
,developments4  ,it is further          
illustrated as follows3 ,it is sometimes
 said that the stream is clearest near  
the spring4 ,whatever use may fairly be 
made of this image1 it does not apply to
 the history of a philosophy or sect1   
which1 on the contrary1 is more equable1
 and purer1 and stronger1 when its bed  
has become deep1 and broad1 and full4   
,it necessarily rises out of an existing
 state of things1 and1 for a time1      
savors of the soil4 ,its vital element  
needs disengaging from what is foreign  
and temporary1 and is employed in       

efforts after freedom1 more vigorous and
 hopeful as its years increase4 ,its    
beginnings are no measures of its       
capabilities1 nor of its scope4 ,at     
first1 no one knows what it is1 or what 
it is worth4 ,it remains1 perhaps1 for a
 time1 quiescent2 it tries1 as it were1 
its limbs1 and proves the ground under  
it1 and feels its way4 ,from time to    
time it makes essays which fail1 and    
are1 in consequence1 abandoned4 ,it     
seems in suspense which way to go2 it   
wavers1 and1 at length1 strikes out in  
one definite direction4 ,in time it     
enters upon strange territory2 points of
 controversy alter their bearing2       
parties rise and fall about it2 dangers 
and hopes appear in new relations1 and  
old principles reappear under new forms2
 it changes with them1 in order to      
remain the same4 ,in a higher world it  
is otherwise2 but here below to live is 
to change1 and to be perfect is to have 
changed often4#ib  ,in answer to the    
objection1 that inspired documents1 such

 as the ,holy ,scriptures1 at once      
determine the doctrines which we should 
believe1 it is replied1 that they were  
intended to create an idea1 and that    
idea is not in the sacred text1 but in  
the mind of the reader2 and the question
 is1 whether that idea is communicated  
to him1 in its completeness and minute  
accuracy1 on its first apprehension1 or 
expands in his heart and intellect1 and 
comes to perfection in the course of    
time4 ,nor could it be maintained       
without extravagance that the letter of 
the ,new ,testament1 or of any          
assignable number of books1 comprises a 
delineation of all possible forms which 
a ,divine message will assume when      
submitted to a multitude of minds4#ic   
,what relation1 it may be asked1 can    
this theory respecting the development  
of revealed or ,christian truth bear to 
the question of the being and           
perfections of ,god8 ,we answer1 that it
 is founded on a general philosophical  
principle which may affect the truths of

 natural as well as those of revealed   
,religion2 and that it is applied in    
such a way as to show that1 as it has   
already led to the worship of angels and
 saints1 so it may hereafter issue in   
the deification of ,nature1 which is    
,pantheism1 or in the separate worship  
of its component parts1 which is        
,polytheism2 and1 in either case1 the   
personality and supremacy of the one    
only1 the living and the true ,god1     
would be effectually superseded1 if not 
explicitly denied4  ,but1 is there any  
real danger of such a disastrous        
consummation8 ,we answer1 that the mere 
coexistence of the theory of            
,ecclesiastical ,development with the   
infidel speculations on the doctrine of 
,human ,progress is of itself an ominous
 symptom2 and1 further1 that the mutual 
interchange of complimentary            
acknowledgments between the ,infidel and
 ,popish parties is another1 especially 
when both are found to coincide in some 
of the main grounds of their opposition 

to ,scripture as the supreme rule of    
faith1 and when the homage which the    
advocates of ,development render to the 
theory of progress is responded to by   
glowing eulogiums from the infidel camp 
on the genius of ,catholicism as the    
masterpiece of human policy4 ,but there 
are other grounds of apprehension1      
arising more directly out of the very   
nature of the theory of ,development    
itself4  ,that theory has been described
 by ,dr4 ,brownson--himself a convert to
 ,catholicism--as the product of a      
school formed1 at first1 outside of the 
,church1 but now brought within her     
communion1 and compared1 in regard to   
its dangerousness1 with the speculations
 of ,hermes and ,lamennais4#id ,and a   
still more competent judge--,professor  
,sedgwick1 of ,cambridge#ie--;has       
characterized it as a monstrous compound
 of ,popery and ,pantheism1 according to
 which the ,catholic faith is not a     
religion revealed to us in the ,sacred  
,books we call canonical1 and in the    

works of the ,fathers which are supposed
 to contain the oral traditions of the  
,apostles and their followers2 but a new
 ,pantheistic element is to be fastened 
on the faith of men1--a principle of    
,development which may overshadow both  
the verbum ,dei scriptum and the verbum 
,dei non scriptum of the ,romish        
,church1 and change both the form and   
substance of primitive ,christianity4   
,it is only justice to ,mr4 ,newman to  
say that he appears to have been aware  
of this possible objection to his       
theory1 and that he makes an attempt to 
obviate it4 ,speaking of the difficulty 
which the ,church experienced in keeping
 ,paganism out of her pale1 he adverts  
to the hazard which attended on the     
development of the ,catholic            
ritual1--such as the honors publicly    
assigned to saints and martyrs1 the     
formal veneration of their relics1 and  
the usages and observances which        
followed4 ,and he asks3 ,what was to    
hinder the rise of a sort of refined    

,pantheism1 and the overthrow of        
,dogmatism pari passu with the          
multiplication of heavenly intercessors 
and patrons8 ,if what is called in      
reproach ',saint-worship' resembled the 
,polytheism which it supplanted1 or was 
a corruption1 how did ,dogmatism        
survive8 ,dogmatism is a religious      
profession of its own reality as        
contrasted with other systems2 but      
,polytheists are liberals1 and hold that
 one religion is as good as another4    
,yet the theological system was         
developing and strengthening1 as well as
 the monastic rule1 all the while the   
ritual was assimilating itself1 as      
,protestants say1 to the ,paganism of   
former ages4#if  ,it seems to be        
admitted in these words1 that1 in the   
past history of the ,church1 the        
development of the ,catholic ritual was 
attended with some danger of infection  
from ,paganism or ,pantheism2 and there 
may be equal reason to fear that1 in the
 future history of the ,church1 still   

working on the principle of development1
 that danger may be very considerably   
aggravated by the general prevalence of 
theories utterly inconsistent with the  
faith of primitive times4 ,what the     
,church has already done in the exercise
 of her developing power may be only a  
specimen of what she may hereafter      
accomplish4 ,she has already developed  
,christianity into a system which bears 
a striking resemblance to ,polytheism2  
she may yet develop it more fully1 so as
 to bring it into accordance with       
philosophical ,pantheism2 or1 retaining 
both forms1--for they are not           
necessarily exclusive of each           
other1--she may use the first in dealing
 with the ignorant1 and reserve the     
second as a sort of esoteric doctrine   
for minds of higher culture4 ,nor let it
 be said that we are either unjust or   
uncharitable towards the ,romish        
,church1 in suggesting the possibility  
of some such development2 for what she  
has already done1 and what she still    

claims the power of doing1 afford very  
sufficient ground for our remarks4 ,when
 ,dr4 ,conyers ,middleton published his 
celebrated ,letter from ,rome1 showing  
an exact conformity between ,popery and 
,paganism1 and that the religion of the 
present ,romans is derived from that of 
their ,heathen ancestors1 many liberal  
,catholics resented the imputation as an
 insult to their faith2 but now ,mr4    
,newman not only admits the fact that   
the ,church did assimilate its ritual to
 the ,paganism of former ages1 but      
vindicates her right to do so1 and      
ascribes to her a power of assimilation 
to which it seems impossible to assign  
any limits4 ,there is1 in truth1 says   
this writer1 a certain virtue or grace  
in the ,gospel1 which changes the       
quality of doctrines1 opinions1 usages1 
actions1 and personal characters1 which 
become incorporated with it1 and makes  
them right and acceptable to its ,divine
 ,author1 when before they were either  
contrary to truth1 or1 at best1 but     

shadows of it4--,confiding1 then1 in the
 power of ,christianity to resist the   
infection of evil1 and to transmute the 
very instruments and appendages of demon
 worship to an ,evangelical use1 444 the
 rulers of the ,church from early times 
were prepared1 should the occasion      
arise1 to adopt1 or imitate1 or sanction
 the existing rites and customs of the  
populace1 as well as the philosophy of  
the educated class4--,the ,church can   
extract good from evil1 or1 at least1   
gets no harm from it4 ,she inherits the 
promise made to the disciples1 that they
 should take up serpents1 and1 if they  
drank any deadly thing1 it should not   
hurt them4--,it has borne1 and can bear1
 principles or doctrines which1 in other
 systems of religion1 quickly degenerate
 into fanaticism or infidelity4 ,this   
marvellous power of assimilation1 which 
made those observances pious in         
,christianity that were superstitions in
 ,paganism1 advanced1 rapidly in its    
work1 and successively introduced the   

deification of man1 the cultus of angels
 and saints1 and the beatification of   
,mary as ,queen of heaven and earth4    
,the sanctification1 or rather the      
deification of the nature of ,man1 is   
one of these developments4 ,christ is in
 them1 because ,he is in human nature2  
and ,he communicates to them that       
nature1 deified by becoming ,his1 that  
it may deify them4 ,the worship of      
saints is another of these developments3
 ,those who are known to be ,god's      
adopted sons in ,christ are fit objects 
of worship on account of ,him who is in 
them4444 ,worship is the necessary      
correlative of glory2 and1 in the same  
sense in which created nature can share 
in the ,creator's incommunicable glory1 
do they also share in that worship which
 is ,his property alone4 ,but a new     
sphere was yet to be discovered in the  
realms of light1 to which the ,church   
had not yet assigned its inhabitant4    
,there was 'a wonder in heaven2' a      
throne was seen1 far above all created  

powers1 mediatorial1 intercessory2 a    
title archetypal2 a crown bright as the 
morning star2 a glory issuing from the  
,eternal ,throne2 robes pure as the     
heavens2 and a sceptre over all4 ,and   
who was the predestined heir of that    
,majesty8 ,who was that ,wisdom1 and    
what was her name8--'the ,mother of fair
 love1 and fear1 and holy hope1' exalted
 like a palm-tree in ,engaddi and a     
rose-plant in ,jericho1 created from the
 beginning before the world in ,god's   
counsels1 and 'in ,jerusalem was her    
power4' ,the vision is found in the     
,apocalypse1 a ,woman clothed with the  
,sun1 and the ,moon under her feet1 and 
upon her head a crown of twelve stars4  
,the ,,deification of ,mary is decreed4 
,the doctrine of her ,immaculate        
,conception is a further development at 
the present moment1 and who can tell    
what other developments may be in store 
for the future8  ,we advert to this form
 of the theory only in so far as it     
stands related to our great theme1--the 

existence1 perfections1 and prerogatives
 of the one only1 the living and the    
true ,god2 and it can scarcely be       
questioned1 we think1 that it has       
already introduced doctrines and        
practices into the ,church which have a 
manifest tendency to obscure the lustre 
and impair the evidence of some of the  
most fundamental articles of ,natural   
,religion4 ,let it still advance in the 
same direction1 and who shall assure us 
that it may not develop into still      
grosser idolatry1 or even into          
,pantheism8 ,why should it not develop1 
for example1 into ,sun worship8 ,on the 
new system1 says ,professor ,butler1 a  
modern growth of ,christian ,guebres    
might make out no feeble case2 the      
public religious recognition of this    
great visible type of the ,true ,light  
is but a fair development of 'the       
typical principle2' the justifiable     
imitation of the guilt of heathens in   
its adoration is but an instance of the 
transforming powers of 'the sacramental 

principle2' while it requires but the   
most moderate use of the great          
instrument of orthodoxy1 'mystical      
interpretation1' to find the duty hinted
 7clearly enough for watchful faith1    
though obscurely to the blinded or      
undevout7 in those passages that speak  
of a 'tabernacle for the ,sun1' or      
,deity itself being 'a ,sun1' or the    
rising of 'the ,sun of                  
righteousness4'444 ,indeed1 the whole   
body of the righteous are promised to   
'shine as the ,sun' in the heavenly     
kingdom1--an expression which1 though it
 appear superficially to refer to a     
period not yet arrived1 the ,church has 
correctively developed into an assurance
 of their present beatification1 and    
consequent right to worship2 while it   
must be at once manifest that1 if any   
representative emblem of the ,deity may 
demand religious prostration in our     
,churches1 the analogous emblem of the  
'deified1' in the great temple of the   
,material ,universe1 may fairly expect a

 participation in that honor4 ,it is    
true there is an express command1 ',take
 heed lest1 when thou seest the ,sun1   
444 thou shouldst be driven to worship  
them2' but so there is a command1 at    
least as distinct and imperative1       
against the worship of ,images1 which1  
,mr4 ,newman instructs us1 has been     
repealed under the ,gospel1 and was     
never more than a mere ,judaic          
prohibition1 'intended for mere         
temporary observance in the letter4'#ig 
,if it be said that1 in the case of the 
,church of ,rome1 there is not only a   
process of development1 but an          
infallible developing power1 and that   
this affords a guaranty1 strong as the  
,divine promise itself1 against that    
risk of error which is attendant on the 
ordinary methods of human teaching1--we 
answer1 that this is a mere assumption1 
which requires to be proved1 and that it
 cannot be proved in the face of the    
facts which attest the historical       
variations of the ,romish ,creed1 as    

these are admitted and defended by ,mr4 
,newman himself4 ,for some of these     
variations are not consistent           
developments of the primitive articles  
of faith1 but involve either a          
corruption or a contradiction of these  
very principles2 and if her             
infallibility has not preserved her from
 the deification of saints1 what        
security have we that it will preserve  
her from the deification of ,nature8 ,if
 it has already introduced a ,christian 
,polytheism1 why may it not issue in a  
,christian ,pantheism8  ,admit the      
principle of development1 and it may    
lead to the deification of man1 as well 
as to the worship of ,mary2 to a sacred 
,calendar of ,heroes1 as well as of     
,saints4#ih ,it may terminate either in 
,infidelity or in ,superstition1        
according to the mental temperament of  
the individual by whom it is adopted and
 applied4 ,an organ of investigation    
being introduced1 which may be employed 
for any purpose indifferently1 the      

tendency of such a theory of religious  
inquiry will just tell according to the 
spirit in which it acts4 ,a skeptic will
 develop the principle into ,infidelity1
 a believer into ,superstition2 but the 
principle itself remains accurately the 
same in both4#ii ,the connection between
 the theory of ,ecclesiastical          
,development and the infidel theory of  
,progress has not escaped the notice of 
many acute and profound thinkers in     
recent times1 nor the danger resulting  
from it to the most fundamental articles
 of faith4 ,modern ,spiritualists tell  
us that ,christianity is a development1 
as the ,papists also assert1 and the    
,new ,testament is its first and        
rudimentary product2 only1 unhappily1 as
 the development1 it seems1 may be      
things so different as ,popery and      
,infidelity1 we are as far as ever from 
any criterium as to which1 out of the   
ten thousand possible developments1 is  
the true2 but it is a matter of the less
 consequence1 since it will1 on such    

reasoning1 be always something          
future4#ajj ,one of the most pernicious 
tenets of the ,neologists beyond the    
,rhine is thus expressed by themselves3 
,christianity renews itself in the human
 heart1 and follows the development of  
the human mind1 and invests itself with 
new forms of thought and language1 and  
adopts new systems of ,church           
organization1 to which it gives         
expression and life4 444 ,but are these 
teachers the only destroyers of ,faith  
and ,morals8 ,are not they also         
chargeable with precisely the same      
offence who command us to submit        
implicitly to the so-called             
divinely-inspired ,spirit of 'one living
 ,infallible ,judge' or ',developing    
,power'8 ,can we have fixed articles of 
faith and morals in this system1 any    
more than in the other8 ,no4 ',unus     
utrisque error1 sed variis illudet      
partibus4' ,there is the same evil in   
both1 but it operates in different ways2
 in the former1 every one develops for  

himself2 in the latter1 the ,pope       
develops for every one4 ,you look with  
fear on the progress of ,rationalism2   
and what hope can any man derive from   
that of ,romanism8#aja         99       
99       99       99       99  ,we have 
examined1 each on its own peculiar      
merits1 the various forms of the ,theory
 of ,development which have been        
propounded in modern times1 and applied 
to account for the origin of planets and
 astral systems1 of vegetable and animal
 races1 and of the different successive 
systems of human opinion and belief4 ,we
 have found that1 imposing as it may    
seem to be1 and high as its pretensions 
are1 that theory has no claim to the    
character of a scientific doctrine2 that
 it is a mere hypothesis1 and nothing   
more2 a speculative figment1 which may  
be injurious to those who thoughtlessly 
dally with it1 but which can have no    
power to hurt any one who will          
resolutely lay hold of it1 and examine  
its claims4      ,gently1 softly1 touch 

a nettle1       ,and it stings you for  
your pains2     ,grasp it1 like a man of
 mettle1       ,and it soft as silk     
remains4  ,it is only necessary to add1 
that the same general principle seems to
 be involved in all the forms of this   
theory1--the principle1 namely1 that we 
are bound to account for the past only  
by causes known to be in actual         
operation at the present day4 ,m4 ,comte
 lays it down in the following terms3   
,our conjectures on the origin1 or      
formation of our world should evidently 
be subjected to this indispensable      
condition1--not to allow of the         
interposition of any other natural      
agents than those whose influence we    
clearly discern in our ordinary         
phenomena1 and whose operations1 then1  
would only be on a greater scale4       
,without this rule1 our work can have no
 truly scientific character1 and we     
shall fall into the inconvenience1 so   
justly made a ground of reproach to the 
greater number of geological            

hypotheses1--that of introducing1 for   
the purpose of explaining the ancient   
revolutions of the globe1 agencies which
 do not exist at the present day1 and   
whose influence it is impossible1 for   
that very reason1 to verify or even to  
comprehend4 ,the same principle is      
strongly stated1 but with due           
limitation1 by ,sir ,charles ,lyell1 who
 insists on the explanation of all      
terrestrial changes by means of causes  
and according to laws known to be in    
operation at the present day3 ,during   
the progress of ,geology1 there have    
been great fluctuations of opinion      
respecting the nature of the causes to  
which all former changes in the earth's 
surface are referable4 ,the first       
observers conceived that the monuments  
which the ,geologist endeavors to       
decipher relate to a period when the    
physical constitution of the earth      
differed entirely from the present1 and 
that1 even after the creation of living 
beings1 there have been causes in action

 distinct in kind or degree from these  
now forming part of the economy of      
nature4 ,these views have been gradually
 modified1 and some of them entirely    
abandoned4#ajb  ,the general principle  
which is involved in these and similar  
statements may be perfectly sound1 when 
it is applied merely to natural events1 
occurring in the ordinary course1 and   
according to the established            
constitution of the material and moral  
world2 but it is manifestly inapplicable
 to supernatural events1 such as the    
creation of the world1 or the revelation
 of ,divine truth1 since these events   
cannot be accounted for by any known    
natural cause1 and must be ascribed to  
the immediate agency of a ,higher       
,power4 ,without some such limitation1  
the general principle cannot be         
admitted1 since it would involve an     
egregious fallacy4 ,we must not limit   
,omnipotence by circumscribing the range
 of its possible exercise within the    
narrow bounds of the existing economy1  

or of our actual experience4 ,we are not
 warranted to assume that the origin of 
the world1 on the one hand1 or the      
establishment of ,christianity on the   
other1 may be accounted for by natural  
causes still known to be in actual      
operation4 ,in regard to natural events 
the principle is sound1 and it is       
rigorously adhered to by the expounder  
of ,natural ,theology2 in regard to     
supernatural events it can have no      
legitimate application1 except in so far
 as it is combined with the doctrine of 
efficient and final causes1 which leads 
us up to the recognition of a ,higher   
,power4 ,it might be safe and legitimate
 enough1 when we find a fossil organism 
imbedded in the earth1 to ascribe its   
production to the ordinary law of       
generation1 even although we had not    
witnessed the fact of its birth1        
provided the same species is known to   
have existed previously2 but when we    
find new races coming into being1 for   
which the ordinary law of derivation    

cannot account1 we are not at liberty to
 apply the same rule to a case so       
essentially different1 and still less to
 postulate a spontaneous generation1 or 
a transmutation of species1 for which we
 have no experience at all4 ,in such a  
case1 we can only reason on the         
principle that like effects must have   
like causes1 that marks of design imply 
a designing cause1 and that events which
 cannot be accounted for by natural     
causes must be ascribed to a ,power     
distinct from nature1 and superior to   
it4 ,it is manifestly unreasonable to   
assume that nothing can be brought to   
pass in the ,universe otherwise than by 
the operation of the same natural laws  
which are now in action2 or that1 in the
 course of our limited and partial      
experience1 we must necessarily know all
 the agencies that may have been at work
 during the long flow of time4 ,and1 in 
accordance with these views1 ,sir       
,charles ,lyell expressly limits the    
general principle to natural events1 and

 shows that ,geology differs as widely  
from ,cosmogony as speculations         
concerning the ,creation of ,man differ 
from his ,history4  ,,footnotes3  #bh   
,vestiges of the ,natural ,history of   
,creation1 p4 #ag4  #bi ,,auguste       
,,comte1 ,cours de ,philosophic         
,positive1 ,,ii4 #cfc1 #cgf4 ,the merits
 of this attempt are very differently   
estimated by two competent authorities2 
by ,,professor ,,sedgwick in the        
,edinburgh ,review1 ,no4 #hb1 p4 #bb2   
and by ,,sir ,,david ,,brewster in the  
,north ,british ,review1 ,no4 #c1 p4    
#dgf4  #cj ,vestiges1 p4 #aa1 #bc4  #ca 
,,whewell1 ,indications of a ,creator4  
,,sedgwick',s ,discourse1 #eth edition4 
,edinburgh ,review1 ,no4 #hb4 ,,sir ,d4 
,,brewster1 ,north ,british ,review1    
,no4 #c4 ,,professor ,,dod1 ,princeton  
,theological ,essays1 second series4 ,h4
 ,,miller1 ,footprints of the ,creator4 
,t4 ,,monck ,,mason1 ,creation by the   
,immediate ,agency of ,god4  #cb        
,,thomas ,,monck ,,mason1 ,creation by  

the ,immediate ,agency of ,god1 as      
opposed to ,creation by ,natural ,law2  
being a ,refutation of ',the ,vestiges1'
 c41 p4 #cd4  #cc ,,sir ,,john          
,,herschell1 ,memoir on ,nebul and      
,clusters of ,stars1 ,london            
,philosophical ,transactions1 #ahcc4    
,edinburgh ,review1 ,no4 #hb1 p4 #ai4   
#cd ,north ,british ,review1 ,no4 #c1 p4
 #dgg4  #ce ,,professor ,,nichol1 ,the  
,system of the ,world1 ,preface1 ,,vi41 
and #ajh4  #cf ,ecclesiastes #ab3 #a4   
#cg ,,lorenz ,,oken1 ,m4 ,d41 ,elements 
of ,physio-philosophy1--reprinted       
7unfortunately7 under the auspices of   
the ,ray ,society1 ,london1 #ahdg4  #ch 
,,dr4 ,,john ,,barclay1 ,inquiry        
concerning ,life and ,organization1 pp4 
#cc1 #cf4 ,see also pp4 #agg1 #bce1     
#dac1 #ebf4  #ci ,telliamed2 ou1        
,entretiens d'un ,philosophe ,indien    
avec un ,missionaire ,franois1 sur la   
,diminution de la ,mer1 la ,formation de
 la ,terre1 l',origine de l',homme1 #b  
vols41 #agdh4  #dj ,vestiges of the     

,natural ,history of ,creation1 #fth    
edition1 p4 #ij4  #da ,,mr4 ,,hugh      
,,miller1 ,footprints of the ,creator1  
p4 #bbf4  #db ,north ,british ,review1  
#ahde1 p4 #dhc4  #dc ,vestiges of the   
,natural ,history of ,creation1 p4 #ib4 
#dd ,the ,vestiges1 p4 #ajd4  #de ,ibid4
  #df ,,todd1 ,cyclopdia of ,anatomy and
 ,physiology1 article1 ,generation4  #dg
 ,,mr4 ,,hugh ,,miller1 ,footprints of  
the ,creator1 p4 #bcc4 ,t4 ,,monck      
,,mason1 ,creation by the ,immediate    
,agency of ,god4 ,princeton ,theological
 ,essays1 ,second ,series1 p4 #dbb4  #dh
 ,,cuvier1 ,ossemens ,fossiles1 p4 #fa4 
#di ,,mr4 ,,hugh ,,miller1 ,footprints1 
p4 #bed4  #ej ,,dr4 ,,whewell',s        
,indications1 p4 #ed4  #ea ,footprints  
of the ,creator1 p4 #ai4  #eb ,the      
,vestiges1 p4 #aje4  #ec ,the ,vestiges1
 pp4 #ia1 #if4  #ed ,the ,vestiges1 p4  
#i4  #ee ,,hugh ,,miller1 ,footprints1  
pp4 #ac1 #ae4 ,,professor ,,dod1        
,princeton ,theological ,essays1 ,,ii4  
#dcb4  #ef ,,cicero1 ,de ,natur ,deorum1

 ,l4 ,,ii4  #eg ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours de  
,philosophie ,positive1 ,i4 #c1 #f1 #ad2
 ,,iv4 viii41 #fec1 #fef1 #gjh1 #gaa1   
#gbc2 ,v4 #a1 #i4  #eh ,m4 ,,comte1     
,cours de la ,philosophie ,positive1 ,i4
 #c4  #ei ,ibid41 ,v4 #cj1 #db1 #ej1    
#if1 #ih1 #aja4  #fj ,m4 ,,comte1       
,cours1 ,v4 #cg1 #ge1 #ia1 #aja4  #fa   
,ibid41 ,v4 #eh1 #hg1 #id1 #aje1 #abe1  
#bgh4  #fb ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,v4     
#ajg1 #aae1 #aai1 #abd1 #acf1 #adh1     
#afb1 #afg1 #bjg1 #bbd1 #bbi4  #fc      
,ibid41 ,v4 #abh1 #afd1 #bfh1 #bgi1     
#bha1 #bij4  #fd ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1   
,v4 #big1 #cbe1 #dfa1 #dgj2 ,,vi4 #bca4 
#fe ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,v4 #dgi1 #dhg1
 #dif1 #eje2 ,,vi4 #b4  #ff ,,comte1    
,cours1 ,i4 #d1 #aj2 ,,iv4 #ffd1 #ffi1  
#fgf1 #gjb4  #fg ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1   
,v4 #bii1 #cbf1 #cde2 ,,vi4 #fb1 #gb1   
#aeg1 #bcd1 #ejc1 #hfd4  #fh ,,abb      
,,maret1 ,theodice ,chretienne1 p4 #bah4
  #fi ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,v4 #cbg1    
#cdd1 #cfi1 #ech1 #ehb1 #fhd2 ,,vi4     
#acg4  #gj ,ibid41 ,v4 #dbh1 #eig1 #fhd1

 #hcf2 ,,vi4 #dai1 #eba1 #hfj4  #ga ,m4 
,,comte1 ,cours1 ,i4 #dd1 #ada2 ,,iv4   
#fgc2 ,v4 #de1 #cjc4  #gb ,,victor      
,,cousin1 ,introduction a l',histoire de
 la ,philosophie1 ,i4 #aba4 ,ibid41     
,cours de la ,philosophie1 ,,iii4 #b1   
#dfd4  #gc ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,v4 #c1 
#e1 #bb2 ,,vi4 #cb1 #dha4  #gd ,m4      
,,comte1 ,cours1 ,v4 #chb1 ,premier     
fondateur1 rel ou ideal1 de ce grand    
systme religieux4  #ge ,encyc4 ,britan41
 articles ,augury and ,divination4 ,,dr4
 ,,thomson',s ,history of ,chemistry4   
#gf ,,mr4 ,h4 ,,miller',s ,scenes and   
,legends of the ,north of ,scotland4    
#gg ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,i4 #ac2 ,v4   
#dfa1 #dgj2 ,,vi4 #hf1 #abf1 #adh4  #gh 
,,dr4 ,,cudworth1 ,intellectual ,system1
 ,i4 #cc4  #gi ,westminster ,confession 
of ,faith1 chap4 ,v4  #b1 #c4  #hj      
,,strauss1 ,life of ,jesus1 ,i4 #hh4    
,,henry ,,rogers1 ,reason and ,faith1   
,appendix1 p4 #if4  #ha ,,dr4           
,,chalmers' ,works1 ,i4 ,natural        
,theology4  #hb ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,i4

 #g4  #hc ,,montaigne1 ,apology for     
,raimond de ,sebonde1 ,essays1 ,,ii4    
#adh4  #hd ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,,vi41      
,preface1 ,,ix4  #he ,,dr4 ,,andrew     
,,thomson1 ,sermons on ,infidelity1 p4  
#fb4  #hf ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,,iv4    
#gji3 ,je puis affirmer n'avoir jamais  
trouv d'argumentation srieuse en        
opposition  cette loi1 depuis dix-sept  
ans que j'ai eu le bonheur de la        
decouvrir1 si ce n'est celle que l'on   
fondait sur la consideration de la      
simultaneit jusq'ici necessairement trs 
commune1 des trois philosophies chez les
 mmes intelligences4 ,cours1 ,i4 #bg1   
#ej1 #aj3 ,l'emploi simultan des trois  
philosophies radicalement               
incompatibles1--la coxistence de ces    
trois philosophies opposes4 ,see also   
,,iv4 #fhc1 #fid2 ,v4 #bh1 #ci1 #da1    
#eg1 #aga2 ,,vi4 #bf1 #ca1 #cd1 #aee4   
#hg ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,i4 #ad3 ,en   
considerant comme absolument            
inaccessible et vide de sens pour nous  
la recherche de ce qu'on appelle les    

causes1 soit premires1 soit finales4    
#hh ,,sir ,,james ,,mackintosh1 ,encyc41
 ,britan41 ,preliminary ,dissertation1  
p4 #ced4  #hi ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,,iv4
 #ffd4  #ij ,ibid41 ,,vi4 #gbh1 #gcj1   
#gfj1 #hbf1 #hce1 #hff4  #ia ,,newman',s
 ,essay on ,development1 p4 #bg4  #ib   
,,newman',s ,essay on ,development1 p4  
#ch4  #ic ,ibid41 p4 #ie4  #id          
,,brownson',s ,quarterly ,review1 ,no4  
#a1 p4 #dc4  #ie ,,sedgwick',s          
,discourse1 ,fourth ,edition4 ,preface1 
,,cccxciii4  #if ,,newman',s ,essay1 p4 
#ddg4  #ig ,letters of ,rev4 ,w4 ,a4    
,,butler on the ,development of         
,christian ,doctrine1 p4 #aaf4  #ih     
,,pierre ,,leroux1 ,sur l',humanite4    
,,augustus ,,comte1 ,positive ,calendar4
 ,the author gave some account of this  
in an article contributed to the ,north 
,british ,review1 ,may1 #ahea4  #ii     
,,professor ,,butler',s ,letters1 p4    
#hg4  #ajj ,eclipse of ,faith1 p4 #ac4  
#aja ,,dr4 ,,wordsworth1 ,letters to ,m4
 ,gondon1 p4 #aec4  #ajb ,,lyell1       

,principles of ,geology1 ,i4 #ge4       
,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,theories ,,of       
,,pantheism4   ,at the commencement of  
the present century1 ,pantheism might   
have been justly regarded and safely    
treated as an obsolete and exploded     
error1--an error which still prevailed1 
indeed1 in the ,east as one of the      
hereditary beliefs of ,indian           
superstition1 but which1 when           
transplanted to ,western ,europe by the 
daring genius of ,spinoza1 was found to 
be an exotic too sickly to take root and
 grow amidst the fresh and bracing air  
of modern civilization4  ,but no one who
 has marked the recent tendencies of    
speculative thought1 and who is         
acquainted1 however slightly1 with the  
character of modern literature1 can have
 failed to discern a remarkable change  
in this respect within the last fifty   
years4 ,german philosophy1 always       
prolific1 and often productive of       
monstrous births1 has given to the world
 many elaborate systems1 physical and   

metaphysical1 whose most prominent      
feature is the deification of ,nature or
 of ,man4 ,france1 always alert and     
lively1 has appropriated the ideas of   
her more ponderous neighbors1 and has   
given them currency through educated    
,europe on the wings of her lighter     
literature4 ,and even in ,england and   
,america there are not wanting some     
significant tokens of a disposition to  
cherish a kind of speculation which1 if 
it be not formally and avowedly         
,pantheistic1 has much of the same      
dreamy and mystic character1 and little1
 if any1 harmony with definite views of 
,god1 or of the relations which ,he     
bears to man4  ,one of the most         
significant symptoms of a reaction in   
favor of ,pantheism may be seen in the  
numerous republications and versions of 
the writings of ,spinoza which have     
recently appeared1 in the public homage 
which has been paid to his character and
 genius1 and in the more than           
philosophic tolerance--the kindly       

indulgence--which has been shown to his 
most characteristic principles4 ,he is  
now recognized by many as the real      
founder both of the ,philosophic and of 
the ,exegetic ,rationalism1 which has   
been applied1 with such disastrous      
effect1 to the interpretation alike of  
the volume of ,nature and of the records
 of ,revelation4 ,in ,germany his works 
have been edited by ,paulus 7#ahjc7 and 
by ,gfrrer 7#ahcj72 in ,france they have
 been translated by ,emile ,saisset1    
,professor of ,philosophy in the ,royal 
,college2 while a copious account of his
 life and writings has been published by
 ,amand ,saintes1 the historian of      
,rationalism in ,germany4#ajc ,all this 
might be accounted for by ascribing it  
simply to the admiration of             
philosophical thinkers for the          
extraordinary talents of the man2 and it
 might be said that his writings have   
been reprinted1 just as those of ,hobbes
 have been recently reproduced in       
,england1 more as a historical monument 

of the past than as a mirror that       
reflects the sentiments of the present  
age4 ,but it is more difficult to       
explain the eulogiums with which the    
reappearance of ,spinoza has been       
greeted1 and the cordiality with which  
his daring speculations have been       
received4 ,he has not only been         
exculpated from the charge of ,atheism1 
but even panegyrized as a saint and     
martyr6 ,that holy and yet outcast man1 
exclaimed ,schleiermacher1--he who was  
fully penetrated by the universal       
,spirit1--for whom the ,infinite was the
 beginning and the end1 and the         
,universe his only and everlasting      
love1--he who1 in holy innocence and    
profound peace1 delighted to contemplate
 himself in the mirror of an eternal    
world1 where1 doubtless1 he saw himself 
reflected as its most lovely image1--he 
who was full of the sentiment of        
religion1 because he was filled with the
 ,holy ,spirit6 ,instead of accusing    
,spinoza of ,atheism1 says ,m4 ,cousin1 

he should rather be subjected to the    
opposite reproach4#ajd ,he has been     
loudly accused1 says ,professor         
,saisset1 of ,atheism and impiety4444   
,the truth is that never did a man      
believe in ,god with a faith more       
profound1 with a soul more sincere1 than
 ,spinoza4 ,take ,god from him1 and you 
take from him his system1 his thought1  
his life4 ,spinoza1 although a ,jew1    
says the ,abb ,sabatier1 a member of the
 ,catholic clergy1 always lived as a    
,christian1 and was as well versed in   
our divine ,testament as in the books of
 the ancient ,law4 ,if he ended1 as we  
cannot doubt he did1 in embracing       
,christianity1 he ought to be enrolled  
in the rank of saints1 instead of being 
placed at the head of the enemies of    
,god4  ,contrast the language in which  
,spinoza is now compared to ,thomas     
,kempis1 and proposed as a fit subject  
for canonization itself1 with the terms 
in which he was wont to be spoken of by 
men of former times2 and the startling  

difference will sufficiently indicate a 
great change in the current of ,european
 thought4 ,and if we add to this the    
contemporaneous reappearance of such    
writers as ,bruno and ,vanini1 whose    
works have been reprinted by the active 
philosophical press of ,paris1 we may be
 well assured that it is not by         
overlooking or despising such           
speculations1 but by boldly confronting 
and closely grappling with them1 that we
 shall best protect the mind of the     
thinking community from their insidious 
and pestilent influence4  ,but we are   
not left to infer the existence1 in many
 quarters1 of a prevailing tendency     
towards ,pantheism1 from such facts as  
have been stated1 significant as they   
are2 we have explicit testimonies on the
 point1 in a multitude of writings1     
philosophical and popular1 which have   
recently issued from the ,continental   
press4 ,in a report presented to the    
,academy of ,sciences1 ,m4 ,franck1 a   
member of the ,institute1 represents    

,pantheism as the last and greatest of  
all the ,metaphysical systems which have
 come into collision with ,revelation2  
and describes it as a theory1 according 
to which spirit and matter1 thought and 
extension1 the phenomena of the soul and
 of the body1 are all equally related1  
either as attributes or modes1 to the   
same substance or being1 at once one and
 many1 finite and infinite1--,humanity1 
,nature1 ,god4 ,conceiving that the     
older forms of error--,dualism and      
,materialism--have all but disappeared2 
and that ,atheism1 in its gross         
mechanical form1 cannot now1 as         
,broussais himself said1 find entrance  
into a well-made head which has         
seriously meditated on nature1 ,m4      
,franck concludes that ,pantheism alone1
 such as has been conceived and         
developed in ,germany1 is likely to have
 the power of seducing serious minds1   
and that it may for a season exert      
considerable influence as an antagonist 
to ,christianity4#aje ,m4 ,javari gives 

a similar testimony4 ,he tells us that  
that great lie1 which is called         
,pantheism 7ce grand mensonge qu'on     
appelle le ,pantheisme71 has dragged    
,german philosophy into an abyss2 that  
it is fascinating a large number of     
minds among his own countrymen2 and that
 it is this doctrine1 rather than any   
other1 which will soon gather around it 
all those who do not know or who reject 
the truth4#ajf ,the ,biographer of      
,spinoza1 referring to the recent       
progress and prospective prevalence of  
these views1 affirms that the tendency  
of the age1 in matters of ,philosophy1  
,morals1 and ,religion1 seems to incline
 towards ,pantheism2 that the time is   
come when every one who will not frankly
 embrace the pure and simple            
,christianity of the ,gospel will be    
obliged to acknowledge ,spinoza as his  
chief1 unless he be willing to expose   
himself to ridicule2 that ,germany is   
already saturated with his principles2  
that his philosophy domineers over all  

the contemporary systems1 and will      
continue to govern them until men are   
brought to believe that word1 ',no man  
hath seen ,god at any time1 but ,he who 
was in the bosom of the ,father hath    
revealed ,him2' that it is this         
,pantheistic philosophy1 boldly avowed1 
towards which the majority of those     
writers who have the talent of          
commanding public interest are          
gravitating at the present day2 and that
 the ultimate struggle will be1 not     
between ,christianity and ,philosophy1  
but between ,christianity and           
,spinozism1 its strongest and most      
inveterate antagonist4#ajg ,and the     
critical reviewer of ,pantheism1 whose  
,essay is said to have been the first   
effective check to its progress in the  
philosophical schools of ,paris1 gives a
 similar testimony4 ,he tells us that it
 was his main object to point out the   
,pantheistic tendencies of the age2 to  
show that ,germany and ,france are      
deeply imbued with its spirit2 that both

 ,philosophy and ,poetry have been      
infected by it2 that this is the        
veritable heresy of the nineteenth      
century2 and that1 when the most current
 beliefs are analyzed1 they resolve     
themselves into ,pantheism1 avowed or   
disguised4#ajh  ,a few specimens of this
 mode of thinking may be added in       
confirmation of these statements4       
,lessing1 as reported by ,jacobi1       
expressed his satisfaction with the poem
 ,prometheus1 saying3 ,this poet's point
 of view is my own2 the orthodox ideas  
on the ,divinity no longer suit me2 ,i  
derive no profit from them3 ,greek3 hen 
kai pan1--7un et tout1 the one and the  
all71--,i know no other4 ,schelling1 in 
his earlier writings1 while he was      
,professor at ,jena1 and before the     
change of sentiment which he avowed at  
,berlin1 represented ,god as the one    
only true and really absolute existence2
 as nothing more or less than ,being1   
filling the whole sphere of reality2 as 
the infinite ,being 7,seyn7 which is the

 essence of the ,universe1 and evolves  
all things from itself by               
self-development4 ,hegel seeks unity in 
every thing and every where4 ,this unity
 he discovers in the identity of        
existence and thought1 in the one       
substance which exists and thinks1 in   
,god who manifests and develops himself 
in many forms4 ,the ,absolute produces  
all and absorbs all2 it is the essence  
of all things4 ,the life of the         
,absolute is never consummated or       
complete4 ,god does not properly exist1 
but comes into being3 ',gott ist in     
werden4'--,deus est in fieri4 ,with him 
,god is not a ,person1 but ,personality1
 which realizes itself in every human   
consciousness as so many thoughts of one
 eternal ,mind4444 ,apart from1 and out 
of the world1 therefore1 there is no    
,god2 and so1 also1 apart from the      
universal consciousness of man1 there is
 no ,divine consciousness or            
personality4 ,god is with him the whole 
process of thought1 combining in itself 

the objective movement1 as seen in      
,nature1 with the subjective1 as seen in
 ,logic2 and fully realizing itself only
 in--the universal spirit of            
,humanity4#aji  ,we select only two     
specimens from the recent literature of 
,france2 they might be multiplied       
indefinitely4 ,pierre ,leroux1 the      
editor of the ,encyclopedie ,nouvelle1  
says1 in his ,essay on ,humanity1       
dedicated to the poet ,beranger3--,it is
 the ,god immanent in the ,universe1 in 
,humanity1 in each ,man1 that ,i        
adore4--,the worship of ,humanity was   
the worship of ,voltaire4--,what1 is    
,humanity considered as comprehending   
all men8 ,is it something1 or is it     
nothing but an abstraction of our mind8 
,is ,humanity a collective being1 or is 
it nothing but a series of individual   
men8--,being1 or the soul1 is eternal by
 its nature4 ,being1 or the soul1 is    
infinite by its nature4 ,being1 or the  
soul1 is permanent and unchangeable by  
its nature4 ,being1 or the soul1 is one 

by its nature4 ,being1 or the soul1 is  
,god by its nature4--,socrates has      
proved our eternity and the divinity of 
our nature4#aaj ,the next specimen is a 
singular but very instructive one4 ,it  
is derived from the treatise of ,m4     
,crousse1 who holds that intelligence is
 a property or an effect of matter2 that
 the world is a great body1 which has   
sense1 spirit1 and reason2 that matter1 
in appearance the most cold and         
insensible1 is in reality animated1 and 
capable of engendering thought4 ,it     
might be amusing1 were it not           
melancholy1 to refer to one of his      
proofs of this position3 ,une horologe  
mesure le temps2 certes1 c'est l un     
effet intellectuel produit par une cause
 physique6#aaa ,his grand principle is  
the doctrine of what he calls           
,unisubstancisme1 and it is applied     
equally to the nature of ,god and the   
soul of man4 ,god is admitted1 but it is
 the ,god of ,pantheism1--,nature1      
including matter and mind1 but excluding

 any higher power4 ,god is the          
self-existent ,being1 which includes    
all1 and beyond which no other can be   
imagined4 ,the ,infinite is identical   
with the ,universe4--,god is and can    
only be the whole of that which exists4 
,let us proclaim it aloud1 that the     
echoes may repeat it1 ,god1 the ,great  
,being1 is the ,all1 and the ,all is    
,one4 ,god is every thing that exists2  
the ,universe1 that is the supreme      
,being4 ,in it are life eternal1 power1 
wisdom1 knowledge1 perfect organization1
 all the qualities1 in a word1 that are 
inseparable from the ,divinity4 ,beyond 
the universe1 or apart from it1 there is
 nothing 7neant72 above the visible     
world and its laws there is for         
man--nullit4  ,it is deeply humbling to 
think that1 in the light of the         
nineteenth century1 and in the very     
centre of ,european civilization1       
speculations such as these should have  
found authors to publish1 and readers to
 purchase them4 ,need we wonder that    

several ,catholic writers on the        
continent1 conversant with the works    
which are daily issuing from the press1 
and familiar with the state of society  
in which they live1 have publicly       
expressed their apprehension that1      
unless some seasonable and effective    
check can be given to the progress of   
this fearful system1 we may yet witness 
the restoration of ,polytheistic worship
 and the revival of ,paganism in        
,europe8#aab  ,the most cursory review  
of the history of ,pantheism#aac will   
serve to convince every reflecting      
reader that it must have its origin in  
some natural but strangely perverted    
principle of the human mind2 and that   
its recent reappearance in ,europe      
affords an additional and very          
unexpected proof that1 like the weeds   
which spring up1 year after year1 in the
 best cultivated field1 it must have its
 roots or seeds deep in the soil4 ,in   
the annals of our race1 we find it      
exhibited in two distinct forms2 first1 

as a ,religious doctrine1 and1 secondly1
 as a ,philosophical system4 ,it had its
 birthplace in the ,east1 where the     
gorgeous magnificence of ,nature was    
fitted to arrest the attention and to   
stimulate the imagination of a subtle1  
dreamy1 and speculative people4 ,the    
primitive doctrine of ,creation was soon
 supplanted by the pagan theory of      
,emanation4 ,the ,indian ,brahm is the  
first and only ,substance1 infinite1    
absolute1 indeterminate ,being1 from    
which all is evolved1 manifested1       
developed1 and to which all returns and 
is reabsorbed4 ,the ,vedanta philosophy 
is based on this fundamental principle1 
and it has been well described as the   
most rigorous system of ,pantheism which
 has ever appeared4  ,we learn from the 
writings of ,greece that a similar      
system prevailed in ,egypt1 different1  
indeed1 in form1 and expressed in other 
terms1 but resting on the same ultimate 
ground2 and we know that ,christianity  
found one of its earliest and most      

formidable antagonists in the           
philosophical school of ,alexandria1    
which was deeply imbued with a          
,pantheistic spirit1 and which1 perhaps 
for that reason1 has recently become an 
object of much interest to speculative  
minds in ,france and ,germany4 ,the     
,gnostic and the ,neoplatonic sects     
maintained1 and the writings of         
,plotinus and ,proclus still exhibit1   
many principles the same in substance   
with those which have been recently     
revived in ,continental ,europe4 ,in the
 earlier as well as the later literature
 of ,greece we find traces of           
,pantheism1 while the ,polytheistic     
worship1 which universally prevailed1   
was its natural product and appropriate 
manifestation4 ,the ancient ,orphic     
doctrines1 which were taught in the     
,mysteries1 seem to have been based on  
the oriental idea of ,emanation4 ,even  
in the masculine literature of ,rome we 
find numerous passages which are still  
quoted1 with glowing admiration1 by the 

,pantheists of modern times4#aad ,there 
is1 indeed1 but too much reason to      
believe that the numerous references    
which occur in the ,classics to the     
existence of one absolute and supreme   
,being1 and which ,dr4 ,cudworth has so 
zealously collected1 with the view of   
proving the naturality of the idea of   
,god1 must be interpreted1 at least in  
many instances1 in a ,pantheistic sense1
 and that they imply nothing more than  
the recognition of one parent           
,substance1 from which all other beings 
have been successively developed4  ,we  
find some lingering remains of          
,pantheism in the writings of the middle
 age4 ,scot ,erigena1 in his work1 ,de  
,divisione ,natur1 sums up his theory by
 saying3 ,all is ,god1 and ,god is all4 
,amaury de ,chartres made use of similar
 language4 ,and it must have been more  
widely diffused in these times than many
 may be ready to believe1 if it be true1
 as the ,abb ,maret affirms1 and as ,m4 
de ,hammer offers to prove1 that the    

,knights of the ,order of the ,temple   
were affiliated to secret societies in  
which the doctrines of ,gnosticism and  
the spirit of ,pantheism were maintained
 and cherished4#aae ,it reappeared in   
the philosophical schools of ,italy     
before the dawn1 and during the early   
progress1 of the revival of letters and 
the ,reformation of ,religion2#aaf and  
even now1 after three centuries of      
scientific progress and social          
advancement1 it is once more rising into
 formidable strength1 and aspiring to   
universal ascendancy4  ,from this rapid 
survey of the history of the past1 it is
 clear that ,pantheism is one of the    
oldest and most inveterate forms of     
error2 that in its twofold character1 as
 at once a philosophy and a faith1 it   
possesses peculiar attractions for that 
class of minds which delight to         
luxuriate in mystic speculation2 and    
that1 in the existing state of society1 
it may be reasonably regarded as the    
most formidable rival to ,natural and   

,revealed ,religion4 ,we are far from   
thinking1 indeed1 that the old          
mechanical and materialistic ,atheism is
 so completely worn out or so utterly   
exploded as some recent writers would   
have us to believe2#aag for ,m4 ,comte  
and his school still avow that wretched 
creed1 while they profess to despise    
,pantheism1 as a system of empty        
abstractions4 ,we do think1 however1    
that the grand ultimate struggle between
 ,christianity and ,atheism will resolve
 itself into a contest between          
,christianity and ,pantheism4 ,for1 in  
the ,christian sense1 ,pantheism is     
itself ,atheistic1 since it denies the  
,divine personality1 and ascribes to the
 universe those attributes which belong 
only to the living ,god2 but then it is 
a distinct and very peculiar form of    
,atheism1 much more plausible in its    
pretensions1 more fascinating to the    
imagination1 and less revolting to the  
reason1 than those colder and coarser   
theories which ascribed the origin of   

the world to a fortuitous concourse of  
atoms1 or to the mere mechanical laws of
 matter and motion4 ,it admits much     
which the ,atheism of a former age would
 have denied2 it recognizes the         
principle of causality1 and gives a     
reason1 such as it is1 for the existing 
order of ,nature2 it adopts the very    
language of ,theism1 and speaks of the  
,infinite1 the ,eternal1 the            
,unchangeable ,one2 it may even generate
 a certain mystic piety1 in which       
elevation of thought may be blended with
 sensibility of emotion1 springing from 
a warm admiration of ,nature2 and it    
admits of being embellished with the    
charms of a seductive eloquence1 and the
 graces of a sentimental poetry4 ,it may
 be regarded1 therefore1 not indeed as  
the only1 but as the most formidable    
rival of ,christian ,theism at the      
present day4  ,we have sometimes thought
 that the recent discoveries of         
,chemical ,science might have a         
tendency1 at least in the case of       

superficial minds1 to create a          
prepossession in favor of ,pantheism2   
for what does modern ,chemistry exhibit1
 but the spectacle of ,nature passing   
through a series of successive          
transmutations8--the same substance     
appearing in different forms1 and       
assuming in every change different      
properties1 but never annihilated1 never
 destroyed2 now existing in the form of 
solid matter1 again in the form of a    
yielding fluid1 again in the form of an 
elastic gas2 now nourishing a plant1 and
 entering into its very substance2 now  
incorporated with an animal1 and forming
 its sinews or its bones2 now reduced   
again to dust and ashes1 but only to    
appear anew1 and enter once more into   
other combinations4 ,the facts are      
certain1 and they are sufficiently      
striking to suggest the question1 ,may  
not ,nature itself be the one ,being    
whose endless transformations constitute
 the history of the universe8 ,this     
question may be naturally suggested1 and

 it may even be lawfully entertained2   
but it cannot be satisfactorily         
determined by any theory which leaves   
the evident marks of ,intelligence and  
,design in the whole constitution and   
course of ,nature unaccounted for or    
unexplained4  ,influenced by these and  
similar considerations1 many thoughtful 
men have recently avowed their belief   
that the two grand alternatives in      
modern times are1 ,christianity and     
,pantheism4 ,the ,abb ,maret and ,amand 
,saintes differ only in this3 that by   
,christianity the former means          
,catholicism1 the latter means the      
,gospel1 or the religion of the         
primitive church2 but both agree that   
,pantheism is the only other            
alternative4 ,schlegel contrasts the    
same alternatives in the following      
impressive terms3 ,here is the decisive 
point2 two distinct1 opposite1 or       
diverging paths lie before us1 and man  
must choose between them4 ,the          
clear-seeing spirit1 which1 in its      

sentiments1 thoughts1 and views of life1
 would be in accordance with itself1 and
 would act consistently with them1 must1
 in any case1 take one or the other4    
,either there is a living ,god1 full of 
love1 even such a ,one as love seeks and
 yearns after1 to whom faith clings1 and
 in whom all our hopes are centred 7and 
such is the personal ,god of            
,revelation71--and on this hypothesis   
the world is not ,god1 but is distinct  
from ,him1 having had a beginning1 and  
being created out of nothing1--or there 
is only one supreme form of existence1  
and the world is eternal1 and not       
distinct from ,god2 there is absolutely 
but ,one1 and this eternal ,one         
comprehends all1 and is itself all in   
all2 so that there is no where any real 
and essential distinction1 and even that
 which is alleged to exist between evil 
and good is only a delusion of a        
narrow-minded system of ,ethics4444     
,now1 the necessity of this choice and  
determination presses urgently upon our 

own time1 which stands midway between   
two worlds4 ,generally1 it is between   
these two paths alone that the decision 
is to be made4#aah  ,we have made the   
preceding remarks on purpose to show    
that the distinctive doctrines of       
,pantheism1 as a system different1 in   
some respects1 from the colder forms of 
,atheism1 demand the careful study of   
the ,divines and the ,philosophers of   
the present age2 and that any statement 
of the evidence in favor of the being   
and perfections of ,god1 which overlooks
 the prevalence of these doctrines1 or  
makes only a cursory reference to them1 
must be alike defective in itself1 and  
ill adapted to the real exigencies of   
,european society4 ,let this be our     
apology for attempting1 as we now       
propose1 to exhibit an outline of the   
,pantheistic system1 to resolve it into 
its constituent elements and ultimate   
grounds1 to examine the validity of the 
reasons on which it rests1 and to       
contrast it with the doctrine of        

,christian ,theism1 which speaks of a   
living1 personal ,god1 and of a distinct
 but dependent ,creation1 the product of
 ,his supreme wisdom and almighty power4
 ,the task is one of considerable       
difficulty1--difficulty arising not so  
much from the nature of the subject1 as 
from the metaphysical and abstruse      
manner in which it has been treated4 ,we
 must follow ,spinoza through the       
labyrinth of his ,theological ,politics 
and his ,geometrical ,ethics2 we must   
follow ,schelling and ,hegel into the   
still darker recesses of their          
,transcendental ,philosophy2 for a      
philosophy of one kind can only be met  
and neutralized by a higher and a       
better1 and the first firm step towards 
the refutation of error is a thorough   
comprehension of it4 ,but having an     
assured faith in those stable laws of   
thought which are inwoven with the very 
texture of the human mind1 and in the   
validity and force of that natural      
evidence to which ,theology appeals1 we 

have no fear of the profoundest         
,metaphysics that can be brought to bear
 on the question at issue1 provided only
 they be not altogether unintelligible4 
,pantheism has appeared in several      
different forms2 and it may conduce both
 to the fullness and the clearness of   
our exposition if we offer1 in the first
 instance1 a comprehensive outline of   
the theory of ,spinoza1 with a brief    
criticism on its leading principles1 and
 thereafter advance to the consideration
 of the twofold development of          
,pantheism in the hands of ,materialists
 and ,idealists1 respectively4          
,,section ,i4  ,,the ,,system ,,of      
,,spinoza4  ,the ,pantheistic           
speculations which have been revived in 
modern times can scarcely be understood1
 and still less accounted for or        
answered1 without reference to the      
system of ,spinoza4 ,that system met    
with little favor from any1 and with    
vigorous opposition from not a few1 of  
the divines and philosophers of the     

times immediately subsequent to its     
publication4 ,it was denounced and      
refuted by ,musus1 a judicious and      
learned professor of divinity at ,jena2 
by ,mansvelt1 a young but promising     
professor of philosophy at ,utrecht2 by 
,cuyper of ,rotterdam2 by ,wittichius of
 ,leyden2 by ,pierre ,poiret of         
,reinsburg2 by ,fenelon1 ,archbishop of 
,cambray2 by ,huet1 ,bishop of          
,avranches2 by ,john ,howe1 and ,dr4    
,samuel ,clarke1 as well as by many     
others1#aai whose writings served for a 
time to preserve the ,church from the   
infection of his most dangerous errors4 
,but gradually these views became an    
object of speculative interest to       
,metaphysical inquirers1 and found favor
 even with a growing class of           
,philosophical ,divines2#abj partly by  
reason of the strong intellectual energy
 with which they were conceived and     
announced1 and partly1 also1 there is   
reason to fear1 on account of a         
prevailing tendency to lower the        

authority of ,scripture1 and to exalt   
the prerogatives of reason1 in matters  
of faith4 ,the system of ,spinoza1 as   
developed in his ,tractatus             
,theologico-politicus1 and1 still more1 
in his ,ethica1--a posthumous           
publication1--may be said to contain the
 germs of the whole system both of      
,theological and ,philosophical         
,rationalism which was subsequently     
unfolded1--in the ,church1 by ,paulus1  
,wegscheider1 and ,strauss1--and1 in the
 ,schools1 by ,fichte1 ,schelling1 and  
,hegel4  ,theological ,rationalism      
consists in making ,reason the sole     
arbiter and the supreme judge in matters
 of faith2 in setting aside or          
undermining the authority of            
,revelation1 partly by denying or       
questioning the plenary inspiration of  
,scripture1 partly by explaining or     
accounting for miracles on natural      
principles1 partly by assuming1 as      
,strauss assumes1 that whatever is      
supernatural must necessarily be        

unhistorical2 in reducing every article 
of the creed1 by a new method of        
critical exegesis1 to a mere statement  
of some natural fact or some moral      
doctrine1 embellished1 in the one case1 
by mythical legends1 and accommodated1  
in the other1 to local and temporary    
prejudices1 but amounting substantially 
to nothing more than a natural          
development of human thought4 ,the      
prolific germs of this ,neologian method
 of the interpretation of ,scripture are
 to be found every where in the writings
 of ,spinoza4  ,philosophical           
,rationalism1 again1 although often1 or 
rather generally1 blended with the      
,theological1 is yet1 in some respects1 
distinct from it4 ,the one has been     
developed in the ,church1 the other in  
the ,schools4 ,the former1 cultivated by
 divines who acknowledged more or less  
explicitly the authority of ,scripture1 
has directed its efforts mainly to the  
establishment of a new method of        
,biblical exegesis and criticism1 by    

which all that is peculiar to           
,revelation1 as a supernatural scheme1  
might be enervated or explained away4   
,the latter cultivated by ,philosophic  
speculators who were not bound by any   
authority1 nor fettered by any          
subscription to articles of faith1 has  
sought1 without reference to            
,revelation1 to solve the great problems
 relating to ,god1 ,man1 and the        
,universe1 on purely natural principles2
 and1 after many fruitless efforts1 has 
taken refuge1 at last1 in the ,faith of 
,pantheism and the ,philosophy of the   
,absolute4 ,the prolific germs of this  
method of the interpretation of ,nature 
are also to be found in the writings of 
,spinoza4  ,the circumstance1 indeed1   
which1 more than any other1 seems to    
have commended his system to some of the
 most inquisitive minds in ,europe1 is  
its apparent completeness4 ,it is not a 
mere theory of ,pantheism1 nor a mere   
method of ,exegesis1 nor a mere code of 
,ethics1 nor a mere scheme of ,politics1

 although all these are comprehended    
under it2 but it is a system founded on 
a few radical principles1 which are     
exhibited in the shape of axioms and    
definitions1 and unfolded1 by rigorous  
logical deduction1 in a series of       
propositions1 with occasional scholia   
and corollaries1 after the method of    
,geometry2 a system which undertakes to 
explain the rationale of every part of  
human knowledge1 to interpret alike the 
,book of ,nature and the ,book of       
,revelation1 to determine the character 
of prophetic inspiration1 and to account
 for apparent miracles on natural       
principles1 to establish the real       
foundations of moral duty1 and the      
ultimate grounds of state policy2 and   
all this on the strength of a few simple
 definitions1 and a series of necessary 
deductions from them4 ,it is important  
to mark this characteristic feature of  
his system2 for while we have directly  
nothing to do with by far the larger    
part of his speculations1 which relate  

to questions foreign to our present     
inquiry1 yet the fact that his ethical  
and political conclusions are deduced   
from the same principles on which his   
,pantheistic theory is founded1 serves  
at once to account for the extensive    
influence which his writings have       
exerted on every department of modern   
speculation1 and also to show that1 in  
opposing that system1 we are entitled to
 found on the conclusions which he has  
himself deduced from it1 for the purpose
 of disproving the fundamental          
principles on which it rests4 ,for if1  
on the one hand1 the principles which he
 assumes in his definitions and axioms  
do necessarily involve the conclusions  
which are propounded in his ,ethics and 
,politics2 and if1 on the other hand1   
these conclusions are found to be at    
variance with the highest views of      
,morality and ,government1 then the more
 logical the process by which they have 
been deduced1 the more certain will it  
be that there is some fundamental flaw  

in the basis on which the whole         
superstructure is reared4 ,in other     
cases1 it might be doubtful how far the 
consequences that may seem to be        
deducible from a theory could be        
legitimately urged in argument1         
especially when these consequences are  
disavowed by the author of it2 but1 in  
the present case1 the consequences are  
explicitly declared1 not less than the  
principles1--they are even exhibited as 
corollaries rigorously deduced from     
them2 and thus the very                 
comprehensiveness of the system1 which  
gives it so much of the aspect of       
completeness1 and which has fascinated  
the minds of speculative men1 always    
fond of bold and sweeping               
generalizations1 may be found to afford 
the most conclusive proof of its        
inherent weakness1 and to show that it  
comes into fatal collision1 at all      
points1 not only with the doctrines of  
,natural and ,revealed ,religion1 but   
also with the practical duties and      

political rights of mankind4  ,we may   
present1 in brief compass1 a            
comprehensive summary of the doctrine of
 ,spinoza4 ,the fundamental principle of
 his whole theory is contained in the   
assumption with which he sets out1--that
 the entire system of ,being consists   
only of three elements1 ,substance1     
,attributes1 and ,modes1 and in the     
definitions which are given of these    
terms respectively4 ,with him1          
,substance is ,being2 not this or that  
particular being1 nor even being in     
general1 considered in the abstract1 but
 absolute ,being1--,being in its        
plentitude1 which comprehends all       
existences that can be conceived without
 requiring the concept of any other     
thing1 and without which no other thing 
can either exist or be conceived4#aba   
,by an ,attribute he means1 not         
substance1 but a manifestation of       
substance1 yet such a manifestation as  
belongs to its very essence2 and1 by a  
,mode1 he means an affection of         

substance1 or that which exists in      
another thing1 and is conceived by means
 of that thing4 ,these are the three    
fundamental ideas of his system4#abb    
,the ,substance of which he speaks is   
,god1 the infinite1 self-existent1      
eternal ,being1 whose essential nature  
is defined in terms which might seem to 
be expressive of a great truth1 for he  
says3 ,i understand by ,god an          
absolutely infinite ,being1 that is to  
say1 a ,substance constituted by an     
infinity of ,attributes1 each of which  
expresses an eternal and infinite       
essence4 ,but1 on closer inspection1 we 
find that the ,god of whom he speaks is 
not the ,creator and ,governor of the   
world1 not a living1 personal ,being1   
distinct from ,nature and superior to   
it1 not the ,holy ,one and the ,just1   
possessing infinite moral perfections1  
and exercising a supreme dominion over  
,his works2 but1 simply1 absolute       
,being1 the necessary self-existent     
,substance1 whose known ,attributes are 

extension and thought1 and whose        
affections1 or ,modes1 comprehend all   
the varieties of finite existence2 in   
short1 it is ,nature that is ,god1 for  
every possible existence may be included
 under the twofold expression of ,natura
 naturans and ,natura naturata4         
,accordingly1 the principle of          
,unisubstancisme is broadly avowed1 and 
the very possibility of creation denied4
 ,he affirms1 and1 indeed1 according to 
his definition1 he is entitled to       
affirm1 that there is not and cannot be 
more than one substance2 for by         
,substance he means a self-existent1    
necessary1 and eternal ,being4 ,and1 on 
the same ground1 he affirms that the    
creation of such a substance is         
impossible2 for1 having excluded every  
finite thing--everything that does not  
exist of itself--from his definition of 
,substance1 he is warranted in saying   
that anything called into being by a    
creative act of ,divine power could not 
be a substance1 in his sense of that    

term4 ,he sets himself to prove1 by a   
series of propositions whose logical    
correctness1 as deductions from his     
fundamental assumption1 may be freely   
and most safely admitted1 that the      
production of a substance is absolutely 
impossible2 that between two substances1
 having different attributes1 there is  
nothing in common2 that where two things
 have nothing in common1 the one cannot 
be the cause of the other2 that two or  
more distinct things can only be        
discriminated from each other by the    
difference of the attributes or         
affections of their substance2 and that1
 in the nature of things1 there cannot  
be two or more substances of the same   
kind1 or possessing the same attributes4
 ,he holds1 of course1 that ,nature is  
as necessary as ,god1 or1 rather1 that  
,god and ,nature are one2 there being   
but one ,substance1 appearing only in   
different aspects1 as cause and effect1 
as substance and mode1 as infinite and  
yet finite1 as one and yet many1 as ever

 the same and yet infinitely variable4  
,it is only necessary to add1 that the  
sole attributes of this ,substance which
 are capable of being known by our      
limited intelligence1 and which are     
discerned by an immediate intuition of  
reason1 are two1 namely1 extension and  
thought4 ,we know nothing1 and can know 
nothing1 of ,god beyond this3 ,he has no
 will1 or his will is mere intelligence 
or thought2 ,he has no law1 or ,his law 
is merely ,his thought embodied in the  
arrangements of nature2 ,he has no moral
 properties that are cognizable by the  
human faculties4 ,it follows that ,god  
is not the creator of the world1 for    
creation implies an act of will1 and    
,god has no will2 that ,he is not the   
,lawgiver or ,governor of the world1 for
 there is no law emanating from a       
superior1 but such only as is created by
 human compact or agreement1 and there  
is no natural obligation to obey ,god1  
no invariable standard of right and     
wrong4 ,the principles which are thus   

assumed in regard to the nature of ,god 
are afterwards applied to many important
 questions1 relating1 first1 to the soul
 of man2 secondly1 to the science of    
,ethics2 thirdly1 to the doctrine of    
political right and liberty2 and1       
fourthly1 to the supposed claims of     
,revelation4 ,and they are carried out1 
with inexorable logic1 into all their   
most revolting results4  ,such is a     
concise1 but1 as we believe1 a correct  
outline of the leading principles of the
 system of ,spinoza4 ,we shall now offer
 a few remarks upon it1 directed to the 
object of showing wherein consists the  
radical fallacy on which it rests1 and  
what are the considerations by which    
thoughtful men may be most effectually  
secured against its pernicious          
influence4  ,it has been well said by   
,professor ,saisset1 that the fallacy of
 this system does not lie in any one    
proposition of the series1 but that it  
is a vicious circle throughout2 that the
 paralogism is not in this or that part 

of the ,ethics1--it is everywhere2 and  
that the germ of the whole is contained 
in the definitions1 which are assumed1  
but not proved4#abc ,our attention1     
therefore1 must be given1 in the first  
instance1 to the fundamental assumptions
 on which the whole superstructure is   
built4  #a4 ,it is assumed1 without     
proof1 that the entire system of ,being 
may be ranked under the three categories
 of ,substance1 ,attributes1 and ,modes4
 ,it is assumed1 equally without proof1 
that there can be no substance which is 
not self-existent1 necessary1 and       
eternal1 and that every being which does
 not possess these properties must be   
only a mode or affection of another     
being to whom they belong4 ,it is       
further assumed1 also without proof1    
that extension and thought are necessary
 attributes of the one self-existent    
substance1 each of the two exhibiting   
only a different aspect of his eternal  
essence1 while both are equally         
essential and equally infinite4 ,and1   

finally1 it is assumed1 still without   
proof1 that ,nature comprehends a       
twofold series of existences1 distinct  
from each other1 but developed1 as it   
were1 in parallel lines1--,corporeal and
 ,intellectual beings1 which correspond 
respectively to the ,divine attributes  
of extension and thought1--which partake
 of the essential nature of these       
attributes1 but exhibit them in finite  
and transient forms1 as mere modes or   
manifestations of the one infinite      
substance4 ,these are some of the       
fundamental assumptions on which he     
proceeds2 they are not proved1 nor even 
attempted to be proved2 for1 although   
several are stated in the form of       
distinct propositions1 and accompanied  
with a formal demonstration1 the most   
cursory inspection of the pretended     
proof is sufficient to show that it     
consists entirely in a series of        
deductions from principles previously   
assumed1 and that its validity must     
ultimately rest on the definitions in   

which these principles are embodied4    
,now1 let any one examine these         
definitions1 and he will find that they 
are wholly arbitrary1 and that he is not
 bound by any law of his intellectual   
nature to admit them1 still less        
entitled1 on any ground of experience1  
to assume and found upon them1 as if    
they were self-evident or axiomatic     
truths4 ,it is possible1 and it may even
 be legitimate and useful for the       
purposes of philosophical speculation1  
to classify the various objects of human
 knowledge by ranging them under the    
categories of ,substance1 ,attributes1  
and ,modes4 ,but is it a self-evident   
truth1 that there can be no substance in
 nature excepting such as is            
self-existent and eternal8 ,is it a     
self-evident truth that man1 with his   
distinct personality and individual     
consciousness1 is a mere mode or        
affection of another being8 ,is it a    
self-evident truth that the ape1 the    
lizard1 and the worm are equally modes  

of the same substance with the angel and
 the seraph8 ,is it a self-evident truth
 that extension and thought are equally 
expressive of the uncreated ,essence and
 necessary attributes of the ,eternal8  
,is it a self-evident truth that no     
being can exist in nature otherwise than
 by development out of the ,divine      
substance1 and that the creation of a   
distinct but dependent being is         
impossible8 ,in regard to questions such
 as these1 the appeal must lie to that  
common sense1 or those laws of thought1 
which are the heritage of every thinking
 mind1 and which cannot be cramped or   
fettered by the arbitrary definitions of
 any philosophical system whatever4     
,these definitions must commend         
themselves as true1 either by their own 
self-evidencing light1 or by their      
manifest conformity with experience1    
before they can be assumed and founded  
on in any process of reasoning2 and we  
are very sure that those which have been
 specified cannot be candidly examined  

without appearing to be1 as they really 
are1 the grossest instances of a petitio
 principii that have ever been offered  
to the world4 ,for these definitions    
constitute the foundation of the whole  
superstructure2 they contain the germ1  
which is subsequently expanded and      
developed in a long series of           
propositions2 and1 as they are assumed  
without proof1 while they are far from  
being self-evident1 no amount of logical
 power and no effort of dialectic skill 
can possibly extract from them any      
doctrinal results1 whether theological1 
ethical1 or political1 possessing       
greater evidence than what belongs to   
themselves4 ,this is our first          
objection4  #b4 ,the philosophical      
method of ,spinoza1 as applied to our   
special subject1 is radically vicious4  
,it is not the inductive or experimental
 method2 it is an argument a priori1 a  
deductive process of reasoning4 ,now1   
this method1 suitable as it is to a     
certain class of subjects1 such as those

 of ,geometry1 in which clear and       
precise definitions are attainable1 is  
either utterly inapplicable to another  
class of subjects1 such as most of those
 of which ,spinoza treats1 or it is     
peculiarly dangerous1 especially in the 
hands of a daring speculator1 since1 in 
the absence of adequate definitions1 he 
may be tempted to have recourse to such 
as are purely arbitrary4 ,all the       
possible properties of a circle may be  
deduced from the simple definition of   
it2 but it will not follow that all the 
possible forms of being in nature may be
 deduced from the definition of         
substance4 ,the reason is clear2 we     
cannot have such a definition of        
substance as we may have of a circle4   
,we do not object merely to the         
geometrical form of his reasoning1--that
 is a mere accessory1 and one which     
renders the ,ethica much more dry and   
less attractive than the ,tractatus1 in 
which he gives free scope to his subtle 
intellect1 unfettered by any such       

artificial plan1--but we object to the  
essential nature of his system1 to the a
 priori and deductive method by which he
 attempts to solve some of the highest  
problems of philosophy respecting ,god1 
,nature1 and ,man4 ,here1 if anywhere1  
is a field of inquiry which demands for 
its due cultivation an enlarged         
experience and a patient spirit of      
induction4 ,yet1 with him1 the          
starting-point of philosophy is the     
highest object of human thought4 ,he    
begins with the idea of self-existent   
,being1 without which1 as he imagines1  
nothing else can be conceived2 and then1
 following the line of a descending     
series1 he attempts to deduce from it   
the philosophy of the whole system of   
the universe6#abd ,his ,metaphysics must
 borrow nothing from experience2 his    
very ,psychology must be purely         
deductive4 ,from the intuitive idea of  
substance he deduces the nature and     
existence of ,god2 from the nature of   
,god1 the necessity of a ,divine        

development2 from the necessity of a    
,divine development1 the existence of a 
universe comprising souls and bodies2   
and nowhere does he condescend to take  
notice of the facts of experience1      
except in two of his axioms1 in which he
 assumes that man thinks1 and that he   
feels his body to be affected in various
 ways4 ,his whole philosophy resolves   
itself ultimately into an intellectual  
intuition1 whose object is ,substance or
 ,being1 with its infinite attributes of
 extension and thought1--an intuition   
which discerns its object directly and  
immediately1 in the light of its own    
self-evidence1 without the aid of any   
intermediate sign1 and which is as      
superior1 in a philosophical point of   
view1 to the intimations of sense1 as   
its objects are superior to the fleeting
 phenomena of ,nature4  ,now1 we submit 
that this method of constructing a      
philosophy of ,nature is radically      
vicious1 and diametrically opposed to   
the only legitimate1 the only possible  

way of attaining to sound knowledge4 ,he
 is not content to tell us what is the  
order of things2 he aspires1 forsooth1  
to show what the order of things must   
be4 ,we have no wish to disparage       
,metaphysical ,science2 it has a natural
 root in human reason1 and a legitimate 
domain in the ample territory of human  
thought2 but we protest against any     
attempt to extend it beyond its proper  
boundaries1 or to apply it to subjects  
which belong to the province of         
experience and observation4 ,the schemes
 which have been recently broached in   
,germany1 and imitated in ,france1 for  
constructing1 at one time1 a deductive  
,psychology1 at another a deductive     
,physics1 at a third a deductive        
,ethics1 at a fourth a deductive ,theory
 of ,progress1 at a fifth a deductive   
,history of ,religion1 afford more than 
sufficient evidence that hitherto the   
spirit of the ,baconian philosophy has  
been little understood1 and still less  
appreciated1 by our continental         

neighbors2 and that the efforts of the  
highest genius have been sadly          
frustrated1 in attempting the           
impracticable task of extracting from   
mere reason that knowledge which can    
only be acquired in the school of       
experience4 ,this is our second         
objection4  #c4 ,the system of ,spinoza 
is vicious1 because it applies a mere   
abstraction of the human mind to account
 for whatever is real and concrete in   
the universe4 ,we have no sympathy with 
those who rail at all abstract ideas1 as
 if they were imaginary essences or mere
 illusions2 we recognize the faculty of 
abstraction as one of the wisest        
provisions of ,nature1 and one of the   
most useful powers belonging to the mind
 of man1--a power which comes into      
action with the first dawn of infant    
intelligence1 and is only matured as    
reason rises into manhood1 till it      
becomes the internal spring of all      
,philosophy and ,science4 ,nor do we    
hold that an abstract idea is           

necessarily an unreality1 or a mere     
negation2 for1 without reviving the     
controversy between the ,nominalists and
 ,realists1 or pronouncing any decision 
on the intricate questions which that   
controversy involved1 we may say1 in    
general terms1 that the idea of a       
circle1 of a square1 or of a triangle1  
is neither unreal nor negative1 but a   
very positive1 and1 withal1 intelligible
 thing4 ,it is the idea of that which is
 essential to the nature of each of     
these figures respectively1 and common  
to all possible figures of the same     
class1 whatever may be their accidental 
varieties1 whether in point of dimension
 or form4 ,and so the idea of ,being or 
,substance1 although it be highly       
abstract1 is not necessarily unreal or  
negative2 it is the idea of existence1  
or of that which is common to everything
 that is1 abstraction being made of     
every diversity by which one being is   
distinguished from another4 ,conscious  
that we ourselves exist1 and observing  

that other beings exist around us1 we   
strike off the peculiarities which      
belong to individuals1 and form the     
general idea which includes nothing but 
what is common to all1 and yet contains 
a positive element1 which is the object 
of one of the strongest convictions of  
the human mind4#abe ,the conception of  
,infinite ,being contains the positive  
element of being1 abstraction being made
 of all limitation or bounds4 ,that this
 is a real1 legitimate1 and useful      
conception1 we have no disposition to   
deny2 we cannot divest ourselves of it2 
it springs up spontaneously from the    
innermost fountain of thought4 ,but we  
cannot accept the account which ,spinoza
 has given of its nature and origin1 and
 still less can we assent to the        
application which he has made of it4 ,he
 describes it as the idea of absolute1  
necessary1 self-existent1 eternal       
,being2 and he traces its origin1 not to
 the combined influence of experience   
and abstraction1 acting under the great 

primitive law of causality1 but to an   
immediate perception1 or direct         
intuition1 of reason4 ,now1 we submit   
that the concept of being1 and the      
concept of absolute self-existent being1
 are perfectly distinct from each other1
 and that they spring from different    
laws of thought4 ,the concept of being  
applies to everything that exists1      
without reference to the cause or manner
 of its existence2 and this springs     
simply from experience and abstraction4 
,the concept of self-existent being1    
which is equally suggested by the laws  
of our mental constitution1 does not    
apply to everything that exists1 but    
only to that whose existence is not     
originated or determined by any other   
being2 and this concept springs also    
from experience and abstraction1        
combined1 however1 with the law or      
principle of causality1 which teaches us
 that no change can occur in ,nature1   
and that nothing can ever come into     
being1 without a cause1 and prompts us  

to infer from the fact of existence now1
 the conclusion that something must have
 existed from all eternity4 ,the origin 
of each of these concepts may thus be   
naturally accounted for by the known    
laws of our mental constitution1 without
 having recourse to any faculty of      
intellectual intuition such as ,spinoza 
describes1--a faculty independent of    
experience1 and superior to it1--a      
faculty which gazes direct on ,absolute 
,being1 and penetrates1 without the aid 
of any intermediate sign or             
manifestation1 into the very essence of 
,god4 ,spinoza has not discriminated    
aright between these two concepts1 in   
respect either of their nature or their 
origin4 ,he has not overlooked1 indeed1 
the distinction1 between abstract ideas 
and the intellectual intuitions1 of     
which he speaks2 but he confounds the   
concept of being with the concept of    
self-existent being1 as if the two were 
identical1 or as if being could not be  
predicated of anything1 otherwise than  

as it is a mode or affection of the one 
only substance4 ,a sounder ,psychology  
has taught us that our conception of    
existence arises1 in the first instance1
 from our own conscious experience2 and 
that1 when this conception subsequently 
expands into the idea of ,absolute      
,being1 and results in the belief of a  
necessary1 self-existent1 and eternal   
,cause1 the new element which is thus   
added to it may be accounted for by the 
principle of causality1 which           
constitutes one of the fundamental laws 
of human thought1 and which1 if it may  
be said to resemble intuition in the    
rapidity and clearness with which it    
enables us to discern the truth1 differs
 essentially from that immediate        
intuition of which ,spinoza speaks1     
since it is dependent on experience1    
and1 instead of gazing direct on        
,absolute ,being1 makes use of          
intermediate signs and manifestations1  
by which it rises to the knowledge of   
the unseen and eternal4  ,we submit1    

further1 that a system which rests on   
the mere idea of ,being as its sole     
support1 cannot afford any satisfactory 
explanation of real and concrete        
existences4 ,the idea of ,being is one  
of our most abstract conceptions2 it is 
associated1 indeed1 with an invincible  
belief in the reality of ,being1--a     
belief which springs up spontaneously1  
along with the idea itself1 from our own
 conscious experience4 ,it is even      
associated with an invincible belief in 
necessary1 self-existent1 and eternal   
,being1--a belief which springs from the
 principle of causality1 or that law of 
thought whereby1 from the fact that     
something exists now1 we instinctively  
conclude that something must have       
existed from all eternity4 ,but neither 
the simple concept of ,being1 which is  
derived from experience and framed by   
abstraction1 nor the additional concept 
of self-existent ,being1 which springs  
from the action of our rational         
faculties on the data furnished by      

experience1 can afford any explanation  
of the nature and origin of the real1   
concrete existences in the universe4    
,these must be studied in the light of  
their own appropriate evidence2 they    
must be interpreted1 and not divined2   
they cannot be inferred deductively from
 any1 even the highest and most         
abstract1 conception of the human mind4 
,yet the philosophy of ,spinoza attempts
 to explain all the phenomena of the    
universe by the idea of ,absolute       
,being2 it accounts for the concrete by 
the abstract2 it represents all         
individual beings as mere modes or      
affections of one universal substance2  
in other words1 it realises the abstract
 idea of thought and extension1 but     
denies the existence of bodies and      
souls1 otherwise than as manifestations 
of these eternal essences4  #d4 ,the    
system of ,spinoza is vicious1 because  
his whole reasoning on the subject of   
,creation is pervaded by a transparent  
fallacy4 ,he affirms the impossibility  

of ,creation1 and attempts to           
demonstrate his position4 ,but how8 ,by 
proving that a substance cannot be      
produced4 ,and why may not a substance  
be produced8 ,because1 by the           
definition1 a substance is that which is
 self-existent4 ,in other words1 a      
self-existent substance cannot be       
created1--a truism which scarcely       
required the apparatus of a geometrical 
proof by means of propositions1 scholia1
 and corollaries1 or1 as ,professor     
,saisset says1 with laconic navet1 ce   
qui a  peine besoin d'tre demontr4 ,but1
 while the only proof that is offered   
extends no further than to self-existent
 or uncreated substance1 it is          
afterwards applied to everything that   
exists1 so as to exclude the creation   
even of that which is not self-existent2
 and this on the convenient assumption  
that whatever exists must be either a   
substance1 or an attribute1 or a mode4  
,and thus1 partly by an ambiguity of    
language1 partly by an arbitrary and    

gratuitous assumption1 he excludes the  
possibility of ,creation altogether4    
,surely it might have occurred to him   
that by proving the necessary existence 
of an uncreated ,being--a doctrine held 
by every ,christian ,theist--he did not 
advance one step towards the disproof of
 the possibility of creation1 nor even  
towards the establishment of his        
favorite theory of unisubstancisme2 for1
 grant that there is an uncreated and   
self-existent ,being2 grant1 even1 that 
there can be no more than one1--would it
 follow that there can be no created and
 dependent beings1 or that they can only
 exist as modes or affections of that   
absolute ,essence8 ,might they not exist
 as creatures1 as products1 as effects1 
without partaking of the nature of their
 cause8#abf ,yet1 if there be one idea  
more than another which ,spinoza is     
anxious to extirpate1 it is that of     
creation1 and he summons the whole      
strength1 both of his logic and sarcasm1
 when he has to deal with the argument  

from final causes4 ,and no marvel2 for  
the doctrine of a creation would cut up 
his system by the roots4 ,the radical   
difference1 in fact1 between ,theism and
 ,pantheism mainly consists in this3    
that the former regards creation as     
distinct from the ,creator1 as the      
product of ,his omnipotent and free     
will1 as the object of ,his constant    
providential care1 as the subject of    
,his supreme control and government2    
whereas the latter represents it as a   
necessary emanation from the ,divine    
substance1 as an eternal development of 
the uncreated ,essence2 the finite1 in  
all its forms1 being a mode of the      
infinite1 and the temporary phases of   
nature so many transient but            
ever-renewed manifestations of the      
unchangeable and eternal4 ,these two    
conceptions are diametrically opposed2  
they cannot admit of conciliation or    
compromise2 and hence the daring attempt
 of ,spinoza to prove the impossibility 
of creation1 even when he admits the    

existence of an ,infinite and ,eternal  
,being4  #e4 ,the system of ,spinoza is 
vicious1 because it involves erroneous  
conclusions respecting both the body and
 the soul4 ,he denies that they are     
substances4 ,and why8 ,because1 by the  
definition1 a substance is that which is
 self-existent1 and may be conceived    
without reference to any other being4   
,be it so4 ,what does this argument     
amount to8 ,why1 simply to this1 that   
they are not gods4 ,what1 then1 are     
they8 ,created beings8 ,no4 ,and why8   
,because creation is impossible1 and1   
also1 because whatever exists must be   
either a substance1 or an attribute1 or 
a mode4 ,what then8 ,clearly not an     
attribute1 for the only attributes known
 to us are extension and thought1 and   
these attributes are as infinite as the 
substance to which they belong2 they    
must therefore be modes or affections of
 that substance4 ,but in what sense8 ,in
 the sense of being created1 and        
therefore dependent1 existences1 whose  

nature and origin cannot be conceived of
 or accounted for without reference to  
the ,being who produced them at first1  
and still continues to maintain them8   
,no2 for in that sense all ,theists     
admit the derivation and dependence of  
every finite being2 but they must be    
modes or affections of the one uncreated
 essence1 mere phenomenal manifestations
 of it4 ,the soul1 whose essence is     
thought1 is a mere succession of ideas4 
,the body is a mere mode of the ,divine 
attribute of extension2 and neither the 
one nor the other can be described as a 
distinct being4 ,they are affections1   
and nothing more1 of the one infinite   
substance4  ,it is important to remark  
that1 according to this theory1 the     
distinct personality of man is excluded1
 not less than the distinct personality 
of ,god4 ,it is not easy1 indeed1 to    
explain this part of ,spinoza's theory2 
for he has a subtle disquisition on the 
relation subsisting between the soul and
 the body1 by means of which he attempts

 to explain the phenomena of            
self-consciousness1 and to show that    
individual personality is not           
necessarily inconsistent with the       
doctrine which represents man as a mere 
mode of the ,divine substance4 ,but one 
thing is clear3 there is no room in the 
system of ,spinoza for the distinct     
personality of man1 in the ordinary     
acceptation of that expression4 ,the    
unity1 especially of the human soul1 its
 individuality1 its self-consciousness1 
its identity1 as a being1 dependent1    
indeed1 on ,god1 but really distinct    
from ,him1 must be sacrificed1 if the   
system is to be saved2 and no other     
being can be recognized but the absolute
 substance1 with its infinite attributes
 and its finite modes4 ,this            
consideration appears to us to be fatal 
to the whole theory4 ,for it shows that 
the ,pantheistic speculations1 which are
 directed against the personality of    
,god1 are equally conclusive1 if they be
 conclusive at all1 against the         

personality of ,man2 that they run      
counter to the intuitive knowledge of   
the human mind2 and that they cannot be 
embraced without doing violence to some 
of our clearest and surest convictions4 
,for what clearer or surer conviction   
can there be than that of my own        
personal existence1 as a distinct1      
self-conscious1 intelligent1 active1 and
 responsible being8 ,and yet the        
existence of our own bodies and souls is
 denied1 except in so far as they are   
mere modes or affections of the one     
uncreated substance1 which is known1 not
 by experience or observation1 but by a 
transcendental faculty of intuition4    
,and1 finally1 the system of ,spinoza is
 vicious1 because the exposition of it  
is replete with the most manifest and   
glaring self-contradictions4 ,his       
logical power has been so much admired1 
and his rigorous geometrical method so  
highly extolled1 that his ,philosophy   
has acquired a certain prestige1 which  
commends it to many ardent1 speculative 

minds4 ,yet there are few philosophical 
writers who have made a larger number of
 gratuitous assumptions1 or who have    
abounded more in contradictory          
statements4 ,the ,antinomies of ,spinoza
 might make the subject of an amusing1  
and even instructive1 dissertation4     
,thus1 by way of specimen1 take the     
following3  ,god is extended2 but1      
nevertheless1 incorporeal4  ,god thinks2
 but1 nevertheless1 has no intelligence4
  ,god is active2 but1 nevertheless1 has
 no will4  ,the soul is a mode of the   
,divine thought2 but1 nevertheless1     
there is no analogy between ,god's      
thought and man's thought4  ,the love of
 ,god is the supreme law of man2 but1   
nevertheless1 it is equally lawful for  
man to live according to appetite or to 
reason4  ,the will of man1 is1 in no    
sense1 free2 but1 nevertheless1 there is
 a science of human ethics4  ,man is    
under no natural obligation to obey     
,god2 but1 nevertheless1 ,god is his    
highest good4  ,god is neither a        

