public domain works from the ,university
 of ,michigan ,digital ,libraries47     
,a  ,,candid ,,examination  ,,of        
,,theism4  ,,by  ,,physicus4  ,,boston3 
,,houghton1 ,,osgood1  ,,company4 #ahgh4
 ,all rights reserved         99        
99       99       99       99   ,,canst 
,,thou ,,by ,,searching ,,find ,,out    
,,god8         99       99       99     
99       99   ,,preface4         99     
99       99       99       99  ,the     
following essay was written several     
years ago2 but ,i have hitherto         
refrained from publishing it1 lest1     
after having done so1 ,i should find    
that more mature thought had modified   
the conclusions which the essay sets    
forth4 ,judging1 however1 that it is now
 more than ever improbable that ,i shall
 myself be able to detect any errors in 
my reasoning1 ,i feel that it is time to
 present the latter to the contemplation
 of other minds2 and in doing so1 ,i    
make this explanation only because ,i   
feel it desirable to state at the outset

 that the present treatise was written  
before the publication of ,mr4 ,mill's  
treatise on the same subject4 ,it is    
desirable to make this statement1 first1
 because in several instances the trains
 of reasoning in the two essays are     
parallel1 and next1 because in other    
instances ,i have quoted passages from  
,mr4 ,mill's essay in connections which 
would be scarcely intelligible were it  
not understood that these passages are  
insertions made after the present essay 
had been completed4 ,i have also added  
several supplementary essays which have 
been written since the main essay was   
finished4  ,it is desirable further to  
observe1 that the only reason why ,i    
publish this edition anonymously is     
because ,i feel very strongly that1 in  
matters of the kind with which the      
present essay deals1 opinions and       
arguments should be allowed to produce  
the exact degree of influence to which  
as opinions and arguments they are      
entitled3 they should be permitted to   

stand upon their own intrinsic merits   
alone1 and quite beyond the shadow of   
that unfair prejudication which cannot  
but arise so soon as their author's     
authority1 or absence of authority1     
becomes known4 ,notwithstanding this    
avowal1 however1 ,i fear that many who  
glance over the following pages will    
read in the ,physicus of the first one a
 very different motive4 ,there is at the
 present time a wonderfully wide-spread 
sentiment pervading all classes of      
society--a sentiment which it would not 
be easy to define1 but the practical    
outcome of which is1 that to discuss the
 question of which this essay treats is1
 in some way or other1 morally wrong4   
,many1 therefore1 who share this        
sentiment will doubtless attribute my   
reticence to a puerile fear on my part  
to meet it4 ,i can only say that such is
 not the case4 ,although ,i allude to   
this sentiment with all                 
respect--believing as ,i do that it is  
an offshoot from the stock which        

contains all that is best and greatest  
in human nature--nevertheless it seems  
to me impossible to deny that the       
sentiment in question is as unreasonable
 as the frame of mind which harbours it 
must be unreasoning4 ,if there is no    
,god1 where can be the harm in our      
examining the spurious evidence of his  
existence8 ,if there is a ,god1 surely  
our first duty towards him must be to   
exert to our utmost1 in our attempts to 
find him1 the most noble faculty with   
which he has endowed us--as carefully to
 investigate the evidence which he has  
seen fit to furnish of his own existence
 as we investigate the evidence of      
inferior things in his dependent        
creation4 ,to say that there is one rule
 or method for ascertaining truth in the
 latter case1 which it is not legitimate
 to apply in the former case1 is merely 
a covert way of saying that the ,deity1 
if he exists1 has not supplied us with  
rational evidence of his existence4 ,for
 my own part1 ,i feel that such an      

assertion cannot but embody far more    
unworthy conceptions of a ,personal ,god
 than are represented by any amount of  
earnest inquiry into whatever evidence  
of his existence there may be present2  
but1 neglecting this reflection1 if     
there is a ,god1 it is certain that     
reason is the faculty by which he has   
enabled man to discover truth1 and it is
 no less certain that the scientific    
methods have proved themselves by far   
the most trustworthy for reason to      
adopt4 ,to my mind1 therefore1 it is    
impossible to resist the conclusion     
that1 looking to this undoubted         
pre-eminence of the scientific methods  
as ways to truth1 whether or not there  
is a ,god1 the question as to his       
existence is both more morally and more 
reverently contemplated if we regard it 
purely as a problem for methodical      
analysis to solve1 than if we regard it 
in any other light4 ,or1 stating the    
case in other words1 ,i believe that in 
whatever degree we intentionally abstain

 from using in this case what we know to
 be the most trustworthy methods of     
inquiry in other cases1 in that degree  
are we either unworthily closing our    
eyes to a dreaded truth1 or we are      
guilty of the worst among human         
sins--,depart from us1 for we desire not
 the knowledge of thy ways4 ,if it is   
said that1 supposing man to be in a     
state of probation1 faith1 and not      
reason1 must be the instrument of his   
trial1 ,i am ready to admit the validity
 of the remark2 but ,i must also ask it 
to be remembered1 that unless faith has 
some basis of reason whereon to rest1 it
 differs in nothing from superstition2  
and hence that it is still our duty to  
investigate the rational standing of the
 question before us by the scientific   
methods alone4 ,and ,i may here observe 
parenthetically1 that the same reasoning
 applies to all investigations          
concerning the reality of a supposed    
revelation4 ,with such investigations1  
however1 the present essay has nothing  

to do1 although1 ,i may remark that if  
there is any evidence of a ,divine ,mind
 discernible in the structure of a      
professing revelation1 such evidence1 in
 whatever degree present1 would be of   
the best possible kind for              
substantiating the hypothesis of        
,theism4  ,such being1 then1 what ,i    
conceive the only reasonable1 as well as
 the most truly moral1 way of regarding 
the question to be discussed in the     
following pages1 even if the conclusions
 yielded by this discussion were more   
negative than they are1 ,i should deem  
it culpable cowardice in me for this    
reason to publish anonymously4 ,for even
 if an inquiry of the present kind could
 ever result in a final demonstration of
 ,atheism1 there might be much for its  
author to regret1 but nothing for him to
 be ashamed of2 and1 by parity of       
reasoning1 in whatever degree the result
 of such an inquiry is seen to have a   
tendency to negative the theistic       
theory1 the author should not be ashamed

 candidly to acknowledge his conviction 
as to the degree of such tendency1      
provided only that his conviction is an 
honest one1 and that he is conscious of 
its having been reached by using his    
faculties with the utmost care of which 
he is capable4  ,if it is retorted that 
the question to be dealt with is of so  
ultimate a character that even the      
scientific methods are here             
untrustworthy1 ,i reply that they are   
nevertheless the best methods available1
 and hence that the retort is without   
pertinence3 the question is still to be 
regarded as a scientific one1 although  
we may perceive that neither an         
affirmative nor a negative answer can be
 given to it with any approach to a full
 demonstration4 ,but if the question is 
thus conceded to be one falling within  
the legitimate scope of rational        
inquiry1 it follows that the mere fact  
of demonstrative certainty being here   
antecedently impossible should not deter
 us from instituting the inquiry4 ,it is

 a well-recognised principle of         
scientific research1 that however       
difficult or impossible it may be to    
prove a given theory true or false1 the 
theory should nevertheless be tested1 so
 far as it admits of being tested1 by   
the full rigour of the scientific       
methods4 ,where demonstration cannot be 
hoped for1 it still remains desirable to
 reduce the question at issue to the    
last analysis of which it is capable4   
,adopting these principles1 therefore1  
,i have endeavoured in the following    
analysis to fix the precise standing of 
the evidence in favour of the theory of 
,theism1 when the latter is viewed in   
all the flood of light which the        
progress of modern science--physical and
 speculative--has shed upon it4 ,and    
forasmuch as it is impossible that      
demonstrated truth can ever be shown    
untrue1 and forasmuch as the            
demonstrated truths on which the present
 examination rests are the most         
fundamental which it is possible for the

 human mind to reach1 ,i do not think it
 presumptuous to assert what appears to 
me a necessary deduction from these     
facts--namely1 that1 possible errors in 
reasoning apart1 the rational position  
of ,theism as here defined must remain  
without material modification as long as
 our intelligence remains human4        
,,london1 #ahgh4         99       99    
99       99       99   ,,analysis4      
,,chapter ,i4  ,,examination ,,of       
,,illogical ,,arguments ,,in ,,favour   
,,of ,,theism4  ,,sect4  #a4            
,introductory4  #b4 ,object of the      
chapter4  #c4 ,the ,argument from the   
,inconceivability of ,self-existence4   
#d4 ,the ,argument from the             
,desirability of there being a ,god4    
#e4 ,the ,argument from the ,presence of
 ,human ,aspirations4  #f4 ,the         
,argument from ,consciousness4  #g4 ,the
 ,argument for a ,first ,cause4         
,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,the ,,argument ,,from
 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,the ,,human   
,,mind4  #h4 ,introductory4  #i4        

,examination of the ,argument1 and the  
independent coincidence of my views     
regarding it with those of ,mr4 ,mill4  
#aj4 ,locke's exposition of the         
,argument1 and a re-enunciation of it in
 the form of a ,syllogism4  #aa4 ,the   
,syllogism defective in that it cannot  
explain ,mind in the abstract4 ,mill    
quoted and answered4 ,this defect in the
 ,syllogism clearly defined4  #ab4 ,the 
,syllogism further defective1 in that it
 assumes ,intelligence to be the only   
possible cause of ,intelligence4 ,this  
assumption amounts to begging the whole 
question as to the being of a ,god4     
,inconceivability of ,matter thinking no
 proof that it may not think4 ,locke    
himself strangely concedes this4 ,his   
fallacies and self-contradictions       
pointed out in an ,appendix4  #ac4      
,objector to the ,syllogism need not be 
a ,materialist1 but assuming that he is 
one1 he is as much entitled to the      
hypothesis that ,matter thinks as a     
,theist is to his hypothesis that it    

does not4  #ad4 ,the two hypotheses are 
thus of exactly equivalent value1 save  
that while ,theism is arbitrary1        
,materialism has a certain basis of fact
 to rest upon4 ,this basis defined in a 
footnote1 where also ,professor         
,clifford's essay on ,body and ,mind is 
briefly examined4 ,difficulty of        
estimating the worth of the ,argument as
 to the most conceivable being most     
likely true4  #ae4 ,locke's comparison  
between certainty of the                
,inconceivability ,argument as applied  
to ,theism and to mathematics shown to  
contain a virtual though not a formal   
fallacy4  #af4 ,summary of              
considerations as to the value of this  
,argument from ,inconceivability4  #ag4 
,introductory to the other ,arguments in
 favour of the conclusion that only     
,intelligence can have caused           
,intelligence4  #ah4 ,locke's           
presentation of the view that the cause 
must contain all that is contained in   
the effects4 ,his statements            

contradicted4 ,mill quoted to show that 
the analogy of ,nature is against the   
doctrine of higher perfections never    
growing out of lower ones4  #ai4        
,enunciation of the last of the         
,arguments in favour of the proposition 
that only ,intelligence can cause       
,intelligence4 ,hamilton quoted to show 
that in his philosophy the entire       
question as to the being of a ,god      
hinges upon that as to whether or not   
human volitions are caused4  #bj4       
,absurdity of the old theory of         
,free-will4 ,hamilton erroneously       
identified this theory with the fact    
that we possess a moral sense4 ,his     
resulting dilemma4  #ba4 ,although      
,hamilton was wrong in thus identifying 
genuine fact with spurious theory1 yet  
his ,argument from the fact of our      
having a moral sense remains to be      
considered4  #bb4 ,the question here is 
merely as to whether or not the presence
 of the moral sense can be explained by 
natural causes4 ,a priori probability of

 the moral sense having been evolved4 ,a
 posteriori confirmation supplied by    
,utilitarianism1 c4  #bc4 ,mill's       
presentation of the ,argument a         
resuscitation of ,paley's4 ,his         
criticism on ,paley shown to be unfair4 
#bd4 ,the real fallacy of ,paley's      
presentation pointed out4  #be4 ,the    
same fallacy pointed out in another way4
  #bf4 ,paley's typical case quoted and 
examined1 in order to illustrate the    
root fallacy of his ,argument from      
,design4 ,mill's observations upon this 
,argument criticised4  #bg4 ,result     
yielded by the present analysis of the  
,argument from ,design4 ,the ,argument  
shown to be a petitio principii4        
,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,the ,,argument ,,from
 ,,general ,,laws4  #bh4 ,my belief that
 no competent writer in favour of the   
,argument from ,design could have       
written upon it at all1 had it not been 
for his instinctive appreciation of the 
much more important ,argument from      
,general ,laws4 ,the nature of this     

,argument stated1 and its cogency       
insisted upon4  #bi4 ,the rational      
standing of the ,argument from ,general 
,laws prior to the enunciation of the   
doctrine of the ,conservation of        
,energy4 ,the ,rev4 ,baden ,powell      
quoted4  #cj4 ,the nature of ,general   
,laws when these are interpreted in     
terms of the doctrine of the            
,conservation of ,energy4 ,the word ,law
 defined in terms of this doctrine4     
#ca4 ,the rational standing of the      
,argument from ,general ,laws subsequent
 to the enunciation of the doctrine of  
the ,conservation of ,energy4  #cb4 ,the
 self-evolution of ,general ,laws1 or   
the objective aspect of the question as 
to whether we may infer the presence of 
,mind in ,nature because ,nature admits 
of being intelligently interrogated4    
#cc4 ,the subjective aspect of this     
question1 according to the data afforded
 by evolutionary psychology4  #cd4      
,correspondence between products due to 
human intelligence and products supposed

 due to ,divine ,intelligence1 a        
correspondence which is only generic4   
,illustrations drawn from prodigality in
 ,nature4 ,further illustrations4       
,illogical manner in which natural      
theologians deal with such difficulties4
 ,the generic resemblance contemplated  
is just what we should expect to find1  
if the doctrine of evolutionary         
psychology be true4  #ce4 ,the last     
three sections parenthetical4 ,necessary
 nature of the conclusion which follows 
from the last five sections4  ,,chapter 
,v4  ,,the ,,logical ,,standing ,,of    
,,the ,,question ,,as ,,to ,,the ,,being
 ,,of ,a ,,god4  #cf4 ,emphatic         
re-statement of the conclusion reached  
in the previous chapter4 ,this          
conclusion shown to be of merely        
scientific1 and not of logical          
conclusiveness4 ,preparation for        
considering the question in its purely  
logical form4  #cg4 ,the logic of       
probability in general explained1 and   
canon of interpretation enunciated4     

#ch4 ,application of this canon to the  
particular case of ,theism4  #ci4       
,exposition of the logical state of the 
question4  #dj4 ,exposition continued4  
#da4 ,result of the exposition2         
,suspended ,judgment the only logical   
attitude of mind with regard to the     
question of ,theism4  ,,chapter ,,vi4   
,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,metaphysical  
,,teleology4  #db4 ,statement of the    
position to which the question of       
,theism has been reduced by the         
foregoing analysis4  #dc4 ,distinction  
between a scientific and a metaphysical 
teleology4 ,statement of the latter in  
legitimate terms4 ,criticism of this    
statement legitimately made on the side 
of ,atheism as being gratuitous4        
,impartial judgment on this criticism4  
#dd4 ,examination of the question as to 
whether the metaphysical system of      
teleology is really destitute of all    
rational support4 ,pleading of a        
supposed ,theist in support of the      
system4 ,the principle of correlation of

 general laws4 ,the complexity of       
,nature4  #de4 ,summary of the ,theist's
 pleading1 and judgment that it fairly  
removes from the hypothesis of          
metaphysical teleology the charge of the
 latter being gratuitous4  #df4         
,examination of the degree of           
probability that is presented by the    
hypothesis of metaphysical teleology1   
comprising an examination of the        
,theistic objection to the scientific   
train of reasoning on account of its    
symbolism1 and showing that a no less   
cogent objection lies against the       
metaphysical train of reasoning on      
account of its embodying the supposition
 of unknowable causes4 ,distinction     
between inconceivability in a formal or 
symbolical1 and in a material or        
realisable sense4 ,reply of a supposed  
,atheist to the previous pleading of the
 supposed ,theist4 ,herbert ,spencer    
quoted on inconceivability of cosmic    
evolution as due to ,mind4  #dg4 ,final 
judgment on the rational value of a     

metaphysical system of teleology4       
,distinction between inconceivability in
 an absolute and in a relative sense4   
,final judgment on the attitude of mind 
which it is rational to adopt towards   
the question of ,theism4 ,the           
desirability and the rationality of     
tolerance in this particular case4      
,,chapter ,,vii4  ,,general ,,summary   
,,and ,,conclusions4  #dh4 ,general     
summary of the whole essay4  #di4       
,concluding remarks4  ,,appendix ,,and  
,,supplementary ,,essays4  ,,appendix4  
,a ,critical ,exposition of a ,fallacy  
in ,locke's use of the ,argument against
 the possibility of ,matter thinking on 
grounds of its being inconceivable that 
it should4  ,,supplementary ,,essay ,i4 
,examination of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer's
 ,theistical ,argument1 and criticism to
 show that it is inadequate to sustain  
the doctrine of ,cosmic ,theism which   
,mr4 ,fiske endeavours to rear upon it4 
,,supplementary ,,essay ,,ii4  ,a       
,critical ,examination of the ,rev4     

,professor ,flint's work on ,theism4    
,,supplementary ,,essay ,,iii4  ,on the 
,speculative ,standing of ,materialism4 
,,supplementary ,,essay ,,iv4  ,on the  
,final ,mystery of ,things4         99  
99       99       99       99           
,,theism4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,,chapter ,i4              
,,examination ,,of ,,illogical          
,,arguments ,,in ,,favour ,,of ,,theism4
   #a4 ,few subjects have occupied so   
much attention among speculative        
thinkers as that which relates to the   
being of ,god4 ,notwithstanding1        
however1 the great amount that has been 
written on this subject1 ,i am not aware
 that any one has successfully          
endeavoured to approach it1 on all its  
various sides1 from the ground of pure  
reason alone1 and thus to fix1 as nearly
 as possible1 the exact position which1 
in pure reason1 this subject ought to   
occupy4 ,perhaps it will be thought that
 an exception to this statement ought to
 be made in favour of ,john ,stuart     

,mill's posthumous essay on ,theism2 but
 from my great respect for this author1 
,i should rather be inclined to regard  
that essay as a criticism on illogical  
arguments1 than as a careful or matured 
attempt to formulate the strictly       
rational status of the question in all  
its bearings4 ,nevertheless1 as this    
essay is in some respects the most      
scientific1 just1 and cogent1 which has 
yet appeared on the subject of which it 
treats1 and as anything which came from 
the pen of that great and accurate      
thinker is deserving of the most serious
 attention1 ,i shall carefully consider 
his views throughout the course of the  
following pages4  ,seeing then that1    
with this partial exception1 no         
competent writer has hitherto           
endeavoured once for all to settle the  
long-standing question as to the        
rational probability of ,theism1 ,i     
cannot but feel that any attempt1       
however imperfect1 to do this1 will be  
welcome to thinkers of every school--the

 more so in view of the fact that the   
prodigious rapidity which of late years 
has marked the advance both of physical 
and of speculative science1 has afforded
 highly valuable data for assisting us  
towards a reasonable and1 ,i think1 a   
final decision as to the strictly       
logical standing of this important      
matter4 ,however1 be my attempt welcome 
or no1 ,i feel that it is my obvious    
duty to publish the results which have  
been yielded by an honest and careful   
analysis4   #b4 ,i may most fitly begin 
this analysis by briefly disposing of   
such arguments in favour of ,theism as  
are manifestly erroneous4 ,and ,i do    
this the more willingly because1 as     
these arguments are at the present time 
most in vogue1 an exposure of their     
fallacies may perhaps deter our popular 
apologists of the future from drawing   
upon themselves the silent contempt of  
every reader whose intellect is not     
either prejudiced or imbecile4   #c4 ,a 
favourite piece of apologetic juggling  

is that of first demolishing ,atheism1  
,pantheism1 ,materialism1 c41 by        
successively calling upon them to       
explain the mystery of self-existence1  
and then tacitly assuming that the need 
of such an explanation is absent in the 
case of ,theism--as though the attribute
 in question were more conceivable when 
posited in a ,deity than when posited   
elsewhere4  ,it is1 ,i hope1 unnecessary
 to observe that1 so far as the ultimate
 mystery of existence is concerned1 any 
and every theory of things is equally   
entitled to the inexplicable fact that  
something is2 and that any endeavour on 
the part of the votaries of one theory  
to shift from themselves to the votaries
 of another theory the onus of          
explaining the necessarily inexplicable1
 is an instance of irrationality which  
borders on the ludicrous4   #d4 ,another
 argument1 or semblance of an argument1 
is the very prevalent one1 ,our heart   
requires a ,god2 therefore it is        
probable that there is a ,god3 as though

 such a subjective necessity1 even if   
made out1 could ever prove an objective 
existence4#a   #e4 ,if it is said that  
the theistic aspirations of the human   
heart1 by the mere fact of their        
presence1 point to the existence of a   
,god as to their explanatory cause1 ,i  
answer that the argument would only be  
valid after the possibility of any more 
proximate causes having been in action  
has been excluded--else the theistic    
explanation violates the fundamental    
rule of science1 the ,law of ,parcimony1
 or the law which forbids us to assume  
the action of more remote causes where  
more proximate ones are found sufficient
 to explain the effects4 ,consequently1 
the validity of the argument now under  
consideration is inversely proportional 
to the number of possibilities there are
 of the aspirations in question being   
due to the agency of physical causes2   
and forasmuch as our ignorance of       
psychological causation is well-nigh    
total1 the ,law of ,parcimony forbids us

 to allow any determinate degree of     
logical value to the present argument4  
,in other words1 we must not use the    
absence of knowledge as equivalent to   
its presence--must not argue from our   
ignorance of psychological              
possibilities1 as though this ignorance 
were knowledge of corresponding         
impossibilities4 ,the burden of proof   
thus lies on the side of ,theism1 and   
from the nature of the case this burden 
cannot be discharged until the science  
of psychology shall have been fully     
perfected4 ,i may add that1 for my own  
part1 ,i cannot help feeling that1 even 
in the present embryonic condition of   
this science1 we are not without some   
indications of the manner in which the  
aspirations in question arose2 but even 
were this not so1 the above             
considerations prove that the argument  
before us is invalid4 ,if it is retorted
 that the fact of these aspirations     
having had proximate causes to account  
for their origin1 even if made out1     

would not negative the inference of     
these being due to a ,deity as to their 
ultimate cause2 ,i answer that this is  
not to use the argument from the        
presence of these aspirations2 it is    
merely to beg the question as to the    
being of a ,god4   #f4 ,next1 we may    
consider the argument from              
consciousness4 ,many persons ground     
their belief in the existence of a      
,deity upon a real or supposed necessity
 of their own subjective thought4 ,i say
 real or supposed1 because1 in its      
bearing upon rational argument1 it is of
 no consequence of which character the  
alleged necessity actually is4 ,even if 
the necessity of thought be real1 all   
that the fact entitles the thinker to   
affirm is1 that it is impossible for    
him1 by any effort of thinking1 to rid  
himself of the persuasion that ,god     
exists2 he is not entitled to affirm    
that this persuasion is necessarily     
bound up with the constitution of the   
human mind4 ,or1 as ,mill puts it1 ,one 

man cannot by proclaiming with ever so  
much confidence that he perceives an    
object1 convince other people that they 
see it too4444 ,when no claim is set up 
to any peculiar gift1 but we are told   
that all of us are as capable of seeing 
what he sees1 feeling what he feels1    
nay1 that we actually do so1 and when   
the utmost effort of which we are       
capable fails to make us aware of what  
we are told1 we perceive this supposed  
universal faculty of intuition is but   
',the ,dark ,lantern of the ,spirit     
,which none see by but those who bear   
it4'  ,it is thus1 ,i think1 abundantly 
certain that the present argument must1 
from its very nature1 be powerless as an
 argument to anyone save its assertor2  
as a matter of fact1 the alleged        
necessity of thought is not universal2  
it is peculiar to those who employ the  
argument4  ,and now1 it is but just to  
go one step further and to question     
whether the alleged necessity of thought
 is1 in any case and properly speaking1 

a real necessity4 ,unless those who     
advance the present argument are the    
victims of some mental aberration1 it is
 overwhelmingly improbable that their   
minds should differ in a fundamental and
 important attribute from the minds of  
the vast majority of their species4 ,or1
 to continue the above quotation1 ,they 
may fairly be asked to consider1 whether
 it is not more likely that they are    
mistaken as to the origin of an         
impression in their minds1 than that    
others are ignorant of the very         
existence of an impression in theirs4   
,no doubt it is true that education and 
habits of thought may so stereotype the 
intellectual faculties1 that at last    
what is conceivable to one man or       
generation may not be so to another2#b  
but to adduce this consideration in this
 place would clearly be but to destroy  
the argument from the intuitive         
necessity of believing in a ,god4       
,lastly1 although superfluous1 it may be
 well to point out that even if the     

impossibility of conceiving the negation
 of ,god were an universal law of human 
mind--which it certainly is not--the    
fact of his existence could not be thus 
proved4 ,doubtless it would be felt to  
be much more probable than it now is--as
 probable1 for instance1 if not more    
probable1 than is the existence of an   
external world2--but still it would not 
be necessarily true4   #g4 ,the argument
 from the general consent of mankind is 
so clearly fallacious1 both as to facts 
and principles1 that ,i shall pass it   
over and proceed at once to the last of 
the untenable arguments--that1 namely1  
from the existence of a ,first ,cause4  
,and here ,i should like to express     
myself indebted to ,mr4 ,mill for the   
following ideas3--,the cause of every   
change is a prior change2 and such it   
cannot but be2 for if there were no new 
antecedent1 there would be no new       
consequent4 ,if the state of facts which
 brings the phenomenon into existence1  
had existed always or for an indefinite 

duration1 the effect also would have    
existed always or been produced an      
indefinite time ago4 ,it is thus a      
necessary part of the fact of causation1
 within the sphere of experience1 that  
the causes as well as the effects had a 
beginning in time1 and were themselves  
caused4 ,it would seem1 therefore1 that 
our experience1 instead of furnishing an
 argument for a first cause1 is         
repugnant to it2 and that the very      
essence of causation1 as it exists      
within the limits of our knowledge1 is  
incompatible with a ,first ,cause4  ,the
 rest of ,mr4 ,mill's remarks upon the  
,first ,cause argument are tolerably    
obvious1 and had occurred to me before  
the publication of his essay4 ,i shall1 
however1 adhere to his order of         
presenting them4  ,but it is necessary  
to look more particularly into this     
matter1 and analyse more closely the    
nature of the causes of which mankind   
have experience4 ,for if it should turn 
out that though all causes have a       

beginning1 there is in all of them a    
permanent element which had no          
beginning1 this permanent element may   
with some justice be termed a first or  
universal cause1 inasmuch as though not 
sufficient of itself to cause anything1 
it enters as a con-cause into all       
causation4  ,he then shows that the     
doctrine of the ,conservation of ,energy
 supplies us with such a datum1 and thus
 the conclusion easily follows--,it     
would seem1 then1 that the only sense in
 which experience supports1 in any      
shape1 the doctrine of a ,first ,cause1 
viz41 as the primval and universal      
element of all causes1 the ,first ,cause
 can be no other than ,force4  ,still1  
however1 it may be maintained that all  
force is will-force4 ,but if there be   
any truth in the doctrine of            
,conservation of ,force1 444 this       
doctrine does not change from true to   
false when it reaches the field of      
voluntary agency4 ,the will does not1   
any more than other agencies1 create    

,force3 granting that it originates     
motion1 it has no means of doing so but 
by converting into that particular      
manifestation1 a portion of ,force which
 already existed in other forms4 ,it is 
known that the source from which this   
portion of ,force is derived1 is        
chiefly1 or entirely1 the force evolved 
in the processes of chemical composition
 and decomposition which constitute the 
body of nutrition3 the force so         
liberated becomes a fund upon which     
every muscular and every nervous action1
 as of a train of thought1 is a draft4  
,it is in this sense only that1         
according to the best lights of science1
 volition is an originating cause4      
,volition1 therefore1 does not answer to
 the idea of a ,first ,cause2 since     
,force must1 in every instance1 be      
assumed as prior to it2 and there is not
 the slightest colour1 derived from     
experience1 for supposing ,force itself 
to have been created by a volition4 ,as 
far as anything can be concluded from   

human experience1 ,force has all the    
attributes of a thing eternal and       
uncreated4444  ,all that can be affirmed
 7even7 by the strongest assertion of   
the ,freedom of the ,will1 is that      
volitions are themselves uncaused and   
are1 therefore1 alone fit to be the     
first or universal cause4 ,but1 even    
assuming volitions to be uncaused1 the  
properties of matter1 so far as         
experience discloses1 are uncaused also1
 and have the advantage over any        
particular volition1 in being1 so far as
 experience can show1 eternal4 ,theism1 
therefore1 in so far as it rests on the 
necessity of a ,first ,cause1 has no    
support from experience4  ,such may be  
taken as a sufficient refutation of the 
argument that1 as human volition is     
apparently a cause in nature1 and       
moreover constitutes the basis of our   
conception of all causation1 therefore  
all causation is probably volitional in 
character4 ,but as this is a favourite  
argument with some theists1 ,i shall    

introduce another quotation from ,mr4   
,mill1 which is taken from a different  
work4  ,volitions are not known to      
produce anything directly except nervous
 action1 for the will influences even   
the muscles only through the nerves4    
,though it were granted1 then1 that     
every phenomenon has an efficient and   
not merely a phenomenal cause1 and that 
volition1 in the case of the particular 
phenomena which are known to be produced
 by it1 is that cause2 are we therefore 
to say with these writers that since we 
know of no other efficient cause1 and   
ought not to assume one without         
evidence1 there is no other1 and        
volition is the direct cause of all     
phenomena8 ,a more outrageous stretch of
 inference could hardly be made4        
,because among the infinite variety of  
the phenomena of nature there is one1   
namely1 a particular mode of action of  
certain nerves which has for its cause  
and1 as we are now supposing1 for its   
efficient cause1 a state of our mind2   

and because this is the only efficient  
cause of which we are conscious1 being  
the only one of which1 in the nature of 
the case1 we can be conscious1 since it 
is the only one which exists within     
ourselves2 does this justify us in      
concluding that all other phenomena must
 have the same kind of efficient cause  
with that one eminently special1 narrow1
 and peculiarly human or animal         
phenomenon8 ,it is then shown that a    
logical parallel to this mode of        
inference is that of generalising from  
the one known instance of the earth     
being inhabited1 to the conclusion that 
every heavenly body without exception1  
sun1 planet1 satellite1 comet1 fixed    
star1 or nebula1 is inhabited1 and must 
be so from the inherent constitution of 
things4 ,after which the passage        
continues1 ,it is true there are cases  
in which1 with acknowledged propriety1  
we generalise from a single instance to 
a multitude of instances4 ,but they must
 be instances which resemble the one    

known instance1 and not such as have no 
circumstance in common with it except   
that of being instances4444 ,but the    
supporters of the volition theory ask us
 to infer that volition causes          
everything1 for no other reason except  
that it causes one particular thing2    
although that one phenomenon1 far from  
being a type of all natural phenomena1  
is eminently peculiar2 its laws bearing 
scarcely any resemblance to those of any
 other phenomenon1 whether of inorganic 
or of organic nature4#c         99      
99       99       99       99           
,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,the ,,argument ,,from
 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,the ,,human   
,,mind4   #h4 ,leaving now the obviously
 untenable arguments1 we next come to   
those which1 in my opinion1 may properly
 be termed scientific4  ,it will be     
convenient to classify those as three in
 number2 and under one or other of these
 heads nearly all the more intelligent  
advocates of ,theism will be found to   
range themselves4   #i4 ,we have first  

the argument drawn from the existence of
 the human mind4 ,this is an argument   
which1 for at least the last three      
centuries1 and especially during the    
present one1 has been more relied upon  
than any other by philosophical         
thinkers4 ,it consists in the reflection
 that the being of our own subjective   
intelligence is the most certain fact   
which our experience supplies1 that this
 fact demands an adequate cause for its 
explanation1 and that the only adequate 
cause of our intelligence must be some  
other intelligence4 ,granting the       
existence of a conditioned intelligence 
7and no one could reasonably suppose his
 own intelligence to be otherwise71 and 
the existence of an unconditioned       
intelligence becomes a logical          
necessity1 unless we deny either the    
validity of the principle that every    
effect must have an adequate cause1 or  
else that the only adequate cause of    
,mind is ,mind4  ,it has been a great   
satisfaction to me to find that my      

examination of this argument--an        
examination which was undertaken and    
completed several months before ,mr4    
,mill's essay appeared--has been        
minutely corroborated by that of our    
great logician4 ,i mention this         
circumstance here1 as on previous       
occasions1 not for the petty motive of  
vindicating my own originality1 but     
because in matters of this kind the     
accuracy of the reasoning employed1 and 
therefore the logical validity of the   
conclusions attained1 are guaranteed in 
the best possible manner1 if the trains 
of thought have been independently      
pursued by different minds4   #aj4      
,seeing that1 among the advocates of    
this argument1 ,locke went so far as to 
maintain that by it alone he could      
render the existence of a ,deity as     
certain as any mathematical             
demonstration1 it is only fair1         
preparatory to our examining this       
argument1 to present it in the words of 
this great thinker4  ,he says3--,there  

was a time when there was no knowing    
7i4e41 conscious7 being1 and when       
knowledge began to be2 or else there has
 been also a knowing being from all     
eternity4 ,if it be said1 there was a   
time when no being had any knowledge1   
when that eternal being was void of all 
understanding1 ,i reply1 that then it   
was impossible there should ever have   
been any knowledge3 it being as         
impossible that things wholly void of   
knowledge1 and operating blindly1 and   
without perception1 should produce a    
knowing being1 as it is impossible that 
a triangle should make itself three     
angles bigger than two right ones4 ,for 
it is as repugnant to the idea of       
senseless matter1 that it should put    
into itself1 sense1 perception1 and     
knowledge1 as it is repugnant to the    
idea of a triangle1 that it should put  
into itself greater angles than two     
right ones4#d  ,now1 although this      
argument has been more fully elaborated 
by other writers1 the above presentation

 contains its whole essence4 ,it will be
 seen that it has the great advantage of
 resting immediately upon the foundation
 from which all argument concerning this
 or any other matter1 must necessarily  
arise1 viz41--upon the very existence of
 our argumentative faculty itself4 ,for 
the sake of a critical examination1 it  
is desirable to throw the argument      
before us into the syllogistic form4 ,it
 will then stand thus3--  ,all known    
minds are caused by an unknown mind4    
,our mind is a known mind2 therefore1   
our mind is caused by an unknown mind4  
#aa4 ,now the major premiss of this     
syllogism is inadmissible for two       
reasons3 in the first place1 it is      
assumed that known mind can only be     
caused by unknown mind2 and1 in the     
second place1 even if this assumption   
were granted1 it would not explain the  
existence of ,mind as ,mind4 ,to take   
the last of these objections first1 in  
the words of ,mr4 ,mill1 ,if the mere   
existence of ,mind is supposed to       

require1 as a necessary antecedent1     
another ,mind greater and more powerful1
 the difficulty is not removed by going 
one step back3 the creating mind stands 
as much in need of another mind to be   
the source of its existence as the      
created mind4 ,be it remembered that we 
have no direct knowledge 7at least apart
 from ,revelation7 of a mind which is   
even apparently eternal1 as ,force and  
,matter are3 an eternal mind is1 as far 
as the present argument is concerned1 a 
simple hypothesis to account for the    
minds which we know to exist4 ,now it is
 essential to an hypothesis that1 if    
admitted1 it should at least remove the 
difficulty and account for the facts4   
,but it does not account for mind to    
refer our mind to a prior mind for its  
origin4 ,the problem remains unsolved1  
nay1 rather increased4  ,nevertheless1  
,i think that it is open to a ,theist to
 answer1 ,my object is not to explain   
the existence of ,mind in the abstract1 
any more than it is my object to explain

 ,existence itself in the abstract--to  
either of which absurd attempts ,mr4    
,mill's reasoning would be equally      
applicable2--but ,i seek for an         
explanation of my own individual finite 
mind1 which ,i know to have had a       
beginning in time1 and which1 therefore1
 in accordance with the widest and most 
complete analogy that experience        
supplies1 ,i believe to have been       
caused4 ,and if there is no other       
objection to my believing in            
,intelligence as the cause of my        
intelligence1 than that ,i cannot prove 
my own intelligence caused1 then ,i am  
satisfied to let the matter rest here2  
for as every argument must have some    
basis of assumption to stand upon1 ,i am
 well pleased to find that the basis in 
this case is the most solid which       
experience can supply1 viz41--the law of
 causation4 ,fully admitting that it    
does not account for ,mind 7in the      
abstract7 to refer one mind to a prior  
mind for its origin2 yet my hypothesis1 

if admitted1 does account for the fact  
that my mind exists2 and this is all    
that my hypothesis is intended to cover4
 ,for to endeavour to explain the       
existence of an eternal mind1 could only
 be done by those who do not understand 
the meaning of these words4  ,now1 ,i   
think that this reply to ,mr4 ,mill1 on 
the part of a theist1 would so far be   
legitimate2 the theistic hypothesis does
 supply a provisional explanation of the
 existence of known minds1 and it is1   
therefore1 an explanation which1 in lieu
 of a better1 a theist may be allowed to
 retain4 ,but a theist may not be       
allowed to confuse this provisional     
explanation of his own mind's existence 
with that of the existence of ,mind in  
the abstract2 he must not be allowed to 
suppose that1 by thus hypothetically    
explaining the existence of known minds1
 he is thereby establishing a           
probability in favour of that           
hypothetical cause1 an ,unknown ,mind4  
,only if he has some independent reason 

to infer that such an ,unknown ,mind    
exists1 could such a probability be made
 out1 and his hypothetical explanation  
of known mind become of more value than 
a guess4 ,in other words1 although the  
theistic hypothesis supplies a possible 
explanation of known mind1 we have no   
reason to conclude that it is the true  
explanation1 unless other reasons can be
 shown to justify1 on independent       
grounds1 the validity of the theistic   
hypothesis4 ,hence it is manifestly     
absurd to adduce this explanation as    
evidence of the hypothesis on which it  
rests--to argue that ,theism must       
therefore be true2 because we assume it 
to be so1 in order to explain known     
mind1 as distinguished from ,mind4 ,if  
it be answered1 ,we are justified in    
assuming ,theism true1 because we are   
justified in assuming that known mind   
can only have been caused by an unknown 
mind1 and hence that ,mind must         
somewhere be self-existing1 then this is
 to lead us to the second objection to  

the above syllogism4   #ab4 ,and this   
second objection is of a most serious   
nature4 ,mind can only be caused by     
,mind1 and1 therefore1 ,mind must either
 be uncaused1 or caused by a ,mind4     
,what is our warrant for ranking this   
assertion8 ,where is the proof that     
nothing can have caused a mind except   
another mind8 ,answer to this question  
there is none4 ,for aught that we can   
ever know to the contrary1 anything     
within the whole range of the ,possible 
may be competent to produce a           
self-conscious intelligence--and to     
assume that ,mind is so far an entity   
sui generis1 that it must either be     
self-existing1 or derived from another  
mind which is self-existing1 is merely  
to beg the whole question as to the     
being of a ,god4 ,in other words1 if we 
can prove that the order of existence to
 which ,mind belongs1 is so essentially 
different from that order1 or those     
orders1 to which all else belongs1 as to
 render it abstractedly impossible that 

the latter can produce the former--if we
 can prove this1 we have likewise proved
 the existence of a ,deity4 ,but this is
 just the point in dispute1 and to set  
out with a bare affirmation of it is    
merely to beg the question and to       
abandon the discussion4 ,doubtless1 by  
the mere act of consulting their own    
consciousness1 the fact now in dispute  
appears to some persons self-evident4   
,but in matters of such high abstraction
 as this1 even the evidence of          
self-evidence must not be relied upon   
too implicitly4 ,to the country boor it 
appears self-evident that wood is       
annihilated by combustion2 and even to  
the mind of the greatest philosophers of
 antiquity it seemed impossible to doubt
 that the sun moved over a stationary   
earth4 ,much more1 therefore1 may our   
broad distinction between cogitative and
 incogitative being#e not be a          
distinction which is legitimated by the 
conditions of external reality4         
,doubtless many will fall back upon the 

position already indicated1 ,it is as   
repugnant to the idea of senseless      
matter1 that it should put into itself  
sense1 perception1 and knowledge1 as it 
is repugnant to the idea of a triangle1 
that it should put into itself greater  
angles than two right ones4 ,but1       
granting this1 and also that conscious  
matter is the sole alternative1 and what
 follows8 ,not surely that matter cannot
 perceive1 and feel1 and know1 merely   
because it is repugnant to our idea of  
it that it should4 ,granting that there 
is no other alternative in the whole    
possibility of things1 than that matter 
must be conscious1 or that              
self-conscious ,mind must somewhere be  
self-existing2 and granting that it is  
quite impossible for us to conceive of  
consciousness as an attribute of matter2
 still surely it would be a prodigious  
leap to conclude that for this reason   
matter cannot possess this attribute4   
,indeed1 ,locke himself elsewhere       
strangely enough insists that thought   

may be a property of matter1 if only the
 ,deity chose to unite that attribute   
with that substance4 ,why it should be  
deemed abstractedly impossible for      
matter to think if there is no ,god1 and
 yet abstractedly possible that it      
should think if there is a ,god1 ,i     
confess myself quite unable to          
determine2 but ,i conceive that it is   
very important clearly to point out this
 peculiarity in ,locke's views1 for he  
is a favourite authority with theists1  
and this peculiarity amounts to nothing 
less than a suicide of his entire       
argument4 ,the mere circumstance that he
 assumed the ,deity capable of endowing 
matter with the faculty of thinking1    
could not have enabled him to conceive  
of matter as thinking1 any more than he 
could conceive of this in the absence of
 his assumption4 ,yet in the one case he
 recognises the possibility of matter   
thinking1 and in the other case denies  
such possibility1 and this on the sole  
ground of its being inconceivable6      

,however1 ,i am not here concerned with 
,locke's eccentricities3#f ,i am merely 
engaged with the general principle1 that
 a subjective inability to establish    
certain relations in thought is no      
sufficient warrant for concluding that  
corresponding objective relations may   
not obtain4   #ac4 ,hence1 an objector  
to the above syllogism need not be a    
materialist2 it is not even necessary   
that he should hold any theory of things
 at all4 ,nevertheless1 for the sake of 
definition1 ,i shall assume that he is a
 materialist4 ,as a materialist1 then1  
he would appear to be as much entitled  
to his hypothesis as a theist is to     
his--in respect1 ,i mean1 of this       
particular argument4 ,for although ,i   
think1 as before shown1 that in strict  
reasoning a theist might have taken     
exception to the last-quoted passage    
from ,mill in its connection with the   
law of causation1 that passage1 if      
considered in the present connection1 is
 certainly unanswerable4 ,what is the   

state of the present argument as between
 a materialist and a theist8 ,the       
mystery of existence and the            
inconceivability of matter thinking are 
their common data4 ,upon these data the 
materialist1 justly arguing that he has 
no right to make his own conceptive     
faculty the unconditional test of       
objective possibility1 is content to    
merge the mystery of his own mind's     
existence into that of ,existence in    
general2 while the theist1 compelled to 
accept without explanation the mystery  
of ,existence in general1 nevertheless  
has recourse to inventing a wholly      
gratuitous hypothesis to explain one    
mode of existence in particular4 ,if it 
is said that the latter hypothesis has  
the merit of causing the mystery of     
material existence and the mystery of   
mental existence to be united in a      
thinkable manner--viz41 in a            
self-existing ,mind1--,i reply1 ,it is  
not so2 for in whatever degree it is    
unthinkable that ,matter should be the  

cause of ,mind1 in that precise degree  
must it be unthinkable that ,mind was   
ever the cause of ,matter1 the          
correlatives being in each case the     
same1 and experience affording no       
evidence of causality in either4   #ad4 
,the two hypotheses1 therefore1 are of  
exactly equivalent value1 save that     
while the one has a certain basis of    
fact to rest upon1#g the other is wholly
 arbitrary4 ,but it may still be        
retorted1 ',is not that which is most   
conceivable most likely to be true8 and 
if it is more conceivable that my       
intelligence is caused by another       
,intelligence than that it is caused by 
,non-intelligence1 may ,i not regard the
 more conceivable hypothesis as also the
 more probable one8 ,it is somewhat     
difficult to say how far this argument  
is1 in this case1 valid2 only ,i think  
it is quite evident that its validity is
 open to grave dispute4 ,for nothing can
 be more evident to a philosophical     
thinker than that the substance of ,mind

 must--so far at least as we can at     
present see--necessarily be unknowable2 
so that if ,matter 7and ,force7 be this 
substance1 we should antecedently expect
 to find that the actual causal         
connection should1 in this particular   
case1 be more inconceivable than some   
imaginary one3 it would be more natural 
for the mind to infer that something    
conceivably more akin to itself should  
be its cause1 than that this cause      
should be the entity which really gives 
rise to the unthinkable connection4 ,but
 even waiving this reflection1 and      
granting that the above argument is     
valid1 it is still to an indefinite     
degree valueless1 seeing that we are    
unable to tell how much it is more      
likely that the more conceivable should 
here be true than that the less         
conceivable should be so4   #ae4        
,returning then to ,locke's comparison  
between the certainty of this argument  
and that which proves the sum of the    
angles of a triangle to be equal to two 

right-angles1 ,i should say that there  
is a virtual1 though not a formal1      
fallacy in his presentation4 ,for       
mathematical science being confessedly  
but of relative significance1 any       
comparison between the degree of        
certainty attained by reasoning upon so 
transcendental a subject as the present1
 and that of mathematical demonstrations
 regarding relative truth1 must be      
misleading4 ,in the present instance1   
the whole strain of the argument comes  
upon the adequacy of the proposed test  
of truth1 viz41 our being able to       
conceive it if true4 ,now1 will any one 
undertake to say that this test of truth
 is of equivalent value when it is      
applied to a triangle and when it is    
applied to the ,deity4 ,in the one case 
we are dealing with a geometrical figure
 of an exceedingly simple type1 with    
which our experience is well acquainted1
 and presenting a very limited number of
 relations for us to contemplate4 ,in   
the other case we are endeavouring to   

deal with the summum genus of all       
mystery1 with reference to which        
experience is quite impossible1 and     
which in its mention contains all the   
relations that are to us unknown and    
unknowable4 ,here1 then1 is the         
oversight4 ,because men find            
conceivability a valid test of truth in 
the affairs of everyday life--as it is  
easy to show  priori that it must be1 if
 our experience has been formed under a 
given code of constant and general      
laws--therefore they conclude that it   
must be equally valid wherever it is    
applied2 forgetting that its validity   
must perforce decrease in proportion to 
the distance at which the test is       
applied from the sphere of experience4#h
   #af4 ,upon the whole1 then1 ,i think 
it is transparently obvious that the    
mere fact of our being unable to        
conceive1 say1 how any disposition of   
matter and motion could possibly give   
rise to a self-conscious intelligence1  
in no wise warrants us in concluding    

that for this reason no such disposition
 is possible4 ,the only question would  
appear to be1 whether the test which is 
here proposed as an unconditional       
criterion of truth should be allowed any
 the smallest degree of credit4 ,seeing1
 on the one hand1 how very fallible the 
test in question is known to have proved
 itself in many cases of much less      
speculative difficulty--seeing1 too1    
that even now the philosophy of the     
condition proves that things there are  
which may1 nay must1 be true1 of which  
nevertheless the mind is unable to      
construe to itself the possibility2#i   
and seeing1 on the other hand1 that the 
substance of ,mind1 whatever it is1 must
 necessarily be unknowable2--seeing     
these things1 if any question remains as
 to whether the test of inconceivability
 should in this case be regarded as     
having any degree of validity at all1   
there can1 ,i think1 be no reasonable   
doubt that such degree should be        
regarded as of the smallest4   #ag4 ,let

 us then turn to the other              
considerations which have been supposed 
to justify the assertion that nothing   
can have caused our mind save another   
,mind4 ,neglecting the crushing fact    
that it does not account for ,mind to   
refer it to another ,mind for its       
origin1 let as see what positive reasons
 there are for concluding that no other 
influence than ,intelligence can        
possibly have produced our intelligence4
   #ah4 ,first we may notice the        
argument which is well and tersely      
presented by ,locke1 thus3--,whatsoever 
is first of all things must necessarily 
contain in it1 and actually have1 at    
least1 all the perfections that can ever
 after exist2 nor can it ever give to   
another any perfection that it hath not 
actually in itself1 or at least in a    
higher degree2 it necessarily follows   
that the first eternal being cannot be  
,matter4 ,now1 as this presentation is  
strictly formal1 ,i shall first meet it 
with a formal reply1 and this reply     

consists in a direct contradiction4 ,it 
is simply untrue that whatsoever is     
first of all things must necessarily    
contain in it1 and actually have1 at    
least1 all the perfections that can     
after exist2 or that it can never give  
to another any perfection that it hath  
not actually in itself4 ,in a sense1 no 
doubt1 a cause contains all that is     
contained in its effects2 the latter    
content being potentially present in the
 former4 ,but to say that a cause       
already contains actually all that its  
effects may afterwards so contain1 is a 
statement which logic and common sense  
alike condemn as absurd4  ,nevertheless1
 although the argument now before us    
thus admits of a childishly easy        
refutation on strictly formal grounds1  
,i suspect that in substance the        
argument in a general way is often      
relied upon as one of very considerable 
weight4 ,even though it is clearly      
illogical to say that causes cannot give
 to their effects any perfection which  

they themselves do not actually present1
 yet it seems in a general way          
incredible that gross matter could      
contain1 even potentially1 the faculty  
of thinking4 ,nevertheless1 this is but 
to appeal to the argument from          
,inconceivability2 to do which1 even    
were it here legitimate1 would1 as we   
have seen1 be unavailing4 ,but to appeal
 to the argument from ,inconceivability 
in this case would not be legitimate2   
for we are in possession of an abundant 
analogy to render the supposition in    
question1 not only conceivable1 but     
credible4 ,in the words of ,mr4 ,mill1  
,apart from experience1 and arguing on  
what is called reason1 that is1 on      
supposed self-evidence1 the notion seems
 to be that no causes can give rise to  
products of a more precious or elevated 
kind than themselves4 ,but this is at   
variance with the known analogies of    
nature4 ,how vastly nobler and more     
precious1 for instance1 are the         
vegetables and animals than the soil and

 manure out of which1 and by the        
properties of which1 they are raised up6
 ,the tendency of all recent speculation
 is towards the opinion that the        
development of inferior orders of       
existence into superior1 the            
substitution of greater elaboration1 and
 higher organisation for lower1 is the  
general rule of nature4 ,whether this is
 so or not1 there are at least in nature
 a multitude of facts bearing that      
character1 and this is sufficient for   
the argument4   #ai4 ,we now come to the
 last of the arguments which1 so far as 
,i know1 have ever been adduced in      
support of the assertion that there can 
be no other cause of our intelligence   
than another and superior ,intelligence4
 ,the argument is chiefly remarkable for
 the very great prominence which was    
given to it by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4      
,this learned and able author           
says3--,the ,deity is not an object of  
immediate contemplation2 as existing and
 in himself1 he is beyond our reach2 we 

can know him only mediately through his 
works1 and are only warranted in        
assuming his existence as a certain kind
 of cause necessary to account for a    
certain state of things1 of whose       
reality our faculties are supposed to   
inform us4 ,the affirmation of a ,god   
being thus a regressive inference from  
the existence of a special class of     
effects to the existence of a special   
character of cause1 it is evident that  
the whole argument hinges on the        
fact1--,does a state of things really   
exist such as is only possible through  
the agency of a ,divine ,cause8 ,for if 
it can be shown that such a state of    
things does not really exist1 then our  
inference to the kind of cause requisite
 to account for it is necessarily null4 
,this being understood1 ,i now proceed  
to show you that the class of phnomena  
which requires that kind of cause we    
denominate a ,deity is exclusively given
 in the phnomena of mind1--that the     
phnomena of matter taken by themselves1 

