supplementation by ,david ,mc,clamrock  
,,summa ,,theologica  ,,part ,,ii-,,ii  
7,secunda ,secundae7  ,translated by    
,fathers of the ,english ,dominican     
,province  ,,benziger ,,brothers ,,new  
,,york   ,,dedication  ,to the ,blessed 
,virgin ,mary ,immaculate ,seat of      
,wisdom   ,,note ,,to ,,this            
,,electronic ,,edition  ,the text of    
this electronic edition was originally  
produced by ,sandra ,k4 ,perry1         
,perrysburg1 ,ohio1 and made available  
through the ,christian ,classics        
,ethereal ,library                      
http3_/_/www4ccel4org4 ,i have          
eliminated unnecessary formatting in the
 text1 corrected some errors in         
transcription1 and added the dedication1
 tables of contents1 ,prologue1 and the 
numbers of the questions and articles1  
as they appeared in the printed         
translation published by ,benziger      
,brothers4 ,each article is now         
designated by part1 question number1 and
 article number in brackets1 like this3 

,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #b
   ,whether the ,supreme ,good1 ,god1   
,is the ,cause of ,evil8  ,in a few     
places1 where obvious errors appeared in
 the ,benziger ,brothers edition1 ,i    
have corrected them by reference to a   
,latin text of the ,summa4 ,these       
corrections are indicated by ,english   
text in brackets4 ,for example1 in ,part
 ,i1 ,question #de1 ,article #b1 the    
first sentence in the ,benziger         
,brothers edition begins3 ,not only is  
it impossible that anything should be   
created by ,god4444 ,by reference to the
 ,latin1 non solum non est impossibile a
 ,deo aliquid creari 7emphasis added71  
this has been corrected to ,not only is 
it not impossible that anything should  
be created by ,god4444  ,this electronic
 edition also differs from the ,benziger
 ,brothers edition in the following     
details 7as well as the obvious lack of 
the original page numbers and headers73 
99 ,the repetitive expression ,we       
proceed thus to the next ,article does  

not appear directly below the title of  
each article4  99 ,italics are          
represented by underscores at the       
beginning and end1 like this4           
,quotations and other quotable matter1  
however1 are ordinarily set off by      
quotation marks with no underscores in  
this edition1 in accordance with common 
,english usage1 even where they were set
 in italics with no quotation marks in  
the ,benziger ,brothers edition4 ,titles
 of books are set off by underscores    
when they appear in the text with no    
parentheses1 but not when the books are 
cited in parentheses4  99 ,bible        
chapters and verses are cited with      
arabic numerals separated by colons1    
like this3 ,dan4 #g3aj--not like this3  
,dan4 vii4 #aj4 ,small roman numerals   
have been retained where they appear in 
citations to books other than the       
,bible4  99 ,any matter that appeared in
 a footnote in the ,benziger ,brothers  
edition is presented in brackets at the 
point in the text where the footnote    

mark appeared4  99 ,greek words are     
presented in ,roman transliteration4  99
 ,paragraphs are not indented and are   
separated by blank lines4  99 ,numbered 
topics1 set forth at the beginning of   
each question and at certain other      
places1 are ordinarily presented on a   
separate line for each topic4  99       
,titles of questions are in all caps4   
,anything else in this electronic       
edition that does not correspond to the 
content of the ,benziger ,brothers      
edition may be regarded as a defect in  
this edition and attributed to me       
7,david ,mc,clamrock74    ,,contents    
,,second ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,second     
,,part 7,,qq4 #a-ahi7  ,question  #a4   
,of ,faith #b4   ,of the ,act of ,faith 
#c4   ,of the ,outward ,act of ,faith   
#d4   ,of the ,virtue ,itself of ,faith 
#e4   ,of ,those ,who ,have ,faith #f4  
,of the ,cause of ,faith #g4   ,of the  
,effects of ,faith #h4   ,of the ,gift  
of ,understanding #i4   ,of the ,gift of
 ,knowledge #aj4  ,of ,unbelief in      

,general #aa4  ,of ,heresy #ab4  ,of    
,apostasy #ac4  ,of the ,sin of         
,blasphemy1 in ,general #ad4  ,of       
,blasphemy ,against the ,holy ,ghost    
#ae4  ,of the ,vices ,opposed to        
,knowledge and ,understanding #af4  ,of 
the ,precepts of ,faith1 ,knowledge1 and
 ,understanding #ag4  ,of ,hope1        
,considered in ,itself #ah4  ,of the    
,subject of ,hope #ai4  ,of the ,gift of
 ,fear #bj4  ,of ,despair #ba4  ,of     
,presumption #bb4  ,of the ,precepts    
,relating to ,hope and ,fear #bc4  ,of  
,charity1 ,considered in ,itself #bd4   
,of the ,subject of ,charity #be4  ,of  
the ,object of ,charity #bf4  ,of the   
,order of ,charity #bg4  ,of the        
,principal ,act of ,charity1 ,which ,is 
to ,love #bh4  ,of ,joy #bi4  ,of ,peace
 #cj4  ,of ,mercy #ca4  ,of ,beneficence
 #cb4  ,of ,almsdeeds #cc4  ,of         
,fraternal ,correction #cd4  ,of ,hatred
 #ce4  ,of ,sloth #cf4  ,of ,envy #cg4  
,of ,discord1 ,which ,is ,contrary to   
,peace #ch4  ,of ,contention #ci4  ,of  

,schism #dj4  ,of ,war #da4  ,of ,strife
 #db4  ,of ,sedition #dc4  ,of ,scandal 
#dd4  ,of the ,precepts of ,charity #de4
  ,of the ,gift of ,wisdom #df4  ,of    
,folly ,which ,is ,opposed to ,wisdom   
,,treatise ,,on ,,prudence ,,and        
,,justice  #dg4  ,of ,prudence          
,considered in ,itself #dh4  ,of the    
,parts of ,prudence #di4  ,of ,each     
,quasi-integral ,part of ,prudence #ej4 
,of the ,subjective ,parts of ,prudence 
#ea4  ,of the ,virtues ,which ,are      
,connected with ,prudence #eb4  ,of the 
,gift of ,counsel #ec4  ,of ,imprudence 
#ed4  ,of ,negligence #ee4  ,of ,vices  
,opposed to ,prudence by ,way of        
,resemblance #ef4  ,of the ,precepts    
,relating to ,prudence #eg4  ,of ,right 
#eh4  ,of ,justice #ei4  ,of ,injustice 
#fj4  ,of ,judgment #fa4  ,of the ,parts
 of ,justice #fb4  ,of ,restitution #fc4
  ,of ,respect of ,persons #fd4  ,of    
,murder #fe4  ,of ,injuries ,committed  
on the ,person #ff4  ,of ,theft and     
,robbery #fg4  ,of the ,injustice of a  

,judge1 in ,judging #fh4  ,of ,matters  
,concerning ,unjust ,accusation #fi4    
,of ,sins ,committed ,against ,justice  
on the ,part of the ,defendant #gj4  ,of
 ,injustice with ,regard to the ,person 
of the ,witness #ga4  ,of ,injustice in 
,judgment on the ,part of ,counsel #gb4 
,of ,reviling #gc4  ,of ,backbiting #gd4
  ,of ,tale-,bearing #ge4  ,of ,derision
 #gf4  ,of ,cursing #gg4  ,of ,cheating1
 ,which ,is ,committed in ,buying and   
,selling #gh4  ,of the ,sin of ,usury   
#gi4  ,of the ,quasi-integral ,parts of 
,justice #hj4  ,of the ,potential ,parts
 of ,justice #ha4  ,of ,religion #hb4   
,of ,devotion #hc4  ,of ,prayer #hd4    
,of ,adoration #he4  ,of ,sacrifice #hf4
  ,of ,oblations and ,first-fruits #hg4 
,of ,tithes #hh4  ,of ,vows #hi4  ,of   
,oaths #ij4  ,of the ,taking of ,god's  
,name by ,way of ,adjuration #ia4  ,of  
,taking the ,divine ,name for the       
,purpose of ,invoking ,it by            
,means of ,praise #ib4  ,of             
,superstition #ic4  ,of ,superstition   

,consisting in ,undue ,worship of the   
,true ,god #id4  ,of ,idolatry #ie4  ,of
 ,superstition in ,divinations #if4  ,of
 ,superstition in ,observances #ig4  ,of
 the ,temptation of ,god #ih4  ,of      
,perjury #ii4  ,of ,sacrilege #ajj4 ,on 
,simony #aja4 ,of ,piety #ajb4 ,of      
,observance1 ,considered in ,itself1 and
 of ,its ,parts #ajc4 ,of ,dulia #ajd4  
,of ,obedience #aje4 ,of ,disobedience  
#ajf4 ,of ,thankfulness or ,gratitude   
#ajg4 ,of ,ingratitude #ajh4 ,of        
,vengeance #aji4 ,of ,truth #aaj4 ,of   
the ,vices ,opposed to ,truth1 and      
,first of ,lying #aaa4 ,of              
,dissimulation and ,hypocrisy #aab4 ,of 
,boasting #aac4 ,of ,irony #aad4 ,of the
 ,friendliness ,which ,is ,called       
,affability #aae4 ,of ,flattery #aaf4   
,of ,quarreling #aag4 ,of ,liberality   
#aah4 ,of the ,vices ,opposed to        
,liberality1 and in the ,first ,place1  
of ,covetousness #aai4 ,of ,prodigality 
#abj4 ,of ,epikeia or ,equity #aba4 ,of 
,piety #abb4 ,of the ,precepts of       

,justice  ,,treatise ,,on ,,fortitude   
,,and ,,temperance  #abc4 ,of ,fortitude
 #abd4 ,of ,martyrdom #abe4 ,of ,fear   
#abf4 ,of ,fearlessness #abg4 ,of       
,daring #abh4 ,of the ,parts of         
,fortitude #abi4 ,of ,magnanimity #acj4 
,of ,presumption #aca4 ,of ,ambition    
#acb4 ,of ,vainglory #acc4 ,of          
,pusillanimity #acd4 ,of ,magnificence  
#ace4 ,of ,meanness #acf4 ,of ,patience 
#acg4 ,of ,perseverance #ach4 ,of the   
,vices ,opposed to ,perseverance #aci4  
,of the ,gift of ,fortitude #adj4 ,of   
the ,precepts of ,fortitude #ada4 ,of   
,temperance #adb4 ,of the ,vices        
,opposed to ,temperance #adc4 ,of the   
,parts of ,temperance1 in ,general #add4
 ,of ,shamefacedness #ade4 ,of ,honesty 
#adf4 ,of ,abstinence #adg4 ,of ,fasting
 #adh4 ,of ,gluttony #adi4 ,of ,sobriety
 #aej4 ,of ,drunkenness #aea4 ,of       
,chastity #aeb4 ,of ,virginity #aec4 ,of
 ,lust #aed4 ,of the ,parts of ,lust    
#aee4 ,of ,continence #aef4 ,of         
,incontinence #aeg4 ,of ,clemency and   

,meekness #aeh4 ,of ,anger #aei4 ,of    
,cruelty #afj4 ,of ,modesty #afa4 ,of   
,humility #afb4 ,of ,pride #afc4 ,of the
 ,first ,man's ,sin #afd4 ,of the       
,punishments of the ,first ,man's ,sin  
#afe4 ,of ,our ,first ,parents'         
,temptation #aff4 ,of ,studiousness     
#afg4 ,of ,curiosity #afh4 ,of ,modesty 
as ,consisting in the ,outward          
,movements of the ,body #afi4 ,of       
,modesty in the ,outward ,apparel #agj4 
,of the ,precepts of ,temperance        
,,treatise ,,on ,,acts ,,which ,,pertain
 ,,especially ,,to ,,certain ,,men      
#aga4 ,of ,prophecy #agb4 ,of the ,cause
 of ,prophecy #agc4 ,of the ,manner in  
,which ,prophetic ,knowledge ,is        
,conveyed #agd4 ,of the ,division of    
,prophecy #age4 ,of ,rapture #agf4 ,of  
the ,grace of ,tongues #agg4 ,of the    
,gratuitous ,grace ,consisting in ,words
 #agh4 ,of the ,grace of ,miracles #agi4
 ,of the ,division of ,life into ,active
 and ,contemplative #ahj4 ,of the       
,contemplative ,life #aha4 ,of the      

,active ,life #ahb4 ,of the ,active     
,life in ,comparison with the           
,contemplative ,life #ahc4 ,of ,man's   
,various ,duties and ,states in ,general
 #ahd4 ,of the ,state of ,perfection in 
,general #ahe4 ,of ,things ,pertaining  
to the ,episcopal ,state #ahf4 ,of      
,those ,things in ,which the ,religious 
,state ,properly ,consists #ahg4 ,of    
,those ,things ,that ,are ,competent to 
,religious #ahh4 ,of the ,different     
,kinds of ,religious ,life #ahi4 ,of the
 ,entrance into ,religious ,life        
,,summa ,,theologica  ,,second ,,part   
,,of ,,the ,,second ,,part ,,ii-,,ii1   
,secunda ,secundae   ,,treatise ,,on    
,,the ,,theological ,,virtues 7,,qq4    
#a-df7   ,,question #a  ,,of ,,faith    
7,in ,ten ,articles7  ,having to treat  
now of the theological virtues1 we shall
 begin with ,faith1 secondly we shall   
speak of ,hope1 and thirdly1 of         
,charity4  ,the treatise on ,faith will 
be fourfold3 7#a7 ,of faith itself2 7#b7
 ,of the corresponding gifts1 knowledge 

and understanding2 7#c7 ,of the opposite
 vices2 7#d7 ,of the precepts pertaining
 to this virtue4  ,about faith itself we
 shall consider3 7#a7 its object2 7#b7  
its act2 7#c7 the habit of faith4       
,under the first head there are ten     
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether the   
object of faith is the ,first ,truth8   
7#b7 ,whether the object of faith is    
something complex or incomplex1 i4e4    
whether it is a thing or a proposition8 
7#c7 ,whether anything false can come   
under faith8  7#d7 ,whether the object  
of faith can be anything seen8  7#e7    
,whether it can be anything known8  7#f7
 ,whether the things to be believed     
should be divided into a certain number 
of articles8  7#g7 ,whether the same    
articles are of faith for all times8    
7#h7 ,of the number of articles2  7#i7  
,of the manner of embodying the articles
 in a symbol2  7#aj7 ,who has the right 
to propose a symbol of faith8   ,,first 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #a   
,whether the ,object of ,faith ,is the  

,first ,truth8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that the object of faith is not   
the ,first ,truth4 ,for it seems that   
the object of faith is that which is    
proposed to us to be believed4 ,now not 
only things pertaining to the ,godhead1 
i4e4 the ,first ,truth1 are proposed to 
us to be believed1 but also things      
concerning ,christ's human nature1 and  
the sacraments of the ,church1 and the  
condition of creatures4 ,therefore the  
object of faith is not only the ,first  
,truth4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 faith and  
unbelief have the same object since they
 are opposed to one another4 ,now       
unbelief can be about all things        
contained in ,holy ,writ1 for whichever 
one of them a man denies1 he is         
considered an unbeliever4 ,therefore    
faith also is about all things contained
 in ,holy ,writ4 ,but there are many    
things therein1 concerning man and other
 creatures4 ,therefore the object of    
faith is not only the ,first ,truth1 but
 also created truth4  ,obj4 #c3         

,further1 faith is condivided with      
charity1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#fb1 ,a4 #c74 ,now by charity we love   
not only ,god1 who is the sovereign     
,good1 but also our neighbor4 ,therefore
 the object of ,faith is not only the   
,first ,truth4  ,on the contrary1       
,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii7 that  
faith is about the simple and           
everlasting truth4 ,now this is the     
,first ,truth4 ,therefore the object of 
faith is the ,first ,truth4  ,i answer  
that1 ,the object of every cognitive    
habit includes two things3 first1 that  
which is known materially1 and is the   
material object1 so to speak1 and1      
secondly1 that whereby it is known1     
which is the formal aspect of the       
object4 ,thus in the science of         
geometry1 the conclusions are what is   
known materially1 while the formal      
aspect of the science is the mean of    
demonstration1 through which the        
conclusions are known4  ,accordingly if 
we consider1 in faith1 the formal aspect

 of the object1 it is nothing else than 
the ,first ,truth4 ,for the faith of    
which we are speaking1 does not assent  
to anything1 except because it is       
revealed by ,god4 ,hence the mean on    
which faith is based is the ,divine     
,truth4 ,if1 however1 we consider       
materially the things to which faith    
assents1 they include not only ,god1 but
 also many other things1 which1         
nevertheless1 do not come under the     
assent of faith1 except as bearing some 
relation to ,god1 in as much as1 to wit1
 through certain effects of the ,divine 
operation1 man is helped on his journey 
towards the enjoyment of ,god4          
,consequently from this point of view   
also the object of faith is1 in a way1  
the ,first ,truth1 in as much as nothing
 comes under faith except in relation to
 ,god1 even as the object of the medical
 art is health1 for it considers nothing
 save in relation to health4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,things concerning ,christ's  
human nature1 and the sacraments of the 

,church1 or any creatures whatever1 come
 under faith1 in so far as by them we   
are directed to ,god1 and in as much as 
we assent to them on account of the     
,divine ,truth4  ,the same answer       
applies to the ,second ,objection1 as   
regards all things contained in ,holy   
,writ4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,charity also  
loves our neighbor on account of ,god1  
so that its object1 properly speaking1  
is ,god1 as we shall show further on    
7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a74   ,,second ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #b  ,whether   
the ,object of ,faith ,is ,something    
,complex1 by ,way of a ,proposition8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
object of faith is not something complex
 by way of a proposition4 ,for the      
object of faith is the ,first ,truth1 as
 stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now the ,first 
,truth is something simple4 ,therefore  
the object of faith is not something    
complex4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the       
exposition of faith is contained in the 
symbol4 ,now the symbol does not contain

 propositions1 but things3 for it is not
 stated therein that ,god is almighty1  
but3 ,i believe in ,god 4 4 4 almighty4 
,therefore the object of faith is not a 
proposition but a thing4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 faith is succeeded by vision1 
according to #a ,cor4 #ac3ab3 ,we see   
now through a glass in a dark manner2   
but then face to face4 ,now ,i know in  
part2 but then ,i shall know even as ,i 
am known4 ,but the object of the        
heavenly vision is something simple1 for
 it is the ,divine ,essence4 ,therefore 
the faith of the wayfarer is also4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,faith is a mean between  
science and opinion4 ,now the mean is in
 the same genus as the extremes4 ,since1
 then1 science and opinion are about    
propositions1 it seems that faith is    
likewise about propositions2 so that its
 object is something complex4  ,i answer
 that1 ,the thing known is in the knower
 according to the mode of the knower4   
,now the mode proper to the human       
intellect is to know the truth by       

synthesis and analysis1 as stated in the
 ,first ,part 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #e74 ,hence 
things that are simple in themselves1   
are known by the intellect with a       
certain amount of complexity1 just as on
 the other hand1 the ,divine intellect  
knows1 without any complexity1 things   
that are complex in themselves4         
,accordingly the object of faith may be 
considered in two ways4 ,first1 as      
regards the thing itself which is       
believed1 and thus the object of faith  
is something simple1 namely the thing   
itself about which we have faith4       
,secondly1 on the part of the believer1 
and in this respect the object of faith 
is something complex by way of a        
proposition4  ,hence in the past both   
opinions have been held with a certain  
amount of truth4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this
 argument considers the object of faith 
on the part of the thing believed4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the symbol mentions   
the things about which faith is1 in so  
far as the act of the believer is       

terminated in them1 as is evident from  
the manner of speaking about them4 ,now 
the act of the believer does not        
terminate in a proposition1 but in a    
thing4 ,for as in science we do not form
 propositions1 except in order to have  
knowledge about things through their    
means1 so is it in faith4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,the object of the heavenly vision  
will be the ,first ,truth seen in       
itself1 according to #a ,john #c3b3 ,we 
know that when ,he shall appear1 we     
shall be like to ,him3 because we shall 
see ,him as ,he is3 hence that vision   
will not be by way of a proposition but 
by way of a simple understanding4 ,on   
the other hand1 by faith1 we do not     
apprehend the ,first ,truth as it is in 
itself4 ,hence the comparison fails4    
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1    
,art4 #c  ,whether ,anything ,false ,can
 ,come ,under ,faith8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that something false can 
come under faith4 ,for faith is         
condivided with hope and charity4 ,now  

something false can come under hope1    
since many hope to have eternal life1   
who will not obtain it4 ,the same may be
 said of charity1 for many are loved as 
being good1 who1 nevertheless1 are not  
good4 ,therefore something false can be 
the object of faith4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 ,abraham believed that ,christ
 would be born1 according to ,john      
#h3ef3 ,abraham your father rejoiced    
that he might see ,my day3 he saw it1   
and was glad4 ,but after the time of    
,abraham1 ,god might not have taken     
flesh1 for it was merely because ,he    
willed that ,he did1 so that what       
,abraham believed about ,christ would   
have been false4 ,therefore the object  
of faith can be something false4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 the ancients believed in  
the future birth of ,christ1 and many   
continued so to believe1 until they     
heard the preaching of the ,gospel4     
,now1 when once ,christ was born1 even  
before ,he began to preach1 it was false
 that ,christ was yet to be born4       

,therefore something false can come     
under faith4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is 
a matter of faith1 that one should      
believe that the true ,body of ,christ  
is contained in the ,sacrament of the   
altar4 ,but it might happen that the    
bread was not rightly consecrated1 and  
that there was not ,christ's true ,body 
there1 but only bread4 ,therefore       
something false can come under faith4   
,on the contrary1 ,no virtue that       
perfects the intellect is related to the
 false1 considered as the evil of the   
intellect1 as the ,philosopher declares 
7,ethic4 vi1 #b74 ,now faith is a virtue
 that perfects the intellect1 as we     
shall show further on 7,q4 #d1 ,,aa4 #b1
 #e74 ,therefore nothing false can come 
under it4  ,i answer that1 ,nothing     
comes under any power1 habit or act1    
except by means of the formal aspect of 
the object3 thus color cannot be seen   
except by means of light1 and a         
conclusion cannot be known save through 
the mean of demonstration4 ,now it has  

been stated 7,a4 #a7 that the formal    
aspect of the object of faith is the    
,first ,truth2 so that nothing can come 
under faith1 save in so far as it stands
 under the ,first ,truth1 under which   
nothing false can stand1 as neither can 
non-being stand under being1 nor evil   
under goodness4 ,it follows therefore   
that nothing false can come under faith4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since the true is   
the good of the intellect1 but not of   
the appetitive power1 it follows that   
all virtues which perfect the intellect1
 exclude the false altogether1 because  
it belongs to the nature of a virtue to 
bear relation to the good alone4 ,on the
 other hand those virtues which perfect 
the appetitive faculty1 do not entirely 
exclude the false1 for it is possible to
 act in accordance with justice or      
temperance1 while having a false opinion
 about what one is doing4 ,therefore1 as
 faith perfects the intellect1 whereas  
hope and charity perfect the appetitive 
part1 the comparison between them fails4

  ,nevertheless neither can anything    
false come under hope1 for a man hopes  
to obtain eternal life1 not by his own  
power 7since this would be an act of    
presumption71 but with the help of      
grace2 and if he perseveres therein he  
will obtain eternal life surely and     
infallibly4  ,in like manner it belongs 
to charity to love ,god1 wherever ,he   
may be2 so that it matters not to       
charity1 whether ,god be in the         
individual whom we love for ,god's sake4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that ,god would not 
take flesh1 considered in itself was    
possible even after ,abraham's time1 but
 in so far as it stands in ,god's       
foreknowledge1 it has a certain         
necessity of infallibility1 as explained
 in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ad1 ,,aa4    
#ac1 #ae73 and it is thus that it comes 
under faith4 ,hence in so far as it     
comes under faith1 it cannot be false4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,after ,christ's birth1
 to believe in ,him1 was to believe in  
,christ's birth at some time or other4  

,the fixing of the time1 wherein some   
were deceived was not due to their      
faith1 but to a human conjecture4 ,for  
it is possible for a believer to have a 
false opinion through a human           
conjecture1 but it is quite impossible  
for a false opinion to be the outcome of
 faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the faith of 
the believer is not directed to such and
 such accidents of bread1 but to the    
fact that the true body of ,christ is   
under the appearances of sensible bread1
 when it is rightly consecrated4 ,hence 
if it be not rightly consecrated1 it    
does not follow that anything false     
comes under faith4   ,,fourth ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #d  ,whether   
the ,object of ,faith ,can ,be          
,something ,seen8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that the object of faith is  
something seen4 ,for ,our ,lord said to 
,thomas 7,john #bj3bi73 ,because thou   
hast seen ,me1 ,thomas1 thou hast       
believed4 ,therefore vision and faith   
regard the same object4  ,obj4 #b3      

,further1 the ,apostle1 while speaking  
of the knowledge of faith1 says 7#a     
,cor4 #ac3ab73 ,we see now through a    
glass in a dark manner4 ,therefore what 
is believed is seen4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 faith is a spiritual light4   
,now something is seen under every      
light4 ,therefore faith is of things    
seen4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,every sense 
is a kind of sight1 as ,augustine states
 7,de ,verb4 ,domini1 ,serm4 xxxiii74   
,but faith is of things heard1 according
 to ,rom4 #aj3ag3 ,faith 4 4 4 cometh by
 hearing4 ,therefore faith is of things 
seen4  ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle  
says 7,heb4 #aa3a7 that faith is the    
evidence of things that appear not4  ,i 
answer that1 ,faith implies assent of   
the intellect to that which is believed4
 ,now the intellect assents to a thing  
in two ways4 ,first1 through being moved
 to assent by its very object1 which is 
known either by itself 7as in the case  
of first principles1 which are held by  
the habit of understanding71 or through 

something else already known 7as in the 
case of conclusions which are held by   
the habit of science74 ,secondly the    
intellect assents to something1 not     
through being sufficiently moved to this
 assent by its proper object1 but       
through an act of choice1 whereby it    
turns voluntarily to one side rather    
than to the other3 and if this be       
accompanied by doubt or fear of the     
opposite side1 there will be opinion1   
while1 if there be certainty and no fear
 of the other side1 there will be faith4
  ,now those things are said to be seen 
which1 of themselves1 move the intellect
 or the senses to knowledge of them4    
,wherefore it is evident that neither   
faith nor opinion can be of things seen 
either by the senses or by the          
intellect4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,thomas saw
 one thing1 and believed another 99,st4 
,gregory3 ,hom4 xxvi in ,evang43 he saw 
the ,man1 and believing ,him to be ,god1
 he made profession of his faith1       
saying3 ,my ,lord and my ,god4  ,reply  

,obj4 #b3 ,those things which come under
 faith can be considered in two ways4   
,first1 in particular2 and thus they    
cannot be seen and believed at the same 
time1 as shown above4 ,secondly1 in     
general1 that is1 under the common      
aspect of credibility2 and in this way  
they are seen by the believer4 ,for he  
would not believe unless1 on the        
evidence of signs1 or of something      
similar1 he saw that they ought to be   
believed4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the light  
of faith makes us see what we believe4  
,for just as1 by the habits of the other
 virtues1 man sees what is becoming to  
him in respect of that habit1 so1 by the
 habit of faith1 the human mind is      
directed to assent to such things as are
 becoming to a right faith1 and not to  
assent to others4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3     
,hearing is of words signifying what is 
of faith1 but not of the things         
themselves that are believed2 hence it  
does not follow that these things are   
seen4   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4

 #a1 ,art4 #e  ,whether ,those ,things  
,that ,are of ,faith ,can ,be an ,object
 of ,science 99,science is certain      
knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion  
through its demonstration8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that those things    
that are of faith can be an object of   
science4 ,for where science is lacking  
there is ignorance1 since ignorance is  
the opposite of science4 ,now we are not
 in ignorance of those things we have to
 believe1 since ignorance of such things
 savors of unbelief1 according to #a    
,tim4 #a3ac3 ,i did it ignorantly in    
unbelief4 ,therefore things that are of 
faith can be an object of science4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 science is acquired 
by reasons4 ,now sacred writers employ  
reasons to inculcate things that are of 
faith4 ,therefore such things can be an 
object of science4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
things which are demonstrated are an    
object of science1 since a demonstration
 is a syllogism that produces science4  
,now certain matters of faith have been 

demonstrated by the philosophers1 such  
as the ,existence and ,unity of ,god1   
and so forth4 ,therefore things that are
 of faith can be an object of science4  
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 opinion is further  
from science than faith is1 since faith 
is said to stand between opinion and    
science4 ,now opinion and science can1  
in a way1 be about the same object1 as  
stated in ,poster4 i4 ,therefore faith  
and science can be about the same object
 also4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 
7,hom4 xxvi in ,evang47 that when a     
thing is manifest1 it is the object1 not
 of faith1 but of perception4 ,therefore
 things that are of faith are not the   
object of perception1 whereas what is an
 object of science is the object of     
perception4 ,therefore there can be no  
faith about things which are an object  
of science4  ,i answer that1 ,all       
science is derived from self-evident and
 therefore seen principles2 wherefore   
all objects of science must needs be1 in
 a fashion1 seen4  ,now as stated above 

7,a4 #d71 it is impossible that one and 
the same thing should be believed and   
seen by the same person4 ,hence it is   
equally impossible for one and the same 
thing to be an object of science and of 
belief for the same person4 ,it may     
happen1 however1 that a thing which is  
an object of vision or science for one1 
is believed by another3 since we hope to
 see some day what we now believe about 
the ,trinity1 according to #a ,cor4     
#ac3ab3 ,we see now through a glass in a
 dark manner2 but then face to face3    
which vision the angels possess already2
 so that what we believe1 they see4 ,in 
like manner it may happen that what is  
an object of vision or scientific       
knowledge for one man1 even in the state
 of a wayfarer1 is1 for another man1 an 
object of faith1 because he does not    
know it by demonstration4  ,nevertheless
 that which is proposed to be believed  
equally by all1 is equally unknown by   
all as an object of science3 such are   
the things which are of faith simply4   

,consequently faith and science are not 
about the same things4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,unbelievers are in ignorance of things
 that are of faith1 for neither do they 
see or know them in themselves1 nor do  
they know them to be credible4 ,the     
faithful1 on the other hand1 know them1 
not as by demonstration1 but by the     
light of faith which makes them see that
 they ought to believe them1 as stated  
above 7,a4 #d1 ad #b1 #c74  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,the reasons employed by holy men  
to prove things that are of faith1 are  
not demonstrations2 they are either     
persuasive arguments showing that what  
is proposed to our faith is not         
impossible1 or else they are proofs     
drawn from the principles of faith1 i4e4
 from the authority of ,holy ,writ1 as  
,dionysius declares 7,div4 ,nom4 ii74   
,whatever is based on these principles  
is as well proved in the eyes of the    
faithful1 as a conclusion drawn from    
self-evident principles is in the eyes  
of all4 ,hence again1 theology is a     

science1 as we stated at the outset of  
this work 7,p4 ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #b74     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,things which can be   
proved by demonstration are reckoned    
among the articles of faith1 not because
 they are believed simply by all1 but   
because they are a necessary            
presupposition to matters of faith1 so  
that those who do not known them by     
demonstration must know them first of   
all by faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as the 
,philosopher says 7,poster4 i71 science 
and opinion about the same object can   
certainly be in different men1 as we    
have stated above about science and     
faith2 yet it is possible for one and   
the same man to have science and faith  
about the same thing relatively1 i4e4 in
 relation to the object1 but not in the 
same respect4 ,for it is possible for   
the same person1 about one and the same 
object1 to know one thing and to think  
another3 and1 in like manner1 one may   
know by demonstration the unity of the  
,godhead1 and1 by faith1 the ,trinity4  

,on the other hand1 in one and the same 
man1 about the same object1 and in the  
same respect1 science is incompatible   
with either opinion or faith1 yet for   
different reasons4 ,because science is  
incompatible with opinion about the same
 object simply1 for the reason that     
science demands that its object should  
be deemed impossible to be otherwise1   
whereas it is essential to opinion1 that
 its object should be deemed possible to
 be otherwise4 ,yet that which is the   
object of faith1 on account of the      
certainty of faith1 is also deemed      
impossible to be otherwise2 and the     
reason why science and faith cannot be  
about the same object and in the same   
respect is because the object of science
 is something seen whereas the object of
 faith is the unseen1 as stated above4  
,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1    
,art4 #f  ,whether ,those ,things ,that 
,are of ,faith ,should ,be ,divided into
 ,certain ,articles8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that those things that are  

of faith should not be divided into     
certain articles4 ,for all things       
contained in ,holy ,writ are matters of 
faith4 ,but these1 by reason of their   
multitude1 cannot be reduced to a       
certain number4 ,therefore it seems     
superfluous to distinguish certain      
articles of faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
material differences can be multiplied  
indefinitely1 and therefore art should  
take no notice of them4 ,now the formal 
aspect of the object of faith is one and
 indivisible1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 
viz4 the ,first ,truth1 so that matters 
of faith cannot be distinguished in     
respect of their formal object4         
,therefore no notice should be taken of 
a material division of matters of faith 
into articles4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it  
has been said by some 99,cf4 ,william of
 ,auxerre1 ,summa ,aurea that an article
 is an indivisible truth concerning     
,god1 exacting arctans our belief4 ,now 
belief is a voluntary act1 since1 as    
,augustine says 7,tract4 xxvi in        

,joan471 no man believes against his    
will4 ,therefore it seems that matters  
of faith should not be divided into     
articles4  ,on the contrary1 ,isidore   
says3 ,an article is a glimpse of       
,divine truth1 tending thereto4 ,now we 
can only get a glimpse of ,divine truth 
by way of analysis1 since things which  
in ,god are one1 are manifold in our    
intellect4 ,therefore matters of faith  
should be divided into articles4  ,i    
answer that1 the word article is        
apparently derived from the ,greek2 for 
the ,greek arthron 99,cf4 ,william of   
,auxerre1 ,summa ,aurea which the ,latin
 renders articulus1 signifies a fitting 
together of distinct parts3 wherefore   
the small parts of the body which fit   
together are called the articulations of
 the limbs4 ,likewise1 in the ,greek    
grammar1 articles are parts of speech   
which are affixed to words to show their
 gender1 number or case4 ,again in      
rhetoric1 articles are parts that fit   
together in a sentence1 for ,tully says 

7,rhet4 iv7 that an article is composed 
of words each pronounced singly and     
separately1 thus3 ,your passion1 your   
voice1 your look1 have struck terror    
into your foes4  ,hence matters of      
,christian faith are said to contain    
distinct articles1 in so far as they are
 divided into parts1 and fit together4  
,now the object of faith is something   
unseen in connection with ,god1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,consequently any
 matter that1 for a special reason1 is  
unseen1 is a special article2 whereas   
when several matters are known or not   
known1 under the same aspect1 we are not
 to distinguish various articles4 ,thus 
one encounters one difficulty in seeing 
that ,god suffered1 and another in      
seeing that ,he rose again from the     
dead1 wherefore the article of the      
,resurrection is distinct from the      
article of the ,passion4 ,but that ,he  
suffered1 died and was buried1 present  
the same difficulty1 so that if one be  
accepted1 it is not difficult to accept 

the others2 wherefore all these belong  
to one article4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some 
things are proposed to our belief are in
 themselves of faith1 while others are  
of faith1 not in themselves but only in 
relation to others3 even as in sciences 
certain propositions are put forward on 
their own account1 while others are put 
forward in order to manifest others4    
,now1 since the chief object of faith   
consists in those things which we hope  
to see1 according to ,heb4 #aa3b3 ,faith
 is the substance of things to be hoped 
for1 it follows that those things are in
 themselves of faith1 which order us    
directly to eternal life4 ,such are the 
,trinity of ,persons in ,almighty ,god  
99,the ,leonine ,edition reads3 ,the    
,three ,persons1 the omnipotence of     
,god1 etc41 the mystery of ,christ's    
,incarnation1 and the like3 and these   
are distinct articles of faith4 ,on the 
other hand certain things in ,holy ,writ
 are proposed to our belief1 not chiefly
 on their own account1 but for the      

manifestation of those mentioned above3 
for instance1 that ,abraham had two     
sons1 that a dead man rose again at the 
touch of ,eliseus' bones1 and the like1 
which are related in ,holy ,writ for the
 purpose of manifesting the ,divine     
mystery or the ,incarnation of ,christ3 
and such things should not form distinct
 articles4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the formal
 aspect of the object of faith can be   
taken in two ways3 first1 on the part of
 the thing believed1 and thus there is  
one formal aspect of all matters of     
faith1 viz4 the ,first ,truth3 and from 
this point of view there is no          
distinction of articles4 ,secondly1 the 
formal aspect of matters of faith1 can  
be considered from our point of view2   
and thus the formal aspect of a matter  
of faith is that it is something unseen2
 and from this point of view there are  
various distinct articles of faith1 as  
we saw above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this   
definition of an article is taken from  
an etymology of the word as derived from

 the ,latin1 rather than in accordance  
with its real meaning1 as derived from  
the ,greek3 hence it does not carry much
 weight4 ,yet even then it could be said
 that although faith is exacted of no   
man by a necessity of coercion1 since   
belief is a voluntary act1 yet it is    
exacted of him by a necessity of end1   
since he that cometh to ,god must       
believe that ,he is1 and without faith  
it is impossible to please ,god1 as the 
,apostle declares 7,heb4 #aa3f74        
,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1  
,art4 #g  ,whether the ,articles of     
,faith ,have ,increased in ,course of   
,time8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that the articles of faith have not     
increased in course of time4 ,because1  
as the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #aa3a71     
faith is the substance of things to be  
hoped for4 ,now the same things are to  
be hoped for at all times4 ,therefore1  
at all times1 the same things are to be 
believed4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1          
development has taken place1 in sciences

 devised by man1 on account of the lack 
of knowledge in those who discovered    
them1 as the ,philosopher observes      
7,metaph4 ii74 ,now the doctrine of     
faith was not devised by man1 but was   
delivered to us by ,god1 as stated in   
,eph4 #b3h3 ,it is the gift of ,god4    
,since then there can be no lack of     
knowledge in ,god1 it seems that        
knowledge of matters of faith was       
perfect from the beginning and did not  
increase as time went on4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 the operation of grace        
proceeds in orderly fashion no less than
 the operation of nature4 ,now nature   
always makes a beginning with perfect   
things1 as ,boethius states 7,de        
,consol4 iii74 ,therefore it seems that 
the operation of grace also began with  
perfect things1 so that those who were  
the first to deliver the faith1 knew it 
most perfectly4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1    
just as the faith of ,christ was        
delivered to us through the apostles1 so
 too1 in the ,old ,testament1 the       

knowledge of faith was delivered by the 
early fathers to those who came later1  
according to ,deut4 #cb3g3 ,ask thy     
father1 and he will declare to thee4    
,now the apostles were most fully       
instructed about the mysteries1 for they
 received them more fully than others1  
even as they received them earlier1 as a
 gloss says on ,rom4 #h3bc3 ,ourselves  
also who have the first fruits of the   
,spirit4 ,therefore it seems that       
knowledge of matters of faith has not   
increased as time went on4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 xvi in   
,ezech47 that the knowledge of the holy 
fathers increased as time went on 4 4 4 
and the nearer they were to ,our        
,savior's coming1 the more fully did    
they receive the mysteries of salvation4
  ,i answer that1 ,the articles of faith
 stand in the same relation to the      
doctrine of faith1 as self-evident      
principles to a teaching based on       
natural reason4 ,among these principles 
there is a certain order1 so that some  

are contained implicitly in others2 thus
 all principles are reduced1 as to their
 first principle1 to this one3 ,the same
 thing cannot be affirmed and denied at 
the same time1 as the ,philosopher      
states 7,metaph4 iv1 text4 #i74 ,in like
 manner all the articles are contained  
implicitly in certain primary matters of
 faith1 such as ,god's existence1 and   
,his providence over the salvation of   
man1 according to ,heb4 #aa3 ,he that   
cometh to ,god1 must believe that ,he   
is1 and is a rewarder to them that seek 
,him4 ,for the existence of ,god        
includes all that we believe to exist in
 ,god eternally1 and in these our       
happiness consists2 while belief in ,his
 providence includes all those things   
which ,god dispenses in time1 for man's 
salvation1 and which are the way to that
 happiness3 and in this way1 again1 some
 of those articles which follow from    
these are contained in others3 thus     
faith in the ,redemption of mankind     
includes belief in the ,incarnation of  

,christ1 ,his ,passion and so forth4    
,accordingly we must conclude that1 as  
regards the substance of the articles of
 faith1 they have not received any      
increase as time went on3 since whatever
 those who lived later have believed1   
was contained1 albeit implicitly1 in the
 faith of those ,fathers who preceded   
them4 ,but there was an increase in the 
number of articles believed explicitly1 
since to those who lived in later times 
some were known explicitly which were   
not known explicitly by those who lived 
before them4 ,hence the ,lord said to   
,moses 7,ex4 #f3b1 #c73 ,i am the ,god  
of ,abraham1 the ,god of ,isaac1 the    
,god of ,jacob 99,vulg43 ',i am the     
,lord that appeared to ,abraham1 to     
,isaac1 and to ,jacob' 4 4 4 and ,my    
name ,adonai ,i did not show them3      
,david also said 7,ps4 #aah3ajj73 ,i    
have had understanding above ancients3  
and the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #c3e7 that 
the mystery of ,christ1 in other        
generations was not known1 as it is now 

revealed to ,his holy apostles and      
prophets4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,among men  
the same things were always to be hoped 
for from ,christ4 ,but as they did not  
acquire this hope save through ,christ1 
the further they were removed from      
,christ in point of time1 the further   
they were from obtaining what they hoped
 for4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7,heb4   
#aa3ac73 ,all these died according to   
faith1 not having received the promises1
 but beholding them afar off4 ,now the  
further off a thing is the less         
distinctly is it seen2 wherefore those  
who were nigh to ,christ's advent had a 
more distinct knowledge of the good     
things to be hoped for4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,progress in knowledge occurs in two
 ways4 ,first1 on the part of the       
teacher1 be he one or many1 who makes   
progress in knowledge as time goes on3  
and this is the kind of progress that   
takes place in sciences devised by man4 
,secondly1 on the part of the learner2  
thus the master1 who has perfect        

knowledge of the art1 does not deliver  
it all at once to his disciple from the 
very outset1 for he would not be able to
 take it all in1 but he condescends to  
the disciple's capacity and instructs   
him little by little4 ,it is in this way
 that men made progress in the knowledge
 of faith as time went on4 ,hence the   
,apostle 7,gal4 #c3bd7 compares the     
state of the ,old ,testament to         
childhood4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,two causes
 are requisite before actual generation 
can take place1 an agent1 namely1 and   
matter4 ,in the order of the active     
cause1 the more perfect is naturally    
first2 and in this way nature makes a   
beginning with perfect things1 since the
 imperfect is not brought to perfection1
 except by something perfect already in 
existence4 ,on the other hand1 in the   
order of the material cause1 the        
imperfect comes first1 and in this way  
nature proceeds from the imperfect to   
the perfect4 ,now in the manifestation  
of faith1 ,god is the active cause1     

having perfect knowledge from all       
eternity2 while man is likened to matter
 in receiving the influx of ,god's      
action4 ,hence1 among men1 the knowledge
 of faith had to proceed from           
imperfection to perfection2 and1        
although some men have been after the   
manner of active causes1 through being  
doctors of faith1 nevertheless the      
manifestation of the ,spirit is given to
 such men for the common good1 according
 to #a ,cor4 #ab3g2 so that the         
knowledge of faith was imparted to the  
,fathers who were instructors in the    
faith1 so far as was necessary at the   
time for the instruction of the people1 
either openly or in figures4  ,reply    
,obj4 #d3 ,the ultimate consummation of 
grace was effected by ,christ1 wherefore
 the time of ,his coming is called the  
time of fulness 99,vulg43 'fulness of   
time' 7,gal4 #d3d74 ,hence those who    
were nearest to ,christ1 whether before1
 like ,john the ,baptist1 or after1 like
 the apostles1 had a fuller knowledge of

 the mysteries of faith2 for even with  
regard to man's state we find that the  
perfection of manhood comes in youth1   
and that a man's state is all the more  
perfect1 whether before or after1 the   
nearer it is to the time of his youth4  
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1   
,art4 #h  ,whether the ,articles of     
,faith ,are ,suitably ,formulated8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
articles of faith are unsuitably        
formulated4 ,for those things1 which can
 be known by demonstration1 do not      
belong to faith as to an object of      
belief for all1 as stated above 7,a4    
#e74 ,now it can be known by            
demonstration that there is one ,god2   
hence the ,philosopher proves this      
7,metaph4 xii1 text4 #eb7 and many other
 philosophers demonstrated the same     
truth4 ,therefore that there is one ,god
 should not be set down as an article of
 faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as it 
is necessary to faith that we should    
believe ,god to be almighty1 so is it   

too that we should believe ,him to be   
all-knowing and provident for all1 about
 both of which points some have erred4  
,therefore1 among the articles of faith1
 mention should have been made of ,god's
 wisdom and providence1 even as of ,his 
omnipotence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to    
know the ,father is the same things as  
to know the ,son1 according to ,john    
#ad3i3 ,he that seeth ,me1 seeth the    
,father also4 ,therefore there ought to 
be but one article about the ,father and
 ,son1 and1 for the same reason1 about  
the ,holy ,ghost4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1  
the ,person of the ,father is no less   
than the ,person of the ,son1 and of the
 ,holy ,ghost4 ,now there are several   
articles about the ,person of the ,holy 
,ghost1 and likewise about the ,person  
of the ,son4 ,therefore there should be 
several articles about the ,person of   
the ,father4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 just  
as certain things are said by           
appropriation1 of the ,person of the    
,father and of the ,person of the ,holy 

,ghost1 so too is something appropriated
 to the ,person of the ,son1 in respect 
of ,his ,godhead4 ,now1 among the       
articles of faith1 a place is given to a
 work appropriated to the ,father1 viz4 
the creation1 and likewise1 a work      
appropriated to the ,holy ,ghost1 viz4  
that ,he spoke by the prophets4         
,therefore the articles of faith should 
contain some work appropriated to the   
,son in respect of ,his ,godhead4  ,obj4
 #f3 ,further1 the sacrament of the     
,eucharist presents a special difficulty
 over and above the other articles4     
,therefore it should have been mentioned
 in a special article3 and consequently 
it seems that there is not a sufficient 
number of articles4  ,on the contrary   
stands the authority of the ,church who 
formulates the articles thus4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #d1 #f71 
to faith those things in themselves     
belong1 the sight of which we shall     
enjoy in eternal life1 and by which we  
are brought to eternal life4 ,now two   

things are proposed to us to be seen in 
eternal life3 viz4 the secret of the    
,godhead1 to see which is to possess    
happiness2 and the mystery of ,christ's 
,incarnation1 by ,whom we have access to
 the glory of the sons of ,god1         
according to ,rom4 #e3b4 ,hence it is   
written 7,john #ag3c73 ,this is eternal 
life3 that they may know ,thee1 the 4 4 
4 true ,god1 and ,jesus ,christ ,whom   
,thou hast sent4 ,wherefore the first   
distinction in matters of faith is that 
some concern the majesty of the         
,godhead1 while others pertain to the   
mystery of ,christ's human nature1 which
 is the mystery of godliness 7#a ,tim4  
#c3af74  ,now with regard to the majesty
 of the ,godhead1 three things are      
proposed to our belief3 first1 the unity
 of the ,godhead1 to which the first    
article refers2 secondly1 the trinity of
 the ,persons1 to which three articles  
refer1 corresponding to the three       
,persons2 and thirdly1 the works proper 
to the ,godhead1 the first of which     

refers to the order of nature1 in       
relation to which the article about the 
creation is proposed to us2 the second  
refers to the order of grace1 in        
relation to which all matters concerning
 the sanctification of man are included 
in one article2 while the third refers  
to the order of glory1 and in relation  
to this another article is proposed to  
us concerning the resurrection of the   
dead and life everlasting4 ,thus there  
are seven articles referring to the     
,godhead4  ,in like manner1 with regard 
to ,christ's human nature1 there are    
seven articles1 the first of which      
refers to ,christ's incarnation or      
conception2 the second1 to ,his virginal
 birth2 the third1 to ,his ,passion1    
death and burial2 the fourth1 to ,his   
descent into hell2 the fifth1 to ,his   
resurrection2 the sixth1 to ,his        
ascension2 the seventh1 to ,his coming  
for the judgment1 so that in all there  
are fourteen articles4  ,some1 however1 
distinguish twelve articles1 six        

pertaining to the ,godhead1 and six to  
the humanity4 ,for they include in one  
article the three about the three       
,persons2 because we have one knowledge 
of the three ,persons3 while they divide
 the article referring to the work of   
glorification into two1 viz4 the        
resurrection of the body1 and the glory 
of the soul4 ,likewise they unite the   
conception and nativity into one        
article4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by faith we 
hold many truths about ,god1 which the  
philosophers were unable to discover by 
natural reason1 for instance ,his       
providence and omnipotence1 and that ,he
 alone is to be worshiped1 all of which 
are contained in the one article of the 
unity of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the   
very name of the ,godhead implies a kind
 of watching over things1 as stated in  
the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #h74 ,now
 in beings having an intellect1 power   
does not work save by the will and      
knowledge4 ,hence ,god's omnipotence    
includes1 in a way1 universal knowledge 

and providence4 ,for ,he would not be   
able to do all ,he wills in things here 
below1 unless ,he knew them1 and        
exercised ,his providence over them4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we have but one       
knowledge of the ,father1 ,son1 and     
,holy ,ghost1 as to the unity of the    
,essence1 to which the first article    
refers3 but1 as to the distinction of   
the ,persons1 which is by the relations 
of origin1 knowledge of the ,father does
 indeed1 in a way1 include knowledge of 
the ,son1 for ,he would not be ,father1 
had ,he not a ,son2 the bond whereof    
being the ,holy ,ghost4 ,from this point
 of view1 there was a sufficient motive 
for those who referred one article to   
the three ,persons4 ,since1 however1    
with regard to each ,person1 certain    
points have to be observed1 about which 
some happen to fall into error1 looking 
at it in this way1 we may distinguish   
three articles about the three ,persons4
 ,for ,arius believed in the omnipotence
 and eternity of the ,father1 but did   

not believe the ,son to be co-equal and 
consubstantial with the ,father2 hence  
the need for an article about the       
,person of the ,son in order to settle  
this point4 ,in like manner it was      
necessary to appoint a third article    
about the ,person of the ,holy ,ghost1  
against ,macedonius4 ,in the same way   
,christ's conception and birth1 just as 
the resurrection and life everlasting1  
can from one point of view be united    
together in one article1 in so far as   
they are ordained to one end2 while1    
from another point of view1 they can be 
distinct articles1 in as much as each   
one separately presents a special       
difficulty4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,it       
belongs to the ,son and ,holy ,ghost to 
be sent to sanctify the creature2 and   
about this several things have to be    
believed4 ,hence it is that there are   
more articles about the ,persons of the 
,son and ,holy ,ghost than about the    
,person of the ,father1 ,who is never   
sent1 as we stated in the ,first ,part  

7,q4 #dc1 ,a4 #d74  ,reply ,obj4 #e3    
,the sanctification of a creature by    
grace1 and its consummation by glory1 is
 also effected by the gift of charity1  
which is appropriated to the ,holy      
,ghost1 and by the gift of wisdom1 which
 is appropriated to the ,son3 so that   
each work belongs by appropriation1 but 
under different aspects1 both to the    
,son and to the ,holy ,ghost4  ,reply   
,obj4 #f3 ,two things may be considered 
in the sacrament of the ,eucharist4 ,one
 is the fact that it is a sacrament1 and
 in this respect it is like the other   
effects of sanctifying grace4 ,the other
 is that ,christ's body is miraculously 
contained therein and thus it is        
included under ,god's omnipotence1 like 
all other miracles which are ascribed to
 ,god's almighty power4   ,,ninth       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #i   
,whether ,it ,is ,suitable for the      
,articles of ,faith to ,be ,embodied in 
a ,symbol8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that it is unsuitable for the      

articles of faith to be embodied in a   
symbol4 ,because ,holy ,writ is the rule
 of faith1 to which no addition or      
subtraction can lawfully be made1 since 
it is written 7,deut4 #d3b73 ,you shall 
not add to the word that ,i speak to    
you1 neither shall you take away from   
it4 ,therefore it was unlawful to make a
 symbol as a rule of faith1 after the   
,holy ,writ had once been published4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to the    
,apostle 7,eph4 #d3e7 there is but one  
faith4 ,now the symbol is a profession  
of faith4 ,therefore it is not fitting  
that there should be more than one      
symbol4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the        
confession of faith1 which is contained 
in the symbol1 concerns all the         
faithful4 ,now the faithful are not all 
competent to believe in ,god1 but only  
those who have living faith4 ,therefore 
it is unfitting for the symbol of faith 
to be expressed in the words3 ,i believe
 in one ,god4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the  
descent into hell is one of the articles

 of faith1 as stated above 7,a4 #h74    
,but the descent into hell is not       
mentioned in the symbol of the ,fathers4
 ,therefore the latter is expressed     
inadequately4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1      
,augustine 7,tract4 xxix in ,joan47     
expounding the passage1 ,you believe in 
,god1 believe also in ,me 7,john #ad3a7 
says3 ,we believe ,peter or ,paul1 but  
we speak only of believing 'in' ,god4   
,since then the ,catholic ,church is    
merely a created being1 it seems        
unfitting to say3 ,in the ,one1 ,holy1  
,catholic and ,apostolic ,church4  ,obj4
 #f3 ,further1 a symbol is drawn up that
 it may be a rule of faith4 ,now a rule 
of faith ought to be proposed to all1   
and that publicly4 ,therefore every     
symbol1 besides the symbol of the       
,fathers1 should be sung at ,mass4      
,therefore it seems unfitting to publish
 the articles of faith in a symbol4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,the universal ,church   
cannot err1 since she is governed by the
 ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is the ,spirit of   

truth3 for such was ,our ,lord's promise
 to ,his disciples 7,john #af3ac73 ,when
 ,he1 the ,spirit of truth1 is come1 ,he
 will teach you all truth4 ,now the     
symbol is published by the authority of 
the universal ,church4 ,therefore it    
contains nothing defective4  ,i answer  
that1 ,as the ,apostle says 7,heb4      
#aa3f71 he that cometh to ,god1 must    
believe that ,he is4 ,now a man cannot  
believe1 unless the truth be proposed to
 him that he may believe it4 ,hence the 
need for the truth of faith to be       
collected together1 so that it might the
 more easily be proposed to all1 lest   
anyone might stray from the truth       
through ignorance of the faith4 ,it is  
from its being a collection of maxims of
 faith that the symbol 99,the ,greek    
symballein takes its name4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,the truth of faith is contained in
 ,holy ,writ1 diffusely1 under various  
modes of expression1 and sometimes      
obscurely1 so that1 in order to gather  
the truth of faith from ,holy ,writ1 one

 needs long study and practice1 which   
are unattainable by all those who       
require to know the truth of faith1 many
 of whom have no time for study1 being  
busy with other affairs4 ,and so it was 
necessary to gather together a clear    
summary from the sayings of ,holy ,writ1
 to be proposed to the belief of all4   
,this indeed was no addition to ,holy   
,writ1 but something taken from it4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the same doctrine of  
faith is taught in all the symbols4     
,nevertheless1 the people need more     
careful instruction about the truth of  
faith1 when errors arise1 lest the faith
 of simple-minded persons be corrupted  
by heretics4 ,it was this that gave rise
 to the necessity of formulating several
 symbols1 which nowise differ from one  
another1 save that on account of the    
obstinacy of heretics1 one contains more
 explicitly what another contains       
implicitly4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the      
confession of faith is drawn up in a    
symbol in the person1 as it were1 of the

 whole ,church1 which is united together
 by faith4 ,now the faith of the ,church
 is living faith2 since such is the     
faith to be found in all those who are  
of the ,church not only outwardly but   
also by merit4 ,hence the confession of 
faith is expressed in a symbol1 in a    
manner that is in keeping with living   
faith1 so that even if some of the      
faithful lack living faith1 they should 
endeavor to acquire it4  ,reply ,obj4   
#d3 ,no error about the descent into    
hell had arisen among heretics1 so that 
there was no need to be more explicit on
 that point4 ,for this reason it is not 
repeated in the symbol of the ,fathers1 
but is supposed as already settled in   
the symbol of the ,apostles4 ,for a     
subsequent symbol does not cancel a     
preceding one2 rather does it expound   
it1 as stated above 7ad #b74  ,reply    
,obj4 #e3 ,if we say3 ',in' the holy    
,catholic ,church1 this must be taken as
 verified in so far as our faith is     
directed to the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who      

sanctifies the ,church2 so that the     
sense is3 ,i believe in the ,holy ,ghost
 sanctifying the ,church4 ,but it is    
better and more in keeping with the     
common use1 to omit the 'in1' and say   
simply1 the holy ,catholic ,church1 as  
,pope ,leo 99,rufinus1 ,comm4 in ,sym4  
,apost4 observes4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3     
,since the symbol of the ,fathers is an 
explanation of the symbol of the        
,apostles1 and was drawn up after the   
faith was already spread abroad1 and    
when the ,church was already at peace1  
it is sung publicly in the ,mass4 ,on   
the other hand the symbol of the        
,apostles1 which was drawn up at the    
time of persecution1 before the faith   
was made public1 is said secretly at    
,prime and ,compline1 as though it were 
against the darkness of past and future 
errors4   ,,tenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #a1 ,art4 #aj  ,whether ,it ,belongs
 to the ,sovereign ,pontiff to ,draw ,up
 a ,symbol of ,faith8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that it does not belong  

to the ,sovereign ,pontiff to draw up a 
symbol of faith4 ,for a new edition of  
the symbol becomes necessary in order to
 explain the articles of faith1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #i74 ,now1 in the ,old
 ,testament1 the articles of faith were 
more and more explained as time went on1
 by reason of the truth of faith        
becoming clearer through greater        
nearness to ,christ1 as stated above    
7,a4 #g74 ,since then this reason ceased
 with the advent of the ,new ,law1 there
 is no need for the articles of faith to
 be more and more explicit4 ,therefore  
it does not seem to belong to the       
authority of the ,sovereign ,pontiff to 
draw up a new edition of the symbol4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no man has the power
 to do what is forbidden under pain of  
anathema by the universal ,church4 ,now 
it was forbidden under pain of anathema 
by the universal ,church1 to make a new 
edition of the symbol4 ,for it is stated
 in the acts of the first99 council of  
,ephesus 7,p4 ii1 ,act4 #f7 that after  

the symbol of the ,nicene council had   
been read through1 the holy synod       
decreed that it was unlawful to utter1  
write or draw up any other creed1 than  
that which was defined by the ,fathers  
assembled at ,nicaea together with the  
,holy ,ghost1 and this under pain of    
anathema4 99,st4 ,thomas wrote 'first'  
7expunged by ,nicolai7 to distinguish it
 from the other council1 ,a4,d4 #dea1   
known as the ,latrocinium and condemned 
by the ,pope4 ,the same was repeated in 
the acts of the council of ,chalcedon   
7,p4 ii1 ,act4 #e74 ,therefore it seems 
that the ,sovereign ,pontiff has no     
authority to publish a new edition of   
the symbol4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1        
,athanasius was not the ,sovereign      
,pontiff1 but patriarch of ,alexandria1 
and yet he published a symbol which is  
sung in the ,church4 ,therefore it does 
not seem to belong to the ,sovereign    
,pontiff any more than to other bishops1
 to publish a new edition of the symbol4
  ,on the contrary1 ,the symbol was     

drawn up by a general council4 ,now such
 a council cannot be convoked otherwise 
than by the authority of the ,sovereign 
,pontiff1 as stated in the ,decretals   
99,dist4 xvii1 ,can4 #d1 #e4 ,therefore 
it belongs to the authority of the      
,sovereign ,pontiff to draw up a symbol4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above      
7,obj4 #a71 a new edition of the symbol 
becomes necessary in order to set aside 
the errors that may arise4 ,consequently
 to publish a new edition of the symbol 
belongs to that authority which is      
empowered to decide matters of faith    
finally1 so that they may be held by all
 with unshaken faith4 ,now this belongs 
to the authority of the ,sovereign      
,pontiff1 to whom the more important and
 more difficult questions that arise in 
the ,church are referred1 as stated in  
the ,decretals 99,dist4 xvii1 ,can4 #e4 
,hence our ,lord said to ,peter whom he 
made ,sovereign ,pontiff 7,luke #bb3cb73
 ,i have prayed for thee1 ,peter1 that  
thy faith fail not1 and thou1 being once

 converted1 confirm thy brethren4 ,the  
reason of this is that there should be  
but one faith of the whole ,church1     
according to #a ,cor4 #a3aj3 ,that you  
all speak the same thing1 and that there
 be no schisms among you3 and this could
 not be secured unless any question of  
faith that may arise be decided by him  
who presides over the whole ,church1 so 
that the whole ,church may hold firmly  
to his decision4 ,consequently it       
belongs to the sole authority of the    
,sovereign ,pontiff to publish a new    
edition of the symbol1 as do all other  
matters which concern the whole ,church1
 such as to convoke a general council   
and so forth4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the    
truth of faith is sufficiently explicit 
in the teaching of ,christ and the      
apostles4 ,but since1 according to #b   
,pet4 #c3af1 some men are so evil-minded
 as to pervert the apostolic teaching   
and other doctrines and ,scriptures to  
their own destruction1 it was necessary 
as time went on to express the faith    

more explicitly against the errors which
 arose4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this         
prohibition and sentence of the council 
was intended for private individuals1   
who have no business to decide matters  
of faith3 for this decision of the      
general council did not take away from a
 subsequent council the power of drawing
 up a new edition of the symbol1        
containing not indeed a new faith1 but  
the same faith with greater             
explicitness4 ,for every council has    
taken into account that a subsequent    
council would expound matters more fully
 than the preceding council1 if this    
became necessary through some heresy    
arising4 ,consequently this belongs to  
the ,sovereign ,pontiff1 by whose       
authority the council is convoked1 and  
its decision confirmed4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,athanasius drew up a declaration of
 faith1 not under the form of a symbol1 
but rather by way of an exposition of   
doctrine1 as appears from his way of    
speaking4 ,but since it contained       

briefly the whole truth of faith1 it was
 accepted by the authority of the       
,sovereign ,pontiff1 so as to be        
considered as a rule of faith4 ,since it
 contained briefly the whole truth of   
faith1 it was accepted by the authority 
of the ,sovereign ,pontiff1 so as to be 
considered as a rule of faith4          
,,question #b  ,,of ,,the ,,act ,,of    
,,faith 7,in ,ten ,articles7  ,we must  
now consider the act of faith1 and 7#a7 
the internal act2 7#b7 the external act4
  ,under the first head there are ten   
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is to    
believe1 which is the internal act of   
faith8  7#b7 ,in how many ways is it    
expressed8  7#c7 ,whether it is         
necessary for salvation to believe in   
anything above natural reason8  7#d7    
,whether it is necessary to believe     
those things that are attainable by     
natural reason8  7#e7 ,whether it is    
necessary for salvation to believe      
certain things explicitly8  7#f7        
,whether all are equally bound to       

explicit faith8  7#g7 ,whether explicit 
faith in ,christ is always necessary for
 salvation8  7#h7 ,whether it is        
necessary for salvation to believe in   
the ,trinity explicitly8  7#i7 ,whether 
the act of faith is meritorious8  7#aj7 
,whether human reason diminishes the    
merit of faith8   ,,first ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #a  ,whether to
 ,believe ,is to ,think with ,assent8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that to   
believe is not to think with assent4    
,because the ,latin word cogitatio      
thought implies a research1 for cogitare
 to think seems to be equivalent to     
coagitare1 i4e4 to discuss together4    
,now ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4  
iv7 that faith is an assent without     
research4 ,therefore thinking has no    
place in the act of faith4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 faith resides in the reason1  
as we shall show further on 7,q4 #d1 ,a4
 #b74 ,now to think is an act of the    
cogitative power1 which belongs to the  
sensitive faculty1 as stated in the     

,first ,part 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #d74         
,therefore thought has nothing to do    
with faith4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to     
believe is an act of the intellect1     
since its object is truth4 ,but assent  
seems to be an act not of the intellect1
 but of the will1 even as consent is1 as
 stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #a1
 ad #c74 ,therefore to believe is not to
 think with assent4  ,on the contrary1  
,this is how to believe is defined by   
,augustine 7,de ,praedest4 ,sanct4 ii74 
,i answer that1 ,to think can be taken  
in three ways4 ,first1 in a general way 
for any kind of actual consideration of 
the intellect1 as ,augustine observes   
7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #g73 ,by understanding 
,i mean now the faculty whereby we      
understand when thinking4 ,secondly1 to 
think is more strictly taken for that   
consideration of the intellect1 which is
 accompanied by some kind of inquiry1   
and which precedes the intellect's      
arrival at the stage of perfection that 
comes with the certitude of sight4 ,in  

this sense ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4  
xv1 #af7 that the ,son of ,god is not   
called the ,thought1 but the ,word of   
,god4 ,when our thought realizes what we
 know and takes form therefrom1 it      
becomes our word4 ,hence the ,word of   
,god must be understood without any     
thinking on the part of ,god1 for there 
is nothing there that can take form1 or 
be unformed4 ,in this way thought is1   
properly speaking1 the movement of the  
mind while yet deliberating1 and not yet
 perfected by the clear sight of truth4 
,since1 however1 such a movement of the 
mind may be one of deliberation either  
about universal notions1 which belongs  
to the intellectual faculty1 or about   
particular matters1 which belongs to the
 sensitive part1 hence it is that to    
think is taken secondly for an act of   
the deliberating intellect1 and thirdly 
for an act of the cogitative power4     
,accordingly1 if to think be understood 
broadly according to the first sense1   
then to think with assent1 does not     

express completely what is meant by to  
believe3 since1 in this way1 a man      
thinks with assent even when he         
considers what he knows by science      
99,science is certain knowledge of a    
demonstrated conclusion through its     
demonstration41 or understands4 ,if1 on 
the other hand1 to think be understood  
in the second way1 then this expresses  
completely the nature of the act of     
believing4 ,for among the acts belonging
 to the intellect1 some have a firm     
assent without any such kind of         
thinking1 as when a man considers the   
things that he knows by science1 or     
understands1 for this consideration is  
already formed4 ,but some acts of the   
intellect have unformed thought devoid  
of a firm assent1 whether they incline  
to neither side1 as in one who doubts2  
or incline to one side rather than the  
other1 but on account of some slight    
motive1 as in one who suspects2 or      
incline to one side yet with fear of the
 other1 as in one who opines4 ,but this 

act to believe1 cleaves firmly to one   
side1 in which respect belief has       
something in common with science and    
understanding2 yet its knowledge does   
not attain the perfection of clear      
sight1 wherein it agrees with doubt1    
suspicion and opinion4 ,hence it is     
proper to the believer to think with    
assent3 so that the act of believing is 
distinguished from all the other acts of
 the intellect1 which are about the true
 or the false4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,faith 
has not that research of natural reason 
which demonstrates what is believed1 but
 a research into those things whereby a 
man is induced to believe1 for instance 
that such things have been uttered by   
,god and confirmed by miracles4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,to think is not taken here   
for the act of the cogitative power1 but
 for an act of the intellect1 as        
explained above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the 
intellect of the believer is determined 
to one object1 not by the reason1 but by
 the will1 wherefore assent is taken    

here for an act of the intellect as     
determined to one object by the will4   
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1   
,art4 #b  ,whether the ,act of ,faith   
,is ,suitably ,distinguished ,as        
,believing ,god1 ,believing in a ,god   
and ,believing in ,god8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that the act of faith is 
unsuitably distinguished as believing   
,god1 believing in a ,god1 and believing
 in ,god4 ,for one habit has but one    
act4 ,now faith is one habit since it is
 one virtue4 ,therefore it is           
unreasonable to say that there are three
 acts of faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1    
that which is common to all acts of     
faith should not be reckoned as a       
particular kind of act of faith4 ,now to
 believe ,god is common to all acts of  
faith1 since faith is founded on the    
,first ,truth4 ,therefore it seems      
unreasonable to distinguish it from     
certain other acts of faith4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 that which can be said of     
unbelievers1 cannot be called an act of 

faith4 ,now unbelievers can be said to  
believe in a ,god4 ,therefore it should 
not be reckoned an act of faith4  ,obj4 
#d3 ,further1 movement towards the end  
belongs to the will1 whose object is the
 good and the end4 ,now to believe is an
 act1 not of the will1 but of the       
intellect4 ,therefore to believe in     
,god1 which implies movement towards an 
end1 should not be reckoned as a species
 of that act4  ,on the contrary is the  
authority of ,augustine who makes this  
distinction 7,de ,verb4 ,dom41 ,serm4   
lxi--,tract4 xxix in ,joan474  ,i answer
 that1 ,the act of any power or habit   
depends on the relation of that power or
 habit to its object4 ,now the object of
 faith can be considered in three ways4 
,for1 since to believe is an act of the 
intellect1 in so far as the will moves  
it to assent1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1  
ad #c71 the object of faith can be      
considered either on the part of the    
intellect1 or on the part of the will   
that moves the intellect4  ,if it be    

considered on the part of the intellect1
 then two things can be observed in the 
object of faith1 as stated above 7,q4   
#a1 ,a4 #a74 ,one of these is the       
material object of faith1 and in this   
way an act of faith is to believe in a  
,god2 because1 as stated above 7ibid47  
nothing is proposed to our belief1      
except in as much as it is referred to  
,god4 ,the other is the formal aspect of
 the object1 for it is the medium on    
account of which we assent to such and  
such a point of faith2 and thus an act  
of faith is to believe ,god1 since1 as  
stated above 7ibid47 the formal object  
of faith is the ,first ,truth1 to ,which
 man gives his adhesion1 so as to assent
 for ,its sake to whatever he believes4 
,thirdly1 if the object of faith be     
considered in so far as the intellect is
 moved by the will1 an act of faith is  
to believe in ,god4 ,for the ,first     
,truth is referred to the will1 through 
having the aspect of an end4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,these three do not denote    

different acts of faith1 but one and the
 same act having different relations to 
the object of faith4  ,this suffices for
 the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,unbelievers cannot be 
said to believe in a ,god as we         
understand it in relation to the act of 
faith4 ,for they do not believe that    
,god exists under the conditions that   
faith determines2 hence they do not     
truly imply believe in a ,god1 since1 as
 the ,philosopher observes 7,metaph4 ix1
 text4 #bb7 to know simple things       
defectively is not to know them at all4 
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as stated above       
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a7 the will moves
 the intellect and the other powers of  
the soul to the end3 and in this respect
 an act of faith is to believe in ,god4 
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1    
,art4 #c  ,whether ,it ,is ,necessary   
for ,salvation to ,believe ,anything    
,above the ,natural ,reason8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem unnecessary for     
salvation to believe anything above the 

natural reason4 ,for the salvation and  
perfection of a thing seem to be        
sufficiently insured by its natural     
endowments4 ,now matters of faith1      
surpass man's natural reason1 since they
 are things unseen as stated above 7,q4 
#a1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore to believe seems
 unnecessary for salvation4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 it is dangerous for man to    
assent to matters1 wherein he cannot    
judge whether that which is proposed to 
him be true or false1 according to ,job 
#ab3aa3 ,doth not the ear discern words8
 ,now a man cannot form a judgment of   
this kind in matters of faith1 since he 
cannot trace them back to first         
principles1 by which all our judgments  
are guided4 ,therefore it is dangerous  
to believe in such matters4 ,therefore  
to believe is not necessary for         
salvation4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man's   
salvation rests on ,god1 according to   
,ps4 #cf3ci3 ,but the salvation of the  
just is from the ,lord4 ,now the        
invisible things of ,god are clearly    

seen1 being understood by the things    
that are made2 ,his eternal power also  
and ,divinity1 according to ,rom4 #a3bj3
 and those things which are clearly seen
 by the understanding are not an object 
of belief4 ,therefore it is not         
necessary for man's salvation1 that he  
should believe certain things4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,it is written 7,heb4 #aa3f73 
,without faith it is impossible to      
please ,god4  ,i answer that1 ,wherever 
one nature is subordinate to another1 we
 find that two things concur towards the
 perfection of the lower nature1 one of 
which is in respect of that nature's    
proper movement1 while the other is in  
respect of the movement of the higher   
nature4 ,thus water by its proper       
movement moves towards the centre 7of   
the earth71 while according to the      
movement of the moon1 it moves round the
 centre by ebb and flow4 ,in like manner
 the planets have their proper movements
 from west to east1 while in accordance 
with the movement of the first heaven1  

they have a movement from east to west4 
,now the created rational nature alone  
is immediately subordinate to ,god1     
since other creatures do not attain to  
the universal1 but only to something    
particular1 while they partake of the   
,divine goodness either in being only1  
as inanimate things1 or also in living1 
and in knowing singulars1 as plants and 
animals2 whereas the rational nature1 in
 as much as it apprehends the universal 
notion of good and being1 is immediately
 related to the universal principle of  
being4  ,consequently the perfection of 
the rational creature consists not only 
in what belongs to it in respect of its 
nature1 but also in that which it       
acquires through a supernatural         
participation of ,divine goodness4      
,hence it was said above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#c1 ,a4 #h7 that man's ultimate         
happiness consists in a supernatural    
vision of ,god3 to which vision man     
cannot attain unless he be taught by    
,god1 according to ,john #f3de3 ,every  

one that hath heard of the ,father and  
hath learned cometh to ,me4 ,now man    
acquires a share of this learning1 not  
indeed all at once1 but by little and   
little1 according to the mode of his    
nature3 and every one who learns thus   
must needs believe1 in order that he may
 acquire science in a perfect degree2   
thus also the ,philosopher remarks 7,de 
,soph4 ,elench4 i1 #b7 that it behooves 
a learner to believe4  ,hence in order  
that a man arrive at the perfect vision 
of heavenly happiness1 he must first of 
all believe ,god1 as a disciple believes
 the master who is teaching him4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,since man's nature is       
dependent on a higher nature1 natural   
knowledge does not suffice for its      
perfection1 and some supernatural       
knowledge is necessary1 as stated above4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as man assents 
to first principles1 by the natural     
light of his intellect1 so does a       
virtuous man1 by the habit of virtue1   
judge aright of things concerning that  

virtue2 and in this way1 by the light of
 faith which ,god bestows on him1 a man 
assents to matters of faith and not to  
those which are against faith4          
,consequently there is no danger or     
condemnation to them that are in ,christ
 ,jesus1 and whom ,he has enlightened by
 faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in many      
respects faith perceives the invisible  
things of ,god in a higher way than     
natural reason does in proceeding to    
,god from ,his creatures4 ,hence it is  
written 7,ecclus4 #c3be73 ,many things  
are shown to thee above the             
understandings of man4   ,,fourth       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #d   
,whether ,it ,is ,necessary to ,believe 
,those ,things ,which ,can ,be ,proved  
by ,natural ,reason8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem unnecessary to believe those
 things which can be proved by natural  
reason4 ,for nothing is superfluous in  
,god's works1 much less even than in the
 works of nature4 ,now it is superfluous
 to employ other means1 where one       

already suffices4 ,therefore it would be
 superfluous to receive by faith1 things
 that can be known by natural reason4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those things must be
 believed1 which are the object of      
faith4 ,now science and faith are not   
about the same object1 as stated above  
7,q4 #a1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e74 ,since therefore
 all things that can be known by natural
 reason are an object of science1 it    
seems that there is no need to believe  
what can be proved by natural reason4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all things knowable 
scientifically 99,science is certain    
knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion  
through its demonstration would seem to 
come under one head3 so that if some of 
them are proposed to man as objects of  
faith1 in like manner the others should 
also be believed4 ,but this is not true4
 ,therefore it is not necessary to      
believe those things which can be proved
 by natural reason4  ,on the contrary1  
,it is necessary to believe that ,god is
 one and incorporeal3 which things      

philosophers prove by natural reason4   
,i answer that1 ,it is necessary for man
 to accept by faith not only things     
which are above reason1 but also those  
which can be known by reason3 and this  
for three motives4 ,first1 in order that
 man may arrive more quickly at the     
knowledge of ,divine truth4 ,because the
 science to whose province it belongs to
 prove the existence of ,god1 is the    
last of all to offer itself to human    
research1 since it presupposes many     
other sciences3 so that it would not by 
until late in life that man would arrive
 at the knowledge of ,god4 ,the second  
reason is1 in order that the knowledge  
of ,god may be more general4 ,for many  
are unable to make progress in the study
 of science1 either through dullness of 
mind1 or through having a number of     
occupations1 and temporal needs1 or even
 through laziness in learning1 all of   
whom would be altogether deprived of the
 knowledge of ,god1 unless ,divine      
things were brought to their knowledge  

under the guise of faith4 ,the third    
reason is for the sake of certitude4    
,for human reason is very deficient in  
things concerning ,god4 ,a sign of this 
is that philosophers in their           
researches1 by natural investigation1   
into human affairs1 have fallen into    
many errors1 and have disagreed among   
themselves4 ,and consequently1 in order 
that men might have knowledge of ,god1  
free of doubt and uncertainty1 it was   
necessary for ,divine matters to be     
delivered to them by way of faith1 being
 told to them1 as it were1 by ,god      
,himself ,who cannot lie4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,the researches of natural reason do
 not suffice mankind for the knowledge  
of ,divine matters1 even of those that  
can be proved by reason3 and so it is   
not superfluous if these others be      
believed4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,science and
 faith cannot be in the same subject and
 about the same object3 but what is an  
object of science for one1 can be an    
object of faith for another1 as stated  

above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #e74  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,although all things that can be    
known by science are of one common      
scientific aspect1 they do not all alike
 lead man to beatitude3 hence they are  
not all equally proposed to our belief4 
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1    
,art4 #e  ,whether ,man ,is ,bound to   
,believe ,anything ,explicitly8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man  
is not bound to believe anything        
explicitly4 ,for no man is bound to do  
what is not in his power4 ,now it is not
 in man's power to believe a thing      
explicitly1 for it is written 7,rom4    
#aj3ad1 #ae73 ,how shall they believe   
,him1 of whom they have not heard8 ,and 
how shall they hear without a preacher8 
,and how shall they preach unless they  
be sent8 ,therefore man is not bound to 
believe anything explicitly4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 just as we are directed to    
,god by faith1 so are we by charity4    
,now man is not bound to keep the       
precepts of charity1 and it is enough if

 he be ready to fulfil them3 as is      
evidenced by the precept of ,our ,lord  
7,matt4 #e3ci73 ,if one strike thee on  
one ,vulg43 'thy right' cheek1 turn to  
him also the other2 and by others of the
 same kind1 according to ,augustine's   
exposition 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte  
xix74 ,therefore neither is man bound to
 believe anything explicitly1 and it is 
enough if he be ready to believe        
whatever ,god proposes to be believed4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the good of faith   
consists in obedience1 according to     
,rom4 #a3e3 ,for obedience to the faith 
in all nations4 ,now the virtue of      
obedience does not require man to keep  
certain fixed precepts1 but it is enough
 that his mind be ready to obey1        
according to ,ps4 #aah3fj3 ,i am ready  
and am not troubled2 that ,i may keep   
,thy commandments4 ,therefore it seems  
enough for faith1 too1 that man should  
be ready to believe whatever ,god may   
propose1 without his believing anything 
explicitly4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   

written 7,heb4 #aa3f73 ,he that cometh  
to ,god1 must believe that ,he is1 and  
is a rewarder to them that seek ,him4   
,i answer that1 ,the precepts of the    
,law1 which man is bound to fulfil1     
concern acts of virtue which are the    
means of attaining salvation4 ,now an   
act of virtue1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #e7 depends on the        
relation of the habit to its object4    
,again two things may be considered in  
the object of any virtue2 namely1 that  
which is the proper and direct object of
 that virtue1 and that which is         
accidental and consequent to the object 
properly so called4 ,thus it belongs    
properly and directly to the object of  
fortitude1 to face the dangers of death1
 and to charge at the foe with danger to
 oneself1 for the sake of the common    
good3 yet that1 in a just war1 a man be 
armed1 or strike another with his sword1
 and so forth1 is reduced to the object 
of fortitude1 but indirectly4           
,accordingly1 just as a virtuous act is 

required for the fulfilment of a        
precept1 so is it necessary that the    
virtuous act should terminate in its    
proper and direct object3 but1 on the   
other hand1 the fulfilment of the       
precept does not require that a virtuous
 act should terminate in those things   
which have an accidental or secondary   
relation to the proper and direct object
 of that virtue1 except in certain      
places and at certain times4 ,we must1  
therefore1 say that the direct object of
 faith is that whereby man is made one  
of the ,blessed1 as stated above 7,q4   
#a1 ,a4 #h73 while the indirect and     
secondary object comprises all things   
delivered by ,god to us in ,holy ,writ1 
for instance that ,abraham had two sons1
 that ,david was the son of ,jesse1 and 
so forth4  ,therefore1 as regards the   
primary points or articles of faith1 man
 is bound to believe them1 just as he is
 bound to have faith2 but as to other   
points of faith1 man is not bound to    
believe them explicitly1 but only       

implicitly1 or to be ready to believe   
them1 in so far as he is prepared to    
believe whatever is contained in the    
,divine ,scriptures4 ,then alone is he  
bound to believe such things explicitly1
 when it is clear to him that they are  
contained in the doctrine of faith4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if we understand those
 things alone to be in a man's power1   
which we can do without the help of     
grace1 then we are bound to do many     
things which we cannot do without the   
aid of healing grace1 such as to love   
,god and our neighbor1 and likewise to  
believe the articles of faith4 ,but with
 the help of grace we can do this1 for  
this help to whomsoever it is given from
 above it is mercifully given2 and from 
whom it is withheld it is justly        
withheld1 as a punishment of a previous1
 or at least of original1 sin1 as       
,augustine states 7,de ,corr4 et ,grat4 
v1 vi 99,cf4 ,ep4 cxc2 ,de ,praed4      
,sanct4 viii474  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man  
is bound to love definitely those       

lovable things which are properly and   
directly the objects of charity1 namely1
 ,god and our neighbor4 ,the objection  
refers to those precepts of charity     
which belong1 as a consequence1 to the  
objects of charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the virtue of obedience is seated1     
properly speaking1 in the will2 hence   
promptness of the will subject to       
authority1 suffices for the act of      
obedience1 because it is the proper and 
direct object of obedience4 ,but this or
 that precept is accidental or          
consequent to that proper and direct    
object4   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #b1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,all ,are    
,equally ,bound to ,have ,explicit      
,faith8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that all are equally bound to have      
explicit faith4 ,for all are bound to   
those things which are necessary for    
salvation1 as is evidenced by the       
precepts of charity4 ,now it is         
necessary for salvation that certain    
things should be believed explicitly4   

,therefore all are equally bound to have
 explicit faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no
 one should be put to test in matters   
that he is not bound to believe4 ,but   
simple persons are sometimes tested in  
reference to the slightest articles of  
faith4 ,therefore all are bound to      
believe everything explicitly4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 if the simple are bound to
 have1 not explicit but only implicit   
faith1 their faith must needs be implied
 in the faith of the learned4 ,but this 
seems unsafe1 since it is possible for  
the learned to err4 ,therefore it seems 
that the simple should also have        
explicit faith2 so that all are1        
therefore1 equally bound to have        
explicit faith4  ,on the contrary1 ,it  
is written 7,job #a3ad73 ,the oxen were 
ploughing1 and the asses feeding beside 
them1 because1 as ,gregory expounds this
 passage 7,moral4 ii1 #ag71 the simple1 
who are signified by the asses1 ought1  
in matters of faith1 to stay by the     
learned1 who are denoted by the oxen4   

,i answer that1 ,the unfolding of       
matters of faith is the result of       
,divine revelation3 for matters of faith
 surpass natural reason4 ,now ,divine   
revelation reaches those of lower degree
 through those who are over them1 in a  
certain order2 to men1 for instance1    
through the angels1 and to the lower    
angels through the higher1 as ,dionysius
 explains 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv1 vii74 ,in  
like manner therefore the unfolding of  
faith must needs reach men of lower     
degree through those of higher degree4  
,consequently1 just as the higher       
angels1 who enlighten those who are     
below them1 have a fuller knowledge of  
,divine things than the lower angels1 as
 ,dionysius states 7,coel4 ,hier4 xii71 
so too1 men of higher degree1 whose     
business it is to teach others1 are     
under obligation to have fuller         
knowledge of matters of faith1 and to   
believe them more explicitly4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,the unfolding of the articles
 of faith is not equally necessary for  

the salvation of all1 since those of    
higher degree1 whose duty it is to teach
 others1 are bound to believe explicitly
 more things than others are4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,simple persons should not be 
put to the test about subtle questions  
of faith1 unless they be suspected of   
having been corrupted by heretics1 who  
are wont to corrupt the faith of simple 
people in such questions4 ,if1 however1 
it is found that they are free from     
obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments1
 and that it is due to their simplicity1
 it is no fault of theirs4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,the simple have no faith implied  
in that of the learned1 except in so far
 as the latter adhere to the ,divine    
teaching4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7#a  
,cor4 #d3af73 ,be ye followers of me1 as
 ,i also am of ,christ4 ,hence it is not
 human knowledge1 but the ,divine truth 
that is the rule of faith3 and if any of
 the learned stray from this rule1 he   
does not harm the faith of the simple   
ones1 who think that the learned believe

 aright2 unless the simple hold         
obstinately to their individual errors1 
against the faith of the universal      
,church1 which cannot err1 since ,our   
,lord said 7,luke #bb3cb73 ,i have      
prayed for thee1 ,peter1 that thy faith 
fail not4   ,,seventh ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #g  ,whether   
,it ,is ,necessary for the ,salvation of
 ,all1 ,that ,they ,should ,believe     
,explicitly in the ,mystery of ,christ8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is
 not necessary for the salvation of all 
that they should believe explicitly in  
the mystery of ,christ4 ,for man is not 
bound to believe explicitly what the    
angels are ignorant about3 since the    
unfolding of faith is the result of     
,divine revelation1 which reaches man by
 means of the angels1 as stated above   
7,a4 #f2 ,i1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #a74 ,now    
even the angels were in ignorance of the
 mystery of the ,incarnation3 hence1    
according to the commentary of          
,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii71 it is   

they who ask 7,ps4 #bc3h73 ,who is this 
king of glory8 and 7,isa4 #fc3a73 ,who  
is this that cometh from ,edom8         
,therefore men were not bound to believe
 explicitly in the mystery of ,christ's 
,incarnation4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is
 evident that ,john the ,baptist was one
 of the teachers1 and most nigh to      
,christ1 ,who said of him 7,matt4       
#aa3aa7 that there hath not risen among 
them that are born of women1 a greater  
than he4 ,now ,john the ,baptist does   
not appear to have known the mystery of 
,christ explicitly1 since he asked      
,christ 7,matt4 #aa3c73 ,art ,thou ,he  
that art to come1 or look we for        
another8 ,therefore even the teachers   
were not bound to explicit faith in     
,christ4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 many      
gentiles obtained salvation through the 
ministry of the angels1 as ,dionysius   
states 7,coel4 ,hier4 ix74 ,now it would
 seem that the gentiles had neither     
explicit nor implicit faith in ,christ1 
since they received no revelation4      

,therefore it seems that it was not     
necessary for the salvation of all to   
believe explicitly in the mystery of    
,christ4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine  
says 7,de ,corr4 et ,gratia vii2 ,ep4   
cxc73 ,our faith is sound if we believe 
that no man1 old or young is delivered  
from the contagion of death and the     
bonds of sin1 except by the one         
,mediator of ,god and men1 ,jesus       
,christ4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated    
above 7,a4 #e2 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h71 the     
object of faith includes1 properly and  
directly1 that thing through which man  
obtains beatitude4 ,now the mystery of  
,christ's ,incarnation and ,passion is  
the way by which men obtain beatitude2  
for it is written 7,acts #d3ab73 ,there 
is no other name under heaven given to  
men1 whereby we must be saved4          
,therefore belief of some kind in the   
mystery of ,christ's ,incarnation was   
necessary at all times and for all      
persons1 but this belief differed       
according to differences of times and   

persons4 ,the reason of this is that    
before the state of sin1 man believed1  
explicitly in ,christ's ,incarnation1 in
 so far as it was intended for the      
consummation of glory1 but not as it was
 intended to deliver man from sin by the
 ,passion and ,resurrection1 since man  
had no foreknowledge of his future sin4 
,he does1 however1 seem to have had     
foreknowledge of the ,incarnation of    
,christ1 from the fact that he said     
7,gen4 #b3bd73 ,wherefore a man shall   
leave father and mother1 and shall      
cleave to his wife1 of which the        
,apostle says 7,eph4 #e3cb7 that this is
 a great sacrament 4 4 4 in ,christ and 
the ,church1 and it is incredible that  
the first man was ignorant about this   
sacrament4  ,but after sin1 man believed
 explicitly in ,christ1 not only as to  
the ,incarnation1 but also as to the    
,passion and ,resurrection1 whereby the 
human race is delivered from sin and    
death3 for they would not1 else1 have   
foreshadowed ,christ's ,passion by      

certain sacrifices both before and after
 the ,law1 the meaning of which         
sacrifices was known by the learned     
explicitly1 while the simple folk1 under
 the veil of those sacrifices1 believed 
them to be ordained by ,god in reference
 to ,christ's coming1 and thus their    
knowledge was covered with a veil1 so to
 speak4 ,and1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1  
,a4 #g71 the nearer they were to        
,christ1 the more distinct was their    
knowledge of ,christ's mysteries4       
,after grace had been revealed1 both    
learned and simple folk are bound to    
explicit faith in the mysteries of      
,christ1 chiefly as regards those which 
are observed throughout the ,church1 and
 publicly proclaimed1 such as the       
articles which refer to the             
,incarnation1 of which we have spoken   
above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h74 ,as to other    
minute points in reference to the       
articles of the ,incarnation1 men have  
been bound to believe them more or less 
explicitly according to each one's state

 and office4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the     
mystery of the ,kingdom of ,god was not 
entirely hidden from the angels1 as     
,augustine observes 7,gen4 ad lit4 v1   
#ai71 yet certain aspects thereof were  
better known to them when ,christ       
revealed them to them4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,it was not through ignorance that     
,john the ,baptist inquired of ,christ's
 advent in the flesh1 since he had      
clearly professed his belief therein1   
saying3 ,i saw1 and ,i gave testimony1  
that this is the ,son of ,god 7,john    
#a3cd74 ,hence he did not say3 ,art     
,thou ,he that hast come8 but ,art ,thou
 ,he that art to come8 thus saying about
 the future1 not about the past4        
,likewise it is not to be believed that 
he was ignorant of ,christ's future     
,passion1 for he had already said 7,john
 #a3ci73 ,behold the ,lamb of ,god1     
behold ,him who taketh away the sins    
,vulg43 'sin' of the world1 thus        
foretelling ,his future immolation2 and 
since other prophets had foretold it1 as

 may be seen especially in ,isaias #ec4 
,we may therefore say with ,gregory     
7,hom4 xxvi in ,evang47 that he asked   
this question1 being in ignorance as to 
whether ,christ would descend into hell 
in ,his own ,person4 ,but he did not    
ignore the fact that the power of       
,christ's ,passion would be extended to 
those who were detained in ,limbo1      
according to ,zech4 #i3aa3 ,thou also1  
by the blood of ,thy testament hast sent
 forth ,thy prisoners out of the pit1   
wherein there is no water2 nor was he   
bound to believe explicitly1 before its 
fulfilment1 that ,christ was to descend 
thither ,himself4  ,it may also be      
replied that1 as ,ambrose observes in   
his commentary on ,luke #g3ai1 he made  
this inquiry1 not from doubt or         
ignorance but from devotion3 or again1  
with ,chrysostom 7,hom4 xxxvi in        
,matth471 that he inquired1 not as      
though ignorant himself1 but because he 
wished his disciples to be satisfied on 
that point1 through ,christ3 hence the  

latter framed ,his answer so as to      
instruct the disciples1 by pointing to  
the signs of ,his works4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,many of the gentiles received      
revelations of ,christ1 as is clear from
 their predictions4 ,thus we read 7,job 
#ai3be73 ,i know that my ,redeemer      
liveth4 ,the ,sibyl too foretold certain
 things about ,christ1 as ,augustine    
states 7,contra ,faust4 xiii1 #ae74     
,moreover1 we read in the history of the
 ,romans1 that at the time of           
,constantine ,augustus and his mother   
,irene a tomb was discovered1 wherein   
lay a man on whose breast was a golden  
plate with the inscription3 ,christ     
shall be born of a virgin1 and in ,him1 
,i believe4 ,o sun1 during the lifetime 
of ,irene and ,constantine1 thou shalt  
see me again 99,cf4 ,baron1 ,annal41    
,a4,d4 #ghj4 ,if1 however1 some were    
saved without receiving any revelation1 
they were not saved without faith in a  
,mediator1 for1 though they did not     
believe in ,him explicitly1 they did1   

nevertheless1 have implicit faith       
through believing in ,divine providence1
 since they believed that ,god would    
deliver mankind in whatever way was     
pleasing to ,him1 and according to the  
revelation of the ,spirit to those who  
knew the truth1 as stated in ,job       
#ce3aa3 ,who teacheth us more than the  
beasts of the earth4   ,,eighth         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #h   
,whether ,it ,is ,necessary for         
,salvation to ,believe ,explicitly in   
the ,trinity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that it was not necessary for      
salvation to believe explicitly in the  
,trinity4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,heb4 
#aa3f73 ,he that cometh to ,god must    
believe that ,he is1 and is a rewarder  
to them that seek ,him4 ,now one can    
believe this without believing in the   
,trinity4 ,therefore it was not         
necessary to believe explicitly in the  
,trinity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further our ,lord 
said 7,john #ag3e1 #f73 ,father1 ,i have
 manifested ,thy name to men1 which     

words ,augustine expounds 7,tract4 cvi7 
as follows3 ,not the name by which ,thou
 art called ,god1 but the name whereby  
,thou art called ,my ,father1 and       
further on he adds3 ,in that ,he made   
this world1 ,god is known to all        
nations2 in that ,he is not to be       
worshipped together with false gods1    
',god is known in ,judea'2 but1 in that 
,he is the ,father of this ,christ1     
through ,whom ,he takes away the sin of 
the world1 ,he now makes known to men   
this name of ,his1 which hitherto they  
knew not4 ,therefore before the coming  
of ,christ it was not known that        
,paternity and ,filiation were in the   
,godhead3 and so the ,trinity was not   
believed explicitly4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 that which we are bound to    
believe explicitly of ,god is the object
 of heavenly happiness4 ,now the object 
of heavenly happiness is the sovereign  
good1 which can be understood to be in  
,god1 without any distinction of        
,persons4 ,therefore it was not         

necessary to believe explicitly in the  
,trinity4  ,on the contrary1 ,in the    
,old ,testament the ,trinity of ,persons
 is expressed in many ways2 thus at the 
very outset of ,genesis it is written in
 manifestation of the ,trinity3 ,let us 
make man to ,our image and likeness     
7,gen4 #a3bf74 ,therefore from the very 
beginning it was necessary for salvation
 to believe in the ,trinity4  ,i answer 
that1 ,it is impossible to believe      
explicitly in the mystery of ,christ1   
without faith in the ,trinity1 since the
 mystery of ,christ includes that the   
,son of ,god took flesh2 that ,he       
renewed the world through the grace of  
the ,holy ,ghost2 and again1 that ,he   
was conceived by the ,holy ,ghost4      
,wherefore just as1 before ,christ1 the 
mystery of ,christ was believed         
explicitly by the learned1 but          
implicitly and under a veil1 so to      
speak1 by the simple1 so too was it with
 the mystery of the ,trinity4 ,and      
consequently1 when once grace had been  

revealed1 all were bound to explicit    
faith in the mystery of the ,trinity3   
and all who are born again in ,christ1  
have this bestowed on them by the       
invocation of the ,trinity1 according to
 ,matt4 #bh3ai3 ,going therefore teach  
ye all nations1 baptizing them in the   
name of the ,father1 and of the ,son and
 of the ,holy ,ghost4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,explicit faith in those two things was 
necessary at all times and for all      
people3 but it was not sufficient at all
 times and for all people4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,before ,christ's coming1 faith in 
the ,trinity lay hidden in the faith of 
the learned1 but through ,christ and the
 apostles it was shown to the world4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god's sovereign       
goodness as we understand it now through
 its effects1 can be understood without 
the ,trinity of ,persons3 but as        
understood in itself1 and as seen by the
 ,blessed1 it cannot be understood      
without the ,trinity of ,persons4       
,moreover the mission of the ,divine    

,persons brings us to heavenly          
happiness4   ,,ninth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #i  ,whether to
 ,believe ,is ,meritorious8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that to believe is   
not meritorious4 ,for the principle of  
all merit is charity1 as stated above   
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,a4 #d74 ,now faith1
 like nature1 is a preamble to charity4 
,therefore1 just as an act of nature is 
not meritorious1 since we do not merit  
by our natural gifts1 so neither is an  
act of faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      
belief is a mean between opinion and    
scientific knowledge or the             
consideration of things scientifically  
known 99,science is a certain knowledge 
of a demonstrated conclusion through its
 demonstration44 ,now the considerations
 of science are not meritorious1 nor on 
the other hand is opinion4 ,therefore   
belief is not meritorious4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 he who assents to a point of  
faith1 either has a sufficient motive   
for believing1 or he has not4 ,if he has

 a sufficient motive for his belief1    
this does not seem to imply any merit on
 his part1 since he is no longer free to
 believe or not to believe3 whereas if  
he has not a sufficient motive for      
believing1 this is a mark of levity1    
according to ,ecclus4 #ai3d3 ,he that is
 hasty to give credit1 is light of      
heart1 so that1 seemingly1 he gains no  
merit thereby4 ,therefore to believe is 
by no means meritorious4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,it is written 7,heb4 #aa3cc7 
that the saints by faith 4 4 4 obtained 
promises1 which would not be the case if
 they did not merit by believing4       
,therefore to believe is meritorious4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 our  
actions are meritorious in so far as    
they proceed from the free-will moved   
with grace by ,god4 ,therefore every    
human act proceeding from the free-will1
 if it be referred to ,god1 can be      
meritorious4 ,now the act of believing  
is an act of the intellect assenting to 

the ,divine truth at the command of the 
will moved by the grace of ,god1 so that
 it is subject to the free-will in      
relation to ,god2 and consequently the  
act of faith can be meritorious4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,nature is compared to       
charity which is the principle of merit1
 as matter to form3 whereas faith is    
compared to charity as the disposition  
which precedes the ultimate form4 ,now  
it is evident that the subject or the   
matter cannot act save by virtue of the 
form1 nor can a preceding disposition1  
before the advent of the form3 but after
 the advent of the form1 both the       
subject and the preceding disposition   
act by virtue of the form1 which is the 
chief principle of action1 even as the  
heat of fire acts by virtue of the      
substantial form of fire4 ,accordingly  
neither nature nor faith can1 without   
charity1 produce a meritorious act2 but1
 when accompanied by charity1 the act of
 faith is made meritorious thereby1 even
 as an act of nature1 and a natural act 

of the free-will4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,two
 things may be considered in science3   
namely the scientist's assent to a      
scientific fact and his consideration of
 that fact4 ,now the assent of science  
is not subject to free-will1 because the
 scientist is obliged to assent by force
 of the demonstration1 wherefore        
scientific assent is not meritorious4   
,but the actual consideration of what a 
man knows scientifically is subject to  
his free-will1 for it is in his power to
 consider or not to consider4 ,hence    
scientific consideration may be         
meritorious if it be referred to the end
 of charity1 i4e4 to the honor of ,god  
or the good of our neighbor4 ,on the    
other hand1 in the case of faith1 both  
these things are subject to the         
free-will so that in both respects the  
act of faith can be meritorious3 whereas
 in the case of opinion1 there is no    
firm assent1 since it is weak and       
infirm1 as the ,philosopher observes    
7,poster4 i1 #cc71 so that it does not  

seem to proceed from a perfect act of   
the will3 and for this reason1 as       
regards the assent1 it does not appear  
to be very meritorious1 though it can be
 as regards the actual consideration4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the believer has      
sufficient motive for believing1 for he 
is moved by the authority of ,divine    
teaching confirmed by miracles1 and1    
what is more1 by the inward instinct of 
the ,divine invitation3 hence he does   
not believe lightly4 ,he has not1       
however1 sufficient reason for          
scientific knowledge1 hence he does not 
lose the merit4   ,,tenth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #aj  ,whether  
,reasons in ,support of ,what ,we       
,believe ,lessen the ,merit of ,faith8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
reasons in support of what we believe   
lessen the merit of faith4 ,for ,gregory
 says 7,hom4 xxvi in ,evang47 that there
 is no merit in believing what is shown 
by reason4 ,if1 therefore1 human reason 
provides sufficient proof1 the merit of 

faith is altogether taken away4         
,therefore it seems that any kind of    
human reasoning in support of matters of
 faith1 diminishes the merit of         
believing4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever
 lessens the measure of virtue1 lessens 
the amount of merit1 since happiness is 
the reward of virtue1 as the            
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 i1 #i74    
,now human reasoning seems to diminish  
the measure of the virtue of faith1     
since it is essential to faith to be    
about the unseen1 as stated above 7,q4  
#a1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e74 ,now the more a thing
 is supported by reasons the less is it 
unseen4 ,therefore human reasons in     
support of matters of faith diminish the
 merit of faith4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
contrary things have contrary causes4   
,now an inducement in opposition to     
faith increases the merit of faith      
whether it consist in persecution       
inflicted by one who endeavors to force 
a man to renounce his faith1 or in an   
argument persuading him to do so4       

,therefore reasons in support of faith  
diminish the merit of faith4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,pet4      
#c3ae73 ,being ready always to satisfy  
every one that asketh you a reason of   
that faith 99,vulg43 ',of that hope     
which is in you4' ,st4 ,thomas' reading 
is apparently taken from ,bede4 and hope
 which is in you4 ,now the ,apostle     
would not give this advice1 if it would 
imply a diminution in the merit of      
faith4 ,therefore reason does not       
diminish the merit of faith4  ,i answer 
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #i71 the act
 of faith can be meritorious1 in so far 
as it is subject to the will1 not only  
as to the use1 but also as to the       
assent4 ,now human reason in support of 
what we believe1 may stand in a twofold 
relation to the will of the believer4   
,first1 as preceding the act of the     
will2 as1 for instance1 when a man      
either has not the will1 or not a prompt
 will1 to believe1 unless he be moved by
 human reasons3 and in this way human   

reason diminishes the merit of faith4   
,in this sense it has been said above   
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a2 ,q4   
#gg1 ,a4 #f1 ad #b7 that1 in moral      
virtues1 a passion which precedes choice
 makes the virtuous act less            
praiseworthy4 ,for just as a man ought  
to perform acts of moral virtue1 on     
account of the judgment of his reason1  
and not on account of a passion1 so     
ought he to believe matters of faith1   
not on account of human reason1 but on  
account of the ,divine authority4       
,secondly1 human reasons may be         
consequent to the will of the believer4 
,for when a man's will is ready to      
believe1 he loves the truth he believes1
 he thinks out and takes to heart       
whatever reasons he can find in support 
thereof2 and in this way human reason   
does not exclude the merit of faith but 
is a sign of greater merit4 ,thus again1
 in moral virtues a consequent passion  
is the sign of a more prompt will1 as   
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #c1 

ad #a74 ,we have an indication of this  
in the words of the ,samaritans to the  
woman1 who is a type of human reason3   
,we now believe1 not for thy saying     
7,john #d3db74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,gregory is referring to the case of a  
man who has no will to believe what is  
of faith1 unless he be induced by       
reasons4 ,but when a man has the will to
 believe what is of faith on the        
authority of ,god alone1 although he may
 have reasons in demonstration of some  
of them1 e4g4 of the existence of ,god1 
the merit of his faith is not1 for that 
reason1 lost or diminished4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,the reasons which are brought
 forward in support of the authority of 
faith1 are not demonstrations which can 
bring intellectual vision to the human  
intellect1 wherefore they do not cease  
to be unseen4 ,but they remove obstacles
 to faith1 by showing that what faith   
proposes is not impossible2 wherefore   
such reasons do not diminish the merit  
or the measure of faith4 ,on the other  

hand1 though demonstrative reasons in   
support of the preambles of faith 99,the
 ,leonine ,edition reads3 'in support of
 matters of faith which are however1    
preambles to the articles of faith1     
diminish1' etc41 but not of the articles
 of faith1 diminish the measure of      
faith1 since they make the thing        
believed to be seen1 yet they do not    
diminish the measure of charity1 which  
makes the will ready to believe them1   
even if they were unseen2 and so the    
measure of merit is not diminished4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whatever is in        
opposition to faith1 whether it consist 
in a man's thoughts1 or in outward      
persecution1 increases the merit of     
faith1 in so far as the will is shown to
 be more prompt and firm in believing4  
,hence the martyrs had more merit of    
faith1 through not renouncing faith on  
account of persecution2 and even the    
wise have greater merit of faith1       
through not renouncing their faith on   
account of the reasons brought forward  

by philosophers or heretics in          
opposition to faith4 ,on the other hand 
things that are favorable to faith1 do  
not always diminish the promptness of   
the will to believe1 and therefore they 
do not always diminish the merit of     
faith4   ,,question #c  ,,of ,,the      
,,outward ,,act ,,of ,,faith 7,in ,two  
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
outward act1 viz4 the confession of     
faith3 under which head there are two   
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
confession is an act of faith8  7#b7    
,whether confession of faith is         
necessary for salvation8   ,,first      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #a   
,whether ,confession ,is an ,act of     
,faith8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that confession is not an act of faith4 
,for the same act does not belong to    
different virtues4 ,now confession      
belongs to penance of which it is a     
part4 ,therefore it is not an act of    
faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man is      
sometimes deterred by fear or some kind 

of confusion1 from confessing his faith3
 wherefore the ,apostle 7,eph4 #f3ai7   
asks for prayers that it may be granted 
him with confidence1 to make known the  
mystery of the gospel4 ,now it belongs  
to fortitude1 which moderates daring and
 fear1 not to be deterred from doing    
good on account of confusion or fear4   
,therefore it seems that confession is  
not an act of faith1 but rather of      
fortitude or constancy4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 just as the ardor of faith    
makes one confess one's faith outwardly1
 so does it make one do other external  
good works1 for it is written 7,gal4    
#e3f7 that faith 4 4 4 worketh by       
charity4 ,but other external works are  
not reckoned acts of faith4 ,therefore  
neither is confession an act of faith4  
,on the contrary1 ,a gloss explains the 
words of #b ,thess4 #a3aa1 and the work 
of faith in power as referring to       
confession which is a work proper to    
faith4  ,i answer that1 ,outward actions
 belong properly to the virtue to whose 

end they are specifically referred3 thus
 fasting is referred specifically to the
 end of abstinence1 which is to tame the
 flesh1 and consequently it is an act of
 abstinence4  ,now confession of those  
things that are of faith is referred    
specifically as to its end1 to that     
which concerns faith1 according to #b   
,cor4 #d3ac3 ,having the same spirit of 
faith 4 4 4 we believe1 and therefore we
 speak also4 ,for the outward utterance 
is intended to signify the inward       
thought4 ,wherefore1 just as the inward 
thought of matters of faith is properly 
an act of faith1 so too is the outward  
confession of them4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a
 threefold confession is commended by   
the ,scriptures4 ,one is the confession 
of matters of faith1 and this is a      
proper act of faith1 since it is        
referred to the end of faith as stated  
above4 ,another is the confession of    
thanksgiving or praise1 and this is an  
act of latria1 for its purpose is to    
give outward honor to ,god1 which is the

 end of latria4 ,the third is the       
confession of sins1 which is ordained to
 the blotting out of sins1 which is the 
end of penance1 to which virtue it      
therefore belongs4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,that which removes an obstacle is not a
 direct1 but an indirect1 cause1 as the 
,philosopher proves 7,phys4 viii1 #d74  
,hence fortitude which removes an       
obstacle to the confession of faith1    
viz4 fear or shame1 is not the proper   
and direct cause of confession1 but an  
indirect cause so to speak4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,inward faith1 with the aid of
 charity1 causes all outward acts of    
virtue1 by means of the other virtues1  
commanding1 but not eliciting them2     
whereas it produces the act of          
confession as its proper act1 without   
the help of any other virtue4   ,,second
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,confession of ,faith ,is      
,necessary for ,salvation8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that confession of   
faith is not necessary for salvation4   

,for1 seemingly1 a thing is sufficient  
for salvation1 if it is a means of      
attaining the end of virtue4 ,now the   
proper end of faith is the union of the 
human mind with ,divine truth1 and this 
can be realized without any outward     
confession4 ,therefore confession of    
faith is not necessary for salvation4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 by outward          
confession of faith1 a man reveals his  
faith to another man4 ,but this is      
unnecessary save for those who have to  
instruct others in the faith4 ,therefore
 it seems that the simple folk are not  
bound to confess the faith4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 whatever may tend to          
scandalize and disturb others1 is not   
necessary for salvation1 for the        
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #aj3cb73 ,be    
without offense to the ,jews and to the 
gentiles and to the ,church of ,god4    
,now confession of faith sometimes      
causes a disturbance among unbelievers4 
,therefore it is not necessary for      
salvation4  ,on the contrary1 ,the      

,apostle says 7,rom4 #aj3aj73 ,with the 
heart we believe unto justice2 but with 
the mouth1 confession is made unto      
salvation4  ,i answer that1 ,things that
 are necessary for salvation come under 
the precepts of the ,divine law4 ,now   
since confession of faith is something  
affirmative1 it can only fall under an  
affirmative precept4 ,hence its         
necessity for salvation depends on how  
it falls under an affirmative precept of
 the ,divine law4 ,now affirmative      
precepts as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#ga1 ,a4 #e1 ad #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1   
,a4 #a1 ad #b7 do not bind for always1  
although they are always binding2 but   
they bind as to place and time according
 to other due circumstances1 in respect 
of which human acts have to be regulated
 in order to be acts of virtue4  ,thus  
then it is not necessary for salvation  
to confess one's faith at all times and 
in all places1 but in certain places and
 at certain times1 when1 namely1 by     
omitting to do so1 we would deprive ,god

 of due honor1 or our neighbor of a     
service that we ought to render him3 for
 instance1 if a man1 on being asked     
about his faith1 were to remain silent1 
so as to make people believe either that
 he is without faith1 or that the faith 
is false1 or so as to turn others away  
from the faith2 for in such cases as    
these1 confession of faith is necessary 
for salvation4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the   
end of faith1 even as of the other      
virtues1 must be referred to the end of 
charity1 which is the love of ,god and  
our neighbor4 ,consequently when ,god's 
honor and our neighbor's good demand1   
man should not be contented with being  
united by faith to ,god's truth1 but    
ought to confess his faith outwardly4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in cases of necessity 
where faith is in danger1 every one is  
bound to proclaim his faith to others1  
either to give good example and         
encouragement to the rest of the        
faithful1 or to check the attacks of    
unbelievers3 but at other times it is   

not the duty of all the faithful to     
instruct others in the faith4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,there is nothing commendable 
in making a public confession of one's  
faith1 if it causes a disturbance among 
unbelievers1 without any profit either  
to the faith or to the faithful4 ,hence 
,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #g3f73 ,give not
 that which is holy to dogs1 neither    
cast ye your pearls before swine 4 4 4  
lest turning upon you1 they tear you4   
,yet1 if there is hope of profit to the 
faith1 or if there be urgency1 a man    
should disregard the disturbance of     
unbelievers1 and confess his faith in   
public4 ,hence it is written 7,matt4    
#ae3ab7 that when the disciples had said
 to ,our ,lord that the ,pharisee1 when 
they heard this word1 were scandalized1 
,he answered3 ,let them alone1 they are 
blind1 and leaders of the blind4        
,,question #d  ,,of ,,the ,,virtue      
,,itself ,,of ,,faith 7,in ,eight       
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
virtue itself of faith1 and1 in the     

first place1 faith itself2 secondly1    
those who have faith2 thirdly1 the cause
 of faith2 fourthly1 its effects4       
,under the first head there are eight   
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is faith8
  7#b7 ,in what power of the soul does  
it reside8  7#c7 ,whether its form is   
charity8  7#d7 ,whether living 7formata7
 faith and lifeless 7informis7 faith are
 one identically8  7#e7 ,whether faith  
is a virtue8  7#f7 ,whether it is one   
virtue8  7#g7 ,of its relation to the   
other virtues2  7#h7 ,of its certitude  
as compared with the certitude of the   
intellectual virtues4   ,,first         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #a   
,whether ,this ,is a ,fitting           
,definition of ,faith3 ,faith ,is the   
,substance of ,things to ,be ,hoped     
,for1 the ,evidence of ,things ,that    
,appear ,not8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that the ,apostle gives an         
unfitting definition of faith 7,heb4    
#aa3a7 when he says3 ,faith is the      
substance of things to be hoped for1 the

 evidence of things that appear not4    
,for no quality is a substance3 whereas 
faith is a quality1 since it is a       
theological virtue1 as stated above     
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore  
it is not a substance4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 different virtues have        
different objects4 ,now things to be    
hoped for are the object of hope4       
,therefore they should not be included  
in a definition of faith1 as though they
 were its object4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
faith is perfected by charity rather    
than by hope1 since charity is the form 
of faith1 as we shall state further on  
7,a4 #c74 ,therefore the definition of  
faith should have included the thing to 
be loved rather than the thing to be    
hoped for4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the same
 thing should not be placed in different
 genera4 ,now substance and evidence are
 different genera1 and neither is       
subalternate to the other4 ,therefore it
 is unfitting to state that faith is    
both substance and evidence4  ,obj4 #e3 

