,on ,war by ,general ,carl von ,clausewitz ,,translated ,,by ,,colonel ,j4,j4 ,,graham #ahgd was #ast edition of this translation4 #aiji was the ,london reprinting4 ,,new ,,and ,,revised ,,edition ,,with ,,an ,,introduction ,,and ,,notes ,,by ,,colonel ,f4,n4 ,,maude ,c4,b4 7,,late ,r4,e47 ,,eighth ,,impression ,,in ,,three ,,volumes ,contents ,,introduction ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition ,,notice ,,the ,,introduction ,,of ,,the ,,author ,,brief ,,memoir ,,of ,,general ,,clausewitz ,,book ,i4 ,,on ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,war ,,chapter ,i4 ,what is ,war8 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,ends and ,means in ,war ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,genius for ,war ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,of ,danger in ,war ,,chapter ,v4 ,of ,bodily ,exertion in ,war ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,information in ,war ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,friction in ,war ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,concluding ,remarks1 ,book ,i ,,book ,,ii4 ,,on ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,war ,,chapter ,i4 ,branches of the ,art of ,war ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,on the ,theory of ,war ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,art or ,science of ,war ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,methodicism ,,chapter ,v4 ,criticism ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,on ,examples ,,book ,,iii4 ,,of ,,strategy ,,in ,,general ,,chapter ,i4 ,strategy ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,elements of ,strategy ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,moral ,forces ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,chief ,moral ,powers ,,chapter ,v4 ,military ,virtue of an ,army ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,boldness ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,perseverance ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,superiority of ,numbers ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,the ,surprise ,,chapter ,x4 ,stratagem ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,assembly of ,forces in ,space ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,assembly of ,forces in ,time ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,strategic ,reserve ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,economy of ,forces ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,geometrical ,element ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,on the ,suspension of the ,act in ,war ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,on the ,character of ,modern ,war ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,tension and ,rest ,,book ,,iv4 ,,the ,,combat ,,chapter ,i4 ,introductory ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,character of a ,modern ,battle ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,combat in ,general ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,combat in ,general 7continuation7 ,,chapter ,v4 ,on the ,signification of the ,combat ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,duration of ,combat ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,decision of the ,combat ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,mutual ,understanding as to a ,battle ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,the ,battle ,,chapter ,x4 ,effects of ,victory ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,the ,use of the ,battle ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,strategic ,means of ,utilising ,victory ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,retreat ,after a ,lost ,battle ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,night ,fighting ,,book ,v4 ,,military ,,forces ,,chapter ,i4 ,general ,scheme ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,theatre of ,war1 ,army1 ,campaign ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,relation of ,power ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,relation of the ,three ,arms ,,chapter ,v4 ,order of ,battle of an ,army ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,general ,disposition of an ,army ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,advanced ,guard and ,out-,posts ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,mode of ,action of ,advanced ,corps ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,camps ,,chapter ,x4 ,marches ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,marches 7continued7 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,marches 7continued7 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,cantonments ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,subsistence ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,base of ,operations ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,lines of ,communication ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,on ,country and ,ground ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,command of ,ground ,,book ,,vi4 ,,defence ,,chapter ,i4 ,offence and ,defence ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,relations of the ,offensive and ,defensive to ,each ,other in ,tactics ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,relations of the ,offensive and ,defensive to ,each ,other in ,strategy ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,convergence of ,attack and ,divergence of ,defence ,,chapter ,v4 ,character of ,strategic ,defensive ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,extent of the ,means of ,defence ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,mutual ,action and ,reaction of ,attack and ,defence ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,methods of ,resistance ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,defensive ,battle ,,chapter ,x4 ,fortresses ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,fortresses 7continued7 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,defensive ,position ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,strong ,positions and ,entrenched ,camps ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,flank ,positions ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,defence of ,mountains ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,defence of ,mountains 7continued7 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,defence of ,mountains 7continued7 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,defence of ,streams and ,rivers ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,defence of ,streams and ,rivers 7continued7 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,a4 ,defence of ,swamps ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,b4 ,inundations ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,defence of ,forests ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,the ,cordon ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,key of the ,country ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,operating ,against a ,flank ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,retreat into the ,interior of the ,country ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,arming the ,nation ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,defence of a ,theatre of ,war ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,defence of a ,theatre of ,war 7continued7 ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,defence of a ,theatre of ,war 7continued7--,successive ,resistance ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,defence of a ,theatre of ,war 7continued7--,when ,no ,decision is ,sought ,for ,,book ,,vii4 ,,the ,,attack ,,chapter ,i4 ,the ,attack in ,relation to the ,defence ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,nature of the ,strategical ,attack ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,on the ,objects of ,strategical ,attack ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,decreasing ,force of the ,attack ,,chapter ,v4 ,culminating ,point of the ,attack ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,destruction of the ,enemy's ,armies ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,the ,offensive ,battle ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,passage of ,rivers ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,attack on ,defensive ,positions ,,chapter ,x4 ,attack on an ,entrenched ,camp ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,attack on a ,mountain ,range ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,attack on ,cordon ,lines ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,manuvering ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,attack on ,morasses1 ,inundations1 ,woods ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,attack on a ,theatre of ,war with the ,view to a ,decision ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,attack on a ,theatre of ,war without the ,view to a ,great ,decision ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,attack on ,fortresses ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,attack on ,convoys ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,attack on the ,enemy's ,army in its ,cantonments ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,diversion ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,invasion ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,on the ,culminating ,point of ,victory ,,book ,,viii4 ,,plan ,,of ,,war ,,chapter ,i4 ,introduction ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,absolute and ,real ,war ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,a4 ,interdependence of the ,parts in a ,war ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,b4 ,on the ,magnitude of the ,object of the ,war and the ,efforts to be ,made ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,ends in ,war ,more ,precisely ,defined--,overthrow of the ,enemy ,,chapter ,v4 ,ends in ,war ,more ,precisely ,defined 7continued7--,limited ,object ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,a4 ,influence of the ,political ,object on the ,military ,object ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,b4 ,war as an ,instrument of ,policy ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,limited ,object--,offensive ,war ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,limited ,object--,defence ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,plan of ,war ,when the ,destruction of the ,enemy is the ,object ,,introduction ,the ,germans interpret their new national colours--black1 red1 and white--by the saying1 8,durch ,nacht und ,blut zur licht40 78,through night and blood to light071 and no work yet written conveys to the thinker a clearer conception of all that the red streak in their flag stands for than this deep and philosophical analysis of 8,war0 by ,clausewitz4 ,it reveals 8,war10 stripped of all accessories1 as the exercise of force for the attainment of a political object1 unrestrained by any law save that of expediency1 and thus gives the key to the interpretation of ,german political aims1 past1 present1 and future1 which is unconditionally necessary for every student of the modern conditions of ,europe4 ,step by step1 every event since ,waterloo follows with logical consistency from the teachings of ,napoleon1 formulated for the first time1 some twenty years afterwards1 by this remarkable thinker4 ,what ,darwin accomplished for ,biology generally ,clausewitz did for the ,life-,history of ,nations nearly half a century before him1 for both have proved the existence of the same law in each case1 viz41 8,the survival of the fittest0--the 8fittest10 as ,huxley long since pointed out1 not being necessarily synonymous with the ethically 8best40 ,neither of these thinkers was concerned with the ethics of the struggle which each studied so exhaustively1 but to both men the phase or condition presented itself neither as moral nor immoral1 any more than are famine1 disease1 or other natural phenomena1 but as emanating from a force inherent in all living organisms which can only be mastered by understanding its nature4 ,it is in that spirit that1 one after the other1 all the ,nations of the ,continent1 taught by such drastic lessons as ,kniggrtz and ,sedan1 have accepted the lesson1 with the result that to-day ,europe is an armed camp1 and peace is maintained by the equilibrium of forces1 and will continue just as long as this equilibrium exists1 and no longer4 ,whether this state of equilibrium is in itself a good or desirable thing may be open to argument4 ,i have discussed it at length in my 8,war and the ,world's ,life02 but ,i venture to suggest that to no one would a renewal of the era of warfare be a change for the better1 as far as existing humanity is concerned4 ,meanwhile1 however1 with every year that elapses the forces at present in equilibrium are changing in magnitude--the pressure of populations which have to be fed is rising1 and an explosion along the line of least resistance is1 sooner or later1 inevitable4 ,as ,i read the teaching of the recent ,hague ,conference1 no responsible ,government on the ,continent is anxious to form in themselves that line of least resistance2 they know only too well what ,war would mean2 and we alone1 absolutely unconscious of the trend of the dominant thought of ,europe1 are pulling down the dam which may at any moment let in on us the flood of invasion4 ,now no responsible man in ,europe1 perhaps least of all in ,germany1 thanks us for this voluntary destruction of our defences1 for all who are of any importance would very much rather end their days in peace than incur the burden of responsibility which ,war would entail4 ,but they realise that the gradual dissemination of the principles taught by ,clausewitz has created a condition of molecular tension in the minds of the ,nations they govern analogous to the 8critical temperature of water heated above boiling-point under pressure10 which may at any moment bring about an explosion which they will be powerless to control4 ,the case is identical with that of an ordinary steam boiler1 delivering so and so many pounds of steam to its engines as long as the envelope can contain the pressure2 but let a breach in its continuity arise--relieving the boiling water of all restraint--and in a moment the whole mass flashes into vapour1 developing a power no work of man can oppose4 ,the ultimate consequences of defeat no man can foretell4 ,the only way to avert them is to ensure victory2 and1 again following out the principles of ,clausewitz1 victory can only be ensured by the creation in peace of an organisation which will bring every available man1 horse1 and gun 7or ship and gun1 if the war be on the sea7 in the shortest possible time1 and with the utmost possible momentum1 upon the decisive field of action--which in turn leads to the final doctrine formulated by ,von der ,goltz in excuse for the action of the late ,president ,kruger in #ahii3 8,the ,statesman who1 knowing his instrument to be ready1 and seeing ,war inevitable1 hesitates to strike first is guilty of a crime against his country40 ,it is because this sequence of cause and effect is absolutely unknown to our ,members of ,parliament1 elected by popular representation1 that all our efforts to ensure a lasting peace by securing efficiency with economy in our ,national ,defences have been rendered nugatory4 ,this estimate of the influence of ,clausewitz's sentiments on contemporary thought in ,continental ,europe may appear exaggerated to those who have not familiarised themselves with ,m4 ,gustav de ,bon's exposition of the laws governing the formation and conduct of crowds ,i do not wish for one minute to be understood as asserting that ,clausewitz has been conscientiously studied and understood in any ,army1 not even in the ,prussian1 but his work has been the ultimate foundation on which every drill regulation in ,europe1 except our own1 has been reared4 ,it is this ceaseless repetition of his fundamental ideas to which one-half of the male population of every ,continental ,nation has been subjected for two to three years of their lives1 which has tuned their minds to vibrate in harmony with his precepts1 and those who know and appreciate this fact at its true value have only to strike the necessary chords in order to evoke a response sufficient to overpower any other ethical conception which those who have not organised their forces beforehand can appeal to4 ,the recent set-back experienced by the ,socialists in ,germany is an illustration of my position4 ,the ,socialist leaders of that country are far behind the responsible ,governors in their knowledge of the management of crowds4 ,the latter had long before 7in #ahic1 in fact7 made their arrangements to prevent the spread of ,socialistic propaganda beyond certain useful limits4 ,as long as the ,socialists only threatened capital they were not seriously interfered with1 for the ,government knew quite well that the undisputed sway of the employer was not for the ultimate good of the ,state4 ,the standard of comfort must not be pitched too low if men are to be ready to die for their country4 ,but the moment the ,socialists began to interfere seriously with the discipline of the ,army the word went round1 and the ,socialists lost heavily at the polls4 ,if this power of predetermined reaction to acquired ideas can be evoked successfully in a matter of internal interest only1 in which the 8obvious interest0 of the vast majority of the population is so clearly on the side of the ,socialist1 it must be evident how enormously greater it will prove when set in motion against an external enemy1 where the 8obvious interest0 of the people is1 from the very nature of things1 as manifestly on the side of the ,government2 and the ,statesman who failed to take into account the force of the 8resultant thought wave0 of a crowd of some seven million men1 all trained to respond to their ruler's call1 would be guilty of treachery as grave as one who failed to strike when he knew the ,army to be ready for immediate action4 ,as already pointed out1 it is to the spread of ,clausewitz's ideas that the present state of more or less immediate readiness for war of all ,european ,armies is due1 and since the organisation of these forces is uniform this 8more or less0 of readiness exists in precise proportion to the sense of duty which animates the several ,armies4 ,where the spirit of duty and self-sacrifice is low the troops are unready and inefficient2 where1 as in ,prussia1 these qualities1 by the training of a whole century1 have become instinctive1 troops really are ready to the last button1 and might be poured down upon any one of her neighbours with such rapidity that the very first collision must suffice to ensure ultimate success--a success by no means certain if the enemy1 whoever he may be1 is allowed breathing-time in which to set his house in order4 ,an example will make this clearer4 ,in #ahhg ,germany was on the very verge of ,war with ,france and ,russia4 ,at that moment her superior efficiency1 the consequence of this inborn sense of duty--surely one of the highest qualities of humanity--was so great that it is more than probable that less than six weeks would have sufficed to bring the ,french to their knees4 ,indeed1 after the first fortnight it would have been possible to begin transferring troops from the ,rhine to the ,niemen2 and the same case may arise again4 ,but if ,france and ,russia had been allowed even ten days' warning the ,german plan would have been completely defeated4 ,france alone might then have claimed all the efforts that ,germany could have put forth to defeat her4 ,yet there are politicians in ,england so grossly ignorant of the ,german reading of the ,napoleonic lessons that they expect that ,nation to sacrifice the enormous advantage they have prepared by a whole century of self-sacrifice and practical patriotism by an appeal to a ,court of ,arbitration1 and the further delays which must arise by going through the medieval formalities of recalling ,ambassadors and exchanging ultimatums4 ,most of our present-day politicians have made their money in business--a 8form of human competition greatly resembling ,war10 to paraphrase ,clausewitz4 ,did they1 when in the throes of such competition1 send formal notice to their rivals of their plans to get the better of them in commerce8 ,did ,mr4 ,carnegie1 the arch-priest of ,peace at any price1 when he built up the ,steel ,trust1 notify his competitors when and how he proposed to strike the blows which successively made him master of millions8 ,surely the ,directors of a ,great ,nation may consider the interests of their shareholders--i4e41 the people they govern--as sufficiently serious not to be endangered by the deliberate sacrifice of the preponderant position of readiness which generations of self-devotion1 patriotism and wise forethought have won for them8 ,as regards the strictly military side of this work1 though the recent researches of the ,french ,general ,staff into the records and documents of the ,napoleonic period have shown conclusively that ,clausewitz had never grasped the essential point of the ,great ,emperor's strategic method1 yet it is admitted that he has completely fathomed the spirit which gave life to the form2 and notwithstanding the variations in application which have resulted from the progress of invention in every field of national activity 7not in the technical improvements in armament alone71 this spirit still remains the essential factor in the whole matter4 ,indeed1 if anything1 modern appliances have intensified its importance1 for though1 with equal armaments on both sides1 the form of battles must always remain the same1 the facility and certainty of combination which better methods of communicating orders and intelligence have conferred upon the ,commanders has rendered the control of great masses immeasurably more certain than it was in the past4 ,men kill each other at greater distances1 it is true--but killing is a constant factor in all battles4 ,the difference between 8now and then0 lies in this1 that1 thanks to the enormous increase in range 7the essential feature in modern armaments71 it is possible to concentrate by surprise1 on any chosen spot1 a man-killing power fully twentyfold greater than was conceivable in the days of ,waterloo2 and whereas in ,napoleon's time this concentration of man-killing power 7which in his hands took the form of the great case-shot attack7 depended almost entirely on the shape and condition of the ground1 which might or might not be favourable1 nowadays such concentration of fire-power is almost independent of the country altogether4 ,thus1 at ,waterloo1 ,napoleon was compelled to wait till the ground became firm enough for his guns to gallop over2 nowadays every gun at his disposal1 and five times that number had he possessed them1 might have opened on any point in the ,british position he had selected1 as soon as it became light enough to see4 ,or1 to take a more modern instance1 viz41 the battle of ,st4 ,privat-,gravelotte1 ,august #ah1 #ahgj1 where the ,germans were able to concentrate on both wings batteries of two hundred guns and upwards1 it would have been practically impossible1 owing to the section of the slopes of the ,french position1 to carry out the old-fashioned case-shot attack at all4 ,nowadays there would be no difficulty in turning on the fire of two thousand guns on any point of the position1 and switching this fire up and down the line like water from a fire-engine hose1 if the occasion demanded such concentration4 ,but these alterations in method make no difference in the truth of the picture of ,war which ,clausewitz presents1 with which every soldier1 and above all every ,leader1 should be saturated4 ,death1 wounds1 suffering1 and privation remain the same1 whatever the weapons employed1 and their reaction on the ultimate nature of man is the same now as in the struggle a century ago4 ,it is this reaction that the ,great ,commander has to understand and prepare himself to control2 and the task becomes ever greater as1 fortunately for humanity1 the opportunities for gathering experience become more rare4 ,in the end1 and with every improvement in science1 the result depends more and more on the character of the ,leader and his power of resisting 8the sensuous impressions of the battlefield40 ,finally1 for those who would fit themselves in advance for such responsibility1 ,i know of no more inspiring advice than that given by ,krishna to ,arjuna ages ago1 when the latter trembled before the awful responsibility of launching his ,army against the hosts of the ,pandav's3 ,this ,life within all living things1 my ,prince1 ,hides beyond harm4 ,scorn thou to suffer1 then1 ,for that which cannot suffer4 ,do thy part6 ,be mindful of thy name1 and tremble not4 ,nought better can betide a martial soul ,than lawful war4 ,happy the warrior ,to whom comes joy of battle4444 4 4 4 ,but if thou shunn'st ,this honourable field--a ,kshittriya-- ,if1 knowing thy duty and thy task1 thou bidd'st ,duty and task go by--that shall be sin6 ,and those to come shall speak thee infamy ,from age to age4 ,but infamy is worse ,for men of noble blood to bear than death6 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,therefore arise1 thou ,son of ,kunti6 ,brace ,thine arm for conflict2 nerve thy heart to meet1 ,as things alike to thee1 pleasure or pain1 ,profit or ruin1 victory or defeat4 ,so minded1 gird thee to the fight1 for so ,thou shalt not sin6 ,,col4 ,f4 ,n4 ,,maude1 ,c4,b41 late ,r4,e4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition ,it will naturally excite surprise that a preface by a female hand should accompany a work on such a subject as the present4 ,for my friends no explanation of the circumstance is required2 but ,i hope by a simple relation of the cause to clear myself of the appearance of presumption in the eyes also of those to whom ,i am not known4 ,the work to which these lines serve as a preface occupied almost entirely the last twelve years of the life of my inexpressibly beloved husband1 who has unfortunately been torn too soon from myself and his country4 ,to complete it was his most earnest desire2 but it was not his intention that it should be published during his life2 and if ,i tried to persuade him to alter that intention1 he often answered1 half in jest1 but also1 perhaps1 half in a foreboding of early death3 8,thou shalt publish it40 ,these words 7which in those happy days often drew tears from me1 little as ,i was inclined to attach a serious meaning to them7 make it now1 in the opinion of my friends1 a duty incumbent on me to introduce the posthumous works of my beloved husband1 with a few prefatory lines from myself2 and although here may be a difference of opinion on this point1 still ,i am sure there will be no mistake as to the feeling which has prompted me to overcome the timidity which makes any such appearance1 even in a subordinate part1 so difficult for a woman4 ,it will be understood1 as a matter of course1 that ,i cannot have the most remote intention of considering myself as the real editress of a work which is far above the scope of my capacity3 ,i only stand at its side as an affectionate companion on its entrance into the world4 ,this position ,i may well claim1 as a similar one was allowed me during its formation and progress4 ,those who are acquainted with our happy married life1 and know how we shared everything with each other--not only joy and sorrow1 but also every occupation1 every interest of daily life--will understand that my beloved husband could not be occupied on a work of this kind without its being known to me4 ,therefore1 no one can like me bear testimony to the zeal1 to the love with which he laboured on it1 to the hopes which he bound up with it1 as well as the manner and time of its elaboration4 ,his richly gifted mind had from his early youth longed for light and truth1 and1 varied as were his talents1 still he had chiefly directed his reflections to the science of war1 to which the duties of his profession called him1 and which are of such importance for the benefit of ,states4 ,scharnhorst was the first to lead him into the right road1 and his subsequent appointment in #ahaj as ,instructor at the ,general ,war ,school1 as well as the honour conferred on him at the same time of giving military instruction to ,h4,r4,h4 the ,crown ,prince1 tended further to give his investigations and studies that direction1 and to lead him to put down in writing whatever conclusions he arrived at4 ,a paper with which he finished the instruction of ,h4,r4,h4 the ,crown ,prince contains the germ of his subsequent works4 ,but it was in the year #ahaf1 at ,coblentz1 that he first devoted himself again to scientific labours1 and to collecting the fruits which his rich experience in those four eventful years had brought to maturity4 ,he wrote down his views1 in the first place1 in short essays1 only loosely connected with each other4 ,the following1 without date1 which has been found amongst his papers1 seems to belong to those early days4 8,in the principles here committed to paper1 in my opinion1 the chief things which compose ,strategy1 as it is called1 are touched upon4 ,i looked upon them only as materials1 and had just got to such a length towards the moulding them into a whole4 8,these materials have been amassed without any regularly preconceived plan4 ,my view was at first1 without regard to system and strict connection1 to put down the results of my reflections upon the most important points in quite brief1 precise1 compact propositions4 ,the manner in which ,montesquieu has treated his subject floated before me in idea4 ,i thought that concise1 sententious chapters1 which ,i proposed at first to call grains1 would attract the attention of the intelligent just as much by that which was to be developed from them1 as by that which they contained in themselves4 ,i had1 therefore1 before me in idea1 intelligent readers already acquainted with the subject4 ,but my nature1 which always impels me to development and systematising1 at last worked its way out also in this instance4 ,for some time ,i was able to confine myself to extracting only the most important results from the essays1 which1 to attain clearness and conviction in my own mind1 ,i wrote upon different subjects1 to concentrating in that manner their spirit in a small compass2 but afterwards my peculiarity gained ascendency completely--,i have developed what ,i could1 and thus naturally have supposed a reader not yet acquainted with the subject4 8,the more ,i advanced with the work1 and the more ,i yielded to the spirit of investigation1 so much the more ,i was also led to system2 and thus1 then1 chapter after chapter has been inserted4 8,my ultimate view has now been to go through the whole once more1 to establish by further explanation much of the earlier treatises1 and perhaps to condense into results many analyses on the later ones1 and thus to make a moderate whole out of it1 forming a small octavo volume4 ,but it was my wish also in this to avoid everything common1 everything that is plain of itself1 that has been said a hundred times1 and is generally accepted2 for my ambition was to write a book that would not be forgotten in two or three years1 and which any one interested in the subject would at all events take up more than once40 ,in ,coblentz1 where he was much occupied with duty1 he could only give occasional hours to his private studies4 ,it was not until #ahah1 after his appointment as ,director of the ,general ,academy of ,war at ,berlin1 that he had the leisure to expand his work1 and enrich it from the history of modern wars4 ,this leisure also reconciled him to his new avocation1 which1 in other respects1 was not satisfactory to him1 as1 according to the existing organisation of the ,academy1 the scientific part of the course is not under the ,director1 but conducted by a ,board of ,studies4 ,free as he was from all petty vanity1 from every feeling of restless1 egotistical ambition1 still he felt a desire to be really useful1 and not to leave inactive the abilities with which ,god had endowed him4 ,in active life he was not in a position in which this longing could be satisfied1 and he had little hope of attaining to any such position3 his whole energies were therefore directed upon the domain of science1 and the benefit which he hoped to lay the foundation of by his work was the object of his life4 ,that1 notwithstanding this1 the resolution not to let the work appear until after his death became more confirmed is the best proof that no vain1 paltry longing for praise and distinction1 no particle of egotistical views1 was mixed up with this noble aspiration for great and lasting usefulness4 ,thus he worked diligently on1 until1 in the spring of #ahcj1 he was appointed to the artillery1 and his energies were called into activity in such a different sphere1 and to such a high degree1 that he was obliged1 for the moment at least1 to give up all literary work4 ,he then put his papers in order1 sealed up the separate packets1 labelled them1 and took sorrowful leave of this employment which he loved so much4 ,he was sent to ,breslau in ,august of the same year1 as ,chief of the ,second ,artillery ,district1 but in ,december recalled to ,berlin1 and appointed ,chief of the ,staff to ,field-,marshal ,count ,gneisenau 7for the term of his command74 ,in ,march #ahca1 he accompanied his revered ,commander to ,posen4 ,when he returned from there to ,breslau in ,november after the melancholy event which had taken place1 he hoped to resume his work and perhaps complete it in the course of the winter4 ,the ,almighty has willed it should be otherwise4 ,on the #gth ,november he returned to ,breslau2 on the #afth he was no more2 and the packets sealed by himself were not opened until after his death4 ,the papers thus left are those now made public in the following volumes1 exactly in the condition in which they were found1 without a word being added or erased4 ,still1 however1 there was much to do before publication1 in the way of putting them in order and consulting about them2 and ,i am deeply indebted to several sincere friends for the assistance they have afforded me1 particularly ,major ,o',etzel1 who kindly undertook the correction of the ,press1 as well as the preparation of the maps to accompany the historical parts of the work4 ,i must also mention my much-loved brother1 who was my support in the hour of my misfortune1 and who has also done much for me in respect of these papers2 amongst other things1 by carefully examining and putting them in order1 he found the commencement of the revision which my dear husband wrote in the year #ahbg1 and mentions in the ,notice hereafter annexed as a work he had in view4 ,this revision has been inserted in the place intended for it in the first book 7for it does not go any further74 ,there are still many other friends to whom ,i might offer my thanks for their advice1 for the sympathy and friendship which they have shown me2 but if ,i do not name them all1 they will1 ,i am sure1 not have any doubts of my sincere gratitude4 ,it is all the greater1 from my firm conviction that all they have done was not only on my own account1 but for the friend whom ,god has thus called away from them so soon4 ,if ,i have been highly blessed as the wife of such a man during one and twenty years1 so am ,i still1 notwithstanding my irreparable loss1 by the treasure of my recollections and of my hopes1 by the rich legacy of sympathy and friendship which ,i owe the beloved departed1 by the elevating feeling which ,i experience at seeing his rare worth so generally and honourably acknowledged4 ,the trust confided to me by a ,royal ,couple is a fresh benefit for which ,i have to thank the ,almighty1 as it opens to me an honourable occupation1 to which ,i devote myself4 ,may this occupation be blessed1 and may the dear little ,prince who is now entrusted to my care1 some day read this book1 and be animated by it to deeds like those of his glorious ancestors4 ,written at the ,marble ,palace1 ,potsdam1 #cjth ,june1 #ahcb4 ,,marie ,,von ,,clausewitz1 ,born ,countess ,brhl1 ,oberhofmeisterinn to ,h4,r4,h4 the ,princess ,william4 ,,notice ,i look upon the first six books1 of which a fair copy has now been made1 as only a mass which is still in a manner without form1 and which has yet to be again revised4 ,in this revision the two kinds of ,war will be everywhere kept more distinctly in view1 by which all ideas will acquire a clearer meaning1 a more precise direction1 and a closer application4 ,the two kinds of ,war are1 first1 those in which the object is the overthrow of the enemy1 whether it be that we aim at his destruction1 politically1 or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms2 and next1 those in which our object is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country1 either for the purpose of retaining them permanently1 or of turning them to account as matter of exchange in the settlement of a peace4 ,transition from one kind to the other must certainly continue to exist1 but the completely different nature of the tendencies of the two must everywhere appear1 and must separate from each other things which are incompatible4 ,besides establishing this real difference in ,wars1 another practically necessary point of view must at the same time be established1 which is1 that ,war is only a continuation of ,state policy by other means4 ,this point of view being adhered to everywhere1 will introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject1 and things will be more easily disentangled from each other4 ,although the chief application of this point of view does not commence until we get to the eighth book1 still it must be completely developed in the first book1 and also lend assistance throughout the revision of the first six books4 ,through such a revision the first six books will get rid of a good deal of dross1 many rents and chasms will be closed up1 and much that is of a general nature will be transformed into distinct conceptions and forms4 ,the seventh book--on attack--for the different chapters of which sketches are already made1 is to be considered as a reflection of the sixth1 and must be completed at once1 according to the above-mentioned more distinct points of view1 so that it will require no fresh revision1 but rather may serve as a model in the revision of the first six books4 ,for the eighth book--on the ,plan of a ,war1 that is1 of the organisation of a whole ,war in general--several chapters are designed1 but they are not at all to be regarded as real materials1 they are merely a track1 roughly cleared1 as it were1 through the mass1 in order by that means to ascertain the points of most importance4 ,they have answered this object1 and ,i propose1 on finishing the seventh book1 to proceed at once to the working out of the eighth1 where the two points of view above mentioned will be chiefly affirmed1 by which everything will be simplified1 and at the same time have a spirit breathed into it4 ,i hope in this book to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen1 and at least to show the object of action1 and the real point to be considered in ,war4 ,now1 when ,i have brought my ideas clearly out by finishing this eighth book1 and have properly established the leading features of ,war1 it will be easier for me to carry the spirit of these ideas in to the first six books1 and to make these same features show themselves everywhere4 ,therefore ,i shall defer till then the revision of the first six books4 ,should the work be interrupted by my death1 then what is found can only be called a mass of conceptions not brought into form2 but as these are open to endless misconceptions1 they will doubtless give rise to a number of crude criticisms3 for in these things1 every one thinks1 when he takes up his pen1 that whatever comes into his head is worth saying and printing1 and quite as incontrovertible as that twice two make four4 ,if such a one would take the pains1 as ,i have done1 to think over the subject1 for years1 and to compare his ideas with military history1 he would certainly be a little more guarded in his criticism4 ,still1 notwithstanding this imperfect form1 ,i believe that an impartial reader thirsting for truth and conviction will rightly appreciate in the first six books the fruits of several years' reflection and a diligent study of ,war1 and that1 perhaps1 he will find in them some leading ideas which may bring about a revolution in the theory of ,war4 ,berlin1 #ajth ,july1 #ahbg4 ,besides this notice1 amongst the papers left the following unfinished memorandum was found1 which appears of very recent date3 ,the manuscript on the conduct of the ,grande ,guerre1 which will be found after my death1 in its present state can only be regarded as a collection of materials from which it is intended to construct a theory of ,war4 ,with the greater part ,i am not yet satisfied2 and the sixth book is to be looked at as a mere essay3 ,i should have completely remodelled it1 and have tried a different line4 ,but the ruling principles which pervade these materials ,i hold to be the right ones3 they are the result of a very varied reflection1 keeping always in view the reality1 and always bearing in mind what ,i have learnt by experience and by my intercourse with distinguished soldiers4 ,the seventh book is to contain the attack1 the subjects of which are thrown together in a hasty manner3 the eighth1 the plan for a ,war1 in which ,i would have examined ,war more especially in its political and human aspects4 ,the first chapter of the first book is the only one which ,i consider as completed2 it will at least serve to show the manner in which ,i proposed to treat the subject throughout4 ,the theory of the ,grande ,guerre1 or ,strategy1 as it is called1 is beset with extraordinary difficulties1 and we may affirm that very few men have clear conceptions of the separate subjects1 that is1 conceptions carried up to their full logical conclusions4 ,in real action most men are guided merely by the tact of judgment which hits the object more or less accurately1 according as they possess more or less genius4 ,this is the way in which all great ,generals have acted1 and therein partly lay their greatness and their genius1 that they always hit upon what was right by this tact4 ,thus also it will always be in action1 and so far this tact is amply sufficient4 ,but when it is a question1 not of acting oneself1 but of convincing others in a consultation1 then all depends on clear conceptions and demonstration of the inherent relations1 and so little progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely a contention of words1 resting on no firm basis1 and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion1 or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect1 a middle course really without any value47997 7997 ,herr ,clausewitz evidently had before his mind the endless consultations at the ,headquarters of the ,bohemian ,army in the ,leipsic ,campaign #ahac4 ,clear ideas on these matters are therefore not wholly useless2 besides1 the human mind has a general tendency to clearness1 and always wants to be consistent with the necessary order of things4 ,owing to the great difficulties attending a philosophical construction of the ,art of ,war1 and the many attempts at it that have failed1 most people have come to the conclusion that such a theory is impossible1 because it concerns things which no standing law can embrace4 ,we should also join in this opinion and give up any attempt at a theory1 were it not that a great number of propositions make themselves evident without any difficulty1 as1 for instance1 that the defensive form1 with a negative object1 is the stronger form1 the attack1 with the positive object1 the weaker--that great results carry the little ones with them--that1 therefore1 strategic effects may be referred to certain centres of gravity--that a demonstration is a weaker application of force than a real attack1 that1 therefore1 there must be some special reason for resorting to the former--that victory consists not merely in the conquest on the field of battle1 but in the destruction of armed forces1 physically and morally1 which can in general only be effected by a pursuit after the battle is gained--that successes are always greatest at the point where the victory has been gained1 that1 therefore1 the change from one line and object to another can only be regarded as a necessary evil--that a turning movement is only justified by a superiority of numbers generally or by the advantage of our lines of communication and retreat over those of the enemy--that flank positions are only justifiable on similar grounds--that every attack becomes weaker as it progresses4 ,,the ,,introduction ,,of ,,the ,,author ,that the conception of the scientific does not consist alone1 or chiefly1 in system1 and its finished theoretical constructions1 requires nowadays no exposition4 ,system in this treatise is not to be found on the surface1 and instead of a finished building of theory1 there are only materials4 ,the scientific form lies here in the endeavour to explore the nature of military phenomena to show their affinity with the nature of the things of which they are composed4 ,nowhere has the philosophical argument been evaded1 but where it runs out into too thin a thread the ,author has preferred to cut it short1 and fall back upon the corresponding results of experience2 for in the same way as many plants only bear fruit when they do not shoot too high1 so in the practical arts the theoretical leaves and flowers must not be made to sprout too far1 but kept near to experience1 which is their proper soil4 ,unquestionably it would be a mistake to try to discover from the chemical ingredients of a grain of corn the form of the ear of corn which it bears1 as we have only to go to the field to see the ears ripe4 ,investigation and observation1 philosophy and experience1 must neither despise nor exclude one another2 they mutually afford each other the rights of citizenship4 ,consequently1 the propositions of this book1 with their arch of inherent necessity1 are supported either by experience or by the conception of ,war itself as external points1 so that they are not without abutments47997 7997 ,that this is not the case in the works of many military writers especially of those who have aimed at treating of ,war itself in a scientific manner1 is shown in many instances1 in which by their reasoning1 the pro and contra swallow each other up so effectually that there is no vestige of the tails even which were left in the case of the two lions4 ,it is1 perhaps1 not impossible to write a systematic theory of ,war full of spirit and substance1 but ours hitherto1 have been very much the reverse4 ,to say nothing of their unscientific spirit1 in their striving after coherence and completeness of system1 they overflow with commonplaces1 truisms1 and twaddle of every kind4 ,if we want a striking picture of them we have only to read ,lichtenberg's extract from a code of regulations in case of fire4 ,if a house takes fire1 we must seek1 above all things1 to protect the right side of the house standing on the left1 and1 on the other hand1 the left side of the house on the right2 for if we1 for example1 should protect the left side of the house on the left1 then the right side of the house lies to the right of the left1 and consequently as the fire lies to the right of this side1 and of the right side 7for we have assumed that the house is situated to the left of the fire71 therefore the right side is situated nearer to the fire than the left1 and the right side of the house might catch fire if it was not protected before it came to the left1 which is protected4 ,consequently1 something might be burnt that is not protected1 and that sooner than something else would be burnt1 even if it was not protected2 consequently we must let alone the latter and protect the former4 ,in order to impress the thing on one's mind1 we have only to note if the house is situated to the right of the fire1 then it is the left side1 and if the house is to the left it is the right side4 ,in order not to frighten the intelligent reader by such commonplaces1 and to make the little good that there is distasteful by pouring water upon it1 the ,author has preferred to give in small ingots of fine metal his impressions and convictions1 the result of many years' reflection on ,war1 of his intercourse with men of ability1 and of much personal experience4 ,thus the seemingly weakly bound-together chapters of this book have arisen1 but it is hoped they will not be found wanting in logical connection4 ,perhaps soon a greater head may appear1 and instead of these single grains1 give the whole in a casting of pure metal without dross4 ,,brief ,,memoir ,,of ,,general ,,clausewitz 7,,by ,,translator7 ,the ,author of the work here translated1 ,general ,carl ,von ,clausewitz1 was born at ,burg1 near ,magdeburg1 in #aghj1 and entered the ,prussian ,army as ,fahnenjunker 7i4e41 ensign7 in #agib4 ,he served in the campaigns of #agic-id on the ,rhine1 after which he seems to have devoted some time to the study of the scientific branches of his profession4 ,in #ahja he entered the ,military ,school at ,berlin1 and remained there till #ahjc4 ,during his residence there he attracted the notice of ,general ,scharnhorst1 then at the head of the establishment2 and the patronage of this distinguished officer had immense influence on his future career1 and we may gather from his writings that he ever afterwards continued to entertain a high esteem for ,scharnhorst4 ,in the campaign of #ahjf he served as ,aide-de-camp to ,prince ,augustus of ,prussia2 and being wounded and taken prisoner1 he was sent into ,france until the close of that war4 ,on his return1 he was placed on ,general ,scharnhorst's ,staff1 and employed in the work then going on for the reorganisation of the ,army4 ,he was also at this time selected as military instructor to the late ,king of ,prussia1 then ,crown ,prince4 ,in #ahab ,clausewitz1 with several other ,prussian officers1 having entered the ,russian service1 his first appointment was as ,aide-de-camp to ,general ,phul4 ,afterwards1 while serving with ,wittgenstein's army1 he assisted in negotiating the famous convention of ,tauroggen with ,york4 ,of the part he took in that affair he has left an interesting account in his work on the 8,russian ,campaign40 ,it is there stated that1 in order to bring the correspondence which had been carried on with ,york to a termination in one way or another1 the ,author was despatched to ,york's headquarters with two letters1 one was from ,general d',auvray1 the ,chief of the ,staff of ,wittgenstein's army1 to ,general ,diebitsch1 showing the arrangements made to cut off ,york's corps from ,macdonald 7this was necessary in order to give ,york a plausible excuse for seceding from the ,french72 the other was an intercepted letter from ,macdonald to the ,duke of ,bassano4 ,with regard to the former of these1 the ,author says1 8it would not have had weight with a man like ,york1 but for a military justification1 if the ,prussian ,court should require one as against the ,french1 it was important40 ,the second letter was calculated at the least to call up in ,general ,york's mind all the feelings of bitterness which perhaps for some days past had been diminished by the consciousness of his own behaviour towards the writer4 ,as the ,author entered ,general ,york's chamber1 the latter called out to him1 8,keep off from me2 ,i will have nothing more to do with you2 your d----d ,cossacks have let a letter of ,macdonald's pass through them1 which brings me an order to march on ,piktrepohnen1 in order there to effect our junction4 ,all doubt is now at an end2 your troops do not come up2 you are too weak2 march ,i must1 and ,i must excuse myself from further negotiation1 which may cost me my head40 ,the ,author said that he would make no opposition to all this1 but begged for a candle1 as he had letters to show the ,general1 and1 as the latter seemed still to hesitate1 the ,author added1 8,your ,excellency will not surely place me in the embarrassment of departing without having executed my commission40 ,the ,general ordered candles1 and called in ,colonel von ,roeder1 the chief of his staff1 from the ante-chamber4 ,the letters were read4 ,after a pause of an instant1 the ,general said1 8,clausewitz1 you are a ,prussian1 do you believe that the letter of ,general d',auvray is sincere1 and that ,wittgenstein's troops will really be at the points he mentioned on the #cast80 ,the ,author replied1 8,i pledge myself for the sincerity of this letter upon the knowledge ,i have of ,general d',auvray and the other men of ,wittgenstein's headquarters2 whether the dispositions he announces can be accomplished as he lays down ,i certainly cannot pledge myself2 for your ,excellency knows that in war we must often fall short of the line we have drawn for ourselves40 ,the ,general was silent for a few minutes of earnest reflection2 then he held out his hand to the ,author1 and said1 8,you have me4 ,tell ,general ,diebitsch that we must confer early to-morrow at the mill of ,poschenen1 and that ,i am now firmly determined to separate myself from the ,french and their cause40 ,the hour was fixed for #h ,a4,m4 ,after this was settled1 the ,general added1 8,but ,i will not do the thing by halves1 ,i will get you ,massenbach also40 ,he called in an officer who was of ,massenbach's cavalry1 and who had just left them4 ,much like ,schiller's ,wallenstein1 he asked1 walking up and down the room the while1 8,what say your regiments80 ,the officer broke out with enthusiasm at the idea of a riddance from the ,french alliance1 and said that every man of the troops in question felt the same4 8,you young ones may talk2 but my older head is shaking on my shoulders10 replied the ,general47997 7997 8,campaign in ,russia in #ahab02 translated from the ,german of ,general ,von ,clausewitz 7by ,lord ,ellesmere74 ,after the close of the ,russian campaign ,clausewitz remained in the service of that country1 but was attached as a ,russian staff officer to ,blcher's headquarters till the ,armistice in #ahac4 ,in #ahad1 he became ,chief of the ,staff of ,general ,walmoden's ,russo-,german ,corps1 which formed part of the ,army of the ,north under ,bernadotte4 ,his name is frequently mentioned with distinction in that campaign1 particularly in connection with the affair of ,goehrde4 ,clausewitz re-entered the ,prussian service in #ahae1 and served as ,chief of the ,staff to ,thielman's corps1 which was engaged with ,grouchy at ,wavre1 on the #ahth of ,june4 ,after the ,peace1 he was employed in a command on the ,rhine4 ,in #ahah1 he became ,major-,general1 and ,director of the ,military ,school at which he had been previously educated4 ,in #ahcj1 he was appointed ,inspector of ,artillery at ,breslau1 but soon after nominated ,chief of the ,staff to the ,army of ,observation1 under ,marshal ,gneisenau on the ,polish frontier4 ,the latest notices of his life and services are probably to be found in the memoirs of ,general ,brandt1 who1 from being on the staff of ,gneisenau's army1 was brought into daily intercourse with ,clausewitz in matters of duty1 and also frequently met him at the table of ,marshal ,gneisenau1 at ,posen4 ,amongst other anecdotes1 ,general ,brandt relates that1 upon one occasion1 the conversation at the ,marshal's table turned upon a sermon preached by a priest1 in which some great absurdities were introduced1 and a discussion arose as to whether the ,bishop should not be made responsible for what the priest had said4 ,this led to the topic of theology in general1 when ,general ,brandt1 speaking of himself1 says1 8,i expressed an opinion that theology is only to be regarded as an historical process1 as a moment in the gradual development of the human race4 ,this brought upon me an attack from all quarters1 but more especially from ,clausewitz1 who ought to have been on my side1 he having been an adherent and pupil of ,kiesewetter's1 who had indoctrinated him in the philosophy of ,kant1 certainly diluted--,i might even say in homopathic doses40 ,this anecdote is only interesting as the mention of ,kiesewetter points to a circumstance in the life of ,clausewitz that may have had an influence in forming those habits of thought which distinguish his writings4 8,the way10 says ,general ,brandt1 8in which ,general ,clausewitz judged of things1 drew conclusions from movements and marches1 calculated the times of the marches1 and the points where decisions would take place1 was extremely interesting4 ,fate has unfortunately denied him an opportunity of showing his talents in high command1 but ,i have a firm persuasion that as a strategist he would have greatly distinguished himself4 ,as a leader on the field of battle1 on the other hand1 he would not have been so much in his right place1 from a manque d'habitude du commandement1 he wanted the art d'enlever les troupes40 ,after the ,prussian ,army of ,observation was dissolved1 ,clausewitz returned to ,breslau1 and a few days after his arrival was seized with cholera1 the seeds of which he must have brought with him from the army on the ,polish frontier4 ,his death took place in ,november #ahca4 ,his writings are contained in nine volumes1 published after his death1 but his fame rests most upon the three volumes forming his treatise on 8,war40 ,in the present attempt to render into ,english this portion of the works of ,clausewitz1 the translator is sensible of many deficiencies1 but he hopes at all events to succeed in making this celebrated treatise better known in ,england1 believing1 as he does1 that so far as the work concerns the interests of this country1 it has lost none of the importance it possessed at the time of its first publication4 ,j4 ,j4 ,,graham 7,col47 ,,book ,i4 ,,on ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,war ,,chapter ,i4 ,what is ,war8 #a4 ,,introduction4 ,we propose to consider first the single elements of our subject1 then each branch or part1 and1 last of all1 the whole1 in all its relations--therefore to advance from the simple to the complex4 ,but it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole1 because it is particularly necessary that in the consideration of any of the parts their relation to the whole should be kept constantly in view4 #b4 ,,definition4 ,we shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of ,war used by publicists4 ,we shall keep to the element of the thing itself1 to a duel4 ,war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale4 ,if we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a ,war1 we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers4 ,each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will3 each endeavours to throw his adversary1 and thus render him incapable of further resistance4 ,war therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will4 ,violence arms itself with the inventions of ,art and ,science in order to contend against violence4 ,self-imposed restrictions1 almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning1 termed usages of ,international ,law1 accompany it without essentially impairing its power4 ,violence1 that is to say1 physical force 7for there is no moral force without the conception of ,states and ,law71 is therefore the means2 the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object4 ,in order to attain this object fully1 the enemy must be disarmed1 and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of hostilities in theory4 ,it takes the place of the final object1 and puts it aside as something we can eliminate from our calculations4 #c4 ,,utmost ,,use ,,of ,,force4 ,now1 philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without great bloodshed1 and that this is the proper tendency of the ,art of ,war4 ,however plausible this may appear1 still it is an error which must be extirpated2 for in such dangerous things as ,war1 the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst4 ,as the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence1 it follows that he who uses force unsparingly1 without reference to the bloodshed involved1 must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application4 ,the former then dictates the law to the latter1 and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counter-acting force on each side4 ,this is the way in which the matter must be viewed and it is to no purpose1 it is even against one's own interest1 to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair because the horror of its elements excites repugnance4 ,if the ,wars of civilised people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages1 the difference arises from the social condition both of ,states in themselves and in their relations to each other4 ,out of this social condition and its relations ,war arises1 and by it ,war is subjected to conditions1 is controlled and modified4 ,but these things do not belong to ,war itself2 they are only given conditions2 and to introduce into the philosophy of ,war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity4 ,two motives lead men to ,war3 instinctive hostility and hostile intention4 ,in our definition of ,war1 we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements1 because it is the most general4 ,it is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description1 bordering on mere instinct1 without combining with it the idea of a hostile intention4 ,on the other hand1 hostile intentions may often exist without being accompanied by any1 or at all events by any extreme1 hostility of feeling4 ,amongst savages views emanating from the feelings1 amongst civilised nations those emanating from the understanding1 have the predominance2 but this difference arises from attendant circumstances1 existing institutions1 c41 and1 therefore1 is not to be found necessarily in all cases1 although it prevails in the majority4 ,in short1 even the most civilised nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other4 ,we may see from this what a fallacy it would be to refer the ,war of a civilised nation entirely to an intelligent act on the part of the ,government1 and to imagine it as continually freeing itself more and more from all feeling of passion in such a way that at last the physical masses of combatants would no longer be required2 in reality1 their mere relations would suffice--a kind of algebraic action4 ,theory was beginning to drift in this direction until the facts of the last ,war7997 taught it better4 ,if ,war is an act of force1 it belongs necessarily also to the feelings4 ,if it does not originate in the feelings1 it reacts1 more or less1 upon them1 and the extent of this reaction depends not on the degree of civilisation1 but upon the importance and duration of the interests involved4 7997 ,clausewitz alludes here to the 8,wars of ,liberation10 #ahac1 #ad1 #ae4 ,therefore1 if we find civilised nations do not put their prisoners to death1 do not devastate towns and countries1 this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on ,war1 and has taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of mere instinct4 ,the invention of gunpowder1 the constant progress of improvements in the construction of firearms1 are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the adversary which lies at the bottom of the conception of ,war is in no way changed or modified through the progress of civilisation4 ,we therefore repeat our proposition1 that ,war is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds2 as one side dictates the law to the other1 there arises a sort of reciprocal action1 which logically must lead to an extreme4 ,this is the first reciprocal action1 and the first extreme with which we meet 7first reciprocal action74 #d4 ,,the ,,aim ,,is ,,to ,,disarm ,,the ,,enemy4 ,we have already said that the aim of all action in ,war is to disarm the enemy1 and we shall now show that this1 theoretically at least1 is indispensable4 ,if our opponent is to be made to comply with our will1 we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand2 but the disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a transitory nature1 at least in appearance1 otherwise the enemy1 instead of yielding1 will hold out1 in the prospect of a change for the better4 ,every change in this position which is produced by a continuation of the ,war should therefore be a change for the worse4 ,the worst condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed4 ,if1 therefore1 the enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of ,war1 he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened with it4 ,from this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy1 whichever we call it1 must always be the aim of ,warfare4 ,now ,war is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision1 not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass1 because an absolute state of endurance would not be making ,war2 therefore1 what we have just said as to the aim of action in ,war applies to both parties4 ,here1 then1 is another case of reciprocal action4 ,as long as the enemy is not defeated1 he may defeat me2 then ,i shall be no longer my own master2 he will dictate the law to me as ,i did to him4 ,this is the second reciprocal action1 and leads to a second extreme 7second reciprocal action74 #e4 ,,utmost ,,exertion ,,of ,,powers4 ,if we desire to defeat the enemy1 we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance4 ,this is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated1 namely1 the sum of available means and the strength of the ,will4 ,the sum of the available means may be estimated in a measure1 as it depends 7although not entirely7 upon numbers2 but the strength of volition is more difficult to determine1 and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives4 ,granted we have obtained in this way an approximation to the strength of the power to be contended with1 we can then take of our own means1 and either increase them so as to obtain a preponderance1 or1 in case we have not the resources to effect this1 then do our best by increasing our means as far as possible4 ,but the adversary does the same2 therefore1 there is a new mutual enhancement1 which1 in pure conception1 must create a fresh effort towards an extreme4 ,this is the third case of reciprocal action1 and a third extreme with which we meet 7third reciprocal action74 #f4 ,,modification ,,in ,,the ,,reality4 ,thus reasoning in the abstract1 the mind cannot stop short of an extreme1 because it has to deal with an extreme1 with a conflict of forces left to themselves1 and obeying no other but their own inner laws4 ,if we should seek to deduce from the pure conception of ,war an absolute point for the aim which we shall propose and for the means which we shall apply1 this constant reciprocal action would involve us in extremes1 which would be nothing but a play of ideas produced by an almost invisible train of logical subtleties4 ,if1 adhering closely to the absolute1 we try to avoid all difficulties by a stroke of the pen1 and insist with logical strictness that in every case the extreme must be the object1 and the utmost effort must be exerted in that direction1 such a stroke of the pen would be a mere paper law1 not by any means adapted to the real world4 ,even supposing this extreme tension of forces was an absolute which could easily be ascertained1 still we must admit that the human mind would hardly submit itself to this kind of logical chimera4 ,there would be in many cases an unnecessary waste of power1 which would be in opposition to other principles of statecraft2 an effort of ,will would be required disproportioned to the proposed object1 which therefore it would be impossible to realise1 for the human will does not derive its impulse from logical subtleties4 ,but everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to reality4 ,in the former1 everything must be subject to optimism1 and we must imagine the one side as well as the other striving after perfection and even attaining it4 ,will this ever take place in reality8 ,it will if1 7#a7 ,war becomes a completely isolated act1 which arises suddenly1 and is in no way connected with the previous history of the combatant ,states4 7#b7 ,if it is limited to a single solution1 or to several simultaneous solutions4 7#c7 ,if it contains within itself the solution perfect and complete1 free from any reaction upon it1 through a calculation beforehand of the political situation which will follow from it4 #g4 ,,war ,,is ,,never ,,an ,,isolated ,,act4 ,with regard to the first point1 neither of the two opponents is an abstract person to the other1 not even as regards that factor in the sum of resistance which does not depend on objective things1 viz41 the ,will4 ,this ,will is not an entirely unknown quantity2 it indicates what it will be to-morrow by what it is to-day4 ,war does not spring up quite suddenly1 it does not spread to the full in a moment2 each of the two opponents can1 therefore1 form an opinion of the other1 in a great measure1 from what he is and what he does1 instead of judging of him according to what he1 strictly speaking1 should be or should do4 ,but1 now1 man with his incomplete organisation is always below the line of absolute perfection1 and thus these deficiencies1 having an influence on both sides1 become a modifying principle4 #h4 ,,war ,,does ,,not ,,consist ,,of ,a ,,single ,,instantaneous ,,blow4 ,the second point gives rise to the following considerations3-- ,if ,war ended in a single solution1 or a number of simultaneous ones1 then naturally all the preparations for the same would have a tendency to the extreme1 for an omission could not in any way be repaired2 the utmost1 then1 that the world of reality could furnish as a guide for us would be the preparations of the enemy1 as far as they are known to us2 all the rest would fall into the domain of the abstract4 ,but if the result is made up from several successive acts1 then naturally that which precedes with all its phases may be taken as a measure for that which will follow1 and in this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract1 and thus modifies the effort towards the extreme4 ,yet every ,war would necessarily resolve itself into a single solution1 or a sum of simultaneous results1 if all the means required for the struggle were raised at once1 or could be at once raised2 for as one adverse result necessarily diminishes the means1 then if all the means have been applied in the first1 a second cannot properly be supposed4 ,all hostile acts which might follow would belong essentially to the first1 and form1 in reality only its duration4 ,but we have already seen that even in the preparation for ,war the real world steps into the place of mere abstract conception--a material standard into the place of the hypotheses of an extreme3 that therefore in that way both parties1 by the influence of the mutual reaction1 remain below the line of extreme effort1 and therefore all forces are not at once brought forward4 ,it lies also in the nature of these forces and their application that they cannot all be brought into activity at the same time4 ,these forces are the armies actually on foot1 the country1 with its superficial extent and its population1 and the allies4 ,in point of fact1 the country1 with its superficial area and the population1 besides being the source of all military force1 constitutes in itself an integral part of the efficient quantities in ,war1 providing either the theatre of war or exercising a considerable influence on the same4 ,now1 it is possible to bring all the movable military forces of a country into operation at once1 but not all fortresses1 rivers1 mountains1 people1 c4--in short1 not the whole country1 unless it is so small that it may be completely embraced by the first act of the ,war4 ,further1 the co-operation of allies does not depend on the ,will of the belligerents2 and from the nature of the political relations of states to each other1 this co-operation is frequently not afforded until after the ,war has commenced1 or it may be increased to restore the balance of power4 ,that this part of the means of resistance1 which cannot at once be brought into activity1 in many cases1 is a much greater part of the whole than might at first be supposed1 and that it often restores the balance of power1 seriously affected by the great force of the first decision1 will be more fully shown hereafter4 ,here it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in a moment of time is contradictory to the nature of ,war4 ,now this1 in itself1 furnishes no ground for relaxing our efforts to accumulate strength to gain the first result1 because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one would purposely expose himself1 and also because the first decision1 although not the only one1 still will have the more influence on subsequent events1 the greater it is in itself4 ,but the possibility of gaining a later result causes men to take refuge in that expectation1 owing to the repugnance in the human mind to making excessive efforts2 and therefore forces are not concentrated and measures are not taken for the first decision with that energy which would otherwise be used4 ,whatever one belligerent omits from weakness1 becomes to the other a real objective ground for limiting his own efforts1 and thus again1 through this reciprocal action1 extreme tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale4 #i4 ,,the ,,result ,,in ,,war ,,is ,,never ,,absolute4 ,lastly1 even the final decision of a whole ,war is not always to be regarded as absolute4 ,the conquered ,state often sees in it only a passing evil1 which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations4 ,how much this must modify the degree of tension1 and the vigour of the efforts made1 is evident in itself4 #aj4 ,,the ,,probabilities ,,of ,,real ,,life ,,take ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,the ,,conceptions ,,of ,,the ,,extreme ,,and ,,the ,,absolute4 ,in this manner1 the whole act of ,war is removed from the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost4 ,if the extreme is no longer to be apprehended1 and no longer to be sought for1 it is left to the judgment to determine the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it1 and this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the real world by the ,,laws ,,of ,,probability4 ,once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions1 but individual ,states and ,governments1 once the ,war is no longer an ideal1 but a definite substantial procedure1 then the reality will furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found4 ,from the character1 the measures1 the situation of the adversary1 and the relations with which he is surrounded1 each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other1 and act accordingly4 #aa4 ,,the ,,political ,,object ,,now ,,reappears4 ,here the question which we had laid aside forces itself again into consideration 7see ,no4 #b71 viz41 the political object of the ,war4 ,the law of the extreme1 the view to disarm the adversary1 to overthrow him1 has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object4 ,just as this law loses its force1 the political must again come forward4 ,if the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations1 then the political object1 being the original motive1 must be an essential factor in the product4 ,the smaller the sacrifice we demand from ours1 the smaller1 it may be expected1 will be the means of resistance which he will employ2 but the smaller his preparation1 the smaller will ours require to be4 ,further1 the smaller our political object1 the less value shall we set upon it1 and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether4 ,thus1 therefore1 the political object1 as the original motive of the ,war1 will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made4 ,this it cannot be in itself1 but it is so in relation to both the belligerent ,states1 because we are concerned with realities1 not with mere abstractions4 ,one and the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people1 or even upon the same people at different times2 we can1 therefore1 only admit the political object as the measure1 by considering it in its effects upon those masses which it is to move1 and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration4 ,it is easy to see that thus the result may be very different according as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour into the action or otherwise4 ,it is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two ,states that a very trifling political motive for ,war may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact1 a perfect explosion4 ,this applies to the efforts which the political object will call forth in the two ,states1 and to the aim which the military action shall prescribe for itself4 ,at times it may itself be that aim1 as1 for example1 the conquest of a province4 ,at other times the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of military action2 then such a one must be chosen as will be an equivalent for it1 and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of peace4 ,but also1 in this1 due attention to the peculiar character of the ,states concerned is always supposed4 ,there are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than the political object1 in order to secure the latter4 ,the political object will be so much the more the standard of aim and effort1 and have more influence in itself1 the more the masses are indifferent1 the less that any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two ,states from other causes1 and therefore there are cases where the political object almost alone will be decisive4 ,if the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political object1 that action will in general diminish as the political object diminishes1 and in a greater degree the more the political object dominates4 ,thus it is explained how1 without any contradiction in itself1 there may be ,wars of all degrees of importance and energy1 from a ,war of extermination down to the mere use of an army of observation4 ,this1 however1 leads to a question of another kind which we have hereafter to develop and answer4 #ab4 ,a ,,suspension ,,in ,,the ,,action ,,of ,,war ,,unexplained ,,by ,,anything ,,said ,,as ,,yet4 ,however insignificant the political claims mutually advanced1 however weak the means put forth1 however small the aim to which military action is directed1 can this action be suspended even for a moment8 ,this is a question which penetrates deeply into the nature of the subject4 ,every transaction requires for its accomplishment a certain time which we call its duration4 ,this may be longer or shorter1 according as the person acting throws more or less despatch into his movements4 ,about this more or less we shall not trouble ourselves here4 ,each person acts in his own fashion2 but the slow person does not protract the thing because he wishes to spend more time about it1 but because by his nature he requires more time1 and if he made more haste would not do the thing so well4 ,this time1 therefore1 depends on subjective causes1 and belongs to the length1 so called1 of the action4 ,if we allow now to every action in ,war this1 its length1 then we must assume1 at first sight at least1 that any expenditure of time beyond this length1 that is1 every suspension of hostile action1 appears an absurdity2 with respect to this it must not be forgotten that we now speak not of the progress of one or other of the two opponents1 but of the general progress of the whole action of the ,war4 #ac4 ,,there ,,is ,,only ,,one ,,cause ,,which ,,can ,,suspend ,,the ,,action1 ,,and ,,this ,,seems ,,to ,,be ,,only ,,possible ,,on ,,one ,,side ,,in ,,any ,,case4 ,if two parties have armed themselves for strife1 then a feeling of animosity must have moved them to it2 as long now as they continue armed1 that is1 do not come to terms of peace1 this feeling must exist2 and it can only be brought to a standstill by either side by one single motive alone1 which is1 ,,that ,,he ,,waits ,,for ,a ,,more ,,favourable ,,moment ,,for ,,action4 ,now1 at first sight1 it appears that this motive can never exist except on one side1 because it1 eo ipso1 must be prejudicial to the other4 ,if the one has an interest in acting1 then the other must have an interest in waiting4 ,a complete equilibrium of forces can never produce a suspension of action1 for during this suspension he who has the positive object 7that is1 the assailant7 must continue progressing2 for if we should imagine an equilibrium in this way1 that he who has the positive object1 therefore the strongest motive1 can at the same time only command the lesser means1 so that the equation is made up by the product of the motive and the power1 then we must say1 if no alteration in this condition of equilibrium is to be expected1 the two parties must make peace2 but if an alteration is to be expected1 then it can only be favourable to one side1 and therefore the other has a manifest interest to act without delay4 ,we see that the conception of an equilibrium cannot explain a suspension of arms1 but that it ends in the question of the ,,expectation ,,of ,a ,,more ,,favourable ,,moment4 ,let us suppose1 therefore1 that one of two ,states has a positive object1 as1 for instance1 the conquest of one of the enemy's provinces--which is to be utilised in the settlement of peace4 ,after this conquest1 his political object is accomplished1 the necessity for action ceases1 and for him a pause ensues4 ,if the adversary is also contented with this solution1 he will make peace2 if not1 he must act4 ,now1 if we suppose that in four weeks he will be in a better condition to act1 then he has sufficient grounds for putting off the time of action4 ,but from that moment the logical course for the enemy appears to be to act that he may not give the conquered party ,,the ,,desired time4 ,of course1 in this mode of reasoning a complete insight into the state of circumstances on both sides is supposed4 #ad4 ,,thus ,a ,,continuance ,,of ,,action ,,will ,,ensue ,,which ,,will ,,advance ,,towards ,a ,,climax4 ,if this unbroken continuity of hostile operations really existed1 the effect would be that everything would again be driven towards the extreme2 for1 irrespective of the effect of such incessant activity in inflaming the feelings1 and infusing into the whole a greater degree of passion1 a greater elementary force1 there would also follow from this continuance of action a stricter continuity1 a closer connection between cause and effect1 and thus every single action would become of more importance1 and consequently more replete with danger4 ,but we know that the course of action in ,war has seldom or never this unbroken continuity1 and that there have been many ,wars in which action occupied by far the smallest portion of time employed1 the whole of the rest being consumed in inaction4 ,it is impossible that this should be always an anomaly2 suspension of action in ,war must therefore be possible1 that is no contradiction in itself4 ,we now proceed to show how this is4 #ae4 ,,here1 ,,therefore1 ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,polarity ,,is ,,brought ,,into ,,requisition4 ,as we have supposed the interests of one ,commander to be always antagonistic to those of the other1 we have assumed a true polarity4 ,we reserve a fuller explanation of this for another chapter1 merely making the following observation on it at present4 ,the principle of polarity is only valid when it can be conceived in one and the same thing1 where the positive and its opposite the negative completely destroy each other4 ,in a battle both sides strive to conquer2 that is true polarity1 for the victory of the one side destroys that of the other4 ,but when we speak of two different things which have a common relation external to themselves1 then it is not the things but their relations which have the polarity4 #af4 ,,attack ,,and ,,defence ,,are ,,things ,,differing ,,in ,,kind ,,and ,,of ,,unequal ,,force4 ,,polarity ,,is1 ,,therefore1 ,,not ,,applicable ,,to ,,them4 ,if there was only one form of ,war1 to wit1 the attack of the enemy1 therefore no defence2 or1 in other words1 if the attack was distinguished from the defence merely by the positive motive1 which the one has and the other has not1 but the methods of each were precisely one and the same3 then in this sort of fight every advantage gained on the one side would be a corresponding disadvantage on the other1 and true polarity would exist4 ,but action in ,war is divided into two forms1 attack and defence1 which1 as we shall hereafter explain more particularly1 are very different and of unequal strength4 ,polarity therefore lies in that to which both bear a relation1 in the decision1 but not in the attack or defence itself4 ,if the one ,commander wishes the solution put off1 the other must wish to hasten it1 but only by the same form of action4 ,if it is ,a's interest not to attack his enemy at present1 but four weeks hence1 then it is ,b's interest to be attacked1 not four weeks hence1 but at the present moment4 ,this is the direct antagonism of interests1 but it by no means follows that it would be for ,b's interest to attack ,a at once4 ,that is plainly something totally different4 #ag4 ,,the ,,effect ,,of ,,polarity ,,is ,,often ,,destroyed ,,by ,,the ,,superiority ,,of ,,the ,,defence ,,over ,,the ,,attack1 ,,and ,,thus ,,the ,,suspension ,,of ,,action ,,in ,,war ,,is ,,explained4 ,if the form of defence is stronger than that of offence1 as we shall hereafter show1 the question arises1 ,is the advantage of a deferred decision as great on the one side as the advantage of the defensive form on the other8 ,if it is not1 then it cannot by its counter-weight over-balance the latter1 and thus influence the progress of the action of the ,war4 ,we see1 therefore1 that the impulsive force existing in the polarity of interests may be lost in the difference between the strength of the offensive and the defensive1 and thereby become ineffectual4 ,if1 therefore1 that side for which the present is favourable1 is too weak to be able to dispense with the advantage of the defensive1 he must put up with the unfavourable prospects which the future holds out2 for it may still be better to fight a defensive battle in the unpromising future than to assume the offensive or make peace at present4 ,now1 being convinced that the superiority of the defensive7997 7rightly understood7 is very great1 and much greater than may appear at first sight1 we conceive that the greater number of those periods of inaction which occur in war are thus explained without involving any contradiction4 ,the weaker the motives to action are1 the more will those motives be absorbed and neutralised by this difference between attack and defence1 the more frequently1 therefore1 will action in warfare be stopped1 as indeed experience teaches4 7997 ,it must be remembered that all this antedates by some years the introduction of long-range weapons4 #ah ,a ,,second ,,ground ,,consists ,,in ,,the ,,imperfect ,,knowledge ,,of ,,circumstances4 ,but there is still another cause which may stop action in ,war1 viz41 an incomplete view of the situation4 ,each ,commander can only fully know his own position2 that of his opponent can only be known to him by reports1 which are uncertain2 he may1 therefore1 form a wrong judgment with respect to it upon data of this description1 and1 in consequence of that error1 he may suppose that the power of taking the initiative rests with his adversary when it lies really with himself4 ,this want of perfect insight might certainly just as often occasion an untimely action as untimely inaction1 and hence it would in itself no more contribute to delay than to accelerate action in ,war4 ,still1 it must always be regarded as one of the natural causes which may bring action in ,war to a standstill without involving a contradiction4 ,but if we reflect how much more we are inclined and induced to estimate the power of our opponents too high than too low1 because it lies in human nature to do so1 we shall admit that our imperfect insight into facts in general must contribute very much to delay action in ,war1 and to modify the application of the principles pending our conduct4 ,the possibility of a standstill brings into the action of ,war a new modification1 inasmuch as it dilutes that action with the element of time1 checks the influence or sense of danger in its course1 and increases the means of reinstating a lost balance of force4 ,the greater the tension of feelings from which the ,war springs1 the greater therefore the energy with which it is carried on1 so much the shorter will be the periods of inaction2 on the other hand1 the weaker the principle of warlike activity1 the longer will be these periods3 for powerful motives increase the force of the will1 and this1 as we know1 is always a factor in the product of force4 #ai4 ,,frequent ,,periods ,,of ,,inaction ,,in ,,war ,,remove ,,it ,,further ,,from ,,the ,,absolute1 ,,and ,,make ,,it ,,still ,,more ,a ,,calculation ,,of ,,probabilities4 ,but the slower the action proceeds in ,war1 the more frequent and longer the periods of inaction1 so much the more easily can an error be repaired2 therefore1 so much the bolder a ,general will be in his calculations1 so much the more readily will he keep them below the line of the absolute1 and build everything upon probabilities and conjecture4 ,thus1 according as the course of the ,war is more or less slow1 more or less time will be allowed for that which the nature of a concrete case particularly requires1 calculation of probability based on given circumstances4 #bj4 ,,therefore1 ,,the ,,element ,,of ,,chance ,,only ,,is ,,wanting ,,to ,,make ,,of ,,war ,a ,,game1 ,,and ,,in ,,that ,,element ,,it ,,is ,,least ,,of ,,all ,,deficient4 ,we see from the foregoing how much the objective nature of ,war makes it a calculation of probabilities2 now there is only one single element still wanting to make it a game1 and that element it certainly is not without3 it is chance4 ,there is no human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in close connection with chance as ,war4 ,but together with chance1 the accidental1 and along with it good luck1 occupy a great place in ,war4 #ba4 ,,war ,,is ,a ,,game ,,both ,,objectively ,,and ,,subjectively4 ,if we now take a look at the subjective nature of ,war1 that is to say1 at those conditions under which it is carried on1 it will appear to us still more like a game4 ,primarily the element in which the operations of ,war are carried on is danger2 but which of all the moral qualities is the first in danger8 ,courage4 ,now certainly courage is quite compatible with prudent calculation1 but still they are things of quite a different kind1 essentially different qualities of the mind2 on the other hand1 daring reliance on good fortune1 boldness1 rashness1 are only expressions of courage1 and all these propensities of the mind look for the fortuitous 7or accidental71 because it is their element4 ,we see1 therefore1 how1 from the commencement1 the absolute1 the mathematical as it is called1 nowhere finds any sure basis in the calculations in the ,art of ,war2 and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities1 probabilities1 good and bad luck1 which spreads about with all the coarse and fine threads of its web1 and makes ,war of all branches of human activity the most like a gambling game4 #bb4 ,,how ,,this ,,accords ,,best ,,with ,,the ,,human ,,mind ,,in ,,general4 ,although our intellect always feels itself urged towards clearness and certainty1 still our mind often feels itself attracted by uncertainty4 ,instead of threading its way with the understanding along the narrow path of philosophical investigations and logical conclusions1 in order1 almost unconscious of itself1 to arrive in spaces where it feels itself a stranger1 and where it seems to part from all well-known objects1 it prefers to remain with the imagination in the realms of chance and luck4 ,instead of living yonder on poor necessity1 it revels here in the wealth of possibilities2 animated thereby1 courage then takes wings to itself1 and daring and danger make the element into which it launches itself as a fearless swimmer plunges into the stream4 ,shall theory leave it here1 and move on1 self-satisfied with absolute conclusions and rules8 ,then it is of no practical use4 ,theory must also take into account the human element2 it must accord a place to courage1 to boldness1 even to rashness4 ,the ,art of ,war has to deal with living and with moral forces1 the consequence of which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive4 ,there is therefore everywhere a margin for the accidental1 and just as much in the greatest things as in the smallest4 ,as there is room for this accidental on the one hand1 so on the other there must be courage and self-reliance in proportion to the room available4 ,if these qualities are forthcoming in a high degree1 the margin left may likewise be great4 ,courage and self-reliance are1 therefore1 principles quite essential to ,war2 consequently1 theory must only set up such rules as allow ample scope for all degrees and varieties of these necessary and noblest of military virtues4 ,in daring there may still be wisdom1 and prudence as well1 only they are estimated by a different standard of value4 #bc4 ,,war ,,is ,,always ,a ,,serious ,,means ,,for ,a ,,serious ,,object4 ,,its ,,more ,,particular ,,definition4 ,such is ,war2 such the ,commander who conducts it2 such the theory which rules it4 ,but ,war is no pastime2 no mere passion for venturing and winning2 no work of a free enthusiasm3 it is a serious means for a serious object4 ,all that appearance which it wears from the varying hues of fortune1 all that it assimilates into itself of the oscillations of passion1 of courage1 of imagination1 of enthusiasm1 are only particular properties of this means4 ,the ,war of a community--of whole ,nations1 and particularly of civilised ,nations--always starts from a political condition1 and is called forth by a political motive4 ,it is1 therefore1 a political act4 ,now if it was a perfect1 unrestrained1 and absolute expression of force1 as we had to deduct it from its mere conception1 then the moment it is called forth by policy it would step into the place of policy1 and as something quite independent of it would set it aside1 and only follow its own laws1 just as a mine at the moment of explosion cannot be guided into any other direction than that which has been given to it by preparatory arrangements4 ,this is how the thing has really been viewed hitherto1 whenever a want of harmony between policy and the conduct of a ,war has led to theoretical distinctions of the kind4 ,but it is not so1 and the idea is radically false4 ,war in the real world1 as we have already seen1 is not an extreme thing which expends itself at one single discharge2 it is the operation of powers which do not develop themselves completely in the same manner and in the same measure1 but which at one time expand sufficiently to overcome the resistance opposed by inertia or friction1 while at another they are too weak to produce an effect2 it is therefore1 in a certain measure1 a pulsation of violent force more or less vehement1 consequently making its discharges and exhausting its powers more or less quickly--in other words1 conducting more or less quickly to the aim1 but always lasting long enough to admit of influence being exerted on it in its course1 so as to give it this or that direction1 in short1 to be subject to the will of a guiding intelligence41 if we reflect that ,war has its root in a political object1 then naturally this original motive which called it into existence should also continue the first and highest consideration in its conduct4 ,still1 the political object is no despotic lawgiver on that account2 it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means1 and though changes in these means may involve modification in the political objective1 the latter always retains a prior right to consideration4 ,policy1 therefore1 is interwoven with the whole action of ,war1 and must exercise a continuous influence upon it1 as far as the nature of the forces liberated by it will permit4 #bd4 ,,war ,,is ,a ,,mere ,,continuation ,,of ,,policy ,,by ,,other ,,means4 ,we see1 therefore1 that ,war is not merely a political act1 but also a real political instrument1 a continuation of political commerce1 a carrying out of the same by other means4 ,all beyond this which is strictly peculiar to ,war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses4 ,that the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means1 the ,art of ,war in general and the ,commander in each particular case may demand1 and this claim is truly not a trifling one4 ,but however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases1 still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them2 for the political view is the object1 ,war is the means1 and the means must always include the object in our conception4 #be4 ,,diversity ,,in ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,wars4 ,the greater and the more powerful the motives of a ,war1 the more it affects the whole existence of a people4 ,the more violent the excitement which precedes the ,war1 by so much the nearer will the ,war approach to its abstract form1 so much the more will it be directed to the destruction of the enemy1 so much the nearer will the military and political ends coincide1 so much the more purely military and less political the ,war appears to be2 but the weaker the motives and the tensions1 so much the less will the natural direction of the military element--that is1 force--be coincident with the direction which the political element indicates2 so much the more must1 therefore1 the ,war become diverted from its natural direction1 the political object diverge from the aim of an ideal ,war1 and the ,war appear to become political4 ,but1 that the reader may not form any false conceptions1 we must here observe that by this natural tendency of ,war we only mean the philosophical1 the strictly logical1 and by no means the tendency of forces actually engaged in conflict1 by which would be supposed to be included all the emotions and passions of the combatants4 ,no doubt in some cases these also might be excited to such a degree as to be with difficulty restrained and confined to the political road2 but in most cases such a contradiction will not arise1 because by the existence of such strenuous exertions a great plan in harmony therewith would be implied4 ,if the plan is directed only upon a small object1 then the impulses of feeling amongst the masses will be also so weak that these masses will require to be stimulated rather than repressed4 #bf4 ,,they ,,may ,,all ,,be ,,regarded ,,as ,,political ,,acts4 ,returning now to the main subject1 although it is true that in one kind of ,war the political element seems almost to disappear1 whilst in another kind it occupies a very prominent place1 we may still affirm that the one is as political as the other2 for if we regard the ,state policy as the intelligence of the personified ,state1 then amongst all the constellations in the political sky whose movements it has to compute1 those must be included which arise when the nature of its relations imposes the necessity of a great ,war4 ,it is only if we understand by policy not a true appreciation of affairs in general1 but the conventional conception of a cautious1 subtle1 also dishonest craftiness1 averse from violence1 that the latter kind of ,war may belong more to policy than the first4 #bg4 ,,influence ,,of ,,this ,,view ,,on ,,the ,,right ,,understanding ,,of ,,military ,,history1 ,,and ,,on ,,the ,,foundations ,,of ,,theory4 ,we see1 therefore1 in the first place1 that under all circumstances ,war is to be regarded not as an independent thing1 but as a political instrument2 and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history4 ,this is the only means of unlocking the great book and making it intelligible4 ,secondly1 this view shows us how ,wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed4 ,now1 the first1 the grandest1 and most decisive act of judgment which the ,statesman and ,general exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the ,war in which he engages1 not to take it for something1 or to wish to make of it something1 which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be4 ,this is1 therefore1 the first1 the most comprehensive1 of all strategical questions4 ,we shall enter into this more fully in treating of the plan of a ,war4 ,for the present we content ourselves with having brought the subject up to this point1 and having thereby fixed the chief point of view from which ,war and its theory are to be studied4 #bh4 ,,result ,,for ,,theory4 ,war is1 therefore1 not only chameleon-like in character1 because it changes its colour in some degree in each particular case1 but it is also1 as a whole1 in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it1 a wonderful trinity1 composed of the original violence of its elements1 hatred and animosity1 which may be looked upon as blind instinct2 of the play of probabilities and chance1 which make it a free activity of the soul2 and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument1 by which it belongs purely to the reason4 ,the first of these three phases concerns more the people the second1 more the ,general and his ,army2 the third1 more the ,government4 ,the passions which break forth in ,war must already have a latent existence in the peoples4 ,the range which the display of courage and talents shall get in the realm of probabilities and of chance depends on the particular characteristics of the ,general and his ,army1 but the political objects belong to the ,government alone4 ,these three tendencies1 which appear like so many different law-givers1 are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject1 and at the same time variable in degree4 ,a theory which would leave any one of them out of account1 or set up any arbitrary relation between them1 would immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality1 that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone4 ,the problem is1 therefore1 that theory shall keep itself poised in a manner between these three tendencies1 as between three points of attraction4 ,the way in which alone this difficult problem can be solved we shall examine in the book on the 8,theory of ,war40 ,in every case the conception of ,war1 as here defined1 will be the first ray of light which shows us the true foundation of theory1 and which first separates the great masses and allows us to distinguish them from one another4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,ends and ,means in ,war ,having in the foregoing chapter ascertained the complicated and variable nature of ,war1 we shall now occupy ourselves in examining into the influence which this nature has upon the end and means in ,war4 ,if we ask1 first of all1 for the object upon which the whole effort of ,war is to be directed1 in order that it may suffice for the attainment of the political object1 we shall find that it is just as variable as are the political object and the particular circumstances of the ,war4 ,if1 in the next place1 we keep once more to the pure conception of ,war1 then we must say that the political object properly lies out of its province1 for if ,war is an act of violence to compel the enemy to fulfil our will1 then in every case all depends on our overthrowing the enemy1 that is1 disarming him1 and on that alone4 ,this object1 developed from abstract conceptions1 but which is also the one aimed at in a great many cases in reality1 we shall1 in the first place1 examine in this reality4 ,in connection with the plan of a campaign we shall hereafter examine more closely into the meaning of disarming a nation1 but here we must at once draw a distinction between three things1 which1 as three general objects1 comprise everything else within them4 ,they are the military power1 the country1 and the will of the enemy4 ,the military power must be destroyed1 that is1 reduced to such a state as not to be able to prosecute the ,war4 ,this is the sense in which we wish to be understood hereafter1 whenever we use the expression 8destruction of the enemy's military power40 ,the country must be conquered1 for out of the country a new military force may be formed4 ,but even when both these things are done1 still the ,war1 that is1 the hostile feeling and action of hostile agencies1 cannot be considered as at an end as long as the will of the enemy is not subdued also2 that is1 its ,government and its ,allies must be forced into signing a peace1 or the people into submission2 for whilst we are in full occupation of the country1 the ,war may break out afresh1 either in the interior or through assistance given by ,allies4 ,no doubt1 this may also take place after a peace1 but that shows nothing more than that every ,war does not carry in itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement4 ,but even if this is the case1 still with the conclusion of peace a number of sparks are always extinguished which would have smouldered on quietly1 and the excitement of the passions abates1 because all those whose minds are disposed to peace1 of which in all nations and under all circumstances there is always a great number1 turn themselves away completely from the road to resistance4 ,whatever may take place subsequently1 we must always look upon the object as attained1 and the business of ,war as ended1 by a peace4 ,as protection of the country is the primary object for which the military force exists1 therefore the natural order is1 that first of all this force should be destroyed1 then the country subdued2 and through the effect of these two results1 as well as the position we then hold1 the enemy should be forced to make peace4 ,generally the destruction of the enemy's force is done by degrees1 and in just the same measure the conquest of the country follows immediately4 ,the two likewise usually react upon each other1 because the loss of provinces occasions a diminution of military force4 ,but this order is by no means necessary1 and on that account it also does not always take place4 ,the enemy's ,army1 before it is sensibly weakened1 may retreat to the opposite side of the country1 or even quite outside of it4 ,in this case1 therefore1 the greater part or the whole of the country is conquered4 ,but this object of ,war in the abstract1 this final means of attaining the political object in which all others are combined1 the disarming the enemy1 is rarely attained in practice and is not a condition necessary to peace4 ,therefore it can in no wise be set up in theory as a law4 ,there are innumerable instances of treaties in which peace has been settled before either party could be looked upon as disarmed2 indeed1 even before the balance of power had undergone any sensible alteration4 ,nay1 further1 if we look at the case in the concrete1 then we must say that in a whole class of cases1 the idea of a complete defeat of the enemy would be a mere imaginative flight1 especially when the enemy is considerably superior4 ,the reason why the object deduced from the conception of ,war is not adapted in general to real ,war lies in the difference between the two1 which is discussed in the preceding chapter4 ,if it was as pure theory gives it1 then a ,war between two ,states of very unequal military strength would appear an absurdity2 therefore impossible4 ,at most1 the inequality between the physical forces might be such that it could be balanced by the moral forces1 and that would not go far with our present social condition in ,europe4 ,therefore1 if we have seen ,wars take place between ,states of very unequal power1 that has been the case because there is a wide difference between ,war in reality and its original conception4 ,there are two considerations which as motives may practically take the place of inability to continue the contest4 ,the first is the improbability1 the second is the excessive price1 of success4 ,according to what we have seen in the foregoing chapter1 ,war must always set itself free from the strict law of logical necessity1 and seek aid from the calculation of probabilities2 and as this is so much the more the case1 the more the ,war has a bias that way1 from the circumstances out of which it has arisen--the smaller its motives are1 and the excitement it has raised--so it is also conceivable how out of this calculation of probabilities even motives to peace may arise4 ,war does not1 therefore1 always require to be fought out until one party is overthrown2 and we may suppose that1 when the motives and passions are slight1 a weak probability will suffice to move that side to which it is unfavourable to give way4 ,now1 were the other side convinced of this beforehand1 it is natural that he would strive for this probability only1 instead of first wasting time and effort in the attempt to achieve the total destruction of the enemy's ,army4 ,still more general in its influence on the resolution to peace is the consideration of the expenditure of force already made1 and further required4 ,as ,war is no act of blind passion1 but is dominated by the political object1 therefore the value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased4 ,this will be the case1 not only as regards extent1 but also as regards duration4 ,as soon1 therefore1 as the required outlay becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value1 the object must be given up1 and peace will be the result4 ,we see1 therefore1 that in ,wars where one side cannot completely disarm the other1 the motives to peace on both sides will rise or fall on each side according to the probability of future success and the required outlay4 ,if these motives were equally strong on both sides1 they would meet in the centre of their political difference4 ,where they are strong on one side1 they might be weak on the other4 ,if their amount is only sufficient1 peace will follow1 but naturally to the advantage of that side which has the weakest motive for its conclusion4 ,we purposely pass over here the difference which the positive and negative character of the political end must necessarily produce practically2 for although that is1 as we shall hereafter show1 of the highest importance1 still we are obliged to keep here to a more general point of view1 because the original political views in the course of the ,war change very much1 and at last may become totally different1 just because they are determined by results and probable events4 ,now comes the question how to influence the probability of success4 ,in the first place1 naturally by the same means which we use when the object is the subjugation of the enemy1 by the destruction of his military force and the conquest of his provinces2 but these two means are not exactly of the same import here as they would be in reference to that object4 ,if we attack the enemy's ,army1 it is a very different thing whether we intend to follow up the first blow with a succession of others1 until the whole force is destroyed1 or whether we mean to content ourselves with a victory to shake the enemy's feeling of security1 to convince him of our superiority1 and to instil into him a feeling of apprehension about the future4 ,if this is our object1 we only go so far in the destruction of his forces as is sufficient4 ,in like manner1 the conquest1 of the enemy's provinces is quite a different measure if the object is not the destruction of the enemy's ,army4 ,in the latter case the destruction of the ,army is the real effectual action1 and the taking of the provinces only a consequence of it2 to take them before the ,army had been defeated would always be looked upon only as a necessary evil4 ,on the other hand1 if our views are not directed upon the complete destruction of the enemy's force1 and if we are sure that the enemy does not seek but fears to bring matters to a bloody decision1 the taking possession of a weak or defenceless province is an advantage in itself1 and if this advantage is of sufficient importance to make the enemy apprehensive about the general result1 then it may also be regarded as a shorter road to peace4 ,but now we come upon a peculiar means of influencing the probability of the result without destroying the enemy's ,army1 namely1 upon the expeditions which have a direct connection with political views4 ,if there are any enterprises which are particularly likely to break up the enemy's alliances or make them inoperative1 to gain new alliances for ourselves1 to raise political powers in our own favour1 c4 c41 then it is easy to conceive how much these may increase the probability of success1 and become a shorter way towards our object than the routing of the enemy's forces4 ,the second question is how to act upon the enemy's expenditure in strength1 that is1 to raise the price of success4 ,the enemy's outlay in strength lies in the wear and tear of his forces1 consequently in the destruction of them on our part1 and in the loss of provinces1 consequently the conquest of them by us4 ,here1 again1 on account of the various significations of these means1 so likewise it will be found that neither of them will be identical in its signification in all cases if the objects are different4 ,the smallness in general of this difference must not cause us perplexity1 for in reality the weakest motives1 the finest shades of difference1 often decide in favour of this or that method of applying force4 ,our only business here is to show that1 certain conditions being supposed1 the possibility of attaining our purpose in different ways is no contradiction1 absurdity1 nor even error4 ,besides these two means1 there are three other peculiar ways of directly increasing the waste of the enemy's force4 ,the first is invasion1 that is the occupation of the enemy's territory1 not with a view to keeping it1 but in order to levy contributions upon it1 or to devastate it4 ,the immediate object here is neither the conquest of the enemy's territory nor the defeat of his armed force1 but merely to do him damage in a general way4 ,the second way is to select for the object of our enterprises those points at which we can do the enemy most harm4 ,nothing is easier to conceive than two different directions in which our force may be employed1 the first of which is to be preferred if our object is to defeat the enemy's ,army1 while the other is more advantageous if the defeat of the enemy is out of the question4 ,according to the usual mode of speaking1 we should say that the first is primarily military1 the other more political4 ,but if we take our view from the highest point1 both are equally military1 and neither the one nor the other can be eligible unless it suits the circumstances of the case4 ,the third1 by far the most important1 from the great number of cases which it embraces1 is the wearing out of the enemy4 ,we choose this expression not only to explain our meaning in few words1 but because it represents the thing exactly1 and is not so figurative as may at first appear4 ,the idea of wearing out in a struggle amounts in practice to a gradual exhaustion of the physical powers and of the will by the long continuance of exertion4 ,now1 if we want to overcome the enemy by the duration of the contest1 we must content ourselves with as small objects as possible1 for it is in the nature of the thing that a great end requires a greater expenditure of force than a small one2 but the smallest object that we can propose to ourselves is simple passive resistance1 that is a combat without any positive view4 ,in this way1 therefore1 our means attain their greatest relative value1 and therefore the result is best secured4 ,how far now can this negative mode of proceeding be carried8 ,plainly not to absolute passivity1 for mere endurance would not be fighting2 and the defensive is an activity by which so much of the enemy's power must be destroyed that he must give up his object4 ,that alone is what we aim at in each single act1 and therein consists the negative nature of our object4 ,no doubt this negative object in its single act is not so effective as the positive object in the same direction would be1 supposing it successful2 but there is this difference in its favour1 that it succeeds more easily than the positive1 and therefore it holds out greater certainty of success2 what is wanting in the efficacy of its single act must be gained through time1 that is1 through the duration of the contest1 and therefore this negative intention1 which constitutes the principle of the pure defensive1 is also the natural means of overcoming the enemy by the duration of the combat1 that is of wearing him out4 ,here lies the origin of that difference of ,offensive and ,defensive1 the influence of which prevails throughout the whole province of ,war4 ,we cannot at present pursue this subject further than to observe that from this negative intention are to be deduced all the advantages and all the stronger forms of combat which are on the side of the ,defensive1 and in which that philosophical-dynamic law which exists between the greatness and the certainty of success is realised4 ,we shall resume the consideration of all this hereafter4 ,if then the negative purpose1 that is the concentration of all the means into a state of pure resistance1 affords a superiority in the contest1 and if this advantage is sufficient to balance whatever superiority in numbers the adversary may have1 then the mere duration of the contest will suffice gradually to bring the loss of force on the part of the adversary to a point at which the political object can no longer be an equivalent1 a point at which1 therefore1 he must give up the contest4 ,we see then that this class of means1 the wearing out of the enemy1 includes the great number of cases in which the weaker resists the stronger4 ,frederick the ,great1 during the ,seven ,years' ,war1 was never strong enough to overthrow the ,austrian monarchy2 and if he had tried to do so after the fashion of ,charles the ,twelfth1 he would inevitably have had to succumb himself4 ,but after his skilful application of the system of husbanding his resources had shown the powers allied against him1 through a seven years' struggle1 that the actual expenditure of strength far exceeded what they had at first anticipated1 they made peace4 ,we see then that there are many ways to one's object in ,war2 that the complete subjugation of the enemy is not essential in every case2 that the destruction of the enemy's military force1 the conquest of the enemy's provinces1 the mere occupation of them1 the mere invasion of them--enterprises which are aimed directly at political objects--lastly1 a passive expectation of the enemy's blow1 are all means which1 each in itself1 may be used to force the enemy's will according as the peculiar circumstances of the case lead us to expect more from the one or the other4 ,we could still add to these a whole category of shorter methods of gaining the end1 which might be called arguments ad hominem4 ,what branch of human affairs is there in which these sparks of individual spirit have not made their appearance1 surmounting all formal considerations8 ,and least of all can they fail to appear in ,war1 where the personal character of the combatants plays such an important part1 both in the cabinet and in the field4 ,we limit ourselves to pointing this out1 as it would be pedantry to attempt to reduce such influences into classes4 ,including these1 we may say that the number of possible ways of reaching the object rises to infinity4 ,to avoid under-estimating these different short roads to one's purpose1 either estimating them only as rare exceptions1 or holding the difference which they cause in the conduct of ,war as insignificant1 we must bear in mind the diversity of political objects which may cause a ,war--measure at a glance the distance which there is between a death struggle for political existence and a ,war which a forced or tottering alliance makes a matter of disagreeable duty4 ,between the two innumerable gradations occur in practice4 ,if we reject one of these gradations in theory1 we might with equal right reject the whole1 which would be tantamount to shutting the real world completely out of sight4 ,these are the circumstances in general connected with the aim which we have to pursue in ,war2 let us now turn to the means4 ,there is only one single means1 it is the ,fight4 ,however diversified this may be in form1 however widely it may differ from a rough vent of hatred and animosity in a hand-to-hand encounter1 whatever number of things may introduce themselves which are not actual fighting1 still it is always implied in the conception of ,war that all the effects manifested have their roots in the combat4 ,that this must always be so in the greatest diversity and complication of the reality is proved in a very simple manner4 ,all that takes place in ,war takes place through armed forces1 but where the forces of ,war1 i4e41 armed men1 are applied1 there the idea of fighting must of necessity be at the foundation4 ,all1 therefore1 that relates to forces of ,war--all that is connected with their creation1 maintenance1 and application--belongs to military activity4 ,creation and maintenance are obviously only the means1 whilst application is the object4 ,the contest in ,war is not a contest of individual against individual1 but an organised whole1 consisting of manifold parts2 in this great whole we may distinguish units of two kinds1 the one determined by the subject1 the other by the object4 ,in an ,army the mass of combatants ranges itself always into an order of new units1 which again form members of a higher order4 ,the combat of each of these members forms1 therefore1 also a more or less distinct unit4 ,further1 the motive of the fight2 therefore its object forms its unit4 ,now1 to each of these units which we distinguish in the contest we attach the name of combat4 ,if the idea of combat lies at the foundation of every application of armed power1 then also the application of armed force in general is nothing more than the determining and arranging a certain number of combats4 ,every activity in ,war1 therefore1 necessarily relates to the combat either directly or indirectly4 ,the soldier is levied1 clothed1 armed1 exercised1 he sleeps1 eats1 drinks1 and marches1 all merely to fight at the right time and place4 ,if1 therefore1 all the threads of military activity terminate in the combat1 we shall grasp them all when we settle the order of the combats4 ,only from this order and its execution proceed the effects1 never directly from the conditions preceding them4 ,now1 in the combat all the action is directed to the destruction of the enemy1 or rather of his fighting powers1 for this lies in the conception of combat4 ,the destruction of the enemy's fighting power is1 therefore1 always the means to attain the object of the combat4 ,this object may likewise be the mere destruction of the enemy's armed force2 but that is not by any means necessary1 and it may be something quite different4 ,whenever1 for instance1 as we have shown1 the defeat of the enemy is not the only means to attain the political object1 whenever there are other objects which may be pursued as the aim in a ,war1 then it follows of itself that such other objects may become the object of particular acts of ,warfare1 and therefore also the object of combats4 ,but even those combats which1 as subordinate acts1 are in the strict sense devoted to the destruction of the enemy's fighting force need not have that destruction itself as their first object4 ,if we think of the manifold parts of a great armed force1 of the number of circumstances which come into activity when it is employed1 then it is clear that the combat of such a force must also require a manifold organisation1 a subordinating of parts and formation4 ,there may and must naturally arise for particular parts a number of objects which are not themselves the destruction of the enemy's armed force1 and which1 while they certainly contribute to increase that destruction1 do so only in an indirect manner4 ,if a battalion is ordered to drive the enemy from a rising ground1 or a bridge1 c41 then properly the occupation of any such locality is the real object1 the destruction of the enemy's armed force which takes place only the means or secondary matter4 ,if the enemy can be driven away merely by a demonstration1 the object is attained all the same2 but this hill or bridge is1 in point of fact1 only required as a means of increasing the gross amount of loss inflicted on the enemy's armed force4 ,it is the case on the field of battle1 much more must it be so on the whole theatre of war1 where not only one ,army is opposed to another1 but one ,state1 one ,nation1 one whole country to another4 ,here the number of possible relations1 and consequently possible combinations1 is much greater1 the diversity of measures increased1 and by the gradation of objects1 each subordinate to another the first means employed is further apart from the ultimate object4 ,it is therefore for many reasons possible that the object of a combat is not the destruction of the enemy's force1 that is1 of the force immediately opposed to us1 but that this only appears as a means4 ,but in all such cases it is no longer a question of complete destruction1 for the combat is here nothing else but a measure of strength--has in itself no value except only that of the present result1 that is1 of its decision4 ,but a measuring of strength may be effected in cases where the opposing sides are very unequal by a mere comparative estimate4 ,in such cases no fighting will take place1 and the weaker will immediately give way4 ,if the object of a combat is not always the destruction of the enemy's forces therein engaged--and if its object can often be attained as well without the combat taking place at all1 by merely making a resolve to fight1 and by the circumstances to which this resolution gives rise--then that explains how a whole campaign may be carried on with great activity without the actual combat playing any notable part in it4 ,that this may be so military history proves by a hundred examples4 ,how many of those cases can be justified1 that is1 without involving a contradiction and whether some of the celebrities who rose out of them would stand criticism1 we shall leave undecided1 for all we have to do with the matter is to show the possibility of such a course of events in ,war4 ,we have only one means in ,war--the battle2 but this means1 by the infinite variety of paths in which it may be applied1 leads us into all the different ways which the multiplicity of objects allows of1 so that we seem to have gained nothing2 but that is not the case1 for from this unity of means proceeds a thread which assists the study of the subject1 as it runs through the whole web of military activity and holds it together4 ,but we have considered the destruction of the enemy's force as one of the objects which maybe pursued in ,war1 and left undecided what relative importance should be given to it amongst other objects4 ,in certain cases it will depend on circumstances1 and as a general question we have left its value undetermined4 ,we are once more brought back upon it1 and we shall be able to get an insight into the value which must necessarily be accorded to it4 ,the combat is the single activity in ,war2 in the combat the destruction of the enemy opposed to us is the means to the end2 it is so even when the combat does not actually take place1 because in that case there lies at the root of the decision the supposition at all events that this destruction is to be regarded as beyond doubt4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that the destruction of the enemy's military force is the foundation-stone of all action in ,war1 the great support of all combinations1 which rest upon it like the arch on its abutments4 ,all action1 therefore1 takes place on the supposition that if the solution by force of arms which lies at its foundation should be realised1 it will be a favourable one4 ,the decision by arms is1 for all operations in ,war1 great and small1 what cash payment is in bill transactions4 ,however remote from each other these relations1 however seldom the realisation may take place1 still it can never entirely fail to occur4 ,if the decision by arms lies at the foundation of all combinations1 then it follows that the enemy can defeat each of them by gaining a victory on the field1 not merely in the one on which our combination directly depends1 but also in any other encounter1 if it is only important enough2 for every important decision by arms--that is1 destruction of the enemy's forces--reacts upon all preceding it1 because1 like a liquid element1 they tend to bring themselves to a level4 ,thus1 the destruction of the enemy's armed force appears1 therefore1 always as the superior and more effectual means1 to which all others must give way4 ,it is1 however1 only when there is a supposed equality in all other conditions that we can ascribe to the destruction of the enemy's armed force the greater efficacy4 ,it would1 therefore1 be a great mistake to draw the conclusion that a blind dash must always gain the victory over skill and caution4 ,an unskilful attack would lead to the destruction of our own and not of the enemy's force1 and therefore is not what is here meant4 ,the superior efficacy belongs not to the means but to the end1 and we are only comparing the effect of one realised purpose with the other4 ,if we speak of the destruction of the enemy's armed force1 we must expressly point out that nothing obliges us to confine this idea to the mere physical force2 on the contrary1 the moral is necessarily implied as well1 because both in fact are interwoven with each other1 even in the most minute details1 and therefore cannot be separated4 ,but it is just in connection with the inevitable effect which has been referred to1 of a great act of destruction 7a great victory7 upon all other decisions by arms1 that this moral element is most fluid1 if we may use that expression1 and therefore distributes itself the most easily through all the parts4 ,against the far superior worth which the destruction of the enemy's armed force has over all other means stands the expense and risk of this means1 and it is only to avoid these that any other means are taken4 ,that these must be costly stands to reason1 for the waste of our own military forces must1 ceteris paribus1 always be greater the more our aim is directed upon the destruction of the enemy's power4 ,the danger lies in this1 that the greater efficacy which we seek recoils on ourselves1 and therefore has worse consequences in case we fail of success4 ,other methods are1 therefore1 less costly when they succeed1 less dangerous when they fail2 but in this is necessarily lodged the condition that they are only opposed to similar ones1 that is1 that the enemy acts on the same principle2 for if the enemy should choose the way of a great decision by arms1 our means must on that account be changed against our will1 in order to correspond with his4 ,then all depends on the issue of the act of destruction2 but of course it is evident that1 ceteris paribus1 in this act we must be at a disadvantage in all respects because our views and our means had been directed in part upon other objects1 which is not the case with the enemy4 ,two different objects of which one is not part1 the other exclude each other1 and therefore a force which may be applicable for the one may not serve for the other4 ,if1 therefore1 one of two belligerents is determined to seek the great decision by arms1 then he has a high probability of success1 as soon as he is certain his opponent will not take that way1 but follows a different object2 and every one who sets before himself any such other aim only does so in a reasonable manner1 provided he acts on the supposition that his adversary has as little intention as he has of resorting to the great decision by arms4 ,but what we have here said of another direction of views and forces relates only to other positive objects1 which we may propose to ourselves in ,war1 besides the destruction of the enemy's force1 not by any means to the pure defensive1 which may be adopted with a view thereby to exhaust the enemy's forces4 ,in the pure defensive the positive object is wanting1 and therefore1 while on the defensive1 our forces cannot at the same time be directed on other objects2 they can only be employed to defeat the intentions of the enemy4 ,we have now to consider the opposite of the destruction of the enemy's armed force1 that is to say1 the preservation of our own4 ,these two efforts always go together1 as they mutually act and react on each other2 they are integral parts of one and the same view1 and we have only to ascertain what effect is produced when one or the other has the predominance4 ,the endeavour to destroy the enemy's force has a positive object1 and leads to positive results1 of which the final aim is the conquest of the enemy4 ,the preservation of our own forces has a negative object1 leads therefore to the defeat of the enemy's intentions1 that is to pure resistance1 of which the final aim can be nothing more than to prolong the duration of the contest1 so that the enemy shall exhaust himself in it4 ,the effort with a positive object calls into existence the act of destruction2 the effort with the negative object awaits it4 ,how far this state of expectation should and may be carried we shall enter into more particularly in the theory of attack and defence1 at the origin of which we again find ourselves4 ,here we shall content ourselves with saying that the awaiting must be no absolute endurance1 and that in the action bound up with it the destruction of the enemy's armed force engaged in this conflict may be the aim just as well as anything else4 ,it would therefore be a great error in the fundamental idea to suppose that the consequence of the negative course is that we are precluded from choosing the destruction of the enemy's military force as our object1 and must prefer a bloodless solution4 ,the advantage which the negative effort gives may certainly lead to that1 but only at the risk of its not being the most advisable method1 as that question is dependent on totally different conditions1 resting not with ourselves but with our opponents4 ,this other bloodless way cannot1 therefore1 be looked upon at all as the natural means of satisfying our great anxiety to spare our forces2 on the contrary1 when circumstances are not favourable1 it would be the means of completely ruining them4 ,very many ,generals have fallen into this error1 and been ruined by it4 ,the only necessary effect resulting from the superiority of the negative effort is the delay of the decision1 so that the party acting takes refuge in that way1 as it were1 in the expectation of the decisive moment4 ,the consequence of that is generally the postponement of the action as much as possible in time1 and also in space1 in so far as space is in connection with it4 ,if the moment has arrived in which this can no longer be done without ruinous disadvantage1 then the advantage of the negative must be considered as exhausted1 and then comes forward unchanged the effort for the destruction of the enemy's force1 which was kept back by a counterpoise1 but never discarded4 ,we have seen1 therefore1 in the foregoing reflections1 that there are many ways to the aim1 that is1 to the attainment of the political object2 but that the only means is the combat1 and that consequently everything is subject to a supreme law3 which is the decision by arms2 that where this is really demanded by one1 it is a redress which cannot be refused by the other2 that1 therefore1 a belligerent who takes any other way must make sure that his opponent will not take this means of redress1 or his cause may be lost in that supreme court2 hence therefore the destruction of the enemy's armed force1 amongst all the objects which can be pursued in ,war1 appears always as the one which overrules all others4 ,what may be achieved by combinations of another kind in ,war we shall only learn in the sequel1 and naturally only by degrees4 ,we content ourselves here with acknowledging in general their possibility1 as something pointing to the difference between the reality and the conception1 and to the influence of particular circumstances4 ,but we could not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the crisis1 the effort for the destruction of the enemy's force1 is the firstborn son of ,war4 ,if when political objects are unimportant1 motives weak1 the excitement of forces small1 a cautious commander tries in all kinds of ways1 without great crises and bloody solutions1 to twist himself skilfully into a peace through the characteristic weaknesses of his enemy in the field and in the ,cabinet1 we have no right to find fault with him1 if the premises on which he acts are well founded and justified by success2 still we must require him to remember that he only travels on forbidden tracks1 where the ,god of ,war may surprise him2 that he ought always to keep his eye on the enemy1 in order that he may not have to defend himself with a dress rapier if the enemy takes up a sharp sword4 ,the consequences of the nature of ,war1 how ends and means act in it1 how in the modifications of reality it deviates sometimes more1 sometimes less1 from its strict original conception1 fluctuating backwards and forwards1 yet always remaining under that strict conception as under a supreme law3 all this we must retain before us1 and bear constantly in mind in the consideration of each of the succeeding subjects1 if we would rightly comprehend their true relations and proper importance1 and not become involved incessantly in the most glaring contradictions with the reality1 and at last with our own selves4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,genius for ,war ,every special calling in life1 if it is to be followed with success1 requires peculiar qualifications of understanding and soul4 ,where these are of a high order1 and manifest themselves by extraordinary achievements1 the mind to which they belong is termed ,,genius4 ,we know very well that this word is used in many significations which are very different both in extent and nature1 and that with many of these significations it is a very difficult task to define the essence of ,genius2 but as we neither profess to be philosopher nor grammarian1 we must be allowed to keep to the meaning usual in ordinary language1 and to understand by 8genius0 a very high mental capacity for certain employments4 ,we wish to stop for a moment over this faculty and dignity of the mind1 in order to vindicate its title1 and to explain more fully the meaning of the conception4 ,but we shall not dwell on that 7genius7 which has obtained its title through a very great talent1 on genius properly so called1 that is a conception which has no defined limits4 ,what we have to do is to bring under consideration every common tendency of the powers of the mind and soul towards the business of ,war1 the whole of which common tendencies we may look upon as the ,,essence ,,of ,,military ,,genius4 ,we say 8common10 for just therein consists military genius1 that it is not one single quality bearing upon ,war1 as1 for instance1 courage1 while other qualities of mind and soul are wanting or have a direction which is unserviceable for ,war1 but that it is ,,an ,,harmonious ,,association ,,of ,,powers1 in which one or other may predominate1 but none must be in opposition4 ,if every combatant required to be more or less endowed with military genius1 then our armies would be very weak2 for as it implies a peculiar bent of the intelligent powers1 therefore it can only rarely be found where the mental powers of a people are called into requisition and trained in many different ways4 ,the fewer the employments followed by a ,nation1 the more that of arms predominates1 so much the more prevalent will military genius also be found4 ,but this merely applies to its prevalence1 by no means to its degree1 for that depends on the general state of intellectual culture in the country4 ,if we look at a wild1 warlike race1 then we find a warlike spirit in individuals much more common than in a civilised people2 for in the former almost every warrior possesses it1 whilst in the civilised whole1 masses are only carried away by it from necessity1 never by inclination4 ,but amongst uncivilised people we never find a really great ,general1 and very seldom what we can properly call a military genius1 because that requires a development of the intelligent powers which cannot be found in an uncivilised state4 ,that a civilised people may also have a warlike tendency and development is a matter of course2 and the more this is general1 the more frequently also will military spirit be found in individuals in their armies4 ,now as this coincides in such case with the higher degree of civilisation1 therefore from such nations have issued forth the most brilliant military exploits1 as the ,romans and the ,french have exemplified4 ,the greatest names in these and in all other nations that have been renowned in ,war belong strictly to epochs of higher culture4 ,from this we may infer how great a share the intelligent powers have in superior military genius4 ,we shall now look more closely into this point4 ,war is the province of danger1 and therefore courage above all things is the first quality of a warrior4 ,courage is of two kinds3 first1 physical courage1 or courage in presence of danger to the person2 and next1 moral courage1 or courage before responsibility1 whether it be before the judgment-seat of external authority1 or of the inner power1 the conscience4 ,we only speak here of the first4 ,courage before danger to the person1 again1 is of two kinds4 ,first1 it may be indifference to danger1 whether proceeding from the organism of the individual1 contempt of death1 or habit3 in any of these cases it is to be regarded as a permanent condition4 ,secondly1 courage may proceed from positive motives1 such as personal pride1 patriotism1 enthusiasm of any kind4 ,in this case courage is not so much a normal condition as an impulse4 ,we may conceive that the two kinds act differently4 ,the first kind is more certain1 because it has become a second nature1 never forsakes the man2 the second often leads him farther4 ,in the first there is more of firmness1 in the second1 of boldness4 ,the first leaves the judgment cooler1 the second raises its power at times1 but often bewilders it4 ,the two combined make up the most perfect kind of courage4 ,war is the province of physical exertion and suffering4 ,in order not to be completely overcome by them1 a certain strength of body and mind is required1 which1 either natural or acquired1 produces indifference to them4 ,with these qualifications1 under the guidance of simply a sound understanding1 a man is at once a proper instrument for ,war2 and these are the qualifications so generally to be met with amongst wild and half-civilised tribes4 ,if we go further in the demands which ,war makes on it1 then we find the powers of the understanding predominating4 ,war is the province of uncertainty3 three-fourths of those things upon which action in ,war must be calculated1 are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty4 ,here1 then1 above all a fine and penetrating mind is called for1 to search out the truth by the tact of its judgment4 ,an average intellect may1 at one time1 perhaps hit upon this truth by accident2 an extraordinary courage1 at another1 may compensate for the want of this tact2 but in the majority of cases the average result will always bring to light the deficient understanding4 ,war is the province of chance4 ,in no sphere of human activity is such a margin to be left for this intruder1 because none is so much in constant contact with him on all sides4 ,he increases the uncertainty of every circumstance1 and deranges the course of events4 ,from this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions1 this continual interposition of chance1 the actor in ,war constantly finds things different from his expectations2 and this cannot fail to have an influence on his plans1 or at least on the presumptions connected with these plans4 ,if this influence is so great as to render the pre-determined plan completely nugatory1 then1 as a rule1 a new one must be substituted in its place2 but at the moment the necessary data are often wanting for this1 because in the course of action circumstances press for immediate decision1 and allow no time to look about for fresh data1 often not enough for mature consideration4 ,but it more often happens that the correction of one premise1 and the knowledge of chance events which have arisen1 are not sufficient to overthrow our plans completely1 but only suffice to produce hesitation4 ,our knowledge of circumstances has increased1 but our uncertainty1 instead of having diminished1 has only increased4 ,the reason of this is1 that we do not gain all our experience at once1 but by degrees2 thus our determinations continue to be assailed incessantly by fresh experience2 and the mind1 if we may use the expression1 must always be 8under arms40 ,now1 if it is to get safely through this perpetual conflict with the unexpected1 two qualities are indispensable3 in the first place an intellect which1 even in the midst of this intense obscurity1 is not without some traces of inner light1 which lead to the truth1 and then the courage to follow this faint light4 ,the first is figuratively expressed by the ,french phrase coup d'il4 ,the other is resolution4 ,as the battle is the feature in ,war to which attention was originally chiefly directed1 and as time and space are important elements in it1 more particularly when cavalry with their rapid decisions were the chief arm1 the idea of rapid and correct decision related in the first instance to the estimation of these two elements1 and to denote the idea an expression was adopted which actually only points to a correct judgment by eye4 ,many teachers of the ,art of ,war then gave this limited signification as the definition of coup d'il4 ,but it is undeniable that all able decisions formed in the moment of action soon came to be understood by the expression1 as1 for instance1 the hitting upon the right point of attack1 c4 ,it is1 therefore1 not only the physical1 but more frequently the mental eye which is meant in coup d'il4 ,naturally1 the expression1 like the thing1 is always more in its place in the field of tactics3 still1 it must not be wanting in strategy1 inasmuch as in it rapid decisions are often necessary4 ,if we strip this conception of that which the expression has given it of the over-figurative and restricted1 then it amounts simply to the rapid discovery of a truth which to the ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so after long examination and reflection4 ,resolution is an act of courage in single instances1 and if it becomes a characteristic trait1 it is a habit of the mind4 ,but here we do not mean courage in face of bodily danger1 but in face of responsibility1 therefore1 to a certain extent against moral danger4 ,this has been often called courage d'esprit1 on the ground that it springs from the understanding2 nevertheless1 it is no act of the understanding on that account2 it is an act of feeling4 ,mere intelligence is still not courage1 for we often see the cleverest people devoid of resolution4 ,the mind must1 therefore1 first awaken the feeling of courage1 and then be guided and supported by it1 because in momentary emergencies the man is swayed more by his feelings than his thoughts4 ,we have assigned to resolution the office of removing the torments of doubt1 and the dangers of delay1 when there are no sufficient motives for guidance4 ,through the unscrupulous use of language which is prevalent1 this term is often applied to the mere propensity to daring1 to bravery1 boldness1 or temerity4 ,but1 when there are sufficient motives in the man1 let them be objective or subjective1 true or false1 we have no right to speak of his resolution2 for1 when we do so1 we put ourselves in his place1 and we throw into the scale doubts which did not exist with him4 ,here there is no question of anything but of strength and weakness4 ,we are not pedantic enough to dispute with the use of language about this little misapplication1 our observation is only intended to remove wrong objections4 ,this resolution now1 which overcomes the state of doubting1 can only be called forth by the intellect1 and1 in fact1 by a peculiar tendency of the same4 ,we maintain that the mere union of a superior understanding and the necessary feelings are not sufficient to make up resolution4 ,there are persons who possess the keenest perception for the most difficult problems1 who are also not fearful of responsibility1 and yet in cases of difficulty cannot come to a resolution4 ,their courage and their sagacity operate independently of each other1 do not give each other a hand1 and on that account do not produce resolution as a result4 ,the forerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making evident the necessity of venturing1 and thus influencing the will4 ,this quite peculiar direction of the mind1 which conquers every other fear in man by the fear of wavering or doubting1 is what makes up resolution in strong minds2 therefore1 in our opinion1 men who have little intelligence can never be resolute4 ,they may act without hesitation under perplexing circumstances1 but then they act without reflection4 ,now1 of course1 when a man acts without reflection he cannot be at variance with himself by doubts1 and such a mode of action may now and then lead to the right point2 but we say now as before1 it is the average result which indicates the existence of military genius4 ,should our assertion appear extraordinary to any one1 because he knows many a resolute hussar officer who is no deep thinker1 we must remind him that the question here is about a peculiar direction of the mind1 and not about great thinking powers4 ,we believe1 therefore1 that resolution is indebted to a special direction of the mind for its existence1 a direction which belongs to a strong head rather than to a brilliant one4 ,in corroboration of this genealogy of resolution we may add that there have been many instances of men who have shown the greatest resolution in an inferior rank1 and have lost it in a higher position4 ,while1 on the one hand1 they are obliged to resolve1 on the other they see the dangers of a wrong decision1 and as they are surrounded with things new to them1 their understanding loses its original force1 and they become only the more timid the more they become aware of the danger of the irresolution into which they have fallen1 and the more they have formerly been in the habit of acting on the spur of the moment4 ,from the coup d'il and resolution we are naturally to speak of its kindred quality1 presence of mind1 which in a region of the unexpected like ,war must act a great part1 for it is indeed nothing but a great conquest over the unexpected4 ,as we admire presence of mind in a pithy answer to anything said unexpectedly1 so we admire it in a ready expedient on sudden danger4 ,neither the answer nor the expedient need be in themselves extraordinary1 if they only hit the point2 for that which as the result of mature reflection would be nothing unusual1 therefore insignificant in its impression on us1 may as an instantaneous act of the mind produce a pleasing impression4 ,the expression 8presence of mind0 certainly denotes very fitly the readiness and rapidity of the help rendered by the mind4 ,whether this noble quality of a man is to be ascribed more to the peculiarity of his mind or to the equanimity of his feelings1 depends on the nature of the case1 although neither of the two can be entirely wanting4 ,a telling repartee bespeaks rather a ready wit1 a ready expedient on sudden danger implies more particularly a well-balanced mind4 ,if we take a general view of the four elements composing the atmosphere in which ,war moves1 of danger1 physical effort1 uncertainty1 and chance1 it is easy to conceive that a great force of mind and understanding is requisite to be able to make way with safety and success amongst such opposing elements1 a force which1 according to the different modifications arising out of circumstances1 we find termed by military writers and annalists as energy1 firmness1 staunchness1 strength of mind and character4 ,all these manifestations of the heroic nature might be regarded as one and the same power of volition1 modified according to circumstances2 but nearly related as these things are to each other1 still they are not one and the same1 and it is desirable for us to distinguish here a little more closely at least the action of the powers of the soul in relation to them4 ,in the first place1 to make the conception clear1 it is essential to observe that the weight1 burden1 resistance1 or whatever it may be called1 by which that force of the soul in the ,general is brought to light1 is only in a very small measure the enemy's activity1 the enemy's resistance1 the enemy's action directly4 ,the enemy's activity only affects the ,general directly in the first place in relation to his person1 without disturbing his action as ,commander4 ,if the enemy1 instead of two hours1 resists for four1 the ,commander instead of two hours is four hours in danger2 this is a quantity which plainly diminishes the higher the rank of the ,commander4 ,what is it for one in the post of ,commander-in-,chief8 ,it is nothing4 ,secondly1 although the opposition offered by the enemy has a direct effect on the ,commander through the loss of means arising from prolonged resistance1 and the responsibility connected with that loss1 and his force of will is first tested and called forth by these anxious considerations1 still we maintain that this is not the heaviest burden by far which he has to bear1 because he has only himself to settle with4 ,all the other effects of the enemy's resistance act directly upon the combatants under his command1 and through them react upon him4 ,as long as his men full of good courage fight with zeal and spirit1 it is seldom necessary for the ,chief to show great energy of purpose in the pursuit of his object4 ,but as soon as difficulties arise--and that must always happen when great results are at stake--then things no longer move on of themselves like a well-oiled machine1 the machine itself then begins to offer resistance1 and to overcome this the ,commander must have a great force of will4 ,by this resistance we must not exactly suppose disobedience and murmurs1 although these are frequent enough with particular individuals2 it is the whole feeling of the dissolution of all physical and moral power1 it is the heartrending sight of the bloody sacrifice which the ,commander has to contend with in himself1 and then in all others who directly or indirectly transfer to him their impressions1 feelings1 anxieties1 and desires4 ,as the forces in one individual after another become prostrated1 and can no longer be excited and supported by an effort of his own will1 the whole inertia of the mass gradually rests its weight on the ,will of the ,commander3 by the spark in his breast1 by the light of his spirit1 the spark of purpose1 the light of hope1 must be kindled afresh in others3 in so far only as he is equal to this1 he stands above the masses and continues to be their master2 whenever that influence ceases1 and his own spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the spirit of all others1 the masses drawing him down with them sink into the lower region of animal nature1 which shrinks from danger and knows not shame4 ,these are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of the military ,commander have to overcome if he is to make his name illustrious4 ,they increase with the masses1 and therefore1 if the forces in question are to continue equal to the burden1 they must rise in proportion to the height of the station4 ,energy in action expresses the strength of the motive through which the action is excited1 let the motive have its origin in a conviction of the understanding1 or in an impulse4 ,but the latter can hardly ever be wanting where great force is to show itself4 ,of all the noble feelings which fill the human heart in the exciting tumult of battle1 none1 we must admit1 are so powerful and constant as the soul's thirst for honour and renown1 which the ,german language treats so unfairly and tends to depreciate by the unworthy associations in the words ,ehrgeiz 7greed of honour7 and ,ruhmsucht 7hankering after glory74 ,no doubt it is just in ,war that the abuse of these proud aspirations of the soul must bring upon the human race the most shocking outrages1 but by their origin they are certainly to be counted amongst the noblest feelings which belong to human nature1 and in ,war they are the vivifying principle which gives the enormous body a spirit4 ,although other feelings may be more general in their influence1 and many of them--such as love of country1 fanaticism1 revenge1 enthusiasm of every kind--may seem to stand higher1 the thirst for honour and renown still remains indispensable4 ,those other feelings may rouse the great masses in general1 and excite them more powerfully1 but they do not give the ,leader a desire to will more than others1 which is an essential requisite in his position if he is to make himself distinguished in it4 ,they do not1 like a thirst for honour1 make the military act specially the property of the ,leader1 which he strives to turn to the best account2 where he ploughs with toil1 sows with care1 that he may reap plentifully4 ,it is through these aspirations we have been speaking of in ,commanders1 from the highest to the lowest1 this sort of energy1 this spirit of emulation1 these incentives1 that the action of armies is chiefly animated and made successful4 ,and now as to that which specially concerns the head of all1 we ask1 ,has there ever been a great ,commander destitute of the love of honour1 or is such a character even conceivable8 ,firmness denotes the resistance of the will in relation to the force of a single blow1 staunchness in relation to a continuance of blows4 ,close as is the analogy between the two1 and often as the one is used in place of the other1 still there is a notable difference between them which cannot be mistaken1 inasmuch as firmness against a single powerful impression may have its root in the mere strength of a feeling1 but staunchness must be supported rather by the understanding1 for the greater the duration of an action the more systematic deliberation is connected with it1 and from this staunchness partly derives its power4 ,if we now turn to strength of mind or soul1 then the first question is1 ,what are we to understand thereby8 ,plainly it is not vehement expressions of feeling1 nor easily excited passions1 for that would be contrary to all the usage of language1 but the power of listening to reason in the midst of the most intense excitement1 in the storm of the most violent passions4 ,should this power depend on strength of understanding alone8 ,we doubt it4 ,the fact that there are men of the greatest intellect who cannot command themselves certainly proves nothing to the contrary1 for we might say that it perhaps requires an understanding of a powerful rather than of a comprehensive nature2 but we believe we shall be nearer the truth if we assume that the power of submitting oneself to the control of the understanding1 even in moments of the most violent excitement of the feelings1 that power which we call self-command1 has its root in the heart itself4 ,it is1 in point of fact1 another feeling1 which in strong minds balances the excited passions without destroying them2 and it is only through this equilibrium that the mastery of the understanding is secured4 ,this counterpoise is nothing but a sense of the dignity of man1 that noblest pride1 that deeply-seated desire of the soul always to act as a being endued with understanding and reason4 ,we may therefore say that a strong mind is one which does not lose its balance even under the most violent excitement4 ,if we cast a glance at the variety to be observed in the human character in respect to feeling1 we find1 first1 some people who have very little excitability1 who are called phlegmatic or indolent4 ,secondly1 some very excitable1 but whose feelings still never overstep certain limits1 and who are therefore known as men full of feeling1 but sober-minded4 ,thirdly1 those who are very easily roused1 whose feelings blaze up quickly and violently like gunpowder1 but do not last4 ,fourthly1 and lastly1 those who cannot be moved by slight causes1 and who generally are not to be roused suddenly1 but only gradually2 but whose feelings become very powerful and are much more lasting4 ,these are men with strong passions1 lying deep and latent4 ,this difference of character lies probably close on the confines of the physical powers which move the human organism1 and belongs to that amphibious organisation which we call the nervous system1 which appears to be partly material1 partly spiritual4 ,with our weak philosophy1 we shall not proceed further in this mysterious field4 ,but it is important for us to spend a moment over the effects which these different natures have on1 action in ,war1 and to see how far a great strength of mind is to be expected from them4 ,indolent men cannot easily be thrown out of their equanimity1 but we cannot certainly say there is strength of mind where there is a want of all manifestation of power4 ,at the same time1 it is not to be denied that such men have a certain peculiar aptitude for ,war1 on account of their constant equanimity4 ,they often want the positive motive to action1 impulse1 and consequently activity1 but they are not apt to throw things into disorder4 ,the peculiarity of the second class is that they are easily excited to act on trifling grounds1 but in great matters they are easily overwhelmed4 ,men of this kind show great activity in helping an unfortunate individual1 but by the distress of a whole ,nation they are only inclined to despond1 not roused to action4 ,such people are not deficient in either activity or equanimity in ,war2 but they will never accomplish anything great unless a great intellectual force furnishes the motive1 and it is very seldom that a strong1 independent mind is combined with such a character4 ,excitable1 inflammable feelings are in themselves little suited for practical life1 and therefore they are not very fit for ,war4 ,they have certainly the advantage of strong impulses1 but that cannot long sustain them4 ,at the same time1 if the excitability in such men takes the direction of courage1 or a sense of honour1 they may often be very useful in inferior positions in ,war1 because the action in ,war over which commanders in inferior positions have control is generally of shorter duration4 ,here one courageous resolution1 one effervescence of the forces of the soul1 will often suffice4 ,a brave attack1 a soul-stirring hurrah1 is the work of a few moments1 whilst a brave contest on the battle-field is the work of a day1 and a campaign the work of a year4 ,owing to the rapid movement of their feelings1 it is doubly difficult for men of this description to preserve equilibrium of the mind2 therefore they frequently lose head1 and that is the worst phase in their nature as respects the conduct of ,war4 ,but it would be contrary to experience to maintain that very excitable spirits can never preserve a steady equilibrium--that is to say1 that they cannot do so even under the strongest excitement4 ,why should they not have the sentiment of self-respect1 for1 as a rule1 they are men of a noble nature8 ,this feeling is seldom wanting in them1 but it has not time to produce an effect4 ,after an outburst they suffer most from a feeling of inward humiliation4 ,if through education1 self-observance1 and experience of life1 they have learned1 sooner or later1 the means of being on their guard1 so that at the moment of powerful excitement they are conscious betimes of the counteracting force within their own breasts1 then even such men may have great strength of mind4 ,lastly1 those who are difficult to move1 but on that account susceptible of very deep feelings1 men who stand in the same relation to the preceding as red heat to a flame1 are the best adapted by means of their ,titanic strength to roll away the enormous masses by which we may figuratively represent the difficulties which beset command in ,war4 ,the effect of their feelings is like the movement of a great body1 slower1 but more irresistible4 ,although such men are not so likely to be suddenly surprised by their feelings and carried away so as to be afterwards ashamed of themselves1 like the preceding1 still it would be contrary to experience to believe that they can never lose their equanimity1 or be overcome by blind passion2 on the contrary1 this must always happen whenever the noble pride of self-control is wanting1 or as often as it has not sufficient weight4 ,we see examples of this most frequently in men of noble minds belonging to savage nations1 where the low degree of mental cultivation favours always the dominance of the passions4 ,but even amongst the most civilised classes in civilised ,states1 life is full of examples of this kind--of men carried away by the violence of their passions1 like the poacher of old chained to the stag in the forest4 ,we therefore say once more a strong mind is not one that is merely susceptible of strong excitement1 but one which can maintain its serenity under the most powerful excitement1 so that1 in spite of the storm in the breast1 the perception and judgment can act with perfect freedom1 like the needle of the compass in the storm-tossed ship4 ,by the term strength of character1 or simply character1 is denoted tenacity of conviction1 let it be the result of our own or of others' views1 and whether they are principles1 opinions1 momentary inspirations1 or any kind of emanations of the understanding2 but this kind of firmness certainly cannot manifest itself if the views themselves are subject to frequent change4 ,this frequent change need not be the consequence of external influences2 it may proceed from the continuous activity of our own mind1 in which case it indicates a characteristic unsteadiness of mind4 ,evidently we should not say of a man who changes his views every moment1 however much the motives of change may originate with himself1 that he has character4 ,only those men1 therefore1 can be said to have this quality whose conviction is very constant1 either because it is deeply rooted and clear in itself1 little liable to alteration1 or because1 as in the case of indolent men1 there is a want of mental activity1 and therefore a want of motives to change2 or lastly1 because an explicit act of the will1 derived from an imperative maxim of the understanding1 refuses any change of opinion up to a certain point4 ,now in ,war1 owing to the many and powerful impressions to which the mind is exposed1 and in the uncertainty of all knowledge and of all science1 more things occur to distract a man from the road he has entered upon1 to make him doubt himself and others1 than in any other human activity4 ,the harrowing sight of danger and suffering easily leads to the feelings gaining ascendency over the conviction of the understanding2 and in the twilight which surrounds everything a deep clear view is so difficult that a change of opinion is more conceivable and more pardonable4 ,it is1 at all times1 only conjecture or guesses at truth which we have to act upon4 ,this is why differences of opinion are nowhere so great as in ,war1 and the stream of impressions acting counter to one's own convictions never ceases to flow4 ,even the greatest impassibility of mind is hardly proof against them1 because the impressions are powerful in their nature1 and always act at the same time upon the feelings4 ,when the discernment is clear and deep1 none but general principles and views of action from a high standpoint can be the result2 and on these principles the opinion in each particular case immediately under consideration lies1 as it were1 at anchor4 ,but to keep to these results of bygone reflection1 in opposition to the stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it1 is just the difficulty4 ,between the particular case and the principle there is often a wide space which cannot always be traversed on a visible chain of conclusions1 and where a certain faith in self is necessary and a certain amount of scepticism is serviceable4 ,here often nothing else will help us but an imperative maxim which1 independent of reflection1 at once controls it3 that maxim is1 in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion1 and not to give it up until a clear conviction forces us to do so4 ,we must firmly believe in the superior authority of well-tried maxims1 and under the dazzling influence of momentary events not forget that their value is of an inferior stamp4 ,by this preference which in doubtful cases we give to first convictions1 by adherence to the same our actions acquire that stability and consistency which make up what is called character4 ,it is easy to see how essential a well-balanced mind is to strength of character2 therefore men of strong minds generally have a great deal of character4 ,force of character leads us to a spurious variety of it--,,obstinacy4 ,it is often very difficult in concrete cases to say where the one ends and the other begins2 on the other hand1 it does not seem difficult to determine the difference in idea4 ,obstinacy is no fault of the understanding2 we use the term as denoting a resistance against our better judgment1 and it would be inconsistent to charge that to the understanding1 as the understanding is the power of judgment4 ,obstinacy is ,a ,,fault ,,of ,,the ,,feelings or heart4 ,this inflexibility of will1 this impatience of contradiction1 have their origin only in a particular kind of egotism1 which sets above every other pleasure that of governing both self and others by its own mind alone4 ,we should call it a kind of vanity1 were it not decidedly something better4 ,vanity is satisfied with mere show1 but obstinacy rests upon the enjoyment of the thing4 ,we say1 therefore1 force of character degenerates into obstinacy whenever the resistance to opposing judgments proceeds not from better convictions or a reliance upon a trustworthy maxim1 but from a feeling of opposition4 ,if this definition1 as we have already admitted1 is of little assistance practically1 still it will prevent obstinacy from being considered merely force of character intensified1 whilst it is something essentially different--something which certainly lies close to it and is cognate to it1 but is at the same time so little an intensification of it that there are very obstinate men who from want of understanding have very little force of character4 ,having in these high attributes of a great military ,commander made ourselves acquainted with those qualities in which heart and head co-operate1 we now come to a speciality of military activity which perhaps may be looked upon as the most marked if it is not the most important1 and which only makes a demand on the power of the mind without regard to the forces of feelings4 ,it is the connection which exists between ,war and country or ground4 ,this connection is1 in the first place1 a permanent condition of ,war1 for it is impossible to imagine our organised ,armies effecting any operation otherwise than in some given space2 it is1 secondly1 of the most decisive importance1 because it modifies1 at times completely alters1 the action of all forces2 thirdly1 while on the one hand it often concerns the most minute features of locality1 on the other it may apply to immense tracts of country4 ,in this manner a great peculiarity is given to the effect of this connection of ,war with country and ground4 ,if we think of other occupations of man which have a relation to these objects1 on horticulture1 agriculture1 on building houses and hydraulic works1 on mining1 on the chase1 and forestry1 they are all confined within very limited spaces which may be soon explored with sufficient exactness4 ,but the ,commander in ,war must commit the business he has in hand to a corresponding space which his eye cannot survey1 which the keenest zeal cannot always explore1 and with which1 owing to the constant changes taking place1 he can also seldom become properly acquainted4 ,certainly the enemy generally is in the same situation2 still1 in the first place1 the difficulty1 although common to both1 is not the less a difficulty1 and he who by talent and practice overcomes it will have a great advantage on his side2 secondly1 this equality of the difficulty on both sides is merely an abstract supposition which is rarely realised in the particular case1 as one of the two opponents 7the defensive7 usually knows much more of the locality than his adversary4 ,this very peculiar difficulty must be overcome by a natural mental gift of a special kind which is known by the--too restricted--term of ,ortsinn sense of locality4 ,it is the power of quickly forming a correct geometrical idea of any portion of country1 and consequently of being able to find one's place in it exactly at any time4 ,this is plainly an act of the imagination4 ,the perception no doubt is formed partly by means of the physical eye1 partly by the mind1 which fills up what is wanting with ideas derived from knowledge and experience1 and out of the fragments visible to the physical eye forms a whole2 but that this whole should present itself vividly to the reason1 should become a picture1 a mentally drawn map1 that this picture should be fixed1 that the details should never again separate themselves--all that can only be effected by the mental faculty which we call imagination4 ,if some great poet or painter should feel hurt that we require from his goddess such an office2 if he shrugs his shoulders at the notion that a sharp gamekeeper must necessarily excel in imagination1 we readily grant that we only speak here of imagination in a limited sense1 of its service in a really menial capacity4 ,but1 however slight this service1 still it must be the work of that natural gift1 for if that gift is wanting1 it would be difficult to imagine things plainly in all the completeness of the visible4 ,that a good memory is a great assistance we freely allow1 but whether memory is to be considered as an independent faculty of the mind in this case1 or whether it is just that power of imagination which here fixes these things better on the memory1 we leave undecided1 as in many respects it seems difficult upon the whole to conceive these two mental powers apart from each other4 ,that practice and mental acuteness have much to do with it is not to be denied4 ,puysegur1 the celebrated ,quartermaster-,general of the famous ,luxemburg1 used to say that he had very little confidence in himself in this respect at first1 because if he had to fetch the parole from a distance he always lost his way4 ,it is natural that scope for the exercise of this talent should increase along with rank4 ,if the hussar and rifleman in command of a patrol must know well all the highways and byways1 and if for that a few marks1 a few limited powers of observation1 are sufficient1 the ,chief of an ,army must make himself familiar with the general geographical features of a province and of a country2 must always have vividly before his eyes the direction of the roads1 rivers1 and hills1 without at the same time being able to dispense with the narrower 8sense of locality0 7,ortsinn74 ,no doubt1 information of various kinds as to objects in general1 maps1 books1 memoirs1 and for details the assistance of his ,staff1 are a great help to him2 but it is nevertheless certain that if he has himself a talent for forming an ideal picture of a country quickly and distinctly1 it lends to his action an easier and firmer step1 saves him from a certain mental helplessness1 and makes him less dependent on others4 ,if this talent then is to be ascribed to imagination1 it is also almost the only service which military activity requires from that erratic goddess1 whose influence is more hurtful than useful in other respects4 ,we think we have now passed in review those manifestations of the powers of mind and soul which military activity requires from human nature4 ,everywhere intellect appears as an essential co-operative force2 and thus we can understand how the work of ,war1 although so plain and simple in its effects1 can never be conducted with distinguished success by people without distinguished powers of the understanding4 ,when we have reached this view1 then we need no longer look upon such a natural idea as the turning an enemy's position1 which has been done a thousand times1 and a hundred other similar conceptions1 as the result of a great effort of genius4 ,certainly one is accustomed to regard the plain honest soldier as the very opposite of the man of reflection1 full of inventions and ideas1 or of the brilliant spirit shining in the ornaments of refined education of every kind4 ,this antithesis is also by no means devoid of truth2 but it does not show that the efficiency of the soldier consists only in his courage1 and that there is no particular energy and capacity of the brain required in addition to make a man merely what is called a true soldier4 ,we must again repeat that there is nothing more common than to hear of men losing their energy on being raised to a higher position1 to which they do not feel themselves equal2 but we must also remind our readers that we are speaking of pre-eminent services1 of such as give renown in the branch of activity to which they belong4 ,each grade of command in ,war therefore forms its own stratum of requisite capacity of fame and honour4 ,an immense space lies between a ,general--that is1 one at the head of a whole ,war1 or of a theatre of ,war--and his ,second in ,command1 for the simple reason that the latter is in more immediate subordination to a superior authority and supervision1 consequently is restricted to a more limited sphere of independent thought4 ,this is why common opinion sees no room for the exercise of high talent except in high places1 and looks upon an ordinary capacity as sufficient for all beneath3 this is why people are rather inclined to look upon a subordinate ,general grown grey in the service1 and in whom constant discharge of routine duties has produced a decided poverty of mind1 as a man of failing intellect1 and1 with all respect for his bravery1 to laugh at his simplicity4 ,it is not our object to gain for these brave men a better lot--that would contribute nothing to their efficiency1 and little to their happiness2 we only wish to represent things as they are1 and to expose the error of believing that a mere bravo without intellect can make himself distinguished in ,war4 ,as we consider distinguished talents requisite for those who are to attain distinction1 even in inferior positions1 it naturally follows that we think highly of those who fill with renown the place of ,second in ,command of an ,army2 and their seeming simplicity of character as compared with a polyhistor1 with ready men of business1 or with councillors of state1 must not lead us astray as to the superior nature of their intellectual activity4 ,it happens sometimes that men import the fame gained in an inferior position into a higher one1 without in reality deserving it in the new position2 and then if they are not much employed1 and therefore not much exposed to the risk of showing their weak points1 the judgment does not distinguish very exactly what degree of fame is really due to them2 and thus such men are often the occasion of too low an estimate being formed of the characteristics required to shine in certain situations4 ,for each station1 from the lowest upwards1 to render distinguished services in ,war1 there must be a particular genius4 ,but the title of genius1 history and the judgment of posterity only confer1 in general1 on those minds which have shone in the highest rank1 that of ,commanders-in-,chief4 ,the reason is that here1 in point of fact1 the demand on the reasoning and intellectual powers generally is much greater4 ,to conduct a whole ,war1 or its great acts1 which we call campaigns1 to a successful termination1 there must be an intimate knowledge of ,state policy in its higher relations4 ,the conduct of the ,war and the policy of the ,state here coincide1 and the ,general becomes at the same time the ,statesman4 ,we do not give ,charles ,,xii4 the name of a great genius1 because he could not make the power of his sword subservient to a higher judgment and philosophy--could not attain by it to a glorious object4 ,we do not give that title to ,henry ,,iv4 7of ,france71 because he did not live long enough to set at rest the relations of different ,states by his military activity1 and to occupy himself in that higher field where noble feelings and a chivalrous disposition have less to do in mastering the enemy than in overcoming internal dissension4 ,in order that the reader may appreciate all that must be comprehended and judged of correctly at a glance by a ,general1 we refer to the first chapter4 ,we say the ,general becomes a ,statesman1 but he must not cease to be the ,general4 ,he takes into view all the relations of the ,state on the one hand2 on the other1 he must know exactly what he can do with the means at his disposal4 ,as the diversity1 and undefined limits1 of all the circumstances bring a great number of factors into consideration in ,war1 as the most of these factors can only be estimated according to probability1 therefore1 if the ,chief of an ,army does not bring to bear upon them a mind with an intuitive perception of the truth1 a confusion of ideas and views must take place1 in the midst of which the judgment will become bewildered4 ,in this sense1 ,buonaparte was right when he said that many of the questions which come before a ,general for decision would make problems for a mathematical calculation not unworthy of the powers of ,newton or ,euler4 ,what is here required from the higher powers of the mind is a sense of unity1 and a judgment raised to such a compass as to give the mind an extraordinary faculty of vision which in its range allays and sets aside a thousand dim notions which an ordinary understanding could only bring to light with great effort1 and over which it would exhaust itself4 ,but this higher activity of the mind1 this glance of genius1 would still not become matter of history if the qualities of temperament and character of which we have treated did not give it their support4 ,truth alone is but a weak motive of action with men1 and hence there is always a great difference between knowing and action1 between science and art4 ,the man receives the strongest impulse to action through the feelings1 and the most powerful succour1 if we may use the expression1 through those faculties of heart and mind which we have considered under the terms of resolution1 firmness1 perseverance1 and force of character4 ,if1 however1 this elevated condition of heart and mind in the ,general did not manifest itself in the general effects resulting from it1 and could only be accepted on trust and faith1 then it would rarely become matter of history4 ,all that becomes known of the course of events in ,war is usually very simple1 and has a great sameness in appearance2 no one on the mere relation of such events perceives the difficulties connected with them which had to be overcome4 ,it is only now and again1 in the memoirs of ,generals or of those in their confidence1 or by reason of some special historical inquiry directed to a particular circumstance1 that a portion of the many threads composing the whole web is brought to light4 ,the reflections1 mental doubts1 and conflicts which precede the execution of great acts are purposely concealed because they affect political interests1 or the recollection of them is accidentally lost because they have been looked upon as mere scaffolding which had to be removed on the completion of the building4 ,if1 now1 in conclusion1 without venturing upon a closer definition of the higher powers of the soul1 we should admit a distinction in the intelligent faculties themselves according to the common ideas established by language1 and ask ourselves what kind of mind comes closest to military genius1 then a look at the subject as well as at experience will tell us that searching rather than inventive minds1 comprehensive minds rather than such as have a special bent1 cool rather than fiery heads1 are those to which in time of ,war we should prefer to trust the welfare of our women and children1 the honour and the safety of our fatherland4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,of ,danger in ,war ,usually before we have learnt what danger really is1 we form an idea of it which is rather attractive than repulsive4 ,in the intoxication of enthusiasm1 to fall upon the enemy at the charge--who cares then about bullets and men falling8 ,to throw oneself1 blinded by excitement for a moment1 against cold death1 uncertain whether we or another shall escape him1 and all this close to the golden gate of victory1 close to the rich fruit which ambition thirsts for--can this be difficult8 ,it will not be difficult1 and still less will it appear so4 ,but such moments1 which1 however1 are not the work of a single pulse-beat1 as is supposed1 but rather like doctors' draughts1 must be taken diluted and spoilt by mixture with time--such moments1 we say1 are but few4 ,let us accompany the novice to the battle-field4 ,as we approach1 the thunder of the cannon becoming plainer and plainer is soon followed by the howling of shot1 which attracts the attention of the inexperienced4 ,balls begin to strike the ground close to us1 before and behind4 ,we hasten to the hill where stands the ,general and his numerous ,staff4 ,here the close striking of the cannon balls and the bursting of shells is so frequent that the seriousness of life makes itself visible through the youthful picture of imagination4 ,suddenly some one known to us falls--a shell strikes amongst the crowd and causes some involuntary movements--we begin to feel that we are no longer perfectly at ease and collected2 even the bravest is at least to some degree confused4 ,now1 a step farther into the battle which is raging before us like a scene in a theatre1 we get to the nearest ,general of ,division2 here ball follows ball1 and the noise of our own guns increases the confusion4 ,from the ,general of ,division to the ,brigadier4 ,he1 a man of acknowledged bravery1 keeps carefully behind a rising ground1 a house1 or a tree--a sure sign of increasing danger4 ,grape rattles on the roofs of the houses and in the fields2 cannon balls howl over us1 and plough the air in all directions1 and soon there is a frequent whistling of musket balls4 ,a step farther towards the troops1 to that sturdy infantry which for hours has maintained its firmness under this heavy fire2 here the air is filled with the hissing of balls which announce their proximity by a short sharp noise as they pass within an inch of the ear1 the head1 or the breast4 ,to add to all this1 compassion strikes the beating heart with pity at the sight of the maimed and fallen4 ,the young soldier cannot reach any of these different strata of danger without feeling that the light of reason does not move here in the same medium1 that it is not refracted in the same manner as in speculative contemplation4 ,indeed1 he must be a very extraordinary man who1 under these impressions for the first time1 does not lose the power of making any instantaneous decisions4 ,it is true that habit soon blunts such impressions2 in half in hour we begin to be more or less indifferent to all that is going on around us3 but an ordinary character never attains to complete coolness and the natural elasticity of mind2 and so we perceive that here again ordinary qualities will not suffice--a thing which gains truth1 the wider the sphere of activity which is to be filled4 ,enthusiastic1 stoical1 natural bravery1 great ambition1 or also long familiarity with danger--much of all this there must be if all the effects produced in this resistant medium are not to fall far short of that which in the student's chamber may appear only the ordinary standard4 ,danger in ,war belongs to its friction2 a correct idea of its influence is necessary for truth of perception1 and therefore it is brought under notice here4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,of ,bodily ,exertion in ,war ,if no one were allowed to pass an opinion on the events of ,war1 except at a moment when he is benumbed by frost1 sinking from heat and thirst1 or dying with hunger and fatigue1 we should certainly have fewer judgments correct objectively2 but they would be so1 subjectively1 at least2 that is1 they would contain in themselves the exact relation between the person giving the judgment and the object4 ,we can perceive this by observing how modestly subdued1 even spiritless and desponding1 is the opinion passed upon the results of untoward events by those who have been eye-witnesses1 but especially if they have been parties concerned4 ,this is1 according to our view1 a criterion of the influence which bodily fatigue exercises1 and of the allowance to be made for it in matters of opinion4 ,amongst the many things in ,war for which no tariff can be fixed1 bodily effort may be specially reckoned4 ,provided there is no waste1 it is a coefficient of all the forces1 and no one can tell exactly to what extent it may be carried4 ,but what is remarkable is1 that just as only a strong arm enables the archer to stretch the bowstring to the utmost extent1 so also in ,war it is only by means of a great directing spirit that we can expect the full power latent in the troops to be developed4 ,for it is one thing if an ,army1 in consequence of great misfortunes1 surrounded with danger1 falls all to pieces like a wall that has been thrown down1 and can only find safety in the utmost exertion of its bodily strength2 it is another thing entirely when a victorious ,army1 drawn on by proud feelings only1 is conducted at the will of its ,chief4 ,the same effort which in the one case might at most excite our pity must in the other call forth our admiration1 because it is much more difficult to sustain4 ,by this comes to light for the inexperienced eye one of those things which put fetters in the dark1 as it were1 on the action of the mind1 and wear out in secret the powers of the soul4 ,although here the question is strictly only respecting the extreme effort required by a ,commander from his ,army1 by a leader from his followers1 therefore of the spirit to demand it and of the art of getting it1 still the personal physical exertion of ,generals and of the ,chief ,commander must not be overlooked4 ,having brought the analysis of ,war conscientiously up to this point1 we could not but take account also of the weight of this small remaining residue4 ,we have spoken here of bodily effort1 chiefly because1 like danger1 it belongs to the fundamental causes of friction1 and because its indefinite quantity makes it like an elastic body1 the friction of which is well known to be difficult to calculate4 ,to check the abuse of these considerations1 of such a survey of things which aggravate the difficulties of ,war1 nature has given our judgment a guide in our sensibilities1 just as an individual cannot with advantage refer to his personal deficiencies if he is insulted and ill-treated1 but may well do so if he has successfully repelled the affront1 or has fully revenged it1 so no ,commander or ,army will lessen the impression of a disgraceful defeat by depicting the danger1 the distress1 the exertions1 things which would immensely enhance the glory of a victory4 ,thus our feeling1 which after all is only a higher kind of judgment1 forbids us to do what seems an act of justice to which our judgment would be inclined4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,information in ,war ,by the word 8information0 we denote all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country2 therefore1 in fact1 the foundation of all our ideas and actions4 ,let us just consider the nature of this foundation1 its want of trustworthiness1 its changefulness1 and we shall soon feel what a dangerous edifice ,war is1 how easily it may fall to pieces and bury us in its ruins4 ,for although it is a maxim in all books that we should trust only certain information1 that we must be always suspicious1 that is only a miserable book comfort1 belonging to that description of knowledge in which writers of systems and compendiums take refuge for want of anything better to say4 ,great part of the information obtained in ,war is contradictory1 a still greater part is false1 and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character4 ,what is required of an officer is a certain power of discrimination1 which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment can give4 ,the law of probability must be his guide4 ,this is not a trifling difficulty even in respect of the first plans1 which can be formed in the chamber outside the real sphere of ,war1 but it is enormously increased when in the thick of ,war itself one report follows hard upon the heels of another2 it is then fortunate if these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability1 and thus themselves call forth a scrutiny4 ,it is much worse for the inexperienced when accident does not render him this service1 but one report supports another1 confirms it1 magnifies it1 finishes off the picture with fresh touches of colour1 until necessity in urgent haste forces from us a resolution which will soon be discovered to be folly1 all those reports having been lies1 exaggerations1 errors1 c4 c4 ,in a few words1 most reports are false1 and the timidity of men acts as a multiplier of lies and untruths4 ,as a general rule1 every one is more inclined to lend credence to the bad than the good4 ,every one is inclined to magnify the bad in some measure1 and although the alarms which are thus propagated like the waves of the sea subside into themselves1 still1 like them1 without any apparent cause they rise again4 ,firm in reliance on his own better convictions1 the ,chief must stand like a rock against which the sea breaks its fury in vain4 ,the rle is not easy2 he who is not by nature of a buoyant disposition1 or trained by experience in ,war1 and matured in judgment1 may let it be his rule to do violence to his own natural conviction by inclining from the side of fear to that of hope2 only by that means will he be able to preserve his balance4 ,this difficulty of seeing things correctly1 which is one of the greatest sources of friction in ,war1 makes things appear quite different from what was expected4 ,the impression of the senses is stronger than the force of the ideas resulting from methodical reflection1 and this goes so far that no important undertaking was ever yet carried out without the ,commander having to subdue new doubts in himself at the time of commencing the execution of his work4 ,ordinary men who follow the suggestions of others become1 therefore1 generally undecided on the spot2 they think that they have found circumstances different from what they had expected1 and this view gains strength by their again yielding to the suggestions of others4 ,but even the man who has made his own plans1 when he comes to see things with his own eyes will often think he has done wrong4 ,firm reliance on self must make him proof against the seeming pressure of the moment2 his first conviction will in the end prove true1 when the foreground scenery which fate has pushed on to the stage of ,war1 with its accompaniments of terrific objects1 is drawn aside and the horizon extended4 ,this is one of the great chasms which separate conception from execution4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,friction in ,war ,as long as we have no personal knowledge of ,war1 we cannot conceive where those difficulties lie of which so much is said1 and what that genius and those extraordinary mental powers required in a ,general have really to do4 ,all appears so simple1 all the requisite branches of knowledge appear so plain1 all the combinations so unimportant1 that in comparison with them the easiest problem in higher mathematics impresses us with a certain scientific dignity4 ,but if we have seen ,war1 all becomes intelligible2 and still1 after all1 it is extremely difficult to describe what it is which brings about this change1 to specify this invisible and completely efficient factor4 ,everything is very simple in ,war1 but the simplest thing is difficult4 ,these difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen ,war1 ,suppose now a traveller1 who towards evening expects to accomplish the two stages at the end of his day's journey1 four or five leagues1 with post-horses1 on the high road--it is nothing4 ,he arrives now at the last station but one1 finds no horses1 or very bad ones2 then a hilly country1 bad roads2 it is a dark night1 and he is glad when1 after a great deal of trouble1 he reaches the next station1 and finds there some miserable accommodation4 ,so in ,war1 through the influence of an infinity of petty circumstances1 which cannot properly be described on paper1 things disappoint us1 and we fall short of the mark4 ,a powerful iron will overcomes this friction2 it crushes the obstacles1 but certainly the machine along with them4 ,we shall often meet with this result4 ,like an obelisk towards which the principal streets of a town converge1 the strong will of a proud spirit stands prominent and commanding in the middle of the ,art of ,war4 ,friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real ,war from ,war on paper4 ,the military machine1 the ,army and all belonging to it1 is in fact simple1 and appears on this account easy to manage4 ,but let us reflect that no part of it is in one piece1 that it is composed entirely of individuals1 each of which keeps up its own friction in all directions4 ,theoretically all sounds very well3 the commander of a battalion is responsible for the execution of the order given2 and as the battalion by its discipline is glued together into one piece1 and the chief must be a man of acknowledged zeal1 the beam turns on an iron pin with little friction4 ,but it is not so in reality1 and all that is exaggerated and false in such a conception manifests itself at once in ,war4 ,the battalion always remains composed of a number of men1 of whom1 if chance so wills1 the most insignificant is able to occasion delay and even irregularity4 ,the danger which ,war brings with it1 the bodily exertions which it requires1 augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the greatest causes of it4 ,this enormous friction1 which is not concentrated1 as in mechanics1 at a few points1 is therefore everywhere brought into contact with chance1 and thus incidents take place upon which it was impossible to calculate1 their chief origin being chance4 ,as an instance of one such chance3 the weather4 ,here the fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time1 a battery from firing at the right moment1 a report from reaching the ,general2 there the rain prevents a battalion from arriving at the right time1 because instead of for three it had to march perhaps eight hours2 the cavalry from charging effectively because it is stuck fast in heavy ground4 ,these are only a few incidents of detail by way of elucidation1 that the reader may be able to follow the author1 for whole volumes might be written on these difficulties4 ,to avoid this1 and still to give a clear conception of the host of small difficulties to be contended with in ,war1 we might go on heaping up illustrations1 if we were not afraid of being tiresome4 ,but those who have already comprehended us will permit us to add a few more4 ,activity in ,war is movement in a resistant medium4 ,just as a man immersed in water is unable to perform with ease and regularity the most natural and simplest movement1 that of walking1 so in ,war1 with ordinary powers1 one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity4 ,this is the reason that the correct theorist is like a swimming master1 who teaches on dry land movements which are required in the water1 which must appear grotesque and ludicrous to those who forget about the water4 ,this is also why theorists1 who have never plunged in themselves1 or who cannot deduce any generalities from their experience1 are unpractical and even absurd1 because they only teach what every one knows--how to walk4 ,further1 every ,war is rich in particular facts1 while at the same time each is an unexplored sea1 full of rocks which the ,general may have a suspicion of1 but which he has never seen with his eye1 and round which1 moreover1 he must steer in the night4 ,if a contrary wind also springs up1 that is1 if any great accidental event declares itself adverse to him1 then the most consummate skill1 presence of mind1 and energy are required1 whilst to those who only look on from a distance all seems to proceed with the utmost ease4 ,the knowledge of this friction is a chief part of that so often talked of1 experience in ,war1 which is required in a good ,general4 ,certainly he is not the best ,general in whose mind it assumes the greatest dimensions1 who is the most over-awed by it 7this includes that class of over-anxious ,generals1 of whom there are so many amongst the experienced72 but a ,general must be aware of it that he may overcome it1 where that is possible1 and that he may not expect a degree of precision in results which is impossible on account of this very friction4 ,besides1 it can never be learnt theoretically2 and if it could1 there would still be wanting that experience of judgment which is called tact1 and which is always more necessary in a field full of innumerable small and diversified objects than in great and decisive cases1 when one's own judgment may be aided by consultation with others4 ,just as the man of the world1 through tact of judgment which has become habit1 speaks1 acts1 and moves only as suits the occasion1 so the officer experienced in ,war will always1 in great and small matters1 at every pulsation of ,war as we may say1 decide and determine suitably to the occasion4 ,through this experience and practice the idea comes to his mind of itself that so and so will not suit4 ,and thus he will not easily place himself in a position by which he is compromised1 which1 if it often occurs in ,war1 shakes all the foundations of confidence and becomes extremely dangerous4 ,it is therefore this friction1 or what is so termed here1 which makes that which appears easy in ,war difficult in reality4 ,as we proceed1 we shall often meet with this subject again1 and it will hereafter become plain that besides experience and a strong will1 there are still many other rare qualities of the mind required to make a man a consummate ,general4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,concluding ,remarks1 ,book ,i ,those things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of ,war and make it a resistant medium for every activity we have designated under the terms danger1 bodily effort 7exertion71 information1 and friction4 ,in their impedient effects they may therefore be comprehended again in the collective notion of a general friction4 ,now is there1 then1 no kind of oil which is capable of diminishing this friction8 ,only one1 and that one is not always available at the will of the ,commander or his ,army4 ,it is the habituation of an ,army to ,war4 ,habit gives strength to the body in great exertion1 to the mind in great danger1 to the judgment against first impressions4 ,by it a valuable circumspection is generally gained throughout every rank1 from the hussar and rifleman up to the ,general of ,division1 which facilitates the work of the ,chief ,commander4 ,as the human eye in a dark room dilates its pupil1 draws in the little light that there is1 partially distinguishes objects by degrees1 and at last knows them quite well1 so it is in ,war with the experienced soldier1 whilst the novice is only met by pitch dark night4 ,habituation to ,war no ,general can give his ,army at once1 and the camps of manuvre 7peace exercises7 furnish but a weak substitute for it1 weak in comparison with real experience in ,war1 but not weak in relation to other ,armies in which the training is limited to mere mechanical exercises of routine4 ,so to regulate the exercises in peace time as to include some of these causes of friction1 that the judgment1 circumspection1 even resolution of the separate leaders may be brought into exercise1 is of much greater consequence than those believe who do not know the thing by experience4 ,it is of immense importance that the soldier1 high or low1 whatever rank he has1 should not have to encounter in ,war those things which1 when seen for the first time1 set him in astonishment and perplexity2 if he has only met with them one single time before1 even by that he is half acquainted with them4 ,this relates even to bodily fatigues4 ,they should be practised less to accustom the body to them than the mind4 ,in ,war the young soldier is very apt to regard unusual fatigues as the consequence of faults1 mistakes1 and embarrassment in the conduct of the whole1 and to become distressed and despondent as a consequence4 ,this would not happen if he had been prepared for this beforehand by exercises in peace4 ,another less comprehensive but still very important means of gaining habituation to ,war in time of peace is to invite into the service officers of foreign armies who have had experience in ,war4 ,peace seldom reigns over all ,europe1 and never in all quarters of the world4 ,a ,state which has been long at peace should1 therefore1 always seek to procure some officers who have done good service at the different scenes of ,warfare1 or to send there some of its own1 that they may get a lesson in ,war4 ,however small the number of officers of this description may appear in proportion to the mass1 still their influence is very sensibly felt47997 ,their experience1 the bent of their genius1 the stamp of their character1 influence their subordinates and comrades2 and besides that1 if they cannot be placed in positions of superior command1 they may always be regarded as men acquainted with the country1 who may be questioned on many special occasions4 7997 ,the ,war of #ahgj furnishes a marked illustration4 ,von ,moltke and von ,goeben1 not to mention many others1 had both seen service in this manner1 the former in ,turkey and ,syria1 the latter in ,spain--,,editor4 ,,book ,,ii4 ,,on ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,war ,,chapter ,i4 ,branches of the ,art of ,war ,war in its literal meaning is fighting1 for fighting alone is the efficient principle in the manifold activity which in a wide sense is called ,war4 ,but fighting is a trial of strength of the moral and physical forces by means of the latter4 ,that the moral cannot be omitted is evident of itself1 for the condition of the mind has always the most decisive influence on the forces employed in ,war4 ,the necessity of fighting very soon led men to special inventions to turn the advantage in it in their own favour3 in consequence of these the mode of fighting has undergone great alterations2 but in whatever way it is conducted its conception remains unaltered1 and fighting is that which constitutes ,war4 ,the inventions have been from the first weapons and equipments for the individual combatants4 ,these have to be provided and the use of them learnt before the ,war begins4 ,they are made suitable to the nature of the fighting1 consequently are ruled by it2 but plainly the activity engaged in these appliances is a different thing from the fight itself2 it is only the preparation for the combat1 not the conduct of the same4 ,that arming and equipping are not essential to the conception of fighting is plain1 because mere wrestling is also fighting4 ,fighting has determined everything appertaining to arms and equipment1 and these in turn modify the mode of fighting2 there is1 therefore1 a reciprocity of action between the two4 ,nevertheless1 the fight itself remains still an entirely special activity1 more particularly because it moves in an entirely special element1 namely1 in the element of danger4 ,if1 then1 there is anywhere a necessity for drawing a line between two different activities1 it is here2 and in order to see clearly the importance of this idea1 we need only just to call to mind how often eminent personal fitness in one field has turned out nothing but the most useless pedantry in the other4 ,it is also in no way difficult to separate in idea the one activity from the other1 if we look at the combatant forces fully armed and equipped as a given means1 the profitable use of which requires nothing more than a knowledge of their general results4 ,the ,art of ,war is therefore1 in its proper sense1 the art of making use of the given means in fighting1 and we cannot give it a better name than the 8,conduct of ,war40 ,on the other hand1 in a wider sense all activities which have their existence on account of ,war1 therefore the whole creation of troops1 that is levying them1 arming1 equipping1 and exercising them1 belong to the ,art of ,war4 ,to make a sound theory it is most essential to separate these two activities1 for it is easy to see that if every act of ,war is to begin with the preparation of military forces1 and to presuppose forces so organised as a primary condition for conducting ,war1 that theory will only be applicable in the few cases to which the force available happens to be exactly suited4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we wish to have a theory which shall suit most cases1 and will not be wholly useless in any case1 it must be founded on those means which are in most general use1 and in respect to these only on the actual results springing from them4 ,the conduct of ,war is1 therefore1 the formation and