7you will observe the qualification     
taken by themselves7 so far from        
warranting any inference to the         
existence of a ,god1 would1 on the      
contrary1 ground even an argument to his
 negation4  ,if1 in man1 intelligence be
 a free power1--in so far as its liberty
 extends1 intelligence must be          
independent of necessity and matter2 and
 a power independent of matter          
necessarily implies the existence of an 
immaterial subject1--that is1 a spirit4 
,if1 then1 the original independence of 
intelligence on matter in the human     
constitution1 in other words1 if the    
spirituality of mind in man be supposed 
a datum of observation1 in this datum is
 also given both the condition and the  
proof of a ,god4 ,for we have only to   
infer1 what analogy entitles us to do1  
that intelligence holds the same        
relative supremacy in the universe which
 it holds in us1 and the first positive 
condition of a ,deity is established in 
the establishment of the absolute       

priority of a free creative             
intelligence4#aj   #bj4 ,thus1 according
 to ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 the whole       
question as to the being of a ,god      
depends upon that as to whether our     
intelligence be a free power1--or1 as he
 elsewhere states it himself1 ,theology 
is wholly dependent upon ,psychology1   
for with the proof of the moral nature  
of man stands or falls the proof of the 
existence of a ,deity4 ,it will be      
observed that ,i am not at present      
engaged with the legitimacy of this     
author's decision upon the comparative  
merits of the different arguments in    
favour of ,theism3 ,i am merely showing 
the high opinion he entertained of the  
particular argument before us4 ,he      
positively affirms that1 unless the     
freedom of the human will be a matter of
 experience1 ,atheism is the sole       
alternative4 ,doubtless most            
well-informed readers will feel that the
 solitary basis thus provided for       
,theism is a very insecure one1 while   

many such readers will at once conclude 
that if this is the only basis which    
reason can provide for ,theism to stand 
upon1 ,theism is without any rational   
basis to stand upon at all4 ,i have no  
hesitation in saying that the           
last-mentioned opinion is the one to    
which ,i myself subscribe1 for ,i am    
quite unable to understand how any one  
at the present day1 and with the most   
moderate powers of abstract thinking1   
can possibly bring himself to embrace   
the theory of ,free-will4 ,i may add    
that ,i cannot but believe that those   
who do embrace this theory with an      
honest conviction1 must have failed to  
understand the issue to which modern    
thought has reduced the question4 ,here1
 however1 is not the place to discuss   
this question4 ,it will be sufficient   
for my purpose to show that even ,sir   
,w4 ,hamilton himself considered it a   
very difficult one2 and although he     
thought upon the whole that the will    
must be free1 he nevertheless           

allowed--nay1 insisted--that he was     
unable to conceive how it could be so4  
,such inability in itself does not of   
course show the ,free-will theory to be 
untrue2 and ,i merely point out the     
circumstance that ,hamilton allowed the 
supposed fact unthinkable1 in order to  
show how very precarious1 even in his   
eyes1 the argument which we are         
considering must have appeared4 ,let us 
then1 for this purpose1 contemplate his 
attitude with regard to it a little more
 closely4 ,he says1 ,it would have been 
better to show articulately that        
,liberty and ,necessity are both        
incomprehensible1 as beyond the limits  
of legitimate thought2 but that though  
the ,free-agency of ,man cannot be      
speculatively proved1 so neither can it 
be speculatively disproved2 while we may
 claim for it as a fact of real         
actuality1 though of inconceivable      
possibility1 the testimony of           
consciousness1 that we are morally free1
 as we are morally accountable for our  

actions4 ,in this manner the whole      
question of free- and bond-will is in   
theory abolished1 leaving1 however1     
practically our ,liberty1 and all the   
moral instincts of ,man entire4#aa      
,from this passage it is clear that ,sir
 ,w4 ,hamilton regarded these two       
counter-theories as of precisely        
equivalent value in everything save the 
testimony of consciousness2 or1 as he   
elsewhere states it1 as equally         
unthinkable1 the two counter1 the two   
one-sided1 schemes are thus             
theoretically balanced4 ,but1           
practically1 our consciousness of the   
moral law 444 gives a decisive          
preponderance to the doctrine of freedom
 over the doctrine of fate4  ,but the   
whole question concerning the freedom of
 the will has now come to be as to      
whether or not consciousness does give  
its verdict on the side of freedom4     
,supposing we grant that we are         
warranted to rely on a deliverance of   
consciousness1 when that deliverance is 

that a thing is1 although we may be     
unable to think how it can be1#ab in    
this case the question still remains1   
whether our opponents have rightly      
interpreted the deliverance of their    
consciousness4 ,i1 for one1 am quite    
persuaded that ,i never perform any     
action without some appropriate motive1 
or set of motives1 having induced me to 
perform it4 ,however1 ,i am not         
discussing this question1 and ,i have   
merely made the above quotations for the
 purpose of showing that ,sir ,w4       
,hamilton appears to identify the theory
 of ,free-will with the fact that we    
possess a moral sense4 ,he argues       
throughout as though the theory he      
advocates were the only one that can    
explain a given fact of real actuality4 
,but no one with whom we have to deal   
questions the fact of our having a moral
 sense2 and to identify this deliverance
 of consciousness with belief in the    
theory that volitions are uncaused1 is1 
or would now be1 merely to abandon the  

only questions in dispute4  ,it is very 
instructive1 from this point of view1 to
 observe the dilemma into which         
,hamilton found himself driven by this  
identification of genuine fact with     
spurious theory4 ,he believed that the  
fact of man possessing an ethical       
faculty could only be explained by the  
theory that man's will was not          
determined by motives2 for otherwise man
 could not be the author of his own     
actions4 ,but when he considered the    
matter in its other aspect1 he found    
that his theory of ,free-will was as    
little compatible with moral            
responsibility as was the opposing      
theory of ,bond-will2 for not only did  
he candidly confess that he could not   
conceive of will as acting without      
motives1 but he further allowed the     
unquestionable truth that1 though       
inconceivable1 a motiveless volition    
would1 if conceived1 be conceived as    
morally worthless4#ac ,i say this is    
very instructive1 because it shows that 

in ,hamilton's view each theory was     
alike irreconcilable with the           
deliverance of consciousness1 and that  
he only chose the one in preference to  
the other1 because1 although not any    
more conceivable a solution1 it seemed  
to him a more possible one4#ad   #ba4   
,such1 then1 is the speculative basis on
 which1 according to ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1
 our belief in a ,deity can alone be    
grounded4  ,those who at the present day
 are still confused enough in their     
notions regarding the ,free-will        
question to suppose that any further    
rational question remains1 may here be  
left to ruminate over this bolus1 and to
 draw from it such nourishment as they  
can in support of their belief in a     
,god2 but to those who can see as       
plainly as daylight that the doctrine of
 ,determinism not only harmonises with  
all the facts of observation1 but alone 
affords a possible condition for1 and a 
satisfactory explanation of1 the        
existence of our ethical faculty1--to   

such persons the question will naturally
 arise3--,although ,hamilton was wrong  
in identifying a known fact with a false
 theory1 yet may he not have been right 
in the deductions which he drew from the
 fact8 ,in other words1 granting that   
his theory of ,free-will was wrong1 does
 not his argument from the existence of 
a moral sense in man to the existence of
 a moral ,governor of the ,universe     
remain as intact as ever8 ,now1 it is   
quite true that whatever degree of      
cogency the argument from the presence  
of the moral sense may at any time have 
had1 this degree remains unaffected by  
the explosion of erroneous theories to  
account for such presence4 ,we have1    
therefore1 still to face the fact that  
the moral sense of man undoubtedly      
exists4   #bb4 ,the question we have to 
determine is1 ,what evidence have we to 
show that the moral part of man was     
created in the image of ,god2 and if    
there is any such evidence1 what        
counter-existence is there to show that 

the moral existence of man may be due to
 natural causes8 ,in deciding this      
question1 just as in deciding any other 
question of a purely scientific         
character1 we must be guided in our     
examination by the ,law of ,parcimony2  
we must not assume the agency of        
supernatural causes if we can discover  
the agency of natural causes2 neither   
must we merge the supposed mystery      
directly into the highest mystery1 until
 we are quite sure that it does not     
admit of being proximately explained by 
the action of proximate influences4     
,now1 whether or not ,mr4 ,darwin's     
theory as to the origin and development 
of the moral sense be considered        
satisfactory1 there can1 ,i think1 be   
very little doubt in any impartial mind 
which duly considers the subject1 that  
in some way or other the moral sense has
 been evolved4 ,the body of scientific  
evidence which has now been collected in
 favour of the general theory of        
evolution is simply overwhelming2 and in

 the presence of so large an analogy1 it
 would require a vast amount of         
contradictory evidence to remove the    
presumption that human conscience1 like 
everything else1 has been evolved4 ,now1
 for my own part1 ,i am quite unable to 
distinguish any such evidence1 while1 on
 the other hand1 in support of the      
priori presumption that conscience has  
been evolved1 ,i cannot conceal from    
myself that there is a large amount of  
posteriori confirmation4 ,i am quite    
unable to distinguish anything in my    
sense of right and wrong which ,i cannot
 easily conceive to have been brought   
about during the evolution of my        
intelligence from lower forms of        
psychical life4 ,on the contrary1       
everything that ,i can find in my sense 
of right and wrong is precisely what ,i 
should expect to find on the supposition
 of this sense having been moulded by   
the progressive requirements of social  
development4 ,read in the light of      
evolution1 ,conscience1 in its every    

detail1 is deductively explained4  ,and1
 as though there were not sufficient    
evidence of this kind to justify the    
conclusion drawn from the theory of     
evolution1 the doctrine of              
utilitarianism--separately conceived and
 separately worked out on altogether    
independent grounds--the doctrine of    
utilitarianism comes in with            
irresistible force to confirm that      
priori conclusion by the widest and most
 unexceptionable of inductions4#ae  ,in 
the supernatural interpretation of the  
facts1 the whole stress of the argument 
comes upon the character of conscience  
as a spontaneously admonishing influence
 which acts independently of our own    
volition4 ,for it is from this character
 alone that the inference can arise that
 conscience is the delegate of the will 
of another4 ,thus1 to render the whole  
argument in the singularly beautiful    
words of ,dr4 ,newman3--,if1 as is the  
case1 we feel responsibility1 are       
ashamed1 are frightened at transgressing

 the voice of conscience1 this implies  
that there is ,one to whom we are       
responsible1 before whom we are ashamed1
 whose claims upon us we fear4 ,if1 on  
doing wrong1 we feel the same tearful1  
broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms  
us on hurting a mother2 if1 on doing    
right1 we enjoy the same seeming        
serenity of mind1 the same soothing1    
satisfactory delight1 which follows on  
one receiving praise from a father1--we 
certainly have within us the image of   
some person to whom our love and        
veneration look1 in whose smile we find 
our happiness1 for whom we yearn1       
towards whom we direct our pleadings1 in
 whose anger we waste away4 ,these      
feelings in us are such as require for  
their exciting cause an intelligent     
being2 we are not affectionate towards a
 stone1 nor do we feel shame before a   
horse or a dog2 we have no remorse or   
compunction in breaking mere human law4 
,yet so it is2 conscience emits all     
these painful emotions1 confusion1      

foreboding1 self-condemnation2 and1 on  
the other hand1 it sheds upon us a deep 
peace1 a sense of security1 a           
resignation1 and a hope which there is  
no sensible1 no earthly object to       
elicit4 ',the wicked flees when no one  
pursueth2' then why does he flee8 whence
 his terror8 ,who is it that he sees in 
solitude1 in darkness1 in the hidden    
chambers of his heart8 ,if the cause of 
these emotions does not belong to this  
visible world1 the ,object to which his 
perception is directed must be          
supernatural and divine2 and thus the   
phenomena of conscience as a dictate    
avail to impress the imagination with   
the picture of a ,supreme ,governor1 a  
,judge1 holy1 just1 powerful1           
all-seeing1 retributive4#af  ,now ,i    
have quoted this passage because it     
seems to me to convey in a concise form 
the whole of the argument from          
,conscience4 ,but how tremendous are the
 inferences which are drawn from the    
facts6 ,as the first step in our        

criticism1 it is necessary to point out 
that two very different orders of       
feelings are here treated by ,dr4       
,newman4 ,there is first the pure or    
uncompounded ethical feelings1 which    
spring directly from the moral sense    
alone1 and which all men experience in  
varying degrees4 ,and next there are    
what we may term the ethico-theological 
feelings1 which can only spring from a  
blending of the moral sense with a      
belief in a personal ,god1 or other     
supernatural agents4 ,the former class  
of feelings1 or the uncompounded ethical
 class1 have exclusive reference to the 
moral obligations that subsist between  
ourselves and other human beings1 or    
sentient organisms4 ,the latter class of
 feelings1 or the ethico-theological    
class1 have reference to the moral      
obligations that are believed to subsist
 between ourselves and the ,deity1 or   
other supernatural beings4 ,now1 in     
order not to lose sight of this         
all-important distinction1 ,i shall     

criticise ,dr4 ,newman's rendering of   
the ordinary argument from ,conscience  
in each of these two points of views    
separately4 ,to begin1 then1 with the   
uncompounded ethical feelings4  ,such   
emotions as attend the operation of     
conscience in those who follow its light
 alone without any theories as to its   
supernatural origin1 are all of the     
character of reasonable or explicable   
emotions4 ,granting that fellow-feeling 
has been for the benefit of the race1   
and therefore that it has been developed
 by natural causes1 certainly there is  
nothing mysterious in the emotions that 
attend the violating or the following of
 the dictates of conscience4 ,for       
conscience is1 by this naturalistic     
supposition1 nothing more than an       
organised body of certain psychological 
elements1 which1 by long inheritance1   
have come to inform us1 by way of       
intuitive feeling1 how we should act for
 the interests of society2 so that1 if  
this hypothesis is correct1 there cannot

 be anything more mysterious or         
supernatural in the working of          
conscience than there is in the working 
of any of our other faculties4 ,that the
 disagreeable feeling of self-reproach1 
as distinguished from religious feeling1
 should follow upon a violation of such 
an organized body of psychological      
elements1 cannot be thought surprising1 
if it is remembered that one of these   
elements is natural fellow-feeling1 and 
the others the elements which lead us to
 know directly that we have violated the
 interests of other persons4 ,and as    
regards the mere fact that the working  
of conscience is independent of the     
will1 surely this is not more than we   
find1 in varying degrees1 to be true of 
all our emotions2 and conscience1       
according to the evolution theory1 has  
its root in the emotions4 ,hence1 it is 
no more an argument to say that the     
irrepressible character of conscience   
refers us to a ,god of morality1 than it
 would be to say that the sometimes     

resistless force of the ludicrous refers
 us to a god of laughter4 ,love1 again1 
is an emotion which cannot be subdued by
 volition1 and in its tendency to       
persist bears just such a striking      
resemblance to the feelings of morality 
as we should expect to find on the      
supposition of the former having played 
an important part in the genesis of the 
latter4 ,the dictating character of     
conscience1 therefore1 is clearly in    
itself of no avail as pointing to a     
superhuman ,dictator4 ,thus1 for        
example1 to take ,dr4 ,newman's own     
illustration1 why should we feel such   
tearful1 broken-hearted sorrow on       
intentionally or carelessly hurting a   
mother8 ,we see no shadow of a reason   
for resorting to any supernatural       
hypothesis to explain the fact--love    
between mother and offspring being an   
essential condition to the existence of 
higher animals4 ,yet this is a simple   
case of truly conscientious feeling1    
where the thought of any personal cause 

of conscience need not be entertained1  
and is certainly not necessary to       
explain the effects4 ,and similarly with
 all cases of conscientious feeling1    
except in cases where it refers directly
 to its supposed author4 ,but these     
latter cases1 or the ethico-theological 
class of feelings1 are in no way        
surprising4 ,if the moral sense has had 
a natural genesis in the actual         
relations between man and man1 as soon  
as an ideal image of a holy1 just1      
powerful1 all-seeing1 retributive ,god  
is firmly believed to have an objective 
existence1 as a matter of course moral  
feelings must become transferred to the 
relations which are believed to obtain  
between ourselves and this most holy    
,god4 ,indeed1 it is these very feelings
 which1 in the absence of any proof to  
the contrary1 must be concluded1 in     
accordance with the law of parcimony1 to
 have generated this idea of ,god as    
holy1 just1 and good4 ,and the mere fact
 that1 when the complex system of       

religious belief has once been built up1
 conscience is strongly wrought upon by 
that belief and its accompanying        
emotions1 is surely a fact the very     
reverse of mysterious4 ,suppose1 for the
 sake of argument1 that the moral sense 
has been evolved from the social        
feelings1 and should we not certainly   
expect that1 when the belief in a moral 
and all-seeing ,god is superadded1      
conscience should be distracted at the  
thought of offending him1 and experience
 a soothing1 satisfactory delight in the
 belief that we are pleasing him8 ,and  
as to the argument1 ,why does the wicked
 flee when none pursueth8 whence his    
terror8 the question admits of only too 
easy an answer4 ,indeed1 the form into  
which the question is thrown would      
almost seem--were it not written by ,dr4
 ,newman--to imply a sarcastic reference
 to the power of superstition4 ,who is  
it that1 not only ,dr4 ,newman1 but the 
haunted savage1 the medival sorcerer1 or
 the frightened child1 sees in solitude1

 in darkness1 in the hidden chambers of 
his heart8 ,who but the image of his own
 thought8 ,if the cause of these        
emotions does not belong to this visible
 world1 the ,object to which his        
perception is directed must be          
supernatural and divine4 ,assuredly2 but
 what an inference from what an         
assumption6 ,whether or not the moral   
sense has been developed by natural     
causes1 these emotions of terror at the 
thought of offending beings supernatural
 and divine are not of such unique      
occurrence in the visible world as to   
give ,dr4 ,newman the monopoly of his   
particular ,object4 ,with a deeper      
meaning1 therefore1 than he intends may 
we repeat1 ,the phenomena of conscience 
as a dictate avail to impress the       
imagination with the picture of a       
,supreme ,governor4 ,but criticism here 
is positively painful4 ,let it be enough
 to say that those of us who do not     
already believe in any such particular  
,object--be it ghost1 shape1 demon1 or  

deity--are strangers1 utter and         
complete1 to any such supernatural      
pursuers4 ,the fact1 therefore1 of these
 various religious emotions being       
associated with conscience in the minds 
of theists1 can in itself be no proof of
 ,theism1 seeing that it is the theory  
of ,theism which itself engenders these 
emotions2 those who do not believe in   
this theory experiencing none of these  
feelings of personal dread1             
responsibility to an unknown ,god1 and  
the feelings of doing injury to1 or of  
receiving praise from1 a parent4 ,to    
such of us the violation of conscience  
is its own punishment1 as the pursuit of
 virtue is its own reward4 ,for we know 
that not more certainly than fire will  
burn1 any violation of the deeply-rooted
 feelings of our humanity will leave a  
gaping wound which even time may not    
always heal4 ,and when it is shown us   
that our natural dread of fire is due to
 a supernatural cause1 we may be        
prepared to entertain the argument that 

our natural dread of sin1 as            
distinguished from our dread of ,god1 is
 likewise due to such a cause4 ,but     
until this can be done we must1 as      
reasonable men1 whose minds have been   
trained in the school of nature1 forbear
 to allow that the one fact is of any   
greater cogency than the other1 so far  
as the question of a supernatural cause 
of either is concerned4 ,for1 as we have
 already seen1 the law of parcimony     
forbids us to ascribe the phenomena of  
conscience as a dictate to a            
supernatural cause1 until the science of
 psychology shall have proved that they 
cannot have been due to natural causes4 
,but1 as we have also seen1 the science 
of psychology is now beginning1 as quick
 and thoroughly as can be expected1 to  
prove the very converse2 so that the    
probability is now overwhelming that our
 moral sense1 like all our other        
faculties1 has been evolved4 ,therefore1
 while the burden of proof really lies  
on the side of ,theism--or with those   

who account for the natural phenomena of
 conscience by the hypothesis of a      
supernatural origin--this burden is now 
being rapidly discharged by the opposite
 side4 ,that is to say1 while the proofs
 which are now beginning to substantiate
 the naturalistic hypothesis are all in 
full accord with the ordinary lines of  
scientific explanations1 the vague and  
feeble reflections of those who still   
maintain that ,conscience is evidence of
 ,deity1 are all such as run counter to 
the very truisms of scientific method4  
,in the face of all the facts1          
therefore1 ,i find it impossible to     
recognise as valid any inference which  
is drawn from the existence of our moral
 sense to the existence of a ,god2      
although1 of course1 all inferences     
drawn from the existence of our moral   
sense to the character of a ,god already
 believed to exist remain unaffected by 
the foregoing considerations4#ag        
99       99       99       99       99  
,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,the ,,argument      

,,from ,,design4   #bc4 ,the argument   
from ,design1 as presented by ,mill1 is 
merely a resuscitation of it as         
presented by ,paley4 ,true it is that   
the logical penetration of the former   
enabled him to perceive that the latter 
had put the case much too strongly2     
although1 even here1 he has failed to   
see wherein ,paley's error consisted4   
,he says3--,if ,i found a watch on an   
apparently desolate island1 ,i should   
indeed infer that it had been left there
 by a human being2 but the inference    
would not be from the marks of design1  
but because ,i already know by direct   
experience that watches are made by men4
 ,now ,i submit that this misses the    
whole point of ,paley's meaning2 for it 
is evident that there would be no       
argument at all unless this author be   
understood to say what he clearly enough
 expresses1 viz41 that the evidence of  
design supposed to be afforded by the   
watch is supposed to be afforded by     
examination of its mechanism only1 and  

not by any previous knowledge as to how 
that particular mechanism called a watch
 is made4 ,paley1 ,i take it1 only chose
 a watch for his example because he knew
 that no reader would dispute the fact  
that watches are constructed by design3 
except for the purpose of pointing out  
that mechanism is in some cases admitted
 to be due to intelligence1 for all the 
other purposes of his argument he might 
as well have chosen for his illustration
 any case of mechanism occurring in     
nature4 ,what the real fallacy in       
,paley's argument is1 is another        
question1 and this ,i shall now         
endeavour to answer2 for1 as ,mill's    
argument is clearly the same in kind as 
that of ,paley and his numberless       
followers1 in examining the one ,i am   
also examining the other4   #bd4 ,in    
nature1 then1 we see innumerable        
examples of apparent design3 are these  
of equal value in testifying to the     
presence of a designing intelligence as 
are similar examples of human           

contrivance1 and if not1 why not8 ,the  
answer to the first of these questions  
is patent4 ,if such examples were of the
 same value in the one case as they are 
in the other1 the existence of a ,deity 
would be1 as ,paley appears to have     
thought it was1 demonstrated by the     
fact4 ,a brief and yet satisfactory     
answer to the second question is not so 
easy1 and we may best approach it by    
assuming the existence of a ,deity4 ,if1
 then1 there is a ,god1 it by no means  
follows that every apparent contrivance 
in nature is an actual contrivance1 in  
the same sense as is any human          
contrivance4 ,the eye of a vertebrated  
animal1 for instance1 exhibits as much  
apparent design as does a watch2 but no 
one--at the present day1 at least--will 
undertake to affirm that the evidence of
 divine thought furnished by one example
 is as conclusive as is the evidence of 
human thought furnished by the          
other--and this even assuming a ,deity  
to exist4 ,why is this8 ,the reason1 ,i 

think1 is1 that we know by our personal 
experience what are our own relations to
 the material world1 and to the laws    
which preside over the action of        
physical forces2 while we can have no   
corresponding knowledge of the relations
 subsisting between the ,deity and these
 same objects of our own experience4    
,hence1 to suppose that the ,deity      
constructed the eye by any such process 
of thought as we know that men construct
 watches1 is to make an assumption not  
only incapable of proof1 but destitute  
of any assignable degree of likelihood4 
,take an example4 ,the relation in which
 a bee stands to the external world is  
to a large extent a matter of           
observation1 and1 therefore1 no one     
imagines that the formation of its      
scientifically-constructed cells is due 
to any profound study on the bee's part4
 ,whatever the origin of the cell-making
 instinct may have been1 its nature is  
certainly not the same as it would have 
been in man1 supposing him to have had  

occasion to construct honeycombs4 ,it   
may be said that the requisite          
calculations have been made for the bees
 by the ,deity2 but1 even if this       
assumption were true1 it would be       
nothing to the point1 which is merely   
that even within the limits of the      
animal kingdom the relations of         
intelligence to the external world are  
so diverse1 that the same results may be
 accomplished by totally different      
intellectual processes4 ,and as this    
example is parallel to the case on which
 we are engaged in everything save the  
observability of the relations involved1
 it supplies us with the exact measure  
of the probability we are trying to     
estimate4 ,hence it is evident that so  
long as we remain ignorant of the       
element essential to the argument from  
design in its ,paleyerian form--viz41   
knowledge or presumption of the         
relations subsisting between an         
hypothetical ,deity and his creation--so
 long must that argument remain1 not    

only unassignably weak1 but incapable of
 being strengthened by any number of    
examples similar in kind4   #be4 ,to put
 the case in another way4 ,the root     
fallacy in ,paley's argument consisted  
in reasoning from a particular to an    
universal4 ,because he knew that design 
was the cause of adaptation in some     
cases1 and because the phenomena of life
 exhibited more instances of adaptation 
than any other class of phenomena in    
nature1 he pointed to these phenomena as
 affording an exceptional kind of proof 
of the presence in nature of intelligent
 agency4 ,yet1 if it is admitted--and of
 this1 even in ,paley's days1 there was 
a strong analogical presumption--that   
the phenomena of life are throughout    
their history as much subject to law as 
are any other phenomena                 
whatsoever1--that the method of the     
divine government1 supposing such to    
exist1 is the same here as elsewhere2   
then nothing can be clearer than that   
any amount of observable adaptation of  

means to ends within this class of      
phenomena cannot afford any different   
kind of evidence of design than is      
afforded by any other class of phenomena
 whatsoever4 ,either we know the        
relations of the ,deity to his creation1
 or we do not4 ,if we do1 then we must  
know whether or not every physical      
change which occurs in accordance with  
law--i4e41 every change occurring within
 experience1 and so1 until contrary     
evidence is produced1 presumably every  
change occurring beyond experience--was 
separately planned by the ,deity4 ,if we
 do not1 then we have no more reason to 
suppose that any one set of physical    
changes rather than another has been    
separately planned by him1 unless we    
could point 7as ,paley virtually        
pointed7 to one particular set of       
changes and assert1 ,these are not      
subject to the same method of divine    
government which we observe elsewhere1  
or1 in other words1 to law4 ,if it is   
retorted that in some way or other all  

these wonderful adaptations must        
ultimately have been due to             
intelligence1 this is merely to shift   
the argument to a ground which we shall 
presently have to consider3 all we are  
now engaged upon is to show that we have
 no right to found arguments on the     
assumed mode1 manner1 or process by     
which the supposed intelligence is      
thought to have operated4 ,we can here  
see1 then1 more clearly where ,paley    
stumbled4 ,he virtually assumed that the
 relations subsisting between the ,deity
 and the universe were such1 that the   
exceptional adaptations met with in the 
organised part of the latter cannot have
 been due to the same intellectual      
processes as was the rest of the        
universe--or that1 if they were1 still  
they yielded better evidence of having  
been due to these processes than does   
the rest of the universe4 ,and it is    
easy to perceive that his error arose   
from his pre-formed belief in special   
creation4 ,so long as a man regards     

every living organism which he sees as  
the lineal descendant of a precisely    
similar organism originally struck out  
by the immediate fiat of ,deity1 so long
 is he justified in holding his axiom1  
,contrivance must have had a contriver4 
,for adaptation then becomes to our     
minds the synonym of contrivance--it    
being utterly inconceivable that the    
numberless adaptations found in any     
living organism could have resulted in  
any other way than by intelligent       
contrivance1 at the time when this      
organism was in the first instance      
suddenly introduced into its complex    
conditions of life4 ,still1 as an       
argument1 this is of course merely      
reasoning in a circle3 we adopt a       
hypothesis which presupposes the        
existence of a ,deity as the first step 
in the proof of his existence4 ,i do not
 say that ,paley committed this error   
expressly1 but merely that if it had not
 been for his pre-formed conviction as  
to the truth of the special-creation    

theory1 he would probably not have      
written his ,natural ,theology4   #bf4  
,thus let us take a case of his own     
choosing1 and the one which is adduced  
by him as typical of the application of 
the argument4 ,i know of no better      
method of introducing so large a subject
 than that of comparing a single thing  
with a single thing2 an eye1 for        
example1 with a telescope4 ,as far as   
the examination of the instrument goes1 
there is precisely the same proof that  
the eye was made for vision as there is 
that the telescope was made for         
assisting it4 ,they are both made upon  
the same principles1 both being adjusted
 to the laws by which the transmission  
and refraction of rays of light are     
regulated4 ,i speak not of the origin of
 the laws themselves2 but these laws    
being fixed1 the construction in both   
cases is adapted to them4 ,for instance3
 these laws require1 in order to produce
 the same effect1 that the rays of      
light1 in passing through water into the

 eye1 should be refracted by a more     
convex surface than when it passes out  
of air into the eye4 ,accordingly we    
find that the eye of a fish1 in that    
part of it called the crystalline lens1 
is much rounder than the eye of         
terrestrial animals4 ,what plainer      
manifestation of design can there be    
than this difference8 ,but what1 let us 
ask1 is the proximate cause of this     
difference8 ',the immediate volition of 
the ,deity1 manifested in special       
creation1' virtually answers ,paley2    
while we of to-day are able to reply1   
',the agency of natural laws1 to wit1   
inheritance1 variation1 survival of the 
fittest1 and probably of other laws as  
yet not discovered4' ,now1 of course1   
according to the former of these two    
premises1 there can be no more          
legitimate conclusion than that the     
difference in question is due to        
intelligent and special design2 but1    
according to the other premise1 it is   
equally clear that no conclusion can be 

more unwarranted2 for1 under the latter 
view1 the greater rotundity of the      
crystalline lens in a fish's eye no more
 exhibits the presence of any special   
design than does the adaptation of a    
river to the bed which it has itself    
been the means of excavating4 ,when1    
therefore1 ,paley goes on to ask3--,how 
is it possible1 under circumstances of  
such close affinity1 and under the      
operation of equal evidence1 to exclude 
contrivance from the case of the eye1   
yet to acknowledge the proof of         
contrivance having been employed1 as the
 plainest and clearest of all           
propositions1 in the case of the        
telescope8 the answer is sufficiently   
obvious1 namely1 that the evidence in   
the two cases is not equal2--any more   
than is the existence1 say1 of the ,nile
 of equal value in point of evidence    
that it was designed for traffic1 as is 
the existence of the ,suez ,canal that  
it was so designed4 ,and the mere fact  
that the problem of achromatism was     

solved by the mind of a sagacious       
optician inquiring how this matter was  
managed in the eye1 no more proves that 
this could not be in the eye without    
purpose1 which suggested to the optician
 the only effectual means of attaining  
that purpose1 than would the fact1 say1 
of the winnowing of corn having         
suggested the fanning-machine prove that
 air currents were designed for the     
purpose of eliminating chaff from grain4
 ,in short1 the real substance of the   
argument from ,design must eventually   
merge into that which ,paley1 in the    
above-quoted passage1 expressly passes  
over--viz41 the origin of the laws      
themselves2 for so long as there is any 
reason to suppose that any apparent     
adaptation to a certain set of fixed    
laws is itself due to the influence of  
other fixed laws1 so long have we as    
little right to say that the latter set 
of fixed laws exhibit any better        
indications of intelligent adaptation to
 the former set1 than the former do to  

that of the latter--the eye to light1   
than light to the eye4 ,hence ,i        
conceive that ,mill is entirely wrong   
when he says of ,paley's argument1 ,it  
surpasses analogy exactly as induction  
surpasses it1 because the instances     
chosen are particular instances of a    
circumstance which experience shows to  
have a real connection with an          
intelligent origin--the fact of         
conspiring to an end4 ,experience shows 
as this1 but it shows us more besides2  
it shows us that there is no necessary  
or uniform connection between an        
intelligent origin and the fact of      
apparent means conspiring to an apparent
 end4 ,if the reader will take the      
trouble to compare this quotation just  
made from ,mill1 and the long train of  
reasoning that follows1 with an         
admirable illustration in ,mr4          
,wallace's ,natural ,selection1 he will 
be well rewarded by finding all the     
steps in ,mr4 ,mill's reasoning so      
closely paralleled by the caricature1   

that but for the respective dates of    
publication1 one might have thought the 
latter had an express reference to the  
former4#ah ,true1 ,mr4 ,mill closes his 
argument with a brief allusion to the   
principle of the survival of the        
fittest1 observing that creative        
forethought is not absolutely the only  
link by which the origin of the         
wonderful mechanism of the eye may be   
connected with the fact of sight4 ,i am 
surprised1 however1 that a man of ,mr4  
,mill's penetration did not see that    
whatever view we may take as to the     
adequacy of this principle 7i4e41       
,natural ,selection7 to account for such
 truly admirable combinations as some of
 those in nature1 the argument from     
,design is not materially affected4 ,so 
far as this argument is concerned1 the  
issue is not ,design versus ,natural    
,selection1 but it is ,design versus    
,natural ,law4 ,by all means1 leaving   
this remarkable speculation 7i4e41 ,mr4 
,darwin's7 to whatever fate the progress

 of discovery may have in store for it1 
and it by no means follows that in the  
present state of knowledge the          
adaptations in nature afford a large    
balance of probability in favour of     
creation by intelligence4 ,for whatever 
we may think of this special theory as  
to the mode1 there can be no longer any 
reasonable doubt1 in the present state  
of our knowledge1 as to the truth of the
 general theory of ,evolution2 and the  
latter1 if accepted1 is as destructive  
to the argument from ,design as would   
the former be if proved4 ,in a word1 it 
is the fact and not the method of       
,evolution which is subversive of       
,teleology in its ,paleyerian form4     
#bg4 ,we have come then to              
this3--,apparent intellectual           
adaptations are perfectly valid         
indications of design1 so long as their 
authorship is known to be confined to   
human intelligence2 for then we know    
from experience what are our relations  
to these laws1 and so in any given case 

can argue  posteriori that such an      
adaptation to such a set of laws by such
 an intelligence can only have been due 
to such a process4 ,but when we overstep
 the limits of experience1 we are not   
entitled to argue anything  priori of   
any other intelligence in this respect1 
even supposing any such intelligence to 
exist4 ,the analogy by which the unknown
 relations are inferred from the known  
is infinitely precarious2 seeing that   
two of the analogous terms--to wit1 the 
divine intelligence and the human--may  
differ to an immeasurable extent in     
their properties--nay1 are supposed thus
 to differ1 the one being supposed      
omniscient1 omnipotent1 c41 and the     
other not4 ,and1 as a final step1 we may
 now see that the argument from ,design1
 in its last resort1 resolves itself    
into a petitio principii4 ,for1         
ultimately1 the only point which the    
analogical argument in question is      
adduced to prove is1 that the relations 
subsisting between an ,unknown ,cause   

and certain physical forces are so far  
identical with the relations known to   
subsist between human intelligence and  
these same forces1 that similar         
intellectual processes are required in  
the two cases to account for the        
production of similar effects--and hence
 that the ,unknown ,cause is            
intelligent4 ,but it is evident that the
 analogy itself can have no existence1  
except upon the presupposition that     
these two sets of relations are thus    
identical4 ,the point which the analogy 
is adduced to prove is therefore        
postulated by the fact of its being     
adduced at all1 and the whole argument  
resolves itself into a case of petitio  
principii4         99       99       99 
99       99   ,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,the    
,,argument ,,from ,,general ,,laws4     
#bh4 ,turning now to an important error 
of ,mr4 ,mill's in respect of omission1 
,i firmly believe that all competent    
writers who have ever undertaken to     
support the argument from ,design1 have 

been moved to do so by their instinctive
 appreciation of the much more important
 argument1 which ,mill does not mention 
at all and which we now proceed to      
consider--the argument from ,general    
,laws4 ,that is to say1 ,i cannot think 
that any one competent writer ever      
seriously believed1 had he taken time to
 analyse his beliefs1 that the cogency  
of his argument lay in assuming any     
knowledge concerning the process of     
divine thought2 he must have really     
believed that it lay entirely in his    
observation of the product of divine    
thought--or rather1 let us say1 of      
divine intelligence4 ,now this is the   
whole difference between the argument   
from ,design and the argument from      
,general ,laws4 ,the argument from      
,design says1 ,there must be a ,god1    
because such and such an organic        
structure must have been due to such and
 such an intellectual process4 ,the     
argument from ,general ,laws says1      
,there must be a ,god1 because such and 

such an organic structure must in some  
way or other have been ultimately due to
 intelligence4 ,nor does this argument  
end here4 ,not only must such and such  
an organic structure have been          
ultimately due to intelligence1 but     
every such structure--nay1 every        
phenomenon in the universe--must have   
been the same2 for all phenomena are    
alike subject to the same method of     
sequence4 ,the argument is thus a       
cumulative one2 for as there is no      
single known exception to this universal
 mode of existence1 the united effect of
 so vast a body of evidence is all but  
irresistible1 and its tendency is       
clearly to point us to some one         
explanatory cause4 ,the scope of this   
argument is therefore co-extensive with 
the universe2 it draws alike upon all   
phenomena with which experience is      
acquainted4 ,for instance1 it contains  
all the phenomena covered by the ,design
 argument1 just as a genus contains any 
one of its species2 it being manifest1  

from what was said in the last section1 
that if the general doctrine of         
,evolution is accepted1 the argument    
from ,design must of necessity merge    
into that from ,general ,laws4 ,and this
 wide basis1 we may be sure1 must be the
 most legitimate one whereon to rest an 
argument in favour of ,theism4 ,if there
 is any such thing as such an argument  
at all1 the most unassailable field for 
its display must be the universe as a   
whole1 seeing that if we separate any   
one section of the universe from the    
rest1 and suppose that we here discover 
a different kind of testimony to        
intelligence from that which we can     
discover elsewhere1 we may from analogy 
be abundantly sure that on the confines 
of our division there must be second    
causes and general laws at work 7whether
 discoverable or not71 which are the    
immediate agents in the production of   
the observed results4 ,of course ,i do  
not deny that some classes of phenomena 
afford us more and better proofs of     

intellectual agency than do others1 in  
the sense of the laws in operation being
 more numerous1 subtle1 and complex2 but
 it will be seen that this is a         
different interpretation of the evidence
 from that against which ,i am          
contending4 ,thus1 if there are tokens  
of divine intention 7as distinguished   
from design7 to be met with in the      
eye1--if it is inconceivable that so    
nice and intricate a structure should   
exist without intelligence as its       
ultimate cause2 then the discovery of   
natural selection1 or of any other law1 
as the manner in which this intelligence
 wrought in no wise attenuates the proof
 as to the fact of an intelligent cause4
 ,on the contrary1 it tends rather to   
confirm it2 for1 besides the evidence   
before existing1 there is added that    
which arises from the conformity of the 
method to that which is observable in   
the rest of the universe4  ,thus1       
notwithstanding what ,hamilton1         
,chalmers1 and others have said1 ,i     

cannot but feel that the ubiquitous     
action of general laws is1 of all facts 
supplied by experience1 the most cogent 
in its bearing upon teleology4 ,if      
perpetual and uninterrupted uniformity  
of method does not indicate the         
existence of a presiding intelligence1  
it becomes a question whether any other 
kind of method--short of the            
intelligently miraculous--could possibly
 do so2 seeing that the further the     
divine modus operandi 7supposing such to
 exist7 were removed from absolute      
uniformity1 the greater would be the    
room for our interpreting it as mere    
fortuity4 ,but forasmuch as the progress
 of science has shown that within       
experience the method of the ,supreme   
,causality is absolutely uniform1 the   
hypothesis of fortuity is rendered      
irrational2 and let us think of this    
,supreme ,causality as we may1 the fact 
remains that from it there emanates a   
directive influence of uninterrupted    
consistency1 on a scale of stupendous   

magnitude and exact precision1 worthy of
 our highest possible conceptions of    
,deity4   #bi4 ,had it been my lot to   
have lived in the last generation1 ,i   
doubt not that ,i should have regarded  
the foregoing considerations as final3  
,i should have concluded that there was 
an overwhelming balance of rational     
probability in favour of ,theism2 and ,i
 think ,i should also have insisted that
 this balance of rational probability   
would require to continue as it was till
 the end of time4 ,i should have        
maintained1 in some such words as the   
following1 in which the ,rev4 ,baden    
,powell conveys this argument3--,the    
very essence of the whole argument is   
the invariable preservation of the      
principle of order3 not necessarily such
 as we can directly recognise1 but the  
universal conviction of the unfailing   
subordination of everything to some     
grand principles of law1 however        
imperfectly apprehended in our partial  
conceptions1 and the successive         

subordination of such laws to others of 
still higher generality1 to an extent   
transcending our conceptions1 and       
constituting the true chain of universal
 causation which culminates in the      
sublime conception of the ,,cosmos4  ,it
 is in immediate connection with this   
enlarged view of universal immutable    
natural order that ,i have regarded the 
narrow notions of those who obscure the 
sublime prospect by imagining so        
unworthy an idea as that of occasional  
interruptions in the physical economy of
 the world4  ,the only instance         
considered was that of the alleged      
sudden supernatural origination of new  
species of organised beings in remote   
geological epochs4 ,it is in relation to
 the broad principle of law1 if once    
rightly apprehended1 that such          
inferences are seen to be wholly        
unwarranted by science1 and such fancies
 utterly derogatory and inadmissible in 
philosophy2 while1 even in those        
instances properly understood1 the real 

scientific conclusions of the invariable
 and indissoluble chain of causation    
stand vindicated in the sublime         
contemplations with which they are thus 
associated4  ,to a correct apprehension 
of the whole argument1 the one essential
 requisite is to have obtained a        
complete and satisfactory grasp of this 
one grand principle of law pervading    
nature1 or rather constituting the very 
idea of nature2--which forms the vital  
essence of the whole of inductive       
science1 and the sole assurance of those
 higher inferences from the inductive   
study of natural causes which are the   
vindications of a supreme intelligence  
and a moral cause4  ,the whole of the   
ensuing discussion must stand or fall   
with the admission of this grand        
principle4 ,those who are not prepared  
to embrace it in its full extent may    
probably not accept the conclusions2 but
 they must be sent back to the school of
 inductive science1 where alone it must 
be independently imbibed and thoroughly 