,further1 evidence manifests the truth  
of the matter for which it is adduced4  
,now a thing is said to be apparent when
 its truth is already manifest4         
,therefore it seems to imply a          
contradiction to speak of evidence of   
things that appear not3 and so faith is 
unfittingly defined4  ,on the contrary1 
,the authority of the ,apostle suffices4
  ,i answer that1 ,though some say that 
the above words of the ,apostle are not 
a definition of faith1 yet if we        
consider the matter aright1 this        
definition overlooks none of the points 
in reference to which faith can be      
defined1 albeit the words themselves are
 not arranged in the form of a          
definition1 just as the philosophers    
touch on the principles of the          
syllogism1 without employing the        
syllogistic form4  ,in order to make    
this clear1 we must observe that since  
habits are known by their acts1 and acts
 by their objects1 faith1 being a habit1
 should be defined by its proper act in 

relation to its proper object4 ,now the 
act of faith is to believe1 as stated   
above 7,q4 #b1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c71 which is  
an act of the intellect determinate to  
one object of the will's command4 ,hence
 an act of faith is related both to the 
object of the will1 i4e4 to the good and
 the end1 and to the object of the      
intellect1 i4e4 to the true4 ,and since 
faith1 through being a theological      
virtue1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#fb1 ,a4 #b71 has one same thing for    
object and end1 its object and end must1
 of necessity1 be in proportion to one  
another4 ,now it has been already stated
 7,q4 #a1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d7 that the object 
of faith is the ,first ,truth1 as       
unseen1 and whatever we hold on account 
thereof3 so that it must needs be under 
the aspect of something unseen that the 
,first ,truth is the end of the act of  
faith1 which aspect is that of a thing  
hoped for1 according to the ,apostle    
7,rom4 #h3be73 ,we hope for that which  
we see not3 because to see the truth is 

to possess it4 ,now one hopes not for   
what one has already1 but for what one  
has not1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#fg1 ,a4 #d74 ,accordingly the relation 
of the act of faith to its end which is 
the object of the will1 is indicated by 
the words3 ,faith is the substance of   
things to be hoped for4 ,for we are wont
 to call by the name of substance1 the  
first beginning of a thing1 especially  
when the whole subsequent thing is      
virtually contained in the first        
beginning2 for instance1 we might say   
that the first self-evident principles  
are the substance of science1 because1  
to wit1 these principles are in us the  
first beginnings of science1 the whole  
of which is itself contained in them    
virtually4 ,in this way then faith is   
said to be the substance of things to be
 hoped for1 for the reason that in us   
the first beginning of things to be     
hoped for is brought about by the assent
 of faith1 which contains virtually all 
things to be hoped for4 ,because we hope

 to be made happy through seeing the    
unveiled truth to which our faith       
cleaves1 as was made evident when we    
were speaking of happiness 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #c1 ,a4 #h2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,a4 #c74  
,the relationship of the act of faith to
 the object of the intellect1 considered
 as the object of faith1 is indicated by
 the words1 evidence of things that     
appear not1 where evidence is taken for 
the result of evidence4 ,for evidence   
induces the intellect to adhere to a    
truth1 wherefore the firm adhesion of   
the intellect to the non-apparent truth 
of faith is called evidence here4 ,hence
 another reading has conviction1 because
 to wit1 the intellect of the believer  
is convinced by ,divine authority1 so as
 to assent to what it sees not4         
,accordingly if anyone would reduce the 
foregoing words to the form of a        
definition1 he may say that faith is a  
habit of the mind1 whereby eternal life 
is begun in us1 making the intellect    
assent to what is non-apparent4  ,in    

this way faith is distinguished from all
 other things pertaining to the         
intellect4 ,for when we describe it as  
evidence1 we distinguish it from        
opinion1 suspicion1 and doubt1 which do 
not make the intellect adhere to        
anything firmly2 when we go on to say1  
of things that appear not1 we           
distinguish it from science and         
understanding1 the object of which is   
something apparent2 and when we say that
 it is the substance of things to be    
hoped for1 we distinguish the virtue of 
faith from faith commonly so called1    
which has no reference to the beatitude 
we hope for4  ,whatever other           
definitions are given of faith1 are     
explanations of this one given by the   
,apostle4 ,for when ,augustine says     
7,tract4 xl in ,joan43 ,,qq4 ,evang4 ii1
 qu4 #ci7 that faith is a virtue whereby
 we believe what we do not see1 and when
 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iv1  
#aa7 that faith is an assent without    
research1 and when others say that faith

 is that certainty of the mind about    
absent things which surpasses opinion   
but falls short of science1 these all   
amount to the same as the ,apostle's    
words3 ,evidence of things that appear  
not2 and when ,dionysius says 7,div4    
,nom4 vii7 that faith is the solid      
foundation of the believer1 establishing
 him in the truth1 and showing forth the
 truth in him1 comes to the same as     
substance of things to be hoped for4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,substance here does   
not stand for the supreme genus         
condivided with the other genera1 but   
for that likeness to substance which is 
found in each genus1 inasmuch as the    
first thing in a genus contains the     
others virtually and is said to be the  
substance thereof4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,since faith pertains to the intellect  
as commanded by the will1 it must needs 
be directed1 as to its end1 to the      
objects of those virtues which perfect  
the will1 among which is hope1 as we    
shall prove further on 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4    

#a74 ,for this reason the definition of 
faith includes the object of hope4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,love may be of the    
seen and of the unseen1 of the present  
and of the absent4 ,consequently a thing
 to be loved is not so adapted to faith1
 as a thing to be hoped for1 since hope 
is always of the absent and the unseen4 
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,substance and evidence
 as included in the definition of faith1
 do not denote various genera of faith1 
nor different acts1 but different       
relationships of one act to different   
objects1 as is clear from what has been 
said4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,evidence taken 
from the proper principles of a thing1  
makes it apparent1 whereas evidence     
taken from ,divine authority does not   
make a thing apparent in itself1 and    
such is the evidence referred to in the 
definition of faith4   ,,second         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #b   
,whether ,faith ,resides in the         
,intellect8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that faith does not reside in the  

intellect4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de    
,praedest4 ,sanct4 v7 that faith resides
 in the believer's will4 ,now the will  
is a power distinct from the intellect4 
,therefore faith does not reside in the 
intellect4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the     
assent of faith to believe anything1    
proceeds from the will obeying ,god4    
,therefore it seems that faith owes all 
its praise to obedience4 ,now obedience 
is in the will4 ,therefore faith is in  
the will1 and not in the intellect4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellect is    
either speculative or practical4 ,now   
faith is not in the speculative         
intellect1 since this is not concerned  
with things to be sought or avoided1 as 
stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #i1 so that it
 is not a principle of operation1       
whereas faith 4 4 4 worketh by charity  
7,gal4 #e3f74 ,likewise1 neither is it  
in the practical intellect1 the object  
of which is some true1 contingent thing1
 that can be made or done4 ,for the     
object of faith is the ,eternal ,truth1 

as was shown above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a74    
,therefore faith does not reside in the 
intellect4  ,on the contrary1 ,faith is 
succeeded by the heavenly vision1       
according to #a ,cor4 #ac3ab3 ,we see   
now through a glass in a dark manner2   
but then face to face4 ,now vision is in
 the intellect4 ,therefore faith is     
likewise4  ,i answer that1 ,since faith 
is a virtue1 its act must needs be      
perfect4 ,now1 for the perfection of an 
act proceeding from two active          
principles1 each of these principles    
must be perfect3 for it is not possible 
for a thing to be sawn well1 unless the 
sawyer possess the art1 and the saw be  
well fitted for sawing4 ,now1 in a power
 of the soul1 which is related to       
opposite objects1 a disposition to act  
well is a habit1 as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a1 #b1   
#c74 ,wherefore an act that proceeds    
from two such powers must be perfected  
by a habit residing in each of them4    
,again1 it has been stated above 7,q4   

#b1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b7 that to believe is an 
act of the intellect inasmuch as the    
will moves it to assent4 ,and this act  
proceeds from the will and the          
intellect1 both of which have a natural 
aptitude to be perfected in this way4   
,consequently1 if the act of faith is to
 be perfect1 there needs to be a habit  
in the will as well as in the intellect3
 even as there needs to be the habit of 
prudence in the reason1 besides the     
habit of temperance in the concupiscible
 faculty1 in order that the act of that 
faculty be perfect4 ,now1 to believe is 
immediately an act of the intellect1    
because the object of that act is the   
true1 which pertains properly to the    
intellect4 ,consequently faith1 which is
 the proper principle of that act1 must 
needs reside in the intellect4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,augustine takes faith for the
 act of faith1 which is described as    
depending on the believer's will1 in so 
far as his intellect assents to matters 
of faith at the command of the will4    

,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not only does the will
 need to be ready to obey but also the  
intellect needs to be well disposed to  
follow the command of the will1 even as 
the concupiscible faculty needs to be   
well disposed in order to follow the    
command of reason2 hence there needs to 
be a habit of virtue not only in the    
commanding will but also in the         
assenting intellect4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,faith resides in the speculative       
intellect1 as evidenced by its object4  
,but since this object1 which is the    
,first ,truth1 is the end of all our    
desires and actions1 as ,augustine      
proves 7,de ,trin4 i1 #h71 it follows   
that faith worketh by charity just as   
the speculative intellect becomes       
practical by extension 7,de ,anima iii1 
#aj74   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #d1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,charity ,is the
 ,form of ,faith8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that charity is not the form 
of faith4 ,for each thing derives its   
species from its form4 ,when therefore  

two things are opposite members of a    
division1 one cannot be the form of the 
other4 ,now faith and charity are stated
 to be opposite members of a division1  
as different species of virtue 7#a ,cor4
 #ac3ac74 ,therefore charity is not the 
form of faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a   
form and the thing of which it is the   
form are in one subject1 since together 
they form one simply4 ,now faith is in  
the intellect1 while charity is in the  
will4 ,therefore charity is not the form
 of faith4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the form
 of a thing is a principle thereof4 ,now
 obedience1 rather than charity1 seems  
to be the principle of believing1 on the
 part of the will1 according to ,rom4   
#a3e3 ,for obedience to the faith in all
 nations4 ,therefore obedience rather   
than charity1 is the form of faith4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,each thing works through
 its form4 ,now faith works through     
charity4 ,therefore the love of charity 
is the form of faith4  ,i answer that1  
,as appears from what has been said     

above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f71 voluntary acts take  
their species from their end which is   
the will's object4 ,now that which gives
 a thing its species1 is after the      
manner of a form in natural things4     
,wherefore the form of any voluntary act
 is1 in a manner1 the end to which that 
act is directed1 both because it takes  
its species therefrom1 and because the  
mode of an action should correspond     
proportionately to the end4 ,now it is  
evident from what has been said 7,a4    
#a71 that the act of faith is directed  
to the object of the will1 i4e4 the     
good1 as to its end3 and this good which
 is the end of faith1 viz4 the ,divine  
,good1 is the proper object of charity4 
,therefore charity is called the form of
 faith in so far as the act of faith is 
perfected and formed by charity4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,charity is called the form  
of faith because it quickens the act of 
faith4 ,now nothing hinders one act from
 being quickened by different habits1 so

 as to be reduced to various species in 
a certain order1 as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #f1 #g2        
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #b7 when we were  
treating of human acts in general4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this objection is true
 of an intrinsic form4 ,but it is not   
thus that charity is the form of faith1 
but in the sense that it quickens the   
act of faith1 as explained above4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even obedience1 and   
hope likewise1 and whatever other virtue
 might precede the act of faith1 is     
quickened by charity1 as we shall show  
further on 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #h71 and       
consequently charity is spoken of as the
 form of faith4   ,,fourth ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #d  ,whether   
,lifeless ,faith ,can ,become ,living1  
or ,living ,faith1 ,lifeless8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
lifeless faith does not become living1  
or living faith lifeless4 ,for1         
according to #a ,cor4 #ac3aj1 when that 
which is perfect is come1 that which is 

in part shall be done away4 ,now        
lifeless faith is imperfect in          
comparison with living faith4 ,therefore
 when living faith comes1 lifeless faith
 is done away1 so that they are not one 
identical habit4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a 
dead thing does not become a living     
thing4 ,now lifeless faith is dead1     
according to ,james #b3bj3 ,faith       
without works is dead4 ,therefore       
lifeless faith cannot become living4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god's grace1 by its
 advent1 has no less effect in a        
believer than in an unbeliever4 ,now by 
coming to an unbeliever it causes the   
habit of faith4 ,therefore when it comes
 to a believer1 who hitherto had the    
habit of lifeless faith1 it causes      
another habit of faith in him4  ,obj4   
#d3 ,further1 as ,boethius says 7,in    
,categ4 ,arist4 i71 accidents cannot be 
altered4 ,now faith is an accident4     
,therefore the same faith cannot be at  
one time living1 and at another1        
lifeless4  ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on

 the words1 ,faith without works is dead
 7,james #b3bj7 adds1 by which it lives 
once more4 ,therefore faith which was   
lifeless and without form hitherto1     
becomes formed and living4  ,i answer   
that1 ,there have been various opinions 
on this question4 ,for some 99,william  
of ,auxerre1 ,sum4 ,aur4 ,,iii1 iii1 #ae
 have said that living and lifeless     
faith are distinct habits1 but that when
 living faith comes1 lifeless faith is  
done away1 and that1 in like manner1    
when a man sins mortally after having   
living faith1 a new habit of lifeless   
faith is infused into him by ,god4 ,but 
it seems unfitting that grace should    
deprive man of a gift of ,god by coming 
to him1 and that a gift of ,god should  
be infused into man1 on account of a    
mortal sin4  ,consequently others       
99,alexander of ,hales1 ,sum4 ,theol4   
iii1 #fd have said that living and      
lifeless faith are indeed distinct      
habits1 but that1 all the same1 when    
living faith comes the habit of lifeless

 faith is not taken away1 and that it   
remains together with the habit of      
living faith in the same subject4 ,yet  
again it seems unreasonable that the    
habit of lifeless faith should remain   
inactive in a person having living      
faith4  ,we must therefore hold         
differently that living and lifeless    
faith are one and the same habit4 ,the  
reason is that a habit is differentiated
 by that which directly pertains to that
 habit4 ,now since faith is a perfection
 of the intellect1 that pertains        
directly to faith1 which pertains to the
 intellect4 ,again1 what pertains to the
 will1 does not pertain directly to     
faith1 so as to be able to differentiate
 the habit of faith4 ,but the           
distinction of living from lifeless     
faith is in respect of something        
pertaining to the will1 i4e4 charity1   
and not in respect of something         
pertaining to the intellect4 ,therefore 
living and lifeless faith are not       
distinct habits4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the 

saying of the ,apostle refers to those  
imperfect things from which imperfection
 is inseparable1 for then1 when the     
perfect comes the imperfect must needs  
be done away4 ,thus with the advent of  
clear vision1 faith is done away1       
because it is essentially of the things 
that appear not4 ,when1 however1        
imperfection is not inseparable from the
 imperfect thing1 the same identical    
thing which was imperfect becomes       
perfect4 ,thus childhood is not         
essential to man and consequently the   
same identical subject who was a child1 
becomes a man4 ,now lifelessness is not 
essential to faith1 but is accidental   
thereto as stated above4 ,therefore     
lifeless faith itself becomes living4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that which makes an   
animal live is inseparable from an      
animal1 because it is its substantial   
form1 viz4 the soul3 consequently a dead
 thing cannot become a living thing1 and
 a living and a dead thing differ       
specifically4 ,on the other hand that   

which gives faith its form1 or makes it 
live1 is not essential to faith4 ,hence 
there is no comparison4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,grace causes faith not only when   
faith begins anew to be in a man1 but   
also as long as faith lasts4 ,for it has
 been said above 7,i1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,a4 #a2 
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #i7 that ,god is 
always working man's justification1 even
 as the sun is always lighting up the   
air4 ,hence grace is not less effective 
when it comes to a believer than when it
 comes to an unbeliever3 since it causes
 faith in both1 in the former by        
confirming and perfecting it1 in the    
latter by creating it anew4  ,we might  
also reply that it is accidental1 namely
 on account of the disposition of the   
subject1 that grace does not cause faith
 in one who has it already3 just as1 on 
the other hand1 a second mortal sin does
 not take away grace from one who has   
already lost it through a previous      
mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,when     
living faith becomes lifeless1 faith is 

not changed1 but its subject1 the soul1 
which at one time has faith without     
charity1 and at another time1 with      
charity4   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #d1 ,art4 #e  ,whether ,faith ,is a 
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that faith is not a virtue4 ,for virtue 
is directed to the good1 since it is    
virtue that makes its subject good1 as  
the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ii1    
#f74 ,but faith is directed to the true4
 ,therefore faith is not a virtue4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 infused virtue is   
more perfect than acquired virtue4 ,now 
faith1 on account of its imperfection1  
is not placed among the acquired        
intellectual virtues1 as the            
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 vi1 #c74   
,much less1 therefore1 can it be        
considered an infused virtue4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 living and lifeless faith are
 the same species1 as stated above 7,a4 
#d74 ,now lifeless faith is not a       
virtue1 since it is not connected with  
the other virtues4 ,therefore neither is

 living faith a virtue4  ,obj4 #d3      
,further1 the gratuitous graces and the 
fruits are distinct from the virtues4   
,but faith is numbered among the        
gratuitous graces 7#a ,cor4 #ab3i7 and  
likewise among the fruits 7,gal4 #e3bc74
 ,therefore faith is not a virtue4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,man is justified by the  
virtues1 since justice is all virtue1 as
 the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 v1    
#a74 ,now man is justified by faith     
according to ,rom4 #e3a3 ,being         
justified therefore by faith let us have
 peace1 etc4 ,therefore faith is a      
virtue4  ,i answer that1 ,as shown      
above1 it is by human virtue that human 
acts are rendered good2 hence1 any habit
 that is always the principle of a good 
act1 may be called a human virtue4 ,such
 a habit is living faith4 ,for since to 
believe is an act of the intellect      
assenting to the truth at the command of
 the will1 two things are required that 
this act may be perfect3 one of which is
 that the intellect should infallibly   

tend to its object1 which is the true2  
while the other is that the will should 
be infallibly directed to the last end1 
on account of which it assents to the   
true3 and both of these are to be found 
in the act of living faith4 ,for it     
belongs to the very essence of faith    
that the intellect should ever tend to  
the true1 since nothing false can be the
 object of faith1 as proved above 7,q4  
#a1 ,a4 #c73 while the effect of        
charity1 which is the form of faith1 is 
that the soul ever has its will directed
 to a good end4 ,therefore living faith 
is a virtue4  ,on the other hand1       
lifeless faith is not a virtue1 because1
 though the act of lifeless faith is    
duly perfect on the part of the         
intellect1 it has not its due perfection
 as regards the will3 just as if        
temperance be in the concupiscible1     
without prudence being in the rational  
part1 temperance is not a virtue1 as    
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a71
 because the act of temperance requires 

both an act of reason1 and an act of the
 concupiscible faculty1 even as the act 
of faith requires an act of the will1   
and an act of the intellect4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,the truth is itself the good 
of the intellect1 since it is its       
perfection3 and consequently faith has a
 relation to some good in so far as it  
directs the intellect to the true4      
,furthermore1 it has a relation to the  
good considered as the object of the    
will1 inasmuch as it is formed by       
charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the faith of
 which the ,philosopher speaks is based 
on human reasoning in a conclusion which
 does not follow1 of necessity1 from its
 premisses2 and which is subject to be  
false3 hence such like faith is not a   
virtue4 ,on the other hand1 the faith of
 which we are speaking is based on the  
,divine ,truth1 which is infallible1 and
 consequently its object cannot be      
anything false2 so that faith of this   
kind can be a virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,living and lifeless faith do not differ

 specifically1 as though they belonged  
to different species4 ,but they differ  
as perfect and imperfect within the same
 species4 ,hence lifeless faith1 being  
imperfect1 does not satisfy the         
conditions of a perfect virtue1 for     
virtue is a kind of perfection 7,phys4  
vii1 text4 #ah74  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,some
 say that faith which is numbered among 
the gratuitous graces is lifeless faith4
 ,but this is said without reason1 since
 the gratuitous graces1 which are       
mentioned in that passage1 are not      
common to all the members of the        
,church3 wherefore the ,apostle says3   
,there are diversities of graces1 and   
again1 ,to one is given this grace and  
to another that4 ,now lifeless faith is 
common to all members of the ,church1   
because its lifelessness is not part of 
its substance1 if we consider it as a   
gratuitous gift4 ,we must1 therefore1   
say that in that passage1 faith denotes 
a certain excellency of faith1 for      
instance1 constancy in faith1 according 

to a gloss1 or the word of faith4       
,faith is numbered among the fruits1 in 
so far as it gives a certain pleasure in
 its act by reason of its certainty1    
wherefore the gloss on the fifth chapter
 to the ,galatians1 where the fruits are
 enumerated1 explains faith as being    
certainty about the unseen4   ,,sixth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #f   
,whether ,faith ,is ,one ,virtue8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that faith
 is not one4 ,for just as faith is a    
gift of ,god according to ,eph4 #b3h1 so
 also wisdom and knowledge are numbered 
among ,god's gifts according to ,isa4   
#aa3b4 ,now wisdom and knowledge differ 
in this1 that wisdom is about eternal   
things1 and knowledge about temporal    
things1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,trin4
 xii1 #ad1 #ae74 ,since1 then1 faith is 
about eternal things1 and also about    
some temporal things1 it seems that     
faith is not one virtue1 but divided    
into several parts4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 confession is an act of faith1 as      

stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a74 ,now     
confession of faith is not one and the  
same for all3 since what we confess as  
past1 the fathers of old confessed as   
yet to come1 as appears from ,isa4      
#g3ad3 ,behold a virgin shall conceive4 
,therefore faith is not one4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 faith is common to all        
believers in ,christ4 ,but one accident 
cannot be in many subjects4 ,therefore  
all cannot have one faith4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,eph4     
#d3e73 ,one ,lord1 one faith4  ,i answer
 that1 ,if we take faith as a habit1 we 
can consider it in two ways4 ,first on  
the part of the object1 and thus there  
is one faith4 ,because the formal object
 of faith is the ,first ,truth1 by      
adhering to which we believe whatever is
 contained in the faith4 ,secondly1 on  
the part of the subject1 and thus faith 
is differentiated according as it is in 
various subjects4 ,now it is evident    
that faith1 just as any other habit1    
takes its species from the formal aspect

 of its object1 but is individualized by
 its subject4 ,hence if we take faith   
for the habit whereby we believe1 it is 
one specifically1 but differs           
numerically according to its various    
subjects4  ,if1 on the other hand1 we   
take faith for that which is believed1  
then1 again1 there is one faith1 since  
what is believed by all is one same     
thing3 for though the things believed1  
which all agree in believing1 be diverse
 from one another1 yet they are all     
reduced to one4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3       
,temporal matters which are proposed to 
be believed1 do not belong to the object
 of faith1 except in relation to        
something eternal1 viz4 the ,first      
,truth1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4    
#a74 ,hence there is one faith of things
 both temporal and eternal4 ,it is      
different with wisdom and knowledge1    
which consider temporal and eternal     
matters under their respective aspects4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this difference of    
past and future arises1 not from any    

difference in the thing believed1 but   
from the different relationships of     
believers to the one thing believed1 as 
also we have mentioned above 7,i-,,ii1  
,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,a4
 #a1 ad #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this    
objection considers numerical diversity 
of faith4   ,,seventh ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #g  ,whether   
,faith ,is the ,first of the ,virtues8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that faith
 is not the first of the virtues4 ,for a
 gloss on ,luke #ab3d1 ,i say to you ,my
 friends1 says that fortitude is the    
foundation of faith4 ,now the foundation
 precedes that which is founded thereon4
 ,therefore faith is not the first of   
the virtues4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a     
gloss on ,ps4 #cf1 ,be not emulous1 says
 that hope leads on to faith4 ,now hope 
is a virtue1 as we shall state further  
on 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore faith  
is not the first of the virtues4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 it was stated above 7,a4  
#b7 that the intellect of the believer  

is moved1 out of obedience to ,god1 to  
assent to matters of faith4 ,now        
obedience also is a virtue4 ,therefore  
faith is not the first virtue4  ,obj4   
#d3 ,further1 not lifeless but living   
faith is the foundation1 as a gloss     
remarks on #a ,cor4 #c3aa 99,augustine1 
,de ,fide et ,oper4 xvi44 ,now faith is 
formed by charity1 as stated above 7,a4 
#c74 ,therefore it is owing to charity  
that faith is the foundation3 so that   
charity is the foundation yet more than 
faith is 7for the foundation is the     
first part of a building7 and           
consequently it seems to precede faith4 
,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the order of habits 
is taken from the order of acts4 ,now1  
in the act of faith1 the act of the will
 which is perfected by charity1 precedes
 the act of the intellect1 which is     
perfected by faith1 as the cause which  
precedes its effect4 ,therefore charity 
precedes faith4 ,therefore faith is not 
the first of the virtues4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,heb4     

#aa3a7 that faith is the substance of   
things to be hoped for4 ,now the        
substance of a thing is that which comes
 first4 ,therefore faith is first among 
the virtues4  ,i answer that1 ,one thing
 can precede another in two ways3 first1
 by its very nature2 secondly1 by       
accident4 ,faith1 by its very nature1   
precedes all other virtues4 ,for since  
the end is the principle in matters of  
action1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#ac1 ,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1 ,a4 #d1  
ad #a71 the theological virtues1 the    
object of which is the last end1 must   
needs precede all the others4 ,again1   
the last end must of necessity be       
present to the intellect before it is   
present to the will1 since the will has 
no inclination for anything except in so
 far as it is apprehended by the        
intellect4 ,hence1 as the last end is   
present in the will by hope and charity1
 and in the intellect1 by faith1 the    
first of all the virtues must1 of       
necessity1 be faith1 because natural    

knowledge cannot reach ,god as the      
object of heavenly bliss1 which is the  
aspect under which hope and charity tend
 towards ,him4  ,on the other hand1 some
 virtues can precede faith accidentally4
 ,for an accidental cause precedes its  
effect accidentally4 ,now that which    
removes an obstacle is a kind of        
accidental cause1 according to the      
,philosopher 7,phys4 viii1 #d73 and in  
this sense certain virtues may be said  
to precede faith accidentally1 in so far
 as they remove obstacles to belief4    
,thus fortitude removes the inordinate  
fear that hinders faith2 humility       
removes pride1 whereby a man refuses to 
submit himself to the truth of faith4   
,the same may be said of some other     
virtues1 although there are no real     
virtues1 unless faith be presupposed1 as
 ,augustine states 7,contra ,julian4 iv1
 #c74  ,this suffices for the ,reply to 
the ,first ,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,hope cannot lead to faith absolutely4 
,for one cannot hope to obtain eternal  

happiness1 unless one believes this     
possible1 since hope does not tend to   
the impossible1 as stated above         
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a74 ,it is1     
however1 possible for one to be led by  
hope to persevere in faith1 or to hold  
firmly to faith2 and it is in this sense
 that hope is said to lead to faith4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,obedience is twofold3 
for sometimes it denotes the inclination
 of the will to fulfil ,god's           
commandments4 ,in this way it is not a  
special virtue1 but is a general        
condition of every virtue2 since all    
acts of virtue come under the precepts  
of the ,divine law1 as stated above     
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,a4 #b72 and thus it
 is requisite for faith4 ,in another    
way1 obedience denotes an inclination to
 fulfil the commandments considered as a
 duty4 ,in this way it is a special     
virtue1 and a part of justice3 for a man
 does his duty by his superior when he  
obeys him3 and thus obedience follows   
faith1 whereby man knows that ,god is   

his superior1 ,whom he must obey4       
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,to be a foundation a  
thing requires not only to come first1  
but also to be connected with the other 
parts of the building3 since the        
building would not be founded on it     
unless the other parts adhered to it4   
,now the connecting bond of the         
spiritual edifice is charity1 according 
to ,col4 #c3ad3 ,above all 4 4 4 things 
have charity which is the bond of       
perfection4 ,consequently faith without 
charity cannot be the foundation3 and   
yet it does not follow that charity     
precedes faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,some 
act of the will is required before      
faith1 but not an act of the will       
quickened by charity4 ,this latter act  
presupposes faith1 because the will     
cannot tend to ,god with perfect love1  
unless the intellect possesses right    
faith about ,him4   ,,eighth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #h  ,whether   
,faith ,is ,more ,certain ,than ,science
 and the ,other ,intellectual ,virtues8 

,objection #a3 ,it would seem that faith
 is not more certain than science and   
the other intellectual virtues4 ,for    
doubt is opposed to certitude1 wherefore
 a thing would seem to be the more      
certain1 through being less doubtful1   
just as a thing is the whiter1 the less 
it has of an admixture of black4 ,now   
understanding1 science and also wisdom  
are free of any doubt about their       
objects2 whereas the believer may       
sometimes suffer a movement of doubt1   
and doubt about matters of faith4       
,therefore faith is no more certain than
 the intellectual virtues4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 sight is more certain than    
hearing4 ,but faith is through hearing  
according to ,rom4 #aj3ag2 whereas      
understanding1 science and wisdom imply 
some kind of intellectual sight4        
,therefore science and understanding are
 more certain than faith4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 in matters concerning the     
intellect1 the more perfect is the more 
certain4 ,now understanding is more     

perfect than faith1 since faith is the  
way to understanding1 according to      
another version 99,the ,septuagint of   
,isa4 #g3i3 ,if you will not believe1   
you shall not understand ,vulg43        
'continue'3 and ,augustine says 7,de    
,trin4 xiv1 #a7 that faith is           
strengthened by science4 ,therefore it  
seems that science or understanding is  
more certain than faith4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,thess4
 #b3ae73 ,when you had received of us   
the word of the hearing1 i4e4 by faith 4
 4 4 you received it not as the word of 
men1 but1 as it is indeed1 the word of  
,god4 ,now nothing is more certain than 
the word of ,god4 ,therefore science is 
not more certain than faith2 nor is     
anything else4  ,i answer that1 ,as     
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #d1 
ad #b7 two of the intellectual virtues  
are about contingent matter1 viz4       
prudence and art2 to which faith is     
preferable in point of certitude1 by    
reason of its matter1 since it is about 

eternal things1 which never change1     
whereas the other three intellectual    
virtues1 viz4 wisdom1 science 99,in     
,english the corresponding 'gift' is    
called knowledge and understanding1 are 
about necessary things1 as stated above 
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #e1 ad #c74 ,but 
it must be observed that wisdom1 science
 and understanding may be taken in two  
ways3 first1 as intellectual virtues1   
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
vi1 #b1 #c72 secondly1 for the gifts of 
the ,holy ,ghost4 ,if we consider them  
in the first way1 we must note that     
certitude can be looked at in two ways4 
,first1 on the part of its cause1 and   
thus a thing which has a more certain   
cause1 is itself more certain4 ,in this 
way faith is more certain than those    
three virtues1 because it is founded on 
the ,divine truth1 whereas the aforesaid
 three virtues are based on human       
reason4 ,secondly1 certitude may be     
considered on the part of the subject1  
and thus the more a man's intellect lays

 hold of a thing1 the more certain it   
is4 ,in this way1 faith is less certain1
 because matters of faith are above the 
human intellect1 whereas the objects of 
the aforesaid three virtues are not4    
,since1 however1 a thing is judged      
simply with regard to its cause1 but    
relatively1 with respect to a           
disposition on the part of the subject1 
it follows that faith is more certain   
simply1 while the others are more       
certain relatively1 i4e4 for us4        
,likewise if these three be taken as    
gifts received in this present life1    
they are related to faith as to their   
principle which they presuppose3 so that
 again1 in this way1 faith is more      
certain4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this doubt  
is not on the side of the cause of      
faith1 but on our side1 in so far as we 
do not fully grasp matters of faith with
 our intellect4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,other
 things being equal sight is more       
certain than hearing2 but if 7the       
authority of7 the person from whom we   

hear greatly surpasses that of the      
seer's sight1 hearing is more certain   
than sight3 thus a man of little science
 is more certain about what he hears on 
the authority of an expert in science1  
than about what is apparent to him      
according to his own reason3 and much   
more is a man certain about what he     
hears from ,god1 ,who cannot be         
deceived1 than about what he sees with  
his own reason1 which can be mistaken4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the gifts of          
understanding and knowledge are more    
perfect than the knowledge of faith in  
the point of their greater clearness1   
but not in regard to more certain       
adhesion3 because the whole certitude of
 the gifts of understanding and         
knowledge1 arises from the certitude of 
faith1 even as the certitude of the     
knowledge of conclusions arises from the
 certitude of premisses4 ,but in so far 
as science1 wisdom and understanding are
 intellectual virtues1 they are based   
upon the natural light of reason1 which 

falls short of the certitude of ,god's  
word1 on which faith is founded4        
,,question #e  ,,of ,,those ,,who ,,have
 ,,faith 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we must
 now consider those who have faith3     
under which head there are four points  
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether there was    
faith in the angels1 or in man1 in their
 original state8  7#b7 ,whether the     
demons have faith8  7#c7 ,whether those 
heretics who err in one article1 have   
faith in others8  7#d7 ,whether among   
those who have faith1 one has it more   
than another8   ,,first ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #a  ,whether   
,there ,was ,faith in the ,angels1 or in
 ,man1 in ,their ,original ,state8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there
 was no faith1 either in the angels1 or 
in man1 in their original state4 ,for   
,hugh of ,s4 ,victor says in his        
,sentences 7,de ,sacram4 i1 #aj7 that   
man cannot see ,god or things that are  
in ,god1 because he closes his eyes to  
contemplation4 ,now the angels1 in their

 original state1 before they were either
 confirmed in grace1 or had fallen from 
it1 had their eyes opened to            
contemplation1 since they saw things in 
the ,word1 according to ,augustine      
7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #h74 ,likewise the   
first man1 while in the state of        
innocence1 seemingly had his eyes open  
to contemplation2 for ,hugh ,st4 ,victor
 says 7,de ,sacram4 i1 #f7 that in his  
original state man knew his ,creator1   
not by the mere outward perception of   
hearing1 but by inward inspiration1 not 
as now believers seek an absent ,god by 
faith1 but by seeing ,him clearly       
present to their contemplation4         
,therefore there was no faith in the    
angels and man in their original state4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the knowledge of    
faith is dark and obscure1 according to 
#a ,cor4 #ac3ac3 ,we see now through a  
glass in a dark manner4 ,now in their   
original state there was not obscurity  
either in the angels or in man1 because 
it is a punishment of sin4 ,therefore   

there could be no faith in the angels or
 in man1 in their original state4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7,rom4 
#aj3ag7 that faith 4 4 4 cometh by      
hearing4 ,now this could not apply to   
angels and man in their original state2 
for then they could not hear anything   
from another4 ,therefore1 in that state1
 there was no faith either in man or in 
the angels4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
written 7,heb4 #aa3f73 ,he that cometh  
to ,god1 must believe4 ,now the original
 state of angels and man was one of     
approach to ,god4 ,therefore they had   
need of faith4  ,i answer that1 ,some   
say that there was no faith in the      
angels before they were confirmed in    
grace or fell from it1 and in man before
 he sinned1 by reason of the manifest   
contemplation that they had of ,divine  
things4 ,since1 however1 faith is the   
evidence of things that appear not1     
according to the ,apostle 7,heb4 #aa3b71
 and since by faith we believe what we  
see not1 according to ,augustine        

7,tract4 xl in ,joan42 ,,qq4 ,evang4 ii1
 qu4 #ci71 that manifestation alone     
excludes faith1 which renders apparent  
or seen the principal object of faith4  
,now the principal object of faith is   
the ,first ,truth1 the sight of which   
gives the happiness of heaven and takes 
the place of faith4 ,consequently1 as   
the angels before their confirmation in 
grace1 and man before sin1 did not      
possess the happiness whereby ,god is   
seen in ,his ,essence1 it is evident    
that the knowledge they possessed was   
not such as to exclude faith4  ,it      
follows then1 that the absence of faith 
in them could only be explained by their
 being altogether ignorant of the object
 of faith4 ,and if man and the angels   
were created in a purely natural state1 
as some 99,st4 ,bonaventure1 ,sent4 ii1 
,d1 #bi hold1 perhaps one might hold    
that there was no faith in the angels   
before their confirmation in grace1 or  
in man before sin1 because the knowledge
 of faith surpasses not only a man's but

 even an angel's natural knowledge about
 ,god4  ,since1 however1 we stated in   
the ,first ,part 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4  
#ie1 ,a4 #a7 that man and the angels    
were created with the gift of grace1 we 
must needs say that there was in them a 
certain beginning of hoped-for          
happiness1 by reason of grace received  
but not yet consummated1 which happiness
 was begun in their will by hope and    
charity1 and in the intellect by faith1 
as stated above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #g74       
,consequently we must hold that the     
angels had faith before they were       
confirmed1 and man1 before he sinned4   
,nevertheless we must observe that in   
the object of faith1 there is something 
formal1 as it were1 namely the ,first   
,truth surpassing all the natural       
knowledge of a creature1 and something  
material1 namely1 the thing to which we 
assent while adhering to the ,first     
,truth4 ,with regard to the former1     
before obtaining the happiness to come1 
faith is common to all who have         

knowledge of ,god1 by adhering to the   
,first ,truth3 whereas with regard to   
the things which are proposed as the    
material object of faith1 some are      
believed by one1 and known manifestly by
 another1 even in the present state1 as 
we have shown above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4
 #b1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b74 ,in this respect1  
too1 it may be said that the angels     
before being confirmed1 and man1 before 
sin1 possessed manifest knowledge about 
certain points in the ,divine mysteries1
 which now we cannot know except by     
believing them4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3       
,although the words of ,hugh of ,s4     
,victor are those of a master1 and have 
the force of an authority1 yet it may be
 said that the contemplation which      
removes the need of faith is heavenly   
contemplation1 whereby the supernatural 
truth is seen in its essence4 ,now the  
angels did not possess this             
contemplation before they were          
confirmed1 nor did man before he sinned3
 yet their contemplation was of a higher

 order than ours1 for by its means they 
approached nearer to ,god1 and had      
manifest knowledge of more of the       
,divine effects and mysteries than we   
can have knowledge of4 ,hence faith was 
not in them so that they sought an      
absent ,god as we seek ,him3 since by   
the light of wisdom ,he was more present
 to them than ,he is to us1 although ,he
 was not so present to them as ,he is to
 the ,blessed by the light of glory4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there was no darkness 
of sin or punishment in the original    
state of man and the angels1 but there  
was a certain natural obscurity in the  
human and angelic intellect1 in so far  
as every creature is darkness in        
comparison with the immensity of the    
,divine light3 and this obscurity       
suffices for faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,in the original state there was no     
hearing anything from man speaking      
outwardly1 but there was from ,god      
inspiring inwardly3 thus the prophets   
heard1 as expressed by the ,ps4 #hd3i3  

,i will hear what the ,lord ,god will   
speak in me4   ,,second ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #b  ,whether in
 the ,demons ,there ,is ,faith8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
demons have no faith4 ,for ,augustine   
says 7,de ,praedest4 ,sanct4 v7 that    
faith depends on the believer's will3   
and this is a good will1 since by it man
 wishes to believe in ,god4 ,since then 
no deliberate will of the demons is     
good1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #fd1 ,a4 
#b1 ad #e71 it seems that in the demons 
there is no faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
faith is a gift of ,divine grace1       
according to ,eph4 #b3h3 ,by grace you  
are saved through faith 4 4 4 for it is 
the gift of ,god4 ,now1 according to a  
gloss on ,osee #c3a1 ,they look to      
strange gods1 and love the husks of the 
grapes1 the demons lost their gifts of  
grace by sinning4 ,therefore faith did  
not remain in the demons after they     
sinned4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 unbelief   
would seem to be graver than other sins1

 as ,augustine observes 7,tract4 lxxxix 
in ,joan47 on ,john #ae3bb1 ,if ,i had  
not come and spoken to them1 they would 
not have sin3 but now they have no      
excuse for their sin4 ,now the sin of   
unbelief is in some men4 ,consequently1 
if the demons have faith1 some men would
 be guilty of a sin graver than that of 
the demons1 which seems unreasonable4   
,therefore in the demons there is no    
faith4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written
 7,james #b3ai73 ,the devils 4 4 4      
believe and tremble4  ,i answer that1   
,as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4   
#b1 ,a4 #a71 the believer's intellect   
assents to that which he believes1 not  
because he sees it either in itself1 or 
by resolving it to first self-evident   
principles1 but because his will        
commands his intellect to assent4 ,now1 
that the will moves the intellect to    
assent1 may be due to two causes4       
,first1 through the will being directed 
to the good1 and in this way1 to believe
 is a praiseworthy action4 ,secondly1   

because the intellect is convinced that 
it ought to believe what is said1 though
 that conviction is not based on        
objective evidence4 ,thus if a prophet1 
while preaching the word of ,god1 were  
to foretell something1 and were to give 
a sign1 by raising a dead person to     
life1 the intellect of a witness would  
be convinced so as to recognize clearly 
that ,god1 ,who lieth not1 was speaking1
 although the thing itself foretold     
would not be evident in itself1 and     
consequently the essence of faith would 
not be removed4  ,accordingly we must   
say that faith is commended in the first
 sense in the faithful of ,christ3 and  
in this way faith is not in the demons1 
but only in the second way1 for they see
 many evident signs1 whereby they       
recognize that the teaching of the      
,church is from ,god1 although they do  
not see the things themselves that the  
,church teaches1 for instance that there
 are three ,persons in ,god1 and so     
forth4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the demons    

are1 in a way1 compelled to believe1 by 
the evidence of signs1 and so their will
 deserves no praise for their belief4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faith1 which is a gift
 of grace1 inclines man to believe1 by  
giving him a certain affection for the  
good1 even when that faith is lifeless4 
,consequently the faith which the demons
 have1 is not a gift of grace4 ,rather  
are they compelled to believe through   
their natural intellectual acumen4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the very fact that the
 signs of faith are so evident1 that the
 demons are compelled to believe1 is    
displeasing to them1 so that their      
malice is by no means diminished by     
their belief4   ,,third ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #c  ,whether a 
,man ,who ,disbelieves ,one ,article of 
,faith1 ,can ,have ,lifeless ,faith in  
the ,other ,articles8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that a heretic who       
disbelieves one article of faith1 can   
have lifeless faith in the other        
articles4 ,for the natural intellect of 

a heretic is not more able than that of 
a catholic4 ,now a catholic's intellect 
needs the aid of the gift of faith in   
order to believe any article whatever of
 faith4 ,therefore it seems that        
heretics cannot believe any articles of 
faith without the gift of lifeless      
faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as     
faith contains many articles1 so does   
one science1 viz4 geometry1 contain many
 conclusions4 ,now a man may possess the
 science of geometry as to some         
geometrical conclusions1 and yet be     
ignorant of other conclusions4          
,therefore a man can believe some       
articles of faith without believing the 
others4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as man
 obeys ,god in believing the articles of
 faith1 so does he also in keeping the  
commandments of the ,law4 ,now a man can
 obey some commandments1 and disobey    
others4 ,therefore he can believe some  
articles1 and disbelieve others4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,just as mortal sin is    
contrary to charity1 so is disbelief in 

one article of faith contrary to faith4 
,now charity does not remain in a man   
after one mortal sin4 ,therefore neither
 does faith1 after a man disbelieves one
 article4   ,i answer that1 ,neither    
living nor lifeless faith remains in a  
heretic who disbelieves one article of  
faith4  ,the reason of this is that the 
species of every habit depends on the   
formal aspect of the object1 without    
which the species of the habit cannot   
remain4 ,now the formal object of faith 
is the ,first ,truth1 as manifested in  
,holy ,writ and the teaching of the     
,church1 which proceeds from the ,first 
,truth4 ,consequently whoever does not  
adhere1 as to an infallible and ,divine 
rule1 to the teaching of the ,church1   
which proceeds from the ,first ,truth   
manifested in ,holy ,writ1 has not the  
habit of faith1 but holds that which is 
of faith otherwise than by faith4 ,even 
so1 it is evident that a man whose mind 
holds a conclusion without knowing how  
it is proved1 has not scientific        

knowledge1 but merely an opinion about  
it4 ,now it is manifest that he who     
adheres to the teaching of the ,church1 
as to an infallible rule1 assents to    
whatever the ,church teaches2 otherwise1
 if1 of the things taught by the        
,church1 he holds what he chooses to    
hold1 and rejects what he chooses to    
reject1 he no longer adheres to the     
teaching of the ,church as to an        
infallible rule1 but to his own will4   
,hence it is evident that a heretic who 
obstinately disbelieves one article of  
faith1 is not prepared to follow the    
teaching of the ,church in all things2  
but if he is not obstinate1 he is no    
longer in heresy but only in error4     
,therefore it is clear that such a      
heretic with regard to one article has  
no faith in the other articles1 but only
 a kind of opinion in accordance with   
his own will4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a      
heretic does not hold the other articles
 of faith1 about which he does not err1 
in the same way as one of the faithful  

does1 namely by adhering simply to the  
,divine ,truth1 because in order to do  
so1 a man needs the help of the habit of
 faith2 but he holds the things that are
 of faith1 by his own will and judgment4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the various         
conclusions of a science have their     
respective means of demonstration1 one  
of which may be known without another1  
so that we may know some conclusions of 
a science without knowing the others4   
,on the other hand faith adheres to all 
the articles of faith by reason of one  
mean1 viz4 on account of the ,first     
,truth proposed to us in ,scriptures1   
according to the teaching of the ,church
 who has the right understanding of     
them4 ,hence whoever abandons this mean 
is altogether lacking in faith4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,the various precepts of the  
,law may be referred either to their    
respective proximate motives1 and thus  
one can be kept without another2 or to  
their primary motive1 which is perfect  
obedience to ,god1 in which a man fails 

whenever he breaks one commandment1     
according to ,james #b3aj3 ,whosoever   
shall 4 4 4 offend in one point is      
become guilty of all4   ,,fourth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #d   
,whether ,faith ,can ,be ,greater in    
,one ,man ,than in ,another8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that faith cannot be
 greater in one man than in another4    
,for the quantity of a habit is taken   
from its object4 ,now whoever has faith 
believes everything that is of faith1   
since by failing in one point1 a man    
loses his faith altogether1 as stated   
above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore it seems that
 faith cannot be greater in one than in 
another4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those     
things which consist in something       
supreme cannot be more or less4 ,now    
faith consists in something supreme1    
because it requires that man should     
adhere to the ,first ,truth above all   
things4 ,therefore faith cannot be more 
or less4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 faith is  
to knowledge by grace1 as the           

understanding of principles is to       
natural knowledge1 since the articles of
 faith are the first principles of      
knowledge by grace1 as was shown above  
7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #g74 ,now the understanding
 of principles is possessed in equal    
degree by all men4 ,therefore faith is  
possessed in equal degree by all the    
faithful4  ,on the contrary1 ,wherever  
we find great and little1 there we find 
more or less4 ,now in the matter of     
faith we find great and little1 for ,our
 ,lord said to ,peter 7,matt4 #ad3ca73  
,o thou of little faith1 why didst thou 
doubt8 ,and to the woman he said 7,matt4
 #ae3 #bh73 ,o woman1 great is thy      
faith6 ,therefore faith can be greater  
in one than in another4  ,i answer that1
 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eb1    
,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,a4    
#d71 the quantity of a habit may be     
considered from two points of view3     
first1 on the part of the object2       
secondly1 on the part of its            
participation by the subject4  ,now the 

object of faith may be considered in two
 ways3 first1 in respect of its formal  
aspect2 secondly1 in respect of the     
material object which is proposed to be 
believed4 ,now the formal object of     
faith is one and simple1 namely the     
,first ,truth1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 
,a4 #a74 ,hence in this respect there is
 no diversity of faith among believers1 
but it is specifically one in all1 as   
stated above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #f74 ,but the 
things which are proposed as the matter 
of our belief are many and can be       
received more or less explicitly2 and in
 this respect one man can believe       
explicitly more things than another1 so 
that faith can be greater in one man on 
account of its being more explicit4     
,if1 on the other hand1 we consider     
faith from the point of view of its     
participation by the subject1 this      
happens in two ways1 since the act of   
faith proceeds both from the intellect  
and from the will1 as stated above 7,q4 
#b1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b74      

,consequently a man's faith may be      
described as being greater1 in one way1 
on the part of his intellect1 on account
 of its greater certitude and firmness1 
and1 in another way1 on the part of his 
will1 on account of his greater         
promptitude1 devotion1 or confidence4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a man who obstinately 
disbelieves a thing that is of faith1   
has not the habit of faith1 and yet he  
who does not explicitly believe all1    
while he is prepared to believe all1 has
 that habit4 ,in this respect1 one man  
has greater faith than another1 on the  
part of the object1 in so far as he     
believes more things1 as stated above4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is essential to    
faith that one should give the first    
place to the ,first ,truth4 ,but among  
those who do this1 some submit to it    
with greater certitude and devotion than
 others2 and in this way faith is       
greater in one than in another4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,the understanding of         
principles results from man's very      

nature1 which is equally shared by all3 
whereas faith results from the gift of  
grace1 which is not equally in all1 as  
explained above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,a4 
#d74 ,hence the comparison fails4       
,nevertheless the truth of principles is
 more known to one than to another1     
according to the greater capacity of    
intellect4   ,,question #f  ,,of ,,the  
,,cause ,,of ,,faith 7,in ,two          
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
cause of faith1 under which head there  
are two points of inquiry3  7#a7        
,whether faith is infused into man by   
,god8  7#b7 ,whether lifeless faith is a
 gift of ,god8   ,,first ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #a  ,whether   
,faith ,is ,infused into ,man by ,god8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that faith
 is not infused into man by ,god4 ,for  
,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv7 that   
science begets faith in us1 and         
nourishes1 defends and strengthens it4  
,now those things which science begets  
in us seem to be acquired rather than   

infused4 ,therefore faith does not seem 
to be in us by ,divine infusion4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 that to which man attains 
by hearing and seeing1 seems to be      
acquired by him4 ,now man attains to    
belief1 both by seeing miracles1 and by 
hearing the teachings of faith3 for it  
is written 7,john #d3ec73 ,the father 4 
4 4 knew that it was at the same hour1  
that ,jesus said to him1 ,thy son       
liveth2 and himself believed1 and his   
whole house2 and 7,rom4 #aj3ag7 it is   
said that faith is through hearing4     
,therefore man attains to faith by      
acquiring it4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that 
which depends on a man's will can be    
acquired by him4 ,but faith depends on  
the believer's will1 according to       
,augustine 7,de ,praedest4 ,sanct4 v74  
,therefore faith can be acquired by man4
  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written      
7,eph4 #b3h1 #i73 ,by grace you are     
saved through faith1 and that not of    
yourselves 4 4 4 that no man may glory 4
 4 4 for it is the gift of ,god4  ,i    

answer that1 ,two things are requisite  
for faith4 ,first1 that the things which
 are of faith should be proposed to man3
 this is necessary in order that man    
believe anything explicitly4 ,the second
 thing requisite for faith is the assent
 of the believer to the things which are
 proposed to him4 ,accordingly1 as      
regards the first of these1 faith must  
needs be from ,god4 ,because those      
things which are of faith surpass human 
reason1 hence they do not come to man's 
knowledge1 unless ,god reveal them4 ,to 
some1 indeed1 they are revealed by ,god 
immediately1 as those things which were 
revealed to the apostles and prophets1  
while to some they are proposed by ,god 
in sending preachers of the faith1      
according to ,rom4 #aj3ae3 ,how shall   
they preach1 unless they be sent8  ,as  
regards the second1 viz4 man's assent to
 the things which are of faith1 we may  
observe a twofold cause1 one of external
 inducement1 such as seeing a miracle1  
or being persuaded by someone to embrace

 the faith3 neither of which is a       
sufficient cause1 since of those who see
 the same miracle1 or who hear the same 
sermon1 some believe1 and some do not4  
,hence we must assert another internal  
cause1 which moves man inwardly to      
assent to matters of faith4  ,the       
,pelagians held that this cause was     
nothing else than man's free-will3 and  
consequently they said that the         
beginning of faith is from ourselves1   
inasmuch as1 to wit1 it is in our power 
to be ready to assent to things which   
are of faith1 but that the consummation 
of faith is from ,god1 ,who proposes to 
us the things we have to believe4 ,but  
this is false1 for1 since man1 by       
assenting to matters of faith1 is raised
 above his nature1 this must needs      
accrue to him from some supernatural    
principle moving him inwardly2 and this 
is ,god4 ,therefore faith1 as regards   
the assent which is the chief act of    
faith1 is from ,god moving man inwardly 
by grace4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,science    

begets and nourishes faith1 by way of   
external persuasion afforded by science2
 but the chief and proper cause of faith
 is that which moves man inwardly to    
assent4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument
 again refers to the cause that proposes
 outwardly the things that are of faith1
 or persuades man to believe by words or
 deeds4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to believe   
does indeed depend on the will of the   
believer3 but man's will needs to be    
prepared by ,god with grace1 in order   
that he may be raised to things which   
are above his nature1 as stated above   
7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c74   ,,second ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #b  ,whether   
,lifeless ,faith ,is a ,gift of ,god8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
lifeless faith is not a gift of ,god4   
,for it is written 7,deut4 #cb3d7 that  
the works of ,god are perfect4 ,now     
lifeless faith is something imperfect4  
,therefore it is not the work of ,god4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as an act is   
said to be deformed through lacking its 

due form1 so too is faith called        
lifeless 7informis7 when it lacks the   
form due to it4 ,now the deformed act of
 sin is not from ,god1 as stated above  
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74      
,therefore neither is lifeless faith    
from ,god4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1         
whomsoever ,god heals1 ,he heals wholly3
 for it is written 7,john #g3bc73 ,if a 
man receive circumcision on the         
sabbath-day1 that the law of ,moses may 
not be broken2 are you angry at ,me     
because ,i have healed the whole man on 
the sabbath-day8 ,now faith heals man   
from unbelief4 ,therefore whoever       
receives from ,god the gift of faith1 is
 at the same time healed from all his   
sins4 ,but this is not done except by   
living faith4 ,therefore living faith   
alone is a gift of ,god3 and            
consequently lifeless faith is not from 
,god4  ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on #a 
,cor4 #ac3b says that the faith which   
lacks charity is a gift of ,god4 ,now   
this is lifeless faith4 ,therefore      

lifeless faith is a gift of ,god4  ,i   
answer that1 ,lifelessness is a         
privation4 ,now it must be noted that   
privation is sometimes essential to the 
species1 whereas sometimes it is not1   
but supervenes in a thing already       
possessed of its proper species3 thus   
privation of the due equilibrium of the 
humors is essential to the species of   
sickness1 while darkness is not         
essential to a diaphanous body1 but     
supervenes in it4 ,since1 therefore1    
when we assign the cause of a thing1 we 
intend to assign the cause of that thing
 as existing in its proper species1 it  
follows that what is not the cause of   
privation1 cannot be assigned as the    
cause of the thing to which that        
privation belongs as being essential to 
its species4 ,for we cannot assign as   
the cause of a sickness1 something which
 is not the cause of a disturbance in   
the humors3 though we can assign as     
cause of a diaphanous body1 something   
which is not the cause of the darkness1 

which is not essential to the diaphanous
 body4  ,now the lifelessness of faith  
is not essential to the species of      
faith1 since faith is said to be        
lifeless through lack of an extrinsic   
form1 as stated above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #d74 
,consequently the cause of lifeless     
faith is that which is the cause of     
faith strictly so called3 and this is   
,god1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,it     
follows1 therefore1 that lifeless faith 
is a gift of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,lifeless faith1 though it is not simply
 perfect with the perfection of a       
virtue1 is1 nevertheless1 perfect with a
 perfection that suffices for the       
essential notion of faith4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,the deformity of an act is        
essential to the act's species1         
considered as a moral act1 as stated    
above 7,i1 ,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b2      
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #e73 for an act is
 said to be deformed through being      
deprived of an intrinsic form1 viz4 the 
due commensuration of the act's         

circumstances4 ,hence we cannot say that
 ,god is the cause of a deformed act1   
for ,he is not the cause of its         
deformity1 though ,he is the cause of   
the act as such4  ,we may also reply    
that deformity denotes not only         
privation of a due form1 but also a     
contrary disposition1 wherefore         
deformity is compared to the act1 as    
falsehood is to faith4 ,hence1 just as  
the deformed act is not from ,god1 so   
neither is a false faith2 and as        
lifeless faith is from ,god1 so too1    
acts that are good generically1 though  
not quickened by charity1 as is         
frequently the case in sinners1 are from
 ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he who        
receives faith from ,god without        
charity1 is healed from unbelief1 not   
entirely 7because the sin of his        
previous unbelief is not removed7 but in
 part1 namely1 in the point of ceasing  
from committing such and such a sin4    
,thus it happens frequently that a man  
desists from one act of sin1 through    

,god causing him thus to desist1 without
 desisting from another act of sin1     
through the instigation of his own      
malice4 ,and in this way sometimes it is
 granted by ,god to a man to believe1   
and yet he is not granted the gift of   
charity3 even so the gift of prophecy1  
or the like1 is given to some without   
charity4   ,,question #g  ,,of ,,the    
,,effects ,,of ,,faith 7,in ,two        
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
effects of faith3 under which head there
 are two points of inquiry3  7#a7       
,whether fear is an effect of faith8    
7#b7 ,whether the heart is purified by  
faith8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #g1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,fear ,is an 
,effect of ,faith8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that fear is not an effect of
 faith4 ,for an effect does not precede 
its cause4 ,now fear precedes faith3 for
 it is written 7,ecclus4 #b3h73 ,ye that
 fear the ,lord1 believe in ,him4       
,therefore fear is not an effect of     
faith4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the same    

thing is not the cause of contraries4   
,now fear and hope are contraries1 as   
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #b73
 and faith begets hope1 as a gloss      
observes on ,matt4 #a3b4 ,therefore fear
 is not an effect of faith4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 one contrary does not cause   
another4 ,now the object of faith is a  
good1 which is the ,first ,truth1 while 
the object of fear is an evil1 as stated
 above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,a4 #a74      
,again1 acts take their species from the
 object1 according to what was stated   
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #b74       
,therefore faith is not a cause of fear4
  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written      
7,james #b3ai73 ,the devils 4 4 4       
believe and tremble4  ,i answer that1   
,fear is a movement of the appetitive   
power1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#da1 ,a4 #a74 ,now the principle of all 
appetitive movements is the good or evil
 apprehended3 and consequently the      
principle of fear and of every          
appetitive movement must be an          

apprehension4 ,again1 through faith     
there arises in us an apprehension of   
certain penal evils1 which are inflicted
 in accordance with the ,divine         
judgment4 ,in this way1 then1 faith is a
 cause of the fear whereby one dreads to
 be punished by ,god2 and this is       
servile fear4  ,it is also the cause of 
filial fear1 whereby one dreads to be   
separated from ,god1 or whereby one     
shrinks from equalling oneself to ,him1 
and holds ,him in reverence1 inasmuch as
 faith makes us appreciate ,god as an   
unfathomable and supreme good1          
separation from which is the greatest   
evil1 and to which it is wicked to wish 
to be equalled4 ,of the first fear1 viz4
 servile fear1 lifeless faith is the    
cause1 while living faith is the cause  
of the second1 viz4 filial fear1 because
 it makes man adhere to ,god and to be  
subject to ,him by charity4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,fear of ,god cannot          
altogether precede faith1 because if we 
knew nothing at all about ,him1 with    

regard to rewards and punishments1      
concerning which faith teaches us1 we   
should nowise fear ,him4 ,if1 however1  
faith be presupposed in reference to    
certain articles of faith1 for example  
the ,divine excellence1 then reverential
 fear follows1 the result of which is   
that man submits his intellect to ,god1 
so as to believe in all the ,divine     
promises4 ,hence the text quoted        
continues3 ,and your reward shall not be
 made void4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the same 
thing in respect of contraries can be   
the cause of contraries1 but not under  
the same aspect4 ,now faith begets hope1
 in so far as it enables us to          
appreciate the prize which ,god awards  
to the just1 while it is the cause of   
fear1 in so far as it makes us          
appreciate the punishments which ,he    
intends to inflict on sinners4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,the primary and formal object
 of faith is the good which is the      
,first ,truth2 but the material object  
of faith includes also certain evils2   

for instance1 that it is an evil either 
not to submit to ,god1 or to be         
separated from ,him1 and that sinners   
will suffer penal evils from ,god3 in   
this way faith can be the cause of fear4
   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #g1
 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,faith ,has the     
,effect of ,purifying the ,heart8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that faith
 does not purify the heart4 ,for purity 
of the heart pertains chiefly to the    
affections1 whereas faith is in the     
intellect4 ,therefore faith has not the 
effect of purifying the heart4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 that which purifies the   
heart is incompatible with impurity4    
,but faith is compatible with the       
impurity of sin1 as may be seen in those
 who have lifeless faith4 ,therefore    
faith does not purify the heart4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 if faith were to purify   
the human heart in any way1 it would    
chiefly purify the intellect of man4    
,now it does not purify the intellect   
from obscurity1 since it is a veiled    

knowledge4 ,therefore faith nowise      
purifies the heart4  ,on the contrary1  
,peter said 7,acts #ae3i73 ,purifying   
their hearts by faith4  ,i answer that1 
,a thing is impure through being mixed  
with baser things3 for silver is not    
called impure1 when mixed with gold1    
which betters it1 but when mixed with   
lead or tin4 ,now it is evident that the
 rational creature is more excellent    
than all transient and corporeal        
creatures2 so that it becomes impure    
through subjecting itself to transient  
things by loving them4 ,from this       
impurity the rational creature is       
purified by means of a contrary         
movement1 namely1 by tending to that    
which is above it1 viz4 ,god4 ,the first
 beginning of this movement is faith3   
since he that cometh to ,god must       
believe that ,he is1 according to ,heb4 
#aa3f4 ,hence the first beginning of the
 heart's purifying is faith2 and if this
 be perfected through being quickened by
 charity1 the heart will be perfectly   

purified thereby4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3     
,things that are in the intellect are   
the principles of those which are in the
 appetite1 in so far as the apprehended 
good moves the appetite4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,even lifeless faith excludes a     
certain impurity which is contrary to   
it1 viz4 that of error1 and which       
consists in the human intellect1        
adhering inordinately to things below   
itself1 through wishing to measure      
,divine things by the rule of sensible  
objects4 ,but when it is quickened by   
charity1 then it is incompatible with   
any kind of impurity1 because charity   
covereth all sins 7,prov4 #aj3ab74      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the obscurity of faith
 does not pertain to the impurity of    
sin1 but rather to the natural defect of
 the human intellect1 according to the  
present state of life4   ,,question #h  
,,of ,,the ,,gift ,,of ,,understanding  
7,in ,eight ,articles7  ,we must now    
consider the gifts of understanding and 
knowledge1 which respond to the virtue  

of faith4 ,with regard to the gift of   
understanding there are eight points of 
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether understanding is
 a gift of the ,holy ,ghost8  7#b7      
,whether it can be together with faith  
in the same person8  7#c7 ,whether the  
understanding which is a gift of the    
,holy ,ghost1 is only speculative1 or   
practical also8  7#d7 ,whether all who  
are in a state of grace have the gift of
 understanding8  7#e7 ,whether this gift
 is to be found in those who are without
 grace8  7#f7 ,of the relationship of   
the gift of understanding to the other  
gifts4  7#g7 ,which of the beatitudes   
corresponds to this gift8  7#h7 ,which  
of the fruits8   ,,first ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #a  ,whether   
,understanding ,is a ,gift of the ,holy 
,ghost8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that understanding is not a gift of the 
,holy ,ghost4 ,for the gifts of grace   
are distinct from the gifts of nature1  
since they are given in addition to the 
latter4 ,now understanding is a natural 

habit of the soul1 whereby self-evident 
principles are known1 as stated in      
,ethic4 vi1 #f4 ,therefore it should not
 be reckoned among the gifts of the     
,holy ,ghost4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the  
,divine gifts are shared by creatures   
according to their capacity and mode1 as
 ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74    
,now the mode of human nature is to know
 the truth1 not simply 7which is a sign 
of understanding71 but discursively     
7which is a sign of reason71 as         
,dionysius explains 7,div4 ,nom4 vii74  
,therefore the ,divine knowledge which  
is bestowed on man1 should be called a  
gift of reason rather than a gift of    
understanding4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in  
the powers of the soul the understanding
 is condivided with the will 7,de ,anima
 iii1 #i1 #aj74 ,now no gift of the     
,holy ,ghost is called after the will4  
,therefore no gift of the ,holy ,ghost  
should receive the name of              
understanding4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is
 written 7,isa4 #aa3b73 ,the ,spirit of 

the ,lord shall rest upon him1 the      
,spirit of wisdom of understanding4  ,i 
answer that1 ,understanding implies an  
intimate knowledge1 for intelligere to  
understand is the same as intus legere  
to read inwardly4 ,this is clear to     
anyone who considers the difference     
between intellect and sense1 because    
sensitive knowledge is concerned with   
external sensible qualities1 whereas    
intellective knowledge penetrates into  
the very essence of a thing1 because the
 object of the intellect is what a thing
 is1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #f4   
,now there are many kinds of things that
 are hidden within1 to find which human 
knowledge has to penetrate within so to 
speak4 ,thus1 under the accidents lies  
hidden the nature of the substantial    
reality1 under words lies hidden their  
meaning2 under likenesses and figures   
the truth they denote lies hidden       
7because the intelligible world is      
enclosed within as compared with the    
sensible world1 which is perceived      

externally71 and effects lie hidden in  
their causes1 and vice versa4 ,hence we 
may speak of understanding with regard  
to all these things4  ,since1 however1  
human knowledge begins with the outside 
of things as it were1 it is evident that
 the stronger the light of the          
understanding1 the further can it       
penetrate into the heart of things4 ,now
 the natural light of our understanding 
is of finite power2 wherefore it can    
reach to a certain fixed point4         
,consequently man needs a supernatural  
light in order to penetrate further     
still so as to know what it cannot know 
by its natural light3 and this          
supernatural light which is bestowed on 
man is called the gift of understanding4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the natural light   
instilled within us1 manifests only     
certain general principles1 which are   
known naturally4 ,but since man is      
ordained to supernatural happiness1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1  
,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h71 man needs to reach to  

certain higher truths1 for which he     
requires the gift of understanding4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the discourse of      
reason always begins from an            
understanding and ends at an            
understanding2 because we reason by     
proceeding from certain understood      
principles1 and the discourse of reason 
is perfected when we come to understand 
what hitherto we ignored4 ,hence the act
 of reasoning proceeds from something   
previously understood4 ,now a gift of   
grace does not proceed from the light of
 nature1 but is added thereto as        
perfecting it4 ,wherefore this addition 
is not called reason but understanding1 
since the additional light is in        
comparison with what we know            
supernaturally1 what the natural light  
is in regard to those things which we   
know from the first4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,will denotes simply a movement of the  
appetite without indicating any         
excellence2 whereas understanding       
denotes a certain excellence of a       

knowledge that penetrates into the heart
 of things4 ,hence the supernatural gift
 is called after the understanding      
rather than after the will4   ,,second  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #b   
,whether the ,gift of ,understanding ,is
 ,compatible with ,faith8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that the gift of     
understanding is incompatible with      
faith4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4      
lxxxiii1 qu4 #ae7 that the thing which  
is understood is bounded by the         
comprehension of him who understands it4
 ,but the thing which is believed is not
 comprehended1 according to the word of 
the ,apostle to the ,philippians #c3ab3 
,not as though ,i had already           
comprehended ,douay3 'attained'1 or were
 already perfect4 ,therefore it seems   
that faith and understanding are        
incompatible in the same subject4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 whatever is understood is
 seen by the understanding4 ,but faith  
is of things that appear not1 as stated 
above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #d1 ,a4 #a74 

,therefore faith is incompatible with   
understanding in the same subject4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 understanding is    
more certain than science4 ,but science 
and faith are incompatible in the same  
subject1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,,aa4 
#d1 #e74 ,much less1 therefore1 can     
understanding and faith be in the same  
subject4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory    
says 7,moral4 i1 #ae7 that understanding
 enlightens the mind concerning the     
things it has heard4 ,now one who has   
faith can be enlightened in his mind    
concerning what he has heard2 thus it is
 written 7,luke #bd3bg1 #cb7 that ,our  
,lord opened the scriptures to ,his     
disciples1 that they might understand   
them4 ,therefore understanding is       
compatible with faith4  ,i answer that1 
,we need to make a twofold distinction  
here3 one on the side of faith1 the     
other on the part of understanding4  ,on
 the side of faith the distinction to be
 made is that certain things1 of        
themselves1 come directly under faith1  

such as the mystery to three ,persons in
 one ,god1 and the incarnation of ,god  
the ,son2 whereas other things come     
under faith1 through being subordinate1 
in one way or another1 to those just    
mentioned1 for instance1 all that is    
contained in the ,divine ,scriptures4   
,on the part of understanding the       
distinction to be observed is that there
 are two ways in which we may be said to
 understand4 ,in one way1 we understand 
a thing perfectly1 when we arrive at    
knowing the essence of the thing we     
understand1 and the very truth          
considered in itself of the proposition 
understood4 ,in this way1 so long as the
 state of faith lasts1 we cannot        
understand those things which are the   
direct object of faith3 although certain
 other things that are subordinate to   
faith can be understood even in this    
way4  ,in another way we understand a   
thing imperfectly1 when the essence of a
 thing or the truth of a proposition is 
not known as to its quiddity or mode of 

being1 and yet we know that whatever be 
the outward appearances1 they do not    
contradict the truth1 in so far as we   
understand that we ought not to depart  
from matters of faith1 for the sake of  
things that appear externally4 ,in this 
way1 even during the state of faith1    
nothing hinders us from understanding   
even those things which are the direct  
object of faith4  ,this suffices for the
 ,replies to the ,objections3 for the   
first three argue in reference to       
perfect understanding1 while the last   
refers to the understanding of matters  
subordinate to faith4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #c   
,whether the ,gift of ,understanding ,is
 ,merely ,speculative or ,also          
,practical8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that understanding1 considered as a
 gift of the ,holy ,ghost1 is not       
practical1 but only speculative4 ,for1  
according to ,gregory 7,moral4 i1 #cb71 
understanding penetrates certain more   
exalted things4 ,but the practical      

intellect is occupied1 not with exalted1
 but with inferior things1 viz4         
singulars1 about which actions are      
concerned4 ,therefore understanding1    
considered as a gift1 is not practical4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the gift of         
understanding is something more         
excellent than the intellectual virtue  
of understanding4 ,but the intellectual 
virtue of understanding is concerned    
with none but necessary things1         
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
vi1 #f74 ,much more1 therefore1 is the  
gift of understanding concerned with    
none but necessary matters4 ,now the    
practical intellect is not about        
necessary things1 but about things which
 may be otherwise than they are1 and    
which may result from man's activity4   
,therefore the gift of understanding is 
not practical4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the 
gift of understanding enlightens the    
mind in matters which surpass natural   
reason4 ,now human activities1 with     
which the practical intellect is        

concerned1 do not surpass natural       
reason1 which is the directing principle
 in matters of action1 as was made clear
 above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b2       
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore   
the gift of understanding is not        
practical4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
written 7,ps4 #aaj3aj73 ,a good         
understanding to all that do it4  ,i    
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 
the gift of understanding is not only   
about those things which come under     
faith first and principally1 but also   
about all things subordinate to faith4  
,now good actions have a certain        
relationship to faith3 since faith      
worketh through charity1 according to   
the ,apostle 7,gal4 #e3f74 ,hence the   
gift of understanding extends also to   
certain actions1 not as though these    
were its principal object1 but in so far
 as the rule of our actions is the      
eternal law1 to which the higher reason1
 which is perfected by the gift of      
understanding1 adheres by contemplating 

and consulting it1 as ,augustine states 
7,de ,trin4 xii1 #g74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,the things with which human actions are
 concerned are not surpassingly exalted 
considered in themselves1 but1 as       
referred to the rule of the eternal law1
 and to the end of ,divine happiness1   
they are exalted so that they can be the
 matter of understanding4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,the excellence of the gift of      
understanding consists precisely in its 
considering eternal or necessary        
matters1 not only as they are rules of  
human actions1 because a cognitive      
virtue is the more excellent1 according 
to the greater extent of its object4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the rule of human     
actions is the human reason and the     
eternal law1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1  
,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f74 ,now the eternal law  
surpasses human reason3 so that the     
knowledge of human actions1 as ruled by 
the eternal law1 surpasses the natural  
reason1 and requires the supernatural   
light of a gift of the ,holy ,ghost4    

,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1   
,art4 #d  ,whether the ,gift of         
,understanding ,is in ,all ,who ,are in 
a ,state of ,grace8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that the gift of             
understanding is not in all who are in a
 state of grace4 ,for ,gregory says     
7,moral4 ii1 #di7 that the gift of      
understanding is given as a remedy      
against dulness of mind4 ,now many who  
are in a state of grace suffer from     
dulness of mind4 ,therefore the gift of 
understanding is not in all who are in a
 state of grace4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 of
 all the things that are connected with 
knowledge1 faith alone seems to be      
necessary for salvation1 since by faith 
,christ dwells in our hearts1 according 
to ,eph4 #c3ag4 ,now the gift of        
understanding is not in everyone that   
has faith2 indeed1 those who have faith 
ought to pray that they may understand1 
as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #bg74
 ,therefore the gift of understanding is
 not necessary for salvation3 and1      

consequently1 is not in all who are in a
 state of grace4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
those things which are common to all who
 are in a state of grace1 are never     
withdrawn from them4 ,now the grace of  
understanding and of the other gifts    
sometimes withdraws itself profitably1  
for1 at times1 when the mind is puffed  
up with understanding sublime things1 it
 becomes sluggish and dull in base and  
vile things1 as ,gregory observes       
7,moral4 ii1 #di74 ,therefore the gift  
of understanding is not in all who are  
in a state of grace4  ,on the contrary1 
,it is written 7,ps4 #ha3e73 ,they have 
not known or understood1 they walk on in
 darkness4 ,but no one who is in a state
 of grace walks in darkness1 according  
to ,john #h3ab3 ,he that followeth ,me1 
walketh not in darkness4 ,therefore no  
one who is in a state of grace is       
without the gift of understanding4  ,i  
answer that1 ,in all who are in a state 
of grace1 there must needs be rectitude 
of the will1 since grace prepares man's 

will for good1 according to ,augustine  
7,contra ,julian4 ,pelag4 iv1 #c74 ,now 
the will cannot be rightly directed to  
good1 unless there be already some      
knowledge of the truth1 since the object
 of the will is good understood1 as     
stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #g4 ,again1   
just as the ,holy ,ghost directs man's  
will by the gift of charity1 so as to   
move it directly to some supernatural   
good2 so also1 by the gift of           
understanding1 ,he enlightens the human 
mind1 so that it knows some supernatural
 truth1 to which the right will needs to
 tend4  ,therefore1 just as the gift of 
charity is in all of those who have     
sanctifying grace1 so also is the gift  
of understanding4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3     
,some who have sanctifying grace may    
suffer dulness of mind with regard to   
things that are not necessary for       
salvation2 but with regard to those that
 are necessary for salvation1 they are  
sufficiently instructed by the ,holy    
,ghost1 according to #a ,john #b3bg3    

,his unction teacheth you of all things4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although not all who
 have faith understand fully the things 
that are proposed to be believed1 yet   
they understand that they ought to      
believe them1 and that they ought nowise
 to deviate from them4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,with regard to things necessary for   
salvation1 the gift of understanding    
never withdraws from holy persons3 but1 
in order that they may have no incentive
 to pride1 it does withdraw sometimes   
with regard to other things1 so that    
their mind is unable to penetrate all   
things clearly4   ,,fifth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #e  ,whether   
the ,gift of ,understanding ,is ,found  
,also in ,those ,who ,have ,not         
,sanctifying ,grace8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that the gift of            
understanding is found also in those who
 have not sanctifying grace4 ,for       
,augustine1 in expounding the words of  
,ps4 #aah3bj3 ,my soul hath coveted to  
long for ,thy justifications1 says3     

,understanding flies ahead1 and man's   
will is weak and slow to follow4 ,but in
 all who have sanctifying grace1 the    
will is prompt on account of charity4   
,therefore the gift of understanding can
 be in those who have not sanctifying   
grace4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is       
written 7,dan4 #aj3a7 that there is need
 of understanding in a prophetic vision1
 so that1 seemingly1 there is no        
prophecy without the gift of            
understanding4 ,but there can be        
prophecy without sanctifying grace1 as  
evidenced by ,matt4 #g3bb1 where those  
who say3 ,we have prophesied in ,thy    
name 99,vulg43 ',have we not prophesied 
in ,thy name8'1 are answered with the   
words3 ,i never knew you4 ,therefore the
 gift of understanding can be without   
sanctifying grace4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
the gift of understanding responds to   
the virtue of faith1 according to ,isa4 
#g3i1 following another reading 99,the  
,septuagint3 ,if you will not believe   
you shall not understand4 ,now faith can

 be without sanctifying grace4          
,therefore the gift of understanding can
 be without it4  ,on the contrary1 ,our 
,lord said 7,john #f3de73 ,every one    
that hath heard of the ,father1 and hath
 learned1 cometh to ,me4 ,now it is by  
the intellect1 as ,gregory observes     
7,moral4 i1 #cb71 that we learn or      
understand what we hear4 ,therefore     
whoever has the gift of understanding1  
cometh to ,christ1 which is impossible  
without sanctifying grace4 ,therefore   
the gift of understanding cannot be     
without sanctifying grace4  ,i answer   
that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#fh1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b7 the gifts of the     
,holy ,ghost perfect the soul1 according
 as it is amenable to the motion of the 
,holy ,ghost4 ,accordingly then1 the    
intellectual light of grace is called   
the gift of understanding1 in so far as 
man's understanding is easily moved by  
the ,holy ,ghost1 the consideration of  
which movement depends on a true        
apprehension of the end4 ,wherefore     

unless the human intellect be moved by  
the ,holy ,ghost so far as to have a    
right estimate of the end1 it has not   
yet obtained the gift of understanding1 
however much the ,holy ,ghost may have  
enlightened it in regard to other truths
 that are preambles to the faith4  ,now 
to have a right estimate about the last 
end one must not be in error about the  
end1 and must adhere to it firmly as to 
the greatest good3 and no one can do    
this without sanctifying grace2 even as 
in moral matters a man has a right      
estimate about the end through a habit  
of virtue4 ,therefore no one has the    
gift of understanding without           
sanctifying grace4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by
 understanding ,augustine means any kind
 of intellectual light1 that1 however1  
does not fulfil all the conditions of a 
gift1 unless the mind of man be so far  
perfected as to have a right estimate   
about the end4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the   
understanding that is requisite for     
prophecy1 is a kind of enlightenment of 

the mind with regard to the things      
revealed to the prophet3 but it is not  
an enlightenment of the mind with regard
 to a right estimate about the last end1
 which belongs to the gift of           
understanding4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,faith 
implies merely assent to what is        
proposed but understanding implies a    
certain perception of the truth1 which  
perception1 except in one who has       
sanctifying grace1 cannot regard the    
end1 as stated above4 ,hence the        
comparison fails between understanding  
and faith4   ,,sixth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #f  ,whether   
the ,gift of ,understanding ,is         
,distinct from the ,other ,gifts8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
gift of understanding is not distinct   
from the other gifts4 ,for there is no  
distinction between things whose        
opposites are not distinct4 ,now wisdom 
is contrary to folly1 understanding is  
contrary to dulness1 counsel is contrary
 to rashness1 knowledge is contrary to  

ignorance1 as ,gregory states 7,moral4  
ii1 #di74 ,but there would seem to be no
 difference between folly1 dulness1     
ignorance and rashness4 ,therefore      
neither does understanding differ from  
the other gifts4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
the intellectual virtue of understanding
 differs from the other intellectual    
virtues in that it is proper to it to be
 about self-evident principles4 ,but the
 gift of understanding is not about any 
self-evident principles1 since the      
natural habit of first principles       
suffices in respect of those matters    
which are naturally self-evident3 while 
faith is sufficient in respect of such  
things as are supernatural1 since the   
articles of faith are like first        
principles in supernatural knowledge1 as
 stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #g74         
,therefore the gift of understanding    
does not differ from the other          
intellectual gifts4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 all intellectual knowledge is either   
speculative or practical4 ,now the gift 

of understanding is related to both1 as 
stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore it is 
not distinct from the other intellectual
 gifts1 but comprises them all4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,when several things are     
enumerated together they must be1 in    
some way1 distinct from one another1    
because distinction is the origin of    
number4 ,now the gift of understanding  
is enumerated together with the other   
gifts1 as appears from ,isa4 #aa3b4     
,therefore the gift of understanding is 
distinct from the other gifts4  ,i      
answer that1 ,the difference between the
 gift of understanding and three of the 
others1 viz4 piety1 fortitude1 and fear1
 is evident1 since the gift of          
understanding belongs to the cognitive  
power1 while the three belong to the    
appetitive power4  ,but the difference  
between this gift of understanding and  
the remaining three1 viz4 wisdom1       
knowledge1 and counsel1 which also      
belong to the cognitive power1 is not so
 evident4 ,to some 99,william of        

,auxerre1 ,sum4 ,aur4 ,,iii1 iii1 #h1 it
 seems that the gift of understanding   
differs from the gifts of knowledge and 
counsel1 in that these two belong to    
practical knowledge1 while the gift of  
understanding belongs to speculative    
knowledge2 and that it differs from the 
gift of wisdom1 which also belongs to   
speculative knowledge1 in that wisdom is
 concerned with judgment1 while         
understanding renders the mind apt to   
grasp the things that are proposed1 and 
to penetrate into their very heart4 ,and
 in this sense we have assigned the     
number of the gifts1 above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #fh1 ,a4 #d74  ,but if we consider the 
matter carefully1 the gift of           
understanding is concerned not only with
 speculative1 but also with practical   
matters1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 and  
likewise1 the gift of knowledge regards 
both matters1 as we shall show further  
on 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #c71 and consequently1  
we must take their distinction in some  
other way4 ,for all these four gifts are

 ordained to supernatural knowledge1    
which1 in us1 takes its foundation from 
faith4 ,now faith is through hearing    
7,rom4 #aj3ag74 ,hence some things must 
be proposed to be believed by man1 not  
as seen1 but as heard1 to which he      
assents by faith4 ,but faith1 first and 
principally1 is about the ,first ,truth1
 secondarily1 about certain             
considerations concerning creatures1 and
 furthermore extends to the direction of
 human actions1 in so far as it works   
through charity1 as appears from what   
has been said above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b1 ad 
#c74  ,accordingly on the part of the   
things proposed to faith for belief1 two
 things are requisite on our part3 first
 that they be penetrated or grasped by  
the intellect1 and this belongs to the  
gift of understanding4 ,secondly1 it is 
necessary that man should judge these   
things aright1 that he should esteem    
that he ought to adhere to these things1
 and to withdraw from their opposites3  
and this judgment1 with regard to       

,divine things belong to the gift of    
wisdom1 but with regard to created      
things1 belongs to the gift of          
knowledge1 and as to its application to 
individual actions1 belongs to the gift 
of counsel4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the      
foregoing difference between those four 
gifts is clearly in agreement with the  
distinction of those things which       
,gregory assigns as their opposites4    
,for dulness is contrary to sharpness1  
since an intellect is said1 by          
comparison1 to be sharp1 when it is able
 to penetrate into the heart of the     
things that are proposed to it4 ,hence  
it is dulness of mind that renders the  
mind unable to pierce into the heart of 
a thing4 ,a man is said to be a fool if 
he judges wrongly about the common end  
of life1 wherefore folly is properly    
opposed to wisdom1 which makes us judge 
aright about the universal cause4       
,ignorance implies a defect in the mind1
 even about any particular things       
whatever1 so that it is contrary to     

knowledge1 which gives man a right      
judgment about particular causes1 viz4  
about creatures4 ,rashness is clearly   
opposed to counsel1 whereby man does not
 proceed to action before deliberating  
with his reason4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the 
gift of understanding is about the first
 principles of that knowledge which is  
conferred by grace2 but otherwise than  
faith1 because it belongs to faith to   
assent to them1 while it belongs to the 
gift of understanding to pierce with the
 mind the things that are said4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,the gift of understanding is 
related to both kinds of knowledge1 viz4
 speculative and practical1 not as to   
the judgment1 but as to apprehension1 by
 grasping what is said4   ,,seventh     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #g   
,whether the ,sixth ,beatitude1 ,blessed
 ,are the ,clean of ,heart1 etc41       
,responds to the ,gift of               
,understanding8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that the sixth beatitude1    
,blessed are the clean of heart1 for    

they shall see ,god1 does not respond to
 the gift of understanding4 ,because    
cleanness of heart seems to belong      
chiefly to the appetite4 ,but the gift  
of understanding belongs1 not to the    
appetite1 but rather to the intellectual
 power4 ,therefore the aforesaid        
beatitude does not respond to the gift  
of understanding4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
it is written 7,acts #ae3i73 ,purifying 
their hearts by faith4 ,now cleanness of
 heart is acquired by the heart being   
purified4 ,therefore the aforesaid      
beatitude is related to the virtue of   
faith rather than to the gift of        
understanding4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the 
gifts of the ,holy ,ghost perfect man in
 the present state of life4 ,but the    
sight of ,god does not belong to the    
present life1 since it is that which    
gives happiness to the ,blessed1 as     
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h74 
,therefore the sixth beatitude which    
comprises the sight of ,god1 does not   
respond to the gift of understanding4   

,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de  
,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #d73 ,the     
sixth work of the ,holy ,ghost which is 
understanding1 is applicable to the     
clean of heart1 whose eye being         
purified1 they can see what eye hath not
 seen4  ,i answer that1 ,two things are 
contained in the sixth beatitude1 as    
also in the others1 one by way of merit1
 viz4 cleanness of heart2 the other by  
way of reward1 viz4 the sight of ,god1  
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,,aa4
 #b1 #d71 and each of these1 in some    
way1 responds to the gift of            
understanding4  ,for cleanness is       
twofold4 ,one is a preamble and a       
disposition to seeing ,god1 and consists
 in the heart being cleansed of         
inordinate affections3 and this         
cleanness of heart is effected by the   
virtues and gifts belonging to the      
appetitive power4 ,the other cleanness  
of heart is a kind of complement to the 
sight of ,god2 such is the cleanness of 
the mind that is purged of phantasms and

 errors1 so as to receive the truths    
which are proposed to it about ,god1 no 
longer by way of corporeal phantasms1   
nor infected with heretical             
misrepresentations3 and this cleanness  
is the result of the gift of            
understanding4  ,again1 the sight of    
,god is twofold4 ,one is perfect1       
whereby ,god's ,essence is seen3 the    
other is imperfect1 whereby1 though we  
see not what ,god is1 yet we see what   
,he is not2 and whereby1 the more       
perfectly do we know ,god in this life1 
the more we understand that ,he         
surpasses all that the mind comprehends4
 ,each of these visions of ,god belongs 
to the gift of understanding2 the first1
 to the gift of understanding in its    
state of perfection1 as possessed in    
heaven2 the second1 to the gift of      
understanding in its state of           
inchoation1 as possessed by wayfarers4  
,this suffices for the ,replies to the  
,objections3 for the first two arguments
 refer to the first kind of cleanness2  

while the third refers to the perfect   
vision of ,god4 ,moreover the gifts both
 perfect us in this life by way of      
inchoation1 and will be fulfilled1 as   
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,a4 #b74
   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1
 ,art4 #h  ,whether ,faith1 ,among the  
,fruits1 ,responds to the ,gift of      
,understanding8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that1 among the fruits1 faith
 does not respond to the gift of        
understanding4 ,for understanding is the
 fruit of faith1 since it is written    
7,isa4 #g3i7 according to another       
reading 99,the ,septuagint3 ,if you will
 not believe you shall not understand1  
where our version has3 ,if you will not 
believe1 you shall not continue4        
,therefore fruit is not the fruit of    
understanding4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that
 which precedes is not the fruit of what
 follows4 ,but faith seems to precede   
understanding1 since it is the          
foundation of the entire spiritual      
edifice1 as stated above 7,q4 #d1 ,,aa4 

#a1 #g74 ,therefore faith is not the    
fruit of understanding4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 more gifts pertain to the     
intellect than to the appetite4 ,now1   
among the fruits1 only one pertains to  
the intellect2 namely1 faith1 while all 
the others pertain to the appetite4     
,therefore faith1 seemingly1 does not   
pertain to understanding more than to   
wisdom1 knowledge or counsel4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,the end of a thing is its    
fruit4 ,now the gift of understanding   
seems to be ordained chiefly to the     
certitude of faith1 which certitude is  
reckoned a fruit4 ,for a gloss on ,gal4 
#e3bb says that the faith which is a    
fruit1 is certitude about the unseen4   
,therefore faith1 among the fruits1     
responds to the gift of understanding4  
,i answer that1 ,the fruits of the      
,spirit1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#gj1 ,a4 #a71 when we were discussing   
them1 are so called because they are    
something ultimate and delightful1      
produced in us by the power of the ,holy

 ,ghost4 ,now the ultimate and          
delightful has the nature of an end1    
which is the proper object of the will3 
and consequently that which is ultimate 
and delightful with regard to the will1 
must be1 after a fashion1 the fruit of  
all the other things that pertain to the
 other powers4  ,accordingly1 therefore1
 to this kind of gift of virtue that    
perfects a power1 we may distinguish a  
double fruit3 one1 belonging to the same
 power2 the other1 the last of all as it
 were1 belonging to the will4 ,in this  
way we must conclude that the fruit     
which properly responds to the gift of  
understanding is faith1 i4e4 the        
certitude of faith2 while the fruit that
 responds to it last of all is joy1     
which belongs to the will4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,understanding is the fruit of     
faith1 taken as a virtue4 ,but we are   
not taking faith in this sense here1 but
 for a kind of certitude of faith1 to   
which man attains by the gift of        
understanding4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faith 

cannot altogether precede understanding1
 for it would be impossible to assent by
 believing what is proposed to be       
believed1 without understanding it in   
some way4 ,however1 the perfection of   
understanding follows the virtue of     
faith3 which perfection of understanding
 is itself followed by a kind of        
certainty of faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the fruit of practical knowledge cannot
 consist in that very knowledge1 since  
knowledge of that kind is known not for 
its own sake1 but for the sake of       
something else4 ,on the other hand1     
speculative knowledge has its fruit in  
its very self1 which fruit is the       
certitude about the thing known4 ,hence 
the gift of counsel1 which belongs only 
to practical knowledge1 has no          
corresponding fruit of its own3 while   
the gifts of wisdom1 understanding and  
knowledge1 which can belongs also to    
speculative knowledge1 have but one     
corresponding fruit1 which is certainly 
denoted by the name of faith4 ,the      

reason why there are several fruits     
pertaining to the appetitive faculty1 is
 because1 as already stated1 the        
character of end1 which the word fruit  
implies1 pertains to the appetitive     
rather than to the intellective part4   
,,question #i  ,,of ,,the ,,gift ,,of   
,,knowledge 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we  
must now consider the gift of knowledge1
 under which head there are four points 
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether knowledge is 
a gift8  7#b7 ,whether it is about      
,divine things8  7#c7 ,whether it is    
speculative or practical8  7#d7 ,which  
beatitude responds to it8   ,,first     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #a   
,whether ,knowledge ,is a ,gift8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
knowledge is not a gift4 ,for the gifts 
of the ,holy ,ghost surpass the natural 
faculty4 ,but knowledge implies an      
effect of natural reason3 for the       
,philosopher says 7,poster4 i1 #b7 that 
a demonstration is a syllogism which    
produces knowledge4 ,therefore knowledge

 is not a gift of the ,holy ,ghost4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the gifts of the    
,holy ,ghost are common to all holy     
persons1 as stated above 7,q4 #h1 ,a4   
#d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #e74 ,now     
,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #a7    
that many of the faithful lack knowledge
 though they have faith4 ,therefore     
knowledge is not a gift4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 the gifts are more perfect    
than the virtues1 as stated above       
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore  
one gift suffices for the perfection of 
one virtue4 ,now the gift of            
understanding responds to the virtue of 
faith1 as stated above 7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #b74
 ,therefore the gift of knowledge does  
not respond to that virtue1 nor does it 
appear to which other virtue it can     
respond4 ,since1 then1 the gifts are    
perfections of virtues1 as stated above 
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 it    
seems that knowledge is not a gift4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,knowledge is reckoned   
among the seven gifts 7,isa4 #aa3b74  ,i

 answer that1 ,grace is more perfect    
than nature1 and1 therefore1 does not   
fail in those things wherein man can be 
perfected by nature4 ,now1 when a man1  
by his natural reason1 assents by his   
intellect to some truth1 he is perfected
 in two ways in respect of that truth3  
first1 because he grasps it2 secondly1  
because he forms a sure judgment on it4 
,accordingly1 two things are requisite  
in order that the human intellect may   
perfectly assent to the truth of the    
faith3 one of these is that he should   
have a sound grasp of the things that   
are proposed to be believed1 and this   
pertains to the gift of understanding1  
as stated above 7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #f73 while 
the other is that he should have a sure 
and right judgment on them1 so as to    
discern what is to be believed1 from    
what is not to be believed1 and for this
 the gift of knowledge is required4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,certitude of knowledge
 varies in various natures1 according to
 the various conditions of each nature4 

,because man forms a sure judgment about
 a truth by the discursive process of   
his reason3 and so human knowledge is   
acquired by means of demonstrative      
reasoning4 ,on the other hand1 in ,god1 
there is a sure judgment of truth1      
without any discursive process1 by      
simple intuition1 as was stated in the  
,first ,part 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #g72         
wherefore ,god's knowledge is not       
discursive1 or argumentative1 but       
absolute and simple1 to which that      
knowledge is likened which is a gift of 
the ,holy ,ghost1 since it is a         
participated likeness thereof4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,a twofold knowledge may be   
had about matters of belief4 ,one is the
 knowledge of what one ought to believe 
by discerning things to be believed from
 things not to be believed3 in this way 
knowledge is a gift and is common to all
 holy persons4 ,the other is a knowledge
 about matters of belief1 whereby one   
knows not only what one ought to        
believe1 but also how to make the faith 

known1 how to induce others to believe1 
and confute those who deny the faith4   
,this knowledge is numbered among the   
gratuitous graces1 which are not given  
to all1 but to some4 ,hence ,augustine1 
after the words quoted1 adds3 ,it is one
 thing for a man merely to know what he 
ought to believe1 and another to know   
how to dispense what he believes to the 
godly1 and to defend it against the     
ungodly4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the gifts   
are more perfect than the moral and     
intellectual virtues2 but they are not  
more perfect than the theological       
virtues2 rather are all the gifts       
ordained to the perfection of the       
theological virtues1 as to their end4   
,hence it is not unreasonable if several
 gifts are ordained to one theological  
virtue4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #i1 ,art4 #b  ,whether the ,gift of 
,knowledge ,is ,about ,divine ,things8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
gift of knowledge is about ,divine      
things4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4

 xiv1 #a7 that knowledge begets1        
nourishes and strengthens faith4 ,now   
faith is about ,divine things1 because  
its object is the ,first ,truth1 as     
stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a74          
,therefore the gift of knowledge also is
 about ,divine things4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 the gift of knowledge is more 
excellent than acquired knowledge4 ,but 
there is an acquired knowledge about    
,divine things1 for instance1 the       
science of metaphysics4 ,much more      
therefore is the gift of knowledge about
 ,divine things4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
according to ,rom4 #a3bj1 the invisible 
things of ,god 4 4 4 are clearly seen1  
being understood by the things that are 
made4 ,if therefore there is knowledge  
about created things1 it seems that     
there is also knowledge of ,divine      
things4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine   
says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #a73 ,the         
knowledge of ,divine things may be      
properly called wisdom1 and the         
knowledge of human affairs may properly 

receive the name of knowledge4  ,i      
answer that1 ,a sure judgment about a   
thing is formed chiefly from its cause1 
and so the order of judgments should be 
according to the order of causes4 ,for  
just as the first cause is the cause of 
the second1 so ought the judgment about 
the second cause to be formed through   
the first cause3 nor is it possible to  
judge of the first cause through any    
other cause2 wherefore the judgment     
which is formed through the first cause1
 is the first and most perfect judgment4
  ,now in those things where we find    
something most perfect1 the common name 
of the genus is appropriated for those  
things which fall short of the most     
perfect1 and some special name is       
adapted to the most perfect thing1 as is
 the case in ,logic4 ,for in the genus  
of convertible terms1 that which        
signifies what a thing is1 is given the 
special name of definition1 but the     
convertible terms which fall short of   
this1 retain the common name1 and are   

called proper terms4  ,accordingly1     
since the word knowledge implies        
certitude of judgment as stated above   
7,a4 #a71 if this certitude of the      
judgment is derived from the highest    
cause1 the knowledge has a special name1
 which is wisdom3 for a wise man in any 
branch of knowledge is one who knows the
 highest cause of that kind of          
knowledge1 and is able to judge of all  
matters by that cause3 and a wise man   
absolutely1 is one who knows the cause  
which is absolutely highest1 namely     
,god4 ,hence the knowledge of ,divine   
things is called wisdom1 while the      
knowledge of human things is called     
knowledge1 this being the common name   
denoting certitude of judgment1 and     
appropriated to the judgment which is   
formed through second causes4           
,accordingly1 if we take knowledge in   
this way1 it is a distinct gift from the
 gift of wisdom1 so that the gift of    
knowledge is only about human or created
 things4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although    

matters of faith are ,divine and        
eternal1 yet faith itself is something  
temporal in the mind of the believer4   
,hence to know what one ought to        
believe1 belongs to the gift of         
knowledge1 but to know in themselves the
 very things we believe1 by a kind of   
union with them1 belongs to the gift of 
wisdom4 ,therefore the gift of wisdom   
corresponds more to charity which unites
 man's mind to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,this argument takes knowledge in the   
generic acceptation of the term3 it is  
not thus that knowledge is a special    
gift1 but according as it is restricted 
to judgments formed through created     
things4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated    
above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a71 every cognitive 
habit regards formally the mean through 
which things are known1 and materially1 
the things that are known through the   
mean4 ,and since that which is formal1  
is of most account1 it follows that     
those sciences which draw conclusions   
about physical matter from mathematical 

principles1 are reckoned rather among   
the mathematical sciences1 though1 as to
 their matter they have more in common  
with physical sciences3 and for this    
reason it is stated in ,phys4  ii1 #b   
that they are more akin to physics4     
,accordingly1 since man knows ,god      
through ,his creatures1 this seems to   
pertain to knowledge1 to which it       
belongs formally1 rather than to wisdom1
 to which it belongs materially3 and1   
conversely1 when we judge of creatures  
according to ,divine things1 this       
pertains to wisdom rather than to       
knowledge4   ,,third ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #c  ,whether   
the ,gift of ,knowledge ,is ,practical  
,knowledge8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that the knowledge1 which is       
numbered among the gifts1 is practical  
knowledge4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de    
,trin4 xii1 #ad7 that knowledge is      
concerned with the actions in which we  
make use of external things4 ,but the   
knowledge which is concerned about      

actions is practical4 ,therefore the    
gift of knowledge is practical4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 i1 
#cb73 ,knowledge is nought if it hath   
not its use for piety 4 4 4 and piety is
 very useless if it lacks the           
discernment of knowledge4 ,now it       
follows from this authority that        
knowledge directs piety4 ,but this      
cannot apply to a speculative science4  
,therefore the gift of knowledge is not 
speculative but practical4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost 
are only in the righteous1 as stated    
above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #e74 ,but speculative
 knowledge can be also in the           
unrighteous1 according to ,james #d3ag3 
,to him 4 4 4 who knoweth to do good1   
and doth it not1 to him it is a sin4    
,therefore the gift of knowledge is not 
speculative but practical4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 i1     
#cb73 ,knowledge on her own day prepares
 a feast1 because she overcomes the fast
 of ignorance in the mind4 ,now         

ignorance is not entirely removed1 save 
by both kinds of knowledge1 viz4        
speculative and practical4 ,therefore   
the gift of knowledge is both           
speculative and practical4  ,i answer   
that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #h71
 the gift of knowledge1 like the gift of
 understanding1 is ordained to the      
certitude of faith4 ,now faith consists 
primarily and principally in            
speculation1 in as much as it is founded
 on the ,first ,truth4 ,but since the   
,first ,truth is also the last end for  
the sake of which our works are done1   
hence it is that faith extends to works1
 according to ,gal4 #e3f3 ,faith 4 4 4  
worketh by charity4  ,the consequence is
 that the gift of knowledge also1       
primarily and principally indeed1       
regards speculation1 in so far as man   
knows what he ought to hold by faith2   
yet1 secondarily1 it extends to works1  
since we are directed in our actions by 
the knowledge of matters of faith1 and  
of conclusions drawn therefrom4  ,reply 

,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking of the 
gift of knowledge1 in so far as it      
extends to works2 for action is ascribed
 to knowledge1 yet not action solely1   
nor primarily3 and in this way it       
directs piety4  ,hence the ,reply to the
 ,second ,objection is clear4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,as we have already stated    
7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #e7 about the gift of      
understanding1 not everyone who         
understands1 has the gift of            
understanding1 but only he that         
understands through a habit of grace3   
and so we must take note1 with regard to
 the gift of knowledge1 that they alone 
have the gift of knowledge1 who judge   
aright about matters of faith and       
action1 through the grace bestowed on   
them1 so as never to wander from the    
straight path of justice4 ,this is the  
knowledge of holy things1 according to  
,wis4 #aj3aj3 ,she conducted the just 4 
4 4 through the right ways 4 4 4 and    
gave him the knowledge of holy things4  
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1   

,art4 #d  ,whether the ,third           
,beatitude1 ,blessed ,are ,they ,that   
,mourn1 etc4 ,corresponds to the ,gift  
of ,knowledge8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that the third beatitude1 ,blessed
 are they that mourn1 does not          
correspond to the gift of knowledge4    
,for1 even as evil is the cause of      
sorrow and grief1 so is good the cause  
of joy4 ,now knowledge brings good to   
light rather than evil1 since the latter
 is known through evil3 for the straight
 line rules both itself and the crooked 
line 7,de ,anima i1 #e74 ,therefore the 
aforesaid beatitude does not suitably   
correspond to the gift of knowledge4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 consideration of    
truth is an act of knowledge4 ,now there
 is no sorrow in the consideration of   
truth2 rather is there joy1 since it is 
written 7,wis4 #h3af73 ,her conversation
 hath no bitterness1 nor her company any
 tediousness1 but joy and gladness4     
,therefore the aforesaid beatitude does 
not suitably correspond with the gift of

 knowledge4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the    
gift of knowledge consists in           
speculation1 before operation4 ,now1 in 
so far as it consists in speculation1   
sorrow does not correspond to it1 since 
the speculative intellect is not        
concerned about things to be sought or  
avoided 7,de ,anima iii1 #i74 ,therefore
 the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably
 reckoned to correspond with the gift of
 knowledge4  ,on the contrary1          
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte iv73 ,knowledge befits the       
mourner1 who has discovered that he has 
been mastered by the evil which he      
coveted as though it were good4  ,i     
answer that1 ,right judgment about      
creatures belongs properly to knowledge4
 ,now it is through creatures that man's
 aversion from ,god is occasioned1      
according to ,wis4 #ad3aa3 ,creatures 4 
4 4 are turned to an abomination 4 4 4  
and a snare to the feet of the unwise1  
of those1 namely1 who do not judge      
aright about creatures1 since they deem 

the perfect good to consist in them4    
,hence they sin by placing their last   
end in them1 and lose the true good4 ,it
 is by forming a right judgment of      
creatures that man becomes aware of the 
loss 7of which they may be the          
occasion71 which judgment he exercises  
through the gift of knowledge4  ,hence  
the beatitude of sorrow is said to      
correspond to the gift of knowledge4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,created goods do not  
cause spiritual joy1 except in so far as
 they are referred to the ,divine good1 
which is the proper cause of spiritual  
joy4 ,hence spiritual peace and the     
resulting joy correspond directly to the
 gift of wisdom3 but to the gift of     
knowledge there corresponds1 in the     
first place1 sorrow for past errors1    
and1 in consequence1 consolation1 since1
 by his right judgment1 man directs     
creatures to the ,divine good4 ,for this
 reason sorrow is set forth in this     
beatitude1 as the merit1 and the        
resulting consolation1 as the reward2   

which is begun in this life1 and is     
perfected in the life to come4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,man rejoices in the very     
consideration of truth2 yet he may      
sometimes grieve for the thing1 the     
truth of which he considers3 it is thus 
that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,no beatitude          
corresponds to knowledge1 in so far as  
it consists in speculation1 because     
man's beatitude consists1 not in        
considering creatures1 but in           
contemplating ,god4 ,but man's beatitude
 does consist somewhat in the right use 
of creatures1 and in well-ordered love  
of them3 and this ,i say with regard to 
the beatitude of a wayfarer4 ,hence     
beatitude relating to contemplation is  
not ascribed to knowledge1 but to       
understanding and wisdom1 which are     
about ,divine things4   ,,question #aj  
,,of ,,unbelief ,,in ,,general 7,in     
,twelve ,articles7  ,in due sequence we 
must consider the contrary vices3 first1
 unbelief1 which is contrary to faith2  

secondly1 blasphemy1 which is opposed to
 confession of faith2 thirdly1 ignorance
 and dulness of mind1 which are contrary
 to knowledge and understanding4  ,as to
 the first1 we must consider 7#a7       
unbelief in general2 7#b7 heresy2 7#c7  
apostasy from the faith4  ,under the    
first head there are twelve points of   
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether unbelief is a   
sin8  7#b7 ,what is its subject8  7#c7  
,whether it is the greatest of sins8    
7#d7 ,whether every action of           
unbelievers is a sin8  7#e7 ,of the     
species of unbelief2  7#f7 ,of their    
comparison1 one with another2  7#g7     
,whether we ought to dispute about faith
 with unbelievers8  7#h7 ,whether they  
ought to be compelled to the faith8     
7#i7 ,whether we ought to have          
communications with them8  7#aj7        
,whether unbelievers can have authority 
over ,christians8  7#aa7 ,whether the   
rites of unbelievers should be          
tolerated8  7#ab7 ,whether the children 
of unbelievers are to be baptized       

against their parents' will8   ,,first  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,unbelief ,is a ,sin8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
unbelief is not a sin4 ,for every sin is
 contrary to nature1 as ,damascene      
proves 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #d74 ,now  
unbelief seems not to be contrary to    
nature2 for ,augustine says 7,de        
,praedest4 ,sanct4 v7 that to be capable
 to having faith1 just as to be capable 
of having charity1 is natural to all    
men2 whereas to have faith1 even as to  
have charity1 belongs to the grace of   
the faithful4 ,therefore not to have    
faith1 which is to be an unbeliever1 is 
not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no one  
sins that which he cannot avoid1 since  
every sin is voluntary4 ,now it is not  
in a man's power to avoid unbelief1 for 
he cannot avoid it unless he have faith1
 because the ,apostle says 7,rom4       
#aj3ad73 ,how shall they believe in     
,him1 of ,whom they have not heard8 ,and
 how shall they hear without a preacher8

 ,therefore unbelief does not seem to be
 a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as stated  
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #d71 there 
are seven capital sins1 to which all    
sins are reduced4 ,but unbelief does not
 seem to be comprised under any of them4
 ,therefore unbelief is not a sin4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,vice is opposed to       
virtue4 ,now faith is a virtue1 and     
unbelief is opposed to it4 ,therefore   
unbelief is a sin4  ,i answer that1     
,unbelief may be taken in two ways3     
first1 by way of pure negation1 so that 
a man be called an unbeliever1 merely   
because he has not the faith4 ,secondly1
 unbelief may be taken by way of        
opposition to the faith2 in which sense 
a man refuses to hear the faith1 or     
despises it1 according to ,isa4 #ec3a3  
,who hath believed our report8 ,it is   
this that completes the notion of       
unbelief1 and it is in this sense that  
unbelief is a sin4  ,if1 however1 we    
take it by way of pure negation1 as we  
find it in those who have heard nothing 

about the faith1 it bears the character1
 not of sin1 but of punishment1 because 
such like ignorance of ,divine things is
 a result of the sin of our first       
parent4 ,if such like unbelievers are   
damned1 it is on account of other sins1 
which cannot be taken away without      
faith1 but not on account of their sin  
of unbelief4 ,hence ,our ,lord said     
7,john #ae3bb7 ,if ,i had not come1 and 
spoken to them1 they would not have sin2
 which ,augustine expounds 7,tract4     
lxxxix in ,joan47 as referring to the   
sin whereby they believed not in        
,christ4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to have the 
faith is not part of human nature1 but  
it is part of human nature that man's   
mind should not thwart his inner        
instinct1 and the outward preaching of  
the truth4 ,hence1 in this way1 unbelief
 is contrary to nature4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,this argument takes unbelief as    
denoting a pure negation4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,unbelief1 in so far as it is a sin1
 arises from pride1 through which man is

 unwilling to subject his intellect to  
the rules of faith1 and to the sound    
interpretation of the ,fathers4 ,hence  
,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 that  
presumptuous innovations arise from     
vainglory4  ,it might also be replied   
that just as the theological virtues are
 not reduced to the cardinal virtues1   
but precede them1 so too1 the vices     
opposed to the theological virtues are  
not reduced to the capital vices4       
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,unbelief ,is in the 
,intellect ,as ,its ,subject8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
unbelief is not in the intellect as its 
subject4 ,for every sin is in the will1 
according to ,augustine 7,de ,duabus    
,anim4 x1 xi74 ,now unbelief is a sin1  
as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore    
unbelief resides in the will and not in 
the intellect4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1     
unbelief is sinful through contempt of  
the preaching of the faith4 ,but        
contempt pertains to the will4          

,therefore unbelief is in the will4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a gloss             
99,augustine1 ,enchiridion lx4 on #b    
,cor4 #aa3ad ,satan 4 4 4 transformeth  
himself into an angel of light1 says    
that if a wicked angel pretend to be a  
good angel1 and be taken for a good     
angel1 it is not a dangerous or an      
unhealthy error1 if he does or says what
 is becoming to a good angel4 ,this     
seems to be because of the rectitude of 
the will of the man who adheres to the  
angel1 since his intention is to adhere 
to a good angel4 ,therefore the sin of  
unbelief seems to consist entirely in a 
perverse will3 and1 consequently1 it    
does not reside in the intellect4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,things which are contrary
 to one another are in the same subject4
 ,now faith1 to which unbelief is       
opposed1 resides in the intellect4      
,therefore unbelief also is in the      
intellect4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated  
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 
sin is said to be in the power which is 

the principle of the sinful act4 ,now a 
sinful act may have two principles3 one 
is its first and universal principle1   
which commands all acts of sin2 and this
 is the will1 because every sin is      
voluntary4 ,the other principle of the  
sinful act is the proper and proximate  
principle which elicits the sinful act3 
thus the concupiscible is the principle 
of gluttony and lust1 wherefore these   
sins are said to be in the              
concupiscible4 ,now dissent1 which is   
the act proper to unbelief1 is an act of
 the intellect1 moved1 however1 by the  
will1 just as assent is4  ,therefore    
unbelief1 like faith1 is in the         
intellect as its proximate subject4 ,but
 it is in the will as its first moving  
principle1 in which way every sin is    
said to be in the will4  ,hence the     
,reply to the ,first ,objection is      
clear4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the will's    
contempt causes the intellect's dissent1
 which completes the notion of unbelief4
 ,hence the cause of unbelief is in the 

will1 while unbelief itself is in the   
intellect4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that   
believes a wicked angel to be a good    
one1 does not dissent from a matter of  
faith1 because his bodily senses are    
deceived1 while his mind does not depart
 from a true and right judgment as the  
gloss observes 99,augustine1            
,enchiridion lx4 ,but1 according to the 
same authority1 to adhere to ,satan when
 he begins to invite one to his abode1  
i4e4 wickedness and error1 is not       
without sin4   ,,third ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,unbelief ,is the ,greatest of ,sins8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
unbelief is not the greatest of sins4   
,for ,augustine says 7,de ,bapt4 contra 
,donat4 iv1 #bj73 ,i should hesitate to 
decide whether a very wicked ,catholic  
ought to be preferred to a heretic1 in  
whose life one finds nothing            
reprehensible beyond the fact that he is
 a heretic4 ,but a heretic is an        
unbeliever4 ,therefore we ought not to  

say absolutely that unbelief is the     
greatest of sins4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
that which diminishes or excuses a sin  
is not1 seemingly1 the greatest of sins4
 ,now unbelief excuses or diminishes    
sin3 for the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4    
#a3ab1 #ac73 ,i 4 4 4 before was a      
blasphemer1 and a persecutor and        
contumelious2 but ,i obtained 4 4 4     
mercy 4 4 4 because ,i did it ignorantly
 in unbelief4 ,therefore unbelief is not
 the greatest of sins4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 the greater sin deserves the  
greater punishment1 according to ,deut4 
#be3b3 ,according to the measure of the 
sin shall the measure also of the       
stripes be4 ,now a greater punishment is
 due to believers than to unbelievers1  
according to ,heb4 #aj3bi3 ,how much    
more1 do you think1 he deserveth worse  
punishments1 who hath trodden under foot
 the ,son of ,god1 and hath esteemed the
 blood of the testament unclean1 by     
which he was sanctified8 ,therefore     
unbelief is not the greatest of sins4   