conduct of the fighting4 ,if this fighting was a single act1 there would be no necessity for any further subdivision1 but the fight is composed of a greater or less number of single acts1 complete in themselves1 which we call combats1 as we have shown in the first chapter of the first book1 and which form new units4 ,from this arises the totally different activities1 that of the formation and conduct of these single combats in themselves1 and the combination of them with one another1 with a view to the ultimate object of the ,war4 ,the first is called tactics1 the other strategy4 ,this division into tactics and strategy is now in almost general use1 and every one knows tolerably well under which head to place any single fact1 without knowing very distinctly the grounds on which the classification is founded4 ,but when such divisions are blindly adhered to in practice1 they must have some deep root4 ,we have searched for this root1 and we might say that it is just the usage of the majority which has brought us to it4 ,on the other hand1 we look upon the arbitrary1 unnatural definitions of these conceptions sought to be established by some writers as not in accordance with the general usage of the terms4 ,according to our classification1 therefore1 tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat4 ,strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the ,war4 ,the way in which the conception of a single1 or independent combat1 is more closely determined1 the conditions to which this unit is attached1 we shall only be able to explain clearly when we consider the combat2 we must content ourselves for the present with saying that in relation to space1 therefore in combats taking place at the same time1 the unit reaches just as far as personal command reaches2 but in regard to time1 and therefore in relation to combats which follow each other in close succession1 it reaches to the moment when the crisis which takes place in every combat is entirely passed4 ,that doubtful cases may occur1 cases1 for instance1 in which several combats may perhaps be regarded also as a single one1 will not overthrow the ground of distinction we have adopted1 for the same is the case with all grounds of distinction of real things which are differentiated by a gradually diminishing scale4 ,there may1 therefore1 certainly be acts of activity in ,war which1 without any alteration in the point of view1 may just as well be counted strategic as tactical2 for example1 very extended positions resembling a chain of posts1 the preparations for the passage of a river at several points1 c4 ,our classification reaches and covers only the use of the military force4 ,but now there are in ,war a number of activities which are subservient to it1 and still are quite different from it2 sometimes closely allied1 sometimes less near in their affinity4 ,all these activities relate to the maintenance of the military force4 ,in the same way as its creation and training precede its use1 so its maintenance is always a necessary condition4 ,but1 strictly viewed1 all activities thus connected with it are always to be regarded only as preparations for fighting2 they are certainly nothing more than activities which are very close to the action1 so that they run through the hostile act alternate in importance with the use of the forces4 ,we have therefore a right to exclude them as well as the other preparatory activities from the ,art of ,war in its restricted sense1 from the conduct of ,war properly so called2 and we are obliged to do so if we would comply with the first principle of all theory1 the elimination of all heterogeneous elements4 ,who would include in the real 8conduct of ,war0 the whole litany of subsistence and administration1 because it is admitted to stand in constant reciprocal action with the use of the troops1 but is something essentially different from it8 ,we have said1 in the third chapter of our first book1 that as the fight or combat is the only directly effective activity1 therefore the threads of all others1 as they end in it1 are included in it4 ,by this we meant to say that to all others an object was thereby appointed which1 in accordance with the laws peculiar to themselves1 they must seek to attain4 ,here we must go a little closer into this subject4 ,the subjects which constitute the activities outside of the combat are of various kinds4 ,the one part belongs1 in one respect1 to the combat itself1 is identical with it1 whilst it serves in another respect for the maintenance of the military force4 ,the other part belongs purely to the subsistence1 and has only1 in consequence of the reciprocal action1 a limited influence on the combats by its results4 ,the subjects which in one respect belong to the fighting itself are marches1 camps1 and cantonments1 for they suppose so many different situations of troops1 and where troops are supposed there the idea of the combat must always be present4 ,the other subjects1 which only belong to the maintenance1 are subsistence1 care of the sick1 the supply and repair of arms and equipment4 ,marches are quite identical with the use of the troops4 ,the act of marching in the combat1 generally called manoeuvring1 certainly does not necessarily include the use of weapons1 but it is so completely and necessarily combined with it that it forms an integral part of that which we call a combat4 ,but the march outside the combat is nothing but the execution of a strategic measure4 ,by the strategic plan is settled when1 where1 and with what forces a battle is to be delivered--and to carry that into execution the march is the only means4 ,the march outside of the combat is therefore an instrument of strategy1 but not on that account exclusively a subject of strategy1 for as the armed force which executes it may be involved in a possible combat at any moment1 therefore its execution stands also under tactical as well as strategic rules4 ,if we prescribe to a column its route on a particular side of a river or of a branch of a mountain1 then that is a strategic measure1 for it contains the intention of fighting on that particular side of the hill or river in preference to the other1 in case a combat should be necessary during the march4 ,but if a column1 instead of following the road through a valley1 marches along the parallel ridge of heights1 or for the convenience of marching divides itself into several columns1 then these are tactical arrangements1 for they relate to the manner in which we shall use the troops in the anticipated combat4 ,the particular order of march is in constant relation with readiness for combat1 is therefore tactical in its nature1 for it is nothing more than the first or preliminary disposition for the battle which may possibly take place4 ,as the march is the instrument by which strategy apportions its active elements1 the combats1 but these last often only appear by their results and not in the details of their real course1 it could not fail to happen that in theory the instrument has often been substituted for the efficient principle4 ,thus we hear of a decisive skilful march1 allusion being thereby made to those combat-combinations to which these marches led4 ,this substitution of ideas is too natural and conciseness of expression too desirable to call for alteration1 but still it is only a condensed chain of ideas in regard to which we must never omit to bear in mind the full meaning1 if we would avoid falling into error4 ,we fall into an error of this description if we attribute to strategical combinations a power independent of tactical results4 ,we read of marches and manuvres combined1 the object attained1 and at the same time not a word about combat1 from which the conclusion is drawn that there are means in ,war of conquering an enemy without fighting4 ,the prolific nature of this error we cannot show until hereafter4 ,but although a march can be regarded absolutely as an integral part of the combat1 still there are in it certain relations which do not belong to the combat1 and therefore are neither tactical nor strategic4 ,to these belong all arrangements which concern only the accommodation of the troops1 the construction of bridges1 roads1 c4 ,these are only conditions2 under many circumstances they are in very close connection1 and may almost identify themselves with the troops1 as in building a bridge in presence of the enemy2 but in themselves they are always activities1 the theory of which does not form part of the theory of the conduct of ,war4 ,camps1 by which we mean every disposition of troops in concentrated1 therefore in battle order1 in contradistinction to cantonments or quarters1 are a state of rest1 therefore of restoration2 but they are at the same time also the strategic appointment of a battle on the spot1 chosen2 and by the manner in which they are taken up they contain the fundamental lines of the battle1 a condition from which every defensive battle starts2 they are therefore essential parts of both strategy and tactics4 ,cantonments take the place of camps for the better refreshment of the troops4 ,they are therefore1 like camps1 strategic subjects as regards position and extent2 tactical subjects as regards internal organisation1 with a view to readiness to fight4 ,the occupation of camps and cantonments no doubt usually combines with the recuperation of the troops another object also1 for example1 the covering a district of country1 the holding a position2 but it can very well be only the first4 ,we remind our readers that strategy may follow a great diversity of objects1 for everything which appears an advantage may be the object of a combat1 and the preservation of the instrument with which ,war is made must necessarily very often become the object of its partial combinations4 ,if1 therefore1 in such a case strategy ministers only to the maintenance of the troops1 we are not on that account out of the field of strategy1 for we are still engaged with the use of the military force1 because every disposition of that force upon any point ,whatever of the theatre of ,war is such a use4 ,but if the maintenance of the troops in camp or quarters calls forth activities which are no employment of the armed force1 such as the construction of huts1 pitching of tents1 subsistence and sanitary services in camps or quarters1 then such belong neither to strategy nor tactics4 ,even entrenchments1 the site and preparation of which are plainly part of the order of battle1 therefore tactical subjects1 do not belong to the theory of the conduct of ,war so far as respects the execution of their construction the knowledge and skill required for such work being1 in point of fact1 qualities inherent in the nature of an organised ,army2 the theory of the combat takes them for granted4 ,amongst the subjects which belong to the mere keeping up of an armed force1 because none of the parts are identified with the combat1 the victualling of the troops themselves comes first1 as it must be done almost daily and for each individual4 ,thus it is that it completely permeates military action in the parts constituting strategy--we say parts constituting strategy1 because during a battle the subsistence of troops will rarely have any influence in modifying the plan1 although the thing is conceivable enough4 ,the care for the subsistence of the troops comes therefore into reciprocal action chiefly with strategy1 and there is nothing more common than for the leading strategic features of a campaign and ,war to be traced out in connection with a view to this supply4 ,but however frequent and however important these views of supply may be1 the subsistence of the troops always remains a completely different activity from the use of the troops1 and the former has only an influence on the latter by its results4 ,the other branches of administrative activity which we have mentioned stand much farther apart from the use of the troops4 ,the care of sick and wounded1 highly important as it is for the good of an ,army1 directly affects it only in a small portion of the individuals composing it1 and therefore has only a weak and indirect influence upon the use of the rest4 ,the completing and replacing articles of arms and equipment1 except so far as by the organism of the forces it constitutes a continuous activity inherent in them--takes place only periodically1 and therefore seldom affects strategic plans4 ,we must1 however1 here guard ourselves against a mistake4 ,in certain cases these subjects may be really of decisive importance4 ,the distance of hospitals and depts of munitions may very easily be imagined as the sole cause of very important strategic decisions4 ,we do not wish either to contest that point or to throw it into the shade4 ,but we are at present occupied not with the particular facts of a concrete case1 but with abstract theory2 and our assertion therefore is that such an influence is too rare to give the theory of sanitary measures and the supply of munitions and arms an importance in theory of the conduct of ,war such as to make it worth while to include in the theory of the conduct of ,war the consideration of the different ways and systems which the above theories may furnish1 in the same way as is certainly necessary in regard to victualling troops4 ,if we have clearly understood the results of our reflections1 then the activities belonging to ,war divide themselves into two principal classes1 into such as are only 8preparations for ,war0 and into the 8,war itself40 ,this division must therefore also be made in theory4 ,the knowledge and applications of skill in the preparations for ,war are engaged in the creation1 discipline1 and maintenance of all the military forces2 what general names should be given to them we do not enter into1 but we see that artillery1 fortification1 elementary tactics1 as they are called1 the whole organisation and administration of the various armed forces1 and all such things are included4 ,but the theory of ,war itself occupies itself with the use of these prepared means for the object of the war4 ,it needs of the first only the results1 that is1 the knowledge of the principal properties of the means taken in hand for use4 ,this we call 8,the ,art of ,war0 in a limited sense1 or 8,theory of the ,conduct of ,war10 or 8,theory of the ,employment of ,armed ,forces10 all of them denoting for us the same thing4 ,the present theory will therefore treat the combat as the real contest1 marches1 camps1 and cantonments as circumstances which are more or less identical with it4 ,the subsistence of the troops will only come into consideration like other given circumstances in respect of its results1 not as an activity belonging to the combat4 ,the ,art of ,war thus viewed in its limited sense divides itself again into tactics and strategy4 ,the former occupies itself with the form of the separate combat1 the latter with its use4 ,both connect themselves with the circumstances of marches1 camps1 cantonments only through the combat1 and these circumstances are tactical or strategic according as they relate to the form or to the signification of the battle4 ,no doubt there will be many readers who will consider superfluous this careful separation of two things lying so close together as tactics and strategy1 because it has no direct effect on the conduct itself of ,war4 ,we admit1 certainly that it would be pedantry to look for direct effects on the field of battle from a theoretical distinction4 ,but the first business of every theory is to clear up conceptions and ideas which have been jumbled together1 and1 we may say1 entangled and confused2 and only when a right understanding is established1 as to names and conceptions1 can we hope to progress with clearness and facility1 and be certain that author and reader will always see things from the same point of view4 ,tactics and strategy are two activities mutually permeating each other in time and space1 at the same time essentially different activities1 the inner laws and mutual relations of which cannot be intelligible at all to the mind until a clear conception of the nature of each activity is established4 ,he to whom all this is nothing1 must either repudiate all theoretical consideration1 or his understanding has not as yet been pained by the confused and perplexing ideas resting on no fixed point of view1 leading to no satisfactory result1 sometimes dull1 sometimes fantastic1 sometimes floating in vague generalities1 which we are often obliged to hear and read on the conduct of ,war1 owing to the spirit of scientific investigation having hitherto been little directed to these subjects4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,on the ,theory of ,war #a4 ,,the ,,first ,,conception ,,of ,,the 8,,art ,,of ,,war0 ,,was ,,merely ,,the ,,preparation ,,of ,,the ,,armed ,,forces4 ,formerly by the term 8,art of ,war10 or 8,science of ,war10 nothing was understood but the totality of those branches of knowledge and those appliances of skill occupied with material things4 ,the pattern and preparation and the mode of using arms1 the construction of fortifications and entrenchments1 the organism of an army and the mechanism of its movements1 were the subject2 these branches of knowledge and skill above referred to1 and the end and aim of them all was the establishment of an armed force fit for use in ,war4 ,all this concerned merely things belonging to the material world and a one-sided activity only1 and it was in fact nothing but an activity advancing by gradations from the lower occupations to a finer kind of mechanical art4 ,the relation of all this to ,war itself was very much the same as the relation of the art of the sword cutler to the art of using the sword4 ,the employment in the moment of danger and in a state of constant reciprocal action of the particular energies of mind and spirit in the direction proposed to them was not yet even mooted4 #b4 ,,true ,,war ,,first ,,appears ,,in ,,the ,,art ,,of ,,sieges4 ,in the art of sieges we first perceive a certain degree of guidance of the combat1 something of the action of the intellectual faculties upon the material forces placed under their control1 but generally only so far that it very soon embodied itself again in new material forms1 such as approaches1 trenches1 counter-approaches1 batteries1 c41 and every step which this action of the higher faculties took was marked by some such result2 it was only the thread that was required on which to string these material inventions in order4 ,as the intellect can hardly manifest itself in this kind of ,war1 except in such things1 so therefore nearly all that was necessary was done in that way4 #c4 ,,then ,,tactics ,,tried ,,to ,,find ,,its ,,way ,,in ,,the ,,same ,,direction4 ,afterwards tactics attempted to give to the mechanism of its joints the character of a general disposition1 built upon the peculiar properties of the instrument1 which character leads indeed to the battle-field1 but instead of leading to the free activity of mind1 leads to an ,army made like an automaton by its rigid formations and orders of battle1 which1 movable only by the word of command1 is intended to unwind its activities like a piece of clockwork4 #d4 ,,the ,,real ,,conduct ,,of ,,war ,,only ,,made ,,its ,,appearance ,,incidentally ,,and ,,incognito4 ,the conduct of ,war properly so called1 that is1 a use of the prepared means adapted to the most special requirements1 was not considered as any suitable subject for theory1 but one which should be left to natural talents alone4 ,by degrees1 as ,war passed from the hand-to-hand encounters of the middle ages into a more regular and systematic form1 stray reflections on this point also forced themselves into men's minds1 but they mostly appeared only incidentally in memoirs and narratives1 and in a certain measure incognito4 #e4 ,,reflections ,,on ,,military ,,events ,,brought ,,about ,,the ,,want ,,of ,a ,,theory4 ,as contemplation on ,war continually increased1 and its history every day assumed more of a critical character1 the urgent want appeared of the support of fixed maxims and rules1 in order that in the controversies naturally arising about military events the war of opinions might be brought to some one point4 ,this whirl of opinions1 which neither revolved on any central pivot nor according to any appreciable laws1 could not but be very distasteful to people's minds4 #f4 ,,endeavours ,,to ,,establish ,a ,,positive ,,theory4 ,there arose1 therefore1 an endeavour to establish maxims1 rules1 and even systems for the conduct of ,war4 ,by this the attainment of a positive object was proposed1 without taking into view the endless difficulties which the conduct of ,war presents in that respect4 ,the conduct of ,war1 as we have shown1 has no definite limits in any direction1 while every system has the circumscribing nature of a synthesis1 from which results an irreconcileable opposition between such a theory and practice4 #g4 ,,limitation ,,to ,,material ,,objects4 ,writers on theory felt the difficulty of the subject soon enough1 and thought themselves entitled to get rid of it by directing their maxims and systems only upon material things and a one-sided activity4 ,their aim was to reach results1 as in the science for the preparation for ,war1 entirely certain and positive1 and therefore only to take into consideration that which could be made matter of calculation4 #h4 ,,superiority ,,of ,,numbers4 ,the superiority in numbers being a material condition1 it was chosen from amongst all the factors required to produce victory1 because it could be brought under mathematical laws through combinations of time and space4 ,it was thought possible to leave out of sight all other circumstances1 by supposing them to be equal on each side1 and therefore to neutralise one another4 ,this would have been very well if it had been done to gain a preliminary knowledge of this one factor1 according to its relations1 but to make it a rule for ever to consider superiority of numbers as the sole law2 to see the whole secret of the ,art of ,war in the formula1 in a certain time1 at a certain point1 to bring up superior masses--was a restriction overruled by the force of realities4 #i4 ,,victualling ,,of ,,troops4 ,by one theoretical school an attempt was made to systematise another material element also1 by making the subsistence of troops1 according to a previously established organism of the ,army1 the supreme legislator in the higher conduct of ,war4 ,in this way certainly they arrived at definite figures1 but at figures which rested on a number of arbitrary calculations1 and which therefore could not stand the test of practical application4 #aj4 ,,base4 ,an ingenious author tried to concentrate in a single conception1 that of a ,,base1 a whole host of objects amongst which sundry relations even with immaterial forces found their way in as well4 ,the list comprised the subsistence of the troops1 the keeping them complete in numbers and equipment1 the security of communications with the home country1 lastly1 the security of retreat in case it became necessary2 and1 first of all1 he proposed to substitute this conception of a base for all these things2 then for the base itself to substitute its own length 7extent72 and1 last of all1 to substitute the angle formed by the army with this base3 all this was done to obtain a pure geometrical result utterly useless4 ,this last is1 in fact1 unavoidable1 if we reflect that none of these substitutions could be made without violating truth and leaving out some of the things contained in the original conception4 ,the idea of a base is a real necessity for strategy1 and to have conceived it is meritorious2 but to make such a use of it as we have depicted is completely inadmissible1 and could not but lead to partial conclusions which have forced these theorists into a direction opposed to common sense1 namely1 to a belief in the decisive effect of the enveloping form of attack4 #aa4 ,,interior ,,lines4 ,as a reaction against this false direction1 another geometrical principle1 that of the so-called interior lines1 was then elevated to the throne4 ,although this principle rests on a sound foundation1 on the truth that the combat is the only effectual means in ,war1 still it is1 just on account of its purely geometrical nature1 nothing but another case of one-sided theory which can never gain ascendency in the real world4 #ab4 ,,all ,,these ,,attempts ,,are ,,open ,,to ,,objection4 ,all these attempts at theory are only to be considered in their analytical part as progress in the province of truth1 but in their synthetical part1 in their precepts and rules1 they are quite unserviceable4 ,they strive after determinate quantities1 whilst in ,war all is undetermined1 and the calculation has always to be made with varying quantities4 ,they direct the attention only upon material forces1 while the whole military action is penetrated throughout by intelligent forces and their effects4 ,they only pay regard to activity on one side1 whilst ,war is a constant state of reciprocal action1 the effects of which are mutual4 #ac4 ,,as ,a ,,rule ,,they ,,exclude ,,genius4 ,all that was not attainable by such miserable philosophy1 the offspring of partial views1 lay outside the precincts of science--and was the field of genius1 which ,,raises ,,itself ,,above ,,rules4 ,pity the warrior who is contented to crawl about in this beggardom of rules1 which are too bad for genius1 over which it can set itself superior1 over which it can perchance make merry6 ,what genius does must be the best of all rules1 and theory cannot do better than to show how and why it is so4 ,pity the theory which sets itself in opposition to the mind6 ,it cannot repair this contradiction by any humility1 and the humbler it is so much the sooner will ridicule and contempt drive it out of real life4 #ad4 ,,the ,,difficulty ,,of ,,theory ,,as ,,soon ,,as ,,moral ,,quantities ,,come ,,into ,,consideration4 ,every theory becomes infinitely more difficult from the moment that it touches on the province of moral quantities4 ,architecture and painting know quite well what they are about as long as they have only to do with matter2 there is no dispute about mechanical or optical construction4 ,but as soon as the moral activities begin their work1 as soon as moral impressions and feelings are produced1 the whole set of rules dissolves into vague ideas4 ,the science of medicine is chiefly engaged with bodily phenomena only2 its business is with the animal organism1 which1 liable to perpetual change1 is never exactly the same for two moments4 ,this makes its practice very difficult1 and places the judgment of the physician above his science2 but how much more difficult is the case if a moral effect is added1 and how much higher must we place the physician of the mind8 #ae4 ,,the ,,moral ,,quantities ,,must ,,not ,,be ,,excluded ,,in ,,war4 ,but now the activity in ,war is never directed solely against matter2 it is always at the same time directed against the intelligent force which gives life to this matter1 and to separate the two from each other is impossible4 ,but the intelligent forces are only visible to the inner eye1 and this is different in each person1 and often different in the same person at different times4 ,as danger is the general element in which everything moves in ,war1 it is also chiefly by courage1 the feeling of one's own power1 that the judgment is differently influenced4 ,it is to a certain extent the crystalline lens through which all appearances pass before reaching the understanding4 ,and yet we cannot doubt that these things acquire a certain objective value simply through experience4 ,every one knows the moral effect of a surprise1 of an attack in flank or rear4 ,every one thinks less of the enemy's courage as soon as he turns his back1 and ventures much more in pursuit than when pursued4 ,every one judges of the enemy's ,general by his reputed talents1 by his age and experience1 and shapes his course accordingly4 ,every one casts a scrutinising glance at the spirit and feeling of his own and the enemy's troops4 ,all these and similar effects in the province of the moral nature of man have established themselves by experience1 are perpetually recurring1 and therefore warrant our reckoning them as real quantities of their kind4 ,what could we do with any theory which should leave them out of consideration8 ,certainly experience is an indispensable title for these truths4 ,with psychological and philosophical sophistries no theory1 no ,general1 should meddle4 #af4 ,,principal ,,difficulty ,,of ,a ,,theory ,,for ,,the ,,conduct ,,of ,,war4 ,in order to comprehend clearly the difficulty of the proposition which is contained in a theory for the conduct of ,war1 and thence to deduce the necessary characteristics of such a theory1 we must take a closer view of the chief particulars which make up the nature of activity in ,war4 #ag4 ,,first ,,speciality4--,,moral ,,forces ,,and ,,their ,,effects4 7,,hostile ,,feeling47 ,the first of these specialities consists in the moral forces and effects4 ,the combat is1 in its origin1 the expression of hostile feeling1 but in our great combats1 which we call ,wars1 the hostile feeling frequently resolves itself into merely a hostile view1 and there is usually no innate hostile feeling residing in individual against individual4 ,nevertheless1 the combat never passes off without such feelings being brought into activity4 ,national hatred1 which is seldom wanting in our ,wars1 is a substitute for personal hostility in the breast of individual opposed to individual4 ,but where this also is wanting1 and at first no animosity of feeling subsists1 a hostile feeling is kindled by the combat itself2 for an act of violence which any one commits upon us by order of his superior1 will excite in us a desire to retaliate and be revenged on him1 sooner than on the superior power at whose command the act was done4 ,this is human1 or animal if we will2 still it is so4 ,we are very apt to regard the combat in theory as an abstract trial of strength1 without any participation on the part of the feelings1 and that is one of the thousand errors which theorists deliberately commit1 because they do not see its consequences4 ,besides that excitation of feelings naturally arising from the combat itself1 there are others also which do not essentially belong to it1 but which1 on account of their relationship1 easily unite with it--ambition1 love of power1 enthusiasm of every kind1 c4 c4 #ah4 ,,the ,,impressions ,,of ,,danger4 7,,courage47 ,finally1 the combat begets the element of danger1 in which all the activities of ,war must live and move1 like the bird in the air or the fish in the water4 ,but the influences of danger all pass into the feelings1 either directly--that is1 instinctively--or through the medium of the understanding4 ,the effect in the first case would be a desire to escape from the danger1 and1 if that cannot be done1 fright and anxiety4 ,if this effect does not take place1 then it is courage1 which is a counterpoise to that instinct4 ,courage is1 however1 by no means an act of the understanding1 but likewise a feeling1 like fear2 the latter looks to the physical preservation1 courage to the moral preservation4 ,courage1 then1 is a nobler instinct4 ,but because it is so1 it will not allow itself to be used as a lifeless instrument1 which produces its effects exactly according to prescribed measure4 ,courage is therefore no mere counterpoise to danger in order to neutralise the latter in its effects1 but a peculiar power in itself4 #ai4 ,,extent ,,of ,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,danger4 ,but to estimate exactly the influence of danger upon the principal actors in ,war1 we must not limit its sphere to the physical danger of the moment4 ,it dominates over the actor1 not only by threatening him1 but also by threatening all entrusted to him1 not only at the moment in which it is actually present1 but also through the imagination at all other moments1 which have a connection with the present2 lastly1 not only directly by itself1 but also indirectly by the responsibility which makes it bear with tenfold weight on the mind of the chief actor4 ,who could advise1 or resolve upon a great battle1 without feeling his mind more or less wrought up1 or perplexed by1 the danger and responsibility which such a great act of decision carries in itself8 ,we may say that action in ,war1 in so far as it is real action1 not a mere condition1 is never out of the sphere of danger4 #bj4 ,,other ,,powers ,,of ,,feeling4 ,if we look upon these affections which are excited by hostility and danger as peculiarly belonging to ,war1 we do not1 therefore1 exclude from it all others accompanying man in his life's journey4 ,they will also find room here frequently enough4 ,certainly we may say that many a petty action of the passions is silenced in this serious business of life2 but that holds good only in respect to those acting in a lower sphere1 who1 hurried on from one state of danger and exertion to another1 lose sight of the rest of the things of life1 become unused to deceit1 because it is of no avail with death1 and so attain to that soldierly simplicity of character which has always been the best representative of the military profession4 ,in higher regions it is otherwise1 for the higher a man's rank1 the more he must look around him2 then arise interests on every side1 and a manifold activity of the passions of good and bad4 ,envy and generosity1 pride and humility1 fierceness and tenderness1 all may appear as active powers in this great drama4 #ba4 ,,peculiarity ,,of ,,mind4 ,the peculiar characteristics of mind in the chief actor have1 as well as those of the feelings1 a high importance4 ,from an imaginative1 flighty1 inexperienced head1 and from a calm1 sagacious understanding1 different things are to be expected4 #bb4 ,,from ,,the ,,diversity ,,in ,,mental ,,individualities ,,arises ,,the ,,diversity ,,of ,,ways ,,leading ,,to ,,the ,,end4 ,it is this great diversity in mental individuality1 the influence of which is to be supposed as chiefly felt in the higher ranks1 because it increases as we progress upwards1 which chiefly produces the diversity of ways leading to the end noticed by us in the first book1 and which gives1 to the play of probabilities and chance1 such an unequal share in determining the course of events4 #bc4 ,,second ,,peculiarity4--,,living ,,reaction4 ,the second peculiarity in ,war is the living reaction1 and the reciprocal action resulting therefrom4 ,we do not here speak of the difficulty of estimating that reaction1 for that is included in the difficulty before mentioned1 of treating the moral powers as quantities2 but of this1 that reciprocal action1 by its nature1 opposes anything like a regular plan4 ,the effect which any measure produces upon the enemy is the most distinct of all the data which action affords2 but every theory must keep to classes 7or groups7 of phenomena1 and can never take up the really individual case in itself3 that must everywhere be left to judgment and talent4 ,it is therefore natural that in a business such as ,war1 which in its plan--built upon general circumstances--is so often thwarted by unexpected and singular accidents1 more must generally be left to talent2 and less use can be made of a theoretical guide than in any other4 #bd4 ,,third ,,peculiarity4--,,uncertainty ,,of ,,all ,,data4 ,lastly1 the great uncertainty of all data in ,war is a peculiar difficulty1 because all action must1 to a certain extent1 be planned in a mere twilight1 which in addition not unfrequently--like the effect of a fog or moonshine--gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance4 ,what this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight talent must discover1 or must be left to chance4 ,it is therefore again talent1 or the favour of fortune1 on which reliance must be placed1 for want of objective knowledge4 #be4 ,,positive ,,theory ,,is ,,impossible4 ,with materials of this kind we can only say to ourselves that it is a sheer impossibility to construct for the ,art of ,war a theory which1 like a scaffolding1 shall ensure to the chief actor an external support on all sides4 ,in all those cases in which he is thrown upon his talent he would find himself away from this scaffolding of theory and in opposition to it1 and1 however many-sided it might be framed1 the same result would ensue of which we spoke when we said that talent and genius act beyond the law1 and theory is in opposition to reality4 #bf4 ,,means ,,left ,,by ,,which ,a ,,theory ,,is ,,possible 7,,the ,,difficulties ,,are ,,not ,,everywhere ,,equally ,,great74 ,two means present themselves of getting out of this difficulty4 ,in the first place1 what we have said of the nature of military action in general does not apply in the same manner to the action of every one1 whatever may be his standing4 ,in the lower ranks the spirit of self-sacrifice is called more into request1 but the difficulties which the understanding and judgment meet with are infinitely less4 ,the field of occurrences is more confined4 ,ends and means are fewer in number4 ,data more distinct2 mostly also contained in the actually visible4 ,but the higher we ascend the more the difficulties increase1 until in the ,commander-in-,chief they reach their climax1 so that with him almost everything must be left to genius4 ,further1 according to a division of the subject in agreement with its nature1 the difficulties are not everywhere the same1 but diminish the more results manifest themselves in the material world1 and increase the more they pass into the moral1 and become motives which influence the will4 ,therefore it is easier to determine1 by theoretical rules1 the order and conduct of a battle1 than the use to be made of the battle itself4 ,yonder physical weapons clash with each other1 and although mind is not wanting therein1 matter must have its rights4 ,but in the effects to be produced by battles when the material results become motives1 we have only to do with the moral nature4 ,in a word1 it is easier to make a theory for tactics than for strategy4 #bg4 ,,theory ,,must ,,be ,,of ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,observations ,,not ,,of ,,doctrine4 ,the second opening for the possibility of a theory lies in the point of view that it does not necessarily require to be a direction for action4 ,as a general rule1 whenever an activity is for the most part occupied with the same objects over and over again1 with the same ends and means1 although there may be trifling alterations and a corresponding number of varieties of combination1 such things are capable of becoming a subject of study for the reasoning faculties4 ,but such study is just the most essential part of every theory1 and has a peculiar title to that name4 ,it is an analytical investigation of the subject that leads to an exact knowledge2 and if brought to bear on the results of experience1 which in our case would be military history1 to a thorough familiarity with it4 ,the nearer theory attains the latter object1 so much the more it passes over from the objective form of knowledge into the subjective one of skill in action2 and so much the more1 therefore1 it will prove itself effective when circumstances allow of no other decision but that of personal talents2 it will show its effects in that talent itself4 ,if theory investigates the subjects which constitute ,war2 if it separates more distinctly that which at first sight seems amalgamated2 if it explains fully the properties of the means2 if it shows their probable effects2 if it makes evident the nature of objects2 if it brings to bear all over the field of ,war the light of essentially critical investigation--then it has fulfilled the chief duties of its province4 ,it becomes then a guide to him who wishes to make himself acquainted with ,war from books2 it lights up the whole road for him1 facilitates his progress1 educates his judgment1 and shields him from error4 ,if a man of expertness spends half his life in the endeavour to clear up an obscure subject thoroughly1 he will probably know more about it than a person who seeks to master it in a short time4 ,theory is instituted that each person in succession may not have to go through the same labour of clearing the ground and toiling through his subject1 but may find the thing in order1 and light admitted on it4 ,it should educate the mind of the future leader in ,war1 or rather guide him in his self-instruction1 but not accompany him to the field of battle2 just as a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without1 therefore1 keeping him in leading strings all through his life4 ,if maxims and rules result of themselves from the considerations which theory institutes1 if the truth accretes itself into that form of crystal1 then theory will not oppose this natural law of the mind2 it will rather1 if the arch ends in such a keystone1 bring it prominently out2 but so does this1 only in order to satisfy the philosophical law of reason1 in order to show distinctly the point to which the lines all converge1 not in order to form out of it an algebraical formula for use upon the battle-field2 for even these maxims and rules serve more to determine in the reflecting mind the leading outline of its habitual movements than as landmarks indicating to it the way in the act of execution4 #bh4 ,,by ,,this ,,point ,,of ,,view ,,theory ,,becomes ,,possible1 ,,and ,,ceases ,,to ,,be ,,in ,,contradiction ,,to ,,practice4 ,taking this point of view1 there is a possibility afforded of a satisfactory1 that is1 of a useful1 theory of the conduct of ,war1 never coming into opposition with the reality1 and it will only depend on rational treatment to bring it so far into harmony with action that between theory and practice there shall no longer be that absurd difference which an unreasonable theory1 in defiance of common sense1 has often produced1 but which1 just as often1 narrow-mindedness and ignorance have used as a pretext for giving way to their natural incapacity4 #bi4 ,,theory ,,therefore ,,considers ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,ends ,,and ,,means--,,ends ,,and ,,means ,,in ,,tactics4 ,theory has therefore to consider the nature of the means and ends4 ,in tactics the means are the disciplined armed forces which are to carry on the contest4 ,the object is victory4 ,the precise definition of this conception can be better explained hereafter in the consideration of the combat4 ,here we content ourselves by denoting the retirement of the enemy from the field of battle as the sign of victory4 ,by means of this victory strategy gains the object for which it appointed the combat1 and which constitutes its special signification4 ,this signification has certainly some influence on the nature of the victory4 ,a victory which is intended to weaken the enemy's armed forces is a different thing from one which is designed only to put us in possession of a position4 ,the signification of a combat may therefore have a sensible influence on the preparation and conduct of it1 consequently will be also a subject of consideration in tactics4 #cj4 ,,circumstances ,,which ,,always ,,attend ,,the ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,means4 ,as there are certain circumstances which attend the combat throughout1 and have more or less influence upon its result1 therefore these must be taken into consideration in the application of the armed forces4 ,these circumstances are the locality of the combat 7ground71 the time of day1 and the weather4 #ca4 ,,locality4 ,the locality1 which we prefer leaving for solution1 under the head of 8,country and ,ground10 might1 strictly speaking1 be without any influence at all if the combat took place on a completely level and uncultivated plain4 ,in a country of steppes such a case may occur1 but in the cultivated countries of ,europe it is almost an imaginary idea4 ,therefore a combat between civilised nations1 in which country and ground have no influence1 is hardly conceivable4 #cb4 ,,time ,,of ,,day4 ,the time of day influences the combat by the difference between day and night2 but the influence naturally extends further than merely to the limits of these divisions1 as every combat has a certain duration1 and great battles last for several hours4 ,in the preparations for a great battle1 it makes an essential difference whether it begins in the morning or the evening4 ,at the same time1 certainly many battles may be fought in which the question of the time of day is quite immaterial1 and in the generality of cases its influence is only trifling4 #cc4 ,,weather4 ,still more rarely has the weather any decisive influence1 and it is mostly only by fogs that it plays a part4 #cd4 ,,end ,,and ,,means ,,in ,,strategy4 ,strategy has in the first instance only the victory1 that is1 the tactical result1 as a means to its object1 and ultimately those things which lead directly to peace4 ,the application of its means to this object is at the same time attended by circumstances which have an influence thereon more or less4 #ce4 ,,circumstances ,,which ,,attend ,,the ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,means ,,of ,,strategy4 ,these circumstances are country and ground1 the former including the territory and inhabitants of the whole theatre of war2 next the time of the day1 and the time of the year as well2 lastly1 the weather1 particularly any unusual state of the same1 severe frost1 c4 #cf4 ,,these ,,form ,,new ,,means4 ,by bringing these things into combination with the results of a combat1 strategy gives this result--and therefore the combat--a special signification1 places before it a particular object4 ,but when this object is not that which leads directly to peace1 therefore a subordinate one1 it is only to be looked upon as a means2 and therefore in strategy we may look upon the results of combats or victories1 in all their different significations1 as means4 ,the conquest of a position is such a result of a combat applied to ground4 ,but not only are the different combats with special objects to be considered as means1 but also every higher aim which we may have in view in the combination of battles directed on a common object is to be regarded as a means4 ,a winter campaign is a combination of this kind applied to the season4 ,there remain1 therefore1 as objects1 only those things which may be supposed as leading directly to peace1 ,theory investigates all these ends and means according to the nature of their effects and their mutual relations4 #cg4 ,,strategy ,,deduces ,,only ,,from ,,experience ,,the ,,ends ,,and ,,means ,,to ,,be ,,examined4 ,the first question is1 ,how does strategy arrive at a complete list of these things8 ,if there is to be a philosophical inquiry leading to an absolute result1 it would become entangled in all those difficulties which the logical necessity of the conduct of ,war and its theory exclude4 ,it therefore turns to experience1 and directs its attention on those combinations which military history can furnish4 ,in this manner1 no doubt1 nothing more than a limited theory can be obtained1 which only suits circumstances such as are presented in history4 ,but this incompleteness is unavoidable1 because in any case theory must either have deduced from1 or have compared with1 history what it advances with respect to things4 ,besides1 this incompleteness in every case is more theoretical than real4 ,one great advantage of this method is that theory cannot lose itself in abstruse disquisitions1 subtleties1 and chimeras1 but must always remain practical4 #ch4 ,,how ,,far ,,the ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,means ,,should ,,be ,,carried4 ,another question is1 ,how far should theory go in its analysis of the means8 ,evidently only so far as the elements in a separate form present themselves for consideration in practice4 ,the range and effect of different weapons is very important to tactics2 their construction1 although these effects result from it1 is a matter of indifference2 for the conduct of ,war is not making powder and cannon out of a given quantity of charcoal1 sulphur1 and saltpetre1 of copper and tin3 the given quantities for the conduct of ,war are arms in a finished state and their effects4 ,strategy makes use of maps without troubling itself about triangulations2 it does not inquire how the country is subdivided into departments and provinces1 and how the people are educated and governed1 in order to attain the best military results2 but it takes things as it finds them in the community of ,european ,states1 and observes where very different conditions have a notable influence on ,war4 #ci4 ,,great ,,simplification ,,of ,,the ,,knowledge ,,required4 ,that in this manner the number of subjects for theory is much simplified1 and the knowledge requisite for the conduct of ,war much reduced1 is easy to perceive4 ,the very great mass of knowledge and appliances of skill which minister to the action of ,war in general1 and which are necessary before an army fully equipped can take the field1 unite in a few great results before they are able to reach1 in actual ,war1 the final goal of their activity2 just as the streams of a country unite themselves in rivers before they fall into the sea4 ,only those activities emptying themselves directly into the sea of ,war have to be studied by him who is to conduct its operations4 #dj4 ,,this ,,explains ,,the ,,rapid ,,growth ,,of ,,great ,,generals1 ,,and ,,why ,a ,,general ,,is ,,not ,a ,,man ,,of ,,learning4 ,this result of our considerations is in fact so necessary1 any other would have made us distrustful of their accuracy4 ,only thus is explained how so often men have made their appearance with great success in ,war1 and indeed in the higher ranks even in supreme ,command1 whose pursuits had been previously of a totally different nature2 indeed how1 as a rule1 the most distinguished ,generals have never risen from the very learned or really erudite class of officers1 but have been mostly men who1 from the circumstances of their position1 could not have attained to any great amount of knowledge4 ,on that account those who have considered it necessary or even beneficial to commence the education of a future ,general by instruction in all details have always been ridiculed as absurd pedants4 ,it would be easy to show the injurious tendency of such a course1 because the human mind is trained by the knowledge imparted to it and the direction given to its ideas4 ,only what is great can make it great2 the little can only make it little1 if the mind itself does not reject it as something repugnant4 #da4 ,,former ,,contradictions4 ,because this simplicity of knowledge requisite in ,war was not attended to1 but that knowledge was always jumbled up with the whole impedimenta of subordinate sciences and arts1 therefore the palpable opposition to the events of real life which resulted could not be solved otherwise than by ascribing it all to genius1 which requires no theory and for which no theory could be prescribed4 #db4 ,,on ,,this ,,account ,,all ,,use ,,of ,,knowledge ,,was ,,denied1 ,,and ,,everything ,,ascribed ,,to ,,natural ,,talents4 ,people with whom common sense had the upper hand felt sensible of the immense distance remaining to be filled up between a genius of the highest order and a learned pedant2 and they became in a manner free-thinkers1 rejected all belief in theory1 and affirmed the conduct of ,war to be a natural function of man1 which he performs more or less well according as he has brought with him into the world more or less talent in that direction4 ,it cannot be denied that these were nearer to the truth than those who placed a value on false knowledge3 at the same time it may easily be seen that such a view is itself but an exaggeration4 ,no activity of the human understanding is possible without a certain stock of ideas2 but these are1 for the greater part at least1 not innate but acquired1 and constitute his knowledge4 ,the only question therefore is1 of what kind should these ideas be2 and we think we have answered it if we say that they should be directed on those things which man has directly to deal with in ,war4 #dc4 ,,the ,,knowledge ,,must ,,be ,,made ,,suitable ,,to ,,the ,,position4 ,inside this field itself of military activity1 the knowledge required must be different according to the station of the ,commander4 ,it will be directed on smaller and more circumscribed objects if he holds an inferior1 upon greater and more comprehensive ones if he holds a higher situation4 ,there are ,field ,marshals who would not have shone at the head of a cavalry regiment1 and vice versa4 #dd4 ,,the ,,knowledge ,,in ,,war ,,is ,,very ,,simple1 ,,but ,,not1 ,,at ,,the ,,same ,,time1 ,,very ,,easy4 ,but although the knowledge in ,war is simple1 that is to say directed to so few subjects1 and taking up those only in their final results1 the art of execution is not1 on that account1 easy4 ,of the difficulties to which activity in ,war is subject generally1 we have already spoken in the first book2 we here omit those things which can only be overcome by courage1 and maintain also that the activity of mind1 is only simple1 and easy in inferior stations1 but increases in difficulty with increase of rank1 and in the highest position1 in that of ,commander-in-,chief1 is to be reckoned among the most difficult which there is for the human mind4 #de4 ,,of ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,this ,,knowledge4 ,the ,commander of an ,army neither requires to be a learned explorer of history nor a publicist1 but he must be well versed in the higher affairs of ,state2 he must know1 and be able to judge correctly of traditional tendencies1 interests at stake1 the immediate questions at issue1 and the characters of leading persons2 he need not be a close observer of men1 a sharp dissector of human character1 but he must know the character1 the feelings1 the habits1 the peculiar faults and inclinations of those whom he is to command4 ,he need not understand anything about the make of a carriage1 or the harness of a battery horse1 but he must know how to calculate exactly the march of a column1 under different circumstances1 according to the time it requires4 ,these are matters the knowledge of which cannot be forced out by an apparatus of scientific formula and machinery3 they are only to be gained by the exercise of an accurate judgment in the observation of things and of men1 aided by a special talent for the apprehension of both4 ,the necessary knowledge for a high position in military action is therefore distinguished by this1 that by observation1 therefore by study and reflection1 it is only to be attained through a special talent which as an intellectual instinct understands how to extract from the phenomena of life only the essence or spirit1 as bees do the honey from the flowers2 and that it is also to be gained by experience of life as well as by study and reflection4 ,life will never bring forth a ,newton or an ,euler by its rich teachings1 but it may bring forth great calculators in ,war1 such as ,cond or ,frederick4 ,it is therefore not necessary that1 in order to vindicate the intellectual dignity of military activity1 we should resort to untruth and silly pedantry4 ,there never has been a great and distinguished ,commander of contracted mind1 but very numerous are the instances of men who1 after serving with the greatest distinction in inferior positions1 remained below mediocrity in the highest1 from insufficiency of intellectual capacity4 ,that even amongst those holding the post of ,commander-in-,chief there may be a difference according to the degree of their plenitude of power is a matter of course4 #df4 ,,science ,,must ,,become ,,art4 ,now we have yet to consider one condition which is more necessary for the knowledge of the conduct of ,war than for any other1 which is1 that it must pass completely into the mind and almost completely cease to be something objective4 ,in almost all other arts and occupations of life the active agent can make use of truths which he has only learnt once1 and in the spirit and sense of which he no longer lives1 and which he extracts from dusty books4 ,even truths which he has in hand and uses daily may continue something external to himself1 ,if the architect takes up a pen to settle the strength of a pier by a complicated calculation1 the truth found as a result is no emanation from his own mind4 ,he had first to find the data with labour1 and then to submit these to an operation of the mind1 the rule for which he did not discover1 the necessity of which he is perhaps at the moment only partly conscious of1 but which he applies1 for the most part1 as if by mechanical dexterity4 ,but it is never so in ,war4 ,the moral reaction1 the ever-changeful form of things1 makes it necessary for the chief actor to carry in himself the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge1 that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving the requisite decision from himself4 ,knowledge must1 by this complete assimilation with his own mind and life1 be converted into real power4 ,this is the reason why everything seems so easy with men distinguished in ,war1 and why everything is ascribed to natural talent4 ,we say natural talent1 in order thereby to distinguish it from that which is formed and matured by observation and study4 ,we think that by these reflections we have explained the problem of a theory of the conduct of ,war2 and pointed out the way to its solution4 ,of the two fields into which we have divided the conduct of ,war1 tactics and strategy1 the theory of the latter contains unquestionably1 as before observed1 the greatest difficulties1 because the first is almost limited to a circumscribed field of objects1 but the latter1 in the direction of objects leading directly to peace1 opens to itself an unlimited field of possibilities4 ,since for the most part the ,commander-in-,chief has only to keep these objects steadily in view1 therefore the part of strategy in which he moves is also that which is particularly subject to this difficulty4 ,theory1 therefore1 especially where it comprehends the highest services1 will stop much sooner in strategy than in tactics at the simple consideration of things1 and content itself to assist the ,commander to that insight into things which1 blended with his whole thought1 makes his course easier and surer1 never forces him into opposition with himself in order to obey an objective truth4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,art or ,science of ,war #a4--,,usage ,,still ,,unsettled 7,,power ,,and ,,knowledge4 ,,science ,,when ,,mere ,,knowing2 ,,art1 ,,when ,,doing1 ,,is ,,the ,,object47 ,the choice between these terms seems to be still unsettled1 and no one seems to know rightly on what grounds it should be decided1 and yet the thing is simple4 ,we have already said elsewhere that 8knowing0 is something different from 8doing40 ,the two are so different that they should not easily be mistaken the one for the other4 ,the 8doing0 cannot properly stand in any book1 and therefore also ,art should never be the title of a book4 ,but because we have once accustomed ourselves to combine in conception1 under the name of theory of ,art1 or simply ,art1 the branches of knowledge 7which may be separately pure sciences7 necessary for the practice of an ,art1 therefore it is consistent to continue this ground of distinction1 and to call everything ,art when the object is to carry out the 8doing0 7being able71 as for example1 ,art of building2 ,science1 when merely knowledge is the object2 as ,science of mathematics1 of astronomy4 ,that in every ,art certain complete sciences may be included is intelligible of itself1 and should not perplex us4 ,but still it is worth observing that there is also no science without a mixture of ,art4 ,in mathematics1 for instance1 the use of figures and of algebra is an ,art1 but that is only one amongst many instances4 ,the reason is1 that however plain and palpable the difference is between knowledge and power in the composite results of human knowledge1 yet it is difficult to trace out their line of separation in man himself4 #b4 ,,difficulty ,,of ,,separating ,,perception ,,from ,,judgment4 7,,art ,,of ,,war47 ,all thinking is indeed ,art4 ,where the logician draws the line1 where the premises stop which are the result of cognition--where judgment begins1 there ,art begins4 ,but more than this even the perception of the mind is judgment again1 and consequently ,art2 and at last1 even the perception by the senses as well4 ,in a word1 if it is impossible to imagine a human being possessing merely the faculty of cognition1 devoid of judgment or the reverse1 so also ,art and ,science can never be completely separated from each other4 ,the more these subtle elements of light embody themselves in the outward forms of the world1 so much the more separate appear their domains2 and now once more1 where the object is creation and production1 there is the province of ,art2 where the object is investigation and knowledge ,science holds sway4--,after all this it results of itself that it is more fitting to say ,art of ,war than ,science of ,war4 ,so much for this1 because we cannot do without these conceptions4 ,but now we come forward with the assertion that ,war is neither an ,art nor a ,science in the real signification1 and that it is just the setting out from that starting-point of ideas which has led to a wrong direction being taken1 which has caused ,war to be put on a par with other arts and sciences1 and has led to a number of erroneous analogies4 ,this has indeed been felt before now1 and on that it was maintained that ,war is a handicraft2 but there was more lost than gained by that1 for a handicraft is only an inferior art1 and as such is also subject to definite and rigid laws4 ,in reality the ,art of ,war did go on for some time in the spirit of a handicraft--we allude to the times of the ,condottieri--but then it received that direction1 not from intrinsic but from external causes2 and military history shows how little it was at that time in accordance with the nature of the thing4 #c4 ,,war ,,is ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,intercourse ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,race4 ,we say therefore ,war belongs not to the province of ,arts and ,sciences1 but to the province of social life4 ,it is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed1 and only in that is it different from others4 ,it would be better1 instead of comparing it with any ,art1 to liken it to business competition1 which is also a conflict of human interests and activities2 and it is still more like ,state policy1 which again1 on its part1 may be looked upon as a kind of business competition on a great scale4 ,besides1 ,state policy is the womb in which ,war is developed1 in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state1 like the qualities of living creatures in their germs47997 7997 ,the analogy has become much closer since ,clausewitz's time4 ,now that the first business of the ,state is regarded as the development of facilities for trade1 ,war between great nations is only a question of time4 ,no ,hague ,conferences can avert it--,,editor4 #d4 ,,difference4 ,the essential difference consists in this1 that ,war is no activity of the will1 which exerts itself upon inanimate matter like the mechanical ,arts2 or upon a living but still passive and yielding subject1 like the human mind and the human feelings in the ideal ,arts1 but against a living and reacting force4 ,how little the categories of ,arts and ,sciences are applicable to such an activity strikes us at once2 and we can understand at the same time how that constant seeking and striving after laws like those which may be developed out of the dead material world could not but lead to constant errors4 ,and yet it is just the mechanical ,arts that some people would imitate in the ,art of ,war4 ,the imitation of the ideal ,arts was quite out of the question1 because these themselves dispense too much with laws and rules1 and those hitherto tried1 always acknowledged as insufficient and one-sided1 are perpetually undermined and washed away by the current of opinions1 feelings1 and customs4 ,whether such a conflict of the living1 as takes place and is settled in ,war1 is subject to general laws1 and whether these are capable of indicating a useful line of action1 will be partly investigated in this book2 but so much is evident in itself1 that this1 like every other subject which does not surpass our powers of understanding1 may be lighted up1 and be made more or less plain in its inner relations by an inquiring mind1 and that alone is sufficient to realise the idea of a ,,theory4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,methodicism ,in order to explain ourselves clearly as to the conception of method1 and method of action1 which play such an important part in ,war1 we must be allowed to cast a hasty glance at the logical hierarchy through which1 as through regularly constituted official functionaries1 the world of action is governed4 ,law1 in the widest sense strictly applying to perception as well as action1 has plainly something subjective and arbitrary in its literal meaning1 and expresses just that on which we and those things external to us are dependent4 ,as a subject of cognition1 ,law is the relation of things and their effects to one another2 as a subject of the will1 it is a motive of action1 and is then equivalent to command or prohibition4 ,principle is likewise such a law for action1 except that it has not the formal definite meaning1 but is only the spirit and sense of law in order to leave the judgment more freedom of application when the diversity of the real world cannot be laid hold of under the definite form of a law4 ,as the judgment must of itself suggest the cases in which the principle is not applicable1 the latter therefore becomes in that way a real aid or guiding star for the person acting4 ,principle is objective when it is the result of objective truth1 and consequently of equal value for all men2 it is subjective1 and then generally called maxim if there are subjective relations in it1 and if it therefore has a certain value only for the person himself who makes it4 ,rule is frequently taken in the sense of ,law1 and then means the same as ,principle1 for we say 8no rule without exceptions10 but we do not say 8no law without exceptions10 a sign that with ,rule we retain to ourselves more freedom of application4 ,in another meaning ,rule is the means used of discerning a recondite truth in a particular sign lying close at hand1 in order to attach to this particular sign the law of action directed upon the whole truth4 ,of this kind are all the rules of games of play1 all abridged processes in mathematics1 c4 ,directions and instructions are determinations of action which have an influence upon a number of minor circumstances too numerous and unimportant for general laws4 ,lastly1 ,method1 mode of acting1 is an always recurring proceeding selected out of several possible ones2 and ,methodicism 7,,methodismus7 is that which is determined by methods instead of by general principles or particular prescriptions4 ,by this the cases which are placed under such methods must necessarily be supposed alike in their essential parts4 ,as they cannot all be this1 then the point is that at least as many as possible should be2 in other words1 that ,method should be calculated on the most probable cases4 ,methodicism is therefore not founded on determined particular premises1 but on the average probability of cases one with another2 and its ultimate tendency is to set up an average truth1 the constant and uniform1 application of which soon acquires something of the nature of a mechanical appliance1 which in the end does that which is right almost unwittingly4 ,the conception of law in relation to perception is not necessary for the conduct of ,war1 because the complex phenomena of ,war are not so regular1 and the regular are not so complex1 that we should gain anything more by this conception than by the simple truth4 ,and where a simple conception and language is sufficient1 to resort to the complex becomes affected and pedantic4 ,the conception of law in relation to action cannot be used in the theory of the conduct of ,war1 because owing to the variableness and diversity of the phenomena there is in it no determination of such a general nature as to deserve the name of law4 ,but principles1 rules1 prescriptions1 and methods are conceptions indispensable to a theory of the conduct of ,war1 in so far as that theory leads to positive doctrines1 because in doctrines the truth can only crystallise itself in such forms4 ,as tactics is the branch of the conduct of ,war in which theory can attain the nearest to positive doctrine1 therefore these conceptions will appear in it most frequently4 ,not to use cavalry against unbroken infantry except in some case of special emergency1 only to use firearms within effective range in the combat1 to spare the forces as much as possible for the final struggle--these are tactical principles4 ,none of them can be applied absolutely in every case1 but they must always be present to the mind of the ,chief1 in order that the benefit of the truth contained in them may not be lost in cases where that truth can be of advantage4 ,if from the unusual cooking by an enemy's camp his movement is inferred1 if the intentional exposure of troops in a combat indicates a false attack1 then this way of discerning the truth is called rule1 because from a single visible circumstance that conclusion is drawn which corresponds with the same4 ,if it is a rule to attack the enemy with renewed vigour1 as soon as he begins to limber up his artillery in the combat1 then on this particular fact depends a course of action which is aimed at the general situation of the enemy as inferred from the above fact1 namely1 that he is about to give up the fight1 that he is commencing to draw off his troops1 and is neither capable of making a serious stand while thus drawing off nor of making his retreat gradually in good order4 ,regulations and methods bring preparatory theories into the conduct of ,war1 in so far as disciplined troops are inoculated with them as active principles4 ,the whole body of instructions for formations1 drill1 and field service are regulations and methods3 in the drill instructions the first predominate1 in the field service instructions the latter4 ,to these things the real conduct of ,war attaches itself2 it takes them over1 therefore1 as given modes of proceeding1 and as such they must appear in the theory of the conduct of ,war4 ,but for those activities retaining freedom in the employment of these forces there cannot be regulations1 that is1 definite instructions1 because they would do away with freedom of action4 ,methods1 on the other hand1 as a general way of executing duties as they arise1 calculated1 as we have said1 on an average of probability1 or as a dominating influence of principles and rules carried through to application1 may certainly appear in the theory of the conduct of ,war1 provided only they are not represented as something different from what they are1 not as the absolute and necessary modes of action 7systems71 but as the best of general forms which may be used as shorter ways in place of a particular disposition for the occasion1 at discretion4 ,but the frequent application of methods will be seen to be most essential and unavoidable in the conduct of ,war1 if we reflect how much action proceeds on mere conjecture1 or in complete uncertainty1 because one side is prevented from learning all the circumstances which influence the dispositions of the other1 or because1 even if these circumstances which influence the decisions of the one were really known1 there is not1 owing to their extent and the dispositions they would entail1 sufficient time for the other to carry out all necessary counteracting measures--that therefore measures in ,war must always be calculated on a certain number of possibilities2 if we reflect how numberless are the trifling things belonging to any single event1 and which therefore should be taken into account along with it1 and that therefore there is no other means to suppose the one counteracted by the other1 and to base our arrangements only upon what is of a general nature and probable2 if we reflect lastly that1 owing to the increasing number of officers as we descend the scale of rank1 less must be left to the true discernment and ripe judgment of individuals the lower the sphere of action1 and that when we reach those ranks where we can look for no other notions but those which the regulations of the service and experience afford1 we must help them with the methodic forms bordering on those regulations4 ,this will serve both as a support to their judgment and a barrier against those extravagant and erroneous views which are so especially to be dreaded in a sphere where experience is so costly4 ,besides this absolute need of method in action1 we must also acknowledge that it has a positive advantage1 which is that1 through the constant repetition of a formal exercise1 a readiness1 precision1 and firmness is attained in the movement of troops which diminishes the natural friction1 and makes the machine move easier4 ,method will therefore be the more generally used1 become the more indispensable1 the farther down the scale of rank the position of the active agent2 and on the other hand1 its use will diminish upwards1 until in the highest position it quite disappears4 ,for this reason it is more in its place in tactics than in strategy4 ,war in its highest aspects consists not of an infinite number of little events1 the diversities in which compensate each other1 and which therefore by a better or worse method are better or worse governed1 but of separate great decisive events which must be dealt with separately4 ,it is not like a field of stalks1 which1 without any regard to the particular form of each stalk1 will be mowed better or worse1 according as the mowing instrument is good or bad1 but rather as a group of large trees1 to which the axe must be laid with judgment1 according to the particular form and inclination of each separate trunk4 ,how high up in military activity the admissibility of method in action reaches naturally determines itself1 not according to actual rank1 but according to things2 and it affects the highest positions in a less degree1 only because these positions have the most comprehensive subjects of activity4 ,a constant order of battle1 a constant formation of advance guards and outposts1 are methods by which a ,general ties not only his subordinates' hands1 but also his own in certain cases4 ,certainly they may have been devised by himself1 and may be applied by him according to circumstances1 but they may also be a subject of theory1 in so far as they are based on the general properties of troops and weapons4 ,on the other hand1 any method by which definite plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if from a machine are absolutely worthless4 ,as long as there exists no theory which can be sustained1 that is1 no enlightened treatise on the conduct of ,war1 method in action cannot but encroach beyond its proper limits in high places1 for men employed in these spheres of activity have not always had the opportunity of educating themselves1 through study and through contact with the higher interests4 ,in the impracticable and inconsistent disquisitions of theorists and critics they cannot find their way1 their sound common sense rejects them1 and as they bring with them no knowledge but that derived from experience1 therefore in those cases which admit of1 and require1 a free individual treatment they readily make use of the means which experience gives them--that is1 an imitation of the particular methods practised by great ,generals1 by which a method of action then arises of itself4 ,if we see ,frederick the ,great's ,generals always making their appearance in the so-called oblique order of battle1 the ,generals of the ,french ,revolution always using turning movements with a long1 extended line of battle1 and ,buonaparte's lieutenants rushing to the attack with the bloody energy of concentrated masses1 then we recognise in the recurrence of the mode of proceeding evidently an adopted method1 and see therefore that method of action can reach up to regions bordering on the highest4 ,should an improved theory facilitate the study of the conduct of ,war1 form the mind and judgment of men who are rising to the highest commands1 then also method in action will no longer reach so far1 and so much of it as is to be considered indispensable will then at least be formed from theory itself1 and not take place out of mere imitation4 ,however pre-eminently a great ,commander does things1 there is always something subjective in the way he does them2 and if he has a certain manner1 a large share of his individuality is contained in it which does not always accord with the individuality of the person who copies his manner4 ,at the same time1 it would neither be possible nor right to banish subjective methodicism or manner completely from the conduct of ,war3 it is rather to be regarded as a manifestation of that influence which the general character of a ,war has upon its separate events1 and to which satisfaction can only be done in that way if theory is not able to foresee this general character and include it in its considerations4 ,what is more natural than that the ,war of the ,french ,revolution had its own way of doing things8 and what theory could ever have included that peculiar method8 ,the evil is only that such a manner originating in a special case easily outlives itself1 because it continues whilst circumstances imperceptibly change4 ,this is what theory should prevent by lucid and rational criticism4 ,when in the year #ahjf the ,prussian ,generals1 ,prince ,louis at ,saalfeld1 ,tauentzien on the ,dornberg near ,jena1 ,grawert before and ,ruechel behind ,kappellendorf1 all threw themselves into the open jaws of destruction in the oblique order of ,frederick the ,great1 and managed to ruin ,hohenlohe's ,army in a way that no ,army was ever ruined1 even on the field of battle1 all this was done through a manner which had outlived its day1 together with the most downright stupidity to which methodicism ever led4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,criticism ,the influence of theoretical principles upon real life is produced more through criticism than through doctrine1 for as criticism is an application of abstract truth to real events1 therefore it not only brings truth of this description nearer to life1 but also accustoms the understanding more to such truths by the constant repetition of their application4 ,we therefore think it necessary to fix the point of view for criticism next to that for theory4 ,from the simple narration of an historical occurrence which places events in chronological order1 or at most only touches on their more immediate causes1 we separate the ,,critical4 ,in this ,,critical three different operations of the mind may be observed4 ,first1 the historical investigation and determining of doubtful facts4 ,this is properly historical research1 and has nothing in common with theory4 ,secondly1 the tracing of effects to causes4 ,this is the ,,real ,,critical ,,inquiry2 it is indispensable to theory1 for everything which in theory is to be established1 supported1 or even merely explained1 by experience can only be settled in this way4 ,thirdly1 the testing of the means employed4 ,this is criticism1 properly speaking1 in which praise and censure is contained4 ,this is where theory helps history1 or rather1 the teaching to be derived from it4 ,in these two last strictly critical parts of historical study1 all depends on tracing things to their primary elements1 that is to say1 up to undoubted truths1 and not1 as is so often done1 resting half-way1 that is1 on some arbitrary assumption or supposition4 ,as respects the tracing of effect to cause1 that is often attended with the insuperable difficulty that the real causes are not known4 ,in none of the relations of life does this so frequently happen as in ,war1 where events are seldom fully known1 and still less motives1 as the latter have been1 perhaps purposely1 concealed by the chief actor1 or have been of such a transient and accidental character that they have been lost for history4 ,for this reason critical narration must generally proceed hand in hand with historical investigation1 and still such a want of connection between cause and effect will often present itself1 that it does not seem justifiable to consider effects as the necessary results of known causes4 ,here1 therefore must occur1 that is1 historical results which cannot be made use of for teaching4 ,all that theory can demand is that the investigation should be rigidly conducted up to that point1 and there leave off without drawing conclusions4 ,a real evil springs up only if the known is made perforce to suffice as an explanation of effects1 and thus a false importance is ascribed to it4 ,besides this difficulty1 critical inquiry also meets with another great and intrinsic one1 which is that the progress of events in ,war seldom proceeds from one simple cause1 but from several in common1 and that it therefore is not sufficient to follow up a series of events to their origin in a candid and impartial spirit1 but that it is then also necessary to apportion to each contributing cause its due weight4 ,this leads1 therefore1 to a closer investigation of their nature1 and thus a critical investigation may lead into what is the proper field of theory4 ,the critical ,,consideration1 that is1 the testing of the means1 leads to the question1 ,which are the effects peculiar to the means applied1 and whether these effects were comprehended in the plans of the person directing8 ,the effects peculiar to the means lead to the investigation of their nature1 and thus again into the field of theory4 ,we have already seen that in criticism all depends upon attaining to positive truth2 therefore1 that we must not stop at arbitrary propositions which are not allowed by others1 and to which other perhaps equally arbitrary assertions may again be opposed1 so that there is no end to pros and cons2 the whole is without result1 and therefore without instruction4 ,we have seen that both the search for causes and the examination of means lead into the field of theory2 that is1 into the field of universal truth1 which does not proceed solely from the case immediately under examination4 ,if there is a theory which can be used1 then the critical consideration will appeal to the proofs there afforded1 and the examination may there stop4 ,but where no such theoretical truth is to be found1 the inquiry must be pushed up to the original elements4 ,if this necessity occurs often1 it must lead the historian 7according to a common expression7 into a labyrinth of details4 ,he then has his hands full1 and it is impossible for him to stop to give the requisite attention everywhere2 the consequence is1 that in order to set bounds to his investigation1 he adopts some arbitrary assumptions which1 if they do not appear so to him1 do so to others1 as they are not evident in themselves or capable of proof4 ,a sound theory is therefore an essential foundation for criticism1 and it is impossible for it1 without the assistance of a sensible theory1 to attain to that point at which it commences chiefly to be instructive1 that is1 where it becomes demonstration1 both convincing and sans rplique4 ,but it would be a visionary hope to believe in the possibility of a theory applicable to every abstract truth1 leaving nothing for criticism to do but to place the case under its appropriate law3 it would be ridiculous pedantry to lay down as a rule for criticism that it must always halt and turn round on reaching the boundaries of sacred theory4 ,the same spirit of analytical inquiry which is the origin of theory must also guide the critic in his work2 and it can and must therefore happen that he strays beyond the boundaries of the province of theory and elucidates those points with which he is more particularly concerned4 ,it is more likely1 on the contrary1 that criticism would completely fail in its object if it degenerated into a mechanical application of theory4 ,all positive results of theoretical inquiry1 all principles1 rules1 and methods1 are the more wanting in generality and positive truth the more they become positive doctrine4 ,they exist to offer themselves for use as required1 and it must always be left for judgment to decide whether they are suitable or not4 ,such results of theory must never be used in criticism as rules or norms for a standard1 but in the same way as the person acting should use them1 that is1 merely as aids to judgment4 ,if it is an acknowledged principle in tactics that in the usual order of battle cavalry should be placed behind infantry1 not in line with it1 still it would be folly on this account to condemn every deviation from this principle4 ,criticism must investigate the grounds of the deviation1 and it is only in case these are insufficient that it has a right to appeal to principles laid down in theory4 ,if it is further established in theory that a divided attack diminishes the probability of success1 still it would be just as unreasonable1 whenever there is a divided attack and an unsuccessful issue1 to regard the latter as the result of the former1 without further investigation into the connection between the two1 as where a divided attack is successful to infer from it the fallacy of that theoretical principle4 ,the spirit of investigation which belongs to criticism cannot allow either4 ,criticism therefore supports itself chiefly on the results of the analytical investigation of theory2 what has been made out and determined by theory does not require to be demonstrated over again by criticism1 and it is so determined by theory that criticism may find it ready demonstrated4 ,this office of criticism1 of examining the effect produced by certain causes1 and whether a means applied has answered its object1 will be easy enough if cause and effect1 means and end1 are all near together4 ,if an ,army is surprised1 and therefore cannot make a regular and intelligent use of its powers and resources1 then the effect of the surprise is not doubtful4--,if theory has determined that in a battle the convergent form of attack is calculated to produce greater but less certain results1 then the question is whether he who employs that convergent form had in view chiefly that greatness of result as his object2 if so1 the proper means were chosen4 ,but if by this form he intended to make the result more certain1 and that expectation was founded not on some exceptional circumstances 7in this case71 but on the general nature of the convergent form1 as has happened a hundred times1 then he mistook the nature of the means and committed an error4 ,here the work of military investigation and criticism is easy1 and it will always be so when confined to the immediate effects and objects4 ,this can be done quite at option1 if we abstract the connection of the parts with the whole1 and only look at things in that relation4 ,but in ,war1 as generally in the world1 there is a connection between everything which belongs to a whole2 and therefore1 however small a cause may be in itself1 its effects reach to the end of the act of warfare1 and modify or influence the final result in some degree1 let that degree be ever so small4 ,in the same manner every means must be felt up to the ultimate object4 ,we can therefore trace the effects of a cause as long as events are worth noticing1 and in the same way we must not stop at the testing of a means for the immediate object1 but test also this object as a means to a higher one1 and thus ascend the series of facts in succession1 until we come to one so absolutely necessary in its nature as to require no examination or proof4 ,in many cases1 particularly in what concerns great and decisive measures1 the investigation must be carried to the final aim1 to that which leads immediately to peace4 ,it is evident that in thus ascending1 at every new station which we reach a new point of view for the judgment is attained1 so that the same means which appeared advisable at one station1 when looked at from the next above it may have to be rejected4 ,the search for the causes of events and the comparison of means with ends must always go hand in hand in the critical review of an act1 for the investigation of causes leads us first to the discovery of those things which are worth examining4 ,this following of the clue up and down is attended with considerable difficulty1 for the farther from an event the cause lies which we are looking for1 the greater must be the number of other causes which must at the same time be kept in view and allowed for in reference to the share which they have in the course of events1 and then eliminated1 because the higher the importance of a fact the greater will be the number of separate forces and circumstances by which it is conditioned4 ,if we have unravelled the causes of a battle being lost1 we have certainly also ascertained a part of the causes of the consequences which this defeat has upon the whole ,war1 but only a part1 because the effects of other causes1 more or less according to circumstances1 will flow into the final result4 ,the same multiplicity of circumstances is presented also in the examination of the means the higher our point of view1 for the higher the object is situated1 the greater must be the number of means employed to reach it4 ,the ultimate object of the ,war is the object aimed at by all the ,armies simultaneously1 and it is therefore necessary that the consideration should embrace all that each has done or could have done4 ,it is obvious that this may sometimes lead to a wide field of inquiry1 in which it is easy to wander and lose the way1 and in which this difficulty prevails--that a number of assumptions or suppositions must be made about a variety of things which do not actually appear1 but which in all probability did take place1 and therefore cannot possibly be left out of consideration4 ,when ,buonaparte1 in #agig17997 at the head of the ,army of ,italy1 advanced from the ,tagliamento against the ,archduke ,charles1 he did so with a view to force that ,general to a decisive action before the reinforcements expected from the ,rhine had reached him4 ,if we look1 only at the immediate object1 the means were well chosen and justified by the result1 for the ,archduke was so inferior in numbers that he only made a show of resistance on the ,tagliamento1 and when he saw his adversary so strong and resolute1 yielded ground1 and left open the passages1 of the ,norican ,alps4 ,now to what use could ,buonaparte turn this fortunate event8 ,to penetrate into the heart of the ,austrian empire itself1 to facilitate the advance of the ,rhine ,armies under ,moreau and ,hoche1 and open communication with them8 ,this was the view taken by ,buonaparte1 and from this point of view he was right4 ,but now1 if criticism places itself at a higher point of view--namely1 that of the ,french ,directory1 which body could see and know that the ,armies on the ,rhine could not commence the campaign for six weeks1 then the advance of ,buonaparte over the ,norican ,alps can only be regarded as an extremely hazardous measure2 for if the ,austrians had drawn largely on their ,rhine ,armies to reinforce their ,army in ,styria1 so as to enable the ,archduke to fall upon the ,army of ,italy1 not only would that ,army have been routed1 but the whole campaign lost4 ,this consideration1 which attracted the serious attention of ,buonaparte at ,villach1 no doubt induced him to sign the armistice of ,leoben with so much readiness4 7997 ,compare ,hinterlassene ,werke1 #bnd edition1 vol4 iv4 p4 #bgf et seq4 ,if criticism takes a still higher position1 and if it knows that the ,austrians had no reserves between the ,army of the ,archduke ,charles and ,vienna1 then we see that ,vienna became threatened by the advance of the ,army of ,italy4 ,supposing that ,buonaparte knew that the capital was thus uncovered1 and knew that he still retained the same superiority in numbers over the ,archduke as he had in ,styria1 then his advance against the heart of the ,austrian ,states was no longer without purpose1 and its value depended on the value which the ,austrians might place on preserving their capital4 ,if that was so great that1 rather than lose it1 they would accept the conditions of peace which ,buonaparte was ready to offer them1 it became an object of the first importance to threaten ,vienna4 ,if ,buonaparte had any reason to know this1 then criticism may stop there1 but if this point was only problematical1 then criticism must take a still higher position1 and ask what would have followed if the ,austrians had resolved to abandon ,vienna and retire farther into the vast dominions still left to them4 ,but it is easy to see that this question cannot be answered without bringing into the consideration the probable movements of the ,rhine ,armies on both sides4 ,through the decided superiority of numbers on the side of the ,french--#acj1jjj to #hj1jjj--there could be little doubt of the result2 but then next arises the question1 ,what use would the ,directory make of a victory2 whether they would follow up their success to the opposite frontiers of the ,austrian monarchy1 therefore to the complete breaking up or overthrow of that power1 or whether they would be satisfied with the conquest of a considerable portion to serve as a security for peace8 ,the probable result in each case must be estimated1 in order to come to a conclusion as to the probable determination of the ,directory4 ,supposing the result of these considerations to be that the ,french forces were much too weak for the complete subjugation of the ,austrian monarchy1 so that the attempt might completely reverse the respective positions of the contending ,armies1 and that even the conquest and occupation of a considerable district of country would place the ,french ,army in strategic relations to which they were not equal1 then that result must naturally influence the estimate of the position of the ,army of ,italy1 and compel it to lower its expectations4 ,and this1 it was no doubt which influenced ,buonaparte1 although fully aware of the helpless condition of the ,archduke1 still to sign the peace of ,campo ,formio1 which imposed no greater sacrifices on the ,austrians than the loss of provinces which1 even if the campaign took the most favourable turn for them1 they could not have reconquered4 ,but the ,french could not have reckoned on even the moderate treaty of ,campo ,formio1 and therefore it could not have been their object in making their bold advance if two considerations had not presented themselves to their view1 the first of which consisted in the question1 what degree of value the ,austrians would attach to each of the above-mentioned results2 whether1 notwithstanding the probability of a satisfactory result in either of these cases1 would it be worth while to make the sacrifices inseparable from a continuance of the ,war1 when they could be spared those sacrifices by a peace on terms not too humiliating8 ,the second consideration is the question whether the ,austrian ,government1 instead of seriously weighing the possible results of a resistance pushed to extremities1 would not prove completely disheartened by the impression of their present reverses4 ,the consideration which forms the subject of the first is no idle piece of subtle argument1 but a consideration of such decidedly practical importance that it comes up whenever the plan of pushing ,war to the utmost extremity is mooted1 and by its weight in most cases restrains the execution of such plans4 ,the second consideration is of equal importance1 for we do not make ,war with an abstraction but with a reality1 which we must always keep in view1 and we may be sure that it was not overlooked by the bold ,buonaparte--that is1 that he was keenly alive to the terror which the appearance of his sword inspired4 ,it was reliance on that which led him to ,moscow4 ,there it led him into a scrape4 ,the terror of him had been weakened by the gigantic struggles in which he had been engaged2 in the year #agig it was still fresh1 and the secret of a resistance pushed to extremities had not been discovered2 nevertheless even in #agig his boldness might have led to a negative result if1 as already said1 he had not with a sort of presentiment avoided it by signing the moderate peace of ,campo ,formio4 ,we must now bring these considerations to a close--they will suffice to show the wide sphere1 the diversity and embarrassing nature of the subjects embraced in a critical examination carried to the fullest extent1 that is1 to those measures of a great and decisive class which must necessarily be included4 ,it follows from them that besides a theoretical acquaintance with the subject1 natural talent must also have a great influence on the value of critical examinations1 for it rests chiefly with the latter to throw the requisite light on the interrelations of things1 and to distinguish from amongst the endless connections of events those which are really essential4 ,but talent is also called into requisition in another way4 ,critical examination is not merely the appreciation of those means which have been actually employed1 but also of all possible means1 which therefore must be suggested in the first place--that is1 must be discovered2 and the use of any particular means is not fairly open to censure until a better is pointed out4 ,now1 however small the number of possible combinations may be in most cases1 still it must be admitted that to point out those which have not been used is not a mere analysis of actual things1 but a spontaneous creation which cannot be prescribed1 and depends on the fertility of genius4 ,we are far from seeing a field for great genius in a case which admits only of the application of a few simple combinations1 and we think it exceedingly ridiculous to hold up1 as is often done1 the turning of a position as an invention showing the highest genius2 still nevertheless this creative self-activity on the part of the critic is necessary1 and it is one of the points which essentially determine the value of critical examination4 ,when ,buonaparte on #cjth ,july1 #agif17997 determined to raise the siege of ,mantua1 in order to march with his whole force against the enemy1 advancing in separate columns to the relief of the place1 and to beat them in detail1 this appeared the surest way to the attainment of brilliant victories4 ,these victories actually followed1 and were afterwards again repeated on a still more brilliant scale on the attempt to relieve the fortress being again renewed4 ,we hear only one opinion on these achievements1 that of unmixed admiration4 7997 ,compare ,hinterlassene ,werke1 #bnd edition1 vol4 iv4 p4 #ajg et seq4 ,at the same time1 ,buonaparte could not have adopted this course on the #cjth ,july without quite giving up the idea of the siege of ,mantua1 because it was impossible to save the siege train1 and it could not be replaced by another in this campaign4 ,in fact1 the siege was converted into a blockade1 and the town1 which if the siege had continued must have very shortly fallen1 held out for six months in spite of ,buonaparte's victories in the open field4 ,criticism has generally regarded this as an evil that was unavoidable1 because critics have not been able to suggest any better course4 ,resistance to a relieving ,army within lines of circumvallation had fallen into such disrepute and contempt that it appears to have entirely escaped consideration as a means4 ,and yet in the reign of ,louis ,,xiv4 that measure was so often used with success that we can only attribute to the force of fashion the fact that a hundred years later it never occurred to any one even to propose such a measure4 ,if the practicability of such a plan had ever been entertained for a moment1 a closer consideration of circumstances would have shown that #dj1jjj of the best infantry in the world under ,buonaparte1 behind strong lines of circumvallation round ,mantua1 had so little to fear from the #ej1jjj men coming to the relief under ,wurmser1 that it was very unlikely that any attempt even would be made upon their lines4 ,we shall not seek here to establish this point1 but we believe enough has been said to show that this means was one which had a right to a share of consideration4 ,whether ,buonaparte himself ever thought of such a plan we leave undecided2 neither in his memoirs nor in other sources is there any trace to be found of his having done so2 in no critical works has it been touched upon1 the measure being one which the mind had lost sight of4 ,the merit of resuscitating the idea of this means is not great1 for it suggests itself at once to any one who breaks loose from the trammels of fashion4 ,still it is necessary that it should suggest itself for us to bring it into consideration and compare it with the means which ,buonaparte employed4 ,whatever may be the result of the comparison1 it is one which should not be omitted by criticism4 ,when ,buonaparte1 in ,february1 #ahad17997 after gaining the battles at ,etoges1 ,champ-,aubert1 and ,montmirail1 left ,blcher's ,army1 and turning upon ,schwartzenberg1 beat his troops at ,montereau and ,mormant1 every one was filled with admiration1 because ,buonaparte1 by thus throwing his concentrated force first upon one opponent1 then upon another1 made a brilliant use of the mistakes which his adversaries had committed in dividing their forces4 ,if these brilliant strokes in different directions failed to save him1 it was generally considered to be no fault of his1 at least4 ,no one has yet asked the question1 ,what would have been the result if1 instead of turning from ,blcher upon ,schwartzenberg1 he had tried another blow at ,blcher1 and pursued him to the ,rhine8 ,we are convinced that it would have completely changed the course of the campaign1 and that the ,army of the ,allies1 instead of marching to ,paris1 would have retired behind the ,rhine4 ,we do not ask others to share our conviction1 but no one who understands the thing will doubt1 at the mere mention of this alternative course1 that it is one which should not be overlooked in criticism4 7997 ,compare ,hinterlassene ,werke1 #bnd edition4 vol4 vii4 p4 #aic et seq4 ,in this case the means of comparison lie much more on the surface than in the foregoing1 but they have been equally overlooked1 because one-sided views have prevailed1 and there has been no freedom of judgment4 ,from the necessity of pointing out a better means which might have been used in place of those which are condemned has arisen the form of criticism almost exclusively in use1 which contents itself with pointing out the better means without demonstrating in what the superiority consists4 ,the consequence is that some are not convinced1 that others start up and do the same thing1 and that thus discussion arises which is without any fixed basis for the argument4 ,military literature abounds with matter of this sort4 ,the demonstration we require is always necessary when the superiority of the means propounded is not so evident as to leave no room for doubt1 and it consists in the examination of each of the means on its own merits1 and then of its comparison with the object desired4 ,when once the thing is traced back to a simple truth1 controversy must cease1 or at all events a new result is obtained1 whilst by the other plan the pros and cons go on for ever consuming each other4 ,should we1 for example1 not rest content with assertion in the case before mentioned1 and wish to prove that the persistent pursuit of ,blcher would have been more advantageous than the turning on ,schwartzenberg1 we should support the arguments on the following simple truths3 #a4 ,in general it is more advantageous to continue our blows in one and the same direction1 because there is a loss of time in striking in different directions2 and at a point where the moral power is already shaken by considerable losses there is the more reason to expect fresh successes1 therefore in that way no part of the preponderance already gained is left idle4 #b4 ,because ,blcher1 although weaker than ,schwartzenberg1 was1 on account of his enterprising spirit1 the more important adversary2 in him1 therefore1 lay the centre of attraction which drew the others along in the same direction4 #c4 ,because the losses which ,blcher had sustained almost amounted to a defeat1 which gave ,buonaparte such a preponderance over him as to make his retreat to the ,rhine almost certain1 and at the same time no reserves of any consequence awaited him there4 #d4 ,because there was no other result which would be so terrific in its aspects1 would appear to the imagination in such gigantic proportions1 an immense advantage in dealing with a ,staff so weak and irresolute as that of ,schwartzenberg notoriously was at this time4 ,what had happened to the ,crown ,prince of ,wartemberg at ,montereau1 and to ,count ,wittgenstein at ,mormant1 ,prince ,schwartzenberg must have known well enough2 but all the untoward events on ,blcher's distant and separate line from the ,marne to the ,rhine would only reach him by the avalanche of rumour4 ,the desperate movements which ,buonaparte made upon ,vitry at the end of ,march1 to see what the ,allies would do if he threatened to turn them strategically1 were evidently done on the principle of working on their fears2 but it was done under far different circumstances1 in consequence of his defeat at ,laon and ,arcis1 and because ,blcher1 with #ajj1jjj men1 was then in communication with ,schwartzenberg4 ,there are people1 no doubt1 who will not be convinced on these arguments1 but at all events they cannot retort by saying1 that 8whilst ,buonaparte threatened ,schwartzenberg's base by advancing to the ,rhine1 ,schwartzenberg at the same time threatened ,buonaparte's communications with ,paris10 because we have shown by the reasons above given that ,schwartzenberg would never have thought of marching on ,paris4 ,with respect to the example quoted by us from the campaign of #agif1 we should say3 ,buonaparte looked upon the plan he adopted as the surest means of beating the ,austrians2 but admitting that it was so1 still the object to be attained was only an empty victory1 which could have hardly any sensible influence on the fall of ,mantua4 ,the way which we should have chosen would1 in our opinion1 have been much more certain to prevent the relief of ,mantua2 but even if we place ourselves in the position of the ,french ,general and assume that it was not so1 and look upon the certainty of success to have been less1 the question then amounts to a choice between a more certain but less useful1 and therefore less important1 victory on the one hand1 and a somewhat less probable but far more decisive and important victory1 on the other hand4 ,presented in this form1 boldness must have declared for the second solution1 which is the reverse of what took place1 when the thing was only superficially viewed4 ,buonaparte certainly was anything but deficient in boldness1 and we may be sure that he did not see the whole case and its consequences as fully and clearly as we can at the present time4 ,naturally the critic1 in treating of the means1 must often appeal to military history1 as experience is of more value in the ,art of ,war than all philosophical truth4 ,but this exemplification from history is subject to certain conditions1 of which we shall treat in a special chapter and unfortunately these conditions are so seldom regarded that reference to history generally only serves to increase the confusion of ideas4 ,we have still a most important subject to consider1 which is1 ,how far criticism in passing judgments on particular events is permitted1 or in duty bound1 to make use of its wider view of things1 and therefore also of that which is shown by results2 or when and where it should leave out of sight these things in order to place itself1 as far as possible1 in the exact position of the chief actor8 ,if criticism dispenses praise or censure1 it should seek to place itself as nearly as possible at the same point of view as the person acting1 that is to say1 to collect all he knew and all the motives on which he acted1 and1 on the other hand1 to leave out of the consideration all that the person acting could not or did not know1 and above all1 the result4 ,but this is only an object to aim at1 which can never be reached because the state of circumstances from which an event proceeded can never be placed before the eye of the critic exactly as it lay before the eye of the person acting4 ,a number of inferior circumstances1 which must have influenced the result1 are completely lost to sight1 and many a subjective motive has never come to light4 ,the latter can only be learnt from the memoirs of the chief actor1 or from his intimate friends2 and in such things of this kind are often treated of in a very desultory manner1 or purposely misrepresented4 ,criticism must1 therefore1 always forego much which was present in the minds of those whose acts are criticised4 ,on the other hand1 it is much more difficult to leave out of sight that which criticism knows in excess4 ,this is only easy as regards accidental circumstances1 that is1 circumstances which have been mixed up1 but are in no way necessarily related4 ,but it is very difficult1 and1 in fact1 can never be completely done with regard to things really essential4 ,let us take first1 the result4 ,if it has not proceeded from accidental circumstances1 it is almost impossible that the knowledge of it should not have an effect on the judgment passed on events which have preceded it1 for we see these things in the light of this result1 and it is to a certain extent by it that we first become acquainted with them and appreciate them4 ,military history1 with all its events1 is a source of instruction for criticism itself1 and it is only natural that criticism should throw that light on things which it has itself obtained from the consideration of the whole4 ,if therefore it might wish in some cases to leave the result out of the consideration1 it would be impossible to do so completely4 ,but it is not only in relation to the result1 that is1 with what takes place at the last1 that this embarrassment arises2 the same occurs in relation to preceding events1 therefore with the data which furnished the motives to action4 ,criticism has before it1 in most cases1 more information on this point than the principal in the transaction4 ,now it may seem easy to dismiss from the consideration everything of this nature1 but it is not so easy as we may think4 ,the knowledge of preceding and concurrent events is founded not only on certain information1 but on a number of conjectures and suppositions2 indeed1 there is hardly any of the information respecting things not purely accidental which has not been preceded by suppositions or conjectures destined to take the place of certain information in case such should never be supplied4 ,now is it conceivable that criticism in after times1 which has before it as facts all the preceding and concurrent circumstances1 should not allow itself to be thereby influenced when it asks itself the question1 ,what portion of the circumstances1 which at the moment of action were unknown1 would it have held to be probable8 ,we maintain that in this case1 as in the case of the results1 and for the same reason1 it is impossible to disregard all these things completely4 ,if therefore the critic wishes to bestow praise or blame upon any single act1 he can only succeed to a certain degree in placing himself in the position of the person whose act he has under review4 ,in many cases he can do so sufficiently near for any practical purpose1 but in many instances it is the very reverse1 and this fact should never be overlooked4 ,but it is neither necessary nor desirable that criticism should completely identify itself with the person acting4 ,in ,war1 as in all matters of skill1 there is a certain natural aptitude required which is called talent4 ,this may be great or small4 ,in the first case it may easily be superior to that of the critic1 for what critic can pretend to the skill of a ,frederick or a ,buonaparte8 ,therefore1 if criticism is not to abstain altogether from offering an opinion where eminent talent is concerned1 it must be allowed to make use of the advantage which its enlarged horizon affords4 ,criticism must not1 therefore1 treat the solution of a problem by a great ,general like a sum in arithmetic2 it is only through the results and through the exact coincidences of events that it can recognise with admiration how much is due to the exercise of genius1 and that it first learns the essential combination which the glance of that genius devised4 ,but for every1 even the smallest1 act of genius it is necessary that criticism should take a higher point of view1 so that1 having at command many objective grounds of decision1 it may be as little subjective as possible1 and that the critic may not take the limited scope of his own mind as a standard4 ,this elevated position of criticism1 its praise and blame pronounced with a full knowledge of all the circumstances1 has in itself nothing which hurts our feelings2 it only does so if the critic pushes himself forward1 and speaks in a tone as if all the wisdom which he has obtained by an exhaustive examination of the event under consideration were really his own talent4 ,palpable as is this deception1 it is one which people may easily fall into through vanity1 and one which is naturally distasteful to others4 ,it very often happens that although the critic has no such arrogant pretensions1 they are imputed to him by the reader because he has not expressly disclaimed them1 and then follows immediately a charge of a want of the power of critical judgment4 ,if therefore a critic points out an error made by a ,frederick or a ,buonaparte1 that does not mean that he who makes the criticism would not have committed the same error2 he may even be ready to grant that had he been in the place of these great ,generals he might have made much greater mistakes2 he merely sees this error from the chain of events1 and he thinks that it should not have escaped the sagacity of the ,general4 ,this is1 therefore1 an opinion formed through the connection of events1 and therefore through the ,,result4 ,but there is another quite different effect of the result itself upon the judgment1 that is if it is used quite alone as an example for or against the soundness of a measure4 ,this may be called ,,judgment ,,according ,,to ,,the ,,result4 ,such a judgment appears at first sight inadmissible1 and yet it is not4 ,when ,buonaparte marched to ,moscow in #ahab1 all depended upon whether the taking of the capital1 and the events which preceded the capture1 would force the ,emperor ,alexander to make peace1 as he had been compelled to do after the battle of ,friedland in #ahjg1 and the ,emperor ,francis in #ahje and #ahji after ,austerlitz and ,wagram2 for if ,buonaparte did not obtain a peace at ,moscow1 there was no alternative but to return--that is1 there was nothing for him but a strategic defeat4 ,we shall leave out of the question what he did to get to ,moscow1 and whether in his advance he did not miss many opportunities of bringing the ,emperor ,alexander to peace2 we shall also exclude all consideration of the disastrous circumstances which attended his retreat1 and which perhaps had their origin in the general conduct of the campaign4 ,still the question remains the same1 for however much more brilliant the course of the campaign up to ,moscow might have been1 still there was always an uncertainty whether the ,emperor ,alexander would be intimidated into making peace2 and then1 even if a retreat did not contain in itself the seeds of such disasters as did in fact occur1 still it could never be anything else than a great strategic defeat4 ,if the ,emperor ,alexander agreed to a peace which was disadvantageous to him1 the campaign of #ahab would have ranked with those of ,austerlitz1 ,friedland1 and ,wagram4 ,but these campaigns also1 if they had not led to peace1 would in all probability have ended in similar catastrophes4 ,whatever1 therefore1 of genius1 skill1 and energy the ,conqueror of the ,world applied to the task1 this last question addressed to fate7997 remained always the same4 ,shall we then discard the campaigns of #ahje1 #ahjg1 #ahji1 and say on account of the campaign of #ahab that they were acts of imprudence2 that the results were against the nature of things1 and that in #ahab strategic justice at last found vent for itself in opposition to blind chance8 ,that would be an unwarrantable conclusion1 a most arbitrary judgment1 a case only half proved1 because no human1 eye can trace the thread of the necessary connection of events up to the determination of the conquered ,princes4 7997 8,frage an der ,schicksal10 a familiar quotation from ,schiller4--,,tr4 ,still less can we say the campaign of #ahab merited the same success as the others1 and that the reason why it turned out otherwise lies in something unnatural1 for we cannot regard the firmness of ,alexander as something unpredictable4 ,what can be more natural than to say that in the years #ahje1 #ahjg1 #ahji1 ,buonaparte judged his opponents correctly1 and that in #ahab he erred in that point8 ,on the former occasions1 therefore1 he was right1 in the latter wrong1 and in both cases we judge by the result4 ,all action in ,war1 as we have already said1 is directed on probable1 not on certain1 results4 ,whatever is wanting in certainty must always be left to fate1 or chance1 call it which you will4 ,we may demand that what is so left should be as little as possible1 but only in relation to the particular case--that is1 as little as is possible in this one case1 but not that the case in which the least is left to chance is always to be preferred4 ,that would be an enormous error1 as follows from all our theoretical views4 ,there are cases in which the greatest daring is the greatest wisdom4 ,now in everything which is left to chance by the chief actor1 his personal merit1 and therefore his responsibility as well1 seems to be completely set aside2 nevertheless we cannot suppress an inward feeling of satisfaction whenever expectation realises itself1 and if it disappoints us our mind is dissatisfied2 and more than this of right and wrong should not be meant by the judgment which we form from the mere result1 or rather that we find there4 ,nevertheless1 it cannot be denied that the satisfaction which our mind experiences at success1 the pain caused by failure1 proceed from a sort of mysterious feeling2 we suppose between that success ascribed to good fortune and the genius of the chief a fine connecting thread1 invisible to the mind's eye1 and the supposition gives pleasure4 ,what tends to confirm this idea is that our sympathy increases1 becomes more decided1 if the successes and defeats of the principal actor are often repeated4 ,thus it becomes intelligible how good luck in ,war assumes a much nobler nature than good luck at play4 ,in general1 when a fortunate warrior does not otherwise lessen our interest in his behalf1 we have a pleasure in accompanying him in his career4 ,criticism1 therefore1 after having weighed all that comes within the sphere of human reason and conviction1 will let the result speak for that part where the deep mysterious relations are not disclosed in any visible form1 and will protect this silent sentence of a higher authority from the noise of crude opinions on the one hand1 while on the other it prevents the gross abuse which might be made of this last tribunal4 ,this verdict of the result must therefore always bring forth that which human sagacity cannot discover2 and it will be chiefly as regards the intellectual powers and operations that it will be called into requisition1 partly because they can be estimated with the least certainty1 partly because their close connection with the will is favourable to their exercising over it an important influence4 ,when fear or bravery precipitates the decision1 there is nothing objective intervening between them for our consideration1 and consequently nothing by which sagacity and calculation might have met the probable result4 ,we must now be allowed to make a few observations on the instrument of criticism1 that is1 the language which it uses1 because that is to a certain extent connected with the action in ,war2 for the critical examination is nothing more than the deliberation which should precede action in ,war4 ,we therefore think it very essential that the language used in criticism should have the same character as that which deliberation in ,war must have1 for otherwise it would cease to be practical1 and criticism could gain no admittance in actual life4 ,we have said in our observations on the theory of the conduct of ,war that it should educate the mind of the ,commander for ,war1 or that its teaching should guide his education2 also that it is not intended to furnish him with positive doctrines and systems which he can use like mental appliances4 ,but if the construction of scientific formulae is never required1 or even allowable1 in ,war to aid the decision on the case presented1 if truth does not appear there in a systematic shape1 if it is not found in an indirect way1 but directly by the natural perception of the mind1 then it must be the same also in a critical review4 ,it is true as we have seen that1 wherever complete demonstration of the nature of things would be too tedious1 criticism must support itself on those truths which theory has established on the point4 ,but1 just as in ,war the actor obeys these theoretical truths rather because his mind is imbued with them than because he regards them as objective inflexible laws1 so criticism must also make use of them1 not as an external law or an algebraic formula1 of which fresh proof is not required each time they are applied1 but it must always throw a light on this proof itself1 leaving only to theory the more minute and circumstantial proof4 ,thus it avoids a mysterious1 unintelligible phraseology1 and makes its progress in plain language1 that is1 with a clear and always visible chain of ideas4 ,certainly this cannot always be completely attained1 but it must always be the aim in critical expositions4 ,such expositions must use complicated forms of science as sparingly as possible1 and never resort to the construction of scientific aids as of a truth apparatus of its own1 but always be guided by the natural and unbiassed impressions of the mind4 ,but this pious endeavour1 if we may use the expression1 has unfortunately seldom hitherto presided over critical examinations3 the most of them have rather been emanations of a species of vanity--a wish to make a display of ideas4 ,the first evil which we constantly stumble upon is a lame1 totally inadmissible application of certain one-sided systems as of a formal code of laws4 ,but it is never difficult to show the one-sidedness of such systems1 and this only requires to be done once to throw discredit for ever on critical judgments which are based on them4 ,we have here to deal with a definite subject1 and as the number of possible systems after all can be but small1 therefore also they are themselves the lesser evil4 ,much greater is the evil which lies in the pompous retinue of technical terms--scientific expressions and metaphors1 which these systems carry in their train1 and which like a rabble-like the baggage of an ,army broken away from its ,chief--hang about in all directions4 ,any critic who has not adopted a system1 either because he has not found one to please him1 or because he has not yet been able to make himself master of one1 will at least occasionally make use of a piece of one1 as one would use a ruler1 to show the blunders committed by a ,general4 ,the most of them are incapable of reasoning without using as a help here and there some shreds of scientific military theory4 ,the smallest of these fragments1 consisting in mere scientific words and metaphors1 are often nothing more than ornamental flourishes of critical narration4 ,now it is in the nature of things that all technical and scientific expressions which belong to a system lose their propriety1 if they ever had any1 as soon as they are distorted1 and used as general axioms1 or as small crystalline talismans1 which have more power of demonstration than simple speech4 ,thus it has come to pass that our theoretical and critical books1 instead of being straightforward1 intelligible dissertations1 in which the author always knows at least what he says and the reader what he reads1 are brimful of these technical terms1 which form dark points of interference where author and reader part company4 ,but frequently they are something worse1 being nothing but hollow shells without any kernel4 ,the author himself has no clear perception of what he means1 contents himself with vague ideas1 which if expressed in plain language would be unsatisfactory even to himself4 ,a third fault in criticism is the misuse of historical examples1 and a display of great reading or learning4 ,what the history of the ,art of ,war is we have already said1 and we shall further explain our views on examples and on military history in general in special chapters4 ,one fact merely touched upon in a very cursory manner may be used to support the most opposite views1 and three or four such facts of the most heterogeneous description1 brought together out of the most distant lands and remote times and heaped up1 generally distract and bewilder the judgment and understanding without demonstrating anything2 for when exposed to the light they turn out to be only trumpery rubbish1 made use of to show off the author's learning4 ,but what can be gained for practical life by such obscure1 partly false1 confused arbitrary conceptions8 ,so little is gained that theory on account of them has always been a true antithesis of practice1 and frequently a subject of ridicule to those whose soldierly qualities in the field are above question4 ,but it is impossible that this could have been the case1 if theory in simple language1 and by natural treatment of those things which constitute the ,art of making ,war1 had merely sought to establish just so much as admits of being established2 if1 avoiding all false pretensions and irrelevant display of scientific forms and historical parallels1 it had kept close to the subject1 and gone hand in hand with those who must conduct affairs in the field by their own natural genius4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,on ,examples ,examples from history make everything clear1 and furnish the best description of proof in the empirical sciences4 ,this applies with more force to the ,art of ,war than to any other4 ,general ,scharnhorst1 whose handbook is the best ever written on actual ,war1 pronounces historical examples to be of the first importance1 and makes an admirable use of them himself4 ,had he survived the ,war in which he fell17997 the fourth part of his revised treatise on artillery would have given a still greater proof of the observing and enlightened spirit in which he sifted matters of experience4 ,but such use of historical examples is rarely made by theoretical writers2 the way in which they more commonly make use of them is rather calculated to leave the mind unsatisfied1 as well as to offend the understanding4 ,we therefore think it important to bring specially into view the use and abuse of historical examples4 7997 ,general ,scharnhorst died in #ahac1 of a wound received in the battle of ,bautzen or ,grosz ,gorchen--,,editor4 ,unquestionably the branches of knowledge which lie at the foundation of the ,art of ,war come under the denomination of empirical sciences2 for although they are derived in a great measure from the nature of things1 still we can only learn this very nature itself for the most part from experience2 and besides that1 the practical application is modified by so many circumstances that the effects can never be completely learnt from the mere nature of the means4 ,the effects of gunpowder1 that great agent in our military activity1 were only learnt by experience1 and up to this hour experiments are continually in progress in order to investigate them more fully4 ,that an iron ball to which powder has given a velocity of #ajjj feet in a second1 smashes every living thing which it touches in its course is intelligible in itself2 experience is not required to tell us that2 but in producing this effect how many hundred circumstances are concerned1 some of which can only be learnt by experience6 ,and the physical is not the only effect which we have to study1 it is the moral which we are in search of1 and that can only be ascertained by experience2 and there is no other way of learning and appreciating it but by experience4 ,in the middle ages1 when firearms were first invented1 their effect1 owing to their rude make1 was materially but trifling compared to what it now is1 but their effect morally was much greater4 ,one must have witnessed the firmness of one of those masses taught and led by ,buonaparte1 under the heaviest and most unintermittent cannonade1 in order to understand what troops1 hardened by long practice in the field of danger1 can do1 when by a career of victory they have reached the noble principle of demanding from themselves their utmost efforts4 ,in pure conception no one would believe it4 ,on the other hand1 it is well known that there are troops in the service of ,european ,powers at the present moment who would easily be dispersed by a few cannon shots4 ,but no empirical science1 consequently also no theory of the ,art of ,war1 can always corroborate its truths by historical proof2 it would also be1 in some measure1 difficult to support experience by single facts4 ,if any means is once found efficacious in ,war1 it is repeated2 one nation copies another1 the thing becomes the fashion1 and in this manner it comes into use1 supported by experience1 and takes its place in theory1 which contents itself with appealing to experience in general in order to show its origin1 but not as a verification of its truth4 ,but it is quite otherwise if experience is to be used in order to overthrow some means in use1 to confirm what is doubtful1 or introduce something new2 then particular examples from history must be quoted as proofs4 ,now1 if we consider closely the use of historical proofs1 four points of view readily present themselves for the purpose4 ,first1 they may be used merely as an explanation of an idea4 ,in every abstract consideration it is very easy to be misunderstood1 or not to be intelligible at all3 when an author is afraid of this1 an exemplification from history serves to throw the light which is wanted on his idea1 and to ensure his being intelligible to his reader4 ,secondly1 it may serve as an application of an idea1 because by means of an example there is an opportunity of showing the action of those minor circumstances which cannot all be comprehended and explained in any general expression of an idea2 for in that consists1 indeed1 the difference between theory and experience4 ,both these cases belong to examples properly speaking1 the two following belong to historical proofs4 ,thirdly1 a historical fact may be referred to particularly1 in order to support what one has advanced4 ,this is in all cases sufficient1 if we have only to prove the possibility of a fact or effect4 ,lastly1 in the fourth place1 from the circumstantial detail of a historical event1 and by collecting together several of them1 we may deduce some theory1 which therefore has its true proof in this testimony itself4 ,for the first of these purposes all that is generally required is a cursory notice of the case1 as it is only used partially4 ,historical correctness is a secondary consideration2 a case invented might also serve the purpose as well1 only historical ones are always to be preferred1 because they bring the idea which they illustrate nearer to practical life4 ,the second use supposes a more circumstantial relation of events1 but historical authenticity is again of secondary importance1 and in respect to this point the same is to be said as in the first case4 ,for the third purpose the mere quotation of an undoubted fact is generally sufficient4 ,if it is asserted that fortified positions may fulfil their object under certain conditions1 it is only necessary to mention the position of ,bunzelwitz7997 in support of the assertion4 7997 ,frederick the ,great's celebrated entrenched camp in #agfa4 ,but if1 through the narrative of a case in history1 an abstract truth is to be demonstrated1 then everything in the case bearing on the demonstration must be analysed in the most searching and complete manner2 it must1 to a certain extent1 develop itself carefully before the eyes of the reader4 ,the less effectually this is done the weaker will be the proof1 and the more necessary it will be to supply the demonstrative proof which is wanting in the single case by a number of cases1 because we have a right to suppose that the more minute details which we are unable to give neutralise each other in their effects in a certain number of cases4 ,if we want to show by example derived from experience that cavalry are better placed behind than in a line with infantry2 that it is very hazardous without a decided preponderance of numbers to attempt an enveloping movement1 with widely separated columns1 either on a field of battle or in the theatre of war--that is1 either tactically or strategically--then in the first of these cases it would not be sufficient to specify some lost battles in which the cavalry was on the flanks and some gained in which the cavalry was in rear of the infantry2 and in the tatter of these cases it is not sufficient to refer to the battles of ,rivoli and ,wagram1 to the attack of the ,austrians on the theatre of war in ,italy1 in #agif1 or of the ,french upon the ,german theatre of war in the same year4 ,the way in which these orders of battle or plans of attack essentially contributed to disastrous issues in those particular cases must be shown by closely tracing out circumstances and occurrences4 ,then it will appear how far such forms or measures are to be condemned1 a point which it is very necessary to show1 for a total condemnation would be inconsistent with truth4 ,it has been already said that when a circumstantial detail of facts is impossible1 the demonstrative power which is deficient may to a certain extent be supplied by the number of cases quoted2 but this is a very dangerous method of getting out of the difficulty1 and one which has been much abused4 ,instead of one well-explained example1 three or four are just touched upon1 and thus a show is made of strong evidence4 ,but there are matters where a whole dozen of cases brought forward would prove nothing1 if1 for instance1 they are facts of frequent occurrence1 and therefore a dozen other cases with an opposite result might just as easily be brought forward4 ,if any one will instance a dozen lost battles in which the side beaten attacked in separate converging columns1 we can instance a dozen that have been gained in which the same order was adopted4 ,it is evident that in this way no result is to be obtained4 ,upon carefully considering these different points1 it will be seen how easily examples may be misapplied4 ,an occurrence which1 instead of being carefully analysed in all its parts1 is superficially noticed1 is like an object seen at a great distance1 presenting the same appearance on each side1 and in which the details of its parts cannot be distinguished4 ,such examples have1 in reality1 served to support the most contradictory opinions4 ,to some ,daun's campaigns are models of prudence and skill4 ,to others1 they are nothing but examples of timidity and want of resolution4 ,buonaparte's passage across the ,noric ,alps in #agig may be made to appear the noblest resolution1 but also as an act of sheer temerity4 ,his strategic defeat in #ahab may be represented as the consequence either of an excess1 or of a deficiency1 of energy4 ,all these opinions have been broached1 and it is easy to see that they might very well arise1 because each person takes a different view of the connection of events4 ,at the same time these antagonistic opinions cannot be reconciled with each other1 and therefore one of the two must be wrong4 ,much as we are obliged to the worthy ,feuquieres for the numerous examples introduced in his memoirs--partly because a number of historical incidents have thus been preserved which might otherwise have been lost1 and partly because he was one of the first to bring theoretical1 that is1 abstract1 ideas into connection with the practical in war1 in so far that the cases brought forward may be regarded as intended to exemplify and confirm what is theoretically asserted--yet1 in the opinion of an impartial reader1 he will hardly be allowed to have attained the object he proposed to himself1 that of proving theoretical principles by historical examples4 ,for although he sometimes relates occurrences with great minuteness1 still he falls short very often of showing that the deductions drawn necessarily proceed from the inner relations of these events4 ,another evil which comes from the superficial notice of historical events1 is that some readers are either wholly ignorant of the events1 or cannot call them to remembrance sufficiently to be able to grasp the author's meaning1 so that there is no alternative between either accepting blindly what is said1 or remaining unconvinced4 ,it is extremely difficult to put together or unfold historical events before the eyes of a reader in such a way as is necessary1 in order to be able to use them as proofs2 for the writer very often wants the means1 and can neither afford the time nor the requisite space2 but we maintain that1 when the object is to establish a new or doubtful opinion1 one single example1 thoroughly analysed1 is far more instructive than ten which are superficially treated4 ,the great mischief of these superficial representations is not that the writer puts his story forward as a proof when it has only a false title1 but that he has not made himself properly acquainted with the subject1 and that from this sort of slovenly1 shallow treatment of history1 a hundred false views and attempts at the construction of theories arise1 which would never have made their appearance if the writer had looked upon it as his duty to deduce from the strict connection of events everything new which he brought to market1 and sought to prove from history4 ,when we are convinced of these difficulties in the use of historical examples1 and at the same time of the necessity 7of making use of such examples71 then we shall also come to the conclusion that the latest military history is naturally the best field from which to draw them1 inasmuch as it alone is sufficiently authentic and detailed4 ,in ancient times1 circumstances connected with ,war1 as well as the method of carrying it on1 were different2 therefore its events are of less use to us either theoretically or practically2 in addition to which1 military history1 like every other1 naturally loses in the course of time a number of small traits and lineaments originally to be seen1 loses in colour and life1 like a worn-out or darkened picture2 so that perhaps at last only the large masses and leading features remain1 which thus acquire undue proportions4 ,if we look at the present state of warfare1 we should say that the ,wars since that of the ,austrian succession are almost the only ones which1 at least as far as armament1 have still a considerable similarity to the present1 and which1 notwithstanding the many important changes which have taken place both great and small1 are still capable of affording much instruction4 ,it is quite otherwise with the ,war of the ,spanish succession1 as the use of fire-arms had not then so far advanced towards perfection1 and cavalry still continued the most important arm4 ,the farther we go back1 the less useful becomes military history1 as it gets so much the more meagre and barren of detail4 ,the most useless of all is that of the old world4 ,but this uselessness is not altogether absolute1 it relates only to those subjects which depend on a knowledge of minute details1 or on those things in which the method of conducting war has changed4 ,although we know very little about the tactics in the battles between the ,swiss and the ,austrians1 the ,burgundians and ,french1 still we find in them unmistakable evidence that they were the first in which the superiority of a good infantry over the best cavalry was1 displayed4 ,a general glance at the time of the ,condottieri teaches us how the whole method of conducting ,war is dependent on the instrument used2 for at no period have the forces used in ,war had so much the characteristics of a special instrument1 and been a class so totally distinct from the rest of the national community4 ,the memorable way in which the ,romans in the second ,punic ,war attacked the ,carthaginan possessions in ,spain and ,africa1 while ,hannibal still maintained himself in ,italy1 is a most instructive subject to study1 as the general relations of the ,states and ,armies concerned in this indirect act of defence are sufficiently well known4 ,but the more things descend into particulars and deviate in character from the most general relations1 the less we can look for examples and lessons of experience from very remote periods1 for we have neither the means of judging properly of corresponding events1 nor can we apply them to our completely different method of ,war4 ,unfortunately1 however1 it has always been the fashion with historical writers to talk about ancient times4 ,we shall not say how far vanity and charlatanism may have had a share in this1 but in general we fail to discover any honest intention and earnest endeavour to instruct and convince1 and we can therefore only look upon such quotations and references as embellishments to fill up gaps and hide defects4 ,it would be an immense service to teach the ,art of ,war entirely by historical examples1 as ,feuquieres proposed to do2 but it would be full work for the whole life of a man1 if we reflect that he who undertakes it must first qualify himself for the task by a long personal experience in actual ,war4 ,whoever1 stirred by ambition1 undertakes such a task1 let him prepare himself for his pious undertaking as for a long pilgrimage2 let him give up his time1 spare no sacrifice1 fear no temporal rank or power1 and rise above all feelings of personal vanity1 of false shame1 in order1 according to the ,french code1 to speak the ,truth1 the whole ,truth1 and nothing but the ,truth4 ,,book ,,iii4 ,,of ,,strategy ,,in ,,general ,,chapter ,i4 ,strategy ,in the second chapter of the second book1 ,strategy has been defined as 8the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the ,war40 ,properly speaking it has to do with nothing but the battle1 but its theory must include in this consideration the instrument of this real activity--the armed force--in itself and in its principal relations1 for the battle is fought by it1 and shows its effects upon it in turn4 ,it must be well acquainted with the battle itself as far as relates to its possible results1 and those mental and moral powers which are the most important in the use of the same4 ,strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the ,war2 it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action1 which must be in accordance with the object of the ,war2 in other words1 ,strategy forms the plan of the ,war1 and to this end it links together the series of acts which are to lead to the final decision1 that1 is to say1 it makes the plans for the separate campaigns and regulates the combats to be fought in each4 ,as these are all things which to a great extent can only be determined on conjectures some of which turn out incorrect1 while a number of other arrangements pertaining to details cannot be made at all beforehand1 it follows1 as a matter of course1 that ,strategy must go with the ,army to the field in order to arrange particulars on the spot1 and to make the modifications in the general plan1 which incessantly become necessary in ,war4 ,strategy can therefore never take its hand from the work for a moment4 ,that this1 however1 has not always been the view taken is evident from the former custom of keeping ,strategy in the cabinet and not with the ,army1 a thing only allowable if the cabinet is so near to the ,army that it can be taken for the chief head-quarters of the ,army4 ,theory will therefore attend on ,strategy in the determination of its plans1 or1 as we may more properly say1 it will throw a light on things in themselves1 and on their relations to each other1 and bring out prominently the little that there is of principle or rule4 ,if we recall to mind from the first chapter how many things of the highest importance ,war touches upon1 we may conceive that a consideration of all requires a rare grasp of mind4 ,a ,prince or ,general who knows exactly how to organise his ,war according to his object and means1 who does neither too little nor too much1 gives by that the greatest proof of his genius4 ,but the effects of this talent are exhibited not so much by the invention of new modes of action1 which might strike the eye immediately1 as in the successful final result of the whole4 ,it is the exact fulfilment of silent suppositions1 it is the noiseless harmony of the whole action which we should admire1 and which only makes itself known in the total result4 ,inquirer who1 tracing back from the final result1 does not perceive the signs of that harmony is one who is apt to seek for genius where it is not1 and where it cannot be found4 ,the means and forms which ,strategy uses are in fact so extremely simple1 so well known by their constant repetition1 that it only appears ridiculous to sound common sense when it hears critics so frequently speaking of them with high-flown emphasis4 ,turning a flank1 which has been done a thousand times1 is regarded here as a proof of the most brilliant genius1 there as a proof of the most profound penetration1 indeed even of the most comprehensive knowledge4 ,can there be in the book-world more absurd productions87997 7997 ,this paragraph refers to the works of ,lloyd1 ,blow1 indeed to all the eighteenth-century writers1 from whose influence we in ,england are not even yet free4--,,ed4 ,it is still more ridiculous if1 in addition to this1 we reflect that the same critic1 in accordance with prevalent opinion1 excludes all moral forces from theory1 and will not allow it to be concerned with anything but the material forces1 so that all must be confined to a few mathematical relations of equilibrium and preponderance1 of time and space1 and a few lines and angles4 ,if it were nothing more than this1 then out of such a miserable business there would not be a scientific problem for even a schoolboy4 ,but let us admit3 there is no question here about scientific formulas and problems2 the relations of material things are all very simple2 the right comprehension of the moral forces which come into play is more difficult4 ,still1 even in respect to them1 it is only in the highest branches of ,strategy that moral complications and a great diversity of quantities and relations are to be looked for1 only at that point where ,strategy borders on political science1 or rather where the two become one1 and there1 as we have before observed1 they have more influence on the 8how much0 and 8how little0 is to be done than on the form of execution4 ,where the latter is the principal question1 as in the single acts both great and small in ,war1 the moral quantities are already reduced to a very small number4 ,thus1 then1 in ,strategy everything is very simple1 but not on that account very easy4 ,once it is determined from the relations of the ,state what should and may be done by ,war1 then the way to it is easy to find2 but to follow that way straightforward1 to carry out the plan without being obliged to deviate from it a thousand times by a thousand varying influences1 requires1 besides great strength of character1 great clearness and steadiness of mind1 and out of a thousand men who are remarkable1 some for mind1 others for penetration1 others again for boldness or strength of will1 perhaps not one will combine in himself all those qualities which are required to raise a man above mediocrity in the career of a general4 ,it may sound strange1 but for all who know ,war in this respect it is a fact beyond doubt1 that much more strength of will is required to make an important decision in ,strategy than in tactics4 ,in the latter we are hurried on with the moment2 a ,commander feels himself borne along in a strong current1 against which he durst not contend without the most destructive consequences1 he suppresses the rising fears1 and boldly ventures further4 ,in ,strategy1 where all goes on at a slower rate1 there is more room allowed for our own apprehensions and those of others1 for objections and remonstrances1 consequently also for unseasonable regrets2 and as we do not see things in ,strategy as we do at least half of them in tactics1 with the living eye1 but everything must be conjectured and assumed1 the convictions produced are less powerful4 ,the consequence is that most ,generals1 when they should act1 remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts4 ,now let us cast a glance at history--upon ,frederick the ,great's campaign of #agfj1 celebrated for its fine marches and manuvres3 a perfect masterpiece of ,strategic skill as critics tell us4 ,is there really anything to drive us out of our wits with admiration in the ,king's first trying to turn ,daun's right flank1 then his left1 then again his right1 c48 ,are we to see profound wisdom in this8 ,no1 that we cannot1 if we are to decide naturally and without affectation4 ,what we rather admire above all is the sagacity of the ,king in this respect1 that while pursuing a great object with very limited means1 he undertook nothing beyond his powers1 and just enough to gain his object4 ,this sagacity of the ,general is visible not only in this campaign1 but throughout all the three ,wars of the ,great ,king6 ,to bring ,silesia into the safe harbour of a well-guaranteed peace was his object4 ,at the head of a small ,state1 which was like other ,states in most things1 and only ahead of them in some branches of administration2 he could not be an ,alexander1 and1 as ,charles ,,xii1 he would only1 like him1 have broken his head4 ,we find1 therefore1 in the whole of his conduct of ,war1 a controlled power1 always well balanced1 and never wanting in energy1 which in the most critical moments rises to astonishing deeds1 and the next moment oscillates quietly on again in subordination to the play of the most subtle political influences4 ,neither vanity1 thirst for glory1 nor vengeance could make him deviate from his course1 and this course alone it is which brought him to a fortunate termination of the contest4 ,these few words do but scant justice to this phase of the genius of the great ,general2 the eyes must be fixed carefully on the extraordinary issue of the struggle1 and the causes which brought about that issue must be traced out1 in order thoroughly to understand that nothing but the ,king's penetrating eye brought him safely out of all his dangers4 ,this is one feature in this great ,commander which we admire in the campaign of #agfj--;and in all others1 but in this especially--because in none did he keep the balance even against such a superior hostile force1 with such a small sacrifice4 ,another feature relates to the difficulty of execution4 ,marches to turn a flank1 right or left1 are easily combined2 the idea of keeping a small force always well concentrated to be able to meet the enemy on equal terms at any point1 to multiply a force by rapid movement1 is as easily conceived as expressed2 the mere contrivance in these points1 therefore1 cannot excite our admiration1 and with respect to such simple things1 there is nothing further than to admit that they are simple4 ,but let a ,general try to do these things like ,frederick the ,great4 ,long afterwards authors1 who were eyewitnesses1 have spoken of the danger1 indeed of the imprudence1 of the ,king's camps1 and doubtless1 at the time he pitched them1 the danger appeared three times as great as afterwards4 ,it was the same with his marches1 under the eyes1 nay1 often under the cannon of the enemy's ,army2 these camps were taken up1 these marches made1 not from want of prudence1 but because in ,daun's system1 in his mode of drawing up his ,army1 in the responsibility which pressed upon him1 and in his character1 ,frederick found that security which justified his camps and marches4 ,but it required the ,king's boldness1 determination1 and strength of will to see things in this light1 and not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which thirty years after people still wrote and spoke4 ,few ,generals in this situation would have believed these simple strategic means to be practicable4 ,again1 another difficulty in execution lay in this1 that the ,king's ,army in this campaign was constantly in motion4 ,twice it marched by wretched cross-roads1 from the ,elbe into ,silesia1 in rear of ,daun and pursued by ,lascy 7beginning of ,july1 beginning of ,august74 ,it required to be always ready for battle1 and its marches had to be organised with a degree of skill which necessarily called forth a proportionate amount of exertion4 ,although attended and delayed by thousands of waggons1 still its subsistence was extremely difficult4 ,in ,silesia1 for eight days before the battle of ,leignitz1 it had constantly to march1 defiling alternately right and left in front of the enemy3--this costs great fatigue1 and entails great privations4 ,is it to be supposed that all this could have been done without producing great friction in the machine8 ,can the mind of a ,commander elaborate such movements with the same ease as the hand of a land surveyor uses the astrolabe8 ,does not the sight of the sufferings of their hungry1 thirsty comrades pierce the hearts of the ,commander and his ,generals a thousand times8 ,must not the murmurs and doubts which these cause reach his ear8 ,has an ordinary man the courage to demand such sacrifices1 and would not such efforts most certainly demoralise the ,army1 break up the bands of discipline1 and1 in short1 undermine its military virtue1 if firm reliance on the greatness and infallibility of the ,commander did not compensate for all8 ,here1 therefore1 it is that we should pay respect2 it is these miracles of execution which we should admire4 ,but it is impossible to realise all this in its full force without a foretaste of it by experience4 ,he who only knows ,war from books or the drill-ground cannot realise the whole effect of this counterpoise in action2 we beg him1 therefore1 to accept from us on faith and trust all that he is unable to supply from any personal experiences of his own4 ,this illustration is intended to give more clearness to the course of our ideas1 and in closing this chapter we will only briefly observe that in our exposition of ,strategy we shall describe those separate subjects which appear to us the most important1 whether of a moral or material nature2 then proceed from the simple to the complex1 and conclude with the inner connection of the whole act of ,war1 in other words1 with the plan for a ,war or campaign4 ,,observation4 ,in an earlier manuscript of the second book are the following passages endorsed by the author himself to be used for the first ,chapter of the second ,book3 the projected revision of that chapter not having been made1 the passages referred to are introduced here in full4 ,by the mere assemblage of armed forces at a particular point1 a battle there becomes possible1 but does not always take place4 ,is that possibility now to be regarded as a reality and therefore an effective thing8 ,certainly1 it is so by its results1 and these effects1 whatever they may be1 can never fail4 #a4 ,,possible ,,combats ,,are ,,on ,,account ,,of ,,their ,,results ,,to ,,be ,,looked ,,upon ,,as ,,real ,,ones4 ,if a detachment is sent away to cut off the retreat of a flying enemy1 and the enemy surrenders in consequence without further resistance1 still it is through the combat which is offered to him by this detachment sent after him that he is brought to his decision4 ,if a part of our ,army occupies an enemy's province which was undefended1 and thus deprives the enemy of very considerable means of keeping up the strength of his ,army1 it is entirely through the battle which our detached body gives the enemy to expect1 in case he seeks to recover the lost province1 that we remain in possession of the same4 ,in both cases1 therefore1 the mere possibility of a battle has produced results1 and is therefore to be classed amongst actual events4 ,suppose that in these cases the enemy has opposed our troops with others superior in force1 and thus forced ours to give up their object without a combat1 then certainly our plan has failed1 but the battle which we offered at 7either of7 those points has not on that account been without effect1 for it attracted the enemy's forces to that point4 ,and in case our whole undertaking has done us harm1 it cannot be said that these positions1 these possible battles1 have been attended with no results2 their effects1 then1 are similar to those of a lost battle4 ,in this manner we see that the destruction of the enemy's military forces1 the overthrow of the enemy's power1 is only to be done through the effect of a battle1 whether it be that it actually takes place1 or that it is merely offered1 and not accepted4 #b4 ,,twofold ,,object ,,of ,,the ,,combat4 ,but these effects are of two kinds1 direct and indirect they are of the latter1 if other things intrude themselves and become the object of the combat--things which cannot be regarded as the destruction of enemy's force1 but only leading up to it1 certainly by a circuitous road1 but with so much the greater effect4 ,the possession of provinces1 towns1 fortresses1 roads1 bridges1 magazines1 c41 may be the immediate object of a battle1 but never the ultimate one4 ,things of this description can never be1 looked upon otherwise than as means of gaining greater superiority1 so as at last to offer battle to the enemy in such a way that it will be impossible for him to accept it4 ,therefore all these things must only be regarded as intermediate links1 steps1 as it were1 leading up to the effectual principle1 but never as that principle itself4 #c4 ,,example4 ,in #ahad1 by the capture of ,buonaparte's capital the object of the ,war was attained4 ,the political divisions which had their roots in ,paris came into active operation1 and an enormous split left the power of the ,emperor to collapse of itself4 ,nevertheless the point of view from which we must look at all this is1 that through these causes the forces and defensive means of ,buonaparte were suddenly very much diminished1 the superiority of the ,allies1 therefore1 just in the same measure increased1 and any further resistance then became impossible4 ,it was this impossibility which produced the peace with ,france4 ,if we suppose the forces of the ,allies at that moment diminished to a like extent through external causes2--if the superiority vanishes1 then at the same time vanishes also all the effect and importance of the taking of ,paris4 ,we have gone through this chain of argument in order to show that this is the natural and only true view of the thing from which it derives its importance4 ,it leads always back to the question1 ,what at any given moment of the ,war or campaign will be the probable result of the great or small combats which the two sides might offer to each other8 ,in the consideration of a plan for a campaign1 this question only is decisive as to the measures which are to be taken all through from the very commencement4 #d4 ,,when ,,this ,,view ,,is ,,not ,,taken1 ,,then ,a ,,false ,,value ,,is ,,given ,,to ,,other ,,things4 ,if we do not accustom ourselves to look upon ,war1 and the single campaigns in a ,war1 as a chain which is all composed of battles strung together1 one of which always brings on another2 if we adopt the idea that the taking of a certain geographical point1 the occupation of an undefended province1 is in itself anything2 then we are very likely to regard it as an acquisition which we may retain2 and if we look at it so1 and not as a term in the whole series of events1 we do not ask ourselves whether this possession may not lead to greater disadvantages hereafter4 ,how often we find this mistake recurring in military history4 ,we might say that1 just as in commerce the merchant cannot set apart and place in security gains from one single transaction by itself1 so in ,war a single advantage cannot be separated from the result of the whole4 ,just as the former must always operate with the whole bulk of his means1 just so in ,war1 only the sum total will decide on the advantage or disadvantage of each item4 ,if the mind's eye is always directed upon the series of combats1 so far as they can be seen beforehand1 then it is always looking in the right direction1 and thereby the motion of the force acquires that rapidity1 that is to say1 willing and doing acquire that energy which is suitable to the matter1 and which is not to be thwarted or turned aside by extraneous influences47997 7997 ,the whole of this chapter is directed against the theories of the ,austrian ,staff in #ahad4 ,it may be taken as the foundation of the modern teaching of the ,prussian ,general ,staff4 ,see especially von ,kmmer4--,,ed4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,elements of ,strategy ,the causes which condition the use of the combat in ,strategy may be easily divided into elements of different kinds1 such as the moral1 physical1 mathematical1 geographical and statistical elements4 ,the first class includes all that can be called forth by moral qualities and effects2 to the second belong the whole mass of the military force1 its organisation1 the proportion of the three arms1 c4 c42 to the third1 the angle of the lines of operation1 the concentric and eccentric movements in as far as their geometrical nature has any value in the calculation2 to the fourth1 the influences of country1 such as commanding points1 hills1 rivers1 woods1 roads1 c4 c42 lastly1 to the fifth1 all the means of supply4 ,the separation of these things once for all in the mind does good in giving clearness and helping us to estimate at once1 at a higher or lower value1 the different classes as we pass onwards4 ,for1 in considering them separately1 many lose of themselves their borrowed importance2 one feels1 for instance1 quite plainly that the value of a base of operations1 even if we look at nothing in it but its relative position to the line of operations1 depends much less in that simple form on the geometrical element of the angle which they form with one another1 than on the nature of the roads and the country through which they pass4 ,but to treat upon ,strategy according to these elements would be the most unfortunate idea that could be conceived1 for these elements are generally manifold1 and intimately connected with each other in every single operation of ,war4 ,we should lose ourselves in the most soulless analysis1 and as if in a horrid dream1 we should be for ever trying in vain to build up an arch to connect this base of abstractions with facts belonging to the real world4 ,heaven preserve every theorist from such an undertaking6 ,we shall keep to the world of things in their totality1 and not pursue our analysis further than is necessary from time to time to give distinctness to the idea which we wish to impart1 and which has come to us1 not by a speculative investigation1 but through the impression made by the realities of ,war in their entirety4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,moral ,forces ,we must return again to this subject1 which is touched upon in the third chapter of the second book1 because the moral forces are amongst the most important subjects in ,war4 ,they form the spirit which permeates the whole being of ,war4 ,these forces fasten themselves soonest and with the greatest affinity on to the ,will which puts in motion and guides the whole mass of powers1 uniting with it as it were in one stream1 because this is a moral force itself4 ,unfortunately they will escape from all book-analysis1 for they will neither be brought into numbers nor into classes1 and require to be both seen and felt4 ,the spirit and other moral qualities which animate an ,army1 a ,general1 or ,governments1 public opinion in provinces in which a ,war is raging1 the moral effect of a victory or of a defeat1 are things which in themselves vary very much in their nature1 and which also1 according as they stand with regard to our object and our relations1 may have an influence in different ways4 ,although little or nothing can be said about these things in books1 still they belong to the theory of the ,art of ,war1 as much as everything else which constitutes ,war4 ,for ,i must here once more repeat that it is a miserable philosophy if1 according to the old plan1 we establish rules and principles wholly regardless of all moral forces1 and then1 as soon as these forces make their appearance1 we begin to count exceptions which we thereby establish as it were theoretically1 that is1 make into rules2 or if we resort to an appeal to genius1 which is above all rules1 thus giving out by implication1 not only that rules were only made for fools1 but also that they themselves are no better than folly4 ,even if the theory of the ,art of ,war does no more in reality than recall these things to remembrance1 showing the necessity of allowing to the moral forces their full value1 and of always taking them into consideration1 by so doing it extends its borders over the region of immaterial forces1 and by establishing that point of view1 condemns beforehand every one who would endeavour to justify himself before its judgment seat by the mere physical relations of forces4 ,further out of regard to all other so-called rules1 theory cannot banish the moral forces beyond its frontier1 because the effects of the physical forces and the moral are completely fused1 and are not to be decomposed like a metal alloy by a chemical process4 ,in every rule relating to the physical forces1 theory must present to the mind at the same time the share which the moral powers will have in it1 if it would not be led to categorical propositions1 at one time too timid and contracted1 at another too dogmatical and wide4 ,even the most matter-of-fact theories have1 without knowing it1 strayed over into this moral kingdom2 for1 as an example1 the effects of a victory cannot in any way be explained without taking into consideration the moral impressions4 ,and therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in this book are composed half of physical1 half of moral causes and effects1 and we might say the physical are almost no more than the wooden handle1 whilst the moral are the noble metal1 the real bright-polished weapon4 ,the value of the moral powers1 and their frequently incredible influence1 are best exemplified by history1 and this is the most generous and the purest nourishment which the mind of the ,general can extract from it4--,at the same time it is to be observed1 that it is less demonstrations1 critical examinations1 and learned treatises1 than sentiments1 general impressions1 and single flashing sparks of truth1 which yield the seeds of knowledge that are to fertilise the mind4 ,we might go through the most important moral phenomena in ,war1 and with all the care of a diligent professor try what we could impart about each1 either good or bad4 ,but as in such a method one slides too much into the commonplace and trite1 whilst real mind quickly makes its escape in analysis1 the end is that one gets imperceptibly to the relation of things which everybody knows4 ,we prefer1 therefore1 to remain here more than usually incomplete and rhapsodical1 content to have drawn attention to the importance of the subject in a general way1 and to have pointed out the spirit in which the views given in this book have been conceived4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,chief ,moral ,powers ,these are ,the ,talents of the ,commander2 ,the ,military ,virtue of the ,army2 ,its ,national feeling4 ,which of these is the most important no one can tell in a general way1 for it is very difficult to say anything in general of their strength1 and still more difficult to compare the strength of one with that of another4 ,the best plan is not to undervalue any of them1 a fault which human judgment is prone to1 sometimes on one side1 sometimes on another1 in its whimsical oscillations4 ,it is better to satisfy ourselves of the undeniable efficacy of these three things by sufficient evidence from history4 ,it is true1 however1 that in modern times the ,armies of ,european states have arrived very much at a par as regards discipline and fitness for service1 and that the conduct of ,war has--as philosophers would say--naturally developed itself1 thereby become a method1 common as it were to all ,armies1 so that even from ,commanders there is nothing further to be expected in the way of application of special means of ,art1 in the limited sense 7such as ,frederick the ,second's oblique order74 ,hence it cannot be denied that1 as matters now stand1 greater scope is afforded for the influence of ,national spirit and habituation of an army to ,war4 ,a long peace may again alter all this47997 7997 ,written shortly after the ,great ,napoleonic campaigns4 ,the national spirit of an ,army 7enthusiasm1 fanatical zeal1 faith1 opinion7 displays itself most in mountain warfare1 where every one down to the common soldier is left to himself4 ,on this account1 a mountainous country is the best campaigning ground for popular levies4 ,expertness of an ,army through training1 and that well-tempered courage which holds the ranks together as if they had been cast in a mould1 show their superiority in an open country4 ,the talent of a ,general has most room to display itself in a closely intersected1 undulating country4 ,in mountains he has too little command over the separate parts1 and the direction of all is beyond his powers2 in open plains it is simple and does not exceed those powers4 ,according to these undeniable elective affinities1 plans should be regulated4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,military ,virtue of an ,army ,this is distinguished from mere bravery1 and still more from enthusiasm for the business of ,war4 ,the first is certainly a necessary constituent part of it1 but in the same way as bravery1 which is a natural gift in some men1 may arise in a soldier as a part of an ,army from habit and custom1 so with him it must also have a different direction from that which it has with others4 ,it must lose that impulse to unbridled activity and exercise of force which is its characteristic in the individual1 and submit itself to demands of a higher kind1 to obedience1 order1 rule1 and method4 ,enthusiasm for the profession gives life and greater fire to the military virtue of an ,army1 but does not necessarily constitute a part of it4 ,war is a special business1 and however general its relations may be1 and even if all the male population of a country1 capable of bearing arms1 exercise this calling1 still it always continues to be different and separate from the other pursuits which occupy the life of man4--,to be imbued with a sense of the spirit and nature of this business1 to make use of1 to rouse1 to assimilate into the system the powers which should be active in it1 to penetrate completely into the nature of the business with the understanding1 through exercise to gain confidence and expertness in it1 to be completely given up to it1 to pass out of the man into the part which it is assigned to us to play in ,war1 that is the military virtue of an ,army in the individual4 ,however much pains may be taken to combine the soldier and the citizen in one and the same individual1 whatever may be done to nationalise ,wars1 and however much we may imagine times have changed since the days of the old ,condottieri1 never will it be possible to do away with the individuality of the business2 and if that cannot be done1 then those who belong to it1 as long as they belong to it1 will always look upon themselves as a kind of guild1 in the regulations1 laws and customs in which the 8,spirit of ,war0 by preference finds its expression4 ,and so it is in fact4 ,even with the most decided inclination to look at ,war from the highest point of view1 it would be very wrong to look down upon this corporate spirit 7esprit de corps7 which may and should exist more or less in every ,army4 ,this corporate spirit forms the bond of union between the natural forces which are active in that which we have called military virtue4 ,the crystals of military virtue have a greater affinity for the spirit of a corporate body than for anything else4 ,an ,army which preserves its usual formations under the heaviest fire1 which is never shaken by imaginary fears1 and in the face of real danger disputes the ground inch by inch1 which1 proud in the feeling of its victories1 never loses its sense of obedience1 its respect for and confidence in its leaders1 even under the depressing effects of defeat2 an ,army with all its physical powers1 inured to privations and fatigue by exercise1 like the muscles of an athlete2 an ,army which looks upon all its toils as the means to victory1 not as a curse which hovers over its standards1 and which is always reminded of its duties and virtues by the short catechism of one idea1 namely the honour of its arms2--,such an ,army is imbued with the true military spirit4 ,soldiers may fight bravely like the ,vendans1 and do great things like the ,swiss1 the ,americans1 or ,spaniards1 without displaying this military virtue4 ,a ,commander may also be successful at the head of standing ,armies1 like ,eugene and ,marlborough1 without enjoying the benefit of its assistance2 we must not1 therefore1 say that a successful ,war without it cannot be imagined2 and we draw especial attention to that point1 in order the more to individualise the conception which is here brought forward1 that the idea may not dissolve into a generalisation and that it may not be thought that military virtue is in the end everything4 ,it is not so4 ,military virtue in an ,army is a definite moral power which may be supposed wanting1 and the influence of which may therefore be estimated--like any instrument the power of which may be calculated4 ,having thus characterised it1 we proceed to consider what can be predicated of its influence1 and what are the means of gaining its assistance4 ,military virtue is for the parts1 what the genius of the ,commander is for the whole4 ,the ,general can only guide the whole1 not each separate part1 and where he cannot guide the part1 there military virtue must be its leader4 ,a ,general is chosen by the reputation of his superior talents1 the chief leaders of large masses after careful probation2 but this probation diminishes as we descend the scale of rank1 and in just the same measure we may reckon less and less upon individual talents2 but what is wanting in this respect military virtue should supply4 ,the natural qualities of a warlike people play just this part3 bravery1 aptitude1 powers of endurance and enthusiasm4 ,these properties may therefore supply the place of military virtue1 and vice versa1 from which the following may be deduced3 #a4 ,military virtue is a quality of standing ,armies only1 but they require it the most4 ,in national risings its place is supplied by natural qualities1 which develop themselves there more rapidly4 #b4 ,standing ,armies opposed to standing ,armies1 can more easily dispense with it1 than a standing ,army opposed to a national insurrection1 for in that case1 the troops are more scattered1 and the divisions left more to themselves4 ,but where an ,army can be kept concentrated1 the genius of the ,general takes a greater place1 and supplies what is wanting in the spirit of the ,army4 ,therefore generally military virtue becomes more necessary the more the theatre of operations and other circumstances make the ,war complicated1 and cause the forces to be scattered4 ,from these truths the only lesson to be derived is this1 that if an ,army is deficient in this quality1 every endeavour should be made to simplify the operations of the ,war as much as possible1 or to introduce double efficiency in the organisation of the ,army in some other respect1 and not to expect from the mere name of a standing ,army1 that which only the veritable thing itself can give4 ,the military virtue of an ,army is1 therefore1 one of the most important moral powers in ,war1 and where it is wanting1 we either see its place supplied by one of the others1 such as the great superiority of generalship or popular enthusiasm1 or we find the results not commensurate with the exertions made4--,how much that is great1 this spirit1 this sterling worth of an army1 this refining of ore into the polished metal1 has already done1 we see in the history of the ,macedonians under ,alexander1 the ,roman legions under ,cesar1 the ,spanish infantry under ,alexander ,farnese1 the ,swedes under ,gustavus ,adolphus and ,charles ,,xii1 the ,prussians under ,frederick the ,great1 and the ,french under ,buonaparte4 ,we must purposely shut our eyes against all historical proof1 if we do not admit1 that the astonishing successes of these ,generals and their greatness in situations of extreme difficulty1 were only possible with ,armies possessing this virtue4 ,this spirit can only be generated from two sources1 and only by these two conjointly2 the first is a succession of campaigns and great victories2 the other is1 an activity of the ,army carried sometimes to the highest pitch4 ,only by these1 does the soldier learn to know his powers4 ,the more a ,general is in the habit of demanding from his troops1 the surer he will be that his demands will be answered4 ,the soldier is as proud of overcoming toil1 as he is of surmounting danger4 ,therefore it is only in the soil of incessant activity and exertion that the germ will thrive1 but also only in the sunshine of victory4 ,once it becomes a strong tree1 it will stand against the fiercest storms of misfortune and defeat1 and even against the indolent inactivity of peace1 at least for a time4 ,it can therefore only be created in ,war1 and under great ,generals1 but no doubt it may last at least for several generations1 even under ,generals of moderate capacity1 and through considerable periods of peace4 ,with this generous and noble spirit of union in a line of veteran troops1 covered with scars and thoroughly inured to ,war1 we must not compare the self-esteem and vanity of a standing ,army17997 held together merely by the glue of service-regulations and a drill book2 a certain plodding earnestness and strict discipline may keep up military virtue for a long time1 but can never create it2 these things therefore have a certain value1 but must not be over-rated4 ,order1 smartness1 good will1 also a certain degree of pride and high feeling1 are qualities of an ,army formed in time of peace which are to be prized1 but cannot stand alone4 ,the whole retains the whole1 and as with glass too quickly cooled1 a single crack breaks the whole mass4 ,above all1 the highest spirit in the world changes only too easily at the first check into depression1 and one might say into a kind of rhodomontade of alarm1 the ,french sauve que peut4--,such an ,army can only achieve something through its leader1 never by itself4 ,it must be led with double caution1 until by degrees1 in victory and hardships1 the strength grows into the full armour4 ,beware then of confusing the ,,spirit of an ,army with its temper4 7997 ,clausewitz is1 of course1 thinking of the long-service standing armies of his own youth4 ,not of the short-service standing armies of to-day 7,,editor74 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,boldness ,the place and part which boldness takes in the dynamic system of powers1 where it stands opposed to ,foresight and prudence1 has been stated in the chapter on the certainty of the result in order thereby to show1 that theory has no right to restrict it by virtue of its legislative power4 ,but this noble impulse1 with which the human soul raises itself above the most formidable dangers1 is to be regarded as an active principle peculiarly belonging to ,war4 ,in fact1 in what branch of human activity should boldness have a right of citizenship if not in ,war8 ,from the transport-driver and the drummer up to the ,general1 it is the noblest of virtues1 the true steel which gives the weapon its edge and brilliancy4 ,let us admit in fact it has in ,war even its own prerogatives4 ,over and above the result of the calculation of space1 time1 and quantity1 we must allow a certain percentage which boldness derives from the weakness of others1 whenever it gains the mastery4 ,it is therefore1 virtually1 a creative power4 ,this is not difficult to demonstrate philosophically4 ,as often as boldness encounters hesitation1 the probability of the result is of necessity in its favour1 because the very state of hesitation implies a loss of equilibrium already4 ,it is only when it encounters cautious foresight--which we may say is just as bold1 at all events just as strong and powerful as itself--that it is at a disadvantage2 such cases1 however1 rarely occur4 ,out of the whole multitude of prudent men in the world1 the great majority are so from timidity4 ,amongst large masses1 boldness is a force1 the special cultivation of which can never be to the detriment of other forces1 because the great mass is bound to a higher will by the frame-work and joints of the order of battle and of the service1 and therefore is guided by an intelligent power which is extraneous4 ,boldness is therefore here only like a spring held down until its action is required4 ,the higher the rank the more necessary it is that boldness should be accompanied by a reflective mind1 that it may not be a mere blind outburst of passion to no purpose2 for with increase of rank it becomes always less a matter of self-sacrifice and more a matter of the preservation of others1 and the good of the whole4 ,where regulations of the service1 as a kind of second nature1 prescribe for the masses1 reflection must be the guide of the ,general1 and in his case individual boldness in action may easily become a fault4 ,still1 at the same time1 it is a fine failing1 and must not be looked at in the same light as any other4 ,happy the ,army in which an untimely boldness frequently manifests itself2 it is an exuberant growth which shows a rich soil4 ,even foolhardiness1 that is boldness without an object1 is not to be despised2 in point of fact it is the same energy of feeling1 only exercised as a kind of passion without any co-operation of the intelligent faculties4 ,it is only when it strikes at the root of obedience1 when it treats with contempt the orders of superior authority1 that it must be repressed as a dangerous evil1 not on its own account but on account of the act of disobedience1 for there is nothing in ,war which is of greater importance than obedience4 ,the reader will readily agree with us that1 supposing an equal degree of discernment to be forthcoming in a certain number of cases1 a thousand times as many of them will end in disaster through over-anxiety as through boldness4 ,one would suppose it natural that the interposition of a reasonable object should stimulate boldness1 and therefore lessen its intrinsic merit1 and yet the reverse is the case in reality4 ,the intervention of lucid thought or the general supremacy of mind deprives the emotional forces of a great part of their power4 ,on that account boldness becomes of rarer occurrence the higher we ascend the scale of rank1 for whether the discernment and the understanding do or do not increase with these ranks still the ,commanders1 in their several stations as they rise1 are pressed upon more and more severely by objective things1 by relations and claims from without1 so that they become the more perplexed the lower the degree of their individual intelligence4 ,this so far as regards ,war is the chief foundation of the truth of the ,french proverb3-- 8,tel brille au second qui s'clipse au premier40 ,almost all the ,generals who are represented in history as merely having attained to mediocrity1 and as wanting in decision when in supreme command1 are men celebrated in their antecedent career for their boldness and decision47997 7997 ,beaulieu1 ,benedek1 ,bazaine1 ,buller1 ,melas1 ,mack4 c4 c4 ,in those motives to bold action which arise from the pressure of necessity we must make a distinction4 ,necessity has its degrees of intensity4 ,if it lies near at hand1 if the person acting is in the pursuit of his object driven into great dangers in order to escape others equally great1 then we can only admire his resolution1 which still has also its value4 ,if a young man to show his skill in horsemanship leaps across a deep cleft1 then he is bold2 if he makes the same leap pursued by a troop of head-chopping ,janissaries he is only resolute4 ,but the farther off the necessity from the point of action1 the greater the number of relations intervening which the mind has to traverse2 in order to realise them1 by so much the less does necessity take from boldness in action4 ,if ,frederick the ,great1 in the year #agef1 saw that ,war was inevitable1 and that he could only escape destruction by being beforehand with his enemies1 it became necessary for him to commence the ,war himself1 but at the same time it was certainly very bold3 for few men in his position would have made up their minds to do so4 ,although ,strategy is only the province of ,generals-in-,chief or ,commanders in the higher positions1 still boldness in all the other branches of an ,army is as little a matter of indifference to it as their other military virtues4 ,with an ,army belonging to a bold race1 and in which the spirit of boldness has been always nourished1 very different things may be undertaken than with one in which this virtue1 is unknown2 for that reason we have considered it in connection with an ,army4 ,but our subject is specially the boldness of the ,general1 and yet we have not much to say about it after having described this military virtue in a general way to the best of our ability4 ,the higher we rise in a position of command1 the more of the mind1 understanding1 and penetration predominate in activity1 the more therefore is boldness1 which is a property of the feelings1 kept in subjection1 and for that reason we find it so rarely in the highest positions1 but then1 so much the more should it be admired4 ,boldness1 directed by an overruling intelligence1 is the stamp of the hero3 this boldness does not consist in venturing directly against the nature of things1 in a downright contempt of the laws of probability1 but1 if a choice is once made1 in the rigorous adherence to that higher calculation which genius1 the tact of judgment1 has gone over with the speed of lightning4 ,the more boldness lends wings to the mind and the discernment1 so much the farther they will reach in their flight1 so much the more comprehensive will be the view1 the more exact the result1 but certainly always only in the sense that with greater objects greater dangers are connected4 ,the ordinary man1 not to speak of the weak and irresolute1 arrives at an exact result so far as such is possible without ocular demonstration1 at most after diligent reflection in his chamber1 at a distance from danger and responsibility4 ,let danger and responsibility draw close round him in every direction1 then he loses the power of comprehensive vision1 and if he retains this in any measure by the influence of others1 still he will lose his power of decision1 because in that point no one can help him4 ,we think then that it is impossible to imagine a distinguished ,general without boldness1 that is to say1 that no man can become one who is not born with this power of the soul1 and we therefore look upon it as the first requisite for such a career4 ,how much of this inborn power1 developed and moderated through education and the circumstances of life1 is left when the man has attained a high position1 is the second question4 ,the greater this power still is1 the stronger will genius be on the wing1 the higher will be its flight4 ,the risks become always greater1 but the purpose grows with them4 ,whether its lines proceed out of and get their direction from a distant necessity1 or whether they converge to the keystone of a building which ambition has planned1 whether ,frederick or ,alexander acts1 is much the same as regards the critical view4 ,if the one excites the imagination more because it is bolder1 the other pleases the understanding most1 because it has in it more absolute necessity4 ,we have still to advert to one very important circumstance4 ,the spirit of boldness can exist in an ,army1 either because it is in the people1 or because it has been generated in a successful ,war conducted by able ,generals4 ,in the latter case it must of course be dispensed with at the commencement4 ,now in our days there is hardly any other means of educating the spirit of a people in this respect1 except by ,war1 and that too under bold ,generals4 ,by it alone can that effeminacy of feeling be counteracted1 that propensity to seek for the enjoyment of comfort1 which cause degeneracy in a people rising in prosperity and immersed in an extremely busy commerce4 ,a ,nation can hope to have a strong position in the political world only if its character and practice in actual ,war mutually support each other in constant reciprocal action4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,perseverance ,the reader expects to hear of angles and lines1 and finds1 instead of these citizens of the scientific world1 only people out of common life1 such as he meets with every day in the street4 ,and yet the author cannot make up his mind to become a hair's breadth more mathematical than the subject seems to him to require1 and he is not alarmed at the surprise which the reader may show4 ,in ,war more than anywhere else in the world things happen differently to what we had expected1 and look differently when near1 to what they did at a distance4 ,with what serenity the architect can watch his work gradually rising and growing into his plan4 ,the doctor although much more at the mercy of mysterious agencies and chances than the architect1 still knows enough of the forms and effects of his means4 ,in ,war1 on the other hand1 the ,commander of an immense whole finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information1 of mistakes committed through fear1 through negligence1 through precipitation1 of contraventions of his authority1 either from mistaken or correct motives1 from ill will1 true or false sense of duty1 indolence or exhaustion1 of accidents which no mortal could have foreseen4 ,in short1 he is the victim of a hundred thousand impressions1 of which the most have an intimidating1 the fewest an encouraging tendency4 ,by long experience in ,war1 the tact is acquired of readily appreciating the value of these incidents2 high courage and stability of character stand proof against them1 as the rock resists the beating of the waves4 ,he who would yield to these impressions would never carry out an undertaking1 and on that account perseverance in the proposed object1 as long as there is no decided reason against it1 is a most necessary counterpoise4 ,further1 there is hardly any celebrated enterprise in ,war which was not achieved by endless exertion1 pains1 and privations2 and as here the weakness of the physical and moral man is ever disposed to yield1 only an immense force of will1 which manifests itself in perseverance admired by present and future generations1 can conduct to our goal4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,superiority of ,numbers ,this is in tactics1 as well as in ,strategy1 the most general principle of victory1 and shall be examined by us first in its generality1 for which we may be permitted the following exposition3 ,strategy fixes the point where1 the time when1 and the numerical force with which the battle is to be fought4 ,by this triple determination it has therefore a very essential influence on the issue of the combat4 ,if tactics has fought the battle1 if the result is over1 let it be victory or defeat1 ,strategy makes such use of it as can be made in accordance with the great object of the ,war4 ,this object is naturally often a very distant one1 seldom does it lie quite close at hand4 ,a series of other objects subordinate themselves to it as means4 ,these objects1 which are at the same time means to a higher purpose1 may be practically of various kinds2 even the ultimate aim of the whole ,war may be a different one in every case4 ,we shall make ourselves acquainted with these things according as we come to know the separate objects which they come1 in contact with2 and it is not our intention here to embrace the whole subject by a complete enumeration of them1 even if that were possible4 ,we therefore let the employment of the battle stand over for the present4 ,even those things through which ,strategy has an influence on the issue of the combat1 inasmuch as it establishes the same1 to a certain extent decrees them1 are not so simple that they can be embraced in one single view4 ,for as ,strategy appoints time1 place and force1 it can do so in practice in many ways1 each of which influences in a different manner the result of the combat as well as its consequences4 ,therefore we shall only get acquainted with this also by degrees1 that is1 through the subjects which more closely determine the application4 ,if we strip the combat of all modifications which it may undergo according to its immediate purpose and the circumstances from which it proceeds1 lastly if we set aside the valour of the troops1 because that is a given quantity1 then there remains only the bare conception of the combat1 that is a combat without form1 in which we distinguish nothing but the number of the combatants4 ,this number will therefore determine victory4 ,now from the number of things above deducted to get to this point1 it is shown that the superiority in numbers in a battle is only one of the factors employed to produce victory that therefore so far from having with the superiority in number obtained all1 or even only the principal thing1 we have perhaps got very little by it1 according as the other circumstances which co-operate happen to vary4 ,but this superiority has degrees1 it may be imagined as twofold1 threefold or fourfold1 and every one sees1 that by increasing in this way1 it must 7at last7 overpower everything else4 ,in such an aspect we grant1 that the superiority in numbers is the most important factor in the result of a combat1 only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating circumstances4 ,the direct result of this is1 that the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point4 ,whether the troops thus brought are sufficient or not1 we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed4 ,this is the first principle in ,strategy1 therefore in general as now stated1 it is just as well suited for ,greeks and ,persians1 or for ,englishmen and ,mahrattas1 as for ,french and ,germans4 ,but we shall take a glance at our relations in ,europe1 as respects ,war1 in order to arrive at some more definite idea on this subject4 ,here we find ,armies much more alike in equipment1 organisation1 and practical skill of every kind4 ,there only remains a difference in the military virtue of ,armies1 and in the talent of ,generals which may fluctuate with time from side to side4 ,if we go through the military history of modern ,europe1 we find no example of a ,marathon4 ,frederick the ,great beat #hj1jjj ,austrians at ,leuthen with about #cj1jjj men1 and at ,rosbach with #be1jjj some #ej1jjj allies2 these are however the only instances of victories gained against an enemy double1 or more than double in numbers4 ,charles ,,xii1 in the battle of ,narva1 we cannot well quote1 for the ,russians were at that time hardly to be regarded as ,europeans1 also the principal circumstances1 even of the battle1 are too little known4 ,buonaparte had at ,dresden #abj1jjj against #bbj1jjj1 therefore not the double4 ,at ,kollin1 ,frederick the ,great did not succeed1 with #cj1jjj against #ej1jjj ,austrians1 neither did ,buonaparte in the desperate battle of ,leipsic1 where he was #afj1jjj strong1 against #bhj1jjj4 ,from this we may infer1 that it is very difficult in the present state of ,europe1 for the most talented ,general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength4 ,now if we see double numbers prove such a weight in the scale against the greatest ,generals1 we may be sure1 that in ordinary cases1 in small as well as great combats1 an important superiority of numbers1 but which need not be over two to one1 will be sufficient to ensure the victory1 however disadvantageous other circumstances may be4 ,certainly1 we may imagine a defile which even tenfold would not suffice to force1 but in such a case it can be no question of a battle at all4 ,we think1 therefore1 that under our conditions1 as well as in all similar ones1 the superiority at the decisive point is a matter of capital importance1 and that this subject1 in the generality of cases1 is decidedly the most important of all4 ,the strength at the decisive point depends on the absolute strength of the ,army1 and on skill in making use of it4 ,the first rule is therefore to enter the field with an ,army as strong as possible4 ,this sounds very like a commonplace1 but still it is really not so4 ,in order to show that for a long time the strength of forces was by no means regarded as a chief point1 we need only observe1 that in most1 and even in the most detailed histories of the ,wars in the eighteenth century1 the strength of the ,armies is either not given at all1 or only incidentally1 and in no case is any special value laid upon it4 ,tempelhof in his history of the ,seven ,years' ,war is the earliest writer who gives it regularly1 but at the same time he does it only very superficially4 ,even ,massenbach1 in his manifold critical observations on the ,prussian campaigns of #agic-id in the ,vosges1 talks a great deal about hills and valleys1 roads and footpaths1 but does not say a syllable about mutual strength4 ,another proof lies in a wonderful notion which haunted the heads of many critical historians1 according to which there was a certain size of an ,army which was the best1 a normal strength1 beyond which the forces in excess were burdensome rather than serviceable47997 7997 ,tempelhof and ,montalembert are the first we recollect as examples--the first in a passage of his first part1 page #adh2 the other in his correspondence relative to the plan of operations of the ,russians in #agei4 ,lastly1 there are a number of instances to be found1 in which all the available forces were not really brought into the battle17997 or into the ,war1 because the superiority of numbers was not considered to have that importance which in the nature of things belongs to it4 7997 ,the ,prussians at ,jena1 #ahjf4 ,wellington at ,waterloo4 ,if we are thoroughly penetrated with the conviction that with a considerable superiority of numbers everything possible is to be effected1 then it cannot fail that this clear conviction reacts on the preparations for the ,war1 so as to make us appear in the field with as many troops as possible1 and either to give us ourselves the superiority1 or at least to guard against the enemy obtaining it4 ,so much for what concerns the absolute force with which the ,war is to be conducted4 ,the measure of this absolute force is determined by the ,government2 and although with this determination the real action of ,war commences1 and it forms an essential part of the ,strategy of the ,war1 still in most cases the ,general who is to command these forces in the ,war must regard their absolute strength as a given quantity1 whether it be that he has had no voice in fixing it1 or that circumstances prevented a sufficient expansion being given to it4 ,there remains nothing1 therefore1 where an absolute superiority is not attainable1 but to produce a relative one at the decisive point1 by making skilful use of what we have4 ,the calculation of space and time appears as the most essential thing to this end--and this has caused that subject to be regarded as one which embraces nearly the whole art of using military forces4 ,indeed1 some have gone so far as to ascribe to great strategists and tacticians a mental organ peculiarly adapted to this point4 ,but the calculation of time and space1 although it lies universally at the foundation of ,strategy1 and is to a certain extent its daily bread1 is still neither the most difficult1 nor the most decisive one4 ,if we take an unprejudiced glance at military history1 we shall find that the instances in which mistakes in such a calculation have proved the cause of serious losses are very rare1 at least in ,strategy4 ,but if the conception of a skilful combination of time and space is fully to account for every instance of a resolute and active ,commander beating several separate opponents with one and the same army 7,frederick the ,great1 ,buonaparte71 then we perplex ourselves unnecessarily with conventional language4 ,for the sake of clearness and the profitable use of conceptions1 it is necessary that things should always be called by their right names4 ,the right appreciation of their opponents 7,daun1 ,schwartzenberg71 the audacity to leave for a short space of time a small force only before them1 energy in forced marches1 boldness in sudden attacks1 the intensified activity which great souls acquire in the moment of danger1 these are the grounds of such victories2 and what have these to do with the ability to make an exact calculation of two such simple things as time and space8 ,but even this ricochetting play of forces1 8when the victories at ,rosbach and ,montmirail give the impulse to victories at ,leuthen and ,montereau10 to which great ,generals on the defensive have often trusted1 is still1 if we would be clear and exact1 only a rare occurrence in history4 ,much more frequently the relative superiority--that is1 the skilful assemblage of superior forces at the decisive point--has its foundation in the right appreciation of those points1 in the judicious direction which by that means has been given to the forces from the very first1 and in the resolution required to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the important--that is1 to keep the forces concentrated in an overpowering mass4 ,in this1 ,frederick the ,great and ,buonaparte are particularly characteristic4 ,we think we have now allotted to the superiority in numbers the importance which belongs to it2 it is to be regarded as the fundamental idea1 always to be aimed at before all and as far as possible4 ,but to regard it on this account as a necessary condition of victory would be a complete misconception of our exposition2 in the conclusion to be drawn from it there lies nothing more than the value which should attach to numerical strength in the combat4 ,if that strength is made as great as possible1 then the maxim is satisfied2 a review of the total relations must then decide whether or not the combat is to be avoided for want of sufficient force47997 7997 ,owing to our freedom from invasion1 and to the condition which arise in our ,colonial ,wars1 we have not yet1 in ,england1 arrived at a correct appreciation of the value of superior numbers in ,war1 and still adhere to the idea of an ,army just 8big enough10 which ,clausewitz has so unsparingly ridiculed4 7,,editor47 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,the ,surprise ,from the subject of the foregoing chapter1 the general endeavour to attain a relative superiority1 there follows another endeavour which must consequently be just as general in its nature3 this is the surprise of the enemy4 ,it lies more or less at the foundation of all undertakings1 for without it the preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conceivable4 ,the surprise is1 therefore1 not only the means to the attainment of numerical superiority2 but it is also to be regarded as a substantive principle in itself1 on account of its moral effect4 ,when it is successful in a high degree1 confusion and broken courage in the enemy's ranks are the consequences2 and of the degree to which these multiply a success1 there are examples enough1 great and small4 ,we are not now speaking of the particular surprise which belongs to the attack1 but of the endeavour by measures generally1 and especially by the distribution of forces1 to surprise the enemy1 which can be imagined just as well in the defensive1 and which in the tactical defence particularly is a chief point4 ,we say1 surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings without exception1 only in very different degrees according to the nature of the undertaking and other circumstances4 ,this difference1 indeed1 originates in the properties or peculiarities of the ,army and its ,commander1 in those even of the ,government4 ,secrecy and rapidity are the two factors in this product and these suppose in the ,government and the ,commander-in-,chief great energy1 and on the part of the ,army a high sense of military duty4 ,with effeminacy and loose principles it is in vain to calculate upon a surprise4 ,but so general1 indeed so indispensable1 as is this endeavour1 and true as it is that it is never wholly unproductive of effect1 still it is not the less true that it seldom succeeds to a remarkable degree1 and this follows from the nature of the idea itself4 ,we should form an erroneous conception if we believed that by this means chiefly there is much to be attained in ,war4 ,in idea it promises a great deal2 in the execution it generally sticks fast by the friction of the whole machine4 ,in tactics the surprise is much more at home1 for the very natural reason that all times and spaces are on a smaller scale4 ,it will1 therefore1 in ,strategy be the more feasible in proportion as the measures lie nearer to the province of tactics1 and more difficult the higher up they lie towards the province of policy4 ,the preparations for a ,war usually occupy several months2 the assembly of an ,army at its principal positions requires generally the formation of depts and magazines1 and long marches1 the object of which can be guessed soon enough4 ,it therefore rarely happens that one ,state surprises another by a ,war1 or by the direction which it gives the mass of its forces4 ,in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 when ,war turned very much upon sieges1 it was a frequent aim1 and quite a peculiar and important chapter in the ,art of ,war1 to invest a strong place unexpectedly1 but even that only rarely succeeded47997 7997 ,railways1 steamships1 and telegraphs have1 however1 enormously modified the relative importance and practicability of surprise4 7,,editor47 ,on the other hand1 with things which can be done in a day or two1 a surprise is much more conceivable1 and1 therefore1 also it is often not difficult thus to gain a march upon the enemy1 and thereby a position1 a point of country1 a road1 c4 ,but it is evident that what surprise gains in this way in easy execution1 it loses in the efficacy1 as the greater the efficacy the greater always the difficulty of execution4 ,whoever thinks that with such surprises on a small scale1 he may connect great results--as1 for example1 the gain of a battle1 the capture of an important magazine--believes in something which it is certainly very possible to imagine1 but for which there is no warrant in history2 for there are upon the whole very few instances where anything great has resulted from such surprises2 from which we may justly conclude that inherent difficulties lie in the way of their success4 ,certainly1 whoever would consult history on such points must not depend on sundry battle steeds of historical critics1 on their wise dicta and self-complacent terminology1 but look at facts with his own eyes4 ,there is1 for instance1 a certain day in the campaign in ,silesia1 #agfa1 which1 in this respect1 has attained a kind of notoriety4 ,it is the #bbnd ,july1 on which ,frederick the ,great gained on ,laudon the march to ,nossen1 near ,neisse1 by which1 as is said1 the junction of the ,austrian and ,russian armies in ,upper ,silesia became impossible1 and1 therefore1 a period of four weeks was gained by the ,king4 ,whoever reads over this occurrence carefully in the principal histories17997 and considers it impartially1 will1 in the march of the #bbnd ,july1 never find this importance2 and generally in the whole of the fashionable logic on this subject1 he will see nothing but contradictions2 but in the proceedings of ,laudon1 in this renowned period of manuvres1 much that is unaccountable4 ,how could one1 with a thirst for truth1 and clear conviction1 accept such historical evidence8 7997 ,tempelhof1 ,the ,veteran1 ,frederick the ,great4 ,compare also 7,clausewitz7 8,hinterlassene ,werke10 vol4 x41 p4 #aeh4 ,when we promise ourselves great effects in a campaign from the principle of surprising1 we think upon great activity1 rapid resolutions1 and forced marches1 as the means of producing them2 but that these things1 even when forthcoming in a very high degree1 will not always produce the desired effect1 we see in examples given by ,generals1 who may be allowed to have had the greatest talent in the use of these means1 ,frederick the ,great and ,buonaparte4 ,the first when he left ,dresden so suddenly in ,july #agfj1 and falling upon ,lascy1 then turned against ,dresden1 gained nothing by the whole of that intermezzo1 but rather placed his affairs in a condition notably worse1 as the fortress ,glatz fell in the meantime4 ,in #ahac1 ,buonaparte turned suddenly from ,dresden twice against ,blcher1 to say nothing of his incursion