,lawgiver nor a ,governor2 but1         
nevertheless1 a future state is         
necessary1 that every man may have his  
due4  ,might is ,right1 and ,government 
has power to restrain the liberty of    
,prophesying2 but1 nevertheless1 has no 
power to restrain the liberty of        
,philosophizing4  ,these are only a few 
specimens of the gratuitous assumptions 
and flagrant contradictions with which  
his writings abound2 but they afford a  
sufficient proof of the reckless        
character of his genius1 and of the     
utter fallacy of the system which he    
promulgated as a rival1 or as a         
substitute1 for ,natural and ,revealed  
,religion4  ,on a review of what has    
been advanced1 it must be manifest that 
the ,pantheistic system of ,spinoza is  
founded on principles assumed without   
proof1 and embodied in his definitions2 
that it is constructed according to a   
philosophical method which is radically 
vicious2 that it abounds in             
self-contradictory statements2 and that 

it is opposed1 at many points1 to some  
of the clearest lessons of experience1  
and to some of the surest convictions of
 reason4 ,it is a system which is not   
demonstrated1 but merely developed4 ,the
 germ of it exists in the definitions2  
deny these1 and you destroy his whole   
philosophy4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 be   
held sufficient to foreclose the        
question respecting the existence of a  
living1 personal ,god1 distinct from    
,nature and independent of it2 nor can  
,pantheism1 in this form1 become the    
successful rival of ,christian ,theism1 
until the human mind has lost the power 
of discriminating between the different 
kinds of evidence to which they         
respectively appeal4   ,,section ,,ii4  
,,material ,,or ,,hylozoic ,,pantheism4 
,in the system of ,spinoza1 the two     
attributes of extension and thought and 
the corresponding modes of body and     
soul1 were equally recognized1 and were 
employed jointly1 in connection with his
 favorite doctrine of ,unisubstancisme4 

,they constituted the opposite poles of 
his theory1 but were both essential to  
its completeness4 ,but most of his      
followers1 influenced by an excessive   
desire for simplification1 have         
attempted to blend the two into one2 and
 have either merged the spiritual in the
 corporeal1 or virtually annihilated the
 material by resolving it into the      
mental4 ,hence two distinct1 and even   
opposite forms of ,pantheism1--the      
material or hylozoic1 and the ideal or  
spiritual4  ,the former was the first in
 the order of historical development1 so
 far as modern ,europe is concerned4 ,it
 was most in accordance with the        
,sensational ,philosophy which prevailed
 in the school of ,condillac1#abg and   
which continued to maintain its         
ascendancy until it was assailed by the 
reviving spirit of ,idealism4 ,it was   
the characteristic feature of the       
,atheism of the last century1 and was   
fully exhibited in the ,systme de la    
,nature4 ,the recent revival of         

,idealism has done much to check its    
progress1 but it has not effected its   
destruction2 on the contrary1 the theory
 of ,material or ,hylozoic ,pantheism is
 an error as inveterate as it is        
ancient1 and it is continually          
reappearing even in the light of the    
intellectual and spiritual ,psychology  
of the nineteenth century4  ,this       
theory1 although it has been propounded 
as a religious creed1 rests mainly on a 
philosophical dogma4 ,it is based       
ultimately on the supposition that      
nothing exists in the universe except   
matter and its laws2 that mind is the   
product of material organization2 and   
that all the phenomena of thought1 of   
feeling1 of conscience1 and even of     
religion1 may be accounted for by       
ascribing them to certain powers        
inherent in matter1 and evolved by      
certain peculiarities of cerebral       
structure4 ,this fundamental assumption1
 on which the whole theory of ,hylozoic 
,pantheism ultimately rests1 will be    

subjected to examination in the sequel4 
,we think that it may be best discussed 
separately and apart1 for this among    
other reasons1 that it stands equally   
related to the old mechanical ,atheism  
and the new material ,pantheism1 and    
that1 in point of fact1 it has been     
applied indifferently to the support of 
both4 ,our remarks at present1          
therefore1 will be directed1 not to the 
refutation of ,materialism1 but to the  
exposition and exposure of the          
,pantheism which has been founded upon  
it4  ,it is not easy--perhaps it might  
be found1 on trial1 to be impossible--to
 show that there is any real difference1
 except in name1 between mechanical     
,atheism and material ,pantheism4 ,both 
equally affirm the self-existence and   
eternity of the ,universe2 both equally 
deny the fact of creation1 and the      
doctrine of a living1 personal ,god1    
distinct from nature1 and superior to   
it4 ,the only apparent difference       
between the two consists in this1--that 

the former speaks more of the rude      
materials1 and the cold1 hard1 unbending
 laws1 which exist in ,nature2 the      
latter speaks more of the vital powers1 
the subtle and ethereal forces1 which   
are at work in her bosom1 and which may 
seem to impart warmth and animation to a
 system that would otherwise be felt to 
be cold1 inert1 and deathlike4 ,but the 
mechanical ,atheist never denied the    
vital powers of ,nature1 he only        
attempted to account for them without an
 intelligent first ,cause2 and the      
material ,pantheist has little1 if any1 
advantage over him1 except in this1 that
 he has combined ,chemistry with        
,mechanics in attempting to account for 
the phenomena of the universe1 and has  
drawn his analogies from the laboratory 
and the crucible1 the process of        
vegetation1 and the laws of reproduction
 and growth1 not less than from the     
formul of ,physical ,science4  ,the     
theory of ,material ,pantheism runs     
insensibly into one or other of the     

forms of naked ,atheism to which we have
 already referred4 ,ignoring the        
existence of mind1 or of any spiritual  
,power distinct from ,nature and        
superior to it1 it must necessarily hold
 the eternal existence of matter2 and1  
in this respect1 it coincides entirely  
with the ,atheistic hypothesis4 ,it may1
 or it may not1 hold also the eternal   
existence of the present order of       
,nature1 including all the varieties of 
vegetable and animal life4 ,in the one  
case1 it harmonizes with the ancient    
theory of ,atheism1 as maintained by    
,ocellus ,lucanus2 in the other1 it must
 run into the modern theory of          
,development1 if it makes any attempt to
 account for the origin of new races1 as
 made known by the researches of        
,geologists4 ,in either case1 it is     
equivalent to ,atheism1 and dependent on
 one or other of the various theories   
which have been applied to the defence  
of the ,atheist's creed4  ,it is worthy 
of remark1 in this connection1 how      

frequently those who are the most daring
 and decided advocates of ,atheism or   
,pantheism do nevertheless ascribe to   
,nature many of the attributes which    
belong to ,god only4 ,this fact is      
admirably illustrated by the            
distinguished founder of the ,boyle     
,lectureship2#abh and it is abundantly  
confirmed by examples which have been   
furnished by more recent times4 ,the    
author of the ,system of ,nature1 which 
appeared before the first ,french       
,revolution1 was an avowed and most     
reckless ,atheist2#abi yet he ascribes  
to ,nature most of the attributes which 
are usually supposed to belong to ,god1 
such as self-existence1 eternity1       
immutability1 infinitude1 and unity2 and
 if the intellectual and moral          
attributes may seem to be omitted1 as   
they must be1 to some extent1 in any    
system of ,atheism1 yet thought1 design1
 and will1 are expressly ascribed to    
,nature4#acj ,and the only difference   
between the ,theist and the ,atheist is 

said to be1 that the latter ascribes all
 the phenomena of ,nature to material1  
natural1 sensible1 and known causes1    
while the former ascribes them to       
spiritual1 supernatural1 unintelligible1
 and unknown causes2 or1 in other words1
 to an occult cause4#aca ,it is         
manifestly a matter of indifference     
whether this method of accounting for   
the phenomena of ,nature be called      
,atheism or ,pantheism2 in either aspect
 it is essentially the same4  ,the more 
recent advocates of ,atheism or         
,pantheism have often made use of       
similar language4 ,m4 ,crousse affirms  
that all nature is animated by an       
internal force which moves it2 that this
 is the true spontaneity1 the causality1
 which is the origin of all sensible    
manifestations1 for mens agitat molem et
 magno se corpore miscet2 that matter1  
the most cold and indifferent1 is full  
of life1 capable of engendering thought1
 and containing mind in it1 at least    
potentially2 and that1 to every man who 

has true insight1 the world feels1      
moves1 speaks1 and thinks4#acb ,the     
author of ,the ,purpose of ,existence   
makes it his grand object to show that  
the evolvement of mind out of matter is 
the primary law and final cause of the  
universe2 that this process commences   
with vegetation1 extracting from matter 
the spirit of vitality2 that this spirit
 is preserved amid the decay of         
vegetables1 and transfused into animals1
 thus establishing the great            
working-principle of ,nature1 that      
spirit is extracted from matter by      
organized bodies1 and survives their    
dissolution4#acc ,of course1 if matter  
have the power of evolving intelligent  
and even immortal minds by its own      
inherent properties and established     
laws1 it will not be difficult to find  
in ,nature a sufficient substitute for  
,god4  ,but the most revolting specimen 
of that material ,pantheism1 which is   
only another name for absolute ,atheism1
 that has recently appeared1 occurs in  

the ,letters of ,atkinson and           
,martineau3 ,we require no supernatural 
causes1 when we can recognize adequate  
natural causes1 inherent in the         
constitution of ,nature2 nor are more   
causes to be admitted than are          
sufficient to produce any particular    
change or effect4--,man has his place in
 ,natural ,history2 his nature does not 
essentially differ from that of the     
lower animals2 he is but a fuller       
development1 and varied condition1 of   
the same fundamental nature or          
cause1--of that which we contemplate as 
matter1 and its changes1 relations1 and 
properties4 ,mind is the consequence or 
product of the material man1 its        
existence depending on the action of the
 brain4--,its highest object seems to   
be1 a sense of the infinite and abstract
 power1--the inherent force and         
principle of ,nature4#acd  ,from these  
specimens it must be evident that       
whatever nominal distinction may exist  
between ,material ,pantheism and avowed 

,atheism1 they are radically identical1 
and that1 for all practical purposes1   
they may be treated as one and the same4
 ,from the same specimens we may derive 
some useful hints respecting the        
essential conditions and the right      
conduct of the ,theistic argument4 ,it  
is not enough to show that there must be
 a self-existent1 eternal1 and infinite 
,first ,cause1 for this is admitted by  
the advocate of ,material ,pantheism1   
who substitutes ,nature for ,god4 ,it is
 further necessary to show that the     
actual phenomena of the ,universe cannot
 be accounted for by means of any       
properties or powers inherent in itself2
 and that they must be ascribed to a    
living1 intelligent1 and powerful       
,being1 distinct from ,nature and       
superior to it4 ,the theory of          
,materialism must be discussed on its   
own proper and peculiar merits1 and if  
we find good cause to reject it1 the    
main pillar of ,material ,pantheism will
 fall to the ground4 ,in the mean time  

we shall only further observe1 that this
 form of ,pantheism cannot be maintained
 without the help either of the doctrine
 of the ,eternity of ,matter or of the  
,theory of ,development1 or1 rather1    
without the aid of both2 and that1 if it
 could be established1 ,polytheism would
 be its natural product1 if not its     
inevitable result4   ,,section ,,iii4   
,,ideal ,,pantheism4  ,we have already  
seen that the system of ,spinoza equally
 recognized the two attributes of       
extension and thought1 and the two      
corresponding modes of body and soul1 in
 connection with the one infinite and   
eternal ,substance4 ,we have also seen  
that most of his followers have taken a 
one-sided view of the subject1 and have 
either merged the spiritual into the    
corporeal1 so as to educe a ,material or
 ,hylozoic ,pantheism1 or have virtually
 annihilated the material by resolving  
it into the mental1 so as to educe a    
system of ,ideal or ,spiritual          
,pantheism4  ,in ,spinoza1 says ,mr4    

,morell1 we see the model upon which the
 modern ,idealists of ,germany have     
renewed their search into the absolute  
ground of all phenomena2 and there can  
be no doubt that his speculations       
contain the germ of ,ideal as well as of
 ,material ,pantheism4 ,the historical  
filiation of modern ,pantheism cannot be
 satisfactorily explained1 in either of 
its two forms1 without reference to his 
writings2 and yet its precise character1
 as it is developed in more recent      
systems1 demands for its full           
elucidation some knowledge of the course
 and progress of philosophical          
speculation in the interval which       
elapsed between the death of ,spinoza   
and the subsequent developments of his  
theory4  ,we cannot here attempt to     
trace the history of ,german ,idealism1 
from its source in the writings of      
,leibnitz1 through the logical school of
 ,wolfius and his successors1 till it   
reached its culminating point in the    
philosophy of ,hegel3--we shall content 

ourselves with a brief reference to the 
fundamental principles of ,kant's       
system1 which may be justly said to have
 contained the prolific germs1 or1 at   
least1 to have determined the prevailing
 character1 of all the subsequent       
speculations of the ,german schools4    
,for if modern ,pantheism be indebted to
 ,spinoza for its substance1 it is      
equally indebted to ,kant for its form2 
and no intelligible account can be given
 of the phases which it has successively
 assumed1 without reference to the      
powerful influence which his            
,philosophy1 in one or other of its     
constituent elements1 has exerted on all
 his successors in the same field of    
inquiry4  ,the ,philosophy of ,kant has 
a most important bearing on the whole   
question as to the validity of the      
natural evidence for the being and      
perfections of ,god4 ,we shall confine  
our attention to those parts of his     
system which give rise to the           
speculations that have issued in the    

recent theories of ,ideal or ,spiritual 
,pantheism4  ,in attempting to explain  
the nature and origin of the whole      
system of human knowledge1 ,kant divides
 our intellectual being into three      
distinct faculties1--sensation1         
understanding1 and reason4 ,he supposes 
that from sensation we derive the whole 
matter of our knowledge2 that from the  
understanding we derive its form1 or the
 manner in which it is conceived of by  
us2 and that from reason we derive      
certain general or abstract notions1    
which are highly useful1 since they give
 a systematic unity to human thought1   
but which have no objective validity1   
that is1 either no reality in nature    
that corresponds to them1 or none1 at   
least1 that can be scientifically       
demonstrated4 ,from this fundamental    
principle of his system it follows1 that
 the only part of our knowledge which   
has any objective reality is that which 
is derived from our sense-perceptions1  
all else being purely formal or         

subjective1 and arising solely from the 
laws of our own mental nature1 which    
determine us to conceive of things in a 
particular way2 and that even that part 
of our knowledge which is derived from  
sense-perception is purely phenomenal1  
since we know nothing of any object     
around us beyond the bare fact that it  
exists1 and that it appears to us to be 
as our senses represent it4 ,hence the  
skeptical tendency of ,kant's           
speculations1 in so far as the          
scientific certainty of our knowledge is
 concerned4 ,the practical utility of   
that knowledge is not disputed1 but its 
objective reality1 or the possibility of
 proving it1 is1 to a large extent1     
denied4 ,still he admits a primitive    
dualism1 and a radical distinction      
between the subject and the object1     
between the mind which thinks and the   
matter of its thoughts4 ,the matter     
comes from without1 the form from       
within2 and the senses are the channels 
through which the phenomena of nature   

are poured into the mould of the human  
mind4 ,all knowledge implies this       
combination of matter with form1 and is 
possible only on the supposition of the 
concurrent action both of the object and
 subject2 not that either of the two is 
known to us in its essence1 or that     
their real existence can be             
scientifically demonstrated1 for we know
 the subject only in its relation to the
 object1 and the object only in its     
relation to the subject2 but that this  
relation necessarily requires the joint 
action of both1 by which alone we can   
acquire the only knowledge of which we  
are capable1 and which is supposed to be
 purely phenomenal1 relative1 and       
subjective4 ,it is true that we are     
capable of forming certain grand ideas1 
such as that of ,god1 the universe1 and 
the soul2 but these are the pure        
products of ,reason1 the mere           
personifications of our own modes of    
thinking1 and have no objective reality1
 at least none that can be              

scientifically demonstrated4 ,but1 while
 the ,speculative ,reason is held to be 
incompetent to prove the existence of   
,god1 the ,practical ,reason is appealed
 to2 and in the conscious liberty of the
 soul1 and its sense of incumbent moral 
duty1--the ,categorical                 
,imperative1--,kant finds materials for 
reconstructing the basis and fabric of a
 true ,theology1 not scientifically     
perfect1 but practically sufficient for 
all the purposes of life4  ,it was      
scarcely possible that ,philosophy could
 find a permanent resting-place in such 
a theory as this2 for1 while it         
recognized both the object and the      
subject as equally indispensable1 the   
one for the matter1 the other for the   
form1 of human knowledge1 it did not    
hold the balance even between the two4  
,it assigned so much to the subject1 and
 so little to the object1 and made so   
large a part of our knowledge merely    
formal and subjective1 that it could    
neither be regarded as a self-consistent

 system of ,skepticism1 nor yet as a    
satisfactory basis for ,scientific      
,belief4 ,it was almost inevitable that 
speculative minds1 starting from this   
point1 should diverge into one or other 
of three courses2 either following the  
line of the subject exclusively1 and    
treating the object as a superfluous    
incumbrance1 so as to reach1 as ,schulz 
and ,maimon did1 a pure ,subjective     
,idealism1 akin to utter ,skepticism2 or
 following the line of the object1 and  
giving it greater prominence than it had
 in the system of ,kant1 so as to lay   
the foundation1 as ,jacobi and ,herbart 
did1 of a system of ,objective          
,certitude2 or keeping both in view1 and
 attempting1 as ,fichte1 ,schelling1 and
 ,hegel did1 to blend the two into one1 
so as to reduce them to systematic      
unity4#ace  ,in ,kant's system a dualism
 was admitted1 a real distinction       
between the subject and object of       
thought2 but he had ascribed so much to 
the subject1 and so little to the       

object1 that ,fichte conceived the idea 
of dispensing with the latter           
altogether1 and constructing his whole  
philosophy on a purely subjective basis4
 ,since ,kant had taught that all       
objects are conceived of either         
according to the forms of our           
sensational faculty1 or the categories  
of our understanding1 or the ideas of   
pure reason1 it seemed to be unnecessary
 to suppose the existence of any object 
distinct from the mind itself4 ,for if  
it be the mind which furnishes the form 
of ,space1 and gives us the idea of     
,substance1 of ,cause1 of ,being1 the   
mind alone might suffice to account for 
the whole sum of human knowledge4       
,fichte was followed by ,schelling1 and 
,schelling by ,hegel1 each differing    
from his predecessor1 but all concurring
 in the attempt to identify ,seyn1 or   
absolute ,being1 with ,thought1 and to  
represent everything in the universe as 
a mere mode or manifestation of one     
,infinite ,essence4 ,the identity of    

,existence and ,thought is the          
fundamental principle of ,hegel's       
doctrine4 ,with him1 ,being and the     
,idea of being1 are the same2 and ,being
 and ,thought are combined in the       
,absolute1 which is at once ideal and   
real 7l'tre and l'ide74 ,with him1 the  
idea of ,god is that of a logical       
process of thought1 ever unfolding      
itself1 but never unfolded1--a dialectic
 movement rather than a ,divine ,being1 
which realizes itself1 and reaches a    
state of self-consciousness in man4     
,god1 nature1 and man1 are but one      
process of thought1 considered in       
different aspects2 all finite           
personalities are only so many thoughts 
of one eternal mind2 ,god is in man1 and
 man is in ,god1 and the progress of    
humanity1 in all its stages1 is a       
,divine development4  ,this bare outline
 of these systems must suffice for our  
present purpose1 and we now proceed to  
offer a few remarks on the doctrine of  
,ideal as distinguished from ,material  

,pantheism4  #a4 ,the whole system of   
,idealism1 as propounded in the ,german 
schools1 is utterly baseless1 and       
contradicts the intuitive1 the universal
 convictions of the human mind4 ,for    
what is ,idealism8 ,reduced to its      
utmost simplicity1 and expressed in the 
briefest formula1 it amounts1 in        
substance1 to this3 that the whole      
universe is to us a mere process of     
thought1 and that nothing exists1 or1 at
 least1 can be known by us1 beyond the  
ideas of our own minds4 ,and what is the
 ground on which it rests8 ,it rests    
entirely on the assumption1 that1 since 
we can know nothing otherwise than      
through the exercise of our mental      
faculties1 these faculties must be the  
sole sources of all our knowledge1 and  
altogether independent of any external  
object4 ,according to this theory1 the  
mind is not informed or instructed by   
the universe1 but the universe is       
created by the mind2 the objective is   
developed from the subjective2 and there

 is no reality anywhere except in the   
region of consciousness4 ,nature is seen
 only as it is imaged in the mirror     
within2 and to us it is a mere          
phantasmagoria1 a series of phenomena1 a
 succession of thoughts4 ,the sum total1
 says ,fichte1 is this2 there is        
absolutely nothing permanent1 either    
without me or within me1 but only an    
unceasing change4 ,i know absolutely    
nothing of any existence1 not even of my
 own4 ,i myself know nothing1 and am    
nothing4 ,images there are2 they        
constitute all that apparently exists2  
and what they know of themselves is     
after the manner of images2 images that 
pass and vanish without there being     
aught to witness their transition2 that 
consist1 in fact1 of the images of      
images1 without significance and without
 an aim4 ,i myself am one of these      
images2 nay1 ,i am not even thus much1  
but only a confused image of images4    
,all reality is converted into a        
marvellous dream1 without a life to     

dream of1 and without a mind to         
dream1--into a dream made up only of a  
dream itself4 ,perception is a dream2   
thought--the source of all existence1   
and all the reality which ,i imagine to 
myself of my existence1 of my power1 of 
my destination--is the dream of that    
dream4#acf  ,the tendency of such       
speculations as these towards universal 
,skepticism1 or even absolute ,nihilism1
 with the exception only of certain     
fleeting phenomena of ,consciousness1 is
 too apparent to require any formal     
proof2 and it must be equally evident   
that they contradict some of the most   
universal and deeply-rooted convictions 
of the human mind4 ,the ultimate ground 
of every system of ,idealism which      
excludes the knowledge of an external   
world must be one or other of these two 
assumptions1 or a combination of both3  
either1 that our knowledge cannot extend
 beyond the range of consciousness1     
which takes cognizance only of ideas1 or
 of subjective mental states2 or that   

any attempt to extend it beyond these   
limits1 so as to embrace external       
objects as really existing1 can only be 
successful on this condition1--that we  
prove1 by reasoning from the subjective 
to the objective1 that there is a       
necessary logical connection between the
 state of the one and the reality of the
 other4 ,each of these assumptions is   
equally groundless4 ,it is true that    
consciousness1 strictly so called1 takes
 cognizance only of what passes within2 
it is not true that consciousness1 in   
this restricted sense1 is commensurate  
with our entire knowledge4 ,it is true  
that we acquire our knowledge only      
through the exercise of our mental      
faculties2 it is not true that our      
mental faculties are the only sources of
 our knowledge1 nor even that1 without  
the concurrence of certain objects1 they
 could give us any knowledge at all4 ,it
 is true that there must be a connection
 between the subjective and the         
objective2 it is not true that this     

connection must be established by       
reasoning1 or that we must prove the    
existence of an external world distinct 
from the thinking mind1 before we are   
entitled to believe in it4 ,for a great 
part of our knowledge is presentative1  
and we directly perceive the objects of 
,nature not less than the phenomena of  
,consciousness4  ,when it is said1 in   
the jargon of the modern ,german        
philosophy1 that the ,ego has no        
immediate consciousness of the ,non-,ego
 as existing1 but that the ,non-,ego is 
only represented to us in a modification
 of the self-conscious ,ego1 and is1 in 
fact1 only a phenomenon of the ,ego1--a 
plain1 practical ,englishman1 little    
tolerant of these subtle distinctions1  
might be ready1 if not deterred by the  
mere sound of the words1 to test them by
 a particular example4 ,what am ,i to   
think1 he might say1 of my own father   
and mother8 ,they are familiarly known  
to me4 ,i have seen them1 and talked    
with1 them1 and loved them as my own    

soul4 ,i have hitherto believed that    
they existed1 and that they were really 
a father and mother to me4 ,but now ,i  
am taught that they are--mere           
modifications of my own mind2 that they 
are nothing more than simple phenomena  
of the self-conscious ,ego2 and that1 so
 far from being the earthly authors of  
my existence1 they are themselves--the  
creation and offspring of my own        
thought4 ,and on what ground am ,i asked
 to receive this astonishing discovery8 
,why1 simply because ,i can be sure of  
nothing but the facts of consciousness4 
,but how are these facts proved8 ,they  
need no proof2 they are self-evident2   
they are immediately and irresistibly   
believed4 ,be it so4 ,i can just as     
little doubt of the existence of my     
body1 of the distinct personality of my 
parents1 and the reality of an external 
universe1 as of any fact of             
consciousness4 ,may it not be1 whether  
we can explain it or not1 that the one  
set of facts is as directly presented1  

and needs as little to be proved1 as the
 other8  #b4 ,the doctrine of ,identity 
constitutes a prominent and             
indispensable part of the theory of     
,idealism1 and is the ground-principle  
of ,philosophical ,pantheism4 ,it       
amounts1 in substance1 to the           
proposition1 that ,existence and        
,thought are one1 that the subject and  
object of knowledge are one4 ,if the    
doctrine of ,identity means anything1 it
 means that ,thought and ,being are     
essentially one2 that the process of    
thinking is virtually the same as the   
process of creating2 that in            
constructing the universe by logical    
deduction1 we do virtually the same     
thing as ,deity accomplishes in         
developing himself in all the forms and 
regions of creation2 that every man's   
reason1 therefore1 is really ,god2 in   
fine1 that ,deity is the whole sum of   
consciousness immanent in the world4#acg
 ,it is through the medium of this      
doctrine of ,identity that ,idealism    

passes into ,pantheism1--not1 indeed1   
the ,idealism of ,berkeley1 which       
recognized1 consistently or otherwise1  
the existence of the human mind and of  
the ,divine ,spirit1 while it denied the
 independent existence of matter1--but  
the ,idealism of ,fichte and others1    
which resolved mind into a mere process 
of thought1 a continuous stream or      
succession of ideas4 ,to such a theory  
the doctrine of ,identity was           
indispensable4 ,its advocates were bound
 to show that nothing existed1 or could 
be proved to exist1 in the universe but 
thought1 and that1 in every case1 the   
subject and object of thought might be  
identified as one4 ,we find1            
accordingly1 that from the earliest ages
 down to the present time1 the idea of  
absolute unity1 or universal identity1  
has been frequently exhibited in        
connection with the speculations of     
philosophical ,idealists4 ,the disciples
 of the ,eleatic school in ancient      
,greece1 not less than those of the     

modern schools of ,germany1 insisted on 
the identity of thought and its object1 
and regarded everything that might seem 
to be external to the mind as a mere    
illusion4  ,it may be difficult for the 
,british mind1 familiarized from infancy
 with the philosophy of common sense1 to
 grasp the idea which this doctrine     
involves2 but1 on the principles of     
absolute ,idealism1 it may be easily    
explained1 and may even seem to have    
some foundation in facts that must be   
acknowledged by all4 ,there are two     
cases1 particularly1 which may serve to 
illustrate1 if they cannot suffice to   
prove1 it4 ,the first is that of the    
,supreme ,intelligence1 conceived as    
existing before the production of a     
created universe1 when ,he was himself  
the sole subject and the sole object of 
thought2 in other words1 the absolute   
,subject-,object4 ,the second is that of
 the human consciousness1 conceived as  
occupied solely with certain subjective 
mental states1 when the mind may be said

 to be at once the subject and the      
object of its own thought4 ,there are   
cases1 then1 in which mind may be       
regarded as a subject-object2 the case  
of human consciousness1 when the mind   
takes cognizance of its own states or   
acts1 and the case of the ,divine       
consciousness1 while as yet the created 
universe had not been called into being4
 ,but the question is1 whether1 in all  
cases1 the subject and object of thought
 are the same8 or1 whether existence and
 thought are universally identical8 ,an 
affirmative answer to this question     
would imply1 that nothing whatever      
exists except only in the mind that     
perceives it2 that1 according to ,bishop
 ,berkeley1 the existence of unthinking 
things without any relation to their    
being perceived is an absurd or         
impossible supposition2 that their esse 
is percipi1 that is1 that their being   
consists in their being perceived or    
known2 whence it would follow1 as       
,berkeley himself admits1 that we have  

no reason to believe in the continued   
existence of the desk at which we write1
 after we have left the room in which we
 see it1 excepting such as may arise    
from the supposition1 that if we        
returned to that room we might still see
 it1 or that in our absence it may still
 be perceived by some other mind4       
,existence is identified with thought1  
and nothing exists save only as it is   
thought of4 ,why8 ,simply because it can
 become known to us only through the    
medium of consciousness1 and that1 too1 
in no other character than as a         
phenomenon of our own minds4  ,that this
 doctrine is at direct variance with the
 universal convictions of mankind1 is   
too evident to require the slightest    
proof4 ,that it is unphilosophical1 as  
well as unpopular1 may be made apparent 
by two very simple considerations4 ,the 
first is1 that it assumes without proof 
the only point in question1 namely1 that
 the objects of our knowledge are       
nothing but the ideas of our own minds2 

whereas it is affirmed1 on the other    
side1 and surely with at least an equal 
amount of apparent reason1 that we are  
so constituted as to have a direct      
perception of external objects as well  
as of internal mental states4 ,the      
second is1 that the very formula of     
,idealism1 which represents the ,non-ego
 as a mere modification of the conscious
 ,ego1 seems to involve a palpable      
contradiction2 since it recognizes1 in a
 certain sense1 the difference between  
the ,ego and the ,non-ego1 and yet1 in  
the same breath1 annihilates that       
difference1 and proclaims their         
identity4#ach ,fichte admits1 indeed1   
that we have the idea of something which
 is not-self2 but instead of ascribing  
it to an external object1 he accounts   
for it by a law of our mental nature1   
which constrains us to create a limit1  
so as to give a determinate character to
 our thought4 ,the three technical      
formulas1 therefore1 which are said#aci 
to express1 respectively1--the          

affirmation of self1--the affirmation of
 not-self1--and the determination of the
 one by the other1--are all equally the 
products of our own mental laws1 and do 
not necessarily require the supposition 
of any external object2 and hence it    
follows that ,self is the one only      
absolute principle1 and that everything 
else that is conceived of is constructed
 out of purely subjective materials4    
,the question whether the object be the 
generative principle of the idea1 or    
vice vers1 is thus superseded2 for there
 is no longer any distinction between   
object and subject2 existence is        
identified with thought2 the ,ego and   
the ,non-ego unite in one absolute      
existence2 and ,self becomes the sole   
,subject-object1 the percipient and the 
perceived1 the knowing and the known4   
,of course1 on this theory1 there is no 
knowledge of ,god1 just as there can be 
no knowledge of ,nature1 and no         
knowledge of our fellow-men1 as distinct
 objective realities2 it is a system of 

pure ,idealism1 which1 if consistently  
followed out1 must terminate in utter   
skepticism in regard to many of the most
 familiar objects of human knowledge2   
or1 rather1 in the hands of a thoroughly
 consequent reasoner1 it must issue1 as 
,jacobi endeavored to show1 in absolute 
,nihilism2 since we can have no better  
reason for believing in the existence of
 ,self than we have for believing in the
 reality of an external world1 and the  
coexistence of our fellow-men4 ,each of 
these beliefs is equally the spontaneous
 product of certain mental laws1 which  
are just as trustworthy1 and need as    
little to be proved1 in the one case as 
in the other4  ,fichte seems to have    
become aware of this fundamental defect 
of his system2 and1 at a later period1  
he attempted to give it a firmer basis  
by representing self1 not as individual1
 but as ,divine1 that is1 as the        
,absolute manifesting itself in ,man4   
,he now admitted what1 if he had not    
denied1 he had overlooked before1 an    

essential reality as the substratum both
 of the ,ego and ,non-ego2 a reality of 
which all things1 whether within or     
without1 are only so many modes or      
manifestations4 ,and it is at this point
 that his subjective ,idealism passes   
into ,pantheism1 and that we mark the   
close affinity between his speculations 
and those of ,spinoza4 ,there is1 in    
some respects1 a wide difference between
 the two2 ,spinoza assumed1 ,fichte     
denied1 the existence of matter2 the    
former affirmed ,substance to be the    
absolute and infinite ,essence2 the     
latter proclaimed a spiritual universe1 
whose essence was the infinite reason1  
or the ,divine idea3 but still1 with    
these and other points of difference1   
there existed a real1 radical affinity  
between the two systems1 that of        
,fichte1 not less than that of ,spinoza1
 being based on the identity of         
existence and thought2 and both systems 
being directed to show that there is but
 one ,absolute ,being1 of which all     

phenomena1 whether material or mental1  
are only so many modes or               
manifestations4  #c4 ,the philosophy of 
the absolute1 as applied in support of  
,german ,pantheism1 depends on the      
doctrine of ,identity1 and must stand or
 fall along with it4#adj ,the absolute  
is described as being at once ideal and 
real1 pure being and pure thought1 and  
as developing itself in a great variety 
of forms4 ,the philosophy of the        
absolute is represented as the only     
science1 properly so called3 it is      
assumed that there can be no science of 
the finite1 the variable1 the           
contingent1 the relative1 but only of   
the absolute1 the unchangeable1 and the 
infinite4 ,to constitute this science1  
the doctrine of identity is             
indispensable2 the subject and the      
object of thought1 knowledge and being1 
must be reduced to scientific unity4    
,realism and ,idealism are thus blended 
together1 or rather identified in the   
philosophy of the absolute4 ,the idea of

 the absolute1 in which being and       
thought are identical1 is the only      
foundation of science1 and the ultimate 
ground of all certitude4 ,and ,pantheism
 is inferred from this idea2 for the    
absolute1 in which being and thought are
 identified1 is properly the sole       
existence1 which develops and manifests 
itself in a great variety of finite     
forms4  ,we are not disposed to treat   
the philosophy of the absolute either   
with levity or with scorn4 ,we feel that
 it brings us into contact with some of 
the most profound and most deeply       
mysterious problems of human thought4   
,finite as we are1 we are so constituted
 that we cannot avoid framing the idea1 
although we can never attain to a       
comprehension1 of the ,infinite4 ,there 
are absolute truths1 and necessary      
truths1 among the elements of human     
knowledge4 ,account for them as we may1 
their reality cannot be reasonably      
denied1 nor their importance disparaged4
 ,there is a tendency--and a most useful

 one--in the human mind1 to seek unity  
in all things1 to trace effects to      
causes1 to reduce phenomena to laws1 to 
resolve the complex into the simple1 and
 to rise from the contingent to the     
absolute1 from the finite to the        
infinite4 ,there are few more           
interesting inquiries in the department 
of ,psychology than that which seeks to 
investigate the nature1 the origin1 and 
the validity of those ideas which       
introduce us into the region of         
absolute1 eternal1 and immutable ,truth2
 and it were a lamentable result of the 
erratic speculations of ,germany did    
they serve to cast discredit on this    
inquiry1 or even to excite a prejudice  
against it1 in the more sober1 but not  
less profound1 minds of our own         
countrymen4 ,but there need be little   
apprehension on this score1 if it be    
clearly understood and carefully        
remembered1 that the philosophy of the  
absolute1 as taught in ,germany and     
applied in support of ,pantheism1 rests 

ultimately on the theory of ,idealism   
and the doctrine of ,identity1 by which 
all is resolved into one absolute       
subject-object1 and existence is        
identified with thought4 ,this system   
may be discarded1 and yet there may     
still remain a sound1 wholesome1 and    
innocuous philosophy of the absolute2 a 
philosophy which does not seek to       
identify things so generically different
 as existence and thought1 or to reduce 
mind and matter1 the finite and the     
infinite1 to the same category2 but     
which1 recognizing the differences      
subsisting between the various objects  
of thought1 seeks merely to investigate 
the nature and sources of that part of  
human knowledge which relates to        
absolute or necessary truths4 ,the      
former of these rival systems may be    
favorable to ,pantheism1 the latter will
 be found to be in entire accordance    
with ,christian ,theism4  ,the          
fundamental principle of philosophical  
,pantheism is either the unity of       

substance1 as taught by ,spinoza1 or the
 identity of existence and thought1 as  
taught1 with some important variations1 
by ,fichte1 ,schelling1 and ,hegel4 ,the
 ,absolute is conceived of1 not as a    
living ,being to whom a proper          
personality and certain intelligible    
attributes may be ascribed1 but as a    
vague1 indeterminate somewhat1 which has
 no distinctive character1 and of which1
 in the first instance1 or prior to its 
development1 almost nothing can be      
either affirmed or denied4 ,but this    
absolute existence1 by some unknown1    
inherent necessity1 develops1           
determines1 and limits itself3 it       
becomes being1 and constitutes all      
being3 the infinite passes into the     
finite1 the absolute into the relative1 
the necessary into the contingent1 the  
one into the many2 all other existences 
are only so many modes or forms of its  
manifestation4 ,here is a theory which1 
to say the very least1 is neither more  
intelligible1 nor less mysterious1 than 

any article of the ,christian faith4    
,and what are the proofs to which it    
appeals1 what the principles on which it
 rests8 ,its two fundamental positions  
are these2 that finite things have no   
distinct existence as realities in      
nature1 and that there exists only one  
,absolute ,being1 manifesting itself in 
a variety of forms4 ,and how are they   
demonstrated8 ,simply by the affirmation
 of universal ,identity4 ,but what if   
this affirmation be denied8 ,what if1   
founding on the clearest data of        
consciousness1 we refuse to acknowledge 
that existence is identical with        
thought8#ada ,what if we continue to    
believe that there are objects of       
thought which are distinct from thought 
itself1 and which must be presented to  
the mind before they can be represented 
by the mind8 ,what if1 while we         
recognize the idea both of the finite   
and the infinite1 the relative and the  
absolute1 the contingent and the        
necessary1 we cannot1 by the utmost     

effort of our reason1 obliterate the    
difference between them1 so as to reduce
 them to one absolute essence8 ,then the
 whole superstructure of ,pantheism     
falls along with the ,idealism on which 
it depends2 and it is found to be1 not a
 solid and enduring system of truth1 but
 a frail edifice1 ingeniously           
constructed out of the mere abstractions
 of the human mind4  ,the advocates of  
this system assume that the relations   
which subsist between beings are the    
same as the relations which subsist     
between our ideas1 and infer that logic 
is sufficient to construct a system of  
metaphysic4 ,but ,professor ,nicolas has
 well said1 that while it is certain we 
cannot know things but by the notions   
which we have of them1 and a certain    
parallelism may thus be established     
between what exists and what we think of
 that which exists1 yet from this to the
 identity of being and thought1 such as 
,pantheism requires1 there is a vast    
distance1 and we have no ground for     

believing that the logical relations of 
our ideas are identical with the real   
relations of beings4 ,speculative       
,pantheism is wholly built on this      
assumption4 ,it describes the relations 
of being according to the logical       
relations of our thought2 and it takes  
logic for a kind of metaphysic4 ,it     
confounds the laws of thought with the  
laws of being4 ,it seeks to solve the   
question1 ,what is the first ,being1 and
 what are its relations to other beings8
 ,that ,being must necessarily be the   
condition of all other beings1 and must 
virtually contain them all2 nay1 it must
 be capable of becoming all things4 ,it 
must therefore be simple1 indeterminate1
 indifferent1 possessing no essential   
character1 resembling nothing that we   
actually know4 ,all this is true of our 
ideas1 but not of beings4 ,the highest  
idea1--that which is the logical        
condition of all others1 and also the   
most general1 the most abstract1 the    
most indeterminate1--this idea contains 

all others1 and by receiving this or    
that determination1 it becomes this or  
that particular idea4 ,but what is true 
of the idea is not true of the being2 no
 such vague1 indeterminate1 indifferent 
being exists2 and yet ,pantheism        
confounds the idea with the being1 and  
rests entirely on that confusion of     
thought4         99       99       99   
99       99  ,in bringing our review of 
,modern ,pantheism to a close1 we may   
offer a few remarks illustrative of its 
nature and tendency1 whether considered 
as a system of speculative thought1 or  
as a substitute for religious belief4   
,in this view1 it is important to       
observe1 first of all1 that the theory  
of ,idealism1 and the doctrine of       
,identity1 which constitute the         
groundwork of the more spiritual form of
 ,pantheism1 are not more adverse to our
 belief in the existence and personality
 of ,god1 than they are to our belief in
 the reality of an external world1 or in
 the existence and personality of man   

himself4 ,they stand equally related to 
each of these three topics2 and1 if they
 be accepted at all1 they must be       
impartially applied1 and consistently   
carried out into all their legitimate   
consequences1 as the only philosophical 
solution of the whole question of       
,ontology4 ,perhaps this is not         
understood2 certainly it has not been   
duly considered by the more superficial 
litterateurs1 who have been slightly    
tinctured with ,pantheism2 but it will  
be acknowledged at once by every        
consistent ,idealist1 who understands   
his own philosophy1 and who is honest or
 bold enough to carry it out into all   
its practical applications4 ,he knows   
very well1 and1 if sufficiently candid1 
he will frankly confess1 that the       
principles on which he founds1 if they  
be conclusive against the existence of a
 living1 personal ,god1 are equally     
conclusive against the reality of an    
external world1 and against the doctrine
 of our own personality or that of our  

fellow-men4 ,with most minds1 this      
consideration would be of itself a      
powerful counteractive to all that is   
most dangerous in the theory of         
,idealism1 were it only clearly         
apprehended and steadily kept in view2  
for an argument which proves too much is
 justly held to prove nothing1 and that 
theory which leaves us no right to      
believe in the existence of ,nature1 or 
in the distinct personality of our      
fellow-men1 can scarcely be held        
sufficient to disprove the existence of 
,god4  ,it may be observed1 further1    
that ,ideal ,pantheism has a strong     
tendency to engender a spirit either of 
,mysticism1 on the one hand1 or of      
,skepticism on the other4 ,it terminates
 in ,mysticism when1 seeking to avoid   
,skepticism1 it takes refuge in the     
doctrine of an intellectual intuition1  
such as gives an immediate knowledge of 
the ,absolute3 and it terminates in     
,skepticism when1 seeking to avoid      
,mysticism1 it rejects the doctrine of  

intellectual intuition1 and discovers   
that it has no other and no higher      
claims to our confidence than such as   
are equally possessed by any one of our 
common faculties1 whose testimony the   
,idealist has been taught to distrust   
and doubt4  ,it is further worthy of    
remark1 that the philosophy of the      
,absolute1 as taught in the ,german     
schools1 has been applied to the whole  
circle of the ,sciences1 not less than  
to ,theology1 and that it has given     
birth to numerous speculative systems1  
in ,physics1 in ,chemistry1 in ,ethics1 
in ,history1 and in ,politics1 all      
strongly marked by the same             
characteristic feature--the substitution
 of  priori and deductive speculation   
for the more sober and legitimate method
 of ,inductive inquiry4 ,the province of
 ,natural ,science1 in which1 if        
anywhere1 we should be guided by the    
light of experience and observation1 has
 been rudely invaded by this            
transcendental philosophy1 which offers 

to construct a theory of universal      
knowledge on the basis of a certain     
self-development of the ,absolute4 ,we  
are indebted to ,mr4 ,morell for a      
specimen1#adb alike amusing and         
instructive1 of ,schelling's            
speculations on this subject4 ,we shall 
not attempt to interpret its meaning1   
for1 in sooth1 we do not pretend to     
understand it3 but one thing is clear1  
the laws of ,matter1 of ,dynamics1 of   
,organic structure and life1 the laws of
 ,knowledge1 of ,action1 and of ,art1   
are all exhibited as mere deductions or 
corollaries from the idea of the        
,absolute2 and in the name of ,natural  
,science1 not less than on behalf of    
,theology1 we protest against this      
vicious method of ,philosophy1 and do   
most earnestly deprecate the            
substitution of ,fichte1 ,schelling1 and
 ,hegel1 in the place of our own ,bacon1
 and ,boyle1 and ,newton1 as models of  
scientific thought4  ,the practical     
influence of ,pantheism1 in so far as   

its peculiar tendencies are not         
restrained or counteracted by more      
salutary beliefs1 must be deeply        
injurious1 both to the individual and   
social welfare of mankind4 ,in its      
,ideal or ,spiritual form it may be     
seductive to some ardent1 imaginative   
minds2 but it is a wretched creed       
notwithstanding2 and it will be found1  
when calmly examined1 to be fraught with
 the most serious evils4 ,it has been   
commended1 indeed1 in glowing terms1 as 
a creed alike beautiful and             
beneficent1--as a source of religious   
life nobler and purer than any that can 
ever spring from the more gloomy system 
of ,theism3 for1 on the theory of       
,pantheism1 ,god is manifest to all1    
everywhere1 and at all times2 ,nature1  
too1 is aggrandized and glorified1 and  
everything in ,nature is invested with a
 new dignity and interest2 above all1   
,man is conclusively freed from all     
fantastic hopes and superstitious fears1
 so that his mind can now repose1 with  

tranquil satisfaction1 on the bosom of  
the ,absolute1 unmoved by the           
vicissitudes of life1 and unscared even 
by the prospect of death4 ,for what is  
death8 ,the dissolution of any living   
organism is but one stage in the process
 of its further development2 and whether
 it passes into a new form of           
self-conscious life1 or is reabsorbed   
into the infinite1 it still forms an    
indestructible element in the vast sum  
of ,being4 ,we may1 therefore1 or1      
rather1 we must1 leave our future state 
to be determined by ,nature's inexorable
 laws1 and we need1 at least1 fear no   
,being higher than ,nature1 to whose    
justice we are amenable1 or whose frown 
we should dread4#adc ,but1 even as it is
 thus exhibited by some of its warmest  
partisans1 it appears to us1 we own1 to 
be a dreary and cheerless creed1 when   
compared with that faith which teaches  
us to regard ,god as our ,father in     
heaven1 and that hope which is full of  
immortality4 ,it is worse1 however1 than

 dreary2 it is destructive of all       
religion and of all morality4 ,if it be 
an avowed antagonist to ,christianity1  
it is not less hostile to ,natural      
,theology and to ,ethical ,science4 ,it 
consecrates error and vice1 as being1   
equally with truth and virtue1 necessary
 and beneficial manifestations of the   
infinite4 ,it is a system of            
,syncretism1 founded on the idea that   
error is only an incomplete truth1 and  
maintaining that truth must necessarily 
be developed by error1 and virtue by    
vice4 ,according to this fundamental law
 of human progress1 ,atheism itself may 
be providential2 and the axiom of a     
,fatalistic ,optimism--,whatever is1 is 
best--must be admitted equally in regard
 to truth and error1 to virtue and vice4
  ,it may be further observed1 that     
modern ,pantheism1 whether in its       
,material or ,ideal form1 is nothing    
else than the revival of some of the    
earliest and most inveterate ,principles
 of ,paganism1--the same ,paganism which

 still flourishes among the theosophic  
dreamers of ,india1 and which exhibits  
its practical fruits in the horrors of  
,hindoo superstition4 ,for ,pantheism1  
although repeatedly revived and         
exhibited in new forms1 has made no real
 progress since the time when it was    
first taught in the ,vedanta system1 and
 sublimed in the schools of ,alexandria4
 ,christianity1 which encountered and   
triumphed over it in her youth1 can have
 nothing to fear from it in her mature  
age1#add provided only that she be      
faithful to herself1 and spurn every    
offered compromise4 ,but there must be  
no truce1 and no attempt at conciliation
 between the two4 ,the ,pantheists of   
,germany have made the most impudent    
claims to the virtual sanction of       
,christianity2 they have even dared to  
make use of ,bible terms in a new sense1
 and have spoken of ,revelation1        
,inspiration1 ,incarnation1 ,redemption1
 ,atonement1 and ,regeneration1 in such 
a way as to adapt them to the           

,pantheistic hypothesis4 ,common honesty
 is outraged1 and the conscience of     
universal humanity offended1 by the     
conduct of individuals--some of them    
wearing the robes of the holy           
ministry--who have substituted the      
dreams of ,pantheism for the doctrines  
of ,jesus ,christ1 and assailed1 both   
from the pulpit and the press1 the      
sacred cause which they had solemnly    
vowed to maintain4 ,but even in ,germany
 itself a powerful reaction has         
commenced2 and the learning and labors  
of such men as ,olshausen1 and ,tholuck1
 and ,hengstenberg1 may be hailed as the
 dawn of a better and brighter day4  ,it
 may be observed1 finally1 that         
,pantheism stands directly opposed to   
,christian ,theism in several distinct  
respects4 ,the following are the        
principal points of collision between   
the two3  #a4 ,pantheism                
denies1--,christian ,theism affirms1 the
 existence of a living1 personal ,god1  
distinct from ,nature1 and superior to  

it4  #b4 ,pantheism                     
supersedes1--,christian ,theism reveals1
 the doctrine of a real creation4  #c4  
,pantheism contests1--,christian ,theism
 confirms1 the doctrine of the constant 
providence and moral government of ,god4
  #d4 ,pantheism disowns1--,christian   
,theism declares1 the doctrine of a     
conscious1 personal immortality4  #e4   
,pantheism rejects1--,christian ,theism 
receives1 the whole scheme of           
,revelation1 considered as a            
supernatural code of ,divine truth4 ,the
 one accounts for its origin on the     
principle of natural development1 the   
other on that of supernatural           
interposition4  #f4 ,pantheism has no   
living1 self-conscious1 personal ,god1  
no loving ,father1 no watchful          
,providence1 no ,hearer of ,prayer1 no  
,object of confiding trust1 no          
,redeemer1 no ,sanctifier1 no           
,comforter3 it leaves us with nothing   
higher than ,nature as our portion here1
 and nothing beyond its eternal         

vicissitudes as our prospect hereafter4 
,,footnotes3  #ajc ,,amand ,,saintes1   
,histoire de la ,vie et des ,ouvrages de
 ,spinoza1 ,fondateur de l',exegse et de
 la ,philosophie ,modernes4  #ajd ,m4   
,,cousin1 ,cours de l',histoire de la   
,philosophie1 ,i4 #djc4 ,see also       
,fragmens ,philosophiques1 ,preface1    
second edition1 p4 ,,xxvii42 ,nouveaux  
,fragments1 pp4 #i1 #afj4  #aje ,m4     
,,ad4 ,,franck1 ,de la ,certitude1      
,preface1 p4 ,,xxi4  #ajf ,m4 ,a4       
,,javari1 ,de la ,certitude1 p4 #eji4   
#ajg ,,amand ,,saintes1 ,histoire de la 
,vie et des ,ouvrages de ,spinoza1 pp4  
#bjh1 #baj4  #ajh ,,abb ,,maret1 ,essai 
sur le ,panthisme dans les ,socits      
,modernes1 pp4 #f1 #aa1 #ca4 ,ibid41    
,theodice ,chretinne1 pp4 #dcg1 #ddd1   
#ddi4  #aji ,,mr4 ,,morell',s           
,historical and ,critical ,view1 ,,ii4  
#ajd1 #aec4  #aaj ,,pierre ,,leroux1 ,de
 l',humanit1 ,i4 vi4 #c1 #bie4  #aaa ,l4
 ,d4 ,,crousse1 ,des ,principes1 ou     
,philosophie ,premire1 #b;d ,edition1   

,paris1 #ahdf4  #aab ,,abb ,,maret1     
,theodice ,chretienne1 p4 #id4  #aac    
,,abb ,,goschler1 sur l',histoire du    
,pantheisme4 ,,abb ,,maret1 ,essai1     
chap4 ,,iv4  #aad ,,pierre ,,leroux1 ,de
 l',humanit1 ,i4 #bdi4 ,m4 ,,crousse1   
,des ,principes1 pp4 #aii1 #baa1 #bif4  
,,bayle1 ,penses1 ,,iii4 #fg4 ,the      
well-known lines of the sixth neid1     
,principio coelum1 ac terras1 camposque 
liquentes1 c4 are thus applied4  #aae   
,,abb ,,maret1 ,essai1 pp4 #aeb1 #aef1  
#bba4  #aaf ,,dr4 ,,merle ,d',,aubign1  
,history of ,reformation1 ,v4 #hd4  #aag
 ,,abb ,,maret1 ,essai1 p4 #hi2         
,theodice1 p4 #cfh4  #aah ,,fred4 ,,von 
,,schlegel1 ,philosophy of ,life1 p4    
#dag4 ,see1 also1 ,,dr4 ,,tholuck',s    
remarks on the same point in the        
,princeton ,theological ,essays1 ,i4    
#eee4  #aai ,,mus,,us1 ,tractatus       
,theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen
 examinatus1 #afgd4 ,,regneri ,a        
,,mansvelt1 ,adversus anonymum          
,theologico-politicum1 ,liber           

singularis1 #afgd4 ,,francois ,,cuyper1 
,arcana ,atheismi ,revelata1 #afgf4     
,,john ,,bredenbourg1 ,enervatio        
,tractatus ,theol4-polit4 ,,christ4     
,,wittichii1 ,anti-,spinoza1 sive       
,examen1 #afij4 ,,pierre ,,poiret1      
,fundamenta ,atheismi ,eversa1 sive     
,specimen ,absurditatis ,spinozian4     
,,fenelon1 ,de l',existence de ,dieu1 p4
 ,,ii41 c4 ,,iii41 ,refutation du       
,spinozisme4 ,,huet1 ,la ,conformit de  
la ,raison avec la ,foi1 #afib4 ,,howe1 
,living ,temple1 ,i4 #bfb4 ,s4 ,,clarke1
 ,discourse on the ,being and           
,attributes of ,god1 pp4 #be1 #dd1 #eh1 
#hj4  #abj ,,jean ,,colerus1 ,vie de    
,spinoza1 reprinted by ,saisset1 p4 #d4 
#aba ,,spinoza1 ,ethica1 ,definitions   
,,iii41 ,,iv41 ,v4  #abb ,il construit  
le systme entiere des tres avec ces     
trois seuls elements2 la substance1     
l'attribut1 et le mode4--,voila l'ide   
mere de la metaphysique de              
,spinoza4--,,saisset4  #abc ,,saisset1  
,introduction1 p4 ,,xxxix4  #abd        

,,spinoza1 ,de ,intellectus             
,emendatione4 ,this treatise contains   
the exposition of his method4  #abe ,m4 
,f4 ,,perron1 ,essai d'une ,nouvelle    
,theorie sur les ,ides ,fondamentales1  
#ahdc4  #abf ,ici1 a prendre les mots   
dans le sens ordinaire1 il semble qu'il 
soit demontr qui la ,creation est       
impossible1 principe justement cher au  
,pantheisme2 tandis qu'au fond1 tout ce 
qui est demontr1 c'est que l',etre en   
soi est necessairement incr1--verit     
incontestable1 dont le ,pantheisme n'a  
rien a tirer4--,,prof4 ,,saisset1       
,introduction1 p4 ,,xlii4  #abg ,m4     
,l',,abb ,,de ,,condillac1 ,trait des   
,sensations1 #b vols4  #abh ,the ,,hon4 
,,robert ,,boyle1 ,theological ,works1  
,,ii4 #gi4--;,a ,free ,inquiry into the 
,received ,notion of ,nature4  #abi     
,systme de la ,nature1 ,,ii4 #ge1 #aaj1 
#aae4  #acj ,tout est toujours dans     
l'ordre rlativement  la ,nature1 o tous 
les tres ne font que suivre les loix qui
 leur sont imposes4 ,il est entr dans   

son plans que de certaines terres       
produiroient des fruits delicieux1      
tandis que d'autres ne fourniroient que 
des pines1 des vegetaux dangereux4 ,elle
 a volu que quelques societs produise   
des sages1 c4--,vol4 ,i4 #bfe1 also     
#bfg4  #aca ,systme de la ,nature1 ,,ii4
 #ajb4  #acb ,m4 ,,crousse1 ,des        
,principes1 ,paris1 #ahdf1 pp4 #ha1 #ic3
 ,pour qui sait voir1 le ,monde sent1 se
 ment1 parle1 et pense4  #acc ,the      
,purpose of ,existence1 pp4 #he1 #hi4   
,london1 #ahej4  #acd ,letters on the   
,laws of ,man's ,nature and             
,development4 ,by ,h4 ,g4 ,,atkinson and
 ,,harriet ,,martineau4 ,london1 #aheb4 
#ace ,,mr4 ,,morell1 ,history of        
,philosophy1 ,,ii4 #ga4  #acf ,,sir     
,,wm4 ,,hamilton',s ,edition of ,,dr4   
,,reid',s ,works1 p4 #abi4  #acg ,,mr4  
,,morell1 ,history of ,philosophy1 ,,ii4
 #abg4 ,m4 ,,maret1 ,essai sur le       
,pantheisme1 pp4 #abi1 #acc1 #adc1 #aib1
 #bgf4 ,ibid41 ,theodice1 pp4 #e1 #abc1 
#aib1 #aii4  #ach ,,sir ,,william       

,,hamilton',s edition of ,,reid',s      
,works1 p4 #bha4 ,sir ,william does not 
seem to admit that there is a           
contradiction such as ,i have noted4    
#aci #a4 ,the ego or moi affirms itself4
 #b4 ,the ego or moi affirms a non-ego  
or non-moi4 #c4 ,the ego or moi affirms 
itself to be determined by the non-ego  
or non-moi4  #adj ,m4 ,,maret1 ,essai1  
pp4 #abi1 #adb1 #adf1 #age1 #aib1 #bbe1 
#bgf4 ,ibid41 ,theodice1 pp4 #aic1 #cff1
 #cgh1 #chf1 #cid4 ,,mr4 ,,morell1      
,history1 ,,ii4 #abg1 #ach4  #ada       
,,professor ,,nicolas1 ,quelques        
,considerations sur le ,pantheisme1 pp4 
#bj-ca4  #adb ,,mr4 ,,morell1 ,history  
of ,philosophy1 ,,ii4 #abi4  #adc ,m4   
,,crousse1 ,des ,principes4 ,m4 ,,maret1
 ,essal1 pp4 #fi1 #hf1 #aej2 ,theodice  
pp4 #caa1 #cad4 ,,valroger1 ,etudes     
,critiques1 pp4 #ig1 #aja1 #aae1 #aea1  
#dab4  #add ,m4 ,,maret1 ,essai sur     
,pantheisme1 p4 #ajg4 ,le ,christianisme
 saura vaincre dans son ge mr l'ennemi  
qu'il a terrass en naissant4            