,on the contrary1 ,augustine1 commenting
 on ,john #ae3bb1 ,if ,i had not come1  
and spoken to them1 they would not have 
sin1 says 7,tract4 lxxxix in ,joan473   
,under the general name1 ,he refers to a
 singularly great sin4 ,for this1 viz4  
infidelity1 is the sin to which all     
others may be traced4 ,therefore        
unbelief is the greatest of sins4  ,i   
answer that1 ,every sin consists        
formally in aversion from ,god1 as      
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f2 
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #c74 ,hence the   
more a sin severs man from ,god1 the    
graver it is4 ,now man is more than ever
 separated from ,god by unbelief1       
because he has not even true knowledge  
of ,god3 and by false knowledge of ,god1
 man does not approach ,him1 but is     
severed from ,him4  ,nor is it possible 
for one who has a false opinion of ,god1
 to know ,him in any way at all1 because
 the object of his opinion is not ,god4 
,therefore it is clear that the sin of  
unbelief is greater than any sin that   

occurs in the perversion of morals4     
,this does not apply to the sins that   
are opposed to the theological virtues1 
as we shall state further on 7,q4 #bj1  
,a4 #c2 ,q4 #cd1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b2 ,q4 #ci1
 ,a4 #b1 ad #c74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3      
,nothing hinders a sin that is more     
grave in its genus from being less grave
 in respect of some circumstances4      
,hence ,augustine hesitated to decide   
between a bad ,catholic1 and a heretic  
not sinning otherwise1 because although 
the heretic's sin is more grave         
generically1 it can be lessened by a    
circumstance1 and conversely the sin of 
the ,catholic can1 by some circumstance1
 be aggravated4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3       
,unbelief includes both ignorance1 as an
 accessory thereto1 and resistance to   
matters of faith1 and in the latter     
respect it is a most grave sin4 ,in     
respect1 however1 of this ignorance1 it 
has a certain reason for excuse1        
especially when a man sins not from     
malice1 as was the case with the        

,apostle4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an         
unbeliever is more severely punished for
 his sin of unbelief than another sinner
 is for any sin whatever1 if we consider
 the kind of sin4 ,but in the case of   
another sin1 e4g4 adultery1 committed by
 a believer1 and by an unbeliever1 the  
believer1 other things being equal1 sins
 more gravely than the unbeliever1 both 
on account of his knowledge of the truth
 through faith1 and on account of the   
sacraments of faith with which he has   
been satiated1 and which he insults by  
committing sin4   ,,fourth ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,every ,act of an ,unbeliever ,is a     
,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that each act of an unbeliever is a sin4
 ,because a gloss on ,rom4 #ad3bc1 ,all 
that is not of faith is sin1 says3 ,the 
whole life of unbelievers is a sin4 ,now
 the life of unbelievers consists of    
their actions4 ,therefore every action  
of an unbeliever is a sin4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 faith directs the intention4  

,now there can be no good save what     
comes from a right intention4           
,therefore1 among unbelievers1 no action
 can be good4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 when 
that which precedes is corrupted1 that  
which follows is corrupted also4 ,now an
 act of faith precedes the acts of all  
the virtues4 ,therefore1 since there is 
no act of faith in unbelievers1 they can
 do no good work1 but sin in every      
action of theirs4  ,on the contrary1 ,it
 is said of ,cornelius1 while yet an    
unbeliever 7,acts #aj3d1 #ca71 that his 
alms were acceptable to ,god4 ,therefore
 not every action of an unbeliever is a 
sin1 but some of his actions are good4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d7 mortal 
sin takes away sanctifying grace1 but   
does not wholly corrupt the good of     
nature4 ,since therefore1 unbelief is a 
mortal sin1 unbelievers are without     
grace indeed1 yet some good of nature   
remains in them4 ,consequently it is    
evident that unbelievers cannot do those

 good works which proceed from grace1   
viz4 meritorious works2 yet they can1 to
 a certain extent1 do those good works  
for which the good of nature suffices4  
,hence it does not follow that they sin 
in everything they do2 but whenever they
 do anything out of their unbelief1 then
 they sin4 ,for even as one who has the 
faith1 can commit an actual sin1 venial 
or even mortal1 which he does not refer 
to the end of faith1 so too1 an         
unbeliever can do a good deed in a      
matter which he does not refer to the   
end of his unbelief4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,the words quoted must be taken to mean 
either that the life of unbelievers     
cannot be sinless1 since without faith  
no sin is taken away1 or that whatever  
they do out of unbelief1 is a sin4      
,hence the same authority adds3 ,because
 every one that lives or acts according 
to his unbelief1 sins grievously4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faith directs the     
intention with regard to the            
supernatural last end3 but even the     

light of natural reason can direct the  
intention in respect of a connatural    
good4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,unbelief does  
not so wholly destroy natural reason in 
unbelievers1 but that some knowledge of 
the truth remains in them1 whereby they 
are able to do deeds that are           
generically good4 ,with regard1 however1
 to ,cornelius1 it is to be observed    
that he was not an unbeliever1 else his 
works would not have been acceptable to 
,god1 whom none can please without      
faith4 ,now he had implicit faith1 as   
the truth of the ,gospel was not yet    
made manifest3 hence ,peter was sent to 
him to give him fuller instruction in   
the faith4   ,,fifth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #e  ,whether  
,there ,are ,several ,species of        
,unbelief8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that there are not several species 
of unbelief4 ,for1 since faith and      
unbelief are contrary to one another1   
they must be about the same thing4 ,now 
the formal object of faith is the ,first

 ,truth1 whence it derives its unity1   
although its matter contains many points
 of belief4 ,therefore the object of    
unbelief also is the ,first ,truth2     
while the things which an unbeliever    
disbelieves are the matter of his       
unbelief4 ,now the specific difference  
depends not on material but on formal   
principles4 ,therefore there are not    
several species of unbelief1 according  
to the various points which the         
unbeliever disbelieves4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 it is possible to stray from  
the truth of faith in an infinite number
 of ways4 ,if therefore the various     
species of unbelief correspond to the   
number of various errors1 it would seem 
to follow that there is an infinite     
number of species of unbelief1 and      
consequently1 that we ought not to make 
these species the object of our         
consideration4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the 
same thing does not belong to different 
species4 ,now a man may be an unbeliever
 through erring about different points  

of truth4 ,therefore diversity of errors
 does not make a diversity of species of
 unbelief3 and so there are not several 
species of unbelief4  ,on the contrary1 
,several species of vice are opposed to 
each virtue1 because good happens in one
 way1 but evil in many ways1 according  
to ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 and the  
,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,now     
faith is a virtue4 ,therefore several   
species of vice are opposed to it4  ,i  
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,a4  
#a71 every virtue consists in following 
some rule of human knowledge or         
operation4 ,now conformity to a rule    
happens one way in one matter1 whereas a
 breach of the rule happens in many     
ways1 so that many vices are opposed to 
one virtue4 ,the diversity of the vices 
that are opposed to each virtue may be  
considered in two ways1 first1 with     
regard to their different relations to  
the virtue3 and in this way there are   
determinate species of vices contrary to

 a virtue3 thus to a moral virtue one   
vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue1
 and another1 by falling short of the   
virtue4 ,secondly1 the diversity of     
vices opposed to one virtue may be      
considered in respect of the corruption 
of the various conditions required for  
that virtue4 ,in this way an infinite   
number of vices are opposed to one      
virtue1 e4g4 temperance or fortitude1   
according to the infinite number of ways
 in which the various circumstances of a
 virtue may be corrupted1 so that the   
rectitude of virtue is forsaken4 ,for   
this reason the ,pythagoreans held evil 
to be infinite4  ,accordingly we must   
say that if unbelief be considered in   
comparison to faith1 there are several  
species of unbelief1 determinate in     
number4 ,for1 since the sin of unbelief 
consists in resisting the faith1 this   
may happen in two ways3 either the faith
 is resisted before it has been         
accepted1 and such is the unbelief of   
pagans or heathens2 or the ,christian   

faith is resisted after it has been     
accepted1 and this either in the figure1
 and such is the unbelief of the ,jews1 
or in the very manifestation of truth1  
and such is the unbelief of heretics4   
,hence we may1 in a general way1 reckon 
these three as species of unbelief4     
,if1 however1 the species of unbelief be
 distinguished according to the various 
errors that occur in matters of faith1  
there are not determinate species of    
unbelief3 for errors can be multiplied  
indefinitely1 as ,augustine observes    
7,de ,haeresibus74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,the formal aspect of a sin can be      
considered in two ways4 ,first1         
according to the intention of the       
sinner1 in which case the thing to which
 the sinner turns is the formal object  
of his sin1 and determines the various  
species of that sin4 ,secondly1 it may  
be considered as an evil1 and in this   
case the good which is forsaken is the  
formal object of the sin2 which however 
does not derive its species from this   

point of view1 in fact it is a          
privation4 ,we must therefore reply that
 the object of unbelief is the ,first   
,truth considered as that which unbelief
 forsakes1 but its formal aspect1       
considered as that to which unbelief    
turns1 is the false opinion that it     
follows3 and it is from this point of   
view that unbelief derives its various  
species4 ,hence1 even as charity is one1
 because it adheres to the ,sovereign   
,good1 while there are various species  
of vice opposed to charity1 which turn  
away from the ,sovereign ,good by       
turning to various temporal goods1 and  
also in respect of various inordinate   
relations to ,god1 so too1 faith is one 
virtue through adhering to the one      
,first ,truth1 yet there are many       
species of unbelief1 because unbelievers
 follow many false opinions4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,this argument considers the  
various species of unbelief according to
 various points in which errors occur4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since faith is one    

because it believes in many things in   
relation to one1 so may unbelief1       
although it errs in many things1 be one 
in so far as all those things are       
related to one4 ,yet nothing hinders one
 man from erring in various species of  
unbelief1 even as one man may be subject
 to various vices1 and to various bodily
 diseases4   ,,sixth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
the ,unbelief of ,pagans or ,heathens   
,is ,graver ,than ,other ,kinds8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
unbelief of heathens or pagans is graver
 than other kinds4 ,for just as bodily  
disease is graver according as it       
endangers the health of a more important
 member of the body1 so does sin appear 
to be graver1 according as it is opposed
 to that which holds a more important   
place in virtue4 ,now that which is most
 important in faith1 is belief in the   
unity of ,god1 from which the heathens  
deviate by believing in many gods4      
,therefore their unbelief is the gravest

 of all4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 among     
heresies1 the more detestable are those 
which contradict the truth of faith in  
more numerous and more important points3
 thus1 the heresy of ,arius1 who severed
 the ,godhead1 was more detestable than 
that of ,nestorius who severed the      
humanity of ,christ from the ,person of 
,god the ,son4 ,now the heathens deny   
the faith in more numerous and more     
important points than ,jews and         
heretics2 since they do not accept the  
faith at all4 ,therefore their unbelief 
is the gravest4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1    
every good diminishes evil4 ,now there  
is some good in the ,jews1 since they   
believe in the ,old ,testament as being 
from ,god1 and there is some good in    
heretics1 since they venerate the ,new  
,testament4 ,therefore they sin less    
grievously than heathens1 who receive   
neither ,testament4  ,on the contrary1  
,it is written 7#b ,pet4 #b3ba73 ,it had
 been better for them not to have known 
the way of justice1 than after they have

 known it1 to turn back4 ,now the       
heathens have not known the way of      
justice1 whereas heretics and ,jews have
 abandoned it after knowing it in some  
way4 ,therefore theirs is the graver    
sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above  
7,a4 #e71 two things may be considered  
in unbelief4 ,one of these is its       
relation to faith3 and from this point  
of view1 he who resists the faith after 
accepting it1 sins more grievously      
against faith1 than he who resists it   
without having accepted it1 even as he  
who fails to fulfil what he has         
promised1 sins more grievously than if  
he had never promised it4 ,in this way  
the unbelief of heretics1 who confess   
their belief in the ,gospel1 and resist 
that faith by corrupting it1 is a more  
grievous sin than that of the ,jews1 who
 have never accepted the ,gospel faith4 
,since1 however1 they accepted the      
figure of that faith in the ,old ,law1  
which they corrupt by their false       
interpretations1 their unbelief is a    

more grievous sin than that of the      
heathens1 because the latter have not   
accepted the ,gospel faith in any way at
 all4  ,the second thing to be          
considered in unbelief is the corruption
 of matters of faith4 ,in this respect1 
since heathens err on more points than  
,jews1 and these in more points than    
heretics1 the unbelief of heathens is   
more grievous than the unbelief of the  
,jews1 and that of the ,jews than that  
of the heretics1 except in such cases as
 that of the ,manichees1 who1 in matters
 of faith1 err even more than heathens  
do4  ,of these two gravities the first  
surpasses the second from the point of  
view of guilt2 since1 as stated above   
7,a4 #a7 unbelief has the character of  
guilt1 from its resisting faith rather  
than from the mere absence of faith1 for
 the latter as was stated 7,a4 #a7 seems
 rather to bear the character of        
punishment4 ,hence1 speaking absolutely1
 the unbelief of heretics is the worst4 
,this suffices for the ,replies to the  

,objections4   ,,seventh ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,one ,ought to ,dispute with            
,unbelievers in ,public8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that one ought not to   
dispute with unbelievers in public4 ,for
 the ,apostle says 7#b ,tim4 #b3ad73    
,contend not in words1 for it is to no  
profit1 but to the subverting of the    
hearers4 ,but it is impossible to       
dispute with unbelievers publicly       
without contending in words4 ,therefore 
one ought not to dispute publicly with  
unbelievers4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the   
law of ,martianus ,augustus confirmed by
 the canons 99,de ,sum4 ,trin4 ,cod4    
lib4 i1 leg4 ,nemo expresses itself     
thus3 ,it is an insult to the judgment  
of the most religious synod1 if anyone  
ventures to debate or dispute in public 
about matters which have once been      
judged and disposed of4 ,now all matters
 of faith have been decided by the holy 
councils4 ,therefore it is an insult to 
the councils1 and consequently a grave  

sin to presume to dispute in public     
about matters of faith4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 disputations are conducted by 
means of arguments4 ,but an argument is 
a reason in settlement of a dubious     
matter3 whereas things that are of      
faith1 being most certain1 ought not to 
be a matter of doubt4 ,therefore one    
ought not to dispute in public about    
matters of faith4  ,on the contrary1 ,it
 is written 7,acts #i3bb1 #bi7 that     
,saul increased much more in strength1  
and confounded the ,jews1 and that he   
spoke 4 4 4 to the gentiles and disputed
 with the ,greeks4  ,i answer that1 ,in 
disputing about the faith1 two things   
must be observed3 one on the part of the
 disputant2 the other on the part of his
 hearers4 ,on the part of the disputant1
 we must consider his intention4 ,for if
 he were to dispute as though he had    
doubts about the faith1 and did not hold
 the truth of faith for certain1 and as 
though he intended to probe it with     
arguments1 without doubt he would sin1  

as being doubtful of the faith and an   
unbeliever4 ,on the other hand1 it is   
praiseworthy to dispute about the faith 
in order to confute errors1 or for      
practice4  ,on the part of the hearers  
we must consider whether those who hear 
the disputation are instructed and firm 
in the faith1 or simple and wavering4   
,as to those who are well instructed and
 firm in the faith1 there can be no     
danger in disputing about the faith in  
their presence4 ,but as to simple-minded
 people1 we must make a distinction2    
because either they are provoked and    
molested by unbelievers1 for instance1  
,jews or heretics1 or pagans who strive 
to corrupt the faith in them1 or else   
they are not subject to provocation in  
this matter1 as in those countries where
 there are no unbelievers4 ,in the first
 case it is necessary to dispute in     
public about the faith1 provided there  
be those who are equal and adapted to   
the task of confuting errors2 since in  
this way simple people are strengthened 

in the faith1 and unbelievers are       
deprived of the opportunity to deceive1 
while if those who ought to withstand   
the perverters of the truth of faith    
were silent1 this would tend to         
strengthen error4 ,hence ,gregory says  
7,pastor4 ii1 #d73 ,even as a           
thoughtless speech gives rise to error1 
so does an indiscreet silence leave     
those in error who might have been      
instructed4 ,on the other hand1 in the  
second case it is dangerous to dispute  
in public about the faith1 in the       
presence of simple people1 whose faith  
for this very reason is more firm1 that 
they have never heard anything differing
 from what they believe4 ,hence it is   
not expedient for them to hear what     
unbelievers have to say against the     
faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle  
does not entirely forbid disputations1  
but such as are inordinate1 and consist 
of contentious words rather than of     
sound speeches4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that 
law forbade those public disputations   

about the faith1 which arise from       
doubting the faith1 but not those which 
are for the safeguarding thereof4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one ought to dispute  
about matters of faith1 not as though   
one doubted about them1 but in order to 
make the truth known1 and to confute    
errors4 ,for1 in order to confirm the   
faith1 it is necessary sometimes to     
dispute with unbelievers1 sometimes by  
defending the faith1 according to #a    
,pet4 #c3ae3 ,being ready always to     
satisfy everyone that asketh you a      
reason of that hope and faith which is  
in you 99,vulg43 ',of that hope which is
 in you'2 ,st4 ,thomas' reading is      
apparently taken from ,bede4 ,sometimes 
again1 it is necessary1 in order to     
convince those who are in error1        
according to ,titus #a3i3 ,that he may  
be able to exhort in sound doctrine and 
to convince the gainsayers4   ,,eighth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #h  
,whether ,unbelievers ,ought to ,be     
,compelled to the ,faith8  ,objection   

#a3 ,it would seem that unbelievers     
ought by no means to be compelled to the
 faith4 ,for it is written 7,matt4      
#ac3bh7 that the servants of the        
householder1 in whose field cockle had  
been sown1 asked him3 ,wilt thou that we
 go and gather it up8 and that he       
answered3 ,no1 lest perhaps gathering up
 the cockle1 you root up the wheat also 
together with it3 on which passage      
,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xlvi in         
,matth473 ,our ,lord says this so as to 
forbid the slaying of men4 ,for it is   
not right to slay heretics1 because if  
you do you will necessarily slay many   
innocent persons4 ,therefore it seems   
that for the same reason unbelievers    
ought not to be compelled to the faith4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 we read in the      
,decretals 7,dist4 xlv can41 ,de        
,judaeis73 ,the holy synod prescribes1  
with regard to the ,jews1 that for the  
future1 none are to be compelled to     
believe4 ,therefore1 in like manner1    
neither should unbelievers be compelled 

to the faith4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1      
,augustine says 7,tract4 xxvi in ,joan47
 that it is possible for a man to do    
other things against his will1 but he   
cannot believe unless he is willing4    
,therefore it seems that unbelievers    
ought not to be compelled to the faith4 
,obj4 #d3 ,it is said in ,god's person  
7,ezech4 #ah3cb 99,ezech4 #cc3aa73 ,i   
desire not the death of the sinner      
,vulg43 'of him that dieth'4 ,now we    
ought to conform our will to the ,divine
 will1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#ai1 ,,aa4 #i1 #aj74 ,therefore we      
should not even wish unbelievers to be  
put to death4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is 
written 7,luke #ad3bc73 ,go out into the
 highways and hedges2 and compel them to
 come in4 ,now men enter into the house 
of ,god1 i4e4 into ,holy ,church1 by    
faith4 ,therefore some ought to be      
compelled to the faith4  ,i answer that1
 ,among unbelievers there are some who  
have never received the faith1 such as  
the heathens and the ,jews3 and these   

are by no means to be compelled to the  
faith1 in order that they may believe1  
because to believe depends on the will3 
nevertheless they should be compelled by
 the faithful1 if it be possible to do  
so1 so that they do not hinder the      
faith1 by their blasphemies1 or by their
 evil persuasions1 or even by their open
 persecutions4 ,it is for this reason   
that ,christ's faithful often wage war  
with unbelievers1 not indeed for the    
purpose of forcing them to believe1     
because even if they were to conquer    
them1 and take them prisoners1 they     
should still leave them free to believe1
 if they will1 but in order to prevent  
them from hindering the faith of        
,christ4  ,on the other hand1 there are 
unbelievers who at some time have       
accepted the faith1 and professed it1   
such as heretics and all apostates3 such
 should be submitted even to bodily     
compulsion1 that they may fulfil what   
they have promised1 and hold what they1 
at one time1 received4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3

 ,some have understood the authority    
quoted to forbid1 not the               
excommunication but the slaying of      
heretics1 as appears from the words of  
,chrysostom4 ,augustine too1 says 7,ep4 
ad ,vincent4 xciii7 of himself3 ,it was 
once my opinion that none should be     
compelled to union with ,christ1 that we
 should deal in words1 and fight with   
arguments4 ,however this opinion of mine
 is undone1 not by words of             
contradiction1 but by convincing        
examples4 ,because fear of the law was  
so profitable1 that many say3 ,thanks be
 to the ,lord ,who has broken our chains
 asunder4 ,accordingly the meaning of   
,our ,lord's words1 ,suffer both to grow
 until the harvest1 must be gathered    
from those which precede1 lest perhaps  
gathering up the cockle1 you root the   
wheat also together with it4 ,for1      
,augustine says 7,contra ,ep4 ,parmen4  
iii1 #b7 these words show that when this
 is not to be feared1 that is to say1   
when a man's crime is so publicly known1

 and so hateful to all1 that he has no  
defenders1 or none such as might cause a
 schism1 the severity of discipline     
should not slacken4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,those ,jews who have in no way received
 the faith1 ought not by no means to be 
compelled to the faith3 if1 however1    
they have received it1 they ought to be 
compelled to keep it1 as is stated in   
the same chapter4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,just as taking a vow is a matter of    
will1 and keeping a vow1 a matter of    
obligation1 so acceptance of the faith  
is a matter of the will1 whereas keeping
 the faith1 when once one has received  
it1 is a matter of obligation4          
,wherefore heretics should be compelled 
to keep the faith4 ,thus ,augustine says
 to the ,count ,boniface 7,ep4 clxxxv73 
,what do these people mean by crying out
 continually3 ',we may believe or not   
believe just as we choose4 ,whom did    
,christ compel8' ,they should remember  
that ,christ at first compelled ,paul   
and afterwards taught ,him4  ,reply     

,obj4 #d3 ,as ,augustine says in the    
same letter1 none of us wishes any      
heretic to perish4 ,but the house of    
,david did not deserve to have peace1   
unless his son ,absalom had been killed 
in the war which he had raised against  
his father4 ,thus if the ,catholic      
,church gathers together some of the    
perdition of others1 she heals the      
sorrow of her maternal heart by the     
delivery of so many nations4   ,,ninth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #i  
,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to ,communicate
 with ,unbelievers8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that it is lawful to         
communicate with unbelievers4 ,for the  
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #aj3bg73 ,if any
 of them that believe not1 invite you1  
and you be willing to go1 eat of        
anything that is set before you4 ,and   
,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xxv super       
,epist4 ad ,heb473 ,if you wish to go to
 dine with pagans1 we permit it without 
any reservation4 ,now to sit at table   
with anyone is to communicate with him4 

,therefore it is lawful to communicate  
with unbelievers4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #e3ab73     
,what have ,i to do to judge them that  
are without8 ,now unbelievers are       
without4 ,when1 therefore1 the ,church  
forbids the faithful to communicate with
 certain people1 it seems that they     
ought not to be forbidden to communicate
 with unbelievers4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
a master cannot employ his servant1     
unless he communicate with him1 at least
 by word1 since the master moves his    
servant by command4 ,now ,christians can
 have unbelievers1 either ,jews1 or     
pagans1 or ,saracens1 for servants4     
,therefore they can lawfully communicate
 with them4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
written 7,deut4 #g3b1 #c73 ,thou shalt  
make no league with them1 nor show mercy
 to them2 neither shalt thou make       
marriages with them3 and a gloss on     
,lev4 #ae3ai1 ,the woman who at the     
return of the month1 etc4 says3 ,it is  
so necessary to shun idolatry1 that we  

should not come in touch with idolaters 
or their disciples1 nor have any        
dealings with them4  ,i answer that1    
,communication with a particular person 
is forbidden to the faithful1 in two    
ways3 first1 as a punishment of the     
person with whom they are forbidden to  
communicate2 secondly1 for the safety of
 those who are forbidden to communicate 
with others4 ,both motives can be       
gathered from the ,apostle's words 7#a  
,cor4 #e3f74 ,for after he had          
pronounced sentence of excommunication1 
he adds as his reason3 ,know you not    
that a little leaven corrupts the whole 
lump8 and afterwards he adds the reason 
on the part of the punishment inflicted 
by the sentence of the ,church when he  
says 7#a ,cor4 #e3ab73 ,do not you judge
 them that are within8  ,accordingly1 in
 the first way the ,church does not     
forbid the faithful to communicate with 
unbelievers1 who have not in any way    
received the ,christian faith1 viz4 with
 pagans and ,jews1 because she has not  

the right to exercise spiritual judgment
 over them1 but only temporal judgment1 
in the case when1 while dwelling among  
,christians they are guilty of some     
misdemeanor1 and are condemned by the   
faithful to some temporal punishment4   
,on the other hand1 in this way1 i4e4 as
 a punishment1 the ,church forbids the  
faithful to communicate with those      
unbelievers who have forsaken the faith 
they once received1 either by corrupting
 the faith1 as heretics1 or by entirely 
renouncing the faith1 as apostates1     
because the ,church pronounces sentence 
of excommunication on both4  ,with      
regard to the second way1 it seems that 
one ought to distinguish according to   
the various conditions of persons1      
circumstances and time4 ,for some are   
firm in the faith2 and so it is to be   
hoped that their communicating with     
unbelievers will lead to the conversion 
of the latter rather than to the        
aversion of the faithful from the faith4
 ,these are not to be forbidden to      

communicate with unbelievers who have   
not received the faith1 such as pagans  
or ,jews1 especially if there be some   
urgent necessity for so doing4 ,but in  
the case of simple people and those who 
are weak in the faith1 whose perversion 
is to be feared as a probable result1   
they should be forbidden to communicate 
with unbelievers1 and especially to be  
on very familiar terms with them1 or to 
communicate with them without necessity4
  ,this suffices for the ,reply to the  
,first ,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,the ,church does not exercise judgment 
against unbelievers in the point of     
inflicting spiritual punishment on them3
 but she does exercise judgment over    
some of them in the matter of temporal  
punishment4 ,it is under this head that 
sometimes the ,church1 for certain      
special sins1 withdraws the faithful    
from communication with certain         
unbelievers4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is
 more probability that a servant who is 
ruled by his master's commands1 will be 

converted to the faith of his master who
 is a believer1 than if the case were   
the reverse3 and so the faithful are not
 forbidden to have unbelieving servants4
 ,if1 however1 the master were in       
danger1 through communicating with such 
a servant1 he should send him away1     
according to ,our ,lord's command       
7,matt4 #ah3h73 ,if 4 4 4 thy foot      
scandalize thee1 cut it off1 and cast it
 from thee4  ,with regard to the        
argument in the contrary 99,the ,leonine
 ,edition gives this solution before the
 ,reply ,obj4 #b sense the reply is that
 the ,lord gave this command in         
reference to those nations into whose   
territory the ,jews were about to enter4
 ,for the latter were inclined to       
idolatry1 so that it was to be feared   
lest1 through frequent dealings with    
those nations1 they should be estranged 
from the faith3 hence the text goes on  
7,deut4 #g3d73 ,for she will turn away  
thy son from following ,me4   ,,tenth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #aj 

,whether ,unbelievers ,may ,have        
,authority or ,dominion ,over the       
,faithful8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that unbelievers may have authority
 or dominion over the faithful4 ,for the
 ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #f3a73         
,whosoever are servants under the yoke1 
let them count their masters worthy of  
all honor3 and it is clear that he is   
speaking of unbelievers1 since he adds  
7#a ,tim4 #f3b73 ,but they that have    
believing masters1 let them not despise 
them4 ,moreover it is written 7#a ,pet4 
#b3ah73 ,servants be subject to your    
masters with all fear1 not only to the  
good and gentle1 but also to the        
froward4 ,now this command would not be 
contained in the apostolic teaching     
unless unbelievers could have authority 
over the faithful4 ,therefore it seems  
that unbelievers can have authority over
 the faithful4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all 
the members of a prince's household are 
his subjects4 ,now some of the faithful 
were members of unbelieving princes'    

households1 for we read in the ,epistle 
to the ,philippians 7#d3bb73 ,all the   
saints salute you1 especially they that 
are of ,caesar's household1 referring to
 ,nero1 who was an unbeliever4          
,therefore unbelievers can have         
authority over the faithful4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 according to the ,philosopher 
7,polit4 i1 #b7 a slave is his master's 
instrument in matters concerning        
everyday life1 even as a craftsman's    
laborer is his instrument in matters    
concerning the working of his art4 ,now1
 in such matters1 a believer can be     
subject to an unbeliever1 for he may    
work on an unbeliever's farm4 ,therefore
 unbelievers may have authority over the
 faithful even as to dominion4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,those who are in authority   
can pronounce judgment on those over    
whom they are placed4 ,but unbelievers  
cannot pronounce judgment on the        
faithful1 for the ,apostle says 7#a     
,cor4 #f3a73 ,dare any of you1 having a 
matter against another1 go to be judged 

before the unjust1 i4e4 unbelievers1 and
 not before the saints8 ,therefore it   
seems that unbelievers cannot have      
authority over the faithful4  ,i answer 
that1 ,that this question may be        
considered in two ways4 ,first1 we may  
speak of dominion or authority of       
unbelievers over the faithful as of a   
thing to be established for the first   
time4 ,this ought by no means to be     
allowed1 since it would provoke scandal 
and endanger the faith1 for subjects are
 easily influenced by their superiors to
 comply with their commands1 unless the 
subjects are of great virtue3 moreover  
unbelievers hold the faith in contempt1 
if they see the faithful fall away4     
,hence the ,apostle forbade the faithful
 to go to law before an unbelieving     
judge4 ,and so the ,church altogether   
forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion 
over believers1 or to have authority    
over them in any capacity whatever4     
,secondly1 we may speak of dominion or  
authority1 as already in force3 and here

 we must observe that dominion and      
authority are institutions of human law1
 while the distinction between faithful 
and unbelievers arises from the ,divine 
law4 ,now the ,divine law which is the  
law of grace1 does not do away with     
human law which is the law of natural   
reason4 ,wherefore the distinction      
between faithful and unbelievers1       
considered in itself1 does not do away  
with dominion and authority of          
unbelievers over the faithful4          
,nevertheless this right of dominion or 
authority can be justly done away with  
by the sentence or ordination of the    
,church who has the authority of ,god3  
since unbelievers in virtue of their    
unbelief deserve to forfeit their power 
over the faithful who are converted into
 children of ,god4  ,this the ,church   
does sometimes1 and sometimes not4 ,for 
among those unbelievers who are subject1
 even in temporal matters1 to the       
,church and her members1 the ,church    
made the law that if the slave of a ,jew

 became a ,christian1 he should         
forthwith receive his freedom1 without  
paying any price1 if he should be a     
vernaculus1 i4e4 born in slavery2 and   
likewise if1 when yet an unbeliever1 he 
had been bought for his service3 if1    
however1 he had been bought for sale1   
then he should be offered for sale      
within three months4 ,nor does the      
,church harm them in this1 because since
 those ,jews themselves are subject to  
the ,church1 she can dispose of their   
possessions1 even as secular princes    
have enacted many laws to be observed by
 their subjects1 in favor of liberty4   
,on the other hand1 the ,church has not 
applied the above law to those          
unbelievers who are not subject to her  
or her members1 in temporal matters1    
although she has the right to do so3 and
 this1 in order to avoid scandal1 for as
 ,our ,lord showed 7,matt4 #ag3be1 #bf7 
that ,he could be excused from paying   
the tribute1 because the children are   
free1 yet ,he ordered the tribute to be 

paid in order to avoid giving scandal4  
,thus ,paul too1 after saying that      
servants should honor their masters1    
adds1 lest the name of the ,lord and    
,his doctrine be blasphemed4  ,this     
suffices for the ,reply to the ,first   
,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the      
authority of ,caesar preceded the       
distinction of faithful from            
unbelievers4 ,hence it was not cancelled
 by the conversion of some to the faith4
 ,moreover it was a good thing that     
there should be a few of the faithful in
 the emperor's household1 that they     
might defend the rest of the faithful4  
,thus the ,blessed ,sebastian encouraged
 those whom he saw faltering under      
torture1 and1 the while1 remained hidden
 under the military cloak in the palace 
of ,diocletian4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3       
,slaves are subject to their masters for
 their whole lifetime1 and are subject  
to their overseers in everything3       
whereas the craftsman's laborer is      
subject to him for certain special      

works4 ,hence it would be more dangerous
 for unbelievers to have dominion or    
authority over the faithful1 than that  
they should be allowed to employ them in
 some craft4 ,wherefore the ,church     
permits ,christians to work on the land 
of ,jews1 because this does not entail  
their living together with them4 ,thus  
,solomon besought the ,king of ,tyre to 
send master workmen to hew the trees1 as
 related in #c ,kings #e3f4 ,yet1 if    
there be reason to fear that the        
faithful will be perverted by such      
communications and dealings1 they should
 be absolutely forbidden4   ,,eleventh  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #aa 
,whether the ,rites of ,unbelievers     
,ought to ,be ,tolerated8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that rites of        
unbelievers ought not to be tolerated4  
,for it is evident that unbelievers sin 
in observing their rites3 and not to    
prevent a sin1 when one can1 seems to   
imply consent therein1 as a gloss       
observes on ,rom4 #a3cb3 ,not only they 

that do them1 but they also that consent
 to them that do them4 ,therefore it is 
a sin to tolerate their rites4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 the rites of the ,jews are
 compared to idolatry1 because a gloss  
on ,gal4 #e3a1 ,be not held again under 
the yoke of bondage1 says3 ,the bondage 
of that law was not lighter than that of
 idolatry4 ,but it would not be         
allowable for anyone to observe the     
rites of idolatry1 in fact ,christian   
princes at first caused the temples of  
idols to be closed1 and afterwards1 to  
be destroyed1 as ,augustine relates 7,de
 ,civ4 ,dei xviii1 #ed74 ,therefore it  
follows that even the rites of ,jews    
ought not to be tolerated4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 unbelief is the greatest of   
sins1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,now    
other sins such as adultery1 theft and  
the like1 are not tolerated1 but are    
punishable by law4 ,therefore neither   
ought the rites of unbelievers to be    
tolerated4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory  
99,regist4 xi1 ,ep4 #ae3 cf4 ,decret41  

dist4 xlv1 can41 ,qui sincera says1     
speaking of the ,jews3 ,they should be  
allowed to observe all their feasts1    
just as hitherto they and their fathers 
have for ages observed them4  ,i answer 
that1 ,human government is derived from 
the ,divine government1 and should      
imitate it4 ,now although ,god is       
all-powerful and supremely good1        
nevertheless ,he allows certain evils to
 take place in the universe1 which ,he  
might prevent1 lest1 without them1      
greater goods might be forfeited1 or    
greater evils ensue4 ,accordingly in    
human government also1 those who are in 
authority1 rightly tolerate certain     
evils1 lest certain goods be lost1 or   
certain greater evils be incurred3 thus 
,augustine says 7,de ,ordine ii1 #d73   
,if you do away with harlots1 the world 
will be convulsed with lust4 ,hence1    
though unbelievers sin in their rites1  
they may be tolerated1 either on account
 of some good that ensues therefrom1 or 
because of some evil avoided4 ,thus from

 the fact that the ,jews observe their  
rites1 which1 of old1 foreshadowed the  
truth of the faith which we hold1 there 
follows this good--that our very enemies
 bear witness to our faith1 and that our
 faith is represented in a figure1 so to
 speak4 ,for this reason they are       
tolerated in the observance of their    
rites4  ,on the other hand1 the rites of
 other unbelievers1 which are neither   
truthful nor profitable are by no means 
to be tolerated1 except perchance in    
order to avoid an evil1 e4g4 the scandal
 or disturbance that might ensue1 or    
some hindrance to the salvation of those
 who if they were unmolested might      
gradually be converted to the faith4    
,for this reason the ,church1 at times1 
has tolerated the rites even of heretics
 and pagans1 when unbelievers were very 
numerous4  ,this suffices for the       
,replies to the ,objections4   ,,twelfth
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #ab
  ,whether the ,children of ,jews and   
,other ,unbelievers ,ought to ,be       

,baptized ,against ,their ,parents'     
,will8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that the children of ,jews and of other 
unbelievers ought to be baptized against
 their parents' will4 ,for the bond of  
marriage is stronger than the right of  
parental authority over children1 since 
the right of parental authority can be  
made to cease1 when a son is set at     
liberty2 whereas the marriage bond      
cannot be severed by man1 according to  
,matt4 #ai3f3 ,what 4 4 4 ,god hath     
joined together let no man put asunder4 
,and yet the marriage bond is broken on 
account of unbelief3 for the ,apostle   
says 7#a ,cor4 #g3ae73 ,if the          
unbeliever depart1 let him depart4 ,for 
a brother or sister is not under        
servitude in such cases3 and a canon    
99,can4 ,uxor legitima1 and             
,idololatria1 qu4 i says that if the    
unbelieving partner is unwilling to     
abide with the other1 without insult to 
their ,creator1 then the other partner  
is not bound to cohabitation4 ,much     

more1 therefore1 does unbelief abrogate 
the right of unbelieving parents'       
authority over their children3 and      
consequently their children may be      
baptized against their parents' will4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one is more bound to
 succor a man who is in danger of       
everlasting death1 than one who is in   
danger of temporal death4 ,now it would 
be a sin1 if one saw a man in danger of 
temporal death and failed to go to his  
aid4 ,since1 then1 the children of ,jews
 and other unbelievers are in danger of 
everlasting death1 should they be left  
to their parents who would imbue them   
with their unbelief1 it seems that they 
ought to be taken away from them and    
baptized1 and instructed in the faith4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the children of a   
bondsman are themselves bondsmen1 and   
under the power of his master4 ,now the 
,jews are bondsmen of kings and princes3
 therefore their children are also4     
,consequently kings and princes have the
 power to do what they will with ,jewish

 children4 ,therefore no injustice is   
committed if they baptize them against  
their parents' wishes4  ,obj4 #d3       
,further1 every man belongs more to     
,god1 from ,whom he has his soul1 than  
to his carnal father1 from whom he has  
his body4 ,therefore it is not unjust if
 ,jewish children be taken away from    
their parents1 and consecrated to ,god  
in ,baptism4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1       
,baptism avails for salvation more than 
preaching does1 since ,baptism removes  
forthwith the stain of sin and the debt 
of punishment1 and opens the gate of    
heaven4 ,now if danger ensue through not
 preaching1 it is imputed to him who    
omitted to preach1 according to the     
words of ,ezech4 #cc3f about the man who
 sees the sword coming and sounds not   
the trumpet4 ,much more therefore1 if   
,jewish children are lost through not   
being baptized are they accounted guilty
 of sin1 who could have baptized them   
and did not4  ,on the contrary1         
,injustice should be done to no man4    

,now it would be an injustice to ,jews  
if their children were to be baptized   
against their will1 since they would    
lose the rights of parental authority   
over their children as soon as these    
were ,christians4 ,therefore these      
should not be baptized against their    
parents' will4  ,i answer that1 ,the    
custom of the ,church has very great    
authority and ought to be jealously     
observed in all things1 since the very  
doctrine of catholic doctors derives its
 authority from the ,church4 ,hence we  
ought to abide by the authority of the  
,church rather than by that of an       
,augustine or a ,jerome or of any doctor
 whatever4 ,now it was never the custom 
of the ,church to baptize the children  
of the ,jews against the will of their  
parents1 although at times past there   
have been many very powerful catholic   
princes like ,constantine and           
,theodosius1 with whom most holy bishops
 have been on most friendly terms1 as   
,sylvester with ,constantine1 and       

,ambrose with ,theodosius1 who would    
certainly not have failed to obtain this
 favor from them if it had been at all  
reasonable4 ,it seems therefore         
hazardous to repeat this assertion1 that
 the children of ,jews should be        
baptized against their parents' wishes1 
in contradiction to the ,church's custom
 observed hitherto4  ,there are two     
reasons for this custom4 ,one is on     
account of the danger to the faith4 ,for
 children baptized before coming to the 
use of reason1 afterwards when they come
 to perfect age1 might easily be        
persuaded by their parents to renounce  
what they had unknowingly embraced2 and 
this would be detrimental to the faith4 
,the other reason is that it is against 
natural justice4 ,for a child is by     
nature part of its father3 thus1 at     
first1 it is not distinct from its      
parents as to its body1 so long as it is
 enfolded within its mother's womb2 and 
later on after birth1 and before it has 
the use of its free-will1 it is enfolded

 in the care of its parents1 which is   
like a spiritual womb1 for so long as   
man has not the use of reason1 he       
differs not from an irrational animal2  
so that even as an ox or a horse belongs
 to someone who1 according to the civil 
law1 can use them when he likes1 as his 
own instrument1 so1 according to the    
natural law1 a son1 before coming to the
 use of reason1 is under his father's   
care4 ,hence it would be contrary to    
natural justice1 if a child1 before     
coming to the use of reason1 were to be 
taken away from its parents' custody1 or
 anything done to it against its        
parents' wish4 ,as soon1 however1 as it 
begins to have the use of its free-will1
 it begins to belong to itself1 and is  
able to look after itself1 in matters   
concerning the ,divine or the natural   
law1 and then it should be induced1 not 
by compulsion but by persuasion1 to     
embrace the faith3 it can then consent  
to the faith1 and be baptized1 even     
against its parents' wish2 but not      

before it comes to the use of reason4   
,hence it is said of the children of the
 fathers of old that they were saved in 
the faith of their parents2 whereby we  
are given to understand that it is the  
parents' duty to look after the         
salvation of their children1 especially 
before they come to the use of reason4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the marriage bond1 
both husband and wife have the use of   
the free-will1 and each can assent to   
the faith without the other's consent4  
,but this does not apply to a child     
before it comes to the use of reason3   
yet the comparison holds good after the 
child has come to the use of reason1 if 
it is willing to be converted4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,no one should be snatched    
from natural death against the order of 
civil law3 for instance1 if a man were  
condemned by the judge to temporal      
death1 nobody ought to rescue him by    
violence3 hence no one ought to break   
the order of the natural law1 whereby a 
child is in the custody of its father1  

in order to rescue it from the danger of
 everlasting death4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,jews are bondsmen of princes by civil  
bondage1 which does not exclude the     
order of natural or ,divine law4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #d3 ,man is directed to ,god by  
his reason1 whereby he can know ,him4   
,hence a child before coming to the use 
of reason1 in the natural order of      
things1 is directed to ,god by its      
parents' reason1 under whose care it    
lies by nature3 and it is for them to   
dispose of the child in all matters     
relating to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the
 peril that ensues from the omission of 
preaching1 threatens only those who are 
entrusted with the duty of preaching4   
,hence it had already been said 7,ezech4
 #c3ag73 ,i have made thee a watchman to
 the children ,vulg43 'house' of        
,israel4 ,on the other hand1 to provide 
the sacraments of salvation for the     
children of unbelievers is the duty of  
their parents4 ,hence it is they whom   
the danger threatens1 if through being  

deprived of the sacraments their        
children fail to obtain salvation4      
,,question #aa  ,,of ,,heresy 7,in ,four
 ,articles7  ,we must now consider      
heresy3 under which head there are four 
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether heresy
 is a kind of unbelief8  7#b7 ,of the   
matter about which it is2  7#c7 ,whether
 heretics should be tolerated8  7#d7    
,whether converts should be received8   
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aa1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,heresy ,is a        
,species of ,unbelief8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that heresy is not a     
species of unbelief4 ,for unbelief is in
 the understanding1 as stated above 7,q4
 #aj1 ,a4 #b74 ,now heresy would seem   
not to pertain to the understanding1 but
 rather to the appetitive power2 for    
,jerome says on ,gal4 #e3ai3 99,cf4     
,decretals xxiv1 qu4 iii1 cap4 #bg ,the 
works of the flesh are manifest3 ,heresy
 is derived from a ,greek word meaning  
choice1 whereby a man makes choice of   
that school which he deems best4 ,but   

choice is an act of the appetitive      
power1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#ac1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore heresy is not a
 species of unbelief4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 vice takes its species chiefly
 from its end2 hence the ,philosopher   
says 7,ethic4 v1 #b7 that he who commits
 adultery that he may steal1 is a thief 
rather than an adulterer4 ,now the end  
of heresy is temporal profit1 especially
 lordship and glory1 which belong to the
 vice of pride or covetousness3 for     
,augustine says 7,de ,util4 ,credendi i7
 that a heretic is one who either       
devises or follows false and new        
opinions1 for the sake of some temporal 
profit1 especially that he may lord and 
be honored above others4 ,therefore     
heresy is a species of pride rather than
 of unbelief4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since
 unbelief is in the understanding1 it   
would seem not to pertain to the flesh4 
,now heresy belongs to the works of the 
flesh1 for the ,apostle says 7,gal4     
#e3ai73 ,the works of the flesh are     

manifest1 which are fornication1        
uncleanness1 and among the others1 he   
adds1 dissensions1 sects1 which are the 
same as heresies4 ,therefore heresy is  
not a species of unbelief4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,falsehood is contrary to     
truth4 ,now a heretic is one who devises
 or follows false or new opinions4      
,therefore heresy is opposed to the     
truth1 on which faith is founded2 and   
consequently it is a species of         
unbelief4  ,i answer that1 ,the word    
heresy as stated in the first objection 
denotes a choosing4 ,now choice as      
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #c7 
is about things directed to the end1 the
 end being presupposed4 ,now1 in matters
 of faith1 the will assents to some     
truth1 as to its proper good1 as was    
shown above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #c73 wherefore 
that which is the chief truth1 has the  
character of last end1 while those which
 are secondary truths1 have the         
character of being directed to the end4 
,now1 whoever believes1 assents to      

someone's words2 so that1 in every form 
of unbelief1 the person to whose words  
assent is given seems to hold the chief 
place and to be the end as it were2     
while the things by holding which one   
assents to that person hold a secondary 
place4 ,consequently he that holds the  
,christian faith aright1 assents1 by his
 will1 to ,christ1 in those things which
 truly belong to ,his doctrine4         
,accordingly there are two ways in which
 a man may deviate from the rectitude of
 the ,christian faith4 ,first1 because  
he is unwilling to assent to ,christ3   
and such a man has an evil will1 so to  
say1 in respect of the very end4 ,this  
belongs to the species of unbelief in   
pagans and ,jews4 ,secondly1 because1   
though he intends to assent to ,christ1 
yet he fails in his choice of those     
things wherein he assents to ,christ1   
because he chooses not what ,christ     
really taught1 but the suggestions of   
his own mind4  ,therefore heresy is a   
species of unbelief1 belonging to those 

who profess the ,christian faith1 but   
corrupt its dogmas4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,choice regards unbelief in the same way
 as the will regards faith1 as stated   
above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,vices take    
their species from their proximate end1 
while1 from their remote end1 they take 
their genus and cause4 ,thus in the case
 of adultery committed for the sake of  
theft1 there is the species of adultery 
taken from its proper end and object2   
but the ultimate end shows that the act 
of adultery is both the result of the   
theft1 and is included under it1 as an  
effect under its cause1 or a species    
under its genus1 as appears from what we
 have said about acts in general        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #g74 ,wherefore1 
as to the case in point also1 the       
proximate end of heresy is adherence to 
one's own false opinion1 and from this  
it derives its species1 while its remote
 end reveals its cause1 viz4 that it    
arises from pride or covetousness4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as heresy is so  

called from its being a choosing 99,from
 the ,greek hairein1 to cut off1 so does
 sect derive its name from its being a  
cutting off 7secando71 as ,isidore      
states 7,etym4 viii1 #c74 ,wherefore    
heresy and sect are the same thing1 and 
each belongs to the works of the flesh1 
not indeed by reason of the act itself  
of unbelief in respect of its proximate 
object1 but by reason of its cause1     
which is either the desire of an undue  
end in which way it arises from pride or
 covetousness1 as stated in the second  
objection1 or some illusion of the      
imagination 7which gives rise to error1 
as the ,philosopher states in ,metaph4  
iv2 ,ed4 ,did4 iii1 #e71 for this       
faculty has a certain connection with   
the flesh1 in as much as its act is     
independent on a bodily organ4          
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aa1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,heresy ,is ,properly
 ,about ,matters of ,faith8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that heresy is not   
properly about matters of faith4 ,for   

just as there are heresies and sects    
among ,christians1 so were there among  
the ,jews1 and ,pharisees1 as ,isidore  
observes 7,etym4 viii1 #c1 #d1 #e74 ,now
 their dissensions were not about       
matters of faith4 ,therefore heresy is  
not about matters of faith1 as though   
they were its proper matter4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 the matter of faith is the    
thing believed4 ,now heresy is not only 
about things1 but also about works1 and 
about interpretations of ,holy ,writ4   
,for ,jerome says on ,gal4 #e3bj that   
whoever expounds the ,scriptures in any 
sense but that of the ,holy ,ghost by   
,whom they were written1 may be called a
 heretic1 though he may not have left   
the ,church3 and elsewhere he says that 
heresies spring up from words spoken    
amiss4 99,st4 ,thomas quotes this saying
 elsewhere1 in ,sent4 iv1 ,d1 #ac1 and  
,,iii1 ,q4 #af1 ,a4 #h1 but it is not to
 be found in ,st4 ,jerome's works4      
,therefore heresy is not properly about 
the matter of faith4  ,obj4 #c3         

,further1 we find the holy doctors      
differing even about matters pertaining 
to the faith1 for example ,augustine and
 ,jerome1 on the question about the     
cessation of the legal observances3 and 
yet this was without any heresy on their
 part4 ,therefore heresy is not properly
 about the matter of faith4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,augustine says against the   
,manichees 99,cf4 ,de ,civ4 ,dei xviii1 
#ea3 ,in ,christ's ,church1 those are   
heretics1 who hold mischievous and      
erroneous opinions1 and when rebuked    
that they may think soundly and rightly1
 offer a stubborn resistance1 and1      
refusing to mend their pernicious and   
deadly doctrines1 persist in defending  
them4 ,now pernicious and deadly        
doctrines are none but those which are  
contrary to the dogmas of faith1 whereby
 the just man liveth 7,rom4 #a3ag74     
,therefore heresy is about matters of   
faith1 as about its proper matter4  ,i  
answer that1 ,we are speaking of heresy 
now as denoting a corruption of the     

,christian faith4 ,now it does not imply
 a corruption of the ,christian faith1  
if a man has a false opinion in matters 
that are not of faith1 for instance1 in 
questions of geometry and so forth1     
which cannot belong to the faith by any 
means2 but only when a person has a     
false opinion about things belonging to 
the faith4  ,now a thing may be of the  
faith in two ways1 as stated above 7,i1 
,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4   
#f1 ad #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,a4 #e71 in 
one way1 directly and principally1 e4g4 
the articles of faith2 in another way1  
indirectly and secondarily1 e4g4 those  
matters1 the denial of which leads to   
the corruption of some article of faith2
 and there may be heresy in either way1 
even as there can be faith4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,just as the heresies of the  
,jews and ,pharisees were about opinions
 relating to ,judaism or ,pharisaism1 so
 also heresies among ,christians are    
about matter touching the ,christian    
faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man is said 

to expound ,holy ,writ in another sense 
than that required by the ,holy ,ghost1 
when he so distorts the meaning of ,holy
 ,writ1 that it is contrary to what the 
,holy ,ghost has revealed4 ,hence it is 
written 7,ezech4 #ac3f7 about the false 
prophets3 ,they have persisted to       
confirm what they have said1 viz4 by    
false interpretations of ,scripture4    
,moreover a man professes his faith by  
the words that he utters1 since         
confession is an act of faith1 as stated
 above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore     
inordinate words about matters of faith 
may lead to corruption of the faith2 and
 hence it is that ,pope ,leo says in a  
letter to ,proterius1 ,bishop of        
,alexandria3 ,the enemies of ,christ's  
cross lie in wait for our every deed and
 word1 so that1 if we but give them the 
slightest pretext1 they may accuse us   
mendaciously of agreeing with           
,nestorius4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as       
,augustine says 7,ep4 xliii7 and we find
 it stated in the ,decretals 7xxiv1 qu4 

#c1 can4 ,dixit ,apostolus73 ,by no     
means should we accuse of heresy those  
who1 however false and perverse their   
opinion may be1 defend it without       
obstinate fervor1 and seek the truth    
with careful anxiety1 ready to mend     
their opinion1 when they have found the 
truth1 because1 to wit1 they do not make
 a choice in contradiction to the       
doctrine of the ,church4 ,accordingly1  
certain doctors seem to have differed   
either in matters the holding of which  
in this or that way is of no            
consequence1 so far as faith is         
concerned1 or even in matters of faith1 
which were not as yet defined by the    
,church2 although if anyone were        
obstinately to deny them after they had 
been defined by the authority of the    
universal ,church1 he would be deemed a 
heretic4 ,this authority resides chiefly
 in the ,sovereign ,pontiff4 ,for we    
read 99,decret4 xxiv1 qu4 #a1 can4      
,quoties3 ,whenever a question of faith 
is in dispute1 ,i think1 that all our   

brethren and fellow bishops ought to    
refer the matter to none other than     
,peter1 as being the source of their    
name and honor1 against whose authority 
neither ,jerome nor ,augustine nor any  
of the holy doctors defended their      
opinion4 ,hence ,jerome says 7,exposit4 
,symbol 99,among the supposititious     
works of ,st4 ,jerome73 ,this1 most     
blessed ,pope1 is the faith that we have
 been taught in the ,catholic ,church4  
,if anything therein has been           
incorrectly or carelessly expressed1 we 
beg that it may be set aright by you who
 hold the faith and see of ,peter4 ,if  
however this1 our profession1 be        
approved by the judgment of your        
apostleship1 whoever may blame me1 will 
prove that he himself is ignorant1 or   
malicious1 or even not a catholic but a 
heretic4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #aa1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,heretics   
,ought to ,be ,tolerated8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it seems that heretics ought to be 
tolerated4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#b   

,tim4 #b3bd1 #be73 ,the servant of the  
,lord must not wrangle 4 4 4 with       
modesty admonishing them that resist the
 truth1 if peradventure ,god may give   
them repentance to know the truth1 and  
they may recover themselves from the    
snares of the devil4 ,now if heretics   
are not tolerated but put to death1 they
 lose the opportunity of repentance4    
,therefore it seems contrary to the     
,apostle's command4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 whatever is necessary in the ,church   
should be tolerated4 ,now heresies are  
necessary in the ,church1 since the     
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #aa3ai73 ,there 
must be 4 4 4 heresies1 that they 4 4 4 
who are reproved1 may be manifest among 
you4 ,therefore it seems that heretics  
should be tolerated4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 the ,master commanded his     
servants 7,matt4 #ac3cj7 to suffer the  
cockle to grow until the harvest1 i4e4  
the end of the world1 as a gloss        
explains it4 ,now holy men explain that 
the cockle denotes heretics4 ,therefore 

heretics should be tolerated4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,titus    
#c3aj1 #aa73 ,a man that is a heretic1  
after the first and second admonition1  
avoid3 knowing that he1 that is such an 
one1 is subverted4  ,i answer that1     
,with regard to heretics two points must
 be observed3 one1 on their own side2   
the other1 on the side of the ,church4  
,on their own side there is the sin1    
whereby they deserve not only to be     
separated from the ,church by           
excommunication1 but also to be severed 
from the world by death4 ,for it is a   
much graver matter to corrupt the faith 
which quickens the soul1 than to forge  
money1 which supports temporal life4    
,wherefore if forgers of money and other
 evil-doers are forthwith condemned to  
death by the secular authority1 much    
more reason is there for heretics1 as   
soon as they are convicted of heresy1 to
 be not only excommunicated but even put
 to death4  ,on the part of the ,church1
 however1 there is mercy which looks to 

the conversion of the wanderer1         
wherefore she condemns not at once1 but 
after the first and second admonition1  
as the ,apostle directs3 after that1 if 
he is yet stubborn1 the ,church no      
longer hoping for his conversion1 looks 
to the salvation of others1 by          
excommunicating him and separating him  
from the ,church1 and furthermore       
delivers him to the secular tribunal to 
be exterminated thereby from the world  
by death4 ,for ,jerome commenting on    
,gal4 #e3i1 ,a little leaven1 says3 ,cut
 off the decayed flesh1 expel the mangy 
sheep from the fold1 lest the whole     
house1 the whole paste1 the whole body1 
the whole flock1 burn1 perish1 rot1 die4
 ,arius was but one spark in            
,alexandria1 but as that spark was not  
at once put out1 the whole earth was    
laid waste by its flame4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,this very modesty demands that the 
heretic should be admonished a first and
 second time3 and if he be unwilling to 
retract1 he must be reckoned as already 

subverted1 as we may gather from the    
words of the ,apostle quoted above4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the profit that ensues
 from heresy is beside the intention of 
heretics1 for it consists in the        
constancy of the faithful being put to  
the test1 and makes us shake off our    
sluggishness1 and search the ,scriptures
 more carefully1 as ,augustine states   
7,de ,gen4 cont4 ,manich4 i1 #a74 ,what 
they really intend is the corruption of 
the faith1 which is to inflict very     
great harm indeed4 ,consequently we     
should consider what they directly      
intend1 and expel them1 rather than what
 is beside their intention1 and so1     
tolerate them4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3        
,according to ,decret4 7xxiv1 qu4 iii1  
can4 ,notandum71 to be excommunicated is
 not to be uprooted4 ,a man is          
excommunicated1 as the ,apostle says 7#a
 ,cor4 #e3e7 that his spirit may be     
saved in the day of ,our ,lord4 ,yet if 
heretics be altogether uprooted by      
death1 this is not contrary to ,our     

,lord's command1 which is to be         
understood as referring to the case when
 the cockle cannot be plucked up without
 plucking up the wheat1 as we explained 
above 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #h1 ad #a71 when    
treating of unbelievers in general4     
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aa1  
,art4 #d  ,whether the ,church ,should  
,receive ,those ,who ,return from       
,heresy8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that the ,church ought in all cases to  
receive those who return from heresy4   
,for it is written 7,jer4 #c3a7 in the  
person of the ,lord3 ,thou hast         
prostituted thyself to many lovers2     
nevertheless return to ,me saith the    
,lord4 ,now the sentence of the ,church 
is ,god's sentence1 according to ,deut4 
#a3ag3 ,you shall hear the little as    
well as the great3 neither shall you    
respect any man's person1 because it is 
the judgment of ,god4 ,therefore even   
those who are guilty of the prostitution
 of unbelief which is spiritual         
prostitution1 should be received all the

 same4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,our ,lord  
commanded ,peter 7,matt4 #ah3bb7 to     
forgive his offending brother not only  
till seven times1 but till seventy times
 seven times1 which ,jerome expounds as 
meaning that a man should be forgiven1  
as often as he has sinned4 ,therefore he
 ought to be received by the ,church as 
often as he has sinned by falling back  
into heresy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 heresy
 is a kind of unbelief4 ,now other      
unbelievers who wish to be converted are
 received by the ,church4 ,therefore    
heretics also should be received4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,the ,decretal ,ad        
abolendam 7,de ,haereticis1 cap4 ix7    
says that those who are found to have   
relapsed into the error which they had  
already abjured1 must be left to the    
secular tribunal4 ,therefore they should
 not be received by the ,church4  ,i    
answer that1 ,in obedience to ,our      
,lord's institution1 the ,church extends
 her charity to all1 not only to        
friends1 but also to foes who persecute 

her1 according to ,matt4 #e3dd3 ,love   
your enemies2 do good to them that hate 
you4 ,now it is part of charity that we 
should both wish and work our neighbor's
 good4 ,again1 good is twofold3 one is  
spiritual1 namely the health of the     
soul1 which good is chiefly the object  
of charity1 since it is this chiefly    
that we should wish for one another4    
,consequently1 from this point of view1 
heretics who return after falling no    
matter how often1 are admitted by the   
,church to ,penance whereby the way of  
salvation is opened to them4  ,the other
 good is that which charity considers   
secondarily1 viz4 temporal good1 such as
 life of the body1 worldly possessions1 
good repute1 ecclesiastical or secular  
dignity1 for we are not bound by charity
 to wish others this good1 except in    
relation to the eternal salvation of    
them and of others4 ,hence if the       
presence of one of these goods in one   
individual might be an obstacle to      
eternal salvation in many1 we are not   

bound out of charity to wish such a good
 to that person1 rather should we desire
 him to be without it1 both because     
eternal salvation takes precedence of   
temporal good1 and because the good of  
the many is to be preferred to the good 
of one4 ,now if heretics were always    
received on their return1 in order to   
save their lives and other temporal     
goods1 this might be prejudicial to the 
salvation of others1 both because they  
would infect others if they relapsed    
again1 and because1 if they escaped     
without punishment1 others would feel   
more assured in lapsing into heresy4    
,for it is written 7,eccles4 #h3aa73    
,for because sentence is not speedily   
pronounced against the evil1 the        
children of men commit evils without any
 fear4  ,for this reason the ,church not
 only admits to ,penance those who      
return from heresy for the first time1  
but also safeguards their lives1 and    
sometimes by dispensation1 restores them
 to the ecclesiastical dignities which  

they may have had before1 should their  
conversion appear to be sincere3 we read
 of this as having frequently been done 
for the good of peace4 ,but when they   
fall again1 after having been received1 
this seems to prove them to be          
inconstant in faith1 wherefore when they
 return again1 they are admitted to     
,penance1 but are not delivered from the
 pain of death4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in   
,god's tribunal1 those who return are   
always received1 because ,god is a      
searcher of hearts1 and knows those who 
return in sincerity4 ,but the ,church   
cannot imitate ,god in this1 for she    
presumes that those who relapse after   
being once received1 are not sincere in 
their return2 hence she does not debar  
them from the way of salvation1 but     
neither does she protect them from the  
sentence of death4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,our ,lord was speaking to ,peter of    
sins committed against oneself1 for one 
should always forgive such offenses and 
spare our brother when he repents4      

,these words are not to be applied to   
sins committed against one's neighbor or
 against ,god1 for it is not left to our
 discretion to forgive such offenses1 as
 ,jerome says on ,matt4 #ah3ae1 ,if thy 
brother shall offend against thee4 ,yet 
even in this matter the law prescribes  
limits according as ,god's honor or our 
neighbor's good demands4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,when other unbelievers1 who have   
never received the faith are converted1 
they do not as yet show signs of        
inconstancy in faith1 as relapsed       
heretics do2 hence the comparison fails4
   ,,question #ab  ,,of ,,apostasy 7,in 
,two ,articles7  ,we must now consider  
apostasy3 about which there are two     
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
apostasy pertains to unbelief8  7#b7    
,whether1 on account of apostasy from   
the faith1 subjects are absolved from   
allegiance to an apostate prince8       
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ab1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,apostasy ,pertains  
to ,unbelief8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 

seem that apostasy does not pertain to  
unbelief4 ,for that which is the origin 
of all sins1 does not1 seemingly1       
pertain to unbelief1 since many sins    
there are without unbelief4 ,now        
apostasy seems to be the origin of every
 sin1 for it is written 7,ecclus4       
#aj3ad73 ,the beginning of the pride of 
man is apostasy ,douay3 'to fall off'   
from ,god1 and further on1 7,ecclus4    
#aj3ae73 ,pride is the beginning of all 
sin4 ,therefore apostasy does not       
pertain to unbelief4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 unbelief is an act of the     
understanding3 whereas apostasy seems   
rather to consist in some outward deed  
or utterance1 or even in some inward act
 of the will1 for it is written 7,prov4 
#f3ab-ad73 ,a man that is an apostate1  
an unprofitable man walketh with a      
perverse mouth4 ,he winketh with the    
eyes1 presseth with the foot1 speaketh  
with the finger4 ,with a wicked heart he
 deviseth evil1 and at all times he     
soweth discord4 ,moreover if anyone were

 to have himself circumcised1 or to     
worship at the tomb of ,mahomet1 he     
would be deemed an apostate4 ,therefore 
apostasy does not pertain to unbelief4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 heresy1 since it    
pertains to unbelief1 is a determinate  
species of unbelief4 ,if then1 apostasy 
pertained to unbelief1 it would follow  
that it is a determinate species of     
unbelief1 which does not seem to agree  
with what has been said 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4   
#e74 ,therefore apostasy does not       
pertain to unbelief4  ,on the contrary1 
,it is written 7,john #f3fg73 ,many of  
his disciples went back1 i4e4           
apostatized1 of whom ,our ,lord had said
 previously 7,john #f3fe73 ,there are   
some of you that believe not4 ,therefore
 apostasy pertains to unbelief4  ,i     
answer that1 ,apostasy denotes a        
backsliding from ,god4 ,this may happen 
in various ways according to the        
different kinds of union between man and
 ,god4 ,for1 in the first place1 man is 
united to ,god by faith2 secondly1 by   

having his will duly submissive in      
obeying ,his commandments2 thirdly1 by  
certain special things pertaining to    
supererogation such as the religious    
life1 the clerical state1 or ,holy      
,orders4 ,now if that which follows be  
removed1 that which precedes1 remains1  
but the converse does not hold4         
,accordingly a man may apostatize from  
,god1 by withdrawing from the religious 
life to which he was bound by           
profession1 or from the ,holy ,order    
which he had received3 and this is      
called apostasy from religious life or  
,orders4 ,a man may also apostatize from
 ,god1 by rebelling in his mind against 
the ,divine commandments3 and though man
 may apostatize in both the above ways1 
he may still remain united to ,god by   
faith4  ,but if he give up the faith1   
then he seems to turn away from ,god    
altogether3 and consequently1 apostasy  
simply and absolutely is that whereby a 
man withdraws from the faith1 and is    
called apostasy of perfidy4 ,in this way

 apostasy1 simply so called1 pertains to
 unbelief4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this      
objection refers to the second kind of  
apostasy1 which denotes an act of the   
will in rebellion against ,god's        
commandments1 an act that is to be found
 in every mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,it belongs to faith not only that the  
heart should believe1 but also that     
external words and deeds should bear    
witness to the inward faith1 for        
confession is an act of faith4 ,in this 
way too1 certain external words or deeds
 pertain to unbelief1 in so far as they 
are signs of unbelief1 even as a sign of
 health is said itself to be healthy4   
,now although the authority quoted may  
be understood as referring to every kind
 of apostate1 yet it applies most truly 
to an apostate from the faith4 ,for     
since faith is the first foundation of  
things to be hoped for1 and since1      
without faith it is impossible to please
 ,god2 when once faith is removed1 man  
retains nothing that may be useful for  

the obtaining of eternal salvation1 for 
which reason it is written 7,prov4      
#f3ab73 ,a man that is an apostate1 an  
unprofitable man3 because faith is the  
life of the soul1 according to ,rom4    
#a3ag3 ,the just man liveth by faith4   
,therefore1 just as when the life of the
 body is taken away1 man's every member 
and part loses its due disposition1 so  
when the life of justice1 which is by   
faith1 is done away1 disorder appears in
 all his members4 ,first1 in his mouth1 
whereby chiefly his mind stands         
revealed2 secondly1 in his eyes2        
thirdly1 in the instrument of movement2 
fourthly1 in his will1 which tends to   
evil4 ,the result is that he sows       
discord1 endeavoring to sever others    
from the faith even as he severed       
himself4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the species 
of a quality or form are not diversified
 by the fact of its being the term      
wherefrom or whereto of movement3 on the
 contrary1 it is the movement that takes
 its species from the terms4 ,now       

apostasy regards unbelief as the term   
whereto of the movement of withdrawal   
from the faith2 wherefore apostasy does 
not imply a special kind of unbelief1   
but an aggravating circumstance thereof1
 according to #b ,pet4 #b3ba3 ,it had   
been better for them not to know the    
truth ,vulg43 'the way of justice'1 than
 after they had known it1 to turn back4 
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ab1  
,art4 #b  ,whether a ,prince ,forfeits  
,his ,dominion ,over ,his ,subjects1 on 
,account of ,apostasy from the ,faith1  
,so ,that ,they ,no ,longer ,owe ,him   
,allegiance8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that a prince does not so forfeit  
his dominion over his subjects1 on      
account of apostasy from the faith1 that
 they no longer owe him allegiance4 ,for
 ,ambrose 99,st4 ,augustine1 ,super ,ps4
 #abd3c says that the ,emperor ,julian1 
though an apostate1 nevertheless had    
under him ,christian soldiers1 who when 
he said to them1 ,fall into line for the
 defense of the republic1 were bound to 

obey4 ,therefore subjects are not       
absolved from their allegiance to their 
prince on account of his apostasy4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an apostate from the
 faith is an unbeliever4 ,now we find   
that certain holy men served unbelieving
 masters2 thus ,joseph served ,pharaoh1 
,daniel served ,nabuchodonosor1 and     
,mardochai served ,assuerus4 ,therefore 
apostasy from the faith does not release
 subjects from allegiance to their      
sovereign4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as 
by apostasy from the faith1 a man turns 
away from ,god1 so does every sin4      
,consequently if1 on account of apostasy
 from the faith1 princes were to lose   
their right to command those of their   
subjects who are believers1 they would  
equally lose it on account of other     
sins3 which is evidently not the case4  
,therefore we ought not to refuse       
allegiance to a sovereign on account of 
his apostatizing from the faith4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,gregory ,,vii says       
7,council1 ,roman ,v73 ,holding to the  

institutions of our holy predecessors1  
we1 by our apostolic authority1 absolve 
from their oath those who through       
loyalty or through the sacred bond of an
 oath owe allegiance to excommunicated  
persons3 and we absolutely forbid them  
to continue their allegiance to such    
persons1 until these shall have made    
amends4 ,now apostates from the faith1  
like heretics1 are excommunicated1      
according to the ,decretal 99,extra1 ,de
 ,haereticis1 cap4 ,ad abolendam4       
,therefore princes should not be obeyed 
when they have apostatized from the     
faith4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above
 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #aj71 unbelief1 in       
itself1 is not inconsistent with        
dominion1 since dominion is a device of 
the law of nations which is a human law3
 whereas the distinction between        
believers and unbelievers is of ,divine 
right1 which does not annul human right4
 ,nevertheless a man who sins by        
unbelief may be sentenced to the loss of
 his right of dominion1 as also1        

sometimes1 on account of other sins4    
,now it is not within the competency of 
the ,church to punish unbelief in those 
who have never received the faith1      
according to the saying of the ,apostle 
7#a ,cor4 #e3ab73 ,what have ,i to do to
 judge them that are without8 ,she can1 
however1 pass sentence of punishment on 
the unbelief of those who have received 
the faith3 and it is fitting that they  
should be punished by being deprived of 
the allegiance of their subjects3 for   
this same allegiance might conduce to   
great corruption of the faith1 since1 as
 was stated above 7,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #b71 a 
man that is an apostate 4 4 4 with a    
wicked heart deviseth evil1 and 4 4 4   
soweth discord1 in order to sever others
 from the faith4 ,consequently1 as soon 
as sentence of excommunication is passed
 on a man on account of apostasy from   
the faith1 his subjects are ipso facto  
absolved from his authority and from the
 oath of allegiance whereby they were   
bound to him4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,at that

 time the ,church was but recently      
instituted1 and had not1 as yet1 the    
power of curbing earthly princes2 and so
 she allowed the faithful to obey       
,julian the apostate1 in matters that   
were not contrary to the faith1 in order
 to avoid incurring a yet greater       
danger4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated in 
the article1 it is not a question of    
those unbelievers who have never        
received the faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,apostasy from the faith severs man from
 ,god altogether1 as stated above 7,a4  
#a71 which is not the case in any other 
sin4   ,,question #ac  ,,of ,,the ,,sin 
,,of ,,blasphemy1 ,,in ,,general 7,in   
,four ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
the sin of blasphemy1 which is opposed  
to the confession of faith2 and 7#a7    
blasphemy in general1 7#b7 that         
blasphemy which is called the sin       
against the ,holy ,ghost4  ,under the   
first head there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether blasphemy is    
opposed to the confession of faith8     

7#b7 ,whether blasphemy is always a     
mortal sin8  7#c7 ,whether blasphemy is 
the most grievous sin8  7#d7 ,whether   
blasphemy is in the damned8   ,,first   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,blasphemy ,is ,opposed to the 
,confession of ,faith8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that blasphemy is not    
opposed to the confession of faith4     
,because to blaspheme is to utter an    
affront or insult against the ,creator4 
,now this pertains to ill-will against  
,god rather than to unbelief4 ,therefore
 blasphemy is not opposed to the        
confession of faith4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 on ,eph4 #d3ca1 ,let blasphemy
 4 4 4 be put away from you1 a gloss    
says1 that which is committed against   
,god or the saints4 ,but confession of  
faith1 seemingly1 is not about other    
things than those pertaining to ,god1   
,who is the object of faith4 ,therefore 
blasphemy is not always opposed to the  
confession of faith4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 according to some1 there are  

three kinds of blasphemy4 ,the first of 
these is when something unfitting is    
affirmed of ,god2 the second is when    
something fitting is denied of ,him2 and
 the third1 when something proper to    
,god is ascribed to a creature1 so that1
 seemingly1 blasphemy is not only about 
,god1 but also about ,his creatures4    
,now the object of faith is ,god4       
,therefore blasphemy is not opposed to  
confession of faith4  ,on the contrary1 
,the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #a3ab1     
#ac73 ,i 4 4 4 before was a blasphemer  
and a persecutor1 and afterwards1 ,i did
 it ignorantly in my unbelief4 ,hence it
 seems that blasphemy pertains to       
unbelief4  ,i answer that1 ,the word    
blasphemy seems to denote the           
disparagement of some surpassing        
goodness1 especially that of ,god4 ,now 
,god1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4   
i71 is the very essence of true         
goodness4 ,hence whatever befits ,god1  
pertains to ,his goodness1 and whatever 
does not befit ,him1 is far removed from

 the perfection of goodness which is    
,his ,essence4 ,consequently whoever    
either denies anything befitting ,god1  
or affirms anything unbefitting ,him1   
disparages the ,divine goodness4  ,now  
this may happen in two ways4 ,in the    
first way it may happen merely in       
respect of the opinion in the intellect2
 in the second way this opinion is      
united to a certain detestation in the  
affections1 even as1 on the other hand1 
faith in ,god is perfected by love of   
,him4 ,accordingly this disparagement of
 the ,divine goodness is either in the  
intellect alone1 or in the affections   
also4 ,if it is in thought only1 it is  
blasphemy of the heart1 whereas if it   
betrays itself outwardly in speech it is
 blasphemy of the tongue4 ,it is in this
 sense that blasphemy is opposed to     
confession of faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,he that speaks against ,god1 with the  
intention of reviling ,him1 disparages  
the ,divine goodness1 not only in       
respect of the falsehood in his         

intellect1 but also by reason of the    
wickedness of his will1 whereby he      
detests and strives to hinder the honor 
due to ,god1 and this is perfect        
blasphemy4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even as   
,god is praised in ,his saints1 in so   
far as praise is given to the works     
which ,god does in ,his saints1 so does 
blasphemy against the saints1 redound1  
as a consequence1 against ,god4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,properly speaking1 the sin of
 blasphemy is not in this way divided   
into three species3 since to affirm     
unfitting things1 or to deny fitting    
things of ,god1 differ merely as        
affirmation and negation4 ,for this     
diversity does not cause distinct       
species of habits1 since the falsehood  
of affirmations and negations is made   
known by the same knowledge1 and it is  
the same ignorance which errs in either 
way1 since negatives are proved by      
affirmatives1 according to ,poster4 i1  
#be4 ,again to ascribe to creatures     
things that are proper to ,god1 seems to

 amount to the same as affirming        
something unfitting of ,him1 since      
whatever is proper to ,god is ,god      
,himself3 and to ascribe to a creature1 
that which is proper to ,god1 is to     
assert that ,god is the same as a       
creature4   ,,second ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,blasphemy ,is ,always a ,mortal ,sin8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
blasphemy is not always a mortal sin4   
,because a gloss on the words1 ,now lay 
you also all away1 etc4 7,col4 #c3h7    
says3 ,after prohibiting greater crimes 
he forbids lesser sins3 and yet among   
the latter he includes blasphemy4       
,therefore blasphemy is comprised among 
the lesser1 i4e4 venial1 sins4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 every mortal sin is       
opposed to one of the precepts of the   
decalogue4 ,but1 seemingly1 blasphemy is
 not contrary to any of them4 ,therefore
 blasphemy is not a mortal sin4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 sins committed without    
deliberation1 are not mortal3 hence     

first movements are not mortal sins1    
because they precede the deliberation of
 the reason1 as was shown above         
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,,aa4 #c1 #aj74 ,now 
blasphemy sometimes occurs without      
deliberation of the reason4 ,therefore  
it is not always a mortal sin4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,it is written 7,lev4 #bd3af73
 ,he that blasphemeth the name of the   
,lord1 dying let him die4 ,now the death
 punishment is not inflicted except for 
a mortal sin4 ,therefore blasphemy is a 
mortal sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e71 a     
mortal sin is one whereby a man is      
severed from the first principle of     
spiritual life1 which principle is the  
charity of ,god4 ,therefore whatever    
things are contrary to charity1 are     
mortal sins in respect of their genus4  
,now blasphemy1 as to its genus1 is     
opposed to ,divine charity1 because1 as 
stated above 7,a4 #a71 it disparages the
 ,divine goodness1 which is the object  
of charity4 ,consequently blasphemy is a

 mortal sin1 by reason of its genus4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this gloss is not to  
be understood as meaning that all the   
sins which follow1 are mortal1 but that 
whereas all those mentioned previously  
are more grievous sins1 some of those   
mentioned afterwards are less grievous2 
and yet among the latter some more      
grievous sins are included4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,since1 as stated above 7,a4  
#a71 blasphemy is contrary to the       
confession of faith1 its prohibition is 
comprised under the prohibition of      
unbelief1 expressed by the words3 ,i am 
the ,lord thy ,god1 etc4 7,ex4 #bj3a74  
,or else1 it is forbidden by the words3 
,thou shalt not take the name of 4 4 4  
,god in vain 7,ex4 #bj3g74 ,because he  
who asserts something false about ,god1 
takes ,his name in vain even more than  
he who uses the name of ,god in         
confirmation of a falsehood4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,there are two ways in which  
blasphemy may occur unawares and without
 deliberation4 ,in the first way1 by a  

man failing to advert to the blasphemous
 nature of his words1 and this may      
happen through his being moved suddenly 
by passion so as to break out into words
 suggested by his imagination1 without  
heeding to the meaning of those words3  
this is a venial sin1 and is not a      
blasphemy properly so called4 ,in the   
second way1 by adverting to the meaning 
of his words1 and to their blasphemous  
nature3 in which case he is not excused 
from mortal sin1 even as neither is he  
who1 in a sudden movement of anger1     
kills one who is sitting beside him4    
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1   
,art4 #c  ,whether the ,sin of          
,blasphemy ,is the ,greatest ,sin8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
sin of blasphemy is not the greatest    
sin4 ,for1 according to ,augustine      
7,enchiridion xii71 a thing is said to  
be evil because it does harm4 ,now the  
sin of murder1 since it destroys a man's
 life1 does more harm than the sin of   
blasphemy1 which can do no harm to ,god4

 ,therefore the sin of murder is more   
grievous than that of blasphemy4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 a perjurer calls upon ,god
 to witness to a falsehood1 and thus    
seems to assert that ,god is false4 ,but
 not every blasphemer goes so far as to 
say that ,god is false4 ,therefore      
perjury is a more grievous sin than     
blasphemy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 on ,ps4 
#gd3f1 ,lift not up your horn on high1 a
 gloss says3 ,to excuse oneself for sin 
is the greatest sin of all4 ,therefore  
blasphemy is not the greatest sin4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,on ,isa4 #ah3b1 ,to a    
terrible people1 etc4 a gloss says3 ,in 
comparison with blasphemy1 every sin is 
slight4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,a4 #a71 blasphemy is opposed to 
the confession of faith1 so that it     
contains the gravity of unbelief3 while 
the sin is aggravated if the will's     
detestation is added thereto1 and yet   
more1 if it breaks out into words1 even 
as love and confession add to the praise
 of faith4  ,therefore1 since1 as stated

 above 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #c71 unbelief is   
the greatest of sins in respect of its  
genus1 it follows that blasphemy also is
 a very great sin1 through belonging to 
the same genus as unbelief and being an 
aggravated form of that sin4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,if we compare murder and     
blasphemy as regards the objects of     
those sins1 it is clear that blasphemy1 
which is a sin committed directly       
against ,god1 is more grave than murder1
 which is a sin against one's neighbor4 
,on the other hand1 if we compare them  
in respect of the harm wrought by them1 
murder is the graver sin1 for murder    
does more harm to one's neighbor1 than  
blasphemy does to ,god4 ,since1 however1
 the gravity of a sin depends on the    
intention of the evil will1 rather than 
on the effect of the deed1 as was shown 
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #h71 it    
follows that1 as the blasphemer intends 
to do harm to ,god's honor1 absolutely  
speaking1 he sins more grievously that  
the murderer4 ,nevertheless murder takes

 precedence1 as to punishment1 among    
sins committed against our neighbor4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a gloss on the words1 
,let 4 4 4 blasphemy be put away from   
you 7,eph4 #d3ca7 says3 ,blasphemy is   
worse than perjury4 ,the reason is that 
the perjurer does not say or think      
something false about ,god1 as the      
blasphemer does3 but he calls ,god to   
witness to a falsehood1 not that he     
deems ,god a false witness1 but in the  
hope1 as it were1 that ,god will not    
testify to the matter by some evident   
sign4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to excuse      
oneself for sin is a circumstance that  
aggravates every sin1 even blasphemy    
itself3 and it is called the most       
grievous sin1 for as much as it makes   
every sin more grievous4   ,,fourth     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #d  
,whether the ,damned ,blaspheme8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
damned do not blaspheme4 ,because some  
wicked men are deterred from blaspheming
 now1 on account of the fear of future  

punishment4 ,but the damned are         
undergoing these punishments1 so that   
they abhor them yet more4 ,therefore1   
much more are they restrained from      
blaspheming4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 since 
blasphemy is a most grievous sin1 it is 
most demeritorious4 ,now in the life to 
come there is no state of meriting or   
demeriting4 ,therefore there will be no 
place for blasphemy4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 it is written 7,eccles4 #aa3c7
 that the tree 4 4 4 in what place      
soever it shall fall1 there shall it be3
 whence it clearly follows that1 after  
this life1 man acquires neither merit   
nor sin1 which he did not already       
possess in this life4 ,now many will be 
damned who were not blasphemous in this 
life4 ,neither1 therefore1 will they    
blaspheme in the life to come4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,it is written 7,apoc4 #af3i73
 ,the men were scorched with great heat1
 and they blasphemed the name of ,god1  
,who hath power over these plagues1 and 
a gloss on these words says that those  

who are in hell1 though aware that they 
are deservedly punished1 will           
nevertheless complain that ,god is so   
powerful as to torture them thus4 ,now  
this would be blasphemy in their present
 state3 and consequently it will also be
 in their future state4  ,i answer that1
 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #c71       
detestation of the ,divine goodness is a
 necessary condition of blasphemy4 ,now 
those who are in hell retain their      
wicked will which is turned away from   
,god's justice1 since they love the     
things for which they are punished1     
would wish to use them if they could1   
and hate the punishments inflicted on   
them for those same sins4 ,they regret  
indeed the sins which they have         
committed1 not because they hate them1  
but because they are punished for them4 
,accordingly this detestation of the    
,divine justice is1 in them1 the        
interior blasphemy of the heart3 and it 
is credible that after the resurrection 
they will blaspheme ,god with the       

tongue1 even as the saints will praise  
,him with their voices4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,in the present life men are        
deterred from blasphemy through fear of 
punishment which they think they can    
escape3 whereas1 in hell1 the damned    
have no hope of escape1 so that1 in     
despair1 they are borne towards whatever
 their wicked will suggests to them4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,merit and demerit     
belong to the state of a wayfarer1      
wherefore good is meritorious in them1  
while evil is demeritorious4 ,in the    
blessed1 on the other hand1 good is not 
meritorious1 but is part of their       
blissful reward1 and1 in like manner1 in
 the damned1 evil is not demeritorious1 
but is part of the punishment of        
damnation4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whoever   
dies in mortal sin1 bears with him a    
will that detests the ,divine justice   
with regard to a certain thing1 and in  
this respect there can be blasphemy in  
him4   ,,question #ad  ,,of ,,blasphemy 
,,against ,,the ,,holy ,,ghost 7,in     

,four ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
in particular blasphemy against the     
,holy ,ghost3 under which head there are
 four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether 
blasphemy or the sin against the ,holy  
,ghost is the same as the sin committed 
through certain malice8  7#b7 ,of the   
species of this sin2  7#c7 ,whether it  
can be forgiven8  7#d7 ,whether it is   
possible to begin by sinning against the
 ,holy ,ghost before committing other   
sins8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #ad1 ,art4 #a  ,whether the ,sin       
,against the ,holy ,ghost ,is the ,same 
,as the ,sin ,committed ,through        
,certain ,malice8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that the sin against the     
,holy ,ghost is not the same as the sin 
committed through certain malice4       
,because the sin against the ,holy      
,ghost is the sin of blasphemy1         
according to ,matt4 #ab3cb4 ,but not    
every sin committed through certain     
malice is a sin of blasphemy3 since many
 other kinds of sin may be committed    

through certain malice4 ,therefore the  
sin against the ,holy ,ghost is not the 
same as the sin committed through       
certain malice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the
 sin committed through certain malice is
 condivided with sin committed through  
ignorance1 and sin committed through    
weakness3 whereas the sin against the   
,holy ,ghost is condivided with the sin 
against the ,son of ,man 7,matt4        
#ab3cb74 ,therefore the sin against the 
,holy ,ghost is not the same as the sin 
committed through certain malice1 since 
things whose opposites differ1 are      
themselves different4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 the sin against the ,holy     
,ghost is itself a generic sin1 having  
its own determinate species3 whereas sin
 committed through certain malice is not
 a special kind of sin1 but a condition 
or general circumstance of sin1 which   
can affect any kind of sin at all4      
,therefore the sin against the ,holy    
,ghost is not the same as the sin       
committed through certain malice4  ,on  

the contrary1 ,the ,master says 7,sent4 
ii1 ,d1 #dc7 that to sin against the    
,holy ,ghost is to take pleasure in the 
malice of sin for its own sake4 ,now    
this is to sin through certain malice4  
,therefore it seems that the sin        
committed through certain malice is the 
same as the sin against the ,holy       
,ghost4  ,i answer that1 ,three meanings
 have been given to the sin against the 
,holy ,ghost4 ,for the earlier doctors1 
viz4 ,athanasius 7,super ,matth4 xii1   
#cb71 ,hilary 7,can4 xii in ,matth471   
,ambrose 7,super ,luc4 xii1 #aj71       
,jerome 7,super ,matth4 xii71 and       
,chrysostom 7,hom4 xli in ,matth471 say 
that the sin against the ,holy ,ghost is
 literally to utter a blasphemy against 
the ,holy ,spirit1 whether by ,holy     
,spirit we understand the essential name
 applicable to the whole ,trinity1 each 
,person of which is a ,spirit and is    
holy1 or the personal name of one of the
 ,persons of the ,trinity1 in which     
sense blasphemy against the ,holy ,ghost

 is distinct from the blasphemy against 
the ,son of ,man 7,matt4 #ab3cb71 for   
,christ did certain things in respect of
 ,his human nature1 by eating1 drinking1
 and such like actions1 while ,he did   
others in respect of ,his ,godhead1 by  
casting out devils1 raising the dead1   
and the like3 which things ,he did both 
by the power of ,his own ,godhead and by
 the operation of the ,holy ,ghost1 of  
,whom ,he was full1 according to his    
human nature4 ,now the ,jews began by   
speaking blasphemy against the ,son of  
,man1 when they said 7,matt4 #aa3ai7    
that ,he was a glutton 4 4 4 a wine     
drinker1 and a friend of publicans3 but 
afterwards they blasphemed against the  
,holy ,ghost1 when they ascribed to the 
prince of devils those works which      
,christ did by the power of ,his own    
,divine ,nature and by the operation of 
the ,holy ,ghost4  ,augustine1 however  
7,de ,verb4 ,dom41 ,serm4 lxxi71 says   
that blasphemy or the sin against the   
,holy ,ghost1 is final impenitence when1

 namely1 a man perseveres in mortal sin 
until death1 and that it is not confined
 to utterance by word of mouth1 but     
extends to words in thought and deed1   
not to one word only1 but to many4 ,now 
this word1 in this sense1 is said to be 
uttered against the ,holy ,ghost1       
because it is contrary to the remission 
of sins1 which is the work of the ,holy 
,ghost1 ,who is the charity both of the 
,father and of the ,son4 ,nor did ,our  
,lord say this to the ,jews1 as though  
they had sinned against the ,holy       
,ghost1 since they were not yet guilty  
of final impenitence1 but ,he warned    
them1 lest by similar utterances they   
should come to sin against the ,holy    
,ghost3 and it is in this sense that we 
are to understand ,mark #c3bi1 #cj1     
where after ,our ,lord had said3 ,but he
 that shall blaspheme against the ,holy 
,ghost1 etc4 the ,evangelist adds1      
because they said3 ,he hath an unclean  
spirit4  ,but others understand it      
differently1 and say that the sin of    

blasphemy against the ,holy ,ghost1 is a
 sin committed against that good which  
is appropriated to the ,holy ,ghost3    
because goodness is appropriated to the 
,holy ,ghost1 just a power is           
appropriated to the ,father1 and wisdom 
to the ,son4 ,hence they say that when a
 man sins through weakness1 it is a sin 
against the ,father2 that when he sins  
through ignorance1 it is a sin against  
the ,son2 and that when he sins through 
certain malice1 i4e4 through the very   
choosing of evil1 as explained above    
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gh1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c71 it is 
a sin against the ,holy ,ghost4  ,now   
this may happen in two ways4 ,first by  
reason of the very inclination of a     
vicious habit which we call malice1 and1
 in this way1 to sin through malice is  
not the same as to sin against the ,holy
 ,ghost4 ,in another way it happens that
 by reason of contempt1 that which might
 have prevented the choosing of evil1 is
 rejected or removed2 thus hope is      
removed by despair1 and fear by         

presumption1 and so on1 as we shall     
explain further on 7,,qq4 #bj1 #ba74    
,now all these things which prevent the 
choosing of sin are effects of the ,holy
 ,ghost in us2 so that1 in this sense1  
to sin through malice is to sin against 
the ,holy ,ghost4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3     
,just as the confession of faith        
consists in a protestation not only of  
words but also of deeds1 so blasphemy   
against the ,holy ,ghost can be uttered 
in word1 thought and deed4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,according to the third            
interpretation1 blasphemy against the   
,holy ,ghost is condivided with         
blasphemy against the ,son of ,man1     
forasmuch as ,he is also the ,son of    
,god1 i4e4 the power of ,god and the    
wisdom of ,god 7#a ,cor4 #a3bd74        
,wherefore1 in this sense1 the sin      
against the ,son of ,man will be that   
which is committed through ignorance1 or
 through weakness4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,sin committed through certain malice1  
in so far as it results from the        

inclination of a habit1 is not a special
 sin1 but a general condition of sin3   
whereas1 in so far as it results from a 
special contempt of an effect of the    
,holy ,ghost in us1 it has the character
 of a special sin4 ,according to this   
interpretation the sin against the ,holy
 ,ghost is a special kind of sin1 as    
also according to the first             
interpretation3 whereas according to the
 second1 it is not a species of sin1    
because final impenitence may be a      
circumstance of any kind of sin4        
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,it ,is ,fitting to  
,distinguish ,six ,kinds of ,sin        
,against the ,holy ,ghost8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem unfitting to         
distinguish six kinds of sin against the
 ,holy ,ghost1 viz4 despair1            
presumption1 impenitence1 obstinacy1    
resisting the known truth1 envy of our  
brother's spiritual good1 which are     
assigned by the ,master 7,sent4 ii1 ,d1 
#dc74 ,for to deny ,god's justice or    

mercy belongs to unbelief4 ,now1 by     
despair1 a man rejects ,god's mercy1 and
 by presumption1 ,his justice4          
,therefore each of these is a kind of   
unbelief rather than of the sin against 
the ,holy ,ghost4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
impenitence1 seemingly1 regards past    
sins1 while obstinacy regards future    
sins4 ,now past and future time do not  
diversify the species of virtues or     
vices1 since it is the same faith       
whereby we believe that ,christ was     
born1 and those of old believed that ,he
 would be born4 ,therefore obstinacy and
 impenitence should not be reckoned as  
two species of sin against the ,holy    
,ghost4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 grace and  
truth came by ,jesus ,christ 7,john     
#a3ag74 ,therefore it seem that         
resistance of the known truth1 and envy 
of a brother's spiritual good1 belong to
 blasphemy against the ,son rather than 
against the ,holy ,ghost4  ,obj4 #d3    
,further1 ,bernard says 7,de ,dispens4  
et ,praecept4 xi7 that to refuse to obey

 is to resist the ,holy ,ghost4         
,moreover a gloss on ,lev4 #aj3af1 says 
that a feigned repentance is a blasphemy
 against the ,holy ,ghost4 ,again1      
schism is1 seemingly1 directly opposed  
to the ,holy ,ghost by ,whom the ,church
 is united together4 ,therefore it seems
 that the species of sins against the   
,holy ,ghost are insufficiently         
enumerated4  ,on the contrary1          
,augustine 99,fulgentius 7,de ,fide ad  
,petrum iii7 says that those who despair
 of pardon for their sins1 or who       
without merits presume on ,god's mercy1 
sin against the ,holy ,ghost1 and       
7,enchiridion lxxxiii7 that he who dies 
in a state of obstinacy is guilty of the
 sin against the ,holy ,ghost1 and 7,de 
,verb4 ,dom41 ,serm4 lxxi7 that         
impenitence is a sin against the ,holy  
,ghost1 and 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte 
xxii71 that to resist fraternal goodness
 with the brands of envy is to sin      
against the ,holy ,ghost1 and in his    
book ,de unico ,baptismo 7,de ,bap4     

contra ,donat4 vi1 #ce7 he says that a  
man who spurns the truth1 is either     
envious of his brethren to whom the     
truth is revealed1 or ungrateful to     
,god1 by ,whose inspiration the ,church 
is taught1 and therefore1 seemingly1    
sins against the ,holy ,ghost4  ,i      
answer that1 ,the above species are     
fittingly assigned to the sin against   
the ,holy ,ghost taken in the third     
sense1 because they are distinguished in
 respect of the removal or contempt of  
those things whereby a man can be       
prevented from sinning through choice4  
,these things are either on the part of 
,god's judgment1 or on the part of ,his 
gifts1 or on the part of sin4 ,for1 by  
consideration of the ,divine judgment1  
wherein justice is accompanied with     
mercy1 man is hindered from sinning     
through choice1 both by hope1 arising   
from the consideration of the mercy that
 pardons sins and rewards good deeds1   
which hope is removed by despair2 and by
 fear1 arising from the consideration of

 the ,divine justice that punishes sins1
 which fear is removed by presumption1  
when1 namely1 a man presumes that he can
 obtain glory without merits1 or pardon 
without repentance4  ,god's gifts       
whereby we are withdrawn from sin1 are  
two3 one is the acknowledgment of the   
truth1 against which there is the       
resistance of the known truth1 when1    
namely1 a man resists the truth which he
 has acknowledged1 in order to sin more 
freely3 while the other is the          
assistance of inward grace1 against     
which there is envy of a brother's      
spiritual good1 when1 namely1 a man is  
envious not only of his brother's       
person1 but also of the increase of     
,divine grace in the world4  ,on the    
part of sin1 there are two things which 
may withdraw man therefrom3 one is the  
inordinateness and shamefulness of the  
act1 the consideration of which is wont 
to arouse man to repentance for the sin 
he has committed1 and against this there
 is impenitence1 not as denoting        

permanence in sin until death1 in which 
sense it was taken above 7for thus it   
would not be a special sin1 but a       
circumstance of sin71 but as denoting   
the purpose of not repenting4 ,the other
 thing is the smallness or brevity of   
the good which is sought in sin1        
according to ,rom4 #f3ba3 ,what fruit   
had you therefore then in those things1 
of which you are now ashamed8 ,the      
consideration of this is wont to prevent
 man's will from being hardened in sin1 
and this is removed by obstinacy1       
whereby man hardens his purpose by      
clinging to sin4 ,of these two it is    
written 7,jer4 #h3f73 ,there is none    
that doth penance for his sin1 saying3  
,what have ,i done8 as regards the      
first2 and1 ,they are all turned to     
their own course1 as a horse rushing to 
the battle1 as regards the second4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sins of despair   
and presumption consist1 not in         
disbelieving in ,god's justice and      
mercy1 but in contemning them4  ,reply  

,obj4 #b3 ,obstinacy and impenitence    
differ not only in respect of past and  
future time1 but also in respect of     
certain formal aspects by reason of the 
diverse consideration of those things   
which may be considered in sin1 as      
explained above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3      
,grace and truth were the work of       
,christ through the gifts of the ,holy  
,ghost which ,he gave to men4  ,reply   
,obj4 #d3 ,to refuse to obey belongs to 
obstinacy1 while a feigned repentance   
belongs to impenitence1 and schism to   
the envy of a brother's spiritual good1 
whereby the members of the ,church are  
united together4   ,,third ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
the ,sin ,against the ,holy ,ghost ,can 
,be ,forgiven8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that the sin against the ,holy    
,ghost can be forgiven4 ,for ,augustine 
says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom41 ,serm4 lxxi73   
,we should despair of no man1 so long as
 ,our ,lord's patience brings him back  
to repentance4 ,but if any sin cannot be

 forgiven1 it would be possible to      
despair of some sinners4 ,therefore the 
sin against the ,holy ,ghost can be     
forgiven4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no sin is
 forgiven1 except through the soul being
 healed by ,god4 ,but no disease is     
incurable to an all-powerful physician1 
as a gloss says on ,ps4 #ajb3c1 ,who    
healeth all thy diseases4 ,therefore the
 sin against the ,holy ,ghost can be    
forgiven4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the      
free-will is indifferent to either good 
or evil4 ,now1 so long as man is a      
wayfarer1 he can fall away from any     
virtue1 since even an angel fell from   
heaven1 wherefore it is written 7,job   
#d3ah1 #ai73 ,in ,his angels ,he found  
wickedness3 how much more shall they    
that dwell in houses of clay8           
,therefore1 in like manner1 a man can   
return from any sin to the state of     
justice4 ,therefore the sin against the 
,holy ,ghost can be forgiven4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4        
#ab3cb73 ,he that shall speak against   

the ,holy ,ghost1 it shall not be       
forgiven him1 neither in this world1 nor
 in the world to come3 and ,augustine   
says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #bb7
 that so great is the downfall of this  
sin that it cannot submit to the        
humiliation of asking for pardon4  ,i   
answer that1 ,according to the various  
interpretations of the sin against the  
,holy ,ghost1 there are various ways in 
which it may be said that it cannot be  
forgiven4 ,for if by the sin against the
 ,holy ,ghost we understand final       
impenitence1 it is said to be           
unpardonable1 since in no way is it     
pardoned3 because the mortal sin wherein
 a man perseveres until death will not  
be forgiven in the life to come1 since  
it was not remitted by repentance in    
this life4  ,according to the other two 
interpretations1 it is said to be       
unpardonable1 not as though it is nowise
 forgiven1 but because1 considered in   
itself1 it deserves not to be pardoned3 
and this in two ways4 ,first1 as regards

 the punishment1 since he that sins     
through ignorance or weakness1 deserves 
less punishment1 whereas he that sins   
through certain malice1 can offer no    
excuse in alleviation of his punishment4
 ,likewise those who blasphemed against 
the ,son of ,man before ,his ,godhead   
was revealed1 could have some excuse1 on
 account of the weakness of the flesh   
which they perceived in ,him1 and hence1
 they deserved less punishment2 whereas 
those who blasphemed against ,his very  
,godhead1 by ascribing to the devil the 
works of the ,holy ,ghost1 had no excuse
 in diminution of their punishment4     
,wherefore1 according to ,chrysostom's  
commentary 7,hom4 xlii in ,matth471 the 
,jews are said not to be forgiven this  
sin1 neither in this world nor in the   
world to come1 because they were        
punished for it1 both in the present    
life1 through the ,romans1 and in the   
life to come1 in the pains of hell4     
,thus also ,athanasius adduces the      
example of their forefathers who1 first 

of all1 wrangled with ,moses on account 
of the shortage of water and bread2 and 
this the ,lord bore with patience1      
because they were to be excused on      
account of the weakness of the flesh3   
but afterwards they sinned more         
grievously when1 by ascribing to an idol
 the favors bestowed by ,god ,who had   
brought them out of ,egypt1 they        
blasphemed1 so to speak1 against the    
,holy ,ghost1 saying 7,ex4 #cb3d73      
,these are thy gods1 ,o ,israel1 that   
have brought thee out of the land of    
,egypt4 ,therefore the ,lord both       
inflicted temporal punishment on them1  
since there were slain on that day about
 three and twenty thousand men 7,ex4    
#cb3bh71 and threatened them with       
punishment in the life to come1 saying1 
7,ex4 #cb3cd73 ,i1 in the day of        
revenge1 will visit this sin 4 4 4 of   
theirs4  ,secondly1 this may be         
understood to refer to the guilt3 thus a
 disease is said to be incurable in     
respect of the nature of the disease1   

which removes whatever might be a means 
of cure1 as when it takes away the power
 of nature1 or causes loathing for food 
and medicine1 although ,god is able to  
cure such a disease4 ,so too1 the sin   
against the ,holy ,ghost is said to be  
unpardonable1 by reason of its nature1  
in so far as it removes those things    
which are a means towards the pardon of 
sins4 ,this does not1 however1 close the
 way of forgiveness and healing to an   
all-powerful and merciful ,god1 ,who1   
sometimes1 by a miracle1 so to speak1   
restores spiritual health to such men4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we should despair of  
no man in this life1 considering ,god's 
omnipotence and mercy4 ,but if we       
consider the circumstances of sin1 some 
are called 7,eph4 #b3b7 children of     
despair 99,filios diffidentiae1 which   
the ,douay version renders children of  
unbelief44  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this      
argument considers the question on the  
part of ,god's omnipotence1 not on that 
of the circumstances of sin4  ,reply    

,obj4 #c3 ,in this life the free-will   
does indeed ever remain subject to      
change3 yet sometimes it rejects that   
whereby1 so far as it is concerned1 it  
can be turned to good4 ,hence considered
 in itself this sin is unpardonable1    
although ,god can pardon it4   ,,fourth 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #d  
,whether a ,man ,can ,sin ,first of ,all
 ,against the ,holy ,ghost8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that a man cannot sin
 first of all against the ,holy ,ghost1 
without having previously committed     
other sins4 ,for the natural order      
requires that one should be moved to    
perfection from imperfection4 ,this is  
evident as regards good things1         
according to ,prov4 #d3ah3 ,the path of 
the just1 as a shining light1 goeth     
forwards and increases even to perfect  
day4 ,now1 in evil things1 the perfect  
is the greatest evil1 as the            
,philosopher states 7,metaph4 v1 text4  
#ba74 ,since then the sin against the   
,holy ,ghost is the most grievous sin1  

it seems that man comes to commit this  
sin through committing lesser sins4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to sin against the  
,holy ,ghost is to sin through certain  
malice1 or through choice4 ,now man     
cannot do this until he has sinned many 
times2 for the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 v1 #f1 #i7 that although a man 
is able to do unjust deeds1 yet he      
cannot all at once do them as an unjust 
man does1 viz4 from choice4 ,therefore  
it seems that the sin against the ,holy 
,ghost cannot be committed except after 
other sins4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1        
repentance and impenitence are about the
 same object4 ,but there is no          
repentance1 except about past sins4     
,therefore the same applies to          
impenitence which is a species of the   
sin against the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore
 the sin against the ,holy ,ghost       
presupposes other sins4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is easy in the eyes of    
,god on a sudden to make a poor man rich
 7,ecclus4 #aa3bc74 ,therefore1         

conversely1 it is possible for a man1   
according to the malice of the devil who
 tempts him1 to be led to commit the    
most grievous of sins which is that     
against the ,holy ,ghost4  ,i answer    
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 in one 
way1 to sin against the ,holy ,ghost is 
to sin through certain malice4 ,now one 
may sin through certain malice in two   
ways1 as stated in the same place3      
first1 through the inclination of a     
habit2 but this is not1 properly        
speaking1 to sin against the ,holy      
,ghost1 nor does a man come to commit   
this sin all at once1 in as much as     
sinful acts must precede so as to cause 
the habit that induces to sin4          
,secondly1 one may sin through certain  
malice1 by contemptuously rejecting the 
things whereby a man is withdrawn from  
sin4 ,this is1 properly speaking1 to sin
 against the ,holy ,ghost1 as stated    
above 7,a4 #a72 and this also1 for the  
most part1 presupposes other sins1 for  
it is written 7,prov4 #ah3c7 that the   

wicked man1 when he is come into the    
depth of sins1 contemneth4              
,nevertheless it is possible for a man1 
in his first sinful act1 to sin against 
the ,holy ,ghost by contempt1 both on   
account of his free-will1 and on account
 of the many previous dispositions1 or  
again1 through being vehemently moved to
 evil1 while but feebly attached to     
good4 ,hence never or scarcely ever does
 it happen that the perfect sin all at  
once against the ,holy ,ghost3 wherefore
 ,origen says 7,peri ,archon4 i1 #c73 ,i
 do not think that anyone who stands on 
the highest step of perfection1 can fail
 or fall suddenly2 this can only happen 
by degrees and bit by bit4  ,the same   
applies1 if the sin against the ,holy   
,ghost be taken literally for blasphemy 
against the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for such     
blasphemy as ,our ,lord speaks of1      
always proceeds from contemptuous       
malice4  ,if1 however1 with ,augustine  
7,de ,verb4 ,dom41 ,serm4 lxxi7 we      
understand the sin against the ,holy    

,ghost to denote final impenitence1 it  
does not regard the question in point1  
because this sin against the ,holy      
,ghost requires persistence in sin until
 the end of life4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3     
,movement both in good and in evil is   
made1 for the most part1 from imperfect 
to perfect1 according as man progresses 
in good or evil3 and yet in both cases1 
one man can begin from a greater 7good  
or evil7 than another man does4         
,consequently1 that from which a man    
begins can be perfect in good or evil   
according to its genus1 although it may 
be imperfect as regards the series of   
good or evil actions whereby a man      
progresses in good or evil4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,this argument considers the  
sin which is committed through certain  
malice1 when it proceeds from the       
inclination of a habit4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,if by impenitence we understand    
with ,augustine 7,de ,verb4 ,dom41      
,serm4 lxxi7 persistence in sin until   
the end1 it is clear that it presupposes

 sin1 just as repentance does4 ,if1     
however1 we take it for habitual        
impenitence1 in which sense it is a sin 
against the ,holy ,ghost1 it is evident 
that it can precede sin3 for it is      
possible for a man who has never sinned 
to have the purpose either of repenting 
or of not repenting1 if he should happen
 to sin4   ,,question #ae  ,,of ,,the   
,,vices ,,opposed ,,to ,,knowledge ,,and
 ,,understanding 7,in ,three ,articles7 
,we must now consider the vices opposed 
to knowledge and understanding4 ,since1 
however1 we have treated of ignorance   
which is opposed to knowledge1 when we  
were discussing the causes of sins      
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gf71 we must now inquire 
about blindness of mind and dulness of  
sense1 which are opposed to the gift of 
understanding2 and under this head there
 are three points of inquiry3  7#a7     
,whether blindness of mind is a sin8    
7#b7 ,whether dulness of sense is a sin 
distinct from blindness of mind8  7#c7  
,whether these vices arise from sins of 

the flesh8   ,,first ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,blindness of ,mind ,is a ,sin8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
blindness of mind is not a sin4         
,because1 seemingly1 that which excuses 
from sin is not itself a sin4 ,now      
blindness of mind excuses from sin2 for 
it is written 7,john #i3da73 ,if you    
were blind1 you should not have sin4    
,therefore blindness of mind is not a   
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 punishment    
differs from guilt4 ,but blindness of   
mind is a punishment as appears from    
,isa4 #f3aj1 ,blind the heart of this   
people1 for1 since it is an evil1 it    
could not be from ,god1 were it not a   
punishment4 ,therefore blindness of mind
 is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
every sin is voluntary1 according to    
,augustine 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xiv74 ,now
 blindness of mind is not voluntary1    
since1 as ,augustine says 7,confess4 x71
 all love to know the resplendent truth1
 and as we read in ,eccles4 #aa3g1 the  

light is sweet and it is delightful for 
the eyes to see the sun4 ,therefore     
blindness of mind is not a sin4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 
reckons blindness of mind among the     
vices arising from lust4  ,i answer     
that1 ,just as bodily blindness is the  
privation of the principle of bodily    
sight1 so blindness of mind is the      
privation of the principle of mental or 
intellectual sight4 ,now this has a     
threefold principle4 ,one is the light  
of natural reason1 which light1 since it
 pertains to the species of the rational
 soul1 is never forfeit from the soul1  
and yet1 at times1 it is prevented from 
exercising its proper act1 through being
 hindered by the lower powers which the 
human intellect needs in order to       
understand1 for instance in the case of 
imbeciles and madmen1 as stated in the  
,first ,part 7,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4 #g1 #h74   
,another principle of intellectual sight
 is a certain habitual light superadded 
to the natural light of reason1 which   

light is sometimes forfeit from the     
soul4 ,this privation is blindness1 and 
is a punishment1 in so far as the       
privation of the light of grace is a    
punishment4 ,hence it is written        
concerning some 7,wis4 #b3ba73 ,their   
own malice blinded them4  ,a third      
principle of intellectual sight is an   
intelligible principle1 through which a 
man understands other things2 to which  
principle a man may attend or not       
attend4 ,that he does not attend thereto
 happens in two ways4 ,sometimes it is  
due to the fact that a man's will is    
deliberately turned away from the       
consideration of that principle1        
according to ,ps4 #ce3d1 ,he would not  
understand1 that he might do well3      
whereas sometimes it is due to the mind 
being more busy about things which it   
loves more1 so as to be hindered thereby
 from considering this principle1       
according to ,ps4 #eg3i1 ,fire1 i4e4 of 
concupiscence1 hath fallen on them and  
they shall not see the sun4 ,in either  

of these ways blindness of mind is a    
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the blindness   
that excuses from sin is that which     
arises from the natural defect of one   
who cannot see4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this 
argument considers the second kind of   
blindness which is a punishment4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,to understand the truth is1 
in itself1 beloved by all2 and yet1     
accidentally it may be hateful to       
someone1 in so far as a man is hindered 
thereby from having what he loves yet   
more4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,dulness of 
,sense ,is a ,sin ,distinct from        
,blindness of ,mind8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 seems that dulness of sense is not a   
distinct sin from blindness of mind4    
,because one thing has one contrary4    
,now dulness is opposed to the gift of  
understanding1 according to ,gregory    
7,moral4 ii1 #di72 and so is blindness  
of mind1 since understanding denotes a  
principle of sight4 ,therefore dulness  
of sense is the same as blindness of    

mind4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory     
7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 in speaking of      
dulness describes it as dulness of sense
 in respect of understanding4 ,now      
dulness of sense in respect of          
understanding seems to be the same as a 
defect in understanding1 which pertains 
to blindness of mind4 ,therefore dulness
 of sense is the same as blindness of   
mind4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if they      
differ at all1 it seems to be chiefly in
 the fact that blindness of mind is     
voluntary1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71    
while dulness of sense is a natural     
defect4 ,but a natural defect is not a  
sin3 so that1 accordingly1 dulness of   
sense would not be a sin1 which is      
contrary to what ,gregory says 7,moral4 
xxxi1 #de71 where he reckons it among   
the sins arising from gluttony4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,different causes produce    
different effects4 ,now ,gregory says   
7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 that dulness of     
sense arises from gluttony1 and that    
blindness of mind arises from lust4 ,now

 these others are different vices4      
,therefore those are different vices    
also4  ,i answer that1 ,dull is opposed 
to sharp3 and a thing is said to be     
sharp because it can pierce2 so that a  
thing is called dull through being      
obtuse and unable to pierce4 ,now a     
bodily sense1 by a kind of metaphor1 is 
said to pierce the medium1 in so far as 
it perceives its object from a distance 
or is able by penetration as it were to 
perceive the smallest details or the    
inmost parts of a thing4 ,hence in      
corporeal things the senses are said to 
be acute when they can perceive a       
sensible object from afar1 by sight1    
hearing1 or scent1 while on the other   
hand they are said to be dull1 through  
being unable to perceive1 except        
sensible objects that are near at hand1 
or of great power4  ,now1 by way of     
similitude to bodily sense1 we speak of 
sense in connection with the intellect2 
and this latter sense is in respect of  
certain primals and extremes1 as stated 

in ,ethic4 vi1 even as the senses are   
cognizant of sensible objects as of     
certain principles of knowledge4 ,now   
this sense which is connected with      
understanding1 does not perceive its    
object through a medium of corporeal    
distance1 but through certain other     
media1 as1 for instance1 when it        
perceives a thing's essence through a   
property thereof1 and the cause through 
its effect4 ,consequently a man is said 
to have an acute sense in connection    
with his understanding1 if1 as soon as  
he apprehends a property or effect of a 
thing1 he understands the nature or the 
thing itself1 and if he can succeed in  
perceiving its slightest details3       
whereas a man is said to have a dull    
sense in connection with his            
understanding1 if he cannot arrive at   
knowing the truth about a thing1 without
 many explanations2 in which case1      
moreover1 he is unable to obtain a      
perfect perception of everything        
pertaining to the nature of that thing4 