into ,bohemia from ,upper ,lusatia1 and both times without in the least attaining his object4 ,they were blows in the air which only cost him time and force1 and might have placed him in a dangerous position in ,dresden4 ,therefore1 even in this field1 a surprise does not necessarily meet with great success through the mere activity1 energy1 and resolution of the ,commander2 it must be favoured by other circumstances4 ,but we by no means deny that there can be success2 we only connect with it a necessity of favourable circumstances1 which1 certainly do not occur very frequently1 and which the ,commander can seldom bring about himself4 ,just those two ,generals afford each a striking illustration of this4 ,we take first ,buonaparte in his famous enterprise against ,blcher's ,army in ,february #ahad1 when it was separated from the ,grand ,army1 and descending the ,marne4 ,it would not be easy to find a two days' march to surprise the enemy productive of greater results than this2 ,blcher's ,army1 extended over a distance of three days' march1 was beaten in detail1 and suffered a loss nearly equal to that of defeat in a great battle4 ,this was completely the effect of a surprise1 for if ,blcher had thought of such a near possibility of an attack from ,buonaparte7997 he would have organised his march quite differently4 ,to this mistake of ,blcher's the result is to be attributed4 ,buonaparte did not know all these circumstances1 and so there was a piece of good fortune that mixed itself up in his favour4 7997 ,blcher believed his march to be covered by ,pahlen's ,cossacks1 but these had been withdrawn without warning to him by the ,grand ,army ,headquarters under ,schwartzenberg4 ,it is the same with the battle of ,liegnitz1 #agfj4 ,frederick the ,great gained this fine victory through altering during the night a position which he had just before taken up4 ,laudon was through this completely surprised1 and lost #gj pieces of artillery and #aj1jjj men4 ,although ,frederick the ,great had at this time adopted the principle of moving backwards and forwards in order to make a battle impossible1 or at least to disconcert the enemy's plans1 still the alteration of position on the night of the #ad-ae was not made exactly with that intention1 but as the ,king himself says1 because the position of the #adth did not please him4 ,here1 therefore1 also chance was hard at work2 without this happy conjunction of the attack and the change of position in the night1 and the difficult nature of the country1 the result would not have been the same4 ,also in the higher and highest province of ,strategy there are some instances of surprises fruitful in results4 ,we shall only cite the brilliant marches of the ,great ,elector against the ,swedes from ,franconia to ,pomerania and from the ,mark 7,brandenburg7 to the ,pregel in #ageg1 and the celebrated passage of the ,alps by ,buonaparte1 #ahjj4 ,in the latter case an ,army gave up its whole theatre of war by a capitulation1 and in #ageg another ,army was very near giving up its theatre of war and itself as well4 ,lastly1 as an instance of a ,war wholly unexpected1 we may bring forward the invasion of ,silesia by ,frederick the ,great4 ,great and powerful are here the results everywhere1 but such events are not common in history if we do not confuse with them cases in which a ,state1 for want of activity and energy 7,saxony #agef1 and ,russia1 #ahab71 has not completed its preparations in time4 ,now there still remains an observation which concerns the essence of the thing4 ,a surprise can only be effected by that party which gives the law to the other2 and he who is in the right gives the law4 ,if we surprise the adversary by a wrong measure1 then instead of reaping good results1 we may have to bear a sound blow in return2 in any case the adversary need not trouble himself much about our surprise1 he has in our mistake the means of turning off the evil4 ,as the offensive includes in itself much more positive action than the defensive1 so the surprise is certainly more in its place with the assailant1 but by no means invariably1 as we shall hereafter see4 ,mutual surprises by the offensive and defensive may therefore meet1 and then that one will have the advantage who has hit the nail on the head the best4 ,so should it be1 but practical life does not keep to this line so exactly1 and that for a very simple reason4 ,the moral effects which attend a surprise often convert the worst case into a good one for the side they favour1 and do not allow the other to make any regular determination4 ,we have here in view more than anywhere else not only the chief ,commander1 but each single one1 because a surprise has the effect in particular of greatly loosening unity1 so that the individuality of each separate leader easily comes to light4 ,much depends here on the general relation in which the two parties stand to each other4 ,if the one side through a general moral superiority can intimidate and outdo the other1 then he can make use of the surprise with more success1 and even reap good fruit where properly he should come to ruin4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,stratagem ,stratagem implies a concealed intention1 and therefore is opposed to straightforward dealing1 in the same way as wit is the opposite of direct proof4 ,it has therefore nothing in common with means of persuasion1 of self-interest1 of force1 but a great deal to do with deceit1 because that likewise conceals its object4 ,it is itself a deceit as well when it is done1 but still it differs from what is commonly called deceit1 in this respect that there is no direct breach of word4 ,the deceiver by stratagem leaves it to the person himself whom he is deceiving to commit the errors of understanding which at last1 flowing into one result1 suddenly change the nature of things in his eyes4 ,we may therefore say1 as nit is a sleight of hand with ideas and conceptions1 so stratagem is a sleight of hand with actions4 ,at first sight it appears as if ,strategy had not improperly derived its name from stratagem2 and that1 with all the real and apparent changes which the whole character of ,war has undergone since the time of the ,greeks1 this term still points to its real nature4 ,if we leave to tactics the actual delivery of the blow1 the battle itself1 and look upon ,strategy as the art of using this means with skill1 then besides the forces of the character1 such as burning ambition which always presses like a spring1 a strong will which hardly bends c4 c41 there seems no subjective quality so suited to guide and inspire strategic activity as stratagem4 ,the general tendency to surprise1 treated of in the foregoing chapter1 points to this conclusion1 for there is a degree of stratagem1 be it ever so small1 which lies at the foundation of every attempt to surprise4 ,but however much we feel a desire to see the actors in ,war outdo each other in hidden activity1 readiness1 and stratagem1 still we must admit that these qualities show themselves but little in history1 and have rarely been able to work their way to the surface from amongst the mass of relations and circumstances4 ,the explanation of this is obvious1 and it is almost identical with the subject matter of the preceding chapter4 ,strategy knows no other activity than the regulating of combat with the measures which relate to it4 ,it has no concern1 like ordinary life1 with transactions which consist merely of words--that is1 in expressions1 declarations1 c4 ,but these1 which are very inexpensive1 are chiefly the means with which the wily one takes in those he practises upon4 ,that which there is like it in ,war1 plans and orders given merely as make-believers1 false reports sent on purpose to the enemy--is usually of so little effect in the strategic field that it is only resorted to in particular cases which offer of themselves1 therefore cannot be regarded as spontaneous action which emanates from the leader4 ,but such measures as carrying out the arrangements for a battle1 so far as to impose upon the enemy1 require a considerable expenditure of time and power2 of course1 the greater the impression to be made1 the greater the expenditure in these respects4 ,and as this is usually not given for the purpose1 very few demonstrations1 so-called1 in ,strategy1 effect the object for which they are designed4 ,in fact1 it is dangerous to detach large forces for any length of time merely for a trick1 because there is always the risk of its being done in vain1 and then these forces are wanted at the decisive point4 ,the chief actor in ,war is always thoroughly sensible of this sober truth1 and therefore he has no desire to play at tricks of agility4 ,the bitter earnestness of necessity presses so fully into direct action that there is no room for that game4 ,in a word1 the pieces on the strategical chess-board want that mobility which is the element of stratagem and subtility4 ,the conclusion which we draw1 is that a correct and penetrating eye is a more necessary and more useful quality for a ,general than craftiness1 although that also does no harm if it does not exist at the expense of necessary qualities of the heart1 which is only too often the case4 ,but the weaker the forces become which are under the command of ,strategy1 so much the more they become adapted for stratagem1 so that to the quite feeble and little1 for whom no prudence1 no sagacity is any longer sufficient at the point where all art seems to forsake him1 stratagem offers itself as a last resource4 ,the more helpless his situation1 the more everything presses towards one single1 desperate blow1 the more readily stratagem comes to the aid of his boldness4 ,let loose from all further calculations1 freed from all concern for the future1 boldness and stratagem intensify each other1 and thus collect at one point an infinitesimal glimmering of hope into a single ray1 which may likewise serve to kindle a flame4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,assembly of ,forces in ,space ,the best ,strategy is always to be very strong1 first generally then at the decisive point4 ,therefore1 apart from the energy which creates the ,army1 a work which is not always done by the ,general1 there is no more imperative and no simpler law for ,strategy than to keep the forces concentrated4--,no portion is to be separated from the main body unless called away by some urgent necessity4 ,on this maxim we stand firm1 and look upon it as a guide to be depended upon4 ,what are the reasonable grounds on which a detachment of forces may be made we shall learn by degrees4 ,then we shall also see that this principle cannot have the same general effects in every ,war1 but that these are different according to the means and end4 ,it seems incredible1 and yet it has happened a hundred times1 that troops have been divided and separated merely through a mysterious feeling of conventional manner1 without any clear perception of the reason4 ,if the concentration of the whole force is acknowledged as the norm1 and every division and separation as an exception which must be justified1 then not only will that folly be completely avoided1 but also many an erroneous ground for separating troops will be barred admission4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,assembly of ,forces in ,time ,we have here to deal with a conception which in real life diffuses many kinds of illusory light4 ,a clear definition and development of the idea is therefore necessary1 and we hope to be allowed a short analysis4 ,war is the shock of two opposing forces in collision with each other1 from which it follows as a matter of course that the stronger not only destroys the other1 but carries it forward with it in its movement4 ,this fundamentally admits of no successive action of powers1 but makes the simultaneous application of all forces intended for the shock appear as a primordial law of ,war4 ,so it is in reality1 but only so far as the struggle resembles also in practice a mechanical shock1 but when it consists in a lasting1 mutual action of destructive forces1 then we can certainly imagine a successive action of forces4 ,this is the case in tactics1 principally because firearms form the basis of all tactics1 but also for other reasons as well4 ,if in a fire combat #ajjj men are opposed to #ejj1 then the gross loss is calculated from the amount of the enemy's force and our own2 #ajjj men fire twice as many shots as #ejj1 but more shots will take effect on the #ajjj than on the #ejj because it is assumed that they stand in closer order than the other4 ,if we were to suppose the number of hits to be double1 then the losses on each side would be equal4 ,from the #ejj there would be for example #bjj disabled1 and out of the body of #ajjj likewise the same2 now if the #ejj had kept another body of equal number quite out of fire1 then both sides would have #hjj effective men2 but of these1 on the one side there would be #ejj men quite fresh1 fully supplied with ammunition1 and in their full vigour2 on the other side only #hjj all alike shaken in their order1 in want of sufficient ammunition and weakened in physical force4 ,the assumption that the #ajjj men merely on account of their greater number would lose twice as many as #ejj would have lost in their place1 is certainly not correct2 therefore the greater loss which the side suffers that has placed the half of its force in reserve1 must be regarded as a disadvantage in that original formation2 further it must be admitted1 that in the generality of cases the #ajjj men would have the advantage at the first commencement of being able to drive their opponent out of his position and force him to a retrograde movement2 now1 whether these two advantages are a counterpoise to the disadvantage of finding ourselves with #hjj men to a certain extent disorganised by the combat1 opposed to an enemy who is not materially weaker in numbers and who has #ejj quite fresh troops1 is one that cannot be decided by pursuing an analysis further1 we must here rely upon experience1 and there will scarcely be an officer experienced in ,war who will not in the generality of cases assign the advantage to that side which has the fresh troops4 ,in this way it becomes evident how the employment of too many forces in combat may be disadvantageous2 for whatever advantages the superiority may give in the first moment1 we may have to pay dearly for in the next4 ,but this danger only endures as long as the disorder1 the state of confusion and weakness lasts1 in a word1 up to the crisis which every combat brings with it even for the conqueror4 ,within the duration of this relaxed state of exhaustion1 the appearance of a proportionate number of fresh troops is decisive4 ,but when this disordering effect of victory stops1 and therefore only the moral superiority remains which every victory gives1 then it is no longer possible for fresh troops to restore the combat1 they would only be carried along in the general movement2 a beaten ,army cannot be brought back to victory a day after by means of a strong reserve4 ,here we find ourselves at the source of a highly material difference between tactics and strategy4 ,the tactical results1 the results within the four corners of the battle1 and before its close1 lie for the most part within the limits of that period of disorder and weakness4 ,but the strategic result1 that is to say1 the result of the total combat1 of the victories realised1 let them be small or great1 lies completely 7beyond7 outside of that period4 ,it is only when the results of partial combats have bound themselves together into an independent whole1 that the strategic result appears1 but then1 the state of crisis is over1 the forces have resumed their original form1 and are now only weakened to the extent of those actually destroyed 7placed hors de combat74 ,the consequence of this difference is1 that tactics can make a continued use of forces1 ,strategy only a simultaneous one47997 7997 ,see chaps4 xiii41 and xiv41 ,book ,,iii and chap4 xxix4 ,book ,v4--,,tr4 ,if ,i cannot1 in tactics1 decide all by the first success1 if ,i have to fear the next moment1 it follows of itself that ,i employ only so much of my force for the success of the first moment as appears sufficient for that object1 and keep the rest beyond the reach of fire or conflict of any kind1 in order to be able to oppose fresh troops to fresh1 or with such to overcome those that are exhausted4 ,but it is not so in ,strategy4 ,partly1 as we have just shown1 it has not so much reason to fear a reaction after a success realised1 because with that success the crisis stops2 partly all the forces strategically employed are not necessarily weakened4 ,only so much of them as have been tactically in conflict with the enemy's force1 that is1 engaged in partial combat1 are weakened by it2 consequently1 only so much as was unavoidably necessary1 but by no means all which was strategically in conflict with the enemy1 unless tactics has expended them unnecessarily4 ,corps which1 on account of the general superiority in numbers1 have either been little or not at all engaged1 whose presence alone has assisted in the result1 are after the decision the same as they were before1 and for new enterprises as efficient as if they had been entirely inactive4 ,how greatly such corps which thus constitute our excess may contribute to the total success is evident in itself2 indeed1 it is not difficult to see how they may even diminish considerably the loss of the forces engaged in tactical1 conflict on our side4 ,if1 therefore1 in ,strategy the loss does not increase with the number of the troops employed1 but is often diminished by it1 and if1 as a natural consequence1 the decision in our favor is1 by that means1 the more certain1 then it follows naturally that in ,strategy we can never employ too many forces1 and consequently also that they must be applied simultaneously to the immediate purpose4 ,but we must vindicate this proposition upon another ground4 ,we have hitherto only spoken of the combat itself2 it is the real activity in ,war1 but men1 time1 and space1 which appear as the elements of this activity1 must1 at the same time1 be kept in view1 and the results of their influence brought into consideration also4 ,fatigue1 exertion1 and privation constitute in ,war a special principle of destruction1 not essentially belonging to contest1 but more or less inseparably bound up with it1 and certainly one which especially belongs to ,strategy4 ,they no doubt exist in tactics as well1 and perhaps there in the highest degree2 but as the duration of the tactical acts is shorter1 therefore the small effects of exertion and privation on them can come but little into consideration4 ,but in ,strategy on the other hand1 where time and space1 are on a larger scale1 their influence is not only always very considerable1 but often quite decisive4 ,it is not at all uncommon for a victorious ,army to lose many more by sickness than on the field of battle4 ,if1 therefore1 we look at this sphere of destruction in ,strategy in the same manner as we have considered that of fire and close combat in tactics1 then we may well imagine that everything which comes within its vortex will1 at the end of the campaign or of any other strategic period1 be reduced to a state of weakness1 which makes the arrival of a fresh force decisive4 ,we might therefore conclude that there is a motive in the one case as well as the other to strive for the first success with as few forces as possible1 in order to keep up this fresh force for the last4 ,in order to estimate exactly this conclusion1 which1 in many cases in practice1 will have a great appearance of truth1 we must direct our attention to the separate ideas which it contains4 ,in the first place1 we must not confuse the notion of reinforcement with that of fresh unused troops4 ,there are few campaigns at the end of which an increase of force is not earnestly desired by the conqueror as well as the conquered1 and indeed should appear decisive2 but that is not the point here1 for that increase of force could not be necessary if the force had been so much larger at the first4 ,but it would be contrary to all experience to suppose that an ,army coming fresh into the field is to be esteemed higher in point of moral value than an ,army already in the field1 just as a tactical reserve is more to be esteemed than a body of troops which has been already severely handled in the fight4 ,just as much as an unfortunate campaign lowers the courage and moral powers of an ,army1 a successful one raises these elements in their value4 ,in the generality of cases1 therefore1 these influences are compensated1 and then there remains over and above as clear gain the habituation to ,war4 ,we should besides look more here to successful than to unsuccessful campaigns1 because when the greater probability of the latter may be seen beforehand1 without doubt forces are wanted1 and1 therefore1 the reserving a portion for future use is out of the question4 ,this point being settled1 then the question is1 ,do the losses which a force sustains through fatigues and privations increase in proportion to the size of the force1 as is the case in a combat8 ,and to that we answer 8,no40 ,the fatigues of ,war result in a great measure from the dangers with which every moment of the act of ,war is more or less impregnated4 ,to encounter these dangers at all points1 to proceed onwards with security in the execution of one's plans1 gives employment to a multitude of agencies which make up the tactical and strategic service of the ,army4 ,this service is more difficult the weaker an ,army is1 and easier as its numerical superiority over that of the enemy increases4 ,who can doubt this8 ,a campaign against a much weaker enemy will therefore cost smaller efforts than against one just as strong or stronger4 ,so much for the fatigues4 ,it is somewhat different with the privations2 they consist chiefly of two things1 the want of food1 and the want of shelter for the troops1 either in quarters or in suitable camps4 ,both these wants will no doubt be greater in proportion as the number of men on one spot is greater4 ,but does not the superiority in force afford also the best means of spreading out and finding more room1 and therefore more means of subsistence and shelter8 ,if ,buonaparte1 in his invasion of ,russia in #ahab1 concentrated his ,army in great masses upon one single road in a manner never heard of before1 and thus caused privations equally unparalleled1 we must ascribe it to his maxim that it is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point4 ,whether in this instance he did not strain the principle too far is a question which would be out of place here2 but it is certain that1 if he had made a point of avoiding the distress which was by that means brought about1 he had only to advance on a greater breadth of front4 ,room was not wanted for the purpose in ,russia1 and in very few cases can it be wanted4 ,therefore1 from this no ground can be deduced to prove that the simultaneous employment of very superior forces must produce greater weakening4 ,but now1 supposing that in spite of the general relief afforded by setting apart a portion of the ,army1 wind and weather and the toils of ,war had produced a diminution even on the part which as a spare force had been reserved for later use1 still we must take a comprehensive general view of the whole1 and therefore ask1 ,will this diminution of force suffice to counterbalance the gain in forces1 which we1 through our superiority in numbers1 may be able to make in more ways than one8 ,but there still remains a most important point to be noticed4 ,in a partial combat1 the force required to obtain a great result can be approximately estimated without much difficulty1 and1 consequently1 we can form an idea of what is superfluous4 ,in ,strategy this may be said to be impossible1 because the strategic result has no such well-defined object and no such circumscribed limits as the tactical4 ,thus what can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of power1 must be regarded in ,strategy as a means to give expansion to success1 if opportunity offers for it2 with the magnitude of the success the gain in force increases at the same time1 and in this way the superiority of numbers may soon reach a point which the most careful economy of forces could never have attained4 ,by means of his enormous numerical superiority1 ,buonaparte was enabled to reach ,moscow in #ahab1 and to take that central capital4 ,had he by means of this superiority succeeded in completely defeating the ,russian ,army1 he would1 in all probability1 have concluded a peace in ,moscow which in any other way was much less attainable4 ,this example is used to explain the idea1 not to prove it1 which would require a circumstantial demonstration1 for which this is not the place47997 7997 ,compare ,book ,,vii41 second edition1 p4 #ef4 ,all these reflections bear merely upon the idea of a successive employment of forces1 and not upon the conception of a reserve properly so called1 which they1 no doubt1 come in contact with throughout1 but which1 as we shall see in the following chapter1 is connected with some other considerations4 ,what we desire to establish here is1 that if in tactics the military force through the mere duration of actual employment suffers a diminution of power1 if time1 therefore1 appears as a factor in the result1 this is not the case in ,strategy in a material degree4 ,the destructive effects which are also produced upon the forces in ,strategy by time1 are partly diminished through their mass1 partly made good in other ways1 and1 therefore1 in ,strategy it cannot be an object to make time an ally on its own account by bringing troops successively into action4 ,we say on 8its own account10 for the influence which time1 on account of other circumstances which it brings about but which are different from itself can have1 indeed must necessarily have1 for one of the two parties1 is quite another thing1 is anything but indifferent or unimportant1 and will be the subject of consideration hereafter4 ,the rule which we have been seeking to set forth is1 therefore1 that all forces which are available and destined for a strategic object should be simultaneously applied to it2 and this application will be so much the more complete the more everything is compressed into one act and into one movement4 ,but still there is in ,strategy a renewal of effort and a persistent action which1 as a chief means towards the ultimate success1 is more particularly not to be overlooked1 it is the continual development of new forces4 ,this is also the subject of another chapter1 and we only refer to it here in order to prevent the reader from having something in view of which we have not been speaking4 ,we now turn to a subject very closely connected with our present considerations1 which must be settled before full light can be thrown on the whole1 we mean the strategic reserve4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,strategic ,reserve ,a reserve has two objects which are very distinct from each other1 namely1 first1 the prolongation and renewal of the combat1 and secondly1 for use in case of unforeseen events4 ,the first object implies the utility of a successive application of forces1 and on that account cannot occur in ,strategy4 ,cases in which a corps is sent to succour a point which is supposed to be about to fall are plainly to be placed in the category of the second object1 as the resistance which has to be offered here could not have been sufficiently foreseen4 ,but a corps which is destined expressly to prolong the combat1 and with that object in view is placed in rear1 would be only a corps placed out of reach of fire1 but under the command and at the disposition of the ,general ,commanding in the action1 and accordingly would be a tactical and not a strategic reserve4 ,but the necessity for a force ready for unforeseen events may also take place in ,strategy1 and consequently there may also be a strategic reserve1 but only where unforeseen events are imaginable4 ,in tactics1 where the enemy's measures are generally first ascertained by direct sight1 and where they may be concealed by every wood1 every fold of undulating ground1 we must naturally always be alive1 more or less1 to the possibility of unforeseen events1 in order to strengthen1 subsequently1 those points which appear too weak1 and1 in fact1 to modify generally the disposition of our troops1 so as to make it correspond better to that of the enemy4 ,such cases must also happen in ,strategy1 because the strategic act is directly linked to the tactical4 ,in ,strategy also many a measure is first adopted in consequence of what is actually seen1 or in consequence of uncertain reports arriving from day to day1 or even from hour to hour1 and lastly1 from the actual results of the combats it is1 therefore1 an essential condition of strategic command that1 according to the degree of uncertainty1 forces must be kept in reserve against future contingencies4 ,in the defensive generally1 but particularly in the defence of certain obstacles of ground1 like rivers1 hills1 c41 such contingencies1 as is well known1 happen constantly4 ,but this uncertainty diminishes in proportion as the strategic activity has less of the tactical character1 and ceases almost altogether in those regions where it borders on politics4 ,the direction in which the enemy leads his columns to the combat can be perceived by actual sight only2 where he intends to pass a river is learnt from a few preparations which are made shortly before2 the line by which he proposes to invade our country is usually announced by all the newspapers before a pistol shot has been fired4 ,the greater the nature of the measure the less it will take the enemy by surprise4 ,time and space are so considerable1 the circumstances out of which the action proceeds so public and little susceptible of alteration1 that the coming event is either made known in good time1 or can be discovered with reasonable certainty4 ,on the other hand the use of a reserve in this province of ,strategy1 even if one were available1 will always be less efficacious the more the measure has a tendency towards being one of a general nature4 ,we have seen that the decision of a partial combat is nothing in itself1 but that all partial combats only find their complete solution in the decision of the total combat4 ,but even this decision of the total combat has only a relative meaning of many different gradations1 according as the force over which the victory has been gained forms a more or less great and important part of the whole4 ,the lost battle of a corps may be repaired by the victory of the ,army4 ,even the lost battle of an ,army may not only be counterbalanced by the gain of a more important one1 but converted into a fortunate event 7the two days of ,kulm1 ,august #bi and #cj1 #ahac799774 ,no one can doubt this2 but it is just as clear that the weight of each victory 7the successful issue of each total combat7 is so much the more substantial the more important the part conquered1 and that therefore the possibility of repairing the loss by subsequent events diminishes in the same proportion4 ,in another place we shall have to examine this more in detail2 it suffices for the present to have drawn attention to the indubitable existence of this progression4 7997 ,refers to the destruction of ,vandamme's column1 which had been sent unsupported to intercept the retreat of the ,austrians and ,prussians from ,dresden--but was forgotten by ,napoleon4--,,editor4 ,if we now add lastly to these two considerations the third1 which is1 that if the persistent use of forces in tactics always shifts the great result to the end of the whole act1 law of the simultaneous use of the forces in ,strategy1 on the contrary1 lets the principal result 7which need not be the final one7 take place almost always at the commencement of the great 7or whole7 act1 then in these three results we have grounds sufficient to find strategic reserves always more superfluous1 always more useless1 always more dangerous1 the more general their destination4 ,the point where the idea of a strategic reserve begins to become inconsistent is not difficult to determine3 it lies in the ,,supreme ,,decision4 ,employment must be given to all the forces within the space of the supreme decision1 and every reserve 7active force available7 which is only intended for use after that decision is opposed to common sense4 ,if1 therefore1 tactics has in its reserves the means of not only meeting unforeseen dispositions on the part of the enemy1 but also of repairing that which never can be foreseen1 the result of the combat1 should that be unfortunate2 ,strategy on the other hand must1 at least as far as relates to the capital result1 renounce the use of these means4 ,as ,a rule1 it can only repair the losses sustained at one point by advantages gained at another1 in a few cases by moving troops from one point to another2 the idea of preparing for such reverses by placing forces in reserve beforehand1 can never be entertained in ,strategy4 ,we have pointed out as an absurdity the idea of a strategic reserve which is not to co-operate in the capital result1 and as it is so beyond a doubt1 we should not have been led into such an analysis as we have made in these two chapters1 were it not that1 in the disguise of other ideas1 it looks like something better1 and frequently makes its appearance4 ,one person sees in it the acme of strategic sagacity and foresight2 another rejects it1 and with it the idea of any reserve1 consequently even of a tactical one4 ,this confusion of ideas is transferred to real life1 and if we would see a memorable instance of it we have only to call to mind that ,prussia in #ahjf left a reserve of #bj1jjj men cantoned in the ,mark1 under ,prince ,eugene of ,wurtemberg1 which could not possibly reach the ,saale in time to be of any use1 and that another force ,of #be1jjj men belonging to this power remained in ,east and ,south ,prussia1 destined only to be put on a war-footing afterwards as a reserve4 ,after these examples we cannot be accused of having been fighting with windmills4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,economy of ,forces ,the road of reason1 as we have said1 seldom allows itself to be reduced to a mathematical line by principles and opinions4 ,there remains always a certain margin4 ,but it is the same in all the practical arts of life4 ,for the lines of beauty there are no abscissae and ordinates2 circles and ellipses are not described by means of their algebraical formulae4 ,the actor in ,war therefore soon finds he must trust himself to the delicate tact of judgment which1 founded on natural quickness of perception1 and educated by reflection1 almost unconsciously seizes upon the right2 he soon finds that at one time he must simplify the law 7by reducing it7 to some prominent characteristic points which form his rules2 that at another the adopted method must become the staff on which he leans4 ,as one of these simplified characteristic points as a mental appliance1 we look upon the principle of watching continually over the co-operation of all forces1 or in other words1 of keeping constantly in view that no part of them should ever be idle4 ,whoever has forces where the enemy does not give them sufficient employment1 whoever has part of his forces on the march--that is1 allows them to lie dead--while the enemy's are fighting1 he is a bad manager of his forces4 ,in this sense there is a waste of forces1 which is even worse than their employment to no purpose4 ,if there must be action1 then the first point is that all parts act1 because the most purposeless activity still keeps employed and destroys a portion of the enemy's force1 whilst troops completely inactive are for the moment quite neutralised4 ,unmistakably this idea is bound up with the principles contained in the last three chapters1 it is the same truth1 but seen from a somewhat more comprehensive point of view and condensed into a single conception4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,geometrical ,element ,the length to which the geometrical element or form in the disposition of military force in ,war can become a predominant principle1 we see in the art of fortification1 where geometry looks after the great and the little4 ,also in tactics it plays a great part4 ,it is the basis of elementary tactics1 or of the theory of moving troops2 but in field fortification1 as well as in the theory of positions1 and of their attack1 its angles and lines rule like law givers who have to decide the contest4 ,many things here were at one time misapplied1 and others were mere fribbles2 still1 however1 in the tactics of the present day1 in which in every combat the aim is to surround the enemy1 the geometrical element has attained anew a great importance in a very simple1 but constantly recurring application4 ,nevertheless1 in tactics1 where all is more movable1 where the moral forces1 individual traits1 and chance are more influential than in a war of sieges1 the geometrical element can never attain to the same degree of supremacy as in the latter4 ,but less still is its influence in ,strategy2 certainly here1 also1 form in the disposition of troops1 the shape of countries and states is of great importance2 but the geometrical element is not decisive1 as in fortification1 and not nearly so important as in tactics4--,the manner in which this influence exhibits itself1 can only be shown by degrees at those places where it makes its appearance1 and deserves notice4 ,here we wish more to direct attention to the difference which there is between tactics and ,strategy in relation to it4 ,in tactics time and space quickly dwindle to their absolute minimum4 ,if a body of troops is attacked in flank and rear by the enemy1 it soon gets to a point where retreat no longer remains2 such a position is very close to an absolute impossibility of continuing the fight2 it must therefore extricate itself from it1 or avoid getting into it4 ,this gives to all combinations aiming at this from the first commencement a great efficiency1 which chiefly consists in the disquietude which it causes the enemy as to consequences4 ,this is why the geometrical disposition of the forces is such an important factor in the tactical product4 ,in ,strategy this is only faintly reflected1 on account of the greater space and time4 ,we do not fire from one theatre of war upon another2 and often weeks and months must pass before a strategic movement designed to surround the enemy can be executed4 ,further1 the distances are so great that the probability of hitting the right point at last1 even with the best arrangements1 is but small4 ,in ,strategy therefore the scope for such combinations1 that is for those resting on the geometrical element1 is much smaller1 and for the same reason the effect of an advantage once actually gained at any point is much greater4 ,such advantage has time to bring all its effects to maturity before it is disturbed1 or quite neutralised therein1 by any counteracting apprehensions4 ,we therefore do not hesitate to regard as an established truth1 that in ,strategy more depends on the number and the magnitude of the victorious combats1 than on the form of the great lines by which they are connected4 ,a view just the reverse has been a favourite theme of modern theory1 because a greater importance was supposed to be thus given to ,strategy1 and1 as the higher functions of the mind were seen in ,strategy1 it was thought by that means to ennoble ,war1 and1 as it was said--through a new substitution of ideas--to make it more scientific4 ,we hold it to be one of the principal uses of a complete theory openly to expose such vagaries1 and as the geometrical element is the fundamental idea from which theory usually proceeds1 therefore we have expressly brought out this point in strong relief4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,on the ,suspension of the ,act in ,war ,if one considers ,war as an act of mutual destruction1 we must of necessity imagine both parties as making some progress2 but at the same time1 as regards the existing moment1 we must almost as necessarily suppose the one party in a state of expectation1 and only the other actually advancing1 for circumstances can never be actually the same on both sides1 or continue so4 ,in time a change must ensue1 from which it follows that the present moment is more favourable to one side than the other4 ,now if we suppose that both commanders have a full knowledge of this circumstance1 then the one has a motive for action1 which at the same time is a motive for the other to wait2 therefore1 according to this it cannot be for the interest of both at the same time to advance1 nor can waiting be for the interest of both at the same time4 ,this opposition of interest as regards the object is not deduced here from the principle of general polarity1 and therefore is not in opposition to the argument in the fifth chapter of the second book2 it depends on the fact that here in reality the same thing is at once an incentive or motive to both commanders1 namely the probability of improving or impairing their position by future action4 ,but even if we suppose the possibility of a perfect equality of circumstances in this respect1 or if we take into account that through imperfect knowledge of their mutual position such an equality may appear to the two ,commanders to subsist1 still the difference of political objects does away with this possibility of suspension4 ,one of the parties must of necessity be assumed politically to be the aggressor1 because no ,war could take place from defensive intentions on both sides4 ,but the aggressor has the positive object1 the defender merely a negative one4 ,to the first then belongs the positive action1 for it is only by that means that he can attain the positive object2 therefore1 in cases where both parties are in precisely similar circumstances1 the aggressor is called upon to act by virtue of his positive object4 ,therefore1 from this point of view1 a suspension in the act of ,warfare1 strictly speaking1 is in contradiction with the nature of the thing2 because two ,armies1 being two incompatible elements1 should destroy one another unremittingly1 just as fire and water can never put themselves in equilibrium1 but act and react upon one another1 until one quite disappears4 ,what would be said of two wrestlers who remained clasped round each other for hours without making a movement4 ,action in ,war1 therefore1 like that of a clock which is wound up1 should go on running down in regular motion4--,but wild as is the nature of ,war it still wears the chains of human weakness1 and the contradiction we see here1 viz41 that man seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the same time will astonish no one4 ,if we cast a glance at military history in general1 we find so much the opposite of an incessant advance towards the aim1 that standing still and doing nothing is quite plainly the normal condition of an ,army in the midst of ,war1 acting1 the exception4 ,this must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception4 ,but if military history leads to this conclusion when viewed in the mass the latest series of campaigns redeems our position4 ,the ,war of the ,french ,revolution shows too plainly its reality1 and only proves too clearly its necessity4 ,in these operations1 and especially in the campaigns of ,buonaparte1 the conduct of ,war attained to that unlimited degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the element4 ,this degree is therefore possible1 and if it is possible then it is necessary4 ,how could any one in fact justify in the eyes of reason the expenditure of forces in ,war1 if acting was not the object8 ,the baker only heats his oven if he has bread to put into it2 the horse is only yoked to the carriage if we mean to drive2 why then make the enormous effort of a ,war if we look for nothing else by it but like efforts on the part of the enemy8 ,so much in justification of the general principle2 now as to its modifications1 as far as they lie in the nature of the thing and are independent of special cases4 ,there are three causes to be noticed here1 which appear as innate counterpoises and prevent the over-rapid or uncontrollable movement of the wheel-work4 ,the first1 which produces a constant tendency to delay1 and is thereby a retarding principle1 is the natural timidity and want of resolution in the human mind1 a kind of inertia in the moral world1 but which is produced not by attractive1 but by repellent forces1 that is to say1 by dread of danger and responsibility4 ,in the burning element of ,war1 ordinary natures appear to become heavier2 the impulsion given must therefore be stronger and more frequently repeated if the motion is to be a continuous one4 ,the mere idea of the object for which arms have been taken up is seldom sufficient to overcome this resistant force1 and if a warlike enterprising spirit is not at the head1 who feels himself in ,war in his natural element1 as much as a fish in the ocean1 or if there is not the pressure from above of some great responsibility1 then standing still will be the order of the day1 and progress will be the exception4 ,the second cause is the imperfection of human perception and judgment1 which is greater in ,war than anywhere1 because a person hardly knows exactly his own position from one moment to another1 and can only conjecture on slight grounds that of the enemy1 which is purposely concealed2 this often gives rise to the case of both parties looking upon one and the same object as advantageous for them1 while in reality the interest of one must preponderate2 thus then each may think he acts wisely by waiting another moment1 as we have already said in the fifth chapter of the second book4 ,the third cause which catches hold1 like a ratchet wheel in machinery1 from time to time producing a complete standstill1 is the greater strength of the defensive form4 ,a may feel too weak to attack ,b1 from which it does not follow that ,b is strong enough for an attack on ,a4 ,the addition of strength1 which the defensive gives is not merely lost by assuming the offensive1 but also passes to the enemy just as1 figuratively expressed1 the difference of a b and a - b is equal to #b;b4 ,therefore it may so happen that both parties1 at one and the same time1 not only feel themselves too weak to attack1 but also are so in reality4 ,thus even in the midst of the act of ,war itself1 anxious sagacity and the apprehension of too great danger find vantage ground1 by means of which they can exert their power1 and tame the elementary impetuosity of ,war4 ,however1 at the same time these causes without an exaggeration of their effect1 would hardly explain the long states of inactivity which took place in military operations1 in former times1 in ,wars undertaken about interests of no great importance1 and in which inactivity consumed nine-tenths of the time that the troops remained under arms4 ,this feature in these ,wars1 is to be traced principally to the influence which the demands of the one party1 and the condition1 and feeling of the other1 exercised over the conduct of the operations1 as has been already observed in the chapter on the essence and object of ,war4 ,these things may obtain such a preponderating influence as to make of ,war a half-and-half affair4 ,a ,war is often nothing more than an armed neutrality1 or a menacing attitude to support negotiations or an attempt to gain some small advantage by small exertions1 and then to wait the tide of circumstances1 or a disagreeable treaty obligation1 which is fulfilled in the most niggardly way possible4 ,in all these cases in which the impulse given by interest is slight1 and the principle of hostility feeble1 in which there is no desire to do much1 and also not much to dread from the enemy2 in short1 where no powerful motives press and drive1 cabinets will not risk much in the game2 hence this tame mode of carrying on ,war1 in which the hostile spirit of real ,war is laid in irons4 ,the more ,war becomes in this manner devitalised so much the more its theory becomes destitute of the necessary firm pivots and buttresses for its reasoning2 the necessary is constantly diminishing1 the accidental constantly increasing4 ,nevertheless in this kind of ,warfare1 there is also a certain shrewdness1 indeed1 its action is perhaps more diversified1 and more extensive than in the other4 ,hazard played with realeaux of gold seems changed into a game of commerce with groschen4 ,and on this field1 where the conduct of ,war spins out the time with a number of small flourishes1 with skirmishes at outposts1 half in earnest half in jest1 with long dispositions which end in nothing with positions and marches1 which afterwards are designated as skilful only because their infinitesimally small causes are lost1 and common sense can make nothing of them1 here on this very field many theorists find the real ,art of ,war at home3 in these feints1 parades1 half and quarter thrusts of former ,wars1 they find the aim of all theory1 the supremacy of mind over matter1 and modern ,wars appear to them mere savage fisticuffs1 from which nothing is to be learnt1 and which must be regarded as mere retrograde steps towards barbarism4 ,this opinion is as frivolous as the objects to which it relates4 ,where great forces and great passions are wanting1 it is certainly easier for a practised dexterity to show its game2 but is then the command of great forces1 not in itself a higher exercise of the intelligent faculties8 ,is then that kind of conventional sword-exercise not comprised in and belonging to the other mode of conducting ,war8 ,does it not bear the same relation to it as the motions upon a ship to the motion of the ship itself8 ,truly it can take place only under the tacit condition that the adversary does no better4 ,and can we tell1 how long he may choose to respect those conditions8 ,has not then the ,french ,revolution fallen upon us in the midst of the fancied security of our old system of ,war1 and driven us from ,chalons to ,moscow8 ,and did not ,frederick the ,great in like manner surprise the ,austrians reposing in their ancient habits of ,war1 and make their monarchy tremble8 ,woe to the cabinet which1 with a shilly-shally policy1 and a routine-ridden military system1 meets with an adversary who1 like the rude element1 knows no other law than that of his intrinsic force4 ,every deficiency in energy and exertion is then a weight in the scales in favour of the enemy2 it is not so easy then to change from the fencing posture into that of an athlete1 and a slight blow is often sufficient to knock down the whole4 ,the result of all the causes now adduced is1 that the hostile action of a campaign does not progress by a continuous1 but by an intermittent movement1 and that1 therefore1 between the separate bloody acts1 there is a period of watching1 during which both parties fall into the defensive1 and also that usually a higher object causes the principle of aggression to predominate on one side1 and thus leaves it in general in an advancing position1 by which then its proceedings become modified in some degree4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,on the ,character of ,modern ,war ,the attention which must be paid to the character of ,war as it is now made1 has a great influence upon all plans1 especially on strategic ones4 ,since all methods formerly usual were upset by ,buonaparte's luck and boldness1 and first-rate ,powers almost wiped out at a blow2 since the ,spaniards by their stubborn resistance have shown what the general arming of a nation and insurgent measures on a great scale can effect1 in spite of weakness and porousness of individual parts2 since ,russia1 by the campaign of #ahab has taught us1 first1 that an ,empire of great dimensions is not to be conquered 7which might have been easily known before71 secondly1 that the probability of final success does not in all cases diminish in the same measure as battles1 capitals1 and provinces are lost 7which was formerly an incontrovertible principle with all diplomatists1 and therefore made them always ready to enter at once into some bad temporary peace71 but that a nation is often strongest in the heart of its country1 if the enemy's offensive power has exhausted itself1 and with what enormous force the defensive then springs over to the offensive2 further1 since ,prussia 7#ahac7 has shown that sudden efforts may add to an ,army sixfold by means of the militia1 and that this militia is just as fit for service abroad as in its own country2--since all these events have shown what an enormous factor the heart and sentiments of a ,nation may be in the product of its political and military strength1 in fine1 since governments have found out all these additional aids1 it is not to be expected that they will let them lie idle in future ,wars1 whether it be that danger threatens their own existence1 or that restless ambition drives them on4 ,that a ,war which is waged with the whole weight of the national power on each side must be organised differently in principle to those where everything is calculated according to the relations of standing ,armies to each other1 it is easy to perceive4 ,standing ,armies once resembled fleets1 the land force the sea force in their relations to the remainder of the ,state1 and from that the ,art of ,war on shore had in it something of naval tactics1 which it has now quite lost4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,tension and ,rest ,the ,dynamic ,law of ,war ,we have seen in the sixteenth chapter of this book1 how1 in most campaigns1 much more time used to be spent in standing still and inaction than in activity4 ,now1 although1 as observed in the preceding chapter we see quite a different character in the present form of ,war1 still it is certain that real action will always be interrupted more or less by long pauses2 and this leads to the necessity of our examining more closely the nature of these two phases of ,war4 ,if there is a suspension of action in ,war1 that is1 if neither party wills something positive1 there is rest1 and consequently equilibrium1 but certainly an equilibrium in the largest signification1 in which not only the moral and physical war-forces1 but all relations and interests1 come into calculation4 ,as soon as ever one of the two parties proposes to himself a new positive object1 and commences active steps towards it1 even if it is only by preparations1 and as soon as the adversary opposes this1 there is a tension of powers2 this lasts until the decision takes place--that is1 until one party either gives up his object or the other has conceded it to him4 ,this decision--the foundation of which lies always in the combat--combinations which are made on each side--is followed by a movement in one or other direction4 ,when this movement has exhausted itself1 either in the difficulties which had to be mastered1 in overcoming its own internal friction1 or through new resistant forces prepared by the acts of the enemy1 then either a state of rest takes place or a new tension with a decision1 and then a new movement1 in most cases in the opposite direction4 ,this speculative distinction between equilibrium1 tension1 and motion is more essential for practical action than may at first sight appear4 ,in a state of rest and of equilibrium a varied kind of activity may prevail on one side that results from opportunity1 and does not aim at a great alteration4 ,such an activity may contain important combats--even pitched battles--but yet it is still of quite a different nature1 and on that account generally different in its effects4 ,if a state of tension exists1 the effects of the decision are always greater partly because a greater force of will and a greater pressure of circumstances manifest themselves therein2 partly because everything has been prepared and arranged for a great movement4 ,the decision in such cases resembles the effect of a mine well closed and tamped1 whilst an event in itself perhaps just as great1 in a state of rest1 is more or less like a mass of powder puffed away in the open air4 ,at the same time1 as a matter of course1 the state of tension must be imagined in different degrees of intensity1 and it may therefore approach gradually by many steps towards the state of rest1 so that at the last there is a very slight difference between them4 ,now the real use which we derive from these reflections is the conclusion that every measure which is taken during a state of tension is more important and more prolific in results than the same measure could be in a state of equilibrium1 and that this importance increases immensely in the highest degrees of tension4 ,the cannonade of ,valmy1 ,september #bj1 #agib1 decided more than the battle of ,hochkirch1 ,october #ad1 #ageh4 ,in a tract of country which the enemy abandons to us because he cannot defend it1 we can settle ourselves differently from what we should do if the retreat of the enemy was only made with the view to a decision under more favourable circumstances4 ,again1 a strategic attack in course of execution1 a faulty position1 a single false march1 may be decisive in its consequence2 whilst in a state of equilibrium such errors must be of a very glaring kind1 even to excite the activity of the enemy in a general way4 ,most bygone ,wars1 as we have already said1 consisted1 so far as regards the greater part of the time1 in this state of equilibrium1 or at least in such short tensions with long intervals between them1 and weak in their effects1 that the events to which they gave rise were seldom great successes1 often they were theatrical exhibitions1 got up in honour of a royal birthday 7,hochkirch71 often a mere satisfying of the honour of the arms 7,kunersdorf71 or the personal vanity of the commander 7,freiberg74 ,that a ,commander should thoroughly understand these states1 that he should have the tact to act in the spirit of them1 we hold to be a great requisite1 and we have had experience in the campaign of #ahjf how far it is sometimes wanting4 ,in that tremendous tension1 when everything pressed on towards a supreme decision1 and that alone with all its consequences should have occupied the whole soul of the ,commander1 measures were proposed and even partly carried out 7such as the reconnaissance towards ,franconia71 which at the most might have given a kind of gentle play of oscillation within a state of equilibrium4 ,over these blundering schemes and views1 absorbing the activity of the ,army1 the really necessary means1 which could alone save1 were lost sight of4 ,but this speculative distinction which we have made is also necessary for our further progress in the construction of our theory1 because all that we have to say on the relation of attack and defence1 and on the completion of this double-sided act1 concerns the state of the crisis in which the forces are placed during the tension and motion1 and because all the activity which can take place during the condition of equilibrium can only be regarded and treated as a corollary2 for that crisis is the real ,war and this state of equilibrium only its reflection4 ,,book ,,iv ,,the ,,combat ,,chapter ,i4 ,introductory ,having in the foregoing book examined the subjects which may be regarded as the efficient elements of ,war1 we shall now turn our attention to the combat as the real activity in ,warfare1 which1 by its physical and moral effects1 embraces sometimes more simply1 sometimes in a more complex manner1 the object of the whole campaign4 ,in this activity and in its effects these elements must therefore1 reappear4 ,the formation of the combat is tactical in its nature2 we only glance at it here in a general way in order to get acquainted with it in its aspect as a whole4 ,in practice the minor or more immediate objects give every combat a characteristic form2 these minor objects we shall not discuss until hereafter4 ,but these peculiarities are in comparison to the general characteristics of a combat mostly only insignificant1 so that most combats are very like one another1 and1 therefore1 in order to avoid repeating that which is general at every stage1 we are compelled to look into it here1 before taking up the subject of its more special application4 ,in the first place1 therefore1 we shall give in the next chapter1 in a few words1 the characteristics of the modern battle in its tactical course1 because that lies at the foundation of our conceptions of what the battle really is4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,character of a ,modern ,battle ,according to the notion we have formed of tactics and strategy1 it follows1 as a matter of course1 that if the nature of the former is changed1 that change must have an influence on the latter4 ,if tactical facts in one case are entirely different from those in another1 then the strategic1 must be so also1 if they are to continue consistent and reasonable4 ,it is therefore important to characterise a general action in its modern form before we advance with the study of its employment in strategy4 ,what do we do now usually in a great battle8 ,we place ourselves quietly in great masses arranged contiguous to and behind one another4 ,we deploy relatively only a small portion of the whole1 and let it wring itself out in a fire-combat which lasts for several hours1 only interrupted now and again1 and removed hither and thither by separate small shocks from charges with the bayonet and cavalry attacks4 ,when this line has gradually exhausted part of its warlike ardour in this manner and there remains nothing more than the cinders1 it is withdrawn7997 and replaced by another4 7997 ,the relief of the fighting line played a great part in the battles of the ,smooth-,bore era2 it was necessitated by the fouling of the muskets1 physical fatigue of the men and consumption of ammunition1 and was recognised as both necessary and advisable by ,napoleon himself4--,,editor4 ,in this manner the battle on a modified principle burns slowly away like wet powder1 and if the veil of night commands it to stop1 because neither party can any longer see1 and neither chooses to run the risk of blind chance1 then an account is taken by each side respectively of the masses remaining1 which can be called still effective1 that is1 which have not yet quite collapsed like extinct volcanoes2 account is taken of the ground gained or lost1 and of how stands the security of the rear2 these results with the special impressions as to bravery and cowardice1 ability and stupidity1 which are thought to have been observed in ourselves and in the enemy are collected into one single total impression1 out of which there springs the resolution to quit the field or to renew the combat on the morrow4 ,this description1 which is not intended as a finished picture of a modern battle1 but only to give its general tone1 suits for the offensive and defensive1 and the special traits which are given1 by the object proposed1 the country1 c4 c41 may be introduced into it1 without materially altering the conception4 ,but modern battles are not so by accident2 they are so because the parties find themselves nearly on a level as regards military organisation and the knowledge of the ,art of ,war1 and because the warlike element inflamed by great national interests has broken through artificial limits and now flows in its natural channel4 ,under these two conditions1 battles will always preserve this character4 ,this general idea of the modern battle will be useful to us in the sequel in more places than one1 if we want to estimate the value of the particular co-efficients of strength1 country1 c4 c4 ,it is only for general1 great1 and decisive combats1 and such as come near to them that this description stands good2 inferior ones have changed their character also in the same direction but less than great ones4 ,the proof of this belongs to tactics2 we shall1 however1 have an opportunity hereafter of making this subject plainer by giving a few particulars4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,combat in ,general ,the ,combat is the real warlike activity1 everything else is only its auxiliary2 let us therefore take an attentive look at its nature4 ,combat means fighting1 and in this the destruction or conquest of the enemy is the object1 and the enemy1 in the particular combat1 is the armed force which stands opposed to us4 ,this is the simple idea2 we shall return to it1 but before we can do that we must insert a series of others4 ,if we suppose the ,state and its military force as a unit1 then the most natural idea is to imagine the ,war also as one great combat1 and in the simple relations of savage nations it is also not much otherwise4 ,but our ,wars are made up of a number of great and small simultaneous or consecutive combats1 and this severance of the activity into so many separate actions is owing to the great multiplicity of the relations out of which ,war arises with us4 ,in point of fact1 the ultimate object of our ,wars1 the political one1 is not always quite a simple one2 and even were it so1 still the action is bound up with such a number of conditions and considerations to be taken into account1 that the object can no longer be attained by one single great act but only through a number of greater or smaller acts which are bound up into a whole2 each of these separate acts is therefore a part of a whole1 and has consequently a special object by which it is bound to this whole4 ,we have already said that every strategic act can be referred to the idea of a combat1 because it is an employment of the military force1 and at the root of that there always lies the idea of fighting4 ,we may therefore reduce every military activity in the province of ,strategy to the unit of single combats1 and occupy ourselves with the object of these only2 we shall get acquainted with these special objects by degrees as we come to speak of the causes which produce them2 here we content ourselves with saying that every combat1 great or small1 has its own peculiar object in subordination to the main object4 ,if this is the case then1 the destruction and conquest of the enemy is only to be regarded as the means of gaining this object2 as it unquestionably is4 ,but this result is true only in its form1 and important only on account of the connection which the ideas have between themselves1 and we have only sought it out to get rid of it at once4 ,what is overcoming the enemy8 ,invariably the destruction of his military force1 whether it be by death1 or wounds1 or any means2 whether it be completely or only to such a degree that he can no longer continue the contest2 therefore as long as we set aside all special objects of combats1 we may look upon the complete or partial destruction of the enemy as the only object of all combats4 ,now we maintain that in the majority of cases1 and especially in great battles1 the special object by which the battle is individualised and bound up with the great whole is only a weak modification of that general object1 or an ancillary object bound up with it1 important enough to individualise the battle1 but always insignificant in comparison with that general object2 so that if that ancillary object alone should be obtained1 only an unimportant part of the purpose of the combat is fulfilled4 ,if this assertion is correct1 then we see that the idea1 according to which the destruction of the enemy's force is only the means1 and something else always the object1 can only be true in form1 but1 that it would lead to false conclusions if we did not recollect that this destruction of the enemy's force is comprised in that object1 and that this object is only a weak modification of it4 ,forgetfulness of this led to completely false views before the ,wars of the last period1 and created tendencies as well as fragments of systems1 in which theory thought it raised itself so much the more above handicraft1 the less it supposed itself to stand in need of the use of the real instrument1 that is the destruction of the enemy's force4 ,certainly such a system could not have arisen unless supported by other false suppositions1 and unless in place of the destruction of the enemy1 other things had been substituted to which an efficacy was ascribed which did not rightly belong to them4 ,we shall attack these falsehoods whenever occasion requires1 but we could not treat of the combat without claiming for it the real importance and value which belong to it1 and giving warning against the errors to which merely formal truth might lead4 ,but now how shall we manage to show that in most cases1 and in those of most importance1 the destruction of the enemy's ,army is the chief thing8 ,how shall we manage to combat that extremely subtle idea1 which supposes it possible1 through the use of a special artificial form1 to effect by a small direct destruction of the enemy's forces a much greater destruction indirectly1 or by means of small but extremely well-directed blows to produce such paralysation of the enemy's forces1 such a command over the enemy's will1 that this mode of proceeding is to be viewed as a great shortening of the road8 ,undoubtedly a victory at one point may be of more value than at another4 ,undoubtedly there is a scientific arrangement of battles amongst themselves1 even in ,strategy1 which is in fact nothing but the ,art of thus arranging them4 ,to deny that is not our intention1 but we assert that the direct destruction of the enemy's forces is everywhere predominant2 we contend here for the overruling importance of this destructive principle and nothing else4 ,we must1 however1 call to mind that we are now engaged with ,strategy1 not with tactics1 therefore we do not speak of the means which the former may have of destroying at a small expense a large body of the enemy's forces1 but under direct destruction we understand the tactical results1 and that1 therefore1 our assertion is that only great tactical results can lead to great strategical ones1 or1 as we have already once before more distinctly expressed it1 the tactical successes are of paramount importance in the conduct of ,war4 ,the proof of this assertion seems to us simple enough1 it lies in the time which every complicated 7artificial7 combination requires4 ,the question whether a simple attack1 or one more carefully prepared1 i4e41 more artificial1 will produce greater effects1 may undoubtedly be decided in favour of the latter as long as the enemy is assumed to remain quite passive4 ,but every carefully combined attack requires time for its preparation1 and if a counter-stroke by the enemy intervenes1 our whole design may be upset4 ,now if the enemy should decide upon some simple attack1 which can be executed in a shorter time1 then he gains the initiative1 and destroys the effect of the great plan4 ,therefore1 together with the expediency of a complicated attack we must consider all the dangers which we run during its preparation1 and should only adopt it if there is no reason to fear that the enemy will disconcert our scheme4 ,whenever this is the case we must ourselves choose the simpler1 i4e41 quicker way1 and lower our views in this sense as far as the character1 the relations of the enemy1 and other circumstances may render necessary4 ,if we quit the weak impressions of abstract ideas and descend to the region of practical life1 then it is evident that a bold1 courageous1 resolute enemy will not let us have time for wide-reaching skilful combinations1 and it is just against such a one we should require skill the most4 ,by this it appears to us that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are complicated is conclusively shown4 ,our opinion is not on that account that the simple blow is the best1 but that we must not lift the arm too far for the time given to strike1 and that this condition will always lead more to direct conflict the more warlike our opponent is4 ,therefore1 far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by complicated plans1 we must rather seek to be beforehand with him by greater simplicity in our designs4 ,if we seek for the lowest foundation-stones of these converse propositions we find that in the one it is ability1 in the other1 courage4 ,now1 there is something very attractive in the notion that a moderate degree of courage joined to great ability will produce greater effects than moderate ability with great courage4 ,but unless we suppose these elements in a disproportionate relation1 not logical1 we have no right to assign to ability this advantage over courage in a field which is called danger1 and which must be regarded as the true domain of courage4 ,after this abstract view we shall only add that experience1 very far from leading to a different conclusion1 is rather the sole cause which has impelled us in this direction1 and given rise to such reflections4 ,whoever reads history with a mind free from prejudice cannot fail to arrive at a conviction that of all military virtues1 energy in the conduct of operations has always contributed the most to the glory and success of arms4 ,how we make good our principle of regarding the destruction of the enemy's force as the principal object1 not only in the ,war as a whole but also in each separate combat1 and how that principle suits all the forms and conditions necessarily demanded by the relations out of which ,war springs1 the sequel will show4 ,for the present all that we desire is to uphold its general importance1 and with this result we return again to the combat4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,combat in ,general 7continuation7 ,in the last chapter we showed the destruction of the enemy as the true object of the combat1 and we have sought to prove by a special consideration of the point1 that this is true in the majority of cases1 and in respect to the most important battles1 because the destruction of the enemy's ,army is always the preponderating object in ,war4 ,the other objects which may be mixed up with this destruction of the enemy's force1 and may have more or less influence1 we shall describe generally in the next chapter1 and become better acquainted with by degrees afterwards2 here we divest the combat of them entirely1 and look upon the destruction of the enemy as the complete and sufficient object of any combat4 ,what are we now to understand by destruction of the enemy's ,army8 ,a diminution of it relatively greater than that on our own side4 ,if we have a great superiority in numbers over the enemy1 then naturally the same absolute amount of loss on both sides is for us a smaller one than for him1 and consequently may be regarded in itself as an advantage4 ,as we are here considering the combat as divested of all 7other7 objects1 we must also exclude from our consideration the case in which the combat is used only indirectly for a greater destruction of the enemy's force2 consequently also1 only that direct gain which has been made in the mutual process of destruction1 is to be regarded as the object1 for this is an absolute gain1 which runs through the whole campaign1 and at the end of it will always appear as pure profit4 ,but every other kind of victory over our opponent will either have its motive in other objects1 which we have completely excluded here1 or it will only yield a temporary relative advantage4 ,an example will make this plain4 ,if by a skilful disposition we have reduced our opponent to such a dilemma1 that he cannot continue the combat without danger1 and after some resistance he retires1 then we may say1 that we have conquered him at that point2 but if in this victory we have expended just as many forces as the enemy1 then in closing the account of the campaign1 there is no gain remaining from this victory1 if such a result can be called a victory4 ,therefore the overcoming the enemy1 that is1 placing him in such a position that he must give up the fight1 counts for nothing in itself1 and for that reason cannot come under the definition of object4 ,there remains1 therefore1 as we have said1 nothing over except the direct gain which we have made in the process of destruction2 but to this belong not only the losses which have taken place in the course of the combat1 but also those which1 after the withdrawal of the conquered part1 take place as direct consequences of the same4 ,now it is known by experience1 that the losses in physical forces in the course of a battle seldom present a great difference between victor and vanquished respectively1 often none at all1 sometimes even one bearing an inverse relation to the result1 and that the most decisive losses on the side of the vanquished only commence with the retreat1 that is1 those which the conqueror does not share with him4 ,the weak remains of battalions already in disorder are cut down by cavalry1 exhausted men strew the ground1 disabled guns and broken caissons are abandoned1 others in the bad state of the roads cannot be removed quickly enough1 and are captured by the enemy's troops1 during the night numbers lose their way1 and fall defenceless into the enemy's hands1 and thus the victory mostly gains bodily substance after it is already decided4 ,here would be a paradox1 if it did not solve itself in the following manner4 ,the loss in physical force is not the only one which the two sides suffer in the course of the combat2 the moral forces also are shaken1 broken1 and go to ruin4 ,it is not only the loss in men1 horses and guns1 but in order1 courage1 confidence1 cohesion and plan1 which come into consideration when it is a question whether the fight can be still continued or not4 ,it is principally the moral forces which decide here1 and in all cases in which the conqueror has lost as heavily as the conquered1 it is these alone4 ,the comparative relation of the physical losses is difficult to estimate in a battle1 but not so the relation of the moral ones4 ,two things principally make it known4 ,the one is the loss of the ground on which the fight has taken place1 the other the superiority of the enemy's4 ,the more our reserves have diminished as compared with those of the enemy1 the more force we have used to maintain the equilibrium2 in this at once1 an evident proof of the moral superiority of the enemy is given which seldom fails to stir up in the soul of the ,commander a certain bitterness of feeling1 and a sort of contempt for his own troops4 ,but the principal thing is1 that men who have been engaged for a long continuance of time are more or less like burnt-out cinders2 their ammunition is consumed2 they have melted away to a certain extent2 physical and moral energies are exhausted1 perhaps their courage is broken as well4 ,such a force1 irrespective of the diminution in its number1 if viewed as an organic whole1 is very different from what it was before the combat2 and thus it is that the loss of moral force may be measured by the reserves that have been used as if it were on a foot-rule4 ,lost ground and want of fresh reserves1 are1 therefore1 usually the principal causes which determine a retreat2 but at the same time we by no means exclude or desire to throw in the shade other reasons1 which may lie in the interdependence of parts of the ,army1 in the general plan1 c4 ,every combat is therefore the bloody and destructive measuring of the strength of forces1 physical and moral2 whoever at the close has the greatest amount of both left is the conqueror4 ,in the combat the loss of moral force is the chief cause of the decision2 after that is given1 this loss continues to increase until it reaches its culminating-point at the close of the whole act4 ,this then is the opportunity the victor should seize to reap his harvest by the utmost possible restrictions of his enemy's forces1 the real object of engaging in the combat4 ,on the beaten side1 the loss of all order and control often makes the prolongation of resistance by individual units1 by the further punishment they are certain to suffer1 more injurious than useful to the whole4 ,the spirit of the mass is broken2 the original excitement about losing or winning1 through which danger was forgotten1 is spent1 and to the majority danger now appears no longer an appeal to their courage1 but rather the endurance of a cruel punishment4 ,thus the instrument in the first moment of the enemy's victory is weakened and blunted1 and therefore no longer fit to repay danger by danger4 ,this period1 however1 passes2 the moral forces of the conquered will recover by degrees1 order will be restored1 courage will revive1 and in the majority of cases there remains only a small part of the superiority obtained1 often none at all4 ,in some cases1 even1 although rarely1 the spirit of revenge and intensified hostility may bring about an opposite result4 ,on the other hand1 whatever is gained in killed1 wounded1 prisoners1 and guns captured can never disappear from the account4 ,the losses in a battle consist more in killed and wounded2 those after the battle1 more in artillery taken and prisoners4 ,the first the conqueror shares with the conquered1 more or less1 but the second not2 and for that reason they usually only take place on one side of the conflict1 at least1 they are considerably in excess on one side4 ,artillery and prisoners are therefore at all times regarded as the true trophies of victory1 as well as its measure1 because through these things its extent is declared beyond a doubt4 ,even the degree of moral superiority may be better judged of by them than by any other relation1 especially if the number of killed and wounded is compared therewith2 and here arises a new power increasing the moral effects4 ,we have said that the moral forces1 beaten to the ground in the battle and in the immediately succeeding movements1 recover themselves gradually1 and often bear no traces of injury2 this is the case with small divisions of the whole1 less frequently with large divisions2 it may1 however1 also be the case with the main ,army1 but seldom or never in the ,state or ,government to which the ,army belongs4 ,these estimate the situation more impartially1 and from a more elevated point of view1 and recognise in the number of trophies taken by the enemy1 and their relation to the number of killed and wounded1 only too easily and well1 the measure of their own weakness and inefficiency4 ,in point of fact1 the lost balance of moral power must not be treated lightly because it has no absolute value1 and because it does not of necessity appear in all cases in the amount of the results at the final close2 it may become of such excessive weight as to bring down everything with an irresistible force4 ,on that account it may often become a great aim of the operations of which we shall speak elsewhere4 ,here we have still to examine some of its fundamental relations4 ,the moral effect of a victory increases1 not merely in proportion to the extent of the forces engaged1 but in a progressive ratio--that is to say1 not only in extent1 but also in its intensity4 ,in a beaten detachment order is easily restored4 ,as a single frozen limb is easily revived by the rest of the body1 so the courage of a defeated detachment is easily raised again by the courage of the rest of the ,army as soon as it rejoins it4 ,if1 therefore1 the effects of a small victory are not completely done away with1 still they are partly lost to the enemy4 ,this is not the case if the ,army itself sustains a great defeat2 then one with the other fall together4 ,a great fire attains quite a different heat from several small ones4 ,another relation which determines the moral value of a victory is the numerical relation of the forces which have been in conflict with each other4 ,to beat many with few is not only a double success1 but shows also a greater1 especially a more general superiority1 which the conquered must always be fearful of encountering again4 ,at the same time this influence is in reality hardly observable in such a case4 ,in the moment of real action1 the notions of the actual strength of the enemy are generally so uncertain1 the estimate of our own commonly so incorrect1 that the party superior in numbers either does not admit the disproportion1 or is very far from admitting the full truth1 owing to which1 he evades almost entirely the moral disadvantages which would spring from it4 ,it is only hereafter in history that the truth1 long suppressed through ignorance1 vanity1 or a wise discretion1 makes its appearance1 and then it certainly casts a lustre on the ,army and its ,leader1 but it can then do nothing more by its moral influence for events long past4 ,if prisoners and captured guns are those things by which the victory principally gains substance1 its true crystallisations1 then the plan of the battle should have those things specially in view2 the destruction of the enemy by death and wounds appears here merely as a means to an end4 ,how far this may influence the dispositions in the battle is not an affair of ,strategy1 but the decision to fight the battle is in intimate connection with it1 as is shown by the direction given to our forces1 and their general grouping1 whether we threaten the enemy's flank or rear1 or he threatens ours4 ,on this point1 the number of prisoners and captured guns depends very much1 and it is a point which1 in many cases1 tactics alone cannot satisfy1 particularly if the strategic relations are too much in opposition to it4 ,the risk of having to fight on two sides1 and the still more dangerous position of having no line of retreat left open1 paralyse the movements and the power of resistance2 further1 in case of defeat1 they increase the loss1 often raising it to its extreme point1 that is1 to destruction4 ,therefore1 the rear being endangered makes defeat more probable1 and1 at the same time1 more decisive4 ,from this arises1 in the whole conduct of the ,war1 especially in great and small combats1 a perfect instinct to secure our own line of retreat and to seize that of the enemy2 this follows from the conception of victory1 which1 as we have seen1 is something beyond mere slaughter4 ,in this effort we see1 therefore1 the first immediate purpose in the combat1 and one which is quite universal4 ,no combat is imaginable in which this effort1 either in its double or single form1 does not go hand in hand with the plain and simple stroke of force4 ,even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon its enemy without thinking of its line of retreat1 and1 in most cases1 it will have an eye upon that of the enemy also4 ,we should have to digress to show how often this instinct is prevented from going the direct road1 how often it must yield to the difficulties arising from more important considerations3 we shall1 therefore1 rest contented with affirming it to be a general natural law of the combat4 ,it is1 therefore1 active2 presses everywhere with its natural weight1 and so becomes the pivot on which almost all tactical and strategic manuvres turn4 ,if we now take a look at the conception of victory as a whole1 we find in it three elements3-- #a4 ,the greater loss of the enemy in physical power4 #b4 ,in moral power4 #c4 ,his open avowal of this by the relinquishment of his intentions4 ,the returns made up on each side of losses in killed and wounded1 are never exact1 seldom truthful1 and in most cases1 full of intentional misrepresentations4 ,even the statement of the number of trophies is seldom to be quite depended on2 consequently1 when it is not considerable it may also cast a doubt even on the reality of the victory4 ,of the loss in moral forces there is no reliable measure1 except in the trophies3 therefore1 in many cases1 the giving up the contest is the only real evidence of the victory4 ,it is1 therefore1 to be regarded as a confession of inferiority--as the lowering of the flag1 by which1 in this particular instance1 right and superiority are conceded to the enemy1 and this degree of humiliation and disgrace1 which1 however1 must be distinguished from all the other moral consequences of the loss of equilibrium1 is an essential part of the victory4 ,it is this part alone which acts upon the public opinion outside the ,army1 upon the people and the ,government in both belligerent ,states1 and upon all others in any way concerned4 ,but renouncement of the general object is not quite identical with quitting the field of battle1 even when the battle has been very obstinate and long kept up2 no one says of advanced posts1 when they retire after an obstinate combat1 that they have given up their object2 even in combats aimed at the destruction of the enemy's ,army1 the retreat from the battlefield is not always to be regarded as a relinquishment of this aim1 as for instance1 in retreats planned beforehand1 in which the ground is disputed foot by foot2 all this belongs to that part of our subject where we shall speak of the separate object of the combat2 here we only wish to draw attention to the fact that in most cases the giving up of the object is very difficult to distinguish from the retirement from the battlefield1 and that the impression produced by the latter1 both in and out of the ,army1 is not to be treated lightly4 ,for ,generals and ,armies whose reputation is not made1 this is in itself one of the difficulties in many operations1 justified by circumstances when a succession of combats1 each ending in retreat1 may appear as a succession of defeats1 without being so in reality1 and when that appearance may exercise a very depressing influence4 ,it is impossible for the retreating ,general by making known his real intentions to prevent the moral effect spreading to the public and his troops1 for to do that with effect he must disclose his plans completely1 which of course would run counter to his principal interests to too great a degree4 ,in order to draw attention to the special importance of this conception of victory we shall only refer to the battle of ,soor17997 the trophies from which were not important 7a few thousand prisoners and twenty guns71 and where ,frederick proclaimed his victory by remaining for five days after on the field of battle1 although his retreat into ,silesia had been previously determined on1 and was a measure natural to his whole situation4 ,according to his own account1 he thought he would hasten a peace by the moral effect of his victory4 ,now although a couple of other successes were likewise required1 namely1 the battle at ,katholisch ,hennersdorf1 in ,lusatia1 and the battle of ,kesseldorf1 before this peace took place1 still we cannot say that the moral effect of the battle of ,soor was nil4 7997 ,soor1 or ,sohr1 ,sept4 #cj1 #agde2 ,hennersdorf1 ,nov4 #bc1 #agde2 ,kealteldorf1 ,dec4 #ae1 #agde1 all in the ,second ,silesian ,war4 ,if it is chiefly the moral force which is shaken by defeat1 and if the number of trophies reaped by the enemy mounts up to an unusual height1 then the lost combat becomes a rout1 but this is not the necessary consequence of every victory4 ,a rout only sets in when the moral force of the defeated is very severely shaken then there often ensues a complete incapability of further resistance1 and the whole action consists of giving way1 that is of flight4 ,jena and ,belle ,alliance were routs1 but not so ,borodino4 ,although without pedantry we can here give no single line of separation1 because the difference between the things is one of degrees1 yet still the retention of the conception is essential as a central point to give clearness to our theoretical ideas and it is a want in our terminology that for a victory over the enemy tantamount to a rout1 and a conquest of the enemy only tantamount to a simple victory1 there is only one and the same word to use4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,on the ,signification of the ,combat ,having in the preceding chapter examined the combat in its absolute form1 as the miniature picture of the whole ,war1 we now turn to the relations which it bears to the other parts of the great whole4 ,first we inquire what is more precisely the signification of a combat4 ,as ,war is nothing else but a mutual process of destruction1 then the most natural answer in conception1 and perhaps also in reality1 appears to be that all the powers of each party unite in one great volume and all results in one great shock of these masses4 ,there is certainly much truth in this idea1 and it seems to be very advisable that we should adhere to it and should on that account look upon small combats at first only as necessary loss1 like the shavings from a carpenter's plane4 ,still1 however1 the thing cannot be settled so easily4 ,that a multiplication of combats should arise from a fractioning of forces is a matter of course1 and the more immediate objects of separate combats will therefore come before us in the subject of a fractioning of forces2 but these objects1 and together with them1 the whole mass of combats may in a general way be brought under certain classes1 and the knowledge of these classes will contribute to make our observations more intelligible4 ,destruction of the enemy's military forces is in reality the object of all combats2 but other objects may be joined thereto1 and these other objects may be at the same time predominant2 we must therefore draw a distinction between those in which the destruction of the enemy's forces is the principal object1 and those in which it is more the means4 ,the destruction of the enemy's force1 the possession of a place or the possession of some object may be the general motive for a combat1 and it may be either one of these alone or several together1 in which case however usually one is the principal motive4 ,now the two principal forms of ,war1 the offensive and defensive1 of which we shall shortly speak1 do not modify the first of these motives1 but they certainly do modify the other two1 and therefore if we arrange them in a scheme they would appear thus3-- ,,offensive4 ,,defensive4 #a4 ,destruction of enemy's force #a4 ,destruction of enemy's force4 #b4 ,conquest of a place4 #b4 ,defence of a place4 #c4 ,conquest of some object4 #c4 ,defence of some object4 ,these motives1 however1 do not seem to embrace completely the whole of the subject1 if we recollect that there are reconnaissances and demonstrations1 in which plainly none of these three points is the object of the combat4 ,in reality we must1 therefore1 on this account be allowed a fourth class4 ,strictly speaking1 in reconnaissances in which we wish the enemy to show himself1 in alarms by which we wish to wear him out1 in demonstrations by which we wish to prevent his leaving some point or to draw him off to another1 the objects are all such as can only be attained indirectly and under the pretext of one of the three objects specified in the table1 usually of the second2 for the enemy whose aim is to reconnoitre must draw up his force as if he really intended to attack and defeat us1 or drive us off1 c4 c4 ,but this pretended object is not the real one1 and our present question is only as to the latter2 therefore1 we must to the above three objects of the offensive further add a fourth1 which is to lead the enemy to make a false conclusion4 ,that offensive means are conceivable in connection with this object1 lies in the nature of the thing4 ,on the other hand we must observe that the defence of a place may be of two kinds1 either absolute1 if as a general question the point is not to be given up1 or relative if it is only required for a certain time4 ,the latter happens perpetually in the combats of advanced posts and rear guards4 ,that the nature of these different intentions of a combat must have an essential influence on the dispositions which are its preliminaries1 is a thing clear in itself4 ,we act differently if our object is merely to drive an enemy's post out of its place from what we should if our object was to beat him completely2 differently1 if we mean to defend a place to the last extremity from what we should do if our design is only to detain the enemy for a certain time4 ,in the first case we trouble ourselves little about the line of retreat1 in the latter it is the principal point1 c4 ,but these reflections belong properly to tactics1 and are only introduced here by way of example for the sake of greater clearness4 ,what ,strategy has to say on the different objects of the combat will appear in the chapters which touch upon these objects4 ,here we have only a few general observations to make1 first1 that the importance of the object decreases nearly in the order as they stand above1 therefore1 that the first of these objects must always predominate in the great battle2 lastly1 that the two last in a defensive battle are in reality such as yield no fruit1 they are1 that is to say1 purely negative1 and can1 therefore1 only be serviceable1 indirectly1 by facilitating something else which is positive4 ,it is1 therefore1 a bad sign of the strategic situation if battles of this kind become too frequent4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,duration of ,combat ,if we consider the combat no longer in itself but in relation to the other forces of ,war1 then its duration acquires a special importance4 ,this duration is to be regarded to a certain extent as a second subordinate success4 ,for the conqueror the combat can never be finished too quickly1 for the vanquished it can never last too long4 ,a speedy victory indicates a higher power of victory1 a tardy decision is1 on the side of the defeated1 some compensation for the loss4 ,this is in general true1 but it acquires a practical importance in its application to those combats1 the object of which is a relative defence4 ,here the whole success often lies in the mere duration4 ,this is the reason why we have included it amongst the strategic elements4 ,the duration of a combat is necessarily bound up with its essential relations4 ,these relations are1 absolute magnitude of force1 relation of force and of the different arms mutually1 and nature of the country4 ,twenty thousand men do not wear themselves out upon one another as quickly as two thousand3 we cannot resist an enemy double or three times our strength as long as one of the same strength2 a cavalry combat is decided sooner than an infantry combat2 and a combat between infantry only1 quicker than if there is artillery7997 as well2 in hills and forests we cannot advance as quickly as on a level country2 all this is clear enough4 7997 ,the increase in the relative range of artillery and the introduction of shrapnel has altogether modified this conclusion4 ,from this it follows1 therefore1 that strength1 relation of the three arms1 and position1 must be considered if the combat is to fulfil an object by its duration2 but to set up this rule was of less importance to us in our present considerations than to connect with it at once the chief results which experience gives us on the subject4 ,even the resistance of an ordinary ,division of #hjjj to #aj1jjj men of all arms even opposed to an enemy considerably superior in numbers1 will last several hours1 if the advantages of country are not too preponderating1 and if the enemy is only a little1 or not at all1 superior in numbers1 the combat will last half a day4 ,a ,corps of three or four ,divisions will prolong it to double the time2 an ,army of #hj1jjj or #ajj1jjj to three or four times4 ,therefore the masses may be left to themselves for that length of time1 and no separate combat takes place if within that time other forces can be brought up1 whose co-operation mingles then at once into one stream with the results of the combat which has taken place4 ,these calculations are the result of experience2 but it is important to us at the same time to characterise more particularly the moment of the decision1 and consequently the termination4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,decision of the ,combat ,no battle is decided in a single moment1 although in every battle there arise moments of crisis1 on which the result depends4 ,the loss of a battle is1 therefore1 a gradual falling of the scale4 ,but there is in every combat a point of time 7997 7997 ,under the then existing conditions of armament understood4 ,this point is of supreme importance1 as practically the whole conduct of a great battle depends on a correct solution of this question--viz41 ,how long can a given command prolong its resistance8 ,if this is incorrectly answered in practice--the whole manuvre depending on it may collapse--e4g41 ,kouroupatkin at ,liao-,yang1 ,september #aijd4 when it may be regarded as decided1 in such a way that the renewal of the fight would be a new battle1 not a continuation of the old one4 ,to have a clear notion on this point of time1 is very important1 in order to be able to decide whether1 with the prompt assistance of reinforcements1 the combat can again be resumed with advantage4 ,often in combats which are beyond restoration new forces are sacrificed in vain2 often through neglect the decision has not been seized when it might easily have been secured4 ,here are two examples1 which could not be more to the point3 ,when the ,prince of ,hohenlohe1 in #ahjf1 at ,jena17997 with #ce1jjj men opposed to from #fj1jjj to #gj1jjj1 under ,buonaparte1 had accepted battle1 and lost it--but lost it in such a way that the #ce1jjj might be regarded as dissolved--,general ,rchel undertook to renew the fight with about #ab1jjj2 the consequence was that in a moment his force was scattered in like manner4 7997 ,october #ad1 #ahjf4 ,on the other hand1 on the same day at ,auerstadt1 the ,prussians maintained a combat with #be1jjj1 against ,davoust1 who had #bh1jjj1 until mid-day1 without success1 it is true1 but still without the force being reduced to a state of dissolution without even greater loss than the enemy1 who was very deficient in cavalry2--but they neglected to use the reserve of #ah1jjj1 under ,general ,kalkreuth1 to restore the battle which1 under these circumstances1 it would have been impossible to lose4 ,each combat is a whole in which the partial combats combine themselves into one total result4 ,in this total result lies the decision of the combat4 ,this success need not be exactly a victory such as we have denoted in the sixth chapter1 for often the preparations for that have not been made1 often there is no opportunity if the enemy gives way too soon1 and in most cases the decision1 even when the resistance has been obstinate1 takes place before such a degree of success is attained as would completely satisfy the idea of a victory4 ,we therefore ask1 ,which is commonly the moment of the decision1 that is to say1 that moment when a fresh1 effective1 of course not disproportionate1 force1 can no longer turn a disadvantageous battle8 ,if we pass over false attacks1 which in accordance with their nature are properly without decision1 then1 #a4 ,if the possession of a movable object was the object of the combat1 the loss of the same is always the decision4 #b4 ,if the possession of ground was the object of the combat1 then the decision generally lies in its loss4 ,still not always1 only if this ground is of peculiar strength1 ground which is easy to pass over1 however important it may be in other respects1 can be re-taken without much danger4 #c4 ,but in all other cases1 when these two circumstances have not already decided the combat1 therefore1 particularly in case the destruction of the enemy's force is the principal object1 the decision is reached at that moment when the conqueror ceases to feel himself in a state of disintegration1 that is1 of unserviceableness to a certain extent1 when therefore1 there is no further advantage in using the successive efforts spoken of in the twelfth chapter of the third book4 ,on this ground we have given the strategic unity of the battle its place here4 ,a battle1 therefore1 in which the assailant has not lost his condition of order and perfect efficiency at all1 or1 at least1 only in a small part of his force1 whilst the opposing forces are1 more or less1 disorganised throughout1 is also not to be retrieved2 and just as little if the enemy has recovered his efficiency4 ,the smaller1 therefore1 that part of a force is which has really been engaged1 the greater that portion which as reserve has contributed to the result only by its presence4 ,so much the less will any new force of the enemy wrest again the victory from our hands1 and that ,commander who carries out to the furthest with his ,army the principle of conducting the combat with the greatest economy of forces1 and making the most of the moral effect of strong reserves1 goes the surest way to victory4 ,we must allow that the ,french1 in modern times1 especially when led by ,buonaparte1 have shown a thorough mastery in this4 ,further1 the moment when the crisis-stage of the combat ceases with the conqueror1 and his original state of order is restored1 takes place sooner the smaller the unit he controls4 ,a picket of cavalry pursuing an enemy at full gallop will in a few minutes resume its proper order1 and the crisis ceases4 ,a whole regiment of cavalry requires a longer time4 ,it lasts still longer with infantry1 if extended in single lines of skirmishers1 and longer again with ,divisions of all arms1 when it happens by chance that one part has taken one direction and another part another direction1 and the combat has therefore caused a loss of the order of formation1 which usually becomes still worse from no part knowing exactly where the other is4 ,thus1 therefore1 the point of time when the conqueror has collected the instruments he has been using1 and which are mixed up and partly out of order1 the moment when he has in some measure rearranged them and put them in their proper places1 and thus brought the battle-workshop into a little order1 this moment1 we say1 is always later1 the greater the total force4 ,again1 this moment comes later if night overtakes the conqueror in the crisis1 and1 lastly1 it comes later still if the country is broken and thickly wooded4 ,but with regard to these two points1 we must observe that night is also a great means of protection1 and it is only seldom that circumstances favour the expectation of a successful result from a night attack1 as on ,march #aj1 #ahad1 at ,laon17997 where ,york against ,marmont gives us an example completely in place here4 ,in the same way a wooded and broken country will afford protection against a reaction to those who are engaged in the long crisis of victory4 ,both1 therefore1 the night as well as the wooded and broken country are obstacles which make the renewal of the same battle more difficult instead of facilitating it4 7997 ,the celebrated charge at night upon ,marmont's ,corps4 ,hitherto1 we have considered assistance arriving for the losing side as a mere increase of force1 therefore1 as a reinforcement coming up directly from the rear1 which is the most usual case4 ,but the case is quite different if these fresh forces come upon the enemy in flank or rear4 ,on the effect of flank or rear attacks so far as they belong to ,strategy1 we shall speak in another place3 such a one as we have here in view1 intended for the restoration of the combat1 belongs chiefly to tactics1 and is only mentioned because we are here speaking of tactical results1 our ideas1 therefore1 must trench upon the province of tactics4 ,by directing a force against the enemy's flank and rear its efficacy may be much intensified2 but this is so far from being a necessary result always that the efficacy may1 on the other hand1 be just as much weakened4 ,the circumstances under which the combat has taken place decide upon this part of the plan as well as upon every other1 without our being able to enter thereupon here4 ,but1 at the same time1 there are in it two things of importance for our subject3 first1 flank and rear attacks have1 as a rule1 a more favourable effect on the consequences of the decision than upon the decision itself4 ,now as concerns the retrieving a battle1 the first thing to be arrived at above all is a favourable decision and not magnitude of success4 ,in this view one would therefore think that a force which comes to re-establish our combat is of less assistance if it falls upon the enemy in flank and rear1 therefore separated from us1 than if it joins itself to us directly2 certainly1 cases are not wanting where it is so1 but we must say that the majority are on the other side1 and they are so on account of the second point which is here important to us4 ,this second point is the moral effect of the surprise1 which1 as a rule1 a reinforcement coming up to re-establish a combat has generally in its favour4 ,now the effect of a surprise is always heightened if it takes place in the flank or rear1 and an enemy completely engaged in the crisis of victory in his extended and scattered order1 is less in a state to counteract it4 ,who does not feel that an attack in flank or rear1 which at the commencement of the battle1 when the forces are concentrated and prepared for such an event would be of little importance1 gains quite another weight in the last moment of the combat4 ,we must1 therefore1 at once admit that in most cases a reinforcement coming up on the flank or rear of the enemy will be more efficacious1 will be like the same weight at the end of a longer lever1 and therefore that under these circumstances1 we may undertake to restore the battle with the same force which employed in a direct attack would be quite insufficient4 ,here results almost defy calculation1 because the moral forces gain completely the ascendency4 ,this is therefore the right field for boldness and daring4 ,the eye must1 therefore1 be directed on all these objects1 all these moments of co-operating forces must be taken into consideration1 when we have to decide in doubtful cases whether or not it is still possible to restore a combat which has taken an unfavourable turn4 ,if the combat is to be regarded as not yet ended1 then the new contest which is opened by the arrival of assistance fuses into the former2 therefore they flow together into one common result1 and the first disadvantage vanishes completely out of the calculation4 ,but this is not the case if the combat was already decided2 then there are two results separate from each other4 ,now if the assistance which arrives is only of a relative strength1 that is1 if it is not in itself alone a match for the enemy1 then a favourable result is hardly to be expected from this second combat3 but if it is so strong that it can undertake the second combat without regard to the first1 then it may be able by a favourable issue to compensate or even overbalance the first combat1 but never to make it disappear altogether from the account4 ,at the battle of ,kunersdorf17997 ,frederick the ,great at the first onset carried the left of the ,russian position1 and took seventy pieces of artillery2 at the end of the battle both were lost again1 and the whole result of the first combat was wiped out of the account4 ,had it been possible to stop at the first success1 and to put off the second part of the battle to the coming day1 then1 even if the ,king had lost it1 the advantages of the first would always have been a set off to the second4 7997 ,august #ab1 #agei4 ,but when a battle proceeding disadvantageously is arrested and turned before its conclusion1 its minus result on our side not only disappears from the account1 but also becomes the foundation of a greater victory4 ,if1 for instance1 we picture to ourselves exactly the tactical course of the battle1 we may easily see that until it is finally concluded all successes in partial combats are only decisions in suspense1 which by the capital decision may not only be destroyed1 but changed into the opposite4 ,the more our forces have suffered1 the more the enemy will have expended on his side2 the greater1 therefore1 will be the crisis for the enemy1 and the more the superiority of our fresh troops will tell4 ,if now the total result turns in our favour1 if we wrest from the enemy the field of battle and recover all the trophies again1 then all the forces which he has sacrificed in obtaining them become sheer gain for us1 and our former defeat becomes a stepping-stone to a greater triumph4 ,the most brilliant feats which with victory the enemy would have so highly prized that the loss of forces which they cost would have been disregarded1 leave nothing now behind but regret at the sacrifice entailed4 ,such is the alteration which the magic of victory and the curse of defeat produces in the specific weight of the same elements4 ,therefore1 even if we are decidedly superior in strength1 and are able to repay the enemy his victory by a greater still1 it is always better to forestall the conclusion of a disadvantageous combat1 if it is of proportionate importance1 so as to turn its course rather than to deliver a second battle4 ,field-,marshal ,daun attempted in the year #agfj to come to the assistance of ,general ,laudon at ,leignitz1 whilst the battle lasted2 but when he failed1 he did not attack the ,king next day1 although he did not want for means to do so4 ,for these reasons serious combats of advance guards which precede a battle are to be looked upon only as necessary evils1 and when not necessary they are to be avoided47997 7997 ,this1 however1 was not ,napoleon's view4 ,a vigorous attack of his advance guard he held to be necessary always1 to fix the enemy's attention and 8paralyse his independent will-power40 ,it was the failure to make this point which1 in ,august #ahgj1 led von ,moltke repeatedly into the very jaws of defeat1 from which only the lethargy of ,bazaine on the one hand and the initiative of his subordinates1 notably of von ,alvensleben1 rescued him4 ,this is the essence of the new ,strategic ,doctrine of the ,french ,general ,staff4 ,see the works of ,bonnal1 ,foch1 ,c4--,,editor ,we have still another conclusion to examine4 ,if on a regular pitched battle1 the decision has gone against one1 this does not constitute a motive for determining on a new one4 ,the determination for this new one must proceed from other relations4 ,this conclusion1 however1 is opposed by a moral force1 which we must take into account3 it is the feeling of rage and revenge4 ,from the oldest ,field-,marshal to the youngest drummer-boy this feeling is general1 and1 therefore1 troops are never in better spirits for fighting than when they have to wipe out a stain4 ,this is1 however1 only on the supposition that the beaten portion is not too great in proportion to the whole1 because otherwise the above feeling is lost in that of powerlessness4 ,there is therefore a very natural tendency to use this moral force to repair the disaster on the spot1 and on that account chiefly to seek another battle if other circumstances permit4 ,it then lies in the nature of the case that this second battle must be an offensive one4 ,in the catalogue of battles of second-rate importance there are many examples to be found of such retaliatory battles2 but great battles have generally too many other determining causes to be brought on by this weaker motive4 ,such a feeling must undoubtedly have led the noble ,blcher with his third ,corps to the field of battle on ,february #ad1 #ahad1 when the other two had been beaten three days before at ,montmirail4 ,had he known that he would have come upon ,buonaparte in person1 then1 naturally1 preponderating reasons would have determined him to put off his revenge to another day3 but he hoped to revenge himself on ,marmont1 and instead of gaining the reward of his desire for honourable satisfaction1 he suffered the penalty of his erroneous calculation4 ,on the duration of the combat and the moment of its decision depend the distances from each other at which those masses should be placed which are intended to fight in conjunction with each other4 ,this disposition would be a tactical arrangement in so far as it relates to one and the same battle2 it can1 however1 only be regarded as such1 provided the position of the troops is so compact that two separate combats cannot be imagined1 and consequently that the space which the whole occupies can be regarded strategically as a mere point4 ,but in ,war1 cases frequently occur where even those forces intended to fight in unison must be so far separated from each other that while their union for one common combat certainly remains the principal object1 still the occurrence of separate combats remains possible4 ,such a disposition is therefore strategic4 ,dispositions of this kind are3 marches in separate masses and columns1 the formation of advance guards1 and flanking columns1 also the grouping of reserves intended to serve as supports for more than one strategic point2 the concentration of several ,corps from widely extended cantonments1 c4 c4 ,we can see that the necessity for these arrangements may constantly arise1 and may consider them something like the small change in the strategic economy1 whilst the capital battles1 and all that rank with them are the gold and silver pieces4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,mutual ,understanding as to a ,battle ,no battle can take place unless by mutual consent2 and in this idea1 which constitutes the whole basis of a duel1 is the root of a certain phraseology used by historical writers1 which leads to many indefinite and false conceptions4 ,according to the view of the writers to whom we refer1 it has frequently happened that one ,commander has offered battle to the other1 and the latter has not accepted it4 ,but the battle is a very modified duel1 and its foundation is not merely in the mutual wish to fight1 that is in consent1 but in the objects which are bound up with the battle3 these belong always to a greater whole1 and that so much the more1 as even the whole war considered as a 8combat-unit0 has political objects and conditions which belong to a higher standpoint4 ,the mere desire to conquer each other therefore falls into quite a subordinate relation1 or rather it ceases completely to be anything of itself1 and only becomes the nerve which conveys the impulse of action from the higher will4 ,amongst the ancients1 and then again during the early period of standing ,armies1 the expression that we had offered battle to the enemy in vain1 had more sense in it than it has now4 ,by the ancients everything was constituted with a view to measuring each other's strength in the open field free from anything in the nature of a hindrance17997 and the whole ,art of ,war consisted in the organisation1 and formation of the ,army1 that is in the order of battle4 7997 ,note the custom of sending formal challenges1 fix time and place for action1 and 8enhazelug0 the battlefield in ,anglo-,saxon times4--,,ed4 ,now as their ,armies regularly entrenched themselves in their camps1 therefore the position in a camp was regarded as something unassailable1 and a battle did not become possible until the enemy left his camp1 and placed himself in a practicable country1 as it were entered the lists4 ,if therefore we hear about ,hannibal having offered battle to ,fabius in vain1 that tells us nothing more as regards the latter than that a battle was not part of his plan1 and in itself neither proves the physical nor moral superiority of ,hannibal2 but with respect to him the expression is still correct enough in the sense that ,hannibal really wished a battle4 ,in the early period of modern ,armies1 the relations were similar in great combats and battles4 ,that is to say1 great masses were brought into action1 and managed throughout it by means of an order of battle1 which like a great helpless whole required a more or less level plain and was neither suited to attack1 nor yet to defence in a broken1 close or even mountainous country4 ,the defender therefore had here also to some extent the means of avoiding battle4 ,these relations although gradually becoming modified1 continued until the first ,silesian ,war1 and it was not until the ,seven ,years' ,war that attacks on an enemy posted in a difficult country gradually became feasible1 and of ordinary occurrence3 ground did not certainly cease to be a principle of strength to those making use of its aid1 but it was no longer a charmed circle1 which shut out the natural forces of ,war4 ,during the past thirty years ,war has perfected itself much more in this respect1 and there is no longer anything which stands in the way of a ,general who is in earnest about a decision by means of battle2 he can seek out his enemy1 and attack him3 if he does not do so he cannot take credit for having wished to fight1 and the expression he offered a battle which his opponent did not accept1 therefore now means nothing more than that he did not find circumstances advantageous enough for a battle1 an admission which the above expression does not suit1 but which it only strives to throw a veil over4 ,it is true the defensive side can no longer refuse a battle1 yet he may still avoid it by giving up his position1 and the rle with which that position was connected3 this is however half a victory for the offensive side1 and an acknowledgment of his superiority for the present4 ,this idea in connection with the cartel of defiance can therefore no longer be made use of in order by such rhodomontade to qualify the inaction of him whose part it is to advance1 that is1 the offensive4 ,the defender who as long as he does not give way1 must have the credit of willing the battle1 may certainly say1 he has offered it if he is not attacked1 if that is not understood of itself4 ,but on the other hand1 he who now wishes to1 and can retreat cannot easily be forced to give battle4 ,now as the advantages to the aggressor from this retreat are often not sufficient1 and a substantial victory is a matter of urgent necessity for him1 in that way the few means which there are to compel such an opponent also to give battle are often sought for and applied with particular skill4 ,the principal means for this are--first surrounding the enemy so as to make his retreat impossible1 or at least so difficult that it is better for him to accept battle2 and1 secondly1 surprising him4 ,this last way1 for which there was a motive formerly in the extreme difficulty of all movements1 has become in modern times very inefficacious4 ,from the pliability and manoeuvring capabilities of troops in the present day1 one does not hesitate to commence a retreat even in sight of the enemy1 and only some special obstacles in the nature of the country can cause serious difficulties in the operation4 ,as an example of this kind the battle of ,neresheim may be given1 fought by the ,archduke ,charles with ,moreau in the ,rauhe ,alp1 ,august #aa1 #agif1 merely with a view to facilitate his retreat1 although we freely confess we have never been able quite to understand the argument of the renowned general and author himself in this case4 ,the battle of ,rosbach7997 is another example1 if we suppose the commander of the allied army had not really the intention of attacking ,frederick the ,great4 7997 ,november #e1 #ageg4 ,of the battle of ,soor17997 the ,king himself says that it was only fought because a retreat in the presence of the enemy appeared to him a critical operation2 at the same time the ,king has also given other reasons for the battle4 7997 ,or ,sohr1 ,september #cj1 #agde4 ,on the whole1 regular night surprises excepted1 such cases will always be of rare occurrence1 and those in which an enemy is compelled to fight by being practically surrounded1 will happen mostly to single corps only1 like ,mortier's at ,drrenstein #ahji1 and ,vandamme at ,kulm1 #ahac4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,the ,battle7997 7997 ,clausewitz still uses the word 8die ,hauptschlacht0 but modern usage employs only the word 8die ,schlacht0 to designate the decisive act of a whole campaign--encounters arising from the collision or troops marching towards the strategic culmination of each portion or the campaign are spoken of either as 8,treffen10 i4e41 8engagements0 or 8,gefecht10 i4e41 8combat0 or 8action40 ,thus technically1 ,gravelotte was a 8,schlacht10 i4e41 8battle10 but ,spicheren1 ,woerth1 ,borny1 even ,vionville were only 8,treffen40 ,,its ,,decision ,what is a battle8 ,a conflict of the main body1 but not an unimportant one about a secondary object1 not a mere attempt which is given up when we see betimes that our object is hardly within our reach3 it is a conflict waged with all our forces for the attainment of a decisive victory4 ,minor objects may also be mixed up with the principal object1 and it will take many different tones of colour from the circumstances out of which it originates1 for a battle belongs also to a greater whole of which it is only a part1 but because the essence of ,war is conflict1 and the battle is the conflict of the main ,armies1 it is always to be regarded as the real centre of gravity of the ,war1 and therefore its distinguishing character is1 that unlike all other encounters1 it is arranged for1 and undertaken with the sole purpose of obtaining a decisive victory4 ,this has an influence on the manner of its decision1 on the effect of the victory contained in it1 and determines the value which theory is to assign to it as a means to an end4 ,on that account we make it the subject of our special consideration1 and at this stage before we enter upon the special ends which may be bound up with it1 but which do not essentially alter its character if it really deserves to be termed a battle4 ,if a battle takes place principally on its own account1 the elements of its decision must be contained in itself2 in other words1 victory must be striven for as long as a possibility or hope remains4 ,it must not1 therefore1 be given up on account of secondary circumstances1 but only and alone in the event of the forces appearing completely insufficient4 ,now how is that precise moment to be described8 ,if a certain artificial formation and cohesion of an ,army is the principal condition under which the bravery of the troops can gain a victory1 as was the case during a great part of the period of the modern ,art of ,war1 then the breaking up of this formation is the decision4 ,a beaten wing which is put out of joint decides the fate of all that was connected with it4 ,if as was the case at another time the essence of the defence consists in an intimate alliance of the ,army with the ground on which it fights and its obstacles1 so that ,army and position are only one1 then the conquest of an essential point in this position is the decision4 ,it is said the key of the position is lost1 it cannot therefore be defended any further2 the battle cannot be continued4 ,in both cases the beaten ,armies are very much like the broken strings of an instrument which cannot do their work4 ,that geometrical as well as this geographical principle which had a tendency to place an ,army in a state of crystallising tension which did not allow of the available powers being made use of up to the last man1 have at least so far lost their influence that they no longer predominate4 ,armies are still led into battle in a certain order1 but that order is no longer of decisive importance2 obstacles of ground are also still turned to account to strengthen a position1 but they are no longer the only support4 ,we attempted in the second chapter of this book to take a general view of the nature of the modern battle4 ,according to our conception of it1 the order of battle is only a disposition of the forces suitable to the convenient use of them1 and the course of the battle a mutual slow wearing away of these forces upon one another1 to see which will have soonest exhausted his adversary4 ,the resolution therefore to give up the fight arises1 in a battle more than in any other combat1 from the relation of the fresh reserves remaining available2 for only these still retain all their moral vigour1 and the cinders of the battered1 knocked-about battalions1 already burnt out in the destroying element1 must not be placed on a level with them2 also lost ground as we have elsewhere said1 is a standard of lost moral force2 it therefore comes also into account1 but more as a sign of loss suffered than for the loss itself1 and the number of fresh reserves is always the chief point to be looked at by both ,commanders4 ,in general1 an action inclines in one direction from the very commencement1 but in a manner little observable4 ,this direction is also frequently given in a very decided manner by the arrangements which have been made previously1 and then it shows a want of discernment in that ,general who commences battle under these unfavourable circumstances without being aware of them4 ,even when this does not occur it lies in the nature of things that the course of a battle resembles rather a slow disturbance of equilibrium which commences soon1 but as we have said almost imperceptibly at first1 and then with each moment of time becomes stronger and more visible1 than an oscillating to and fro1 as those who are misled by mendacious descriptions usually suppose4 ,but whether it happens that the balance is for a long time little disturbed1 or that even after it has been lost on one side it rights itself again1 and is then lost on the other side1 it is certain at all events that in most instances the defeated ,general foresees his fate long before he retreats1 and that cases in which some critical event acts with unexpected force upon the course of the whole have their existence mostly in the colouring with which every one depicts his lost battle4 ,we can only here appeal to the decision of unprejudiced men of experience1 who will1 we are sure1 assent to what we have said1 and answer for us to such of our readers as do not know ,war from their own experience4 ,to develop the necessity of this course from the nature of the thing would lead us too far into the province of tactics1 to which this branch of the subject belongs2 we are here only concerned with its results4 ,if we say that the defeated ,general foresees the unfavourable result usually some time before he makes up his mind to give up the battle1 we admit that there are also instances to the contrary1 because otherwise we should maintain a proposition contradictory in itself4 ,if at the moment of each decisive tendency of a battle it should be considered as lost1 then also no further forces should be used to give it a turn1 and consequently this decisive tendency could not precede the retreat by any length of time4 ,certainly there are instances of battles which after having taken a decided turn to one side have still ended in favour of the other2 but they are rare1 not usual2 these exceptional cases1 however1 are reckoned upon by every ,general against whom fortune declares itself1 and he must reckon upon them as long as there remains a possibility of a turn of fortune4 ,he hopes by stronger efforts1 by raising the remaining moral forces1 by surpassing himself1 or also by some fortunate chance that the next moment will bring a change1 and pursues this as far as his courage and his judgment can agree4 ,we shall have something more to say on this subject1 but before that we must show what are the signs of the scales turning4 ,the result of the whole combat consists in the sum total of the results of all partial combats2 but these results of separate combats are settled by different considerations4 ,first by the pure moral power in the mind of the leading officers4 ,if a ,general of ,division has seen his battalions forced to succumb1 it will have an influence on his demeanour and his reports1 and these again will have an influence on the measures of the ,commander-in-,chief2 therefore even those unsuccessful partial combats which to all appearance are retrieved1 are not lost in their results1 and the impressions from them sum themselves up in the mind of the ,commander without much trouble1 and even against his will4 ,secondly1 by the quicker melting away of our troops1 which can be easily estimated in the slow and relatively7997 little tumultuary course of our battles4 7997 ,relatively1 that is say to the shock of former days4 ,thirdly1 by lost ground4 ,all these things serve for the eye of the ,general as a compass to tell the course of the battle in which he is embarked4 ,if whole batteries have been lost and none of the enemy's taken2 if battalions have been overthrown by the enemy's cavalry1 whilst those of the enemy everywhere present impenetrable masses2 if the line of fire from his order of battle wavers involuntarily from one point to another2 if fruitless efforts have been made to gain certain points1 and the assaulting battalions each1 time been scattered by well-directed volleys of grape and case2--if our artillery begins to reply feebly to that of the enemy--if the battalions under fire diminish unusually1 fast1 because with the wounded crowds of unwounded men go to the rear2--if single ,divisions have been cut off and made prisoners through the disruption of the plan of the battle2--if the line of retreat begins to be endangered3 the ,commander may tell very well in which direction he is going with his battle4 ,the longer this direction continues1 the more decided it becomes1 so much the more difficult will be the turning1 so much the nearer the moment when he must give up the battle4 ,we shall now make some observations on this moment4 ,we have already said more than once that the final decision is ruled mostly by the relative number of the fresh reserves remaining at the last2 that ,commander who sees his adversary is decidedly superior to him in this respect makes up his mind to retreat4 ,it is the characteristic of modern battles that all mischances and losses which take place in the course of the same can be retrieved by fresh forces1 because the arrangement of the modern order of battle1 and the way in which troops are brought into action1 allow of their use almost generally1 and in each position4 ,so long1 therefore1 as that ,commander against whom the issue seems to declare itself still retains a superiority in reserve force1 he will not give up the day4 ,but from the moment that his reserves begin to become weaker than his enemy's1 the decision may be regarded as settled1 and what he now does depends partly on special circumstances1 partly on the degree of courage and perseverance which he personally possesses1 and which may degenerate into foolish obstinacy4 ,how a ,commander can attain to the power of estimating correctly the still remaining reserves on both sides is an affair of skilful practical genius1 which does not in any way belong to this place2 we keep ourselves to the result as it forms itself in his mind4 ,but this conclusion is still not the moment of decision properly1 for a motive which only arises gradually does not answer to that1 but is only a general motive towards resolution1 and the resolution itself requires still some special immediate causes4 ,of these there are two chief ones which constantly recur1 that is1 the danger of retreat1 and the arrival of night4 ,if the retreat with every new step which the battle takes in its course becomes constantly in greater danger1 and if the reserves are so much diminished that they are no longer adequate to get breathing room1 then there is nothing left but to submit to fate1 and by a well-conducted retreat to save what1 by a longer delay ending in flight and disaster1 would be lost4 ,but night as a rule puts an end to all battles1 because a night combat holds out no hope of advantage except under particular circumstances2 and as night is better suited for a retreat than the day1 so1 therefore1 the ,commander who must look at the retreat as a thing inevitable1 or as most probable1 will prefer to make use of the night for his purpose4 ,that there are1 besides the above two usual and chief causes1 yet many others also1 which are less or more individual and not to be overlooked1 is a matter of course2 for the more a battle tends towards a complete upset of equilibrium the more sensible is the influence of each partial result in hastening the turn4 ,thus the loss of a battery1 a successful charge of a couple of regiments of cavalry1 may call into life the resolution to retreat already ripening4 ,as a conclusion to this subject1 we must dwell for a moment on the point at which the courage of the ,commander engages in a sort of conflict with his reason4 ,if1 on the one hand the overbearing pride of a victorious conqueror1 if the inflexible will of a naturally obstinate spirit1 if the strenuous resistance of noble feelings will not yield the battlefield1 where they must leave their honour1 yet on the other hand1 reason counsels not to give up everything1 not to risk the last upon the game1 but to retain as much over as is necessary for an orderly retreat4 ,however highly we must esteem courage and firmness in ,war1 and however little prospect there is of victory to him who cannot resolve to seek it by the exertion of all his power1 still there is a point beyond which perseverance can only be termed desperate folly1 and therefore can meet with no approbation from any critic4 ,in the most celebrated of all battles1 that of ,belle-,alliance1 ,buonaparte used his last reserve in an effort to retrieve a battle which was past being retrieved4 ,he spent his last farthing1 and then1 as a beggar1 abandoned both the battle-field and his crown4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,effects of ,victory ,according to the point from which our view is taken1 we may feel as much astonished at the extraordinary results of some great battles as at the want of results in others4 ,we shall dwell for a moment on the nature of the effect of a great victory4 ,three things may easily be distinguished here3 the effect upon the instrument itself1 that is1 upon the ,generals and their ,armies2 the effect upon the ,states interested in the ,war2 and the particular result of these effects as manifested in the subsequent course of the campaign4 ,if we only think of the trifling difference which there usually is between victor and vanquished in killed1 wounded1 prisoners1 and artillery lost on the field of battle itself1 the consequences which are developed out of this insignificant point seem often quite incomprehensible1 and yet1 usually1 everything only happens quite naturally4 ,we have already said in the seventh chapter that the magnitude of a victory increases not merely in the same measure as the vanquished forces increase in number1 but in a higher ratio4 ,the moral effects resulting from the issue of a great battle are greater on the side of the conquered than on that of the conqueror3 they lead to greater losses in physical force1 which then in turn react on the moral element1 and so they go on mutually supporting and intensifying each other4 ,on this moral effect we must therefore lay special weight4 ,it takes an opposite direction on the one side from that on the other2 as it undermines the energies of the conquered so it elevates the powers and energy of the conqueror4 ,but its chief effect is upon the vanquished1 because here it is the direct cause of fresh losses1 and besides it is homogeneous in nature with danger1 with the fatigues1 the hardships1 and generally with all those embarrassing circumstances by which ,war is surrounded1 therefore enters into league with them and increases by their help1 whilst with the conqueror all these things are like weights which give a higher swing to his courage4 ,it is therefore found1 that the vanquished sinks much further below the original line of equilibrium than the conqueror raises himself above it2 on this account1 if we speak of the effects of victory we allude more particularly to those which manifest themselves in the army4 ,if this effect is more powerful in an important combat than in a smaller one1 so again it is much more powerful in a great battle than in a minor one4 ,the great battle takes place for the sake of itself1 for the sake of the victory which it is to give1 and which is sought for with the utmost effort4 ,here on this spot1 in this very hour1 to conquer the enemy is the purpose in which the plan of the ,war with all its threads converges1 in which all distant hopes1 all dim glimmerings of the future meet1 fate steps in before us to give an answer to the bold question4--,this is the state of mental tension not only of the ,commander but of his whole ,army down to the lowest waggon-driver1 no doubt in decreasing strength but also in decreasing importance4 ,according to the nature of the thing1 a great battle has never at any time been an unprepared1 unexpected1 blind routine service1 but a grand act1 which1 partly of itself and partly from the aim of the ,commander1 stands out from amongst the mass of ordinary efforts1 sufficiently to raise the tension of all minds to a higher degree4 ,but the higher this tension with respect to the issue1 the more powerful must be the effect of that issue4 ,again1 the moral effect of victory in our battles is greater than it was in the earlier ones of modern military history4 ,if the former are as we have depicted them1 a real struggle of forces to the utmost1 then the sum total of all these forces1 of the physical as well as the moral1 must decide more than certain special dispositions or mere chance4 ,a single fault committed may be repaired next time2 from good fortune and chance we can hope for more favour on another occasion2 but the sum total of moral and physical powers cannot be so quickly altered1 and1 therefore1 what the award of a victory has decided appears of much greater importance for all futurity4 ,very probably1 of all concerned in battles1 whether in or out of the ,army1 very few have given a thought to this difference1 but the course of the battle itself impresses on the minds of all present in it such a conviction1 and the relation of this course in public documents1 however much it may be coloured by twisting particular circumstances1 shows also1 more or less1 to the world at large that the causes were more of a general than of a particular nature4 ,he who has not been present at the loss of a great battle will have difficulty in forming for himself a living or quite true idea of it1 and the abstract notions of this or that small untoward affair will never come up to the perfect conception of a lost battle4 ,let us stop a moment at the picture4 ,the first thing which overpowers the imagination--and we may indeed say1 also the understanding--is the diminution of the masses2 then the loss of ground1 which takes place always1 more or less1 and1 therefore1 on the side of the assailant also1 if he is not fortunate2 then the rupture of the original formation1 the jumbling together of troops1 the risks of retreat1 which1 with few exceptions may always be seen sometimes in a less sometimes in a greater degree2 next the retreat1 the most part of which commences at night1 or1 at least1 goes on throughout the night4 ,on this first march we must at once leave behind1 a number of men completely worn out and scattered about1 often just the bravest1 who have been foremost in the fight who held out the longest3 the feeling of being conquered1 which only seized the superior officers on the battlefield1 now spreads through all ranks1 even down to the common soldiers1 aggravated by the horrible idea of being obliged to leave in the enemy's hands so many brave comrades1 who but a moment since were of such value to us in the battle1 and aggravated by a rising distrust of the chief1 to whom1 more or less1 every subordinate attributes as a fault the fruitless efforts he has made2 and this feeling of being conquered is no ideal picture over which one might become master2 it is an evident truth that the enemy is superior to us2 a truth of which the causes might have been so latent before that they were not to be discovered1 but which1 in the issue1 comes out clear and palpable1 or which was also1 perhaps1 before suspected1 but which in the want of any certainty1 we had to oppose by the hope of chance1 reliance on good fortune1 ,providence or a bold attitude4 ,now1 all this has proved insufficient1 and the bitter truth meets us harsh and imperious4 ,all these feelings are widely different from a panic1 which in an army fortified by military virtue never1 and in any other1 only exceptionally1 follows the loss of a battle4 ,they must arise even in the best of ,armies1 and although long habituation to ,war and victory together with great confidence in a ,commander may modify them a little here and there1 they are never entirely wanting in the first moment4 ,they are not the pure consequences of lost trophies2 these are usually lost at a later period1 and the loss of them does not become generally known so quickly2 they will therefore not fail to appear even when the scale turns in the slowest and most gradual manner1 and they constitute that effect of a victory upon which we can always count in every case4 ,we have already said that the number of trophies intensifies this effect4 ,it is evident that an ,army in this condition1 looked at as an instrument1 is weakened6 ,how can we expect that when reduced to such a degree that1 as we said before1 it finds new enemies in all the ordinary difficulties of making ,war1 it will be able to recover by fresh efforts what has been lost6 ,before the battle there was a real or assumed equilibrium between the two sides2 this is lost1 and1 therefore1 some external assistance is requisite to restore it2 every new effort without such external support can only lead to fresh losses4 ,thus1 therefore1 the most moderate victory of the chief ,army must tend to cause a constant sinking of the scale on the opponent's side1 until new external circumstances bring about a change4 ,if these are not near1 if the conqueror is an eager opponent1 who1 thirsting for glory1 pursues great aims1 then a first-rate ,commander1 and in the beaten ,army a true military spirit1 hardened by many campaigns are required1 in order to stop the swollen stream of prosperity from bursting all bounds1 and to moderate its course by small but reiterated acts of resistance1 until the force of victory has spent itself at the goal of its career4 ,and now as to the effect of defeat beyond the ,army1 upon the ,nation and ,government6 ,it is the sudden collapse of hopes stretched to the utmost1 the downfall of all self-reliance4 ,in place of these extinct forces1 fear1 with its destructive properties of expansion1 rushes into the vacuum left1 and completes the prostration4 ,it is a real shock upon the nerves1 which one of the two athletes receives from the electric spark of victory4 ,and that effect1 however different in its degrees1 is never completely wanting4 ,instead of every one hastening with a spirit of determination to aid in repairing the disaster1 every one fears that his efforts will only be in vain1 and stops1 hesitating with himself1 when he should rush forward2 or in despondency he lets his arm drop1 leaving everything to fate4 ,the consequence which this effect of victory brings forth in the course of the ,war itself depend in part on the character and talent of the victorious ,general1 but more on the circumstances from which the victory proceeds1 and to which it leads4 ,without boldness and an enterprising spirit on the part of the leader1 the most brilliant victory will lead to no great success1 and its force exhausts itself all the sooner on circumstances1 if these offer a strong and stubborn opposition to it4 ,how very differently from ,daun1 ,frederick the ,great would have used the victory at ,kollin2 and what different consequences ,france1 in place of ,prussia1 might have given a battle of ,leuthen6 ,the conditions which allow us to expect great results from a great victory we shall learn when we come to the subjects with which they are connected2 then it will be possible to explain the disproportion which appears at first sight between the magnitude of a victory and its results1 and which is only too readily attributed to a want of energy on the part of the conqueror4 ,here1 where we have to do with the great battle in itself1 we shall merely say that the effects now depicted never fail to attend a victory1 that they mount up with the intensive strength of the victory--mount up more the more the whole strength of the ,army has been concentrated in it1 the more the whole military power of the ,nation is contained in that ,army1 and the ,state in that military power4 ,but then the question may be asked1 ,can theory accept this effect of victory as absolutely necessary8--must it not rather endeavour to find out counteracting means capable of neutralising these effects8 ,it seems quite natural to answer this question in the affirmative2 but heaven defend us from taking that wrong course of most theories1 out of which is begotten a mutually devouring ,pro et ,contra4 ,certainly that effect is perfectly necessary1 for it has its foundation in the nature of things1 and it exists1 even if we find means to struggle against it2 just as the motion of a cannon ball is always in the direction of the terrestrial1 although when fired from east to west part of the general velocity is destroyed by this opposite motion4 ,all ,war supposes human weakness1 and against that it is directed4 ,therefore1 if hereafter in another place we examine what is to be done after the loss of a great battle1 if we bring under review the resources which still remain1 even in the most desperate cases1 if we should express a belief in the possibility of retrieving all1 even in such a case2 it must not be supposed we mean thereby that the effects of such a defeat can by degrees be completely wiped out1 for the forces and means used to repair the disaster might have been applied to the realisation of some positive object2 and this applies both to the moral and physical forces4 ,another question is1 whether1 through the loss of a great battle1 forces are not perhaps roused into existence1 which otherwise would never have come to life4 ,this case is certainly conceivable1 and it is what has actually occurred with many ,nations4 ,but to produce this intensified reaction is beyond the province of military art1 which can only take account of it where it might be assumed as a possibility4 ,if there are cases in which the fruits of a victory appear rather of a destructive nature in consequence of the reaction of the forces which it had the effect of rousing into activity--cases which certainly are very exceptional--then it must the more surely be granted1 that there is a difference in the effects which one and the same victory may produce according to the character of the people or state1 which has been conquered4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,the ,use of the ,battle ,whatever form the conduct of ,war may take in particular cases1 and whatever we may have to admit in the sequel as necessary respecting it3 we have only to refer to the conception of ,war to be convinced of what follows3 #a4 ,the destruction of the enemy's military force1 is the leading principle of ,war1 and for the whole chapter of positive action the direct way to the object4 #b4 ,this destruction of the enemy's force1 must be principally effected by means of battle4 #c4 ,only great and general battles can produce great results4 #d4 ,the results will be greatest when combats unite themselves in one great battle4 #e4 ,it is only in a great battle that the ,general-in-,chief commands in person1 and it is in the nature of things1 that he should place more confidence in himself than in his subordinates4 ,from these truths a double law follows1 the parts of which mutually support each other2 namely1 that the destruction of the enemy's military force is to be sought for principally by great battles1 and their results2 and that the chief object of great battles must be the destruction of the enemy's military force4 ,no doubt the annihilation-principle is to be found more or less in other means--granted there are instances in which through favourable circumstances in a minor combat1 the destruction of the enemy's forces has been disproportionately great 7,maxen71 and on the other hand in a battle1 the taking or holding a single post may be predominant in importance as an object--but as a general rule it remains a paramount truth1 that battles are only fought with a view to the destruction of the enemy's ,army1 and that this destruction can only be effected by their means4 ,the battle may therefore be regarded as ,war concentrated1 as the centre of effort of the whole ,war or campaign4 ,as the sun's rays unite in the focus of the concave mirror in a perfect image1 and in the fulness of their heat2 to the forces and circumstances of ,war1 unite in a focus in the great battle for one concentrated utmost effort4 ,the very assemblage of forces in one great whole1 which takes place more or less in all ,wars1 indicates an intention to strike a decisive blow with this whole1 either voluntarily as assailant1 or constrained by the opposite party as defender4 ,when this great blow does not follow1 then some modifying1 and retarding motives have attached themselves to the original motive of hostility1 and have weakened1 altered or completely checked the movement4 ,but also1 even in this condition of mutual inaction which has been the key-note in so many ,wars1 the idea of a possible battle serves always for both parties as a point of direction1 a distant focus in the construction of their plans4 ,the more ,war is ,war in earnest1 the more it is a venting of animosity and hostility1 a mutual struggle to overpower1 so much the more will all activities join deadly contest1 and also the more prominent in importance becomes the battle4 ,in general1 when the object aimed at is of a great and positive nature1 one therefore in which the interests of the enemy are deeply concerned1 the battle offers itself as the most natural means2 it is1 therefore1 also the best as we shall show more plainly hereafter3 and1 as a rule1 when it is evaded from aversion to the great decision1 punishment follows4 ,the positive object belong to the offensive1 and therefore the battle is also more particularly his means4 ,but without examining the conception of offensive and defensive more minutely here1 we must still observe that1 even for the defender in most cases1 there is no other effectual means with which to meet the exigencies of his situation1 to solve the problem presented to him4 ,the battle is the bloodiest way of solution4 ,true1 it is not merely reciprocal slaughter1 and its effect is more a killing of the enemy's courage than of the enemy's soldiers1 as we shall see more plainly in the next chapter--but still blood is always its price1 and slaughter its character as well as name27997 from this the humanity in the ,general's mind recoils with horror4 7997 8,schlacht01 from schlachten to slaughter4 ,but the soul of the man trembles still more at the thought of the decision to be given with one single blow4 in one point of space and time all action is here pressed together1 and at such a moment there is stirred up within us a dim feeling as if in this narrow space all our forces could not develop themselves and come into activity1 as if we had already gained much by mere time1 although this time owes us nothing at all4 ,this is all mere illusion1 but even as illusion it is something1 and the same weakness which seizes upon the man in every other momentous decision may well be felt more powerfully by the ,general1 when he must stake interests of such enormous weight upon one venture4 ,thus1 then1 ,statesmen and ,generals have at all times endeavoured to avoid the decisive battle1 seeking either to attain their aim without it1 or dropping that aim unperceived4 ,writers on history and theory have then busied themselves to discover in some other feature in these campaigns not only an equivalent for the decision by battle which has been avoided1 but even a higher art4 ,in this way1 in the present age1 it came very near to this1 that a battle in the economy of ,war was looked upon as an evil1 rendered necessary through some error committed1 a morbid paroxysm to which a regular prudent system of ,war would never lead3 only those ,generals were to deserve laurels who knew how to carry on ,war without spilling blood1 and the theory of ,war--a real business for ,brahmins--was to be specially directed to teaching this4 ,contemporary history has destroyed this illusion17997 but no one can guarantee that it will not sooner or later reproduce itself1 and lead those at the head of affairs to perversities which please man's weakness1 and therefore have the greater affinity for his nature4 ,perhaps1 by-and-by1 ,buonaparte's campaigns and battles will be looked upon as mere acts of barbarism and stupidity1 and we shall once more turn with satisfaction and confidence to the dress-sword of obsolete and musty institutions and forms4 ,if theory gives a caution against this1 then it renders a real service to those who listen to its warning voice4 ,may we succeed in lending a hand to those who in our dear native land are called upon to speak with authority on these matters1 that we may be their guide into this field of inquiry1 and excite them to make a candid examination of the subject4799997 7997 ,on the ,continent only1 it still preserves full vitality in the minds of ,british politicians and pressmen4--,,editor4 799997 ,this prayer was abundantly granted--vide the ,german victories of #ahgj4--;,,editor4 ,not only the conception of ,war but experience also leads us to look for a great decision only in a great battle4 ,from time immemorial1 only great victories have led to great successes on the offensive side in the absolute form1 on the defensive side in a manner more or less satisfactory4 ,even ,buonaparte would not have seen the day of ,ulm1 unique in its kind1 if he had shrunk from shedding blood2 it is rather to be regarded as only a second crop from the victorious events in his preceding campaigns4 ,it is not only bold1 rash1 and presumptuous ,generals who have sought to complete their work by the great venture of a decisive battle1 but also fortunate ones as well2 and we may rest satisfied with the answer which they have thus given to this vast question4 ,let us not hear of ,generals who conquer without bloodshed4 ,if a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight1 then that is a ground for paying more respect to ,war1 but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity1 until some one steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body4 ,we look upon a great battle as a principal decision1 but certainly not as the only one necessary for a ,war or a campaign4 ,instances of a great battle deciding a whole campaign1 have been frequent only in modern times1 those which have decided a whole ,war1 belong to the class of rare exceptions4 ,a decision which is brought about by a great battle depends naturally not on the battle itself1 that is on the mass of combatants engaged in it1 and on the intensity of the victory1 but also on a number of other relations between the military forces opposed to each other1 and between the ,states to which these forces belong4 ,but at the same time that the principal mass of the force available is brought to the great duel1 a great decision is also brought on1 the extent of which may perhaps be foreseen in many respects1 though not in all1 and which although not the only one1 still is the first decision1 and as such1 has an influence on those which succeed4 ,therefore a deliberately planned great battle1 according to its relations1 is more or less1 but always in some degree1 to be regarded as the leading means and central point of the whole system4 ,the more a ,general takes the field in the true spirit of ,war as well as of every contest1 with the feeling and the idea1 that is the conviction1 that he must and will conquer1 the more he will strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first battle1 hope and strive to win everything by it4 ,buonaparte hardly ever entered upon a ,war without thinking of conquering his enemy at once in the first battle17997 and ,frederick the ,great1 although in a more limited sphere1 and with interests of less magnitude at stake1 thought the same when1 at the head of a small ,army1 he sought to disengage his rear from the ,russians or the ,federal ,imperial ,army4 7997 ,this was ,moltke's essential idea in his preparations for the ,war of #ahgj4 ,see his secret memorandum issued to ,g4,o4,c4s on ,may #g4 #ahgj1 pointing to a battle on the ,upper ,saar as his primary purpose4--,,editor4 ,the decision which is given by the great battle1 depends1 we have said1 partly on the battle itself1 that is on the number of troops engaged1 and partly on the magnitude of the success4 ,how the ,general may increase its importance in respect to the first point is evident in itself and we shall merely observe that according to the importance of the great battle1 the number of cases which are decided along with it increases1 and that therefore ,generals who1 confident in themselves have been lovers of great decisions1 have always managed to make use of the greater part of their troops in it without neglecting on that account essential points elsewhere4 ,as regards the consequences or speaking more correctly the effectiveness of a victory1 that depends chiefly on four points3 #a4 ,on the tactical form adopted as the order of battle4 #b4 ,on the nature of the country4 #c4 ,on the relative proportions of the three arms4 #d4 ,on the relative strength of the two ,armies4 ,a battle with parallel fronts and without any action against a flank will seldom yield as great success as one in which the defeated ,army has been turned1 or compelled to change front more or less4 ,in a broken or hilly country the successes are likewise smaller1 because the power of the blow is everywhere less4 ,if the cavalry of the vanquished is equal or superior to that of the victor1 then the effects of the pursuit are diminished1 and by that great part of the results of victory are lost4 ,finally it is easy to understand that if superior numbers are on the side of the conqueror1 and he uses his advantage in that respect to turn the flank of his adversary1 or compel him to change front1 greater results will follow than if the conqueror had been weaker in numbers than the vanquished4 ,the battle of ,leuthen may certainly be quoted as a practical refutation of this principle1 but we beg permission for once to say what we otherwise do not like1 no rule without an exception4 ,in all these ways1 therefore1 the ,commander has the means of giving his battle a decisive character2 certainly he thus exposes himself to an increased amount of danger1 but his whole line of action is subject to that dynamic law of the moral world4 ,there is then nothing in ,war which can be put in comparison with the great battle in point of importance1 and the acme of strategic ability is displayed in the provision of means for this great event1 in the skilful determination of place and time1 and direction of troops1 and in the good use made of success4 ,but it does not follow from the importance of these things that they must be of a very complicated and recondite nature2 all is here rather simple1 the art of combination by no means great2 but there is great need of quickness in judging of circumstances1 need of energy1 steady resolution1 a youthful spirit of enterprise--heroic qualities1 to which we shall often have to refer4 ,there is1 therefore1 but little wanted here of that which can be taught by books and there is much that1 if it can be taught at all1 must come to the ,general through some other medium than printer's type4 ,the impulse towards a great battle1 the voluntary1 sure progress to it1 must proceed from a feeling of innate power and a clear sense of the necessity2 in other words1 it must proceed from inborn courage and from perceptions sharpened by contact with the higher interests of life4 ,great examples are the best teachers1 but it is certainly a misfortune if a cloud of theoretical prejudices comes between1 for even the sunbeam is refracted and tinted by the clouds4 ,to destroy such prejudices1 which many a time rise and spread themselves like a miasma1 is an imperative duty of theory1 for the misbegotten offspring of human reason can also be in turn destroyed by pure reason4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,strategic ,means of ,utilising ,victory ,the more difficult part1 viz41 that of perfectly preparing the victory1 is a silent service of which the merit belongs to ,strategy and yet for which it is hardly sufficiently commended4 ,it appears brilliant and full of renown by turning to good account a victory gained4 ,what may be the special object of a battle1 how it is connected with the whole system of a ,war1 whither the career of victory may lead according to the nature of circumstances1 where its culminating-point lies--all these are things which we shall not enter upon until hereafter4 ,but under any conceivable circumstances the fact holds good1 that without a pursuit no victory can have a great effect1 and that1 however short the career of victory may be1 it must always lead beyond the first steps in pursuit2 and in order to avoid the frequent repetition of this1 we shall now dwell for a moment on this necessary supplement of victory in general4 ,the pursuit of a beaten ,army commences at the moment that ,army1 giving up the combat1 leaves its position2 all previous movements in one direction and another belong not to that but to the progress of the battle itself4 ,usually victory at the moment here described1 even if it is certain1 is still as yet small and weak in its proportions1 and would not rank as an event of any great positive advantage if not completed by a pursuit on the first day4 ,then it is mostly1 as we have before said1 that the trophies which give substance to the victory begin to be gathered up4 ,of this pursuit we shall speak in the next place4 ,usually both sides come into action with their physical powers considerably deteriorated1 for the movements immediately preceding have generally the character of very urgent circumstances4 ,the efforts which the forging out of a great combat costs1 complete the exhaustion2 from this it follows that the victorious party is very little less disorganised and out of his original formation than the vanquished1 and therefore requires time to reform1 to collect stragglers1 and issue fresh ammunition to those who are without4 ,all these things place the conqueror himself in the state of crisis of which we have already spoken4 ,if now the defeated force is only a detached portion of the enemy's ,army1 or if it has otherwise to expect a considerable reinforcement1 then the conqueror may easily run into the obvious danger of having to pay dear for his victory1 and this consideration1 in such a case1 very soon puts an end to pursuit1 or at least restricts it materially4 ,even when a strong accession of force by the enemy is not to be feared1 the conqueror finds in the above circumstances a powerful check to the vivacity of his pursuit4 ,there is no reason to fear that the victory will be snatched away1 but adverse combats are still possible1 and may diminish the advantages which up to the present have been gained4 ,moreover1 at this moment the whole weight of all that is sensuous in an ,army1 its wants and weaknesses1 are dependent on the will of the ,commander4 ,all the thousands under his command require rest and refreshment1 and long to see a stop put to toil and danger for the present2 only a few1 forming an exception1 can see and feel beyond the present moment1 it is only amongst this little number that there is sufficient mental vigour to think1 after what is absolutely necessary at the moment has been done1 upon those results which at such a moment only appear to the rest as mere embellishments of victory--as a luxury of triumph4 ,but all these thousands have a voice in the council of the ,general1 for through the various steps of the military hierarchy these interests of the sensuous creature have their sure conductor into the heart of the ,commander4 ,he himself1 through mental and bodily fatigue1 is more or less weakened in his natural activity1 and thus it happens then that1 mostly from these causes1 purely incidental to human nature1 less is done than might have been done1 and that generally what is done is to be ascribed entirely to the thirst for glory1 the energy1 indeed also the hard-heartedness of the ,general-in-,chief4 ,it is only thus we can explain the hesitating manner in which many ,generals follow up a victory which superior numbers have given them4 ,the first pursuit of the enemy we limit in general to the extent of the first day1 including the night following the victory4 ,at the end of that period the necessity of rest ourselves prescribes a halt in any case4 ,this first pursuit has different natural degrees4 ,the first is1 if cavalry alone are employed2 in that case it amounts usually more to alarming and watching than to pressing the enemy in reality1 because the smallest obstacle of ground is generally sufficient to check the pursuit4 ,useful as cavalry may be against single bodies of broken demoralised troops1 still when opposed to the bulk of the beaten ,army it becomes again only the auxiliary arm1 because the troops in retreat can employ fresh reserves to cover the movement1 and1 therefore1 at the next trifling obstacle of ground1 by combining all arms they can make a stand with success4 ,the only exception to this is in the case of an army in actual flight in a complete state of dissolution4 ,the second degree is1 if the pursuit is made by a strong advance-guard composed of all arms1 the greater part consisting naturally of cavalry4 ,such a pursuit generally drives the enemy as far as the nearest strong position for his rear-guard1 or the next position affording space for his ,army4 ,neither can usually be found at once1 and1 therefore1 the pursuit can be carried further2 generally1 however1 it does not extend beyond the distance of one or at most a couple of leagues1 because otherwise the advance-guard would not feel itself sufficiently supported4 ,the third and most vigorous degree is when the victorious ,army itself continues to advance as far as its physical powers can endure4 ,in this case the beaten ,army will generally quit such ordinary positions as a country usually offers on the mere show of an attack1 or of an intention to turn its flank2 and the rear-guard will be still less likely to engage in an obstinate resistance4 ,in all three cases the night1 if it sets in before the conclusion of the whole act1 usually puts an end to it1 and the few instances in which this has not taken place1 and the pursuit has been continued throughout the night1 must be regarded as pursuits in an exceptionally vigorous form4 ,if we reflect that in fighting by night everything must be1 more or less1 abandoned to chance1 and that at the conclusion of a battle the regular cohesion and order of things in an army must inevitably be disturbed1 we may easily conceive the reluctance of both ,generals to carrying on their business under such disadvantageous conditions4 ,if a complete dissolution of the vanquished ,army1 or a rare superiority of the victorious ,army in military virtue does not ensure success1 everything would in a manner be given up to fate1 which can never be for the interest of any one1 even of the most fool-hardy ,general4 ,as a rule1 therefore1 night puts an end to pursuit1 even when the battle has only been decided shortly before darkness sets in4 ,this allows the conquered either time for rest and to rally immediately1 or1 if he retreats during the night it gives him a march in advance4 ,after this break the conquered is decidedly in a better condition2 much of that which had been thrown into confusion has been brought again into order1 ammunition has been renewed1 the whole has been put into a fresh formation4 ,whatever further encounter now takes place with the enemy is a new battle not a continuation of the old1 and although it may be far from promising absolute success1 still it is a fresh combat1 and not merely a gathering up of the dbris by the victor4 ,when1 therefore1 the conqueror can continue the pursuit itself throughout the night1 if only with a strong advance-guard composed of all arms of the service1 the effect of the victory is immensely increased1 of this the battles of ,leuthen and ,la ,belle ,alliance7997 are examples4 7997 ,waterloo4 ,the whole action of this pursuit is mainly tactical1 and we only dwell upon it here in order to make plain the difference which through it may be produced in the effect of a victory4 ,this first pursuit1 as far as the nearest stopping-point1 belongs as a right to every conqueror1 and is hardly in any way connected with his further plans and combinations4 ,these may considerably diminish the positive results of a victory gained with the main body of the ,army1 but they cannot make this first use of it impossible2 at least cases of that kind1 if conceivable at all1 must be so uncommon that they should have no appreciable influence on theory4 ,and here certainly we must say that the example afforded by modern ,wars opens up quite a new field for energy4 ,in preceding ,wars1 resting on a narrower basis1 and altogether more circumscribed in their scope1 there were many unnecessary conventional restrictions in various ways1 but particularly in this point4 ,the conception1 ,honour of ,victory seemed to ,generals so much by far the chief thing that they thought the less of the complete destruction of the enemy's military force1 as in point of fact that destruction of force appeared to them only as one of the many means in ,war1 not by any means as the principal1 much less as the only means2 so that they the more readily put the sword in its sheath the moment the enemy had lowered his4 ,nothing seemed more natural to them than to stop the combat as soon as the decision was obtained1 and to regard all further carnage as unnecessary cruelty4 ,even if this false philosophy did not determine their resolutions entirely1 still it was a point of view by which representations of the exhaustion of all powers1 and physical impossibility of continuing the struggle1 obtained readier evidence and greater weight4 ,certainly the sparing one's own instrument of victory is a vital question if we only possess this one1 and foresee that soon the time may arrive when it will not be sufficient for all that remains to be done1 for every continuation of the offensive must lead ultimately to complete exhaustion4 ,but this calculation was still so far false1 as the further loss of forces by a continuance of the pursuit could bear no proportion to that which the enemy must suffer4 ,that view1 therefore1 again could only exist because the military forces were not considered the vital factor4 ,and so we find that in former ,wars real heroes only--such as ,charles ,,xii41 ,marlborough1 ,eugene1 ,frederick the ,great--added a vigorous pursuit to their victories when they were decisive enough1 and that other ,generals usually contented themselves with the possession of the field of battle4 ,in modern times the greater energy infused into the conduct of ,wars through the greater importance of the circumstances from which they have proceeded has thrown down these conventional barriers2 the pursuit has become an all-important business for the conqueror2 trophies have on that account multiplied in extent1 and if there are cases also in modern ,warfare in which this has not been the case1 still they belong to the list of exceptions1 and are to be accounted for by peculiar circumstances4 ,at ,gorschen7997 and ,bautzen nothing but the superiority of the allied cavalry prevented a complete rout1 at ,gross ,beeren and ,dennewitz the ill-will of ,bernadotte1 the ,crown ,prince of ,sweden2 at ,laon the enfeebled personal condition of ,blcher1 who was then seventy years old and at the moment confined to a dark room owing to an injury to his eyes4 7997 ,gorschen or ,lutzen1 ,may #b1 #ahac2 ,gross ,beeren and ,dennewitz1 ,august #bb1 #ahac2 ,bautzen4 ,may #bb1 #aiac2 ,laon1 ,march #aj #ahac4 ,but ,borodino is also an illustration to the point here1 and we cannot resist saying a few more words about it1 partly because we do not consider the circumstances are explained simply by attaching blame to ,buonaparte1 partly because it might appear as if this1 and with it a great number of similar cases1 belonged to that class which we have designated as so extremely rare1 cases in which the general relations seize and fetter the ,general at the very beginning of the battle4 ,french authors in particular1 and great admirers of ,buonaparte 7,vaudancourt1 ,chambray1 ,sgur71 have blamed him decidedly because he did not drive the ,russian ,army completely off the field1 and use his last reserves to scatter it1 because then what was only a lost battle would have been a complete rout4 ,we should be obliged to diverge too far to describe circumstantially the mutual situation of the two ,armies2 but this much is evident1 that when ,buonaparte passed the ,niemen with his ,army the same corps which afterwards fought at ,borodino numbered #cjj1jjj men1 of whom now only #abj1jjj remained1 he might therefore well be apprehensive that he would not have enough left to march upon ,moscow1 the point on which everything seemed to depend4 ,the victory which he had just gained gave him nearly a certainty of taking that capital1 for that the ,russians would be in a condition to fight a second battle within eight days seemed in the highest degree improbable2 and in ,moscow he hoped to find peace4 ,no doubt the complete dispersion of the ,russian ,army would have made this peace much more certain2 but still the first consideration was to get to ,moscow1 that is1 to get there with a force with which he should appear dictator over the capital1 and through that over the ,empire and the ,government4 ,the force which he brought with him to ,moscow was no longer sufficient for that1 as shown in the sequel1 but it would have been still less so if1 in scattering the ,russian ,army1 he had scattered his own at the same time4 ,buonaparte was thoroughly alive to all this1 and in our eyes he stands completely justified4 ,but on that account this case is still not to be reckoned amongst those in which1 through the general relations1 the ,general is interdicted from following up his victory1 for there never was in his case any question of mere pursuit4 ,the victory was decided at four o'clock in the afternoon1 but the ,russians still occupied the greater part of the field of battle2 they were not yet disposed to give up the ground1 and if the attack had been renewed1 they would still have offered a most determined resistance1 which would have undoubtedly ended in their complete defeat1 but would have cost the conqueror much further bloodshed4 ,we must therefore reckon the ,battle of ,borodino as amongst battles1 like ,bautzen1 left unfinished4 ,at ,bautzen the vanquished preferred to quit the field sooner2 at ,borodino the conqueror preferred to content himself with a half victory1 not because the decision appeared doubtful1 but because he was not rich enough to pay for the whole4 ,returning now to our subject1 the deduction from our reflections in relation to the first stage of pursuit is1 that the energy thrown into it chiefly determines the value of the victory2 that this pursuit is a second act of the victory1 in many cases more important also than the first1 and that strategy1 whilst here approaching tactics to receive from it the harvest of success1 exercises the first act of her authority by demanding this completion of the victory4 ,but further1 the effects of victory are very seldom found to stop with this first pursuit2 now first begins the real career to which victory lent velocity4 ,this course is conditioned as we have already said1 by other relations of which it is not yet time to speak4 ,but we must here mention1 what there is of a general character in the pursuit in order to avoid repetition when the subject occurs again4 ,in the further stages of pursuit1 again1 we can distinguish three degrees3 the simple pursuit1 a hard pursuit1 and a parallel march to intercept4 ,the simple following or pursuing causes the enemy to continue his retreat1 until he thinks he can risk another battle4 ,it will therefore in its effect suffice to exhaust the advantages gained1 and besides that1 all that the enemy cannot carry with him1 sick1 wounded1 and disabled from fatigue1 quantities of baggage1 and carriages of all kinds1 will fall into our hands1 but this mere following does not tend to heighten the disorder in the enemy's ,army1 an effect which is produced by the two following causes4 ,if1 for instance1 instead of contenting ourselves with taking up every day the camp the enemy has just vacated1 occupying just as much of the country as he chooses to abandon1 we make our arrangements so as every day to encroach further1 and accordingly with our advance-guard organised for the purpose1 attack his rear-guard every time it attempts to halt1 then such a course will hasten his retreat1 and consequently tend to increase his disorganisation4--,this it will principally effect by the character of continuous flight1 which his retreat will thus assume4 ,nothing has such a depressing influence on the soldier1 as the sound of the enemy's cannon afresh at the moment when1 after a forced march he seeks some rest2 if this excitement is continued from day to day for some time1 it may lead to a complete rout4 ,there lies in it a constant admission of being obliged to obey the law of the enemy1 and of being unfit for any resistance1 and the consciousness of this cannot do otherwise than weaken the moral of an ,army in a high degree4 ,the effect of pressing the enemy in this way attains a maximum when it drives the enemy to make night marches4 ,if the conqueror scares away the discomfited opponent at sunset from a camp which has just been taken up either for the main body of the ,army1 or for the rear-guard1 the conquered must either make a night march1 or alter his position in the night1 retiring further away1 which is much the same thing2 the victorious party can on the other hand pass the night in quiet4 ,the arrangement of marches1 and the choice of positions depend in this case also upon so many other things1 especially on the supply of the ,army1 on strong natural obstacles in the country1 on large towns1 c4 c41 that it would be ridiculous pedantry to attempt to show by a geometrical analysis how the pursuer1 being able to impose his laws on the retreating enemy1 can compel him to march at night while he takes his rest4 ,but nevertheless it is true and practicable that marches in pursuit may be so planned as to have this tendency1 and that the efficacy of the pursuit is very much enchanced thereby4 ,if this is seldom attended to in the execution1 it is because such a procedure is more difficult for the pursuing ,army1 than a regular adherence to ordinary marches in the daytime4 ,to start in good time in the morning1 to encamp at mid-day1 to occupy the rest of the day in providing for the ordinary wants of the ,army1 and to use the night for repose1 is a much more convenient method than to regulate one's movements exactly according to those of the enemy1 therefore to determine nothing till the last moment1 to start on the march1 sometimes in the morning1 sometimes in the evening1 to be always for several hours in the presence of the enemy1 and exchanging cannon shots with him1 and keeping up skirmishing fire1 to plan manuvres to turn him1 in short1 to make the whole outlay of tactical means which such a course renders necessary4 ,all that naturally bears with a heavy weight on the pursuing ,army1 and in ,war1 where there are so many burdens to be borne1 men are always inclined to strip off those which do not seem absolutely necessary4 ,these observations are true1 whether applied to a whole ,army or as in the more usual case1 to a strong advance-guard4 ,for the reasons just mentioned1 this second method of pursuit1 this continued pressing of the enemy pursued is rather a rare occurrence2 even ,buonaparte in his ,russian campaign1 #ahab1 practised it but little1 for the reasons here apparent1 that the difficulties and hardships of this campaign1 already threatened his ,army with destruction before it could reach its object2 on the other hand1 the ,french in their other campaigns have distinguished themselves by their energy in this point also4 ,lastly1 the third and most effectual form of pursuit is1 the parallel march to the immediate object of the retreat4 ,every defeated ,army will naturally have behind it1 at a greater or less distance1 some point1 the attainment of which is the first purpose in view1 whether it be that failing in this its further retreat might be compromised1 as in the case of a defile1 or that it is important for the point itself to reach it before the enemy1 as in the case of a great city1 magazines1 c41 or1 lastly1 that the ,army at this point will gain new powers of defence1 such as a strong position1 or junction with other corps4 ,now if the conqueror directs his march on this point by a lateral road1 it is evident how that may quicken the retreat of the beaten ,army in a destructive manner1 convert it into hurry1 perhaps into flight47997 ,the conquered has only three ways to counteract this3 the first is to throw himself in front of the enemy1 in order by an unexpected attack to gain that probability of success which is lost to him in general from his position2 this plainly supposes an enterprising bold ,general1 and an excellent ,army1 beaten but not utterly defeated2 therefore1 it can only be employed by a beaten ,army in very few cases4 7997 ,this point is exceptionally well treated by von ,bernhardi in his 8,cavalry in ,future ,wars40 ,london3 ,murray1 #aijf4 ,the second way is hastening the retreat2 but this is just what the conqueror wants1 and it easily leads to immoderate efforts on the part of the troops1 by which enormous losses are sustained1 in stragglers1 broken guns1 and carriages of all kinds4 ,the third way is to make a dtour1 and get round the nearest point of interception1 to march with more ease at a greater distance from the enemy1 and thus to render the haste required less damaging4 ,this last way is the worst of all1 it generally turns out like a new debt contracted by an insolvent debtor1 and leads to greater embarrassment4 ,there are cases in which this course is advisable2 others where there is nothing else left2 also instances in which it has been successful2 but upon the whole it is certainly true that its adoption is usually influenced less by a clear persuasion of its being the surest way of attaining the aim than by another inadmissible motive--this motive is the dread of encountering the enemy4 ,woe to the ,commander who gives in to this6 ,however much the moral of his ,army may have deteriorated1 and however well founded may be his apprehensions of being at a disadvantage in any conflict with the enemy1 the evil will only be made worse by too anxiously avoiding every possible risk of collision4 ,buonaparte in #ahac would never have brought over the ,rhine with him the #cj1jjj or #dj1jjj men who remained after the battle of ,hanau17997 if he had avoided that battle and tried to pass the ,rhine at ,mannheim or ,coblenz4 ,it is just by means of small combats carefully prepared and executed1 and in which the defeated army being on the defensive1 has always the assistance of the ground--it is just by these that the moral strength of the ,army can first be resuscitated4 7997 ,at ,hanau 7,october #cj1 #ahac71 the ,bavarians some #ej1jjj strong threw themselves across the line of ,napoleon's retreat from ,leipsic4 ,by a masterly use of its artillery the ,french tore the ,bavarians asunder and marched on over their bodies4--,,editor4 ,the beneficial effect of the smallest successes is incredible2 but with most ,generals the adoption of this plan implies great self-command4 ,the other way1 that of evading all encounter1 appears at first so much easier1 that there is a natural preference for its adoption4 ,it is therefore usually just this system of evasion which best1 promotes the view of the pursuer1 and often ends with the complete downfall of the pursued2 we must1 however1 recollect here that we are speaking of a whole ,army1 not of a single ,division1 which1 having been cut off1 is seeking to join the main ,army by making a dtour2 in such a case circumstances are different1 and success is not uncommon4 ,but there is one condition requisite to the success of this race of two ,corps for an object1 which is that a ,division of the pursuing army should follow by the same road which the pursued has taken1 in order to pick up stragglers1 and keep up the impression which the presence of the enemy never fails to make4 ,blcher neglected this in his1 in other respects unexceptionable1 pursuit after ,la ,belle ,alliance4 ,such marches tell upon the pursuer as well as the pursued1 and they are not advisable if the enemy's ,army rallies itself upon another considerable one2 if it has a distinguished ,general at its head1 and if its destruction is not already well prepared4 ,but when this means can be adopted1 it acts also like a great mechanical power4 ,the losses of the beaten ,army from sickness and fatigue are on such a disproportionate scale1 the spirit of the ,army is so weakened and lowered by the constant solicitude about impending ruin1 that at last anything like a well organised stand is out of the question2 every day thousands of prisoners fall into the enemy's hands without striking a blow4 ,in such a season of complete good fortune1 the conqueror need not hesitate about dividing his forces in order to draw into the vortex of destruction everything within reach of his ,army1 to cut off detachments1 to take fortresses unprepared for defence1 to occupy large towns1 c4 c4 ,he may do anything until a new state of things arises1 and the more he ventures in this way the longer will it be before that change will take place4 ,there is no want of examples of brilliant results from grand decisive victories1 and of great and vigorous pursuits in the wars of ,buonaparte4 ,we need only quote ,jena #ahjf1 ,ratisbonne #ahji1 ,leipsic #ahac1 and ,belle- ,alliance #ahae4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,retreat ,after a ,lost ,battle ,in a lost battle the power of an ,army is broken1 the moral to a greater degree than the physical4 ,a second battle unless fresh favourable circumstances come into play1 would lead to a complete defeat1 perhaps1 to destruction4 ,this is a military axiom4 ,according to the usual course the retreat is continued up to that point where the equilibrium of forces is restored1 either by reinforcements1 or by the protection of strong fortresses1 or by great defensive positions afforded by the country1 or by a separation of the enemy's force4 ,the magnitude of the losses sustained1 the extent of the defeat1 but still more the character of the enemy1 will bring nearer or put off the instant of this equilibrium4 ,how many instances may be found of a beaten ,army rallied again at a short distance1 without its circumstances having altered in any way since the battle4 ,the cause of this may be traced to the moral weakness of the adversary1 or to the preponderance gained in the battle not having been sufficient to make lasting impression4 ,to profit by this weakness or mistake of the enemy1 not to yield one inch breadth more than the pressure of circumstances demands1 but above all things1 in order to keep up the moral forces to as advantageous a point as possible1 a slow retreat1 offering incessant resistance1 and bold courageous counterstrokes1 whenever the enemy seeks to gain any excessive advantages1 are absolutely necessary4 ,retreats of great ,generals and of ,armies inured to ,war have always resembled the retreat of a wounded lion1 such is1 undoubtedly1 also the best theory4 ,it is true that at the moment of quitting a dangerous position we have often seen trifling formalities observed which caused a waste of time1 and were1 therefore1 attended with danger1 whilst in such cases everything depends on getting out of the place speedily4 ,practised ,generals reckon this maxim a very important one4 ,but such cases must not be confounded with a general retreat after a lost battle4 ,whoever then thinks by a few rapid marches to gain a start1 and more easily to recover a firm standing1 commits a great error4 ,the first movements should be as small as possible1 and it is a maxim in general not to suffer ourselves to be dictated to by the enemy4 ,this maxim cannot be followed without bloody fighting with the enemy at our heels1 but the gain is worth the sacrifice2 without it we get into an accelerated pace which soon turns into a headlong rush1 and costs merely in stragglers more men than rear-guard combats1 and besides that extinguishes the last remnants of the spirit of resistance4 ,a strong rear-guard composed of picked troops1 commanded by the bravest ,general1 and supported by the whole ,army at critical moments1 a careful utilisation of ground1 strong ambuscades wherever the boldness of the enemy's advance-guard1 and the ground1 afford opportunity2 in short1 the preparation and the system of regular small battles1--these are the means of following this principle4 ,the difficulties of a retreat are naturally greater or less according as the battle has been fought under more or less favourable circumstances1 and according as it has been more or less obstinately contested4 ,the battle of ,jena and ,la ,belle-,alliance show how impossible anything like a regular retreat may become1 if the last man is used up against a powerful enemy4 ,now and again it has been suggested7997 to divide for the purpose of retreating1 therefore to retreat in separate divisions or even eccentrically4 ,such a separation as is made merely for convenience1 and along with which concentrated action continues possible and is kept in view1 is not what we now refer to2 any other kind is extremely dangerous1 contrary to the nature of the thing1 and therefore a great error4 ,every lost battle is a principle of weakness and disorganisation2 and the first and immediate desideratum is to concentrate1 and in concentration to recover order1 courage1 and confidence4 ,the idea of harassing the enemy by separate corps on both flanks at the moment when he is following up his victory1 is a perfect anomaly2 a faint-hearted pedant might be overawed by his enemy in that manner1 and for such a case it may answer2 but where we are not sure of this failing in our opponent it is better let alone4 ,if the strategic relations after a battle require that we should cover ourselves right and left by detachments1 so much must be done1 as from circumstances is unavoidable1 but this fractioning must always be regarded as an evil1 and we are seldom in a state to commence it the day after the battle itself4 7997 ,allusion is here made to the works of ,lloyd ,blow and others4 ,if ,frederick the ,great after the battle of ,kollin17997 and the raising of the siege of ,prague retreated in three columns that was done not out of choice1 but because the position of his forces1 and the necessity of covering ,saxony1 left him no alternative1 ,buonaparte after the battle of ,brienne1799997 sent ,marmont back to the ,aube1 whilst he himself passed the ,seine1 and turned towards ,troyes2 but that this did not end in disaster1 was solely owing to the circumstance that the ,allies1 instead of pursuing divided their forces in like manner1 turning with the one part 7,blcher7 towards the ,marne1 while with the other 7,schwartzenberg71 from fear of being too weak1 they advanced with exaggerated caution4 7997 ,june #ai1 #ageg4 799997 ,january #cj1 #ahad4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,night ,fighting ,the manner of conducting a combat at night1 and what concerns the details of its course1 is a tactical subject2 we only examine it here so far as in its totality it appears as a special strategic means4 ,fundamentally every night attack is only a more vehement form of surprise4 ,now at the first look of the thing such an attack appears quite pre-eminently advantageous1 for we suppose the enemy to be taken by surprise1 the assailant naturally to be prepared for everything which can happen4 ,what an inequality6 ,imagination paints to itself a picture of the most complete confusion on the one side1 and on the other side the assailant only occupied in reaping the fruits of his advantage4 ,hence the constant creation of schemes for night attacks by those who have not to lead them1 and have no responsibility1 whilst these attacks seldom take place in reality4 ,these ideal schemes are all based on the hypothesis that the assailant knows the arrangements of the defender because they have been made and announced beforehand1 and could not escape notice in his reconnaissances1 and inquiries2 that on the other hand1 the measures of the assailant1 being only taken at the moment of execution1 cannot be known to the enemy4 ,but the last of these is not always quite the case1 and still less is the first4 ,if we are not so near the enemy as to have him completely under our eye1 as the ,austrians had ,frederick the ,great before the battle of ,hochkirch 7#ageh71 then all that we know of his position must always be imperfect1 as it is obtained by reconnaissances1 patrols1 information from prisoners1 and spies1 sources on which no firm reliance can be placed because intelligence thus obtained is always more or less of an old date1 and the position of the enemy may have been altered in the meantime4 ,moreover1 with the tactics and mode of encampment of former times it was much easier than it is now to examine the position of the enemy4 ,a line of tents is much easier to distinguish than a line of huts or a bivouac2 and an encampment on a line of front1 fully and regularly drawn out1 also easier than one of ,divisions formed in columns1 the mode often used at present4 ,we may have the ground on which a ,division bivouacs in that manner completely under our eye1 and yet not be able to arrive at any accurate idea4 ,but the position again is not all that we want to know the measures which the defender may take in the course of the combat are just as important1 and do not by any means consist in mere random shots4 ,these measures also make night attacks more difficult in modern ,wars than formerly1 because they have in these campaigns an advantage over those already taken4 ,in our combats the position of the defender is more temporary than definitive1 and on that account the defender is better able to surprise his adversary with unexpected blows1 than he could formerly47997 7997 ,all these difficulties obviously become increased as the power of the weapons in use tends to keep the combatants further apart4--,,editor4 ,therefore what the assailant knows of the defensive previous to a night attack1 is seldom or never sufficient to supply the want of direct observation4 ,but the defender has on his side another small advantage as well1 which is that he is more at home than the assailant1 on the ground which forms his position1 and therefore1 like the inhabitant of a room1 will find his way about it in the dark with more ease than a stranger4 ,he knows better where to find each part of his force1 and therefore can more readily get at it than is the case with his adversary4 ,from this it follows1 that the assailant in a combat at night feels the want of his eyes just as much as the defender1 and that therefore1 only particular reasons can make a night attack advisable4 ,now these reasons arise mostly in connection with subordinate parts of an ,army1 rarely with the ,army itself2 it follows that a night attack also as a rule can only take place with secondary combats1 and seldom with great battles4 ,we may attack a portion of the enemy's ,army with a very superior force1 consequently enveloping it with a view either to take the whole1 or to inflict very severe loss on it by an unequal combat1 provided that other circumstances are in our favour4 ,but such a scheme can never succeed except by a great surprise1 because no fractional part of the enemy's ,army would engage in such an unequal combat1 but would retire instead4 ,but a surprise on an important scale except in rare instances in a very close country1 can only be effected at night4 ,if therefore we wish to gain such an advantage as this from the faulty disposition of a portion of the enemy's ,army1 then we must make use of the night1 at all events1 to finish the preliminary part even if the combat itself should not open till towards daybreak4 ,this is therefore what takes place in all the little enterprises by night against outposts1 and other small bodies1 the main point being invariably through superior numbers1 and getting round his position1 to entangle him unexpectedly in such a disadvantageous combat1 that he cannot disengage himself without great loss4 ,the larger the body attacked the more difficult the undertaking1 because a strong force has greater resources within itself to maintain the fight long enough for help to arrive4 ,on that account the whole of the enemy's ,army can never in ordinary cases be the object of such an attack for although it has no assistance to expect from any quarter outside itself1 still1 it contains within itself sufficient means of repelling attacks from several sides particularly in our day1 when every one from the commencement is prepared for this very usual form of attack4 ,whether the enemy can attack us on several sides with success depends generally on conditions quite different from that of its being done unexpectedly2 without entering here into the nature of these conditions1 we confine ourselves to observing1 that with turning an enemy1 great results1 as well as great dangers are connected2 that therefore1 if we set aside special circumstances1 nothing justifies it but a great superiority1 just such as we should use against a fractional part of the enemy's ,army4 ,but the turning and surrounding a small fraction of the enemy1 and particularly in the darkness of night1 is also more practicable for this reason1 that whatever we stake upon it1 and however superior the force used may be1 still probably it constitutes only a limited portion of our ,army1 and we can sooner stake that than the whole on the risk of a great venture4 ,besides1 the greater part or perhaps the whole serves as a support and rallying-point for the portion risked1 which again very much diminishes the danger of the enterprise4 ,not only the risk1 but the difficulty of execution as well confines night enterprises to small bodies4 ,as surprise is the real essence of them so also stealthy approach is the chief condition of execution3 but this is more easily done with small bodies than with large1 and for the columns of a whole ,army is seldom practicable4 ,for this reason such enterprises are in general only directed against single outposts1 and can only be feasible against greater bodies if they are without sufficient outposts1 like ,frederick the ,great at ,hochkirch47997 ,this will happen seldomer in future to ,armies themselves than to minor divisions4 7997 ,october #ad1 #ageh4 ,in recent times1 when ,war has been carried on with so much more rapidity and vigour1 it has in consequence often happened that ,armies have encamped very close to each other1 without having a very strong system of outposts1 because those circumstances have generally occurred just at the crisis which precedes a great decision4 ,but then at such times the readiness for battle on both sides is also more perfect2 on the other hand1 in former ,wars it was a frequent practice for armies to take up camps in sight of each other1 when they had no other object but that of mutually holding each other in check1 consequently for a longer period4 ,how often ,frederick the ,great stood for weeks so near to the ,austrians1 that the two might have exchanged cannon shots with each other4 ,but these practices1 certainly more favourable to night attacks1 have been discontinued in later days2 and armies being now no longer in regard to subsistence and requirements for encampment1 such independent bodies complete in themselves1 find it necessary to keep usually a day's march between themselves and the enemy4 ,if we now keep in view especially the night attack of an army1 it follows that sufficient motives for it can seldom occur1 and that they fall under one or other of the following classes4 #a4 ,an unusual degree of carelessness or audacity which very rarely occurs1 and when it does is compensated for by a great superiority in moral force4 #b4 ,a panic in the enemy's army1 or generally such a degree of superiority in moral force on our side1 that this is sufficient to supply the place of guidance in action4 #c4 ,cutting through an enemy's army of superior force1 which keeps us enveloped1 because in this all depends on surprise1 and the object of merely making a passage by force1 allows a much greater concentration of forces4 #d4 ,finally1 in desperate cases1 when our forces have such a disproportion to the enemy's1 that we see no possibility of success1 except through extraordinary daring4 ,but in all these cases there is still the condition that the enemy's army is under our eyes1 and protected by no advance-guard4 ,as for the rest1 most night combats are so conducted as to end with daylight1 so that only the approach and the first attack are made under cover of darkness1 because the assailant in that manner can better profit by the consequences of the state of confusion into which he throws his adversary2 and combats of this description which do not commence until daybreak1 in which the night therefore is only made use of to approach1 are not to be counted as night combats4 ,,book ,v ,,military ,,forces ,,chapter ,i4 ,general ,scheme ,we shall consider military forces3 #a4 ,as regards their numerical strength and organisation4 #b4 ,in their state independent of fighting4 #c4 ,in respect of their maintenance2 and1 lastly1 #d4 ,in their general relations to country and ground4 ,thus we shall devote this book to the consideration of things appertaining to an army1 which only come under the head of necessary conditions of fighting1 but do not constitute the fight itself4 ,they stand in more or less close connection with and react upon the fighting1 and therefore1 in considering the application of the combat they must often appear2 but we must first consider each by itself1 as a whole1 in its essence and peculiarities4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,theatre of ,war1 ,army1 ,campaign ,the nature of the things does not allow of a completely satisfactory definition of these three factors1 denoting respectively1 space1 mass1 and time in war2 but that we may not sometimes be quite misunderstood1 we must try to make somewhat plainer the usual meaning of these terms1 to which we shall in most cases adhere4 #a4--,theatre of ,war4 ,this term denotes properly such a portion of the space over which war prevails as has its boundaries protected1 and thus possesses a kind of independence4 ,this protection may consist in fortresses1 or important natural obstacles presented by the country1 or even in its being separated by a considerable distance from the rest of the space embraced in the war4--,such a portion is not a mere piece of the whole1 but a small whole complete in itself2 and consequently it is more or less in such a condition that changes which take place at other points in the seat of war have only an indirect and no direct influence upon it4 ,to give an adequate idea of this1 we may suppose that on this portion an advance is made1 whilst in another quarter a retreat is taking place1 or that upon the one an army is acting defensively1 whilst an offensive is being carried on upon the other4 ,such a clearly defined idea as this is not capable of universal application2 it is here used merely to indicate the line of distinction4 #b4--;,army4 ,with the assistance of the conception of a ,theatre of ,war1 it is very easy to say what an ,army is3 it is1 in point of fact1 the mass of troops in the same ,theatre of ,war4 ,but this plainly does not include all that is meant by the term in its common usage4 ,blcher and ,wellington commanded each a separate army in #ahae1 although the two were in the same ,theatre of ,war4 ,the chief command is1 therefore1 another distinguishing sign for the conception of an ,army4 ,at the same time this sign is very nearly allied to the preceding1 for where things are well organised1 there should only exist one supreme command in a ,theatre of ,war1 and the commander-in-chief in a particular ,theatre of ,war should always have a proportionate degree of independence4 ,the mere absolute numerical strength of a body of troops is less decisive on the subject than might at first appear4 ,for where several ,armies are acting under one command1 and upon one and the same ,theatre of ,war1 they are called ,armies1 not by reason of their strength1 but from the relations antecedent to the war 7#ahac1 the ,silesian ,army1 the ,army of the ,north1 etc71 and although we should divide a great mass of troops intended to remain in the same ,theatre into corps1 we should never divide them into ,armies1 at least1 such a division would be contrary to what seems to be the meaning which is universally attached to the term4 ,on the other hand1 it would certainly be pedantry to apply the term ,army to each band of irregular troops acting independently in a remote province3 still we must not leave unnoticed that it surprises no one when the ,army of the ,vendeans in the ,revolutionary ,war is spoken of1 and yet it was not much stronger4 ,the conceptions of ,army and ,theatre of ,war therefore1 as a rule1 go together1 and mutually include each other4 #c4--;,campaign4 ,although the sum of all military events which happen in all the ,theatres of ,war in one year is often called a ,campaign1 still1 however1 it is more usual and more exact to understand by the term the events in one single ,theatre of ,war4 ,but it is worse still to connect the notion of a ,campaign with the period of one year1 for wars no longer divide themselves naturally into ,campaigns of a year's duration by fixed and long periods in winter quarters4 ,as1 however1 the events in a ,theatre of ,war of themselves form certain great chapters--if1 for instance1 the direct effects of some more or less great catastrophe cease1 and new combinations begin to develop themselves--therefore these natural subdivisions must be taken into consideration in order to allot to each year 7,campaign7 its complete share of events4 ,no one would make the ,campaign of #ahab terminate at ,memel1 where the armies were on the #ast ,january1 and transfer the further retreat of the ,french until they recrossed the ,elbe to the