,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,theories ,,of        
,,materialism4   ,the doctrine of       
,materialism stands equally related to  
the mechanical form of ,atheism1 and to 
the hylozoic form of ,pantheism4 ,it is 
subsumed in both1 and is the fundamental
 postulate on which they respectively   
depend4  ,it has no natural affinity    
with the more ideal or spiritual form of
 ,pantheism4 ,we must not conclude1     
however1 that it has no historical      
connection with it4 ,for it is          
instructive to mark1 in tracing the     
history of philosophic speculation1 that
 its course resembles not so much the   
uniform current of a stream1 as the     
alternate flowing and ebbing of the     
tide2 or1 if we may change the figure1  
that its movement may be likened to the 
oscillation of a pendulum1 which no     
sooner reaches its highest elevation on 
the one side1 than it acquires a        
tendency to rush to the opposite extreme
 on the other4 ,there can be little     
doubt that the recent revival of        

speculative ,idealism was the result1 at
 least in part1 of a strong reaction    
against the sensational philosophy1     
which had degenerated in the school of  
,priestley at home1 and in that of      
,condillac abroad1 into a system of     
gross and revolting ,materialism4 ,for  
the same reason1 we may now1 ,i think1  
anticipate a speedy reaction the other  
way1--a reaction against the            
extravagances of idealistic and         
transcendental speculation1 and a       
tendency towards a more practical and   
matter-of-fact philosophy4 ,this        
tendency1 if guided by the true spirit  
of the ,baconian method1 may give a     
powerful impulse to ,inductive ,science 
in all its departments2 but1 if biased  
by partial and one-sided views1 may     
issue either in the temporary ascendancy
 of the ,positive ,school1 or the       
partial revival of some other form of   
,materialism4  ,some such tendency might
 have been expected to arise as soon as 
,idealism should have reached its       

culminating point4 ,for1 on a           
comprehensive view of the whole history 
of speculative thought1 we find that    
there are just four great systems of    
,metaphysics1 which are perpetually     
recurring1 as it were1 in cycles4 ,the  
first is the system of ,dualism1--not   
the ,dualism of ,christian ,theology1   
which speaks of ,god and nature1 the    
,creator and the creature1--but the     
,dualism of ancient ,paganism1 which    
held ,matter and ,spirit to be equally  
uncreated and eternal3 the second is    
,materialism1 which resolves all into   
,matter and its laws3 the third is      
,idealism1 which resolves all into ,mind
 and its modifications3 and the fourth  
is ,pantheism1 which identifies         
,existence with ,thought1 and resolves  
all into the ,absolute4#ade ,in the     
present age1 ,idealism is in the        
ascendant1 and has risen to the height  
of ,pantheism2 but1 by a natural        
reaction1 many are beginning to         
desiderate a more substantial and       

practical philosophy1 while the rapid   
progress of physical science is         
directing their thoughts more and more  
to the wonders of the material world4   
,in these circumstances1 there may be a 
tendency to relapse into the            
,materialism of the last century1 which 
attempted to explain the whole theory of
 the universe by the laws of matter and 
motion2 or at least to embrace some     
modification of the ,positive           
,philosophy1 which excludes all causes1 
whether efficient or final1 from the    
field of human knowledge1 and confines  
our inquiries to the mere phenomena and 
laws of material nature4  ,there are not
 wanting various significant indications
 of the existence of this tendency at   
the present day4 ,it is sufficiently    
indicated1 in some quarters1 by the mere
 omission of all reference to ,mind or  
,spirit as distinct from ,matter2 and1  
in others1 by elaborate attempts to     
explain all the phenomena of life and   
thought by means of physical agencies   

and organic laws4 ,the writings of      
,comte1 ,crousse1 ,cabanis1 and         
,broussais1#adf afford ample evidence of
 its growing prevalence in ,france2 and 
although it has been said by a recent   
historian of ,philosophy that in        
,england there has been no formal       
avowal1 or at least no recognized       
school1 of ,materialism1 since the      
publication of ,dr4 ,thomas ,brown's    
reply to ,darwin's ,zonomia1 yet there  
is too much reason to believe that it   
was all along cherished by not a few    
private thinkers1 who had imbibed the   
spirit of ,hobbes and ,priestley2 and   
now it is beginning to speak out1 in    
terms too unambiguous to be             
misunderstood1 in such works as ,the    
,purpose of ,existence and the ,letters 
of ,atkinson and ,martineau4 ,but apart 
from the opinions of individual         
inquirers1 it must be remembered that   
there is a tendency in certain studies1 
when exclusively pursued1 to generate a 
frame of mind which will tempt men      

either to adopt the theory of           
,materialism1 or at least to attach     
undue importance to physical agencies   
and organic laws4 ,this tendency may be 
observed in the study of ,physiology1   
especially when it is combined with that
 of ,phrenology and ,animal ,magnetism2 
not that there is any necessary or      
strictly logical connection between     
these studies and ,materialism1 for some
 of their ablest expounders1 including  
,cabanis1 ,gall1 and ,spurzheim1 have   
explicitly disavowed that theory2 but   
simply that1 in prosecuting such        
inquiries1 the mind is insensibly led to
 bestow an undue1 if not exclusive1     
attention on the phenomena and laws of  
our material organization1 so as to     
become comparatively unmindful of what  
is mental1 moral1 and spiritual in the  
constitution of man4 ,for these reasons1
 and considering1 especially1 the close 
connection of ,materialism both with the
 mechanical ,atheism of the past1 and   
the hylozoic ,pantheism of the present  

age1 we deem it necessary to subject its
 claims to a rigorous scrutiny1 in      
connection with the subject of our      
present inquiry4  ,what1 then1 is the   
doctrine of ,materialism8 ,what are the 
forms in which it has appeared1 and what
 the ground on which it rests8 ,how does
 it stand related to the question       
concerning the nature and existence of  
,god1 or the constitution and destiny of
 ,man8 ,a brief answer to these         
questions will be sufficient to show    
that this theory cannot be safely       
disregarded in any attempt to construct 
a comprehensive and conclusive argument 
on the first principles of ,natural     
,theology4   ,,section ,i4  ,,distinct  
,,forms ,,of ,,materialism4  ,the       
doctrine of ,materialism has assumed    
several distinct phases or forms in the 
hands of its different advocates2 and   
these must be carefully discriminated   
from each other1 if we would either     
estimate aright their respective merits1
 or do justice to the parties by whom   

they have been severally maintained4    
,the grossest and most revolting form of
 ,materialism is that which identifies  
mind with matter1 and thought with      
motion4 ,it denies that there is any    
real or radical difference between      
physical and moral phenomena1 and       
affirms that life and thought are so    
entirely dependent on material          
organization1 that the dissolution of   
the body must necessarily be the        
destruction of conscious existence1 and 
that death can only be an eternal sleep4
 ,this is the doctrine of ,materialism  
which was taught in a former age1 by the
 author of the ,systme de la ,nature1   
and which has recently been revived by  
,m4 ,comte in ,france1 and by ,atkinson 
and ,martineau in ,england4 ,a few      
extracts will sufficiently illustrate   
its character and tendency4 ,men have   
evidently abused the distinction1 says  
,baron ,d',holbach1 which is so often   
made between man physical and man moral3
 man moral is nothing else than that    

physical being considered in a certain  
point of view1 that is1 with reference  
to some modes of action which belong to 
his peculiar organization4--,the        
universe--that vast assemblage of       
everything that exists--exhibits nowhere
 anything else than matter and          
motion4--,if we are asked1 what is man8 
we reply1 that he is a material being1  
organized or framed so as to feel1 to   
think1 and to be affected in certain    
ways peculiar to himself1 according to  
his organization4#adg ,more recently1   
,m4 ,comte has affirmed that the subject
 of all our researches is one1 and that 
all natural phenomena are the necessary 
results either of the laws of extension 
or of the laws of motion2 while ,m4     
,crousse is quite clear that            
intelligence is a property or effect of 
matter1 and that body and spirit        
together constitute matter4 ,in our own 
country1 ,atkinson and ,martineau have  
not shrunk from the avowal of the same  
doctrine1 or the adoption of the most   

revolting consequences that can be      
deduced from it4 ,instinct1 passion1    
thought1 are effects of organized       
substances4--,mind is the consequence or
 product of the material man2 it is not 
a thing having a seat or home in the    
brain1 but it is the manifestation or   
expression of the brain in action1 as   
heat and light are of fire1 and         
fragrance of the flower4#adh  ,the      
doctrine of ,materialism1 as formerly   
taught by ,dr4 ,priestley and his       
followers1 is in some respects similar  
to that which we have just noticed1 but 
in other respects differs from it1 if   
not in its essential nature1 at least in
 its collateral adjuncts and its        
practical applications4 ,it resembles   
the theory of ,d',holbach and ,comte1 in
 so far as it affirms the doctrine of   
unisubstancisme1 and rejects the idea of
 a dualism such as is implied in the    
common doctrine of ,matter and ,spirit4 
,but it differs from that theory1       
inasmuch as it is combined1 whether     

consistently or otherwise1 with the     
recognition of a personal ,god1 a       
resurrection from the dead1 and a future
 state of reward and punishment4 ,dr4   
,priestley seems to have fluctuated for 
a time between two opposite             
extremes1--that of spiritualizing       
,matter1 and that of materializing      
,mind2 for1 in a very remarkable        
passage1 we find him saying1 ,this      
scheme of the immateriality of ,matter1 
as it may be called1 or rather1 the     
mutual penetration of ,matter1 first    
occurred to my friend ,mr4 ,mitchell on 
reading ',baxter on the ,immateriality  
of the ,soul4'#adi ,but at length he    
settled down in the fixed belief of     
,materialism1 as he had always held the 
principle of unisubstancisme4 ,he held  
throughout that ,man does not consist of
 two principles so essentially different
 from each other as ,matter and ,spirit1
 but the whole man is of one uniform    
composition2 and that either the        
material or the immaterial part of the  

universal system is superfluous4#aej ,he
 attempts1 therefore1 to show1 that     
sensation1 perception1 and thought1--the
 common properties of mind1--are not    
incompatible with extension1 attraction1
 and repulsion1 which he conceives to be
 the only essential properties of       
matter2 that both classes of properties 
may possibly belong to the same subject2
 and that hence no second substance is  
necessary to account for and explain any
 of the phenomena of human nature4 ,in  
this respect1 his theory is precisely   
the same with that which has been       
already noticed2 but the peculiarity by 
which it is distinguished from the      
,atheistic and ,antichristian           
speculations of ,d',holbach and ,comte  
is twofold4 ,in the first place1 while  
he ascribes to mere matter the power of 
sensation1 thought1 and volition1 he    
admits that these powers1 and all others
 belonging to matter1 were communicated 
to it at the first1 and are still       
continued1 by the ,divine will1 thus    

recognizing the doctrine both of        
,creation and ,providence2 and in the   
second place1 while he denies the       
natural immortality of the soul1 and    
even the possibility of its conscious   
existence in a state of separation from 
the body1 he does not deny the          
immortality of man1 but receives it1 as 
well as the doctrine of future rewards  
and punishments1 on the authority of    
that ,divine ,revelation which speaks of
 the resurrection of the dead1 and of a 
judgment to come4 ,in these respects1   
his theory is widely different from that
 of the ,systme de la ,nature1 while the
 two are substantially the same in so   
far as they relate simply to the        
constitution of human nature4 ,he is not
 an ,atheist1 but a ,theist1 and a      
,theist1 too1 who1 believing in         
,revelation1 admits the immortality of  
man1 and a future state of retribution4 
,but it must be evident that as in these
 respects he founds entirely on the     
authority of ,scripture1 so he may be   

confronted with the same authority when 
he denies the spirituality of the soul2 
and in that case the question would     
resolve itself into one of ,biblical    
exegesis1 and would fall to be decided1 
not by metaphysical reasoning1 but by   
,scriptural proofs4  ,another variety of
 the theory is presented by ,dr4 ,good  
in his ,life of ,lucretius4 ,it agrees  
with the doctrine of ,priestley in      
representing the soul as material2 but  
differs from it in holding the possible 
existence of the soul in a separate     
state1 during the interval between the  
dissolution and resurrection of the     
body4 ,it speaks of the body as being   
composed of gross material particles2   
and of the soul as consisting of more   
subtle1 refined1 and ethereal matter4   
,this modification of the theory may be 
illustrated by the following extract3   
,perception1 consciousness1 cognition1  
we continue to be told1 are qualities   
which cannot appertain to matter2 there 
must hence be a thinking and an         

immaterial principle2 and man must still
 be a compound being4 ,yet1 why thus    
degrade matter1 the plastic and prolific
 creature of the ,deity1 beyond what we 
are authorized to do8 ,why may it not   
perceive1 why not think1 why not become 
conscious8 ,what eternal and necessary  
impediment prevents8 or what            
self-contradiction and absurdity is     
hereby implied8 ,let us examine ,nature 
as she presents herself to us in her    
most simple and inorganized forms2 let  
us trace her through her gradual and    
ascending stages of power and           
perfection4 ,in its simplest form1      
matter evinces the desire of reciprocal 
union1 or1 as it is commonly called1 the
 attraction of gravitation4 ,increase   
its mass1 arrange it in other           
modifications1 and it immediately       
evinces other powers or attractions2 and
 these will be perpetually1 and almost  
infinitely1 varied1 in proportion as we 
vary its combinations4 ,if arranged1    
therefore1 in one mode1 it discloses the

 power of magnetism2 in another1 that of
 electricity or galvanism2 in a third1  
that of chemical affinities2 in a       
fourth1 that of mineral assimilations4  
,pursue its modifications into classes  
of a more complex1 or rather1 perhaps1  
of a more gaseous or attenuate nature1  
and it will evince the power of         
vegetable or fibrous irritability3      
ascend through the classes of           
vegetables1 and you will at length reach
 the strong stimulative perfection1 the 
palpable vitality of the mimosa pudica1 
or the hedysarum gyrans1 the former of  
which shrinks from the touch with the   
most bashful coyness1 while the latter  
perpetually dances beneath the jocund   
rays of the sun4 ,and when we have thus 
attained the summit of vegetable powers 
and vegetable life1 it will require1 ,i 
think1 no great stretch of the          
imagination to conceive that the fibrous
 irritability of animals1 as well as    
vegetables1 is the mere result of a     
peculiar arrangement of simple and      

unirritable material atoms4--,hence1    
then1 animal sensation1 and hence1      
necessarily and consequently1 ideas1 and
 a material soul or spirit1 rude and    
confined1 indeed1 in its first and      
simplest mode of existence1 but1 like   
every other production of ,nature1      
beautifully and progressively advancing 
from power to power1 from faculty to    
faculty1 from excellence to excellence1 
till at length it terminate in the      
perfection of the human mind4#aea       
,according to this theory1 the mind is  
supposed to have a real existence1 as a 
substance distinct from the grosser     
forms of matter1 and capable even of    
surviving its separation from them4 ,it 
is supposed to be a combination of the  
most volatile auras or gases1 diffused  
over the whole body1 though traced in a 
more concentrate form in some organs    
than in others2 and it is described as  
the very texture of that separate state 
of existence which the infallible page  
of ,revelation clearly indicates will be

 ours4  ,a form of the theory very      
nearly resembling this has been recently
 reproduced4 ,it consists in            
representing the ,mind or ,spirit of    
man1 not as a mere fleeting phenomenon  
of the brain1 or an evanescent effect of
 its organization1 but as a distinct    
substantive product1 generated1 indeed1 
from matter1 and partaking1 therefore1  
of its nature1 but so exquisitely subtle
 and ethereal that it has no resemblance
 to the grosser materials of the body1  
and admits only of being compared with  
the ,dynamides--the imponderable        
elements and forces of ,nature4 ,this   
spirit is generated in man by his       
peculiar organization1 and especially by
 the action of the brain2 it is capable 
of surviving the dissolution of the     
body1 of retaining its individual       
consciousness after death1 of passing   
into new spheres of being1 and of rising
 from lower to higher states1 according 
to a law of eternal progression4 ,such  
is the theory of ,davis1 the            

,poughkeepsie ,seer2 and such also1 with
 some variations1 is that of the author 
of ,the ,purpose of ,existence4  ,matter
 and ,spirit1 says ,davis1 have         
heretofore been supposed to constitute  
two distinct and independent substances1
 the latter not having any material     
origin4 444 ,instead of making material 
and spiritual existence totally         
disconnected1 the object and intention  
of the foregoing has been to prove1 by  
acknowledged laws and principles of     
matter1 the production of intelligence1 
the perfection of which is spirit2 to   
show that the ,organizer uses ,nature   
and all things therein as an effect1 to 
produce spirit as an end and designed   
ultimate4 ,the author of ,the ,purpose  
of ,existence adopts a similar view4 ,he
 tells us1 indeed1 that the first simple
 forms or states of existence are       
admitted to be two1 spirit and          
matter1--the first the moving power1 the
 second the moved substance2 that of the
 positive essence of either we can      

arrive at no knowledge2 and that whether
 spirit be a refined1 etherealized      
portion of matter1 or a distinct dynamic
 principle1 we cannot ascertain4 ,and   
yet1 one of the leading objects of his  
work is to account for the origin and   
development of the human mind2 and this 
he does by ascribing it to a            
self-dynamic spirit which is resident in
 matter1 and which he denominates the   
spirit of vitality4 ,the spirit exists  
in vegetables1 and is extracted by means
 of the organs of the animals which feed
 upon them1 and then1 by a delicate work
 of distillation1 it is converted into  
spirit6--,nature proclaims one of her   
great working principles to be1 that    
spirit is evolved out of matter1 and    
outlives the body in which it is        
educated4--,matter is full of spirit4   
,this spirit is brought out of matter by
 vegetation4 ,by means of vegetation1 it
 is conveyed into animal frames1 in     
which its purest essence centres in the 
brain4444 ,this is no idle theory1 he   

adds1 no vain hypothesis1 for making    
matter think4 ,it is a clear            
proposition1 showing how matter is      
employed by the ,supreme ,intelligence  
for evolving1 training1 and educating   
spirit4--,we conclude that ,progression 
is the great law of the universe1 the   
purpose for which its present           
arrangement was ordained2 and that the  
object of this progression is the       
evolvement of mind out of matter4  ,this
 is a new and very singular phase of    
,materialism4 ,it is widely different   
from the doctrine which was taught by   
the infidel writers of the last century4
 ,they had recourse to the theory of    
,materialism chiefly with the view of   
excluding a world of spirits1 and of    
undermining the doctrine of a future    
state3 here it is applied to prove the  
constant development and indestructible 
existence of minds generated from       
matter1 but destined to survive the     
dissolution of the body2 nay1 every     
particle of matter in the universe is   

supposed to be advancing1 in one        
magnificent progression1 towards the    
spiritual state4 ,the danger now is1 not
 that ,religion may be undermined by    
,materialism1 but that it may be        
supplanted by a fond and foolish        
superstition1 in which the facts of     
,mesmerism and the fictions of          
,clairvoyance are blended into one      
ghostly system1 fitted to exert a       
powerful but pernicious influence on    
over-credulous minds4#aeb  ,on a review 
of the various forms which the theory of
 ,materialism has assumed1 it must be   
evident that we should be doing great   
injustice to their respective advocates1
 did we place them all on the same level
 in relation to ,theology1 or pronounce 
upon them one indiscriminate censure4   
,in the hands of ,d',holbach and ,comte1
 it was associated with the avowal of   
,atheism1 and the denial of a future    
state3 in the hands of ,priestley1 it   
was associated with the recognition of a
 ,god1 and the ,christian doctrine of a 

resurrection3 in the hands of ,dr4      
,good1 it was combined with the         
principles of ,theism1 and even with the
 revealed doctrine of the separate      
existence of the soul during the        
interval between death and the          
resurrection3 and in the hands of ,davis
 and the author of the ,purpose of      
,existence1 it is exhibited in          
connection with a theory of             
,progression1 widely different1 indeed1 
from the doctrine of ,scripture1 but    
equally different from the infidel      
speculations of the last century4       
,still1 with all these shades of        
difference1 there is that common to all 
the forms in which it can be presented  
which shows that they are radically one 
and the same3 they all deny the         
existence of any generic difference     
between ,matter and ,mind4  ,confining  
our attention to this common element1   
and omitting the consideration of minor 
diversities1 we may now inquire into the
 grounds on which the theory rests1 and 

the most plausible reasons which have   
been urged in support of it4  ,to some  
minds it has been recommended by its    
apparent simplicity4 ,it speaks only of 
one substance as existing in ,nature    
under various modifications4 ,it        
represents the universe1 so far as      
created being is concerned1 as entirely 
composed of matter1 more or less        
refined2 and thus excludes the          
complication which must necessarily     
arise from the supposition of two       
substances1 generically different1 yet  
intimately and indissolubly related4    
,the principle1 therefore1 which prompts
 us to seek unity in diversity1 and to  
reduce1 by some comprehensive           
generalization1 a multitude of phenomena
 under one general law1 has led some to 
adopt the theory of unisubstancisme in  
preference to the opposite doctrine of  
dualism4 ,not content with the          
generalization1 alike safe and          
legitimate1 which ranks both mind and   
matter under the generic head of        

substance1 they have sought to reduce   
them to the same category1 and to give  
to matter a monopoly of the universe1 at
 least of created being4 ,in support of 
their views1 they remind us of the      
fundamental principle of philosophy as  
laid down by ,sir ,isaac ,newton1 that  
we are to admit no more causes of things
 than are sufficient to explain         
appearances4#aec ,the principle is a    
sound one2 and the only question is1    
whether matter alone is sufficient to   
account for mental phenomena8 ,on this  
question the two parties are at         
irreconcilable variance2 and the        
controversy cannot be determined1 brevi 
man1 by the mere assumption of the      
simplicity and uniform composition of   
everything in ,nature2 it can be settled
 only by an appeal to the facts as they 
are known to exist4 ,it is the aim of   
science1 undoubtedly1 to reduce all     
compound substances to the smallest     
possible number of constituent elements1
 and all complex phenomena to the       

smallest possible number of general     
laws4 ,but we feel that1 desirable as   
this simplification may be1 we are not  
warranted in identifying light with     
heat1 or even electricity with          
magnetism1 however closely connected    
with each other1 simply because there   
are certain observed differences between
 them1 which could not be explained1 in 
the present state of our knowledge1     
consistently with any such theory of    
their absolute identity3 and so1 there  
are such manifest differences between   
,mental and ,material phenomena1 that we
 cannot yield to the temptation of      
ascribing them to one cause or origin1  
until it has been satisfactorily proved 
that the same cause is sufficient to    
account for appearances so diverse4 ,it 
should be considered1 too1 in connection
 with this pretence of greater          
simplicity1 that even if we could       
succeed in getting rid of the dualism of
 ,mind and ,matter in the constitution  
of man1 we never can get rid of it with 

reference to the universe at large1     
otherwise than by denying the           
spirituality of ,god himself3 for the   
grand1 the indestructible1 the eternal  
dualism would still remain1--the        
distinction between ,god and ,his       
works1--between the ,creator and the    
universe which ,he has called into      
being1--between the finite1 contingent1 
and transitory1 and the infinite1       
necessary1 and eternal4 ,and this is a  
distinction that cannot be obliterated1 
although it may be obscured1 by the     
speculations of ,pantheism4  ,another   
reason which has induced some to adopt1 
or at least to regard with favor1 the   
theory of ,materialism1 is--the         
difficulty of conceiving of the union of
 two substances so incongruous as ,mind 
and ,matter are supposed to be1--and    
still more the difficulty of explaining 
how they could have any mutual action on
 each other4 ,dr4 ,priestley largely    
insists on this1 as well as on the      
former reason1 as one of the main       

inducements which led him to abandon the
 commonly-received doctrine4 ,many      
doubts occurred to me1 he says1 on the  
subject of the intimate union of two    
substances so entirely heterogeneous as 
the soul and body were represented to   
be4 ,and he was led to conclude1 that   
man does not consist of two principles  
so essentially different from one       
another as matter and spirit1 which are 
always described as having no one common
 property by means of which they can    
affect or act upon each other4 ,in the  
,systme de la ,nature1 the same argument
 is often urged4 ,it is boldly and      
repeatedly affirmed that an immaterial  
cause cannot produce motion2 and this is
 applied equally to the soul and to     
,god4 ,how can we form an idea of a     
substance destitute of extension1 and   
yet acting on our senses1 that is1 on   
material organs which are extended8 ,how
 can a being without extension be       
capable of motion1 and of putting matter
 into motion8--,it is as impossible that

 spirit or thought should produce       
matter1 as that matter should produce   
spirit or thought4#aed  ,now1 it is not 
denied by any1--it is admitted on all   
hands1--that the union between the soul 
and the body is a great mystery1 and    
that we are not able1 in the present    
state of our knowledge1 to explain      
either the action of matter on mind1 or 
the action of mind on matter4 ,the mode 
of the union between them1 and the      
nature of the influence which they      
mutually exercise1 are to us            
inscrutable3 but the facts of our most  
familiar experience are not the less    
certain1 because they depend on causes  
to us unknown1 or stand connected with  
mysteries which we cannot solve4        
,besides1 the theory of unisubstancisme 
itself1 were it adopted1 would still    
leave many facts unexplained1 and the   
inmost nature of man would continue to  
be as inscrutable as before4 ,there is  
nothing inconceivable1 impossible1 or   
self-contradictory in the supposition of

 a non-material or spiritual substance2 
nor is there any reason a priori to     
conclude that such a substance could not
 be united to a material frame1 although
 the nature of their union1 and the mode
 of their reciprocal action1 might be to
 us inexplicable4  ,there is still      
another reason which is urged by some1  
derived from the dependence of the mind 
on the body1 and its liability to be    
affected1 beneficially or injuriously1  
by mere physical influences4 ,the       
faculty of thinking1 says ,dr4          
,priestley1 in general ripens and comes 
to maturity with the body2 it is also   
observed to decay with it1--,if the     
brain be affected1 as by a blow on the  
head1 by actual pressure within the     
skull1 by sleep1 or by inflammation1 the
 mental faculties are universally       
affected in proportion4 ,likewise1 as   
the mind is affected in consequence of  
the affections of the body and brain1 so
 the body is liable to be reciprocally  
affected by the affections of the mind1 

as is evident in the visible effects of 
all-strong passions1--hope or fear1 love
 or anger1 joy or sorrow1 exultation or 
despair4 ,these are certainly           
irrefragable arguments that it is       
properly no other than one and the same 
thing that is subject to these          
affections4#aee ,mr4 ,atkinson urges the
 same reason4 ,the proof that mind holds
 the same relation to the body that all 
other phenomena do to material          
conditions1 may be found1 he tells us1  
in the whole circumstances of man's     
existence1 his origin and growth2 the   
faculties following the development of  
the body in man and other animals2 the  
direction of the faculties being        
influenced by surrounding circumstances2
 the desires1 the will1 the hopes1 the  
fears1 the habits1 and the opinions1    
being effects traceable to causes1--to  
natural causes1--and becoming the facts 
of ,history and ,statistics4 ,we observe
 the influence of climate1 of sunshine  
and damp1 of wine and opium and poison1 

of health and disease4 444 ,when a glass
 of wine turns a wise man into a fool1  
is it not clear that the result is the  
consequence of a change in the material 
conditions8#aef  ,now1 these facts are  
sufficient to show that1 in the present 
life1 there is a very close and intimate
 union between the soul and the body1   
and that they exert a reciprocal and    
very powerful influence4 ,this is       
admitted by the firmest advocates of    
,spiritualism2 nay1 it is necessarily   
involved in the doctrine which they     
maintain1 relative to the union of two  
distinct1 but mutually dependent1       
principles in the present constitution  
of human nature4 ,but it is far1 very   
far1 from affording any ground or       
warrant for the idea1 that ,matter may  
be identified with ,mind1 or ,thought   
with ,motion4  ,there are certain       
,theological considerations which1 if   
they have not been pleaded as reasons1  
may yet have been felt as inducements1  
to the adoption of the theory of        

,materialism4 ,not to speak of the      
difficulty which has been felt in       
explaining the traduction or propagation
 of human souls1 occasionally referred  
to in this controversy1 it is plain that
 many ,deists in the last century1 and  
that not a few ,atheists still1 have    
been induced to embrace and avow        
,materialism1 with the view of          
undermining the doctrine of man's       
immortality1 and of a future state of   
rewards and punishments4 ,it is equally 
certain that ,dr4 ,priestley was        
influenced by his peculiar views as a   
,socinian2 for he tells us himself that 
the doctrine of ,materialism commended  
itself to his mind as a sure and        
effectual means of disproving the       
prexistence of ,christ4 ,the            
consideration1 he says with singular    
candor1 that biases me as a ,christian1 
exclusive of philosophical              
considerations1 against the doctrine of 
a separate soul1 is1 that it has been   
the foundation of what appears to me to 

be the very grossest corruptions of     
,christianity1 and even of that very    
,antichristianism that began to work in 
the apostles' times1 and which extended 
itself so amazingly and dreadfully      
afterwards4 ,i mean the ,oriental       
philosophy of the 'prexistence of       
souls1' which drew after it the belief  
of the prexistence and divinity of      
,christ1 the worship of ,christ and of  
dead men1 and the doctrine of           
,purgatory1 with all the ,popish        
doctrines and practices that are        
connected with them1 and supported by   
them4--,this doctrine 7of the           
prexistence of ,christ7 is the point to 
which all that ,i have written tends1 it
 being the capital inference that ,i    
make from the doctrine of ,materialism4 
,there is also abundant reason to       
believe that both ,atheists and         
,pantheists have had recourse to the    
theory of ,materialism with the view of 
excluding the doctrine of a living1     
personal ,god1 and explaining all the   

phenomena of ,nature by the eternal laws
 of matter and motion4 ,now1 if the     
question stands related in any way to   
such themes as these1--the immortality  
of man1 the prexistence and divinity of 
,christ1 and the personality and        
spirituality of ,god1--it must be       
confessed to have at least a very high  
relative importance1 as it bears on some
 of the most momentous articles of our  
religious faith2 and the question       
naturally arises1 ,what relation it     
bears to the fundamental principles of  
,theism1 and how far it comports with   
right views of ,god1 as the ,creator and
 ,governor of the world8  ,we cannot1 in
 the face of direct evidence to the     
contrary1 bring an indiscriminate charge
 of ,atheism1 or even of irreligion1    
against all the advocates of            
,materialism4 ,it is true that it has   
often1 perhaps most generally1 been     
associated with infidel opinions1 and   
that in the hands of ,d',holbach1       
,comte1 and ,atkinson1 it has been      

applied in support of ,atheism2 but it  
is equally true1 that in the hands of   
,dr4 ,priestley and ,dr4 ,good1 it is   
combined with the professed1 and1 as we 
believe1 the sincere recognition of a   
personal ,god and of a future state4 ,in
 point of fact1 then1 all ,materialists 
have not been ,atheists2 and even were  
we convinced that ,materialists         
professing religion were illogical or   
inconsequent reasoners1 we should not be
 justified in ascribing to them those   
consequences of their system which they 
explicitly disclaim and disavow4 ,still 
it is competent1 and it may be highly   
useful1 to entertain the question1 ,what
 are the grounds on which the theory of 
,materialism rests8 ,and whether1 if    
these grounds be valid1 they would not  
lead1 in strict logic1 to conclusions at
 variance with some of the most vital   
and fundamental articles of the         
,christian faith8  ,in attempting to    
discuss the merits of that theory1 we   
propose to state1 confirm1 and          

illustrate a few propositions which are 
sufficient1 in our opinion1 to show that
 the grounds on which it rests1 and the 
reasons to which it appeals1 are not    
such as to warrant or justify any       
prejudice against the articles of       
,natural or ,revealed ,religion4        
,,section ,,ii4  ,,propositions ,,on    
,,materialism4  ,i4 ,our first          
proposition is1 that the recent progress
 of ,natural ,science1 great and rapid  
as it has been1 has not materially      
altered the state of the question       
respecting the distinction between ,mind
 and ,matter1 however much it may have  
extended our knowledge respecting the   
properties of both1 and of the relation 
subsisting between the two4  ,we place  
this proposition on the foreground1     
because we have reason to believe that a
 very different impression prevails in  
certain quarters1 associated in some    
cases with the hope1 in others with the 
apprehension1 that the advances which   
have been made in physical science may  

ultimately lead to the obliteration of  
the old distinction between ,mind and   
,matter4 ,this impression has been      
deepened by every successive addition to
 the doctrines of ,physiology2 and      
especially by the recent speculations on
 ,phrenology1 ,animal ,magnetism1 and   
,clairvoyance4 ,now1 we think that these
 speculations1 even if they were        
admitted into the rank of true sciences1
 would not materially alter the state of
 the question respecting the distinction
 between ,mind and ,matter1 as that     
question was discussed in former times4 
,take the case of ,phrenology4 ,it had  
always been admitted that the mind has  
certain external organs1 through which  
it receives various impressions from    
without1 and holds communication with   
the sensible universe4 ,the existence   
and use of these organs were held to be 
perfectly compatible with the doctrine  
that the soul itself is immaterial4     
,phrenology appears1 and professes to   
have discovered certain other organs1   

certain cerebral developments1 which    
stand connected with the various        
functions of thought and feeling2 in    
other words1 to the five senses which   
are universally recognized1 it adds     
thirty or forty organs in the brain1 not
 hitherto known to exist4 ,but how does 
this discovery1 even supposing it to be 
fully established1 affect the state of  
the question respecting the radical     
distinction betwixt ,mind and ,matter8  
,a material organization1 in the case of
 man1 was always admitted2 and the only 
difference which that discovery could be
 supposed to make1 must arise from the  
addition of certain organs to those     
which were previously established4 ,but 
why should the spirituality of the soul 
be more affected by the one set of      
organs than it was by the other8 ,the   
ablest advocates of ,phrenology have    
repudiated ,materialism4 ,dr4 ,spurzheim
 expressly disclaims it4 ,i incessantly 
repeat1 says he1 that the aim of        
,phrenology is never to attempt pointing

 out what the mind is in itself4 ,i do  
not say that the organization produces  
the affective and intellectual faculties
 of man's mind1 as a tree brings forth  
fruit or an animal procreates its kind2 
,i only say that organic conditions are 
necessary to every manifestation of     
mind4--,if the manifestation of the     
faculties of the mind depend on         
organization1 ,materialism1 it is said1 
will be established4444 ,when our       
antagonists1 however1 maintain that we  
are ,materialists1 they ought to show   
where we teach that there is nothing but
 matter4 ,the entire falsehood of the   
accusation is made obvious by a review  
of the following considerations4 ,the   
expression 'organ' designates an        
instrument by means of which some       
faculty proclaims itself4 ,the muscles1 
for example1 are the organs of voluntary
 motion1 but they are not the moving    
power2 the eyes are the organ of sight1 
but they are not the faculty of seeing4 
,we separate the faculties of the soul1 

or of the mind1 from the organs2 and    
consider the cerebral parts as the      
instruments by means of which they      
manifest themselves4 ,now1 even the     
adversaries of ,phrenology must1 to a   
certain extent1 admit the dependence of 
the soul on the body4444 ,we are1       
therefore1 no more ,materialists than   
our predecessors1 whether anatomists1   
physiologists1 or physicians1 or the    
great number of philosophers and        
moralists1 who have admitted the        
dependence of the soul on the body4 ,for
 the ,materialism is essentially the    
same1 whether the faculties of the mind 
be said to depend on the whole body1 on 
the whole brain1 or individual powers on
 particular parts of the brain2 the     
faculties still depend on organization  
for their exhibition4#aeg ,we conclude1 
therefore1 that ,phrenology1 even       
supposing it to be fully established1   
could not materially affect the state of
 the question respecting the radical    
distinction between ,mind and ,matter4  

,similar remarks apply to the case of   
,mesmerism or ,animal ,magnetism4 ,it   
had always been known and admitted that 
the soul is liable1 by reason of its    
connection with the body in the present 
state1 to be affected by certain        
influences1--from light1 from heat1 from
 electricity1 from the atmosphere1 and  
from other sources4 ,mesmerism appears1 
and professes to have discovered another
 influence by which the nervous system  
is peculiarly affected2 in other words1 
it merely adds a new influence to the   
number of those which were universally  
acknowledged before1 it matters little  
whether it be the ,magnetism of ,mesmer1
 or the ,odyle of ,reichenbach1 or the  
,dia-magnetism of ,faraday4 ,but how    
could this discovery1 even supposing it 
to be fully established1 affect the     
state of the question respecting the    
radical distinction between ,mind and   
,matter8 ,if we were ,immaterialists    
before1 while we acknowledged the       
influence of the atmosphere1 of light1  

of heat1 and of electricity1 may we not 
be ,immaterialists still1               
notwithstanding the addition of ,odyle  
to the class of dynamides8 ,may we not  
admit the stranger1 with the strange    
name1 if suitably attested1 without the 
slightest apprehension of thereby       
weakening the grounds on which we hold  
,mind to be essentially different from  
,matter1 and incapable of being         
identified with it8 ,it were a foolish  
and dangerous expedient1 and one to     
which no enlightened advocate of        
,immaterialism will have recourse1 to   
denounce the professed discoveries      
either of ,phrenology or of ,mesmerism1 
on the ground of their supposed tendency
 to obliterate the distinction between  
,mind and ,matter4 ,for the fact1 that  
certain organs exist1 by means of which 
the mind acquires a large portion of its
 knowledge1 and that certain influences 
are known to affect it from without1 is 
too well established to be called in    
question2 and the mere extension of that

 fact by the discovery of other organs  
and other influences1 hitherto unknown1 
could have no tendency to shut us up1   
more than before1 to the adoption of the
 theory of ,materialism4 ,it is the part
 of wisdom1 then1 to leave ample scope  
and verge for the progress of           
,physiological research in this as in   
every other department1 and to rest in  
the confident persuasion that whatever  
discoveries may yet be made in regard to
 the connection between mind and body1  
they can have no effect in disproving a 
radical distinction between the two4    
,and this we deem a much safer ground   
than that which ,professor ,gregory has 
adopted1 when he first of all denies the
 possibility of defining either matter  
or spirit1 and then leaves the existence
 of a thinking principle or soul        
distinct from the body to rest merely on
 our instinctive consciousness4#aeh ,we 
think it1 in every point of view1 a     
safer course to meet all objections by  
saying1 that the admission of the odylic

 or any other influence of a similar    
kind1 would not in the least affect the 
grounds of our belief in the existence  
of an immaterial mind4  ,we are disposed
 to pursue the same line of argument a  
step further1 and to apply it to the    
case of ,hypnotism or ,clairvoyance4 ,it
 had always been known that the mind1 in
 its present state of connection with   
the body1 is liable to be affected by   
sleep and by dreams2 and the phenomena  
of natural sleep and of ordinary dreams 
were never supposed to be incompatible  
with the distinction between mind and   
body4 ,but the ,hypnotist or the        
,clairvoyant appears1 and announces a   
state of magnetic sleep1 with a new set 
of phenomena dependent on it1 resembling
 the dreams and visions of the night4   
,the facts are strange and startling2   
but1 after recovering from our first    
surprise1 we may calmly ask1 what effect
 these facts1 if established1 should    
have in modifying our convictions       
respecting the essential nature of mind 

and matter2 and we shall find that they 
afford no sufficient reason for         
relinquishing the doctrine of an        
immaterial spirit1 but that1 on the     
contrary1 these very facts1 were they   
sufficiently verified1 would open up a  
new view of the powers and activities of
 spirit1 such as might well fill us with
 wonder and awe4 ,i have heard1 times   
innumerable1 says ,professor ,gregory1  
religious persons declare1 on seeing    
these phenomena1 that nothing could more
 clearly demonstrate the immateriality1 
and consequently the immortality of the 
soul4 ',in clairvoyance1' say these     
persons1 'we observe the mind acting    
separate from the body1 and entirely    
independent of it4 ,how beautiful a     
proof of the infinite difference between
 spirit and matter4' ,it is a proof that
 we would be slow to adduce1 for the    
facts are doubtful as well as obscure2  
but1 for our present purpose1 it is not 
necessary either to admit or to deny the
 truth of these facts2 it is sufficient 

to say that the phenomena of ,mesmeric  
sleep and the visions of ,clairvoyance  
are not more inconsistent with the      
doctrine of an immaterial soul than the 
more familiar1 but scarcely less        
mysterious1 phenomena of natural sleep  
and common dreams4 ,it is1 indeed1 not a
 little remarkable that the profound and
 sagacious ,butler expressed himself in 
the following terms1 long before the    
phenomena of ,magnetism and             
,clairvoyance were spoken of as subjects
 of scientific study3 ,that we have no  
reason to think our organs of sense     
percipients 444 is confirmed by the     
experience of dreams1 by which we find  
we are at present possessed of a latent1
 and what would otherwise be an         
unimagined1 unknown power of perceiving 
sensible objects1 in as strong and      
lively a manner1 without our external   
organs of sense as with them4#aei  ,on  
the whole1 we think it clear that       
neither by ,phrenology1 which adds      
merely to the number of our material    

organs1 nor by ,mesmerism1 which adds   
one to the number of the influences by  
which we are affected1 nor by           
,clairvoyance1 which adds the phenomena 
of magnetic to those of natural sleep1  
is the state of the question materially 
altered from what it was before these   
additions were made to ,physiological   
speculation4 ,and hence those who are   
well versed in our older writers on the 
doctrine of spirit and matter1 will be  
sufficiently furnished with weapons for 
repelling the more recent assaults of   
,materialism4 ,if any one has read and  
digested the ,treatises of ,dr4 ,samuel 
,clarke1 in his replies to ,dodwell1    
,collins1 and ,leibnitz2 the ,free      
,discussion between ,dr4 ,priestley and 
,dr4 ,price2 the ,examen du             
,materialisme by ,bergier1 in reply to  
the ,systme de la ,nature2 and the      
writings of ,andrew ,baxter1 ,drew1     
,ditton1 and others1 on the same        
subject1 he will find little difficulty 
in grappling with the arguments of      

,comte1 ,atkinson1 and ,martineau4 ,he  
will see at once that the main1 the     
fundamental question1 is not materially 
affected by the advances which have been
 made in ,physiological discovery4      
,these discoveries may have extended our
 knowledge respecting the relations     
which subsist between the mind and the  
body2 they have in no degree served to  
obliterate the distinction betwixt the  
two4  ,in perfect consistency1 however1 
with this conviction1 we may frankly    
avow our opinion1 that some of the older
 opponents of ,materialism adopted a    
method of stating their argument which  
appears to us to be liable to just      
exception1 and which the progress of    
,physical1 and especially of ,chemical  
science1 has tended greatly to          
discredit4 ,they seem to have been      
apprehensive that by ascribing any      
peculiar properties or active powers to 
matter1 they might incur the hazard of  
weakening the grounds on which they     
contended for the spirituality of man   

and the supremacy of ,god4 ,thus1 in the
 ,inquiry into the ,nature of the ,human
 ,soul1 by ,andrew ,baxter1 the         
existence of any active property or     
power in matter is explicitly denied1   
and the only property which is ascribed 
to it is a certain passive power1 or vis
 inerti1 by which it is incapable of    
changing its state1 whether of rest or  
of motion4 ,this vis inerti is not only 
supposed to be the sole property of     
matter1 but is even held to be          
inconsistent with1 and exclusive of1 any
 active power whatever2 and all the     
effects which are usually said to be    
produced by it are ascribed to the power
 of an immaterial ,being4 ,we are told  
that vis inerti1 or a resistance to any 
change of its present state1 is         
essential to matter1 and inconsistent   
with any active power in it2 that all   
gravity1 attraction1 elasticity1        
repulsion1 or whatever other tendencies 
to motion are observed in matter        
7commonly called natural powers of      

matter71 are not powers implanted in    
matter or possible to be made inherent  
in it1 but impulse or force impressed   
upon it ab extra2 and that the cause of 
its motion must be sought for in        
something not matter1 in some immaterial
 cause or being4--,gravity1 for         
instance1 is not the action of matter   
upon matter1 but the virtue or power of 
an immaterial cause or being1 constantly
 impressed upon it4 ,nor has this       
doctrine been confined to such          
metaphysical reasoners as ,andrew       
,baxter4 ,professor ,playfair tells us1 
that when he was introduced to ,dr4     
,horsley1 the ,bishop expressed great   
respect for ,lord ,monboddo1 for his    
learning and his acuteness1 and 7what   
was more surprising7 for the soundness  
of his judgment4 ,he talked very        
seriously of the notion of mind being   
united to all the parts of matter and   
being the cause of motion4 ,so far as ,i
 could gather1 ,dr4 ,horsley supposes   
that every atom of matter has a soul1   

which is the cause of its motion1 its   
gravitation1 c4 ,what has made him adopt
 this strange unphilosophical notion ,i 
cannot tell1 unless it be the fear that 
his study of natural philosophy should  
make him suspected of ,atheism1 or at   
least of ,materialism4 ,for it is       
certain that there is at present a      
prejudice among the ,english clergy that
 natural philosophy has a tendency to   
make men ,atheists or ,materialists4    
,this absurd prejudice was first        
introduced1 ,i think1 by that illiberal1
 though learned1 prelate1 ,dr4          
,warburton4#afj ,a similar opinion has  
been recently reproduced by ,dr4        
,burnett in his ,philosophy of ,spirits 
in relation to ,matter1 in which he     
attempts to show that the forces and    
laws of ,nature cannot be proved to be  
the result of anything inherent in      
matter alone1 and that they ought to be 
ascribed to some substantive and        
distinct1 but immaterial and dependent  
spirits1 called the spirit of life1 the 

spirit of electricity1 the spirit of    
heat4#afa4  ,all these statements are   
only so many modifications of the same  
theory1 and they agree in denying the   
existence of any active powers in       
matter1 while they ascribe the phenomena
 of motion1 life1 and thought to an     
immaterial principle4 ,there is1 as it  
seems to us1 a mixture of truth and     
error in this theory4 ,it affirms a     
great truth1 in so far as it declares   
the impossibility of accounting for the 
phenomena of motion1 life1 and thought1 
without ascribing them ultimately to a  
spiritual1 intelligent1 and voluntary   
cause2 but it adopts a dangerous1 and1  
as we conceive1 a perfectly gratuitous  
assumption1 when it denies that matter  
is capable of possessing any other      
properties or powers than those of      
extension1 solidity1 and vis inerti4 ,we
 know little of the nature of those     
fluids1 forces1 or powers1 which have   
been denominated dynamides or           
imponderables2 but1 unquestionably1 they

 possess properties and produce         
phenomena very different from any that  
can be reasonably ascribed to mere vis  
inerti4 ,nor is their possession of     
these properties incompatible with that 
law1 when it is correctly understood4   
,for what is the real import of the law 
of vis inerti8 ,it amounts simply to    
this1 as stated by ,baxter himself1 that
 a resistance to any change of its      
present state1--whether of motion or    
rest1--is essential to 'matter1' he     
adds1 indeed1 and inconsistent with any 
active power in it2 but this is an      
assumption which is true only in a sense
 that would make it inconclusive with   
reference to the point at issue4 ,it is 
true1 if it means merely that matter is 
destitute of spontaneity and            
self-motion1 such as belongs to living1 
voluntary agents2 but it is not true1 if
 it means that matter is destitute of   
all inherent properties and powers4     
,indeed1 the vis inerti which is        
ascribed to matter is itself a power1   

and a very formidable one2 it is        
described by ,baxter himself as a kind  
of positive or stubborn inactivity1 as  
something receding further from action  
than bare inactivity1 for matter is so  
powerfully inactive a thing6 ,now1 if   
such a power as this may be ascribed to 
matter1 why may it not be admitted with 
equal safety that ,god has bestowed on  
it certain other properties and powers1 
not inconsistent with this1 but         
additional to it2 and that ,he has      
established such relations and          
affinities between different substances 
as that they may act and                
react--mechanically or chemically--on   
one another8 ,the phenomena of chemical 
affinity1 the motions1 and other        
changes1 produced by the contact1 or    
even the juxtaposition1 of certain      
substances1 and the variety of the      
resulting products1 do certainly evince 
the operation of other powers besides   
that of vis inerti2 and we cannot see   
why these powers should be ascribed to  

immaterial spirits1 any more than that  
of vis inerti itself1 or why it would be
 a whit more dangerous to ascribe them  
to matter than to created spirits4 ,all 
that is required1 as it appears to us1  
to establish the dependence of the      
creature on the ,creator and to         
vindicate the truth of ,christian       
,theism1 is to maintain these two       
positions3 first1 that whatever         
properties or powers belong either to   
matter or to mind1 were originally      
conferred on them1 respectively1 at the 
time of their creation by the will of   
,god2 and1 secondly1 that by the same   
will1 these properties and powers are   
continually sustained1 governed1 and    
controlled4 ,these two positions are    
held by all enlightened ,theists1 and   
are abundantly sufficient1 if proved1 to
 vindicate their doctrine against every 
assault2 but we think it unwarrantable  
and dangerous to go further1 and to     
ascribe1 on the strength of mere        
gratuitous assumptions1 all the         

activity1 motion1 and change which occur
 in the universe to created spirits or  
immaterial causes4 ,these assumptions   
are extremely different from the        
common-sense notions of men1 and they   
are utterly unnecessary for the support 
of any doctrine which we are concerned  
to defend4  ,on the whole1 we venture to
 conclude that the radical distinction  
between ,mind and ,matter has not been  
materially affected by the recent       
progress of ,physiological research1 and
 that the old arguments against         
,materialism are still available1 except
 in so far as they were founded on a too
 limited view of the properties of      
matter1 which the advancing ,science of 
,chemistry has done so much1 to unfold  
and to illustrate4  ,,ii4 ,our second   
proposition may be thus stated3 ,that   
were we reduced to the necessity of     
embracing any form of the theory of     
unisubstancisme1 there could not be     
less1--there might even be              
greater1--reason for spiritualizing     

matter1 than for materializing mind4    
,on the supposition that one or other of
 the two must be dispensed with1 the    
question still remains1 which of them   
can be most easily spared8 or1 which of 
them can be most conclusively proved8   
,mankind have generally thought that    
they had equally good evidence for the  
existence of both2 that in the direct   
and irresistible evidence of            
,consciousness1 they had proof          
sufficient of a thinking1 voluntary1 and
 active spirit1 and in the less direct1 
but not less irresistible1 evidence of  
,perception1 proof sufficient of the    
existence of a material world4 ,but each
 of these convictions has been in its   
turn assailed by the cavils of          
skepticism2 and men have been asked to  
prove by reasoning what needed1 and1    
indeed1 admitted of no such proof1--the 
existence of ,matter as distinct from   
,mind1 and the existence of ,mind as    
distinct from ,matter4 ,the latter is   
denied by ,materialists1 the former is  

equally denied by ,idealists2 and what  
we affirm is1 that each of these        
opposite theories is one-sided and      
partial1 and that1 on the supposition of
 our being reduced to the necessity of  
adopting the idea of unisubstancisme1 we
 should still have greater reason to    
reduce all to the category of spirit1   
than to reduce all to the category of   
matter4 ,many seem to think that it is  
more easy1 or1 perhaps1 that it is less 
necessary1 to prove the distinct        
existence of matter1 than to prove the  
distinct existence of mind4 ,they are so
 familiar with matter1 and so           
continually surrounded by it1 that they 
cannot conceive of its non-existence as 
possible1 and scarcely think it         
necessary to inquire after any evidence 
in the case4 ,but can it be justly said 
that they are more familiar with matter 
and its movements than they are with a  
living spirit within them1 which feels1 
and thinks1 and wills1 and by means of  
which alone the phenomena of external   

nature itself can become known to them8 
,if they receive the testimony of       
,perception as a sufficient proof of the
 existence of ,matter1 why should they  
not also receive the still more direct  
and immediate testimony of              
,consciousness as a sufficient proof of 
the existence of ,mind8 ,or1 if they    
refuse the latter1 and admit the former1
 are they quite sure that1 on their own 
partial principles1 they could offer any
 conclusive answer to the ,idealism of  
,berkeley8 ,that ingenious and amiable  
prelate will tell them that the objects 
of sense cannot exist otherwise than in 
a mind perceiving them2 that their esse 
is percipi1 nor is it possible that they
 should have any existence out of the   
minds1 or thinking things1 which        
perceive them2 and that all the choir of
 heaven and the furniture of the        
earth1--in a word1 all those bodies     
which compose the mighty frame of the   
world1 have not any subsistence without 
a mind4#afb ,nay1 others who are not    

,idealists1 but who believe equally in  
the existence of mind and matter1 will  
tell them that ,berkeley's arguments are
 conclusive1 at least to the extent of  
showing that the existence of matter1 as
 a thing external to us1 cannot be      
proved without presupposing the         
existence of mind4 ,for what1 says ,lord
 ,brougham1 is this matter8 ,whence do  
we derive any knowledge of it8 ,how do  
we assure ourselves of its existence8   
,what evidence have we at all respecting
 either its being or its qualities8 ,we 
feel1 or taste1 or smell something2 that
 is1 we have certain sensations1 which  
make us conclude that something exists  
beyond ourselves4 444 ,but what are our 
sensations8 ,the feelings or thoughts of
 our own minds4 ,then what we do is     
this3 from certain ideas in our minds1  
produced no doubt by1 and connected     
with1 our bodily senses1 but independent
 of and separate from them1 we draw     
certain conclusions by reasoning2 and   
these conclusions are in favor of the   

existence of something other than our   
sensations and our reasonings1 and other
 than that which experiences the        
sensations and makes the reasonings1    
passive in the one case1 active in the  
other4 ,that something is what we       
call--,mind4 ,but plainly1 whatever it  
is1 we owe to it the knowledge that     
matter exists2 for that knowledge is    
gained by means of a sensation or       
feeling1 followed by a process of       
reasoning2 it is gained by the mind     
having first suffered something1 and    
then done something4 ,therefore1 to say 
there is no such thing as matter would  
be a much less absurd inference than to 
say there is no such thing as mind4 444 
,the truth is1 that we believe in the   
existence of 'matter1' because we cannot
 help it4 ,the inferences of our reason 
from our sensations impel us to this    
conclusion1 and the steps are few and   
short by which we reach it4 ,but the    
steps are fewer1 and shorter1 and of the
 self-same nature1 which lead us to     

believe in the existence of ,mind1 for  
of that we have the evidence within     
ourselves4#afc  ,it follows that were we
 reduced1 as we are not1 to the         
necessity of adopting the theory of     
unisubstancisme1 we might with at least 
as good reason dispense with the        
existence of matter as with the         
existence of mind2 for1 in the words of 
,dugald ,stewart1 it would no more be   
proper to say of 'mind' that it is      
material1 than to say of 'body' that it 
is spiritual4#afd  ,,iii4 ,our third    
proposition is1 ,that we are not reduced
 to the necessity of adopting any theory
 of unisubstancisme1 since there is     
nothing inconceivable or                
self-contradictory in the supposition of
 two distinct substantive beings1       
possessing diverse properties1 such as  
mind and body1 or spirit and matter1 are
 usually held to be4  ,let any one      
endeavor to assign a reason for the     
sole1 exclusive existence either of     
matter or of spirit1 or a distinct1     

specific ground for the opinion that    
they are necessarily incompatible with  
each other1 and he will be compelled to 
own that the theory of unisubstancisme1 
however plausible by reason of its      
apparent simplicity1 is really nothing  
more than a gratuitous assumption4 ,it  
cannot be admitted with reference even  
to nature and man without confounding   
the simplest elements of human          
knowledge2 and with reference to ,god   
and the universe1 it is attended with   
still more fatal consequences1 since it 
must lead1 if consistently followed out1
 to undisguised ,pantheism4 ,why should 
it be supposed that there is1 or can    
only be1 one substance in ,nature8 one  
substance invested with all those       
properties and powers which exist1 in   
such manifold diversity1 in the organic 
and inorganic kingdoms8 ,the wonder     
might rather seem to be that any two    
substances should be capable of         
accounting for such a variety of        
phenomena as the universe exhibits4 ,a  

dualism is unavoidable1 unless we are to
 materialize ,god as well as man2 and   
why may there not be a dualism in the   
case of created mind and matter1 as     
there must be1 on any supposition except
 that of ,pantheism1 in the case of the 
uncreated mind and the material         
universe8 ,we see variety and gradation 
in all the works of ,god2 we see        
thousands of substances1 simple and     
compound1 possessing various properties1
 even in the inorganic world2 we see    
different forms of life1 vegetable and  
animal1 ascending by steps of regular   
gradation1 from the lowest to the       
highest2 we see1 in the animal kingdom1 
various propensities1 instincts1 and    
powers1 which constitute the            
characteristics of distinct species2 at 
length we rise to ,man1 with his        
rational1 responsible1 and immortal     
nature4 ,why may not ,man be the nexus  
between a world of matter and a world of
 spirits1--,man1 who is equally         
connected with the material world by his

 body1 and with the spiritual by his    
soul1--who is1 as it were1 mind         
incarnate1 spirit in flesh8 ,and why may
 there not be higher spirits still1     
whether embodied in subtler and more    
refined vehicles1 or existing apart from
 all material forms1 in those other     
worlds which ,astronomy has brought to  
light8 ,no reason can be assigned for a 
negative answer to these and similar    
queries1 unless it be that we cannot    
conceive of pure spirit without bodily  
form2 and this may be true1 if it be    
meant merely to affirm that we can find 
no sensible image for it1 nothing by    
which it can be represented to our      
sight1 or pictured in our imagination1  
as visible things may be2 but it is not 
true1 if it be meant to imply that we   
have no distinct notion of mind or      
spirit1 for it is as clearly known by   
its properties1 of thought1 feeling1    
volition1 and consciousness1 as matter  
itself can be2 and who will venture to  
define1 or to depict1 or to form any    

image of the substance of matter1 apart 
from the properties which belong to it8 
,we are under no necessity1 then1 of    
adopting the theory of unisubstancisme1 
and we cannot found upon it in argument 
without building on a mere gratuitous   
assumption4  ,,iv4 ,our fourth          
proposition is1 ,that the same reason   
which warrants us in ascribing certain  
properties and phenomena to a distinct  
substance called matter1 equally        
warrants us in ascribing certain other  
properties and phenomena to a distinct  
substance called mind2 and that the     
difference between their respective     
properties and phenomena is so great as 
to justify the belief that the          
substances are different and ought to be
 denominated by distinctive names4      
,when ,materialists affirm1 as they do1 
the existence of one only substantive   
being in ,nature1 and represent all our 
mental phenomena as the mere results of 
physical organization1 they assume that 
matter1 at least1 is a real entity2 that

 it is a substance or substratum in     
which certain powers or qualities       
inhere2 and that its existence1 as such1
 is evident and undeniable4 ,we are     
entirely relieved1 therefore1 by their  
own admission or assumption1 from the   
necessity of discussing the more general
 problem of ,ontology2 the problem1     
whether we can prove the existence of   
any being1 properly so called1 from a   
mere series of phenomena1 a succession  
of appearances4 ,they virtually admit1  
since they evidently assume1 that the   
phenomena must have a substance under   
them1 the qualities a substratum in     
which they inhere4 ,now1 the very same  
reason which warrants1 or rather obliges
 them to recognize matter as a substance
 and not as a shadow1--as an entity     
which really exists and manifests itself
 by its properties and effects1--must   
equally warrant1 or rather oblige them  
to recognize mind or spirit also as a   
distinct substantive being1 unless it   
can be shown either that its properties 

are the same with those of matter1 or   
that they may be accounted for by some  
peculiar modification of matter1 some   
law of physical organization4 ,there can
 be no reason for admitting the         
existence of matter as a substance1     
which does not apply also to the        
existence of mind as a distinct         
substance1 if it shall be found that    
their properties are essentially        
different4 ,we know1 and can know1      
nothing of substance otherwise than by  
its properties or powers3 we know       
nothing of matter1--it would1 in fact1  
be to us non-existent1 but for its      
extension1 solidity1 and other          
properties2 we know nothing of mind1--it
 would equally be to us non-existent1   
but for its consciousness1 its thoughts1
 feelings1 and desires2 and if it be    
right to ascribe the one set of         
properties to a substantive being1      
called matter1 it cannot be wrong to    
ascribe the other set of properties also
 to a substantive being1 called mind4   

,if it could be shown1 indeed1 that the 
properties of the one substance might   
either be identified with1 or accounted 
for1 by those of the other2 if animal   
feeling could be identified with or     
derived from1 mere physical impulse2 if 
intellectual thought could be reduced to
 material motion2 if desire and         
aversion1 hope and fear could be        
explained by the natural laws of        
attraction and repulsion1 then we might 
blend the two substances into one1 and  
speak of mind as a mere modification of 
matter4 ,but as long as the properties  
or powers by which alone any substance  
can be known are seen to be generically 
different1 we cannot confound the       
substances themselves1 or reduce them to
 one category1 without violating the    
plainest rules of philosophical inquiry4
  ,and yet to these rules ,dr4          
,priestley refers1 as if they warranted 
the conclusions at which he had arrived4
 ,he desires his readers to recur to the
 universally received rules of          

philosophizing1 such as are laid down by
 ,sir ,isaac ,newton at the beginning of
 his third book of ,principia4 ,the     
first of these rules1 as laid down by   
him1 is that we are to admit no more    
causes than are sufficient to explain   
appearances2 and the second is1 that to 
the same effect we must1 as far as      
possible1 assign the same cause4 ,we    
cheerfully accept these canons of       
philosophical inquiry2 and it is just   
because no one substance is sufficient1 
in our estimation1 to account for all   
the appearances1 that we equally reject 
the spiritualism of ,berkeley1 who would
 resolve all phenomena into mind1 and   
the materialism of ,priestley1 who would
 resolve all phenomena into matter4     
,matter and ,mind may1 indeed1 be said  
to resemble each other in some          
respects1--in their being equally       
existent1 equally created1 and equally  
dependent2 but their essential          
properties are generically different1   
for there is no identity1 but a manifest

 and undeniable diversity1 between      
thought1 feeling1 desire1 volition1 and 
conscience1 and the various qualities or
 powers belonging to matter1 such as    
extension1 solidity1 and vis inerti1 or 
even the powers of attraction and       
repulsion4 ,on the ground of this       
manifest difference between the         
properties by which alone any substance 
makes itself known1 we hold ourselves   
warranted to affirm that the mind is    
immaterial1 and to ascribe mental       
phenomena to a distinct substantive     
being1 not less than the material       
phenomena of ,nature4  ,some ingenious  
thinkers1 on both sides of the question1
 have not been fully satisfied with this
 method of stating the grounds of our   
opinion4 ,it has been said by our       
opponents1 that if we found merely on   
the acknowledged difference between two 
sets of properties or phenomena1 while  
we admit that the substance or          
substratum is in itself entirely unknown
 to us1 or known only through the medium

 of the properties to which we          
refer1--then the dispute becomes a      
purely verbal one1 and can amount to    
nothing more than this1 whether a       
substance of whose essence we are       
entirely ignorant should be called by   
the name of matter or by the name of    
spirit4 ,but the dispute is not a purely
 verbal one1 even on the suppositions   
which have been stated4 ,for it is      
essential to a right philosophy of      
nature1 that every substance possessing 
peculiar properties should have a       
distinctive name4 ,thus1 even in the    
material world itself1 we distinguish   
sulphur from soda1 gold from granite1   
and magnesia from electricity or odyle4 
,why8 ,because1 while they have some    
properties in common1 in virtue of which
 we rank them in the same category as   
material substances1 they have1         
severally1 certain distinctive or       
peculiar characteristics1 which forbid  
us to call the one by the same name as  
the other4 ,and for precisely the same  

reason1 when we find another class of   
properties and powers existing in       
certain beings1 which are totally       
different from those belonging to mere  
material substances1--incapable not only
 of being identified with them1 but also
 of being accounted for by means of     
them1--we are equally warranted in      
ascribing these properties to a         
substance1 and in affirming that this   
substance1 of which we know nothing     
except through its properties1 is       
radically different from matter4 ,that  
there is something more than a mere     
verbal difference between us and our    
opponents might seem to be admitted by  
themselves1 when they evince so much    
zeal in assailing our position and      
defending their own2 but it becomes     
strikingly apparent as soon as we extend
 our inquiry so as to embrace the grand 
question respecting the distinction1 if 
any1 between ,god and the material      
universe4  ,some1 again1 who are        
substantially1 at least in all important

 respects1 on our side of the question1 
have not been satisfied with showing    
that the two sets of properties are     
generically different1 and that the same
 reason exists for ascribing the one to 
a distinct substantive being called     
mind1 as for ascribing the other to a   
substantive being called matter4 ,they  
have been anxious to advance a step     
further2 and to show that the two sets  
of properties are mutually exclusive1   
and that they could not possibly coexist
 in the same subject4 ,this is the      
declared object of ,baxter's ,work on   
the ,soul1 which professes to prove that
 the only power belonging to matter1    
namely1 its vis inerti1 or resistance to
 any change in its present state1 is    
inconsistent with its possession of any 
active power4 ,it is not held sufficient
 to show that the properties are        
generically different1 and that the     
substances in which these properties    
inhere may and should be designated by  
distinct names1 as matter and spirit1   

soul and body2 but it must be further   
proved that they are so heterogeneous   
and inconsistent as to be mutually      
exclusive1 and incapable of coexisting  
in the same substance4 ,to a certain    
extent1 we think this mode of reasoning 
may be admitted4 ,we do not conceive    
that vis inerti is the only property    
belonging to matter1 or that it is      
necessarily exclusive of attraction and 
repulsion1 and the other powers which   
may belong to its specific varieties2   
but we do conceive that the vis inerti  
of mere matter is utterly inconsistent  
with the self-activity1 the self-moving 
power1 which belongs to mind3 and we are
 confirmed in this conviction by the    
anxiety which our opponents have evinced
 to explain the phenomena of mind by    
purely mechanical laws1 and to establish
 a system1 not of moral1 but of material
 necessity1 in opposition to the        
doctrine of man's spontaneity and       
freedom4 ,we are further of opinion1    
that extension cannot be predicated of  

mind1 without also being predicated of  
thought2 and that to ascribe it to      
either would lead to ridiculous         
absurdities1 such as have been noted1   
and perhaps caricatured1 by ,dr4 ,thomas
 ,brown4 ,we think1 too1 that the unity 
and continuity of consciousness1 with   
the intimate sense of personal identity1
 that belongs to all rational and       
responsible beings1 are utterly         
irreconcilable with the continual flux  
and mutation that are incident to       
matter1 and that they cannot be         
accounted for without the supposition of
 a distinct substance1 existing the same
 throughout all the changes that occur  
in the material receptacle in which it  
dwells4 ,to this extent we think that   
the argument is alike legitimate and    
valid2 but when it goes beyond this1 and
 attempts either to divest matter of all
 active properties1 or to demonstrate   
that1 in the very nature of things1     
sensation and thought could not possibly
 be annexed to a material substance1 we 

think that it advances beyond the real  
exigencies of the case1 and that it     
undertakes a task which is somewhat too 
arduous for our present powers1--a task 
which many of the ablest advocates of   
,immaterialism would humbly1 but firmly1
 decline4  ,in this connection1 it may  
be useful to remark that it is only with
 reference to this advanced and more    
arduous part of the general argument1   
that such writers as ,locke and ,bonnet1
 whose authority is often pleaded in    
opposition to our views1 ever felt the  
slightest difficulty4 ,they were both   
,immaterialists1 because they both      
discerned the radical difference between
 mental and material phenomena1 and     
because they both admitted the          
reasonableness of ascribing them1       
respectively1 to a distinct substance4  
,but they were not convinced by the more
 metaphysical arguments of those who    
professed to show that none of the      
phenomena of mind could possibly be     
exhibited by matter1 or1 at least1 they 

declined to take that ground4 ,that     
,locke was an ,immaterialist is evident 
from many passages in his writings4 ,by 
putting together1 he says1 the ideas of 
thinking1 perceiving1 liberty and power 
of moving themselves and other things1  
we have as clear a perception and notion
 of immaterial substances as we have of 
material4 ,for putting together the     
ideas of thinking and willing1 c41      
joined to substance1 of which we have no
 distinct idea1 we have the idea of an  
immaterial spirit2 and by putting       
together the ideas of coherent solid    
parts and a power of being moved1 joined
 with substance1 of which likewise we   
have no positive idea1 we have the idea 
of matter3 the one is as clear and      
distinct an idea as the other4#afe ,but 
notwithstanding this explicit statement1
 he demurred to the doctrine of those   
who maintained that the power of        
thinking could not possibly be          
superadded to matter1 and this because  
he deemed it presumptuous to set limits 

to the ,divine omnipotence1 or to       
pronounce any judgment on a question of 
that kind4 ,we have the ideas of matter 
and thinking1 but possibly shall never  
be able to know whether any mere        
material being thinks or no2 it being   
impossible for us1 by the contemplation 
of our own ideas1 without ,revelation1  
to discover whether ,omnipotency has not
 given to some systems of matter1 fitly 
disposed1 a power to perceive and       
think4444 ,i see no contradiction in it 
that the first eternal thinking ,being  
should1 if ,he pleased1 give to certain 
systems of created senseless matter1 put
 together as ,he sees fit1 some degrees 
of sense1 perception1 and thought4#aff  
,in these and similar passages1 ,locke  
did not mean1 we think1 to retract or   
modify the doctrine which he had taught 
respecting the radical distinction      
betwixt mind and matter2 he intended    
merely to intimate that1 in adopting    
that doctrine1 he proceeded on grounds  
different from those which had been     

assumed by some other writers2 that his 
belief rested mainly on the essential   
difference between the properties       
belonging to the two substances1 and not
 on the mere metaphysical arguments by  
which some had attempted to prove that  
,god himself could not impart to matter 
the power of thinking4 ,he shrunk from  
pronouncing a positive decision on this 
one point2 and yet his words have ever  
since been quoted with triumph by the   
advocates of ,materialism as affording a
 virtual sanction to the possibility at 
least of that for which they contend4   
,and on the same account1 ,locke has    
been severely blamed by some modern     
spiritualists4 ,mr4 ,carlyle1 speaking  
of ,hartley's and ,darwin's1 and all the
 possible forms of ,materialism1--the   
grand ,idolatry1 as we may rightly call 
it1 by which at all times the true      
worship1 that of the invisible1 has been
 polluted and withstood--adds the       
following characteristic remarks3       
,locke1 himself a clear1 humble-minded1 

patient1 reverent1 nay religious man1   
had paved the way for banishing religion
 from the world4 ,mind1 by being        
modelled in men's imaginations into a   
,shape1 a ,visibility1 and reasoned of  
as if it had been some composite1       
divisible1 and reunitable substance1    
some finer chemical salt1 or curious    
piece of logical joinery1 began to lose 
its immaterial1 mysterious1 divine1     
though invisible character3 it was      
tacitly figured as something that might1
 were our organs fine enough1 be seen4  
,yet who had ever seen it8 who could    
ever see it8 ,thus1 by degrees1 it      
passed into a ,doubt1 a ,relation1 some 
faint ,possibility1 and1 at last1 into a
 highly probably ,nonentity4 ,following 
,locke's footsteps1 the ,french had     
discovered that 'as the stomach secretes
 chyle1 so does the brain secrete       
thought4'#afg  ,the sentiments of       
,bonnet of ,geneva1 as stated in his    
,palingenesie1 are substantially in     
accordance with those of ,locke1 and    

have met with similar treatment4 ,he is 
not a ,materialist2 he admits a real    
distinction1 as well as a close union1  
between the soul and the body2 he speaks
 even of the possible existence of      
disembodied souls or pure spirits2 he   
affirms the immateriality of the        
thinking principle2 and expressly       
assigns his reasons for not being a     
,materialist4#afh ,but he appears to    
have thought1 as ,locke did1 that       
possibly the power of thinking might be 
superadded to matter1 by the ,creator's 
omnipotent will1 and that there is      
nothing in this supposition which could 
seriously affect either the doctrine of 
,theism or the immortality of man4 ,and 
hence he affirmed1 in words which ,dr4  
,priestley selected for the motto of his
 ,disquisitions1 that if any one should 
ever demonstrate the soul to be         
material1 far from being alarmed at     
this1 we should only admire the power   
which could give to matter the power of 
thinking4  ,we conceive that the        

language both of ,locke and ,bonnet on  
this particular point amounts to a      
dangerous and very unnecessary          
concession4 ,were it meant merely to    
affirm that ,god could so unite a       
thinking spiritual being with a material
 organism1 as to make the two mutually  
dependent and subservient1 this is no   
more than is admitted by all the        
advocates of ,immaterialism1 and it is  
actually exhibited in the constitution  
of human nature4 ,but if it were meant  
to admit that the power of thinking and 
willing might be superadded as a        
property or quality to matter itself1   
without any substantive being other than
 matter as a substratum1 then we        
conceive it to be at variance with the  
grounds on which ,locke and ,bonnet     
themselves had previously declared their
 belief in the distinct existence both  
of matter and spirit4 ,we shall only    
add1 that the prejudice against our     
doctrine1 which is founded on the union 
of two substances apparently so         

heterogeneous as mind and matter in the 
same person1 is1 to say the least1 fully
 counterbalanced by the difficulty1     
incident to the theory1 of demonstrating
 the coexistence of two sets of         
properties1 apparently so diverse and   
disparate as thought and extension1 vis 
inerti and spontaneity1 in the same     
substance4  ,on the whole1 we conclude  
that the same reason which warrants us  
in ascribing certain properties or      
phenomena to a distinct substance called
 matter1 equally warrants us in         
ascribing certain other properties or   
phenomena to a distinct substance called
 mind2 and that the difference between  
their properties and phenomena is so    
great as to justify the belief that the 
substances are different1 and ought to  
be denominated by distinctive names4    
,v4 ,our fifth proposition is1 ,that it 
is impossible to account for the        
phenomena of thought1 feeling1 desire1  
volition1 and self-consciousness1 by    
ascribing them1 as ,materialists do1    

either to the substance of matter1 or to
 its form2 that is1 either to the atomic
 particles of which it consists1 or to  
the peculiar organization in which these
 particles are arranged4  ,it is too    
manifest to admit either of doubt or    
denial1 that the power of thinking1     
feeling1 and willing1 does not belong to
 every form of matter4 ,it is not1      
therefore1 one of its essential         
properties2 and if it belong to it at   
all1 it must be either a quality        
superadded to the ordinary powers of    
matter1 or a product resulting from its 
configuration in an organized form4  ,if
 it be a quality superadded merely to   
the ordinary powers of matter1 then it  
must exist equally in every part of the 
mass to which it is attached2 every     
particle of the matter in which it      
inheres must be sentient1 intelligent1  
voluntary1 and active2 and1 on this     
supposition1 it will remain a difficult1
 if not desperate problem1 to account   
for the unity of consciousness by such a

 diversity of parts1 and especially for 
the continuity of consciousness1 when   
the material elements are confessedly in
 a state of constant flux and mutation4 
,it would seem1 too1 that if thought be 
thus connected with an extended1        
divisible1 and mutable substance1 it    
must be itself extended1 and1 of course1
 divisible2 and1 accordingly1 ,dr4      
,priestley does not hesitate to affirm  
that our ideas1 as well as our minds1   
possess these characters4 ,whatever     
ideas1 he says1 are in themselves1 they 
are evidently produced by external      
objects1 and must therefore correspond  
to them2 and since many of the objects  
or archetypes of ideas are divisible1 it
 necessarily follows that the ideas     
themselves are divisible also4 444 ,if  
the archetypes of ideas have extension1 
the ideas which are expressive of them1 
and are actually produced by them       
according to certain mechanical laws1   
must have extension likewise2 and1      
therefore1 the mind in which they exist1

 whether it be material or immaterial1  
must have extension also4444 ,i am1     
therefore1 obliged to conclude that the 
sentient principle in man1 containing   
ideas which certainly have parts1 and   
are divisible1 and consequently must    
have extension1 cannot be that simple1  
indivisible1 and immaterial substance   
that some have imagined it to be1 but   
something that has real extension1 and  
therefore may have the other properties 
of matter4#afi ,he argues that ideas    
must be extended and divisible because  
their objects or archetypes are so2 and1
 further1 that the mind itself must be  
material1 because these properties      
belong to the ideas which inhere in it  
as their subject or seat4 ,now1 this    
argument is fairly met by the reasoning1
 or the ridicule1 call it which you     
will1 of ,dr4 ,thomas ,brown3 ,in saying
 of mind that it is matter1 we must     
mean1 if we mean anything1 that the     
principle which thinks is hard and      
divisible2 and that it will be not more 

absurd to talk of the twentieth part of 
an affirmation1 or the quarter of a     
hope1 of the top of a remembrance1 and  
the north and east corners of a         
comparison1 than of the twentieth part  
of a pound1 or of the different points  
of the compass1 in reference to any part
 of the globe4 ,the true answer to the  
statement of the ,materialist1--the     
answer which we feel in our hearts1 on  
the very expression of the plurality and
 divisibility of feeling1--is that it   
assumes what1 far from admitting1 we    
cannot even understand1 and that1 with  
every effort of attention which we can  
give to our mental analysis1 we are as  
incapable of forming any conception of  
what is meant by the quarter of a doubt1
 or the half of a belief1 as of forming 
to ourselves an image of a circle       
without a central point1 or of a square 
without a single angle4#agj  ,but the   
theory which supposes the soul to be    
extended and divisible1 and its ideas1  
feelings1 and volitions to be extended  

and divisible also1 has given place to  
another1 which does not represent the   
mental qualities as inhering in every   
particle of the matter with which they  
are associated1 but rather as the       
products of organization1 the results1  
not of the atomic elements1 but of the  
form1 or figure1 into which they are    
cast4 ,it seems to have been felt that  
it would be unsafe to ascribe the power 
of thinking to every particle of the    
brain1 and it is now represented as the 
result or product of the brain in       
action1 as light and heat are of fire1  
and fragrance of the flower4#aga ,this  
idea is illustrated by a great variety  
of natural examples1 in which certain   
effects are produced by the arrangement 
of matter1 which could not be produced  
by its individual particles1 existing   
separate and apart1 or combined in other
 forms4 ,nor is this a new phase of the 
theory1 or an original discovery of the 
present age2 it was familiarly known and
 fully discussed#agb in the days of     