,accordingly dulness of sense in        
connection with understanding denotes a 
certain weakness of the mind as to the  
consideration of spiritual goods2 while 
blindness of mind implies the complete  
privation of the knowledge of such      
things4 ,both are opposed to the gift of
 understanding1 whereby a man knows     
spiritual goods by apprehending them1   
and has a subtle penetration of their   
inmost nature4 ,this dulness has the    
character of sin1 just as blindness of  
mind has1 that is1 in so far as it is   
voluntary1 as evidenced in one who1     
owing to his affection for carnal       
things1 dislikes or neglects the careful
 consideration of spiritual things4     
,this suffices for the ,replies to the  
,objections4   ,,third ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,blindness of ,mind and ,dulness of     
,sense ,arise from ,sins of the ,flesh8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
blindness of mind and dulness of sense  
do not arise from sins of the flesh4    

,for ,augustine 7,retract4 i1 #d7       
retracts what he had said in his        
,soliloquies i1 #a1 ,god ,who didst wish
 none but the clean to know the truth1  
and says that one might reply that many1
 even those who are unclean1 know many  
truths4 ,now men become unclean chiefly 
by sins of the flesh4 ,therefore        
blindness of mind and dulness of sense  
are not caused by sins of the flesh4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 blindness of mind   
and dulness of sense are defects in     
connection with the intellective part of
 the soul3 whereas carnal sins pertain  
to the corruption of the flesh4 ,but the
 flesh does not act on the soul1 but    
rather the reverse4 ,therefore the sins 
of the flesh do not cause blindness of  
mind and dulness of sense4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 all things are more passive to
 what is near them than to what is      
remote4 ,now spiritual vices are nearer 
the mind than carnal vices are4         
,therefore blindness of mind and dulness
 of sense are caused by spiritual rather

 than by carnal vices4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxi1  
#de7 that dulness of sense arises from  
gluttony and blindness of mind from     
lust4  ,i answer that1 ,the perfect     
intellectual operation in man consists  
in an abstraction from sensible         
phantasms1 wherefore the more a man's   
intellect is freed from those phantasms1
 the more thoroughly will it be able to 
consider things intelligible1 and to set
 in order all things sensible4 ,thus    
,anaxagoras stated that the intellect   
requires to be detached in order to     
command1 and that the agent must have   
power over matter1 in order to be able  
to move it4 ,now it is evident that     
pleasure fixes a man's attention on that
 which he takes pleasure in3 wherefore  
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #d1   
#e7 that we all do best that which we   
take pleasure in doing1 while as to     
other things1 we do them either not at  
all1 or in a faint-hearted fashion4     
,now carnal vices1 namely gluttony and  

lust1 are concerned with pleasures of   
touch in matters of food and sex2 and   
these are the most impetuous of all     
pleasures of the body4 ,for this reason 
these vices cause man's attention to be 
very firmly fixed on corporeal things1  
so that in consequence man's operation  
in regard to intelligible things is     
weakened1 more1 however1 by lust than by
 gluttony1 forasmuch as sexual pleasures
 are more vehement than those of the    
table4 ,wherefore lust gives rise to    
blindness of mind1 which excludes almost
 entirely the knowledge of spiritual    
things1 while dulness of sense arises   
from gluttony1 which makes a man weak in
 regard to the same intelligible things4
 ,on the other hand1 the contrary       
virtues1 viz4 abstinence and chastity1  
dispose man very much to the perfection 
of intellectual operation4 ,hence it is 
written 7,dan4 #a3ag7 that to these     
children on account of their abstinence 
and continency1 ,god gave knowledge and 
understanding in every book1 and wisdom4

  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although some who   
are the slaves of carnal vices are at   
times capable of subtle considerations  
about intelligible things1 on account of
 the perfection of their natural genius1
 or of some habit superadded thereto1   
nevertheless1 on account of the         
pleasures of the body1 it must needs    
happen that their attention is          
frequently withdrawn from this subtle   
contemplation3 wherefore the unclean can
 know some truths1 but their uncleanness
 is a clog on their knowledge4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,the flesh acts on the        
intellective faculties1 not by altering 
them1 but by impeding their operation in
 the aforesaid manner4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,it is owing to the fact that the      
carnal vices are further removed from   
the mind1 that they distract the mind's 
attention to more remote things1 so that
 they hinder the mind's contemplation   
all the more4   ,,question #af  ,,of    
,,the ,,precepts ,,of ,,faith1          
,,knowledge ,,and ,,understanding 7,in  

,two ,articles7  ,we must now consider  
the precepts pertaining to the          
aforesaid1 and under this head there are
 two points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,the      
precepts concerning faith2  7#b7 ,the   
precepts concerning the gifts of        
knowledge and understanding4   ,,first  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #a  
,whether in the ,old ,law ,there ,should
 ,have ,been ,given ,precepts of ,faith8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that1 in
 the ,old ,law1 there should have been  
given precepts of faith4 ,because a     
precept is about something due and      
necessary4 ,now it is most necessary for
 man that he should believe1 according  
to ,heb4 #aa3f1 ,without faith it is    
impossible to please ,god4 ,therefore   
there was very great need for precepts  
of faith to be given4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 the ,new ,testament is        
contained in the ,old1 as the reality in
 the figure1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1  
,q4 #ajg1 ,a4 #c74 ,now the ,new        
,testament contains explicit precepts of

 faith1 for instance ,john #ad3a3 ,you  
believe in ,god2 believe also in ,me4   
,therefore it seems that some precepts  
of faith ought to have been given in the
 ,old ,law also4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to
 prescribe the act of a virtue comes to 
the same as to forbid the opposite      
vices4 ,now the ,old ,law contained many
 precepts forbidding unbelief3 thus     
7,ex4 #bj3c73 ,thou shalt not have      
strange gods before ,me1 and 7,deut4    
#ac3a-c7 they were forbidden to hear the
 words of the prophet or dreamer who    
might wish to turn them away from their 
faith in ,god4 ,therefore precepts of   
faith should have been given in the ,old
 ,law also4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1        
confession is an act of faith1 as stated
 above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a74 ,now the ,old  
,law contained precepts about the       
confession and the promulgation of      
faith3 for they were commanded 7,ex4    
#ab3bg7 that1 when their children should
 ask them1 they should tell them the    
meaning of the paschal observance1 and  

7,deut4 #ac3i7 they were commanded to   
slay anyone who disseminated doctrine   
contrary to faith4 ,therefore the ,old  
,law should have contained precepts of  
faith4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 all the     
books of the ,old ,testament are        
contained in the ,old ,law2 wherefore   
,our ,lord said 7,john #ae3be7 that it  
was written in the ,law3 ,they have     
hated ,me without cause1 although this  
is found written in ,ps4 #cd and #fh4   
,now it is written 7,ecclus4 #b3h73 ,ye 
that fear the ,lord1 believe ,him4      
,therefore the ,old ,law should have    
contained precepts of faith4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,the ,apostle 7,rom4 #c3bg7   
calls the ,old ,law the law of works    
which he contrasts with the law of      
faith4 ,therefore the ,old ,law ought   
not to have contained precepts of faith4
  ,i answer that1 ,a master does not    
impose laws on others than his subjects2
 wherefore the precepts of a law        
presuppose that everyone who receives   
the law is subject to the giver of the  

law4 ,now the primary subjection of man 
to ,god is by faith1 according to ,heb4 
#aa3f3 ,he that cometh to ,god1 must    
believe that ,he is4 ,hence faith is    
presupposed to the precepts of the ,law3
 for which reason 7,ex4 #bj3b7 that     
which is of faith1 is set down before   
the legal precepts1 in the words1 ,i am 
the ,lord thy ,god1 ,who brought thee   
out of the land of ,egypt1 and1 likewise
 7,deut4 #f3d71 the words1 ,hear1 ,o    
,israel1 the ,lord thy ,vulg43 'our'    
,god is one1 precede the recording of   
the precepts4  ,since1 however1 faith   
contains many things subordinate to the 
faith whereby we believe that ,god is1  
which is the first and chief of all     
articles of faith1 as stated above 7,q4 
#a1 ,,aa4 #a1 #g71 it follows that1 if  
we presuppose faith in ,god1 whereby    
man's mind is subjected to ,him1 it is  
possible for precepts to be given about 
other articles of faith4 ,thus          
,augustine expounding the words3 ,this  
is ,my commandment 7,john #ae3ab7 says  

7,tract4 lxxxiii in ,joan47 that we have
 received many precepts of faith4 ,in   
the ,old ,law1 however1 the secret      
things of faith were not to be set      
before the people1 wherefore1           
presupposing their faith in one ,god1 no
 other precepts of faith were given in  
the ,old ,law4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,faith 
is necessary as being the principle of  
spiritual life1 wherefore it is         
presupposed before the receiving of the 
,law4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even then ,our 
,lord both presupposed something of     
faith1 namely belief in one ,god1 when  
,he said3 ,you believe in ,god1 and     
commanded something1 namely1 belief in  
the ,incarnation whereby one ,person is 
,god and man4 ,this explanation of faith
 belongs to the faith of the ,new       
,testament1 wherefore ,he added3        
,believe also in ,me4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,the prohibitive precepts regard sins1  
which corrupt virtue4 ,now virtue is    
corrupted by any particular defect1 as  
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #d1 

ad #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #f1 ad #a1 
,a4 #g1 ad #c74 ,therefore faith in one 
,god being presupposed1 prohibitive     
precepts had to be given in the ,old    
,law1 so that men might be warned off   
those particular defects whereby their  
faith might be corrupted4  ,reply ,obj4 
#d3 ,confession of faith and the        
teaching thereof also presuppose man's  
submission to ,god by faith3 so that the
 ,old ,law could contain precepts       
relating to the confession and teaching 
of faith1 rather than to faith itself4  
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,in this passage again 
that faith is presupposed whereby we    
believe that ,god is2 hence it begins1  
,ye that fear the ,lord1 which is not   
possible without faith4 ,the words which
 follow--believe ,him--must be referred 
to certain special articles of faith1   
chiefly to those things which ,god      
promises to them that obey ,him1        
wherefore the passage concludes--and    
your reward shall not be made void4     
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #af1  

,art4 #b  ,whether the ,precepts        
,referring to ,knowledge and            
,understanding ,were ,fittingly ,set    
,down in the ,old ,law8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that the precepts        
referring to knowledge and understanding
 were unfittingly set down in the ,old  
,law4 ,for knowledge and understanding  
pertain to cognition4 ,now cognition    
precedes and directs action4 ,therefore 
the precepts referring to knowledge and 
understanding should precede the        
precepts of the ,law referring to       
action4 ,since1 then1 the first precepts
 of the ,law are those of the decalogue1
 it seems that precepts of knowledge and
 understanding should have been given a 
place among the precepts of the         
decalogue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 learning
 precedes teaching1 for a man must learn
 from another before he teaches another4
 ,now the ,old ,law contains precepts   
about teaching--both affirmative        
precepts as1 for example1 7,deut4 #d3i71
 ,thou shalt teach them to thy sons--and

 prohibitive precepts1 as1 for instance1
 7,deut4 #d3b71 ,you shall not add to   
the word that ,i speak to you1 neither  
shall you take away from it4 ,therefore 
it seems that man ought to have been    
given also some precepts directing him  
to learn4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 knowledge
 and understanding seem more necessary  
to a priest than to a king1 wherefore it
 is written 7,malachi #b3g73 ,the lips  
of the priest shall keep knowledge1 and 
they shall seek the law at his mouth1   
and 7,osee #d3f73 ,because thou hast    
rejected knowledge1 ,i will reject thee1
 that thou shalt not do the office of   
priesthood to ,me4 ,now the king is     
commanded to learn knowledge of the ,law
 7,deut4 #ag3ah1 #ai74 ,much more       
therefore should the ,law have commanded
 the priests to learn the ,law4  ,obj4  
#d3 ,further1 it is not possible while  
asleep to meditate on things pertaining 
to knowledge and understanding3 moreover
 it is hindered by extraneous           
occupations4 ,therefore it is           

unfittingly commanded 7,deut4 #f3g73    
,thou shalt meditate upon them sitting  
in thy house1 and walking on thy        
journey1 sleeping and rising4 ,therefore
 the precepts relating to knowledge and 
understanding are unfittingly set down  
in the ,law4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is  
written 7,deut4 #d3f73 ,that1 hearing   
all these precepts1 they may say1       
,behold a wise and understanding people4
  ,i answer that1 ,three things may be  
considered in relation to knowledge and 
understanding3 first1 the reception     
thereof2 secondly1 the use2 and thirdly1
 their preservation4 ,now the reception 
of knowledge or understanding1 is by    
means of teaching and learning1 and both
 are prescribed in the ,law4 ,for it is 
written 7,deut4 #f3f73 ,these words     
which ,i command thee 4 4 4 shall be in 
thy heart4 ,this refers to learning1    
since it is the duty of a disciple to   
apply his mind to what is said1 while   
the words that follow--and thou shalt   
tell them to thy children--refer to     

teaching4  ,the use of knowledge and    
understanding is the meditation on those
 things which one knows or understands4 
,in reference to this1 the text goes on3
 thou shalt meditate upon them sitting  
in thy house1 etc4  ,their preservation 
is effected by the memory1 and1 as      
regards this1 the text continues--and   
thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy   
hand1 and they shall be and shall move  
between thy eyes4 ,and thou shalt write 
them in the entry1 and on the doors of  
thy house4 ,thus the continual          
remembrance of ,god's commandments is   
signified1 since it is impossible for us
 to forget those things which are       
continually attracting the notice of our
 senses1 whether by touch1 as those     
things we hold in our hands1 or by      
sight1 as those things which are ever   
before our eyes1 or to which we are     
continually returning1 for instance1 to 
the house door4 ,moreover it is clearly 
stated 7,deut4 #d3i73 ,forget not the   
words that thy eyes have seen and let   

them not go out of thy heart all the    
days of thy life4  ,we read of these    
things also being commanded more notably
 in the ,new ,testament1 both in the    
teaching of the ,gospel and in that of  
the apostles4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3         
,according to ,deut4 #d3f1 this is your 
wisdom and understanding in the sight of
 the nations4 ,by this we are given to  
understand that the wisdom and          
understanding of those who believe in   
,god consist in the precepts of the     
,law4 ,wherefore the precepts of the    
,law had to be given first1 and         
afterwards men had to be led to know and
 understand them1 and so it was not     
fitting that the aforesaid precepts     
should be placed among the precepts of  
the decalogue which take the first      
place4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there are also
 in the ,law precepts relating to       
learning1 as stated above4 ,nevertheless
 teaching was commanded more expressly  
than learning1 because it concerned the 
learned1 who were not under any other   

authority1 but were immediately under   
the law1 and to them the precepts of the
 ,law were given4 ,on the other hand    
learning concerned the people of lower  
degree1 and these the precepts of the   
,law have to reach through the learned4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,knowledge of the ,law 
is so closely bound up with the priestly
 office that being charged with the     
office implies being charged to know the
 ,law3 hence there was no need for      
special precepts to be given about the  
training of the priests4 ,on the other  
hand1 the doctrine of ,god's law is not 
so bound up with the kingly office1     
because a king is placed over his people
 in temporal matters3 hence it is       
especially commanded that the king      
should be instructed by the priests     
about things pertaining to the law of   
,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,that precept of
 the ,law does not mean that man should 
meditate on ,god's law by sleeping1 but 
during sleep1 i4e4 that he should       
meditate on the law of ,god when he is  

preparing to sleep1 because this leads  
to his having better phantasms while    
asleep1 in so far as our movements pass 
from the state of vigil to the state of 
sleep1 as the ,philosopher explains     
7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 ,in like manner we are
 commanded to meditate on the ,law in   
every action of ours1 not that we are   
bound to be always actually thinking    
about the ,law1 but that we should      
regulate all our actions according to   
it4   ,,question #ag  ,,of ,,hope1      
,,considered ,,in ,,itself 7,in ,eight  
,articles7  ,after treating of faith1 we
 must consider hope and 7#a7 hope       
itself2 7#b7 the gift of fear2 7#c7 the 
contrary vices2 7#d7 the corresponding  
precepts4 ,the first of these points    
gives rise to a twofold consideration3  
7#a7 hope1 considered in itself2 7#b7   
its subject4  ,under the first head     
there are eight points of inquiry3  7#a7
 ,whether hope is a virtue8  7#b7       
,whether its object is eternal          
happiness8  7#c7 ,whether1 by the virtue

 of hope1 one man may hope for another's
 happiness8  7#d7 ,whether a man may    
lawfully hope in man8  7#e7 ,whether    
hope is a theological virtue8  7#f7 ,of 
its distinction from the other          
theological virtues8  7#g7 ,of its      
relation to faith2  7#h7 ,of its        
relation to charity4   ,,first ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,hope ,is a ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that hope is not a virtue4  
,for no man makes ill use of a virtue1  
as ,augustine states 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4   
ii1 #ah74 ,but one may make ill use of  
hope1 since the passion of hope1 like   
the other passions1 is subject to a mean
 and extremes4 ,therefore hope is not a 
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no virtue  
results from merits1 since ,god works   
virtue in us without us1 as ,augustine  
states 7,de ,grat4 et ,lib4 ,arb4 xvii74
 ,but hope is caused by grace and       
merits1 according to the ,master 7,sent4
 iii1 ,d1 #bf74 ,therefore hope is not a
 virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 virtue is 

the disposition of a perfect thing      
7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag1 #ah74 ,but hope 
is the disposition of an imperfect      
thing1 of one1 namely1 that lacks what  
it hopes to have4 ,therefore hope is not
 a virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory  
says 7,moral4 i1 #cc7 that the three    
daughters of ,job signify these three   
virtues1 faith1 hope and charity4       
,therefore hope is a virtue4  ,i answer 
that1 ,according to the ,philosopher    
7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 the virtue of a thing  
is that which makes its subject good1   
and its work good likewise4             
,consequently wherever we find a good   
human act1 it must correspond to some   
human virtue4 ,now in all things        
measured and ruled1 the good is that    
which attains its proper rule3 thus we  
say that a coat is good if it neither   
exceeds nor falls short of its proper   
measurement4 ,but1 as we stated above   
7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c7 human acts have 
a twofold measure2 one is proximate and 
homogeneous1 viz4 the reason1 while the 

other is remote and excelling1 viz4     
,god3 wherefore every human act is good1
 which attains reason or ,god ,himself4 
,now the act of hope1 whereof we speak  
now1 attains ,god4 ,for1 as we have     
already stated 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4   
#a71 when we were treating of the       
passion of hope1 the object of hope is a
 future good1 difficult but possible to 
obtain4 ,now a thing is possible to us  
in two ways3 first1 by ourselves2       
secondly1 by means of others1 as stated 
in ,ethic4 iii4 ,wherefore1 in so far as
 we hope for anything as being possible 
to us by means of the ,divine           
assistance1 our hope attains ,god       
,himself1 on ,whose help it leans4 ,it  
is therefore evident that hope is a     
virtue1 since it causes a human act to  
be good and to attain its due rule4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the passions1 the  
mean of virtue depends on right reason  
being attained1 wherein also consists   
the essence of virtue4 ,wherefore in    
hope too1 the good of virtue depends on 

a man's attaining1 by hoping1 the due   
rule1 viz4 ,god4 ,consequently man      
cannot make ill use of hope which       
attains ,god1 as neither can he make ill
 use of moral virtue which attains the  
reason1 because to attain thus is to    
make good use of virtue4 ,nevertheless1 
the hope of which we speak now1 is not a
 passion but a habit of the mind1 as we 
shall show further on 7,a4 #e2 ,q4 #ah1 
,a4 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,hope is said
 to arise from merits1 as regards the   
thing hoped for1 in so far as we hope to
 obtain happiness by means of grace and 
merits2 or as regards the act of living 
hope4 ,the habit itself of hope1 whereby
 we hope to obtain happiness1 does not  
flow from our merits1 but from grace    
alone4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he who hopes  
is indeed imperfect in relation to that 
which he hopes to obtain1 but has not as
 yet2 yet he is perfect1 in so far as he
 already attains his proper rule1 viz4  
,god1 on ,whose help he leans4          
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1  

,art4 #b  ,whether ,eternal ,happiness  
,is the ,proper ,object of ,hope8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
eternal happiness is not the proper     
object of hope4 ,for a man does not hope
 for that which surpasses every movement
 of the soul1 since hope itself is a    
movement of the soul4 ,now eternal      
happiness surpasses every movement of   
the human soul1 for the ,apostle says   
7#a ,cor4 #b3i7 that it hath not entered
 into the heart of man4 ,therefore      
happiness is not the proper object of   
hope4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prayer is an 
expression of hope1 for it is written   
7,ps4 #cf3e73 ,commit thy way to the    
,lord1 and trust in ,him1 and ,he will  
do it4 ,now it is lawful for man to pray
 ,god not only for eternal happiness1   
but also for the goods1 both temporal   
and spiritual1 of the present life1 and1
 as evidenced by the ,lord's ,prayer1 to
 be delivered from evils which will no  
longer be in eternal happiness4         
,therefore eternal happiness is not the 

proper object of hope4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 the object of hope is         
something difficult4 ,now many things   
besides eternal happiness are difficult 
to man4 ,therefore eternal happiness is 
not the proper object of hope4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,heb4     
#f3ai7 that we have hope which entereth 
in1 i4e4 maketh us to enter 4 4 4 within
 the veil1 i4e4 into the happiness of   
heaven1 according to the interpretation 
of a gloss on these words4 ,therefore   
the object of hope is eternal happiness4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 
#a71 the hope of which we speak now1    
attains ,god by leaning on ,his help in 
order to obtain the hoped for good4 ,now
 an effect must be proportionate to its 
cause4 ,wherefore the good which we     
ought to hope for from ,god properly and
 chiefly is the infinite good1 which is 
proportionate to the power of our divine
 helper1 since it belongs to an infinite
 power to lead anyone to an infinite    
good4 ,such a good is eternal life1     

which consists in the enjoyment of ,god 
,himself4 ,for we should hope from ,him 
for nothing less than ,himself1 since   
,his goodness1 whereby ,he imparts good 
things to ,his creature1 is no less than
 ,his ,essence4 ,therefore the proper   
and principal object of hope is eternal 
happiness4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,eternal   
happiness does not enter into the heart 
of man perfectly1 i4e4 so that it be    
possible for a wayfarer to know its     
nature and quality2 yet1 under the      
general notion of the perfect good1 it  
is possible for it to be apprehended by 
a man1 and it is in this way that the   
movement of hope towards it arises4     
,hence the ,apostle says pointedly      
7,heb4 #f3ai7 that hope enters in1 even 
within the veil1 because that which we  
hope for is as yet veiled1 so to speak4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,we ought not to pray  
,god for any other goods1 except in     
reference to eternal happiness4 ,hence  
hope regards eternal happiness chiefly1 
and other things1 for which we pray     

,god1 it regards secondarily and as     
referred to eternal happiness3 just as  
faith regards ,god principally1 and1    
secondarily1 those things which are     
referred to ,god1 as stated above 7,q4  
#a1 ,a4 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to him  
that longs for something great1 all     
lesser things seem small2 wherefore to  
him that hopes for eternal happiness1   
nothing else appears arduous1 as        
compared with that hope2 although1 as   
compared with the capability of the man 
who hopes1 other things besides may be  
arduous to him1 so that he may have hope
 for such things in reference to its    
principal object4   ,,third ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,one ,man ,may ,hope for ,another's     
,eternal ,happiness8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that one may hope for       
another's eternal happiness4 ,for the   
,apostle says 7,phil4 #a3f73 ,being     
confident of this very thing1 that ,he  
,who hath begun a good work in you1 will
 perfect it unto the day of ,jesus      

,christ4 ,now the perfection of that day
 will be eternal happiness4 ,therefore  
one man may hope for another's eternal  
happiness4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever
 we ask of ,god1 we hope to obtain from 
,him4 ,but we ask ,god to bring others  
to eternal happiness1 according to      
,james #e3af3 ,pray for one another that
 you may be saved4 ,therefore we can    
hope for another's eternal happiness4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 hope and despair are
 about the same object4 ,now it is      
possible to despair of another's eternal
 happiness1 else ,augustine would have  
no reason for saying 7,de ,verb4 ,dom41 
,serm4 lxxi7 that we should not despair 
of anyone so long as he lives4          
,therefore one can also hope for        
another's eternal salvation4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,enchiridion 
viii7 that hope is only of such things  
as belong to him who is supposed to hope
 for them4  ,i answer that1 ,we can hope
 for something in two ways3 first1      
absolutely1 and thus the object of hope 

is always something arduous and         
pertaining to the person who hopes4     
,secondly1 we can hope for something1   
through something else being            
presupposed1 and in this way its object 
can be something pertaining to someone  
else4 ,in order to explain this we must 
observe that love and hope differ in    
this1 that love denotes union between   
lover and beloved1 while hope denotes a 
movement or a stretching forth of the   
appetite towards an arduous good4 ,now  
union is of things that are distinct1   
wherefore love can directly regard the  
other whom a man unites to himself by   
love1 looking upon him as his other     
self3 whereas movement is always towards
 its own term which is proportionate to 
the subject moved4 ,therefore hope      
regards directly one's own good1 and not
 that which pertains to another4 ,yet if
 we presuppose the union of love with   
another1 a man can hope for and desire  
something for another man1 as for       
himself2 and1 accordingly1 he can hope  

for another's eternal life1 inasmuch as 
he is united to him by love1 and just as
 it is the same virtue of charity       
whereby a man loves ,god1 himself1 and  
his neighbor1 so too it is the same     
virtue of hope1 whereby a man hopes for 
himself and for another4  ,this suffices
 for the ,replies to the ,objections4   
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1  
,art4 #d  ,whether a ,man ,can ,lawfully
 ,hope in ,man8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that one may lawfully hope in
 man4 ,for the object of hope is eternal
 happiness4 ,now we are helped to obtain
 eternal happiness by the patronage of  
the saints1 for ,gregory says 7,dial4 i1
 #h7 that predestination is furthered by
 the saints' prayers4 ,therefore one may
 hope in man4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if a 
man may not hope in another man1 it     
ought not to be reckoned a sin in a man1
 that one should not be able to hope in 
him4 ,yet this is reckoned a vice in    
some1 as appears from ,jer4 #i3d3 ,let  
every man take heed of his neighbor1 and

 let him not trust in any brother of    
his4 ,therefore it is lawful to trust in
 a man4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 prayer is  
the expression of hope1 as stated above 
7,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #b74 ,but it is lawful to
 pray to a man for something4 ,therefore
 it is lawful to trust in him4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,it is written 7,jer4 #ag3e73 
,cursed be the man that trusteth in man4
  ,i answer that1 ,hope1 as stated above
 7,a4 #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #g71    
regards two things1 viz4 the good which 
it intends to obtain1 and the help by   
which that good is obtained4 ,now the   
good which a man hopes to obtain1 has   
the aspect of a final cause1 while the  
help by which one hopes to obtain that  
good1 has the character of an efficient 
cause4 ,now in each of these kinds of   
cause we find a principal and a         
secondary cause4 ,for the principal end 
is the last end1 while the secondary end
 is that which is referred to an end4   
,in like manner the principal efficient 
cause is the first agent1 while the     

secondary efficient cause is the        
secondary and instrumental agent4 ,now  
hope regards eternal happiness as its   
last end1 and the ,divine assistance as 
the first cause leading to happiness4   
,accordingly1 just as it is not lawful  
to hope for any good save happiness1 as 
one's last end1 but only as something   
referred to final happiness1 so too1 it 
is unlawful to hope in any man1 or any  
creature1 as though it were the first   
cause of movement towards happiness4 ,it
 is1 however1 lawful to hope in a man or
 a creature as being the secondary and  
instrumental agent through whom one is  
helped to obtain any goods that are     
ordained to happiness4 ,it is in this   
way that we turn to the saints1 and that
 we ask men also for certain things2 and
 for this reason some are blamed in that
 they cannot be trusted to give help4   
,this suffices for the ,replies to the  
,objections4   ,,fifth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #e  ,whether  
,hope ,is a ,theological ,virtue8       

,objection #a3 ,it would seem that hope 
is not a theological virtue4 ,for a     
theological virtue is one that has ,god 
for its object4 ,now hope has for its   
object not only ,god but also other     
goods which we hope to obtain from ,god4
 ,therefore hope is not a theological   
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a          
theological virtue is not a mean between
 two vices1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1   
,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #d74 ,but hope is a mean   
between presumption and despair4        
,therefore hope is not a theological    
virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 expectation
 belongs to longanimity which is a      
species of fortitude4 ,since1 then1 hope
 is a kind of expectation1 it seems that
 hope is not a theological1 but a moral 
virtue4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the object 
of hope is something arduous4 ,but it   
belongs to magnanimity1 which is a moral
 virtue1 to tend to the arduous4        
,therefore hope is a moral1 and not a   
theological virtue4  ,on the contrary1  
,hope is enumerated 7#a ,cor4 #ac7      

together with faith and charity1 which  
are theological virtues4  ,i answer     
that1 ,since specific differences1 by   
their very nature1 divide a genus1 in   
order to decide under what division we  
must place hope1 we must observe whence 
it derives its character of virtue4     
,now it has been stated above 7,a4 #a7  
that hope has the character of virtue   
from the fact that it attains the       
supreme rule of human actions3 and this 
it attains both as its first efficient  
cause1 in as much as it leans on its    
assistance1 and as its last final cause1
 in as much as it expects happiness in  
the enjoyment thereof4 ,hence it is     
evident that ,god is the principal      
object of hope1 considered as a virtue4 
,since1 then1 the very idea of a        
theological virtue is one that has ,god 
for its object1 as stated above         
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #a71 it is       
evident that hope is a theological      
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,whatever else
 hope expects to obtain1 it hopes for it

 in reference to ,god as the last end1  
or as the first efficient cause1 as     
stated above 7,a4 #d74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,in things measured and ruled the mean 
consists in the measure or rule being   
attained2 if we go beyond the rule1     
there is excess1 if we fall short of the
 rule1 there is deficiency4 ,but in the 
rule or measure itself there is no such 
thing as a mean or extremes4 ,now a     
moral virtue is concerned with things   
ruled by reason1 and these things are   
its proper object2 wherefore it is      
proper to it to follow the mean as      
regards its proper object4 ,on the other
 hand1 a theological virtue is concerned
 with the ,first ,rule not ruled by     
another rule1 and that ,rule is its     
proper object4 ,wherefore it is not     
proper for a theological virtue1 with   
regard to its proper object1 to follow  
the mean1 although this may happen to it
 accidentally with regard to something  
that is referred to its principal       
object4 ,thus faith can have no mean or 

extremes in the point of trusting to the
 ,first ,truth1 in which it is          
impossible to trust too much2 whereas on
 the part of the things believed1 it may
 have a mean and extremes2 for instance 
one truth is a mean between two         
falsehoods4 ,so too1 hope has no mean or
 extremes1 as regards its principal     
object1 since it is impossible to trust 
too much in the ,divine assistance2 yet 
it may have a mean and extremes1 as     
regards those things a man trusts to    
obtain1 in so far as he either presumes 
above his capability1 or despairs of    
things of which he is capable4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,the expectation which is     
mentioned in the definition of hope does
 not imply delay1 as does the           
expectation which belongs to            
longanimity4 ,it implies a reference to 
the ,divine assistance1 whether that    
which we hope for be delayed or not4    
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,magnanimity tends to  
something arduous in the hope of        
obtaining something that is within one's

 power1 wherefore its proper object is  
the doing of great things4 ,on the other
 hand hope1 as a theological virtue1    
regards something arduous1 to be        
obtained by another's help1 as stated   
above 7,a4 #a74   ,,sixth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,hope ,is ,distinct from the ,other     
,theological ,virtues8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that hope is not distinct
 from the other theological virtues4    
,for habits are distinguished by their  
objects1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#ed1 ,a4 #b74 ,now the object of hope is
 the same as of the other theological   
virtues4 ,therefore hope is not distinct
 from the other theological virtues4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the symbol of    
faith1 whereby we make profession of    
faith1 we say3 ,i expect the            
resurrection of the dead and the life of
 the world to come4 ,now expectation of 
future happiness belongs to hope1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,therefore hope  
is not distinct from faith4  ,obj4 #c3  

,further1 by hope man tends to ,god4    
,but this belongs properly to charity4  
,therefore hope is not distinct from    
charity4  ,on the contrary1 ,there      
cannot be number without distinction4   
,now hope is numbered with the other    
theological virtues3 for ,gregory says  
7,moral4 i1 #af7 that the three virtues 
are faith1 hope1 and charity4 ,therefore
 hope is distinct from the theological  
virtues4  ,i answer that1 ,a virtue is  
said to be theological from having ,god 
for the object to which it adheres4 ,now
 one may adhere to a thing in two ways3 
first1 for its own sake2 secondly1      
because something else is attained      
thereby4 ,accordingly charity makes us  
adhere to ,god for ,his own sake1       
uniting our minds to ,god by the emotion
 of love4  ,on the other hand1 hope and 
faith make man adhere to ,god as to a   
principle wherefrom certain things      
accrue to us4 ,now we derive from ,god  
both knowledge of truth and the         
attainment of perfect goodness4         

,accordingly faith makes us adhere to   
,god1 as the source whence we derive the
 knowledge of truth1 since we believe   
that what ,god tells us is true3 while  
hope makes us adhere to ,god1 as the    
source whence we derive perfect         
goodness1 i4e4 in so far as1 by hope1 we
 trust to the ,divine assistance for    
obtaining happiness4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,god is the object of these virtues     
under different aspects1 as stated      
above3 and a different aspect of the    
object suffices for the distinction of  
habits1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#ed1 ,a4 #b74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3         
,expectation is mentioned in the symbol 
of faith1 not as though it were the     
proper act of faith1 but because the act
 of hope presupposes the act of faith1  
as we shall state further on 7,a4 #g74  
,hence an act of faith is expressed in  
the act of hope4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hope
 makes us tend to ,god1 as to a good to 
be obtained finally1 and as to a helper 
strong to assist3 whereas charity1      

properly speaking1 makes us tend to     
,god1 by uniting our affections to ,him1
 so that we live1 not for ourselves1 but
 for ,god4   ,,seventh ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,hope ,precedes ,faith8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that hope precedes faith4
 ,because a gloss on ,ps4 #cf3c1 ,trust 
in the ,lord1 and do good1 says3 ,hope  
is the entrance to faith and the        
beginning of salvation4 ,but salvation  
is by faith whereby we are justified4   
,therefore hope precedes faith4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 that which is included in 
a definition should precede the thing   
defined and be more known4 ,but hope is 
included in the definition of faith     
7,heb4 #aa3a73 ,faith is the substance  
of things to be hoped for4 ,therefore   
hope precedes faith4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 hope precedes a meritorious   
act1 for the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4    
#i3aj73 ,he that plougheth should plough
 in hope 4 4 4 to receive fruit4 ,but   
the act of faith is meritorious4        

,therefore hope precedes faith4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4 #a3b73
 ,abraham begot ,isaac1 i4e4 ,faith     
begot hope1 according to a gloss4  ,i   
answer that1 ,absolutely speaking1 faith
 precedes hope4 ,for the object of hope 
is a future good1 arduous but possible  
to obtain4 ,in order1 therefore1 that we
 may hope1 it is necessary for the      
object of hope to be proposed to us as  
possible4 ,now the object of hope is1 in
 one way1 eternal happiness1 and in     
another way1 the ,divine assistance1 as 
explained above 7,a4 #b2 ,a4 #f1 ad #c73
 and both of these are proposed to us by
 faith1 whereby we come to know that we 
are able to obtain eternal life1 and    
that for this purpose the ,divine       
assistance is ready for us1 according to
 ,heb4 #aa3f3 ,he that cometh to ,god1  
must believe that ,he is1 and is a      
rewarder to them that seek ,him4        
,therefore it is evident that faith     
precedes hope4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the
 same gloss observes further on1 hope is

 called the entrance to faith1 i4e4 of  
the thing believed1 because by hope we  
enter in to see what we believe4 ,or we 
may reply that it is called the entrance
 to faith1 because thereby man begins to
 be established and perfected in faith4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the thing to be hoped 
for is included in the definition of    
faith1 because the proper object of     
faith1 is something not apparent in     
itself4 ,hence it was necessary to      
express it in a circumlocution by       
something resulting from faith4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,hope does not precede every  
meritorious act2 but it suffices for it 
to accompany or follow it4   ,,eighth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #h  
,whether ,charity ,precedes ,hope8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
charity precedes hope4 ,for ,ambrose    
says on ,luke #bg3f1 ,if you had faith  
like to a grain of mustard seed1 etc43  
,charity flows from faith1 and hope from
 charity4 ,but faith precedes charity4  
,therefore charity precedes hope4  ,obj4

 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de     
,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #i7 that good emotions  
and affections proceed from love and    
holy charity4 ,now to hope1 considered  
as an act of hope1 is a good emotion of 
the soul4 ,therefore it flows from      
charity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the       
,master says 7,sent4 iii1 ,d1 #bf7 that 
hope proceeds from merits1 which precede
 not only the thing hoped for1 but also 
hope itself1 which1 in the order of     
nature1 is preceded by charity4         
,therefore charity precedes hope4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a    
,tim4 #a3e73 ,the end of the commandment
 is charity from a pure heart1 and a    
good conscience1 i4e4 from hope1        
according to a gloss4 ,therefore hope   
precedes charity4  ,i answer that1      
,order is twofold4 ,one is the order of 
generation and of matter1 in respect of 
which the imperfect precedes the        
perfect3 the other is the order of      
perfection and form1 in respect of which
 the perfect naturally precedes the     

imperfect4 ,in respect of the first     
order hope precedes charity3 and this is
 clear from the fact that hope and all  
movements of the appetite flow from     
love1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1
 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #f1 ad   
#b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #g7 in the    
treatise on the passions4  ,now there is
 a perfect1 and an imperfect love4      
,perfect love is that whereby a man is  
loved in himself1 as when someone wishes
 a person some good for his own sake2   
thus a man loves his friend4 ,imperfect 
love is that whereby a man love         
something1 not for its own sake1 but    
that he may obtain that good for        
himself2 thus a man loves what he       
desires4 ,the first love of ,god        
pertains to charity1 which adheres to   
,god for ,his own sake2 while hope      
pertains to the second love1 since he   
that hopes1 intends to obtain possession
 of something for himself4  ,hence in   
the order of generation1 hope precedes  
charity4 ,for just as a man is led to   

love ,god1 through fear of being        
punished by ,him for his sins1 as       
,augustine states 7,in primam canon4    
,joan4 ,tract4 ix71 so too1 hope leads  
to charity1 in as much as a man through 
hoping to be rewarded by ,god1 is       
encouraged to love ,god and obey ,his   
commandments4 ,on the other hand1 in the
 order of perfection charity naturally  
precedes hope1 wherefore1 with the      
advent of charity1 hope is made more    
perfect1 because we hope chiefly in our 
friends4 ,it is in this sense that      
,ambrose states 7,obj4 #a7 that charity 
flows from hope3 so that this suffices  
for the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,hope and every      
movement of the appetite proceed from   
some kind of love1 whereby the expected 
good is loved4 ,but not every kind of   
hope proceeds from charity1 but only the
 movement of living hope1 viz4 that     
whereby man hopes to obtain good from   
,god1 as from a friend4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,the ,master is speaking of living  

hope1 which is naturally preceded by    
charity and the merits caused by        
charity4   ,,question #ah  ,,of ,,the   
,,subject ,,of ,,hope 7,in ,four        
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
subject of hope1 under which head there 
are four points of inquiry3  7#a7       
,whether the virtue of hope is in the   
will as its subject8  7#b7 ,whether it  
is in the blessed8  7#c7 ,whether it is 
in the damned8  7#d7 ,whether there is  
certainty in the hope of the wayfarer8  
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,hope ,is in the     
,will ,as ,its ,subject8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that hope is not in the 
will as its subject4 ,for the object of 
hope is an arduous good1 as stated above
 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4
 #a74 ,now the arduous is the object1   
not of the will1 but of the irascible4  
,therefore hope is not in the will but  
in the irascible4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
where one suffices it is superfluous to 
add another4 ,now charity suffices for  

the perfecting of the will1 which is the
 most perfect of the virtues4 ,therefore
 hope is not in the will4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 the one same power cannot     
exercise two acts at the same time2 thus
 the intellect cannot understand many   
things simultaneously4 ,now the act of  
hope can be at the same time as an act  
of charity4 ,since1 then1 the act of    
charity evidently belongs to the will1  
it follows that the act of hope does not
 belong to that power3 so that1         
therefore1 hope is not in the will4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,the soul is not         
apprehensive of ,god save as regards the
 mind in which is memory1 intellect and 
will1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,trin4
 xiv1 #c1 #f74 ,now hope is a           
theological virtue having ,god for its  
object4 ,since therefore it is neither  
in the memory1 nor in the intellect1    
which belong to the cognitive faculty1  
it follows that it is in the will as its
 subject4  ,i answer that1 ,as shown    
above 7,i1 ,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #b71 habits are 

known by their acts4 ,now the act of    
hope is a movement of the appetitive    
faculty1 since its object is a good4    
,and1 since there is a twofold appetite 
in man1 namely1 the sensitive which is  
divided into irascible and              
concupiscible1 and the intellective     
appetite1 called the will1 as stated in 
the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #e71     
those movements which occur in the lower
 appetite1 are with passion1 while those
 in the higher appetite are without     
passion1 as shown above 7,i1 ,q4 #hg1   
,a4 #b1 ad #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c1
 ad #c74 ,now the act of the virtue of  
hope cannot belong to the sensitive     
appetite1 since the good which is the   
principal object of this virtue1 is not 
a sensible but a ,divine good4          
,therefore hope resides in the higher   
appetite called the will1 and not in the
 lower appetite1 of which the irascible 
is a part4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the object
 of the irascible is an arduous         
sensible3 whereas the object of the     

virtue of hope is an arduous            
intelligible1 or rather                 
superintelligible4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,charity perfects the will sufficiently 
with regard to one act1 which is the act
 of loving3 but another virtue is       
required in order to perfect it with    
regard to its other act1 which is that  
of hoping4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the       
movement of hope and the movement of    
charity are mutually related1 as was    
shown above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #h74 ,hence   
there is no reason why both movements   
should not belong at the same time to   
the same power3 even as the intellect   
can understand many things at the same  
time if they be related to one another1 
as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #he1 
,a4 #d74   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #b  ,whether in the     
,blessed ,there ,is ,hope8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that in the blessed  
there is hope4 ,for ,christ was a       
perfect comprehensor from the first     
moment of ,his conception4 ,now ,he had 

hope1 since1 according to a gloss1 the  
words of ,ps4 #cj3b1 ,in ,thee1 ,o      
,lord1 have ,i hoped1 are said in ,his  
person4 ,therefore in the blessed there 
can be hope4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 even  
as the obtaining of happiness is an     
arduous good1 so is its continuation4   
,now1 before they obtain happiness1 men 
hope to obtain it4 ,therefore1 after    
they have obtained it1 they can hope to 
continue in its possession4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 by the virtue of hope1 a man  
can hope for happiness1 not only for    
himself1 but also for others1 as stated 
above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #c74 ,but the       
blessed who are in heaven hope for the  
happiness of others1 else they would not
 pray for them4 ,therefore there can be 
hope in them4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the  
happiness of the saints implies not only
 glory of the soul but also glory of the
 body4 ,now the souls of the saints in  
heaven1 look yet for the glory of their 
bodies 7,apoc4 #f3aj2 ,augustine1 ,gen4 
ad lit4 xii1 #ce74 ,therefore in the    

blessed there can be hope4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4     
#h3bd73 ,what a man seeth1 why doth he  
hope for8 ,now the blessed enjoy the    
sight of ,god4 ,therefore hope has no   
place in them4  ,i answer that1 ,if what
 gives a thing its species be removed1  
the species is destroyed1 and that thing
 cannot remain the same2 just as when a 
natural body loses its form1 it does not
 remain the same specifically4 ,now hope
 takes its species from its principal   
object1 even as the other virtues do1 as
 was shown above 7,q4 #ag1 ,,aa4 #e1 #f2
 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b73 and its     
principal object is eternal happiness as
 being possible to obtain by the        
assistance of ,god1 as stated above 7,q4
 #ag1 ,a4 #b74  ,since then the arduous 
possible good cannot be an object of    
hope except in so far as it is something
 future1 it follows that when happiness 
is no longer future1 but present1 it is 
incompatible with the virtue of hope4   
,consequently hope1 like faith1 is      

voided in heaven1 and neither of them   
can be in the blessed4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,although ,christ was a comprehensor   
and therefore blessed as to the         
enjoyment of ,god1 nevertheless ,he was1
 at the same time1 a wayfarer1 as       
regards the passibility of nature1 to   
which ,he was still subject4 ,hence it  
was possible for ,him to hope for the   
glory of impassibility and immortality1 
yet not so as to have the virtue of     
hope1 the principal object of which is  
not the glory of the body but the       
enjoyment of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,the happiness of the saints is called  
eternal life1 because through enjoying  
,god they become partakers1 as it were1 
of ,god's eternity which surpasses all  
time3 so that the continuation of       
happiness does not differ in respect of 
present1 past and future4 ,hence the    
blessed do not hope for the continuation
 of their happiness 7for as regards this
 there is no future71 but are in actual 
possession thereof4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   

,so long as the virtue of hope lasts1 it
 is by the same hope that one hopes for 
one's own happiness1 and for that of    
others4 ,but when hope is voided in the 
blessed1 whereby they hoped for their   
own happiness1 they hope for the        
happiness of others indeed1 yet not by  
the virtue of hope1 but rather by the   
love of charity4 ,even so1 he that has  
,divine charity1 by that same charity   
loves his neighbor1 without having the  
virtue of charity1 but by some other    
love4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since hope is a
 theological virtue having ,god for its 
object1 its principal object is the     
glory of the soul1 which consists in the
 enjoyment of ,god1 and not the glory of
 the body4 ,moreover1 although the glory
 of the body is something arduous in    
comparison with human nature1 yet it is 
not so for one who has the glory of the 
soul2 both because the glory of the body
 is a very small thing as compared with 
the glory of the soul1 and because one  
who has the glory of the soul has       

already the sufficient cause of the     
glory of the body4   ,,third ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,hope ,is in the ,damned8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that there is hope in
 the damned4 ,for the devil is damned   
and prince of the damned1 according to  
,matt4 #be3da3 ,depart 4 4 4 you cursed1
 into everlasting fire1 which was       
prepared for the devil and his angels4  
,but the devil has hope1 according to   
,job #dj3bh1 ,behold his hope shall fail
 him4 ,therefore it seems that the      
damned have hope4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
just as faith is either living or dead1 
so is hope4 ,but lifeless faith can be  
in the devils and the damned1 according 
to ,james #b3ai3 ,the devils 4 4 4      
believe and tremble4 ,therefore it seems
 that lifeless hope also can be in the  
damned4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 after death
 there accrues to man no merit or       
demerit that he had not before1         
according to ,eccles4 #aa3c1 ,if the    
tree fall to the south1 or to the north1

 in what place soever it shall fall1    
there shall it be4 ,now many who are    
damned1 in this life hoped and never    
despaired4 ,therefore they will hope in 
the future life also4  ,on the contrary1
 ,hope causes joy1 according to ,rom4   
#ab3ab1 ,rejoicing in hope4 ,now the    
damned have no joy1 but sorrow and      
grief1 according to ,isa4 #fe3ad1 ,my   
servants shall praise for joyfulness of 
heart1 and you shall cry for sorrow of  
heart1 and shall howl for grief of      
spirit4 ,therefore no hope is in the    
damned4  ,i answer that1 ,just as it is 
a condition of happiness that the will  
should find rest therein1 so is it a    
condition of punishment1 that what is   
inflicted in punishment1 should go      
against the will4 ,now that which is not
 known can neither be restful nor       
repugnant to the will3 wherefore        
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #ag7 
that the angels could not be perfectly  
happy in their first state before their 
confirmation1 or unhappy before their   

fall1 since they had no foreknowledge of
 what would happen to them4 ,for perfect
 and true happiness requires that one   
should be certain of being happy for    
ever1 else the will would not rest4  ,in
 like manner1 since the everlastingness 
of damnation is a necessary condition of
 the punishment of the damned1 it would 
not be truly penal unless it went       
against the will2 and this would be     
impossible if they were ignorant of the 
everlastingness of their damnation4     
,hence it belongs to the unhappy state  
of the damned1 that they should know    
that they cannot by any means escape    
from damnation and obtain happiness4    
,wherefore it is written 7,job #ae3bb73 
,he believeth not that he may return    
from darkness to light4 ,it is1         
therefore1 evident that they cannot     
apprehend happiness as a possible good1 
as neither can the blessed apprehend it 
as a future good4 ,consequently there is
 no hope either in the blessed or in the
 damned4 ,on the other hand1 hope can be

 in wayfarers1 whether of this life or  
in purgatory1 because in either case    
they apprehend happiness as a future    
possible thing4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as   
,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxiii1 #bj7 this
 is said of the devil as regards his    
members1 whose hope will fail utterly3  
or1 if it be understood of the devil    
himself1 it may refer to the hope       
whereby he expects to vanquish the      
saints1 in which sense we read just     
before 7,job #dj3ah73 ,he trusteth that 
the ,jordan may run into his mouth3 this
 is not1 however1 the hope of which we  
are speaking4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as     
,augustine says 7,enchiridion viii71    
faith is about things1 bad or good1     
past1 present1 or future1 one's own or  
another's2 whereas hope is only about   
good things1 future and concerning      
oneself4 ,hence it is possible for      
lifeless faith to be in the damned1 but 
not hope1 since the ,divine goods are   
not for them future possible things1 but
 far removed from them4  ,reply ,obj4   

#c3 ,lack of hope in the damned does not
 change their demerit1 as neither does  
the voiding of hope in the blessed      
increase their merit3 but both these    
things are due to the change in their   
respective states4   ,,fourth ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,there ,is ,certainty in the ,hope of a 
,wayfarer8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that there is no certainty in the  
hope of a wayfarer4 ,for hope resides in
 the will4 ,but certainty pertains not  
to the will but to the intellect4       
,therefore there is no certainty in     
hope4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 hope is based
 on grace and merits1 as stated above   
7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #a74 ,now it is impossible
 in this life to know for certain that  
we are in a state of grace1 as stated   
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,a4 #e74      
,therefore there is no certainty in the 
hope of a wayfarer4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 there can be no certainty about that   
which may fail4 ,now many a hopeful     
wayfarer fails to obtain happiness4     

,therefore wayfarer's hope has no       
certainty4  ,on the contrary1 ,hope is  
the certain expectation of future       
happiness1 as the ,master states 7,sent4
 iii1 ,d1 #bf73 and this may be gathered
 from #b ,tim4 #a3ab1 ,i know ,whom ,i  
have believed1 and ,i am certain that   
,he is able to keep that which ,i have  
committed to ,him4  ,i answer that1     
,certainty is found in a thing in two   
ways1 essentially and by participation4 
,it is found essentially in the         
cognitive power2 by participation in    
whatever is moved infallibly to its end 
by the cognitive power4 ,in this way we 
say that nature works with certainty1   
since it is moved by the ,divine        
intellect which moves everything with   
certainty to its end4 ,in this way too1 
the moral virtues are said to work with 
greater certainty than art1 in as much  
as1 like a second nature1 they are moved
 to their acts by the reason3 and thus  
too1 hope tends to its end with         
certainty1 as though sharing in the     

certainty of faith which is in the      
cognitive faculty4  ,this suffices for  
the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,hope does not trust   
chiefly in grace already received1 but  
on ,god's omnipotence and mercy1 whereby
 even he that has not grace1 can obtain 
it1 so as to come to eternal life4 ,now 
whoever has faith is certain of ,god's  
omnipotence and mercy4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,that some who have hope fail to obtain
 happiness1 is due to a fault of the    
free will in placing the obstacle of    
sin1 but not to any deficiency in ,god's
 power or mercy1 in which hope places   
its trust4 ,hence this does not         
prejudice the certainty of hope4        
,,question #ai  ,,of ,,the ,,gift ,,of  
,,fear 7,in ,twelve ,articles7  ,we must
 now consider the gift of fear1 about   
which there are twelve points of        
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether ,god is to be   
feared8  7#b7 ,of the division of fear  
into filial1 initial1 servile and       
worldly2  7#c7 ,whether worldly fear is 

always evil8  7#d7 ,whether servile fear
 is good8  7#e7 ,whether it is          
substantially the same as filial fear8  
7#f7 ,whether servile fear departs when 
charity comes8  7#g7 ,whether fear is   
the beginning of wisdom8  7#h7 ,whether 
initial fear is substantially the same  
as filial fear8  7#i7 ,whether fear is a
 gift of the ,holy ,ghost8  7#aj7       
,whether it grows when charity grows8   
7#aa7 ,whether it remains in heaven8    
7#ab7 ,which of the beatitudes and      
fruits correspond to it8   ,,first      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,god ,can ,be ,feared8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god 
cannot be feared4 ,for the object of    
fear is a future evil1 as stated above  
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #da1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,but  
,god is free of all evil1 since ,he is  
goodness itself4 ,therefore ,god cannot 
be feared4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fear is 
opposed to hope4 ,now we hope in ,god4  
,therefore we cannot fear ,him at the   
same time4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the  

,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii1 #e71 we 
fear those things whence evil comes to  
us4 ,but evil comes to us1 not from     
,god1 but from ourselves1 according to  
,osee #ac3i3 ,destruction is thy own1 ,o
 ,israel3 thy help is 4 4 4 in ,me4     
,therefore ,god is not to be feared4    
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,jer4 
#aj3g73 ,who shall not fear ,thee1 ,o   
,king of nations8 and 7,malachi #a3f73  
,if ,i be a master1 where is ,my fear8  
,i answer that1 ,just as hope has two   
objects1 one of which is the future good
 itself1 that one expects to obtain1    
while the other is someone's help1      
through whom one expects to obtain what 
one hopes for1 so1 too1 fear may have   
two objects1 one of which is the very   
evil which a man shrinks from1 while the
 other is that from which the evil may  
come4 ,accordingly1 in the first way    
,god1 ,who is goodness itself1 cannot be
 an object of fear2 but ,he can be an   
object of fear in the second way1 in so 
far as there may come to us some evil   

either from ,him or in relation to ,him4
  ,from ,him there comes the evil of    
punishment1 but this is evil not        
absolutely but relatively1 and1         
absolutely speaking1 is a good4         
,because1 since a thing is said to be   
good through being ordered to an end1   
while evil implies lack of this order1  
that which excludes the order to the    
last end is altogether evil1 and such is
 the evil of fault4 ,on the other hand  
the evil of punishment is indeed an     
evil1 in so far as it is the privation  
of some particular good1 yet absolutely 
speaking1 it is a good1 in so far as it 
is ordained to the last end4  ,in       
relation to ,god the evil of fault can  
come to us1 if we be separated from     
,him3 and in this way ,god can and ought
 to be feared4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this  
objection considers the object of fear  
as being the evil which a man shuns4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in ,god1 we may       
consider both ,his justice1 in respect  
of which ,he punishes those who sin1 and

 ,his mercy1 in respect of which ,he    
sets us free3 in us the consideration of
 ,his justice gives rise to fear1 but   
the consideration of ,his mercy gives   
rise to hope1 so that1 accordingly1 ,god
 is the object of both hope and fear1   
but under different aspects4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,the evil of fault is not from
 ,god as its author but from us1 in for 
far as we forsake ,god3 while the evil  
of punishment is from ,god as its       
author1 in so far as it has character of
 a good1 since it is something just1    
through being inflicted on us justly2   
although originally this is due to the  
demerit of sin3 thus it is written      
7,wis4 #a3ac1 #af73 ,god made not death 
4 4 4 but the wicked with works and     
words have called it to them4   ,,second
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,fear ,is ,fittingly ,divided  
into ,filial1 ,initial1 ,servile and    
,worldly ,fear8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that fear is unfittingly     
divided into filial1 initial1 servile   

and worldly fear4 ,for ,damascene says  
7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ae7 that there   
are six kinds of fear1 viz4 laziness1   
shamefacedness1 etc4 of which we have   
treated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #da1 ,a4    
#d71 and which are not mentioned in the 
division in question4 ,therefore this   
division of fear seems unfitting4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 each of these fears is   
either good or evil4 ,but there is a    
fear1 viz4 natural fear1 which is       
neither morally good1 since it is in the
 demons1 according to ,james #b3ai1 ,the
 devils 4 4 4 believe and tremble1 nor  
evil1 since it is in ,christ1 according 
to ,mk4 #ad3cc1 ,jesus began to fear and
 be heavy4 ,therefore the aforesaid     
division of fear is insufficient4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 the relation of son to   
father differs from that of wife to     
husband1 and this again from that of    
servant to master4 ,now filial fear1    
which is that of the son in comparison  
with his father1 is distinct from       
servile fear1 which is that of the      

servant in comparison with his master4  
,therefore chaste fear1 which seems to  
be that of the wife in comparison with  
her husband1 ought to be distinguished  
from all these other fears4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 even as servile fear fears    
punishment1 so do initial and worldly   
fear4 ,therefore no distinction should  
be made between them4  ,obj4 #e3        
,further1 even as concupiscence is about
 some good1 so is fear about some evil4 
,now concupiscence of the eyes1 which is
 the desire for things of this world1 is
 distinct from concupiscence of the     
flesh1 which is the desire for one's own
 pleasure4 ,therefore worldly fear1     
whereby one fears to lose external      
goods1 is distinct from human fear1     
whereby one fears harm to one's own     
person4  ,on the contrary stands the    
authority of the ,master 7,sent4 iii1   
,d1 #cd74  ,i answer that1 ,we are      
speaking of fear now1 in so far as it   
makes us turn1 so to speak1 to ,god or  
away from ,him4 ,for1 since the object  

of fear is an evil1 sometimes1 on       
account of the evils he fears1 man      
withdraws from ,god1 and this is called 
human fear2 while sometimes1 on account 
of the evils he fears1 he turns to ,god 
and adheres to ,him4 ,this latter evil  
is twofold1 viz4 evil of punishment1 and
 evil of fault4  ,accordingly if a man  
turn to ,god and adhere to ,him1 through
 fear of punishment1 it will be servile 
fear2 but if it be on account of fear of
 committing a fault1 it will be filial  
fear1 for it becomes a child to fear    
offending its father4 ,if1 however1 it  
be on account of both1 it will be       
initial fear1 which is between both     
these fears4 ,as to whether it is       
possible to fear the evil of fault1 the 
question has been treated above         
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,a4 #c7 when we were 
considering the passion of fear4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,damascene divides fear as a 
passion of the soul3 whereas this       
division of fear is taken from its      
relation to ,god1 as explained above4   

,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,moral good consists   
chiefly in turning to ,god1 while moral 
evil consists chiefly in turning away   
from ,him3 wherefore all the fears      
mentioned above imply either moral evil 
or moral good4 ,now natural fear is     
presupposed to moral good and evil1 and 
so it is not numbered among these kinds 
of fear4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the relation
 of servant to master is based on the   
power which the master exercises over   
the servant2 whereas1 on the contrary1  
the relation of a son to his father or  
of a wife to her husband is based on the
 son's affection towards his father to  
whom he submits himself1 or on the      
wife's affection towards her husband to 
whom she binds herself in the union of  
love4 ,hence filial and chaste fear     
amount to the same1 because by the love 
of charity ,god becomes our ,father1    
according to ,rom4 #h3ae1 ,you have     
received the spirit of adoption of sons1
 whereby we cry3 ,abba 7,father72 and by
 this same charity ,he is called our    

spouse1 according to #b ,cor4 #aa3b1 ,i 
have espoused you to one husband1 that  
,i may present you as a chaste virgin to
 ,christ3 whereas servile fear has no   
connection with these1 since it does not
 include charity in its definition4     
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,these three fears     
regard punishment but in different ways4
 ,for worldly or human fear regards a   
punishment which turns man away from    
,god1 and which ,god's enemies sometimes
 inflict or threaten3 whereas servile   
and initial fear regard a punishment    
whereby men are drawn to ,god1 and which
 is inflicted or threatened by ,god4    
,servile fear regards this punishment   
chiefly1 while initial fear regards it  
secondarily4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,it      
amounts to the same whether man turns   
away from ,god through fear of losing   
his worldly goods1 or through fear of   
forfeiting the well-being of his body1  
since external goods belong to the body4
 ,hence both these fears are reckoned as
 one here1 although they fear different 

evils1 even as they correspond to the   
desire of different goods4 ,this        
diversity causes a specific diversity of
 sins1 all of which alike however lead  
man away from ,god4   ,,third ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,worldly ,fear ,is ,always ,evil8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
worldly fear is not always evil4        
,because regard for men seems to be a   
kind of human fear4 ,now some are blamed
 for having no regard for man1 for      
instance1 the unjust judge of whom we   
read 7,luke #ah3b7 that he feared not   
,god1 nor regarded man4 ,therefore it   
seems that worldly fear is not always   
evil4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 worldly fear 
seems to have reference to the          
punishments inflicted by the secular    
power4 ,now such like punishments incite
 us to good actions1 according to ,rom4 
#ac3c1 ,wilt thou not be afraid of the  
power8 ,do that which is good1 and thou 
shalt have praise from the same4        
,therefore worldly fear is not always   

evil4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it seems that
 what is in us naturally1 is not evil1  
since our natural gifts are from ,god4  
,now it is natural to man to fear       
detriment to his body1 and loss of his  
worldly goods1 whereby the present life 
is supported4 ,therefore it seems that  
worldly fear is not always evil4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4   
#aj3bh73 ,fear ye not them that kill the
 body1 thus forbidding worldly fear4    
,now nothing but what is evil is        
forbidden by ,god4 ,therefore worldly   
fear is evil4  ,i answer that1 ,as shown
 above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2        
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#ed1 ,a4 #b7 moral acts and habits take 
their name and species from their       
objects4 ,now the proper object of the  
appetite's movement is the final good3  
so that1 in consequence1 every          
appetitive movement is both specified   
and named from its proper end4 ,for if  
anyone were to describe covetousness as 
love of work because men work on account

 of covetousness1 this description would
 be incorrect1 since the covetous man   
seeks work not as end but as a means3   
the end that he seeks is wealth1        
wherefore covetousness is rightly       
described as the desire or the love of  
wealth1 and this is evil4 ,accordingly  
worldly love is1 properly speaking1 the 
love whereby a man trusts in the world  
as his end1 so that worldly love is     
always evil4 ,now fear is born of love1 
since man fears the loss of what he     
loves1 as ,augustine states 7,qq4       
lxxxiii1 qu4 #cc74 ,now worldly fear is 
that which arises from worldly love as  
from an evil root1 for which reason     
worldly fear is always evil4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,one may have regard for men  
in two ways4 ,first in so far as there  
is in them something divine1 for        
instance1 the good of grace or of       
virtue1 or at least of the natural image
 of ,god3 and in this way those are     
blamed who have no regard for man4      
,secondly1 one may have regard for men  

as being in opposition to ,god1 and thus
 it is praiseworthy to have no regard   
for men1 according as we read of ,elias 
or ,eliseus 7,ecclus4 #dh3ac73 ,in his  
days he feared not the prince4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,when the secular power       
inflicts punishment in order to withdraw
 men from sin1 it is acting as ,god's   
minister1 according to ,rom4 #ac3d1 ,for
 he is ,god's minister1 an avenger to   
execute wrath upon him that doth evil4  
,to fear the secular power in this way  
is part1 not of worldly fear1 but of    
servile or initial fear4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,it is natural for man to shrink    
from detriment to his own body and loss 
of worldly goods1 but to forsake justice
 on that account is contrary to natural 
reason4 ,hence the ,philosopher says    
7,ethic4 iii1 #a7 that there are certain
 things1 viz4 sinful deeds1 which no    
fear should drive us to do1 since to do 
such things is worse than to suffer any 
punishment whatever4   ,,fourth         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #d  

,whether ,servile ,fear ,is ,good8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
servile fear is not good4 ,for if the   
use of a thing is evil1 the thing itself
 is evil4 ,now the use of servile fear  
is evil1 for according to a gloss on    
,rom4 #h3ae1 if a man do anything       
through fear1 although the deed be good1
 it is not well done4 ,therefore servile
 fear is not good4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
no good grows from a sinful root4 ,now  
servile fear grows from a sinful root1  
because when commenting on ,job #c3aa1  
,why did ,i not die in the womb8        
,gregory says 7,moral4 iv1 #be73 ,when a
 man dreads the punishment which        
confronts him for his sin and no longer 
loves the friendship of ,god which he   
has lost1 his fear is born of pride1 not
 of humility4 ,therefore servile fear is
 evil4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as     
mercenary love is opposed to the love of
 charity1 so is servile fear1           
apparently1 opposed to chaste fear4 ,but
 mercenary love is always evil4         

,therefore servile fear is also4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,nothing evil is from the 
,holy ,ghost4 ,but servile fear is from 
the ,holy ,ghost1 since a gloss on ,rom4
 #h3ae1 ,you have not received the      
spirit of bondage1 etc4 says3 ,it is the
 one same spirit that bestows two fears1
 viz4 servile and chaste fear4          
,therefore servile fear is not evil4  ,i
 answer that1 ,it is owing to its       
servility that servile fear may be evil4
 ,for servitude is opposed to freedom4  
,since1 then1 what is free is cause of  
itself 7,metaph4 i1 #b71 a slave is one 
who does not act as cause of his own    
action1 but as though moved from        
without4 ,now whoever does a thing      
through love1 does it of himself so to  
speak1 because it is by his own         
inclination that he is moved to act3 so 
that it is contrary to the very notion  
of servility that one should act from   
love4 ,consequently servile fear as such
 is contrary to charity3 so that if     
servility were essential to fear1       

servile fear would be evil simply1 even 
as adultery is evil simply1 because that
 which makes it contrary to charity     
belongs to its very species4  ,this     
servility1 however1 does not belong to  
the species of servile fear1 even as    
neither does lifelessness to the species
 of lifeless faith4 ,for the species of 
a moral habit or act is taken from the  
object4 ,now the object of servile fear 
is punishment1 and it is by accident    
that1 either the good to which the      
punishment is contrary1 is loved as the 
last end1 and that consequently the     
punishment is feared as the greatest    
evil1 which is the case with one who is 
devoid of charity1 or that the          
punishment is directed to ,god as its   
end1 and that1 consequently1 it is not  
feared as the greatest evil1 which is   
the case with one who has charity4 ,for 
the species of a habit is not destroyed 
through its object or end being directed
 to a further end4 ,consequently servile
 fear is substantially good1 but is     

servility is evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,this saying of ,augustine is to be     
applied to a man who does something     
through servile fear as such1 so that he
 loves not justice1 and fears nothing   
but the punishment4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,servile fear as to its substance is not
 born of pride1 but its servility is1   
inasmuch as man is unwilling1 by love1  
to subject his affections to the yoke of
 justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,mercenary  
love is that whereby ,god is loved for  
the sake of worldly goods1 and this is1 
of itself1 contrary to charity1 so that 
mercenary love is always evil4 ,but     
servile fear1 as to its substance1      
implies merely fear of punishment1      
whether or not this be feared as the    
principal evil4   ,,fifth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #e  ,whether  
,servile ,fear ,is ,substantially the   
,same ,as ,filial ,fear8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that servile fear is    
substantially the same as filial fear4  
,for filial fear is to servile fear the 

same apparently as living faith is to   
lifeless faith1 since the one is        
accompanied by mortal sin and the other 
not4 ,now living faith and lifeless     
faith are substantially the same4       
,therefore servile and filial fear are  
substantially the same4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 habits are diversified by     
their objects4 ,now the same thing is   
the object of servile and of filial     
fear1 since they both fear ,god4        
,therefore servile and filial fear are  
substantially the same4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 just as man hopes to enjoy    
,god and to obtain favors from ,him1 so 
does he fear to be separated from ,god  
and to be punished by ,him4 ,now it is  
the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy  
,god1 and to receive other favors from  
,him1 as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #b1 
ad #b74 ,therefore filial fear1 whereby 
we fear separation from ,god1 is the    
same as servile fear whereby we fear    
,his punishments4  ,on the contrary1    
,augustine 7,in prim4 canon4 ,joan4     

,tract4 ix7 says that there are two     
fears1 one servile1 another filial or   
chaste fear4  ,i answer that1 ,the      
proper object of fear is evil4 ,and     
since acts and habits are diversified by
 their objects1 as shown above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b71 it follows of        
necessity that different kinds of fear  
correspond to different kinds of evil4  
,now the evil of punishment1 from which 
servile fear shrinks1 differs           
specifically from evil of fault1 which  
filial fear shuns1 as shown above 7,a4  
#b74 ,hence it is evident that servile  
and filial fear are not the same        
substantially but differ specifically4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,living and lifeless   
faith differ1 not as regards the object1
 since each of them believes ,god and   
believes in a ,god1 but in respect of   
something extrinsic1 viz4 the presence  
or absence of charity1 and so they do   
not differ substantially4 ,on the other 
hand1 servile and filial fear differ as 
to their objects3 and hence the         

comparison fails4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3     
,servile fear and filial fear do not    
regard ,god in the same light4 ,for     
servile fear looks upon ,god as the     
cause of the infliction of punishment1  
whereas filial fear looks upon ,him1 not
 as the active cause of guilt1 but      
rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks 
to be separated by guilt4 ,consequently 
the identity of object1 viz4 ,god1 does 
not prove a specific identity of fear1  
since also natural movements differ     
specifically according to their         
different relationships to some one     
term1 for movement from whiteness is not
 specifically the same as movement      
towards whiteness4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,hope looks upon ,god as the principle  
not only of the enjoyment of ,god1 but  
also of any other favor whatever4 ,this 
cannot be said of fear2 and so there is 
no comparison4   ,,sixth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,servile ,fear ,remains with ,charity8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      

servile fear does not remain with       
charity4 ,for ,augustine says 7,in prim4
 canon4 ,joan4 ,tract4 ix7 that when    
charity takes up its abode1 it drives   
away fear which had prepared a place for
 it4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,the charity  
of ,god is poured forth in our hearts1  
by the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is given to us
 7,rom4 #e3e74 ,now where the ,spirit of
 the ,lord is1 there is liberty 7#b     
,cor4 #c3ag74 ,since then freedom       
excludes servitude1 it seems that       
servile fear is driven away when charity
 comes4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 servile    
fear is caused by self-love1 in so far  
as punishment diminishes one's own good4
 ,now love of ,god drives away          
self-love1 for it makes us despise      
ourselves3 thus ,augustine testifies    
7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #bh7 that the love 
of ,god unto the contempt of self builds
 up the city of ,god4 ,therefore it     
seems that servile fear is driven out   
when charity comes4  ,on the contrary1  
,servile fear is a gift of the ,holy    

,ghost1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,now  
the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are not   
forfeited through the advent of charity1
 whereby the ,holy ,ghost dwells in us4 
,therefore servile fear is not driven   
out when charity comes4  ,i answer that1
 ,servile fear proceeds from self-love1 
because it is fear of punishment which  
is detrimental to one's own good4 ,hence
 the fear of punishment is consistent   
with charity1 in the same way as        
self-love is3 because it comes to the   
same that a man love his own good and   
that he fear to be deprived of it4  ,now
 self-love may stand in a threefold     
relationship to charity4 ,in one way it 
is contrary to charity1 when a man      
places his end in the love of his own   
good4 ,in another way it is included in 
charity1 when a man loves himself for   
the sake of ,god and in ,god4 ,in a     
third way1 it is indeed distinct from   
charity1 but is not contrary thereto1 as
 when a man loves himself from the point
 of view of his own good1 yet not so as 

to place his end in this his own good3  
even as one may have another special    
love for one's neighbor1 besides the    
love of charity which is founded on     
,god1 when we love him by reason of     
usefulness1 consanguinity1 or some other
 human consideration1 which1 however1 is
 referable to charity4  ,accordingly    
fear of punishment is1 in one way1      
included in charity1 because separation 
from ,god is a punishment1 which charity
 shuns exceedingly2 so that this belongs
 to chaste fear4 ,in another way1 it is 
contrary to charity1 when a man shrinks 
from the punishment that is opposed to  
his natural good1 as being the principal
 evil in opposition to the good which he
 loves as an end2 and in this way fear  
of punishment is not consistent with    
charity4 ,in another way fear of        
punishment is indeed substantially      
distinct from chaste fear1 when1 to wit1
 a man fears a penal evil1 not because  
it separates him from ,god1 but because 
it is hurtful to his own good1 and yet  

he does not place his end in this good1 
so that neither does he dread this evil 
as being the principal evil4 ,such fear 
of punishment is consistent with        
charity2 but it is not called servile1  
except when punishment is dreaded as a  
principal evil1 as explained above      
7,,aa4 #b1 #d74 ,hence fear considered  
as servile1 does not remain with        
charity1 but the substance of servile   
fear can remain with charity1 even as   
self-love can remain with charity4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking 
of fear considered as servile3 and such 
is the sense of the two other           
objections4   ,,sixth ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,fear ,is the ,beginning of ,wisdom8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fear 
is not the beginning of wisdom4 ,for the
 beginning of a thing is a part thereof4
 ,but fear is not a part of wisdom1     
since fear is seated in the appetitive  
faculty1 while wisdom is in the         
intellect4 ,therefore it seems that fear

 is not the beginning of wisdom4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 nothing is the beginning  
of itself4 ,now fear of the ,lord1 that 
is wisdom1 according to ,job #bh3bh4    
,therefore it seems that fear of ,god is
 not the beginning of wisdom4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 nothing is prior to the      
beginning4 ,but something is prior to   
fear1 since faith precedes fear4        
,therefore it seems that fear is not the
 beginning of wisdom4  ,on the contrary1
 ,it is written in the ,ps4 #aaj3aj3    
,the fear of the ,lord is the beginning 
of wisdom4  ,i answer that1 ,a thing may
 be called the beginning of wisdom in   
two ways3 in one way because it is the  
beginning of wisdom itself as to its    
essence2 in another way1 as to its      
effect4 ,thus the beginning of an art as
 to its essence consists in the         
principles from which that art proceeds1
 while the beginning of an art as to its
 effect is that wherefrom it begins to  
operate3 for instance we might say that 
the beginning of the art of building is 

the foundation because that is where the
 builder begins his work4  ,now1 since  
wisdom is the knowledge of ,divine      
things1 as we shall state further on    
7,q4 #de1 ,a4 #a71 it is considered by  
us in one way1 and in another way by    
philosophers4 ,for1 seeing that our life
 is ordained to the enjoyment of ,god1  
and is directed thereto according to a  
participation of the ,divine ,nature1   
conferred on us through grace1 wisdom1  
as we look at it1 is considered not only
 as being cognizant of ,god1 as it is   
with the philosophers1 but also as      
directing human conduct2 since this is  
directed not only by the human law1 but 
also by the ,divine law1 as ,augustine  
shows 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ad74            
,accordingly the beginning of wisdom as 
to its essence consists in the first    
principles of wisdom1 i4e4 the articles 
of faith1 and in this sense faith is    
said to be the beginning of wisdom4 ,but
 as regards the effect1 the beginning of
 wisdom is the point where wisdom begins

 to work1 and in this way fear is the   
beginning of wisdom1 yet servile fear in
 one way1 and filial fear1 in another4  
,for servile fear is like a principle   
disposing a man to wisdom from without1 
in so far as he refrains from sin       
through fear of punishment1 and is thus 
fashioned for the effect of wisdom1     
according to ,ecclus4 #a3bg1 ,the fear  
of the ,lord driveth out sin4 ,on the   
other hand1 chaste or filial fear is the
 beginning of wisdom1 as being the first
 effect of wisdom4 ,for since the       
regulation of human conduct by the      
,divine law belongs to wisdom1 in order 
to make a beginning1 man must first of  
all fear ,god and submit himself to     
,him3 for the result will be that in all
 things he will be ruled by ,god4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument proves  
that fear is not the beginning of wisdom
 as to the essence of wisdom4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,the fear of ,god is compared 
to a man's whole life that is ruled by  
,god's wisdom1 as the root to the tree3 

hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #a3be73   
,the root of wisdom is to fear the      
,lord1 for ,vulg43 'and' the branches   
thereof are longlived4 ,consequently1 as
 the root is said to be virtually the   
tree1 so the fear of ,god is said to be 
wisdom4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated    
above1 faith is the beginning of wisdom 
in one way1 and fear1 in another4 ,hence
 it is written 7,ecclus4 #be3af73 ,the  
fear of ,god is the beginning of love3  
and the beginning of faith is to be fast
 joined to it4   ,,seventh ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,initial ,fear ,differs ,substantially  
from ,filial ,fear8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that initial fear differs    
substantially from filial fear4 ,for    
filial fear is caused by love4 ,now     
initial fear is the beginning of love1  
according to ,ecclus4 #be3af1 ,the fear 
of ,god is the beginning of love4       
,therefore initial fear is distinct from
 filial fear4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      
initial fear dreads punishment1 which is

 the object of servile fear1 so that    
initial and servile fear would seem to  
be the same4 ,but servile fear is       
distinct from filial fear4 ,therefore   
initial fear also is substantially      
distinct from initial fear4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 a mean differs in the same    
ratio from both the extremes4 ,now      
initial fear is the mean between servile
 and filial fear4 ,therefore it differs 
from both filial and servile fear4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,perfect and imperfect do 
not diversify the substance of a thing4 
,now initial and filial fear differ in  
respect of perfection and imperfection  
of charity1 as ,augustine states 7,in   
prim4 canon4 ,joan4 ,tract4 ix74        
,therefore initial fear does not differ 
substantially from filial fear4  ,i     
answer that1 ,initial fear is so called 
because it is a beginning 7initium74    
,since1 however1 both servile and filial
 fear are1 in some way1 the beginning of
 wisdom1 each may be called in some way1
 initial4  ,it is not in this sense1    

however1 that we are to understand      
initial fear in so far as it is distinct
 from servile and filial fear1 but in   
the sense according to which it belongs 
to the state of beginners1 in whom there
 is a beginning of filial fear resulting
 from a beginning of charity1 although  
they do not possess the perfection of   
filial fear1 because they have not yet  
attained to the perfection of charity4  
,consequently initial fear stands in the
 same relation to filial fear as        
imperfect to perfect charity4 ,now      
perfect and imperfect charity differ1   
not as to essence but as to state4      
,therefore we must conclude that initial
 fear1 as we understand it here1 does   
not differ essentially from filial fear4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the fear which is a 
beginning of love is servile fear1 which
 is the herald of charity1 just as the  
bristle introduces the thread1 as       
,augustine states 7,tract4 ix in ,ep4 i 
,joan474 ,or else1 if it be referred to 
initial fear1 this is said to be the    

beginning of love1 not absolutely1 but  
relatively to the state of perfect      
charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,initial fear
 does not dread punishment as its proper
 object1 but as having something of     
servile fear connected with it3 for this
 servile fear1 as to its substance1     
remains indeed1 with charity1 its       
servility being cast aside2 whereas its 
act remains with imperfect charity in   
the man who is moved to perform good    
actions not only through love of        
justice1 but also through fear of       
punishment1 though this same act ceases 
in the man who has perfect charity1     
which casteth out fear1 according to #a 
,john #d3ah4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,initial 
fear is a mean between servile and      
filial fear1 not as between two things  
of the same genus1 but as the imperfect 
is a mean between a perfect being and a 
non-being1 as stated in ,metaph4 ii1 for
 it is the same substantially as the    
perfect being1 while it differs         
altogether from non-being4   ,,ninth    

,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #i  
,whether ,fear ,is a ,gift of the ,holy 
,ghost8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that fear is not a gift of the ,holy    
,ghost4 ,for no gift of the ,holy ,ghost
 is opposed to a virtue1 which is also  
from the ,holy ,ghost2 else the ,holy   
,ghost would be in opposition to        
,himself4 ,now fear is opposed to hope1 
which is a virtue4 ,therefore fear is   
not a gift of the ,holy ,ghost4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 it is proper to a         
theological virtue to have ,god for its 
object4 ,but fear has ,god for its      
object1 in so far as ,god is feared4    
,therefore fear is not a gift1 but a    
theological virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 fear arises from love4 ,but love is    
reckoned a theological virtue4          
,therefore fear also is a theological   
virtue1 being connected with the same   
matter1 as it were4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1
 ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii1 #di7 that   
fear is bestowed as a remedy against    
pride4 ,but the virtue of humility is   

opposed to pride4 ,therefore again1 fear
 is a kind of virtue4  ,obj4 #e3        
,further1 the gifts are more perfect    
than the virtues1 since they are        
bestowed in support of the virtues as   
,gregory says 7,moral4 ii1 #di74 ,now   
hope is more perfect than fear1 since   
hope regards good1 while fear regards   
evil4 ,since1 then1 hope is a virtue1 it
 should not be said that fear is a gift4
  ,on the contrary1 ,the fear of the    
,lord is numbered among the seven gifts 
of the ,holy ,ghost 7,isa4 #aa3c74  ,i  
answer that1 ,fear is of several kinds1 
as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,now it is not
 human fear1 according to ,augustine    
7,de ,gratia et ,lib4 ,arb4 xviii71 that
 is a gift of ,god--for it was by this  
fear that ,peter denied ,christ--but    
that fear of which it was said 7,matt4  
#aj3bh73 ,fear ,him that can destroy    
both soul and body into hell4  ,again   
servile fear is not to be reckoned among
 the seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1   
though it is from ,him1 because         

according to ,augustine 7,de ,nat4 et   
,grat4 lvii7 it is compatible with the  
will to sin3 whereas the gifts of the   
,holy ,ghost are incompatible with the  
will to sin1 as they are inseparable    
from charity1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #e74  ,it follows1         
therefore1 that the fear of ,god1 which 
is numbered among the seven gifts of the
 ,holy ,ghost1 is filial or chaste fear4
 ,for it was stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#fh1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c7 that the gifts of the
 ,holy ,ghost are certain habitual      
perfections of the soul's powers1       
whereby these are rendered amenable to  
the motion of the ,holy ,ghost1 just as1
 by the moral virtues1 the appetitive   
powers are rendered amenable to the     
motion of reason4 ,now for a thing to be
 amenable to the motion of a certain    
mover1 the first condition required is  
that it be a non-resistant subject of   
that mover1 because resistance of the   
movable subject to the mover hinders the
 movement4 ,this is what filial or      

chaste fear does1 since thereby we      
revere ,god and avoid separating        
ourselves from ,him4 ,hence1 according  
to ,augustine 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in      
,monte i1 #d7 filial fear holds the     
first place1 as it were1 among the gifts
 of the ,holy ,ghost1 in the ascending  
order1 and the last place1 in the       
descending order4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3     
,filial fear is not opposed to the      
virtue of hope3 since thereby we fear1  
not that we may fail of what we hope to 
obtain by ,god's help1 but lest we      
withdraw ourselves from this help4      
,wherefore filial fear and hope cling   
together1 and perfect one another4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the proper and        
principal object of fear is the evil    
shunned1 and in this way1 as stated     
above 7,a4 #a71 ,god cannot be an object
 of fear4 ,yet ,he is1 in this way1 the 
object of hope and the other theological
 virtues1 since1 by the virtue of hope1 
we trust in ,god's help1 not only to    
obtain any other goods1 but1 chiefly1 to

 obtain ,god ,himself1 as the principal 
good4 ,the same evidently applies to the
 other theological virtues4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,from the fact that love is   
the origin of fear1 it does not follow  
that the fear of ,god is not a distinct 
habit from charity which is the love of 
,god1 since love is the origin of all   
the emotions1 and yet we are perfected  
by different habits in respect of       
different emotions4 ,yet love is more of
 a virtue than fear is1 because love    
regards good1 to which virtue is        
principally directed by reason of its   
own nature1 as was shown above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ee1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d72 for which      
reason hope is also reckoned as a       
virtue2 whereas fear principally regards
 evil1 the avoidance of which it        
denotes1 wherefore it is something less 
than a theological virtue4  ,reply ,obj4
 #d3 ,according to ,ecclus4 #aj3ad1 the 
beginning of the pride of man is to fall
 off from ,god1 that is to refuse       
submission to ,god1 and this is opposed 

to filial fear1 which reveres ,god4     
,thus fear cuts off the source of pride 
for which reason it is bestowed as a    
remedy against pride4 ,yet it does not  
follow that it is the same as the virtue
 of humility1 but that it is its origin4
 ,for the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are 
the origin of the intellectual and moral
 virtues1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#fh1 ,a4 #d71 while the theological     
virtues are the origin of the gifts1 as 
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,a4 #d1 
ad #c74  ,this suffices for the ,reply  
to the ,fifth ,objection4   ,,tenth     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #aj 
,whether ,fear ,decreases ,when ,charity
 ,increases8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems  
that fear decreases when charity        
increases4 ,for ,augustine says 7,in    
prim4 canon4 ,joan4 ,tract4 ix73 ,the   
more charity increases1 the more fear   
decreases4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fear    
decreases when hope increases4 ,but     
charity increases when hope increases1  
as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #h74      

,therefore fear decreases when charity  
increases4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 love    
implies union1 whereas fear implies     
separation4 ,now separation decreases   
when union increases4 ,therefore fear   
decreases when the love of charity      
increases4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine
 says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #cf7 that the  
fear of ,god not only begins but also   
perfects wisdom1 whereby we love ,god   
above all things1 and our neighbor as   
ourselves4  ,i answer that1 ,fear is    
twofold1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #d72
 one is filial fear1 whereby a son fears
 to offend his father or to be separated
 from him2 the other is servile fear1   
whereby one fears punishment4  ,now     
filial fear must needs increase when    
charity increases1 even as an effect    
increases with the increase of its      
cause4 ,for the more one loves a man1   
the more one fears to offend him and to 
be separated from him4  ,on the other   
hand servile fear1 as regards its       
servility1 is entirely cast out when    

charity comes1 although the fear of     
punishment remains as to its substance1 
as stated above 7,a4 #f74 ,this fear    
decreases as charity increases1 chiefly 
as regards its act1 since the more a man
 loves ,god1 the less he fears          
punishment2 first1 because he thinks    
less of his own good1 to which          
punishment is opposed2 secondly1        
because1 the faster he clings1 the more 
confident he is of the reward1 and1     
consequently the less fearful of        
punishment4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine
 speaks there of the fear of punishment4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is fear of       
punishment that decreases when hope     
increases2 but with the increase of the 
latter filial fear increases1 because   
the more certainly a man expects to     
obtain a good by another's help1 the    
more he fears to offend him or to be    
separated from him4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,filial fear does not imply separation  
from ,god1 but submission to ,him1 and  
shuns separation from that submission4  

,yet1 in a way1 it implies separation1  
in the point of not presuming to equal  
oneself to ,him1 and of submitting to   
,him1 which separation is to be observed
 even in charity1 in so far as a man    
loves ,god more than himself and more   
than aught else4 ,hence the increase of 
the love of charity implies not a       
decrease but an increase in the         
reverence of fear4   ,,eleventh         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #aa 
,whether ,fear ,remains in ,heaven8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fear 
does not remain in heaven4 ,for it is   
written 7,prov4 #a3cc73 ,he 4 4 4 shall 
enjoy abundance1 without fear of evils1 
which is to be understood as referring  
to those who already enjoy wisdom in    
everlasting happiness4 ,now every fear  
is about some evil1 since evil is the   
object of fear1 as stated above 7,,aa4  
#b1 #e2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,a4 #a74      
,therefore there will be no fear in     
heaven4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in heaven  
men will be conformed to ,god1 according

 to #a ,john #c3b1 ,when ,he shall      
appear1 we shall be like to ,him4 ,but  
,god fears nothing4 ,therefore1 in      
heaven1 men will have no fear4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 hope is more perfect than 
fear1 since hope regards good1 and fear1
 evil4 ,now hope will not be in heaven4 
,therefore neither will there be fear in
 heaven4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is      
written 7,ps4 #ah3aj73 ,the fear of the 
,lord is holy1 enduring for ever and    
ever4  ,i answer that1 ,servile fear1 or
 fear of punishment1 will by no means be
 in heaven1 since such a fear is        
excluded by the security which is       
essential to everlasting happiness1 as  
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,a4 #d74 
,but with regard to filial fear1 as it  
increases with the increase of charity1 
so is it perfected when charity is made 
perfect2 hence1 in heaven1 it will not  
have quite the same act as it has now4  
,in order to make this clear1 we must   
observe that the proper object of fear  
is a possible evil1 just as the proper  

object of hope is a possible good3 and  
since the movement of fear is like one  
of avoidance1 fear implies avoidance of 
a possible arduous evil1 for little     
evils inspire no fear4 ,now as a thing's
 good consists in its staying in its own
 order1 so a thing's evil consists in   
forsaking its order4 ,again1 the order  
of a rational creature is that it should
 be under ,god and above other          
creatures4 ,hence1 just as it is an evil
 for a rational creature to submit1 by  
love1 to a lower creature1 so too is it 
an evil for it1 if it submit not to     
,god1 but presumptuously revolt against 
,him or contemn ,him4 ,now this evil is 
possible to a rational creature         
considered as to its nature on account  
of the natural flexibility of the       
free-will2 whereas in the blessed1 it   
becomes impossible1 by reason of the    
perfection of glory4 ,therefore the     
avoidance of this evil that consists in 
non-subjection to ,god1 and is possible 
to nature1 but impossible in the state  

of bliss1 will be in heaven2 while in   
this life there is avoidance of this    
evil as of something altogether         
possible4 ,hence ,gregory1 expounding   
the words of ,job 7#bf3aa71 ,the pillars
 of heaven tremble1 and dread at ,his   
beck1 says 7,moral4 xvii1 #bi73 ,the    
heavenly powers that gaze on ,him       
without ceasing1 tremble while          
contemplating3 but their awe1 lest it   
should be of a penal nature1 is one not 
of fear but of wonder1 because1 to wit1 
they wonder at ,god's supereminence and 
incomprehensibility4 ,augustine also    
7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #i7 in this sense1 
admits fear in heaven1 although he      
leaves the question doubtful4 ,if1 he   
says1 this chaste fear that endureth for
 ever and ever is to be in the future   
life1 it will not be a fear that is     
afraid of an evil which might possibly  
occur1 but a fear that holds fast to a  
good which we cannot lose4 ,for when we 
love the good which we have acquired1   
with an unchangeable love1 without      

doubt1 if it is allowable to say so1 our
 fear is sure of avoiding evil4 ,because
 chaste fear denotes a will that cannot 
consent to sin1 and whereby we avoid sin
 without trembling lest1 in our         
weakness1 we fall1 and possess ourselves
 in the tranquillity born of charity4   
,else1 if no kind of fear is possible   
there1 perhaps fear is said to endure   
for ever and ever1 because that which   
fear will lead us to1 will be           
everlasting4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the     
passage quoted excludes from the        
blessed1 the fear that denotes          
solicitude1 and anxiety about evil1 but 
not the fear which is accompanied by    
security4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as         
,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ix7 the    
same things are both like and unlike    
,god4 ,they are like by reason of a     
variable imitation of the               
,inimitable--that is1 because1 so far as
 they can1 they imitate ,god ,who cannot
 be imitated perfectly--they are unlike 
because they are the effects of a ,cause

 of ,whom they fall short infinitely and
 immeasurably4 ,hence1 if there be no   
fear in ,god 7since there is none above 
,him to whom ,he may be subject7 it does
 not follow that there is none in the   
blessed1 whose happiness consists in    
perfect subjection to ,god4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,hope implies a certain       
defect1 namely the futurity of          
happiness1 which ceases when happiness  
is present3 whereas fear implies a      
natural defect in a creature1 in so far 
as it is infinitely distant from ,god1  
and this defect will remain even in     
heaven4 ,hence fear will not be cast out
 altogether4   ,,twelfth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #ab  ,whether 
,poverty of ,spirit ,is the ,beatitude  
,corresponding to the ,gift of ,fear8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
poverty of spirit is not the beatitude  
corresponding to the gift of fear4 ,for 
fear is the beginning of the spiritual  
life1 as explained above 7,a4 #g73      
whereas poverty belongs to the          

perfection of the spiritual life1       
according to ,matt4 #ai3ba1 ,if thou    
wilt be perfect1 go sell what thou hast1
 and give to the poor4 ,therefore       
poverty of spirit does not correspond to
 the gift of fear4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
it is written 7,ps4 #aah3abj73 ,pierce  
,thou my flesh with ,thy fear1 whence it
 seems to follow that it belongs to fear
 to restrain the flesh4 ,but the curbing
 of the flesh seems to belong rather to 
the beatitude of mourning4 ,therefore   
the beatitude of mourning corresponds to
 the gift of fear1 rather than the      
beatitude of poverty4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 the gift of fear corresponds  
to the virtue of hope1 as stated above  
7,a4 #i1 ad #a74 ,now the last beatitude
 which is1 ,blessed are the peacemakers1
 for they shall be called the children  
of ,god1 seems above all to correspond  
to hope1 because according to ,rom4     
#e3b1 we 4 4 4 glory in the hope of the 
glory of the sons of ,god4 ,therefore   
that beatitude corresponds to the gift  

of fear1 rather than poverty of spirit4 
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it was stated above 
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1 ,a4 #b7 that the     
fruits correspond to the beatitudes4    
,now none of the fruits correspond to   
the gift of fear4 ,neither1 therefore1  
does any of the beatitudes4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4   
,dom4 in ,monte i1 #d73 ,the fear of the
 ,lord is befitting the humble of whom  
it is said3 ,blessed are the poor in    
spirit4  ,i answer that1 ,poverty of    
spirit properly corresponds to fear4    
,because1 since it belongs to filial    
fear to show reverence and submission to
 ,god1 whatever results from this       
submission belongs to the gift of fear4 
,now from the very fact that a man      
submits to ,god1 it follows that he     
ceases to seek greatness either in      
himself or in another but seeks it only 
in ,god4 ,for that would be inconsistent
 with perfect subjection to ,god1       
wherefore it is written 7,ps4 #ai3h73   
,some trust in chariots and some in     

horses2 but we will call upon the name  
of 4 4 4 our ,god4 ,it follows that if a
 man fear ,god perfectly1 he does not1  
by pride1 seek greatness either in      
himself or in external goods1 viz4      
honors and riches4 ,in either case1 this
 proceeds from poverty of spirit1 in so 
far as the latter denotes either the    
voiding of a puffed up and proud spirit1
 according to ,augustine's              
interpretation 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in     
,monte i1 #d71 or the renunciation of   
worldly goods which is done in spirit1  
i4e4 by one's own will1 through the     
instigation of the ,holy ,spirit1       
according to the expounding of ,ambrose 
on ,luke #f3bj and ,jerome on ,matt4    
#e3c4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since a        
beatitude is an act of perfect virtue1  
all the beatitudes belong to the        
perfection of spiritual life4 ,and this 
perfection seems to require that whoever
 would strive to obtain a perfect share 
of spiritual goods1 needs to begin by   
despising earthly goods1 wherefore fear 

holds the first place among the gifts4  
,perfection1 however1 does not consist  
in the renunciation itself of temporal  
goods2 since this is the way to         
perfection3 whereas filial fear1 to     
which the beatitude of poverty          
corresponds1 is consistent with the     
perfection of wisdom1 as stated above   
7,,aa4 #g1 #aj74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the 
undue exaltation of man either in       
himself or in another is more directly  
opposed to that submission to ,god which
 is the result of filial fear1 than is  
external pleasure4 ,yet this is1 in     
consequence1 opposed to fear1 since     
whoever fears ,god and is subject to    
,him1 takes no delight in things other  
than ,god4 ,nevertheless1 pleasure is   
not concerned1 as exaltation is1 with   
the arduous character of a thing which  
fear regards3 and so the beatitude of   
poverty corresponds to fear directly1   
and the beatitude of mourning1          
consequently4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hope   
denotes a movement by way of a relation 

of tendency to a term1 whereas fear     
implies movement by way of a relation of
 withdrawal from a term3 wherefore the  
last beatitude which is the term of     
spiritual perfection1 fittingly         
corresponds to hope1 by way of ultimate 
object2 while the first beatitude1 which
 implies withdrawal from external things
 which hinder submission to ,god1       
fittingly corresponds to fear4  ,reply  
,obj4 #d3 ,as regards the fruits1 it    
seems that those things correspond to   
the gift of fear1 which pertain to the  
moderate use of temporal things or to   
abstinence therefrom2 such are modesty1 
continency and chastity4   ,,question   
#bj  ,,of ,,despair 7,in ,four          
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
contrary vices2 7#a7 despair2 7#b7      
presumption4 ,under the first head there
 are four points of inquiry3  7#a7      
,whether despair is a sin8  7#b7        
,whether it can be without unbelief8    
7#c7 ,whether it is the greatest of     
sins8  7#d7 ,whether it arises from     

sloth8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,despair ,is
 a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that despair is not a sin4 ,for every   
sin includes conversion to a mutable    
good1 together with aversion from the   
immutable good1 as ,augustine states    
7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ai74 ,but despair 
includes no conversion to a mutable     
good4 ,therefore it is not a sin4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 that which grows from a  
good root1 seems to be no sin1 because a
 good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit
 7,matt4 #g3ah74 ,now despair seems to  
grow from a good root1 viz4 fear of     
,god1 or from horror at the greatness of
 one's own sins4 ,therefore despair is  
not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if      
despair were a sin1 it would be a sin   
also for the damned to despair4 ,but    
this is not imputed to them as their    
fault but as part of their damnation4   
,therefore neither is it imputed to     
wayfarers as their fault1 so that it is 
not a sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,that     

which leads men to sin1 seems not only  
to be a sin itself1 but a source of     
sins4 ,now such is despair1 for the     
,apostle says of certain men 7,eph4     
#d3ai73 ,who1 despairing1 have given    
themselves up to lasciviousness1 unto   
the working of all uncleanness and      
,vulg43 'unto' covetousness4 ,therefore 
despair is not only a sin but also the  
origin of other sins4  ,i answer that1  
,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
vi1 #b7 affirmation and negation in the 
intellect correspond to search and      
avoidance in the appetite2 while truth  
and falsehood in the intellect          
correspond to good and evil in the      
appetite4 ,consequently every appetitive
 movement which is conformed to a true  
intellect1 is good in itself1 while     
every appetitive movement which is      
conformed to a false intellect is evil  
in itself and sinful4 ,now the true     
opinion of the intellect about ,god is  
that from ,him comes salvation to       
mankind1 and pardon to sinners1         

according to ,ezech4 #ah3bc1 ,i desire  
not the death of the sinner1 but that he
 should be converted1 and live 99,vulg43
 ',is it ,my will that a sinner should  
die 4 4 4 and not that he should be     
converted and live8' ,cf4 ,ezech4       
#cc3aa3 while it is a false opinion that
 ,he refuses pardon to the repentant    
sinner1 or that ,he does not turn       
sinners to ,himself by sanctifying      
grace4 ,therefore1 just as the movement 
of hope1 which is in conformity with the
 true opinion1 is praiseworthy and      
virtuous1 so the contrary movement of   
despair1 which is in conformity with the
 false opinion about ,god1 is vicious   
and sinful4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in every 
mortal sin there is1 in some way1       
aversion from the immutable good1 and   
conversion to a mutable good1 but not   
always in the same way4 ,because1 since 
the theological virtues have ,god for   
their object1 the sins which are        
contrary to them1 such as hatred of     
,god1 despair and unbelief1 consist     

principally in aversion from the        
immutable good2 but1 consequently1 they 
imply conversion to a mutable good1 in  
so far as the soul that is a deserter   
from ,god1 must necessarily turn to     
other things4 ,other sins1 however1     
consist principally in conversion to a  
mutable good1 and1 consequently1 in     
aversion from the immutable good3       
because the fornicator intends1 not to  
depart from ,god1 but to enjoy carnal   
pleasure1 the result of which is that he
 departs from ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a
 thing may grow from a virtuous root in 
two ways3 first1 directly and on the    
part of the virtue itself2 even as an   
act proceeds from a habit3 and in this  
way no sin can grow from a virtuous     
root1 for in this sense ,augustine      
declared 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ah1 #ai7 
that no man makes evil use of virtue4   
,secondly1 a thing proceeds from a      
virtue indirectly1 or is occasioned by a
 virtue1 and in this way nothing hinders
 a sin proceeding from a virtue3 thus   

sometimes men pride themselves of their 
virtues1 according to ,augustine 7,ep4  
ccxi73 ,pride lies in wait for good     
works that they may die4 ,in this way   
fear of ,god or horror of one's own sins
 may lead to despair1 in so far as man  
makes evil use of those good things1 by 
allowing them to be an occasion of      
despair4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the damned  
are outside the pale of hope on account 
of the impossibility of returning to    
happiness3 hence it is not imputed to   
them that they hope not1 but it is a    
part of their damnation4 ,even so1 it   
would be no sin for a wayfarer to       
despair of obtaining that which he had  
no natural capacity for obtaining1 or   
which was not due to be obtained by him2
 for instance1 if a physician were to   
despair of healing some sick man1 or if 
anyone were to despair of ever becoming 
rich4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,there ,can 
,be ,despair ,without ,unbelief8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there

 can be no despair without unbelief4    
,for the certainty of hope is derived   
from faith2 and so long as the cause    
remains the effect is not done away4    
,therefore a man cannot lose the        
certainty of hope1 by despairing1 unless
 his faith be removed4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 to prefer one's own guilt to  
,god's mercy and goodness1 is to deny   
the infinity of ,god's goodness and     
mercy1 and so savors of unbelief4 ,but  
whoever despairs1 prefers his own guilt 
to the ,divine mercy and goodness1      
according to ,gen4 #d3ac3 ,my iniquity  
is greater than that ,i may deserve     
pardon4 ,therefore whoever despairs1 is 
an unbeliever4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
whoever falls into a condemned heresy1  
is an unbeliever4 ,but he that despairs 
seems to fall into a condemned heresy1  
viz4 that of the ,novatians1 who say    
that there is no pardon for sins after  
,baptism4 ,therefore it seems that      
whoever despairs1 is an unbeliever4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,if we remove that which 

follows1 that which precedes remains4   
,but hope follows faith1 as stated above
 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #g74 ,therefore when hope
 is removed1 faith can remain2 so that1 
not everyone who despairs1 is an        
unbeliever4  ,i answer that1 ,unbelief  
pertains to the intellect1 but despair1 
to the appetite3 and the intellect is   
about universals1 while the appetite is 
moved in connection with particulars1   
since the appetitive movement is from   
the soul towards things1 which1 in      
themselves1 are particular4 ,now it may 
happen that a man1 while having a right 
opinion in the universal1 is not rightly
 disposed as to his appetitive movement1
 his estimate being corrupted in a      
particular matter1 because1 in order to 
pass from the universal opinion to the  
appetite for a particular thing1 it is  
necessary to have a particular estimate 
7,de ,anima iii1 #b71 just as it is     
impossible to infer a particular        
conclusion from an universal            
proposition1 except through the holding 

of a particular proposition4 ,hence it  
is that a man1 while having right faith1
 in the universal1 fails in an          
appetitive movement1 in regard to some  
particular1 his particular estimate     
being corrupted by a habit or a passion1
 just as the fornicator1 by choosing    
fornication as a good for himself at    
this particular moment1 has a corrupt   
estimate in a particular matter1        
although he retains the true universal  
estimate according to faith1 viz4 that  
fornication is a mortal sin4 ,in the    
same way1 a man while retaining in the  
universal1 the true estimate of faith1  
viz4 that there is in the ,church the   
power of forgiving sins1 may suffer a   
movement of despair1 to wit1 that for   
him1 being in such a state1 there is no 
hope of pardon1 his estimate being      
corrupted in a particular matter4 ,in   
this way there can be despair1 just as  
there can be other mortal sins1 without 
belief4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the effect is
 done away1 not only when the first     

cause is removed1 but also when the     
secondary cause is removed4 ,hence the  
movement of hope can be done away1 not  
only by the removal of the universal    
estimate of faith1 which is1 so to say1 
the first cause of the certainty of     
hope1 but also by the removal of the    
particular estimate1 which is the       
secondary cause1 as it were4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,if anyone were to judge1 in  
universal1 that ,god's mercy is not     
infinite1 he would be an unbeliever4    
,but he who despairs judges not thus1   
but that1 for him in that state1 on     
account of some particular disposition1 
there is no hope of the ,divine mercy4  
,the same answer applies to the ,third  
,objection1 since the ,novatians denied1
 in universal1 that there is remission  
of sins in the ,church4   ,,third       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,despair ,is the ,greatest of  
,sins8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that despair is not the greatest of     
sins4 ,for there can be despair without 

unbelief1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,but
 unbelief is the greatest of sins       
because it overthrows the foundation of 
the spiritual edifice4 ,therefore       
despair is not the greatest of sins4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a greater evil is   
opposed to a greater good1 as the       
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 viii1 #aj74
 ,but charity is greater than hope1     
according to #a ,cor4 #ac3ac4 ,therefore
 hatred of ,god is a greater sin than   
despair4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the sin
 of despair there is nothing but        
inordinate aversion from ,god3 whereas  
in other sins there is not only         
inordinate aversion from ,god1 but also 
an inordinate conversion4 ,therefore the
 sin of despair is not more but less    
grave than other sins4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,an incurable sin seems to be 
most grievous1 according to ,jer4       
#cj3ab3 ,thy bruise is incurable1 thy   
wound is very grievous4 ,now the sin of 
despair is incurable1 according to ,jer4
 #ae3ah3 ,my wound is desperate so as to

 refuse to be healed4 99,vulg43 ,why is 
my wound1 etc4 ,therefore despair is a  
most grievous sin4  ,i answer that1     
,those sins which are contrary to the   
theological virtues are in themselves   
more grievous than others3 because1     
since the theological virtues have ,god 
for their object1 the sins which are    
opposed to them imply aversion from ,god
 directly and principally4 ,now every   
mortal sin takes its principal malice   
and gravity from the fact of its turning
 away from ,god1 for if it were possible
 to turn to a mutable good1 even        
inordinately1 without turning away from 
,god1 it would not be a mortal sin4     
,consequently a sin which1 first and of 
its very nature1 includes aversion from 
,god1 is most grievous among mortal     
sins4  ,now unbelief1 despair and hatred
 of ,god are opposed to the theological 
virtues3 and among them1 if we compare  
hatred of ,god and unbelief to despair1 
we shall find that1 in themselves1 that 
is1 in respect of their proper species1 

they are more grievous4 ,for unbelief is
 due to a man not believing ,god's own  
truth2 while the hatred of ,god arises  
from man's will being opposed to ,god's 
goodness itself2 whereas despair        
consists in a man ceasing to hope for a 
share of ,god's goodness4 ,hence it is  
clear that unbelief and hatred of ,god  
are against ,god as ,he is in ,himself1 
while despair is against ,him1 according
 as ,his good is partaken of by us4     
,wherefore strictly speaking it is a    
more grievous sin to disbelieve ,god's  
truth1 or to hate ,god1 than not to hope
 to receive glory from ,him4  ,if1      
however1 despair be compared to the     
other two sins from our point of view1  
then despair is more dangerous1 since   
hope withdraws us from evils and induces
 us to seek for good things1 so that    
when hope is given up1 men rush headlong
 into sin1 and are drawn away from good 
works4 ,wherefore a gloss on ,prov4     
#bd3aj1 ,if thou lose hope being weary  
in the day of distress1 thy strength    

shall be diminished1 says3 ,nothing is  
more hateful than despair1 for the man  
that has it loses his constancy both in 
the every day toils of this life1 and1  
what is worse1 in the battle of faith4  
,and ,isidore says 7,de ,sum4 ,bono ii1 
#ad73 ,to commit a crime is to kill the 
soul1 but to despair is to fall into    
hell4  ,and from this the response to   
the objections is evident4   ,,fourth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,despair ,arises from ,sloth8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
despair does not arise from sloth4      
,because different causes do not give   
rise to one same effect4 ,now despair of
 the future life arises from lust1      
according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1    
#de74 ,therefore it does not arise from 
sloth4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as     
despair is contrary to hope1 so is sloth
 contrary to spiritual joy4 ,but        
spiritual joy arises from hope1         
according to ,rom4 #ab3ab1 rejoicing in 
hope4 ,therefore sloth arises from      

despair1 and not vice versa4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 contrary effects have contrary
 causes4 ,now hope1 the contrary of     
which is despair1 seems to proceed from 
the consideration of ,divine favors1    
especially the ,incarnation1 for        
,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiii1 #aj73 
,nothing was so necessary to raise our  
hope1 than that we should be shown how  
much ,god loves us4 ,now what greater   
proof could we have of this than that   
,god's ,son should deign to unite       
,himself to our nature8 ,therefore      
despair arises rather from the neglect  
of the above consideration than from    
sloth4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory      
7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 reckons despair     
among the effects of sloth4  ,i answer  
that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #a2
 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a71 the object  
of hope is a good1 difficult but        
possible to obtain by oneself or by     
another4 ,consequently the hope of      
obtaining happiness may be lacking in a 
person in two ways3 first1 through his  

not deeming it an arduous good2         
secondly1 through his deeming it        
impossible to obtain either by himself1 
or by another4 ,now1 the fact that      
spiritual goods taste good to us no     
more1 or seem to be goods of no great   
account1 is chiefly due to our          
affections being infected with the love 
of bodily pleasures1 among which1 sexual
 pleasures hold the first place3 for the
 love of those pleasures leads man to   
have a distaste for spiritual things1   
and not to hope for them as arduous     
goods4 ,in this way despair is caused by
 lust4  ,on the other hand1 the fact    
that a man deems an arduous good        
impossible to obtain1 either by himself 
or by another1 is due to his being over 
downcast1 because when this state of    
mind dominates his affections1 it seems 
to him that he will never be able to    
rise to any good4 ,and since sloth is a 
sadness that casts down the spirit1 in  
this way despair is born of sloth4  ,now
 this is the proper object of hope--that

 the thing is possible1 because the good
 and the arduous regard other passions  
also4 ,hence despair is born of sloth in
 a more special way3 though it may arise
 from lust1 for the reason given above4 
,this suffices for the ,reply to the    
,first ,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,according to the ,philosopher 7,rhet4  
i1 #aa71 just as hope gives rise to joy1
 so1 when a man is joyful he has greater
 hope3 and1 accordingly1 those who are  
sorrowful fall the more easily into     
despair1 according to #b ,cor4 #b3g3    
,lest 4 4 4 such an one be swallowed up 
by overmuch sorrow4 ,yet1 since the     
object of hope is good1 to which the    
appetite tends naturally1 and which it  
shuns1 not naturally but only on account
 of some supervening obstacle1 it       
follows that1 more directly1 hope gives 
birth to joy1 while on the contrary     
despair is born of sorrow4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,this very neglect to consider the 
,divine favors arises from sloth4 ,for  
when a man is influenced by a certain   

passion he considers chiefly the things 
which pertain to that passion3 so that a
 man who is full of sorrow does not     
easily think of great and joyful things1
 but only of sad things1 unless by a    
great effort he turn his thoughts away  
from sadness4   ,,question #ba  ,,of    
,,presumption 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we
 must now consider presumption1 under   
which head there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is the object in   
which presumption trusts8  7#b7 ,whether
 presumption is a sin8  7#c7 ,to what is
 it opposed8  7#d7 ,from what vice does 
it arise8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #a  ,whether            
,presumption ,trusts in ,god or in ,our 
,own ,power8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that presumption1 which is a sin   
against the ,holy ,ghost1 trusts1 not in
 ,god1 but in our own power4 ,for the   
lesser the power1 the more grievously   
does he sin who trusts in it too much4  
,but man's power is less than ,god's4   
,therefore it is a more grievous sin to 

presume on human power than to presume  
on the power of ,god4 ,now the sin      
against the ,holy ,ghost is most        
grievous4 ,therefore presumption1 which 
is reckoned a species of sin against the
 ,holy ,ghost1 trusts to human rather   
than to ,divine power4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 other sins arise from the sin 
against the ,holy ,ghost1 for this sin  
is called malice which is a source from 
which sins arise4 ,now other sins seem  
to arise from the presumption whereby   
man presumes on himself rather than from
 the presumption whereby he presumes on 
,god1 since self-love is the origin of  
sin1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 
,dei xiv1 #bh74 ,therefore it seems that
 presumption which is a sin against the 
,holy ,ghost1 relies chiefly on human   
power4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sin arises  
from the inordinate conversion to a     
mutable good4 ,now presumption is a sin4
 ,therefore it arises from turning to   
human power1 which is a mutable good1   
rather than from turning to the power of