campaign of #ahac1 as that further retreat was plainly only a part of the whole retreat from ,moscow4 ,that we cannot give these conceptions any greater degree of distinctness is of no consequence1 because they cannot be used as philosophical definitions for the basis of any kind of propositions4 ,they only serve to give a little more clearness and precision to the language we use4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,relation of ,power ,in the eighth chapter of the third book we have spoken of the value of superior numbers in battles1 from which follows as a consequence the superiority of numbers in general in strategy4 ,so far the importance of the relations of power is established3 we shall now add a few more detailed considerations on the subject4 ,an unbiassed examination of modern military history leads to the conviction that the superiority in numbers becomes every day more decisive2 the principle of assembling the greatest possible numbers for a decisive battle may therefore be regarded as more important than ever4 ,courage and the spirit of an army have1 in all ages1 multiplied its physical powers1 and will continue to do so equally in future2 but we find also that at certain periods in history a superiority in the organisation and equipment of an army has given a great moral preponderance2 we find that at other periods a great superiority in mobility had a like effect2 at one time we see a new system of tactics brought to light2 at another we see the art of war developing itself in an effort to make a skilful use of ground on great general principles1 and by such means here and there we find one general gaining great advantages over another2 but even this tendency has disappeared1 and wars now go on in a simpler and more natural manner4--,if1 divesting ourselves of any preconceived notions1 we look at the experiences of recent wars1 we must admit that there are but little traces of any of the above influences1 either throughout any whole campaign1 or in engagements of a decisive character--that is1 the great battle1 respecting which term we refer to the second chapter of the preceding book4 ,armies are in our days so much on a par in regard to arms1 equipment1 and drill1 that there is no very notable difference between the best and the worst in these things4 ,a difference may still be observed1 resulting from the superior instruction of the scientific corps1 but in general it only amounts to this1 that one is the inventor and introducer of improved appliances1 which the other immediately imitates4 ,even the subordinate generals1 leaders of corps and divisions1 in all that comes within the scope of their sphere1 have in general everywhere the same ideas and methods1 so that1 except the talent of the commander-in-chief--a thing entirely dependent on chance1 and not bearing a constant relation to the standard of education amongst the people and the army--there is nothing now but habituation to war which can give one army a decided superiority over another4 ,the nearer we approach to a state of equality in all these things1 the more decisive becomes the relation in point of numbers4 ,the character of modern battles is the result of this state of equality4 ,take for instance the battle of ,borodino1 where the first army in the world1 the ,french1 measured its strength with the ,russian1 which1 in many parts of its organisation1 and in the education of its special branches1 might be considered the furthest behindhand4 ,in the whole battle there is not one single trace of superior art or intelligence1 it is a mere trial of strength between the respective armies throughout2 and as they were nearly equal in that respect1 the result could not be otherwise than a gradual turn of the scale in favour of that side where there was the greatest energy on the part of the commander1 and the most experience in war on the part of the troops4 ,we have taken this battle as an illustration1 because in it there was an equality in the numbers on each side such as is rarely to be found4 ,we do not maintain that all battles exactly resemble this1 but it shows the dominant tone of most of them4 ,in a battle in which the forces try their strength on each other so leisurely and methodically1 an excess of force on one side must make the result in its favour much more certain4 ,and it is a fact that we may search modern military history in vain for a battle in which an army has beaten another double its own strength1 an occurrence by no means uncommon in former times4 ,buonaparte1 the greatest general of modern times1 in all his great victorious battles--with one exception1 that of ,dresden1 #ahac--;had managed to assemble an army superior in numbers1 or at least very little inferior1 to that of his opponent1 and when it was impossible for him to do so1 as at ,leipsic1 ,brienne1 ,laon1 and ,belle-,alliance1 he was beaten4 ,the absolute strength is in strategy generally a given quantity1 which the commander cannot alter4 ,but from this it by no means follows that it is impossible to carry on a war with a decidedly inferior force4 ,war is not always a voluntary act of state policy1 and least of all is it so when the forces are very unequal3 consequently1 any relation of forces is imaginable in war1 and it would be a strange theory of war which would wish to give up its office just where it is most wanted4 ,however desirable theory may consider a proportionate force1 still it cannot say that no use can be made of the most disproportionate4 ,no limits can be prescribed in this respect4 ,the weaker the force the more moderate must be the object it proposes to itself1 and the weaker the force the shorter time it will last4 ,in these two directions there is a field for weakness to give way1 if we may use this expression4 ,of the changes which the measure of the force produces in the conduct of war1 we can only speak by degrees1 as these things present themselves2 at present it is sufficient to have indicated the general point of view1 but to complete that we shall add one more observation4 ,the more that an army involved in an unequal combat falls short of the number of its opponents1 the greater must be the tension of its powers1 the greater its energy when danger presses4 ,if the reverse takes place1 and instead of heroic desperation a spirit of despondency ensues1 then certainly there is an end to every art of war4 ,if with this energy of powers is combined a wise moderation in the object proposed1 then there is that play of brilliant actions and prudent forbearance which we admire in the wars of ,frederick the ,great4 ,but the less that this moderation and caution can effect1 the more must the tension and energy of the forces become predominant4 ,when the disproportion of forces is so great that no modification of our own object can ensure us safety from a catastrophe1 or where the probable continuance of the danger is so great that the greatest economy of our powers can no longer suffice to bring us to our object1 then the tension of our powers should be concentrated for one desperate blow2 he who is pressed on all sides expecting little help from things which promise none1 will place his last and only reliance in the moral ascendancy which despair gives to courage1 and look upon the greatest daring as the greatest wisdom1--at the same time employ the assistance of subtle stratagem1 and if he does not succeed1 will find in an honourable downfall the right to rise hereafter4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,relation of the ,three ,arms ,we shall only speak of the three principal arms3 ,infantry1 ,cavalry1 and ,artillery4 ,we must be excused for making the following analysis which belongs more to tactics1 but is necessary to give distinctness to our ideas4 ,the combat is of two kinds1 which are essentially different3 the destructive principle of fire1 and the hand to hand or personal combat4 ,this latter1 again1 is either attack or defence4 7,as we here speak of elements1 attack and defence are to be understood in a perfectly absolute sense47 ,artillery1 obviously1 acts only with the destructive principle of fire4 ,cavalry only with personal combat4 ,infantry with both4 ,in close combat the essence of defence consists in standing firm1 as if rooted to the ground2 the essence of the attack is movement4 ,cavalry is entirely deficient in the first quality2 on the other hand1 it possesses the latter in an especial manner4 ,it is therefore only suited for attack4 ,infantry has especially the property of standing firm1 but is not altogether without mobility4 ,from this division of the elementary forces of war into different arms1 we have as a result1 the superiority and general utility of ,infantry as compared with the other two arms1 from its being the only arm which unites in itself all the three elementary forces4 ,a further deduction to be drawn is1 that the combination of the three arms leads to a more perfect use of the forces1 by affording the means of strengthening at pleasure either the one or the other of the principles which are united in an unalterable manner in ,infantry4 ,the destructive principle of fire is in the wars of the present time plainly beyond measure the most effective2 nevertheless1 the close combat1 man to man1 is just as plainly to be regarded as the real basis of combat4 ,for that reason1 therefore1 an army of artillery only would be an absurdity in war1 but an army of cavalry is conceivable1 only it would possess very little intensity of force ,an army of infantry alone is not only conceivable but also much the strongest of the three4 ,the three arms1 therefore1 stand in this order in reference to independent value--,infantry1 ,cavalry1 ,artillery4 ,but this order does not hold good if applied to the relative importance of each arm when they are all three acting in conjunction4 ,as the destructive principle is much more effective than the principle of motion1 therefore the complete want of cavalry would weaken an army less than the total want of artillery4 ,an army consisting of infantry and artillery alone1 would certainly find itself in a disagreeable position if opposed to an army composed of all three arms2 but if what it lacked in cavalry was compensated for by a proportionate increase of infantry1 it would still1 by a somewhat different mode of acting1 be able to do very well with its tactical economy4 ,its outpost service would cause some embarrassment2 it would never be able to pursue a beaten enemy with great vivacity1 and it must make a retreat with greater hardships and efforts2 but these inconveniences would still never be sufficient in themselves to drive it completely out of the field4--,on the other hand1 such an army opposed to one composed of infantry and cavalry only would be able to play a very good part1 while it is hardly conceivable that the latter could keep the field at all against an army made up of all three arms4 ,of course these reflections on the relative importance of each single arm result only from a consideration of the generality of events in war1 where one case compensates another2 and therefore it is not our intention to apply the truth thus ascertained to each individual case of a particular combat4 ,a battalion on outpost service or on a retreat may1 perhaps1 choose to have with it a squadron in preference to a couple of guns4 ,a body of cavalry with horse artillery1 sent in rapid pursuit of1 or to cut off1 a flying enemy wants no infantry1 etc41 etc4 ,if we summarise the results of these considerations they amount to this4 #a4 ,that infantry is the most independent of the three arms4 #b4 ,artillery is quite wanting in independence4 #c4 ,infantry is the most important in the combination of the three arms4 #d4 ,cavalry can the most easily be dispensed with4 #e4 ,a combination of the three arms gives the greatest strength4 ,now1 if the combination of the three gives the greatest strength1 it is natural to inquire what is the best absolute proportion of each1 but that is a question which it is almost impossible to answer4 ,if we could form a comparative estimate of the cost of organising in the first instance1 and then provisioning and maintaining each of the three arms1 and then again of the relative amount of service rendered by each in war1 we should obtain a definite result which would give the best proportion in the abstract4 ,but this is little more than a play of the imagination4 ,the very first term in the comparison is difficult to determine1 that is to say1 one of the factors1 the cost in money1 is not difficult to find2 but another1 the value of men's lives1 is a computation which no one would readily try to solve by figures4 ,also the circumstance that each of the three arms chiefly depends on a different element of strength in the state--,infantry on the number of the male population1 cavalry on the number of horses1 artillery on available financial means--introduces into the calculation some heterogeneous conditions1 the overruling influence of which may be plainly observed in the great outlines of the history of different people at various periods4 ,as1 however1 for other reasons we cannot altogether dispense with some standard of comparison1 therefore1 in place of the whole of the first term of the comparison we must take only that one of its factors which can be ascertained1 namely1 the cost in money4 ,now on this point it is sufficient for our purpose to assume that1 in general1 a squadron of #aej horsemen1 a battalion of infantry #hjj strong1 a battery of artillery consisting of #h six-pounders1 cost nearly the same1 both as respects the expense of formation and of maintenance4 ,with regard to the other member of the comparison1 that is1 how much service the one arm is capable of rendering as compared with the others1 it is much less easy to find any distinct quantity4 ,the thing might perhaps be possible if it depended merely on the destroying principle2 but each arm is destined to its own particular use1 therefore has its own particular sphere of action1 which1 again1 is not so distinctly defined that it might not be greater or less through modifications only in the mode of conducting the war1 without causing any decided disadvantage4 ,we are often told of what experience teaches on this subject1 and it is supposed that military history affords the information necessary for a settlement of the question1 but every one must look upon all that as nothing more than a way of talking1 which1 as it is not derived from anything of a primary and necessary nature1 does not deserve attention in an analytical examination4 ,now although a fixed ratio as representing the best proportion between the three arms is conceivable1 but is an x which it is impossible to find1 a mere imaginary quantity1 still it is possible to appreciate the effects of having a great superiority or a great inferiority in one particular arm as compared with the same arm in the enemy's army4 ,artillery increases the destructive principle of fire2 it is the most redoubtable of arms1 and its want1 therefore1 diminishes very considerably the intensive force of an army4 ,on the other hand1 it is the least moveable1 consequently1 makes an army more unwieldy2 further1 it always requires a force for its support1 because it is incapable of close combat2 if it is too numerous1 so that the troops appointed for its protection are not able to resist the attacks of the enemy at every point1 it is often lost1 and from that follows a fresh disadvantage1 because of the three arms it is the only one which in its principal parts1 that is guns and carriages1 the enemy can soon use against us4 ,cavalry increases the principle of mobility in an army4 ,if too few in number the brisk flame of the elements of war is thereby weakened1 because everything must be done slower 7on foot71 everything must be organised with more care2 the rich harvest of victory1 instead of being cut with a scythe1 can only be reaped with a sickle4 ,an excess of cavalry can certainly never be looked upon as a direct diminution of the combatant force1 as an organic disproportion1 but it may certainly be so indirectly1 on account of the difficulty of feeding that arm1 and also if we reflect that instead of a surplus of #aj1jjj horsemen not required we might have #ej1jjj infantry4 ,these peculiarities arising from the preponderance of one arm are the more important to the art of war in its limited sense1 as that art teaches the use of whatever forces are forthcoming2 and when forces are placed under the command of a general1 the proportion of the three arms is also commonly already settled without his having had much voice in the matter4 ,if we would form an idea of the character of warfare modified by the preponderance of one or other of the three arms it is to be done in the following manner3-- ,an excess of artillery leads to a more defensive and passive character in our measures2 our interest will be to seek security in strong positions1 great natural obstacles of ground1 even in mountain positions1 in order that the natural impediments we find in the ground may undertake the defence and protection of our numerous artillery1 and that the enemy's forces may come themselves and seek their own destruction4 ,the whole war will be carried on in a serious formal minuet step4 ,on the other hand1 a want of artillery will make us prefer the offensive1 the active1 the mobile principle2 marching1 fatigue1 exertion1 become our special weapons1 thus the war will become more diversified1 more lively1 rougher2 small change is substituted for great events4 ,with a very numerous cavalry we seek wide plains1 and take to great movements4 ,at a greater distance from the enemy we enjoy more rest and greater conveniences without conferring the same advantages on our adversary4 ,we may venture on bolder measures to outflank him1 and on more daring movements generally1 as we have command over space4 ,in as far as diversions and invasions are true auxiliary means of war we shall be able to make use of them with greater facility4 ,a decided want of cavalry diminishes the force of mobility in an army without increasing its destructive power as an excess of artillery does4 ,prudence and method become then the leading characteristics of the war4 ,always to remain near the enemy in order to keep him constantly in view--no rapid1 still less hurried movements1 everywhere a slow pushing on of well concentrated masses--a preference for the defensive and for broken country1 and1 when the offensive must be resorted to1 the shortest road direct to the centre of force in the enemy's army--these are the natural tendencies or principles in such cases4 ,these different forms which warfare takes according as one or other of the three arms preponderates1 seldom have an influence so complete and decided as alone1 or chiefly to determine the direction of a whole undertaking4 ,whether we shall act strategically on the offensive or defensive1 the choice of a theatre of war1 the determination to fight a great battle1 or adopt some other means of destruction1 are points which must be determined by other and more essential considerations1 at least1 if this is not the case1 it is much to be feared that we have mistaken minor details for the chief consideration4 ,but although this is so1 although the great questions must be decided before on other grounds1 there still always remains a certain margin for the influence of the preponderating arm1 for in the offensive we can always be prudent and methodical1 in the defensive bold and enterprising1 etc41 etc41 through all the different stages and gradations of the military life4 ,on the other hand1 the nature of a war may have a notable influence on the proportions of the three arms4 ,first1 a national war1 kept up by militia and a general levy 7,landsturm71 must naturally bring into the field a very numerous infantry2 for in such wars there is a greater want of the means of equipment than of men1 and as the equipment consequently is confined to what is indisputably necessary1 we may easily imagine1 that for every battery of eight pieces1 not only one1 but two or three battalions might be raised4 ,second1 if a weak state opposed to a powerful one cannot take refuge in a general call of the male population to regular military service1 or in a militia system resembling it1 then the increase of its artillery is certainly the shortest way of bringing up its weak army nearer to an equality with that of the enemy1 for it saves men1 and intensifies the essential principle of military force1 that is1 the destructive principle4 ,any way1 such a state will mostly be confined to a limited theatre1 and therefore this arm will be better suited to it4 ,frederick the ,great adopted this means in the later period of the ,seven ,years' ,war4 ,third1 cavalry is the arm for movement and great decisions2 its increase beyond the ordinary proportions is therefore important if the war extends over a great space1 if expeditions are to be made in various directions1 and great and decisive blows are intended4 ,buonaparte is an example of this4 ,that the offensive and defensive do not properly in themselves exercise an influence on the proportion of cavalry will only appear plainly when we come to speak of these two methods of acting in war2 in the meantime1 we shall only remark that both assailant and defender as a rule traverse the same spaces in war1 and may have also1 at least in many cases1 the same decisive intentions4 ,we remind our readers of the campaign of #ahab4 ,it is commonly believed that1 in the middle ages1 cavalry was much more numerous in proportion to infantry1 and that the difference has been gradually on the decrease ever since4 ,yet this is a mistake1 at least partly4 ,the proportion of cavalry was1 according to numbers1 on the average perhaps1 not much greater2 of this we may convince ourselves by tracing1 through the history of the middle ages1 the detailed statements of the armed forces then employed4 ,let us only think of the masses of men on foot who composed the armies of the ,crusaders1 or the masses who followed the ,emperors of ,germany on their ,roman expeditions4 ,it was in reality the importance of the cavalry which was so much greater in those days2 it was the stronger arm1 composed of the flower of the people1 so much so that1 although always very much weaker actually in numbers1 it was still always looked upon as the chief thing1 infantry was little valued1 hardly spoken of2 hence has arisen the belief that its numbers were few4 ,no doubt it happened oftener than it does now1 that in incursions of small importance in ,france1 ,germany1 and ,italy1 a small army was composed entirely of cavalry2 as it was the chief arm1 there is nothing inconsistent in that2 but these cases decide nothing if we take a general view1 as they are greatly outnumbered by cases of greater armies of the period constituted differently4 ,it was only when the obligations to military service imposed by the feudal laws had ceased1 and wars were carried on by soldiers enlisted1 hired1 and paid--when1 therefore1 wars depended on money and enlistment1 that is1 at the time of the ,thirty ,years' ,war1 and the wars of ,louis ,,xiv4--that this employment of great masses of almost useless infantry was checked1 and perhaps in those days they might have fallen into the exclusive use of cavalry1 if infantry had not just then risen in importance through the improvements in fire-arms1 by which means it maintained its numerical superiority in proportion to cavalry2 at this period1 if infantry was weak1 the proportion was as one to one1 if numerous as three to one4 ,since then cavalry has always decreased in importance according as improvements in the use of fire-arms have advanced4 ,this is intelligible enough in itself1 but the improvement we speak of does not relate solely to the weapon itself and the skill in handling it2 we advert also to greater ability in using troops armed with this weapon4 ,at the battle of ,mollwitz the ,prussian army had brought the fire of their infantry to such a state of perfection1 that there has been no improvement since then in that sense4 ,on the other hand1 the use of infantry in broken ground and as skirmishers has been introduced more recently1 and is to be looked upon as a very great advance in the art of destruction4 ,our opinion is1 therefore1 that the relation of cavalry has not much changed as far as regards numbers1 but as regards its importance1 there has been a great alteration4 ,this seems to be a contradiction1 but is not so in reality4 ,the infantry of the middle ages1 although forming the greater proportion of an army1 did not attain to that proportion by its value as compared to cavalry1 but because all that could not be appointed to the very costly cavalry were handed over to the infantry2 this infantry was1 therefore1 merely a last resource2 and if the number of cavalry had depended merely on the value set on that arm1 it could never have been too great4 ,thus we can understand how cavalry1 in spite of its constantly decreasing importance1 may still1 perhaps1 have importance enough to keep its numerical relation at that point which it has hitherto so constantly maintained4 ,it is a remarkable fact that1 at least since the wars of the ,austrian succession1 the proportion of cavalry to infantry has changed very little1 the variation being constantly between a fourth1 a fifth or a sixth2 this seems to indicate that those proportions meet the natural requirements of an army1 and that these numbers give the solution which it is impossible to find in a direct manner4 ,we doubt1 however1 if this is the case1 and we find the principal instances of the employment of a numerous cavalry sufficiently accounted for by other causes4 ,austria and ,russia are states which have kept up a numerous cavalry1 because they retain in their political condition the fragments of a ,tartar organisation4 ,buonaparte for his purposes could never be strong enough in cavalry2 when he had made use of the conscription as far as possible1 he had no ways of strengthening his armies1 but by increasing the auxiliary arms1 as they cost him more in money than in men4 ,besides this1 it stands to reason that in military enterprises of such enormous extent as his1 cavalry must have a greater value than in ordinary cases4 ,frederick the ,great it is well known reckoned carefully every recruit that could be saved to his country2 it was his great business to keep up the strength of his army1 as far as possible at the expense of other countries4 ,his reasons for this are easy to conceive1 if we remember that his small dominions did not then include ,prussia and the ,westphalian provinces4 ,cavalry was kept complete by recruitment more easily than infantry1 irrespective of fewer men being required2 in addition to which1 his system of war was completely founded on the mobility of his army1 and thus it was1 that while his infantry diminished in number1 his cavalry was always increasing itself till the end of the ,seven ,years' ,war4 ,still at the end of that war it was hardly more than a fourth of the number of infantry that he had in the field4 ,at the period referred to there is no want of instances1 also of armies entering the field unusually weak in cavalry1 and yet carrying off the victory4 ,the most remarkable is the battle of ,gross-gorschen4 ,if we only count the ,french divisions which took part in the battle1 ,buonaparte was #ajj1jjj strong1 of which #e1jjj were cavalry1 #ij1jjj infantry2 the ,allies had #gj1jjj1 of which #be1jjj were cavalry and #dj1jjj infantry4 ,thus1 in place of the #bj1jjj cavalry on the side of the ,allies in excess of the total of the ,french cavalry1 ,buonaparte had only #ej1jjj additional infantry when he ought to have had #ajj1jjj4 ,as he gained the battle with that superiority in infantry1 we may ask whether it was at all likely that he would have lost it if the proportions had been #adj1jjj to #dj1jjj4 ,certainly the great advantage of our superiority in cavalry was shown immediately after the battle1 for ,buonaparte gained hardly any trophies by his victory4 ,the gain of a battle is therefore not everything1--but is it not always the chief thing8 ,if we put together these considerations1 we can hardly believe that the numerical proportion between cavalry and infantry which has existed for the last eighty years is the natural one1 founded solely on their absolute value2 we are much rather inclined to think1 that after many fluctuations1 the relative proportions of these arms will change further in the same direction as hitherto1 and that the fixed number of cavalry at last will be considerably less4 ,with respect to artillery1 the number of guns has naturally increased since its first invention1 and according as it has been made lighter and otherwise improved2 still since the time of ,frederick the ,great1 it has also kept very much to the same proportion of two or three guns per #a1jjj men1 we mean at the commencement of a campaign2 for during its course artillery does not melt away as fast as infantry1 therefore at the end of a campaign the proportion is generally notably greater1 perhaps three1 four1 or five guns per #a1jjj men4 ,whether this is the natural proportion1 or that the increase of artillery may be carried still further1 without prejudice to the whole conduct of war1 must be left for experience to decide4 ,the principal results we obtain from the whole of these considerations1 are-- #a4 ,that infantry is the chief arm1 to which the other two are subordinate4 #b4 ,that by the exercise of great skill and energy in command1 the want of the two subordinate arms may in some measure be compensated for1 provided that we are much stronger in infantry2 and the better the infantry the easier this may be done4 #c4 ,that it is more difficult to dispense with artillery than with cavalry1 because it is the chief principle of destruction1 and its mode of fighting is more amalgamated with that of infantry4 #d4 ,that artillery being the strongest arm1 as regards destructive action1 and cavalry the weakest in that respect1 the question must in general arise1 how much artillery can we have without inconvenience1 and what is the least proportion of cavalry we require8 ,,chapter ,v4 ,order of ,battle of an ,army ,the order of battle is that division and formation of the different arms into separate parts or sections of the whole ,army1 and that form of general position or disposition of those parts which is to be the norm throughout the whole campaign or war4 ,it consists1 therefore1 in a certain measure1 of an arithmetical and a geometrical element1 the division and the form of disposition4 ,the first proceeds from the permanent peace organisation of the army2 adopts as units certain parts1 such as battalions1 squadrons1 and batteries1 and with them forms units of a higher order up to the highest of all1 the whole army1 according to the requirements of predominating circumstances4 ,in like manner1 the form of disposition comes from the elementary tactics1 in which the army is instructed and exercised in time of peace1 which must be looked upon as a property in the troops that cannot be essentially modified at the moment war breaks out1 the disposition connects these tactics with the conditions which the use of the troops in war and in large masses demands1 and thus it settles in a general way the rule or norm in conformity with which the troops are to be drawn up for battle4 ,this has been invariably the case when great armies have taken the field1 and there have been times when this form was considered as the most essential part of the battle4 ,in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 when the improvements in the firearms of infantry occasioned a great increase of that arm1 and allowed of its being deployed in such long thin lines1 the order of battle was thereby simplified1 but1 at the same time it became more difficult and more artificial in the carrying out1 and as no other way of disposing of cavalry at the commencement of a battle was known but that of posting them on the wings1 where they were out of the fire and had room to move1 therefore in the order of battle the army always became a closed inseparable whole4 ,if such an army was divided in the middle1 it was like an earthworm cut in two3 the wings had still life and the power of motion1 but they had lost their natural functions4 ,the army lay1 therefore1 in a manner under a spell of unity1 and whenever any parts of it had to be placed in a separate position1 a small organisation and disorganisation became necessary4 ,the marches which the whole army had to make were a condition in which1 to a certain extent1 it found itself out of rule4 ,if the enemy was at hand1 the march had to be arranged in the most artificial manner1 and in order that one line or one wing might be always at the prescribed distance from the other1 the troops had to scramble over everything3 marches had also constantly to be stolen from the enemy1 and this perpetual theft only escaped severe punishment through one circumstance1 which was1 that the enemy lay under the same ban4 ,hence1 when1 in the latter half of the eighteenth century1 it was discovered that cavalry would serve just as well to protect a wing if it stood in rear of the army as if it were placed on the prolongation of the line1 and that1 besides this1 it might be applied to other purposes than merely fighting a duel with the enemy's cavalry1 a great step in advance was made1 because now the army in its principal extension or front1 which is always the breadth of its order of battle 7position71 consisted entirely of homogeneous members1 so that it could be formed of any number of parts at pleasure1 each part like another and like the whole4 ,in this way it ceased to be one single piece and became an articulated whole1 consequently pliable and manageable3 the parts might be separated from the whole and then joined on again without difficulty1 the order of battle always remained the same4--,thus arose the corps consisting of all arms1 that is1 thus such an organisation became possible1 for the want of it had been felt long before4 ,that all this relates to the combat is very natural4 ,the battle was formerly the whole war1 and will always continue to be the principal part of it2 but1 the order of battle belongs generally more to tactics than strategy1 and it is only introduced here to show how tactics in organising the whole into smaller wholes made preparations for strategy4 ,the greater armies become1 the more they are distributed over wide spaces and the more diversified the action and reaction of the different parts amongst themselves1 the wider becomes the field of strategy1 and1 therefore1 then the order of battle1 in the sense of our definition1 must also come into a kind of reciprocal action with strategy1 which manifests itself chiefly at the extreme points where tactics and strategy meet1 that is1 at those moments when the general distribution of the combatant forces passes into the special dispositions for the combat4 ,we now turn to those three points1 the division1 combination of arms1 and order of battle 7disposition7 in a strategic point of view4 #a4--;,division4 ,in strategy we must never ask what is to be the strength of a division or a corps1 but how many corps or division an army should have4 ,there is nothing more unmanageable than an army divided into three parts1 except it be one divided into only two1 in which case the chief command must be almost neutralised4 ,to fix the strength of great and small corps1 either on the grounds of elementary tactics or on higher grounds1 leaves an incredibly wide field for arbitrary judgment1 and heaven knows what strange modes of reasoning have sported in this wide field4 ,on the other hand1 the necessity of forming an independent whole 7army7 into a certain number of parts is a thing as obvious as it is positive1 and this idea furnishes real strategic motives for determining the number of the greater divisions of an army1 consequently their strength1 whilst the strength of the smaller divisions1 such as companies1 battalions1 etc41 is left to be determined by tactics4 ,we can hardly imagine the smallest independent body in which there are not at least three parts to be distinguished1 that one part may be thrown out in advance1 and another part be left in rear3 that four is still more convenient follows of itself1 if we keep in view that the middle part1 being the principal division1 ought to be stronger than either of the others2 in this way1 we may proceed to make out eight1 which appears to us to be the most suitable number for an army if we take one part for an advanced guard as a constant necessity1 three for the main body1 that is a right wing1 centre and left wing1 two divisions for reserve1 and one to detach to the right1 one to the left4 ,without pedantically ascribing a great importance to these numbers and figures1 we certainly believe that they represent the most usual and frequently recurring strategic disposition1 and on that account one that is convenient4 ,certainly it seems that the supreme direction of an army 7and the direction of every whole7 must be greatly facilitated if there are only three or four subordinates to command1 but the commander-in-chief must pay dearly for this convenience in a twofold manner4 ,in the first place1 an order loses in rapidity1 force1 and exactness if the gradation ladder down which it has to descend is long1 and this must be the case if there are corps-commanders between the division leaders and the chief2 secondly1 the chief loses generally in his own proper power and efficiency the wider the spheres of action of his immediate subordinates become4 ,a general commanding #ajj1jjj men in eight divisions exercises a power which is greater in intensity than if the #ajj1jjj men were divided into only three corps4 ,there are many reasons for this1 but the most important is that each commander looks upon himself as having a kind of proprietary right in his own corps1 and always opposes the withdrawal from him of any portion of it for a longer or shorter time4 ,a little experience of war will make this evident to any one4 ,but on the other hand the number of divisions must not be too great1 otherwise disorder will ensue4 ,it is difficult enough to manage eight divisions from one head quarter1 and the number should never be allowed to exceed ten4 ,but in a division in which the means of circulating orders are much less1 the smaller normal number four1 or at most five1 may be regarded as the more suitable4 ,if these factors1 five and ten1 will not answer1 that is1 if the brigades are too strong1 then corps d'arme must be introduced2 but we must remember that by so doing1 a new power is created1 which at once very much lowers all other factors4 ,but now1 what is too strong a brigade8 ,the custom is to make them from #b1jjj to #e1jjj men strong1 and there appear to be two reasons for making the latter number the limit2 the first is that a brigade is supposed to be a subdivision which can be commanded by one man directly1 that is1 through the compass of his voice3 the second is that any larger body of infantry should not be left without artillery1 and through this first combination of arms a special division of itself is formed4 ,we do not wish to involve ourselves in these tactical subtilties1 neither shall we enter upon the disputed point1 where and in what proportions the combination of all three arms should take place1 whether with divisions of #h1jjj to #ab1jjj men1 or with corps which are #bj1jjj to #cj1jjj men strong4 ,the most decided opponent of these combinations will scarcely take exception at the mere assertion1 that nothing but this combination of the three arms can make a division independent1 and that therefore1 for such as are intended to be frequently detached separately1 it is at least very desirable4 ,an army of #bjj1jjj men in ten divisions1 the divisions composed of five brigades each1 would give brigades #d1jjj strong4 ,we see here no disproportion4 ,certainly this army might also be divided into five corps1 the corps into four divisions1 and the division into four brigades1 which makes the brigade #b1ejj men strong2 but the first distribution1 looked at in the abstract1 appears to us preferable1 for besides that1 in the other1 there is one more gradation of rank1 five parts are too few to make an army manageable2 four divisions1 in like manner1 are too few for a corps1 and #b1ejj men is a weak brigade1 of which1 in this manner1 there are eighty1 whereas the first formation has only fifty1 and is therefore simpler4 ,all these advantages are given up merely for the sake of having only to send orders to half as many generals4 ,of course the distribution into corps is still more unsuitable for smaller armies4 ,this is the abstract view of the case4 ,the particular case may present good reasons for deciding otherwise4 ,likewise1 we must admit that1 although eight or ten divisions may be directed when united in a level country1 in widely extended mountain positions the thing might perhaps be impossible4 ,a great river which divides an army into halves1 makes a commander for each half indispensable2 in short1 there are a hundred local and particular objects of the most decisive character1 before which all rules must give way4 ,but still1 experience teaches us1 that these abstract grounds come most frequently into use and are seldomer overruled by others than we should perhaps suppose4 ,we wish further to explain clearly the scope of the foregoing considerations by a simple outline1 for which purpose we now place the different points of most importance next to each other4 ,as we mean by the term numbers1 or parts of a whole1 only those which are made by the primary1 therefore the immediate division1 we say4 #a4 ,if a whole has too few members it is unwieldy4 #b4 ,if the parts of a whole body are too large1 the power of the superior will is thereby weakened4 #c4 ,with every additional step through which an order has to pass1 it is weakened in two ways3 in one way by the loss of force1 which it suffers in its passage through an additional step2 in another way by the longer time in its transmission4 ,the tendency of all this is to show that the number of co-ordinate divisions should be as great1 and the gradational steps as few as possible2 and the only limitation to this conclusion is1 that in armies no more than from eight to ten1 and in subordinate corps no more than from four or at most six1 subdivisions can be conveniently directed4 #b4--;,combination of ,arms4 ,for strategy the combination of the three arms in the order of battle is only important in regard to those parts of the army which1 according to the usual order of things1 are likely to be frequently employed in a detached position1 where they may be obliged to engage in an independent combat4 ,now it is in the nature of things1 that the members of the first class1 and for the most part only these1 are destined for detached positions1 because1 as we shall see elsewhere1 detached positions are most generally adopted upon the supposition and the necessity of a body independent in itself4 ,in a strict sense strategy would therefore only require a permanent combination of arms in army corps1 or where these do not exist1 in divisions1 leaving it to circumstances to determine when a provisional combination of the three arms shall be made in subdivisions of an inferior order4 ,but it is easy to see that1 when corps are of considerable size1 such as #cj1jjj or #dj1jjj men1 they can seldom find themselves in a situation to take up a completely connected position in mass4 ,with corps of such strength1 a combination of the arms in the divisions is therefore necessary4 ,no one who has had any experience in war1 will treat lightly the delay which occurs when pressing messages have to be sent to some other perhaps distant point before cavalry can be brought to the support of infantry--to say nothing of the confusion which takes place4 ,the details of the combination of the three arms1 how far it should extend1 how low down it should be carried1 what proportions should be observed1 the strength of the reserves of each to be set apart--these are all purely tactical considerations4 #c4--,the ,disposition4 ,the determination as to the relations in space1 according to which the parts of an army amongst themselves are to be drawn up in order of battle1 is likewise completely a tactical subject1 referring solely to the battle4 ,no doubt there is also a strategic disposition of the parts2 but it depends almost entirely on determinations and requirements of the moment1 and what there is in it of the rational1 does not come within the meaning of the term 8order of battle40 ,we shall therefore treat of it in the following chapter under the head of ,disposition of an ,army4 ,the order of battle of an army is therefore the organisation and disposition of it in mass ready prepared for battle4 ,its parts are united in such a manner that both the tactical and strategical requirements of the moment can be easily satisfied by the employment of single parts drawn from the general mass4 ,when such momentary exigency has passed over1 these parts resume their original place1 and thus the order of battle becomes the first step to1 and principal foundation of1 that wholesome methodicism which1 like the beat of a pendulum1 regulates the work in war1 and of which we have already spoken in the fourth chapter of the ,second ,book4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,general ,disposition of an ,army ,between the moment of the first assembling of military forces1 and that of the solution arrived at maturity when strategy has brought the army to the decisive point1 and each particular part has had its position and rle pointed out by tactics1 there is in most cases a long interval2 it is the same between one decisive catastrophe and another4 ,formerly these intervals in a certain measure did not belong to war at all4 ,take for example the manner in which ,luxemburg encamped and marched4 ,we single out this general because he is celebrated for his camps and marches1 and therefore may be considered a representative general of his period1 and from the ,histoire de la ,flandre militaire1 we know more about him than about other generals of the time4 ,the camp was regularly pitched with its rear close to a river1 or morass1 or a deep valley1 which in the present day would be considered madness4 ,the direction in which the enemy lay had so little to do with determining the front of the army1 that cases are very common in which the rear was towards the enemy and the front towards their own country4 ,this now unheard of mode of proceeding is perfectly unintelligible1 unless we suppose that in the choice of camps the convenience of the troops was the chief1 indeed almost the only consideration1 and therefore look upon the state of being in camp as a state outside of the action of war1 a kind of withdrawal behind the scenes1 where one is quite at ease4 ,the practice of always resting the rear upon some obstacle may be reckoned the only measure of security which was then taken1 of course1 in the sense of the mode of conducting war in that day1 for such a measure was quite inconsistent with the possibility of being compelled to fight in that position4 ,but there was little reason for apprehension on that score1 because the battles generally depended on a kind of mutual understanding1 like a duel1 in which the parties repair to a convenient rendezvous4 ,as armies1 partly on account of their numerous cavalry1 which in the decline of its splendour was still regarded1 particularly by the ,french1 as the principal arm1 partly on account of the unwieldy organisation of their order of battle1 could not fight in every description of country1 an army in a close broken country was as it were under the protection of a neutral territory1 and as it could itself make but little use of broken ground1 therefore1 it was deemed preferable to go to meet an enemy seeking battle4 ,we know1 indeed1 that ,luxemburg's battles at ,fleurus1 ,stienkirk1 and ,neerwinden1 were conceived in a different spirit2 but this spirit had only just then under this great general freed itself from the old method1 and it had not yet reacted on the method of encampment4 ,alterations in the art of war originate always in matters of a decisive nature1 and then lead by degrees to modifications in other things4 ,the expression il va la guerre1 used in reference to a partizan setting out to watch the enemy1 shows how little the state of an army in camp was considered to be a state of real warfare4 ,it was not much otherwise with the marches1 for the artillery then separated itself completely from the rest of the army1 in order to take advantage of better and more secure roads1 and the cavalry on the wings generally took the right alternately1 that each might have in turn its share of the honour of marching on the right4 ,at present 7that is1 chiefly since the ,silesian wars7 the situation out of battle is so thoroughly influenced by its connection with battle that the two states are in intimate correlation1 and the one can no longer be completely imagined without the other4 ,formerly in a campaign the battle was the real weapon1 the situation at other times only the handle--the former the steel blade1 the other the wooden haft glued to it1 the whole therefore composed of heterogeneous parts1--now the battle is the edge1 the situation out of the battle the back of the blade1 the whole to be looked upon as metal completely welded together1 in which it is impossible any longer to distinguish where the steel ends and the iron begins4 ,this state in war outside of the battle is now partly regulated by the organisation and regulations with which the army comes prepared from a state of peace1 partly by the tactical and strategic arrangements of the moment4 ,the three situations in which an army may be placed are in quarters1 on a march1 or in camp4 ,all three belong as much to tactics as to strategy1 and these two branches1 bordering on each other here in many ways1 often seem to1 or actually do1 incorporate themselves with each other1 so that many dispositions may be looked upon at the same time as both tactical and strategic4 ,we shall treat of these three situations of an army outside of the combat in a general way1 before any special objects come into connection with them2 but we must1 first of all1 consider the general disposition of the forces1 because that is a superior and more comprehensive measure1 determining as respects camps1 cantonments1 and marches4 ,if we look at the disposition of the forces in a general way1 that is1 leaving out of sight any special object1 we can only imagine it as a unit1 that is1 as a whole1 intended to fight all together1 for any deviation from this simplest form would imply a special object4 ,thus arises1 therefore1 the conception of an army1 let it be small or large4 ,further1 when there is an absence of any special end1 there only remains as the sole object the preservation of the army itself1 which of course includes its security4 ,that the army shall be able to exist without inconvenience1 and that it shall be able to concentrate without difficulty for the purpose of fighting1 are1 therefore1 the two requisite conditions4 ,from these result1 as desirable1 the following points more immediately applying to subjects concerning the existence and security of the army4 #a4 ,facility of subsistence4 #b4 ,facility of providing shelter for the troops4 #c4 ,security of the rear4 #d4 ,an open country in front4 #e4 ,the position itself in a broken country4 #f4 ,strategic points d'appui4 #g4 ,a suitable distribution of the troops4 ,our elucidation of these several points is as follows3 ,the first two lead us to seek out cultivated districts1 and great towns and roads4 ,they determine measures in general rather than in particular4 ,in the chapter on lines of communication will be found what we mean by security of the rear4 ,the first and most important point in this respect is that the centre of the position should be at a right angle with the principal line of retreat adjoining the position4 ,respecting the fourth point1 an army certainly cannot look over an expanse of country in its front as it overlooks the space directly before it when in a tactical position for battle4 ,but the strategic eyes are the advanced guard1 scouts and patrols sent forward1 spies1 etc41 etc41 and the service will naturally be easier for these in an open than in an intersected country4 ,the fifth point is merely the reverse of the fourth4 ,strategical points d'appui differ from tactical in these two respects1 that the army need not be in immediate contact with them1 and that1 on the other hand1 they must be of greater extent4 ,the cause of this is that1 according to the nature of the thing1 the relations to time and space in which strategy moves are generally on a greater scale than those of tactics4 ,if1 therefore1 an army posts itself at a distance of a mile from the sea coast or the banks of a great river1 it leans strategically on these obstacles1 for the enemy cannot make use of such a space as this to effect a strategic turning movement4 ,within its narrow limits he cannot adventure on marches miles in length1 occupying days and weeks4 ,on the other hand1 in strategy1 a lake of several miles in circumference is hardly to be looked upon as an obstacle2 in its proceedings1 a few miles to the right or left are not of much consequence4 ,fortresses will become strategic points d'appui1 according as they are large1 and afford a wide sphere of action for offensive combinations4 ,the disposition of the army in separate masses may be done with a view either to special objects and requirements1 or to those of a general nature2 here we can only speak of the latter4 ,the first general necessity is to push forward the advanced guard and the other troops required to watch the enemy4 ,the second is that1 with very large armies1 the reserves are usually placed several miles in rear1 and consequently occupy a separate position4 ,lastly1 the covering of both wings of an army usually requires a separate disposition of particular corps4 ,by this covering it is not at all meant that a portion of the army is to be detached to defend the space round its wings1 in order to prevent the enemy from approaching these weak points1 as they are called3 who would then defend the wings of these flanking corps8 ,this kind of idea1 which is so common1 is complete nonsense4 ,the wings of an army are in themselves not weak points of an army for this reason1 that the enemy also has wings1 and cannot menace ours without placing his own in jeopardy4 ,it is only if circumstances are unequal1 if the enemy's army is larger than ours1 if his lines of communication are more secure 7see ,lines of ,communication71 it is only then that the wings become weak parts2 but of these special cases we are not now speaking1 therefore1 neither of a case in which a flanking corps is appointed in connection with other combinations to defend effectually the space on our wings1 for that no longer belongs to the category of general dispositions4 ,but although the wings are not particularly weak parts still they are particularly important1 because here1 on account of flanking movements the defence is not so simple as in front1 measures are more complicated and require more time and preparation4 ,for this reason it is necessary in the majority of cases to protect the wings specially against unforeseen enterprises on the part of the enemy1 and this is done by placing stronger masses on the wings than would be required for mere purposes of observation4 ,to press heavily these masses1 even if they oppose no very serious resistance1 more time is required1 and the stronger they are the more the enemy must develop his forces and his intentions1 and by that means the object of the measure is attained2 what is to be done further depends on the particular plans of the moment4 ,we may therefore regard corps placed on the wings as lateral advanced guards1 intended to retard the advance of the enemy through the space beyond our wings and give us time to make dispositions to counteract his movement4 ,if these corps are to fall back on the main body and the latter is not to make a backward movement at the same time1 then it follows of itself that they must not be in the same line with the front of the main body1 but thrown out somewhat forwards1 because when a retreat is to be made1 even without being preceded by a serious engagement1 they should not retreat directly on the side of the position4 ,from these reasons of a subjective nature1 as they relate to the inner organisation of an army1 there arises a natural system of disposition1 composed of four or five parts according as the reserve remains with the main body or not4 ,as the subsistence and shelter of the troops partly decide the choice of a position in general1 so also they contribute to a disposition in separate divisions4 ,the attention which they demand comes into consideration along with the other considerations above mentioned2 and we seek to satisfy the one without prejudice to the other4 ,in most cases1 by the division of an army into five separate corps1 the difficulties of subsistence and quartering will be overcome1 and no great alteration will afterwards be required on their account4 ,we have still to cast a glance at the distances at which these separated corps may be allowed to be placed1 if we are to retain in view the advantage of mutual support1 and1 therefore1 of concentrating for battle4 ,on this subject we remind our readers of what is said in the chapters on the duration and decision of the combat1 according to which no absolute distance1 but only the most general1 as it were1 average rules can be given1 because absolute and relative strength of arms and country have a great influence4 ,the distance of the advanced guard is the easiest to fix1 as in retreating it falls back on the main body of the army1 and1 therefore1 may be at all events at a distance of a long day's march without incurring the risk of being obliged to fight an independent battle4 ,but it should not be sent further in advance than the security of the army requires1 because the further it has to fall back the more it suffers4 ,respecting corps on the flanks1 as we have already said1 the combat of an ordinary division of #hjjj to #aj1jjj men usually lasts for several hours1 even for half a day before it is decided2 on that account1 therefore1 there need be no hesitation in placing such a division at a distance of some leagues or one or two miles1 and for the same reason1 corps of three or four divisions may be detached a day's march or a distance of three or four miles4 ,from this natural and general disposition of the main body1 in four or five divisions at particular distances1 a certain method has arisen of dividing an army in a mechanical manner whenever there are no strong special reasons against this ordinary method4 ,but although we assume that each of these distinct parts of an army shall be competent to undertake an independent combat1 and it may be obliged to engage in one1 it does not therefore by any means follow that the real object of fractioning an army is that the parts should fight separately2 the necessity for this distribution of the army is mostly only a condition of existence imposed by time4 ,if the enemy approaches our position to try the fate of a general action1 the strategic period is over1 everything concentrates itself into the one moment of the battle1 and therewith terminates and vanishes the object of the distribution of the army4 ,as soon as the battle commences1 considerations about quarters and subsistence are suspended2 the observation of the enemy before our front and on our flanks has fulfilled the purpose of checking his advance by a partial resistance1 and now all resolves itself into the one great unit--the great battle4 ,the best criterion of skill in the disposition of an army lies in the proof that the distribution has been considered merely as a condition1 as a necessary evil1 but that united action in battle has been considered the object of the disposition4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,advanced ,guard and ,out-,posts ,these two bodies belong to that class of subjects into which both the tactical and strategic threads run simultaneously4 ,on the one hand we must reckon them amongst those provisions which give form to the battle and ensure the execution of tactical plans2 on the other hand1 they frequently lead to independent combats1 and on account of their position1 more or less distant from the main body1 they are to be regarded as links in the strategic chain1 and it is this very feature which obliges us to supplement the preceding chapter by devoting a few moments to their consideration4 ,every body of troops1 when not completely in readiness for battle1 requires an advanced guard to learn the approach of the enemy1 and to gain further particulars respecting his force before he comes in sight1 for the range of vision1 as a rule1 does not go much beyond the range of firearms4 ,but what sort of man would he be who could not see farther than his arms can reach6 ,the foreposts are the eyes of the army1 as we have already said4 ,the want of them1 however1 is not always equally great2 it has its degrees4 ,the strength of armies and the extent of ground they cover1 time1 place1 contingencies1 the method of making war1 even chance1 are all points which have an influence in the matter2 and1 therefore1 we cannot wonder that military history1 instead of furnishing any definite and simple outlines of the method of using advanced guards and outposts1 only presents the subject in a kind of chaos of examples of the most diversified nature4 ,sometimes we see the security of an army intrusted to a corps regularly appointed to the duty of advanced guard2 at another time a long line of separate outposts2 sometimes both these arrangements co-exist1 sometimes neither one nor the other2 at one time there is only one advanced guard in common for the whole of the advancing columns2 at another time1 each column has its own advanced guard4 ,we shall endeavour to get a clear idea of what the subject really is1 and then see whether we can arrive at some principles capable of application4 ,if the troops are on the march1 a detachment of more or less strength forms its van or advanced guard1 and in case of the movement of the army being reversed1 this same detachment will form the rearguard4 ,if the troops are in cantonments or camp1 an extended line of weak posts1 forms the vanguard1 the outposts4 ,it is essentially in the nature of things1 that1 when the army is halted1 a greater extent of space can and must be watched than when the army is in motion1 and therefore in the one case the conception of a chain of posts1 in the other that of a concentrated corps arises of itself4 ,the actual strength of an advanced guard1 as well as of outposts1 ranges from a considerable corps1 composed of an organisation of all three arms1 to a regiment of hussars1 and from a strongly entrenched defensive line1 occupied by portions of troops from each arm of the service1 to mere outlying pickets1 and their supports detached from the camp4 ,the services assigned to such vanguards range also from those of mere observation to an offer of opposition or resistance to the enemy1 and this opposition may not only be to give the main body of the army the time which it requires to prepare for battle1 but also to make the enemy develop his plans1 and intentions1 which consequently makes the observation far more important4 ,according as more or less time is required to be gained1 according as the opposition to be offered is calculated upon and intended to meet the special measures of the enemy1 so accordingly must the strength of the advanced guard and outposts be proportioned4 ,frederick the ,great1 a general above all others ever ready for battle1 and who almost directed his army in battle by word of command1 never required strong outposts4 ,we see him therefore constantly encamping close under the eyes of the enemy1 without any great apparatus of outposts1 relying for his security1 at one place on a hussar regiment1 at another on a light battalion1 or perhaps on the pickets1 and supports furnished from the camp4 ,on the march1 a few thousand horse1 generally furnished by the cavalry on the flanks of the first line1 formed his advanced guard1 and at the end of the march rejoined the main body4 ,he very seldom had any corps permanently employed as advanced guard4 ,when it is the intention of a small army1 by using the whole weight of its mass with great vigour and activity1 to make the enemy feel the effect of its superior discipline and the greater resolution of its commander1 then almost every thing must be done sous la barbe de l'ennemi1 in the same way as ,frederick the ,great did when opposed to ,daun4 ,a system of holding back from the enemy1 and a very formal1 and extensive system of outposts would neutralise all the advantages of the above kind of superiority4 ,the circumstance that an error of another kind1 and the carrying out ,frederick's system too far1 may lead to a battle of ,hochkirch1 is no argument against this method of acting2 we should rather say1 that as there was only one battle of ,hochkirch in all the ,silesian war1 we ought to recognise in this system a proof of the ,king's consummate ability4 ,napoleon1 however1 who commanded an army not deficient in discipline and firmness1 and who did not want for resolution himself1 never moved without a strong advanced guard4 ,there are two reasons for this4 ,the first is to be found in the alteration in tactics4 ,a whole army is no longer led into battle as one body by mere word of command1 to settle the affair like a great duel by more or less skill and bravery2 the combatants on each side now range their forces more to suit the peculiarities of the ground and circumstances1 so that the order of battle1 and consequently the battle itself1 is a whole made up of many parts1 from which there follows1 that the simple determination to fight becomes a regularly formed plan1 and the word of command a more or less long preparatory arrangement4 ,for this time and data are required4 ,the second cause lies in the great size of modern armies4 ,frederick brought thirty or forty thousand men into battle2 ,napoleon from one to two hundred thousand4 ,we have selected these examples because every one will admit1 that two such generals would never have adopted any systematic mode of proceeding without some good reason4 ,upon the whole1 there has been a general improvement in the use of advanced guards and outposts in modern wars2 not that every one acted as ,frederick1 even in the ,silesian wars1 for at that time the ,austrians had a system of strong outposts1 and frequently sent forward a corps as advanced guard1 for which they had sufficient reason from the situation in which they were placed4 ,just in the same way we find differences enough in the mode of carrying on war in more modern times4 ,even the ,french ,marshals ,macdonald in ,silesia1 ,oudinot and ,ney in the ,mark 7,brandenburg71 advanced with armies of sixty or seventy thousand men1 without our reading of their having had any advanced guard4--,we have hitherto been discussing advanced guards and outposts in relation to their numerical strength2 but there is another difference which we must settle4 ,it is that1 when an army advances or retires on a certain breadth of ground1 it may have a van and rear guard in common for all the columns which are marching side by side1 or each column may have one for itself4 ,in order to form a clear idea on this subject1 we must look at it in this way4 ,the fundamental conception of an advanced guard1 when a corps is so specially designated1 is that its mission is the security of the main body or centre of the army4 ,if this main body is marching upon several contiguous roads so close together that they can also easily serve for the advanced guard1 and therefore be covered by it1 then the flank columns naturally require no special covering4 ,but those corps which are moving at great distances1 in reality as detached corps1 must provide their own van-guards4 ,the same applies also to any of those corps which belong to the central mass1 and owing to the direction that the roads may happen to take1 are too far from the centre column4 ,therefore there will be as many advanced guards1 as there are columns virtually separated from each other2 if each of these advanced guards is much weaker than one general one would be1 then they fall more into the class of other tactical dispositions1 and there is no advanced guard in the strategic tableau4 ,but if the main body or centre has a much larger corps for its advanced guard1 then that corps will appear as the advanced guard of the whole1 and will be so in many respects4 ,but what can be the reason for giving the centre a van-guard so much stronger than the wings8 ,the following three reasons4 #a4 ,because the mass of troops composing the centre is usually much more considerable4 #b4 ,because plainly the central point of a strip of country along which the front of an army is extended must always be the most important point1 as all the combinations of the campaign relate mostly to it1 and therefore the field of battle is also usually nearer to it than to the wings4 #c4 ,because1 although a corps thrown forward in front of the centre does not directly protect the wings as a real vanguard1 it still contributes greatly to their security indirectly4 ,for instance1 the enemy cannot in ordinary cases pass by such a corps within a certain distance in order to effect any enterprise of importance against one of the wings1 because he has to fear an attack in flank and rear4 ,even if this check which a corps thrown forward in the centre imposes on the enemy is not sufficient to constitute complete security for the wings1 it is at all events sufficient to relieve the flanks from all apprehension in a great many cases4 ,the van-guard of the centre1 if much stronger than that of a wing1 that is to say1 if it consists of a special corps as advanced guard1 has then not merely the mission of a van-guard intended to protect the troops in its rear from sudden surprise2 it also operates in more general strategic relations as an army corps thrown forward in advance4 ,the following are the purposes for which such a corps may be used1 and therefore those which determine its duties in practice4 #a4 ,to insure a stouter resistance1 and make the enemy advance with more caution2 consequently to do the duties of a van-guard on a greater scale1 whenever our arrangements are such as to require time before they can be carried into effect4 #b4 ,if the central mass of the army is very large1 to be able to keep this unwieldy body at some distance from the enemy1 while we still remain close to him with a more moveable body of troops4 #c4 ,that we may have a corps of observation close to the enemy1 if there are any other reasons which require us to keep the principal mass of the army at a considerable distance4 ,the idea that weaker look-out posts1 mere partisan corps1 might answer just as well for this observation is set aside at once if we reflect how easily a weak corps might be dispersed1 and how very limited also are its means of observation as compared with those of a considerable corps4 #d4 ,in the pursuit of the enemy4 ,a single corps as advanced guard1 with the greater part of the cavalry attached to it1 can move quicker1 arriving later at its bivouac1 and moving earlier in the morning than the whole mass4 #e4 ,lastly1 on a retreat1 as rearguard1 to be used in defending the principal natural obstacles of ground4 ,in this respect also the centre is exceedingly important4 ,at first sight it certainly appears as if such a rearguard would be constantly in danger of having its flanks turned4 ,but we must remember that1 even if the enemy succeeds in overlapping the flanks to some extent1 he has still to march the whole way from there to the centre before he can seriously threaten the central mass1 which gives time to the rearguard of the centre to prolong its resistance1 and remain in rear somewhat longer4 ,on the other hand1 the situation becomes at once critical if the centre falls back quicker than the wings2 there is immediately an appearance as if the line had been broken through1 and even the very idea or appearance of that is to be dreaded4 ,at no time is there a greater necessity for concentration and holding together1 and at no time is this more sensibly felt by every one than on a retreat4 ,the intention always is1 that the wings in case of extremity should close upon the centre2 and if1 on account of subsistence and roads1 the retreat has to be made on a considerable width 7of country71 still the movement generally ends by a concentration on the centre4 ,if we add to these considerations also this one1 that the enemy usually advances with his principal force in the centre and with the greatest energy against the centre1 we must perceive that the rear guard of the centre is of special importance4 ,accordingly1 therefore1 a special corps should always be thrown forward as an advanced guard in every case where one of the above relations occurs4 ,these relations almost fall to the ground if the centre is not stronger than the wings1 as1 for example1 ,macdonald when he advanced against ,blcher1 in ,silesia1 in #ahac1 and the latter1 when he made his movement towards the ,elbe4 ,both of them had three corps1 which usually moved in three columns by different roads1 the heads of the columns in line4 ,on this account no mention is made of their having had advanced guards4 ,but this disposition in three columns of equal strength is one which is by no means to be recommended1 partly on that account1 and also because the division of a whole army into three parts makes it very unmanageable1 as stated in the fifth chapter of the third book4 ,when the whole is formed into a centre with two wings separate from it1 which we have represented in the preceding chapter as the most natural formation as long as there is no particular object for any other1 the corps forming the advanced guard1 according to the simplest notion of the case1 will have its place in front of the centre1 and therefore before the line which forms the front of the wings2 but as the first object of corps thrown out on the flanks is to perform the same office for the sides as the advanced guard for the front1 it will very often happen that these corps will be in line with the advanced guard1 or even still further thrown forward1 according to circumstances4 ,with respect to the strength of an advanced guard we have little to say1 as now very properly it is the general custom to detail for that duty one or more component parts of the army of the first class1 reinforced by part of the cavalry3 so that it consists of a corps1 if the army is formed in corps2 of a division1 if the organisation is in divisions4 ,it is easy to perceive that in this respect also the great number of higher members or divisions is an advantage4 ,how far the advanced guard should be pushed to the front must entirely depend on circumstances2 there are cases in which it may be more than a day's march in advance1 and others in which it should be immediately before the front of the army4 ,if we find that in most cases between one and three miles is the distance chosen1 that shows certainly that circumstances have usually pointed out this distance as the best2 but we cannot make of it a rule by which we are to be always guided4 ,in the foregoing observations we have lost sight altogether of outposts1 and therefore we must now return to them again4 ,in saying1 at the commencement1 that the relations between outposts and stationary troops is similar to that between advanced guards and troops in motion1 our object was to refer the conceptions back to their origin1 and keep them distinct in future2 but it is clear that if we confine ourselves strictly to the words we should get little more than a pedantic distinction4 ,if an army on the march halts at night to resume the march next morning1 the advanced guard must naturally do the same1 and always organise the outpost duty1 required both for its own security and that of the main body1 without on that account being changed from an advanced guard into a line of outposts4 ,to satisfy the notion of that transformation1 the advanced guard would have to be completely broken up into a chain of small posts1 having either only a very small force1 or none at all in a form approaching to a mass4 ,in other words1 the idea of a line of outposts must predominate over that of a concentrated corps4 ,the shorter the time of rest of the army1 the less complete does the covering of the army require to be1 for the enemy has hardly time to learn from day to day what is covered and what is not4 ,the longer the halt is to be the more complete must be the observation and covering of all points of approach4 ,as a rule1 therefore1 when the halt is long1 the vanguard becomes always more and more extended into a line of posts4 ,whether the change becomes complete1 or whether the idea of a concentrated corps shall continue uppermost1 depends chiefly on two circumstances4 ,the first is the proximity of the contending armies1 the second is the nature of the country4 ,if the armies are very close in comparison to the width of their front1 then it will often be impossible to post a vanguard between them1 and the armies are obliged to place their dependence on a chain of outposts4 ,a concentrated corps1 as it covers the approaches to the army less directly1 generally requires more time and space to act efficiently2 and therefore1 if the army covers a great extent of front1 as in cantonments1 and a corps standing in mass is to cover all the avenues of approach1 it is necessary that we should be at a considerable distance from the enemy2 on this account winter quarters1 for instance1 are generally covered by a cordon of posts4 ,the second circumstance is the nature of the country2 where1 for example1 any formidable obstacle of ground affords the means of forming a strong line of posts with but few troops1 we should not neglect to take advantage of it4 ,lastly1 in winter quarters1 the rigour of the season may also be a reason for breaking up the advanced guard into a line of posts1 because it is easier to find shelter for it in that way4 ,the use of a reinforced line of outposts was brought to great perfection by the ,anglo-,dutch army1 during the campaign of #agid and #agie1 in the ,netherlands1 when the line of defence was formed by brigades composed of all arms1 in single posts1 and supported by a reserve4 ,scharnhorst1 who was with that army1 introduced this system into the ,prussian army on the ,passarge in #ahjg4 ,elsewhere in modern times1 it has been little adopted1 chiefly because the wars have been too rich in movement4 ,but even when there has been occasion for its use it has been neglected1 as for instance1 by ,murat1 at ,tarutino4 ,a wider extension of his defensive line would have spared him the loss of thirty pieces of artillery in a combat of out-posts4 ,it cannot be disputed that in certain circumstances1 great advantages may be derived from this system4 ,we propose to return to the subject on another occasion4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,mode of ,action of ,advanced ,corps ,we have just seen how the security of the army is expected1 from the effect which an advanced guard and flank corps produce on an advancing enemy4 ,such corps are always to be considered as very weak whenever we imagine them in conflict with the main body of the enemy1 and therefore a peculiar mode of using them is required1 that they may fulfil the purpose for which they are intended1 without incurring the risk of the serious loss which is to be feared from this disproportion in strength4 ,the object of a corps of this description1 is to observe the enemy1 and to delay his progress4 ,for the first of these purposes a smaller body would never be sufficient1 partly because it would be more easily driven back1 partly because its means of observation that is its eyes could not reach as far4 ,but the observation must be carried to a high point2 the enemy must be made to develop his whole strength before such a corps1 and thereby reveal to a certain extent1 not only his force1 but also his plans4 ,for this its mere presence would be sufficient1 and it would only be necessary to wait and see the measures by which the enemy seeks to drive it back1 and then commence its retreat at once4 ,but further1 it must also delay the advance of the enemy1 and that implies actual resistance4 ,now how can we conceive this waiting until the last moment1 as well as this resistance1 without such a corps being in constant danger of serious loss8 ,chiefly in this way1 that the enemy himself is preceded by an advanced guard1 and therefore does not advance at once with all the outflanking and overpowering weight of his whole force4 ,now1 if this advance guard is also from the commencement superior to our advanced corps1 as we may naturally suppose it is intended it should be1 and if the enemy's main body is also nearer to his advanced guard than we are to ours1 and if that main body1 being already on the march1 will soon be on the spot to support the attack of his advanced guard with all his strength1 still this first act1 in which our advanced corps has to contend with the enemy's advanced guard1 that is with a force not much exceeding its own1 ensures at once a certain gain of time1 and thus allows of our watching the adversary's movements for some time without endangering our own retreat4 ,but even a certain amount of resistance which such a corps can offer in a suitable position is not attended with such disadvantage as we might anticipate in other cases through the disproportion in the strength of the forces engaged4 ,the chief danger in a contest with a superior enemy consists always in the possibility of being turned and placed in a critical situation by the enemy enveloping our position2 but in the case to which our attention is now directed1 a risk of this description is very much less1 owing to the advancing enemy never knowing exactly how near there may be support from the main body of his opponent's army itself1 which may place his advanced column between two fires4 ,the consequence is1 that the enemy in advancing keeps the heads of his single columns as nearly as possible in line1 and only begins very cautiously to attempt to turn one or other wing after he has sufficiently reconnoitred our position4 ,while the enemy is thus feeling about and moving guardedly1 the corps we have thrown forward has time to fall back before it is in any serious danger4 ,as for the length of the resistance which such a corps should offer against the attack in front1 or against the commencement of any turning movement1 that depends chiefly on the nature of the ground and the proximity of the enemy's supports4 ,if this resistance is continued beyond its natural measure1 either from want of judgment or from a sacrifice being necessary in order to give the main body the time it requires1 the consequence must always be a very considerable loss4 ,it is only in rare instances1 and more especially when some local obstacle is favourable1 that the resistance actually made in such a combat can be of importance1 and the duration of the little battle of such a corps would in itself be hardly sufficient to gain the time required2 that time is really gained in a threefold manner1 which lies in the nature of the thing1 viz43 #a4 ,by the more cautious1 and consequently slower advance of the enemy4 #b4 ,by the duration of the actual resistance offered4 #c4 ,by the retreat itself4 ,this retreat must be made as slowly as is consistent with safety4 ,if the country affords good positions they should be made use of1 as that obliges the enemy to organise fresh attacks and plans for turning movements1 and by that means more time is gained4 ,perhaps in a new position a real combat even may again be fought4 ,we see that the opposition to the enemy's progress by actual fighting and the retreat are completely combined with one another1 and that the shortness of the duration of the fights must be made up for by their frequent repetition4 ,this is the kind of resistance which an advanced corps should offer4 ,the degree of effect depends chiefly on the strength of the corps1 and the configuration of the country2 next on the length of the road which the corps has to march over1 and the support which it receives4 ,a small body1 even when the forces on both sides are equal can never make as long a stand as a considerable corps2 for the larger the masses the more time they require to complete their action1 of whatever kind it may be4 ,in a mountainous country the mere marching is of itself slower1 the resistance in the different positions longer1 and attended with less danger1 and at every step favourable positions may be found4 ,as the distance to which a corps is pushed forward increases so will the length of its retreat1 and therefore also the absolute gain of time by its resistance2 but as such a corps by its position has less power of resistance in itself1 and is less easily reinforced1 its retreat must be made more rapidly in proportion than if it stood nearer the main body1 and had a shorter distance to traverse4 ,the support and means of rallying afforded to an advanced corps must naturally have an influence on the duration of the resistance1 as all the time that prudence requires for the security of the retreat is so much taken from the resistance1 and therefore diminishes its amount4 ,there is a marked difference in the time gained by the resistance of an advanced corps when the enemy makes his first appearance after midday2 in such a case the length of the night is so much additional time gained1 as the advance is seldom continued throughout the night4 ,thus it was that1 in #ahae1 on the short distance from ,charleroi to ,ligny1 not more than two miles17997 the first ,prussian corps under ,general ,ziethen1 about #cj1jjj strong1 against ,buonaparte at the head of #abj1jjj men1 was enabled to gain twenty-four hours for the ,prussian army then engaged in concentrating4 ,the first attack was made on ,general ,ziethen about nine o'clock on the morning of #aeth ,june1 and the battle of ,ligny did not commence until about two on the afternoon of #afth4 ,general ,ziethen suffered1 it is true1 very considerable loss1 amounting to five or six thousand men killed1 wounded or prisoners4 7997 ,here1 as well as elsewhere1 by the word mile1 the ,german mile is meant4--,tr4 ,if we refer to experience the following are the results1 which may serve as a basis in any calculations of this kind4 ,a division of ten or twelve thousand men1 with a proportion of cavalry1 a day's march of three or four miles in advance in an ordinary country1 not particularly strong1 will be able to detain the enemy 7including time occupied in the retreat7 about half as long again as he would otherwise require to march over the same ground1 but if the division is only a mile in advance1 then the enemy ought to be detained about twice or three times as long as he otherwise would be on the march4 ,therefore supposing the distance to be a march of four miles1 for which usually ten hours are required1 then from the moment that the enemy appears in force in front of the advanced corps1 we may reckon upon fifteen hours before he is in a condition to attack our main body4 ,on the other hand1 if the advanced guard is posted only a mile in advance1 then the time which will elapse before our army can be attacked will be more than three or four hours1 and may very easily come up to double that1 for the enemy still requires just as much time to mature his first measures against our advanced guard1 and the resistance offered by that guard in its original position will be greater than it would be in a position further forward4 ,the consequence is1 that in the first of these supposed cases the enemy cannot easily make an attack on our main body on the same day that he presses back the advanced corps1 and this exactly coincides with the results of experience4 ,even in the second case the enemy must succeed in driving our advanced guard from its ground in the first half of the day to have the requisite time for a general action4 ,as the night comes to our help in the first of these supposed cases1 we see how much time may be gained by an advanced guard thrown further forward4 ,with reference to corps placed on the sides or flanks1 the object of which we have before explained1 the mode of action is in most cases more or less connected with circumstances which belong to the province of immediate application4 ,the simplest way is to look upon them as advanced guards placed on the sides1 which being at the same time thrown out somewhat in advance1 retreat in an oblique direction upon the army4 ,as these corps are not immediately in the front of the army1 and cannot be so easily supported as a regular advanced guard1 they would1 therefore1 be exposed to greater danger if it was not that the enemy's offensive power in most cases is somewhat less at the outer extremities of his line1 and in the worst cases such corps have sufficient room to give way without exposing the army so directly to danger as a flying advanced guard would in its rapid retreat4 ,the most usual and best means of supporting an advanced corps is by a considerable body of cavalry1 for which reason1 when necessary from the distance at which the corps is advanced1 the reserve cavalry is posted between the main body and the advanced corps4 ,the conclusion to be drawn from the preceding reflections is1 that an advanced corps effects more by its presence than by its efforts1 less by the combats in which it engages than by the possibility of those in which it might engage3 that it should never attempt to stop the enemy's movements1 but only serve like a pendulum to moderate and regulate them1 so that they may be made matter of calculation4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,camps ,we are now considering the three situations of an army outside of the combat only strategically1 that is1 so far as they are conditioned by place1 time1 and the number of the effective force4 ,all those subjects which relate to the internal arrangement of the combat and the transition into the state of combat belong to tactics4 ,the disposition in camps1 under which we mean every disposition of an army except in quarters1 whether it be in tents1 huts1 or bivouac1 is strategically completely identical with the combat which is contingent upon such disposition4 ,tactically1 it is not so always1 for we can1 for many reasons1 choose a site for encamping which is not precisely identical with the proposed field of battle4 ,having already said all that is necessary on the disposition of an army1 that is1 on the position of the different parts1 we have only to make some observations on camps in connection with their history4 ,in former times1 that is1 before armies grew once more to considerable dimensions1 before wars became of greater duration1 and their partial acts brought into connection with a whole or general plan1 and up to the time of the war of the ,french ,revolution1 armies always used tents4 ,this was their normal state4 ,with the commencement of the mild season of the year they left their quarters1 and did not again take them up until winter set in4 ,winter quarters at that time must to a certain extent be looked upon as a state of no war1 for in them the forces were neutralised1 the whole clockwork stopped1 quarters to refresh an army which preceded the real winter quarters1 and other temporary cantonments1 for a short time within contracted limits were transitional and exceptional conditions4 ,this is not the place to enquire how such a periodical voluntary neutralisation of power consisted with1 or is now consistent with the object and being of war2 we shall come to that subject hereafter4 ,enough that it was so4 ,since the wars of the ,french ,revolution1 armies have completely done away with the tents on account of the encumbrance they cause4 ,partly it is found better for an army of #ajj1jjj men to have1 in place of #f1jjj tent horses1 #e1jjj additional cavalry1 or a couple of hundred extra guns1 partly it has been found that in great and rapid operations a load of tents is a hindrance1 and of little use4 ,but this change is attended with two drawbacks1 viz41 an increase of casualties in the force1 and greater wasting of the country4 ,however slight the protection afforded by a roof of common tent cloth1--it cannot be denied that on a long continuance it is great relief to the troops4 ,for a single day the difference is small1 because a tent is little protection against wind and cold1 and does not completely exclude wet2 but this small difference1 if repeated two or three hundred times in a year1 becomes important4 ,a greater loss through sickness is just a natural result4 ,how the devastation of the country is increased through the want of tents for the troops requires no explanation4 ,one would suppose that on account of these two reactionary influences the doing away with tents must have diminished again the energy of war in another way1 that troops must remain longer in quarters1 and from want of the requisites for encampment must forego many positions which would have been possible had tents been forthcoming4 ,this would indeed have been the case had there not been1 in the same epoch of time1 an enormous revolution in war generally1 which swallowed up in itself all these smaller subordinate influences4 ,the elementary fire of war has become so overpowering1 its energy so extraordinary1 that these regular periods of rest also have disappeared1 and every power presses forward with persistent force towards the great decision1 which will be treated of more fully in the ninth book4 ,under these circumstances1 therefore1 any question about effects on an army from the discontinuance of the use of tents in the field is quite thrown into the shade4 ,troops now occupy huts1 or bivouac under the canopy of heaven1 without regard to season of the year1 weather1 or locality1 just according as the general plan and object of the campaign require4 ,whether war will in the future continue to maintain1 under all circumstances and at all times1 this energy1 is a question we shall consider hereafter2 where this energy is wanting1 the want of tents is calculated to exercise some influence on the conduct of war2 but that this reaction will ever be strong enough to bring back the use of tents is very doubtful1 because now that much wider limits have been opened for the elements of war it will never return within its old narrow bounds1 except occasionally for a certain time and under certain circumstances1 only to break out again with the all-powerful force of its nature4 ,permanent arrangements for an army must1 therefore1 be based only upon that nature4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,marches ,marches are a mere passage from one position to another under two primary conditions4 ,the first is the due care of the troops1 so that no forces shall be squandered uselessly when they might be usefully employed2 the second1 is precision in the movements1 so that they may fit exactly4 ,if we marched #ajj1jjj men in one single column1 that is1 upon one road without intervals of time1 the rear of the column would never arrive at the proposed destination on the same day with the head of the column2 we must either advance at an unusually slow pace1 or the mass would1 like a thread of water1 disperse itself in drops2 and this dispersion1 together with the excessive exertion laid upon those in rear owing to the length of the column1 would soon throw everything into confusion4 ,if from this extreme we take the opposite direction1 we find that the smaller the mass of troops in one column the greater the ease and precision with which the march can be performed4 ,the result of this is the need of a division quite irrespective of that division of an army in separate parts which belongs to its position2 therefore1 although the division into columns of march originates in the strategic disposition in general1 it does not do so in every particular case4 ,a great mass which is to be concentrated at any one point must necessarily be divided for the march4 ,but even if a disposition of the army in separate parts causes a march in separate divisions1 sometimes the conditions of the primitive disposition1 sometimes those of the march1 are paramount4 ,for instance1 if the disposition of the troops is one made merely for rest1 one in which a battle is not expected1 then the conditions of the march predominate1 and these conditions are chiefly the choice of good1 well-frequented roads4 ,keeping in view this difference1 we choose a road in the one case on account of the quarters and camping ground1 in the other we take the quarters and camps such as they are1 on account of the road4 ,when a battle is expected1 and everything depends on our reaching a particular point with a mass of troops1 then we should think nothing of getting to that point by even the worst by-roads1 if necessary2 if1 on the other hand1 we are still on the journey to the theatre of war1 then the nearest great roads are selected for the columns1 and we look out for the best quarters and camps that can be got near them4 ,whether the march is of the one kind or the other1 if there is a possibility of a combat1 that is within the whole region of actual war1 it is an invariable rule in the modern art of war to organise the columns so that the mass of troops composing each column is fit of itself to engage in an independent combat4 ,this condition is satisfied by the combination of the three arms1 by an organised subdivision of the whole1 and by the appointment of a competent commander4 ,marches1 therefore1 have been the chief cause of the new order of battle1 and they profit most by it4 ,when in the middle of the last century1 especially in the theatre of war in which ,frederick ,,ii4 was engaged1 generals began to look upon movement as a principle belonging to fighting1 and to think of gaining the victory by the effect of unexpected movements1 the want of an organised order of battle caused the most complicated and laborious evolutions on a march4 ,in carrying out a movement near the enemy1 an army ought to be always ready to fight2 but at that time they were never ready to fight unless the whole army was collectively present1 because nothing less than the army constituted a complete whole4 ,in a march to a flank1 the second line1 in order to be always at the regulated distance1 that is about a quarter of a mile from the first1 had to march up hill and down dale1 which demanded immense exertion1 as well as a great stock of local knowledge2 for where can one find two good roads running parallel at a distance of a quarter of a mile from each other8 ,the cavalry on the wings had to encounter the same difficulties when the march was direct to the front4 ,there was other difficulty with the artillery1 which required a road for itself1 protected by infantry2 for the lines of infantry required to be continuous lines1 and the artillery increased the length of their already long trailing columns still more1 and threw all their regulated distances into disorder4 ,it is only necessary to read the dispositions for marches in ,tempelhof's ,history of the ,seven ,years' ,war1 to be satisfied of all these incidents and of the restraints thus imposed on the action of war4 ,but since then the modern art of war has subdivided armies on a regular principle1 so that each of the principal parts forms in itself a complete whole1 of small proportions1 but capable of acting in battle precisely like the great whole1 except in one respect1 which is1 that the duration of its action must be shorter4 ,the consequence of this change is1 that even when it is intended that the whole force should take part in a battle1 it is no longer necessary to have the columns so close to each other that they may unite before the commencement of the combat2 it is sufficient now if the concentration takes place in the course of the action4 ,the smaller a body of troops the more easily it can be moved1 and therefore the less it requires that subdivision which is not a result of the separate disposition1 but of the unwieldiness of the mass4 ,a small body1 therefore1 can march upon one road1 and if it is to advance on several lines it easily finds roads near each other which are as good as it requires4 ,the greater the mass the greater becomes the necessity for subdividing1 the greater becomes the number of columns1 and the want of made roads1 or even great high roads1 consequently also the distance of the columns from each other4 ,now the danger of this subdivision is arithmetically expressed in an inverse ratio to the necessity for it4 ,the smaller the parts are1 the more readily must they be able to render assistance to each other2 the larger they are1 the longer they can be left to depend on themselves4 ,if we only call to mind what has been said in the preceding book on this subject1 and also consider that in cultivated countries at a few miles distance from the main road there are always other tolerably good roads running in a parallel direction1 it is easy to see that1 in regulating a march1 there are no great difficulties which make rapidity and precision in the advance incompatible with the proper concentration of force4 ,in a mountainous country parallel roads are both scarce1 and the difficulties of communication between them great2 but the defensive powers of a single column are very much greater4 ,in order to make this idea clearer let us look at it for a moment in a concrete form4 ,a division of #h1jjj men1 with its artillery and other carriages1 takes up1 as we know by experience in ordinary cases1 a space of one league2 if1 therefore1 two divisions march one after the other on the same road1 the second arrives one hour after the first2 but now1 as said in the sixth chapter of the fourth book1 a division of this strength is quite capable of maintaining a combat for several hours1 even against a superior force1 and1 therefore1 supposing the worst1 that is1 supposing the first had to commence a fight instantaneously1 still the second division would not arrive too late4 ,further1 within a league right and left of the road on which we march1 in the cultivated countries of central ,europe there are1 generally1 lateral roads which can be used for a march1 so that there is no necessity to go across country1 as was so often done in the ,seven ,years' ,war4 ,again1 it is known by experience that the head of a column composed of four divisions and a reserve of cavalry1 even on indifferent roads1 generally gets over a march of three miles in eight hours2 now1 if we reckon for each division one league in depth1 and the same for the reserve cavalry and artillery1 then the whole march will last thirteen hours4 ,this is no great length of time1 and yet in this case forty thousand men would have marched over the same road4 ,but with such a mass as this we can make use of lateral roads1 which are to be found at a greater distance1 and therefore easily shorten the march4 ,if the mass of troops marching on the same road is still greater than above supposed1 then it is a case in which the arrival of the whole on the same day is no longer indispensable1 for such masses never give battle now the moment they meet1 usually not until the next day4 ,we have introduced these concrete cases1 not as exhausting considerations of this kind1 but to make ourselves more intelligible1 and by means of this glance at the results of experience to show that in the present mode of conducting war the organisation of marches no longer offers such great difficulties2 that the most rapid marches1 executed with the greatest precision1 no longer require either that peculiar skill or that exact knowledge of the country which was needed for ,frederick's rapid and exact marches in the ,seven ,years' ,war4 ,through the existing organisation of armies1 they rather go on now almost of themselves1 at least without any great preparatory plans4 ,in times past1 battles were conducted by mere word of command1 but marches required a regular plan1 now the order of battle requires the latter1 and for a march the word of command almost suffices4 ,as is well known1 all marches are either perpendicular to the front or parallel4 ,the latter1 also called flank marches1 alter the geometrical position of the divisions2 those parts which1 in position1 were in line1 will follow one another1 and vice versa4 ,now1 although the line of march may be at any angle with the front1 still the order of the march must decidedly be of one or other of these classes4 ,this geometrical alteration could only be completely carried out by tactics1 and by it only through the file-march as it is called1 which1 with great masses1 is impossible4 ,far less is it possible for strategy to do it4 ,the parts which changed their geometrical relation in the old order of battle were only the centre and wings2 in the new they are the divisions of the first rank corps1 divisions1 or even brigades1 according to the organisation of the army4 ,now1 the consequences above deduced from the new order of battle have an influence here also1 for as it is no longer so necessary1 as formerly1 that the whole army should be assembled before action commences1 therefore the greater care is taken that those troops which march together form one whole 7a unit74 ,if two divisions were so placed that one formed the reserve to the other1 and that they were to advance against the enemy upon two roads1 no one would think of sending a portion of each division by each of the roads1 but a road would at once be assigned to each division2 they would therefore march side by side1 and each general of division would be left to provide a reserve for himself in case of a combat4 ,unity of command is much more important than the original geometrical relation2 if the divisions reach their new position without a combat1 they can resume their previous relations4 ,much less if two divisions1 standing together1 are to make a parallel 7flank7 march upon two roads should we think of placing the second line or reserve of each division on the rear road2 instead of that1 we should allot to each of the divisions one of the roads1 and therefore during the march consider one division as forming the reserve to the other4 ,if an army in four divisions1 of which three form the front line and the fourth the reserve1 is to march against the enemy in that order1 then it is natural to assign a road to each of the divisions in front1 and cause the reserve to follow the centre4 ,if there are not three roads at a suitable distance apart1 then we need not hesitate at once to march upon two roads1 as no serious inconvenience can arise from so doing4 ,it is the same in the opposite case1 the flank march4 ,another point is the march off of columns from the right flank or left4 ,in parallel marches 7marches to a flank7 the thing is plain in itself4 ,no one would march off from the right to make a movement to the left flank4 ,in a march to the front or rear1 the order of march should properly be chosen according to the direction of the lines of roads in respect to the future line of deployment4 ,this may also be done frequently in tactics1 as its spaces are smaller1 and therefore a survey of the geometrical relations can be more easily taken4 ,in strategy it is quite impossible1 and therefore although we have seen here and there a certain analogy brought over into strategy from tactics1 it was mere pedantry4 ,formerly the whole order of march was a purely tactical affair1 because the army on a march remained always an indivisible whole1 and looked to nothing but a combat of the whole2 yet nevertheless ,schwerin1 for example1 when he marched off from his position near ,brandeis1 on the #eth of ,may1 could not tell whether his future field of battle would be on his right or left1 and on this account he was obliged to make his famous countermarch4 ,if an army in the old order of battle advanced against the enemy in four columns1 the cavalry in the first and second lines on each wing formed the two exterior columns1 the two lines of infantry composing the wings formed the two central columns4 ,now these columns could march off all from the right or all from the left1 or the right wing from the right1 the left wing from the left1 or the left from the right1 and the right from the left4 ,in the latter case it would have been called 8double column from the centre40 ,but all these forms1 although they ought to have had a relation directly to the future deployment1 were really all quite indifferent in that respect4 ,when ,frederick the ,great entered on the battle of ,leuthen1 his army had been marched off by wings from the right in four columns1 therefore the wonderful transition to a march off in order of battle1 as described by all writers of history1 was done with the greatest ease1 because it happened that the king chose to attack the left wing of the ,austrians2 had he wanted to turn their right1 he must have countermarched his army1 as he did at ,prague4 ,if these forms did not meet that object in those days1 they would be mere trifling as regards it now4 ,we know now just as little as formerly the situation of the future battle-field in reference to the road we take2 and the little loss of time occasioned by marching off in inverted order is now infinitely less important than formerly4 ,the new order of battle has further a beneficial influence in this respect1 that it is now immaterial which division arrives first or which brigade is brought under fire first4 ,under these circumstances the march off from the right or left is of no consequence now1 otherwise than that when it is done alternately it tends to equalise the fatigue which the troops undergo4 ,this1 which is the only object1 is certainly an important one for retaining both modes of marching off with large bodies4 ,the advance from the centre as a definite evolution naturally comes to an end on account of what has just been stated1 and can only take place accidentally4 ,an advance from the centre by one and the same column in strategy is1 in point of fact1 nonsense1 for it supposes a double road4 ,the order of march belongs1 moreover1 more to the province of tactics than to that of strategy1 for it is the division of a whole into parts1 which1 after the march1 are once more to resume the state of a whole4 ,as1 however1 in modern warfare the formal connection of the parts is not required to be constantly kept up during a march1 but on the contrary1 the parts during the march may become further separated1 and therefore be left more to their own resources1 therefore it is much easier now for independent combats to happen in which the parts have to sustain themselves1 and which1 therefore must be reckoned as complete combats in themselves1 and on that account we have thought it necessary to say so much on the subject4 ,further1 an order of battle in three parts in juxtaposition being1 as we have seen in the second #a chapter of this book1 the most natural where no special object predominates1 from that results also that the order of march in three columns is the most natural4 ,it only remains to observe that the notion of a column in strategy does not found itself mainly on the line of march of one body of troops4 ,the term is used in strategy to designate masses of troops marching on the same road on different days as well4 ,for the division into columns is made chiefly to shorten and facilitate the march1 as a small number marches quicker and more conveniently than large bodies4 ,but this end may1 be attained by marching troops on different days1 as well as by marching them on different roads4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,marches 7,continued7 ,respecting the length of a march and the time it requires1 it is natural for us to depend on the general results of experience4 ,for our modern armies it has long been settled that a march of three miles should be the usual day's work which1 on long distances1 may be set down as an average distance of two miles per day1 allowing for the necessary rest days1 to make such repairs of all kinds as may be required4 ,such a march in a level country1 and on tolerable roads will occupy a division of #h1jjj men from eight to ten hours2 in a hilly country from ten to twelve hours4 ,if several divisions are united in one column1 the march will occupy a couple of hours longer1 without taking into account the intervals which must elapse between the departure of the first and succeeding divisions4 ,we see1 therefore1 that the day is pretty well occupied with such a march2 that the fatigue endured by a soldier loaded with his pack for ten or twelve hours is not to be judged of by that of an ordinary journey of three miles on foot which a person1 on tolerable roads1 might easily get over in five hours4 ,the longest marches to be found in exceptional instances are of five1 or at most six miles a day2 for a continuance four4 ,a march of five miles requires a halt for several hours2 and a division of #h1jjj men will not do it1 even on a good road1 in less than sixteen hours4 ,if the march is one of six miles1 and that there are several divisions in the column1 we may reckon upon at least twenty hours4 ,we here mean the march of a number of whole divisions at once1 from one camp to another1 for that is the usual form of marches made on a theatre of war4 ,when several divisions are to march in one column1 the first division to move is assembled and marched off earlier than the rest1 and therefore arrives at its camping ground so much the sooner4 ,at the same time this difference can still never amount to the whole time1 which corresponds to the depth of a division on the line of march1 and which is so well expressed in ,french1 as the time it requires for its dcoulement 7running down74 ,the soldier is1 therefore1 saved very little fatigue in this way1 and every march is very much lengthened in duration in proportion as the number of troops to be moved increases4 ,to assemble and march off the different brigades of a division1 in like manner at different times1 is seldom practicable1 and for that reason we have taken the division itself as the unit4 ,in long distances1 when troops march from one cantonment into another1 and go over the road in small bodies1 and without points of assembly1 the distance they go over daily may certainly be increased1 and in point of fact it is so1 from the necessary detours in getting to quarters4 ,but those marches1 on which troops have to assemble daily in divisions1 or perhaps in corps1 and have an additional move to get into quarters1 take up the most time1 and are only advisable in rich countries1 and where the masses of troops are not too large1 as in such cases the greater facilility of subsistence and the advantage of the shelter which the troops obtain compensate sufficiently for the fatigue of a longer march4 ,the ,prussian army undoubtedly pursued a wrong system in their retreat in #ahjf in taking up quarters for the troops every night on account of subsistence4 ,they could have procured subsistence in bivouacs1 and the army would not have been obliged to spend fourteen days in getting over fifty miles of ground1 which1 after all1 they only accomplished by extreme efforts4 ,if a bad road or a hilly country has to be marched over1 all these calculations as to time and distance undergo such modifications that it is difficult to estimate1 with any certainty1 in any particular case1 the time required for a march2 much less1 then1 can any general theory be established4 ,all that theory can do is to direct attention to the liability to error with which we are here beset4 ,to avoid it the most careful calculation is necessary1 and a large margin for unforeseen delays4 ,the influence of weather and condition of the troops also come into consideration4 ,since the doing away with tents and the introduction of the system of subsisting troops by compulsory demands for provisions on the spot1 the baggage of an army has been very sensibly diminished1 and as a natural and most important consequence we look first for an acceleration in the movements of an army1 and1 therefore1 of course1 an increase in the length of the day's march4 ,this1 however1 is only realized under certain circumstances4 ,marches within the theatre of war have been very little accelerated by this means1 for it is well known that for many years whenever the object required marches of unusual length it has always been the practice to leave the baggage behind or send it on beforehand1 and1 generally1 to keep it separate from the troops during the continuance of such movements1 and it had in general no influence on the movement1 because as soon as it was out of the way1 and ceased to be a direct impediment1 no further trouble was taken about it1 whatever damage it might suffer in that way4 ,marches1 therefore1 took place in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 which even now cannot be surpassed2 as an instance we cite ,lascy's march in #agfj1 when he had to support the diversion of the ,russians on ,berlin1 on that occasion he got over the road from ,schweidnitz to ,berlin through ,lusatia1 a distance of #bbe miles1 in ten days1 averaging1 therefore1 twenty-two miles a day1 which1 for a ,corps of #ae1jjj1 would be an extraordinary march even in these days4 ,on the other hand1 through the new method of supplying troops the movements of armies have acquired a new retarding principle4 ,if troops have partly to procure supplies for themselves1 which often happens1 then they require more time for the service of supply than would be necessary merely to receive rations from provision wagons4 ,besides this1 on marches of considerable duration troops cannot be encamped in such large numbers at any one point2 the divisions must be separated from one another1 in order the more easily to manage for them4 ,lastly1 it almost always happens that it is necessary to place part of the army1 particularly the cavalry1 in quarters4 ,all this occasions on the whole a sensible delay4 ,we find1 therefore1 that ,buonaparte in pursuit of the ,prussians in #ahjf1 with a view to cut off their retreat1 and ,blcher in #ahae1 in pursuit of the ,french1 with a like object1 only accomplished thirty miles in ten days1 a rate which ,frederick the ,great was able to attain in his marches from ,saxony to ,silesia and back1 notwithstanding all the train that he had to carry with him4 ,at the same time the mobility and handiness1 if we may use such an expression1 of the parts of an army1 both great and small1 on the theatre of war have very perceptibly gained by the diminution of baggage4 ,partly1 inasmuch as while the number of cavalry and guns is the same1 there are fewer horses1 and therefore1 there is less forage required2 partly1 inasmuch as we are no longer so much tied to any one position1 because we have not to be for ever looking after a long train of baggage dragging after us4 ,marches such as that1 which1 after raising the siege of ,olmtz1 #ageh1 ,frederick the ,great made with #d1jjj carriages1 the escort of which employed half his army broken up into single battalions and companies1 could not be effected now in presence of even the most timid adversary4 ,on long marches1 as from the ,tagus to the ,niemen1 that lightening of the army is more sensibly felt1 for although the usual measure of the day's march remains the same on account of the carriages still remaining1 yet1 in cases of great urgency1 we can exceed that usual measure at a less sacrifice4 ,generally the diminution of baggage tends more to a saving of power than to the acceleration of movement4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,marches 7continued7 ,we have now to consider the destructive influence which marches have upon an army4 ,it is so great that it may be regarded as an active principle of destruction1 just as much as the combat4 ,one single moderate march does not wear down the instrument1 but a succession of even moderate marches is certain to tell upon it1 and a succession of severe ones will1 of course1 do so much sooner4 ,at the actual scene of war1 want of food and shelter1 bad broken-up roads1 and the necessity of being in a perpetual state of readiness for battle1 are causes of an excessive strain upon our means1 by which men1 cattle1 carriages of every description as well as clothing are ruined4 ,it is commonly said that a long rest does not suit the physical health of an army2 that at such a time there is more sickness than during moderate activity4 ,no doubt sickness will and does occur if soldiers are packed too close in confined quarters2 but the same thing would occur if these were quarters taken up on the march1 and the want of air and exercise can never be the cause of such sicknesses1 as it is so easy to give the soldier both by means of his exercises4 ,only think for a moment1 when the organism of a human being is in a disordered and fainting state1 what a difference it must make to him whether he falls sick in a house or is seized in the middle of a high road1 up to his knees in mud1 under torrents of rain1 and loaded with a knapsack on his back2 even if he is in a camp he can soon be sent to the next village1 and will not be entirely without medical assistance1 whilst on a march he must be for hours without any assistance1 and then be made to drag himself along for miles as a straggler4 ,how many trifling illnesses by that means become serious1 how many serious ones become mortal4 ,let us consider how an ordinary march in the dust1 and under the burning rays of a summer sun may produce the most excessive heat1 in which state1 suffering from intolerable thirst1 the soldier then rushes to the fresh spring of water1 to bring back for himself sickness and death4 ,it is not our object by these reflections to recommend less activity in war2 the instrument is there for use1 and if the use wears away the instrument that is only in the natural order of things2 we only wish to see every thing put in its right place1 and to oppose that theoretical bombast according to which the most astonishing surprises the most rapid movements1 the most incessant activity cost nothing1 and are painted as rich mines which the indolence of the general leaves unworked4 ,it is very much the same with these mines as with those from which gold and silver are obtained2 nothing is seen but the produce1 and no one asks about the value of the work which has brought this produce to light4 ,on long marches outside a theatre of war1 the conditions under which the march is made are no doubt usually easier1 and the daily losses smaller1 but on that account men with the slightest sickness are generally lost to the army for some time1 as it is difficult for convalescents to overtake an army constantly advancing4 ,amongst the cavalry the number of lame horses and horses with sore backs rises in an increasing ratio1 and amongst the carriages many break down or require repair4 ,it never fails1 therefore1 that at the end of a march of #ajj miles or more1 an army arrives much weakened1 particularly as regards its cavalry and train4 ,if such marches are necessary on the theatre of war1 that is under the eyes of the enemy1 then that disadvantage is added to the other1 and from the two combined the losses with large masses of troops1 and under conditions otherwise unfavourable may amount to something incredible4 ,only a couple of examples in order to illustrate our ideas4 ,when ,buonaparte crossed the ,niemen on #bdth ,june1 #ahab1 the enormous centre of his army with which he subsequently marched against ,moscow numbered #cja1jjj men4 ,at ,smolensk1 on the #aeth ,august1 he detached #ac1ejj1 leaving1 it is to be supposed1 #bhg1ejj4 ,the actual state of his army however at that date was only #ahb1jjj2 he had therefore lost #aje1jjj47997 ,bearing in mind that up to that time only two engagements to speak of had taken place1 one between ,davoust and ,bragathion1 the other between ,murat and ,tolstoy-,osterman1 we may put down the losses of the ,french army in action at #aj1jjj men at most1 and therefore the losses in sick and stragglers within fifty-two days on a march of about seventy miles direct to his front1 amounted to #ie1jjj1 that is a third part of the whole army4 7997 ,all these figures are taken from ,chambray4 ,vergl4 ,bd4 vii4 #bte ,auflage1 #hj1 ff4 ,three weeks later1 at the time of the battle of ,borodino1 the loss amounted to #add1jjj 7including the casualties in the battle71 and eight days after that again1 at ,moscow1 the number was #aih1jjj4 ,the losses of this army in general were at the commencement of the campaign at the rate of #a_/aej;daily1 subsequently they rose to #a_/abj1 and in the last period they increased to #a_/ai of the original strength4 ,the movement of ,napoleon from the passage of the ,niemen up to ,moscow certainly may be called a persistent one2 still1 we must not forget that it lasted eighty-two days1 in which time he only accomplished #abj miles1 and that the ,french army upon two occasions made regular halts1 once at ,wilna for about fourteen days1 and the other time at ,witebsk for about eleven days1 during which periods many stragglers had time to rejoin4 ,this fourteen weeks' advance was not made at the worst season of the year1 nor over the worst of roads1 for it was summer1 and the roads along which they marched were mostly sand4 ,it was the immense mass of troops collected on one road1 the want of sufficient subsistence1 and an enemy who was on the retreat1 but by no means in flight1 which were the adverse conditions4 ,of the retreat of the ,french army from ,moscow to the ,niemen1 we shall say nothing1 but this we may mention1 that the ,russian army following them left ,kaluga #abj1jjj strong1 and reached ,wilna with #cj1jjj4 ,every one knows how few men were lost in actual combats during that period4 ,one more example from ,blcher's campaign of #ahac in ,silesia and ,saxony1 a campaign very remarkable not for any long march but for the amount of marching to and fro4 ,york's corps of ,blcher's army began this campaign #afth ,august about #dj1jjj strong1 and was reduced to #ab1jjj at the battle of ,leipsic1 #aith ,october4 ,the principal combats which this corps fought at ,goldberg1 ,lowenberg1 on the ,katsbach1 at ,wartenburg1 and ,mockern 7,leipsic7 cost it1 on the authority of the best writers1 #ab1jjj men4 ,according to that their losses from other causes in eight weeks amounted to #af1jjj1 or two-fifths of the whole4 ,we must1 therefore1 make up our minds to great wear and tear of our own forces1 if we are to carry on a war rich in movements1 we must arrange the rest of our plan accordingly1 and above all things the reinforcements which are to follow4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,cantonments ,in the modern system of war cantonments have become again indispensable1 because neither tents nor a complete military train make an army independent of them4 ,huts and open-air camps 7bivouacs as they are called71 however far such arrangements may be carried1 can still never become the usual way of locating troops without sickness gaining the upper hand1 and prematurely exhausting their strength1 sooner or later1 according to the state of the weather or climate4 ,the campaign in ,russia in #ahab is one of the few in which1 in a very severe climate1 the troops1 during the six months that it lasted hardly ever lay in cantonments4 ,but what was the consequence of this extreme effort1 which should be called an extravagance1 if that term was not much more applicable to the political conception of the enterprise6 ,two things interfere with the occupation of cantonments the proximity of the enemy1 and the rapidity of movement4 ,for these reasons they are quitted as soon as the decision approaches1 and cannot be again taken up until the decision is over4 ,in modern wars1 that's1 in all campaigns during the last twenty-five years which occur to us at this moment1 the military element has acted with full energy4 ,nearly all that was possible has generally been done in them1 as far as regards activity and the utmost effort of force2 but all these campaigns have been of short duration1 they have seldom exceeded half a year2 in most of them a few months sufficed to bring matters to a crisis1 that is1 to a point where the vanquished enemy saw himself compelled to sue for an armistice or at once for peace1 or to a point where1 on the conqueror's part1 the impetus of victory had exhausted itself4 ,during this period of extreme effort there could be little question of cantonments1 for even in the victorious march of the pursuer1 if there was no longer any danger1 the rapidity of movement made that kind of relief impossible4 ,but when from any cause the course of events is less impetuous1 when a more even oscillation and balancing of forces takes place1 then the housing of troops must again become a foremost subject for attention4 ,this want has some influence even on the conduct of war itself1 partly in this way1 that we seek to gain more time and security by a stronger system of outposts1 by a more considerable advanced guard thrown further forward2 and partly in this way1 that our measures are governed more by the richness and fertility of the country than by the tactical advantages which the ground affords in the geometrical relations of lines and points4 ,a commercial town of twenty or thirty thousand inhabitants1 a road thickly studded with large villages or flourishing towns give such facilities for the assembling in one position large bodies of troops1 and this concentration gives such a freedom and such a latitude for movement as fully compensate for the advantages which the better situation of some point may otherwise present4 ,on the form to be followed in arranging cantonments we have only a few observations to make1 as this subject belongs for the most part to tactics4 ,the housing of troops comes under two heads1 inasmuch as it can either be the main point or only a secondary consideration4 ,if the disposition of the troops in the course of a campaign is regulated by grounds purely tactical and strategical1 and if1 as is done more especially with cavalry1 they are directed for their comfort to occupy the quarters available in the vicinity of the point of concentration of the army1 then the quarters are subordinate considerations and substitutes for camps2 they must1 therefore1 be chosen within such a radius that the troops can reach the point of assembly in good time4 ,but if an army takes up quarters to rest and refresh1 then the housing of the troops is the main point1 and other measures1 consequently also the selection of the particular point of assembly1 will be influenced by that object4 ,the first question for examination here is as to the general form of the cantonments as a whole4 ,the usual form is that of a very long oval1 a mere widening as it were of the tactical order of battle4 ,the point of assembly for the army is in front1 the head-quarters in rear4 ,now these three arrangements are1 in point of fact1 adverse1 indeed almost opposed1 to the safe assembly of the army on the approach of the enemy4 ,the more the cantonments form a square1 or rather a circle1 the quicker the troops can concentrate at one point1 that is the centre4 ,the further the place of assembly is placed in rear1 the longer the enemy will be in reaching it1 and1 therefore1 the more time is left us to assemble4 ,a point of assembly in rear of the cantonments can never be in danger4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the farther the head-quarters are in advance1 so much the sooner reports arrive1 therefore so much the better is the commander informed of everything4 ,at the same time1 the first named arrangements are not devoid of points which deserve some attention4 ,by the extension of cantonments in width1 we have in view the protection of the country which would otherwise be laid under contributions by the enemy4 ,but this motive is neither thoroughly sound1 nor is it very important4 ,it is only sound as far as regards the country on the extremity of the wings1 but does not apply at all to intermediate spaces existing between separate divisions of the army1 if the quarters of those divisions are drawn closer round their point of assembly1 for no enemy will then venture into those intervals of space4 ,and it is not very important1 because there are simpler means of shielding the districts in our vicinity from the enemy's requisitions than scattering the army itself4 ,the placing of the point of assembly in front is with a view to covering the quarters1 for the following reasons3 ,in the first place1 a body of troops1 suddenly called to arms1 always leaves behind it in cantonments a tail of stragglers sick1 baggage1 provisions1 etc41 etc4 which may easily fall into the enemy's hands if the point of assembly is placed in rear4 ,in the second place1 we have to apprehend that if the enemy with some bodies of cavalry passes by the advanced guard1 or if it is defeated in any way1 he may fall upon scattered regiments or battalions4 ,if he encounters a force drawn up in good order1 although it is weak1 and in the end must be overpowered1 still he is brought to a stop1 and in that way time is gained4 ,as respects the position of the head-quarters1 it is generally supposed that it cannot be made too secure4 ,according to these different considerations1 we may conclude that the best arrangement for districts of cantonments is where they take an oblong form1 approaching the square or circle1 have the point of assembly in the centre1 and the head-quarters placed on the front line1 well protected by considerable masses of troops4 ,what we have said as to covering of the wings in treating of the disposition of the army in general1 applies here also2 therefore corps detached from the main body1 right and left1 although intended to fight in conjunction with the rest1 will have particular points of assembly of their own in the same line with the main body4 ,now1 if we reflect that the nature of a country1 on the one hand1 by favourable features in the ground determines the most natural point of assembly1 and on the other hand1 by the positions of towns and villages determines the most suitable situation for cantonments1 then we must perceive how very rarely any geometrical form can be decisive in our present subject4 ,but yet it was necessary to direct attention to it1 because1 like all general laws1 it affects the generality of cases in a greater or less degree4 ,what now remains to be said as to an advantageous position for cantonments is that they should be taken up behind some natural obstacle of ground affording cover1 whilst the sides next the enemy can be watched by small but numerous detached parties2 or they may be taken up behind fortresses1 which1 when circumstances prevent any estimate being formed of the strength of their garrisons1 impose upon the enemy a greater feeling of respect and and caution4 ,we reserve the subject of winter quarters1 covered by defensive works for a separate article4 ,the quarters taken up by troops on a march differ from those called standing cantonments in this way1 that1 in order to save the troops from unnecessary marching1 cantonments on a march are taken up as much as possible along the lines of march1 and are not at any considerable distance on either side of these roads2 if their extension in this sense does not exceed a short day's march1 the arrangement is not one at all unfavourable to the quick concentration of the army4 ,in all cases in presence of the enemy1 according to the technical phrase in use1 that is in all cases where there is no considerable interval between the advance guards of the two armies respectively1 the extent of the cantonments and the time required to assemble the army determine the strength and position of the advanced guard and outposts2 but when these must be suited to the enemy and circumstances1 then1 on the contrary1 the extent of the cantonments must depend on the time which we can count upon by the resistance of the advance guard4 ,in the third7997 chapter of this book1 we have stated how this resistance1 in the case of an advanced corps1 may be estimated4 ,from the time of that resistance we must deduct the time required for transmission of reports and getting the men under arms1 and the remainder only is the time available for assembling at the point of concentration4 7997 #hth ,chapter4--,tr4 ,we shall conclude here also by establishing our ideas in the form of a result1 such as is usual under ordinary circumstances4 ,if the distance at which the advanced guard is detached is the same as the radius of the cantonments1 and the point of assembly is fixed in the centre of the cantonments1 the time which is gained by checking the enemy's advance would be available for the transmission of intelligence and getting under arms1 and would in most cases be sufficient1 even although the communication is not made by means of signals1 cannon-shots1 etc41 but simply by relays of orderlies1 the only really sure method4 ,with an advanced guard pushed forward three miles in front1 our cantonments might therefore cover a space of thirty square miles4 ,in a moderately-peopled country there would be #aj1jjj houses in this space1 which for an army of #ej1jjj1 after deducting the advanced guard1 would be four men to a billet1 therefore very comfortable quarters2 and for an army of twice the strength nine men to a billet1 therefore still not very close quarters4 ,on the other hand1 if the advanced guard is only one mile in front1 we could only occupy a space of four square miles2 for although the time gained does not diminish exactly in proportion as the distance of the advanced guard diminishes1 and even with a distance of one mile we may still calculate on a gain of six hours1 yet the necessity for caution increases when the enemy is so close4 ,but in such a space an army of #ej1jjj men could only find partial accommodation1 even in a very thickly populated country4 ,from all this we see what an important part is played here by great or at least considerable towns1 which afford convenience for sheltering #aj1jjj or even #bj1jjj men almost at one point4 ,from this result it follows that1 if we are not very close to the enemy1 and have a suitable advanced guard we might remain in cantonments1 even if the enemy is concentrated1 as ,frederick the ,great did at ,breslau in the beginning of the year #agfb1 and ,buonaparte at ,witebsk in #ahab4 ,but although by preserving a right distance and by suitable arrangements we have no reason to fear not being able to assemble in time1 even opposite an enemy who is concentrated1 yet we must not forget that an army engaged in assembling itself in all haste can do nothing else in that time2 that it is therefore1 for a time at least1 not in a condition to avail itself in an instant of fortuitous opportunities1 which deprives it of the greater part of its really efficient power4 ,the consequence of this is1 that an army should only break itself up completely in cantonments under some one or other of the three following cases3 #a4 ,if the enemy does the same4 #b4 ,if the condition of the troops makes it unavoidable4 #c4 ,if the more immediate object with the army is completely limited to the maintenance of a strong position1 and therefore the only point of importance is concentrating the troops at that point in good time4 ,the campaign of #ahae gives a very remarkable example of the assembly of an army from cantonments4 ,general ,ziethen1 with ,blcher's advanced guard1 #cj1jjj men1 was posted at ,charleroi1 only two miles from ,sombreff1 the place appointed for the assembly of the army4 ,the farthest cantonments of the army were about eight miles from ,sombreff1 that is1 on the one side beyond ,ciney1 and on the other near ,lige4 ,notwithstanding this1 the troops cantoned about ,ciney were assembled at ,ligny several hours before the battle began1 and those near ,lige 7,bulow's ,corps7 would have been also1 had it not been for accident and faulty arrangements in the communication of orders and intelligence4 ,unquestionably1 proper care for the security of the ,prussian army was not taken2 but in explanation we must say that the arrangements were made at a time when the ,french army was still dispersed over widely extended cantonments1 and that the real fault consisted in not altering them the moment the first news was received that the enemy's troops were in movement1 and that ,buonaparte had joined the army4 ,still it remains noteworthy that the ,prussian army was able in any way to concentrate at ,sombreff before the attack of the enemy4 ,certainly1 on the night of the #adth1 that is1 twelve hours before ,ziethen was actually attacked1 ,blcher received information of the advance of the enemy1 and began to assemble his army2 but on the #aeth at nine in the morning1 ,ziethen was already hotly engaged1 and it was not until the same moment that ,general ,thielman at ,ciney first received orders to march to ,namur4 ,he had therefore then to assemble his divisions1 and to march six and a half miles to ,sombreff1 which he did in #bd hours4 ,general ,bulow would also have been able to arrive about the same time1 if the order had reached him as it should have done4 ,but ,buonaparte did not resolve to make his attack on ,ligny until two in the afternoon of the #afth4 ,the apprehension of having ,wellington on the one side of him1 and ,blcher on the other1 in other words1 the disproportion in the relative forces1 contributed to this slowness2 still we see how the most resolute commander may be detained by the cautious feeling of the way which is always unavoidable in cases which are to a certain degree complicated4 ,some of the considerations here raised are plainly more tactical than strategic in their nature2 but we have preferred rather to encroach a little than to run the risk of not being sufficiently explicit4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,subsistence ,this subject has acquired much greater importance in modern warfare from two causes in particular4 ,first1 because the armies in general are now much greater than those of the middle ages1 and even those of the old world2 for1 although formerly armies did appear here and there which equalled or even surpassed modern ones in size1 still these were only rare and transient occurrences1 whilst in modern military history1 since the time of ,louis ,,xiv1 armies have always been very strong in number4 ,but the second cause is still more important1 and belongs entirely to modern times4 ,it is the very much closer inner connection which our wars have in themselves1 the constant state of readiness for battle of the belligerents engaged in carrying them on4 ,almost all old wars consist of single unconnected enterprises1 which are separated from each other by intervals during which the war in reality either completely rested1 and only still existed in a political sense1 or when the armies at least had removed so far from each other that each1 without any care about the army opposite1 only occupied itself with its own wants4 ,modern wars1 that is1 the wars which have taken place since the ,peace of ,westphalia1 have1 through the efforts of respective governments1 taken a more systematic connected form2 the military object1 in general1 predominates everywhere1 and demands also that arrangements for subsistence shall be on an adequate scale4 ,certainly there were long periods of inaction in the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 almost amounting to a cessation of war2 these are the regular periods passed in cantonments2 still even those periods were subordinate to the military object2 they were caused by the inclemency of the season1 not by any necessity arising out of the subsistence of the troops1 and as they regularly terminated with the return of summer1 therefore we may say at all events uninterrupted action was the rule of war during the fine season of the year4 ,as the transition from one situation or method of action to another always takes place gradually so it was in the case before us4 ,in the wars against ,louis ,,xiv4 the allies used still to send their troops into winter cantonments in distant provinces in order to subsist them the more easily2 in the ,silesian war that was no longer done4 ,this systematic and connected form of carrying on war only became possible when states took regular troops into their service in place of the feudal armies4 ,the obligation of the feudal law was then commuted into a fine or contribution3 personal service either came to an end1 enlistment being substituted1 or it was only continued amongst the lowest classes1 as the nobility regarded the furnishing a quota of men 7as is still done in ,russia and ,hungary7 as a kind of tribute1 a tax in men4 ,in every case1 as we have elsewhere observed1 armies became henceforward1 an instrument of the cabinet1 their principal basis being the treasury or the revenue of the government4 ,just the same kind of thing which took place in the mode of raising and keeping up an establishment of troops could not but follow in the mode of subsisting them4 ,the privileged classes having been released from the first of these services on payment of a contribution in money1 the expense of the latter could not be again imposed on them quite so easily4 ,the cabinet and the treasury had therefore to provide for the subsistence of the army1 and could not allow it to be maintained in its own country at the expense of the people4 ,administrations were therefore obliged to look upon the subsistence of the army as an affair for which they were specially responsible4 ,the subsistence thus became more difficult in two ways3 first1 because it was an affair belonging to government1 and next1 because the forces required to be permanently embodied to confront those kept up in other states4 ,thus arose a separate military class in the population1 with an independent organisation provided for its subsistence1 and carried out to the utmost possible perfection4 ,not only were stores of provisions collected1 either by purchase or by deliveries in kind from the landed estates 7,dominiallieferungen71 consequently from distant points1 and lodged in magazines1 but they were also forwarded from these by means of special wagons1 baked near the quarters of the troops in ovens temporarily established1 and from thence again carried away at last by the troops1 by means of another system of transport attached to the army itself4 ,we take a glance at this system not merely from its being characteristic of the military arrangements of the period1 but also because it is a system which can never be entirely done away2 some parts of it must continually reappear4 ,thus military organisation strove perpetually towards becoming more independent of people and country4 ,the consequence was that in this manner war became certainly a more systematic and more regular affair1 and more subordinated to the military1 that is the political object2 but it was at the same time also much straitened and impeded in its movement1 and infinitely weakened in energy4 ,for now an army was tied to its magazines1 limited to the working powers of its transport service1 and it naturally followed that the tendency of everything was to economise the subsistence of the troops4 ,the soldier fed on a wretched pittance of bread1 moved about like a shadow1 and no prospect of a change for the better comforted him under his privations4 ,whoever treats this miserable way of feeding soldiers as a matter of no moment1 and points to what ,frederick the ,great did with soldiers subsisted in this manner1 only takes a partial view of the matter4 ,the power of enduring privations is one of the finest virtues in a soldier1 and without it no army is animated with the true military spirit2 but such privation must be of a temporary kind1 commanded by the force of circumstances1 and not the consequence of a wretchedly bad system1 or of a parsimonious abstract calculation of the smallest ration that a man can exist upon4 ,when such is the case the powers of the men individually will always deteriorate physically and morally4 ,what ,frederick the ,great managed to do with his soldiers cannot be taken as a standard for us1 partly because he was opposed to those who pursued a similar system1 partly because we do not know how much more he might have effected if he had been able to let his troops live as ,buonaparte allowed his whenever circumstances permitted4 ,the feeding of horses by an artificial system of supply is1 however1 an experiment which has not been tried1 because forage is much more difficult to provide on account of its bulk4 ,a ration for a horse weighs about ten times as much as one for a man1 and the number of horses with an army is more than one-tenth the number of men1 at present it is one-fourth to one-third1 and formerly it was one-third to one-half1 therefore the weight of the forage required is three1 four1 or five times as much as that of the soldier's rations required for the same period of time2 on this account the shortest and most direct means were taken to meet the wants of an army in this respect1 that is by foraging expeditions4 ,now these expeditions occasioned great inconvenience in the conduct of war in other ways1 first by making it a principal object to keep the war in the enemy's country2 and next because they made it impossible to remain very long in one part of the country4 ,however1 at the time of the ,silesian war1 foraging expeditions were much less frequent1 they were found to occasion a much greater drain upon the country1 and much greater waste than if the requirements were satisfied by means of requisitions and imposts4 ,when the ,french ,revolution suddenly brought again upon the war stage a national army1 the means which governments could command were found insufficient1 and the whole system of war1 which had its origin in the limited extent of these means1 and found again its security in this limitation1 fell to pieces1 and of course in the downfall of the whole was included that of the branch of which we are now speaking1 the system of subsistence4 ,without troubling themselves about magazines1 and still less about such an organisation as the artificial clockwork of which we have spoken1 by which the different divisions of the transport service went round like a wheel1 the leading spirits of the revolution sent their soldiers into the field1 forced their generals to fight1 subsisted1 reinforced their armies1 and kept alive the war by a system of exaction1 and of helping themselves to all they required by robbery and plunder4 ,between these two extremes the war under ,buonaparte1 and against him1 preserved a sort of medium1 that is to say1 it just made use of such means as suited it best amongst all that were available2 and so it will be also in future4 ,the modern method of subsisting troops1 that is1 seizing every thing which is to be found in the country without regard to meum et tuum may be carried out in four different ways3 that is1 subsisting on the inhabitant1 contributions which the troops themselves look after1 general contributions and magazines4 ,all four are generally applied together1 one generally prevailing more than the others3 still it sometimes happens that only one is applied entirely by itself4 #a4--,living on the inhabitants1 or on the community1 which is the same thing4 ,if we bear in mind that in a community consisting even as it does in great towns1 of consumers only1 there must always be provisions enough to last for several days1 we may easily see that the most densely populated place can furnish food and quarters for a day for about as many troops as there are inhabitants1 and for a less number of troops for several days without the necessity of any particular previous preparation4 ,in towns of considerable size this gives a very satisfactory result1 because it enables us to subsist a large force at one point4 ,but in smaller towns1 or even in villages1 the supply would be far from sufficient2 for a population of #c1jjj or #d1jjj in a square mile which would be large in such a space1 would only suffice to feed #c1jjj or #d1jjj soldiers1 and if the whole mass of troops is great they would have to be spread over such an extent of country at this rate as would hardly be consistent with other essential points4 ,but in level countries1 and even in small towns1 the quantity of those kinds of provisions which are essential in war is generally much greater2 the supply of bread which a peasant has is generally adequate to the consumption of his family for several1 perhaps from eight to fourteen days2 meat can be obtained daily1 vegetable productions are generally forthcoming in sufficient quantity to last till the following crop4 ,therefore in quarters which have never been occupied there is no difficulty in subsisting troops three or four times the number of the inhabitants for several days1 which again is a very satisfactory result4 ,according to this1 where the population is about #b1jjj or #c1jjj per square mile1 and if no large town is included1 a column of #cj1jjj would require about four square miles1 which would be a length of side of two miles4 ,therefore for an army of #ij1jjj1 which we may reckon at about #ge1jjj combatants1 if marching in three columns contiguous to each other1 we should require to take up a front six miles in breadth in case three roads could be found within that breadth4 ,if several columns follow one another into these cantonments1 then special measures must be adopted by the civil authorities1 and in that way there can be no great difficulty in obtaining all that is required for a day or two more4 ,therefore if the above #ij1jjj are followed the day after by a like number1 even these last would suffer no want2 this makes up the large number of #aej1jjj combatants4 ,forage for the horses occasions still less difficulty1 as it neither requires grinding nor baking1 and as there must be forage forthcoming in sufficient quantity to last the horses in the country until next harvest1 therefore even where there is little stall-feeding1 still there should be no want1 only the deliveries of forage should certainly be demanded from the community at large1 not from the inhabitants individually4 ,besides1 it is supposed that some attention is1 of course1 paid to the nature of the country in making arrangements for a march1 so as not to send cavalry mostly into places of commerce and manufactures1 and into districts where there is no forage4 ,the conclusion to be drawn from this hasty glance is1 therefore1 that in a moderately populated country1 that is1 a country of from #b1jjj to #c1jjj souls per square mile1 an army of #aej1jjj combatants may be subsisted by the inhabitants and community for one or two days within such a narrow space as will not interfere with its concentration for battle1 that is1 therefore1 that such an army can be subsisted on a continuous march without magazines or other preparation4 ,on this result were based the enterprises of the ,french army in the revolutionary war1 and under ,buonaparte4 ,they marched from the ,adige to the ,lower ,danube1 and from the ,rhine to the ,vistula1 with little means of subsistence except upon the inhabitants1 and without ever suffering want4 ,as their undertakings depended on moral and physical superiority1 as they were attended with certain results1 and were never delayed by indecision or caution1 therefore their progress in the career of victory was generally that of an uninterrupted march4 ,if circumstances are less favourable1 if the population is not so great1 or if it consists more of artisans than agriculturists1 if the soil is bad1 the country already several times overrun--then of course the results will fall short of what we have supposed4 ,still1 we must remember that if the breadth of the front of a column is extended from two miles to three1 we get a superficial extent of country more than double in size1 that is1 instead of four we command nine square miles1 and that this is still an extent which in ordinary cases will always admit of concentration for action2 we see therefore that even under unfavourable circumstances this method of subsistence will still be always compatible with a continuous march4 ,but if a halt of several days takes place1 then great distress must ensue if preparations have not been made beforehand for such an event in other ways4 ,now these preparatory measures are of two kinds1 and without them a considerable army even now cannot exist4 ,the first is equipping the troops with a wagon train1 by means of which bread or flour1 as the most essential part of their subsistence1 can be carried with them for a few1 that is1 for three or four days2 if to this we add three or four days' rations which the soldier himself can carry1 then we have provided what is most indispensable in the way of subsistence for eight days4 ,the second arrangement is that of a regular commissariat1 which whenever there is a moment's halt gathers provisions from distant localities1 so that at any moment we can pass over from the system of quartering on the inhabitants to a different system4 ,subsisting in cantonments has the immense advantage that hardly any transport is required1 and that it is done in the shortest time1 but certainly it supposes as a prior condition that cantonments can be provided for all the troops4 #b4--,subsistence through exactions enforced by the troops themselves4 ,if a single battalion occupies a camp1 this camp may be placed in the vicinity of some villages1 and these may receive notice to furnish subsistence2 then the method of subsistence would not differ essentially from the preceding mode4 ,but1 as is most usual1 if the mass of troops to be encamped at some one point is much larger1 there is no alternative but to make a collection in common within the circle of districts marked out for the purpose1 collecting sufficient for the supply of one of the parts of the army1 a brigade or division1 and afterwards to make a distribution from the common stock thus collected4 ,the first glance shows that by such a mode of proceeding the subsistence of a large army would be a matter of impossibility4 ,the collection made from the stores in any given district in the country will be much less than if the troops had taken up their quarters in the same district1 for when thirty or forty men take possession of a farmer's house they can if necessary collect the last mouthful1 but one officer sent with a few men to collect provisions has neither time nor means to hunt out all the provisions that may be stored in a house1 often also he has not the means of transport2 he will therefore only be able to collect a small proportion of what is actually forthcoming4 ,besides1 in camps the troops are crowded together in such a manner at one point1 that the range of country from which provisions can be collected in a hurry is not of sufficient extent to furnish the whole of what is required4 ,what could be done in the way of supplying #cj1jjj men1 within a circle of a mile in diameter1 or from an area of three or four square miles8 ,moreover it would seldom be possible to collect even what there is1 for the most of the nearest adjacent villages would be occupied by small bodies of troops1 who would not allow anything to be removed4 ,lastly1 by such a measure there would be the greatest waste1 because some men would get more than they required1 whilst a great deal would be lost1 and of no benefit to any one4 ,the result is1 therefore1 that the subsistence of troops by forced contributions in this manner can only be adopted with success when the bodies of troops are not too large1 not exceeding a division of #h1jjj or #aj1jjj men1 and even then it is only to be resorted to as an unavoidable evil4 ,it cannot in general be avoided in the case of troops directly in front of the enemy1 such as advanced guards and outposts1 when the army is advancing1 because these bodies must arrive at points where no preparations could have been made1 and they are usually too far from the stores collected for the rest of the army2 further1 in the case of moveable columns acting independently2 and lastly1 in all cases where by chance there is neither time nor means to procure subsistence in any other way4 ,the more troops are accustomed to live by regular requisitions1 the more time and circumstances permit the adoption of that way of subsisting1 then the more satisfactory will be the result4 ,but time is generally wanting1 for what the troops get for themselves directly is got much quicker4 #c4--;,by regular requisitions4 ,this is unquestionably the simplest and most efficacious means of subsisting troops1 and it has been the basis of all modern wars4 ,it differs from the preceding way chiefly by its having the co-operation of the local authorities4 ,the supply in this case must not be carried off forcibly just from the spot where it is found1 but be regularly delivered according to an equitable division of the burden4 ,this division can only be made by the recognised official authorities of the country4 ,in this all depends on time4 ,the more time there is1 the more general can the division be made1 the less will it press on individuals1 and the more regular will be the result4 ,even purchases may be made with ready money to assist1 in which way it will approach the mode which follows next in order 7,magazines74 ,in all assemblages of troops in their own country there is no difficulty in subsisting by regular requisitions2 neither1 as a rule1 is there any in retrograde movements4 ,on the other hand1 in all movements into a country of which we are not in possession1 there is very little time for such arrangements1 seldom more than the one day which the advanced guard is in the habit of preceding the army4 ,with the advanced guard the requisitions are sent to the local officials1 specifying how many rations they are to have ready at such and such places4 ,as these can only be furnished from the immediate neighbourhood1 that is1 within a circuit of a couple of miles round each point1 the collections so made in haste will never be nearly sufficient for an army of considerable strength1 and consequently1 if the troops do not carry with them enough for several days1 they will run short4 ,it is therefore the duty of the commissariat to economise what is received1 and only to issue to those troops who have nothing4 ,with each succeeding day1 however1 the embarrassment diminishes2 that is to say1 if the distances from which provisions can be procured increase in proportion to the number of days1 then the superficial area over which the contributions can be levied increases as the squares of the distances gained4 ,if on the first day only four square miles have been drawn upon1 on the next day we shall have sixteen1 on the third1 thirty-six2 therefore on the second day twelve more than on the first1 and on the third day twenty more than on the second4 ,of course this is a mere rough estimate of what may take place1 subject to many modifying circumstances which may intervene1 of which the principal is1 that one district may not be capable of contributing like another4 ,but on the other hand1 we must also remember that the radius within which we can levy may increase more than two miles a day in width1 perhaps three or four1 or in many places still more4 ,the due execution of these requisitions is enforced by detachments placed under the orders of the official functionaries1 but still more by the fear of responsibility1 punishment1 and ill-treatment which1 in such cases1 like a general weight1 presses on the whole population4 ,however1 it is not our intention to enter into details--into the whole machinery of commissariat and army subsistence2 we have only results in view4 ,the result to be derived from a common-sense view of all the circumstances in general1 and the view which the experience of the wars since the ,french revolution tends to confirm is1--that even the largest army1 if it carries with it provisions for a few days1 may undoubtedly be subsisted by contributions which1 commencing at the moment of entering a country1 affect at first only the districts in the immediate vicinity of the army1 but afterwards1 in the course of time1 are levied on a greater scale1 over a range of country always increasing1 and with an ever increasing weight of authority4 ,this resource has no limits except those of the exhaustion1 impoverishment1 and devastation of the country4 ,when the stay of an invading army is of some duration1 the administration of this system at last is handed over to those in the highest official capacity2 and they naturally do all they can to equalise its pressure as much as possible1 and to alleviate the weight of the tax by purchases2 at the same time1 even an invader1 when his stay is prolonged in his enemy's country1 is not usually so barbarous and reckless as to lay upon that country the entire burden of his support2 thus the system of contributions of itself gradually approaches to that of magazines1 at the same time without ever ceasing altogether1 or sensibly losing any of that influence which it exercises on the operations of the war2 for there is a wide difference between a case in which some of the resources which have been drawn from a country are replaced by supplies brought from more distant parts 7the country1 however1 still remaining substantially the source on which the army depends for its supplies71 and the case of an army which--as in the eighteenth century--provides for all its wants from its own resources1 the country in which it is operating contributing1 as a rule1 nothing towards its support4 ,the great difference consists in two things1--namely1 the employment of the transport of the country1 and its ovens4 ,in this way1 that enormous burden of any army1 that incubus which is always destroying its own work1 a military transport train1 is almost got rid of4 ,it is true that even now no army can do entirely without some subsistence wagons1 but the number is immensely diminished1 and little more is required than sufficient to carry the surplus of one day on till the next4 ,peculiar circumstances1 as in ,russia in #ahab1 may even again compel an army to carry an enormous train1 and also field-ovens2 but in the first place these are exceptional cases2 for how seldom will it happen that #cjj1jjj men make a hostile advance of #acj miles upon almost a single road1 and that through countries such as ,poland and ,russia1 and shortly before the season of harvest2 and in the next place1 any means of supply attached to an army in such cases1 may be looked upon as only an assistance in case of need1 the contributions of the country being always regarded as the groundwork of the whole system of supply4 ,since the first campaigns of the ,french revolutionary war1 the requisition system has formed constantly the mainstay of their armies1 the armies opposed to them were also obliged to adopt the same system1 and it is not at all likely that it will ever be abandoned4 ,there is no other which can be substituted for it with the same results1 both as regards its simplicity and freedom from restraint1 and also as respects energy in the prosecution of the war4 ,as an army is seldom distressed for provisions during the first three or four weeks of a campaign whatever direction it takes1 and afterwards can be assisted by magazines1 we may very well say that by this method war has acquired the most perfect freedom of action4 ,certainly difficulties may be greater in one direction than in another1 and that may carry weight in preliminary deliberation2 but we can never encounter an absolute impossibility1 and the attention which is due to the subject of subsistence can never decide a question imperatively4 ,to this there is only one exception1 which is a retreat through an enemy's country4 ,in such a case many of the inconveniences connected with subsistence meet together4 ,the operation is one of a continuous nature1 generally carried on without a halt worth speaking of2 there is1 therefore1 no time to procure provisions2 the circumstances under which the operation commences are generally unfavourable1 it is therefore necessary to keep the troops in masses1 and a dispersion in cantonments1 or even any considerable extension in the width of the column cannot be allowed2 the hostile feeling of the country precludes the chance of any collection of contributions by mere orders issued without the support of a force capable of executing the order2 and1 lastly1 the moment is most auspicious for the inhabitants to give vent to their feelings by acts of hostility4 ,on account of all this1 an army so situated is generally obliged to confine itself strictly to its previously prepared lines of communication and retreat4 ,when ,buonaparte had to retreat in #ahab1 it was impossible for him to do so by any other line but the one upon which he had advanced1 on account of the subsistence of his army2 and if he had attempted any other he would only have plunged into more speedy and certain destruction2 all the censure therefore passed on him by even ,french writers as well as by others with regard to this point is sheer nonsense4 #d4--,subsistence from ,magazines4 ,if we are to make a generic distinction between this method of subsisting troops and the preceding1 it must be by an organisation such as existed for about thirty years at the close of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth century4 ,can this organisation ever reappear8 ,certainly we cannot conceive how it can be dispensed with if great armies are to be bound down for seven1 ten1 or twelve years long to one spot1 as they have been formerly in the ,netherlands1 on the ,rhine1 in ,upper ,italy1 ,silesia1 and ,saxony2 for what country can continue for such a length of time to endure the burden of two great armies1 making it the entire source of their supplies1 without being utterly ruined in the end1 and therefore gradually becoming unable to meet the demands8 ,but here naturally arises the question3 shall the war prescribe the system of subsistence1 or shall the latter dictate the nature of the war8 ,to this we answer3 the system of subsistence will control the war1 in the first place1 as far as the other conditions on which it depends permit2 but when the latter are encroached upon1 the war will react on the subsistence system1 and in such case determine the same4 ,a war carried on by means of the system of requisitions and local supplies furnished on the spot has such an advantage over one carried on in dependence on issues from magazines1 that the latter does not look at all like the same instrument4 ,no state will therefore venture to encounter the former with the latter2 and if any war minister should be so narrow-minded and blind to circumstances as to ignore the real relation which the two systems bear to each other1 by sending an army into the field to live upon the old system1 the force of circumstances would carry the commander of that army along with it in its course1 and the requisition system would burst forth of itself4 ,if we consider besides1 that the great expense attending such an organisation must necessarily reduce the extent of the armament in other respects1 including of course the actual number of combatant soldiers1 as no state has a superabundance of wealth1 then there seems no probability of any such organisation being again resorted to unless it should be adopted by the belligerents by mutual agreement1 an idea which is a mere play of the imagination4 ,wars therefore may be expected henceforward always to commence with the requisition system2 how much one or other government will do to supplement the same by an artificial organisation to spare their own country1 etc41 etc41 remains to be seen2 that it will not be overmuch we may be certain1 for at such moments the tendency is to look to the most urgent wants1 and an artificial system of subsisting troops does not come under that category4 ,but now1 if a war is not so decisive in its results1 if its operations are not so comprehensive as is consistent with its real nature1 then the requisition system will begin to exhaust the country in which it is carried on to that degree that either peace must be made1 or means must be found to lighten the burden on the country1 and to become independent of it for the supplies of the army4 ,the latter was the case of the ,french army under ,buonaparte in ,spain1 but the first happens much more frequently4 ,in most wars the exhaustion of the state increases to that degree that1 instead of thinking of prosecuting the war at a still greater expense1 the necessity for peace becomes so urgent as to be imperative4 ,thus from this point of view the modern method of carrying on war has a tendency to shorten the duration of wars4 ,at the same time we shall not positively deny the possibility of the old system of subsistence reappearing in future wars2 it will perhaps be resorted to by belligerents hereafter1 where the nature of their mutual relations urge them to it1 and circumstances are favourable to its adoption2 but we can never perceive in that system a natural organisation2 it is much rather an abnormal growth permitted by circumstances1 but which can never spring from war in its true sense4 ,still less can we consider that form or system as any improvement in war on the ground of its being more humane1 for war itself is not a humane proceeding4 ,whatever method of providing subsistence may be chosen1 it is but natural that it should be more easily carried out in rich and well-peopled countries1 than in the midst of a poor and scanty population4 ,that the population should be taken into consideration1 lies in the double relation which that element bears to the quantity of provisions to be found in a country3 first because1 where the consumption is large1 the provision to meet that consumption is also large2 and in the next place1 because as a rule a large population produces also largely4 ,from this we must certainly except districts peopled chiefly by manufacturers1 particularly when1 as is often the case1 such districts lie in mountain valleys surrounded by unproductive land2 but in the generality of cases it is always very much easier to feed troops in a well populated than in a thinly inhabited country4 ,an army of #ajj1jjj men cannot be supported on four hundred square miles inhabited by #djj1jjj people1 as well as it would be on four hundred square miles with a population of #b1jjj1jjj inhabitants1 even supposing the soil equally good in the two cases4 ,besides1 the roads and means of water-carriage are much better in rich countries and afford a greater choice1 being more numerous1 the means of transport are more abundant1 the commercial relations easier and more certain4 ,in a word1 there is infinitely less difficulty in supporting an army in ,flanders than in ,poland4 ,the consequence is1 that war with its manifold suckers fixes itself by preference along high roads1 near populous towns1 in the fertile valleys of large rivers1 or along such sea-coasts as are well frequented4 ,this shows clearly how the subsistence of troops may have a general influence upon the direction and form of military undertakings1 and upon the choice of a theatre of war and lines of communication4 ,the extent of this influence1 what weight shall attach to the facility or difficulty of provisioning the troops1 all that in the calculation depends very much on the way in which the war is to be conducted4 ,if it is to be carried on in its real spirit1 that is1 with the unbridled force which belongs to its element1 with a constant pressing forward to1 or seeking for the combat and decisive solution1 then the sustenance of the troops although an important1 is but a subordinate1 affair2 but if there is to be a state of equilibrium during which the armies move about here and there in the same province for several years1 then the subsistence must often become the principal thing1 the intendant the commander-in-chief1 and the conduct of the war an administration of wagons4 ,there are numberless campaigns of this kind in which nothing took place2 the plans miscarried1 the forces were used to no purpose1 the only excuse being the plea of a want of subsistence2 on the other hand ,buonaparte used to say 8,qu'on ne me parle pas des vivres60 ,certainly that general in the ,russian campaign proved that such recklessness may be carried too far1 for not to say that perhaps his whole campaign was ruined through that cause alone1 which at best would be only a supposition1 still it is beyond doubt that to his want of regard to the subsistence of his troops he was indebted for the extraordinary melting away of his army on his advance1 and for its utter ruin on the retreat4 ,but while fully recognising in ,buonaparte the eager gambler who ventures on many a mad extreme1 we may justly say that he and the revolutionary generals who preceded him dispelled a powerful prejudice in respect to the subsistence of troops1 and showed that it should never be looked upon in any other light than as a condition of war1 never as an object4 ,besides1 it is with privation in war just as with physical exertion and danger2 the demands which the general can make on his army are without any defined bounds2 an iron character demands more than a feeble sensitive man2 also the endurance of an army differs in degree1 according as habit1 military spirit1 confidence in and affection towards the commander1 or enthusiasm for the cause of fatherland1 sustain the will and energy of the soldier4 ,but this we may look upon as an established principle1 that privation and want1 however far they may be carried1 should never be otherwise regarded than as transition-states which should be succeeded by a state of abundance1 indeed even by superfluity4 ,can there be any thing more touching than the thought of so many thousand soldiers1 badly clothed1 with packs on their backs weighing thirty or forty pounds1 toiling over every kind of road1 in every description of weather1 for days and days continually on the march1 health and life for ever in peril1 and for all that unable to get a sufficiency of dry bread4 ,any one who knows how often this happens in war1 is at a loss to know how it does not oftener lead to a refusal of the will and powers to submit any longer to such exactions1 and how the mere bent constantly given to the imagination of human beings in one direction1 is capable of first calling forth1 and then supporting such incredible efforts4 ,let any one then1 who imposes great privations on his men because great objects demand such a trial of endurance1 always bear in mind as a matter of prudence1 if not prompted to it by his own feelings1 that there is a recompence for such sacrifices which he is bound to pay at some other time4 ,we have now to consider the difference which takes place in respect to the question of subsistence in war1 according as the action is offensive or defensive4 ,the defensive is in a position to make uninterrupted use of the subsistence which he has been able to lay in beforehand1 as long as his defensive act continues4 ,the defensive side therefore can hardly be in want of the necessaries of life1 particularly if he is in his own country2 but even in the enemy's this holds good4 ,the offensive on the other hand is moving away from his resources1 and as long as he is advancing1 and even during the first weeks after he stops1 must procure from day to day what he requires1 and this can very rarely be done without want and inconvenience being felt4 ,this difficulty is felt in its fullest force at two particular periods1 first in the advance1 before the decision takes place2 then the supplies of the defensive side are all at hand1 whilst the assailant has been obliged to leave his behind2 he is obliged to keep his masses concentrated1 and therefore cannot spread his army over any considerable space2 even his transport cannot keep close to him when he commences his movements preliminary to a battle4 ,if his preparations have not been very well made1 it may easily happen at this moment that his army may be in want of supplies for several days before the decisive battle1 which certainly is not a means of bringing them into the fight in the highest state of efficiency4 ,the second time a state of want arises is at the end of a victorious career1 if the lines of communication begin to be too long1 especially if the war is carried on in a poor1 sparsely-populated country1 and perhaps also in the midst of a people whose feelings are hostile4 ,what an enormous difference between a line of communication from ,wilna to ,moscow1 on which every carriage must be forcibly seized1 and a line from ,cologne by ,lige1 ,louvain1 ,brussels1 ,mons1 and ,valenciennes to ,paris1 where a mercantile contract or a bill of exchange would suffice to procure millions of rations4 ,frequently has the difficulty we are now speaking of resulted in obscuring the splendour of the most brilliant victories1 reduced the powers of the victorious army1 rendered retreat necessary1 and then by degrees ended in producing all the symptoms of a real defeat4 ,forage1 of which1 as we have before said1 there is usually at first the least deficiency1 will run short soonest if a country begins to become exhausted1 for it is the most difficult supply to procure from a distance1 on account of its bulk1 and the horse feels the effect of low feeding much sooner than the man4 ,for this reason1 an over-numerous cavalry and artillery may become a real burden1 and an element of weakness to an army4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,base of ,operations ,if an army sets out on any expedition1 whether it be to attack the enemy and his theatre of war1 or to take post on its own frontier1 it continues in a state of necessary dependence on the sources from which it draws its subsistence and reinforcements1 and must maintain its communication with them1 as they are the conditions of its existence and preservation4 ,this dependence increases in intensity and extent in proportion to the size of the army4 ,but now it is neither always possible nor requisite that the army should continue in direct communication with the whole of its own country2 it is sufficient if it does so with that portion immediately in its rear1 and which is consequently covered by its position4 ,in this portion of the country then1 as far as necessary1 special depts of provisions are formed1 and arrangements are made for regularly forwarding reinforcements and supplies4 ,this strip of territory is therefore the foundation of the army and of all its undertakings1 and the two must be regarded as forming in connection only one whole4 ,if the supplies for their greater security are lodged in fortified places1 the idea of a base becomes more distinct2 but the idea does not originate in any arrangement of that kind1 and in a number of cases no such arrangement is made4 ,but a portion of the enemy's territory may also become a base for our army1 or1 at least1 form part of it2 for when an army penetrates into an enemy's land1 a number of its wants are supplied from that part of the country which is taken possession of2 but it is then a necessary condition that we are completely masters of this portion of territory1 that is1 certain of our orders being obeyed within its limits4 ,this certainty1 however1 seldom extends beyond the reach of our ability to keep the inhabitants in awe by small garrisons1 and detachments moving about from place to place1 and that is not very far in general4 ,the consequence is1 that in the enemy's country1 the part of territory from which we can draw supplies is seldom of sufficient extent to furnish all the supplies we require1 and we must therefore still depend on our own land for much1 and this brings us back again to the importance of that part of our territory immediately in rear of our army as an indispensable portion of our base4 ,the wants of an army may be divided into two classes1 first those which every cultivated country can furnish2 and next those which can only be obtained from those localities where they are produced4 ,the first are chiefly provisions1 the second the means of keeping an army complete in every way4 ,the first can therefore be obtained in the enemy's country2 the second1 as a rule1 can only be furnished by our own country1 for example men1 arms1 and almost all munitions of war4 ,although there are exceptions to this classification in certain cases1 still they are few and trifling1 and the distinction we have drawn is of standing importance1 and proves again that the communication with our own country is indispensable4 ,depts of provisions and forage are generally formed in open towns1 both in the enemy's and in our own country1 because there are not as many fortresses as would be required for these bulky stores continually being consumed1 and wanted sometimes here1 sometimes there1 and also because their loss is much easier to replace2 on the other hand1 stores to keep the army complete1 such as arms1 munition of war1 and articles of equipment are never lodged in open places in the vicinity of the theatre of war if it can be avoided1 but are rather brought from a distance1 and in the enemy's country never stored anywhere but in fortresses4 ,from this point1 again1 it may be inferred that the base is of more importance in relation to supplies intended to refit an army than in relation to provisions for food4 ,now1 the more means of each kind are collected together in great magazines before being brought into use1 the more1 therefore1 all separate streams unite in great reservoirs1 so much the more may these be regarded as taking the place of the whole country1 and so much the more will the conception of a base fix itself upon these great depts of supply2 but this must never go so far that any such place becomes looked upon as constituting a base in itself alone4 ,if these sources of supply and refitment are abundant1 that is1 if the tracts of territory are wide and rich1 if the stores are collected in great depts to be more speedily brought into use1 if these depts are covered in a military sense in one way or another1 if they are in close proximity to the army and accessible by good roads1 if they extend along a considerable width in the rear of the army or surround it in part as well--then follows a greater vitality for the army1 as well as a greater freedom in its movements4 ,attempts have been made to sum up all the advantages which an army derives from being so situated in one single conception1 that is1 the extent of the base of operations4 ,by the relation which this base bears to the object of the undertakings1 by the angle which its extremities make with this object 7supposed as a point71 it has been attempted to express the whole sum of the advantages and disadvantages which accrue to an army from the position and nature of its sources of supply and equipment2 but it is plain this elegant piece of geometrical refinement is merely a play of fancy1 as it is founded on a series of substitutions which must all be made at the expense of truth4 ,as we have seen1 the base of an army is a triple formation in connection with the situation in which an army is placed3 the resources of the country adjacent to the position of the army1 the depts of stores which have been made at particular points1 and the province from which these stores are derived or collected4 ,these three things are separated in space1 and cannot be collected into one whole1 and least of all can we substitute for them a line which is to represent the width of the base1 a line which is generally imagined in a manner perfectly arbitrary1 either from one fortress to another or from one capital of a province to another1 or along a political boundary of a country4 ,neither can we determine precisely the mutual relation of these three steps in the formation of a base1 for in reality they blend themselves with each other always more or less4 ,in one case the surrounding country affords largely the means of refitting an army with things which otherwise could only be obtained from a long distance2 in another case we are obliged to get even food from a long distance4 ,sometimes the nearest fortresses are great arsenals1 ports1 or commercial cities1 which contain all the military resources of a whole state1 sometimes they are nothing but old1 feeble ramparts1 hardly sufficient for their own defence4 ,the consequence is that all deductions from the length of the base of operations and its angles1 and the whole theory of war founded on these data1 as far as its geometrical phase1 have never met with any attention in real war1 and in theory they have only caused wrong tendencies4 ,but as the basis of this chain of reasoning is a truth1 and only the conclusions drawn are false1 this same view will easily and frequently thrust itself forward again4 ,we think1 therefore1 that we cannot go beyond acknowledging generally the influence of a base on military enterprises1 that at the same time there are no means of framing out of this maxim any serviceable rules by a few abstract ideas2 but that in each separate case the whole of the things which we have specified must be kept in view together4 ,when once arrangements are made within a certain radius to provide the means of subsisting an army and keeping it complete in every respect1 and with a view to operations in a certain direction1 then1 even in our own country1 this district only is to be regarded as the base of the army2 and as any alteration of a base requires time and labour1 therefore an army cannot change its base every day1 even in its own country1 and this again limits it always more or less in the direction of its operations4 ,if1 then1 in operating against an enemy's country we take the whole line of our own frontier1 where it forms a boundary between the two countries as our base1 we may do so in a general sense1 in so far that we might make those preparations which constitute a base anywhere on that frontier2 but it will not be a base at any moment if preparations have not been already made everywhere4 ,when the ,russian army retreated before the ,french in #ahab1 at the beginning of the campaign the whole of ,russia might have been considered as its base1 the more so because the vast extent of the country offered the army abundance of space in any direction it might select4 ,this is no illusory notion1 as it was actually realised at a subsequent time1 when other ,russian armies from different quarters entered the field2 but still at every period throughout the campaign the base of the ,russian army was not so extensive2 it was principally confined to the road on which the whole train of transport to and from their army was organised4 ,this limitation prevented the ,russian army1 for instance1 from making the further retreat which became necessary after the three days' fighting at ,smolensk in any direction but that of ,moscow1 and so hindered their turning suddenly in the direction of ,kaluga1 as was proposed in order to draw the enemy away from ,moscow4 ,such a change of direction could only have been possible by having been prepared for long beforehand4 ,we have said that the dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the army1 which is easy to understand4 ,an army is like a tree4 ,from the ground out of which it grows it draws its nourishment2 if it is small it can easily be transplanted1 but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size4 ,a small body of troops has also its channels1 from which it draws the sustenance of life1 but it strikes root easily where it happens to be2 not so a large army4 ,when1 therefore1 we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an army1 the dimensions of the army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence4 ,further it is consistent with the nature of things that for the immediate wants of the present hour the subsistence is the main point1 but for the general efficiency of the army through a long period of time the refitment and recruitment are the more important1 because the latter can only be done from particular sources while the former may be obtained in many ways2 this again defines still more distinctly the influence of the base on the operations of the army4 ,however great that influence may be1 we must never forget that it belongs to those things which can only show a decisive effect after some considerable time1 and that therefore the question always remains what may happen in that time4 ,the value of a base of operations will seldom determine the choice of an undertaking in the first instance4 ,mere difficulties which may present themselves in this respect must be put side by side and compared with other means actually at our command2 obstacles of this nature often vanish before the force of decisive victories4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,lines of ,communication ,the roads which lead from the position of an army to those points in its rear where its depts of supply and means of recruiting and refitting its forces are principally united1 and which it also in all ordinary cases chooses for its retreat1 have a double signification2 in the first place1 they are its lines of communication for the constant nourishment of the combatant force1 and next they are roads of retreat4 ,we have said in the preceding chapter1 that1 although according to the present system of subsistence1 an army is chiefly fed from the district in which it is operating1 it must still be looked upon as forming a whole with its base4 ,the lines of communication belong to this whole2 they form the connection between the army and its base1 and are to be considered as so many great vital arteries4 ,supplies of every kind1 convoys of munitions1 detachments moving backwards and forwards1 posts1 orderlies1 hospitals1 depts1 reserves of stores1 agents of administration1 all these objects are constantly making use of these roads1 and the total value of these services is of the utmost importance to the army4 ,these great channels of life must therefore neither be permanently severed1 nor must they be of too great length1 or beset with difficulties1 because there is always a loss of strength on a long road1 which tends to weaken the condition of an army4 ,by their second purpose1 that is as lines of retreat1 they constitute in a real sense the strategic rear of the army4 ,for both purposes the value of these roads depends on their length1 their number1 their situation1 that is their general direction1 and their direction specially as regards the army1 their nature as roads1 difficulties of ground1 the political relations and feeling of local population1 and lastly1 on the protection they derive from fortresses or natural obstacles in the country4 ,but all the roads which lead from the point occupied by an army to its sources of existence and power1 are not on that account necessarily lines of communication for that army4 ,they may no doubt be used for that purpose1 and may be considered as supplementary of the system of communication1 but that system is confined to the lines regularly prepared for the purpose4 ,only those roads on which magazines1 hospitals1 stations1 posts for despatches and letters are organised under commandants with police and garrisons1 can be looked upon as real lines of communication4 ,but here a very important difference between our own and the enemy's army makes its appearance1 one which is often overlooked4 ,an army1 even in its own country1 has its prepared lines of communication1 but it is not completely limited to them1 and can in case of need change its line1 taking some other which presents itself1 for it is every where at home1 has officials in authority1 and the friendly feeling of the people4 ,therefore1 although other roads may not be as good as those at first selected there is nothing to prevent their being used1 and the use of them is not to be regarded as impossible in case the army is turned and obliged to change its front4 ,an army in an enemy's country on the contrary can as a rule only look upon those roads as lines of communication upon which it has advanced2 and hence arises through small and almost invisible causes a great difference in operating4 ,the army in the enemy's country takes under its protection the organisation which1 as it advances1 it necessarily introduces to form its lines of communication2 and in general1 inasmuch as terror1 and the presence of an enemy's army in the country invests these measures in the eyes of the inhabitants with all the weight of unalterable necessity1 the inhabitants may even be brought to regard them as an alleviation of the evils inseparable from war4 ,small garrisons left behind in different places support and maintain this system4 ,but if these commissaries1 commandants of stations1 police1 fieldposts1 and the rest of the apparatus of administration1 were sent to some distant road upon which the army had not been seen1 the inhabitants then would look upon such measures as a burden which they would gladly get rid of1 and if the most complete defeats and catastrophes had not previously spread terror throughout the land1 the probability is that these functionaries would be treated as enemies1 and driven away with very rough usage4 ,therefore in the first place it would be necessary to establish garrisons to subjugate the new line1 and these garrisons would require to be of more than ordinary strength1 and still there would always be a danger of the inhabitants rising and attempting to overpower them4 ,in short1 an army marching into an enemy's country is destitute of the mechanism through which obedience is rendered2 it has to institute its officials into their places1 which can only be done by a strong hand1 and this cannot be effected thoroughly without sacrifices and difficulties1 nor is it the work of a moment--,from this it follows that a change of the system of communication is much less easy of accomplishment in an enemy's country than in our own1 where it is at least possible2 and it also follows that the army is more restricted in its movements1 and must be much more sensitive about any demonstrations against its communications4 ,but the choice and organisation of lines of communication is from the very commencement subject also to a number of conditions by which it is restricted4 ,not only must they be in a general sense good high roads1 but they will be the more serviceable the wider they are1 the more populous and wealthy towns they pass through1 the more strong places there are which afford them protection4 ,rivers1 also1 as means of water communication1 and bridges as points of passage1 have a decisive weight in the choice4 ,it follows from this that the situation of a line of communication1 and consequently the road by which an army proceeds to commence the offensive1 is only a matter of free choice up to a certain point1 its situation being dependent on certain geographical relations4 ,all the foregoing circumstances taken together determine the strength or weakness of the communication of an army with its base1 and this result1 compared with one similarly obtained with regard to the enemy's communications1 decides which of the two opponents is in a position to operate against the other's lines of communication1 or to cut off his retreat1 that is1 in technical language to turn him4 ,setting aside all considerations of moral or physical superiority1 that party can only effectually accomplish this whose communications are the strongest of the two1 for otherwise the enemy saves himself in the shortest mode1 by a counterstroke4 ,now this turning can1 by reason of the double signification of these lines1 have also two purposes4 ,either the communications may be interfered with and interrupted1 that the enemy may melt away by degrees from want1 and thus be compelled to retreat1 or the object may be directly to cut off the retreat4 ,with regard to the first1 we have to observe that a mere momentary interruption will seldom have any effect while armies are subsisted as they now are2 a certain time is requisite to produce an effect in this way in order that the losses of the enemy by frequent repetition may compensate in number for the small amount he suffers in each case4 ,one single enterprise against the enemy's flank1 which might have been a decisive stroke in those days when thousands of bread-waggons traversed the lines of communication1 carrying out the systematised method then in force for subsisting troops1 would hardly produce any effect now1 if ever so successful2 one convoy at most might be seized1 which would cause the enemy some partial damage1 but never compel him to retreat4 ,the consequence is1 that enterprises of this description on a flank1 which have always been more in fashion in books than in real warfare1 now appear less of a practical nature than ever1 and we may safely say that there is no danger in this respect to any lines of communication but such as are very long1 and otherwise unfavourably circumstanced1 more especially by being exposed everywhere and at any moment to attacks from an insurgent population4 ,with respect to the cutting off an enemy's retreat1 we must not be overconfident in this respect either of the consequences of threatening or closing the enemy's lines of retreat1 as recent experience has shown that1 when troops are good and their leader resolute1 it is more difficult to make them prisoners1 than it is for them to cut their way through the force opposed to them4 ,the means of shortening and protecting long lines of communication are very limited4 ,the seizure of some fortresses adjacent to the position taken up by the army1 and on the roads leading to the rear--or in the event of there being no fortresses in the country1 the construction of temporary defences at suitable points--the kind treatment of the people of the country1 strict discipline on the military roads1 good police1 and active measures to improve the roads1 are the only means by which the evil may be diminished1 but it is one which can never be entirely removed4 ,furthermore1 what we said when treating of the question of subsistence with respect to the roads which the army should chose by preference1 applies also particularly to lines of communication4 ,the best lines of communication are roads leading through the most flourishing towns and the most important provinces2 they ought to be preferred1 even if considerably longer1 and in most cases they exercise an important influence on the definitive disposition of the army4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,on ,country and ,ground ,quite irrespective of their influence as regards the means of subsistence of an army1 country and ground bear another most intimate and never-failing relation to the business of war1 which is their decisive influence on the battle1 both upon what concerns its course1 as well as upon the preparation for it1 and the use to be made of it4 ,we now proceed to consider country and ground in this phase1 that is1 in the full meaning of the ,french expression 8,terrain40 ,the way to make use of them is a subject which lies mostly within the province of tactics1 but the effects resulting from them appear in strategy2 a battle in the mountains is1 in its consequences as well as in itself1 quite a different thing from a battle on a level plain4 ,but until we have studied the distinction between offensive and defensive1 and examined the nature of each separately and fully1 we cannot enter upon the consideration of the principal features of the ground in their effects2 we must therefore for the present confine ourselves to an investigation of its general properties4 ,there are three properties through which the ground has an influence on action in war2 that is1 as presenting an obstacle to approach1 as an obstacle to an extensive view1 and as protection against the effect of fire-arms2 all other effects may be traced back to these three4 ,unquestionably this threefold influence of ground has a tendency to make warfare more diversified1 more complicated1 and more scientific1 for they are plainly three more quantities which enter into military combinations4 ,a completely level plain1 quite open at the same time1 that is1 a tract of country which cannot influence war at all1 has no existence except in relation to small bodies of troops1 and with respect to them only for the duration of some given moment of time4 ,when larger bodies are concerned1 and a longer duration of time1 accidents of ground mix themselves up with the action of such bodies1 and it is hardly possible in the case of a whole army to imagine any particular moment1 such as a battle1 when the ground would not make its influence felt4 ,this influence is therefore never in abeyance1 but it is certainly stronger or weaker according to the nature of the country4 ,if we keep in view the great mass of topographical phenomena we find that countries deviate from the idea of perfectly open level plains principally in three ways3 first by the form of the ground1 that is1 hills and valleys2 then by woods1 marshes1 and lakes as natural features2 and lastly1 by such changes as have been introduced by the hand of man4 ,through each of these three circumstances there is an increase in the influence of ground on the operations of war4 ,if we trace them up to a certain distance we have mountainous country1 a country little cultivated and covered with woods and marshes1 and the well cultivated4 ,the tendency in each case is to render war more complicated and connected with art4 ,the degree of influence which cultivation exercises is greater or less according to the nature of the cultivation2 the system pursued in ,flanders1 ,holstein1 and some other countries1 where the land is intersected in every direction with ditches1 dykes1 hedges1 and walls1 interspersed with many single dwellings and small woods has the greatest effect on war4 ,the conduct of war is therefore of the easiest kind in a level moderately-cultivated country4 ,this however only holds good in quite a general sense1 leaving entirely out of consideration the use which the defensive can make of obstacles of ground4 ,each of these three kinds of ground has an effect in its own way on movement1 on the range of sight1 and in the cover it affords4 ,in a thickly-wooded country the obstacle to sight preponderates2 in a mountainous country1 the difficulty of movement presents the greatest obstacle to an enemy2 in countries very much cultivated both these obstacles exist in a medium degree4 ,as thick woods render great portions of ground in a certain manner impracticable for military movements1 and as1 besides the difficulty which they oppose to movement they also obstruct the view1 thereby preventing the use of means to clear a passage1 the result is that they simplify the measures to be adopted on one side in proportion as they increase the difficulties with which the other side has to contend4 ,although it is difficult practically to concentrate forces for action in a wooded country1 still a partition of forces does not take place to the same extent as it usually does in a mountainous country1 or in a country very much intersected with canals1 rivers1 c43 in other words1 the partition of forces in such a country is more unavoidable but not so great4 ,in mountains1 the obstacles to movement preponderate and take effect in two ways1 because in some parts the country is quite impassable1 and where it is practicable we must move slower and with greater difficulty4 ,on this account the rapidity of all movements is much diminished in mountains1 and all operations are mixed up with a larger quantity of the element of time4 ,but the ground in mountains has also the special property peculiar to itself1 that one point commands another4 ,we shall devote the following chapter to the discussion of the subject of commanding heights generally1 and shall only here remark that it is this peculiarity which causes the great partition of forces in operations carried on amongst mountains1 for particular points thus acquire importance from the influence they have upon other points in addition to any intrinsic value which they have in themselves4 ,as we have elsewhere observed1 each of these three kinds of ground in proportion as its own special peculiarity has a tendency to an extreme1 has in the same degree a tendency to lower the influence of the supreme command1 increasing in like manner the independent action of subordinates down to the private soldier4 ,the greater the partition of any force1 the less an undivided control is possible1 so much the more are subordinates left to themselves2 that is self-evident4 ,certainly when the partition of a force is greater1 then through the diversity of action and greater scope in the use of means the influence of intelligence must increase1 and even the commander-in-chief may show his talents to advantage under such circumstances2 but we must here repeat what has been said before1 that in war the sum total of single results decides more than the form or method in which they are connected1 and therefore1 if we push our present considerations to an extreme case1 and suppose a whole army extended in a line of skirmishers so that each private soldier fights his own little battle1 more will depend on the sum of single victories gained than on the form in which they are connected2 for the benefit of good combinations can only follow from positive results1 not from negative4 ,therefore in such a case the courage1 the dexterity1 and the spirit of individuals will prove decisive4 ,it is only when two opposing armies are on a par as regards military qualities1 or that their peculiar properties hold the balance even1 that the talent and judgment of the commander become again decisive4 ,the consequence is that national armies and insurgent levies1 etc41 etc41 in which1 at least in the individual1 the warlike spirit is highly excited1 although they are not superior in skill and bravery1 are still able to maintain a superiority by a great dispersion of their forces favoured by a difficult country1 and that they can only maintain themselves for a continuance upon that kind of system1 because troops of this description are generally destitute of all the qualities and virtues which are indispensable when tolerably large numbers are required to act as a united body4 ,also in the nature of forces there are many gradations between one of these extremes and the other1 for the very circumstance of being engaged in the defence of its own country gives to even a regular standing army something of the