assimilated with the mind of the student
 in the first instance4  ,on the        
slightest consideration of the nature1  
the foundations1 and general results of 
inductive science1444 we recognise the  
powers of intellect fitly employed in   
the study of nature1444 pre-eminently   
leading us to perceive in nature1 and in
 the invariable and universal constancy 
of its laws1 the indications of         
universal1 unchangeable1 and recondite  
arrangement1 dependence1 and connection 
in reason4444  ,we thus see the         
importance of taking a more enlarged    
view of the great argument of natural   
theology2 and the necessity for so doing
 becomes the more apparent when we      
reflect on the injury to which these    
sublime inferences are exposed from the 
narrow and unworthy form in which the   
reasoning has been too often            
conducted4444  ,the satisfactory view of
 the whole case can only be found in    
those more enlarged conceptions which   
are furnished by the grand contemplation

 of cosmical order and unity1 and which 
do not refer to inferences from the     
past1 but to proofs of the ever-present 
mind and reason in nature4  ,if we read 
a book which it requires much thought   
and exercise of reason to understand1   
but which we find discloses more and    
more truth and reason as we proceed in  
the study1 and contains clearly more    
than we can at present comprehend1 then 
undeniably we properly say that thought 
and reason exist in that book           
irrespectively of our minds1 and equally
 so of any question as to its author or 
origin4 ,such a book confessedly exists1
 and is ever open to us in the natural  
world4 ,or1 to put the case under a     
slightly different form3--,when the     
astronomer1 the physicist1 the          
geologist1 or the naturalist notes down 
a series of observed facts or measured  
dates1 he is not an author expressing   
his own ideas1--he is a mere amanuensis 
taking down the dictations of nature3   
his observation book is the record of   

the thoughts of another mind3 he has but
 set down literally what he himself does
 not understand1 or only very           
imperfectly4 ,on further examination1   
and after deep and anxious study1 he    
perhaps begins to decipher the meaning1 
by perceiving some law which gives a    
signification to the facts2 and the     
further he pursues the investigation up 
to any more comprehensive theory1 the   
more fully he perceives that there is a 
higher reason1 of which his own is but  
the humbler interpreter1 and into whose 
depths he may penetrate continually     
further1 to discover yet more profound  
and invariable order and system1 always 
indicating still deeper and more hidden 
abysses yet unfathomed1 but throughout  
which he is assured the same recondite  
and immutable arrangement ever prevails4
  ,that which requires thought and      
reason to understand must be itself     
thought and reason4 ,that which mind    
alone can investigate or express must be
 itself mind4 ,and if the highest       

conception attained is but partial1 then
 the mind and reason studied is greater 
than the mind and reason of the student4
 ,if the more it be studied the more    
vast and complex is the necessary       
connection in reason disclosed1 then the
 more evident is the vast extent and    
compass of the intelligence thus        
partially manifested1 and its reality1  
as existing in the immutably connected  
order of objects examined1 independently
 of the mind of the investigator4  ,but 
considerations of this kind1 just and   
transcendently important as they are in 
themselves1 give us no aid in any       
inquiry into the origin of the order of 
things thus investigated1 or the nature 
or other attributes of the mind evinced 
in them4  ,the real argument for        
universal intelligence1 manifested in   
the universality of order and law in the
 material world1 is very different from 
any attempt to give a form to our       
conceptions1 even by the language of    
analogy1 as to the nature or mode of    

existence or operation of that          
intelligence i4e41 as ,i have stated the
 case1 the argument can only rest on a  
study of the products1 as distinguished 
from the processes of such intelligence3
 and still more different from any      
extension of our inference from what is 
to what may have been1 from present     
order to a supposed origination1 first  
adjustment1 or planning of that order4  
,by keeping these distinctions steadily 
in view1 we appreciate properly both the
 limits and the extent and compass of   
what we may appropriately call          
,,cosmotheology4#ai  ,i have quoted     
these passages at length1 because they  
convey in a more forcible1 guarded1 and 
accurate manner than any others with    
which ,i am acquainted1 the strictly    
rational standing of this great subject 
prior to the date at which the          
above-quoted passage was written4       
,therefore1 as ,i have said1 if it had  
been my lot to have lived in the last   
generation1 ,i should certainly have    

rested in these sublime conceptions as  
in an argument supreme and irrefutable4 
,i should have felt that the progress of
 physical knowledge could never exert   
any other influence on ,theism than that
 of ever tending more and more to       
confirm that magnificent belief1 by     
continuously expanding our human        
thoughts into progressively advancing   
conceptions1 ever grander and yet more  
grand1 of that tremendous ,origin of    
,things--the ,mind of ,god4 ,such would 
have been my hope--such would have been 
my prayer4 ,but now1 how changed6 ,never
 in the history of man has so terrific a
 calamity befallen the race as that     
which all who look may now behold       
advancing as a deluge1 black with       
destruction1 resistless in might1       
uprooting our most cherished hopes1     
engulfing our most precious creed1 and  
burying our highest life in mindless    
desolation4 ,science1 whom erstwhile we 
thought a very ,angel of ,god1 pointing 
to that great barrier of ,law1 and      

proclaiming to the restless sea of      
changing doubt1 ,hitherto shalt thou    
come1 but no further1 and here shall thy
 proud waves be stayed1--even ,science  
has now herself thrown down this trusted
 barrier2 the flood-gates of infidelity 
are open1 and ,atheism overwhelming is  
upon us4   #cj4 ,all and every law      
follows as a necessary consequence from 
the persistence of force and the primary
 qualities of matter4#bj ,that this must
 be so is evident if we consider that1  
were it not so1 force could not be      
permanent nor matter constant4 ,for     
instance1 if action and reaction were   
not invariably equal and opposite1 force
 would not be invariably persistent1    
seeing that in no case can the formula  
fail1 unless some one or other of the   
forces concerned1 or parts of them1     
disappear4 ,and as with a simple law of 
this kind1 so with every other natural  
law and inter-operation of laws1        
howsoever complex such inter-operation  
may be2 for it is manifest that if in   

any case similar antecedents did not    
determine similar consequents1 on one or
 other of these occasions some quantum  
of force1 or of matter1 or of both1 must
 have disappeared--or1 which is the same
 thing1 the law of causation cannot have
 been constant4 ,every natural law1     
therefore1 may be defined as the formula
 of a sequence1 which must either ensue 
upon certain forces of a given intensity
 impinging upon certain given           
quantities1 kinds1 and forms of matter1 
or else1 by not ensuing1 prove that the 
force or the matter concerned were not  
of a permanent nature4   #ca4 ,the      
argument1 then1 which was elaborated in 
#bi1 and which has so long and so       
generally received the popular sanction 
in the common-sense epitome1 that in the
 last record there must be mind in      
external nature1 since that which it    
requires thought and reason to          
understand must itself be thought and   
reason1--this argument1 ,i say1 must now
 for ever be abandoned by reasonable    

men4 ,no doubt it would be easy to point
 to several speculative thinkers who    
have previously combated this           
argument1#ba and from this fact some    
readers will perhaps be inclined to     
judge1 from a false analogy1 that as the
 argument in question has withstood     
previous assaults1 it need not          
necessarily succumb to the present one4 
,be it observed1 however1 that the      
present assault differs from all        
previous assaults1 just as demonstration
 differs from speculation4 ,what has    
hitherto been but mere guess and        
unwarrantable assertion has now become a
 matter of the greatest certainty4 ,that
 the argument from ,general ,laws is a  
futile argument1 is no longer a matter  
of unverifiable opinion3 it is as sure  
as is the most fundamental axiom of     
science4 ,that the argument will long   
remain in illogical minds1 ,i doubt not2
 but that it is from henceforth quite   
inadmissible in accurate thinking1 there
 can be no question4 ,for the sake1     

however1 of impressing this fact still  
more strongly upon such readers as have 
been accustomed to rely upon this       
argument1 and so find it difficult thus 
abruptly to reverse the whole current of
 their thoughts1--for the sake of such1 
,i shall here add a few remarks with the
 view of facilitating the conception of 
an universal ,order existing            
independently of ,mind4   #cb4          
,interpreting the mazy nexus of         
phenomena only by the facts which       
science has revealed1 and what          
conclusion are we driven to accept8     
,clearly1 looking to what has been said 
in the last two sections1 that from the 
time when the process of evolution first
 began1--from the time before the       
condensation of the nebula had showed   
any signs of commencing1--every         
subsequent change or event of evolution 
was necessarily bound to ensue2 else    
force and matter have not been          
persistent4 ,how then1 it will be asked1
 did the vast nexus of natural laws     

which is now observable ever begin or   
continue to be8 ,in this way4 ,when the 
first womb of things was pregnant with  
all the future1 there would probably    
have been existent at any rate not more 
than one of the formul which we now call
 natural laws4 ,this one law1 of course1
 would have been the law of gravitation4
 ,here we may take our stand4 ,it does  
not signify whether there ever was a    
time when gravitation was not1--i4e41 if
 ever there was a time when matter1 as  
we now know it1 was not in              
existence2--for if there ever was such a
 time1 there is no reason to doubt1 but 
every reason to conclude1 that the      
evolution of matter1 as we now know it1 
was accomplished in accordance with law4
 ,similarly1 we are not concerned with  
the question as to how the law of       
gravitation came to be associated with  
matter2 for it is overwhelmingly        
probable1 from the extent of the        
analogy1 that if our knowledge          
concerning molecular physics were       

sufficiently great1 the existence of the
 law in question would be found to      
follow as a necessary deduction from the
 primary qualities of matter and force1 
just as we can now see that1 when       
present1 its peculiar quantitative      
action necessarily follows from the     
primary qualities of space4  ,starting1 
then1 with these data1--matter1 force1  
and the law of gravitation1--what must  
happen8 ,we have the strongest          
scientific reason to believe that the   
matter of the solar system primordially 
existed in a highly diffused or nebulous
 form4 ,by mutual gravitation1          
therefore1 all the substance of the     
nebula must have begun to concentrate   
upon itself1 or to condense4 ,now1 from 
this point onwards1 ,i wish it to be    
clearly understood that the mere        
consideration of the supposed facts not 
admitting of scientific proof1 or of    
scientific explanation if true1 in no   
wise affects the certainty of the       
doctrine which these facts are here     

adduced to establish4 ,fully granting   
that the alleged facts are not beyond   
dispute1 and that1 even if true1        
innumerable other unknown and unknowable
 facts must have been associated with   
them--fully admitting1 in short1 that   
our ideas concerning the genesis of the 
solar system are of the crudest and     
least trustworthy character2 still1 if  
it be admitted1 what at the present day 
only ignorance or prejudice can deny1   
viz41 that1 as a whole1 evolution has   
been the method of the universe2 then it
 follows that the doctrine here         
contended for is as certainly true as it
 would be were we fully acquainted with 
every cause and every change which has  
acted and ensued throughout the whole   
process of the genesis of things4  ,now1
 bearing this caveat in mind1 we have   
next to observe that when once the      
nebula began to condense1 new relations 
among its constituent parts would1 for  
this reason1 begin to be established4   
,given a rare and widely diffused mass  

of nebulous matter1444 what are the     
successive changes that will take place8
 ,mutual gravitation will approximate   
its atoms1 but their approximation will 
be opposed by atomic repulsion1 the     
overcoming of which implies the         
evolution of heat4 ,that is to say1 the 
condensation of the nebula as a whole of
 necessity implies at least the         
origination of these new material and   
dynamical relations among its           
constituent parts4 ,as fast as this heat
 partially escapes by radiation1 further
 approximation will take place1 attended
 by further evolution of heat1 and so on
 continuously3 the processes not        
occurring separately1 as here described1
 but simultaneously1 uninterruptedly1   
and with increasing activity4 ,hence the
 newly established relations            
continuously acquire new increments of  
intensity4 ,but now observe a more      
important point4 ,the previous essential
 conditions remaining unaltered--viz41  
the persistence of matter and force1 as 

well as1 or rather let us say and       
consequently1 the law of                
gravitation--these conditions1 ,i say1  
remaining constant1 and the newly       
established relations would necessarily 
of themselves give origin to new laws4  
,for whenever two given quantities of   
force and matter met in one of the novel
 relations1 they would of necessity give
 rise to novel effects2 and whenever1 on
 any future occasion1 similar quantities
 of force and matter again so met1      
precisely similar effects would of      
necessity require to occur3 but the     
occurrence of similar effects under     
similar conditions is all that we mean  
by a natural law4  ,continuing1 then1   
our quotation from ,mr4 ,herbert        
,spencer's terse and lucid exposition of
 the nebular theory1 we find this       
doctrine virtually embodied in the next 
sentences3--,eventually this slow       
movement of the atoms towards their     
common centre of gravity will bring     
about phenomena of another order4       

,arguing from the known laws of atomic  
combination1 it will happen that1 when  
the nebulous mass has reached a         
particular stage of condensation--when  
its internally situated atoms have      
approached to within certain distances1 
have generated a certain amount of heat1
 and are subject to a certain mutual    
pressure 7the heat and pressure         
increasing as the aggregation           
progresses71 some of them will suddenly 
enter into chemical union4 ,whether the 
binary atoms so produced be of kinds    
such as we know1 which is possible1 or  
whether they be of kinds simpler than   
any we know1 which is more probable1    
matters not to the argument4 ,it        
suffices that molecular combinations of 
some species will finally take place4   
,we have1 then1 here a new and important
 change of relations4 ,matter1          
primordially uniform1 has itself become 
heterogeneous2 and in as many places as 
it has thus changed its state1 it must1 
in virtue of the fact1 give rise to     

other hitherto novel relations1 and so1 
in many cases1 to new laws4#bb  ,it     
would be tedious and unnecessary to     
trace this genesis of natural law any   
further3 indeed1 it would be quite      
impossible so to trace it for any       
considerable distance without feeling   
that the ever-multiplying mazes of      
relations renders all speculation as to 
the actual processes quite useless4     
,this fact1 however1 as before insisted1
 in no wise affects the only doctrine   
which ,i here enunciate--viz41 that the 
self-generation of natural law is a     
necessary corollary from the persistence
 of matter and force4 ,and that this    
must be so is now1 ,i hope1 sufficiently
 evident4 ,just as in the first dawn of 
things1 when the proto-binary compounds 
of matter gave rise to new relations    
together with their appropriate laws1 so
 throughout the whole process of        
evolution1 as often as matter acquired a
 hitherto novel state1 or in one of its 
old states entered into hitherto novel  

relations1 so often would non-existent  
or even impossible laws become at once  
possible and necessary4 ,and in this way
 ,i cannot see that there is any reason 
to stop until we arrive at all the      
marvellous complexity of things as they 
are4 ,for aught that speculative reason 
can ever from henceforth show to the    
contrary1 the evolution of all the      
diverse phenomena of inorganic nature1  
of life1 and of mind1 appears to be as  
necessary and as self-determined as is  
the being of that mysterious ,something 
which is ,everything1--the ,entity we   
must all believe in1 which without      
condition and beyond relation holds its 
existence in itself4   #cc4 ,does it    
still seem incredible that1             
notwithstanding it requires mental      
processes to interpret external nature1 
external nature may nevertheless be     
destitute of mind8 ,then let us look at 
the subject on its obverse aspect4      
,according to the theory of             
evolution--which1 be it always          

remembered1 is no mere gratuitous       
supposition1 but a genuine scientific   
theory--human intelligence1 like        
everything else1 has been evolved4 ,now 
in what does the evolution of           
intelligence consist8 ,any one          
acquainted with the writings of our     
great philosopher can have no hesitation
 in answering3 ,clearly and only in the 
establishment of more and more numerous 
and complex internal or psychological   
relations4 ,in other words1 the law of  
intelligence being that the strengths of
 the inner cohesions between psychical  
states must be proportionate to the     
persistences of the outer relations     
symbolised1 it follows that the         
development of intelligence is secured  
by the one simple principle that        
experience of the outer relations       
produces inner cohesions1 and makes the 
inner cohesions strong in proportion as 
the outer relations are persistent4 ,now
 the question before us at present is   
merely this3--,must we not infer that   

these outer relations are regulated by  
mind1 seeing that order is undoubtedly  
apparent among them1 and that it        
requires mental processes on our part to
 interpret this order8 ,the only        
legitimate answer to this question is1  
that these outer relations may be       
regulated by mind1 but that1 in view of 
the evolution theory1 we are certainly  
not entitled to infer that they are so  
regulated1 merely because it requires   
mental processes on our part to         
interpret their orderly character4 ,for 
if it is true that the human mind was   
itself evolved by these outer           
relations--ever continuously moulded    
into conformity with them as the prime  
condition of its existence--then its    
process of interpreting them is but     
reflecting 7as it were7 in consciousness
 these outer relations by which the     
inner ones were originally produced4    
,granting that1 as a matter of fact1 an 
objective macrocosm exists1 and if we   
can prove or render probable that this  

objective macrocosm is of itself        
sufficient to evolve a subjective       
microcosm1 ,i do not see any the        
faintest reason for the latter to       
conclude that a self-conscious          
intelligence is inherent in the former1 
merely because it is able to trace in   
the macrocosm some of those orderly     
objective relations by which its own    
corresponding subjective relations were 
originally produced4 ,if it is said that
 it is impossible to conceive how1 apart
 from mind1 the orderly objective       
relations themselves can ever have      
originated1 ,i reply that this is merely
 to shift the ground of discussion to   
that which occupied us in the last      
section3 all we are now engaged upon    
is1--,granting that the existence of    
such orderly relations is actual1       
whether with or without mind to account 
for them2 and granting also that these  
relations are of themselves sufficient  
to produce corresponding subjective     
relations2 then the mere fact of our    

conscious intelligence being able to    
discover numerous and complex outer     
relations answering to those which they 
themselves have caused in our           
intelligence1 does not warrant the      
latter in concluding that the causal    
connection between intelligence and     
non-intelligence has ever been          
reversed--that these outer relations in 
turn are caused by a similar conscious  
intelligence4 ,how such a thing as a    
conscious intelligence is possible is   
another and wholly unanswerable question
 7though not more so than that as to the
 existence of force and matter1 and     
would not be rendered less so by merging
 the fact in a hypothetical ,deity72 but
 granting1 as we must1 that such an     
entity does exist1 and supposing it to  
have been evolved by natural causes1    
then it would appear incontestably to   
follow1 that whether or not objective   
existence is presided over by objective 
mind1 our subjective mind would alike   
and equally require to read in the facts

 of the external world an indication1   
whether true or false1 of some such     
presiding agency4 ,the subjective mind  
being1 by the supposition1 but the      
obverse aspect of the sum total of such 
among objective relations as have had a 
share in its production1 when1 as in    
observation and reflection1 this obverse
 aspect is again inverted upon its die1 
it naturally fits more or less exactly  
into all the prints4   #cd4 ,this last  
illustration1 however1 serves to        
introduce us to another point4 ,the     
supposed evidence from which the        
existence of mind in nature is inferred 
does not always depend upon such minute 
correspondences between subjective      
method and objective method as the      
illustration suggests4 ,every natural   
theologian has experienced more or less 
difficulty in explaining the fact1 that 
while there is a tolerably general      
similarity between the contrivances due 
to human thought and the apparent       
contrivances in nature which he regards 

as due to divine thought1 the similarity
 is nevertheless only general4 ,for     
instance1 if a man has occasion to      
devise any artificial appliance1 he does
 so with the least possible cost of     
labour to himself1 and with the least   
possible expenditure of material4 ,yet  
it is obvious that in nature as a whole 
no such economic considerations obtain4 
,doubtless by superficial minds this    
assertion will be met at first with an  
indignant denial3 they have been        
accustomed to accumulate instances of   
this very principle of economy in       
nature2 perhaps written about it in     
books1 and illustrated it in            
lectures1--totally ignoring the fact    
that the instances of economy in nature 
bear no proportion at all to the        
instances of prodigality4 ,conceive of  
the force which is being quite uselessly
 expended by all the wind-currents which
 are at this moment blowing over the    
face of ,europe4 ,imagine the energy    
that must have been dissipated during   

the secular cooling of this single      
planet4 ,feebly try to think of what the
 sun is radiating into space4 ,if it is 
retorted that we are incompetent to     
judge of the purposes of the ,almighty1 
,i reply that this is but to abandon the
 argument from economy whenever it is   
found untenable3 we presume to be       
competent judges of almighty purposes so
 long as they appear to imitate our own2
 but so soon as there is any divergence 
observable1 we change front4 ,by thus   
selecting all the instances of economy  
in nature1 and disregarding all the     
vastly greater instances of reckless    
waste1 we are merely laying ourselves   
open to the charge of an unfair         
eclecticism4 ,and this formal refutation
 of the argument from economy admits of 
being further justified in a strikingly 
substantial manner2 for if all the      
examples of economy in nature that were 
ever observed1 or admit being observed1 
were collected into one view1 ,i        
undertake to affirm that1 without       

exception1 they would be found to       
marshal themselves in one great         
company--the subjects whose law is      
survival of the fittest4 ,one question  
only will ,i here ask4 ,is it possible  
at the present day for any degree of    
prejudice1 after due consideration1 to  
withstand the fact that the solitary    
exceptions to the universal prodigality 
so painfully conspicuous in nature are  
to be found where there is also to be   
found a full and adequate physical      
explanation of their occurrence8  ,but1 
again1 prodigality is only one of       
several particulars wherein the modes   
and the means of the supposed divine    
intelligence differ from those of its   
human counterpart4 ,comparative         
anatomists can point to organic         
structures which are far from being     
theoretically perfect3 even the mind of 
man in these cases1 notwithstanding its 
confessed deficiencies in respect both  
of cognitive and cogitative powers1 is  
competent to suggest improvements to an 

intelligence supposed to be omniscient  
and all-wise6 ,and what shall we say of 
the numerous cases in which the supposed
 purposes of this intelligence could    
have been attained by other and less    
roundabout means8 ,in short1 not        
needlessly to prolong discussion1 it is 
admitted1 even by natural theologians   
themselves1 that the difficulties of    
reconciling1 even approximately1 the    
supposed processes of divine thought    
with the known processes of human       
thought are quite insuperable4 ,the fact
 is expressed by such writers in various
 ways1--e4g41 that it would be          
presumptuous in man to expect complete  
conformity in all cases2 that the       
counsels of ,god are past finding out2  
that his ways are not as our ways1 and  
so on4 ,observing only1 as before1 that 
in thus ignoring adverse cases natural  
theologians are guilty of an unfair     
eclecticism1 it is evident that all such
 expressions concede the fact1 that even
 in those provinces of nature where the 

evidence of superhuman intelligence     
appears most plain1 the resemblance of  
its apparent products to those of human 
intelligence consists in a general      
approximation of method rather than in  
any precise similarity of particulars3  
the likeness is generic rather than     
specific4  ,now this is exactly what we 
should expect to be the case1 if the    
similarity in question be due to the    
cause which the present section         
endeavours to set forth4 ,if all natural
 laws are self-evolved1 and if human    
intelligence is but a subjective        
photograph of certain among their       
interrelations1 it seems but natural    
that when this photograph compares      
itself with the whole external world    
from parts of which it was taken1 its   
subjective lights and shadows should be 
found to correspond with some of the    
objective lights and shadows much more  
perfectly than with others4 ,still there
 would doubtless be sufficient general  
conformity to lead the thinking         

photograph to conclude that the great   
world of objective reality1 instead of  
being the cause of such conformity as   
exists1 was itself the effect of some   
common cause1--that it too was of the   
nature of a picture4 ,dropping the      
figure1 if it is true that human        
intelligence has been evolved by natural
 law1 then in view of all that has been 
said it must now1 ,i think1 be tolerably
 apparent1 that as by the hypothesis    
human intelligence has always been      
required to think and to act in         
conformity with law1 human intelligence 
must at last be in danger of confusing  
or identifying the fact of action in    
conformity with law with the existence  
and the action of a self-conscious      
intelligence4 ,reading then in external 
nature innumerable examples of action in
 conformity with law1 human intelligence
 falls back upon the unwarrantable      
identification1 and out of the bare fact
 that law exists in nature concludes    
that beyond nature there is an          

,intelligent ,lawgiver4   #ce4 ,from    
what has been said in the last five     
sections1 it manifestly follows that all
 the varied phenomena of the universe   
not only may1 but must1 depend upon the 
persistence of force and the primary    
qualities of matter4#bc ,be it          
remembered that the object of the last  
three sections was merely to facilitate 
conception of the fact that it does not 
at all follow1 because the phenomena of 
external nature admit of being          
intelligently inquired into1 therefore  
they are due to an intelligent cause4   
,the last three sections are hence in a 
manner parenthetical1 and it is of      
comparatively little importance whether 
or not they have been successful in     
their object2 for1 from what went       
before1 it is abundantly manifest that1 
whether or not the subjective side of   
the question admits of satisfactory     
elucidation1 there can be no doubt that 
the objective side of it is as certain  
as are the fundamental axioms of        

science4 ,it does not admit of one      
moment's questioning that it is as      
certainly true that all the exquisite   
beauty and melodious harmony of nature  
follow as necessarily and as inevitably 
from the persistence of force and the   
primary qualities of matter1 as it is   
certainly true that force is persistent1
 or that matter is extended and         
impenetrable4 ,no doubt this            
generalisation is too vast to be        
adequately conceived1 but there can be  
equally little doubt that it is         
necessarily true4 ,if matter and force  
have been eternal1 so far as human mind 
can soar it can discover no need of a   
superior mind to explain the varied     
phenomena of existence4 ,man has truly  
become in a new sense the measure of the
 universe1 and in this the latest and   
most appalling of his soundings1        
indications are returned from the       
infinite voids of space and time by     
which he is surrounded1 that his        
intelligence1 with all its noble        

capacities for love and adoration1 is   
yet alone--destitute of kith or kin in  
all this universe of being4         99  
99       99       99       99           
,,chapter ,v4  ,,the ,,logical          
,,standing ,,of ,,the ,,question ,,as   
,,to ,,the ,,being ,,of ,a ,,god4   #cf4
 ,but the discussion must not end here4 
,inexorable logic has forced us to      
conclude that1 viewing the question as  
to the existence of a ,god only by the  
light which modern science has shed upon
 it1 there no longer appears to be any  
semblance of an argument in its favour4 
,let us then turn upon science herself1 
and question her right to be our sole   
guide in this matter4 ,undoubtedly we   
have no alternative but to conclude that
 the hypothesis of mind in nature is now
 logically proved to be as certainly    
superfluous is the very basis of all    
science is certainly true4 ,there can no
 longer be any more doubt that the      
existence of a ,god is wholly           
unnecessary to explain any of the       

phenomena of the universe1 than there is
 doubt that if ,i leave go of my pen it 
will fall upon the table4 ,nay1 the     
doubt is even less than this1 because   
while the knowledge that my pen will    
fall if ,i allow it to do so is founded 
chiefly upon empirical knowledge 7,i    
could not predict with  priori certainty
 that it would so fall1 for the pen     
might be in an electrical state1 or     
subject to some set of unknown natural  
laws antagonistic to gravity71 the      
knowledge that a ,deity is superfluous  
as an explanation of anything1 being    
grounded on the doctrine of the         
persistence of force1 is grounded on an 
priori necessity of reason--i4e41 if    
this fact were not so1 our science1 our 
thought1 our very existence itself1     
would be scientifically impossible4     
,but now1 having thus stated the case as
 strongly as ,i am able1 it remains to  
question how far the authority of       
science extends4 ,even our knowledge of 
the persistence of force and of the     

primary qualities of matter is but of   
relative significance4 ,deeper than the 
foundations of our experience1 deeper   
than demonstration--deeper even than    
definite cognition1--deep as the very   
nature of mind1#bd are these the most   
ultimate of known truths2 but where from
 this is our warrant for concluding with
 certainty that these known truths are  
everywhere and eternally true8 ,it will 
be said that there is a strong          
analogical probability4 ,perhaps so1 but
 of this next3 ,i am not now speaking of
 probability2 ,i am speaking of         
certainty2 and unless we deny the       
doctrine of the relativity of knowledge1
 we cannot but conclude that there is no
 absolute certainty in this case4 ,as ,i
 deem this consideration one of great   
importance1 ,i shall proceed to develop 
it at some length4 ,it will be observed1
 then1 that the consideration really    
amounts to this3--,although it must on  
all hands be admitted that the fact of  
the theistic hypothesis not being       

required to explain any of the phenomena
 of nature is a fact which has been     
demonstrated scientifically1            
nevertheless it must likewise on all    
hands be admitted that this fact has    
not1 and cannot be1 demonstrated        
logically4 ,or thus1 although it is     
unquestionably true that so far as      
science can penetrate she cannot discern
 any speculative necessity for a ,god1  
it may nevertheless be true that if     
science could penetrate further she     
might discern some such necessity4 ,now 
the present discussion would clearly be 
incomplete if it neglected to define as 
carefully this the logical standing of  
our subject1 as it has hitherto         
endeavoured to define its scientific    
standing4 ,as a final step in our       
analysis1 therefore1 we must altogether 
quit the region of experience1 and1     
ignoring even the very foundations of   
science and so all the most certain of  
relative truths1 pass into the          
transcendental region of purely formal  

considerations4 ,in this region theist  
and atheist must alike consent to forego
 all their individual predilections1    
and1 after regarding the subject as it  
were in the abstract and by the light of
 pure logic alone1 finally come to an   
agreement as to the transcendental      
probability of the question before them4
 ,disregarding the actual probability   
which they severally feel to exist in   
relation to their own individual        
intelligences1 they must apply          
themselves to ascertain the probability 
which exists in relation to those       
fundamental laws of thought which       
preside over the intelligence of our    
race4 ,in fine1 it will now1 ,i hope1 be
 understood that1 as we have hitherto   
been endeavouring to determine1 by      
deductions drawn from the very          
foundations of all possible science1 the
 relative probability as to the         
existence of a ,god1 so we shall next   
apply ourselves to the task of          
ascertaining the absolute probability of

 such existence--or1 more correctly1    
what is the strictly formal probability 
of such existence when its possibility  
is contemplated in an absolute sense4   
#cg4 ,to begin then4 ,in the last       
resort1 the value of every probability  
is fixed by ratiocination4 ,in          
endeavouring1 therefore1 to fix the     
degree of strictly formal probability   
that is present in any given case1 our  
method of procedure should be1 first to 
ascertain the ultimate ratios on which  
the probability depends1 and then to    
estimate the comparative value of these 
ratios4 ,now ,i think there can be no   
doubt that the value of any probability 
in this its last analysis is determined 
by the number1 the importance1 and the  
definiteness of the relations known1 as 
compared with those of the relations    
unknown2 and1 consequently1 that in all 
cases where the sum of the unknown      
relations is larger1 or more important1 
or more indefinite than is the sum of   
the known relations1 it is an essential 

principle that the value of the         
probability decreases in exact          
proportion to the decrease in the       
similarity between the two sets of      
relations1 whether this decrease        
consists in the number1 in the          
importance1 or in the definiteness of   
the relations involved4 ,this rule or   
canon is self-evident as soon as pointed
 out1 and has been formulated by        
,professor ,bain in his ,logic when     
treating of ,analogy1 but not with      
sufficient precision2 for1 while        
recognising the elements of number and  
importance1 he has overlooked that of   
definiteness4 ,this element1 however1 is
 a very essential one--indeed the most  
essential of the three2 for there are   
many analogical inferences in which     
either the character or the extent of   
the unknown relations is quite          
indefinite2 and it is obvious that1     
whenever this is the case1 the value of 
the analogy is proportionably           
diminished1 and diminished in a much    

more material particular than it is when
 the diminution of value arises from a  
mere excess of the unknown relations    
over the known ones in respect of their 
number or of their importance4 ,for it  
is evident that1 in the latter case1    
however little value the analogy may    
possess1 the exact degree of such value 
admits of being determined2 while it is 
no less evident that1 in the former     
case1 we are precluded from estimating  
the value of the analogy at all1 and    
this just in proportion to the          
indefiniteness of the unknown relations4
   #ch4 ,now the particular instance    
with which we are concerned is somewhat 
peculiar4 ,notwithstanding we have the  
entire sphere of human experience from  
which to argue1 we are still unable to  
gauge the strictly logical probability  
of any argument whatsoever2 for the     
unknown relations in this case are so   
wholly indefinite1 both as to their     
character and extent1 that any attempt  
to institute a definite comparison      

between them and the known relations is 
felt at once to be absurd4 ,the question
 discussed1 being the most ultimate of  
all possible questions1 must eventually 
contain in itself all that is to man    
unknown and unknowable2 the whole orbit 
of human knowledge is here insufficient 
to obtain a parallax whereby to         
institute the required measurements4    
#ci4 ,i think it is desirable to insist 
upon this truth at somewhat greater     
length1 and1 for the sake of impressing 
it still more deeply1 ,i shall present  
it in another form4 ,no one can for a   
single moment deny that1 beyond and     
around the sphere of the ,knowable1     
there exists the unfathomable abyss of  
the ,unknowable4 ,i do not here use this
 latter word as embodying any theory3 ,i
 merely wish it to state the undoubted  
fact1 which all must admit1 viz41 that  
beneath all our possible explanations   
there lies a great ,inexplicable4 ,now  
let us see what is the effect of making 
this necessary admission4 ,in the first 

place1 it clearly follows that1 while   
our conceptions as to what the          
,unknowable contains may or may not     
represent the truth1 it is certain that 
we can never discover whether or not    
they do4 ,further1 it is impossible for 
us to determine even a definite         
probability as to the existence 7much   
less the nature7 of anything which we   
may suppose the ,unknowable to contain4 
,we may1 of course1 perceive that such  
and such a supposition is more          
conceivable than such and such2 but1 as 
already indicated1 the fact does not    
show that the one is in itself more     
definitely probable than the other1     
unless it has been previously shown1    
either that the capacity of our         
conceptions is a fully adequate measure 
of the ,possible1 or that the proportion
 between such capacity and the extent of
 the ,possible is a proportion that can 
be determined4 ,in either of these      
cases1 the ,conceivable would be a fair 
measure of the ,possible3 in the former 

case1 an exact equivalent 7e4g41 in any 
instance of contradictory propositions1 
the most conceivable would certainly be 
true72 in the latter case1 a measure any
 degree less than an exact              
equivalent--the degree depending upon   
the then ascertainable disparity between
 the extent of the ,possible and the    
extent of the ,conceivable4 ,now the    
,unknowable 7including of course the    
,inconceivable ,existent7 is a species  
of the ,possible1 and in its name       
carries the declaration that the        
disparity between its extent and the    
extent of the ,conceivable 7i4e41 the   
other species of the ,possible7 is a    
disparity that cannot be determined4 ,we
 are hence driven to the conclusion that
 the most apparently probable of all    
propositions1 if predicated of anything 
within the ,unknowable1 may not in      
reality be a whit more so than is the   
most apparently improbable proposition  
which it is possible to make2 for if it 
is admitted 7as of course it must be7   

that we are necessarily precluded from  
comparing the extent of the ,conceivable
 with that of the ,unknowable1 then it  
necessarily follows that in no case     
whatever are we competent to judge how  
far an apparent probability relating to 
the latter province is an actual        
probability4 ,in other words1 did we    
know the proportion subsisting between  
the ,conceivable and the ,unknowable in 
respect of relative extent and          
character1 and so of inherent           
probabilities1 we should then be able to
 estimate the actual value of any       
apparent probability relating to the    
latter province2 but1 as it is1 our     
ability to make this estimate varies    
inversely as our inability to estimate  
our ignorance in this particular4 ,and  
as our ignorance in this particular is  
total--i4e41 since we cannot even       
approximately determine the proportion  
that subsists between the ,conceivable  
and the ,unknowable1--the result is that
 our ability to make the required       

estimate in any given case is absolutely
 nil4   #dj4 ,i have purposely rendered 
this presentation in terms of the       
highest abstraction1 partly to avoid the
 possibility of any one1 whatever his   
theory of things may be1 finding        
anything at which to object1 and partly 
in order that my meaning may be         
understood to include all things which  
are beyond the range of possible        
knowledge4 ,most of all1 therefore1 must
 this presentation 7if it contains      
anything of truth7 apply to the question
 regarding the existence of ,deity2 for 
the ,ens ,realissimum must of all things
 be furthest removed from the range of  
possible knowledge4 ,hence1 if this     
presentation contains anything of       
truth--and of its rigidly accurate truth
 ,i think there can be no question--the 
assertion that the ,self-existing       
,substance is a ,personal and           
,intelligent ,being1 and the assertion  
that this ,substance is an ,impersonal  
and ,non-,intelligent ,being1 are alike 

assertions wholly destitute of any      
assignable degree of logical            
probability1 ,i say assignable degree of
 logical probability1 because that some 
degree of such probability may exist ,i 
do not undertake to deny4 ,all ,i assert
 is1 that if we are here able to        
institute any such probability at all1  
we are unable logically to assign to it 
any determinate degree of value4 ,or1 in
 other words1 although we may establish 
some probability in a sense relative to 
ourselves1 we are unable to know how far
 this probability is a probability in an
 absolute sense4 ,or again1 the case is 
not as though we were altogether        
unacquainted with the ,possible4        
,experience undoubtedly affords us some 
information regarding this1 although1   
comparatively speaking1 we are unable to
 know how much4 ,consequently1 we must  
suppose that1 in any given case1 it is  
more likely that the ,conceivable should
 be ,possible than that the             
,inconceivable should be so1 and that   

the ,conceivably ,probable should exist 
than that the ,conceivably ,improbable  
should do so3 in neither case1 however1 
can we know what degree of such         
likelihood is present4   #da4 ,from the 
foregoing considerations1 then1 it would
 appear that the only attitude which in 
strict logic it is admissible to adopt  
towards the question concerning the     
being of a ,god is that of suspended    
judgment4 ,formally speaking1 it is     
alike illegitimate to affirm or to deny 
,intelligence as an attribute of the    
,ultimate4 ,and here ,i would desire it 
to be observed1 that this is the        
attitude which the majority of          
scientifically-trained philosophers     
actually have adopted with regard to    
this matter4 ,i am not aware1 however1  
that any one has yet endeavoured to     
formulate the justification of this     
attitude2 and as ,i think there can be  
no doubt that the above presentation    
contains in a logical shape the whole of
 such justification1 ,i cannot but think

 that some important ends will have been
 secured by it4 ,for we are here in     
possession1 not merely of a vague and   
general impression that the ,ultimate is
 super-scientific1 and so beyond the    
range of legitimate prediction2 but we  
are also in possession of a logical     
formula whereby at once to vindicate the
 rationality of our opinion1 and to     
measure the precise degree of its       
technical value4         99       99    
99       99       99   ,,chapter ,,vi4  
,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,metaphysical  
,,teleology4   #db4 ,let us now proceed 
to examine the effect of the formal     
considerations which have been adduced  
in the last chapter on the scientific   
considerations which were dealt with in 
the previous chapters4 ,in these        
previous chapters the proposition was   
clearly established that1 just as       
certainly as the fundamental data of    
science are true1 so certainly is it    
true that the theory of ,theism in any  
shape is1 scientifically considered1    

superfluous2 for these chapters have    
clearly shown that1 if there is a ,god1 
his existence1 considered as a cause of 
things1 is as certainly unnecessary as  
it is certainly true that force is      
persistent and that matter is           
indestructible4 ,but after this         
proposition had been carefully          
justified1 it remained to show that the 
doctrine of the relativity of knowledge 
compelled us to carry our discussion    
into a region of yet higher abstraction4
 ,for although we observed that the     
essential qualities of matter and of    
force are the most ultimate data of     
human knowledge1 and although1 by       
showing how far the question of ,theism 
depended on these data1 we carried the  
discussion of that question to the      
utmost possible limits of scientific    
thought1 it still devolved on us to     
contemplate the fact that even these the
 most ultimate data of science are only 
known to be of relative significance4   
,and the bearing of this fact to the    

question of ,theism was seen to be most 
important4 ,for1 without waiting to     
recapitulate the substance of a chapter 
so recently concluded1 it will be       
remembered that its effect was to       
establish this position beyond all      
controversy--viz41 that when ideas which
 have been formed by our experience     
within the region of phenomenal         
actuality are projected into the region 
of ontological possibility1 they become 
utterly worthless2 seeing that we can   
never have any means whereby to test the
 actual value of whatever transcendental
 probabilities they may appear to       
establish4 ,therefore it is that even   
the most ultimate of relative truths    
with which1 as we have seen1 the        
question of ,theism is so vitally       
associated1 is almost without meaning   
when contemplated in an absolute sense4 
,what1 then1 is the effect of these     
metaphysical considerations on the      
position of ,theism as we have seen it  
to be left by the highest               

generalisations of physical science8    
,let us contemplate this question with  
the care which it deserves4  ,in the    
first place1 it is evident that the     
effect of these purely formal           
considerations is to render all         
reasonings on the subject of ,theism    
equally illegitimate1 unless it is      
constantly borne in mind that such      
reasonings can only be of relative      
signification4 ,thus1 as a matter of    
pure logic1 these considerations are    
destructive of all assignable validity  
of any such reasoning whatsoever4       
,still1 even a strictly relative        
probability is1 in some undefinable     
degree1 of more value than no           
probability at all1 as we have seen     
these same formal considerations to show
 7see  #dj72 and1 moreover1 even were   
this not so1 the human mind will never  
rest until it attains to the furthest   
probability which to its powers is      
accessible4 ,therefore1 if we do not    
forget the merely relative nature of the

 considerations which are about to be   
adduced1 by adducing them we may at the 
same time satisfy our own minds and     
abstain from violating the conditions of
 sound logic4  ,the shape1 then1 to     
which the subject has now been reduced  
is simply this3--,seeing that the theory
 of ,evolution in its largest sense has 
shown the theory of ,theism to be       
superfluous in a scientific sense1 does 
it not follow that the theory of ,theism
 is thus shown to be superfluous in any 
sense8 ,for it would seem from the      
discussion1 so far as it has hitherto   
gone1 that the only rational basis on   
which the theory of ,theism can rest is 
a basis of teleology2 and if1 as has    
been clearly shown1 the theory of       
evolution1 by deducing the genesis of   
natural law from the primary data of    
science1 irrevocably destroys this      
basis1 does it not follow that the      
theory of evolution has likewise        
destroyed the theory which rested on    
that basis8 ,now ,i conclude1 as stated 

at the close of ,chapter ,,iv41 that the
 question here put must certainly be    
answered in the affirmative1 so far as  
its scientific aspect is concerned4 ,but
 when we consider the question in its   
purely logical aspect1 as we have done  
in ,chapter ,v41 the case is otherwise4 
,for although1 so far as the utmost     
reach of scientific vision enables us to
 see1 we can discern no evidence of     
,deity1 it does not therefore follow    
that beyond the range of such vision    
,deity does not exist4 ,science indeed  
has proved that if there is a ,divine   
,mind in nature1 and if by the          
hypothesis such a ,mind exerts any      
causative influence on the phenomena of 
nature1 such influence is exerted beyond
 the sphere of experience4 ,and this    
achievement of science1 be it never     
forgotten1 is an achievement of         
prodigious importance1 effectually      
destroying1 as it does1 all vestiges of 
a scientific teleology4 ,but be it now  
carefully observed1 although all        

vestiges of a scientific teleology are  
thus completely and permanently ruined1 
the formal considerations adduced in the
 last chapter supply the conditions for 
constructing what may be termed a       
metaphysical teleology4 ,i use these    
terms advisedly1 because ,i think they  
will serve to bring out with great      
clearness the condition to which our    
analysis of the teleological argument   
has now been reduced4   #dc4 ,in the    
first place1 let it be understood that  
,i employ the terms scientific and      
metaphysical in the convenient sense in 
which they are employed by ,mr4 ,lewes1 
viz41 as respectively designating a     
theory that is verifiable and a theory  
that is not4 ,consequently1 by the term 
scientific teleology ,i mean to denote a
 form of teleology which admits either  
of being proved or disproved1 while by  
the term metaphysical teleology ,i mean 
to denote a form of teleology which does
 not admit either of being proved or of 
being disproved4 ,now1 with these       

significations clearly understood1 it   
will be seen that the forms of teleology
 which we have hitherto considered      
belong entirely to the scientific class4
 ,that the ,paleyerian form of the      
argument did so is manifest1 first      
because this argument itself treats the 
problem of ,theism as a problem that is 
susceptible of scientific demonstration1
 and next because we have seen that the 
advance of science has proved this      
argument susceptible of scientific      
refutation4 ,in other words1 from the   
supposed axiom1 ,there cannot be        
apparent design without a designer1     
adaptations in nature become logically  
available as purely scientific evidence 
of an intelligent cause2 and that ,paley
 himself regarded them exclusively in   
this light is manifest1 both from his   
own statement of the argument1 and from 
the character of the evidence by which  
he seeks to establish the argument when 
stated--witness the typical passage     
before quoted 7 #bf74 ,on the other     

hand1 we have clearly seen that this    
,paleyerian system of natural theology  
has been effectually demolished by the  
scientific theory of natural            
selection--the fundamental axiom of the 
former having been shown by the latter  
to be scientifically untrue4 ,hence the 
term scientific teleology is without    
question applicable to the ,paleyerian  
system4  ,nor is the case essentially   
different with the more refined form of 
the teleological argument which we have 
had to consider--the argument1 namely1  
from ,general ,laws4 ,for here1         
likewise1 we have clearly seen that the 
inference from the ubiquitous operation 
of ,general ,laws to the existence of an
 omniscient ,law-maker is quite as      
illegitimate as is the inference from   
apparent ,design to the existence of a  
,supreme ,designer4 ,in other words1    
science1 by establishing the doctrine of
 the persistence of force and the       
indestructibility of matter1 has        
effectually disproved the hypothesis    

that the presence of ,law in nature is  
of itself sufficient to prove the       
existence of an intelligent ,law-giver4 
,thus it is that scientific teleology in
 any form is now and for ever obsolete4 
,but not so with what ,i have termed    
metaphysical teleology4 ,for as we have 
seen that the doctrine of the relativity
 of knowledge precludes us from         
asserting1 or even from inferring1 that 
beyond the region of the ,knowable ,mind
 does not exist1 it remains logically   
possible to institute a metaphysical    
hypothesis that beyond this region of   
the ,knowable ,mind does exist4 ,there  
being a necessary absence of any        
positive information whereby to refute  
this metaphysical hypothesis1 any one   
who chooses to adopt it is fully        
justified in doing so1 provided only he 
remembers that the purely metaphysical  
quality whereby the hypothesis is       
ensured against disproof1 likewise1 and 
in the same degree1 precludes it from   
the possibility of proof4 ,he must      

remember that it is no longer open to   
him to point to any particular set of   
general laws and to assert1 these       
proclaim ,intelligence as their cause2  
for we have repeatedly seen that the    
known states of matter and force        
themselves afford sufficient explanation
 of the facts to which he points4 ,and  
he must remember that the only reason   
why his hypothesis does not conflict    
with any of the truths known to science1
 is because he has been careful to rest 
that hypothesis upon a basis of purely  
formal considerations1 which lie beyond 
even the most fundamental truths of     
which science is cognisant4  ,thus1 for 
example1 he may present his metaphysical
 theory of ,theism in some such terms as
 these3--',fully conceding what reason  
shows must be conceded1 and there still 
remains this possible supposition--viz41
 that there is a presiding ,mind in     
nature1 which exerts its causative      
influence beyond the sphere of          
experience1 thus rendering it impossible

 for us to obtain scientific evidence of
 its action4 ,for such a ,mind1 exerting
 such an influence beyond experience1   
may direct affairs within experience by 
methods conceivable or inconceivable to 
us--producing1 possibly1 innumerable and
 highly varied results1 which in turn   
may produce their effects within        
experience1 their introduction being    
then1 of course1 in the ordinary way of 
natural law4 ,for instance1 there can be
 no question that by the intelligent    
creation or dissipation of energy1 all  
the phenomena of cosmic evolution might 
have been directed1 and1 for aught that 
science can show to the contrary1 thus  
only rendered possible4 ,hence there is 
at least one nameable way in which1 even
 in accordance with observed facts1 a   
,supreme ,mind could be competent to    
direct the phenomena of observable      
nature4 ,but we are not necessarily     
restricted to the limits of the nameable
 in this matter1 so that it is of no    
argumentative importance whether or not 