 ,god1 which is an immutable good4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,just as1 through despair1
 a man despises the ,divine mercy1 on   
which hope relies1 so1 through          
presumption1 he despises the ,divine    
justice1 which punishes the sinner4 ,now
 justice is in ,god even as mercy is4   
,therefore1 just as despair consists in 
aversion from ,god1 so presumption      
consists in inordinate conversion to    
,him4  ,i answer that1 ,presumption     
seems to imply immoderate hope4 ,now the
 object of hope is an arduous possible  
good3 and a thing is possible to a man  
in two ways3 first by his own power2    
secondly1 by the power of ,god alone4   
,with regard to either hope there may be
 presumption owing to lack of           
moderation4 ,as to the hope whereby a   
man relies on his own power1 there is   
presumption if he tends to a good as    
though it were possible to him1 whereas 
it surpasses his powers1 according to   
,judith #f3ae3 ,thou humblest them that 
presume of themselves4 ,this presumption

 is contrary to the virtue of           
magnanimity which holds to the mean in  
this kind of hope4  ,but as to the hope 
whereby a man relies on the power of    
,god1 there may be presumption through  
immoderation1 in the fact that a man    
tends to some good as though it were    
possible by the power and mercy of ,god1
 whereas it is not possible1 for        
instance1 if a man hope to obtain pardon
 without repenting1 or glory without    
merits4 ,this presumption is1 properly1 
the sin against the ,holy ,ghost1       
because1 to wit1 by presuming thus a man
 removes or despises the assistance of  
the ,holy ,spirit1 whereby he is        
withdrawn from sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,as stated above 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #c2      
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #c7 a sin which is
 against ,god is1 in its genus1 graver  
than other sins4 ,hence presumption     
whereby a man relies on ,god            
inordinately1 is a more grievous sin    
than the presumption of trusting in     
one's own power1 since to rely on the   

,divine power for obtaining what is     
unbecoming to ,god1 is to depreciate the
 ,divine power1 and it is evident that  
it is a graver sin to detract from the  
,divine power than to exaggerate one's  
own4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the presumption 
whereby a man presumes inordinately on  
,god1 includes self-love1 whereby he    
loves his own good inordinately4 ,for   
when we desire a thing very much1 we    
think we can easily procure it through  
others1 even though we cannot4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,presumption on ,god's mercy  
implies both conversion to a mutable    
good1 in so far as it arises from an    
inordinate desire of one's own good1 and
 aversion from the immutable good1 in as
 much as it ascribes to the ,divine     
power that which is unbecoming to it1   
for thus man turns away from ,god's     
power4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,presumption
 ,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that presumption is not a sin4 ,for
 no sin is a reason why man should be   

heard by ,god4 ,yet1 through presumption
 some are heard by ,god1 for it is      
written 7,judith #i3ag73 ,hear me a poor
 wretch making supplication to ,thee1   
and presuming of ,thy mercy4 ,therefore 
presumption on ,god's mercy is not a    
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 presumption   
denotes excessive hope4 ,but there      
cannot be excess of that hope which is  
in ,god1 since ,his power and mercy are 
infinite4 ,therefore it seems that      
presumption is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 that which is a sin does not  
excuse from sin3 for the ,master says   
7,sent4 ii1 ,d1 #bb7 that ,adam sinned  
less1 because he sinned in the hope of  
pardon1 which seems to indicate         
presumption4 ,therefore presumption is  
not a sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
reckoned a species of sin against the   
,holy ,ghost4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #a7 with     
regard to despair1 every appetitive     
movement that is conformed to a false   
intellect1 is evil in itself and sinful4

 ,now presumption is an appetitive      
movement1 since it denotes an inordinate
 hope4 ,moreover it is conformed to a   
false intellect1 just as despair is3 for
 just as it is false that ,god does not 
pardon the repentant1 or that ,he does  
not turn sinners to repentance1 so is it
 false that ,he grants forgiveness to   
those who persevere in their sins1 and  
that ,he gives glory to those who cease 
from good works3 and it is to this      
estimate that the movement of           
presumption is conformed4  ,consequently
 presumption is a sin1 but less grave   
than despair1 since1 on account of ,his 
infinite goodness1 it is more proper to 
,god to have mercy and to spare1 than to
 punish3 for the former becomes ,god in 
,himself1 the latter becomes ,him by    
reason of our sins4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,presumption sometimes stands for hope1 
because even the right hope which we    
have in ,god seems to be presumption1 if
 it be measured according to man's      
estate3 yet it is not1 if we look at the

 immensity of the goodness of ,god4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,presumption does not  
denote excessive hope1 as though man    
hoped too much in ,god2 but through man 
hoping to obtain from ,god something    
unbecoming to ,him2 which is the same as
 to hope too little in ,him1 since it   
implies a depreciation of ,his power2 as
 stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a74  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,to sin with the intention of 
persevering in sin and through the hope 
of being pardoned1 is presumptuous1 and 
this does not diminish1 but increases   
sin4 ,to sin1 however1 with the hope of 
obtaining pardon some time1 and with the
 intention of refraining from sin and of
 repenting of it1 is not presumptuous1  
but diminishes sin1 because this seems  
to indicate a will less hardened in sin4
   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ba1
 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,presumption ,is    
,more ,opposed to ,fear ,than to ,hope8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
presumption is more opposed to fear than
 to hope4 ,because inordinate fear is   

opposed to right fear4 ,now presumption 
seems to pertain to inordinate fear1 for
 it is written 7,wis4 #ag3aj73 ,a       
troubled conscience always presumes     
,douay3 'forecasteth' grievous things1  
and 7,wis4 #ag3aa7 that fear is a help  
to presumption 99,vulg43 ',fear is      
nothing else but a yielding up of the   
succours from thought4'4 ,therefore     
presumption is opposed to fear rather   
than to hope4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      
contraries are most distant from one    
another4 ,now presumption is more       
distant from fear than from hope1       
because presumption implies movement to 
something1 just as hope does1 whereas   
fear denotes movement from a thing4     
,therefore presumption is contrary to   
fear rather than to hope4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 presumption excludes fear     
altogether1 whereas it does not exclude 
hope altogether1 but only the rectitude 
of hope4 ,since therefore contraries    
destroy one another1 it seems that      
presumption is contrary to fear rather  

than to hope4  ,on the contrary1 ,when  
two vices are opposed to one another    
they are contrary to the same virtue1 as
 timidity and audacity are opposed to   
fortitude4 ,now the sin of presumption  
is contrary to the sin of despair1 which
 is directly opposed to hope4 ,therefore
 it seems that presumption also is more 
directly opposed to hope4  ,i answer    
that1 ,as ,augustine states 7,contra    
,julian4 iv1 #c71 every virtue not only 
has a contrary vice manifestly distinct 
from it1 as temerity is opposed to      
prudence1 but also a sort of kindred    
vice1 alike1 not in truth but only in   
its deceitful appearance1 as cunning is 
opposed to prudence4 ,this agrees with  
the ,philosopher who says 7,ethic4 ii1  
#h7 that a virtue seems to have more in 
common with one of the contrary vices   
than with the other1 as temperance with 
insensibility1 and fortitude with       
audacity4  ,accordingly presumption     
appears to be manifestly opposed to     
fear1 especially servile fear1 which    

looks at the punishment arising from    
,god's justice1 the remission of which  
presumption hopes for2 yet by a kind of 
false likeness it is more opposed to    
hope1 since it denotes an inordinate    
hope in ,god4 ,and since things are more
 directly opposed when they belong to   
the same genus1 than when they belong to
 different genera1 it follows that      
presumption is more directly opposed to 
hope than to fear4 ,for they both regard
 and rely on the same object1 hope      
inordinately1 presumption inordinately4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as hope is       
misused in speaking of evils1 and       
properly applied in speaking of good1 so
 is presumption3 it is in this way that 
inordinate fear is called presumption4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,contraries are things 
that are most distant from one another  
within the same genus4 ,now presumption 
and hope denote a movement of the same  
genus1 which can be either ordinate or  
inordinate4 ,hence presumption is more  
directly opposed to hope than to fear1  

since it is opposed to hope in respect  
of its specific difference1 as an       
inordinate thing to an ordinate one1    
whereas it is opposed to fear1 in       
respect of its generic difference1 which
 is the movement of hope4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,presumption is opposed to fear by a
 generic contrariety1 and to the virtue 
of hope by a specific contrariety4      
,hence presumption excludes fear        
altogether even generically1 whereas it 
does not exclude hope except by reason  
of its difference1 by excluding its     
ordinateness4   ,,fourth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,presumption ,arises from ,vainglory8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
presumption does not arise from         
vainglory4 ,for presumption seems to    
rely most of all on the ,divine mercy4  
,now mercy 7misericordia7 regards       
unhappiness 7miseriam7 which is contrary
 to glory4 ,therefore presumption does  
not arise from vainglory4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 presumption is opposed to     

despair4 ,now despair arises from       
sorrow1 as stated above 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4   
#d1 ad #b74 ,since therefore opposites  
have opposite causes1 presumption would 
seem to arise from pleasure1 and        
consequently from sins of the flesh1    
which give the most absorbing pleasure4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the vice of         
presumption consists in tending to some 
impossible good1 as though it were      
possible4 ,now it is owing to ignorance 
that one deems an impossible thing to be
 possible4 ,therefore presumption arises
 from ignorance rather than from        
vainglory4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory  
says 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 that           
presumption of novelties is a daughter  
of vainglory4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,a4 #a71 presumption is   
twofold2 one whereby a man relies on his
 own power1 when he attempts something  
beyond his power1 as though it were     
possible to him4 ,such like presumption 
clearly arises from vainglory2 for it is
 owing to a great desire for glory1 that

 a man attempts things beyond his power1
 and especially novelties which call for
 greater admiration4 ,hence ,gregory    
states explicitly that presumption of   
novelties is a daughter of vainglory4   
,the other presumption is an inordinate 
trust in the ,divine mercy or power1    
consisting in the hope of obtaining     
glory without merits1 or pardon without 
repentance4 ,such like presumption seems
 to arise directly from pride1 as though
 man thought so much of himself as to   
esteem that ,god would not punish him or
 exclude him from glory1 however much he
 might be a sinner4  ,this suffices for 
the ,replies to the ,objections4        
,,question #bb  ,,of ,,the ,,precepts   
,,relating ,,to ,,hope ,,and ,,fear 7,in
 ,two ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
the precepts relating to hope and fear3 
under which head there are two points of
 inquiry3  7#a7 ,the precepts relating  
to hope2  7#b7 ,the precepts relating to
 fear4   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #bb1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,there      

,should ,be a ,precept of ,hope8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no   
precept should be given relating to the 
virtue of hope4 ,for when an effect is  
sufficiently procured by one cause1     
there is no need to induce it by        
another4 ,now man is sufficiently       
induced by his natural inclination to   
hope for good4 ,therefore there is no   
need of a precept of the ,law to induce 
him to do this4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1    
since precepts are given about acts of  
virtue1 the chief precepts are about the
 acts of the chief virtues4 ,now the    
chief of all the virtues are the three  
theological virtues1 viz4 hope1 faith   
and charity4 ,consequently1 as the chief
 precepts of the ,law are those of the  
decalogue1 to which all others may be   
reduced1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#ajj1 ,a4 #c71 it seems that if any     
precept of hope were given1 it should be
 found among the precepts of the        
decalogue4 ,but it is not to be found   
there4 ,therefore it seems that the ,law

 should contain no precept of hope4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to prescribe an act 
of virtue is equivalent to a prohibition
 of the act of the opposite vice4 ,now  
no precept is to be found forbidding    
despair which is contrary to hope4      
,therefore it seems that the ,law should
 contain no precept of hope4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,augustine says on ,john      
#ae3ab1 ,this is ,my commandment1 that  
you love one another 7,tract4 lxxxiii in
 ,joan473 ,how many things are commanded
 us about faith6 ,how many relating to  
hope6 ,therefore it is fitting that some
 precepts should be given about hope4   
,i answer that1 ,among the precepts     
contained in ,holy ,writ1 some belong to
 the substance of the ,law1 others are  
preambles to the ,law4 ,the preambles to
 the ,law are those without which no law
 is possible3 such are the precepts     
relating to the act of faith and the act
 of hope1 because the act of faith      
inclines man's mind so that he believes 
the ,author of the ,law to be ,one to   

,whom he owes submission1 while1 by the 
hope of a reward1 he is induced to      
observe the precepts4 ,the precepts that
 belong to the substance of the ,law are
 those which relate to right conduct and
 are imposed on man already subject and 
ready to obey3 wherefore when the ,law  
was given these precepts were set forth 
from the very outset under the form of a
 command4  ,yet the precepts of hope and
 faith were not to be given under the   
form of a command1 since1 unless man    
already believed and hoped1 it would be 
useless to give him the ,law3 but1 just 
as the precept of faith had to be given 
under the form of an announcement or    
reminder1 as stated above 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 
#a71 so too1 the precept of hope1 in the
 first promulgation of the ,law1 had to 
be given under the form of a promise4   
,for he who promises rewards to them    
that obey him1 by that very fact1 urges 
them to hope3 hence all the promises    
contained in the ,law are incitements to
 hope4  ,since1 however1 when once the  

,law has been given1 it is for a wise   
man to induce men not only to observe   
the precepts1 but also1 and much more1  
to safeguard the foundation of the ,law1
 therefore1 after the first promulgation
 of the ,law1 ,holy ,writ holds out to  
man many inducements to hope1 even by   
way of warning or command1 and not      
merely by way of promise1 as in the     
,law2 for instance1 in the ,ps4 #fa3i3  
,hope ,douay3 ',trust' in ,him all ye   
congregation of the people1 and in many 
other passages of the ,scriptures4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nature inclines us to 
hope for the good which is proportionate
 to human nature2 but for man to hope   
for a supernatural good he had to be    
induced by the authority of the ,divine 
law1 partly by promises1 partly by      
admonitions and commands4 ,nevertheless 
there was need for precepts of the      
,divine law to be given even for those  
things to which natural reason inclines 
us1 such as the acts of the moral       
virtues1 for sake of insuring a greater 

stability1 especially since the natural 
reason of man was clouded by the lusts  
of sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the precepts 
of the law of the decalogue belong to   
the first promulgation of the ,law3     
hence there was no need for a precept of
 hope among the precepts of the         
decalogue1 and it was enough to induce  
men to hope by the inclusion of certain 
promises1 as in the case of the first   
and fourth commandments4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,in those observances to which man  
is bound as under a duty1 it is enough  
that he receive an affirmative precept  
as to what he has to do1 wherein is     
implied the prohibition of what he must 
avoid doing3 thus he is given a precept 
concerning the honor due to parents1 but
 not a prohibition against dishonoring  
them1 except by the law inflicting      
punishment on those who dishonor their  
parents4 ,and since in order to be saved
 it is man's duty to hope in ,god1 he   
had to be induced to do so by one of the
 above ways1 affirmatively1 so to speak1

 wherein is implied the prohibition of  
the opposite4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bb1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,there ,should ,have ,been ,given a     
,precept of ,fear8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that1 in the ,law1 there     
should not have been given a precept of 
fear4 ,for the fear of ,god is about    
things which are a preamble to the ,law1
 since it is the beginning of wisdom4   
,now things which are a preamble to the 
,law do not come under a precept of the 
,law4 ,therefore no precept of fear     
should be given in the ,law4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 given the cause1 the effect is
 also given4 ,now love is the cause of  
fear1 since every fear proceeds from    
some kind of love1 as ,augustine states 
7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #cc74 ,therefore     
given the precept of love1 it would have
 been superfluous to command fear4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 presumption1 in a   
way1 is opposed to fear4 ,but the ,law  
contains no prohibition against         
presumption4 ,therefore it seems that   

neither should any precept of fear have 
been given4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
written 7,deut4 #aj3ab73 ,and now1      
,israel1 what doth the ,lord thy ,god   
require of thee1 but that thou fear the 
,lord thy ,god8 ,but ,he requires of us 
that which ,he commands us to do4       
,therefore it is a matter of precept    
that man should fear ,god4  ,i answer   
that1 ,fear is twofold1 servile and     
filial4 ,now just as man is induced1 by 
the hope of rewards1 to observe precepts
 of law1 so too is he induced thereto by
 the fear of punishment1 which fear is  
servile4  ,and just as according to what
 has been said 7,a4 #a71 in the         
promulgation of the ,law there was no   
need for a precept of the act of hope1  
and men were to be induced thereto by   
promises1 so neither was there need for 
a precept1 under form of command1 of    
fear which regards punishment1 and men  
were to be induced thereto by the threat
 of punishment3 and this was realized   
both in the precepts of the decalogue1  

and afterwards1 in due sequence1 in the 
secondary precepts of the ,law4  ,yet1  
just as wise men and the prophets who1  
consequently1 strove to strengthen man  
in the observance of the ,law1 delivered
 their teaching about hope under the    
form of admonition or command1 so too   
did they in the matter of fear4  ,on the
 other hand filial fear which shows     
reverence to ,god1 is a sort of genus in
 respect of the love of ,god1 and a kind
 of principle of all observances        
connected with reverence for ,god4      
,hence precepts of filial fear are given
 in the ,law1 even as precepts of love1 
because each is a preamble to the       
external acts prescribed by the ,law and
 to which the precepts of the decalogue 
refer4 ,hence in the passage quoted in  
the argument ,on the contrary1 man is   
required to have fear1 to walk in ,god's
 ways1 by worshipping ,him1 and to love 
,him4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,filial fear is 
a preamble to the ,law1 not as though it
 were extrinsic thereto1 but as being   

the beginning of the ,law1 just as love 
is4 ,hence precepts are given of both1  
since they are like general principles  
of the whole ,law4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,from love proceeds filial fear as also 
other good works that are done from     
charity4 ,hence1 just as after the      
precept of charity1 precepts are given  
of the other acts of virtue1 so at the  
same time precepts are given of fear and
 of the love of charity1 just as1 in    
demonstrative sciences1 it is not enough
 to lay down the first principles1      
unless the conclusions also are given   
which follow from them proximately or   
remotely4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,inducement 
to fear suffices to exclude presumption1
 even as inducement to hope suffices to 
exclude despair1 as stated above 7,a4   
#a1 ad #c74   ,,question #bc  ,,of      
,,charity1 ,,considered ,,in ,,itself   
7,in ,eight ,articles7  ,in proper      
sequence1 we must consider charity2 and 
7#a7 charity itself2 7#b7 the           
corresponding gift of wisdom4 ,the first

 consideration will be fivefold3 7#a7   
,charity itself2 7#b7 ,the object of    
charity2 7#c7 ,its acts2 7#d7 ,the      
opposite vices2 7#e7 ,the precepts      
relating thereto4  ,the first of these  
considerations will be twofold3 7#a7    
,charity1 considered as regards itself2 
7#b7 ,charity1 considered in its        
relation to its subject4 ,under the     
first head there are eight points of    
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether charity is      
friendship8  7#b7 ,whether it is        
something created in the soul8  7#c7    
,whether it is a virtue8  7#d7 ,whether 
it is a special virtue8  7#e7 ,whether  
it is one virtue8  7#f7 ,whether it is  
the greatest of the virtues8  7#g7      
,whether any true virtue is possible    
without it8  7#h7 ,whether it is the    
form of the virtues8   ,,first ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,charity ,is ,friendship8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that charity is not  
friendship4 ,for nothing is so          
appropriate to friendship as to dwell   

with one's friend1 according to the     
,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #e74 ,now   
charity is of man towards ,god and the  
angels1 whose dwelling ,douay3          
'conversation' is not with men 7,dan4   
#b3aa74 ,therefore charity is not       
friendship4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there  
is no friendship without return of love 
7,ethic4 viii1 #b74 ,but charity extends
 even to one's enemies1 according to    
,matt4 #e3dd3 ,love your enemies4       
,therefore charity is not friendship4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to the    
,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #c7 there   
are three kinds of friendship1 directed 
respectively towards the delightful1 the
 useful1 or the virtuous4 ,now charity  
is not the friendship for the useful or 
delightful2 for ,jerome says in his     
letter to ,paulinus which is to be found
 at the beginning of the ,bible3 ,true  
friendship cemented by ,christ1 is where
 men are drawn together1 not by         
household interests1 not by mere bodily 
presence1 not by crafty and cajoling    

flattery1 but by the fear of ,god1 and  
the study of the ,divine ,scriptures4   
,no more is it friendship for the       
virtuous1 since by charity we love even 
sinners1 whereas friendship based on the
 virtuous is only for virtuous men      
7,ethic4 viii74 ,therefore charity is   
not friendship4  ,on the contrary1 ,it  
is written 7,john #ae3ae73 ,i will not  
now call you servants 4 4 4 but ,my     
friends4 ,now this was said to them by  
reason of nothing else than charity4    
,therefore charity is friendship4  ,i   
answer that1 ,according to the          
,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #b1 #c7 not 
every love has the character of         
friendship1 but that love which is      
together with benevolence1 when1 to wit1
 we love someone so as to wish good to  
him4 ,if1 however1 we do not wish good  
to what we love1 but wish its good for  
ourselves1 7thus we are said to love    
wine1 or a horse1 or the like71 it is   
love not of friendship1 but of a kind of
 concupiscence4 ,for it would be absurd 

to speak of having friendship for wine  
or for a horse4  ,yet neither does      
well-wishing suffice for friendship1 for
 a certain mutual love is requisite1    
since friendship is between friend and  
friend3 and this well-wishing is founded
 on some kind of communication4         
,accordingly1 since there is a          
communication between man and ,god1     
inasmuch as ,he communicates ,his       
happiness to us1 some kind of friendship
 must needs be based on this same       
communication1 of which it is written   
7#a ,cor4 #a3i73 ,god is faithful3 by   
,whom you are called unto the fellowship
 of ,his ,son4 ,the love which is based 
on this communication1 is charity3      
wherefore it is evident that charity is 
the friendship of man for ,god4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,man's life is twofold4 ,there
 is his outward life in respect of his  
sensitive and corporeal nature3 and with
 regard to this life there is no        
communication or fellowship between us  
and ,god or the angels4 ,the other is   

man's spiritual life in respect of his  
mind1 and with regard to this life there
 is fellowship between us and both ,god 
and the angels1 imperfectly indeed in   
this present state of life1 wherefore it
 is written 7,phil4 #c3bj73 ,our        
conversation is in heaven4 ,but this    
conversation will be perfected in       
heaven1 when ,his servants shall serve  
,him1 and they shall see ,his face      
7,apoc4 #bb3c1 #d74 ,therefore charity  
is imperfect here1 but will be perfected
 in heaven4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3           
,friendship extends to a person in two  
ways3 first in respect of himself1 and  
in this way friendship never extends but
 to one's friends3 secondly1 it extends 
to someone in respect of another1 as1   
when a man has friendship for a certain 
person1 for his sake he loves all       
belonging to him1 be they children1     
servants1 or connected with him in any  
way4 ,indeed so much do we love our     
friends1 that for their sake we love all
 who belong to them1 even if they hurt  

or hate us2 so that1 in this way1 the   
friendship of charity extends even to   
our enemies1 whom we love out of charity
 in relation to ,god1 to ,whom the      
friendship of charity is chiefly        
directed4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the        
friendship that is based on the virtuous
 is directed to none but a virtuous man 
as the principal person1 but for his    
sake we love those who belong to him1   
even though they be not virtuous3 in    
this way charity1 which above all is    
friendship based on the virtuous1       
extends to sinners1 whom1 out of        
charity1 we love for ,god's sake4       
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,charity ,is         
,something ,created in the ,soul8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
charity is not something created in the 
soul4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4  
viii1 #g73 ,he that loveth his neighbor1
 consequently1 loveth love itself4 ,now 
,god is love4 ,therefore it follows that
 he loves ,god in the first place4      

,again he says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ag73 ,it
 was said3 ,god is ,charity1 even as it 
was said3 ,god is a ,spirit4 ,therefore 
charity is not something created in the 
soul1 but is ,god ,himself4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 ,god is the life of the soul  
spiritually just as the soul is the life
 of the body1 according to ,deut4       
#cj3bj3 ,he is thy life4 ,now the soul  
by itself quickens the body4 ,therefore 
,god quickens the soul by ,himself4 ,but
 ,he quickens it by charity1 according  
to #a ,john #c3ad3 ,we know that we have
 passed from death to life1 because we  
love the brethren4 ,therefore ,god is   
charity itself4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no 
created thing is of infinite power2 on  
the contrary every creature is vanity4  
,but charity is not vanity1 indeed it is
 opposed to vanity2 and it is of        
infinite power1 since it brings the     
human soul to the infinite good4        
,therefore charity is not something     
created in the soul4  ,on the charity1  
,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4   

iii1 #aj73 ,by charity ,i mean the      
movement of the soul towards the        
enjoyment of ,god for ,his own sake4    
,but a movement of the soul is something
 created in the soul4 ,therefore charity
 is something created in the soul4  ,i  
answer that1 ,the ,master looks         
thoroughly into this question in ,q4 #ag
 of the ,first ,book1 and concludes that
 charity is not something created in the
 soul1 but is the ,holy ,ghost ,himself 
dwelling in the mind4 ,nor does he mean 
to say that this movement of love       
whereby we love ,god is the ,holy ,ghost
 ,himself1 but that this movement is    
from the ,holy ,ghost without any       
intermediary habit1 whereas other       
virtuous acts are from the ,holy ,ghost 
by means of the habits of other virtues1
 for instance the habit of faith or hope
 or of some other virtue3 and this he   
said on account of the excellence of    
charity4  ,but if we consider the matter
 aright1 this would be1 on the contrary1
 detrimental to charity4 ,for when the  

,holy ,ghost moves the human mind the   
movement of charity does not proceed    
from this motion in such a way that the 
human mind be merely moved1 without     
being the principle of this movement1 as
 when a body is moved by some extrinsic 
motive power4 ,for this is contrary to  
the nature of a voluntary act1 whose    
principle needs to be in itself1 as     
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,a4 #a73 
so that it would follow that to love is 
not a voluntary act1 which involves a   
contradiction1 since love1 of its very  
nature1 implies an act of the will4     
,likewise1 neither can it be said that  
the ,holy ,ghost moves the will in such 
a way to the act of loving1 as though   
the will were an instrument1 for an     
instrument1 though it be a principle of 
action1 nevertheless has not the power  
to act or not to act1 for then again the
 act would cease to be voluntary and    
meritorious1 whereas it has been stated 
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,a4 #d7 that  
the love of charity is the root of      

merit3 and1 given that the will is moved
 by the ,holy ,ghost to the act of love1
 it is necessary that the will also     
should be the efficient cause of that   
act4  ,now no act is perfectly produced 
by an active power1 unless it be        
connatural to that power by reason of   
some form which is the principle of that
 action4 ,wherefore ,god1 ,who moves all
 things to their due ends1 bestowed on  
each thing the form whereby it is       
inclined to the end appointed to it by  
,him2 and in this way ,he ordereth all  
things sweetly 7,wis4 #h3a74 ,but it is 
evident that the act of charity         
surpasses the nature of the power of the
 will1 so that1 therefore1 unless some  
form be superadded to the natural power1
 inclining it to the act of love1 this  
same act would be less perfect than the 
natural acts and the acts of the other  
powers2 nor would it be easy and        
pleasurable to perform4 ,and this is    
evidently untrue1 since no virtue has   
such a strong inclination to its act as 

charity has1 nor does any virtue perform
 its act with so great pleasure4        
,therefore it is most necessary that1   
for us to perform the act of charity1   
there should be in us some habitual form
 superadded to the natural power1       
inclining that power to the act of      
charity1 and causing it to act with ease
 and pleasure4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the   
,divine ,essence ,itself is charity1    
even as ,it is wisdom and goodness4     
,wherefore just as we are said to be    
good with the goodness which is ,god1   
and wise with the wisdom which is ,god  
7since the goodness whereby we are      
formally good is a participation of     
,divine goodness1 and the wisdom whereby
 we are formally wise1 is a share of    
,divine wisdom71 so too1 the charity    
whereby formally we love our neighbor is
 a participation of ,divine charity4    
,for this manner of speaking is common  
among the ,platonists1 with whose       
doctrines ,augustine was imbued2 and the
 lack of adverting to this has been to  

some an occasion of error4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,god is effectively the life both  
of the soul by charity1 and of the body 
by the soul3 but formally charity is the
 life of the soul1 even as the soul is  
the life of the body4 ,consequently we  
may conclude from this that just as the 
soul is immediately united to the body1 
so is charity to the soul4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,charity works formally4 ,now the  
efficacy of a form depends on the power 
of the agent1 who instills the form1    
wherefore it is evident that charity is 
not vanity4 ,but because it produces an 
infinite effect1 since1 by justifying   
the soul1 it unites it to ,god1 this    
proves the infinity of the ,divine      
power1 which is the author of charity4  
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,charity ,is a       
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that charity is not a virtue4 ,for      
charity is a kind of friendship4 ,now   
philosophers do not reckon friendship a 
virtue1 as may be gathered from ,ethic4 

viii1 #a2 nor is it numbered among the  
virtues whether moral or intellectual4  
,neither1 therefore1 is charity a       
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue is  
the ultimate limit of power 7,de ,coelo 
et ,mundo i1 #aa74 ,but charity is not  
something ultimate1 this applies rather 
to joy and peace4 ,therefore it seems   
that charity is not a virtue1 and that  
this should be said rather of joy and   
peace4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every virtue
 is an accidental habit4 ,but charity is
 not an accidental habit1 since it is a 
more excellent thing than the soul      
itself3 whereas no accident is more     
excellent than its subject4 ,therefore  
charity is not a virtue4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,moribus 
,eccl4 xi73 ,charity is a virtue which1 
when our affections are perfectly       
ordered1 unites us to ,god1 for by it we
 love ,him4  ,i answer that1 ,human acts
 are good according as they are         
regulated by their due rule and measure4
 ,wherefore human virtue which is the   

principle of all man's good acts        
consists in following the rule of human 
acts1 which is twofold1 as stated above 
7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #a71 viz4 human reason and
 ,god4  ,consequently just as moral     
virtue is defined as being in accord    
with right reason1 as stated in ,ethic4 
ii1 #f1 so too1 the nature of virtue    
consists in attaining ,god1 as also     
stated above with regard to faith1 7,q4 
#d1 ,a4 #e7 and hope 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #a74 
,wherefore1 it follows that charity is a
 virtue1 for1 since charity attains     
,god1 it unites us to ,god1 as evidenced
 by the authority of ,augustine quoted  
above4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the           
,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii7 does not    
deny that friendship is a virtue1 but   
affirms that it is either a virtue or   
with a virtue4 ,for we might say that it
 is a moral virtue about works done in  
respect of another person1 but under a  
different aspect from justice4 ,for     
justice is about works done in respect  
of another person1 under the aspect of  

the legal due1 whereas friendship       
considers the aspect of a friendly and  
moral duty1 or rather that of a         
gratuitous favor1 as the ,philosopher   
explains 7,ethic4 viii1 #ac74           
,nevertheless it may be admitted that it
 is not a virtue distinct of itself from
 the other virtues4 ,for its            
praiseworthiness and virtuousness are   
derived merely from its object1 in so   
far1 to wit1 as it is based on the moral
 goodness of the virtues4 ,this is      
evident from the fact that not every    
friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous1
 as in the case of friendship based on  
pleasure or utility4 ,wherefore         
friendship for the virtuous is something
 consequent to virtue rather than a     
virtue4 ,moreover there is no comparison
 with charity since it is not founded   
principally on the virtue of a man1 but 
on the goodness of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,it belongs to the same virtue to   
love a man and to rejoice about him1    
since joy results from love1 as stated  

above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b7 in the 
treatise on the passions3 wherefore love
 is reckoned a virtue1 rather than joy1 
which is an effect of love4 ,and when   
virtue is described as being something  
ultimate1 we mean that it is last1 not  
in the order of effect1 but in the order
 of excess1 just as one hundred pounds  
exceed sixty4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every  
accident is inferior to substance if we 
consider its being1 since substance has 
being in itself1 while an accident has  
its being in another3 but considered as 
to its species1 an accident which       
results from the principles of its      
subject is inferior to its subject1 even
 as an effect is inferior to its cause2 
whereas an accident that results from a 
participation of some higher nature is  
superior to its subject1 in so far as it
 is a likeness of that higher nature1   
even as light is superior to the        
diaphanous body4 ,in this way charity is
 superior to the soul1 in as much as it 
is a participation of the ,holy ,ghost4 

,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1  
,art4 #d  ,whether ,charity ,is a       
,special ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that charity is not a special
 virtue4 ,for ,jerome says3 ,let me     
briefly define all virtue as the charity
 whereby we love ,god 99,the reference  
should be to ,augustine1 ,ep4 clxvii3   
and ,augustine says 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4
 xv7 99,de ,civ4 ,dei xv1 #bb that      
virtue is the order of love4 ,now no    
special virtue is included in the       
definition of virtue in general4        
,therefore charity is not a special     
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which 
extends to all works of virtue1 cannot  
be a special virtue4 ,but charity       
extends to all works of virtue1         
according to #a ,cor4 #ac3d3 ,charity is
 patient1 is kind1 etc42 indeed it      
extends to all human actions1 according 
to #a ,cor4 #af3ad3 ,let all your things
 be done in charity4 ,therefore charity 
is not a special virtue4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 the precepts of the ,law refer

 to acts of virtue4 ,now ,augustine says
 7,de ,perfect4 ,human4 ,justit4 v7     
that1 ,thou shalt love is a general     
commandment1 and ,thou shalt not covet1 
a general prohibition4 ,therefore       
charity is a general virtue4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,nothing general is enumerated
 together with what is special4 ,but    
charity is enumerated together with     
special virtues1 viz4 hope and faith1   
according to #a ,cor4 #ac3ac3 ,and now  
there remain faith1 hope1 charity1 these
 three4 ,therefore charity is a special 
virtue4  ,i answer that1 ,acts and      
habits are specified by their objects1  
as shown above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4   
#b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b74 ,now the 
proper object of love is the good1 as   
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #a71
 so that wherever there is a special    
aspect of good1 there is a special kind 
of love4 ,but the ,divine good1 inasmuch
 as it is the object of happiness1 has a
 special aspect of good1 wherefore the  
love of charity1 which is the love of   

that good1 is a special kind of love4   
,therefore charity is a special virtue4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,charity is included in
 the definition of every virtue1 not as 
being essentially every virtue1 but     
because every virtue depends on it in a 
way1 as we shall state further on 7,,aa4
 #g1 #h74 ,in this way prudence is      
included in the definition of the moral 
virtues1 as explained in ,ethic4 ii1 vi1
 from the fact that they depend on      
prudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the virtue 
or art which is concerned about the last
 end1 commands the virtues or arts which
 are concerned about other ends which   
are secondary1 thus the military art    
commands the art of horse-riding        
7,ethic4 i74 ,accordingly since charity 
has for its object the last end of human
 life1 viz4 everlasting happiness1 it   
follows that it extends to the acts of a
 man's whole life1 by commanding them1  
not by eliciting immediately all acts of
 virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the precept 
of love is said to be a general command1

 because all other precepts are reduced 
thereto as to their end1 according to #a
 ,tim4 #a3e3 ,the end of the commandment
 is charity4   ,,fifth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #e  ,whether  
,charity ,is ,one ,virtue8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that charity is not  
one virtue4 ,for habits are distinct    
according to their objects4 ,now there  
are two objects of charity--,god and our
 neighbor--which are infinitely distant 
from one another4 ,therefore charity is 
not one virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1    
different aspects of the object         
diversify a habit1 even though that     
object be one in reality1 as shown above
 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #f2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4
 #b1 ad #a74 ,now there are many aspects
 under which ,god is an object of love1 
because we are debtors to ,his love by  
reason of each one of ,his favors4      
,therefore charity is not one virtue4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity comprises   
friendship for our neighbor4 ,but the   
,philosopher reckons several species of 

friendship 7,ethic4 viii1 #c1 #aa1 #ab74
 ,therefore charity is not one virtue1  
but is divided into a number of various 
species4  ,on the contrary1 ,just as    
,god is the object of faith1 so is ,he  
the object of charity4 ,now faith is one
 virtue by reason of the unity of the   
,divine truth1 according to ,eph4 #d3e3 
,one faith4 ,therefore charity also is  
one virtue by reason of the unity of the
 ,divine goodness4  ,i answer that1     
,charity1 as stated above 7,a4 #a7 is a 
kind of friendship of man for ,god4 ,now
 the different species of friendship are
 differentiated1 first of all1 in       
respect of a diversity of end1 and in   
this way there are three species of     
friendship1 namely friendship for the   
useful1 for the delightful1 and for the 
virtuous2 secondly1 in respect of the   
different kinds of communion on which   
friendships are based2 thus there is one
 species of friendship between kinsmen1 
and another between fellow citizens or  
fellow travellers1 the former being     

based on natural communion1 the latter  
on civil communion or on the comradeship
 of the road1 as the ,philosopher       
explains 7,ethic4 viii1 #ab74  ,now     
charity cannot be differentiated in     
either of these ways3 for its end is    
one1 namely1 the goodness of ,god2 and  
the fellowship of everlasting happiness1
 on which this friendship is based1 is  
also one4 ,hence it follows that charity
 is simply one virtue1 and not divided  
into several species4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,this argument would hold1 if ,god and  
our neighbor were equally objects of    
charity4 ,but this is not true3 for ,god
 is the principal object of charity1    
while our neighbor is loved out of      
charity for ,god's sake4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,god is loved by charity for ,his   
own sake3 wherefore charity regards     
principally but one aspect of           
lovableness1 namely ,god's goodness1    
which is ,his substance1 according to   
,ps4 #aje3a3 ,give glory to the ,lord   
for ,he is good4 ,other reasons that    

inspire us with love for ,him1 or which 
make it our duty to love ,him1 are      
secondary and result from the first4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,human friendship of   
which the ,philosopher treats has       
various ends and various forms of       
fellowship4 ,this does not apply to     
charity1 as stated above3 wherefore the 
comparison fails4   ,,sixth ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,charity ,is the ,most ,excellent of the
 ,virtues8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that charity is not the most       
excellent of the virtues4 ,because the  
higher power has the higher virtue even 
as it has a higher operation4 ,now the  
intellect is higher than the will1 since
 it directs the will4 ,therefore1 faith1
 which is in the intellect1 is more     
excellent than charity which is in the  
will4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the thing by 
which another works seems the less      
excellent of the two1 even as a servant1
 by whom his master works1 is beneath   
his master4 ,now faith 4 4 4 worketh by 

charity1 according to ,gal4 #e3f4       
,therefore faith is more excellent than 
charity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which
 is by way of addition to another seems 
to be the more perfect of the two4 ,now 
hope seems to be something additional to
 charity3 for the object of charity is  
good1 whereas the object of hope is an  
arduous good4 ,therefore hope is more   
excellent than charity4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,cor4      
#ac3ac73 ,the greater of these is       
charity4  ,i answer that1 ,since good1  
in human acts1 depends on their being   
regulated by the due rule1 it must needs
 be that human virtue1 which is a       
principle of good acts1 consists in     
attaining the rule of human acts4 ,now  
the rule of human acts is twofold1 as   
stated above 7,a4 #c71 namely1 human    
reason and ,god3 yet ,god is the first  
rule1 whereby1 even human reason must be
 regulated4 ,consequently the           
theological virtues1 which consist in   
attaining this first rule1 since their  

object is ,god1 are more excellent than 
the moral1 or the intellectual virtues1 
which consist in attaining human reason3
 and it follows that among the          
theological virtues themselves1 the     
first place belongs to that which       
attains ,god most4  ,now that which is  
of itself always ranks before that which
 is by another4 ,but faith and hope     
attain ,god indeed in so far as we      
derive from ,him the knowledge of truth 
or the acquisition of good1 whereas     
charity attains ,god ,himself that it   
may rest in ,him1 but not that something
 may accrue to us from ,him4 ,hence     
charity is more excellent than faith or 
hope1 and1 consequently1 than all the   
other virtues1 just as prudence1 which  
by itself attains reason1 is more       
excellent than the other moral virtues1 
which attain reason in so far as it     
appoints the mean in human operations or
 passions4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the       
operation of the intellect is completed 
by the thing understood being in the    

intellectual subject1 so that the       
excellence of the intellectual operation
 is assessed according to the measure of
 the intellect4 ,on the other hand1 the 
operation of the will and of every      
appetitive power is completed in the    
tendency of the appetite towards a thing
 as its term1 wherefore the excellence  
of the appetitive operation is gauged   
according to the thing which is the     
object of the operation4 ,now those     
things which are beneath the soul are   
more excellent in the soul than they are
 in themselves1 because a thing is      
contained according to the mode of the  
container 7,de ,causis xii74 ,on the    
other hand1 things that are above the   
soul1 are more excellent in themselves  
than they are in the soul4 ,consequently
 it is better to know than to love the  
things that are beneath us2 for which   
reason the ,philosopher gave the        
preference to the intellectual virtues  
over the moral virtues 7,ethic4 x1 #g1  
#h73 whereas the love of the things that

 are above us1 especially of ,god1 ranks
 before the knowledge of such things4   
,therefore charity is more excellent    
than faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faith    
works by love1 not instrumentally1 as a 
master by his servant1 but as by its    
proper form3 hence the argument does not
 prove4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the same good
 is the object of charity and of hope3  
but charity implies union with that     
good1 whereas hope implies distance     
therefrom4 ,hence charity does not      
regard that good as being arduous1 as   
hope does1 since what is already united 
has not the character of arduous3 and   
this shows that charity is more perfect 
than hope4   ,,seventh ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,any ,true ,virtue ,is ,possible        
,without ,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that there can be true virtue
 without charity4 ,for it is proper to  
virtue to produce a good act4 ,now those
 who have not charity1 do some good     
actions1 as when they clothe the naked1 

or feed the hungry and so forth4        
,therefore true virtue is possible      
without charity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
charity is not possible without faith1  
since it comes of an unfeigned faith1 as
 the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #a3e74     
,now1 in unbelievers1 there can be true 
chastity1 if they curb their            
concupiscences1 and true justice1 if    
they judge rightly4 ,therefore true     
virtue is possible without charity4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 science and art are 
virtues1 according to ,ethic4 vi4 ,but  
they are to be found in sinners who lack
 charity4 ,therefore true virtue can be 
without charity4  ,on the contrary1 ,the
 ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3c73 ,if ,i 
should distribute all my goods to the   
poor1 and if ,i should deliver my body  
to be burned1 and have not charity1 it  
profiteth me nothing4 ,and yet true     
virtue is very profitable1 according to 
,wis4 #h3g3 ,she teacheth temperance1   
and prudence1 and justice1 and          
fortitude1 which are such things as men 

can have nothing more profitable in     
life4 ,therefore no true virtue is      
possible without charity4  ,i answer    
that1 ,virtue is ordered to the good1 as
 stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4    
#d74 ,now the good is chiefly an end1   
for things directed to the end are not  
said to be good except in relation to   
the end4 ,accordingly1 just as the end  
is twofold1 the last end1 and the       
proximate end1 so also1 is good twofold1
 one1 the ultimate and universal good1  
the other proximate and particular4 ,the
 ultimate and principal good of man is  
the enjoyment of ,god1 according to ,ps4
 #gb3bh3 ,it is good for me to adhere to
 ,god1 and to this good man is ordered  
by charity4 ,man's secondary and1 as it 
were1 particular good may be twofold3   
one is truly good1 because1 considered  
in itself1 it can be directed to the    
principal good1 which is the last end2  
while the other is good apparently and  
not truly1 because it leads us away from
 the final good4 ,accordingly it is     

evident that simply true virtue is that 
which is directed to man's principal    
good2 thus also the ,philosopher says   
7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag7 that virtue is  
the disposition of a perfect thing to   
that which is best3 and in this way no  
true virtue is possible without charity4
  ,if1 however1 we take virtue as being 
ordered to some particular end1 then we 
speak of virtue being where there is no 
charity1 in so far as it is directed to 
some particular good4 ,but if this      
particular good is not a true1 but an   
apparent good1 it is not a true virtue  
that is ordered to such a good1 but a   
counterfeit virtue4 ,even so1 as        
,augustine says 7,contra ,julian4 iv1   
#c71 the prudence of the miser1 whereby 
he devises various roads to gain1 is no 
true virtue2 nor the miser's justice1   
whereby he scorns the property of       
another through fear of severe          
punishment2 nor the miser's temperance1 
whereby he curbs his desire for         
expensive pleasures2 nor the miser's    

fortitude1 whereby as ,horace1 says1 'he
 braves the sea1 he crosses mountains1  
he goes through fire1 in order to avoid 
poverty' 7,epis4 lib1 #a2 ,ep4 i1 #de74 
,if1 on the other hand1 this particular 
good be a true good1 for instance the   
welfare of the state1 or the like1 it   
will indeed be a true virtue1 imperfect1
 however1 unless it be referred to the  
final and perfect good4 ,accordingly no 
strictly true virtue is possible without
 charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the act of 
one lacking charity may be of two kinds2
 one is in accordance with his lack of  
charity1 as when he does something that 
is referred to that whereby he lacks    
charity4 ,such an act is always evil3   
thus ,augustine says 7,contra ,julian4  
iv1 #c7 that the actions which an       
unbeliever performs as an unbeliever1   
are always sinful1 even when he clothes 
the naked1 or does any like thing1 and  
directs it to his unbelief as end4      
,there is1 however1 another act of one  
lacking charity1 not in accordance with 

his lack of charity1 but in accordance  
with his possession of some other gift  
of ,god1 whether faith1 or hope1 or even
 his natural good1 which is not         
completely taken away by sin1 as stated 
above 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#he1 ,a4 #b74 ,in this way it is        
possible for an act1 without charity1 to
 be generically good1 but not perfectly 
good1 because it lacks its due order to 
the last end4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since  
the end is in practical matters1 what   
the principle is in speculative matters1
 just as there can be no strictly true  
science1 if a right estimate of the     
first indemonstrable principle be       
lacking1 so1 there can be no strictly   
true justice1 or chastity1 without that 
due ordering to the end1 which is       
effected by charity1 however rightly a  
man may be affected about other matters4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,science and art of  
their very nature imply a relation to   
some particular good1 and not to the    
ultimate good of human life1 as do the  

moral virtues1 which make man good      
simply1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#ef1 ,a4 #c74 ,hence the comparison     
fails4   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #h  ,whether ,charity ,is
 the ,form of the ,virtues8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that charity is not  
the true form of the virtues4 ,because  
the form of a thing is either exemplar  
or essential4 ,now charity is not the   
exemplar form of the other virtues1     
since it would follow that the other    
virtues are of the same species as      
charity3 nor is it the essential form of
 the other virtues1 since then it would 
not be distinct from them4 ,therefore it
 is in no way the form of the virtues4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 charity is compared 
to the other virtues as their root and  
foundation1 according to ,eph4 #c3ag3   
,rooted and founded in charity4 ,now a  
root or foundation is not the form1 but 
rather the matter of a thing1 since it  
is the first part in the making4        
,therefore charity is not the form of   

the virtues4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
formal1 final1 and efficient causes do  
not coincide with one another 7,phys4   
ii1 #g74 ,now charity is called the end 
and the mother of the virtues4          
,therefore it should not be called their
 form4  ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose      
99,lombard1 ,sent4 iii1 ,d1 #bc says    
that charity is the form of the virtues4
  ,i answer that1 ,in morals the form of
 an act is taken chiefly from the end4  
,the reason of this is that the         
principal of moral acts is the will1    
whose object and form1 so to speak1 are 
the end4 ,now the form of an act always 
follows from a form of the agent4       
,consequently1 in morals1 that which    
gives an act its order to the end1 must 
needs give the act its form4 ,now it is 
evident1 in accordance with what has    
been said 7,a4 #g71 that it is charity  
which directs the acts of all other     
virtues to the last end1 and which1     
consequently1 also gives the form to all
 other acts of virtue3 and it is        

precisely in this sense that charity is 
called the form of the virtues1 for     
these are called virtues in relation to 
informed acts4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,charity is called the form of the other
 virtues not as being their exemplar or 
their essential form1 but rather by way 
of efficient cause1 in so far as it sets
 the form on all1 in the aforesaid      
manner4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,charity is   
compared to the foundation or root in so
 far as all other virtues draw their    
sustenance and nourishment therefrom1   
and not in the sense that the foundation
 and root have the character of a       
material cause4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3       
,charity is said to be the end of other 
virtues1 because it directs all other   
virtues to its own end4 ,and since a    
mother is one who conceives within      
herself and by another1 charity is      
called the mother of the other virtues1 
because1 by commanding them1 it         
conceives the acts of the other virtues1
 by the desire of the last end4         

,,question #bd  ,,of ,,the ,,subject    
,,of ,,charity 7,in ,twelve ,articles7  
,we must now consider charity in        
relation to its subject1 under which    
head there are twelve points of inquiry3
  7#a7 ,whether charity is in the will  
as its subject8  7#b7 ,whether charity  
is caused in man by preceding acts or by
 a ,divine infusion8  7#c7 ,whether it  
is infused according to the capacity of 
our natural gifts8  7#d7 ,whether it    
increases in the person who has it8     
7#e7 ,whether it increases by addition8 
7#f7 ,whether it increases by every act8
  7#g7 ,whether it increases            
indefinitely8  7#h7 ,whether the charity
 of a wayfarer can be perfect8  7#i7 ,of
 the various degrees of charity2  7#aj7 
,whether charity can diminish8  7#aa7   
,whether charity can be lost after it   
has been possessed8  7#ab7 ,whether it  
is lost through one mortal sin8         
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1   
,art4 #a  ,whether the ,will ,is the    
,subject of ,charity8  ,objection #a3   

,it would seem that the will is not the 
subject of charity4 ,for charity is a   
kind of love4 ,now1 according to the    
,philosopher 7,topic4 ii1 #c7 love is in
 the concupiscible part4 ,therefore     
charity is also in the concupiscible and
 not in the will4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
charity is the foremost of the virtues1 
as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #f74 ,but 
the reason is the subject of virtue4    
,therefore it seems that charity is in  
the reason and not in the will4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 charity extends to all    
human acts1 according to #a ,cor4       
#af3ad3 ,let all your things be done in 
charity4 ,now the principle of human    
acts is the free-will4 ,therefore it    
seems that charity is chiefly in the    
free-will as its subject and not in the 
will4  ,on the contrary1 ,the object of 
charity is the good1 which is also the  
object of the will4 ,therefore charity  
is in the will as its subject4  ,i      
answer that1 ,since1 as stated in the   
,first ,part 7,q4 #hj1 ,a4 #b71 the     

appetite is twofold1 namely the         
sensitive1 and the intellective which is
 called the will1 the object of each is 
the good1 but in different ways3 for the
 object of the sensitive appetite is a  
good apprehended by sense1 whereas the  
object of the intellective appetite or  
will is good under the universal aspect 
of good1 according as it can be         
apprehended by the intellect4 ,now the  
object of charity is not a sensible     
good1 but the ,divine good which is     
known by the intellect alone4 ,therefore
 the subject of charity is not the      
sensitive1 but the intellective         
appetite1 i4e4 the will4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,the concupiscible is a part of the 
sensitive1 not of the intellective      
appetite1 as proved in the ,first ,part 
7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b73 wherefore the love   
which is in the concupiscible1 is the   
love of sensible good3 nor can the      
concupiscible reach to the ,divine good 
which is an intelligible good2 the will 
alone can4 ,consequently the            

concupiscible cannot be the subject of  
charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to
 the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 #i71 
the will also is in the reason3         
wherefore charity is not excluded from  
the reason through being in the will4   
,yet charity is regulated1 not by the   
reason1 as human virtues are1 but by    
,god's wisdom1 and transcends the rule  
of human reason1 according to ,eph4     
#c3ai3 ,the charity of ,christ1 which   
surpasseth all knowledge4 ,hence it is  
not in the reason1 either as its        
subject1 like prudence is1 or as its    
rule1 like justice and temperance are1  
but only by a certain kinship of the    
will to the reason4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hc1
 ,a4 #d71 the free-will is not a        
distinct power from the will4 ,yet      
charity is not in the will considered as
 free-will1 the act of which is to      
choose4 ,for choice is of things        
directed to the end1 whereas the will is
 of the end itself 7,ethic4 iii1 #b74   

,hence charity1 whose object is the last
 end1 should be described as residing in
 the will rather than in the free-will4 
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,charity ,is ,caused 
in ,us by ,infusion8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that charity is not caused  
in us by infusion4 ,for that which is   
common to all creatures1 is in man      
naturally4 ,now1 according to ,dionysius
 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 the ,divine good1    
which is the object of charity1 is for  
all an object of dilection and love4    
,therefore charity is in us naturally1  
and not by infusion4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 the more lovable a thing is   
the easier it is to love it4 ,now ,god  
is supremely lovable1 since ,he is      
supremely good4 ,therefore it is easier 
to love ,him than other things4 ,but we 
need no infused habit in order to love  
other things4 ,neither1 therefore1 do we
 need one in order to love ,god4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a     
,tim4 #a3e73 ,the end of the commandment

 is charity from a pure heart1 and a    
good conscience1 and an unfeigned faith4
 ,now these three have reference to     
human acts4 ,therefore charity is caused
 in us from preceding acts1 and not from
 infusion4  ,on the contrary1 ,the      
,apostle says 7,rom4 #e3e73 ,the charity
 of ,god is poured forth in our hearts  
by the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is given to   
us4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above   
7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a71 charity is a         
friendship of man for ,god1 founded upon
 the fellowship of everlasting          
happiness4 ,now this fellowship is in   
respect1 not of natural1 but of         
gratuitous gifts1 for1 according to     
,rom4 #f3bc1 the grace of ,god is life  
everlasting3 wherefore charity itself   
surpasses our natural facilities4 ,now  
that which surpasses the faculty of     
nature1 cannot be natural or acquired by
 the natural powers1 since a natural    
effect does not transcend its cause4    
,therefore charity can be in us neither 
naturally1 nor through acquisition by   

the natural powers1 but by the infusion 
of the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is the love of
 the ,father and the ,son1 and the      
participation of ,whom in us is created 
charity1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4  
#b74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,dionysius is    
speaking of the love of ,god1 which is  
founded on the fellowship of natural    
goods1 wherefore it is in all naturally4
 ,on the other hand1 charity is founded 
on a supernatural fellowship1 so the    
comparison fails4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3     
,just as ,god is supremely knowable in  
,himself yet not to us1 on account of a 
defect in our knowledge which depends on
 sensible things1 so too1 ,god is       
supremely lovable in ,himself1 in as    
much as ,he is the object of happiness4 
,but ,he is not supremely lovable to us 
in this way1 on account of the          
inclination of our appetite towards     
visible goods4 ,hence it is evident that
 for us to love ,god above all things in
 this way1 it is necessary that charity 
be infused into our hearts4  ,reply     

,obj4 #c3 ,when it is said that in us   
charity proceeds from a pure heart1 and 
a good conscience1 and an unfeigned     
faith1 this must be referred to the act 
of charity which is aroused by these    
things4 ,or again1 this is said because 
the aforesaid acts dispose man to       
receive the infusion of charity4 ,the   
same remark applies to the saying of    
,augustine 7,tract4 ix in prim4 canon4  
,joan473 ,fear leads to charity1 and of 
a gloss on ,matt4 #a3b3 ,faith begets   
hope1 and hope charity4   ,,third       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,charity ,is ,infused          
,according to the ,capacity of ,our     
,natural ,gifts8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem that charity is infused      
according to the capacity of our natural
 gifts4 ,for it is written 7,matt4      
#be3ae7 that ,he gave to every one      
according to his own virtue ,douay3     
'proper ability'4 ,now1 in man1 none but
 natural virtue precedes charity1 since 
there is no virtue without charity1 as  

stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #g74         
,therefore ,god infuses charity into man
 according to the measure of his natural
 virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 among     
things ordained towards one another1 the
 second is proportionate to the first3  
thus we find in natural things that the 
form is proportionate to the matter1 and
 in gratuitous gifts1 that glory is     
proportionate to grace4 ,now1 since     
charity is a perfection of nature1 it is
 compared to the capacity of nature as  
second to first4 ,therefore it seems    
that charity is infused according to the
 capacity of nature4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 men and angels partake of     
happiness according to the same measure1
 since happiness is alike in both1      
according to ,matt4 #bb3cj and ,luke    
#bj3cf4 ,now charity and other          
gratuitous gifts are bestowed on the    
angels1 according to their natural      
capacity1 as the ,master teaches 7,sent4
 ii1 ,d1 #c74 ,therefore the same       
apparently applies to man4  ,on the     

contrary1 ,it is written 7,john #c3h73  
,the ,spirit breatheth where ,he will1  
and 7#a ,cor4 #ab3aa73 ,all these things
 one and the same ,spirit worketh1      
dividing to every one according as ,he  
will4 ,therefore charity is given1 not  
according to our natural capacity1 but  
according as the ,spirit wills to       
distribute ,his gifts4  ,i answer that1 
,the quantity of a thing depends on the 
proper cause of that thing1 since the   
more universal cause produces a greater 
effect4 ,now1 since charity surpasses   
the proportion of human nature1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #b7 it depends1 not on
 any natural virtue1 but on the sole    
grace of the ,holy ,ghost ,who infuses  
charity4 ,wherefore the quantity of     
charity depends neither on the condition
 of nature nor on the capacity of       
natural virtue1 but only on the will of 
the ,holy ,ghost ,who divides ,his gifts
 according as ,he will4 ,hence the      
,apostle says 7,eph4 #d3g73 ,to every   
one of us is given grace according to   

the measure of the giving of ,christ4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the virtue in         
accordance with which ,god gives ,his   
gifts to each one1 is a disposition or  
previous preparation or effort of the   
one who receives grace4 ,but the ,holy  
,ghost forestalls even this disposition 
or effort1 by moving man's mind either  
more or less1 according as ,he will4    
,wherefore the ,apostle says 7,col4     
#a3ab73 ,who hath made us worthy to be  
partakers of the lot of the saints in   
light4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the form does 
not surpass the proportion of the       
matter4 ,in like manner grace and glory 
are referred to the same genus1 for     
grace is nothing else than a beginning  
of glory in us4 ,but charity and nature 
do not belong to the same genus1 so that
 the comparison fails4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,the angel's is an intellectual nature1
 and it is consistent with his condition
 that he should be borne wholly         
whithersoever he is borne1 as stated in 
the ,first ,part 7,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #f74     

,hence there was a greater effort in the
 higher angels1 both for good in those  
who persevered1 and for evil in those   
who fell1 and consequently those of the 
higher angels who remained steadfast    
became better than the others1 and those
 who fell became worse4 ,but man's is a 
rational nature1 with which it is       
consistent to be sometimes in           
potentiality and sometimes in act3 so   
that it is not necessarily borne wholly 
whithersoever it is borne1 and where    
there are greater natural gifts there   
may be less effort1 and vice versa4     
,thus the comparison fails4   ,,fourth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,charity ,can ,increase8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
charity cannot increase4 ,for nothing   
increases save what has quantity4 ,now  
quantity is twofold1 namely dimensive   
and virtual4 ,the former does not befit 
charity which is a spiritual perfection1
 while virtual quantity regards the     
objects in respect of which charity does

 not increase1 since the slightest      
charity loves all that is to be loved   
out of charity4 ,therefore charity does 
not increase4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that 
which consists in something extreme     
receives no increase4 ,but charity      
consists in something extreme1 being the
 greatest of the virtues1 and the       
supreme love of the greatest good4      
,therefore charity cannot increase4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 increase is a kind  
of movement4 ,therefore wherever there  
is increase there is movement1 and if   
there be increase of essence there is   
movement of essence4 ,now there is no   
movement of essence save either by      
corruption or generation4 ,therefore    
charity cannot increase essentially1    
unless it happen to be generated anew or
 corrupted1 which is unreasonable4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,tract4  
lxxiv in ,joan47 99,cf4 ,ep4 clxxxv4    
that charity merits increase that by    
increase it may merit perfection4  ,i   
answer that1 ,the charity of a wayfarer 

can increase4 ,for we are called        
wayfarers by reason of our being on the 
way to ,god1 ,who is the last end of our
 happiness4 ,in this way we advance as  
we get nigh to ,god1 ,who is approached1
 not by steps of the body but by the    
affections of the soul 99,st4           
,augustine1 ,tract4 in ,joan4 xxxii3 and
 this approach is the result of charity1
 since it unites man's mind to ,god4    
,consequently it is essential to the    
charity of a wayfarer that it can       
increase1 for if it could not1 all      
further advance along the way would     
cease4 ,hence the ,apostle calls charity
 the way1 when he says 7#a ,cor4        
#ab3ca73 ,i show unto you yet a more    
excellent way4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,charity is not subject to dimensive1   
but only to virtual quantity3 and the   
latter depends not only on the number of
 objects1 namely whether they be in     
greater number or of greater excellence1
 but also on the intensity of the act1  
namely whether a thing is loved more1 or

 less2 it is in this way that the       
virtual quantity of charity increases4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,charity consists in an
 extreme with regard to its object1 in  
so far as its object is the ,supreme    
,good1 and from this it follows that    
charity is the most excellent of the    
virtues4 ,yet not every charity consists
 in an extreme1 as regards the intensity
 of the act4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some    
have said that charity does not increase
 in its essence1 but only as to its     
radication in its subject1 or according 
to its fervor4  ,but these people did   
not know what they were talking about4  
,for since charity is an accident1 its  
being is to be in something4 ,so that an
 essential increase of charity means    
nothing else but that it is yet more in 
its subject1 which implies a greater    
radication in its subject4 ,furthermore1
 charity is essentially a virtue        
ordained to act1 so that an essential   
increase of charity implies ability to  
produce an act of more fervent love4    

,hence charity increases essentially1   
not by beginning anew1 or ceasing to be 
in its subject1 as the objection        
imagines1 but by beginning to be more   
and more in its subject4   ,,fifth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #e  
,whether ,charity ,increases by         
,addition8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that charity increases by addition4
 ,for just as increase may be in respect
 of bodily quantity1 so may it be       
according to virtual quantity4 ,now     
increase in bodily quantity results from
 addition2 for the ,philosopher says    
7,de ,gener4 i1 #e7 that increase is    
addition to pre-existing magnitude4     
,therefore the increase of charity which
 is according to virtual quantity is by 
addition4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 charity  
is a kind of spiritual light in the     
soul1 according to #a ,john #b3aj3 ,he  
that loveth his brother abideth in the  
light4 ,now light increases in the air  
by addition2 thus the light in a house  
increases when another candle is lit4   

,therefore charity also increases in the
 soul by addition4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
the increase of charity is ,god's work1 
even as the causing of it1 according to 
#b ,cor4 #i3aj3 ,he will increase the   
growth of the fruits of your justice4   
,now when ,god first infuses charity1   
,he puts something in the soul that was 
not there before4 ,therefore also1 when 
,he increases charity1 ,he puts         
something there which was not there     
before4 ,therefore charity increases by 
addition4  ,on the contrary1 ,charity is
 a simple form4 ,now nothing greater    
results from the addition of one simple 
thing to another1 as proved in ,phys4   
iii1 text4 #ei1 and ,metaph4 ii1 #d4    
,therefore charity does not increase by 
addition4  ,i answer that1 ,every       
addition is of something to something   
else3 so that in every addition we must 
at least presuppose that the things     
added together are distinct before the  
addition4 ,consequently if charity be   
added to charity1 the added charity must

 be presupposed as distinct from charity
 to which it is added1 not necessarily  
by a distinction of reality1 but at     
least by a distinction of thought4 ,for 
,god is able to increase a bodily       
quantity by adding a magnitude which did
 not exist before1 but was created at   
that very moment2 which magnitude1      
though not pre-existent in reality1 is  
nevertheless capable of being           
distinguished from the quantity to which
 it is added4 ,wherefore if charity be  
added to charity we must presuppose the 
distinction1 at least logical1 of the   
one charity from the other4  ,now       
distinction among forms is twofold3     
specific and numeric4 ,specific         
distinction of habits follows diversity 
of objects1 while numeric distinction   
follows distinction of subjects4        
,consequently a habit may receive       
increase through extending to objects to
 which it did not extend before3 thus   
the science of geometry increases in one
 who acquires knowledge of geometrical  

matters which he ignored hitherto4 ,but 
this cannot be said of charity1 for even
 the slightest charity extends to all   
that we have to love by charity4 ,hence 
the addition which causes an increase of
 charity cannot be understood1 as though
 the added charity were presupposed to  
be distinct specifically from that to   
which it is added4  ,it follows         
therefore that if charity be added to   
charity1 we must presuppose a numerical 
distinction between them1 which follows 
a distinction of subjects3 thus         
whiteness receives an increase when one 
white thing is added to another1        
although such an increase does not make 
a thing whiter4 ,this1 however1 does not
 apply to the case in point1 since the  
subject of charity is none other than   
the rational mind1 so that such like an 
increase of charity could only take     
place by one rational mind being added  
to another2 which is impossible4        
,moreover1 even if it were possible1 the
 result would be a greater lover1 but   

not a more loving one4 ,it follows1     
therefore1 that charity can by no means 
increase by addition of charity to      
charity1 as some have held to be the    
case4  ,accordingly charity increases   
only by its subject partaking of charity
 more and more subject thereto4 ,for    
this is the proper mode of increase in a
 form that is intensified1 since the    
being of such a form consists wholly in 
its adhering to its subject4            
,consequently1 since the magnitude of a 
thing follows on its being1 to say that 
a form is greater is the same as to say 
that it is more in its subject1 and not 
that another form is added to it3 for   
this would be the case if the form1 of  
itself1 had any quantity1 and not in    
comparison with its subject4 ,therefore 
charity increases by being intensified  
in its subject1 and this is for charity 
to increase in its essence2 and not by  
charity being added to charity4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,bodily quantity has something
 as quantity1 and something else1 in so 

far as it is an accidental form4 ,as    
quantity1 it is distinguishable in      
respect of position or number1 and in   
this way we have the increase of        
magnitude by addition1 as may be seen in
 animals4 ,but in so far as it is an    
accidental form1 it is distinguishable  
only in respect of its subject1 and in  
this way it has its proper increase1    
like other accidental forms1 by way of  
intensity in its subject1 for instance  
in things subject to rarefaction1 as is 
proved in ,phys4 iv1 #i4 ,in like manner
 science1 as a habit1 has its quantity  
from its objects1 and accordingly it    
increases by addition1 when a man knows 
more things2 and again1 as an accidental
 form1 it has a certain quantity through
 being in its subject1 and in this way  
it increases in a man who knows the same
 scientific truths with greater         
certainty now than before4 ,in the same 
way charity has a twofold quantity2 but 
with regard to that which it has from   
its object1 it does not increase1 as    

stated above3 hence it follows that it  
increases solely by being intensified4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the addition of light 
to light can be understood through the  
light being intensified in the air on   
account of there being several          
luminaries giving light3 but this       
distinction does not apply to the case  
in point1 since there is but one        
luminary shedding forth the light of    
charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the infusion
 of charity denotes a change to the     
state of having charity from the state  
of not having it1 so that something must
 needs come which was not there before4 
,on the other hand1 the increase of     
charity denotes a change to more having 
from less having1 so that there is need1
 not for anything to be there that was  
not there before1 but for something to  
be more there that previously was less  
there4 ,this is what ,god does when ,he 
increases charity1 that is ,he makes it 
to have a greater hold on the soul1 and 
the likeness of the ,holy ,ghost to be  

more perfectly participated by the soul4
   ,,sixth ,,article  ,whether ,charity 
,increases ,through ,every ,act of      
,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that charity increases through every   
act of charity4 ,for that which can do  
what is more1 can do what is less4 ,but 
every act of charity can merit          
everlasting life2 and this is more than 
a simple addition of charity1 since it  
includes the perfection of charity4     
,much more1 therefore1 does every act of
 charity increase charity4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 just as the habits of acquired
 virtue are engendered by acts1 so too  
an increase of charity is caused by an  
act of charity4 ,now each virtuous act  
conduces to the engendering of virtue4  
,therefore also each virtuous act of    
charity conduces to the increase of     
charity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory  
99,st4 ,bernard1 ,serm4 ii in ,festo    
,purif4 says that to stand still in the 
way to ,god is to go back4 ,now no man  
goes back when he is moved by an act of 

charity4 ,therefore whoever is moved by 
an act of charity goes forward in the   
way to ,god4 ,therefore charity         
increases through every act of charity4 
,on the contrary1 ,the effect does not  
surpass the power of its cause4 ,but an 
act of charity is sometimes done with   
tepidity or slackness4 ,therefore it    
does not conduce to a more excellent    
charity1 rather does it dispose one to a
 lower degree4  ,i answer that1 ,the    
spiritual increase of charity is        
somewhat like the increase of a body4   
,now bodily increase in animals and     
plants is not a continuous movement1 so 
that1 to wit1 if a thing increase so    
much in so much time1 it need to        
increase proportionally in each part of 
that time1 as happens in local movement2
 but for a certain space of time nature 
works by disposing for the increase1    
without causing any actual increase1 and
 afterwards brings into effect that to  
which it had disposed1 by giving the    
animal or plant an actual increase4 ,in 

like manner charity does not actually   
increase through every act of charity1  
but each act of charity disposes to an  
increase of charity1 in so far as one   
act of charity makes man more ready to  
act again according to charity1 and this
 readiness increasing1 man breaks out   
into an act of more fervent love1 and   
strives to advance in charity1 and then 
his charity increases actually4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,every act of charity merits  
everlasting life1 which1 however1 is not
 to be bestowed then and there1 but at  
its proper time4 ,in like manner every  
act of charity merits an increase of    
charity2 yet this increase does not take
 place at once1 but when we strive for  
that increase4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even  
when an acquired virtue is being        
engendered1 each act does not complete  
the formation of the virtue1 but        
conduces towards that effect by         
disposing to it1 while the last act1    
which is the most perfect1 and acts in  
virtue of all those that preceded it1   

reduces the virtue into act1 just as    
when many drops hollow out a stone4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man advances in the   
way to ,god1 not merely by actual       
increase of charity1 but also by being  
disposed to that increase4   ,,seventh  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #g  
,whether ,charity ,increases            
,indefinitely8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that charity does not increase    
indefinitely4 ,for every movement is    
towards some end and term1 as stated in 
,metaph4 ii1 text4 #h1 #i4 ,but the     
increase of charity is a movement4      
,therefore it tends to an end and term4 
,therefore charity does not increase    
indefinitely4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no   
form surpasses the capacity of its      
subject4 ,but the capacity of the       
rational creature who is the subject of 
charity is finite4 ,therefore charity   
cannot increase indefinitely4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 every finite thing can1 by   
continual increase1 attain to the       
quantity of another finite thing however

 much greater1 unless the amount of its 
increase be ever less and less4 ,thus   
the ,philosopher states 7,phys4 iii1 #f7
 that if we divide a line into an       
indefinite number of parts1 and take    
these parts away and add them           
indefinitely to another line1 we shall  
never arrive at any definite quantity   
resulting from those two lines1 viz4 the
 one from which we subtracted and the   
one to which we added what was          
subtracted4 ,but this does not occur in 
the case in point3 because there is no  
need for the second increase of charity 
to be less than the first1 since rather 
is it probable that it would be equal or
 greater4 ,as1 therefore1 the charity of
 the blessed is something finite1 if the
 charity of the wayfarer can increase   
indefinitely1 it would follow that the  
charity of the way can equal the charity
 of heaven2 which is absurd4 ,therefore 
the wayfarer's charity cannot increase  
indefinitely4  ,on the contrary1 ,the   
,apostle says 7,phil4 #c3ab73 ,not as   

though ,i had already attained1 or were 
already perfect2 but ,i follow after1 if
 ,i may1 by any means apprehend1 on     
which words a gloss says3 ,even if he   
has made great progress1 let none of the
 faithful say3 ',enough4' ,for whosoever
 says this1 leaves the road before      
coming to his destination4 ,therefore   
the wayfarer's charity can ever increase
 more and more4  ,i answer that1 ,a term
 to the increase of a form may be fixed 
in three ways3 first by reason of the   
form itself having a fixed measure1 and 
when this has been reached it is no     
longer possible to go any further in    
that form1 but if any further advance is
 made1 another form is attained4 ,an    
example of this is paleness1 the bounds 
of which may1 by continual alteration1  
be passed1 either so that whiteness     
ensues1 or so that blackness results4   
,secondly1 on the part of the agent1    
whose power does not extend to a further
 increase of the form in its subject4   
,thirdly1 on the part of the subject1   

which is not capable of ulterior        
perfection4  ,now1 in none of these     
ways1 is a limit imposed to the increase
 of man's charity1 while he is in the   
state of the wayfarer4 ,for charity     
itself considered as such has no limit  
to its increase1 since it is a          
participation of the infinite charity   
which is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,in like     
manner the cause of the increase of     
charity1 viz4 ,god1 is possessed of     
infinite power4 ,furthermore1 on the    
part of its subject1 no limit to this   
increase can be determined1 because     
whenever charity increases1 there is a  
corresponding increased ability to      
receive a further increase4 ,it is      
therefore evident that it is not        
possible to fix any limits to the       
increase of charity in this life4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the increase of       
charity is directed to an end1 which is 
not in this1 but in a future life4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the capacity of the   
rational creature is increased by       

charity1 because the heart is enlarged  
thereby1 according to #b ,cor4 #f3aa3   
,our heart is enlarged2 so that it still
 remains capable of receiving a further 
increase4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this       
argument holds good in those things     
which have the same kind of quantity1   
but not in those which have different   
kinds3 thus however much a line may     
increase it does not reach the quantity 
of a superficies4 ,now the quantity of a
 wayfarer's charity which follows the   
knowledge of faith is not of the same   
kind as the quantity of the charity of  
the blessed1 which follows open vision4 
,hence the argument does not prove4     
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1  
,art4 #h  ,whether ,charity ,can ,be    
,perfect in ,this ,life8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that charity cannot be  
perfect in this life4 ,for this would   
have been the case with the apostles    
before all others4 ,yet it was not so1  
since the ,apostle says 7,phil4 #c3ab73 
,not as though ,i had already attained1 

or were already perfect4 ,therefore     
charity cannot be perfect in this life4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says     
7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #cf7 that whatever   
kindles charity quenches cupidity1 but  
where charity is perfect1 cupidity is   
done away altogether4 ,but this cannot  
be in this world1 wherein it is         
impossible to live without sin1         
according to #a ,john #a3h3 ,if we say  
that we have no sin1 we deceive         
ourselves4 ,now all sin arises from some
 inordinate cupidity4 ,therefore charity
 cannot be perfect in this life4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 what is already perfect   
cannot be perfected any more4 ,but in   
this life charity can always increase1  
as stated above 7,a4 #g74 ,therefore    
charity cannot be perfect in this life4 
,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,in  
prim4 canon4 ,joan4 ,tract4 v7 ,charity 
is perfected by being strengthened2 and 
when it has been brought to perfection1 
it exclaims1 ',i desire to be dissolved 
and to be with ,christ4' ,now this is   

possible in this life1 as in the case of
 ,paul4 ,therefore charity can be       
perfect in this life4  ,i answer that1  
,the perfection of charity may be       
understood in two ways3 first with      
regard to the object loved1 secondly    
with regard to the person who loves4    
,with regard to the object loved1       
charity is perfect1 if the object be    
loved as much as it is lovable4 ,now    
,god is as lovable as ,he is good1 and  
,his goodness is infinite1 wherefore ,he
 is infinitely lovable4 ,but no creature
 can love ,him infinitely since all     
created power is finite4 ,consequently  
no creature's charity can be perfect in 
this way2 the charity of ,god alone can1
 whereby ,he loves ,himself4  ,on the   
part of the person who loves1 charity is
 perfect1 when he loves as much as he   
can4 ,this happens in three ways4       
,first1 so that a man's whole heart is  
always actually borne towards ,god3 this
 is the perfection of the charity of    
heaven1 and is not possible in this     

life1 wherein1 by reason of the weakness
 of human life1 it is impossible to     
think always actually of ,god1 and to be
 moved by love towards ,him4 ,secondly1 
so that man makes an earnest endeavor to
 give his time to ,god and ,divine      
things1 while scorning other things     
except in so far as the needs of the    
present life demand4 ,this is the       
perfection of charity that is possible  
to a wayfarer2 but is not common to all 
who have charity4 ,thirdly1 so that a   
man gives his whole heart to ,god       
habitually1 viz4 by neither thinking nor
 desiring anything contrary to the love 
of ,god2 and this perfection is common  
to all who have charity4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,the ,apostle denies that he has the
 perfection of heaven1 wherefore a gloss
 on the same passage says that he was a 
perfect wayfarer1 but had not yet       
achieved the perfection to which the way
 leads4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this is said 
on account of venial sins1 which are    
contrary1 not to the habit1 but to the  

act of charity3 hence they are          
incompatible1 not with the perfection of
 the way1 but with that of heaven4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the perfection of the 
way is not perfection simply1 wherefore 
it can always increase4   ,,ninth       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #i  
,whether ,charity ,is ,rightly          
,distinguished into ,three ,degrees1    
,beginning1  ,progress1 and ,perfection8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem         
unfitting to distinguish three degrees  
of charity1 beginning1 progress1 and    
perfection4 ,for there are many degrees 
between the beginning of charity and its
 ultimate perfection4 ,therefore it is  
not right to put only one4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 charity begins to progress as 
soon as it begins to be4 ,therefore we  
ought not to distinguish between charity
 as progressing and as beginning4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 in this world1 however   
perfect a man's charity may be1 it can  
increase1 as stated above 7,a4 #g74 ,now
 for charity to increase is to progress4

 ,therefore perfect charity ought not to
 be distinguished from progressing      
charity3 and so the aforesaid degrees   
are unsuitably assigned to charity4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,in     
prim4 canon4 ,joan4 ,tract4 v7 ,as soon 
as charity is born it takes food1 which 
refers to beginners1 after taking food1 
it waxes strong1 which refers to those  
who are progressing1 and when it has    
become strong it is perfected1 which    
refers to the perfect4 ,therefore there 
are three degrees of charity4  ,i answer
 that1 ,the spiritual increase of       
charity may be considered in respect of 
a certain likeness to the growth of the 
human body4 ,for although this latter   
growth may be divided into many parts1  
yet it has certain fixed divisions      
according to those particular actions or
 pursuits to which man is brought by    
this same growth4 ,thus we speak of a   
man being an infant until he has the use
 of reason1 after which we distinguish  
another state of man wherein he begins  

to speak and to use his reason1 while   
there is again a third state1 that of   
puberty when he begins to acquire the   
power of generation1 and so on until he 
arrives at perfection4  ,in like manner 
the divers degrees of charity are       
distinguished according to the different
 pursuits to which man is brought by the
 increase of charity4 ,for at first it  
is incumbent on man to occupy himself   
chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting 
his concupiscences1 which move him in   
opposition to charity3 this concerns    
beginners1 in whom charity has to be fed
 or fostered lest it be destroyed3 in   
the second place man's chief pursuit is 
to aim at progress in good1 and this is 
the pursuit of the proficient1 whose    
chief aim is to strengthen their charity
 by adding to it3 while man's third     
pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with 
and enjoyment of ,god3 this belongs to  
the perfect who desire to be dissolved  
and to be with ,christ4  ,in like manner
 we observe in local motion that at     

first there is withdrawal from one term1
 then approach to the other term1 and   
thirdly1 rest in this term4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,all these distinct degrees   
which can be discerned in the increase  
of charity1 are comprised in the        
aforesaid three1 even as every division 
of continuous things is included in     
these three--the beginning1 the middle1 
and the end1 as the ,philosopher states 
7,de ,coelo i1 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,although those who are beginners in    
charity may progress1 yet the chief care
 that besets them is to resist the sins 
which disturb them by their onslaught4  
,afterwards1 however1 when they come to 
feel this onslaught less1 they begin to 
tend to perfection with greater         
security2 yet with one hand doing the   
work1 and with the other holding the    
sword as related in #b ,esdr4 #d3ag     
about those who built up ,jerusalem4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even the perfect make 
progress in charity3 yet this is not    
their chief care1 but their aim is      

principally directed towards union with 
,god4 ,and though both the beginner and 
the proficient seek this1 yet their     
solicitude is chiefly about other       
things1 with the beginner1 about        
avoiding sin1 with the proficient1 about
 progressing in virtue4   ,,tenth       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #aj 
,whether ,charity ,can ,decrease8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
charity can decrease4 ,for contraries by
 their nature affect the same subject4  
,now increase and decrease are          
contraries4 ,since then charity         
increases1 as stated above 7,a4 #d71 it 
seems that it can also decrease4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 ,augustine1 speaking to   
,god1 says 7,confess4 x7 ,he loves ,thee
 less1 who loves aught besides ,thee3   
and 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #cf7 he says that
 what kindles charity quenches cupidity4
 ,from this it seems to follow that1 on 
the contrary1 what arouses cupidity     
quenches charity4 ,but cupidity1 whereby
 a man loves something besides ,god1 can

 increase in man4 ,therefore charity can
 decrease4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as      
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1    
#ab7 ,god makes the just man1 by        
justifying him1 but in such a way1 that 
if the man turns away from ,god1 he no  
longer retains the effect of the ,divine
 operation4 ,from this we may gather    
that when ,god preserves charity in man1
 ,he works in the same way as when ,he  
first infuses charity into him4 ,now at 
the first infusion of charity ,god      
infuses less charity into him that      
prepares himself less4 ,therefore also  
in preserving charity1 ,he preserves    
less charity in him that prepares       
himself less4 ,therefore charity can    
decrease4  ,on the contrary1 ,in        
,scripture1 charity is compared to fire1
 according to ,cant #h3f3 ,the lamps    
thereof1 i4e4 of charity1 are fire and  
flames4 ,now fire ever mounts upward so 
long as it lasts4 ,therefore as long as 
charity endures1 it can ascend1 but     
cannot descend1 i4e4 decrease4  ,i      

answer that1 ,the quantity which charity
 has in comparison with its proper      
object1 cannot decrease1 even as neither
 can it increase1 as stated above 7,a4  
#d1 ad #b74  ,since1 however1 it        
increases in that quantity which it has 
in comparison with its subject1 here is 
the place to consider whether it can    
decrease in this way4 ,now1 if it       
decrease1 this must needs be either     
through an act1 or by the mere cessation
 from act4 ,it is true that virtues     
acquired through acts decrease and      
sometimes cease altogether through      
cessation from act1 as stated above     
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore  
the ,philosopher says1 in reference to  
friendship 7,ethic4 viii1 #e7 that want 
of intercourse1 i4e4 the neglect to call
 upon or speak with one's friends1 has  
destroyed many a friendship4 ,now this  
is because the safe-keeping of a thing  
depends on its cause1 and the cause of  
human virtue is a human act1 so that    
when human acts cease1 the virtue       

acquired thereby decreases and at last  
ceases altogether4 ,yet this does not   
occur to charity1 because it is not the 
result of human acts1 but is caused by  
,god alone1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74   
,hence it follows that even when its act
 ceases1 it does not for this reason    
decrease1 or cease altogether1 unless   
the cessation involves a sin4  ,the     
consequence is that a decrease of       
charity cannot be caused except either  
by ,god or by some sinful act4 ,now no  
defect is caused in us by ,god1 except  
by way of punishment1 in so far as ,he  
withdraws ,his grace in punishment of   
sin4 ,hence ,he does not diminish       
charity except by way of punishment3 and
 this punishment is due on account of   
sin4  ,it follows1 therefore1 that if   
charity decrease1 the cause of this     
decrease must be sin either effectively 
or by way of merit4 ,but mortal sin does
 not diminish charity1 in either of     
these ways1 but destroys it entirely1   
both effectively1 because every mortal  

sin is contrary to charity1 as we shall 
state further on 7,a4 #ab71 and by way  
of merit1 since when1 by sinning        
mortally1 a man acts against charity1 he
 deserves that ,god should withdraw     
charity from him4  ,in like manner1     
neither can venial sin diminish charity 
either effectively or by way of merit4  
,not effectively1 because it does not   
touch charity1 since charity is about   
the last end1 whereas venial sin is a   
disorder about things directed to the   
end3 and a man's love for the end is    
none the less through his committing an 
inordinate act as regards the things    
directed to the end4 ,thus sick people  
sometimes1 though they love health much1
 are irregular in keeping to their diet3
 and thus again1 in speculative         
sciences1 the false opinions that are   
derived from the principles1 do not     
diminish the certitude of the           
principles4 ,so too1 venial sin does not
 merit diminution of charity2 for when a
 man offends in a small matter he does  

not deserve to be mulcted in a great    
matter4 ,for ,god does not turn away    
from man1 more than man turns away from 
,him3 wherefore he that is out of order 
in respect of things directed to the    
end1 does not deserve to be mulcted in  
charity whereby he is ordered to the    
last end4  ,the consequence is that     
charity can by no means be diminished1  
if we speak of direct causality1 yet    
whatever disposes to its corruption may 
be said to conduce indirectly to its    
diminution1 and such are venial sins1 or
 even the cessation from the practice of
 works of charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,contraries affect the same subject when
 that subject stands in equal relation  
to both4 ,but charity does not stand in 
equal relation to increase and decrease4
 ,for it can have a cause of increase1  
but not of decrease1 as stated above4   
,hence the argument does not prove4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,cupidity is twofold1  
one whereby man places his end in       
creatures1 and this kills charity       

altogether1 since it is its poison1 as  
,augustine states 7,confess4 x74 ,this  
makes us love ,god less 7i4e4 less than 
we ought to love ,him by charity71 not  
indeed by diminishing charity but by    
destroying it altogether4 ,it is thus   
that we must understand the saying3 ,he 
loves ,thee less1 who loves aught beside
 ,thee1 for he adds these words1 which  
he loveth not for ,thee4 ,this does not 
apply to venial sin1 but only to mortal 
sin3 since that which we love in venial 
sin1 is loved for ,god's sake habitually
 though not actually4 ,there is another 
cupidity1 that of venial sin1 which is  
always diminished by charity3 and yet   
this cupidity cannot diminish charity1  
for the reason given above4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,a movement of the free-will  
is requisite in the infusion of charity1
 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,a4
 #c74 ,wherefore that which diminishes  
the intensity of the free-will conduces 
dispositively to a diminution in the    
charity to be infused4 ,on the other    

hand1 no movement of the free-will is   
required for the safe-keeping of        
charity1 else it would not remain in us 
while we sleep4 ,hence charity does not 
decrease on account of an obstacle on   
the part of the intensity of the        
free-will's movement4   ,,eleventh      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #aa 
,whether ,we ,can ,lose ,charity ,when  
,once ,we ,have ,it8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that we cannot lose charity 
when once we have it4 ,for if we lose   
it1 this can only be through sin4 ,now  
he who has charity cannot sin1 for it is
 written 7#a ,john #c3i73 ,whosoever is 
born of ,god1 committeth not sin2 for   
,his seed abideth in him1 and he cannot 
sin1 because he is born of ,god4 ,but   
none save the children of ,god have     
charity1 for it is this which           
distinguishes the children of ,god from 
the children of perdition1 as ,augustine
 says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ag74 ,therefore  
he that has charity cannot lose it4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de

 ,trin4 viii1 #g7 that if love be not   
true1 it should not be called love4     
,now1 as he says again in a letter to   
,count ,julian1 charity which can fail  
was never true4 99,the quotation is from
 ,de ,salutaribus ,documentis ad quemdam
 comitem1 vii41 among the works of ,paul
 of ,friuli1 more commonly known as     
,paul the ,deacon1 a monk of ,monte     
,cassino4 ,therefore it was no charity  
at all4 ,therefore1 when once we have   
charity1 we cannot lose it4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 ,gregory says in a homily for 
,pentecost 7,in ,evang4 xxx7 that ,god's
 love works great things where it is2 if
 it ceases to work it is not charity4   
,now no man loses charity by doing great
 things4 ,therefore if charity be there1
 it cannot be lost4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1
 the free-will is not inclined to sin   
unless by some motive for sinning4 ,now 
charity excludes all motives for        
sinning1 both self-love and cupidity1   
and all such things4 ,therefore charity 
cannot be lost4  ,on the contrary1 ,it  

is written 7,apoc4 #b3d73 ,i have       
somewhat against thee1 because thou hast
 left thy first charity4  ,i answer     
that1 ,the ,holy ,ghost dwells in us by 
charity1 as shown above 7,a4 #b2 ,,qq4  
#bc1 #bd74 ,we can1 accordingly1        
consider charity in three ways3 first on
 the part of the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who     
moves the soul to love ,god1 and in this
 respect charity is incompatible with   
sin through the power of the ,holy      
,ghost1 ,who does unfailingly whatever  
,he wills to do4 ,hence it is impossible
 for these two things to be true at the 
same time--that the ,holy ,ghost should 
will to move a certain man to an act of 
charity1 and that this man1 by sinning1 
should lose charity4 ,for the gift of   
perseverance is reckoned among the      
blessings of ,god whereby whoever is    
delivered1 is most certainly delivered1 
as ,augustine says in his book on the   
,predestination of the saints 7,de ,dono
 ,persev4 xiv74  ,secondly1 charity may 
be considered as such1 and thus it is   

incapable of anything that is against   
its nature4 ,wherefore charity cannot   
sin at all1 even as neither can heat    
cool1 nor unrighteousness do good1 as   
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte ii1 #bd74  ,thirdly1 charity can 
be considered on the part of its        
subject1 which is changeable on account 
of the free-will4 ,moreover charity may 
be compared with this subject1 both from
 the general point of view of form in   
comparison with matter1 and from the    
specific point of view of habit as      
compared with power4 ,now it is natural 
for a form to be in its subject in such 
a way that it can be lost1 when it does 
not entirely fill the potentiality of   
matter3 this is evident in the forms of 
things generated and corrupted1 because 
the matter of such things receives one  
form in such a way1 that it retains the 
potentiality to another form1 as though 
its potentiality were not completely    
satisfied with the one form4 ,hence the 
one form may be lost by the other being 

received4 ,on the other hand the form of
 a celestial body which entirely fills  
the potentiality of its matter1 so that 
the latter does not retain the          
potentiality to another form1 is in its 
subject inseparably4 ,accordingly the   
charity of the blessed1 because it      
entirely fills the potentiality of the  
rational mind1 since every actual       
movement of that mind is directed to    
,god1 is possessed by its subject       
inseparably3 whereas the charity of the 
wayfarer does not so fill the           
potentiality of its subject1 because the
 latter is not always actually directed 
to ,god3 so that when it is not actually
 directed to ,god1 something may occur  
whereby charity is lost4  ,it is proper 
to a habit to incline a power to act1   
and this belongs to a habit1 in so far  
as it makes whatever is suitable to it1 
to seem good1 and whatever is           
unsuitable1 to seem evil4 ,for as the   
taste judges of savors according to its 
disposition1 even so does the human mind

 judge of things to be done1 according  
to its habitual disposition4 ,hence the 
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #e7 that
 such as a man is1 so does the end      
appear to him4 ,accordingly charity is  
inseparable from its possessor1 where   
that which pertains to charity cannot   
appear otherwise than good1 and that is 
in heaven1 where ,god is seen in ,his   
,essence1 which is the very essence of  
goodness4 ,therefore the charity of     
heaven cannot be lost1 whereas the      
charity of the way can1 because in this 
state ,god is not seen in ,his ,essence1
 which is the essence of goodness4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passage quoted    
speaks from the point of view of the    
power of the ,holy ,ghost1 by ,whose    
safeguarding1 those whom ,he wills to   
move are rendered immune from sin1 as   
much as ,he wills4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,the charity which can fail by reason of
 itself is no true charity2 for this    
would be the case1 were its love given  
only for a time1 and afterwards were to 

cease1 which would be inconsistent with 
true love4 ,if1 however1 charity be lost
 through the changeableness of the      
subject1 and against the purpose of     
charity included in its act1 this is not
 contrary to true charity4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,the love of ,god ever works great 
things in its purpose1 which is         
essential to charity2 but it does not   
always work great things in its act1 on 
account of the condition of its subject4
  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,charity by reason of
 its act excludes every motive for      
sinning4 ,but it happens sometimes that 
charity is not acting actually1 and then
 it is possible for a motive to         
intervene for sinning1 and if we consent
 to this motive1 we lose charity4       
,,twelfth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 
,art4 #ab  ,whether ,charity ,is ,lost  
,through ,one ,mortal ,sin8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that charity is not  
lost through one mortal sin4 ,for       
,origen says 7,peri ,archon i73 ,when a 
man who has mounted to the stage of     

perfection1 is satiated1 ,i do not think
 that he will become empty or fall away 
suddenly2 but he must needs do so       
gradually and by little and little4 ,but
 man falls away by losing charity4      
,therefore charity is not lost through  
only one mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 ,pope ,leo in a sermon on the 
,passion 7lx7 addresses ,peter thus3    
,our ,lord saw in thee not a conquered  
faith1 not an averted love1 but         
constancy shaken4 ,tears abounded where 
love never failed1 and the words uttered
 in trepidation were washed away by the 
fount of charity4 ,from this ,bernard   
99,william of ,st4 ,thierry1 ,de ,nat4  
et ,dig4 ,amoris4 vi4 drew his assertion
 that charity in ,peter was not         
quenched1 but cooled4 ,but ,peter sinned
 mortally in denying ,christ4 ,therefore
 charity is not lost through one mortal 
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity is    
stronger than an acquired virtue4 ,now a
 habit of acquired virtue is not        
destroyed by one contrary sinful act4   

,much less1 therefore1 is charity       
destroyed by one contrary mortal sin4   
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 charity denotes love
 of ,god and our neighbor4 ,now1        
seemingly1 one may commit a mortal sin1 
and yet retain the love of ,god and     
one's neighbor2 because an inordinate   
affection for things directed to the    
end1 does not remove the love for the   
end1 as stated above 7,a4 #aj74         
,therefore charity towards ,god can     
endure1 though there be a mortal sin    
through an inordinate affection for some
 temporal good4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the
 object of a theological virtue is the  
last end4 ,now the other theological    
virtues1 namely faith and hope1 are not 
done away by one mortal sin1 in fact    
they remain though lifeless4 ,therefore 
charity can remain without a form1 even 
when a mortal sin has been committed4   
,on the contrary1 ,by mortal sin man    
becomes deserving of eternal death1     
according to ,rom4 #f3bc3 ,the wages of 
sin is death4 ,on the other hand whoever

 has charity is deserving of eternal    
life1 for it is written 7,john #ad3ba73 
,he that loveth ,me1 shall be loved by  
,my ,father3 and ,i will love ,him1 and 
will manifest ,myself to him1 in which  
manifestation everlasting life consists1
 according to ,john #ag3c3 ,this is     
eternal life2 that they may know ,thee  
the 4 4 4 true ,god1 and ,jesus ,christ 
,whom ,thou hast sent4 ,now no man can  
be worthy1 at the same time1 of eternal 
life and of eternal death4 ,therefore it
 is impossible for a man to have charity
 with a mortal sin4 ,therefore charity  
is destroyed by one mortal sin4  ,i     
answer that1 ,that one contrary is      
removed by the other contrary           
supervening4 ,now every mortal sin is   
contrary to charity by its very nature1 
which consists in man's loving ,god     
above all things1 and subjecting himself
 to ,him entirely1 by referring all that
 is his to ,god4 ,it is therefore       
essential to charity that man should so 
love ,god as to wish to submit to ,him  

in all things1 and always to follow the 
rule of ,his commandments2 since        
whatever is contrary to ,his            
commandments is manifestly contrary to  
charity1 and therefore by its very      
nature is capable of destroying charity4
  ,if indeed charity were an acquired   
habit dependent on the power of its     
subject1 it would not necessarily be    
removed by one mortal sin1 for act is   
directly contrary1 not to habit but to  
act4 ,now the endurance of a habit in   
its subject does not require the        
endurance of its act1 so that when a    
contrary act supervenes the acquired    
habit is not at once done away4 ,but    
charity1 being an infused habit1 depends
 on the action of ,god ,who infuses it1 
,who stands in relation to the infusion 
and safekeeping of charity1 as the sun  
does to the diffusion of light in the   
air1 as stated above 7,a4 #aj1 ,obj4    
#c74 ,consequently1 just as the light   
would cease at once in the air1 were an 
obstacle placed to its being lit up by  

the sun1 even so charity ceases at once 
to be in the soul through the placing of
 an obstacle to the outpouring of       
charity by ,god into the soul4  ,now it 
is evident that through every mortal sin
 which is contrary to ,god's            
commandments1 an obstacle is placed to  
the outpouring of charity1 since from   
the very fact that a man chooses to     
prefer sin to ,god's friendship1 which  
requires that we should obey ,his will1 
it follows that the habit of charity is 
lost at once through one mortal sin4    
,hence ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4   
viii1 #ab7 that man is enlightened by   
,god's presence1 but he is darkened at  
once by ,god's absence1 because distance
 from ,him is effected not by change of 
place but by aversion of the will4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this saying of ,origen
 may be understood1 in one way1 that a  
man who is in the state of perfection1  
does not suddenly go so far as to commit
 a mortal sin1 but is disposed thereto  
by some previous negligence1 for which  

reason venial sins are said to be       
dispositions to mortal sin1 as stated   
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #c74       
,nevertheless he falls1 and loses       
charity through the one mortal sin if he
 commits it4  ,since1 however1 he adds3 
,if some slight slip should occur1 and  
he recover himself quickly he does not  
appear to fall altogether1 we may reply 
in another way1 that when he speaks of a
 man being emptied and falling away     
altogether1 he means one who falls so as
 to sin through malice2 and this does   
not occur in a perfect man all at once4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,charity may be lost in
 two ways2 first1 directly1 by actual   
contempt1 and1 in this way1 ,peter did  
not lose charity4 ,secondly1 indirectly1
 when a sin is committed against        
charity1 through some passion of desire 
or fear2 it was by sinning against      
charity in this way1 that ,peter lost   
charity2 yet he soon recovered it4  ,the
 ,reply to the ,third ,objection is     
evident from what has been said4  ,reply

 ,obj4 #d3 ,not every inordinate        
affection for things directed to the    
end1 i4e41 for created goods1           
constitutes a mortal sin1 but only such 
as is directly contrary to the ,divine  
will2 and then the inordinate affection 
is contrary to charity1 as stated4      
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,charity denotes union 
with ,god1 whereas faith and hope do    
not4 ,now every mortal sin consists in  
aversion from ,god1 as stated above     
7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #ab74 ,consequently
 every mortal sin is contrary to        
charity1 but not to faith and hope1 but 
only certain determinate sins1 which    
destroy the habit of faith or of hope1  
even as charity is destroyed by every   
moral sin4 ,hence it is evident that    
charity cannot remain lifeless1 since it
 is itself the ultimate form regarding  
,god under the aspect of last end as    
stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #h74         
,,question #be  ,,of ,,the ,,object ,,of
 ,,charity 7,,twelve ,,articles7  ,we   
must now consider the object of charity2

 which consideration will be twofold3   
7#a7 ,the things we ought to love out of
 charity3 7#b7 ,the order in which they 
ought to be loved4 ,under the first head
 there are twelve points of inquiry3    
7#a7 ,whether we should love ,god alone1
 out of charity1 or should we love our  
neighbor also8  7#b7 ,whether charity   
should be loved out of charity8  7#c7   
,whether irrational creatures ought to  
be loved out of charity8  7#d7 ,whether 
one may love oneself out of charity8    
7#e7 ,whether one's own body8  7#f7     
,whether sinners should be loved out of 
charity8  7#g7 ,whether sinners love    
themselves8  7#h7 ,whether we should    
love our enemies out of charity8  7#i7  
,whether we are bound to show them      
tokens of friendship8  7#aj7 ,whether we
 ought to love the angels out of        
charity8  7#aa7 ,whether we ought to    
love the demons8  7#ab7 ,how to         
enumerate the things we are bound to    
love out of charity4   ,,first ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 

the ,love of ,charity ,stops at ,god1 or
 ,extends to ,our ,neighbor8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that the love of    
charity stops at ,god and does not      
extend to our neighbor4 ,for as we owe  
,god love1 so do we owe ,him fear1      
according ,deut4 #aj3ab3 ,and now       
,israel1 what doth the ,lord thy ,god   
require of thee1 but that thou fear 4 4 
4 and love ,him8 ,now the fear with     
which we fear man1 and which is called  
human fear1 is distinct from the fear   
with which we fear ,god1 and which is   
either servile or filial1 as is evident 
from what has been stated above 7,q4    
#aj1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore also the love  
with which we love ,god1 is distinct    
from the love with which we love our    
neighbor4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the      
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 viii1 #h7    
that to be loved is to be honored4 ,now 
the honor due to ,god1 which is known as
 latria1 is distinct from the honor due 
to a creature1 and known as dulia4      
,therefore again the love wherewith we  

love ,god1 is distinct from that with   
which we love our neighbor4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 hope begets charity1 as a     
gloss states on ,matt4 #a3b4 ,now hope  
is so due to ,god that it is            
reprehensible to hope in man1 according 
to ,jer4 #ag3e3 ,cursed be the man that 
trusteth in man4 ,therefore charity is  
so due to ,god1 as not to extend to our 
neighbor4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is     
written 7#a ,john #d3ba73 ,this         
commandment we have from ,god1 that he1 
who loveth ,god1 love also his brother4 
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#ag1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1  
,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #c7 habits are not         
differentiated except their acts be of  
different species4 ,for every act of the
 one species belongs to the same habit4 
,now since the species of an act is     
derived from its object1 considered     
under its formal aspect1 it follows of  
necessity that it is specifically the   
same act that tends to an aspect of the 
object1 and that tends to the object    

under that aspect3 thus it is           
specifically the same visual act whereby
 we see the light1 and whereby we see   
the color under the aspect of light4    
,now the aspect under which our neighbor
 is to be loved1 is ,god1 since what we 
ought to love in our neighbor is that he
 may be in ,god4 ,hence it is clear that
 it is specifically the same act whereby
 we love ,god1 and whereby we love our  
neighbor4 ,consequently the habit of    
charity extends not only to the love of 
,god1 but also to the love of our       
neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we may fear
 our neighbor1 even as we may love him1 
in two ways3 first1 on account of       
something that is proper to him1 as when
 a man fears a tyrant on account of his 
cruelty1 or loves him by reason of his  
own desire to get something from him4   
,such like human fear is distinct from  
the fear of ,god1 and the same applies  
to love4 ,secondly1 we fear a man1 or   
love him on account of what he has of   
,god2 as when we fear the secular power 

by reason of its exercising the ministry
 of ,god for the punishment of          
evildoers1 and love it for its justice3 
such like fear of man is not distinct   
from fear of ,god1 as neither is such   
like love4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,love      
regards good in general1 whereas honor  
regards the honored person's own good1  
for it is given to a person in          
recognition of his own virtue4 ,hence   
love is not differentiated specifically 
on account of the various degrees of    
goodness in various persons1 so long as 
it is referred to one good common to    
all1 whereas honor is distinguished     
according to the good belonging to      
individuals4 ,consequently we love all  
our neighbors with the same love of     
charity1 in so far as they are referred 
to one good common to them all1 which is
 ,god2 whereas we give various honors to
 various people1 according to each one's
 own virtue1 and likewise to ,god we    
give the singular honor of latria on    
account of ,his singular virtue4  ,reply

 ,obj4 #c3 ,it is wrong to hope in man  
as though he were the principal author  
of salvation1 but not1 to hope in man as
 helping us ministerially under ,god4   
,in like manner it would be wrong if a  
man loved his neighbor as though he were
 his last end1 but not1 if he loved him 
for ,god's sake2 and this is what       
charity does4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,we ,should ,love ,charity ,out of      
,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that charity need not be loved out of  
charity4 ,for the things to be loved out
 of charity are contained in the two    
precepts of charity 7,matt4 #bb3cg-ci73 
and neither of them includes charity1   
since charity is neither ,god nor our   
neighbor4 ,therefore charity need not be
 loved out of charity4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 charity is founded on the     
fellowship of happiness1 as stated above
 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a74 ,but charity cannot 
participate in happiness4 ,therefore    
charity need not be loved out of        

charity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity is
 a kind of friendship1 as stated above  
7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a74 ,but no man can have 
friendship for charity or for an        
accident1 since such things cannot      
return love for love1 which is essential
 to friendship1 as stated in ,ethic4    
viii4 ,therefore charity need not be    
loved out of charity4  ,on the contrary1
 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 viii1 #h73 
,he that loves his neighbor1 must1 in   
consequence1 love love itself4 ,but we  
love our neighbor out of charity4       
,therefore it follows that charity also 
is loved out of charity4  ,i answer     
that1 ,charity is love4 ,now love1 by   
reason of the nature of the power whose 
act it is1 is capable of reflecting on  
itself2 for since the object of the will
 is the universal good1 whatever has the
 aspect of good1 can be the object of an
 act of the will3 and since to will is  
itself a good1 man can will himself to  
will4 ,even so the intellect1 whose     
object is the true1 understands that it 

understands1 because this again is      
something true4 ,love1 however1 even by 
reason of its own species1 is capable of
 reflecting on itself1 because it is a  
spontaneous movement of the lover       
towards the beloved1 wherefore from the 
moment a man loves1 he loves himself to 
love4  ,yet charity is not love simply1 
but has the nature of friendship1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a74 ,now by 
friendship a thing is loved in two ways3
 first1 as the friend for whom we have  
friendship1 and to whom we wish good    
things3 secondly1 as the good which we  
wish to a friend4 ,it is in the latter  
and not in the former way that charity  
is loved out of charity1 because charity
 is the good which we desire for all    
those whom we love out of charity4 ,the 
same applies to happiness1 and to the   
other virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god   
and our neighbor are those with whom we 
are friends1 but love of them includes  
the loving of charity1 since we love    
both ,god and our neighbor1 in so far as

 we love ourselves and our neighbor to  
love ,god1 and this is to love charity4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,charity is itself the 
fellowship of the spiritual life1       
whereby we arrive at happiness3 hence it
 is loved as the good which we desire   
for all whom we love out of charity4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument         
considers friendship as referred to     
those with whom we are friends4         
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,irrational          
,creatures ,also ,ought to ,be ,loved   
,out of ,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that irrational creatures    
also ought to be loved out of charity4  
,for it is chiefly by charity that we   
are conformed to ,god4 ,now ,god loves  
irrational creatures out of charity1 for
 ,he loves all things that are 7,wis4   
#aa3be71 and whatever ,he loves1 ,he    
loves by ,himself ,who is charity4      
,therefore we also should love          
irrational creatures out of charity4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 charity is referred 

to ,god principally1 and extends to     
other things as referable to ,god4 ,now 
just as the rational creature is        
referable to ,god1 in as much as it     
bears the resemblance of image1 so too1 
are the irrational creatures1 in as much
 as they bear the resemblance of a trace
 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,a4 #g4 ,therefore 
charity extends also to irrational      
creatures4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as 
the object of charity is ,god4 so is the
 object of faith4 ,now faith extends to 
irrational creatures1 since we believe  
that heaven and earth were created by   
,god1 that the fishes and birds were    
brought forth out of the waters1 and    
animals that walk1 and plants1 out of   
the earth4 ,therefore charity extends   
also to irrational creatures4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,the love of charity extends  
to none but ,god and our neighbor4 ,but 
the word neighbor cannot be extended to 
irrational creatures1 since they have no
 fellowship with man in the rational    
life4 ,therefore charity does not extend

 to irrational creatures4  ,i answer    
that1 ,according to what has been stated
 above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #a7 charity is a   
kind of friendship4 ,now the love of    
friendship is twofold3 first1 there is  
the love for the friend to whom our     
friendship is given1 secondly1 the love 
for those good things which we desire   
for our friend4 ,with regard to the     
first1 no irrational creature can be    
loved out of charity2 and for three     
reasons4 ,two of these reasons refer in 
a general way to friendship1 which      
cannot have an irrational creature for  
its object3 first because friendship is 
towards one to whom we wish good things1
 while1 properly speaking1 we cannot    
wish good things to an irrational       
creature1 because it is not competent1  
properly speaking1 to possess good1 this
 being proper to the rational creature  
which1 through its free-will1 is the    
master of its disposal of the good it   
possesses4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 
7,phys4 ii1 #f7 that we do not speak of 

good or evil befalling such like things1
 except metaphorically4 ,secondly1      
because all friendship is based on some 
fellowship in life2 since nothing is so 
proper to friendship as to live         
together1 as the ,philosopher proves    
7,ethic4 viii1 #e74 ,now irrational     
creatures can have no fellowship in     
human life which is regulated by reason4
 ,hence friendship with irrational      
creatures is impossible1 except         
metaphorically speaking4 ,the third     
reason is proper to charity1 for charity
 is based on the fellowship of          
everlasting happiness1 to which the     
irrational creature cannot attain4      
,therefore we cannot have the friendship
 of charity towards an irrational       
creature4  ,nevertheless we can love    
irrational creatures out of charity1 if 
we regard them as the good things that  
we desire for others1 in so far1 to wit1
 as we wish for their preservation1 to  
,god's honor and man's use2 thus too    
does ,god love them out of charity4     

,wherefore the ,reply to the ,first     
,objection is evident4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,the likeness by way of trace does not 
confer the capacity for everlasting     
life1 whereas the likeness of image     
does3 and so the comparison fails4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,faith can extend to   
all that is in any way true1 whereas the
 friendship of charity extends only to  
such things as have a natural capacity  
for everlasting life2 wherefore the     
comparison fails4   ,,fourth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #d  ,whether a
 ,man ,ought to ,love ,himself ,out of  
,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that a man is not bound to love himself
 out of charity4 ,for ,gregory says in a
 homily 7,in ,evang4 xvii7 that there   
can be no charity between less than two4
 ,therefore no man has charity towards  
himself4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1           
friendship1 by its very nature1 implies 
mutual love and equality 7,ethic4 viii1 
#b1 #g71 which cannot be of one man     
towards himself4 ,but charity is a kind 

of friendship1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1
 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore a man cannot have  
charity towards himself4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 anything relating to charity  
cannot be blameworthy1 since charity    
dealeth not perversely 7#a ,cor4 #bc3d74
 ,now a man deserves to be blamed for   
loving himself1 since it is written 7#b 
,tim4 #c3a1 #b73 ,in the last days shall
 come dangerous times1 men shall be     
lovers of themselves4 ,therefore a man  
cannot love himself out of charity4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,it is written 7,lev4    
#ai3ah73 ,thou shalt love thy friend as 
thyself4 ,now we love our friends out of
 charity4 ,therefore we should love     
ourselves too out of charity4  ,i answer
 that1 ,since charity is a kind of      
friendship1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1   
,a4 #a71 we may consider charity from   
two standpoints3 first1 under the       
general notion of friendship1 and in    
this way we must hold that1 properly    
speaking1 a man is not a friend to      
himself1 but something more than a      

friend1 since friendship implies union1 
for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7    
that love is a unitive force1 whereas a 
man is one with himself which is more   
than being united to another4 ,hence1   
just as unity is the principle of union1
 so the love with which a man loves     
himself is the form and root of         
friendship4 ,for if we have friendship  
with others it is because we do unto    
them as we do unto ourselves1 hence we  
read in ,ethic4 ix1 #d1 #h1 that the    
origin of friendly relations with others
 lies in our relations to ourselves4    
,thus too with regard to principles we  
have something greater than science1    
namely understanding4  ,secondly1 we may
 speak of charity in respect of its     
specific nature1 namely as denoting     
man's friendship with ,god in the first 
place1 and1 consequently1 with the      
things of ,god1 among which things is   
man himself who has charity4 ,hence1    
among these other things which he loves 
out of charity because they pertain to  