,clarke and ,collins1 and every         
similitude which is now employed to     
illustrate it may be found dissected in 
their writings4 ,collins had undertaken 
to prove that an individual power may   
reside in a material system which       
consists of separate and distinct       
parts1--an individual power which is not
 in every one1 nor in any one1 of the   
particles that compose it1 when taken   
apart and considered singly3 and he had 
adduced as an example the very          
similitude which ,atkinson employs1     
namely1 fragrance from the flower2 for  
he adds1 a rose1 for example1 consists  
of several particles1 which1 separately 
and singly1 want a power to produce that
 agreeable sensation we experience in   
them when united4 ,other instances are  
given2 such as the power of the eye to  
contribute to the act of seeing1 the    
power of a clock to show the hour of the
 day1 the power of a musical instrument 
to produce in us harmonious sounds2     
these1 he says1 are powers not at all   

resulting from any powers of the same   
kind inhering in the parts of the       
system2 and he infers that in the same  
manner the power of thinking1 without   
being an aggregate of powers of the same
 kind1 may yet inhere in a system of    
matter4 ,but these examples1 so far from
 confirming1 serve rather to confute1   
the theory in whose support they are    
adduced4 ,could it be shown1 indeed1    
that the eye possesses in itself the    
power of vision1 and that sight results 
solely from its peculiar texture2 or1   
that a clock is really an intellectual  
machine1 and produces an intellectual   
effect2 or1 that a musical instrument   
possesses in itself the soul of melody1 
and is conscious of its own sweet       
sounds1--then it might be possible to   
entertain the supposition that1 in like 
manner1 an organized brain may have the 
power of producing thought1 and feeling1
 and will4 ,but what is the matter of   
fact8 ,let ,dr4 ,clarke's answer with   
reference to the case of a timepiece    

suffice for all3 ,that which you call   
the power of a clock to show the time of
 the day is evidently nothing in the    
clock itself1 but the figure and motion 
of its parts1 and1 consequently1 not    
anything of a different sort or kind    
from the powers inherent in the parts4  
,whereas 'thinking1' if it was the      
result of the powers of the different   
parts of the machine of the body1 or of 
the brain in particular1 would be       
something really inhering in the machine
 itself1 specifically different from all
 and every one of the powers of the     
several parts out of which it resulted2 
which is an express contradiction1 a    
supposing the effect to have more in it 
than the cause4 444 ,that particular and
 determinate degree of velocity in a    
wheel1 whereby it turns once round      
precisely in twelve hours1 is that which
 you call the power of a clock to show  
the time of the day2 and because such a 
determinate velocity of motion is made  
use of by us for the measure of time1 is

 it therefore really a new quality or   
power distinct from the motion itself8  
,the same answer is equally applicable  
to all the other examples1 and it may be
 stated generally as amounting to this1 
that it is absolutely false in fact1 and
 impossible in the nature of things1    
that any power whatsoever should inhere 
or reside in any system or composition  
of matter1 different from the powers    
residing in the single parts4#agc  ,the 
two great difficulties which adhere to  
the theory of ,materialism1 and which   
must ever prove insurmountable1 are     
these3 first1 to account for the power  
of thinking by means of material atoms1 
which are individually destitute of it2 
and secondly1 to account for the unity  
and continuity of human consciousness by
 means of material atoms which are      
constantly undergoing flux and mutation4
 ,for the first end1 recourse has been  
had to the theory which ascribes the    
power of thinking1 not to the particles 
of matter1 but to their order1          

arrangement1 or organization2 and for   
the second1 the continuous sense of     
personal identity is supposed to be     
sufficiently accounted for by supposing 
that1 as the particles which compose the
 brain are changed1 the retiring atoms  
leave their share of the general        
consciousness as a legacy to their      
successors4 ,and both these expedients  
for surmounting the difficulty are      
exquisitely caricatured in the ,memoirs 
of ,martinus ,scriblerus1 in a chapter  
which is justly described as an         
inimitable ridicule on ,collins'        
argument against ,clarke1 to prove the  
soul only a quality4 ,the ,society of   
,freethinkers1 addressing ,martinus1    
propose to send him an answer to the    
ill-grounded sophisms of their          
opponents1 and likewise an easy         
mechanical explanation of perception or 
thinking4--,one of their chief          
arguments1 say they1 is that            
self-consciousness cannot inhere in any 
system of matter1 because all matter is 

made up of several distinct beings which
 never can make up one individual       
thinking being4 ,this is easily answered
 by a familiar instance4 ,in every jack 
there is a meat-roasting quality1 which 
neither resides in the fly1 nor in the  
weight1 nor in any particular wheel1 of 
the jack1 but is the result of the whole
 composition4444 ,and as the general    
quality of meat-roasting1 with its      
several modifications1 does not inhere  
in any one part of the jack1 so neither 
does consciousness1 with its several    
modes of sensation1 intellection1       
volition1 c41 inhere in any one1 but is 
the result from the mechanical          
composition of the whole animal4 ,and   
then1 in regard to the second           
difficulty3 ,the parts1 say they1 of an 
animal body are perpetually changed1 444
 from whence it will follow that the    
idea of individual consciousness must be
 constantly translated from one particle
 of matter to another4444 ,we answer1   
this is only a fallacy of the           

imagination4 ,they make a great noise   
about this individuality1 how a man is  
conscious to himself that he is the same
 individual he was twenty years ago1    
notwithstanding the flux state of the   
particles of matter that compose his    
body4 ,we think this is capable of a    
very plain answer1 and may be easily    
illustrated by a familiar example4 ,sir 
,john ,cutler had a pair of black       
worsted stockings1 which his maid darned
 so often with silk1 that they became at
 last a pair of silk stockings4 ,now1   
supposing those stockings of ,sir       
,john's endued with some degree of      
consciousness at every particular       
darning1 they would have been sensible  
that they were the same individual pair 
of stockings1 both before and after the 
darning6  ,the subject is here presented
 in a ludicrous point of view1 and some 
may doubt whether this is a legitimate  
method of treating it4 ,but it should   
not be forgotten that while ridicule is 
no safe test of truth1 it may be the    

most effective exposure of nonsense and 
folly4   ,,section ,,iii4  ,,the        
,,relations ,,of ,,materialism ,,to     
,,theology4  ,it has been generally felt
 and acknowledged1 that the doctrine    
which preserves the distinction between 
matter and spirit1 body and soul1 is    
more in accordance with the truths of   
,natural and ,revealed ,religion1 than  
the opposite theory which identifies    
them2 and that1 on the other hand1 a    
profound and serious study of these     
truths has a tendency to raise our      
thoughts above the low level of         
,materialism1 and to direct them to the 
contemplation of a higher and nobler    
world1--the world of spirits4  ,there   
are many distinct points at which the   
theory of ,materialism comes into       
contact and collision with the truths   
both of ,natural and ,revealed          
,religion4 ,by a brief enumeration of   
these1 the practical importance of the  
subject may be clearly evinced4  #a4    
,the doctrine of the immortality of the 

soul is seriously affected by the theory
 of ,materialism4 ,that there is some   
connection between the two is apparent  
from the very anxiety with which        
infidels have labored to undermine the  
doctrine of spirit1 on purpose to get   
rid of the doctrine of immortality4 ,but
 in stating the connection between them1
 we must exercise the utmost caution1   
lest we should unwarily place the truth 
on a precarious or questionable basis4  
,in arguing for the future life of the  
soul1 as a doctrine of ,natural         
,religion1 some writers have spoken as  
if they supposed that nothing more was  
needful to demonstrate its immortality  
than the bare fact of its being         
immaterial1 and that1 by its very nature
 as spirit1 it is indestructible by ,god
 ,himself4 ,now1 we do not hold that the
 mere proof of its being an immaterial  
substance would necessarily infer its   
being also immortal4 ,for ought we know1
 the principle of life1 sensation1      
memory1 and volition may belong to an   

immaterial substance even in the lower  
animals1 who are not supposed to be     
immortal2 and the only use which we     
would make of its immateriality in      
connection with its immortality1 is     
simply this1--that not being material1  
its destruction is not necessarily      
implied in the dissolution of the body4 
,it is not in the metaphysical doctrine 
of its immaterial nature1 but in the    
practical evidence of its moral         
responsibilities and religious          
capacities1 that we find the most       
satisfactory natural proof of its       
immortality4 ,it is perfectly possible  
to hold1 on the one hand1 that all      
immaterial substances are not           
necessarily indestructible2 and yet to  
hold1 on the other hand1 that such an   
immaterial substance as the soul of man 
is known to be1--endowed with           
conscience1 with intelligence1 with     
affections and aspirations1 with hopes  
and fears such as can find no suitable  
object and no adequate range within the 

limits of the present life1--must be    
destined to an immortal existence4 ,the 
immortality1 for which alone we ought to
 contend1 is such as implies neither a  
necessity of existence in the creature1 
nor its independence on the will of the 
,creator4 ,the power of ,god to         
annihilate the soul is not called in    
question1 but the purpose of ,god to    
make the soul immortal is inferred from 
its nature and capacities1 its          
aspirations and hopes and fears4 ,and   
all that is necessarily implied in the  
doctrine of what has been called the    
natural immortality of the soul is well 
stated by ,dr4 ,s4 ,clarke1 when he says
 that1 the soul may be such a substance 
as is able to continue its own duration 
forever1 by the powers given to it at   
its first production1 and the           
continuance of those general influences 
which are requisite for the support of  
created beings in general4 ,mr4 ,baxter1
 acute and metaphysical as he was1      
placed the argument substantially on the

 same ground4 ,it appears1 he says1 that
 all substance equally1 as well material
 as immaterial1 cannot cease to exist   
but by an effect of infinite power4444  
,the human soul1 having no parts1 must  
be indissoluble in its nature by        
anything that hath not power to destroy 
or annihilate it4 ,and since it hath not
 a natural tendency to annihilation1 nor
 a power to annihilate itself1 nor can  
be annihilated by any being finitely    
powerful only1 without an immediate act 
of the omnipotent ,creator to annihilate
 it1 it must endlessly abide an active  
perceptive substance1 without either    
fear or hopes of dying through all      
eternity1 which is1 in other words1 to  
be immortal as to the agency of all     
natural or second causes1 that is1      
'naturally immortal4'#agd  ,when thus   
stated and limited1 the argument is at  
once safe and valid4 ,it is first proved
 that the ,mind is a substance1 living1 
perceptive1 and active1 which is simple 
and indivisible1 and not capable1 like  

matter1 of being separated into parts   
possessing the same properties or       
powers2 and then this distinction       
betwixt mind and matter is applied to   
prove that it cannot be destroyed by    
dissolution1 as the body may be1 but    
that if it be destroyed at all1 it must 
be by annihilation4 ,but no substance1  
material or immaterial1 can be          
annihilated by any finite or second     
cause2 it can be annihilated only by the
 will of him who created it2 and the    
question respecting the soul of man     
remains1 ,what are the indications of   
,god's will concerning it8 ,when this   
question is seriously entertained1 we   
can hardly fail to see in the structure 
of its powers1 in the grandeur of its   
capacities1 in the moral and responsible
 consciousness which belongs to it1 a   
strong presumptive proof of its being   
,his purpose that it should continue to 
live after the dissolution of the body4 
,the ,metaphysical argument is          
sufficient to remove preliminary        

objections1 the ,moral argument         
furnishes a presumptive proof4  ,the    
theory of ,materialism1 as it assumes   
different forms1 so it admits of being  
associated with different views         
respecting the future prospects of the  
soul4 ,when it is held in its grossest  
form1 it stands in a relation of direct 
antagonism to the doctrine of           
immortality1 as is apparent in the      
speculations of ,d',holbach1 ,comte1 and
 ,atkinson1 who insist at large on the  
proof of ,materialism on purpose to     
undermine and overthrow the doctrine of 
,immortality4 ,the theory of            
,materialism has been maintained by ,dr4
 ,priestley and others1 in conjunction  
with a professed1 and1 as we believe1   
sincere belief in a future state of     
rewards and punishments4 ,the sleep of  
the soul during the interval between    
death and the resurrection1 and its     
ultimate awakening by an immediate and  
miraculous interposition of ,divine     
power1 are equally held to be true1--the

 one on the ground of a natural         
evidence1 the other on that of the      
authority of ,revelation4 ,but the      
natural evidence is defective1 since it 
depends entirely on the assumption that 
thought is produced by and dependent on 
a certain material organization1 without
 which it could not exist2 and the      
supernatural authority is still less to 
be relied on1 since it seems1 at least1 
to recognize the existence of           
disembodied spirits1 and unequivocally  
declares that the soul cannot be killed 
as the body may4 ,if the soul be        
material1 as ,dr4 ,priestley says it is1
 it must be1 equally with the body1     
affected by the stroke of death2 yet our
 ,lord says1--and ,his authority cannot 
be declined when the doctrine of a      
future resurrection is made to depend on
 the mere testimony of                  
,scripture1--,fear not them which kill  
the body1 but are not able to kill the  
soul2 but rather fear ,him which is able
 to destroy both soul and body in       

hell4#age ,and the soul is represented  
as existing in a state of conscious     
happiness or misery1 even during the    
interval between death and the          
resurrection1 in the parable of the rich
 man and ,lazarus1 as well as in the    
statement of the apostle that he was in 
a strait betwixt two1 having a desire to
 depart and to be with ,christ1 which is
 far better4#agf ,in its most recent and
 refined form1 the theory of            
,materialism represents mind as a subtle
 product1 evolved out of matter1 and    
destined to an endless existence1--an   
ever-ascending progression2 and in this 
form of it1 the doctrine of a distinct1 
personal immortality is1 no doubt1 far  
better preserved than in its earlier and
 grosser forms1 which spoke of the utter
 destruction of individual consciousness
 at the hour of death1 and of our       
material particles passing merely into  
other kinds of organic or inorganic     
being4 ,but then1 it is placed on a very
 precarious ground1--the mere           

supposition of a material product1 which
 can never be established by proof1 and 
which1 if there were no other objection 
to it1 might well seem to be            
sufficiently discredited by the mere    
fact that it ascribes to the effect     
properties and powers1 of a very high   
and peculiar order1 which do not exist  
in the cause4  #b4 ,the doctrine of     
future rewards and punishments1 or of   
man's responsibility as a subject of the
 ,divine government1 is also materially 
affected by the theory of ,materialism1 
in some1 at least1 of its forms4 ,when  
it is connected1 as it often has been1  
with the doctrine of ,mechanical        
,necessity1 which represents every      
thought1 opinion1 emotion1 desire1 and  
habit1 as the unavoidable result of mere
 physical influences acting on the      
brain1 and makes no account of the      
spontaneity or freedom which belongs to 
man as an intelligent1 moral1 and       
responsible agent1 it is manifestly     
impossible to discover any ground for   

the doctrine of future rewards and      
punishments4 ,and accordingly1          
,d',holbach1 ,comte1 and ,atkinson      
describe man as if he were the mere     
creature of circumstances1 and deny that
 his character could possibly have been 
different from what it is4 ,but even    
when it is not associated with fatalism1
 the theory1 which denies the distinct  
existence of the soul as a substantive  
being1 has a tendency to shake our      
belief in the doctrine of a future      
retribution1 properly so called1 since  
that doctrine rests on the assumption of
 our continued personal identity1 or the
 unity and continuity of our            
consciousness1 as dying yet immortal    
beings2 whereas1 if there be no soul1 or
 substantive spiritual being1 and if the
 body be in a state of perpetual flux   
and mutation1 it is difficult to see how
 the same being that sinned can suffer1 
or how the doctrine of retribution1     
properly so called1 can be consistently 
maintained4  #c4 ,the doctrine of the   

spirituality of the ,divine nature must 
be seriously affected1 in different     
ways1 by the theory of ,materialism4    
,it is said in ,scripture that ,god made
 man in ,his own image1 and that ,he    
breathed into his nostrils the breath of
 life1 and man became a living soul4    
,deny the existence of spirit or soul1  
as ,god's living image on earth1 and    
what ground of evidence1 or what help of
 analogy1 remains for either conceiving 
or proving aright the existence of ,him 
who is a ,spirit and the ,father of the 
spirits of all flesh8 ,and if the       
spirituality of the ,divine nature be   
called in question1 many of the ,divine 
attributes must also suffer2 for it is  
only as a spirit that ,god can be       
omnipresent1 and his omnipresence is    
presupposed in his omniscience and      
omnipotence4 ,for these reasons1 we     
incur the greatest risk of entertaining 
limited and false conceptions of ,god1  
by obliterating the distinction between 
matter and spirit4  ,it is1 no doubt1   

competent1 and it may even be highly    
useful1 to entertain the question1 how  
far the theory of ,materialism should be
 held to affect the grounds on which we 
believe in a living1 personal1 spiritual
 ,god8 ,in answer to this question1 we  
have no hesitation in avowing our       
conviction that the theory of           
,materialism1 however it may be         
modified1 has a tendency to impair the  
evidence of that fundamental article of 
faith4 ,god is a ,spirit1 and man was   
made in the image of ,god4 ,take away   
all spiritual essences2 reduce every    
known object in nature to matter1 gross 
or refined2 let mental and moral        
phenomena be blended with the physical1 
and what remains to constitute the      
groundwork of a spiritual system1 or to 
conduct us to the recognition of a      
supreme1 immaterial ,mind8 ,if the      
material body1 with its peculiar        
organization1 be capable of producing   
human thought1 and sufficient to account
 for the intelligence of man1 why may   

not the material universe1 with its     
mysterious laws and manifold forces1 be 
held sufficient to explain whatever     
marks of a higher intelligence may      
appear in ,nature8 and why may we not at
 once embrace ,pantheism1 and conceive  
of ,god only as the soul of the world8  
,dr4 ,priestley's reply to this question
 appears to us to be a mere evasion of  
the difficulty4 ,in treating of the     
objection to the system of ,materialism 
derived from the consideration of the   
,divine essence1 he first of all        
premises that in fact we have no proper 
idea of any essence whatever2 that our  
ideas concerning 'matter' do not go     
beyond the powers of which it is        
possessed1 and much less can our ideas  
go beyond powers1 properties1 or        
attributes with respect to the ,divine  
,being2 and then adds1 ,now1 the powers 
and properties of the ,divine mind1 as  
clearly deduced from the works of ,god1 
are not only so infinitely superior to  
those of the human mind1 when there is  

some analogy between them1 but so       
essentially different from them in other
 respects1 that whatever term we make   
use of to denote the one1 it must be    
improperly applied to the other4 ,he    
specifies several points of essential   
difference between the human and the    
,divine mind3 the first is1 the limited 
intelligence of the one as contrasted   
with the all-comprehensive omniscience  
of the other2 the second is1 the        
omnipotence which belongs to ,god1 and  
in virtue of which ,he can produce1 or  
annihilate1 anything at ,his pleasure3  
the third is1 that the ,divine essence  
cannot be the object of any of our      
senses1 as everything else that we call 
'matter' is4 ,and on these grounds he   
concludes that as the ,divine powers1 so
 the ,divine nature1 must be essentially
 different from ours1 and1 consequently1
 no common term1 except such            
comprehensive terms as being1 nature1   
c41 can be properly used to express     
both4 ,he further argues that no proof  

of the materiality of man can be        
extended1 by any just analogy1 to a     
proof or evidence of a similar          
materiality of the ,divine nature2 for  
the properties or powers being          
different1 the 'substance' or 'essence' 
7if it be any convenience to us to use  
such terms at all7 must be different    
also4#agg  ,now1 we conceive this to be 
a mere evasion of the real difficulty3  
first1 because the same mode of         
reasoning1 if applied to the case of the
 human mind1 would equally serve to     
prove that it should be distinguished   
from matter3 and1 secondly1 because the 
alleged differences between the human   
and the ,divine mind1 great and real as 
we admit them to be1 afford no better   
reason for calling ,god a spirit1 than  
that which may be found in the          
resemblance or analogy between created  
and uncreated intelligence4 ,it is as   
true of the human as it is of the       
,divine mind1 that we know nothing of   
its essence1 except what we learn       

through its properties and powers1 that 
it cannot be the object of any of our   
senses1 as everything that we call      
'matter' is1 and that if it be right to 
give different and distinctive names to 
substances1 expressive of their         
properties in so far as these are known 
to us1 we are warranted in calling the  
human soul a spirit and distinguishing  
it from matter1 until it can be shown   
that the properties of both are         
identical4 ,if this be denied1 we cannot
 see on what ground the distinction     
between matter and spirit can be        
maintained with reference to ,god       
,himself4 ,dr4 ,priestley founds1 not on
 the resemblance or analogy1 but on the 
essential difference1 between created   
and uncreated intelligence2 but1 in     
point of fact1 the difference1 great and
 real as it is1 has no bearing on the   
only question at issue2 it is the       
resemblance or analogy between all      
thinking beings and the ,supreme ,mind  
that suggests the reason for classing   

them under the same category as spirits1
 and that enables us to rise from the   
spiritual nature of man to the spiritual
 nature of ,god4  ,the personality of   
,god1 as a living1 self-conscious1 and  
active ,being1 distinct from the created
 universe and superior to it1 is        
dependent on the spirituality of ,his   
nature2 and in so far as the latter is  
affected by the theory of ,materialism1 
the evidence of the former must also be 
proportionally weakened4 ,we find1      
accordingly1 that many ,materialists    
have exhibited a tendency towards a     
,pantheistic theory of nature1 in which 
the material universe is conceived of as
 the body1 of which ,god is the soul4   
,some ,materialists1 indeed1 have       
stopped short of ,pantheism2 but this   
may have arisen from their being less   
consequent reasoners1 or more timid     
thinkers1 than others who were prepared 
to follow out their principles          
fearlessly to all their logical results2
 for1 assuredly1 if there be no evidence

 sufficient to show that the mind is    
distinct from the body1 it will require 
a very high kind of evidence to make it 
certain that ,god is distinct from      
,nature4  #d4 ,the theory of            
,materialism comes into direct          
collision1 at several points1 with the  
doctrines of ,revealed ,religion4  ,the 
doctrine of ,scripture in regard to the 
human soul is manifestly at variance    
with that theory4 ,in the earliest pages
 of ,genesis1 we have an account of its 
creation1 which1 when compared with     
other statements and forms of expression
 occurring elsewhere1 seems very clearly
 to imply that the soul is a distinct   
substantive being1 possessing properties
 and powers peculiar to itself1 and1    
although now united to the body1 yet    
capable of existing apart from it1 and  
destined to an immortal existence       
hereafter4#agh ,that it is a distinct   
substantive being1 connected with the   
body1 but not dependent on it1 at least 
in the sense of being incapable of      

existing apart from it1 appears from    
various testimonies of the inspired     
,word4 ,god is there pleased to call    
,himself the ,father of our spirits1 and
 that1 too1 in contradistinction to the 
fathers of our flesh4 ,we have had      
fathers of our 'flesh' which corrected  
us1 and we gave them reverence2 shall we
 not much rather be in subjection unto  
the ,father of 'spirits' and live8 ,he  
is called the ,god of the 'spirits' of  
all flesh1 and the ,lord who formeth the
 'spirit' of man within him4 ,the       
historical narrative1 too1 of man's     
creation1 which declares that he was    
made in the image of ,god1 and that his 
soul was infused by an immediate ,divine
 afflatus1 seems to imply that there is 
another and a higher relation subsisting
 between ,god and the soul than any that
 subsists between ,god and matter4 ,in  
other passages1 the soul is expressly   
represented as distinct and different   
from the body3--,fear not them which can
 kill the 'body1' but are not able to   

kill the 'soul4' ,into thy hands ,i     
commit my 'spirit1' said our ,lord1 just
 as his proto-martyr ,stephen said1     
,lord ,jesus1 receive my 'spirit4'      
,there are other passages still which   
affirm the separate existence of        
disembodied spirits3 ,then shall the    
dust return to the earth as it was1 and 
'the spirit1' shall return unto ,god who
 gave it4 ,a spirit hath not flesh and  
bones as ye see me have4 ,nay1 spiritual
 life1 such as clearly presupposes the  
continuance of conscious existence1     
without interruption and without end1 is
 said to be imparted by ,christ to his  
people3--,i am the resurrection and the 
life3 he that believeth in me1 though he
 were dead1 yet shall he live again1 and
 whosoever liveth and believeth in me   
shall never die4--,whoso believeth in me
 444 is passed from death unto life4#agi
 ,life is said to be already imparted1  
such a life as shall survive death1 and 
continue without interruption and       
without end2 and surely this is utterly 

inconsistent with that theory of        
,materialism which affirms1 either the  
annihilation of the soul at death1 or   
even the cessation of its conscious     
existence during the interval between   
death and the resurrection4  ,the       
revealed doctrine of angels1 or         
spiritual intelligences existing in     
other parts of the universe1 is also    
opposed to the theory of ,materialism4  
,according to the common belief1 the    
soul of man is the nexus between two    
worlds or states of being1--the world of
 matter and the world of mind4 ,in man  
the elements of both worlds are united2 
by his body he is connected with the    
world of matter1 by his soul with the   
world of mind4 ,death1 which dissolves  
the union between the two1 consigns the 
one to the dust1 and introduces the     
other into the world of spirits4 ,on    
this view1 there is no difficulty in    
rising to the conception of higher      
spiritual intelligences2 and the variety
 and gradation that are observable in   

all the works of ,god on earth may      
impart to that sublime conception such a
 measure of verisimilitude as to make it
 easily credible on the authority of    
,revelation4 ,but the theory of         
,materialism1 especially as advocated by
 ,dr4 ,priestley1 plainly excludes the  
existence of any order of spiritual     
beings other than the uncreated ,mind2  
for if that only is to be termed spirit 
which possesses omniscience and the     
power of producing anything at pleasure1
 it is clear that the highest angels and
 seraphims are no more spirits than the 
souls of men4  ,such being the relation 
which subsists between the theory of    
,materialism1 and some of the most      
important doctrines of ,natural and     
,revealed ,religion1 it is not wonderful
 that a serious consideration of the    
latter should lead reflective men to    
abjure the former1 or that their        
aversion to it should increase in       
proportion as their views of ,divine    
truth are extended and enlarged4 ,not a 

few have yielded1 in early youth1 to the
 charm of speculative inquiry1 and      
fondly embraced the idea of             
unisubstancisme1 who have lived to      
exchange it for a more ,scriptural      
faith4 ,for just in proportion as men   
are brought under the influence of      
serious views of ,god1 of the soul1 and 
of an eternal world1 in the same        
proportion will they become alienated1  
and even averse1 from a theory which    
confounds spirit with matter1 obscures  
their conceptions of ,god and of the    
world of spirits1 and degrades men to   
the level of the beasts that perish4    
,this effect of new1 or1 at least1 more 
vivid views of things unseen and eternal
 was instructively exemplified in the   
case of the late ,robert ,hall4 ,like   
many an ardent speculatist1 he had      
embraced in early life the system of    
,materialism2 and even after he had     
entered on the work of the ministry1 he 
could write to a professedly ,christian 
congregation in the following terms3 ,i 

am1 and have been for a long time1 a    
,materialist1 though ,i have never drawn
 your attention to this subject in my   
preaching1 because ,i have always       
considered it myself1 and wished you to 
consider it1 as a mere metaphysical     
speculation4 ,my opinion1 however1 on   
this head1 is1 that the nature of man is
 simple and uniform1 that the thinking  
powers and faculties are the result of a
 certain organization of matter1--and   
that after death he ceases to be        
conscious until the resurrection4#ahj   
,but speculative inquiry was soon to    
give place to spiritual faith4 ,the     
death of his revered and pious father   
brought his mind into realizing contact 
with an unseen and eternal world2 and1  
in the words of his biographer1         
distinguished alike for profound science
 and deep practical piety1 ,the death of
 ,mr4 ,hall's father tended greatly to  
bring his mind to the state of serious  
thought with which he entered on the    
pastoral office4 ,meditating with the   

deepest veneration upon the unusual     
excellences of a parent now forever lost
 to him1 he was led to investigate1 with
 renewed earnestness1 the truth as well 
as the value of those high and sacred   
principles from which his eminent piety 
and admirable consistency so evidently  
flowed4 ,he called to mind1 too1 several
 occasions on which his father1 partly  
by the force of reason1 partly by that  
of tender expostulation1 had exhorted   
him to abandon the vague and dangerous  
speculations to which he was prone4     
,some important changes in ,mr4 ,hall's 
sentiments resulted from an inquiry     
conducted under such solemn impressions1
 and among these may be mentioned his   
renunciation of ,materialism1 which1 he 
often declared1 he buried in his        
father's grave4  ,,footnotes3  #ade ,m4 
,,ad4 ,,franck1 ,rapport a l',academie1 
,preface1 p4 ,,xxi4  #adf ,m4 ,,comte1  
,cours1 ,i4 #dd1 #hi1 #ada2 ,,iv4 #fge2 
,v4 #de1 #cjc4 ,m4 ,,crousse1 ,des      
,principes1 pp4 #af1 #bj1 #hd1 #hh4 ,m4 

,,cabanis1 ,rapports du ,phisique et du 
,moral de l',homme1 #c vols4 ,m4        
,,broussais1 ,trait de ,physiologie     
applique a la ,pathologie1 #ahbh4  #adg 
,systme de la ,nature1 ,i4 #b1 #aj1 #hf1
 #aja1 and passim4 ,this eloquent       
text-book of the ,atheism of the last   
century is dissected and refuted by ,m4 
,,bergier in his ,examen du             
,materialisme1 #b vols4 ,paris1 #agga4  
#adh ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,i4 #dd1 #ada4
 ,m4 ,,crousse1 ,des ,principes1 pp4    
#hd1 #hf4 ,,atkitson ,,and ,,martineau1 
,letters on the ,laws of ,man's ,nature 
and ,development4  #adi ,,dr4           
,,priestley1 ,discoveries relating to   
,vision1 ,light1 and ,colors4 ,,mr4     
,,dugald ,,stewart1 ,philosoph4 ,essays1
 p4 #ahg4  #aej ,,dr4 ,,priestley1      
,disquisitions relating to ,matter and  
,spirit2 ,free ,discussion of the       
,doctrine of ,materialism2              
,correspondence between ,dr4 ,priestley 
and ,dr4 ,price4  #aea ,,dr4 ,,john     
,,mason ,,good1 ,life of ,lucretius1    

prefixed to his poetical version of ,the
 ,nature of ,things1 ,i4 ,,xxxviii4     
#aeb ,the fictions of ,clairvoyance may 
be studied at large in ,the ,principles 
of ,nature and her ,divine ,revelations1
 by ,,and4 ,j4 ,,davis1 the             
,poughkeepsie ,seer1 #b vols42 and in   
,the ,celestial ,telegraph1 by ,m4      
,,cahagnet4 ,an attempt has been made to
 popularize the doctrine by introducing 
it into the light literature of the     
,continent4 ,see ,memoirs of a          
,physician1 ,joseph ,balsamo1 by        
,,alexander ,,dumas1 ,i4 #ae1 #ba1 #hb2 
,,ii4 #ej1 #fb1 #gj4 ,whether the cases 
reported by ,dr4 ,gregory deserve to be 
ranked as facts or fictions is a        
question which we need not wait to      
solve1 before we reject the ,revelations
 of ,davis4  #aec ,,dr4 ,,priestley1    
,disquisitions1 p4 #b4  #aed ,systme de 
la ,nature1 ,i4 #ig1 #ajh4  #aee ,,dr4  
,,priestley1 ,disquisitions1 pp4 #bg1   
#ch1 #fj4  #aef ,,mr4 ,,atkinson1 ,laws 
of ,man's ,nature1 p4 #ag4  #aeg ,,dr4  

,,spurzheim1 ,philosophical ,principles 
of ,phrenology1 pp4 ,,vi41 #hf1 #ajj4   
,,professor ,,dod1 ,princeton           
,theological ,essays1 ,,ii4 #cgf4  #aeh 
,,dr4 ,,gregory1 ,letters on ,animal    
,magnetism1 p4 #eg4  #aei ,,bishop      
,,butler1 ,analogy1 p4 ,i4 c4 #a1 p4    
#agj4  #afj ,,dr4 ,,john ,,playfair1    
,works1 ,i41 ,preface1 ,,xxix4  #afa ,c4
 ,m4 ,,burnett1 ,m4 ,d41 ,philosophy1 c4
 ,london1 #ahej4  #afb ,,bishop         
,,berkeley1 ,words1 ,i4 #hj4  #afc      
,,lord ,,brougham1 ,discourse of        
,natural ,theology1 p4 #bch4  #afd      
,,stewart1 ,elements of ,philosophy1 ,i4
 #e4  #afe ,,locke',s ,essay1 b4 ,,ii4  
c4 #bc1  #ae4 ,ibid41 b4 ,,iv4 c4 #c1   
#f4  #aff ,,locke1 ,letter to ,bishop of
 ,worcester1 ,works1 ,,iv4 #ca4  #afg   
,,thomas ,,carlyle1 ,essays1 ,i4 #gg1   
#bad4  #afh ,c4 ,,bonnet1 ,palingenesie 
,philosophique1 #d vols41 ,i4 #g1 #dg1  
#eb4  #afi ,,dr4 ,,priestley1           
,disquisitions1 pp4 #cg1 #ch4  #agj     
,,dr4 ,,thomas ,,brown1 ,lectures1 ,no4 

,,xcvi4  #aga ,,atkinson1 ,letters1 p4  
#ag4  #agb ,,dr4 ,,sam4 ,,clarke',s     
,third ,defence1 in reply to ,collins1  
pp4 #e1 #h1 #ag4  #agc ,,dr4 ,,sam4     
,,clarke1 ,first ,defence1 pp4 #aa1 #af2
 ,second ,defence1 pp4 #d1 #aj4  #agd   
,,dr4 ,,clarke',s ,letter to ,mr4       
,dodwell1 pp4 #cd1 #fi1 #gb4 ,,andrew   
,,baxter1 ,on the ,soul1 ,i4 #bbg1 #bcc4
  #age ,matthew #aj3 #bh4  #agf ,luke   
#af3 #bb2 ,phil4 #a3 #bc4  #agg ,,dr4   
,,priestley1 ,disquisitions1 p4 #ajc2   
,free ,discussion1 pp4 #ff1 #bcg4  #agh 
,,flavel1 ,pneumatologia2 or1 ,treatise 
of the ,soul1 ,i4 #bij4 ,,sir ,m4       
,,hale1 ,primitive ,origination of      
,mankind1 p4 #cji4  #agi ,compare ,heb4 
#ab3 #i2 ,num4 #af3 #bb2 #bg3 #af2      
,zech4 #ab3 #a2 ,luke #bc3 #dc1 #df2    
,acts #g3 #ei2 ,eccles4 #ab3 #g2 #b     
,cor4 #e3 #h2 ,james #b3 #bf2 ,luke #bd3
 #ci2 ,john #aj3 #be2 ,john #e3 #bd4    
#ahj ,,dr4 ,,olinthus ,,gregory1 ,life  
of ,hall1 ,works1 ,,vi4 #bf4            
,,chapter ,v4  ,,theory ,,of            

,,government ,,by ,,natural             
,,laws4--,,volney4--,,combe4   ,the     
theory of natural laws has been applied 
to disprove or supersede the doctrine of
 ,creation1 by means of the principle of
 ,development4 ,it has been further     
applied to the government1 as well as to
 the creation1 of the world2 and in this
 connection1 it has been urged as a     
reason for disbelieving the doctrine of 
,god's special ,,providence1 and        
employed to discredit the efficacy of   
,,prayer4  ,when thus applied1 it is    
often associated with the recognition of
 the ,divine existence1 and cannot1     
therefore1 be ranked among systems      
avowedly ,atheistic4 ,but from the      
earliest times1 it has been the belief  
of seriously reflecting men1 that a     
system which professedly recognizes the 
,divine ,being as the ,creator of the   
world1 but practically excludes ,him    
from the government of its affairs1     
however theoretically different from    
,atheism1 is substantially the same with

 it4#aha ,it was against this ,epicurean
 ,atheism that ,howe contended in his   
,living ,temple2 an ,atheism which      
acknowledged gods1 but accounted that   
they were such as between whom and man  
there could be no conversation1--on     
their part by providence1 on man's by   
religion4 ,and it was against the same  
,epicurean ,atheism that ,cudworth      
contended in his ,intellectual ,system  
of the ,universe1 when he grappled with 
the objections which had been urged     
against the doctrine of ,providence and 
the practice of prayer4#ahb  ,it is not 
wonderful that either ,atheists or      
,pantheists should discard the doctrine 
of ,providence1 or deny the efficacy of 
,prayer4 ,on their principles1 there is 
no room for the recognition of a supreme
 intelligent ,power governing the world1
 or of a ,will capable of controlling   
the course of human affairs4#ahc ,but   
while neither ,atheism nor ,pantheism   
could be expected to recognize a        
presiding ,providence1 since they       

equally exclude a personal ,god1 it may 
well seem strange that any system of    
,theism1 whether natural or revealed1   
should omit or oppose this fundamental  
truth4 ,for the doctrine of ,providence 
may be established1 inductively1 by the 
very same kind of evidence to which     
every ,theist has recourse in proving   
the existence and perfections of the    
,divine ,being2 and1 ,his existence and 
perfections being proved1 the doctrine  
of ,providence may be inferred1         
deductively1 from ,his character1 and   
from the relations which ,he sustains   
towards ,his creatures1 since it cannot 
be supposed that ,he who brought them   
into being1 as the products of ,his own 
wisdom1 goodness1 and power1 and endowed
 them with all their various properties 
for some great and noble end1 will ever 
cease to care for them1 or deem them    
unworthy of ,his regard4 ,yet1 strong as
 is the proof arising from these and    
similar sources1 there have occasionally
 appeared in all ages1 and especially at

 a certain stage in the progress of     
philosophical speculation1 men who      
admitted1 and even maintained1 the      
existence of the ,supreme ,being1 while 
they denied1 nevertheless1 the doctrine 
of ,providence and the efficacy of      
,prayer4  ,in certain stages of         
philosophic inquiry1 there is a natural 
tendency1 we think1 or at least a strong
 temptation1 to substitute the laws of  
,nature in the place of ,god1 or to     
conceive of him as somehow removed to a 
greater distance from us by means of    
these laws4 ,every one must be          
conscious1 to some extent1 of this      
tendency in his own personal experience2
 he must have felt that when he first   
began to apprehend any one of the great 
laws of ,nature1 and still more when he 
advanced far enough to see that every   
department of the physical world is     
subject to them1 so as to exhibit a     
constant order1 an all-pervading        
harmony1 his views of ,god and          
,providence became less impressive in   

proportion as the domain of law was     
extended1 and that he was in imminent   
danger of sinking1 if not into          
theoretical1 at least into practical    
,atheism4 ,it is a fact1 says ,dr4      
,channing1 that ,science has not made   
,nature as expressive of ,god in the    
first instance or1 to the beginner in   
religion1 as it was in earlier times4   
,science reveals a rigid1 immutable     
order2 and this to common minds looks   
much like self-subsistence1 and does not
 manifest intelligence1 which is full of
 life1 variety1 and progressive         
operation4 ,men in the days of their    
ignorance saw an immediate ,divinity    
accomplishing an immediate purpose1 or  
expressing an immediate feeling1 in     
every sudden1 striking change of        
,nature1 444 and ,nature1 thus          
interpreted1 became the sign of a       
present1 deeply-interested ,deity4#ahd  
,that the scientific study of ,nature1  
and especially of certain departments of
 physical inquiry1 has often had the    

effect of deadening our sense of a      
present and presiding ,deity1 of        
obscuring or perplexing our views of the
 connection of ,god with ,his works1 and
 of virtually removing ,him from all    
efficient control over the creatures of 
,his hands1 is attested1 not only by the
 published speculations of some1 but    
also by the inward consciousness of many
 more1 who have never avowed infidel    
sentiments to others1 nor even1 at least
 articulately1 to themselves4 ,it may be
 useful1 therefore1 to inquire somewhat 
particularly1 whether1 and how far1 the 
existence of natural laws and the       
operation of second causes should affect
 our views of the ,providence which ,god
 exercises over us1 or of the ,prayers  
which we address to ,him4   ,,section   
,i4  ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,natural    
,,laws ,,and ,,second ,,causes4  ,the   
existence of natural laws1 and the      
operation of second causes1 are often   
explicitly recognized1 and always       
obviously implied1 in ,scripture4       

,revelation is not designed to explain  
the nature or the action of either2 but 
it assumes the reality of both4#ahe ,it 
is plainly implied in the very first    
chapter of ,genesis1 that1 at the era of
 creation1 ,god gave a definite         
constitution1 implying peculiar         
properties and powers1 to all the       
various classes of objects which were   
then called into being4 ,he created     
light1 with its peculiar properties2 ,he
 created water1 with its peculiar       
properties4 ,he created everything after
 its kind4 ,the distinction between one 
created thing and another1 such as light
 and water1 and the distinction also    
between genera and species1 especially  
in the case of plants1 trees1 fish1     
fowl1 cattle1 and reptiles1 are very    
strongly marked in the sacred narrative3
 and this distinction implies the       
existence of certain properties peculiar
 to each of these objects or            
classes1--properties not common to them 
all1 but distinctive and characteristic1

 which made them to be1 severally1 what 
they are1 and which amount to a distinct
 definite constitution4 ,these          
properties1 account for them as we may1 
are essential to their existence as     
distinct objects in nature1 and cannot  
be separated from them as long as the   
objects themselves exist4 ,light has    
certain properties1 and so has water1   
and so has every distinct order of      
vegetable or animal life1 which make    
them to be what they severally are1 and 
which cannot be severed from them       
otherwise than by the destruction of    
their very nature4 ,these properties are
 known to us by their effects2 and hence
 the substances or beings to which they 
respectively belong are regarded by us  
as causes2 and their operation as causes
 is regulated by certain laws1 imposed  
upon them by the same ,omnipotent ,will 
which called them into being and endowed
 them with all their peculiar properties
 and powers4 ,the operation of these    
natural causes1 and the existence of    

certain established laws by which they  
are regulated1 are explicitly recognized
 or obviously assumed in ,scripture4#ahf
 ,thou hast established the earth1 and  
it abideth2 they continue this day      
according to thine ordinances1 for all  
are thy servants4  ,the established     
constitution and settled order of       
,nature1 as well as the laws1 decrees1  
or ordinances by which it is regulated1 
are thus explicitly recognized in       
,scripture itself2 and there are several
 reasons why this fact should be        
deliberately considered4 ,first1 because
 it seems to have been assumed by our   
opponents1 that the discovery of natural
 laws1 and the admission of second      
causes1 must necessarily be adverse1 and
 may ultimately prove fatal1 to the     
cause of ,religion2 or1 in other words1 
that ,faith must recede just in         
proportion as ,science advances2 whereas
 the ,bible speaks both of natural      
objects1 possessing peculiar properties 
and powers1 and also of natural laws1 as

 ,god's ordinances both in the heavens  
and the earth1 but speaks nevertheless  
of a presiding ,providence or governing 
,will1 without ever supposing that the  
two are incompatible or mutually        
exclusive4 ,secondly1 because some of   
the less intelligent members of the     
,christian community itself seem to be  
influenced1 to a certain extent1 by the 
very same error which we ascribe to our 
opponents2 and evince a very groundless 
jealousy of ,science1 as if they feared 
that the progress of physical research  
might have the effect of weakening the  
grounds on which they believe in the    
care of ,providence and the efficacy of 
,prayer2 whereas the ,bible gives no    
countenance to any jealousies or fears  
of this kind1 but affirms ,god's        
providential government and encourages  
man's believing prayer1 at the very time
 when it founds upon and appeals to the 
established constitution and course of  
,nature4#ahg ,and thirdly1 because a    
right apprehension of the properties and

 powers belonging to created beings1 and
 of the laws to which they are severally
 subject1 will be found to conduce      
largely to a clear and comprehensive    
view of the relation which ,god sustains
 to ,his works4 ,his ,providence1 as it 
is declared and exemplified in          
,scripture1 has a necessary reference to
 the natural constitution of things2 and
 hence the ,westminster ,confession1 in 
the spirit of the highest philosophy1   
and with admirable discrimination and   
accuracy1 affirms that ,god1 the        
,creator of all things1 doth uphold1    
direct1 dispose1 and govern1 all        
creatures1 actions1 and things1 from the
 greatest even to the least1 by ,his    
most wise and holy ,providence2 that by 
the same ,providence1 ,he ordereth all  
things to fall out according to the     
nature of second causes1 either         
necessarily1 freely1 or contingently2   
and that ,god in ,his ordinary          
,providence maketh use of means1 yet is 
free to work without1 above1 and against

 them at ,his pleasure4#ahh  ,natural   
laws and second causes are thus         
established by experience1 and          
explicitly recognized in ,scripture4 ,it
 is necessary1 however1 especially with 
reference to certain modern             
speculations1 to discriminate between   
the two2 and to show that while they are
 closely related and equally legitimate 
objects of philosophical inquiry1 they  
are nevertheless radically different1 as
 well as easily distinguishable1 from   
each other4 ,it is the favorite doctrine
 of the ,positive school in ,france that
 the knowledge of causes is utterly     
interdicted to man1 and that the only   
science to which he should aspire       
consists exclusively in the knowledge of
 phenomena1 and their cordination under 
general laws4 ,m4 ,comte explicitly     
avows this doctrine1 and ,mr4 ,mill and 
,mr4 ,lewes give it their implied       
sanction4#ahi ,according to their       
theory1 all ,science is limited to the  
laws of the coexistence and succession  

of phenomena1 and causes are not only   
unknown1 but incapable of being known4  
,and to such an extent is this doctrine 
carried that ,m4 ,comte anticipates the 
possible ultimate reduction of all      
phenomena to one all-comprehensive1     
all-pervading law1 as the highest       
perfection of ,science and the decisive 
extinction of ,religion2 while ,mr4     
,mill1 doubtful of this being possible1 
thinks it conceivable1 at least1 that   
there may be worlds1 different from our 
own1 in which events occur without      
causes of any kind1 and even without any
 fixed law4  ,in regard to this theory  
it might well be asked1 how it comes to 
pass that human language1 which is the  
natural exponent of human thought1      
should contain1 in every one of its     
multifarious dialects1 so many          
expressions which denote or imply       
causation1 if it be true that all       
knowledge of causes is utterly          
inaccessible to the human faculties8    
,nay1 why is it that the axiom of       

causation needs only to be announced to 
command the immediate assent of the     
whole human race8  ,it will be found1 we
 believe1 that even in the case of those
 who contend for this theory1 the       
instinctive and spontaneous belief in   
causation is not extinguished nor even  
impaired2 but that they seek merely to  
substitute laws for causes1 or rather to
 represent the laws of nature as the    
only efficient causes of all natural    
phenomena4 ,they thus identify or       
confound two things which it is of the  
utmost consequence to discriminate and  
keep distinct4 ,there is an ambiguity1  
however1 in the common usage of the term
 law1 which may seem to give a plausible
 appearance to their theory1 or at least
 to vail over and conceal its radical   
fallacy4 ,it denotes sometimes the mere 
statement of a general fact1 or the     
result of a comprehensive               
generalization1 founded on the          
observation and comparison of many      
particular facts2 it denotes at other   

times the force or power1 whatever that 
may be1 which produces any given set of 
phenomena4 ,the law of gravitation1 for 
example1 is often used to denote nothing
 more than the general fact1 ascertained
 by experience1 that all bodies near the
 surface of the earth tend to its centre
 with a velocity proportioned directly  
to their mass1 and inversely to the     
square of their distance2 and when it is
 employed in this sense1 it determines  
nothing as to the cause which is in     
operation1--it affirms merely a fact1 or
 a fact reduced to a formula1 and       
confirmed by universal experience4 ,but 
it is often transferred1 at least       
mentally and almost perhaps             
unconsciously1 to denote some power     
which is instinctively supposed to be in
 operation when any change is           
observed1--a power which may be         
conceived of1 either as a property      
inherent in mind or in matter1 or as a  
force1 such as the ,divine volition1    
acting upon it ab extra2 and it is only 

in the latter of these two senses1 as   
denoting a cause1 properly so called1   
and not a mere fact or law1 that it can 
be applied to account for any           
phenomenon4 ,in like manner1 the laws of
 motion are merely the generalized      
results of our experience and           
observation relative to the direction1  
velocity1 and other phenomena of moving 
bodies2 but motion1 although it is      
regulated1 is not produced1 by these    
laws2 it depends on a cause1 whatever   
that may be1 which is not only          
distinguishable1 but different from them
 all4 ,yet when we speak of the laws of 
motion1 we may imperceptibly include1 in
 our conception of them1 that force or  
power which impels the body1 as well as 
the mere law or rule which regulates its
 movements4 ,it were a mere unprofitable
 dispute about words1 did we entertain  
and discuss the question1 whether the   
import of the term law might not be so  
extended as to include under it powers1 
properties1 and causes1 as well as the  

rules and conditions of their operation3
 for1 even were this question answered  
in the affirmative1 there would still be
 room for a real distinction between the
 two1 and there could be no reason for  
saying that the knowledge of causes1 as 
distinguished from laws1 is wholly      
inaccessible to the human faculties4    
,there is thus a real and important     
distinction between laws considered     
simply as general facts1 and causes     
considered as efficient agents2 and the 
two cannot be reduced to the same       
category1 otherwise than by giving such 
an extension to the term law as shall   
make it comprehensive of causation2 and 
even then1 the distinction remains      
between the mere formulas of ,science   
and the actual forces of ,nature4 ,the  
laws of ,nature1 says the sagacious ,dr4
 ,reid1 are the rules according to which
 the effects are produced1 but there    
must be a cause which operates according
 to these rules4 ,the rules of          
navigation never navigated a ship2 the  

rules of architecture never built a     
house4#aij  ,it might be shown1 were it 
needful for our present purpose1 that   
the object of ,science is threefold3    
first1 to ascertain particular facts2   
secondly1 to reduce these facts under   
general laws2 and1 thirdly1 to          
investigate the causes by which both    
facts and laws may be accounted for4    
,the exclusion of any one of the three  
would be fatal to ,philosophy as well as
 ,religion2 and it is prohibited by the 
natural laws of the human mind1 which   
has the capacity not only of observing  
particular facts1 but of comparing and  
contrasting them so as to deduce from   
them a knowledge of general laws1 and   
which is also imbued with an instinctive
 and spontaneous tendency to ascribe    
every change that is observed to some   
power or cause capable of producing such
 an effect4 ,it might further be shown1 
that in every instance a cause1 properly
 so called1 is a substance or being     
possessing certain properties or        

powers1--properties which may be called1
 if you will1 the laws of that          
substance1 but which necessarily include
 the idea of causation or efficiency2   
that in the case of mere physical       
agency1 there must be a plurality of    
substances so related as that the one   
shall act on the other in certain       
conditions which are indispensable to   
their mutual action2 and that these     
requirements leave ample room for those 
manifold adjustments and adaptations on 
which the argument from design1 in favor
 of the ,perfections and ,providence of 
,god1 is founded4 ,the mere recognition 
of general laws1 considered simply as   
the cordination of facts1 and especially
 as exclusive of the idea of causation  
or efficiency1 can never satisfy the    
demands of reason1 nor exhaust the      
legitimate functions of ,science4 ,for1 
in the expressive words of ,sir ,john   
,herschell1 ,it is high time that       
philosophers1 both physical and others1 
should come to some nearer agreement    

than seems to prevail1 as to the meaning
 they intend to convey in speaking of   
causes and causation4 ,on the one hand1 
we are told that the grand object of    
physical inquiry is to explain the      
nature of phenomena by referring them to
 their causes2 on the other1 that the   
inquiry into 'causes' is altogether vain
 and futile1 and that ,science has no   
concern but with the discovery of       
'laws4' ,which of these is the truth8   
,or are both views of the matter true on
 a different interpretation of the      
terms8 ,whichever view we may take1 or  
whichever interpretation we may adopt1  
there is one thing certain1--the extreme
 inconvenience of such a state of       
language4 ,this can only be reformed by 
a careful analysis of the widest of all 
human generalizations1 disentangling    
from one another the innumerable shades 
of meaning which have got confounded    
together in its progress1 and           
establishing among them a rational      
classification and nomenclature4444 ,a  

'law' may be a rule of action1 but it is
 not action4 ,the great ,first ,agent   
may lay down a rule of action for       
himself1 and that rule may become known 
to man by observation of its uniformity2
 but1 constituted as our minds are1 and 
having that conscious knowledge of      
causation which is forced upon us by the
 reality of the distinction between     
intending a thing1 and doing it1 we can 
never substitute the 'rule' for the     
'act4'#aia  ,but while the existence of 
natural laws and the operation of second
 causes are equally admitted1 and yet   
duly discriminated1 large room is still 
left for diversities of opinion or of   
statement in regard to the precise      
relation which ,god sustains to ,his    
works1 and especially in regard to the  
nature and method of ,his agency in     
connection with the use of second       
causes4 ,hence have arisen the various  
theories which have appeared            
successively in the history of          
,philosophy1 and which have had for     

their avowed object the explanation of  
the connection between ,god and ,nature1
 or the conciliation of ,theology with  
,science4#aib ,hence1 first of all1 the 
theory of occasional causes1 as taught  
by ,father ,malebranche1 with the       
laudable1 but1 as we think1 mistaken1   
design of vindicating the ,divine agency
 in ,providence by virtually superseding
 every other power in ,nature2--a theory
 which represents physical agencies as  
the mere occasions1 and ,god as the sole
 cause of all changes1 which teaches    
that a healthy eye1 with the presence of
 light1 is not the cause of vision1 but 
the occasion only of that ,divine       
interposition by which alone we are     
enabled to see1 and that a man's desire 
or volition to walk is not the cause of 
his walking1 but the occasion merely of 
that ,divine interposition which alone  
puts the proper muscles in motion4      
,hence1 secondly1 the theory of         
prestablished harmony as taught by      
,leibnitz2--a theory which was mainly   

designed to explain the relation        
subsisting between the soul and the     
body1 but which involves principles     
bearing on the general doctrine of cause
 and effect1 and applicable to the      
relation subsisting between ,god and    
,his works4 ,this theory teaches that   
mind and body1 although closely united1 
have no real influence on each other1   
that each of them acts by its own       
properties and powers1 and that their   
respective operations exactly correspond
 to each other by virtue of a           
prestablished harmony between the two1  
just as one clock may be so adjusted as 
to keep time with another1 although each
 has its own moving power1 and neither  
receives any part of its motions from   
the other4 ,this theory1 therefore1     
denies everything like causal action    
between mind and matter2 and when it is 
extended1 as it may legitimately be1 to 
the relation between ,god and the world1
 it would seem to imply the coequal     
existence and independence of both1 and 

the impossibility of any causal relation
 between the two4 ,the manifest defects 
of these theories have given rise to a  
third1 which1 in one of its forms1 has  
been generally adopted by ,divines1--the
 theory of instrumental causes4  ,this  
theory has assumed two distinct and very
 different forms4 ,in the first1 all    
natural effects are ascribed to powers  
imparted to created beings1 and inherent
 in them2 that is1 to powers which are  
supposed to have been conferred at the  
era of ,creation1 and to be still       
sustained by ,god's will in ,providence1
 subject1 however1 to be suspended or   
revoked according to ,his pleasure4 ,in 
the second1 which resembles in some     
respects the doctrine of occasional     
causes1 all natural effects are ascribed
 to powers not imparted1 but impressed1 
not belonging to the natural agent1 but 
communicated by impulse ab extra2 and   
,god's will is represented as the only  
efficient cause in ,nature4 ,in both    
forms of the theory1 the agency of ,god 

and the instrumentality of natural means
 are1 in a certain sense1 acknowledged2 
but in the former1 second causes are apt
 to be regarded as if they were         
self-existent and independent of ,god2  
in the latter1 second causes are apt to 
be virtually annulled1 and all events to
 be regarded as the immediate effects of
 ,divine volition4 ,both extremes are   
dangerous4 ,for1 on the one hand1 the   
operation of second causes cannot be    
regarded as necessary and independent1  
without severing the tie which connects 
the created universe with the will of   
the ,supreme2 and1 on the other hand1   
the operation of second causes cannot be
 excluded or denied1 without virtually  
making ,god's will the only efficient   
cause1 and thereby charging directly and
 immediately on ,him1 not only all the  
physical changes which occur in ,nature1
 but also all the volitions and actions 
of ,his creatures4 ,in order to guard   
against these opposite and equally      
dangerous extremes1 we must hold the    

real existence and actual operation of  
second causes2 while we are careful1 at 
the same time1 to show both that        
whatever powers belong to any created   
being were originally conferred by ,god1
 and also that they are still preserved 
and perpetuated by ,him1 subject to his 
control1 and liable to be suspended or  
revoked1 according to the pleasure of   
,his will4 ,we would thus have one      
,first1 and ,,many ,,second ,,causes2   
the former supreme1 the latter          
subordinate2 really distinct1 but not   
equally independent1 since second causes
 are1 from their very nature1 subject to
 the dominion and control of that       
,omniscient ,mind which called them into
 being1 and which knows how to overrule 
them all for the accomplishment of ,his 
great designs4  ,we are aware that some 
are unwilling to acknowledge the        
efficiency of any second causes1 and    
seek to resolve all events1 even such as
 are brought about by the volitions of  
men1 into the will of ,god1 as the only 

,agent in ,nature4 ,others1 again1      
admitting the existence of created      
spirits1 and their operation as real    
causes1 are unwilling to acknowledge any
 active powers in matter1 and are       
anxious to show that mind1 and mind     
only1 can be an efficient cause4 ,we see
 no reason for this extreme jealousy of 
second causes either in the mental or   
the material world4 ,in the mental      
world1 they cannot be denied1 as        
distinct1 although subordinate and      
dependent1 agencies1 without virtually  
making ,god's will the only cause in    
,nature1 and thereby representing ,him  
as the cause of sin1 if sin1 indeed1    
could exist on that supposition1 or     
without destroying the distinct         
individuality and personal              
responsibility of man4 ,man must be     
regarded as a distinct1 though          
dependent1 agent1 and1 as such1 a real1 
though subordinate1 cause2 otherwise    
every action1 whether good or evil1 must
 be ascribed directly and immediately to

 the efficiency of the ,divine will1 and
 to that alone4 ,and in the material    
world1 second causes can as little be   
dispensed with2 for every theory1 even  
the most meagre1 must acknowledge the   
existence of some power or property in  
matter1 were it only the passive power  
or vis inerti on which all the laws of  
motion depend4 ,and if this can be      
admitted as a power inherent in matter  
and inseparable from it1 we cannot see  
why the existence of other powers1 not  
incompatible with this1 should be deemed
 a whit more derogatory to the dominion 
and providence of ,god4 ,in a certain   
sense1 indeed1 ,god's will may be said  
to be the ,first1 the ,supreme ,cause of
 all1 since nothing can happen without  
,his permission or appointment3 but1 in 
this sense1 the existence of natural    
laws and the operation of second causes 
are by no means excluded2 they are only 
held to have been originated at first1  
and ever afterwards sustained by the    
,divine ,will1 the latter being supreme1

 the former subordinate4 ,it may also be
 said1 in a certain sense1 that ,mind   
only is active3#aic for all the         
properties and powers of matter are the 
results of the ,divine volition1 and    
their mode of action is regulated and   
determined by laws which ,god has       
imposed2 but it were unphilosophical1 as
 well as unscriptural1 to infer from    
this that ,he is the only ,agent in the 
,universe2 it is enough to say that ,he 
created the system of ,nature1 and that 
,he still upholds and governs it by ,his
 ,providence4  ,it must be evident that 
the speculations to which we have       
referred have a close connection with   
the argument1 founded on natural        
evidence1 for the being1 perfections1   
and providence of ,god4 ,that argument1 
in so far as it depends on the mutual   
adaptations between natural objects and 
the nice adjustments of natural laws1   
might be seriously impaired by supposing
 that there is really only one cause in 
,nature2 whereas the ascription of      

certain properties and powers to created
 beings1 whether mental or material1 can
 have no effect in diminishing its      
force1 since the evidence depends not so
 much on the phenomena of physical1 as  
on those of moral causation4  ,on the   
whole1 we conclude that the existence of
 natural laws and the operation of      
second causes are recognized alike by   
the sacred writers and by sound         
philosophy2 and that neither the one nor
 the other ought to be regarded as      
adverse to any doctrine which1 as       
,christian ,theists1 we are concerned to
 defend4   ,,section ,,ii4  ,,the       
,,constitution ,,of ,,man ,,considered  
,,in ,,its ,,relation ,,to ,,the        
,,government ,,of ,,god4  ,the          
,constitution of ,man considered in     
,relation to ,external                  
,objects1#aid--such is the title of a   
popular1 and1 in some respects1         
instructive work1 which has obtained1   
partly through the aid of an endowment1 
extensive circulation among the reading 

class of artisans and tradesmen4        
,written in a lucid style1 and          
illustrated by numerous facts in        
,natural ,history and ,philosophy1 it is
 skilfully adapted to the capacities and
 tastes of common readers1 and it is not
 wonderful that it should have exerted  
considerable influence on the public    
mind4 ,the character of that influence1 
and its tendency to induce a religious  
or irreligious frame of spirit1 has been
 made a matter of controversial         
discussion4 ,on the one hand1 ,mr4      
,combe tells us that ',the ,constitution
 of ,man' not only admits the existence 
of ,god1 but is throughout devoted to   
the object of expounding and proving    
that ,he exercises a real1 practical1   
and intelligible government of this     
world1 rewarding virtue with physical   
and moral well-being1 and punishing vice
 with want and suffering4 ,on the other 
hand1 it is manifest1 beyond the        
possibility of doubt or denial1 that if 
his professed ,theism has subjected him 

to the charge of being an inconsequent  
thinker in some of the organs of avowed 
,atheism1#aie his favorite arguments in 
support of government by natural law    
have been applied by himself1 and       
eagerly welcomed by others1 as          
conclusive objections to the doctrine of
 a special ,providence and the efficacy 
of ,prayer4  ,we do not object to the   
limitation of his inquiry to the one    
point of the relation subsisting between
 the ,constitution of ,man and ,external
 ,objects1--that is a perfectly         
legitimate1 and might be a highly       
instructive field of investigation2 but 
we do object to his utter forgetfulness 
of that limitation in the progress of   
his work1 and to his attempt to         
introduce a variety of other topics     
which are manifestly alien from his     
professed design4 ,if he meant to       
discuss merely the relation between the 
constitution of man and external        
objects1 he had nothing whatever to do  
with the far higher and more            

comprehensive doctrine respecting the   
relation between the constitution of man
 and the government of ,god1 and1 least 
of all1 with the revealed doctrines of a
 special ,providence1 of a fall into a  
state of sin1 of death as its wages1 and
 of spiritual influences by which the   
ruin occasioned by the fall may be      
redressed2 and yet these topics1 foreign
 as they are to the professed design of 
his work1 are all introduced1 and       
treated1 too1 in a way that is fitted1  
if not designed1 to shake the confidence
 of his readers in what have hitherto   
been regarded as important articles of  
the ,christian faith4 ,it has received  
this significant testimony1 ',combe's   
,constitution of ,man' would be worth a 
hundred ,new ,testaments on the banks of
 the ,ganges4#aif  ,there are two       
points1 especially1 on which he comes   
more directly into collision with our   
present argument3  #a4 ,he speaks as if 
,god governed the universe only by      
natural laws1 so as to exclude any other

 dispensation of ,providence4  #b4 ,he  
speaks as if the physical and organic   
laws of ,nature possessed the same      
authority and imposed the same          
obligation as the moral laws of         
,conscience and ,revelation2 and as if  
the breach or neglect of the former were
 punishable in the same sense1 and for  
the same reason1 as the transgression of
 the latter4  ,next to the omission of  
all reference to a future state1 and the
 total exclusion of the connection which
 subsists between the temporal and the  
eternal under the ,divine government1 we
 hold these two to be the capital       
defects of his treatise2 and it may be  
useful1 in the present state of public  
opinion1 to offer a few remarks upon    
each of them4  ,in regard to the first1 
we need not repeat what we have already 
explicitly declared1 that ,god does     
govern the world in part by means of    
natural laws and second causes2 but1 not
 content with this concession1 ,mr4     
,combe speaks as if ,he governed the    

world only by these means1 to the       
exclusion of everything like a special  
,providence1 or ,divine influences4 ,it 
is not so much in his dogmatic          
statements as in his illustrative       
examples that the real tendency of his  
theory becomes apparent4 ,thus he speaks
 of the most pious and benevolent       
missionaries sailing to civilize and    
,christianize the heathen1 but1         
embarking in an unsound ship1 they are  
drowned by their disobeying a physical  
law1 without their destruction being    
averted by their morality2 and1 on the  
other hand1 of the greatest monsters of 
iniquity embarking in a staunch and     
strong ship1 and escaping drowning in   
circumstances exactly similar to those  
which would send the missionaries to the
 bottom4 ,thus1 again1 he speaks of     
plague1 fever1 and ague1 as resulting   
from the neglect of organic laws1 and as
 resulting from it so necessarily that  
they could be averted neither by        
,providence nor by ,prayer2 and he      

illustrates his views by the mental     
distress of the wife of ,ebenezer       
,erskine1 and the recorded experience of
 ,mrs4 ,hannah ,more4#aig ,it cannot be 
doubted1 we think1 that in all these    
cases he speaks as if ,god governed the 
world only by natural laws2 and that he 
does not recognize any special          
,providence or any answer to ,prayer1   
but resolves all events into the        
operation of these laws4  ,now1 there   
are evidently two suppositions that may 
be entertained on this subject3 either1 
that ,god orders all events to fall out 
according to natural laws and by means  
of second causes2 or1 that while ,he    
generally makes use of means in the     
ordinary course of ,his ,providence1 ,he
 reserves the liberty and the power of  
interposing directly and immediately1   
when ,he sees cause1 for the            
accomplishment of ,his sovereign will4  
,these two suppositions seem to exhaust 
the only possible alternatives in a     
question of this kind2 and1 strange as  

it may at first sight appear to be1 it  
is nevertheless true that neither the   
one nor the other is necessarily adverse
 to the doctrine for which we now       
contend4 ,even on the first             
supposition1--that ,god orders all      
events to fall out according to natural 
laws and by means of second             
causes1--there might still be room1 not1
 indeed1 for miraculous interposition1  
but for the exercise of a special       
,providence and even for an answer to   
prayer2 for it should never be forgotten
 that1 among the second causes created  
and governed by the ,supreme ,will1     
there are other agencies besides those  
that are purely physical1--there are    
intelligent beings1 belonging both to   
the visible and invisible worlds1 who   
may be employed1 for ought we know to   
the contrary1 as ministers in fulfilling
 ,his will1 and whose agency may1       
without any miraculous interference with
 the established order of ,nature1 bring
 about important practical results1 just

 as man's own agency is admitted to have
 the power of arranging1 modifying1 and 
directing the elements of ,nature1 while
 it has no power to suspend or reverse  
any natural law4 ,and if ,god is        
ordinarily pleased to make use of means1
 why should it be thought incredible    
that ,he may make use of the ministry of
 intelligent beings1 whether they be men
 or angels1 for the accomplishment of   
,his designs8 ,but on the second        
supposition1--that while ,he generally  
makes use of means in the ordinary      
course of ,his ,providence1 ,he reserves
 the liberty and the power of           
interposing directly and immediately    
when ,he sees cause1--the doctrine of a 
special ,providence1 including every    
interposition1 natural or supernatural1 
is at once established2 and we cannot   
see how ,mr4 ,combe1 as a professed     
believer in ,revelation1 which must of  
course be regarded as a supernatural    
effect of ,divine influence1 can        
consistently deny ,god's direct and     

immediate agency in ,providence1 since  
he is compelled to admit it at least on 
two great occasions1 namely1 the        
,creation of the world1 and the         
promulgation of ,his revealed will4  ,in
 regard1 again1 to the second capital   
defect or error of his system1 it may be
 conclusively shown that he confounds1  
or fails at least duly to discriminate1 
two things which are radically          
different1 when he speaks as if the     
physical and organic laws of ,nature had
 the same authority1 and imposed the    
same obligations1 as the moral laws of  
,conscience and ,revelation1 and as if  
the breach or neglect of the former were
 punishable1 in the same sense1 and for 
the same reason1 as the transgression of
 the latter4  ,the declared object of   
his treatise is twofold3 first1 to      
illustrate the relation subsisting      
between the natural laws and the        
constitution of man2 and1 secondly1 to  
prove the independent operation of these
 laws1 as a key to the explanation of   

the ,divine government4 ,in illustrating
 the relation between the natural laws  
and the constitution of man1 he attempts
 to show that the natural laws require  
obedience not less than the moral1 and  
that they inflict punishment on         
disobedience3 ,the peculiarity of the   
new doctrine is that these 7the         
physical1 organic1 and moral laws7      
operate independently of each other2    
that each requires obedience to itself2 
that each1 in its own specific way1     
rewards obedience and punishes          
disobedience2 and that human beings are 
happy in proportion to the extent to    
which they place themselves in          
accordance with all of these ,divine    
institutions4 ,in regard to these       
natural laws1--including the physical1  
the organic1 the intellectual1 and the  
moral1--four positions are laid down3   
first1 that they are independent of each
 other2 secondly1 that obedience or     
disobedience to each of them is followed
 by reward or punishment2 thirdly1 that 

they are universal and invariable2 and1 
fourthly1 that they are in harmony with 
the constitution of man4#aih  ,now1 in  
this theory of natural laws1 especially 
as it is applied to the doctrines of    
,providence and ,prayer1 there seem to  
be three radical defects3  #a4 ,mr4     
,combe speaks of obedience and          
disobedience to the physical and organic
 laws1 as if they could be obeyed or    
disobeyed in the same sense and in the  
same way as the moral laws1 and as if   
they imposed an obligation on man which 
it would be sinful to disregard4 ,he has
 not duly considered that the moral law 
differs from the physical and organic   
laws of ,nature in two important        
respects3 first1 that while the former  
may1 the latter cannot1 be broken or    
violated by man2 and secondly1 that     
while the former does impose an         
imperative obligation which is felt by  
every conscience1 the latter have either
 no relation to the conscience at all1  
or1 if they have1 it is collateral and  

indirect only1 and arises not from the  
mere existence of such laws1 but from   
the felt obligation of a moral law      
belonging to our own nature1 which      
prescribes prudence as a duty with      
reference to our personal conduct in the
 circumstances in which we are placed4  
,that the physical and organic laws     
cannot be broken or violated in the same
 sense in which the moral law may be    
transgressed1 is evident from the simple
 consideration that the violation of a  
natural law1 were it possible1 would be 
not a sin1 but a miracle6 ,and that     
these laws impose no real obligation on 
the conscience is further manifest1     
because we hold it to be perfectly      
lawful to counteract1 so far as we can1 
the operation of one physical or organic
 law by employing the agency of another1
 as in the appliances of ,mechanics1 the
 experiments of ,chemistry1 and the art 
of ,navigation4 ,when the aronaut       
inflates his balloon with a gas         
specifically lighter than atmospheric   

air1 or the ship-builder constructs     
vessels of wood or iron1 so that when   
filled with air they shall be lighter   
than water1 and float with their cargo  
on its surface1 each is attempting to   
counteract the law of gravitation by the
 application of certain other related   
laws3 but no one ever dreams of their   
disobeying ,god in thus availing        
themselves of one physical agent to     
counterpoise another4 ,the moral law1   
however1 cannot be treated in the same  
way1 and that simply because it is      
generically different4  ,it is true1    
that indirectly the laws of ,nature1    
when known1 may and ought to regulate   
our practical conduct2 not1 however1 by 
virtue of any obligation imposed by them
 on our conscience1 but solely by virtue
 of that law of moral prudence which    
springs from conscience itself1 and     
which teaches us that we ought so to act
 with reference to outward objects as to
 secure1 so far as we can1 our own      
safety and happiness1 and the welfare of

 our fellow-men4 ,but there can be no   
greater blunder than to confound the    
laws of natural objects with the law of 
human conduct2 and into this deplorable 
blunder ,mr4 ,combe has allowed himself 
to fall4 ,throughout the whole of his   
statements respecting the natural laws1 
there are two things included under one 
name1 which are perfectly distinct and  
separate from each other4 ,in the first 
place1 there are the laws which belong  
to the constitution of natural objects1 
and which regulate their mutual action  
on one another3 in the second place1    
there are1 in the words of a late       
sagacious layman1 rules which the       
intellect of man is able to deduce for  
the regulation of his own conduct1 by   
means of his knowledge of those laws    
which govern the phenomena of ,nature4  
,these last are perfectly distinct from 
the former2 and it is a monstrous       
confusion of ideas to mix them up       
together4444 ,the true state of the case
 is this1--it is for our interest to    

study these natural arrangements1 and to
 accommodate our conduct to them1 as far
 as we know them2 and in doing so1 we   
obey1 not those laws of ,nature1        
physical and organic1 but the laws of   
prudence and good sense1 arising from a 
due use of our moral and intellectual   
faculties4#aii ,another acute           
writer1#bjj who states the substance of 
the argument in very few words1 has     
shown that the theory of natural laws1  
as taught by ,mr4 ,combe1 is true in one
 sense and false in another3 ,it is     
true1 first1 that the ,creator has      
bestowed constitutions on physical      
objects2 in other words1 the            
constitutions which physical objects    
possess were given them1 given during   
,his pleasure2 secondly1 that the       
constitutions of physical objects are   
definite1--that is1 they are distinct1  
individual1 and incapable of            
transmutation by natural causes2        
thirdly1 that no power but the power of 
the ,creator can vary their             

constitutions4 ,but it is not true1     
first1 that any mode of action of a     
physical object is otherwise inherent in
 it1 than as it is the will of ,god that
 that object should now present that    
mode of action4 ,nor is it true1        
secondly1 that it is beyond the power of
 ,god to vary1 when ,he pleases1 either 
temporarily or permanently1 the         
constitution of physical objects4 ,he   
further shows that1 on ,mr4 ,combe's    
principle of natural laws being all     
equally ,divine institutions which must 
be obeyed1 human obedience is a very    
complicated and perplexing affair1 so   
complicated and so perplexing as to     
involve positive contradictions2 that   
the very same act is required by one    
law1 and forbidden by another1 both laws
 being equally ,divine2 and that we     
sometimes cannot obey both the 'organic'
 and the 'moral' laws4 ,he concludes    
that physical laws ought not to be      
confounded with laws of human conduct2  
that these we always must obey1 and     

those we may often1 without deserving   
blame1 boldly disregard2 and that by    
commingling distinct classes of 'natural
 laws1' ,mr4 ,combe introduces into his 
system dangerous error and gross        
absurdity4  #b4 ,another radical defect 
in this theory of natural laws consists 
in its representing the consequences of 
our ignorance or neglect of them as     
punishments in the same sense in which  
moral delinquencies are said to be      
followed by penal inflictions4 ,there is
 something here which is totally at     
variance with the instinctive feelings  
and moral convictions of mankind4 ,mr4  
,combe affirms that each of the three   
great classes of natural laws requires  
obedience to itself1 and that each1 in  
its own specific way1 rewards obedience 
and punishes disobedience4 ,and he      
gives1 as one example1 the case of the  
most pious and benevolent missionaries  
sailing to civilize and ,christianize   
the heathen1 but embarking in an unsound
 ship1 and being drowned by disobeying a

 natural law2 as another1 the case of a 
child or an aged person1 stumbling into 
the fire1 through mere lack of physical 
strength to keep out of it2 as another1 
the case of an ignorant child1 groping  
about for something to eat and drink1   
and stumbling on a phial of laudanum1   
drinking it and dying2 and as another1  
the case of a slater slipping from the  
roof of a high building1 in consequence 
of a stone of the ridge having given way
 as he walked upright along it4#bja ,in 
all these cases1 the accident or        
misfortune which befalls the individual 
is represented as the punishment        
connected with the neglect or           
transgression of a natural law1 just as 
remorse1 shame1 conviction1 and         
condemnation may be the punishment for a
 moral offence4 ,in other words1 a child
 who ignorantly drinks laudanum is      
punished with death1 in the same sense1 
and for the same reason1 that the       
murderer is punished with death for     
shedding the blood of a fellow-creature2

 and the poor slater who misses his     
foot1 and falls1 most unwillingly1 from 
a roof or parapet1 is punished with     
death1 just as a man would be who threw 
himself over with the intention of      
committing suicide6 ,surely there is    
some grave error here1--an error opposed
 to the surest dictates of our moral    
nature1 and one that cannot be glossed  
over by any apologue1 however           
ingeniously constructed1 to show the    
evil effects which would follow from a  
suspension of the general laws of       
,nature4 ,for1 in the words of ,mr4     
,scott1 it is only where the law is     
previously known--and not only so1 but  
where the circumstances which determine 
the effect might be foreseen--that the  
pleasures or pains annexed to actions   
can properly be termed rewards and      
punishments2 for these have reference to
 the state of mind of the party who is  
to be rewarded or punished2 it is the   
intention or disposition of the mind1   
and not the mere act of the body1 that  

is ever considered as obedience or      
disobedience1 or thought worthy1 in a   
moral sense1 of either reward or        
punishment4 ,and as the theory is thus  
subversive of all our ideas of moral    
retribution1 so it demands of man a kind
 of obedience which it is impossible for
 him to render1 since all the laws of   
,nature1 and all the states of          
particular things at a given time1      
cannot possibly be known by the ignorant
 many1 nor even by the philosophic few4 
,the philosopher1 not less than the     
peasant1 may perish through the         
explosion of a steam engine1 or the     
unsoundness of a ship1 or the casual    
ignition of his dwelling2 and that1 too1
 without blame or punishment being      
involved in either case4 ,on ,mr4       
,combe's theory1 it would seem to be    
necessary that every one should be a man
 of science1 if he would avoid sin and  
punishment2 and yet1 unfortunately1 the 
ablest man of science is not exempt1 in 
the present state of his knowledge1 from

 the same calamities which befall his   
less enlightened1 but not less virtuous1
 neighbors4  ,these views are strikingly
 confirmed by the remarks of a writer in
 ,the ,reasoner1 who blames ,mr4 ,combe 
for complicating his argument           
unnecessarily and uselessly with some of
 the truths of ,theism1 and who thinks  
that the doctrine of natural laws can   
only be consistently maintained on the  
ground of ,atheism4 ,if the system of   
,nature1 he says1 be viewed by itself1  
without any reference to a ,divine      
,author or all-perfect ,creator1--merely
 as an isolated system of facts1--no    
comparison could be made1 no            
reconciliation would be necessary1 and  
the system of ,nature would be regarded 
as the result of some unknown cause1 a  
combination of good and evil1 and no    
more to be censured or wondered at for  
being what it is1 than any single       
substance or fact in ,nature excites    
censure or surprise on account of its   
peculiar constitution4444 ,the          

assumption of a ,supernatural ,being as 
the author and director of the laws of  
,nature appears to me to be attended    
with several mischievous results4       
,first1 you make every infringement of  
the laws of ,nature an offence against  
the supposed ,divine ,legislator1 which1
 to a pious and conscientious mind1 must
 give rise to distressing remorse4444   
,again1 under this view1 the penalties  
incurred will often be very unjust1     
oppressive1 and cruel2 as where persons 
are placed in circumstances that compel 
them to violate the laws of ,nature1 as 
when they are obliged to pursue some    
unwholesome employment which injures    
their health and shortens their lives2  
or where the penalty is incurred by an  
accident1 as when a person breaks a leg 
or an arm1 or is killed by a fall2 or   
where a person is materially or fatally 
injured in endeavoring to save another  
person from injury or death4 ,in such   
cases as these1 to represent the        
unavoidable pain or death incurred or   

undergone for an act of beneficence1 as 
a punishment inflicted for a            
transgression of the laws of ,god the   
,divine ,legislator1 is to violate all  
our notions of justice and right1 to say
 nothing of goodness or mercy1 and to   
represent the ,divine ,being as grossly 
unjust and cruelly vindictive4444       
,again1 if all suffering1 however       
unavoidably incurred1 is to be regarded 
as a punishment from the ,divine        
,legislator1 to attempt to alleviate or 
remove the suffering thus incurred would
 be to fly in the face of the ,divine   
authority1 by endeavoring to set aside  
the punishment it had inflicted2 just as
 it would be an opposition to the       
authority of human laws to rescue a     
prisoner from custody1 or deliver a     
culprit from punishment4#bjb  #c4 ,we   
deem it another radical defect in ,mr4  
,combe's theory of natural laws1 that he
 represents the distinct existence and  
independent action of these laws as the 
key to the ,divine government1 as the   

one principle which explains all        
apparent irregularities1 and accounts   
satisfactorily for the casualties and   
calamities of human life4 ,we cannot    
doubt1 indeed1 either the wisdom or the 
benevolence of that constitution of     
things under which we live1 nor dispute 
the value and importance of those laws  
according to which the world is         
ordinarily governed4 ,we admit that the 
suspension of any one of these laws1    
except perhaps on some signal occasion  
of miraculous interposition1 would go   
far to unsettle and derange the existing
 economy4 ,but natural laws--whether    
viewed individually or collectively1 and
 whether considered as acting           
independently of each other1 or as      
mutually related and                    
interdependent--cannot afford of        
themselves any key to the ,divine       
government1 or any solution of the      
difficulties of ,providence4 ,we must   
rise to a far higher platform if we     
would survey the whole scheme of the    

,divine administration3 we must         
consider1 not merely the independent    
operation of the several classes of     
natural laws1 but also their mutual     
relations1 as distinct but connected    
parts of one vast system1 in which the  
physical and organic laws are made      
subordinate and subservient to the      
moral1 under the superintendence of that
 ,supreme ,intelligence which makes the 
things that are seen and temporal to    
minister to those things which are      
unseen and eternal2 we must carefully   
discriminate1 as ,bishop ,butler has    
done1 between the mere natural          
government which is common to man with  
the inferior and irresponsible creation1
 and the higher moral government which  
is peculiar to intelligent and          
accountable agents2 and we must seek to 
know how far--the reality of both being 
admitted--the former is auxiliary or    
subservient to the latter1 and whether1 
on the whole1 the system is fitted to   
generate that frame of mind1 and to     

inculcate those lessons of truth1 which 
are appropriate to the condition of man1
 as a subject of moral discipline in a  
state of probation and trial4 ,nothing  
short of this will suffice for the      
explanation of the ,divine government1  
or for the satisfaction of the human    
mind4 ,it is felt to be a mere insult to
 the understandings1 and a bitter       
mockery to the feelings1 of men1 to talk
 only of natural laws1 or even of their 
independent action in such a case1 to   
tell a weeping mother that her child    
died1 and died too as the transgressor  
of a wise and salutary natural law which
 establishes a certain relation between 
opium and the nervous system3 for1 grant
 that the law is wise and salutary1     
grant that evil would result from its   
abolition1 grant even that it acts      
independently of any other law1 physical
 or moral1 still the profounder question
 remains1 whether such an event as the  
death of a tender child1 through the    
operation of a law of which that child  

was necessarily ignorant1 can properly  
be regarded as a punishment inflicted by
 ,divine justice8 and whether a theory  
of this kind can afford a key to the    
government of ,god8  ,such are some of  
the radical and incurable defects of    
,mr4 ,combe's theory of natural laws4   
,we ascribe it to him simply because he 
has been the most recent and the most   
popular expounder of it4 ,but it is not 
original1 nor in any sense peculiar to  
him alone4 ,he acknowledges his         
obligations in this respect to a        
manuscript work of ,dr4 ,spurzheim1     
entitled1 ,a ,sketch of the ,natural    
,laws of ,man2 and he refers1 somewhat  
incidentally1 to ,volney's ,law of      
,nature1 published originally as a      
,catechism1 and afterwards reprinted    
under the title1 ,la ,loi ,naturelle2   
ou1 ,principes ,physiques de la ,morale4
 ,the same theory1 in substance1 had    
been broached in the ,systme de la      
,nature1 and there it was applied in    
support of the atheistic conclusions of 

that remarkable treatise4 ,but it may be
 said to have been methodized by        
,volney2 and in his treatise it is      
exhibited in a form adapted to popular  
instruction4#bjc ,there is a striking   
resemblance between his speculations and
 those of ,mr4 ,combe4 ,he1 too1        
acknowledges the existence of ,god2 but 
virtually supersedes ,his ,providence by
 the substitution of natural laws4 ,the 
law of ,nature is defined as the        
constant order by which ,god governs the
 world1 and is represented as the most  
universal rule of action4 ,that law is  
supposed to be a command or a           
prohibition to act in certain cases1    
accompanied with the natural sanction of
 reward and punishment4 ,after giving   
several examples of natural laws1 which 
are all merely general facts or the     
generalized results of experience1 he   
describes man's relation to these laws  
almost in the words of ,mr4 ,combe4     
,since all these1 and similar facts1 he 
says1 are unchangeable1 constant1 and   

regular1 there result for man as many   
true laws to which he must conform1 with
 the express clause of a penalty        
attached to their infraction1 or of a   
benefit attached to their observance2 so
 that if a man shall pretend to see well
 in the dark1 if he acts in opposition  
to the course of the seasons or the     
action of the elements1 if he pretends  
to live under water without being       
drowned1 or to touch fire without being 
burned1 or to deprive himself of air    
without being suffocated1 or to drink   
poison without being destroyed1 he      
receives for each of these infractions  
of the 'natural laws' a corporeal       
punishment1 and one that is proportioned
 to his offence2 while1 on the contrary1
 if he observes and obeys every one of  
these laws1 in their exact and regular  
relations to him1 he will preserve his  
existence1 and make it as happy as it   
can be4  ,this code of natural laws is  
then described by ,volney as possessing 
no fewer than ten peculiar              

characteristics1 which give it a decided
 preminence over every other moral      
system1 whether human or ,divine1--as   
being primitive1 immediate1 universal1  
invariable1 evident1 reasonable1 just1  
peaceful1 beneficial1 and alone         
sufficient4 ,but it is so only when     
viewed in connection with the miserably 
low and meagre system of morals with    
which it is avowedly associated4 ,for   
when morals are described as a mere     
physical science1 founded on man's      
organization1 his interests and         
passions1--when the treatise1 according 
to its second title1 is professedly an  
attempt to expound the physical         
principles of morals1--and when1 in     
pursuance of this plan1 all the         
principles of ,ethics are rigorously    
reduced to one1 namely1 the principle of
 self-preservation1 which is enforced1  
as a duty1 by the only sanctions of     
pleasure and pain1--it is not wonderful 
that1 for such an end1 the natural laws 
might be held sufficient3 but it is     

wonderful that any mind capable of a    
moment's reflection should not have     
perceived that1 in such a system1 the   
cardinal idea of ,deity is altogether   
omitted1 or left unaccounted for1 in the
 case of ,man1 and that no attempt is   
made to explain or to account for       
anything that is properly moral in the  
government of ,god4         99       99 
99       99       99  ,on a review of   
these speculations1 it is important to  
bear in mind that the existence of      
natural laws is not necessarily         
exclusive of a superintending           
,providence4 ,their operation1 on the   
contrary1 may afford some of the        
strongest proofs of its reality4 ,for1  
whether considered as a scheme of       
provision or as a system of government1 
,divine ,providence rests on a strong   
body of natural evidence4 ,in the one   
aspect1 it upholds and preserves all    
things2 in the other1 it controls and   
overrules all things for the            
accomplishment of the ,divine will4     