character of a national army1 and makes it more suited for a war waged by an army broken up into detachments4 ,now the more these qualifications and influences are wanting in an army1 the greater they are on the side of its opponent1 so much the more will it dread being split into fractions1 the more it will avoid a broken country2 but to avoid fighting in such a description of country is seldom a matter of choice2 we cannot choose a theatre of war like a piece of merchandise from amongst several patterns1 and thus we find generally that armies which from their nature fight with advantage in concentrated masses1 exhaust all their ingenuity in trying to carry out their system as far as possible in direct opposition to the nature of the country4 ,they must in consequence submit to other disadvantages1 such as scanty and difficult subsistence for the troops1 bad quarters1 and in the combat numerous attacks from all sides2 but the disadvantage of giving up their own special advantage would be greater4 ,these two tendencies in opposite directions1 the one to concentration the other to dispersion of forces1 prevail more or less according as the nature of the troops engaged incline them more to one side or the other1 but however decided the tendency1 the one side cannot always remain with his forces concentrated1 neither can the other expect success by following his system of warfare in scattered bodies on all occasions4 ,the ,french were obliged to resort to partitioning their forces in ,spain1 and the ,spaniards1 whilst defending their country by means of an insurgent population1 were obliged to try the fate of great battles in the open field with part of their forces4 ,next to the connection which country and ground have with the general1 and especially with the political1 composition of the forces engaged1 the most important point is the relative proportion of the three arms4 ,in all countries which are difficult to traverse1 whether the obstacles are mountains1 forests1 or a peculiar cultivation1 a numerous cavalry is useless3 that is plain in itself2 it is just the same with artillery in wooded countries2 there will probably be a want of room to use it with effect1 of roads to transport it1 and of forage for the horses4 ,for this arm highly cultivated countries are less disadvantageous1 and least of all a mountainous country4 ,both1 no doubt1 afford cover against its fire1 and in that respect they are unfavourable to an arm which depends entirely on its fire3 both also often furnish means for the enemy's infantry to place the heavy artillery in jeopardy1 as infantry can pass anywhere2 but still in neither is there in general any want of space for the use of a numerous artillery1 and in mountainous countries it has this great advantage1 that its effects are prolonged and increased in consequence of the movements of the enemy being slower4 ,but it is undeniable that infantry has a decided advantage over every other arm in difficult country1 and that1 therefore1 in such a country its number may considerably exceed the usual proportion4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,command of ,ground ,the word 8command0 has a charm in the art of war peculiar to itself1 and in fact to this element belongs a great part1 perhaps half the influence which ground exercises on the use of troops4 ,here many of the sacred relics of military erudition have their root1 as1 for instance1 commanding positions1 key positions1 strategic manuvres1 etc4 ,we shall take as clear a view of the subject as we can without prolixity1 and pass in review the true and the false1 reality and exaggeration4 ,every exertion of physical force if made upwards is more difficult than if it is made in the contrary direction 7downwards72 consequently it must be so in fighting2 and there are three evident reasons why it is so4 ,first1 every height may be regarded as an obstacle to approach2 secondly1 although the range is not perceptibly greater in shooting down from a height1 yet1 all geometrical relations being taken into consideration1 we have a better chance of hitting than in the opposite case2 thirdly1 an elevation gives a better command of view4 ,how all these advantages unite themselves together in battle we are not concerned with here2 we collect the sum total of the advantages which tactics derives from elevation of position and combine them in one whole which we regard as the first strategic advantage4 ,but the first and last of these advantages that have been enumerated must appear once more as advantages of strategy itself1 for we march and reconnoitre in strategy as well as in tactics2 if1 therefore1 an elevated position is an obstacle to the approach of those on lower ground1 that is the second2 and the better command of view which this elevated position affords is the third advantage which strategy may derive in this way4 ,of these elements is composed the power of dominating1 overlooking1 commanding2 from these sources springs the sense of superiority and security which is felt in standing on the brow of a hill and looking at the enemy below1 and the feeling of weakness and apprehension which pervades the minds of those below4 ,perhaps the total impression made is at the same time stronger than it ought to be1 because the advantage of the higher ground strikes the senses more than the circumstances which modify that advantage4 ,perhaps the impression made surpasses that which the truth warrants1 in which case the effect of imagination must be regarded as a new element1 which exaggerates the effect produced by an elevation of ground4 ,at the same time the advantage of greater facility of movement is not absolute1 and not always in favour of the side occupying the higher position2 it is only so when his opponent wishes to attack him2 it is not if the combatants are separated by a great valley1 and it is actually in favour of the army on the lower ground if both wish to fight in the plain 7battle of ,hohenfriedberg74 ,also the power of overlooking1 or command of view1 has likewise great limitations4 ,a wooded country in the valley below1 and often the very masses of the mountains themselves on which we stand1 obstruct the vision4 ,countless are the cases in which we might seek in vain on the spot for those advantages of an elevated position which a map would lead us to expect2 and we might often be led to think we had only involved ourselves in all kinds of disadvantages1 the very opposite of the advantages we counted upon4 ,but these limitations and conditions do not abrogate or destroy the superiority which the more elevated position confers1 both on the defensive and offensive4 ,we shall point out1 in a few words1 how this is the case with each4 ,out of the three strategic advantages of the more elevated ground1 the greater tactical strength1 the more difficult approach1 and the better view1 the first two are of such a nature that they belong really to the defensive only2 for it is only in holding firmly to a position that we can make use of them1 whilst the other side 7offensive7 in moving cannot remove them and take them with him2 but the third advantage can be made use of by the offensive just as well as by the defensive4 ,from this it follows that the more elevated ground is highly important to the defensive1 and as it can only be maintained in a decisive way in mountainous countries1 therefore it would seem to follow1 as a consequence1 that the defensive has an important advantage in mountain positions4 ,how it is that1 through other circumstances1 this is not so in reality1 we shall show in the chapter on the defence of mountains4 ,we must first of all make a distinction if the question relates merely to commanding ground at one single point1 as1 for example1 a position for an army2 in such case the strategic advantages rather merge in the tactical one of a battle fought under advantageous circumstances2 but if now we imagine a considerable tract of country--suppose a whole province--as a regular slope1 like the declivity at a general watershed1 so that we can make several marches1 and always hold the upper ground1 then the strategic advantages become greater1 because we can now use the advantages of the more elevated ground not only in the combination of our forces with each other for one particular combat1 but also in the combination of several combats with one another4 ,thus it is with the defensive4 ,as regards the offensive1 it enjoys to a certain extent the same advantages as the defensive from the more elevated ground2 for this reason that the stragetic attack is not confined to one act like the tactical4 ,the strategic advance is not the continuous movement of a piece of wheelwork2 it is made in single marches with a longer or shorter interval between them1 and at each halting point the assailant is just as much acting on the defensive as his adversary4 ,through the advantage of a better view of the surrounding country1 an elevated position confers1 in a certain measure1 on the offensive as well as the defensive1 a power of action which we must not omit to notice2 it is the facility of operating with separate masses4 ,for each portion of a force separately derives the same advantages which the whole derives from this more elevated position2 by this--a separate corps1 let it be strong or weak in numbers1 is stronger than it would otherwise be1 and we can venture to take up a position with less danger than we could if it had not that particular property of being on an elevation4 ,the advantages which are to be derived from such separate bodies of troops is a subject for another place4 ,if the possession of more elevated ground is combined with other geographical advantages which are in our favour1 if the enemy finds himself cramped in his movements from other causes1 as1 for instance1 by the proximity of a large river1 such disadvantages of his position may prove quite decisive1 and he may feel that he cannot too soon relieve himself from such a position4 ,no army can maintain itself in the valley of a great river if it is not in possession of the heights on each side by which the valley is formed4 ,the possession of elevated ground may therefore become virtually command1 and we can by no means deny that this idea represents a reality4 ,but nevertheless the expressions 8commanding ground10 8sheltering position10 8key of the country10 in so far as they are founded on the nature of heights and descents1 are hollow shells without any sound kernel4 ,these imposing elements of theory have been chiefly resorted to in order to give a flavour to the seeming commonplace of military combinations2 they have become the darling themes of learned soldiers1 the magical wands of adepts in strategy1 and neither the emptiness of these fanciful conceits1 nor the frequent contradictions which have been given to them by the results of experience have sufficed to convince authors1 and those who read their books1 that with such phraseology they are drawing water in the leaky vessel of the ,danaides4 ,the conditions have been mistaken for the thing itself1 the instrument for the hand4 ,the occupation of such and such a position or space of ground1 has been looked upon as an exercise of power like a thrust or a cut1 the ground or position itself as a substantive quantity2 whereas the one is like the lifting of the arm1 the other is nothing but the lifeless instrument1 a mere property which can only realise itself upon an object1 a mere sign of plus or minus which wants the figures or quantities4 ,this cut and thrust1 this object1 this quantity1 is a victorious battle2 it alone really counts2 with it only can we reckon2 and we must always have it in view1 as well in giving a critical judgment in literature as in real action in the field4 ,consequently1 if nothing but the number and value of victorious combats decides in war1 it is plain that the comparative value of the opposing armies and ability of their respective leaders again rank as the first points for consideration1 and that the part which the influence of ground plays can only be one of an inferior grade4 ,,book ,,vi ,,defence ,,chapter ,i4 ,offence and ,defence #a4--;,conception of ,defence4 ,what is defence in conception8 ,the warding off a blow4 ,what is then its characteristic sign8 ,the state of expectancy 7or of waiting for this blow74 ,this is the sign by which we always recognise an act as of a defensive character1 and by this sign alone can the defensive be distinguished from the offensive in war4 ,but inasmuch as an absolute defence completely contradicts the idea of war1 because there would then be war carried on by one side only1 it follows that the defence in war can only be relative and the above distinguishing signs must therefore only be applied to the essential idea or general conception3 it does not apply to all the separate acts which compose the war4 ,a partial combat is defensive if we receive the onset1 the charge of the enemy2 a battle is so if we receive the attack1 that is1 wait for the appearance of the enemy before our position and within range of our fire2 a campaign is defensive if we wait for the entry of the enemy into our theatre of war4 ,in all these cases the sign of waiting for and warding off belongs to the general conception1 without any contradiction arising with the conception of war1 for it may be to our advantage to wait for the charge against our bayonets1 or the attack on our position or our theatre of war4 ,but as we must return the enemy's blows if we are really to carry on war on our side1 therefore this offensive act in defensive war takes place more or less under the general title defensive--that is to say1 the offensive of which we make use falls under the conception of position or theatre of war4 ,we can1 therefore1 in a defensive campaign fight offensively1 in a defensive battle we may use some divisions for offensive purposes1 and lastly1 while remaining in position awaiting the enemy's onslaught1 we still make use of the offensive by sending at the same time balls into the enemy's ranks4 ,the defensive form in war is therefore no mere shield but a shield formed of blows delivered with skill4 #b4--;,advantages of the ,defensive4 ,what is the object of defence8 ,to preserve4 ,to preserve is easier than to acquire2 from which follows at once that the means on both sides being supposed equal1 the defensive is easier than the offensive4 ,but in what consists the greater facility of preserving or keeping possession8 ,in this1 that all time which is not turned to any account falls into the scale in favour of the defence4 ,he reaps where he has not sowed4 ,every suspension of offensive action1 either from erroneous views1 from fear or from indolence1 is in favour of the side acting defensively4 ,this advantage saved the ,state of ,prussia from ruin more than once in the ,seven ,years' ,war4 ,it is one which derives itself from the conception and object of the defensive1 lies in the nature of all defence1 and in ordinary life1 particularly in legal business which bears so much resemblance to war1 it is expressed by the ,latin proverb1 ,beati sunt possidentes4 ,another advantage arising from the nature of war and belonging to it exclusively1 is the aid afforded by locality or ground2 this is one of which the defensive form has a preferential use4 ,having established these general ideas we now turn more directly to the subject4 ,in tactics every combat1 great or small1 is defensive if we leave the initiative to the enemy1 and wait for his appearance in our front4 ,from that moment forward we can make use of all offensive means without losing the said two advantages of the defence1 namely1 that of waiting for1 and that of ground4 ,in strategy1 at first1 the campaign represents the battle1 and the theatre of war the position2 but afterwards the whole war takes the place of the campaign1 and the whole country that of the theatre of war1 and in both cases the defensive remains that which it was in tactics4 ,it has been already observed in a general way that the defensive is easier than the offensive2 but as the defensive has a negative object1 that of preserving1 and the offensive a positive object that of conquering1 and as the latter increases our own means of carrying on war1 but the preserving does not1 therefore in order to express ourselves distinctly1 we must say1 that the defensive form of war is in itself stronger than the offensive4 ,this is the result we have been desirous of arriving at2 for although it lies completely in the nature of the thing1 and has been confirmed by experience a thousand times1 still it is completely contrary to prevalent opinion--a proof how ideas may be confused by superficial writers4 ,if the defensive is the stronger form of conducting war1 but has a negative object1 it follows of itself that we must only make use of it so long as our weakness compels us to do so1 and that we must give up that form as soon as we feel strong enough to aim at the positive object4 ,now as the state of our circumstances is usually improved in the event of our gaining a victory through the assistance of the defensive1 it is therefore1 also1 the natural course in war to begin with the defensive1 and to end with the offensive4 ,it is therefore just as much in contradiction with the conception of war to suppose the defensive the ultimate object of the war as it was a contradiction to understand passivity to belong to all the parts of the defensive1 as well as to the defensive as a whole4 ,in other words3 a war in which victories are merely used to ward off blows1 and where there is no attempt to return the blow1 would be just as absurd as a battle in which the most absolute defence 7passivity7 should everywhere prevail in all measures4 ,against the justice of this general view many examples might be quoted in which the defensive continued defensive to the last1 and the assumption of the offensive was never contemplated2 but such an objection could only be urged if we lost sight of the fact that here the question is only about general ideas 7abstract ideas71 and that examples in opposition to the general conception we are discussing are all of them to be looked upon as cases in which the time for the possibility of offensive reaction had not yet arrived4 ,in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 at least in the last three years of it1 ,frederick the ,great did not think of an offensive2 indeed we believe further1 that generally speaking1 he only acted on the offensive at any time in this war as the best means of defending himself2 his whole situation compelled him to this course1 and it is natural that a general should aim more immediately at that which is most in accordance with the situation in which he is placed for the time being4 ,nevertheless1 we cannot look at this example of a defence upon a great scale without supposing that the idea of a possible counterstroke against ,austria lay at the bottom of the whole of it1 and saying to ourselves1 the moment for that counterstroke had not arrived before the war came to a close4 ,the conclusion of peace shows that this idea is not without foundation even in this instance2 for what could have actuated the ,austrians to make peace except the thought that they were not in a condition with their own forces alone to make head against the talent of the king2 that to maintain an equilibrium their exertions must be greater than heretofore1 and that the slightest relaxation of their efforts would probably lead to fresh losses of territory4 ,and1 in fact1 who can doubt that if ,russia1 ,sweden1 and the army of the ,german ,empire had ceased to act together against ,frederick the ,great he would have tried to conquer the ,austrians again in ,bohemia and ,moravia8 ,having thus defined the true meaning of the defensive1 having defined its boundaries1 we return again to the assertion that the defensive is the stronger form of making war4 ,upon a closer examination1 and comparison of the offensive and defensive1 this will appear perfectly plain2 but for the present we shall confine ourselves to noticing the contradiction in which we should be involved with ourselves1 and with the results of experience by maintaining the contrary to be the fact4 ,if the offensive form was the stronger there would be no further occasion ever to use the defensive1 as it has merely a negative object1 every one would be for attacking1 and the defensive would be an absurdity4 ,on the other hand1 it is very natural that the higher object should be purchased by greater sacrifices4 ,whoever feels himself strong enough to make use of the weaker form has it in his power to aim at the greater object2 whoever sets before himself the smaller object can only do so in order to have the benefit of the stronger form--,if we look to experience1 such a thing is unheard of as any one carrying on a war upon two different theatres--offensively on one with the weaker army1 and defensively on the other with his strongest force ,but if the reverse of this has everywhere and at all times taken place that shows plainly that generals although their own inclination prompts them to the offensive1 still hold the defensive to be the stronger form4 ,we have still in the next chapters to explain some preliminary points4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,relations of the ,offensive and ,defensive to ,each ,other in ,tactics ,first of all we must inquire into the circumstances which give the victory in a battle4 ,of superiority of numbers1 and bravery1 discipline1 or other qualities of an army1 we say nothing here1 because1 as a rule1 they depend on things which lie out of the province of the art of war in the sense in which we are now considering it2 besides which they exercise the same effect in the offensive as the defensive2 and1 moreover also1 the superiority in numbers in general cannot come under consideration here1 as the number of troops is likewise a given quantity or condition1 and does not depend on the will or pleasure of the general4 ,further1 these things have no particular connection with attack and defence4 ,but1 irrespective of these things1 there are other three which appear to us of decisive importance1 these are3 surprise1 advantage of ground1 and the attack from several quarters4 ,the surprise produces an effect by opposing to the enemy a great many more troops than he expected at some particular point4 ,the superiority in numbers in this case is very different to a general superiority of numbers2 it is the most powerful agent in the art of war4--,the way in which the advantage of ground contributes to the victory is intelligible enough of itself1 and we have only one observation to make which is1 that we do not confine our remarks to obstacles which obstruct the advance of an enemy1 such as scarped grounds1 high hills1 marshy streams1 hedges1 inclosures1 etc42 we also allude to the advantage which ground affords as cover1 under which troops are concealed from view4 ,indeed we may say that even from ground which is quite unimportant a person acquainted with the locality may derive assistance4 ,the attack from several quarters includes in itself all tactical turning movements great and small1 and its effects are derived partly from the double execution obtained in this way from fire-arms1 and partly from the enemy's dread of his retreat being cut off4 ,now how do the offensive and defensive stand respectively in relation to these things8 ,having in view the three principles of victory just described1 the answer to this question is1 that only a small portion of the first and last of these principles is in favour of the offensive1 whilst the greater part of them1 and the whole of the second principle1 are at the command of the party acting defensively4 ,the offensive side can only have the advantage of one complete surprise of the whole mass with the whole1 whilst the defensive is in a condition to surprise incessantly1 throughout the whole course of the combat1 by the force and form which he gives to his partial attacks4 ,the offensive has greater facilities than the defensive for surrounding and cutting off the whole1 as the latter is in a manner in a fixed position while the former is in a state of movement having reference to that position4 ,but the superior advantage for an enveloping movement1 which the offensive possesses1 as now stated1 is again limited to a movement against the whole mass2 for during the course of the combat1 and with separate divisions of the force1 it is easier for the defensive than for the offensive to make attacks from several quarters1 because1 as we have already said1 the former is in a better situation to surprise by the force and form of his attacks4 ,that the defensive in an especial manner enjoys the assistance which ground affords is plain in itself2 as to what concerns the advantage which the defensive has in surprising by the force and form of his attacks1 that results from the offensive being obliged to approach by roads and paths where he may be easily observed1 whilst the defensive conceals his position1 and1 until almost the decisive moment1 remains invisible to his opponent4--,since the true method of defence has been adopted1 reconnaissances have gone quite out of fashion1 that is to say1 they have become impossible4 ,certainly reconnaissances are still made at times1 but they seldom bring home much with them4 ,immense as is the advantage of being able to examine well a position1 and become perfectly acquainted with it before a battle1 plain as it is that he 7the defensive7 who lies in wait near such a chosen position can much more easily effect a surprise than his adversary1 yet still to this very hour the old notion is not exploded that a battle which is accepted is half lost4 ,this comes from the old kind of defensive practised twenty years ago1 and partly also in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 when the only assistance expected from the ground was that it should be difficult of approach in front 7by steep mountain slopes1 etc41 etc471 when the little depth of the positions and the difficulty of moving the flanks produced such weakness that the armies dodged one another from one hill to another1 which increased the evil4 ,if some kind of support were found on which to rest the wings1 then all depended on preventing the army stretched along between these points1 like a piece of work on an embroidery frame1 from being broken through at any point4 ,the ground occupied possessed a direct value at every point1 and therefore a direct defence was required everywhere4 ,under such circumstances1 the idea of making a movement or attempting a surprise during the battle could not be entertained2 it was the exact reverse of what constitutes a good defence1 and of that which the defence has actually become in modern warfare4 ,in reality1 contempt for the defensive has always been the result of some particular method of defence having become worn out 7outlived its period72 and this was just the case with the method we have now mentioned1 for in times antecedent to the period we refer to1 that very method was superior to the offensive4 ,if we go through the progressive development of the modern art of war1 we find that at the commencement--that is the ,thirty ,years' ,war and the war of the ,spanish ,succession--the deployment and drawing up of the army in array1 was one of the great leading points connected with the battle4 ,it was the most important part of the plan of the battle4 ,this gave the defensive1 as a rule1 a great advantage1 as he was already drawn up and deployed4 ,as soon as the troops acquired greater capability of manuvring1 this advantage ceased1 and the superiority passed over to the side of the offensive for a time4 ,then the defensive sought shelter behind rivers or deep valleys1 or on high land4 ,the defensive thus recovered the advantage1 and continued to maintain it until the offensive acquired such increased mobility and expertness in manuvring that he himself could venture into broken ground and attack in separate columns1 and therefore became able to turn his adversary4 ,this led to a gradual increase in the length of positions1 in consequence of which1 no doubt1 it occurred to the offensive to concentrate at a few points1 and break through the enemy's thin line4 ,the offensive thus1 for a third time1 gained the ascendancy1 and the defence was again obliged to alter its system4 ,this it has done in recent wars by keeping its forces concentrated in large masses1 the greater part not deployed1 and1 where possible1 concealed1 thus merely taking up a position in readiness to act according to the measures of the enemy as soon as they are sufficiently revealed4 ,this does not preclude a partially passive defence of the ground2 its advantage is too great for it not to be used a hundred times in a campaign4 ,but that kind of passive defence of the ground is usually no longer the principal affair3 that is what we have to do with here4 ,if the offensive should discover some new and powerful element which it can bring to its assistance--an event not very probable1 seeing the point of simplicity and natural order to which all is now brought--then the defence must again alter its method4 ,but the defensive is always certain of the assistance of ground1 which insures to it in general its natural superiority1 as the special properties of country and ground exercise a greater influence than ever on actual warfare4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,relations of the ,offensive and ,defensive to ,each ,other in ,strategy ,let us ask again1 first of all1 what are the circumstances which insure a successful result in strategy8 ,in strategy there is no victory1 as we have before said4 ,on the one hand1 the strategic success is the successful preparation of the tactical victory2 the greater this strategic success1 the more probable becomes the victory in the battle4 ,on the other hand1 strategic success lies in the making use of the victory gained4 ,the more events the strategic combinations can in the sequel include in the consequences of a battle gained1 the more strategy can lay hands on amongst the wreck of all that has been shaken to the foundation by the battle1 the more it sweeps up in great masses what of necessity has been gained with great labour by many single hands in the battle1 the grander will be its success4--,those things which chiefly lead to this success1 or at least facilitate it1 consequently the leading principles of efficient action in strategy1 are as follow3-- #a4 ,the advantage of ground4 #b4 ,the surprise1 let it be either in the form of an actual attack by surprise or by the unexpected display of large forces at certain points4 #c4 ,the attack from several quarters 7all three1 as in tactics74 #d4 ,the assistance of the theatre of war by fortresses1 and everything belonging to them4 #e4 ,the support of the people4 #f4 ,the utilisation of great moral forces4 ,now1 what are the relations of offensive and defensive with respect to these things8 ,the party on the defensive has the advantage of ground2 the offensive side that of the attack by surprise in strategy1 as in tactics ,but respecting the surprise1 we must observe that it is infinitely more efficacious and important in strategy than in tactics4 ,in the latter1 a surprise seldom rises to the level of a great victory1 while in strategy it often finishes the war at one stroke4 ,but at the same time we must observe that the advantageous use of this means supposes some great and uncommon1 as well as decisive error committed by the adversary1 therefore it does not alter the balance much in favour of the offensive4 ,the surprise of the enemy1 by placing superior forces in position at certain points1 has again a great resemblance to the analogous case in tactics4 ,were the defensive compelled to distribute his forces upon several points of approach to his theatre of war1 then the offensive would have plainly the advantage of being able to fall upon one point with all his weight4 ,but here also1 the new art of acting on the defensive by a different mode of proceeding has imperceptibly brought about new principles4 ,if the defensive side does not apprehend that the enemy1 by making use of an undefended road1 will throw himself upon some important magazine or dept1 or on some unprepared fortification1 or on the capital itself4--and if he is not reduced to the alternative of opposing the enemy on the road he has chosen1 or of having his retreat cut off1 then there are no peremptory grounds for dividing his forces2 for if the offensive chooses a different road from that on which the defensive is to be found1 then some days later the latter can march against his opponent with his whole force upon the road he has chosen2 besides1 he may at the same time1 in most cases1 rest satisfied that the offensive will do him the honour to seek him out4--,if the offensive is obliged to advance with his forces divided1 which is often unavoidable on account of subsistence1 then plainly the defensive has the advantage on his side of being able to fall in force upon a fraction of the enemy4 ,attacks in flank and rear1 which in strategy mean on the sides and reverse of the theatre of war1 are of a very different nature to attacks so called in tactics4 #ast4 ,there is no bringing the enemy under two fires1 because we cannot fire from one end of a theatre of war to the other4 #bnd4 ,the apprehension of losing the line of retreat is very much less1 for the spaces in strategy are so great that they cannot be barred as in tactics4 #crd4 ,in strategy1 on account of the extent of space embraced1 the efficacy of interior1 that is of shorter lines1 is much greater1 and this forms a great safeguard against attacks from several directions4 #dth4 ,a new principle makes its appearance in the sensibility1 which is felt as to lines of communication1 that is in the effect which is produced by merely interrupting them4 ,now it confessedly lies in the nature of things1 that on account of the greater spaces in strategy1 the enveloping attack1 or the attack from several sides1 as a rule is only possible for the side which has the initiative1 that is the offensive1 and that the defensive is not in a condition1 as he is in tactics1 in the course of the action1 to turn the tables on the enemy by surrounding him1 because he has it not in his power either to draw up his forces with the necessary depth relatively1 or to conceal them sufficiently3 but then1 of what use is the facility of enveloping to the offensive1 if its advantages are not forthcoming8 ,we could not therefore bring forward the enveloping attack in strategy as a principle of victory in general1 if its influence on the lines of communication did not come into consideration4 ,but this factor is seldom great at the first moment1 when attack and defence first meet1 and while they are still opposed to each other in their original position2 it only becomes great as a campaign advances1 when the offensive in the enemy's country is by degrees brought into the condition of defensive2 then the lines of communication of this new party acting on the defensive1 become weak1 and the party originally on the defensive1 in assuming the offensive can derive advantage from this weakness4 ,but who does not see that this casual superiority of the attack is not to be carried to the credit of the offensive in general1 for it is in reality created out of the superior relations of the defensive4 ,the fourth principle1 the ,assistance of the ,theatre of ,war1 is naturally an advantage on the side of the defensive4 ,if the attacking army opens the campaign1 it breaks away from its own theatre1 and is thus weakened1 that is1 it leaves fortresses and depts of all kinds behind it4 ,the greater the sphere of operations which must be traversed1 the more it will be weakened 7by marches and garrisons72 the army on the defensive continues to keep up its connection with everything1 that is1 it enjoys the support of its fortresses1 is not weakened in any way1 and is near to its sources of supply4 ,the support of the population as a fifth principle is not realised in every defence1 for a defensive campaign may be carried on in the enemy's country1 but still this principle is only derived from the idea of the defensive1 and applies to it in the majority of cases4 ,besides by this is meant chiefly1 although not exclusively1 the effect of calling out the last ,reserves1 and even of a national armament1 the result of which is that all friction is diminished1 and that all resources are sooner forthcoming and flow in more abundantly4 ,the campaign of #ahab1 gives as it were in a magnifying glass a very clear illustration of the effect of the means specified under principles #c and #d4 #ejj1jjj men passed the ,niemen1 #abj1jjj fought at ,borodino1 and much fewer arrived at ,moscow4 ,we may say that the effect itself of this stupendous attempt was so disastrous that even if the ,russians had not assumed any offensive at all1 they would still have been secure from any fresh attempt at invasion for a considerable time4 ,it is true that with the exception of ,sweden there is no country in ,europe which is situated like ,russia1 but the efficient principle is always the same1 the only distinction being in the greater or less degree of its strength4 ,if we add to the fourth and fifth principles1 the consideration that these forces of the defensive belong to the original defensive1 that is the defensive carried on in our own soil1 and that they are much weaker if the defence takes place in an enemy's country and is mixed up with an offensive undertaking1 then from that there is a new disadvantage for the offensive1 much the same as above1 in respect to the third principle2 for the offensive is just as little composed entirely of active elements1 as the defensive of mere warding off blows2 indeed every attack which does not lead directly to peace must inevitably end in the defensive4 ,now1 if all defensive elements which are brought into use in the attack are weakened by its nature1 that is by belonging to the attack1 then this must also be considered as a general disadvantage of the offensive4 ,this is far from being an idle piece of logical refinement1 on the contrary we should rather say that in it lies the chief disadvantage of the offensive in general1 and therefore from the very commencement of1 as well as throughout every combination for a strategic attack1 most particular attention ought to be directed to this point1 that is to the defensive1 which may follow1 as we shall see more plainly when we come to the book on plans of campaigns4 ,the great moral forces which at times saturate the element of war1 as it were with a leaven of their own1 which therefore the commander in certain cases can use to assist the other means at his command1 are to be supposed just as well on the side of the defensive as of the offensive2 at least those which are more especially in favour of the attack1 such as confusion and disorder in the enemy's ranks--do not generally appear until after the decisive stroke is given1 and consequently seldom contribute beforehand to produce that result4 ,we think we have now sufficiently established our proposition1 that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the offensive2 but there still remains to be mentioned one small factor hitherto unnoticed4 ,it is the high spirit1 the feeling of superiority in an army which springs from a consciousness of belonging to the attacking party4 ,the thing is in itself a fact1 but the feeling soon merges into the more general and more powerful one which is imparted by victory or defeat1 by the talent or incapacity of the general4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,convergence of ,attack and ,divergence of ,defence ,these two conceptions1 these forms in the use of offensive and defensive1 appear so frequently in theory and reality1 that the imagination is involuntarily disposed to look upon them as intrinsic forms1 necessary to attack and defence1 which1 however1 is not really the case1 as the smallest reflection will show4 ,we take the earliest opportunity of examining them1 that we may obtain once for all clear ideas respecting them1 and that1 in proceeding with our consideration of the relations of attack and defence1 we may be able to set these conceptions aside altogether1 and not have our attention for ever distracted by the appearance of advantage and the reverse which they cast upon things4 ,we treat them here as pure abstractions1 extract the conception of them like an essence1 and reserve our remarks on the part which it has in actual things for a future time4 ,the defending party1 both in tactics and in strategy1 is supposed to be waiting in expectation1 therefore standing1 whilst the assailant is imagined to be in movement1 and in movement expressly directed against that standing adversary4 ,it follows from this1 necessarily1 that turning and enveloping is at the option of the assailant only1 that is to say1 as long as his movement and the immobility of the defensive continue4 ,this freedom of choice of the mode of attack1 whether it shall be convergent or not1 according as it shall appear advantageous or otherwise1 ought to be reckoned as an advantage to the offensive in general4 ,but this choice is free only in tactics2 it is not always allowed in strategy4 ,in the first1 the points on which the wings rest are hardly ever absolutely secure2 but they are very frequently so in strategy1 as when the front to be defended stretches in a straight line from one sea to another1 or from one neutral territory to another4 ,in such cases1 the attack cannot be made in a convergent form1 and the liberty of choice is limited4 ,it is limited in a still more embarrassing manner if the assailant is obliged to operate by converging lines4 ,russia and ,france cannot attack ,germany in any other way than by converging lines2 therefore they cannot attack with their forces united4 ,now if we assume as granted that the concentric form in the action of forces in the majority of cases is the weaker form1 then the advantage which the assailant possesses in the greater freedom of choice may probably be completely outweighed by the disadvantage1 in other cases1 of being compelled to make use of the weaker form4 ,we proceed to examine more closely the action of these forms1 both in tactics and in strategy4 ,it has been considered one of the chief advantages of giving a concentric direction to forces1 that is1 operating from the circumference of a circle towards the centre1 that the further the forces advance1 the nearer they approach to each other2 the fact is true1 but the supposed advantage is not2 for the tendency to union is going on equally on both sides2 consequently1 the equilibrium is not disturbed4 ,it is the same in the dispersion of force by eccentric movements4 ,but another and a real advantage is1 that forces operating on converging lines direct their action towards a common point1 those operating on diverging lines do not4--,now what are the effects of the action in the two cases8 ,here we must separate tactics from strategy4 ,we shall not push the analysis too far1 and therefore confine ourselves to the following points as the advantages of the action in tactics4 #a4 ,a cross fire1 or1 at least1 an increased effect of fire1 as soon as all is brought within a certain range4 #b4 ,attack of one and the same point from several sides4 #c4 ,the cutting off the retreat4 ,the interception of a retreat may be also conceived strategically1 but then it is plainly much more difficult1 because great spaces are not easily blocked4 ,the attack upon one and the same body from several quarters is generally more effectual and decisive1 the smaller this body is1 the nearer it approaches to the lowest limit--that of a single combatant4 ,an army can easily give battle on several sides1 a division less easily1 a battalion only when formed in mass1 a single man not at all4 ,now strategy1 in its province1 deals with large masses of men1 extensive spaces1 and considerable duration of time2 with tactics1 it is the reverse4 ,from this follows that the attack from several sides in strategy cannot have the same results as in tactics4 ,the effect of fire does not come within the scope of strategy2 but in its place there is something else4 ,it is that tottering of the base which every army feels when there is a victorious enemy in its rear1 whether near or far off4 ,it is1 therefore1 certain that the concentric action of forces has an advantage in this way1 that the action or effect against a is at the same time one against b1 without its force against a being diminished1 and that the action against b is likewise action against a4 ,the whole1 therefore1 is not a b1 but something more2 and this advantage is produced both in tactics and strategy1 although somewhat differently in each4 ,now what is there in the eccentric or divergent action of forces to oppose to this advantage8 ,plainly the advantage of having the forces in greater proximity to each other1 and the moving on interior lines4 ,it is unnecessary to demonstrate how this can become such a multiplier of forces that the assailant cannot encounter the advantage it gives his opponent unless he has a great superiority of force4--,when once the defensive has adopted the principle of movement 7movement which certainly commences later than that of the assailant1 but still time enough to break the chains of paralysing inaction71 then this advantage of greater concentration and the interior lines tends much more decisively1 and in most cases more effectually1 towards victory than the concentric form of the attack4 ,but victory must precede the realisation of this superiority2 we must conquer before we can think of cutting off an enemy's retreat4 ,in short1 we see that there is here a relation similar to that which exists between attack and defence generally2 the concentric form leads to brilliant results1 the advantages of the eccentric are more secure3 the former is the weaker form with the positive object2 the latter1 the stronger form with the negative object4 ,in this way these two forms seem to us to be brought nearly to an even balance4 ,now if we add to this that the defence1 not being always absolute1 is also not always precluded from using its forces on converging lines1 we have no longer a right to believe that this converging form is alone sufficient to ensure to the offensive a superiority over the defensive universally1 and thus we set ourselves free from the influence which that opinion usually exercises over the judgment1 whenever there is an opportunity4 ,what has been said up to the present1 relates to both tactics and strategy2 we have still a most important point to bring forward1 which applies to strategy only4 ,the advantage of interior lines increases with the distances to which these lines relate4 ,in distances of a few thousand yards1 or a half mile1 the time which is gained1 cannot of course be as much as in distances of several days' march1 or indeed1 of twenty or thirty miles2 the first1 that is1 the small distances1 concerns tactics1 the greater ones belong to strategy4 ,but1 although we certainly require more time1 to reach an object in strategy1 than in tactics1 and an army is not so quickly defeated as a battalion1 still1 these periods of time in strategy can only increase up to a certain point2 that is1 they can only last until a battle takes place1 or1 perhaps1 over and above that1 for the few days during which a battle may be avoided without serious loss4 ,further1 there is a much greater difference in the real start in advance1 which is gained in one case1 as compared with the other4 ,owing to the insignificance of the distances in tactics1 the movements of one army in a battle1 take place almost in sight of the other2 the army1 therefore1 on the exterior line1 will generally very soon be made aware of what his adversary is doing4 ,from the long distances1 with which strategy has to deal1 it very seldom happens1 that the movement of one army1 is not concealed from the other for at least a day1 and there are numerous instances1 in which especially if the movement is only partial1 such as a considerable detachment1 that it remains secret for weeks4--,it is easy to see1 what a great advantage this power of concealing movements must be to that party1 who through the nature of his position has reason to desire it most4 ,we here close our considerations on the convergent and divergent use of forces1 and the relation of those forms to attack and defence1 proposing to return to the subject at another time4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,character of the ,strategic ,defensive ,we have already explained what the defensive is generally1 namely1 nothing more than a stronger form of carrying on war1 by means of which we endeavour to wrest a victory1 in order1 after having gained a superiority1 to pass over to the offensive1 that is to the positive object of war4 ,even if the intention of a war is only the maintenance of the existing situation of things1 the status quo1 still a mere parrying of a blow is something quite contradictory to the conception of the term war1 because the conduct of war is unquestionably no mere state of endurance4 ,if the defender has obtained an important advantage1 then the defensive form has done its part1 and under the protection of this success he must give back the blow1 otherwise he exposes himself to certain destruction2 common sense points out that iron should be struck while it is hot1 that we should use the advantage gained to guard against a second attack4 ,how1 when and where this reaction shall commence is subject certainly to a number of other conditions1 which we can only explain hereafter4 ,for the present we keep to this1 that we must always consider this transition to an offensive return as a natural tendency of the defensive1 therefore as an essential element of the same1 and always conclude that there is something wrong in the management of a war when a victory gained through the defensive form is not turned to good account in any manner1 but allowed to wither away4 ,a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive2 he who does not at once think of it at the right moment1 or rather he who does not from the first include this transition in his idea of the defensive will never understand the superiority of the defensive as a form of war2 he will be for ever thinking only of the means which will be consumed by the enemy and gained by ourselves through the offensive1 which means however depend not on tying the knot1 but on untying it4 ,further1 it is a stupid confusion of ideas if1 under the term offensive1 we always understand sudden attack or surprise1 and consequently under defensive imagine nothing but embarrassment and confusion4 ,it is true that a conqueror makes his determination to go to war sooner than the unconscious defender1 and if he knows how to keep his measures properly secret1 he may also perhaps take the defender unawares2 but that is a thing quite foreign to war itself1 for it should not be so4 ,war actually takes place more for the defensive than for the conqueror1 for invasion only calls forth resistance1 and it is not until there is resistance that there is war4 ,a conqueror is always a lover of peace 7as ,buonaparte always asserted of himself72 he would like to make his entry into our state unopposed2 in order to prevent this1 we must choose war1 and therefore also make preparations1 that is in other words1 it is just the weak1 or that side which must defend itself1 which should be always armed in order not to be taken by surprise2 so it is willed by the art of war4 ,the appearance of one side sooner than the other in the theatre of war depends1 besides1 in most cases on things quite different from a view to offensive or defensive4 ,but although a view to one or other of these forms is not the cause1 it is often the result of this priority of appearance4 ,whoever is first ready will on that account go to work offensively1 if the advantage of surprise is sufficiently great to make it expedient2 and the party who is the last to be ready can only then in some measure compensate for the disadvantage which threatens him by the advantages of the defensive4 ,at the same time1 it must be looked upon in general as an advantage for the offensive1 that he can make that good use of being the first in the field which has been noticed in the third book2 only this general advantage is not an absolute necessity in every case4 ,if1 therefore1 we imagine to ourselves a defensive1 such as it should be1 we must suppose it with every possible preparation of all means1 with an army fit for1 and inured to1 war1 with a general who does not wait for his adversary with anxiety from an embarrassing feeling of uncertainty1 but from his own free choice1 with cool presence of mind1 with fortresses which do not dread a siege1 and lastly1 with a loyal people who fear the enemy as little as he fears them4 ,with such attributes the defensive will act no such contemptible part in opposition to the offensive1 and the latter will not appear such an easy and certain form of war1 as it does in the gloomy imaginations of those who can only see in the offensive courage1 strength of will1 and energy2 in the defensive1 helplessness and apathy4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,extent of the ,means of ,defence ,we have shown in the second and third chapters of this book how the defence has a natural advantage in the employment of those things1 which1--irrespective of the absolute strength and qualities of the combatant force1--influence the tactical as well as the strategic result1 namely1 the advantage of ground1 sudden attack1 attack from several directions 7converging form of attack71 the assistance of the theatre of war1 support of the people1 and the utilising great moral forces4 ,we think it useful now to cast again a glance over the extent of the means which are at command of the defensive in particular1 and which are to be regarded as the columns of the different orders of architecture in his edifice4 #a4--,landwehr 7,militia74 ,this force has been used in modern times to combat the enemy on foreign soil2 and it is not to be denied that its organisation in many states1 for instance in ,prussia1 is of such a kind1 that it may almost be regarded as part of the standing army1 therefore it does not belong to the defensive exclusively4 ,at the same time1 we must not overlook the fact1 that the very great use made of it in #ahac-ad-ae was the result of defensive war2 that it is organised in very few places to the same degree as in ,prussia1 and that always when its organisation falls below the level of complete efficiency1 it is better suited for the defensive than for the offensive4 ,but besides that1 there always lies in the idea of a militia the notion of a very extensive more or less voluntary co-operation of the whole mass of the people in support of the war1 with all their physical powers1 as well as with their feelings1 and a ready sacrifice of all they possess4 ,the more its organisation deviates from this1 so much the more the force thus created will become a standing army under another name1 and the more it will have the advantages of such a force2 but it will also lose in proportion the advantages which belong properly to the militia1 those of being a force1 the limits of which are undefined1 and capable of being easily increased by appealing to the feelings and patriotism of the people4 ,in these things lies the essence of a militia2 in its organisation1 latitude must be allowed for this co-operation of the whole people2 if we seek to obtain something extraordinary from a militia1 we are only following a shadow4 ,but now the close relationship between this essence of a militia system1 and the conception of the defensive1 is not to be denied1 neither can it be denied that such a militia will always belong more to the defensive form than to the offensive1 and that it will manifest chiefly in the defensive1 those effects through which it surpasses the attack4 #b4--;,fortresses4 ,the assistance afforded by fortresses to the offensive does not extend beyond what is given by those close upon the frontiers1 and is only feeble in influence2 the assistance which the defensive can derive from this reaches further into the heart of the country1 and therefore more of them can be brought into use1 and their utility itself differs in the degree of its intensity4 ,a fortress which is made the object of a regular siege1 and holds out1 is naturally of more considerable weight in the scales of war1 than one which by the strength of its works merely forbids the idea of its capture1 and therefore neither occupies nor consumes any of the enemy's forces4 #c4--,the ,people4 ,although the influence of a single inhabitant of the theatre of war on the course of the war in most cases is not more perceptible than the co-operation of a drop of water in a whole river1 still even in cases where there is no such thing as a general rising of the people1 the total influence of the inhabitants of a country in war is anything but imperceptible4 ,every thing goes on easier in our own country1 provided it is not opposed by the general feeling of the population4 ,all contributions great and small1 are only yielded to the enemy under the compulsion of direct force2 that operation must be undertaken by the troops1 and cost the employment of many men as well as great exertions4 ,the defensive receives all he wants1 if not always voluntarily1 as in cases of enthusiastic devotion1 still through the long-used channels of submission to the state on the part of the citizens1 which has become second nature1 and which besides that1 is enforced by the terrors of the law with which the army has nothing to do4 ,but the spontaneous co-operation of the people proceeding from true attachment is in all cases most important1 as it never fails in all those points where service can be rendered without any sacrifice4 ,we shall only notice one point1 which is of the highest importance in war1 that is intelligence1 not so much special1 great and important information through persons employed1 as that respecting the innumerable little matters in connection with which the daily service of an army is carried on in uncertainty1 and with regard to which a good understanding with the inhabitants gives the defensive a general advantage4 ,if we ascend from this quite general and never failing beneficial influence1 up to special cases in which the populace begins to take part in the war1 and then further up to the highest degree1 where as in ,spain1 the war1 as regards its leading events is chiefly a war carried on by the people themselves1 we may see that we have here virtually a new power rather than a manifestation of increased cooperation on the part of the people1 and therefore that-- #d4--,the ,national ,armament1 or general call to arms1 may be considered as a particular means of defence4 #e4--;,allies4 ,finally1 we may further reckon allies as the last support of the defensive4 ,naturally we do not mean ordinary allies1 which the assailant may likewise have2 we speak of those essentially interested in maintaining the integrity of the country4 ,if for instance we look at the various states composing ,europe at the present time1 we find 7without speaking of a systematically regulated balance of power and interests1 as that does not exist1 and therefore is often with justice disputed1 still1 unquestionably7 that the great and small states and interests of nations are interwoven with each other in a most diversified and changeable manner1 each of these points of intersection forms a binding knot1 for in it the direction of the one gives equilibrium to the direction of the other2 by all these knots therefore1 evidently a more or less compact connection of the whole will be formed1 and this general connection must be partially overturned by every change4 ,in this manner the whole relations of all states to each other serve rather to preserve the stability of the whole than to produce changes1 that is to say1 this tendency to stability exists in general4 ,this we conceive to be the true notion of a balance of power1 and in this sense it will always of itself come into existence1 wherever there are extensive connections between civilised states4 ,how far this tendency of the general interests to the maintenance of the existing state of things is efficient is another question2 at all events we can conceive some changes in the relations of single states to each other1 which promote this efficiency of the whole1 and others which obstruct it4 ,in the first case they are efforts to perfect the political balance1 and as these have the same tendency as the universal interests1 they will also be supported by the majority of these interests4 ,but in the other case1 they are of an abnormal nature1 undue activity on the part of some single states1 real maladies2 still that these should make their appearance in a whole with so little cohesion as an assemblage of great and little states is not to be wondered at1 for we see the same in that marvellously organised whole1 the natural world4 ,if in answer we are reminded of instances in history where single states have effected important changes1 solely for their own benefit1 without any effort on the part of the whole to prevent the same1 or cases where a single state has been able to raise itself so much above others as to become almost the arbiter of the whole1--then our answer is that these examples by no means prove that a tendency of the interests of the whole in favour of stability does not exist1 they only show that its action was not powerful enough at the moment4 ,the effort towards an object is a different thing from the motion towards it4 ,at the same time it is anything but a nullity1 of which we have the best exemplification in the dynamics of the heavens4 ,we say1 the tendency of equilibrium is to the maintenance of the existing state1 whereby we certainly assume that rest1 that is equilibrium1 existed in this state2 for where that has been already disturbed1 tension has already commenced1 and there the equilibrium may certainly also tend to a change4 ,but if we look to the nature of the thing1 this change can only affect some few separate states1 never the majority1 and therefore it is certain that the preservation of the latter is supported and secured through the collective interests of the whole--certain also that each single state which has not against it a tension of the whole will have more interest in favour of its defence than opposition to it4 ,whoever laughs at these reflections as utopian dreams1 does so at the expense of philosophical truth4 ,although we may learn from it the relations which the essential elements of things bear to each other1 it would be rash to attempt to deduce laws from the same by which each individual case should be governed without regard to any accidental disturbing influences4 ,but when a person1 in the words of a great writer1 8never rises above anecdote10 builds all history on it1 begins always with the most individual points1 with the climaxes of events1 and only goes down just so deep as he finds a motive for doing1 and therefore never reaches to the lowest foundation of the predominant general relations1 his opinion will never have any value beyond the one case1 and to him1 that which philosophy proves to be applicable to cases in general1 will only appear a dream4 ,without that general striving for rest and the maintenance of the existing condition of things1 a number of civilised states could not long live quietly side by side2 they must necessarily become fused into one4 ,therefore1 as ,europe has existed in its present state for more than a thousand years1 we can only regard the fact as a result of that tendency of the collective interests2 and if the protection afforded by the whole has not in every instance proved strong enough to preserve the independence of each individual state1 such exceptions are to be regarded as irregularities in the life of the whole1 which have not destroyed that life1 but have themselves been mastered by it4 ,it would be superfluous to go over the mass of events in which changes which would have disturbed the balance too much have been prevented or reversed by the opposition more or less openly declared of other states4 ,they will be seen by the most cursory glance at history4 ,we only wish to say a few words about a case which is always on the lips of those who ridicule the idea of a political balance1 and because it appears specially applicable here as a case in which an unoffending state1 acting on the defensive1 succumbed without receiving any foreign aid4 ,we allude to ,poland4 ,that a state of eight millions of inhabitants should disappear1 should be divided amongst three others without a sword being drawn by any of the rest of the ,european states1 appears1 at first sight1 a fact which either proves conclusively the general inefficiency of the political balance1 or at least shows that it is inefficient to a very great extent in some instances4 ,that a state of such extent should disappear1 a prey to others1 and those already the most powerful 7,russia and ,austria71 appears such a very extreme case that it will be said1 if an event of this description could not rouse the collective interests of all free states1 then the efficient action which this collective interest should display for the benefit of individual states is imaginary4 ,but we still maintain that a single case1 however striking1 does not negative the general truth1 and we assert next that the downfall of ,poland is also not so unaccountable as may at first sight appear4 ,was ,poland really to be regarded as a ,european state1 as a homogeneous member of the community of nations in ,europe8 ,no6 ,it was a ,tartar state1 which instead of being located1 like the ,tartars of the ,crimea1 on the ,black ,sea1 on the confines of the territory inhabited by the ,european community1 had its habitation in the midst of that community on the ,vistula4 ,we neither desire by this to speak disrespectfully of the ,poles1 nor to justify the partition of their country1 but only to look at things as they really are4 ,for a hundred years this country had ceased to play any independent part in ,european politics1 and had been only an apple of discord for the others4 ,it was impossible that for a continuance it could maintain itself amongst the others with its state and constitution unaltered3 an essential alteration in its ,tartar nature would have been the work of not less than half1 perhaps a whole century1 supposing the chief men of that nation had been in favour of it4 ,but these men were far too thorough ,tartars to wish any such change4 ,their turbulent political condition1 and their unbounded levity went hand in hand1 and so they tumbled into the abyss4 ,long before the partition of ,poland the ,russians had become quite at home there1 the idea of its being an independent state1 with boundaries of its own1 had ceased1 and nothing is more certain than that ,poland1 if it had not been partitioned1 must have become a ,russian province4 ,if this had not been so1 and if ,poland had been a state capable of making a defence1 the three powers would not so readily have proceeded to its partition1 and those powers most interested in maintaining its integrity1 like ,france1 ,sweden and ,turkey1 would have been able to co-operate in a very different manner towards its preservation4 ,but if the maintenance of a state is entirely dependent on external support1 then certainly too much is asked4 ,the partition of ,poland had been talked of frequently for a hundred years1 and for that time the country had been not like a private house1 but like a public road1 on which foreign armies were constantly jostling one another4 ,was it the business of other states to put a stop to this2 were they constantly to keep the sword drawn to preserve the political inviolability of the ,polish frontier8 ,that would have been to demand a moral impossibility4 ,poland was at this time politically little better than an uninhabited steppe2 and as it is impossible that defenceless steppes1 lying in the midst of other countries should be guarded for ever from invasion1 therefore it was impossible to preserve the integrity of this state1 as it was called4 ,for all these reasons there is as little to cause wonder in the noiseless downfall of ,poland as in the silent conquest of the ,crimean ,tartars2 the ,turks had a greater interest in upholding the latter than any ,european state had in preserving the independence of ,poland1 but they saw that it would be a vain effort to try to protect a defenceless steppe4-- ,we return to our subject1 and think we have proved that the defensive in general may count more on foreign aid than the offensive2 he may reckon the more certainly on it in proportion as his existence is of importance to others1 that is to say1 the sounder and more vigorous his political and military condition4 ,of course the subjects which have been here enumerated as means properly belonging to the defensive will not be at the command of each particular defensive4 ,sometimes one1 sometimes another1 may be wanting2 but they all belong to the idea of the defensive as a whole4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,mutual ,action and ,reaction of ,attack and ,defence ,we shall now consider attack and defence separately1 as far as they can be separated from each other4 ,we commence with the defensive for the following reasons3--,it is certainly very natural and necessary to base the rules for the defence upon those of the offensive1 and vice vers2 but one of the two must still have a third point of departure1 if the whole chain of ideas is to have a beginning1 that is1 to be possible4 ,the first question concerns this point4 ,if we reflect upon the commencement of war philosophically1 the conception of war properly does not originate with the offensive1 as that form has for its absolute object1 not so much fighting as the taking possession of something4 ,the idea of war arises first by the defensive1 for that form has the battle for its direct object1 as warding off and fighting plainly are one and the same4 ,the warding off is directed entirely against the attack2 therefore supposes it1 necessarily2 but the attack is not directed against the warding off2 it is directed upon something else--the taking possession2 consequently does not presuppose the warding off4 ,it lies1 therefore1 in the nature of things1 that the party who first brings the element of war into action1 the party from whose point of view two opposite parties are first conceived1 also establishes the first laws of war1 and that party is the defender4 ,we are not speaking of any individual case2 we are only dealing with a general1 an abstract case1 which theory imagines in order to determine the course it is to take4 ,by this we now know where to look for this fixed point1 outside and independent of the reciprocal effect of attack and defence1 and that it is in the defensive4 ,if this is a logical consequence1 the defensive must have motives of action1 even when as yet he knows nothing of the intentions of the offensive2 and these motives of action must determine the organisation of the means of fighting4 ,on the other hand1 as long as the offensive knows nothing of the plans of his adversary1 there are no motives of action for him1 no grounds for the application of his military means4 ,he can do nothing more than take these means along with him1 that is1 take possession by means of his army4 ,and thus it is also in point of fact2 for to carry about the apparatus of war is not to use it2 and the offensive who takes such things with him1 on the quite general supposition that he may require to use them1 and who1 instead of taking possession of a country by official functionaries and proclamations1 does so with an army1 has not as yet committed1 properly speaking1 any act of warfare2 but the defensive who both collects his apparatus of war1 and disposes of it with a view to fighting1 is the first to exercise an act which really accords with the conception of war4 ,the second question is now3 what is theoretically the nature of the motives which must arise in the mind of the defensive first1 before the attack itself is thought of8 ,plainly the advance made with a view to taking possession1 which we have imagined extraneous to the war1 but which is the foundation of the opening chapter4 ,the defence is to oppose this advance2 therefore in idea we must connect this advance with the land 7country72 and thus arise the first most general measures of the defensive4 ,when these are once established1 then upon them the application of the offensive is founded1 and from a consideration of the means which the offensive then applies1 new principles again of defence are derived4 ,now here is the reciprocal effect which theory can follow in its inquiry1 as long as it finds the fresh results which are produced are worth examination4 ,this little analysis was necessary in order to give more clearness and stability to what follows1 such as it is2 it is not made for the field of battle1 neither is it for the generals of the future2 it is only for the army of theorists1 who have made a great deal too light of the subject hitherto4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,methods of ,resistance ,the conception of the defence is warding off2 in this warding off lies the state of expectance1 and this state of expectance we have taken as the chief characteristic of the defence1 and at the same time as its principal advantage4 ,but as the defensive in war cannot be a state of endurance1 therefore this state of expectation is only a relative1 not an absolute state2 the subjects with which this waiting for is connected are1 as regards space1 either the country1 or the theatre of war1 or the position1 and1 as regards time1 the war1 the campaign1 or the battle4 ,that these subjects are no immutable units1 but only the centres of certain limited regions1 which run into one another and are blended together1 we know2 but in practical life we must often be contented only to group things together1 not rigidly to separate them2 and these conceptions have1 in the real world itself1 sufficient distinctness to be made use of as centres round which we may group other ideas4 ,a defence of the country1 therefore1 only waits for attack on the country2 a defence of a theatre of war an attack on the theatre of war2 and the defence of a position the attack of that position4 ,every positive1 and consequently more or less offensive1 kind of action which the defensive uses after the above period of waiting for1 does not negative the idea of the continuance of the defensive2 for the state of expectation1 which is the chief sign of the same1 and its chief advantage1 has been realised4 ,the conception of war1 campaign1 and battle1 in relation to time1 are coupled respectively with the ideas of country1 theatre of war1 and position1 and on that account they have the same relations to the present subject4 ,the defensive consists1 therefore1 of two heterogeneous parts1 the state of expectancy and that of action4 ,by having referred the first to a definite subject1 and therefore given it precedence of action1 we have made it possible to connect the two into one whole4 ,but an act of the defensive1 especially a considerable one1 such as a campaign or a whole war1 does not1 as regards time1 consist of two great halves1 the first the state of mere expectation1 the second entirely of a state of action2 it is a state of alternation between the two1 in which the state of expectation can be traced through the whole act of the defensive like a continuous thread4 ,we give to this state of expectation so much importance simply because it is demanded by the nature of the thing4 ,in preceding theories of war it has certainly never been brought forward as an independent conception1 but in reality it has always served as a guide1 although often unobserved4 ,it is such a fundamental part of the whole act of war1 that the one without the other appears almost impossible2 and we shall therefore often have occasion to recur to it hereafter by calling attention to its effects in the dynamic action of the powers called into play4 ,for the present we shall employ ourselves in explaining how the principle of the state of expectation runs through the act of defence1 and what are the successive stages in the defence itself which have their origin in this state4 ,in order to establish our ideas on subjects of a more simple kind1 we shall defer the defence of a country1 a subject on which a very great diversity of political influences exercises a powerful effect1 until we come to the ,book on the ,plan of ,war2 and as on the other hand1 the defensive act in a position or in a battle is matter of tactics1 which only forms a starting point for strategic action as a whole1 we shall take the defence of a theatre1 of war as being the subject1 in which we can best show the relations of the defensive4 ,we have said1 that the state of expectation and of action--which last is always a counterstroke1 therefore a reaction--are both essential parts of the defensive2 for without the first1 there would be no defensive1 without the second no war4 ,this view led us before to the idea of the defensive being nothing but the stronger form of war1 in order the more certainly to conquer the enemy2 this idea we must adhere to throughout1 partly because it alone saves us in the end from absurdity1 partly1 because the more vividly it is impressed on the mind1 so much the greater is the energy it imparts to the whole act of the defensive4 ,if therefore we should make a distinction between the reaction1 constituting the second element of the defensive1 and the other element which consists in reality in the repulse only of the enemy2--if we should look at expulsion from the country1 from the theatre of war1 in such a light as to see in it alone the necessary thing by itself1 the ultimate object beyond the attainment of which our efforts should not be carried1 and on the other hand1 regard the possibility of a reaction carried still further1 and passing into the real strategic attack1 as a subject foreign to and of no consequence to the defence1--such a view would be in opposition to the nature of the idea above represented1 and therefore we cannot look upon this distinction as really existing1 and we must adhere to our assertion1 that the idea of revenge must always be at the bottom of every defensive2 for otherwise1 however much damage might be occasioned to the enemy1 by a successful issue of the first reaction1 there would always be a deficiency in the necessary balance of the dynamic relations of the attack and defence4 ,we say1 then1 the defensive is the more powerful form of making war1 in order to overcome the enemy more easily1 and we leave to circumstances to determine whether this victory over the object against which the defence was commenced is sufficient or not4 ,but as the defensive is inseparable from the idea of the state of expectation1 that object1 the defeat of the enemy1 only exists conditionally1 that is1 only if the offensive takes place2 and otherwise 7that is1 if the offensive stroke does not follow7 of course the defensive is contented with the maintenance of its possessions2 this maintenance is therefore its object in the state of expectation1 that is1 its immediate object2 and it is only as long as it contents itself with this more modest end1 that it preserves the advantages of the stronger form of war4 ,if we suppose an army with its theatre of war intended for defence1 the defence may be made as follows3 #a4 ,by attacking the enemy the moment he enters the theatre of war4 7,mollwitz1 ,hohenfriedberg74 #b4 ,by taking up a position close on the frontier1 and waiting till the enemy appears with the intention of attacking it1 in order then to attack him 7,czaslau1 ,soor1 ,rosbach74 ,plainly this second mode of proceeding1 partakes more of endurance1 we 8wait for0 longer2 and although the time gained by it as compared with that gained in the first1 may be very little1 or none at all if the enemy's attack actually takes place1 still1 the battle which in the first case was certain1 is in the second much less certain1 perhaps the enemy may not be able to make up his mind to attack2 the advantage of the 8waiting for10 is then at once greater4 #c4 ,by the army in such position not only awaiting the decision of the enemy to fight a battle1 that is his appearance in front of the position1 but also waiting to be actually assaulted 7in order to keep to the same general1 ,bunzelwitz74 ,in such case1 we fight a regular defensive battle1 which however1 as we have before said1 may include offensive movements with one or more parts of the army4 ,here also1 as before1 the gain of time does not come into consideration1 but the determination of the enemy is put to a new proof2 many a one has advanced to the attack1 and at the last moment1 or after one attempt given it up1 finding the position of the enemy too strong4 #d4 ,by the army transferring its defence to the heart of the country4 ,the object of retreating into the interior is to cause a diminution in the enemy's strength1 and to wait until its effects are such that his forward march is of itself discontinued1 or at least until the resistance which we can offer him at the end of his career is such as he can no longer overcome4 ,this case is exhibited in the simplest and plainest manner1 when the defensive can leave one or more of his fortresses behind him1 which the offensive is obliged to besiege or blockade4 ,it is clear in itself1 how much his forces must be weakened in this way1 and what a chance there is of an opportunity for the defensive to attack at some point with superior forces4 ,but even when there are no fortresses1 a retreat into the interior of the country may procure by degrees for the defender that necessary equilibrium or that superiority which was wanting to him on the frontier2 for every forward movement in the strategic attack lessens its force1 partly absolutely1 partly through the separation of forces which becomes necessary1 of which we shall say more under the head of the 8,attack40 ,we anticipate this truth here as we consider it as a fact sufficiently exemplified in all wars4 ,now in this fourth case the gain of time is to be looked upon as the principal point of all4 ,if the assailant lays siege to our fortresses1 we have time till their probable fall1 7which may be some weeks or in some cases months72 but if the weakening1 that is the expenditure1 of the force of the attack is caused by the advance1 and the garrisoning or occupation of certain points1 therefore merely through the length of the assailant's march1 then the time gained in most cases becomes greater1 and our action is not so much restricted in point of time4 ,besides the altered relations between offensive and defensive in regard to power which is brought about at the end of this march1 we must bring into account in favour of the defensive an increased amount of the advantage of the state of 8waiting for40 ,although the assailant by this advance may not in reality be weakened to such a degree that he is unfit to attack our main body where he halts1 still he will probably want resolution to do so1 for that is an act requiring more resolution in the position in which he is now placed1 than would have sufficed when operations had not extended beyond the frontier3 partly1 because the powers are weakened1 and no longer in fresh vigour1 while the danger is increased2 partly1 because with an irresolute commander the possession of that portion of the country which has been obtained is often sufficient to do away with all idea of a battle1 because he either really believes or assumes as a pretext1 that it is no longer necessary4 ,by the offensive thus declining to attack1 the defensive certainly does not acquire1 as he would on the frontier1 a sufficient result of a negative kind1 but still there is a great gain of time4 ,it is plain that1 in all the four methods indicated1 the defensive has the benefit of the ground or country1 and likewise that he can by that means bring into cooperation his fortresses and the people2 moreover these efficient principles increase at each fresh stage of the defence1 for they are a chief means of bringing about the weakening of the enemy's force in the fourth stage4 ,now as the advantages of the 8state of expectation0 increase in the same direction1 therefore it follows of itself that these stages are to be regarded as a real intensifying of the defence1 and that this form of war always gains in strength the more it differs from the offensive4 ,we are not afraid on this account of any one accusing us of holding the opinion that the most passive defence would therefore be the best4 ,the action of resistance is not weakened at each new stage1 it is only delayed1 postponed4 ,but the assertion that a stouter resistance can be offered in a strong judiciously entrenched position1 and also that when the enemy has exhausted his strength in fruitless efforts against such a position a more effective counterstroke may be levelled at him1 is surely not unreasonable4 ,without the advantage of position ,daun would not have gained the victory at ,kollin1 and as ,frederick the ,great only brought off #ah1jjj men from the field of battle1 if ,daun had pursued him with more energy the victory might have been one of the most brilliant in military history4 ,we therefore maintain1 that at each new stage of the defensive the preponderance1 or more correctly speaking1 the counterpoise increases in favour of the defensive1 and consequently there is also a gain in power for the counterstroke4 ,now are these advantages of the increasing force of the defensive to be had for nothing8 ,by no means1 for the sacrifice with which they are purchased increases in the same proportion4 ,if we wait for the enemy within our own theatre of war1 however near the border of our territory the decision takes place1 still this theatre of war is entered by the enemy1 which must entail a sacrifice on our part2 whereas1 had we made the attack1 this disadvantage would have fallen on the enemy4 ,if we do not proceed at once to meet the enemy and attack him1 our loss will be the greater1 and the extent of the country which the enemy will overrun1 as well as the time which he requires to reach our position1 will continually increase4 ,if we wish to give battle on the defensive1 and we therefore leave its determination and the choice of time for it to the enemy1 then perhaps he may remain for some time in occupation of the territory which he has taken1 and the time which through his deferred decision we are allowed to gain will in that manner be paid for by us4 ,the sacrifices which must be made become still more burdensome if a retreat into the heart of the country takes place4 ,but all these sacrifices on the part of the defensive1 at most only occasion him in general a loss of power which merely diminishes his military force indirectly1 therefore1 at a later period1 and not directly1 and often so indirectly that its effect is hardly felt at all4 ,the defensive1 therefore1 strengthens himself for the present moment at the expense of the future1 that is to say1 he borrows1 as every one must who is too poor for the circumstances in which he is placed4 ,now1 if we would examine the result of these different forms of resistance1 we must look to the object of the aggression4 ,this is1 to obtain possession of our theatre of war1 or1 at least1 of an important part of it1 for under the conception of the whole1 at least the greater part must be understood1 as the possession of a strip of territory few miles in extent is1 as a rule1 of no real consequence in strategy4 ,as long1 therefore1 as the aggressor is not in possession of this1 that is1 as long as from fear of our force he has either not yet advanced to the attack of the theatre of war1 or has not sought to find us in our position1 or has declined the combat we offer1 the object of the defence is fulfilled1 and the effects of the measures taken for the defensive have therefore been successful4 ,at the same time this result is only a negative one1 which certainly cannot directly give the force for a real counterstroke4 ,but it may give it indirectly1 that is to say1 it is on the way to do so2 for the time which elapses the aggression loses1 and every loss of time is a disadvantage1 and must weaken in some way the party who suffers the loss4 ,therefore in the first three stages of the defensive1 that is1 if it takes place on the frontier1 the non-decision is already a result in favour of the defensive4 ,but it is not so with the fourth4 ,if the enemy lays siege to our fortresses we must relieve them in time1 to do this we must therefore bring about the decision by positive action4 ,this is likewise the case if the enemy follows us into the interior of the country without besieging any of our places4 ,certainly in this case we have more time2 we can wait until the enemy's weakness is extreme1 but still it is always an indispensable condition that we are at last to act4 ,the enemy is now1 perhaps1 in possession of the whole territory which was the object of his aggression1 but it is only lent to him2 the tension continues1 and the decision is yet pending4 ,as long as the defensive is gaining strength and the aggressor daily becoming weaker1 the postponement of the decision is in the interest of the former3 but as soon as the culminating point of this progressive advantage has arrived1 as it must do1 were it only by the ultimate influence of the general loss to which the offensive has exposed himself1 it is time for the defender to proceed to action1 and bring on a solution1 and the advantage of the 8waiting for0 may be considered as completely exhausted4 ,there can naturally be no point of time fixed generally at which this happens1 for it is determined by a multitude of circumstances and relations2 but it may be observed that the winter is usually a natural turning point4 ,if we cannot prevent the enemy from wintering in the territory which he has seized1 then1 as a rule1 it must be looked upon as given up4 ,we have only1 however1 to call to mind ,torres ,vedras1 to see that this is no general rule4 ,what is now the solution generally8 ,we have always supposed it in our observations in the form of a battle2 but in reality1 this is not necessary1 for a number of combinations of battles with separate corps may be imagined1 which may bring about a change of affairs1 either because they have really ended with bloodshed1 or because their probable result makes the retreat of the enemy necessary4 ,upon the theatre of war itself there can be no other solution2 that is a necessary consequence of our view of war2 for1 in fact1 even if an enemy's army1 merely from want of provisions1 commences his retreat1 still it takes place from the state of restraint in which our sword holds him2 if our army was not in the way he would soon be able to provision his forces4 ,therefore1 even at the end of his aggressive course1 when the enemy is suffering the heavy penalty of his attack1 when detachments1 hunger1 and sickness have weakened and worn him out1 it is still always the dread of our sword which causes him to turn about1 and allow everything to go on again as usual4 ,but nevertheless1 there is a great difference between such a solution and one which takes place on the frontier4 ,in the latter case our arms only were opposed to his to keep him in check1 or carry destruction into his ranks2 but at the end of the aggressive career the enemy's forces1 by their own exertions1 are half destroyed1 by which our arms acquire a totally different value1 and therefore1 although they are the final they are not the only means which have produced the solution4 ,this destruction of the enemy's forces in the advance prepares the solution1 and may do so to this extent1 that the mere possibility of a reaction on our part may cause the retreat1 consequently a reversal of the situation of affairs4 ,in this case1 therefore1 we can practically ascribe the solution to nothing else than the efforts made in the advance4 ,now1 in point of fact we shall find no case in which the sword of the defensive has not co-operated2 but1 for the practical view1 it is important to distinguish which of the two principles is the predominating one4 ,in this sense we think we may say that there is a double solution in the defensive1 consequently a double kind of reaction1 according as the aggressor is ruined by the sword of the defensive1 or by his own efforts4 ,that the first kind of solution predominates in the first three steps of the defence1 the second in the fourth1 is evident in itself2 and the latter will1 in most cases1 only come to pass by the retreat being carried deep into the heart of the country1 and nothing but the prospect of that result can be a sufficient motive for such a retreat1 considering the great sacrifices which it must cost4 ,we have1 therefore1 ascertained that there are two different principles of defence2 there are cases in military history where they each appear as separate and distinct as it is possible for an elementary conception to appear in practical life4 ,when ,frederick the ,great attacked the ,austrians at ,hohenfriedberg1 just as they were descending from the ,silesian mountains1 their force could not have been weakened in any sensible manner by detachments or fatigue2 when1 on the other hand1 ,wellington1 in his entrenched camp at ,torres ,vedras1 waited till hunger1 and the severity of the weather1 had reduced ,massena's army to such extremities that they commenced to retreat of themselves1 the sword of the defensive party had no share in the weakening of the enemy's army4 ,in other cases1 in which they are combined with each other in a variety of ways1 still1 one of them distinctly predominates4 ,this was the case in the year #ahab4 ,in that celebrated campaign such a number of bloody encounters took place as might1 under other circumstances1 have sufficed for a most complete decision by the sword2 nevertheless1 there is hardly any campaign in which we can so plainly see how the aggressor may be ruined by his own efforts4 ,of the #cjj1jjj men composing the ,french centre only about #ij1jjj reached ,moscow2 not more than #ac1jjj were detached2 consequently there had been a loss of #aig1jjj men1 and certainly not a third of that loss can be put to account of battles4 ,all campaigns which are remarkable for temporising1 as it is called1 like those of the famous ,fabius ,cunctator1 have been calculated chiefly on the destruction of the enemy by his own efforts4 ,this principle has been the leading one in many campaigns without that point being almost ever mentioned2 and it is only when we disregard the specious reasoning of historians1 and look at things clearly with our own eyes1 that we are led to this real cause of many a solution4 ,by this we believe we have unravelled sufficiently those ideas which lie at the root of the defensive1 and that in the two great kinds of defence we have shown plainly and made intelligible how the principle of the waiting for runs through the whole system and connects itself with positive action in such a manner that1 sooner or later1 action does take place1 and that then the advantage of the attitude of waiting for appears to be exhausted4 ,we think1 now1 that in this way we have gone over and brought into view everything comprised in the province of the defensive4 ,at the same time1 there are subjects of sufficient importance in themselves to form separate chapters1 that is1 points for consideration in themselves1 and these we must also study2 for example1 the nature and influence of fortified places1 entrenched camps1 defence of mountains and rivers1 operations against the flank1 etc41 etc4 ,we shall treat of them in subsequent chapters1 but none of these things lie outside of the preceding sequence of ideas2 they are only to be regarded as a closer application of it to locality and circumstances4 ,that order of ideas has been deduced from the conception of the defensive1 and from its relation to the offensive2 we have connected these simple ideas with reality1 and therefore shown the way by which we may return again from the reality to those simple ideas1 and obtain firm ground1 and not be forced in reasoning to take refuge on points of support which themselves vanish in the air4 ,but resistance by the sword may wear such an altered appearance1 assume such a different character1 through the multiplicity of ways of combining battles1 especially in cases where these are not actually realised1 but become effectual merely through their possibility1 that we might incline to the opinion that there must be some other efficient active principle still to be discovered2 between the sanguinary defeat in a simple battle1 and the effects of strategic combinations which do not bring the thing nearly so far as actual combat1 there seems such a difference1 that it is necessary to suppose some fresh force1 something in the same way as astronomers have decided on the existence of other planets from the great space between ,mars and ,jupiter4 ,if the assailant finds the defender in a strong position which he thinks he cannot take1 or behind a large river which he thinks he cannot cross1 or even if he fears that by advancing further he will not be able to subsist his army1 in all these cases it is nothing but the sword of the defensive which produces the effect2 for it is the fear of being conquered by this sword1 either in a great battle or at some specially important points1 which compels the aggressor to stop1 only he will either not admit that at all1 or does not admit it in a straightforward way4 ,now even if it is granted that1 where there has been a decision without bloodshed1 the combat merely offered1 but not accepted1 has been the ultimate cause of the decision1 it will still be thought that in such cases the really effectual principle is the strategic combination of these combats and not their tactical decision1 and that this superiority of the strategic combination could only have been thought of because there are other defensive means which may be considered besides an actual appeal to the sword4 ,we admit this1 and it brings us just to the point we wished to arrive at1 which is as follows3 if the tactical result of a battle must be the foundation of all strategic combinations1 then it is always possible and to be feared that the assailant may lay hold of this principle1 and above all things direct his efforts to be superior in the hour of decision1 in order to baffle the strategic combination2 and that therefore this strategic combination can never be regarded as something all-sufficient in itself2 that it only has a value when either on one ground or another we can look forward to the tactical solution without any misgivings4 ,in order to make ourselves intelligible in a few words1 we shall merely call to our readers' recollection how such a general as ,buonaparte marched without hesitation through the whole web of his opponents' strategic plans1 to seek for the battle itself1 because he had no doubts as to its issue4 ,where1 therefore1 strategy had not directed its whole effort to ensure a preponderance over him in this battle1 where it engaged in finer 7feebler7 plans1 there it was rent asunder like a cobweb4 ,but a general like ,daun might be checked by such measures2 it would therefore be folly to offer ,buonaparte and his army what the ,prussian army of the ,seven ,years' ,war dared to offer ,daun and his contemporaries4 ,why8--,because ,buonaparte knew right well that all depended on the tactical issue1 and made certain of gaining it2 whereas with ,daun it was very different in both respects4 ,on this account we hold it therefore to be serviceable to show that every strategic combination rests only upon the tactical results1 and that these are everywhere1 in the bloody as well as in the bloodless solution1 the real fundamental grounds of the ultimate decision4 ,it is only if we have no reason to fear that decision1 whether on account of the character or the situation of the enemy1 or on account of the moral and physical equality of the two armies1 or on account of our own superiority--it is only then that we can expect something from strategic combinations in themselves without battles4 ,now if a great many campaigns are to be found within the compass of military history in which the assailant gives up the offensive without any blood being spilt in fight1 in which1 therefore1 strategic combinations show themselves effectual to that degree1 this may lead to the idea that these combinations have at least great inherent force in themselves1 and might in general decide the affair alone1 where too great a preponderance in the tactical results is not supposed on the side of the aggressor4 ,to this we answer that1 if the question is about things which have their origin in the theatre of war1 and consequently belong to the war itself1 this idea is also equally false2 and we add that the cause of the failure of most attacks is to be found in the higher1 the political relations of war4 ,the general relations out of which a war springs1 and which naturally constitute its foundation1 determine also its character2 on this subject we shall have more to say hereafter1 in treating of the plan of a war4 ,but these general relations have converted most wars into half-and-half things1 into which real hostility has to force its way through such a conflict of interests1 that it is only a very weak element at the last4 ,this effect must naturally show itself chiefly and with most force on the side of the offensive1 the side of positive action4 ,one cannot therefore wonder if such a short-winded1 consumptive attack is brought to a standstill by the touch of a finger4 ,against a weak resolution so fettered by a thousand considerations1 that it has hardly any existence1 a mere show of resistance is often enough4 ,it is not the number of unassailable positions in all directions1 not the formidable look of the dark mountain masses encamped round the theatre of war1 or the broad river which passes through it1 not the ease with which certain combinations of battles can effectually paralyse the muscle which should strike the blow against us--none of these things are the true causes of the numerous successes which the defensive gains on bloodless fields2 the cause lies in the weakness of the will with which the assailant puts forward his hesitating feet4 ,these counteracting influences may and ought to be taken into consideration1 but they should only be looked upon in their true light1 and their effects should not be ascribed to other things1 namely the things of which alone we are now treating4 ,we must not omit to point out in an emphatic manner how easily military history in this respect may become a perpetual liar and deceiver if criticism is not careful about taking a correct point of view4 ,let us now consider1 in what we may call their ordinary form1 the many offensive campaigns which have miscarried without a bloody solution4 ,the assailant advances into the enemy's country1 drives back his opponent a little way1 but finds it too serious a matter to bring on a decisive battle4 ,he therefore remains standing opposite to him2 acts as if he had made a conquest1 and had nothing else to do but to protect it2 as if it was the enemy's business to seek the battle1 as if he offered it to him daily1 etc41 etc4 ,these are the representations with which the commander deludes his army1 his government1 the world1 even himself4 ,but the truth is1 that he finds the enemy in a position too strong for him4 ,we do not now speak of a case where an aggressor does not proceed with his attack because he can make no use of a victory1 because at the end of his first bound he has not enough impulsive force left to begin another4 ,such a case supposes an attack which has been successful1 a real conquest2 but we have here in view the case where an assailant sticks fast half way to his intended conquest4 ,he is now waiting to take advantage of favourable circumstances1 of which favourable circumstances there is in general no prospect1 for the aggression now intended shows at once that there is no better prospect from the future than from the present2 it is1 therefore1 a further illusion4 ,if now1 as is commonly the case1 the undertaking is in connection with other simultaneous operations1 then what they do not want to do themselves is transferred to other shoulders1 and their own inactivity is ascribed to want of support and proper co-operation4 ,insurmountable obstacles are talked of1 and motives in justification are discovered in the most confused and subtil considerations4 ,thus the forces of the assailant are wasted away in inactivity1 or rather in a partial activity1 destitute of any utility4 ,the defensive gains time1 the greatest gain to him2 bad weather arrives1 and the aggression ends by the return of the aggressor to winter quarters in his own theatre of war4 ,a tissue of false representations thus passes into history in place of the simple real ground of absence of any result1 namely fear of the enemy's sword4 ,when criticism takes up such a campaign1 it wearies itself in the discussion of a number of motives and counter-motives1 which give no satisfactory result1 because they all dwindle into vapour1 and we have not descended to the real foundation of the truth4 ,the opposition through which the elementary energy of war1 and therefore of the offensive in particular1 becomes weakened1 lies for the most part in the relations and views of states1 and these are always concealed from the world1 from the mass of the people belonging to the state1 as well as from the army1 and very often from the general-in-chief4 ,no one will account for his faint-heartedness by the admission that he feared he could not attain the desired object with the force at his disposal1 or that new enemies would be roused1 or that he did not wish to make his allies too powerful1 etc4 ,such things are hushed up2 but as occurrences have to be placed before the world in a presentable form1 therefore the commander is obliged1 either on his own account or on that of his government to pass off a tissue of fictitious motives4 ,this ever-recurring deception in military dialectics has ossified into systems in theory1 which1 of course1 are equally devoid of truth4 ,theory can never be deduced from the essence of things except by following the simple thread of cause and effect1 as we have tried to do4 ,if we look at military history with this feeling of suspicion1 then a great parade of mere words about offensive and defensive collapses1 and the simple idea of it1 which we have given1 comes forward of itself4 ,we believe it therefore to be applicable to the whole domain of the defensive1 and that we must adhere closely to it in order to obtain that clear view of the mass of events by which alone we can form correct judgments4 ,we have still to inquire into the question of the employment of these different forms of defence4 ,as they are merely gradations of the same which must be purchased by a higher sacrifice1 corresponding to the increased intensity of the form1 there would seem to be sufficient in that view to indicate always to the general which he should choose1 provided there are no other circumstances which interfere4 ,he would1 in fact1 choose that form which appeared sufficient to give his force the requisite degree of defensive power and no more1 that there might be no unnecessary waste of his force4 ,but we must not overlook the circumstance that the room given for choice amongst these different forms is generally very circumscribed1 because other circumstances which must be attended to necessarily urge a preference for one or other of them4 ,for a retreat into the interior of the country a considerable superficial space is required1 or such a condition of things as existed in ,portugal 7#ahaj71 where one ally 7,england7 gave support in rear1 and another 7,spain7 with its wide territory1 considerably diminished the impulsive force of the enemy4 ,the position of the fortresses more on the frontier or more in the interior may likewise decide for or against such a plan2 but still more the nature of the country and ground1 the character1 habits1 and feelings of the inhabitants4 ,the choice between an offensive or defensive battle may be decided by the plans of the enemy1 by the peculiar qualities of both armies and their generals2 lastly1 the possession of an excellent position or line of defence1 or the want of them may determine for one or the other2--in short1 at the bare mention of these things1 we can perceive that the choice of the form of defensive must in many cases be determined more by them than by the mere relative strength of the armies4 ,as we shall hereafter enter more into detail on the more important subjects which have just been touched upon1 the influence which they must have upon the choice will then develop itself more distinctly1 and in the end the whole will be methodised in the ,book on ,plans of ,wars and ,campaigns4 ,but this influence will not1 in general1 be decisive unless the inequality in the strength of the opposing armies is trifling2 in the opposite case 7as in the generality of cases71 the relation of the numerical strength will be decisive4 ,there is ample proof1 in military history1 that it has done so heretofore1 and that without the chain of reasoning by which it has been brought out here2 therefore in a manner intuitively by mere tact of judgment1 like most things that happen in war4 ,it was the same general who at the head of the same army1 and on the same theatre of war1 fought the battle of ,hohenfriedberg1 and at another time took up the camp of ,bunzelwitz4 ,therefore even ,frederick the ,great1 a general above all inclined to the offensive as regards the battle1 saw himself compelled at last1 by a great disproportion of force1 to resort to a real defensive position2 and ,buonaparte1 who was once in the habit of falling on his enemy like a wild boar1 have we not seen him1 when the proportion of force turned against him1 in ,august and ,september1 #ahac1 turn himself hither and thither as if he had been pent up in a cage1 instead of rushing forward recklessly upon some one of his adversaries8 ,and in ,october of the same year1 when the disproportion reached its climax1 have we not seen him at ,leipsic1 seeking shelter in the angle formed by the ,parth1 the ,elster1 and ,pleiss1 as it were waiting for his enemy in the corner of a room1 with his back against the wall8 ,we cannot omit to observe1 that from this chapter1 more than from any other in our book1 it is plainly shown that our object is not to lay down new principles and methods of conducting war1 but merely to investigate what has long existed in its innermost relations1 and to reduce it to its simplest elements4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,defensive ,battle ,we have said1 in the preceding chapter1 that the defender1 in his defensive1 would make use of a battle1 technically speaking1 of a purely offensive character1 if1 at the moment the enemy invades his theatre of war1 he marches against him and attacks him2 but that he might also wait for the appearance of the enemy in his front1 and then pass over to the attack2 in which case also the battle tactically would be again an offensive battle1 although in a modified form2 and lastly1 that he might wait till the enemy attacked his position1 and then oppose him both by holding a particular spot1 and by offensive action with portions of his force4 ,in all this we may imagine several different gradations and shades1 deviating always more from the principle of a positive counterstroke1 and passing into that of the defence of a spot of ground4 ,we cannot here enter on the subject of how far this should be carried1 and which is the most advantageous proportion of the two elements of offensive and defensive1 as regards the winning a decisive victory4 ,but we maintain that when such a result is desired1 the offensive part of the battle should never be completely omitted1 and we are convinced that all the effects of a decisive victory may and must be produced by this offensive part1 just as well as in a purely tactical offensive battle4 ,in the same manner as the field of battle is only a point in strategy1 the duration of a battle is only1 strategically1 an instant of time1 and the end and result1 not the course of a battle1 constitutes a strategic quantity4 ,now1 if it is true that a complete victory may result from the offensive elements which lie in every defensive battle1 then there would be no fundamental difference between an offensive and a defensive battle1 as far as regards strategic combinations2 we are indeed convinced that this is so1 but the thing wears a different appearance4 ,in order to fix the subject more distinctly in the eye1 to make our view clear and thereby remove the appearance now referred to1 we shall sketch1 hastily1 the picture of a defensive battle1 such as we imagine it4 ,the defensive waits the attack in a position2 for this he has selected proper ground1 and turned it to the best account1 that is1 he has made himself well acquainted with the locality1 thrown up strong entrenchments at some of the most important points1 opened and levelled communications1 constructed batteries1 fortified villages1 and looked out places where he can draw up his masses under cover1 etc41 etc41 etc4 ,whilst the forces on both sides are consuming each other at the different points where they come into contact1 the advantage of a front more or less strong1 the approach to which is made difficult by one or more parallel trenches or other obstacles1 or also by the influence of some strong commanding points1 enables him with a small part of his force to destroy great numbers of the enemy at every stage of the defence up to the heart of the position4 ,the points of support which he has given his wings secure him from any sudden attack from several quarters2 the covered ground which he has chosen for his masses makes the enemy cautious1 indeed timid1 and affords the defensive the means of diminishing by partial and successful attacks the general backward movement which goes on as the combat becomes gradually concentrated within narrower limits4 ,the defender therefore casts a contented look at the battle as it burns in a moderate blaze before him2--but he does not reckon that his resistance in front can last for ever2--he does not think his flanks impregnable2--he does not expect that the whole course of the battle will be changed by the successful charge of a few battalions or squadrons4 ,his position is deep1 for each part in the scale of gradation of the order of battle1 from the division down to the battalion1 has its reserve for unforeseen events1 and for a renewal of the fight2 and at the same time an important mass1 one fifth to a quarter of the whole1 is kept quite in the rear out of the battle1 so far back as to be quite out of fire1 and if possible so far as to be beyond the circuitous line by which the enemy might attempt to turn either flank4 ,with this corps he intends to cover his flanks from wider and greater turning movements1 secure himself against unforeseen events1 and in the latter stage of the battle1 when the assailant's plan is fully developed1 when the most of his troops have been brought into action1 he will throw this mass on a part of the enemy's army1 and open at that part of the field a smaller offensive battle on his own part1 using all the elements of attack1 such as charges1 surprise1 turning movements1 and by means of this pressure against the centre of gravity of the battle1 now only resting on a point1 make the whole recoil4 ,this is the normal idea which we have formed of a defensive battle1 based on the tactics of the present day4 ,in this battle the general turning movement made by the assailant in order to assist his attack1 and at the same time with a view to make the results of victory more complete1 is replied to by a partial turning movement on the part of the defensive1 that is1 by the turning of that part of the assailant's force used by him in the attempt to turn4 ,this partial movement may be supposed sufficient to destroy the effect of the enemy's attempt1 but it cannot lead to a like general enveloping of the assailant's army2 and there will always be a distinction in the features of a victory on this account1 that the side fighting an offensive battle encircles the enemy's army1 and acts towards the centre of the same1 while the side fighting on the defensive acts more or less from the centre to the circumference1 in the direction of the radii4 ,on the field of battle itself1 and in the first stages of the pursuit1 the enveloping form must always be considered the most effectual2 we do not mean on account of its form generally1 we only mean in the event of its being carried out to such an extreme as to limit very much the enemy's means of retreat during the battle4 ,but it is just against this extreme point that the enemy's positive counter-effort is directed1 and in many cases where this effort is not sufficient to obtain a victory1 it will at least suffice to protect him from such an extreme as we allude to4 ,but we must always admit that this danger1 namely1 of having the line of retreat seriously contracted1 is particularly great in defensive battles1 and if it cannot be guarded against1 the results in the battle itself1 and in the first stage of the retreat are thereby very much enhanced in favour of the enemy4 ,but as a rule this danger does not extend beyond the first stage of the retreat1 that is1 until night-fall2 on the following day enveloping is at an end1 and both parties are again on an equality in this respect4 ,certainly the defender may have lost his principal line of retreat1 and therefore be placed in a disadvantageous strategic situation for the future2 but in most cases the turning movement itself will be at an end1 because it was only planned to suit the field of battle1 and therefore cannot apply much further4 ,but what will take place1 on the other hand1 if the defender is victorious8 ,a division of the defeated force4 ,this may facilitate the retreat at the first moment1 but next day a concentration of all parts is the one thing most needful4 ,now if the victory is a most decisive one1 if the defender pursues with great energy1 this concentration will often become impossible1 and from this separation of the beaten force the worst consequences may follow1 which may go on step by step to a complete rout4 ,if ,buonaparte had conquered at ,leipsic1 the allied army would have been completely cut in two1 which would have considerably lowered their relative strategic position4 ,at ,dresden1 although ,buonaparte certainly did not fight a regular defensive battle1 the attack had the geometrical form of which we have been speaking1 that is1 from the centre to the circumference2 the embarrassment of the ,allies in consequence of their separation1 is well known1 an embarrassment from which they were only relieved by the victory on the ,katzbach1 the tidings of which caused ,buonaparte to return to ,dresden with the ,guard4 ,this battle on the ,katzbach itself is a similar example4 ,in it the defender1 at the last moment passes over to the offensive1 and consequently operates on diverging lines2 the ,french corps were thus wedged asunder1 and several days after1 as the fruits of the victory1 ,puthod's division fell into the hands of the ,allies4 ,the conclusion we draw from this is1 that if the assailant1 by the concentric form which is homogeneous to him1 has the means of giving expansion to his victory1 on the other hand the defender also1 by the divergent form which is homogeneous to the defence1 acquires a a means of giving greater results to his victory than would be the case by a merely parallel position and perpendicular attack1 and we think that one means is at least as good as the other4 ,if in military history we rarely find such great victories resulting from the defensive battle as from the offensive1 that proves nothing against our assertion that the one is as well suited to produce victory as the other2 the real cause is in the very different relations of the defender4 ,the army acting on the defensive is generally the weaker of the two1 not only in the amount of his forces1 but also in every other respect2 he either is1 or thinks he is1 not in a condition to follow up his victory with great results1 and contents himself with merely fending off the danger and saving the honour of his arms4 ,that the defender by inferiority of force and other circumstances may be tied down to that degree we do not dispute1 but there is no doubt that this1 which is only the consequence of a contingent necessity1 has often been assumed to be the consequence of that part which every defender has to play3 and thus in an absurd manner it has become a prevalent view of the defensive that its battles should really be confined to warding off the attacks of the enemy1 and not directed to the destruction of the enemy4 ,we hold this to be a prejudicial error1 a regular substitution of the form for the thing itself2 and we maintain unreservedly that in the form of war which we call defence1 the victory may not only be more probable1 but may also attain the same magnitude and efficacy as in the attack1 and that this may be the case not only in the total result of all the combats which constitute campaign1 but also in any particular battle1 if the necessary degree of force and energy is not wanting4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,fortresses ,formerly1 and up to the time of great standing armies1 fortresses1 that is castles and fortified towns1 were only built for the defence and protection of the inhabitants4 ,the baron1 if he saw himself pressed on all sides1 took refuge in his castle to gain time and wait a more favourable moment2 and towns sought by their walls to keep off the passing hurricane of war4 ,this simplest and most natural object of fortresses did not continue to be the only one2 the relation which such a place acquired with regard to the whole country and to troops acting here and there in the country soon gave these fortified points a wider importance1 a signification which made itself felt beyond their walls1 and contributed essentially to the conquest or occupation of the country1 to the successful or unsuccessful issue of the whole contest1 and in this manner they even became a means of making war more of a connected whole4 ,thus fortresses acquired that strategic significance which for a time was regarded as so important that it dictated the leading features of the plans of campaigns1 which were more directed to the taking of one or more fortresses than the destruction of the enemy's army in the field4 ,men reverted to the cause of the importance of these places1 that is to the connection between a fortified point1 and the country1 and the armies2 and then thought that they could not be sufficiently particular or too philosophical in choosing the points to be fortified4 ,in these abstract objects the original one was almost lost sight of1 and at length they came to the idea of fortresses without either towns or inhabitants4 ,on the other hand1 the times are past in which the mere enclosure of a place with walls1 without any military preparations1 could keep a place dry during an inundation of war sweeping over the whole country4 ,such a possibility rested partly on the division of nations formerly into small states1 partly on the periodical character of the incursions then in vogue1 which had fixed and very limited duration1 almost in accordance with the seasons1 as either the feudal forces hastened home1 or the pay for the condottieri used regularly to run short4 ,since large standing armies1 with powerful trains of artillery mow down the opposition of walls or ramparts as it were with a machine1 neither town nor other small corporation has any longer an inclination to hazard all their means only to be taken a few weeks or months later1 and then to be treated so much the worse4 ,still less can it be the interest of an army to break itself up into garrisons for a number of strong places1 which may for a time retard the progress of the enemy1 but must in the end submit4 ,we must always keep enough forces1 over and above those in garrison1 to make us equal to the enemy in the open field1 unless we can depend on the arrival of an ally1 who will relieve our strong places and set our army free4 ,consequently the number of fortresses has necessarily much diminished1 and this has again led to the abandonment of the idea of directly protecting the population and property in towns by fortifications1 and promoted the other idea of regarding the fortresses as an indirect protection to the country1 which they secure by their strategic importance as knots which hold together the strategic web4 ,such has been the course of ideas1 not only in books but also in actual experience1 at the same time1 as usually happens1 it has been much more spun out in books4 ,natural as was this tendency of things1 still these ideas were carried out to an extreme1 and mere crotchets and fancies displaced the sound core of a natural and urgent want4 ,we shall look into these simple and important wants when we enumerate the objects and conditions of fortresses all together2 we shall thereby advance from the simple to the more complicated1 and in the succeeding chapter we shall see what is to be deduced therefrom as to the determination of the position and number of fortresses4 ,the efficacy of a fortress is plainly composed of two different elements1 the passive and the active4 ,by the first it shelters the place1 and all that it contains2 by the other it possesses a certain influence over the adjacent country1 even beyond the range of its guns4 ,this active element consists in the attacks which the garrison may undertake upon every enemy who approaches within a certain distance4 ,the larger the garrison1 so much the stronger numerically will be the detachments that may be employed on such expeditions1 and the stronger such detachments the wider as a rule will be the range of their operations2 from which it follows that the sphere of the active influence of a great fortress is not only greater in intensity but also more extensive than that of a small one4 ,but the active element itself is again1 to a certain extent1 of two kinds1 consisting namely of enterprises of the garrison proper1 and of enterprises which other bodies of troops1 great and small1 not belonging to the garrison but in co-operation with it1 may be able to carry out4 ,for instance1 corps which independently would be too weak to face the enemy1 may1 through the shelter which1 in case of necessity1 the walls of a fortress afford them1 be able to maintain themselves in the country1 and to a certain extent to command it4 ,the enterprises which the garrison of a fortress can venture to undertake are always somewhat restricted4 ,even in the case of large places and strong garrisons1 the bodies of troops which can be employed on such operations are mostly inconsiderable as compared with the forces in the field1 and their average sphere of action seldom exceeds a couple of days' marches4 ,if the fortress is small1 the detachments it can send out are quite insignificant and the range of their activity will generally be confined to the nearest villages4 ,but corps which do not belong to the garrison1 and therefore are not under the necessity of returning to the place1 are thereby much more at liberty in their movements1 and by their means1 if other circumstances are favourable1 the external zone of action of a fortress may be immensely extended4 ,therefore if we speak of the active influence of fortresses in general terms1 we must always keep this feature of the same principally in view4 ,but even the smallest active element of the weakest garrison1 is still essential for the different objects which fortresses are destined to fulfil1 for strictly speaking even the most passive of all the functions of a fortress 7defence against attack7 cannot be imagined exclusive of that active agency4 ,at the same time it is evident that amongst the different purposes which a fortress may have to answer generally1 or in this or that moment1 the passive element will be most required at one time1 the active at another4 ,the role which a fortress is to fulfil may be perfectly simple1 and the action of the place will in such case be to a certain extent direct2 it may be partly complicated1 and the action then becomes more or less indirect4 ,we shall examine these subjects separately1 commencing with the first2 but at the outset we must state that a fortress may be intended to answer several of these purposes1 perhaps all of them1 either at once1 or at least at different stages of the war4 ,we say1 therefore1 that fortresses are great and most important supports of the defensive4 #a4 ,as secure depots of stores of all kinds4 ,the assailant during his aggression subsists his army from day to day2 the defensive usually must have made preparations long beforehand1 he need not therefore draw provisions exclusively from the district he occupies1 and which he no doubt desires to spare4 ,storehouses are therefore for him a great necessity4 ,the provisions of all kinds which the aggressor possesses are in his rear as he advances1 and are therefore exempt from the dangers of the theatre of war1 while those of the defensive are exposed to them4 ,if these provisions of all kinds are not in fortified places1 then a most injurious effect on the operations in the field is the consequence1 and the most extended and compulsory positions often become necessary in order to cover depots or sources of supply4 ,an army on the defensive without fortresses has a hundred vulnerable spots2 it is a body without armour4 #b4 ,as a protection to great and wealthy towns4 ,this purpose is closely allied to the first1 for great and wealthy towns1 especially commercial ones1 are the natural storehouses of an army2 as such their possession and loss affects the army directly4 ,besides this1 it is also always worth while to preserve this portion of the national wealth1 partly on account of the resources which they furnish directly1 partly because1 in negotiations for peace1 an important place is in itself a valuable weight thrown into the scale4 ,this use of fortresses has been too little regarded in modern times1 and yet it is one of the most natural1 and one which has a most powerful effect1 and is the least liable to mistakes4 ,if there was a country in which not only all great and rich cities1 but all populous places as well were fortified1 and defended by the inhabitants and the people belonging to the adjacent districts1 then by that means the expedition of military operation would be so much reduced1 and the people attacked would press with so great a part of their whole weight in the scales1 that the talent as well as the force of will of the enemy's general would sink to nothing4 ,we just mention this ideal application of fortification to a country to do justice to what we have just supposed to be the proper use of fortresses1 and that the importance of the direct protection which they afford may not be overlooked for a moment2 but in any other respect this idea will not again interrupt our considerations1 for amongst the whole number of fortresses there must always be some which must be more strongly fortified than others1 to serve as the real supports of the active army4 ,the purposes specified under #a and #b hardly call forth any other but the passive action of fortresses4 #c4 ,as real barriers1 they close the roads1 and in most cases the rivers1 on which they are situated4 ,it is not as easy as is generally supposed to find a practicable lateral road which passes round a fortress1 for this turning must be made1 not only out of reach of the guns of this place1 but also by a detour greater or less1 to avoid sorties of the garrison4 ,if the country is in the least degree difficult1 there are often delays connected with the slightest deviation of the road which may cause the loss of a whole day's march1 and1 if the road is much used1 may become of great importance4 ,how they may have an influence on enterprises by closing the navigation of a river is clear in itself4 #d4 ,as tactical points d'appui4 ,as the diameter of the zone covered by the fire of even a very inferior class of fortifications is usually some leagues1 fortresses may be considered always as the best points d'appui for the flanks of a position4 ,a lake of several miles long is certainly an excellent support for the wing of an army1 and yet a fortress of moderate size is better4 ,the flank does not require to rest close upon it1 as the assailant1 for the sake of his retreat1 would not throw himself between our flank and that obstacle4 #e4 ,as a station 7or stage74 ,if fortresses are on the line of communication of the defensive1 as is generally the case1 they serve as halting places for all that passes up and down these lines4 ,the chief danger to lines of communication is from irregular bands1 whose action is always of the nature of a shock4 ,if a valuable convoy1 on the approach of such a comet1 can reach a fortress by hastening the march or quickly turning1 it is saved1 and may wait there till the danger is past4 ,further1 all troops marching to or from the army1 after halting here for a a few days1 are better able to hasten the remainder of the march1 and a halting day is just the time of greatest danger4 ,in this way a fortress situated half way on a line of communication of #cj miles shortens the line in a manner one half4 #f4 ,as places of refuge for weak or defeated corps4 ,under the guns of a moderate sized fortress every corps is safe from the enemy's blows1 even if no entrenched camp is specially prepared for them4 ,no doubt such a corps must give up its further retreat if it waits too long2 but this is no great sacrifice in cases where a further retreat would only end in complete destruction4 ,in many cases a fortress can ensure a few days' halt without the retreat being altogether stopped4 ,for the slightly wounded and fugitives who precede a beaten army1 it is especially suited as a place of refuge1 where they can wait to rejoin their corps4 ,if ,magdeburg had lain on the direct line of the ,prussian retreat in #ahjf1 and if that line had not been already lost at ,auerstadt1 the army could easily have halted for three or four days near that great fortress1 and rallied and reorganised itself4 ,but even as it was it served as a rallying point for the remains of ,hohenlohe's corps1 which there first resumed the appearance of an army4 ,it is only by actual experience in war itself that the beneficial influence of fortresses close at hand in disastrous times can be rightly understood4 ,they contain powder and arms1 forage and bread1 give covering to the sick1 security to the sound1 and recovery of sense to the panic-stricken4 ,they are like an hostelry in the desert4 ,in the four last named purposes it is evident that the active agency of fortresses is called more into requisition4 #g4 ,as a real shield against the enemy's aggression4 ,fortresses which the defender leaves in his front break the stream of the enemy's attack like blocks of ice4 ,the enemy must at least invest them1 and requires for that1 if the garrisons are brave and enterprising1 perhaps double their strength4 ,but1 besides1 these garrisons may and do mostly consist in part of troops1 who1 although competent to duty in a garrison1 are not fit for the field--half trained militia1 invalids1 convalescents1 armed citizens1 landsturm1 etc4 ,the enemy1 therefore1 in such case is perhaps weakened four times more than we are4 ,this disproportionate weakening of the enemy's power is the first and most important but not the only advantage which a besieged fortress affords by its resistance4 ,from the moment that the enemy crosses our line of fortresses1 all his movements become much more constrained2 he is limited in his lines of retreat1 and must constantly attend to the direct covering of the sieges which he undertakes4 ,here1 therefore1 fortresses co-operate with the defensive act in a most extensive and decisive manner1 and of all the objects that they can have1 this may be regarded as the most important4 ,if this use of fortresses--far from being seen regularly repeating itself--seldom comparatively occurs in military history1 the cause is to be found in the character of most wars1 this means being to a certain extent far too decisive and too thoroughly effectual for them1 the explanation of which we leave till hereafter4 ,in this use of fortresses it is chiefly their offensive power that is called for1 at least it is that by which their effectual action is chiefly produced4 ,if a fortress was no more to an aggressor than a point which could not be occupied by him1 it might be an obstacle to him1 but not to such a degree as to compel him to lay siege to it ,but as he cannot leave six1 eight1 or ten thousand men to do as they like in his rear1 he is obliged to invest the place with a sufficient force1 and if he desires that this investment should not continue to employ so large a detachment1 he must convert the investment into a siege1 and take the place4 ,from the moment the siege commences1 it is then chiefly the passive efficacy of the fortress which comes into action4 ,all the destinations of fortresses which we have been hitherto considering are fulfilled in a simple and mainly in a direct manner4 ,on the other hand1 in the next two objects the method of action is more complicated4 #h4 ,as a protection to extended cantonments4 ,that a moderate-sized fortress closes the approach to cantonments lying behind it for a width of three or four milesis a simple result of its existence2 but how such a place comes to have the honour of covering a line of cantonments fifteen or twenty miles in length1 which we find frequently spoken of in military history as a fact--that requires investigation as far as it has really taken place1 and refutation so far as it may be mere illusion4 ,the following points offer themselves for consideration3-- 7#a47 ,that the place in itself blocks one of the main roads1 and really covers a breadth of three or four miles of country4 7#b47 ,that it may be regarded as an exceptionally strong advanced post1 or that it affords a more complete observation of the country1 to which may be added facilities in the way of secret information through the ordinary relations of civil life which exist between a great town and the adjacent districts ,it is natural that in a place of six1 eight or ten thousand inhabitants1 one should be able to learn more of what is going on in the neighbourhood than in a mere village1 the quarters of an ordinary outpost4 7#c47 ,that smaller corps are appuyed on it1 derive from it protection and security1 and from time to time can advance towards the enemy1 it may be to bring in intelligence1 or1 in case he attempts to turn the fortress1 to underdertake something against his rear2 that therefore although a fortress1 cannot quit its place1 still it may have the efficacy of an advanced corps 7,fifth ,book1 eighth ,chapter74 7#d47 ,that the defender1 after assembling his corps1 can take up his position at a point directly behind this fortress1 which the assailant cannot reach without becoming exposed to danger from the fortress in his rear4 ,no doubt every attack on a line of cantonments as such is to be taken in the sense of a surprise1 or rather1 we are only speaking here of that kind of attack2 now it is evident in itself that an attack by surprise accomplishes its effect in a much shorter space of time than a regular attack on a theatre of war4 ,therefore1 although in the latter case1 a fortress which is to be passed by must necessarily be invested and kept in check1 this investment will not be so indispensable in the case of a mere sudden attack on cantonments1 and therefore in the same proportion the fortress will be less an obstacle to the attack of the cantonments4 ,that is true enough2 also the cantonments lying at a distance of six to eight miles from the fortress cannot be directly protected by it2 but the object of such a sudden attack does not consist alone in the attack of a few cantonments4 ,until we reach the book on attack we cannot describe circumstantially the real object of such a sudden attack and what may be expected from it2 but this much we may say at present1 that its principal results are obtained1 not by the actual attack on some isolated quarters1 but by the series of combats which the aggressor forces on single corps not in proper order1 and more bent upon hurrying to certain points than upon fighting4 ,but this attack and pursuit will always be in a direction more or less towards the centre of the enemy's cantonments1 and1 therefore1 an important fortress lying before this centre will certainly prove a very great impediment to the attack4 ,if we reflect on these four points in the whole of their effects1 we see that an important fortress in a direct and in an indirect way certainly gives some security to a much greater extent of cantonments than we should think at first sight4 8,some security0 we say1 for all these indirect agencies do not render the advance of the enemy impossible2 they only make it more difficult1 and a more serious consideration2 consequently less probable and less of a danger for the defensive4 ,but that is also all that was required1 and all that should be understood in this case under the term covering4 ,the real direct security must be attained by means of outposts and the arrangement of the cantonments themselves4 ,there is1 therefore1 some truth in ascribing to a great fortress the capability of covering a wide extent of cantonments lying in rear of it2 but it is also not to be denied that often in plans of real campaigns1 but still oftener in historical works1 we meet with vague and empty expressions1 or illusory views in connection with this subject4 ,for if that covering is only realised by the co-operation of several circumstances1 if it then also only produces a diminution of the danger1 we can easily see that1 in particular cases1 through special circumstances1 above all1 through the boldness of the enemy1 this whole covering may prove an illusion1 and therefore in actual war we must not content ourselves with assuming hastily at once the efficacy of such and such a fortress1 but carefully examine and study each single case on its own merits4 #i4 ,as covering a province not occupied4 ,if during war province is either not occupied at all1 or only occupied by an insufficient force1 and likewise exposed more or less to incursions from flying columns1 then a fortress1 if not too unimportant in size1 may be looked upon as a covering1 or1 if we prefer1 as a security for this province4 ,as a security it may at all events be regarded1 for an enemy cannot become master of the province until he has taken it1 and that gives us time to hasten to its defence4 ,but the actual covering can certainly only be supposed very indirect1 or as not preperly belonging to it4 ,that is1 the fortress by its active opposition can only in some measure check the incursions of hostile bands4 ,if this opposition is limited to merely what the garrison can effect1 then the result must be little indeed1 for the garrisons of such places are generally weak and usually consist of infantry only1 and that not of the best quality4 ,the idea gains a little more reality if small columns keep themselves in communication with the place1 making it their base and place of retreat in case of necessity4 #aj4 ,as the focus of a general arming of the nation4 ,provisions1 arms1 and munitions can never be supplied in a regular manner in a ,people's ,war2 on the other hand1 it is just in the very nature of such a war to do the best we can2 in that way a thousand small sources furnishing means of resistance are opened which otherwise might have remained unused2 and it is easy to see that a strong commodious fortress1 as a great magazine of these things1 can well give to the whole defence more force and intensity1 more cohesion1 and greater results4 ,besides1 a fortress is a place of refuge for wounded1 the seat of the civil functionaries1 the treasury1 the point of assembly for the greater enterprises1 etc41 etc42 lastly1 a nucleus of resistance which during the siege places the enemy's force in a condition which facilitates and favours the attacks of national levies acting in conjunction4 #aa4 ,for the defence of rivers and mountains4 ,nowhere can a fortress answer so many purposes1 undertake to play so many parts1 as when it is situated on a great river4 ,it secures the passage at any time at that spot1 and hinders that of the enemy for several miles each way1 it commands the use of the river for commercial purposes1 receives all ships within its walls1 blocks bridges and roads1 and helps the indirect defence of the river1 that is1 the defence by a position on the enemy's side4 ,it is evident that1 by its influence in so many ways1 it very greatly facilitates the defence of the river1 and may be regarded as an essential part of that defence4 ,fortresses in mountains are important in a similar manner4 ,they there form the knots of whole systems of roads1 which have their commencement and termination at that spot2 they thus command the whole country which is traversed by these roads1 and they may be regarded as the true buttresses of the whole defensive system4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,fortresses 7,continued7 ,we have discussed the object of fortresses3 now for their situation4 ,at first the subject seems very complicated1 when we think of the diversity of objects1 each of which may again be modified by the locality2 but such a view has very little foundation if we keep to the essence of the thing1 and guard against unnecessary subtilties4 ,it is evident that all these demands are at once satisfied1 if1 in those districts of country which are to be regarded as the theatre of war1 all the largest and richest towns on the great high roads connecting the two countries with each other are fortified1 more particularly those adjacent to harbours and bays of the sea1 or situated on large rivers and in mountains4 ,great towns and great roads always go hand in hand1 and both have also a natural connection with great rivers and the coasts of the sea1 all these four conditions1 therefore1 agree very well with each other1 and give rise to no incongruity2 on the other hand1 it is not the same with mountains1 for large towns are seldom found there4 ,if1 therefore1 the position and direction of a mountain chain makes it favourable to a defensive line1 it is necessary to close its roads and passes by small forts1 built for this purpose only1 and at the least possible cost1 the great outlay on works of fortification being reserved for the important places of arms in the level country4 ,we have not yet noticed the frontiers of the state1 nor said anything of the geometrical form of the whole system of fortresses1 nor of the other geographical points in connection with their situation1 because we regard the objects above mentioned as the most essential1 and are of opinion that in many cases they alone are sufficient1 particularly in small states4 ,but1 at the same time1 other considerations may be admitted1 and may be imperative in countries of a greater superficial extent1 which either have a great many important towns and roads1 or1 on the contrary1 are almost without any1 which are either very rich1 and1 possessing already many fortresses1 still want new ones1 or those which1 on the other hand1 are very poor1 and under the necessity of making a few answer1 in short1 in cases where the number of fortresses does not correspond with the number of important towns and roads which present themselves1 being either considerably greater or less4 ,we shall now cast a glance at the nature of such other considerations4 ,the chief questions which remain relate to #a4 ,the choice of the principal roads1 if the two countries are connected by more roads than we wish to fortify4 #b4 ,whether the fortresses are to be placed on the frontier only1 or spread over the country4 ,or1 #c4 ,whether they shall be distributed uniformly1 or in groups4 #d4 ,circumstances relating to the geography of the country to which it is necessary to pay attention4 ,a number of other points with respect to the geometrical form of the line of fortifications1 such as whether they should be placed in a single line or in several lines1 that is1 whether they do more service when placed one behind another1 or side by side in line with each other2 whether they should be chequer-wise1 or in a straight line2 or whether they should take the form of a fortification itself1 with salients and re-entering angles all these we look upon as empty subtilties1 that is1 considerations so insignificant1 that1 compared with the really important points1 they are not worth notice2 and we only mention them here because they are not merely treated of in many books1 but also a great deal more is made of this rubbish than it is worth4 ,as regards the first question1 in order to place it in a clearer light we shall merely instance the relation of the south of ,germany to ,france1 that is1 to the upper ,rhine4 ,if1 without reference to the number of separate states composing this district of country1 we suppose it a whole which is to be fortified strategically1 much doubt will arise1 for a great number of very fine roads lead from the ,rhine into the interior of ,franconia1 ,bavaria and ,austria4 ,certainly1 towns are not wanting which surpass others in size and importance1 as ,nuremburg1 ,wurzburg1 ,ulm1 ,augsburg1 and ,munich2 but if we are not disposed to fortify all1 there is no alternative but to make a selection4 ,if1 further1 in accordance with our view1 the fortification of the greatest and wealthiest is held to be the principal thing1 still it is not to be denied that1 owing to the distance between ,nuremburg and ,munich1 the first has a very different strategic signification from the second2 and therefore it always remains to be considered whether it would not be better1 in place of ,nuremburg1 to fortify some other place in the neighbourhood of ,munich1 even if the place is one of less importance in itself4 ,as concerns the decision in such cases1 that is1 answering the first question1 we must refer to what has been said in the chapters on the general plan of defence1 and on the choice of points of attack4 ,wherever the most natural point of attack is situated1 there the defensive arrangements should be made by preference4 ,therefore1 amongst a number of great roads leading from the enemy's country into ours1 we should first of all fortify that which leads most directly to the heart of our dominions1 or that which1 traversing fertile provinces1 or running parallel to navigable rivers1 facilitates the enemy's undertaking1 and then we may rest secure4 ,the assailant then encounters these works1 or should he resolve to pass them by1 he will naturally offer a favourable opportunity for operations against his flank4 ,vienna is the heart of ,south ,germany1 and plainly ,munich or ,augsburg1 in relation to ,france alone 7,switzerland and ,italy being therefore supposed neutral7 would be more efficient as a principal fortress than ,nuremburg or ,wurzburg4 ,but if1 at the same time1 we look at the roads leading from ,italy into ,germany by ,switzerland and the ,tyrol1 this will become still more evident1 because1 in relation to these1 ,munich and ,augsburg will always be places of importance1 whereas ,wurzburg and ,nuremburg are much the same1 in this respect1 as if they did not exist4 ,we turn now to the second question ,whether the fortresses should be placed on the frontier1 or distributed over the country8 ,in the first place1 we must observe1 that1 as regards small states1 this question is superfluous1 for what are called strategic frontiers coincide1 in their case1 nearly with the whole country4 ,the larger the state is supposed to be in the consideration of this question1 the plainer appears the necessity for its being answered4 ,the most natural answer is1 that fortresses belong to the frontiers1 for they are to defend the state1 and the state is defended as long as the frontiers are defended4 ,this argument may be valid in the abstract1 but the following considerations will show that it is subject to very many modifications4 ,every defence which is calculated chiefly on foreign assistance lays great value on gaining time2 it is not a vigorous counterstroke1 but a slow proceeding1 in which the chief gain consists more in delay than in any weakening of the enemy which is effected4 ,but now it lies in the nature of the thing that1 supposing all other circumstances alike1 fortresses which are spread over the whole country1 and include between them a very considerable area of territory1 will take longer to capture than those squeezed together in a close line on the frontier4 ,further1 in all cases in which the object is to overcome the enemy through the length of his communications1 and the difficulty of his existence therefore in countries which can chiefly reckon on this kind of reaction1 it would be a complete contradiction to have the defensive preparations of this kind only on the frontier4 ,lastly1 let us also remember that1 if circumstances will in any way allow of it1 the fortification of the capital is a main point2 that according to our principles the chief towns and places of commerce in the provinces demand it likewise2 that rivers passing through the country1 mountains1 and other irregular features of ground1 afford advantages for new lines of defence2 that many towns1 through their strong natural situation1 invite fortification2 moreover1 that certain accessories of war1 such as manufactories of arms1 c41 are better placed in the interior of the country than on the frontier1 and their value well entitles them to the protection of works of fortification2 then we see that there is always more or less occasion for the construction of fortresses in the interior of a country2 on this account we are of opinion1 that although states which possess a great number of fortresses are right in placing the greater number on the frontier1 still it would be a great mistake if the interior of the country was left entirely destitute of them4 ,we think that this mistake has been made in a remarkable degree in ,france4 ,a great doubt may with reason arise if the border provinces of a country contain no considerable towns1 such towns lying further back towards the interior1 as is the case in ,south ,germany in particular1 where ,swabia is almost destitute of great towns1 whilst ,bavaria contains a large number4 ,we do not hold it to be necessary to remove these doubts once for all on general grounds1 believing that in such cases1 in order to arrive at a solution1 reasons derived from the particular situation must come into consideration4 ,still we must call attention to the closing remarks in this chapter4 ,the third question ,whether fortresses should be disposed in groups1 or more equally distributed8 will1 if we reflect upon it1 seldom arise2 still we must not1 for that reason1 set it down as a useless subtilty1 because certainly a group of two1 three1 or four fortresses1 which are only a few days' march from a common centre1 give that point and the army placed there such strength1 that1 if other conditions allowed of it1 in some measure one would be very much tempted to form such a strategic bastion4 ,the last point concerns the other geographical properties of the points to be chosen4 ,that fortresses on the sea1 on streams and great rivers1 and in mountains1 are doubly effective1 has been already stated to be one of the principal considerations2 but there are a number of other points in connection with fortresses to which regard must be paid4 ,if a fortress cannot lie on the river itself1 it is better not to place it near1 but at a distance of ten or twelve miles from it2 otherwise1 the river intersects1 and lowers the value of the sphere of action of the fortress in all those points above mentioned47997 7997 ,philippsburg was the pattern of a badly-placed fortress2 it resembled a fool standing with his nose close to a wall4 ,this is not the same in mountains1 because there the movement of large or small masses upon particular points is not restricted in the same degree as it is by a river4 ,but fortresses on the enemy's side of a mountain are not well placed1 because they are difficult to succour4 ,if they are on our side1 the difficulty of laying siege to them is very great1 as the mountains cut across the enemy's line of communication4 ,we give ,olmtz1 #ageh1 as an example4 ,it is easily seen that impassable forests and marshes have a similar effect to that of rivers4 ,the question has been often raised as to whether towns situated in a very difficult country are well or ill suited for fortresses4 ,as they can be fortified and defended at a small expense1 or be made much stronger1 often impregnable1 at an equal expenditure1 and the services of a fortress are always more passive than active1 it does not seem necessary to attach much importance to the objection that they can easily be blockaded4 ,if we now1 in conclusion1 cast a retrospective glance over our simple system of fortification for a country1 we may assert that it rests on comprehensive data1 lasting in their nature1 and directly connected with the foundations of the state itself1 not on transient views on war1 fashionable for a day2 not on imaginary strategic niceties1 nor on requirements completely singular in character an error which might be attended with irreparable consequences if allowed to influence the construction of fortresses intended to last five hundred1 perhaps a thousand1 years4 ,silberberg1 in ,silesia1 built by ,frederick the ,great on one of the ridges of the ,sudetics1 has1 from the complete alteration in circumstances which has since taken place1 lost almost entirely its importance and object1 whilst ,breslau1 if it had been made a strong place of arms1 and continued to be so1 would have always maintained its value against the ,french1 as well as against the ,russians1 ,poles1 and ,austrians4 ,our reader will not overlook the fact that these considerations are not raised on the supposed case of a state providing itself with a set of new fortifications2 they would be useless if such was their object1 as such a case seldom1 if ever1 happens2 but they may all arise at the designing of each single fortification4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,defensive ,position ,every position in which we accept battle1 at the same time making use of the ground as a means of protection1 is a defensive position1 and it makes no difference in this respect whether we act more passively or more offensively in the action4 ,this follows from the general view of the defensive which we have given4 ,now we may also apply the term to every position in which an army whilst marching to encounter the enemy would certainly accept battle if the latter sought for it4 ,in point of fact1 most battles take place in this way1 and in all the middle ages no other was ever thought of4 ,that is1 however1 not the kind of position of which we are now speaking2 by far the greater number of positions are of this kind1 and the conception of a position in contradistinction to a camp taken up on the march would suffice for that4 ,a position which is specially called a defensive position must therefore have some other distinguishing characteristics4 ,in the decisions which take place in an ordinary position1 the idea of time evidently predominates2 the armies march against each other in order to come to an engagement3 the place is a subordinate point1 all that is required from it is that it should not be unsuitable4 ,but in a real defensive position the idea of place predominates2 the decision is to be realised on this spot1 or rather1 chiefly through this spot4 ,that is the only kind of position we have here in view4 ,now the connection of place is a double one2 that is1 in the first instance1 inasmuch as a force posted at this point exercises a certain influence upon the war in general2 and next1 inasmuch as the local features of the ground contribute to the strength of the army and afford protection3 in a word1 a strategic and a tactical connection4 ,strictly speaking1 the term defensive position has its origin only in connection with tactics1 for its connection with strategy1 namely1 that an army posted at this point by its presence serves to defend the country1 will also suit the case of an army acting offensively4 ,the strategic effect to be derived from a position cannot be shown completely until hereafter1 when we discuss the defence of a theatre of war2 we shall therefore only consider it here as far as can be done at present1 and for that end we must examine more closely the nature of two ideas which have a similarity and are often mistaken for one another1 that is1 the turning a position1 and the passing by it4 ,the turning a position relates to its front1 and is done either by an attack upon the side of the position or on its rear1 or by acting against its lines of retreat and communication4 ,the first of these1 that is1 an attack on flank or rear is tactical in its nature4 ,in our days in which the mobility of troops is so great1 and all plans of battles have more or less in view the turning or enveloping the enemy1 every position must accordingly be adapted to meet such measures1 and one to deserve the name of strong must1 with a strong front1 allow at least of good combinations for battle on the sides and rear as well1 in case of their being menaced4 ,in this way a position will not become untenable by the enemy turning it with a view to an attack on the flank or rear1 as the battle which then takes place was provided for in the choice of the position1 and should ensure the defender all the advantages which he could expect from this position generally4 ,if the position is turned by the enemy with a view to acting against the lines of retreat and communication1 this is a strategic relation1 and the question is how long the position can be maintained1 and whether we cannot outbid the enemy by a scheme like his own1 both these questions depend on the situation of the point 7strategically71 that is1 chiefly on the relations of the lines of communication of both combatants4 ,a good position should secure to the army on the defensive the advantage in this point4 ,in any case the position will not be rendered of no effect in this way1 as the enemy is neutralised by the position when he is occupied by it in the manner supposed4 ,but if the assailant1 without troubling himself about the existence of the army awaiting his attack in a defensive position1 advances with his main body by another line in pursuit of his object1 then he passes by the position2 and if he can do this with impunity1 and really does it1 he will immediately enforce the abandonment of the position1 consequently put an end to its usefulness4 ,there is hardly any position in the world which1 in the simple sense of the words1 cannot be passed by1 for cases such as the isthmus of ,perekop are so rare that they are hardly worth attention4 ,the impossibility of passing by must therefore be understood as merely applying to the disadvantages in which the assailant would become involved if he set about such an operation4 ,we shall have a more fitting opportunity to state these disadvantages in the twenty-seventh chapter2 whether small or great1 in every case they are the equivalent of the tactical effect which the position is capable of producing but which has not been realised1 and in common with it constitute the object of the position4 ,from the preceding observations1 therefore1 two strategic properties of the defensive position have resulted3 #a4 ,that it cannot be passed round4 #b4 ,that in the struggle for the lines of communication it gives the defender advantages4 ,here we have to add two other strategic properties1 namely-- #c4 ,that the relation of the lines of communication may also have a favourable influence on the form of combat2 and #d4 ,that the general influence of the country is advantageous4 ,for the relation of the lines of communication has an influence not only upon the possibility or impossibility of passing by a position or of cutting off the enemy's supplies1 but also on the whole course of the battle4 ,an oblique line of retreat facilitates a tactical turning movement on the part of the assailant1 and paralyses our own tactical movements during the battle4 ,but an oblique position in relation to the lines of communication is often not the fault of tactics but a consequence of a defective strategic point2 it is1 for example1 not to be avoided when the road changes direction in the vicinity of the position 7,borodino1 #ahab72 the assailant is then in such a position that he can turn our line without deviating from1 his own perpendicular disposition4 ,further1 the aggressor has much greater freedom for tactical movement if he commands several roads for his retreat whilst we are limited to one4 ,in such cases the tactical skill of the defensive will be exerted in vain to overcome the disadvantageous influence resulting from the strategic relations4 ,lastly as regards the fourth point1 such a disadvantageous general influence may predominate in the other characteristics of ground1 that the most careful choice1 and the best use of tactical means1 can do nothing to combat them4 ,under such circumstances the chief points are as follows3 #a4 ,the defensive must particularly seek for the advantage of being able to overlook his adversary1 so that he may be able swiftly to throw himself upon him inside the limits of his position4 ,it is only when the local difficulties of approach combine with these two conditions that the ground is really favourable to the defensive4 ,on the other hand1 those points which are under the influence of commanding ground are disadvantageous to him2 also most positions in mountains 7of which we shall speak more particularly in the chapters on mountain warfare74 ,further1 positions which rest one flank on mountains1 for such a position certainly makes the passing by more difficult1 but facilitates a turning movement4 ,of the same kind are all positions which have a mountain immediately in their front1 and generally all those which bear relation to the description of ground above specified4 ,as an example of the opposite of these disadvantageous properties1 we shall only instance the case of a position which has a mountain in rear2 from this so many advantages result that it may be assumed in general to be one of the most favourable of all positions for the defensive4 #b4 ,a country may correspond more or less to the character and composition of an army4 ,a very numerous cavalry is a proper reason for seeking an open country4 ,want of this arm1 perhaps also of artillery1 while we have at command a courageous infantry inured to war1 and acquainted with the country1 make it advisable to take advantage of a difficult1 close country4 ,we do not here enter into particulars respecting the tactical relation which the local features of a defensive position bear to the force which is to occupy it4 ,we only speak of the total result1 as that only is a strategic quantity4 ,undoubtedly a position in which an army is to await the full force of the hostile attack1 should give the troops such an important advantage of ground as may be considered a multiplier of its force4 ,where nature does much1 but not to the full as much as we want1 the art of entrenchment comes to our help4 ,in this way it happens not unfrequently that some parts become unassailable1 and not unusually the whole is made so3 plainly in this last case1 the whole nature of the measure is changed4 ,it is then no longer a battle under advantageous conditions which we seek1 and in this battle the issue of the campaign1 but an issue without a battle4 ,whilst we occupy with our force an unassailable position1 we directly refuse the battle1 and oblige our enemy to seek for a solution in some other way4 ,we must1 therefore1 completely separate these two cases1 and shall speak of the latter in the following chapter1 under the title of a strong position4 ,but the defensive position with which we have now to do is nothing more than a field of battle with the addition of advantages in our favour2 and that it should become a field of battle1 the advantages in our favour must not be too great4 ,but now what degree of strength may such a position have8 ,plainly more in proportion as our enemy is more determined on the attack1 and that depends on the nature of the individual case4 ,opposed to a ,buonaparte1 we may and should withdraw behind stronger ramparts than before a ,daun or a ,schwartzenburg4 ,if certain portions of a position are unattackable1 say the front1 then that is to be taken as a separate factor of its whole strength1 for the forces not required at that point are available for employment elsewhere2 but we must not omit to observe that whilst the enemy is kept completely off such impregnable points1 the form of his attack assumes quite a different character1 and we must ascertain1 in the first instance1 how this alteration will suit our situation4 ,for instance1 to take up a position1 as has often been done1 so close behind a great river that it is to be looked upon as covering the front1 is nothing else but to make the river a point of support for the right or left flank2 for the enemy is naturally obliged to cross further to the right or left1 and cannot attack without changing his front3 the chief question1 therefore1 is what advantages or disadvantages does that bring to us8 ,according to our opinion1 a defensive position will come the nearer to the true ideal of such a position the more its strength is hid from observation1 and the more it is favourable to our surprising the enemy by our combinations in the battle4 ,just as we advisably endeavour to conceal from the enemy the whole strength of our forces and our real intentions1 so in the same way we should seek to conceal from the enemy the advantages which we expect to derive from the form of the ground4 ,this of course can only be done to a certain degree1 and requires1 perhaps1 a peculiar mode of proceeding1 hitherto but little attempted4 ,the vicinity of a considerable fortress1 in whatever direction it may be1 confers on every position a great advantage over the enemy in the movement and use of the forces belonging to it4 ,by suitable field-works1 the want of natural strength at particular points may be remedied1 and in that manner the great features of the battle may be settled beforehand at will2 these are the means of strengthening by art2 if with these we combine a good selection of those natural obstacles of ground which impede the effective action of the enemy's forces without making action absolutely impossible1 if we turn to the best account the advantage we have over the enemy in knowing the ground1 which he does not1 so that we succeed in concealing our movements better than he does his1 and that we have a general superiority over him in unexpected movements in the course of the battle1 then from these advantages united1 there may result in our favour an overpowering and decisive influence in connection with the ground1 under the power of which the enemy will succumb1 without knowing the real cause of his defeat4 ,this is what we understand under defensive position1 and we consider it one of the greatest advantages of defensive war4 ,leaving out of consideration particular circumstances1 we may assume that an undulating1 not too well1 but still not too little1 cultivated country affords the most positions of this kind4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,strong ,positions and ,entrenched ,camps ,we have said in the preceding chapter that a position so strong through nature1 assisted by art1 that it is unassailable1 does not come under the meaning of an advantageous field of battle1 but belongs to a peculiar class of things4 ,we shall in this chapter take a review of what constitutes the nature of this peculiarity1 and on account of the analogy between such positions and fortresses1 call them strong positions4 ,merely by entrenchments alone they can hardly be formed1 except as entrenched camps resting on fortresses2 but still less are they to be found ready formed entirely by natural obstacles4 ,art usually lends a hand to assist nature1 and therefore they are frequently designated as entrenched camps or positions4 ,at the same time1 that term may really be applied to any position strengthened more or less by field works1 which need have nothing in common with the nature of the position we are now considering4 ,the object of a strong position is to make the force there stationed in point of fact unattackable1 and by that means1 either really to cover a certain space directly1 or only the troops which occupy that space in order then1 through them1 in another way to effect the covering of the country indirectly4 ,the first was the signification of the lines of former times1 for instance1 those on the ,french frontier2 the latter1 is that of entrenched camps laid out near fortresses1 and showing a front in every direction4 ,if1 for instance1 the front of a position is so strong by works and hindrances to approach that an attack is impossible1 then the enemy is compelled to turn it1 to make his attack on a side of it or in rear4 ,now to prevent this being easily done1 points d'appui were sought for these lines1 which should give them a certain degree of support on the side1 such as the ,rhine and the ,vosges give the lines in ,alsace4 ,the longer the front of such a line the more easily it can be protected from being turned1 because every movement to turn it is attended with danger to the side attempting the movement1 the danger increasing in proportion as the required movement causes a greater deviation from the normal direction of the attacking force4 ,therefore1 a considerable length of front1 which can be made unassailable1 and good flank-supports1 ensure the possibility of protecting a large space of territory directly from hostile invasion3 at least1 that was the view in which works of this class originated2 that was the object of the lines in ,alsace1 with their right flank on the ,rhine and the left on the ,vosges2 and the lines in ,flanders1 fifteen miles long1 resting their right on the ,scheldt and the fortress of ,tournay1 their left on the sea4 ,but when we have not the advantages of such a long well-defended front1 and good flank-supports1 if the country is to be held generally by a force well entrenched1 then that force 7and its position7 must be protected against being turned by such an arrangement that it can show a front in every direction4 ,but then the idea of a thoroughly covered tract of country vanishes1 for such a position is only strategically a point which covers the force occupying it1 and thus secures to that force the power of keeping the field1 that is to say1 maintaining itself in the country4 ,such a camp cannot be turned1 that is1 cannot be attacked in flank or rear by reason of those parts being weaker than its front1 for it can show front in all directions1 and is equally strong everywhere4 ,but such a camp can be passed by1 and that much easier than a fortified line1 because its extent amounts to nothing4 ,entrenched camps connected with fortresses are in reality of this second kind1 for the object of them is to protect the troops assembled in them2 but their further strategic meaning1 that is1 the application of this protected force1 is somewhat different from that of other fortified camps4 ,having given this explanation of the origin of these three different defensive means1 we shall now proceed to consider the value of each of them separately1 under the heads of strong lines1 strong positions1 and entrenched camps resting on fortresses4 #a4 ,lines4--,they are the worst kind of cordon war3 the obstacle which they present to the aggressor is of no value at all unless they are defended by a powerful fire2 in themselves they are simply worthless4 ,but now the extent to which an army can furnish an effective fire is generally very small in proportion to the extent of country to be defended2 the lines can1 therefore1 only be short1 and consequently cover only a small extent of country1 or the army will not be able really to defend the lines at all points4 ,in consequence of this1 the idea was started of not occupying all points in the line1 but only watching them1 and defending them by means of strong reserves1 in the same way as a small river may be defended2 but this procedure is in opposition to the nature of the means4 ,if the natural obstacles of the ground are so great that such a method of defence could be applied1 then the entrenchments were needless1 and entail danger1 for that method of defence is not local1 and entrenchments are only suited to a strictly local defence2 but if the entrenchments themselves are to be considered the chief impediments to approach1 then we may easily conceive that an undefended line will not have much to say as an obstacle to approach4 ,what is a twelve or fifteen feet ditch1 and a rampart ten or twelve feet high1 against the united efforts of many thousands1 if these efforts are not hindered by the fire of an enemy8 ,the consequence1 therefore1 is1 that if such lines are short and tolerably well defended by troops1 they can be turned2 but if they are extensive1 and not sufficiently occupied1 they can be attacked in front1 and taken without much difficulty4 ,now as lines of this description tie the troops down to a local defence1 and take away from them all mobility1 they are a bad and senseless means to use against an enterprising enemy4 ,if we find them long retained in modern wars in spite of these objections1 the cause lies entirely in the low degree of energy impressed on the conduct of war1 one consequence of which was1 that seeming difficulties often effected quite as much as real ones4 ,besides1 in most campaigns these lines were used merely for a secondary defence against irregular incursions2 if they have been found not wholly inefficacious for that purpose1 we must only keep in view1 at the same time1 how much more usefully the troops required for their defence might have been employed at other points4 ,in the latest wars such lines have been out of the question1 neither do we find any trace of them2 and it is doubtful if they will ever re-appear4 #b4 ,positions4--,the defence of a tract of country continues 7as we shall show more plainly in the #bgth chapter7 as long as the force designated for it maintains itself there1 and only ceases if that force removes and abandons it4 ,if a force is to maintain itself in any district of country which is attacked by very superior forces1 the means of protecting this force against the power of the sword by a position which is unassailable is a first consideration4 ,now such a position1 as before said1 must be able to show a front in all directions2 and in conformity with the usual extent of tactical positions1 if the force is not very large 7and a large force would be contrary to the nature of the supposed case7 it would take up a very small space1 which1 in the course of the combat1 would be exposed to so many disadvantages that1 even if strengthened in every possible way by entrenchments1 we could hardly expect to make a successful defence4 ,such a camp1 showing front in every direction1 must therefore necessarily have an extent of sides proportionably great2 but these sides must likewise be as good as unassailable2 to give this requisite strength1 notwithstanding the required extension1 is not within the compass of the art of field fortification2 it is therefore a fundamental condition that such a camp must derive part of its strength from natural impediments of ground which render many places impassable and others difficult to pass4 ,in order1 therefore1 to be able to apply this defensive means1 it is necessary to find such a spot1 and when that is wanting1 the object cannot be attained merely by field works4 ,these considerations relate more immediately to tactical results in order that we may first establish the existence of this strategic means2 we mention as examples for illustration1 ,pirna1 ,bunzelwitz1 ,colberg1 ,torres ,vedras1 and ,drissa4 ,now1 as respects the strategic properties and effects4 ,the first condition is naturally that the force which occupies this camp shall have its subsistence secured for some time1 that is1 for as long as we think the camp will be required1 and this is only possible when the position has behind it a port1 like ,colberg and ,torres ,vedras1 or stands in connection with a fortress like ,bunzelwitz and ,pirna1 or has large depts within itself or in the immediate vicinity1 like ,drissa4 ,it is only in the first case that the provisioning can be ensured for any time we please2 in the second and third cases1 it can only be so for a more or less limited time1 so that in this point there is always danger4 ,from this appears how the difficulty of subsistence debars the use of many strong points which otherwise would be suitable for entrenched positions1 and1 therefore1 makes those that are eligible scarce4 ,in order to ascertain the eligibility of a position of this description1 its advantages and defects1 we must ask ourselves what the aggressor can do against it4 a4 ,the assailant can pass by this strong position1 pursue his enterprise1 and watch the position with a greater or less force4 ,we must here make a distinction between the cases of a position which is occupied by the main body1 and one only occupied by an inferior force4 ,in the first case the passing by the position can only benefit the assailant1 if1 besides the principal force of the defendant1 there is also some other attainable and decisive object of attack1 as1 for instance1 the capture of a fortress or a capital city1 etc4 ,but even if there is such an object1 he can only follow it if the strength of his base and the direction of his lines of communication are such that he has no cause to fear operations against his strategic flanks4 ,the conclusions to be drawn from this with respect to the admissibility and eligibility of a strong position for the main body of the defender's army are1 that it is only an advisable position when either the possibility of operating against the strategic flank of the aggressor is so decisive that we may be sure beforehand of being able in that way to keep him at a point where his army can effect nothing1 or in a case where there is no object attainable by the aggressor for which the defence need be uneasy4 ,if there is such an object1 and the strategic flank of the assailant cannot be seriously menaced1 then such position should not be taken up1 or if it is it should only be as a feint to see whether the assailant can be imposed upon respecting its value2 this is always attended with the danger1 in case of failure1 of being too late to reach the point which is threatened4 ,if the strong position is only held by an inferior force1 then the aggressor can never be at a loss for a further object of attack1 because he has it in the main body itself of the enemy's army2 in this case1 therefore1 the value of the position is entirely limited to the means which it affords of operating against the enemy's strategic flank1 and depends upon that condition4 b4 ,if the assailant does not venture to pass by a position1 he can invest it and reduce it by famine4 ,but this supposes two conditions beforehand3 first1 that the position is not open in rear1 and secondly1 that the assailant is sufficiently strong to be able to make such an investment4 ,if these two conditions are united then the assailant's army certainly would be neutralised for a time by this strong position1 but at the same time1 the defensive pays the price of this advantage by a loss of his defensive force4 ,from this1 therefore1 we deduce that the occupation of such a strong position with the main body is a measure only to be taken1-- aa4 ,when the rear is perfectly safe 7,torres ,vedras74 bb4 ,when we foresee that the enemy's force is not strong enough formally to invest us in our camp4 ,should the enemy attempt the investment with insufficient means1 then we should be able to sally out of the camp and beat him in detail4 cc4 ,when we can count upon relief like the ,saxons at ,pirna1 #agef1 and as took place in the main at ,prague1 because ,prague could only be regarded as an entrenched camp in which ,prince ,charles would not have allowed himself to be shut up if he had not known that the ,moravian army could liberate him4 ,one of these three conditions is therefore absolutely necessary to justify the choice of a strong position for the main body of an army2 at the same time we must add that the two last are bordering on a great danger for the defensive4 ,but if it is a question of exposing an inferior corps to the risk of being sacrificed for the benefit of the whole1 then these conditions disappear1 and the only point to decide is whether by such a sacrifice a greater evil may be avoided4 ,this will seldom happen2 at the same time it is certainly not inconceivable4 ,the entrenched camp at ,pirna prevented ,frederick the ,great from attacking ,bohemia1 as he would have done1 in the year #agef4 ,the ,austrians were at that time so little prepared1 that the loss of that kingdom appears beyond doubt2 and perhaps1 a greater loss of men would have been connected with it than the #ag1jjj allied troops who capitulated in the ,pirna camp4 c4 ,if none of those possibilities specified under a and b are in favour of the aggressor2 if1 therefore1 the conditions which we have there laid down for the defensive are fulfilled1 then there remains certainly nothing to be done by the assailant but to fix himself before the position1 like a setter before a covey of birds1 to spread himself1 perhaps1 as much as possible by detachments over the country1 and contenting himself with these small and indecisive advantages to leave the real decision as to the possession of territory to the future4 ,in this case the position has fulfilled its object4 #c4 ,entrenched camps near fortresses4--,they belong1 as already said1 to the class of entrenched positions generally1 in so far1 as they have for their object to cover not a tract of territory1 but an armed force against a hostile attack1 and only differ in reality from the other in this1 that with the fortress they make up an inseparable whole1 by which they naturally acquire much greater strength4 ,but there follows further from the above the undermentioned special points4 a4 ,that they may also have the particular object of rendering the siege of the fortress either impossible or extremely difficult4 ,this object may be worth a great sacrifice of troops if the place is a port which cannot be blockaded1 but in any other case we have to take care lest the place is one which may be reduced by hunger so soon that the sacrifice of any considerable number of troops is not justifiable4 b4 ,entrenched camps can be formed near fortresses for smaller bodies of troops than those in the open field4 ,four or five thousand men may be invincible under the walls of a fortress1 when1 on the contrary1 in the strongest camp in the world1 formed in the open field1 they would be lost4 c4 ,they may be used for the assembly and organisation of forces which have still too little solidity to be trusted in contact with the enemy1 without the support afforded by the works of the place1 as for example1 recruits1 militia1 national levies1 etc4 ,they might1 therefore1 be recommended as a very useful measure1 in many ways1 if they had not the immense disadvantage of injuring the fortress1 more or less1 when they cannot be occupied2 and to provide the fortress always with a garrison1 in some measure sufficient to occupy the camp also1 would be much too onerous a condition4 ,we are1 therefore1 very much inclined to consider them only advisable for places on a sea coast1 and as more injurious than useful in all other cases4 ,if1 in conclusion1 we should summarise our opinion in a general view1 then strong and entrenched positions are-- #a4 ,the more requisite the smaller the country1 the less the space afforded for a retreat4 #b4 ,the less dangerous the more surely we can reckon on succouring or relieving them by other forces1 or by the inclemency of season1 or by a rising of the nation1 or by want1 c4 #c4 ,the more efficacious1 the weaker the elementary force of the enemy's attack4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,flank ,positions ,we have only allotted to this prominent conception1 in the world of ordinary military theory1 a special chapter in dictionary fashion1 that it may the more easily be found2 for we do not believe that anything independent in itself is denoted by the term4 ,every position which is to be held1 even if the enemy passes by it1 is a flank position2 for from the moment that he does so it can have no other efficacy but that which it exercises on the enemy's strategic flank4 ,therefore1 necessarily1 all strong positions are flank positions as well2 for as they cannot be attacked1 the enemy accordingly is driven to pass them by1 therefore they can only have a value by their influence on his strategic flank4 ,the direction of the proper front of a strong position is quite immaterial1 whether it runs parallel with the enemy's strategic flank1 as ,colberg1 or at right angles as ,bunzelwitz and ,drissa1 for a strong position must front every way4 ,but it may also be desirable still to maintain a position which is not unassailable1 even if the enemy passes by it1 should its situation1 for instance1 give us such a preponderating advantage in the comparative relations of the lines of retreat and communication1 that we can not only make an efficacious attack on the strategic flank of the advancing enemy1 but also that the enemy alarmed for his own retreat is unable to seize ours entirely2 for if that last is not the case1 then because our position is not a strong1 that is not an unassailable one1 we should run the risk of being obliged to fight without having the command of any retreat4 ,the year #ahjf affords an example which throws a light on this4 ,the disposition of the ,prussian army1 on the right bank of the ,saal1 might in respect to ,buonaparte's advance by ,hof1 have become in every sense a flank position1 if the army had been drawn up with its front parallel to the ,saal1 and there1 in that position1 waited the progress of events4 ,if there had not been here such a disproportion of moral and physical powers1 if there had only been a ,daun at the head of the ,french army1 then the ,prussian position might have shown its efficacy by a most brilliant result4 ,to pass it by was quite impossible2 that was acknowledged by ,buonaparte1 by his resolution to attack it2 in severing from it the line of retreat even ,buonaparte himself did not completely succeed1 and if the disproportion in physical and moral relations had not been quite so great1 that would have been just as little practicable as the passing it by1 for the ,prussian army was in much less danger from its left wing being overpowered than the ,french army would have been by the defeat of their left wing4 ,even with the disproportion of physical and moral power as it existed1 a resolute and sagacious exercise of the command would still have given great hopes of a victory4 ,there was nothing to prevent the ,duke of ,brunswick from making arrangements on the #acth1 so that on the morning of the #adth1 at day-break1 he might have opposed #hj1jjj men to the #fj1jjj with which ,buonaparte passed the ,saal1 near ,jena and ,dornburg4 ,had even this superiority in numbers1 and the steep valley of the ,saal behind the ,french not been sufficient to procure a decisive victory1 still it was a fortunate concurrence of circumstances1 and if with such advantages no successful decision could be gained1 no decision was to be expected in that district of country2 and we should1 therefore1 have retreated further1 in order to gain reinforcements and weaken the enemy4 ,the ,prussian position on the ,saal1 therefore1 although assailable1 might have been regarded as a flank position in respect to the great road through ,hof2 but like every position which can be attacked1 that property is not to be attributed to it absolutely1 because it would only have become so if the enemy had not attempted to attack it4 ,still less would it bespeak a clear idea if those positions which cannot be maintained after the enemy has passed by them1 and from which1 in consequence of that1 the defensive seeks to attack the assailant's flank1 were called flank positions merely because his attack is directed against a flank2 for this flank attack has hardly anything to do with the position itself1 or1 at least1 is not mainly produced by its properties1 as is the case in the action against a strategic flank4 ,it appears from this that there is nothing new to establish with regard to the properties of a flank position4 ,a few words only on the character of the measure may properly be introduced here2 we set aside1 however1 completely strong positions in the true sense1 as we have said enough about them already4 ,a flank position which is not assailable is an extremely efficacious instrument1 but certainly just on that account a dangerous one4 ,if the assailant is checked by it1 then we have obtained a great effect by a small expenditure of force2 it is the pressure of the finger on the long lever of a sharp bit4 ,but if the effect is too insignificant1 if the assailant is not stopped1 then the defensive has more or less imperilled his retreat1 and must seek to escape either in haste and by a detour--consequently under very unfavourable circumstances1 or he is in danger of being compelled to fight without any line of retreat being open to him4 ,against a bold adversary1 having the moral superiority1 and seeking a decisive solution1 this means is therefore extremely hazardous and entirely out of place1 as shown by the example of #ahjf above quoted4 ,on the other hand1 when used against a cautious opponent in a war of mere observation1 it may be reckoned one of the best means which the defensive can adopt4 ,the ,duke ,ferdinand's defence of the ,weser by his position on the left bank1 and the well-known positions of ,schmotseifen and ,landshut are examples of this2 only the latter1 it is true1 by the catastrophe which befell ,fouqu's corps in #agfj1 also shows the danger of a false application4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,defence of ,mountains ,the influence of mountains on the conduct of war is very great2 the subject1 therefore1 is very important for theory4 ,as this influence introduces into action a retarding principle1 it belongs chiefly to the defensive4 ,we shall therefore discuss it here in a wider sense than that conveyed by the simple conception1 defence of mountains4 ,as we have discovered in our consideration of the subject results which run counter to general opinion in many points1 we shall therefore be obliged to enter into rather an elaborate analysis of it4 ,we shall first examine the tactical nature of the subject1 in order to gain the point where it connects itself with strategy4 ,the endless difficulty attending the march of large columns on mountain roads1 the extraordinary strength which a small post obtains by a steep scarp covering its front1 and by ravines right and left supporting its flanks1 are unquestionably the principal causes why such efficacy and strength are universally attributed to the defence of mountains1 so that nothing but the peculiarities in armament and tactics at certain periods has prevented large masses of combatants from engaging in it4 ,when a column1 winding like a serpent1 toils its way through narrow ravines up to the top of a mountain1 and passes over it at a snail's pace1 artillery and train-drivers1 with oaths and shouts1 flogging their over-driven cattle through the narrow rugged roads1 each broken waggon has to be got out of the way with indescribable trouble1 whilst all behind are detained1 cursing and blaspheming1 every one then thinks to himself1 ,now if the enemy should appear with only a few hundred men1 he might disperse the whole4 ,from this has originated the expression used by historical writers1 when they describe a narrow pass as a place where 8a handful of men might keep an army in check40 ,at the same time1 every one who has had any experience in war knows1 or ought to know1 that such a march through mountains has little or nothing in common with the attack of these same mountains1 and that therefore to infer from the difficulty of marching through mountains that the difficulty of attacking them must be much greater is a false conclusion4 ,it is natural enough that an inexperienced person should thus argue1 and it is almost as natural that the art of war itself for a certain time should have been entangled in the same error1 for the fact which it related to was almost as new at that time to those accustomed to war as to the uninitiated4 ,before the ,thirty ,years' ,war1 owing to the deep order of battle1 the numerous cavalry1 the rude fire-arms1 and other peculiarities1 it was quite unusual to make use of formidable obstacles of ground in war1 and a formal defence of mountains1 at least by regular troops1 was almost impossible4 ,it was not until a more extended order of battle was introduced1 and that infantry and their arms became the chief part of an army1 that the use which might be made of hills and valleys occurred to men's minds4 ,but it was not until a hundred years afterwards1 or about the middle of the eighteenth century1 that the idea became fully developed4 ,the second circumstance1 namely1 the great defensive capability which might be given to a small post planted on a point difficult of access1 was still more suited to lead to an exaggerated idea of the strength of mountain defences4 ,the opinion arose that it was only necessary to multiply such a post by a certain number to make an army out of a battalion1 a chain of mountains out of a mountain4 ,it is undeniable that a small post acquires an extraordinary strength by selecting a good position in a mountainous country4 ,a small detatchment1 which would be driven off in the level country by a couple of squadrons1 and think itself lucky to save itself from rout or capture by a hasty retreat1 can in the mountains stand up before a whole army1 and1 as one might say1 with a kind of tactical effrontery exact the military honour of a regular attack1 of having its flank turned1 etc41 etc4 ,how it obtains this defensive power1 by obstacles to approach1 points d'appui for its flanks1 and new positions which it finds on its retreat1 is a subject for tactics to explain2 we accept it as an established fact4 ,it was very natural to believe that a number of such posts placed in a line would give a very strong1 almost unassailable front1 and all that remained to be done was to prevent the position from being turned by extending it right and left until either flank-supports were met with commensurate with the importance of the whole1 or until the extent of the position itself gave security against turning movements4 ,a mountainous country specially invites such a course by presenting such a succession of defensive positions1 each one apparently better than another1 that one does not know where to stop2 and therefore it ended in all and every approach to the mountains within a certain distance being guarded1 with a view to defence1 and ten or fifteen single posts1 thus spread over a space of about ten miles or more1 were supposed to bid defiance to that odious turning movement4 ,now as the connection between these posts was considered sufficiently secure by the intervening spaces1 being ground of an impassable nature 7columns at that time not being able to quit the regular roads71 it was thought a wall of brass was thus presented to the enemy4 ,as an extra precaution1 a few battalions1 some horse artillery1 and a dozen squadrons of cavalry1 formed a reserve to provide against the event of the line being unexpectedly burst through at any point4 ,no one will deny that the prevalence of this idea is shown by history1 and it is not certain that at this day we are completely emancipated from these errors4 ,the course of improvement in tactics since the ,middle ,ages1 with the ever increasing strength of armies1 likewise contributed to bring mountainous districts in this sense more within the scope of military action4 ,the chief characteristic of mountain defence is its complete passivity2 in this light the tendency towards the defence of mountains was very natural before armies attained to their present capability of movement4 ,but armies were constantly becoming greater1 and on account of the effect of fire-arms began to extend more and more into long thin lines connected with a great deal of art1 and on that account very difficult1 often almost impossible1 to move4 ,to dispose1 in order of battle1 such an artistic machine1 was often half a day's work1 and half the battle2 and almost all which is now attended to in the preliminary plan of the battle was included in this first disposition or drawing up4 ,after this work was done it was therefore difficult to make any modifications to suit new circumstances which might spring up2 from this it followed that the assailant1 being the last to form his line of battle1 naturally adapted it to the order of battle adopted by the enemy1 without the latter being able in turn to modify his in accordance4 ,the attack thus acquired a general superiority1 and the defensive had no other means of reinstating the balance than that of seeking protection from the impediments of ground1 and for this nothing was so favourable in general as mountainous ground4 ,thus it became an object to couple1 as it were1 the army with a formidable obstacle of ground1 and the two united then made common cause4 ,the battalion defended the mountain1 and the mountain the battalion2 so the passive defence through the aid of mountainous ground became highly efficacious1 and there was no other evil in the thing itself except that it entailed a greater loss of freedom of movement1 but of that quality they did not understand the particular use at that time4 ,when two antagonistic systems act upon each other1 the exposed1 that is1 the weak point on the one side always draws upon itself the blows from the other side4 ,if the defensive becomes fixed1 and as it were1 spell-bound in posts1 which are in themselves strong1 and can not be taken1 the aggressor then becomes bold in turning movements1 because he has no apprehension about his own flanks4 ,this is what took place--,the turning1 as it was called1 soon became the order of the day3 to counteract this1 positions were extended more and more2 they were thus weakened in front1 and the offensive suddenly turned upon that part3 instead of trying to outflank by extending1 the assailant now concentrated his masses for attack at some one point1 and the line was broken4 ,this is nearly what took place in regard to mountain defences according to the latest modern history4 ,the offensive had thus again gained a preponderance through the greater mobility of troops2 and it was only through the same means that the defence could seek for help4 ,but mountainous ground by its nature is opposed to mobility1 and thus the whole theory of mountain defence experienced1 if we may use the expression1 a defeat like that which the armies engaged in it in the ,revolutionary war so often suffered4 ,but that we may not reject the good with the bad1 and allow ourselves to be carried along by the stream of commonplace to assertions which1 in actual experience1 would be refuted a thousand times by the force of circumstances1 we must distinguish the effects of mountain defence according to the nature of the cases4 ,the principal question to be decided here1 and that which throws the greatest light over the whole subject is1 whether the resistance which is intended by the defence of mountains is to be relative or absolute--whether it is only intended to last for a time1 or is meant to end in a decisive victory4 ,for a resistance of the first kind mountainous ground is in a high degree suitable1 and introduces into it a very powerful element of strength2 for one of the latter kind1 on the contrary1 it is in general not at all suitable1 or only so in some special cases4 ,in mountains every movement is slower and more difficult1 costs also more time1 and more men as well1 if within the sphere of danger4 ,but the loss of the assailant in time and men is the standard by which the defensive resistance is measured4 ,as long as the movement is all on the side of the offensive so long the defensive has a marked advantage2 but as soon as the defensive resorts to this principle of movement also1 that advantage ceases4 ,now from the nature of the thing1 that is to say1 on tactical grounds1 a relative resistance allows of a much greater degree of passivity than one which is intended to lead to a decisive result1 and it allows this passivity to be carried to an extreme1 that is1 to the end of the combat1 which in the other case can never happen4 ,the impeding element of mountain ground1 which as a medium of greater density weakens all positive activity1 is1 therefore1 completely suited to the passive defence4 ,we have already said that a small post acquires an extraordinary strength by the nature of the ground2 but although this tactical result in general requires no further proof1 we must add to what we have said some explanation4 ,we must be careful here to draw a distinction between what is relatively and what is absolutely small4 ,if a body of troops1 let its size be what it may1 isolates a portion of itself in a position1 this portion may possibly be exposed to the attack of the whole body of the enemy's troops1 therefore of a superior force1 in opposition to which it is itself small4 ,there1 as a rule1 no absolute but only a relative defence can be the object4 ,the smaller the post in relation to the whole body from which it is detached and in relation to the whole body of the enemy1 the more this applies4 ,but a post also which is small in an absolute sense1 that is1 one which is not opposed by an enemy superior to itself1 and which1 therefore1 may aspire to an absolute defence1 a real victory1 will be infinitely better off in mountains than a large army1 and can derive more advantage from the ground as we shall show further on4 ,our conclusion1 therefore1 is1 that a small post in mountains possesses great strength4 ,how this may be of decisive utility in all cases which depend entirely on a relative defence is plain of itself2 but will it be of the same decisive utility for the absolute defence by a whole army8 ,this is the question which we now propose to examine4 ,first of all we ask whether a front line composed of several posts has1 as has hitherto been assumed1 the same strength proportionally as each post singly4 ,this is certainly not the case1 and to suppose so would involve one of two errors4 ,in the first place1 a country without roads is often confounded with one which is quite impassable4 ,where a column1 or where artillery and cavalry cannot march1 infantry may still1 in general1 be able to pass1 and even artillery may often be brought there as well1 for the movements made in a battle by excessive efforts of short duration are not to be judged of by the same scale as marches4 ,the secure connection of the single posts with one another rests therefore on an illusion1 and the flanks are in reality in danger4 ,or next it is supposed1 a line of small posts1 which are very strong in front1 are also equally strong on their flanks1 because a ravine1 a precipice1 etc41 etc41 form excellent supports for a small post4 ,but why are they so8--not because they make it impossible to turn the post1 but because they cause the enemy an expenditure of time and of force1 which gives scope for the effectual action of the post4 ,the enemy who1 in spite of the difficulty of the ground1 wishes1 and in fact is obliged1 to turn such a post1 because the front is unassailable requires1 perhaps1 half-a-day to execute his purpose1 and cannot after all accomplish it without some loss of men4 ,now if such a post can be succoured1 or if it is only designed to resist for a certain space of time1 or lastly1 if it is able to cope with the enemy1 then the flank supports have done their part1 and we may say the position had not only a strong front1 but strong flanks as well4 ,but it is not the same if it is a question of a line of posts1 forming part of an extended mountain position4 ,none of these three conditions are realised in that case4 ,the enemy attacks one point with an overwhelming force1 the support in rear is perhaps slight1 and yet it is a question of absolute resistance4 ,under such circumstances the flank supports of such posts are worth nothing4 ,upon a weak point like this the attack usually directs its blows4 ,the assault with concentrated1 and therefore very superior forces1 upon a point in front1 may certainly be met by a resistance1 which is very violent as regards that point1 but which is unimportant as regards the whole4 ,after it is overcome1 the line is pierced1 and the object of the attack attained4 ,from this it follows that the relative resistance in mountain warfare is1 in general1 greater than in a level country1 that it is comparatively greatest in small posts1 and does not increase in the same measure as the masses increase4 ,let us now turn to the real object of great battles generally--to the positive victory which may also be the object in the defence of mountains4 ,if the whole mass1 or the principal part of the force1 is employed for that purpose1 then the defence of mountains changes itself eo ipso into a defensive battle in the mountains4 ,a battle1 that is the application of all our powers to the destruction of the enemy is now the form1 a victory the object of the combat4 ,the defence of mountains which takes place in this combat1 appears now a subordinate consideration1 for it is no longer the object1 it is only the means4 ,now in this view1 how does the ground in mountains answer to the object8 ,the character of a defensive battle is a passive reaction in front1 and an increased active reaction in rear2 but for this the ground in mountains is a paralysing principle4 ,there are two reasons for this3 first1 want of