,god1 he loves also himself out of      
charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gregory     
speaks there of charity under the       
general notion of friendship3 and the   
,second ,objection is to be taken in the
 same sense4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those   
who love themselves are to be blamed1 in
 so far as they love themselves as      
regards their sensitive nature1 which   
they humor4 ,this is not to love oneself
 truly according to one's rational      
nature1 so as to desire for oneself the 
good things which pertain to the        
perfection of reason3 and in this way   
chiefly it is through charity that a man
 loves himself4   ,,fifth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #e  ,whether a
 ,man ,ought to ,love ,his ,body ,out of
 ,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that a man ought not to love his   
body out of charity4 ,for we do not love
 one with whom we are unwilling to      
associate4 ,but those who have charity  
shun the society of the body1 according 
to ,rom4 #g3bd3 ,who shall deliver me   

from the body of this death8 and ,phil4 
#a3bc3 ,having a desire to be dissolved 
and to be with ,christ4 ,therefore our  
bodies are not to be loved out of       
charity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the       
friendship of charity is based on       
fellowship in the enjoyment of ,god4    
,but the body can have no share in that 
enjoyment4 ,therefore the body is not to
 be loved out of charity4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 since charity is a kind of    
friendship it is towards those who are  
capable of loving in return4 ,but our   
body cannot love us out of charity4     
,therefore it should not be loved out of
 charity4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 
says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bc1 #bf7 
that there are four things that we      
should love out of charity1 and among   
them he reckons our own body4  ,i answer
 that1 ,our bodies can be considered in 
two ways3 first1 in respect of their    
nature1 secondly1 in respect of the     
corruption of sin and its punishment4   
,now the nature of our body was created1

 not by an evil principle1 as the       
,manicheans pretend1 but by ,god4 ,hence
 we can use it for ,god's service1      
according to ,rom4 #f3ac3 ,present 4 4 4
 your members as instruments of justice 
unto ,god4 ,consequently1 out of the    
love of charity with which we love ,god1
 we ought to love our bodies also1 but  
we ought not to love the evil effects of
 sin and the corruption of punishment2  
we ought rather1 by the desire of       
charity1 to long for the removal of such
 things4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle
 did not shrink from the society of his 
body1 as regards the nature of the body1
 in fact in this respect he was loth to 
be deprived thereof1 according to #b    
,cor4 #e3d3 ,we would not be unclothed1 
but clothed over4 ,he did1 however1 wish
 to escape from the taint of            
concupiscence1 which remains in the     
body1 and from the corruption of the    
body which weighs down the soul1 so as  
to hinder it from seeing ,god4 ,hence he
 says expressly3 ,from the body of this 

death4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although our  
bodies are unable to enjoy ,god by      
knowing and loving ,him1 yet by the     
works which we do through the body1 we  
are able to attain to the perfect       
knowledge of ,god4 ,hence from the      
enjoyment in the soul there overflows a 
certain happiness into the body1 viz41  
the flush of health and incorruption1 as
 ,augustine states 7,ep4 ad ,dioscor4   
cxviii74 ,hence1 since the body has1 in 
a fashion1 a share of happiness1 it can 
be loved with the love of charity4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,mutual love is found  
in the friendship which is for another1 
but not in that which a man has for     
himself1 either in respect of his soul1 
or in respect of his body4   ,,sixth    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #f  
,whether ,we ,ought to ,love ,sinners   
,out of ,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that we ought not to love    
sinners out of charity4 ,for it is      
written 7,ps4 #aah3aac73 ,i have hated  
the unjust4 ,but ,david had perfect     

charity4 ,therefore sinners should be   
hated rather than loved1 out of charity4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 love is proved by 
deeds as ,gregory says in a homily for  
,pentecost 7,in ,evang4 xxx74 ,but good 
men do no works of the unjust3 on the   
contrary1 they do such as would appear  
to be works of hate1 according to ,ps4  
#ajj3h3 ,in the morning ,i put to death 
all the wicked of the land3 and ,god    
commanded 7,ex4 #bb3ah73 ,wizards thou  
shalt not suffer to live4 ,therefore    
sinners should not be loved out of      
charity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is part
 of friendship that one should desire   
and wish good things for one's friends4 
,now the saints1 out of charity1 desire 
evil things for the wicked1 according to
 ,ps4 #i3ah3 ,may the wicked be turned  
into hell 99,douay and ,a4 ,v43 ',the   
wicked shall be1' etc4 ,see ,reply to   
this ,objection44 ,therefore sinners    
should not be loved out of charity4     
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is proper to     
friends to rejoice in1 and will the same

 things4 ,now charity does not make us  
will what sinners will1 nor to rejoice  
in what gives them joy1 but rather the  
contrary4 ,therefore sinners should not 
be loved out of charity4  ,obj4 #e3     
,further1 it is proper to friends to    
associate together1 according to ,ethic4
 viii4 ,but we ought not to associate   
with sinners1 according to #b ,cor4     
#f3ag3 ,go ye out from among them4      
,therefore we should not love sinners   
out of charity4  ,on the contrary1      
,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1
 #cj7 that when it is said3 ',thou shalt
 love thy neighbor1' it is evident that 
we ought to look upon every man as our  
neighbor4 ,now sinners do not cease to  
be men1 for sin does not destroy nature4
 ,therefore we ought to love sinners out
 of charity4  ,i answer that1 ,two      
things may be considered in the sinner3 
his nature and his guilt4 ,according to 
his nature1 which he has from ,god1 he  
has a capacity for happiness1 on the    
fellowship of which charity is based1 as

 stated above 7,a4 #c2 ,q4 #bc1 ,,aa4   
#a1 #e71 wherefore we ought to love     
sinners1 out of charity1 in respect of  
their nature4  ,on the other hand their 
guilt is opposed to ,god1 and is an     
obstacle to happiness4 ,wherefore1 in   
respect of their guilt whereby they are 
opposed to ,god1 all sinners are to be  
hated1 even one's father or mother or   
kindred1 according to ,luke #ab3bf4 ,for
 it is our duty to hate1 in the sinner1 
his being a sinner1 and to love in him1 
his being a man capable of bliss2 and   
this is to love him truly1 out of       
charity1 for ,god's sake4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,the prophet hated the unjust1 as   
such1 and the object of his hate was    
their injustice1 which was their evil4  
,such hatred is perfect1 of which he    
himself says 7,ps4 #ach3bb73 ,i have    
hated them with a perfect hatred4 ,now  
hatred of a person's evil is equivalent 
to love of his good4 ,hence also this   
perfect hatred belongs to charity4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the ,philosopher   

observes 7,ethic4 ix1 #c71 when our     
friends fall into sin1 we ought not to  
deny them the amenities of friendship1  
so long as there is hope of their       
mending their ways1 and we ought to help
 them more readily to regain virtue than
 to recover money1 had they lost it1 for
 as much as virtue is more akin than    
money to friendship4 ,when1 however1    
they fall into very great wickedness1   
and become incurable1 we ought no longer
 to show them friendliness4 ,it is for  
this reason that both ,divine and human 
laws command such like sinners to be put
 to death1 because there is greater     
likelihood of their harming others than 
of their mending their ways4            
,nevertheless the judge puts this into  
effect1 not out of hatred for the       
sinners1 but out of the love of charity1
 by reason of which he prefers the      
public good to the life of the          
individual4 ,moreover the death         
inflicted by the judge profits the      
sinner1 if he be converted1 unto the    

expiation of his crime2 and1 if he be   
not converted1 it profits so as to put  
an end to the sin1 because the sinner is
 thus deprived of the power to sin any  
more4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,such like      
imprecations which we come across in    
,holy ,writ1 may be understood in three 
ways3 first1 by way of prediction1 not  
by way of wish1 so that the sense is3   
,may the wicked be1 that is1 ,the wicked
 shall be1 turned into hell4 ,secondly1 
by way of wish1 yet so that the desire  
of the wisher is not referred to the    
man's punishment1 but to the justice of 
the punisher1 according to ,ps4 #eg3aa3 
,the just shall rejoice when he shall   
see the revenge1 since1 according to    
,wis4 #a3ac1 not even ,god hath pleasure
 in the destruction of the wicked       
,vulg43 'living' when ,he punishes them1
 but ,he rejoices in ,his justice1      
according to ,ps4 #aj3h3 ,the ,lord is  
just and hath loved justice4 ,thirdly1  
so that this desire is referred to the  
removal of the sin1 and not to the      

punishment itself1 to the effect1       
namely1 that the sin be destroyed1 but  
that the man may live4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3
 ,we love sinners out of charity1 not so
 as to will what they will1 or to       
rejoice in what gives them joy1 but so  
as to make them will what we will1 and  
rejoice in what rejoices us4 ,hence it  
is written 7,jer4 #ae3ai73 ,they shall  
be turned to thee1 and thou shalt not to
 be turned to them4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3   
,the weak should avoid associating with 
sinners1 on account of the danger in    
which they stand of being perverted by  
them4 ,but it is commendable for the    
perfect1 of whose perversion there is no
 fear1 to associate with sinners that   
they may convert them4 ,for thus did    
,our ,lord eat and drink with sinners as
 related by ,matt4 #i3aa-ac4 ,yet all   
should avoid the society of sinners1 as 
regards fellowship in sin2 in this sense
 it is written 7#b ,cor4 #f3ag73 ,go out
 from among them 4 4 4 and touch not the
 unclean thing1 i4e4 by consenting to   

sin4   ,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #be1 ,art4 #g  ,whether ,sinners    
,love ,themselves8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that sinners love themselves4
 ,for that which is the principle of    
sin1 is most of all in the sinner4 ,now 
love of self is the principle of sin1   
since ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei   
xiv1 #bh7 that it builds up the city of 
,babylon4 ,therefore sinners most of all
 love themselves4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
sin does not destroy nature4 ,now it is 
in keeping with nature that every man   
should love himself3 wherefore even     
irrational creatures naturally desire   
their own good1 for instance1 the       
preservation of their being1 and so     
forth4 ,therefore sinners love          
themselves4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 good is
 beloved by all1 as ,dionysius states   
7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,now many sinners     
reckon themselves to be good4 ,therefore
 many sinners love themselves4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #aj3f73  
,he that loveth iniquity1 hateth his own

 soul4  ,i answer that1 ,love of self is
 common to all1 in one way2 in another  
way it is proper to the good2 in a third
 way1 it is proper to the wicked4 ,for  
it is common to all for each one to love
 what he thinks himself to be4 ,now a   
man is said to be a thing1 in two ways3 
first1 in respect of his substance and  
nature1 and1 this way all think         
themselves to be what they are1 that is1
 composed of a soul and body4 ,in this  
way too1 all men1 both good and wicked1 
love themselves1 in so far as they love 
their own preservation4  ,secondly1 a   
man is said to be something in respect  
of some predominance1 as the sovereign  
of a state is spoken of as being the    
state1 and so1 what the sovereign does1 
the state is said to do4 ,in this way1  
all do not think themselves to be what  
they are4 ,for the reasoning mind is the
 predominant part of man1 while the     
sensitive and corporeal nature takes the
 second place1 the former of which the  
,apostle calls the inward man1 and the  

latter1 the outward man 7#b ,cor4       
#d3af74 ,now the good look upon their   
rational nature or the inward man as    
being the chief thing in them1 wherefore
 in this way they think themselves to be
 what they are4 ,on the other hand1 the 
wicked reckon their sensitive and       
corporeal nature1 or the outward man1 to
 hold the first place4 ,wherefore1 since
 they know not themselves aright1 they  
do not love themselves aright1 but love 
what they think themselves to be4 ,but  
the good know themselves truly1 and     
therefore truly love themselves4  ,the  
,philosopher proves this from five      
things that are proper to friendship4   
,for in the first place1 every friend   
wishes his friend to be and to live2    
secondly1 he desires good things for    
him2 thirdly1 he does good things to    
him2 fourthly1 he takes pleasure in his 
company2 fifthly1 he is of one mind with
 him1 rejoicing and sorrowing in almost 
the same things4 ,in this way the good  
love themselves1 as to the inward man1  

because they wish the preservation      
thereof in its integrity1 they desire   
good things for him1 namely spiritual   
goods1 indeed they do their best to     
obtain them1 and they take pleasure in  
entering into their own hearts1 because 
they find there good thoughts in the    
present1 the memory of past good1 and   
the hope of future good1 all of which   
are sources of pleasure4 ,likewise they 
experience no clashing of wills1 since  
their whole soul tends to one thing4    
,on the other hand1 the wicked have no  
wish to be preserved in the integrity of
 the inward man1 nor do they desire     
spiritual goods for him1 nor do they    
work for that end1 nor do they take     
pleasure in their own company by        
entering into their own hearts1 because 
whatever they find there1 present1 past 
and future1 is evil and horrible2 nor do
 they agree with themselves1 on account 
of the gnawings of conscience1 according
 to ,ps4 #di3ba3 ,i will reprove thee   
and set before thy face4  ,in the same  

manner it may be shown that the wicked  
love themselves1 as regards the         
corruption of the outward man1 whereas  
the good do not love themselves thus4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the love of self which
 is the principle of sin is that which  
is proper to the wicked1 and reaches to 
the contempt of ,god1 as stated in the  
passage quoted1 because the wicked so   
desire external goods as to despise     
spiritual goods4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,although natural love is not altogether
 forfeited by wicked men1 yet it is     
perverted in them1 as explained above4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the wicked have some  
share of self-love1 in so far as they   
think themselves good4 ,yet such love of
 self is not true but apparent3 and even
 this is not possible in those who are  
very wicked4   ,,eighth ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #h  ,whether  
,charity ,requires ,that ,we ,should    
,love ,our ,enemies8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that charity does not       
require us to love our enemies4 ,for    

,augustine says 7,enchiridion lxxiii7   
that this great good1 namely1 the love  
of our enemies1 is not so universal in  
its application1 as the object of our   
petition when we say3 ,forgive us our   
trespasses4 ,now no one is forgiven sin 
without he have charity1 because1       
according to ,prov4 #aj3ab1 charity     
covereth all sins4 ,therefore charity   
does not require that we should love our
 enemies4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 charity  
does not do away with nature4 ,now      
everything1 even an irrational being1   
naturally hates its contrary1 as a lamb 
hates a wolf1 and water fire4 ,therefore
 charity does not make us love our      
enemies4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity   
doth nothing perversely 7#a ,cor4       
#ac3d74 ,now it seems perverse to love  
one's enemies1 as it would be to hate   
one's friends3 hence ,joab upbraided    
,david by saying 7#b ,kings #ai3f73     
,thou lovest them that hate thee1 and   
thou hatest them that love thee4        
,therefore charity does not make us love

 our enemies4  ,on the contrary1 ,our   
,lord said 7,matt4 #d3dd73 ,love your   
enemies4  ,i answer that1 ,love of one's
 enemies may be understood in three     
ways4 ,first1 as though we were to love 
our enemies as such3 this is perverse1  
and contrary to charity1 since it       
implies love of that which is evil in   
another4  ,secondly love of one's       
enemies may mean that we love them as to
 their nature1 but in general3 and in   
this sense charity requires that we     
should love our enemies1 namely1 that in
 loving ,god and our neighbor1 we should
 not exclude our enemies from the love  
given to our neighbor in general4       
,thirdly1 love of one's enemies may be  
considered as specially directed to     
them1 namely1 that we should have a     
special movement of love towards our    
enemies4 ,charity does not require this 
absolutely1 because it does not require 
that we should have a special movement  
of love to every individual man1 since  
this would be impossible4 ,nevertheless 

charity does require this1 in respect of
 our being prepared in mind1 namely1    
that we should be ready to love our     
enemies individually1 if the necessity  
were to occur4 ,that man should actually
 do so1 and love his enemy for ,god's   
sake1 without it being necessary for him
 to do so1 belongs to the perfection of 
charity4 ,for since man loves his       
neighbor1 out of charity1 for ,god's    
sake1 the more he loves ,god1 the more  
does he put enmities aside and show love
 towards his neighbor3 thus if we loved 
a certain man very much1 we would love  
his children though they were unfriendly
 towards us4 ,this is the sense in which
 ,augustine speaks in the passage quoted
 in the ,first ,objection1 the ,reply to
 which is therefore evident4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,everything naturally hates   
its contrary as such4 ,now our enemies  
are contrary to us1 as enemies1         
wherefore this itself should be hateful 
to us1 for their enmity should displease
 us4 ,they are not1 however1 contrary to

 us1 as men and capable of happiness3   
and it is as such that we are bound to  
love them4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is     
wrong to love one's enemies as such3    
charity does not do this1 as stated     
above4   ,,ninth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #be1 ,art4 #i  ,whether ,it ,is     
,necessary for ,salvation ,that ,we     
,should ,show ,our ,enemies the ,signs  
and ,effects of ,love8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that charity demands of a
 man to show his enemy the signs or     
effects of love4 ,for it is written 7#a 
,john #c3ah73 ,let us not love in word  
nor in tongue1 but in deed and in truth4
 ,now a man loves in deed by showing the
 one he loves signs and effects of love4
 ,therefore charity requires that a man 
show his enemies such signs and effects 
of love4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,our ,lord
 said in the same breath 7,matt4 #e3dd73
 ,love your enemies1 and1 ,do good to   
them that hate you4 ,now charity demands
 that we love our enemies4 ,therefore it
 demands also that we should do good to 

them4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 not only ,god
 but also our neighbor is the object of 
charity4 ,now ,gregory says in a homily 
for ,pentecost 7,in ,evang4 xxx71 that  
love of ,god cannot be idle for wherever
 it is it does great things1 and if it  
ceases to work1 it is no longer love4   
,hence charity towards our neighbor     
cannot be without producing works4 ,but 
charity requires us to love our neighbor
 without exception1 though he be an     
enemy4 ,therefore charity requires us to
 show the signs and effects of love     
towards our enemies4  ,on the contrary1 
,a gloss on ,matt4 #e3dd1 ,do good to   
them that hate you1 says3 ,to do good to
 one's enemies is the height of         
perfection 99,augustine1 ,enchiridion   
lxxiii4 ,now charity does not require us
 to do that which belongs to its        
perfection4 ,therefore charity does not 
require us to show the signs and effects
 of love to our enemies4  ,i answer     
that1 ,the effects and signs of charity 
are the result of inward love1 and are  

in proportion with it4 ,now it is       
absolutely necessary1 for the fulfilment
 of the precept1 that we should inwardly
 love our enemies in general1 but not   
individually1 except as regards the mind
 being prepared to do so1 as explained  
above 7,a4 #h74  ,we must accordingly   
apply this to the showing of the effects
 and signs of love4 ,for some of the    
signs and favors of love are shown to   
our neighbors in general1 as when we    
pray for all the faithful1 or for a     
whole people1 or when anyone bestows a  
favor on a whole community3 and the     
fulfilment of the precept requires that 
we should show such like favors or signs
 of love towards our enemies4 ,for if we
 did not so1 it would be a proof of     
vengeful spite1 and contrary to what is 
written 7,lev4 #ai3ah73 ,seek not       
revenge1 nor be mindful of the injury of
 thy citizens4 ,but there are other     
favors or signs of love1 which one shows
 to certain persons in particular3 and  
it is not necessary for salvation that  

we show our enemies such like favors and
 signs of love1 except as regards being 
ready in our minds1 for instance to come
 to their assistance in a case of       
urgency1 according to ,prov4 #be3ba3 ,if
 thy enemy be hungry1 give him to eat2  
if he thirst1 give him 4 4 4 drink4     
,outside cases of urgency1 to show such 
like favors to an enemy belongs to the  
perfection of charity1 whereby we not   
only beware1 as in duty bound1 of being 
overcome by evil1 but also wish to      
overcome evil by good 99,rom4 #ab3ba1   
which belongs to perfection3 for then we
 not only beware of being drawn into    
hatred on account of the hurt done to   
us1 but purpose to induce our enemy to  
love us on account of our kindliness4   
,this suffices for the ,replies to the  
,objections4   ,,tenth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #aj  ,whether 
,we ,ought to ,love the ,angels ,out of 
,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that we are not bound to love the      
angels out of charity4 ,for1 as         

,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4   
i71 charity is a twofold love3 the love 
of ,god and of our neighbor4 ,now love  
of the angels is not contained in the   
love of ,god1 since they are created    
substances2 nor is it1 seemingly1       
contained in the love of our neighbor1  
since they do not belong with us to a   
common species4 ,therefore we are not   
bound to love them out of charity4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 dumb animals have   
more in common with us than the angels  
have1 since they belong to the same     
proximate genus as we do4 ,but we have  
not charity towards dumb animals1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,neither1        
therefore1 have we towards the angels4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing is so proper
 to friends as companionship with one   
another 7,ethic4 viii1 #e74 ,but the    
angels are not our companions2 we cannot
 even see them4 ,therefore we are unable
 to give them the friendship of charity4
  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de
 ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #cj73 ,if the name 

of neighbor is given either to those    
whom we pity1 or to those who pity us1  
it is evident that the precept binding  
us to love our neighbor includes also   
the holy angels from whom we receive    
many merciful favors4  ,i answer that1  
,as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a71 the 
friendship of charity is founded upon   
the fellowship of everlasting happiness1
 in which men share in common with the  
angels4 ,for it is written 7,matt4      
#bb3cj7 that in the resurrection 4 4 4  
men shall be as the angels of ,god in   
heaven4 ,it is therefore evident that   
the friendship of charity extends also  
to the angels4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our   
neighbor is not only one who is united  
to us in a common species1 but also one 
who is united to us by sharing in the   
blessings pertaining to everlasting     
life1 and it is on the latter fellowship
 that the friendship of charity is      
founded4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,dumb animals
 are united to us in the proximate      
genus1 by reason of their sensitive     

nature2 whereas we are partakers of     
everlasting happiness1 by reason not of 
our sensitive nature but of our rational
 mind wherein we associate with the     
angels4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the          
companionship of the angels does not    
consist in outward fellowship1 which we 
have in respect of our sensitive nature2
 it consists in a fellowship of the     
mind1 imperfect indeed in this life1 but
 perfect in heaven1 as stated above 7,q4
 #bc1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a74   ,,eleventh      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #aa 
,whether ,we ,are ,bound to ,love the   
,demons ,out of ,charity8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that we ought to love
 the demons out of charity4 ,for the    
angels are our neighbors by reason of   
their fellowship with us in a rational  
mind4 ,but the demons also share in our 
fellowship thus1 since natural gifts1   
such as life and understanding1 remain  
in them unimpaired1 as ,dionysius states
 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore we ought  
to love the demons out of charity4      

,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the demons differ   
from the blessed angels in the matter of
 sin1 even as sinners from just men4    
,now the just man loves the sinner out  
of charity4 ,therefore he ought to love 
the demons also out of charity4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 we ought1 out of charity1 
to love1 as being our neighbors1 those  
from whom we receive favors1 as appears 
from the passage of ,augustine quoted   
above 7,a4 #i74 ,now the demons are     
useful to us in many things1 for by     
tempting us they work crowns for us1 as 
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1     
#ag74 ,therefore we ought to love the   
demons out of charity4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,it is written 7,isa4 #bh3ah73
 ,your league with death shall be       
abolished1 and your covenant with hell  
shall not stand4 ,now the perfection of 
a peace and covenant is through charity4
 ,therefore we ought not to have charity
 for the demons who live in hell and    
compass death4  ,i answer that1 ,as     
stated above 7,a4 #f71 in the sinner1 we

 are bound1 out of charity1 to love his 
nature1 but to hate his sin4 ,but the   
name of demon is given to designate a   
nature deformed by sin1 wherefore demons
 should not be loved out of charity4    
,without however laying stress on the   
word1 the question as to whether the    
spirits called demons ought to be loved 
out of charity1 must be answered in     
accordance with the statement made above
 7,,aa4 #b1 #c71 that a thing may be    
loved out of charity in two ways4       
,first1 a thing may be loved as the     
person who is the object of friendship1 
and thus we cannot have the friendship  
of charity towards the demons4 ,for it  
is an essential part of friendship that 
one should be a well-wisher towards     
one's friend2 and it is impossible for  
us1 out of charity1 to desire the good  
of everlasting life1 to which charity is
 referred1 for those spirits whom ,god  
has condemned eternally1 since this     
would be in opposition to our charity   
towards ,god whereby we approve of ,his 

justice4  ,secondly1 we love a thing as 
being that which we desire to be        
enduring as another's good4 ,in this way
 we love irrational creatures out of    
charity1 in as much as we wish them to  
endure1 to give glory to ,god and be    
useful to man1 as stated above 7,a4 #c73
 and in this way too we can love the    
nature of the demons even out of        
charity1 in as much as we desire those  
spirits to endure1 as to their natural  
gifts1 unto ,god's glory4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,the possession of everlasting      
happiness is not impossible for the     
angelic mind as it is for the mind of a 
demon2 consequently the friendship of   
charity which is based on the fellowship
 of everlasting life1 rather than on the
 fellowship of nature1 is possible      
towards the angels1 but not towards the 
demons4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in this life1
 men who are in sin retain the          
possibility of obtaining everlasting    
happiness3 not so those who are lost in 
hell1 who1 in this respect1 are in the  

same case as the demons4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,that the demons are useful to us is
 due not to their intention but to the  
ordering of ,divine providence2 hence   
this leads us to be friends1 not with   
them1 but with ,god1 ,who turns their   
perverse intention to our profit4       
,,twelfth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 
,art4 #ab  ,whether ,four ,things ,are  
,rightly ,reckoned ,as to ,be ,loved    
,out of ,charity1 ,viz4 ,god1 ,our      
,neighbor1 ,our ,body and ,ourselves8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that these
 four things are not rightly reckoned as
 to be loved out of charity1 to wit3    
,god1 our neighbor1 our body1 and       
ourselves4 ,for1 as ,augustine states   
7,tract4 super ,joan4 lxxxiii71 he that 
loveth not ,god1 loveth not himself4    
,hence love of oneself is included in   
the love of ,god4 ,therefore love of    
oneself is not distinct from the love of
 ,god4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a part ought
 not to be condivided with the whole4   
,but our body is part of ourselves4     

,therefore it ought not to be condivided
 with ourselves as a distinct object of 
love4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as a man
 has a body1 so has his neighbor4 ,since
 then the love with which a man loves   
his neighbor1 is distinct from the love 
with which a man loves himself1 so the  
love with which a man loves his         
neighbor's body1 ought to be distinct   
from the love with which he loves his   
own body4 ,therefore these four things  
are not rightly distinguished as objects
 to be loved out of charity4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4  
,christ4 i1 #bc73 ,there are four things
 to be loved2 one which is above us1    
namely ,god1 another1 which is          
ourselves1 a third which is nigh to us1 
namely our neighbor1 and a fourth which 
is beneath us1 namely our own body4  ,i 
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 
,,aa4 #a1 #e71 the friendship of charity
 is based on the fellowship of          
happiness4 ,now1 in this fellowship1 one
 thing is considered as the principle   

from which happiness flows1 namely ,god2
 a second is that which directly        
partakes of happiness1 namely men and   
angels2 a third is a thing to which     
happiness comes by a kind of overflow1  
namely the human body4  ,now the source 
from which happiness flows is lovable by
 reason of its being the cause of       
happiness3 that which is a partaker of  
happiness1 can be an object of love for 
two reasons1 either through being       
identified with ourselves1 or through   
being associated with us in partaking of
 happiness1 and in this respect1 there  
are two things to be loved out of       
charity1 in as much as man loves both   
himself and his neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,the different relations between a  
lover and the various things loved make 
a different kind of lovableness4        
,accordingly1 since the relation between
 the human lover and ,god is different  
from his relation to himself1 these two 
are reckoned as distinct objects of     
love1 for the love of the one is the    

cause of the love of the other1 so that 
the former love being removed the latter
 is taken away4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the  
subject of charity is the rational mind 
that can be capable of obtaining        
happiness1 to which the body does not   
reach directly1 but only by a kind of   
overflow4 ,hence1 by his reasonable mind
 which holds the first place in him1    
man1 out of charity1 loves himself in   
one way1 and his own body in another4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man loves his         
neighbor1 both as to his soul and as to 
his body1 by reason of a certain        
fellowship in happiness4 ,wherefore1 on 
the part of his neighbor1 there is only 
one reason for loving him2 and our      
neighbor's body is not reckoned as a    
special object of love4   ,,question #bf
  ,,of ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,charity 7,in
 ,thirteen ,articles7  ,we must now     
consider the order of charity1 under    
which head there are thirteen points of 
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether there is an     
order in charity8  7#b7 ,whether man    

ought to love ,god more than his        
neighbor8  7#c7 ,whether more than      
himself8  7#d7 ,whether he ought to love
 himself more than his neighbor8  7#e7  
,whether man ought to love his neighbor 
more than his own body8  7#f7 ,whether  
he ought to love one neighbor more than 
another8  7#g7 ,whether he ought to love
 more1 a neighbor who is better1 or one 
who is more closely united to him8  7#h7
 ,whether he ought to love more1 one who
 is akin to him by blood1 or one who is 
united to him by other ties8  7#i7      
,whether1 out of charity1 a man ought to
 love his son more than his father8     
7#aj7 ,whether he ought to love his     
mother more than his father8  7#aa7     
,whether he ought to love his wife more 
than his father or mother8  7#ab7       
,whether we ought to love those who are 
kind to us more than those whom we are  
kind to8  7#ac7 ,whether the order of   
charity endures in heaven8   ,,first    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,there ,is ,order in ,charity8 

,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there
 is no order in charity4 ,for charity is
 a virtue4 ,but no order is assigned to 
the other virtues4 ,neither1 therefore1 
should any order be assigned to charity4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as the object
 of faith is the ,first ,truth1 so is   
the object of charity the ,sovereign    
,good4 ,now no order is appointed for   
faith1 but all things are believed      
equally4 ,neither1 therefore1 ought     
there to be any order in charity4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 charity is in the will3  
whereas ordering belongs1 not to the    
will1 but to the reason4 ,therefore no  
order should be ascribed to charity4    
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,cant 
#b3d73 ,he brought me into the cellar of
 wine1 he set in order charity in me4   
,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher    
says 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #af71 the terms 
before and after are used in reference  
to some principle4 ,now order implies   
that certain things are1 in some way1   
before or after4 ,hence wherever there  

is a principle1 there must needs be also
 order of some kind4 ,but it has been   
said above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #be1   
,a4 #ab7 that the love of charity tends 
to ,god as to the principle of          
happiness1 on the fellowship of which   
the friendship of charity is based4     
,consequently there must needs be some  
order in things loved out of charity1   
which order is in reference to the first
 principle of that love1 which is ,god4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,charity tends towards 
the last end considered as last end3 and
 this does not apply to any other       
virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4   
#f74 ,now the end has the character of  
principle in matters of appetite and    
action1 as was shown above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4
 #g1 ad #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a74    
,wherefore charity1 above all1 implies  
relation to the ,first ,principle1 and  
consequently1 in charity above all1 we  
find an order in reference to the ,first
 ,principle4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faith   
pertains to the cognitive power1 whose  

operation depends on the thing known    
being in the knower4 ,on the other hand1
 charity is in an appetitive power1     
whose operation consists in the soul    
tending to things themselves4 ,now order
 is to be found in things themselves1   
and flows from them into our knowledge4 
,hence order is more appropriate to     
charity than to faith4  ,and yet there  
is a certain order in faith1 in so far  
as it is chiefly about ,god1 and        
secondarily about things referred to    
,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,order belongs  
to reason as the faculty that orders1   
and to the appetitive power as to the   
faculty which is ordered4 ,it is in this
 way that order is stated to be in      
charity4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,god ,ought
 to ,be ,loved ,more ,than ,our         
,neighbor8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that ,god ought not to be loved    
more than our neighbor4 ,for it is      
written 7#a ,john #d3bj73 ,he that      
loveth not his brother whom he seeth1   

how can he love ,god1 ,whom he seeth    
not8 ,whence it seems to follow that the
 more a thing is visible the more       
lovable it is1 since loving begins with 
seeing1 according to ,ethic4 ix1 #e1    
#ab4 ,now ,god is less visible than our 
neighbor4 ,therefore ,he is less        
lovable1 out of charity1 than our       
neighbor4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 likeness 
causes love1 according to ,ecclus4      
#ac3ai3 ,every beast loveth its like4   
,now man bears more likeness to his     
neighbor than to ,god4 ,therefore man   
loves his neighbor1 out of charity1 more
 than he loves ,god4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 what charity loves in a       
neighbor1 is ,god1 according to         
,augustine 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bb1
 #bg74 ,now ,god is not greater in      
,himself than ,he is in our neighbor4   
,therefore ,he is not more to be loved  
in ,himself than in our neighbor4       
,therefore we ought not to love ,god    
more than our neighbor4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,a thing ought to be loved    

more1 if others ought to be hated on its
 account4 ,now we ought to hate our     
neighbor for ,god's sake1 if1 to wit1 he
 leads us astray from ,god1 according to
 ,luke #ad3bf3 ,if any man come to ,me  
and hate not his father1 and mother1 and
 wife1 end children1 and brethren1 and  
sisters 4 4 4 he cannot be ,my disciple4
 ,therefore we ought to love ,god1 out  
of charity1 more than our neighbor4  ,i 
answer that1 ,each kind of friendship   
regards chiefly the subject in which we 
chiefly find the good on the fellowship 
of which that friendship is based3 thus 
civil friendship regards chiefly the    
ruler of the state1 on whom the entire  
common good of the state depends2 hence 
to him before all1 the citizens owe     
fidelity and obedience4 ,now the        
friendship of charity is based on the   
fellowship of happiness1 which consists 
essentially in ,god1 as the ,first      
,principle1 whence it flows to all who  
are capable of happiness4  ,therefore   
,god ought to be loved chiefly and      

before all out of charity3 for ,he is   
loved as the cause of happiness1 whereas
 our neighbor is loved as receiving     
together with us a share of happiness   
from ,him4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a thing is
 a cause of love in two ways3 first1 as 
being the reason for loving4 ,in this   
way good is the cause of love1 since    
each thing is loved according to its    
measure of goodness4 ,secondly1 a thing 
causes love1 as being a way to acquire  
love4 ,it is in this way that seeing is 
the cause of loving1 not as though a    
thing were lovable according as it is   
visible1 but because by seeing a thing  
we are led to love it4 ,hence it does   
not follow that what is more visible is 
more lovable1 but that as an object of  
love we meet with it before others3 and 
that is the sense of the ,apostle's     
argument4 ,for1 since our neighbor is   
more visible to us1 he is the first     
lovable object we meet with1 because the
 soul learns1 from those things it      
knows1 to love what it knows not1 as    

,gregory says in a homily 7,in ,evang4  
xi74 ,hence it can be argued that1 if   
any man loves not his neighbor1 neither 
does he love ,god1 not because his      
neighbor is more lovable1 but because he
 is the first thing to demand our love3 
and ,god is more lovable by reason of   
,his greater goodness4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,the likeness we have to ,god precedes 
and causes the likeness we have to our  
neighbor3 because from the very fact    
that we share along with our neighbor in
 something received from ,god1 we become
 like to our neighbor4 ,hence by reason 
of this likeness we ought to love ,god  
more than we love our neighbor4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,considered in ,his substance1
 ,god is equally in all1 in whomsoever  
,he may be1 for ,he is not lessened by  
being in anything4 ,and yet our neighbor
 does not possess ,god's goodness       
equally with ,god1 for ,god has it      
essentially1 and our neighbor by        
participation4   ,,third ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  

,out of ,charity1 ,man ,is ,bound to    
,love ,god ,more ,than ,himself8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man  
is not bound1 out of charity1 to love   
,god more than himself4 ,for the        
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #h7 that 
a man's friendly relations with others  
arise from his friendly relations with  
himself4 ,now the cause is stronger than
 its effect4 ,therefore man's friendship
 towards himself is greater than his    
friendship for anyone else4 ,therefore  
he ought to love himself more than ,god4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one loves a thing 
in so far as it is one's own good4 ,now 
the reason for loving a thing is more   
loved than the thing itself which is    
loved for that reason1 even as the      
principles which are the reason for     
knowing a thing are more known4         
,therefore man loves himself more than  
any other good loved by him4 ,therefore 
he does not love ,god more than himself4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a man loves ,god  
as much as he loves to enjoy ,god4 ,but 

a man loves himself as much as he loves 
to enjoy ,god2 since this is the highest
 good a man can wish for himself4       
,therefore man is not bound1 out of     
charity1 to love ,god more than himself4
  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de
 ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bb73 ,if thou     
oughtest to love thyself1 not for thy   
own sake1 but for the sake of ,him in   
,whom is the rightest end of thy love1  
let no other man take offense if him    
also thou lovest for ,god's sake4 ,now  
the cause of a thing being such is yet  
more so4 ,therefore man ought to love   
,god more than himself4  ,i answer that1
 ,the good we receive from ,god is      
twofold1 the good of nature1 and the    
good of grace4 ,now the fellowship of   
natural goods bestowed on us by ,god is 
the foundation of natural love1 in      
virtue of which not only man1 so long as
 his nature remains unimpaired1 loves   
,god above all things and more than     
himself1 but also every single creature1
 each in its own way1 i4e4 either by an 

intellectual1 or by a rational1 or by an
 animal1 or at least by a natural love1 
as stones do1 for instance1 and other   
things bereft of knowledge1 because each
 part naturally loves the common good of
 the whole more than its own particular 
good4 ,this is evidenced by its         
operation1 since the principal          
inclination of each part is towards     
common action conducive to the good of  
the whole4 ,it may also be seen in civic
 virtues whereby sometimes the citizens 
suffer damage even to their own property
 and persons for the sake of the common 
good4 ,wherefore much more is this      
realized with regard to the friendship  
of charity which is based on the        
fellowship of the gifts of grace4       
,therefore man ought1 out of charity1 to
 love ,god1 ,who is the common good of  
all1 more than himself3 since happiness 
is in ,god as in the universal and      
fountain principle of all who are able  
to have a share of that happiness4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is   

speaking of friendly relations towards  
another person in whom the good1 which  
is the object of friendship1 resides in 
some restricted way2 and not of friendly
 relations with another in whom the     
aforesaid good resides in totality4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the part does indeed  
love the good of the whole1 as becomes a
 part1 not however so as to refer the   
good of the whole to itself1 but rather 
itself to the good of the whole4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,that a man wishes to enjoy  
,god pertains to that love of ,god which
 is love of concupiscence4 ,now we love 
,god with the love of friendship more   
than with the love of concupiscence1    
because the ,divine good is greater in  
itself1 than our share of good in       
enjoying ,him4 ,hence1 out of charity1  
man simply loves ,god more than himself4
   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    
#bf1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,out of         
,charity1 ,man ,ought to ,love ,himself 
,more ,than ,his ,neighbor8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that a man ought not1

 out of charity1 to love himself more   
than his neighbor4 ,for the principal   
object of charity is ,god1 as stated    
above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #be1 ,,aa4 #a1 #ab74 
,now sometimes our neighbor is more     
closely united to ,god than we are      
ourselves4 ,therefore we ought to love  
such a one more than ourselves4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 the more we love a person1
 the more we avoid injuring him4 ,now a 
man1 out of charity1 submits to injury  
for his neighbor's sake1 according to   
,prov4 #ab3bf3 ,he that neglecteth a    
loss for the sake of a friend1 is just4 
,therefore a man ought1 out of charity1 
to love his neighbor more than himself4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written 7#a   
,cor4 #ac3e7 charity seeketh not its    
own4 ,now the thing we love most is the 
one whose good we seek most4 ,therefore 
a man does not1 out of charity1 love    
himself more than his neighbor4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,it is written 7,lev4 #ai3ah1
 ,matt4 #bb3ci73 ,thou shalt love thy   
neighbor 7,lev4 #ai3ah3 'friend'7 as    

thyself4 ,whence it seems to follow that
 man's love for himself is the model of 
his love for another4 ,but the model    
exceeds the copy4 ,therefore1 out of    
charity1 a man ought to love himself    
more than his neighbor4  ,i answer that1
 ,there are two things in man1 his      
spiritual nature and his corporeal      
nature4 ,and a man is said to love      
himself by reason of his loving himself 
with regard to his spiritual nature1 as 
stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #g73 so that 
accordingly1 a man ought1 out of        
charity1 to love himself more than he   
loves any other person4  ,this is       
evident from the very reason for loving3
 since1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,,aa4 
#a1 #ab71 ,god is loved as the principle
 of good1 on which the love of charity  
is founded2 while man1 out of charity1  
loves himself by reason of his being a  
partaker of the aforesaid good1 and     
loves his neighbor by reason of his     
fellowship in that good4 ,now fellowship
 is a reason for love according to a    

certain union in relation to ,god4      
,wherefore just as unity surpasses      
union1 the fact that man himself has a  
share of the ,divine good1 is a more    
potent reason for loving than that      
another should be a partner with him in 
that share4 ,therefore man1 out of      
charity1 ought to love himself more than
 his neighbor3 in sign whereof1 a man   
ought not to give way to any evil of    
sin1 which counteracts his share of     
happiness1 not even that he may free his
 neighbor from sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,the love of charity takes its quantity 
not only from its object which is ,god1 
but also from the lover1 who is the man 
that has charity1 even as the quantity  
of any action depends in some way on the
 subject4 ,wherefore1 though a better   
neighbor is nearer to ,god1 yet because 
he is not as near to the man who has    
charity1 as this man is to himself1 it  
does not follow that a man is bound to  
love his neighbor more than himself4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man ought to bear   

bodily injury for his friend's sake1 and
 precisely in so doing he loves himself 
more as regards his spiritual mind1     
because it pertains to the perfection of
 virtue1 which is a good of the mind4   
,in spiritual matters1 however1 man     
ought not to suffer injury by sinning1  
in order to free his neighbor from sin1 
as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as  
,augustine says in his ,rule 7,ep4      
ccxi71 the saying1 'charity seeks not   
her own1' means that it prefers the     
common to the private good4 ,now the    
common good is always more lovable to   
the individual than his private good1   
even as the good of the whole is more   
lovable to the part1 than the latter's  
own partial good1 as stated above 7,a4  
#c74   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 
#bf1 ,art4 #e  ,whether a ,man ,ought to
 ,love ,his ,neighbor ,more ,than ,his  
,own ,body8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that a man is not bound to love his
 neighbor more than his own body4 ,for  
his neighbor includes his neighbor's    

body4 ,if therefore a man ought to love 
his neighbor more than his own body1 it 
follows that he ought to love his       
neighbor's body more than his own4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a man ought to love 
his own soul more than his neighbor's1  
as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,now a man's  
own body is nearer to his soul than his 
neighbor4 ,therefore we ought to love   
our body more than our neighbor4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 a man imperils that which 
he loves less for the sake of what he   
loves more4 ,now every man is not bound 
to imperil his own body for his         
neighbor's safety3 this belongs to the  
perfect1 according to ,john #ae3ac3     
,greater love than this no man hath1    
that a man lay down his life for his    
friends4 ,therefore a man is not bound1 
out of charity1 to love his neighbor    
more than his own body4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4  
,christ4 i1 #bg7 that we ought to love  
our neighbor more than our own body4  ,i
 answer that1 ,out of charity we ought  

to love more that which has more fully  
the reason for being loved out of       
charity1 as stated above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4   
#be1 ,a4 #ab74 ,now fellowship in the   
full participation of happiness which is
 the reason for loving one's neighbor1  
is a greater reason for loving1 than the
 participation of happiness by way of   
overflow1 which is the reason for loving
 one's own body4 ,therefore1 as regards 
the welfare of the soul we ought to love
 our neighbor more than our own body4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to the      
,philosopher 7,ethic4 ix1 #h7 a thing   
seems to be that which is predominant in
 it3 so that when we say that we ought  
to love our neighbor more than our own  
body1 this refers to his soul1 which is 
his predominant part4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,our body is nearer to our soul than our
 neighbor1 as regards the constitution  
of our own nature3 but as regards the   
participation of happiness1 our         
neighbor's soul is more closely         
associated with our own soul1 than even 

our own body is4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3      
,every man is immediately concerned with
 the care of his own body1 but not with 
his neighbor's welfare1 except perhaps  
in cases of urgency3 wherefore charity  
does not necessarily require a man to   
imperil his own body for his neighbor's 
welfare1 except in a case where he is   
under obligation to do so2 and if a man 
of his own accord offer himself for that
 purpose1 this belongs to the perfection
 of charity4   ,,sixth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,we ,ought to ,love ,one ,neighbor ,more
 ,than ,another8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem that we ought not to love one
 neighbor more than another4 ,for       
,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1
 #bh73 ,one ought to love all men       
equally4 ,since1 however1 one cannot do 
good to all1 we ought to consider those 
chiefly who by reason of place1 time or 
any other circumstance1 by a kind of    
chance1 are more closely united to us4  
,therefore one neighbor ought not to be 

loved more than another4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 where there is one and the    
same reason for loving several1 there   
should be no inequality of love4 ,now   
there is one and the same reason for    
loving all one's neighbors1 which reason
 is ,god1 as ,augustine states 7,de     
,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bg74 ,therefore we 
ought to love all our neighbors equally4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to love a man is  
to wish him good things1 as the         
,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii1 #d74    
,now to all our neighbors we wish an    
equal good1 viz4 everlasting life4      
,therefore we ought to love all our     
neighbors equally4  ,on the contrary1   
,one's obligation to love a person is   
proportionate to the gravity of the sin 
one commits in acting against that love4
 ,now it is a more grievous sin to act  
against the love of certain neighbors1  
than against the love of others4 ,hence 
the commandment 7,lev4 #aj3i71 ,he that 
curseth his father or mother1 dying let 
him die1 which does not apply to those  

who cursed others than the above4       
,therefore we ought to love some        
neighbors more than others4  ,i answer  
that1 ,there have been two opinions on  
this question3 for some have said that  
we ought1 out of charity1 to love all   
our neighbors equally1 as regards our   
affection1 but not as regards the       
outward effect4 ,they held that the     
order of love is to be understood as    
applying to outward favors1 which we    
ought to confer on those who are        
connected with us in preference to those
 who are unconnected1 and not to the    
inward affection1 which ought to be     
given equally to all including our      
enemies4  ,but this is unreasonable4    
,for the affection of charity1 which is 
the inclination of grace1 is not less   
orderly than the natural appetite1 which
 is the inclination of nature1 for both 
inclinations flow from ,divine wisdom4  
,now we observe in the physical order   
that the natural inclination in each    
thing is proportionate to the act or    

movement that is becoming to the nature 
of that thing3 thus in earth the        
inclination of gravity is greater than  
in water1 because it is becoming to     
earth to be beneath water4 ,consequently
 the inclination also of grace which is 
the effect of charity1 must needs be    
proportionate to those actions which    
have to be performed outwardly1 so that1
 to wit1 the affection of our charity be
 more intense towards those to whom we  
ought to behave with greater kindness4  
,we must1 therefore1 say that1 even as  
regards the affection we ought to love  
one neighbor more than another4 ,the    
reason is that1 since the principle of  
love is ,god1 and the person who loves1 
it must needs be that the affection of  
love increases in proportion to the     
nearness to one or the other of those   
principles4 ,for as we stated above 7,a4
 #a71 wherever we find a principle1     
order depends on relation to that       
principle4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,love can  
be unequal in two ways3 first on the    

part of the good we wish our friend4 ,in
 this respect we love all men equally   
out of charity3 because we wish them all
 one same generic good1 namely          
everlasting happiness4 ,secondly love is
 said to be greater through its action  
being more intense3 and in this way we  
ought not to love all equally4  ,or we  
may reply that we have unequal love for 
certain persons in two ways3 first1     
through our loving some and not loving  
others4 ,as regards beneficence we are  
bound to observe this inequality1       
because we cannot do good to all3 but as
 regards benevolence1 love ought not to 
be thus unequal4 ,the other inequality  
arises from our loving some more than   
others3 and ,augustine does not mean to 
exclude the latter inequality1 but the  
former1 as is evident from what he says 
of beneficence4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,our  
neighbors are not all equally related to
 ,god2 some are nearer to ,him1 by      
reason of their greater goodness1 and   
those we ought1 out of charity1 to love 

more than those who are not so near to  
,him4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument  
considers the quantity of love on the   
part of the good which we wish our      
friends4   ,,seventh ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,we ,ought to ,love ,those ,who ,are    
,better ,more ,than ,those ,who ,are    
,more ,closely ,united ,us8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that we ought to love
 those who are better more than those   
who are more closely united to us4 ,for 
that which is in no way hateful seems   
more lovable than that which is hateful 
for some reason3 just as a thing is all 
the whiter for having less black mixed  
with it4 ,now those who are connected   
with us are hateful for some reason1    
according to ,luke #ad3bf3 ,if any man  
come to ,me1 and hate not his father1   
etc4 ,on the other hand good men are not
 hateful for any reason4 ,therefore it  
seems that we ought to love those who   
are better more than those who are more 
closely connected with us4  ,obj4 #b3   

,further1 by charity above all1 man is  
likened to ,god4 ,but ,god loves more   
the better man4 ,therefore man also1 out
 of charity1 ought to love the better   
man more than one who is more closely   
united to him4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in  
every friendship1 that ought to be loved
 most which has most to do with the     
foundation of that friendship3 for1 by  
natural friendship we love most those   
who are connected with us by nature1 our
 parents for instance1 or our children4 
,now the friendship of charity is       
founded upon the fellowship of          
happiness1 which has more to do with    
better men than with those who are more 
closely united to us4 ,therefore1 out of
 charity1 we ought to love better men   
more than those who are more closely    
connected with us4  ,on the contrary1   
,it is written 7#a ,tim4 #e3h73 ,if any 
man have not care of his own and        
especially of those of his house1 he    
hath denied the faith1 and is worse than
 an infidel4 ,now the inward affection  

of charity ought to correspond to the   
outward effect4 ,therefore charity      
regards those who are nearer to us      
before those who are better4  ,i answer 
that1 ,every act should be proportionate
 both to its object and to the agent4   
,but from its object it takes its       
species1 while1 from the power of the   
agent it takes the mode of its          
intensity3 thus movement has its species
 from the term to which it tends1 while 
the intensity of its speed arises from  
the disposition of the thing moved and  
the power of the mover4 ,accordingly    
love takes its species from its object1 
but its intensity is due to the lover4  
,now the object of charity's love is    
,god1 and man is the lover4 ,therefore  
the specific diversity of the love which
 is in accordance with charity1 as      
regards the love of our neighbor1       
depends on his relation to ,god1 so     
that1 out of charity1 we should wish a  
greater good to one who is nearer to    
,god2 for though the good which charity 

wishes to all1 viz4 everlasting         
happiness1 is one in itself1 yet it has 
various degrees according to various    
shares of happiness1 and it belongs to  
charity to wish ,god's justice to be    
maintained1 in accordance with which    
better men have a fuller share of       
happiness4 ,and this regards the species
 of love2 for there are different       
species of love according to the        
different goods that we wish for those  
whom we love4  ,on the other hand1 the  
intensity of love is measured with      
regard to the man who loves1 and        
accordingly man loves those who are more
 closely united to him1 with more       
intense affection as to the good he     
wishes for them1 than he loves those who
 are better as to the greater good he   
wishes for them4  ,again a further      
difference must be observed here3 for   
some neighbors are connected with us by 
their natural origin1 a connection which
 cannot be severed1 since that origin   
makes them to be what they are4 ,but the

 goodness of virtue1 wherein some are   
close to ,god1 can come and go1 increase
 and decrease1 as was shown above 7,q4  
#bd1 ,,aa4 #d1 #aj1 #aa74 ,hence it is  
possible for one1 out of charity1 to    
wish this man who is more closely united
 to one1 to be better than another1 and 
so reach a higher degree of happiness4  
,moreover there is yet another reason   
for which1 out of charity1 we love more 
those who are more nearly connected with
 us1 since we love them in more ways4   
,for1 towards those who are not         
connected with us we have no other      
friendship than charity1 whereas for    
those who are connected with us1 we have
 certain other friendships1 according to
 the way in which they are connected4   
,now since the good on which every other
 friendship of the virtuous is based1 is
 directed1 as to its end1 to the good on
 which charity is based1 it follows that
 charity commands each act of another   
friendship1 even as the art which is    
about the end commands the art which is 

about the means4 ,consequently this very
 act of loving someone because he is    
akin or connected with us1 or because he
 is a fellow-countryman or for any like 
reason that is referable to the end of  
charity1 can be commanded by charity1 so
 that1 out of charity both eliciting and
 commanding1 we love in more ways those 
who are more nearly connected with us4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we are commanded to   
hate1 in our kindred1 not their kinship1
 but only the fact of their being an    
obstacle between us and ,god4 ,in this  
respect they are not akin but hostile to
 us1 according to ,micah #g3f3 ,a men's 
enemies are they of his own household4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,charity conforms man  
to ,god proportionately1 by making man  
comport himself towards what is his1 as 
,god does towards what is ,his4 ,for we 
may1 out of charity1 will certain things
 as becoming to us which ,god does not  
will1 because it becomes ,him not to    
will them1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #ai1 ,a4 #aj71 when we were treating of

 the goodness of the will4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,charity elicits the act of love   
not only as regards the object1 but also
 as regards the lover1 as stated above4 
,the result is that the man who is more 
nearly united to us is more loved4      
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1  
,art4 #h  ,whether ,we ,ought to ,love  
,more ,those ,who ,are ,connected with  
,us by ,ties of ,blood8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that we ought not to love
 more those who are more closely united 
to us by ties of blood4 ,for it is      
written 7,prov4 #ah3bd73 ,a man amiable 
in society1 shall be more friendly than 
a brother4 ,again1 ,valerius ,maximus   
says 7,fact4 et ,dict4 ,memor4 iv #g73  
,the ties of friendship are most strong 
and in no way yield to the ties of      
blood4 ,moreover it is quite certain and
 undeniable1 that as to the latter1 the 
lot of birth is fortuitous1 whereas we  
contract the former by an untrammelled  
will1 and a solid pledge4 ,therefore we 
ought not to love more than others those

 who are united to us by ties of blood4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,ambrose says 7,de  
,officiis i1 #g73 ,i love not less you  
whom ,i have begotten in the ,gospel1   
than if ,i had begotten you in wedlock1 
for nature is no more eager to love than
 grace4 ,surely we ought to love those  
whom we expect to be with us for ever   
more than those who will be with us only
 in this world4 ,therefore we should not
 love our kindred more than those who   
are otherwise connected with us4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 ,love is proved by deeds1 
as ,gregory states 7,hom4 in ,evang4    
xxx74 ,now we are bound to do acts of   
love to others than our kindred3 thus in
 the army a man must obey his officer   
rather than his father4 ,therefore we   
are not bound to love our kindred most  
of all4  ,on the contrary1 ,the         
commandments of the decalogue contain a 
special precept about the honor due to  
our parents 7,ex4 #bj3ab74 ,therefore we
 ought to love more specially those who 
are united to us by ties of blood4  ,i  

answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #g71 
we ought out of charity to love those   
who are more closely united to us more1 
both because our love for them is more  
intense1 and because there are more     
reasons for loving them4 ,now intensity 
of love arises from the union of lover  
and beloved3 and therefore we should    
measure the love of different persons   
according to the different kinds of     
union1 so that a man is more loved in   
matters touching that particular union  
in respect of which he is loved4 ,and1  
again1 in comparing love to love we     
should compare one union with another4  
,accordingly we must say that friendship
 among blood relations is based upon    
their connection by natural origin1 the 
friendship of fellow-citizens on their  
civic fellowship1 and the friendship of 
those who are fighting side by side on  
the comradeship of battle4 ,wherefore in
 matters pertaining to nature we should 
love our kindred most1 in matters       
concerning relations between citizens1  

we should prefer our fellow-citizens1   
and on the battlefield our              
fellow-soldiers4 ,hence the ,philosopher
 says 7,ethic4 ix1 #b7 that it is our   
duty to render to each class of people  
such respect as is natural and          
appropriate4 ,this is in fact the       
principle upon which we seem to act1 for
 we invite our relations to a wedding 4 
4 4 ,it would seem to be a special duty 
to afford our parents the means of      
living 4 4 4 and to honor them4  ,the   
same applies to other kinds of          
friendship4  ,if however we compare     
union with union1 it is evident that the
 union arising from natural origin is   
prior to1 and more stable than1 all     
others1 because it is something         
affecting the very substance1 whereas   
other unions supervene and may cease    
altogether4 ,therefore the friendship of
 kindred is more stable1 while other    
friendships may be stronger in respect  
of that which is proper to each of them4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in as much as the   

friendship of comrades originates       
through their own choice1 love of this  
kind takes precedence of the love of    
kindred in matters where we are free to 
do as we choose1 for instance in matters
 of action4 ,yet the friendship of      
kindred is more stable1 since it is more
 natural1 and preponderates over others 
in matters touching nature3 consequently
 we are more beholden to them in the    
providing of necessaries4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,ambrose is speaking of love with   
regard to favors respecting the         
fellowship of grace1 namely1 moral      
instruction4 ,for in this matter1 a man 
ought to provide for his spiritual      
children whom he has begotten           
spiritually1 more than for the sons of  
his body1 whom he is bound to support in
 bodily sustenance4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the fact that in the battle a man obeys
 his officer rather than his father     
proves1 that he loves his father less1  
not simply but relatively1 i4e4 as      
regards the love which is based on      

fellowship in battle4   ,,ninth         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #i  
,whether a ,man ,ought1 ,out of         
,charity1 to ,love ,his ,children ,more 
,than ,his ,father8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
seems that a man ought1 out of charity1 
to love his children more than his      
father4 ,for we ought to love those more
 to whom we are more bound to do good4  
,now we are more bound to do good to our
 children than to our parents1 since the
 ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #ab3ad73       
,neither ought the children to lay up   
for the parents1 but the parents for the
 children4 ,therefore a man ought to    
love his children more than his parents4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 grace perfects    
nature4 ,but parents naturally love     
their children more than these love     
them1 as the ,philosopher states        
7,ethic4 viii1 #ab74 ,therefore a man   
ought to love his children more than his
 parents4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man's    
affections are conformed to ,god by     
charity4 ,but ,god loves ,his children  

more than they love ,him4 ,therefore we 
also ought to love our children more    
than our parents4  ,on the contrary1    
,ambrose 99,origen1 ,hom4 ii in ,cant4  
says3 ,we ought to love ,god first1 then
 our parents1 then our children1 and    
lastly those of our household4  ,i      
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #d1  
ad #a2 ,a4 #g71 the degrees of love may 
be measured from two standpoints4       
,first1 from that of the object4 ,in    
this respect the better a thing is1 and 
the more like to ,god1 the more is it to
 be loved3 and in this way a man ought  
to love his father more than his        
children1 because1 to wit1 he loves his 
father as his principle1 in which       
respect he is a more exalted good and   
more like ,god4  ,secondly1 the degrees 
of love may be measured from the        
standpoint of the lover1 and in this    
respect a man loves more that which is  
more closely connected with him1 in     
which way a man's children are more     
lovable to him than his father1 as the  

,philosopher states 7,ethic4 viii74     
,first1 because parents love their      
children as being part of themselves1   
whereas the father is not part of his   
son1 so that the love of a father for   
his children1 is more like a man's love 
for himself4 ,secondly1 because parents 
know better that so and so is their     
child than vice versa4 ,thirdly1 because
 children are nearer to their parents1  
as being part of them1 than their       
parents are to them to whom they stand  
in the relation of a principle4         
,fourthly1 because parents have loved   
longer1 for the father begins to love   
his child at once1 whereas the child    
begins to love his father after a lapse 
of time2 and the longer love lasts1 the 
stronger it is1 according to ,ecclus4   
#i3ad3 ,forsake not an old friend1 for  
the new will not be like to him4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,the debt due to a principle 
is submission of respect and honor1     
whereas that due to the effect is one of
 influence and care4 ,hence the duty of 

children to their parents consists      
chiefly in honor3 while that of parents 
to their children is especially one of  
care4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is natural  
for a man as father to love his children
 more1 if we consider them as closely   
connected with him3 but if we consider  
which is the more exalted good1 the son 
naturally loves his father more4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de     
,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #cb71 ,god loves us 
for our good and for ,his honor4        
,wherefore since our father is related  
to us as principle1 even as ,god is1 it 
belongs properly to the father to       
receive honor from his children1 and to 
the children to be provided by their    
parents with what is good for them4     
,nevertheless in cases of necessity the 
child is bound out of the favors        
received to provide for his parents     
before all4   ,,tenth ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #aj  ,whether 
a ,man ,ought to ,love ,his ,mother     
,more ,than ,his ,father8  ,objection   

#a3 ,it would seem that a man ought to  
love his mother more than his father4   
,for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de     
,gener4 ,animal4 i1 #bj71 the female    
produces the body in generation4 ,now   
man receives his soul1 not from his     
father1 but from ,god by creation1 as   
stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4
 #b2 ,q4 #aah74 ,therefore a man        
receives more from his mother than from 
his father3 and consequently he ought to
 love her more than him4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 where greater love is given1  
greater love is due4 ,now a mother loves
 her child more than the father does3   
for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1  
#g7 that mothers have greater love for  
their children4 ,for the mother labors  
more in child-bearing1 and she knows    
more surely than the father who are her 
children4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 love     
should be more fond towards those who   
have labored for us more1 according to  
,rom4 #af3f3 ,salute ,mary1 who hath    
labored much among you4 ,now the mother 

labors more than the father in giving   
birth and education to her child2       
wherefore it is written 7,ecclus4       
#g3bi73 ,forget not the groanings of thy
 mother4 ,therefore a man ought to love 
his mother more than his father4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,jerome says on ,ezech4   
#dd3be that man ought to love ,god the  
,father of all1 and then his own father1
 and mentions the mother afterwards4  ,i
 answer that1 ,in making such           
comparisons as this1 we must take the   
answer in the strict sense1 so that the 
present question is whether the father  
as father1 ought to be loved more than  
the mother as mother4 ,the reason is    
that virtue and vice may make such a    
difference in such like matters1 that   
friendship may be diminished or         
destroyed1 as the ,philosopher remarks  
7,ethic4 viii1 #g74 ,hence ,ambrose     
99,origen1 ,hom4 ii in ,cant4 says3     
,good servants should be preferred to   
wicked children4  ,strictly speaking1   
however1 the father should be loved more

 than the mother4 ,for father and mother
 are loved as principles of our natural 
origin4 ,now the father is principle in 
a more excellent way than the mother1   
because he is the active principle1     
while the mother is a passive and       
material principle4 ,consequently1      
strictly speaking1 the father is to be  
loved more4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the   
begetting of man1 the mother supplies   
the formless matter of the body2 and the
 latter receives its form through the   
formative power that is in the semen of 
the father4 ,and though this power      
cannot create the rational soul1 yet it 
disposes the matter of the body to      
receive that form4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,this applies to another kind of love4  
,for the friendship between lover and   
lover differs specifically from the     
friendship between child and parent3    
while the friendship we are speaking of 
here1 is that which a man owes his      
father and mother through being begotten
 of them4  ,the ,reply to the ,third    

,objection is evident4   ,,eleventh     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #aa 
,whether a ,man ,ought to ,love ,his    
,wife ,more ,than ,his ,father and      
,mother8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that a man ought to love his wife more  
than his father and mother4 ,for no man 
leaves a thing for another unless he    
love the latter more4 ,now it is written
 7,gen4 #b3bd7 that a man shell leave   
father and mother on account of his     
wife4 ,therefore a man ought to love his
 wife more than his father and mother4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says   
7,eph4 #e3cc7 that a husband should love
 his wife as himself4 ,now a man ought  
to love himself more than his parents4  
,therefore he ought to love his wife    
also more than his parents4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 love should be greater where  
there are more reasons for loving4 ,now 
there are more reasons for love in the  
friendship of a man towards his wife4   
,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4     
viii1 #ab7 that in this friendship there

 are the motives of utility1 pleasure1  
and also of virtue1 if husband and wife 
are virtuous4 ,therefore a man's love   
for his wife ought to be greater than   
his love for his parents4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,according to ,eph4 #e3bh1 men
 ought to love their wives as their own 
bodies4 ,now a man ought to love his    
body less than his neighbor1 as stated  
above 7,a4 #e73 and among his neighbors 
he should love his parents most4        
,therefore he ought to love his parents 
more than his wife4  ,i answer that1 ,as
 stated above 7,a4 #i71 the degrees of  
love may be taken from the good 7which  
is loved71 or from the union between    
those who love4 ,on the part of the good
 which is the object loved1 a man should
 love his parents more than his wife1   
because he loves them as his principles 
and considered as a more exalted good4  
,but on the part of the union1 the wife 
ought to be loved more1 because she is  
united with her husband1 as one flesh1  
according to ,matt4 #ai3f3 ,therefore   

now they are not two1 but one flesh4    
,consequently a man loves his wife more 
intensely1 but his parents with greater 
reverence4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a man does
 not in all respects leave his father   
and mother for the sake of his wife3 for
 in certain cases a man ought to succor 
his parents rather than his wife4 ,he   
does however leave all his kinsfolk1 and
 cleaves to his wife as regards the     
union of carnal connection and          
co-habitation4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the   
words of the ,apostle do not mean that a
 man ought to love his wife equally with
 himself1 but that a man's love for     
himself is the reason for his love of   
his wife1 since she is one with him4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there are also several
 reasons for a man's love for his       
father2 and these1 in a certain respect1
 namely1 as regards good1 are more      
weighty than those for which a man loves
 his wife2 although the latter outweigh 
the former as regards the closeness of  
the union4  ,as to the argument in the  

contrary sense1 it must be observed that
 in the words quoted1 the particle as   
denotes not equality of love but the    
motive of love4 ,for the principal      
reason why a man loves his wife is her  
being united to him in the flesh4       
,,twelfth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 
,art4 #ab  ,whether a ,man ,ought to    
,love ,more ,his ,benefactor ,than ,one 
,he ,has ,benefited8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that a man ought to love his
 benefactor more than one he has        
benefited4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de    
,catech4 ,rud4 iv73 ,nothing will incite
 another more to love you than that you 
love him first3 for he must have a hard 
heart indeed1 who not only refuses to   
love1 but declines to return love       
already given4 ,now a man's benefactor  
forestalls him in the kindly deeds of   
charity4 ,therefore we ought to love our
 benefactors above all4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 the more grievously we sin by 
ceasing to love a man or by working     
against him1 the more ought we to love  

him4 ,now it is a more grievous sin to  
cease loving a benefactor or to work    
against him1 than to cease loving one to
 whom one has hitherto done kindly      
actions4 ,therefore we ought to love our
 benefactors more than those to whom we 
are kind4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 of all   
things lovable1 ,god is to be loved     
most1 and then one's father1 as ,jerome 
says 99,comment4 in ,ezechiel xliv1 #be4
 ,now these are our greatest            
benefactors4 ,therefore a benefactor    
should be loved above all others4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says    
7,ethic4 ix1 #g71 that benefactors seem 
to love recipients of their             
benefactions1 rather than vice versa4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 
#i1 #aa71 a thing is loved more in two  
ways3 first because it has the character
 of a more excellent good1 secondly by  
reason of a closer connection4 ,in the  
first way we ought to love our          
benefactor most1 because1 since he is a 
principle of good to the man he has     

benefited1 he has the character of a    
more excellent good1 as stated above    
with regard to one's father 7,a4 #i74   
,in the second way1 however1 we love    
those more who have received            
benefactions from us1 as the            
,philosopher proves 7,ethic4 ix1 #g7 by 
four arguments4 ,first because the      
recipient of benefactions is the        
handiwork of the benefactor1 so that we 
are wont to say of a man3 ,he was made  
by so and so4 ,now it is natural to a   
man to love his own work 7thus it is to 
be observed that poets love their own   
poems73 and the reason is that we love  
to be and to live1 and these are made   
manifest in our action4 ,secondly1      
because we all naturally love that in   
which we see our own good4 ,now it is   
true that the benefactor has some good  
of his in the recipient of his          
benefaction1 and the recipient some good
 in the benefactor2 but the benefactor  
sees his virtuous good in the recipient1
 while the recipient sees his useful    

good in the benefactor4 ,now it gives   
more pleasure to see one's virtuous good
 than one's useful good1 both because it
 is more enduring1--for usefulness      
quickly flits by1 and the pleasure of   
calling a thing to mind is not like the 
pleasure of having it present--and      
because it is more pleasant to recall   
virtuous goods than the profit we have  
derived from others4 ,thirdly1 because  
is it the lover's part to act1 since he 
wills and works the good of the beloved1
 while the beloved takes a passive part 
in receiving good1 so that to love      
surpasses being loved1 for which reason 
the greater love is on the part of the  
benefactor4 ,fourthly because it is more
 difficult to give than to receive      
favors3 and we are most fond of things  
which have cost us most trouble1 while  
we almost despise what comes easy to us4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is some thing in 
the benefactor that incites the         
recipient to love him3 whereas the      
benefactor loves the recipient1 not     

through being incited by him1 but       
through being moved thereto of his own  
accord3 and what we do of our own accord
 surpasses what we do through another4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the love of the       
beneficiary for the benefactor is more  
of a duty1 wherefore the contrary is the
 greater sin4 ,on the other hand1 the   
love of the benefactor for the          
beneficiary is more spontaneous1        
wherefore it is quicker to act4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,god also loves us more than  
we love ,him1 and parents love their    
children more than these love them4 ,yet
 it does not follow that we love all who
 have received good from us1 more than  
any of our benefactors4 ,for we prefer  
such benefactors as ,god and our        
parents1 from whom we have received the 
greatest favors1 to those on whom we    
have bestowed lesser benefits4          
,,thirteenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4   
#bf1 ,art4 #ac  ,whether the ,order of  
,charity ,endures in ,heaven8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  

order of charity does not endure in     
heaven4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,vera 
,relig4 xlviii73 ,perfect charity       
consists in loving greater goods more1  
and lesser goods less4 ,now charity will
 be perfect in heaven4 ,therefore a man 
will love those who are better more than
 either himself or those who are        
connected with him4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 we love more him to whom we wish a     
greater good4 ,now each one in heaven   
wishes a greater good for those who have
 more good1 else his will would not be  
conformed in all things to ,god's will3 
and there to be better is to have more  
good4 ,therefore in heaven each one     
loves more those who are better1 and    
consequently he loves others more than  
himself1 and one who is not connected   
with him1 more than one who is4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 in heaven love will be    
entirely for ,god's sake1 for then will 
be fulfilled the words of #a ,cor4      
#ae3bh3 ,that ,god may be all in all4   
,therefore he who is nearer ,god will be

 loved more1 so that a man will love a  
better man more than himself1 and one   
who is not connected with him1 more than
 one who is4  ,on the contrary1 ,nature 
is not done away1 but perfected1 by     
glory4 ,now the order of charity given  
above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c1 #d7 is derived from
 nature3 since all things naturally love
 themselves more than others4 ,therefore
 this order of charity will endure in   
heaven4  ,i answer that1 ,the order of  
charity must needs remain in heaven1 as 
regards the love of ,god above all      
things4 ,for this will be realized      
simply when man shall enjoy ,god        
perfectly4 ,but1 as regards the order   
between man himself and other men1 a    
distinction would seem to be necessary1 
because1 as we stated above 7,,aa4 #g1  
#i71 the degrees of love may be         
distinguished either in respect of the  
good which a man desires for another1 or
 according to the intensity of love     
itself4 ,in the first way a man will    
love better men more than himself1 and  

those who are less good1 less than      
himself3 because1 by reason of the      
perfect conformity of the human to the  
,divine will1 each of the blessed will  
desire everyone to have what is due to  
him according to ,divine justice4 ,nor  
will that be a time for advancing by    
means of merit to a yet greater reward1 
as happens now while it is possible for 
a man to desire both the virtue and the 
reward of a better man1 whereas then the
 will of each one will rest within the  
limits determined by ,god4 ,but in the  
second way a man will love himself more 
than even his better neighbors1 because 
the intensity of the act of love arises 
on the part of the person who loves1 as 
stated above 7,,aa4 #g1 #i74 ,moreover  
it is for this that the gift of charity 
is bestowed by ,god on each one1 namely1
 that he may first of all direct his    
mind to ,god1 and this pertains to a    
man's love for himself1 and that1 in the
 second place1 he may wish other things 
to be directed to ,god1 and even work   

for that end according to his capacity4 
,as to the order to be observed among   
our neighbors1 a man will simply love   
those who are better1 according to the  
love of charity4 ,because the entire    
life of the blessed consists in         
directing their minds to ,god1 wherefore
 the entire ordering of their love will 
be ruled with respect to ,god1 so that  
each one will love more and reckon to be
 nearer to himself those who are nearer 
to ,god4 ,for then one man will no      
longer succor another1 as he needs to in
 the present life1 wherein each man has 
to succor those who are closely         
connected with him rather than those who
 are not1 no matter what be the nature  
of their distress3 hence it is that in  
this life1 a man1 by the inclination of 
charity1 loves more those who are more  
closely united to him1 for he is under a
 greater obligation to bestow on them   
the effect of charity4 ,it will however 
be possible in heaven for a man to love 
in several ways one who is connected    

with him1 since the causes of virtuous  
love will not be banished from the mind 
of the blessed4 ,yet all these reasons  
are incomparably surpassed by that which
 is taken from nighness to ,god4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument should be     
granted as to those who are connected   
together2 but as regards man himself1 he
 ought to love himself so much the more 
than others1 as his charity is more     
perfect1 since perfect entire reason of 
his love1 for ,god is man's charity     
directs man to ,god perfectly1 and this 
belongs to love of oneself1 as stated   
above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument 
considers the order of charity in       
respect of the degree of good one wills 
the person one loves4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,god will be to each one the entire     
reason of his love1 for ,god is man's   
entire good4 ,for if we make the        
impossible supposition that ,god were   
not man's good1 ,he would not be man's  
reason for loving4 ,hence it is that in 
the order of love man should love       

himself more than all else after ,god4  
,,question #bg  ,,of ,,the ,,principal  
,,act ,,of ,,charity1 ,,which ,,is ,,to 
,,love 7,in ,eight ,articles7  ,we must 
now consider the act of charity1 and    
7#a7 the principal act of charity1 which
 is to love1 7#b7 the other acts or     
effects which follow from that act4     
,under the first head there are eight   
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,which is the  
more proper to charity1 to love or to be
 loved8  7#b7 ,whether to love          
considered as an act of charity is the  
same as goodwill8  7#c7 ,whether ,god   
should be loved for ,his own sake8  7#d7
 ,whether ,god can be loved immediately 
in this life8  7#e7 ,whether ,god can be
 loved wholly8  7#f7 ,whether the love  
of ,god is according to measure8  7#g7  
,which is the better1 to love one's     
friend1 or one's enemy8  7#h7 ,which is 
the better1 to love ,god1 or one's      
neighbor8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #a  ,whether to ,be     
,loved ,is ,more ,proper to ,charity    

,than to ,love8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that it is more proper to    
charity to be loved than to love4 ,for  
the better charity is to be found in    
those who are themselves better4 ,but   
those who are better should be more     
loved4 ,therefore to be loved is more   
proper to charity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
that which is to be found in more       
subjects seems to be more in keeping    
with nature1 and1 for that reason1      
better4 ,now1 as the ,philosopher says  
7,ethic4 viii1 #h71 many would rather be
 loved than love1 and lovers of flattery
 always abound4 ,therefore it is better 
to be loved than to love1 and           
consequently it is more in keeping with 
charity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the cause 
of anything being such is yet more so4  
,now men love because they are loved1   
for ,augustine says 7,de ,catech4 ,rud4 
iv7 that nothing incites another more to
 love you than that you love him first4 
,therefore charity consists in being    
loved rather than in loving4  ,on the   

contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 viii1 #h7 that friendship      
consists in loving rather than in being 
loved4 ,now charity is a kind of        
friendship4 ,therefore it consists in   
loving rather than in being loved4  ,i  
answer that1 ,to love belongs to charity
 as charity4 ,for1 since charity is a   
virtue1 by its very essence it has an   
inclination to its proper act4 ,now to  
be loved is not the act of the charity  
of the person loved2 for this act is to 
love3 and to be loved is competent to   
him as coming under the common notion of
 good1 in so far as another tends       
towards his good by an act of charity4  
,hence it is clear that to love is more 
proper to charity than to be loved3 for 
that which befits a thing by reason of  
itself and its essence is more competent
 to it than that which is befitting to  
it by reason of something else4 ,this   
can be exemplified in two ways4 ,first1 
in the fact that friends are more       
commended for loving than for being     

loved1 indeed1 if they be loved and yet 
love not1 they are blamed4 ,secondly1   
because a mother1 whose love is the     
greatest1 seeks rather to love than to  
be loved3 for some women1 as the        
,philosopher observes 7,ethic4 viii1 #h7
 entrust their children to a nurse2 they
 do love them indeed1 yet seek not to be
 loved in return1 if they happen not to 
be loved4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a better   
man1 through being better1 is more      
lovable2 but through having more perfect
 charity1 loves more4 ,he loves more1   
however1 in proportion to the person he 
loves4 ,for a better man does not love  
that which is beneath him less than it  
ought to be loved3 whereas he who is    
less good fails to love one who is      
better1 as much as he ought to be loved4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the ,philosopher 
says 7,ethic4 viii1 #h71 men wish to be 
loved in as much as they wish to be     
honored4 ,for just as honor is bestowed 
on a man in order to bear witness to the
 good which is in him1 so by being loved

 a man is shown to have some good1 since
 good alone is lovable4 ,accordingly men
 seek to be loved and to be honored1 for
 the sake of something else1 viz4 to    
make known the good which is in the     
person loved4 ,on the other hand1 those 
who have charity seek to love for the   
sake of loving1 as though this were     
itself the good of charity1 even as the 
act of any virtue is that virtue's good4
 ,hence it is more proper to charity to 
wish to love than to wish to be loved4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some love on account  
of being loved1 not so that to be loved 
is the end of their loving1 but because 
it is a kind of way leading a man to    
love4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #b  ,whether to ,love    
,considered ,as an ,act of ,charity ,is 
the ,same ,as ,goodwill8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that to love1 considered
 as an act of charity1 is nothing else  
than goodwill4 ,for the ,philosopher    
says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that to love is to 
wish a person well2 and this is         

goodwill4 ,therefore the act of charity 
is nothing but goodwill4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 the act belongs to the same   
subject as the habit4 ,now the habit of 
charity is in the power of the will1 as 
stated above 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #a74         
,therefore the act of charity is also an
 act of the will4 ,but it tends to good 
only1 and this is goodwill4 ,therefore  
the act of charity is nothing else than 
goodwill4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the      
,philosopher reckons five things        
pertaining to friendship 7,ethic4 ix1   
#d71 the first of which is that a man   
should wish his friend well2 the second1
 that he should wish him to be and to   
live2 the third1 that he should take    
pleasure in his company2 the fourth1    
that he should make choice of the same  
things2 the fifth1 that he should grieve
 and rejoice with him4 ,now the first   
two pertain to goodwill4 ,therefore     
goodwill is the first act of charity4   
,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says
 7,ethic4 ix1 #e7 that goodwill is      

neither friendship nor love1 but the    
beginning of friendship4 ,now charity is
 friendship1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1  
,a4 #a74 ,therefore goodwill is not the 
same as to love considered as an act of 
charity4  ,i answer that1 ,goodwill     
properly speaking is that act of the    
will whereby we wish well to another4   
,now this act of the will differs from  
actual love1 considered not only as     
being in the sensitive appetite but also
 as being in the intellective appetite  
or will4 ,for the love which is in the  
sensitive appetite is a passion4 ,now   
every passion seeks its object with a   
certain eagerness4 ,and the passion of  
love is not aroused suddenly1 but is    
born of an earnest consideration of the 
object loved2 wherefore the             
,philosopher1 showing the difference    
between goodwill and the love which is a
 passion1 says 7,ethic4 ix1 #e7 that    
goodwill does not imply impetuosity or  
desire1 that is to say1 has not an eager
 inclination1 because it is by the sole 

judgment of his reason that one man     
wishes another well4 ,again such like   
love arises from previous acquaintance1 
whereas goodwill sometimes arises       
suddenly1 as happens to us if we look on
 at a boxing-match1 and we wish one of  
the boxers to win4 ,but the love1 which 
is in the intellective appetite1 also   
differs from goodwill1 because it       
denotes a certain union of affections   
between the lover and the beloved1 in as
 much as the lover deems the beloved as 
somewhat united to him1 or belonging to 
him1 and so tends towards him4 ,on the  
other hand1 goodwill is a simple act of 
the will1 whereby we wish a person well1
 even without presupposing the aforesaid
 union of the affections with him4      
,accordingly1 to love1 considered as an 
act of charity1 includes goodwill1 but  
such dilection or love adds union of    
affections1 wherefore the ,philosopher  
says 7,ethic4 ix1 #e7 that goodwill is a
 beginning of friendship4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,the ,philosopher1 by thus defining 

to love1 does not describe it fully1 but
 mentions only that part of its         
definition in which the act of love is  
chiefly manifested4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,to love is indeed an act of the will   
tending to the good1 but it adds a      
certain union with the beloved1 which   
union is not denoted by goodwill4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these things mentioned
 by the ,philosopher belong to          
friendship because they arise from a    
man's love for himself1 as he says in   
the same passage1 in so far as a man    
does all these things in respect of his 
friend1 even as he does them to himself3
 and this belongs to the aforesaid union
 of the affections4   ,,third ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,out of ,charity ,god ,ought to ,be     
,loved for ,himself8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that ,god is loved out of   
charity1 not for ,himself but for the   
sake of something else4 ,for ,gregory   
says in a homily 7,in ,evang4 xi73 ,the 
soul learns from the things it knows1 to

 love those it knows not1 where by      
things unknown he means the intelligible
 and the ,divine1 and by things known he
 indicates the objects of the senses4   
,therefore ,god is to be loved for the  
sake of something else4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 love follows knowledge4 ,but  
,god is known through something else1   
according to ,rom4 #a3bj3 ,the invisible
 things of ,god are clearly seen1 being 
understood by the things that are made4 
,therefore ,he is also loved on account 
of something else and not for ,himself4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 hope begets charity 
as a gloss says on ,matt4 #a3a1 and fear
 leads to charity1 according to         
,augustine in his commentary on the     
,first ,canonical ,epistle of ,john 7,in
 prim4 canon4 ,joan4 ,tract4 ix74 ,now  
hope looks forward to obtain something  
from ,god1 while fear shuns something   
which can be inflicted by ,god4         
,therefore it seems that ,god is to be  
loved on account of some good we hope   
for1 or some evil to be feared4         

,therefore ,he is not to be loved for   
,himself4  ,on the contrary1 ,according 
to ,augustine 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i71 
to enjoy is to cleave to something for  
its own sake4 ,now ,god is to be enjoyed
 as he says in the same book4 ,therefore
 ,god is to be loved for ,himself4  ,i  
answer that1 ,the preposition for       
denotes a relation of causality4 ,now   
there are four kinds of cause1 viz41    
final1 formal1 efficient1 and material1 
to which a material disposition also is 
to be reduced1 though it is not a cause 
simply but relatively4 ,according to    
these four different causes one thing is
 said to be loved for another4 ,in      
respect of the final cause1 we love     
medicine1 for instance1 for health2 in  
respect of the formal cause1 we love a  
man for his virtue1 because1 to wit1 by 
his virtue he is formally good and      
therefore lovable2 in respect of the    
efficient cause1 we love certain men    
because1 for instance1 they are the sons
 of such and such a father2 and in      

respect of the disposition which is     
reducible to the genus of a material    
cause1 we speak of loving something for 
that which disposed us to love it1 e4g4 
we love a man for the favors received   
from him1 although after we have begun  
to love our friend1 we no longer love   
him for his favors1 but for his virtue4 
,accordingly1 as regards the first three
 ways1 we love ,god1 not for anything   
else1 but for ,himself4 ,for ,he is not 
directed to anything else as to an end1 
but is ,himself the last end of all     
things2 nor does ,he require to receive 
any form in order to be good1 for ,his  
very substance is ,his goodness1 which  
is itself the exemplar of all other good
 things2 nor again does goodness accrue 
to ,him from aught else1 but from ,him  
to all other things4 ,in the fourth way1
 however1 ,he can be loved for something
 else1 because we are disposed by       
certain things to advance in ,his love1 
for instance1 by favors bestowed by     
,him1 by the rewards we hope to receive 

from ,him1 or even by the punishments   
which we are minded to avoid through    
,him4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,from the things
 it knows the soul learns to love what  
it knows not1 not as though the things  
it knows were the reason for its loving 
things it knows not1 through being the  
formal1 final1 or efficient cause of    
this love1 but because this knowledge   
disposes man to love the unknown4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,knowledge of ,god is  
indeed acquired through other things1   
but after ,he is known1 ,he is no longer
 known through them1 but through        
,himself1 according to ,john #d3db3 ,we 
now believe1 not for thy saying3 for we 
ourselves have heard ,him1 and know that
 this is indeed the ,saviour of the     
world4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hope and fear 
lead to charity by way of a certain     
disposition1 as was shown above 7,q4    
#ag1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #ai1 ,,aa4 #d1 #g1     
#aj74   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,god ,can   
,be ,loved ,immediately in ,this ,life8 

,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god 
cannot be loved immediately in this     
life4 ,for the unknown cannot be loved  
as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #a74  
,now we do not know ,god immediately in 
this life1 since we see now through a   
glass1 in a dark manner 7#a ,cor4       
#ac3ab74 ,neither1 therefore1 do we love
 ,him immediately4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
he who cannot do what is less1 cannot do
 what is more4 ,now it is more to love  
,god than to know ,him1 since he who is 
joined to ,god by love1 is one spirit   
with ,him 7#a ,cor4 #f3ag74 ,but man    
cannot know ,god immediately4 ,therefore
 much less can he love ,him immediately4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man is severed    
from ,god by sin1 according to ,isa4    
#ei3b3 ,your iniquities have divided    
between you and your ,god4 ,now sin is  
in the will rather than in the          
intellect4 ,therefore man is less able  
to love ,god immediately than to know   
,him immediately4  ,on the contrary1    
,knowledge of ,god1 through being       

mediate1 is said to be enigmatic1 and   
falls away in heaven1 as stated in #a   
,cor4 #ac3ab4 ,but charity does not fall
 away as stated in the same passage 7#a 
,cor4 #ac3ab74 ,therefore the charity of
 the way adheres to ,god immediately4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,i1   
,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g71 the  
act of a cognitive power is completed by
 the thing known being in the knower1   
whereas the act of an appetitive power  
consists in the appetite being inclined 
towards the thing in itself4 ,hence it  
follows that the movement of the        
appetitive power is towards things in   
respect of their own condition1 whereas 
the act of a cognitive power follows the
 mode of the knower4  ,now in itself the
 very order of things is such1 that ,god
 is knowable and lovable for ,himself1  
since ,he is essentially truth and      
goodness itself1 whereby other things   
are known and loved3 but with regard to 
us1 since our knowledge is derived      
through the senses1 those things are    

knowable first which are nearer to our  
senses1 and the last term of knowledge  
is that which is most remote from our   
senses4  ,accordingly1 we must assert   
that to love which is an act of the     
appetitive power1 even in this state of 
life1 tends to ,god first1 and flows on 
from ,him to other things1 and in this  
sense charity loves ,god immediately1   
and other things through ,god4 ,on the  
other hand1 with regard to knowledge1 it
 is the reverse1 since we know ,god     
through other things1 either as a cause 
through its effects1 or by way of       
pre-eminence or negation as ,dionysius  
states 7,div4 ,nom4 i2 cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 
,a4 #ab74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although   
the unknown cannot be loved1 it does not
 follow that the order of knowledge is  
the same as the order of love1 since    
love is the term of knowledge1 and      
consequently1 love can begin at once    
where knowledge ends1 namely in the     
thing itself which is known through     
another thing4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since 

to love ,god is something greater than  
to know ,him1 especially in this state  
of life1 it follows that love of ,god   
presupposes knowledge of ,god4 ,and     
because this knowledge does not rest in 
creatures1 but1 through them1 tends to  
something else1 love begins there1 and  
thence goes on to other things by a     
circular movement so to speak2 for      
knowledge begins from creatures1 tends  
to ,god1 and love begins with ,god as   
the last end1 and passes on to          
creatures4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,aversion  
from ,god1 which is brought about by    
sin1 is removed by charity1 but not by  
knowledge alone3 hence charity1 by      
loving ,god1 unites the soul immediately
 to ,him with a chain of spiritual      
union4   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #e  ,whether ,god can be 
loved wholly8 99,cf4 ,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #b   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god 
cannot be loved wholly4 ,for love       
follows knowledge4 ,now ,god cannot be  
wholly known by us1 since this would    

imply comprehension of ,him4 ,therefore 
,he cannot be wholly loved by us4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 love is a kind of union1 
as ,dionysius shows 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74   
,but the heart of man cannot be wholly  
united to ,god1 because ,god is greater 
than our heart 7#a ,john #c3bj74        
,therefore ,god cannot be loved wholly4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god loves ,himself 
wholly4 ,if therefore ,he be loved      
wholly by another1 this one will love   
,him as much as ,god loves ,himself4    
,but this is unreasonable4 ,therefore   
,god cannot be wholly loved by a        
creature4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is     
written 7,deut4 #f3e73 ,thou shalt love 
the ,lord thy ,god with thy whole heart4
  ,i answer that1 ,since love may be    
considered as something between lover   
and beloved1 when we ask whether ,god   
can be wholly loved1 the question may be
 understood in three ways1 first so that
 the qualification wholly be referred to
 the thing loved1 and thus ,god is to be
 loved wholly1 since man should love all

 that pertains to ,god4  ,secondly1 it  
may be understood as though wholly      
qualified the lover3 and thus again ,god
 ought to be loved wholly1 since man    
ought to love ,god with all his might1  
and to refer all he has to the love of  
,god1 according to ,deut4 #f3e3 ,thou   
shalt love the ,lord thy ,god with thy  
whole heart4  ,thirdly1 it may be       
understood by way of comparison of the  
lover to the thing loved1 so that the   
mode of the lover equal the mode of the 
thing loved4 ,this is impossible3 for1  
since a thing is lovable in proportion  
to its goodness1 ,god is infinitely     
lovable1 since ,his goodness is         
infinite4 ,now no creature can love ,god
 infinitely1 because all power of       
creatures1 whether it be natural or     
infused1 is finite4  ,this suffices for 
the ,replies to the ,objections1 because
 the first three objections consider the
 question in this third sense1 while the
 last takes it in the second sense4     
,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1   

,art4 #f  ,whether in ,loving ,god ,we  
,ought to ,observe ,any ,mode8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that we   
ought to observe some mode in loving    
,god4 ,for the notion of good consists  
in mode1 species and order1 as          
,augustine states 7,de ,nat4 ,boni iii1 
iv74 ,now the love of ,god is the best  
thing in man1 according to ,col4 #c3ad3 
,above all 4 4 4 things1 have charity4  
,therefore there ought to be a mode of  
the love of ,god4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
,augustine says 7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4     
viii73 ,prithee1 tell me which is the   
mode of love4 ,for ,i fear lest ,i burn 
with the desire and love of my ,lord1   
more or less than ,i ought4 ,but it     
would be useless to seek the mode of the
 ,divine love1 unless there were one4   
,therefore there is a mode of the love  
of ,god4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as        
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #c71 
the measure which nature appoints to a  
thing1 is its mode4 ,now the measure of 
the human will1 as also of external     

action1 is the reason4 ,therefore just  
as it is necessary for the reason to    
appoint a mode to the exterior effect of
 charity1 according to ,rom4 #ab3a3     
,your reasonable service1 so also the   
interior love of ,god requires a mode4  
,on the contrary1 ,bernard says 7,de    
,dilig4 ,deum #a7 that ,god is the cause
 of our loving ,god2 the measure is to  
love ,him without measure4  ,i answer   
that1 ,as appears from the words of     
,augustine quoted above 7,obj4 #c7 mode 
signifies a determination of measure2   
which determination is to be found both 
in the measure and in the thing         
measured1 but not in the same way4 ,for 
it is found in the measure essentially1 
because a measure is of itself the      
determining and modifying rule of other 
things2 whereas in the things measured1 
it is found relatively1 that is in so   
far as they attain to the measure4      
,hence there can be nothing unmodified  
in the measure whereas the thing        
measured is unmodified if it fails to   

attain to the measure1 whether by       
deficiency or by excess4  ,now in all   
matters of appetite and action the      
measure is the end1 because the proper  
reason for all that we desire or do     
should be taken from the end1 as the    
,philosopher proves 7,phys4 ii1 #i74    
,therefore the end has a mode by itself1
 while the means take their mode from   
being proportionate to the end4 ,hence1 
according to the ,philosopher 7,polit4  
i1 #c71 in every art1 the desire for the
 end is endless and unlimited1 whereas  
there is a limit to the means3 thus the 
physician does not put limits to health1
 but makes it as perfect as he possibly 
can2 but he puts a limit to medicine1   
for he does not give as much medicine as
 he can1 but according as health demands
 so that if he give too much or too     
little1 the medicine would be           
immoderate4  ,again1 the end of all     
human actions and affections is the love
 of ,god1 whereby principally we attain 
to our last end1 as stated above 7,q4   

#bc1 ,a4 #f71 wherefore the mode in the 
love of ,god1 must not be taken as in a 
thing measured where we find too much or
 too little1 but as in the measure      
itself1 where there cannot be excess1   
and where the more the rule is attained 
the better it is1 so that the more we   
love ,god the better our love is4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that which is so by   
its essence takes precedence of that    
which is so through another1 wherefore  
the goodness of the measure which has   
the mode essentially1 takes precedence  
of the goodness of the thing measured1  
which has its mode through something    
else2 and so too1 charity1 which has a  
mode as a measure has1 stands before the
 other virtues1 which have a mode       
through being measured4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,as ,augustine adds in the same     
passage1 the measure of our love for    
,god is to love ,him with our whole     
heart1 that is to love ,him as much as  
,he can be loved1 and this belongs to   
the mode which is proper to the measure4

  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an affection1 whose 
object is subject to reason's judgment1 
should be measured by reason4 ,but the  
object of the ,divine love which is ,god
 surpasses the judgment of reason1      
wherefore it is not measured by reason  
but transcends it4 ,nor is there parity 
between the interior act and external   
acts of charity4 ,for the interior act  
of charity has the character of an end1 
since man's ultimate good consists in   
his soul cleaving to ,god1 according to 
,ps4 #gb3bh3 ,it is good for me to      
adhere to my ,god2 whereas the exterior 
acts are as means to the end1 and so    
have to be measured both according to   
charity and according to reason4        
,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1 
,art4 #g  ,whether ,it ,is ,more        
,meritorious to ,love an ,enemy ,than to
 ,love a ,friend8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem more meritorious to love an  
enemy than to love a friend4 ,for it is 
written 7,matt4 #e3df73 ,if you love    
them that love you1 what reward shall   

you have8 ,therefore it is not deserving
 of reward to love one's friend3        
whereas1 as the same passage proves1 to 
love one's enemy is deserving of a      
reward4 ,therefore it is more           
meritorious to love one's enemy than to 
love one's friend4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
an act is the more meritorious through  
proceeding from a greater charity4 ,but 
it belongs to the perfect children of   
,god to love their enemies1 whereas     
those also who have imperfect charity   
love their friends4 ,therefore it is    
more meritorious to love one's enemy    
than to love one's friend4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 where there is more effort for
 good1 there seems to be more merit1    
since every man shall receive his own   
reward according to his own labor 7#a   
,cor4 #c3h74 ,now a man has to make a   
greater effort to love his enemy than to
 love his friend1 because it is more    
difficult4 ,therefore it seems more     
meritorious to love one's enemy than to 
love one's friend4  ,on the contrary1   

,the better an action is1 the more      
meritorious it is4 ,now it is better to 
love one's friend1 since it is better to
 love a better man1 and the friend who  
loves you is better than the enemy who  
hates you4 ,therefore it is more        
meritorious to love one's friend than to
 love one's enemy4  ,i answer that1 ,god
 is the reason for our loving our       
neighbor out of charity1 as stated above
 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a74 ,when therefore it  
is asked which is better or more        
meritorious1 to love one's friend or    
one's enemy1 these two loves may be     
compared in two ways1 first1 on the part
 of our neighbor whom we love1 secondly1
 on the part of the reason for which we 
love him4  ,in the first way1 love of   
one's friend surpasses love of one's    
enemy1 because a friend is both better  
and more closely united to us1 so that  
he is a more suitable matter of love and
 consequently the act of love that      
passes over this matter1 is better1 and 
therefore its opposite is worse1 for it 

is worse to hate a friend than an enemy4
  ,in the second way1 however1 it is    
better to love one's enemy than one's   
friend1 and this for two reasons4       
,first1 because it is possible to love  
one's friend for another reason than    
,god1 whereas ,god is the only reason   
for loving one's enemy4 ,secondly1      
because if we suppose that both are     
loved for ,god1 our love for ,god is    
proved to be all the stronger through   
carrying a man's affections to things   
which are furthest from him1 namely1 to 
the love of his enemies1 even as the    
power of a furnace is proved to be the  
stronger1 according as it throws its    
heat to more distant objects4 ,hence our
 love for ,god is proved to be so much  
the stronger1 as the more difficult are 
the things we accomplish for its sake1  
just as the power of fire is so much the
 stronger1 as it is able to set fire to 
a less inflammable matter4  ,yet just as
 the same fire acts with greater force  
on what is near than on what is distant1

 so too1 charity loves with greater     
fervor those who are united to us than  
those who are far removed2 and in this  
respect the love of friends1 considered 
in itself1 is more ardent and better    
than the love of one's enemy4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,the words of ,our ,lord must 
be taken in their strict sense3 because 
the love of one's friends is not        
meritorious in ,god's sight when we love
 them merely because they are our       
friends3 and this would seem to be the  
case when we love our friends in such a 
way that we love not our enemies4 ,on   
the other hand the love of our friends  
is meritorious1 if we love them for     
,god's sake1 and not merely because they
 are our friends4  ,the ,reply to the   
other ,objections is evident from what  
has been said in the article1 because   
the two arguments that follow consider  
the reason for loving1 while the last   
considers the question on the part of   
those who are loved4   ,,eighth         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #h  

,whether ,it ,is ,more ,meritorious to  
,love ,one's ,neighbor ,than to ,love   
,god8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that it is more meritorious to love     
one's neighbor than to love ,god4 ,for  
the more meritorious thing would seem to
 be what the ,apostle preferred4 ,now   
the ,apostle preferred the love of our  
neighbor to the love of ,god1 according 
to ,rom4 #i3c3 ,i wished myself to be an
 anathema from ,christ for my brethren4 
,therefore it is more meritorious to    
love one's neighbor than to love ,god4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in a certain sense  
it seems to be less meritorious to love 
one's friend1 as stated above 7,a4 #g74 
,now ,god is our chief friend1 since ,he
 hath first loved us 7#a ,john #d3aj74  
,therefore it seems less meritorious to 
love ,god4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever
 is more difficult seems to be more     
virtuous and meritorious since virtue is
 about that which is difficult and good 
7,ethic4 ii1 #c74 ,now it is easier to  
love ,god than to love one's neighbor1  

both because all things love ,god       
naturally1 and because there is nothing 
unlovable in ,god1 and this cannot be   
said of one's neighbor4 ,therefore it is
 more meritorious to love one's neighbor
 than to love ,god4  ,on the contrary1  
,that on account of which a thing is    
such1 is yet more so4 ,now the love of  
one's neighbor is not meritorious1      
except by reason of his being loved for 
,god's sake4 ,therefore the love of ,god
 is more meritorious than the love of   
our neighbor4  ,i answer that1 ,this    
comparison may be taken in two ways4    
,first1 by considering both loves       
separately3 and then1 without doubt1 the
 love of ,god is the more meritorious1  
because a reward is due to it for its   
own sake1 since the ultimate reward is  
the enjoyment of ,god1 to ,whom the     
movement of the ,divine love tends3     
hence a reward is promised to him that  
loves ,god 7,john #ad3ba73 ,he that     
loveth ,me1 shall be loved of ,my       
,father1 and ,i will 4 4 4 manifest     

,myself to him4 ,secondly1 the          
comparison may be understood to be      
between the love of ,god alone on the   
one side1 and the love of one's neighbor
 for ,god's sake1 on the other4 ,in this
 way love of our neighbor includes love 
of ,god1 while love of ,god does not    
include love of our neighbor4 ,hence the
 comparison will be between perfect love
 of ,god1 extending also to our         
neighbor1 and inadequate and imperfect  
love of ,god1 for this commandment we   
have from ,god1 that he1 who loveth     
,god1 love also his brother 7#a ,john   
#d3ba74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to 
one gloss1 the ,apostle did not desire  
this1 viz4 to be severed from ,christ   
for his brethren1 when he was in a state
 of grace1 but had formerly desired it  
when he was in a state of unbelief1 so  
that we should not imitate him in this  
respect4  ,we may also reply1 with      
,chrysostom 7,de ,compunct4 i1 #h7      
99,hom4 xvi in ,ep4 ad ,rom4 that this  
does not prove the ,apostle to have     

loved his neighbor more than ,god1 but  
that he loved ,god more than himself4   
,for he wished to be deprived for a time
 of the ,divine fruition which pertains 
to love of one self1 in order that ,god 
might be honored in his neighbor1 which 
pertains to the love of ,god4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,a man's love for his friends 
is sometimes less meritorious in so far 
as he loves them for their sake1 so as  
to fall short of the true reason for the
 friendship of charity1 which is ,god4  
,hence that ,god be loved for ,his own  
sake does not diminish the merit1 but is
 the entire reason for merit4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,the good has1 more than the  
difficult1 to do with the reason of     
merit and virtue4 ,therefore it does not
 follow that whatever is more difficult 
is more meritorious1 but only what is   
more difficult1 and at the same time    
better4   ,,question #bh  ,,of ,,joy    
7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we must now     
consider the effects which result from  
the principal act of charity which is   

love1 and 7#a7 the interior effects1    
7#b7 the exterior effects4 ,as to the   
first1 three things have to be          
considered3 7#a7 ,joy1 7#b7 ,peace1 7#c7
 ,mercy4  ,under the first head there   
are four points of inquiry3  7#a7       
,whether joy is an effect of charity8   
7#b7 ,whether this kind of joy is       
compatible with sorrow8  7#c7 ,whether  
this joy can be full8  7#d7 ,whether it 
is a virtue8   ,,first ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,joy ,is ,effected in ,us by ,charity8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that joy  
is not effected in us by charity4 ,for  
the absence of what we love causes      
sorrow rather than joy4 ,but ,god1 ,whom
 we love by charity1 is absent from us1 
so long as we are in this state of life1
 since while we are in the body1 we are 
absent from the ,lord 7#b ,cor4 #e3f74  
,therefore charity causes sorrow in us  
rather than joy4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it
 is chiefly through charity that we     
merit happiness4 ,now mourning1 which   

pertains to sorrow1 is reckoned among   
those things whereby we merit happiness1
 according to ,matt4 #e3e3 ,blessed are 
they that mourn1 for they shall be      
comforted4 ,therefore sorrow1 rather    
than joy1 is an effect of charity4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity is a virtue 
distinct from hope1 as shown above 7,q4 
#ag1 ,a4 #f74 ,now joy is the effect of 
hope1 according to ,rom4 #ab3ab3        
,rejoicing in hope4 ,therefore it is not
 the effect of charity4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #e3e73  
,the charity of ,god is poured forth in 
our hearts by the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is 
given to us4 ,but joy is caused in us by
 the ,holy ,ghost according to ,rom4    
#ad3ag3 ,the kingdom of ,god is not meat
 and drink1 but justice and peace1 and  
joy in the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore     
charity is a cause of joy4  ,i answer   
that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#be1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c71 when we were    
treating of the passions1 joy and sorrow
 proceed from love1 but in contrary     

ways4 ,for joy is caused by love1 either
 through the presence of the thing      
loved1 or because the proper good of the
 thing loved exists and endures in it2  
and the latter is the case chiefly in   
the love of benevolence1 whereby a man  
rejoices in the well-being of his       
friend1 though he be absent4 ,on the    
other hand sorrow arises from love1     
either through the absence of the thing 
loved1 or because the loved object to   
which we wish well1 is deprived of its  
good or afflicted with some evil4 ,now  
charity is love of ,god1 ,whose good is 
unchangeable1 since ,he is ,his         
goodness1 and from the very fact that   
,he is loved1 ,he is in those who love  
,him by ,his most excellent effect1     
according to #a ,john #d3af3 ,he that   
abideth in charity1 abideth in ,god1 and
 ,god in him4 ,therefore spiritual joy1 
which is about ,god1 is caused by       
charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,so long as  
we are in the body1 we are said to be   
absent from the ,lord1 in comparison    

with that presence whereby ,he is       
present to some by the vision of sight2 
wherefore the ,apostle goes on to say   
7#b ,cor4 #e3f73 ,for we walk by faith  
and not by sight4 ,nevertheless1 even in
 this life1 ,he is present to those who 
love ,him1 by the indwelling of ,his    
grace4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the mourning  
that merits happiness1 is about those   
things that are contrary to happiness4  
,wherefore it amounts to the same that  
charity causes this mourning1 and this  
spiritual joy about ,god1 since to      
rejoice in a certain good amounts to the
 same as to grieve for things that are  
contrary to it4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there
 can be spiritual joy about ,god in two 
ways4 ,first1 when we rejoice in the    
,divine good considered in itself2      
secondly1 when we rejoice in the ,divine
 good as participated by us4 ,the former
 joy is the better1 and proceeds from   
charity chiefly3 while the latter joy   
proceeds from hope also1 whereby we look
 forward to enjoy the ,divine good1     

although this enjoyment itself1 whether 
perfect or imperfect1 is obtained       
according to the measure of one's       
charity4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #b  ,whether the        
,spiritual ,joy1 ,which ,results from   
,charity1 ,is ,compatible with an       
,admixture of ,sorrow8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that the spiritual joy   
that results from charity is compatible 
with an admixture of sorrow4 ,for it    
belongs to charity to rejoice in our    
neighbor's good1 according to #a ,cor4  
#ac3d1 #f3 ,charity 4 4 4 rejoiceth not 
in iniquity1 but rejoiceth with the     
truth4 ,but this joy is compatible with 
an admixture of sorrow1 according to    
,rom4 #ab3ae3 ,rejoice with them that   
rejoice1 weep with them that weep4      
,therefore the spiritual joy of charity 
is compatible with an admixture of      
sorrow4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according  
to ,gregory 7,hom4 in ,evang4 xxxiv71   
penance consists in deploring past sins1
 and in not committing again those we   

have deplored4 ,but there is no true    
penance without charity4 ,therefore the 
joy of charity has an admixture of      
sorrow4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is      
through charity that man desires to be  
with ,christ according to ,phil4 #a3bc3 
,having a desire to be dissolved and to 
be with ,christ4 ,now this desire gives 
rise1 in man1 to a certain sadness1     
according to ,ps4 #aai3e3 ,woe is me    
that my sojourning is prolonged6        
,therefore the joy of charity admits of 
a seasoning of sorrow4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,the joy of charity is joy    
about the ,divine wisdom4 ,now such like
 joy has no admixture of sorrow1        
according to ,wis4 #h3af3 ,her          
conversation hath no bitterness4        
,therefore the joy of charity is        
incompatible with an admixture of       
sorrow4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c71 a twofold joy in 
,god arises from charity4 ,one1 the more
 excellent1 is proper to charity2 and   
with this joy we rejoice in the ,divine 

good considered in itself4 ,this joy of 
charity is incompatible with an         
admixture of sorrow1 even as the good   
which is its object is incompatible with
 any admixture of evil3 hence the       
,apostle says 7,phil4 #d3d73 ,rejoice in
 the ,lord always4  ,the other is the   
joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the
 ,divine good as participated by us4    
,this participation can be hindered by  
anything contrary to it1 wherefore1 in  
this respect1 the joy of charity is     
compatible with an admixture of sorrow1 
in so far as a man grieves for that     
which hinders the participation of the  
,divine good1 either in us or in our    
neighbor1 whom we love as ourselves4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our neighbor does not 
weep save on account of some evil4 ,now 
every evil implies lack of participation
 in the sovereign good3 hence charity   
makes us weep with our neighbor in so   
far as he is hindered from participating
 in the ,divine good4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,our sins divide between us and ,god1   

according to ,isa4 #ei3b2 wherefore this
 is the reason why we grieve for our    
past sins1 or for those of others1 in so
 far as they hinder us from             
participating in the ,divine good4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although in this      
unhappy abode we participate1 after a   
fashion1 in the ,divine good1 by        
knowledge and love1 yet the unhappiness 
of this life is an obstacle to a perfect
 participation in the ,divine good3     
hence this very sorrow1 whereby a man   
grieves for the delay of glory1 is      
connected with the hindrance to a       
participation of the ,divine good4      
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1   
,art4 #c  ,whether the ,spiritual ,joy  
,which ,proceeds from ,charity1 ,can ,be
 ,filled8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that the spiritual joy which proceeds  
from charity cannot be filled4 ,for the 
more we rejoice in ,god1 the more is our
 joy in ,him filled4 ,but we can never  
rejoice in ,him as much as it is meet   
that we should rejoice in ,god1 since   

,his goodness which is infinite1        
surpasses the creature's joy which is   
finite4 ,therefore joy in ,god can never
 be filled4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that   
which is filled cannot be increased4    
,but the joy1 even of the blessed1 can  
be increased1 since one's joy is greater
 than another's4 ,therefore joy in ,god 
cannot be filled in a creature4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 comprehension seems to be 
nothing else than the fulness of        
knowledge4 ,now1 just as the cognitive  
power of a creature is finite1 so is its
 appetitive power4 ,since therefore ,god
 cannot be comprehended by any creature1
 it seems that no creature's joy in ,god
 can be filled4  ,on the contrary1 ,our 
,lord said to ,his disciples 7,john     
#ae3aa73 ,that ,my joy may be in you1   
and your joy may be filled4  ,i answer  
that1 ,fulness of joy can be understood 
in two ways2 first1 on the part of the  
thing rejoiced in1 so that one rejoice  
in it as much as it is meet that one    
should rejoice in it1 and thus ,god's   

joy alone in ,himself is filled1 because
 it is infinite2 and this is condignly  
due to the infinite goodness of ,god3   
but the joy of any creature must needs  
be finite4 ,secondly1 fulness of joy may
 be understood on the part of the one   
who rejoices4 ,now joy is compared to   
desire1 as rest to movement1 as stated  
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 
when we were treating of the passions3  
and rest is full when there is no more  
movement4 ,hence joy is full1 when there
 remains nothing to be desired4 ,but as 
long as we are in this world1 the       
movement of desire does not cease in us1
 because it still remains possible for  
us to approach nearer to ,god by grace1 
as was shown above 7,q4 #bd1 ,,aa4 #d1  
#g74 ,when once1 however1 perfect       
happiness has been attained1 nothing    
will remain to be desired1 because then 
there will be full enjoyment of ,god1   
wherein man will obtain whatever he had 
desired1 even with regard to other      
goods1 according to ,ps4 #ajb3e3 ,who   

satisfieth thy desire with good things4 
,hence desire will be at rest1 not only 
our desire for ,god1 but all our        
desires3 so that the joy of the blessed 
is full to perfection--indeed over-full1
 since they will obtain more than they  
were capable of desiring3 for neither   
hath it entered into the heart of man1  
what things ,god hath prepared for them 
that love ,him 7#a ,cor4 #b3i74 ,this is
 what is meant by the words of ,luke    
#f3ch3 ,good measure and pressed down1  
and shaken together1 and running over   
shall they give into your bosom4 ,yet1  
since no creature is capable of the joy 
condignly due to ,god1 it follows that  
this perfectly full joy is not taken    
into man1 but1 on the contrary1 man     
enters into it1 according to ,matt4     
#be3ba3 ,enter into the joy of thy      
,lord4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument 
takes the fulness of joy in reference to
 the thing in which we rejoice4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,when each one attains to     
happiness he will reach the term        

appointed to him by ,divine             
predestination1 and nothing further will
 remain to which he may tend1 although  
by reaching that term1 some will        
approach nearer to ,god than others4    
,hence each one's joy will be full with 
regard to himself1 because his desire   
will be fully set at rest2 yet one's joy
 will be greater than another's1 on     
account of a fuller participation of the
 ,divine happiness4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,comprehension denotes fulness of       
knowledge in respect of the thing known1
 so that it is known as much as it can  
be4 ,there is however a fulness of      
knowledge in respect of the knower1 just
 as we have said of joy4 ,wherefore the 
,apostle says 7,col4 #a3i73 ,that you   
may be filled with the knowledge of ,his
 will1 in all wisdom and spiritual      
understanding4   ,,fourth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,joy ,is a ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that joy is a virtue4 ,for   
vice is contrary to virtue4 ,now sorrow 

is set down as a vice1 as in the case of
 sloth and envy4 ,therefore joy also    
should be accounted a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 as love and hope are         
passions1 the object of which is good1  
so also is joy4 ,now love and hope are  
reckoned to be virtues4 ,therefore joy  
also should be reckoned a virtue4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 the precepts of the ,law 
are about acts of virtue4 ,but we are   
commanded to rejoice in the ,lord1      
according to ,phil4 #d3d3 ,rejoice in   
the ,lord always4 ,therefore joy is a   
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is not   
numbered among the theological virtues1 
nor among the moral1 nor among the      
intellectual virtues1 as is evident from
 what has been said above 7,i-,,ii1     
,,qq4 #eg1 #fj1 #fb74  ,i answer that1  
,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1     
,,aa4 #b1 #d71 virtue is an operative   
habit1 wherefore by its very nature it  
has an inclination to a certain act4    
,now it may happen that from the same   
habit there proceed several ordinate and

 homogeneous acts1 each of which follows
 from another4 ,and since the subsequent
 acts do not proceed from the virtuous  
habit except through the preceding act1 
hence it is that the virtue is defined  
and named in reference to that preceding
 act1 although those other acts also    
proceed from the virtue4 ,now it is     
evident from what we have said about the
 passions 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,,aa4 #b1  
#d7 that love is the first affection of 
the appetitive power1 and that desire   
and joy follow from it4 ,hence the same 
virtuous habit inclines us to love and  
desire the beloved good1 and to rejoice 
in it4 ,but in as much as love is the   
first of these acts1 that virtue takes  
its name1 not from joy1 nor from desire1
 but from love1 and is called charity4  
,hence joy is not a virtue distinct from
 charity1 but an act1 or effect1 of     
charity3 for which reason it is numbered
 among the ,fruits 7,gal4 #e3bb74       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sorrow which is a 
vice is caused by inordinate self-love1 

and this is not a special vice1 but a   
general source of the vices1 as stated  
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #d72 so    
that it was necessary to account certain
 particular sorrows as special vices1   
because they do not arise from a        
special1 but from a general vice4 ,on   
the other hand love of ,god is accounted
 a special virtue1 namely charity1 to   
which joy must be referred1 as its      
proper act1 as stated above 7here and   
,a4 #b74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,hope        
proceeds from love even as joy does1 but
 hope adds1 on the part of the object1 a
 special character1 viz4 difficult1 and 
possible to obtain2 for which reason it 
is accounted a special virtue4 ,on the  
other hand joy does not add to love any 
special aspect1 that might cause a      
special virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the  
,law prescribes joy1 as being an act of 
charity1 albeit not its first act4      
,,question #bi  ,,of ,,peace 7,four     
,articles7  ,we must now consider       
,peace1 under which head there are four 

points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether peace 
is the same as concord8  7#b7 ,whether  
all things desire peace8  7#c7 ,whether 
peace is an effect of charity8  7#d7    
,whether peace is a virtue8   ,,first   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,peace ,is the ,same ,as       
,concord8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that peace is the same as concord4 ,for
 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1   
#ac73 ,peace among men is well ordered  
concord4 ,now we are speaking here of no
 other peace than that of men4          
,therefore peace is the same as concord4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 concord is union  
of wills4 ,now the nature of peace      
consists in such like union1 for        
,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 xi7 that   
peace unites all1 and makes them of one 
mind4 ,therefore peace is the same as   
concord4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things    
whose opposites are identical are       
themselves identical4 ,now the one same 
thing is opposed to concord and peace1  
viz4 dissension2 hence it is written 7#a