this suggested method is the method     
which the supposed ,mind actually       
adopts1 seeing that there may still be  
other possible methods1 which1          
nevertheless1 we are unable to suggest4'
  ,doubtless the hypothesis of ,theism1 
as thus presented1 will be deemed by    
many persons but of very slender        
probability4 ,i am not1 however1        
concerned with whatever character of    
probability it may be supposed to       
exhibit4 ,i am merely engaged in        
carefully presenting the only hypothesis
 which can be presented1 if the theory  
as to an ,intelligent ,author of nature 
is any longer to be maintained on       
grounds of a rational teleology4 ,no    
doubt1 scientifically considered1 the   
hypothesis in question is purely        
gratuitous2 for1 so far as the light of 
science can penetrate1 there is no need 
of any such hypothesis at all4 ,thus it 
may well seem1 at first sight1 that no  
hypothesis could well have less to      
recommend it2 and1 so far as the        

presentation has yet gone1 it is        
therefore fully legitimate for an       
atheist to reply3--',all that this      
so-called metaphysical theory amounts to
 is a wholly gratuitous assumption4 ,no 
doubt it is always difficult1 and       
usually impossible1 logically or        
unequivocally to prove a negative4 ,if  
my adversary chose to imagine that      
nature is presided over by a demon with 
horns and hoofs1 or by a dragon with    
claws and tail1 ,i should be as unable  
to disprove this his supposed theory as 
,i am now unable to disprove his actual 
theory4 ,but in all cases reasonable men
 ought to be guided in their beliefs by 
such positive evidence as is available2 
and if1 as in the present case1 the     
alternative belief is wholly            
gratuitous--adopted not only without any
 evidence1 but against all that great   
body of evidence which the sum-total of 
science supplies--surely we ought not to
 hesitate for one moment in the choice  
of our creed8'  ,now all this is quite  

sound in principle1 provided only that  
the metaphysical theory of ,theism is   
wholly gratuitous1 in the sense of being
 utterly destitute of evidential        
support4 ,that it is destitute of all   
scientific support1 we have already and 
repeatedly seen2 but the question       
remains as to whether it is similarly   
destitute of metaphysical support4      
#dd4 ,to this question1 then1 let us    
next address ourselves4 ,from the       
theistic pleading which we have just    
heard1 it is abundantly manifest that   
the formal conditions of a metaphysical 
teleology are present3 the question now 
before us is as to whether or not any   
actual evidence exists in favour of such
 a theory4 ,in order to discuss this    
question1 let us begin by allowing the  
theist to continue his pleading4 ',you  
have shown me1' he may say1 'that a     
scientific or demonstrable system of    
teleology is no longer possible1 and1   
therefore1 as ,i have already conceded1 
,i must take my stand on a metaphysical 

or non-demonstrable system4 ,but ,i     
reflect that the latter term is a loose 
one1 seeing that it embraces all        
possible degrees of evidence short of   
actual proof4 ,the question1 therefore1 
,i conceive to be1 ,what amount of      
evidence is there in favour of this     
metaphysical system of teleology8 ,and  
this question ,i answer by the following
 considerations3--,as general laws      
separately have all been shown to be the
 necessary outcome of the primary data  
of science1 it certainly follows that   
general laws collectively must be the   
same--i4e41 that the whole system of    
general laws must be1 so far as the     
lights of our science can penetrate1 the
 necessary outcome of the persistence of
 force and the indestructibility of     
matter4 ,but you have also dearly shown 
me that these lights are of the feeblest
 conceivable character when they are    
brought to illuminate the final mystery 
of things4 ,i therefore feel at liberty 
to assert1 that if there is any one     

principle to be observed in the         
collective operation of general laws    
which cannot conceivably be explained by
 any cause other than that of           
intelligent guidance1 ,i am still free  
to fall back on such a principle and to 
maintain--,although the collective      
operation of general laws follows as a  
necessary consequence from the primary  
data of science1 this one principle     
which pervades their united action1 and 
which cannot be conceivably explained by
 any hypothesis other than that of      
intelligent guidance1 is a principle    
which still remains to be accounted for2
 and as it cannot conceivably be        
accounted for on grounds of physical    
science1 ,i may legitimately account for
 it on grounds of metaphysical          
teleology4 ,now ,i cannot open my eyes  
without perceiving such a principle     
everywhere characterising the collective
 operation of general laws4 ,universally
 ,i behold in nature1 order1 beauty1    
harmony1--that is1 a perfect correlation

 among general laws4 ,but this          
ubiquitous correlation among general    
laws1 considered as the cause of cosmic 
harmony1 itself requires some           
explanatory cause such as the           
persistence of force and the            
indestructibility of matter cannot      
conceivably be made to supply4 ,for     
unless we postulate some one integrating
 cause1 the greater the number of       
general laws in nature1 the less        
likelihood is there of such laws being  
so correlated as to produce harmony by  
their combined action4 ,and forasmuch as
 the only cause that ,i am able to      
imagine as competent to produce such    
effects is that of intelligent guidance1
 ,i accept the metaphysical hypothesis  
that beyond the sphere of the ,knowable 
there exists an ,unknown ,god4#be  ',if 
it is retorted that the above argument  
involves an absurd contradiction1 in    
that while it sets out with an explicit 
avowal of the fact that the collective  
operation of general laws follows as a  

necessary consequence from the primary  
data of physical science1 it            
nevertheless afterwards proceeds to     
explain an effect of such collective    
operation by a metaphysical hypothesis2 
,i answer that it was expressly for the 
purpose of eliciting this retort that ,i
 threw my argument into the above form4 
,for the position which ,i wish to      
establish is this1 that fully accepting 
the logical cogency of the reasoning    
whereby the action of every law is      
deduced from the primary data of        
science1 ,i wish to show that when this 
train of reasoning is followed to its   
ultimate term1 it leads us into the     
presence of a fact for which it is      
inadequate to account4 ,if1 then1 my    
contention be granted--viz41 that to    
human faculties it is not conceivable   
how1 in the absence of a directing      
intelligence1 general laws could be so  
correlated as to produce universal      
harmony--then ,i have brought the matter
 to this issue3--,notwithstanding the   

scientific train of argument being      
complete in itself1 it still leaves us  
in the presence of a fact which it      
cannot conceivably explain2 and it is   
this unexplained residuum--this total   
product of the operation of general     
laws--that ,i appeal to as the logical  
justification for a system of           
metaphysical teleology--a system which  
offers the only conceivable explanation 
of this stupendous fact4  ',and here ,i 
may further observe1 that the scientific
 train of reasoning is of the kind which
 embodies what ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer   
calls symbolic conceptions of the       
illegitimate order4#bf ,that is to say1 
we can see how such simple laws as that 
action and reaction are equal and       
opposite may have been self-evolved1 and
 from this fact we go on generalising   
and generalising1 until we land         
ourselves in wholly symbolic and--a     
paradox is here                         
legitimate--inconceivable conceptions4  
,now the farther we travel into this    

region of unrealisable ideas1 the less  
trustworthy is the report that we are   
able to bring back4 ,the method is in a 
sense scientific2 but when even         
scientific method is projected into a   
region of really super-scientific       
possibility1 it ceases to have that     
character of undoubted certainty which  
it enjoys when dealing with verifiable  
subjects of inquiry4 ,the demonstrations
 are formal1 but they are not real4     
',therefore1 looking to this necessarily
 suspicious character of the scientific 
train of reasoning1 and then observing  
that1 even if accepted1 it leaves the   
fact of cosmic harmony unexplained1 ,i  
maintain1 that whatever probability the 
phenomena of nature may in former times 
have been thought to establish in favour
 of the theory as to an intelligent     
,author of nature1 that probability has 
been in no wise annihilated--nor        
apparently can it ever be               
annihilated--by the advance of science4 
,and not only so1 but ,i question       

whether this probability has been even  
seriously impaired by such advance1     
seeing that although this advance has   
revealed a speculative raison d'tre of  
the mechanical precision of nature1 it  
has at the same time shown the baffling 
complexity of nature2 and therefore1 in 
view of what has just been said1 leaves 
the balance of probability concerning   
the existence of a ,god very much where 
it always was4 ,for stay awhile to      
contemplate this astounding complexity  
of harmonious nature6 ,think of how much
 we already know of its innumerable laws
 and processes1 and then think that this
 knowledge only serves to reveal1 in a  
glimmering way1 the huge immensity of   
the unknown4 ,try to picture the        
meshwork of contending rhythms which    
must have been before organic nature was
 built up1 and then let us ask1 ,is it  
conceivable1 is it credible1 that all   
this can have been the work of blind    
fate8 ,must we not feel that had there  
not been intelligent agency at work     

somewhere1 other and less terrifically  
intricate results would have ensued8    
,and if we further try to symbolise in  
thought the unimaginable complexity of  
the material and dynamical changes in   
virtue of which that thought itself     
exists1--if we then extend our symbols  
to represent all the history of all the 
orderly changes which must have taken   
place to evolve human intelligence into 
what it is1--and if we still further    
extend our symbols to try if it be      
possible1 even in the language of       
symbols1 to express the number and the  
subtlety of those natural laws which now
 preside over the human will2--in the   
face of so vast an assumption as that   
all this has been self-evolved1 ,i am   
content still to rest in the faith of my
 forefathers4'   #de4 ,now ,i think it  
must be admitted that we have here a    
valid argument4 ,that is to say1 the    
considerations which we have just       
adduced must1 ,i think1 in fairness be  
allowed to have established this        

position3--,that the system of          
metaphysical teleology for which we have
 supposed a candid theist to plead1 is  
something more than a purely gratuitous 
system--that it does not belong to the  
same category of baseless imaginings as 
that to which the atheist at first      
sight1 and in view of the scientific    
deductions alone1 might be inclined to  
assign it4 ,for we have seen that our   
supposed theist1 while fully admitting  
the formal cogency of the scientific    
train of reasoning1 is nevertheless able
 to point to a fact which1 in his       
opinion1 lies without that train of     
reasoning4 ,for he declares that it is  
beyond his powers of conception to      
regard the complex harmony of nature    
otherwise than as a product of some one 
integrating cause2 and that the only    
cause of which he is able to conceive as
 adequate to produce such an effect is  
that of a conscious ,intelligence4      
,pointing1 therefore1 to this complex   
harmony of nature as to a fact which    

cannot to his mind be conceivably       
explained by any deductions from        
physical science1 he feels that he is   
justified in explaining this fact by the
 aid of a metaphysical hypothesis4 ,and 
in so doing he is in my opinion         
perfectly justified1 at any rate to this
 extent--that his antagonist cannot     
fairly dispose of this metaphysical     
hypothesis as a purely gratuitous       
hypothesis4 ,how far it is a probable   
hypothesis is another question1 and to  
this question we shall now address      
ourselves4   #df4 ,if it is true that   
the deductions from physical science    
cannot be conceived to explain some     
among the observed facts of nature1 and 
if it is true that these particular     
facts admit of being conceivably        
explained by the metaphysical hypothesis
 in question1 then1 beyond all          
controversy1 this metaphysical          
hypothesis must be provisionally        
accepted4 ,let us then carefully examine
 the premises which are thus adduced to 

justify acceptance of this hypothesis as
 their conclusion4  ,in the first place1
 it is not--cannot--be denied1 even by a
 theist1 that the deductions from       
physical science do embrace the fact of 
cosmic harmony in their explanation1    
seeing that1 as they explain the        
operation of general laws collectively1 
they must be regarded as also explaining
 every effect of such operation4 ,and   
this1 as we have seen1 is a             
consideration to which our imaginary    
theist was not blind4 ,how then did he  
meet it8 ,he met it by the              
considerations--#ast4 ,that the         
scientific train of reasoning evolved   
this conclusion only by employing1 in a 
wholly unrestricted manner1 symbolic    
conceptions of the illegitimate order2  
and1 #b;d4 ,that when the conclusion    
thus illegitimately evolved was directly
 confronted with the fact of cosmic     
harmony which it professes to explain1  
he found it to be beyond the powers of  
human thought to conceive of such an    

effect as due to such a cause4 ,now1 as 
already observed1 ,i consider these     
strictures on the scientific train of   
reasoning to be thoroughly valid4 ,there
 can be no question that the highly     
symbolic character of the conceptions   
which that train of reasoning is        
compelled to adopt1 is a source of      
serious weakness to the conclusions     
which it ultimately evolves2 while there
 can1 ,i think1 be equally little doubt 
that there does not live a human being  
who would venture honestly to affirm1   
that he can really conceive the fact of 
cosmic harmony as exclusively due to the
 causes which the scientific train of   
reasoning assigns4 ,but freely conceding
 this much1 and an atheist may reply1   
that although the objections of his     
antagonist against this symbolic method 
of reasoning are undoubtedly valid1 yet1
 from the nature of the case1 this is   
the only method of scientific reasoning 
which is available4 ,if1 therefore1 he  
expresses his obligations to his        

antagonist for pointing out a source of 
weakness in this method of reasoning--a 
source of weakness1 be it observed1     
which renders it impossible for him to  
estimate the actual1 as distinguished   
from the apparent1 probability of the   
conclusion attained--this is all that he
 can be expected to do3 he cannot be    
expected to abandon the only scientific 
method of reasoning available1 in favour
 of a metaphysical method which only    
escapes the charge of symbolism by      
leaping with a single bound from a known
 cause 7human intelligence7 to the      
inference of an unknowable cause        
7,divine ,intelligence74 ,for the       
atheist may well point out that1 however
 objectionable his scientific method of 
reasoning may be on account of the      
symbolism which it involves1 it must at 
any rate be preferable to the           
metaphysical method1 in that its symbols
 throughout refer to known causes4#bg   
,with regard1 then1 to this stricture on
 the scientific method of reasoning1 ,i 

conclude that although the caveat which 
it contains should never be lost sight  
of by atheists1 it is not of sufficient 
cogency to justify theists in abandoning
 a scientific in favour of a            
metaphysical mode of reasoning4  ,how   
then does it fare with the other        
stricture1 or the consideration that1   
when the conclusion thus                
illegitimately#bh evolved is confronted 
with the fact of cosmic harmony which it
 professes to explain1 we find it to be 
beyond the powers of human thought to   
conceive of such an effect as due to    
such a cause8 ,the atheist may answer1  
in the first place1 that a great deal   
here turns on the precise meaning which 
we assign to the word conceive4 ,for we 
have just seen that1 by employing       
symbolic conceptions1 we are able to    
frame what we may term a formal         
conception of universal harmony as due  
to the persistence of force and the     
primary qualities of matter4 ,that is to
 say1 we have seen that such universal  

harmony as nature presents must be      
regarded as an effect of the collective 
operation of general laws2 and we have  
previously arrived at a formal          
conception of general laws as singly and
 collectively the product of            
self-evolution4 ,consequently1 the word 
conceive1 as used in the theistic       
argument1 must be taken to mean our     
ability to frame what we may term a     
material conception1 or a representation
 in thought of the whole history of     
cosmic evolution1 which representation  
shall be in some satisfactory degree    
intellectually realisable4 ,observing1  
then1 this important difference between 
an inconceivability which arises from an
 impossibility of establishing relations
 in thought between certain abstract or 
symbolic conceptions1 and an            
inconceivability which arises from a    
mere failure to realise in imagination  
the results which must follow among     
external relations if the symbolically  
conceivable combinations among them ever

 took place1 an atheist may here argue  
as follows2 and it does not appear that 
there is any legitimate escape from his 
reasonings4  ',i first consider the     
undoubted fact that the existence of a  
,supreme ,mind in nature is1            
scientifically considered1 unnecessary2 
and1 therefore1 that the only reason we 
require to entertain the supposition of 
any such existence at all is1 that the  
complexity of nature being so great1 we 
are unable adequately to conceive of its
 self-evolution--notwithstanding our    
reason tells us plainly that1 given a   
self-existing universe of force and     
matter1 and such self-evolution becomes 
abstractedly possible4 ,i then reflect  
that this is a negative and not a       
positive ground of belief4 ,if the      
hypothesis of self-evolution is true1 we
 should  priori expect that by the time 
evolution had advanced sufficiently far 
to admit of the production of a         
reasoning intelligence1 the complexity  
of nature must be so great that the     

nascent reasoning powers would be       
completely baffled in their attempts to 
comprehend the various processes going  
on around them4 ,this seems to be about 
the state of things which we now        
experience4 ,still1 as reason advances  
more and more1 we may expect1 both from 
general  priori principles and from     
particular historical analogies1 that   
more and more of the processes of nature
 will admit of being interpreted by     
reason1 and that in proportion as our   
ability to understand the frame and the 
constitution of things progresses1 so   
our ability to conceive of them as all  
naturally and necessarily evolved will  
likewise and concurrently progress4     
,thus1 for example1 how vast a number of
 the most intricate and delicate        
correlations in nature have been        
rendered at once intelligible and       
conceivably due to non-intelligent      
causes1 by the discovery of a single    
principle in nature--the principle of   
natural selection4  ',in the adverse    

argument1 conceivability is again made  
the unconditional test of truth1 just as
 it was in the argument against the     
possibility of matter thinking4 ,we     
reject the hypothesis of self-evolution1
 not because it is the more remote one1 
but simply because we experience a      
subjective incapacity adequately to     
frame the requisite generalisations in  
thought1 or to frame them with as much  
clearness as we could wish4 ,yet our    
reason tells us as plainly as it tells  
us any general truth which is too large 
to be presented in detail1 that there is
 nothing in the nature of things        
themselves1 as far as we can see1       
antagonistic to the supposition of their
 having been self-evolved4 ,only on the 
ground1 therefore1 of our own           
intellectual deficiencies2 only because 
as yet1 by the self-evolutionary        
hypothesis1 the inner order does not    
completely answer to the outer order2   
only because the number and complexity  
of subjective relations have not yet    

been able to rival those of the         
objective relations producing them2 only
 on this ground do we refuse to assent  
to the obvious deductions of our        
reason4#bi  ',and here ,i may observe1  
further1 that the presumption in favour 
of atheism which these deductions       
establish is considerably fortified by  
certain  posteriori considerations which
 we cannot afford to overlook4 ,in      
particular1 ,i reflect that1 as a matter
 of fact1 the theistic theory is born of
 highly suspicious parentage1--that     
,fetichism1 or the crudest form of the  
theory of personal agency in external   
nature1 admits of being easily traced to
 the laws of a primitive psychology2    
that the step from this to ,polytheism  
is easy2 and that the step from this to 
,monotheism is necessary4 ,if it is     
objected to this view that it does not  
follow that because some theories of    
personal agency have proved themselves  
false1 therefore all such theories must 
be so--,i answer1 ,unquestionably not2  

but the above considerations are not    
adduced in order to negative the        
theistic theory3 they are merely adduced
 to show that the human mind has        
hitherto undoubtedly exhibited an undue 
and a vicious tendency to interpret the 
objective processes of nature in terms  
of its own subjective processes2 and as 
we can see quite well that the current  
theory of personal agency in nature1    
whether or not true1 is a necessary     
outcome of intellectual evolution1 ,i   
think that the fact of so abundant an   
historical analogy ought to be allowed  
to lend a certain degree of antecedent  
suspicion to this theory--although1 of  
course1 the suspicion is of a kind which
 would admit of immediate destruction   
before any satisfactory positive        
evidence in favour of the theory4#cj    
',but what is 'the satisfactory positive
 evidence' that is offered me8 ,nothing1
 save an alleged subjective incapacity  
on the part of my opponent adequately to
 conceive of the fact of cosmic harmony 

as due to physical causation alone4 ,now
 ,i have already commented on the       
weakness of his position2 but as my     
opponent will doubtless resort to the   
consideration that inconceivability of  
an opposite is1 after all1 the best     
criterion of truth which at any given   
stage of intellectual evolution is      
available1 ,i will now conclude my      
overthrow by pointing out that1 even if 
we take the argument from teleology in  
its widest possible sense--the argument1
 ,i mean1 from the general order and    
beauty of nature1 as well as the gross  
constituent part of it from design--even
 taking this argument in its widest     
sense and upon its own ground 7which    
ground1 ,i presume1 it is now           
sufficiently obvious can only be that of
 the inconceivability of its negation71 
,i will conclude my examination of this 
argument by showing that it is quite as 
inconceivable to predicate cosmic       
harmony an effect of ,intelligence1 as  
it is to predicate it an effect of      

,non-intelligence2 and therefore that   
the argument from inconceivability      
admits of being turned with quite as    
terrible a force upon ,theism as it can 
be made to exert upon ,atheism4  ',in   
metaphysical controversy1 many of the   
propositions propounded and accepted as 
quite believable are absolutely         
inconceivable4 ,there is a perpetual    
confusing of actual ideas with what are 
nothing but pseud-ideas4 ,no distinction
 is made between propositions that      
contain real thoughts and propositions  
that are only the forms of thoughts4 ,a 
thinkable proposition is one of which   
the two terms can be brought together in
 consciousness under the relation said  
to exist between them4 ,but very often1 
when the subject of a proposition has   
been thought of as something known1 and 
when the predicate of a proposition has 
been thought of as something known1 and 
when the relation alleged between them  
has been thought of as a known relation1
 it is supposed that the proposition    

itself has been thought4 ,the thinking  
separately of the elements of a         
proposition is mistaken for the thinking
 of them in the combination which the   
proposition affirms4 ,and hence it      
continually happens that propositions   
which cannot be rendered into thought at
 all are supposed to be not only thought
 but believed4 ,the proposition that    
,evolution is caused by ,mind is one of 
this nature4 ,the two terms are         
separately intelligible2 but they can be
 regarded in the relation of effect and 
cause only so long as no attempt is made
 to put them together in this relation4 
',the only thing which any one knows as 
,mind is the series of his own states of
 consciousness2 and if he thinks of any 
mind other than his own1 he can think of
 it only in terms derived from his own4 
,if ,i am asked to frame a notion of    
,mind divested of all those structural  
traits under which alone ,i am conscious
 of mind in myself1 ,i cannot do it4 ,i 
know nothing of thought save as carried 

on in ideas originally traceable to the 
effects wrought by objects on me4 ,a    
mental act is an unintelligible phrase  
if ,i am not to regard it as an act in  
which states of consciousness are       
severally known as like other states in 
the series that has gone by1 and in     
which the relations between them are    
severally known as like past relations  
in the series4 ,if1 then1 ,i have to    
conceive evolution as caused by an      
'originating ,mind1' ,i must conceive   
this ,mind as having attributes akin to 
those of the only mind ,i know1 and     
without which ,i cannot conceive mind at
 all4  ',i will not dwell on the many   
incongruities hence resulting1 by asking
 how the 'originating ,mind' is to be   
thought of as having states produced by 
things objective to it1 as              
discriminating among these states1 and  
classing them as like and unlike2 and as
 preferring one objective result to     
another4 ,i will simply ask1 ,what      
happens if we ascribe to the            

'originating ,mind' the character       
absolutely essential to the conception  
of mind1 that it consists of a series of
 states of consciousness8 ,put a series 
of states of consciousness as cause and 
the evolving universe as effect1 and    
then endeavour to see the last as       
flowing from the first4 ,i find it      
possible to imagine in some dim way a   
series of states of consciousness       
serving as antecedent to any one of the 
movements ,i see going on2 for my own   
states of consciousness are often       
indirectly the antecedents to such      
movements4 ,but how if ,i attempt to    
think of such a series as antecedent to 
all actions throughout the universe--to 
the motions of the multitudinous stars  
throughout space1 to the revolutions of 
all their planets round them1 to the    
gyrations of all these planets on their 
axes1 to the infinitely multiplied      
physical processes going on in each of  
these suns and planets8 ,i cannot think 
of a single series of states of         

consciousness as causing even the       
relatively small groups of actions going
 on over the earth's surface4 ,i cannot 
think of it even as antecedent to all   
the various winds and the dissolving    
clouds they bear1 to the currents of all
 the rivers1 and the grinding actions of
 all the glaciers2 still less can ,i    
think of it as antecedent to the        
infinity of processes simultaneously    
going on in all the plants that cover   
the globe1 from scattered polar lichens 
to crowded tropical palms1 and in all   
the millions of quadrupeds that roam    
among them1 and the millions of millions
 of insects that buzz about them4 ,even 
a single small set of these             
multitudinous terrestrial changes ,i    
cannot conceive as antecedent a single  
series of states of                     
consciousness--cannot1 for instance1    
think of it as causing the hundred      
thousand breakers that are at this      
instant curling over on the shores of   
,england4 ,how1 then1 is it possible for

 me to conceive an 'originating ,mind1' 
which ,i must represent to myself as a  
single series of states of              
consciousness1 working the infinitely   
multiplied sets of changes              
simultaneously going on in worlds too   
numerous to count1 dispersed throughout 
a space that baffles imagination8  ',if1
 to account for this infinitude of      
physical changes everywhere going on1   
',mind must be conceived as there'      
'under the guise of simple ,dynamics1'  
then the reply is1 that1 to be so       
conceived1 ,mind must be divested of all
 attributes by which it is              
distinguished2 and that1 when thus      
divested of its distinguishing          
attributes1 the conception              
disappears--the word ,mind stands for a 
blank4444  ',clearly1 therefore1 the    
proposition that an 'originating ,mind' 
is the cause of evolution is a          
proposition that can be entertained so  
long only as no attempt is made to unite
 in thought its two terms in the alleged

 relation4 ,that it should be accepted  
as a matter of faith may be a defensible
 position1 provided good cause is shown 
why it should be so accepted2 but that  
it should be accepted as a matter of    
understanding--as a statement making the
 order of the universe                  
comprehensible--is a quite indefensible 
position4'#ca   #dg4 ,we have now heard 
the pleading on both sides of the       
ultimate issue to which it is possible  
that the argument from teleology can    
ever be reduced4 ,it therefore devolves 
on us very briefly to adjudicate upon   
the contending opinions4 ,and this it is
 not difficult to do2 for throughout the
 pleading on both sides ,i have been    
careful to exclude all arguments and    
considerations which are not logically  
valid4 ,it is therefore impossible for  
me now to pass any criticisms on the    
pleading of either side which have not  
already been passed by the pleading of  
the other4 ,but nevertheless1 in my     
capacity of an impartial judge1 ,i feel 

it desirable to conclude this chapter   
with a few general considerations4  ,in 
the first place1 ,i think that the      
theist's antecedent objection to a      
scientific mode of reasoning on the     
score of its symbolism1 may be regarded 
as fairly balanced by the atheist's     
antecedent objection to a metaphysical  
mode of reasoning on the score of its   
postulating an unknowable cause4 ,and it
 must be allowed that the force of this 
antecedent objection is considerably    
increased by the reflection that the    
kind of unknowable cause which is thus  
postulated is that which the human mind 
has always shown an overweening tendency
 to postulate as a cause of natural     
phenomena4  ,i think1 therefore1 that   
neither disputant has the right to      
regard the  priori standing of his      
opponent's theory as much more          
suspicious than that of his own2 for it 
is obvious that neither disputant has   
the means whereby to estimate the actual
 value of these antecedent objections4  

,with regard1 then1 to the  posteriori  
evidence in favour of the rival         
theories1 ,i think that the final test  
of their validity--i4e41 the            
inconceivability of their respective    
negations--fails equally in the case of 
both theories2 for in the case of each  
theory any proposition which embodies it
 must itself contain an infinite1 i4e41 
an inconceivable--term4 ,thus1 whether  
we speak of an ,infinite ,mind as the   
cause of evolution1 or of evolution as  
due to an infinite duration of physical 
processes1 we are alike open to the     
charge of employing unthinkable         
propositions4  ,hence1 two unthinkables 
are presented to our choice2 one of     
which is an eternity of matter and of   
force1#cb and the other an ,infinite    
,mind1 so that in this respect again the
 two theories are tolerably parallel2   
and therefore1 all that can be concluded
 with rigorous certainty upon the       
subject is1 that neither theory has     
anything to gain us against the other   

from an appeal to the test of           
inconceivability4  ,yet we have seen    
that this is a test than which none can 
be more ultimate4 ,what then shall we   
say is the final outcome of this        
discussion concerning the rational      
standing of the teleological argument8  
,the answer1 ,i think1 to this question 
is1 that in strict reasoning the        
teleological argument1 in its every     
shape1 is inadequate to form a basis of 
,theism2 or1 in other words1 that the   
logical cogency of this argument is     
insufficient to justify a wholly        
impartial mind in accepting the theory  
of ,theism on so insecure a foundation4 
,nevertheless1 if the further question  
were directly put to me1 ',after having 
heard the pleading both for and against 
the most refined expression of the      
argument from teleology1 with what      
degree of strictly rational probability 
do you accredit it8'--,i should reply as
 follows3--',the question which you put 
,i take to be a question which it is    

wholly impossible to answer1 and this   
for the simple reason that the degree of
 even rational probability may here     
legitimately vary with the character of 
the mind which contemplates it4' ,this  
statement1 no doubt1 sounds paradoxical2
 but ,i think it is justified by the    
following considerations4 ,when we say  
that one proposition is more conceivable
 than another1 we may mean either of two
 very different things1 and this quite  
apart from the distinction previously   
drawn between symbolic conceptions and  
realisable conceptions4 ,for we may mean
 that one of the two propositions       
presents terms which cannot possibly be 
rendered into thought at all in the     
relation which the proposition alleges  
to subsist between them2 or we may mean 
that one of the two propositions        
presents terms in a relation which is   
more congruous with the habitual tenor  
of our thoughts than does the other     
proposition4 ,thus1 as an example of the
 former usage1 we may say1 ,it is more  

conceivable that two and two should make
 four than that two and two should make 
five2 and1 as an example of the latter  
usage1 we may say1 ,it is more          
conceivable that a man should be able to
 walk than that he should be able to    
fly4 ,now1 for the sake of distinction1 
,i shall call the first of these usages 
the test of absolute inconceivability1  
and the second the test of relative     
inconceivability4 ,doubtless1 when the  
word inconceivability is used in the    
sense of relative inconceivability1 it  
is incorrectly used1 unless it is       
qualified in some way2 because1 if used 
without qualification1 there is danger  
of its being confused with              
inconceivability in its absolute sense4 
,nevertheless1 if used with some        
qualifying epithet1 it becomes quite    
unexceptionable4 ,for the process of    
conception being in all cases the       
process of establishing relations in    
thought1 we may properly say1 ,it is    
relatively more conceivable that a man  

should walk than that a man should fly1 
since it is more easy to establish1 the 
necessary relations in thought in the   
case of the former than in the case of  
the latter proposition4 ,the only       
difference1 then1 between what ,i have  
called absolute inconceivability and    
what ,i have called relative            
inconceivability consists in this--that 
while the latter admits of degrees1 the 
former does not4#cc  ,with this         
distinction clearly understood1 ,i may  
now proceed to observe that in everyday 
life we constantly apply the test of    
relative inconceivability as a test of  
truth4 ,and in the vast majority of     
cases this test of relative             
inconceivability is1 for all practical  
purposes1 as valid a test of truth as is
 the test of absolute conceivability4   
,for as every man is more or less in    
harmony with his environment1 his habits
 of thought with regard to his          
environment are for the most part       
stereotyped correctly2 so that the most 

ready and the most trustworthy gauge of 
probability that he has is an immediate 
appeal to consciousness as to whether he
 feels the probability4 ,thus every man 
learns for himself to endow his own     
sense of probability with a certain     
undefined but massive weight of         
authority4 ,now it is this test of      
relative conceivability which all men   
apply in varying degrees to the question
 of ,theism4 ,for if1 from education and
 organised habits of thought1 the       
probability in this matter appears to a 
man to incline in a certain direction1  
when this probability is called in      
question1 the whole body of this        
organised system of thought rises in    
opposition to the questioning1 and being
 individually conscious of this strong  
feeling of subjective opposition1 the   
man declares the sceptical propositions 
to be more inconceivable to him than are
 the counter-propositions4 ,and in so   
saying he is1 of course1 perfectly      
right4 ,hence ,i conceive that the      

acceptance or the rejection of          
metaphysical teleology as probable will 
depend entirely upon individual habits  
of thought4 ,the test of absolute       
inconceivability making equally for and 
against the doctrine of ,theism1        
disputants are compelled to fall back on
 the test of relative inconceivability2 
and as the direction in which the more  
inconceivable proposition will here seem
 to lie will be determined by previous  
habits of thought1 it follows that while
 to a theist metaphysical teleology will
 appear a probable argument1 to an      
atheist it will appear an improbable    
one4 ,thus to a theist it will no doubt 
appear more conceivable that the        
,supreme ,mind should be such that in   
some of its attributes it resembles the 
human mind1 while in other of its       
attributes--among which he will place   
omnipresence1 omnipotence1 and directive
 agency--it transcends the human mind as
 greatly as the latter transcends       
mechanical motion2 and therefore that   

although it is true1 as a matter of     
logical terminology1 that we ought to   
designate such an entity ,not mind or   
,blank1 still1 as a matter of           
psychology1 we may come nearer to the   
truth by assimilating in thought this   
entity with the nearest analogies which 
experience supplies1 than by            
assimilating it in thought with any     
other entity--such as force or          
matter--which are felt to be in all     
likelihood still more remote from it in 
nature4 ,on the other hand1 to an       
atheist it will no doubt appear more    
conceivable1 because more simple1 to    
accept the dogma of an eternal          
self-existence of something which we    
call force and matter1 and with this    
dogma to accept the implication of a    
necessary self-evolution of cosmic      
harmony1 than to resort to the          
additional and no less inconceivable    
supposition of a self-existing ,agent   
which must be regarded both as ,mind and
 as ,not-mind at the same time4 ,but in 

both cases1 in whatever degree this test
 of relative inconceivability of a      
negative is held by the disputants to be
 valid in solving the problem of        
,theism1 in that degree is each man     
entitled to his respective estimate of  
the probability in question4 ,and thus  
we arrive at the judgment that the      
rational probability of ,theism         
legitimately varies with the character  
of the mind which contemplates it4 ,for1
 as the test of absolute                
inconceivability is equally annihilative
 in whichever direction it is applied1  
the test of relative inconceivability is
 the only one that remains2 and as the  
formal conditions of a metaphysical     
teleology are undoubtedly present on the
 one hand1 and the formal conditions of 
a physical explanation of cosmic harmony
 are no less undoubtedly present on the 
other hand1 it follows that a theist and
 an atheist have an equal right to      
employ this test of relative            
inconceivability4 ,and as there is no   

more ultimate court of appeal whereby to
 decide the question than the universe  
as a whole1 each man has here an equal  
argumentative right to abide by the     
decision which that court awards to him 
individually--to accept whatever        
probability the sum-total of phenomena  
appears to present to his particular    
understanding4 ,and it is needless to   
say that experience shows1 even among   
well-informed and accurate reasoners1   
how large an allowance must thus be made
 for personal equations4 ,to some men   
the facts of external nature seem to    
proclaim a ,god with clarion voice1     
while to other men the same facts bring 
no whisper of such a message4 ,all1     
therefore1 that a logician can here do  
is to remark1 that the individuals in   
each class--provided they bear in mind  
the strictly relative character of their
 belief--have a similar right to be     
regarded as holding a rational creed3   
the grounds of belief in this case      
logically vary with the natural         

disposition and the subsequent training 
of different minds4#cd  ,it only remains
 to show that disputants on either side 
are apt to endow this test of relative  
inconceivability with far more than its 
real logical worth4 ,being accustomed to
 apply this test of truth in daily life1
 and there finding it a trustworthy     
test1 most men are apt to forget that   
its value as a test must clearly        
diminish in proportion to the distance  
from experience at which it is applied4 
,this1 indeed1 we saw to be the case    
even with the test of absolute          
inconceivability 7see ,chapter ,v471 but
 much more must it be the case with this
 test of relative inconceivability4     
,for1 without comment1 it is manifest   
that our acquired sense of probability1 
as distinguished from our innate sense  
of possibility1 with regard to any      
particular question of a transcendental 
nature1 cannot be at all comparable with
 its value in the case of ordinary      
questions1 with respect to which our    

sense of probability is being always    
rectified by external facts4 ,although1 
therefore1 it is true that both those   
who reject and those who retain a belief
 in ,theism on grounds of relative      
conceivability are equally entitled to  
be regarded as displaying a rational    
attitude of mind1 in whatever degree    
either party considers their belief as  
of a higher validity than the grounds of
 psychology from which it takes its     
rise1 in that degree must the members of
 that party be deemed irrational4 ,in   
other words1 not only must a man be     
careful not to confuse the test of      
relative inconceivability with that of  
absolute conceivability--not to suppose 
that his sense of probability in this   
matter is determined by an innate       
psychological inability to conceive a   
proposition1 when in reality it is only 
determined by the difficulty of         
dissociating ideas which have long been 
habitually associated2--but he must also
 be careful to remember that the test of

 relative inconceivability in this      
matter is only valid as justifying a    
belief of the most diffident possible   
kind4  ,and from this the practical     
deduction is--tolerance4 ,let no man    
think that he has any argumentative     
right to expect that the mere subjective
 habit or tone of his own mind should   
exert any influence on that of his      
fellow2 but rather let him always       
remember that the only legitimate       
weapons of his intellectual warfare are 
those the material of which is derived  
from the external world1 and only the   
form of which is due to the forging     
process of his own mind4 ,and if in     
battle such weapons seem to be unduly   
blunted on the hardened armoury of      
traditional beliefs1 or on the no less  
hardened armoury of confirmed           
scepticism1 let him remember further    
that he must not too confidently infer  
that the fault does not lie in the      
character of his own weapons4 ,to drop  
the figure1 let none of us forget in how

 much need we all stand of this         
caution3--,knowing how greatly the value
 of arguments is affected1 even to the  
most impartial among us1 by the frame of
 mind in which we regard them1 let all  
of us be jealously careful not to       
over-estimate the certainty that our    
frame or habit of mind is actually      
superior to that of our neighbour4 ,and1
 in conclusion1 it is surely needless to
 insist on the yet greater need there is
 for most of us to bear in mind this    
further caution3--,knowing with what    
great subjective opposition arguments   
are met when they conflict with our     
established modes of thought1 let us all
 be jealously careful to guard the      
sanctuary of our judgment from the      
polluting tyranny of habit4         99  
99       99       99       99           
,,chapter ,,vii4  ,,general ,,summary   
,,and ,,conclusions4   #dh4 ,our        
analysis is now at an end1 and a very   
few words will here suffice to convey an
 epitomised recollection of the numerous

 facts and conclusions which we have    
found it necessary to contemplate4 ,we  
first disposed of the conspicuously     
absurd supposition that the origin of   
things1 or the mystery of existence1    
admits of being explained by the theory 
of ,theism in any further degree than by
 the theory of ,atheism4 ,next it was   
shown that the argument ,our heart      
requires a ,god is invalid1 seeing that 
such a subjective necessity1 even if    
made out1 could not be sufficient to    
prove--or even to render probable--an   
objective existence4 ,and with regard to
 the further argument that the fact of  
our theistic aspirations point to ,god  
as to their explanatory cause1 it became
 necessary to observe that the argument 
could only be admissible after the      
possibility of the operation of natural 
causes had been excluded4 ,similarly the
 argument from the supposed intuitive   
necessity of individual thought was     
found to be untenable1 first1 because1  
even if the supposed necessity were a   

real one1 it would only possess an      
individual applicability2 and second1   
that1 as a matter of fact1 it is        
extremely improbable that the supposed  
necessity is a real necessity even for  
the individual who asserts it1 while it 
is absolutely certain that it is not    
such to the vast majority of the race4  
,the argument from the general consent  
of mankind1 being so obviously          
fallacious both as to facts and         
principles1 was passed over without     
comment2 while the argument from a first
 cause was found to involve a logical   
suicide4 ,lastly1 the argument that1 as 
human volition is a cause in nature1    
therefore all causation is probably     
volitional in character1 was shown to   
consist in a stretch of inference so    
outrageous that the argument had to be  
pronounced worthless4  ,proceeding next 
to examine the less superficial         
arguments in favour of ,theism1 it was  
first shown that the syllogism1 ,all    
known minds are caused by an unknown    

mind2 our mind is a known mind2         
therefore our mind is caused by an      
unknown mind1--is a syllogism that is   
inadmissible for two reasons4 ,in the   
first place1 it does not account for    
mind 7in the abstract7 to refer it to a 
prior mind for its origin2 and          
therefore1 although the hypothesis1 if  
admitted1 would be an explanation of    
known mind1 it is useless as an argument
 for the existence of the unknown mind1 
the assumption of which forms the basis 
of that explanation4 ,again1 in the next
 place1 if it be said that mind is so   
far an entity sui generis that it must  
be either self-existing or caused by    
another mind1 there is no assignable    
warrant for the assertion4 ,and this is 
the second objection to the above       
syllogism2 for anything within the whole
 range of the possible may1 for aught   
that we can tell1 be competent to       
produce a self-conscious intelligence4  
,thus an objector to the above syllogism
 need not hold any theory of things at  

all2 but even as opposed to the definite
 theory of materialism1 the above       
syllogism has not so valid an           
argumentative basis to stand upon4 ,we  
know that what we call matter and force 
are to all appearance eternal1 while we 
have no corresponding evidence of a mind
 that is even apparently eternal4       
,further1 within experience mind is     
invariably associated with highly       
differentiated collocations of matter   
and distributions of force1 and many    
facts go to prove1 and none to negative1
 the conclusion that the grade of       
intelligence invariably depends upon1 or
 at least is associated with1 a         
corresponding grade of cerebral         
development4 ,there is thus both a      
qualitative and a quantitative relation 
between intelligence and cerebral       
organisation4 ,and if it is said that   
matter and motion cannot produce        
consciousness because it is             
inconceivable that they should1 we have 
seen at some length that this is no     

conclusive consideration as applied to a
 subject of a confessedly transcendental
 nature1 and that in the present case it
 is particularly inconclusive1 because1 
as it is speculatively certain that the 
substance of mind must be unknowable1 it
 seems  priori probable that1 whatever  
is the cause of the unknowable reality1 
this cause should be more difficult to  
render into thought in that relation    
than would some other hypothetical      
substance which is imagined as more akin
 to mind4 ,and if it is said that the   
more conceivable cause is the more      
probable cause1 we have seen that it is 
in this case impossible to estimate the 
validity of the remark4 ,lastly1 the    
statement that the cause must contain   
actually all that its effects can       
contain1 was seen to be inadmissible in 
logic and contradicted by everyday      
experience2 while the argument from the 
supposed freedom of the will and the    
existence of the moral sense was        
negatived both deductively by the theory

 of evolution1 and inductively by the   
doctrine of utilitarianism4 ,on the     
whole1 then1 with regard to the argument
 from the existence of the human mind1  
we were compelled to decide that it is  
destitute of any assignable weight1     
there being nothing more to lead to the 
conclusion that our mind has been caused
 by another mind1 than to the conclusion
 that it has been caused by anything    
else whatsoever4  ,with regard to the   
argument from ,design1 it was observed  
that ,mill's presentation of it is      
merely a resuscitation of the argument  
as presented by ,paley1 ,bell1 and      
,chalmers4 ,and indeed we saw that the  
first-named writer treated this whole   
subject with a feebleness and inaccuracy
 very surprising in him2 for while he   
has failed to assign anything like due  
weight to the inductive evidence of     
organic evolution1 he did not hesitate  
to rush into a supernatural explanation 
of biological phenomena4 ,moreover1 he  
has failed signally in his analysis of  

the ,design argument1 seeing that1 in   
common with all previous writers1 he    
failed to observe that it is utterly    
impossible for us to know the relations 
in which the supposed ,designer stands  
to the ,designed1--much less to argue   
from the fact that the ,supreme ,mind1  
even supposing it to exist1 caused the  
observable products by any particular   
intellectual process4 ,in other words1  
all advocates of the ,design argument   
have failed to perceive that1 even if we
 grant nature to be due to a creating   
,mind1 still we have no shadow of a     
right to conclude that this ,mind can   
only have exerted its creative power by 
means of such and such cogitative       
operations4 ,how absurd1 therefore1 must
 it be to raise the supposed evidence of
 such cogitative operations into        
evidences of the existence of a creating
 ,mind6 ,if a theist retorts that it is1
 after all1 of very little importance   
whether or not we are able to divine the
 methods of creation1 so long as the    

facts are there to attest that1 in some 
way or other1 the observable phenomena  
of nature must be due to ,intelligence  
of some kind as their ultimate cause1   
then ,i am the first to endorse this    
remark4 ,it has always appeared to me   
one of the most unaccountable things in 
the history of speculation that so many 
competent writers can have insisted upon
 ,design as an argument for ,theism1    
when they must all have known perfectly 
well that they have no means of         
ascertaining the subjective psychology  
of that ,supreme ,mind whose existence  
the argument is adduced to demonstrate4 
,the truth is1 that the argument from   
teleology must1 and can only1 rest upon 
the observable facts of nature1 without 
reference to the intellectual processes 
by which these facts may be supposed to 
have been accomplished4 ,but1 looking to
 the present state of our knowledge1    
this is merely to change the            
teleological argument from its gross    
,paleyerian form1 into the argument from

 the ubiquitous operation of general    
laws4 ,and we saw that this             
transformation is now a rational        
necessity4 ,how far the great principle 
of natural selection may have been      
instrumental in the evolution of organic
 forms1 is not here1 as ,mill           
erroneously imagined1 the question2 the 
question is simply as to whether we are 
to accept the theory of special creation
 or the theory of organic evolution4    
,and forasmuch as no competent judge at 
the present time can hesitate for one   
moment in answering this question1 the  
argument from a proximate teleology must
 be regarded as no longer having any    
rational existence4  ,how then does it  
fare with the last of the arguments--the
 argument from an ultimate teleology8   
,doubtless at first sight this argument 
seems a very powerful one1 inasmuch as  
it is a generic argument1 which embraces
 not only biological phenomena1 but all 
the phenomena of the universe4 ,but     
nevertheless we are constrained to      

acknowledge that its apparent power     
dwindles to nothing in view of the      
indisputable fact that1 if force and    
matter have been eternal1 all and every 
natural law must have resulted by way of
 necessary consequence4 ,it will be     
remembered that ,i dwelt at considerable
 length and with much earnestness upon  
this truth1 not only because of its     
enormous importance in its bearing upon 
our subject1 but also because no one has
 hitherto considered it in that         
relation4  ,the next step1 however1 was 
to mitigate the severity of the         
conclusion that was liable to be formed 
upon the utter and hopeless collapse of 
all the possible arguments in favour of 
,theism4 ,having fully demonstrated that
 there is no shadow of a positive       
argument in support of the theistic     
theory1 there arose the danger that some
 persons might erroneously conclude that
 for this reason the theistic theory    
must be untrue4 ,it therefore became    
necessary to point out1 that although1  

as far as we can see1 nature does not   
require an ,intelligent ,cause to       
account for any of her phenomena1 yet it
 is possible that1 if we could see      
farther1 we should see that nature could
 not be what she is unless she had owed 
her existence to an ,intelligent ,cause4
 ,or1 in other words1 the probability   
there is that an ,intelligent ,cause is 
unnecessary to explain any of the       
phenomena of nature1 is only equal to   
the probability there is that the       
doctrine of the persistence of force is 
everywhere and eternally true4  ,as a   
final step in our analysis1 therefore1  
we altogether quitted the region of     
experience1 and ignoring even the very  
foundations of science1 and so all the  
most certain of relative truths1 we     
carried the discussion into the         
transcendental region of purely formal  
considerations4 ,and here we laid down  
the canon1 that the value of any        
probability1 in its last analysis1 is   
determined by the number1 the           