roads affording means of rapidly moving in all directions1 from the rear towards the front1 and even the sudden tactical attack is hampered by the unevenness of ground2 secondly1 a free view over the country1 and the enemy's movements is not to be had4 ,the ground in mountains1 therefore1 ensures in this case to the enemy the same advantages which it gave to us in the front1 and deadens all the better half of the resistance4 ,to this is to be added a third objection1 namely the danger of being cut off4 ,much as a mountainous country is favourable to a retreat1 made under a pressure exerted along the whole front1 and great as may be the loss of time to an enemy who makes a turning movement in such a country1 still these again are only advantages in the case of a relative defence1 advantages which have no connection with the decisive battle1 the resistance to the last extremity4 ,the resistance will last certainly somewhat longer1 that is until the enemy has reached a point with his flank-columns which menaces or completely bars our retreat4 ,once he has gained such a point then relief is a thing hardly possible4 ,no act of the offensive which we can make from the rear can drive him out again from the points which threaten us2 no desperate assault with our whole mass can clear the passage which he blocks4 ,whoever thinks he discovers in this a contradiction1 and believes that the advantages which the assailant has in mountain warfare1 must also accrue to the defensive in an attempt to cut his way through1 forgets the difference of circumstances4 ,the corps which opposes the passage is not engaged in an absolute defence1 a few hours' resistance will probably be sufficient2 it is1 therefore1 in the situation of a small post4 ,besides this1 its opponent is no longer in full possession of all his fighting powers2 he is thrown into disorder1 wants ammunition1 etc4 ,therefore1 in any view1 the chance of cutting through is small1 and this is the danger that the defensive fears above all2 this fear is at work even during the battle1 and enervates every fibre of the struggling athlete4 ,a nervous sensibility springs up on the flanks1 and every small detachment which the aggressor makes a display of on any wooded eminence in our rear1 is for him a new lever1 helping on the victory4 ,these disadvantages will1 for the most part1 disappear1 leaving all the advantages1 if the defence of a mountain district consists in the concentrated disposition of the army on an extensive mountain plateau4 ,there we may imagine a very strong front2 flanks very difficult of approach1 and yet the most perfect freedom of movement1 both within and in rear of the position4 ,such a position would be one of the strongest that there can be1 but it is little more than an illusion1 for although most mountains are more easily traversed along their crests than on their declivities1 yet most plateaux of mountains are either too small for such a purpose1 or they have no proper right to be called plateaux1 and are so termed more in a geological1 than in a geometrical sense4 ,for smaller bodies of troops1 the disadvantages of a defensive position in mountains diminish as we have already remarked4 ,the cause of this is1 that such bodies take up less space1 and require fewer roads for retreat1 etc41 etc4 ,a single hill is not a mountain system1 and has not the same disadvantages4 ,the smaller the force1 the more easily it can establish itself on a single ridge or hill1 and the less will be the necessity for it to get entangled in the intricacies of countless steep mountain gorges4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,defence of ,mountains 7,continued7 ,we now proceed to the strategic use of the tactical results developed in the preceding chapter4 ,we make a distinction between the following points3 #a4 ,a mountainous district as a battle-field4 #b4 ,the influence which the possession of it exercises on other parts of the country4 #c4 ,its effect as a strategic barrier4 #d4 ,the attention which it demands in respect to the supply of the troops4 ,the first and most important of these heads1 we must again subdivide as follows3 a4 ,a general action4 b4 ,inferior combats4 #a4 ,a mountain system as a battle-field4 ,we have shown in the preceding chapter how unfavourable mountain ground is to the defensive in a decisive battle1 and1 on the other hand1 how much it favours the assailant4 ,this runs exactly counter to the generally received opinion2 but then how many other things there are which general opinion confuses2 how little does it draw distinctions between things which are of the most opposite nature6 ,from the powerful resistance which small bodies of troops may offer in a mountainous country1 common opinion becomes impressed with an idea that all mountain defence is extremely strong1 and is astonished when any one denies that this great strength is communicated to the greatest act of all defence1 the defensive battle4 ,on the other hand1 it is instantly ready1 whenever a battle is lost by the defensive in mountain warfare1 to point out the inconceivable error of a system of cordon war1 without any regard to the fact that in the nature of things such a system is unavoidable in mountain warfare4 ,we do not hesitate to put ourselves in direct opposition to such an opinion1 and at the same time we must mention1 that to our great satisfaction1 we have found our views supported in the works of an author whose opinion ought to have great weight in this matter2 we allude to the history of the campaigns of #agif and #agig1 by the ,archduke ,charles1 himself a good historical writer1 a good critic1 and above all1 a good general4 ,we can only characterise it as a lamentable position when the weaker defender1 who has laboriously1 by the greatest effort1 assembled all his forces1 in order to make the assailant feel the effect of his love of ,fatherland1 of his enthusiasm and his ability1 in a decisive battle when he on whom every eye is fixed in anxious expectation1 having betaken himself to the obscurity of thickly veiled mountains1 and hampered in every movement by the obstinate ground1 stands exposed to the thousand possible forms of attack which his powerful adversary can use against him4 ,only towards one single side is there still left an open field for his intelligence1 and that is in making all possible use of every obstacle of ground2 but this leads close to the borders of the disastrous war of cordons1 which1 under all circumstances1 is to be avoided4 ,very far therefore from seeing a refuge for the defensive1 in a mountainous country1 when a decisive battle is sought1 we should rather advise a general in such a case to avoid such a field by every possible means4 ,it is true1 however1 that this is sometimes impossible2 but the battle will then necessarily have a very different character from one in a level country3 the disposition of the troops will be much more extended in most cases twice or three times the length2 the resistance more passive1 the counter blow much less effective4 ,these are influences of mountain ground which are inevitable2 still1 in such a battle the defensive is not to be converted into a mere defence of mountains2 the predominating character must be a concentrated order of battle in the mountains1 in which everything unites into one battle1 and passes as much as possible under the eye of one commander1 and in which there are sufficient reserves to make the decision something more than a mere warding off1 a mere holding up of the shield4 ,this condition is indispensable1 but difficult to realise2 and the drifting into the pure defence of mountains comes so naturally1 that we cannot be surprised at its often happening2 the danger in this is so great that theory cannot too urgently raise a warning voice4 ,thus much as to a decisive battle with the main body of the army4 ,for combats of minor significance and importance1 a mountainous country1 on the other hand1 may be very favourable1 because the main point in them is not absolute defence1 and because no decisive results are coupled with them4 ,we may make this plainer by enumerating the objects of this reaction4 a4 ,merely to gain time4 ,this motive occurs a hundred times3 always in the case of a defensive line formed with the view of observation2 besides that1 in all cases in which a reinforcement is expected4 b4 ,the repulse of a mere demonstration or minor enterprise of the enemy4 ,if a province is guarded by mountains which are defended by troops1 then this defence1 however weak1 will always suffice to prevent partisan attacks and expeditions intended to plunder the country4 ,without the mountains1 such a weak chain of posts would be useless4 c4 ,to make demonstrations on our own part4 ,it will be some time yet before general opinion with respect to mountains will be brought to the right point2 until then an enemy may at any time be met with who is afraid of them1 and shrinks back from them in his undertakings4 ,in such a case1 therefore1 the principal body may also be used for the defence of a mountain system4 ,in wars carried on with little energy or movement1 this state of things will often happen2 but it must always be a condition then that we neither design to accept a general action in this mountain position1 nor can be compelled to do so4 d4 ,in general1 a mountainous country is suited for all positions in which we do not intend to accept any great battle1 for each of the separate parts of the army is stronger there1 and it is only the whole that is weaker2 besides1 in such a position1 it is not so easy to be suddenly attacked and forced into a decisive battle4 e4 ,lastly1 a mountainous country is the true region for the efforts of a people in arms4 ,but while national risings should always be supported by small bodies of regular troops1 on the other hand1 the proximity of a great army seems to have an unfavourable effect upon movements of this kind2 this motive1 therefore1 as a rule1 will never give occasion for transferring the whole army to the mountains4 ,thus much for mountains in connection with the positions which may be taken up there for battle4 #b4 ,the influence of mountains on other parts of the country4 ,because1 as we have seen1 it is so easy in mountainous ground to secure a considerable tract of territory by small posts1 so weak in numbers that in a district easily traversed they could not maintain themselves1 and would be continually exposed to danger2 because every step forward in mountains which have been occupied by the enemy must be made much more slowly than in a level country1 and therefore cannot be made at the same rate with him therefore the question1 ,who is in possession8 is also much more important in reference to mountains than to any other tract of country of equal extent4 ,in an open country1 the possession may change from day to day4 ,the mere advance of strong detachments compels the enemy to give up the country we want to occupy4 ,but it is not so in mountains2 there a very stout resistance is possible by much inferior forces1 and for that reason1 if we require a portion of country which includes mountains1 enterprises of a special nature1 formed for the purpose1 and often necessitating a considerable expenditure of time as well as of men1 are always required in order to obtain possession4 ,if1 therefore1 the mountains of a country are not the theatre of the principal operations of a war1 we cannot1 as we should were it the case of a district of level country1 look upon the possession of the mountains as dependent on and a necessary consequence of our success at other parts4 ,a mountainous district has therefore much more independence1 and the possession of it is much firmer and less liable to change4 ,if we add to this that a ridge of mountains from its crests affords a good view over the adjacent open country1 whilst it remains itself veiled in obscurity1 we may therefore conceive that when we are close to mountains1 without being in actual possession of them1 they are to be regarded as a constant source of disadvantage a sort of laboratory of hostile forces2 and this will be the case in a still greater degree if the mountains are not only occupied by the enemy1 but also form part of his territory4 ,the smallest bodies of adventurous partisans always find shelter there if pursued1 and can then sally forth again with impunity at other points2 the largest bodies1 under their cover1 can approach unperceived1 and our forces must1 therefore1 always keep at a sufficient distance if they would avoid getting within reach of their dominating influence if they would not be exposed to disadvantageous combats and sudden attacks which they cannot return4 ,in this manner every mountain system1 as far as a certain distance1 exercises a very great influence over the lower and more level country adjacent to it4 ,whether this influence shall take effect momentarily1 for instance in a battle 7as at ,maltsch on the ,rhine1 #agif7 or only after some time upon the lines of communication1 depends on the local relations2 whether or not it shall be overcome through some decisive event happening in the valley or level country1 depends on the relations of the armed forces to each other respectively4 ,buonaparte1 in #ahje and #ahji1 advanced upon ,vienna without troubling himself much about the ,tyrol2 but ,moreau had to leave ,swabia in #agif1 chiefly because he was not master of the more elevated parts of the country1 and too many troops were required to watch them4 ,in campaigns1 in which there is an evenly balanced series of alternate successes on each side1 we shall not expose ourselves to the constant disadvantage of the mountains remaining in possession of the enemy3 we need1 therefore1 only endeavour to seize and retain possession of that portion of them which is required on account of the direction of the principal lines of our attack2 this generally leads to the mountains being the arena of the separate minor combats which take place between forces on each side4 ,but we must be careful of overrating the importance of this circumstance1 and being led to consider a mountain-chain as the key to the whole in all cases1 and its possession as the main point4 ,when a victory is the object sought2 then it is the principal1 object2 and if the victory is gained1 other things can be regulated according to the paramount requirement of the situation4 #c4 ,mountains considered in their aspect of a strategic barrier4 ,we must divide this subject under two heads4 ,the first is again that of a decisive battle4 ,we can1 for instance1 consider the mountain chain as a river1 that is1 as a barrier with certain points of passage1 which may afford us an opportunity of gaining a victory1 because the enemy will be compelled by it to divide his forces in advancing1 and is tied down to certain roads1 which will enable us with our forces concentrated behind the mountains to fall upon fractions of his force4 ,as the assailant on his march through the mountains1 irrespective of all other considerations1 cannot march in a single column because he would thus expose himself to the danger of getting engaged in a decisive battle with only one line of retreat1 therefore1 the defensive method recommends itself certainly on substantial grounds4 ,but as the conception of mountains and their outlets is very undefined1 the question of adopting this plan depends entirely on the nature of the country itself1 and it can only be pointed out as possible whilst it must also be considered as attended with two disadvantages1 the first is1 that if the enemy receives a severe blow1 he soon finds shelter in the mountains2 the second is1 that he is in possession of the higher ground1 which1 although not decisive1 must still always be regarded as a disadvantage for the pursuer4 ,we know of no battle given under such circumstances unless the battle with ,alvinzi in #agif can be so classed4 ,but that the case may occur is plain from ,buonaparte's passage of the ,alps in the year #ahjj1 when ,melas might and should have fallen on him with his whole force before he had united his columns4 ,the second influence which mountains may have as a barrier is that which they have upon the lines of communication if they cross those lines4 ,without taking into account what may be done by erecting forts at the points of passage and by arming the people1 the bad roads in mountains at certain seasons of the year may of themselves alone prove at once destructive to an army2 they have frequently compelled a retreat after having first sucked all the marrow and blood out of the army4 ,if1 in addition1 troops of active partisans hover round1 or there is a national rising to add to the difficulties1 then the enemy's army is obliged to make large detachments1 and at last driven to form strong posts in the mountains and thus gets engaged in one of the most disadvantageous situations that can be in an offensive war4 #d4 ,mountains in their relation to the provisioning of an army4 ,this is a very simple subject1 easy to understand4 ,the opportunity to make the best use of them in this respect is when the assailant is either obliged to remain in the mountains1 or at least to leave them close in his rear4 ,these considerations on the defence of mountains1 which1 in the main1 embrace all mountain warfare1 and1 by their reflection1 throw also the necessary light on offensive war1 must not be deemed incorrect or impracticable because we can neither make plains out of mountains1 nor hills out of plains1 and the choice of a theatre of war is determined by so many other things that it appears as if there was little margin left for considerations of this kind4 ,in affairs of magnitude it will be found that this margin is not so small4 ,if it is a question of the disposition and effective employment of the principal force1 and that1 even in the moment of a decisive battle1 by a few marches more to the front or rear an army can be brought out of mountain ground into the level country1 then a resolute concentration of the chief masses in the plain will neutralise the adjoining mountains4 ,we shall now once more collect the light which has been thrown on the subject1 and bring it to a focus in one distinct picture4 ,we maintain and believe we have shown1 that mountains1 both tactically and strategically1 are in general unfavourable to the defensive1 meaning thereby1 that kind of defensive which is decisive1 on the result of which the question of the possession or loss of the country depends4 ,they limit the view and prevent movements in every direction2 they force a state of passivity1 and make it necessary to stop every avenue or passage1 which always leads more or less to a war of cordons4 ,we should therefore1 if possible1 avoid mountains with the principal mass of our force1 and leave them on one side1 or keep them before or behind us4 ,at the same time1 we think that1 for minor operations and objects1 there is an element of increased strength to be found in mountain ground2 and after what has been said1 we shall not be accused of inconsistency in maintaining that such a country is the real place of refuge for the weak1 that is1 for those who dare not any longer seek an absolute decision4 ,on the other hand again1 the advantages derived from a mountainous country by troops acting an inferior rle cannot be participated in by large masses of troops4 ,still all these considerations will hardly counteract the impressions made on the senses4 ,the imagination not only of the inexperienced but also of all those accustomed to bad methods of war will still feel in the concrete case such an overpowering dread of the difficulties which the inflexible and retarding nature of mountainous ground opposes to all the movements of an assailant1 that they will hardly be able to look upon our opinion as anything but a most singular paradox4 ,then again1 with those who take a general view1 the history of the last century 7with its peculiar form of war7 will take the place of the impressions of the senses1 and therefore there will be but few who will not still adhere to the belief that ,austria1 for example1 should be better able to defend her states on the ,italian side than on the side of the ,rhine4 ,on the other hand1 the ,french who carried on war for twenty years under a leader both energetic and indifferent to minor considerations1 and have constantly before their eyes the successful results thus obtained1 will1 for some time to come1 distinguish themselves in this as well as in other cases by the tact of a practised judgment4 ,does it follow from this that a state would be better protected by an open country than by mountains1 that ,spain would be stronger without the ,pyrenees2 ,lombardy more difficult of access without the ,alps1 and a level country such as ,north ,germany more difficult to conquer than a mountainous country8 ,to these false deductions we shall devote our concluding remarks4 ,we do not assert that ,spain would be stronger without the ,pyrenees than with them1 but we say that a ,spanish army1 feeling itself strong enough to engage in a decisive battle1 would do better by concentrating itself in a position behind the ,ebro1 than by fractioning itself amongst the fifteen passes of the ,pyrenees4 ,but the influence of the ,pyrenees on war is very far from being set aside on that account4 ,we say the same respecting an ,italian army4 ,if it divided itself in the ,high ,alps it would be vanquished by each resolute commander it encountered1 without even the alternative of victory or defeat2 whilst in the plains of ,turin it would have the same chance as every other army4 ,but still no one can on that account suppose that it is desirable for an aggressor to have to march over masses of mountains such as the ,alps1 and to leave them behind4 ,besides1 a determination to accept a great battle in the plains1 by no means excludes a preliminary defence of the mountains by subordinate forces1 an arrangement very advisable in respect to such masses as the ,alps and ,pyrenees4 ,lastly1 it is far from our intention to argue that the conquest of a mountainous country is easier than that of a level7997 one1 unless a single victory sufficed to prostrate the enemy completely4 ,after this victory ensues a state of defence for the conqueror1 during which the mountainous ground must be as disadvantageous to the assailant as it was to the defensive1 and even more so4 ,if the war continues1 if foreign assistance arrives1 if the people take up arms1 this reaction will gain strength from a mountainous country4 7997 ,as it is conceived that the words 8ebenen0 and 8gebirgigen0 in this passage in the original have by some means become transposed1 their equivalents--level and mountainous--are here placed in the order in which it is presumed the author intended the words to stand4--,tr4 ,it is here as in dioptrics1 the image represented becomes more luminous when moved in a certain direction1 not1 however1 as far as one pleases1 but only until the focus is reached1 beyond that the effect is reversed4 ,if the defensive is weaker in the mountains1 that would seem to be a reason for the assailant to prefer a line of operations in the mountains4 ,but this will seldom occur1 because the difficulties of supporting an army1 and those arising from the roads1 the uncertainty as to whether the enemy will accept battle in the mountains1 and even whether he will take up a position there with his principal force1 tend to neutralise that possible advantage4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,defence of ,mountains 7continued7 ,in the fifteenth chapter we spoke of the nature of combats in mountains1 and in the sixteenth of the use to be made of them by strategy1 and in so doing we often came upon the idea of mountain defence1 without stopping to consider the form and details of such a measure4 ,we shall now examine it more closely4 ,as mountain systems frequently extend like streaks or belts over the surface of the earth1 and form the division between streams flowing in different directions1 consequently the separation between whole water systems1 and as this general form repeats itself in the parts composing that whole1 inasmuch as these parts diverge from the main chain in branches or ridges1 and then form the separation between lesser water systems2 hence the idea of a system of mountain defence has naturally founded itself in the first instance1 and afterwards developed itself1 upon the conception of the general form of mountains1 that of an obstacle1 like a great barrier1 having greater length than breadth4 ,although geologists are not yet agreed as to the origin of mountains and the laws of their formation1 still in every case the course of the waters indicates in the shortest and surest manner the general form of the system1 whether the action of the water has contributed to give that general form 7according to the aqueous theory71 or that the course of the water is a consequence of the form of the system itself4 ,it was1 therefore1 very natural again1 in devising a system of mountain defence1 to take the course of the waters as a guide1 as those courses form a natural series of levels1 from which we can obtain both the general height and the general profile of the mountain1 while the valleys formed by the streams present also the best means of access to the heights1 because so much of the effect of the erosive and alluvial action of the water is permanent1 that the inequalities of the slopes of the mountain are smoothed down by it to one regular slope4 ,hence1 therefore1 the idea of mountain defence would assume that1 when a mountain ran about parallel with the front to be defended1 it was to be regarded as a great obstacle to approach1 as a kind of rampart1 the gates of which were formed by the valleys4 ,the real defence was then to be made on the crest of this rampart1 7that is1 on the edge of the plateau which crowned the mountain7 and cut the valleys transversely4 ,if the line of the principal mountain-chain formed somewhat of a right angle with the front of defence1 then one of the principal branches would be selected to be used instead2 thus the line chosen would be parallel to one of the principal valleys1 and run up to the principal ridge1 which might be regarded as the extremity4 ,we have noticed this scheme for mountain defence founded on the geological structure of the earth1 because it really presented itself in theory for some time1 and in the so-called 8theory of ground0 the laws of the process of aqueous action have been mixed up with the conduct of war4 ,but all this is so full of false hypotheses and incorrect substitutions1 that when these are abstracted1 nothing in reality remains to serve as the basis of any kind of a system4 ,the principal ridges of real mountains are far too impracticable and inhospitable to place large masses of troops upon them2 it is often the same with the adjacent ridges1 they are often too short and irregular4 ,plateaux do not exist on all mountain ridges1 and where they are to be found they are mostly narrow1 and therefore unfit to accommodate many troops2 indeed1 there are few mountains which1 closely examined1 will be found surmounted by an uninterrupted ridge1 or which have their sides at such an angle that they form in some measure practicable slopes1 or1 at least1 a succession of terraces4 ,the principal ridge winds1 bends1 and splits itself2 immense branches launch into the adjacent country in curved lines1 and lift themselves often just at their termination to a greater height than the main ridge itself2 promontories then join on1 and form deep valleys which do not correspond with the general system4 ,thus it is that1 when several lines of mountains cross each other1 or at those points from which they branch out1 the conception of a small band or belt is completely at an end1 and gives place to mountain and water lines radiating from a centre in the form of a star4 ,from this it follows1 and it will strike those who have examined mountain-masses in this manner the more forcibly1 that the idea of a systematic disposition is out of the question1 and that to adhere to such an idea as a fundamental principle for our measures would be wholly impracticable4 ,there is still one important point to notice belonging to the province of practical application4 ,if we look closely at mountain warfare in its tactical aspects1 it is evident that these are of two principal kinds1 the first of which is the defence of steep slopes1 the second is that of narrow valleys4 ,now this last1 which is often1 indeed almost generally1 highly favourable to the action of the defence1 is not very compatible with the disposition on the principal ridge1 for the occupation of the valley itself is often required and that at its outer extremity nearest to the open country1 not at its commencement1 because there its sides are steeper4 ,besides1 this defence of valleys offers a means of defending mountainous districts1 even when the ridge itself affords no position which can be occupied2 the rle which it performs is1 therefore1 generally greater in proportion as the masses of the mountains are higher and more inaccessible4 ,the result of all these considerations is1 that we must entirely give up the idea of a defensible line more or less regular1 and coincident with one of the geological lines1 and must look upon a mountain range as merely a surface intersected and broken with inequalities and obstacles strewed over it in the most diversified manner1 the features of which we must try to make the best use of which circumstances permit2 that therefore1 although a knowledge of the geological features of the ground is indispensable to a clear conception of the form of mountain masses1 it is of little value in the organisation of defensive measures4 ,neither in the war of the ,austrian ,succession1 nor in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 nor in those of the ,french ,revolution1 do we find military dispositions which comprehended a whole mountain system1 and in which the defence was systematised in accordance with the leading features of that system4 ,nowhere do we find armies on the principal ridges always in position on the slopes4 ,sometimes at a greater1 sometimes at a lower elevation2 sometimes in one direction1 sometimes in another2 parallel1 at right angles1 and obliquely2 with and against the watercourse2 in lofty mountains1 such as the ,alps1 frequently extended along the valleys2 amongst mountains of a inferior class1 like the ,sudetics 7and this is the strangest anomaly71 at the middle of the declivity1 as it sloped towards the defender1 therefore with the principal ridge in front1 like the position in which ,frederick the ,great1 in #agfb1 covered the siege of ,schwednitz1 with the 8hohe ,eule0 before the front of his camp4 ,the celebrated positions1 ,schmotseifen and ,landshut1 in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 are for the most part in the bottoms of valleys4 ,it is the same with the position of ,feldkirch1 in the ,vorarlsberg4 ,in the campaigns of #agii and #ahjj1 the chief posts1 both of the ,french and ,austrians1 were always quite in the valleys1 not merely across them so as to close them1 but also parallel with them1 whilst the ridges were either not occupied at all1 or merely by a few single posts4 ,the crests of the higher ,alps in particular are so difficult of access1 and afford so little space for the accommodation of troops1 that it would be impossible to place any considerable bodies of men there4 ,now if we must positively have armies in mountains to keep possession of them1 there is nothing to be done but to place them in the valleys4 ,at first sight this appears erroneous1 because1 in accordance with the prevalent theoretical ideas1 it will be said1 the heights command the valleys4 ,but that is really not the case4 ,mountain ridges are only accessible by a few paths and rude tracks1 with a few exceptions only passable for infantry1 whilst the carriage roads are in the valleys4 ,the enemy can only appear there at certain points with infantry2 but in these mountain masses the distances are too great for any effective fire of small arms1 and therefore a position in the valleys is less dangerous than it appears4 ,at the same time1 the valley defence is exposed to another great danger1 that of being cut off4 ,the enemy can1 it is true1 only descend into the valley with infantry1 at certain points1 slowly and with great exertion2 he cannot1 therefore1 take us by surprise2 but none of the positions we have in the valley defend the outlets of such paths into the valley4 ,the enemy can1 therefore1 bring down large masses gradually1 then spread out1 and burst through the thin and from that moment weak line1 which1 perhaps1 has nothing more for its protection than the rocky bed of a shallow mountain-stream4 ,but now retreat1 which must always be made piecemeal in a valley1 until the outlet from the mountains is reached1 is impossible for many parts of the line of troops2 and that was the reason that the ,austrians in ,switzerland almost always lost a third1 or a half of their troops taken prisoners4-- ,now a few words on the usual way of dividing troops in such a method of defence4 ,each of the subordinate positions is in relation with a position taken up by the principal body of troops1 more or less in the centre of the whole line1 on the principal road of approach4 ,from this central position1 other corps are detached right and left to occupy the most important points of approach1 and thus the whole is disposed in a line1 as it were1 of three1 four1 five1 six posts1 c4 ,how far this fractioning and extension of the line shall be carried1 must depend on the requirements of each individual case4 ,an extent of a couple of marches1 that is1 six to eight miles is of moderate length1 and we have seen it carried as far as twenty or thirty miles4 ,between each of these separate posts1 which are one or two leagues from each other1 there will probably be some approaches of inferior importance1 to which afterwards attention must be directed4 ,some very good posts for a couple of battalions each are selected1 which form a good connection between the chief posts1 and they are occupied4 ,it is easy to see that the distribution of the force may be carried still further1 and go down to posts occupied only by single companies and squadrons2 and this has often happened4 ,there are1 therefore1 in this no general limits to the extent of fractioning4 ,on the other hand1 the strength of each post must depend on the strength of the whole2 and therefore we can say nothing as to the possible or natural degree which should be observed with regard to the strength of the principal posts4 ,we shall only append1 as a guide1 some maxims which are drawn from experience and the nature of the case4 #a4 ,the more lofty and inaccessible the mountains are1 so much the further this separation of divisions of the force not only may be1 but also must be1 carried2 for the less any portion of a country can be kept secure by combinations dependent on the movement of troops1 so much the more must the security be obtained by direct covering4 ,the defence of the ,alps requires a much greater division of force1 and therefore approaches nearer to the cordon system1 than the defence of the ,vosges or the ,giant mountains4 #b4 ,hitherto1 wherever defence of mountains has taken place1 such a division of the force employed has been made that the chief posts have generally consisted of only one line of infantry1 and in a second line1 some squadrons of cavalry2 at all events1 only the chief post established in the centre has perhaps had some battalions in a second line4 #c4 ,a strategic reserve1 to reinforce any point attacked1 has very seldom been kept in rear1 because the extension of front made the line feel too weak already in all parts4 ,on this account the support which a post attacked has received1 has generally been furnished from other posts in the line not themselves attacked4 #d4 ,even when the division of the forces has been relatively moderate1 and the strength of each single post considerable1 the principal resistance has been always confined to a local defence2 and if once the enemy succeeded in wresting a post1 it has been impossible to recover it by any supports afterwards arriving4 ,how much1 according to this1 may be expected from mountain defence1 in what cases this means may be used1 how far we can and may go in the extension and fractioning of the forces--these are all questions which theory must leave to the tact of the general4 ,it is enough if it tells him what these means really are1 and what rle they can perform in the active operations of the army4 ,a general who allows himself to be beaten in an extended mountain position deserves to be brought before a court martial4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,defence of ,streams and ,rivers ,streams and large rivers1 in so far as we speak of their defence1 belong1 like mountains1 to the category of strategic barriers4 ,but they differ from mountains in two respects4 ,the one concerns their relative1 the other their absolute defence4 ,like mountains1 they strengthen the relative defence2 but one of their peculiarities is1 that they are like implements of hard and brittle metal1 they either stand every blow without bending1 or their defence breaks and then ends altogether4 ,if the river is very large1 and the other conditions are favourable1 then the passage may be absolutely impossible4 ,but if the defence of any river is forced at one point1 then there cannot be1 as in mountain warfare1 a persistent defence afterwards2 the affair is finished with that one act1 unless that the river itself runs between mountains4 ,the other peculiarity of rivers in relation to war is1 that in many cases they admit of very good1 and in general of better combinations than mountains for a decisive battle4 ,both again have this property in common1 that they are dangerous and seductive objects which have often led to false measures1 and placed generals in awkward situations4 ,we shall notice these results in examining more closely the defence of rivers4 ,although history is rather bare in examples of rivers defended with success1 and therefore the opinion is justified that rivers and streams are no such formidable barriers as was once supposed1 when an absolute defensive system seized all means of strengthening itself which the country offered1 still the influence which they exercise to the advantage of the battle1 as well as of the defence of a country1 cannot be denied4 ,in order to look over the subject in a connected form1 we shall specify the different points of view from which we propose to examine it4 ,first and foremost1 the strategic results which streams and rivers produce through their defence1 must be distinguished from the influence which they have on the defence of a country1 even when not themselves specially defended4 ,further1 the defence itself may take three different forms3-- #a4 ,an absolute defence with the main body4 #b4 ,a mere demonstration of resistance4 #c4 ,a relative resistance by subordinate bodies of troops1 such as outposts1 covering lines1 flanking corps1 etc4 ,lastly1 we must distinguish three different degrees or kinds of defence1 in each of its forms1 namely-- #a4 ,a direct defence by opposing the passage4 #b4 ,a rather indirect one1 by which the river and its valley are only used as a means towards a better combination for the battle4 #c4 ,a completely direct one1 by holding an unassailable position on the enemy's side of the river4 ,we shall subdivide our observations1 in conformity with these three degrees1 and after we have made ourselves acquainted with each of them in its relation to the first1 which is the most important of the forms1 we shall then proceed to do the same in respect to their relations to the other two4 ,therefore1 first1 the direct defence1 that is1 such a defence as is to prevent the passage of the enemy's army itself4 ,this can only come into the question in relation to large rivers1 that is1 great bodies of water4 ,the combinations of space1 time1 and force1 which require to be looked into as elements of this theory of defence1 make the subject somewhat complicated1 so that it is not easy to gain a sure point from which to commence4 ,the following is the result at which every one will arrive on full consideration4 ,the time required to build a bridge determines the distance from each other at which the corps charged with the defence of the river should be posted4 ,if we divide the whole length of the line of defence by this distance1 we get the number of corps required for the defence2 if with that number we divide the mass of troops disposable1 we shall get the strength of each corps4 ,if we now compare the strength of each single corps with the number of troops which the enemy1 by using all the means in his power1 can pass over during the construction of his bridge1 we shall be able to judge how far we can expect a successful resistance4 ,for we can only assume the forcing of the passage to be impossible when the defender is able to attack the troops passed over with a considerable numerical superiority1 say the double1 before the bridge is completed4 ,an illustration will make this plain4 ,if the enemy requires twenty-four hours for the construction of a bridge1 and if he can by other means only pass over #bj1jjj men in those twenty-four hours1 whilst the defender within twelve hours can appear at any point whatever with #bj1jjj men1 in such case the passage cannot be forced2 for the defender will arrive when the enemy engaged in crossing has only passed over the half of #bj1jjj4 ,now as in twelve hours1 the time for conveying intelligence included1 we can march four miles1 therefore every eight miles #bj1jjj men would be required1 which would make #fj1jjj for the defence of a length of twenty-four miles of river4 ,these would be sufficient for the appearance of #bj1jjj men at any point1 even if the enemy attempted the passage at two points at the same time2 if at only one point twice #bj1jjj could be brought to oppose him at that single point4 ,here1 then1 there are three circumstances exercising a decisive influence3 7#a7 the breadth of the river2 7#b7 the means of passage1 for the two determine both the time required to construct the bridge1 and the number of troops that can cross during the time the bridge is being built2 7#c7 the strength of the defender's army4 ,the strength of the enemy's force itself does not as yet come into consideration4 ,according to this theory we may say that there is a point at which the possibility of crossing completely stops1 and that no numerical superiority on the part of the enemy would enable him to force a passage4 ,this is the simple theory of the direct defence of a river1 that is1 of a defence intended to prevent the enemy from finishing his bridge and from making the passage itself2 in this there is as yet no notice taken of the effect of demonstrations which the enemy may use4 ,we shall now bring into consideration particulars in detail1 and measures requisite for such a defence4 ,setting aside1 in the first place1 geographical peculiarities1 we have only to say that the corps as proposed by the present theory1 must be posted close to the river1 and each corps in itself concentrated4 ,it must be close to the river1 because every position further back lengthens unnecessarily and uselessly the distance to be gone over to any point menaced2 for as the waters of the river give security against any important movement on the part of the enemy1 a reserve in rear is not required1 as it is for an ordinary line of defence1 where there is no river in front4 ,besides1 the roads running parallel to and near a river up and down1 are generally better than transverse roads from the interior leading to any particular points on the river4 ,lastly1 the river is unquestionably better watched by corps thus placed than by a mere chain of posts1 more particularly as the commanders are all close at hand4--,each of these corps must be concentrated in itself1 because otherwise all the calculation as to time would require alteration4 ,he who knows the loss of time in effecting a concentration1 will easily comprehend that just in this concentrated position lies the great efficacy of the defence4 ,no doubt1 at first sight1 it is very tempting to make the crossing1 even in boats1 impossible for the enemy by a line of posts2 but with a few exceptions of points1 specially favourable for crossing1 such a measure would be extremely prejudicial4 ,to say nothing of the objection that the enemy can generally drive off such a post by bringing a superior force to bear on it from the opposite side1 it is1 as a rule1 a waste of strength1 that is to say1 the most that can be obtained by any such post1 is to compel the enemy to choose another point of passage4 ,if1 therefore1 we are not so strong that we can treat and defend the river like a ditch of a fortress1 a case for which no new precept is required1 such a method of directly defending the bank of a river leads necessarily away from the proposed object4 ,besides these general principles for positions1 we have to consider--first1 the examination of the special peculiarities of the river2 second1 the removal of all means of passage2 third1 the influence of any fortresses situated on the river4 ,a river1 considered as a line of defence1 must have at the extremities of the line1 right and left1 points d'appui1 such as1 for instance1 the sea1 or a neutral territory2 or there must be other causes which make it impracticable for the enemy to turn the line of defence by crossing beyond its extremities4 ,now1 as neither such flank supports nor such impediments are to be found1 unless at considerable distances1 we see at once that the defence of a river must embrace a considerable portion of its length1 and that1 therefore1 the possibility of a defence by placing a large body of troops behind a relatively short length of the river vanishes from the class of possible facts 7to which we must always confine ourselves74 ,we say a relatively short length of the river1 by which we mean a length which does not very much exceed that which the same number of troops would usually occupy on an ordinary position in line without a river4 ,such cases1 we say1 do not occur1 and every direct defence of a river always becomes a kind of cordon system1 at least as far as regards the extension of the troops1 and therefore is not at all adapted to oppose a turning movement on the part of the enemy in the same manner which is natural to an army in a concentrated position4 ,where1 therefore1 such turning movement is possible1 the direct defence of the river1 however promising its results in other respects1 is a measure in the highest degree dangerous4 ,now1 as regards the portion of the river between its extreme points1 of course we may suppose that all points within that portion are not equally well suited for crossing4 ,this subject admits of being somewhat more precisely determined in the abstract1 but not positively fixed1 for the very smallest local peculiarity often decides more than all which looks great and important in books4 ,besides1 it is wholly unnecessary to lay down any rules on this subject1 for the appearance of the river1 and the information to be obtained from those residing near it1 will always amply suffice1 without referring back to books4 ,as matters of detail1 we may observe that roads leading down upon a river1 its affluents1 the great towns through which it passes1 and lastly above all1 its islands1 generally favour a passage the most2 that on the other hand1 the elevation of one bank over another1 and the bend in the course of the river at the point of passage1 which usually act such a prominent rle in books1 are seldom of any consequence4 ,the reason of this is1 that the presumed influence of these two things rests on the limited idea of an absolute defence of the river bank--a case which seldom or never happens in connection with great rivers4 ,now1 whatever may be the nature of the circumstances which make it easier to cross a river at particular points1 they must have an influence on the position of the troops1 and modify the general geometrical law2 but it is not advisable to deviate too far from that law1 relying on the difficulties of the passage at many points4 ,the enemy would choose exactly those spots which are the least favourable by nature for crossing1 if he knew that these are the points where there is the least likelihood of meeting us4 ,in any case the strongest possible occupation of islands is a measure to be recommended1 because a serious attack on an island indicates in the surest way the intended point of passage4 ,as the corps stationed close to a river must be able to move either up or down along its banks according as circumstances require1 therefore if there is no road parallel to the river1 one of the most essential preparatory measures for the defence of the river is to put the nearest small roads running in a parallel direction into suitable order1 and to construct such short roads of connection as may be necessary4 ,the second point on which we have to speak1 is the removal of the means of crossing4--,on the river itself the thing is no easy matter1 at least requires considerable time2 but on the affluents which fall into the river1 particularly those on the enemy's side1 the difficulties are almost insurmountable1 as these branch rivers are generally already in the hands of the enemy4 ,for that reason it is important to close the mouths of such rivers by fortifications4 ,as the equipment for crossing rivers which an enemy brings with him1 that is his pontoons1 are rarely sufficient for the passage of great rivers1 much depends on the means to be found on the river itself1 its affluents1 and in the great towns adjacent1 and lastly1 on the timber for building boats and rafts in forests near the river4 ,there are cases in which all these circumstances are so unfavourable1 that the crossing of a river is by that means almost an impossibility4 ,lastly1 the fortresses1 which lie on both sides1 or on the enemy's side of the river1 serve both to prevent any crossing at any points near them1 up or down the river1 and as a means of closing the mouths of affluents1 as well as to receive immediately all craft or boats which may be seized4 ,so much as to the direct defence of a river1 on the supposition that it is one containing a great volume of water4 ,if a deep valley with precipitous sides or marshy banks1 are added to the barrier of the river itself1 then the difficulty of passing and the strength of the defence are certainly increased2 but the volume of water is not made up for by such obstacles1 for they constitute no absolute severance of the country1 which is an indispensable condition of direct defence4 ,if we are asked what rle such a direct river defence can play in the strategic plan of the campaign1 we must admit that it can never lead to a decisive victory1 partly because the object is not to let the enemy pass over to our side at all1 or to crush the first mass of any size which passes2 partly because the river prevents our being able to convert the advantages gained into a decisive victory by sallying forth in force4 ,on the other hand1 the defence of a river in this way may produce a great gain of time1 which is generally all important for the defensive4 ,the collecting the means of crossing1 takes up often much time2 if several attempts fail a good deal more time is gained4 ,if the enemy1 on account of the river1 gives his forces an entirely different direction1 then still further advantages may be gained by that means4 ,lastly1 whenever the enemy is not in downright earnest about advancing1 a river will occasion a stoppage in his movements and thereby afford a durable protection to the country4 ,a direct defence of a river1 therefore1 when the masses of troops engaged are considerable1 the river large1 and other circumstances favourable1 may be regarded as a very good defensive means1 and may yield results to which commanders in modern times 7influenced only by the thought of unfortunate attempts to defend rivers1 which failed from insufficient means71 have paid too little attention4 ,for if1 in accordance with the supposition just made 7which may easily be realized in connection with such rivers as the ,rhine or the ,danube71 an efficient defence of #bd miles of river is possible by #fj1jjj men in face of a very considerably superior force1 we may well say that such a result deserves consideration4 ,we say1 in opposition to a considerably superior force1 and must again recur to that point4 ,according to the theory we have propounded1 all depends on the means of crossing1 and nothing on the numerical strength of the force seeking to cross1 always supposing it is not less than the force which defends the river4 ,this appears very extraordinary1 and yet it is true4 ,but we must take care not to forget that most defences of rivers1 or1 more properly speaking1 the whole1 have no absolute points d'appui1 therefore1 may be turned1 and this turning movement will be very much easier if the enemy has very superior numbers4 ,if now we reflect that such a direct defence of a river1 even if overcome by the enemy1 is by no means to be compared to a lost battle1 and can still less lead to a complete defeat1 since only a part of our force has been engaged1 and the enemy1 detained by the tedious crossing over of his troops on a single bridge1 cannot immediately follow up his victory1 we shall be the less disposed to despise this means of defence4 ,in all the practical affairs of human life it is important to hit the right point2 and so also1 in the defence of a river1 it makes a great difference whether we rightly appreciate our situation in all its relations2 an apparently insignificant circumstance may essentially alter the case1 and make a measure which is wise and effective in one instance1 a disastrous mistake in another4 ,this difficulty of forming a right judgment and of avoiding the notion that 8a river is a river0 is perhaps greater here than anywhere else1 therefore we must especially guard against false applications and interpretations2 but having done so1 we have also no hesitation in plainly declaring that we do not think it worth while to listen to the cry of those who1 under the influence of some vague feeling1 and without any fixed idea1 expect everything from attack and movement1 and think they see the most true picture of war in a hussar at full gallop brandishing his sword over his head4 ,such ideas and feelings are not always all that is required 7we shall only instance here the once famous dictator ,wedel1 at ,zllichau1 in #agei72 but the worst of all is that they are seldom durable1 and they forsake the general at the last moment if great complex cases branching out into a thousand relations bear heavily upon him4 ,we therefore believe that a direct defence of a river with large bodies of troops1 under favourable conditions1 can lead to successful results if we content ourselves with a moderate negative3 but this does not hold good in the case of smaller masses4 ,although #fj1jjj men on a certain length of river could prevent an army of #ajj1jjj or more from passing1 a corps of #aj1jjj on the same length would not be able to oppose the passage of a corps of #aj1jjj men1 indeed1 probably1 not of one half that strength if such a body chose to run the risk of placing itself on the same side of the river with an enemy so much superior in numbers4 ,the case is clear1 as the means of passing do not alter4 ,we have as yet said little about feints or demonstrations of crossing1 as they do not essentially come into consideration in the direct defence of a river1 for partly such defence is not a question of concentration of the army at one point1 but each corps has the defence of a portion of the river distinctly allotted to it2 partly such simulated intentions of crossing are also very difficult under the circumstances we have supposed4 ,if1 for instance1 the means of crossing in themselves are already limited1 that is1 not in such abundance as the assailant must desire to ensure the success of his undertaking1 he will then hardly be able or willing to apply a large share to a mere demonstration3 at all events the mass of troops to be passed over at the true point of crossing must be so much the less1 and the defender gains again in time what through uncertainty he may have lost4 ,this direct defence1 as a rule1 seems only suitable to large rivers1 and on the last half of their course4 ,the second form of defence is suitable for smaller rivers with deep valleys1 often also for very unimportant ones4 ,it consists in a position taken up further back from the river at such a distance that the enemy's army may either be caught in detail after the passage 7if it passes at several points at the same time7 or if the passage is made by the whole at one point1 then near the river1 hemmed in upon one bridge and road4 ,an army with the rear pressed close against a river or a deep valley1 and confined to one line of retreat1 is in a most disadvantageous position for battle2 in the making proper use of this circumstance1 consists precisely the most efficacious defence of rivers of moderate size1 and running in deep valleys4 ,the disposition of an army in large corps close to a river which we consider the best in a direct defence1 supposes that the enemy cannot pass the river unexpectedly and in great force1 because otherwise1 by making such a disposition1 there would be great danger of being beaten in detail4 ,if1 therefore1 the circumstances which favour the defence are not sufficiently advantageous1 if the enemy has already in hand ample means of crossing1 if the river has many islands or fords1 if it is not broad enough1 if we are too weak1 etc41 etc41 then the idea of that method may be dismissed3 the troops for the more secure connection with each other must be drawn back a little from the river1 and all that then remains to do is to ensure the most rapid concentration possible upon that point where the enemy attempts to cross1 so as to be able to attack him before he has gained so much ground that he has the command of several passages4 ,in the present case the river or its valley must be watched and partially defended by a chain of outposts whilst the army is disposed in several corps at suitable points and at a certain distance 7usually a few leagues7 from the river4 ,the most difficult point lies here in the passage through the narrow way formed by the river and its valley4 ,it is not now only the volume of water in the river with which we are concerned1 but the whole of the defile1 and1 as a rule1 a deep rocky valley is a greater impediment to pass than a river of considerable breadth4 ,the difficulty of the march of a large body of troops through a long defile is in reality much greater than appears at first consideration4 ,the time required is very considerable2 and the danger that the enemy during the march may make himself master of the surrounding heights must cause disquietude4 ,if the troops in front advance too far1 they encounter the enemy too soon1 and are in danger of being overpowered2 if they remain near the point of passage then they fight in the worst situation4 ,the passage across such an obstacle of ground with a view to measure strength with the enemy on the opposite side is1 therefore1 a bold undertaking1 or it implies very superior numbers and great confidence in the commander4 ,such a defensive line cannot certainly be extended to such a length as in the direct defence of a great river1 for it is intended to fight with the whole force united1 and the passages1 however difficult1 cannot be compared in that respect with those over a large river2 it is1 therefore1 much easier for the enemy to make a turning movement against us4 ,but at the same time1 such a movement carries him out of his natural direction 7for we suppose1 as is plain in itself1 that the valley crosses that direction at about right angles71 and the disadvantageous effect of a confined line of retreat only disappears gradually1 not at once1 so that the defender will still always have some advantage over the advancing foe1 although the latter is not caught exactly at the crisis of the passage1 but by the detour he makes is enabled to get a little more room to move4 ,as we are not speaking of rivers in connection only with the mass of their waters1 but have rather more in view the deep cleft or channel formed by their valleys1 we must explain that under the term we do not mean any regular mountain gorge1 because then all that has been said about mountains would be applicable4 ,but1 as every one knows1 there are many level districts where the channels of even the smallest streams have deep and precipitous sides2 and1 besides these1 such as have marshy banks1 or whose banks are otherwise difficult of approach1 belong to the same class4 ,under these conditions1 therefore1 an army on the defensive1 posted behind a large river or deep valley with steep sides1 is in a very excellent position1 and this sort of river defence is a strategic measure of the best kind4 ,its defect 7the point on which the defender is very apt to err7 is the over-extension of the defending force4 ,it is so natural in such a case to be drawn on from one point of passage to another1 and to miss the right point where we ought to stop2 but then1 if we do not succeed in fighting with the whole army united1 we miss the intended effect2 a defeat in battle1 the necessity of retreat1 confusion in many ways and losses reduce the army nearly to ruin1 even although the resistance has not been pushed to an extremity4 ,in saying that the defensive1 under the above conditions1 should not extend his forces widely1 that he should be in any case able to assemble all his forces on the evening of the day on which the enemy passes1 enough is said1 and it may stand in place of all combinations of time1 power1 and space1 things which1 in this case1 must depend on many local points4 ,the battle to which these circumstances lead must have a special character--that of the greatest impetuosity on the side of the defender4 ,the feigned passages by which the enemy will keep him for some time in uncertainty--will1 in general prevent his discovering the real point of crossing a moment too soon4 ,the peculiar advantages of the situation of the defender consist in the disadvantageous situation of the enemy's corps just immediately in his front2 if other corps1 having passed at other points1 menace his flank1 he cannot1 as in a defensive battle1 counteract such movements by vigorous blows from his rear1 for that would be to sacrifice the above-mentioned advantage of his situation2 he must1 therefore1 decide the affair in his front before such other corps can arrive and become dangerous1 that is1 he must attack what he has before him as swiftly and vigorously as possible1 and decide all by its defeat4 ,but the object of this form of river defence can never be the repulse of a very greatly superior force1 as is conceivable in the direct defence of a large river2 for as a rule we have really to deal with the bulk of the enemy's force1 and although we do so under favourable circumstances1 still it is easy to see the relation between the forces must soon be felt4 ,this is the nature of the defence of rivers of a moderate size and deep valleys when the principal masses of the armies are concerned1 for in respect to them the considerable resistance which can be offered on the ridges or scarps of the valley stands no comparison with the disadvantages of a scattered position1 and to them a decisive victory is a matter of necessity4 ,but if nothing more is wanted but the reinforcement of a secondary line of defence which is intended to hold out for a short time1 and which can calculate on support1 then certainly a direct defence of the scarps of the valley1 or even of the river bank1 may be made2 and although the same advantages are not to be expected here as in mountain positions1 still the resistance will always last longer than in an ordinary country4 ,only one circumstance makes this measure very dangerous1 if not impossible3 it is when the river has many windings and sharp turnings1 which is just what is often the case when a river runs in a deep valley1 ,only look at the course of the ,mosel4 ,in a case of its defence1 the corps in advance on the salients of the bends would almost inevitably be lost in the event of a retreat4 ,that a great river allows the same defensive means1 the same form of defence1 which we have pointed out as best suited for rivers of a moderate size1 in connection with the mass of an army1 and also under much more favourable circumstances1 is plain of itself4 ,it will come into use more especially when the point with the defender is to gain a decisive victory 7,aspern74 ,the case of an army drawn up with its front close on a river1 or stream1 or deep valley1 in order by that means to command a tactical obstacle to the approach to its position1 or to strengthen its front1 is quite a different one1 the detailed examination of which belongs to tactics4 ,of the effect of this we shall only say this much1 that it is founded on a delusion4--,if the cleft in the ground is very considerable1 the front of the position becomes absolutely unassailable4 ,now1 as there is no more difficulty in passing round such a position than any other1 it is just the same as if the defender had himself gone out of the way of the assailant1 yet that could hardly be the object of the position4 ,a position of this kind can1 therefore1 only be advisable when1 as a consequence of its position1 it threatens the communications of the assailant1 so that every deviation by him from the direct road is fraught with consequences altogether too serious to be risked4 ,in this second form of defence1 feigned passages are much more dangerous1 for the assailant can make them more easily1 while1 on the other hand1 the proposition for the defender is1 to assemble his whole army at the right point4 ,but the defender is certainly not quite so much limited for time here1 because the advantage of his situation lasts until the assailant has massed his whole force1 and made himself master of several crossings2 moreover1 also1 the simulated attack has not the same degree of effect here as in the defence of a cordon1 where all must be held1 and where1 therefore1 in the application of the reserve1 it is not merely a question1 as in our proposition1 where the enemy has his principal force1 but the much more difficult one1 ,which is the point he will first seek to force8 ,with respect to both forms of defence of large and small rivers1 we must observe generally1 that if they are undertaken in the haste and confusion of a retreat1 without preparation1 without the removal of all means of passage1 and without an exact knowledge of the country1 they cannot certainly fulfil what has been here supposed2 in most such cases1 nothing of the kind is to be calculated upon2 and therefore it will be always a great error for an army to divide itself over extended positions4 ,as everything usually miscarries in war1 if it is not done upon clear convictions and with the whole will and energy1 so a river defence will generally end badly when it is only resorted to because we have not the heart to meet the enemy in the open field1 and hope that the broad river or the deep valley will stop him4 ,when that is the case1 there is so little confidence in the actual situation that both the general and his army are usually filled with anxious forebodings1 which are almost sure to be realized quick enough4 ,a battle in the open field does not suppose a perfectly equal state of circumstances beforehand1 like a duel2 and the defender who does not know how to gain for himself any advantages1 either through the special nature of the defence1 through rapid marches1 or by knowledge of the country and freedom of movement1 is one whom nothing can save1 and least of all will a river or its valley be able to help him4 ,the third form of defence--by a strong position taken up on the enemy's side of the river--founds its efficacy on the danger in which it places the enemy of having his communications cut by the river1 and being thus limited to some bridges4 ,it follows1 as a matter of course1 that we are only speaking of great rivers with a great volume of water1 as these alone can lead to such results1 whilst a river which is merely in a deep ravine usually affords such a number of passages that all danger of the above disappears4 ,but the position of the defensive must be very strong1 almost unassailable2 otherwise he would just meet the enemy half way1 and give up his advantages4 ,but if it is of such strength that the enemy resolves not to attack it1 he will1 under certain circumstances1 be confined thereby to the same bank with the defender4 ,if the assailant crosses1 he exposes his communications2 but certainly1 at the same time1 he threatens ours4 ,here1 as in all cases in which one army passes by another1 the great point is1 whose communications1 by their number1 situation1 and other circumstances1 are the best secured1 and which has also1 in other respects1 most to lose1 therefore can be outbid by his opponent2 lastly1 which possesses still in his army the most power of victory upon which he can depend in an extreme case4 ,the influence of the river merely amounts to this1 that it augments the danger of such a movement for both parties1 as both are dependent on bridges4 ,now1 in so far as we can assume that1 according to the usual course of things1 the passage of the defender1 as well as of his depts of all kinds1 are better secured by fortresses than those of the offensive1 in so far is such a defence conceivable1 and one which might be substituted for the direct defence when circumstances are not favourable to that form4 ,certainly then the river is not defended by the army1 nor the army by the river1 but by the connection between the two the country is defended1 which is the main point4 ,at the same time it must be granted that this mode of defence1 without a decisive blow1 and resembling the state of tension of two electric currents1 of which the atmospheres only are as yet in contact1 cannot stop any very powerful impulsive force4 ,it might be applicable against even a great superiority of force on the side of the enemy1 if their army is commanded by a cautious general1 wanting in decision1 and never disposed to push forward with energy2 it might also answer when a kind of oscillation towards equality between the contending forces has previously arisen1 and nothing but small advantages are looked for on either side4 ,but if we have to deal with superior forces1 led by a bold general1 we are upon a dangerous course1 very close to an abyss4 ,this form of defence looks so bold1 and at the same time so scientific1 that it might be called the elegant2 but as elegance easily merges into folly1 and as it is not so easily excused in war as in society1 therefore we have had as yet few instances of this elegant art4 ,from this third mode a special means of assistance for the first two forms is developed1 that is1 by the permanent occupation of a bridge and a tte du pont to keep up a constant threat of crossing4 ,besides the object of an absolute defence with the main body1 each of the three modes of defence may also have that of a feigned defence4 ,this show of a resistance1 which it is not intended really to offer1 is an act which is combined with many other measures1 and fundamentally with every position which is anything more than a camp of route2 but the feigned defence of a great river becomes a complete stratagem in this way1 that it is necessary to adopt actually more or less a number of measures of detail1 and that its action is usually on a greater scale and of longer duration than that of any other2 for the act of passing a great river in sight of an army is always an important step for the assailant1 one over which he often ponders long1 or which he postpones to a more favourable moment4 ,for such a feigned defence it is therefore requisite that the main army should divide and post itself along the river1 7much in the same manner as for a real defence72 but as the intention of a mere demonstration shows that circumstances are not favourable enough for a real defence1 therefore1 from that measure as it always occasions a more or less extended and scattered disposition1 the danger of serious loss may very easily arise if the corps should get engaged in a real resistance1 even if not carried to an extremity2 it would then be in the true sense a half measure4 ,in a demonstration of defence1 therefore1 arrangement must be made for a sure concentration of the army at a point considerably 7perhaps several days' march7 in rear1 and the defence should not be carried beyond what is consistent with this arrangement4 ,in order to make our views plainer1 and to show the importance of such a defensive demonstration1 let us refer to the end of the campaign of #ahac4 ,buonaparte repassed the ,rhine with forty or fifty thousand men4 ,to attempt to defend this river with such a force at all points where the ,allies1 according to the direction of their forces1 might easily pass1 that is1 between ,manheim and ,nimeguen1 would have been to attempt an impossibility4 ,the only idea which ,buonaparte could therefore entertain was to offer his first real resistance somewhere on the ,french ,meuse1 where he could make his appearance with his army in some measure reinforced4 ,had he at once withdrawn his forces to that point1 the ,allies would have followed close at his heels2 had he placed his army in cantonments for rest behind the ,rhine1 the same thing must have taken place almost as soon1 for at the least show of desponding caution on his part1 the ,allies would have sent over swarms of ,cossacks and other light troops in pursuit1 and1 if that measure produced good results1 other corps would have followed4 ,the ,french corps had therefore nothing for it but to take steps to defend the ,rhine in earnest4 ,as ,buonaparte could foresee that this defence must end in nothing whenever1 the ,allies seriously undertook to cross the river1 it may therefore be regarded in the light of a mere demonstration1 in which the ,french corps incurred hardly any danger1 as their point of concentration lay on the ,upper ,moselle4 ,only ,macdonald1 who1 as is known1 was at ,nimeguen with twenty thousand men1 committed a mistake in deferring his retreat till fairly compelled to retire1 for this delay prevented his joining ,buonaparte before the battle of ,brienne1 as the retreat was not forced on him until after the arrival of ,winzurgerode's corps in ,january4 ,this defensive demonstration on the ,rhine1 therefore1 produced the result of checking the ,allies in their advance1 and induced them to postpone the crossing of the river until their reinforcements arrived1 which did not take place for six weeks4 ,these six weeks were of infinite value to ,buonaparte4 ,without this defensive demonstration on the ,rhine1 ,paris would have become the next immediate object after the victory of ,leipsic1 and it would have been impossible for the ,french to have given battle on that side of their capital4 ,in a river defence of the second class1 therefore1 in that of rivers of a smaller size1 such demonstrations may also be used1 but they will generally be less effectual1 because mere attempts to cross are in such a case easier1 and therefore the spell is sooner broken4 ,in the third kind of river defence1 a demonstration would in all probability be still less effectual1 and produce no more result than that of the occupation of any other temporary position4 ,lastly1 the two first forms of defence are very well suited to give a chain of outposts1 or any other defensive line 7cordon7 established for a secondary object1 or to a corps of observation1 much greater and more reliable strength than it would have without the river4 ,in all these cases the question is limited to a relative resistance1 and that must naturally be considerably strengthened by such a great natural obstacle4 ,at the same time1 we must not think only of the relative quantity of time gained by the resistance in fight in a case of this sort1 but also of the many anxieties which such undertakings usually excite in the mind of the enemy1 and which in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred lead to his giving up his plans if not urged or pressed by necessity4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,defence of ,streams and ,rivers 7continued7 ,we have still to add something respecting the influence of streams and rivers on the defence of a country1 even when they are not themselves defended4 ,every important river1 with its main valley and its adjacent valleys1 forms a very considerable obstacle in a country1 and in that way it is1 therefore1 advantageous to defence in general2 but its peculiar influence admits of being more particularly specified in its principal effects4 ,first we must distinguish whether it flows parallel to the frontier1 that is1 the general strategic front1 or at an oblique or a right angle to it4 ,in the case of the parallel direction we must observe the difference between having our own army or that of the enemy behind it1 and in both cases again the distance between it and the army4 ,an army on the defensive1 having behind it a large river within easy reach 7but not less than a day's march71 and on that river an adequate number of secure crossings1 is unquestionably in a much stronger situation than it would be without the river2 for if it loses a little in freedom of movement by the requisite care for the security of the crossings1 still it gains much more by the security of its strategic rear1 that means chiefly of its lines of communication4 ,in all this we allude to a defence in our own country2 for in the enemy's country1 although his army might be before us1 we should still have always more or less to apprehend his appearance behind us on the other side of the river1 and then the river1 involving as it does narrow defiles in roads1 would be more disadvantageous than otherwise in its effect on our situation4 ,the further the river is behind the army1 the less useful it will be1 and at certain distances its influence disappears altogether4 ,if an advancing army has to leave a river in its rear1 the river cannot be otherwise than prejudicial to its movements1 for it restricts the communications of the army to a few single passages4 ,when ,prince ,henry marched against the ,russians on the right bank of the ,oder near ,breslau1 he had plainly a point d'appui in the ,oder flowing behind him at a day's march2 on the other hand1 when the ,russians under ,cznernitschef passed the ,oder subsequently1 they were in a very embarrassing situation1 just through the risk of losing their line of retreat1 which was limited to one bridge4 ,if a river crosses the theatre of war more or less at a right angle with the strategic front1 then the advantage is again on the side of the defensive2 for1 in the first place1 there are generally a number of good positions leaning on the river1 and covered in front by the transverse valleys connected with the principal valley 7like the ,elbe for the ,prussians in the ,seven ,years' ,war72 secondly1 the assailant must leave one side of the river or the other unoccupied1 or he must divide his forces2 and such division cannot fail to be in favour again of the defensive1 because he will be in possession of more well secured passages than the assailant4 ,we need only cast a glance over the whole ,seven ,years' ,war1 to be convinced that the ,oder and ,elbe were very useful to ,frederick the ,great in the defence of his theatre of war 7namely ,silesia1 ,saxony and the ,mark71 and consequently a great impediment to the conquest of these provinces by the ,austrians and ,russians1 although there was no real defence of those rivers in the whole ,seven ,years' ,war1 and their course is mostly1 as connected with the enemy1 at an oblique or a right angle rather than parallel with the front4 ,it is only the convenience of a river as a means of transport1 when its course is more or less in a perpendicular direction1 which can1 in general1 be advantageous to the assailant2 in that respect it may be so for this reason1 that as he has the longer line of communication1 and1 therefore1 the greater difficulty in the transport of all he requires1 water carriage may relieve him of a great deal of trouble and prove very useful4 ,the defender1 on his side1 certainly has it in his power to close the navigation within his own frontier by fortresses2 still even by that means the advantages which the river affords the assailant will not be lost so far as regards its course up to that frontier4 ,but if we reflect upon the fact that many rivers are often not navigable1 even where they are of no unimportant breadth as respects other military relations1 that others are not navigable at all seasons1 that the ascent against the stream is tedious1 that the winding of a river often doubles its length1 that the chief communications between countries now are high roads1 and that now more than ever the wants of an army are supplied from the country adjacent to the scene of its operations1 and not by carriage from distant parts1--we can well see that the use of a river does not generally play such a prominent part in the subsistence of troops as is usually represented in books1 and that its influence on the march of events is therefore very remote and uncertain4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,a4 ,defence of ,swamps ,very large wide swamps1 such as the ,bourtang ,moor in ,north ,germany1 are so uncommon that it is not worth while to lose time over them2 but we must not forget that certain lowlands and marshy banks of small rivers are more common1 and form very considerable obstacles of ground which may be1 and often have been1 used for defensive purposes4 ,measures for their defence are certainly very like those for the defence of rivers1 at the same time there are some peculiarties to be specially noticed4 ,the first and principal one is1 that a marsh which except on the causeway is impracticable for infantry is much more difficult to cross than any river2 for1 in the first place1 a causeway is not so soon built as a bridge2 secondly1 there are no means at hand by which the troops to cover the construction of the dyke or causeway can be sent across4 ,no one would begin to build a bridge without using some of the boats to send over an advanced guard in the first instance2 but in the case of a morass no similar assistance can be employed2 the easiest way to make a crossing for infantry over a morass is by means of planks1 but when the morass is of some width1 this is a much more tedious process than the crossing of the first boats on a river4 ,if now1 besides1 there is in the middle of the morass a river which cannot be passed without a bridge1 the crossing of the first detachment of troops becomes a still more difficult affair1 for although single passengers may get across on boards1 the heavy material required for bridge building cannot be so transported4 ,this difficulty on many occasions may be insurmountable4 ,a second peculiarity of a swamp is1 that the means used to cross cannot be completely removed like those1 used for passing a river2 bridges may be broken1 or so completely destroyed that they can never be used again2 the most that can be done with dykes is to cut them1 which is not doing much4 ,if there is a river in the middle1 the bridge can of course be taken away1 but the whole passage will not by that means be destroyed in the same degree as that of a large river by the destruction of a bridge4 ,the natural consequence is that dykes which exist must always be occupied in force and strenuously defended if we desire to derive any general advantage from the morass4 ,on the one hand1 therefore1 we are compelled to adopt a local defence1 and on the other1 such a defence is favoured by the difficulty of passing at other parts4 ,from these two peculiarities the result is1 that the defence of a swamp must be more local and passive than that of a river4 ,it follows from this that we must be stronger in a relative degree than in the direct defence of a river1 consequently that the line of defence must not be of great length1 especially in cultivated countries1 where the number of passages1 even under the most favourable circumstances for defence1 is still very great4 ,in this respect1 therefore1 swamps are inferior to great rivers1 and this is a point of great importance1 for all local defence is illusory and dangerous to an extreme4 ,but if we reflect that such swamps and low grounds generally have a breadth with which that of the largest rivers in ,europe bears no comparison1 and that consequently a post stationed for the defence of a passage is never in danger of being overpowered by the fire from the other side1 that the effects of its own fire over a long narrow dyke is greatly increased1 and that the time required to pass such a defile1 perhaps a quarter or half a mile long1 is much longer than would suffice to pass an ordinary bridge3 if we consider all this1 we must admit that such low lands and morasses1 if means of crossing are not too numerous1 belong to the strongest lines of defence which can be formed4 ,an indirect defence1 such as we made ourselves acquainted with in the case of streams and rivers1 in which obstacles of ground are made use of to bring on a great battle under advantageous circumstances1 is generally quite as applicable to morasses4 ,the third method of a river-defence by means of a position on the enemy's side would be too hazardous on account of the toilsome nature of the crossing4 ,it is extremely dangerous to venture on the defence of such morasses1 soft meadows1 bogs1 etc41 as are not quite impassable beyond the dykes4 ,one single line of crossing discovered by the enemy is sufficient to pierce the whole line of defence which1 in case of a serious resistance1 is always attended with great loss to the defender4 ,b4 ,inundations ,now we have still to consider inundations4 ,as defensive means and also as phenomena in the natural world they have unquestionably the nearest resemblance to morasses4 ,they are not common certainly2 perhaps ,holland is the only country in ,europe where they constitute a phenomenon which makes them worth notice in connection with our object2 but just that country1 on account of the remarkable campaigns of #afgb and #aghg1 as well as on account of its important relation in itself to both ,france and ,germany1 obliges us to devote some consideration to this matter4 ,the character of these ,dutch inundations differs from ordinary swampy and impassable wet low lands in the following respects3 #a4 ,the soil itself is dry and consists either of dry meadows or of cultivated fields4 #b4 ,for purposes of irrigation or of drainage1 a number of small ditches of greater or loss depth and breadth intersect the country in such a way that they may be seen running in lines in parallel directions4 #c4 ,larger canals1 inclosed by dykes and intended for irrigation1 drainage1 and transit of vessels1 run through the country in all possible directions and are of such a size that they can only be passed on bridges4 #d4 ,the level of the ground throughout the whole district subject to inundation1 lies perceptibly under the level of the sea1 therefore1 of course1 under that of the canals4 #e4 ,the consequence of this is1 that by means of cutting the dams1 closing and opening the sluices1 the whole country can be laid under water1 so that there are no dry roads except on the tops of the dykes1 all others being either entirely under water or1 at least1 so soaked that they become no longer fit for use4 ,now1 if even the inundation is only three or four feet deep1 so that1 perhaps1 for short distances it might be waded through1 still even that is made impossible on account of the smaller ditches mentioned under ,no4 #b1 which are not visible4 ,it is only where these ditches have a corresponding direction1 so that we can move between two of them without crossing either1 that the inundation does not constitute in effect an absolute bar to all communication4 ,it is easy to conceive that this exception to the general obstruction can only be for short distances1 and1 therefore1 can only be used for tactical purposes of an entirely special character4 ,from all this we deduce #a4 ,that the assailant's means of moving are limited to a more or less small number of practicable lines1 which run along very narrow dykes1 and usually have a wet ditch on the right and left1 consequently form very long defiles4 #b4 ,that every defensive preparation upon such a dam may be easily strengthened to such a degree as to become impregnable4 #c4 ,but that1 because the defensive is so hemmed in1 he must confine himself to the most passive resistance as respects each isolated point1 and consequently must look for his safety entirely from passive resistance4 #d4 ,that in such a country it is not a system of a single defensive line1 closing the country like a simple barrier1 but that as in every direction the same obstacle to movement exists1 and the same security for flanks may be found1 new posts may incessantly be formed1 and in this manner any portion of the first defensive line1 if lost1 may be replaced by a new piece4 ,we may say that the number of combinations here1 like those on a chessboard1 are infinite4 #e4 ,but while this general condition of a country is only conceivable along with the supposition of a high degree of cultivation and a dense population1 it follows of itself that the number of passages1 and therefore the number of posts required or their defence1 must be very great in comparison to other strategetic dispositions2 from which again we have1 as a consequence1 that such a defensive line must not be long4 ,the principal line of defence in ,holland is from ,naarden on the ,zuyder ,zee 7the greater part of the way behind the ,vecht71 to ,gorcum on the ,waal1 that is properly to the ,biesbosch1 its extent being about eight miles4 ,for the defence of this line a force of #be1jjj to #cj1jjj was employed in #afgb1 and again in #aghg4 ,if we could reckon with certainty upon an invincible resistance1 the results would certainly be very great1 at least for the provinces of ,holland lying behind that line4 ,in #afgb the line actually withstood very superior forces led by great generals1 first ,cond1 and afterwards ,luxembourg1 who had under their command #dj1jjj to #ej1jjj men1 and yet would not assault1 preferring to wait for the winter1 which did not prove severe enough4 ,on the other hand1 the resistance which was made on this first line in #aghg amounted to nothing1 and even that which was made by a second line much shorter1 between the ,zuyder ,zee and the lake of ,haarlem1 although somewhat more effective1 was overcome by the ,duke of ,brunswick in one day1 through a very skilful tactical disposition well adapted to the locality1 and this although the ,prussian force actually engaged in the attack was little1 if at all1 superior in numbers to the troops guarding the lines4 ,the different result in the two cases is to be attributed to the difference in the supreme command4 ,in the year #afgb the ,dutch were surprised by ,louis ,,xiv41 while everything was on a peace establishment1 in which1 as is well known1 there breathed very little military spirit as far as concerned land forces4 ,for that reason the greater number of the fortresses were deficient in all articles of material and equipment1 garrisoned only by weak bodies of hired troops1 and defended by governors who were either native-born incapables1 or treacherous foreigners4 ,thus all the ,brandenburg fortresses on the ,rhine1 garrisoned by ,dutch1 as well as all their own places situated to the east of the line of defence above described1 except ,groningen1 very soon fell into the hands of the ,french1 and for the most part without any real defence4 ,and in the conquest of this great number of places consisted the chief exertions of the ,french army1 #aej1jjj strong1 at that time4 ,but when1 after the murder of the brothers ,de ,witt1 in ,august #afgb1 the ,prince of ,orange came to the head of affairs1 bringing unity to the measures for national defence1 there was still time to close the defensive line above-mentioned1 and all the measures then adopted harmonised so well with each other that neither ,cond nor ,luxembourg1 who commanded the ,french armies left in ,holland after the departure of the two armies under ,turenne and ,louis in person1 would venture to attempt anything against the separate posts4 ,in the year #aghg all was different4 ,it was not the ,republic of seven united provinces1 but only the province of ,holland which had to resist the invasion4 ,the conquest of all the fortresses1 which had been the principal object in #afgb1 was therefore not the question2 the defence was confined at once to the line we have described4 ,but the assailant this time1 instead of #aej1jjj men1 had only #be1jjj1 and was no mighty sovereign of a great country adjoining ,holland1 but the subordinate general of a distant prince1 himself by no means independent in many respects4 ,the people in ,holland1 like those everywhere else at that time1 were divided into two parties1 but the republican spirit in ,holland was decidedly predominant1 and had at the same time attained even to a kind of enthusiastic excitement4 ,under these circumstances the resistance in the year #aghg ought to have ensured at least as great results as that of #afgb4 ,but there was one important difference1 which is1 that in the year #aghg unity of command was entirely wanting4 ,what in #afgb had been left to the wise1 skilful1 and energetic guidance of the ,prince of ,orange1 was entrusted to a so called ,defence ,commission in #aghg1 which although it included in its number men of energy1 was not in a position to infuse into its work the requisite unity of measures1 and to inspire others with that confidence which was wanted to prevent the whole instrument from proving imperfect and inefficient in use4 ,we have dwelt for a moment on this example1 in order to give more distinctness to the conception of this defensive measure1 and at the same time to show the difference in the effects produced1 according as more or less unity and sequence prevail in the direction of the whole4 ,although the organisation and method of defence of such a defensive line are tactical subjects1 still1 in connection with the latter1 which is the nearest allied to strategy1 we cannot omit to make an observation to which the campaign of #aghg gives occasion4 ,we think1 namely1 that however passive the defence must naturally be at each point in a line of this kind1 still an offensive action from some one point of the line is not impossible1 and may not be unproductive of good results if the enemy1 as was the case in #aghg1 is not decidedly very superior4 ,for although such an attack must be executed by means of dykes1 and on that account cannot certainly have the advantage of much freedom of movement or of any great impulsive force1 nevertheless1 it is impossible for the offensive side to occupy all the dykes and roads which he does not require for his own purposes1 and therefore the defensive with his better knowledge of the country1 and being in possession of the strong points1 should be able by some of the unoccupied dykes to effect a real flank attack against the columns of the assailant1 or to cut them off from their sources of supply4 ,if now1 on the other hand1 we reflect for a moment on the constrained position in which the assailant is placed1 how much more dependent he is on his communications than in almost any other conceivable case1 we may well imagine that every sally on the part of the defensive side which has the remotest possibility of success must at once as a demonstration be most effective4 ,we doubt very much if the prudent and cautious duke of ,brunswick would have ventured to approach ,amsterdam if the ,dutch had only made such a demonstration1 from ,utrecht for instance4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,defence of ,forests ,above all things we must distinguish thick tangled and impassable forests from extensive woods under a certain degree of culture1 which are partly quite clear1 partly intersected by numerous roads4 ,whenever the object is to form a defensive line1 the latter should be left in rear or avoided as much as possible4 ,the defensive requires more than the assailant to see clearly round him1 partly because1 as a rule1 he is the weaker1 partly because the natural advantages of his position cause him to develop his plans later than the assailant4 ,if he should place a woody district before him he would be fighting like a blind man against one with his eyesight4 ,if he should place himself in the middle of the wood then both would be blind1 but that equality of condition is just what would not answer the natural requirements of the defender4 ,such a wooded country can therefore not be brought into any favourable connection with the defensive except it is kept in rear of the defender's army1 so as to conceal from the enemy all that takes place behind that army1 and at the same time to be available as an assistance to cover and facilitate the retreat4 ,at present we only speak of forests in level country1 for where the decided mountain character enters into combination1 its influence becomes predominant over tactical and strategic measures1 and we have already treated of those subjects elsewhere4 ,but impassable forests1 that is1 such as can only be traversed on certain roads1 afford advantages in an indirect defence similar to those which the defence derives from mountains for bringing on a battle under favourable circumstances2 the army can await the enemy behind the wood in a more or less concentrated position with a view to falling on him the moment he debouches from the road defiles4 ,such a forest resembles mountain in its effects more than a river3 for it affords1 it is true1 only one very long and difficult defile1 but it is in respect to the retreat rather advantageous than otherwise4 ,but a direct defence of forests1 let them be ever so impracticable1 is a very hazardous piece of work for even the thinnest chain of outposts2 for abattis are only imaginary barriers1 and no wood is so completely impassable that it cannot be penetrated in a hundred places by small detachments1 and these1 in their relation to a chain of defensive posts1 may be likened to the first drops of water which ooze through a roof and are soon followed by a general rush of water4 ,much more important is the influence of great forests of every kind in connection with the arming of a nation2 they are undoubtedly the true element for such levies2 if1 therefore1 the strategic plan of defence can be so arranged that the enemy's communications pass through great forests1 then1 by that means1 another mighty lever is brought into use in support of the work of defence4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,the ,cordon ,the term cordon is used to denote every defensive plan which is intended directly to cover a whole district of country by a line of posts in connection with each other4 ,we say directly1 for several corps of a great army posted in line with each other might protect a large district of country from invasion without forming a cordon2 but then this protection would not be direct1 but through the effect of combinations and movements4 ,it is evident at a glance that such a long defensive line as that must be1 which is to cover an extensive district of country directly1 can only have a very small degree of defensive stamina4 ,even when very large bodies of troops occupy the lines this would be the case if they were attacked by corresponding masses4 ,the object of a cordon can therefore only be to resist a weak blow1 whether that the weakness proceeds from a feeble will or the smallness of the force employed4 ,with this view the wall of ,china was built3 a protection against the inroads of ,tartars4 ,this is the intention of all lines and frontier defences of the ,european ,states bordering on ,asia and ,turkey4 ,applied in this way the cordon system is neither absurd nor does it appear unsuitable to its purpose4 ,certainly it is not sufficient to stop all inroads1 but it will make them more difficult and therefore of less frequent occurrence1 and this is a point of considerable importance where relations subsist with people like those of ,asia1 whose passions and habits have a perpetual tendency to war4 ,next to this class of cordons come the lines1 which1 in the wars of modern times have been formed between ,european ,states1 such as the ,french lines on the ,rhine and in the ,netherlands4 ,these were originally formed only with a view to protect a country against inroads made for the purpose of levying contributions or living at the expense of the enemy4 ,they are1 therefore1 only intended to check minor operations1 and consequently it is also meant that they should be defended by small bodies of troops4 ,but1 of course1 in the event of the enemy's principal force taking its direction against these lines1 the defender must also use his principal force in their defence1 an event by no means conducive to the best defensive arrangements4 ,on account of this disadvantage and because the protection against incursions in temporary war is quite a minor object1 by which through the very existence of these lines an excessive expenditure of troops may easily be caused1 their formation is looked upon in our day as a pernicious measure4 ,the more power and energy thrown into the prosecution of the war the more useless and dangerous this means becomes4 ,lastly1 all very extended lines of outposts covering the quarters of an army and intended to offer a certain amount of resistance come under the head of cordons4 ,this defensive measure is chiefly designed as an impediment to raids1 and other such minor expeditions directed against single cantonments1 and for this purpose it may be quite sufficient if favoured by the country4 ,against an advance of the main body of the enemy the opposition offered can be only relative1 that is1 intended to gain time3 but as this gain of time will be but inconsiderable in most cases1 this object may be regarded as a very minor consideration in the establishment of these lines4 ,the assembling and advance of the enemy's army itself can never take place so unobservedly that the defender gets his first information of it through his outposts2 when such is the case he is much to be pitied4 ,consequently1 in this case also1 the cordon is only intended to resist the attack of a weak force1 and the object1 therefore1 in this and in the other two cases is not at variance with the means4 ,but that an army formed for the defence of a country should spread itself out in a long line of defensive posts opposite to the enemy1 that it should disperse itself in a cordon form1 seems to be so absurd that we must seek to discover the circumstances and motives which lead to and accompany such a proceeding4 ,every position in a mountainous country1 even if taken up with the view of a battle with the whole force united1 is and must necessarily be more extended than a position in a level country4 ,it may be because the aid of the ground augments very much the force of the resistance2 it must be because a wider basis of retreat is required1 as we have shown in the chapter on mountain defences4 ,but if there is no near prospect of a battle1 if it is probable that the enemy will remain in his position opposite to us for some time without undertaking anything unless tempted by some very favourable opportunity which may present itself 7the usual state of things in most wars formerly71 then it is also natural not to limit ourselves merely to the occupation of so much country as is absolutely necessary1 but to hold as much right or left as is consistent with the security of the army1 by which we obtain many advantages1 as we shall presently show4 ,in open countries with plenty of communications1 this object may be effected to a greater extent than in mountains1 through the principle of movement1 and for that reason the extension and dispersion of the troops is less necessary in an open country2 it would also be much more dangerous there on account of the inferior capability of resistance of each part4 ,but in mountains where all occupation of ground is more dependent on local defence1 where relief cannot so soon be afforded to a point menaced1 and where1 when once the enemy has got possession of a point1 it is more difficult to dislodge him by a force slightly superior--in mountains1 under these circumstances1 we shall always come to a form of position which1 if not strictly speaking a cordon1 still approaches very near to it1 being a line of defensive posts4 ,from such a disposition1 consisting of several detached posts1 to the cordon system1 there is still certainly a considerable step1 but it is one which generals1 nevertheless1 often take without being aware of it1 being drawn on from one step to another4 ,first1 the covering and the possession of the country is the object of the dispersion2 afterwards it is the security of the army itself4 ,every commander of a post calculates the advantage which may be derived from this or that point connected with the approach to his position on the right or the left1 and thus the whole progresses insensibly from one degree of subdivision to another4 ,a cordon war1 therefore1 carried on by the principal force of an army1 is not to be considered a form of war designedly chosen with a view to stopping every blow which the enemy's forces might attempt1 but a situation which the army is drawn into in the pursuit of a very different object1 namely1 the holding and covering the country against an enemy who has no decisive undertaking in view4 ,such a situation must always be looked upon as a mistake2 and the motives through which generals have been lured by degrees into allowing one small post after another1 are contemptible in connection with the object of a large army2 this point of view shows1 at all events1 the possibility of such a mistake4 ,that it is really an error1 namely1 a mistaken appreciation of our own position1 and that of the enemy is sometimes not observed1 and it is spoken of as an erroneous system4 ,but this same system1 when it is pursued with advantage1 or1 at all events1 without causing damage1 is quietly approved4 ,every one praises the faultless campaigns of ,prince ,henry in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 because they have been pronounced so by the king1 although these campaigns exhibit the most decided and most incomprehensible examples of chains of posts so extended that they may just with as much propriety be called cordons as any that ever were4 ,we may completely justify these positions by saying1 the prince knew his opponent2 he knew that he had no enterprises of a decisive character to apprehend from that quarter1 and as the object of his position besides was to occupy always as much territory as possible1 he therefore carried out that object as far as circumstances in any way permitted4 ,if the prince had once been unfortunate with one of these cobwebs1 and had met with a severe loss1 we should not say that he had pursued a faulty system of warfare1 but that he had been mistaken about a measure and had applied it to a case to which it was not suited4 ,while we thus seek to explain how the cordon system1 as it is called1 may be resorted to by the principal force in a theatre in war1 and how it may even be a judicious and useful measure1 and1 therefore1 far from being an absurdity1 we must1 at the same time1 acknowledge that there appear to have been instances where generals or their staff have overlooked the real meaning or object of a cordon system1 and assumed its relative value to be a general one2 conceiving it to be really suited to afford protection against every kind of attack1 instances1 therefore1 where there was no mistaken application of the measure but a complete misunderstanding of its nature2 we shall further allow that this very absurdity amongst others seems to have taken place in the defence of the ,vosges by the ,austrian and ,prussian armies in #agic and #agid4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,key to the ,country ,there is no theoretical idea in the art of war which has played such a part in criticism as that we are now entering upon4 ,it is the 8great war steed0 in all accounts of battles and campaigns2 the most frequent point of view in all arguments1 and one of those fragments of scientific form with which critics make a show of learning4 ,and yet the conception embodied in it has never yet been established1 nor has it ever been clearly explained4 ,we shall try to ascertain its real meaning1 and then see how far it can be made available for practical use4 ,we treat of it here because the defence of mountains1 river defences1 as well as the conceptions of strong and entrenched camps with which it closely connects itself1 required to have precedence4 ,the indefinite confused conception which is concealed behind this ancient military metaphor has sometimes signified the most exposed part of a country at other times the strongest4 ,if there is any spot without the possession of which no one dare venture to penetrate into an enemy's country that may1 with propriety1 be called the key of that country4 ,but this simple1 though certainly at the same time also1 barren notion has not satisfied theorists1 and they have amplified it1 and under the term key of a country imagined points which decide upon the possession of the whole country4 ,when the ,russians wanted to advance into the ,crimean peninsula1 they were obliged to make themselves masters of the isthmus of ,perekop and its lines1 not so much to gain an entrance generally--for ,lascy turned it twice 7#agcg and #agch7--;but to be able to establish themselves with tolerable security in the ,crimea4 ,that is very simple1 but we gain very little in this through the conception of a key-point4 ,but if it might be said1 ,whoever has possession of the district of ,langres commands all ,france as far as ,paris--that is to say1 it only rests with himself to take possession--that is plainly a very different thing1 something of much higher importance4 ,according to the first kind of conception the possession of the country cannot be thought of without the possession of the point which we have called key2 that is a thing which is intelligible to the most ordinary capacity3 but according to the second kind of conception1 the possession of the point which we have called key1 cannot be imagined without the possession of the country following as a necessary consequence2 that is plainly1 something marvellous1 common sense is no longer sufficient to grasp this1 the magic of the occult sciences must be called into requisition4 ,this cabala came into existence in works published fifty years ago1 and reached its zenith at the end of the last century2 and notwithstanding the irresistible force1 certainty and distinctness with which ,buonaparte's method of conducting war carried conviction generally1 this cabala has1 nevertheless1 still managed1 we say1 to spin out the thread of its tenacious existence through the medium of books4 7,setting aside for a moment our conception of the key-point7 it is self-evident that in every country there are points of commanding importance1 where several roads meet1 where our means of subsistence may be conveniently collected1 which have the advantage of being centrally situated with reference to other important points1 the possession of which in short meets many requirements and affords many advantages4 ,now1 if generals wishing to express the importance of such a point by one word have called it the key of the land1 it would be pedantic affectation to take offence at their using that term2 on the contrary we should rather say the term is very expressive and pleasing4 ,but if we try to convert this mere flower of speech into the germ of a system branching out like a tree into many ramifications1 common sense rises in opposition1 and demands that the expression should be restricted to its true value4 ,in order to develop a system out of the expression1 it was necessary to resort to something more distinct and absolute than the practical1 but certainly very indefinite1 meaning attaching to the term in the narrations of generals when speaking of their military enterprises4 ,and from amongst all its various relations1 that of high ground was chosen4 ,where a road traverses a mountain ridge1 we thank heaven when we get to the top and have only to descend4 ,this feeling so natural to a single traveller is still more so in the case of an army ,all difficulties seem to be overcome1 and so they are indeed in most instances2 we find that the descent is easy1 and we are conscious of a kind of feeling of superiority over any one who would stop us2 we have an extensive view over the country1 and command it with a look beforehand4 ,thus the highest point on a road over a mountain is always considered to possess a decisive importance1 and it does in fact in the majority of cases1 but by no means in all4 ,such points are very often described in the despatches of generals by the name of key-points2 but certainly again in a somewhat different and generally in a more restricted sense4 ,this idea has been the starting point of a false theory 7of which1 perhaps1 ,lloyd may be regarded as the founder72 and on this account1 elevated points from which several roads descend into the adjacent country1 came to be regarded as the keypoints of the country--as points which command the country4 ,it was natural that this view should amalgamate itself with one very nearly connected with it1 that of a systematic defence of mountains1 and that the matter should thus be driven still further into the regions of the illusory2 added to which many tactical elements connected with the defence of mountains came into play1 and thus the idea of the highest point in the road was soon abandoned1 and the highest point generally of the whole mountain system1 that is the point of the watershed1 was substituted for it as the key of the country4 ,now just at that time1 that is the latter half of the preceding century1 more definite ideas on the forms given to the surface of the earth through aqueous action became current2 thus natural science lent a hand to the theory of war by this geological system1 and then every barrier of practical truth was broken through1 and reasoning floated in the illusory system of a geological analogy4 ,in consequence of this1 about the end of the eighteenth century we heard1 or rather we read1 of nothing but the sources of the ,rhine and ,danube4 ,it is true that this nuisance prevailed mostly in books1 for only a small portion of book wisdom ever reaches the real world1 and the more foolish a theory the less it will attain to practice2 but this of which we are now speaking has not been unproductive of injury to ,germany by its practical effects1 therefore we are not fighting with a windmill1 in proof of which we shall quote two examples2 first1 the important but very scientific campaigns of the ,prussian army1 #agic and #agid in the ,vosges1 the theoretical key to which will be found in the works of ,gravert and ,massenbach2 secondly1 the campaign of #ahad1 when1 on the principle of the same theory1 an army of #bjj1jjj men was led by the nose through ,switzerland on to the plateau of ,langres as it is called4 ,but a high point in a country from which all its waters flow1 is generally nothing more than a high point2 and all that in exaggeration and false application of ideas1 true in themselves1 was written at the end of the eighteenth and commencement of the nineteenth centuries1 about its influence on military events1 is completely imaginary4 ,if the ,rhine and ,danube and all the six rivers of ,germany had their common source on the top of one mountain1 that mountain would not on that account have any claim to any greater military value than being suited for the position of a trigonometrical point4 ,for a signal tower it would be less useful1 still less so for a vidette1 and for a whole army worth just nothing at all4 ,to seek for a key-position therefore in the so called key country1 that is where the different branches of the mountains diverge from a common point1 and at the highest source of its waters1 is merely an idea in books1 which is overthrown by nature itself1 because nature does not make the ridges and valleys so easy to descend as is assumed by the hitherto so called theory of ground1 but distributes peaks and gorges1 in the most irregular manner1 and not unfrequently the lowest water level is surrounded by the loftiest masses of mountain4 ,if any one questions military history on the subject1 he will soon convince himself that the leading geological points of a country exercise very little regular influence on the use of the country for the purposes of war1 and that little is so over-balanced by other local circumstances1 and other requirements1 that a line of positions may often run quite close to one of the points we are discussing without having been in any way attracted there by that point4 ,we have only dwelt so long upon this false idea because a whole--and very pretentious--system has built itself upon it4 ,we now leave it1 and turn back to our own views4 ,we say1 then1 that if the expression1 key-position1 is to represent an independent conception in strategy1 it must only be that of a locality the possession of which is indispensable before daring to enter the enemy's country4 ,but if we choose to designate by that term every convenient point of entrance to a country1 or every advantageous central point in the country1 then the term loses its real meaning 7that is1 its value71 and denotes something which may be found anywhere more or less4 ,it then becomes a mere pleasing figure of speech4 ,but positions such as the term conveys to our mind are very rarely indeed to be found4 ,in general1 the best key to the country lies in the enemy's army2 and when the idea of country predominates over that of the armed force1 some very specially advantageous circumstances must prevail4 ,these1 according to our opinion1 may be recognised by their tending to two principal results3 first1 that the force occupying the position1 through the help of the ground1 obtains extraordinary capability of tactical resistance2 second1 that the enemy's lines of communication can be sooner effectively threatened from this position than he can threaten ours4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,operating ,against a ,flank ,we need hardly observe that we speak of the strategic flank1 that is1 a side of the theatre of war1 and that the attack from one side in battle1 or the tactical movement against a flank1 must not be confounded with it2 and even in cases in which the strategic operation against a flank1 in its last stage1 ends in the tactical operation1 they can quite easily be kept separate1 because the one never follows necessarily out of the other4 ,these flanking movements1 and the flanking positions connected with them1 belong also to the mere useless pageantry of theory1 which is seldom met with in actual war4 ,not that the means itself is either ineffectual or illusory1 but because both sides generally seek to guard themselves against its effects2 and cases in which this is impossible are rare4 ,now in these uncommon cases this means has often also proved highly efficacious1 and for this reason1 as well as on account of the constant watching against it which is required in war1 it is important that it should be clearly explained in theory4 ,although the strategic operation against a flank can naturally be imagined1 not only on the part of the defensive1 but also on that of the offensive1 still it has much more affinity with the first1 and therefore finds its place under the head of defensive means4 ,before we enter into the subject1 we must establish the simple principle1 which must never be lost sight of afterwards in the consideration of the subject1 that troops which are to act against the rear or flank of the enemy cannot be employed against his front1 and that1 therefore1 whether it be in tactics or strategy1 it is a completely false kind of notion to consider that coming on the rear of the enemy is at once an advantage in itself4 ,in itself1 it is as yet nothing2 but it will become something in connection with other things1 and something either advantageous or the reverse1 according to the nature of these things1 the examination of which now claims our attention4 ,first1 in the action against the strategic flank1 we must make a distinction between two objects of that measure--between the action merely against the communications1 and that against the line of retreat1 with which1 at the same time1 an effect upon the communications may also be combined4 ,when ,daun1 in #ageh1 sent a detachment to seize the convoys on their way to the siege of ,olmtz1 he had plainly no intention of impeding the king's retreat into ,silesia2 he rather wished to bring about that retreat1 and would willingly have opened the line to him4 ,in the campaign of #ahab1 the object of all the expeditionary corps that were detached from the ,russian army in the months of ,september and ,october1 was only to intercept the communications1 not to stop the retreat2 but the latter was quite plainly the design of the ,moldavian army which1 under ,tschitschagof1 marched against the ,beresina1 as well as of the attack which ,general ,wittgenstein was commissioned to make on the ,french corps stationed on the ,dwina4 ,these examples are merely to make the exposition clearer4 ,the action against the lines of communication is directed against the enemy's convoys1 against small detachments following in rear of the army1 against couriers and travellers1 small depts1 etc42 in fact1 against all the means which the enemy requires to keep his army in a vigorous and healthy condition2 its object is1 therefore1 to weaken the condition of the enemy in this respect1 and by this means to cause him to retreat4 ,the action against the enemy's line of retreat is to cut his army off from that line4 ,it cannot effect this object unless the enemy really determines to retreat2 but it may certainly cause him to do so by threatening his line of retreat1 and1 therefore1 it may have the same effect as the action against the line of communication1 by working as a demonstration4 ,but as already said1 none of these effects are to be expected from the mere turning which has been effected1 from the mere geometrical form given to the disposition of the troops1 they only result from the conditions suitable to the same4 ,in order to learn more distinctly these conditions1 we shall separate completely the two actions against the flank1 and first consider that which is directed against the communications4 ,here we must first establish two principal conditions1 one or other of which must always be forthcoming4 ,the first is1 that the forces used for this action against the flank of the enemy must be so insignificant in numbers that their absence is not observed in front4 ,the second1 that the enemy's army has run its career1 and therefore can neither make use of a fresh victory over our army1 nor can he pursue us if we evade a combat by moving out of the way4 ,this last case1 which is by no means so uncommon as might be supposed1 we shall lay aside for the moment1 and occupy ourselves with the accessory conditions of the first4 ,the first of these is1 that the communications have a certain length1 and cannot be protected by a few good posts2 the second point is1 that the situation of the line is such as exposes it to our action4 ,this weakness of the line may arise in two ways--either by its direction1 if it is not perpendicular to the strategic front of the enemy's army1 or because his lines of communication pass through our territory2 if both these circumstances exist1 the line is so much the more exposed4 ,these two relations require a closer examination4 ,one would think that when it is a question of covering a line of communication forty or fifty miles long1 it is of little consequence whether the position occupied by an army standing at one extremity of this line forms an oblique angle or a right angle in reference to it1 as the breadth of the position is little more than a mere point in comparison to the line2 and yet it is not so unimportant as it may seem4 ,when an army is posted at a right angle with its communications1 it is difficult1 even with a considerable superiority1 to interrupt the communications by any detachments or partisans sent out for the purpose4 ,if we think only of the difficulty of covering absolutely a certain space1 we should not believe this1 but rather suppose1 on the contrary1 that it must be very difficult for an army to protect its rear 7that is1 the country behind it7 against all expeditions which an enemy superior in numbers may undertake4 ,certainly1 if we could look at everything in war as it is on a sheet of paper6 ,then the party covering the line1 in his uncertainty as to the point where light troops or partisans may appear1 would be in a certain measure blind1 and only the partisans would see4 ,but if we think of the uncertainty and insufficiency of intelligence gained in war1 and know that both parties are incessantly groping in the dark1 then we easily perceive that a detached corps sent round the enemy's flank to gain his rear is in the position of a man engaged in a fray with numbers in a dark room4 ,in the end he must fall2 and so must it also be with bands who get round an army occupying a perpendicular position1 and who therefore place themselves near to the enemy1 but widely separated from their own people4 ,not only is there danger of losing numbers in this way2 there is also a risk of the whole instrument itself being blunted immediately2 for the very first misfortune which happens to one such party will make all the others timid1 and instead of bold attacks and insolent dodging1 the only play will be constant running away4 ,through this difficulty1 therefore1 an army occupying a perpendicular position covers the nearest points on its line of communications for a distance of two or three marches1 according to the strength of the army2 but those nearest points are just those which are most in danger1 as they are the nearest to the enemy4 ,on the other hand1 in the case of a decidedly oblique position1 no such part of the line of communication is covered2 the smallest pressure1 the most insignificant attempt on the part of the enemy1 leads at once to a vulnerable point4 ,but now1 what is it which determines the front of a position1 if it is not just the direction perpendicular to the line of communication8 ,the front of the enemy2 but then1 again1 this may be equally as well supposed as dependent on our front4 ,here there is a reciprocal effect1 for the origin of which we must search4 ,illustration3 lines of communication ,if we suppose the lines of communication of the assailant1 a b1 so situated with respect to those of the enemy1 c d1 that the two lines form a considerable angle with each other1 it is evident that if the defensive wishes to take up a position at e1 where the two lines intersect1 the assailant from b1 by the mere geometrical relation1 could compel him to form front opposite to him1 and thus to lay bare his communications4 ,the case would be reversed if the defensive took up his position on this side of the point of junction1 about d2 then the assailant must make front towards him1 if so be that his line of operations1 which closely depends on geographical conditions1 cannot be arbitrarily changed1 and moved1 for instance1 to the direction a d4 ,from this it would seem to follow that the defender has an advantage in this system of reciprocal action1 because he only requires to take a position on this side of the intersection of the two lines4 ,but very far from attaching any importance to this geometrical element1 we only brought it into consideration to make ourselves the better understood2 and we are rather of opinion that local and generally individual relations have much more to do with determining the position of the defender2 that1 therefore1 it is quite impossible to lay down in general which of two belligerents will be obliged soonest to expose his communications4 ,if the lines of communication of both sides lie in one and the same direction1 then whichever of the two parties takes up an oblique position will certainly compel his adversary to do the same4 ,but then there is nothing gained geometrically by this1 and both parties attain the same advantages and disadvantages4 ,in the continuation of our considerations we shall1 therefore1 confine ourselves to the case of the line of communication of one side only being exposed4 ,now as regards the second disadvantageous relation of a line of communication1 that is to say1 when it runs through an enemy's country1 it is clear in itself how much the line is compromised by that circumstance1 if the inhabitants of the country have taken up arms2 and consequently the case must be looked at as if a body of the enemy was posted all along the line2 this body1 it is true1 is in itself weak without solidity or intensive force2 but we must also take into consideration what the close contact and influence of such a hostile force may nevertheless effect through the number of points which offer themselves one after another on long lines of communication4 ,that requires no further explanation4 ,but even if the enemy's subjects have not taken up arms1 and even if there is no militia in the country1 or other military organisation1 indeed if the people are even very unwarlike in spirit1 still the mere relation of the people as subjects to a hostile government is a disadvantage for the lines of communication of the other side which is always felt4 ,the assistance which expeditionary forces and partisans derive merely through a better understanding with the people1 through a knowledge of the country and its inhabitants1 through good information1 through the support of official functionaries1 is1 for them1 of decided value2 and this support every such body will enjoy without any special effort on its own part4 ,added to this1 within a certain distance there will not be wanting fortresses1 rivers1 mountains1 or other places of refuge1 which of ordinary right belong to the enemy1 if they have not been formally taken possession of and occupied by our troops4 ,now in such a case as is here supposed1 especially if attended with other favourable circumstances1 it is possible to act against the communications of an army1 although their direction is perpendicular to the position of that army2 for the detachments employed for the purpose do not then require to fall back always on their own army1 because being in their own country they are safe enough if they only make their escape4 ,we have1 therefore1 now ascertained that-- #a4 ,a considerable length1 #b4 ,an oblique direction1 #c4 ,an enemy's province1 are the principal circumstances under which the lines of communication of an army may be interrupted by a relatively small proportion of armed forces on the side of the enemy2 in order to make this interruption effectual1 a fourth condition is still requisite1 which is a certain duration of time4 ,respecting this point1 we beg attention to what has been said in the fifteenth chapter of the fifth book4 ,but these four conditions are only the chief points which relate to the subject2 a number of local and special circumstances attach themselves to these1 and often attain to an influence more decisive and important than that of the principal ones themselves4 ,selecting only the most essential1 we mention the state of the roads1 the nature of the country through which they pass1 the means of cover which are afforded by rivers1 mountains1 and morasses1 the seasons and weather1 the importance of particular convoys1 such as siege trains1 the number of light troops1 etc41 etc4 ,on all these circumstances1 therefore1 will depend the effect with which a general can act on his opponent's communications2 and by comparing the result of the whole of these circumstances on the one side with the result of the whole on the other1 we obtain a just estimate of the relative advantages of both systems of communication1 on which will depend which of the two generals can play the highest game4 ,what here seems so prolix in the explanation is often decided in the concrete case at first sight2 but still1 the tact of a practised judgment is required for that1 and person must have thought over every one of the cases now developed in order to see in its true light the absurdity of those critical writers who think they have settled something by the mere words 8turning0 and 8acting on a flank10 without giving their reasons4 ,we now come to the second chief condition1 under which the strategic action against the enemy's flank may take place4 ,if the enemy is hindered from advancing by any other cause but the resistance which our army opposes1 let that cause be what it may1 then our army has no reason to be apprehensive about weakening itself by sending out detachments to harass the enemy2 for if the enemy should attempt to chastise us by an attack1 we have only to yield some ground and decline the combat4 ,this is what was done by the chief ,russian army at ,moscow in #ahab4 ,but it is not at all necessary that everything should be again on the same great scale as in that campaign for such a case to happen again4 ,in the first ,silesian war1 ,frederick the ,great was each time in this situation1 on the frontiers of ,bohemia and ,moravia1 and in the complex affairs relating to generals and their armies1 many causes of different kinds1 particularly political ones1 may be imagined1 which make further advance an impossibility4 ,as in the case now supposed more forces may be spared to act against the enemy's flank1 the other conditions need not be quite so favourable3 even the nature of our communications in relation to those of the enemy need not give us the advantage in that respect1 as an enemy who is not in a condition to make any particular use of our further retreat is not likely to use his right to retaliate1 but will rather be anxious about the direct covering of his own line of retreat4 ,such a situation is therefore very well suited to obtain for us1 by means less brilliant and complete but less dangerous than a victory1 those results which it would be too great a risk to seek to obtain by a battle4 ,as in such a case we feel little anxiety about exposing our own line of communications1 by taking up a position on one or other flank1 and as the enemy by that means may always be comspelled to form front obliquely to his line of communications1 therefore this one of the conditions above named will seldom fail to occur4 ,the more the rest of the conditions1 as well as other circumstances1 co-operate1 so much the more certain are we of success from the means now in question2 but the fewer favourable circumstances exist1 the more will all depend on superior skill in combination1 and promptitude and precision in the execution4 ,here is the proper field for strategic manuvres1 such as are to be found so frequently in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 in ,silesia and ,saxony1 and in the campaigns of #agfj and #agfb4 ,if1 in many wars in which only a moderate amount of elementary force is displayed1 such strategic manuvring very often appears1 this is not because the commander on each occasion found himself at the end of his career1 but because want of resolution and courage1 and of an enterprising spirit1 and dread of responsibility1 have often supplied the place of real impediments2 for a case in point1 we have only to call to mind ,field ,marshal ,daun4 ,as a summary of the results of our considerations1 we may say1 that the action against a flank is most effectual-- #a4 ,in the defensive2 #b4 ,towards the end of a campaign2 #c4 ,above all1 in a retreat into the heart of the country2 and #d4 ,in connection with a general arming of the people4 ,on the mode of executing this action against the communications1 we have only a few words to say4 ,the enterprises must be conducted by skilful detachment leaders1 who1 at the head of small bodies1 by bold marches and attacks1 fall upon the enemy's weak garrisons1 convoys1 and small detachments on the march here and there1 encourage the national levies 7landsturm71 and sometimes join with them in particular undertakings4 ,these parties must be more numerous than strong individually1 and so organised that it may be possible to unite several of them for any greater undertaking without any obstacle from the vanity or caprice of any of the single leaders4 ,we have now to speak of the action against the enemy's line of retreat4 ,here we must keep in view1 above all things1 the principle with which we commenced1 that forces destined to operate in rear cannot be used in front2 that1 therefore1 the action against the rear or flanks is not an increase of force in itself2 it is only to be regarded as a more powerful application 7or employment7 of the same2 increasing the degree of success in prospect1 but also increasing the degree of risk4 ,every opposition offered with the sword which is not of a direct and simple nature1 has a tendency to raise the result at the cost of its certainty4 ,an operation against the enemy's flank1 whether with one compact force1 or with separate bodies converging from several quarters1 belongs to this category4 ,but now1 if cutting off the enemy's retreat is not to be a mere demonstration1 but is seriously intended1 the real solution is a decisive battle1 or1 at least1 the conjunction of all the conditions for the same2 and just in this solution we find again the two elements above-mentioned--the greater result and the greater danger4 ,therefore1 if a general is to stand justified in adopting this method of action1 his reasons must be favourable conditions4 ,in this method of resistance we must distinguish the two forms already mentioned4 ,the first is1 if a general with his whole force intends to attack the enemy in rear1 either from a position taken up on the flank for that purpose1 or by a formal turning movement2 the second is1 if he divides his forces1 and1 by an enveloping position with one part1 threatens the enemy's rear1 with the other part his front4 ,the result is intensified in both cases alike1 that is--either there is a real interception of the retreat1 and consequently the enemy's army taken prisoners1 or the greater part scattered1 or there may be a long and hasty retreat of the enemy's force to escape the danger4 ,but the intensified risk is different in the two cases4 ,if we turn the enemy with our whole force1 the danger lies in the laying open our own rear2 and hence the question again depends on the relation of the mutual lines of retreat1 just as in the action against the lines of communication1 it depended on the relation of those lines4 ,now certainly the defender1 if he is in his own country1 is less restricted than the assailant1 both as to his lines of retreat and communication1 and in so far is therefore in a better position to turn his adversary strategically2 but this general relation is not of a sufficiently decisive character to be used as the foundation of a practical method2 therefore1 nothing but the whole of the relations in each individual case can decide4 ,only so much we may add1 that favourable conditions are naturally more common in wide spheres of action than in small2 more common1 also1 on the side of independent states than on that of weak ones1 dependent on foreign aid1 and whose armies must1 therefore1 constantly have their attention bent on the point of junction with the auxiliary army2 lastly1 they become most favorable for the defender towards the close of the campaign1 when the impulsive force of the assailant is somewhat spent2 very much1 again1 in the same manner as in the case of the lines of communication4 ,such a flank position as the ,russians took up with such advantage on the road from ,moscow to ,kaluga1 when ,buonaparte's aggressive force was spent1 would have brought them into a scrape at the commencement of the campaign at the camp of ,drissa1 if they had not been wise enough to change their plan in good time4 ,the other method of turning the enemy1 and cutting off his retreat by dividing our force1 entails the risk attending a division of our own force1 whilst the enemy1 having the advantage of interior lines1 retains his forces united1 and therefore has the power of acting with superior numbers against one of our divisions4 ,this is a disadvantage which nothing can remove1 and in exposing ourselves to it1 we can only be justified by one of three principal reasons3-- #a4 ,the original division of the force which makes such a method of action necessary1 unless we incur a great loss of time4 #b4 ,a great moral and physical superiority1 which justifies the adoption of a decisive method4 #c4 ,the want of impulsive force in the enemy as soon as he has arrived at the culminating point of his career4 ,when ,frederick the ,great invaded ,bohemia1 #ageg1 on converging lines1 he had not in view to combine an attack in front with one on the strategic rear1 at all events1 this was by no means his principal object1 as we shall more fully explain elsewhere1 but in any case it is evident that there never could have been any question of a concentration of forces in ,silesia or ,saxony before the invasion1 as he would thereby have sacrificed all the advantages of a surprise4 ,when the allies formed their plan for the second part of the campaign of #ahac1 looking to their great superiority in numbers1 they might very well at that time entertain the idea of attacking ,buonaparte's right on the ,elbe with their main force1 and of thus shifting the theatre of war from the ,oder to the ,elbe4 ,their ill-success at ,dresden is to be ascribed not to this general plan but to their faulty dispositions both strategic and tactical4 ,they could have concentrated #bbj1jjj men at ,dresden against ,buonaparte's #acj1jjj1 a proportion of numbers eminently favourable 7at ,leipsic1 at least1 the proportion was as #bhe 3 #aeg74 ,it is true that ,buonaparte had distributed his forces too evenly for the particular system of a defence upon one line 7in ,silesia #gj1jjj against #ij1jjj1 in the ,mark--,brandenburg--#gj1jjj against #aaj1jjj71 but at all events it would have been difficult for him1 without completely abandoning ,silesia1 to assemble on the ,elbe a force which could have contended with the principal army of the allies in a decisive battle4 ,the allies could also have easily called up the army of ,wrede to the ,maine1 and employed it to try to cut ,buonaparte off from the road to ,mayence4 ,lastly1 in #ahab1 the ,russians might have directed their army of ,moldavia upon ,volhynia and ,lithuania in order to move it forward afterwards against the rear of the principal ,french army1 because it was quite certain that ,moscow must be the extreme point of the ,french line of operations4 ,for any part of ,russia beyond ,moscow there was nothing to fear in that campaign1 therefore the ,russian main army had no cause to consider itself too weak4 ,this same scheme formed part of the disposition of the forces laid down in the first defensive plan proposed by ,general ,phul1 according to which the army of ,barclay was to occupy the camp at ,drissa1 whilst that under ,bragathion was to press forward against the rear of the main ,french army4 ,but what a difference of circumstances in the two cases6 ,in the first of them the ,french were three times as strong as the ,russians2 in the second1 the ,russians were decidedly superior4 ,in the first1 ,buonaparte's great army had in it an impulsive force which carried it to ,moscow #hj miles beyond ,drissa3 in the second1 it is unfit to make a day's march beyond ,moscow2 in the first1 the line of retreat on the ,niemen did not exceed #cj miles3 in the second it was #aab4 ,the same action against the enemy's retreat therefore1 which was so successful in the second case1 would1 in the first1 have been the wildest folly4 ,as the action against the enemy's line of retreat1 if it is more than a demonstration1 becomes a formal attack from the rear1 there remains therefore still a good deal to be said on the subject1 but it will come in more appropriately in the book upon the attack2 we shall therefore break off here and content ourselves with having given the conditions under which this kind of reaction may take place4 ,very commonly the design of causing the enemy to retreat by menacing his line of retreat1 is understood to imply rather a mere demonstration than the actual execution of the threat4 ,if it was necessary that every efficacious demonstration should be founded on the actual practicability of real action1 which seems a matter of course at first sight1 then it would accord with the same in all respects4 ,but this is not the case3 on the contrary1 in the chapter on demonstrations we shall see that they are connected with conditions somewhat different1 at all events in some respects1 we therefore refer our readers to that chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,retreat into the ,interior of the ,country ,we have considered the voluntary retreat into the heart of the country as a particular indirect form of defence through which it is expected the enemy will be destroyed1 not so much by the sword as by exhaustion from his own efforts4 ,in this case1 therefore1 a great battle is either not supposed1 or it is assumed to take place when the enemy's forces are considerably reduced4 ,every assailant in advancing diminishes his military strength by the advance2 we shall consider this more in detail in the seventh book2 here we must assume that result which we may the more readily do as it is clearly shown by military history in every campaign in which there has been a considerable advance4 ,this loss in the advance is increased if the enemy has not been beaten1 but withdraws of his own accord with his forces intact1 and offering a steady continuous resistance1 sells every step of ground at a bloody price1 so that the advance is a continuous combat for ground and not a mere pursuit4 ,on the other hand1 the losses which a party on the defensive suffers on a retreat1 are much greater if his retreat has been preceded by a defeat in battle than if his retreat is voluntary4 ,for if he is able to offer the pursuer the daily resistance which we expect on a voluntary retreat1 his losses would be at least the same in that way1 over and above which those sustained in the battle have still to be added4 ,but how contrary to the nature of the thing such a supposition as this would be6 ,the best army in the world if obliged to retire far into the country after the loss of a battle1 will suffer losses on the retreat1 beyond measure out of proportion2 and if the enemy is considerably superior1 as we suppose him1 in the case of which we are now speaking1 if he pursues with great energy as has almost always been done in modern wars1 then there is the highest probability that a regular flight takes place by which the army is usually completely ruined4 ,a regularly measured daily resistance1 that is1 one which each time only lasts as long as the balance of success in the combat can be kept wavering1 and in which we secure ourselves from defeat by giving up the ground which has been contested at the right moment1 will cost the assailant at least as many men as the defender in these combats1 for the loss which the latter by retiring now and again must unavoidably suffer in prisoners1 will be balanced by the losses of the other under fire1 as the assailant must always fight against the advantages of the ground4 ,it is true that the retreating side loses entirely all those men who are badly wounded1 but the assailant likewise loses all his in the same case for the present1 as they usually remain several months in the hospitals4 ,the result will be that the two armies will wear each other away in nearly equal proportions in these perpetual collisions4 ,it is quite different in the pursuit of a beaten army4 ,here the troops lost in battle1 the general disorganisation1 the broken courage1 the anxiety about the retreat1 make such a resistance on the part of the retreating army very difficult1 in many cases impossible2 and the pursuer who1 in the former case1 advances extremely cautiously1 even hesitatingly1 like a blind man1 always groping about1 presses forward in the latter case with the firm tread of the conqueror1 with the overweening spirit which good fortune imparts1 with the confidence of a demigod1 and the more daringly he urges the pursuit so much the more he hastens on things in the direction which they have already taken1 because here is the true field for the moral forces which intensify and multiply themselves without being restricted to the rigid numbers and measures of the physical world4 ,it is therefore very plain how different will be the relations of two armies according as it is by the first or the second of the above ways1 that they arrive at that point which may be regarded as the end of the assailant's course4 ,this is merely the result of the mutual destruction2 to this must now be added the reductions which the advancing party suffers otherwise in addition1 and respecting which1 as already said1 we refer to the seventh book2 further1 on the other hand1 we have to take into account reinforcements which the retreating party receives in the great majority of cases1 by forces subsequently joining him either in the form of help from abroad or through persistent efforts at home4 ,lastly1 there is1 in the means of subsistence1 such a disproportion between the retreating side and the advancing1 that the first not uncommonly lives in superfluity when the other is reduced to want4 ,the army in retreat has the means of collecting provisions everywhere1 and he marches towards them1 whilst the pursuer must have everything brought after him1 which1 as long as he is in motion1 even with the shortest lines of communication1 is difficult1 and on that account begets scarcity from the very first4 ,all that the country yields will be taken for the benefit of the retreating army first1 and will be mostly consumed4 ,nothing remains but wasted villages and towns1 fields from which the crops have been gathered1 or which are trampled down1 empty wells1 and muddy brooks4 ,the pursuing army1 therefore1 from the very first day1 has frequently to contend with the most pressing wants4 ,on taking the enemy's supplies he cannot reckon2 it is only through accident1 or some unpardonable blunder on the part of the enemy1 that here and there some little falls into his hands4 ,thus there can be no doubt that in countries of vast dimensions1 and when there is no extraordinary disproportion between the belligerent powers1 a relation may be produced in this way between the military forces1 which holds out to the defensive an immeasurably greater chance of a final result in his favour than he would have had if there had been a great battle on the frontier4 ,not only does the probability of gaining a victory become greater through this alteration in the proportions of the contending armies1 but the prospects of great results from the victory are increased as well1 through the change of position4 ,what a difference between a battle lost close to the frontier of our country and one in the middle of the enemy's country6 ,indeed1 the situation of the assailant is often such at the end of his first start1 that even a battle gained may force him to retreat1 because he has neither enough impulsive power left to complete and make use of a victory1 nor is he in a condition to replace the forces he has lost4 ,there is1 therefore1 an immense difference between a decisive blow at the commencement and at the end of the attack4 ,to the great advantage of this mode of defence are opposed two drawbacks4 ,the first is the loss which the country suffers through the presence of the enemy in his advance1 the other is the moral impression4 ,to protect the country from loss can certainly never be looked upon as the object of the whole defence4 ,that object is an advantageous peace4 ,to obtain that as surely as possible is the endeavour1 and for it no momentary sacrifice must he considered too great4 ,at the same time1 the above loss1 although it may not be decisive1 must still be laid in the balance1 for it always affects our interests4 ,this loss does not affect our army directly2 it only acts upon it in a more or less roundabout way1 whilst the retreat itself directly reinforces our army4 ,it is1 therefore1 difficult to draw a comparison between the advantage and disadvantage in this case2 they are things of a different kind1 the action of which is not directed towards any common point4 ,we must1 therefore1 content ourselves with saying that the loss is greater when we have to sacrifice fruitful provinces well populated1 and large commercial towns2 but it arrives at a maximum when at the same time we lose war-means either ready for use or in course of preparation4 ,the second counterpoise is the moral impression4 ,there are cases in which the commander must be above regarding such a thing1 in which he must quietly follow out his plans1 and run the risk of the objections which short-sighted despondency may offer2 but nevertheless1 this impression is no phantom which should be despised4 ,it is not like a force which acts upon one point3 but like a force which1 with the speed of lightning1 penetrates every fibre1 and paralyses all the powers which should be in full activity1 both in a nation and in its army4 ,there are indeed cases in which the cause of the retreat into the interior of the country is quickly understood by both nation and army1 and trust1 as well as hope1 are elevated by the step2 but such cases are rare4 ,more usually1 the people and the army cannot distinguish whether it is a voluntary movement or a precipitate retreat1 and still less whether the plan is one wisely adopted1 with a view to ensure ulterior advantages1 or the result of fear of the enemy's sword4 ,the people have a mingled feeling of sympathy and dissatisfaction at seeing the fate of the provinces sacrificed2 the army easily loses confidence in its leaders1 or even in itself1 and the constant combats of the rear-guard during the retreat1 tend always to give new strength to its fears4 ,these are consequences of the retreat about which we must never deceive ourselves4 ,and it certainly is--considered in itself--more natural1 simpler1 nobler1 and more in accordance with the moral existence of a nation1 to enter the lists at once1 that the enemy may out cross the frontiers of its people without being opposed by its genius1 and being called to a bloody account4 ,these are the advantages and disadvantages of this kind of defence2 now a few words on its conditions and the circumstances which are in its favour4 ,a country of great extent1 or at all events1 a long line of retreat1 is the first and fundamental condition2 for an advance of a few marches will naturally not weaken the enemy seriously4 ,buonaparte's centre1 in the year #ahab1 at ,witepsk1 was #bej1jjj strong1 at ,smolensk1 #ahb1jjj1 at ,borodino it had only diminished to #acj1jjj1 that is to say1 had fallen to about an equality with the ,russian centre4 ,borodino is ninety miles from the frontier2 but it was not until they came near ,moscow that the ,russians reached that decided superiority in numbers1 which of itself reversed the situation of the combatants so assuredly1 that the ,french victory at ,malo ,jaroslewetz could not essentially alter it again4 ,no other ,european state has the dimensions of ,russia1 and in very few can a line of retreat #ajj miles long be imagined4 ,but neither will a power such as that of the ,french in #ahab1 easily appear under different circumstances1 still less such a superiority in numbers as existed at the commencement of the campaign1 when the ,french army had more than double the numbers of its adversary1 besides its undoubted moral superiority4 ,therefore1 what was here only effected at the end of #ajj miles1 may perhaps1 in other cases1 be attained at the end of #ej or #cj miles4 ,the circumstances which favour this mode of defence are-- #a4 ,a country only little cultivated4 #b4 ,a loyal and warlike people4 #c4 ,an inclement season4 ,all these things increase the difficulty of maintaining an army1 render great convoys necessary1 many detachments1 harassing duties1 cause the spread of sickness1 and make operations against the flanks easier for the defender4 ,lastly1 we have yet to speak of the absolute mass alone of the armed force1 as influencing the result4 ,it lies in the nature of the thing itself that1 irrespective of the mutual relation of the forces opposed to each other1 a small force is sooner exhausted than a larger1 and1 therefore1 that its career cannot be so long1 nor its theatre of war so wide4 ,there is1 therefore1 to a certain extent1 a constant relation between the absolute size of an army and the space which that army can occupy4 ,it is out of the question to try to express this relation by any figures1 and besides1 it will always be modified by other circumstances2 it is sufficient for our purpose to say that these things necessarily have this relation from their very nature4 ,we may be able to march upon ,moscow with #ejj1jjj but not with #ej1jjj1 even if the relation of the invader's army to that of the defender in point of numbers were much more favourable in the latter case4 ,now if we assume that there is this relation of absolute power to space in two different cases1 then it is certain that the effect of our retreat into the interior in weakening the enemy will increase with the masses4 #a4 ,subsistence and lodging of the troops become more difficult--for1 supposing the space which an army covers to increase in proportion to the size of the army1 still the subsistence for the army will never be obtainable from this space alone1 and everything which has to be brought after an army is subject to greater loss also2 the whole space occupied is never used for covering for the troops1 only a small part of it is required1 and this does not increase in the same proportion as the masses4 #b4 ,the advance is in the same manner more tedious in proportion as the masses increase1 consequently1 the time is longer before the career of aggression is run out1 and the sum total of the daily losses is greater4 ,three thousand men driving two thousand before them in an ordinary country1 will not allow them to march at the rate of #a1 #b1 or at most #c miles a day1 and from time to time to make a few days' halt4 ,to come up with them1 to attack them1 and force them to make a further retreat is the work of a few hours2 but if we multiply these masses by #ajj1 the case is altered4 ,operations for which a few hours sufficed in the first case1 require now a whole day1 perhaps two4 ,the contending forces cannot remain together near one point2 thereby1 therefore1 the diversity of movements and combinations increases1 and1 consequently1 also the time required4 ,but this places the assailant at a disadvantage1 because his difficulty with subsistence being greater1 he is obliged to extend his force more than the pursued1 and1 therefore1 is always in danger of being overpowered by the latter at some particular point1 as the ,russians tried to do at ,witepsk4 #c4 ,the greater the masses are1 the more severe are the exertions demanded from each individual for the daily duties required strategically and tactically4 ,a hundred thousand men who have to march to and from the point of assembly every day1 halted at one time1 and then set in movement again1 now called to arms1 then cooking or receiving their rations--a hundred thousand who must not go into their bivouac until the necessary reports are delivered in from all quarters--these men1 as a rule1 require for all these exertions connected with the actual march1 twice as much time as #ej1jjj would require1 but there are only twenty-four hours in the day for both4 ,how much the time and fatigue of the march itself differs according to the size of the body of troops to be moved1 has been shown in the ninth chapter of the preceding book4 ,now1 the retreating army1 it is true1 partakes of these fatigues as well as the advancing1 but they are much greater for the latter3-- #a4 because the mass of his troops is greater on account of the superiority which we supposed1 #b4 because the defender1 by being always the party to yield ground1 purchases by this sacrifice the right of the initiative1 and1 therefore1 the right always to give the law to the other4 ,he forms his plan beforehand1 which1 in most cases1 he can carry out unaltered1 but the aggressor1 on the other hand1 can only make his plans conformably to those of his adversary1 which he must in the first instance find out4 ,we must1 however1 remind our readers that we are speaking of the pursuit of an enemy who has not suffered a defeat1 who has not even lost a battle4 ,it is necessary to mention this1 in order that we may not be supposed to contradict what was said in the twelfth chapter of our fourth book4 ,but this privilege of giving the law to the enemy makes a difference in saving of time1 expenditure of force1 as well as in respect of other minor advantages which1 in the long run1 becomes very important4 #c4 because the retreating force on the one hand does all he can to make his own retreat easy1 repairs roads1 and bridges1 chooses the most convenient places for encampment1 etc41 and1 on the other hand again1 does all he can to throw impediments in the way of the pursuer1 as he destroys bridges1 by the mere act of marching makes bad roads worse1 deprives the enemy of good places for encampment by occupying them himself1 etc4 ,lastly1 we must add still1 as a specially favourable circumstance1 the war made by the people4 ,this does not require further examination here1 as we shall allot a chapter to the subject itself4 ,hitherto1 we have been engaged upon the advantages which such a retreat ensures1 the sacrifices which it requires1 and the conditions which must exist2 we shall now say something of the mode of executing it4 ,the first question which we have to propose to ourselves is with reference to the direction of the retreat4 ,it should be made into the interior of the country1 therefore1 if possible1 towards a point where the enemy will be surrounded on all sides by our provinces2 there he will be exposed to their influence1 and we shall not be in danger of being separated from the principal mass of our territory1 which might happen if we chose a line too near the frontier1 as would have happened to the ,russians in #ahab if they had retreated to the south instead of the east4 ,this is the condition which lies in the object of the measure itself4 ,which point in the country is the best1 how far the choice of that point will accord with the design of covering the capital or any other important point directly1 or drawing the enemy away from the direction of such important places depends on circumstances4 ,if the ,russians had well considered their retreat in #ahab beforehand1 and1 therefore1 made it completely in conformity with a regular plan1 they might easily1 from ,smolensk1 have taken the road to ,kaluga1 which they only took on leaving ,moscow2 it is very possible that under these circumstances ,moscow would have been entirely saved4 ,that is to say1 the ,french were about #acj1jjj strong at ,borodino1 and there is no ground for assuming that they would have been any stronger if this battle had been fought by the ,russians half way to ,kaluga instead2 now1 how many of these men could they have spared to detach to ,moscow8 ,plainly1 very few2 but it is not with a few troops that an expedition can be sent a distance of fifty miles 7the distance from ,smolensk to ,moscow7 against such a place as ,moscow4 ,supposing ,buonaparte when at ,smolensk1 where he was #afj1jjj strong1 had thought he could venture to detach against ,moscow before engaging in a great battle1 and had used #dj1jjj men for that purpose1 leaving #abj1jjj opposite the principal ,russian army1 in that case1 these #abj1jjj men would not have been more than #ij1jjj in the battle1 that is #dj1jjj less than the number which fought at ,borodino2 the ,russians1 therefore1 would have had a superiority in numbers of #cj1jjj men4 ,taking the course of the battle of ,borodino as a standard1 we may very well assume that with such a superiority they would have been victorious4 ,at all events1 the relative situation of the parties would have been more favourable for the ,russians than it was at ,borodino4 ,but the retreat of the ,russians was not the result of a well-matured plan2 they retreated as far as they did because each time that they were on the point of giving battle they did not consider themselves strong enough yet for a great action2 all their supplies and reinforcements were on the road from ,moscow to ,smolensk1 and it could not enter the head of anyone at ,smolensk to leave that road4 ,but1 besides1 a victory between ,smolensk and ,kaluga would never have excused1 in the eyes of the ,russians1 the offence of having left ,moscow uncovered1 and exposed it to the possibility of being captured4 ,buonaparte1 in #ahac1 would have secured ,paris with more certainty from an attack if he had taken up a position at some distance in a lateral direction1 somewhere behind the canal of ,burgundy1 leaving only with the large force of ,national ,guard in ,paris a few thousand regular troops4 ,the allies would never have had the courage to march a corps of #ej1jjj or #fj1jjj against ,paris whilst ,buonaparte was in the field at ,auxerre with #ajj1jjj men4 ,if the case is supposed reversed1 and the allies in ,buonaparte's place1 then no one1 indeed1 would have advised them to leave the road open to their own capital with ,buonaparte for their opponent4 ,with such a preponderance he would not have hesitated a moment about marching on the capital4 ,so different is the effect under the same circumstances but under different moral relations4 ,as we shall have hereafter to return to this subject when treating of the plan of a war1 we shall only at present add that1 when such a lateral position is taken1 the capital or place which it is the object to protect1 must1 in every case1 be capable of making some resistance that it may not be occupied and laid under contribution by every flying column or irregular band4 ,but we have still to consider another peculiarity in the direction of such a line of retreat1 that is1 a sudden change of direction4 ,after the ,russians had kept the same direction as far as ,moscow they left that direction which would have taken them to ,wladimir1 and after first taking the road to ,riazan for some distance1 they then transferred their army to the ,kaluga road4 ,if they had been obliged to continue their retreat they could easily have done so in this new direction which would have led them to ,kiew1 therefore much nearer again to the enemy's frontier4 ,that the ,french1 even if they had still preserved a large numerical superiority over the ,russians1 could not have maintained their line of communication by ,moscow under such circumstances is clear in itself2 they must have given up not only ,moscow but1 in all probability1 ,smolensk also1 therefore have again abandoned the conquests obtained with so much toil1 and contented themselves with a theatre of war on this side the ,beresina4 ,now1 certainly1 the ,russian army would thus have got into the same difficulty to which it would have exposed itself by taking the direction of ,kiew at first1 namely1 that of being separated from the mass of its own territory2 but this disadvantage would now have become almost insignificant1 for how different would have been the condition of the ,french army if it had marched straight upon ,kiew without making the detour by ,moscow4 ,it is evident that such a sudden change of direction of a line of retreat1 which is very practicable in a spacious country1 ensures remarkable advantages4 #a4 ,it makes it impossible for the enemy 7the advancing force7 to maintain his old line of communication3 but the organisation of a new one is always a difficult matter1 in addition to which the change is made gradually1 therefore1 probably1 he has to try more than one new line4 #b4 ,if both parties in this manner approach the frontier again2 the position of the aggressor no longer covers his conquests1 and he must in all probability give them up4 ,russia with its enormous dimensions1 is a country in which two armies might in this manner regularly play at prisoners' base 7,zeck jagen74 ,but such a change of the line of retreat is also possible in smaller countries1 when other circumstances are favourable1 which can only be judged of in each individual case1 according to its different relations4 ,when the direction in which the enemy is to be drawn into the country is once fixed upon1 then it follows of itself that our principal army should take that direction1 for otherwise the enemy would not advance in that direction1 and if he even did we should not then be able to impose upon him all the conditions above supposed4 ,the question then only remains whether we shall take this direction with our forces undivided1 or whether considerable portions should spread out laterally and therefore give the retreat a divergent 7eccentric7 form4 ,to this we answer that this latter form in itself is to be rejected4 #a4 ,because it divides our forces1 whilst their concentration on one point is just one of the chief difficulties for the enemy4 #b4 ,because the enemy gets the advantage of operating on interior lines1 can remain more concentrated than we are1 consequently can appear in so much the greater force at any one point4 ,now certainly this superiority is less to be dreaded when we are following a system of constantly giving way2 but the very condition of this constantly yielding1 is always to continue formidable to the enemy and not to allow him to beat us in detail1 which might easily happen4 ,a further object of such a retreat1 is to bring our principal force by degrees to a superiority of numbers1 and with this superiority to give a decisive blow1 but that by a partition of forces would become an uncertainty4 #c4 ,because as a general rule the concentric 7convergent7 action against the enemy is not adapted to the weaker forces4 #d4 ,because many disadvantages of the weak points of the aggression disappear when the defender's army is divided into separate parts4 ,the weakest features in a long advance on the part of the aggressor are for instance2--the length of the lines of communication1 and the exposure of the strategic flanks4 ,by the divergent form of retreat1 the aggressor is compelled to cause a portion of his force to show a front to the flank1 and this portion properly destined only to neutralise our force immediately in his front1 now effects to a certain extent something else in addition1 by covering a portion of the lines of communication4 ,for the mere strategic effect of the retreat1 the divergent form is therefore not favourable2 but if it is to prepare an action hereafter against the enemy's line of retreat1 then we must refer to what has been said about that in the last chapter4 ,there is only one object which can give occasion to a divergent retreat1 that is when we can by that means protect provinces which otherwise the enemy would occupy4 ,what sections of territory the advancing foe will occupy right and left of his course1 can with tolerable accuracy be discerned by the point of assembly of1 and directions given to1 his forces1 by the situation of his own provinces1 fortresses1 etc41 in respect to our own4 ,to place troops in those districts of territory which he will in all probability leave unoccupied1 would be dangerous waste of our forces4 ,but now whether by any disposition of our forces we shall be able to hinder him from occupying those districts which in all probability he will desire to occupy1 is more difficult to decide1 and it is therefore a point1 the solution of which depends much on tact of judgment4 ,when the ,russians retreated in #ahab1 they left #cj1jjj men under ,tormassow in ,volhynia1 to oppose the ,austrian force which was expected to invade that province4 ,the size of the province1 the numerous obstacles of ground which the country presents1 the near proportion between the forces likely to come into conflict justified the ,russians in their expectations1 that they would be able to keep the upper hand in that quarter1 or at least to maintain themselves near to their frontier4 ,by this1 very important advantages might have resulted in the sequel1 which we shall not stop here to discuss2 besides this1 it was almost impossible for these troops to have joined the main army in time if they had wished4 ,for these reasons1 the determination to leave these troops in ,volhynia to carry on there a distinct war of their own1 was right4 ,now on the other hand1 if according to the proposed plan of campaign submitted by ,general ,phul1 only the army of ,barclay 7#hj1jjj men71 was to retire to ,drissa1 and ,bragathion's army 7#dj1jjj men7 was to remain on the right flank of the ,french1 with a view to subsequently falling on their rear1 it is evident at once that this corps could not possibly maintain itself in ,south ,lithuania so near to the rear of the main body of the ,french army1 and would soon have been destroyed by their overwhelming masses4 ,that the defender's interest in itself is to give up as few provinces as possible to the assailant is intelligible enough1 but this is always a secondary consideration2 that the attack is also made more difficult the smaller or rather narrower the theatre of war is to which we can confine the enemy1 is likewise clear in itself2 but all this is subordinate to the condition that in so doing we have the probability of a result in our favour1 and that the main body of the force on the defensive will not be too much weakened2 for upon that force we must chiefly depend for the final solution1 because the difficulties and distress suffered by the main body of the enemy1 first call forth his determination to retreat1 and increase in the greatest degree the loss of physical and moral power therewith connected4 ,the retreat into the interior of the country should therefore as a rule be made directly before the enemy1 and as slowly as possible1 with an army which has not suffered defeat and is undivided2 and by its incessant resistance it should force the enemy to a constant state of readiness for battle1 and to a ruinous expenditure of forces in tactical and strategical measures of precaution4 ,when both sides have in this manner reached the end of the aggressor's first start1 the defender should then dispose his army in a position1 if such can be found1 forming an oblique angle with the route of his opponent1 and operate against the enemy's rear with all the means at his command4 ,the campaign of #ahab in ,russia shows all these measures on a great scale1 and their effects1 as it were1 in a magnifying glass4 ,although it was not a voluntary retreat1 we may easily consider it from that point of view4 ,if the ,russians with the experience they now have of the results to be thus produced1 had to undertake the defence of their country over again1 exactly under the same circumstances1 they would do voluntarily and systematically what in great part was done without a definite plan in #ahab2 but it would be a great mistake to suppose that there neither is nor can be any instance elsewhere of the same mode of action where the dimensions of the ,russian empire are wanting4 ,whenever a strategic attack1 without coming to the issue of a battle1 is wrecked merely on the difficulties encountered1 and the aggressor is compelled to make a more or less disastrous retreat1 there the chief conditions and principal effects of this mode of defence will be found to have taken place1 whatever may be the modifying circumstances otherwise with which it is accompanied4 ,frederick the ,great's campaign of #agdb in ,moravia1 of #agdd in ,bohemia1 the ,french campaign of #agdc in ,austria and ,bohemia1 the ,duke of ,brunswick's campaign of #agib in ,france1 ,massena's winter campaign of #ahaj--aa in ,portugal1 are all cases in which this is exemplified1 although in smaller proportions and relations2 there are besides innumerable fragmentary operations of this kind1 the results of which1 although not wholly1 are still partly to be ascribed to the principle which we here uphold2 these we do not bring forward1 because it would necessitate a development of circumstances which would lead us into too wide a field4 ,in ,russia1 and in the other cases cited1 the crisis or turn of affairs took place without any successful battle1 having given the decision at the culminating point2 but even when such an effect is not to be expected1 it is always a matter of immense importance in this mode of defence to bring about such a relation of forces as makes victory possible1 and through that victory1 as through a first blow1 to cause a movement which usually goes on increasing in its disastrous effects according to the laws applicable to falling bodies4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,arming the ,nation ,a people's war in civilised ,europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century4 ,it has its advocates and its opponents3 the latter either considering it in a political sense as a revolutionary means1 a state of anarchy declared lawful1 which is as dangerous as a foreign enemy to social order at home2 or on military grounds1 conceiving that the result is not commensurate with the expenditure of the nation's strength4 ,the first point does not concern us here1 for we look upon a people's war merely as a means of fighting1 therefore1 in its connection with the enemy2 but with regard to the latter point1 we must observe that a people's war in general is to be regarded as a consequence of the outburst which the military element in our day has made through its old formal limits2 as an expansion and strengthening of the whole fermentation-process which we call war4 ,the requisition system1 the immense increase in the size of armies by means of that system1 and the general liability to military service1 the utilizing militia1 are all things which lie in the same direction1 if we make the limited military system of former days our starting point2 and the leve en masse1 or arming of the people1 now lies also in the same direction4 ,if the first named of these new aids to war are the natural and necessary consequences of barriers thrown down2 and if they have so enormously increased the power of those who first used them1 that the enemy has been carried along in the current1 and obliged to adopt them likewise1 this will be the case also with people-wars4 ,in the generality of cases1 the people who make judicious use of this means1 will gain a proportionate superiority over those who despise its use4 ,if this be so1 then the only question is whether this modern intensification of the military element is1 upon the whole1 salutary for the interests of humanity or otherwise1--a question which it would be about as easy to answer as the question of war itself--we leave both to philosophers4 ,but the opinion may be advanced1 that the resources swallowed up in people's wars might be more profitably employed1 if used in providing other military means2 no very deep investigation1 however1 is necessary to be convinced that these resources are for the most part not disposable1 and cannot be utilized in an arbitrary manner at pleasure4 ,one essential part that is the moral element1 is not called into existence until this kind of employment for it arises4 ,we therefore do not ask again3 how much does the resistance which the whole nation in arms is capable of making1 cost that nation8 but we ask3 what is the effect which such a resistance can produce8 ,what are its conditions1 and how is it to be used8 ,it follows from the very nature of the thing that defensive means thus widely dispersed1 are not suited to great blows requiring concentrated action in time and space4 ,its operation1 like the process of evaporation in physical nature1 is according to the surface4 ,the greater that surface and the greater the contact with the enemy's army1 consequently the more that army spreads itself out1 so much the greater will be the effects of arming the nation4 ,like a slow gradual heat1 it destroys the foundations of the enemy's army4 ,as it requires time to produce its effects1 therefore whilst the hostile elements are working on each other1 there is a state of tension which either gradually wears out if the people's war is extinguished at some points1 and burns slowly away at others1 or leads to a crisis1 if the flames of this general conflagration envelop the enemy's army1 and compel it to evacuate the country to save itself from utter destruction4 ,in order that this result should be produced by a national war alone1 we must suppose either a surface-extent of the dominions invaded1 exceeding that of any country in ,europe1 except ,russia1 or suppose a disproportion between the strength of the invading army and the extent of the country1 such as never occurs in reality4 ,therefore1 to avoid following a phantom1 we must imagine a people-war always in combination1 with a war carried on by a regular army1 and both carried on according to a plan embracing the operations of the whole4 ,the conditions under which alone the people's war can become effective are the following-- #a4 ,that the war is carried on in the heart of the country4 #b4 ,that it cannot be decided by a single catastrophe4 #c4 ,that the theatre of war embraces a considerable extent of country4 #d4 ,that the national character is favourable to the measure4 #e4 ,that the country is of a broken and difficult nature1 either from being mountainous1 or by reason of woods and marshes1 or from the peculiar mode of cultivation in use4 ,whether the population is dense or otherwise1 is of little consequence1 as there is less likelihood of a want of men than of anything else4 ,whether the inhabitants are rich or poor is also a point by no means decisive1 at least it should not be2 but it must be admitted that a poor population accustomed to hard work and privations usually shows itself more vigorous and better suited for war4 ,one peculiarity of country which greatly favors the action of war carried on by the people1 is the scattered sites of the dwellings of the country people1 such as is to be found in many parts of ,germany4 ,the country is thus more intersected an dcovered2 the roads are worse1 although more numerous2 the lodgement of troops is attended with endless difficulties1 but especially that peculiarity repeats itself on a small scale1 which a people-war possesses on a great scale1 namely that the principle of resistance exists everywhere1 but is nowhere tangible4 ,if the inhabitants are collected in villages1 the most troublesome have troops quartered on them1 or they are plundered as a punishment1 and their houses burnt1 etc1 a system which could not be very easily carried out with a peasant community of ,westphalia4 ,national levies and armed peasantry cannot and should not be employed against the main body of the enemy's army1 or even against any considerable corps of the same1 they must not attempt to crack the nut1 they must only gnaw on the surface and the borders4 ,they should rise in the provinces situated at one of the sides of the theatre of war1 and in which the assailant does not appear in force1 in order to withdraw these provinces entirely from his influence4 ,where no enemy is to be found1 there is no want of courage to oppose him1 and at the example thus given1 the mass of the neighboring population gradually takes fire4 ,thus the fire spreads as it does in heather1 and reaching at last that part of the surface of the soil on which the aggressor is based1 it seizes his lines of communication and preys upon the vital thread by which his existence is supported4 ,for although we entertain no exaggerated ideas of the omnipotence of a people's war1 such as that it is an inexhaustible1 unconquerable element1 over which the mere force of an army has as little control as the human will has over the wind or the rain2 in short1 although our opinion is not founded on flowery ephemeral literature1 still we must admit that armed peasants are not to be driven before us in the same way as a body of soldiers who keep together like a herd of cattle1 and usually follow their noses4 ,armed peasants1 on the contrary1 when broken1 disperse in all directions1 for which no formal plan is required2 through this circumstance1 the march of every small body of troops in a mountainous1 thickly wooded1 or even broken country1 becomes a service of a very dangerous character1 for at any moment a combat may arise on the march2 if in point of fact no armed bodies have even been seen for some time1 yet the same peasants already driven off by the head of a column1 may at any hour make their appearance in its rear4 ,if it is an object to destroy roads or to block up a defile2 the means which outposts or detachments from an army can apply to that purpose1 bear about the same relation to those furnished by a body of insurgent peasants1 as the action of an automaton does to that of a human being4 ,the enemy has no other means to oppose to the action of national levies except that of detaching numerous parties to furnish escorts for convoys to occupy military stations1 defiles1 bridges1 etc4 ,in proportion as the first efforts of the national levies are small1 so the detachments sent out will be weak in numbers1 from the repugnance to a great dispersion of forces2 it is on these weak bodies that the fire of the national war usually first properly kindles itself1 they are overpowered by numbers at some points1 courage rises1 the love of fighting gains strength1 and the intensity of this struggle increases until the crisis approaches which is to decide the issue4 ,according to our idea of a people's war1 it should1 like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence1 never condense into a solid body2 otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this core1 crushes it1 and makes a great many prisoners2 their courage sinks2 every one thinks the main question is decided1 any further effort useless1 and the arms fall from the hands of the people4 ,still1 however1 on the other hand1 it is necessary that this mist should collect at some points into denser masses1 and form threatening clouds from which now and again a formidable flash of lightning may burst forth4 ,these points are chiefly on the flanks of the enemy's theatre of war1 as already observed4 ,there the armament of the people should be organised into greater and more systematic bodies1 supported by a small force of regular troops1 so as to give it the appearance of a regular force and fit it to venture upon enterprises on a larger scale4 ,from these points1 the irregular character in the organisation of these bodies should diminish in proportion as they are to be employed more in the direction of the rear of the enemy1 where he is exposed to their hardest blows4 ,these better organised masses1 are for the purpose of falling upon the larger garrisons which the enemy leaves behind him4 ,besides1 they serve to create a feeling of uneasiness and dread1 and increase the moral impression of the whole1 without them the total action would be wanting in force1 and the situation of the enemy upon the whole would not be made sufficiently uncomfortable4 ,the easiest way for a general to produce this more effective form of a national armament1 is to support the movement by small detachments sent from the army4 ,without the support of a few regular troops as an encouragement1 the inhabitants generally want an impulse1 and the confidence to take up arms4 ,the stronger these detachments are1 the greater will be their power of attraction1 the greater will be the avalanche which is to fall down4 ,but this has its limits2 partly1 first1 because it would be detrimental to the army to cut it up into detachments1 for this secondary object to dissolve it1 as it were1 into a body of irregulars1 and form with it in all directions a weak defensive line1 by which we may be sure both the regular army and national levies alike would become completely ruined2 partly1 secondly1 because experience seems to tell us that when there are too many regular troops in a district1 the people-war loses in vigour and efficacy2 the causes of this are in the first place1 that too many of the enemy's troops are thus drawn into the district1 and1 in the second place1 that the inhabitants then rely on their own regular troops1 and1 thirdly1 because the presence of such large bodies of troops makes too great demands on the powers of the people in other ways1 that is1 in providing quarters1 transport1 contributions1 etc41 etc4 ,another means of preventing any serious reaction on the part of the enemy against this popular movement constitutes1 at the same time1 a leading principle in the method of using such levies2 this is1 that as a rule1 with this great strategic means of defence1 a tactical defence should seldom or ever take place4 ,the character of a combat with national levies is the same as that of all combats of masses of troops of an inferior quality1 great impetuosity and fiery ardour at the commencement1 but little coolness or tenacity if the combat is prolonged4 ,further1 the defeat and dispersion of a body of national levies is of no material consequence1 as they lay their account with that1 but a body of this description must not be broken up by losses in killed1 wounded1 and prisoners2 a defeat of that kind would soon cool their ardour4 ,but both these peculiarities are entirely opposed to the nature of a tactical defensive4 ,in the defensive combat a persistent slow systematic action is required1 and great risks must be run2 a mere attempt1 from which we can desist as soon as we please1 can never lead to results in the defensive4 ,if1 therefore1 the national levies are entrusted with the defence of any particular portion of territory1 care must be taken that the measure does not lead to a regular great defensive combat2 for if the circumstances were ever so favourable to them1 they would be sure to be defeated4 ,they may1 and should1 therefore1 defend the approaches to mountains1 dykes1 over marshes1 river-passages1 as long as possible2 but when once they are broken1 they should rather disperse1 and continue their defence by sudden attacks1 than concentrate and allow themselves to be shut up in some narrow last refuge in a regular defensive position4--,however brave a nation may be1 however warlike its habits1 however intense its hatred of the enemy1 however favourable the nature of the country1 it is an undeniable fact that a people's war cannot be kept up in an atmosphere too full of danger4 ,if1 therefore1 its combustible material is to be fanned by any means into a considerable flame it must be at remote points where there is more air1 and where it cannot be extinguished by one great blow4 ,after these reflections1 which are more of the nature of subjective impressions than an objective analysis1 because the subject is one as yet of rare occurrence generally1 and has been but imperfectly treated of by those who have had actual experience for any length of time1 we have only to add that the strategic plan of defence can include in itself the cooperation of a general arming of the people in two different ways1 that is1 either as a last resource after a lost battle1 or as a natural assistance before a decisive battle has been fought4 ,the latter case supposes a retreat into the interior of the country1 and that indirect kind of reaction of which we have treated in the eighth and twenty-fourth chapters of this book4 ,we have1 therefore1 here only to say a few words on the mission of the national levies after a battle has been lost4 ,no ,state should believe its fate1 that is1 its entire existence1 to be dependent upon one battle1 let it be even the most decisive4 ,if it is beaten1 the calling forth fresh power1 and the natural weakening which every offensive undergoes with time1 may bring about a turn of fortune1 or assistance may come from abroad4 ,no such urgent haste to die is needed yet2 and as by instinct the drowning man catches at a straw1 so in the natural course of the moral world a people should try the last means of deliverance when it sees itself hurried along to the brink of an abyss4 ,however small and weak a ,state may be in comparison to its enemy1 if it foregoes a last supreme effort1 we must say there is no longer any soul left in it4 ,this does not exclude the possibility of saving itself from complete destruction by the purchase of peace at a sacrifice2 but neither does such an aim on its part do away with the utility of fresh measures for defence2 they will neither make peace more difficult nor more onerous1 but easier and better4 ,they are still more necessary if there is an expectation of assistance from those who are interested in maintaining our political existence4 ,any government1 therefore1 which1 after the loss of a great battle1 only thinks how it may speedily place the nation in the lap of peace1 and unmanned by the feeling of great hopes disappointed1 no longer feels in itself the courage or the desire to stimulate to the utmost every element of force1 completely stultifies itself in such case through weakness1 and shows itself unworthy of victory1 and1 perhaps1 just on that account1 was incapable of gaining one4 ,however decisive1 therefore1 the overthrow may be which is experienced by a ,state1 still by a retreat of the army into the interior1 the efficacy of its fortresses and an arming of the people may be brought into use4 ,in connection with this it is advantageous if the flank of the principal theatre of war is fenced in by mountains1 or otherwise very difficult tracts of country1 which stand forth as bastions1 the strategic enfilade of which is to check the enemy's progress4 ,if the victorious enemy is engaged in siege works1 if he has left strong garrisons behind him everywhere to secure his communications1 or detached corps to make himself elbow-room1 and to keep the adjacent provinces in subjection1 if he is already weakened by his various losses in active means and material of war1 then the moment is arrived when the defensive army should again enter the lists1 and by a well-directed blow make the assailant stagger in his disadvantageous position4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,defence of a ,theatre of ,war ,having treated of the most important defensive means1 we might perhaps be contented to leave the manner in which these means attach themselves to the plan of defence as a whole to be discussed in the last ,book1 which will be devoted to the ,plan of a ,war2 for from this every secondary scheme1 either of attack or defence1 emanates and is determined in its leading features2 and moreover in many cases the plan of the war itself is nothing more than the plan of the attack or defence of the principal theatre of war4 ,but we have not been able to commence with war as a whole1 although in war more than in any other phase of human activity1 the parts are shaped by the whole1 imbued with and essentially altered by its character2 instead of that1 we have been obliged to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted1 in the first instance1 with each single subject as a separate part4 ,without this progress from the simple to the complex1 a number of undefined ideas would have overpowered us1 and the manifold phases of reciprocal action in particular would have constantly confused our conceptions4 ,we shall therefore still continue to advance towards the whole by one step at a time2 that is1 we shall consider the defence of a theatre in itself1 and look for the thread by which the subjects already treated of connect themselves with it4 ,the defensive1 according to our conception1 is nothing but the stronger form of combat4 ,the preservation of our own forces and the destruction of those of the enemy--in a word1 the victory--is the aim of this contest1 but at the same time not its ultimate object4 ,that object is the preservation of our own political state and the subjugation of that of the enemy2 or again1 in one word1 the desired peace1 because it is only by it that this conflict adjusts itself1 and ends in a common result4 ,but what is the enemy's state in connection with war8 ,above all things its military force is important1 then its territory2 but certainly there are also still many other things which1 through particular circumstances1 may obtain a predominant importance2 to these belong1 before all1 foreign and domestic political relations1 which sometimes decide more than all the rest4 ,but although the military force and the territory of the enemy alone are still not the state itself1 nor are they the only connections which the state may have with the war1 still these two things are always preponderating1 mostly immeasurably surpassing all other connections in importance4 ,military force is to protect the territory of the state1 or to conquer that of an enemy2 the territory on the other hand1 constantly nourishes and renovates the military force4 ,the two1 therefore1 depend on each other1 mutually support each other1 are equal in importance one to the other4 ,but still there is a difference in their mutual relations4 ,if the military force is destroyed1 that is completely defeated1 rendered incapable of further resistance1 then the loss of the territory follows of itself2 but on the other hand1 the destruction of the military force by no means follows from the conquest of the country1 because that force may of its own accord evacuate the territory1 in order afterwards to reconquer it the more easily4 ,indeed1 not only does the complete destruction of its army decide the fate of a country1 but even every considerable weakening of its military force leads regularly to a loss of territory2 on the other hand1 every considerable loss of territory does not cause a proportionate diminution of military power2 in the long run it will do so1 but not always within the space of time in which a war is brought to a close4 ,from this it follows that the preservation of our own military power1 and the diminution or destruction of that of the enemy1 take precedence in importance over the occupation of territory1 and1 therefore1 is the first object which a general should strive for4 ,the possession of territory only presses for consideration as an object if that means 7diminution or destruction of the enemy's military force7 has not effected it4 ,if the whole of the enemy's military power was united in one army1 and if the whole war consisted of one battle1 then the possession of the country would depend on the issue of that battle2 destruction of the enemy's military forces1 conquest of his country and security of our own1 would follow from that result1 and1 in a certain measure1 be identical with it4 ,now the question is1 what can induce the defensive to deviate from this simplest form of the act of warfare1 and distribute his power in space8 ,the answer is1 the insufficiency of the victory which he might gain with all his forces united4 ,every victory has its sphere of influence4 ,if this extends over the whole of the enemy's state1 consequently over the whole of his military force and his territory1 that is1 if all the parts are carried along in the same movement1 which we have impressed upon the core of his power1 then such a victory is all that we require1 and a division of our forces would not be justified by sufficient grounds4 ,but if there are portions of the enemy's military force1 and of country belonging to either party1 over which our victory would have no effect1 then we must give particular attention to those parts2 and as we cannot unite territory like a military force in one point1 therefore we must divide our forces for the purpose of attacking or defending those portions4 ,it is only in small1 compactly shaped states that it is possible to have such a unity of military force1 and that probably all depends upon a victory over that force4 ,such a unity is practically impossible when larger tracts of country1 having for a great extent boundaries conterminious with our own1 are concerned1 or in the case of an alliance of several surrounding states against us4 ,in such cases1 divisions of force must necessarily take place1 giving occasion to different theatres of war4 ,the effect of a victory will naturally depend on its greatness1 and that on the mass of the conquered troops4 ,therefore the blow which1 if successful1 will produce the greatest effect1 must be made against that part of the country where the greatest number of the enemy's forces are collected together2 and the greater the mass of our own forces which we use for this blow1 so much the surer shall we be of this success4 ,this natural sequence of ideas leads us to an illustration by which we shall see this truth more clearly2 it is the nature and effect of the centre of gravity in mechanics4 ,as the centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected1 and as a shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect1 and further1 as the most effective blow is struck with the centre of gravity of the power used1 so it is also in war4 ,the armed forces of every belligerent1 whether of a single state or of an alliance of states1 have a certain unity1 and in that way1 connection2 but where connection is there come in analogies of the centre of gravity4 ,there are1 therefore1 in these armed forces certain centres of gravity1 the movement and direction of which decide upon other points1 and these centres of gravity are situated where the greatest bodies of troops are assembled4 ,but just as1 in the world of inert matter1 the action against the centre of gravity has its measure and limits in the connection of the parts1 so it is in war1 and here as well as there the force exerted may easily be greater than the resistance requires1 and then there is a blow in the air1 a waste of force4 ,what a difference there is between the solidity of an army under one standard1 led into battle under the personal command of one general1 and that of an allied army extended over #ej or #ajj miles1 or it may be even based upon quite different sides 7of the theatre of war74 ,there we see coherence in the strongest degree1 unity most complete2 here unity in a very remote degree often only existing in the political view held in common1 and in that also in a miserable and insufficient degree1 the cohesion of parts mostly very weak1 often quite an illusion4 ,therefore1 if on the one hand1 the violence with which we wish to strike the blow prescribes the greatest concentration of force1 so in like manner1 on the other hand1 we have to fear every undue excess as a real evil1 because it entails a waste of power1 and that in turn a deficiency of power at other points4 ,to distinguish these 8centra gravitatis0 in the enemy's military power1 to discern their spheres of action is1 therefore1 a supreme act of strategic judgment4 ,we must constantly ask ourselves1 what effect the advance or retreat of part of the forces on either side will produce on the rest4 ,we do not by this lay claim in any way to the discovery of a new method1 we have only sought to explain the foundation of the method of all generals1 in every age1 in a manner which may place its connection with the nature of things in a clearer light4 ,how this conception of the centre of gravity of the enemy's force affects the whole plan of the war1 we shall consider in the last book1 for that is the proper place for the subject1 and we have only borrowed it from there to avoid leaving any break in the sequence of ideas4 ,by the introduction of this view we have seen the motives which occasion a partition of forces in general4 ,these consist fundamentally of two interests which are in opposition to each other2 the one1 the possession of territory strives to divide the forces2 the other1 the effort of force against the centre of gravity of the enemy's military power1 combines them again up to a certain point4 ,thus it is that theatres of war or particular army regions originate4 ,these are those boundaries of the area of the country and of the forces thereon distributed1 within which every decision given by the principal force of such a region extends itself directly over the whole1 and carries on the whole with it in its own direction4 ,we say directly1 because a decision on one theatre of war must naturally have also an influence more or less over those adjoining it4 ,although it lies quite in the nature of the thing1 we must again remind our readers expressly that here as well as everywhere else our definitions are only directed at the centres of certain speculative regions1 the limits of which we neither desire to1 nor can we1 define by sharp lines4 ,we think1 therefore1 a theatre of war1 whether large or small1 with its military force1 whatever may be the size of that1 represents a unity which maybe reduced to one centre of gravity4 ,at this centre of gravity the decision must take place1 and to be conqueror here means to defend the theatre of war in the widest sense4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,defence of a ,theatre of ,war--7continued7 ,defence1 however1 consists of two different elements1 these are the decision and the state of expectation4 ,the combination of these two elements forms the subject of this chapter4 ,first we must observe that the state of expectation is not1 in point of fact1 the complete defence2 it is only that province of the same in which it proceeds to its aim4 ,as long as a military force has not abandoned the portion of territory placed under its guardianship1 the tension of forces on both sides created by the attack continues1 and this lasts until there is a decision4 ,the decision itself can only be regarded as having actually taken place when either the assailant or defender has left the theatre of war4 ,as long as an armed force maintains itself within its theatre1 the defence of the same continues1 and in this sense the defence of the theatre of war is identical with the defence in the same4 ,whether the enemy in the meantime has obtained possession of much or little of that section of country is not essential1 for it is only lent to him until the decision4 ,but this kind of idea by which we wish to settle the proper relation of the state of expectation to the whole is only correct when a decision is really to take place1 and is regarded by both parties as inevitable4 ,for it is only by that decision that the centres of gravity of the respective forces1 and the theatre of war determined through them are effectually hit4 ,whenever the idea of a decisive solution disappears1 then the centres of gravity are neutralised1 indeed1 in a certain sense1 the whole of the armed forces become so also1 and now the possession of territory1 which forms the second principal branch of the whole theatre of war1 comes forward as the direct object4 ,in other words1 the less a decisive blow is sought for by both sides in a war1 and the more it is merely a mutual observation of one another1 so much the more important becomes the possession of territory1 so much the more the defensive seeks to cover all directly1 and the assailant seeks to extend his forces in his advance4 ,now we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that the majority of wars and campaigns approach much more to a state of observation than to a struggle for life or death1 that is1 a contest in which one at least of the combatants uses every effort to bring about a complete decision4 ,this last character is only to be found in the wars of the nineteenth century to such a degree that a theory founded on this point of view can be made use of in relation to them4 ,but as all future wars will hardly have this character1 and it is rather to be expected that they will again show a tendency to the observation character1 therefore any theory to be practically useful must pay attention to that4 ,hence we shall commence with the case in which the desire of a decision permeates and guides the whole1 therefore with real1 or if we may use the expression1 absolute war2 then in another chapter we shall examine those modifications which arise through the approach1 in a greater or less degree1 to the state of a war of observation4 ,in the first case 7whether the decision is sought by the aggressor or the defender7 the defence of the theatre of war must consist in the defender establishing himself there in such a manner1 that in a decision he will have an advantage on his side at any moment4 ,this decision may be either a battle1 or a series of great combats1 but it may also consist in the resultant of mere relations1 which arise from the situation of the opposing forces1 that is1 possible combats4 ,if the battle were not also the most powerful1 the most usual and most effectual means of a decision in war1 as we think we have already shown on several occasions1 still the mere fact of its being in a general way one of the means of reaching this solution1 would be sufficient to enjoin the greatest concentration of our forces which circumstances will in any way permit4 ,a great battle upon the theatre of war is the blow of the centre of force against the centre of force2 the more forces can be collected in the one or the other1 the surer and greater will be the effect4 ,therefore every separation of forces which is not called for by an object 7which either cannot itself be attained by the successful issue of a battle1 or which itself is necessary to the successful issue of the battle7 is blameable4 ,but the greatest concentration of forces is not the only fundamental condition2 it is also requisite that they should have such a position and place that the battle may be fought under favourable circumstances4 ,the different steps in the defence which we have become acquainted with in the chapter on the methods of defence1 are completely homogeneous with these fundamental conditions2 there will therefore be no difficulty in connecting them with the same1 according to the special requirements of each case4 ,but there is one point which seems at first sight to involve a contradiction in itself1 and which1 as one of the most important in the defence1 requires explanation so much the