,considered as a scheme of government1  
it is either natural or moral4 ,to the  
former1 all created beings without      
exception are subject2 to the latter1   
only some orders of being1--such1       
namely1 as are intelligent1 voluntary1  
and responsible agents4 ,in the case of 
man1 constituted as he is1 the          
,physical1 ,organic1 ,intellectual1 and 
,moral laws are all combined2 and he is 
subject1 therefore1 both to a natural   
government1 which is common to him with 
all other material and organized beings1
 and also to a moral government1 which  
is peculiar to himself as a free and    
accountable agent4 ,the natural         
government of ,god extends to all his   
creatures1 and includes man considered  
simply as one of them2 and its reality  
is proved1 first1 by the laws to which  
all created things are subject1 and     
which they have no power to alter or    
resist2 secondly1 by the final causes or
 beneficial ends which are obviously    
contemplated in the arrangements of     

,nature1 and the great purposes which   
are actually served by them2 and1       
thirdly1 by the necessary dependence of 
all created things on the will of ,him  
to whom they owe alike the commencement 
and the continuance of their being4 ,but
 the natural government of ,god1 which  
extends to all ,his creatures1 does not 
exhaust or complete the doctrine of ,his
 ,providence3 it includes also a scheme 
of moral government1 adapted to the     
nature1 and designed for the regulation1
 of ,his intelligent1 voluntary1 and    
responsible subjects4 ,and the reality  
of a moral government may be proved1    
first1 by the moral faculty1 which is a 
constituent part of human nature1 and   
which makes man a law to himself2       
secondly1 by the essential nature of    
virtuous and vicious dispositions1 as   
being inherently pleasant or painful2   
thirdly1 by the natural consequences of 
our actions1 which indicate a sure      
connection between moral and physical   
evil2 and1 fourthly1 by the moral       

atmosphere in which we are placed1 as   
being members of a community in which   
the distinction between right and wrong 
is universally acknowledged1 and applied
 in the way of approbation or censure4  
,by such proofs1 the ,providence of ,god
 may be shown to be a scheme both of    
natural and moral government1--two      
aspects of the same system which are    
equally real1 yet widely different4 ,but
 the distinction between the two1       
although founded on a real and radical  
difference1 is not such as to imply that
 they have no relation to each other1 or
 no mutual influence1 as distinct but   
connected parts of the same             
comprehensive scheme4 ,they are not     
isolated1 but interpenetrating2 they    
come into contact at many points1 and   
the natural is made subordinate and     
subservient to the moral4 ,for there is 
a beautiful gradation in the order of   
the established laws of ,nature4 ,the   
physical laws are made subordinate and  
subservient to the organic2 both the    

physical and organic are subservient to 
the intellectual2 the physical1 organic1
 and intellectual are subservient to the
 moral2 and the intellectual and moral  
are subservient to our preparation for  
the spiritual and eternal4 ,in the words
 of ,bishop ,butler1 ,the natural and   
moral constitution and government of the
 world are so connected as to make up   
together but one scheme2 and it is      
highly probable that the first is formed
 and carried on merely in subserviency  
to the latter1 as the vegetable world is
 for the animal1 and organized bodies   
for minds4#bjd  ,every instance of      
pleasure or pain arising from the       
voluntary actions of men1 is a proof    
that a relation of some kind has been   
established between all the distinct1   
but independent1 provinces of ,nature2  
and the invariable connection between   
moral and physical evil shows how the   
lower are made subservient to the higher
 departments of the ,divine government4 
,apart from a scheme of moral           

discipline1 there is no reason          
discernible1  priori1 why pain should be
 the accompaniment or consequent of one 
mode of action rather than another2 and 
the relations which have been           
established1 in the natural constitution
 of things1 between sin and misery1     
affords a strong proof not only of the  
reality of a moral government1 but of   
the subordination of physical and       
organic agencies to its great designs4  
,this relation between the natural and  
the moral government of ,god is         
admirably illustrated by ,bishop        
,warburton3 ,the application of natural 
events to moral government1 in the      
common course of ,providence1 connects  
the character of ,lord and ,governor of 
the intellectual world with that of     
,creator and ,preserver of the          
material4444 ,the doctrine of the       
prestablished harmony1--the direction of
 natural events to moral                
government1--obviates all irreligious   
suspicions1 and not only satisfies us   

that there is but one governor of both  
systems1 but that both systems are      
conducted by one scheme of ,providence4 
,to form the constitution of ,nature in 
such a manner that1 without controlling 
or suspending its laws1 it should       
continue1 throughout a long succession  
of ages1 to produce its physical        
revolutions as they best contribute to  
the preservation and order of its own   
system1 just at those precise periods of
 time when their effects1 whether       
salutary or hurtful to many1 may serve  
as instruments for the government of the
 moral world3 for example1 that a       
foreign enemy1 amidst our intestine     
broils1 should desolate all the         
flourishing works of rural              
industry1--that warring elements1 in the
 suited order of natural government1    
should depopulate and tear in pieces a  
highly-viced city1 just in those very   
moments when moral government required a
 warning and example to be held out to a
 careless world1--is giving us the      

noblest as well as the most astonishing 
idea of ,god's goodness and justice4444 
,when ,he made the world1 the free      
determinations of the human will1 and   
the necessary effects of laws physical1 
were so fitted and accommodated to one  
another1 that a sincere repentance in   
the moral world should be sure to avert 
an impending desolation in the natural1 
not by any present alteration or        
suspension of its established laws1 but 
by originally adjusting all their       
operations to all the foreseen          
circumstances of moral agency4#bje      
,viewed in this light1 the course of    
,providence is wonderfully adapted to   
the constitution of human nature1 since 
it affords as much certainty in regard  
to some things as is sufficient to lay a
 foundation for forethought1 prudence1  
and diligence in the use of means1 and  
yet leaves so much remaining uncertainty
 in regard to other things as should    
impress us with a sense of constant     
dependence on ,him in whom we live1 and 

move1 and have our being4 ,the          
constitution of ,nature and the course  
of ,providence in the present state seem
 mainly intended to teach these two     
lessons1--first1 of diligence in the use
 of means1 and1 secondly1 of dependence 
on a ,higher ,power3 for there is       
sufficient regularity in the course of  
events to encourage human industry in   
every department of labor2 and yet there
 is as much uncertainty1 arising from   
the endless complication of causes and  
the limited range of human knowledge1 as
 should impress us with a sense of our  
utter helplessness4 ,the wisdom of ,god 
in the government of the world may be   
equally manifested in the regular order 
which ,he has established1 and which1   
within certain limits1 man may be able  
to ascertain and reckon on as a ground  
of hopeful activity2 and in the apparent
 casualty and inscrutable mystery of    
many things which can neither be divined
 by human wisdom1 nor controlled by     
human power4 ,it matters not whether the

 remaining uncertainty is supposed to   
arise from some classes of events not   
being subject to regular laws1 or from  
our ignorance of these laws1 and the    
variety of their manifold combinations4 
,in either case1 it is certain that1 in 
our actual experience1 and1 so far as we
 can judge1 in the experience of every  
creature not possessed of omniscient    
knowledge1 these two elements are and   
must be combined1--such a measure of    
certainty as should encourage industry  
in the use of means1 and such a measure 
of remaining uncertainty as should keep 
them mindful that they are not1 and     
never can be1 independent of ,god4      
,,section ,,iii4  ,,the ,,efficacy ,,of 
,,prayer4  ,the doctrine of ,providence 
lays a firm foundation for the duty of  
,prayer4 ,in the case of all            
intelligent1 moral1 and responsible     
beings1 the mere existence of a ,divine 
government to which they are subject1   
would seem to imply an obligation to own
 and acknowledge it2 and this obligation

 is best fulfilled by the exercise of   
prayer1 which is a practical testimony  
alike to man's dependence and to ,god's 
dominion4  ,prayer1 in its widest sense1
 includes the whole homage which man is 
capable of rendering to ,god as the sole
 object of religious worship2 and it    
implies the recognition of all ,his     
supreme perfections and prerogatives as 
the ,creator and ,governor of the world4
 ,it is usually described#bjf as        
consisting1 first1 in adoration1--in    
which we express our sense of ,his      
rightful supremacy and absolute         
perfection1 and do homage to ,him for   
what ,he is in himself2 secondly1 in    
thanksgiving1--in which we express our  
sense of gratitude for all ,his kindness
 and care1 and do homage to ,him for the
 benefits which ,he has bestowed2       
thirdly1 in confession1--in which we    
express our sense of sin in having      
transgressed ,his law1 and do homage to 
,him as our moral ,governor and ,judge2 
and1 fourthly1 in petition1--in which we

 express our sense of dependence alike  
on ,his providence and grace1 and do    
homage to ,him as the ,father of lights1
 from whom cometh down every good and   
perfect gift4 ,of these1 the three first
 are so evidently reasonable and        
becoming1 so necessarily involved in the
 simplest idea which we can form of our 
relations to ,god and of the obligations
 which result from them1 that few1 if   
any1 of those who admit the existence   
and providence of the ,supreme ,being1  
will deny that the sentiments themselves
 are appropriate to our condition1      
however they may doubt the necessity or 
the duty of giving formal utterance to  
them in the language of religious       
worship4 ,but in regard to the fourth1  
which1 if it be not the most sublime or 
elevated1 is yet the most urgent motive 
to the exercise of devotion1 many       
difficulties have been raised and many  
objections urged1 which do not apply1 at
 least in the same measure1 to the other
 parts of ,prayer1 and which1 in so far 

as they prevail with reflecting minds1  
would soon lead to the practical neglect
 of all religious worship4 ,the practice
 of offering up petitions either for    
ourselves or others1 with the view of   
thereby obtaining any benefit1 whether  
of a temporal or spiritual kind1 has    
been denounced1 and even ridiculed1 as  
an unphilosophical attempt to alter the 
established course of ,nature1 or the   
preordained sequences of events4 ,the   
supposition of its efficacy has been    
represented as a flagrant instance of   
superstitious ignorance1 worthy only of 
the dark ages1 and even as a            
presumptuous blasphemy1 derogatory to   
the unchangeable character of the       
,supreme4 ,some have held1 indeed1 that 
while prayer can have no real efficacy  
either in averting evil or procuring    
good1 it may nevertheless be both       
legitimate and useful1 by reason of the 
wholesome reflex influence which it is  
fitted to exert on the mind of the      
worshipper2 and they have recommended   

the continuance of the practice on this 
ground1 as if men1 once convinced of its
 utter inefficacy1 would or could       
continue1 with any fervency1 to offer up
 their requests to ,god1 merely for the 
sake of impressing their own minds      
through the medium of a sort of         
conscious hypocrisy6 ,we are told that  
,david ,hume1 after hearing a sermon    
preached by ,dr4 ,leechman1 in which he 
dwelt on the power of prayer to render  
the wishes it expressed more ardent and 
passionate1 remarked with great justice1
 that 'we can make use of no expression1
 or even thought1 in prayers and        
entreaties1 which does not imply that   
these prayers have an influence4' ,this 
intermediate ground1 therefore1 is      
plainly untenable1 and we are shut up to
 one or other of two alternatives3      
either there is an efficacy in prayer as
 a means of averting evil and procuring 
good1 such as may warrant1 and should   
encourage1 us in offering up our        
requests unto ,god2 or1 there is no such

 efficacy in it1 and no reason why it   
should be observed by any of ,god's     
intelligent creatures1 whether on earth 
or in heaven4  ,the principles which are
 applicable to the decision of this     
important question may be best          
explained1 after adverting briefly to   
some of the particular objections which 
have been urged against the efficacy of 
prayer4 ,several of these objections    
evidently proceed on an erroneous view  
of the nature and object of prayer4     
,when it is said1 for example1 that     
,god1 being omniscient1 does not need to
 be informed either of the wants or the 
wishes of any of ,his creatures1 the    
objection involves a great and important
 truth1--a truth which was explicitly   
recognized by our ,lord when ,he said1  
,your heavenly ,father knoweth what     
things ye have need of before ye ask    
,him2 but that truth is grievously      
misapplied when it is directed to prove 
that prayer is either superfluous or    
ineffectual1 since the objection        

virtually assumes that the object of    
prayer is to inform ,god of what ,he did
 not know before1 and that ,his         
omniscience is of itself sufficient to  
show that prayer from men or angels must
 needs be unavailing4 ,when it is said1 
again1 that ,god being immutable1 ,his  
will cannot be affected or altered by   
the petitions of ,his creatures1 this   
objection1 like the former one1 involves
 a great and important truth1--a truth  
which is also explicitly recognized in  
,scripture when it is said that ,he is  
without variableness or the least shadow
 of turning2 but this truth1 too1 is    
grievously misapplied when it is        
directed to prove that there can be no  
efficacy in prayer1 since it might as   
well be said that the ,divine           
dispensations must be invariably the    
same whatever may be the conduct of ,his
 creatures in other respects1 as that   
they must be the same whether men do or 
do not pray2 or1 that ,his procedure as 
a ,moral ,governor has no reference     

whatever either to the character or     
conduct of his subjects4 ,but1 in the   
words of ,dr4 ,price1 ,god's            
unchangeableness1 when considered in    
relation to the exertion of ,his        
attributes in the government of the     
world1 consists1 not in always acting in
 the same manner however cases and      
circumstances alter1 but in always doing
 what is right1 and varying ,his conduct
 according to the various actions1      
characters and dispositions of beings4  
,if1 then1 prayer makes an alteration in
 the case of the suppliant1 as being the
 discharge of an indispensable duty1    
what would in truth infer changeableness
 in ,him would be1 not ,his regarding   
and answering it1 but ,his not doing    
this4#bjg ,when it is said1 again1 that 
there can be no efficacy in prayer1     
because there is an established         
constitution and regular course of      
,nature1 by which all events1 whether   
prosperous or adverse1 are invariably   
determined1 and which cannot be altered 

or modified without a miracle1 this     
objection1 like each of the two former1 
involves an important truth1--a truth   
which is also explicitly recognized in  
,scripture when it speaks of the        
ordinances of the heavens and the earth1
 and of the peculiar laws and properties
 of all created things2 but this truth  
is also grievously misapplied when it is
 directed to prove that ,god's will has 
no efficient control over natural       
events1 or that ,he has no agencies at  
,his disposal by which he can accomplish
 the desires of them that seek ,him4 ,in
 all these objections there is an       
apparent truth1 but there is also a     
latent error2 and the false conclusion  
is founded on an erroneous supposition  
in regard to the nature and object of   
prayer4  ,for this reason1 we shall     
endeavor to separate the truth from the 
error1 and to lay down a few positions  
which may be established both by reason 
and ,scripture1 and which will be       
sufficient to show that the doctrine    

which affirms the efficacy of prayer is 
not only credible1 but true4  #a4       
,prayer1 in the restricted sense in     
which we now speak of it1 as denoting   
petition or supplication1 consists in   
offering up the desires of the heart to 
,god for things agreeable to ,his will4 
,it is not a mere formal1 outward       
homage1 such as might be rendered by    
words1 or ceremonies2 it is a spiritual 
service1 in which the mind and heart of 
man come into immediate converse with   
,god ,himself4 ,it is offered to ,him   
personally1 as to the invisible but     
ever-present ,searcher of hearts1 who   
hears the desire of the humble1 and     
whose ear is attentive to the voice of  
their supplications4 ,this implies the  
recognition of ,his omnipresence and    
omniscience1 but these perfections of   
,his nature do not supersede the        
expression of our desires in prayer1    
just because prayer is designed1 not to 
increase ,his knowledge1 but to declare 
our sense of dependence on ,his will1   

and to procure ,his grace to help us in 
every time of need4 ,our petitions1 too1
 are always bounded within certain      
limits1 and subject to at least one     
indispensable condition2 they are       
offered only for things agreeable to    
,his will2 and when our own will is     
thus1 in the very act of prayer1        
expressly subordinated to that which is 
alone unerring and supreme1 we          
acknowledge at once ,his rightful       
sovereignty and our dutiful subjection1 
and we are not justly chargeable with   
the presumption of dictating to ,god the
 course of procedure which ,he should   
pursue towards us4 ,we are protected1   
too1 against the evils which our own    
errors in prayer might otherwise entail 
on us1 for we know not what things to   
pray for as we ought2 and we have an    
infallible security that1 in the best   
and highest sense1--that which is most  
in accordance with our real             
welfare1--our prayers must be answered1 
since our wills are resolved into ,his  

will2 and ,his will1 being omnipotent1  
cannot be resisted or frustrated in any 
of its designs4 ,our assurance of the   
certain efficacy of our prayers is so   
much the greater1 in proportion as we   
have reason to believe that the things  
for which we pray are agreeable to ,his 
will2 and hence we are more confident in
 asking spiritual than temporal gifts2  
for the former we know to be always     
agreeable to ,his will and conducive to 
our own welfare1 while the latter may1  
or may not1 be good for us in our       
present circumstances1 and must be left 
at the sovereign disposal of ,him who   
knows what is in man1 and what is best  
for each of ,his children4  #b4         
,considering the relation in which we   
stand to ,god as ,his creatures and     
subjects1 it is natural1 fit1 and proper
 that we should make known our requests 
to ,him1 and supplicate the aids both of
 ,his providence and grace2 and if it be
 our duty to pray1 it is reasonable to  
believe that ,god will have some respect

 to our prayers in ,his methods of      
dealing with us2 in other words1 that1  
as a righteous moral governor1 he will  
make a difference between the godly and 
the ungodly1 the men who do1 and the men
 who do not1 pray4  ,in this position it
 is assumed that there are certain      
relations1 natural or revealed1         
subsisting betwixt us and ,god1 in      
virtue of which it is our duty to       
acknowledge ,his dominion and our       
dependence1 by supplicating the aids of 
,his providence and grace4 ,that such   
relations do subsist between ,god and   
man1 is evinced alike by the light of   
,nature and of ,revelation2 and they    
cannot be discerned or realized without 
immediately suggesting the idea of      
certain corresponding obligations and   
duties4 ,every one whose conscience has 
not been utterly seared must            
instinctively feel the force of that    
appeal1 ,if ,i be a ,father1 where is   
mine honor8 and if ,i be a ,master1     
where is my fear8 ,for1 considering ,god

 in the very simplest aspect of ,his    
character as the ,creator and ,governor 
of the world1 ,he stands related to us  
as the ,author and ,preserver of our    
being1 as our rightful ,proprietor and  
constant ,benefactor1 as our supreme    
,lawgiver1 ,governor1 and ,judge2 and   
these natural relations1 apart          
altogether from the supernatural which  
are revealed in ,scripture1 are         
sufficient to lay a solid groundwork for
 the duty of prayer in the case of every
 intelligent being who is capable of    
knowing ,god1 and acknowledging his     
dependence on the ,divine will4 ,in such
 a case1 prayer is felt to be a natural1
 fit1 and becoming expression of what is
 known to be true1 and what ought1 as a 
matter of duty1 to be practically       
avowed4 ,now1 this is the grand design  
of prayer2 and in its real design1 when 
that is rightly apprehended1 it finds   
its noblest vindication4 ,the object of 
prayer is1 neither to inform ,god1 as if
 he were not omniscient1 nor to alter   

,his eternal purposes1 as if ,he were   
not unchangeable1 nor to unsettle the   
established course of ,nature1 as if ,he
 were not a ,god of order2 but simply to
 acknowledge ,his dominion and our      
dependence1 and to obtain from ,him1 in 
the way of ,his own appointment1 the    
blessings of which we stand in need4    
,it is not unreasonable to believe that 
,god1 as the ,governor of the world1    
will have some regard to the            
dispositions and actions of ,his        
responsible creatures1 as a reason for  
dealing differently with those who own1 
and those who disown1 ,his supremacy2   
and that ,he may require the use of     
certain means1 such as the exercise of  
prayer1 with the view of our obtaining  
from ,him1 in a way the most beneficial 
to ourselves1 the blessings1 whether    
temporal or spiritual1 of which we stand
 in need4 ,for if we really be the      
creatures of ,god1 and1 as such1        
dependent on ,his providential bounty1  
and subject to ,his righteous           

government1 it is self-evidently natural
 and right that we should1 as           
intelligent and responsible beings1     
acknowledge ,his supreme dominion and   
our absolute dependence by supplicating 
the aids both of ,his providence and    
grace4 ,this is our duty1 considering   
the relations which ,he sustains towards
 us2 and if it be fit and proper that we
 should pray to ,god1 if it be1 in our  
circumstances1 a duty which we owe to   
,him1 then it is most reasonable to     
believe that it is equally fit and      
proper in ,god to have some respect to  
our prayers1 and to deal with us        
differently according as we either      
observe or neglect this religious duty4 
,prayer may be regarded in one or other 
of two distinct aspects3 either as a    
duty1 the observance or neglect of which
 must be followed1 under a system of    
moral government1 with different        
results2 or simply as a means1 the use  
of which is productive of certain       
effects which are made to depend on this

 special instrumentality4 ,and in either
 view1 its efficacy may be affirmed on  
the same grounds on which we are wont to
 vindicate the use of all other means1  
and to enforce the observance of all    
other duties1 in connection with the    
system of the ,divine government4  #c4  
,the efficacy of prayer1 so far from    
being inconsistent with1 is founded on1 
the immutability of the ,divine purposes
 and the faithfulness of the ,divine    
promises4 ,god's purposes are justly    
held1 in all other cases1 to include the
 means as well as the ends2 and they are
 often fulfilled through the            
instrumentality of second causes4 ,his  
purpose to provide for the wants of man 
and beast has reference not merely to   
the harvest which is the result1 but    
also to the agricultural labor by which1
 instrumentally1 the harvest is         
prepared4 ,may not prayer be also a     
means ordained by ,god in the original  
constitution of the world1 a means      
towards certain ends which are made     

dependent on its use8 ,if it be such a  
means1 then its efficacy is established1
 in the only sense in which we are      
concerned to contend for it2 while it is
 shown to be no more inconsistent with  
the immutability of the ,divine         
purposes1 than any other system of means
 or instruments that may be employed as 
subordinate agencies in the government  
of the world4 ,this important view is   
strikingly illustrated in ,scripture4   
,for some of the purposes of ,god1 which
 might have been undiscoverable in the  
mere light of ,nature1 are there        
explicitly declared2 nay1 they are      
thrown into the form of express         
promises1 to which the ,divine          
faithfulness is solemnly pledged2 and   
yet the exercise of prayer1 so far from 
being superseded by these promises1 is  
rather stimulated and encouraged by     
them2 and the believer pleads with      
increased fervor and confidence when he 
simply converts ,god's promises into his
 own petitions4 ,he feels that in doing 

so he is taking ,god at his word2 and   
that his own prayer1 in so far as it is 
warranted by ,his promise1 cannot be    
ineffectual any more than ,god's        
faithfulness can fail4  ,thus ,daniel   
understood by books the number of the   
years whereof the word of the ,lord came
 to ,jeremiah the prophet1 that ,he     
would accomplish seventy years in the   
desolation of ,jerusalem4 ,he knew the  
,lord's promise1 and that the time for  
its fulfilment was at hand2 yet so far  
from regarding either the immutability  
of the ,divine purpose1 or even the     
infallible certainty of the ,divine     
promise1 as a reason for neglecting     
prayer1 as if that exercise were        
superfluous or vain1 he was stimulated  
and encouraged to pray just because he  
knew the word of the ,lord4--,and ,i set
 my face1 he says1 unto the ,lord ,god1 
to seek by prayer and supplications1    
with fasting1 sackcloth1 and ashes2 and 
,i prayed unto the ,lord my ,god1 and   
said1 ,o ,lord6 hear2 ,o ,lord6 forgive2

 ,o ,lord6 hearken and do2 defer not1   
for thine own sake1 ,o my ,god6#bjh     
,thus1 again1 when the ,lord gave       
certain great and precious promises to  
,his ancient people1 assuring them that 
,he would sprinkle clean water upon     
them1 and give them a new heart and a   
right spirit1 it is added1 ,i will yet  
for this be inquired of by the house of 
,israel to do it for them4#bji ,thus1   
again1 when the ,saviour himself gave to
 ,his disciples that promise1 which is  
emphatically called the promise of the  
,father1 assuring them that they should 
be baptized with the ,holy ,ghost not   
many days hence1 and directing them to  
wait at ,jerusalem until they should be 
endued with power from above1 the       
apostles1 so far from regarding that    
promise as superseding the exercise of  
prayer1 betook themselves immediately to
 an upper room1 and all continued with  
one accord in prayer and supplication2  
and1 at the appointed time1 ,god's      
promise was fulfilled1 and their prayer 

answered1 when they were all filled with
 the ,holy ,ghost1 and began to speak   
with other tongues as the ,spirit gave  
them utterance4 ,these examples are     
abundantly sufficient to show that      
prayer1 so far from being inconsistent  
with1 is founded on1 the immutability of
 the ,divine purposes1 and the          
faithfulness of the ,divine promises4   
#d4 ,our next position is1 that the     
method in which ,god answers the prayers
 of ,his people may be1 in many         
respects1 mysterious or even            
inscrutable2 but no objection to the    
efficacy of prayer1 which is founded on 
our ignorance of ,his infinite          
resources1 can have any weight1         
especially when there are several       
hypothetical solutions1 any one of which
 is sufficient to neutralize its force4 
,an omnipresent1 omniscient1 and        
almighty ,being1 presiding over the     
affairs of ,his own world1 as the       
author1 upholder1 and governor of all   
things1 may well be conceived to have   

infinite resources at ,his              
command1--such as we can never fully    
estimate1--by which he can give effect  
to prayer in ways that may be to us     
inscrutable4 ,but our ignorance of the  
mode is no reason for doubting the      
reality of ,his interposition in answer 
to prayer2 and even if we were unable to
 decide on the comparative merits of the
 various explanations of it which have  
been proposed1 the mere fact that there 
are several solutions1 at once          
conceivable and credible1 any one of    
which may be sufficient1 as a           
hypothetical explanation1 to neutralize 
every adverse presumption1 should be    
held tantamount to a proof that no valid
 or conclusive objection can be urged   
against it4 ,dr4 ,chalmers has          
frequently illustrated the legitimate   
and important uses of hypothetical      
solutions in ,theology2 and has         
conclusively shown that even where they 
leave us at a loss to determine which of
 various methods of solving a difficulty

 is the truest or the best1 they yet    
serve a great purpose1 if they merely   
neutralize an objection1 by showing that
 the difficulty in question might be    
satisfactorily accounted for1 were our  
knowledge more extensive or more        
precise4#baj ,now1 with regard to the   
efficacy of prayer1 there are four      
distinct solutions1 or rather four      
different methods of disposing of the   
difficulty1 any one of which is         
sufficient to vindicate the claims of   
the doctrine on our faith4 ,we shall not
 discuss the respective merits of these 
various solutions in detail1 but shall  
merely state them1 with the view of     
showing that there are several methods  
of accounting for the efficacy of prayer
 in perfect consistency with the        
established order of ,nature4  ,the     
first is the theory of those who hold   
that there is the same relation between 
prayer and the answer to prayer as      
between cause and effect in any other   
sequence of ,nature4 ,prayer is supposed

 to be the cause1 and the answer the    
effect2 and this by an invariable law1  
established in the original             
constitution1 and manifested in the     
uniform course1 of the world4 ,to this  
solution ,dr4 ,chalmers seems to refer  
when he says1 that the doctrine of the  
efficacy of prayer but introduces a new 
sequence to the notice of the mind1 that
 it may add another law of ,nature to   
those which have been formerly observed1
 and that the general truth may be      
preserved1 that the same result always  
follows in the same circumstances1      
although it should be discovered that   
prayer is one of those influential      
circumstances by which the result is    
liable to be modified4#baa ,now1 if it  
be meant merely to affirm that1 in the  
administration of ,his providential     
government1 ,god has respect to the     
prayers of men as a consideration which 
affects their relation to ,him and ,his 
treatment of them1 and that this rule is
 as invariable as any other law of      

,nature1 the principle that is involved 
in this solution may be admitted as     
sound and valid2 but if it be further   
meant1 that prayer and the answer to    
prayer are in all respects similar to   
any other instance of cause and effect1 
it must be remembered that the answer is
 not the effect of the prayer1 at least 
directly and immediately1 but the effect
 of the ,divine will2 and then the      
question suggested by ,dr4              
,m',cosh--whether causality can properly
 be ascribed to our prayers with        
reference to the ,divine will8--would   
claim our serious consideration4 ,but in
 the former sense1 as implying nothing  
more than that1 in the original         
constitution and the ordinary course of 
,providence1 the same effect is given to
 our prayers as to any other moral cause
 or condition1 it seems to be exempt    
from all reasonable objection1 and to   
afford a sufficient explanation of the  
difficulty4  ,the second hypothetical   
solution is that of those who hold that 

while ,god1 in answering the prayers of 
men1 does not ordinarily disturb the    
known or discoverable sequences of the  
natural world1 yet ,his interference may
 be alike real and efficacious though it
 should take place at a point in the    
series of natural causes far removed    
beyond the limits of our experience and 
observation2 and thus the answer to     
prayer may be effectually given without 
any infringement on the known           
regularities of ,nature4 ,dr4 ,chalmers 
adverts to this second solution in      
replying to an objection which might    
possibly be raised against the first1   
namely1 that we see no evidence of the  
constancy of visible nature giving way  
to that invisible agency1 the           
interposition of which it is the express
 object of prayer to obtain2 and he     
suggests that1 in the vast scale of     
natural sequences1 which constitute one 
connected chain1 the responsive touch   
from the finger of the ,almighty may be 
given either at a higher or a lower     

place in the progression1 and that if it
 be supposed to be given far enough     
back1 it might originate a new sequence1
 but without doing violence to any      
ascertained law1 since it occurs beyond 
the reach of our experience and         
observation4 ,this solution we hold to  
be not so much an effective argument in 
favor of the efficacy of prayer1 as a   
conclusive answer to a particular       
objection against it4 ,it is sufficient 
to show that1 with our very limited     
knowledge1 we act presumptuously in     
deciding against the possibility of an  
answer to prayer such as may leave the  
established course of ,nature unaltered2
 but there is no necessity1 and no      
reason1 for supposing that the          
responsive touch can only be given at a 
point to which our knowledge does not   
extend1 or that1 were our knowledge     
extended1 we would have less difficulty 
in admitting it there1 than in holding  
it to be possible at any lower term in  
the scale of sequences4  ,the third     

hypothetical solution is that of those  
who hold that a ,divine answer to prayer
 may be conveyed through the ministry of
 angels1 or the agency of intelligent1  
voluntary1 and active beings1 employed  
by ,god1 in subordination to ,his       
,providence1 for the accomplishment of  
,his great designs4 ,the existence of   
such an order1 or rather hierarchy1 of  
created intelligences is clearly        
revealed in ,scripture2 and it is       
rendered credible1 or even probable1 by 
the analogy of ,nature1 since we observe
 on earth a regular gradation of animal 
life from the insect up to man1 and we  
have no reason to suppose that the      
gradation is suddenly arrested just at  
the point where the animal and the      
spiritual are combined4 ,but not only   
their existence1 their active agency    
also1 as ministers fulfilling ,his will1
 as ministering spirits sent forth to   
minister to them who shall be heirs of  
salvation1 is explicitly and frequently 
declared as well as exemplified in      

,scripture2 and this1 too1 would be1 on 
the supposition of their existence1 in  
strict accordance with the analogy of   
,nature1 which shows that the lower     
orders of being are placed under the    
care and control of the higher4 ,mr4    
,boyle1 accordingly1 makes frequent     
reference1 in his ,theological          
treatises1 to the ministry of angels1 as
 subordinate agents1 through whose      
instrumentality many of the designs of  
,providence may be carried into effect2 
and ,president ,edwards enlarges on the 
same theme4#bab  ,the fourth            
hypothetical solution is that of those  
who hold that ,god has so arranged ,his 
,providence from the beginning as to    
provide for particular events as well as
 for general results1 and especially to 
provide an answer to the prayers of ,his
 intelligent creatures4 ,this solution  
is more general than any of the three   
former1 and may even be comprehensive of
 them all4 ,it regards prayer as an     
element which was taken into account at 

the original constitution of the world1 
and for which an answer was provided1 as
 the result of natural laws or of       
angelic agency1 employed for this       
express end by the omniscient           
foreknowledge and wisdom of ,god4 ,it is
 the solution that has obtained the     
sanction of some of the highest names in
 ,science and ,theology4  ,i begin1 says
 ,euler1 with considering an objection  
which almost all the ,philosophical     
,systems have started against prayer4   
,religion prescribes this as our duty1  
with an assurance that ,god will hear   
and answer our vows and prayers1        
provided they are conformable to the    
precepts which ,he hath given us4       
,philosophy1 on the other hand1         
instructs us that all events take place 
in strict conformity to the course of   
,nature1 established from the beginning1
 and that our prayers can effect no     
change whatever1 unless we pretend to   
expect that ,god should be continually  
working miracles in compliance with our 

prayers4 ,this objection has the greater
 weight1 that ,religion itself teaches  
the doctrine of ,god's having           
established the course of all events1   
and that nothing can come to pass but   
what ,god foresaw from all eternity4 ,is
 it credible1 say the objectors1 that   
,god should think of altering this      
settled course1 in compliance with any  
prayers which men might address to ,him8
 ,but ,i remark1 first1 that when ,god  
established the course of the universe1 
and arranged all the events that must   
come to pass in it1 ,he paid attention  
to all the circumstances which should   
accompany each event1 and1 particularly1
 to the dispositions1 desires1 and      
prayers of every intelligent being2 and 
that the arrangement of all events was  
disposed in perfect harmony with all    
these circumstances4 ,when1 therefore1 a
 man addresses to ,god a prayer worthy  
to be heard1 that prayer was already    
heard from all eternity1 and the ,father
 of mercies arranged the world expressly

 in favor of that prayer1 so that the   
accomplishment should be a consequence  
of the natural course of events4 ,it is 
thus that ,god answers the prayers of   
men without working a miracle4#bac  ,it 
is not impossible1 says ,dr4 ,wollaston1
 that such laws of ,nature1 and such a  
series of causes and effects1 may be    
originally designed that not only       
general provisions may be made for the  
several species of beings1 but even     
particular cases1 at least many of them1
 may also be provided for1 without      
innovations or alterations in the course
 of ,nature4 ,it is true this amounts to
 a prodigious scheme1 in which all      
things to come are1 as it were1         
comprehended under one view1 estimated  
and laid together3 but when ,i consider 
what a mass of wonders the universe is  
in other regards1 what a ,being ,god is1
 incomprehensibly great and perfect1    
that ,he cannot be ignorant of anything1
 no not of the future wants and         
deportments of particular men1 and that 

all things which derive from ,him1 as   
their ,first ,cause1 must do this so as 
to be consistent with one another1 and  
in such a manner as to make one compact 
system1 befitting so great an ,author2  
when ,i consider this1 ,i cannot deny   
such an adjustment of things to be      
within ,his power4 ,the order of events1
 proceeding from the settlement of      
,nature1 may be as compatible with the  
due and reasonable success of my        
endeavors and prayers 7as inconsiderable
 a part of the world as ,i am7 as with  
any other thing or phenomena how great  
soever4444 ,and thus the prayers which  
good men offer to the all-knowing ,god1 
and the neglects of others1 may find    
fitting effects1 already forecasted in  
the course of ,nature1 which possibly   
may be extended to the labors of men and
 their behavior in general4#bad  ,if    
ever there was a future event1 says ,dr4
 ,gordon1 which might have been reckoned
 on with absolute certainty1 and one1   
therefore1 in the accomplishment of     

which it might appear that prayer could 
have no room or efficacy1 it was just   
the restoration of the ,jewish captives 
to the land and city of their fathers4  
,and yet1 so far from supposing that    
there was no place for prayer to occupy1
 among the various means that were      
employed to bring about that event1 it  
was just his firm belief in the nearness
 and certainty of it that set ,daniel   
upon fervent and persevering            
supplications for its accomplishment4444
 ,with regard to the rank which         
,daniel's prayer occupied among the     
various means or agencies that were to  
be employed in bringing about the object
 of it1 he had good reason to believe   
that it was neither without a definite  
place1 nor in itself devoid of          
efficacy4444 ,he had been honored to    
vindicate the power and assert the      
supremacy of the ,lord ,god of ,israel2 
by the wisdom of his counsels and the   
weight of his personal character1 he had
 paved the way for that decision in     

favor of the people of ,god to which the
 ,king of ,persia was soon to be        
brought2 and the whole business of his  
active and most laborious life was made 
to bear on the interests and the        
liberation of his afflicted brethren4   
,and if ,god had thus assigned to the   
outward actions of ,his servant an      
important place in carrying into effect 
,his thoughts of peace towards his      
penitent people1 is it conceivable that 
,he had no place in that scheme for the 
holy and spiritual efforts of the same  
servant8 or that the aspirations of a   
sanctified spirit1 the travailing of a  
soul intent upon the accomplishment of  
the ,divine will and the manifestation  
of the ,divine glory1 should be less    
efficient or less essential in the      
execution of the ,divine counsels1 than 
the outward and ordinary agency of human
 actions8 ,the whole tenor and the most 
explicit declarations of ,scripture     
stand opposed to such a supposition2 nor
 can ,i understand how a devout mind    

should have any difficulty in conceiving
 that it must be so4 ,the agency of     
prayer is1 indeed1 a less obvious and   
palpable thing than that outward        
coperation whereby mankind are rendered 
subservient to the accomplishment of the
 ,divine purposes4 ,but is it not an    
agency of an unspeakably loftier        
character8 ,is it not the coperation of 
an immortal spirit1 bearing the impress 
of the ,divine image1 and at the moment 
acting in unison with the ,divine will8 
,is it not befitting the character of   
,god to set upon that coperation a      
special mark of ,his holy approbation1  
by assigning to it a more elevated place
 among the secondary causes which ,he is
 pleased to employ8 ,and must there not 
be provision made1 therefore1 in the    
general principles of ,his              
administration1 for fulfilling the      
special promise of ,his word1 ',the     
,lord is nigh to all that call upon     
,him1 to all that call upon him in      
truth4'#bae  ,we should blush1 says     

,bishop ,warburton1 to be thought so    
uninstructed in the nature of prayer1 as
 to fancy that it can work any temporary
 change in the dispositions of the      
,deity1 who is 'the same yesterday1     
to-day1 and forever4' ,yet we are not   
ashamed to maintain that ,god1 in the   
chain of causes and effects1 which not  
only sustains each system1 but connects 
them all with one another1 hath so      
wonderfully contrived1 that the         
temporary endeavors of pious men shall  
procure good and avert evil1 by means of
 that 'prestablished harmony' which ,he 
hath willed to exist between moral      
actions and natural events4      ,but   
should some frigid skeptic1 therefore1  
dare     ,to doubt the all-prevailing   
power of prayer2     ,as if 'twere ours1
 with impious zeal1 to try     ,to shake
 the purposes of ,deity2     ,pause1    
cold philosopher1 nor snatch away       
,the last1 the best1 the wretched's     
surest stay4     ,look round on life1   
and trace its checkered plan1     ,the  

griefs1 the joys1 the hopes1 the fears  
of man2     ,tell me1 if each           
deliverance1 each success1     ,each    
transient golden dream of happiness1    
,each palm that genius in the race      
acquires1     ,each thrilling rapture   
virtuous pride inspires1     ,tell me1  
if each and all were not combined       
,in the great purpose of the ,eternal   
,mind8             99       99       99 
99       99      ,thus while we humbly  
own the vast decree1     ,formed in the 
bosom of ,eternity1     ,and know all   
secondary causes tend     ,each to      
contribute to one mighty end2     ,yet  
while these causes firmly fixed remain--
     ,links quite unbroken in the       
endless chain1     ,so that could one be
 snapped1 the whole must fail1     ,and 
wide confusion o'er the world prevail2  
,why may not our petitions1 which arise 
,in humble adoration to the skies1      
,be foreordained the causes1 whence     
shall flow     ,our purest pleasures in 
this vale of woe8     ,not that they    

move the purpose that hath stood     ,by
 time unchanged1 immeasurably good1     
,but that the event and prayer alike may
 be     ,united objects of the same     
decree4#baf   ,on the whole1 we feel    
ourselves warranted1 and even           
constrained1 to conclude that the theory
 of government by natural law is        
defective in so far as it excludes the  
superintendence and control of ,god over
 all the events of human life1 and that 
neither the existence of second causes  
nor the operation of physical laws      
should diminish our confidence in the   
care of ,providence and the efficacy of 
,prayer4  ,,footnotes3  #aha ,,cicero1  
,de ,natur ,deorum1 lib4 ,i4 c4 #dd4    
#ahb ,,howe1 ,works1 ,i4 #ajd4          
,,cudworth1 ,intellectual ,system1 ,i4  
#abj1 #add4  #ahc ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1  
,,vi4 #adi1 #bdg1 #bie4 ,,spinoza1      
,tractatus ,theol4-politicus1 pp4 #eg1  
#ajb1 #abb1 #add1 #aej1 #cai4  #ahd     
,,dr4 ,,channing1 ,memoirs1 ,,ii4 #dci4 
,,robt4 ,,boyle1 ,free ,inquiry into the

 ,notion of ,nature1 p4 #g4  #ahe       
,,professor ,,sedgwick1 ,discourse1     
fifth edition1 p4 ,,cliii4 ,,mr4        
,,combe1 ,constitution of ,man1 p4 #dag4
  #ahf ,proverbs #f3 #bg2 ,psalm #fh3   
#b2 #hc3 #ad2 ,james #c3 #ab2 ,matthew  
#g3 #af2 ,proverbs #h3 #bi2 ,job #ch3   
#aa1 #cc2 ,psalm #aai3 #ij2 ,jeremiah   
#ca3 #ce2 #cc3 #be4  #ahg ,,dr4         
,m',,cosh1 ,on the ,divine ,government1 
pp4 #abf1 #abi1 #adi4  #ahh ,westminster
 ,confession1 c4 v41  ,,ii41 ,,iii4     
#ahi ,m4 ,,comte1 ,cours1 ,,iv4 #ffc1   
#ffi2 ,v4 #bei1 #bgg2 ,,vi4 #gjb1 #ghj4 
,j4 ,s4 ,,mill1 ,logic1 ,i4 #cig1 #dag1 
#dbb2 ,,ii4 #aji1 #dga4 ,,lewes1        
,biographical ,history1 ,i4 #ad2 ,,iii4 
#ee2 ,,iv4 #i1 #db4  #aij ,,dr4 ,,reid1 
,essays1 ,,iii4 #dd4 ,,dr4 ,m',,cosh1   
,divine ,government1 #hh1 #ia1 #aaa1    
#aad4  #aia ,,sir ,,john ,,herschell1   
,address to the ,british ,association1  
#ahde4  #aib ,,dr4 ,,thos4 ,,brown1     
,essay on ,cause and ,effect1 p4 #hf4   
,,dr4 ,,thos4 ,,reid1 ,essays1 ,i4 #acf4

 ,,pierre ,,poiret1 ,de ,deo1 ,anima1 et
 ,malo4  #aic ,,dr4 ,,thomas ,,brown1   
,essay on ,cause and ,effect1 pp4 #gd1  
#hc1 #ic1 #ajh1 #aia4  #aid ,,george    
,,combe1 ,,esq4  #aie ,reasoner1 ,,xii4 
#ba1 #bc4  #aif ,,holyoake1 ,grant and  
,holyoake's ,discussion1 p4 #dj4  #aig  
,,george ,,combe1 ,constitution of ,man1
 pp4 #aej1 #aee1 #afc1 #afe1 #bcd1 #cdc1
 #ceh4  #aih ,,mr4 ,,combe1             
,constitution of ,man1 ,,vi41 ,,ix41    
#be1 #ci1 #da4  #aii ,,mr4 ,,scott1     
,harmony of ,phrenology with ,scripture1
 pp4 #hb1 #ig4  #bjj ,,citizen          
,,kennedy1 ,nature and ,revelation      
,harmonious1 pp4 #gj1 #abb1 #abd1 #aca4 
#bja ,,mr4 ,,combe1 ,constitution of    
,man1 pp4 #be1 #ec1 #cjf1 #cfd4  #bjb   
,f4 ,b4 ,,barton1 ,the ,reasoner1 ,,xi4 
#bd1 #cgc4  #bjc ,,volney1 ,la ,loi     
,naturelle1 which has been translated1  
and is usually appended to his ,ruins of
 ,empires4  #bjd ,,butler',s ,analogy1  
p4 #a4 c4 #g4  #bje ,,warburton',s      
,works1 ,x4 p4 #h4  #bjf ,,dr4          

,,price',s ,dissertations1 p4 #aih4     
#bjg ,,dr4 ,,price1 ,dissertations1 pp4 
#bjh1 #bai4  #bjh ,daniel #i3 #b1 #ai4  
#bji ,ezekiel #cf3 #cg4  #baj ,,dr4     
,,chalmers1 ,works1 ,,ii4 #bhf4  #baa   
,ibid41 #cbe4  #bab ,,hon4 ,,rob4       
,,boyle1 ,theolog4 ,works1 ,,ii4 #if1   
,,iii4 #bcj4 ,,president ,,edwards1     
,works1 ,x4 #a4  #bac ,,euler1 ,letters 
to a ,german ,princess1 ,i4 #bga4  #bad 
,,dr4 ,,wollaston1 ,religion of ,nature1
 p4 #ajc4  #bae ,,dr4 ,,robt4 ,,gordon1 
,sermons1 p4 #cfi4  #baf ,it is with    
melancholy pleasure that the author     
recalls and reproduces1 after an        
interval of thirty years1 the lines of  
his early college companion1--,,william 
,,friend ,,durant1--a young man of high 
promise1 removed1 like his distinguished
 fellow-student1 ,,robert ,,pollock1 by 
what might seem a premature death1 but  
for the prospect of immortality4        
,,chapter ,,vi4  ,,theories ,,of        
,,chance ,,and ,,fate4   ,when we survey
 the actual course of ,god's            

,providence1 by which the eternal       
purposes of the ,divine ,mind are       
carried into effect1 we discern         
immediately a marked difference between 
two great classes of events4 ,the one   
comprehends a multitude of events which 
are so regular1 stable1 and constant1   
that we feel ourselves warranted in     
reckoning on their invariable           
recurrence1 in the same circumstances in
 which they have been observed2 they    
seem to be governed by an unchangeable1 
or at least an established law4 ,the    
other comprehends a different set of    
events1 which are so irregular and      
variable that they occur quite          
unexpectedly1 and cannot be reduced to  
any rule of rational computation2 they  
appear1--perhaps from our ignorance1--to
 be purely accidental or fortuitous4    
,in exact accordance with this          
difference between the two great classes
 of ,providential events1 there is a    
similar difference in our internal views
 or sentiments in regard to them4 ,we   

are conscious of two totally dissimilar 
feelings in contemplating them          
respectively4 ,we have a feeling of     
certainty1 confidence1 or assurance in  
regard to the one2 and a feeling of     
uncertainty1 anxiety1 and helplessness  
in regard to the other2 while for an    
intermediate class of events1 there is  
also an intermediate state of mind1     
equally removed from entire certainty   
and absolute doubt1 arising from the    
various degrees of probability that may 
seem to belong to them4 ,these are at   
once natural and legitimate sentiments  
in the circumstances in which we are    
placed2 for unquestionably there is much
 in these circumstances that is fitted  
to produce and cherish them all2 and    
when they are combined1--especially when
 they are duly proportioned1 in the case
 of any individual1 they induce a habit 
or frame of mind most favorable to the  
recognition of ,god's ,providence1 and  
most conducive to our welfare1 by       
impressing us with a sense both of our  

dependence on ,his supreme will1 and of 
our duty to be diligent in the use of   
all appointed means4 ,but when either of
 the two classes of events is           
exclusively considered1 or the          
sentiments appropriate to them          
inordinately cherished1 there will be a 
tendency1 in the absence of an          
enlightened belief in ,providence1      
towards one or other of two opposite    
extremes3--the extreme1 on the one hand1
 of resolving all events into results of
 physical agencies and mechanical laws1 
acting with the blind force of destiny1 
and leaving no room for the             
interposition of an intelligent ,moral  
,ruler2 and the extreme1 on the other   
hand1 of ascribing all events to        
accidental or fortuitous influences1    
equally exempt from ,his control4 ,the  
former is the theory of ,fate1 the      
latter is the theory of ,chance2 and    
both are equally opposed to the doctrine
 which affirms the eternal purpose and  
the actual providence of an omniscient  

and all-controlling ,mind4  ,it matters 
little1 with reference to our present   
purpose1 whether or not every department
 of ,nature be supposed to be equally   
subject to natural laws2 for even were  
it so1 still if these laws were either  
in part unknown and undiscoverable by   
us1 or so related to each other that the
 results of their manifold possible     
combinations could not be calculated or 
reckoned on by human wisdom or          
foresight1 ample room would be left for 
the exercise of diligence within the    
limits of our ascertained knowledge1 and
 yet for a sense of dependence on a     
power which we feel ourselves unable    
either to comprehend or control4 ,on the
 ground of analogy1 we think it highly  
probable that every department of       
,nature is subject to regular and stable
 laws2 and on the same ground we may    
anticipate that1 in the progressive     
advance of human knowledge1 many new    
fields will yet be conquered1 and added 
to the domain of ,science4 ,but suppose 

every law were discovered1--suppose1    
even1 that every individual event should
 be shown to depend on some natural     
cause1 there would still remain at least
 two considerations which should remind 
us of our dependence4 ,the first is our 
ignorance of the whole combination of   
causes which may at any time be brought 
into action1 and of the results which   
may flow from them in circumstances such
 as we can neither foresee nor provide  
against4 ,the second is our ignorance1  
equally unavoidable and profound1 of the
 intelligent and voluntary agencies     
which may be at work1 modifying1        
disposing1 and directing that           
combination of causes1 so as to         
accomplish the purposes of the          
,omniscient ,mind4 ,our want of         
knowledge in either case is a reason for
 uncertainty2 and our uncertainty in    
regard to events in which we may be     
deeply concerned is fitted to teach us  
our dependence on a higher ,power4 ,let 
it not be thought1 however1 that our    

argument for ,god's ,providence is drawn
 merely from man's ignorance1 or that   
its strength must diminish in proportion
 as his knowledge of ,nature is         
extended2 on the contrary1 it rests on  
the assumption that man knows enough to 
be aware that he cannot know all1 and   
that as long as he is not omniscient1 he
 must be dependent on ,him who alone    
knows the end from the beginning1 and   
who ruleth among the armies of heaven as
 well as among the inhabitants of this  
earth4  ,it is in the invariable        
combination and marvellous mutual       
adjustment of these two elements1--the  
regular and the variable1 the constant  
and the casual1 the certain and the     
uncertain1--that we best discern the    
wisdom of that vast scheme of           
,providence1 which is designed at once  
to secure our diligence in the use of   
means1 and to impress us with a sense of
 our dependence on a higher ,power4 ,and
 the same remark may be equally         
applicable1 mutatis mutandis1 to the    

revealed constitution of things1 since  
,scripture itself exhibits certain      
definite truths surrounded with a margin
 of mystery like lights shining in a    
dark place2 and while it prescribes and 
encourages diligence in the use of      
means1 teaches us at the same time our  
dependence on the ,divine blessing which
 alone can render our efforts effectual4
 ,both elements1 therefore1 must be     
taken into account and kept steadily in 
view1 if we would form a comprehensive  
conception of the method of the ,divine 
government1 or a correct estimate of the
 wisdom with which it is adapted to the 
case of created and dependent1 but      
intelligent1 active1 and responsible    
beings4 ,but when the one is either     
dissevered from the other1 or viewed    
apart and exclusively by itself1 when   
the mind dwells on either1 to the       
neglect of what is equally a part of the
 same comprehensive scheme1 then we are 
in danger of adopting a partial and     
one-sided view of ,providence1 and of   

lapsing into one or other of the        
opposite extremes1--the theory of       
,chance or the theory of ,fate4  ,a few 
remarks on each of these theories may be
 neither unseasonable nor useless1 if   
they serve to illustrate the different  
kinds of ,atheism which have sprung from
 them1 and to place in a clear and      
strong light the radical difference     
which subsists between both1 and the    
doctrine of ,providence1 as it is taught
 and exemplified in ,scripture4  #a4    
,the theory of ,chance1 which was once  
the stronghold of ,atheism1 is now all  
but abandoned by speculative thinkers1  
and exists only1 if at all1 in the vague
 beliefs of uneducated and unreflecting 
men4 ,this result has been brought      
about1 not so much by the ,metaphysical 
or even the ,theological considerations 
which were urged against the theory1 as 
by the steady advance of ,science1 and  
the slow but progressive growth of a    
belief in law and order as existing in  
every department of ,nature4 ,it has    

been undeniably the effect of scientific
 inquiry to banish the idea of ,chance1 
at least from as much of the domain as  
has been successfully explored1 and to  
afford a strong presumption that the    
same result would follow were our       
researches extended beyond the limits   
within which they are yet confined4 ,to 
this extent there is truth in the       
reasonings of ,m4 ,comte as applied to  
,chance1 while they have no validity or 
value as applied to ,providence2 and we 
deem it a noble tribute to ,science when
 it can be said of her with truth1 that 
she has been an effective auxiliary to  
,religion in overthrowing the once      
vaunted empire of that blind power4  ,at
 one time some ascribed all the works   
both of ,creation and ,providence to    
,chance1 and spoke of a fortuitous      
concourse of atoms in the one case1 and 
of a fortuitous concurrence of events in
 the other4 ,the ,atomic theory1 which1 
as a mere physiological hypothesis1 is  
far from being necessarily ,atheistic1  

and which has been adopted and defended 
by such writers as ,gassendus and ,dr4  
,goode1#bag was applied by ,epicurus and
 ,lucretius to account for the          
fortuitous origin of existing beings1   
and also for the fortuitous course of   
human affairs4 ,no one now1 in the      
present advanced state of science1 would
 seriously propose to account either for
 the creation of the world1 or for the  
events of the world's history1 by       
ascribing them to the operation of      
,chance2 the current is flowing in      
another direction2 it has set in1 like a
 returning tide1 towards the universal  
recognition of general laws and natural 
causes1 such as1 from their invariable  
regularity and uniformity1 are utterly  
exclusive of everything like chance or  
accident in any department of ,nature4  
,instead of ascribing the creation of   
the world to a fortuitous concourse of  
atoms1 modern speculation would refer it
 to a law of development such as is able
 of itself to insure the production of  

astral systems in the firmament1 and    
also of vegetable and animal races on   
the earth1 without any direct or        
immediate interposition of a higher     
power2 and instead of ascribing the     
events of history and the progress of   
humanity to a fortuitous or accidental  
origin1 modern speculation would refer  
them to a law of social or historical   
development1 such as makes every        
succeeding state the natural1 and1      
indeed1 necessary product of a prior    
one1 and places the whole order of      
sequences--whether physical1 moral1     
political1 or religious--under the      
government of natural law1 as           
contradistinguished from that of a      
supernatural will4 ,there is thus a     
manifest tendency to resile from the old
 theory of ,chance1 and to take refuge  
in the new asylum of ,law1 ,order1 or   
,destiny4 ,there is1 apparently1 a wide 
difference between the two contrasted   
systems2 and yet the difference may be1 
after all1 more seeming than real3 for  

both the old doctrine of chance and the 
new theory of development are compelled 
to assume certain conditions or         
qualities as belonging to the primordial
 elements of matter1 without which it is
 felt that neither ,chance nor ,fate can
 afford a satisfactory account of the   
works either of ,creation or            
,providence4 ,the one party spoke more  
of ,chance1 the other speaks more of    
,law2 but both were compelled to feel   
that neither ,chance nor ,law could of  
themselves account for the established  
order of ,nature1 without presupposing  
certain conditions1 adjustments1 and    
dispositions of matter1 such as could   
only be satisfactorily explained by     
ascribing them to a wise1 foreseeing1   
and designing ,mind4  ,in the present   
state of philosophical speculation1     
which evinces so strong a tendency to   
reduce everything to the dominion of    
,law1 it may seem unnecessary to refer  
to the doctrine of ,chance at all2 but  
believing as we do that there are1 and  

ever must be1 certain events in the     
course of life1 and certain facts in the
 complex experience of man1 which will  
irresistibly suggest the idea of it1    
even where the doctrine is theoretically
 disowned1 we think it right to lay down
 a distinct and definite position on    
this subject1 such as may serve1 if duly
 established1 at once to neutralize     
whatever is false and noxious in the    
doctrine of ,chance1 and at the same    
time to preserve whatever is true and   
wholesome in it1 as having a tendency to
 illustrate the actual scheme of ,divine
 ,providence4 ,and the position which we
 are disposed to state and prepared to  
establish is this3 ,that1 with reference
 to ,god1 as an omniscient ,being1 there
 is1 and there can be1 no such thing as 
,chance2 while1 with reference alike to 
men and angels1 many events may be      
fortuitous or accidental1 not as being  
independent of causes1 but as depending 
on causes unknown1 or on combinations of
 causes whose joint operation may result

 in effects absolutely undiscoverable by
 our limited intelligence4  ,this       
position consists of two parts4 ,it     
affirms that with reference to ,god and 
,his omniscient knowledge1 there can be 
nothing that is fortuitous1 accidental1 
or unexpected4 ,it affirms1 with        
reference to man and all created        
intelligences1 that there may1 or even  
must1 be much uncertainty in regard to  
the products of natural causes1         
especially when they act in combination1
 and come into play in circumstances    
which we cannot foresee or control4     
,many events may thus be casual1        
accidental1 or unexpected to men1 which 
are not so to the supreme governing     
,intelligence4 ,the first part of the   
position is proved by the general       
evidence which warrants us in ascribing 
omniscience1 and especially an unerring 
prescience1 to the ,divine ,mind2 and it
 cannot be denied1 without virtually    
ascribing ignorance to ,god4 ,the second
 part of the position is established by 

some of the most familiar facts of      
experience4 ,we know and feel that      
however certain all events are to the   
omniscient knowledge of the ,most ,high1
 many of them are entirely beyond the   
reach of our limited foresight2 and this
 because they are either dependent on   
individual causes which are unknown to  
us1 or on a combination of various      
causes1 too complex to admit of any     
rational computation in regard to their 
results4  ,the calculation of chances   
has been reduced to something like      
scientific accuracy2#bah and it has been
 applied1 with beneficial effect1 to the
 insurance of life and property on land 
and at sea4 ,even the casual events of  
human history may be said1 in a certain 
sense1 to be governed by fixed laws4    
,the aggregate result in such cases may 
be tolerably certain1 while the         
individual cases are very much the      
reverse2 and hence human wisdom1        
proceeding on a well-ascertained body of
 statistics1 may construct a scheme for 

securing some against the evils to which
 they would otherwise have been liable1 
by means of the sacrifices of others1   
who would not have been in fact1        
although they might have been1 for ought
 they know1 liable to the same4 ,but    
what is this1 if it be not a practical  
acknowledgement of the uncertainty in   
which all are placed in regard to some  
of the most important interests of the  
present life8 or how can it be said that
 chance or accident is altogether1 and  
in every sense1 exploded1 when large    
bodies of men are found to combine1 and 
that1 too1 at a considerable personal   
sacrifice1 for the express purpose of   
protecting themselves1 so far as they   
can1 from the hazards to which they are 
individually exposed8  ,in the sense    
above explained1 we cannot consent to   
discard ,chance altogether1 either at   
the bidding of those who resolve        
everything into natural laws1 or even in
 deference to the authority of others   
who ascribe all events to ,divine       

,providence4 ,it may be true that all   
events1 however apparently casual or    
fortuitous1 are governed by natural     
laws2 it may be equally true that all   
events are determined1 directed1 or     
controlled by ,divine ,providence3 but  
as long as some events depend on causes 
which are certainly known1 and other    
events on causes which are not known1 or
 on a combination of causes whose       
results cannot be foreseen1 so long will
 there be room for the distinction      
between the regular and the accidental  
phenomena of human experience4 ,this    
distinction1 indeed1 is explicitly      
recognized in ,scripture itself2 for    
while it speaks of all events as being  
infallibly known to ,god1 it speaks of  
some events that are accidental with    
reference to man4#bai ,the unknown1     
unforeseen1 and unexpected incidents of 
life1 which constitute all that is      
apparently casual or accidental1 may be1
 and we believe they are1 really subject
 both to natural laws and to ,god's     

providential will2 but they are removed 
far beyond our comprehension or control2
 and being so1 they are admirably       
fitted1 as a part of the complex scheme 
of ,his natural and moral government1 to
 serve one of the most important        
practical ends for which it is designed1
 by impressing us with a sense of       
constant dependence on a higher ,power1 
and of dutiful subjection to a superior 
,will4  ,but while1 in this sense and to
 this extent1 the doctrine of ,chance is
 retained1 it must be utterly rejected  
as a means of accounting either for the 
creation or government of the world4    
,for1 on the supposition of a ,supreme  
,being1 there can be no chance with     
reference to ,him2 and without such a   
supposition1 we cannot account for the  
regularity which prevails in the course 
of ,nature1 and which indicates a       
presiding ,intelligence and a           
controlling ,will4 4 #b4 ,but this very 
regularity of ,nature1 when viewed apart
 from the cross accidents of life1 is   

apt to engender the opposite idea of    
,fate or ,destiny1 as if all events were
 determined by laws alike necessary and 
invariable1 inherent in the constitution
 of ,nature1 and independent of the     
concurrence or the control of the       
,divine will4 ,we are not sure1 indeed1 
that the idea of ,fate or ,destiny is   
suggested solely1 or even mainly1 by the
 regular sequences of the natural world2
 we rather think that it is more        
frequently derived from those unexpected
 and crushing calamities which occur in 
spite of every precaution of human      
foresight and prudence1 and that thus it
 may be identified1 in a great measure1 
with the doctrine of ,chance1 or1 at    
least1 the one may run into and blend   
with the other4 ,but if any attempt were
 made to establish it by proof1 recourse
 would be had to the established order  
and regular sequences of ,nature1 as    
affording its most plausible            
verification1 although they afford no   
real sanction to it1 in so far as it    

differs from the ,christian doctrine of 
,providence4  ,dr4 ,cudworth discusses  
this subject at great length1 and makes 
mention of three distinct forms of      
,fatalism4 ,the first1 which is         
variously designated as the ,democritic1
 the ,physiological1 or the ,atheistic  
,fate1 is that which teaches the        
material or physical necessity of all   
things1 and ascribes all natural        
phenomena to the mechanical laws of     
matter and motion4 ,the second1 which is
 described as a species of ,divine or   
,theistic ,fate1 is that which admits   
the existence and agency of ,god1 but   
teaches that ,he both decrees and does1 
purposes and performs all things1       
whether good or evil1 as if ,he were the
 only real agent in the universe1 or as 
if ,he had no moral character1 and were1
 as ,cudworth graphically expresses it1 
mere arbitrary will omnipotent3 this he 
describes as a ,divine ,fate immoral and
 violent4 ,the third1 which is also     
designated as a species of ,divine or   

,theistic ,fate1 is that which          
recognizes both the existence of ,god1  
and the agency of other beings in       
,nature1 together with the radical      
distinction between moral good and evil1
 but teaches that men are so far under  
necessity as to be incapable of moral   
and responsible action1 and unfit       
subjects of praise or blame1 of reward  
or punishment3 this he describes as     
,divine ,fate moral and natural4 ,these 
three are all justly held to be         
erroneous or defective views of the     
,divine government1 and1 as such1 they  
are strenuously and successfully        
opposed4#bbj  ,but there is room for a  
fourth doctrine1 which may be designated
 as the ,christian doctrine of          
,providence1 and which combines in      
itself all the great fundamental truths 
for which ,dr4 ,cudworth contends1 while
 it leaves open1 or1 at least1 does not 
necessarily determine1 some of the      
collateral questions on which he might  
have differed from many of its          

defenders4 ,this doctrine affirms1      
first1 the existence and attributes of  
,god1 as a holy and righteous ,moral    
,governor2 secondly1 the real existence 
and actual operation of second causes1  
distinct from1 but not independent of1  
the ,first ,cause2 thirdly1 the         
operation of these causes according to  
their several natures1 so that1 under   
,god's ,providence1 events fall out     
either necessarily1 freely1 or          
contingently1 according to the kind of  
intermediate agency by which they are   
brought to pass2 and1 fourthly1 that in 
the case of intelligent and moral       
agents1 ample room is left for          
responsible action1 and for the         
consequent sentence of praise or blame1 
reward or punishment1 notwithstanding   
the eternal decree of ,god1 and the     
constant control which ,he exercises    
over all ,his creatures and all their   
actions4 ,these four positions may be   
all harmoniously combined in one        
self-consistent and comprehensive       

statement2 and1 in point of fact1 they  
are all included in the ,christian      
doctrine of ,providence1 as that has    
been usually explained and defended by  
the various sections of the ,catholic   
,church4 ,not one of them is omitted or 
denied4#bba ,they seem fairly to meet1  
or rather fully to exhaust1 the demands 
of ,dr4 ,cudworth himself1 when he says3
 ,these three things are1 as we         
conceive1 the fundamentals or essentials
 of true religion1 first1 that all      
things in the world do not float without
 a head or governor1 but that there is a
 ,god1 an omnipotent understanding      
,being1 presiding over all2 secondly1   
that this ,god being essentially good   
and just1 there is something in its own 
nature immutably and eternally just and 
unjust1 and not by arbitrary will1 law1 
and command only2 and lastly1 that there
 is something ,greek3 eph' hmin1 or that
 we are so far forth principals or      
masters of our own actions as to be     
accountable to justice for them1 or to  

make us guilty or blameworthy for what  
we do amiss1 and to deserve punishment  
accordingly4 ,all these fundamentals of 
true religion are explicitly recognized 
in the ,christian doctrine of           
,providence1 which stands out1          
therefore1 in striking contrast with the
 ,atheistic1 and even ,theistic1        
theories of ,fate which he condemns2 and
 they are as zealously maintained       
7whether with the same consistency is a 
different question7 by ,edwards1        
,chalmers1 and ,woods1 on the one side1 
as they ever were by ,cudworth1 ,clarke1
 and ,tappan1 on the other4  ,it may be 
said1 however1 that the doctrine of     
,providence1 especially when taught in  
connection with that of ,predestination1
 does unavoidably imply some kind of    
necessity1 incompatible with free moral 
agency1 and that1 to all practical      
intents1 it amounts substantially to    
,fate or ,destiny4 ,but we are prepared 
to show that there is neither the same  
kind of necessity in the one scheme     

which is implied in the other1 nor the  
same reason for denying moral and       
responsible agency in the case of       
intelligent beings4 ,in doing so1 we    
must carefully discriminate1 in the     
first instance1 between the various     
senses in which the term necessity is   
used4 ,dr4 ,waterland has given a       
comprehensive division of necessity into
 four kinds1 denominated respectively1  
the ,logical1 the ,moral1 the ,physical1
 and the ,metaphysical4  ,logical       
necessity exists wherever the contrary  
of what is affirmed would imply a       
contradiction2 and in this sense we call
 it a necessary truth that two and two  
make four1 that a whole is greater than 
any of its parts1 and that a circle     
neither is nor can be a square4 ,it     
amounts to nothing more than the        
affirmation1 that the same idea or thing
 is what it is2 and it relates solely to
 the connection between one idea and    
another1 or between one proposition and 
another1 or between subject and         

predicate4 ,this is logical necessity2  
we cannot1 with our present laws of     
thought1 conceive the thing to be       
otherwise without implying a            
contradiction4  ,moral necessity1 again1
 denotes a connection1 not between one  
idea and another1 or between the subject
 and predicate of a proposition1 but    
between means and ends4 ,it is not      
necessary absolutely that any man should
 continue to live2 but it is necessary  
morally that1 if he would continue to   
live1 he should eat and sleep1 food and 
rest being1 according to the established
 constitution of ,nature1 a necessary   
condition or indispensable means for the
 support of life4 ,there is in like     
manner a moral necessity that we should 
be virtuous and obedient1 if we would be
 truly happy1 virtue and obedience      
being1 according to the established     
constitution of ,nature1 an             
indispensable means of true and         
permanent happiness4 ,this is moral     
necessity which has reference solely to 

the connection between means and ends1  
but that connection1 being ordained1 is 
immutable and invariable4  ,physical    
necessity1 again1 exists wherever there 
is either a causal connection between   
antecedents and consequents in the      
material world1 or even a coactive and  
compulsory constraint in the moral      
world4 ,it is physically necessary that 
fire should burn substances that are    
combustible1 that water and other fluids
 should flow down a declivity1 and rise 
again but only to a certain level2 and  
there is the like kind of necessity1    
wherever a moral agent is forced to act 
under irresistible compulsion1--as when 
the assassin seizes hold of another's   
arm1 and thrusting a deadly weapon into 
his hand1 directs it1 by his own        
overmastering will1 to the brain or     
heart of his victim4 ,in this latter    
case1 the unwilling instrument of his   
revenge or malice is not held to be the 
guilty party1 but the more powerful     
agent by whom that instrument was       

employed4 ,this is physical necessity1  
which relates solely to the connection  
between cause and effect in the material
 world1 and1 in the moral1 to the       
compulsory action of one agent on       
another4  ,metaphysical necessity1      
again1 can be predicated of ,god only1  
and denotes the peculiar property or    
prerogative of ,his being1 as existing  
necessarily1 immutably1 and eternally1  
or1 to use a scholastic phrase1 the     
necessary connection in ,his case       
between essence and existence4          
,omitting the last1 which does not fall 
properly within the limits of our       
present inquiry1 we may say with regard 
to the three first1 that each of them   
may exist1 and that each of them does   
really operate1 in the present          
constitution of ,nature4 ,we are        
subject1 unquestionably1 to certain laws
 of thought1 which we can neither repeal
 nor resist1 and which impose upon us a 
logical necessity to conceive1 to       
reason1 and to infer1 not according to  

our own whim or caprice1 but according  
to established rules4 ,we are equally   
subject to certain conditions of        
existence1--arising partly from our own 
constitution1 partly from the           
constitution of external objects and the
 relations subsisting between the       
two1--which lay us under a moral        
necessity of using suitable means for   
the accomplishment of our purposes and  
plans4 ,and we are still further subject
 to physical necessity1 in so far as our
 material frame is liable to be affected
 by external influences1 and even our   
muscular powers may be overmastered and 
subordinated by a more vigorous or      
resolute will than our own4 ,these three
 kinds of necessity exist2 they are all 
constituent parts of that vast scheme of
 government under which we are placed2  
and the question arises1 ,whether1 when 
the existence of these necessary laws is
 admitted1 we can still maintain the    
doctrine which affirms the providential 
government of ,god and the moral agency 

of man2 or whether we must not resolve  
the whole series of events1 both in the 
natural and moral worlds1 into the blind
 and inexorable dominion of ,destiny or 
,fate8  ,we answer1 first1 that there is
 nothing in any one of these three kinds
 of necessity1 nor in all of them       
combined1 which1 when rightly           
understood1 should either exclude the   
idea of ,divine ,providence1 or impair  
our sense of moral and responsible      
agency4 ,we may not be so free1 nor so  
totally exempt from the operation of    
established laws1 as some of the        
advocates of human liberty have         
supposed3 but we may be free enough1    
notwithstanding1 to be regarded and     
treated as moral and accountable beings4
 ,we may be subject to certain laws of  
thought1 and yet may be responsible for 
our opinions and beliefs1 in so far as  
these depend on our voluntary acts1 on  
our attention or inattention to the     
truth and its evidence1 on our use or   
neglect of the appropriate means1 on our

 love or our hatred to the light4 ,and  
so we may be subject to certain other   
laws1 in various departments of our     
complex experience1 without being either
 restrained or impelled by such external
 coaction as alone can exempt creatures1
 constituted as we know and feel        
ourselves to be1 from the righteous     
retributions of ,god4  ,we answer1      
secondly1 that the doctrine of          
,providence1 even when it is combined   
with that of ,predestination1 represents
 all events as falling out according to 
the nature of second causes1            
necessarily1 contingently1 or freely2   
nay1 as falling out so that no violence 
is offered to the will of the creature1 
nor is the liberty or contingency of    
second causes taken away1 but rather    
established4 ,it follows that if there  
be either on earth or in heaven any free
 cause1 or any moral and responsible    
agent1 his nature is not changed1 nor is
 the character of his agency altered1 by
 that providential government which ,god

 exercises over all ,his creatures and  
all their actions2 he still continues to
 develop1 within certain limits imposed 
by unalterable laws1 his own proper     
individuality1 or his personal          
character1 in its relation to the law   
and government of ,god4  ,we answer1    
thirdly1 that the moral and responsible 
agency of man cannot be justly held to  
be incompatible with the ,providence and
 ,supremacy of ,god1 unless it can be   
shown that1 in the exercise of the      
latter1 ,god acts in the way of physical
 coaction or irresistible constraint1   
and further1 that man is not only       
controlled and governed in his actions1 
but compelled to act in opposition to   
his own will4 ,but no enlightened       
advocate either of ,providence or       
,predestination will affirm that there  
is any physical necessity1 imposed by   
the ,divine will1 which constrains men  
to commit sin1 or that ,god is the      
author of sin4 ,let no man say when he  
is tempted1 ,i am tempted of ,god3 for  