importance1 and the definiteness of the 
relations known1 as compared with those 
of the relations unknown2 and1          
consequently1 that in cases where the   
unknown relations are more numerous1    
more important1 or more indefinite than 
are the known relations1 the value of   
our inference varies inversely as the   
difference in these respects between the
 relations compared4 ,from which canon  
it followed1 that as the problem of     
,theism is the most ultimate of all     
problems1 and so contains in its unknown
 relations all that is to man unknown   
and unknowable1 these relations must be 
pronounced the most indefinite of all   
relations that it is possible for man to
 contemplate2 and1 consequently1 that   
although we have here the entire range  
of experience from which to argue1 we   
are unable to estimate the real value of
 any argument whatsoever4 ,the unknown  
relations in our attempted induction    
being wholly indefinite1 both in respect
 of their number and importance1 as     

compared with the known relations1 it is
 impossible for us to determine any     
definite probability either for or      
against the being of a ,god4 ,therefore1
 although it is true that1 so far as    
human science can penetrate or human    
thought infer1 we can perceive no       
evidence of ,god1 yet we have no right  
on this account to conclude that there  
is no ,god4 ,the probability1 therefore1
 that nature is devoid of ,deity1 while 
it is of the strongest kind if regarded 
scientifically--amounting1 in fact1 to a
 scientific demonstration1--is          
nevertheless wholly worthless if        
regarded logically4 ,notwithstanding it 
is as true as is the fundamental basis  
of all science and of all experience    
that1 if there is a ,god1 his existence1
 considered as a cause of the universe1 
is superfluous1 it may nevertheless be  
true that1 if there had never been a    
,god1 the universe could never have     
existed4  ,hence these formal           
considerations proved conclusively that1

 no matter how great the probability of 
,atheism might appear to be in a        
relative sense1 we have no means of     
estimating such probability in an       
absolute sense4 ,from which position    
there emerged the possibility of another
 argument in favour of ,theism--or      
rather let us say1 of a reappearance of 
the teleological argument in another    
form4 ,for it may be said1 seeing that  
these formal considerations exclude     
legitimate reasoning either for or      
against ,deity in an absolute sense1    
while they do not exclude such reasoning
 in a relative sense1 if there yet      
remain any theistic deductions which may
 properly be drawn from experience1     
these may now be adduced to balance the 
atheistic deductions from the           
persistence of force4 ,for although the 
latter deductions have clearly shown the
 existence of ,deity to be superfluous  
in a scientific sense1 the formal       
considerations in question have no less 
clearly opened up beyond the sphere of  

science a possible locus for the        
existence of ,deity2 so that if there   
are any facts supplied by experience for
 which the atheistic deductions appear  
insufficient to account1 we are still   
free to account for them in a relative  
sense by the hypothesis of ,theism4     
,and1 it may be urged1 we do find such  
an unexplained residuum in the          
correlation of general laws in the      
production of cosmic harmony4 ,it       
signifies nothing1 the argument may run1
 that we are unable to conceive the     
methods whereby the supposed ,mind      
operates in producing cosmic harmony2   
nor does it signify that its operation  
must now be relegated to a              
super-scientific province4 ,what does   
signify is that1 taking a general view  
of nature1 we find it impossible to     
conceive of the extent and variety of   
her harmonious processes as other than  
products of intelligent causation4 ,now 
this sublimated form of the teleological
 argument1 it will be remembered1 ,i    

denoted a metaphysical teleology1 in    
order sharply to distinguish it from all
 previous forms of that argument1 which1
 in contradistinction ,i denoted        
scientific teleologies4 ,and the        
distinction1 it will be remembered1     
consisted in this--that while all       
previous forms of teleology1 by resting 
on a basis which was not beyond the     
possible reach of science1 laid         
themselves open to the possibility of   
scientific refutation1 the metaphysical 
system of teleology1 by resting on a    
basis which is clearly beyond the       
possible reach of science1 can never be 
susceptible of scientific refutation4   
,and that this metaphysical system of   
teleology does rest on such a basis is  
indisputable2 for while it accepts the  
most ultimate truths of which science   
can ever be cognisant--viz41 the        
persistence of force and the            
consequently necessary genesis of       
natural law1--it nevertheless maintains 
that the necessity of regarding ,mind as

 the ultimate cause of things is not on 
this account removed2 and1 therefore1   
that if science now requires the        
operation of a ,supreme ,mind to be     
posited in a super-scientific sphere1   
then in a super-scientific sphere it    
ought to be posited4 ,no doubt this     
hypothesis at first sight seems         
gratuitous1 seeing that1 so far as      
science can penetrate1 there is no need 
of any such hypothesis at all--cosmic   
harmony resulting as a physically       
necessary consequence from the combined 
action of natural laws1 which in turn   
result as a physically necessary        
consequence of the persistence of force 
and the primary qualities of matter4    
,but although it is thus indisputably   
true that metaphysical teleology is     
wholly gratuitous if considered         
scientifically1 it may not be true that 
it is wholly gratuitous if considered   
psychologically4 ,in other words1 if it 
is more conceivable that ,mind should be
 the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony   

than that the persistence of force      
should be so1 then it is not irrational 
to accept the more conceivable          
hypothesis in preference to the less    
conceivable one1 provided that the      
choice is made with the diffidence which
 is required by the considerations      
adduced in ,chapter ,v4  ,i conclude1   
therefore1 that the hypothesis of       
metaphysical teleology1 although in a   
physical sense gratuitous1 may be in a  
psychological sense legitimate4 ,but as 
against the fundamental position on     
which alone this argument can           
rest--viz41 the position that the       
fundamental postulate of ,atheism is    
more inconceivable than is the          
fundamental postulate of ,theism--we    
have seen two important objections to   
lie4  ,for1 in the first place1 the     
sense in which the word inconceivable is
 here used is that of the impossibility 
of framing realisable relations in the  
thought2 not that of the impossibility  
of framing abstract relations in        

thought4 ,in the same sense1 though in a
 lower degree1 it is true that the      
complexity of the human organisation and
 its functions is inconceivable2 but in 
this sense the word inconceivable has   
much less weight in an argument than it 
has in its true sense4 ,and1 without    
waiting again to dispute 7as we did in  
the case of the speculative standing of 
,materialism7 how far even the genuine  
test of inconceivability ought to be    
allowed to make against an inference    
which there is a body of scientific     
evidence to substantiate1 we went on to 
the second objection against this       
fundamental position of metaphysical    
teleology4 ,this objection1 it will be  
remembered1 was1 that it is as          
impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony
 as an effect of ,mind1 as it is to     
conceive of it as an effect of mindless 
evolution4 ,the argument from           
inconceivability1 therefore1 admits of  
being turned with quite as terrible an  
effect on ,theism1 as it can possibly be

 made to exert on ,atheism4  ,hence this
 more refined form of teleology which we
 are considering1 and which we saw to be
 the last of the possible arguments in  
favour of ,theism1 is met on its own    
ground by a very crushing opposition3 by
 its metaphysical character it has      
escaped the opposition of physical      
science1 only to encounter a new        
opposition in the region of pure        
psychology to which it fled4 ,as a      
conclusion to our whole inquiry1        
therefore1 it devolved on us to         
determine the relative magnitudes of    
these opposing forces4 ,and in doing    
this we first observed that1 if the     
supporters of metaphysical teleology    
objected  priori to the method whereby  
the genesis of natural law was deduced  
from the datum of the persistence of    
force1 in that this method involved an  
unrestricted use of illegitimate        
symbolic conceptions2 then it is no less
 open to an atheist to object  priori to
 the method whereby a directing ,mind   

was inferred from the datum of cosmic   
harmony1 in that this method involved   
the population of an unknowable         
cause1--and this of a character which   
the whole history of human thought has  
proved the human mind to exhibit an     
overweening tendency to postulate as the
 cause of natural phenomena4 ,on these  
grounds1 therefore1 ,i concluded that1  
so far as their respective standing     
priori is concerned1 both theories may  
be regarded as about equally suspicious4
 ,and similar with regard to their      
standing  posteriori2 for as both       
theories require to embody at least one 
infinite term1 they must each alike be  
pronounced absolutely inconceivable4    
,but1 finally1 if the question were put 
to me which of the two theories ,i      
regarded as the more rational1 ,i       
observed that this is a question which  
no one man can answer for another4 ,for 
as the test of absolute inconceivability
 is equally destructive of both         
theories1 if a man wishes to choose     

between them1 his choice can only be    
determined by what ,i have designated   
relative inconceivability--i4e41 in     
accordance with the verdict given by his
 individual sense of probability as     
determined by his previous habits of    
thought4 ,and forasmuch as the test of  
relative inconceivability may be held in
 this matter legitimately to vary with  
the character of the mind which applies 
it1 the strictly rational probability of
 the question to which it is applied    
varies in like manner4 ,or1 otherwise   
presented1 the only alternative for any 
man in this matter is either to         
discipline himself into an attitude of  
pure scepticism1 and thus to refuse in  
thought to entertain either a           
probability or an improbability         
concerning the existence of a ,god2 or  
else to incline in thought towards an   
affirmation or a negation of ,god1      
according as his previous habits of     
thought have rendered such an           
inclination more facile in the one      

direction than in the other4 ,and       
although1 under such circumstances1 ,i  
should consider that man the more       
rational who carefully suspended his    
judgment1 ,i conclude that if this      
course is departed from1 neither the    
metaphysical teleologist nor the        
scientific atheist has any perceptible  
advantage over the other in respect of  
rationality4 ,for as the formal         
conditions of a metaphysical teleology  
are undoubtedly present on the one hand1
 and the formal conditions of a         
speculative atheism are as undoubtedly  
present on the other1 there is thus in  
both cases a logical vacuum supplied    
wherein the pendulum of thought is free 
to swing in whichever direction it may  
be made to swing by the momentum of     
preconceived ideas4  ,such is the       
outcome of our investigation1 and       
considering the abstract nature of the  
subject1 the immense divergence of      
opinion which at the present time is    
manifested with regard to it1 as well as

 the confusing amount of good1 bad1 and 
indifferent literature on both sides of 
the controversy which is                
extant2--considering these things1 ,i do
 not think that the result of our       
inquiry can be justly complained of on  
the score of its lacking precision4 ,at 
a time like the present1 when           
traditional beliefs respecting ,theism  
are so generally accepted and so        
commonly concluded1 as a matter of      
course1 to have a large and valid basis 
of induction whereon to rest1 ,i cannot 
but feel that a perusal of this short   
essay1 by showing how very concise the  
scientific status of the subject really 
is1 will do more to settle the minds of 
most readers as to the exact standing at
 the present time of all the            
probabilities of the question1 than     
could a perusal of all the rest of the  
literature upon this subject4 ,and1     
looking to the present condition of     
speculative philosophy1 ,i regard it as 
of the utmost importance to have clearly

 shown that the advance of science has  
now entitled us to assert1 without the  
least hesitation1 that the hypothesis of
 ,mind in nature is as certainly        
superfluous to account for any of the   
phenomena of nature1 as the scientific  
doctrine of the persistence of force and
 the indestructibility of matter is     
certainly true4  ,on the other hand1 if 
any one is inclined to complain that the
 logical aspect of the question has not 
proved itself so unequivocally definite 
as has the scientific1 ,i must ask him  
to consider that1 in any matter which   
does not admit of actual demonstration1 
some margin must of necessity be left   
for variations of individual opinion4   
,and1 if he bears this consideration in 
mind1 ,i feel sure that he cannot       
properly complain of my not having done 
my utmost in this case to define as     
sharply as possible the character and   
the limits of this margin4   #di4 ,and  
now1 in conclusion1 ,i feel it is       
desirable to state that any antecedent  

bias with regard to ,theism which ,i    
individually possess is unquestionably  
on the side of traditional beliefs4 ,it 
is therefore with the utmost sorrow that
 ,i find myself compelled to accept the 
conclusions here worked out2 and nothing
 would have induced me to publish them1 
save the strength of my conviction that 
it is the duty of every member of       
society to give his fellows the benefit 
of his labours for whatever they may he 
worth4 ,just as ,i am confident that    
truth must in the end be the most       
profitable for the race1 so ,i am       
persuaded that every individual         
endeavour to attain it1 provided only   
that such endeavour is unbiassed and    
sincere1 ought without hesitation to be 
made the common property of all men1 no 
matter in what direction the results of 
its promulgation may appear to tend4    
,and so far as the ruination of         
individual happiness is concerned1 no   
one can have a more lively perception   
than myself of the possibly disastrous  

tendency of my work4 ,so far as ,i am   
individually concerned1 the result of   
this analysis has been to show that1    
whether ,i regard the problem of ,theism
 on the lower plane of strictly relative
 probability1 or on the higher plane of 
purely formal considerations1 it equally
 becomes my obvious duty to stifle all  
belief of the kind which ,i conceive to 
be the noblest1 and to discipline my    
intellect with regard to this matter    
into an attitude of the purest          
scepticism4 ,and forasmuch as ,i am far 
from being able to agree with those who 
affirm that the twilight doctrine of the
 new faith is a desirable substitute for
 the waning splendour of the old1 ,i am 
not ashamed to confess that with this   
virtual negation of ,god the universe to
 me has lost its soul of loveliness2 and
 although from henceforth the precept to
 work while it is day will doubtless but
 gain an intensified force from the     
terribly intensified meaning of the     
words that the night cometh when no man 

can work1 yet when at times ,i think1 as
 think at times ,i must1 of the         
appalling contrast between the hallowed 
glory of that creed which once was mine1
 and the lonely mystery of existence as 
now ,i find it1--at such times ,i shall 
ever feel it impossible to avoid the    
sharpest pang of which my nature is     
susceptible4 ,for whether it be due to  
my intelligence not being sufficiently  
advanced to meet the requirements of the
 age1 or whether it be due to the memory
 of those sacred associations which to  
me at least were the sweetest that life 
has given1 ,i cannot but feel that for  
me1 and for others who think as ,i do1  
there is a dreadful truth in those words
 of ,hamilton1--,philosophy having      
become a meditation1 not merely of      
death1 but of annihilation1 the precept 
know thyself has become transformed into
 the terrific oracle to ,oedipus--      
,mayest thou ne'er know the truth of    
what thou art4         99       99      
99       99       99   ,,appendix  ,,and

  ,,supplementary ,,essays4         99  
99       99       99       99           
,,appendix4         99       99       99
       99       99  ,a ,,critical       
,,exposition ,,of ,a ,,fallacy ,,in     
,,locke',s ,,use ,,of ,,the ,,argument  
,,against ,,the ,,possibility ,,of      
,,matter ,,thinking ,,on ,,grounds ,,of 
,,its ,,being ,,inconceivable ,,that    
,,it ,,should4  ,lest it should be      
thought that ,i am doing injustice to   
the views of this illustrious theist1 ,i
 here quote his own words3--,we have the
 ideas of matter and thinking1 but      
possibly shall never be able to know    
whether any mere material being thinks  
or no1 it being impossible for us1 by   
the contemplation of our own ideas1     
without revelation1 to discover whether 
omnipotency has not given to some       
systems of matter fitly disposed a power
 to perceive and think1 or else joined  
and fixed to matter so disposed a       
thinking immaterial substance2 it being1
 in respect of our notions1 not much    

more remote from our comprehension to   
conceive that ,god can1 if ,he pleases1 
superadd to matter a faculty of         
thinking1 than that ,he should superadd 
to it another substance with a faculty  
of thinking2 since we know not wherein  
thinking consists1 nor to what sort of  
substance the ,almighty has been pleased
 to give that power1 which cannot be in 
any created being1 but merely by the    
good pleasure and bounty of the         
,creator4 ,for ,i see no contradiction  
in it that the first eternal thinking   
being should1 if he pleased1 give to    
certain systems of created senseless    
matter1 put together as he thinks fit1  
some degrees of sense1 perception1 and  
thought3 though1 as ,i think1 ,i have   
proved1 lib4 iv41 ch4 #aj and #ad1 c41  
it is no less than a contradiction to   
suppose matter 7which is evidently in   
its own nature void of sense and        
thought7 should be that eternal         
first-thinking being4 ,what certainty of
 knowledge can any one have that some   

perceptions1 such as1 e4g41 pleasure and
 pain1 should not be in some bodies     
themselves1 after a certain manner      
modified and moved1 as well as that they
 should be in an immaterial substance   
upon the motion of the parts of body8   
,body1 as far as we can conceive1 being 
able only to strike and affect body2 and
 motion1 according to the utmost reach  
of our ideas1 being able to produce     
nothing but motion3 so that when we     
allow it to produce pleasure or pain1 or
 the idea of a colour or sound1 we are  
fain to quit our reason1 go beyond our  
ideas1 and attribute it wholly to the   
good pleasure of our ,maker4 ,for since 
we must allow ,he has annexed effects to
 motion which we can no way conceive    
motion able to produce1 what reason have
 we to conclude that ,he could not order
 them as well to be produced in a       
subject we cannot conceive capable of   
them1 as well as in a subject we cannot 
conceive the motion of matter can any   
way operate upon8 ,i say not this1 that 

,i would any way lessen the belief of   
the soul's immateriality1 c4444 ,it is a
 point which seems to me to be put out  
of the reach of our knowledge2 and he   
who will give himself leave to consider 
freely1 and look into the dark and      
intricate part of each hypothesis1 will 
scarce find his reason able to determine
 him fixedly for or against the soul's  
materiality4 ,since on which side soever
 he views it1 either as an unextended   
substance or as a thinking extended     
matter1 the difficulty to conceive      
either will1 whilst either alone is in  
his thoughts1 still drive him to the    
contrary side4 ,an unfair way which some
 men take with themselves1 who1 because 
of the inconceivableness of something   
they find in one1 throw themselves      
violently into the contrary hypothesis1 
though altogether as unintelligible to  
an unbiassed understanding4  ,this      
passage1 ,i do not hesitate to say1 is  
one of the most remarkable in the whole 
range of philosophical literature1 in   

respect of showing how even the         
strongest and most candid intellect may 
have its reasoning faculty impaired by  
the force of a preformed conviction4    
,here we have a mind of unsurpassed     
penetration and candour1 which has left 
us side by side two parallel trains of  
reasoning4 ,in the one1 the object is to
 show that the author's preformed       
conviction as to the being of a ,god is 
justifiable on grounds of reason2 in the
 other1 the object is to show that1     
granting the existence of a ,god1 and it
 is not impossible that he may have     
endowed matter with the faculty of      
thinking4 ,now1 in the former train of  
reasoning1 the whole proof rests        
entirely upon the fact that it is       
impossible to conceive that ever bare   
incogitative matter should produce a    
thinking intelligent being4 ,clearly1 if
 this proposition is true1 it must      
destroy one or other of the trains of   
reasoning2 for it is common to them     
both1 and in one of them it is made the 

sole ground for concluding that matter  
cannot think1 while in the other it is  
made compatible with the supposition    
that matter may think4 ,this            
extraordinary inconsistency no doubt    
arose from the fact that the author was 
antecedently persuaded of the existence 
of an ,omnipotent ,mind1 and having been
 long accustomed in his intellectual    
symbols to regard it presumptuous in him
 to impose any limitations on this      
almighty power1 when he asked himself   
whether it would be possible for this   
almighty power1 if it so willed1 to     
endow matter with the faculty of        
thinking1 he argued that it might be    
possible1 notwithstanding his being     
unable to conceive the possibility4 ,but
 when he banished from his mind the idea
 of this personal and almighty power1   
and with that idea banished all its     
associations1 he then felt that he had a
 right to argue more freely1 and        
forthwith made his conceptive faculty a 
test of abstract possibility4 ,yet the  

sum total of abstract possibility1 in   
relation to him1 must have been the same
 in the two cases2 so that in whichever 
of the two trains of reasoning his      
argument was sound1 in the other it must
 certainly have been null4  ,we may well
 feel amazed that so able a thinker can 
have fallen into so obvious an error1   
and afterwards have persisted in it     
through pages and pages of his work4 ,it
 will be instructive1 however1 to those 
who rely upon ,locke's exposition of the
 argument from ,inconceivability to see 
how effectually he has himself destroyed
 it4 ,for this purpose1 therefore1 ,i   
shall make some further quotations from 
the same train of reasoning4 ,the       
statement of ,locke's opinion that the  
,almighty could endow matter with the   
faculty of thinking if ,he so willed1   
called down some remonstrances and      
rebukes from the then ,bishop of        
,worcester4 ,locke's reply was a very   
lengthy one1 and from it the following  
extracts are taken4 ,i merely request   

the reader throughout to substitute for 
the words ,god1 ,creator1 ,almighty1    
,omipotency1 c41 the words ,summum genus
 of ,possibility4  ,but it is further   
urged that we cannot conceive how matter
 can think4 ,i grant it1 but to argue   
from thence that ,god therefore cannot  
give to matter a faculty of thinking is 
to say ,god's omnipotency is limited to 
a narrow compass because man's          
understanding is so1 and brings down    
,god's infinite power to the size of our
 capacities4444  ,if ,god can give no   
power to any parts of matter but what   
men can account for from the essence of 
matter in general2 if all such qualities
 and properties must destroy the        
essence1 or change the essential        
properties of matter1 which are to our  
conceptions above it1 and we cannot     
conceive to be the natural consequence  
of that essence2 it is plain that the   
essence of matter is destroyed1 and its 
essential properties changed1 in most of
 the sensible parts of this our system4 

,for it is visible that all the planets 
have revolutions about certain remote   
centres1 which ,i would have any one    
explain or make conceivable by the bare 
essence1 or natural powers depending on 
the essence of matter in general1       
without something added to that essence 
which we cannot conceive2 for the moving
 of matter in a crooked line1 or the    
attraction of matter by matter1 is all  
that can be said in the case2 either of 
which it is above our reach to derive   
from the essence of matter or body in   
general1 though one of these two must   
unavoidably be allowed to be superadded1
 in this instance1 to the essence of    
matter in general4 ,the omnipotent      
,creator advised not with us in the     
making of the world1 and ,his ways are  
not the less excellent because they are 
past finding out4444  ,in all such      
cases1 the superinducement of greater   
perfections and nobler qualities        
destroys nothing of the essence or      
perfections that were there before1     

unless there can be showed a manifest   
repugnancy between them2 but all the    
proof offered for that is only that we  
cannot conceive how matter1 without such
 superadded perfections1 can produce    
such effects2 which is1 in truth1 no    
more than to say matter in general1 or  
every part of matter1 as matter1 has    
them not1 but is no reason to prove that
 ,god1 if ,he pleases1 cannot superadd  
them to some parts of matter1 unless it 
can be proved to be a contradiction that
 ,god should give to some parts of      
matter qualities and perfections which  
matter in general has not1 though we    
cannot conceive how matter is invested  
with them1 or how it operates by virtue 
of those new endowments2 nor is it to be
 wondered that we cannot1 whilst we     
limit all its operations to those       
qualities it had before1 and would      
explain them by the known properties of 
matter in general1 without any such     
induced perfections4 ,for if this be a  
right rule of reasoning1 to deny a thing

 to be because we cannot conceive the   
manner how it comes to be1 ,i shall     
desire them who use it to stick to this 
rule1 and see what work it will make    
both in divinity as well as philosophy1 
and whether they can advance anything   
more in favour of scepticism4  ,for to  
keep within the present subject of the  
power of thinking and self-motion       
bestowed by omnipotent power in some    
parts of matter3 the objection to this  
is1 ,i cannot conceive how matter should
 think4 ,what is the consequence8 ,ergo1
 ,god cannot give it a power to think4  
,let this stand for a good reason1 and  
then proceed in other cases by the same4
  ,you cannot conceive how matter can   
attract matter at any distance1 much    
less at the distance of #a1jjj1jjj      
miles2 ergo1 ,god cannot give it such a 
power3 you cannot conceive how matter   
should feel or move itself1 or affect   
any material being1 or be moved by it2  
ergo1 ,god cannot give it such powers3  
which is in effect to deny gravity1 and 

the revolution of the planets about the 
sun2 to make brutes mere machines1      
without sense or spontaneous motion2 and
 to allow man neither sense nor         
voluntary motion4  ,let us apply this   
rule one degree farther4 ,you cannot    
conceive how an extended solid substance
 should think1 therefore ,god cannot    
make it think3 can you conceive how your
 own soul or any substance thinks8 ,you 
find1 indeed1 that you do think1 and so 
do ,i2 but ,i want to be told how the   
action of thinking is performed3 this1  
,i confess1 is beyond my conception2 and
 ,i would be glad any one who conceives 
it would explain it to me4  ,god1 ,i    
find1 has given me this faculty2 and    
since ,i cannot but be convinced of ,his
 power in this instance1 which1 though  
,i every moment experience in myself1   
yet ,i cannot conceive the manner of1   
what would it be less than an insolent  
absurdity to deny ,his power in other   
like cases1 only for this reason1       
because ,i cannot conceive the manner   

how8444  ,that ,omnipotency cannot make 
a substance to be solid and not solid at
 the same time1 ,i think with due       
reverence diffidence8#ce we may say2 but
 that a solid substance may not have    
qualities1 perfections1 and powers1     
which have no natural or visibly        
necessary connection with solidity and  
extension1 is too much for us 7who are  
but of yesterday1 and know nothing7 to  
be positive in4  ,if ,god cannot join   
things together by connections          
inconceivable to us1 we must deny even  
the consistency and being of matter     
itself2 since every particle of it      
having some bulk1 has its parts         
connected by ways inconceivable to us4  
,so that all the difficulties that are  
raised against the thinking of matter1  
from our ignorance or narrow            
conceptions1 stand not at all in the way
 of the power of ,god1 if ,he pleases to
 ordain it so2 nor prove anything       
against ,his having actually endowed    
some parcels of matter1 so disposed as  

,he thinks fit1 with a faculty of       
thinking1 till it can he shown that it  
contains a contradiction to suppose it4 
,though to me sensation be comprehended 
under thinking in general1 in the       
foregoing discourse ,i have spoke of    
sense in brutes as distinct from        
thinking2 because your lordship1 as ,i  
remember1 speaks of sense in brutes4    
,but here ,i take liberty to observe1   
that if your lordship allows brutes to  
have sensation1 it will follow1 either  
that ,god can and doth give to some     
parcels of matter a power of perception 
and thinking1 or that all animals have  
immaterial1 and consequently1 according 
to your lordship1 immortal souls1 as    
well as men2 and to say that fleas and  
mites1 c41 have immortal souls as well  
as men1 will possibly be looked on as   
going a great way to serve an           
hypothesis4444  ,it is true1 ,i say1    
',that bodies operate by impulse1 and   
nothing else1' and so ,i thought when ,i
 writ it1 and can yet conceive no other 

way of their operation4 ,but ,i am since
 convinced1 by the judicious ,mr4       
,newton's incomparable book1 that it is 
too bold a presumption to limit ,god's  
power in this point by my narrow        
conceptions4 ,the gravitation of matter 
towards matter1 by way unconceivable to 
me1 is not only a demonstration that    
,god can1 if ,he pleases1 put into      
bodies powers and ways of operation     
above what can be derived from our idea 
of body1 or can be explained by what we 
know of matter1 but also an             
unquestionable and everywhere visible   
instance that ,he has done so4 ,and     
therefore1 in the next edition of my    
book1 ,i will take care to have that    
passage rectified4444  ,as to           
self-consciousness1 your lordship asks1 
',what is there like self-consciousness 
in matter8' ,nothing at all in matter as
 matter4 ,but that ,god cannot bestow on
 some parcels of matter a power of      
thinking1 and with it                   
self-consciousness1 will never be proved

 by asking how is it possible to        
apprehend that mere body should perceive
 that it doth perceive8 ,the weakness of
 our apprehension ,i grant in the case3 
,i confess as much as you please1 that  
we cannot conceive how an unsolid       
created substance thinks2 but this      
weakness of our apprehension reaches not
 the power of ,god1 whose weakness is   
stronger than anything in man4  ,lastly1
 ,locke turns upon his opponent the     
power of the odium theologicum4  ,let it
 be as hard a matter as it will to give 
an account what it is that should keep  
the parts of a material soul together   
after it is separated from the body1 yet
 it will be always as easy to give an   
account of it as to give an account what
 it is that shall keep together a       
material and immaterial substance4 ,and 
yet the difficulty that there is to give
 an account of that1 ,i hope1 does not1 
with your lordship1 weaken the          
credibility of the inseparable union of 
soul and body to eternity2 and ,i       

persuade myself that the men of sense1  
to whom your lordship appeals in this   
case1 do not find their belief of this  
fundamental point much weakened by that 
difficulty4444 ,but you will say1 you   
speak only of the soul2 and your words  
are1 that it is no easy matter to give  
an account how the soul should be       
capable of immortality unless it be a   
material substance4 ,i grant it1 but    
crave leave to say1 that there is not   
any one of these difficulties that are  
or can be raised about the manner how a 
material soul can be immortal1 which do 
not as well reach the immortality of the
 body4444  ,but your lordship1 as ,i    
guess from your following words1 would  
argue that a material substance cannot  
be a free agent2 whereby ,i suppose you 
only mean that you cannot see or        
conceive how a solid substance should   
begin1 stop1 or change its own motion4  
,to which give me leave to answer1 that 
when you can make it conceivable how any
 created1 finite1 dependent substance   

can move itself1 ,i suppose you will    
find it no harder for ,god to bestow    
this power on a solid than an unsolid   
created substance4444 ,but though you   
cannot see how any created substance1   
solid or not solid1 can be a free agent 
7pardon me1 my lord1 if ,i put in both1 
till your lordship please to explain it 
of either1 and show the manner how      
either of them can of itself move itself
 or anything else71 yet ,i do not think 
you will so far deny men to be free     
agents1 from the difficulty there is to 
see how they are free agents1 as to     
doubt whether there be foundation enough
 for the day of judgment4  ,let us now1 
for the sake of contrast1 turn to some  
passages which occur in the other train 
of reasoning4  ,if we suppose only      
matter and motion first or eternal1     
thought can never begin to be4 ,for it  
is impossible to conceive that matter1  
either with or without motion1 could    
have originally in and from itself      
sense1 perception1 and knowledge2 as is 

evident from hence1 that then sense1    
perception1 and knowledge must be a     
property eternally inseparable from     
matter and every particle of it4 ,there 
is a double fallacy here4 ,in the first 
place1 conceivability is made the       
unconditional test of possibility2 and1 
in the next place1 it is asserted that  
unless every particle of matter can     
think1 no collocation of such particles 
can possibly do so4 ,this latter fallacy
 is further insisted upon thus3--,if    
they will not allow matter as matter1   
that is1 every particle of matter1 to be
 as well cogitative as extended1 they   
will have as hard a task to make out to 
their own reasons a cogitative being out
 of incogitative particles1 as an       
extended being out of unextended parts1 
if ,i may so speak4444 ,every particle  
of matter1 as matter1 is capable of all 
the same figures and motions of any     
other1 and ,i challenge any one in his  
thoughts to add anything else to one    
above another4 ,now1 as we have seen1   

,locke himself has shown in his other   
trains of argument that this challenge  
is thoroughly futile as a refutation of 
possibilities2 but the point to which ,i
 now wish to draw attention is this--,it
 does not follow because certain and    
highly complex collocations of material 
particles may be supposed capable of    
thinking1 that therefore every particle 
of matter must be regarded as having    
this attribute4 ,we have innumerable    
analogies in nature of a certain        
collocation of matter and force         
producing certain results which another 
somewhat similar collocation could not  
produce3 in such cases we do not assume 
that all the resulting attributes of the
 one collocation must be presented also 
by the other--still less that these     
resulting attributes must belong to the 
primary qualities of matter and force4  
,hence1 it is not fair to assume that   
thought must either be inherent in every
 particle of matter1 or else not        
producible by any possible collocation  

of such particles1 unless it has        
previously been shown that so to produce
 it by any possible collocation is in   
the nature of things impossible4 ,but no
 one could refute this fallacy better   
than ,locke himself has done in some of 
the passages already quoted from his    
other train of reasoning4  ,but to      
continue the quotation3--,if1 therefore1
 it be evident that something           
necessarily must exist from eternity1 it
 is also as evident that that something 
must necessarily be a cogitative being2 
for it is as impossible inconceivable   
that incogitative matter should produce 
a cogitative being1 as that nothing1 or 
the negation of all being1 should       
produce a positive being or matter4     
,again1--,for unthinking particles of   
matter1 however put together1 can have  
can be taught to have nothing thereby   
added to them1 but a new relation of    
position1 which it is impossible        
inconceivable should give thought and   
knowledge to them4  ,it is unnecessary  

to multiply these quotations1 for1 in   
effect1 they would all be merely        
repetitions of one another4 ,it is      
enough to have seen that this able      
author undertakes to demonstrate the    
existence of a ,god1 and that his whole 
demonstration resolves itself into the  
unwarrantable inference1 that as we are 
unable to conceive how thought can be a 
property of matter1 therefore a property
 of matter thought cannot be4 ,that such
 an erroneous inference should occur in 
any writings of so old a date as those  
of ,locke is not in itself surprising4  
,what is surprising is the fact1 that in
 the same writings1 and in the course of
 the same discussion1 the fallacy of    
this very inference is repeatedly       
pointed out and insisted upon in a great
 variety of ways2 and it has been       
chiefly for the sake of showing the     
pernicious influence which preformed    
opinion may exert--viz41 even to        
blinding the eyes of one of the most    
clear-sighted and thoughtful men that   

ever lived to a glaring contradiction   
repeated over and over again in the     
course of a few pages1--it has been     
chiefly for this reason that ,i have    
extended this ,appendix to so great a   
length4 ,i shall now conclude it by     
quoting some sentences which occur on   
the very next page after that from which
 the last quoted sentences were taken4  
,our author here again returns to his   
defence of the omnipotency of ,god2 and 
as he now again thus personifies the sum
 total of possibility1 his mind abruptly
 reverts to all its other class of      
associations4 ,in this case the         
transition is particularly interesting1 
not only on account of its suddenness1  
but also because the correlations       
contemplated happen to be exactly the   
same in the two cases--viz41 matter as  
the cause of mind1 and mind as the cause
 of matter4 ,remember that on the last  
page this great philosopher supposed he 
had demonstrated the abstract           
impossibility of matter being the cause 

of mind on the ground of a causal       
connection being inconceivable1 let us  
now observe what he says upon this page 
regarding the abstract possibility of   
mind being the cause of matter4 ,nay1   
possibly1 if we would emancipate        
ourselves from vulgar notions1 and raise
 our thoughts as far as they would reach
 to a closer contemplation of things1 we
 might be able to aim at some dim and   
seeming conception how matter might at  
first be made and begin to exist by the 
power of that eternal first being4444   
,but you will say1 ,is it not impossible
 to admit of the making anything out of 
nothing1 since we cannot possibly       
conceive it8 ,i answer--,no2 because it 
is not reasonable to deny the power of  
an infinite being this phrase1 in the   
absence of hypothesis1 i4e41 in ,locke's
 other train of reasoning1 is of course 
equivalent to the sum-total of          
possibility because we cannot comprehend
 its operations4 ,we do not deny other  
effects upon this ground1 because we    

cannot possibly conceive the manner of  
their production4 ,we cannot conceive   
how anything but impulse of body can    
move body2 and yet that is not a reason 
sufficient to make us deny it possible1 
against the constant experience we have 
of it in ourselves1 in all our voluntary
 motions1 which are produced in us only 
by the free action or thought of our    
minds1 and are not1 nor can be1 the     
effects of the impulse or determination 
of the blind matter in or upon our own  
bodies2 for then it could not be in our 
power or choice to alter it4 ,for       
example1 my right hand writes1 whilst my
 left hand is still3 what causes rest in
 one and motion in the other8 ,nothing  
but my will1 a thought in my mind2 my   
thought only changing1 the right hand   
rests1 and the left hands moves4 ,this  
is matter of fact1 which cannot be      
denied3 explain this and make it        
intelligible1 and then the next step    
will be to understand creation4#cf      
99       99       99       99       99  

,,supplementary ,,essays4         99    
99       99       99       99  ,i4      
,,cosmic ,,theism4#cg  ,mr4 ,herbert    
,spencer's doctrine of the ,unknowable  
is a doctrine of so much speculative    
importance1 that it behoves all students
 of philosophy to have clear views      
respecting its character and            
implications4 ,mr4 ,spencer has himself 
so fully explained the character of this
 doctrine1 that no attentive reader can 
fail to understand it2 but concerning   
those of its implications which may be  
termed theological--as distinguished    
from religious--,mr4 ,spencer is silent4
 ,within the last two or three years1   
however1 there has appeared a valuable  
work by an able exponent of the new     
philosophy2 and in this work the writer1
 adopting his master's teaching of the  
,unknowable1 proceeds to develop it into
 a definite system of what may be termed
 scientific theology4 ,and not only so1 
but he assures the world that this      
system of scientific theology is the    

highest1 the purest1 and the most       
ennobling form of religion that mankind 
has ever been privileged to know in the 
past1 or1 from the nature of the case1  
can ever be destined to know in the     
future4 ,it is a system1 we are told1   
wherein the most fundamental truths of  
,theism are taught as necessary         
deductions from the highest truths of   
,science2 it is a system wherein no     
single doctrine appeals for its         
acceptance to any principle of blind or 
credulous faith1 but wherein every      
doctrine can be fully justified by the  
searching light of reason2 it is a      
system wherein the noblest of our       
aspirations and the most sublime of our 
emotions are able to find an object far 
more worthy and much more glorious than 
has ever been supplied to them by any of
 the older forms of ,theism2 and it is a
 system1 therefore1 in which1 with a    
greatly enlarged and intensified        
meaning1 we may worship ,god1 and all   
that is within us bless ,his holy name4 

,assuredly a proclamation such as this1 
emanating from the most authoritative   
expounders of modern thought1 as the    
highest and the greatest result to which
 a rigorous philosophic synthesis has   
led1 is a proclamation which cannot fail
 to arrest our most serious attention4  
,nay1 may it not do more than this8 ,may
 it not appeal to hearts which long have
 ceased to worship8 ,may it not once    
more revive a hope--long banished1      
perhaps1 but still the dearest which our
 poor natures have experienced--that    
somewhere1 sometime1 or in some way1 it 
may yet be possible to feel that ,god is
 not far from any one of us8 ,for to    
those who have known the anguish of a   
shattered faith1 it will not seem so    
childish that our hearts should beat the
 quicker when we once more hear a voice 
announcing to a world of superstitious  
idolaters--,whom ye ignorantly worship1 
,him declare ,i unto you4 ,but if1 when 
we have listened to the glad tidings of 
the new gospel1 we find that the        

preacher1 though apparently in earnest1 
is not worthy to be heard again on this 
matter2 and if1 as we turn away1 our    
eyes grow dim with the memory of a      
vanished dream1 surely we may feel that 
the preacher is deserving of our blame  
for obtruding thus upon the most sacred 
of our sorrows4  ,mr4 ,john ,fiske is1  
as is well known1 an author who unites  
in himself the qualities of a well-read 
student of philosophy1 a clear and      
accurate thinker1 a thorough master of  
the principles which in his recent work 
he undertakes to explain and to extend1 
and a writer gifted in a remarkable     
degree with the power of lucid          
exposition4 ,such being the intellectual
 calibre of the man who elaborates this 
new system of scientific theology1 ,i   
confess that1 on first seeing his work1 
,i experienced a faint hope that1 in the
 higher departments of the ,philosophy  
of ,evolution as conceived by ,mr4      
,spencer and elaborated by his disciple1
 there might be found some rational     

justification for an attenuated form of 
,theism4 ,but on examination ,i find    
that the bread which these fathers have 
offered us turns out to be a stone2 and 
thinking that it is desirable to warn   
other of the children--whether of the   
family ,philosophical or                
,theological--against swallowing on     
trust a morsel so injurious1 ,i shall   
endeavour to point out what ,i conceive 
to be the true nature of ,cosmic        
,theism4  ,starting from the doctrine of
 the ,relativity of ,knowledge1 ,mr4    
,fiske1 following ,mr4 ,spencer1        
proceeds to show how the doctrine       
implies that there must be a mode of    
,being to which human knowledge is      
non-relative4 ,or1 in other words1 he   
shows that the postulation of phenomena 
necessitates the further postulation of 
noumena of which phenomena are the      
manifestations4 ,now what may we affirm 
of noumena without departing from a     
scientific or objective mode of         
philosophising8 ,we may affirm at least 

this much of noumena1 that they         
constitute a mode of existence which    
need not necessarily vanish were our    
consciousness to perish2 and1 therefore1
 that they now stand out of necessary   
relation to our consciousness4 ,or1 in  
other words1 so far as human            
consciousness is concerned1 noumena must
 be regarded as absolute4 ,but now1 what
 do we mean by this affirmation of      
absolute reality independent of the     
conditions of the process of knowing8   
,do we mean to 444 affirm1 in language  
savouring strongly of scholasticism1    
that beneath the phenomena which we call
 subjective there is an occult          
substratum ,mind1 and beneath the       
phenomena which we call objective there 
is an occult substratum ,matter8 ,our   
conclusion cannot be stated in any such 
form4444 ,our conclusion is simply this1
 that no theory of phenomena1 external  
or internal1 can be framed without      
postulating an ,absolute ,existence of  
which phenomena are the manifestations4 

,and now let us carefully note what     
follows4 ,we cannot identify this       
,absolute ,existence with ,mind1 since  
what we know as ,mind is a series of    
phenomenal manifestations4444 ,nor can  
we identify this ,absolute ,existence   
with ,matter1 since what we know as     
,matter is a series of phenomenal       
manifestations4444 ,absolute ,existence1
 therefore1--the ,reality which persists
 independently of us1 and of which ,mind
 and ,matter are the phenomenal         
manifestations1--cannot be identified   
either with ,mind or with ,matter4 ,thus
 is ,materialism included in the same   
condemnation with ,idealism4444 ,see    
then how far we have travelled from the 
scholastic theory of occult substrata   
underlying each group of phenomena4     
,these substrata were but the ghosts of 
the phenomena themselves2 behind the    
tree or the mountain a sort of phantom  
tree or mountain1 which persists after  
the body of perception has gone away    
with the departure of the percipient    

mind4 ,clearly this is no scientific    
interpretation of the facts1 but is     
rather a specimen of nave barbaric      
thought surviving in metaphysics4 ,the  
tree or mountain being groups of        
phenomena1 what we assert as persisting 
independently of the percipient mind is 
a something which we are unable to      
condition either as tree or as mountain4
  ,and now we come down to the very     
bottom of the problem4 ,since we do     
postulate ,absolute ,existence1 and do  
not postulate a particular occult       
substance underlying each group of      
phenomena1 are we to be understood as   
implying that there is a single ,being  
of which all phenomena1 internal and    
external to consciousness1 are          
manifestations8 ,such must seem to be   
the inevitable conclusion1 since we are 
able to carry on thinking at all only   
under the relations of ,difference and  
,no-difference4444 ,it may seem that1   
since we cannot attribute to the        
,absolute ,reality any relations of     