 ,cor4 #af3cc73 ,god is not the ,god of 
dissension but of peace4 ,therefore     
peace is the same as concord4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,there can be concord in evil 
between wicked men4 ,but there is no    
peace to the wicked 7,isa4 #dh3bb74     
,therefore peace is not the same as     
concord4  ,i answer that1 ,peace        
includes concord and adds something     
thereto4 ,hence wherever peace is1 there
 is concord1 but there is not peace1    
wherever there is concord1 if we give   
peace its proper meaning4  ,for concord1
 properly speaking1 is between one man  
and another1 in so far as the wills of  
various hearts agree together in        
consenting to the same thing4 ,now the  
heart of one man may happen to tend to  
diverse things1 and this in two ways4   
,first1 in respect of the diverse       
appetitive powers3 thus the sensitive   
appetite tends sometimes to that which  
is opposed to the rational appetite1    
according to ,gal4 #e3ag3 ,the flesh    
lusteth against the spirit4 ,secondly1  

in so far as one and the same appetitive
 power tends to diverse objects of      
appetite1 which it cannot obtain all at 
the same time3 so that there must needs 
be a clashing of the movements of the   
appetite4 ,now the union of such        
movements is essential to peace1 because
 man's heart is not at peace1 so long as
 he has not what he wants1 or if1 having
 what he wants1 there still remains     
something for him to want1 and which he 
cannot have at the same time4 ,on the   
other hand this union is not essential  
to concord3 wherefore concord denotes   
union of appetites among various        
persons1 while peace denotes1 in        
addition to this union1 the union of the
 appetites even in one man4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking there  
of that peace which is between one man  
and another1 and he says that this peace
 is concord1 not indeed any kind of     
concord1 but that which is well ordered1
 through one man agreeing with another  
in respect of something befitting to    

both of them4 ,for if one man concord   
with another1 not of his own accord1 but
 through being forced1 as it were1 by   
the fear of some evil that besets him1  
such concord is not really peace1       
because the order of each concordant is 
not observed1 but is disturbed by some  
fear-inspiring cause4 ,for this reason  
he premises that peace is tranquillity  
of order1 which tranquillity consists in
 all the appetitive movements in one man
 being set at rest together4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,if one man consent to the    
same thing together with another man1   
his consent is nevertheless not         
perfectly united to himself1 unless at  
the same time all his appetitive        
movements be in agreement4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,a twofold dissension is opposed to
 peace1 namely dissension between a man 
and himself1 and dissension between one 
man and another4 ,the latter alone is   
opposed to concord4   ,,second ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,all ,things ,desire ,peace8  ,objection

 #a3 ,it would seem that not all things 
desire peace4 ,for1 according to        
,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 xi71 peace      
unites consent4 ,but there cannot be    
unity of consent in things which are    
devoid of knowledge4 ,therefore such    
things cannot desire peace4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 the appetite does not tend to 
opposite things at the same time4 ,now  
many desire war and dissension4         
,therefore all men do not desire peace4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 good alone is an    
object of appetite4 ,but a certain peace
 is1 seemingly1 evil1 else ,our ,lord   
would not have said 7,matt4 #aj3cd73 ,i 
came not to send peace4 ,therefore all  
things do not desire peace4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 that which all desire is1     
seemingly1 the sovereign good which is  
the last end4 ,but this is not true of  
peace1 since it is attainable even by a 
wayfarer2 else ,our ,lord would vainly  
command 7,mk4 #i3di73 ,have peace among 
you4 ,therefore all things do not desire
 peace4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine   

says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ab1 #ad7 that
 all things desire peace3 and ,dionysius
 says the same 7,div4 ,nom4 xi74  ,i    
answer that1 ,from the very fact that a 
man desires a certain thing it follows  
that he desires to obtain what he       
desires1 and1 in consequence1 to remove 
whatever may be an obstacle to his      
obtaining it4 ,now a man may be hindered
 from obtaining the good he desires1 by 
a contrary desire either of his own or  
of some other1 and both are removed by  
peace1 as stated above4 ,hence it       
follows of necessity that whoever       
desires anything desires peace1 in so   
far as he who desires anything1 desires 
to attain1 with tranquillity and without
 hindrance1 to that which he desires3   
and this is what is meant by peace which
 ,augustine defines 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1
 #ac7 the tranquillity of order4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,peace denotes union not only
 of the intellective or rational        
appetite1 or of the animal appetite1 in 
both of which consent may be found1 but 

also of the natural appetite4 ,hence    
,dionysius says that peace is the cause 
of consent and of connaturalness1 where 
consent denotes the union of appetites  
proceeding from knowledge1 and          
connaturalness1 the union of natural    
appetites4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even those
 who seek war and dissension1 desire    
nothing but peace1 which they deem      
themselves not to have4 ,for as we      
stated above1 there is no peace when a  
man concords with another man counter to
 what he would prefer4 ,consequently men
 seek by means of war to break this     
concord1 because it is a defective      
peace1 in order that they may obtain    
peace1 where nothing is contrary to     
their will4 ,hence all wars are waged   
that men may find a more perfect peace  
than that which they had heretofore4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,peace gives calm and  
unity to the appetite4 ,now just as the 
appetite may tend to what is good       
simply1 or to what is good apparently1  
so too1 peace may be either true or     

apparent4 ,there can be no true peace   
except where the appetite is directed to
 what is truly good1 since every evil1  
though it may appear good in a way1 so  
as to calm the appetite in some respect1
 has1 nevertheless many defects1 which  
cause the appetite to remain restless   
and disturbed4 ,hence true peace is only
 in good men and about good things4 ,the
 peace of the wicked is not a true peace
 but a semblance thereof1 wherefore it  
is written 7,wis4 #ad3bb73 ,whereas they
 lived in a great war of ignorance1 they
 call so many and so great evils peace4 
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since true peace is   
only about good things1 as the true good
 is possessed in two ways1 perfectly and
 imperfectly1 so there is a twofold true
 peace4 ,one is perfect peace4 ,it      
consists in the perfect enjoyment of the
 sovereign good1 and unites all one's   
desires by giving them rest in one      
object4 ,this is the last end of the    
rational creature1 according to ,ps4    
#adg3c3 ,who hath placed peace in thy   

borders4 ,the other is imperfect peace1 
which may be had in this world1 for     
though the chief movement of the soul   
finds rest in ,god1 yet there are       
certain things within and without which 
disturb the peace4   ,,third ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,peace ,is the ,proper ,effect of       
,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that peace is not the proper effect of 
charity4 ,for one cannot have charity   
without sanctifying grace4 ,but some    
have peace who have not sanctifying     
grace1 thus heathens sometimes have     
peace4 ,therefore peace is not the      
effect of charity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
if a certain thing is caused by charity1
 its contrary is not compatible with    
charity4 ,but dissension1 which is      
contrary to peace1 is compatible with   
charity1 for we find that even holy     
doctors1 such as ,jerome and ,augustine1
 dissented in some of their opinions4   
,we also read that ,paul and ,barnabas  
dissented from one another 7,acts #ae74 

,therefore it seems that peace is not   
the effect of charity4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 the same thing is not the     
proper effect of different things4 ,now 
peace is the effect of justice1         
according to ,isa4 #cb3ag3 ,and the work
 of justice shall be peace4 ,therefore  
it is not the effect of charity4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4      
#aah3afe73 ,much peace have they that   
love ,thy ,law4  ,i answer that1 ,peace 
implies a twofold union1 as stated above
 7,a4 #a74 ,the first is the result of  
one's own appetites being directed to   
one object2 while the other results from
 one's own appetite being united with   
the appetite of another3 and each of    
these unions is effected by charity--the
 first1 in so far as man loves ,god with
 his whole heart1 by referring all      
things to ,him1 so that all his desires 
tend to one object--the second1 in so   
far as we love our neighbor as          
ourselves1 the result being that we wish
 to fulfil our neighbor's will as though

 it were ours3 hence it is reckoned a   
sign of friendship if people make choice
 of the same things 7,ethic4 ix1 #d71   
and ,tully says 7,de ,amicitia7 that    
friends like and dislike the same things
 7,sallust1 ,catilin47  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,without sin no one falls from a state 
of sanctifying grace1 for it turns man  
away from his due end by making him     
place his end in something undue3 so    
that his appetite does not cleave       
chiefly to the true final good1 but to  
some apparent good4 ,hence1 without     
sanctifying grace1 peace is not real but
 merely apparentapparent4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4  
ix1 #f7 friends need not agree in       
opinion1 but only upon such goods as    
conduce to life1 and especially upon    
such as are important2 because          
dissension in small matters is scarcely 
accounted dissension4 ,hence nothing    
hinders those who have charity from     
holding different opinions4 ,nor is this
 an obstacle to peace1 because opinions 

concern the intellect1 which precedes   
the appetite that is united by peace4   
,in like manner if there be concord as  
to goods of importance1 dissension with 
regard to some that are of little       
account is not contrary to charity3 for 
such a dissension proceeds from a       
difference of opinion1 because one man  
thinks that the particular good1 which  
is the object of dissension1 belongs to 
the good about which they agree1 while  
the other thinks that it does not4      
,accordingly such like dissension about 
very slight matters and about opinions  
is inconsistent with a state of perfect 
peace1 wherein the truth will be known  
fully1 and every desire fulfilled2 but  
it is not inconsistent with the         
imperfect peace of the wayfarer4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,peace is the work of justice
 indirectly1 in so far as justice       
removes the obstacles to peace3 but it  
is the work of charity directly1 since  
charity1 according to its very nature1  
causes peace4 ,for love is a unitive    

force as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4   
iv73 and peace is the union of the      
appetite's inclinations4   ,,fourth     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,peace ,is a ,virtue8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that peace
 is a virtue4 ,for nothing is a matter  
of precept1 unless it be an act of      
virtue4 ,but there are precepts about   
keeping peace1 for example3 ,have peace 
among you 7,mk4 #i3di74 ,therefore peace
 is a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 we do
 not merit except by acts of virtue4    
,now it is meritorious to keep peace1   
according to ,matt4 #e3i3 ,blessed are  
the peacemakers1 for they shall be      
called the children of ,god4 ,therefore 
peace is a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
vices are opposed to virtues4 ,but      
dissensions1 which are contrary to      
peace1 are numbered among the vices     
7,gal4 #e3bj74 ,therefore peace is a    
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,virtue is   
not the last end1 but the way thereto4  
,but peace is the last end1 in a sense1 

as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 
#aa74 ,therefore peace is not a virtue4 
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#bh1 ,a4 #d71 when a number of acts all 
proceeding uniformly from an agent1     
follow one from the other1 they all     
arise from the same virtue1 nor do they 
each have a virtue from which they      
proceed1 as may be seen in corporeal    
things4 ,for1 though fire by heating1   
both liquefies and rarefies1 there are  
not two powers in fire1 one of          
liquefaction1 the other of rarefaction3 
and fire produces all such actions by   
its own power of calefaction4  ,since   
then charity causes peace precisely     
because it is love of ,god and of our   
neighbor1 as shown above 7,a4 #c71 there
 is no other virtue except charity whose
 proper act is peace1 as we have also   
said in reference to joy 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4  
#d74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we are commanded
 to keep peace because it is an act of  
charity2 and for this reason too it is a
 meritorious act4 ,hence it is placed   

among the beatitudes1 which are acts of 
perfect virtue1 as stated above         
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,it is
 also numbered among the fruits1 in so  
far as it is a final good1 having       
spiritual sweetness4  ,this suffices for
 the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,several vices are     
opposed to one virtue in respect of its 
various acts3 so that not only is hatred
 opposed to charity1 in respect of its  
act which is love1 but also sloth and   
envy1 in respect of joy1 and dissension 
in respect of peace4   ,,question #cj   
,,of ,,mercy99 99,the one ,latin word   
misericordia signifies either pity or   
mercy4 ,the distinction between these   
two is that pity may stand either for   
the act or for the virtue1 whereas mercy
 stands only for the virtue4 7,in ,four 
,articles7  ,we must now go on to       
consider ,mercy1 under which head there 
are four points of inquiry3  7#a7       
,whether evil is the cause of mercy on  
the part of the person pitied8  7#b7 ,to

 whom does it belong to pity8  7#c7     
,whether mercy is a virtue8  7#d7       
,whether it is the greatest of virtues8 
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cj1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,evil ,is ,properly  
the ,motive of ,mercy8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that1 properly speaking1 
evil is not the motive of mercy4 ,for1  
as shown above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #a2        
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #a1 ad #d2 ,i1 ,q4
 #dh1 ,a4 #f71 fault is an evil rather  
than punishment4 ,now fault provokes    
indignation rather than mercy4          
,therefore evil does not excite mercy4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 cruelty and         
harshness seem to excel other evils4    
,now the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1  
#h7 that harshness does not call for    
pity but drives it away4 ,therefore     
evil1 as such1 is not the motive of     
mercy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 signs of    
evils are not true evils4 ,but signs of 
evils excite one to mercy1 as the       
,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii1 #h74    
,therefore evil1 properly speaking1 is  

not an incentive to mercy4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide    
,orth4 ii1 #b7 that mercy is a kind of  
sorrow4 ,now evil is the motive of      
sorrow4 ,therefore it is the motive of  
mercy4  ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine  
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #e71 mercy is  
heartfelt sympathy for another's        
distress1 impelling us to succor him if 
we can4 ,for mercy takes its name       
misericordia from denoting a man's      
compassionate heart 7miserum cor7 for   
another's unhappiness4 ,now unhappiness 
is opposed to happiness3 and it is      
essential to beatitude or happiness that
 one should obtain what one wishes2 for1
 according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4    
xiii1 #e71 happy is he who has whatever 
he desires1 and desires nothing amiss4  
,hence1 on the other hand1 it belongs to
 unhappiness that a man should suffer   
what he wishes not4  ,now a man wishes a
 thing in three ways3 first1 by his     
natural appetite2 thus all men naturally
 wish to be and to live3 secondly1 a man

 wishes a thing from deliberate choice3 
thirdly1 a man wishes a thing1 not in   
itself1 but in its cause1 thus1 if a man
 wishes to eat what is bad for him1 we  
say that1 in a way1 he wishes to be ill4
  ,accordingly the motive of mercy1     
being something pertaining to misery1   
is1 in the first way1 anything contrary 
to the will's natural appetite1 namely  
corruptive or distressing evils1 the    
contrary of which man desires naturally1
 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4
 ii1 #h7 that pity is sorrow for a      
visible evil1 whether corruptive or     
distressing4 ,secondly1 such like evils 
are yet more provocative of pity if they
 are contrary to deliberate choice1     
wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 
ii1 #h7 that evil excites our pity when 
it is the result of an accident1 as when
 something turns out ill1 whereas we    
hoped well of it4 ,thirdly1 they cause  
yet greater pity1 if they are entirely  
contrary to the will1 as when evil      
befalls a man who has always striven to 

do well3 wherefore the ,philosopher says
 7,rhet4 ii1 #h7 that we pity most the  
distress of one who suffers             
undeservedly4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is  
essential to fault that it be voluntary2
 and in this respect it deserves        
punishment rather than mercy4 ,since1   
however1 fault may be1 in a way1 a      
punishment1 through having something    
connected with it that is against the   
sinner's will1 it may1 in this respect1 
call for mercy4 ,it is in this sense    
that we pity and commiserate sinners4   
,thus ,gregory says in a homily 7,hom4  
in ,evang4 xxxiv7 that true godliness is
 not disdainful but compassionate1 and  
again it is written 7,matt4 #i3cf7 that 
,jesus seeing the multitudes1 had       
compassion on them3 because they were   
distressed1 and lying like sheep that   
have no shepherd4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3     
,since pity is sympathy for another's   
distress1 it is directed1 properly      
speaking1 towards another1 and not to   
oneself1 except figuratively1 like      

justice1 according as a man is          
considered to have various parts        
7,ethic4 v1 #aa74 ,thus it is written   
7,ecclus4 #cj3bd73 ,have pity on thy own
 soul1 pleasing ,god 99,cf4 ,q4 #ajf1   
,a4 #c1 ad #a4  ,accordingly just as1   
properly speaking1 a man does not pity  
himself1 but suffers in himself1 as when
 we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves1
 so too1 in the case of those who are so
 closely united to us1 as to be part of 
ourselves1 such as our children or our  
parents1 we do not pity their distress1 
but suffer as for our own sores2 in     
which sense the ,philosopher says that  
harshness drives pity away4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,just as pleasure results from
 hope and memory of good things1 so does
 sorrow arise from the prospect or the  
recollection of evil things2 though not 
so keenly as when they are present to   
the senses4 ,hence the signs of evil    
move us to pity1 in so far as they      
represent as present1 the evil that     
excites our pity4   ,,second ,,article  

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
the ,reason for ,taking ,pity ,is a     
,defect in the ,person ,who ,pities8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
reason for taking pity is not a defect  
in the person who takes pity4 ,for it is
 proper to ,god to be merciful1         
wherefore it is written 7,ps4 #add3i73  
,his tender mercies are over all ,his   
works4 ,but there is no defect in ,god4 
,therefore a defect cannot be the reason
 for taking pity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
if a defect is the reason for taking    
pity1 those in whom there is most       
defect1 must needs take most pity4 ,but 
this is false3 for the ,philosopher says
 7,rhet4 ii1 #h7 that those who are in a
 desperate state are pitiless4          
,therefore it seems that the reason for 
taking pity is not a defect in the      
person who pities4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
to be treated with contempt is to be    
defective4 ,but the ,philosopher says   
7,rhet4 ii1 #h7 that those who are      
disposed to contumely are pitiless4     

,therefore the reason for taking pity1  
is not a defect in the person who       
pities4  ,on the contrary1 ,pity is a   
kind of sorrow4 ,but a defect is the    
reason of sorrow1 wherefore those who   
are in bad health give way to sorrow    
more easily1 as we shall say further on 
7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,therefore the
 reason why one takes pity is a defect  
in oneself4  ,i answer that1 ,since pity
 is grief for another's distress1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #a71 from the very    
fact that a person takes pity on anyone1
 it follows that another's distress     
grieves him4 ,and since sorrow or grief 
is about one's own ills1 one grieves or 
sorrows for another's distress1 in so   
far as one looks upon another's distress
 as one's own4  ,now this happens in two
 ways3 first1 through union of the      
affections1 which is the effect of love4
 ,for1 since he who loves another looks 
upon his friend as another self1 he     
counts his friend's hurt as his own1 so 
that he grieves for his friend's hurt as

 though he were hurt himself4 ,hence the
 ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ix1 #d7 reckons  
grieving with one's friend as being one 
of the signs of friendship1 and the     
,apostle says 7,rom4 #ab3ae73 ,rejoice  
with them that rejoice1 weep with them  
that weep4  ,secondly1 it happens       
through real union1 for instance when   
another's evil comes near to us1 so as  
to pass to us from him4 ,hence the      
,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #h7 that  
men pity such as are akin to them1 and  
the like1 because it makes them realize 
that the same may happen to themselves4 
,this also explains why the old and the 
wise who consider that they may fall    
upon evil times1 as also feeble and     
timorous persons1 are more inclined to  
pity3 whereas those who deem themselves 
happy1 and so far powerful as to think  
themselves in no danger of suffering any
 hurt1 are not so inclined to pity4     
,accordingly a defect is always the     
reason for taking pity1 either because  
one looks upon another's defect as one's

 own1 through being united to him by    
love1 or on account of the possibility  
of suffering in the same way4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,god takes pity on us through 
love alone1 in as much as ,he loves us  
as belonging to ,him4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,those who are already in infinite      
distress1 do not fear to suffer more1   
wherefore they are without pity4 ,in    
like manner this applies to those also  
who are in great fear1 for they are so  
intent on their own passion1 that they  
pay no attention to the suffering of    
others4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those who are
 disposed to contumely1 whether through 
having been contemned1 or because they  
wish to contemn others1 are incited to  
anger and daring1 which are manly       
passions and arouse the human spirit to 
attempt difficult things4 ,hence they   
make a man think that he is going to    
suffer something in the future1 so that 
while they are disposed in that way they
 are pitiless1 according to ,prov4      
#bg3d3 ,anger hath no mercy1 nor fury   

when it breaketh forth4 ,for the same   
reason the proud are without pity1      
because they despise others1 and think  
them wicked1 so that they account them  
as suffering deservedly whatever they   
suffer4 ,hence ,gregory says 7,hom4 in  
,evang4 xxxiv7 that false godliness1    
i4e4 of the proud1 is not compassionate 
but disdainful4   ,,third ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,mercy ,is a ,virtue8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that mercy is not a      
virtue4 ,for the chief part of virtue is
 choice as the ,philosopher states      
7,ethic4 ii1 #e74 ,now choice is the    
desire of what has been already         
counselled 7,ethic4 iii1 #b74 ,therefore
 whatever hinders counsel cannot be     
called a virtue4 ,but mercy hinders     
counsel1 according to the saying of     
,sallust 7,catilin473 ,all those that   
take counsel about matters of doubt1    
should be free from 4 4 4 anger 4 4 4   
and mercy1 because the mind does not    
easily see aright1 when these things    

stand in the way4 ,therefore mercy is   
not a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      
nothing contrary to virtue is           
praiseworthy4 ,but nemesis is contrary  
to mercy1 as the ,philosopher states    
7,rhet4 ii1 #i71 and yet it is a        
praiseworthy passion 7,rhet4 ii1 #i74   
,therefore mercy is not a virtue4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 joy and peace are not    
special virtues1 because they result    
from charity1 as stated above 7,q4 #bh1 
,a4 #d2 ,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #d74 ,now mercy1   
also1 results from charity2 for it is   
out of charity that we weep with them   
that weep1 as we rejoice with them that 
rejoice4 ,therefore mercy is not a      
special virtue4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1    
since mercy belongs to the appetitive   
power1 it is not an intellectual virtue1
 and1 since it has not ,god for its     
object1 neither is it a theological     
virtue4 ,moreover it is not a moral     
virtue1 because neither is it about     
operations1 for this belongs to justice2
 nor is it about passions1 since it is  

not reduced to one of the twelve means  
mentioned by the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
ii1 #g74 ,therefore mercy is not a      
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine   
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #e73 ,cicero in
 praising ,caesar expresses himself much
 better and in a fashion at once more   
humane and more in accordance with      
religious feeling1 when he says3 ',of   
all thy virtues none is more marvelous  
or more graceful than thy mercy4'       
,therefore mercy is a virtue4  ,i answer
 that1 ,mercy signifies grief for       
another's distress4 ,now this grief may 
denote1 in one way1 a movement of the   
sensitive appetite1 in which case mercy 
is not a virtue but a passion2 whereas1 
in another way1 it may denote a movement
 of the intellective appetite1 in as    
much as one person's evil is displeasing
 to another4 ,this movement may be ruled
 in accordance with reason1 and in      
accordance with this movement regulated 
by reason1 the movement of the lower    
appetite may be regulated4 ,hence       

,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #e7 
that this movement of the mind 7viz4    
mercy7 obeys the reason1 when mercy is  
vouchsafed in such a way that justice is
 safeguarded1 whether we give to the    
needy or forgive the repentant4 ,and    
since it is essential to human virtue   
that the movements of the soul should be
 regulated by reason1 as was shown above
 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e71 it   
follows that mercy is a virtue4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,the words of ,sallust are to 
be understood as applying to the mercy  
which is a passion unregulated by       
reason3 for thus it impedes the         
counselling of reason1 by making it     
wander from justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,the ,philosopher is speaking there of  
pity and nemesis1 considered1 both of   
them1 as passions4 ,they are contrary to
 one another on the part of their       
respective estimation of another's      
evils1 for which pity grieves1 in so far
 as it esteems someone to suffer        
undeservedly1 whereas nemesis rejoices1 

in so far as it esteems someone to      
suffer deservedly1 and grieves1 if      
things go well with the undeserving3    
both of these are praiseworthy and come 
from the same disposition of character  
7,rhet4 ii1 #i74 ,properly speaking1    
however1 it is envy which is opposed to 
pity1 as we shall state further on 7,q4 
#cf1 ,a4 #c74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,joy and
 peace add nothing to the aspect of good
 which is the object of charity1        
wherefore they do not require any other 
virtue besides charity4 ,but mercy      
regards a certain special aspect1 namely
 the misery of the person pitied4       
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,mercy1 considered as a
 virtue1 is a moral virtue having       
relation to the passions1 and it is     
reduced to the mean called nemesis1     
because they both proceed from the same 
character 7,rhet4 ii1 #i74 ,now the     
,philosopher proposes these means not as
 virtues1 but as passions1 because1 even
 as passions1 they are praiseworthy4    
,yet nothing prevents them from         

proceeding from some elective habit1 in 
which case they assume the character of 
a virtue4   ,,fourth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,mercy ,is the ,greatest of the         
,virtues8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that mercy is the greatest of the      
virtues4 ,for the worship of ,god seems 
a most virtuous act4 ,but mercy is      
preferred before the worship of ,god1   
according to ,osee #f3f and ,matt4      
#ab3g3 ,i have desired mercy and not    
sacrifice4 ,therefore mercy is the      
greatest virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 on
 the words of #a ,tim4 #d3h3 ,godliness 
is profitable to all things1 a gloss    
says3 ,the sum total of a ,christian's  
rule of life consists in mercy and      
godliness4 ,now the ,christian rule of  
life embraces every virtue4 ,therefore  
the sum total of all virtues is         
contained in mercy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 ,virtue is that which makes its subject
 good1 according to the ,philosopher4   
,therefore the more a virtue makes a man

 like ,god1 the better is that virtue3  
since man is the better for being more  
like ,god4 ,now this is chiefly the     
result of mercy1 since of ,god is it    
said 7,ps4 #add3i7 that ,his tender     
mercies are over all ,his works1 and    
7,luke #f3cf7 ,our ,lord said3 ,be ye 4 
4 4 merciful1 as your ,father also is   
merciful4 ,therefore mercy is the       
greatest of virtues4  ,on the contrary1 
,the ,apostle after saying 7,col4       
#c3ab73 ,put ye on 4 4 4 as the elect of
 ,god 4 4 4 the bowels of mercy1 etc41  
adds 7,col4 #c3ad73 ,above all things   
have charity4 ,therefore mercy is not   
the greatest of virtues4  ,i answer     
that1 ,a virtue may take precedence of  
others in two ways3 first1 in itself2   
secondly1 in comparison with its        
subject4 ,in itself1 mercy takes        
precedence of other virtues1 for it     
belongs to mercy to be bountiful to     
others1 and1 what is more1 to succor    
others in their wants1 which pertains   
chiefly to one who stands above4 ,hence 

mercy is accounted as being proper to   
,god3 and therein ,his omnipotence is   
declared to be chiefly manifested       
99,collect1 ,tenth ,sunday after        
,pentecost4  ,on the other hand1 with   
regard to its subject1 mercy is not the 
greatest virtue1 unless that subject be 
greater than all others1 surpassed by   
none and excelling all3 since for him   
that has anyone above him it is better  
to be united to that which is above than
 to supply the defect of that which is  
beneath4 99,the quality of mercy is not 
strained4_/',tis mightiest in the       
mightiest3 it becomes_/,the throned     
monarch better than his crown4 ,merchant
 of ,venice1 ,act ,,iv1 ,scene i44      
,hence1 as regards man1 who has ,god    
above him1 charity which unites him to  
,god1 is greater than mercy1 whereby he 
supplies the defects of his neighbor4   
,but of all the virtues which relate to 
our neighbor1 mercy is the greatest1    
even as its act surpasses all others1   
since it belongs to one who is higher   

and better to supply the defect of      
another1 in so far as the latter is     
deficient4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we worship
 ,god by external sacrifices and gifts1 
not for ,his own profit1 but for that of
 ourselves and our neighbor4 ,for ,he   
needs not our sacrifices1 but wishes    
them to be offered to ,him1 in order to 
arouse our devotion and to profit our   
neighbor4 ,hence mercy1 whereby we      
supply others' defects is a sacrifice   
more acceptable to ,him1 as conducing   
more directly to our neighbor's         
well-being1 according to ,heb4 #ac3af3  
,do not forget to do good and to impart1
 for by such sacrifices ,god's favor is 
obtained4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the sum    
total of the ,christian religion        
consists in mercy1 as regards external  
works3 but the inward love of charity1  
whereby we are united to ,god           
preponderates over both love and mercy  
for our neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,charity likens us to ,god by uniting us
 to ,him in the bond of love3 wherefore 

it surpasses mercy1 which likens us to  
,god as regards similarity of works4    
,,question #ca  ,,of ,,beneficence 7,in 
,four ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
the outward acts or effects of charity1 
7#a7 ,beneficence1 7#b7 ,almsdeeds1     
which are a part of beneficence1 7#c7   
,fraternal correction1 which is a kind  
of alms4  ,under the first head there   
are four points of inquiry3  7#a7       
,whether beneficence is an act of       
charity8  7#b7 ,whether we ought to be  
beneficent to all8  7#c7 ,whether we    
ought to be more beneficent to those who
 are more closely united to us8  7#d7   
,whether beneficence is a special       
virtue8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,beneficence
 ,is an ,act of ,charity8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that beneficence is  
not an act of charity4 ,for charity is  
chiefly directed to ,god4 ,now we cannot
 benefit ,god1 according to ,job #ce3g3 
,what shalt thou give ,him8 or what     
shall ,he receive of thy hand8          

,therefore beneficence is not an act of 
charity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1           
beneficence consists chiefly in making  
gifts4 ,but this belongs to liberality4 
,therefore beneficence is an act of     
liberality and not of charity4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 what a man gives1 he gives
 either as being due1 or as not due4    
,but a benefit conferred as being due   
belongs to justice while a benefit      
conferred as not due1 is gratuitous1 and
 in this respect is an act of mercy4    
,therefore every benefit conferred is   
either an act of justice1 or an act of  
mercy4 ,therefore it is not an act of   
charity4  ,on the contrary1 ,charity is 
a kind of friendship1 as stated above   
7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a74 ,now the ,philosopher
 reckons among the acts of friendship   
7,ethic4 ix1 #a7 doing good1 i4e4 being 
beneficent1 to one's friends4 ,therefore
 it is an act of charity to do good to  
others4  ,i answer that1 ,beneficence   
simply means doing good to someone4     
,this good may be considered in two     

ways1 first under the general aspect of 
good1 and this belongs to beneficence in
 general1 and is an act of friendship1  
and1 consequently1 of charity3 because  
the act of love includes goodwill       
whereby a man wishes his friend well1 as
 stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #bg1
 ,a4 #b74 ,now the will carries into    
effect if possible1 the things it wills1
 so that1 consequently1 the result of an
 act of love is that a man is beneficent
 to his friend4 ,therefore beneficence  
in its general acceptation is an act of 
friendship or charity4  ,but if the good
 which one man does another1 be         
considered under some special aspect of 
good1 then beneficence will assume a    
special character and will belong to    
some special virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,according to ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4   
iv71 love moves those1 whom it unites1  
to a mutual relationship3 it turns the  
inferior to the superior to be perfected
 thereby2 it moves the superior to watch
 over the inferior3 and in this respect 

beneficence is an effect of love4 ,hence
 it is not for us to benefit ,god1 but  
to honor ,him by obeying ,him1 while it 
is for ,him1 out of ,his love1 to bestow
 good things on us4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,two things must be observed in the     
bestowal of gifts4 ,one is the thing    
given outwardly1 while the other is the 
inward passion that a man has in the    
delight of riches4 ,it belongs to       
liberality to moderate this inward      
passion so as to avoid excessive desire 
and love for riches2 for this makes a   
man more ready to part with his wealth4 
,hence1 if a man makes some great gift1 
while yet desiring to keep it for       
himself1 his is not a liberal giving4   
,on the other hand1 as regards the      
outward gift1 the act of beneficence    
belongs in general to friendship or     
charity4 ,hence it does not detract from
 a man's friendship1 if1 through love1  
he give his friend something he would   
like to keep for himself2 rather does   
this prove the perfection of his        

friendship4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as  
friendship or charity sees1 in the      
benefit bestowed1 the general aspect of 
good1 so does justice see therein the   
aspect of debt1 while pity considers the
 relieving of distress or defect4       
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,we ,ought to ,do    
,good to ,all8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that we are not bound to do good  
to all4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de       
,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bh7 that we are    
unable to do good to everyone4 ,now     
virtue does not incline one to the      
impossible4 ,therefore it is not        
necessary to do good to all4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 it is written 7,ecclus4 #ab3e7
 ,give to the good1 and receive not a   
sinner4 ,but many men are sinners4      
,therefore we need not do good to all4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,charity dealeth not
 perversely 7#a ,cor4 #ac3d74 ,now to do
 good to some is to deal perversely3 for
 instance if one were to do good to an  
enemy of the common weal1 or if one were

 to do good to an excommunicated person1
 since1 by doing so1 he would be holding
 communion with him4 ,therefore1 since  
beneficence is an act of charity1 we    
ought not to do good to all4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,gal4     
#f3aj73 ,whilst we have time1 let us    
work good to all men4  ,i answer that1  
,as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a71       
beneficence is an effect of love in so  
far as love moves the superior to watch 
over the inferior4 ,now degrees among   
men are not unchangeable as among       
angels1 because men are subject to many 
failings1 so that he who is superior in 
one respect1 is or may be inferior in   
another4 ,therefore1 since the love of  
charity extends to all1 beneficence also
 should extend to all1 but according as 
time and place require3 because all acts
 of virtue must be modified with a view 
to their due circumstances4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,absolutely speaking it is    
impossible to do good to every single   
one3 yet it is true of each individual  

that one may be bound to do good to him 
in some particular case4 ,hence charity 
binds us1 though not actually doing good
 to someone1 to be prepared in mind to  
do good to anyone if we have time to    
spare4 ,there is however a good that we 
can do to all1 if not to each           
individual1 at least to all in general1 
as when we pray for all1 for unbelievers
 as well as for the faithful4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,in a sinner there are two    
things1 his guilt and his nature4       
,accordingly we are bound to succor the 
sinner as to the maintenance of his     
nature1 but not so as to abet his sin1  
for this would be to do evil rather than
 good4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the           
excommunicated and the enemies of the   
common weal are deprived of all         
beneficence1 in so far as this prevents 
them from doing evil deeds4 ,yet if     
their nature be in urgent need of succor
 lest it fail1 we are bound to help     
them3 for instance1 if they be in danger
 of death through hunger or thirst1 or  

suffer some like distress1 unless this  
be according to the order of justice4   
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,we ,ought to ,do    
,good to ,those ,rather ,who ,are ,more 
,closely ,united to ,us8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that we are not bound to
 do good to those rather who are more   
closely united to us4 ,for it is written
 7,luke #ad3ab73 ,when thou makest a    
dinner or a supper1 call not thy        
friends1 nor thy brethren1 nor thy      
kinsmen4 ,now these are the most closely
 united to us4 ,therefore we are not    
bound to do good to those rather who are
 more closely united to us1 but         
preferably to strangers and to those who
 are in want3 hence the text goes on3   
,but1 when thou makest a feast1 call the
 poor1 the maimed1 etc4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 to help another in the battle 
is an act of very great goodness4 ,but a
 soldier on the battlefield is bound to 
help a fellow-soldier who is a stranger 
rather than a kinsman who is a foe4     

,therefore in doing acts of kindness we 
are not bound to give the preference to 
those who are most closely united to us4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we should pay what
 is due before conferring gratuitous    
favors4 ,but it is a man's duty to be   
good to those who have been good to him4
 ,therefore we ought to do good to our  
benefactors rather than to those who are
 closely united to us4  ,obj4 #d3       
,further1 a man ought to love his       
parents more than his children1 as      
stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #i74 ,yet a  
man ought to be more beneficent to his  
children1 since neither ought the       
children to lay up for the parents1     
according to #b ,cor4 #ab3ad4 ,therefore
 we are not bound to be more beneficent 
to those who are more closely united to 
us4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says  
7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bh73 ,since   
one cannot do good to all1 we ought to  
consider those chiefly who by reason of 
place1 time or any other circumstance1  
by a kind of chance are more closely    

united to us4  ,i answer that1 ,grace   
and virtue imitate the order of nature1 
which is established by ,divine wisdom4 
,now the order of nature is such that   
every natural agent pours forth its     
activity first and most of all on the   
things which are nearest to it3 thus    
fire heats most what is next to it4 ,in 
like manner ,god pours forth the gifts  
of ,his goodness first and most         
plentifully on the substances which are 
nearest to ,him1 as ,dionysius declares 
7,coel4 ,hier4 vii74 ,but the bestowal  
of benefits is an act of charity towards
 others4 ,therefore we ought to be most 
beneficent towards those who are most   
closely connected with us4  ,now one    
man's connection with another may be    
measured in reference to the various    
matters in which men are engaged        
together2 7thus the intercourse of      
kinsmen is in natural matters1 that of  
fellow-citizens is in civic matters1    
that of the faithful is in spiritual    
matters1 and so forth73 and various     

benefits should be conferred in various 
ways according to these various         
connections1 because we ought in        
preference to bestow on each one such   
benefits as pertain to the matter in    
which1 speaking simply1 he is most      
closely connected with us4 ,and yet this
 may vary according to the various      
requirements of time1 place1 or matter  
in hand3 because in certain cases one   
ought1 for instance1 to succor a        
stranger1 in extreme necessity1 rather  
than one's own father1 if he is not in  
such urgent need4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our
 ,lord did not absolutely forbid us to  
invite our friends and kinsmen to eat   
with us1 but to invite them so that they
 may invite us in return1 since that    
would be an act not of charity but of   
cupidity4 ,the case may occur1 however1 
that one ought rather to invite         
strangers1 on account of their greater  
want4 ,for it must be understood that1  
other things being equal1 one ought to  
succor those rather who are most closely

 connected with us4 ,and if of two1 one 
be more closely connected1 and the other
 in greater want1 it is not possible to 
decide1 by any general rule1 which of   
them we ought to help rather than the   
other1 since there are various degrees  
of want as well as of connection3 and   
the matter requires the judgment of a   
prudent man4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the     
common good of many is more ,godlike    
than the good of an individual4         
,wherefore it is a virtuous action for a
 man to endanger even his own life1     
either for the spiritual or for the     
temporal common good of his country4    
,since therefore men engage together in 
warlike acts in order to safeguard the  
common weal1 the soldier who with this  
in view succors his comrade1 succors him
 not as a private individual1 but with a
 view to the welfare of his country as a
 whole3 wherefore it is not a matter for
 wonder if a stranger be preferred to   
one who is a blood relation4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,a thing may be due in two    

ways4 ,there is one which should be     
reckoned1 not among the goods of the    
debtor1 but rather as belonging to the  
person to whom it is due3 for instance1 
a man may have another's goods1 whether 
in money or in kind1 either because he  
has stolen them1 or because he has      
received them on loan or in deposit or  
in some other way4 ,in this case a man  
ought to pay what he owes1 rather than  
benefit his connections out of it1      
unless perchance the case be so urgent  
that it would be lawful for him to take 
another's property in order to relieve  
the one who is in need4 ,yet1 again1    
this would not apply if the creditor    
were in equal distress3 in which case1  
however1 the claims on either side would
 have to be weighed with regard to such 
other conditions as a prudent man would 
take into consideration1 because1 on    
account of the different particular     
cases1 as the ,philosopher states       
7,ethic4 ix1 #b71 it is impossible to   
lay down a general rule4  ,the other    

kind of due is one which is reckoned    
among the goods of the debtor and not of
 the creditor2 for instance1 a thing may
 be due1 not because justice requires   
it1 but on account of a certain moral   
equity1 as in the case of benefits      
received gratis4 ,now no benefactor     
confers a benefit equal to that which a 
man receives from his parents3 wherefore
 in paying back benefits received1 we   
should give the first place to our      
parents before all others1 unless1 on   
the other side1 there be such weightier 
motives1 as need or some other          
circumstance1 for instance the common   
good of the ,church or state4 ,in other 
cases we must take to account the       
connection and the benefit received2 and
 here again no general rule can laid    
down4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,parents are    
like superiors1 and so a parent's love  
tends to conferring benefits1 while the 
children's love tends to honor their    
parents4 ,nevertheless in a case of     
extreme urgency it would be lawful to   

abandon one's children rather than one's
 parents1 to abandon whom it is by no   
means lawful1 on account of the         
obligation we lie under towards them for
 the benefits we have received from     
them1 as the ,philosopher states        
7,ethic4 iii1 #ad74   ,,fourth ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,beneficence ,is a ,special ,virtue8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
beneficence is a special virtue4 ,for   
precepts are directed to virtue1 since  
lawgivers purpose to make men virtuous  
7,ethic4 i #i1 #ac2 ii1 #a74 ,now       
beneficence and love are prescribed as  
distinct from one another1 for it is    
written 7,matt4 #d3dd73 ,love your      
enemies1 do good to them that hate you4 
,therefore beneficence is a virtue      
distinct from charity4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 vices are opposed to virtues4 
,now there are opposed to beneficence   
certain vices whereby a hurt is         
inflicted on our neighbor1 for instance1
 rapine1 theft and so forth4 ,therefore 

beneficence is a special virtue4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 charity is not divided    
into several species3 whereas there     
would seem to be several kinds of       
beneficence1 according to the various   
kinds of benefits4 ,therefore           
beneficence is a distinct virtue from   
charity4  ,on the contrary1 ,the        
internal and the external act do not    
require different virtues4 ,now         
beneficence and goodwill differ only as 
external and internal act1 since        
beneficence is the execution of         
goodwill4 ,therefore as goodwill is not 
a distinct virtue from charity1 so      
neither is beneficence4  ,i answer that1
 ,virtues differ according to the       
different aspects of their objects4 ,now
 the formal aspect of the object of     
charity and of beneficence is the same1 
since both virtues regard the common    
aspect of good1 as explained above 7,a4 
#a74 ,wherefore beneficence is not a    
distinct virtue from charity1 but       
denotes an act of charity4  ,reply ,obj4

 #a3 ,precepts are given1 not about     
habits but about acts of virtue3        
wherefore distinction of precept denotes
 distinction1 not of habits1 but of     
acts4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even as all    
benefits conferred on our neighbor1 if  
we consider them under the common aspect
 of good1 are to be traced to love1 so  
all hurts considered under the common   
aspect of evil1 are to be traced to     
hatred4 ,but if we consider these same  
things under certain special aspects of 
good or of evil1 they are to be traced  
to certain special virtues or vices1 and
 in this way also there are various     
kinds of benefits4  ,hence the ,reply to
 the ,third ,objection is evident4      
,,question #cb  ,,of ,,almsdeeds 7,in   
,ten ,articles7  ,we must now consider  
almsdeeds1 under which head there are   
ten points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether   
almsgiving is an act of charity8  7#b7  
,of the different kinds of alms2  7#c7  
,which alms are of greater account1     
spiritual or corporal8  7#d7 ,whether   

corporal alms have a spiritual effect8  
7#e7 ,whether the giving of alms is a   
matter of precept8  7#f7 ,whether       
corporal alms should be given out of the
 things we need8  7#g7 ,whether corporal
 alms should be given out of ill-gotten 
goods8  7#h7 ,who can give alms8  7#i7  
,to whom should we give alms8  7#aj7    
,how should alms be given8   ,,first    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,almsgiving ,is an ,act of     
,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that almsgiving is not an act of       
charity4 ,for without charity one cannot
 do acts of charity4 ,now it is possible
 to give alms without having charity1   
according to #a ,cor4 #ac3c3 ,if ,i     
should distribute all my goods to feed  
the poor 4 4 4 and have not charity1 it 
profiteth me nothing4 ,therefore        
almsgiving is not an act of charity4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 almsdeeds are       
reckoned among works of satisfaction1   
according to ,dan4 #d3bd3 ,redeem thou  
thy sins with alms4 ,now satisfaction is

 an act of justice4 ,therefore          
almsgiving is an act of justice and not 
of charity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the    
offering of sacrifices to ,god is an act
 of religion4 ,but almsgiving is        
offering a sacrifice to ,god1 according 
to ,heb4 #ac3af3 ,do not forget to do   
good and to impart1 for by such         
sacrifices ,god's favor is obtained4    
,therefore almsgiving is not an act of  
charity1 but of religion4  ,obj4 #d3    
,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4
 iv1 #a7 that to give for a good purpose
 is an act of liberality4 ,now this is  
especially true of almsgiving4          
,therefore almsgiving is not an act of  
charity4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is      
written #b ,john #c3ag3 ,he that hath   
the substance of this world1 and shall  
see his brother in need1 and shall put  
up his bowels from him1 how doth the    
charity of ,god abide in him8  ,i answer
 that1 ,external acts belong to that    
virtue which regards the motive for     
doing those acts4 ,now the motive for   

giving alms is to relieve one who is in 
need4 ,wherefore some have defined alms 
as being a deed whereby something is    
given to the needy1 out of compassion   
and for ,god's sake1 which motive       
belongs to mercy1 as stated above 7,q4  
#cj1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,hence it is clear  
that almsgiving is1 properly speaking1  
an act of mercy4 ,this appears in its   
very name1 for in ,greek 7eleemosyne7 it
 is derived from having mercy 7eleein7  
even as the ,latin miseratio is4 ,and   
since mercy is an effect of charity1 as 
shown above 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #b1 ,a4 #c1   
,obj4 #c71 it follows that almsgiving is
 an act of charity through the medium of
 mercy4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,an act of    
virtue may be taken in two ways3 first  
materially1 thus an act of justice is to
 do what is just2 and such an act of    
virtue can be without the virtue1 since 
many1 without having the habit of       
justice1 do what is just1 led by the    
natural light of reason1 or through     
fear1 or in the hope of gain4 ,secondly1

 we speak of a thing being an act of    
justice formally1 and thus an act of    
justice is to do what is just1 in the   
same way as a just man1 i4e4 with       
readiness and delight1 and such an act  
of virtue cannot be without the virtue4 
,accordingly almsgiving can be          
materially without charity1 but to give 
alms formally1 i4e4 for ,god's sake1    
with delight and readiness1 and         
altogether as one ought1 is not possible
 without charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3     
,nothing hinders the proper elicited act
 of one virtue being commanded by       
another virtue as commanding it and     
directing it to this other virtue's end4
 ,it is in this way that almsgiving is  
reckoned among works of satisfaction in 
so far as pity for the one in distress  
is directed to the satisfaction for his 
sin2 and in so far as it is directed to 
placate ,god1 it has the character of a 
sacrifice1 and thus it is commanded by  
religion4  ,wherefore the ,reply to the 
,third ,objection is evident4  ,reply   

,obj4 #d3 ,almsgiving belongs to        
liberality1 in so far as liberality     
removes an obstacle to that act1 which  
might arise from excessive love of      
riches1 the result of which is that one 
clings to them more than one ought4     
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1  
,art4 #b  ,whether the ,different ,kinds
 of ,almsdeeds ,are ,suitably           
,enumerated8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that the different kinds of        
almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated4    
,for we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds1
 namely1 to feed the hungry1 to give    
drink to the thirsty1 to clothe the     
naked1 to harbor the harborless1 to     
visit the sick1 to ransom the captive1  
to bury the dead2 all of which are      
expressed in the following verse3 ,to   
visit1 to quench1 to feed1 to ransom1   
clothe1 harbor or bury4  ,again we      
reckon seven spiritual alms1 namely1 to 
instruct the ignorant1 to counsel the   
doubtful1 to comfort the sorrowful1 to  
reprove the sinner1 to forgive injuries1

 to bear with those who trouble and     
annoy us1 and to pray for all1 which are
 all contained in the following verse3  
,to counsel1 reprove1 console1 to       
pardon1 forbear1 and to pray1 yet so    
that counsel includes both advice and   
instruction4  ,and it seems that these  
various almsdeeds are unsuitably        
enumerated4 ,for the purpose of         
almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor4    
,but a dead man profits nothing by being
 buried1 else ,our ,lord would not have 
spoken truly when ,he said 7,matt4      
#aj3bh73 ,be not afraid of them who kill
 the body1 and after that have no more  
that they can do4 99,the quotation is   
from ,luke #ab3d4 ,this explains why    
,our ,lord1 in enumerating the works of 
mercy1 made no mention of the burial of 
the dead 7,matt4 #be3ce1 #cf74          
,therefore it seems that these almsdeeds
 are unsuitably enumerated4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the 
purpose of giving alms is to relieve our
 neighbor's need4 ,now there are many   

needs of human life other than those    
mentioned above1 for instance1 a blind  
man needs a leader1 a lame man needs    
someone to lean on1 a poor man needs    
riches4 ,therefore these almsdeeds are  
unsuitably enumerated4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 almsgiving is a work of mercy4
 ,but the reproof of the wrong-doer     
savors1 apparently1 of severity rather  
than of mercy4 ,therefore it ought not  
to be reckoned among the spiritual      
almsdeeds4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1         
almsgiving is intended for the supply of
 a defect4 ,but no man is without the   
defect of ignorance in some matter or   
other4 ,therefore1 apparently1 each one 
ought to instruct anyone who is ignorant
 of what he knows himself4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,nom4 in       
,evang4 ix73 ,let him that hath         
understanding beware lest he withhold   
his knowledge2 let him that hath        
abundance of wealth1 watch lest he      
slacken his merciful bounty2 let him who
 is a servant to art be most solicitous 

to share his skill and profit with his  
neighbor2 let him who has an opportunity
 of speaking with the wealthy1 fear lest
 he be condemned for retaining his      
talent1 if when he has the chance he    
plead not with him the cause of the     
poor4 ,therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds
 are suitably enumerated in respect of  
those things whereof men have abundance 
or insufficiency4  ,i answer that1 ,the 
aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is   
suitably taken from the various needs of
 our neighbor3 some of which affect the 
soul1 and are relieved by spiritual     
almsdeeds1 while others affect the body1
 and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds4
 ,for corporal need occurs either during
 this life or afterwards4 ,if it occurs 
during this life1 it is either a common 
need in respect of things needed by all1
 or it is a special need occurring      
through some accident supervening4 ,in  
the first case1 the need is either      
internal or external4 ,internal need is 
twofold3 one which is relieved by solid 

food1 viz4 hunger1 in respect of which  
we have to feed the hungry2 while the   
other is relieved by liquid food1 viz4  
thirst1 and in respect of this we have  
to give drink to the thirsty4 ,the      
common need with regard to external help
 is twofold2 one in respect of clothing1
 and as to this we have to clothe the   
naked3 while the other is in respect of 
a dwelling place1 and as to this we have
 to harbor the harborless4 ,again if the
 need be special1 it is either the      
result of an internal cause1 like       
sickness1 and then we have to visit the 
sick1 or it results from an external    
cause1 and then we have to ransom the   
captive4 ,after this life we give burial
 to the dead4  ,in like manner spiritual
 needs are relieved by spiritual acts in
 two ways1 first by asking for help from
 ,god1 and in this respect we have      
prayer1 whereby one man prays for       
others2 secondly1 by giving human       
assistance1 and this in three ways4     
,first1 in order to relieve a deficiency

 on the part of the intellect1 and if   
this deficiency be in the speculative   
intellect1 the remedy is applied by     
instructing1 and if in the practical    
intellect1 the remedy is applied by     
counselling4 ,secondly1 there may be a  
deficiency on the part of the appetitive
 power1 especially by way of sorrow1    
which is remedied by comforting4        
,thirdly1 the deficiency may be due to  
an inordinate act2 and this may be the  
subject of a threefold consideration4   
,first1 in respect of the sinner1       
inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his   
inordinate will1 and thus the remedy    
takes the form of reproof4 ,secondly1 in
 respect of the person sinned against2  
and if the sin be committed against     
ourselves1 we apply the remedy by       
pardoning the injury1 while1 if it be   
committed against ,god or our neighbor1 
it is not in our power to pardon1 as    
,jerome observes 7,super ,matth4 xviii1 
#ae74 ,thirdly1 in respect of the result
 of the inordinate act1 on account of   

which the sinner is an annoyance to     
those who live with him1 even beside his
 intention2 in which case the remedy is 
applied by bearing with him1            
especially with regard to those who sin 
out of weakness1 according to ,rom4     
#ae3a3 ,we that are stronger1 ought to  
bear the infirmities of the weak1 and   
not only as regards their being infirm  
and consequently troublesome on account 
of their unruly actions1 but also by    
bearing any other burdens of theirs with
 them1 according to ,gal4 #f3b3 ,bear ye
 one another's burdens4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,burial does not profit a dead man  
as though his body could be capable of  
perception after death4 ,in this sense  
,our ,lord said that those who kill the 
body have no more that they can do2 and 
for this reason ,he did not mention the 
burial of the dead with the other works 
of mercy1 but those only which are more 
clearly necessary4 ,nevertheless it does
 concern the deceased what is done with 
his body3 both that he may live in the  

memory of man whose respect he forfeits 
if he remain without burial1 and as     
regards a man's fondness for his own    
body while he was yet living1 a fondness
 which kindly persons should imitate    
after his death4 ,it is thus that some  
are praised for burying the dead1 as    
,tobias1 and those who buried ,our      
,lord2 as ,augustine says 7,de ,cura pro
 ,mort4 iii74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all    
other needs are reduced to these1 for   
blindness and lameness are kinds of     
sickness1 so that to lead the blind1 and
 to support the lame1 come to the same  
as visiting the sick4 ,in like manner to
 assist a man against any distress that 
is due to an extrinsic cause comes to   
the same as the ransom of captives4 ,and
 the wealth with which we relieve the   
poor is sought merely for the purpose of
 relieving the aforesaid needs3 hence   
there was no reason for special mention 
of this particular need4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,the reproof of the sinner1 as to   
the exercise of the act of reproving1   

seems to imply the severity of justice1 
but1 as to the intention of the         
reprover1 who wishes to free a man from 
the evil of sin1 it is an act of mercy  
and lovingkindness1 according to ,prov4 
#bg3f3 ,better are the wounds of a      
friend1 than the deceitful kisses of an 
enemy4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,nescience is  
not always a defect1 but only when it is
 about what one ought to know1 and it is
 a part of almsgiving to supply this    
defect by instruction4 ,in doing this   
however we should observe the due       
circumstances of persons1 place and     
time1 even as in other virtuous acts4   
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,corporal ,alms ,are 
of ,more ,account ,than ,spiritual      
,alms8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that corporal alms are of more account  
than spiritual alms4 ,for it is more    
praiseworthy to give an alms to one who 
is in greater want1 since an almsdeed is
 to be praised because it relieves one  
who is in need4 ,now the body which is  

relieved by corporal alms1 is by nature 
more needy than the spirit which is     
relieved by spiritual alms4 ,therefore  
corporal alms are of more account4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an alms is less     
praiseworthy and meritorious if the     
kindness is compensated1 wherefore ,our 
,lord says 7,luke #ad3ab73 ,when thou   
makest a dinner or a supper1 call not   
thy neighbors who are rich1 lest perhaps
 they also invite thee again4 ,now there
 is always compensation in spiritual    
almsdeeds1 since he who prays for       
another1 profits thereby1 according to  
,ps4 #cd3ac3 ,my prayer shall be turned 
into my bosom3 and he who teaches       
another1 makes progress in knowledge1   
which cannot be said of corporal        
almsdeeds4 ,therefore corporal almsdeeds
 are of more account than spiritual     
almsdeeds4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an alms 
is to be commended if the needy one is  
comforted by it3 wherefore it is written
 7,job #ca3bj73 ,if his sides have not  
blessed me1 and the ,apostle says to    

,philemon 7verse #g73 ,the bowels of the
 saints have been refreshed by thee1    
brother4 ,now a corporal alms is        
sometimes more welcome to a needy man   
than a spiritual alms4 ,therefore bodily
 almsdeeds are of more account than     
spiritual almsdeeds4  ,on the contrary1 
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte i1 #bj7 on the words1 ,give to   
him that asketh of thee 7,matt4 #e3db73 
,you should give so as to injure neither
 yourself nor another1 and when you     
refuse what another asks you must not   
lose sight of the claims of justice1 and
 send him away empty2 at times indeed   
you will give what is better than what  
is asked for1 if you reprove him that   
asks unjustly4 ,now reproof is a        
spiritual alms4 ,therefore spiritual    
almsdeeds are preferable to corporal    
almsdeeds4  ,i answer that1 ,there are  
two ways of comparing these almsdeeds4  
,first1 simply2 and in this respect1    
spiritual almsdeeds hold the first      
place1 for three reasons4 ,first1       

because the offering is more excellent1 
since it is a spiritual gift1 which     
surpasses a corporal gift1 according to 
,prov4 #d3b3 ,i will give you a good    
gift1 forsake not ,my ,law4 ,secondly1  
on account of the object succored1      
because the spirit is more excellent    
than the body1 wherefore1 even as a man 
in looking after himself1 ought to look 
to his soul more than to his body1 so   
ought he in looking after his neighbor1 
whom he ought to love as himself4       
,thirdly1 as regards the acts themselves
 by which our neighbor is succored1     
because spiritual acts are more         
excellent than corporal acts1 which are1
 in a fashion1 servile4  ,secondly1 we  
may compare them with regard to some    
particular case1 when some corporal alms
 excels some spiritual alms3 for        
instance1 a man in hunger is to be fed  
rather than instructed1 and as the      
,philosopher observes 7,topic4 iii1 #b71
 for a needy man money is better than   
philosophy1 although the latter is      

better simply4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is 
better to give to one who is in greater 
want1 other things being equal1 but if  
he who is less needy is better1 and is  
in want of better things1 it is better  
to give to him3 and it is thus in the   
case in point4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3        
,compensation does not detract from     
merit and praise if it be not intended1 
even as human glory1 if not intended1   
does not detract from virtue4 ,thus     
,sallust says of ,cato 7,catilin471 that
 the less he sought fame1 the more he   
became famous3 and thus it is with      
spiritual almsdeeds4  ,nevertheless the 
intention of gaining spiritual goods    
does not detract from merit1 as the     
intention of gaining corporal goods4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the merit of an       
almsgiver depends on that in which the  
will of the recipient rests reasonably1 
and not on that in which it rests when  
it is inordinate4   ,,fourth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,corporal ,almsdeeds ,have a ,spiritual 

,effect8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that corporal almsdeeds have not a      
spiritual effect4 ,for no effect exceeds
 its cause4 ,but spiritual goods exceed 
corporal goods4 ,therefore corporal     
almsdeeds have no spiritual effect4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the sin of simony   
consists in giving the corporal for the 
spiritual1 and it is to be utterly      
avoided4 ,therefore one ought not to    
give alms in order to receive a         
spiritual effect4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
to multiply the cause is to multiply the
 effect4 ,if therefore corporal         
almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect1 the 
greater the alms1 the greater the       
spiritual profit1 which is contrary to  
what we read 7,luke #ba3c7 of the widow 
who cast two brass mites into the       
treasury1 and in ,our ,lord's own words 
cast in more than 4 4 4 all4 ,therefore 
bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual      
effect4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is       
written 7,ecclus4 #ag3ah73 ,the alms of 
a man 4 4 4 shall preserve the grace of 

a man as the apple of the eye4  ,i      
answer that1 ,corporal almsdeeds may be 
considered in three ways4 ,first1 with  
regard to their substance1 and in this  
way they have merely a corporal effect1 
inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's  
corporal needs4 ,secondly1 they may be  
considered with regard to their cause1  
in so far as a man gives a corporal alms
 out of love for ,god and his neighbor1 
and in this respect they bring forth a  
spiritual fruit1 according to ,ecclus4  
#bi3ac1 #ad3 ,lose thy money for thy    
brother 4 4 4 place thy treasure in the 
commandments of the ,most ,high1 and it 
shall bring thee more profit than gold4 
,thirdly1 with regard to the effect1 and
 in this way again1 they have a         
spiritual fruit1 inasmuch as our        
neighbor1 who is succored by a corporal 
alms1 is moved to pray for his          
benefactor2 wherefore the above text    
goes on 7,ecclus4 #bi3ae73 ,shut up alms
 in the heart of the poor1 and it shall 
obtain help for thee from all evil4     

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument         
considers corporal almsdeeds as to their
 substance4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he who   
gives an alms does not intend to buy a  
spiritual thing with a corporal thing1  
for he knows that spiritual things      
infinitely surpass corporal things1 but 
he intends to merit a spiritual fruit   
through the love of charity4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,the widow who gave less in   
quantity1 gave more in proportion2 and  
thus we gather that the fervor of her   
charity1 whence corporal almsdeeds      
derive their spiritual efficacy1 was    
greater4   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #e  ,whether ,almsgiving 
,is a ,matter of ,precept8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that almsgiving is   
not a matter of precept4 ,for the       
counsels are distinct from the precepts4
 ,now almsgiving is a matter of counsel1
 according to ,dan4 #d3bd3 ,let my      
counsel be acceptable to the ,king2     
,vulg43 'to thee1 and' redeem thou thy  
sins with alms4 ,therefore almsgiving is

 not a matter of precept4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 it is lawful for everyone to  
use and to keep what is his own4 ,yet by
 keeping it he will not give alms4      
,therefore it is lawful not to give     
alms3 and consequently almsgiving is not
 a matter of precept4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 whatever is a matter of       
precept binds the transgressor at some  
time or other under pain of mortal sin1 
because positive precepts are binding   
for some fixed time4 ,therefore1 if     
almsgiving were a matter of precept1 it 
would be possible to point to some fixed
 time when a man would commit a mortal  
sin unless he gave an alms4 ,but it does
 not appear how this can be so1 because 
it can always be deemed probable that   
the person in need can be relieved in   
some other way1 and that what we would  
spend in almsgiving might be needful to 
ourselves either now or in some future  
time4 ,therefore it seems that          
almsgiving is not a matter of precept4  
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 every commandment is

 reducible to the precepts of the       
,decalogue4 ,but these precepts contain 
no reference to almsgiving4 ,therefore  
almsgiving is not a matter of precept4  
,on the contrary1 ,no man is punished   
eternally for omitting to do what is not
 a matter of precept4 ,but some are     
punished eternally for omitting to give 
alms1 as is clear from ,matt4 #be3da-dc4
 ,therefore almsgiving is a matter of   
precept4  ,i answer that1 ,as love of   
our neighbor is a matter of precept1    
whatever is a necessary condition to the
 love of our neighbor is a matter of    
precept also4 ,now the love of our      
neighbor requires that not only should  
we be our neighbor's well-wishers1 but  
also his well-doers1 according to #a    
,john #c3ah3 ,let us not love in word1  
nor in tongue1 but in deed1 and in      
truth4 ,and in order to be a person's   
well-wisher and well-doer1 we ought to  
succor his needs3 this is done by       
almsgiving4 ,therefore almsgiving is a  
matter of precept4  ,since1 however1    

precepts are about acts of virtue1 it   
follows that all almsgiving must be a   
matter of precept1 in so far as it is   
necessary to virtue1 namely1 in so far  
as it is demanded by right reason4 ,now 
right reason demands that we should take
 into consideration something on the    
part of the giver1 and something on the 
part of the recipient4 ,on the part of  
the giver1 it must be noted that he     
should give of his surplus1 according to
 ,luke #aa3da3 ,that which remaineth1   
give alms4 ,this surplus is to be taken 
in reference not only to himself1 so as 
to denote what is unnecessary to the    
individual1 but also in reference to    
those of whom he has charge 7in which   
case we have the expression necessary to
 the person 99,the official necessities 
of a person in position taking the word 
person as expressive of dignity74       
,because each one must first of all look
 after himself and then after those over
 whom he has charge1 and afterwards with
 what remains relieve the needs of      

others4 ,thus nature first1 by its      
nutritive power1 takes what it requires 
for the upkeep of one's own body1 and   
afterwards yields the residue for the   
formation of another by the power of    
generation4  ,on the part of the        
recipient it is requisite that he should
 be in need1 else there would be no     
reason for giving him alms3 yet since it
 is not possible for one individual to  
relieve the needs of all1 we are not    
bound to relieve all who are in need1   
but only those who could not be succored
 if we not did succor them4 ,for in such
 cases the words of ,ambrose apply1     
,feed him that dies of hunger3 if thou  
hast not fed him1 thou hast slain him   
99,cf4 ,canon ,pasce1 dist4 lxxxvi1     
whence the words1 as quoted1 are taken4 
,accordingly we are bound to give alms  
of our surplus1 as also to give alms to 
one whose need is extreme3 otherwise    
almsgiving1 like any other greater good1
 is a matter of counsel4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,daniel spoke to a king who was not 

subject to ,god's ,law1 wherefore such  
things as were prescribed by the ,law   
which he did not profess1 had to be     
counselled to him4 ,or he may have been 
speaking in reference to a case in which
 almsgiving was not a matter of precept4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the temporal goods  
which ,god grants us1 are ours as to the
 ownership1 but as to the use of them1  
they belong not to us alone but also to 
such others as we are able to succor out
 of what we have over and above our     
needs4 ,hence ,basil says 99,hom4 super 
,luc4 xii1 #ah3 ,if you acknowledge     
them1 viz4 your temporal goods1 as      
coming from ,god1 is ,he unjust because 
,he apportions them unequally8 ,why are 
you rich while another is poor1 unless  
it be that you may have the merit of a  
good stewardship1 and he the reward of  
patience8 ,it is the hungry man's bread 
that you withhold1 the naked man's cloak
 that you have stored away1 the shoe of 
the barefoot that you have left to rot1 
the money of the needy that you have    

buried underground3 and so you injure as
 many as you might help4 ,ambrose       
expresses himself in the same way4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is a time when  
we sin mortally if we omit to give alms2
 on the part of the recipient when we   
see that his need is evident and urgent1
 and that he is not likely to be        
succored otherwise--on the part of the  
giver1 when he has superfluous goods1   
which he does not need for the time     
being1 as far as he can judge with      
probability4 ,nor need he consider every
 case that may possibly occur in the    
future1 for this would be to think about
 the morrow1 which ,our ,lord forbade us
 to do 7,matt4 #f3cd71 but he should    
judge what is superfluous and what      
necessary1 according as things probably 
and generally occur4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3  
,all succor given to our neighbor is    
reduced to the precept about honoring   
our parents4 ,for thus does the ,apostle
 interpret it 7#a ,tim4 #d3h7 where he  
says3 ,dutifulness99 ,douay3            

',godliness' is profitable to all       
things1 having promise of the life that 
now is1 and of that which is to come1   
and he says this because the precept    
about honoring our parents contains the 
promise1 that thou mayest be longlived  
upon the land 7,ex4 #bj3ab73 and        
dutifulness comprises all kinds of      
almsgiving4 99,pietas1 whence our       
,english word ,piety4 ,cf4 also inf4 ,q4
 #aja1 ,a4 #b4   ,,sixth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,one ,ought to ,give ,alms ,out of ,what
 ,one ,needs8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that one ought not to give alms out
 of what one needs4 ,for the order of   
charity should be observed not only as  
regards the effect of our benefactions  
but also as regards our interior        
affections4 ,now it is a sin to         
contravene the order of charity1 because
 this order is a matter of precept4     
,since1 then1 the order of charity      
requires that a man should love himself 
more than his neighbor1 it seems that he

 would sin if he deprived himself of    
what he needed1 in order to succor his  
neighbor4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever  
gives away what he needs himself1       
squanders his own substance1 and that is
 to be a prodigal1 according to the     
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #a74 ,but no  
sinful deed should be done4 ,therefore  
we should not give alms out of what we  
need4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle 
says 7#a ,tim4 #e3h73 ,if any man have  
not care of his own1 and especially of  
those of his house1 he hath denied the  
faith1 and is worse than an infidel4    
,now if a man gives of what he needs for
 himself or for his charge1 he seems to 
detract from the care he should have for
 himself or his charge4 ,therefore it   
seems that whoever gives alms from what 
he needs1 sins gravely4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4       
#ai3ba73 ,if thou wilt be perfect1 go1  
sell what thou hast1 and give to the    
poor4 ,now he that gives all he has to  
the poor1 gives not only what he needs  

not1 but also what he needs4 ,therefore 
a man may give alms out of what he      
needs4  ,i answer that1 ,a thing is     
necessary in two ways3 first1 because   
without it something is impossible1 and 
it is altogether wrong to give alms out 
of what is necessary to us in this      
sense2 for instance1 if a man found     
himself in the presence of a case of    
urgency1 and had merely sufficient to   
support himself and his children1 or    
others under his charge1 he would be    
throwing away his life and that of      
others if he were to give away in alms1 
what was then necessary to him4 ,yet ,i 
say this without prejudice to such a    
case as might happen1 supposing that by 
depriving himself of necessaries a man  
might help a great personage1 and a     
support of the ,church or ,state1 since 
it would be a praiseworthy act to       
endanger one's life and the lives of    
those who are under our charge for the  
delivery of such a person1 since the    
common good is to be preferred to one's 

own4  ,secondly1 a thing is said to be  
necessary1 if a man cannot without it   
live in keeping with his social station1
 as regards either himself or those of  
whom he has charge4 ,the necessary      
considered thus is not an invariable    
quantity1 for one might add much more to
 a man's property1 and yet not go beyond
 what he needs in this way1 or one might
 take much from him1 and he would still 
have sufficient for the decencies of    
life in keeping with his own position4  
,accordingly it is good to give alms of 
this kind of necessary2 and it is a     
matter not of precept but of counsel4   
,yet it would be inordinate to deprive  
oneself of one's own1 in order to give  
to others to such an extent that the    
residue would be insufficient for one to
 live in keeping with one's station and 
the ordinary occurrences of life3 for no
 man ought to live unbecomingly4 ,there 
are1 however1 three exceptions to the   
above rule4 ,the first is when a man    
changes his state of life1 for instance1

 by entering religion1 for then he gives
 away all his possessions for ,christ's 
sake1 and does the deed of perfection by
 transferring himself to another state4 
,secondly1 when that which he deprives  
himself of1 though it be required for   
the decencies of life1 can nevertheless 
easily be recovered1 so that he does not
 suffer extreme inconvenience4 ,thirdly1
 when he is in presence of extreme      
indigence in an individual1 or great    
need on the part of the common weal4    
,for in such cases it would seem        
praiseworthy to forego the requirements 
of one's station1 in order to provide   
for a greater need4  ,the objections may
 be easily solved from what has been    
said4   ,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #g  ,whether ,one ,may   
,give ,alms ,out of ,ill-gotten ,goods8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one  
may give alms out of ill-gotten goods4  
,for it is written 7,luke #af3i73 ,make 
unto you friends of the mammon of       
iniquity4 ,now mammon signifies riches4 

,therefore it is lawful to make unto    
oneself spiritual friends by giving alms
 out of ill-gotten riches4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 all filthy lucre seems to be  
ill-gotten4 ,but the profits from       
whoredom are filthy lucre2 wherefore it 
was forbidden 7,deut4 #bc3ah7 to offer  
therefrom sacrifices or oblations to    
,god3 ,thou shalt not offer the hire of 
a strumpet 4 4 4 in the house of 4 4 4  
thy ,god4 ,in like manner gains from    
games of chance are ill-gotten1 for1 as 
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a71 
we take such like gains from our friends
 to whom we ought rather to give4 ,and  
most of all are the profits from simony 
ill-gotten1 since thereby the ,holy     
,ghost is wronged4 ,nevertheless out of 
such gains it is lawful to give alms4   
,therefore one may give alms out of     
ill-gotten goods4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
greater evils should be avoided more    
than lesser evils4 ,now it is less      
sinful to keep back another's property  
than to commit murder1 of which a man is

 guilty if he fails to succor one who is
 in extreme need1 as appears from the   
words of ,ambrose who says 7,cf4 ,canon 
,pasce dist4 lxxxvi1 whence the words1  
as quoted1 are taken73 ,feed him that   
dies of hunger1 if thou hast not fed    
him1 thou hast slain him4 ,therefore1 in
 certain cases1 it is lawful to give    
alms of ill-gotten goods4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4   
,dom4 xxxv1 #b73 ,give alms from your   
just labors4 ,for you will not bribe    
,christ your judge1 not to hear you with
 the poor whom you rob 4 4 4 ,give not  
alms from interest and usury3 ,i speak  
to the faithful to whom we dispense the 
,body of ,christ4  ,i answer that1 ,a   
thing may be ill-gotten in three ways4  
,in the first place a thing is          
ill-gotten if it be due to the person   
from whom it is gotten1 and may not be  
kept by the person who has obtained     
possession of it2 as in the case of     
rapine1 theft and usury1 and of such    
things a man may not give alms since he 

is bound to restore them4  ,secondly1 a 
thing is ill-gotten1 when he that has it
 may not keep it1 and yet he may not    
return it to the person from whom he    
received it1 because he received it     
unjustly1 while the latter gave it      
unjustly4 ,this happens in simony1      
wherein both giver and receiver         
contravene the justice of the ,divine   
,law1 so that restitution is to be made 
not to the giver1 but by giving alms4   
,the same applies to all similar cases  
of illegal giving and receiving4        
,thirdly1 a thing is ill-gotten1 not    
because the taking was unlawful1 but    
because it is the outcome of something  
unlawful1 as in the case of a woman's   
profits from whoredom4 ,this is filthy  
lucre properly so called1 because the   
practice of whoredom is filthy and      
against the ,law of ,god1 yet the woman 
does not act unjustly or unlawfully in  
taking the money4 ,consequently it is   
lawful to keep and to give in alms what 
is thus acquired by an unlawful action4 

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says    
7,de ,verb4 ,dom4 #b71 ,some have       
misunderstood this saying of ,our ,lord1
 so as to take another's property and   
give thereof to the poor1 thinking that 
they are fulfilling the commandment by  
so doing4 ,this interpretation must be  
amended4 ,yet all riches are called     
riches of iniquity1 as stated in ,de    
,quaest4 ,ev4 ii1 #cd1 because riches   
are not unjust save for those who are   
themselves unjust1 and put all their    
trust in them4 ,or1 according to        
,ambrose in his commentary on ,luke     
#af3i1 ,make unto yourselves friends1   
etc41 ,he calls mammon unjust1 because  
it draws our affections by the various  
allurements of wealth4 ,or1 because     
among the many ancestors whose property 
you inherit1 there is one who took the  
property of others unjustly1 although   
you know nothing about it1 as ,basil    
says in a homily 7,hom4 super ,luc4 ,a1 
#e74 ,or1 all riches are styled riches  
of iniquity1 i4e41 of inequality1       

because they are not distributed equally
 among all1 one being in need1 and      
another in affluence4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,we have already explained how alms may 
be given out of the profits of whoredom4
 ,yet sacrifices and oblations were not 
made therefrom at the altar1 both on    
account of the scandal1 and through     
reverence for sacred things4 ,it is also
 lawful to give alms out of the profits 
of simony1 because they are not due to  
him who paid1 indeed he deserves to lose
 them4 ,but as to the profits from games
 of chance1 there would seem to be      
something unlawful as being contrary to 
the ,divine ,law1 when a man wins from  
one who cannot alienate his property1   
such as minors1 lunatics and so forth1  
or when a man1 with the desire of making
 money out of another man1 entices him  
to play1 and wins from him by cheating4 
,in these cases he is bound to          
restitution1 and consequently cannot    
give away his gains in alms4 ,then again
 there would seem to be something       

unlawful as being against the positive  
civil law1 which altogether forbids any 
such profits4 ,since1 however1 a civil  
law does not bind all1 but only those   
who are subject to that law1 and        
moreover may be abrogated through       
desuetude1 it follows that all such as  
are bound by these laws are bound to    
make restitution of such gains1 unless  
perchance the contrary custom prevail1  
or unless a man win from one who enticed
 him to play1 in which case he is not   
bound to restitution1 because the loser 
does not deserve to be paid back3 and   
yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has 
won1 so long as that positive law is in 
force1 wherefore in this case he ought  
to give it away in alms4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,all things are common property in a
 case of extreme necessity4 ,hence one  
who is in such dire straits may take    
another's goods in order to succor      
himself1 if he can find no one who is   
willing to give him something4 ,for the 
same reason a man may retain what       

belongs to another1 and give alms       
thereof2 or even take something if there
 be no other way of succoring the one   
who is in need4 ,if however this be     
possible without danger1 he must ask the
 owner's consent1 and then succor the   
poor man who is in extreme necessity4   
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1  
,art4 #h  ,whether ,one ,who ,is ,under 
,another's ,power ,can ,give ,alms8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one  
who is under another's power can give   
alms4 ,for religious are under the power
 of their prelates to whom they have    
vowed obedience4 ,now if it were        
unlawful for them to give alms1 they    
would lose by entering the state of     
religion1 for as ,ambrose 99,the        
quotation is from the works of          
,ambrosiaster4 ,cf4 ,index to           
ecclesiastical authorities quoted by    
,st4 ,thomas says on #a ,tim4 #d3h3     
',dutifulness ,douay3 'godliness' is    
profitable to all things'3 ,the sum     
total of the ,christian religion        

consists in doing one's duty by all1 and
 the most creditable way of doing this  
is to give alms4 ,therefore those who   
are in another's power can give alms4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a wife is under her 
husband's power 7,gen4 #c3af74 ,but a   
wife can give alms since she is her     
husband's partner2 hence it is related  
of the ,blessed ,lucy that she gave alms
 without the knowledge of her betrothed 
99,sponsus4 ,the matrimonial            
institutions of the ,romans were so     
entirely different from ours that       
sponsus is no longer accurately rendered
 either husband or betrothed4 ,therefore
 a person is not prevented from giving  
alms1 by being under another's power4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the subjection of   
children to their parents is founded on 
nature1 wherefore the ,apostle says     
7,eph4 #f3a73 ,children1 obey your      
parents in the ,lord4 ,but1 apparently1 
children may give alms out of their     
parents' property4 ,for it is their own1
 since they are the heirs2 wherefore1   

since they can employ it for some bodily
 use1 it seems that much more can they  
use it in giving alms so as to profit   
their souls4 ,therefore those who are   
under another's power can give alms4    
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 servants are under  
their master's power1 according to      
,titus #b3i3 ,exhort servants to be     
obedient to their masters4 ,now they may
 lawfully do anything that will profit  
their masters3 and this would be        
especially the case if they gave alms   
for them4 ,therefore those who are under
 another's power can give alms4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,alms should not be given out
 of another's property2 and each one    
should give alms out of the just profit 
of his own labor as ,augustine says 7,de
 ,verb4 ,dom4 xxxv1 #b74 ,now if those  
who are subject to anyone were to give  
alms1 this would be out of another's    
property4 ,therefore those who are under
 another's power cannot give alms4  ,i  
answer that1 ,anyone who is under       
another's power must1 as such1 be ruled 

in accordance with the power of his     
superior3 for the natural order demands 
that the inferior should be ruled       
according to its superior4 ,therefore in
 those matters in which the inferior is 
subject to his superior1 his            
ministrations must be subject to the    
superior's permission4  ,accordingly he 
that is under another's power must not  
give alms of anything in respect of     
which he is subject to that other1      
except in so far as he has been         
commissioned by his superior4 ,but if he
 has something in respect of which he is
 not under the power of his superior1 he
 is no longer subject to another in its 
regard1 being independent in respect of 
that particular thing1 and he can give  
alms therefrom4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if a 
monk be dispensed through being         
commissioned by his superior1 he can    
give alms from the property of his      
monastery1 in accordance with the terms 
of his commission2 but if he has no such
 dispensation1 since he has nothing of  

his own1 he cannot give alms without his
 abbot's permission either express or   
presumed for some probable reason3      
except in a case of extreme necessity1  
when it would be lawful for him to      
commit a theft in order to give an alms4
 ,nor does it follow that he is worse   
off than before1 because1 as stated in  
,de ,eccles4 ,dogm4 lxxi1 it is a good  
thing to give one's property to the poor
 little by little1 but it is better     
still to give all at once in order to   
follow ,christ1 and being freed from    
care1 to be needy with ,christ4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,a wife1 who has other        
property besides her dowry which is for 
the support of the burdens of marriage1 
whether that property be gained by her  
own industry or by any other lawful     
means1 can give alms1 out of that       
property1 without asking her husband's  
permission3 yet such alms should be     
moderate1 lest through giving too much  
she impoverish her husband4 ,otherwise  
she ought not to give alms without the  

express or presumed consent of her      
husband1 except in cases of necessity as
 stated1 in the case of a monk1 in the  
preceding ,reply4 ,for though the wife  
be her husband's equal in the marriage  
act1 yet in matters of housekeeping1 the
 head of the woman is the man1 as the   
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #aa3c74 ,as     
regards ,blessed ,lucy1 she had a       
betrothed1 not a husband1 wherefore she 
could give alms with her mother's       
consent4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,what belongs
 to the children belongs also to the    
father3 wherefore the child cannot give 
alms1 except in such small quantity that
 one may presume the father to be       
willing3 unless1 perchance1 the father  
authorize his child to dispose of any   
particular property4 ,the same applies  
to servants4 ,hence the ,reply to the   
,fourth ,objection is clear4   ,,ninth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #i  
,whether ,one ,ought to ,give ,alms to  
,those ,rather ,who ,are ,more ,closely 
,united to ,us8  ,objection #a3 ,it     

would seem that one ought not to give   
alms to those rather who are more       
closely united to us4 ,for it is written
 7,ecclus4 #ab3d1 #f73 ,give to the     
merciful and uphold not the sinner 4 4 4
 ,do good to the humble and give not to 
the ungodly4 ,now it happens sometimes  
that those who are closely united to us 
are sinful and ungodly4 ,therefore we   
ought not to give alms to them in       
preference to others4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 alms should be given that we  
may receive an eternal reward in return1
 according to ,matt4 #f3ah3 ,and thy    
,father ,who seeth in secret1 will repay
 thee4 ,now the eternal reward is gained
 chiefly by the alms which are given to 
the saints1 according to ,luke #af3i3   
,make unto you friends of the mammon of 
iniquity1 that when you shall fail1 they
 may receive you into everlasting       
dwellings1 which passage ,augustine     
expounds 7,de ,verb4 ,dom4 xxxv1 #a73   
,who shall have everlasting dwellings   
unless the saints of ,god8 ,and who are 

they that shall be received by them into
 their dwellings1 if not those who      
succor them in their needs8 ,therefore  
alms should be given to the more holy   
persons rather than to those who are    
more closely united to us4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 man is more closely united to 
himself4 ,but a man cannot give himself 
an alms4 ,therefore it seems that we are
 not bound to give alms to those who are
 most closely united to us4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4  
#e3h73 ,if any man have not care of his 
own1 and especially of those of his     
house1 he hath denied the faith1 and is 
worse than an infidel4  ,i answer that1 
,as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4        
,christ4 i1 #bh71 it falls to us by lot1
 as it were1 to have to look to the     
welfare of those who are more closely   
united to us4 ,nevertheless in this     
matter we must employ discretion1       
according to the various degrees of     
connection1 holiness and utility4 ,for  
we ought to give alms to one who is much

 holier and in greater want1 and to one 
who is more useful to the common weal1  
rather than to one who is more closely  
united to us1 especially if the latter  
be not very closely united1 and has no  
special claim on our care then and      
there1 and who is not in very urgent    
need4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we ought not to
 help a sinner as such1 that is by      
encouraging him to sin1 but as man1 that
 is by supporting his nature4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,almsdeeds deserve on two     
counts to receive an eternal reward4    
,first because they are rooted in       
charity1 and in this respect an almsdeed
 is meritorious in so far as it observes
 the order of charity1 which requires   
that1 other things being equal1 we      
should1 in preference1 help those who   
are more closely connected with us4     
,wherefore ,ambrose says 7,de ,officiis 
i1 #cj73 ,it is with commendable        
liberality that you forget not your     
kindred1 if you know them to be in need1
 for it is better that you should       

yourself help your own family1 who would
 be ashamed to beg help from others4    
,secondly1 almsdeeds deserve to be      
rewarded eternally1 through the merit of
 the recipient1 who prays for the giver1
 and it is in this sense that ,augustine
 is speaking4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since  
almsdeeds are works of mercy1 just as a 
man does not1 properly speaking1 pity   
himself1 but only by a kind of          
comparison1 as stated above 7,q4 #cj1   
,,aa4 #a1 #b71 so too1 properly         
speaking1 no man gives himself an alms1 
unless he act in another's person2 thus 
when a man is appointed to distribute   
alms1 he can take something for himself1
 if he be in want1 on the same ground as
 when he gives to others4   ,,tenth     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #aj 
,whether ,alms ,should ,be ,given in    
,abundance8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that alms should not be given in   
abundance4 ,for we ought to give alms to
 those chiefly who are most closely     
connected with us4 ,but we ought not to 

give to them in such a way that they are
 likely to become richer thereby1 as    
,ambrose says 7,de ,officiis i1 #cj74   
,therefore neither should we give       
abundantly to others4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,officiis  
i1 #cj73 ,we should not lavish our      
wealth on others all at once1 we should 
dole it out by degrees4 ,but to give    
abundantly is to give lavishly4         
,therefore alms should not be given in  
abundance4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the     
,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #h3ac73 ,not    
that others should be eased1 i4e4 should
 live on you without working themselves1
 and you burthened1 i4e4 impoverished4  
,but this would be the result if alms   
were given in abundance4 ,therefore we  
ought not to give alms abundantly4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,tob4     
#d3ic73 ,if thou have much1 give        
abundantly4  ,i answer that1 ,alms may  
be considered abundant in relation      
either to the giver1 or to the          
recipient3 in relation to the giver1    

when that which a man gives is great as 
compared with his means4 ,to give thus  
is praiseworthy1 wherefore ,our ,lord   
7,luke #ba3c1 #d7 commended the widow   
because of her want1 she cast in all the
 living that she had4 ,nevertheless     
those conditions must be observed which 
were laid down when we spoke of giving  
alms out of one's necessary goods 7,a4  
#i74  ,on the part of the recipient1 an 
alms may be abundant in two ways2 first1
 by relieving his need sufficiently1 and
 in this sense it is praiseworthy to    
give alms3 secondly1 by relieving his   
need more than sufficiently2 this is not
 praiseworthy1 and it would be better to
 give to several that are in need1      
wherefore the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4   
#ac3c73 ,if ,i should distribute 4 4 4  
to feed the poor1 on which words a gloss
 comments3 ,thus we are warned to be    
careful in giving alms1 and to give1 not
 to one only1 but to many1 that we may  
profit many4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this    
argument considers abundance of alms as 

exceeding the needs of the recipient4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the passage quoted    
considers abundance of alms on the part 
of the giver2 but the sense is that ,god
 does not wish a man to lavish all his  
wealth at once1 except when he changes  
his state of life1 wherefore he goes on 
to say3 ,except we imitate ,eliseus who 
slew his oxen and fed the poor with what
 he had1 so that no household cares     
might keep him back 7#c ,kings #ai3ba74 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the passage quoted 
the words1 not that others should be    
eased or refreshed1 refer to that       
abundance of alms which surpasses the   
need of the recipient1 to whom one      
should give alms not that he may have an
 easy life1 but that he may have relief4
 ,nevertheless we must bring discretion 
to bear on the matter1 on account of the
 various conditions of men1 some of whom
 are more daintily nurtured1 and need   
finer food and clothing4 ,hence ,ambrose
 says 7,de ,officiis i1 #cj73 ,when you 
give an alms to a man1 you should take  

into consideration his age and his      
weakness2 and sometimes the shame which 
proclaims his good birth2 and again that
 perhaps he has fallen from riches to   
indigence through no fault of his own4  
,with regard to the words that follow1  
and you burdened1 they refer to         
abundance on the part of the giver4     
,yet1 as a gloss says on the same       
passage1 he says this1 not because it   
would be better to give in abundance1   
but because he fears for the weak1 and  
he admonishes them so to give that they 
lack not for themselves4   ,,question   
#cc  ,,of ,,fraternal ,,correction 7,in 
,eight ,articles7  ,we must now consider
 ,fraternal ,correction1 under which    
head there are eight points of inquiry3 
7#a7 ,whether fraternal correction is an
 act of charity8  7#b7 ,whether it is a 
matter of precept8  7#c7 ,whether this  
precept binds all1 or only superiors8   
7#d7 ,whether this precept binds the    
subject to correct his superior8  7#e7  
,whether a sinner may correct anyone8   

7#f7 ,whether one ought to correct a    
person who becomes worse through being  
corrected8  7#g7 ,whether secret        
correction should precede denouncement8 
7#h7 ,whether witnesses should be called
 before denouncement8   ,,first         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,fraternal ,correction ,is an  
,act of ,charity8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that fraternal correction is 
not an act of charity4 ,for a gloss on  
,matt4 #ah3ae1 ,if thy brother shall    
offend against thee1 says that a man    
should reprove his brother out of zeal  
for justice4 ,but justice is a distinct 
virtue from charity4 ,therefore         
fraternal correction is an act1 not of  
charity1 but of justice4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 fraternal correction is given 
by secret admonition4 ,now admonition is
 a kind of counsel1 which is an act of  
prudence1 for a prudent man is one who  
is of good counsel 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74    
,therefore fraternal correction is an   
act1 not of charity1 but of prudence4   

,obj4 #c3 ,further1 contrary acts do not
 belong to the same virtue4 ,now it is  
an act of charity to bear with a sinner1
 according to ,gal4 #f3b3 ,bear ye one  
another's burdens1 and so you shall     
fulfil the law of ,christ1 which is the 
law of charity4 ,therefore it seems that
 the correction of a sinning brother1   
which is contrary to bearing with him1  
is not an act of charity4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,to correct the wrongdoer is a
 spiritual almsdeed4 ,but almsdeeds are 
works of charity1 as stated above 7,q4  
#cb1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore fraternal      
correction is an act of charity4  ,i    
answer that1 ,the correction of the     
wrongdoer is a remedy which should be   
employed against a man's sin4 ,now a    
man's sin may be considered in two ways1
 first as being harmful to the sinner1  
secondly as conducing to the harm of    
others1 by hurting or scandalizing them1
 or by being detrimental to the common  
good1 the justice of which is disturbed 
by that man's sin4  ,consequently the   

correction of a wrongdoer is twofold1   
one which applies a remedy to the sin   
considered as an evil of the sinner     
himself4 ,this is fraternal correction  
properly so called1 which is directed to
 the amendment of the sinner4 ,now to do
 away with anyone's evil is the same as 
to procure his good3 and to procure a   
person's good is an act of charity1     
whereby we wish and do our friend well4 
,consequently fraternal correction also 
is an act of charity1 because thereby we
 drive out our brother's evil1 viz4 sin1
 the removal of which pertains to       
charity rather than the removal of an   
external loss1 or of a bodily injury1 in
 so much as the contrary good of virtue 
is more akin to charity than the good of
 the body or of external things4        
,therefore fraternal correction is an   
act of charity rather than the healing  
of a bodily infirmity1 or the relieving 
of an external bodily need4 ,there is   
another correction which applies a      
remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer1     

considered as hurtful to others1 and    
especially to the common good4 ,this    
correction is an act of justice1 whose  
concern it is to safeguard the rectitude
 of justice between one man and another4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this gloss speaks of
 the second correction which is an act  
of justice4 ,or if it speaks of the     
first correction1 then it takes justice 
as denoting a general virtue1 as we     
shall state further on 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4    
#e71 in which sense again all sin is    
iniquity 7#a ,john #c3d71 through being 
contrary to justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
vi1 #ab71 prudence regulates whatever is
 directed to the end1 about which things
 counsel and choice are concerned4      
,nevertheless when1 guided by prudence1 
we perform some action aright which is  
directed to the end of some virtue1 such
 as temperance or fortitude1 that action
 belongs chiefly to the virtue to whose 
end it is directed4 ,since1 then1 the   
admonition which is given in fraternal  

correction is directed to the removal of
 a brother's sin1 which removal pertains
 to charity1 it is evident that this    
admonition is chiefly an act of charity1
 which virtue commands it1 so to speak1 
but secondarily an act of prudence1     
which executes and directs the action4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,fraternal correction  
is not opposed to forbearance with the  
weak1 on the contrary it results from   
it4 ,for a man bears with a sinner1 in  
so far as he is not disturbed against   
him1 and retains his goodwill towards   
him3 the result being that he strives to
 make him do better4   ,,second         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,fraternal ,correction ,is a   
,matter of ,precept8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that fraternal correction is
 not a matter of precept4 ,for nothing  
impossible is a matter of precept1      
according to the saying of ,jerome      
99,pelagius1 ,expos4 ,symb4 ad ,damas3  
,accursed be he who says that ,god has  
commanded anything impossible4 ,now it  

is written 7,eccles4 #g3ad73 ,consider  
the works of ,god1 that no man can      
correct whom ,he hath despised4         
,therefore fraternal correction is not a
 matter of precept4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 all the precepts of the ,divine ,law   
are reduced to the precepts of the      
,decalogue4 ,but fraternal correction   
does not come under any precept of the  
,decalogue4 ,therefore it is not a      
matter of precept4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
the omission of a ,divine precept is a  
mortal sin1 which has no place in a holy
 man4 ,yet holy and spiritual men are   
found to omit fraternal correction3     
since ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i1
 #i73 ,not only those of low degree1 but
 also those of high position1 refrain   
from reproving others1 moved by a guilty
 cupidity1 not by the claims of charity4
 ,therefore fraternal correction is not 
a matter of precept4  ,obj4 #d3         
,further1 whatever is a matter of       
precept is something due4 ,if1          
therefore1 fraternal correction is a    

matter of precept1 it is due to our     
brethren that we correct them when they 
sin4 ,now when a man owes anyone a      
material due1 such as the payment of a  
sum of money1 he must not be content    
that his creditor come to him1 but he   
should seek him out1 that he may pay him
 his due4 ,hence we should have to go   
seeking for those who need correction1  
in order that we might correct them2    
which appears to be inconvenient1 both  
on account of the great number of       
sinners1 for whose correction one man   
could not suffice1 and because religious
 would have to leave the cloister in    
order to reprove men1 which would be    
unbecoming4 ,therefore fraternal        
correction is not a matter of precept4  
,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de  
,verb4 ,dom4 xvi1 #d73 ,you become worse
 than the sinner if you fail to correct 
him4 ,but this would not be so unless1  
by this neglect1 one omitted to observe 
some precept4 ,therefore fraternal      
correction is a matter of precept4  ,i  

answer that1 ,fraternal correction is a 
matter of precept4 ,we must observe1    
however1 that while the negative        
precepts of the ,law forbid sinful acts1
 the positive precepts inculcate acts of
 virtue4 ,now sinful acts are evil in   
themselves1 and cannot become good1 no  
matter how1 or when1 or where1 they are 
done1 because of their very nature they 
are connected with an evil end1 as      
stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #f3 wherefore     
negative precepts bind always and for   
all times4 ,on the other hand1 acts of  
virtue must not be done anyhow1 but by  
observing the due circumstances1 which  
are requisite in order that an act be   
virtuous2 namely1 that it be done where1
 when1 and how it ought to be done4 ,and
 since the disposition of whatever is   
directed to the end depends on the      
formal aspect of the end1 the chief of  
these circumstances of a virtuous act is
 this aspect of the end1 which in this  
case is the good of virtue4 ,if         
therefore such a circumstance be omitted

 from a virtuous act1 as entirely takes 
away the good of virtue1 such an act is 
contrary to a precept4 ,if1 however1 the
 circumstance omitted from a virtuous   
act be such as not to destroy the virtue
 altogether1 though it does not         
perfectly attain the good of virtue1 it 
is not against a precept4 ,hence the    
,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #i7 says that 
if we depart but little from the mean1  
it is not contrary to the virtue1       
whereas if we depart much from the mean 
virtue is destroyed in its act4 ,now    
fraternal correction is directed to a   
brother's amendment3 so that it is a    
matter of precept1 in so far as it is   
necessary for that end1 but not so as we
 have to correct our erring brother at  
all places and times4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,in all good deeds man's action is not  
efficacious without the ,divine         
assistance3 and yet man must do what is 
in his power4 ,hence ,augustine says    
7,de ,correp4 et ,gratia xv73 ,since we 
ignore who is predestined and who is    

not1 charity should so guide our        
feelings1 that we wish all to be saved4 
,consequently we ought to do our        
brethren the kindness of correcting     
them1 with the hope of ,god's help4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#cb1 ,a4 #e1 ad #d71 all the precepts   
about rendering service to our neighbor 
are reduced to the precept about the    
honor due to parents4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,fraternal correction may be omitted in 
three ways4  ,first1 meritoriously1 when
 out of charity one omits to correct    
someone4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4
 ,dei i1 #i73 ,if a man refrains from   
chiding and reproving wrongdoers1       
because he awaits a suitable time for so
 doing1 or because he fears lest1 if he 
does so1 they may become worse1 or      
hinder1 oppress1 or turn away from the  
faith1 others who are weak and need to  
be instructed in a life of goodness and 
virtue1 this does not seem to result    
from covetousness1 but to be counselled 
by charity4  ,secondly1 fraternal       

correction may be omitted in such a way 
that one commits a mortal sin1 namely1  
when 7as he says in the same passage7   
one fears what people may think1 or lest
 one may suffer grievous pain or death2 
provided1 however1 that the mind is so  
dominated by such things1 that it gives 
them the preference to fraternal        
charity4 ,this would seem to be the case
 when a man reckons that he might       
probably withdraw some wrongdoer from   
sin1 and yet omits to do so1 through    
fear or covetousness4  ,thirdly1 such an
 omission is a venial sin1 when through 
fear or covetousness1 a man is loth to  
correct his brother's faults1 and yet   
not to such a degree1 that if he saw    
clearly that he could withdraw him from 
sin1 he would still forbear from so     
doing1 through fear or covetousness1    
because in his own mind he prefers      
fraternal charity to these things4 ,it  
is in this way that holy men sometimes  
omit to correct wrongdoers4  ,reply     
,obj4 #d3 ,we are bound to pay that     

which is due to some fixed and certain  
person1 whether it be a material or a   
spiritual good1 without waiting for him 
to come to us1 but by taking proper     
steps to find him4 ,wherefore just as he
 that owes money to a creditor should   
seek him1 when the time comes1 so as to 
pay him what he owes1 so he that has    
spiritual charge of some person is bound
 to seek him out1 in order to reprove   
him for a sin4 ,on the other hand1 we   
are not bound to seek someone on whom to
 bestow such favors as are due1 not to  
any certain person1 but to all our      
neighbors in general1 whether those     
favors be material or spiritual goods1  
but it suffices that we bestow them when
 the opportunity occurs2 because1 as    
,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1
 #bh71 we must look upon this as a      
matter of chance4 ,for this reason he   
says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom4 xvi1 #a7 that    
,our ,lord warns us not to be listless  
in regard of one another's sins3 not    
indeed by being on the lookout for      

something to denounce1 but by correcting
 what we see3 else we should become     
spies on the lives of others1 which is  
against the saying of ,prov4 #bd3ai3    
,lie not in wait1 nor seek after        
wickedness in the house of the just1 nor
 spoil his rest4 ,it is evident from    
this that there is no need for religious
 to leave their cloister in order to    
rebuke evil-doers4   ,,third ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,fraternal ,correction ,belongs ,only to
 ,prelates8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that fraternal correction belongs  
to prelates alone4 ,for ,jerome         
99,origen1 ,hom4 vii in ,joan4 says3    
,let priests endeavor to fulfil this    
saying of the ,gospel3 ',if thy brother 
sin against thee1' etc4 ,now prelates   
having charge of others were usually    
designated under the name of priests4   
,therefore it seems that fraternal      
correction belongs to prelates alone4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fraternal correction
 is a spiritual alms4 ,now corporal     

almsgiving belongs to those who are     
placed above others in temporal matters1
 i4e4 to the rich4 ,therefore fraternal 
correction belongs to those who are     
placed above others in spiritual        
matters1 i4e4 to prelates4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 when one man reproves another 
he moves him by his rebuke to something 
better4 ,now in the physical order the  
inferior is moved by the superior4      
,therefore in the order of virtue also1 
which follows the order of nature1 it   
belongs to prelates alone to correct    
inferiors4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
written 7,dist4 xxiv1 qu4 #c1 ,can4 ,tam
 ,sacerdotes73 ,both priests and all the
 rest of the faithful should be most    
solicitous for those who perish1 so that
 their reproof may either correct their 
sinful ways1 or1 if they be             
incorrigible1 cut them off from the     
,church4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated    
above 7,a4 #a71 correction is twofold4  
,one is an act of charity1 which seeks  
in a special way the recovery of an     

erring brother by means of a simple     
warning3 such like correction belongs to
 anyone who has charity1 be he subject  
or prelate4  ,but there is another      
correction which is an act of justice   
purposing the common good1 which is     
procured not only by warning one's      
brother1 but also1 sometimes1 by        
punishing him1 that others may1 through 
fear1 desist from sin4 ,such a          
correction belongs only to prelates1    
whose business it is not only to        
admonish1 but also to correct by means  
of punishments4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even 
as regards that fraternal correction    
which is common to all1 prelates have a 
grave responsibility1 as ,augustine says
 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i1 #i73 for just as a  
man ought to bestow temporal favors on  
those especially of whom he has temporal
 care1 so too ought he to confer        
spiritual favors1 such as correction1   
teaching and the like1 on those who are 
entrusted to his spiritual care4        
,therefore ,jerome does not mean that   

the precept of fraternal correction     
concerns priests only1 but that it      
concerns them chiefly4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,just as he who has the means wherewith
 to give corporal assistance is rich in 
this respect1 so he whose reason is     
gifted with a sane judgment1 so as to be
 able to correct another's wrong-doing1 
is1 in this respect1 to be looked on as 
a superior4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even in  
the physical order certain things act   
mutually on one another1 through being  
in some respect higher than one another1
 in so far as each is somewhat in act1  
and somewhat in potentiality with regard
 to another4 ,in like manner one man can
 correct another in so far as he has a  
sane judgment in a matter wherein the   
other sins1 though he is not his        
superior simply4   ,,fourth ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #d  ,whether a
 ,man ,is ,bound to ,correct ,his       
,prelate8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that no man is bound to correct his    
prelate4 ,for it is written 7,ex4       

#ai3ab73 ,the beast that shall touch the
 mount shall be stoned1 99,vulg43       
',everyone that shall touch the mount1  
dying he shall die4' and 7#b ,kings     
#f3g7 it is related that the ,lord      
struck ,oza for touching the ark4 ,now  
the mount and the ark signify our       
prelates4 ,therefore prelates should not
 be corrected by their subjects4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 a gloss on ,gal4 #b3aa1 ,i
 withstood him to the face1 adds3 as an 
equal4 ,therefore1 since a subject is   
not equal to his prelate1 he ought not  
to correct him4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1    
,gregory says 7,moral4 xxiii1 #h7 that  
one ought not to presume to reprove the 
conduct of holy men1 unless one thinks  
better of oneself4 ,but one ought not to
 think better of oneself than of one's  
prelate4 ,therefore one ought not to    
correct one's prelate4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,augustine says in his ,rule3 
,show mercy not only to yourselves1 but 
also to him who1 being in the higher    
position among you1 is therefore in     

greater danger4 ,but fraternal          
correction is a work of mercy4          
,therefore even prelates ought to be    
corrected4  ,i answer that1 ,a subject  
is not competent to administer to his   
prelate the correction which is an act  
of justice through the coercive nature  
of punishment3 but the fraternal        
correction which is an act of charity is
 within the competency of everyone in   
respect of any person towards whom he is
 bound by charity1 provided there be    
something in that person which requires 
correction4  ,now an act which proceeds 
from a habit or power extends to        
whatever is contained under the object  
of that power or habit3 thus vision     
extends to all things comprised in the  
object of sight4 ,since1 however1 a     
virtuous act needs to be moderated by   
due circumstances1 it follows that when 
a subject corrects his prelate1 he ought
 to do so in a becoming manner1 not with
 impudence and harshness1 but with      
gentleness and respect4 ,hence the      

,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #e3a73 ,an      
ancient man rebuke not1 but entreat him 
as a father4 ,wherefore ,dionysius finds
 fault with the monk ,demophilus 7,ep4  
viii71 for rebuking a priest with       
insolence1 by striking and turning him  
out of the church4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it
 would seem that a subject touches his  
prelate inordinately when he upbraids   
him with insolence1 as also when he     
speaks ill of him3 and this is signified
 by ,god's condemnation of those who    
touched the mount and the ark4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,to withstand anyone in public
 exceeds the mode of fraternal          
correction1 and so ,paul would not have 
withstood ,peter then1 unless he were in
 some way his equal as regards the      
defense of the faith4 ,but one who is   
not an equal can reprove privately and  
respectfully4 ,hence the ,apostle in    
writing to the ,colossians 7#d3ag7 tells
 them to admonish their prelate3 ,say to
 ,archippus3 ,fulfil thy ministry       
99,vulg43 ',take heed to the ministry   

which thou hast received in the ,lord1  
that thou fulfil it4' ,cf4 #b ,tim4     
#d3e4 ,it must be observed1 however1    
that if the faith were endangered1 a    
subject ought to rebuke his prelate even
 publicly4 ,hence ,paul1 who was        
,peter's subject1 rebuked him in public1
 on account of the imminent danger of   
scandal concerning faith1 and1 as the   
gloss of ,augustine says on ,gal4 #b3aa1
 ,peter gave an example to superiors1   
that if at any time they should happen  
to stray from the straight path1 they   
should not disdain to be reproved by    
their subjects4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to   
presume oneself to be simply better than
 one's prelate1 would seem to savor of  
presumptuous pride2 but there is no     
presumption in thinking oneself better  
in some respect1 because1 in this life1 
no man is without some fault4 ,we must  
also remember that when a man reproves  
his prelate charitably1 it does not     
follow that he thinks himself any       
better1 but merely that he offers his   

help to one who1 being in the higher    
position among you1 is therefore in     
greater danger1 as ,augustine observes  
in his ,rule quoted above4   ,,fifth    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #e  
,whether a ,sinner ,ought to ,reprove a 
,wrongdoer8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that a sinner ought to reprove a   
wrongdoer4 ,for no man is excused from  
obeying a precept by having committed a 
sin4 ,but fraternal correction is a     
matter of precept1 as stated above 7,a4 
#b74 ,therefore it seems that a man     
ought not to forbear from such like     
correction for the reason that he has   
committed a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
spiritual almsdeeds are of more account 
than corporal almsdeeds4 ,now one who is
 in sin ought not to abstain from       
administering corporal alms4 ,much less 
therefore ought he1 on account of a     
previous sin1 to refrain from correcting
 wrongdoers4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is 
written 7#a ,john #a3h73 ,if we say that
 we have no sin1 we deceive ourselves4  

,therefore if1 on account of a sin1 a   
man is hindered from reproving his      
brother1 there will be none to reprove  
the wrongdoer4 ,but the latter          
proposition is unreasonable3 therefore  
the former is also4  ,on the contrary1  
,isidore says 7,de ,summo ,bono iii1    
#cb73 ,he that is subject to vice should
 not correct the vices of others4 ,again
 it is written 7,rom4 #b3a73 ,wherein   
thou judgest another1 thou condemnest   
thyself4 ,for thou dost the same things 
which thou judgest4  ,i answer that1 ,as
 stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad #b71 to       
correct a wrongdoer belongs to a man1 in
 so far as his reason is gifted with    
right judgment4 ,now sin1 as stated     
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 
does not destroy the good of nature so  
as to deprive the sinner's reason of all
 right judgment1 and in this respect he 
may be competent to find fault with     
others for committing sin4 ,nevertheless
 a previous sin proves somewhat of a    
hindrance to this correction1 for three 

reasons4 ,first because this previous   
sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke    
another2 and especially is he unworthy  
to correct another for a lesser sin1 if 
he himself has committed a greater4     
,hence ,jerome says on the words1 ,why  
seest thou the mote8 etc4 7,matt4 #g3c73
 ,he is speaking of those who1 while    
they are themselves guilty of mortal    
sin1 have no patience with the lesser   
sins of their brethren4  ,secondly1 such
 like correction becomes unseemly1 on   
account of the scandal which ensues     
therefrom1 if the corrector's sin be    
well known1 because it would seem that  
he corrects1 not out of charity1 but    
more for the sake of ostentation4 ,hence
 the words of ,matt4 #g3d1 ,how sayest  
thou to thy brother8 etc4 are expounded 
by ,chrysostom 99,hom4 xvii in the ,opus
 ,imperfectum falsely ascribed to ,st4  
,john ,chrysostom thus3 ,that is--',with
 what object8' ,out of charity1 think   
you1 that you may save your neighbor8   
,no1 because you would look after your  

own salvation first4 ,what you want is1 
not to save others1 but to hide your    
evil deeds with good teaching1 and to   
seek to be praised by men for your      
knowledge4  ,thirdly1 on account of the 
rebuker's pride2 when1 for instance1 a  
man thinks lightly of his own sins1 and1
 in his own heart1 sets himself above   
his neighbor1 judging the latter's sins 
with harsh severity1 as though he       
himself were a just man4 ,hence         
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte ii1 #ai73 ,to reprove the faults 
of others is the duty of good and kindly
 men3 when a wicked man rebukes anyone1 
his rebuke is the latter's acquittal4   
,and so1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 
,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ai73 ,when we have 
to find fault with anyone1 we should    
think whether we were never guilty of   
his sin2 and then we must remember that 
we are men1 and might have been guilty  
of it2 or that we once had it on our    
conscience1 but have it no longer3 and  
then we should bethink ourselves that we

 are all weak1 in order that our reproof
 may be the outcome1 not of hatred1 but 
of pity4 ,but if we find that we are    
guilty of the same sin1 we must not     
rebuke him1 but groan with him1 and     
invite him to repent with us4 ,it       
follows from this that1 if a sinner     
reprove a wrongdoer with humility1 he   
does not sin1 nor does he bring a       
further condemnation on himself1        
although thereby he proves himself      
deserving of condemnation1 either in his
 brother's or in his own conscience1 on 
account of his previous sin4  ,hence the
 ,replies to the ,objections are clear4 
,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1   
,art4 #f  ,whether ,one ,ought to       
,forbear from ,correcting ,someone1     
,through ,fear ,lest ,he ,become ,worse8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one
 ought not to forbear from correcting   
someone through fear lest he become     
worse4 ,for sin is weakness of the soul1
 according to ,ps4 #f3c3 ,have mercy on 
me1 ,o ,lord1 for ,i am weak4 ,now he   

that has charge of a sick person1 must  
not cease to take care of him1 even if  
he be fractious or contemptuous1 because
 then the danger is greater1 as in the  
case of madmen4 ,much more1 therefore   
should one correct a sinner1 no matter  
how badly he takes it4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 according to ,jerome vital    
truths are not to be foregone on account
 of scandal4 ,now ,god's commandments   
are vital truths4 ,since1 therefore1    
fraternal correction is a matter of     
precept1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71 it   
seems that it should not be foregone for
 fear of scandalizing the person to be  
corrected4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1         
according to the ,apostle 7,rom4 #c3h7  
we should not do evil that good may come
 of it4 ,therefore1 in like manner1 good
 should not be omitted lest evil befall4
 ,now fraternal correction is a good    
thing4 ,therefore it should not be      
omitted for fear lest the person        
corrected become worse4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4 #i3h73 

,rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee1
 where a gloss remarks3 ,you must not   
fear lest the scorner insult you when   
you rebuke him3 rather should you bear  
in mind that by making him hate you1 you
 may make him worse4 ,therefore one     
ought to forego fraternal correction1   
when we fear lest we may make a man     
worse4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above
 7,a4 #c7 the correction of the         
wrongdoer is twofold4 ,one1 which       
belongs to prelates1 and is directed to 
the common good1 has coercive force4    
,such correction should not be omitted  
lest the person corrected be disturbed1 
both because if he is unwilling to amend
 his ways of his own accord1 he should  
be made to cease sinning by being       
punished1 and because1 if he be         
incorrigible1 the common good is        
safeguarded in this way1 since the order
 of justice is observed1 and others are 
deterred by one being made an example   
of4 ,hence a judge does not desist from 
pronouncing sentence of condemnation    

against a sinner1 for fear of disturbing
 him or his friends4  ,the other        
fraternal correction is directed to the 
amendment of the wrongdoer1 whom it does
 not coerce1 but merely admonishes4     
,consequently when it is deemed probable
 that the sinner will not take the      
warning1 and will become worse1 such    
fraternal correction should be foregone1
 because the means should be regulated  
according to the requirements of the    
end4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the doctor uses 
force towards a madman1 who is unwilling
 to submit to his treatment2 and this   
may be compared with the correction     
administered by prelates1 which has     
coercive power1 but not with simple     
fraternal correction4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,fraternal correction is a matter of    
precept1 in so far as it is an act of   
virtue1 and it will be a virtuous act in
 so far as it is proportionate to the   
end4 ,consequently whenever it is a     
hindrance to the end1 for instance when 
a man becomes worse through it1 it is   

longer a vital truth1 nor is it a matter
 of precept4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whatever
 is directed to an end1 becomes good    
through being directed to the end4      
,hence whenever fraternal correction    
hinders the end1 namely the amendment of
 our brother1 it is no longer good1 so  
that when such a correction is omitted1 
good is not omitted lest evil should    
befall4   ,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #g  ,whether the        
,precept of ,fraternal ,correction      
,demands ,that a ,private ,admonition   
,should ,precede ,denunciation8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
precept of fraternal correction does not
 demand that a private admonition should
 precede denunciation4 ,for1 in works of
 charity1 we should above all follow the
 example of ,god1 according to ,eph4    
#e3a1 #b3 ,be ye followers of ,god1 as  
most dear children1 and walk in love4   
,now ,god sometimes punishes a man for a
 sin1 without previously warning him in 
secret4 ,therefore it seems that there  

is no need for a private admonition to  
precede denunciation4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 according to ,augustine 7,de  
,mendacio xv71 we learn from the deeds  
of holy men how we ought to understand  
the commandments of ,holy ,writ4 ,now   
among the deeds of holy men we find that
 a hidden sin is publicly denounced1    
without any previous admonition in      
private4 ,thus we read 7,gen4 #cg3b7    
that ,joseph accused his brethren to his
 father of a most wicked crime3 and     
7,acts #e3d1 #i7 that ,peter publicly   
denounced ,ananias and ,saphira who had 
secretly by fraud kept back the price of
 the land1 without beforehand           
admonishing them in private3 nor do we  
read that ,our ,lord admonished ,judas  
in secret before denouncing him4        
,therefore the precept does not require 
that secret admonition should precede   
public denunciation4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 it is a graver matter to      
accuse than to denounce4 ,now one may go
 to the length of accusing a person     

publicly1 without previously admonishing
 him in secret3 for it is decided in the
 ,decretal 7,cap4 ,qualiter1 xiv1 ,de   
,accusationibus7 that nothing else need 
precede accusation except inscription4  
99,the accuser was bound by ,roman ,law 
to endorse 7se inscribere7 the writ of  
accusation4 ,the effect of this         
endorsement or inscription was that the 
accuser bound himself1 if he failed to  
prove the accusation1 to suffer the same
 punishment as the accused would have to
 suffer if proved guilty4 ,therefore it 
seems that the precept does not require 
that a secret admonition should precede 
public denunciation4  ,obj4 #d3         
,further1 it does not seem probable that
 the customs observed by religious in   
general are contrary to the precepts of 
,christ4 ,now it is customary among     
religious orders to proclaim this or    
that one for a fault1 without any       
previous secret admonition4 ,therefore  
it seems that this admonition is not    
required by the precept4  ,obj4 #e3     