,god cannot be tempted of evil1 neither 
tempteth ,he any man4 ,but every man is 
tempted1 when he is drawn away of his   
own lusts and enticed4#bbb  ,we answer1 
fourthly1 that when a moral necessity or
 moral inability is spoken of by divines
 as making sin certain and inevitable in
 the case of man1 we must carefully     
distinguish between the constitution and
 the state of human nature1--its        
constitution as it was originally       
created1 and its state as it at present 
exists4 ,there might be nothing in the  
original constitution of human nature   
which could interfere in any way with   
the freedom of man as an intelligent1   
moral1 and responsible being2 and yet1  
in consequence of the introduction of   
sin1 his state may now be so far changed
 as to have become a state of moral     
bondage4 ,but the constitution of his   
nature1 in virtue of which he was at the
 first1 and must ever continue to be1 a 
moral and accountable being1 remains    
unreversed2 from being holy1 he has     

become depraved1 but he has not ceased  
to be a subject of moral government1 and
 the evils that are incident to his     
present position must be ascribed1 not  
to ,god's creative will1 but1 in the    
first instance1 to man's voluntary      
disobedience1 and1 in the second1 to a  
,divine judicial sentence following     
thereupon4  ,and finally1 we answer that
 the theory which ascribes all events1  
both in the natural and moral worlds1 to
 the blind and inexorable dominion of   
,destiny or ,fate1 leaves altogether    
unexplained many of the most certain and
 familiar facts of human experience4    
,there are two large classes of facts   
which no theory of ,fate can possibly   
explain4 ,the first comprises all those 
manifest indications of provident       
forethought1 intelligent design1 and    
moral purpose1 which appear in the      
course of ,nature1 and which cannot be  
accounted for by a blind1 unintelligent1
 undesigning cause4 ,the second         
comprises all those facts of            

consciousness which bear witness to the 
moral nature and responsible agency of  
man1 as the subject of a government     
which rewards and punishes his actions1 
in some measure1 even here1 and which   
irresistibly suggests the idea of a     
future reckoning and retribution4 ,these
 two classes of facts must either be    
ignored1 or left as insoluble1 by any   
theory which advocates blind ,fate or   
,destiny1 in opposition to the          
overruling ,providence and moral        
government of ,god4  ,these answers are 
sufficient1 if not to remove all mystery
 from the methods of the ,divine        
administration 7for who would undertake 
to fathom the counsels of ,him whose    
judgments are unsearchable and ,his ways
 past finding out871 yet to show at     
least that a ,divine ,providence is more
 credible in itself1 and better         
supported by evidence1 than any theory  
of ,destiny or ,fate2 that the facts to 
which the latter appeals may be         
explained consistently with the former1 

while the facts on which the former is  
founded must either be left altogether  
out of view1 or at least left           
unexplained1 if the doctrine of ,fate be
 substituted for that of ,providence4   
,we have thus far compared the two      
theories of ,chance and ,fate1 by which 
some have attempted to explain the      
system of the universe1 and have        
contrasted both with the ,christian     
doctrine of ,providence4 ,on a review of
 the whole discussion1 we think it must 
be evident that the latter combines     
whatever is true and valuable in each of
 these opposite theories1 while it      
eliminates and rejects whatever is      
unsound or noxious in either4 ,it may   
seem strange that we should speak as if 
anything1 either true or valuable1 could
 be involved in the theories of ,chance 
and ,destiny2 and1 unquestionably1      
considered as theories designed to      
explain the system of the world1 and to 
supersede the doctrine of ,providence1  
they are1 in all their distinctive      

peculiarities1 utterly false and        
worthless4 ,but it seldom1 if ever1     
happens that any theory obtains a       
wide-spread and permanent influence1    
which does not stand connected with some
 partial truth1 or which cannot appeal  
to some apparent natural evidence4 ,we  
have already seen that there are two    
distinct classes of events in ,nature1  
and two corresponding classes of        
sentiments and feelings in the human    
mind2 that the latter point1            
respectively1 to the constant and the   
variable1 the certain and the doubtful1 
the causal and the casual2 and that were
 either of the two to acquire an        
absolute ascendancy over us1 it would   
naturally lead to one or other of two   
opposite extremes--the theory of        
,chance1 or the theory of ,fate4 ,now1  
the doctrine of ,providence takes       
account of both these classes of        
phenomena and feelings1 so as to combine
 whatever is true and useful in each of 
the two rival theories1 while it strikes

 out and rejects whatever is false in   
either1 by placing all things under the 
government and control of a living1     
intelligent1 personal ,god4  ,it is     
scarcely necessary to add that the views
 and sentiments which the ,christian    
doctrine of ,providence inspires are    
widely different from those which must  
be generated by a belief either in      
,chance or in ,fate1 as the supreme     
arbiter of our destiny4 ,the doctrine   
which teaches us to look up and to say1 
with childlike confidence1 ,our ,,father
 which art in heaven1 is worth more than
 all the philosophy in the world6 ,could
 we only realize it as a truth1 and have
 habitual recourse to it in all our     
anxieties and straits1 we should feel   
that1 if it be a deeply serious and     
solemn fact that the ,lord reigneth1 it 
is also1 to all his trusting and        
obedient children1 alike cheering and   
consolatory2 and he who can relish the  
sweetness of our ,lord's words when he  
spake of the birds of the air and the   

flowers of the field1 will see at once  
that ,stoicism is immeasurably inferior1
 both as a philosophy and a faith1 to   
,christian ,theism4#bbc  ,,footnotes3   
#bag ,,dr4 ,,cudworth1 ,intellectual    
,system1 ,i4 #ge1 #hb1 #ajf1 #aea2 ,,ii4
 #gg1 #ccd4 ,,gassendi1 ,syntagma4 ,,dr4
 ,j4 ,m4 ,,goode1 ,lucretius1 ,preface4 
#bah ,,la ,,place1 ,des ,probabilities4 
#bai ,eccles4 #i3 #aa2 ,luke #aj3 #ca2  
,deut4 #ai3 #e  #bbj ,,dr4 ,,cudworth1  
,intellectual ,system1 ,i4 #cc4         
,american ,edition4  #bba ,,dr4 ,,john  
,,collinges1 ,on ,providence4 ,dr4      
,price1 ,dissertations4 ,,samuel        
,,rutherford1 ,de ,providentia ,dei4    
,,dr4 ,,charnock1 ,on ,providence4  #bbb
 ,james #a3 #ac1 #ad4 ,see              
,m',,laurin',s profound discourse on    
this text4  #bbc ,,michelet has         
presented a graphic portrait of a       
,stoic3--,l'individu sous la forme du   
,stoicisme1--ramass soi1--appuy sur     
soi1--ne demandant rien aux dieux1--ne  
les accusant point1--ne daignant pas mme

 les nier4--,introduction  l',historie  
,universelle4     ,,chapter ,,vii4      
,,theory ,,of ,,religious ,,liberalism4 
,the ,eclectic method of ,philosophy1   
which was first exemplified in the      
celebrated ,school of ,alexandria1 and  
which has been recently revived under   
the auspices of ,m4 ,cousin in the      
,schools of ,paris1 may be regarded1 in 
one of its aspects1 as the most         
legitimate1 and1 indeed1 as the only    
practicable course of successful        
intellectual research4 ,if by           
eclecticism we were to understand the   
habit of culling from every system that 
portion or fragment of truth which may  
be contained in it1 and of rejecting the
 error with which it may have been      
associated or alloyed1--in other words1 
the art of sifting the wheat from the   
chaff1 so as to preserve the former1    
while the latter is dissipated and      
dispersed1--there could be no valid     
objection to it which would not equally 
apply to every method of ,inductive     

,inquiry4 ,but this is not the sense in 
which eclecticism has been adopted and  
eulogized by the ,parisian ,school4     
,for1 not content with affirming that   
the same system may contain both truth  
and error1 and that it is our duty to   
separate the one from the other1--which 
is the only rational eclecticism1--,m4  
,cousin maintains that error itself is  
only a partial or incomplete truth2 that
 if it be an evil1 it is a necessary    
evil1 and an eventual good1 since it is 
a means1 according to a fundamental law 
of human development1 of evolving truth 
and advancing philosophy2 and that thus 
the grossest errors may exert a salutary
 influence1 insomuch that ,atheism      
itself may be regarded as               
providential4#bbd ,in this form1        
,eclecticism becomes a huge and         
heterogeneous system of ,,syncretism1   
including all varieties of opinion1     
whether true or false2 and it has a     
natural and inevitable tendency to issue
 in a spirit of ,,indifference to the   

claims of truth1 which may assume the   
form either of ,philosophical           
,skepticism or of ,religious            
,liberalism1 according to the taste and 
temperament of the individual who       
embraces it4  ,in the form of ,religious
 ,liberalism1 it has often been         
exemplified in our own country by those 
who1 averse from definite articles of   
faith1 and prone to latitudinarian      
license1 have studiously set themselves 
to disparage the importance of the      
peculiar doctrines of ,christianity1 and
 even to obliterate the distinction     
between the various forms of ,religion1 
natural and revealed1 by representing   
them all as so many varieties of the    
same religious sentiment1 so many       
diverse1 but not antagonistic1          
embodiments of the same radical         
principle4 ,in the writings of ,pope1   
several expressions occur which are     
easily susceptible of this construction1
 and which have often been quoted and   
applied in defence of ,religious        

,liberalism1 notwithstanding his        
explicit disavowal of it in his letter  
to the younger ,racine1 prefixed to the 
collected edition of his works4 ,but on 
the continent of ,europe1 ,syncretism   
has been much more fully developed1 and 
fearlessly applied to every department  
of human thought4 ,pushed to its        
ultimate consequences1 it obliterates   
the distinction not only between truth  
and error1 but also between virtue and  
vice1 nay even between ,religion and    
,atheism2 and represents them all as    
constituent parts of a scheme1 which is 
developed under a law of fatal          
necessity1 but which is described also  
as a scheme of optimism4 ,its range is  
supposed to be unlimited3 for it has    
been applied to the ,history of         
,philosophy1 by ,cousin1 to the theory  
of the ,passions1 by ,fourier1 to the   
doctrines of ,christianity1 by ,quinet  
and ,michelet1 and to the ,philosophy of
 ,religion1 by ,benjamin ,constant4 ,the
 practical result of such speculations  

is a growing skepticism or indifference 
in regard to the distinction between    
truth and error1 and a very faint       
impression of the difference between    
good and evil4#bbe ,the speculations of 
,pierre ,leroux1 the head1 if not the   
founder1 of the ,humanitarian ,school1  
are strongly tinged with this spirit3   
they amount to a justification of evil1 
an apotheosis of man4#bbf  ,we do not   
class these speculations among the      
formal systems of ,atheism1 although    
they have often been associated with it2
 but we advert to them as specimens of  
that style of thinking which has a      
natural tendency to induce an atheistic 
frame of mind4#bbg ,the profession of   
such sentiments is a symptom rather of  
incipient danger1 than of confirmed     
disease4 ,but that danger is far from   
being either doubtful or insignificant4 
,for should the distinction between     
truth and error be obliterated or even  
feebly discerned1 should it come to be  
regarded as a matter of comparative     

indifference whether our beliefs be true
 or false1 should it1 above all1 become 
our prevailing habit to call good evil1 
and evil good1 we can scarcely fail1 in 
such circumstances1 to fall into a      
course of practical ,atheism2 and this1 
as all experience testifies1 will leave 
us an easy prey1 especially in seasons  
of peculiar temptation and trial1 to any
 form of speculative ,infidelity that   
may happen to acquire a temporary       
ascendancy4 ,if there be no dogmatic    
,atheism involved in this state of mind1
 there is at least the germ of          
skepticism1 which may soon grow and     
ripen into the open and avowed denial of
 religious truth4 ,at the very least1 it
 will issue in that heartless           
indifference to all creeds and all      
definite articles of faith1 which1 under
 the plausible but surreptitious        
disguise of freethinking and liberalism1
 is the nearest practical approximation 
to utter ,infidelity4#bbh  ,the system  
which is known under the name of        

,religious ,liberalism or ,indifference 
has been recently avowed in our own     
country with a frankness and boldness   
which can leave no room for doubt in    
regard to its ultimate tendency4 ,the   
late ,blanco ,white avowed it as his    
mature conviction1 that to declare any  
one unworthy of the name of ,christian  
because he does not agree with your     
belief1 is to fall into the intolerance 
of the articled ,churches2 that the     
moment the name ,christian is made      
necessarily to contain in its           
signification belief in certain         
historical or metaphysical propositions1
 that moment the name itself becomes a  
creed1--the length of that creed is of  
little consequence4#bbi ,this is the    
extreme on one side1 and it plainly     
implies that no one article of faith is 
necessary1 and that a man may be a      
,christian who neither acknowledges an  
historical ,christ1 nor believes a      
single doctrine which ,he taught6 ,but  
there is an extreme also on the other   

side1 which is exemplified in the       
singularly eloquent1 but equally        
unsatisfactory1 treatise of the ,abb    
,lamennais1#bcj in which1 as then an    
ardent and somewhat arrogant advocate of
 the ,romish ,church1 he attempts to    
fasten the charge of ,indifference or   
,liberalism on the ,protestant system1  
and to prove that there can be no true  
faith1 and of course no salvation1      
beyond the ,catholic pale4 ,the chief   
interest of his treatise depends on his 
peculiar theory of certitude1 to which  
we shall have occasion to advert in the 
sequel2 in the meantime1 we may notice  
briefly the grievous error into which he
 has fallen in treating of the faith    
which is necessary to salvation4 ,he    
overstates the case as much1 at least1  
as it has been understated by the       
abettors of ,liberalism4 ,the latter    
deny the necessity of any articles of   
faith2 the former demands the implicit  
reception of every doctrine propounded  
by the ,romish ,church4 ,he repudiates  

the distinction between fundamentals and
 non-fundamentals in ,religion1 and     
insists that1 as every truth is declared
 by the same infallible authority1 so   
every truth must be received with the   
same unquestioning faith4 ,he forgets   
that while all the truths of ,scripture 
ought to be believed by reason of the   
,divine authority on which they rest1   
yet some truths are more directly       
connected with our salvation than       
others1 as well as more clearly and     
explicitly revealed4 ,nor are we justly 
liable to the charge of ,indifference or
 ,liberalism when we tolerate a         
difference of opinion1 on some points1  
among men who are1 in all important     
respects1 substantially agreed3 for true
 toleration is the fruit1 not of        
unbelief or indifference1 but of charity
 and candor2 and it is sanctioned in    
,scripture1 which enjoins that we should
 receive those who are weak in the      
faith1 but not to doubtful disputations1
 and that every man should be fully     

persuaded in his own mind4#bca  ,but it 
is not so much in its relation to the   
articles of the ,christian faith1 as in 
its bearing on the different forms of   
true and false religion1 that the theory
 of ,liberalism comes into collision    
with the cause of ,theism1 and evinces  
its infidel tendencies4 ,if any one can 
regard with the same complacency1 or    
with the same apathetic indifference1   
all the varieties of religious or       
superstitious belief and worship2 if he 
can discern no radical or important     
difference between ,monotheism and      
,polytheism1 or between the ,protestant 
and ,popish systems2 if he be disposed  
to treat each of these as equally true  
or equally false1 as alike beneficial or
 injurious in their practical influence1
 then this may be regarded as a         
sufficient proof that he is ignorant of 
the evidence1 and blind to the claims1  
of truth1--a mere skeptical dreamer1 if 
not a speculative ,atheist4  ,an attempt
 has recently been made to place the    

theory of ,religious ,liberalism on a   
philosophical basis1 by representing    
religion as a mere sentiment1 which may 
be equally elicited and exemplified in  
various forms of belief and worship4    
,several writers1 following in the wake 
of ,schleiermacher1 who gave such a     
powerful impulse to the mind of         
,germany1 have made ,religion to consist
 either in a sense of dependence1 or in 
a consciousness of the infinite2 and    
this sentiment1 as well as the          
spontaneous intuitions of reason with   
which it is associated1 is said to be   
alike natural1 universal1 and           
invariable1 the essential principle of  
all ,religion1 the root whence have     
sprung all the various forms of belief  
and worship4 ,these varieties are       
supposed to be more or less rational and
 salutary1 according to the conception  
which they respectively exhibit of the  
nature and character of ,god1--a        
conception which may be endlessly       
diversified by the intellect1 or the    

imagination1 or the passions of         
different men2 while all the forms of   
belief are radically identical1 since   
they all spring from the same           
ground-principle1 and are only so many  
distinct manifestations of it4 ,thus    
,mr4 ,parker tells us that1 stripping   
the religious sentiment in man of all   
accidental circumstances peculiar to the
 age1 nation1 sect1 or individual1 and  
pursuing a sharp and final analysis till
 the subject and predicate can no longer
 be separated1 we find as the ultimate  
fact1 that the religious sentiment is   
this1--'a sense of dependence4' ,this   
sentiment does not itself disclose the  
character1 and still less the nature and
 essence1 of the object on which it     
depends1 no more than the senses declare
 the nature of their objects4 ,like them
 it acts spontaneously and              
unconsciously1 as soon as the outward   
occasion offers1 with no effort of will1
 forethought1 or making up the mind4    
,but the religious sentiment implies its

 object2 444 and there is but one       
religion1 though many theologies4#bcb   
,there is1 as it appears to us1 a       
mixture of some truth with much grave   
and dangerous error1 in these and       
similar speculations4 ,it is an         
important truth1 and one which has been 
too often overlooked in treating the    
evidences of ,natural ,theology1 that   
the sentiments of the human mind1 not   
less than its intuitive perceptions or  
logical processes1 have a close relation
 to the subject of inquiry2 but it is an
 error to suppose that all the          
sentiments having a religious tendency  
can be reduced to one1 whether it be    
called a sense of dependence or a       
consciousness of the infinite1 for there
 are other sentiments besides these     
which are equally subservient to the    
uses of ,religion1 such as the sense of 
moral obligation1 of the true1 of the   
ideal1 of the sublime1 and of the       
beautiful4 ,it is also an important     
truth1 that there are spontaneous       

intuitions of reason1 or fundamental and
 invariable laws of thought1 which come 
into action at the first dawn of        
experience1 and which have a close      
connection with the proof of the being  
and perfections of ,god2 but it is an   
error to suppose that the proof depends 
exclusively on these1 or that it could  
be made out irrespective of the evidence
 afforded by the works of ,creation and 
,providence4 ,it is further an important
 truth1 that the religious sentiment1 or
 religious tendency1 is natural to man1 
and that it may appear either in the    
form of ,religion or ,superstition3 but 
it is an error to suppose that there is 
but one religion1 although many         
theologies2 for these theologies must   
spring from fundamentally different     
conceptions of ,god1 and what are these 
conceptions1 in their ultimate analysis1
 but so many beliefs1 doctrines1 or     
dogmas1 which1 whether formally defined 
or not in articles of faith1 have in    
them the self-same essence which is     

supposed to belong only to the bigotry  
of articled churches8 ,but the          
fundamental1 the fatal error of all     
these speculations1 is the denial of any
 stable and permanent standard of       
objective truth4 ,truth is made purely  
subjective1 and1 of course1 it must also
 be progressive1 insomuch that the truth
 of a former age may be an error in the 
present1 and the supposed truth of the  
present age may become obsolete         
hereafter4 ,so that there is really     
nothing certain in human knowledge2 and 
truth may be justly described as never  
existing1 but only becoming1 as never   
possessed1 though ever pursued2 it is a 
verit mobile1 a truth not in esse1 but  
in fieri4 ,hence we read in recent      
speculations of a new ,christianity1 of 
a new ,gospel1 and of the ,church of the
 ,future1 as if there could be any other
 ,christianity than that of the ,new    
,testament1 any other ,gospel than that 
of ,jesus ,christ1 or any other ,church 
than that of apostolic times4  ,i have  

adverted to this theory1 because1 while 
it is of little value in a speculative  
point of view1 it is often found to     
exert a powerful practical influence1   
especially on men of affairs1 men who   
have travelled in various countries1 or 
who have been employed in the arts of   
diplomacy and government2 and who1      
finding religious worship everywhere1   
but clothed in different forms1 and     
marking its subserviency to social and  
political interests1 have been too prone
 to place all the varieties of belief in
 the same category1 if not precisely on 
the same level1 and to regard with      
indifference1 perhaps even with         
indulgence1 the grossest corruptions    
both of ,natural and ,revealed          
,religion4 ,the world is surely old     
enough1 and its history sufficiently    
instructive1 to prove1 even to the most 
indifferent statesmen1 that truth is    
always salutary1 and error noxious1 to  
the commonwealth1 and that nowhere is   
society more safe1 orderly1 or stable1  

than in those countries which are       
blessed with pure and undefiled         
religion4 ,but let the opinion spread   
from the prince to the peasant1 from the
 aristocracy to the artisans1 from the  
philosopher to the public1 that there is
 either no difference1 or only a slight 
and trivial one1 between truth and      
error1 that it matters little what a man
 believes1 or whether he believes at    
all3 let the general mind of the        
community become indoctrinated with such
 lessons1 and it needs no prophetic     
foresight to predict a crisis of        
unprecedented peril1 an era of reckless 
revolution4 ,a philosophic dreamer may  
affect a calm indifference1 a bland and 
benignant ,liberalism2 but a nation1 a  
community1 cannot be neutral or inert in
 regard to matters of faith3 it must and
 will be either religious or            
irreligious1 it must either love the    
truth or hate it3 it is too             
sharp-sighted1 and too much guided by   
homely common sense1 to believe that    

systems so opposite as ,paganism and    
,christianity1 or ,popery and           
,protestantism1 are harmonious          
manifestations of the same religious    
principle1 or equally beneficial to the 
,state4  ,,footnotes3  #bbd ,m4         
,,cousin1 ,introduction1 ,i4 #cah1 #cia1
 #dje1 #dai2 ,,ii4 #acd4 ,ibid41        
,fragmens ,philosophiques4 ,preface1    
,,vii4  #bbe ,,valroger1 ,etudes        
,critiques1 pp4 #aae1 #abf1 #aea1 #cjh1 
#caf4 ,,maret1 ,essai sur ,pantheisme1  
p4 #bdi4  #bbf ,p4 ,,leroux1 ,sur       
l',humanit1 #b vols4  #bbg ,,budd,,us1  
,de ,atheismo et ,superstitione1 pp4    
#ahd1 #bab4  #bbh ,,richard ,,bentley1  
,on ,freethinking1 ,boyle ,lectures4    
,,villemandy1 ,scepticismus ,debellatus1
 ,,iii4 ,his words are                  
remarkable3--,passim haec1 aliaque      
generis ejusdem1 placita                
disseminantur1--neque verum neque bonum1
 qualia sunt in seipsis1 posse dignosci2
 hinc que adeo sectandam esse duntaxat  
cum veri1 tum boni1 similitudinem3 qu si

 stent ac valeant1--illud omne erit     
verum1 illud omne quum1--illud omne pium
 et religiosum1--illud omne utile1 quod 
cuiquam tale videatur2 privatam cujusque
 conscientiam supremam esse agendorum1  
vel non agendorum1 normam4  #bbi ,,james
 ,,martineau1 ,rationale of ,religious  
,inquiry1 p4 #ajh4  #bcj ,f4 ,,de       
,,lamennais1 ,essai sur l',indifference 
en matiere de la ,religion1 #d vols4    
,paris1 #ahdd4  #bca ,romans #ad3 #a1   
#e4  #bcb ,,theodore ,,parker1          
,discourse of ,matters pertaining to    
,religion1 pp4 #ad1 #ag4     ,,chapter  
,,viii4  ,,theories ,,of ,,certitude    
,,and ,,skepticism4   ,we formerly      
adverted to the distinction between     
,dogmatic and ,skeptical ,atheism2 and1 
believing that the latter is the form in
 which it is most prevalent1 as well as 
most insidious and plausible1 we now    
propose to review some recent theories  
both of ,certitude and ,skepticism1     
which have sometimes been applied to    
throw doubt on the evidence of          

,christian ,theism4  ,the ,academy of   
,moral and ,political ,sciences in the  
,french ,institute announced in #ahdc   
the theory of ,certitude as the subject 
of a ,prize ,essay1 and issued the      
following programme as a guide to the   
competitors in the selection of the     
principal topics of discussion3  #a4 ,to
 determine the character of ,certitude1 
and what distinguishes it from          
everything else4 ,for example1 ,is      
,certitude the same with the highest    
probability8  #b4 ,what is the faculty1 
or what are the faculties1 which give us
 ,certitude8 ,if several faculties of   
knowledge are supposed to exist1 to     
state with precision the differences    
between them4  #c4 ,of ,truth and its   
foundations4 ,is truth the reality      
itself1--the nature of things falling   
under the knowledge of man8--or is it   
nothing but an appearance1--a           
conception1 necessary or arbitrary1 of  
the human mind8  #d4 ,to expound and    
discuss the most celebrated opinions1   

ancient and modern1 on the problem of   
,certitude1 and to follow them out into 
their theoretical and practical         
consequences4 ,to subject to a critical 
and profound examination the great      
monuments of ,skepticism1--the writings 
of ,sextus1 ,huet1 ,hume1 and ,kant4    
#e4 ,to inquire what are1 in spite of   
the assaults of ,skepticism1 the certain
 truths which ought to subsist in the   
,philosophy of our times4  ,such was the
 comprehensive programme of the ,french 
,institute2 and many circumstances      
concurred at the time to impart a       
peculiar interest to the competition4   
,m4 ,franck's volume#bcc contains the   
,report of the ,section of ,philosophy  
on the papers which had been prepared1  
and offers a careful analysis and       
critical estimate of their contents4    
,various other works#bcd not concerned  
in the competition appeared before and  
after it1 showing how much the          
philosophical mind of ,france had been  
occupied with this great theme1 while in

 ,britain it was attracting little or no
 attention4  ,this is the most recent   
discussion1 on a great scale1 of the    
theory of ,certitude4 ,but the question1
 far from being a new or modern         
speculation1 is as old as ,philosophy   
itself1 and has been perpetually        
reproduced in every age of intellectual 
activity4 ,plato discusses it1 chiefly  
in the ,thetetus1 ,sophist1 and         
,parmenides2 it was agitated by ,pyrrho1
 ,enesidemus1 and ,sextus ,empiricus1   
with that peculiar subtlety which       
belonged to the mind of ,greece2 and in 
more recent times it has reappeared in  
the writings of ,montaigne and ,bayle1  
,huet and ,pascal1 ,glanville1 ,hume1   
and ,kant4 ,even during the middle age1 
the controversy between the ,nominalists
 and ,realists had an important bearing 
on this subject3 so that from the whole 
history of ,philosophy we derive the    
impression of its fundamental           
importance1 an impression which is      
deepened and confirmed by the           

transcendent interest of the themes to  
which it has been applied4  ,in our     
present argument1 we are concerned with 
it only so far as it stands connected   
with the foundations of ,theology1 or as
 the right or wrong solution of the     
general question might affect the       
evidence for the ,being and ,perfections
 of ,god4 ,we do not propose1 therefore1
 to offer a full exposition of the      
philosophy of ,certitude1 still less to 
institute a detailed examination of the 
various theories which have been        
propounded respecting it4 ,it will be   
sufficient for our purpose if we merely 
sketch a comprehensive outline of the   
subject1 and select some of the more    
prominent points which have the most    
direct bearing on the grounds of our    
religious belief4 ,thus much may be     
accomplished by considering1 first1 the 
statement of the problem1 and1 secondly1
 the solution of it4  ,in regard to the 
statement of the problem1 it is         
necessary1 in the first instance1 to    

ascertain its precise import1 by        
determining the meaning of the term     
,certitude4 ,the programme of the       
,academy very properly places this      
question on the foreground1 ,is         
,certitude the same with the highest    
probability8 ,and it is the more        
necessary to give precedence to this    
part of the inquiry1 because it is      
notorious that there is a wide          
difference between the philosophical and
 the popular sense of ,certitude1--a    
difference which has often occasioned   
mutual misunderstanding between         
disputants1 and a profitless warfare of 
words4 ,in the philosophical sense of   
the term1 that only is said to be       
certain which is either an axiomatic    
truth1 intuitively discerned1 or a      
demonstrated truth1 derived from the    
former by rigorous deduction2 while all 
that part of our knowledge which is     
gathered from experience and            
observation1 however credible in itself 
and however surely believed1 is         

characterized as probable only4 ,in the 
popular sense of the term1 ,certitude   
belongs to all those truths1 of whatever
 kind and in whatever way acquired1 in  
regard to which we have no reason to be 
in doubt or suspense1 and which rest on 
sufficient and satisfactory evidence4 ,a
 philosopher is certain1 in his sense of
 the term1 only of what he intuitively  
perceives or can logically demonstrate2 
a peasant is certain1 in his sense of   
the term1 of whatever he distinctly     
sees1 or clearly remembers1 or receives 
on authentic testimony4 ,there is much  
reason1 we think1 to regret the         
existence of such a wide difference     
between the philosophical and the       
popular sense of an expression1 which   
must occur so often both in speculative 
discussion and in the intercourse of    
common life4 ,it may be doubted whether 
the metaphysician is entitled to borrow 
the language of society1 and to engraft 
upon it an arbitrary definition of his  
own1 different from and even            

inconsistent with that which it bears in
 common usage4 ,nor can he plead        
necessity as a sufficient excuse1 or the
 accuracy of his definition as an       
effectual safeguard1 since1 however     
needful it may be to discriminate       
between different species of ,certitude1
 by marking their peculiar              
characteristics and respective sources1 
surely this might be done more safely   
and satisfactorily by designating one   
kind of it as ,intuitive1 another as    
,demonstrative1 another as ,moral1 or   
,experimental1 or ,historical1 than it  
can be by any arbitrary restriction of  
the generic term to one or two of the   
many species which are comprehended     
under it4 ,no doubt there is a real     
distinction1 and one of great practical 
importance1 between certitude and       
probability2 but this distinction is not
 overlooked in the language of common   
life2--it is only necessary to determine
 what truths belong respectively to     
each3 whereas when all the truths of    

,experience1 and even1 in some cases1   
those of scientific ,induction1 are     
ranked under the head of probability    
merely1 is it not evident that the      
language of ,philosophy is in this      
respect at variance with the prevailing 
sense of mankind8  ,an attempt has      
sometimes been made to draw a           
distinction between popular and         
philosophical ,certitude1 or1 in other  
words1 between the unreflecting belief  
of the many and the scientific belief of
 the few4 ,thus1 ,m4 ,franck            
distinguishes ,certitude1 first of all1 
from the blind faith which commences    
with the earliest dawn of intelligence3 
then1 from the doubt which supervenes on
 the initial process of inquiry2 and    
then1 from that half-knowledge1 that    
middle term between doubt and certainty1
 which is called probability4 ,and ,m4  
,javari speaks of ,certitude as the     
complete demonstration1 acquired by     
reflection1 of the legitimacy of any    
judgment1 or of the reality of any      

object3 this is definitive and          
scientific certitude1 which is          
contrasted with that belief1 however    
strong1 which springs1 not from the     
reflective1 but the direct and          
spontaneous exercise of our             
faculties4#bce ,it must be evident that1
 according to this definition of the    
term1 ,certitude1 in the scientific     
sense of it1 as the product of          
philosophical reflection1 must be the   
privilege and prerogative of the few1   
who have been led by taste or education 
to cultivate the study of ,psychology2  
while the vast majority of men1 who are 
nevertheless as certain of the truths   
which they believe1 and1 to say the very
 least1 as little liable to doubt or    
skepticism1 as any class of philosophers
 whatever1 must be held to have no      
,certitude1 just because they have no   
,science4 ,it seems to be assumed that  
,certitude is the creation of ,science1 
the product of reflective thought2      
whereas it may be demonstrably shown    

that without ,certitude1 ,science would 
be impossible1 and that reflection can  
give forth nothing but what it finds    
previously existing in the storehouse of
 human consciousness4 ,it surveys the   
streams of belief1 and may trace up     
these streams to their highest springs2 
but it does not1 it cannot1 create a new
 truth1 or give birth to a higher       
certitude4 ,we have no disposition1     
assuredly1 to underrate the value of    
philosophical reflection1 or to         
disparage the science of ,psychology2   
the former may collect the materials and
 the latter may attempt the             
construction1 of a goodly and solid     
fabric3 but we cannot admit that the    
certainty of all our knowledge depends  
upon either of them1 or that it is      
confined exclusively to the metaphysical
 inquirer4 ,reflection adds nothing to  
the contents of human consciousness3 it 
examines our fundamental beliefs1 but   
originates none of them2 it discerns the
 elements and sources of certainty1 but 

can neither produce nor alter them4 ,its
 sole province is to examine and report4
 ,if ,certitude1 in the philosophical   
sense of it1 belongs to the reflex1     
,certainty1 in the popular sense1       
belongs to the direct and spontaneous1  
operations of the human mind4 ,we see   
and believe1 we remember and believe1 we
 compare and believe1 we hear and       
believe1 and that1 too1 with a feeling  
of confidence which needs no argument to
 confirm it1 and to which all the       
philosophy in the world could impart no 
additional strength4 ,certitude is not  
the creation of ,philosophy1 but the    
object of its study2 it exists          
independently of ,science1 and is only  
recognized by it2 and it would still    
exist as a constituent and              
indestructible element of human         
consciousness were ,metaphysics         
scattered to the wind4  ,it appears1    
again1 to have been assumed in some     
recent treatises1 that ,certitude       
belongs only to that portion of truth   

the denial of which would imply a       
contradiction1 or amount to the         
annihilation of reason4 ,is it1 then1 to
 be restricted to necessary and         
absolute1 as contrasted with contingent 
and relative truths8 ,am ,i not as      
certain that ,i see four objects before 
me1 as that two and two make four8 ,yet 
the former is a contingent1 the latter a
 necessary truth4 ,is not my personal   
consciousness infallibly certain8 ,and  
yet can it be said to belong to the head
 of necessary truth8 ,surely ,certitude 
is unduly restricted when we exclude    
from it many of our surest and strongest
 convictions1 which relate to truths    
attested by experience1 but the denial  
of which would involve no contradiction4
  ,the question has been still further  
complicated by extreme opinions of      
another kind4 ,it seems to have been    
assumed that there can be no ,certitude1
 unless we can explain the rationale of 
our knowledge1 and even account for the 
objects of our knowledge by tracing them

 up to their ,first ,cause1 as the      
ground and reason of their              
existence4#bcf ,now1 if the question    
were1 ,can you account for your own     
existence1 or for the existence of the  
world around you1 without having        
recourse to a supreme ,first ,cause8 we 
would answer1 ,no3 but if the question  
be1 ,can there be any ,certitude prior  
to the idea of ,god1 not deduced from   
it1 and capable of existing without it8 
we would answer1 ,yes3 the little child 
is certain of its mother's existence    
before it is capable of knowing ,god1   
and the veriest ,atheist is certain of  
his own existence and that of his       
fellow-men1 even when he professes to   
doubt or to disbelieve the existence of 
,god4 ,it may be true that the essential
 nature and omniscient knowledge of ,god
 is the ultimate and eternal standard of
 truth and certainty1 or1 in the words  
of ,fenelon1 that il n'y a qu'une seule 
verit1 et qu'une seule manire de bien   
juger1 qui est1 de juger comme ,dieu    

mme2#bcg and yet it may not be true that
 all our knowledge is derived by        
deduction from our idea of ,god1 or that
 its entire certainty is dependent on   
our religious belief4 ,surely we may be 
certainly assured of the facts of       
consciousness1 of the phenomena of      
,nature1 and of many truths1 both       
necessary and contingent1 before we have
 made any attempt to explain the        
rationale of our knowledge1 or to       
connect it with the idea of the great   
,first ,cause2 nay1 it may be1 and we   
believe it is1 by means of these        
inferior and subordinate truths that we 
rise to the belief of a supreme1        
omniscient ,mind4  ,some writers seem to
 confound ,certitude with               
,infallibility1 or at least to hold that
 there can be no ,certitude without it4 
,the impersonal reason of ,cousin1 the  
common sense or generic reason of       
,lamennais1 and the authoritative       
tradition of the ,church1 have all been 
severally resorted to1 for the purpose  

of obtaining a ground of ,certitude in  
the matters both of ,philosophy and     
,faith1 such as is supposed to be       
unattainable by the exercise of our own 
proper faculties1 or by the most careful
 study of evidence4 ,according to these 
theories1 ,certitude belongs to our     
knowledge1 only because that knowledge  
is derived from a reason superior to our
 own1--a reason not personal1 but       
universal2 not individual1 but generic4 
,when they are applied1 as they have    
been1 to undermine the authority of     
private judgment1 and to supersede the  
exercise of free inquiry2 when they are 
urged as a reason why we should defer to
 the authority of the ,race in matters  
of ,philosophy and to the authority of  
the ,church in matters of ,faith2 when  
we are told that the certainty of our   
own existence depends on our knowledge  
of ,god1 and that our knowledge of ,god 
depends on the common consent or        
invariable traditions of mankind1--we do
 feel that the grounds of ,certitude1 so

 far from being strengthened1 are sapped
 and weakened by such speculations1 and 
that we have here a new and most        
unexpected application of the ,scottish 
doctrine of ,common ,sense1 such as may 
be highly serviceable to the ,church of 
,rome4 ,protestant writers1 indeed1 have
 sometimes appealed to common consent as
 a collateral proof1 auxiliary to that  
which is more direct and conclusive2 but
 they have done so merely because they  
regarded it as a part of the evidence1  
well fitted to prove what ,dr4 ,cudworth
 calls the naturality of the idea of    
,god1 and not because they confounded it
 with the faculty by which alone that   
evidence can be discerned and           
appreciated4 ,they never regarded it as 
the sole ground of certainty either in  
matters of ,philosophy or ,faith4 ,nor  
can it be so considered by any          
thoughtful mind4 ,for how can ,i be more
 assured of an impersonal reason than of
 my own8 ,how can ,i be more certain of 
the existence and the traditions of     

other men1 than of the facts of my own  
consciousness1 and the spontaneous      
convictions of my own understanding8 or 
how can ,i be assured that1 in passing  
from the impersonal reason to the       
individual mind1 from the generic reason
 to the personal1 the truth may not     
contract some taint of weakness or      
impurity from the vessel in which it is 
ultimately contained1--from the finite  
faculties by which alone it is          
apprehended and believed8  ,the fact is 
that any attempt to prove the truth of  
our faculties must necessarily fail4    
,did we set ourselves to the task of    
proving by argument or by authority that
 we are not wrong in believing in our   
own existence or that of an external    
world1 or did we attempt to establish   
the trustworthiness of our faculties by 
resolving it into the veracity of ,god1 
our effort must needs be as abortive as 
it is superfluous1 since it involves the
 necessity not only of proving the fact1
 but of proving the proof itself1 and   

that1 too1 by the aid of the very       
faculties whose trustworthiness is in   
question6 ,there are certain ultimate   
facts beyond which it is impossible to  
push our speculative inquiries2 certain 
first or fundamental principles of      
,reason1 which are in themselves        
indemonstrable1 but which constitute the
 ground or condition of all             
demonstration2 certain intuitive        
perceptions1 which are widely different 
from rational deductions1 but which     
determine and govern every process of   
reasoning and every form of belief4 ,to 
deny the certainty of our intuitive     
perceptions1 merely because we cannot   
prove by argument the truth of our      
mental faculties1 would virtually amount
 to a rejection of all evidence except  
such as comes to us only through one    
channel1 and that the circuitous one of 
a process of reasoning2 while1 by the   
constitution of our nature1 we are      
qualified and privileged to draw it     
fresh1 in many cases1 at its spring and 

fountain-head4 ,it may be as impossible 
for man to prove the trustworthiness of 
his intellectual faculties as it is for 
the bee to prove the truth of its       
marvellous instinct2 but1 in either     
case1 the reason may be that any such   
proof is unnecessary1 that it is        
superseded by the laws of ,instinct in  
the one1 and by the laws of ,thought in 
the other1 and that by these laws a     
better and surer provision is made for  
our guidance than any that could have   
been found in a mere logical faculty1--a
 natural and irresistible authority1    
which the ,skeptic may dispute1 but     
cannot destroy1 and which1 however      
disowned in theory1 must be practically 
obeyed4  ,it must be evident that the   
various meanings which have been        
attached to the term ,certitude must    
materially affect both the statement and
 solution of the general problem1 and1  
more particularly1 that they must have  
an important bearing on the question1   
whether the doctrine which affirms the  

,being1 ,perfections1 and ,providence of
 ,god1 should be ranked under the head  
of certain1 or only of probable1 truth4 
,if1 in making use of the term          
,certitude1 ,i mean to denote by it     
something different from the certainty  
which belongs to the most assured       
convictions of the human mind1 something
 that arises1 not from the spontaneous  
and direct exercise of its faculties1   
but from a process of reflective thought
 or philosophical speculation1          
something1 in short1 that is peculiar to
 the metaphysical inquirer1 and is not  
the common heritage of the race at      
large2 then1 unquestionably1 the        
problem1 as thus understood1 must leave 
out of view many of the surest and most 
universal beliefs of mankind1--beliefs  
which may be illustrated and confirmed  
by ,philosophy1 but which are anterior  
to it in respect to their origin1 and   
independent of it in respect of the     
evidence on which they severally rest4  
,in the case of ,certitude1 just as in  

the case of every similar term          
expressive of a simple1 elementary idea1
 the ultimate appeal must be made to    
individual consciousness4 ,no one can   
convey to another a conception of       
,certitude by means of words1 apart from
 an experimental sense of it in the mind
 of the latter1 any more than he could  
give the idea of color to the blind or  
of music to the deaf4 ,it is because we 
have had experience of it in our own    
breasts that we recognize and respond to
 the descriptions which others give of  
it4 ,every one knows what it is to be   
certain in regard to many things1 just  
because1 constituted as he is1 he cannot
 doubt or disbelieve them4 ,he is       
certain of his own existence1 of the    
existence of other men1 of the facts of 
his familiar consciousness1 of many     
events long since past which are still  
clearly remembered1 of certain abstract 
truths which are intuitively discerned  
or logically demonstrated4 ,these       
various objects of his thought may      

differ in other respects1 and may       
occasion a corresponding difference in  
the kind of ,certitude which is         
conceived to belong to them2 but they   
all possess the same generic character1 
and admit1 therefore1 of being          
classified under the same comprehensive 
category1 as objects of our certain     
knowledge4  ,in the current use both of 
philosophical and popular language1     
,certitude is spoken of in a twofold    
sense4 ,we speak of a belief or         
conviction of our own minds as          
possessing the character of ,certitude1 
when it is so strong1 and so firmly     
rooted that it excludes all doubt or    
hesitation2--we speak also of an object 
or event as possessing the same         
character1 when it is so presented to   
our minds as to produce the full        
assurance of its reality4 ,hence the    
distinction between subjective and      
objective ,certitude4 ,the former is a  
fact of consciousness2 it is simply the 
undoubting assent which we yield to     

certain judgments1 whether these        
judgments be true or false2 it exists in
 us1 and not in the objects of thought2 
it denotes a condition of our minds1    
which may1 or may not1 be in accordance 
with the actual state of things4 ,the   
latter is truth or certainty considered 
objectively1 as existing in the objects 
of our knowledge2 it is independent of  
us and of our conceptions2 it is as it  
is1 whether it be known or unknown to   
us2 our belief cannot add to its        
reality1 nor can our unbelief diminish  
or destroy it4 ,certitude1 considered as
 a mental state1 denotes simply the     
strength of our conviction or belief1 as
 distinguished from doubt or mere       
opinion2 but1 considered as an objective
 reality1 it denotes the ground or      
reason existing in the nature of things 
for the convictions which we cherish4   
,subjective certitude is not always the 
index or the proof of objective truth1  
for men often believe with the strongest
 assurance what they find reason        

afterwards to doubt or to disbelieve2   
and the prevalence of many false        
beliefs1 sincerely cherished and        
zealously maintained1 raises the        
question1 how we may best discriminate  
between truth and error8 ,hence the     
various theories of ,certitude1 and     
hence also the antagonist theories of   
,skepticism4  ,the theories of          
,certitude may be reduced to three      
classes4 ,the first places the ground of
 ,certitude in ,reason2 the second in   
,authority2 the third1 in ,evidence1    
including under that term both the      
external manifestations of truth1 and   
the internal principles or laws of      
thought by which we are determined in   
forming our judgments in regard to them4
 ,each of these theories1 however1 has  
appeared in various phases in the       
history of philosophical speculation4   
,the ,individual ,reason of ,martineau1 
the ,generic ,reason of ,lamennais1 the 
,impersonal ,reason of ,cousin1 the     
,authority of the ,race1 and the        

,infallibility of the ,church1 are      
specimens of these varieties4  ,the     
theory which places the principle of    
,certitude in ,,reason has assumed at   
least two distinct shapes4 ,in the one  
it discards all authority except that of
 private judgment or individual reason2 
in the other it appeals to a higher     
reason1 which is said to be impersonal  
and infallible1 and which is supposed to
 regulate and determine the convictions 
of the human mind4 ,in the former shape1
 it appears in the speculations of      
,martineau2 in the latter1 it is        
advocated by ,cousin2 and in one or     
other of these shapes it constitutes the
 ground-principle of ,,rationalism4 ,the
 theory1 again1 which places the        
principle of ,certitude in ,,authority  
has also assumed two distinct shapes4   
,in the one it speaks of a universal    
consent or ,generic ,reason1 the reason 
not of the individual but of the race to
 which he belongs1 and exhibits a       
singular combination of the ,philosophy 

of ,common ,sense as taught by ,dr4     
,reid and the ,scottish ,school1 with   
the principle of ,authoritative         
,tradition as taught in the ,popish     
,church2 in the other1 it refers more   
specifically1 not to the infallibility  
of the race at large1 but to the        
infallibility of a select body1         
regularly organized and invested with   
peculiar powers1 into whose hands has   
been committed the sacred deposit and   
the sole guardianship of truth1 whether 
in matters of philosophy or faith4 ,in  
both forms it is presented in the       
writings of ,m4 ,gerbet and ,m4         
,lamennais1 and in both it is necessary 
for the full maintenance of the ,popish 
system of doctrine4 ,the theory1 again1 
which places the principle of ,certitude
 in ,,evidence1 admits of being         
exhibited in two very distinct aspects4 
,in the one1 it has been treated as if  
,evidence were purely subjective1 as if 
it belonged exclusively to thought1 and 
not to the object of thought1 or as if  

it depended solely on the perceptions of
 our minds1 and not at all on any       
objective reality which is independent  
of them1 and which is equally true      
whether it be perceived by our minds or 
not4 ,in this form it is a theory of    
,individualism1 and has a strong        
tendency towards ,skepticism4 ,in the   
other aspect1 ,evidence is regarded as  
the sole and sufficient ground of       
,certitude1 but it is viewed both       
objectively and                         
subjectively2--objectively1 as having   
its ground and reason in a reality that 
is independent of our perceptions1 and  
that may or may not be perceived without
 being the less true or the less certain
 in itself2--and yet subjectively also1 
as being equally dependent on certain   
principles of reason or laws of thought1
 without which no external manifestation
 would suffice to create the ideas and  
beliefs of the human mind1 since the    
evidence which is exhibited externally  
must not only exist1 but must be        

perceived1 discerned1 and appreciated1  
before it can generate belief3 but when 
perceived1 it produces conviction1      
varying in different cases in degree1   
and amounting in some to absolute       
certainty1 which leaves no room either  
for denial or doubt4  ,such are the     
three grand theories of ,certitude1 and 
the several distinct forms or phases in 
which they have severally appeared4 ,we 
have no hesitation in declaring our     
decided preference for the second form  
of the third theory1--that which        
resolves the principle or ground of     
,certitude into ,,evidence2 but         
,,evidence considered both objectively  
and subjectively1--objectively1 as that 
which exists whether it is perceived or 
not1 and is independent of the caprices 
of individual minds1 and subjectively1  
as that which must be discerned before  
its proper impression can be produced1  
which must be judged of according to the
 laws of human thought1 and which1 when 
so discerned and judged of1 imparts a   

feeling of assurance which no sophistry 
can shake and no philosophy strengthen4 
,according to some recent theories1     
,certitude belongs to our knowledge1    
only because that knowledge is derived  
from a reason superior to our own1--a   
reason not personal1 but universal1 not 
individual but generic1 which1 although 
not belonging to ourselves1 is supposed 
to hold communication with our minds3   
and if this were meant merely to remind 
us of the limitation of our faculties1  
and of our consequent liability to      
error1 or even to teach us the duty of  
acknowledging our dependence on a higher
 power1 it might be alike               
unobjectionable and salutary2 but when  
it is applied to undermine the authority
 of private judgment and to supersede   
the exercise of free inquiry1 they have 
a tendency to excite suspicion and      
distrust in every thoughtful mind4 ,the 
capital error which pervades all these  
speculations consists in not            
distinguishing aright between the       

evidence which constitutes the ground of
 our belief1 and the faculty by which   
that evidence is discerned and          
appreciated4 ,the ,generic ,reason of   
,lamennais1 as well as the uniform      
,tradition of the ,church1 may          
constitute1 when duly improved1 a branch
 of the objective evidence for the      
truth1 and as such they have been       
applied even by ,protestant writers when
 they have appealed to common consent as
 a collateral proof1 auxiliary to that  
which is more direct and conclusive2 but
 they cannot be regarded as the         
exclusive grounds of the certainty of   
human knowledge1 since this arises from 
the fundamental1 universal1 and         
invariable laws of human thought4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,the term ,skepticism1 again1 may denote
 either a mere state of mind1--a state  
of suspense or doubt in regard to some  
particular fact or opinion2 or a system 
of speculative philosophy1 relating to  
the principles of human knowledge or the

 grounds of human belief4 ,in the former
 sense1 it implies nothing more than the
 want of a sure and satisfactory        
conviction of the truth on the          
particular point in question4 ,were it  
expressed in words1 it would simply     
amount to a verdict of non liquet4 ,in  
the latter sense1 it imports much more  
than this2 it is not merely a sense of  
doubt respecting any one truth1 but a   
system of doubt in regard to the grounds
 of our belief in all truth1 a subtle   
philosophy which seeks to explain the   
phenomena of ,belief by resolving them  
into their ultimate principles1 and     
which often terminates--in explaining   
them away4 ,in both forms1 it has       
existed1 either continuously or in      
ever-recurring cycles1 from the earliest
 dawn of speculative inquiry2 and while 
it has seemed to retard or arrest the   
progress of human knowledge1 it has     
really been overruled as a means of     
quickening the intellectual powers1 and 
imparting at once greater precision and 

comprehensiveness to the matured results
 of ,science4  ,theoretical ,skepticism 
may be divided into three distinct      
branches3 ,first1 ,universal or         
,philosophical ,skepticism1 which       
professes to deny1 or rather to doubt   
the certainty of all human knowledge2   
secondly1 ,partial or ,religious        
,skepticism1 which admits the possible  
certitude of human knowledge in other   
respects1 but holds that religious truth
 is either altogether inaccessible to   
our faculties1 or that it is not        
supported by sufficient evidence2       
thirdly1 a mongrel system1 which        
combines ,philosophic ,doubt with       
,ecclesiastical ,dogmatism1 and which   
may be aptly characterized as the       
,skeptico-,dogmatic theory4#bch  ,we    
agree with ,dr4 ,reid in thinking that  
,universal ,skepticism is unanswerable  
by argument1 and can only be effectively
 met by an appeal to consciousness4#bci 
,it might be shown1 indeed1 that in so  
far as it assumes1 however slightly1 the

 aspect of a positive or dogmatic       
system1 it is self-contradictory and    
absurd2 it might also be shown that     
doubt itself implies thought1 and       
thought existence or reality3 but the   
ultimate appeal must be to the facts of 
human consciousness1 and the laws of    
thought which operate in every human    
breast4 ,and when such an appeal is     
made1 we can have no anxiety in regard  
to the result1 nor any apprehension that
 philosophical skepticism can ever      
become the prevailing creed of the      
popular mind4 ,there is a risk1 however1
 of danger arising from a different     
source2 it may not be always remembered 
that the theory of ,skepticism must be  
universal to be either consistent or    
consequent2 and hence it may be         
partially applied to some truths1 while 
it is practically abandoned in regard to
 other truths1 which are neither more   
certain nor less liable to objection    
than the former4 ,thus the skeptical    
difficulties which have been raised     

against the doctrines of ,ontology are  
of such a kind that if they have any    
validity or force1 they bear as strongly
 against the reality of an external     
world and the existence of our          
fellow-men1 as against the doctrine     
which affirms the being of ,god3 yet    
many will be found urging them against  
the latter doctrine1 who do not profess 
to have any doubt in regard to the two  
former2 and it is of paramount          
importance to show that this is a       
partial and therefore unfair application
 of their own principles1 and that they 
cannot consistently admit the one       
without also admitting the other4       
,atheism1 in its skeptical form1 must   
either be a mere sense of doubt in      
regard to the sufficiency of the        
evidence in favor of the being and      
perfections of ,god2 or a speculative   
system1 which attempts to justify that  
doubt by some theory of philosophical   
skepticism1 either partial or universal4
 ,in the latter case1 it may be best    

dealt with by showing that it affects   
the certainty of our common knowledge1  
not less than that of our religious     
belief1 and that we cannot consistently 
reject ,theology1 and yet retain our    
convictions on other cognate subjects of
 thought4 ,in the former case1 it should
 be treated as a case of ignorance1 by  
illustrating the evidence1 and urging it
 on the attention of those who have     
hitherto been blind to its force2       
reminding them that their not seeing it 
is no proof that it does not exist1 and 
that doubt itself on such a question1 so
 nearly affecting their duty and        
welfare1 involves a solemn obligation to
 patient1 candid1 and dispassionate     
inquiry4  ,a skeptic in religion1 says  
,bishop ,earle1 is one that hangs in the
 balance with all sorts of opinions1    
whereof not one but stirs him1 and none 
sways him4 ,a man guiltier of credulity 
than he is taken to be2 for it is out of
 his belief of everything that he fully 
believes nothing4 ,each religion scares 

him from its contrary1 none persuades   
him to itself4444 ,he finds reason in   
all opinions1 truth in none2 indeed1 the
 least reason perplexes him1 and the    
best will not satisfy him4444 ,he finds 
doubts and scruples better than resolves
 them1 and is always too hard for       
himself4444 ,in sum1 his whole life is a
 question1 and his salvation a greater1 
which death only concludes1 and then    
he--is resolved4#bdj  ,this second phase
 or form of ,skepticism1 which we have  
designated as ,partial or ,religious    
,skepticism1 admits the possible        
certitude of human knowledge in other   
respects1 and especially in regard to   
secular and scientific pursuits1 but    
holds that religious truth is either    
altogether inaccessible to man with his 
present faculties1 or that its certainty
 cannot be evinced by any legitimate    
process of reasoning4  ,these two       
positions are in some respects widely   
different1 although they are often      
combined1 and always conducive to the   

same result1--the practical negation of 
,religion4 ,many who never dream of     
doubting the certainty of human         
knowledge1 in so far as it relates to   
their secular or scientific pursuits1   
are prone to cherish a skeptical spirit 
in regard to religious or spiritual     
truths2 and this1 not because they have 
examined and weighed the evidence to    
which ,theology appeals1 and found it   
wanting1 but rather because they have a 
lurking suspicion that men1 with their  
present faculties1 are incapable of     
rising to the knowledge of supernatural 
things1 and that they could attain to no
 certainty1 while they might expose     
themselves to much delusion1 by entering
 on the inquiry at all4 ,this is their  
apology for ignoring ,religion          
altogether1 and contenting themselves   
with other branches of knowledge1 which 
are supposed to be more certain in      
themselves as well as more conducive to 
their present welfare4 ,in this respect1
 it is deeply instructive to remark that

 ,infidelity has been singularly at     
variance with itself4 ,at one time1 in  
the age of ,herbert1 human reason was   
extolled1 to the disparagement of       
,divine ,revelation2 it was held to be  
so thoroughly competent to deal with all
 the truths of ,theology1 and to arrive1
 on mere natural grounds1 at such an    
assured belief in them1 that no         
supernatural message was needed either  
to illustrate1 or confirm1 or enforce   
the lessons of ,nature3 but now1 when   
the lessons of ,nature herself are      
called in question1 human reason is     
disparaged as incompetent to the task of
 deciphering her dark hieroglyphics1 and
 while she can traverse with firm step  
every department of the material world1 
and soar aloft1 as on eagle's wings1 to 
survey the suns and systems of          
astronomy1 she is held to be incapable  
alike of religious inquiry and of divine
 instruction6 ,there is1 indeed1 a      
striking contrast between the high      
pretensions of ,reason in matters of    

philosophy1 and the bastard humility    
which it sometimes assumes in matters of
 faith4  ,but there is another1 and a   
still more subtle1 form of ,partial or  
,religious ,skepticism4 ,it does not    
absolutely deny the possibility of      
religious knowledge1 nor does it        
dogmatically affirm that man1 with his  
present faculties1 can have no religious
 convictions2 it contents itself with   
saying1 and attempting to prove1 that   
the certitude of religious truth cannot 
be evinced by any legitimate process of 
reasoning4 ,it examines the proof1 and  
detects flaws in it4 ,it discusses1 with
 a severe and critical logic1 the       
arguments that have been employed to    
establish the first and most fundamental
 article of ,theology1 the existence of 
,god2 and discarding them one by one1 it
 reaches the conclusion that1 whether   
true or not1 it cannot be proved4       
,strange as it may appear1 these        
sentiments have been embraced and avowed
 by men who still continue to profess   

their belief in ,god and ,religion4     
,some have held that proof by reasoning 
is impossible1 but only because it is   
superfluous4 ,they distinguish between  
reason and reasoning2 and hold that     
while the latter is incompetent to the  
task of proving the existence of ,god1  
the former spontaneously suggests the   
idea of a ,supreme ,cause1 and imparts  
to it all the certainty which belongs to
 a direct intellectual intuition4       
,others distinguish between the         
,speculative and the ,practical ,reason2
 and hold that while the former cannot  
prove by an unexceptionable argument the
 existence of ,god1 the latter affords a
 sufficient groundwork for religious    
belief and worship4 ,others1 again1     
speak not so much of reason or          
reasoning1 as of sentiment and instinct1
 as the source of our religious beliefs2
 and instead of addressing arguments to 
the understanding1 they would make their
 appeal to the feelings and affections  
of the heart4 ,there is still another   

class of writers who resolve all human  
knowledge1 whether relating to things   
secular or spiritual1 into what they    
call the principle of faith 7foi71 and  
to this class belong two distinct       
parties who are widely different from   
each other in almost everything else4   
,it is important1 therefore1 to mark the
 radical difference between their       
respective systems1 since it is apt to  
be concealed or disguised by the        
ambiguous use of the same phraseology by
 both4 ,the one party may be described  
as the disciples of a ,faith-,philosophy
 of ,reason1 the other of a             
,faith-,philosophy of ,revelation3 the  
former resolving all our knowledge into 
the intuitive perceptions or first      
principles of the human intellect1      
considered as a kind of divine and      
infallible1 though natural inspiration2 
the latter contending that in regard at 
least to the knowledge of theological   
truth1 human reason is utterly          
powerless1 and can only arrive at       

certainty by faith in the divine        
testimony4 ,the two are widely          
different1 yet there are points of      
resemblance and agreement betwixt them1 
and on this account they have sometimes 
been classed together under a wide and  
sweeping generalization4  ,the form of  
,partial ,skepticism to which these     
remarks apply is perhaps more common    
than it is generally supposed to be4 ,on
 what other principle1 indeed1 can we   
account1 at least in the case of        
religious men1 for the indifference and 
even aversion with which they turn away 
from any attempt to prove by natural    
evidence the existence and providence of
 ,god8 ,the prevalence of such feelings 
even within the ,christian community has
 been admitted and deplored by one of   
the most profound spiritual teachers of 
modern times2#bda and it can only be    
explained1 where ,religion is cherished 
and professed1 on the supposition that  
they regard proof by argument as        
superfluous1 either because it is       

superseded by the natural instincts and 
intuitions of the human mind1 or by the 
authoritative teaching of ,divine       
,revelation4 ,but it ought to be        
seriously considered1 on the one hand1  
that the instincts and intuitions of    
human reason are not altogether         
independent of the natural evidence     
which is exhibited in the constitution  
and course of ,nature2 and1 on the other
 hand1 that ,revelation itself refers to
 that natural evidence1 and recommends  
it to our careful and devout study4     
,besides the theories of ,partial       
,skepticism to which we have already    
referred1 there is a mongrel system     
which seems to combine the two opposite 
extremes of ,doubt and ,dogmatism1 and  
which1 for that reason1 may be not      
inaptly designated as                   
,skeptico-,dogmatic4#bdb ,ever since the
 era of the ,reformation1 when the      
principle of free inquiry1 and the right
 or rather the duty of private judgment 
in matters of ,religion1 were so        

strenuously affirmed and so successfully
 maintained1 there has been a standing  
controversy between the ,popish and     
,protestant ,churches respecting the    
rival claims of ,reason and ,authority  
as the ultimate arbiter on points of    
faith4 ,extreme opinions on either side 
were advanced4 ,one party1 repudiating  
all authority1 whether human or divine1 
rejected alike the testimony of         
,scripture and the decrees of the       
,church1 and1 receiving only what was   
supposed to be in accordance with the   
dictates of ,reason1 sought to establish
 a scheme of ,rationalism in connection 
with at least a nominal profession of   
,christianity4 ,the opposite party1 not 
slow to detect the error into which     
extreme ,protestants had fallen1 and    
intent seemingly on fastening that error
 on all who had separated themselves    
from the ,catholic ,church1 affirmed and
 endeavored to prove that ,rationalism1 
in its most obnoxious sense1 is inherent
 in and inseparable from the avowed     

principles of the ,reformation1 and that
 the recognition of the right of private
 judgment is necessarily subversive of  
all authority in matters of faith4 ,they
 did not see1 or if they did see1 they  
were unwilling to acknowledge that      
,rationalism is a very different thing  
from the legitimate use of ,reason2 and 
that while the former repudiates all    
authority1 whether human or divine1 the 
latter may bow with profound reverence  
to the supreme authority of the         
,inspired ,word1 and even listen with   
docility to the ministerial authority of
 the ,church1 in so far as her teaching 
is in accordance with the lessons of    
,scripture4 ,it may be safely affirmed  
that the ,confessions and ,articles of  
all the ,protestant ,churches in ,europe
 and ,america do recognize the authority
 both of ,god and the ,church1 and are  
as much opposed to ,rationalism1        
considered as a system which makes      
,reason the sole standard and judge1 as 
they are to the opposite extreme of     

lordly domination over the faith and    
consciences of men4 ,but such a         
controversy having arisen1 it was to be 
expected that while eager partisans1 on 
the one side1 might unduly exalt and    
extol the powers and prerogatives of    
,reason1 the adherents of ,romanism1    
which claims the sanction of            
infallibility for her doctrines and     
decrees1 would be tempted to follow an  
opposite course1 and would seek to      
disparage the claims of ,reason with the
 view of exalting the authority of the  
,church4 ,hence arose what has been     
called ,,popish ,,pyrrhonism1--a system 
which attempts to combine ,doubt with   
,dogmatism1 and to establish the        
certitude of religious knowledge on the 
sole basis of authority1 which is       
somehow supposed to be more secure and  
stable when it rests on the ruins of    
human reason4 ,not a few significant    
symptoms of a tendency in this direction
 have appeared from age to age4 ,it was 
apparent in some of the writings1       

otherwise valuable1 of ,huet1 ,bishop of
 ,avranches2 some traces of it are      
discernible in the profound ,thoughts of
 ,pascal2 but it was reserved for the   
present age to elaborate this tendency  
into a theory1 and to give it the form  
of a regular system4 ,this task was     
fearlessly undertaken by the eloquent   
but versatile ,lamennais1 while as yet  
he held office in the ,church1 and was  
publicly honored as one who was worthy  
to be called the latest of the ,fathers4
 ,his ,essay on ,indifference in        
,matters of ,faith1 exhibits many proofs
 of a profound and vigorous intellect1  
and contains many passages of powerful  
and impressive eloquence4 ,we heartily  
sympathize with it in so far as it is   
directed against that ,liberalism which 
makes light of all definite articles of 
faith2 but we deplore the grievous error
 into which he has been seduced by his  
zeal for the authority of the ,church1  
when he attempts to undermine the       
foundations of all belief in the        

trustworthiness of the human faculties4 
,in opposition to the claims of private 
judgment1 he contends for the necessity 
of a ,reason more elevated and more     
general as the only ground of           
,certitude1 the supreme rule and        
standard of belief4 ,this normal ,reason
 he finds in the doctrine and decrees of
 an ,infallible ,church1 wherever the   
,church is known2 but where the ,church 
is yet unknown1 or while it was yet     
non-existent in its present organized   
form1 he seeks this more general ,reason
 in the common sense or unanimous       
consent of the race at large1 and       
affirms that this is the sole ground of 
,certitude1 and the ultimate standard of
 appeal in every question respecting the
 truth or falsity of our individual     
opinions4#bdc ,he holds that the        
authority both of the ,church and of the
 ,race is infallible2 and that its      
infallibility neither requires nor      
admits of proof4#bdd ,with the view of  
establishing this one and exclusive     

criterion of ,certitude1 he assails the 
evidence of sense1 the evidence of      
consciousness1 the evidence of memory1  
the evidence even of axiomatic truths   
and first principles1 and involves      
everything except ecclesiastical        
authority or general reason in the same 
abyss of ,skepticism4#bde ,he ventures  
even to affirm that ,geometry itself1   
the most exact of all the ,sciences1    
rests1 like every other1 on common      
consent6 ,no wonder1 then1 that he      
should also found exclusively on        
authority our belief in the existence   
and government of ,god4  ,an intelligent
 member of his own communion propounds a
 very different1 and much more          
reasonable1 opinion3 ,il n'y a pas      
d'autorit morale qui n'ait besoin de se 
prouver ellemme1 d'une maniere          
quelconque1 et d'etablir sa legitimit4  
,en definitive1 c'est a l'individu      
qu'elle s'addresse1 car on ne croit pas 
par masse1 on croit chacun pour soi4    
,l'individu reste donc toujours juge1 et

 juge inevitable de l'autorit           
intellectuelle qu'il accepte1 ou de     
celle qui s'offre a lui4 ,nous n'avons  
pas a examiner si cette disposition     
constitutive de l'esprit humain est     
bonne ou mauvaise2 la seule question que
 l'on en fait est vaine et sterile4     
,nous sommes necessairement amns par    
l'observation physchologique a constater
 qu'il faut que l'homme croie a la      
fidelit du temoignage de ses sens       
individuels1 et  la valeur de sa raison 
personelle1 avant de faire un pas       
au-dela4#bdf  ,we think it unnecessary  
to enter into a detailed discussion of  
this strange and startling theory1      
especially as the altered position of   
the writer in his relation to the       
,church before his death may be held to 
indicate that to a large extent it had  
been abandoned by himself4 ,nor should  
we have thought it worthy even of this  
transient notice1 had we not discerned  
symptoms of an incipient tendency in a  
similar direction among some writers in 

the ,protestant ranks4 ,it should be    
remembered by divines of every communion
 that the rational faculties of man and 
their general trustworthiness are       
necessarily presupposed in any          
,revelation which may be addressed to   
them2 and that in ,scripture itself     
frequent appeals are made to the works  
of ,creation and ,providence1 as        
affording at once a body of natural     
evidence1 and a signal manifestation of 
,his adorable perfections4 ,it were a   
vain thing to hope that faith in ,god   
may be strengthened by a spirit of      
,skepticism in regard to ,reason1 which 
constitutes part of ,his own image on   
the soul of man4  ,it is but common     
justice to add that the speculations of 
,lamennais1 so far from being           
sanctioned1 were openly censured1 by    
some of the most distinguished of his   
fellow-ecclesiastics4 ,such writers as  
,valroger1 ,gioberti1 and the late      
,archbishop of ,paris1 gave forth their 
public protest against them1 and have   

thereby done much to vindicate their    
,church from the imputation of conniving
 at the progress of ,skepticism4        
,valroger's testimony is strong and     
decided3 ,m4 de ,lamennais pretendait   
que la raison individuelle est incapable
 de nous donner la ,certitude4 ,cette   
pretention est1 suivant1 nous absurde et
 funeste4 ,n'est ce pas par notre raison
 individuelle que la verit-arriv a nous 
et devient notre bien8 ,quel moyen plus 
immediat pourrons-nous avoir de saisir  
la verit8 ,quel principe de connaisance 
ou de ,certitude pourrait-on placer     
entre nous et notre raison8 ,et comment 
pourrions-nous l'employer1 si ce ne'est 
avec notre raison8 ,n'est ce pas une    
contradiction flagrante de vouloir      
persuader quelque chose  des hommes que 
l'on a declars incapables de connaitre  
certainement quoi que ce soit8 ,a quoi  
bon une methode1 une autorit            
infaillible1 un enseignement ,divin1 si 
nous n'avons que des facults trompeuses 
pour user de ces secours8 ,nous croyons1

 nous1 que la raison individuelle peut  
connaitre avec certitude toutes les     
verits necessaires  l'accomplissement de
 notre destine4 ,si nous avons besoin de
 la ,grace1 de la ,revelation1 de la    
,tradition1 et de l',eglise pour        
atteindre le bt supreme de notre        
vie1--sur une foule de questions        
subalternes1 nous peuvons arriver a une 
certitude complete1 sans recourir       
aucune exterieure1  aucun secours       
surnaturel4#bdg  ,gioberti is equally   
explicit3 ,m4 de ,lamennais dans sa     
theorie sur la ,certitude1 confond les  
deux methodes1 ,ontologique et          
,physiologique2 il les rejette toutes   
les deux1 et leur substitue la seule    
methode d',autorit4 ,mais la methode    
d',autorit est impossible sans un       
fondement ,ontologique1 et c'est une    
manifeste petition de principe que      
d'etabler l',ontologie sur              
l',autorit4#bdh  ,and the late          
,archbishop of ,paris1--the same who    
fell before the barricades1 a martyr to 

,charity if not to ,truth1 and who seems
 to have had a wakeful eye on the       
progress of philosophic                 
speculation1--took occasion1 in a       
preface to the ,abb ,maret's ,theodice1 
to declare that ,lamennais' system was  
obnoxious to the ,church1 because of its
 opposition to the doctrine of ,rational
 ,certitude3 ,tout le monde sait que le 
clerg de ,france avait repouss le       
systeme de ,m4 de ,lamennais precisment 
cause de son opposition a la ,certitude 
,rationnelle constanment professe dans  
nos ecoles2 et tout le monde peu savoir 
que les ,bossuet1 les ,fenelon1 les     
,descartes out raisonn1 et que nous     
aussi nous raisonnons et discutons avec 
nos accusateurs1 444 preuve irrcusable  
que ,,le ,,rationalisme ,,et ,,la       
,,raison ,,sont ,,deux ,,choses ,,fort  
,,differentes4#bdi  ,,perrone has given 
a similar testimony1 and we cannot doubt
 that the more thoughtful adherents of  
,romanism must be sensible of the danger
 which is involved in any attempt to    

combine ,rational ,skepticism with      
,dogmatic ,authority4  ,it were well1   
however1 if they would reconsider their 
position with reference to this whole   
question1 in its more general bearings  
in conection with their doctrine as to  
the rule of faith2 and weigh1 with      
candid impartiality1 the arguments which
 have been adduced by ,protestant       
writers on the subject4#bej             
,,footnotes3  #bcc ,m4 ,a4 ,,franck1    
,rapport1 ,paris1 #ahdg4 ,m4 ,a4        
,,javary1 ,ouvrage ,couronn par         
l',institut1 #ahdg4  #bcd ,m4 ,,ed4     
,,mercier1 ,de la ,certitude1 dans ses  
,rapports avec la ,science et la ,foi1  
#ahdd4 ,m4 ,a4 ,,vera1 ,problme de la   
,certitude1 #ahdc4 ,,abb ,,gerbet1 ,des 
,doctrines ,philosophiques sur la       
,certitude1 dans leur ,rapports avec les
 ,fondemens de la ,theologie4 ,,abb ,,de
 ,,lamennais1 ,du ,fondement de la      
,certitude1 #ahbf4 ,vols4 ,,ii4 and     
,,iii4 of the ,essai sur l',indifference
 en ,matire de la ,religion4 #d vols41  

#ahdd4  #bce ,m4 ,,franck1 p4 #bcg4 ,m4 
,,javari1 p4 #bh4  #bcf ,,amand         
,,sainte1 ,vie de ,spinoza1 p4 #bja4    
,,abb ,,lamennais1 ,essai sur           
l',indifference1 ,,iv4 #bef4  #bcg      
,,fenelon1 ,oeuvres ,spirituelles1 ,i4  
#ach4  #bch ,,sextus ,,empiricus1       
,adversus ,mathematicos1 that is1       
,dogmaticos--teachers of ,greek3        
mathmata4 ,,glanville1 ,scepsis         
,scientifica4 ,,hume1 and ,,montaigne1  
,essays4 ,h4 ,o',,connor1 ,connected    
,essays and ,tracts4 ,,villemandy1      
,scepticismus ,debellatus2 seu1 ,human  
,cognitionis ,ratio ab imis radicibus   
explicata2 ejusdem ,certitudo adversus  
,scepticos quosque veteres ac novos     
invicte asserta4 ,,lamennais1 ,essai sur
 l',indifference4  #bci ,,dr4 ,,reid1   
,essays1--,on ,first ,principles1 ,,ii4 
#bdi-beb1 #bic1 #cjj4 ,,sir ,,wm4       
,,hamilton1 ,reid1 pp4 #ia1 #aja1 #aji4 
#bdj ,,bishop ,,earle1                  
,microcosmography1 p4 #abj4  #bda ,,dr4 
,,john ,,love1 of ,glasgow1 ,discourses4

  #bdb ,,cousin1 ,cours1 ,,ii4 #dbj1    
#dbb4 ,,morell1 ,history of ,philosophy1
 ,i4 #bea2 ,,ii4 #bba1 #eje1 #ebb4      
,,spinoza1 ,tractatus ,theolog4-,polit41
 p4 #bfg4 ,,lamennais1 ,essai sur       
l',indifference1 passim4  #bdc          
,,lamennais1 ,essai1 ,,ii4 #f1 #g1 #eb1 
#fj1 #beh4  #bdd ,ibid41 ,,ii4 #i1 #ig1 
#aaj4  #bde ,,lamennais1 ,essai1 ,,ii4  
#ei1 #gb1 #ge1 #gh1 #hj1 #hd1 #id2 ,,iv4
 #bee4  #bdf ,,bouchitt1 ,histoire des  
,preuves1 p4 #dgh4  #bdg ,,valroger1    
,etudes ,critiques1 p4 #egd4  #bdh      
,,gioberti1 ,introduction a l',etude de 
la ,philosophie1 ,i4 #eib4  #bdi        
,,maret1 ,theodice1 ,preface1 p4 ,,viii4
  #bej ,,la ,,placette1 ,de ,insanabill 
,roman ,ecclesi ,scepticismo4           
,,chapter ,,ix4  ,,theory ,,of          
,,secularism4--,g4 ,j4 ,,holyoake4      
,such is the new name under which       
,atheism has recently appeared among not
 a few of the tradesmen and artisans of 
the metropolis and provincial towns of  
,great ,britain4 ,in literature1 it is  

represented by ,mr4 ,g4 ,j4 ,holyoake1  
the author of an answer to ,paley1 the  
editor of ,the ,reasoner1 and a popular 
lecturer and controversialist1 whose    
public discussions are duly reported in 
that periodical1 and occasionally       
reprinted in a separate form4#bea ,the  
extensive circulation which these and   
similar tracts have already obtained1   
the number of affiliated societies which
 have been formed in many of the chief  
centres of manufactures and commerce1   
the zeal and boldness of popular        
itinerant lecturers1 and the urgent     
demands which have been incessantly made
 for the extension of their machinery by
 means of a propaganda fund1 are all    
indications of a tendency1 in some      
quarters1 towards a form of unbelief1   
less speculative and more practical1 but
 only on that account more attractive to
 the ,english mind1 and neither less    
insidious nor less dangerous than any of
 the philosophical theories of ,atheism4
  ,we have often thought1 indeed1 that  

should ,atheism ever threaten to become 
prevalent in ,england1 this is the form 
which it is most likely to assume4 ,the 
,english mind is eminently practical2 it
 has little sympathy with the profundity
 of ,german or the subtlety of ,french  
speculation on such subjects4 ,a few    
speculative spirits may be influenced   
for a time by the reasonings of ,comte1 
or the representations of ,the          
,vestiges2 but the general mind of the  
community will desiderate something more
 solid and substantial2 not content with
 any scientific theory1 however         
ingenious1 it will demand a practical   
system4 ,and we are not sure that       
,secularism may not be made to appear1  
in the view of some1 to be just such a  
system1 since it dismisses or refuses to
 pronounce on many of the highest       
problems of human thought1 insists on   
the necessary limitation of the human   
faculties1 and seeks to confine both our
 aspirations and our thoughts to the    
interests and the duties of the present 

life4 ,in estimating the probable       
influence of such a system on the public
 mind1 we must not forget the large     
amount of practical irreligion which    
exists even in ,england1 the strong     
temptation which is felt by many to     
escape from their occasional feelings of
 remorse and fear by embracing some     
plausible pretext for the neglect of    
prayer and other religious observances1 
and the disposition1 natural and almost 
irresistible in such circumstances1 to  
lend a willing ear to any doctrine which
 promises to relieve them of all        
responsibility with relation to ,god and
 a future state4 ,the theory of         
,secularism is adapted to this state of 
mind2 it chimes in with the instinctive 
tendencies of every ungodly mind2 and it
 is the likeliest medium through which  
practical ,atheism may pass into        
speculative ,infidelity4  ,mr4          
,holyoake1 it is true1 abjures the name 
both of an ,atheist and ,infidel4 ,we   
admire the prudence of his policy1 but  

cannot subscribe to the correctness of  
his reasons for doing so4 ,mr4          
,southwell1 he says1 has taken an       
objection to the term ,atheism4 ,we are 
glad he has4 ,we have disused it a long 
time4444 ,we disuse it1 because ,atheist
 is a worn-out word4 ,both the ancients 
and the moderns have understood by it   
one without ,god1 and also without      
morality4 ,thus the term connotes more  
than any well-informed and earnest      
person accepting it ever included in it2
 that is1 the word carries with it      
associations of immorality1 which have  
been repudiated by the ,atheist as      
seriously as by the ,christian4         
,non-theism is a term less open to the  
same misunderstanding1 as it implies the
 simple non-acceptance of the ,theist's 
explanation of the origin and government
 of the world4#beb  ,but ,non-theism was
 afterwards exchanged for ,secularism1  
as a term less liable to                
misconstruction1 and more correctly     
descriptive of the real import of the   

theory4 ,secularists was1 perhaps1 the  
proper designation of all who dissented 
extremely from the religious opinions of
 the day4--,freethinking is the ,secular
 sphere2 drawing its line of demarcation
 between time and eternity1 it works for
 the welfare of man in this world--,the 
,secularist is the larger and more      
comprehensive designation of the        
,atheist4#bec ,with all this coyness and
 fastidiousness about names1 there can  
be no doubt that the character of the   
system is essentially atheistic3 ,we    
refuse to employ the term ,god1 not     
having any definite idea of it which we 
can explain to others1--not knowing any 
theory of such an existence as will     
enable us to defend that dogma to       
others4 ,we therefore prefer the honest1
 though unusual designation of ,atheist2
 not using it in the sense in which it  
is commonly employed1 as signifying one 
without morality1 but in its stricter   
sense of describing those without any   
determinate knowledge of ,deity4#bed    