,difference1 we must positively ascribe 
to it ,no-difference4 ,or1 what is the  
same thing1 in refusing to predicate    
multiplicity of it1 do we not virtually 
predicate of it unity8 ,we do1 simply   
because we cannot think without so      
doing4#ch  ,a single ,absolute ,reality 
being thus posited1 our author proceeds1
 towards the close of his work1 to argue
 that as this ,reality cannot be        
conceived as limited either in space or 
time1 it constitutes a ,being which     
corresponds with our essential          
conception of ,deity4 ,true it is devoid
 of certain accessory attributes1 such  
as personality1 intelligence1 and       
volition2 but for this very reason1 it  
is insisted1 the theistic ideal as thus 
presented is a purer1 and therefore a   
better1 ideal than has ever been        
presented before4 ,nay1 it is the       
highest possible form of this ideal1 as 
the following considerations will show4 
,in what has consisted that continuous  
purification of ,theism which the       

history of thought shows to have been   
effected1 from the grossest form of     
belief in supernatural agency as        
exhibited in ,fetichism1 through its    
more refined form as exhibited in       
,polytheism1 to its still more refined  
form as exhibited in ,monotheism8 ,in   
nothing but in a continuous process of  
what ,mr4 ,fiske calls                  
deanthropomorphisation4 ,consequently1  
must we not conclude that when we carry 
this process yet one step further1 and  
divest our conception of ,deity of all  
the yet lingering remnants of           
anthropomorphism which occur in the     
current conceptions of ,deity1 we are   
but still further purifying that        
conception8 ,assuredly1 the attributes  
of personality1 intelligence1 and so    
forth1 are only known as attributes of  
,humanity1 and therefore to ascribe them
 to ,deity is but to foster1 in a more  
refined form1 the anthropomorphic       
teachings of previous religions4 ,but if
 we carefully refuse to limit ,deity by 

the ascription of any human attributes  
whatever1 and if the only attributes    
which we do ascribe are such as on      
grounds of pure reason alone we are     
compelled to ascribe1 must we not       
conclude that the form of ,theism which 
results is the purest and the most      
refined form in which it is possible for
 ,theism to exist8 ,from the            
anthropomorphic point of view it will   
quite naturally be urged in objection1  
that this apparently desirable result is
 reached through the degradation of     
,deity from an 'intelligent personality'
 to a 'blind force1' and is therefore in
 reality an undesirable and perhaps     
quasi-atheistic result4#ci ,but the     
question which really presents itself   
is1 theologically phrased1 whether the  
creature is to be taken as a measure of 
the ,creator4 ,scientifically phrased1  
the question is whether the highest form
 of ,being as yet suggested to one petty
 race of creatures by its ephemeral     
experience of what is going on in one   

tiny corner of the universe1 is         
necessarily to be taken as the          
equivalent of that absolutely highest   
form of ,being in which all the         
possibilities of existence are alike    
comprehended4#dj ,therefore1 in         
conclusion1 whether or not it is true   
that1 within the bounds of the          
phenomenal universe the highest type of 
existence is that which we know as      
humanity1 the conclusion is in every way
 forced upon us that1 quite             
independently of limiting conditions in 
space or time1 there is a form of ,being
 which can neither be assimilated to    
humanity nor to any lower type of       
existence4 ,we have no alternative1     
therefore1 but to regard it as higher   
than humanity1 even 'as the heavens are 
higher than the earth1' and except for  
the intellectual arrogance which the    
arguments of theologians show lurking   
beneath their expressions of humility1  
there is no reason why this admission   
should not be made unreservedly1 without

 the anthropomorphic qualifications by  
which its effect is commonly nullified4 
,the time is surely coming when the     
slowness of men in accepting such a     
conclusion will be marvelled at1 and    
when the very inadequacy of human       
language to express ,divinity will be   
regarded as a reason for a deeper faith 
and more solemn adoration4#da  ,i have  
now sufficiently detailed the leading   
principles of ,cosmic ,theism to render 
a clear and just conception of those    
fundamental parts of the system which ,i
 am about to criticise2 but it is       
needless to say that1 for all minor     
details of this system1 ,i must refer   
those who may not already have perused  
them to ,mr4 ,fiske's somewhat elaborate
 essays4 ,in now beginning my           
criticisms1 it may be well to state at  
the outset1 that they are to be         
restricted to the philosophical aspect  
of the subject4 ,with matters of        
sentiment ,i do not intend to           
deal1--partly because to do so would be 

unduly to extend this essay1 and partly 
also because ,i believe that1 so far as 
the acceptance or the rejection of      
,cosmic ,theism is to be determined by  
sentiment1 much1 if not all1 will depend
 on individual habits of thought4 ,for  
whether or not ,cosmic ,theism is to be 
regarded as a religion adapted to the   
needs of any individual man1 will depend
 on what these needs are felt to be by  
that man himself3 we cannot assert      
magisterially that this religion must be
 adapted to his needs because we have   
found it to be adapted to our own4 ,and 
if it is retorted that1 human nature    
being everywhere the same1 a form of    
religion that is adapted to one man must
 on this account be adapted to another1 
,i reply that it is not so4 ,for if a   
man who is what ,mr4 ,fiske calls an    
,anthropomorphic ,theist finds from     
experience that his system of           
religion--say ,christianity--creates and
 sustains a class of emotions and       
general habits of thought which he feels

 to be the highest and the best of which
 he is capable1 it is useless for a     
,cosmic ,theist to offer such a man     
another system of religion1 in which the
 conditions essential to the existence  
of these particular emotions and habits 
of thought are manifestly absent4 ,for  
such a man cannot but feel that the     
proffered substitution would be         
tantamount1 if accepted1 to an utter    
destruction of all that he regards as   
essentially religious4 ,he will tell us 
that he finds it perfectly easy to      
understand and to appreciate those      
feelings of vague awe and worship of the
 silent kind which the ,cosmic ,theist  
declares to be fostered by ,cosmic      
,theism2 but he will also tell us that  
those feelings1 which he has experienced
 with equal vividness under his own     
system of ,anthropomorphic ,theism1 are 
to him but as non-religious dross       
compared with the unspeakable felicity  
of holding definite commune with the    
,almighty and ,most ,merciful1 or of    

rendering worship that is a glad        
hosanna--a fearless shout of joy4 ,on   
the other hand1 ,i believe that it is   
possible for philosophic habits of      
thought so to discipline the mind that  
the feelings of vague awe and silent    
worship in the presence of an appalling 
,mystery become more deep and steady    
than a theist proper can well believe4  
,it is therefore impossible that either 
party can fully appreciate those        
sentiments of the other which they have 
never fully experienced themselves2 for 
even in those cases where an            
anthropomorphic theist has been         
compelled to abandon his creed1 as the  
change must take place in mature life1  
his tone of mind has been determined    
before it does take place2 and therefore
 in sentiment1 though not in faith1 he  
is more or less of a theist for the rest
 of his life3 the only effect of the    
change is to create a troubled          
interference between his desires and his
 beliefs4  ,however1 ,i do not intend to

 develop this branch of the subject     
further than thus to point out1 in a    
general way1 that religion-mongers as a 
class are apt to show too little regard 
for the sentiments1 as distinguished    
from the beliefs1 of those to whom they 
offer their wares4 ,but although ,i do  
not intend to constitute myself a       
champion of theology by pointing out the
 defects of ,cosmic ,theism in the      
aspect which it presents to current     
modes of thought1 there is one such     
defect which ,i must here dwell upon1   
because we shall afterwards have        
occasion to refer to it4 ,a theologian  
may very naturally make this objection  
to ,cosmic ,theism as presented by ,mr4 
,fiske--viz41 that the argument on which
 this philosopher throughout relies as a
 self-evident demonstration that the new
 system of ,theism is a further and a   
final improvement on all the previous   
systems of ,theism1 is a fallacious     
argument4 ,as we have already seen1 this
 argument is1 that as the progress in   

the purification of ,theism has         
throughout consisted in a process of    
deanthropomorphisation1 therefore the   
terminal phase in this process1 which   
,cosmic ,theism introduces1 must be     
still in the direction of that progress4
 ,but to this argument a theologian may 
not unreasonably object1 that this      
terminal phase differs from all the     
previous phases in one all-important    
feature--viz41 in effecting a total     
abolition of the anthropomorphic        
element4 ,before1 therefore1 it can be  
shown that this terminal phase is a     
further development of ,theism1 it must 
he shown that ,theism still remains     
,theism after this hitherto             
characteristic element has been removed4
 ,if it is true1 as ,mr4 ,fiske very    
properly insists1 that all the various  
forms of belief in ,god have thus far   
had this as a common factor1 that they  
ascribed to ,god the attributes of ,man2
 it becomes a question whether we may   
properly abstract this hitherto         

invariable factor of a belief1 and still
 call that belief by the same name4 ,or1
 to put the matter in another light1 as 
cosmists maintain that ,theism1 in all  
the phases of its development1 has been 
the product of a probably erroneous     
theory of personal agency in nature1    
when this theory is expressly           
discarded--as it is by the doctrine of  
the ,unknowable--is it philosophically  
legitimate for cosmists to render their 
theory of things in terms which belong  
to the totally different theory which   
they discard8 ,no doubt it is true that 
the progressive refinement of ,theism   
has throughout consisted in a           
progressive discarding of               
anthropomorphic qualities2 but this fact
 does not touch the consideration that1 
when we proceed to strip off the last   
remnants of these qualities1 we are     
committing an act which differs toto    
coelo from all the previous acts which  
are cited as precedents2 for by this    
terminal act we are not1 as heretofore1 

refining the theory of ,theism--we are  
completely transforming it by removing  
an element which1 both genetically and  
historically1 would seem to constitute  
the very essence of ,theism4  ,or the   
case may be presented in yet another    
light4 ,the only use of terms1 whether  
in daily talk or in philosophical       
disquisition1 is that of designating    
certain things or attributes to which by
 general custom we agree to affix them2 
so that if anyone applies a term to some
 thing or attribute which general custom
 does not warrant him in so applying1 he
 is merely laying himself open to the   
charge of abusing that term4 ,now apply 
these elementary principles to the case 
before us4 ,we have but to think of the 
disgust with which the vast majority of 
living persons would regard the sense in
 which ,mr4 ,fiske uses the term        
,theism1 to perceive how intimate is the
 association of that term with the idea 
of a ,personal ,god4 ,such persons will 
feel strongly that1 by this final act of

 purification1 ,mr4 ,fiske has simply   
purified the ,deity altogether out of   
existence4 ,and ,i scarcely think it is 
here competent to reply that all        
previous acts of purification were at   
first similarly regarded as destructive1
 because it is evident that none of     
these previous acts affected1 as this   
one does1 the central core of ,theism4  
,and1 lastly1 if it should be still     
further objected1 that by declaring the 
theory of ,personal ,agency the central 
core of ,theism1 ,i am begging the      
question as to the appropriateness of   
,mr4 ,fiske's use of the word           
,theism1--seeing he appears to regard   
the essential meaning of this word to be
 that of a postulation of merely ,causal
 ,agency1--,i answer1 ,more of this     
anon2 but meanwhile let it be observed  
that any charge of question-begging lies
 rather at the door of ,mr4 ,fiske1 in  
that he assumes1 without any expressed  
justification1 that the essence of      
,theism does consist in such a          

postulation and in nothing more4 ,and as
 he unquestionably has against him the  
present world of theists no less than   
the history of ,theism in the past1 ,i  
do not see how he is to meet this charge
 except by confessing to an abuse of the
 term in question4  ,i will now proceed 
to examine the structure of ,cosmic     
,theism4 ,we are all1 ,i suppose1 at one
 in allowing that there are only three  
verbally intelligible theories of the   
universe1--viz41 that it is             
self-existent1 or that it is            
self-created1 or that it has been       
created by some other and external      
,being4 ,it is usual to call the first  
of these theories ,atheism1 the second  
,pantheism1 and the third ,theism4 ,now 
as there are here three distinct        
nameable theories1 it is necessary1 if  
the term ,cosmic ,theism is to be       
justified as an appropriate term1 that  
the particular theory which it          
designates should be shown to be in its 
essence theistic--i4e41 that the theory 

should present those distinguishing     
features in virtue of which ,theism     
differs from ,atheism on the one hand1  
and from ,pantheism on the other4 ,now  
what are these features8 ,the postulate 
of an ,eternal ,self-existing ,something
 is common to ,theism and to ,atheism4  
,here ,atheism ends4 ,theism1 however1  
is generally said to assume             
,personality1 ,intelligence1 and        
,creative ,power as attributes of the   
single self-existing substance4 ,lastly1
 ,pantheism assumes the ,something now  
existing to have been self-created4 ,to 
which1 then1 of these distinct theories 
is ,cosmic ,theism most nearly allied8  
,for the purpose of answering this      
question1 ,i shall render that theory in
 terms of a formula which ,mr4 ,fiske   
presents as a full and complete         
statement of the theory3--,there exists 
a ,,power1 to which no limit in space or
 time is conceivable1 of which all      
phenomena1 as presented in              
consciousness1 are manifestations1 but  

which we can only know through these    
manifestations4 ,but although the word  
,power is here so strongly emphasised1  
we are elsewhere told that it is not to 
be regarded as having more than a       
strictly relative or symbolic meaning2  
so that1 in point of fact1 some more    
neutral word1 such as ,something1       
,being1 or ,substance1 ought in         
strictness to be here substituted for   
the word ,power4 ,well1 if this is done1
 we have the postulation of a ,being    
which is self-existing1 infinite1 and   
eternal--relatively1 at all events1 to  
our powers of conception4 ,thus far1    
therefore1 it would seem that we are    
still on the common standing-ground of  
,atheism1 ,pantheism1 and ,theism2 for  
as it is not1 so far as ,i can see1     
incumbent on ,pantheism to affirm that  
thought is a measure of things1 the     
apparent or relative eternity which the 
,primal ,something must be supposed to  
present may not be actual or absolute   
eternity4 ,nevertheless1 as ,mr4 ,fiske1

 by predicating ,divinity of the ,primal
 ,something1 implicitly attributes to it
 the quality of an eternal              
self-existence1 ,i infer that ,cosmic   
,theism may be concluded at this point  
to part company with ,pantheism4 ,there 
remain1 then1 ,theism and ,atheism4     
,now undoubtedly1 at first sight1       
,cosmic ,theism appears to differ from  
,atheism in one all-important           
particular4 ,for we have seen that1 by  
means of a subtle though perfectly      
logical argument1 ,cosmic ,philosophy   
has evolved this conclusion--that all   
phenomena as presented in consciousness 
are manifestations of a not improbable  
,single ,self-existing ,power1 of whose 
existence these manifestations alone can
 make us cognisant4 ,from which it      
apparently follows1 that this           
hypothetical ,power must be regarded as 
existing out of necessary relation to   
the phenomenal universe2 that it is1    
therefore1 beyond question ,absolute    
,being2 and that1 as such1 we are       

entitled to call it ,deity4 ,but in the 
train of reasoning of which this is a   
very condensed epitome1 it is evident   
that the legitimacy of denominating this
 ,absolute ,being ,deity1 must depend on
 the exact meaning which we attach to   
the word ,absolute--and this1 be it     
observed1 quite apart from the question1
 before touched upon1 as to whether     
,personality and ,intelligence are not  
to be considered as attributes essential
 to ,deity4 ,in what sense1 then1 is the
 word ,absolute used8 ,it is used in    
this sense4 ,as from the relativity of  
knowledge we cannot know things in      
themselves1 but only symbolical         
representations of such things1         
therefore things in themselves are      
absolute to consciousness3 but analysis 
shows that we cannot conceivably        
predicate ,difference among things in   
themselves1 so that we are at liberty1  
with due diffidence1 to predicate of    
them ,no-difference3 hence the noumena  
of the schoolmen admit of being         

collected into a summum genus of        
noumenal existence2 and since1 before   
their colligation noumena were severally
 absolute1 after their colligation they 
become collectively absolute3 therefore 
it is legitimate to designate this      
sum-total of noumenal existence1        
,absolute ,being4 ,now there is clearly 
no exception to be taken to the formal  
accuracy of this reasoning2 the only    
question is as to whether the ,absolute 
,being which it evolves is absolute in  
the sense required by ,theism4 ,i       
confess that to me this ,being appears  
to be absolute in a widely different    
sense from that in which ,deity must be 
regarded as absolute4 ,for this ,being  
is thus seen to be absolute in no other 
sense than as holding--to quote from    
,mr4 ,fiske--existence independent of   
the conditions of the process of        
knowing4 ,in other words1 it is absolute
 only as standing out of necessary      
relation to human consciousness4 ,but   
,theism requires1 as an essential       

feature1 that ,deity should be absolute 
as standing out of necessary relation to
 all else4 ,before1 therefore1 the      
,absolute ,being of ,cosmism can be     
shown1 by the reasoning adopted1 to     
deserve1 even in part1 the appellation  
of ,deity1 it must be shown that there  
is no other mode of ,being in existence 
save our own subjective consciousness   
and the ,absolute ,reality which becomes
 objective to it through the world of   
phenomena4 ,but any attempt to establish
 this position would involve a disregard
 of the doctrine that knowledge is      
relative2 and to do this1 it is needless
 to say1 would be to destroy the basis  
of the argument whereby the ,absolute   
,being of ,cosmism was posited4  ,or1 to
 state this part of the criticism in    
other words1 as the first step in       
justifying the predication of ,deity1 it
 must be shown that the ,being of which 
the predication is made is absolute1 and
 this not merely as independent of human
 consciousness1 but as independent of   

the whole noumenal universe--,deity     
itself alone excepted4 ,that is1 the    
,being of which ,deity is predicated    
must be ,unconditioned4 ,hence it is    
incumbent on ,cosmic ,theism to prove1  
either that the ,causal ,agent which it 
denominates ,deity is itself the whole  
noumenal universe1 or that it created   
the rest of a noumenal universe2 else   
there is nothing to show that this      
,causal ,agent was not itself           
created--seeing that1 even if we assume 
the existence of a ,god1 there is       
nothing to indicate that the ,causal    
,agent of ,cosmism is that ,god4  ,it   
would appear therefore from this1 that  
whatever else the ,cosmist's theory of  
things may be1 it certainly is not      
,theism2 and ,i think that closer       
inspection will tend to confirm this    
judgment4 ,to this then let us proceed4 
,mr4 ,fiske is very hard on the         
atheists1 and so will probably repudiate
 with scorn any insinuations to the     
effect that his theory of things is     

quasi-atheistic4 ,nevertheless1 it seems
 to me that he is very unjust to the    
atheists1 in that while he spares no    
pains to purify and refine the theory of
 the theists1 so as at last to leave    
nothing but what he regards as the      
distilled essence of ,theism behind2 he 
habitually leaves the theory of the     
atheists as he finds it1 without making 
any attempt either to purify it by      
removing its weak and unnecessary       
ingredients1 or to refine it by adding  
such sublimated ingredients as modern   
speculation has supplied4 ,thus1 while  
he despises the atheists of the         
eighteenth century for their            
irrationality in believing in the       
self-existence of a phenomenal universe1
 and reviles them for their irreligion  
in denying that the religious sentiment 
needed satisfaction2 he does not wait to
 inquire whether1 in its essential      
substance1 the theory of these men is   
not the one that has proved itself best 
able to withstand the grinding action of

 more recent thought4 ,but let us in    
fairness ask1 ,what was the essential   
substance of that theory8 ,apparently it
 was the bare statement of the          
unthinkable fact that ,something ,is4   
,it therefore seems to me useless in    
,mr4 ,fiske to lay so much stress on the
 fact that this ,something was          
originally identified by atheists with  
the phenomenal universe4 ,it seems      
useless to do this1 because such        
identification is clearly no part of the
 essence of ,atheism1 which1 as just    
stated1 ,i take to consist in the single
 dogma of self-existence as itself      
sufficient to constitute a theory of    
things4 ,and1 if so1 it is a matter of  
scarcely any moment1 as regards that    
theory1 whether we are immediately      
cognisant of that which is              
self-existent1 or only become so through
 the world of phenomena--the vital point
 of the theory being1 that              
,self-existence1 wherever posited1 is   
itself the only admissible explanation  

of phenomena4 ,or1 in other words1 it   
does not seem that there is anything in 
the atheistic theory1 as such1 which is 
incompatible with the doctrine of the   
,relativity of ,knowledge2 so that      
whatever cogency there may be in the    
train of reasoning whereby a single     
,causal ,agent is deduced from that     
doctrine1 it would seem that an atheist 
has as much right to the benefit of this
 reasoning as a theist2 and there is    
thus no more apparent reason why this   
single ,causal ,agent should be         
appropriated as the ,god of ,theism1    
than that it should be appropriated as  
the ,self-existing ,x of ,atheism4      
,indeed1 there seems to be less reason4 
,for an atheist of to-day may very      
properly argue3--',so far from beholding
 anything divine in this ,single ,being 
absolute to human consciousness1 it is  
just precisely the form of ,being which 
my theory postulates as the             
,self-existing ,all4 ,in order to       
constitute such a ,being ,god1 it must  

be shown1 as we have already seen1 to be
 something more than a merely ,causal   
,agent which is absolute in the         
grotesquely restricted sense of being   
independent of 'one petty race of       
creatures with an ephemeral experience  
of what is going on in one tiny corner  
of the universe2' it must be shown to be
 something more than absolute even in   
the wholly unrestricted sense of being  
,unconditioned2 it must be shown to     
possess such other attributes as are    
distinctive of ,deity4 ,for ,i maintain 
that even ,unconditioned ,being1 merely 
as such1 would only then have a right to
 the name of ,god when it has been shown
 that the theory of ,theism has a right 
to monopolise the doctrine of           
,relativity4'  ,in thus endeavouring to 
purify the theory of ,atheism1 by       
divesting it of all superfluous         
accessories1 and laying bare what ,i    
conceive to be its essential substance2 
it may be well to state that1 even apart
 from their irreligious character1 ,i   

have no sympathy with the atheists of   
the past century4 ,i mean1 that these   
men do not seem to me to deserve any    
credit for advanced powers of           
speculation merely because they adopted 
a theory of things which in its         
essential features now promises to be   
the most enduring4 ,for it is evident   
that the strength of this theory now    
lies in its simplicity1--in its         
undertaking to explain1 so far as       
explanation is possible1 the sum-total  
of phenomena by the single postulate of 
self-existence4 ,but it seems to me that
 in the last century there were no      
sufficient data for rendering such a    
theory of things a rational theory2 for 
so long as the quality of self-existence
 was supposed to reside in phenomena    
themselves1 the very simplicity of the  
theory1 as expressed in words1 must have
 seemed to render it inapplicable as a  
reasonable theory of things4 ,the       
astounding variety1 complexity1 and     
harmony which are everywhere so         

conspicuous in the world of phenomena   
must have seemed to necessitate as an   
explanation some one integrating cause2 
and it is impossible that in the        
eighteenth century any such integrating 
cause can have been conceivable other   
than ,intelligence4 ,therefore ,i think1
 with ,mr4 ,fiske1 that the atheists of 
the eighteenth century were irrational  
in applying their single postulate of   
self-existence as alone a sufficient    
explanation of things4 ,but of course   
the aspect of the case is now completely
 changed1 when we regard it in all the  
flood of light which has been shed on it
 by recent science1 physical and        
speculative4 ,for the demonstration of  
the fact that energy is indestructible1 
coupled with the corollary that every   
so-called natural law is a physically   
necessary consequence of that fact1     
clearly supply us with a completely     
novel datum as the ultimate source of   
experience--and a datum1 moreover1 which
 is as different as can well be imagined

 from the ever-changing1 ever-fleeting1 
world of phenomena4 ,we have1 therefore1
 but to apply the postulate of          
self-existence to this single ultimate  
datum1 and we have a theory of things as
 rational as the ,atheism of the last   
century was irrational4 ,nevertheless1  
that this theory is more akin to the    
,atheism of the last century than to any
 other theory of that time1 is1 ,i      
think1 unquestionable2 for while we     
retain the central doctrine of          
self-existence as alone a scientifically
 admissible1 or non-gratuitous1         
explanation of things1 we only change   
the original theory by transferring the 
application of this doctrine from the   
world of manifestations to that which   
causes the manifestations3 we do not    
resort to any of the additional         
doctrines whereby the other theories of 
the universe were distinguished from the
 theory of ,atheism in its original     
form4 ,however1 as by our recognition of
 the relativity of knowledge we are     

precluded from dogmatically denying any 
theory of the universe that may be      
proposed1 it would clearly be erroneous 
to identify the doctrine of the         
,unknowable with the theory of ,atheism3
 all we can say is1 that1 so far as     
speculative thought can soar1 the       
permanent self-existence of an          
inconceivable ,something1 which         
manifests itself to consciousness as    
force and matter1 constitutes the only  
datum that can be shown to be required  
for the purposes of a rational ontology4
  ,to sum up4 ,in the theory which ,mr4 
,fiske calls ,cosmic ,theism1 while ,i  
am able to discern the elements which ,i
 think may properly be regarded as      
common to ,theism and to ,atheism1 ,i am
 not able to discern any single element 
that is specifically distinctive of     
,theism4 ,still ,i am far from          
concluding that the theory in question  
is the theory of ,atheism4 ,all ,i wish 
to insist upon is this--that as the     
,absolute ,being of ,cosmism presents no

 other qualities than such as are       
required by the renovated theory of     
,atheism1 its postulation supplies a    
basis1 not for ,theism1 but for         
,non-theism3 a man with such a postulate
 ought in strictness to abstain from    
either affirming or denying the         
existence of ,god4 ,and this1 ,i may    
observe1 appears to be the position     
which ,mr4 ,spencer himself has adopted 
as the only logical outcome of his      
doctrine of the ,unknowable--a position 
which1 in my opinion1 it is most        
undesirable to obscure by endeavouring  
to give it a quasi-theistic             
interpretation4 ,i may further observe1 
that we here seem to have a             
philosophical justification of the      
theological sentiment previously alluded
 to--the sentiment1 namely1 that by his 
attempt at a final purification of      
,theism1 ,mr4 ,fiske has destroyed those
 essential features of the theory in    
virtue of which alone it exists as      
,theism4 ,for seeing it is impossible1  

from the relativity of knowledge1 that  
the ,absolute ,being of ,cosmism can    
ever be shown absolute in the sense     
required by ,theism1 and1 even if it    
could1 that it would still be but the   
,unconditioned ,being of ,atheism2 it   
follows that if this ,absolute ,being is
 to be shown even in part to deserve the
 appellation of ,deity1 it must be shown
 to possess the only remaining          
attributes which are distinctive of     
,deity--to wit1 personality and         
intelligence4 ,but forasmuch as the     
final act of purifying the conception of
 ,deity consists1 according to ,mr4     
,fiske1 in expressly removing these     
particular attributes from the object of
 that conception1 does it not follow    
that the conception which remains is1 as
 ,i have said1 not theistic1 but        
non-theistic8  ,here my criticism might 
properly have ended1 were it not that   
,mr4 ,fiske1 after having divested the  
,deity of all his psychical attributes1 
forthwith proceeds to show how it may be

 dimly possible to reinvest him with    
attributes that are quasi-psychical4    
,mr4 ,fiske is1 of course1 far too      
subtle a thinker not to see that his    
previous argument from relativity       
precludes him from assigning much weight
 to the ontological speculations in     
which he here indulges1 seeing that in  
whatever degree the relativity of       
knowledge renders legitimate the        
non-ascription to ,deity of known       
psychical attributes1 in some such      
degree at least must it render          
illegitimate the ascription to ,deity of
 unknown psychical attributes4 ,but in  
the part of his work in which he treats 
of the quasi-psychical attributes1 ,mr4 
,fiske is merely engaged in showing that
 the speculative standing of the        
materialists is inferior to that of the 
spiritualists2 so that1 as this is a    
subject distinct from ,theism1 he is not
 open to the charge of inconsistency4   
,well1 feeble as these speculations     
undoubtedly are in the support which    

they render to ,theism1 it nevertheless 
seems desirable to consider them before 
closing this review4 ,the speculations  
in question are quoted from ,mr4        
,spencer1 and are as follows3--  ,mind1 
as known to the possessor of it1 is a   
circumscribed aggregate of activities2  
and the cohesion of these activities1   
one with another1 throughout the        
aggregate1 compels the postulation of a 
something of which they are the         
activities4 ,but the same experiences   
which make him aware of this coherent   
aggregate of mental activities1         
simultaneously make him aware of        
activities that are not included in     
it--outlying activities which become    
known by their effects on this          
aggregate1 but which are experimentally 
proved to be not coherent with it1 and  
to be coherent with one another 7,first 
,principles1  #dc1 #dd74 ,as1 by the    
definition of them1 these external      
activities cannot be brought within the 
aggregate of activities distinguished as

 those of ,mind1 they must for ever     
remain to him nothing more than the     
unknown correlatives of their effects on
 this aggregate2 and can be thought of  
only in terms furnished by this         
aggregate4 ,hence1 if he regards his    
conceptions of these activities lying   
beyond ,mind as constituting knowledge  
of them1 he is deluding himself3 he is  
but representing these activities in    
terms of ,mind1 and can never do        
otherwise4 ,eventually he is obliged to 
admit that his ideas of ,matter and     
,motion1 merely symbolic of unknowable  
realities1 are complex states of        
consciousness built out of units of     
feeling4 ,but if1 after admitting this1 
he persists in asking whether units of  
feeling are of the same nature as the   
units of force distinguished as         
external1 or whether the units of force 
distinguished as external are of the    
same nature as units of feeling2 then   
the reply1 still substantially the same1
 is that we may go further towards      

conceiving units of external force to be
 identical with units of feeling1 than  
we can towards conceiving units of      
feeling to be identical with units of   
external force4 ,clearly1 if units of   
external force are regarded as          
absolutely unknown and unknowable1 then 
to translate units of feeling into them 
is to translate the known into the      
unknown1 which is absurd4 ,and if they  
are what they are supposed to be by     
those who identify them with their      
symbols1 then the difficulty of         
translating units of feeling into them  
is insurmountable3 if ,force as it      
objectively exists is absolutely alien  
in nature from that which exists        
subjectively as ,feeling1 then the      
transformation of ,force into ,feeling  
is unthinkable4 ,either way1 therefore1 
it is impossible to interpret inner     
existence in terms of outer existence4  
,but if1 on the other hand1 units of    
,force as they exist objectively are    
essentially the same in nature with     

those manifested subjectively as units  
of ,feeling1 then a conceivable         
hypothesis remains open4 ,every element 
of that aggregate of activities         
constituting a consciousness is known as
 belonging to consciousness only by its 
cohesion with the rest4 ,beyond the     
limits of this coherent aggregate of    
activities exist activities quite       
independent of it1 and which cannot be  
brought into it4 ,we may imagine1 then1 
that by their exclusion from the        
circumscribed activities constituting   
consciousness1 these outer activities1  
though of the same intrinsic nature1    
become antithetically opposed in aspect4
 ,being disconnected from consciousness1
 or cut off by its limits1 they are     
thereby rendered foreign to it4 ,not    
being incorporated with its activities1 
or linked with these as they are with   
one another1 consciousness cannot1 as it
 were1 run through them2 and so they    
come to be figured as unconscious--are  
symbolised as having the nature called  

material1 as opposed to that called     
spiritual4 ,while1 however1 it thus     
seems an imaginable possibility that    
units of external ,force may be         
identical in nature with units of the   
force known as ,feeling1 yet we cannot  
by so representing them get any nearer  
to a comprehension of external ,force4  
,for1 as already shown1 supposing all   
forms of ,mind to be composed of        
homogeneous units of feeling variously  
aggregated1 the resolution of them into 
such units leaves us as unable as before
 to think of the substance of ,mind as  
it exists in such units2 and thus1 even 
could we really figure to ourselves all 
units of external ,force as being       
essentially like units of the force     
known as ,feeling1 and as so            
constituting a universal sentiency1 we  
should be as far as ever from forming a 
conception of that which is universally 
sentient4#db  ,now while ,i agree with  
,mr4 ,fiske that we have here the most  
subtle conclusion now within the ken of 

the scientific speculator1 reached      
without any disregard of the canons     
prescribed by the doctrine of           
relativity1 ,i would like to point out  
to minds less clear-sighted than his1   
that this same doctrine of relativity   
effectually debars us from using this   
conclusion as an argument of any        
assignable value in favour of ,theism4  
,for the value of conceivability as a   
test of truth1 on which this conclusion 
is founded1 is here vitiated by the     
consideration that1 whatever the nature 
of ,force-units may be1 we can clearly  
perceive it to be a subjective necessity
 of the case that they should admit of  
being more easily conceived by us to be 
of the nature of ,feeling-units than to 
be of any other nature4 ,for as units of
 ,feeling are the only entities of which
 we are1 or can be1 conscious1 they are 
the entities into which units of ,force 
must be1 so to speak1 subjectively      
translated before we can cognise their  
existence at all4 ,therefore1 whatever  

the real nature of ,force-units may be1 
ultimate analysis must show that it is  
more conceivable to identify them in    
thought with the only units of which we 
are cognisant1 than it is to think of   
them as units of which we are not       
cognisant1 and concerning which1        
therefore1 conception is necessarily    
impossible4 ,or thus1 the only          
alternative with respect to the         
classifying of ,force-units lies between
 refusing to classify them at all1 or   
classifying them with the only ultimate 
units with which we are acquainted4 ,but
 this restriction1 for aught that can   
ever be shown to the contrary1 arises   
only from the subjective conditions of  
our own consciousness2 there is nothing 
to indicate that1 in objective reality1 
units of ,force are in any wise akin to 
units of ,feeling4 ,conceivability1     
therefore1 as a test of truth1 is in    
this particular case of no assignable   
degree of value2 for as the entities to 
which it is applied are respectively the

 highest known abstractions of          
subjective and objective existence1 the 
test of conceivability is neutralised by
 directly encountering the inconceivable
 relation that subsists between subject 
and object4 ,i think1 therefore1 it is  
evident that these ontological          
speculations present no sufficient      
warrant for an inference1 even of the   
slenderest kind1 that the ,absolute     
,being of ,cosmism possesses attributes 
of a nature quasi-psychical2 and1 if so1
 it follows that these speculations are 
incompetent to form the basis of a      
theory which1 even by the greatest      
stretch of courtesy1 can in any         
legitimate sense be termed              
quasi-theistic4#dc  ,on the whole1 then1
 ,i conclude that the term ,cosmic      
,theism is not an appropriate term      
whereby to denote the theory of things  
set forth in ,cosmic ,philosophy2 and   
that it would therefore be more         
judicious to leave the doctrine of the  
,unknowable as ,mr4 ,spencer has left   

it--that is1 without theological        
implications of any kind4 ,but in now   
taking leave of this subject1 ,i should 
like it to be understood that the only  
reason why ,i have ventured thus to take
 exception to a part of ,mr4 ,fiske's   
work is because ,i regret that a        
treatise which displays so much of      
literary excellence and philosophic     
power should lend itself to promoting   
what ,i regard as mistaken views        
concerning the ontological tendencies of
 recent thought1 and this with no other 
apparent motive than that of unworthily 
retaining in the new philosophy a       
religious term the distinctive          
connotations of which are considered by 
that philosophy to have become obsolete4
         99       99       99       99  
99   ,,ii4  ,,supplementary ,,essay ,,in
 ,,reply ,,to ,a ,,recent ,,work ,,on   
,,theism4#dd  ,on perusing my main essay
 several years after its completion1 it 
occurred to me that another very        
effectual way of demonstrating the      

immense difference between the nature of
 all previous attacks upon the          
teleological argument and the nature of 
the present attack1 would be briefly to 
review the reasonable objections to     
which all the previous attacks were     
open4 ,very opportunely a work on       
,theism has just been published which   
states these objections with great      
lucidity1 and answers them with much    
ability4 ,the work to which ,i allude is
 by the ,rev4 ,professor ,flint1 and as 
it is characterised by temperate candour
 in tone and logical care in exposition1
 ,i felt on reading it that the work was
 particularly well suited for displaying
 the enormous change in the speculative 
standing of ,theism which the foregoing 
considerations must be rationally deemed
 to have effected4 ,i therefore         
determined on throwing my supplementary 
essay1 which ,i had previously intended 
to write1 into the form of a criticism  
on ,professor ,flint's treatise1 and ,i 
adopted this course the more willingly  

because there are several other points  
dwelt upon in that treatise which it    
seems desirable for me to consider in   
the present one1 although1 for the sake 
of conciseness1 ,i abstained from       
discussing them in my previous essay4   
,with these two objects in view1        
therefore1 ,i undertook the following   
criticism4#de  ,in the first place1 it  
is needful to protest against an        
argument which our author adopts on the 
authority of ,professor ,clark ,maxwell4
 ,the argument is now a well-known one1 
and is thus stated by ,professor        
,maxwell in his presidential address    
before the ,british ,association for the
 ,advancement of ,science1 #ahgj3--,none
 of the processes of nature1 since the  
time when nature began1 have produced   
the slightest difference in the         
properties of any molecule4 ,we are     
therefore unable to ascribe either the  
existence of the molecules or the       
identity of their properties to the     
operation of any of the causes which we 

call natural4 ,on the other hand1 the   
exact quality of each molecule to all   
others of the same kind gives it1 as    
,sir ,john ,herschel has well said1 the 
essential character of a manufactured   
article1 and precludes the idea of its  
being eternal and self-existent4 ,thus  
we have been led along a strictly       
scientific path1 very near to the point 
at which science must stop4 ,not that   
science is debarred from studying the   
external mechanism of a molecule which  
she cannot take to pieces1 any more than
 from investigating an organism which   
she cannot put together4 ,but in tracing
 back the history of matter1 science is 
arrested when she assures herself1 on   
the one hand1 that the molecule has been
 made1 and1 on the other1 that it has   
not been made by any of the processes we
 call natural4  ,now it is obvious that 
we have here no real argument1 since it 
is obvious that science can never be in 
a position to assert that atoms1 the    
very existence of which is hypothetical1

 were never made by any of the processes
 we call natural4 ,the mere fact that in
 the universe1 as we now know it1 the   
evolution of material atoms is not      
observed to be taking place by any of   
the processes we call natural1 cannot   
possibly be taken as proof1 or even as  
presumption1 that there ever was a time 
when the material atoms now in existence
 were created by a supernatural cause4  
,the fact cannot be taken to justify any
 such inference for the following       
reasons4 ,in the first place1 assuming  
the atomic theory to be true1 and there 
is nothing in the argument to show that 
the now-existing atoms are not          
self-existing atoms1 endowed with their 
peculiar and severally distinctive      
properties from all eternity4 ,doubtless
 the argument is1 that as there appear  
to be some sixty or more elementary     
atoms constituting the raw material of  
the observable universe1 it is          
incredible that they can all have owed  
their correlated properties to any cause

 other than that of a designing and     
manufacturing intelligence4 ,but1 in the
 next place--and here comes the         
demolishing force of the                
criticism--science is not in a position 
to assert that these sixty or more      
elementary atoms are in any real sense  
of the term elementary4 ,the mere fact  
that chemistry is as yet in too         
undeveloped a condition to pronounce    
whether or not all the forms of matter  
known to her are modifications of some  
smaller number of elements1 or even of a
 single element1 cannot possibly be     
taken as a warrant for so huge an       
inference as that there are really more 
than sixty elements all endowed with    
absolutely distinctive properties by a  
supernatural cause4 ,now this           
consideration1 which arises immediately 
from the doctrine of the relativity of  
knowledge1 is alone amply sufficient to 
destroy the present argument4 ,but we   
must not on this account lose sight of  
the fact that1 even to our strictly     

relative science in its present         
embryonic condition1 we are not without 
decided indications1 not only that the  
so-called elements are probably for the 
most part compounds1 but even that      
matter as a whole is one substance1     
which is itself probably but some       
modification of energy4 ,indeed1 the    
whole tendency of recent scientific     
speculation is towards the view that the
 universe consists of some one          
substance1 which1 whether self-existing 
or created1 is diverse only in its      
relation to ignorance4 ,and if this view
 is correct1 how obvious is the         
inference which ,i have elaborated in   
#cb1 that all the diverse forms of      
matter1 as we know them1 were probably  
evolved by natural causes4 ,so obvious1 
indeed1 is this inference1 that to      
resort to any supernatural hypothesis to
 explain the diverse properties of the  
various chemical elements appears to me 
a most glaring violation of the law of  
parcimony--as much more glaring1 for    

instance1 than the violation of this law
 by ,paley1 as the number and variety of
 organic species are greater than the   
number and variety of chemical species4 
,and if it was illegitimate in ,paley to
 use a mere absence of knowledge as to  
how the transmutation of apparently     
fixed species of animals was effected as
 equivalent to the possession of        
knowledge that such transmutation had   
not been effected1 how much more        
illegitimate must it be to commit a     
similar sin against logic in the case of
 the chemical elements1 where our       
classification is confessedly beset with
 numberless difficulties1 and when we   
begin to discern that in all probability
 it is a classification essentially     
artificial4 ,lastly1 the mere fact that 
the transmutation of chemical species   
and the evolution of chemical atoms are 
processes which we do not now observe as
 occurring in nature1 is surely a       
consideration of a far more feeble kind 
than it is even in the case of          

biological species and biological       
evolution2 seeing that nature's         
laboratory must be now so inconceivably 
different from what it was during the   
condensation of the nebula4 ,what an    
atrocious piece of arrogance1 therefore1
 it is to assert that none of the       
processes of nature1 since the time when
 nature began1 have produced the        
slightest difference in the properties  
of any molecule6 ,no one can entertain a
 higher respect for ,professor ,clark   
,maxwell than ,i do2 but a single       
sentence of such a kind as this cannot  
leave two opinions in any impartial mind
 concerning his competency to deal with 
such subjects4  ,i am therefore sorry to
 see this absurd argument approvingly   
incorporated in ,professor ,flint's     
work4 ,he says1 ,i believe that no reply
 to these words of ,professor ,clark    
,maxwell is possible from any one who   
holds the ordinary view of scientific   
men as to the ultimate constitution of  
matter4 ,they must suppose every atom1  

every molecule1 to be of such a nature1 
to be so related to others and to the   
universe generally1 that things may be  
such as we see them to be2 but this     
their fitness to be built up into the   
structure of the universe is a proof    
that they have been made fit1 and since 
natural forces could not have acted on  
them while not yet existent1 a          
supernatural power must have created    
them1 and created them with a view to   
their manifold uses4 ,here the inference
 so confidently drawn would have been a 
weak one even were we not able to see   
that the doctrine of natural evolution  
probably applies to inorganic nature no 
less than to organic4 ,for the inference
 is drawn from considerations of a      
character so transcendental and so      
remote from science1 that unless we wish
 to be deceived by a merely verbal      
argument1 we must feel that the         
possibilities of error in the inference 
are so numerous and indefinite1 that the
 inference itself is well-nigh worthless

 as a basis of belief4 ,but when we add 
that in ,chapter ,,iv4 of the foregoing 
essay it has been shown to be within the
 legitimate scope of scientific         
reasoning to conclude that material     
atoms have been progressively evolved   
pari passu with the natural laws of     
chemical combination1 it is evident that
 any force which the present argument   
could ever have had must now be         
pronounced as neutralised4 ,natural     
causes have been shown1 so far as       
scientific inference can extend1 as not 
improbably sufficient to produce the    
observed effects2 and therefore we are  
no longer free to invoke the            
hypothetical action of any supernatural 
cause4  ,the same observations apply to 
,professor ,flint's theistic argument   
drawn from recent scientific            
speculations as to the vortex-ring      
construction of matter4 ,if these       
speculations are sound1 their only      
influence on ,theism would be that of   
supplying a scientific demonstration of 

the substantial identity of ,force and  
,matter1 and so of supplying a still    
more valid basis for the theory as to   
the natural genesis of matter from a    
single primordial substance1 in the     
manner sketched out in ,chapter ,,iv4   
,for the argument adduced by ,professor 
,flint1 that as the manner in which the 
vorticial motion of a ring is originated
 has not as yet been suggested1         
therefore its origination must have been
 due to a ,divine impulse1 is an        
argument which again uses the absence of
 knowledge as equivalent to its         
possession4 ,we are in the presence of a
 very novel and highly abstruse theory1 
or rather hypothesis1 in physics1 which 
was originally suggested by1 and has    
hitherto been mainly indebted to1       
empirical experiments as distinguished  
from mathematical calculations2 and from
 the mere fact that1 in the case of such
 a hypothesis1 mathematicians have not  
as yet been able to determine the       
physical conditions required to         

originate vorticial motion1 we are      
expected to infer that no such          
conditions can ever have existed1 and   
therefore that every such vortex system1
 if it exists1 is a miracle6  ,and      
substantially the same criticism applies
 to the argument which ,professor ,flint
 adduces--the argument also on which    
,professors ,balfour and ,tait lay so   
much stress in their work on the ,unseen
 ,universe--the argument1 namely1 as to 
the non-eternal character of heat4 ,the 
calculations on which this argument     
depends would only be valid as          
sustaining this argument if they were   
based upon a knowledge of the universe  
as a whole2 and therefore1 as before1   
the absence of requisite knowledge must 
not be used as equivalent to its        
possession4  ,these1 however1 are the   
weakest parts of ,professor ,flint's    
work4 ,i therefore gladly turn to those 
parts which are exceedingly cogent as   
written from his standpoint1 but which1 
in view of the strictures on the        

teleological argument that ,i have      
adduced in ,chapters ,,iv4 and ,,vi41 ,i
 submit to be now wholly valueless4     
,how could matter of itself produce     
order1 even if it were self-existent and
 eternal8 ,it is far more unreasonable  
to believe that the atoms or            
constituents of matter produced of      
themselves1 without the action of a     
,supreme ,mind1 this wonderful universe1
 than that the letters of the ,english  
alphabet produced the plays of          
,shakespeare1 without the slightest     
assistance from the human mind known by 
that famous name4 ,these atoms might1   
perhaps1 now and then1 here and there1  
at great distances and long intervals1  
produce by a chance contact some curious
 collocation or compound2 but never     
could they produce order or organisation
 on an extensive scale1 or of a durable 
character1 unless ordered1 arranged1 and
 adjusted in ways of which intelligence 
alone can be the ultimate explanation4  
,to believe that these fortuitous and   

indirected movements could originate the
 universe1 and all the harmonies and    
utilities and beauties which abound in  
it1 evinces a credulity far more        
extravagant than has ever been displayed
 by the most superstitious of           
religionists4 ,yet no consistent        
materialist can refuse to accept this   
colossal chance hypothesis4 ,all the    
explanations of the order of the        
universe which materialists1 from       
,democritus and ,epicurus to ,diderot   
and ,lange1 have devised1 rest on the   
assumption that the elements of matter1 
being eternal1 must pass through        
infinite combinations1 and that one of  
these must be our present world--a      
special collocation among the countless 
millions of collocations1 past and      
future4 ,throw the letters of the ,greek
 alphabet1 it has been said1 an infinite
 number of times1 and you must produce  
the ',iliad' and all the ,greek books4  
,the theory of probabilities1 ,i need   
hardly say1 requires us to believe      

nothing so absurd4444 ,but what is the  
',iliad' to the hymn of creation and the
 drama of providence8 c4  ,now this ,i  
conceive to have been a fully valid     
argument at the time it was published1  
and indeed the most convincing of all   
the arguments in favour of ,theism4     
,but1 as already so frequently pointed  
out1 the considerations adduced in      
,chapter ,,iv4 of the present work are  
utterly destructive of this argument4   
,for this argument assumes1 rightly     
enough1 that the only alternative we    
have in choosing our hypothesis         
concerning the final explanation of     
things is either to regard that         
explanation as ,intelligence or as      
,fortuity4 ,this1 ,i say1 was a         
legitimate argument a few months ago1   
because up to that time no one had shown
 that strictly natural causes1 as       
distinguished from chances1 could       
conceivably be able to produce a cosmos2
 and although the several previous      
writers to whom ,professor ,flint       

alludes--and he might have alluded to   
others in this connection--entertained a
 dim anticipation of the fact that      
natural causes might alone be sufficient
 to produce the observed universe1 still
 these dim anticipations were worthless 
as arguments so long as it remained     
impossible to suggest any natural       
principle whereby such a result could   
have been conceivably effected by such  
causes4 ,but it is evident that         
,professor ,flint's time-honoured       
argument is now completely overthrown1  
unless it can be proved that there is   
some radical error in the reasoning     
whereby ,i have endeavoured to show that
 natural causes not only may1 but must1 
have produced existing order4 ,the      
overthrow is complete1 because the very 
groundwork of the argument in question  
is knocked away2 a third possibility1 of
 the nature of a necessity1 is          
introduced1 and therefore the           
alternative is no longer between        
,intelligence and ,fortuity1 but between

 ,intelligence and ,natural ,causation4 
,whereas the overwhelming strength of   
the argument from ,order has hitherto   
consisted in the supposition of         
,intelligence as the one and only       
conceivable cause of the integration of 
things1 my exposition in ,chapter ,,iv4 
has shown that such integration must    
have been due1 at all events in a       
relative or proximate sense1 to a       
strictly physical cause--the persistence
 of force and the consequent            
self-evolution of natural law4 ,and the 
question as to whether or not           
,intelligence may not have been the     
absolute or ultimate cause is manifestly
 a question altogether alien to the     
argument from ,order2 for if existing   
order admits of being accounted for1 in 
a relative or proximate sense1 by merely
 physical causes1 the argument from a   
relative or proximate order is not at   
liberty to infer or to assume the       
existence of any higher or more ultimate
 cause4 ,although1 therefore1 in        