more4 ,it is the hitting upon the exact centre of gravity of the enemy's force4 ,if the defender ascertains in time the roads by which the enemy will advance1 and upon which in particular the great mass of his force will be found for a certainty1 he may march against him on that road4 ,this will be the most usual case1 for although the defence precedes the attack in measures of a general nature1 in the establishment of strong places1 great arsenals1 and depts1 and in the peace establishment of his army1 and thus gives a line of direction to the assailant in his preparations1 still1 when the campaign really opens1 the defender1 in relation to the aggressor1 has the peculiar advantage in general of playing the last hand4 ,to attack a foreign country with a large army1 very considerable preparations are required4 ,provisions1 stores1 and articles of equipment of all kinds must be collected1 which is a work of time4 ,while these preparations are going on1 the defender has time to prepare accordingly1 in regard to which we must not forget that the defensive requires less time1 generally speaking1 because in every state things are prepared rather for the defensive than the offensive4 ,but although this may hold good in the majority of cases1 there is always a possibility that1 in particular cases1 the defensive may remain in uncertainty as to the principal line by which the enemy intends to advance2 and this case is more likely to occur when the defence is dependent on measures which of themselves take a good deal of time1 as for example1 the preparation of a strong position4 ,further1 supposing the defender places himself on the line by which the aggressor is advancing1 then1 unless the defender is prepared to take the initiative by attacking the aggressor1 the latter may avoid the position which the defender has taken up1 by only altering a little his line of advance1 for in the cultivated parts of ,europe we can never be so situated that there are not roads to the right or left by which any position may be avoided4 ,plainly1 in such a case the defender could not wait for his enemy in a position1 or at least could not wait there in the expectation of giving battle4 ,but before entering on the means available to the defensive in this case1 we must inquire more particularly into the nature of such a case1 and the probability of its occurrence4 ,naturally there are in every ,state1 and also in every theatre of war 7of which alone we are at present speaking71 objects and points upon which an attack is likely to be more efficacious than anywhere else4 ,upon this we think it will be better to speak when we come to the attack4 ,here we shall confine ourselves to observing that1 if the most advantageous object and point of attack is the motive for the assailant in the direction of his blow1 this motive reacts on the defensive1 and must be his guide in cases in which he knows nothing of the intentions of his adversary4 ,if the assailant does not take this direction which is favourable to him1 he foregoes part of his natural advantages4 ,it is evident that1 if the defender has taken up a position in that direction1 the evading his position1 or passing round1 is not to be done for nothing2 it costs a sacrifice4 ,from this it follows that there is not on the side of the defender such a risk of missing the direction of his enemy2 neither on the other hand1 is it so easy for the assailant to pass round his adversary as appears at first sight1 because there exists beforehand a very distinct1 and in most cases preponderating1 motive in favour of one or the other direction1 and that consequently the defender1 although his preparations are fixed to one spot1 will not fail in most cases to come in contact with the mass of the enemy's forces4 ,in other words1 if the defender has put himself in the right position1 he may be almost sure that the assailant will come to meet him4 ,but by this we shall not and cannot deny the possibility of the defender sometimes not meeting with the assailant after all these arrangements1 and therefore the question arises1 what he should then do1 and how much of the real advantages of his position still remain available to him4 ,if we ask ourselves what means still remain generally to the defender when the assailant passes by his position1 they are the following3-- #a4 ,to divide his forces instantly1 so as to be certain to find the assailant with one portion1 and then to support that portion with the other4 #b4 ,to take up a position with his force united1 and in case the assailant passes by him1 to push on rapidly in front of him by a lateral movement4 ,in most cases there will not be time to make such a movement directly to a flank1 it will therefore be necessary to take up the new position somewhat further back4 #c4 ,with his whole force to attack the enemy in flank4 #d4 ,to operate against his communications4 #e4 ,by a counter attack on his theatre of war1 to do exactly what the enemy has done in passing by us4 ,we introduce this last measure1 because it is possible to imagine a case in which it may be efficacious2 but as it is in contradiction to the object of the defence1 that is1 the grounds on which that form has been chosen1 therefore it can only be regarded as an abnormity1 which can only take place because the enemy has made some great mistake1 or because there are other special features in a particular case4 ,operating against the enemy's communications implies that our own are superior1 which is also one of the fundamental requisites of a good defensive position4 ,but although on that ground this action may promise the defender a certain amount of advantage1 still1 in the defence of a theatre of war1 it is seldom an operation suited to lead to a decision1 which we have supposed to be the object of the campaign4 ,the dimensions of a single theatre of war are seldom so large that the line of communications is exposed to much danger by their length1 and even if they were in danger1 still the time which the assailant requires for the execution of his blow is usually too short for his progress to be arrested by the slow effects of the action against his communications4 ,therefore this means 7that is the action against the communications7 will prove quite inefficacious in most cases against an enemy determined upon a decision1 and also in case the defender seeks such a solution4 ,the object of the three other means which remain for the defender1 is a direct decision--a meeting of centre of force with centre of force2 they correspond better1 therefore1 with the thing required4 ,but we shall at once say that we decidedly prefer the third to the other two1 and without quite rejecting the latter1 we hold the former to be in the majority of cases the true means of defence4 ,in a position where our forces are divided1 there is always a danger of getting involved in a war of posts1 from which1 if our adversary is resolute1 can follow1 under the best of circumstances1 only a relative defence on a large scale1 never a decision such as we desire2 and even if by superior tact we should be able to avoid this mistake1 still1 by the preliminary resistance being with divided forces1 the first shock is sensibly weakened1 and we can never be sure that the advanced corps first engaged will not suffer disproportionate losses4 ,to this is to be added that the resistance of this corps which usually ends in its falling back on the main body1 appears to the troops in the light of a lost combat1 or miscarriage of plans1 and the moral force suffers accordingly4 ,the second means1 that of placing our whole force in front of the enemy1 in whichever direction he may bend his march1 involves a risk of our arriving too late1 and thus between two measures1 falling short of both4 ,besides this1 a defensive battle requires coolness and consideration1 a knowledge1 indeed intimate knowledge of the country1 which cannot be expected in a hasty oblique movement to a flank4 ,lastly1 positions suitable for a good defensive battle-field are too rarely to be met with to reckon upon them at every point of every road4 ,on the other hand1 the third means1 namely to attack the enemy in flank1 therefore to give battle with a change of front1 is attended with great advantages4 ,firstly1 there is always in this case1 as we know1 an exposure of the lines of communication1 here the lines of retreat1 and in this respect the defender has one advantage in his general relations as defender1 and next and chiefly1 the advantage which we have claimed for the strategic properties of his position at present4 ,secondly1--and this is the principal thing1--every assailant who attempts to pass by his opponent is placed between two opposite tendencies4 ,his first desire is to advance to attain the object of his attack2 but the possibility of being attacked in flank at any moment1 creates a necessity for being prepared1 at any moment1 to deliver a blow in that direction1 and that too a blow with the mass of his forces4 ,these two tendencies are contradictory1 and beget such a complication in the internal relations 7of his army71 such a difficulty in the choice of measures1 if they are to suit every event1 that there can hardly be a more disagreeable position strategically4 ,if the assailant knew with certainty the moment when he would be attacked1 he might prepare to receive the enemy with skill and ability2 but in his uncertainty on this point1 and pressed by the necessity of advancing1 it is almost certain that when the moment for battle arrives1 it finds him in the midst of hurried and half-finished preparations1 and therefore by no means in an advantageous relation to his enemy4 ,if then there are favourable moments for the defender to deliver an offensive battle1 it is surely at such a moment as this1 above all others1 that we may look for success4 ,if we consider1 further1 that the knowledge of the country and choice of ground are on the side of the defender1 that he can prepare his movements1 and can time them1 no one can doubt that he possesses in such a situation a decided superiority1 strategically1 over his adversary4 ,we think1 therefore1 that a defender occupying a well chosen position1 with his forces united1 may quietly wait for the enemy passing by his army2 should the enemy not attack him in his position1 and that an operation against the enemy's communications does not suit the circumstances1 there still remains for him an excellent means of bringing about a decision by resorting to a flank attack4 ,if cases of this kind are hardly to be found in military history1 the reason is1 partly1 that the defender has seldom had the courage to remain firm in such a position1 but has either divided his forces1 or rashly thrown himself in front of his enemy by a cross or diagonal march1 or that no assailant dares to venture past the defender under such circumstances1 and in that way his movement usually comes to a stand still4 ,the defender is in this case compelled to resort to an offensive battle3 the further advantages of the state of expectation of a strong position1 of good entrenchments1 etc41 etc41 he must give up2 in most cases the situation in which he finds the advancing enemy will not quite make up for these advantages1 for it is just to evade their influence that the assailant has placed himself in his present situation2 still it always offers him a certain compensation1 and theory is therefore not just obliged to see a quantity disappear at once from the calculation1 to see the pro and contra mutually cancel each other1 as so often happens when critical writers of history introduce a little bit of theory4 ,it must not1 in fact1 be supposed that we are now dealing with logical subtilties2 the subject is rather one which the more it is practically considered1 the more it appears as an idea embracing the whole essence of defensive war1 everywhere dominating and regulating it4 ,it is only by the determination on the part of the defender to assail his opponent with all his force1 the moment he passes by him1 that he avoids two pitfalls1 close to which he is led by the defensive form2 that is a division of his force1 and a hasty flank march to intercept the assailant in front4 ,in both he accepts the law of the assailant2 in both he seeks to aid himself through measures of a very critical nature1 and with a most dangerous degree of haste2 and wherever a resolute adversary1 thirsting for victory and a decision1 has encountered such a system of defence1 he has knocked it on the head4 ,but when the defender has assembled his forces at the right point to fight a general action1 if he is determined with this force1 come what will1 to attack his enemy in flank1 he has done right1 and is in the right course1 and he is supported by all the advantages which the defence can give in his situation2 his actions will then bear the stamp of good preparation1 coolness1 security1 unity and simplicity4 ,we cannot here avoid mentioning a remarkable event in history1 which has a close analogy with the ideas now developed2 we do so to anticipate its being used in a wrong application4 ,when the ,prussian army was1 in ,october1 #ahjf1 waiting in ,thuringia for the ,french under ,buonaparte1 the former was posted between the two great roads on which the latter might be expected to advance1 that is1 the road to ,berlin by ,erfurth1 and that by ,hof and ,leipsic4 ,the first intention of breaking into ,franconia straight through the ,thuringian ,forest1 and afterwards1 when that plan was abandoned1 the uncertainty as to which of the roads the ,french would choose for their advance1 caused this intermediate position4 ,as such1 it must therefore have led to the adoption of the measure we have been discussing1 a hasty interception of the enemy in front by a lateral movement4 ,this was in fact the idea in case the enemy marched by ,erfurth1 for the roads in that direction were good2 on the other hand1 the idea of a movement of this description on the road by ,hof could not be entertained1 partly because the army was two or three marches away from that road1 partly because the deep valley of the ,saale interposed2 neither did this plan ever enter into the views of the ,duke of ,brunswick1 so that there was no kind of preparation made for carrying it into effect1 but it was always contemplated by ,prince ,hohenlohe1 that is1 by ,colonel ,massenbach1 who exerted all his influence to draw the ,duke into this plan4 ,still less could the idea be entertained of leaving the position which had been taken on the left bank of the ,saale to try an offensive battle against ,buonaparte on his advance1 that is1 to such an attack in flank as we have been considering2 for if the ,saale was an obstacle to intercepting the enemy in the last moment 7 fortiori7 it would be a still greater obstacle to assuming the offensive at a moment when the enemy would be in possession of the opposite side of the river1 at least partially4 ,the ,duke1 therefore1 determined to wait behind the ,saale to see what would happen1 that is to say1 if we can call anything a determination which emanated from this many-headed ,headquarters' ,staff1 and in this time of confusion and utter indecision4 ,whatever may have been the true condition of affairs during this state of expectation1 the consequent situation of the army was this3-- #a4 ,that the enemy might be attacked if he crossed the ,saale to attack the ,prussian army4 #b4 ,that if he did not march against that army1 operations might be commenced against his communications4 #c4 ,if it should be found practicable and advisable1 he might be intercepted near ,leipsic by a rapid flank march4 ,in the first case1 the ,prussian army possessed a great strategic and tactical advantage in the deep valley of the ,saale4 ,in the second1 the strategic advantage was just as great1 for the enemy had only a very narrow base between our position and the neutral territory of ,bohemia1 whilst ours was extremely broad2 even in the third case1 our army1 covered by the ,saale1 was still by no means in a disadvantageous situation4 ,all these three measures1 in spite of the confusion and want of any clear perception at head-quarters1 were really discussed2 but certainly we cannot wonder that1 although a right idea may have been entertained1 it should have entirely failed in the execution by the complete want of resolution and the confusion generally prevailing4 ,in the two first cases1 the position on the left bank of the ,saale is to be regarded as a real flank position1 and it had undoubtedly as such very great qualities2 but in truth1 against a very superior enemy1 against a ,buonaparte1 a flank position with an army that is not very sure about what it is doing1 is a very bold measure4 ,after long hesitation1 the ,duke on the #acth adopted the last of the plans proposed1 but it was too late1 ,buonaparte had already commenced to pass the ,saale1 and the battles of ,jena and ,auerstadt were inevitable4 ,the ,duke1 through his indecision1 had set himself between two stools2 he quitted his first position too late to push his army in before the enemy1 and too soon for a battle suited to the object4 ,nevertheless1 the natural strength of this position proved itself so far that the ,duke was able to destroy the right wing of the enemy's army at ,auerstadt1 whilst ,prince ,hohenlohe1 by a bloody retreat1 was still able to back out of the scrape2 but at ,auerstadt they did not venture to realise the victory1 which was quite certain2 and at ,jena they thought they might reckon upon one which was quite impossible4 ,in any case1 ,buonaparte felt the strategic importance of the position on the ,saale so much1 that he did not venture to pass it by1 but determined on a passage of the ,saale in sight of the enemy4 ,by what we have now said we think we have sufficiently specified the relations between the defence and the attack when a decisive course of action is intended1 and we believe we have shown also the threads to which1 according to their situation and connection1 the different subjects of the plan of defence attach themselves4 ,to go through the different arrangements more in detail does not come within our views1 for that would lead us into a boundless field of particular cases4 ,when a general has laid down for his direction a distinct point1 he will see how far it agrees with geographical1 statistical1 and political circumstances1 the material and personal relations of his own army and that of the enemy1 and how the one or the other may require that his plans should be modified in carrying them into effect4 ,but in order more distinctly to connect and look closer at the gradations in the defence specified in the chapter on the different kinds of defence1 we shall here lay before our readers what seems to us most important1 in relation to the same generally4 #a4 ,reasons for marching against the enemy with a view to an offensive battle1 may be as follows3-- 7a7 ,if we know that the enemy is advancing with his forces very much divided1 and therefore we have reason to expect a victory1 although we are1 upon the whole1 much weaker4 ,but such an advance on the part of the assailant is in itself very improbable1 and consequently1 unless we know of it upon certain information1 the plan is not good2 for to reckon upon it1 and rest all our hopes on it through a mere supposition1 and without sufficient motive1 leads generally to a very dangerous situation4 ,we do not1 then1 find things as we expected2 we are obliged to give up the offensive battle1 we are not prepared to fight on the defensive1 we are obliged to commence with a retreat against our will1 and leave almost everything to chance4 ,this is very much what occurred in the defence1 conducted by the army under ,dohna against the ,russians1 in the campaign of #agei1 and which1 under ,general ,wedel1 ended in the unfortunate battle of ,zllichau4 ,this measure shortens matters so much that plan-makers are only too ready to propose it1 without taking much trouble to inquire how far the hypothesis on which it rests is well founded4 7b7 ,if we are generally in sufficient strength for battle1 and-- 7c7 ,if a blundering1 irresolute adversary specially invites an attack4 ,in this case the effect of surprise may be worth more than any assistance furnished by the ground through a good position4 ,it is the real essence of good generalship thus to bring into play the power of the moral forces2--but theory can never say loud enough nor often enough there must be an objective foundation for these suppositions2 without such foundation to be always talking of surprises and the superiority of novel or unusual modes of attack1 and thereon to found plans1 considerations1 criticisms1 is acting without any grounds1 and is altogether objectionable4 7d7 ,when the nature of our army makes it specially suited for the offensive4 ,it was certainly not a visionary or false idea when ,frederick the ,great conceived that in his mobile1 courageous army1 full of confidence in him1 obedient by habit1 trained to precision1 animated and elevated by pride1 and with its perfection in the oblique attack1 he possessed an instrument which1 in his firm and daring hand1 was much more suited to attack than defence2 all these qualities were wanting in his opponents1 and in this respect1 therefore1 he had the most decided superiority2 to make use of this was worth more to him1 in most cases1 than to take to his assistance entrenchments and obstacles of ground4--,but such a superiority will always be rare2 a well-trained army1 thoroughly practised in great movements1 has only part of the above advantages4 ,if ,frederick the ,great maintained that the ,prussian army was particularly adapted for attack--and this has been incessantly repeated since his time--still we should not attach too much weight to any such saying2 in most cases in war we feel more exhilarated1 more courageous when acting offensively than defensively3 but this is a feeling which all troops have in common1 and there is hardly an army respecting which its generals and leaders have not made the same assertion 7as ,frederick74 ,we must1 therefore1 not too readily rely on an appearance of superiority1 and through that neglect real advantages4 ,a very natural and weighty reason for resorting to an offensive battle may be the composition of the army as regards the three arms1 for instance1 a numerous cavalry and little artillery4 ,we continue the enumeration of reasons4 7e7 ,when we can nowhere find a good position4 7f7 ,when we must hasten with the decision4 7g7 ,lastly1 the combined influence of several or all of these reasons4 #b4 ,the waiting for the enemy in a locality where it is intended to attack him 7,minden1 #agei7 naturally proceeds from-- a1 there being no such disproportion of force to our disadvantage as to make it necessary to seek a strong position and strengthen it by entrenchments4 b1 a locality having been found particularly adapted to the purpose4 ,the properties which determine this belong to tactics2 we shall only observe that these properties chiefly consist in an easy approach for the defender from his side1 and in all kinds of obstacles on the side next to the enemy4 #c4 ,a position will be taken with the express intention of there waiting the attack of the enemy-- a4 ,if the disproportion of forces compels us to seek cover from natural obstacles or behind field-works4 b4 ,when the country affords an excellent position for our purpose4 ,the two modes of defence1 #b and #c1 will come more into consideration according as we do not seek the decision itself1 but content ourselves with a negative result1 and have reason to think that our opponent is wavering and irresolute1 and that he will in the end fail to carry out his plans4 #d4 ,an entrenched unassailable camp only fulfils the object-- a4 ,if it is situated at an extremely important strategic point4 ,the character of such a position consists in this1 that we cannot be driven out of it2 the enemy is therefore obliged to try some other means1 that is1 to pursue his object without touching this camp1 or to blockade it and reduce it by starvation3 if it is impossible for him to do this1 then the strategic qualities of the position must be very great4 b4 ,if we have reason to expect aid from abroad4 ,such was the case with the ,saxon army in its position at ,pirna4 ,notwithstanding all that has been said against the measure on account of the ill-success which attended it in this instance1 it is perfectly certain that #ag1jjj ,saxons could never have been able to neutralise #dj1jjj ,prussians in any other way4 ,if the ,austrians were unable to make better use of the superiority obtained at ,lowositz1 that only shows the badness of their whole method of war1 as well as of their whole military organisation2 and there cannot be a doubt that if the ,saxons instead of taking post in the camp at ,pirna had retired into ,bohemia1 ,frederick the ,great would have driven both ,austrians and ,saxons beyond ,prague1 and taken that place in the same campaign4 ,whoever does not admit the value of this advantage1 and limits his consideration to the capture of the whole ,saxon army1 shows himself incapable of making a calculation of all the circumstances in a case of this kind1 and without calculation no certain deduction can be obtained4 ,but as the cases a and b very rarely occur1 therefore1 the entrenched camp is a measure which requires to be well considered1 and which is very seldom suitable in practice4 ,the hope of inspiring the enemy with respect by such a camp1 and thus reducing him to a state of complete inactivity1 is attended with too much danger1 namely1 with the danger of being obliged to fight without the possibility of retreat4 ,if ,frederick the ,great gained his object in this way at ,bunzelwitz1 we must admire the correct judgment he formed of his adversary1 but we must certainly also lay more stress than usual on the resources which he would have found at the last moment to clear a road for the remnants of his army1 and also on the irresponsibility of a king4 #e4 ,if there is one or if there are several fortresses near the frontier1 then the great question arises1 whether the defender should seek an action before or behind them4 ,the latter recommends itself-- a1 by the superiority of the enemy in numbers1 which forces us to break his power before coming to a final struggle4 b1 by these fortresses being near1 so that the sacrifice of territory is not greater than we are compelled to make4 c1 by the fitness of the fortresses for defence4 ,one principal use of fortresses is unquestionably1 or should be1 to break the enemy's force in his advance and to weaken considerably that portion which we intend to bring to an engagement4 ,if we so seldom see this use made of fortresses1 that proceeds from the cases in which a decisive battle is sought for by one of the opposing parties being very rare4 ,but that is the only kind of case which we treat of here4 ,we therefore look upon it as a principle equally simple and important in all cases in which the defender has one or more fortresses near him1 that he should keep them before him1 and give the decisive battle behind them4 ,we admit that a battle lost within the line of our fortresses will compel us to retreat further into the interior of the country than one lost on the other side1 tactical results in both cases being the same1 although the causes of the difference have their origin rather in the imagination than in real things2 neither do we forget that a battle may be given beyond the fortresses in a well chosen position1 whilst inside them the battle in most cases must be an offensive one1 particularly if the enemy is laying siege to a fortress which is in danger of being lost2 but what signify these nice shades of distinction1 as compared to the advantage that1 in the decisive battle1 we meet the enemy weakened by a fourth or a third of his force1 perhaps one half if there are many fortresses8 ,we think1 therefore1 that in all cases of an inevitable decision1 whether sought for by the offensive or the defensive1 and that the latter is not tolerably sure of a victory1 or if the nature of the country does not offer some most decisive reason to give battle in a position further forward--in all these cases we say when a fortress is situated near at hand and capable of defence1 the defender should by all means withdraw at once behind it1 and let the decision take place on this side1 consequently with its co-operation4 ,if he takes up his position so close to the fortress that the assailant can neither form the siege of nor blockade the place without first driving him off1 he places the assailant under the necessity of attacking him1 the defender1 in his position4 ,to us1 therefore1 of all defensive measures in a critical situation1 none appears so simple and efficacious as the choice of a good position near to and behind a strong fortress4 ,at the same time1 the question would wear a different aspect if the fortress was situated far back2 for then it would be necessary to abandon a considerable part of our theatre of war1 a sacrifice which1 as we know1 should not be made unless in a case of great urgency4 ,in such a case the measure would bear more resemblance to a retreat into the interior of the country4 ,another condition is1 the fitness of the place for defence4 ,it is well known that there are fortified places1 especially large ones1 which are not fit to be brought into contact with an enemy's army1 because they could not resist the sudden assault of a powerful force4 ,in this case1 our position must at all events be so close behind that we could support the garrison4 ,lastly1 the retreat into the interior of the country is only a natural resource under the following circumstances3-- a1 when owing to the physical and moral relation in which we stand as respects the enemy1 the idea of a successful resistance on the frontier or near it cannot be entertained4 b1 when it is a principal object to gain time4 c1 when there are peculiarities in the country which are favourable to the measure1 a subject on which we have already treated in the twenty-fifth chapter4 ,we thus close the chapter on the defence of a theatre of war if a decisive solution is sought for by one or other party1 and is therefore inevitable4 ,but it must be particularly borne in mind1 that events in war do not exhibit themselves in such a pure abstract form1 and that therefore1 if our maxims and arguments should be used in reasoning on actual war1 our thirtieth chapter should also be kept in view1 and we must suppose the general1 in the majority of cases1 as placed between two tendencies1 urged more towards one or the other1 according to circumstances4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,defence of a ,theatre of ,war 7continued7 ,successive ,resistance4 ,we have proved1 in the twelfth and thirteenth chapters1 that in strategy a successive resistance is inconsistent with the nature of the thing1 and that all forces available should be used simultaneously4 ,as regards forces which are moveable1 this requires no further demonstration2 but when we look at the seat of war itself1 with its fortresses1 the natural divisions of the ground1 and even the extent of its surface as being also elements of war1 then1 these being immovable1 we can only either bring them gradually into use1 or we must at once place ourselves so far back1 that all agencies of this kind which are to be brought into activity are in our front4 ,then everything which can contribute to weaken the enemy in the territory which he has occupied1 comes at once into activity1 for the assailant must at least blockade the defender's fortresses1 he must keep the country in subjection by garrisons and other posts1 he has long marches to make1 and everything he requires must be brought from a distance1 etc4 ,all these agencies commence to work1 whether the assailant makes his advance before or after a decision1 but in the former case their influence is somewhat greater4 ,from this1 therefore1 it follows1 that if the defender chooses to transfer his decision to a point further back1 he has thus the means of bringing at once into play all these immovable elements of military force4 ,on the other hand1 it is clear that this transfer of the solution 7on the part of the defender7 does not alter the extent of the influence of a victory which the assailant gains4 ,in treating of the attack1 we shall examine more closely the extent of the influence of a victory2 here we shall only observe that it reaches to the exhaustion of the superiority1 that is1 the resultant of the physical and moral relations4 ,now this superiority exhausts itself in the first place by the duties required from the forces on the theatre of war1 and secondly by losses in combats2 the diminution of force arising from these two causes cannot be essentially altered1 whether the combats take place at the commencement or at the end1 near the frontier1 or further towards the interior of the country 7vom oder hinten74 ,we think1 for example1 that a victory gained by ,buonaparte over the ,russians at ,wilna1 #ahab1 would have carried him just as far as that of ,borodino--assuming that it was equally great--and that a victory at ,moscow would not have carried him any further2 ,moscow was1 in either case1 the limit of this sphere of victory4 ,indeed1 it cannot be doubted for a moment that a decisive battle on the frontier 7for other reasons7 would have produced much greater results through victory1 and then1 perhaps1 the sphere of its influence would have been wider4 ,therefore1 in this view1 also1 the transfer of the decision to a point further back is not necessary for the defence4 ,in the chapter on the various means of resistance1 that method of delaying the decision1 which may be regarded as an extreme form1 was brought before us under the name of retreat into the interior1 and as a particular method of defence1 in which the object is rather that the assailant should wear himself out1 than that he should be destroyed by the sword on the field of battle4 ,but it is only when such an intention predominates that the delaying of the decisive battle can be regarded as a peculiar method of resistance2 for otherwise it is evident that an infinite number of gradations may be conceived in this method1 and that these may be combined with all other means of defence4 ,we therefore look upon the greater or less co-operation of the theatre of war1 not as a special form of defence1 but as nothing more than a discretionary introduction into the defence of the immovable means of resistance1 just according as circumstances and the nature of the situation may appear to require4 ,but now1 if the defender does not think he requires any assistance from these immovable forces for his purposed decision1 or if the further sacrifice connected with the use of them is too great1 then they are kept in reserve for the future1 and form a sort of succession of reinforcements1 which perhaps ensure the possibility of keeping the moveable forces in such a condition that they will be able to follow up the first favourable decision with a second1 or perhaps in the same manner even with a third1 that is to say1 in this manner a successive application of his forces becomes possible4 ,if the defender loses a battle on the frontier1 which does not amount to a complete defeat1 we may very well imagine that1 by placing himself behind the nearest fortress1 he will then be in a condition to accept battle again2 indeed1 if he is only dealing with an opponent who has not much resolution1 then1 perhaps1 some considerable obstacle of ground will be quite sufficient as a means of stopping the enemy4 ,there is1 therefore1 in strategy1 in the use of the theatre of war as well as in everything else1 an economy of force2 the less one can make suffice the better3 but there must be sufficient1 and here1 as well as in commerce1 there is something to be thought of besides mere niggardliness4 ,but in order to prevent a great misconception1 we must draw attention to this1 that the subject of our present consideration is not how much resistance an army can offer1 or the enterprises which it can undertake after a lost battle1 but only the result which we can promise ourselves beforehand from this second act in our defence2 consequently1 how high we can estimate it in our plan4 ,here there is only one point almost which the defender has to look to1 which is the character and the situation of his opponent4 ,an adversary weak in character1 with little self-confidence1 without noble ambition1 placed under great restrictions1 will content himself1 in case he is successful1 with a moderate advantage1 and timidly hold back at every fresh offer of a decision which the defender ventures to make4 ,in this case the defender may count upon the beneficial use of all the means of resistance of his theatre of war in succession1 in constantly fresh1 although in themselves small1 combats1 in which the prospect always brightens of an ultimate decision in his favour4 ,but who does not feel that we are now on the road to campaigns devoid of decision1 which are much more the field of a successive application of force4 ,of these we shall speak in the following chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,defence of a ,theatre of ,war 7continued7 ,when no ,decision is ,sought for4 ,whether and how far a war is possible in which neither party acts on the offensive1 therefore in which neither combatant has a positive aim1 we shall consider in the last book2 here it is not necessary for us to occupy ourselves with the contradiction which this presents1 because on a single theatre of war we can easily suppose reasons for such a defensive on both sides1 consequent on the relations of each of these parts to a whole4 ,but in addition to the examples which history furnishes of particular campaigns that have taken place without the focus of a necessary solution1 history also tells us of many others in which there was no want of an assailant1 consequently no want of a positive will on one side1 but in which that will was so weak that instead of striving to attain the object at any price1 and forcing the necessary decision1 it contented itself with such advantages as arose in a manner spontaneously out of circumstances4 ,or the assailant pursued no self-selected end at all1 but made his object depend on circumstances1 in the meanwhile gathering such fruits as presented themselves from time to time4 ,although such an offensive which deviates very much from the strict logical necessity of a direct march towards the object1 and which1 almost like a lounger sauntering through the campaign1 looking out right and left for the cheap fruits of opportunity1 differs very little from the defensive itself1 which allows the general to pick up what he can in this way1 still we shall give the closer philosophical consideration of this kind of warfare a place in the book on the attack4 ,here we shall confine ourselves to the conclusion that in such a campaign the settlement of the whole question is not looked for by either assailant or defender through a decisive battle1 that1 therefore1 the great battle is no longer the key-stone of the arch1 towards which all the lines of the strategic superstructure are directed4 ,campaigns of this kind 7as the history of all times and all countries shows us7 are not only numerous1 but form such an overwhelming majority1 that the remainder only appear as exceptions4 ,even if this proportion should alter in the future1 still it is certain that there will always be many such campaigns2 and1 therefore1 in studying the theory of the defence of a theatre of war1 they must be brought into consideration4 ,we shall endeavour to describe the peculiarities by which they are characterised4 ,real war will generally be in a medium between the two different tendencies1 sometimes approaching nearer to one1 sometimes to the other1 and we can1 therefore1 only see the practical effect of these peculiarities in the modification which is produced1 in the absolute form of war by their counteraction4 ,we have already said in the third chapter of this book1 that the state of expectation is one of the greatest advantages which the defensive has over the offensive2 as a general rule1 it seldom happens in life1 and least of all in war1 that all that circumstances would lead us to expect does actually take place4 ,the imperfection of human insight1 the fear of evil results1 accidents which derange the development of designs in their execution1 are causes through which many of the transactions enjoined by circumstances are never realised in the execution4 ,in war where insufficiency of knowledge1 the danger of a catastrophe1 the number of accidents are incomparably greater than in any other branch of human activity1 the number of shortcomings1 if we may so call them1 must necessarily also be much greater4 ,this is then the rich field where the defensive gathers fruits which grow for it spontaneously4 ,if we add to this result of experience the substantial importance of the possession of the surface of the ground in war1 then that maxim which has become a proverb1 beati sunt possidentes1 holds good here as well as in peace4 ,it is this maxim which here takes the place of the decision1 that focus of all action in every war directed to mutual destruction4 ,it is fruitful beyond measure1 not in actions which it calls forth1 but in motives for not acting1 and for all that action which is done in the interest of inaction4 ,when no decision is to be sought for or expected1 there is no reason for giving up anything1 for that could only be done to gain thereby some advantage in the decision4 ,the consequence is that the defender keeps all1 or at least as much as he can 7that is as much as he can cover71 and the assailant takes possession of so much as he can without involving himself in a decision1 7that is1 he will extend himself laterally as much as possible74 ,we have only to deal with the first in this place4 ,wherever the defender is not present with his military forces1 the assailant can take possession1 and then the advantage of the state of expectation is on his side2 hence the endeavour to cover the country everywhere directly1 and to take the chance of the assailant attacking the troops posted for this purpose4 ,before we go further into the special properties of the defence1 we must extract from the book on the attack those objects which the assailant usually aims at when the decision 7by battle7 is not sought4 ,they are as follows3-- #a4 ,the seizure of a considerable strip of territory1 as far as that can be done without a decisive engagement4 #b4 ,the capture of an important magazine under the same condition4 #c4 ,the capture of a fortress not covered4 ,no doubt a siege is more or less a great operation1 often requiring great labour2 but it is an undertaking which does not contain the elements of a catastrophe4 ,if it comes to the worst1 the siege can be raised without thereby suffering a great positive loss4 #d4 ,lastly1 a successful combat of some importance1 but in which there is not much risked1 and consequently not much to be gained2 a combat which takes place not as the cardinal knot of a whole strategic bond1 but on its own account for the sake of trophies or honour of the troops4 ,for such an object1 of course1 a combat is not fought at any price2 we either wait for the chance of a favourable opportunity1 or seek to bring one about by skill4 ,these four objects of attack give rise to the following efforts on the part of the defence3-- #a4 ,to cover the fortresses by keeping them behind us4 #b4 ,to cover the country by extending the troops over it4 #c4 ,where the extension is not sufficient1 to throw the army rapidly in front of the enemy by a flank march4 #d4 ,to guard against disadvantageous combats4 ,it is clear that the object of the first three measures is to force on the enemy the initiative1 and to derive the utmost advantage from the state of expectation1 and this object is so deeply rooted in the nature of the thing that it would be great folly to despise it prima facie4 ,it must necessarily occupy a higher place the less a decision is expected1 and it is the ruling principle in all such campaigns1 even although1 apparently1 a considerable degree of activity may be manifested in small actions of an indecisive character4 ,hannibal as well as ,fabius1 and both ,frederick the ,great and ,daun1 have done homage to this principle whenever they did not either seek for or expect a decision4 ,the fourth effort serves as a corrective to the three others1 it is their conditio sine qu non4 ,we shall now proceed to examine these subjects a little more closely4 ,at first sight it appears somewhat preposterous to protect a fortress from the enemy's attack by placing an army in front of it2 such a measure looks like a kind of pleonasm1 as fortifications are built to resist a hostile attack of themselves4 ,yet it is a measure which we see resorted to thousands and thousands of times4 ,but thus it is in the conduct of war2 the most common things often seem the most incomprehensible4 ,who would presume to pronounce these thousands of instances to be so many blunders on the ground of this seeming inconsistency8 ,the constant repetition of the measure shows that it must proceed from some deep-seated motive4 ,this reason is1 however1 no other than that pointed out above1 emanating from moral sluggishness and inactivity4 ,if the defender places himself in front of his fortress1 the enemy cannot attack it unless he first beats the army in front of it2 but a battle is a decision2 if that is not the enemy's object then there will be no battle1 and the defender will remain in possession of his fortress without striking a blow2 consequently1 whenever we do not believe the enemy intends to fight a battle1 we should venture on the chance of his not making up his mind to do so1 especially as in most cases we still retain the power of withdrawing behind the fortress in a moment1 if1 contrary to our expectation1 the enemy should march to attack us2 the position before the fortress is in this way free from danger1 and the probability of maintaining the status quo without any sacrifice1 is not even attended with the slightest risk4 ,if the defender places himself behind the fortress1 he offers the assailant an object which is exactly suited to the circumstances in which the latter is placed4 ,if the fortress is not of great strength1 and he is not quite unprepared1 he will commence the siege3 in order that this may not end in the fall of the place1 the defender must march to its relief4 ,the positive action1 the initiative1 is now laid on him1 and the adversary who by his siege is to be regarded as advancing towards his object1 is in the situation of occupier4 ,experience teaches that the matter always takes this turn1 and it does so naturally4 ,a catastrophe1 as we have before said1 is not necessarily bound up with a siege4 ,even a general1 devoid of either the spirit of enterprise or energy1 who would never make up his mind to a battle1 will proceed to undertake a siege with perhaps nothing but field artillery1 when he can approach a fortress without risk4 ,at the worst he can abandon his undertaking without any positive loss4 ,there always remains to be considered the danger to which most fortresses are more or less exposed1 that of being taken by assault1 or in some other irregular manner1 and this circumstance should certainly not be overlooked by the defender in his calculation of probabilities4 ,in weighing and considering the different chances1 it seems natural that the defender should look upon the probability of not having to fight at all as more for his advantage than the probability of fighting even under favourable circumstances4 ,and thus it appears to us that the practice of placing an army in the field before its fortress1 is both natural and fully explained4 ,frederick the ,great1 for instance1 at ,glogau1 against the ,russians1 at ,schwednitz1 ,neiss1 and ,dresden1 against the ,austrians1 almost always adopted it4 ,this measure1 however1 brought misfortune on the ,duke of ,bevern at ,breslau2 behind ,breslau he could not have been attacked2 the superiority of the ,austrians in the king's absence would soon cease1 as he was approaching2 and therefore1 by a position behind ,breslau1 a battle might have been avoided until ,frederick's arrival4 ,no doubt the ,duke would have preferred that course if it had not been that it would have exposed that important place to a bombardment1 at which the king1 who was anything but tolerant on such occasions1 would have been highly displeased4 ,the attempt made by the ,duke to protect ,breslau by an entrenched position taken up for the purpose1 cannot after all be disapproved1 for it was very possible that ,prince ,charles of ,lorraine1 contented with the capture of ,schwednitz1 and threatened by the march of the king1 would1 by that position1 have been prevented from advancing farther4 ,the best thing he could have done would have been to refuse the battle at the last by withdrawing through ,breslau at the moment that the ,austrians advanced to the attack2 in this way he would have got all the advantages of the state of expectation without paying for them by a great danger4 ,if we have here traced the position before a fortress to reasons of a superior and absolute order1 and defended its adoption on those grounds1 we have still to observe that there is a motive of a secondary class which1 though a more obvious one1 is not sufficient of itself alone1 not being absolute2 we refer to the use which is made by armies of the nearest fortress as a dept of provisions and munitions of war4 ,this is so convenient1 and presents so many advantages1 that a general will not easily make up his mind to draw his supplies of all kinds from more distant places1 or to lodge them in open towns4 ,but if a fortress is the great magazine of an army1 then the position before it is frequently a matter of absolute necessity1 and in most cases is very natural4 ,but it is easy to see that this obvious motive1 which is easily over-valued by those who are not in the habit of looking far before them1 is neither sufficient to explain all cases1 nor are the circumstances connected with it of sufficient importance to entitle it to give a final decision4 ,the capture of one or more fortresses without risking a battle1 is such a very natural object of all attacks which do not aim at a decision on the field of battle1 that the defender makes it his principal business to thwart this design4 ,thus it is that on theatres of war1 containing a number of fortresses1 we find these places made the pivots of almost all the movements2 we find the assailant seeking to approach one of them unexpectedly1 and employing various feints to aid his purpose1 and the defender immediately seeking to stop him by well-prepared movements4 ,such is the general character of almost all the campaigns of ,louis ,,xiv4 in the ,netherlands up to the time of ,marshal ,saxe4 ,so much for the covering of fortresses4 ,the covering of a country by an extended disposition of forces1 is only conceivable in combination with very considerable obstacles of ground4 ,the great and small posts which must be formed for the purpose1 can only get a certain capability of resistance through strength of position2 and as natural obstacles are seldom found sufficient1 therefore field fortification is made use of as an assistance4 ,but now it is to be observed that1 the power of resistance which is thus obtained at any one point1 is always only relative 7see the chapter on the signification of the combat71 and never to be regarded as absolute4 ,it may certainly happen that one such post may remain proof against all attacks made upon it1 and that therefore in a single instance there may be an absolute result2 but from the great number of posts1 any single one1 in comparison to the whole1 appears weak1 and exposed to the possible attack of an overwhelming force1 and consequently it would be unreasonable to place one's dependence for safety on the resistance of any one single post4 ,in such an extended position1 we can therefore only count on a resistance of relative length1 and not upon a victory1 properly speaking4 ,this value of single posts1 at the same time1 is also sufficient for the object1 and for a general calculation4 ,in campaigns in which no great decision1 no irresistible march1 towards the complete subjugation of the whole force is to be feared1 there is little risk in a combat of posts1 even if it ends in the loss of a post4 ,there is seldom any further result in connection with it than the loss of the post and a few trophies2 the influence of victory penetrates no further into the situation of affairs1 it does not tear down any part of the foundation to be followed by a mass of building in ruin4 ,in the worst case1 if1 for instance1 the whole defensive system is disorganised by the loss of a single post1 the defender has always time to concentrate his corps1 and with his whole force to offer battle1 which the assailant1 according to our supposition1 does not desire4 ,therefore also it usually happens that with this concentration of force the act closes1 and the further advance of the assailant is stopped4 ,a strip of land1 a few men and guns1 are the losses of the defender1 and with these results the assailant is satisfied4 ,to such a risk we say the defender may very well expose himself1 if he has1 on the other hand1 the possibility1 or rather the probability1 in his favour1 that the assailant from excessive caution will halt before his posts without attacking them4 ,only in regard to this we must not lose sight of the fact1 that we are now supposing an assailant who will not venture upon any great stroke1 a moderate sized1 but strong post will very well serve to stop such an adversary1 for although he can undoubtedly make himself master of it1 still the question arises as to the price it will cost1 and whether that price is not too high for any use that he can make of the victory4 ,in this way we may see how the powerful relative resistance which the defender can obtain from an extended disposition1 consisting of a number of posts in juxtaposition with each other1 may constitute a satisfactory result in the calculation of his whole campaign4 ,in order to direct at once to the right point the glance which the reader1 with his mind's eye1 will here cast upon military history1 we must observe that these extended positions appear most frequently in the latter half of a campaign1 because by that time the defender has become thoroughly acquainted with his adversary1 with his projects1 and his situation2 and the little quantity of the spirit of enterprise with which the assailant started1 is usually exhausted4 ,in this defensive1 in an extended position by which the country1 the supplies1 the fortresses are to be covered1 all great natural obstacles1 such as streams1 rivers1 mountains1 woods1 morasses1 must naturally play a great part1 and acquire a predominant importance4 ,upon their use we refer to what has been already said on these subjects4 ,it is through this predominant importance of the topographical element that the knowledge and activity which are looked upon as the speciality of the general staff of an army are more particularly called into requisition4 ,now1 as the staff of the army is usually that branch which writes and publishes most1 it follows that these parts of campaigns are recorded more fully in history2 and then again from that there follows a not unnatural tendency to systematise them1 and to frame out of the historical solution of one case a general solution for all succeeding cases4 ,but this endeavour is futile1 and therefore erroneous4 ,besides1 in this more passive kind of war1 in this form of it which is tied to localities1 each case is different to another1 and must be differently treated4 ,the ablest memoirs of a critical character respecting these subjects are therefore only suited to make one acquainted with facts1 but never to serve as dictates4 ,natural1 and at the same time meritorious1 as is this industry which1 according to the general view1 we have attributed to the staff in particular1 still we must raise a warning voice against usurpations which often spring from it to the prejudice of the whole4 ,the authority acquired by those who are at the head of1 and best acquainted with1 this branch of military service1 gives them often a sort of general dominion over people's minds1 beginning with the general himself1 and from this then springs a routine of ideas which causes an undue bias of the mind4 ,at last the general sees nothing but mountains and passes1 and that which should be a measure of free choice guided by circumstances becomes mannerism1 becomes second nature4 ,thus in the year #agic and #agid1 ,colonel ,grawert of the ,prussian army1 who was the animating spirit of the staff at that time1 and well known as a regular man for mountains and passes1 persuaded two generals of the most opposite personal characteristics1 the ,duke of ,brunswick and ,general ,mollendorf1 into exactly the same method of carrying on war4 ,that a defensive line parallel to the course of a formidable natural obstacle may lead to a cordon war is quite plain4 ,it must1 in most cases1 necessarily lead to that if really the whole extent of the theatre of war could be directly covered in that manner4 ,but most theatres of war have such an extent1 that the normal tactical disposition of the troops destined for its defence would be by no means commensurate with that object2 at the same time as the assailant1 by his own dispositions and other circumstances1 is confined to certain principal directions and great roads1 and any great deviations from these directions1 even if he is only opposed to a very inactive defender1 would be attended with great embarrassment and disadvantage1 therefore generally all that the defender has to do is to cover the country for a certain number of miles or marches right and left of these principal lines of direction of his adversary4 ,but again to effect this covering1 we may be contented with defensive posts on the principal roads and means of approach1 and merely watch the country between by small posts of observation4 ,the consequence of this is certainly that the assailant may then pass a column between two of these posts1 and thus make the attack1 which he has in view1 upon one post from several quarters at once4 ,now1 these posts are in some measure arranged to meet this1 partly by their having supports for their flanks1 partly by the formation of flank defences 7called crochets71 partly by their being able to receive assistance from a reserve posted in rear1 or by troops detached from adjoining posts4 ,in this manner the number of posts is reduced still more1 and the result is that an army engaged in a defence of this kind1 usually divides itself into four or five principal posts4 ,for important points of approach1 beyond a certain distance1 and yet in some measure threatened1 special central points are established which1 in a certain measure1 form small theatres of war within the principal one4 ,in this manner the ,austrians1 during the ,seven ,years' ,war1 generally placed the main body of their army1 in four or five posts in the mountains of ,lower ,silesia2 whilst a small almost independent corps organised for itself a similar system of defence in ,upper ,silesia4 ,now1 the further such a defensive system diverges from direct covering1 the more it must call to its assistance--mobility 7active defence71 and even offensive means4 ,certain corps are considered reserves2 besides which1 one post hastens to send to the help of another all the troops it can spare4 ,this assistance may be rendered either by hastening up directly from the rear to reinforce and re-establish the passive defence1 or by attacking the enemy in flank1 or even by menacing his line of retreat4 ,if the assailant threatens the flank of a post not with direct attack1 but only by a position through which he can act upon the communications of this post1 then either the corps which has been advanced for this purpose must be attacked in earnest1 or the way of reprisal must be resorted to by acting in turn on the enemy's communications4 ,we see1 therefore1 that however passive this defence is in the leading ideas on which it is based1 still it must comprise many active means1 and in its organisation may be forearmed in many ways against complicated events4 ,usually those defences pass for the best which make the most use of active or even offensive means2 but this depends in great part on the nature of the country1 the characteristics of the troops1 and even on the talent of the general2 partly we are also very prone in general to expect too much from movement1 and other auxiliary measures of an active nature1 and to place too little reliance on the local defence of a formidable natural obstacle4 ,we think we have thus sufficiently explained what we understand by an extended line of defence1 and we now turn to the third auxiliary means1 the placing ourselves in front of the enemy by a rapid march to a flank4 ,this means is necessarily one of those provided for that defence of a country which we are now considering4 ,in the first place the defender1 even with the most extended position1 often cannot guard all the approaches to his country which are menaced2 next1 in many cases1 he must be ready to repair with the bulk of his forces to any posts upon which the bulk of the enemy's force is about to be thrown1 as otherwise those posts would be too easily overpowered2 lastly1 a general who has an aversion to confining his army to a passive resistance in an extended position1 must seek to attain his object1 the protection of the country1 by rapid1 well-planned1 and well-conducted movements4 ,the greater the spaces which he leaves exposed1 the greater the talent required in planning the movements1 in order to arrive anywhere at the right moment of time4 ,the natural consequence of striving to do this is1 that in such a case1 positions which afford sufficient advantages to make an enemy give up all idea of an attack as soon as our army1 or only a portion of it1 reaches them1 are sought for and prepared in all directions4 ,as these positions are again and again occupied1 and all depends on reaching the same in right time1 they are in a certain measure the vowels of all this method of carrying on war1 which on that account has been termed a war of posts4 ,just as an extended position1 and the relative resistance in a war without great decisions1 do not present the dangers which are inherent in its original nature1 so in the same manner the intercepting the enemy in front by a march to a flank is not so hazardous as it would be in the immediate expectation of a great decision4 ,to attempt at the last moment in greatest haste 7by a lateral movement7 to thrust in an army in front of an adversary of determined character1 who is both able and willing to deal heavy blows1 and has no scruples about an expenditure of forces1 would be half way to a most decisive disaster2 for against an unhesitating blow delivered with the enemy's whole strength1 such running and stumbling into a position would not do4 ,but against an opponent who1 instead of taking up his work with his whole hand1 uses only the tips of his fingers1 who does not know how to make use of a great result1 or rather of the opening for one1 who only seeks a trifling advantage but at small expense1 against such an opponent this kind of resistance certainly may be applied with effect4 ,a natural consequence is1 that this means also in general occurs oftener in the last half of a campaign than at its commencement4 ,here1 also1 the general staff has an opportunity of displaying its topographical knowledge in framing a system of combined measures1 connected with the choice and preparation of the positions and the roads leading to them4 ,when the whole object of one party is to gain in the end a certain point1 and the whole object of his adversary1 on the other hand1 is to prevent his doing so1 then both parties are often obliged to make their movements under the eyes of each other2 for this reason1 these movements must be made with a degree of precaution and precision not otherwise required4 ,formerly1 before the mass of an army was formed of independent divisions1 and even on the march was always regarded as an indivisible whole1 this precaution and precision was attended with much more formality1 and with the copious use of tactical skill4 ,on these occasions1 certainly1 single brigades were often obliged to leave the general line of battle to secure particular points1 and act an independent part until the army arrived3 but these were1 and continued1 anomalous proceedings2 and the aim in the order of march generally was to move the army from one point to another as a whole1 preserving its normal formation1 and avoiding such exceptional proceedings as the above as far as possible4 ,now that the parts of the main body of an army are subdivided again into independent bodies1 and those bodies can venture to enter into an engagement with the mass of the enemy's army1 provided the rest of the force of which it is a member is sufficiently near to carry it on and finish it1--now such a flank march is attended with less difficulty even under the eye of the enemy4 ,what formerly could only be effected through the actual mechanism of the order of march1 can now be done by starting single divisions at an earlier hour1 by hastening the march of others1 and by the greater freedom in the employment of the whole4 ,by the means of defence just considered1 the assailant can be prevented from taking any fortress1 from occupying any important extent of country1 or capturing magazines2 and he will be prevented1 if in every direction combats are offered to him in which he can see little probability of success1 or too great danger of a reaction in case of failure1 or in general1 an expenditure of force too great for his object and existing relations4 ,if now the defender succeeds in this triumph of his art and skill1 and the assailant1 wherever he turns his eyes1 sees prudent preparations through which he is cut off from any prospect of attaining his modest wishes3 then the offensive principle often seeks to escape from the difficulty in the satisfaction of the mere honour of its arms4 ,the gain of some combat of respectable importance1 gives the arms of the victor a semblance of superiority1 appeases the vanity of the general1 of the court1 of the army1 and the people1 and thus satisfies1 to a certain extent1 the expectations which are naturally always raised when the offensive is assumed4 ,an advantageous combat of some importance merely for the sake of the victory and some trophies1 becomes1 therefore1 the last hope of the assailant4 ,no one must suppose that we here involve ourselves in a contradiction1 for we contend that we still continue within our own supposition1 that the good measures of the defender have deprived the assailant of all expectation of attaining any one of those other objects by means of a successful combat6 ,to warrant that expectation1 two conditions are required1 that is1 a favourable termination to the combat1 and next1 that the result shall lead really to the attainment of one of those objects4 ,the first may very well take place without the second1 and therefore the defenders' corps and posts singly are much more frequently in danger of getting involved in disadvantageous combats if the assailant merely aims at the honour of the battle field1 than if he connects with that a view to further advantages as well4 ,if we place ourselves in ,daun's situation1 and with his way of thinking1 then his venturing on the surprise of ,hochkirch does not appear inconsistent with his character1 as long as we suppose him aiming at nothing more than the trophies of the day4 ,but a victory rich in results1 which would have compelled the king to abandon ,dresden and ,neisse1 appears an entirely different problem1 one with which he would not have been inclined to meddle4 ,let it not be imagined that these are trifling or idle distinctions2 we have1 on the contrary1 now before us one of the deepest-rooted1 leading principles of war4 ,the signification of a combat is its very soul in strategy1 and we cannot too often repeat1 that in strategy the leading events always proceed from the ultimate views of the two parties1 as it were1 from a conclusion of the whole train of ideas4 ,this is why there may be such a difference strategically between one battle and another1 that they can hardly be looked upon as the same means4 ,now1 although the fruitless victory of the assailant can hardly be considered any serious injury to the defence1 still as the defender will not willingly concede even this advantage1 particularly as we never know what accident may also be connected with it1 therefore the defender requires to keep an incessant watch upon the situation of all his corps and posts4 ,no doubt here all greatly depends on the leaders of those corps making suitable dispositions2 but any one of them may be led into an unavoidable catastrophe by injudicious orders imposed on him by the general-in-chief4 ,who is not reminded here of ,fouqu's corps at ,landshut and of ,fink's at ,maxen8 ,in both cases ,frederick the ,great reckoned too much on customary ideas4 ,it was impossible that he could suppose #aj1jjj men capable of successfully resisting #cj1jjj in the position of ,landshut1 or that ,fink could resist a superior force pouring in and overwhelming him on all sides2 but he thought the strength of the position of ,landshut would be accepted1 like a bill of exchange1 as heretofore1 and that ,daun would see in the demonstration against his flank sufficient reason to exchange his uncomfortable position in ,saxony for the more comfortable one in ,bohemia4 ,he misjudged ,laudon in one case and ,daun in the other1 and therein lies the error in these measures4 ,but irrespective of such errors1 into which even generals may fall who are not so proud1 daring1 and obstinate as ,frederick the ,great in some of his proceedings may certainly be termed1 there is always1 in respect to the subject we are now considering1 a great difficulty in this way1 that the general-in-chief cannot always expect all he desires from the sagacity1 good-will1 courage and firmness of character of his corps-commanders4 ,he cannot1 therefore1 leave everything to their good judgment2 he must prescribe rules on many points by which their course of action1 being restricted1 may easily become inconsistent with the circumstances of the moment4 ,this is1 however1 an unavoidable inconvenience4 ,without an imperious commanding will1 the influence of which penetrates through the whole army1 war cannot be well conducted2 and whoever would follow the practice of always expecting the best from his subordinates1 would from that very reason be quite unfit for a good ,commander of an army4 ,therefore the situation of every corps and post must be for ever kept clearly in view1 to prevent any of them being unexpectedly drawn into a catastrophe4 ,the aim of all these efforts is to preserve the status quo4 ,the more fortunate and successful these efforts are1 the longer will the war last at the same point2 but the longer war continues at one point1 the greater become the cares for subsistence4 ,in place of collections and contributions from the country1 a system of subsistence from magazines commences at once1 or in a very short time2 in place of country waggons being collected upon each occasion1 the formation1 more or less1 of a regular transport takes place1 composed either of carriages of the country1 or of those belonging to the army2 in short1 there arises an approach to that regular system of feeding troops from magazines1 of which we have already treated in the fourteenth chapter 7,on ,subsistence74 ,at the same time1 it is not this which exercises a great influence on this mode of conducting war1 for as this mode1 by its object and character1 is in fact already tied down to a limited space1 therefore the question of subsistence may very well have a part in determining its action--and will do so in most cases--without altering the general character of the war4 ,on the other hand1 the action of the belligerents mutually against the lines of communications gains a much greater importance for two reasons4 ,firstly1 because in such campaigns1 there being no measures of a great and comprehensive kind1 generals must apply their energies to those of an inferior order2 and secondly1 because here there is time enough to wait for the effect of this means4 ,the security of his line of communications is therefore specially important to the defender1 for although it is true that its interruption cannot be an object of the hostile operations which take place1 yet it might compel him to retreat1 and thus to leave other objects open to attack4 ,all the measures having for their object the protection of the area of the theatre of war itself1 must naturally also have the effect of covering the lines of communication2 their security is therefore in part provided for in that way1 and we have only to observe that it is a principal condition in fixing upon a position4 ,a special means of security consists in the bodies of troops1 both small and large1 escorting convoys4 ,first1 the most extended positions are not sufficient to secure the lines of communication1 and next1 such an escort is particularly necessary when the general wishes to avoid a very extended position4 ,therefore1 we find1 in ,tempelhof's ,history of the ,seven ,years' ,war1 instances without end in which ,frederick the ,great caused his bread and flour waggons to be escorted by single regiments of infantry or cavalry1 sometimes also by whole brigades4 ,on the ,austrian side we nowhere find mention of the same thing1 which certainly may be partly accounted for in this way1 that they had no such circumstantial historian on their side1 but in part it is also to be ascribed just to this1 that they always took up much more extended positions4 ,having now touched upon the four efforts which form the foundation of a defensive that does not aim at a decision1 and which are at the same time1 altogether free upon the whole from all offensive elements1 we must now say something of the offensive means with which they may become more or less mixed up1 in a certain measure flavoured4 ,these offensive means are chiefly3-- #a4 ,operating against the enemy's communications1 under which we likewise include enterprises against his places of supply4 #b4 ,diversions and incursions within the enemy's territory4 #c4 ,attacks on the enemy's corps and posts1 and even upon his main body1 under favourable circumstances1 or the threat only of such intention4 ,the first of these means is incessantly in action in all campaigns of this kind1 but in a certain measure quite quietly without actually making its appearance4 ,every suitable position for the defender derives a great part of its efficacy from the disquietude which it causes the assailant in connection with his communications2 and as the question of subsistence in such warfare becomes1 as we have already observed1 one of vital importance1 affecting the assailant equally1 therefore1 through this apprehension of offensive action1 possibly resulting from the enemy's position1 a great part of the strategic web is determined1 as we shall again find in treating of the attack4 ,not only this general influence1 proceeding from the choice of positions1 which1 like pressure in mechanics1 produces an effect invisibly1 but also an actual offensive movement with part of the army against the enemy's lines of communication1 comes within the compass of such a defensive4 ,but that it may be done with effect1 the situation of the lines of communication1 the nature of the country1 and the peculiar qualities of the troops must be specially propitious to the undertaking4 ,incursions into the enemy's country which have as their object reprisals or levying contributions1 cannot properly be regarded as defensive means1 they are rather true offensive means2 but they are usually combined with the object of a real diversion1 which may be regarded as a real defensive measure1 as it is intended to weaken the enemy's force opposed to us4 ,but as the above means may be used just as well by the assailant1 and in itself is a real attack1 we therefore think more suitable to leave its further examination for the next book4 ,accordingly we shall only count it in here1 in order to render a full account of the arsenal of small offensive arms belonging to the defender of a theatre of war1 and for the present merely add that in extent and importance it may attain to such a point1 as to give the whole war the appearance1 and along with that the honour1 of the offensive4 ,of this nature are ,frederick the ,great's enterprises in ,poland1 ,bohemia and ,franconia1 before the campaign of #agei4 ,his campaign itself is plainly a pure defence2 these incursions into the enemy's territory1 however1 gave it the appearance of an aggression1 which perhaps had a special value on account of the moral effect4 ,an attack on one of the enemy's corps or on his main body must always be kept in view as a necessary complement of the whole defence whenever the aggressor takes the matter too easily1 and on that account shows himself very defenceless at particular points4 ,under this silent condition the whole action takes place4 ,but here also the defender1 in the same way as in operating against the communications of the enemy1 may go a step further in the province of the offensive1 and just as well as his adversary may make it his business to lie in wait for a favourable stroke4 ,in order to ensure a result in this field1 he must either be very decidedly superior in force to his opponent--which certainly is inconsistent with the defensive in general1 but still may happen--or he must have a method and the talent of keeping his forces more concentrated1 and make up by activity and mobility for the danger which he incurs in other respects4 ,the first was ,daun's case in the ,seven ,years' ,war2 the latter1 the case of ,frederick the ,great4 ,still we hardly ever see ,daun's offensive make its appearance except when ,frederick the ,great invited it by excessive boldness and a display of contempt for him 7,hochkirch1 ,maxen1 ,landshut74 ,on the other hand1 we see ,frederick the ,great almost constantly on the move in order to beat one or other of ,daun's corps with his main body4 ,he certainly seldom succeeded1 at least1 the results were never great1 because ,daun1 in addition to his great superiority in numbers1 had also a rare degree of prudence and caution2 but we must not suppose that1 therefore1 the king's attempts were altogether fruitless4 ,in these attempts lay rather a very effectual resistance2 for the care and fatigue1 which his adversary had to undergo in order to avoid fighting at a disadvantage1 neutralised those forces which would otherwise have aided in advancing the offensive action4 ,let us only call to mind the campaign of #agfj1 in ,silesia1 where ,daun and the ,russians1 out of sheer apprehension of being attacked and beaten by the king1 first here and then there1 never could succeed in making one step in advance4 ,we believe we have now gone through all the subjects which form the predominant ideas1 the principal aims1 and therefore the main stay1 of the whole action in the defence of a theatre of war when no idea of decision is entertained4 ,our chief1 and1 indeed1 sole object in bringing them all close together1 was to let the organism of the whole strategic action be seen in one view2 the particular measures by means of which those subjects come to life1 marches1 positions1 etc41 etc41 we have already considered in detail4 ,by now casting a glance once more at the whole of our subject1 the idea must strike us forcibly1 that with such a weak offensive principle1 with so little desire for a decision on either side1 with so little positive motive1 with so many counteracting influences of a subjective nature1 which stop us and hold us back1 the essential difference between attack and defence must always tend more to disappear4 ,at the opening of a campaign1 certainly one party will enter the other's theatre of war1 and in that manner1 to a certain extent1 such party puts on the form of offensive4 ,but it may very well take place1 and happens frequently that he must soon enough apply all his powers to defend his own country on the enemy's territory4 ,then both stand1 in reality1 opposite one another in a state of mutual observation4 ,both intent on losing nothing1 perhaps both alike intent also on obtaining a positive advantage4 ,indeed it may happen1 as with ,frederick the ,great1 that the real defender aims higher in that way than his adversary4 ,now the more the assailant gives up the position of an enemy making progress1 the less the defender is menaced by him1 and confined to a strictly defensive attitude by the pressing claims of a regard for mere safety1 so much the more a similarity in the relations of the parties is produced in which then the activity of both will be directed towards gaining an advantage over his opponent1 and protecting himself against any disadvantage1 therefore to a true strategic manuvring2 and indeed this is the character into which all campaigns resolve themselves more or less1 when the situation of the combatants or political views do not allow of any great decision4 ,in the following book we have allotted a chapter specially to the subject of strategic manuvres2 but as this equipoised play of forces has frequently been invested in theory with an importance to which it is not entitled1 we find ourselves under the necessity of examining the subject more closely while we are treating of the defence1 as it is in that form of warfare more particularly that this false importance is ascribed to strategic manuvres4 ,we call it an equipoised play of forces1 for when there is no movement of the whole body there is a state of equilibrium2 where no great object impels1 there is no movement of the whole2 therefore1 in such a case1 the two parties1 however unequal they may be1 are still to be regarded as in a state of equilibrium4 ,from this state of equilibrium of the whole now come forth the particular motives to actions of a minor class and secondary objects4 ,they can here develop themselves1 because they are no longer kept down by the pressure of a great decision and great danger4 ,therefore1 what can be lost or won upon the whole is changed into small counters1 and the action of the war1 as a whole1 is broken up into smaller transactions4 ,with these smaller operations for smaller gains1 a contest of skill now takes place between the two generals2 but as it is impossible in war to shut out chance1 and consequently good luck1 therefore this contest will never be otherwise than a game4 ,in the meantime1 here arise two other questions1 that is1 whether in this manuvring1 chance will not have a smaller1 and superior intelligence a greater1 share in the decision1 than where all concentrates itself into one single great act4 ,the last of these questions we must answer in the affirmative4 ,the more complete the organisation of the whole1 the oftener time and space come into consideration--the former by single moments1 the latter at particular points--so much the greater1 plainly1 will be the field for calculation1 therefore the greater the sway exercised by superior intelligence4 ,what the superior understanding gains is abstracted in part from chance1 but not necessarily altogether1 and therefore we are not obliged to answer the first question affirmatively4 ,moreover1 we must not forget that a superior understanding is not the only mental quality of a general2 courage1 energy1 resolution1 presence of mind1 etc41 are qualities which rise again to a higher value when all depends on one single great decision2 they will1 therefore1 have somewhat less weight when there is an equipoised play of forces1 and the predominating ascendancy of sagacious calculation increases not only at the expense of chance1 but also at the expense of these qualities4 ,on the other hand1 these brilliant qualities1 at the moment of a great decision1 may rob chance of a great part of its power1 and therefore1 to a certain extent1 secure that which calculating intelligence in such cases would be obliged to leave to chance4 ,we see by this that here a conflict takes place between several forces1 and that we cannot positively assert that there is a greater field left open to chance in the case of a great decision1 than in the total result when that equipoised play of forces takes place4 ,if we1 therefore1 see more particularly in this play of forces a contest of mutual skill1 that must only be taken to refer to skill in sagacious calculation1 and not to the sum total of military genius4 ,now it is just from this aspect of strategic manuvring that the whole has obtained that false importance of which we have spoken above4 ,in the first place1 in this skilfulness the whole genius of a general has been supposed to consist2 but this is a great mistake1 for it is1 as already said1 not to be denied that in moments of great decisions other moral qualities of a general may have power to control the force of events4 ,if this power proceeds more from the impulse of noble feelings and those sparks of genius which start up almost unconsciously1 and therefore does not proceed from long chains of thought1 still it is not the less a free citizen of the art of war1 for that art is neither a mere act of the understanding1 nor are the activities of the intellectual faculties its principal ones4 ,further1 it has been supposed that every active campaign without results must be owing to that sort of skill on the part of one1 or even of both generals1 while in reality it has always had its general and principal foundation just in the general relations which have turned war into such a game4 ,as most wars between civilised states have had for their object rather the observation of the enemy than his destruction1 therefore it was only natural that the greater number of the campaigns should bear the character of strategic manuvring4 ,those amongst them which did not bring into notice any renowned generals1 attracted no attention2 but where there was a great commander on whom all eyes were fixed1 or two opposed to each other1 like ,turenne and ,montecuculi1 there the seal of perfection has been stamped upon this whole art of manuvring through the names of these generals4 ,a further consequence has then been that this game has been looked upon as the summit of the art1 as the manifestation of its highest perfection1 and consequently also as the source at which the art of war must chiefly be studied4 ,this view prevailed almost universally in the theoretical world before the wars of the ,french ,revolution4 ,but when these wars at one stroke opened to view a quite different world of phenomena in war1 at first somewhat rough and wild1 but which afterwards1 under ,buonaparte systematised into a method on a grand scale1 produced results which created astonishment amongst old and young1 then people set themselves free from the old models1 and believed that all the changes they saw resulted from modern discoveries1 magnificent ideas1 etc42 but also at the same time1 certainly from the changes in the state of society4 ,it was now thought that what was old would never more be required1 and would never even reappear4 ,but as in such revolutions in opinions two parties are always formed1 so it was also in this instance1 and the old views found their champions1 who looked upon the new phenomena as rude blows of brute force1 as a general decadence of the art2 and held the opinion that1 in the evenly-balanced1 nugatory1 fruitless war game1 the perfection of the art is realised4 ,there lies at the bottom of this last view such a want of logic and philosophy1 that it can only be termed a hopeless1 distressing confusion of ideas4 ,but at the same time the opposite opinion1 that nothing like the past will ever reappear1 is very irrational4 ,of the novel appearances manifested in the domain of the art of war1 very few indeed are to be ascribed to new discoveries1 or to a change in the direction of ideas2 they are chiefly attributable to the alterations in the social state and its relations4 ,but as these took place just at the crisis of a state of fermentation1 they must not be taken as a norm2 and we cannot1 therefore1 doubt that a great part of the former manifestations of war1 will again make their appearance4 ,this is not the place to enter further into these matters2 it is enough for us that by directing attention to the relation which this even-balanced play of forces occupies in the whole conduct of a war1 and to its signification and connection with other objects1 we have shown that it is always produced by constraint laid on both parties engaged in the contest1 and by a military element greatly attenuated4 ,in this game one general may show himself more skilful than his opponent2 and therefore1 if the strength of his army is equal1 he may also gain many advantages over him2 or if his force is inferior1 he may1 by his superior talent1 keep the contest evenly balanced2 but it is completely contradictory to the nature of the thing to look here for the highest honour and glory of a general2 such a campaign is always rather a certain sign that neither of the generals has any great military talent1 or that he who has talent is prevented by the force of circumstances from venturing on a great decision2 but when this is the case1 there is no scope afforded for the display of the highest military genius4 ,we have hitherto been engaged with the general character of strategic manuvring2 we must now proceed to a special influence which it has on the conduct of war1 namely this1 that it frequently leads the combatants away from the principal roads and places into unfrequented1 or at least unimportant localities4 ,when trifling interests1 which exist for a moment and then disappear1 are paramount1 the great features of a country have less influence on the conduct of the war4 ,we therefore often find that bodies of troops move to points where we should never look for them1 judging only by the great and simple requirements of the war2 and that consequently1 also1 the changefulness and diversity in the details of the contest as it progresses1 are much greater here than in wars directed to a great decision4 ,let us only look how in the last five campaigns of the ,seven ,years' ,war1 in spite of the relations in general remaining unchanged in themselves1 each of these campaigns took a different form1 and1 closely examined1 no single measure ever appears twice2 and yet in these campaigns the offensive principle manifests itself on the side of the allied army much more decidedly than in most other earlier wars4 ,in this chapter on the defence of a theatre of war1 if no great decision is proposed1 we have only shown the tendencies of the action1 together with its combination1 and the relations and character of the same2 the particular measures of which it is composed have been described in detail in a former part of our work4 ,now the question arises whether for these different tendencies of action no thoroughly general comprehensive principles1 rules1 or methods can be given4 ,to this we reply that1 as far as history is concerned1 we have decidedly not been led to any deductions of that kind through constantly recurring forms2 and at the same time1 for a subject so diversified and changeful in its general nature1 we could hardly admit any theoretical rule1 except one founded on experience4 ,a war directed to great decisions is not only much simpler1 but also much more in accordance with nature2 is more free from inconsistencies1 more objective1 more restricted by a law of inherent necessity2 hence the mind can prescribe forms and laws for it2 but for a war without a decision for its object1 this appears to us to be much more difficult4 ,even the two fundamental principles of the earliest theories of strategy published in our times1 the ,breadth of the ,base1 in ,bulow1 and the ,position on ,interior ,lines1 in ,jomini1 if applied to the defence of a theatre of war1 have in no instance shown themselves absolute and effective4 ,but being mere forms1 this is just where they should show themselves most efficacious1 because forms are always more efficacious1 always acquire a preponderance over other factors of the product1 the more the action extends over time and space4 ,notwithstanding this1 we find that they are nothing more than particular parts of the subject1 and certainly anything but decisive advantages4 ,it is very clear that the peculiar nature of the means and the relations must always from the first have a great influence adverse to all general principles4 ,what ,daun did by the extent and provident choice of positions1 the king did by keeping his army always concentrated1 always hugging the enemy close1 and by being always ready to act extemporally with his whole army4 ,the method of each general proceeded not only from the nature of the army he commanded1 but also from the circumstances in which he was placed4 ,to extemporise movements is always much easier for a king than for any commander who acts under responsibility4 ,we shall here once more point out particularly that the critic has no right to look upon the different manners and methods which may make their appearance as different degrees on the road to perfection1 the one inferior to the other2 they are entitled to be treated as on an equality1 and it must rest with the judgment to estimate their relative fitness for use in each particular case4 ,to enumerate these different manners which may spring from the particular nature of an army1 of a country1 or of circumstances1 is not our object here2 the influence of these things generally we have already noticed4 ,we acknowledge1 therefore1 that in this chapter we are unable to give any maxims1 rules1 or methods1 because history does not furnish the means2 and on the contrary1 at almost every moment1 we there meet with peculiarities such as are often quite inexplicable1 and often also surprise us by their singularity4 ,but it is not on that account unprofitable to study history in connection with this subject also4 ,where neither system nor any dogmatic apparatus can be found1 there may still be truth1 and this truth will then1 in most cases1 only be discovered by a practised judgment and the tact of long experience4 ,therefore1 even if history does not here furnish any formula1 we may be certain that here as well as everywhere else1 it will give us exercise for the judgment4 ,we shall only set up one comprehensive general principle1 or rather we shall reproduce1 and present to view more vividly1 in the form of a separate principle1 the natural presupposition of all that has now been said4 ,all the means which have been here set forth have only a relative value2 they are all placed under the legal ban of a certain disability on both sides2 above this region a higher law prevails1 and there is a totally different world of phenomena4 ,the general must never forget this2 he must never move in imaginary security within the narrower sphere1 as if he were in an absolute medium2 never look upon the means which he employs here as the necessary or as the only means1 and still adhere to them1 even when he himself already trembles at their insufficiency4 ,from the point of view at which we have here placed ourselves1 such an error may appear to be almost impossible2 but it is not impossible in the real world1 because there things do not appear in such sharp contrast4 ,we must just again remind our readers that1 for the sake of giving clearness1 distinctness1 and force to our ideas1 we have always taken as the subject of our consideration only the complete antithesis1 that is the two extremes of the question1 but that the concrete case in war generally lies between these two extremes1 and is only influenced by either of these extremes according to the degree in which it approaches nearer towards it4 ,therefore1 quite commonly1 everything depends on the general making up his own mind before all things as to whether his adversary has the inclination and the means of outbidding him by the use of greater and more decisive measures4 ,as soon as he has reason to apprehend this1 he must give up small measures intended to ward off small disadvantages2 and the course which remains for him then is to put himself in a better situation1 by a voluntary sacrifice1 in order to make himself equal to a greater solution4 ,in other words1 the first requisite is that the general should take the right scale in laying out his work4 ,in order to give these ideas still more distinctness through the help of real experience1 we shall briefly notice a string of cases in which1 according to our opinion1 a false criterion was made use of1 that is1 in which one of the generals in the calculation of his operations very much underestimated the decisive action intended by his adversary4 ,we begin with the opening of the campaign of #ageg1 in which the ,austrians showed by the disposition of their forces that they had not counted upon so thorough an offensive as that adopted by ,frederick the ,great2 even the delay of ,piccolomini's corps on the ,silesian frontier while ,duke ,charles of ,lorraine was in danger of having to surrender with his whole army1 is a similar case of complete misconception of the situation4 ,in #ageh1 the ,french were in the first place completely taken in as to the effects of the convention of ,kloster ,seeven 7a fact1 certainly1 with which we have nothing to do here71 and two months afterwards they were completely mistaken in their judgment of what their opponent might undertake1 which1 very shortly after1 cost them the country between the ,weser and the ,rhine4 ,that ,frederick the ,great1 in #agei1 at ,maxen1 and in #agfj1 at ,landshut1 completely misjudged his enemies in not supposing them capable of such decisive measures has been already mentioned4 ,but in all history we can hardly find a greater error in the criterion than that in #agib4 ,it was then imagined possible to turn the tide in a national war by a moderate sized auxiliary army1 which brought down on those who attempted it the enormous weight of the whole ,french people1 at that time completely unhinged by political fanaticism4 ,we only call this error a great one because it has proved so since1 and not because it would have been easy to avoid it4 ,as far as regards the conduct of the war itself1 it cannot be denied that the foundation of all the disastrous years which followed was laid in the campaign of #agid4 ,on the side of the allies in that campaign1 even the powerful nature of the enemy's system of attack was quite misunderstood1 by opposing to it a pitiful system of extended positions and strategic manuvres2 and further in the want of unanimity between ,prussia and ,austria politically1 and the foolish abandonment of ,belgium and the ,netherlands1 we may also see how little presentiment the cabinets of that day had of the force of the torrent which had just broken loose4 ,in the year #agif1 the partial acts of resistance offered at ,montenotte1 ,lodi1 etc41 etc41 show sufficiently how little the ,austrians understood the main point when confronted by a ,buonaparte4 ,in the year #ahjj it was not by the direct effect of the surprise1 but by the false view which ,melas took of the possible consequences of this surprise1 that his catastrophe was brought about4 ,ulm1 in the year #ahje1 was the last knot of a loose network of scientific but extremely feeble strategic combinations1 good enough to stop a ,daun or a ,lascy but not a ,buonaparte1 the ,revolution's ,emperor4 ,the indecision and embarrassment of the ,prussians in #ahjf1 proceeded from antiquated1 pitiful1 impracticable views and measures being mixed up with some lucid ideas and a true feeling of the immense importance of the moment4 ,if there had been a distinct consciousness and a complete appreciation of the position of the country1 how could they have left #cj1jjj men in ,prussia1 and then entertained the idea of forming a special theatre of war in ,westphalia1 and of gaining any results from a trivial offensive such as that for which ,ruchel's and the ,weimar corps were intended8 and how could they have talked of danger to magazines and loss of this or that strip of territory in the last moments left for deliberation8 ,even in #ahab1 in that grandest of all campaigns1 there was no want at first of unsound purposes proceeding from the use of an erroneous standard ,scale4 ,in the head quarters at ,wilna there was a party of men of high mark who insisted on a battle on the frontier1 in order that no hostile foot should tread on ,russian ground with impunity4 ,that this battle on the frontier might be lost1 nay1 that it would be lost1 these men certainly admitted2 for although they did not know that there would be #cjj1jjj ,french to meet #hj1jjj ,russians1 still they knew that the enemy was considerably superior in numbers4 ,the chief error was in the value which they ascribed to this battle2 they thought it would be a lost battle1 like many other lost battles1 whereas it may with certainty be asserted that this great battle on the frontier would have produced a succession of events completely different to those which actually took place4 ,even the camp at ,drissa was a measure at the root of which there lay a completely erroneous standard with regard to the enemy4 ,if the ,russian army had been obliged to remain there they would have been completely isolated and cut off from every quarter1 and then the ,french army would not have been at a loss for means to compel the ,russians to lay down their arms4 ,the designer of that camp never thought of power and will on such a scale as that4 ,but even ,buonaparte sometimes used a false standard4 ,after the armistice of #ahac he thought to hold in check the subordinate armies of the allies under ,blcher and the ,crown ,prince of ,sweden by corps which were certainly not able to offer any effectual resistance1 but which might impose sufficiently on the cautious to prevent their risking anything1 as had so often been done in preceding wars4 ,he did not reflect sufficiently on the reaction proceeding from the deep-rooted resentment with which both ,blcher and ,bulow were animated1 and from the imminent danger in which they were placed4 ,in general1 he under-estimated the enterprising spirit of old ,blcher4 ,at ,leipsic ,blcher alone wrested from him the victory2 at ,laon ,blcher might have entirely ruined him1 and if he did not do so the cause lay in circumstances completely out of the calculation of ,buonaparte2 lastly1 at ,belle-,alliance1 the penalty of this mistake reached him like a thunderbolt4 ,,sketches ,,for ,,book ,,vii ,,the ,,attack ,,chapter ,i4 ,the ,attack in ,relation to the ,defence ,if two ideas form an exact logical antithesis1 that is to say if the one is the complement of the other1 then1 in fact1 each one is implied in the other2 and when the limited power of our mind is insufficient to apprehend both at once1 and1 by the mere antithesis1 to recognise in the one perfect conception the totality of the other also1 still1 at all events1 the one always throws on the other a strong1 and in many parts a sufficient light ,thus we think the first chapter on the defence throws a sufficient light on all the points of the attack which it touches upon4 ,but it is not so throughout in respect of every point2 the train of thought could nowhere be carried to a finality2 it is1 therefore1 natural that where the opposition of ideas does not lie so immediately at the root of the conception as in the first chapters1 all that can be said about the attack does not follow directly from what has been said on the defence4 ,an alteration of our point of view brings us nearer to the subject1 and it is natural for us to observe1 at this closer point of view1 that which escaped observation at our former standpoint4 ,what is thus perceived will1 therefore1 be the complement of our former train of thought2 and it will not unfrequently happen that what is said on the attack will throw a new light on the defence4 ,in treating of the attack we shall1 of course1 very frequently have the same subjects before us with which our attention has been occupied in the defence4 ,but we have no intention1 nor would it be consistent with the nature of the thing1 to adopt the usual plan of works on engineering1 and in treating of the attack1 to circumvent or upset all that we have found of positive value in the defence1 by showing that against every means of defence1 there is an infallible method of attack4 ,the defence has its strong points and weak ones2 if the first are even not unsurmountable1 still they can only be overcome at a disproportionate price1 and that must remain true from whatever point of view we look at it1 or we get involved in a contradiction4 ,further1 it is not our intention thoroughly to review the reciprocal action of the means2 each means of defence suggests a means of attack2 but this is often so evident1 that there is no occasion to transfer oneself from our standpoint in treating of the defence to a fresh one for the attack1 in order to perceive it2 the one issues from the other of itself4 ,our object is1 in each subject1 to set forth the peculiar relations of the attack1 so far as they do not directly come out of the defence1 and this mode of treatment must necessarily lead us to many chapters to which there are no corresponding ones in the defence4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,nature of the ,strategical ,attack ,we have seen that the defensive in war generally--therefore1 also1 the strategic defensive--is no absolute state of expectancy and warding off1 therefore no completely passive state1 but that it is a relative state1 and consequently impregnated more or less with offensive principles4 ,in the same way the offensive is no homogeneous whole1 but incessantly mixed up with the defensive4 ,but there is this difference between the two1 that a defensive1 without an offensive return blow1 cannot be conceived2 that this return blow is a necessary constituent part of the defensive1 whilst in the attack1 the blow or act is in itself one complete idea4 ,the defence in itself is not necessarily a part of the attack2 but time and space1 to which it is inseparably bound1 import into it the defensive as a necessary evil4 ,for in the first place1 the attack cannot be continued uninterruptedly up to its conclusion1 it must have stages of rest1 and in these stages1 when its action is neutralised1 the state of defence steps in of itself2 in the second place1 the space which a military force1 in its advance1 leaves behind it1 and which is essential to its existence1 cannot always be covered by the attack itself1 but must be specially protected4 ,the act of attack in war1 but particularly in that branch which is called strategy1 is therefore a perpetual alternating and combining of attack and defence2 but the latter is not to be regarded as an effectual preparation for attack1 as a means by which its force is heightened1 that is to say1 not as an active principle1 but purely as a necessary evil2 as the retarding weight arising from the specific gravity of the mass2 it is its original sin1 its seed of mortality4 ,we say3 a retarding weight1 because if the defence does not contribute to strengthen the attack1 it must tend to diminish its effect by the very loss of time which it represents4 ,but now1 may not this defensive element1 which is contained in every attack1 have over it a positively disadvantageous influence8 ,if we suppose the attack is the weaker1 the defence the stronger form of war1 it seems to follow that the latter can not act in a positive sense prejudicially on the former2 for as long as we have sufficient force for the weaker form1 we should have more than enough for the stronger4 ,in general--that is1 as regards the chief part--this is true3 in its detail we shall analyse it more precisely in the chapter on the culminating point of victory2 but we must not forget that that superiority of the strategic defence is partly founded in this1 that the attack itself cannot take place without a mixture of defence1 and of a defensive of a very weak kind2 what the assailant has to carry about with him of this kind are its worst elements2 with respect to these1 that which holds good of the whole1 in a general sense1 cannot be maintained2 and therefore it is conceivable that the defensive may act upon the attack positively as a weakening principle4 ,it is just in these moments of weak defensive in the attack1 that the positive action of the offensive principle in the defensive should be introduced4 ,during the twelve hours rest which usually succeeds a day's work1 what a difference there is between the situation of the defender in his chosen1 well-known1 and prepared position1 and that of the assailant occupying a bivouac1 into which--like a blind man--he has groped his way1 or during a longer period of rest1 required to obtain provisions and to await reinforcements1 etc41 when the defender is close to his fortresses and supplies1 whilst the situation of the assailant1 on the other hand1 is like that of a bird on a tree4 ,every attack must lead to a defence2 what is to be the result of that defence1 depends on circumstances2 these circumstances may be very favourable if the enemy's forces are destroyed2 but they may be very unfavourable if such is not the case4 ,although this defensive does not belong to the attack itself1 its nature and effects must re-act on the attack1 and must take part in determining its value4 ,the deduction from this view is1 that in every attack the defensive1 which is necessarily an inherent feature in the same1 must come into consideration1 in order to see clearly the disadvantages to which it is subject1 and to be prepared for them4 ,on the other hand1 in another respect1 the attack is always in itself one and the same4 ,but the defensive has its gradations according as the principle of expectancy approaches to an end4 ,this begets forms which differ essentially from each other1 as has been developed in the chapter on the forms of defence4 ,as the principle of the attack is strictly active1 and the defensive1 which connects itself with it1 is only a dead weight2 there is1 therefore1 not the same kind of difference in it4 ,no doubt1 in the energy employed in the attack1 in the rapidity and force of the blow1 there may be a great difference1 but only a difference in degree1 not in form4--,it is quite possible to conceive even that the assailant may choose a defensive form1 the better to attain his object2 for instance1 that he may choose a strong position1 that he may be attacked there2 but such instances are so rare that we do not think it necessary to dwell upon them in our grouping of ideas and facts1 which are always founded on the practical4 ,we may1 therefore1 say that there are no such gradations in the attack as those which present themselves in the defence4 ,lastly1 as a rule1 the extent of the means of attack consists of the armed force only2 of course1 we must add to these the fortresses1 for if in the vicinity of the theatre of war1 they have a decided influence on the attack4 ,but this influence gradually diminishes as the attack advances2 and it is conceivable that1 in the attack1 its own fortresses never can play such an important part as in the defence1 in which they often become objects of primary importance4 ,the assistance of the people may be supposed in co-operation with the attack1 in those cases in which the inhabitants of the country are better disposed towards the invader of the country than they are to their own army2 finally1 the assailant may also have allies1 but then they are only the result of special or accidental relations1 not an assistance proceeding from the nature of the aggressive4 ,although1 therefore1 in speaking of the defence we have reckoned fortresses1 popular insurrections1 and allies as available means of resistance2 we cannot do the same in the attack2 there they belong to the nature of the thing2 here they only appear rarely1 and for the most part accidentally4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,of the ,objects of ,strategical ,attack ,the overthrow of the enemy is the aim in war2 destruction of the hostile military forces1 the means both in attack and defence4 ,by the destruction of the enemy's military force1 the defensive is led on to the offensive1 the offensive is led by it to the conquest of territory4 ,territory is1 therefore1 the object of the attack2 but that need not be a whole country1 it may be confined to a part1 a province1 a strip of country1 a fortress4 ,all these things may have a substantial value from their political importance1 in treating for peace1 whether they are retained or exchanged4 ,the object of the strategic attack is1 therefore1 conceivable in an infinite number of gradations1 from the conquest of the whole country down to that of some insignificant place4 ,as soon as this object is attained1 and the attack ceases1 the defensive commences4 ,we may1 therefore1 represent to ourselves the strategic attack as a distinctly limited unit4 ,but it is not so if we consider the matter practically1 that is in accordance with actual phenomena4 ,practically the moments of the attack1 that is1 its views and measures1 often glide just as imperceptibly into the defence as the plans of the defence into the offensive4 ,it is seldom1 or at all events not always1 that a general lays down positively for himself what he will conquer1 he leaves that dependent on the course of events4 ,his attack often leads him further than he had intended2 after rest more or less1 he often gets renewed strength1 without our being obliged to make out of this two quite different acts2 at another time he is brought to a standstill sooner than he expected1 without1 however1 giving up his intentions1 and changing to a real defensive4 ,we see1 therefore1 that if the successful defence may change imperceptibly into the offensive2 so on the other hand an attack may1 in like manner1 change into a defence4 ,these gradations must be kept in view1 in order to avoid making a wrong application of what we have to say of the attack in general4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,decreasing ,force of the ,attack ,this is one of the principal points in strategy3 on its right valuation in the concrete1 depends our being able to judge correctly what we are able to do4 ,the decrease of absolute power arises-- #a4 ,through the object of the attack1 the occupation of the enemy's country2 this generally commences first after the first decision1 but the attack does not cease upon the first decision4 #b4 ,through the necessity imposed on the attacking army to guard the country in its rear1 in order to preserve its line of communication and means of subsistence4 #c4 ,through losses in action and through sickness4 #d4 ,distance of the various depts of supplies and reinforcements4 #e4 ,sieges and blockades of fortresses4 #f4 ,relaxation of efforts4 #g4 ,secession of allies4 ,but frequently1 in opposition to these weakening causes1 there may be many others which contribute to strengthen the attack4 ,it is clear1 at all events1 that a net result can only be obtained by comparing these different quantities2 thus1 for example1 the weakening of the attack may be partly or completely compensated1 or even surpassed by the weakening of the defensive4 ,this last is a case which rarely happens2 we cannot always bring into the comparison any more forces than those in the immediate front or at decisive points1 not the whole of the forces in the field4--,different examples3 ,the ,french in ,austria and ,prussia1 in ,russia2 the allies in ,france1 the ,french in ,spain4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,culminating ,point of the ,attack ,the success of the attack is the result of a present superiority of force1 it being understood that the moral as well as physical forces are included4 ,in the preceding chapter we have shown that the power of the attack gradually exhausts itself2 possibly at the same time the superiority may increase1 but in most cases it diminishes4 ,the assailant buys up prospective advantages which are to be turned to account hereafter in negotiations for peace2 but1 in the meantime1 he has to pay down on the spot for them a certain amount of his military force4 ,if a preponderance on the side of the attack1 although thus daily diminishing1 is still maintained until peace is concluded1 the object is attained4 ,there are strategic attacks which have led to an immediate peace but such instances are rare2 the majority1 on the contrary1 lead only to a point at which the forces remaining are just sufficient to maintain a defensive1 and to wait for peace4 ,beyond that point the scale turns1 there is a reaction2 the violence of such a reaction is commonly much greater than the force of the blow4 ,this we call the culminating point of the attack4 ,as the object of the attack is the possession of the enemy's territory1 it follows that the advance must continue till the superiority is exhausted2 this cause1 therefore1 impels us towards the ultimate object1 and may easily lead us beyond it4 ,if we reflect upon the number of the elements of which an equation of the forces in action is composed1 we may conceive how difficult it is in many cases to determine which of two opponents has the superiority on his side4 ,often all hangs on the silken thread of imagination4 ,everything then depends on discovering the culminating point by the fine tact of judgment4 ,here we come upon a seeming contradiction4 ,the defence is stronger than the attack2 therefore we should think that the latter can never lead us too far1 for as long as the weaker form remains strong enough for what is required1 the stronger form ought to be still more so4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,destruction of the ,enemy's ,armies ,the destruction of the enemy's armed forces is the means to the end--,what is meant by this--,the price it costs--,different points of view which are possible in respect to the subject4 #a1 only to destroy as many as the object of the attack requires4 #b1 or as many on the whole as is possible4 #c1 the sparing of our own forces as the principal point of view4 #d1 this may again be carried so far1 that the assailant does nothing towards the destruction of the enemy's force except when a favourable opportunity offers1 which may also be the case with regard to the object of the attack1 as already mentioned in the third chapter4 ,the only means of destroying the enemy's armed force is by combat1 but this may be done in two ways3 #a1 directly1 #b1 indirectly1 through a combination of combats4--,if1 therefore1 the battle is the chief means1 still it is not the only means4 ,the capture of a fortress or of a portion of territory1 is in itself really a destruction of the enemy's force1 and it may also lead to a still greater destruction1 and therefore1 also1 be an indirect means4 ,the occupation of an undefended strip of territory1 therefore1 in addition to the value which it has as a direct fulfilment of the end1 may also reckon as a destruction of the enemy's force as well4 ,the manuvring1 so as to draw an enemy out of a district of country which he has occupied1 is somewhat similar1 and must1 therefore1 only be looked at from the same point of view1 and not as a success of arms1 properly speaking--,these means are generally estimated at more than they are worth--they have seldom the value of a battle2 besides which it is always to be feared that the disadvantageous position to which they lead1 will be overlooked2 they are seductive through the low price which they cost4 ,we must always consider means of this description as small investments1 from which only small profits are to be expected2 as means suited only to very limited ,state relations and weak motives4 ,then they are certainly better than battles without a purpose--than victories1 the results of which cannot be realised to the full4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,the ,offensive ,battle ,what we have said about the defensive battle throws a strong light upon the offensive also4 ,we there had in view that class of battle in which the defensive appears most decidedly pronounced1 in order that we might convey a more vivid impression of its nature2--but only the fewer number are of that kind2 most battles are demirencontres in which the defensive character disappears to a great extent4 ,it is otherwise with the offensive battle3 it preserves its character under all circumstances1 and can keep up that character the more boldly1 as the defender is out of his proper esse4 ,for this reason1 in the battle which is not purely defensive and in the real rencontres1 there always remains also something of the difference of the character of the battle on the one side and on the other4 ,the chief distinctive characteristic of the offensive battle is the manuvre to turn or surround1 therefore1 the initiative as well4 ,a combat in lines1 formed to envelope1 has evidently in itself great advantages2 it is1 however1 a subject of tactics4 ,the attack must not give up these advantages because the defence has a means of counteracting them2 for the attack itself cannot make use of that means1 inasmuch as it is one that is too closely dependent upon other things connected with the defence4 ,to be able in turn to operate with success against the flanks of an enemy1 whose aim is to turn our line1 it is necessary to have a well chosen and well prepared position4 ,but what is much more important is1 that all the advantages which the defensive possesses1 cannot be made use of2 most defences are poor makeshifts2 the greater number of defenders find themselves in a very harassing and critical position1 in which1 expecting the worst1 they meet the attack half way4 ,the consequence of this is1 that battles formed with enveloping lines1 or even with an oblique front1 which should properly result from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication1 are commonly the result of a moral and physical preponderance 7,marengo1 ,austerlitz1 ,jena74 ,besides1 in the first battle fought1 the base of the assailant1 if not superior to that of the defender1 is still mostly very wide in extent1 on account of the proximity of the frontier2 he can1 therefore1 afford to venture a little4--,the flank-attack1 that is1 the battle with oblique front1 is moreover generally more efficacious than the enveloping form4 ,it is an erroneous idea that an enveloping strategic advance from the very commencement must be connected with it1 as at ,prague4 7,that strategic measure has seldom anything in common with it1 and is very hazardous2 of which we shall speak further in the attack of a theatre of war47 ,as it is an object with the commander in the defensive battle to delay the decision as long as possible1 and gain time1 because a defensive battle undecided at sunset is commonly one gained3 therefore the commander1 in the offensive battle1 requires to hasten the decision2 but1 on the other hand1 there is a great risk in too much haste1 because it leads to a waste of forces4 ,one peculiarity in the offensive battle is the uncertainty1 in most cases1 as to the position of the enemy2 it is a complete groping about amongst things that are unknown 7,austerlitz1 ,wagram1 ,hohenlinden1 ,jena1 ,katzbach74 ,the more this is the case1 so much the more concentration of forces becomes paramount1 and turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding4 ,that the principal fruits of victory are first gathered in the pursuit1 we have already learnt in the twelfth chapter of the #dth ,book4 ,according to the nature of the thing1 the pursuit is more an integral part of the whole action in the offensive than in the defensive battle4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,passage of ,rivers #a4 ,a large river which crosses the direction of the attack is always very inconvenient for the assailant3 for when he has crossed it he is generally limited to one point of passage1 and1 therefore1 unless he remains close to the river he becomes very much hampered in his movements4 ,whether he meditates bringing on a decisive battle after crossing1 or may expect the enemy to attack him1 he exposes himself to great danger2 therefore1 without a decided superiority1 both in moral and physical force1 a general will not place himself in such a position4 #b4 ,from this mere disadvantage of placing a river behind an army1 a river is much oftener capable of defence than it would otherwise be4 ,if we suppose that this defence is not considered the only means of safety1 but is so planned that even if it fails1 still a stand can be made near the river1 then the assailant in his calculations must add to the resistance which he may experience in the defence of the river1 all the advantages mentioned in ,no4 #a1 as being on the side of the defender of a river1 and the effect of the two together is1 that we usually see generals show great respect to a river before they attack it if it is defended4 #c4 ,but in the preceding book we have seen1 that under certain conditions1 the real defence of a river promises right good results2 and if we refer to experience1 we must allow that such results follow in reality much more frequently than theory promises1 because in theory we only calculate with real circumstances as we find them take place1 while in the execution1 things commonly appear to the assailant much more difficult than they really are1 and they become therefore a greater clog on his action4 ,suppose1 for instance1 an attack which is not intended to end in a great solution1 and which is not conducted with thorough energy1 we may be sure that in carrying it out a number of little obstacles and accidents1 which no theory could calculate upon1 will start up to the disadvantage of the assailant1 because he is the acting party1 and must1 therefore1 come first into collision with such impediments4 ,let us just think for a moment how often some of the insignificant rivers of ,lombardy have been successfully defended6--,if1 on the other hand1 cases may also be found in military history1 in which the defence of rivers has failed to realise what was expected of them1 that lies in the extravagant results sometimes looked for from this means2 results not founded in any kind of way on its tactical nature1 but merely on its well-known efficacy1 to which people have thought there were no bounds4 #d4 ,it is only when the defender commits the mistake of placing his entire dependence on the defence of a river1 so that in case it is forced he becomes involved in great difficulty1 in a kind of catastrophe1 it is only then that the defence of a river can be looked upon as a form of defence favourable to the attack1 for it is certainly easier to force the passage of a river than to gain an ordinary battle4 #e4 ,it follows of itself from what has just been said that the defence of a river may become of great value if no great solution is desired1 but where that is to be expected1 either from the superior numbers or energy of the enemy1 then this means1 if wrongly used1 may turn to the positive advantage of the assailant4 #f4 ,there are very few river-lines of defence which cannot be turned either on the whole length or at some particular point4 ,therefore the assailant1 superior in numbers and bent upon serious blows1 has the means of making a demonstration at one point and passing at another1 and then by superior numbers1 and advancing1 regardless of all opposition1 he can repair any disadvantageous relations in which he may have been placed by the issue of the first encounters3 for his general superiority will enable him to do so4 ,it very rarely happens that the passage of a river is actually tactically forced by overpowering the enemy's principal post by the effect of superior fire and greater valour on the part of the troops1 and the expression1 forcing a passage is only to be taken in a strategic sense1 in so far that the assailant by his passage at an undefended or only slightly defended point within the line of defence1 braves all the dangers which1 in the defender's view1 should result to him through the crossing4--,but the worst which an assailant can do1 is to attempt a real passage at several points1 unless they lie close to each other and admit of all the troops joining in the combat2 for as the defender must necessarily have his forces separated1 therefore1 if the assailant fractions his in like manner1 he throws away his natural advantage4 ,in that way ,bellegarde lost the battle on the ,mincio1 #ahad1 where by chance both armies passed at different points at the same time1 and the ,austrians were more divided than the ,french4 #g4 ,if the defender remains on this side of the river1 it necessarily follows that there are two ways to gain a strategic advantage over him3 either to pass at some point1 regardless of his position1 and so to outbid him in the same means1 or to give battle4 ,in the first case1 the relations of the base and lines of communications should chiefly decide1 but it often happens that special circumstances exercise more influence than general relations2 he who can choose the best positions1 who knows best how to make his dispositions1 who is better obeyed1 whose army marches fastest1 etc41 may contend with advantage against general circumstances4 ,as regards the second means1 it presupposes on the part of the assailant the means1 suitable relations1 and the determination to fight2 but when these conditions may be presupposed1 the defender will not readily venture upon this mode of defending a river4 #h4 ,as a final result1 we must therefore give as our opinion that1 although the passage of a river in itself rarely presents great difficulties1 yet in all cases not immediately connected with a great decision1 so many apprehensions of the consequences and of future complications are bound up with it1 that at all events the progress of the assailant may easily be so far arrested that he either leaves the defender on this side the river1 or he passes1 and then remains close to the river4 ,for it rarely happens that two armies remain any length of time confronting one another on different sides of a river4 ,but also in cases of a great solution1 a river is an important object2 it always weakens and deranges the offensive2 and the most fortunate thing1 in this case is1 if the defender is induced through that to look upon the river as a tactical barrier1 and to make the particular defence of that barrier the principal act of his resistance1 so that the assailant at once obtains the advantage of being able to strike a decisive blow in a very easy manner4--,certainly1 in the first instance1 this blow will never amount to a complete defeat of the enemy1 but it will consist of several advantageous combats1 and these bring about a state of general relations very adverse to the enemy1 as happened to the ,austrians on the ,lower ,rhine1 #agif4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,attack on ,defensive ,positions ,in the book on the defence1 it has been sufficiently explained how far defensive positions can compel the assailant either to attack them1 or to give up his advance4 ,only those which can effect this are subservient to our object1 and suited to wear out or neutralise the forces of the aggressor1 either wholly or in part1 and in so far the attack can do nothing against such positions1 that is to say1 there are no means at its disposal by which to counter-balance this advantage4 ,but defensive positions are not all really of this kind4 ,if the assailant sees he can pursue his object without attacking such a position1 it would be an error to make the attack2 if he cannot follow out his object1 then it is a question whether he cannot manuvre the enemy out of his position by threatening his flank4 ,it is only if such means are ineffectual1 that a commander determines on the attack of a good position1 and then an attack directed against one side1 always in general presents the less difficulty2 but the choice of the side must depend on the position and direction of the mutual lines of retreat1 consequently1 on the threatening the enemy's retreat1 and covering our own4 ,between these two objects a competition may arise1 in which case the first is entitled to the preference1 as it is of an offensive nature2 therefore homogeneous with the attack1 whilst the other is of a defensive character4 ,but it is certain1 and may be regarded as a truth of the first importance1 that to attack an enemy thoroughly inured to war1 in a good position1 is a critical thing4 ,no doubt instances are not wanting of such battles1 and of successful ones too1 as ,torgau1 ,wagram 7we do not say ,dresden1 because we cannot call the enemy there quite aguerried72 but upon the whole1 the danger is small1 and it vanishes altogether1 opposed to the infinite number of cases in which we have seen the most resolute commanders make their bow before such positions4 7,torres ,vedras47 ,we must not1 however1 confuse the subject now before us with ordinary battles4 ,most battles are real 8rencontres10 in which one party certainly occupies a position1 but one which has not been prepared4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,attack on an ,entrenched ,camp ,it was for a time the fashion to speak with contempt of entrenchments and their utility4 ,the cordon lines of the ,french frontier1 which had been often burst through2 the entrenched camp at ,breslau in which the ,duke of ,bevern was defeated1 the battle of ,torgau1 and several other cases1 led to this opinion of their value2 and the victories of ,frederick the ,great1 gained by the principle of movement and the use of the offensive1 threw a fresh light on all kind of defensive action1 all fighting in a fixed position1 particularly in intrenchments1 and brought them still more into contempt4 ,certainly1 when a few thousand men are to defend several miles of country1 and when entrenchments are nothing more than ditches reversed1 they are worth nothing1 and they constitute a dangerous snare through the confidence which is placed in them4 ,but is it not inconsistent1 or rather nonsensical1 to extend this view even to the idea of field fortification1 in a mere swaggering spirit 7as ,templehof does78 ,what would be the object of entrenchments generally1 if not to strengthen the defence8 ,no1 not only reason but experience1 in hundreds and thousands of instances1 show that a well-traced1 sufficiently manned1 and well defended entrenchment is1 as a rule1 to be looked upon as an impregnable point1 and is also so regarded by the attack4 ,starting from this point of the efficiency of a single entrenchment1 we argue that there can be no doubt as to the attack of an entrenched camp being a most difficult undertaking1 and one in which generally it will be impossible for the assailant to succeed4 ,it is consistent with the nature of an entrenched camp that it should be weakly garrisoned2 but with good1 natural obstacles of ground and strong field works1 it is possible to bid defiance to superior numbers4 ,frederick the ,great considered the attack of the camp of ,pirna as impracticable1 although he had at his command double the force of the garrison2 and although it has been since asserted1 here and there1 that it was quite possible to have taken it2 the only proof in favour of this assertion is founded on the bad condition of the ,saxon troops2 an argument which does not at all detract in any way from the value of entrenchments4 ,but it is a question1 whether those who have since contended not only for the feasibility but also for the facility of the attack1 would have made up their minds to execute it at the time4 ,we1 therefore1 think that the attack of an entrenched camp belongs to the category of quite exceptional means on the part of the offensive4 ,it is only if the entrenchments have been thrown up in haste are not completed1 still less strengthed by obstacles to prevent their being approached1 or when1 as is often the case taken altogether1 the whole camp is only an outline of what it was intended to be1 a half-finished ruin1 that then an attack on it may be advisable1 and at the same time become the road to gain an easy conquest over the enemy4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,attack on a ,mountain ,from the fifth and following chapters of the sixth book1 may be deduced sufficiently the strategic relations of a mountain generally1 both as regards the defence and the attack4 ,we have also there endeavoured to explain the part which a mountain plays as a line of defence1 properly so called1 and from that naturally follows how it is to be looked upon in this signification from the side of the assailant4 ,there remains1 therefore1 little for us to say here on this important subject4 ,our chief result was there that the defence must choose as his point of view a secondary combat1 or the entirely different one of a great general action2 that in the first case the attack of a mountain can only be regarded as a necessary evil1 because all the circumstances are unfavourable to it2 but in the second case the advantages are on the side of the attack4 ,an attack1 therefore1 armed with the means and the resolution for a battle1 will give the enemy a meeting in the mountains1 and certainly find his account in so doing4 ,but we must here once more repeat that it will be difficult to obtain respect for this conclusion1 because it runs counter to appearances1 and is also1 at first sight1 contrary to the experience of war4 ,it has been observed1 in most cases hitherto1 that an army pressing forward to the attack 7whether seeking a great general action or not71 has considered it an unusual piece of good fortune if the enemy has not occupied the intervening mountains1 and has itself then hastened to be beforehand in the occupation of them4 ,no one will find this forestalling of the enemy in any way inconsistent with the interests of the assailant2 in our view this is also quite admissible1 only we must point out clearly a fine distinction here between circumstances4 ,an army advancing against the enemy1 with the design of bringing him to a general action1 if it has to pass over an unoccupied range of mountain1 has naturally to apprehend that the enemy may1 at the last moment1 block up those very passes which it proposes to use on its march3 in such a case1 the assailant will by no means have the same advantages as if the enemy occupied merely an ordinary mountain position4 ,the latter is1 for instance1 not then in a position extended beyond measure1 nor is he in uncertainty as to the road which the assailant will take2 the assailant has not been able to choose his road with reference to the enemy's position1 and therefore this battle in the mountains is not then united with all those advantages on his side of which we have spoken in the sixth book2 under such circumstances1 the defender might be found in an impregnable position--,according to this1 the defender might even have means at his command of making advantageous use of the mountains for a great battle4--,this is1 at any rate1 possible2 but if we reflect on the difficulties which the defender would have to encounter in establishing himself in a strong position in the mountains just at the last moment1 particularly if he has left it entirely unoccupied before1 we may put down this means of defence as one upon which no dependence can be placed1 and therefore as one1 the probability of which the assailant has little reason to dread4 ,but even if it is a very improbable case1 yet still it is natural to fear it2 for in war1 many a thing is very natural1 and yet in a certain measure superfluous4 ,but another measure which the assailant has to apprehend here is1 a preliminary defence of the mountains by an advanced guard or chain of outposts4 ,this means1 also1 will seldom accord with the interests of the defender2 but the assailant has not the means of discerning how far it may be beneficial to the defender or otherwise1 and therefore he has only to provide against the worst4 ,further1 our view by no means excludes the possibility of a position being quite unassailable from the mountainous character of the ground3 there are such positions which are not1 on that account1 in the mountains 7,pirna1 ,schmotseifen1 ,meissen1 ,feldkirch71 and it is just because they are not in the mountains1 that they are so well suited for defence4 ,we may also very well conceive that positions may be found in mountains themselves where the defender might avoid the ordinary disadvantages of mountain-positions1 as1 for instance1 on lofty plateaux2 but they are not common1 and we can only take into our view the generality of cases4 ,it is just in military history that we see how little mountain-positions are suited to decisive defensive battles1 for great generals have always preferred a position in the plains1 when it was their object to fight a battle of the first order2 and throughout the whole range of military history1 there are no examples of decisive battles in the mountains1 except in the ,revolutionary ,wars1 and even there it was plainly a false application and analogy which led to the use of mountain-positions1 where of necessity a decisive battle had to be fought 7#agic and #agid in the ,vosges1 and #agie1 #agif1 and #agig in ,italy74 ,melas has been generally blamed for not having occupied the ,alpine passes in #ahjj2 but such criticisms are nothing more than 8early notions0--we might say--childlike judgments founded on appearances4 ,buonaparte1 in ,mela's place1 would just as little have thought of occupying the passes4 ,the dispositions for the attack of mountain-positions are mostly of a tactical nature2 but we think it necessary to insert here the following remarks as to the general outline1 consequently as to those parts which come into immediate contact with1 and are coincident with1 strategy4 #a4 ,as we cannot move wide of the roads in mountains as we can in other districts1 and form two or three columns out of one1 when the exigency of the moment requires that the mass of the troops should be divided2 but1 on the contrary1 we are generally confined to long defiles2 the advance in mountains must generally be made on several roads1 or rather upon a somewhat broader front4 #b4 ,against a mountain line of defence of wide extent1 the attack must naturally be made with concentrated forces2 to surround the whole cannot be thought of there1 and if an important result is to be gained from victory1 it must be obtained rather by bursting through the enemy's line1 and separating the wings1 than by surrounding the force1 and so cutting it off4 ,a rapid1 continuous advance upon the enemy's principal line of retreat is there the natural endeavour of the assailant4 #c4 ,but if the enemy to be attacked occupies a position somewhat concentrated1 turning movements are an essential part of the scheme of attack1 as the front attacks fall upon the mass of the defender's forces2 but the turning movements again must be made more with a view to cutting off the enemy's retreat1 than as a tactical rolling up of the flank or attack on the rear2 for mountain positions are capable of a prolonged resistance even in rear if forces are not wanting1 and the quickest result is invariably to be expected only from the enemy's apprehension of losing his line of retreat2 this sort of uneasiness arises sooner1 and acts more powerfully in mountains1 because1 when it comes to the worst1 it is not so easy to make room sword in hand4 ,a mere demonstration is no sufficient means here2 it might certainly manuvre the enemy out of his position1 but would not ensure any special result2 the aim must therefore be to cut him off1 in reality1 from his line of retreat4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,attack on ,cordon ,lines ,if a supreme decision should lie in their defence and their attack1 they place the assailant in an advantageous situation1 for their wide extent is still more in opposition to all the requirements of a decisive battle than the direct defence of a river or a mountain range4 ,eugene's lines of ,denain1 #agab1 are an illustration to the point here1 for their loss was quite equal to a complete defeat1 but ,villars would hardly have gained such a victory against ,eugene in a concentrated position4 ,if the offensive side does not possess the means required for a decisive battle1 then even lines are treated with respect1 that is1 if they are occupied by the main body of an army2 for instance1 those of ,stollhofen1 held by ,louis of ,baden in the year #agjc1 were respected even by ,villars4 ,but if they are only held by a secondary force1 then it is merely a question of the strength of the corps which we can spare for their attack4 ,the resistance in such cases is seldom great1 but at the same time the result of the victory is seldom worth much4 ,the circumvallation lines of a besieger have a peculiar character1 of which we shall speak in the chapter on the attack of a theatre of war4 ,all positions of the cordon kind1 as1 for instance1 entrenched lines of outposts1 etc41 etc41 have always this property1 that they can be easily broken through2 but when they are not forced with a view of going further and bringing on a decision1 there is so little to be gained in general by the attack1 that it hardly repays the trouble expended4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,manuvring #a4 ,we have already touched upon this subject in the thirtieth chapter of the sixth book4 ,it is one which concerns the defence and the attack in common2 nevertheless it has always in it something more of the nature of the offensive than the defensive4 ,we shall therefore now examine it more thoroughly4 #b4 ,manuvring is not only the opposite of executing the offensive by force1 by means of great battles2 it stands also opposed to every such execution of the offensive as proceeds directly from offensive means1 let it be either an operation against the enemy's communications1 or line of retreat1 a diversion1 etc41 etc4 #c4 ,if we adhere to the ordinary use of the word1 there is in the conception of manuvring an effect which is first produced1 to a certain extent1 from nothing1 that is1 from a state of rest or equilibrium through the mistakes into which the enemy is enticed4 ,it is like the first moves in a game of chess4 ,it is1 therefore1 a game of evenly-balanced powers1 to obtain results from favourable opportunity1 and then to use these as an advantage over the enemy4 #d4 ,but those interests which1 partly as the final object1 partly as the principal supports 7pivot7 of action1 must be considered in this matter1 are chiefly3-- 7a47 ,the subsistence from which it is our object to cut off the enemy1 or to impede his obtaining4 7b47 ,the junction with other corps4 7c47 ,the threatening other communications with the interior of the country1 or with other armies or corps4 7d47 ,threatening the retreat4 7e47 ,attack of isolated points with superior forces ,these five interests may establish themselves in the smallest features of detail belonging to any particular situation2 and any such object then becomes1 on that account1 a point round which everything for a time revolves4 ,a bridge1 a road1 or an entrenchment1 often thus plays the principal part4 ,it is easy to show in each case that it is only the relation which any such object has to one of the above interests which gives it importance4 7f47 ,the result of a successful manuvre1 then1 is for the offensive1 or rather for the active party 7which may certainly be just as well the defensive71 a piece of land1 a magazine1 etc4 7g47 ,in a strategic manuvre two converse propositions appear1 which look like different manuvres1 and have sometimes served for the derivation of false maxims and rules1 and have four branches1 which are1 however1 in reality1 all necessary constituents of the same thing1 and are to be regarded as such4 ,the first antithesis is the surrounding the enemy1 and the operating on interior lines2 the second is the concentration of forces1 and their extension over several posts4 7h47 ,as regards the first antithesis1 we certainly cannot say that one of its members deserves a general preference over the other2 for partly it is natural that action of one kind calls forth the other as its natural counterpoise1 its true remedy2 partly the enveloping form is homogeneous to the attack1 but the use of interior lines to the defence2 and therefore1 in most cases1 the first is more suitable to the offensive side1 the latter to the defensive4 ,that form will gain the upper hand which is used with the greatest skill4 7i47 ,the branches of the other antithesis can just as little be classed the one above the other4 ,the stronger force has the choice of extending itself over several posts2 by that means he will obtain for himself a convenient strategic situation1 and liberty of action in many respects1 and spare the physical powers of his troops4 ,the weaker1 on the other hand1 must keep himself more concentrated1 and seek by rapidity of movement to counteract the disadvantage of his inferior numbers4 ,this greater mobility supposes greater readiness in marching4 ,the weaker must therefore put a greater strain on his physical and moral forces1--a final result which we must naturally come upon everywhere if we would always be consistent1 and which1 therefore1 we regard1 to a certain extent1 as the logical test of the reasoning4 ,the campaigns of ,frederick the ,great against ,daun1 in the years #agei and #agfj1 and against ,laudon1 #agfa1 and ,montecuculis against ,turenne in #afgc1 #afge1 have always been reckoned the most scientific combinations of this kind1 and from them we have chiefly derived our view4 7j47 ,just as the four parts of the two antitheses above supposed must not be abused by being made the foundation of false maxims and rules1 so we must also give a caution against attaching to other general relations1 such as base1 ground1 etc41 an importance and a decisive influence which they do not in reality possess4 ,the smaller the interests at stake1 so much the more important the details of time and place become1 so much the more that which is general and great falls into the background1 having1 in a certain measure no place in small calculations4 ,is there to be found1 viewed generally1 a more absurd situation than that of ,turenne in #afge1 when he stood with his back close to the ,rhine1 his army along a line of three miles in extent1 and with his bridge of retreat at the extremity of his right wing8 ,but his measures answered their object1 and it is not without reason that they are acknowledged to show a high degree of skill and intelligence4 ,we can only understand this result and this skill when we look more closely into details1 and judge of them according to the value which they must have had in this particular case4 ,we are convinced that there are no rules of any kind for strategic manuvring2 that no method1 no general principle can determine the mode of action2 but that superior energy1 precision1 order1 obedience1 intrepidity in the most special and trifling circumstances may find means to obtain for themselves signal advantages1 and that1 therefore1 chiefly on those qualities will depend the victory in this sort of contest4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,attack on ,morasses1 ,inundations1 ,woods ,morasses1 that is1 impassable swamps1 which are only traversed by a few embankments1 present peculiar difficulties to the tactical attack1 as we have stated in treating of the defence4 ,their breadth hardly ever admits of the enemy being driven from the opposite bank by artillery1 and of the construction of a roadway across4 ,the strategic consequence is that endeavours are made to avoid attacking them by passing round them4 ,where the state of culture1 as in many low countries1 is so great that the means of passing are innumerable1 the resistance of the defender is still strong enough relatively1 but it is proportionably weakened for an absolute decision1 and1 therefore1 wholly unsuitable for it4 ,on the other hand1 if the low land 7as in ,holland7 is aided by inundations1 the resistance may become absolute1 and defy every attack4 ,this was shown in ,holland in the year #afgb1 when1 after the conquest and occupation of all the fortresses outside the margin of the inundation1 #ej1jjj ,french troops became available1 who1--first under ,cond and then under ,luxemburg1--were unable to force the line of inundation1 although it was only defended by about #bj1jjj men4 ,the campaign of the ,prussians1 in #aghg1 under the ,duke of ,brunswick1 against the ,dutch1 ended1 it is true1 in a quite contrary way1 as these lines were then carried by a force very little superior to the defenders1 and with trifling loss2 but the reason of that is to be found in the dissensions amongst the defenders from political animosities1 and a want of unity in the command1 and yet nothing is more certain than that the success of the campaign1 that is1 the advance through the last line of inundation up to the walls of ,amsterdam depended on a point of such extreme nicety that it is impossible to draw any general deduction from this case4 ,the point alluded to was the leaving unguarded the ,sea of ,haarlem4 ,by means of this1 the ,duke turned the inundation line1 and got in rear of the post of ,amselvoen4 ,if the ,dutch had had a couple of armed vessels on this lake the duke would never have got to ,amsterdam1 for he was 8au bout de son latin40 ,what influence that might have had on the conclusion of peace does not concern us here1 but it is certain that any further question of carrying the last line of inundation would have been put an end to completely4 ,the winter is1 no doubt1 the natural enemy of this means of defence1 as the ,french have shown in #agid and #agie1 but it must be a severe winter4 ,woods1 which are scarcely passable1 we have also included amongst the means which afford the defence powerful assistance4 ,if they are of no great depth then the assailant may force his way through by several roads running near one another1 and thus reach better ground1 for no one point can have any great tactical strength1 as we can never suppose a wood as absolutely impassable as a river or a morass4--,but when1 as in ,russia and ,poland1 a very large tract of country is nearly everywhere covered with wood1 and the assailant has not the power of getting beyond it1 then1 certainly1 his situation becomes very embarrassing4 ,we have only to think of the difficulties he must contend with to subsist his army1 and how little he can do in the depths of the forest to make his ubiquitous adversary feel his superiority in numbers4 ,certainly this is one of the worst situations in which the offensive can be placed4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,attack on a ,theatre of ,war with the ,view to a ,decision ,most of the subjects have been already touched upon in the sixth book1 and by their mere reflection1 throw sufficient light on the attack4 ,moreover1 the conception of an enclosed theatre of war1 has a nearer relation to the defence than to the attack4 ,many of the leading points1 the object of attack1 the sphere of action of victory1 etc41 have been already treated of in that book1 and that which is most decisive and essential on the nature of the attack1 cannot be made to appear until we get to the plan of war3 still there remains a good deal to say here1 and we shall again commence with the campaign1 in which a great decision is positively intended4 #a4 ,the first aim of the attack is a victory4 ,to all the advantages which the defender finds in the nature of his situation1 the assailant can only oppose superior numbers2 and1 perhaps1 in addition1 the slight advantage which the feeling of being the offensive and advancing side gives an army4 ,the importance of this feeling1 however1 is generally overrated2 for it does not last long1 and will not hold out against real difficulties4 ,of course1 we assume that the defender is as faultless and judicious in all he does as the aggressor4 ,our object in this observation is to set aside those vague ideas of sudden attack and surprise1 which1 in the attack1 are generally assumed to be fertile sources of victory1 and which yet1 in reality1 never occur except under special circumstances4 ,the nature of the real strategic surprise1 we have already spoken of elsewhere4--,if1 then1 the attack is inferior in physical power1 it must have the ascendancy in moral power1 in order to make up for the disadvantages which are inherent in the offensive form2 if the superiority in that way is also wanting1 then there are no good grounds for the attack1 and it will not succeed4 #b4 ,as prudence is the real genius of the defender1 so boldness and self-confidence must animate the assailant4 ,we do not mean that the opposite qualities in each case may be altogether wanting1 but that the qualities named have the greatest affinity to the attack and defence respectively4 ,these qualities are only in reality necessary because action in war is no mere mathematical calculation2 it is activity which is carried on if not in the dark1 at all events in a feeble twilight1 in which we must trust ourselves to the leader who is best suited to carry out the aim we have in view4--,the weaker the defender shows himself morally1 the bolder the assailant should become4 #c4 ,for victory1 it is necessary that there should be a battle between the enemy's principal force and our own4 ,this is less doubtful as regards the attack than in regard to the defence1 for the assailant goes in search of the defender in his position4 ,but we have maintained 7in treating of the defensive7 that the offensive should not seek the defender out if he has placed himself in a false position1 because he may be sure that the defender will seek him out1 and then he will have the advantage of fighting where the defender has not prepared the ground4 ,here all depends on the road and direction which have the greatest importance2 this is a point which was not examined in the defence1 being reserved for the present chapter4 ,we shall1 therefore1 say what is necessary about it here4 #d4 ,we have already pointed out those objects to which the attack should be more immediately directed1 and which1 therefore1 are the ends to be obtained by victory2 now1 if these are within the theatre of war which is attacked1 and within the probable sphere of victory1 then the road to them is the natural direction of the blow to be struck4 ,but we must not forget that the object of the attack does not generally obtain its signification until victory has been gained1 and therefore the mind must always embrace the idea of victory with it2 the principal consideration for the assailant is1 therefore1 not so much merely to reach the object as to reach it a conqueror2 therefore the direction of his blow should be not so much on the object itself as on the way which the enemy's army must take to reach it4 ,this way is the immediate object of the attack4 ,to fall in with the enemy before he has reached this object1 to cut him off from it1 and in that position to beat him--to do this is to gain an intensified victory4--,if1 for example1 the enemy's capital is the object of the attack1 and the defender has not placed himself between it and the assailant1 the latter would be wrong in marching direct upon the capital1 he would do much better by taking his direction upon the line connecting the defender's army with the capital1 and seeking there the victory which shall place the capital in his hands4 ,if there is no great object within the assailant's sphere of victory1 then the enemy's line of communication with the nearest great object to him is the point of paramount importance4 ,the question1 then1 for every assailant to ask himself is1 ,if ,i am successful in the battle1 what is the first use ,i shall make of the victory8 ,the object to be gained1 as indicated by the answer to this question1 shows the natural direction for his blow4 ,if the defender has placed himself in that direction1 he has done right1 and there is nothing to do but to go and look for him there4 ,if his position is too strong1 then the assailant must seek to turn it1 that is1 make a virtue of necessity4 ,but if the defender has not placed himself on this right spot1 then the assailant chooses that direction1 and as soon as he comes in line with the defender1 if the latter has not in the mean time made a lateral movement1 and placed himself across his path1 he should turn himself in the direction of the defender's line of communication in order to seek an action there2 if the defender remains quite stationary1 then the assailant must wheel round towards him and attack him in rear4 ,of all the roads amongst which the assailant has a choice1 the great roads which serve the commerce of the country are always the best and the most natural to choose4 ,to avoid any very great bends1 more direct roads1 even if smaller1 must be chosen1 for a line of retreat which deviates much from a direct line is always perilous4 #e4 ,the assailant1 when he sets out with a view to a great decision1 has seldom any reason for dividing his forces1 and if1 notwithstanding this1 he does so1 it generally proceeds from a want of clear views4 ,he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width of front as will admit of their all coming into action together4 ,if the enemy himself has divided his forces1 so much the better for the assailant1 and to preserve this further advantage small demonstrations should be made against the enemy's corps which have separated from the main body2 these are the strategic fausses attaques2 a detachment of forces for this purpose would then be justifiable4 ,such separation into several columns as is indispensably necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form1 for that form is natural to the attack1 and must not be disregarded without good reason4 ,but it must be only of a tactical nature1 for a strategic envelopment when a great blow takes place1 is a complete waste of power4 ,it can only be excused when the assailant is so strong that there can be no doubt at all about the result4 #f4 ,but the attack requires also prudence1 for the assailant has also a rear1 and has communications which must be protected4 ,this service of protection must be performed as far as possible by the manner in which the army advances1 that is1 eo ipso by the army itself4 ,if a force must be specially detailed for this duty1 and therefore a partition of forces is required1 this cannot but naturally weaken the force of the blow itself4--,as a large army is always in the habit of advancing with a front of a day's march at least in breadth1 therefore1 if the lines of retreat and communication do not deviate much from the perpendicular1 the covering of those lines is in most cases attained by the front of the army4 ,dangers of this description1 to which the assailant is exposed1 must be measured chiefly by the situation and character of the adversary4 ,when everything lies under the pressure of an imminent great decision1 there is little room for the defender to engage in undertakings of this description2 the assailant has1 therefore1 in ordinary circumstances not much to fear4 ,but if the advance is over1 if the assailant himself is gradually passing into the defensive1 then the covering of the rear becomes every moment more necessary1 becomes more a thing of the first importance4 ,for the rear of the assailant being naturally weaker than that of the defender1 therefore the latter1 long before he passes over to the real offensive1 and even at the same time that he is yielding ground1 may have commenced to operate against the communications of the assailant4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,attack on a ,theatre of ,war without the ,view to a ,great ,decision #a4 ,although there is neither the will nor the power sufficient for a great decision1 there may still exist a decided view in a strategic attack1 but it is directed against some secondary object4 ,if the attack succeeds1 then1 with the attainment of this object the whole falls again into a state of rest and equilibrium4 ,if difficulties to a certain extent present themselves1 the general progress of the attack comes to a standstill before the object is gained4 ,then in its place commences a mere occasional offensive or strategic manuvring4 ,this is the character of most campaigns4 #b4 ,the objects which may be the aim of an offensive of this description are3-- 7a47 ,a strip of territory2 gain in means of subsistence1 perhaps contributions1 sparing our own territory1 equivalents in negotiations for peace--such are the advantages to be derived from this procedure4 ,sometimes an idea of the credit of the army is attached to it1 as was perpetually the case in the wars of the ,french ,marshals in the time of ,louis ,,xiv4 ,it makes a very important difference whether a portion of territory can be kept or not4 ,in general1 the first is the case only when the territory is on the edge of our own theatre of war1 and forms a natural complement of it4 ,only such portions come into consideration as an equivalent in negotiating a peace1 others are usually only taken possession of for the duration of a campaign1 and to be evacuated when winter begins4 7b47 ,one of the enemy's principal magazines4 ,if it is not one of considerable importance1 it can hardly be looked upon as the object of an offensive determining a whole campaign4 ,it certainly in itself is a loss to the defender1 and a gain to the assailant2 the great advantage1 however1 from it for the latter1 is that the loss may compel the defender to retire a little and give up a strip of territory which he would otherwise have kept4 ,the capture of a magazine is therefore in reality more a means1 and is only spoken of here as an object1 because1 until captured1 it becomes1 for the time being1 the immediate definite aim of action4 7c47 ,the capture of a fortress4--,we have made the siege of fortresses the subject of a separate chapter1 to which we refer our readers4 ,for the reasons there explained1 it is easy to conceive how it is that fortresses always constitute the best and most desirable objects in those offensive wars and campaigns in which views cannot be directed to the complete overthrow of the enemy or the conquest of an important part of his territory4 ,we may also easily understand how it is that in the wars in the ,low ,countries1 where fortresses are so abundant1 everything has always turned on the possession of one or other of these fortresses1 so much so1 that the successive conquests of whole provinces never once appear as leading features2 while1 on the other hand1 each of these strong places used to be regarded as a separate thing1 which had an intrinsic value in itself1 and more attention was paid to the convenience and facility with which it could be attacked than to the value of the place itself4 ,at the same time1 the attack of a place of some importance is always a great undertaking1 because it causes a very large expenditure2 and1 in wars in which the whole is not staked at once on the game1 this is a matter which ought to be very much considered4 ,therefore1 such a siege takes its place here as one of the most important objects of a strategic attack4 ,the more unimportant a place is1 or the less earnestness there is about the siege1 the smaller the preparations for it1 the more it is done as a thing en passant1 so much the smaller also will be the strategic object1 and the more it will be a service fit for small forces and limited views2 and the whole thing then often sinks into a kind of sham fight1 in order to close the campaign with honour1 because as assailant it is incumbent to do something4 7d47 ,a successful combat1 encounter1 or even battle1 for the sake of trophies1 or merely for the honour of the arms1 sometimes even for the mere ambition of the commanders4 ,that this does happen no one can doubt1 unless he knows nothing at all of military history4 ,in the campaigns of the ,french during the reign of ,louis ,,xiv41 the most of the offensive battles were of this kind4 ,but what is of more importance for us is to observe that these things are not without objective value1 they are not the mere pastime of vanity2 they have a very distinct influence on peace1 and therefore lead as it were direct to the object4 ,the military fame1 the moral superiority of the army and of the general1 are things1 the influence of which1 although unseen1 never ceases to bear upon the whole action in war4 ,the aim of such a combat of course presupposes2 7a7 that there is an adequate prospect of victory1 7b7 that there is not a very heavy stake dependent on the issue4--,such a battle fought in straitened relations1 and with a limited object1 must naturally not be confounded with a victory which is not turned to profitable account merely from moral weakness4 #c4 ,with the exception of the last of these objects 7d7 they may all be attained without a combat of importance1 and generally they are so obtained by the offensive4 ,now1 the means which the assailant has at command without resorting to a decisive battle1 are derived from the interests which the defensive has to protect in his theatre of war2 they consist1 therefore1 in threatening his lines of communications1 either through objects connected with subsistence1 as magazines1 fertile provinces1 water communications1 etc41 or important points 7bridges1 defiles1 and such like17 or also by placing other corps in the occupation of strong positions situated inconveniently near to him and from which he cannot again drive us out2 the seizure of important towns1 fertile districts1 disturbed parts of the country1 which may be excited to rebellion1 the threatening of weak allies1 etc41 etc4 ,should the attack effectually interrupt the communications1 and in such a manner that the defender cannot re-establish them but at a great sacrifice1 it compels the defender to take up another position more to the rear or to a flank to cover the objects1 at the same time giving up objects of secondary importance4 ,thus a strip of territory is left open2 a magazine or a fortress uncovered3 the one exposed to be overrun1 the other to be invested4 ,out of this1 combats greater or less may arise1 but in such case they are not sought for and treated as an object of the war but as a necessary evil1 and can never exceed a certain degree of greatness and importance4 #d4 ,the operation of the defensive on the communications of the offensive1 is a kind of reaction which in wars waged for the great solution1 can only take place when the lines of operation are very long2 on the other hand1 this kind of reaction lies more in accordance with the nature of things in wars which are not aimed at the great solution4 ,the enemy's lines of communication are seldom very long in such a case2 but then1 neither is it here so much a question of inflicting great losses of this description on the enemy1 a mere impeding and cutting short his means of subsistence often produces an effect1 and what the lines want in length is made up for in some degree by the length of time which can be expended in this kind of contest with the enemy3 for this reason1 the covering his strategic flanks becomes an important object for the assailant4 ,if1 therefore1 a contest 7or rivalry7 of this description takes place between the assailant and defender1 then the assailant must seek to compensate by numbers for his natural disadvantages4 ,if he retains sufficient power and resolution still to venture a decisive stroke against one of the enemy's corps1 or against the enemy's main body itself1 the danger which he thus holds over the head of his opponent is his best means of covering himself4 #e4 ,in conclusion1 we must notice another great advantage which the assailant certainly has over the defender in wars of this kind1 which is that of being better able to judge of the intentions and force of his adversary than the latter can in turn of his4 ,it is much more difficult to discover in what degree an assailant is enterprising and bold than when the defender has something of consequence in his mind4 ,practically viewed1 there usually lies already in the choice of the defensive form of war a sort of guarantee that nothing positive is intended2 besides this1 the preparations for a great reaction differ much more from the ordinary preparations for defence than the preparations for a great attack differ from those directed against minor objects4 ,finally1 the defender is obliged to take his measures soonest of the two1 which gives the assailant the advantage of playing the last hand4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,attack on ,fortresses ,the attack on fortresses cannot of course come before us here in its aspect as a branch of the science of fortification or military works2 we have only to consider the subject1 first1 in its relation to the strategic object with which it is connected2 secondly1 as regards the choice among several fortresses2 and thirdly1 as regards the manner in which a siege should be covered4 ,that the loss of a fortress weakens the defence1 especially in case it forms an essential part of that defence2 that many conveniences accrue to the assailant by gaining possession of one1 inasmuch as he can use it for magazines and depts1 and by means of it can cover districts of country cantonments1 etc42 that if his offensive at last should have to be changed into the defensive1 it forms the very best support for that defensive--all these relations which fortresses bear to theatres of war1 in the course of a war1 make themselves sufficiently evident by what has been said about fortresses in the book on the ,defence1 the reflection from which throws all the light required on these relations with the attack4 ,in relation to the taking of strong places1 there is also a great difference between campaigns which tend to a great decision and others4 ,in the first1 a conquest of this description is always to be regarded as an evil which is unavoidable4 ,as long as there is yet a decision to be made1 we undertake no sieges but such as are positively unavoidable4 ,when the decision has been already given--the crisis1 the utmost tension of forces1 some time passed--and when1 therefore1 a state of rest has commenced1 then the capture of strong places serves as a consolidation of the conquests made1 and then they can generally be carried out1 if not without effort and expenditure of force1 at least without danger4 ,in the crisis itself the siege of a fortress heightens the intensity of the crisis to the prejudice of the offensive2 it is evident that nothing so much weakens the force of the offensive1 and therefore there is nothing so certain to rob it of its preponderance for a season4 ,but there are cases in which the capture of this or that fortress is quite unavoidable1 if the offensive is to be continued1 and in such case a siege is to be considered as an intensified progress of the attack2 the crisis will be so much greater the less there has been decided previously4 ,all that remains now for consideration on this subject belongs to the book on the plan of the war4 ,in campaigns with a limited object1 a fortress is generally not the means but the end itself2 it is regarded as a small independent conquest1 and as such has the following advantages over every other3-- #a4 ,that a fortress is a small1 distinctly-defined conquest1 which does not require a further expenditure of force1 and therefore gives no cause to fear a reaction4 #b4 ,that in negotiating for peace1 its value as an equivalent may be turned to account4 #c4 ,that a siege is a real progress of the attack1 or at least seems so1 without constantly diminishing the force like every other advance of the offensive4 #d4 ,that the siege is an enterprise without a catastrophe4 ,the result of these things is that the capture of one or more of the enemy's strong places1 is very frequently the object of those strategic attacks which cannot aim at any higher object4 ,the grounds which decide the choice of the fortress which should be attacked1 in case that may be doubtful1 generally are-- 7a7 ,that it is one which can be easily kept1 therefore stands high in value as an equivalent in case of negotiations for peace4 7b7 ,that the means of taking it are at hand4 ,small means are only sufficient to take small places2 but it is better to take a small one than to fail before a large one4 7c7 ,its strength in engineering respects1 which obviously is not always in proportion to its importance in other respects4 ,nothing is more absurd than to waste forces before a very strong place of little importance1 if a place of less strength may be made the object of attack4 7d7 ,the strength of the armament and of the garrison as well4 ,if a fortress is weakly armed and insufficiently garrisoned1 its capture must naturally be easier2 but here we must observe that the strength of the garrison and armament1 are to be reckoned amongst those things which make up the total importance of the place1 because garrison and armaments are directly parts of the enemy's military strength1 which cannot be said in the same measure of works of fortification4 ,the conquest of a fortress with a strong garrison can1 therefore1 much more readily repay the sacrifice it costs than one with very strong works4 7e7 ,the facility of moving the siege train4 ,most sieges fail for want of means1 and the means are generally wanting from the difficulty attending their transport4 ,eugene's siege of ,landreci1 #agab1 and ,frederick the ,great's siege of ,olmtz1 #ageh1 are very remarkable instances in point4 7f7 ,lastly1 there remains the facility of covering the siege as a point now to be considered4 ,there are two essentially different ways by which a siege may be covered3 by entrenching the besieging force1 that is1 by a line of circumvallation1 and by what is called lines of observation4 ,the first of these methods has gone quite out of fashion1 although evidently one important point speaks in its favour1 namely1 that by this method the force of the assailant does not suffer by division exactly that weakening which is so generally found a great disadvantage at sieges4 ,but we grant there is still a weakening in another way1 to a very considerable degree1 because-- #a4 ,the position round the fortress1 as a rule1 is of too great extent for the strength of the army4 #b4 ,the garrison1 the strength of which1 added to that of the relieving army1 would only make up the force originally opposed to us1 under these circumstances is to be looked upon as an enemy's corps in the middle of our camp1 which1 protected by its walls1 is invulnerable1 or at least not to be overpowered1 by which its power is immensely increased4 #c4 ,the defence of a line of circumvallation admits of nothing but the most absolute defensive1 because the circular order1 facing outwards1 is the weakest and most disadvantageous of all possible orders of battle1 and is particularly unfavourable to any advantageous counter-attacks4 ,there is no alternative1 in fact1 but to defend ourselves to the last extremity within the entrenchments4 ,that these circumstances may cause a greater diminution of the army than one-third which1 perhaps1 would be occasioned by forming an army of observation1 is easy to conceive4 ,if1 added to that1 we now think of the general preference which has existed since the time of ,frederick the ,great for the offensive1 as it is called1 7but which1 in reality1 is not always so7 for movements and manuvres1 and the aversion to entrenchments1 we shall not wonder at lines of circumvallation having gone quite out of fashion4 ,but this weakening of the tactical resistance is by no means its only disadvantage2 and we have only reckoned up the prejudices which forced themselves into the judgment on the lines of circumvallation next in order after that disadvantage1 because they are nearly akin to each other4 ,a line of circumvallation only in reality covers that portion of the theatre of war which it actually encloses2 all the rest is more or less given up to the enemy if special detachments are not made use of to cover it1 in which way the very partition of force which it was intended to obviate takes place4 ,thus the besieging army will be always in anxiety and embarrassment on account of the convoys which it requires1 and the covering the same by lines of circumvallation1 is not to be thought of if the army and the siege supplies required are considerable1 and the enemy is in the field in strong force1 unless under such conditions as are found in the ,netherlands1 where there is a whole system of fortresses lying close to each other1 and intermediate lines connecting them1 which cover the rest of the theatre of war1 and considerably shorten the lines by which transport can be affected4 ,in the time of ,louis the ,fourteenth the conception of a theatre of war had not yet bound itself up with the position of an army4 ,in the ,thirty ,years' ,war particularly1 the armies moved here and there sporadically before this or that fortress1 in the neighbourhood of which there was no enemy's corps at all1 and besieged it as long as the siege equipment they had brought with them lasted1 and until an enemy's army approached to relieve the place4 ,then lines of circumvallation had their foundation in the nature of circumstances4 ,in future it is not likely they will be often used again1 unless where the enemy in the field is very weak1 or the conception of the theatre of war vanishes before that of the siege4 ,then it will be natural to keep all the forces united in the siege1 as a siege by that means unquestionably gains in energy in a high degree4 ,the lines of circumvallation in the reign of ,louis ,,xiv41 at ,cambray and ,valenciennes1 were of little use1 as the former were stormed by ,turenne1 opposed to ,cond1 the latter by ,cond opposed to ,turenne2 but we must not overlook the endless number of other cases in which they were respected1 even when there existed in the place the most urgent need for relief2 and when the commander on the defensive side was a man of great enterprise1 as in #agjh1 when ,villars did not venture to attack the allies in their lines at ,lille4 ,frederick the ,great at ,olmtz1 #ageh1 and at ,dresden1 #agfj1 although he had no regular lines of circumvallation1 had a system which in all essentials was identical2 he used the same army to carry on the siege1 and also as a covering army4 ,the distance of the ,austrian army induced him to adopt this plan at ,olmtz1 but the loss of his convoy at ,domstdtel made him repent it2 at ,dresden in #agfj the motives which led him to this mode of proceeding1 were his contempt for the ,german ,states' imperial army1 and his desire to take ,dresden as soon as possible4 ,lastly1 it is a disadvantage in lines of circumvallation1 that in case of a reverse it is more difficult to save the siege train4 ,if a defeat is sustained at a distance of one or more days' march from the place besieged1 the siege may be raised before the enemy can arrive1 and the heavy trains may1 in the mean time1 gain also a day's march4 ,in taking up a position for an army of observation1 an important question to be considered is the distance at which it should be placed from the besieged place4 ,this question will1 in most cases1 be decided by the nature of the country1 or by the position of other armies or corps with which the besiegers have to remain in communication4 ,in other respects1 it is easy to see that1 with a greater distance1 the siege is better covered1 but that by a smaller distance1 not exceeding a few miles1 the two armies are better able to afford each other mutual support4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,attack on ,convoys ,the attack and defence of a convoy form a subject of tactics3 we should1 therefore1 have nothing to say upon the subject here if it was not necessary1 first1 to demonstrate generally1 to a certain extent1 the possibility of the thing1 which can only be done from strategic motives and relations4 ,we should have had to speak of it in this respect before when treating of the defence1 had it not been that the little which can be said about it can easily be framed to suit for both attack and defence1 while at the same time the first plays the higher part in connection with it4 ,a moderate convoy of three or four hundred wagons1 let the load be what it may1 takes up half a mile1 a large convoy is several miles in length4 ,now1 how is it possible to expect that the few troops usually allotted to a convoy will suffice for its defence8 ,if to this difficulty we add the unwieldy nature of this mass1 which can only advance at the slowest pace1 and which1 besides1 is always liable to be thrown into disorder1 and lastly1 that every part of a convoy must be equally protected1 because the moment that one part is attacked by the enemy1 the whole is brought to a stop1 and thrown into a state of confusion1 we may well ask1--how can the covering and defence of such a train be possible at all8 ,or1 in other words1 why are not all convoys taken when they are attacked1 and why are not all attacked which require an escort1 or1 which is the same thing1 all that come within reach of the enemy8 ,it is plain that all tactical expedients1 such as ,templehof's most impracticable scheme of constantly halting and assembling the convoy at short distances1 and then moving off afresh3 and the much better plan of ,scharnhorst1 of breaking up the convoy into several columns1 are only slight correctives of a radical evil4 ,the explanation consists in this1 that by far the greater number of convoys derive more security from the strategic situation in general1 than any other parts exposed to the attacks of the enemy1 which bestows on their limited means of defence a very much increased efficacy4 ,convoys generally move more or less in rear of their own army1 or1 at least1 at a great distance from that of the enemy4 ,the consequence is1 that only weak detachments can be sent to attack them1 and these are obliged to cover themselves by strong reserves4 ,added to this the unwieldiness itself of the carriages used1 makes it very difficult to carry them off2 the assailant must therefore1 in general1 content himself with cutting the traces1 taking away the horses1 and blowing up powder-wagons1 by which the whole is certainly detained and thrown into disorder1 but not completely lost2 by all this we may perceive1 that the security of such trains lies more in these general relations than in the defensive power of its escort4 ,if now to all this we add the defence of the escort1 which1 although it cannot by marching resolutely against the enemy directly cover the convoy1 is still able to derange the plan of the enemy's attack2 then1 at last1 the attack of a convoy1 instead of appearing easy and sure of success1 will appear rather difficult1 and very uncertain in its result4 ,but there remains still a chief point1 which is the danger of the enemy's army1 or one of its corps1 retaliating on the assailants of its convoy1 and punishing it ultimately for the undertaking by defeating it4 ,the apprehension of this1 puts a stop to many undertakings1 without the real cause ever appearing2 so that the safety of the convoy is attributed to the escort1 and people wonder how a miserable arrangement1 such as an escort1 should meet with such respect4 ,in order to feel the truth of this observation1 we have only to think of the famous retreat which ,frederick the ,great made through ,bohemia after the siege of ,olmtz1 #ageh1 when the half of his army was broken into a column of companies to cover a convoy of #d1jjj carriages4 ,what prevented ,daun from falling on this monstrosity8 ,the fear that ,frederick would throw himself upon him with the other half of his army1 and entangle him in a battle which ,daun did not desire2 what prevented ,laudon1 who was constantly at the side of that convoy1 from falling upon it at ,zischbowitz sooner and more boldly than he did8 ,the fear that he would get a rap over the knuckles4 ,ten miles from his main army1 and completely separated from it by the ,prussian army1 he thought himself in danger of a serious defeat if the king1 who had no reason at that time to be concerned about ,daun1 should fall upon him with the bulk of his forces4 ,it is only if the strategic situation of an army involves it in the unnatural necessity of connecting itself with its convoys by the flank or by its front that then these convoys are really in great danger1 and become an advantageous object of attack for the enemy1 if his position allows him to detach troops for that purpose4 ,the same campaign of #ageh affords an instance of the most complete success of an undertaking of this description1 in the capture of the convoy at ,domstdtel4 ,the road to ,neiss lay on the left flank of the ,prussian position1 and the king's forces were so neutralised by the siege and by the corps watching ,daun1 that the partizans had no reason to be uneasy about themselves1 and were able to make their attack completely at their ease4 ,when ,eugene besieged ,landrecy in #agab1 he drew his supplies for the siege from ,bouchain by ,denain2 therefore1 in reality1 from the front of the strategic position4 ,it is well known what means he was obliged to use to overcome the difficulty of protecting his convoys on that occasion1 and in what embarrassments he involved himself1 ending in a complete change of circumstances4 ,the conclusion we draw1 therefore1 is that however easy an attack on a convoy may appear in its tactical aspect1 still it has not much in its favour on strategic grounds1 and only promises important results in the exceptional instances of lines of communication very much exposed4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,attack on the ,enemy's ,army in its ,cantonments ,we have not treated of this subject in the defence1 because a line of cantonments is not to be regarded as a defensive means1 but as a mere existence of the army in a state which implies little readiness for battle4 ,in respect to this readiness for battle1 we therefore did not go beyond what we required to say in connection with this condition of an army in the #acth chapter of the #eth book4 ,but here1 in considering the attack1 we have to think of an enemy's army in cantonments in all respects as a special object2 for1 in the first place1 such an attack is of a very peculiar kind in itself2 and1 in the next place1 it may be considered as a strategic means of particular efficacy4 ,here we have before us1 therefore1 not the question of an onslaught on a single cantonment or a small corps dispersed amongst a few villages1 as the arrangements for that are entirely of a tactical nature1 but of the attack of a large army1 distributed in cantonments more or less extensive2 an attack in which the object is not the mere surprise of a single cantonment1 but to prevent the assembly of the army4 ,the attack on an enemy's army in cantonments is therefore the surprise of an army not assembled4 ,if this surprise succeeds fully1 then the enemy's army is prevented from reaching its appointed place of assembly1 and1 therefore1 compelled to choose another more to the rear2 as this change of the point of assembly to the rear in a state of such emergency can seldom be effected in less than a day's march1 but generally will require several days1 the loss of ground which this occasions is by no means an insignificant loss2 and this is the first advantage gained by the assailant4 ,but now1 this surprise which is in connection with the general relations1 may certainly at the same time1 in its commencement1 be an onslaught on some of the enemy's single cantonments1 not certainly upon all1 or upon a great many1 because that would suppose a scattering of the attacking army to an extent which could never be advisable4 ,therefore1 only the most advanced quarters1 only those which lie in the direction of the attacking columns1 can be surprised1 and even this will seldom happen to many of them1 as large forces cannot easily approach unobserved4 ,however1 this element of the attack is by no means to be disregarded2 and we reckon the advantages which may be thus obtained1 as the second advantage of the surprise4 ,a third advantage consists in the minor combats forced upon the enemy in which his losses will be considerable4 ,a great body of troops does not assemble itself at once by single battalions at the spot appointed for the general concentration of the army1 but usually forms itself by brigades1 divisions1 or corps1 in the first place1 and these masses cannot then hasten at full speed to the rendezvous2 in case of meeting with an enemy's column in their course1 they are obliged to engage in a combat2 now1 they may certainly come off victorious in the same1 particularly if the enemy's attacking column is not of sufficient strength1 but in conquering1 they lose time1 and1 in most cases1 as may be easily conceived1 a corps1 under such circumstances1 and in the general tendency to gain a point which lies to the rear1 will not make any beneficial use of its victory4 ,on the other hand1 they may be beaten1 and that is the most probable issue in itself1 because they have not time to organise a good resistance4 ,we may1 therefore1 very well suppose that in an attack well planned and executed1 the assailant through these partial combats will gather up a considerable number of trophies1 which become a principal point in the general result4 ,lastly1 the fourth advantage1 and the keystone of the whole1 is a certain momentary disorganisation and discouragement on the side of the enemy1 which1 when the force is at last assembled1 seldom allows of its being immediately brought into action1 and generally obliges the party attacked to abandon still more ground to his assailant1 and to make a change generally in his plan of operations4 ,such are the proper results of a successful surprise of the enemy in cantonments1 that is1 of one in which the enemy is prevented from assembling his army without loss at the point fixed in his plan4 ,but by the nature of the case1 success has many degrees2 and1 therefore1 the results may be very great in one case1 and hardly worth mentioning in another4 ,but even when1 through the complete success of the enterprise1 these results are considerable1 they will seldom bear comparison with the gain of a great battle1 partly because1 in the first place1 the trophies are seldom as great1 and in the next1 the moral impression never strikes so deep4 ,this general result must always be kept in view1 that we may not promise ourselves more from an enterprise of this kind than it can give4 ,many hold it to be the non plus ultra of offensive activity2 but it is not so by any means1 as we may see from this analysis1 as well as from military history4 ,one of the most brilliant surprises in history1 is that made by the ,duke of ,lorraine in #afdc1 on the cantonments of the ,french1 under ,general ,ranzan1 at ,duttlingen4 ,the corps was #af1jjj men1 and they lost the ,general commanding1 and #g1jjj men2 it was a complete defeat4 ,the want of outposts was the cause of the disaster4 ,the surprise of ,turenne at ,mergentheim 7,mariendal1 as the ,french call it17 in #afdd1 is in like manner to be regarded as equal to a defeat in its effects1 for he lost #c1jjj men out of #h1jjj1 which was principally owing to his having been led into making an untimely stand after he got his men assembled4 ,such results we cannot1 therefore1 often reckon upon2 it was rather the result of an ill-judged action than of the surprise1 properly speaking1 for ,turenne might easily have avoided the action1 and have rallied his troops upon those in more distant quarters4 ,a third noted surprise is that which ,turenne made on the ,allies under the great ,elector1 the ,imperial ,general ,bournonville and the ,duke of ,lorraine1 in ,alsace1 in the year #afgd4 ,the trophies were very small1 the loss of the ,allies did not exceed #b1jjj or #c1jjj men1 which could not decide the fate of a force of #ej1jjj2 but the ,allies considered that they could not venture to make any further resistance in ,alsace1 and retired across the ,rhine again4 ,this strategic result was all that ,turenne wanted1 but we must not look for the causes of it entirely in the surprise4 ,turenne surprised the plans of his opponents more than the troops themselves2 the want of unanimity amongst the allied generals and the proximity of the ,rhine did the rest4 ,this event altogether deserves a closer examination1 as it is generally viewed in a wrong light4 ,in #agda1 ,neipperg surprised ,frederick the ,great in his quarters2 the whole of the result was that the king was obliged to fight the battle of ,mollwitz before he had collected all his forces1 and with a change of front4 ,in #agde1 ,frederick the ,great surprised the ,duke of ,lorraine in his cantonments in ,lusatia2 the chief success was through the real surprise of one of the most important quarters1 that of ,hennersdorf1 by which the ,austrians suffered a loss of #b1jjj men2 the general result was that the ,duke of ,lorraine retreated to ,bohemia by ,upper ,lusatia1 but that did not at all prevent his returning into ,saxony by the left bank of the ,elbe1 so that without the battle of ,kesselsdorf1 there would have been no important result4 #ageh4 ,the ,duke ,ferdinand surprised the ,french quarters2 the immediate result was that the ,french lost some thousands of men1 and were obliged to take up a position behind the ,aller4 ,the moral effect may have been of more importance1 and may have had some influence on the subsequent evacuation of ,westphalia4 ,if from these different examples we seek for a conclusion as to the efficacy of this kind of attack1 then only the two first can be put in comparison with a battle gained4 ,but the corps were only small1 and the want of outposts in the system of war in those days was a circumstance greatly in favour of these enterprises4 ,although the four other cases must be reckoned completely successful enterprises1 it is plain that not one of them is to be compared with a battle gained as respects its result4 ,the general result could not have taken place in any of them except with an adversary weak in will and character1 and therefore it did not take place at all in the case of #agda4 ,in #ahjf the ,prussian army contemplated surprising the ,french in this manner in ,franconia4 ,the case promised well for a satisfactory result4 ,buonaparte was not present1 the ,french corps were in widely extended cantonments2 under these circumstances1 the ,prussian army1 acting with great resolution and activity1 might very well reckon on driving the ,french back across the ,rhine1 with more or less loss4 ,but this was also all2 if they reckoned upon more1 for instance1 on following up their advantages beyond the ,rhine1 or on gaining such a moral ascendancy1 that the ,french would not again venture to appear on the right bank of the river in the same campaign1 such an expectation had no sufficient grounds whatever4 ,in the beginning of ,august1 #ahab1 the ,russians from ,smolensk meditated falling upon the cantonments of the ,french when ,napoleon halted his army in the neighbourhood of ,witepsk4 ,but they wanted courage to carry out the enterprise2 and it was fortunate for them they did2 for as the ,french commander with his centre was not only more than twice the strength of their centre1 but also in himself the most resolute commander that ever lived1 as further1 the loss of a few miles of ground would have decided nothing1 and there was no natural obstacle in any feature of the country near enough up to which they might pursue their success1 and by that means1 in some measure make it certain1 and lastly1 as the war of the year #ahab was not in any way a campaign of that kind1 which draws itself in a languid way to a conclusion1 but the serious plan of an assailant who had made up his mind to conquer his opponent completely1--therefore the trifling results to be expected from a surprise of the enemy in his quarters1 appear nothing else than utterly disproportionate to the solution of the problem1 they could not justify a hope of making good by their means the great inequality of forces and other relations4 ,but this scheme serves to show how a confused idea of the effect of this means may lead to an entirely false application of the same4 ,what has been hitherto said1 places the subject in the light of a strategic means4 ,but it lies in its nature that its execution also is not purely tactical1 but in part belongs again to strategy so far1 particularly that such an attack is generally made on a front of considerable width1 and the army which carries it out can1 and generally will1 come to blows before it is concentrated1 so that the whole is an agglomeration of partial combats4 ,we must now add a few words on the most natural organisation of such an attack4 ,the first condition is3-- 7#a47 ,to attack the front of the enemy's quarters in a certain width of front1 for that is the only means by which we can really surprise several cantonments1 cut off others1 and create generally that disorganisation in the enemy's army which is intended4--,the number of1 and the intervals between1 the columns must depend on circumstances4 7#b47 ,the direction of the different columns must converge upon a point where it is intended they should unite2 for the enemy ends more or less with a concentration of his force1 and therefore we must do the same4 ,this point of concentration should1 if possible1 be the enemy's point of assembly1 or lie on his line of retreat1 it will naturally be best where that line crosses an important obstacle in the country4 7#c47 ,the separate columns when they come in contact with the enemy's forces must attack them with great determination1 with dash and boldness1 as they have general relations in their favour1 and daring is always there in its right place4 ,from this it follows that the commanders of the separate columns must be allowed freedom of action and full power in this respect4 7#d47 ,the tactical plan of attack against those of the enemy's corps that are the first to place themselves in position1 must always be directed to turn a flank1 for the greatest result is always to be expected by separating the corps1 and cutting them off4 7#e47 ,each of the columns must be composed of portions of the three arms1 and must not be stinted in cavalry1 it may even sometimes be well to divide amongst them the whole of the reserve cavalry2 for it would be a great mistake to suppose that this body of cavalry could play any great part in a mass in an enterprise of this sort4 ,the first village1 the smallest bridge1 the most insignificant thicket would bring it to a halt4 7#f47 ,although it lies in the nature of a surprise that the assailant should not send his advanced guard very far in front1 that principle only applies to the first approach to the enemy's quarters4 ,when the fight has commenced in the enemy's quarters1 and therefore all that was to be expected from actual surprise has been gained1 then the columns of the advanced guard of all arms should push on as far as possible1 for they may greatly increase the confusion on the side of the enemy by more rapid movement4 ,it is only by this means that it becomes possible to carry off here and there the mass of baggage1 artillery1 non-effectives1 and camp-followers1 which have to be dragged after a cantonment suddenly broken up1 and these advanced guards must also be the chief instruments in turning and cutting off the enemy4 7#g47 ,finally1 the retreat in case of ill-success must be thought of1 and a rallying point be fixed upon beforehand4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,diversion ,according to the ordinary use of language1 under the term diversion is understood such an incursion into the enemy's country as draws off a portion of his force from the principal point4 ,it is only when this is the chief end in view1 and not the gain of the object which is selected as the point of attack1 that it is an enterprise of a special character1 otherwise it is only an ordinary attack4 ,naturally the diversion must at the same time always have an object of attack1 for it is only the value of this object that will induce the enemy to send troops for its protection2 besides1 in case the undertaking does not succeed as a diversion1 this object is a compensation for the forces expended in the attempt4 ,these objects of attack may be fortresses1 or important magazines1 or rich and large towns1 especially capital cities1 contributions of all kinds2 lastly1 assistance may be afforded in this way to discontented subjects of the enemy4 ,it is easy to conceive that diversions may be useful1 but they certainly are not so always2 on the contrary1 they are just as often injurious4 ,the chief condition is that they should withdraw from the principal theatre of the war more of the enemy's troops than we employ on the diversion2 for if they only succeed in drawing off just the same number1 then their efficacy as diversions1 properly called1 ceases1 and the undertaking becomes a mere subordinate attack4 ,even where1 on account of circumstances1 we have in view to attain a very great end with a very small force1 as1 for instance1 to make an easy capture of an important fortress1 and another attack is made adjoining to the principal attack1 to assist the latter1 that is no longer a diversion4 ,when two states are at war1 and a third falls upon one of them1 such an event is very commonly called a diversion--but such an attack differs in nothing from an ordinary attack except in its direction2 there is1 therefore1 no occasion to give it a particular name1 for in theory it should be a rule only to denote by particular names such things as are in their nature distinct4 ,but if small forces are to attract large ones1 there must obviously be some special cause1 and1 therefore1 for the object of a diversion it is not sufficient merely to detach some troops to a point not hitherto occupied4 ,if the assailant with a small corps of #ajjj men overruns one of his enemy's provinces1 not belonging to the theatre of war1 and levies contribution1 etc41 it is easy to see beforehand that the enemy cannot put a stop to this by detaching #ajjj men1 but that if he means to protect the province from invaders1 he must at all events send a considerably larger force4 ,but it may be asked cannot a defender1 instead of protecting his own province1 restore the balance by sending a similar detachment to plunder a province in our country8 ,therefore1 if an advantage is to be obtained by an aggressor in this way1 it must first be ascertained that there is more to be got or to be threatened in the defender's provinces than in his own4 ,if this is the case1 then no doubt a weak diversion will occupy a force on the enemy's side greater than that composing the enterprise4 ,on the other hand1 this advantage naturally diminishes as the masses increase1 for #ej1jjj men can defend a province of moderate extent not only against equal but even against somewhat superior numbers4 ,the advantage of large diversions is1 therefore1 very doubtful1 and the greater they become the more decisive must be the other circumstances which favour a diversion if any good is to come out of such an enterprise upon the whole4 ,now these favourable circumstances may be3-- a4 ,forces which the assailant holds available for a diversion without weakening the great mass of his force4 b4 ,points belonging to the defender which are of vital importance to him and can be threatened by a diversion4 c4 ,discontented subjects of the same4 d4 ,a rich province which can supply a considerable quantity of munitions of war4 ,if only these diversions are undertaken1 which1 when tested by these different considerations1 promise results1 it will be found that an opportunity of making a diversion does not offer frequently4 ,but now comes another important point4 ,every diversion brings war into a district into which the war would not otherwise have penetrated3 for that reason it will always be the means1 more or less1 of calling forth military forces which would otherwise have continued in abeyance1 this will be done in a way which will be very sensibly felt if the enemy has any organised militia1 and means of arming the nation at large4 ,it is quite in the natural order of things1 and amply shown by experience1 that if a district is suddenly threatened by an enemy's force1 and nothing has been prepared beforehand for its defence1 all the most efficient official functionaries immediately lay hold of and set in motion every extraordinary means that can be imagined1 in order to ward off the impending danger4 ,thus1 new powers of resistance spring up1 such as are next to a people's war1 and may easily excite one4 ,this is a point which should be kept well in view in every diversion1 in order that we may not dig our own graves4 ,the expeditions to ,north ,holland in #agii1 and to ,walcheren in #ahji1 regarded as diversions1 are only to be justified in so far that there was no other way of employing the ,english troops2 but there is no doubt that the sum total of the means of resistance of the ,french was thereby increased1 and every landing in ,france1 would have just the same effect4 ,to threaten the ,french coast certainly offers great advantages1 because by that means an important body of troops becomes neutralised in watching the coast1 but a landing with a large force can never be justifiable unless we can count on the assistance of a province in opposition to the ,government4 ,the less a great decision is looked forward to in war the more will diversions be allowable1 but so much the smaller will also certainly be the gain to be derived from them4 ,they are only a means of bringing the stagnant masses into motion4 ,execution4 #a4 ,a diversion may include in itself a real attack1 then the execution has no special character in itself except boldness and expedition4 #b4 ,it may also have as an object to appear more than it really is1 being1 in fact1 a demonstration as well4 ,the special means to be employed in such a case can only suggest themselves to a subtil mind well versed in men and in the existing state of circumstances4 ,it follows from the nature of the thing that there must be a great fractioning of forces on such occasions4 #c4 ,if the forces employed are not quite inconsiderable1 and the retreat is restricted to certain points1 then a reserve on which the whole may rally is an essential condition4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,invasion ,almost all that we have to say on this subject consists in an