,that the ,atheist does consider matter 
to be eternal is perfectly correct2 and 
for this reason1 no ,atheist could make 
use of such a term as that matter       
originally possessed1 or originally was2
 whatever is eternal has no origin1     
beginning1 or end4444 ,organized plants 
and animals--man also with his noble    
intellect--are not now at least produced
 by supernatural causes2 and the        
,atheist1 without positively asserting  
that there must have been a beginning to
 life in this earth1 argues that if a   
plant1 an animal1 or a man1 can be      
produced at this time without           
supernatural interference1 so also a    
first plant1 a first animal1 or a first 
man1 may have been naturally produced in
 this earth under the right             
circumstances1--circumstances which     
probably cannot occur in the present    
condition of our globe4 ,our            
difficulties and our ignorance are not  
in the least dispelled1 but on the      
contrary complicated and increased1 by  

the adoption of the ancient belief in a 
,supernatural ,contriver and ,maker1    
who1 after existing from eternity in    
absolute void and solitude1 suddenly    
proceeded to create the universe out of 
nothing or out of himself4#bee ,the     
editor thinks the course to be taken is 
to use the term ,secularists as         
indicating general views1 and accept the
 term ,atheist at the point at which    
,ethics declines alliance with          
,theology2 always1 however1 explaining  
the term ,atheist to mean 'not seeing   
,god1' visually or inferentially2 never 
suffering it to be taken 7as ,chalmers1 
,foster1 and many others represent it7  
for ,anti-theism1 that is1 hating ,god1 
denying ,god1 as hating implies personal
 knowledge as the ground of dislike1 and
 denying implies infinite knowledge as  
the ground of disproof4#bef  ,these     
extracts are sufficient to illustrate   
the peculiar character of this popular  
form of ,infidelity4 ,it is not a       
philosophical system1 although          

philosophical terms are often employed  
by its advocates2 it does not even      
profess to solve1 as the theory of      
,development does1 any of the great     
problems of ,nature4 ,we shall offer a  
brief statement of its distinctive      
peculiarities1 as it is developed by    
,mr4 ,holyoake1 and suggest some        
considerations which should be seriously
 pondered by those who may be tempted to
 exchange ,christianity for ,secularism4
  #a4 ,the theory of ,secularism is a   
form1 not of dogmatic1 but of skeptical1
 ,atheism2 it is dogmatic only in       
denying the sufficiency of the evidence 
for the being and perfections of ,god4  
,it does not deny1 it only does not     
believe1 ,his existence4 ,there may be a
 ,god notwithstanding2 there may even be
 sufficient evidence of ,his being1     
although some men cannot1 or will not1  
see it4 ,they do not deny the existence 
of ,god1 but only assert that they have 
not sufficient proof of ,his            
existence4#beg ,the ,non-theist takes   

this ground4 ,he affirms that natural   
reason has not yet attained to 7evidence
 of7 ,supernatural ,being4 ,he does not 
deny that it may do so1 because the     
capacity of natural reason in the       
pursuit of evidence of ,supernatural    
,being is not1 so far as he is aware1   
fixed4--,the power of reason is yet a   
growth4 ,to deny its power absolutely   
would be hazardous2 and in the case of a
 speculative question1 not to admit that
 the opposite views may in some sense be
 tenable1 is to assume your own         
infallibility1--a piece of arrogance the
 public always punish by disbelieving   
you when you are in the right4#beh      
,accordingly the thesis which ,mr4      
,holyoake undertook to maintain in      
public discussion was couched in these  
terms3--,that we have not sufficient    
evidence to believe in the existence of 
a ,supreme ,being independent of        
,nature2#bei and so far from venturing  
to deny ,his existence1 he makes the    
important admission1 that denying       

implies infinite knowledge as the ground
 of disproof4  ,it is admitted1 then1 by
 the ,secularist himself1--that there   
may be a ,god1--that there may be       
evidence of ,his existence1--that it may
 yet be discovered in the progress of   
natural reason1--and that to deny any   
one of these possibilities would be to  
assume infallibility1 or to arrogate    
infinite knowledge as the ground of     
disproof4 ,now1 we humbly conceive that 
there is enough in these admissions1 if 
not to disarm the ,secular polemic1 yet 
to shut up every seriously reflecting   
man1 not1 perhaps1 to the instant       
recognition of a ,divine ,being1 but    
certainly to the duty of earnest1       
patient1 and persevering inquiry4 ,it   
was with this view that both ,chalmers  
and ,foster penned those powerful       
passages which seem to have left some   
impression on the mind even of ,mr4     
,holyoake1 not for the purpose1 as he   
seems to imagine1 of confounding        
,atheism with ,anti-theism1 but for the 

very opposite purpose of discriminating 
between the two1 so as to show that1 the
 one being impossible1 the other can    
afford no security against the possible 
truth of ,religion4 ,and every word of  
warning which they convey should tell   
with powerful effect on ,mr4 ,holyoake's
 conscience1 after the admissions which 
he has deliberately made1 especially    
when he is engaged in the cheerless task
 of undermining the faith of multitudes 
in their ,father which is in heaven4    
,dr4 ,chalmers devotes a chapter of his 
,natural ,theology to illustrate the    
duty which is laid upon men by the      
possibility or even the imagination of a
 ,god4 ,he does not overlook1 on the    
contrary he founds upon1 the distinction
 between ,skeptical and ,dogmatic       
,atheism4 ,going back1 he says1 to the  
very earliest of our mental conceptions 
on this subject1 we advert first to the 
distinction1 in point of real and       
logical import1 between unbelief and    
disbelief4 ,there being no ground for   

affirming that there is a ,god1 is a    
different proposition from there being  
ground for affirming that there is no   
,god4444 ,the ,atheist does not labor to
 demonstrate that there is no ,god2 but 
he labors to demonstrate that there is  
no adequate proof of there being one4   
,he does not positively affirm the      
position1 that ,god is not2 but he      
affirms the lack of evidence for the    
position1 that ,god is4 ,judging from   
the tendency and effect of his          
arguments1 an ,atheist does not appear  
positively to refuse that a ,god may be2
 but he insists that ,he has not        
discovered ,himself1 whether by the     
utterance of ,his voice in audible      
revelation1 or by the impress of ,his   
hand upon visible nature4 ,his verdict  
on the doctrine of a ,god is only that  
it is not proven2 it is not1 that it is 
disproven4 ,he is but an ,atheist3 he is
 not an ,anti-theist4  ,mr4 ,holyoake   
can scarcely fail to recognize in these 
words a correct and graphic delineation 

of his own position and sentiments4     
,now1 says ,dr4 ,chalmers1 there is a   
certain duteous movement which the mind 
ought to take1 on the bare suggestion   
that a ,god may be4444 ,the certainty of
 an actual ,god binds over to certain   
distinct and most undoubted proprieties4
 ,but so also may the imagination of a  
possible ,god2 in which case1 the very  
idea of a ,god1 even in its most        
hypothetical form1 might lay a          
responsibility even upon ,atheists4444  
,the very idea of a ,god will bring     
along with it an instant sense and      
recognition of the moralities and duties
 that would be owing to ,him4 ,should an
 actual ,god be revealed1 we clearly    
feel that there is a something which we 
ought to be and to do in regard to ,him4
 ,but more than this3 should a possible 
,god be imagined1 there is a something  
not only which we feel that we ought1   
but there is a something which we       
actually ought to do or to be1 in       
consequence of our being visited by such

 an imagination4444 ,to this condition  
there attaches a most clear and         
incumbent morality4 ,it is to go in     
quest of that unseen ,benefactor1 who1  
for aught ,i know1 has ushered me into  
existence1 and spread so glorious a     
panorama around me4 ,it is to probe the 
secret of my being and my birth2 and1 if
 possible1 to make discovery whether it 
was indeed the hand of a ,benefactor    
that brought me forth from nonentity1   
and gave me place and entertainment in  
that glowing territory which is lighted 
up with the hopes and happiness of      
living men4 ,it is thus that the very   
conception of a ,god throws a solemn    
responsibility after it4#bfj  ,it is a  
dangerous mistake1 then1 to imagine     
either that we can ever know that there 
is no ,god1 or that we can get rid of   
all responsibility by merely doubting   
,his existence4 ,atheism1 in so far as  
it is dogmatic1 must1 in his own        
language1 arrogate infinite knowledge as
 the ground of disproof2 and in so far  

as it is merely skeptical1 it can afford
 no security against the fears and      
forebodings which doubt on such a       
subject must necessarily awaken in every
 thoughtful mind4 ,and this             
consideration will become only the more 
solemn and impressive the longer we     
reflect upon it4 ,mr4 ,holyoake1        
however1 is far from being consistent in
 his various statements on this subject4
 ,for not content with saying1 ,most    
decidedly ,i believe that the present   
order of ,nature is insufficient to     
prove the existence of an intelligent   
,creator1 he adds that no imaginable    
order1 that no contrivance1 however     
mechanical1 precise1 or clear1 would be 
sufficient to prove it4#bfa ,at one time
 he tells us that an increasing party   
respectfully and deferentially avow     
their inability to subscribe to the     
arguments supposed to establish the     
existence of a ,being distinct from     
,nature4 ,at another1 ,we have always   
held that the existence of ,deity is    

'past finding out1' and we have held    
that the time employed upon the         
investigation might more profitably be  
devoted to the study of humanity4       
,again1 ,that central point in all      
religious belief--the existence of      
,god--has not yet been approached in a  
frank spirit4 ,the very terms of the    
assertion are as yet an enigma in       
language1 the fact is yet a problem in  
philosophy2 the world possesses as yet  
no adequate logic for that province of  
our speculation which lies beyond our   
immediate experience4#bfb ,man must die 
to solve the problem of ,deity's        
existence4#bfc ,the existence of ,god is
 a problem to which the mathematics of  
human intelligence seems to me to       
furnish no solution1#bfd a problem      
without a solution1 a hieroglyphic      
without an interpretation1 a gordian    
knot still untied1 a question           
unanswered1 a thread still unravelled1 a
 labyrinth untrod4#bfe ,that there is   
here a strong expression of ,skeptical  

,atheism is evident2 but is there not   
something more8 ,does not ,skeptical    
,atheism insensibly transform itself    
into ,dogmatic1 when doubt respecting   
the sufficiency of the evidence is      
combined with a denial of the           
possibility of any satisfactory proof1  
or of the capacity of the human mind to 
reach it1 here or hereafter8 ,yet the   
plea is the want of sufficient evidence 
now2 and this plea is urged in          
connection with the admission that the  
power of reason is yet a growth1 and    
that although it has not yet attained to
 evidence of ,supernatural ,being1 the  
denial of it would imply infinite       
knowledge as the ground of disproof4    
,mr4 ,holyoake does not deny that there 
may be a ,god1 distinct from ,nature and
 superior to it2 but he denies1 first of
 all1 the sufficiency of the evidence to
 which we appeal1 embracing here that   
form of ,atheism which is merely        
skeptical2 and he denies1 secondly1 the 
possibility of any sufficient proof1 for

 no imaginable order would be           
sufficient1 and the whole subject       
exceeds human comprehension1 embracing1 
in this instance1 that form of ,atheism 
which is strictly dogmatic1 if not in   
affirming that there is no ,god1 yet in 
affirming that it is impossible ,he can 
ever be known to exist4 ,what then      
becomes of his cautious                 
limitations1--,the fact is yet a problem
 in philosophy4--,the world possesses as
 yet no adequate logic for that province
 of speculation--,men must die to solve 
the problem of ,deity's existence8 ,is  
it still a problem1 and one1 too1 which 
may after all be solved1 and solved even
 in the affirmative8 ,if it be1 why may 
it not be solved before death8 or what  
other evidence will there be after      
death8 ,and as to the plea of           
insufficient evidence1 what is its      
precise meaning8 ,does it mean merely   
that it has hitherto failed to convince 
himself and his associates8 ,if so1 how 
can he tell that it may not yet flash   

upon him with irresistible power1 and   
that he too1 like his former associate1 
,mr4 ,knight1 may be able to say1 ,by   
the blessing of ,god1 the exercise of   
those mental powers which ,he has       
bestowed upon me has led me to the      
conclusion that ,he exists4 ,there is a 
,god4#bff ,if it means more than this1  
will he say that it is insufficient for 
others as well as for him8 ,but why1 if 
others believe on the ground of that    
evidence1 and if1 according to his      
favorite theory1 belief is the          
inevitable result of evidence8 ,is his  
belief1 or theirs1 the measure of truth8
 ,does he not know that multitudes have 
passed through the same dreary shade of 
unbelief in which he is still involved1 
and have afterwards emerged into the    
clear light of faith1 discovering what  
they now wonder they had overlooked     
before1 and saying with heartfelt       
humility and gratitude1 ,one thing ,i   
know1 that whereas ,i was blind1 now ,i 
see8#bfg ,but what has their belief1 or 

his unbelief1 to do with the great1 the 
momentous fact8 ,the truth1 whatever it 
be1 is independent of both3 and it is   
the truth1 and not our apprehensions of 
it1 it is the evidence1 and not our     
belief or doubt1 that is the subject of 
inquiry4 ,will it be affirmed1 then1    
either that the supposed existence of   
,god is intrinsically incredible1 and as
 such incapable of proof1 or that the   
evidence is insufficient1 in the sense  
of being illogical and inconclusive8    
,this is the ultimate ground of         
atheistic unbelief1 and here the        
,skeptical unites and blends with the   
,dogmatic form of ,infidelity4  ,but    
when driven to this last resort1 and    
before taking up the position which it  
is concerned to defend1 ,secularism puts
 forth certain preliminary pleas1 partly
 in the way of self-defence1 and partly 
with the view of exciting prejudice     
against the cause of ,theism4#bfh ,i    
make no pretence1 says ,mr4 ,holyoake1  
to account for everything4 ,i do not    

pretend to account for what ,i find in  
,nature4 ,i do not feel called upon to  
account for it4 ,i do not know that ,i  
am required to account for it4 444 ,a   
man will come to me and say1 ,can you   
account for this8 ,can you account for  
that8 ,now he expects me to tell him all
 about everything1 just as though ,i was
 present at the beginning of ,nature1   
and knew all its manifestations4 ,if ,i 
cannot do it1 he will not admit my plea 
of ignorance2--he will not admit the    
propriety of my saying1 ,i do not know4 
,he is not bound to explain either the  
past or the future3 ,what went before   
and what will follow me ,i regard as two
 black impenetrable curtains1 which hang
 down at the two extremities of human   
life1 and which no living man has yet   
drawn aside4444 ,a deep silence reigns  
behind this curtain2 no one once within 
will answer those he has left without2  
all you can hear is a hollow echo of    
your question1 as if you shouted into a 
chasm4#bfi ,and can a mind that is      

capable of writing thus be content to   
discard ,religion from his thoughts on  
the sorry pretext that he is not bound  
to account for the phenomena of ,nature8
 ,one would expect at least a           
thoughtful1 serious1 and earnest spirit1
 even were it a spirit of doubt1 in one 
surrounded with such solemn mysteries1  
gazing on these black impenetrable      
curtains1 listening to the hollow echo  
from that awful chasm3 nay1 that        
seriousness might be expected to deepen 
into sadness1 too intensely real to be  
soothed by the plea of ignorance1 or    
assuaged otherwise than by the light of 
truth4 ,but to say1 ,i do not pretend to
 account for what ,i find in ,nature1   
what is this but to discard the whole   
question1 to give it up as one          
insoluble1 at least by him1 and to leave
 to others the problems which have ever 
exercised the noblest and most gifted   
minds8 ,mr4 ,holyoake is not bound1     
indeed1 to explain everything1 and he   
mistakes if he supposes that any one    

expects this at his hand4 ,there are    
many subjects on which even a man of    
science must ingenuously confess his    
ignorance1 and many more so little      
connected with the interests and duties 
of life as to have only a very slight   
claim on his interest and attention4    
,but ,religion is not one of these3 it  
is so closely related to the welfare and
 the duty of men1 and has such a direct 
bearing on the conscience1 that it      
demands and deserves the serious        
attention of all2 and no one who        
undertakes to instruct his fellow-men1  
and especially when he attempts to      
overthrow their most sacred convictions1
 is entitled to turn round and say1 ,i  
do not pretend to account for what ,i   
find in ,nature4 ,he is bound to give   
some intelligible answer to the         
question1 ,what is the cause of these   
marvellous phenomena which ,i behold8   
and what is the ground of that religious
 belief which has always prevailed in   
the world8  ,but ,mr4 ,holyoake is      

deterred from any attempt to answer such
 questions by its amazing presumption3  
,the assumption is1--we may look through
 ,nature up to ,nature's ,god4 ,that    
seems to me to imply a power1 a         
capacity1 an endowment1 which repels me 
at the outset4 ,if we are to deal with  
the common sense of probability1 ,i say 
,i am repelled by the amazing           
probability which is against me if ,i am
 to deal with the assumption of         
distinctness1--that ,i can look from    
,nature up to ,nature's ,god4 ,why1 in  
the presence of this shadowy form of    
things1 before which all men stand in   
awe and dread1 in the presence of so    
many mysteries and marvels which art is 
unable to unravel1 which philosophy is  
unable to explain1 it seems to me an    
immense endowment when a man can say    
with confidence1 ,i look through        
,nature1 and beyond ,nature1 up to      
,nature's ,god4 ,i say the presumption  
of the thing does repel me4--,let the   
profound sense of our own littleness1   

which here creeps in upon us1 check the 
dogmatic spirit and arrest the          
presumptuous world2 we stand in the     
great presence of ,nature1 whose        
inspiration should be that of modesty1  
humility1 and love4--,when my friend    
talks so much about matter1 444 his     
reasoning proceeds upon this very great 
hypothesis1 namely1 that he knows all   
that matter can do1 and all that it     
cannot do4 ,if he does not know that1 ,i
 wonder by what right he says so plainly
 that the wonders he observes in ,nature
 are not the work of ,nature1 but of    
some ,being above ,nature4 ,that which  
repels me from that aspect of the       
argument is its amazing presumption1 the
 amount of knowledge it implies4#bgj    
,foster's argument against ,dogmatic    
,atheism seems to have made some        
impression on ,mr4 ,holyoake1 since he  
makes the important admission that the  
denial of a ,god implies infinite       
knowledge as the ground of disproof1 but
 it is here retorted against ,dogmatic  

,theism2 and ,unbelief1 at other times  
so arrogant in its pretensions1 so      
confident in the powers of reason1 and  
so proud of the prerogatives of man1    
borrows the cloak of modesty from the   
wardrobe of true science1 and assumes an
 attitude of deep humility4 ,at other   
times ,mr4 ,holyoake does not scruple to
 sit in judgment on what                
,god1--supposing such a ,being to       
exist1--could or could not do2 on what  
,he could or could not permit to be     
done2--,he could not create a moral and 
responsible agent1 and leave him to     
fall2 ,he could not require or receive  
any satisfaction for sin2 ,he could not 
hear or answer the prayers of his       
people2 ,he could not inflict penal     
suffering1 or allow it to be permanent4 
,there is no presumption1 it would seem1
 in determining what ,god could or could
 not do2 but when we stand in the great 
presence of ,nature1 her inspiration    
should be that of modesty and humility4 
,but presumption does not consist in    

looking at what we can see1 or aiming to
 know what may be known2 and it is a    
bastard humility1 not the true modesty  
of science1 which would turn away from  
the contemplation of any truth1 however 
sublime1 that is exhibited in the light 
of its appropriate evidence4 ,we are not
 concerned to deny that it is a great   
endowment which enables men to discern  
in ,nature a manifestation of ,god2 it  
is a great endowment1 but not too great 
for the mind of man1 if he was made in  
the image and likeness of ,god2 a small 
mirror may reflect the sun4 ,is it      
presumptuous in the mind of man to scale
 the heavens1 and trace the planets in  
their course1 and calculate their       
distances1 their orbits1 and their      
motions in the illimitable fields of    
space8 ,and if the sublime truths of    
,astronomy are not interdicted to our   
faculties1 simply because there is a    
natural evidence in the light of which  
they may be clearly discerned1 why      
should it be presumptuous to look from  

,nature up to ,nature's ,god1 if in     
,nature we behold a mirror in which ,his
 perfections are displayed8 ,if there be
 presumption on either side1 does it not
 lie rather with those who virtually    
deny the power of ,god to make ,himself 
known1--,his power to create a world    
capable of exhibiting ,his perfections1 
and a mind adapted to that world capable
 of discerning the perfections which are
 therein displayed8 ,there might be     
modesty1 there might be humility in the 
ingenuous confession of ignorance1      
saying1 ,i do not know2 but there can be
 neither in the confidence which affirms
 that no imaginable order would be      
sufficient to prove the existence of    
,god1 for what is this but to say that  
he knows all that matter can do1 and all
 that it cannot do1 or be made to do8   
#b4 ,secularism admits the existence of 
a self-existent and eternal ,being1 and 
thereby recognizes the fundamental law  
of ,causality on which the ,theistic    
proof depends1 while it forces upon us  

the question whether these attributes   
should be ascribed to ,nature or to     
,god4  ,i am driven1 says ,mr4          
,holyoake1 to the conclusion that the   
great aggregate of matter which we call 
'nature' is eternal1 because we are     
unable to conceive a state of things    
when nothing was4 ,there must always    
have been something1 or there could be  
nothing now4 ,this the dullest feel4    
,hence we arrive at the idea of the     
eternity of matter4 ,and in the eternity
 of matter we are assured of the        
self-existence of matter1 and           
self-existence is the most majestic of  
attributes1 and includes all others4#bga
 ,if ,natural ,theologians were content 
to stop where they prove a superior     
something to exist1 ,atheists might be  
content to stop there too1 and allow    
,theologians to dream in quiet over     
their barren foundling4#bgb ,if ,i      
supposed that the ,christian meant no   
more than that something exists         
independently of ,nature1 that it may be

 boundless1 that it may be limited1 that
 it may be one1 that it may be many     
beings1 if ,i supposed nothing more than
 that was meant1 then surely ,i would   
not occupy your time or my own in       
discussing a question so barren of      
practical consequences4--,if we reason  
about it1 unless we take refuge in the  
idea of a creation which we cannot      
understand1 we must come to the         
conclusion that ,nature is              
self-existent1 and that attribute is so 
majestic1--the power of being           
independent of any ruler1--the power of 
being independent of the law of other   
beings1--seems so majestic as fairly to 
be supposed to include all others2 for  
that which has power to be has power to 
act1 for the power to be is the most    
majestic of all forms of action4#bgc    
,it is here admitted that there must be 
a self-existent1 independent1 and       
eternal ,being1 that self-existence is  
an attribute so majestic that it may be 
fairly said to include all others1 that 

the ,being to whom it belongs is exempt 
from the conditions of other beings1 and
 that the power to act is involved in   
the power to be4 ,it is assumed1 indeed1
 that these attributes may belong to    
,nature1 and that ,nature is mere       
matter2 but1 reserving this point for   
the present1 are we not warranted in    
saying that his doctrine1 as stated by  
himself1 involves the same profound     
mysteries1 and is embarrassed by the    
same difficulties1 which are often urged
 as objections to the theory of         
,religion1 and that it is1 at the very  
least1 as incomprehensible1 as the      
doctrine which affirms the existence of 
,god8 ,suppose there were simply an     
equality in this respect between the    
,theistic and ,atheistic hypothesis1    
that both were alike incomprehensible   
and incapable of an adequate            
explanation1 still the former might be  
more credible and more satisfactory to  
reason than the latter1 since in the one
 we have an intelligent and designing   

,cause1 such as accounts for the        
existence of other minds and the        
manifold marks of design in ,nature1    
whereas in the other all the phenomena  
of thought1 and feeling1 and volition1  
as well as all the instances of skilful 
adjustment and adaptation1 must be      
resolved into the power of              
self-existent1 but unintelligent and    
unconscious matter4  ,further it is     
admitted1 not only that we may1 but that
 we must1 proceed on the principle of   
,causality1 the fundamental axiom of    
,theology2 for there must always have   
been something1 or there could be       
nothing now4 ,this principle or law of  
human thought leads him up to a region  
which far transcends his present        
sensible experience1 and guides him to  
the stupendous height of self-existent  
and eternal ,being4 ,it is assumed and  
applied to prove the self-existence and 
eternity of matter4 ,but if it be a     
valid principle of reason1 its          
application may be equally legitimate   

when it is employed1 in conjunction with
 the manifest evidence of moral as      
distinct from physical causation1 to    
prove the self-existence and eternity of
 a supreme intelligent ,cause4 ,a       
principle such as this cannot1 from its 
very nature1 be limited within the range
 of our present sensible experience4 ,we
 are told1 indeed1 that if we look over 
the nature of our own impressions1 we   
find we always shall begin with things  
which lie below reason1 with things     
plainer than reason1 with things which  
need no demonstration4 ,such is the     
nature of the human mind1 that we all   
begin in this sphere of equal knowledge1
 we begin under the dominion of the     
senses1 and whatever comes within that  
wants no demonstration1 wants no proof1 
wants no logic2 it is the constant1 it  
is the most indubitable1 it is the most 
indisputable of all our knowledge4 ,and 
if the question of the being of a ,god  
came within that sphere1 if it was found
 amongst those indisputable truths1 if  

it was found to be a matter of sense1   
then there would be no occasion for us  
to reason at all about it3 it could not 
be a matter of controversy1 because it  
never would be a matter of dispute4#bgd 
,certain first principles of reason are 
admitted1 but only1 it would seem1 with 
reference to matters of sense2 but why1 
if there be such a principle of reason  
as compels the ,atheist himself to      
acknowledge a ,self-existent and        
,eternal ,being8 ,is this a matter of   
sense8 ,is it not a conclusion of       
reason1--founded1 no doubt1 on present  
sensible experience1 but far            
transcending it1--and yet self-evident  
and irresistible as intuition itself8   
,and if reason may thus rise from the   
contingent and variable to the          
conception and belief of the            
self-existent and eternal1 why may it   
not be equally valid as a proof of a    
supreme1 intelligent ,first ,cause8     
,speaking of ,nature as self-existent   
and eternal1 ,mr4 ,holyoake ascribes    

such attributes to it as might seem to  
imply a leaning towards ,pantheism1     
rather than the colder form of mere     
material ,atheism4 ,it seems to me1 he  
says1 that ,nature and ,god are one2 in 
other words1 that the ,god whom we seek 
is the ,nature whom we know4 ,but he    
afterwards states1 with clearness and   
precision1 in what respects ,secularism 
accords with1 and differs from1         
,pantheism3 ,the term1 ,god1 seems to me
 inapplicable to ,nature4 ,in the mouth 
of the ,theist1 ,god signifies an       
entity1 spiritual and percipient1       
distinct from matter4 ,with ,pantheists1
 the term ,god signifies the aggregate  
of ,nature1--but ,nature as a being1    
intelligent and conscious4 ,it is my    
inability to subscribe to either of     
these views which constitutes me an     
,atheist4 ,i cannot rank myself with the
 ,theists1 because ,i can conceive of   
nothing beyond ,nature1 distinct from   
it1 and above it4444 ,the ,theist1      
therefore1 ,i leave2 but while ,i go    

with the ,pantheist so far as to accept 
the fact of ,nature in the plenitude of 
its diverse1 illimitable1 and           
transcendent manifestations1 ,i cannot  
go further and predicate with the       
,pantheist the unity of its intelligence
 and consciousness6#bge ,he holds1      
therefore1 that self-existence is an    
attribute of ,nature1 that this         
attribute is so majestic that it may be 
fairly held to include all others1 and  
that1 while intelligence and            
consciousness exist1 he cannot affirm   
their unity in ,nature1 or regard       
,nature as a being1 intelligent and     
conscious4 ,whence it follows that he   
can give no other account of the living1
 intelligent1 active1 and responsible   
beings which inhabit the world1 than    
that they came into existence1 he knows 
not how1 and that they have the ultimate
 ground of their existence in a         
necessary1 underived1 and eternal being1
 which is neither intelligent nor       
self-conscious6  #c4 ,secularism seeks  

to invalidate the proof from marks of   
design in ,nature by attempting to show1
 either that it is merely analogical1   
and can1 therefore1 afford no certainty1
 or that1 if it were certain1 it could  
prove nothing1 because1 by an extension 
of the same principle1 it must prove too
 much4  ,such is the pith and substance 
of ,mr4 ,holyoake's argument in his     
singular pamphlet entitled1 ,paley      
refuted in his own ,words4 ,he first of 
all endeavors to invalidate the proof   
from design by assuming that it is a    
mere argument from analogy1 and that at 
the best analogy can afford no ground of
 certainty1 although it may possibly    
suggest a probable conjecture3 ,it may  
be said that analogy fails to find out  
,god1 and this must be admitted1 it     
being no more than was to be expected4  
,the ,god of ,theology being infinite1  
it is no subject for analogy4444 ,no    
conceivable analogy can prove a         
creation4 ,creation is without an       
analogy4444 ,no analogy can prove       

creation1 because no analogy can prove  
what it does not contain1 namely1 an    
example of creation4#bgf ,analogy1 the  
specious precursor of reason1 would     
suggest the personality of the powers   
which awed and cheered man4 ,reason     
sends us to facts as the only positive  
grounds of positive conclusions2 but in 
the childhood of intellect and          
experience1 likelihood is mistaken for  
certainty1 and probability for fact4 ,in
 the disturbed reflection of man's image
 on the wall1 as it were1 of the        
universe1 arose the idea of ,god4 444 ,i
 say1 if that is all you mean by your   
argument1 that it is merely a matter of 
analogy1 if it is only a matter of      
partial resemblance1 ,i say you can get 
from it no complete proof2 that if you  
merely found it upon partial            
resemblance1 there is no demonstration  
there whatever1 and your cause is no    
better1 no sounder than ,i have before  
described it1--as being merely your     
conjecture about a ,being independent of

 ,nature2 it is merely a conjecture1    
merely a suggestion1 just like my own   
conjecture1 just like my own suggestion 
about ,nature being that one great      
,being about which we are all           
concerned4#bgg  ,but not content with   
assailing analogy as incapable of       
leading to any certain conclusion1 he   
changes his tactics1 and seems at least 
to do homage to it1 while he insists    
only on its extension4 ,the argument of 
design1 he says1 is unquestionably the  
most popular ever developed1 and the    
most seductive ever displayed4 ,it has  
the rare merit of making the existence  
of ,god1 which is the most subtle of all
 problems1 appear a mere truism1--and   
the proofs of such existence1 which have
 puzzled the wisest of human heads1 seem
 self-evident4 ,this tribute1 however1  
must be read in the light of his chosen 
motto1--,the existence of a watch proves
 the existence of a watch-maker2 a      
picture indicates a painter2 a house    
announces an architect4 ,see here are   

arguments of terrible force for         
children4#bgh ,i took up1 he says1 ,dr4 
,paley's book1 444 and ,i agreed with   
myself to admit1 as ,i read1 whatever   
appeared plausible4 ,i did so1 and my   
objection to my author was this3 ,upon  
the grounds of analogy and experience ,i
 found ,paley insisted that design      
implies a designer1 that this designer  
must be a person1 and that this person  
is ,god3 but the analogy which had been 
the guide to his feet1 and the          
experience which had been a lamp to his 
path1 were suddenly abandoned1 and at   
the very moment when their assistance   
seemed to promise curious               
revelations4--,two modes of refutation  
are open2 to attack the principle1 or   
pursue the analogy4 ,geoffroy ,st4      
,hilaire has taken one course4 ,i take  
the other4 ,if1 in the investigation of 
this question1 it be legitimate to      
employ analogy in one part1 it must be  
legitimate to employ it in like respects
 in another4444 ,analogy was ,paley's   

alpha1 it must be made also his         
omega4#bgi ,in pursuing this course1 he 
makes large concessions1 such as might  
seem at first sight to involve the very 
principles on which the ,theistic proof 
depends4 ,that design implies a         
designer1 ,i am disposed to allow2 and  
that this designer must be a person1 ,i 
am quite inclined to admit4 ,thus far   
goes ,paley1 and thus far ,i go with    
him4444 ,his general position1 that     
design proves a personal designer1 is so
 natural1 so easy1 and so plausible1    
that it invites one to admit it1 to see 
where it will lead1 and what it will    
prove4--,paley tells us that ,god is a  
person4 ,he insists upon it as a        
legitimate inference from his premises1 
nor would it be easy to disturb his     
conclusion4444 ,from ,paley's premises1 
it is the clearest of all inferences4   
,design must have a designer1 because   
whatever we know of designers has taught
 us that a designer is a person4 ,all   
analogy is in favor of this inference4  

,this is ,paley's reasoning upon the    
subject1 and it is too natural1 too     
rigid1 and too cogent to be escaped     
from4#bhj ,here we have an apparent     
admission of the principle on which the 
argument of design is based1 but it is  
apparent only1 and is afterwards        
withdrawn4 ,it was used to serve a      
temporary purpose1 and as soon as that  
purpose was served1 it was thrown aside1
 although it had been described as so   
natural1 so easy1 and so plausible1 that
 it invites one to admit it1 as too     
natural1 too rigid1 and too cogent to be
 escaped from4 ,when ,i made the        
admission1 ,i was going in the footsteps
 of ,paley1 and adopting his own        
phraseology3 then ,i came to the        
conclusion to see whether it was right1 
and then ,i gave it up2 when ,i found it
 led me to a contrary result1 then ,i   
gave it up2 what ,i supposed to be      
design in the opening of my argument is 
no longer design4 ,my reverend friend is
 wrong in supposing that ,i admit       

design1 and yet refuse to admit the     
force of the design argument4#bha ,and  
what is the reason which now induces him
 to deny the existence of design in     
,nature1 and to withdraw all the        
admissions he had previously made8 ,why1
 simply because he conceives that1 by a 
legitimate extension of the same        
analogy1 the design argument may be     
pushed to a reductio ad absurdum1 so as 
to prove first the existence of an      
organized person1 an animal ,god1 and1  
secondly1 an infinite series of such    
organized persons1 since one such must  
necessarily presuppose another1 and that
 again another1 and so on in infinitum4 
,for there are two stages in his        
extension of the analogy4 ,in the first1
 it is extended so far as to show that  
the person to whom design is ascribed   
must necessarily be an organized ,being3
 in the second1 it is still further     
extended1 so as to show that1 being     
organized1 that person must also have   
had a designer or maker1 since          

organization is held to imply design1   
and design to imply a designer4 ,and    
thus the analogy1 when extended1 does   
not lead up to one ,supreme ,mind1 the  
,infinite and ,eternal ,creator of all  
things1 but to an organized being1      
himself exhibiting marks of design in   
his organization1 and requiring         
therefore1 like every organism1 a prior 
cause1 and1 by parity of reason1 an     
eternal succession or infinite series of
 such causes4  ,the following extracts  
will place the progressive steps of his 
argument in a clear1 if not convincing  
light3 ,by reasoning from analogy1      
,paley infers that there is a personal1 
intelligent being1 the author of all    
design1 whom he christens ,deity4 ,but  
what kind of a person is a ,deity8 ,if a
 person1 is it organized like a person8 
,whence came it8 ,how did it originate8 
,was it formed1 as it is said to have   
formed us8444 ,i ask1 has the person of 
,deity an organization8 because1 if it  
be unreasonable to suppose design       

without a designer1 it is surely as     
unreasonable to suppose a person without
 an organization1 to the full           
contradiction of all analogy and all    
experience4 444 ,every person is        
organized4 ,no person was ever known    
without an organization4 ,the term      
person implies it4 ,all analogy1 all    
experience are in favor of this truth4  
,this is so plain as to be admitted     
almost before it is stated4444 ,no      
person ever knew of consciousness       
separate from an organization in which  
it was produced4 ,no man ever knew of   
thought distinct from an organization in
 which it was generated4444 ,shelley    
says that ',intelligence is only known  
to us as a mode of animal being4' 444   
,we have great authority1--the authority
 of universal and uncontradicted        
experience1--for limiting the properties
 of mind to organization4444 ,if        
intelligence is without an organization1
 design may be without a designer2      
because there are the same experience   

and analogy to support the organization1
 as there are to support the design     
argument4#bhb  ,but organization proves 
contrivance4444 ,if1 then1 every known  
organization is redolent with           
contrivance1 and teems with marks of    
design1 by what analogy can we conclude 
that ,deity's organization is devoid of 
these properties8--,shelley thus states 
the case1--',from the fitness of the    
universe to its end1 you infer the      
necessity of an intelligent ,creator4   
,but if the fitness of the universe to  
produce certain effects be thus         
conspicuous and evident1 how much more  
exquisite fitness to this end must exist
 in the author of this universe6444 how 
much more clearly must we perceive the  
necessity of this very ,creator's       
creation1 whose perfections comprehend  
an arrangement far more accurate and    
just6 ,the belief of an infinity of     
creative and created gods1 each more    
eminently requiring an intelligent      
author of his being than the foregoing1 

is a direct consequence of the          
premises4'--,hence from design1         
designers1 and persons1 we have stepped 
to organization and contrivance1 and    
arrive at a contriver again4#bhc  ,such 
is the outline of his argument4 ,he     
seems to think that if there be any flaw
 in it1 the only assailable point must  
be his extension of the analogy3 ,in the
 chain of analogies which ,paley        
commenced1 and which ,i have continued1 
,i believe there is no defective link4  
,the principle of assailment1 if any1 is
 the extension of the analogies beyond  
the ,paley point4444 ,with the extension
 commences my responsibility4 ,he who   
proves an irrelevancy in it answers my  
book4 ,this is1 no doubt1 a vulnerable  
point1 but we venture to think that it  
is not the only one4 ,his whole         
reasoning seems to proceed on an unsound
 view of the nature and conditions of   
the argument1 and is radically defective
 in at least three respects4  ,it is not
 correct to say that the argument of    

design1 is a mere argument from analogy4
 ,were it so1 it might1 like many       
another process of mere analogical      
reasoning1 yield no more than a probable
 conclusion or a plausible conjecture4  
,but in the case before us1 the         
conclusion is strictly and properly an  
inductive inference4 ,it may be         
suggested by the perception of analogy1 
but it is founded on the principle of   
causality4 ,it is capable1 therefore1 of
 yielding1 not a mere probability1 but  
an absolute certainty4 ,the fact that   
analogy is so far concerned in the      
process cannot weaken a conclusion which
 rests ultimately on a fundamental law  
of reason1 the ground-principle of all  
induction4 ,it is true1 no doubt1 that  
were we destitute of the conscious      
possession of intelligence1 will1 and   
design1 we should be utterly incapable  
of forming these conceptions1 or        
applying them to the interpretation of  
,nature2 and in a loose sense1 it may be
 said that we are guided by the analogy 

of our own experience to the belief in  
an intelligent ,first ,cause2 but mere  
analogy would not produce that belief   
without the great law of causality1     
which demands an adequate cause for     
every effect1 nor is this law deprived  
of its necessary and absolute certainty 
merely because it comes into action     
along with1 and is stimulated by1 the   
perception of obvious analogies4 ,is it 
not equally true1 that it is only by our
 own mental consciousness that we are   
qualified to conceive of other minds1   
and that we are1 to a certain extent1   
guided by analogy to the belief that our
 fellow-men are possessed1 like         
ourselves1 of intelligence and design8  
,but who would say that this conclusion 
is no more than a probable conjecture1  
or that1 depending as it does in part on
 the analogy of our own experience1 it  
cannot yield absolute certainty8 ,in so 
far as it is merely analogical1 it might
 be only more or less probable2 but     
being founded also on the law of        

causality1 it is an inductive inference1
 and1 as such1 one of the most certain  
convictions of the human mind4  ,and so 
the argument derived from marks of      
design in ,nature may be stated in one  
or other of two ways3--it may be stated 
analogically or inductively4 ,the       
difference between analogy and          
induction1 which is not always duly     
considered1 should be carefully marked4 
,analogy proceeds on partial1 induction 
on perfect resemblance4 ,the former     
marks a resemblance or agreement in some
 respects between things which differ in
 other respects3 the latter requires a  
strict and entire similarity in those   
respects on which the inductive         
inference depends4 ,the one by itself   
may only yield a probable conjecture1   
but the other1 when combined with it1   
may produce a certain conviction4       
,accordingly the design argument may be 
thrown either into the analogical or the
 inductive form4 ,stated analogically1  
it stands thus3 ,there is an ascertained

 partial resemblance between organs seen
 in art and organs seen in nature2 as1  
for instance1 between the telescope and 
the eye4  ,it is probable from analogy  
that there is in some further respect a 
partial resemblance between organs seen 
in art and organs seen in nature3 in art
 the telescope has been produced by a   
contriver1 analogy makes it probable    
that in nature the eye also will have   
been produced by a contriver4  ,but     
stated inductively1 it stands thus3 ,if 
there be in nature the manifestation of 
supernatural contrivance1 there must    
exist a supernatural contriver4  ,there 
is in nature the manifestation of       
supernatural contrivance4  ,therefore a 
supernatural contriver1--,god1--must    
exist4#bhd  ,combine the perfection of  
analogy with the principle of causality1
 and you have not only the              
verisimilitude or likelihood which      
prepares the way for belief1 but also a 
positive proof resting on a fundamental 
law of reason4 ,the inference of        

intelligence from marks of design in    
nature is not one of analogy1 but of    
strict and proper induction2 and        
accordingly we must either deny that    
there are marks of design in nature1    
thereby discarding the analogy1 or do   
violence to our own reason by resisting 
the fundamental law of causality1       
thereby discarding the inductive        
inference4 ,and of these two unavoidable
 alternatives1 ,mr4 ,holyoake seems to  
prefer the former3 he will venture to   
deny the existence of design in nature1 
rather than admit the existence of      
design and resist the inevitable        
inference of a designing cause2 for he  
is compelled in the long run to come    
round to this desperate confession1     
,what ,i supposed to be design in the   
opening of my argument is no longer     
design4 ,my reverend friend is wrong in 
supposing that ,i admit design1 and yet 
refuse to admit the force of the design 
argument4  ,but if he mistakes the      
general nature and conditions of the    

argument when he speaks of it as if it  
were a mere argument from analogy1 his  
extension of the analogy1 and the       
reasonings founded on it1 are equally   
unjustifiable and inconclusive4 ,he     
forgets that analogy proceeds on a      
partial resemblance in some respects1   
between things which differ in other    
respects1 and that even induction itself
 requires a perfect resemblance only in 
those respects on which the inference   
depends4 ,there may be such a           
resemblance between the marks of design 
in nature and in art as to warrant the  
inference of a contriver in both2 and   
yet in other respects there may be a    
dissimilarity which cannot in the least 
affect the validity or the certainty of 
that inference4 ,it is only when we     
extend the analogy beyond the inductive 
point1 that the conclusion becomes1 in  
some cases1 merely probable1 in others  
altogether doubtful4 ,if we advance a   
step further than we are warranted to go
 by obvious and certain analogies1 our  

conclusions must be purely conjectural1 
and cannot be accepted as inductive     
inferences4 ,from what we know of this  
world1 and of ,god's design in it to    
make ,himself known to ,his intelligent 
creatures1 we may infer1 with some      
measure of probability1 that other      
worlds may also be inhabited by beings  
capable1 like ourselves1 of admiring    
,his works1 and adoring ,his infinite   
perfections2 but if we go further1 and  
infer either that all these worlds must 
now be inhabited1 or that the           
inhabitants must be in all respects     
constituted as we are1 we pass far      
beyond the point to which our knowledge 
extends1 and enter on the region of mere
 conjecture4 ,and so when ,mr4 ,holyoake
 extends the analogy1 so as to include  
not only the marks of design1 on which  
the inductive inference rests1 but also 
the forms of organization1 with which in
 the case of man1 intelligence is at    
presented associated1 although not      
identified1 he goes beyond the point at 

which analogy and induction combine to  
give a certain conclusion1 and          
introduces a conjectural element1 which 
may well render his own inferences      
extremely doubtful1 but which can have  
no effect in weakening the grounds of   
our confidence in the fundamental law1  
which demands an adequate cause for the 
marks of design in nature4  ,mr4        
,ferrier has shown that the senses are  
only contingent conditions of knowledge2
 in other words1 it is possible that    
intelligences different from the human  
7supposing that there are such7 should  
apprehend things under other laws1 or in
 other ways1 than those of seeing1      
hearing1 touching1 tasting1 and         
smelling2 or more shortly1 our senses   
are not laws of cognition or modes of   
apprehension which are binding on       
intelligence necessarily and            
universally4--,a contingent law of      
knowledge is defined as one which1      
although complied with in certain cases 
in the attainment of knowledge1 is not  

enforced by reason as a condition which 
must be complied with wherever knowledge
 is to take place4 ,knowledge is thus   
possible under other conditions than the
 contingent laws to which certain       
intelligences may be subject2 in other  
words1 there is no contradiction in     
affirming that an intelligent being may 
have knowledge of some kind or other    
without having such senses as we        
have4#bhe  ,the application of analogy  
as a principle of judgment is subject to
 certain well-known limitations1 which  
cannot be disregarded without serious   
risk of error4 ,they are well stated by 
,dr4 ,hampden3 ,there are two requisites
 in order to every analogical           
argument3--#a4 ,that the two1 or several
 particulars concerned in the argument  
should be known to agree in some one    
point2 for otherwise they could not be  
referable to any one class1 and there   
would consequently be no basis to the   
subsequent inference drawn in the       
conclusion4 #b4 ,that the conclusion    

must be modified by a reference to the  
circumstances of the particular to which
 we argue4 ,for herein consists the     
essential distinction between an        
analogical and an inductive argument4   
,since1 in an inductive argument1 we    
draw a general conclusion1 we have no   
concern with the circumstantial         
peculiarity of individual instances1 but
 simply with their abstract agreement4  
,whereas1 on the contrary1 in an        
analogical argument1 we draw a          
particular conclusion1 we must enter    
into a consideration of the             
circumstantial peculiarity of the       
individual instance1 in order to exhibit
 the conclusion in that particular form 
which we would infer4 ,whence it        
follows1 that whilst by induction we    
obtain absolute conclusions1 by analogy 
we can only arrive at relative          
conclusions1 or such as depend for their
 absolute and entire validity on the    
coincidence of all the circumstances of 
the particular inferred with those of   

the particular from which the inference 
is drawn4 ,again3 ,the circumstances to 
which we reason may be considered of    
threefold character4 ,they are either   
known or unknown4 ,if they are known1   
they are either 7#a47 ,such as we have  
no reason to think different1 in any    
respect from those under which our      
observations have been made2 or 7#b47   
,such as differ in certain known        
respects from these last4 7#c47 ,they   
are unknown1 where we reason concerning 
truths of which1 from the state of our  
present knowledge1 from the nature of   
our faculties1 or from the accident of  
our situation as sojourners upon earth1 
we are totally ignorant4#bhf  ,with     
these necessary limitations1 suggested  
by the different circumstances in which 
analogy is applied1 we shall have little
 difficulty in disposing of ,mr4        
,holyoake's extension of ,dr4 ,paley's  
argument4 ,not content with resemblance 
in some respects1 he requires a sameness
 in all4 ,he would exclude all          

dissimilarity1 forgetting that analogy  
denotes a certain relation between two  
or more things which in other respects  
may be entirely different4 ,we may see a
 resemblance between the marks of design
 in nature and the ordinary effects of  
design in art2 and that perception of   
design gives rise to an intuitive       
conviction or inductive inference of a  
designing cause3 thus far we proceed    
under the guidance of analogy1 but on   
the sure ground of induction4 ,if we go 
beyond this1 and insist that the        
designing cause must be in all respects 
like ourselves1 that if we be organized1
 ,he must be organized1 that if we act  
by material organs ,he must act by the  
same1 we exceed the limits of legitimate
 reasoning1 and enter on the region of  
pure conjecture4 ,but such conjectures1 
groundless as they are1 and revolting as
 every one must feel them to be1 can    
have no effect in shaking our confidence
 in the valid induction by which we     
infer from marks of design in nature the

 existence of a designing ,cause4  ,it  
can scarcely be necessary to enlarge on 
the gratuitous assumptions on which this
 extension of the argument is made to   
rest2--such as that every person is     
organized1 that all power is a mere     
attribute of matter1 that no man ever   
knew of thought distinct from an        
organization in which it was generated4 
,the only fragment of truth that can be 
detected in these assumptions is the    
fact that we have1 in our present state1
 no experience of intelligence apart    
from the organization with which it is  
here associated3 but will this warrant  
the inference that intelligence cannot  
exist apart from organization1 or that  
the one is the mere product of the      
other8 ,it may be a good and valid      
inference from the marks of design in   
nature1 that a designing cause must     
exist2 for this inference1 although     
suggested by analogy1 is founded on     
induction1 which requires a perfect     
resemblance only in those respects on   

which the inference depends4 ,but to go 
beyond this1 and to insist that the     
designing cause must be organized1      
because we have no experience of        
intelligence apart from organization1 is
 to make our experience the measure of  
possible being1 and to exclude1 surely  
on very insufficient grounds1 all notion
 of purely spiritual personality4 ,in   
extending the analogy beyond the ,paley 
point1 ,mr4 ,holyoake is arguing from   
the particular case of man to another   
case1 which resembles it in some        
respects1 but may differ from it in     
others2 and similar as they are in the  
one point of living1 designing          
intelligence1 they may1 for aught he    
knows1 differ in many other respects4   
,and this we hold to be a sufficient    
answer to his argument1 especially when 
it is combined with the consideration   
that the assumptions on which that      
argument is based are purely gratuitous1
 namely1 that every person is organized1
 and that there is no thought distinct  

from an organization in which it is     
generated4 ,by these assumptions1 his   
theory connects itself with the grossest
 ,materialism2 and that subject has been
 sufficiently discussed in a separate   
chapter4  ,but in truth we regard the   
whole discussion on organization as a   
huge and unnecessary excrescence on his 
argument1 for he would have come to his 
point quite as effectually1 and much    
more directly1 had he said nothing at   
all about an organized being1 and       
insisted merely on one1 whether material
 or spiritual1 possessing powers of     
intelligence1 contrivance1 and design2  
for it is evidently on the existence of 
such a being1 and not on the            
arrangements or adaptations of his      
organic parts1 that his main argument   
depends1 namely1 that such a being      
implies also a contriver1 and that again
 another1 and so on in an endless       
series4 ,whatever force belongs to his  
argument lies here3 it consists1 not in 
the evidence of design arising from     

material organization1 but in the       
necessity of a cause adequate to account
 for a being possessing intelligence1   
purpose1 and will4 ,the existence of an 
endless series of such beings is        
impossible1 and the supposition of it is
 absurd2 and ,mr4 ,holyoake himself     
admits a self-existent1 underived1 and  
eternal ,being1--a being exempt1        
therefore1 from all the conditions of   
time and causality to which others are  
subject1--while he ascribes the origin  
of intelligent1 self-conscious beings to
 ,nature1 which is neither intelligent  
nor self-conscious1 rather than to ,god1
 the father of spirits1 ,himself a      
,spirit1 infinite1 omniscient1 and      
almighty4 ,he ascribes the existence of 
intelligent1 self-conscious1 personal   
moral agents to a power called ,nature1 
which he cannot venture to call a       
person1 nor even an animal being1 and of
 which he cannot predicate with the     
,pantheist the unity of its intelligence
 and consciousness4 ,his theory1 in so  

far as it is intelligible1 seems to have
 a stronger affinity with ,pantheism    
than he appears to suppose4 ,were he to 
define the meaning of the word          
,nature1--a word so often used in a     
vague1 indefinite sense1#bhg--;he would 
find that his idea bears a close        
resemblance to that of the ,german      
school1#bhh who speak of the first being
 as the ,indifference of the            
different1--a certain vague1            
undetermined1 inexplicable entity1      
possessing no distinctive character or  
peculiar attributes1 whose existence is 
necessary1 but not as a living1         
self-conscious1 and active being1 while 
it is the cause of all life and         
intelligence and activity in the        
universe2 in short1 a mere abstraction  
of the human mind4 ,to some such cause1 
if it can be called a cause1 ,mr4       
,holyoake ascribes all the phenomena of 
the universe2 or he leaves them utterly 
unaccounted for1 and takes refuge in an 
eternal series of derived and dependent 

beings1 without attempting to assign any
 reason for their existence4 ,he        
undertakes to account for nothing4 ,he  
leaves the great problem unsolved1 and  
discards it as insoluble4 ,mr4 ,harrison
 demanded of me1 where the first man    
came from8 ,i said1 ,i did not know2 ,i 
was not in the secrets of ,nature4 ,i   
cannot accept1 says one1 the theory of  
progressive development1 it is so       
intricate and unsatisfying4 ,if         
something must be self-existent and     
eternal1 says another1 why may not      
matter and all its properties be that   
something8 ,the ,atheist holds that the 
universe is an endless series of causes 
and effects ad infinitum1 and therefore 
the idea of a first cause is an         
absurdity and a contradiction4#bhi ,in  
short1 the eternity of the world is     
assumed1 the origin of new races is left
 unexplained1 and no account whatever is
 given of the order which everywhere    
exists in ,nature4 ,in the last resort1 
he takes refuge in the plea of          

ignorance4 ,his only answer is1 ,i do   
not know1 ,i am not in the secrets of   
,nature4  ,but how does his extension of
 ,paley's argument justify the position 
which he now assumes8 ,or how can it    
invalidate the admissions which he had  
previously made8 ,that extension of the 
argument1 even were it supposed to be   
legitimate1 amounts simply to this1 that
 a designer must be an organized being1 
and1 as such1 must have had a cause4    
,but what analogy suggests1 or what law 
of reason requires1 an infinite series  
of such causes8 ,and what is there in   
this extension of the argument that     
should exclude the idea of a ,first     
,cause8 ,it is thought1 indeed1 that by 
connecting intelligence with            
organization1 we may succeed at least in
 excluding ,his infinity1 ,his          
omnipresence1 and other attributes which
 are ascribed to the ,most ,high3 but   
the main stress of the argument rests   
not on the fact of organization1 but on 
the supposed necessity of an endless    

series of contrivers to account for the 
existence of any one intelligent being1 
whether organized or not is of little   
moment4 ,now1 this is a mere assumption1
 an assumption entirely destitute of    
proof1 an assumption which is not       
necessarily involved even in the        
proposed extension of the analogy3 for  
all that the analogy1 however extended1 
can possibly require is a cause adequate
 to the production of designing minds1  
and that cause may be a self-existent1  
underived1 and eternal ,being4 ,let the 
analogy be extended ever so far1 it must
 reach a point at which we are          
compelled1 by the fundamental law of    
causality1 to rise to a self-existent   
,being1 exempt from all conditions of   
time1 space1 and causality4 ,mr4        
,holyoake admits the very same truth in 
regard to ,nature which we maintain in  
regard to ,god3 ,i am driven to the     
conclusion that ,nature is eternal1     
because we are unable to conceive a     
state of things when nothing was4444    

,and in the eternity of matter1 we are  
assured of the self-existence of matter1
 and self-existence is the most majestic
 of all attributes1 and includes all    
others2 it is the power of being        
independent of the law of other beings4 
,now1 what is there in the proposed     
extension of the analogy that should    
exclude the idea of a self-existent     
,first ,cause1 or shut us up to the     
admission of an endless series of       
designing causes8 ,and still further1   
what is there in the proposed extension 
of the analogy which should invalidate  
the argument from design1 or induce ,mr4
 ,holyoake to give it up1 and to        
withdraw the concessions which he had   
previously made in regard to it8 ,these 
concessions must be supposed to have    
been honestly made in deference to the  
claims of truth1 and they are not in the
 least affected by the extension of the 
analogy4 ,it is still true1 if it ever  
was1 that order prevails in ,nature2 and
 this is admitted3 ,if by ,atheism is   

meant the belief that all that we see in
 ,nature is the result of chance1 of a  
fortuitous concourse of atoms1 nothing  
would be so absurd as ,atheism4 ,nothing
 can be more evident than that law and  
order prevail in ,nature1 that every    
species of matter1 organic or inorganic1
 is impressed with certain laws1        
according to which all its properties   
and movements are regulated4444 ,in     
denying1 therefore1 the existence of a  
personal1 intelligent ,deity1 we do not 
admit that there is any chance1         
contingency1 or disorder in ,nature3 we 
do not deny1 but absolutely affirm1 the 
constant and universal operation of law 
and order4 ,this we do1 because it is a 
matter of fact of obvious and daily     
experience4#bij ,again1 it is still     
true1 if it ever was1 that design       
implies a designer2 and this1 says ,mr4 
,holyoake1 ,i am disposed to allow2 and 
that this designer must be a person1 ,i 
am quite inclined to admit4 ,thus far   
goes ,paley1 and1 therefore1 thus far ,i

 go with him4 ,his general position1    
that design proves a personal designer1 
is so natural1 so easy1 and so          
plausible1 that it invites one to admit 
it4444 ,paley insists upon it as a      
legitimate inference from his premises1 
nor would it be easy to disturb his     
conclusion4444 ,this is ,paley's        
reasoning upon the subject1 and it is   
too natural1 too rigid1 and too cogent  
to be escaped from4 ,now1 what is there 
in the proposed extension of the analogy
 that can invalidate either of these    
admissions1 or that should induce us to 
set aside both8 ,extend the analogy ever
 so far1 it is still true that law and  
order prevail in ,nature1 that design   
implies a designer1 and that a designer 
must be a person4 ,and how does ,mr4    
,holyoake save his consistency8 ,simply 
by stretching the analogy till it snaps 
asunder2 he begins by extending1 and    
ends in destroying it2 he admits it at  
first1 merely to see where it will lead 
and what it will prove1 and finding that

 it must imply an organized designer1   
and an endless series of such beings1 he
 gives it up1 and denies the existence  
of design altogether4 ,there is a       
hiatus1 it would seem1--an impassable   
gulf1--between the admission that law   
and order prevail in ,nature1 and the   
conclusion that law and order are       
manifestations of design3 ,what ,i      
supposed to be design in the opening of 
my argument is no longer design4 ,my    
reverend friend is wrong in supposing   
that ,i admit ,,design1 and yet refuse  
to admit the force of the design        
argument1 ,on the supposition1 then1    
that law and order are manifestations of
 design1 the design argument might be   
valid and conclusive3 but no conceivable
 order could prove the existence of     
,god2 why8 ,because no conceivable order
 could be a manifestation of design4    
,but how is this proved by the extension
 of the analogy8 ,does it not amount to 
a denial of the analogy itself8 ,and is 
it not an instructive fact that his     

abortive attempt to disprove the design 
argument1 results1 not in the denial of 
the inductive inference1 but in the     
exclusion of the very analogy which he  
proposed to extend1 not in shaking the  
validity of the proof1 but in disputing 
the fact on which it is based8 ,the     
extension of the analogy cannot prove   
either that law and order are not       
manifestations of design1 or that there 
may be design without a personal        
designer2 all that it could prove1 even 
were it legitimate1 would be the        
existence of an organized instead of a  
spiritual ,being1 which1 on the         
supposition of its self-existence1--a   
supposition which is not excluded by the
 argument1 since that majestic          
attribute1 which may be fairly held to  
include all others1 is expressly        
admitted1--neither requires nor admits  
of an infinite series of contrivers4    
#d4 ,secularism denies the truth of a   
special ,providence1 and also the       
efficacy of ,prayer1 while it justly    

holds both to be indispensable for the  
purposes of practical religion4  ,the   
importance of these doctrines is        
strongly declared1 and sometimes        
illustrated with much apparent feeling1 
by ,mr4 ,holyoake himself3 ,there is    
more mixed up with the question than the
 mere fact as to whether some ,being    
exists independently of ,nature2 for    
instance1 if any man would debate       
whether there existed a ,divine ,being1 
whether a ,providence1 who was the      
,father of ,his creatures1 whom we could
 propitiate by prayer in our danger1    
from whom we could obtain light in      
darkness1 and help in distress1--if any 
man debated a proposition like this1 ,i 
should say there was much of great      
practical utility about it4444 ,if you  
tell me ,god exists1 that he is a power1
 a principle1 or spirit1 or light1 or   
life1 or love1 or intelligence1 or what 
you will1--if ,he be not a ,father to   
whom ,his children may appeal1 if ,he be
 not a ,providence whom we may          

propitiate1 and from whom we can obtain 
special help in the hour of danger1--,i 
say1 practically1 it does not matter to 
us whether ,he exists or not4#bia ,the  
great practical question is1 whether    
there exists a ,deity to whom we can    
appeal1 who is the ,father of his       
children1 who is to be propitiated by   
prayer1 and who will render us help in  
the hour of danger and distress4  ,with 
the spirit of these remarks every       
believer will cordially sympathize4 ,he 
knows that there can be no practical    
religion without faith in ,providence   
and confidence in prayer2 for he that   
cometh to ,god must believe that ,he is1
 and that ,he is the rewarder of them   
that diligently seek ,him4 ,mr4         
,holyoake does not err in supposing that
 this is the general belief of          
,christians1 or that it is explicitly   
sanctioned in ,scripture4 ,he may1 and  
we think he does err in his             
interpretation of the ,bible doctrine1  
and the inferences which he deduces from

 it2 but assuredly ,christianity would  
be robbed of its most attractive and    
endearing attributes1 were it           
represented as silent on the paternal   
character of ,god and ,his providential 
care4 ,he is right in saying that the   
,providence man needs1 the ,providence  
the old theologies gave him1 was a      
personal ,providence1 an available      
help4444 ,i care only to add1 that there
 is hardly any feature in the ,christian
 system which is so seductive as this   
doctrine of a special ,providence4444   
,do you not know that in all your       
appeals your success depends upon your  
telling all orders of people that there 
is ,one in heaven who cares for them1   
that every prayer will be answered1 that
 every hair of their head is numbered1  
that not a sparrow falls to the ground  
without their heavenly ,father's        
knowledge1 and are not they worth more  
than many sparrows8#bib ,he sees the    
necessity1 and seems to feel the        
attractiveness1 of the doctrine2 yet he 

denies its truth3 why8 because it is    
contradicted1 as he conceives1 by       
experience4 ,he adduces his own personal
 experience1 and then appeals to the    
experience of his fellow-men3 ,i once   
prayed in all the fervency of this same 
religion4 ,i believed once all these    
things4 ,i put up prayers to ,heaven    
which ,i cannot conceive how humanity   
could have refused to respond           
to1--prayers such as if put up to me ,i 
must have responded to4 ,i saw those    
near and dear to me perishing around me2
 and ,i learned the secret ,i care no   
longer to conceal1 that man's dependence
 is upon his courage and his industry1  
and dependence upon ,heaven there seems 
to be none4#bic ,such was his private   
experience2 and facts of public         
notoriety are appealed to in            
confirmation3 ,it has long seemed to me 
the most serious libel on the character 
of the ,deity to assume for one moment  
that he interferes in human exigencies4 
,a mountain of desolating facts rises up

 to shame into silence the hazardous    
supposition8 ,was not the whole land a  
short time ago convulsed with horror at 
the fate of the ,amazon8 ,there was not 
a wretch in the whole country whose     
slumbering humanity would not have been 
aroused in the presence of that dismal  
calamity4 444 ,how is it that liberty is
 in chains all over ,europe1 if ,god be 
still interposing in human affairs8 ,if 
the older doctrine were true1 if our    
brother's blood still cried to ,god from
 the ground1 the patriot would be       
released from the dungeon1 and the      
tyrant would descend from the throne he 
has polluted4--,science has shown us    
that we are under the dominion of       
general laws1 and that there is no      
special providence1 and that prayers are
 useless1 and that propitiation is vain2
 that whether there be a ,deity         
independent of ,nature1 or whether      
,nature be ,god1 it is still the ,god of
 the iron foot1 that passes on without  
heeding1 without feeling1 and without   

resting2 that ,nature acts with a       
fearful uniformity1 stern as fate1      
absolute as tyranny1 merciless as death2
 too vast to praise1 too inexplicable to
 worship1 too inexorable to propitiate1 
it has no ear for prayer1 no heart for  
sympathy1 no arm to save4#bid  ,in these
 and similar appeals to the facts of    
individual or common experience1 the    
scriptural doctrine of ,providence and  
,prayer is supposed to be very different
 from what it really is1 and stated     
without any of the qualifications which 
are expressly declared by the sacred    
writers4  --,it is nowhere declared in  
,scripture that every prayer must       
receive an immediate answer1 whatever   
may be the object for which it is       
presented1 or the spirit in which it is 
offered4 ,on the contrary it is         
expressly written1 ,if ,i regard        
iniquity in my heart1 the ,lord will not
 hear me4 ,but let him ask in faith1    
nothing wavering2 for he that wavereth  
is like a wave of the sea driven with   

the wind and tossed3 ,for let not that  
man think that he shall receive anything
 of the ,lord4 ,ye ask1 and receive not1
 because ye ask amiss1 that ye may      
consume it on your lusts4#bie  --,it is 
nowhere declared in ,scripture that man 
is to obtain whatever he asks1          
irrespective of that ,sovereign ,will   
which is guided by unerring wisdom as   
well as infinite love4 ,on the contrary1
 prayer is an expression of dependence  
and subjection1 and must ever be        
qualified by submission to ,his         
sovereignty3 ,nevertheless not my will1 
but ,thine be done4#bif  --,it is       
nowhere declared in ,scripture that     
,providence will suspend1 or that       
,prayer will counteract1 the operation  
of the general laws of ,nature1         
excepting only in the case of those to  
whom a promise of miraculous power was  
vouchsafed4 ,on the contrary1 these laws
 are declared to be stable and          
permanent3 ,thou hast established the   
earth1 and it abideth3 they continue    

this day according to thine ordinances3 
for all are thy servants2 and any wilful
 neglect or violation of these laws is a
 sinful tempting of ,providence1 even   
when it may seem to be sanctioned by a  
perverse application of ,scripture      
itself2 for the ,saviour himself was    
solicited on this wise1 ,if thou be the 
,son of ,god1 cast thyself down2 for it 
is written1 ,he shall give his angels   
charge concerning thee1 and in their    
hands they shall bear thee up1 lest at  
any time thou dash thy foot against a   
stone2 but he answered1 ,it is written  
again1 ,thou shalt not tempt the ,lord  
thy ,god4#big  --,it is nowhere declared
 in ,scripture that ,providence will    
secure1 or ,prayer obtain1 exemption    
from the afflictions and calamities of  
life4 ,on the contrary it is written1   
,many are the afflictions of the        
righteous1 but the ,lord delivereth him 
out of them all4 ,in the world ye shall 
have tribulation3 but be of good cheer1 
,i have overcome the world4 ,if ye      

endure chastening1 ,god dealeth with you
 as with sons2 for what son is he whom  
the father chasteneth not8 ,now no      
chastening for the present seemeth to be
 joyous1 but grievous2 nevertheless     
afterward it yieldeth the peaceable     
fruit of righteousness unto them which  
are exercised thereby4 ,we glory in     
tribulations also2 knowing that         
tribulation worketh patience1 and       
patience experience1 and experience     
hope4 ,for our light affliction1 which  
is but for a moment1 worketh for us a   
far more exceeding and eternal weight of
 glory4 ,and we know that all things    
work together for good to them that love
 ,god6444 ,who shall separate us from   
the love of ,christ8 ,shall tribulation1
 or distress1 or persecution1 or famine1
 or nakedness1 or peril1 or sword8 ,nay1
 in all these things we are more than   
conquerors through him that loved       
us4#bih  --,it is nowhere declared in   
,scripture that ,providence will award1 
or that ,prayer may hope to secure1 a   

regular and equal distribution of good  
and evil in the present life4 ,on the   
contrary the present state is described 
as a scene of probation1 trial1 and     
discipline1 which is preparatory to a   
state of retribution hereafter3 ,i saw  
under the sun the place of judgment1    
that wickedness was there2 and the place
 of righteousness1 that iniquity was    
there4 ,i said in mine heart1 ,god shall
 judge the righteous and the wicked2 for
 there is a time for every purpose and  
for every work4 ,because sentence       
against an evil work is not executed    
speedily1 therefore the heart of the    
sons of men is fully set in them to do  
evil4 ,though a sinner do evil a hundred
 times1 and his days be prolonged1 yet  
surely ,i know that it shall be well    
with those that fear ,god1 which fear   
before ,him3 but it shall not be well   
with the wicked1 neither shall he       
prolong his days1 which are as a shadow2
 because he feareth not before ,god4#bii
 ,this is the faith and patience of the 

saints2 a faith which is often          
staggered1 a patience which may be ready
 to fail1 in the view of the darker     
aspects of ,providence2 for many a true 
believer may say1 ,as for me1 my feet   
were almost gone1 my steps had well-nigh
 slipped2 for ,i was envious at the     
foolish1 when ,i saw the prosperity of  
the wicked2 and even the spirits of just
 men made perfect sing the song1 ,o     
,lord6 how long8  --,it is nowhere      
declared in ,scripture that ,providence 
excludes the aid of ,science1 or that   
,prayer supersedes the diligent use of  
ordinary means4 ,on the contrary it is  
written1 ,when wisdom entereth into     
thine heart1 and knowledge is pleasant  
unto thy soul1 discretion shall preserve
 thee1 understanding shall keep thee2   
and believers are required to be not    
slothful in business1 while they are    
fervent in spirit1 serving the          
,lord4#cjj  ,on all these points1 so    
clearly involved in the ,christian      
doctrine of ,providence and ,prayer1    

,mr4 ,holyoake's argument rests on      
assumptions which are utterly           
groundless1 and hence he imagines that  
the doctrine is contradicted by         
experience1 when a more scriptural view 
of it would be sufficient to obviate all
 his objections4 ,he reasons as if there
 could be no truth in the doctrine of a 
special ,providence1 and no efficacy in 
,prayer1 unless every petition were     
immediately heard and answered2 unless  
the cry of nature in distress were      
sufficient to ward off the stroke of    
disease and bereavement1 and to avert   
all the calamities of life2 unless the  
operation of the general laws of ,nature
 were forthwith suspended2 unless the   
present state of trial and discipline   
were converted into one of strict and   
impartial retribution2 and unless man's 
wisdom and man's agency were to be      
superseded altogether by dependence on a
 higher power4 ,but not one of these    
suppositions has any place in the       
doctrine of ,scripture on the subject4  

,it speaks of a special ,providence1 but
 not such as is incompatible with the   
constant operation of natural laws2 it  
ascribes a certain efficacy to ,prayer1 
but not such as implies a miraculous    
interference with the ordinary course of
 ,nature1 and still less an exemption   
from affliction1 or an equal            
distribution of good and evil in the    
present life4 ,if it be said that such  
being the doctrine of ,scripture1 it can
 afford little or no consolation1 since 
it holds out no hope of sure and instant
 relief in circumstances of distress and
 danger1 may we not ask1 ,is there no   
comfort in knowing that our affairs are 
under the superintendence of a ,being   
everywhere present1 infinitely wise and 
good1 whose ear is ever open to our cry1
 who is able to do for us exceeding     
abundantly above all that we can ask1   
and who has promised to sustain us in   
all our trials1 to sanctify us by means 
of them1 and to make all things work    
together for our good8 ,is there no     

comfort in being able to say1 ,god is   
our refuge and strength1 a very present 
help in trouble1 therefore will not we  
fear though the earth be removed1 and   
though the mountains be carried into the
 midst of the sea4 ,the ,lord is my     
,shepherd1 ,i shall not want4 ,yea1     
though ,i walk through the valley of the
 shadow of death1 ,i will fear no evil1 
for ,thou art with me4 ,the ,lord shall 
deliver me from every evil work1 and    
will preserve me unto ,his heavenly     
kingdom8#cja ,is there not enough for   
all the purposes of practical religion  
in the assurance1 ,ask1 and it shall be 
given you2 seek1 and ye shall find2 444 
for if ye1 being evil1 know how to give 
good gifts unto your children1 how much 
more shall your ,father which is in     
heaven give good things to them that ask
 ,him8 ,your heavenly ,father knoweth   
that ye have need of all these things4  
,seek ye first the kingdom of ,god1 and 
,his righteousness2 and all these things
 shall be added unto you8#cjb ,and when 

the believer is enabled in any measure  
to comply with the injunctions of       
,scripture1--,cast thy burden on the    
,lord1 and ,he will sustain it1 ,commit 
thy way unto ,him1 and ,he will bring it
 to pass1 ,be careful for nothing1 but  
in everything by prayer and supplication
 with thanksgiving1 let your requests be
 made known unto ,god1 and the peace of 
,god1 which passeth all understanding1  
shall keep your hearts and minds through
 ,christ ,jesus1--does he not know      
experimentally that it is faith in a    
living1 personal ,god1--the ,god of     
providence1 and the ,hearer of prayer1  
and not the desolate doctrine of        
,nature1--the ,god of the iron foot1    
stern as fate1 absolute as tyranny1 and 
merciless as death1--that can sustain   
him under every trial1 and nerve him    
with fresh vigor for the battle of life8
  ,mr4 ,holyoake refers to his own      
experience1 and appeals to the          
experience of his fellow-men1 in        
confirmation of his negative conclusion 

in regard to a special ,providence and  
the efficacy of ,prayer4 ,but what      
weight is due to his testimony in such a
 case8 ,is it sufficient to countervail 
the experience of all in every age--the 
great cloud of witnesses--who have      
unanimously declared that the ,lord hath
 not forsaken them that seek ,him1 and  
that ,he hath not said to the seed of   
,jacob1 ,seek ye my face in vain8 ,which
 is entitled to the greater weight1 the 
testimony of ,mr4 ,holyoake1 or that of 
the ,psalmist1 ,i waited patiently for  
the ,lord1 and ,he inclined unto me1 and
 heard my cry2 or that of the prophet1  
,i cried by reason of mine affliction   
unto the ,lord1 and ,he heard me3 out of
 the belly of hell cried ,i1 and thou   
heardest my voice3 ,when my soul fainted
 within me ,i remembered the ,lord1 and 
my prayer came in unto ,thee into thine 
holy temple2 or that of the apostle1    
,for this thing ,i besought the ,lord   
thrice1 that it might depart from me2   
and ,he said unto me1 ,my grace is      

sufficient for thee1 for my strength is 
made perfect in weakness8#cjc ,a cry for
 help may not be the prayer of faith1   
but the utterance of an unsubdued and   
rebellious will1 and can afford no test1
 therefore1 of the truth of the doctrine
 of ,scripture4  ,but ,science1 says    
,mr4 ,holyoake1 is the providence of    
life1 and spiritual dependence may be   
attended with material destruction4 ,he 
would substitute1 therefore1 the        
,science of man for the ,providence of  
,god1 and secular diligence for         
spiritual dependence4 ,but is there no  
room for both8 ,are they necessarily    
incompatible or mutually exclusive8 ,why
 should the ,science of man be opposed  
to the ,providence of ,god1 or secular  
industry to religious faith8 ,all       
,christians combine the two2 why should 
,mr4 ,holyoake seek to divorce them8    
,what is ,science8 ,it is the           
well-devised method of using ,nature2 it
 is in this that ,science is the        
providence of man4 ,it is not pretended 

that ,science is a perfect dependence2  
on the contrary1 it is admitted to be   
narrow and but partially developed2 but 
it is the only special dependence that  
man has4#cjd ,and is the wise use of    
,nature inconsistent with ,religion8 is 
it the exclusive monopoly of ,atheism8  
,or is spiritual dependence necessarily 
incompatible with industrial pursuits8  
,who have been the most scientific and  
the most industrious members of the     
community1 the small band of ,atheists1 
or the great body of ,christians8 ,to   
the latter belong all the advantages    
which ,science1 or the wise use of      
,nature1 can secure1 while they have    
besides a ,providence1 distinct from    
,nature and superior to it1 whose       
wakeful eye never slumbers1 and whose   
ear is ever open to their cry4  #e4     
,secularism seeks to supersede          
,religion1 and to substitute morality in
 its stead1--but a morality which leaves
 men irresponsible for their belief1    
their passions1 and even their actions1 

to any superior ,power4  ,the histories 
of all ages1 says ,mr4 ,holyoake1 and   
the bitter experience of mankind1 prove 
the pernicious influence of piety4 ,it  
seems a more useful work cannot be      
performed than to sweep away the assumed
 foundations of all religions4 ,i deem  
it inimical to human welfare1 and should
 no more proceed to supply a new        
religion than the people who had just   
interred the cholera would think of     
raising a plague4444 ,religion is a     
distraction of social progress2 once    
removed1 no wise man will desire its    
restoration4  ,but one question remains 
to be answered1 ,if ,religion is not our
 proper business1 what is8 ,i answer1   
,morality6444 ,by ,religion ,i          
understand a system of human duties1    
commencing from a ,god3 by ,morality a  
system of human duties1 commencing from 
man4 ,religion asks but one question1   
,is an act pleasing to ,deity8 ,morality
 makes the wiser inquiry1 ,is an act    
useful to man8 ,the standard of religion

 varies with fickle creeds2 the standard
 of morality is utility4#cje ,there     
exist 7independently of ,scriptural     
,religion7 guarantees of morality in    
human nature1 in intelligence1 and      
utility4 ,morality1 that system of human
 duties commencing from man1 we will    
keep distinct from ,religion1 that      
system of human duties assumed to       
commence from ,god4#cjf ,nature refers  
us to science for help1 and to humanity 
for sympathy2 love to the lovely is our 
only homage1 study our only praise1     
quiet submission to the inevitable our  
duty1 and work is our only worship4#cjg 
,we1 by establishing morals             
independently of scriptural authority1  
and basing them on secular              
considerations1--more immediate1 more   
demonstrative and universal1--attain a  
signal benefit2 for when ,inspiration is
 shaken1 or ,miracles fail you1 or      
,prophecy eludes the believer1 he breaks
 away1 and probably falls into vice2    
while we hold the thinker by the        

thousand relations of ,natural          
,affection1 ,utility1 and ,intelligence1
 which the ,christian distrusts4444 ,a  
man may do good because it is honest1   
because it is useful1 because it is     
commanded by human law1 because it is   
humane1 because it is polite1 because it
 is a noble pleasure4#cjh ,of course1   
when ,morality is thus divorced from    
,religion there can be no responsibility
 to a higher ,power1 and man is not     
accountable to any one for his belief1  
his passions1 his will1 his character or
 conduct1 except in so far as his       
actions may trench on the rights of     
others1 and render him amenable to civil
 or criminal law4 ,and ,mr4 ,holyoake1  
at one time an associate and            
fellow-laborer of ,robert ,owen1 still  
cleaves to the doctrine that his belief 
is entirely dependent on evidence1 and  
that his character is1 to a large       
extent1 determined by the circumstances 
of his condition4  ,an attempt is thus  
made to establish the ,ethics of        