,chapter ,v41 ,i have been careful to   
point out that the fact of existing     
order having been due to proximate or   
natural causes does not actually        
disprove the possible existence of an   
ultimate and supernatural cause1 still  
it must be carefully observed that this 
negative fact cannot possibly justify   
any positive inference to the existence 
of such a cause4  ,thus1 upon the whole1
 it may be said1 without danger of      
reasonable dispute1 that as the argument
 from ,order has hitherto derived its   
immense weight entirely from the fact   
that ,intelligence appeared to be the   
one and only cause sufficient to produce
 the observed integration of the cosmos1
 this immense weight has now been       
completely counterpoised by the         
demonstration that other causes of a    
strictly physical kind must have been   
instrumental1 if not themselves alone   
sufficient1 to produce this integration1
 ,so that1 just as in the case of       
,astronomy the demonstration of the one 

natural principle of gravity was        
sufficient to classify under one        
physical explanation several observed   
facts which many persons had previously 
attributed to supernatural causes2 and  
just as in the more complex science of  
,geology the demonstration of the one   
principle of uniformitarianism was      
sufficient to explain1 without the aid  
of supernaturalism1 a still greater     
number of facts2 and1 lastly1 just as in
 the case of the still more complex     
science of ,biology the demonstration of
 the one principle of natural selection 
was sufficient to marshal under one     
scientific1 or natural1 hypothesis an   
almost incalculable number of facts     
which were previously explained by the  
metaphysical hypothesis of supernatural 
design2 so in the science which includes
 all other sciences1 and which we may   
term the science of ,cosmology1 ,i      
assert with confidence that in the one  
principle of the persistence of force we
 have a demonstrably harmonising        

principle1 whereby all the facts within 
our experience admit of being collocated
 under one natural explanation1 without 
there being the smallest reason to      
attribute these facts to any            
supernatural cause4  ,but perhaps the   
immense change which these              
considerations must logically be        
regarded as having produced in the      
speculative standing of the argument    
from teleology will be better           
appreciated if ,i continue to quote from
 ,professor ,flint's very forcible and  
thoroughly logical exposition of the    
previous standing of this argument4 ,he 
says3--  ,to ascribe the origination of 
order to law is a manifest evasion of   
the real problem4 ,law is order4 ,law is
 the very thing to be explained4 ,the   
question is--,has law a reason1 or is it
 without a reason8 ,the unperverted     
human mind cannot believe it to be      
without a reason4  ,i do not know where 
a more terse and accurate statement of  
the case could be found2 and to my mind 

the question so lucidly put admits of   
the direct answer--,law clearly has a   
reason of a purely physical kind4 ,and  
therefore ,i submit that the following  
quotation which ,professor ,flint makes 
from ,professor ,jevons1 logical as it  
was when written1 must now be regarded  
as embodying an argument which is       
obsolete4  ,as an unlimited number of   
atoms can be placed in unlimited space  
in an unlimited number of modes of      
distribution1 there must1 even granting 
matter to have had all its laws from    
eternity1 have been at some moment in   
time1 out of the unlimited choices and  
distributions possible1 that one choice 
and distribution which yielded the fair 
and orderly universe that now exists4   
,only out of rational choice can order  
have come4  ,but clearly the alternative
 is now no longer one between chance and
 choice4 ,if natural laws arise by way  
of necessary consequence from the       
persistence of a single self-existing   
substance1 it becomes a matter of       

scientific 7though not of logical7      
demonstration that the fair and orderly 
universe that now exists is the one and 
only universe that1 in the nature of    
things1 can exist4 ,but to continue this
 interesting passage from ,dr4 ,flint's 
work--interesting not only because it   
sets forth the previous standing of this
 subject with so much clearness1 but    
also because the work is of such very   
recent publication4  ,the most common   
mode1 perhaps1 of evading the problem   
which order presents to reason is the   
indication of the process by which the  
order has been realised4 ,from          
,democritus to the latest ,darwinian    
there have been men who supposed they   
had completely explained away the       
evidences of design in nature when they 
had described the physical antecedents  
of the arrangements appealed to as      
evidences4 ,aristotle showed the        
absurdity of this supposition more than 
#bbjj years ago4  ,now this is a        
perfectly valid criticism on all such   

previous non-theistical arguments as    
were drawn from an indication of the    
process by which the order has been     
realised2 for in all these previous     
arguments there was an absence of any   
physical explanation of the ultimate    
cause of the process contemplated1 and  
so long as this ultimate cause remained 
obscure1 although the evidence of design
 might by these arguments have been     
excluded from particular processes1 the 
evidence of design could not be         
similarly excluded from the ultimate    
cause of these processes4 ,thus1 for    
instance1 it is doubtless illogical1 as 
,professor ,flint points out1 in any    
,darwinian to argue that because his    
theory of natural selection supplies him
 with a natural explanation of the      
process whereby organisms have been     
adapted to their surroundings1 therefore
 this process need not itself have been 
designed4 ,that is to say1 in general   
terms1 as insisted upon in the foregoing
 essay1 the discovery of a natural law  

or orderly process cannot of itself     
justify the inference that this law or  
method of orderly procedure is not      
itself a product of supernatural        
,intelligence2 but1 on the contrary1 the
 very existence of such orderly         
processes1 considered only in relation  
to their products1 must properly be     
regarded as evidence of the best        
possible kind in favour of supernatural 
,intelligence1 provided that no natural 
cause can be suggested as adequate to   
explain the origin of these processes4  
,but this is precisely what the         
persistence of force1 considered as a   
natural cause1 must be pronounced as    
necessarily competent to achieve2 for we
 can clearly see that all these         
processes obviously must and actually do
 derive their origin from this one      
causative principle4 ,and whether or not
 behind this one causative principle of 
natural law there exists a still more   
ultimate cause in the form of a         
supernatural ,intelligence1 this is a   

question altogether foreign to any      
argument from teleology1 seeing that    
teleology1 in so far as it is teleology1
 can only rest upon the observed facts  
of the cosmos2 and if these facts admit 
of being explained by the action of a   
single causative principle inherent in  
the cosmos itself1 teleology is not free
 to assume the action of any causative  
principle of a more ultimate character4 
,still1 as ,i have repeatedly insisted1 
these considerations do not entitle us  
dogmatically to deny the existence of   
some such more ultimate principle2 all  
that these considerations do is to      
remove any rational argument from       
teleological sources that any such more 
ultimate principle exists4 ,therefore ,i
 am1 of course1 quite at one with       
,professor ,flint when he says          
,professor ,huxley admits that the most 
thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least
 assume 'a primordial molecular         
arrangement of which all the phenomena  
of the universe are the consequences1'  

and 'is thereby at the mercy of the     
theologist1 who can defy him to disprove
 that this primordial molecular         
arrangement was not intended to involve 
the phenomena of the universe4'         
,granting this much1 he is logically    
bound to grant more4 ,if the entire     
evolution of the universe may have been 
intended1 the several stages of its     
evolution may have been intended1 and   
they may have been intended for their   
own sakes as well as for the sake of the
 collective evolution or its final      
result4 ,now that such may have been the
 case1 ,i have been careful to insist in
 ,chapter ,v42 all ,i am now concerned  
with is to show that1 in view of the    
considerations adduced in ,chapter      
,,iv41 there is no longer any evidence  
to prove1 or even to indicate1 that such
 has been the case4 ,and with reference 
to this opportune quotation from        
,professor ,huxley ,i may remark1 that  
the thoroughgoing evolutionist is now no
 longer at the mercy of the theologian  

to any further extent than that of not  
being able to disprove a purely         
metaphysical hypothesis1 which is as    
certainly superfluous1 in any scientific
 sense1 as the fundamental data of      
science are certainly true4  ,it may    
seem almost unnecessary to extend this  
postscript by pursuing further the      
criticism on ,professor ,flint's        
exposition in the light of a single new 
reason 444 for the denial of design     
which he challenges2 but there are      
nevertheless one or two other points    
which it seems desirable to consider4   
,professor ,flint writes3--  ,m4 ,comte 
imagines that he has shown the inference
 from design1 from the order and        
stability of the solar system1 to be    
unwarranted1 when he has pointed out the
 physical conditions through which that 
order and stability are secured1 and the
 process by which they have been        
obtained4444 ,now the assertion that the
 peculiarities which make the solar     
system stable and the earth habitable   

have flowed naturally and necessarily   
from the simple mutual gravity of the   
several parts of nebulous matter is one 
which greatly requires proof1 but which 
has never received it4 ,in saying this1 
we do not challenge the proof of the    
nebular theory itself4 ,that theory may 
or may not be true4 ,we are quite       
willing to suppose it true--to grant    
that it has been scientifically         
established4 ,what we maintain is1 that 
even if we admit unreservedly that the  
earth and the whole system to which it  
belongs once existed in a nebulous      
state1 from which they were gradually   
evolved into their present condition    
conformably to physical laws1 we are in 
no degree entitled to infer from the    
admission the conclusion which ,comte   
and others have drawn4 ,the man who     
fancies that the nebular theory implies 
that the law of gravitation1 or any     
other physical law1 has of itself       
determined the course of cosmical       
evolution1 so that there is no need for 

believing in the existence and operation
 of a divine mind1 proves merely that he
 is not exempt from reasoning very      
illogically4 ,the solar system could    
only have been evolved out of its       
nebulous state into that which it now   
presents if the nebula possessed a      
certain size1 mass1 form1 and           
constitution1 if it was neither too     
fluid nor too tenacious--if its atoms   
were all numbered1 its elements all     
weighed1 its constituents all disposed  
in due relation to one another2 that is 
to say1 only if the nebula was in       
reality as much a system of order1 which
 ,intelligence alone could account for1 
as the worlds which have been developed 
from it4 ,the origin of the nebula thus 
presents itself to reason as a problem  
which demands solution no less than the 
origin of the planets4 ,all the         
properties and laws of the nebula       
require to be accounted for4 ,what      
origin are we to give them8 ,it must be 
either reason or unreason4 ,we may go   

back as far as we please1 but1 at every 
step and stage of the regress we must   
find ourselves confronted with the same 
question1 the same                      
alternative--intelligent purpose or     
colossal chance4  ,now1 so far as ,comte
 is here guilty of the fallacy ,i have  
already dwelt upon of building a        
destructive argument upon a             
demonstration of mere orderly processes 
in nature1 as distinguished from a      
demonstration of the natural cause of   
these processes1 it is not for me to    
defend him4 ,all we can say with regard 
to him in this connection is1 that1     
having a sort of scientific presentiment
 that if the knowledge of his day were  
sufficiently advanced it would prove    
destructive of supernaturalism in the   
higher and more abstruse provinces of   
physical speculation1 as it had         
previously proved in the lower and less 
abstruse of these provinces1 ,comte     
allowed his inferences to outrun their  
legitimate basis4 ,being necessarily    

ignorant of the one generating cause of 
orderly processes in nature1 he         
improperly allowed himself to found     
conclusions on the basis of these       
processes alone1 which could only be    
properly founded on the basis of their  
cause4 ,but freely granting this much to
 ,professor ,flint1 and the rest of his 
remarks in this connection will be      
found1 in view of the altered standing  
of this subject1 to be open to          
amendment4 ,for1 in the first place1 no 
one need now resort to the illogical    
supposition that the law of gravitation 
or any other physical law has of itself 
determined the course of cosmical       
evolution4 ,what we may argue1 and what 
must be conceded to us1 is1 that the    
common substratum of all physical laws  
was at one time sufficient to produce   
the simplest physical laws1 and that    
throughout the whole course of evolution
 this common substratum has always been 
sufficient to produce the more complex  
laws in the ascending series of their   

ever-increasing number and variety4 ,and
 hence it becomes obvious that the      
origin of the nebula presents a         
difficulty neither greater nor less than
 the origin of the planets1 since1 if we
 may go back as far as we please1 we can
 entertain no scientific doubt that we  
should come to a time1 prior even to the
 nebula1 when the substance of the solar
 system existed merely as such--i4e41 in
 an almost or in a wholly               
undifferentiated form1 the product1 no  
doubt1 of endless cycles of previous    
evolutions and dissolutions of formal   
differentiations4 ,therefore1 although  
it is undoubtedly true that the solar   
system could only have been evolved out 
of its nebulous state into that which it
 now presents if the nebula possessed   
those particular attributes which were  
necessity to the evolution of such a    
product1 this consideration is clearly  
deprived of all its force from our      
present point of view4 ,for unless it   
can be shown that there is some         

independent reason for believing these  
particular attributes--which must have  
been of a more and more simple a        
character the further we recede in      
time--to have been miraculously imposed1
 the analogy is overwhelming that they  
all progressively arose by way of       
natural law4 ,and if so1 the universe   
which has been thus produced is the only
 universe in this particular point of   
space and time which could have been    
thus produced4 ,that it is an orderly   
universe we have seen ad nauseam to be  
no argument in favour of its having been
 a designed universe1 so long as the    
cause of its order--general laws--can be
 seen to admit of a natural explanation4
  ,thus there is clearly nothing to be  
gained on the side of teleology by going
 back to the dim and dismal birth of the
 nebula2 for no thoroughgoing           
evolutionist would for one moment       
entertain the supposition that natural  
law in the simplest phases of its       
development partook any more of a       

miraculous character than it does in its
 more recent and vastly more complex    
phases4 ,the absence of knowledge must  
not be used as equivalent to its        
presence2 and if analogy can be held to 
justify any inference whatsoever1 surely
 we may conclude with confidence that if
 existing general laws admit of being   
conceivably attributed to a natural     
genesis1 the primordial laws of a       
condensing nebula must have been the    
same4  ,there is another passage in     
,professor ,flint's work to which it    
seems desirable to refer4 ,it begins    
thus3 ,there is the law of heredity3    
like produces like4 ,but why is there   
such a law8 ,why does like produce      
like8444 ,physical science cannot answer
 these questions2 but that is no reason 
why they should not both be asked and   
answered4 ,i can conceive of no other   
intelligent answer being given to them  
than that there is a ,god of wisdom1 who
 designed that the world should be for  
all ages the abode of life1 c4  ,now    

here we have in another form that same  
vicious tendency to take refuge in the  
more obscure cases of physical causation
 as proofs of supernatural design--the  
obscurity in this case arising from the 
complexity of the causes and work1 as in
 the former case it arose from their    
remoteness in time4 ,but in both cases  
the same answer is patent1 viz41 that   
although physical science cannot answer 
these questions by pointing out the     
precise sequence of causes and effects1 
physical science is nevertheless quite  
as certain that this precise sequence   
arises in its last resort from the      
persistence of force1 as she would be   
were she able to trace the whole        
process4 ,and therefore1 in view of the 
considerations set forth in ,chapter    
,,iv4 of this work1 it is no longer open
 to ,professor ,flint or to any other   
writer logically to assert--,i can      
conceive of no other intelligent answer 
being given to such questions than that 
there is a ,god of wisdom4  ,the same   

answer awaits this author's further     
disquisition on other biological laws1  
so it is needless to make any further   
quotations in this connection4 ,but     
there is one other principle embodied in
 some of these passages which it seems  
undesirable to overlook4 ,it is said1   
for instance1 ,natural selection might  
have had no materials1 or altogether    
insufficient materials1 to work with1 or
 the circumstances might have been such 
that the lowest organisms were the best 
endowed for the struggle for life4 ,if  
the earth were covered with water1 fish 
would survive and higher creatures would
 perish4  ,now the principle here       
embodied--viz41 that had the conditions 
of evolution been other than they were1 
the results would have been             
different--is1 of course1 true2 but     
clearly1 on the view that all natural   
laws spring from the persistence of     
force1 no other conditions than those   
which actually occurred1 or are now     
occurring1 could ever have              

occurred1--the whole course of evolution
 must have been1 in all its phases and  
in all its processes1 an unconditional  
necessity4 ,but if it is said1 ,how     
fortunate that the outcome1 being       
unconditionally necessary1 has happened 
to be so good as it is2 ,i answer that  
the remark is legitimate enough if it is
 not intended to convey an implication  
that the general quality of the outcome 
points to beneficent design as to its   
cause4 ,such an implication would not be
 legitimate1 because1 in the first      
place1 we have no means of knowing in   
how many cases1 whether in planets1     
stars1 or systems1 the course of        
evolution has failed to produce life and
 mind--the one known case of this earth1
 whether or not it is the one success   
out of millions of abortions1 being of  
necessity the only known case4 ,in how  
vastly greater a number of cases the    
course of evolution may have been1 so to
 speak1 deflected by some even slight1  
though strictly necessary1 cause from   

producing self-conscious intelligence1  
it is impossible to conjecture4 ,but    
this consideration1 be it observed1 is  
not here adduced in order to disprove   
the assertion that telluric evolution   
has been effected by ,intelligence2 it  
is merely adduced to prove that such an 
assertion cannot rest on the single     
known result of telluric evolution1 so  
long as an infinite number of the       
results of evolution elsewhere remain   
unknown4  ,and now1 lastly1 it must be  
observed that even in the one case with 
which we are acquainted1 the net product
 of evolution is not such as can of     
itself point us to beneficent design4   
,professor ,flint1 indeed1 in common    
with theologians generally1 argues that 
it does4 ,i will therefore briefly      
criticise his remarks on this subject1  
believing1 as ,i do1 that they form a   
very admirable illustration of what ,i  
conceive to be a general                
principle--viz41 that minds which       
already believe in the existence of a   

,deity are1 as a rule1 not in a position
 to view this question of beneficence in
 nature in a perfectly impartial manner4
 ,for if the existence of a ,deity is   
presupposed1 a mind with any particle of
 that most noble                        
quality--reverence--will naturally      
hesitate to draw conclusions that       
partake of the nature of blasphemy2 and 
therefore1 unconsciously perhaps to     
themselves1 they endeavour in various   
ways to evade the evidence which1 if    
honestly and impartially considered1 can
 scarcely fail to negative the argument 
from beneficence in the universe4       
,professor ,flint argues that the law of
 over-production1 and the consequent    
struggle for existence1 being the reason
 why the world is so wonderfully rich in
 the most varied forms of life1 is a    
means to an end worthy of ,divine       
,wisdom4 ,although involving privation1 
pain1 and conflict1 its final result is 
order and beauty4 ,all the perfections  
of sentient creatures are represented as

 due to it4 ,through it the lion has    
gained its strength1 the deer its speed1
 and the dog its sagacity4 ,the         
inference seems natural that these      
perfections were designed to be attained
 by it2 that this state of struggle was 
ordained for the sake of the advantages 
which it is actually seen to produce4   
,the suffering which the conflict       
involves may indicate that ,god has made
 even animals for some higher end than  
happiness--that he cares for animal     
perfection as well as for animal        
enjoyment2 but it affords no reason for 
denying that the ends which the conflict
 actually serves it was intended to     
serve4  ,now1 whatever may be thought of
 such an argument as an attempted       
justification of beneficent design      
already on independent ground believed  
to exist1 it is manifestly no argument  
at all as establishing any presumption  
in favour of such design1 unless it     
could be shown that the ,deity is so far
 limited in his power of adapting means 

to ends that the particular method      
adopted in this case was the best1 all  
things considered1 that he was able to  
adopt4 ,for supposing the ,deity to be1 
what ,professor ,flint maintains that he
 is--viz41 omnipotent--and there can be 
no inference more transparent than that 
such wholesale suffering1 for whatever  
ends designed1 exhibits an incalculably 
greater deficiency of beneficence in the
 divine character than that which we    
know in any1 the very worst1 of human   
characters4 ,for let us pause for one   
moment to think of what suffering in    
nature means4 ,some hundreds of millions
 of years ago some millions of millions 
of animals must be supposed to have been
 sentient4 ,since that time till the    
present1 there must have been millions  
and millions of generations of millions 
of millions of individuals4 ,and        
throughout all this period of           
incalculable duration1 this             
inconceivable host of sentient organisms
 have been in a state of unceasing      

battle1 dread1 ravin1 pain4 ,looking to 
the outcome1 we find that more than half
 of the species which have survived the 
ceaseless struggle are parasitic in     
their habits1 lower and insentient forms
 of life feasting on higher and sentient
 forms2 we find teeth and talons whetted
 for slaughter1 hooks and suckers       
moulded for torment--everywhere a reign 
of terror1 hunger1 and sickness1 with   
oozing blood and quivering limbs1 with  
gasping breath and eyes of innocence    
that dimly close in deaths of brutal    
torture6 ,is it said that there are     
compensating enjoyments8 ,i care not to 
strike the balance2 the enjoyments ,i   
plainly perceive to be as physically    
necessary as the pains1 and this whether
 or not evolution is due to design4     
,therefore all ,i am concerned with is  
to show1 that if such a state of things 
is due to omnipotent design1 the        
omnipotent designer must be concluded1  
so far as reason can infer1 to be       
non-beneficent4 ,and this it is not     

difficult to show4 ,when ,i see a rabbit
 panting in the iron jaws of a          
spring-trap1 ,i abhor the devilish      
nature of the being who1 with full      
powers of realising what pain means1 can
 deliberately employ his noble faculties
 of invention in contriving a thing so  
hideously cruel4 ,but if ,i could       
believe that there is a being who1 with 
yet higher faculties of thought and     
knowledge1 and with an unlimited choice 
of means to secure his ends1 has        
contrived untold thousands of mechanisms
 no less diabolical than a spring-trap2 
,i should call that being a fiend1 were 
all the world besides to call him ,god4 
,am ,i told that this is arrogance8 ,it 
is nothing of the kind2 it is plain     
morality1 and to say otherwise would be 
to hide our eyes from murder because we 
dread the ,murderer4 ,am ,i told that ,i
 am not competent to judge the purposes 
of the ,almighty8 ,i answer that if     
these are purposes1 ,i am able to judge 
of them so far as ,i can see2 and if ,i 

am expected to judge of his purposes    
when they appear to be beneficent1 ,i am
 in consistency obliged also to judge of
 them when they appear to be malevolent4
 ,and it can be no possible extenuation 
of the latter to point to the final     
result as order and beauty1 so long as  
the means adopted by the ,omnipotent    
,designer are known to have been so     
revolting4 ,all that we could           
legitimately assert in this case would  
be1 that so far as observation can      
extend1 he cares for animal perfection  
to the exclusion of animal enjoyment1   
and even to the total disregard of      
animal suffering4 ,but to assert this   
would merely be to deny beneficence as  
an attribute of ,god4  ,the dilemma1    
therefore1 which ,epicurus has stated   
with great lucidity1 and which          
,professor ,flint quotes1 appears to me 
so obvious as scarcely to require       
statement4 ,the dilemma is1 that1       
looking to the facts of organic nature1 
theists must abandon their belief1      

either in the divine omnipotence1 or in 
the divine beneficence4 ,and yet1 such  
is the warping effect of preformed      
beliefs on the mind1 that even so candid
 a writer as ,professor ,flint can thus 
write of this most obvious truth3--     
,the late ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 for 
no better reason than that nature       
sometimes drowns men and burns them1 and
 that childbirth is a painful process1  
maintained that ,god could not possibly 
be infinite4 ,i shall not say what ,i   
think of the shallowness and            
self-conceit displayed by such an       
argument4 ,what it proves is not the    
finiteness of ,god1 but the littleness  
of man4 ,the mind of man never shows    
itself so small as when it tries to     
measure the attributes and limit the    
greatness of its ,creator4  ,but the    
argument--or rather the truism--in      
question is an attempt to do neither the
 one nor the other2 it simply asserts   
the patent fact that1 if ,god is        
omnipotent1 and so had an unlimited     

choice of means whereby to accomplish   
the ends of animal perfection1 animal   
enjoyment1 and the rest2 then the fact  
of his having chosen to adopt the means 
which he has adopted is a fact which is 
wholly incompatible with his            
beneficence4 ,and on the other hand1 if 
he is beneficent1 the fact of his having
 adopted these means in order that the  
sum of ultimate enjoyment might exceed  
the sum of concomitant pain1 is a fact  
which is wholly incompatible with his   
omnipotence4 ,to a man who already      
believes1 on independent grounds1 in an 
omnipotent and beneficent ,deity1 it is 
no doubt possible to avoid facing this  
dilemma1 and to rest content with the   
assumption that1 in a sense beyond the  
reach of human reason1 or even of human 
conception1 the two horns of this       
dilemma must be united in some          
transcendental reconciliation2 but if a 
man undertakes to reason on the subject 
at all1 as he must and ought when the   
question is as to the existence of such 

a ,deity1 then clearly he has no        
alternative but to allow that the       
dilemma is a hopeless one4 ,with        
inverted meaning1 therefore1 may we     
quote ,professor ,flint's words against 
himself3--,the mind of man never shows  
itself so small as when it tries to     
measure the attributes 444 of its       
,creator2 for certainly1 if ,professor  
,flint's usually candid mind has had a  
,creator1 it nowhere displays the       
littleness of prejudice in so marked a  
degree as it does when measuring his    
attributes4  ,thus in a subsequent      
chapter he deals at greater length with 
this difficulty of the apparent failure 
of beneficence in nature1 arguing1 in   
effect1 that as pain and suffering serve
 many good ends in the way of warning   
animals of danger to life1 c41 therefore
 we ought to conclude that1 if we could 
see farther1 we should see pain and     
suffering to be unmitigated good1 or    
nearly so4 ,now this argument1 as ,i    
have previously said1 may possibly be   

admissible as between ,christians or    
others who already believe in the       
existence and in the beneficence of     
,god2 but it is only the blindest       
prejudice which can fail to perceive    
that the argument is quite without      
relevancy when the question is as to the
 evidences of such existence and the    
evidences of such character4 ,for where 
the fact of such an existence and       
character is the question in dispute1 it
 clearly can be no argument to state its
 bare assumption by saying that if we   
knew more of nature we should find the  
relative preponderance of good over evil
 to be immeasurably greater than that   
which we now perceive4 ,the platform of 
argument on which the question of       
,theism must be discussed is that of the
 observable ,cosmos2 and if1 as ,dr4    
,flint is constrained to admit1 there is
 a fearful spectacle of misery presented
 by this ,cosmos1 it becomes mere       
question-begging to gloss over this     
aspect of the subject by any vague      

assumption that the misery must have    
some unobservable ends of so            
transcendentally beneficent a nature1   
that were they known they would justify 
the means4 ,indeed1 this kind of        
discussion seems to me worse than       
useless for the purposes which the      
,professor has in view2 for it only     
serves by contrast to throw out into    
stronger relief the natural and the     
unstrained character of the adverse     
interpretation of the facts4 ,according 
to this adverse interpretation1         
sentiency has been evolved by natural   
selection to secure the benefits which  
are pointed out by ,professor ,flint2   
and therefore the fact of this1 its     
cause1 having been a mindless cause1    
clearly implies that the restriction of 
pain and suffering cannot be an active  
principle1 or a vera causa1 as between  
species and species1 though it must be  
such within the limits of the same      
organism1 and to a lesser extent within 
the limits of the same species4 ,and    

this is just what we find to be the     
case4 ,therefore1 without the need of   
resorting to wholly arbitrary           
assumptions concerning transcendental   
reconciliations between apparently      
needless suffering and a supposed       
almighty beneficence1 the non-theistic  
hypothesis is saved by merely opening   
our eyes to the observable facts around 
us1 and there seeing that pain and      
misery1 alike in the benefits which they
 bring and in the frightful excesses    
which they manifest1 play just that part
 in nature which this hypothesis would  
lead us to expect4  ,therefore1 to sum  
up these considerations on physical     
suffering1 the case between a theist and
 a sceptic as to the question of divine 
beneficence is seen to be a case of     
extreme simplicity4 ,the theist believes
 in such beneficence by purposely       
concealing from his mind all adverse    
evidence--feeling1 on the one side1 that
 to entertain the doubt to which this   
evidence points would be to hold        

dalliance with blasphemy1 and1 on the   
other side1 that the subject is of so   
transcendental a nature that1 in view of
 so great a risk1 it is better to avoid 
impartial reasoning upon it4 ,a sceptic1
 on the other hand1 is under no such    
obligation to preconceived ideas1 and is
 therefore free to draw unbiassed       
inferences as to the character of ,god1 
if he exists1 to the extent which such  
character is indicated by the sphere of 
observable nature4 ,and1 as ,i have     
said1 when the subject is so viewed1 the
 inference is unavoidable that1 so far  
as human reason can penetrate1 ,god1 if 
he exists1 must either be non-infinite  
in his resources1 or non-beneficent in  
his designs4 ,therefore it is evident   
that when the being of ,god1 as         
distinguished from his character1 is the
 subject in dispute1 ,theism can gain   
nothing by an appeal to evidences of    
beneficent designs4 ,if such evidences  
were unequivocal1 then indeed the       
argument which they would establish to  

an intelligent cause of nature would be 
almost irresistible2 for the fact of the
 external world being in harmony with   
the moral nature of man would be        
unaccountable except on the supposition 
of both having derived their origin from
 a common moral source2 and morality    
implies intelligence4 ,but as it is1 all
 the so-called evidence of divine       
beneficence in nature is1 without any   
exception of a kind that is worthless as
 proving design2 for all the facts admit
 of being explained equally well on the 
supposition of their having been due to 
purely physical processes1 acting       
through the various biological laws     
which we are now only beginning to      
understand4 ,and further than this1 so  
far are these facts from proving the    
existence of a moral cause1 that1 in    
view of the alternative just stated1    
they even ground a positive argument to 
its negation4 ,for1 as we have seen1 all
 these facts are just of such a kind as 
we should expect to be the facts1 on the

 supposition of their having been due to
 natural causes--i4e41 causes which     
could have had no moral solicitude for  
animal happiness as such4 ,let us now1  
in conclusion1 dwell on this antithesis 
at somewhat greater length4  ,if natural
 selection has played any large share in
 the process of organic evolution1 it is
 evident that animal enjoyment1 being an
 important factor in this natural cause1
 must always have been furthered to the 
extent in which it was necessary for the
 adaptation of organisms to their       
environment that it should4 ,and such we
 invariably find to be the limits within
 which animal enjoyments are confined4  
,on the other hand1 so long as the      
adaptations in question are not         
complete1 so long must more or less of  
suffering be entailed--the capacity for 
suffering1 as for enjoyment1 being no   
doubt itself a product of natural       
selection4 ,but as all specific types   
are perpetually struggling together1 it 
is manifest that the competition must   

prevent any considerable number of types
 from becoming so far adapted to their  
environment of other types as to become 
exempt from suffering as a result of    
this competition4 ,there being no one   
integrating cause of an intelligent or  
moral nature to supply the conditions of
 happiness to each organic type without 
the misery of this competition1 such    
happiness as animals have is derived    
from the heavy expenditure of pain      
suffered by themselves and by their     
ancestry4  ,thus1 whether we look to    
animal pleasures or to animal pains1 the
 result is alike just what we should    
expect to find on the supposition of    
these pleasures and pains having been   
due to necessary and physical1 as       
distinguished from intelligent and      
moral1 antecedents2 for how different is
 that which is from that which might    
have been6 ,not only might beneficent   
selection have eliminated the countless 
species of parasites which now destroy  
the health and happiness of all the     

higher organisms2 not only might        
survival of the fittest1 in a moral     
sense1 have determined that rapacious   
and carnivorous animals should yield    
their places in the world to harmless   
and gentle ones2 not only might life    
have been without sickness and death    
without pain2--but how might the        
exigences and the welfare of species    
have been consulted by the structures   
and the habits of one another6 ,but no6 
,amid all the millions of mechanisms and
 habits in organic nature1 all of which 
are so beautifully adapted to the needs 
of the species presenting them1 there is
 no single instance of any mechanism or 
habit occurring in one species for the  
exclusive benefit of another            
species--although1 as we should expect  
on the non-theistic theory1 there are   
some comparatively few cases of a       
mechanism or a habit which is of benefit
 to its possessor being also utilised by
 other species4 ,yet1 on the            
beneficent-design theory1 it is         

impossible to understand why1 when all  
mechanisms and habits in the same       
species are invariably correlated for   
the benefit of that species1 there      
should never be any such correlation    
between mechanisms and habits of        
different species4 ,for how magnificent1
 how sublime a display of supreme       
beneficence would nature have afforded  
if all her sentient animals had been so 
inter-related as to minister to each    
other's happiness6 ,organic species     
might then have been likened to a       
countless multitude of voices1 all      
singing to their ,creator in one        
harmonious psalm of praise4 ,but1 as it 
is1 we see no vestige of such           
correlation2 every species is for       
itself1 and for itself alone--an outcome
 of the always and everywhere fiercely  
raging struggle for life4  ,so much1    
then1 for the case of physical evil2 but
 ,dr4 ,flint also treats of the case of 
moral evil4 ,let us see what this       
well-equipped writer can make of this   

old problem in the present year of      
grace4 ,he says--,but it will be        
objected1 could not ,god have made moral
 creatures who would be certain always  
to choose what is right1 always to      
acquiesce in ,his holy will8444 ,well1  
far be it from me to deny that ,god     
could have originated a sinless moral   
system4444 ,but if questioned as to why 
,he has not done better1 ,i feel no     
shame in confessing my ignorance4 ,it   
seems to me that when you have resolved 
the problem of the origin of moral evil 
into the question1 ,why has ,god not    
originated a moral universe in which the
 lowest moral being would be as         
excellent as the archangels are8 you    
have at once shown it to be             
speculatively incapable of solution     
italics mine1 and practically without   
importance64 ,the question is one which 
would obviously give rise to another1   
,why has ,god not created only moral    
beings as much superior to the          
archangels as they are superior to the  

lowest ,australian aborigines8 ,but no  
complete answer can be given to a       
question which may be followed by a     
series of similar questions to which    
there is no end4 ,we have1 besides1     
neither the facts nor the faculties to  
answer such questions4#df  ,now ,i      
confess that this argument presents to  
my mind more of subtlety than sense4 ,i 
had previously imagined that the        
archangels were supposed to enjoy a     
condition of moral existence which might
 fairly be thought to remove them from  
any association with that of the        
,australian aborigines4 ,but as this    
question is one that belongs to         
,divinity1 ,i am here quite prepared to 
bow to ,professor ,flint's              
authority--hoping1 however1 that he is  
prepared to take the responsibility     
should the archangels ever care to      
accuse me of calumny4 ,but1 as a        
logician1 ,i must be permitted to       
observe1 that if ,i ask1 ,why am ,i not 
better than ,i am8 it is no answer to   

tell me1 ,because the archangels are not
 better than they are4 ,for aught that  
,i know to the contrary1 the archangels 
may be morally perfect--as an authority 
in such matters has told us that even   
just men may become1--and therefore1 for
 aught that ,i know to the contrary1    
,professor ,flint's regress of moral    
degrees ad infinitum1 may be an         
ontological absurdity4 ,but granting1   
for the sake of argument1 that          
archangels fall infinitely short of     
moral perfection1 and ,i should only be 
able to see in the fact a hopeless      
aggravation of my previous difficulty4  
,if it is hard to reconcile the supreme 
goodness of ,god with the moral         
turpitude of man1 much more would it be 
hard to do so if his very angels are    
depraved4 ,therefore1 if the reasonable 
question which ,i originally put may be 
followed by a series of similar         
questions to which there is no end1 the 
goodness of ,god must simply be         
pronounced a delusion4 ,for the question

 which ,i originally put was no mere    
flimsy question of a stupidly unreal    
description4 ,my own moral depravity is 
a matter of painful certainty to me1 and
 ,i want to know why1 if there is a ,god
 of infinite power and goodness1 he     
should have made me thus4 ,and in answer
 ,i am told that my question is         
practically without importance1 because 
there may be an endless series of beings
 who1 in their several degrees1 are in a
 similar predicament to myself4 ,perhaps
 they are2 but if so1 the moral evil    
with which ,i am directly acquainted is 
made all the blacker by the fact that it
 is thus but a drop in an infinite ocean
 of moral imperfection4 ,when1          
therefore1 ,professor ,flint goes on to 
say1 ,we ought to be content if we can  
show that what ,god has done is wise and
 right1 and not perplex ourselves as to 
why ,he has not done an infinity of     
other things1 ,i answer1 ,most          
certainly2 but can we show that what    
,god has done is wise and right8        

,unquestionably not4 ,that what he has  
done may be wise and right1 could we see
 his whole scheme of things1 no careful 
thinker will deny2 but to suppose it can
 be shown that he has done this1 is an  
instance of purblind fanaticism which is
 most startling in a work on ,theism4   
,the best world1 we may be assured1 that
 our fancies can feign1 would in reality
 be far inferior to the world ,god has  
made1 whatever imperfections we may     
think we see in it4 ,are we leading a   
sermon on the datum ,god is love8 ,no2  
but a work on the questions1 ,is there a
 ,god8 and1 if so1 ,is he a ,god of     
love8 ,and yet the work is written by a 
man who evidently tries to argue fairly4
 ,what shall we say of the despotism of 
preformed beliefs8 ,may we not say at   
least this much--that those who         
endeavour to reconcile their theories of
 divine goodness with the facts of human
 evil might well appropriate to         
themselves the words above quoted1 ,we  
have neither the facts nor the faculties

 to answer such questions8 ,for the     
facts indeed are absent1 and the        
faculties of impartial thought must be  
absent also1 if this obvious truth      
cannot be seen--that these questions    
only derive their speculatively         
unanswerable character from the rational
 falsity of the manner by which it is   
sought to answer them4 ,the facts of our
 moral nature1 so far as honest reason  
can perceive1 belie the hypothesis of   
,theism2 and although the faculties of  
man may be forced by prejudice into an  
acceptance of contradictory             
propositions1 the truth is obvious that 
only by the hypothesis of ,evolution can
 that old-tied knot be cut--the ,origin 
of ,evil4 ,the form of ,theism for which
 ,dr4 ,flint is arguing is the current  
form1 viz41 that there is a ,god who    
combines in himself the attributes of   
infinite power and perfect goodness--a  
,god at once omnipotent and wholly      
moral4 ,but1 in view of the fact that   
moral evil exists in man1 the           

proposition that ,god is omnipotent and 
the proposition that he is wholly moral 
become contradictory2 and therefore the 
fact of moral evil can only be met1     
either by abandoning one or other of    
these propositions1 or by altogether    
rejecting the hypothesis of ,theism4    
99       99       99       99       99  
,,iii4  ,,the ,,speculative ,,standing  
,,of ,,materialism4  ,as a continuation 
of my criticism on ,mr4 ,fiske's views1 
,i think it is desirable to add a few   
words concerning the speculative        
annihilation with which he supposes ,mr4
 ,spencer's doctrines to have visited   
,materialism4 ,of course it is a        
self-evident truism that the doctrine of
 ,relativity is destructive of          
,materialism1 if by ,materialism we mean
 a theory which ignores that doctrine4  
,in other words1 the doctrine of        
,relativity1 if accepted1 clearly       
excludes the doctrine that ,matter1 as  
known phenomenally1 is at all likely to 
be a true representative of whatever    

thing-in-itself it may be that          
constitutes ,mind4 ,but this position is
 fully established by the doctrine of   
,relativity alone1 and is therefore not 
in the least affected1 either by way of 
confirmation or otherwise1 by ,mr4      
,spencer's extended doctrine of the     
,unknowable--it being only because the  
latter doctrine presupposes the doctrine
 of ,relativity that it is exclusive of 
,materialism in the sense which has just
 been stated4 ,so far1 therefore1 ,mr4  
,spencer's writings cannot be held to   
have any special bearing on the doctrine
 of ,materialism4 ,such a special       
bearing is only exerted by these        
writings when they proceed to show that 
it seems an imaginable possibility that 
units of external force may be identical
 in nature with the units of the force  
known as feeling4 ,let us then ascertain
 how far it is true that the argument   
already quoted1 and which leads to this 
conclusion1 is utterly destructive of   
,materialism4  ,in the first place1 ,i  

may observe that this argument differs  
in several instructive particulars from 
the anti-materialistic argument of      
,locke1 which we have already had       
occasion to consider4 ,for while ,locke 
erroneously imagined that the test of   
inconceivability is of equivalent value 
wherever it is applied1 save only where 
it conflicts with preconceived ideas on 
the subject of ,theism 7see ,appendix   
,a471 ,spencer1 of course1 is much too  
careful a thinker to fall into so       
obvious a fallacy4 ,but again1 it is    
curious to observe that in the          
anti-materialistic argument of ,spencer 
the test of inconceivability is used in 
a manner the precise opposite of that in
 which it is used in the                
anti-materialistic argument of ,locke4  
,for while the ground of ,locke's       
argument is that ,materialism must be   
untrue because it is inconceivable that 
,matter 7and ,force7 should be of a     
psychical nature2 the ground of         
,spencer's argument is that what we know

 as ,force 7and ,matter7 may not        
inconceivably be of a psychical nature4 
,for my own part1 ,i think that         
,spencer's argument is1 psychologically 
speaking1 the more valid of the two2 but
 nevertheless ,i think that1 logically  
speaking1 it is likewise invalid to a   
perceptibly great1 and to a further     
indefinite1 degree4 ,for the argument   
sets out with the reflection that we can
 only know ,matter and ,force as symbols
 of consciousness1 while we know        
consciousness directly1 and therefore   
that we can go further in conceivably   
translating ,matter and ,force into     
terms of ,mind than vice versa4 ,and    
this is true1 but it does not therefore 
follow that the truth is more likely to 
lie in the direction that thought can   
most easily travel4 ,for although ,i am 
at one with ,mr4 ,spencer1 whom ,mr4    
,fiske follows1 in regarding his test of
 truth--viz41 inconceivability of a     
negation--as the most ultimate test     
within our reach1 ,i cannot agree with  

him that in this particular case it is  
the most trustworthy test within our    
reach4 ,i cannot do so because the      
reflection is forced upon me that1 as   
the terms which are contemplated in this
 particular case are respectively the   
highest abstractions of objective and of
 subjective existence1 the test of truth
 in question is neutralised by directly 
encountering the inconceivable relation 
that exists between subject and object4 
,or1 in other words1 as before stated1  
whatever the cause of ,mind may be1 we  
can clearly perceive it to be a         
subjective necessity of the case that1  
in ultimate analysis1 we should find it 
more easy to conceive of this cause as  
resembling ,mind--the only entity of    
which we are directly conscious--than to
 conceive of it as any other entity of  
which we are only indirectly conscious4 
,when1 therefore1 ,mr4 ,spencer argues  
that it is impossible to interpret inner
 existence in terms of outer existence1 
while it is not so impossible to        

interpret outer existence in terms of   
inner existence1 the fact is merely what
 we should in any case expect  priori to
 be the fact1 and therefore as a fact it
 is not a very surprising discovery     
posteriori4 ,so that when ,mr4 ,fiske   
proceeds to make this fact the basis of 
his argument1 that because we can more  
conceivably regard objective existence  
as like in kind to subjective existence 
than conversely1 therefore we should    
conclude that there is a corresponding  
probability in favour of the more       
conceivable proposition1 ,i demur to his
 argument4 ,for1 fully accepting the    
fact on which the argument rests1 and it
 seems to me1 in view of what ,i have   
said1 that the latter assigns an        
altogether disproportionate value to the
 test of inconceivability in this case4 
,far from endowing this test with so    
great an authority in this case1 ,i     
should regard it not only as perceptibly
 of very small validity1 but1 as ,i have
 said1 invalid to a degree which we have

 no means of ascertaining4 ,if it be    
asked1 ,what other gauge of probability 
can we have in this matter other than   
such a direct appeal to consciousness8  
,i answer1 that this appeal being here  
priori invalid1 we are left to fall back
 upon the formal probability which is   
established by an application of        
scientific canons to objective          
phenomena4 7,see footnote in  #ad47     
,for1 be it carefully observed1 ,mr4    
,spencer1 and his disciple ,mr4 ,fiske1 
are not idealists4 ,were this the case1 
of course the test of an immediate      
appeal to consciousness would be to them
 the only test available4 ,but1 on the  
contrary1 as all the world knows1 ,mr4  
,spencer asserts the existence of an    
unknown ,reality1 of which all phenomena
 are the manifestations4 ,consequently1 
what we call ,force and ,matter are1    
according to this doctrine1 phenomenal  
manifestations of this objective        
,reality4 ,that is to say1 for aught    
that we can know1 ,force and ,matter may

 be anything within the whole range of  
the possible2 and the only limitation   
that can be assigned to them is1 that   
they are modes of existence which are   
independent of1 or objective to1 our    
individual consciousness1 but which are 
uniformly translated into consciousness 
as ,force and ,matter4 ,now it does not 
signify one iota for the purposes of    
,materialism whether these our          
symbolical representations of ,force and
 ,matter are accurate or inaccurate     
representations of their corresponding  
realities1--unless1 of course1 some     
independent reason could be shown for   
supposing that in their reality they    
resemble ,mind4 ,call ,force x and      
,matter y1 and so long as we are agreed 
that x and y are objective realities    
which are uniformly translated into     
consciousness as ,force and ,matter1 the
 materialistic deductions remain        
unaffected by this mere change in our   
terminology2 these essential facts are  
allowed to remain substantially as      

before1 namely1 that there is an        
external something or external          
somethings--,matter and ,force1 or x and
 y--which themselves display no         
observable tokens of consciousness1 but 
which are invariably associated with    
consciousness in a highly distinctive   
manner4  ,i dwell at length upon this   
subject1 because although ,mr4 ,spencer 
himself does not appear to attach much  
weight to his argument1 ,mr4 ,fiske1 as 
we have seen1 elevates it into a basis  
for ,cosmic ,theism4 ,yet so far is this
 argument from ruling out1 as ,mr4      
,fiske asserts1 the essential doctrine  
of ,materialism--i4e41 the doctrine that
 what we know as ,mind is an effect of  
certain collocations and distributions  
of what we know as ,matter and          
,force--that the argument might be      
employed with almost the same degree of 
effect1 or absence of effect1 to        
disprove any instance of recognised     
causation4 ,thus1 for example1 the      
doctrine of ,materialism is no more     

ruled out by the reflection that what we
 cognise as cerebral matter is only     
cognised relatively1 than would the     
doctrine of chemical equivalents be     
ruled out by the parallel reflection    
that what we cognise as chemical        
elements are only cognised relatively4  
,i say advisedly1 with almost the same  
degree of effect1 because1 to be        
strictly accurate1 we ought not         
altogether to ignore the indefinitely   
slender presumption which ,mr4          
,spencer's subjective test of           
inconceivability establishes on the side
 of ,spiritualism1 as against the       
objective evidence of causation on the  
side of ,materialism4 ,as this is an    
important subject1 ,i will be a little  
more explicit4 ,we are agreed that      
,force and ,matter are entities external
 to consciousness1 of which we can      
possess only symbolical knowledge4      
,therefore1 as we have said1 ,force and 
,matter may be anything within the whole
 range of the possible4 ,but we know    

that ,mind is a possible entity1 while  
we have no certain knowledge of any     
other possible entity4 ,hence we are    
justified in saying1 ,it is possible    
that ,force and ,matter may be identical
 with the only entity which we know as  
certainly possible2 but forasmuch as we 
do not know the sum of possible         
entities1 we have no means of           
calculating the chances there are that  
what we know as ,force and ,matter are  
identical in nature with ,mind4 ,still1 
that there is a chance we cannot        
dispute2 all we can assert is1 that we  
are unable to determine its value1 and  
that it would be a mistake to suppose we
 can do so1 even in the lowest degree1  
by ,mr4 ,spencer's test of              
inconceivability4 ,nevertheless1 the    
fact that there is such a chance renders
 it in some indeterminate degree more   
probable that what we know as ,force and
 ,matter are identical with what we know
 as ,mind1 than that what we know as    
oxygen and hydrogen are identical with  

what we know as water4 ,so that to this 
extent the essential doctrine of        
,materialism is ruled out in a further  
degree by the philosophy of the         
,unknowable than is the chemical        
doctrine of equivalents4 ,but1 of       
course1 this indefinite possibility of  
what we know as ,force and ,matter being
 identical with what we know as ,mind   
does not neutralise1 in any determinable
 degree1 the considerations whereby     
,materialism in its present shape infers
 that what we know as ,force and ,matter
 are probably distinct from what we know
 as ,mind4  ,but ,i see no reason why   
,materialism should be restricted to    
this its present shape4 ,even if we     
admit to the fullest extent the validity
 of ,mr4 ,spencer's argument1 and       
conclude with ,professor ,clifford as a 
matter of probability that the universe 
consists entirely of ,mind-stuff1 ,i do 
not see that the admission would affect 
,materialism in any essential respect4  
,for here again the admission would     

amount to little else1 so far as        
,materialism is directly concerned1 than
 a change of terminology3 instead of    
calling objective existence ,matter1 we 
call it ,mind-stuff4 ,i say to little   
else1 because no doubt in one particular
 there is here some change introduced in
 the speculative standing of the        
subject4 ,so long as ,matter and ,mind1 
x and y1 are held to be antithetically  
opposed in substance1 so long must      
,materialism suppose that a connection  
of causality subsists between the two1  
such that the former substance is       
produced in some unaccountable way by   
the latter4 ,but when ,matter and ,mind1
 x and y1 are supposed to be identical  
in substance1 the need for any          
additional supposition as to a causal   
connection is excluded4 ,but unless we  
hold1 what seems to me an uncalled-for  
opinion1 that the essential feature of  
,materialism consists in a postulation  
of a causal connection between x and y1 
it would appear that the only effect of 

supposing x and y to be really but one  
substance z1 must be that of            
strengthening the essential doctrine of 
,materialism--the doctrine1 namely1 that
 conscious intellectual existence is    
necessarily associated with that form of
 existence which we know phenomenally as
 ,matter and ,motion4 ,if it is true    
that a a moving molecule of inorganic   
matter does not possess mind or         
consciousness1 but it possesses a small 
piece of ,mind-stuff1 then assuredly the
 central position of ,materialism is    
shown to be impregnable4 ,for while it  
remains as true as ever that mind and   
consciousness can only emerge when what 
we know phenomenally as ,matter takes   
the complex form of a living brain1 we  
have abolished the necessity for        
assuming even a causal connection       
between the substance of what we know   
phenomenally as ,matter and the         
substance of what we know phenomenally  
as ,mind3 we have found that1 in the    
last resort1 the phenomenal connection  