explanation of the term4 ,we find the expression very frequently used by modern authors and also that they pretend to denote by it something particular4 ,guerre d'invasion occurs perpetually in ,french authors4 ,they use it as a term for every attack which enters deep into the enemy's country1 and perhaps sometimes mean to apply it as the antithesis to methodical attack1 that is1 one which only nibbles at the frontier4 ,but this is a very unphilosophical confusion of language4 ,whether an attack is to be confined to the frontier or to be carried into the heart of the country1 whether it shall make the seizure of the enemy's strong places the chief object1 or seek out the core of the enemy's power1 and pursue it unremittingly1 is the result of circumstances1 and not dependent on a system4 ,in some cases1 to push forward may be more methodical1 and at the same time more prudent than to tarry on the frontier1 but in most cases it is nothing else than just the fortunate result of a vigorous attack1 and consequently does not differ from it in any respect4 ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,on the ,culminating ,point of ,victory7997 7997 ,see ,chapters ,,iv4 and ,v4 ,the conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his adversary completely4 ,often1 in fact1 almost universally1 there is a culminating point of victory4 ,experience shows this sufficiently2 but as the subject is one especially important for the theory of war1 and the pivot of almost all plans of campaigns1 while1 at the same time1 on its surface some apparent contradictions glitter1 as in ever-changing colours1 we therefore wish to examine it more closely1 and look for its essential causes4 ,victory1 as a rule1 springs from a preponderance of the sum of all the physical and moral powers combined2 undoubtedly it increases this preponderance1 or it would not be sought for and purchased at a great sacrifice4 ,victory itself does this unquestionably2 also its consequences have the same effect1 but not to the utmost point generally only up to a certain point4 ,this point may be very near at hand1 and is sometimes so near that the whole of the results of a victorious battle are confined to an increase of the moral superiority4 ,how this comes about we have now to examine4 ,in the progress of action in war1 the combatant force is incessantly meeting with elements which strengthen it1 and others which weaken it4 ,hence it is a question of superiority on one side or the other4 ,as every diminution of power on one side is to be regarded as an increase on the opposite1 it follows1 of course1 that this double current1 this ebb and flow1 takes place whether troops are advancing or retiring4 ,it is therefore necessary to find out the principal cause of this alteration in the one case to determine the other along with it4 ,in advancing1 the most important causes of the increase of strength which the assailant gains1 are3 #a4 ,the loss which the enemy's army suffers1 because it is usually greater than that of the assailant4 #b4 ,the loss which the enemy suffers in inert military means1 such as magazines1 depts1 bridges1 etc41 and which the assailant does not share with him4 #c4 ,that from the moment the assailant enters the enemy's territory1 there is a loss of provinces to the defence1 consequently of the sources of new military forces4 #d4 ,that the advancing army gains a portion of those resources1 in other words1 gains the advantage of living at the expense of the enemy4 #e4 ,the loss of internal organisation and of the regular action of everything on the side of the enemy4 #f4 ,that the allies of the enemy secede from him1 and others join the conqueror4 #g4 ,lastly1 the discouragement of the enemy who lets the arms1 in some measure1 drop out of his hands4 ,the causes of decrease of strength in an army advancing1 are3 #a4 ,that it is compelled to lay siege to the enemy's fortresses1 to blockade them or observe them2 or that the enemy1 who did the same before the victory1 in his retreat draws in these corps on his main body4 #b4 ,that from the moment the assailant enters the enemy's territory1 the nature of the theatre of war is changed2 it becomes hostile2 we must occupy it1 for we cannot call any portion our own beyond what is in actual occupation1 and yet it everywhere presents difficulties to the whole machine1 which must necessarily tend to weaken its effects4 #c4 ,that we are removing further away from our resources1 whilst the enemy is drawing nearer to his2 this causes a delay in the replacement of expended power4 #d4 ,that the danger which threatens the state1 rouses other powers to its protection4 #e4 ,lastly1 the greater efforts of the adversary1 in consequence of the increased danger1 on the other hand1 a relaxation of effort on the side of the victorious state4 ,all these advantages and disadvantages can exist together1 meet each other in a certain measure1 and pursue their way in opposite directions1 except that the last meet as real opposites1 cannot pass1 therefore mutually exclude each other4 ,this alone shows how infinitely different may be the effect of a victory according as it stuns the vanquished or stimulates him to greater exertions4 ,we shall now try to characterise1 in a few words1 each of these points singly4 #a4 ,the loss of the enemy when defeated1 may be at the greatest in the first moment of defeat1 and then daily diminish in amount until it arrives at a point where the balance is restored as regards our force2 but it may go on increasing every day in an ascending ratio4 ,the difference of situation and relations determines this4 ,we can only say that1 in general1 with a good army the first will be the case1 with an indifferent army the second2 next to the spirit of the army1 the spirit of the ,government is here the most important thing4 ,it is of great consequence in war to distinguish between the two cases in practice1 in order not to stop just at the point where we ought to begin in good earnest1 and vice vers4 #b4 ,the loss which the enemy sustains in that part of the apparatus of war which is inert1 may ebb and flow just in the same manner1 and this will depend on the accidental position and nature of the depts from which supplies are drawn4 ,this subject1 however1 in the present day1 cannot be compared with the others in point of importance4 #c4 ,the third advantage must necessarily increase as the army advances2 indeed1 it may be said that it does not come into consideration until an army has penetrated far into the enemy's country2 that is to say1 until a third or a fourth of the country has been left in rear4 ,in addition1 the intrinsic value which a province has in connection with the war comes also into consideration4 ,in the same way the fourth advantage should increase with the advance4 ,but with respect to these two last1 it is also to be observed that their influence on the combatant powers actually engaged in the struggle1 is seldom felt so immediately2 they only work slowly and by a circuitous course2 therefore we should not bend the bow too much on their account1 that is to say1 not place ourselves in any dangerous position4 ,the fifth advantage1 again1 only comes into consideration if we have made a considerable advance1 and if by the form of the enemy's country some provinces can be detached from the principal mass1 as these1 like limbs compressed by ligatures1 usually soon die off4 ,as to six and seven1 it is at least probable that they increase with the advance2 furthermore1 we shall return to them hereafter4 ,let us now pass on to the causes of weakness4 #a4 ,the besieging1 blockade1 and investment of fortresses1 generally increase as the army advances4 ,this weakening influence alone acts so powerfully on the condition of the combatant force1 that it may soon outweigh all the advantages gained4 ,no doubt1 in modern times1 a system has been introduced of blockading places with a small number of troops1 or of watching them with a still smaller number2 and also the enemy must keep garrisons in them4 ,nevertheless1 they remain a great element of security4 ,the garrisons consist very often in half of people1 who have taken no part in the war previously4 ,before those places which are situated near the line of communication1 it is necessary for the assailant to leave a force at least double the strength of the garrison2 and if it is desirable to lay formal siege to1 or to starve out1 one single considerable place1 a small army is required for the purpose4 #b4 ,the second cause1 the taking up a theatre of war in the enemy's country1 increases necessarily with the advance1 and if it does not further weaken the condition of the combatant force at the moment1 it does so at all events in the long run4 ,we can only regard as our theatre of war1 so much of the enemy's country as we actually possess2 that is to say1 where we either have small corps in the field1 or where we have left here and there strong garrisons in large towns1 or stations along the roads1 etc42 now1 however small the garrisons may be which are detached1 still they weaken the combatant force considerably4 ,but this is the smallest evil4 ,every army has strategic flanks1 that is1 the country which borders both sides of its lines of communications2 the weakness of these parts is not sensibly felt as long as the enemy is similarly situated with respect to his4 ,but that can only be the case as long as we are in our own country2 as soon as we get into the enemy's country1 the weakness of these parts is felt very much1 because the smallest enterprise promises some result when directed against a long line only feebly1 or not all1 covered2 and these attacks may be made from any quarter in an enemy's country4 ,the further we advance1 the longer these flanks become1 and the danger arising from them is enhanced in an increased ratio1 for not only are they difficult to cover1 but the spirit of enterprise is also first roused in the enemy1 chiefly by long insecure lines of communication1 and the consequences which their loss may entail in case of a retreat are matter of grave consideration4 ,all this contributes to place a fresh load on an advancing army at every step of its progress2 so that if it has not commenced with a more than ordinary superiority1 it will feel itself always more and more cramped in its plans1 gradually weakened in its impulsive force1 and at last in a state of uncertainty and anxiety as to its situation4 #c4 ,the third cause1 the distance from the source from which the incessantly diminishing combatant force is to be just as incessantly filled up1 increases with the advance4 ,a conquering army is like the light of a lamp in this respect2 the more the oil which feeds it sinks in the reservoir and recedes from the focus of light1 the smaller the light becomes1 until at length it is quite extinguished4 ,the richness of the conquered provinces may certainly diminish this evil very much1 but can never entirely remove it1 because there are always a number of things which can only be supplied to the army from its own country1 men in particular2 because the subsidies furnished by the enemy's country are1 in most cases1 neither so promptly nor so surely forthcoming as in our own country2 because the means of meeting any unexpected requirement cannot be so quickly procured2 because misunderstandings and mistakes of all kinds cannot so soon be discovered and remedied4 ,if a prince does not lead his army in person1 as became the custom in the last wars1 if he is not anywhere near it1 then another and very great inconvenience arises in the loss of time occasioned by communications backwards and forwards2 for the fullest powers conferred on a commander of an army1 are never sufficient to meet every case in the wide expanse of his activity4 #d4 ,the change in political alliances4 ,if these changes1 produced by a victory1 should be such as are disadvantageous to the conqueror1 they will probably be so in a direct relation to his progress1 just as is the case if they are of an advantageous nature4 ,this all depends on the existing political alliances1 interests1 customs1 and tendencies1 on princes1 ministers1 etc4 ,in general1 we can only say that when a great state which has smaller allies is conquered1 these usually secede very soon from their alliance1 so that the victor1 in this respect1 with every blow becomes stronger2 but if the conquered state is small1 protectors much sooner present themselves when his very existence is threatened1 and others1 who have helped to place him in his present embarrassment1 will turn round to prevent his complete downfall4 #e4 ,the increased resistance on the part of the enemy which is called forth4 ,sometimes the enemy drops his weapon out of his hands from terror and stupefaction2 sometimes an enthusiastic paroxysm seizes him1 every one runs to arms1 and the resistance is much stronger after the first defeat than it was before4 ,the character of the people and of the ,government1 the nature of the country and its political alliances1 are here the data from which the probable effect must be conjectured4 ,what countless differences these two last points alone make in the plans which may and should be made in war in one case and another8 ,whilst one1 through an excess of caution1 and what is called methodical proceedings1 fritters away his good fortune1 another1 from a want of rational reflection1 tumbles into destruction4 ,in addition1 we must here call to mind the supineness1 which not unfrequently comes over the victorious side1 when danger is removed2 whilst1 on the contrary1 renewed efforts are then required in order to follow up the success4 ,if we cast a general glance over these different and antagonistic principles1 the deduction1 doubtless is1 that the profitable use of the onward march in a war of aggression1 in the generality of cases1 diminishes the preponderance with which the assailant set out1 or which has been gained by victory4 ,here the question must naturally strike us2 if this be so1 what is it which impels the conqueror to follow up the career of victory to continue the offensive8 ,and can this really be called making further use of the victory8 ,would it not be better to stop where as yet there is hardly any diminution of the preponderance gained8 ,to this we must naturally answer3 the preponderance of combatant forces is only the means1 not the end4 ,the end or object is to subdue the enemy1 or at least to take from him part of his territory1 in order thus to put ourselves in a condition to realize the value of the advantages we have gained when we conclude a peace4 ,even if our aim is to conquer the enemy completely1 we must be content that1 perhaps1 every step we advance1 reduces our preponderance1 but it does not necessarily follow from this that it will be nil before the fall of the enemy3 the fall of the enemy may take place before that1 and if it is to be obtained by the last minimum of preponderance1 it would be an error not to expend it for that purpose4 ,the preponderance which we have or acquire in war is1 therefore1 the means1 not the end1 and it must be staked to gain the latter4 ,but it is necessary to know how far it will reach1 in order not to go beyond that point1 and instead of fresh advantages1 to reap disaster4 ,it is not necessary to introduce special examples from experience in order to prove that this is the way in which the strategic preponderance exhausts itself in the strategic attack2 it is rather the multitude of instances which has forced us to investigate the causes of it4 ,it is only since the appearance of ,buonaparte that we have known campaigns between civilized nations1 in which the preponderance has led1 without interruption1 to the fall of the enemy2 before his time1 every campaign ended with the victorious army seeking to win a point where it could simply maintain itself in a state of equilibrium4 ,at this point1 the movement of victory stopped1 even if a retreat did not become necessary4 ,now1 this culminating point of victory will also appear in the future1 in all wars in which the overthrow of the enemy is not the military object of the war2 and the generality of wars will still be of this kind4 ,the natural aim of all single plans of campaigns is the point at which the offensive changes into the defensive4 ,but now1 to overstep this point1 is more than simply a useless expenditure of power1 yielding no further result1 it is a destructive step which causes reaction2 and this re-action is1 according to all general experience1 productive of most disproportionate effects4 ,this last fact is so common1 and appears so natural and easy to understand that we need not enter circumstantially into the causes4 ,want of organisation in the conquered land1 and the very opposite effect which a serious loss instead of the looked-for fresh victory makes on the feelings1 are the chief causes in every case4 ,the moral forces1 courage on the one side rising often to audacity1 and extreme depression on the other1 now begin generally their active play4 ,the losses on the retreat are increased thereby1 and the hitherto successful party now generally thanks providence if he can escape with only the surrender of all his gains1 without losing some of his own territory4 ,we must now clear up an apparent contradiction4 ,it may be generally supposed that as long as progress in the attack continues1 there must still be a preponderance2 and1 that as the defensive1 which will commence at the end of the victorious career1 is a stronger form of war than the offensive1 therefore1 there is so much the less danger of becoming unexpectedly the weaker party4 ,but yet there is1 and keeping history in view1 we must admit that the greatest danger of a reverse is often just at the moment when the offensive ceases and passes into the defensive4 ,we shall try to find the cause of this4 ,the superiority which we have attributed to the defensive form of war consists3 #a4 ,in the use of ground4 #b4 ,in the possession of a prepared theatre of war4 #c4 ,in the support of the people4 #d4 ,in the advantage of the state of expectancy4 ,it must be evident that these principles cannot always be forthcoming and active in a like degree2 that1 consequently1 one defence is not always like another2 and therefore1 also1 that the defence will not always have this same superiority over the offensive4 ,this must be particularly the case in a defensive1 which commences after the exhaustion of an offensive1 and has its theatre of war usually situated at the apex of an offensive triangle thrust far forward into the country4 ,of the four principles above named1 this defensive only enjoys the first the use of the ground undiminished1 the second generally vanishes altogether1 the third becomes negative1 and the fourth is very much reduced4 ,a few more words1 only by way of explanation1 respecting the last4 ,if the imagined equilibrium1 under the influence of which whole campaigns have often passed without any results1 because the side which should assume the initiative is wanting in the necessary resolution1 and just therein lies1 as we conceive1 the advantage of the state of expectancy if this equilibrium is disturbed by an offensive act1 the enemy's interests damaged1 and his will stirred up to action1 then the probability of his remaining in a state of indolent irresolution is much diminished4 ,a defence1 which is organised on conquered territory1 has a much more irritating character than one upon our own soil2 the offensive principle is engrafted on it in a certain measure1 and its nature is thereby weakened4 ,the quiet which ,daun allowed ,frederick ,,ii4 in ,silesia and ,saxony1 he would never have granted him in ,bohemia4 ,thus it is clear that the defensive1 which is interwoven or mixed up with an offensive undertaking1 is weakened in all its chief principles2 and1 therefore1 will no longer have the preponderance which belongs to it originally4 ,as no defensive campaign is composed of purely defensive elements1 so likewise no offensive campaign is made up entirely of offensive elements2 because1 besides the short intervals in every campaign1 in which both armies are on the defensive1 every attack which does not lead to a peace1 must necessarily end in a defensive4 ,in this manner it is the defensive itself which contributes to the weakening of the offensive4 ,this is so far from being an idle subtlety1 that on the contrary1 we consider it a chief disadvantage of the attack that we are afterwards reduced through it to a very disadvantageous defensive4 ,and this explains how the difference which originally exists between the strength of the offensive and defensive forms in war is gradually reduced4 ,we shall now show how it may completely disappear1 and the advantage for a short time may change into the reverse4 ,if we may be allowed to make use of an idea from nature1 we shall be able sooner to explain ourselves4 ,it is the time which every force in the material world requires to show its effect4 ,a power1 which if applied slowly by degrees1 would be sufficient to check a body in motion1 will be overcome by it if time fails4 ,this law of the material world is a striking illustration of many of the phenomena in our inner life4 ,if we are once roused to a certain train of thought1 it is not every motive sufficient in itself which can change or stop that current of thought4 ,time1 tranquillity and durable impressions on our senses are required4 ,so it is also in war4 ,when once the mind has taken a decided direction towards an object1 or turned back towards a harbour of refuge1 it may easily happen that the motives which in the one base naturally serve to restrain1 and those which in the other as naturally excite to enterprise1 are not felt at once in their full force2 and as the progress of action in the mean time continues1 one is carried along by the stream of movement beyond the line of equilibrium1 beyond the culminating point1 without being aware of it4 ,indeed1 it may even happen that1 in spite of the exhaustion of force1 the assailant1 supported by the moral forces which specially lie in the offensive1 like a horse drawing a load uphill1 finds it less difficult to advance than to stop4 ,by this1 we believe1 we have now shown1 without contradiction in itself1 how the assailant may pass that point1 where1 if he had stopped at the right moment1 he might still1 through the defensive1 have had a result1 that is equilibrium4 ,rightly to determine this point is1 therefore1 important in framing a plan of a campaign1 as well for the offensive1 that he may not undertake what is beyond his powers 7to a certain extent contract debts71 as for the defensive1 that he may perceive and profit by this error if committed by the assailant4 ,if now we look back at all the points which the commander should bear in mind in making his determination1 and remember that he can only estimate the tendency and value of the most important of them through the consideration of many other near and distant relations1 that he must to a certain extent guess at them guess whether the enemy's army1 after the first blow1 will show a stronger core and increasing solidity1 or like a ,bologna phial1 will turn into dust as soon as the surface is injured2 guess the extent of weakness and prostration which the drying up of certain sources1 the interruption of certain communications will produce on the military state of the enemy2 guess whether the enemy1 from the burning pain of the blow which has been dealt him1 will collapse powerless1 or whether1 like a wounded bull1 he will rise to a state of fury2 lastly1 guess whether other powers will be dismayed or roused1 what political alliances are likely to be dissolved1 and what are likely to be formed4 ,when we say that he must hit all this1 and much more1 with the tact of his judgment1 as the rifleman hits a mark1 it must be admitted that such an act of the human mind is no trifle4 ,a thousand wrong roads running here and there1 present themselves to the judgment2 and whatever the number1 the confusion and complexity of objects leaves undone1 is completed by the sense of danger and responsibility4 ,thus it happens that the majority of generals prefer to fall short of the mark rather than to approach too close2 and thus it happens that a fine courage and great spirit of enterprise often go beyond the point1 and therefore also fail to hit the mark4 ,only he that does great things with small means has made a successful hit4 ,,sketches ,,for ,,book ,,viii ,,plan ,,of ,,war ,,chapter ,i4 ,introduction ,in the chapter on the essence and object of war1 we sketched1 in a certain measure1 its general conception1 and pointed out its relations to surrounding circumstances1 in order to commence with a sound fundamental idea4 ,we there cast a glance at the manifold difficulties which the mind encounters in the consideration of this subject1 whilst we postponed the closer examination of them1 and stopped at the conclusion1 that the overthrow of the enemy1 consequently the destruction of his combatant force1 is the chief object of the whole of the action of war4 ,this put us in a position to show in the following chapter1 that the means which the act of war employs is the combat alone4 ,in this manner1 we think1 we have obtained at the outset a correct point of view4 ,having now gone through singly all the principal relations and forms which appear in military action1 but are extraneous to1 or outside of1 the combat1 in order that we might fix more distinctly their value1 partly through the nature of the thing1 partly from the lessons of experience which military history affords1 purify them from1 and root out1 those vague ambiguous ideas which are generally mixed up with them1 and also to put prominently forward the real object of the act of war1 the destruction of the enemy's combatant force as the primary object universally belonging to it2 we now return to ,war as a whole1 as we propose to speak of the ,plan of ,war1 and of campaigns2 and that obliges us to revert to the ideas in our first book ,in these chapters1 which are to deal with the whole question1 is contained strategy1 properly speaking1 in its most comprehensive and important features4 ,we enter this innermost part of its domain1 where all other threads meet1 not without a degree of diffidence1 which1 indeed1 is amply justified ,if1 on the one hand1 we see how extremely simple the operations of war appear2 if we hear and read how the greatest generals speak of it1 just in the plainest and briefest manner1 how the government and management of this ponderous machine1 with its hundred thousand limbs1 is made no more of in their lips than if they were only speaking of their own persons1 so that the whole tremendous act of war is individualised into a kind of duel2 if we find the motives also of their action brought into connection sometimes with a few simple ideas1 sometimes with some excitement of feeling2 if we see the easy1 sure1 we might almost say light manner1 in which they treat the subject and now see1 on the other hand1 the immense number of circumstances which present themselves for the consideration of the mind2 the long1 often indefinite1 distances to which the threads of the subject run out1 and the number of combinations which lie before us2 if we reflect that it is the duty of theory to embrace all this systematically1 that is with clearness and fullness1 and always to refer the action to the necessity of a sufficient cause1 then comes upon us an overpowering dread of being dragged down to a pedantic dogmatism1 to crawl about in the lower regions of heavy abstruse conceptions1 where we shall never meet any great captain1 with his natural coup d'il4 ,if the result of an attempt at theory is to be of this kind1 it would have been as well1 or rather1 it would have been better1 not to have made the attempt2 it could only bring down on theory the contempt of genius1 and the attempt itself would soon be forgotten4 ,and on the other hand1 this facile coup d'il of the general1 this simple art of forming notions1 this personification of the whole action of war1 is so entirely and completely the soul of the right method of conducting war1 that in no other but this broad way is it possible to conceive that freedom of the mind which is indispensable if it is to dominate events1 not to be overpowered by them ,with some fear we proceed again2 we can only do so by pursuing the way which we have prescribed for ourselves from the first4 ,theory ought to throw a clear light on the mass of objects1 that the mind may the easier find its bearings2 theory ought to pull up the weeds which error has sown broadcast2 it should show the relations of things to each other1 separate the important from the trifling4 ,where ideas resolve themselves spontaneously into such a core of ,truth as is called ,principle1 when they of themselves keep such a line as forms a rule1 ,theory should indicate the same ,whatever the mind seizes1 the rays of light which are awakened in it by this exploration amongst the fundamental notions of things1 that is the assistance which ,theory affords the mind4 ,theory can give no formulas with which to solve problems2 it cannot confine the mind's course to the narrow line of necessity by ,principles set up on both sides4 ,it lets the mind take a look at the mass of objects and their relations1 and then allows it to go free to the higher regions of action1 there to act according to the measure of its natural forces1 with the energy of the whole of those forces combined1 and to grasp the ,true and the ,right1 as one single clear idea1 which shooting forth from under the united pressure of all these forces1 would seem to be rather a product of feeling than of reflection4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,absolute and ,real ,war ,the ,plan of the ,war comprehends the whole ,military ,act2 through it that ,act becomes a whole1 which must have one final determinate object1 in which all particular objects must become absorbed4 ,no war is commenced1 or1 at least1 no war should be commenced1 if people acted wisely1 without saying to themselves1 ,what is to be attained by and in the same2 the first is the final object2 the other is the intermediate aim4 ,by this chief consideration the whole course of the war is prescribed1 the extent of the means and the measure of energy are determined2 its influence manifests itself down to the smallest organ of action4 ,we said1 in the first chapter1 that the overthrow of the enemy is the natural end of the act of ,war2 and that if we would keep within the strictly philosophical limits of the idea1 there can be no other in reality4 ,as this idea must apply to both the belligerent parties1 it must follow1 that there can be no suspension in the ,military ,act1 and peace cannot take place until one or other of the parties concerned is overthrown4 ,in the chapter on the suspension of the ,belligerent ,act1 we have shown how the simple principle of hostility applied to its embodiment1 man1 and all circumstances out of which it makes a war1 is subject to checks and modifications from causes which are inherent in the apparatus of war4 ,but this modification is not nearly sufficient to carry us from the original conception of ,war to the concrete form in which it almost everywhere appears4 ,most wars appear only as an angry feeling on both sides1 under the influence of which1 each side takes up arms to protect himself1 and to put his adversary in fear1 and--when opportunity offers1 to strike a blow4 ,they are1 therefore1 not like mutually destructive elements brought into collision1 but like tensions of two elements still apart which discharge themselves in small partial shocks4 ,but what is now the non-conducting medium which hinders the complete discharge8 ,why is the philosophical conception not satisfied8 ,that medium consists in the number of interests1 forces1 and circumstances of various kinds1 in the existence of the ,state1 which are affected by the war1 and through the infinite ramifications of which the logical consequence cannot be carried out as it would on the simple threads of a few conclusions2 in this labyrinth it sticks fast1 and man1 who in great things as well as in small1 usually acts more on the impulse of ideas and feelings1 than according to strictly logical conclusions1 is hardly conscious of his confusion1 unsteadiness of purpose1 and inconsistency4 ,but if the intelligence by which the war is decreed1 could even go over all these things relating to the war1 without for a moment losing sight of its aim1 still all the other intelligences in the ,state which are concerned may not be able to do the same2 thus an opposition arises1 and with that comes the necessity for a force capable of overcoming the inertia of the whole mass--a force which is seldom forthcoming to the full4 ,this inconsistency takes place on one or other of the two sides1 or it may be on both sides1 and becomes the cause of the war being something quite different to what it should be1 according to the conception of it--a half and half production1 a thing without a perfect inner cohesion4 ,this is how we find it almost everywhere1 and we might doubt whether our notion of its absolute character or nature was founded in reality1 if we had not seen real warfare make its appearence in this absolute completeness just in our own times4 ,after a short introduction performed by the ,french ,revolution1 the impetuous ,buonaparte quickly brought it to this point ,under him it was carried on without slackening for a moment until the enemy was prostrated1 and the counter stroke followed almost with as little remission4 ,is it not natural and necessary that this phenomenon should lead us back to the original conception of war with all its rigorous deductions8 ,shall we now rest satisfied with this idea1 and judge of all wars according to it1 however much they may differ from it1--deduce from it all the requirements of theory8 ,we must decide upon this point1 for we can say nothing trustworthy on the ,plan of ,war until we have made up our minds whether war should only be of this kind1 or whether it may be of another kind4 ,if we give an affirmative to the first1 then our ,theory will be1 in all respects1 nearer to the necessary1 it will be a clearer and more settled thing4 ,but what should we say then of all wars since those of ,alexander up to the time of ,buonaparte1 if we except some campaigns of the ,romans8 ,we should have to reject them in a lump1 and yet we cannot1 perhaps1 do so without being ashamed of our presumption4 ,but an additional evil is1 that we must say to ourselves1 that in the next ten years there may perhaps be a war of that same kind again1 in spite of our ,theory2 and that this ,theory1 with a rigorous logic1 is still quite powerless against the force of circumstances4 ,we must1 therefore1 decide to construe war as it is to be1 and not from pure conception1 but by allowing room for everything of a foreign nature which mixes up with it and fastens itself upon it--all the natural inertia and friction of its parts1 the whole of the inconsistency1 the vagueness and hesitation 7or timidity7 of the human mind3 we shall have to grasp the idea that war1 and the form which we give it1 proceeds from ideas1 feelings1 and circumstances1 which dominate for the moment2 indeed1 if we would be perfectly candid we must admit that this has even been the case where it has taken its absolute character1 that is1 under ,buonaparte4 ,if we must do so1 if we must grant that war originates and takes its form not from a final adjustment of the innumerable relations with which it is connected1 but from some amongst them which happen to predominate2 then it follows1 as a matter of course1 that it rests upon a play of possibilities1 probabilities1 good fortune and bad1 in which rigorous logical deduction often gets lost1 and in which it is in general a useless1 inconvenient instrument for the head2 then it also follows that war may be a thing which is sometimes war in a greater1 sometimes in a lesser degree4 ,all this1 theory must admit1 but it is its duty to give the foremost place to the absolute form of war1 and to use that form as a general point of direction1 that whoever wishes to learn something from theory1 may accustom himself never to lose sight of it1 to regard it as the natural measure of all his hopes and fears1 in order to approach it where he can1 or where he must4 ,that a leading idea1 which lies at the root of our thoughts and actions1 gives them a certain tone and character1 even when the immediately determining grounds come from totally different regions1 is just as certain as that the painter can give this or that tone to his picture by the colours with which he lays on his ground4 ,theory is indebted to the last wars for being able to do this effectually now4 ,without these warning examples of the destructive force of the element set free1 she might have talked herself hoarse to no purpose2 no one would have believed possible what all have now lived to see realised4 ,would ,prussia have ventured to penetrate into ,france in the year #agih with #gj1jjj men1 if she had foreseen that the reaction in case of failure would be so strong as to overthrow the old balance of power in ,europe8 ,would ,prussia1 in #ahjf1 have made war with #ajj1jjj against ,france1 if she had supposed that the first pistol shot would be a spark in the heart of the mine1 which would blow it into the air8 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,a4 ,interdependence of the ,parts in ,war ,according as we have in view the absolute form of war1 or one of the real forms deviating more or less from it1 so likewise different notions of its result will arise4 ,in the absolute form1 where everything is the effect of its natural and necessary cause1 one thing follows another in rapid succession2 there is1 if we may use the expression1 no neutral space2 there is on account of the manifold reactionary effects which war contains in itself1799#a7 on account of the connection in which1 strictly speaking1 the whole series of combats1799#b7 follow one after another1 on account of the culminating point which every victory has1 beyond which losses and defeats commence799#c7 on account of all these natural relations of war there is1 ,i say1 only one result1 to wit1 the final result4 ,until it takes place nothing is decided1 nothing won1 nothing lost4 ,here we may say indeed3 the end crowns the work4 ,in this view1 therefore1 war is an indivisible whole1 the parts of which 7the subordinate results7 have no value except in their relation to this whole4 ,the conquest of ,moscow1 and of half ,russia in #ahab1 was of no value to ,buonaparte unless it obtained for him the peace which he desired4 ,but it was only a part of his ,plan of campaign2 to complete that ,plan1 one part was still wanted1 the destruction of the ,russian army2 if we suppose this1 added to the other success1 then the peace was as certain as it is possible for things of this kind to be4 ,this second part ,buonaparte missed at the right time1 and he could never afterwards attain it1 and so the whole of the first part was not only useless1 but fatal to him4 799#a47 ,book ,i41 ,chapter ,i4 799#b47 ,book ,i41 ,chapter ,i4 799#c47 ,book ,,vii41 ,chapters ,,iv4 and ,v4 7,culminating ,point of ,victory74 ,to this view of the relative connection of results in war1 which may be regarded as extreme1 stands opposed another extreme1 according to which war is composed of single independent results1 in which1 as in any number of games played1 the preceding has no influence on the next following2 everything here1 therefore1 depends only on the sum total of the results1 and we can lay up each single one like a counter at play4 ,just as the first kind of view derives its truth from the nature of things1 so we find that of the second in history4 ,there are cases without number in which a small moderate advantage might have been gained without any very onerous condition being attached to it4 ,the more the element of war is modified the more common these cases become2 but as little as the first of the views now imagined was ever completely realised in any war1 just as little is there any war in which the last suits in all respects1 and the first can be dispensed with4 ,if we keep to the first of these supposed views1 we must perceive the necessity of every war being looked upon as a whole from the very commencement1 and that at the very first step forwards1 the commander should have in his eye the object to which every line must converge4 ,if we admit the second view1 then subordinate advantages may be pursued on their own account1 and the rest left to subsequent events4 ,as neither of these forms of conception is entirely without result1 therefore theory cannot dispense with either4 ,but it makes this difference in the use of them1 that it requires the first to be laid as a fundamental idea at the root of everything1 and that the latter shall only be used as a modification which is justified by circumstances4 ,if ,frederick the ,great in the years #agdb1 #agdd1 #ageg1 and #ageh1 thrust out from ,silesia and ,saxony a fresh offensive point into the ,austrian ,empire1 which he knew very well could not lead to a new and durable conquest like that of ,silesia and ,saxony1 it was done not with a view to the overthrow of the ,austrian ,empire1 but from a lesser motive1 namely1 to gain time and strength2 and it was optional with him to pursue that subordinate object without being afraid that he should thereby risk his whole existence47997 ,but if ,prussia in #ahjf1 and ,austria in #ahje1 #ahji1 proposed to themselves a still more moderate object1 that of driving the ,french over the ,rhine1 they would not have acted in a reasonable manner if they had not first scanned in their minds the whole series of events which either1 in the case of success1 or of the reverse1 would probably follow the first step1 and lead up to peace4 ,this was quite indispensable1 as well to enable them to determine with themselves how far victory might be followed up without danger1 and how and where they would be in a condition to arrest the course of victory on the enemy's side4 7997 ,had ,frederick the ,great gained the ,battle of ,kollen1 and taken prisoners the chief ,austrian army with their two field marshals in ,prague1 it would have been such a tremendous blow that he might then have entertained the idea of marching to ,vienna to make the ,austrian ,court tremble1 and gain a peace directly4 ,this1 in these times1 unparalleled result1 which would have been quite like what we have seen in our day1 only still more wonderful and brilliant from the contest being between a little ,david and a great ,goliath1 might very probably have taken place after the gain of this one battle2 but that does not contradict the assertion above maintained1 for it only refers to what the king originally looked forward to from his offensive4 ,the surrounding and taking prisoners the enemy's army was an event which was beyond all calculation1 and which the king never thought of1 at least not until the ,austrians laid themselves open to it by the unskilful position in which they placed themselves at ,prague4 ,an attentive consideration of history shows wherein the difference of the two cases consists4 ,at the time of the ,silesian ,war in the eighteenth century1 war was still a mere ,cabinet affair1 in which the people only took part as a blind instrument2 at the beginning of the nineteenth century the people on each side weighed in the scale4 ,the commanders opposed to ,frederick the ,great were men who acted on commission1 and just on that account men in whom caution was a predominant characteristic2 the opponent of the ,austrians and ,prussians may be described in a few words as the very god of war himself4 ,must not these different circumstances give rise to quite different considerations8 ,should they not in the year #ahje1 #ahjf1 and #ahji have pointed to the extremity of disaster as a very close possibility1 nay1 even a very great probability1 and should they not at the same time have led to widely different plans and measures from any merely aimed at the conquest of a couple of fortresses or a paltry province8 ,they did not do so in a degree commensurate with their importance1 although both ,austria and ,prussia1 judging by their armaments1 felt that storms were brewing in the political atmosphere4 ,they could not do so because those relations at that time were not yet so plainly developed as they have been since from history4 ,it is just those very campaigns of #ahje1 #ahjf1 #ahji1 and following ones1 which have made it easier for us to form a conception of modern absolute war in its destroying energy4 ,theory demands1 therefore1 that at the commencement of every war its character and main outline shall be defined according to what the political conditions and relations lead us to anticipate as probable4 ,the more1 that according to this probability its character approaches the form of absolute war1 the more its outline embraces the mass of the belligerent states and draws them into the vortex1 so much the more complete will be the relation of events to one another and the whole1 but so much the more necessary it will also be not to take the first step without thinking what may be the last4 ,b4 ,on the ,magnitude of the ,object of the ,war1 and the ,efforts to be ,made4 ,the compulsion which we must use towards our enemy will be regulated by the proportions of our own and his political demands4 ,in so far as these are mutually known they will give the measure of the mutual efforts2 but they are not always quite so evident1 and this may be a first ground of a difference in the means adopted by each4 ,the situation and relations of the states are not like each other2 this may become a second cause4 ,the strength of will1 the character and capabilities of the governments are as little like2 this is a third cause4 ,these three elements cause an uncertainty in the calculation of the amount of resistance to be expected1 consequently an uncertainty as to the amount of means to be applied and the object to be chosen4 ,as in war the want of sufficient exertion may result not only in failure but in positive harm1 therefore1 the two sides respectively seek to outstrip each other1 which produces a reciprocal action4 ,this might lead to the utmost extremity of exertion1 if it was possible to define such a point4 ,but then regard for the amount of the political demands would be lost1 the means would lose all relation to the end1 and in most cases this aim at an extreme effort would be wrecked by the opposing weight of forces within itself4 ,in this manner1 he who undertakes war is brought back again into a middle course1 in which he acts to a certain extent upon the principle of only applying so much force and aiming at such an object in war as are just sufficient for the attainment of its political object4 ,to make this principle practicable he must renounce every absolute necessity of a result1 and throw out of the calculation remote contingencies4 ,here1 therefore1 the action of the mind leaves the province of science1 strictly speaking1 of logic and mathematics1 and becomes1 in the widest sense of the term1 an art1 that is1 skill in discriminating1 by the tact of judgment among an infinite multitude of objects and relations1 that which is the most important and decisive4 ,this tact of judgment consists unquestionably more or less in some intuitive comparison of things and relations by which the remote and unimportant are more quickly set aside1 and the more immediate and important are sooner discovered than they could be by strictly logical deduction4 ,in order to ascertain the real scale of the means which we must put forth for war1 we must think over the political object both on our own side and on the enemy's side2 we must consider the power and position of the enemy's state as well as of our own1 the character of his government and of his people1 and the capacities of both1 and all that again on our own side1 and the political connections of other states1 and the effect which the war will produce on those ,states4 ,that the determination of these diverse circumstances and their diverse connections with each other is an immense problem1 that it is the true flash of genius which discovers here in a moment what is right1 and that it would be quite out of the question to become master of the complexity merely by a methodical study1 this it is easy to conceive4 ,in this sense ,buonaparte was quite right when he said that it would be a problem in algebra before which a ,newton might stand aghast4 ,if the diversity and magnitude of the circumstances and the uncertainty as to the right measure augment in a high degree the difficulty of obtaining a right result1 we must not overlook the fact that although the incomparable importance of the matter does not increase the complexity and difficulty of the problem1 still it very much increases the merit of its solution4 ,in men of an ordinary stamp freedom and activity of mind are depressed not increased by the sense of danger and responsibility3 but where these things give wings to strengthen the judgment1 there undoubtedly must be unusual greatness of soul4 ,first of all1 therefore1 we must admit that the judgment on an approaching war1 on the end to which it should be directed1 and on the means which are required1 can only be formed after a full consideration of the whole of the circumstances in connection with it3 with which therefore must also be combined the most individual traits of the moment2 next1 that this decision1 like all in military life1 cannot be purely objective but must be determined by the mental and moral qualities of princes1 statesmen1 and generals1 whether they are united in the person of one man or not4 ,the subject becomes general and more fit to be treated of in the abstract if we look at the general relations in which ,states have been placed by circumstances at different times4 ,we must allow ourselves here a passing glance at history4 ,half-civilised ,tartars1 the ,republics of ancient times1 the feudal lords and commercial cities of the ,middle ,ages1 kings of the eighteenth century1 and1 lastly1 princes and people of the nineteenth century1 all carry on war in their own way1 carry it on differently1 with different means1 and for a different object4 ,the ,tartars seek new abodes4 ,they march out as a nation with their wives and children1 they are1 therefore1 greater than any other army in point of numbers1 and their object is to make the enemy submit or expel him altogether4 ,by these means they would soon overthrow everything before them if a high degree of civilisation could be made compatible with such a condition4 ,the old ,republics with the exception of ,rome were of small extent2 still smaller their armies1 for they excluded the great mass of the populace3 they were too numerous and lay too close together not to find an obstacle to great enterprises in the natural equilibrium in which small separate parts always place themselves according to the general law of nature3 therefore their wars were confined to devastating the open country and taking some towns in order to ensure to themselves in these a certain degree of influence for the future4 ,rome alone forms an exception1 but not until the later period of its history4 ,for a long time1 by means of small bands1 it carried on the usual warfare with its neighbours for booty and alliances4 ,it became great more through the alliances which it formed1 and through which neighbouring peoples by degrees became amalgamated with it into one whole1 than through actual conquests4 ,it was only after having spread itself in this manner all over ,southern ,italy1 that it began to advance as a really conquering power4 ,carthage fell1 ,spain and ,gaul were conquered1 ,greece subdued1 and its dominion extended to ,egypt and ,asia4 ,at this period its military power was immense1 without its efforts being in the same proportion4 ,these forces were kept up by its riches2 it no longer resembled the ancient republics1 nor itself as it had been2 it stands alone4 ,just as peculiar in their way are the wars of ,alexander4 ,with a small army1 but distinguished for its intrinsic perfection1 he overthrew the decayed fabric of the ,asiatic ,states2 without rest1 and regardless of risks1 he traverses the breadth of ,asia1 and penetrates into ,india4 ,no republics could do this4 ,only a king1 in a certain measure his own condottiere1 could get through so much so quickly4 ,the great and small monarchies of the middle ages carried on their wars with feudal armies4 ,everything was then restricted to a short period of time2 whatever could not be done in that time was held to be impracticable4 ,the feudal force itself was raised through an organisation of vassaldom2 the bond which held it together was partly legal obligation1 partly a voluntary contract2 the whole formed a real confederation4 ,the armament and tactics were based on the right of might1 on single combat1 and therefore little suited to large bodies4 ,in fact1 at no period has the union of ,states been so weak1 and the individual citizen so independent4 ,all this influenced the character of the wars at that period in the most distinct manner4 ,they were comparatively rapidly carried out1 there was little time spent idly in camps1 but the object was generally only punishing1 not subduing1 the enemy4 ,they carried off his cattle1 burnt his towns1 and then returned home again4 ,the great commercial towns and small republics brought forward the condottieri4 ,that was an expensive1 and therefore1 as far as visible strength1 a very limited military force2 as for its intensive strength1 it was of still less value in that respect2 so far from their showing anything like extreme energy or impetuosity in the field1 their combats were generally only sham fights4 ,in a word1 hatred and enmity no longer roused a state to personal activity1 but had become articles of trade2 war lost great part of its danger1 altered completely its nature1 and nothing we can say of the character it then assumed1 would be applicable to it in its reality4 ,the feudal system condensed itself by degrees into a decided territorial supremacy2 the ties binding the ,state together became closer2 obligations which concerned the person were made subject of composition2 by degrees gold became the substitute in most cases1 and the feudal armies were turned into mercenaries4 ,the condottieri formed the connecting link in the change1 and were therefore1 for a time1 the instrument of the more powerful ,states2 but this had not lasted long1 when the soldier1 hired for a limited term1 was turned into a standing mercenary1 and the military force of ,states now became an army1 having its base in the public treasury4 ,it is only natural that the slow advance to this stage caused a diversified interweaving of all three kinds of military force4 ,under ,henry ,,iv4 we find the feudal contingents1 condottieri1 and standing army all employed together4 ,the condottieri carried on their existence up to the period of the ,thirty ,years' ,war1 indeed there are slight traces of them even in the eighteenth century4 ,the other relations of the ,states of ,europe at these different periods were quite as peculiar as their military forces4 ,upon the whole1 this part of the world had split up into a mass of petty ,states1 partly republics in a state of internal dissension1 partly small monarchies in which the power of the government was very limited and insecure4 ,a ,state in either of these cases could not be considered as a real unity2 it was rather an agglomeration of loosely connected forces4 ,neither1 therefore1 could such a ,state be considered an intelligent being1 acting in accordance with simple logical rules4 ,it is from this point of view we must look at the foreign politics and wars of the ,middle ,ages4 ,let us only think of the continual expeditions of the ,emperors of ,germany into ,italy for five centuries1 without any substantial conquest of that country resulting from them1 or even having been so much as in view4 ,it is easy to look upon this as a fault repeated over and over again as a false view which had its root in the nature of the times1 but it is more in accordance with reason to regard it as the consequence of a hundred important causes which we can partially realise in idea1 but the vital energy of which it is impossible for us to understand so vividly as those who were brought into actual conflict with them4 ,as long as the great ,states which have risen out of this chaos required time to consolidate and organise themselves1 their whole power and energy is chiefly directed to that point2 their foreign wars are few1 and those that took place bear the stamp of a ,state-unity not yet well cemented4 ,the wars between ,france and ,england are the first that appear1 and yet at that time ,france is not to be considered as really a monarchy1 but as an agglomeration of dukedoms and countships2 ,england1 although bearing more the semblance of a unity1 still fought with the feudal organisation1 and was hampered by serious domestic troubles4 ,under ,louis ,,xi41 ,france made its greatest step towards internal unity2 under ,charles ,,viii4 it appears in ,italy as a power bent on conquest2 and under ,louis ,,xiv4 it had brought its political state and its standing army to the highest perfection4 ,spain attains to unity under ,ferdinand the ,catholic2 through accidental marriage connections1 under ,charles ,v41 suddenly arose the great ,spanish monarchy1 composed of ,spain1 ,burgundy1 ,germany1 and ,italy united4 ,what this colossus wanted in unity and internal political cohesion1 it made up for by gold1 and its standing army came for the first time into collision with the standing army of ,france4 ,after ,charles's abdication1 the great ,spanish colossus split into two parts1 ,spain and ,austria4 ,the latter1 strengthened by the acquisition of ,bohemia and ,hungary1 now appears on the scene as a great power1 towing the ,german ,confederation like a small vessel behind her4 ,the end of the seventeenth century1 the time of ,louis ,,xiv41 is to be regarded as the point in history at which the standing military power1 such as it existed in the eighteenth century1 reached its zenith4 ,that military force was based on enlistment and money4 ,states had organised themselves into complete unities2 and the governments1 by commuting the personal obligations of their subjects into a money payment1 had concentrated their whole power in their treasuries4 ,through the rapid strides in social improvements1 and a more enlightened system of government1 this power had become very great in comparison to what it had been4 ,france appeared in the field with a standing army of a couple of hundred thousand men1 and the other powers in proportion4 ,the other relations of ,states had likewise altered4 ,europe was divided into a dozen kingdoms and two republics2 it was now conceivable that two of these powers might fight with each other without ten times as many others being mixed up in the quarrel1 as would certainly have been the case formerly4 ,the possible combinations in political relations were still manifold1 but they could be discerned and determined from time to time according to probability4 ,internal relations had almost everywhere settle down into a pure monarchical form2 the rights and influence of privileged bodies or estates had gradually died away1 and the cabinet had become a complete unity1 acting for the ,state in all its external relations4 ,the time had therefore come that a suitable instrument and a despotic will could give war a form in accordance with the theoretical conception4 ,and at this epoch appeared three new ,alexanders ,gustavus ,adolphus1 ,charles ,,xii41 and ,frederick the ,great1 whose aim was by small but highly-disciplined armies1 to raise little ,states to the rank of great monarchies1 and to throw down everything that opposed them4 ,if they had had only to deal with ,asiatic ,states1 they would have more closely resembled ,alexander in the parts they acted4 ,in any case1 we may look upon them as the precursors of ,buonaparte as respects that which may be risked in war4 ,but what war gained on the one side in force and consistency was lost again on the other side4 ,armies were supported out of the treasury1 which the sovereign regarded partly as his private purse1 or at least as a resource belonging to the government1 and not to the people4 ,relations with other states1 except with respect to a few commercial subjects1 mostly concerned only the interests of the treasury or of the government1 not those of the people2 at least ideas tended everywhere in that way4 ,the cabinets1 therefore1 looked upon themselves as the owners and administrators of large estates1 which they were continually seeking to increase without the tenants on these estates being particularly interested in this improvement4 ,the people1 therefore1 who in the ,tartar invasions were everything in war1 who1 in the old republics1 and in the ,middle ,ages1 7if we restrict the idea to those possessing the rights of citizens17 were of great consequence1 were in the eighteenth century1 absolutely nothing directly1 having only still an indirect influence on the war through their virtues and faults4 ,in this manner1 in proportion as the government separated itself from the people1 and regarded itself as the state1 war became more exclusively a business of the government1 which it carried on by means of the money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds it could pick up in its own and neighbouring countries4 ,the consequence of this was1 that the means which the government could command had tolerably well defined limits1 which could be mutually estimated1 both as to their extent and duration2 this robbed war of its most dangerous feature3 namely the effort towards the extreme1 and the hidden series of possibilities connected therewith4 ,the financial means1 the contents of the treasury1 the state of credit of the enemy1 were approximately known as well as the size of his army4 ,any large increase of these at the outbreak of a war was impossible4 ,inasmuch as the limits of the enemy's power could thus be judged of1 a ,state felt tolerably secure from complete subjugation1 and as the ,state was conscious at the same time of the limits of its own means1 it saw itself restricted to a moderate aim4 ,protected from an extreme1 there was no necessity to venture on an extreme4 ,necessity no longer giving an impulse in that direction1 that impulse could only now be given by courage and ambition4 ,but these found a powerful counterpoise in the political relations4 ,even kings in command were obliged to use the instrument of war with caution4 ,if the army was dispersed1 no new one could be got1 and except the army there was nothing4 ,this imposed as a necessity great prudence in all undertakings4 ,it was only when a decided advantage seemed to present itself that they made use of the costly instrument2 to bring about such an opportunity was a general's art2 but until it was brought about they floated to a certain degree in an absolute vacuum1 there was no ground of action1 and all forces1 that is all designs1 seemed to rest4 ,the original motive of the aggressor faded away in prudence and circumspection4 ,thus war1 in reality1 became a regular game1 in which ,time and ,chance shuffled the cards2 but in its signification it was only diplomacy somewhat intensified1 a more vigorous way of negotiating1 in which battles and sieges were substituted for diplomatic notes4 ,to obtain some moderate advantage in order to make use of it in negotiations for peace1 was the aim even of the most ambitious4 ,this restricted1 shrivelled-up form of war proceeded1 as we have said1 from the narrow basis on which it was supported4 ,but that excellent generals and kings1 like ,gustavus ,adolphus1 ,charles ,,xii41 and ,frederick the ,great1 at the head of armies just as excellent1 could not gain more prominence in the general mass of phenomena that even these men were obliged to be contented to remain at the ordinary level of moderate results1 is to be attributed to the balance of power in ,europe4 ,now that ,states had become greater1 and their centres further apart from each other1 what had formerly been done through direct perfectly natural interests1 proximity1 contact1 family connections1 personal friendship1 to prevent any one single ,state among the number from becoming suddenly great was effected by a higher cultivation of the art of diplomacy4 ,political interests1 attractions and repulsions developed into a very refined system1 so that a cannon shot could not be fired in ,europe without all the cabinets having some interest in the occurrence4 ,a new ,alexander must therefore try the use of a good pen as well as his good sword2 and yet he never went very far with his conquests4 ,but although ,louis ,,xiv4 had in view to overthrow the balance of power in ,europe1 and at the end of the seventeenth century had already got to such a point as to trouble himself little about the general feeling of animosity1 he carried on war just as it had heretofore been conducted2 for while his army was certainly that of the greatest and richest monarch in ,europe1 in its nature it was just like others4 ,plundering and devastating the enemy's country1 which play such an important part with ,tartars1 with ancient nations1 and even in the ,middle ,ages1 were no longer in accordance with the spirit of the age4 ,they were justly looked upon as unnecessary barbarity1 which might easily be retaliated1 and which did more injury to the enemy's subjects than the enemy's government1 therefore1 produced no effect beyond throwing the nation back many stages in all that relates to peaceful arts and civilisation4 ,war1 therefore1 confined itself more and more both as regards means and end1 to the army itself4 ,the army with its fortresses1 and some prepared positions1 constituted a ,state in a ,state1 within which the element of war slowly consumed itself4 ,all ,europe rejoiced at its taking this direction1 and held it to be the necessary consequence of the spirit of progress4 ,although there lay in this an error1 inasmuch as the progress of the human mind can never lead to what is absurd1 can never make five out of twice two1 as we have already said1 and must again repeat1 still upon the whole this change had a beneficial effect for the people2 only it is not to be denied that it had a tendency to make war still more an affair of the ,state1 and to separate it still more from the interests of the people4 ,the plan of a war on the part of the state assuming the offensive in those times consisted generally in the conquest of one or other of the enemy's provinces2 the plan of the defender was to prevent this2 the particular plan of campaign was to take one or other of the enemy's fortresses1 or to prevent one of our own from being taken2 it was only when a battle became unavoidable for this purpose that it was sought for and fought4 ,whoever fought a battle without this unavoidable necessity1 from mere innate desire of gaining a victory1 was reckoned a general with too much daring4 ,generally the campaign passed over with one siege1 or if it was a very active one1 with two sieges1 and winter quarters1 which were regarded as a necessity1 and during which1 the faulty arrangements of the one could never be taken advantage of by the other1 and in which the mutual relations of the two parties almost entirely ceased1 formed a distinct limit to the activity which was considered to belong to one campaign4 ,if the forces opposed were too much on an equality1 or if the aggressor was decidedly the weaker of the two1 then neither battle nor siege took place1 and the whole of the operations of the campaign pivoted on the maintenance of certain positions and magazines1 and the regular exhaustion of particular districts of country4 ,as long as war was universally conducted in this manner1 and the natural limits of its force were so close and obvious1 so far from anything absurd being perceived in it1 all was considered to be in the most regular order2 and criticism1 which in the eighteenth century began to turn its attention to the field of art in war1 addressed itself to details without troubling itself much about the beginning and the end4 ,thus there was eminence and perfection of every kind1 and even ,field ,marshal ,daun1 to whom it was chiefly owing that ,frederick the ,great completely attained his object1 and that ,maria ,theresa completely failed in hers1 notwithstanding that could still pass for a great ,general4 ,only now and again a more penetrating judgment made its appearance1 that is1 sound common sense acknowledged that with superior numbers something positive should be attained or war is badly conducted1 whatever art may be displayed4 ,thus matters stood when the ,french ,revolution broke out2 ,austria and ,prussia tried their diplomatic art of war2 this very soon proved insufficient4 ,whilst1 according to the usual way of seeing things1 all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in #agic1 such a force as no one had any conception of1 made its appearance4 ,war had suddenly become again an affair of the people1 and that of a people numbering thirty millions1 every one of whom regarded himself as a citizen of the ,state4 ,without entering here into the details of circumstances with which this great phenomenon was attended1 we shall confine ourselves to the results which interest us at present4 ,by this participation of the people in the war instead of a cabinet and an army1 a whole nation with its natural weight came into the scale4 ,henceforward1 the means available the efforts which might be called forth had no longer any definite limits2 the energy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer any counterpoise1 and consequently the danger for the adversary had risen to the extreme4 ,if the whole war of the revolution passed over without all this making itself felt in its full force and becoming quite evident2 if the generals of the revolution did not persistently press on to the final extreme1 and did not overthrow the monarchies in ,europe2 if the ,german armies now and again had the opportunity of resisting with success1 and checking for a time the torrent of victory1 the cause lay in reality in that technical incompleteness with which the ,french had to contend1 which showed itself first amongst the common soldiers1 then in the generals1 lastly1 at the time of the ,directory1 in the ,government itself4 ,after all this was perfected by the hand of ,buonaparte1 this military power1 based on the strength of the whole nation1 marched over ,europe1 smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly1 that where it only encountered the old fashioned armies the result was not doubtful for a moment4 ,a re-action1 however1 awoke in due time4 ,in ,spain1 the war became of itself an affair of the people4 ,in ,austria1 in the year #ahji1 the ,government commenced extraordinary efforts1 by means of ,reserves and ,landwehr1 which were nearer to the true object1 and far surpassed in degree what this ,state had hitherto conceived possible1 ,in ,russia1 in #ahab1 the example of ,spain and ,austria was taken as a pattern1 the enormous dimensions of that empire on the one hand allowed the preparations1 although too long deferred1 still to produce effect2 and1 on the other hand1 intensified the effect produced4 ,the result was brilliant4 ,in ,germany1 ,prussia rose up the first1 made the war a national cause1 and without either money or credit1 and with a population reduced one half1 took the field with an army twice as strong as that of #ahjf4 ,the rest of ,germany followed the example of ,prussia sooner or later1 and ,austria1 although less energetic than in #ahji1 still also came forward with more than its usual strength4 ,thus it was that ,germany and ,russia in the years #ahac and #ahad1 including all who took an active part in1 or were absorbed in these two campaigns1 appeared against ,france with about a million of men4 ,under these circumstances1 the energy thrown into the conduct of the war was quite different2 and1 although not quite on a level with that of the ,french1 although at some points timidity was still to be observed1 the course of the campaigns1 upon the whole1 may be said to have been in the new1 not in the old1 style4 ,in eight months the theatre of war was removed from the ,oder to the ,seine4 ,proud ,paris had to bow its head for the first time2 and the redoubtable ,buonaparte lay fettered on the ground4 ,therefore1 since the time of ,buonaparte1 war1 through being first on one side1 then again on the other1 an affair of the whole nation1 has assumed quite a new nature1 or rather it has approached much nearer to its real nature1 to its absolute perfection4 ,the means then called forth had no visible limit1 the limit losing itself in the energy and enthusiasm of the ,government and its subjects4 ,by the extent of the means1 and the wide field of possible results1 as well as by the powerful excitement of feeling which prevailed1 energy in the conduct of war was immensely increased2 the object of its action was the downfall of the foe2 and not until the enemy lay powerless on the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop or to come to any understanding with respect to the mutual objects of the contest4 ,thus1 therefore1 the element of war1 freed from all conventional restrictions1 broke loose1 with all its natural force4 ,the cause was the participation of the people in this great affair of ,state1 and this participation arose partly from the effects of the ,french ,revolution on the internal affairs of countries1 partly from the threatening attitude of the ,french towards all nations4 ,now1 whether this will be the case always in future1 whether all wars hereafter in ,europe will be carried on with the whole power of the ,states1 and1 consequently1 will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people1 or whether a separation of the interests of the ,government from those of the people will gradually again arise1 would be a difficult point to settle2 and1 least of all1 shall we take upon us to settle it4 ,but every one will agree with us1 that bounds1 which to a certain extent existed only in an unconsciousness of what is possible1 when once thrown down1 are not easily built up again2 and that1 at least1 whenever great interests are in dispute1 mutual hostility will discharge itself in the same manner as it has done in our times4 ,we here bring our historical survey to a close1 for it was not our design to give at a gallop some of the principles on which war has been carried on in each age1 but only to show how each period has had its own peculiar forms of war1 its own restrictive conditions1 and its own prejudices4 ,each period would1 therefore1 also keep its own theory of war1 even if every where1 in early times1 as well as in later1 the task had been undertaken of working out a theory on philosophical principles4 ,the events in each age must1 therefore1 be judged of in connection with the peculiarities of the time1 and only he who1 less through an anxious study of minute details than through an accurate glance at the whole1 can transfer himself into each particular age1 is fit to understand and appreciate its generals4 ,but this conduct of war1 conditioned by the peculiar relations of ,states1 and of the military force employed1 must still always contain in itself something more general1 or rather something quite general1 with which1 above everything1 theory is concerned4 ,the latest period of past time1 in which war reached its absolute strength1 contains most of what is of general application and necessary4 ,but it is just as improbable that wars henceforth will all have this grand character as that the wide barriers which have been opened to them will ever be completely closed again4 ,therefore1 by a theory which only dwells upon this absolute war1 all cases in which external influences alter the nature of war would be excluded or condemned as false4 ,this cannot be the object of theory1 which ought to be the science of war1 not under ideal but under real circumstances4 ,theory1 therefore1 whilst casting a searching1 discriminating and classifying glance at objects1 should always have in view the manifold diversity of causes from which war may proceed1 and should1 therefore1 so trace out its great features as to leave room for what is required by the exigencies of time and the moment4 ,accordingly1 we must add that the object which every one who undertakes war proposes to himself1 and the means which he calls forth1 are determined entirely according to the particular details of his position2 and on that very account they will also bear in themselves the character of the time and of the general relations2 lastly1 that they are always subject to the general conclusions to be deduced from the nature of war4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,ends in ,war ,more ,precisely ,defined ,overthrow of the ,enemy ,the aim of war in conception must always be the overthrow of the enemy2 this is the fundamental idea from which we set out4 ,now1 what is this overthrow8 ,it does not always imply as necessary the complete conquest of the enemy's country4 ,if the ,germans had reached ,paris1 in #agib1 there--in all human probability--the war with the ,revolutionary party would have been brought to an end at once for a season2 it was not at all necessary at that time to beat their armies beforehand1 for those armies were not yet to be looked upon as potent powers in themselves singly4 ,on the other hand1 in #ahad1 the allies would not have gained everything by taking ,paris if ,buonaparte had still remained at the head of a considerable army2 but as his army had nearly melted away1 therefore1 also in the year #ahad and #ahae the taking of ,paris decided all4 ,if ,buonaparte in the year #ahab1 either before or after taking ,moscow1 had been able to give the ,russian army of #abj1jjj on the ,kaluga road1 a complete defeat1 such as he gave the ,austrians in #ahje1 and the ,prussian army1 #ahjf1 then the possession of that capital would most probably have brought about a peace1 although an enormous tract of country still remained to be conquered4 ,in the year #ahje it was the battle of ,austerlitz that was decisive2 and1 therefore1 the previous possession of ,vienna and two-thirds of the ,austrian ,states1 was not of sufficient weight to gain for ,buonaparte a peace2 but1 on the other hand also1 after that battle of ,austerlitz1 the integrity of ,hungary1 still intact1 was not of sufficient weight to prevent the conclusion of peace4 ,in the ,russian campaign1 the complete defeat of the ,russian army was the last blow required3 the ,emperor ,alexander had no other army at hand1 and1 therefore1 peace was the certain consequence of victory4 ,if the ,russian army had been on the ,danube along with the ,austrian1 and had shared in its defeat1 then probably the conquest of ,vienna would not have been necessary1 and peace would have been concluded in ,linz4 ,in other cases1 the complete conquest of a country has not been sufficient1 as in the year #ahjg1 in ,prussia1 when the blow levelled against the ,russian auxiliary army1 in the doubtful battle of ,eylau1 was not decisive enough1 and the undoubted victory of ,friedland was required as a finishing blow1 like the victory of ,austerlitz in the preceding year4 ,we see that here1 also1 the result cannot be determined from general grounds2 the individual causes1 which no one knows who is not on the spot1 and many of a moral nature which are never heard of1 even the smallest traits and accidents1 which only appear in history as anecdotes1 are often decisive4 ,all that theory can here say is as follows3--,that the great point is to keep the overruling relations of both parties in view4 ,out of them a certain centre of gravity1 a centre of power and movement1 will form itself1 on which everything depends2 and against this centre of gravity of the enemy1 the concentrated blow of all the forces must be directed4 ,the little always depends on the great1 the unimportant on the important1 and the accidental on the essential4 ,this must guide our view4 ,alexander had his centre of gravity in his army1 so had ,gustavus ,adolphus1 ,charles ,,xii41 and ,frederick the ,great1 and the career of any one of them would soon have been brought to a close by the destruction of his army3 in ,states torn by internal dissensions1 this centre generally lies in the capital2 in small states dependent on greater ones1 it lies generally in the army of these allies2 in a confederacy1 it lies in the unity of interests2 in a national insurrection1 in the person of the chief leader1 and in public opinion2 against these points the blow must be directed4 ,if the enemy by this loses his balance1 no time must be allowed for him to recover it2 the blow must be persistently repeated in the same direction1 or1 in other words1 the conqueror must always direct his blows upon the mass1 but not against a fraction of the enemy4 ,it is not by conquering one of the enemy's provinces1 with little trouble and superior numbers1 and preferring the more secure possession of this unimportant conquest to great results1 but by seeking out constantly the heart of the hostile power1 and staking everything in order to gain all1 that we can effectually strike the enemy to the ground4 ,but whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against which we are to direct our operations1 still the conquest and destruction of his army is the surest commencement1 and in all cases1 the most essential4 ,hence we think that1 according to the majority of ascertained facts1 the following circumstances chiefly bring about the overthrow of the enemy4 #a4 ,dispersion of his army if it forms1 in some degree1 a potential force4 #b4 ,capture of the enemy's capital city1 if it is both the centre of the power of the ,state and the seat of political assemblies and actions4 #c4 ,an effectual blow against the principal ally1 if he is more powerful than the enemy himself4 ,we have always hitherto supposed the enemy in war as a unity1 which is allowable for considerations of a very general nature4 ,but having said that the subjugation of the enemy lies in the overcoming his resistance1 concentrated in the centre of gravity1 we must lay aside this supposition and introduce the case1 in which we have to deal with more than one opponent4 ,if two or more ,states combine against a third1 that combination constitutes1 in a political aspect1 only one war1 at the same time this political union has also its degrees4 ,the question is whether each ,state in the coalition possesses an independent interest in1 and an independent force with which to prosecute1 the war2 or whether there is one amongst them on whose interests and forces those of the others lean for support4 ,the more that the last is the case1 the easier it is to look upon the different enemies as one alone1 and the more readily we can simplify our principal enterprise to one great blow2 and as long as this is in any way possible1 it is the most thorough and complete means of success4 ,we may1 therefore1 establish it as a principle1 that if we can conquer all our enemies by conquering one of them1 the defeat of that one must be the aim of the war1 because in that one we hit the common centre of gravity of the whole war4 ,there are very few cases in which this kind of conception is not admissible1 and where this reduction of several centres of gravity to one cannot be made4 ,but if this cannot be done1 then indeed there is no alternative but to look upon the war as two or more separate wars1 each of which has its own aim4 ,as this case supposes the substantive independence of several enemies1 consequently a great superiority of the whole1 therefore in this case the overthrow of the enemy cannot1 in general1 come into question4 ,we now turn more particularly to the question1 ,when is such an object possible and advisable8 ,in the first place1 our forces must be sufficient1-- #a4 ,to gain a decisive victory over those of the enemy4 #b4 ,to make the expenditure of force which may be necessary to follow up the victory to a point at which it will no longer be possible for the enemy to regain his balance4 ,next1 we must feel sure that in our political situation1 such a result will not excite against us new enemies1 who may compel us on the spot to set free our first enemy4 ,france1 in the year #ahjf1 was able completely to conquer ,prussia1 although in doing so it brought down upon itself the whole military power of ,russia1 because it was in a condition to cope with the ,russians in ,prussia4 ,france might have done the same in ,spain in #ahjh as far as regards ,england1 but not as regards ,austria4 ,it was compelled to weaken itself materially in ,spain in #ahji1 and must have quite given up the contest in that country if it had not had otherwise great superiority both physically and morally1 over ,austria4 ,these three cases should therefore be carefully studied1 that we may not lose in the last the cause which we have gained in the former ones1 and be condemned in costs4 ,in estimating the strength of forces1 and that which may be effected by them1 the idea very often suggests itself to look upon time by a dynamic analogy as a factor of forces1 and to assume accordingly that half efforts1 or half the number of forces would accomplish in two years what could only be effected in one year by the whole force united4 ,this view which lies at the bottom of military schemes1 sometimes clearly1 sometimes less plainly1 is completely wrong4 ,an operation in war1 like everything else upon earth1 requires its time2 as a matter of course we cannot walk from ,wilna to ,moscow in eight days2 but there is no trace to be found in war of any reciprocal action between time and force1 such as takes place in dynamics4 ,time is necessary to both belligerents1 and the only question is3 which of the two1 judging by his position1 has most reason to expect special advantages from time8 ,now 7exclusive of peculiarities in the situation on one side or the other7 the vanquished has plainly the most reason1 at the same time certainly not by dynamic1 but by psychological laws4 ,envy1 jealousy1 anxiety for self1 as well as now and again magnanimity1 are the natural intercessors for the unfortunate2 they raise up for him on the one hand friends1 and on the other hand weaken and dissolve the coalition amongst his enemies4 ,therefore1 by delay something advantageous is more likely to happen for the conquered than for the conqueror4 ,further1 we must recollect that to make right use of a first victory1 as we have already shown1 a great expenditure of force is necessary2 this is not a mere outlay once for all1 but has to be kept up like housekeeping1 on a great scale2 the forces which have been sufficient to give us possession of a province1 are not always sufficient to meet this additional outlay2 by degrees the strain upon our resources becomes greater1 until at last it becomes insupportable2 time1 therefore1 of itself may bring about a change4 ,could the contributions which ,buonaparte levied from the ,russians and ,poles1 in money and in other ways1 in #ahab1 have procured the hundreds of thousands of men that he must have sent to ,moscow in order to retain his position there8 ,but if the conquered provinces are sufficiently important1 if there are in them points which are essential to the well-being of those parts which are not conquered1 so that the evil1 like a cancer1 is perpetually of itself gnawing further into the system1 then it is possible that the conqueror1 although nothing further is done1 may gain more than he loses4 ,now in this state of circumstances1 if no help comes from without1 then time may complete the work thus commenced2 what still remains unconquered will1 perhaps1 fall of itself4 ,therefore1 thus time may also become a factor of his forces1 but this can only take place if a return blow from the conquered is no longer possible1 a change of fortune in his favour no longer conceivable1 when therefore this factor of his forces is no longer of any value to the conqueror2 for he has accomplished the chief object1 the danger of the culminating point is past1 in short1 the enemy is already subdued4 ,our object in the above reasoning has been to show clearly that no conquest can be finished too soon1 that spreading it over a greater space of time than is absolutely necessary for its completion1 instead of facilitating it1 makes it more difficult4 ,if this assertion is true1 it is further true also that if we are strong enough to effect a certain conquest1 we must also be strong enough to do it in one march without intermediate stations4 ,of course we do not mean by this without short halts1 in order to concentrate the forces1 and make other indispensable arrangements4 ,by this view1 which makes the character of a speedy and persistent effort towards a decision essential to offensive war1 we think we have completely set aside all grounds for that theory which in place of the irresistible continued following up of victory1 would substitute a slow methodical system as being more sure and prudent4 ,but even for those who have readily followed us so far1 our assertion has1 perhaps after all1 so much the appearance of a paradox1 is at first sight so much opposed and offensive to an opinion which1 like an old prejudice1 has taken deep root1 and has been repeated a thousand times in books1 that we considered it advisable to examine more closely the foundation of those plausible arguments which may be advanced4 ,it is certainly easier to reach an object near us than one at a distance1 but when the nearest one does not suit our purpose it does not follow that dividing the work1 that a resting point1 will enable us to get over the second half of the road easier4 ,a small jump is easier than a large one1 but no one on that account1 wishing to cross a wide ditch1 would jump half of it first4 ,if we look closely into the foundation of the conception of the so-called methodical offensive war1 we shall find it generally consists of the following things3-- #a4 ,conquest of those fortresses belonging to the enemy which we meet with4 #b4 ,laying in the necessary supplies4 #c4 ,fortifying important points1 as1 magazines1 bridges1 positions1 etc4 #d4 ,resting the troops in quarters during winter1 or when they require to be recruited in health and refreshed4 #e4 ,waiting for the reinforcements of the ensuing year4 ,if for the attainment of all these objects we make a formal division in the course of the offensive action1 a resting point in the movement1 it is supposed that we gain a new base and renewed force1 as if our own ,state was following up in the rear of the army1 and that the latter laid in renewed vigour for every fresh campaign4 ,all these praiseworthy motives may make the offensive war more convenient1 but they do not make its results surer1 and are generally only make-believes to cover certain counteracting forces1 such as the feelings of the commander or irresolution in the cabinet4 ,we shall try to roll them up from the left flank4 #a4 ,the waiting for reinforcements suits the enemy just as well1 and is1 we may say1 more to his advantage4 ,besides1 it lies in the nature of the thing that a ,state can place in line nearly as many combatant forces in one year as in two2 for all the actual increase of combatant force in the second year is but trifling in relation to the whole4 #b4 ,the enemy rests himself at the same time that we do4 #c4 ,the fortification of towns and positions is not the work of the army1 and therefore no ground for any delay4 #d4 ,according to the present system of subsisting armies1 magazines are more necessary when the army is in cantonments1 than when it is advancing4 ,as long as we advance with success1 we continually fall into possession of some of the enemy's provision depots1 which assist us when the country itself is poor4 #e4 ,the taking of the enemy's fortresses cannot be regarded as a suspension of the attack3 it is an intensified progress1 and therefore the seeming suspension which is caused thereby is not properly a case such as we allude to1 it is neither a suspension nor a modifying of the use of force4 ,but whether a regular siege1 a blockade1 or a mere observation of one or other is most to the purpose1 is a question which can only be decided according to particular circumstances4 ,we can only say this in general1 that in answering this question another must be clearly decided1 which is1 whether the risk will not be too great if1 while only blockading1 we at the same time make a further advance4 ,where this is not the case1 and when there is ample room to extend our forces1 it is better to postpone the formal siege till the termination of the whole offensive movement4 ,we must therefore take care not to be led into the error of neglecting the essential1 through the idea of immediately making secure that which is conquered4 ,no doubt it seems as if1 by thus advancing1 we at once hazard the loss of what has been already gained4 ,our opinion1 however1 is that no division of action1 no resting point1 no intermediate stations are in accordance with the nature of offensive war1 and that when the same are unavoidable1 they are to be regarded as an evil which makes the result not more certain1 but1 on the contrary1 more uncertain2 and further1 that1 strictly speaking1 if from weakness or any cause we have been obliged to stop1 a second spring at the object we have in view is1 as a rule1 impossible2 but if such a second spring is possible1 then the stoppage at the intermediate station was unnecessary1 and that when an object at the very commencement is beyond our strength1 it will always remain so4 ,we say1 this appears to be the general truth1 by which we only wish to set aside the idea that time of itself can do something for the advantage of the assailant4 ,but as the political relations may change from year to year1 therefore1 on that account alone1 many cases may happen which are exceptions to this general truth4 ,it may appear perhaps as if we had left our general point of view1 and had nothing in our eye except offensive war2 but it is not so by any means4 ,certainly1 he who can set before himself the complete overthrow of the enemy as his object1 will not easily be reduced to take refuge in the defensive1 the immediate object of which is only to keep possession2 but as we stand by the declaration throughout1 that a defensive without any positive principle is a contradiction in strategy as well as in tactics1 and therefore always come back to the fact that every defensive1 according to its strength1 will seek to change to the attack as soon as it has exhausted the advantages of the defensive1 so therefore1 however great or small the defence may be1 we still also include in it contingently the overthrow of the enemy as an object which this attack may have1 and which is to be considered as the proper object of the defensive1 and we say that there may be cases in which the assailant1 notwithstanding he has in view such a great object1 may still prefer at first to make use of the defensive form4 ,that this idea is founded in reality is easily shown by the campaign of #ahab4 ,the ,emperor ,alexander in engaging in the war did not perhaps think of ruining his enemy completely1 as was done in the sequel2 but is there anything which makes such an idea impossible8 ,and yet1 if so1 would it not still remain very natural that the ,russians began the war on the defensive8 ,,chapter ,v4 ,ends in ,war ,more ,precisely ,defined 7continued7 ,limited ,object ,in the preceding chapter we have said that1 under the expression 8overthrow of the enemy10 we understand the real absolute aim of the 8act of war20 now we shall see what remains to be done when the conditions under which this object might be attained do not exist4 ,these conditions presuppose a great physical or moral superiority1 or a great spirit of enterprise1 an innate propensity to extreme hazards4 ,now where all this is not forthcoming1 the aim in the act of war can only be of two kinds2 either the conquest of some small or moderate portion of the enemy's country1 or the defence of our own until better times2 this last is the usual case in defensive war4 ,whether the one or the other of these aims is of the right kind1 can always be settled by calling to mind the expression used in reference to the last4 ,the waiting till more favourable times implies that we have reason to expect such times hereafter1 and this waiting for1 that is1 defensive war1 is always based on this prospect2 on the other hand1 offensive war1 that is1 the taking advantage of the present moment1 is always commanded when the future holds out a better prospect1 not to ourselves1 but to our adversary4 ,the third case1 which is probably the most common1 is when neither party has anything definite to look for from the future1 when therefore it furnishes no motive for decision4 ,in this case1 the offensive war is plainly imperative upon him who is politically the aggressor1 that is1 who has the positive motive2 for he has taken up arms with that object1 and every moment of time which is lost without any good reason1 is so much lost time for him4 ,we have here decided for offensive or defensive war on grounds which have nothing to do with the relative forces of the combatants respectively1 and yet it may appear that it would be nearer right to make the choice of the offensive or defensive chiefly dependent on the mutual relations of combatants in point of military strength2 our opinion is1 that in doing so we should just leave the right road4 ,the logical correctness of our simple argument no one will dispute2 we shall now see whether in the concrete case it leads to the contrary4 ,let us suppose a small ,state which is involved in a contest with a very superior power1 and foresees that with each year its position will become worse3 should it not1 if war is inevitable1 make use of the time when its situation is furthest from the worst8 ,then it must attack1 not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages--it will rather increase the disparity of forces--but because this ,state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives1 or of gaining1 at least1 in the mean time1 some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account4 ,this theory cannot appear absurd4 ,but if this small ,state is quite certain that the enemy will advance against it1 then1 certainly1 it can and may make use of the defensive against its enemy to procure a first advantage2 there is then at any rate no danger of losing time4 ,if1 again1 we suppose a small ,state engaged in war with a greater1 and that the future has no influence on their decisions1 still1 if the small ,state is politically the assailant1 we demand of it also that it should go forward to its object4 ,if it has had the audacity to propose to itself a positive end in the face of superior numbers1 then it must also act1 that is1 attack the foe1 if the latter does not save it the trouble4 ,waiting would be an absurdity2 unless at the moment of execution it has altered its political resolution1 a case which very frequently occurs1 and contributes in no small degree to give wars an indefinite character4 ,these considerations on the limited object apply to its connection both with offensive war and defensive war2 we shall consider both in separate chapters4 ,but we shall first turn our attention to another phase4 ,hitherto we have deduced the modifications in the object of war solely from intrinsic reasons4 ,the nature of the political view 7or design7 we have only taken into consideration in so far as it is or is not directed at something positive4 ,everything else in the political design is in reality something extraneous to war2 but in the second chapter of the first book 7,end and ,means in ,war7 we have already admitted that the nature of the political object1 the extent of our own or the enemy's demand1 and our whole political relation practically have a most decisive influence on the conduct of the war1 and we shall therefore devote the following chapter to that subject specially4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,a4 ,influence of the ,political ,object on the ,military ,object ,we never find that a ,state joining in the cause of another ,state1 takes it up with the same earnestness as its own4 ,an auxiliary army of moderate strength is sent2 if it is not successful1 then the ally looks upon the affair as in a manner ended1 and tries to get out of it on the cheapest terms possible4 ,in ,european politics it has been usual for ,states to pledge themselves to mutual assistance by an alliance offensive and defensive1 not so far that the one takes part in the interests and quarrels of the other1 but only so far as to promise one another beforehand the assistance of a fixed1 generally very moderate1 contingent of troops1 without regard to the object of the war1 or the scale on which it is about to be carried on by the principals4 ,in a treaty of alliance of this kind1 the ally does not look upon himself as engaged with the enemy in a war properly speaking1 which should necessarily begin with a declaration of war1 and end with a treaty of peace4 ,still1 this idea also is nowhere fixed with any distinctness1 and usage varies one way and another4 ,the thing would have a kind of consistency1 and it would be less embarrassing to the theory of war if this promised contingent of ten1 twenty1 or thirty thousand men was handed over entirely to the state engaged in war1 so that it could be used as required2 it might then be regarded as a subsidised force4 ,but the usual practice is widely different4 ,generally the auxiliary force has its own commander1 who depends only on his own government1 and to whom they prescribe an object such as best suits the shilly-shally measures they have in view4 ,but even if two ,states go to war with a third1 they do not always both look in like measure upon this common enemy as one that they must destroy or be destroyed by themselves1 the business is often settled like a commercial transaction2 each1 according to the amount of the risk he incurs or the advantage to be expected1 takes shares in the concern to the extent of #cj1jjj or #dj1jjj men1 and acts as if he could not lose more than the amount of his investment4 ,not only is this the point of view taken when a ,state comes to the assistance of another in a cause in which it has in a manner1 little concern1 but even when both allies have a common and very considerable interest at stake1 nothing can be done except under diplomatic reservation1 and the contracting parties usually only agree to furnish a small stipulated contingent1 in order to employ the rest of the forces according to the special ends to which policy may happen to lead them4 ,this way of regarding wars entered into by reason of alliances was quite general1 and was only obliged to give place to the natural way in quite modern times1 when the extremity of danger drove men's minds into the natural direction 7as in the wars against ,buonaparte71 and when the most boundless power compelled them to it 7as under ,buonaparte74 ,it was an abnormal thing1 an anomaly1 for war and peace are ideas which in their foundation can have no gradations2 nevertheless it was no mere diplomatic offspring which the reason could look down upon1 but deeply rooted in the natural limitedness and weakness of human nature4 ,lastly1 even in wars carried on without allies1 the political cause of a war has a great influence on the method in which it is conducted4 ,if we only require from the enemy a small sacrifice1 then we content ourselves with aiming at a small equivalent by the war1 and we expect to attain that by moderate efforts4 ,the enemy reasons in very much the same way4 ,now1 if one or the other finds that he has erred in his reckoning that in place of being slightly superior to the enemy1 as he supposed1 he is1 if anything1 rather weaker1 still1 at that moment1 money and all other means1 as well as sufficient moral impulse for greater exertions are very often deficient3 in such a case he just does what is called 8the best he can20 hopes better things in the future1 although he has not the slightest foundation for such hope1 and the war1 in the mean time drags itself feebly along1 like a body worn out with sickness4 ,thus it comes to pass that the reciprocal action1 the rivalry1 the violence and impetuosity of war lose themselves in the stagnation of weak motives1 and that both parties move with a certain kind of security in very circumscribed spheres4 ,if this influence of the political object is once permitted1 as it then must be1 there is no longer any limit1 and we must be pleased to come down to such warfare as consists in a mere threatening of the enemy and in negotiating4 ,that the theory of war1 if it is to be and to continue a philosophical study1 finds itself here in a difficulty is clear4 ,all that is essentially inherent in the conception of war seems to fly from it1 and it is in danger of being left without any point of support4 ,but the natural outlet soon shows itself4 ,according as a modifying principle gains influence over the act of war1 or rather1 the weaker the motives to action become1 the more the action will glide into a passive resistance1 the less eventful it will become1 and the less it will require guiding principles4 ,all military art then changes itself into mere prudence1 the principal object of which will be to prevent the trembling balance from suddenly turning to our disadvantage1 and the half war from changing into a complete one4 ,b4 ,war as an ,instrument of ,policy ,having made the requisite examination on both sides of that state of antagonism in which the nature of war stands with relation to other interests of men individually and of the bond of society1 in order not to neglect any of the opposing elements1 an antagonism which is founded in our own nature1 and which1 therefore1 no philosophy can unravel1 we shall now look for that unity into which1 in practical life1 these antagonistic elements combine themselves by partly neutralising each other4 ,we should have brought forward this unity at the very commencement1 if it had not been necessary to bring out this contradiction very plainly1 and also to look at the different elements separately4 ,now1 this unity is the conception that war is only a part of political intercourse1 therefore by no means an independent thing in itself4 ,we know1 certainly1 that war is only called forth through the political intercourse of ,governments and nations2 but in general it is supposed that such intercourse is broken off by war1 and that a totally different state of things ensues1 subject to no laws but its own4 ,we maintain1 on the contrary3 that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse1 with a mixture of other means4 ,we say1 mixed with other means1 in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself1 is not changed into something quite different1 but that1 in its essence1 it continues to exist1 whatever may be the form of the means which it uses1 and that the chief lines on which the events of the war progress1 and to which they are attached1 are only the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place4 ,and how can we conceive it to be otherwise8 ,does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different nations and ,governments8 ,is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts8 ,it has certainly a grammar of its own1 but its logic is not peculiar to itself4 ,accordingly1 war can never be separated from political intercourse1 and if1 in the consideration of the matter1 this is done in any way1 all the threads of the different relations are1 to a certain extent1 broken1 and we have before us a senseless thing without an object4 ,this kind of idea would be indispensable even if war was perfect war1 the perfectly unbridled element of hostility1 for all the circumstances on which it rests1 and which determine its leading features1 viz41 our own power1 the enemy's power1 allies on both sides1 the characteristics of the people and their ,governments respectively1 etc41 as enumerated in the first chapter of the first book1 are they not of a political nature1 and are they not so intimately connected with the whole political intercourse that it is impossible to separate them8 ,but this view is doubly indispensable if we reflect that real war is no such consistent effort tending to an extreme1 as it should be according to the abstract idea1 but a half and half thing1 a contradiction in itself2 that1 as such1 it cannot follow its own laws1 but must be looked upon as a part of another whole1 and this whole is policy4 ,policy in making use of war avoids all those rigorous conclusions which proceed from its nature2 it troubles itself little about final possibilities1 confining its attention to immediate probabilities4 ,if much uncertainty in the whole action ensues therefrom1 if it thereby becomes a sort of game1 the policy of each cabinet places its confidence in the belief that in this game it will surpass its neighbour in skill and sharpsightedness4 ,thus policy makes out of the all-overpowering element of war a mere instrument1 changes the tremendous battle-sword1 which should be lifted with both hands and the whole power of the body to strike once for all1 into a light handy weapon1 which is even sometimes nothing more than a rapier to exchange thrusts and feints and parries4 ,thus the contradictions in which man1 naturally timid1 becomes involved by war1 may be solved1 if we choose to accept this as a solution4 ,if war belongs to policy1 it will naturally take its character from thence4 ,if policy is grand and powerful1 so will also be the war1 and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its absolute form4 ,in this way of viewing the subject1 therefore1 we need not shut out of sight the absolute form of war1 we rather keep it continually in view in the back ground4 ,only through this kind of view1 war recovers unity2 only by it can we see all wars as things of one kind2 and it is only through it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of view from which great plans may be traced out and determined upon4 ,it is true the political element does not sink deep into the details of war1 ,vedettes are not planted1 patrols do not make their rounds from political considerations1 but small as is its influence in this respect1 it is great in the formation of a plan for a whole war1 or a campaign1 and often even for a battle4 ,for this reason we were in no hurry to establish this view at the commencement4 ,while engaged with particulars1 it would have given us little help2 and1 on the other hand1 would have distracted our attention to a certain extent2 in the plan of a war or campaign it is indispensable4 ,there is1 upon the whole1 nothing more important in life than to find out the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of1 and then to keep to that point2 for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity from one standpoint2 and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency4 ,if1 therefore1 in drawing up a plan of a war it is not allowable to have a two-fold or three-fold point of view1 from which things may be looked at1 now with the eye of a soldier1 then with that of an administrator1 and then again with that of a politician1 etc41 then the next question is1 whether policy is necessarily paramount1 and everything else subordinate to it4 ,that policy unites in itself1 and reconciles all the interests of internal administrations1 even those of humanity1 and whatever else are rational subjects of consideration1 is presupposed1 for it is nothing in itself1 except a mere representative and exponent of all these interests towards other ,states4 ,that policy may take a false direction1 and may promote unfairly the ambitious ends1 the private interests1 the vanity of rulers1 does not concern us here2 for1 under no circumstances can the art of war be regarded as its preceptor1 and we can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests generally of the whole community4 ,the only question1 therefore1 is1 whether in framing plans for a war the political point of view should give way to the purely military 7if such a point is conceivable71 that is to say1 should disappear altogether1 or subordinate itself to it1 or whether the political is to remain the ruling point of view1 and the military to be considered subordinate to it4 ,that the political point of view should end completely when war begins1 is only conceivable in contests which are wars of life and death1 from pure hatred3 as wars are in reality1 they are as we before said1 only the expressions or manifestations of policy itself4 ,the subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense1 for policy has declared the war2 it is the intelligent faculty1 war only the instrument1 and not the reverse4 ,the subordination of the military point of view to the political is1 therefore1 the only thing which is possible4 ,if we reflect on the nature of real war1 and call to mind what has been said in the third chapter of this book1 that every war should be viewed above all things according to the probability of its character1 and its leading features as they are to be deduced from the political forces and proportions1 and that often--indeed we may safely affirm1 in our days1 almost always--war is to be regarded as an organic whole1 from which the single branches are not to be separated1 in which therefore every individual activity flows into the whole1 and also has its origin in the idea of this whole1 then it becomes certain and palpable to us that the superior stand-point for the conduct of the war1 from which its leading lines must proceed1 can be no other than that of policy4 ,from this point of view the plans come1 as it were1 out of a cast2 the apprehension of them and the judgment upon them become easier and more natural1 our convictions respecting them gain in force1 motives are more satisfying1 and history more intelligible4 ,at all events1 from this point of view1 there is no longer in the nature of things a necessary conflict between the political and military interests1 and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as imperfect knowledge only4 ,that policy makes demands on the war which it cannot respond to1 would be contrary to the supposition that it knows the instrument which it is going to use1 therefore1 contrary to a natural and indispensable supposition4 ,but if it judges correctly of the march of military events1 it is entirely its affair1 and can be its only to determine what are the events and what the direction of events most favourable to the ultimate and great end of the war4 ,in one word1 the art of war in its highest point of view is policy1 but1 no doubt1 a policy which fights battles1 instead of writing notes4 ,according to this view1 to leave a great military enterprise1 or the plan for one1 to a purely military judgment and decision1 is a distinction which cannot be allowed1 and is even prejudicial2 indeed1 it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of a war1 that they may give a purely military opinion upon what the cabinet should do2 but still more absurd is the demand of ,theorists that a statement of the available means of war should be laid before the general1 that he may draw out a purely military plan for the war or for a campaign1 in accordance with those means4 ,experience in general also teaches us that notwithstanding the multifarious branches and scientific character of military art in the present day1 still the leading outlines of a war are always determined by the cabinet1 that is1 if we would use technical language1 by a political not a military functionary4 ,this is perfectly natural4 ,none of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without an insight into the political relations2 and1 in reality1 when people speak1 as they often do1 of the prejudicial influence of policy on the conduct of a war1 they say in reality something very different to what they intend4 ,it is not this influence but the policy itself which should be found fault with4 ,if policy is right1 that is1 if it succeeds in hitting the object1 then it can only act on the war in its sense1 with advantage also2 and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the object1 the cause is only to be looked for in a mistaken policy4 ,it is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain military means and measures1 an effect opposed to their nature1 that it can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes4 ,just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant sometimes says what he does not intend1 so policy1 when intending right1 may often order things which do not tally with its own views4 ,this has happened times without end1 and it shows that a certain knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of political commerce4 ,but before going further1 we must guard ourselves against a false interpretation of which this is very susceptible4 ,we are far from holding the opinion that a war minister1 smothered in official papers1 a scientific engineer1 or even a soldier who has been well tried in the field1 would1 any of them1 necessarily make the best minister of ,state where the sovereign does not act for himself2 or in other words1 we do not mean to say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the principal qualification for a war minister2 elevation1 superiority of mind1 strength of character1 these are the principal qualifications which he must possess2 a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or the other4 ,france was never worse advised in its military and political affairs than by the two ,brothers ,belleisle and the ,duke of ,choiseul1 although all three were good soldiers4 ,if war is to harmonise entirely with the political views and policy1 to accommodate itself to the means available for war1 there is only one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are not combined in one person1 which is1 to make the chief commander a member of the cabinet1 that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions4 ,but then again1 this is only possible when the cabinet1 that is the government itself1 is near the theatre of war1 so that things can be settled without a serious waste of time4 ,this is what the ,emperor of ,austria did in #ahji1 and the allied sovereigns in #ahac1 #ahad1 #ahae1 and the arrangement proved completely satisfactory4 ,the influence of any military man except the ,general-in ,chief in the cabinet1 is extremely dangerous2 it very seldom leads to able vigorous action4 ,the example of ,france in #agic1 #agid1 #agie1 when ,carnot1 while residing in ,paris1 managed the conduct of the war1 is to be avoided1 as a system of terror is not at the command of any but a revolutionary government4 ,we shall now conclude with some reflections derived from history4 ,in the last decennary of the past century1 when that remarkable change in the art of war in ,europe took place by which the best armies found that a part of their method of war had become utterly unserviceable1 and events were brought about of a magnitude far beyond what any one had any previous conception of1 it certainly appeared that a false calculation of everything was to be laid to the charge of the art of war4 ,it was plain that while confined by habit within a narrow circle of conceptions1 she had been surprised by the force of a new state of relations1 lying1 no doubt1 outside that circle1 but still not outside the nature of things4 ,those observers who took the most comprehensive view1 ascribed the circumstance to the general influence which policy had exercised for centuries on the art of war1 and undoubtedly to its very great disadvantage1 and by which it had sunk into a half-measure1 often into mere sham fighting4 ,they were right as to fact1 but they were wrong in attributing it to something accidental1 or which might have been avoided4 ,others thought that everything was to be explained by the momentary influence of the particular policy of ,austria1 ,prussia1 ,england1 etc41 with regard to their own interests respectively4 ,but is it true that the real surprise by which men's minds were seized1 was confined to the conduct of war1 and did not rather relate to policy itself8 ,that is1 as we should say3 did the ill success proceed from the influence of policy on the war1 or from a wrong policy itself8 ,the prodigious effects of the ,french revolution abroad were evidently brought about much less through new methods and views introduced by the ,french in the conduct of war than through the changes which it wrought in state-craft and civil administration1 in the character of governments1 in the condition of the people1 etc4 ,that other governments took a mistaken view of all these things2 that they endeavoured1 with their ordinary means1 to hold their own against forces of a novel kind1 and overwhelming in strength2 all that was a blunder in policy4 ,would it have been possible to perceive and mend this error by a scheme for the war from a purely military point of view8 ,impossible4 ,for if there had been1 even in reality1 a philosophical strategist1 who merely from the nature of the hostile elements1 had foreseen all the consequences1 and prophesied remote possibilities1 still it would have been purely impossible to have turned such wisdom to account4 ,if policy had risen to a just appreciation of the forces which had sprung up in ,france1 and of the new relations in the political state of ,europe1 it might have foreseen the consequences1 which must follow in respect to the great features of war1 and it was only in this way that it could arrive at a correct view of the extent of the means required as well as of the best use to make of those means4 ,we may therefore say1 that the twenty years' victories of the revolution are chiefly to be ascribed to the erroneous policy of the governments by which it was opposed4 ,it is true these errors first displayed themselves in the war1 and the events of the war completely disappointed the expectations which policy entertained4 ,but this did not take place because policy neglected to consult its military advisers4 ,that art of war in which the politician of the day could believe1 namely1 that derived from the reality of war at that time1 that which belonged to the policy of the day1 that familiar instrument which policy had hitherto used--that art of war1 ,i say1 was naturally involved in the error of policy1 and therefore could not teach it anything better4 ,it is true that war itself underwent important alterations both in its nature and forms1 which brought it nearer to its absolute form2 but these changes were not brought about because the ,french ,government had1 to a certain extent1 delivered itself from the leading-strings of policy2 they arose from an altered policy1 produced by the ,french ,revolution1 not only in ,france1 but over the rest of ,europe as well4 ,this policy had called forth other means and other powers1 by which it became possible to conduct war with a degree of energy which could not have been thought of otherwise4 ,therefore1 the actual changes in the art of war are a consequence of alterations in policy2 and1 so far from being an argument for the possible separation of the two1 they are1 on the contrary1 very strong evidence of the intimacy of their connexion4 ,therefore1 once more3 war is an instrument of policy2 it must necessarily bear its character1 it must measure with its scale3 the conduct of war1 in its great features1 is therefore policy itself1 which takes up the sword in place of the pen1 but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,limited ,object--,offensive ,war ,even if the complete overthrow of the enemy cannot be the object1 there may still be one which is directly positive1 and this positive object can be nothing else than the conquest of a part of the enemy's country4 ,the use of such a conquest is this1 that we weaken the enemy's resources generally1 therefore1 of course1 his military power1 while we increase our own2 that we therefore carry on the war1 to a certain extent1 at his expense2 further in this way1 that in negotiations for peace1 the possession of the enemy's provinces may be regarded as net gain1 because we can either keep them or exchange them for other advantages4 ,this view of a conquest of the enemy's provinces is very natural1 and would be open to no objection if it were not that the defensive attitude1 which must succeed the offensive1 may often cause uneasiness4 ,in the chapter on the culminating point of victory we have sufficiently explained the manner in which such an offensive weakens the combatant force1 and that it may be succeeded by a situation causing anxiety as to the future4 ,this weakening of our combatant force by the conquest of part of the enemy's territory has its degrees1 and these depend chiefly on the geographical position of this portion of territory4 ,the more it is an annex of our own country1 being contiguous to or embraced by it1 the more it is in the direction of our principal force1 by so much the less will it weaken our combatant force4 ,in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 ,saxony was a natural complement of the ,prussian theatre of war1 and ,frederick the ,great's army1 instead of being weakened1 was strengthened by the possession of that province1 because it lies nearer to ,silesia than to the ,mark1 and at the same time covers the latter4 ,even in #agdj and #agda1 after ,frederick the ,great had once conquered ,silesia1 it did not weaken his army in the field1 because1 owing to its form and situation as well as the contour of its frontier line1 it only presented a narrow point to the ,austrians1 as long as they were not masters of ,saxony1 and besides that1 this small point of contact also lay in the direction of the chief operations of the contending forces4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the conquered territory is a strip running up between hostile provinces1 has an eccentric position and unfavourable configuration of ground1 then the weakening increases so visibly that a victorious battle becomes not only much easier for the enemy1 but it may even become unnecessary as well4 ,the ,austrians have always been obliged to evacuate ,provence without a battle when they have made attempts on it from ,italy4 ,in the year #agdd the ,french were very well pleased even to get out of ,bohemia without having lost a battle4 ,in #ageh ,frederick the ,great could not hold his position in ,bohemia and ,moravia with the same force with which he had obtained such brilliant successes in ,silesia and ,saxony in #ageg4 ,examples of armies not being able to keep possession of conquered territory solely because their combatant force was so much weakened thereby1 are so common that it does not appear necessary to quote any more of them4 ,therefore1 the question whether we should aim at such an object depends on whether we can expect to hold possession of the conquest or whether a temporary occupation 7invasion1 diversion7 would repay the expenditure of force required3 especially1 whether we have not to apprehend such a vigorous counterstroke as will completely destroy the balance of forces4 ,in the chapter on the culmination point we have treated of the consideration due to this question in each particular case4 ,there is just one point which we have still to add4 ,an offensive of this kind will not always compensate us for what we lose upon other points4 ,whilst we are engaged in making a partial conquest1 the enemy may be doing the same at other points1 and if our enterprise does not greatly preponderate in importance then it will not compel the enemy to give up his4 ,it is1 therefore1 a question for serious consideration whether we may not lose more than we gain in a case of this description4 ,even if we suppose two provinces 7one on each side7 to be of equal value1 we shall always lose more by the one which the enemy takes from us than we can gain by the one we take1 because a number of our forces become to a certain extent like faux frais1 non-effective4 ,but as the same takes place on the enemy's side also1 one would suppose that in reality there is no ground to attach more importance to the maintenance of what is our own than to the conquest4 ,but yet there is4 ,the maintenance of our own territory is always a matter which more deeply concerns us1 and the suffering inflicted on our own state can not be outweighed1 nor1 to a certain extent1 neutralised by what we gain in return1 unless the latter promises a high percentage1 that is1 is much greater4 ,the consequence of all this is that a strategic attack directed against only a moderate object involves a greater necessity for steps to defend other points which it does not directly cover than one which is directed against the centre of the enemy's force2 consequently1 in such an attack the concentration of forces in time and space cannot be carried out to the same extent4 ,in order that it may take place1 at least as regards time1 it becomes necessary for the advance to be made offensively from every point possible1 and at the same moment exactly3 and therefore this attack loses the other advantage of being able to make shift with a much smaller force by acting on the defensive at particular points4 ,in this way the effect of aiming at a minor object is to bring all things more to a level3 the whole act of the war cannot now be concentrated into one principal affair which can be governed according to leading points of view2 it is more dispersed2 the friction becomes greater everywhere1 and there is everywhere more room for chance4 ,this is the natural tendency of the thing4 ,the commanders weighed down by it1 finds himself more and more neutralised4 ,the more he is conscious of his own powers1 the greater his resources subjectively1 and his power objectively1 so much the more he will seek to liberate himself from this tendency in order to give to some one point a preponderating importance1 even if that should only be possible by running greater risks4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,limited ,object--,defence ,the ultimate aim of defensive war can never be an absolute negation1 as we have before observed4 ,even for the weakest there must be some point in which the enemy may be made to feel1 and which may be threatened4 ,certainly we may say that this object is the exhaustion of the adversary1 for as he has a positive object1 every one of his blows which fails1 if it has no other result than the loss of the force applied1 still may be considered a retrograde step in reality1 whilst the loss which the defensive suffers is not in vain1 because his object was keeping possession1 and that he has effected4 ,this would be tantamount to saying that the defensive has his positive object in merely keeping possession4 ,such reasoning might be good if it was certain that the assailant after a certain number of fruitless attempts must be worn out1 and desist from further efforts4 ,but just this necessary consequence is wanting4 ,if we look at the exhaustion of forces1 the defender is under a disadvantage4 ,the assailant becomes weaker1 but only in the sense that it may reach a turning point2 if we set aside that supposition1 the weakening goes on certainly more rapidly on the defensive side than on that of the assailant3 for in the first place1 he is the weaker1 and1 therefore1 if the losses on both sides are equal1 he loses more actually than the other2 in the next place1 he is deprived generally of a portion of territory and of his resources4 ,we have1 therefore1 here no ground on which to build the expectation that the offensive will cease1 and nothing remains but the idea that if the assailant repeats his blows1 while the defensive does nothing but wait to ward them off1 then the defender has no counterpoise as a set off to the risk he runs of one of these attacks succeeding sooner or later4 ,although in reality the exhaustion1 or rather the weakening of the stronger1 has brought about a peace in many instances that is to be attributed to the indecision which is so general in war1 but cannot be imagined philosophically as the general and ultimate object of any defensive war whatever1 there is1 therefore1 no alternative but that the defence should find its object in the idea of the 8waiting for10 which is besides its real character4 ,this idea in itself includes that of an alteration of circumstances1 of an improvement of the situation1 which1 therefore1 when it cannot be brought about by internal means1 that is1 by defensive pure in itself1 can only be expected through assistance coming from without4 ,now1 this improvement from without can proceed from nothing else than a change in political relations2 either new alliances spring up in favour of the defender1 or old ones directed against him fall to pieces4 ,here1 then1 is the object for the defender1 in case his weakness does not permit him to think of any important counterstroke4 ,but this is not the nature of every defensive war1 according to the conception which we have given of its form4 ,according to that conception it is the stronger form of war1 and on account of that strength it can also be applied when a counterstroke more or less important is designed4 ,these two cases must be kept distinct from the very first1 as they have an influence on the defence4 ,in the first case1 the defender's object is to keep possession of his own country intact as long as possible1 because in that way he gains most time2 and gaining time is the only way to attain his object4 ,the positive object which he can in most cases attain1 and which will give him an opportunity of carrying out his object in the negotiations for peace1 he cannot yet include in his plan for the war4 ,in this state of strategic passiveness1 the advantages which the defender can gain at certain points consist in merely repelling partial attacks2 the preponderance gained at those points he tries to make of service to him at others1 for he is generally hard pressed at all points4 ,if he has not the opportunity of doing this1 then there often only accrues to him the small advantage that the enemy will leave him at rest for a time4 ,if the defender is not altogether too weak1 small offensive operations directed less towards permanent possession than a temporary advantage to cover losses1 which may be sustained afterwards1 invasions1 diversions1 or enterprises against a single fortress1 may have a place in this defensive system without altering its object or essence4 ,but in the second case1 in which a positive object is already grafted upon the defensive1 the greater the counterstroke that is warranted by circumstances the more the defensive imports into itself of positive character4 ,in other words1 the more the defence has been adopted voluntarily1 in order to make the first blow surer1 the bolder may be the snares which the defender lays for his opponent4 ,the boldest1 and if it succeeds1 the most effectual1 is the retreat into the interior of the country2 and this means is then at the same time that which differs most widely from the other system4 ,let us only think of the difference between the position in which ,frederick the ,great was placed in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 and that of ,russia in #ahab4 ,when the war began1 ,frederick1 through his advanced state of preparation for war1 had a kind of superiority1 this gave him the advantage of being able to make himself master of ,saxony1 which was besides such a natural complement of his theatre of war1 that the possession of it did not diminish1 but increased1 his combatant force4 ,at the opening of the campaign of #ageg1 the ,king endeavoured to proceed with his strategic attack1 which seemed not impossible as long as the ,russians and ,french had not yet reached the theatre of war in ,silesia1 the ,mark and ,saxony4 ,but the attack miscarried1 and ,frederick was thrown back on the defensive for the rest of the campaign1 was obliged to evacuate ,bohemia and to rescue his own theatre from the enemy1 in which he only succeeded by turning himself with one and the same army1 first upon the ,french1 and then upon the ,austrians4 ,this advantage he owed entirely to the defensive4 ,in the year #ageh when his enemies had drawn round him in a closer circle1 and his forces were dwindling down to a very disproportionate relation1 he determined on an offensive on a small scale in ,moravia3 his plan was to take ,olmtz before his enemies were prepared2 not in the expectation of keeping possession of1 or of making it a base for further advance1 but to use it as a sort of advanced work1 a counter-approach against the ,austrians1 who would be obliged to devote the rest of the present campaign1 and perhaps even a second1 to recover possession of it4 ,this attack also miscarried4 ,frederick then gave up all idea of a real offensive1 as he saw that it only increased the disproportion of his army4 ,a compact position in the heart of his own country in ,saxony and ,silesia1 the use of short lines1 that he might be able rapidly to increase his forces at any point which might be menaced1 a battle when unavoidable1 small incursions when opportunity offered1 and along with this a patient state of waiting-for 7expectation71 a saving of his means for better times became now his general plan4 ,by degrees the execution of it became more and more passive4 ,as he saw that even a victory cost him too much1 therefore he tried to manage at still less expense2 everything depended on gaining time1 and on keeping what he had got2 he therefore became more tenacious of yielding any ground1 and did not hesitate to adopt a perfect cordon system4 ,the positions of ,prince ,henry in ,saxony1 as well as those of the ,king in the ,silesian mountains1 may be so termed4 ,in his letters to the ,marquis d',argens1 he manifests the impatience with which he looks forward to winter quarters1 and the satisfaction he felt at being able to take them up again without having suffered any serious loss4 ,whoever blames ,frederick for this1 and looks upon it as a sign that his spirit had sunk1 would1 we think1 pass judgment without much reflection4 ,if the entrenched camp at ,bunzelwitz1 the positions taken up by ,prince ,henry in ,saxony1 and by the ,king in the ,silesian mountains1 do not appear to us now as measures on which a ,general should place his dependence in a last extremity because a ,buonaparte would soon have thrust his sword through such tactical cobwebs1 we must not forget that times have changed1 that war has become a totally different thing1 is quickened with new energies1 and that therefore positions might have been excellent at that time1 although they are not so now1 and that in addition to all1 the character of the enemy deserves attention4 ,against the army of the ,german ,states1 against ,daun and ,butturlin1 it might have been the height of wisdom to employ means which ,frederick would have despised if used against himself4 ,the result justified this view3 in the state of patient expectation1 ,frederick attained his object1 and got round difficulties in a collision with which his forces would have been dashed to pieces4 ,the relation in point of numbers between the ,russian and ,french armies opposed to each other at the opening of the campaign in #ahab was still more unfavourable to the former than that between ,frederick and his enemies in the ,seven ,years' ,war4 ,but the ,russians looked forward to being joined by large reinforcements in the course of the campaign4 ,all ,europe was in secret hostility to ,buonaparte1 his power had been screwed up to the highest point1 a devouring war occupied him in ,spain1 and the vast extent of ,russia allowed of pushing the exhaustion of the enemy's military means to the utmost extremity by a retreat over a hundred miles of country4 ,under circumstances on this grand scale1 a tremendous counterstroke was not only to be expected if the ,french enterprise failed 7and how could it succeed if the ,russian ,emperor would not make peace1 or his subjects did not rise in insurrection87 but this counterstroke might also end in the complete destruction of the enemy4 ,the most profound sagacity could1 therefore1 not have devised a better plan of campaign than that which the ,russians followed on the spur of the moment4 ,that this was not the opinion at the time1 and that such a view would then have been looked upon as preposterous1 is no reason for our now denying it to be the right one4 ,if we are to learn from history1 we must look upon things which have actually happened as also possible in the future1 and that the series of great events which succeeded the march upon ,moscow is not a succession of mere accidents every one will grant who can claim to give an opinion on such subjects4 ,if it had been possible for the ,russians1 with great efforts1 to defend their frontier1 it is certainly probable that in such case also the ,french power would have sunk1 and that they would have at last suffered a reverse of fortune2 but the reaction then would certainly not have been so violent and decisive4 ,by sufferings and sacrifices 7which certainly in any other country would have been greater1 and in most would have been impossible7 ,russia purchased this enormous success4 ,thus a great positive success can never be obtained except through positive measures1 planned not with a view to a mere state of 8waiting-for10 but with a view to a decision1 in short1 even on the defensive1 there is no great gain to be won except by a great stake4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,plan of ,war when the ,destruction of the ,enemy is the ,object ,having characterised in detail the different aims to which war may be directed1 we shall go through the organisation of war as a whole for each of the three separate gradations corresponding to these aims4 ,in conformity with all that has been said on the subject up to the present1 two fundamental principles reign throughout the whole plan of the war1 and serve as a guide for everything else4 ,the first is3 to reduce the weight of the enemy's power into as few centres of gravity as possible1 into one if it can be done2 again1 to confine the attack against these centres of force to as few principal undertakings as possible1 to one if possible2 lastly1 to keep all secondary undertakings as subordinate as possible4 ,in a word1 the first principle is1 to act concentrated as much as possible4 ,the second principle runs thus to act as swiftly as possible2 therefore1 to allow of no delay or detour without sufficient reason4 ,the reducing the enemy's power to one central point depends #a4 ,on the nature of its political connection4 ,if it consists of armies of one ,power1 there is generally no difficulty2 if of allied armies1 of which one is acting simply as an ally without any interest of its own1 then the difficulty is not much greater2 if of a coalition for a common object1 then it depends on the cordiality of the alliance2 we have already treated of this subject4 #b4 ,on the situation of the theatre of war upon which the different hostile armies make their appearance4 ,if the enemy's forces are collected in one army upon one theatre of war1 they constitute in reality a unity1 and we need not inquire further2 if they are upon one theatre of war1 but in separate armies1 which belong to different ,powers1 there is no longer absolute unity2 there is1 however1 a sufficient interdependence of parts for a decisive blow upon one part to throw down the other in the concussion4 ,if the armies are posted in theatres of war adjoining each other1 and not separated by any great natural obstacles1 then there is in such case also a decided influence of the one upon the other2 but if the theatres of war are wide apart1 if there is neutral territory1 great mountains1 etc41 intervening between them1 then the influence is very doubtful and improbable as well2 if they are on quite opposite sides of the ,state against which the war is made1 so that operations directed against them must diverge on eccentric lines1 then almost every trace of connection is at an end4 ,if ,prussia was attacked by ,france and ,russia at the same time1 it would be as respects the conduct of the war much the same as if there were two separate wars2 at the same time the unity would appear in the negotiations4 ,saxony and ,austria1 on the contrary1 as military powers in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 were to be regarded as one2 what the one suffered the other felt also1 partly because the theatres of war lay in the same direction for ,frederick the ,great1 partly because ,saxony had no political independence4 ,numerous as were the enemies of ,buonaparte in ,germany in #ahac1 still they all stood very much in one direction in respect to him1 and the theatres of war for their armies were in close connection1 and reciprocally influenced each other very powerfully4 ,if by a concentration of all his forces he had been able to overpower the main army1 such a defeat would have had a decisive effect on all the parts4 ,if he had beaten the ,bohemain grand army1 and marched upon ,vienna by ,prague1 ,blcher1 however willing1 could not have remained in ,saxony1 because he would have been called upon to co-operate in ,bohemia1 and the ,crown ,prince of ,sweden as well would have been unwilling to remain in the ,mark4 ,on the other hand1 ,austria1 if carrying on war against the ,french on the ,rhine and ,italy at the same time1 will always find it difficult to give a decision upon one of those theatres by means of a successful stroke on the other4 ,partly because ,switzerland1 with its mountains1 forms too strong a barrier between the two theatres1 and partly because the direction of the roads on each side is divergent4 ,france1 again1 can much sooner decide in the one by a successful result in the other1 because the direction of its forces in both converges upon ,vienna1 the centre of the power of the whole ,austrian empire2 we may add further1 that a decisive blow in ,italy will have more effect on the ,rhine theatre than a success on the ,rhine would have in ,italy1 because the blow from ,italy strikes nearer to the centre1 and that from the ,rhine more upon the flank1 of the ,austrian dominions4 ,it proceeds from what we have said that the conception of separated or connected hostile power extends through all degrees of relationship1 and that therefore1 in each case1 the first thing is to discover the influence which events in one theatre may have upon the other1 according to which we may then afterwards settle how far the different forces of the enemy may be reduced into one centre of force4 ,there is only one exception to the principle of directing all our strength against the centre of gravity of the enemy's power1 that is1 if ancillary expeditions promise extraordinary advantages1 and still1 in this case1 it is a condition assumed1 that we have such a decisive superiority as enables us to undertake such enterprises without incurring too great risk at the point which forms our great object4 ,when ,general ,bulow marched into ,holland in #ahad1 it was to be foreseen that the thirty thousand men composing his corps would not only neutralise the same number of ,frenchmen1 but would1 besides1 give the ,english and the ,dutch an opportunity of entering the field with forces which otherwise would never have been brought into activity4 ,thus1 therefore1 the first consideration in the combination of a plan for a war1 is to determine the centres of gravity of the enemy's power1 and1 if possible1 to reduce them to one4 ,the second is to unite the forces which are to be employed against the centre of force into one great action4 ,here now the following grounds for dividing our forces may present themselves3 #a4 ,the original position of the military forces1 therefore also the situation of the ,states engaged in the offensive4 ,if the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss of time1 and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too great1 then the same may be justifiable on those grounds2 for to effect an unnecessary concentration of forces1 with great loss of time1 by which the freshness and rapidity of the first blow is diminished1 would be contrary to the second leading principle we have laid down4 ,in all cases in which there is a hope of surprising the enemy in some measure1 this deserves particular attention4 ,but the case becomes still more important if the attack is undertaken by allied ,states which are not situated on a line directed towards the ,state attacked not one behind the other but situated side by side4 ,if ,prussia and ,austria undertook a war against ,france1 it would be a very erroneous measure1 a squandering of time and force if the armies of the two powers were obliged to set out from the same point1 as the natural line for an army operating from ,prussia against the heart of ,france is from the ,lower ,rhine1 and that of the ,austrians is from the ,upper ,rhine4 ,concentration1 therefore1 in this case1 could only be effected by a sacrifice2 consequently in any particular instance1 the question to be decided would be1 ,is the necessity for concentration so great that this sacrifice must be made8 #b4 ,the attack by separate lines may offer greater results4 ,as we are now speaking of advancing by separate lines against one centre of force1 we are1 therefore1 supposing an advance by converging lines4 ,a separate advance on parallel or eccentric lines belongs to the rubric of accessory undertakings1 of which we have already spoken4 ,now1 every convergent attack in strategy1 as well as in tactics1 holds out the prospect of great results2 for if it succeeds1 the consequence is not simply a defeat1 but more or less the cutting off of the enemy4 ,the concentric attack is1 therefore1 always that which may lead to the greatest results2 but on account of the separation of the parts of the force1 and the enlargement of the theatre of war1 it involves also the most risk2 it is the same here as with attack and defence1 the weaker form holds out the greater results in prospect4 ,the question1 therefore1 is1 whether the assailant feels strong enough to try for this great result4 ,when ,frederick the ,great advanced upon ,bohemia1 in the year #ageg1 he set out from ,saxony and ,silesia with his forces divided4 ,the two principal reasons for his doing so were1 first1 that his forces were so cantoned in the winter that a concentration of them at one point would have divested the attack of all the advantages of a surprise2 and next1 that by this concentric advance1 each of the two ,austrian theatres of war was threatened in the flanks and the rear4 ,the danger to which ,frederick the ,great exposed himself on that occasion was that one of his two armies might have been completely defeated by superior forces2 should the ,austrians not see this1 then they would have to give battle with their centre only1 or run the risk of being thrown off their line of communication1 either on one side or the other1 and meeting with a catastrophe2 this was the great result which the king hoped for by this advance4 ,the ,austrians preferred the battle in the centre1 but ,prague1 where they took up their position1 was in a situation too much under the influence of the convergent attack1 which1 as they remained perfectly passive in their position1 had time to develop its efficacy to the utmost4 ,the consequence of this was that when they lost the battle1 it was a complete catastrophe2 as is manifest from the fact that two-thirds of the army with the commander-in-chief were obliged to shut themselves up in ,prague4 ,this brilliant success at the opening of the campaign was attained by the bold stroke with a concentric attack4 ,if ,frederick considered the precision of his own movements1 the energy of his generals1 the moral superiority of his troops1 on the one side1 and the sluggishness of the ,austrians on the other1 as sufficient to ensure the success of his plan1 who can blame him8 ,but as we cannot leave these moral advantages out of consideration1 neither can we ascribe the success solely to the mere geometrical form of the attack4 ,let us only think of the not less brilliant campaign of ,buonaparte's1 in the year #agif1 when the ,austrians were so severely punished for their concentric march into ,italy4 ,the means which the ,french general had at command on that occasion1 the ,austrian general had also at his disposal in #ageg 7with the exception of the moral71 indeed1 he had rather more1 for he was not1 like ,buonaparte1 weaker than his adversary4 ,therefore1 when it is to be apprehended that the advance on separate converging lines may afford the enemy the means of counteracting the inequality of numerical forces by using interior lines1 such a form of attack is not advisable2 and if on account of the situation of the belligerents1 it must be resorted to1 it can only be regarded as a necessary evil4 ,if1 from this point of view1 we cast our eyes on the plan which was adopted for the invasion of ,france in #ahad1 it is impossible to give it approval4 ,the ,russian1 ,austrian1 and ,prussian armies were concentrated at a point near ,frankfort on the ,maine1 on the most natural and most direct line to the centre of the force of the ,french monarchy4 ,these armies were then separated1 that one might penetrate into ,france from ,mayence1 the other from ,switzerland4 ,as the enemy's force was so reduced that a defence of the frontier was out of the question1 the whole advantage to be expected from this concentric advance1 if it succeeded1 was that while ,lorraine and ,alsace were conquered by one army1 ,franche-,comte would be taken by the other4 ,was this trifling advantage worth the trouble of marching into ,switzerland8 ,we know very well that there were other 7but just as insufficient7 grounds which caused this march2 but we confine ourselves here to the point which we are considering4 ,on the other side1 ,buonaparte was a man who thoroughly understood the defensive to oppose to a concentric attack1 as he had already shown in his masterly campaign of #agif2 and although the ,allies were very considerably superior in numbers1 yet the preponderance due to his superiority as a general was on all occasions acknowledged4 ,he joined his army too late near ,chalons1 and looked down rather too much1 generally1 on his opponents1 still he was very near hitting the two armies separately2 and what was the state he found them in at ,brienne8 ,blcher had only #bg1jjj of his #fe1jjj men with him1 and the great army1 out of #bjj1jjj1 had only #ajj1jjj present4 ,it was impossible to make a better game for the adversary4 ,and from the moment that active work began1 no greater want was felt than that of re-union4 ,after all these reflections1 we think that although the concentric attack is in itself a means of obtaining greater results1 still it should generally only proceed from a previous separation of the parts composing the whole force1 and that there are few cases in which we should do right in giving up the shortest and most direct line of operation for the sake of adopting that form4 #c4 ,the breadth of a theatre of war can be a motive for attacking on separate lines4 ,if an army on the offensive in its advance from any point1 penetrates with success to some distance into the interior of the enemy's country1 then1 certainly1 the space which it commands is not restricted exactly to the line of road by which it marches1 it will command a margin on each side2 still that will depend very much1 if we may use the figure1 on the solidity and cohesion of the opposing ,state4 ,if the ,state only hangs loosely together1 if its people are an effeminate race unaccustomed to war1 then1 without our taking much trouble1 a considerable extent of country will open behind our victorious army2 but if we have to deal with a brave and loyal population1 the space behind our army will form a triangle1 more or less acute4 ,in order to obviate this evil1 the attacking force requires to regulate its advance on a certain width of front4 ,if the enemy's force is concentrated at a particular point1 this breadth of front can only be preserved so long as we are not in contact with the enemy1 and must be contracted as we approach his position3 that is easy to understand4 ,but if the enemy himself has taken up a position with a certain extent of front1 then there is nothing absurd in a corresponding extension on our part4 ,we speak here of one theatre of war1 or of several1 if they are quite close to each other4 ,obviously this is1 therefore1 the case when1 according to our view1 the chief operation is1 at the same time1 to be decisive on subordinate points ,but now can we always run the chance of this8 ,and may we expose ourselves to the danger which must arise if the influence of the chief operation is not sufficient to decide at the minor points8 ,does not the want of a certain breadth for a theatre of war deserve special consideration8 ,here as well as everywhere else it is impossible to exhaust the number of combinations which may take place2 but we maintain that1 with few exceptions1 the decision on the capital point will carry with it the decision on all minor points4 ,therefore1 the action should be regulated in conformity with this principle1 in all cases in which the contrary is not evident4 ,when ,buonaparte invaded ,russia1 he had good reason to believe that by conquering the main body of the ,russian army he would compel their forces on the ,upper ,dwina to succumb4 ,he left at first only the corps of ,oudinot to oppose them1 but ,wittgenstein assumed the offensive1 and ,buonaparte was then obliged to send also the sixth corps to that quarter4 ,on the other hand1 at the beginning of the campaign1 he directed a part of his forces against ,bagration2 but that general was carried along by the influence of the backward movement in the centre1 and ,buonaparte was enabled then to recall that part of his forces4 ,if ,wittgenstein had not had to cover the second capital1 he would also have followed the retreat of the great army under ,barclay4 ,in the years #ahje and #ahji1 ,buonaparte's victories at ,ulm and ,ratisbon decided matters in ,italy and also in the ,tyrol1 although the first was rather a distant theatre1 and an independent one in itself4 ,in the year #ahjf1 his victories at ,jena and ,auerstadt were decisive in respect to everything that might have been attempted against him in ,westphalia and ,hesse1 or on the ,frankfort road4 ,amongst the number of circumstances which may have an influence on the resistance at secondary points1 there are two which are the most prominent4 ,the first is3 that in a country of vast extent1 and also relatively of great power1 like ,russia1 we can put off the decisive blow at the chief point for some time1 and are not obliged to do all in a hurry4 ,the second is3 when a minor point 7like ,silesia in the year #ahjf71 through a great number of fortresses1 possesses an extraordinary degree of independent strength4 ,and yet ,buonaparte treated that point with great contempt1 inasmuch as1 when he had to leave such a point completely in his rear on the march to ,warsaw1 he only detached #bj1jjj men under his brother ,jerome to that quarter4 ,if it happens that the blow at the capital point1 in all probability1 will not shake such a secondary point1 or has not done so1 and if the enemy has still forces at that point1 then to these1 as a necessary evil1 an adequate force must be opposed1 because no one can absolutely lay open his line of communication from the very commencement4 ,but prudence may go a step further2 it may require that the advance upon the chief point shall keep pace with that on the secondary points1 and consequently the principal undertaking must be delayed whenever the secondary points will not succumb4 ,this principle does not directly contradict ours as to uniting all action as far as possible in one great undertaking1 but the spirit from which it springs is diametrically opposed to the spirit in which ours is conceived4 ,by following such a principle there would be such a measured pace in the movements1 such a paralysation of the impulsive force1 such room for the freak of chance1 and such a loss of time1 as would be practically perfectly inconsistent with an offensive directed to the complete overthrow of the enemy4 ,the difficulty becomes still greater if the forces stationed at these minor points can retire on divergent lines4 ,what would then become of the unity of our attack8 ,we must1 therefore1 declare ourselves completely opposed in principle to the dependence of the chief attack on minor attacks1 and we maintain that an attack directed to the destruction of the enemy which has not the boldness to shoot1 like the point of an arrow1 direct at the heart of the enemy's power1 can never hit the mark4 #d4 ,lastly1 there is still a fourth ground for a separate advance in the facility which it may afford for subsistence4 ,it is certainly much pleasanter to march with a small army through an opulent country1 than with a large army through a poor one2 but by suitable measures1 and with an army accustomed to privations1 the latter is not impossible1 and1 therefore1 the first should never have such an influence on our plans as to lead us into a great danger4 ,we have now done justice to the grounds for a separation of forces which divides the chief operation into several1 and if the separation takes place on any of these grounds1 with a distinct conception of the object1 and after due consideration of the advantages and disadvantages1 we shall not venture to find fault4 ,but if1 as usually happens1 a plan is drawn out by a learned general staff1 merely according to routine2 if different theatres of war1 like the squares on a chess board1 must each have its piece first placed on it before the moves begin1 if these moves approach the aim in complicated lines and relations by dint of an imaginary profundity in the art of combination1 if the armies are to separate to-day in order to apply all their skill in reuniting at the greatest risk in fourteen days then we have a perfect horror of this abandonment of the direct simple common-sense road to rush intentionally into absolute confusion4 ,this folly happens more easily the less the general-in-chief directs the war1 and conducts it in the sense which we have pointed out in the first chapter as an act of his individuality invested with extraordinary powers2 the more1 therefore1 the whole plan is manufactured by an inexperienced staff1 and from the ideas of a dozen smatterers4 ,we have still now to consider the third part of our first principle2 that is1 to keep the subordinate parts as much as possible in subordination4 ,whilst we endeavour to refer the whole of the operations of a war to one single aim1 and try to attain this as far as possible by one great effort1 we deprive the other points of contact of the ,states at war with each other of a part of their independence2 they become subordinate actions4 ,if we could concentrate everything absolutely into one action1 then those points of contact would be completely neutralised2 but this is seldom possible1 and1 therefore1 what we have to do is to keep them so far within bounds1 that they shall not cause the abstraction of too many forces from the main action4 ,next1 we maintain that the plan of the war itself should have this tendency1 even if it is not possible to reduce the whole of the enemy's resistance to one point2 consequently1 in case we are placed in the position already mentioned1 of carrying on two almost quite separate wars at the same time1 the one must always be looked upon as the principal affair to which our forces and activity are to be chiefly devoted4 ,in this view1 it is advisable only to proceed offensively against that one principal point1 and to preserve the defensive upon all the others4 ,the attack there being only justifiable when invited by very exceptional circumstances4 ,further we are to carry on this defensive1 which takes place at minor points1 with as few troops as possible1 and to seek to avail ourselves of every advantage which the defensive form can give4 ,this view applies with still more force to all theatres of war on which armies come forward belonging to different powers really1 but still such as will be struck when the general centre of force is struck4 ,but against the enemy at whom the great blow is aimed1 there must be1 according to this1 no defensive on minor theatres of war4 ,the chief attack itself1 and the secondary attacks1 which for other reasons are combined with it1 make up this blow1 and make every defensive1 on points not directly covered by it1 superfluous4 ,all depends on this principal attack2 by it every loss will be compensated4 ,if the forces are sufficient to make it reasonable to seek for that great decision1 then the possibility of failure can be no ground for guarding oneself against injury at other points in any event2 for just by such a course this failure will become more probable1 and it therefore constitutes here a contradiction in our action4 ,this same predominance of the principal action over the minor1 must be the principle observed in each of the separate branches of the attack4 ,but as there are generally ulterior motives which determine what forces shall advance from one theatre of war1 and what from another against the common centre of the enemy's power1 we only mean here that there must be an effort to make the chief action over-ruling1 for everything will become simpler and less subject to the influence of chance events the nearer this state of preponderance can be attained4 ,the second principle concerns the rapid use of the forces4 ,every unnecessary expenditure of time1 every unnecessary detour1 is a waste of power1 and therefore contrary to the principles of strategy4 ,it is most important to bear always in mind that almost the only advantage which the offensive possesses1 is the effect of surprise at the opening of the scene4 ,suddenness and irresistible impetuosity are its strongest pinions2 and when the object is the complete overthrow of the enemy1 it can rarely dispense with them4 ,by this1 therefore1 theory demands the shortest way to the object1 and completely excludes from consideration endless discussions about right and left here and there4 ,if we call to mind what was said in the chapter on the subject of the strategic attack respecting the pit of the stomach in a state1 and further1 what appears in the fourth chapter of this book1 on the influence of time1 we believe no further argument is required to prove that the influence which we claim for that principle really belongs to it4 ,buonaparte never acted otherwise4 ,the shortest high road from army to army1 from one capital to another1 was always the way he loved best4 ,and in what will now consist the principal action to which we have referred everything1 and for which we have demanded a swift and straightforward execution8 ,in the fourth chapter we have explained as far as it is possible in a general way what the total overthrow of the enemy means1 and it is unnecessary to repeat it4 ,whatever that may depend on at last in particular cases1 still the first step is always the same in all cases1 namely3 ,the destruction of the enemy's combatant force1 that is1 a great victory over the same and its dispersion4 ,the sooner1 which means the nearer our own frontiers1 this victory is sought for1 the easier it is2 the later1 that is1 the further in the heart of the enemy's country it is gained1 the more decisive it is4 ,here1 as well as everywhere1 the facility of success and its magnitude balance each other4 ,if we are not so superior to the enemy that the victory is beyond doubt1 then we should1 when possible1 seek him out1 that is his principal force4 ,we say when possible1 for if this endeavour to find him led to great detours1 false directions1 and a loss of time1 it might very likely turn out a mistake4 ,if the enemy's principal force is not on our road1 and our interests otherwise prevent our going in quest of him1 we may be sure we shall meet with him hereafter1 for he will not fail to place himself in our way4 ,we shall then1 as we have just said1 fight under less advantageous circumstances an evil to which we must submit4 ,however1 if we gain the battle1 it will be so much the more decisive4 ,from this it follows that1 in the case now assumed1 it would be an error to pass by the enemy's principal force designedly1 if it places itself in our way1 at least if we expect thereby to facilitate a victory4 ,on the other hand1 it follows from what precedes1 that if we have a decided superiority over the enemy's principal force1 we may designedly pass it by in order at a future time to deliver a more decisive battle4 ,we have been speaking of a complete victory1 therefore of a thorough defeat of the enemy1 and not of a mere battle gained4 ,but such a victory requires an enveloping attack1 or a battle with an oblique front1 for these two forms always give the result a decisive character4 ,it is therefore an essential part of a plan of a war to make arrangements for this movement1 both as regards the mass of forces required and the direction to be given them1 of which more will be said in the chapter on the plan of campaign4 ,it is certainly not impossible1 that even ,battles fought with parallel fronts may lead to complete defeats1 and cases in point are not wanting in military history2 but such an event is uncommon1 and will be still more so the more armies become on a par as regards discipline and handiness in the field4 ,we no longer take twenty-one battalions in a village1 as they did at ,blenheim4 ,once the great victory is gained1 the next question is not about rest1 not about taking breath1 not about considering1 not about reorganising1 etc41 etc41 but only of pursuit of fresh blows wherever necessary1 of the capture of the enemy's capital1 of the attack of the armies of his allies1 or of whatever else appears to be a rallying point for the enemy4 ,if the tide of victory carries us near the enemy's fortresses1 the laying siege to them or not will depend on our means4 ,if we have a great superiority of force1 it would be a loss of time not to take them as soon as possible2 but if we are not certain of the further events before us1 we must keep the fortresses in check with as few troops as possible1 which precludes any regular formal sieges4 ,the moment that the siege of a fortress compels us to suspend our strategic advance1 that advance1 as a rule1 has reached its culminating point4 ,we demand1 therefore1 that the main body should press forward rapidly in pursuit without any rest2 we have already condemned the idea of allowing the advance towards the principal point being made dependent on success at secondary points2 the consequence of this is1 that in all ordinary cases1 our chief army only keeps behind it a narrow strip of territory which it can call its own1 and which therefore constitutes its theatre of war4 ,how this weakens the momentum at the head1 and the dangers for the offensive arising therefrom1 we have shown already4 ,will not this difficulty1 will not this intrinsic counterpoise come to a point which impedes further advance8 ,certainly that may occur2 but just as we have already insisted that it would be a mistake to try to avoid this contracted theatre of war at the commencement1 and for the sake of that object to rob the advance of its elasticity1 so we also now maintain1 that as long as the commander has not yet overthrown his opponent1 as long as he considers himself strong enough to effect that object1 so long must he also pursue it4 ,he does so perhaps at an increased risk1 but also with the prospect of a greater success4 ,if he reaches a point which he cannot venture to go beyond1 where1 in order to protect his rear1 he must extend himself right and left well1 then1 this is most probably his culminating point4 ,the power of flight is spent1 and if the enemy is not subdued1 most probably he will not be now4 ,all that the assailant now does to intensify his attack by conquest of fortresses1 defiles1 provinces1 is no doubt still a slow advance1 but it is only of a relative kind1 it is no longer absolute4 ,the enemy is no longer in flight1 he is perhaps preparing a renewed resistance1 and it is therefore already possible that1 although the assailant still advances intensively1 the position of the defence is every day improving4 ,in short1 we come back to this1 that1 as a rule1 there is no second spring after a halt has once been necessary4 ,theory1 therefore1 only requires that1 as long as there is an intention of destroying the enemy1 there must be no cessation in the advance of the attack2 if the commander gives up this object because it is attended with too great a risk1 he does right to stop and extend his force4 ,theory only objects to this when he does it with a view to more readily defeating the enemy4 ,we are not so foolish as to maintain that no instance can be found of ,states having been gradually reduced to the utmost extremity4 ,in the first place1 the principle we now maintain is no absolute truth1 to which an exception is impossible1 but one founded only on the ordinary and probable result2 next1 we must make a distinction between cases in which the downfall of a ,state has been effected by a slow gradual process1 and those in which the event was the result of a first campaign4 ,we are here only treating of the latter case1 for it is only in such that there is that tension of forces which either overcomes the centre of gravity of the weight1 or is in danger of being overcome by it4 ,if in the first year we gain a moderate advantage1 to which in the following we add another1 and thus gradually advance towards our object1 there is nowhere very imminent danger1 but it is distributed over many points4 ,each pause between one result and another gives the enemy fresh chances3 the effects of the first results have very little influence on those which follow1 often none1 often a negative only1 because the enemy recovers himself1 or is perhaps excited to increased resistance1 or obtains foreign aid2 whereas1 when all is done in one march1 the success of yesterday brings on with itself that of to-day1 one brand lights itself from another4 ,if there are cases in which ,states have been overcome by successive blows in which1 consequently1 ,time1 generally the patron of the defensive1 has proved adverse how infinitely more numerous are the instances in which the designs of the aggressor have by that means utterly failed4 ,let us only think of the result of the ,seven ,years' ,war1 in which the ,austrians sought to attain their object so comfortably1 cautiously1 and prudently1 that they completely missed it4 ,in this view1 therefore1 we cannot at all join in the opinion that the care which belongs to the preparation of a theatre of war1 and the impulse which urges us onwards1 are on a level in importance1 and that the former must1 to a certain extent1 be a counterpoise to the latter2 but we look upon any evil which springs out of the forward movement1 as an unavoidable evil which only deserves attention when there is no longer hope for us a-head by the forward movement4 ,buonaparte's case in #ahab1 very far from shaking our opinion1 has rather confirmed us in it4 ,his campaign did not miscarry because he advanced too swiftly1 or too far1 as is commonly believed1 but because the only means of success failed4 ,the ,russian ,empire is no country which can be regularly conquered1 that is to say1 which can be held in possession1 at least not by the forces of the present ,states of ,europe1 nor by the #ejj1jjj men with which ,buonaparte invaded the country4 ,such a country can only be subdued by its own weakness1 and by the effects of internal dissension4 ,in order to strike these vulnerable points in its political existence1 the country must be agitated to its very centre4 ,it was only by reaching ,moscow with the force of his blow that ,buonaparte could hope to shake the courage of the ,government1 the loyalty and steadfastness of the people4 ,in ,moscow he expected to find peace1 and this was the only rational object which he could set before himself in undertaking such a war4 ,he therefore led his main body against that of the ,russians1 which fell back before him1 trudged past the camp at ,drissa1 and did not stop until it reached ,smolensk4 ,he carried ,bagration along in his movement1 beat the principal ,russia army1 and took ,moscow4 ,he acted on this occasion as he had always done3 it was only in that way that he made himself the arbiter of ,europe1 and only in that way was it possible for him to do so4 ,he1 therefore1 who admires ,buonaparte in all his earlier campaigns as the greatest of generals1 ought not to censure him in this instance4 ,it is quite allowable to judge an event according to the result1 as that is the best criticism upon it 7see fifth chapter1 #bnd book71 but this judgment derived merely from the result1 must not then be passed off as evidence of superior understanding4 ,to seek out the causes of the failure of a campaign1 is not going the length of making a criticism upon it2 it is only if we show that these causes should neither have been overlooked nor disregarded that we make a criticism and place ourselves above the ,general4 ,now we maintain that any one who pronounces the campaign of #ahab an absurdity merely on account of the tremendous reaction in it1 and who1 if it had been successful1 would look upon it as a most splendid combination1 shows an utter incapacity of judgment4 ,if ,buonaparte had remained in ,lithuania1 as most of his critics think he should1 in order first to get possession of the fortresses1 of which1 moreover1 except ,riga1 situated quite at one side1 there is hardly one1 because ,bobruisk is a small insignificant place of arms1 he would have involved himself for the winter in a miserable defensive system3 then the same people would have been the first to exclaim1 ,this is not the old ,buonaparte6 ,how is it1 he has not got even as far as a first great battle8 he who used to put the final seal to his conquests on the last ramparts of the enemy's states1 by victories such as ,austerlitz and ,friedland4 ,has his heart failed him that he has not taken the enemy's capital1 the defenceless ,moscow1 ready to open its gates1 and thus left a nucleus round which new elements of resistance may gather themselves8 ,he had the singular luck to take this far-off and enormous colossus by surprise1 as easily as one would surprise a neighbouring town1 or as ,frederick the ,great entered the little state of ,silesia1 lying at his door1 and he makes no use of his good fortune1 halts in the middle of his victorious career1 as if some evil spirit laid at his heels6 ,this is the way in which he would have been judged of after the result1 for this is the fashion of critics' judgments in general4 ,in opposition to this1 we say1 the campaign of #ahab did not succeed because the government remained firm1 the people loyal and steadfast1 because it therefore could not succeed4 ,buonaparte may have made a mistake in undertaking such an expedition2 at all events1 the result has shown that he deceived himself in his calculations1 but we maintain that1 supposing it necessary to seek the attainment of this object1 it could not have been done in any other way upon the whole4 ,instead of burthening himself with an interminable costly defensive war in the east1 such as he had on his hands in the west1 ,buonaparte attempted the only means to gain his object3 by one bold stroke to extort a peace from his astonished adversary4 ,the destruction of his army was the danger to which he exposed himself in the venture2 it was the stake in the game1 the price of great expectations4 ,if this destruction of his army was more complete than it need have been through his own fault1 this fault was not in his having penetrated too far into the heart of the country1 for that was his object1 and unavoidable2 but in the late period at which the campaign opened1 the sacrifice of life occasioned by his tactics1 the want of due care for the supply of his army1 and for his line of retreat1 and lastly1 in his having too long delayed his march from ,moscow4 ,that the ,russians were able to reach the ,beresina before him1 intending regularly to cut off his retreat1 is no strong argument against us4 ,for in the first place1 the failure of that attempt just shows how difficult it is really to cut off an army1 as the army which was intercepted in this case under the most unfavourable circumstances that can be conceived1 still managed at last to cut its way through2 and although this act upon the whole contributed certainly to increase its catastrophe1 still it was not essentially the cause of it4 ,secondly1 it was only the very peculiar nature of the country which afforded the means to carry things as far as the ,russians did2 for if it had not been for the marshes of the ,beresina1 with its wooded impassable borders lying across the great road1 the cutting off would have been still less possible4 ,thirdly1 there is generally no means of guarding against such an eventuality except by making the forward movement with the front of the army of such a width as we have already disapproved2 for if we proceed on the plan of pushing on in advance with the centre and covering the wings by armies detached right and left1 then if either of these detached armies meets with a check1 we must fall back with the centre1 and then very little can be gained by the attack4 ,moreover1 it cannot be said that ,buonaparte neglected his wings4 ,a superior force remained fronting ,wittgenstein1 a proportionate siege-corps stood before ,riga which at the same time was not needed there1 and in the south ,schwarzenberg had #ej1jjj men with which he was superior to ,tormasoff and almost equal to ,tschitschagow3 in addition1 there were #cj1jjj men under ,victor1 covering the rear of the centre4 ,even in the month of ,november1 therefore1 at the decisive moment when the ,russian armies had been reinforced1 and the ,french were very much reduced1 the superiority of the ,russians in rear of the ,moscow army was not so very extraordinary4 ,wittgenstein1 ,tschitschagow1 and ,sacken1 made up together a force of #ajj1jjj4 ,schwartzenberg1 ,regmer1 ,victor1 ,oudinot1 and ,st4 ,cyr1 had still #hj1jjj effective4 ,the most cautious general in advancing would hardly devote a greater proportion of his force to the protection of his flanks4 ,if out of the #fjj1jjj men who crossed the ,niemen in #ahab1 ,buonaparte had brought back #bej1jjj instead of the #ej1jjj who repassed it under ,schwartzenberg1 ,regmer1 and ,macdonald1 which was possible1 by avoiding the mistakes with which he has been reproached1 the campaign would still have been an unfortunate one1 but theory would have had nothing to object to it1 for the loss of half an army in such a case is not at all unusual1 and only appears so to us in this instance on account of the enormous scale of the whole enterprize4 ,so much for the principal operation1 its necessary tendency1 and the unavoidable risks4 ,as regards the subordinate operations1 there must be1 above all things1 a common aim for all2 but this aim must be so situated as not to paralyse the action of any of the individual parts4 ,if we invade ,france from the upper and middle ,rhine and ,holland1 with the intention of uniting at ,paris1 neither of the armies employed to risk anything on the advance1 but to keep itself intact until the concentration is effected1 that is what we call a ruinous plan4 ,there must be necessarily a constant comparison of the state of this threefold movement causing delay1 indecision1 and timidity in the forward movement of each of the armies4 ,it is better to assign to each part its mission1 and only to place the point of union wherever these several activities become unity of themselves4 ,therefore1 when a military force advances to the attack on separate theatres of war1 to each army should be assigned an object against which the force of its shock is to be directed4 ,here the point is that these shocks should be given from all sides simultaneously1 but not that proportional advantages should result from all of them4 ,if the task assigned to one army is found too difficult because the enemy has made a disposition of his force different to that which was expected1 if it sustains a defeat1 this neither should1 nor must have1 any influence on the action of the others1 or we should turn the probability of the general success against ourselves at the very outset4 ,it is only the unsuccessful issue of the majority of enterprises or of the principal one1 which can and must have an influence upon the others3 for then it comes under the head of a plan which has miscarried4 ,this same rule applies to those armies and portions of them which have originally acted on the defensive1 and1 owing to the successes gained1 have assumed the offensive1 unless we prefer to attach such spare forces to the principal offensive1 a point which will chiefly depend on the geographical situation of the theatre of war4 ,but under these circumstances1 what becomes of the geometrical form and unity of the whole attack1 what of the flanks and rear of corps when those corps next to them are beaten4 ,that is precisely what we wish chiefly to combat4 ,this glueing down of a great offensive plan of attack on a geometrical square1 is losing one's way in the regions of fallacy4 ,in the fifteenth chapter of the ,third ,book we have shown that the geometrical element has less influence in strategy than in tactics2 and we shall only here repeat the deduction there obtained1 that in the attack especially1 the actual results at the various points throughout deserve more attention than the geometrical figure1 which may gradually be formed through the diversity of results4 ,but in any case1 it is quite certain1 that looking to the vast spaces with which strategy has to deal1 the views and resolutions which the geometrical situation of the parts may create1 should be left to the general-in-chief2 that1 therefore1 no subordinate general has a right to ask what his neighbour is doing or leaving undone1 but each is to be directed peremptorily to follow out his object4 ,if any serious incongruity really arises from this1 a remedy can always be applied in time by the supreme authority4 ,thus1 then1 may be obviated the chief evil of this separate mode of action1 which is1 that in the place of realities1 a cloud of apprehensions and suppositions mix themselves up in the progress of an operation1 that every accident affects not only the part it comes immediately in contact with1 but also the whole1 by the communication of impressions1 and that a wide field of action is opened for the personal failings and personal animosities of subordinate commanders4 ,we think that these views will only appear paradoxical to those who have not studied military history long enough or with sufficient attention1 who do not distinguish the important from the unimportant1 nor make proper allowance for the influence of human weaknesses in general4 ,if even in tactics there is a difficulty1 which all experienced soldiers admit there is1 in succeeding in an attack in separate columns where it depends on the perfect connection of the several columns1 how much more difficult1 or rather how impossible1 must this be in strategy1 where the separation is so much wider4 ,therefore1 if a constant connection of all parts was a necessary condition of success1 a strategic plan of attack of that nature must be at once given up4 ,but on the one hand1 it is not left to our option to discard it completely1 because circumstances1 which we cannot control1 may determine in favour of it2 on the other hand1 even in tactics1 this constant close conjunction of all parts at every moment of the execution1 is not at all necessary1 and it is still less so in strategy4 ,therefore in strategy we should pay the less attention to this point1 and insist the more upon a distinct piece of work being assigned to each part4 ,we have still to add one important observation3 it relates to the proper allotment of parts4 ,in the year #agic and #agid the principal ,austrian army was in the ,netherlands1 that of the ,prussians1 on the upper ,rhine4 ,the ,austrians marched from ,vienna to ,cond and ,valenciennes1 crossing the line of march of the ,prussians from ,berlin to ,landau4 ,the ,austrians had certainly to defend their ,belgian provinces in that quarter1 and any conquests made in ,french ,flanders would have been acquisitions conveniently situated for them1 but that interest was not strong enough4 ,after the death of ,prince ,kaunitz1 the ,minister ,thugut carried a measure for giving up the ,netherlands entirely1 for the better concentration of the ,austrian forces4 ,in fact1 ,austria is about twice as far from ,flanders as from ,alsace2 and at a time when military resources were very limited1 and everything had to be paid for in ready money1 that was no trifling consideration4 ,still1 the ,minister ,thugut had plainly something else in view2 his object was1 through the urgency of the danger to compel ,holland1 ,england1 and ,prussia1 the powers interested in the defence of the ,netherlands and ,lower ,rhine1 to make greater efforts4 ,he certainly deceived himself in his calculations1 because nothing could be done with the ,prussian cabinet at that time1 but this occurrence always shows the influence of political interests on the course of a war4 ,prussia had neither anything to conquer nor to defend in ,alsace4 ,in the year #agib it had undertaken the march through ,lorraine into ,champagne in a sort of chivalrous spirit4 ,but as that enterprise ended in nothing1 through the unfavourable course of circumstances1 it continued the war with a feeling of very little interest4 ,if the ,prussian troops had been in the ,netherlands1 they would have been in direct communication with ,holland1 which they might look upon almost as their own country1 having conquered it in the year #aghg2 they would then have covered the ,lower ,rhine1 and consequently that part of the ,prussian monarchy which lay next to the theatre of war4 ,prussia on account of subsidies would also have had a closer alliance with ,england1 which1 under these circumstances1 would not so easily have degenerated into the crooked policy of which the ,prussian cabinet was guilty at that time4 ,a much better result1 therefore1 might have been expected if the ,austrians had appeared with their principal force on the ,upper ,rhine1 the ,prussians with their whole force in the ,netherlands1 and the ,austrians had left there only a corps of proportionate strength4 ,if1 instead of the enterprising ,blcher1 ,general ,barclay had been placed at the head of the ,silesian army in #ahad1 and ,blcher and ,schwartzenberg had been kept with the grand army1 the campaign would perhaps have turned out a complete failure4 ,if the enterprising ,laudon1 instead of having his theatre of war at the strongest point of the ,prussian dominions1 namely1 in ,silesia1 had been in the position of the ,german ,states' army1 perhaps the whole ,seven ,years' ,war would have had quite a different turn4 ,in order to examine this subject more narrowly1 we must look at the cases according to their chief distinctions4 ,the first is1 if we carry on war in conjunction with other powers1 who not only take part as our allies1 but also have an independent interest as well4 ,the second is1 if the army of the ally has come to our assistance4 ,the third is1 when it is only a question with regard to the personal characteristics of the ,general4 ,in the two first cases1 the point may be raised1 whether it is better to mix up the troops of the different powers completely1 so that each separate army is composed of corps of different powers1 as was done in the wars #ahac and #ahad1 or to keep them separate as much as possible1 so that the army of each power may continue distinct and act independently4 ,plainly1 the first is the most salutary plan2 but it supposes a degree of friendly feeling and community of interests which is seldom found4 ,when there is this close good fellowship between the troops1 it is much more difficult for the cabinets to separate their interests2 and as regards the prejudicial influence of the egotistical views of commanders1 it can only show itself under these circumstances amongst the subordinate ,generals1 therefore1 only in the province of tactics1 and even there not so freely or with such impunity as when there is a complete separation4 ,in the latter case1 it affects the strategy1 and therefore1 makes decided marks4 ,but1 as already observed1 for the first case there must be a rare spirit of conciliation on the part of the ,governments4 ,in the year #ahac1 the exigencies of the time impelled all ,governments in that direction2 and yet we cannot sufficiently praise this in the ,emperor of ,russia1 that although he entered the field with the strongest army1 and the change of fortune was chiefly brought about by him1 yet he set aside all pride about appearing at the head of a separate and an independent ,russian army1 and placed his troops under the ,prussian and ,austrian ,commanders4 ,if such a fusion of armies cannot be effected1 a complete separation of them is certainly better than a half-and-half state of things2 the worst of all is when two independent ,commanders of armies of different powers find themselves on the same theatre of war1 as frequently happened in the ,seven ,years' ,war with the armies of ,russia1 ,austria1 and the ,german ,states4 ,when there is a complete separation of forces1 the burdens which must be borne are also better divided1 and each suffers only from what is his own1 consequently is more impelled to activity by the force of circumstances2 but if they find themselves in close connection1 or quite on the same theatre of war1 this is not the case1 and besides that the ill will of one paralyses also the powers of the other as well4 ,in the first of the three supposed cases1 there will be no difficulty in the complete separation1 as the natural interest of each ,state generally indicates to it a separate mode of employing its force2 this may not be so in the second case1 and then1 as a rule1 there is nothing to be done but to place oneself completely under the auxiliary army1 if its strength is in any way proportionate to that measure1 as the ,austrians did in the latter part of the campaign of #ahae1 and the ,prussians in the campaign of #ahjg4 ,with regard to the personal qualifications of the ,general1 everything in this passes into what is particular and individual2 but we must not omit to make one general remark1 which is1 that we should not1 as is generally done1 place at the head of subordinate armies the most prudent and cautious ,commanders1 but the most enterprising2 for we repeat that in strategic operations conducted separately1 there is nothing more important than that every part should develop its powers to the full1 in that way faults committed at one part may be compensated for by successes at others4 ,this complete activity at all points1 however1 is only to be expected when the ,commanders are spirited1 enterprising men1 who are urged forwards by natural impulsiveness by their own hearts1 because a mere objective1 coolly reasoned out1 conviction of the necessity of action seldom suffices4 ,lastly1 we have to remark that1 if circumstances in other respects permit1 the troops and their commanders1 as regards their destination1 should be employed in accordance with their qualities and the nature of the country that is regular armies2 good troops2 numerous cavalry2 old1 prudent1 intelligent generals in an open country2 ,militia2 national levies2 young enterprising commanders in wooded country1 mountains and defiles2 auxiliary armies in rich provinces where they can make themselves comfortable4 ,what we have now said upon a plan of a war in general1 and in this chapter upon those in particular which are directed to the destruction of the enemy1 is intended to give special prominence to the object of the same1 and next to indicate principles which may serve as guides in the preparation of ways and means4 ,our desire has been in this way to give a clear perception of what is to be1 and should be1 done in such a war4 ,we have tried to emphasise the necessary and general1 and to leave a margin for the play of the particular and accidental2 but to exclude all that is arbitrary1 unfounded1 trifling1 fantastical2 or sophistical4 ,if we have succeeded in this object1 we look upon our problem as solved4 ,now1 if any one wonders at finding nothing here about turning rivers1 about commanding mountains from their highest points1 about avoiding strong positions1 and finding the keys of a country1 he has not understood us1 neither does he as yet understand war in its general relations according to our views4 ,in preceding books we have characterised these subjects in general1 and we there arrived at the conclusion1 they are much more insignificant in their nature than we should think from their high repute4 ,therefore1 so much the less can or ought they to play a great part1 that is1 so far as to influence the whole plan of a war1 when it is a war which has for its object the destruction of the enemy4 ,at the end of the book we shall devote a chapter specially to the consideration of the chief command2 the present chapter we shall close with an example4 ,if ,austria1 ,prussia1 the ,german ,con-federation1 the ,netherlands and ,england1 determine on a war with ,france1 but ,russia remains neutral a case which has frequently happened during the last one hundred and fifty years they are able to carry on an offensive war1 having for its object the overthrow of the enemy4 ,for powerful and great as ,france is1 it is still possible for it to see more than half its territory overrun by the enemy1 its capital occupied1 and itself reduced in its means to a state of complete inefficiency1 without there being any power1 except ,russia1 which can give it effectual support4 ,spain is too distant and too disadvantageously situated2 the ,italian ,states are at present too brittle and powerless4 ,the countries we have named have1 exclusive of their possessions out of ,europe1 above #ge1jjj1jjj inhabitants17997 whilst ,france has only #cj1jjj1jjj2 and the army which they could call out for a war against ,france really meant in earnest1 would be as follows1 without exaggeration3-- ,austria 4444444444444#bej1jjj ,prussia 4444444444444#bjj1jjj ,the rest of ,germany4 #aej1jjj ,netherlands 4444444444#ge1jjj ,england 44444444444444#ej1jjj ---------- ,total3 444444#gbe1jjj 7997 ,this chapter was probably written in #ahbh1 since which time the numerical relations have considerably changed4 ,a4 d4 ,h4 ,should this force be placed on a warfooting it would1 in all probability1 very much exceed that which ,france could oppose2 for under ,buonaparte the country never had an army of the like strength4 ,now1 if we take into account the deductions required as garrisons for fortresses and depts1 to watch the coasts1 etc41 there can be no doubt the allies would have a great superiority in the principal theatre of war1 and upon that the object or plan of overthrowing the enemy is chiefly founded4 ,the centre of gravity of the ,french power lies in its military force and in ,paris4 ,to defeat the former in one or more battles1 to take ,paris and drive the wreck of the ,french across the ,loire1 must be the object of the allies4 ,the pit of the stomach of the ,french monarchy is between ,paris and ,brussels1 on that side the frontier is only thirty miles from the capital4 ,part of the allies2 the ,english1 ,netherlanders1 ,prussian1 and ,north ,german ,states have their natural point of assembly in that direction1 as these ,states lie partly in the immediate vicinity1 partly in a direct line behind it4 ,austria and ,south ,germany can only carry on their war conveniently from the upper ,rhine4 ,their natural direction is upon ,troyes and ,paris1 or it may be ,orleans4 ,both shocks1 therefore1 that from the ,netherlands and the other from the upper ,rhine1 are quite direct and natural1 short and powerful2 and both fall upon the centre of gravity of the enemy's power4 ,between these two points1 therefore1 the whole invading army should be divided4 ,but there are two considerations which interfere with the simplicity of this plan4 ,the ,austrians would not lay bare their ,italian dominions1 they would wish to retain the mastery over events there1 in any case1 and therefore would not incur the risk of making an attack on the heart of ,france1 by which they would leave ,italy only indirectly covered4 ,looking to the political state of the country1 this collateral consideration is not to be treated with contempt2 but it would be a decided mistake if the old and oft-tried plan of an attack from ,italy1 directed against the ,south of ,france1 was bound up with it1 and if on that account the force in ,italy was increased to a size not required for mere security against contingencies in the first campaign4 ,only the number needed for that security should remain in ,italy1 only that number should be withdrawn from the great undertaking1 if we would not be unfaithful to that first maxim1 ,unity of plan1 concentration of force4 ,to think of conquering ,france by the ,rhone1 would be like trying to lift a musket by the point of its bayonet2 but also as an auxiliary enterprise1 an attack on the ,south of ,france is to be condemned1 for it only raises new forces against us4 ,whenever an attack is made on distant provinces1 interests and activities are roused1 which would otherwise have lain dormant4 ,it would only be in case that the forces left for the security of ,italy were in excess of the number required1 and1 therefore1 to avoid leaving them unemployed1 that there would be any justification for an attack on the ,south of ,france from that quarter4 ,we therefore repeat that the force left in ,italy must be kept down as low as circumstances will permit2 and it will be quite large enough if it will suffice to prevent the ,austrians from losing the whole country in one campaign4 ,let us suppose that number to be #ej1jjj men for the purpose of our illustration4 ,another consideration deserving attention1 is the relation of ,france in respect to its sea-coast4 ,as ,england has the upper hand at sea1 it follows that ,france must1 on that account1 be very susceptible with regard to the whole of her ,atlantic coast2 and1 consequently1 must protect it with garrisons of greater or less strength4 ,now1 however weak this coast-defence may be1 still the ,french frontiers are tripled by it2 and large drafts1 on that account1 cannot fail to be withdrawn from the ,french army on the theatre of war4 ,twenty or thirty thousand troops disposable to effect a landing1 with which the ,english threaten ,france1 would probably absorb twice or three times the number of ,french troops2 and1 further1 we must think not only of troops1 but also of money1 artillery1 etc41 etc41 required for ships and coast batteries4 ,let us suppose that the ,english devote #be1jjj to this object4 ,our plan of war would then consist simply in this3 #a4 ,that in the ,netherlands3-- #bjj1jjj ,prussians1 #ge1jjj ,netherlanders1 #be1jjj ,english1 #ej1jjj ,north ,german ,confederation1 ---------- ,total3 #cej1jjj be assembled1 of whom about #ej1jjj should be set aside to garrison frontier fortresses1 and the remaining #cjj1jjj should advance against ,paris1 and engage the ,french ,army in a decisive battle4 #b4 ,that #bjj1jjj ,austrians and #ajj1jjj ,south ,german troops should assemble on the ,upper ,rhine to advance at the same time as the army of the ,netherlands1 their direction being towards the ,upper ,seine1 and from thence towards the ,loire1 with a view1 likewise1 to a great battle4 ,these two attacks would1 perhaps1 unite in one on the ,loire4 ,by this the chief point is determined4 ,what we have to add is chiefly intended to root out false conceptions1 and is as follows3-- #a4 ,to seek for the great battle1 as prescribed1 and deliver it with such a relation1 in point of numerical strength and under such circumstances1 as promise a decisive victory1 is the course for the chief commanders to follow2 to this object everything must be sacrificed2 and as few men as possible should be employed in sieges1 blockades1 garrisons1 etc4 ,if1 like ,schwartzenberg in #ahad1 as soon as they enter the enemy's provinces they spread out in eccentric rays all is lost4 ,that this did not take place in #ahad the ,allies may thank the powerless state of ,france alone4 ,the attack should be like a wedge well driven home1 not like a soap bubble1 which distends itself till it bursts4 #b4 ,switzerland must be left to its own forces4 ,if it remains neutral it forms a good point d'appui on the ,upper ,rhine2 if it is attacked by ,france1 let her stand up for herself1 which in more than one respect she is very well able to do4 ,nothing is more absurd than to attribute to ,switzerland a predominant geographical influence upon events in war because it is the highest land in ,europe4 ,such an influence only exists under certain very restricted conditions1 which are not to be found here4 ,when the ,french are attacked in the heart of their country they can undertake no offensive from ,switzerland1 either against ,italy or ,swabia1 and1 least of all1 can the elevated situation of the country come into consideration as a decisive circumstance4 ,the advantage of a country which is dominating in a strategic sense1 is1 in the first place1 chiefly important in the defensive1 and any importance which it has in the offensive may manifest itself in a single encounter4 ,whoever does not know this has not thought over the thing and arrived at a clear perception of it1 and in case that at any future council of potentates and generals1 some learned officer of the general staff should be found1 who1 with an anxious brow1 displays such wisdom1 we now declare it beforehand to be mere folly1 and wish that in the same council some true ,blade1 some child of sound common-sense may be present who will stop his mouth4 #c4 ,the space between two attacks we think of very little consequence4 ,when #fjj1jjj assemble thirty or forty miles from ,paris to march against the heart of ,france1 would any one think of covering the middle ,rhine as well as ,berlin1 ,dresden1 ,vienna1 and ,munich8 ,there would be no sense in such a thing4 ,are we to cover the communications8 ,that would not be unimportant2 but then we might soon be led into giving this covering the importance of an attack1 and then1 instead of advancing on two lines1 as the situation of the ,states positively requires1 we should be led to advance upon three1 which is not required4 ,these three would then1 perhaps1 become five1 or perhaps seven1 and in that way the old rigmarole would once more become the order of the day4 ,our two attacks have each their object2 the forces employed on them are probably very superior to the enemy in numbers4 ,if each pursues his march with vigour1 they cannot fail to react advantageously upon each other4 ,if one of the two attacks is unfortunate because the enemy has not divided his force equally1 we may fairly expect that the result of the other will of itself repair this disaster1 and this is the true interdependence between the two4 ,an interdependence extending to 7so as to be affected by7 the events of each day is impossible on account of the distance2 neither is it necessary1 and therefore the immediate1 or1 rather the direct connection1 is of no such great value4 ,besides1 the enemy attacked in the very centre of his dominions will have no forces worth speaking of to employ in interrupting this connection2 all that is to be apprehended is that this interruption may be attempted by a co-operation of the inhabitants with the partisans1 so that this object does not actually cost the enemy any troops4 ,to prevent that1 it is sufficient to send a corps of #aj1jjj or #ae1jjj men1 particularly strong in cavalry1 in the direction from ,trves to ,rheims4 ,it will be able to drive every partisan before it1 and keep in line with the grand army4 ,this corps should neither invest nor watch fortresses1 but march between them1 depend on no fixed basis1 but give way before superior forces in any direction1 no great misfortune could happen to it1 and if such did happen1 it would again be no serious misfortune for the whole4 ,under these circumstances1 such a corps might probably serve as an intermediate link between the two attacks4 #d4 ,the two subordinate undertakings1 that is1 the ,austrian army in ,italy1 and the ,english army for landing on the coast1 might follow their object as appeared best4 ,if they do not remain idle1 their mission is fulfilled as regards the chief point1 and on no account should either of the two great attacks be made dependent in any way on these minor ones4 ,we are quite convinced that in this way ,france may be overthrown and chastised whenever it thinks fit to put on that insolent air with which it has oppressed ,europe for a hundred and fifty years4 ,it is only on the other side of ,paris1 on the ,loire1 that those conditions can be obtained from it which are necessary for the peace of ,europe4 ,in this way alone the natural relation between #cj millions of men and #ge millions will quickly make itself known1 but not if the country from ,dunkirk to ,genoa is to be surrounded in the way it has been for #aej years by a girdle of armies1 whilst fifty different small objects are aimed at1 not one of which is powerful enough to overcome the inertia1 friction1 and extraneous influences which spring up and reproduce themselves everywhere1 but more especially in allied armies4 ,how little the provisional organisation of the ,german federal armies is adapted to such a disposition1 will strike the reader4 ,by that organisation the federative part of ,germany forms the nucleus of the ,german power1 and ,prussia and ,austria thus weakened1 lose their natural influence4 ,but a federative state is a very brittle nucleus in war4 ,there is in it no unity1 no energy1 no rational choice of a commander1 no authority1 no responsibility4 ,austria and ,prussia are the two natural centres of force of the ,german empire2 they form the pivot 7or fulcrum71 the forte of the sword2 they are monarchical states1 used to war2 they have well-defined interests1 independence of power2 they are predominant over the others4 ,the organisation should follow these natural lineaments1 and not a false notion about unity1 which is an impossibility in such a case2 and he who neglects the possible in quest of the impossible is a fool4