,atheism on the ruins of ,religion4 ,but
 to one who calmly reflects on the      
subject1 it must be evident that a      
scheme of morals founded on the negation
 of all religious belief can have none  
of that authority which belongs to the  
expression of a superior will1 and must 
be utterly destitute of all sanctions   
excepting such as may be found in the   
natural consequences of our conduct4    
,its only standard is utility2 and      
utility must be interpreted by every man
 for himself1 according to his own taste
 and inclination4 ,the word duty is     
used1 but there is nothing in the system
 to account for the idea which that word
 is intended to convey1 nothing to      
explain or justify the meaning of the   
phrase1 ,i ought4 ,for why ought ,i to  
do this1 or refrain from that8 ,because 
it is useful8 because it is conducive to
 happiness8 ,because it will be followed
 by certain natural consequences8 ,but  
if ,i love the pleasures of sin1 if ,i  
prefer them to every other kind of      

enjoyment1 if ,i am willing to accept   
the consequences and to say1 ,evil1 be  
thou my good1 what is there in the      
system of secular ethics that should    
oblige me to forego my favorite         
indulgences1 or that can impress me with
 the conviction that ,i ought to do so8 
,true ,i may suffer1 and suffer much1 as
 the drunkard and the libertine do1 in  
the way of natural consequence1 and it  
may be prudent to be temperate in the   
indulgence of my sensual appetites2     
there may even be a sense of inward     
degradation1 and a politic regard to the
 opinions of my fellow-men1 which will  
operate to some extent as a restraining 
influence2 but if ,i be destitute of a  
sense of duty1 and willing to brave all 
hazards and accept all consequences1    
,secularism has nothing to say to me1   
and is utterly powerless to govern or   
control me otherwise than by physical   
coercion or the power of brute force4   
,but admit the idea of ,god as a ,moral 
,governor1 and of ,conscience as ,his   

vicegerent in my soul1 view the law of  
my moral nature as the authoritative    
expression of ,his supreme will1 and    
instantly ,i recognize a ,master whom ,i
 ought to obey1 and a course of conduct 
which it is my duty to pursue1          
irrespective alike of my personal       
propensities and of all possible        
consequences4 ,the categoric imperative 
within is felt to be a far more solid   
ground1 as well as a much stronger      
sanction1 of duty1 than any that can be 
found in the mere consequences of my    
actions2 while it accounts for the      
innate sense of right and wrong1 and the
 sentiments of remorse1 and shame1 and  
fear which conscious guilt inspires4    
,but ,mr4 ,holyoake shifts the question 
from this broad general ground1 which is
 common to all earnest inquirers after  
truth1 and seeks to entangle us in a    
collateral1 but subordinate1 discussion 
respecting the relation between         
,morality and ,scripture4 ,he proposes  
to show that there exist1 independently 

of ,scriptural ,religion1 guarantees of 
morality in human nature1 and that      
morals may be established independently 
of scriptural authority4 ,but this is   
not the question3 the question is a     
wider and more comprehensive one1       
namely1 whether a system of morals can  
be established apart from the           
recognition of ,god1 and independently  
of any expression1 natural or           
supernatural1 of ,his supreme and       
authoritative will8 ,mr4 ,holyoake is   
bound to return and defend an           
affirmative to this question1 and is not
 at liberty to take refuge in the mere  
denial of the absolute dependence of    
morals on scriptural authority4 ,the    
idea of duty may be involved in the     
principles of ,natural ,religion1 and   
these may be presupposed and assumed in 
,revelation2 but to make out his case1  
he must attempt to show that neither    
,natural nor ,revealed ,religion is     
necessary to establish and sanction a   
code of ethics1 and that the natural    

consequences of our actions are         
sufficient of themselves1 and without   
reference to the law of a ,supreme      
,will1 to awaken and sustain a sense of 
moral obligation4 ,in point of fact1    
,christianity does not represent the    
duties of morality as dependent on its  
own sole authority4 ,it sanctions these 
duties1 it illustrates their nature1 it 
enforces their observance by new and    
powerful motives2 but it presupposes the
 existence of ,conscience1 as ,god's    
vicegerent in the heart1 and appeals to 
a law by which every man is a law to    
himself4 ,the law revealed in ,scripture
 is binding by reason of the authority  
of the ,lawgiver2 but not more binding  
than the law written on the heart1      
without which we should be incapable    
alike of moral instruction and of moral 
government4 ,the question1 then1 is not 
whether morality be entirely dependent  
on the authority of ,scripture1 but     
whether it be so independent of         
,religion as to be equally authoritative

 and binding with or without the        
recognition of ,god8  ,and if this be   
the real question at issue1 few will be 
bold enough to affirm either that the   
nature of moral duty is in no wise      
affected1 or that its foundation is in  
no degree weakened1 by the              
non-recognition of ,god and ,his supreme
 will4 ,the will of ,god may not be the 
ultimate ground of duty1 but it is the  
expression of the essential holiness of 
,his nature1 which is the unchangeable  
standard of rectitude4 ,the supposition 
of ,his non-existence1 therefore1 or    
even the skeptical ,atheism which       
doubts1 without venturing to deny1 the  
reality of ,his being1 deprives morality
 of its only absolute support1 and      
leaves it to depend on the fluctuating  
opinions or the capricious tastes of    
individual minds4 ,it affects both the  
nature and the extent of moral duty1 by 
resolving it into a mere regard to      
utility1 and excluding a large class of 
duties which ,religion sanctions1 while 

it deprives every other class of their  
sacred character as acts of obedience to
 ,god4 ,it shuts out some of the most   
powerful and impressive motives to      
virtuous conduct1 by relieving men from 
a sense of responsibility to a higher   
,power1 by excluding the idea of a      
future retribution1 and still more by   
keeping out of sight the attributes1    
alike august and amiable1 of a living   
personal ,god1 everywhere present1      
beholding the evil and the good1 an     
omniscient ,witness and an impartial    
,judge4 ,christianity leaves all the    
secular motives to morality intact and  
entire1 and only superadds to these     
certain spiritual motives of far higher 
power4 ,it neither supersedes the       
lessons of experience nor abjures all   
regard to utility2 but by revealing our 
relation to ,god1 it extends1 and       
elevates1 and purifies our sense of     
duty4 ,in vain does ,mr4 ,holyoake      
pretend that by basing morals on secular
 considerations1 he attains a signal    

benefit1 and that he holds the thinker  
by the thousand relations of ,natural   
,affection1 ,utility1 and ,intelligence1
 which the ,christian distrusts2 for not
 one of these relations is excluded by  
the scheme of ,revealed ,religion1 not  
one of them is denied by the ,christian2
 and if he may be said to distrust them1
 it is only because he holds them to be 
insufficient1 without a belief in ,god1 
to maintain a pure morality in the      
world4 ,but he can say1 with at least as
 much earnestness as any ,secularism can
 feel1 ,whatsoever things are true1     
whatsoever things are honest1 whatsoever
 things are just1 whatsoever things are 
pure1 whatsoever things are lovely1     
whatsoever things are of good report2 if
 there be any virtue1 and if there be   
any praise1 think of these things2 and  
he feels that far from weakening1 he    
greatly enhances1 the force of that     
appeal1 when he adds1 and perfect       
holiness in the fear of the ,lord4  #f4 
,secularism professes to be the positive

 side of ,atheism1 and to be better than
 ,religion at least for this world1     
because it pays a preminent1 if not an  
exclusive1 regard to the duties of the  
present life4  ,this is1 perhaps1 the   
most dangerous aspect of the doctrine4  
,it prescribes a course of systematic   
ungodliness1 a practical disregard of   
the future1 and an engrossing attention 
to things seen and temporal1 as if these
 were virtues in which mankind are      
greatly deficient1 and as if their      
general prevalence would be a prelude to
 a secular millennium1 or the           
commencement of an atheistic paradise4  
,but the purely negative part of the    
system1 however accordant with the      
natural tendencies of men1 is felt to be
 in itself somewhat unattractive2 it    
must be associated1 therefore1 with some
 positive element1 some practical aims1 
such as may give it a hold on the       
interest and a claim on the zealous     
support of its adherents4 ,under this   
conviction1 says ,mr4 ,holyoake1 the    

,secularist applied himself to the      
reinspection of the general field of    
controversy1 and the adoption of the    
following rules1 among others1 has been 
the consequence3 #a4 ,to disuse the term
 ,atheist1 since the public understand  
by that word one who is without ,god and
 also without morality1 and who wishes  
to be without both4 #b4 ,to disuse the  
term ,infidel1 since ,christians        
understand by that term one who is      
unfaithful or treacherous to the        
truth4444 #c4 ,to recognize1 not as a   
matter of policy merely1 but as a matter
 of fact1 the sincerity of the clergy   
and the good intentions of ,christians  
generally4444 #d4 ,to seek the maxims of
 duty in the relations of man to society
 and nature1 and1 as the ,christian     
,spectator did us the honor to admit1   
'to preach nature and science1 morality 
and art3 nature1 the only subject of    
knowledge2 science1 the providence of   
life2 morality1 the harmony of action2  
art1 the culture of the individual and  

of society4' ,we therefore resolved to  
choose a new name 7,secularism71 which  
should express the practical and moral  
element always concealed in the word    
,atheism4444 ,secularism seeks the      
personal ,law of duty1 the ,sphere of   
duty1 and the ,power by which duty may  
work independently4 ,the ,law is found  
in natural1 utilitarian1 and artistic   
morals4 ,the ,sphere is this1 to work   
with our first energies in this life1   
for this life1--for its growth1 culture1
 development1 and progress4 ,the ,power 
is discovered in ,science1 the          
providence of life1 and                 
intelligence4#cji ,by ',secularism' is  
meant giving the precedence to the      
duties of this life over those which    
pertain to another life2--attention to  
temporal things should take precedence  
of considerations relating to a future  
existence4 ,the positive side of our    
views is a more recent development of   
our own4 ,we seek the coperation of all 
who can agree to promote present human  

improvement by present human means4#caj 
444 ,if there are other worlds to be    
inhabited after this life1 those persons
 will best be fitted for the enjoyment  
of them who have made the welfare of    
humanity their business in this4 ,but if
 there are not other worlds1 men are    
essentially losers by neglecting the    
enjoyment of this4 ,hence ,aristippus   
was truly wise1 who agreed with         
,socrates in dismissing1 as wholly      
unprofitable1 all those speculations    
which have no connection with the       
business of life4 ,this life being the  
first in certainty1 we give it the first
 place in importance2 and by giving     
human duties in relation to men the     
precedence1 we secure that all          
interpretations of spiritual duty shall 
be in harmony with human progress4      
,secularism is the philosophy of the    
things of time4 ,a ,secularist is one   
who gives primary attention to those    
subjects1 the issues of which can be    
tested by the experience of this life4  

,the ,secularist principle requires that
 precedence should be given to the      
duties of this life over those which    
pertain to another world4#caa           
,secularism1 then1 professes to be the  
positive or practical side of ,atheism1 
and it claims to be better than         
,religion at least for this world1      
because it pays a preminent1 if not     
exclusive1 regard to the duties of the  
present life4 ,we cannot consider this  
new development of an old system1 in    
connection with its recent change of    
name1 and the reasons that are assigned 
for it1 without seeing that the force of
 public opinion1 whether well or ill    
founded1 has compelled its advocates to 
alter their tactics at least in two     
respects3 they are anxious to withdraw  
from offensive prominence the negative  
articles of their creed1 and to put     
forward the positive elements of truth  
which may still survive after the ruin  
of ,religion2 and they evince a         
disposition1 somewhat new1 to conciliate

 the ,christian community1 by admitting 
the sincerity of the clergy and the good
 intentions of believers generally1 and 
inviting their coperation in plans of   
secular improvement4 ,but ,atheism still
 lurks under the disguise of            
,secularism2 and men of earnest religion
 are not likely to be tempted to any    
close alliance or active coperation with
 those who misrepresent the character of
 that ,god in whom they believe1 and of 
that ,saviour in whom they trust4 ,there
 may be some nominal ,christians1       
however1 already as unconcerned about   
the future and devoted to the present   
life1 as ,mr4 ,holyoake himself could   
wish them to be1 who will eagerly grasp 
at this new development1 as a plausible 
pretext for continuing in their present 
course2 for with the exception of those 
who compose the real ,church of ,christ1
 whose faith is not a mere name and an  
unthinking assent to ,christianity1 but 
a real1 living1 constant power over     
their life1 the whole world is          

practically secularist1 and is living   
solely by the light of the present1 and 
under the impulse of the motives which  
it supplies4#cab ,for ,secularism is    
only the ,latin term for the old ,saxon 
worldliness3 ,secularism has more       
elements of union than perhaps any other
 phase of infidelity2 it has the        
worldliness of mere nominal ,christians1
 as well as of real infidels4#cac ,they 
are really ,secularists1 but as yet they
 may not be at ease in their            
,secularism4 ,there may be a secret     
monitor within1 which reminds them      
occasionally of death1 and judgment1 and
 eternity2 and the rapid flight of time1
 or the incipient sense of disease1 or  
the ever-recurring instances of         
mortality1 may awaken them to transient 
thoughts of another life for which it   
were well to be better prepared4 ,what  
they want is a theory1--of plausible    
aspect and easy application1--which     
might serve to quell these rising       
thoughts1 and allay their foreboding    

fears2 and just such a theory they may  
seem to find in the proverbial maxim of 
,secularism1 ,work in this life1 for    
this life4 ,we are not sure1 however1   
that even with such men the zeal of the 
new propaganda will be altogether       
successful4 ,it may seem to some to be  
out of place1 and may even excite a     
sense of the ludicrous4 ,just fancy for 
a moment1 says the author already       
quoted1 some missionary of this         
principle going into the ,royal         
,exchange at ,london1 or the ,stock     
,exchange at ,leeds or ,bradford1 or the
 ,cloth-halls of any of our             
manufacturing towns1 summoning around   
him the merchants and the brokers1 and  
then beginning with much earnestness and
 point to urge them not to live for     
eternity1 but to be very careful about  
the present life3 insisting that it was 
very1 very doubtful if earth were not   
all1--the present existence the whole of
 human existence2 and that therefore    
until there was more certainty they had 

better make the most of this2 be        
industrious and prudent1 and make       
themselves as comfortable as possible2  
get as much money as they could         
honestly1 and by no means let any dread 
of retribution hereafter fetter them in 
any of their actions here4 ,why1 these  
merchants would turn away laughing and  
saying1 ',either the man is mocking us1 
or he is mad3 that is just what we are  
doing with all our might4' ,they would  
see at least that ,mr4 ,holyoake's      
teaching is very different from that of 
,him who said1 ',take no thought for    
your life1 what ye shall eat1 or what ye
 shall drink2 nor yet for your body1    
what ye shall put on4 ,is not the life  
more than meat1 and the body than       
raiment8 ,but seek ye first the kingdom 
of ,god and ,his righteousness2 and all 
these things shall be added unto you4'  
',for what is a man profited1 if he     
shall gain the whole world1 and lose his
 soul8 or what shall a man give in      
exchange for his soul8' ,and marking    

that vast difference1 they will feel1 at
 least1 that no man is entitled to      
address them as rational beings in the  
style of ,secularism1 unless he can give
 them an absolute assurance that there  
is and can be no future state of        
existence1--that the present is man's   
only life1 and that death is an eternal 
sleep4  ,but does ,mr4 ,holyoake give1  
or pretend to give1 any such assurance8 
,we do not say1 he tells us1 that every 
man ought to give an exclusive attention
 to this world1 because that would be to
 commit the old sin of dogmatism1 and   
exclude the possibility of another      
world1 and of walking by a different    
light from that by which alone we are   
able to walk4 ,but as our knowledge is  
confined to this life1 and testimony1   
and conjecture1 and probability are all 
that can be set forth with respect to   
another life1 we think we are justified 
in giving precedence to the duties of   
this state1 and of attaching primary    
importance to the morality of man to    

man4 ,it is not certain1 then1 that     
there is no future life2 it is even     
possible that there may be one2 the     
supposition is not in itself incredible1
 it may even have testimony1 conjecture1
 and probability in its favor3--some    
attention to it1 therefore1 cannot be   
forbidden without committing the old sin
 of dogmatism1 and excluding the        
possibility of another world2 but its   
comparative uncertainty is urged as a   
reason for giving precedence to the     
duties of this state1 and attaching     
primary importance to the morality of   
man to man4 ,the question would seem to 
be1 not whether any attention should be 
bestowed on a future life1 but whether  
it should be less or more than the      
attention which we bestow on the present
 world4 ,it is a question of degree2 and
 the settlement of that question is made
 to hinge entirely on the comparative   
uncertainty of our prospect after death4
 ,suppose it were more uncertain1 might 
not the magnitude of the interests that 

must be involved in a new and untried   
existence hereafter1 and which must be  
measured on the scale of eternity1 be   
more than sufficient to counterbalance  
the difference8 ,let us be only fully   
convinced that our present life is 7or  
may be7 the beginning of an eternal     
duration1 and how irresistibly are we   
urged to a mode of conduct answerable to
 that accession of importance which our 
present condition in the world derives  
from the peculiar point of view in which
 we then contemplate it6#cad ,but1 in   
point of fact1 can it be reasonably said
 that the future of our present life is 
in any respect more certain than our    
prospects after death3 ,what is our     
life8 is it not like a vapor1 which     
appeareth for a little time1 and then   
vanisheth away8 ,and yet1 in spite of   
its proverbial uncertainty1 is it not a 
fundamental principle of ,secularism    
that true life begins in renunciation1  
and that the future must rule the       
present8 ,extend these maxims1 which are

 of unquestionable authority with       
reference to the present life1 to our   
prospects beyond the grave1 whether they
 be regarded as certain1 or probable1 or
 possible only1 and they will abundantly
 vindicate the position that our conduct
 now and here should be regulated to    
some extent by a regard to what may be  
before us4 ,in both cases alike1 present
 gratification must give place to future
 safety1 and self-denial1 according to  
the shrewd remark of ,franklin1 is      
neither more nor less in the case of a  
prudent man than self-owning1 the       
recognition of his own dignity1 and the 
preference of a greater and more        
permanent to a smaller and transitory   
good4 ,it might still1 therefore1 be    
alike our interest and our duty to have 
some regard to a possible future in the 
scheme of our present life4 ,and aware  
of this ,mr4 ,holyoake solaces himself1 
and attempts to sustain the spirits of  
his friends with the assurance1         
,whatever is likely to secure your best 

interests here will procure for you the 
same hereafter1--a strange inversion of 
the scriptural maxim1 for it practically
 amounts to this1 ,seek first the things
 of this world1 and the kingdom of      
heaven shall be added unto you4 ,and he 
states the ground or reason of his      
confidence in this respect3 ,if there be
 other worlds to be inhabited after this
 life1 those persons will best be fitted
 for the enjoyment of them who have made
 the welfare of humanity their business 
in this4 ,to make the welfare of        
humanity their business in this life1 is
 a duty which may be discharged by the  
,christian not less than the            
,secularist1 and perhaps with all the   
greater zeal in proportion to his       
estimate of men as responsible and      
immortal beings1 all passing on1 like   
himself1 to an interminable future4 ,but
 if there be another state of being     
after death1 will he be best prepared   
for it who lives without ,god in this   
world1 without serious forethought in   

regard to his eternal prospects1 without
 any deliberate preparation for his     
certain and solemn change8 ,or will it  
be a consolation to him then to reflect 
that he disbelieved or doubted now1 and 
that he exerted his talents and spent   
his life on earth in undermining the    
faith of his fellow-men1 and weakening  
their impressions of things unseen and  
eternal8  ,mr4 ,holyoake seems to       
imagine that whether there be or be not 
a future state after death1 ,secularism 
is the safest side1 and he puts the     
alternative thus3 ,if there are other   
worlds to be inhabited after this life1 
those persons will best be fitted for   
the enjoyment of them who have made the 
welfare of humanity their business in   
this4 ,but if there are not other       
worlds1 men are essentially losers by   
neglecting the enjoyment of this4 ,on   
either supposition1 it would seem1 the  
,secularist has the advantage of the    
,christian3 on the one1 because he and  
not the ,christian1 makes the welfare of

 humanity his business2 on the other1   
because he1 and not the ,christian1 has 
the true enjoyment of the present life4 
,it might be difficult to prove either  
of these convenient assumptions1 or to  
show that there is anything in          
,christianity to prevent1 anything in   
,atheism to promote1 the care of        
humanity on the one hand1 or the        
enjoyment of life on the other4 ,on the 
contrary1 all experience testifies that 
,religion is the only sure spring of    
philanthropy1 and that1 on the whole1   
none have a sweeter enjoyment of the    
present life than those who can look    
abroad on the works of ,nature and say1 
,my ,father made them all1 and who can  
look forward to death itself with a hope
 full of immortality4 ,it is true1 that 
the serious expectation of a future     
state must impose a certain restraint on
 the indulgence of our appetites and    
passions2 but is it such a restraint as 
is injurious even to our temporal       
welfare8 is it not the dictate of       

enlightened prudence1 were we to look no
 further than to the present life8 ,mr4 
,holyoake himself repudiates the        
language which the apostle puts into the
 mouth of the unbeliever1 ,let us eat   
and drink1 for to-morrow we             
die1--language which is expressive of   
what would be the natural tendency of   
men1 were they assured of non-existence 
hereafter1 but which ,mr4 ,holyoake     
rejects1 with something like virtuous   
indignation1 saying1 ,that is the       
sentiment of the sensualist3 it is not  
the sentiment of a man who is at all    
conscious that right and wrong are      
inherent in human nature1 that there are
 wide distinctions between virtue and   
vice4 ,this is not the sentiment of the 
man who comprehends that if we do well1 
it will be well with us1 that if we do  
harm1 the evil influence will follow us2
 who sees distinctly that our acts1 if  
good1 our angels are1 and if ill1 our   
fatal shadows that walk by us still4#cae
 ,it is not the apostle's sentiment nor 

the sentiment of any believer2 it is1 as
 ,mr4 ,holyoake says1 the sentiment of  
the sensualist2 but it is represented as
 the natural offspring of unbelief in   
regard to a future state1 just as       
sensualism is naturally generated and   
fostered by unbelief in regard to those 
moral principles which have respect to  
the present life2 and if these          
principles may and should exert a       
controlling influence over our conduct1 
even to the extent of imposing restraint
 and self-denial with a view to our     
welfare in time1 may they not be        
expected to be all the more powerful    
when we include also our welfare in     
eternity8 and may it not thus become    
manifest that godliness hath the promise
 of the life that now is1 as well as of 
that which is to come8 ,it would be     
difficult to say in what respect        
believers neglect the enjoyment of this 
life1 or are essentially losers by their
 religion4 ,they will gratefully ascribe
 to it their highest and purest         

happiness2 and rather than part with it 
they will cheerfully submit to the loss 
of all other things1 and even to        
persecution and martyrdom itself4 ,but  
it is asked1 ,if ,christianity be false1
 is it nothing that you are troubled    
with a thousand anxieties and cares     
about what shall become of you after    
death8 ,if ,christianity be false1 is it
 nothing that day after day you have the
 fear of death before your eyes8 ,if    
,christianity be false1 it makes you    
slaves while you live1 and cowards in   
death4#caf ,we might answer1 ,if        
,christianity be true1 what then8 but we
 prefer a different course3 we say that 
the reality of a future state is in     
nowise dependent on the truth of        
,christianity1 however much we may be   
indebted to ,christianity for our       
certain knowledge of it2 that even on   
the principles of ,atheism there is no  
security against the everlasting        
continuance of self-consciousness1 any  
more than there is against the          

inevitable stroke of death2 that        
,christianity in either case assumes the
 fact1 and addresses men as dying yet   
immortal creatures1 while it reveals a  
way in which those who through fear of  
death were all their lifetime subject to
 bondage may be delivered from that     
fear1 and raised to a hope full of      
immortality4 ,as death is not created or
 called into being by ,christianity1 so 
neither is the awful future which lies  
beyond it3 the ,secularist not less than
 the ,christian has to do with it4 ,mr4 
,holyoake seems1 at least occasionally1 
to be sensible of this solemn truth4 ,i 
am as much concerned1 he says1 as this  
reverend gentleman can be1 as to what   
shall be the issue of my own condition  
in the future2 ,i am as much concerned  
in the solution of this question as he  
is himself2 and ,i believe that the view
 ,i entertain1 or that any of us may    
entertain1 conscientiously1 will be our 
justification in that issue1 if we      
should come to want justification4 ,when

 we pass through the inexorable gates of
 the future2 when we pass through that  
vestibule where death stands opening his
 everlasting gates as widely to the     
pauper as to the king2 when we pass out 
here into the dim mysteries of the      
future1 to confront1 it may be1 the     
interrogations of the ,eternal1--,i     
apprehend every man's responsibility    
will go with him1 and no second-hand    
opinions will answer for us4#cag ,is    
there not something here that should    
arrest the attention and awaken the     
anxiety even of the ,secularist himself8
 ,he sees before him the inevitable     
event of death1 and beyond it the dim   
mysteries of the future2 he may be      
called to confront the interrogations of
 the ,eternal1 and then every man's     
responsibility will go with him4 ,surely
 there is enough in the bare possibility
 of such a prospect to justify more than
 all the interest which has ever been   
expended upon it even by the most       
anxious inquirer4 ,but1 haunted by these

 solemn thoughts1 ,mr4 ,holyoake takes  
refuge in the other alternative of his  
dilemma3 ,if there are other worlds1    
those will best be fitted for the       
enjoyment of them who have made the     
welfare of humanity their business in   
this4 ,secular philanthropy is the best1
 and only needful1 preparation4 ,with   
this any belief in regard to the future 
is unnecessary1 without it no belief    
will be of any avail3 for the view which
 any of us may entertain1               
conscientiously1 will be our            
justification in that issue1 if we      
should come to want justification2 ,no  
second-hand opinions will answer for us4
 ,nothing can justify us1 nothing can   
give us confidence1 but the             
conscientious nature of our own         
conclusions2 nothing can give us courage
 but innocence2 nothing can serve our   
turn but having believed according to   
the best of our judgment1 and having    
followed those principles which seem to 
us to be the truth4 ,he takes refuge1   

then1 first in his good works1 and      
secondly in the sincerity of his        
convictions1 as the sole grounds of his 
confidence in the prospect of           
confronting the interrogations of the   
,eternal6  ,is it wonderful1--such being
 his only hope in death1--that when     
cholera appeared in ,london1 and        
multitudes were suddenly removed by that
 appalling visitation1 he should have   
felt it necessary to deliver a series of
 ,lectures1--now reprinted as ,the      
,logic of ,death1--with a view to the   
assurance of his friends8 ,might there  
not be some among them who would shrink 
from a future judgment on the ground of 
their innocence or good works1 and many 
more who would feel that they were      
making an awful venture in leaving their
 eternity to depend on the mere         
sincerity of their convictions1 in      
whatever way these convictions may have 
been formed1 and whether they were true 
or false8 ,and could they be reassured  
or comforted by any other article of the

 ,secular ,creed8 ,they might be told1  
as ,mr4 ,holyoake tells them1 ,i am not 
an unbeliever1 if that implies the      
rejection of ,christian truth1 since all
 ,i reject is ,christian error3 ,i      
reject the fall of man1 the atonement1  
the sin of unbelief1 the doctrine of    
future punishment2 a disbeliever in all 
these doctrines1 why should ,i fear to  
die8 ,but the more thoughtful among     
them1 all who were really in earnest1   
might desiderate something more2 they   
might see that disbelief1 however       
dogmatic1 does not amount to disproof1  
and that the real ground of fear is not 
in the least removed by it4 ,does his   
question imply1 that if these doctrines 
were true1 he would have just reason to 
fear death8 or does it mean merely1 that
 whether they be true or false1 he can  
have no reason to fear death1 simply    
because he disbelieves them8 ,on the    
former supposition1 how vast the        
difference between the ,secularist and  
the ,christian8 ,the one would have     

reason to fear because these doctrines  
are or may be true2 the other believes  
them to be true1 and finds in that very 
belief a deliverance from the fear of   
death1 and a firm ground of confidence  
and hope6 ,on the latter                
supposition1--which we believe to be the
 correct one1--what an amazing          
confidence must that man possess in the 
sincerity of his convictions1 the       
conscientiousness of his judgment1 and  
the rigid impartiality of his inquiries 
after truth1 who can peril his eternal  
prospects on the mere fact that he      
disbelieves these doctrines1 whether    
they be true or false6 ,suppose that    
disbelief may diminish the intensity of 
his fears1 can it alter the real state  
of the case1 or remove the only just    
ground of apprehension and anxiety in   
regard to the future8 ,the truth of     
these doctrines is not dependent either 
on our belief or disbelief2 and in the  
way of natural consequence1 even were   
there no additional penal infliction1   

they may vindicate themselves hereafter 
in the case of those who neglect or     
disbelieve them here1 by leaving them   
destitute of all the advantages which   
flow only from the cordial reception of 
the truth4 ,thus much at least would be 
in entire accordance with the analogy of
 our experience with reference to the   
interests of the present life2 for we do
 suffer1 even now and here1 in          
consequence of our ignorance1 or        
neglect1 or practical disbelief of      
truth1--and it may be so hereafter1 in  
the way simply of inevitable natural    
consequence1 but much more in the way of
 righteous penal retribution1 if there  
be any truth in that philosophy of      
unbelief1 so true to nature and so      
solemnly proclaimed1 ,this is the       
condemnation1 that light is come into   
the world1 and men loved darkness rather
 than light1 because their deeds were   
evil2 for every one that doeth evil     
hateth the light1 neither cometh to the 
light1 lest his deeds should be         

reproved4#cah         99       99       
99       99       99  ,we have          
endeavored to estimate the claims of    
,secularism1 and to examine the         
foundations on which it rests4 ,in doing
 so1 we have not denied either the right
 or the duty of any man to inquire and  
to decide for himself on his own solemn 
responsibility4 ,we admit as fully as   
,mr4 ,holyoake himself1 that personal   
responsibility implies the right1 or    
rather the duty1 of inquiry4 ,he has our
 entire sympathy when he says1 ,it is my
 business to take care1 if ,i walk from 
time to eternity1 that ,i walk by that  
light which satisfies my own            
understanding4 ,if it were true that any
 of you would take my place1 if we      
should eventually find ourselves at the 
bar of ,god1 and ,i should find myself  
to be made answerable for the opinions  
which ,i entertain1 or for beliefs which
 ,i had in time1 if any of you1 or all  
of you1 would take my place1 and answer 
for me1 then ,i might be content to take

 your opinions1 then ,i might stand on  
the side of the world3 but what does it 
matter to me what ,newton believed1 what
 ,locke believed1 or what the world     
believes1 unless the world will answer  
for me if ,i believe as the world       
believes8 ,but while the right of       
inquiry is frankly admitted1 it can     
scarcely be denied that the mind may be 
biased by prejudice and involved in     
error2 and the ultimate question is1    
not1 what are your opinions8 but1 what  
are the grounds on which they           
rest8--not1 what is your belief8 but1   
what is the truth8 ,mr4 ,holyoake is the
 ,coryphus of his party4 ,as a popular  
writer and speaker1 his talents and     
zeal1 devoted to a better cause1 might  
have fitted him for extensive           
usefulness1 and rendered him a          
benefactor to his country4 ,as it is1 no
 man in ,england rests under a heavier  
load of responsibility4 ,he has placed  
himself at the head of the propaganda of
 popular infidelity4 ,is it yet too late

 for him to reconsider his opinions1 and
 retrace his steps8 ,for his own sake1  
for the sake of those who are near and  
dear to him1 for the sake of the        
multitudes who must be influenced1 for  
good or evil1 by his speeches and       
writings1 let him lay to heart the      
solemn words of ,sir ,humphrey          
,davy2--,i envy no quality of mind or   
intellect in others1--not genius1 power1
 wit1 or fancy3 but if ,i could choose  
what would be most delightful1 and ,i   
believe most useful to me1 ,i should    
prefer a firm religious belief to every 
other blessing2 for it makes life a     
discipline of goodness1 creates new     
hopes when all earthly hopes vanish1 and
 throws over the decay1 the destruction 
of existence1 the most gorgeous of all  
lights1 calling up the most delightful  
visions1 where the sensualist and       
skeptic view only gloom1 decay1 and     
annihilation4              ,attempt how 
vain1--     ,with things of earthly     
sort1 with aught but ,god1     ,with    

aught but moral excellence1 truth1 and  
love     ,to satisfy and fill the       
immortal soul6     ,to satisfy the ocean
 with a drop2--     ,to marry           
immortality to death2     ,and with the 
unsubstantial ,shade of ,time     ,to   
fill the embrace of all ,eternity4      
,,the ,,end4  ,,footnotes3  #bea        
,,george ,,jacob ,,holyoake1 ,paley     
,refuted in his own ,words1 ,third      
,edition4 ,london1 #ahej4 ,,townley     
,,and ,,holyoake1 ,a ,public ,discussion
 on the ,being of a ,god1 ,third        
,thousand4 ,london1 #aheb4 ,,grant ,,and
 ,,holyoake1 ,christianity and          
,secularism2 a ,public ,discussion held 
on six successive ,thursday evenings1   
,seventh ,thousand4 ,london1 #ahec4     
#beb ,the ,reasoner1 ,new ,series1 ,no4 
,,viii4 #aae4 ,of this serial it is said
 7,,xii4 #f1 #ha71 ,the ,reasoner1 which
 was established in #ahdf1 has come to  
be regarded as the accredited organ of  
,freethinking in ,great ,britain4       
,indeed1 for a long time1 it has been   

the principal professed exponent of     
these views1 addressed to the working   
and thinking classes4  #bec ,ibid41     
,,xi4 #ae1 #bbb2 ,,xii4 #d1 #f1 #di1    
#ha4  #bed ,the ,reasoner1 ,,xii4 #d1   
#ej4  #bee ,ibid41 ,,xi4 #ah1 #bga4     
#bef ,ibid41 ,,xi4 #ae1 #bcb4  #beg ,the
 ,reasoner1 ,,xii4 #bd1 #cgf4  #beh     
,ibid41 ,new ,series1 pp4 #i1 #acj4     
#bei ,ibid41 ,,xi4 #bd1 #cfh4  #bfj     
,,dr4 ,,chalmers' ,works1 ,i4 #fd4  #bfa
 ,paley ,refuted1 p4 #ab4  #bfb ,,grant 
,,and ,,holyoake1 ,discussion1 pp4 #e4  
#h1 #bba4  #bfc ,the ,reasoner ,reasoned
 with1 p4 #ac4 ,holyoake's ,reply to    
,dr4 ,forbes of ,glasgow4  #bfd ,the    
,logic of ',logic of ,death1' p4 #aj4   
#bfe ,paley ,refuted1 p4 #cg4  #bff     
,,townley ,,and ,,holyoake1 ,discussion1
 p4 #ac4  #bfg ,the ,converted          
,atheist's ,testimony4  #bfh ,,townley  
,,and ,,holyoake1 ,discussion1 pp4 #ef1 
#eg4  #bfi ,,holyoake1 ,logic of ,death4
  #bgj ,,townley ,,and ,,holyoake1      
,discussion1 pp4 #bb1 #cg1 #ee4  #bga   

,,holyoake1 ,logic of ,death4  #bgb     
,paley ,refuted1 p4 #ca4  #bgc ,,townley
 ,,and ,,holyoake1 ,discussion1 pp4 #ag1
 #bd4  #bgd ,,townley ,,and ,,holyoake1 
,discussion1 p4 #be4  #bge ,,holyoake1  
,logic of ,death4  #bgf ,,holyoake1     
,paley ,refuted1 p4 #cg4  #bgg ,,townley
 ,,and ,,holyoake1 ,discussion1 pp4 #bc1
 #dg4  #bgh ,,de ,,grimm1 ,title page of
 ,paley ,refuted4  #bgi ,,holyoake1     
,paley ,refuted1 pp4 #h1 #aa4  #bhj     
,,holyoake1 ,paley ,refuted1 pp4 #ai1   
#bc4  #bha ,,townley ,,and ,,holyoake1  
,discussion1 p4 #bg4  #bhb ,,holyoake1  
,paley ,refuted1 pp4 #ai1 #bd1 #be4     
#bhc ,ibid41 pp4 #bf1 #cb1 #ci4 ,see    
also ,,townley ,,and ,,holyoake1        
,discussion1 pp4 #bg1 #bi1 #cd1 #dc1    
#de4  #bhd ,,townley ,,and ,,holyoake1  
,discussion1 pp4 #g1 #dad4  #bhe ,,prof4
 ,,ferrier1 ,institutes of ,metaphysic1 
,epistemology1 ,prop4 ,,xxii4 p4 #cgg1  
also pp4 #cha1 #che1 #ejf4  #bhf ,,dr4  
,,hampden1 ,essay on the ,philosophical 
,evidence of ,christianity1 pp4 #fj1    

#fd4  #bhg ,,robert ,,boyle1            
,theological ,works1 on the term        
,nature4  #bhh ,,professor ,,nicolas1   
,quelques ,considerations sur le        
,pantheisme1 pp4 #cj1 #cc1 #ce1 #ch4    
#bhi ,the ,reasoner1 ,,xi4 #h1 #aai1    
#bc1 #cef4 ,new ,series1 pp4 #i1 #ada4  
#bij ,the ,reasoner1 ,,xi4 #bc1 #ceg4   
#bia ,,townley ,,and ,,holyoake1        
,discussion1 pp4 #af1 #ei4  #bib ,,grant
 ,,and ,,holyoake1 ,discussion1 pp4 #hj1
 #ha4  #bic ,ibid41 pp4 #ff1 #hj4  #bid 
,,townley ,,and ,,holyoake1 ,discussion4
 p4 #eh4  #bie ,psalm #ff3 #ah2 ,james  
#a3 #f2 #d3 #c4  #bif ,matt4 #bf3 #ci4  
#big ,psalm #aai3 #ij2 ,matt4 #d3 #f4   
#bih ,psalm #cd3 #ai2 ,john #af3 #cc2   
,heb4 #ab3 #g1 #aa2 ,rom4 #e3 #c2 #b    
,cor4 #d3 #ag2 ,rom4 #h3 #bh1 #ce1 #cg4 
#bii ,eccles4 #c3 #af1 #ag2 #h3 #aa4    
#cjj ,proverbs #b3 #aj2 ,rom4 #ab3 #aa4 
#cja ,psalm #df3 #a1 #b2 #bc3 #a1 #d2 #b
 ,tim4 #d3 #ah4  #cjb ,matt4 #g3 #g1    
#aa2 #f3 #cb1 #cc4  #cjc ,psalm #dj3 #a2
 ,jonah #b3 #b1 #g2 #b ,cor4 #ab3 #h4   

#cjd ,,grant ,,and ,,holyoake1 ,v4 #h1  
#dj1 #ej1 #eg4  #cje ,paley ,refuted1 p4
 #ch1 #dc4  #cjf ,,grant ,,and          
,,holyoake1 ,discussion1 pp4 ,v4 #g4    
#cjg ,,townley ,,and ,,holyoake1        
,discussion1 p4 #eh4  #cjh ,,grant ,,and
 ,,holyoake1 ,discussion1 p4 #bbc4  #cji
 ,,grant ,,and ,,holyoake1 ,discussion1 
pp4 #d1 #bba4  #caj ,ibid41 ,v41 ,,vi4  
#g4  #caa ,,holyoake1 ,paley ,refuted1  
p4 #dc4 ,,grant ,,and ,,holyoake1       
,discussion1 pp4 #g1 #h4  #cab ,modern  
,atheism1 or the ,pretensions of        
,secularism ,examined1 p4 #ei4  #cac    
,logic of ,logic of ,death1 p4 #d4  #cad
 ,,dr4 ,,hampden1 ,philosophical        
,evidence of ,christianity1 p4 #bh4     
#cae ,,holyoake ,,and ,,grant1          
,discussion1 p4 #abe4  #caf ,modern     
,atheism1 p4 #ad4  #cag ,,townley ,,and 
,,holyoake1 ,discussion1 p4 #ah4  #cah  
,john #c3 #bj1 #ba4     ,,important     
,,literary ,,and ,,scientific ,,works1  
,,published ,,by  ,,gould ,,and         
,,lincoln1  #ei ,,washington ,,street1  

,,boston4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,,annual ,,of ,,scientific 
,,discovery2  ,or1 ,year ,book of ,facts
 in ,science and ,art4 ,by ,,david ,a4  
,,wells1 ,a4 ,m4 #abmo1 cloth1 #a4be4   
,this work1 commenced in the year #ahej1
 and issued in the month of ,january1   
annually1 embraces an enumeration and   
description of every important          
,invention1 ,discovery1 or ,scientific  
,theory1 reported during the year4 ,each
 volume is distinct in itself1 and      
contains ,,entirely ,,new ,,matter1 with
 a fine portrait of some person         
distinguished for his attainments in    
science and art4   ,,lake ,,superior2   
,its ,physical ,character1 ,vegetation1 
and ,animals4 ,by ,l4 ,,agassiz1 and    
others4 ,one volume1 octavo1 elegantly  
,illustrated4 ,cloth1 #c4ej4   ,,the    
,,plurality ,,of ,,worlds4  ,new        
,edition4 ,with a ,,supplementary       
,,dialogue1 in which the author's       
reviewers are reviewed4 #abmo1 cloth1   
#a4jj4  ,this masterly production1 which

 has excited so much interest in this   
country and in ,europe1 will now have   
increased attraction in the             
,,supplement1 in which the author's     
reviewers are triumphantly reviewed4    
,,comparative ,,anatomy ,,of ,,the      
,,animal ,,kingdom4  ,by ,prof4 ,c4     
,,th4 ,,von ,,siebold and ,h4           
,,stannius4 ,translated1 with ,notes1   
,additions1 c41 ,by ,,waldo ,j4         
,,burnett1 ,m4 ,d4 ,one vol41 octavo1   
cloth1 #c4jj4  ,this is unquestionably  
the best and most complete work of its  
class ever yet published4   ,,works ,,by
 ,,hugh ,,miller4  ,,the ,,footprints   
,,of ,,the ,,creator2 or1 ,the          
,asterolepis of ,stromness4 ,with       
,illustrations4 ,memoir of the ,author  
by ,,louis ,,agassiz4 #abmo1 cloth1     
#a4jj4   ,,my ,,schools and             
,,schoolmasters2 or1 ,the ,story of my  
,education4 ,with and elegant ,likeness4
 #abmo1 cloth1 #a4be4  ,this is a       
personal narrative of a deeply          
interesting and instructive character1  

concerning one of the most remarkable   
men of the age4   ,,the ,,old ,,red     
,,sandstone2 or1 ,new ,walks in an ,old 
,field4 ,illustrated with ,plates and   
,geological ,sections4 #abmo1 cloth1    
#a4jj4   ,,first ,,impressions ,,of     
,,england ,,and ,,its ,,people4 ,with a 
fine ,engraving of the ,author4 #abmo1  
cl41 #a4jj4  ,a thrillingly interesting1
 and very instructive book of travels2  
presenting the most perfectly life-like 
views of ,england and its people1 to be 
found in the language4  ,,dr4 ,,buckland
 said1 ,he would give his left hand to  
possess such powers of description as   
this man4   ,,the ,,natural ,,history   
,,of ,,the ,,human ,,species4  ,its     
,typical ,forms and ,primeval           
,distribution4 ,by ,,charles ,,hamilton 
,,smith1 ,with an ,introduction1        
containing and ,abstract of the ,views  
of ,blumenbach1 ,prichard1 ,bachman1    
,agassiz1 and other writers of repute4  
,by ,,samuel ,,kneeland1 ,jr41 ,m4 ,d4  
,with elegant ,illustrations4 #abmo1    

cloth1 #a4be4  ,it is a book of         
learning1 and full of interest1 and may 
be regarded as among the comparatively  
few real contributions to               
science4--,christian ,witness4          
,,thesaurus ,,of ,,english ,,words ,,and
 ,,phrases4  ,so classified and arranged
 as to facilitate the expression of     
ideas1 and assist in literary           
composition4 ,by ,,peter ,,mark ,,roget4
 ,revised and ,edited1 with a ,list of  
,foreign ,words ,defined in ,english1   
and other additions1 by ,,barnas        
,,sears1 ,d4 ,d41 ,president of ,brown  
,university4 ,a ,new ,american1 from the
 late stereotype ,london edition1 with  
,,additions ,,and ,,improvements4 #abmo1
 cloth1 #a4ej4  ,this edition contains  
important additions of words and phrases
 ,,not ,,in ,,the ,,english ,,edition1  
making it in all respects ,,more ,,full 
,,and ,,perfect ,,than ,,the ,,author',s
 ,,edition4 ,the work has already become
 one of standard authority1 both in this
 country and in ,great ,britain4   ,,the

 ,,elements ,,of ,,geology4  ,adapted to
 ,schools and ,colleges4 ,with numerous 
,illustrations4 ,by ,j4 ,r4 ,,loomis1   
,lewisburg ,university1 ,pa4 #abmo1     
cloth1 #ge cts4  ,it is surpassed by no 
work before the ,american public4 ,we   
hope that every teacher among our       
readers will examine the work and put   
the justness of our remarks to the test 
of his judgment and experience4--,m4 ,b4
 ,,anderson1 ,,ll4 ,d4--,pres4 of       
,rochester ,university1 ,n4 ,y4  ,this  
is just such a work as is needed for all
 our schools4 ,it should take its place 
as a text-book in all the schools of the
 land4--,n4 ,y4 ,observer4   ,,the      
,,earth ,,and ,,man4  ,by ,,prof4       
,,arnold ,,guyot4 ,with ,illustrations4 
#abmo1 cloth1 #a4be4   ,,influence ,,of 
,,the ,,history ,,of ,,science ,,upon   
,,intellectual ,,education4  ,by        
,,william ,,whewell1 ,d4 ,d4 #afmo1     
cloth1 #be cents4   ,,principles ,,of   
,,zo,,logy4  ,with ,illustrations4 ,by  
,,louis ,,agassiz and ,,augustus ,a4    

,,gould4 #abmo1 cloth1 #a4  ,this work  
places us in possession of information  
half a century in advance of all our    
elementary works on this                
subject4--,,prof4 ,,james ,,hall4  ,a   
work emanating from so high a source    
hardly requires commendation to give it 
currency4 ,simple and elementary in its 
style1 full in its illustrations1       
comprehensive in its range4--,silliman's
 ,journal4  ,the best book of the kind  
in our language4--,christian ,examiner4 
,zoology is an interesting science1 and 
is here treated with a masterly         
hand4--,scientific ,american4   ,,the   
,,landing ,,at ,,cape ,,anne2  ,or1 ,the
 ,charter of the ,first ,permanent      
,colony on the ,territory of the        
,massachusetts ,company4 ,now discovered
 and first published from the original  
manuscript4 ,by ,,john ,,wingate        
,,thornton4 ,octavo1 cloth1 #a4ej4      
,,geological ,,map ,,of ,,the ,,united  
,,states ,,and ,,british ,,provinces4   
,with an ,explanatory ,text1 ,geological

 ,sections1 and ,plates of the ,fossils 
which characterize the ,formations4 ,by 
,,jules ,,marcou4 ,two volumes4 ,octavo1
 cloth1 #c4jj4   ,the ,map is elegantly 
colored1 and done up with linen cloth   
back1 and folded in octavo form1 with   
thick cloth covers4   ,,knowledge ,,is  
,,power4  ,a view of the ,productive    
,forces of ,modern ,society1 and the    
,results of ,labor1 ,capital and ,skill4
 ,by ,,charles ,,knight4 ,with numerous 
,illustrations4 ,american edition4      
,revised1 with ,additions1 by ,,david   
,a4 ,,wells1 editor of the ,annual of   
,scientific ,discovery4 #abmo1 cloth1   
#a4be4   ,,cyclop,,dia ,,of ,,anecdotes 
,,of ,,literature ,,and ,,the ,,fine    
,,arts4  ,a choice selection of         
,anecdotes of the various forms of      
,literature1 of the ,arts1 of           
,architecture1 ,engravings1 ,music1     
,poetry1 ,painting and ,sculpture1 and  
of the most celebrated ,literary        
,characters and ,artists of different   
,countries and ,ages1 c4 ,by ,,kazlitt  

,,arvine1 ,a4 ,m4 ,with numerous        
,illustrations4 #gbe pages1 octavo1     
cloth1 #h4jj4  ,this is unquestionably  
the choicest collection of ,,anecdotes  
ever published4 ,it contains ,,three    
,,thousand ,,and ,,forty ,,anecdotes1   
and more than ,,one ,,hundred ,,and     
,,fifty ,,illustrations4 ,it is         
admirably adapted to literary and       
scientific men1 to artists1 mechanics1  
and others1 as a ,,dictionary ,,for     
,,reference1 in relation to facts on the
 numberless subjects and characters     
introduced4   ,,kitto',s ,,popular      
,,cyclop,,dia ,,of ,,biblical           
,,literature4  ,condensed from the      
larger work1 by the author ,,john       
,,kitto1 ,d4 ,d4 ,assisted by ,,james   
,,taylor1 ,d4 ,d4 ,with over #ejj       
,illustrations4 ,octavo1 #hab pp41      
cloth1 #h4jj4  ,this work answers the   
purpose of a commentary1 while at the   
same time it furnishes a complete       
,,dictionary ,,of ,,the ,,bible1        
embodying the products of the best and  

most recent researches in biblical      
literature1 in which the scholars of    
,europe and ,america have been engaged4 
,it is not only intended for ministers  
and theological students1 but is also   
particularly adapted to parents1        
,sabbath-school teachers1 and the great 
body of the religious public4           
,,history ,,of ,,palestine4  ,with the  
,geography and ,natural ,history of the 
,country1 the ,customs and ,institutions
 of the ,hebrews1 etc4 ,by ,,john       
,,kitto1 ,d4 ,d4 ,with upwards of #bjj  
,illustrations4 #abmo1 cloth1 #a4be4    
,beyond all dispute this is the best    
historical compendium of the ,holy      
,land1 from the days of ,abraham to     
those of the late ,pasha of ,egypt1     
,mehemet ,ali4--,edinburgh ,review4     
,in the numerous notices and reviews1   
the work has been strongly recommended1 
as not only admirably adapted to the    
,,family1 but also as a text-book for   
,,sabbath and ,,week ,,day ,,schools4   
,,chambers',s ,,cyclop,,dia ,,of        

,,english ,,literature4  ,two large     
imperial octavo volumes of #adjj pages2 
with upwards of #cjj elegant            
,illustrations4 ,by ,,robert ,,chambers4
 ,embossed cloth1 #e4jj4  ,this work    
embraces about ,,one ,,thousand         
,,authors1 chronologically arranged and 
classed as ,poets1 ,historians1         
,dramatists1 ,philosophers1             
,metaphysicians1 ,divines1 etc41 with   
choice selections from their writings1  
connected by a ,biographical1           
,historical1 and ,critical ,narrative2  
thus presenting a complete view of      
,english literature from the earliest to
 the present time4 ,let the reader open 
where he will1 he cannot fail to find   
matter for profit and delight4 ,the     
selections are gems--infinite riches in 
a little room2 in the language of       
another1 ,a ,,whole ,,english ,,library 
,,fused ,,down ,,into ,,one ,,cheap     
,,book6   ,,chambers',s ,,miscellany    
,,of ,,useful ,,and ,,entertaining      
,,knowledge4  ,by ,,william ,,chambers4 

,with ,illustrations4 ,ten vols41 #afmo1
 cloth1 #g4jj4   ,,chambers',s ,,home   
,,book ,,and ,,pocket ,,miscellany4  ,a 
choice ,selection of ,interesting and   
,instructive ,reading for the ,old and  
the ,young4 ,six vols4 #afmo1 cloth1    
#c4jj4  ,this work is fully equal1 if   
not superior1 to either of the          
,chambers's other works in interest1    
containing a vast fund of valuable      
information1 furnishing ample variety   
for every class of readers4             
,,chambers',s ,,repository ,,of         
,,instructive ,,and ,,amusing ,,papers4 
,with ,illustrations4 #afmo1 cloth1     
bound1 #d vols4 in two1 #a4ge2 and #d   
vols4 in one1 #a4ej4     ,,valuable     
,,works  ,,published ,,by  ,,gould ,,and
 ,,lincoln1  #ei ,,washington ,,street1 
,,boston4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,,the ,,christian',s       
,,daily ,,treasury4  ,a ,religious      
,exercise for ,every ,day in the ,year4 
,by ,e4 ,,temple4 ,a new and improved   
edition4 #abmo1 cloth1 #a4jj4  ,a work  

for every ,christian4 ,it is indeed a   
,treasury of good things4   ,,the       
,,school ,,of ,,christ2  ,or1           
,christianity ,viewed in its ,leading   
,aspects4 ,by the ,rev4 ,a4 ,l4 ,r4     
,,foote1 author of ,incidents in the    
,life of our ,saviour1 etc4 #afmo1      
cloth1 #ej cents4   ,,the ,,christian   
,,life1  ,social and ,individual4 ,by   
,,peter ,,bayne1 ,m4 ,a4 #abmo1 cloth1  
#a4be4  ,the demand for this            
extraordinary work1 commencing before   
its publication1 is still eager and     
constant4 ,there is but one voice       
respecting it2 men of all denominations 
agree in pronouncing it one of the most 
admirable works of the age4   ,,god     
,,revealed ,,in ,,the ,,process ,,of    
,,creation1  ,and by the ,manifestation 
of ,jesus ,christ4 ,including an        
,examination of the ,development ,theory
 contained in the ,vestiges of the      
,natural ,history of ,creation4 ,by     
,,james ,b4 ,,walker1 author of         
,philosophy of the ,plan of ,salvation4 

#abmo1 cloth1 #a4jj4   ,,philosophy ,,of
 ,,the ,,plan ,,of ,,salvation4  ,by an 
,,american ,,citizen4 ,an ,introductory 
,essay1 by ,,calvin ,e4 ,,stowe1 ,d4 ,d4
  ,new improved edition1 with a         
,,supplementary ,,chapter4 #abmo1 cloth1
 #ge cts4  ,this book is generally      
admitted to be one of the best in the   
,english language4 ,the work has been   
translated into several different       
languages in ,europe4 ,a capital book to
 circulate among young men4   ,a        
,,wreath ,,around ,,the ,,cross2  ,or1  
,scripture ,truths ,illustrated4 ,by ,a4
 ,,morton ,,brown1 ,d4 ,d4              
,recommendatory ,preface1 by ,,john     
,,angell ,,james4 ,beautiful            
,frontispiece4 #afmo1 cloth1 #fj cents4 
,,the ,,better ,,land2  ,or1 ,the       
,believer's ,journey and ,future ,home4 
,by ,,rev4 ,a4 ,c4 ,,thompson4 #abmo1   
cloth1 #he cents4  ,a most charming and 
instructive book for all now journeying 
to the ,better ,land1 and especially for
 those who have friends already entered 

upon its never-ending joys4   ,,the     
,,mission ,,of ,,the ,,comforter4  ,with
 copious ,notes4 ,by ,,julius ,,charles 
,,hare4 ,with the ,notes translated for 
the ,american edition4 #abmo1 cloth1    
#a4be4   ,,dr4 ,,wayland',s ,,university
 ,,sermon  ,delivered in the ,chapel of 
,brown ,university4 #abmo1 cloth1 #a4jj4
   ,,the ,,religions ,,of ,,the ,,world4
  ,and their ,relations to              
,christianity4 ,by ,,frederick ,,denison
 ,,maurice1 ,a4 ,m41 ,professor of      
,divinity1 ,king's ,college1 ,london4   
#afmo1 cloth1 #fj cts4   ,,sacred       
,,rhetoric2  ,or1 ,composition and      
,delivery of ,sermons4 ,by ,,henry ,j4  
,,ripley1 ,professor in ,newton         
,theological ,institution4 ,including   
,professor ,ware's ,hints on            
,extemporaneous ,preaching4 #abmo1 #ge  
cts4   ,,the ,,preacher ,,and ,,the     
,,king2  ,or1 ,bourdalone in the ,court 
of ,louis ,,xiv4 ,an ,account of that   
distinguished ,era1 ,translated from the
 ,french of ,l4 ,f4 ,,bungener4 ,with an

 ,introduction by the ,,rev4 ,,george   
,,potts1 ,d4 ,d4 ,new edition1 with a   
fine ,likeness1 and a ,sketch of the    
,author's ,life4 #abmo1 cloth1 #a4be4   
,it combines substantial history with   
the highest charm of romance4 ,its      
attractions are so various that it can  
hardly fail to find readers of almost   
every description4--,puritan ,recorder4 
,,the ,,priest ,,and ,,the ,,huguenot2  
,or1 ,persecution in the ,age of ,louis 
,,xv4 ,translated from the ,french of   
,l4 ,f4 ,,bungener4 #b vols41 #abmo1    
cloth1 #b4be4   ,this is truly a        
masterly production1 full of interest1  
and may be set down as one of the       
greatest ,protestant works of the age4  
,,footsteps ,,of ,,our ,,forefathers4   
,what they ,suffered and what they      
,sought4 ,describing ,localities and    
portraying ,personages and ,events      
conspicuous in the ,struggles for       
,religious ,liberty4 ,by ,,james ,g4    
,,miall4 ,thirty-six fine               
,illustrations4 #abmo1 #a4jj4  ,an      

exceedingly entertaining work4 ,the     
reader soon becomes so deeply           
entertained that he finds it difficult  
to lay aside the book till              
finished4--,ch4 ,parlor ,mag4  ,a work  
absorbingly interesting1 and very       
instructive4--,western ,lit4 ,magazine4 
,,memorials ,,of ,,early ,,christianity4
  ,presenting1 in a graphic1 compact1   
and popular form1 ,memorable ,events of 
,early ,ecclesiastical ,history1 etc4   
,by ,,james ,g4 ,,miall4 ,with numerous 
elegant ,illustrations4 #abmo1 cloth1   
#a4jj4   ,this1 like the ,footsteps of  
our ,forefathers1 will be found a work  
of uncommon interest4   ,,works ,,by    
,,john ,,harris1 ,d4 ,d4  ,,the         
,,pre-,,adamite ,,earth4 ,contributions 
to ,theological ,science4 #abmo1 cloth1 
#a4jj4  ,,man ,,primeval2 or1 the       
,constitution and ,primitive ,condition 
of the ,human ,being4 ,with a fine      
,portrait of the ,author4 #abmo1 cloth1 
#a4be4  ,,patriarchy2 or1 ,,the         
,,family4 ,its ,constitution and        

,probation2 being the third volume of   
,contributions to ,theological ,science4
 #a4be4  ,,the ,,great ,,teacher2 or1   
,characteristics of our ,lord's         
,ministry4 ,with an ,introductory       
,essay4 ,by ,h4 ,,humphrey1 ,d4 ,d4     
#abmo1 cloth1 #he cts4  ,,the ,,great   
,,commission2 or1 the ,christian ,church
 constituted and charged to convey the  
,gospel to the ,world4 ,introductory    
,essay by ,w4 ,r4 ,,williams1 ,d4 ,d4   
#abmo1 cloth1 #a4jj4  ,,zebulon2 ,or1   
the ,moral ,claims of ,seamen4 #ahmo1   
cloth1 #be cts4   ,,philip ,,doddridge4 
,his ,life and ,labors4 ,by ,,john      
,,stoughton1 ,d4 ,d41 with beautiful    
,illuminated ,title-page and            
,frontispiece4 #afmo1 cloth1 #fj cents4 
,,the ,,evidences ,,of ,,christianity1  
,as exhibited in the writings of its    
apologists1 down to ,augustine4 ,by ,w4 
,j4 ,,bolton1 of ,gonville and ,caius   
,college1 ,cambridge4 #abmo1 cloth1 #hj 
cents4   ,,works ,,by ,,dr4 ,,tweedie4  
,,glad ,,tidings2 or1 ,the ,gospel of   

,peace4 ,a series of ,daily ,meditations
 for ,christian ,disciples4 ,by ,rev4   
,w4 ,k4 ,,tweedie1 ,d4 ,d4 ,with elegant
 ,illustrated ,title-page4 #afmo1 cloth1
 #fc cts4  ,,the ,,morn ,,of ,,life2 or1
 ,examples of ,female ,excellence4 ,a   
,book for ,young ,ladies4 #afmo1 cloth4 
,in press4  ,a ,,lamp ,,to ,,the ,,path2
 or1 the ,bible in the ,heart1 the      
,home1 and the ,market ,place4 ,with an 
elegant ,illustrated ,title-page4 #af   
mo1 cloth1 #fc cts4  ,,seed ,,time ,,and
 ,,harvest2 or1 ,sow ,well and ,reap    
,well4 ,a ,book for the ,young4 ,with an
 elegant ,illustrated ,title-page4      
#afmo1 cloth1 #fc cts4   ,the above     
works1 by ,dr4 ,tweedie1 are of uniform 
size and style4 ,they are most charming1
 pious1 and instructive works1          
beautifully gotten up1 and well adapted 
for gift-books4   ,,works ,,by ,,john   
,,angell ,,james4  ,,the ,,church       
,,member',s ,,guide2 ,edited by ,j4 ,o4 
,,choules1 ,d4 ,d4 ,new edition4 ,with  
an ,introductory ,essay by ,rev4        

,,hubbard ,,winslow4 ,cloth1 #cc;c4     
,,christian ,,progress4 ,a ,sequel to   
the ,anxious ,inquirer4 #ahmo1 cloth1   
#ca;c4   one of the best and most useful
 works of this popular author4  ,,the   
,,church ,,in ,,earnest4 ,seventh       
thousand4 #ahmo1 cloth1 #dj cents       
,,mothers ,,of ,,the ,,wise ,,and       
,,good4  ,by ,,jabez ,,burns1 ,d4 ,d4   
#afmo1 cloth1 #ge cents4  ,we wish it   
were in every family1 and read by every 
mother in the land4--,lutheran          
,observer4   ,,my ,,mother2  ,or1       
,recollections of ,material ,influence4 
,by a ,new ,england ,clergyman4 ,with a 
beautiful ,frontispiece4 #abmo1 cloth1  
#ge cents4  ,this is one of the most    
charming books that have issued from the
 press for a long period4 ,it is1 says a
 distinguished author1 one of those rare
 pictures painted from life with the    
exquisite skill of one of the ',old     
,masters1' which so seldom present      
themselves to the amateur4   ,,the      
,,excellent ,,woman4  ,with an          

,introduction by ,rev4 ,w4 ,b4          
,,sprague1 ,d4 ,d4 ,containing          
twenty-four splendid ,illustrations4    
#abmo1 cloth1 #a4jj2 cloth1 gilt1 #a4ge2
 extra ,turkey1 #b4ej4   ,this elegant  
volume is an appropriate and valuable   
gift book for the husband to present the
 wife1 or the child the mother4         
,,memories ,,of ,a ,,grandmother4  ,by a
 ,lady of ,massachusetts4 #afmo1 cloth1 
#ej cents4   ,,the ,,marriage ,,ring2   
,or1 ,how to make ,home ,happy4 ,by     
,,john ,,angell ,,james4 ,beautiful     
illustrated edition4 #afmo1 cloth1 gilt1
 #ge cents4  ,a beautiful volume1 and a 
very suitable present to a newly-married
 couple4--,n4 ,y4 ,christian            
,intelligencer4   ,,works ,,by ,,william
 ,r4 ,,williams1 ,d4 ,d4  ,,religious   
,,progress2 ,discourses on the          
,development of the ,christian          
,character4 #abmo1 cloth1 #he cts4      
,this work is from the pen of one of the
 brightest lights of the ,american      
pulpit4 ,we scarcely know of any living 

writer who has a finer command of       
powerful thought and glowing1 impressive
 language than he4--,,dr4 ,,sprague1    
,alb4 ,atl4  ,,lectures ,,on ,,the      
,,lord',s ,,prayer ,third edition4      
#abmo1 cloth1 #he cts4  ,their breadth  
of view1 strength of logic1 and stirring
 eloquence place them among the very    
best homilitical efforts of the age4    
,every page is full of suggestions as   
well as eloquence4--,ch4 ,parlor ,mag4  
,,miscellanies4 ,new improved edition4  
,price reduced4 #abmo1 #a4be4   ,,amos  
,,lawrence4  ,,diary ,,and              
,,correspondence ,,of ,,the ,,late      
,,amos ,,lawrence2 with a brief account 
of some ,incidents in his ,life4 ,edited
 by his son1 ,,william ,r4 ,,lawrence1  
,m4 ,d4 ,with fine steel ,portraits of  
,,amos and ,,abbott ,,lawrence1 an      
,engraving of their ,birth-place1 a     
,fac-simile page of ,mr4 ,lawrence's    
,hand-writing1 and a copious ,index4    
,octavo edition1 cloth1 #a4fj4 ,royal   
duodecimo edition1 #a4jj4  ,this work   

was first published in an elegant octavo
 volume1 and sold at the unusually low  
price of #a4ej4 ,at the solicitation of 
numerous benevolent individuals who were
 desirous of circulating the work--so   
remarkably adapted to do good1          
especially to young men--gratuitously1  
and of giving those of moderate means1  
of every class1 an opportunity of       
possessing it1 the royal duodecimo1 or  
cheap edition1 was issued1 varying from 
the other edition1 only in a reduction  
in the size 7allowing less margin71 and 
the thickness of the paper4  ,within six
 months after the first publication of  
this work1 twenty-two thousand copies   
had been sold4 ,this extraordinary sale 
is to be accounted for by the character 
of the man and the merits of the book4  
,it is the memoir of a ,boston merchant1
 who became distinguished for his great 
wealth1 but more distinguished for the  
manner in which he used it4 ,it is the  
memoir of a man1 who1 commencing        
business with only #bj1 gave away in    

public and private charities1 during his
 lifetime more1 probably than any other 
person in ,america4 ,it is substantially
 an autobiography1 containing a full    
account of ,mr4 ,lawrence's career as a 
merchant1 of his various multiplied     
charities1 and of his domestic life4    
,we have by us another work1 the ',life 
of ,amos ,lawrence4' ,we      heard it  
once said in the pulpit1 ',there is no  
work of art like      a noble life1' and
 for that reason he who has achieved    
one1      takes rank with the great     
artists and becomes the world's         
property4 ,,we ,,are ,,proud ,,of ,,this
 ,,book4 ,,we ,,are ,,willing ,,to ,,let
 ,,it      ,,go ,,forth ,,to ,,other    
,,lands ,,as ,a ,,specimen ,,of ,,what  
,,america ,,can      ,,produce4 ,in the 
old world1 reviewers have called ,barnum
 ,,the      characteristic ,american    
man4 ,we are willing enough to admit    
that he is a characteristic ,american   
man3 he is ,,one fruit of      our soil1
 but ,amos ,lawrence is another4 ,let   

our country have      credit for him    
also4 ,,the ,,good ,,effect ,,which     
,,this ,,life ,,may ,,have      ,,in    
,,determining ,,the ,,course ,,of       
,,young ,,men ,,to ,,honor ,,and        
,,virtue ,,is                           
,,incalculable4--,,mrs4 ,,stowe1 ,,in   
,n4 ,y4 ,,independent4       ,we are    
glad to know that our large business    
houses are      purchasing copies of    
this work for each of their numerous    
clerks4 ,its influence on young men     
cannot be otherwise than      highly    
salutory4 ,as a business man1 ,mr4      
,lawrence was a pattern      for the    
young clerk4--,,boston ,,traveller4     
,we are thankful for the volume before  
us4 ,it carries us back      to the     
farm-house of ,mr4 ,lawrence's birth1   
and the village      store of his first 
apprenticeship4 ,it exhibits a charity  
noble      and active1 while the young  
merchant was still poor4 ,and above     
all1 it reveals to us a beautiful       
cluster of sister graces1 a      keen   

sense of honor1 integrity which never   
knew the shadow of      suspicion1      
candor in the estimate of character1    
filial piety1      rigid fidelity in    
every domestic relation1 and all these  
connected with and flowing from         
steadfast religious principle1          
profound sentiments of devotion1 and a  
vivid realization of      spiritual     
truth4--,,north ,,american ,,review4    
,we are glad that ,american ,biography  
has been enriched by such      a        
contribution to its treasures4 ,in all  
that composes the      career of 'the   
good man1' and the practical ,christian1
 we have      read few memoirs more full
 of instruction1 or richer in lessons   
of wisdom and virtue4 ,we cordially     
unite in the opinion that      the      
publication of this memoir was a duty   
owed to      society4--,,national       
,,intelligencer4       ,with the        
intention of placing it within the reach
 of a large      number1 the mere cost  
price is charged1 and a more beautifully

      printed volume1 or one calculated 
to do more good1 has not been           
issued from the press of late           
years4--,,evening ,,gazette4       ,this
 book1 besides being of a different     
class from most      biographies1 has   
another peculiar charm4 ,it shows the   
inside      life of the man4 ,you have1 
as it were1 a peep behind the           
curtain1 and see ,mr4 ,lawrence as he   
went in and out among      business men1
 as he appeared on change1 as he        
received his      friends1 as he poured 
out1 'with liberal hand and generous    
heart1' his wealth for the benefit of   
others1 as he received      the         
greetings and salutations of children1  
and as he appeared      in the bosom of 
his family at his own hearth            
stone4--,,brunswick      ,,telegraph4   
,it is printed on new type1 the best    
paper1 and is illustrated      by four  
beautiful plates4 ,how it can be sold   
for the price      named is a           
marvel4--,,norfolk ,,co4 ,,journal4     

,it was first privately printed1 and a  
limited number of copies      were      
distributed among the relatives and near
 friends of the      deceased4 ,this    
volume was read with the deepest        
interest by      those who were so      
favored as to obtain a copy1 and it     
passed      from friend to friend as    
rapidly as it could be read4 ,dr4       
,lawrence has yielded to the general    
wish1 and made public the      volume4  
,it will now be widely circulated1 will 
certainly prove      a standard work1   
and be read over and over               
again4--,,boston      ,,daily           
,,advertiser4       ,june #ast1 #ahef4  
,,supplementary ,,catalogue  ,,of       
,,valuable ,,works1  ,,recently         
,,published4         99       99        
99       99       99  ,,the ,,camel3    
,his ,organization1 ,habits and ,uses1  
considered with reference to his        
,introduction into the ,united ,states4 
,by ,,george ,p4 ,,marsh1 late ,u4 ,s4  
,minister at ,constantinople4 #afmo1    

cloth4 #ge cents4  ,this book treats of 
a subject of great interest1 especially 
at the present time4 ,it furnishes a    
more complete and reliable account of   
the ,camel than any other in the        
language3 ,indeed1 it is believed that  
there is no other4 ,it is the result of 
long study1 extensive research1 and much
 personal observation on the part the   
author2 and it has been prepared with   
special reference to the experiment of  
domesticating the ,camel in this        
country1 now going on under the auspices
 of the ,united ,states government4 ,it 
is written in a style worthy of the     
distinguished author's reputation for   
great learning and fine scholarship4    
,,dr4 ,,grant ,,and ,,the ,,mountain    
,,nestorians4 ,,by ,,rev4 ,,thomas      
,,laurie4 ,with a ,portrait1 ,map of the
 ,country1 and ,illustrations4 #abmo1   
cloth4 ,price #a4be4 ,third edition     
revised4  ,this edition has been        
thoroughly revised by the author1 with  
the view of making the work scrupulously

 accurate4 ,the map is the first correct
 one of the ,nestorian country yet      
published4 ,the work itself is one of   
the most permanently valuable of its    
class1 while it presents a full view of 
the life and labors of the heroic       
missionary whose name it bears2 it also 
makes the reader familiar with the      
striking features of a country which1   
both in ancient and modern times1 has   
been memorable in history4 ,it embraces 
the scene of ,xenophon's immortal       
,anabasis1 the site of ,nineveh1 that   
mighty seat of ancient civilization1 and
 the cities of ,kars and ,erzerum1 so   
recently the scene of deadly strife     
between the ,russians and the ,allies4  
,,analytical ,,concordance ,,to ,,the   
,,holy ,,scriptures2  ,or1 ,,the ,,bible
 ,,presented ,,under ,,distinct ,,and   
,,classified ,,heads ,,or ,,topics4     
,,by ,,john ,,eadie1 ,d4 ,d41 ,,ll4 ,d41
  ,author of ,biblical ,cyclopedia1     
,ecclesiastical ,cyclopedia1 ,early     
,oriental ,history1 ,dictionary of the  

,bible1 etc4 etc4 ,one volume4 ,octavo4 
,p4 #hhf4 7,,in ,,press47 ,the subjects 
are arranged as follows1 viz43          
,agriculture1      ,animals1            
,architecture1      ,army1 ,arms1       
,body1      ,canaan1      ,covenant1    
,diet and ,dress1      ,disease and     
,death1      ,earth1      ,family1      
,genealogy1      ,god1      ,heaven1    
,idolatry1 ,idols1      ,jesus ,christ1 
,jews1      ,laws1      ,magistrates1   
,man1      ,marriage1      ,metals and  
,minerals1      ,ministers of ,religion1
      ,miracles1      ,occupations1     
,ordinances1      ,parables and         
,emblems1      ,persecution1            
,praise and ,prayer1      ,prophecy1    
,providence1      ,redemption1          
,sabbaths and ,holy ,days1              
,sacrifice1      ,scriptures1           
,speech1      ,spirits1      ,tabernacle
 and ,temple1      ,vineyard and        
,orchard1      ,visions and ,dreams1    
,war1      ,water4  ,the object of this 
,concordance is to present the entire   

,scriptures under a certain classified  
and exhaustive heads4 ,it differs from  
and ordinary ,concordance1 in that its  
arrangement depends no on words1 but on 
subjects1 and the verses are printed in 
full4 ,its plan does not bring it at all
 into competition with such limited     
works as those of ,gaston and ,warden2  
for they select doctrinal topics        
principally1 and do not profess to      
comprehend1 as we do1 the entire ,bible4
 ,the work also contains a ,synoptical  
,table of ,contents of the whole work1  
presenting in brief a system of biblical
 antiquities and theology1 with a very  
copious and accurate index4  ,the value 
of this work to ministers and ,sabbath  
school teachers can hardly be           
over-estimated2 and it needs but to be  
examined to secure the approval and     
patronage of every ,bible student4      
,transcriber's ,list of ,corrections    
,,location          ,,original          
,,corrected  ,chapter ,i4          ,abbe
 ,lamennais                   ,abb      

,lamennais          ,atheoi en tkosm    
,atheoi en t kosm          distinction  
beetween                   distinction  
between          ,abbe ,barruel         
,abb ,barruel  ,chapter ,,ii4           
,it it                   ,it is         
artifical                   artificial  
,christain                   ,christian 
,chapter ,,iii4          en kai pan     
hen kai pan          puelques           
quelques  ,chapter ,,viii4              
puruits                   pursuits      
,chapter ,,ix4          endles          
endless