between what we know as ,matter and what
 we know as ,mind is actually even more 
intimate than a connection of causality2
 we have found that it is a substantial 
identity4  ,to sum up this discussion4  
,we have considered the bearing of      
modern speculation on the doctrine of   
,materialism in three successive stages 
of argument4 ,first1 we had to consider 
the bearing on ,materialism of the      
simple doctrine of ,relativity4 ,here we
 saw that ,materialism was only affected
 to the extent of being compelled to    
allow that what we know as ,matter and  
,motion are not known as they are in    
themselves4 ,but we also saw that1 as   
the inscrutable realities are uniformly 
translated into consciousness as ,matter
 and ,motion1 it still remains as true  
as ever that what we know as ,matter and
 ,motion may be the causes of what we   
know as ,mind4 ,even1 therefore1 if the 
supposition of causality is taken to be 
an essential feature of ,materialism1   
,materialism would be in no wise        

affected by substituting for the words  
,matter and ,motion the symbols x and y4
  ,the second of the three stages       
consisted in showing that ,mr4          
,spencer's argument as to the possible  
identity of ,force and ,feeling is not  
in itself sufficient to overthrow the   
doctrine that what we know as ,matter   
and ,motion may be the cause of what we 
know as ,mind4 ,for the mere fact of its
 being more conceivable that units of   
,force should resemble units of ,feeling
 than conversely1 is no warrant for     
concluding that in reality any          
corresponding probability obtains4 ,the 
test of conceivability1 although the    
most ultimate test that is available1 is
 here rendered vague and valueless by   
the  priori consideration that whatever 
the cause of ,mind may be 7if it has a  
cause71 we must find it more easy to    
conceive of this cause as resembling    
,mind than to conceive of it as         
resembling any other entity of which we 
are only conscious indirectly4  ,lastly1

 in the third place1 we saw that even if
 ,mr4 ,spencer's argument were fully    
subscribed to1 and ,mind in its         
substantial essence were conceded to be 
causeless1 the central position of      
,materialism would still remain         
unaffected4 ,for ,mr4 ,spencer does not 
suppose that his units of ,force are    
themselves endowed with consciousness1  
any more than ,professor ,clifford      
supposes his moving molecules of        
inorganic matter to be thus endowed4 ,so
 that the only change which these       
possibilities1 even if conceded to be   
actualities1 produce in the speculative 
standing of ,materialism1 is to show    
that the raw material of consciousness1 
instead of requiring to be caused by    
other substances--,matter and ,force1 x 
and y1--occurs ready made as those      
substances4 ,but the essential feature  
of ,materialism remains                 
untouched--namely1 that what we know as 
,mind is dependent 7whether by way of   
causality or not is immaterial7 on      

highly complex forms of what we know as 
,matter1 in association with highly     
peculiar distributions of what we know  
as ,force4         99       99       99 
99       99   ,,iv4  ,,the ,,final      
,,mystery ,,of ,,things4  ,some         
physicists are inclined to dispute the  
fundamental proposition in which the    
whole of ,mr4 ,spencer's system of      
philosophy may be said to rest--the     
proposition1 namely1 that the fact of   
the persistence of force constitutes the
 ultimate basis of science4 ,for my own 
part1 ,i cannot but believe that any    
disagreement on this matter only arises 
from some want of mutual understanding2 
and1 therefore1 in order to anticipate  
any criticisms to which the present work
 may be open on this score1 ,i append   
this explanatory note4  ,i readily grant
 that the term persistence of force is  
not a happy one1 seeing that the word   
force1 as used by physicists1 does not  
at the present time convey the full     
meaning which ,mr4 ,spencer desires it  

to convey4 ,but ,i think that any       
impartial physicist will be prepared to 
admit that1 in the present state of his 
science1 we are entitled to conclude    
that energy of position is merely the   
result of energy of motion2 or1 in other
 words1 that potential energy is merely 
an expression of the fact that the      
universe1 as a whole1 is replete with   
actual energy1 whose essential          
characteristic is that it is            
indestructible4 ,and this may be        
concluded without committing ourselves  
to any particular theory as to the      
physical explanation of gravity2 all we 
need assert is1 that in some way or     
other gravity is the result of          
ubiquitous energy4 ,and this1 it seems  
to me1 we must assert1 or else conclude 
that gravity can never admit of a       
physical explanation4 ,for all that we  
mean by a physical explanation is the   
proved establishment of an equation     
between two quantities of energy2 so    
that if energy of position does not     

admit of being interpreted in terms of  
energy of motion1 we must conclude that 
it does not admit of being interpreted  
at all--at least not in any physical    
sense4  ,throughout the foregoing       
essays1 therefore1 ,i have assumed that 
all forms of energy are but relatively  
varying expressions of the same         
fact--the fact1 namely1 which ,mr4      
,spencer means to express when he says  
that force is persistent4 ,and it seems 
to me almost needless to show that this 
fact is really the basis of all science4
 ,for unless this fact is assumed as a  
postulate1 not only would scientific    
inquiry become impossible1 but all      
experience would become chaotic4 ,the   
physicist could not prosecute his       
researches unless he presupposed that   
the forces which he measures are of a   
permanent nature1 any more than could   
the chemist prosecute his researches    
unless he presupposed that the materials
 which he estimates by energy-units are 
likewise of a permanent nature4 ,and    

similarly with all the other sciences1  
as well as with every judgment in our   
daily experience4 ,if1 therefore1 any   
one should be hypercritical enough to   
dispute the position that the doctrine  
of the conservation of energy           
constitutes the ultimate datum of       
science1 ,i think it will be enough to  
observe that if this is not the ultimate
 datum of science1 science can have no  
ultimate datum at all4 ,for any datum   
more ultimate than permanent existence  
is manifestly impossible1 while any such
 datum as non-permanent existence would 
clearly render science impossible4      
,even1 therefore1 if such hypercriticism
 had a valid basis of apparently adverse
 fact whereon to stand1 ,i should feel  
myself justified in neglecting it on    
priori grounds2 but the only basis on   
which such hypercriticism can rest is1  
not the knowledge of any adverse facts1 
but the ignorance of certain facts which
 we must either conclude to be facts or 
else conclude that science can have no  

ultimate datum whereon to rest4 ,in the 
foregoing essays1 therefore1 ,i have not
 scrupled to maintain that the ultimate 
datum of science is destructive of      
teleology as a scientific argument for  
,theism2 because1 unless we deny the    
possibility of any such ultimate datum1 
and so land ourselves in hopeless       
scepticism1 we must conclude that there 
can be no datum more ultimate than      
this--,permanent ,existence2 and this is
 just the datum which we have seen to be
 destructive of teleology as a          
scientific argument for ,theism4  ,it   
may be well to point out that from this 
ultimate datum of science--or rather1   
let us say1 of experience--there follows
 a deductive explanation of the law of  
causation4 ,for this law1 when stripped 
of all the metaphysical corruptions with
 which it has been so cumbersomely      
clothed1 simply means that a given      
collocation of antecedents              
unconditionally produces a certain      
consequent4 ,but this fact1 otherwise   

stated1 amounts to nothing more than a  
re-statement of the ultimate datum of   
experience--the fact that energy is     
indestructible4 ,for if this latter fact
 be granted1 it is obvious that the     
so-called law of causation follows as a 
deductive necessity--or rather1 as ,i   
have said1 that this law becomes but    
another way of expressing the same fact4
 ,this is obvious if we reflect that the
 only means we have of ascertaining that
 energy is not destructible1 is by      
observing that similar antecedents do   
invariably determine similar            
consequents4 ,it is as a vast induction 
from all those particular cases of      
sequence-changes which collectively we  
call causation that we conclude energy  
to be indestructible4 ,and1 obversely1  
having concluded energy to be           
indestructible1 we can plainly see that 
in any particular cases of its          
manifestation in sequence-phenomena1 the
 unconditional resemblance between      
effects due to similar causes which is  

formulated by the law of causation is   
merely the direct expression of the fact
 which we had previously concluded4 ,it 
seems to me1 therefore1 that the        
old-standing question concerning the    
nature of causation ought now properly  
to be considered as obsolete4 ,doubtless
 there will long remain a sort of       
hereditary tendency in metaphysical     
minds to look upon cause-connection as a
 mysterious tie between antecedent and  
consequent2 but henceforth there is no  
need for scientific minds to regard this
 tie as mysterious in any other sense   
than the existence of energy is         
mysterious4 ,to state the law of        
causation is merely to state the fact   
that energy is indestructible4  ,and    
from this there also arises at once the 
explanation and the justification of our
 belief in the uniformity of nature4 ,if
 energy is1 in its relation to us1      
ubiquitous and persistent1 it clearly   
follows that in all its manifestations  
which collectively we call nature1      

similar preceding manifestations must   
always determine similar succeeding     
manifestations2 for otherwise the energy
 concerned would require on one or on   
both of the occasions1 either to have   
become augmented by creation1 or        
dissipated by annihilation4 ,thus our   
belief in the uniformity of nature1 as  
in the validity of the law of causation1
 is merely an expression of our belief  
in the ubiquitous and indestructible    
character of energy4  ,such being the   
case1 we may fairly conclude that all   
these old-standing mysteries are now    
merged in the one mystery of existence4 
,and deeper than this it is manifestly  
impossible that they can be merged2 for 
it is manifestly impossible that        
,existence in the abstract can ever     
admit of what we call explanation4      
,hence we can clearly see that1 in a    
scientific sense1 there must always     
remain a final mystery of things4 ,but  
although we can thus see that1 from the 
very meaning of what we call            

explanation1 it follows that at the base
 of all our explanations there must lie 
a great ,inexplicable1 ,i think that the
 mystery of ,existence in the abstract  
may be rendered less appalling if we    
reflect that1 as opposed to ,existence1 
there is only one logical               
alternative--,non-existence4 ,supposing1
 then1 our physical explanations to have
 reached their highest limits by        
resolving all modes of ,existence into  
one mode--force1 matter1 life1 and mind1
 being shown but different              
manifestations of the same ,infinite    
,existence--the final mystery of things 
would then become resolved into the     
simple question1 ,why is there          
,existence8--,why is there not ,nothing8
  ,let us then first ask1 ,what is      
,nothing8 ,is it a mere word1 which     
presents no meaning as corresponding to 
any objective reality1 or has the word a
 meaning notwithstanding its being an   
inconceivable one8 ,or1 otherwise       
phrased1 is ,nothing possible or        

impossible8 ,now1 although in ordinary  
conversation it is generally taken for  
granted that ,nothing is possible1 there
 is certainly no more ground for this   
supposition than there is for its       
converse--viz41 that ,nothing is merely 
a word which signifies the negation of  
possibility4 ,for analysis will show    
that the choice between these two       
counter-suppositions can only be made in
 the presence of knowledge which is     
necessarily absent--the knowledge       
whether the universe of ,existence is   
finite or infinite4 ,if the universe as 
a whole is finite1 the word ,nothing    
would stand as a symbol to denote an    
unthinkable blank of which a finite     
universe is the content4 ,and forasmuch 
as ,something and ,nothing would then   
become actual1 as distinguished from    
nominal correlatives1 we could have no  
guarantee that1 in an absolute or       
transcendental sense1 it may not be     
possible1 although it is inconceivable1 
for ,something to become ,nothing or    

,nothing ,something4 ,hence1 if         
,existence is finite1 ,no-existence     
becomes possible2 and the doctrine of   
the indestructibility of ,existence     
becomes1 for aught that we can tell1 of 
a merely relative signification4 ,but1  
on the other hand1 if ,existence is     
infinite1 ,no-existence becomes         
impossible2 and the doctrine of the     
indestructibility of ,existence becomes1
 in a logical sense1 of an absolute     
signification4 ,for it is manifest that 
if the universe of ,existence is without
 end in space and time1 the possibility 
of ,no-existence is of necessity        
excluded1 and the word ,nothing thus    
becomes a mere negation of              
possibility4#dg  ,thus1 if it be        
conceded that the universe as a whole is
 infinite both in space and time1 the   
concession amounts to an abolition of   
the final mystery of things4 ,for all   
that we mean by a mystery is something  
that requires an explanation1 and the   
whole of the final mystery of things is 

therefore embodied in the question1 ,why
 is there ,existence8--,why is there not
 ,nothing8 ,but if the universe of      
,existence be conceded infinite1 this   
question is sufficiently met by the     
answer1 ,because ,existence is1 and     
,nothing is not4 ,if it is retorted1    
,but this is no real answer2 ,i reply1  
,it is as real as the question4 ,for to 
ask1 ,why is there ,existence8 is1 upon 
the supposition which has been conceded1
 equivalent to asking1 ,why is the      
possible possible8 ,and if such         
questions cannot be answered1 it is     
scarcely right to say that on this      
account they embody a mystery2 because  
the questions are really not rational   
questions1 and therefore the fact of    
their not admitting of any rational     
answer cannot be held to show that the  
questions embody any rational mystery4  
,that there is a rational mystery1 in   
the sense of there being something which
 can never be explained1 ,i do not      
dispute2 all ,i assert is1 that this    

mystery is inexplicable1 only because   
there is nothing to explain2 the mystery
 being ultimate1 to ask for an          
explanation of that which1 being        
ultimate1 requires no explanation1 is   
irrational4 ,or1 to state the case in   
another way1 if it is asked1 ,why is    
there not ,nothing8 it is a sufficient  
answer1 on supposition of the universe  
being infinite1 to say1 ,because        
,nothing is nothing2 it is merely a word
 which presents no meaning1 and which1  
so far as anything can be conceived to  
the contrary1 never can present any     
meaning4  ,the above discussion has     
proceeded on the supposition of         
,existence being infinite2 but          
practically the same result would follow
 on the counter-supposition of          
,existence being finite4 ,for although  
in this case1 as we have seen1          
,non-entity would still be included     
within the range of possibility1 it     
would still be no more conceivable as   
such than is ,entity2 and hence the     

question1 ,why is there not ,nothing8   
would still be irrational1 seeing that1 
even if the possibility which the       
question supposes were realised1 it     
would in no wise tend to explain the    
mystery of ,something4 ,and even if it  
could1 the final mystery would not be   
thus excluded2 it would merely be       
transferred from the mystery of         
,existence to the mystery of            
,non-existence4 ,thus under every       
conceivable supposition we arrive at the
 same termination--viz41 that in the    
last resort there must be a final       
mystery1 which1 as forming the basis of 
all possible explanations1 cannot itself
 receive any explanation1 and which     
therefore is really not1 in any proper  
sense of the term1 a mystery at all4 ,it
 is merely a fact which itself requires 
no explanation1 because it is a fact    
than which none can be more ultimate4   
,so that even if we suppose this        
ultimate fact to be an ,intelligent     
,being1 it is clearly impossible that he

 should be able to explain his own      
existence1 since the possibility of any 
such explanation would imply that his   
existence could not be ultimate4 ,in the
 sense1 therefore1 of not admitting of  
any explanation1 his existence would    
require to be a mystery to himself1     
rendering it impossible for him to state
 anything further with regard to it than
 this--,i am that ,i am4  ,i do not     
doubt that this way of looking at the   
subject will be deemed unsatisfactory at
 first sight1 because it seems to be1 as
 it were1 a merely logical way of       
cheating our intelligence out of an     
intuitively felt justification for its  
own curiosity in this matter4 ,but the  
fault really lies in this intuitive     
feeling of justification not being      
itself justifiable4 ,for this particular
 question1 it will be observed1 differs 
from all other possible questions with  
which the mind has to deal4 ,all other  
questions being questions concerning    
manifestations of existence presupposed 

as existing1 it is perfectly legitimate 
to seek for an explanation of one series
 of manifestations in another--i4e41 to 
refer a less known group to a group     
better known4 ,but the case is          
manifestly quite otherwise when1 having 
merged one group of manifestations into 
another group1 and this into another for
 an indefinite number of stages1 we     
suddenly make a leap to the last        
possible stage and ask1 ,into what group
 are we to merge the basis of all our   
previous groups1 and of all groups which
 can possibly be formed in the future8  
,how are we to classify that which      
contains all possible classes8 ,where   
are we to look for an explanation of    
,existence8 ,when thus clearly stated1  
the question1 is1 as ,i have said1      
manifestly irrational2 but the point    
with which ,i am now concerned is       
this--,when in plain reason the question
 is seen to be irrational1 why in       
intuitive sentiment should it not be    
felt to be so8 ,the answer1 ,i think1   

is1 that the interrogative faculty being
 usually occupied with questions which  
admit of rational answers1 we acquire a 
sort of intellectual habit of           
presupposing every wherefore to have a  
therefore1 and thus1 when eventually we 
arrive at the last of all possible      
wherefores1 which itself supplies the   
basis of all possible therefores1 we    
fail at first to recognise the          
exceptional character of our position4  
,we fail at first to perceive that1 from
 the very nature of this particular     
case1 our wherefore is deprived of the  
rational meaning which it had in all the
 previous cases1 where the possibility  
of a corresponding therefore was        
presupposed4 ,and failing fully to      
perceive this truth1 our organised habit
 of expecting an answer to our question 
asserts itself1 and we experience the   
same sense of intellectual unrest in the
 presence of this wholly meaningless and
 absurd question1 as we experience in   
the presence of questions significant   

and rational4  ,,the ,,end4         99  
99       99       99       99   ,notes  
#a ,the above was written before ,mr4   
,mill's essay on ,theism was published4 
,lest1 therefore1 my refutation may be  
deemed too curt1 ,i supplement it with  
,mr4 ,mill's remarks upon the same      
subject4 ,it may still be maintained    
that the feelings of morality make the  
existence of ,god eminently desirable4  
,no doubt they do1 and that is the great
 reason why we find that good men and   
women cling to the belief1 and are      
pained by its being questioned4 ,but1   
surely1 it is not legitimate to assume  
that1 in the order of the universe1     
whatever is desirable is true4          
,optimism1 even when a ,god is already  
believed in1 is a thorny doctrine to    
maintain1 and had to be taken by        
,leibnitz in the limited sense1 that the
 universe being made by a good being1 is
 the best universe possible1 not the    
best absolutely3 that the ,divine power1
 in short1 was not equal to making it   

more free from imperfections than it is4
 ,but optimism1 prior to belief in a    
,god1 and as the ground of that belief1 
seems one of the oddest of all          
speculative delusions4 ,nothing1        
however1 ,i believe1 contributes more to
 keep up the belief in the general mind 
of humanity than the feeling of its     
desirableness1 which1 when clothed1 as  
it very often is1 in the form of an     
argument1 is a naive expression of the  
tendency of the human mind to believe   
whatever is agreeable to it4 ,positive  
value the argument of course has none4  
,for ,mill's remarks on the version of  
the argument dealt with in  #e1 see his 
,three ,essays1 p4 #bjd4  #b ,the words 
or not conceivable1 are here used in the
 sense of not relatively conceivable1 as
 explained in ,chap4 vi4  #c ,for the   
full discussion from which the above is 
an extract1 see ,system of ,logic1 vol4 
i4 pp4 #dji-dbf 7#hth ed474 ,but1       
substituting psychical for volitional1  
see also1 for some mitigation of the    

severity of the above statement1 the    
closing paragraphs of my supplementary  
essay on ,cosmic ,theism4  #d ,essay on 
,understanding--,existence of ,god4  #e 
,locke1 loc4 cit4  #f ,see ,appendix ,a4
  #g ,viz41 the constant association    
within experience of mind with certain  
highly peculiar material forms2 the     
constant proportion which is found to   
subsist between the quantity of cerebral
 matter and the degree of intellectual  
capacity--a proportion which may be     
clearly traced throughout the ascending 
series of vertebrated animals1 and which
 is very generally manifested in        
individuals of the human species2 the   
effects of cerebral anmia1 ansthetics1  
stimulants1 narcotic poisons1 and       
lesions of cerebral substance4 ,there   
can1 in short1 be no question that the  
whole series of observable facts bearing
 upon the subject are precisely such as 
they ought to be upon supposition of the
 materialistic theory being true2 while1
 contrariwise1 there is a total absence 

of any known facts tending to negative  
that theory4 ,at the same time it must  
be carefully noted1 that the observed   
facts 7and any additional number of the 
like kind7 do not logically warrant us  
in concluding that mental states are    
necessarily dependent upon material     
changes4 ,nevertheless1 it must also be 
noted1 that1 in the absence of positive 
proof of causation1 it is certainly in  
accordance with scientific procedure1 to
 yield our provisional assent to an     
hypothesis which undoubtedly connects a 
large order of constant accompaniments1 
rather than to an hypothesis which is   
confessedly framed to meet but a single 
one of the facts4  ,professor ,clifford1
 in a lecture on ,body and ,mind which  
he delivered at ,st4 ,george's ,hall1   
and afterwards published in the         
,fortnightly ,review1 argues against the
 existence of ,god on the ground that1  
as ,mind is always associated with      
,matter within experience1 there arises 
a presumption against ,mind existing    

anywhere without being thus associated1 
so that unless we can trace in the      
disposition of the heavenly bodies some 
resemblance to the conformation of      
cerebral structure1 we are to conclude  
that there is a considerable balance of 
probability in favour of ,atheism4 ,now1
 as this argument--if we rid it of the  
grotesque allusion to the heavenly      
bodies--is one that is frequently met   
with1 it seems desirable in this place  
briefly to analyse it4 ,first of all1   
then1 the validity of the argument      
depends upon the probability there is   
that the constant associated of ,mind   
with ,matter within experience is due to
 a causal connection2 for if the        
association in question is merely an    
association and nothing more1 the origin
 of known mind is as far from being     
explained as it would be were ,mind     
never known as associated with ,matter4 
,but1 in the next place1 supposing the  
constant association in question to be  
due to a causal connection1 it by no    

means follows that because ,mind is due 
to ,matter within experience1 therefore 
,mind cannot exist in any other mode    
beyond experience4  ,doubtless1 from    
analogy1 there is a presumption against 
the hypothesis that the same entity     
should exist in more than one mode at   
the same time2 but clearly in this case 
we are quite unable to estimate the     
value of this presumption4              
,consequently1 even assuming a causal   
connection between ,matter and ,human   
,mind1 if there is any1 the slightest1  
indications supplied by any other facts 
of experience pointing to the existence 
of a ,divine ,mind1 such indications    
should be allowed as much argumentative 
weight as they would have had in the    
absence of the presumption we are       
considering4 ,hence ,professor          
,clifford's conclusion cannot be        
regarded as valid until all the other   
arguments in favour of ,theism have been
 separately refuted4 ,doubtless         
,professor ,clifford will be the first  

to recognise the cogency of this        
criticism--if indeed it has not already 
occurred to him2 for as ,i know that he 
is much too clear a thinker not to      
perceive the validity of these          
considerations1 ,i am willing to believe
 that the substance of them was omitted 
from his essay merely for the sake of   
brevity2 but1 for the sake of less      
thoughtful persons1 ,i have deemed it   
desirable to state thus clearly that the
 problem of ,theism cannot be solved on 
grounds of ,materialism alone4 ,this    
note was written before ,i had the      
advantage of ,professor ,clifford's     
acquaintance1 but now ,i leave it1 as ,i
 leave all other parts of this          
essay--viz41 as it was originally       
written4--#ahgh4  #h ,to avoid burdening
 the text1 ,i have omitted another      
criticism which may be made on ,locke's 
argument4 ,triangle is a word by which  
we designate a certain figure1 one of   
the properties of which is that the sum 
of its angles is equal to two right     

angles4 ,in other words1 any figure     
which does not exhibit this property is 
not that figure which we designate a    
triangle4 ,hence1 when ,locke says he   
cannot conceive of a triangle which does
 not present this property1 it may be   
answered that his inability arises      
merely from the fact that any figure    
which fails to present this property is 
not a figure to which the term triangle 
can apply4 ,thus viewed1 however1 the   
illustration would obviously be absurd1 
for the same reason that the question of
 the clown is absurd1 ,can you think of 
a horse that is just like a cow8 ,what  
,locke evidently means is1 that we      
cannot conceive of any geometrical      
figure which presents all the other     
properties of a triangle without also   
presenting the property in question4    
,now1 even admitting1 with ,locke1 that 
it is as inconceivable that the entity  
known to us as ,matter should possess   
the property of causing thought as it is
 that the figure which we term a        

triangle should posses the property of  
containing more than two right angles1  
still it remains1 for the purposes of   
,locke's supposed theistic              
demonstration1 to prove that it is an   
inconceivable for the entity which we   
call ,mind not to be due to another     
,mind1 as it is for a triangle not to   
contain1 other than two right angles4   
,but1 further1 even if it were possible 
to prove this1 the demonstration would  
make as much against ,theism as in      
favour of it2 for if1 as the            
illustration of the triangle implies1 we
 restrict the meaning of the word ,mind 
to an entity one of whose essential     
qualities is that it should be caused by
 another ,mind1 the words ,supreme and  
,uncaused ,mind involve a contradiction 
in terms1 just as much as would the     
words ,a square triangle having four    
right angles4 ,it would1 therefore1 seem
 that if we adhere to ,locke's argument1
 and pursue it to its conclusion1 the   
only logical outcome would be           

this3--,seeing that by the word ,mind1  
,i expressly connote the quality of     
derivation from a prior ,mind1 as a     
quality belonging no less essentially to
 ,mind than the quality of presenting   
two right angles belongs to a triangle2 
therefore1 whatever other attributes ,i 
ascribe to the ,first ,cause1 ,i must   
clearly exclude the attribute ,mind2 and
 hence1 whatever else such a ,cause may 
be1 it follows from my argument that it 
certainly is--,not ,mind4  #i ,hamilton4
  #aj ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 vol4 i4
 pp4 #be-ca4  #aa ,lectures on          
,metaphysics1 vol4 ii4 p4 #edb4  #ab    
,loc4 cit41 p4 #edc4  #ac ,appendix to  
,discussions1 pp4 #fad1 #afe4  #ad      
,mill1 in the lengthy chapter which he  
devotes to the freedom of the will in   
his ,examination1 does not notice this  
point4  #ae ,if more evidence can be    
wanted1 it is supplied in some          
suggestive facts of ,psychology4 ,for   
example1 ,from our earliest childhood1  
the idea of doing wrong 7that is1 of    

doing what is forbidden1 or what is     
injurious to others7 and the idea of    
punishment are presented to the mind    
together1 and the intense character of  
the impressions causes the association  
between them to attain the highest      
degree of closeness and intimacy4 ,is it
 strange1 or unlike the usual processes 
of the human mind1 that in these        
circumstances we should retain the      
feeling and forget the reason on which  
it is grounded8 ,but why do ,i speak of 
forgetting8 ,in most cases the reason   
has never1 in our early education1 been 
presented to the mind4 ,the only ideas  
presented have been those of wrong and  
punishment1 and an inseparable          
association has been created between    
these directly1 without the help of any 
intervening idea4 ,this is quite enough 
to make the spontaneous feelings of     
mankind regard punishment and a         
wrong-doer as naturally fitted to each  
other--as a conjunction appropriate in  
itself1 independently of any            

consequences1 c4--,mill1 ,examination of
 ,hamilton1 p4 #eii4  #af ,grammar of   
,assent1 pp4 #ajf1 #ajg4  #ag           
,throughout these considerations ,i have
 confined myself to the positive side of
 the subject4 ,my argument being of the 
nature of a criticism on the erroneous  
inferences which are drawn from the good
 qualities of our moral nature1 ,i      
thought it desirable1 for the sake of   
clearness1 not to burden that argument  
by the additional one as to the source  
of the evil qualities of that nature4   
,this additional argument1 however1 will
 be found briefly stated at the close of
 my supplementary essay on ,professor   
,flint's ,theism4 ,on reading that      
additional argument1 ,i think that any  
candid and unbiassed mind must conclude 
that1 alike in what it is not as well as
 in what it is1 our moral nature points 
to a natural genesis1 as distinguished  
from a supernatural cause4  #ah ,the    
illustration to which ,i refer is that  
of the watershed of a country being     

precisely adapted to draining purposes4 
,the rivers just fit their own          
particular beds3 the latter occupy the  
lowest grounds1 and get broader and     
deeper as they advance2 pebbles1 gravel1
 and sand all occupy the best           
teleological situations1 c41 c4  #ai    
,order of ,nature1 by the ,rev4 ,baden  
,powell1 ,m4,a41 ,f4,r4,s41 c41 #ahei1  
pp4 #bbh-bda4  #bj ,i think it desirable
 to state that ,i perceived this great  
truth before ,i was aware that it had   
been perceived also by ,mr4 ,spencer4   
,his statement of it now occurs in the  
short chapter of ,first ,principles     
entitled ,relations between ,forces4 ,so
 far as ,i an able to ascertain1 no one 
has hitherto considered this important  
doctrine in its immediate relation to   
the question of ,theism4  ,in using the 
term persistence of force1 ,i am aware  
that ,i am using a term which is not    
unopen to criticism4 ,but as ,mr4       
,spencer's writings have brought this   
term into such general use among        

speculative thinkers1 it seemed to me   
undesirable to modify it4 ,questions of 
mere terminology are without any        
importance in a discussion of this kind1
 provided that the terms are universally
 understood to mean what they are       
intended to mean2 and ,i think that the 
signification which ,mr4 ,spencer       
attaches to his term1 persistence of    
force1 is sufficiently precise4         
,therefore1 adopting his usage1 whenever
 throughout the following pages ,i speak
 of force as persisting1 what ,i intend 
to be understood is1 that there is a    
something--call it force1 or energy1 or 
x--which1 so far as experience or       
imagination can extend1 is1 in its      
relation to us1 ubiquitous and          
illimitable2 or1 in other words1 that it
 universally presents the property of   
permanence4 7,see1 for a more detailed  
explanation1 supplementary essay1 ,on   
the ,final ,mystery of ,things47  #ba   
,hamilton may here be especially        
noticed1 because he went so far as to   

maintain that the phenomena of the      
external world1 taken by themselves1    
would ground a valid argument to the    
negation of ,god4 ,although ,i cannot   
but think that this position was a      
conspicuously irrational one for any    
competent thinker to occupy before the  
scientific doctrine of the correlation  
of the forces had been enunciated1      
nevertheless ,i cannot lose the         
opportunity of alluding to this         
remarkable feature in ,sir ,william     
,hamilton's philosophy1 showing as it   
does that same prophetic forestalling of
 the results which have since followed  
from the discovery of the conservation  
of energy1 as was shown by his no less  
remarkable theory of causation4 7,see   
supplementary essay ,on the ,final      
,mystery of ,things47  #bb ,mr4 ,n4     
,lockyer's work is now supplying        
important evidence on these             
points4--#ahgh4  #bc ,it will of course 
be observed that if matter and force are
 identical1 the unification is complete4

  #bd ,herbert ,spencer4  #be ,it may   
here be observed that the above         
discussion would not be affected by the 
view of ,professor ,clifford and others1
 that natural law is to be regarded as  
having a subjective rather than an      
objective signification--that what we   
call a natural law is merely an         
arbitrary selection made by ourselves of
 certain among natural processes4 ,the  
discussion would not be affected by this
 view1 because the argument is really   
based upon the existence of a cosmos as 
distinguished from a chaos2 and         
therefore it would be rather an         
intensification of the argument than    
otherwise to point out that1 for the    
maintenance of a cosmos1 natural laws1  
as conceived by us1 would be inadequate4
 ,and this seems a fitting place to make
 the almost superfluous remark1 that    
throughout this present essay ,i have   
used the words ,natural ,law1 ,supreme  
,law-giver1 c41 in an apparently        
unguarded sense1 merely in order to     

avoid needless obscurity4 ,fully        
sensible as ,i am of the misleading     
nature of the analogy which these words 
embody1 ,i have yet adopted them for the
 sake of perspicuity--being careful1    
however1 never to allow the false       
analogy which they express to enter into
 an argument on either side of the      
question4 ,thus1 even where it is said  
that the existence of ,natural ,law     
points to the existence of a ,supreme   
,law-maker1 the argument might equally  
well be phrased3 ,the existence of an   
orderly cosmos points to the existence  
of a disposing mind4  #bf ,first        
,principles1 pp4 #bg-bi4  #bg ,it may be
 here observed that this quality of     
indefiniteness on the part of such      
reasoning is merely a practical outcome 
of the theoretical considerations       
adduced in ,chapter ,v4 ,for as we there
 saw that the ratio between the known   
and the unknown is in this case wholly  
indefinite1 it follows that any symbols 
derived from the region of the          

known--even though such symbols be the  
highest generalities which the latter   
region affords--must be wholly          
indefinite when projected into the      
region of the unknown4 ,or rather let us
 say1 that as the region of the unknown 
is but a progressive continuation of the
 region of the known1 the determinate   
value of symbols of thought varies      
inversely as the distance--or1 not      
improbably1 as the square of the        
distance--from the sphere of the known  
at which they are applied4  #bh i4e41   
illegitimate in a relative sense4 ,the  
conclusion is legitimate enough in a    
formal sense1 and as establishing a     
probability of some unassignable degree 
of value4 ,but it would be illegitimate 
if this quality of indefiniteness were  
disregarded1 and the conclusion supposed
 to possess the same character of actual
 probability as it has of formal        
definition4  #bi ,in order not to burden
 the text with details1 ,i have         
presented these reflections in their    

most general terms4 ,thus1 if it be     
granted that cosmic harmony results from
 the combined action of general laws1   
and that these laws are the necessary   
result of the primary qualities of force
 and matter1 this the most general      
statement of the atheistic position     
includes all more special considerations
 as a genus includes its species2 and   
therefore it would not signify1 for the 
purposes of the atheistic argument1     
whether or not any such more special    
considerations are possible4            
,nevertheless1 for the sake of          
completeness1 ,i may here observe that  
we are not wholly without indications in
 nature of the physical causation       
whereby the effect of cosmic harmony is 
produced4 ,the universal tendency of    
motion to become rhythmical--itself1 as 
,mr4 ,spencer was the first to show1 a  
necessary consequence of the persistence
 of force--is1 so to speak1 a           
conservative tendency3 it sets a premium
 against natural cataclysms4 ,but a more

 important consideration is this1--that 
during the evolution of natural law in  
the way suggested in ,chapter ,,iv41 as 
every newly evolved law came into       
existence it must have been1 as it were1
 grafted on the stock of all            
pre-existing natural laws1 and so would 
not enter the cosmic system as an       
element of confusion1 but rather as an  
element of further progress4 ,for       
instance1 when1 with the origin of      
organic nature1 the law of natural      
selection entered upon the cosmos1 it   
was grafted upon the pre-existing stock 
of other natural laws1 and so combined  
within them in unity4 ,and a little     
thought will show that it was impossible
 that it should do otherwise2 for it was
 impossible that natural selection could
 ever produce organisms which would ever
 be able by their existence to conflict 
with the pre-existing system of         
astronomic or geologic laws2 seeing that
 organisms1 being a product of later    
evolution than these laws1 would either 

have to be adapted to them or perish4   
,and hence the new law of natural       
selection1 which consists in so adapting
 organisms to the pre-existing laws that
 they must either conform to them or    
die4 ,now1 ,i have chosen the case of   
natural selection because1 as alluded to
 in the text1 it is the law of all      
others which is the most conspicuously  
effective in producing the harmonious   
complexity of nature4 ,but the same kind
 of considerations may be seen to apply 
to most of the other general laws with  
which we are acquainted1 particularly if
 we bear in mind that the general       
outcome of their united action as we    
observe it--the cosmic harmony on which 
so much stress is laid--is not perfectly
 harmonious4 ,cataclysms--whether it be 
the capture of an insect1 or the ruin of
 a star--although events of             
comparatively rare occurrence if at any 
given time we take into account the     
total number of insects or the total    
number of stars1 are events which       

nevertheless do occasionally happen4    
,and the fact that even cataclysms take 
place in accordance with so-called      
natural law1 serves but to emphasise the
 consideration on which we are          
engaged--viz41 that the total result of 
the combined action of general laws is  
not such as to produce perfect order4   
,lastly1 if the answer is made that     
human ideas of perfect order may not    
correspond with the highest ideal of    
such order1 ,i observe that to make such
 a answer is merely to abandon the      
subject of discussion2 for if a theist  
rests his argument on the basis of our  
human conception of order1 he is not    
free to maintain his argument and at the
 same time to abandon its basis at      
whatever point the latter may be shown  
untenable4  #cj ,since the above was    
written1 the first volume of ,mr4       
,spencer's ,sociology has been          
published2 and those who may not as yet 
have read the first half of that work   
are here strongly recommended to do so2 

for ,mr4 ,spencer has there shown1 in a 
more connected and conclusive manner    
than has ever been shown before1 how    
strictly natural is the growth of all   
superstitions and religions--i4e41 of   
all the theories of personal agency in  
nature4--#ahgh4  #ca ,herbert ,spencer's
 ,essays1 vol4 iii4 pp4 #bdf-bdi        
7#ahgd74  #cb ,this is the truly        
inconceivable element in the physical   
theory4 ,as ,i have shown in the        
pleading on the side of ,atheism1 the   
supposed inconceivability of cosmic     
harmony being due to mindless forces1 is
 not of such a kind as wholly refuses to
 be surmounted by symbolic conceptions  
of a sufficiently abstract character4   
,but it is impossible1 by the aid of any
 symbols1 to gain a conception of an    
eternal existence4 ,and ,i may here     
point out1 that if ,mind is said to be  
the cause of evolution1 not only does   
the statement involve the inconceivable 
proposition that such a ,mind must be   
infinite in respect to its powers of    

supervision1 direction1 c42 but the     
statement also involves a necessary     
alternative between two additional      
inconceivable propositions--viz41 either
 that such a ,mind must have been       
eternal1 or that it must have come into 
existence without a cause4 ,in this     
respect1 therefore1 it would seem that  
the theory of ,atheism has the advantage
 over that of ,theism2 for while the    
former theory is under the necessity of 
embodying only a single inconceivable   
term1 the latter theory is under the    
necessity of embodying two such terms4  
#cc ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer has treated  
of this subject in his memorable        
controversy with ,mill on the ,universal
 ,postulate 7see ,psychology1  #dbg71   
and refuses to entertain the term       
,inconceivable as applicable to any     
propositions other than those wherein   
the terms cannot1 by any effort1 be     
brought before consciousness in that    
relation which the proposition asserts  
between them4 ,that is to say1 he limits

 the term ,inconceivable to that which  
is absolutely inconceivable2 and he then
 proceeds to affirm that all            
propositions which admit of being framed
 in thought1 but which are so much at   
variance with experience1 in which its  
terms have habitually been otherwise    
united1 that its terms cannot be put in 
the alleged relation without effort1    
ought properly to be termed incredible  
propositions4 ,now ,i cannot see that   
the class ,incredible propositions is1  
as this definition asserts1 identical   
with the class which ,i have termed     
,relatively inconceivable propositions4 
,for example1 it is a familiar          
observation that1 on looking at the     
setting sun1 we experience an almost1 if
 not quite1 insuperable difficulty in   
conceiving the sun's apparent motion as 
due to our own actual motion1 and yet we
 experience no difficulty in believing  
it4 ,conversely1 ,i entertain but little
 difficulty in conceiving--i4e41        
imagining--a shark with a mammalian     

heart1 and yet it would require         
extremely strong evidence to make me    
believe that such an animal exists4 ,the
 truth appears to be that our language  
is deficient in terms whereby to        
distinguish between that which is wholly
 inconceivable from that which is with  
difficulty conceivable4 ,this1 it seems 
to me1 was the principle reason of the  
dispute between ,spencer and ,mill above
 alluded to1--the former writer having  
always used the word ,inconceivable in  
the sense of ,absolutely inconceivable1 
and the latter having apparently used   
it--in his ,logic and elsewhere--in both
 senses4 ,i have endeavoured to remedy  
this defect in the language by          
introducing the qualifying words1       
,absolutely and ,relatively1 which1     
although not appropriate words1 are the 
best that ,i am able to supply4 ,the    
conceptive faculty of the individual    
having been determined by the experience
 of the race1 that which is             
inconceivable by the intelligence of the

 race may be said to be inconceivable to
 the intelligence of the individual in  
an absolute sense2 no effort on his part
 can enable him to surmount the         
organically imposed conditions of his   
conceptive faculty4 ,but that which is  
inconceivable merely to one individual  
or generation1 while it is not          
inconceivable to the intelligence of the
 race1 may properly be said to be       
inconceivable to the intelligence of    
that individual or generation only in a 
relative sense2 apart from the special  
condition to which the individual       
intelligence has been subjected1 there  
is nothing in the conditions of human   
intelligence as such to prevent the     
thing from being conceived4 ,while this 
work has been passing through the press1
 ,i have found that ,mr4 ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes 
has already employed the above terms in 
precisely the same sense as that which  
is above explained4--#ahgh4  #cd ,i     
should here like to have added some     
considerations on ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's  

remarks concerning the effect of        
training upon the mind in this          
connection2 but1 to avoid being tedious1
 ,i shall condense what ,i have to say  
into a few sentences4 ,what ,hamilton   
maintains is very true1 viz41 that the  
study of classics1 moral and mental     
philosophy1 c41 renders the mind more   
capable of believing in a ,god than does
 the study of physical science4 ,the    
question1 however1 is1 ,which class of  
studies ought to be considered the more 
authoritative in this matter8 ,i        
certainly cannot see what title         
classics1 history1 political economy1   
c41 have to be regarded at all2 and     
although the mental and moral sciences  
have doubtless a better claim1 still ,i 
think they must be largely subordinate  
to those sciences which deal with the   
whole domain of nature besides4         
,further1 ,i should say that there is no
 very strong affirmative influence      
created on the mind in this respect by  
any class of studies2 and that the only 

reason why we so generally find ,theism 
and classics1 c41 united1 is because we 
so seldom find classics1 c41 and        
physical science united2 the negative   
influence of the latter1 in the case of 
classical minds1 being therefore        
generally absent4  #ce ,the qualities   
named are only known in a relative      
sense1 and therefore the apparent       
contradiction may be destitute of       
meaning in an absolute sense4  #cf ,all 
the quotations in this ,appendix have   
been taken from the chapter on ,our     
knowledge of the existence of a ,god1   
and from the early part of that on ,the 
extent of human knowledge1 together with
 the appended letter to the ,bishop of  
,worcester4  #cg ,a criticism of ,mr4   
,john ,fiske's proposed system of       
theology as expounded in his work on    
,cosmic ,philosophy 7,macmillan  ,co41  
#ahgd74  #ch ,cosmic ,philosophy1 vol4  
i4 pp4 #hg-hi4  #ci ,cosmic ,philosophy1
 vol4 ii4 pp4 #dbi1 #dcj4  #dj ,ibid41  
p4 #dda4  #da ,ibid41 pp4 #dej1 #dea4   

#db ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 i4 
pp4 #aei-afa4  #dc ,we thus see that the
 question whether there may not be      
something quasi-psychical in the        
constitution of things is a question    
which does not affect the position of   
,theism as it has been left by a        
negation of the self-conscious          
personality of ,god4 ,but as the        
speculations on which this question has 
been reared are in themselves of much   
philosophical interest1 ,i may here     
observe that1 in one form or another1   
they have been dimly floating in men's  
minds for a long time past4 ,thus1      
excepting the degree of certainty with  
which it is taught1 we have in ,mr4     
,spencer's words above quoted a         
reversion to the doctrine of ,buddha2   
for1 as force is persistent1 all that   
would happen on death1 supposing the    
doctrine true1 would be an escape of the
 circumscribed aggregate of units       
forming the individual consciousness    
into the unlimited abyss of similar     

units constituting the ,absolute ,being 
of the ,cosmists1 or the ,divine        
,essence of the ,buddhists4 ,again1 the 
doctrine in a vague form pervades the   
philosophy of ,spinoza1 and is next     
clearly enunciated by ,wundt4 ,lastly1  
in a recently published very remarkable 
essay ,on the ,nature of ,things in     
,themselves1 ,professor ,clifford       
arrives at a similar doctrine by a      
different route4 ,the following is the  
conclusion to which he arrives3--,that  
element of which1 as we have seen1 even 
the simplest feeling is a complex1 ,i   
shall call ,mind-stuff4 ,a moving       
molecule of inorganic matter does not   
possess mind or consciousness1 but it   
possesses a small piece of mind-stuff4  
,when molecules are so combined together
 as to form the film on the under side  
of a jellyfish1 the elements of         
mind-stuff which go along with them are 
so combined as to form the faint        
beginnings of ,sentience4 ,when the     
molecules are so combined as to form the

 brain and nervous system of a          
vertebrate1 the corresponding elements  
of mind-stuff are so combined as to form
 some kind of consciousness2 that is to 
say1 changes in the complex which take  
place at the same time get so linked    
together that the repetition of one     
implies the repetition of the other4    
,when matters take the complex form of a
 living human brain1 the corresponding  
mind-stuff takes the form of a human    
consciousness1 having intelligence and  
volition4 7,mind1 ,january1 #ahgh47  #dd
 ,theism1 by ,robert ,flint1 ,d4,d41    
,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,divinity in the
 ,university of ,edinburgh1 c4  #de     
,such being the objects in view1 ,i have
 not thought it necessary to extend this
 criticism into anything resembling a   
review of ,professor ,flint's work as a 
whole2 but1 on the contrary1 ,i have    
aimed rather at confining my            
observations to those parts of his      
treatise which embody the current       
arguments from teleology alone4 ,i may  

here observe1 however1 in general terms1
 that ,i consider all his arguments to  
have been answered by anticipation in   
the foregoing examination of ,theism4 ,i
 may also here observe1 that throughout 
the following essay ,i have used the    
word design in the sense in which it is 
used by ,professor ,flint himself4 ,this
 sense is distinctly a different one    
from that which the word bears in the   
writings of the ,paley1 ,bell1 and      
,chalmers school4 ,for while in the     
latter writings1 as pointed out in      
,chapter ,,iii41 the word bears its     
natural meaning of a certain process of 
thought1 in ,professor ,flint's work it 
is used rather as expressive of a       
product of intelligence4 ,in other      
words1 design1 as used by ,professor    
,flint1 is synonymous with intention1   
irrespective of the particular          
psychological process by which the      
intention may have been put into effect4
  #df ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bee-beg4  #dg ,let
 it be observed that there is a         

distinction between what ,i may call    
substantial and formal existence4 ,thus 
there is no doubt that flowers as       
flowers perish1 or become non-existent2 
but the substances of which they were   
composed persist4 ,and1 in this         
connection1 ,i may here point out that  
if the universe is infinite in space and
 time1 the universe as a whole would    
present substantial existence as        
standing out of relation to space and   
time1 whereas innumerable portions of   
the universe present only formal        
existences1 because standing in relation
 both to space and time4 ,thus1 for     
instance1 the solar system1 as a solar  
system1 must have an end in time as it  
has a boundary in space2 but as the     
substance of which it consists will not 
become extinguished by the extinction of
 the system1 it may not now stand in any
 real relation to what we call space and
 time4 ,i am inclined to think that it  
is upon the idea of non-existence in    
this formal sense that we construct a   

pseud-idea of non-existence in a        
substantial sense2 but it is evident    
that if the universe as a whole is      
absolute1 this pseud-idea must represent
 as impossibility4 ,and from this it    
follows1 that if existence is infinite  
in space and time1 every quantum of it  
with which our experience comes into    
relation must represent1 as its         
essential quality1 that quality which we
 find to be presented by the substance  
of things--the quality1 that is1 of     
persistence4