,further1 religious are bound to obey   
their prelates4 ,now a prelate sometimes
 commands either all in general1 or     
someone in particular1 to tell him if   
they know of anything that requires     
correction4 ,therefore it would seem    
that they are bound to tell them this1  
even before any secret admonition4      
,therefore the precept does not require 
secret admonition before public         
denunciation4  ,on the contrary1        
,augustine says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom4 xvi1  
#d7 on the words1 ,rebuke him between   
thee and him alone 7,matt4 #ah3ae73     
,aiming at his amendment1 while avoiding
 his disgrace3 since perhaps from shame 
he might begin to defend his sin2 and   
him whom you thought to make a better   
man1 you make worse4 ,now we are bound  
by the precept of charity to beware lest
 our brother become worse4 ,therefore   
the order of fraternal correction comes 
under the precept4  ,i answer that1     
,with regard to the public denunciation 
of sins it is necessary to make a       

distinction3 because sins may be either 
public or secret4 ,in the case of public
 sins1 a remedy is required not only for
 the sinner1 that he may become better1 
but also for others1 who know of his    
sin1 lest they be scandalized4          
,wherefore such like sins should be     
denounced in public1 according to the   
saying of the ,apostle 7#a ,tim4 #e3bj73
 ,them that sin reprove before all1 that
 the rest also may have fear1 which is  
to be understood as referring to public 
sins1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,verb4  
,dom4 xvi1 #g74  ,on the other hand1 in 
the case of secret sins1 the words of   
,our ,lord seem to apply 7,matt4        
#ah3ae73 ,if thy brother shall offend   
against thee1 etc4 ,for if he offend    
thee publicly in the presence of others1
 he no longer sins against thee alone1  
but also against others whom he         
disturbs4 ,since1 however1 a man's      
neighbor may take offense even at his   
secret sins1 it seems that we must make 
yet a further distinction4 ,for certain 

secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor 
either in his body or in his soul1 as1  
for instance1 when a man plots secretly 
to betray his country to its enemies1 or
 when a heretic secretly turns other men
 away from the faith4 ,and since he that
 sins thus in secret1 sins not only     
against you in particular1 but also     
against others1 it is necessary to take 
steps to denounce him at once1 in order 
to prevent him doing such harm1 unless  
by chance you were firmly persuaded that
 this evil result would be prevented by 
admonishing him secretly4 ,on the other 
hand there are other sins which injure  
none but the sinner1 and the person     
sinned against1 either because he alone 
is hurt by the sinner1 or at least      
because he alone knows about his sin1   
and then our one purpose should be to   
succor our sinning brother3 and just as 
the physician of the body restores the  
sick man to health1 if possible1 without
 cutting off a limb1 but1 if this be    
unavoidable1 cuts off a limb which is   

least indispensable1 in order to        
preserve the life of the whole body1 so 
too he who desires his brother's        
amendment should1 if possible1 so amend 
him as regards his conscience1 that he  
keep his good name4  ,for a good name is
 useful1 first of all to the sinner     
himself1 not only in temporal matters   
wherein a man suffers many losses1 if he
 lose his good name1 but also in        
spiritual matters1 because many are     
restrained from sinning1 through fear of
 dishonor1 so that when a man finds his 
honor lost1 he puts no curb on his      
sinning4 ,hence ,jerome says on ,matt4  
#ah3ae3 ,if he sin against thee1 thou   
shouldst rebuke him in private1 lest he 
persist in his sin if he should once    
become shameless or unabashed4          
,secondly1 we ought to safeguard our    
sinning brother's good name1 both       
because the dishonor of one leads to the
 dishonor of others1 according to the   
saying of ,augustine 7,ep4 ad pleb4     
,hipponens4 lxxviii73 ,when a few of    

those who bear a name for holiness are  
reported falsely or proved in truth to  
have done anything wrong1 people will   
seek by busily repeating it to make it  
believed of all3 and also because when  
one man's sin is made public others are 
incited to sin likewise4  ,since1       
however1 one's conscience should be     
preferred to a good name1 ,our ,lord    
wished that we should publicly denounce 
our brother and so deliver his          
conscience from sin1 even though he     
should forfeit his good name4 ,therefore
 it is evident that the precept requires
 a secret admonition to precede public  
denunciation4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3         
,whatever is hidden1 is known to ,god1  
wherefore hidden sins are to the        
judgment of ,god1 just what public sins 
are to the judgment of man4             
,nevertheless ,god does rebuke sinners  
sometimes by secretly admonishing them1 
so to speak1 with an inward inspiration1
 either while they wake or while they   
sleep1 according to ,job #cc3ae-ag3 ,by 

a dream in a vision by night1 when deep 
sleep falleth upon men 4 4 4 then ,he   
openeth the ears of men1 and teaching   
instructeth them in what they are to    
learn1 that ,he may withdraw a man from 
the things he is doing4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,our ,lord as ,god knew the sin of  
,judas as though it were public1        
wherefore ,he could have made it known  
at once4 ,yet ,he did not1 but warned   
,judas of his sin in words that were    
obscure4 ,the sin of ,ananias and       
,saphira was denounced by ,peter acting 
as ,god's executor1 by ,whose revelation
 he knew of their sin4 ,with regard to  
,joseph it is probable that he warned   
his brethren1 though ,scripture does not
 say so4 ,or we may say that the sin was
 public with regard to his brethren1    
wherefore it is stated in the plural    
that he accused his brethren4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,when there is danger to a    
great number of people1 those words of  
,our ,lord do not apply1 because then   
thy brother does not sin against thee   

alone4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,proclamations 
made in the chapter of religious are    
about little faults which do not affect 
a man's good name1 wherefore they are   
reminders of forgotten faults rather    
than accusations or denunciations4 ,if1 
however1 they should be of such a nature
 as to injure our brother's good name1  
it would be contrary to ,our ,lord's    
precept1 to denounce a brother's fault  
in this manner4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a    
prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to 
a ,divine precept1 according to ,acts   
#e3bi3 ,we ought to obey ,god rather    
then men4 ,therefore when a prelate     
commands anyone to tell him anything    
that he knows to need correction1 the   
command rightly understood supports the 
safeguarding of the order of fraternal  
correction1 whether the command be      
addressed to all in general1 or to some 
particular individual4 ,if1 on the other
 hand1 a prelate were to issue a command
 in express opposition to this order    
instituted by ,our ,lord1 both would    

sin1 the one commanding1 and the one    
obeying him1 as disobeying ,our ,lord's 
command4 ,consequently he ought not to  
be obeyed1 because a prelate is not the 
judge of secret things1 but ,god alone  
is1 wherefore he has no power to command
 anything in respect of hidden matters1 
except in so far as they are made known 
through certain signs1 as by ill-repute 
or suspicion2 in which cases a prelate  
can command just as a judge1 whether    
secular or ecclesiastical1 can bind a   
man under oath to tell the truth4       
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1  
,art4 #h  ,whether ,before the ,public  
,denunciation ,witnesses ,ought to ,be  
,brought ,forward8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that before the public       
denunciation witnesses ought not to be  
brought forward4 ,for secret sins ought 
not to be made known to others1 because 
by so doing a man would betray his      
brother's sins instead of correcting    
them1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4    
,dom4 xvi1 #g74 ,now by bringing forward

 witnesses one makes known a brother's  
sin to others4 ,therefore in the case of
 secret sins one ought not to bring     
witnesses forward before the public     
denunciation4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man  
should love his neighbor as himself4    
,now no man brings in witnesses to prove
 his own secret sin4 ,neither therefore 
ought one to bring forward witnesses to 
prove the secret sin of our brother4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 witnesses are       
brought forward to prove something4 ,but
 witnesses afford no proof in secret    
matters4 ,therefore it is useless to    
bring witnesses forward in such cases4  
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,augustine says in  
his ,rule that before bringing it to the
 notice of witnesses 4 4 4 it should be 
put before the superior4 ,now to bring a
 matter before a superior or a prelate  
is to tell the ,church4 ,therefore      
witnesses should not be brought forward 
before the public denunciation4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4      
#ah3af73 ,take with thee one or two     

more1 that in the mouth of two1 etc4  ,i
 answer that1 ,the right way to go from 
one extreme to another is to pass       
through the middle space4 ,now ,our     
,lord wished the beginning of fraternal 
correction to be hidden1 when one       
brother corrects another between this   
one and himself alone1 while ,he wished 
the end to be public1 when such a one   
would be denounced to the ,church4      
,consequently it is befitting that a    
citation of witnesses should be placed  
between the two extremes1 so that at    
first the brother's sin be indicated to 
a few1 who will be of use without being 
a hindrance1 and thus his sin be amended
 without dishonoring him before the     
public4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some have    
understood the order of fraternal       
correction to demand that we should     
first of all rebuke our brother         
secretly1 and that if he listens1 it is 
well2 but if he listen not1 and his sin 
be altogether hidden1 they say that we  
should go no further in the matter1     

whereas if it has already begun to reach
 the ears of several by various signs1  
we ought to prosecute the matter1       
according to ,our ,lord's command4 ,but 
this is contrary to what ,augustine says
 in his ,rule that we are bound to      
reveal a brother's sin1 if it will cause
 a worse corruption in the heart4       
,wherefore we must say otherwise that   
when the secret admonition has been     
given once or several times1 as long as 
there is probable hope of his amendment1
 we must continue to admonish him in    
private1 but as soon as we are able to  
judge with any probability that the     
secret admonition is of no avail1 we    
must take further steps1 however secret 
the sin may be1 and call witnesses1     
unless perhaps it were thought probable 
that this would not conduce to our      
brother's amendment1 and that he would  
become worse3 because on that account   
one ought to abstain altogether from    
correcting him1 as stated above 7,a4    
#f74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man needs no  

witnesses that he may amend his own sin3
 yet they may be necessary that we may  
amend a brother's sin4 ,hence the       
comparison fails4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,there may be three reasons for citing  
witnesses4 ,first1 to show that the deed
 in question is a sin1 as ,jerome says3 
secondly1 to prove that the deed was    
done1 if repeated1 as ,augustine says   
7loc4 cit473 thirdly1 to prove that the 
man who rebuked his brother1 has done   
what he could1 as ,chrysostom says      
7,hom4 in ,matth4 lx74  ,reply ,obj4 #d3
 ,augustine means that the matter ought 
to be made known to the prelate before  
it is stated to the witnesses1 in so far
 as the prelate is a private individual 
who is able to be of more use than      
others1 but not that it is to be told   
him as to the ,church1 i4e4 as holding  
the position of judge4   ,,question #cd 
,,of ,,hatred 7,in ,six ,articles7  ,we 
must now consider the vices opposed to  
charity3 7#a7 hatred1 which is opposed  
to love2 7#b7 sloth and envy1 which are 

opposed to the joy of charity2 7#c7     
discord and schism1 which are contrary  
to peace2 7#d7 offense and scandal1     
which are contrary to beneficence and   
fraternal correction4  ,under the first 
head there are six points of inquiry3   
7#a7 ,whether it is possible to hate    
,god8  7#b7 ,whether hatred of ,god is  
the greatest of sins8  7#c7 ,whether    
hatred of one's neighbor is always a    
sin8  7#d7 ,whether it is the greatest  
of all sins against our neighbor8  7#e7 
,whether it is a capital sin8  7#f7     
,from what capital sin does it arise8   
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,it ,is ,possible for
 ,anyone to ,hate ,god8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that no man can hate     
,god4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 
iv7 that the first good and beautiful is
 an object of love and dilection to all4
 ,but ,god is goodness and beauty       
itself4 ,therefore ,he is hated by none4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the ,apocryphal
 books of #c ,esdras #d3cf1 #ci it is   

written that all things call upon truth 
4 4 4 and 7all men7 do well like of her 
works4 ,now ,god is the very truth      
according to ,john #ad3f4 ,therefore all
 love ,god1 and none can hate ,him4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 hatred is a kind of 
aversion4 ,but according to ,dionysius  
7,div4 ,nom4 i7 ,god draws all things to
 ,himself4 ,therefore none can hate     
,him4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 
7,ps4 #gc3bc73 ,the pride of them that  
hate ,thee ascendeth continually1 and   
7,john #ae3bd73 ,but now they have both 
seen and hated both ,me and ,my ,father4
  ,i answer that1 ,as shown above       
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #a71 hatred is a 
movement of the appetitive power1 which 
power is not set in motion save by      
something apprehended4 ,now ,god can be 
apprehended by man in two ways2 first1  
in ,himself1 as when ,he is seen in ,his
 ,essence2 secondly1 in ,his effects1   
when1 to wit1 the invisible things of   
,god 4 4 4 are clearly seen1 being      
understood by the things that are made  

7,rom4 #a3bj74 ,now ,god in ,his        
,essence is goodness itself1 which no   
man can hate--for it is natural to good 
to be loved4 ,hence it is impossible for
 one who sees ,god in ,his ,essence1 to 
hate ,him4  ,moreover some of ,his      
effects are such that they can nowise be
 contrary to the human will1 since to   
be1 to live1 to understand1 which are   
effects of ,god1 are desirable and      
lovable to all4 ,wherefore again ,god   
cannot be an object of hatred if we     
consider ,him as the ,author of such    
like effects4 ,some of ,god's effects1  
however1 are contrary to an inordinate  
will1 such as the infliction of         
punishment1 and the prohibition of sin  
by the ,divine ,law4 ,such like effects 
are repugnant to a will debased by sin1 
and as regards the consideration of     
them1 ,god may be an object of hatred to
 some1 in so far as they look upon ,him 
as forbidding sin1 and inflicting       
punishment4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this     
argument is true of those who see ,god's

 ,essence1 which is the very essence of 
goodness4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this       
argument is true in so far as ,god is   
apprehended as the cause of such effects
 as are naturally beloved of all1 among 
which are the works of ,truth who       
reveals herself to men4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,god draws all things to ,himself1  
in so far as ,he is the source of being1
 since all things1 in as much as they   
are1 tend to be like ,god1 ,who is      
,being itself4   ,,second ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,hatred of ,god ,is the ,greatest of    
,sins8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that hatred of ,god is not the greatest 
of sins4 ,for the most grievous sin is  
the sin against the ,holy ,ghost1 since 
it cannot be forgiven1 according to     
,matt4 #ab3cb4 ,now hatred of ,god is   
not reckoned among the various kinds of 
sin against the ,holy ,ghost1 as may be 
seen from what has been said above 7,q4 
#ad1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore hatred of ,god 
is not the most grievous sin4  ,obj4 #b3

 ,further1 sin consists in withdrawing  
oneself from ,god4 ,now an unbeliever   
who has not even knowledge of ,god seems
 to be further away from ,him than a    
believer1 who though he hate ,god1      
nevertheless knows ,him4 ,therefore it  
seems that the sin of unbelief is graver
 than the sin of hatred against ,god4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god is an object of
 hatred1 only by reason of those of ,his
 effects that are contrary to the will3 
the chief of which is punishment4 ,but  
hatred of punishment is not the most    
grievous sin4 ,therefore hatred of ,god 
is not the most grievous sin4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,the best is opposite to the  
worst1 according to the ,philosopher    
7,ethic4 viii1 #aj74 ,but hatred of ,god
 is contrary to the love of ,god1       
wherein man's best consists4 ,therefore 
hatred of ,god is man's worst sin4  ,i  
answer that1 ,the defect in sin consists
 in its aversion from ,god1 as stated   
above 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #c73 and this       
aversion would not have the character of

 guilt1 were it not voluntary4 ,hence   
the nature of guilt consists in a       
voluntary aversion from ,god4  ,now this
 voluntary aversion from ,god is        
directly implied in the hatred of ,god1 
but in other sins1 by participation and 
indirectly4 ,for just as the will       
cleaves directly to what it loves1 so   
does it directly shun what it hates4    
,hence when a man hates ,god1 his will  
is directly averted from ,god1 whereas  
in other sins1 fornication for instance1
 a man turns away from ,god1 not        
directly1 but indirectly1 in so far1    
namely1 as he desires an inordinate     
pleasure1 to which aversion from ,god is
 connected4 ,now that which is so by    
itself1 always takes precedence of that 
which is so by another4 ,wherefore      
hatred of ,god is more grievous than    
other sins4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according
 to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxv1 #aa71 it is  
one thing not to do good things1 and    
another to hate the giver of good       
things1 even as it is one thing to sin  

indeliberately1 and another to sin      
deliberately4 ,this implies that to hate
 ,god1 the giver of all good things1 is 
to sin deliberately1 and this is a sin  
against the ,holy ,ghost4 ,hence it is  
evident that hatred of ,god is chiefly a
 sin against the ,holy ,ghost1 in so far
 as the sin against the ,holy ,ghost    
denotes a special kind of sin3 and yet  
it is not reckoned among the kinds of   
sin against the ,holy ,ghost1 because it
 is universally found in every kind of  
that sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even       
unbelief is not sinful unless it be     
voluntary3 wherefore the more voluntary 
it is1 the more it is sinful4 ,now it   
becomes voluntary by the fact that a man
 hates the truth that is proposed to    
him4 ,wherefore it is evident that      
unbelief derives its sinfulness from    
hatred of ,god1 ,whose truth is the     
object of faith2 and hence just as a    
cause is greater than its effect1 so    
hatred of ,god is a greater sin than    
unbelief4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not        

everyone who hates his punishment1 hates
 ,god the author of punishments4 ,for   
many hate the punishments inflicted on  
them1 and yet they bear them patiently  
out of reverence for the ,divine        
justice4 ,wherefore ,augustine says     
7,confess4 x7 that ,god commands us to  
bear with penal evils1 not to love them4
 ,on the other hand1 to break out into  
hatred of ,god when ,he inflicts those  
punishments1 is to hate ,god's very     
justice1 and that is a most grievous    
sin4 ,hence ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxv1 
#aa73 ,even as sometimes it is more     
grievous to love sin than to do it1 so  
is it more wicked to hate justice than  
not to have done it4   ,,third ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
hatred of one's neighbor is always a    
sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that
 hatred of one's neighbor is not always 
a sin4 ,for no sin is commanded or      
counselled by ,god1 according to ,prov4 
#h3h3 ,all ,my words are just1 there is 
nothing wicked nor perverse in them4    

,now1 it is written 7,luke #ad3bf73 ,if 
any man come to ,me1 and hate not his   
father and mother 4 4 4 he cannot be ,my
 disciple4 ,therefore hatred of one's   
neighbor is not always a sin4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 nothing wherein we imitate   
,god can be a sin4 ,but it is in        
imitation of ,god that we hate certain  
people3 for it is written 7,rom4 #a3cj73
 ,detractors1 hateful to ,god4          
,therefore it is possible to hate       
certain people without committing a sin4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing that is   
natural is a sin1 for sin is a wandering
 away from what is according to nature1 
according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide      
,orth4 ii1 #d1 #cj2 iv1 #bj74 ,now it is
 natural to a thing to hate whatever is 
contrary to it1 and to aim at its       
undoing4 ,therefore it seems that it is 
not a sin to hate one's ,i enemy4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,john  
#b3i73 ,he that 4 4 4 hateth his        
brother1 is in darkness4 ,now spiritual 
darkness is sin4 ,therefore there cannot

 be hatred of one's neighbor without    
sin4  ,i answer that1 ,hatred is opposed
 to love1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#bi1 ,a4 #b72 so that hatred of a thing 
is evil according as the love of that   
thing is good4 ,now love is due to our  
neighbor in respect of what he holds    
from ,god1 i4e4 in respect of nature and
 grace1 but not in respect of what he   
has of himself and from the devil1 i4e4 
in respect of sin and lack of justice4  
,consequently it is lawful to hate the  
sin in one's brother1 and whatever      
pertains to the defect of ,divine       
justice1 but we cannot hate our         
brother's nature and grace without sin4 
,now it is part of our love for our     
brother that we hate the fault and the  
lack of good in him1 since desire for   
another's good is equivalent to hatred  
of his evil4 ,consequently the hatred of
 one's brother1 if we consider it       
simply1 is always sinful4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,by the commandment of ,god 7,ex4   
#bj3ab7 we must honor our parents--as   

united to us in nature and kinship4 ,but
 we must hate them in so far as they    
prove an obstacle to our attaining the  
perfection of ,divine justice4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,god hates the sin which is in
 the detractor1 not his nature3 so that 
we can hate detractors without          
committing a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,men
 are not opposed to us in respect of the
 goods which they have received from    
,god3 wherefore1 in this respect1 we    
should love them4 ,but they are opposed 
to us1 in so far as they show hostility 
towards us1 and this is sinful in them4 
,in this respect we should hate them1   
for we should hate in them the fact that
 they are hostile to us4   ,,fourth     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,hatred of ,our ,neighbor ,is  
the ,most ,grievous ,sin ,against ,our  
,neighbor8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that hatred of our neighbor is the 
most grievous sin against our neighbor4 
,for it is written 7#a ,john #c3ae73    
,whosoever hateth his brother is a      

murderer4 ,now murder is the most       
grievous of sins against our neighbor4  
,therefore hatred is also4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 worst is opposed to best4 ,now
 the best thing we give our neighbor is 
love1 since all other things are        
referable to love4 ,therefore hatred is 
the worst4  ,on the contrary1 ,a thing  
is said to be evil1 because it hurts1 as
 ,augustine observes 7,enchiridion xii74
 ,now there are sins by which a man     
hurts his neighbor more than by hatred1 
e4g4 theft1 murder and adultery4        
,therefore hatred is not the most       
grievous sin4  ,moreover1 ,chrysostom   
99,hom4 x in the ,opus ,imperfectum1    
falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,john          
,chrysostom commenting on ,matt4 #e3ai1 
,he that shall break one of these least 
commandments1 says3 ,the commandments of
 ,moses1 ,thou shalt not kill1 ,thou    
shalt not commit adultery1 count for    
little in their reward1 but they count  
for much if they be disobeyed4 ,on the  
other hand the commandments of ,christ  

such as1 ,thou shalt not be angry1 ,thou
 shalt not desire1 are reckoned great in
 their reward1 but little in the        
transgression4 ,now hatred is an        
internal movement like anger and desire4
 ,therefore hatred of one's brother is a
 less grievous sin than murder4  ,i     
answer that1 ,sins committed against our
 neighbor are evil on two counts2 first 
by reason of the disorder in the person 
who sins1 secondly by reason of the hurt
 inflicted on the person sinned against4
 ,on the first count1 hatred is a more  
grievous sin than external actions that 
hurt our neighbor1 because hatred is a  
disorder of man's will1 which is the    
chief part of man1 and wherein is the   
root of sin1 so that if a man's outward 
actions were to be inordinate1 without  
any disorder in his will1 they would not
 be sinful1 for instance1 if he were to 
kill a man1 through ignorance or out of 
zeal for justice3 and if there be       
anything sinful in a man's outward sins 
against his neighbor1 it is all to be   

traced to his inward hatred4  ,on the   
other hand1 as regards the hurt         
inflicted on his neighbor1 a man's      
outward sins are worse than his inward  
hatred4 ,this suffices for the ,replies 
to the ,objections4   ,,fifth ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #e  ,whether  
,hatred ,is a ,capital ,sin8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that hatred is a    
capital sin4 ,for hatred is directly    
opposed to charity4 ,now charity is the 
foremost among the virtues1 and the     
mother of all others4 ,therefore hatred 
is the chief of the capital sins1 and   
the origin of all others4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 sins arise in us on account of
 the inclinations of our passions1      
according to ,rom4 #g3e3 ,the passions  
of sins 4 4 4 did work in our members to
 bring forth fruit unto death4 ,now all 
other passions of the soul seem to arise
 from love and hatred1 as was shown     
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 
,therefore hatred should be reckoned one
 of the capital sins4  ,obj4 #c3        

,further1 vice is a moral evil4 ,now    
hatred regards evil more than any other 
passion does4 ,therefore it seems that  
hatred should be reckoned a capital sin4
  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4   
xxxi7 does not reckon hatred among the  
seven capital sins4  ,i answer that1 ,as
 stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4  
#c1 #d71 a capital vice is one from     
which other vices arise most frequently4
 ,now vice is contrary to man's nature1 
in as much as he is a rational animal3  
and when a thing acts contrary to its   
nature1 that which is natural to it is  
corrupted little by little4             
,consequently it must first of all fail 
in that which is less in accordance with
 its nature1 and last of all in that    
which is most in accordance with its    
nature1 since what is first in          
construction is last in destruction4    
,now that which1 first and foremost1 is 
most natural to man1 is the love of what
 is good1 and especially love of the    
,divine good1 and of his neighbor's     

good4 ,wherefore hatred1 which is       
opposed to this love1 is not the first  
but the last thing in the downfall of   
virtue resulting from vice3 and         
therefore it is not a capital vice4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated in ,phys4   
vii1 text4 #ah1 the virtue of a thing   
consists in its being well disposed in  
accordance with its nature4 ,hence what 
is first and foremost in the virtues    
must be first and foremost in the       
natural order4 ,hence charity is        
reckoned the foremost of the virtues1   
and for the same reason hatred cannot be
 first among the vices1 as stated above4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,hatred of the evil  
that is contrary to one's natural good1 
is the first of the soul's passions1    
even as love of one's natural good is4  
,but hatred of one's connatural good    
cannot be first1 but is something last1 
because such like hatred is a proof of  
an already corrupted nature1 even as    
love of an extraneous good4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,evil is twofold4 ,one is a   

true evil1 for the reason that it is    
incompatible with one's natural good1   
and the hatred of such an evil may have 
priority over the other passions4 ,there
 is1 however1 another which is not a    
true1 but an apparent evil1 which1      
namely1 is a true and connatural good1  
and yet is reckoned evil on account of  
the corruption of nature3 and the hatred
 of such an evil must needs come last4  
,this hatred is vicious1 but the former 
is not4   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,hatred     
,arises from ,envy8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
seems that hatred does not arise from   
envy4 ,for envy is sorrow for another's 
good4 ,now hatred does not arise from   
sorrow1 for1 on the contrary1 we grieve 
for the presence of the evil we hate4   
,therefore hatred does not arise from   
envy4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 hatred is    
opposed to love4 ,now love of our       
neighbor is referred to our love of     
,god1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a2 
,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore hatred of  

our neighbor is referred to our hatred  
of ,god4 ,but hatred of ,god does not   
arise from envy1 for we do not envy     
those who are very far removed from us1 
but rather those who seem to be near us1
 as the ,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii74
 ,therefore hatred does not arise from  
envy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to one effect
 there is one cause4 ,now hatred is     
caused by anger1 for ,augustine says in 
his ,rule that anger grows into hatred4 
,therefore hatred does not arise from   
envy4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says  
7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 that out of envy    
cometh hatred4  ,i answer that1 ,as     
stated above 7,a4 #e71 hatred of his    
neighbor is a man's last step in the    
path of sin1 because it is opposed to   
the love which he naturally has for his 
neighbor4 ,now if a man declines from   
that which is natural1 it is because he 
intends to avoid that which is naturally
 an object to be shunned4 ,now every    
animal naturally avoids sorrow1 just as 
it desires pleasure1 as the ,philosopher

 states 7,ethic4 vii1 x74 ,accordingly  
just as love arises from pleasure1 so   
does hatred arise from sorrow4 ,for just
 as we are moved to love whatever gives 
us pleasure1 in as much as for that very
 reason it assumes the aspect of good2  
so we are moved to hate whatever        
displeases us1 in so far as for this    
very reason it assumes the aspect of    
evil4 ,wherefore1 since envy is sorrow  
for our neighbor's good1 it follows that
 our neighbor's good becomes hateful to 
us1 so that out of envy cometh hatred4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since the appetitive  
power1 like the apprehensive power1     
reflects on its own acts1 it follows    
that there is a kind of circular        
movement in the actions of the          
appetitive power4 ,and so according to  
the first forward course of the         
appetitive movement1 love gives rise to 
desire1 whence follows pleasure when one
 has obtained what one desired4 ,and    
since the very fact of taking pleasure  
in the good one loves is a kind of good1

 it follows that pleasure causes love4  
,and in the same way sorrow causes      
hatred4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,love and     
hatred are essentially different1 for   
the object of love is good1 which flows 
from ,god to creatures1 wherefore love  
is due to ,god in the first place1 and  
to our neighbor afterwards4 ,on the     
other hand1 hatred is of evil1 which has
 no place in ,god ,himself1 but only in 
,his effects1 for which reason it has   
been stated above 7,a4 #a71 that ,god is
 not an object of hatred1 except in so  
far as ,he is considered in relation to 
,his effects1 and consequently hatred is
 directed to our neighbor before being  
directed to ,god4 ,therefore1 since envy
 of our neighbor is the mother of hatred
 of our neighbor1 it becomes1 in        
consequence1 the cause of hatred towards
 ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nothing       
prevents a thing arising from various   
causes in various respects1 and         
accordingly hatred may arise both from  
anger and from envy4 ,however it arises 

more directly from envy1 which looks    
upon the very good of our neighbor as   
displeasing and therefore hateful1      
whereas hatred arises from anger by way 
of increase4 ,for at first1 through     
anger1 we desire our neighbor's evil    
according to a certain measure1 that is 
in so far as that evil has the aspect of
 vengeance3 but afterwards1 through the 
continuance of anger1 man goes so far as
 absolutely to desire his neighbor's    
evil1 which desire is part of hatred4   
,wherefore it is evident that hatred is 
caused by envy formally as regards the  
aspect of the object1 but dispositively 
by anger4   ,,question #ce  ,,of ,,sloth
 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we must now    
consider the vices opposed to the joy of
 charity4 ,this joy is either about the 
,divine good1 and then its contrary is  
sloth1 or about our neighbor's good1 and
 then its contrary is envy4 ,wherefore  
we must consider 7#a7 ,sloth and 7#b7   
,envy4  ,under the first head there are 
four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether  

sloth is a sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is a  
special vice8  7#c7 ,whether it is a    
mortal sin8  7#d7 ,whether it is a      
capital sin8   ,,first ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,sloth ,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that sloth is not a sin4 ,for
 we are neither praised nor blamed for  
our passions1 according to the          
,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #e74 ,now     
sloth is a passion1 since it is a kind  
of sorrow1 according to ,damascene 7,de 
,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ad71 and as we stated 
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #h74       
,therefore sloth is not a sin4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 no bodily failing that    
occurs at fixed times is a sin4 ,but    
sloth is like this1 for ,cassian says   
7,de ,instit4 ,monast4 x1 99,de         
,institutione ,caenobiorum73 ,the monk  
is troubled with sloth chiefly about the
 sixth hour3 it is like an intermittent 
fever1 and inflicts the soul of the one 
it lays low with burning fires at       
regular and fixed intervals4 ,therefore 

sloth is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 that which proceeds from a good root   
is1 seemingly1 no sin4 ,now sloth       
proceeds from a good root1 for ,cassian 
says 7,de ,instit4 ,monast4 x7 that     
sloth arises from the fact that we sigh 
at being deprived of spiritual fruit1   
and think that other monasteries and    
those which are a long way off are much 
better than the one we dwell in3 all of 
which seems to point to humility4       
,therefore sloth is not a sin4  ,obj4   
#d3 ,further1 all sin is to be avoided1 
according to ,ecclus4 #ba3b3 ,flee from 
sins as from the face of a serpent4 ,now
 ,cassian says 7,de ,instit4 ,monast4   
x73 ,experience shows that the onslaught
 of sloth is not to be evaded by flight 
but to be conquered by resistance4      
,therefore sloth is not a sin4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,whatever is forbidden in     
,holy ,writ is a sin4 ,now such is sloth
 7acedia73 for it is written 7,ecclus4  
#f3bf73 ,bow down thy shoulder1 and bear
 her1 namely spiritual wisdom1 and be   

not grieved 7acedieris7 with her bands4 
,therefore sloth is a sin4  ,i answer   
that1 ,sloth1 according to ,damascene   
7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ad7 is an        
oppressive sorrow1 which1 to wit1 so    
weighs upon man's mind1 that he wants to
 do nothing2 thus acid things are also  
cold4 ,hence sloth implies a certain    
weariness of work1 as appears from a    
gloss on ,ps4 #ajf3ah1 ,their soul      
abhorred all manner of meat1 and from   
the definition of some who say that     
sloth is a sluggishness of the mind     
which neglects to begin good4  ,now this
 sorrow is always evil1 sometimes in    
itself1 sometimes in its effect4 ,for   
sorrow is evil in itself when it is     
about that which is apparently evil but 
good in reality1 even as1 on the other  
hand1 pleasure is evil if it is about   
that which seems to be good but is1 in  
truth1 evil4 ,since1 then1 spiritual    
good is a good in very truth1 sorrow    
about spiritual good is evil in itself4 
,and yet that sorrow also which is about

 a real evil1 is evil in its effect1 if 
it so oppresses man as to draw him away 
entirely from good deeds4 ,hence the    
,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #b3g7 did not wish   
those who repented to be swallowed up   
with overmuch sorrow4  ,accordingly1    
since sloth1 as we understand it here1  
denotes sorrow for spiritual good1 it is
 evil on two counts1 both in itself and 
in point of its effect4 ,consequently it
 is a sin1 for by sin we mean an evil   
movement of the appetite1 as appears    
from what has been said above 7,q4 #aj1 
,a4 #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #d74      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,passions are not      
sinful in themselves2 but they are      
blameworthy in so far as they are       
applied to something evil1 just as they 
deserve praise in so far as they are    
applied to something good4 ,wherefore   
sorrow1 in itself1 calls neither for    
praise nor for blame3 whereas moderate  
sorrow for evil calls for praise1 while 
sorrow for good1 and again immoderate   
sorrow for evil1 call for blame4 ,it is 

in this sense that sloth is said to be a
 sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the passions of
 the sensitive appetite may either be   
venial sins in themselves1 or incline   
the soul to mortal sin4 ,and since the  
sensitive appetite has a bodily organ1  
it follows that on account of some      
bodily transmutation a man becomes apt  
to commit some particular sin4 ,hence it
 may happen that certain sins may become
 more insistent1 through certain bodily 
transmutations occurring at certain     
fixed times4 ,now all bodily effects1 of
 themselves1 dispose one to sorrow2 and 
thus it is that those who fast are      
harassed by sloth towards mid-day1 when 
they begin to feel the want of food1 and
 to be parched by the sun's heat4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is a sign of       
humility if a man does not think too    
much of himself1 through observing his  
own faults2 but if a man contemns the   
good things he has received from ,god1  
this1 far from being a proof of         
humility1 shows him to be ungrateful3   

and from such like contempt results     
sloth1 because we sorrow for things that
 we reckon evil and worthless4          
,accordingly we ought to think much of  
the goods of others1 in such a way as   
not to disparage those we have received 
ourselves1 because if we did they would 
give us sorrow4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,sin  
is ever to be shunned1 but the assaults 
of sin should be overcome1 sometimes by 
flight1 sometimes by resistance2 by     
flight when a continued thought         
increases the incentive to sin1 as in   
lust2 for which reason it is written 7#a
 ,cor4 #f3ah73 ,fly fornication2 by     
resistance1 when perseverance in the    
thought diminishes the incentive to sin1
 which incentive arises from some       
trivial consideration4 ,this is the case
 with sloth1 because the more we think  
about spiritual goods1 the more pleasing
 they become to us1 and forthwith sloth 
dies away4   ,,second ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,sloth ,is a ,special ,vice8  ,objection

 #a3 ,it would seem that sloth is not a 
special vice4 ,for that which is common 
to all vices does not constitute a      
special kind of vice4 ,but every vice   
makes a man sorrowful about the opposite
 spiritual good3 for the lustful man is 
sorrowful about the good of continence1 
and the glutton about the good of       
abstinence4 ,since then sloth is sorrow 
for spiritual good1 as stated above 7,a4
 #a71 it seems that sloth is not a      
special sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sloth1
 through being a kind of sorrow1 is     
opposed to joy4 ,now joy is not         
accounted one special virtue4 ,therefore
 sloth should not be reckoned a special 
vice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since        
spiritual good is a general kind of     
object1 which virtue seeks1 and vice    
shuns1 it does not constitute a special 
virtue or vice1 unless it be determined 
by some addition4 ,now nothing1         
seemingly1 except toil1 can determine it
 to sloth1 if this be a special vice2   
because the reason why a man shuns      

spiritual goods1 is that they are       
toilsome1 wherefore sloth is a kind of  
weariness3 while dislike of toil1 and   
love of bodily repose seem to be due to 
the same cause1 viz4 idleness4 ,hence   
sloth would be nothing but laziness1    
which seems untrue1 for idleness is     
opposed to carefulness1 whereas sloth is
 opposed to joy4 ,therefore sloth is not
 a special vice4  ,on the contrary1     
,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7            
distinguishes sloth from the other      
vices4 ,therefore it is a special vice4 
,i answer that1 ,since sloth is sorrow  
for spiritual good1 if we take spiritual
 good in a general way1 sloth will not  
be a special vice1 because1 as stated   
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #a71 every 
vice shuns the spiritual good of its    
opposite virtue4 ,again it cannot be    
said that sloth is a special vice1 in so
 far as it shuns spiritual good1 as     
toilsome1 or troublesome to the body1 or
 as a hindrance to the body's pleasure1 
for this again would not sever sloth    

from carnal vices1 whereby a man seeks  
bodily comfort and pleasure4  ,wherefore
 we must say that a certain order exists
 among spiritual goods1 since all the   
spiritual goods that are in the acts of 
each virtue are directed to one         
spiritual good1 which is the ,divine    
good1 about which there is a special    
virtue1 viz4 charity4 ,hence it is      
proper to each virtue to rejoice in its 
own spiritual good1 which consists in   
its own act1 while it belongs specially 
to charity to have that spiritual joy   
whereby one rejoices in the ,divine     
good4 ,in like manner the sorrow whereby
 one is displeased at the spiritual good
 which is in each act of virtue1        
belongs1 not to any special vice1 but to
 every vice1 but sorrow in the ,divine  
good about which charity rejoices1      
belongs to a special vice1 which is     
called sloth4 ,this suffices for the    
,replies to the ,objections4   ,,third  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,sloth ,is a ,mortal ,sin8     

,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sloth
 is not a mortal sin4 ,for every mortal 
sin is contrary to a precept of the     
,divine ,law4 ,but sloth seems contrary 
to no precept1 as one may see by going  
through the precepts of the ,decalogue4 
,therefore sloth is not a mortal sin4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the same genus1 a
 sin of deed is no less grievous than a 
sin of thought4 ,now it is not a mortal 
sin to refrain in deed from some        
spiritual good which leads to ,god1 else
 it would be a mortal sin not to observe
 the counsels4 ,therefore it is not a   
mortal sin to refrain in thought from   
such like spiritual works4 ,therefore   
sloth is not a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 no mortal sin is to be found  
in a perfect man4 ,but sloth is to be   
found in a perfect man3 for ,cassian    
says 7,de ,instit4 ,caenob4 x1 l7 that  
sloth is well known to the solitary1 and
 is a most vexatious and persistent foe 
to the hermit4 ,therefore sloth is not  
always a mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1 

,it is written 7#b ,cor4 #g3bj73 ,the   
sorrow of the world worketh death4 ,but 
such is sloth2 for it is not sorrow     
according to ,god1 which is contrasted  
with sorrow of the world4 ,therefore it 
is a mortal sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as   
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,,aa4   
#a1 #b71 mortal sin is so called because
 it destroys the spiritual life which is
 the effect of charity1 whereby ,god    
dwells in us4 ,wherefore any sin which  
by its very nature is contrary to       
charity is a mortal sin by reason of its
 genus4 ,and such is sloth1 because the 
proper effect of charity is joy in ,god1
 as stated above 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #a71     
while sloth is sorrow about spiritual   
good in as much as it is a ,divine good4
 ,therefore sloth is a mortal sin in    
respect of its genus4 ,but it must be   
observed with regard to all sins that   
are mortal in respect of their genus1   
that they are not mortal1 save when they
 attain to their perfection4 ,because   
the consummation of sin is in the       

consent of reason3 for we are speaking  
now of human sins consisting in human   
acts1 the principle of which is the     
reason4 ,wherefore if the sin be a mere 
beginning of sin in the sensuality      
alone1 without attaining to the consent 
of reason1 it is a venial sin on account
 of the imperfection of the act4 ,thus  
in the genus of adultery1 the           
concupiscence that goes no further than 
the sensuality is a venial sin1 whereas 
if it reach to the consent of reason1 it
 is a mortal sin4 ,so too1 the movement 
of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality 
alone1 by reason of the opposition of   
the flesh to the spirit1 and then it is 
a venial sin2 whereas sometimes it      
reaches to the reason1 which consents in
 the dislike1 horror and detestation of 
the ,divine good1 on account of the     
flesh utterly prevailing over the       
spirit4 ,in this case it is evident that
 sloth is a mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,sloth is opposed to the precept    
about hallowing the ,sabbath day4 ,for  

this precept1 in so far as it is a moral
 precept1 implicitly commands the mind  
to rest in ,god3 and sorrow of the mind 
about the ,divine good is contrary      
thereto4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sloth is not
 an aversion of the mind from any       
spiritual good1 but from the ,divine    
good1 to which the mind is obliged to   
adhere4 ,wherefore if a man is sorry    
because someone forces him to do acts of
 virtue that he is not bound to do1 this
 is not a sin of sloth2 but when he is  
sorry to have to do something for ,god's
 sake4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,imperfect     
movements of sloth are to be found in   
holy men1 but they do not reach to the  
consent of reason4   ,,fourth ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,sloth ,should ,be ,accounted a ,capital
 ,vice8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that sloth ought not to be accounted a  
capital vice4 ,for a capital vice is one
 that moves a man to sinful acts1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #cd1 ,a4 #e74 ,now    
sloth does not move one to action1 but  

on the contrary withdraws one from it4  
,therefore it should not be accounted a 
capital sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a     
capital sin is one to which daughters   
are assigned4 ,now ,gregory 7,moral4    
xxxi1 #de7 assigns six daughters to     
sloth1 viz4 malice1 spite1              
faint-heartedness1 despair1 sluggishness
 in regard to the commandments1         
wandering of the mind after unlawful    
things4 ,now these do not seem in       
reality to arise from sloth4 ,for spite 
is1 seemingly the same as hatred1 which 
arises from envy1 as stated above 7,q4  
#cd1 ,a4 #f72 malice is a genus which   
contains all vices1 and1 in like manner1
 a wandering of the mind after unlawful 
things is to be found in every vice2    
sluggishness about the commandments     
seems to be the same as sloth1 while    
faint-heartedness and despair may arise 
from any sin4 ,therefore sloth is not   
rightly accounted a capital sin4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 ,isidore distinguishes the
 vice of sloth from the vice of sorrow1 

saying 7,de ,summo ,bono ii1 #cg7 that  
in so far as a man shirks his duty      
because it is distasteful and           
burdensome1 it is sorrow1 and in so far 
as he is inclined to undue repose1 it is
 sloth3 and of sorrow he says that it   
gives rise to spite1 faint-heartedness1 
bitterness1 despair1 whereas he states  
that from sloth seven things arise1 viz4
 idleness1 drowsiness1 uneasiness of the
 mind1 restlessness of the body1        
instability1 loquacity1 curiosity4      
,therefore it seems that either ,gregory
 or ,isidore has wrongly assigned sloth 
as a capital sin together with its      
daughters4  ,on the contrary1 ,the same 
,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 states that
 sloth is a capital sin1 and has the    
daughters aforesaid4  ,i answer that1   
,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1     
,,aa4 #c1 #d71 a capital vice is one    
which easily gives rise to others as    
being their final cause4 ,now just as we
 do many things on account of pleasure1 
both in order to obtain it1 and through 

being moved to do something under the   
impulse of pleasure1 so again we do many
 things on account of sorrow1 either    
that we may avoid it1 or through being  
exasperated into doing something under  
pressure thereof4 ,wherefore1 since     
sloth is a kind of sorrow1 as stated    
above 7,a4 #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,a4    
#h71 it is fittingly reckoned a capital 
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sloth by        
weighing on the mind1 hinders us from   
doing things that cause sorrow3         
nevertheless it induces the mind to do  
certain things1 either because they are 
in harmony with sorrow1 such as weeping1
 or because they are a means of avoiding
 sorrow4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,gregory     
fittingly assigns the daughters of      
sloth4 ,for since1 according to the     
,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #e1 #f7 no  
man can be a long time in company with  
what is painful and unpleasant1 it      
follows that something arises from      
sorrow in two ways3 first1 that man     
shuns whatever causes sorrow2 secondly1 

that he passes to other things that give
 him pleasure3 thus those who find no   
joy in spiritual pleasures1 have        
recourse to pleasures of the body1      
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
x1 #f74 ,now in the avoidance of sorrow 
the order observed is that man at first 
flies from unpleasant objects1 and      
secondly he even struggles against such 
things as cause sorrow4 ,now spiritual  
goods which are the object of the sorrow
 of sloth1 are both end and means4      
,avoidance of the end is the result of  
despair1 while avoidance of those goods 
which are the means to the end1 in      
matters of difficulty which come under  
the counsels1 is the effect of          
faint-heartedness1 and in matters of    
common righteousness1 is the effect of  
sluggishness about the commandments4    
,the struggle against spiritual goods   
that cause sorrow is sometimes with men 
who lead others to spiritual goods1 and 
this is called spite2 and sometimes it  
extends to the spiritual goods          

themselves1 when a man goes so far as to
 detest them1 and this is properly      
called malice4 ,in so far as a man has  
recourse to eternal objects of pleasure1
 the daughter of sloth is called        
wandering after unlawful things4 ,from  
this it is clear how to reply to the    
objections against each of the          
daughters3 for malice does not denote   
here that which is generic to all vices1
 but must be understood as explained4   
,nor is spite taken as synonymous with  
hatred1 but for a kind of indignation1  
as stated above3 and the same applies to
 the others4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this    
distinction between sorrow and sloth is 
also given by ,cassian 7,de ,instit4    
,caenob4 x1 #a74 ,but ,gregory more     
fittingly 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 calls     
sloth a kind of sorrow1 because1 as     
stated above 7,a4 #b71 sorrow is not a  
distinct vice1 in so far as a man shirks
 a distasteful and burdensome work1 or  
sorrows on account of any other cause   
whatever1 but only in so far as he is   

sorry on account of the ,divine good1   
which sorrow belongs essentially to     
sloth2 since sloth seeks undue rest in  
so far as it spurns the ,divine good4   
,moreover the things which ,isidore     
reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow1 
are reduced to those mentioned by       
,gregory3 for bitterness which ,isidore 
states to be the result of sorrow1 is an
 effect of spite4 ,idleness and         
drowsiness are reduced to sluggishness  
about the precepts3 for some are idle   
and omit them altogether1 while others  
are drowsy and fulfil them with         
negligence4 ,all the other five which he
 reckons as effects of sloth1 belong to 
the wandering of the mind after unlawful
 things4 ,this tendency to wander1 if it
 reside in the mind itself that is      
desirous of rushing after various things
 without rhyme or reason1 is called     
uneasiness of the mind1 but if it       
pertains to the imaginative power1 it is
 called curiosity2 if it affect the     
speech it is called loquacity2 and in so

 far as it affects a body that changes  
place1 it is called restlessness of the 
body1 when1 to wit1 a man shows the     
unsteadiness of his mind1 by the        
inordinate movements of members of his  
body2 while if it causes the body to    
move from one place to another1 it is   
called instability2 or instability may  
denote changeableness of purpose4       
,,question #cf  ,,of ,,envy 7,,four     
,,articles7  ,we must now consider envy1
 and under this head there are four     
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is envy8 
7#b7 ,whether it is a sin8  7#c7        
,whether it is a mortal sin8  7#d7      
,whether it is a capital sin1 and which 
are its daughters8   ,,first ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,envy ,is a ,kind of ,sorrow8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that envy 
is not a kind of sorrow4 ,for the object
 of envy is a good1 for ,gregory says   
7,moral4 v1 #df7 of the envious man that
 self-inflicted pain wounds the pining  
spirit1 which is racked by the          

prosperity of another4 ,therefore envy  
is not a kind of sorrow4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 likeness is a cause1 not of   
sorrow but rather of pleasure4 ,but     
likeness is a cause of envy3 for the    
,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #aj73 ,men
 are envious of such as are like them in
 genus1 in knowledge1 in stature1 in    
habit1 or in reputation4 ,therefore envy
 is not a kind of sorrow4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 sorrow is caused by a defect1 
wherefore those who are in great defect 
are inclined to sorrow1 as stated above 
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #c7 when we were 
treating of the passions4 ,now those who
 lack little1 and who love honors1 and  
who are considered wise1 are envious1   
according to the ,philosopher 7,rhet4   
ii1 #aj74 ,therefore envy is not a kind 
of sorrow4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 sorrow  
is opposed to pleasure4 ,now opposite   
effects have not one and the same cause4
 ,therefore1 since the recollection of  
goods once possessed is a cause of      
pleasure1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 

#cb1 ,a4 #c7 it will not be a cause of  
sorrow4 ,but it is a cause of envy2 for 
the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #aj7  
that we envy those who have or have had 
things that befitted ourselves1 or which
 we possessed at some time4 ,therefore  
sloth is not a kind of sorrow4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4  
ii1 #ad7 calls envy a species of sorrow1
 and says that envy is sorrow for       
another's good4  ,i answer that1 ,the   
object of a man's sorrow is his own     
evil4 ,now it may happen that another's 
good is apprehended as one's own evil1  
and in this way sorrow can be about     
another's good4 ,but this happens in two
 ways3 first1 when a man is sorry about 
another's good1 in so far as it         
threatens to be an occasion of harm to  
himself1 as when a man grieves for his  
enemy's prosperity1 for fear lest he may
 do him some harm3 such like sorrow is  
not envy1 but rather an effect of fear1 
as the ,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii1  
#i74  ,secondly1 another's good may be  

reckoned as being one's own evil1 in so 
far as it conduces to the lessening of  
one's own good name or excellence4 ,it  
is in this way that envy grieves for    
another's good3 and consequently men are
 envious of those goods in which a good 
name consists1 and about which men like 
to be honored and esteemed1 as the      
,philosopher remarks 7,rhet4 ii1 #aj74  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing hinders what  
is good for one from being reckoned as  
evil for another3 and in this way it is 
possible for sorrow to be about good1 as
 stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since 
envy is about another's good name in so 
far as it diminishes the good name a man
 desires to have1 it follows that a man 
is envious of those only whom he wishes 
to rival or surpass in reputation4 ,but 
this does not apply to people who are   
far removed from one another3 for no    
man1 unless he be out of his mind1      
endeavors to rival or surpass in        
reputation those who are far above him4 
,thus a commoner does not envy the king1

 nor does the king envy a commoner whom 
he is far above4 ,wherefore a man envies
 not those who are far removed from him1
 whether in place1 time1 or station1 but
 those who are near him1 and whom he    
strives to rival or surpass4 ,for it is 
against our will that these should be in
 better repute than we are1 and that    
gives rise to sorrow4 ,on the other     
hand1 likeness causes pleasure in so far
 as it is in agreement with the will4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a man does not strive 
for mastery in matters where he is very 
deficient2 so that he does not envy one 
who surpasses him in such matters1      
unless he surpass him by little1 for    
then it seems to him that this is not   
beyond him1 and so he makes an effort2  
wherefore1 if his effort fails through  
the other's reputation surpassing his1  
he grieves4 ,hence it is that those who 
love to be honored are more envious2 and
 in like manner the faint-hearted are   
envious1 because all things are great to
 them1 and whatever good may befall     

another1 they reckon that they          
themselves have been bested in something
 great4 ,hence it is written 7,job      
#e3b73 ,envy slayeth the little one1 and
 ,gregory says 7,moral4 v1 #df7 that we 
can envy those only whom we think better
 in some respect than ourselves4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #d3 ,recollection of past goods  
in so far as we have had them1 causes   
pleasure2 in so far as we have lost     
them1 causes sorrow2 and in so far as   
others have them1 causes envy1 because  
that1 above all1 seems to belittle our  
reputation4 ,hence the ,philosopher says
 7,rhet4 ii7 that the old envy the      
young1 and those who have spent much in 
order to get something1 envy those who  
have got it by spending little1 because 
they grieve that they have lost their   
goods1 and that others have acquired    
goods4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,envy ,is a 
,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that envy is not a sin4 ,for ,jerome    
says to ,laeta about the education of   

her daughter 7,ep4 cvii73 ,let her have 
companions1 so that she may learn       
together with them1 envy them1 and be   
nettled when they are praised4 ,but no  
one should be advised to commit a sin4  
,therefore envy is not a sin4           
,objection #b3 ,further1 ,envy is sorrow
 for another's good1 as ,damascene says 
7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ad74 ,but this is
 sometimes praiseworthy3 for it is      
written 7,prov4 #bi3b73 ,when the wicked
 shall bear rule1 the people shall      
mourn4 ,therefore envy is not always a  
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 envy denotes a
 kind of zeal4 ,but there is a good     
zeal1 according to ,ps4 #fh3aj3 ,the    
zeal of ,thy house hath eaten me up4    
,therefore envy is not always a sin4    
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 punishment is       
condivided with fault4 ,but envy is a   
kind of punishment3 for ,gregory says   
7,moral4 v1 #df73 ,when the foul sore of
 envy corrupts the vanquished heart1 the
 very exterior itself shows how forcibly
 the mind is urged by madness4 ,for     

paleness seizes the complexion1 the eyes
 are weighed down1 the spirit is        
inflamed1 while the limbs are chilled1  
there is frenzy in the heart1 there is  
gnashing with the teeth4 ,therefore envy
 is not a sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is
 written 7,gal4 #e3bf73 ,let us not be  
made desirous of vainglory1 provoking   
one another1 envying one another4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 
envy is sorrow for another's good4 ,now 
this sorrow may come about in four ways4
 ,first1 when a man grieves for         
another's good1 through fear that it may
 cause harm either to himself1 or to    
some other goods4 ,this sorrow is not   
envy1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 and may 
be void of sin4 ,hence ,gregory says    
7,moral4 xxii1 #aa73 ,it very often     
happens that without charity being lost1
 both the destruction of an enemy       
rejoices us1 and again his glory1       
without any sin of envy1 saddens us1    
since1 when he falls1 we believe that   
some are deservedly set up1 and when he 

prospers1 we dread lest many suffer     
unjustly4  ,secondly1 we may grieve over
 another's good1 not because he has it1 
but because the good which he has1 we   
have not3 and this1 properly speaking1  
is zeal1 as the ,philosopher says       
7,rhet4 ii1 #i74 ,and if this zeal be   
about virtuous goods1 it is             
praiseworthy1 according to #a ,cor4     
#ad3a3 ,be zealous for spiritual gifts3 
while1 if it be about temporal goods1 it
 may be either sinful or sinless4       
,thirdly1 one may grieve over another's 
good1 because he who happens to have    
that good is unworthy of it4 ,such      
sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by  
virtuous goods1 which make a man        
righteous1 but1 as the ,philosopher     
states1 is about riches1 and those      
things which can accrue to the worthy   
and the unworthy2 and he calls this     
sorrow nemesis 99,the nearest equivalent
 is indignation4 ,the use of the word   
nemesis to signify revenge does not     
represent the original ,greek41 saying  

that it belongs to good morals4 ,but he 
says this because he considered temporal
 goods in themselves1 in so far as they 
may seem great to those who look not to 
eternal goods3 whereas1 according to the
 teaching of faith1 temporal goods that 
accrue to those who are unworthy1 are so
 disposed according to ,god's just      
ordinance1 either for the correction of 
those men1 or for their condemnation1   
and such goods are as nothing in        
comparison with the goods to come1 which
 are prepared for good men4 ,wherefore  
sorrow of this kind is forbidden in     
,holy ,writ1 according to ,ps4 #cf3a3   
,be not emulous of evil doers1 nor envy 
them that work iniquity1 and elsewhere  
7,ps4 #gb3b1 #c73 ,my steps had well    
nigh slipped1 for ,i was envious of the 
wicked1 when ,i saw the prosperity of   
sinners 99,douay3 'because ,i had a zeal
 on occasion of the wicked1 seeing the  
prosperity of sinners'4 ,fourthly1 we   
grieve over a man's good1 in so far as  
his good surpasses ours2 this is envy   

properly speaking1 and is always sinful1
 as also the ,philosopher states 7,rhet4
 ii1 #aj71 because to do so is to grieve
 over what should make us rejoice1 viz4 
over our neighbor's good4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,envy there denotes the zeal with   
which we ought to strive to progress    
with those who are better than we are4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument         
considers sorrow for another's good in  
the first sense given above4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,envy differs from zeal1 as   
stated above4 ,hence a certain zeal may 
be good1 whereas envy is always evil4   
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,nothing hinders a sin 
from being penal accidentally1 as stated
 above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #b7 when  
we were treating of sins4   ,,third     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,envy ,is a ,mortal ,sin8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that envy 
is not a mortal sin4 ,for since envy is 
a kind of sorrow1 it is a passion of the
 sensitive appetite4 ,now there is no   
mortal sin in the sensuality1 but only  

in the reason1 as ,augustine declares   
7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab7 99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1   
,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #d4 ,therefore envy is not 
a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there
 cannot be mortal sin in infants4 ,but  
envy can be in them1 for ,augustine says
 7,confess4 i73 ,i myself have seen and 
known even a baby envious1 it could not 
speak1 yet it turned pale and looked    
bitterly on its foster-brother4         
,therefore envy is not a mortal sin4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every mortal sin is 
contrary to some virtue4 ,but envy is   
contrary1 not to a virtue but to        
nemesis1 which is a passion1 according  
to the ,philosopher 7,rhet4 ii1 #i74    
,therefore envy is not a mortal sin4    
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,job  
#e3b73 ,envy slayeth the little one4    
,now nothing slays spiritually1 except  
mortal sin4 ,therefore envy is a mortal 
sin4  ,i answer that1 ,envy is a mortal 
sin1 in respect of its genus4 ,for the  
genus of a sin is taken from its object2
 and envy according to the aspect of its

 object is contrary to charity1 whence  
the soul derives its spiritual life1    
according to #a ,john #c3ad3 ,we know   
that we have passed from death to life1 
because we love the brethren4 ,now the  
object both of charity and of envy is   
our neighbor's good1 but by contrary    
movements1 since charity rejoices in our
 neighbor's good1 while envy grieves    
over it1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74      
,therefore it is evident that envy is a 
mortal sin in respect of its genus4     
,nevertheless1 as stated above 7,q4 #ce1
 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e1 ad   
#a71 in every kind of mortal sin we find
 certain imperfect movements in the     
sensuality1 which are venial sins3 such 
are the first movement of concupiscence1
 in the genus of adultery1 and the first
 movement of anger1 in the genus of     
murder1 and so in the genus of envy we  
find sometimes even in perfect men      
certain first movements1 which are      
venial sins4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the     
movement of envy in so far as it is a   

passion of the sensuality1 is an        
imperfect thing in the genus of human   
acts1 the principle of which is the     
reason1 so that envy of that kind is not
 a mortal sin4 ,the same applies to the 
envy of little children who have not the
 use of reason3 wherefore the ,reply to 
the ,second ,objection is manifest4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,according to the      
,philosopher 7,rhet4 ii1 #i71 envy is   
contrary both to nemesis and to pity1   
but for different reasons4 ,for it is   
directly contrary to pity1 their        
principal objects being contrary to one 
another1 since the envious man grieves  
over his neighbor's good1 whereas the   
pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's 
evil1 so that the envious have no pity1 
as he states in the same passage1 nor is
 the pitiful man envious4 ,on the other 
hand1 envy is contrary to nemesis on the
 part of the man whose good grieves the 
envious man1 for nemesis is sorrow for  
the good of the undeserving according to
 ,ps4 #gb3c3 ,i was envious of the      

wicked1 when ,i saw the prosperity of   
sinners 99,douay3 because ,i had a zeal 
on occasion of the wicked1 seeing the   
prosperity of sinners1 whereas the      
envious grieves over the good of those  
who are deserving of it4 ,hence it is   
clear that the former contrariety is    
more direct than the latter4 ,now pity  
is a virtue1 and an effect proper to    
charity3 so that envy is contrary to    
pity and charity4   ,,fourth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,envy ,is a ,capital ,vice8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that envy is not a   
capital vice4 ,for the capital vices are
 distinct from their daughters4 ,now    
envy is the daughter of vainglory2 for  
the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #aj7  
that those who love honor and glory are 
more envious4 ,therefore envy is not a  
capital vice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the  
capital vices seem to be less grave than
 the other vices which arise from them4 
,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de73 
,the leading vices seem to worm their   

way into the deceived mind under some   
kind of pretext1 but those which follow 
them provoke the soul to all kinds of   
outrage1 and confuse the mind with their
 wild outcry4 ,now envy is seemingly a  
most grave sin1 for ,gregory says       
7,moral4 v1 #df73 ,though in every evil 
thing that is done1 the venom of our old
 enemy is infused into the heart of man1
 yet in this wickedness the serpent     
stirs his whole bowels and discharges   
the bane of spite fitted to enter deep  
into the mind4 ,therefore envy is not a 
capital sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it    
seems that its daughters are unfittingly
 assigned by ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1    
#de71 who says that from envy arise     
hatred1 tale-bearing1 detraction1 joy at
 our neighbor's misfortunes1 and grief  
for his prosperity4 ,for joy at our     
neighbor's misfortunes and grief for his
 prosperity seem to be the same as envy1
 as appears from what has been said     
above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore these should 
not be assigned as daughters of envy4   

,on the contrary stands the authority of
 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 who states
 that envy is a capital sin and assigns 
the aforesaid daughters thereto4  ,i    
answer that1 ,just as sloth is grief for
 a ,divine spiritual good1 so envy is   
grief for our neighbor's good4 ,now it  
has been stated above 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #d7 
that sloth is a capital vice for the    
reason that it incites man to do certain
 things1 with the purpose either of     
avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its    
demands4 ,wherefore envy is accounted a 
capital vice for the same reason4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,gregory says      
7,moral4 xxxi1 #de71 the capital vices  
are so closely akin to one another that 
one springs from the other4 ,for the    
first offspring of pride is vainglory1  
which by corrupting the mind it occupies
 begets envy1 since while it craves for 
the power of an empty name1 it repines  
for fear lest another should acquire    
that power4 ,consequently the notion of 
a capital vice does not exclude its     

originating from another vice1 but it   
demands that it should have some        
principal reason for being itself the   
origin of several kinds of sin4 ,however
 it is perhaps because envy manifestly  
arises from vainglory1 that it is not   
reckoned a capital sin1 either by       
,isidore 7,de ,summo ,bono7 or by       
,cassian 7,de ,instit4 ,caenob4 v1 #a74 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it does not follow    
from the passage quoted that envy is the
 greatest of sins1 but that when the    
devil tempts us to envy1 he is enticing 
us to that which has its chief place in 
his heart1 for as quoted further on in  
the same passage1 by the envy of the    
devil1 death came into the world 7,wis4 
#b3bd74  ,there is1 however1 a kind of  
envy which is accounted among the most  
grievous sins1 viz4 envy of another's   
spiritual good1 which envy is a sorrow  
for the increase of ,god's grace1 and   
not merely for our neighbor's good4     
,hence it is accounted a sin against the
 ,holy ,ghost1 because thereby a man    

envies1 as it were1 the ,holy ,ghost    
,himself1 ,who is glorified in ,his     
works4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the number of 
envy's daughters may be understood for  
the reason that in the struggle aroused 
by envy there is something by way of    
beginning1 something by way of middle1  
and something by way of term4 ,the      
beginning is that a man strives to lower
 another's reputation1 and this either  
secretly1 and then we have tale-bearing1
 or openly1 and then we have detraction4
 ,the middle consists in the fact that  
when a man aims at defaming another1 he 
is either able to do so1 and then we    
have joy at another's misfortune1 or he 
is unable1 and then we have grief at    
another's prosperity4 ,the term is      
hatred itself1 because just as good     
which delights causes love1 so does     
sorrow cause hatred1 as stated above    
7,q4 #cd1 ,a4 #f74 ,grief at another's  
prosperity is in one way the very same  
as envy1 when1 to ,wit1 a man grieves   
over another's prosperity1 in so far as 

it gives the latter a good name1 but in 
another way it is a daughter of envy1 in
 so far as the envious man sees his     
neighbor prosper notwithstanding his    
efforts to prevent it4 ,on the other    
hand1 joy at another's misfortune is not
 directly the same as envy1 but is a    
result thereof1 because grief over our  
neighbor's good which is envy1 gives    
rise to joy in his evil4   ,,question   
#cg  ,,of ,,discord1 ,,which ,,is       
,,contrary ,,to ,,peace 7,in ,two       
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
sins contrary to peace1 and first we    
shall consider discord which is in the  
heart1 secondly contention1 which is on 
the lips1 thirdly1 those things which   
consist in deeds1 viz4 schism1          
quarrelling1 war1 and sedition4 ,under  
the first head there are two points of  
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether discord is a    
sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is a daughter of 
vainglory8   ,,first ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cg1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,discord ,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it

 would seem that discord is not a sin4  
,for to disaccord with man is to sever  
oneself from another's will4 ,but this  
does not seem to be a sin1 because      
,god's will alone1 and not our          
neighbor's1 is the rule of our own will4
 ,therefore discord is not a sin4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 whoever induces another  
to sin1 sins also himself4 ,but it      
appears not to be a sin to incite others
 to discord1 for it is written 7,acts   
#bc3f7 that ,paul1 knowing that the one 
part were ,sadducees1 and the other     
,pharisees1 cried out in the council3   
,men brethren1 ,i am a ,pharisee1 the   
son of ,pharisees1 concerning the hope  
and resurrection of the dead ,i am      
called in question4 ,and when he had so 
said1 there arose a dissension between  
the ,pharisees and the ,sadducees4      
,therefore discord is not a sin4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 sin1 especially mortal    
sin1 is not to be found in a holy man4  
,but discord is to be found even among  
holy men1 for it is written 7,acts      

#ae3ci73 ,there arose a dissension      
between ,paul and ,barnabas1 so that    
they departed one from another4         
,therefore discord is not a sin1 and    
least of all a mortal sin4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,dissensions1 that is1        
discords1 are reckoned among the works  
of the flesh 7,gal4 #e3bj71 of which it 
is said afterwards 7,gal4 #e3ba7 that   
they who do such things shall not obtain
 the kingdom of ,god4 ,now nothing1 save
 mortal sin1 excludes man from the      
kingdom of ,god4 ,therefore discord is a
 mortal sin4  ,i answer that1 ,discord  
is opposed to concord4 ,now1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #bi1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c7 concord   
results from charity1 in as much as     
charity directs many hearts together to 
one thing1 which is chiefly the ,divine 
good1 secondarily1 the good of our      
neighbor4 ,wherefore discord is a sin1  
in so far as it is opposed to this      
concord4  ,but it must be observed that 
this concord is destroyed by discord in 
two ways3 first1 directly2 secondly1    

accidentally4 ,now1 human acts and      
movements are said to be direct when    
they are according to one's intention4  
,wherefore a man directly disaccords    
with his neighbor1 when he knowingly and
 intentionally dissents from the ,divine
 good and his neighbor's good1 to which 
he ought to consent4 ,this is a mortal  
sin in respect of its genus1 because it 
is contrary to charity1 although the    
first movements of such discord are     
venial sins by reason of their being    
imperfect acts4  ,the accidental in     
human acts is that which occurs beside  
the intention4 ,hence when several      
intend a good pertaining to ,god's      
honor1 or our neighbor's profit1 while  
one deems a certain thing good1 and     
another thinks contrariwise1 the discord
 is in this case accidentally contrary  
to the ,divine good or that of our      
neighbor4 ,such like discord is neither 
sinful nor against charity1 unless it be
 accompanied by an error about things   
necessary to salvation1 or by undue     

obstinacy1 since it has also been stated
 above 7,q4 #bi1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c1 ad #b7   
that the concord which is an effect of  
charity1 is union of wills not of       
opinions4 ,it follows from this that    
discord is sometimes the sin of one     
party only1 for instance1 when one wills
 a good which the other knowingly       
resists2 while sometimes it implies sin 
in both parties1 as when each dissents  
from the other's good1 and loves his    
own4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,one man's will  
considered in itself is not the rule of 
another man's will2 but in so far as our
 neighbor's will adheres to ,god's will1
 it becomes in consequence1 a rule      
regulated according to its proper       
measure4 ,wherefore it is a sin to      
disaccord with such a will1 because by  
that very fact one disaccords with the  
,divine rule4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as
 a man's will that adheres to ,god is a 
right rule1 to disaccord with which is a
 sin1 so too a man's will that is       
opposed to ,god is a perverse rule1 to  

disaccord with which is good4 ,hence to 
cause a discord1 whereby a good concord 
resulting from charity is destroyed1 is 
a grave sin3 wherefore it is written    
7,prov4 #f3af73 ,six things there are1  
which the ,lord hateth1 and the seventh 
,his soul detesteth1 which seventh is   
stated 7,prov4 #f3ai7 to be him that    
soweth discord among brethren4 ,on the  
other hand1 to arouse a discord whereby 
an evil concord 7i4e4 concord in an evil
 will7 is destroyed1 is praiseworthy4   
,in this way ,paul was to be commended  
for sowing discord among those who      
concorded together in evil1 because ,our
 ,lord also said of ,himself 7,matt4    
#aj3cd73 ,i came not to send peace1 but 
the sword4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the       
discord between ,paul and ,barnabas was 
accidental and not direct3 because each 
intended some good1 yet the one thought 
one thing good1 while the other thought 
something else1 which was owing to human
 deficiency3 for that controversy was   
not about things necessary to salvation4

 ,moreover all this was ordained by     
,divine providence1 on account of the   
good which would ensue4   ,,second      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cg1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,discord ,is a ,daughter of    
,vainglory8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that discord is not a daughter of  
vainglory4 ,for anger is a vice distinct
 from vainglory4 ,now discord is        
apparently the daughter of anger1       
according to ,prov4 #ae3ah3 ,a          
passionate man stirreth up strifes4     
,therefore it is not a daughter of      
vainglory4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1         
,augustine expounding the words of ,john
 #g3ci1 ,as yet the ,spirit was not     
given1 says 7,tract4 xxxii7 ,malice     
severs1 charity unites4 ,now discord is 
merely a separation of wills4 ,therefore
 discord arises from malice1 i4e4 envy1 
rather than from vainglory4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 whatever gives rise to many   
evils1 would seem to be a capital vice4 
,now such is discord1 because ,jerome in
 commenting on ,matt4 #ab3be1 ,every    

kingdom divided against itself shall be 
made desolate1 says3 ,just as concord   
makes small things thrive1 so discord   
brings the greatest things to ruin4     
,therefore discord should itself be     
reckoned a capital vice1 rather than a  
daughter of vainglory4  ,on the contrary
 stands the authority of ,gregory       
7,moral4 xxxi1 #de74  ,i answer that1   
,discord denotes a certain disunion of  
wills1 in so far1 to wit1 as one man's  
will holds fast to one thing1 while the 
other man's will holds fast to something
 else4 ,now if a man's will holds fast  
to its own ground1 this is due to the   
act that he prefers what is his own to  
that which belongs to others1 and if he 
do this inordinately1 it is due to pride
 and vainglory4 ,therefore discord1     
whereby a man holds to his own way of   
thinking1 and departs from that of      
others1 is reckoned to be a daughter of 
vainglory4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,strife is 
not the same as discord1 for strife     
consists in external deeds1 wherefore it

 is becoming that it should arise from  
anger1 which incites the mind to hurt   
one's neighbor2 whereas discord consists
 in a divergence in the movements of    
wills1 which arises from pride or       
vainglory1 for the reason given above4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in discord we may     
consider that which is the term         
wherefrom1 i4e4 another's will from     
which we recede1 and in this respect it 
arises from envy2 and again we may      
consider that which is the term whither1
 i4e4 something of our own to which we  
cling1 and in this respect it is caused 
by vainglory4 ,and since in every moment
 the term whither is more important than
 the term wherefrom 7because the end is 
of more account than the beginning71    
discord is accounted a daughter of      
vainglory rather than of envy1 though it
 may arise from both for different      
reasons1 as stated4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the reason why concord makes small     
things thrive1 while discord brings the 
greatest to ruin1 is because the more   

united a force is1 the stronger it is1  
while the more disunited it is the      
weaker it becomes 7,de ,causis xvii74   
,hence it is evident that this is part  
of the proper effect of discord which is
 a disunion of wills1 and in no way     
indicates that other vices arise from   
discord1 as though it were a capital    
vice4   ,,question #ch  ,,of            
,,contention 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we  
must now consider contention1 in respect
 of which there are two points of       
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether contention is a 
mortal sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is a      
daughter of vainglory8   ,,first        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ch1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,contention ,is a ,mortal ,sin8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
contention is not a mortal sin4 ,for    
there is no mortal sin in spiritual men3
 and yet contention is to be found in   
them1 according to ,luke #bb3bd3 ,and   
there was also a strife amongst the     
disciples of ,jesus1 which of them      
should 4 4 4 be the greatest4 ,therefore

 contention is not a mortal sin4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 no well disposed man      
should be pleased that his neighbor     
commit a mortal sin4 ,but the ,apostle  
says 7,phil4 #a3ag73 ,some out of       
contention preach ,christ1 and          
afterwards he says 7,phil4 #a3ah73 ,in  
this also ,i rejoice1 yea1 and will     
rejoice4 ,therefore contention is not a 
mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it     
happens that people contend either in   
the courts or in disputations1 without  
any spiteful purpose1 and with a good   
intention1 as1 for example1 those who   
contend by disputing with heretics4     
,hence a gloss on #a ,kings #ad3a1 ,it  
came to pass one day1 etc4 says3        
,catholics do not raise contentions with
 heretics1 unless they are first        
challenged to dispute4 ,therefore       
contention is not a mortal sin4  ,obj4  
#d3 ,further1 ,job seems to have        
contended with ,god1 according to ,job  
#ci3cb3 ,shall he that contendeth with  
,god be so easily silenced8 ,and yet    

,job was not guilty of mortal sin1 since
 the ,lord said of him 7,job #db3g73    
,you have not spoken the thing that is  
right before me1 as my servant ,job     
hath4 ,therefore contention is not      
always a mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1 
,it is against the precept of the       
,apostle who says 7#b ,tim4 #b3ad73     
,contend not in words4 ,moreover 7,gal4 
#e3bj7 contention is included among the 
works of the flesh1 and as stated there 
7,gal4 #e3ba7 they who do such things   
shall not obtain the kingdom of ,god4   
,now whatever excludes a man from the   
kingdom of ,god and is against a        
precept1 is a mortal sin4 ,therefore    
contention is a mortal sin4  ,i answer  
that1 ,to contend is to tend against    
some one4 ,wherefore just as discord    
denotes a contrariety of wills1 so      
contention signifies contrariety of     
speech4 ,for this reason when a man     
contrasts various contrary things in a  
speech1 this is called contentio1 which 
,tully calls one of the rhetorical      

colors 7,de ,rhet4 ad ,heren4 iv71 where
 he says that it consists in developing 
a speech from contrary things1 for      
instance3 ,adulation has a pleasant     
beginning1 and a most bitter end4  ,now 
contrariety of speech may be looked at  
in two ways3 first with regard to the   
intention of the contentious party1     
secondly1 with regard to the manner of  
contending4 ,as to the intention1 we    
must consider whether he contends       
against the truth1 and then he is to be 
blamed1 or against falsehood1 and then  
he should be praised4 ,as to the manner1
 we must consider whether his manner of 
contending is in keeping with the       
persons and the matter in dispute1 for  
then it would be praiseworthy1 hence    
,tully says 7,de ,rhet4 ad ,heren4 iii7 
that contention is a sharp speech       
suitable for proof and refutation--or   
whether it exceeds the demands of the   
persons and matter in dispute1 in which 
case it is blameworthy4  ,accordingly if
 we take contention as denoting a       

disclaimer of the truth and an          
inordinate manner1 it is a mortal sin4  
,thus ,ambrose 99,cf4 ,gloss4 ,ord4 in  
,rom4 i1 #bi defines contention3        
,contention is a disclaimer of the truth
 with clamorous confidence4 ,if1        
however1 contention denote a disavowal  
of what is false1 with the proper       
measure of acrimony1 it is praiseworthy3
 whereas1 if it denote a disavowal of   
falsehood1 together with an inordinate  
manner1 it can be a venial sin1 unless  
the contention be conducted so          
inordinately1 as to give scandal to     
others4 ,hence the ,apostle after saying
 7#b ,tim4 #b3ad73 ,contend not in      
words1 adds1 for it is to no profit1 but
 to the subverting of the hearers4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the disciples of      
,christ contended together1 not with the
 intention of disclaiming the truth1    
since each one stood up for what he     
thought was true4 ,yet there was        
inordinateness in their contention1     
because they contended about a matter   

which they ought not to have contended  
about1 viz4 the primacy of honor2 for   
they were not spiritual men as yet1 as a
 gloss says on the same passage2 and for
 this reason ,our ,lord checked them4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who preached    
,christ out of contention1 were to be   
blamed1 because1 although they did not  
gainsay the truth of faith1 but preached
 it1 yet they did gainsay the truth1 by 
the fact that they thought they would   
raise affliction to the ,apostle who was
 preaching the truth of faith4 ,hence   
the ,apostle rejoiced not in their      
contention1 but in the fruit that would 
result therefrom1 namely that ,christ   
would be made known--since evil is      
sometimes the occasion of good results4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,contention is complete
 and is a mortal sin when1 in contending
 before a judge1 a man gainsays the     
truth of justice1 or in a disputation1  
intends to impugn the true doctrine4 ,in
 this sense ,catholics do not contend   
against heretics1 but the reverse4 ,but 

when1 whether in court or in a          
disputation1 it is incomplete1 i4e4 in  
respect of the acrimony of speech1 it is
 not always a mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4 
#d3 ,contention here denotes an ordinary
 dispute4 ,for ,job had said 7#ac3c73 ,i
 will speak to the ,almighty1 and ,i    
desire to reason with ,god3 yet he      
intended not to impugn the truth1 but to
 defend it1 and in seeking the truth    
thus1 he had no wish to be inordinate in
 mind or in speech4   ,,second ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ch1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,contention ,is a ,daughter of          
,vainglory8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that contention is not a daughter  
of vainglory4 ,for contention is akin to
 zeal1 wherefore it is written 7#a ,cor4
 #c3c73 ,whereas there is among you zeal
 ,douay3 'envying' and contention1 are  
you not carnal1 and walk according to   
men8 ,now zeal pertains to envy4        
,therefore contention arises rather from
 envy4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 contention  
is accompanied by raising of the voice4 

,but the voice is raised on account of  
anger1 as ,gregory declares 7,moral4    
xxxi1 #ad74 ,therefore contention too   
arises from anger4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
among other things knowledge seems to be
 the matter of pride and vainglory1     
according to #a ,cor4 #h3a3 ,knowledge  
puffeth up4 ,now contention is often due
 to lack of knowledge1 and by knowledge 
we do not impugn the truth1 we know it4 
,therefore contention is not a daughter 
of vainglory4  ,on the contrary stands  
the authority of ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1
 #ad74  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above
 7,q4 #cg1 ,a4 #b71 discord is a        
daughter of vainglory1 because each of  
the disaccording parties clings to his  
own opinion1 rather than acquiesce with 
the other4 ,now it is proper to pride   
and vainglory to seek one's own glory4  
,and just as people are discordant when 
they hold to their own opinion in their 
hearts1 so are they contentious when    
each defends his own opinion by words4  
,consequently contention is reckoned a  

daughter of vainglory for the same      
reason as discord4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,contention1 like discord1 is akin to   
envy in so far as a man severs himself  
from the one with whom he is discordant1
 or with whom he contends1 but in so far
 as a contentious man holds to          
something1 it is akin to pride and      
vainglory1 because1 to wit1 he clings to
 his own opinion1 as stated above 7,q4  
#cg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,the contention of which we are speaking
 puts on a loud voice1 for the purpose  
of impugning the truth1 so that it is   
not the chief part of contention4 ,hence
 it does not follow that contention     
arises from the same source as the      
raising of the voice4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,pride and vainglory are occasioned     
chiefly by goods even those that are    
contrary to them1 for instance1 when a  
man is proud of his humility3 for when a
 thing arises in this way1 it does so   
not directly but accidentally1 in which 
way nothing hinders one contrary from   

arising out of another4 ,hence there is 
no reason why the per se and direct     
effects of pride or vainglory1 should   
not result from the contraries of those 
things which are the occasion of pride4 
,,question #ci  ,,of ,,schism 7,in ,four
 ,articles7  ,we must now consider the  
vices contrary to peace1 which belong to
 deeds3 such are schism1 strife1        
sedition1 and war4 ,in the first place1 
then1 about schism1 there are four      
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether schism
 is a special sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is 
graver than unbelief8  7#c7 ,of the     
power exercised by schismatics2  7#d7   
,of the punishment inflicted on them4   
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ci1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,schism ,is a        
,special ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that schism is not a special sin4 
,for schism1 as ,pope ,pelagius ,i says 
7,epist4 ad ,victor4 et ,pancrat471     
denotes a division4 ,but every sin      
causes a division1 according to ,isa4   
#ei3 ,your sins have divided between you

 and your ,god4 ,therefore schism is not
 a special sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a  
man is apparently a schismatic if he    
disobeys the ,church4 ,but every sin    
makes a man disobey the commandments of 
the ,church1 because sin1 according to  
,ambrose 7,de ,parad4 viii7 is          
disobedience against the heavenly       
commandments4 ,therefore every sin is a 
schism4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 heresy also
 divides a man from the unity of faith4 
,if1 therefore1 the word schism denotes 
a division1 it would seem not to differ1
 as a special sin1 from the sin of      
unbelief4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 
7,contra ,faust4 xx1 #c2 ,contra        
,crescon4 ii1 #d7 distinguishes between 
schism and heresy1 for he says that a   
schismatic is one who holds the same    
faith1 and practises the same worship1  
as others1 and takes pleasure in the    
mere disunion of the community1 whereas 
a heretic is one who holds another faith
 from that of the ,catholic ,church4    
,therefore schism is not a generic sin4 

,i answer that1 ,as ,isidore says       
7,etym4 viii1 #c71 schism takes its name
 from being a scission of minds1 and    
scission is opposed to unity4 ,wherefore
 the sin of schism is one that is       
directly and essentially opposed to     
unity4 ,for in the moral1 as in the     
physical order1 the species is not      
constituted by that which is accidental4
 ,now1 in the moral order1 the essential
 is that which is intended1 and that    
which results beside the intention1 is1 
as it were1 accidental4 ,hence the sin  
of schism is1 properly speaking1 a      
special sin1 for the reason that the    
schismatic intends to sever himself from
 that unity which is the effect of      
charity3 because charity unites not only
 one person to another with the bond of 
spiritual love1 but also the whole      
,church in unity of spirit4             
,accordingly schismatics properly so    
called are those who1 wilfully and      
intentionally separate themselves from  
the unity of the ,church2 for this is   

the chief unity1 and the particular     
unity of several individuals among      
themselves is subordinate to the unity  
of the ,church1 even as the mutual      
adaptation of each member of a natural  
body is subordinate to the unity of the 
whole body4 ,now the unity of the       
,church consists in two things2 namely1 
in the mutual connection or communion of
 the members of the ,church1 and again  
in the subordination of all the members 
of the ,church to the one head1         
according to ,col4 #b3ah1 #ai3 ,puffed  
up by the sense of his flesh1 and not   
holding the ,head1 from which the whole 
body1 by joints and bands1 being        
supplied with nourishment and compacted1
 groweth unto the increase of ,god4 ,now
 this ,head is ,christ ,himself1 ,whose 
viceregent in the ,church is the        
,sovereign ,pontiff4 ,wherefore         
schismatics are those who refuse to     
submit to the ,sovereign ,pontiff1 and  
to hold communion with those members of 
the ,church who acknowledge his         

supremacy4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the       
division between man and ,god that      
results from sin is not intended by the 
sinner3 it happens beside his intention 
as a result of his turning inordinately 
to a mutable good1 and so it is not     
schism properly so called4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,the essence of schism consists in 
rebelliously disobeying the             
commandments3 and ,i say rebelliously1  
since a schismatic both obstinately     
scorns the commandments of the ,church1 
and refuses to submit to her judgment4  
,but every sinner does not do this1     
wherefore not every sin is a schism4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,heresy and schism are 
distinguished in respect of those things
 to which each is opposed essentially   
and directly4 ,for heresy is essentially
 opposed to faith1 while schism is      
essentially opposed to the unity of     
ecclesiastical charity4 ,wherefore just 
as faith and charity are different      
virtues1 although whoever lacks faith   
lacks charity1 so too schism and heresy 

are different vices1 although whoever is
 a heretic is also a schismatic1 but not
 conversely4 ,this is what ,jerome says 
in his commentary on the ,epistle to the
 ,galatians 99,in ,ep4 ad ,tit4 iii1    
#aj3 ,i consider the difference between 
schism and heresy to be that heresy     
holds false doctrine while schism severs
 a man from the ,church4 ,nevertheless1 
just as the loss of charity is the road 
to the loss of faith1 according to #a   
,tim4 #a3f3 ,from which things1 i4e4    
charity and the like1 some going astray1
 are turned aside into vain babbling1 so
 too1 schism is the road to heresy4     
,wherefore ,jerome adds 7,in ,ep4 ad    
,tit4 iii1 #aj7 that at the outset it is
 possible1 in a certain respect1 to find
 a difference between schism and heresy3
 yet there is no schism that does not   
devise some heresy for itself1 that it  
may appear to have had a reason for     
separating from the ,church4   ,,second 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,schism ,is a ,graver ,sin     

,than ,unbelief8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem that schism is a graver sin  
than unbelief4 ,for the graver sin meets
 with a graver punishment1 according to 
,deut4 #be3b3 ,according to the measure 
of the sin shall the measure also of the
 stripes be4 ,now we find the sin of    
schism punished more severely than even 
the sin of unbelief or idolatry3 for we 
read 7,ex4 #cb3bh7 that some were slain 
by the swords of their fellow men on    
account of idolatry3 whereas of the sin 
of schism we read 7,num4 #af3cj73 ,if   
the ,lord do a new thing1 and the earth 
opening her mouth swallow them down1 and
 all things that belong to them1 and    
they go down alive into hell1 you shall 
know that they have blasphemed the ,lord
 ,god4 ,moreover the ten tribes who were
 guilty of schism in revolting from the 
rule of ,david were most severely       
punished 7#d ,kings #ag74 ,therefore the
 sin of schism is graver than the sin of
 unbelief4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,the    
good of the multitude is greater and    

more godlike than the good of the       
individual1 as the ,philosopher states  
7,ethic4 i1 #b74 ,now schism is opposed 
to the good of the multitude1 namely1   
ecclesiastical unity1 whereas unbelief  
is contrary to the particular good of   
one man1 namely the faith of an         
individual4 ,therefore it seems that    
schism is a graver sin than unbelief4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a greater good is   
opposed to a greater evil1 according to 
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #aj74   
,now schism is opposed to charity1 which
 is a greater virtue than faith to which
 unbelief is opposed1 as shown above    
7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #f74     
,therefore schism is a graver sin than  
unbelief4  ,on the contrary1 ,that which
 results from an addition to something  
else surpasses that thing either in good
 or in evil4 ,now heresy results from   
something being added to schism1 for it 
adds corrupt doctrine1 as ,jerome       
declares in the passage quoted above    
7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,therefore schism is a 

less grievous sin than unbelief4  ,i    
answer that1 ,the gravity of a sin can  
be considered in two ways3 first1       
according to the species of that sin1   
secondly1 according to its              
circumstances4 ,and since particular    
circumstances are infinite in number1 so
 too they can be varied in an infinite  
number of ways3 wherefore if one were to
 ask in general which of two sins is the
 graver1 the question must be understood
 to refer to the gravity derived from   
the sin's genus4 ,now the genus or      
species of a sin is taken from its      
object1 as shown above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#gb1 ,a4 #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #c74 
,wherefore the sin which is opposed to  
the greater good is1 in respect of its  
genus1 more grievous1 for instance a sin
 committed against ,god is graver than a
 sin committed against one's neighbor4  
,now it is evident that unbelief is a   
sin committed against ,god ,himself1    
according as ,he is ,himself the ,first 
,truth1 on which faith is founded2      

whereas schism is opposed to            
ecclesiastical unity1 which is a        
participated good1 and a lesser good    
than ,god ,himself4 ,wherefore it is    
manifest that the sin of unbelief is    
generically more grievous than the sin  
of schism1 although it may happen that a
 particular schismatic sins more        
grievously than a particular unbeliever1
 either because his contempt is greater1
 or because his sin is a source of      
greater danger1 or for some similar     
reason4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it had       
already been declared to that people by 
the law which they had received that    
there was one ,god1 and that no other   
,god was to be worshipped by them2 and  
the same had been confirmed among them  
by many kinds of signs4 ,consequently   
there was no need for those who sinned  
against this faith by falling into      
idolatry1 to be punished in an unwonted 
manner3 it was enough that they should  
be punished in the usual way4 ,on the   
other hand1 it was not so well known    

among them that ,moses was always to be 
their ruler1 and so it behooved those   
who rebelled against his authority to be
 punished in a miraculous and unwonted  
manner4  ,we may also reply by saying   
that the sin of schism was sometimes    
more severely punished in that people1  
because they were inclined to seditions 
and schisms4 ,for it is written 7#a     
,esdra #d3ae73 ,this city since days    
gone by has rebelled against its kings3 
and seditions and wars were raised      
therein 99,vulg43 ',this city is a      
rebellious city1 and hurtful to the     
kings and provinces1 and 4 4 4 wars were
 raised therein of old'4 ,now sometimes 
a more severe punishment is inflicted   
for an habitual sin 7as stated above1   
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #b1 ad #i71      
because punishments are medicines       
intended to keep man away from sin3 so  
that where there is greater proneness to
 sin1 a more severe punishment ought to 
be inflicted4 ,as regards the ten       
tribes1 they were punished not only for 

the sin of schism1 but also for that of 
idolatry as stated in the passage       
quoted4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as the  
good of the multitude is greater than   
the good of a unit in that multitude1 so
 is it less than the extrinsic good to  
which that multitude is directed1 even  
as the good of a rank in the army is    
less than the good of the               
commander-in-chief4 ,in like manner the 
good of ecclesiastical unity1 to which  
schism is opposed1 is less than the good
 of ,divine truth1 to which unbelief is 
opposed4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,charity has 
two objects2 one is its principal object
 and is the ,divine goodness1 the other 
is its secondary object and is our      
neighbor's good4 ,now schism and other  
sins against our neighbor1 are opposed  
to charity in respect of its secondary  
good1 which is less than the object of  
faith1 for this is ,god ,himself2 and so
 these sins are less grievous than      
unbelief4 ,on the other hand1 hatred of 
,god1 which is opposed to charity in    

respect of its principal object1 is not 
less grievous than unbelief4            
,nevertheless of all sins committed by  
man against his neighbor1 the sin of    
schism would seem to be the greatest1   
because it is opposed to the spiritual  
good of the multitude4   ,,third        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,schismatics ,have ,any ,power8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
schismatics have some power4 ,for       
,augustine says 7,contra ,donat4 i1 #a73
 ,just as those who come back to the    
,church after being baptized1 are not   
baptized again1 so those who return     
after being ordained1 are not ordained  
again4 ,now ,order is a kind of power4  
,therefore schismatics have some power  
since they retain their ,orders4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de      
,unico ,bapt4 99,de ,bap4 contra ,donat4
 vi1 #e73 ,one who is separated can     
confer a sacrament even as he can have  
it4 ,but the power of conferring a      
sacrament is a very great power4        

,therefore schismatics who are separated
 from the ,church1 have a spiritual     
power4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,pope ,urban
 ,,ii 99,council of ,piacenza1 cap4 x2  
cf4 ,can4 ,ordinationes1 ix1 qu4 #a     
says3 ,we command that persons          
consecrated by bishops who were         
themselves consecrated according to the 
,catholic rite1 but have separated      
themselves by schism from the ,roman    
,church1 should be received mercifully  
and that their ,orders should be        
acknowledged1 when they return to the   
unity of the ,church1 provided they be  
of commendable life and knowledge4 ,but 
this would not be so1 unless spiritual  
power were retained by schismatics4     
,therefore schismatics have spiritual   
power4  ,on the contrary1 ,cyprian says 
in a letter 7,ep4 lii1 quoted vii1 qu4  
#a1 can4 ,novatianus73 ,he who observes 
neither unity of spirit nor the concord 
of peace1 and severs himself from the   
bonds of the ,church1 and from the      
fellowship of her priests1 cannot have  

episcopal power or honor4  ,i answer    
that1 ,spiritual power is twofold1 the  
one sacramental1 the other a power of   
jurisdiction4 ,the sacramental power is 
one that is conferred by some kind of   
consecration4 ,now all the consecrations
 of the ,church are immovable so long as
 the consecrated thing remains3 as      
appears even in inanimate things1 since 
an altar1 once consecrated1 is not      
consecrated again unless it has been    
broken up4 ,consequently such a power as
 this remains1 as to its essence1 in the
 man who has received it by             
consecration1 as long as he lives1 even 
if he fall into schism or heresy3 and   
this is proved from the fact that if he 
come back to the ,church1 he is not     
consecrated anew4 ,since1 however1 the  
lower power ought not to exercise its   
act1 except in so far as it is moved by 
the higher power1 as may be seen also in
 the physical order1 it follows that    
such persons lose the use of their      
power1 so that it is not lawful for them

 to use it4 ,yet if they use it1 this   
power has its effect in sacramental     
acts1 because therein man acts only as  
,god's instrument1 so that sacramental  
effects are not precluded on account of 
any fault whatever in the person who    
confers the sacrament4  ,on the other   
hand1 the power of jurisdiction is that 
which is conferred by a mere human      
appointment4 ,such a power as this does 
not adhere to the recipient immovably3  
so that it does not remain in heretics  
and schismatics2 and consequently they  
neither absolve nor excommunicate1 nor  
grant indulgence1 nor do anything of the
 kind1 and if they do1 it is invalid4   
,accordingly when it is said that such  
like persons have no spiritual power1 it
 is to be understood as referring either
 to the second power1 or if it be       
referred to the first power1 not as     
referring to the essence of the power1  
but to its lawful use4  ,this suffices  
for the ,replies to the ,objections4    
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ci1  

,art4 #d  ,whether ,it ,is ,right ,that 
,schismatics ,should ,be ,punished with 
,excommunication8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that schismatics are not     
rightly punished with excommunication4  
,for excommunication deprives a man     
chiefly of a share in the sacraments4   
,but ,augustine says 7,contra ,donat4   
vi1 #e7 that ,baptism can be received   
from a schismatic4 ,therefore it seems  
that excommunication is not a fitting   
punishment for schismatics4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 it is the duty of ,christ's   
faithful to lead back those who have    
gone astray1 wherefore it is written    
against certain persons 7,ezech4 #cd3d73
 ,that which was driven away you have   
not brought again1 neither have you     
sought that which was lost4 ,now        
schismatics are more easily brought back
 by such as may hold communion with     
them4 ,therefore it seems that they     
ought not to be excommunicated4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 a double punishment is not
 inflicted for one and the same sin1    

according to ,nahum #a3i3 ,god will not 
judge the same twice 99,septuagint      
version4 ,now some receive a temporal   
punishment for the sin of schism1       
according to #bc1 qu4 #e 99,gratianus1  
,decretum1 ,p4 ,,ii1 causa ,,xxiii1 qu4 
#e1 can4 #dd1 ,quali nos 7,,rp ,i1      
#idc71 where it is stated3 ,both divine 
and earthly laws have laid down that    
those who are severed from the unity of 
the ,church1 and disturb her peace1 must
 be punished by the secular power4      
,therefore they ought not to be punished
 with excommunication4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,it is written 7,num4 #af3bf73
 ,depart from the tents of these wicked 
men1 those1 to wit1 who had caused the  
schism1 and touch nothing of theirs1    
lest you be involved in their sins4  ,i 
answer that1 ,according to ,wis4 #aa3aa1
 ,by what things a man sinneth1 by the  
same also he should be punished ,vulg43 
'he is tormented'4 ,now a schismatic1 as
 shown above 7,a4 #a71 commits a twofold
 sin3 first by separating himself from  

communion with the members of the       
,church1 and in this respect the fitting
 punishment for schismatics is that they
 be excommunicated4 ,secondly1 they     
refuse submission to the head of the    
,church1 wherefore1 since they are      
unwilling to be controlled by the       
,church's spiritual power1 it is just   
that they should be compelled by the    
secular power4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is 
not lawful to receive ,baptism from a   
schismatic1 save in a case of necessity1
 since it is better for a man to quit   
this life1 marked with the sign of      
,christ1 no matter from whom he may     
receive it1 whether from a ,jew or a    
pagan1 than deprived of that mark1 which
 is bestowed in ,baptism4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,excommunication does not forbid the
 intercourse whereby a person by        
salutary admonitions leads back to the  
unity of the ,church those who are      
separated from her4 ,indeed this very   
separation brings them back somewhat1   
because through confusion at their      

separation1 they are sometimes led to do
 penance4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the        
punishments of the present life are     
medicinal1 and therefore when one       
punishment does not suffice to compel a 
man1 another is added3 just as          
physicians employ several bodily        
medicines when one has no effect4 ,in   
like manner the ,church1 when           
excommunication does not sufficiently   
restrain certain men1 employs the       
compulsion of the secular arm4 ,if1     
however1 one punishment suffices1       
another should not be employed4         
,,question #dj  ,,of ,,war 7,in ,four   
,articles7  ,we must now consider war1  
under which head there are four points  
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether some kind of 
war is lawful8  7#b7 ,whether it is     
lawful for clerics to fight8  7#c7      
,whether it is lawful for belligerents  
to lay ambushes8  7#d7 ,whether it is   
lawful to fight on holy days8   ,,first 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,it ,is ,always ,sinful to     

,wage ,war8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that it is always sinful to wage   
war4 ,because punishment is not         
inflicted except for sin4 ,now those who
 wage war are threatened by ,our ,lord  
with punishment1 according to ,matt4    
#bf3eb3 ,all that take the sword shall  
perish with the sword4 ,therefore all   
wars are unlawful4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
whatever is contrary to a ,divine       
precept is a sin4 ,but war is contrary  
to a ,divine precept1 for it is written 
7,matt4 #e3ci73 ,but ,i say to you not  
to resist evil2 and 7,rom4 #ab3ai73 ,not
 revenging yourselves1 my dearly        
beloved1 but give place unto wrath4     
,therefore war is always sinful4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 nothing1 except sin1 is   
contrary to an act of virtue4 ,but war  
is contrary to peace4 ,therefore war is 
always a sin4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the  
exercise of a lawful thing is itself    
lawful1 as is evident in scientific     
exercises4 ,but warlike exercises which 
take place in tournaments are forbidden 

by the ,church1 since those who are     
slain in these trials are deprived of   
ecclesiastical burial4 ,therefore it    
seems that war is a sin in itself4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,augustine says in a      
sermon on the son of the centurion      
99,ep4 ad ,marcel4 cxxxviii3 ,if the    
,christian ,religion forbade war        
altogether1 those who sought salutary   
advice in the ,gospel would rather have 
been counselled to cast aside their     
arms1 and to give up soldiering         
altogether4 ,on the contrary1 they were 
told3 ',do violence to no man 4 4 4 and 
be content with your pay' 99,luke #c3ad4
 ,if he commanded them to be content    
with their pay1 he did not forbid       
soldiering4  ,i answer that1 ,in order  
for a war to be just1 three things are  
necessary4 ,first1 the authority of the 
sovereign by whose command the war is to
 be waged4 ,for it is not the business  
of a private individual to declare war1 
because he can seek for redress of his  
rights from the tribunal of his         

superior4 ,moreover it is not the       
business of a private individual to     
summon together the people1 which has to
 be done in wartime4 ,and as the care of
 the common weal is committed to those  
who are in authority1 it is their       
business to watch over the common weal  
of the city1 kingdom or province subject
 to them4 ,and just as it is lawful for 
them to have recourse to the sword in   
defending that common weal against      
internal disturbances1 when they punish 
evil-doers1 according to the words of   
the ,apostle 7,rom4 #ac3d73 ,he beareth 
not the sword in vain3 for he is ,god's 
minister1 an avenger to execute wrath   
upon him that doth evil2 so too1 it is  
their business to have recourse to the  
sword of war in defending the common    
weal against external enemies4 ,hence it
 is said to those who are in authority  
7,ps4 #ha3d73 ,rescue the poor3 and     
deliver the needy out of the hand of the
 sinner2 and for this reason ,augustine 
says 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #ge73 ,the  

natural order conducive to peace among  
mortals demands that the power to       
declare and counsel war should be in the
 hands of those who hold the supreme    
authority4  ,secondly1 a just cause is  
required1 namely that those who are     
attacked1 should be attacked because    
they deserve it on account of some      
fault4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,,qq4
 in ,hept41 qu4 x1 super ,jos473 ,a just
 war is wont to be described as one that
 avenges wrongs1 when a nation or state 
has to be punished1 for refusing to make
 amends for the wrongs inflicted by its 
subjects1 or to restore what it has     
seized unjustly4  ,thirdly1 it is       
necessary that the belligerents should  
have a rightful intention1 so that they 
intend the advancement of good1 or the  
avoidance of evil4 ,hence ,augustine    
says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom4 99,the words     
quoted are to be found not in ,st4      
,augustine's works1 but ,can4 ,apud4    
,caus4 xxiii1 qu4 #a73 ,true religion   
looks upon as peaceful those wars that  

are waged not for motives of            
aggrandizement1 or cruelty1 but with the
 object of securing peace1 of punishing 
evil-doers1 and of uplifting the good4  
,for it may happen that the war is      
declared by the legitimate authority1   
and for a just cause1 and yet be        
rendered unlawful through a wicked      
intention4 ,hence ,augustine says       
7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #gd73 ,the       
passion for inflicting harm1 the cruel  
thirst for vengeance1 an unpacific and  
relentless spirit1 the fever of revolt1 
the lust of power1 and such like things1
 all these are rightly condemned in war4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says  
7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #gj73 ,to take   
the sword is to arm oneself in order to 
take the life of anyone1 without the    
command or permission of superior or    
lawful authority4 ,on the other hand1 to
 have recourse to the sword 7as a       
private person7 by the authority of the 
sovereign or judge1 or 7as a public     
person7 through zeal for justice1 and by

 the authority1 so to speak1 of ,god1 is
 not to take the sword1 but to use it as
 commissioned by another1 wherefore it  
does not deserve punishment4 ,and yet   
even those who make sinful use of the   
sword are not always slain with the     
sword1 yet they always perish with their
 own sword1 because1 unless they repent1
 they are punished eternally for their  
sinful use of the sword4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,such like precepts1 as ,augustine  
observes 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 
#ai71 should always be borne in         
readiness of mind1 so that we be ready  
to obey them1 and1 if necessary1 to     
refrain from resistance or self-defense4
 ,nevertheless it is necessary sometimes
 for a man to act otherwise for the     
common good1 or for the good of those   
with whom he is fighting4 ,hence        
,augustine says 7,ep4 ad ,marcellin4    
cxxxviii73 ,those whom we have to punish
 with a kindly severity1 it is necessary
 to handle in many ways against their   
will4 ,for when we are stripping a man  

of the lawlessness of sin1 it is good   
for him to be vanquished1 since nothing 
is more hopeless than the happiness of  
sinners1 whence arises a guilty         
impunity1 and an evil will1 like an     
internal enemy4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those
 who wage war justly aim at peace1 and  
so they are not opposed to peace1 except
 to the evil peace1 which ,our ,lord    
came not to send upon earth 7,matt4     
#aj3cd74 ,hence ,augustine says 7,ep4 ad
 ,bonif4 clxxxix73 ,we do not seek peace
 in order to be at war1 but we go to war
 that we may have peace4 ,be peaceful1  
therefore1 in warring1 so that you may  
vanquish those whom you war against1 and
 bring them to the prosperity of peace4 
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,manly exercises in    
warlike feats of arms are not all       
forbidden1 but those which are          
inordinate and perilous1 and end in     
slaying or plundering4 ,in olden times  
warlike exercises presented no such     
danger1 and hence they were called      
exercises of arms or bloodless wars1 as 

,jerome states in an epistle            
99,reference incorrect3 cf4 ,veget41 ,de
 ,re ,milit4 i4   ,,second ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful for ,clerics and        
,bishops to ,fight8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem lawful for clerics and       
bishops to fight4 ,for1 as stated above 
7,a4 #a71 wars are lawful and just in so
 far as they protect the poor and the   
entire common weal from suffering at the
 hands of the foe4 ,now this seems to be
 above all the duty of prelates1 for    
,gregory says 7,hom4 in ,ev4 xiv73 ,the 
wolf comes upon the sheep1 when any     
unjust and rapacious man oppresses those
 who are faithful and humble4 ,but he   
who was thought to be the shepherd1 and 
was not1 leaveth the sheep1 and flieth1 
for he fears lest the wolf hurt him1 and
 dares not stand up against his         
injustice4 ,therefore it is lawful for  
prelates and clerics to fight4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 ,pope ,leo ,,iv writes    
7xxiii1 qu4 #h1 can4 ,igitur73 ,as      

untoward tidings had frequently come    
from the ,saracen side1 some said that  
the ,saracens would come to the port of 
,rome secretly and covertly2 for which  
reason we commanded our people to gather
 together1 and ordered them to go down  
to the seashore4 ,therefore it is lawful
 for bishops to fight4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 apparently1 it comes to the   
same whether a man does a thing himself1
 or consents to its being done by       
another1 according to ,rom4 #a3cb3 ,they
 who do such things1 are worthy of      
death1 and not only they that do them1  
but they also that consent to them that 
do them4 ,now those1 above all1 seem to 
consent to a thing1 who induce others to
 do it4 ,but it is lawful for bishops   
and clerics to induce others to fight3  
for it is written 7xxiii1 qu4 #h1 can4  
,hortatu7 that ,charles went to war with
 the ,lombards at the instance and      
entreaty of ,adrian1 bishop of ,rome4   
,therefore they also are allowed to     
fight4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whatever is 

right and meritorious in itself1 is     
lawful for prelates and clerics4 ,now it
 is sometimes right and meritorious to  
make war1 for it is written 7xxiii1 qu4 
#h1 can4 ,omni timore7 that if a man die
 for the true faith1 or to save his     
country1 or in defense of ,christians1  
,god will give him a heavenly reward4   
,therefore it is lawful for bishops and 
clerics to fight4  ,on the contrary1 ,it
 was said to ,peter as representing     
bishops and clerics 7,matt4 #af3eb73    
,put up again thy sword into the        
scabbard ,vulg43 'its place' 99,scabbard
 is the reading in ,john #ah3aa4        
,therefore it is not lawful for them to 
fight4  ,i answer that1 ,several things 
are requisite for the good of a human   
society3 and a number of things are done
 better and quicker by a number of      
persons than by one1 as the ,philosopher
 observes 7,polit4 i1 #a71 while certain
 occupations are so inconsistent with   
one another1 that they cannot be        
fittingly exercised at the same time2   

wherefore those who are deputed to      
important duties are forbidden to occupy
 themselves with things of small        
importance4 ,thus according to human    
laws1 soldiers who are deputed to       
warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage
 in commerce 99,cod4 xii1 #ce1 ,de ,re  
,milit44  ,now warlike pursuits are     
altogether incompatible with the duties 
of a bishop and a cleric1 for two       
reasons4 ,the first reason is a general 
one1 because1 to wit1 warlike pursuits  
are full of unrest1 so that they hinder 
the mind very much from the             
contemplation of ,divine things1 the    
praise of ,god1 and prayers for the     
people1 which belong to the duties of a 
cleric4 ,wherefore just as commercial   
enterprises are forbidden to clerics1   
because they unsettle the mind too much1
 so too are warlike pursuits1 according 
to #b ,tim4 #b3d3 ,no man being a       
soldier to ,god1 entangleth himself with
 secular business4 ,the second reason is
 a special one1 because1 to wit1 all the

 clerical ,orders are directed to the   
ministry of the altar1 on which the     
,passion of ,christ is represented      
sacramentally1 according to #a ,cor4    
#aa3bf3 ,as often as you shall eat this 
bread1 and drink the chalice1 you shall 
show the death of the ,lord1 until ,he  
come4 ,wherefore it is unbecoming for   
them to slay or shed blood1 and it is   
more fitting that they should be ready  
to shed their own blood for ,christ1 so 
as to imitate in deed what they portray 
in their ministry4 ,for this reason it  
has been decreed that those who shed    
blood1 even without sin1 become         
irregular4 ,now no man who has a certain
 duty to perform1 can lawfully do that  
which renders him unfit for that duty4  
,wherefore it is altogether unlawful for
 clerics to fight1 because war is       
directed to the shedding of blood4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,prelates ought to     
withstand not only the wolf who brings  
spiritual death upon the flock1 but also
 the pillager and the oppressor who work

 bodily harm2 not1 however1 by having   
recourse themselves to material arms1   
but by means of spiritual weapons1      
according to the saying of the ,apostle 
7#b ,cor4 #aj3d73 ,the weapons of our   
warfare are not carnal1 but mighty      
through ,god4 ,such are salutary        
warnings1 devout prayers1 and1 for those
 who are obstinate1 the sentence of     
excommunication4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,prelates and clerics may1 by the       
authority of their superiors1 take part 
in wars1 not indeed by taking up arms   
themselves1 but by affording spiritual  
help to those who fight justly1 by      
exhorting and absolving them1 and by    
other like spiritual helps4 ,thus in the
 ,old ,testament 7,joshua #f3d7 the     
priests were commanded to sound the     
sacred trumpets in the battle4 ,it was  
for this purpose that bishops or clerics
 were first allowed to go to the front3 
and it is an abuse of this permission1  
if any of them take up arms themselves4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4  

#bc1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b7 every power1 art or 
virtue that regards the end1 has to     
dispose that which is directed to the   
end4 ,now1 among the faithful1 carnal   
wars should be considered as having for 
their end the ,divine spiritual good to 
which clerics are deputed4 ,wherefore it
 is the duty of clerics to dispose and  
counsel other men to engage in just     
wars4 ,for they are forbidden to take up
 arms1 not as though it were a sin1 but 
because such an occupation is unbecoming
 their personality4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3   
,although it is meritorious to wage a   
just war1 nevertheless it is rendered   
unlawful for clerics1 by reason of their
 being deputed to works more meritorious
 still4 ,thus the marriage act may be   
meritorious2 and yet it becomes         
reprehensible in those who have vowed   
virginity1 because they are bound to a  
yet greater good4   ,,third ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q41 #dj1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,it ,is ,lawful to ,lay ,ambushes in    
,war8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    

that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in  
war4 ,for it is written 7,deut4 #af3bj73
 ,thou shalt follow justly after that   
which is just4 ,but ambushes1 since they
 are a kind of deception1 seem to       
pertain to injustice4 ,therefore it is  
unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just 
war4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ambushes and  
deception seem to be opposed to         
faithfulness even as lies are4 ,but     
since we are bound to keep faith with   
all men1 it is wrong to lie to anyone1  
as ,augustine states 7,contra ,mend4    
xv74 ,therefore1 as one is bound to keep
 faith with one's enemy1 as ,augustine  
states 7,ep4 ad ,bonif4 clxxxix71 it    
seems that it is unlawful to lay        
ambushes for one's enemies4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 it is written 7,matt4 #g3ab73 
,whatsoever you would that men should do
 to you1 do you also to them3 and we    
ought to observe this in all our        
dealings with our neighbor4 ,now our    
enemy is our neighbor4 ,therefore1 since
 no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to

 be prepared for himself1 it seems that 
no one ought to carry on war by laying  
ambushes4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 
says 7,,qq4 in ,hept4 qu4 x super ,jos73
 ,provided the war be just1 it is no    
concern of justice whether it be carried
 on openly or by ambushes3 and he proves
 this by the authority of the ,lord1    
,who commanded ,joshua to lay ambushes  
for the city of ,hai 7,joshua #h3b74  ,i
 answer that1 ,the object of laying     
ambushes is in order to deceive the     
enemy4 ,now a man may be deceived by    
another's word or deed in two ways4     
,first1 through being told something    
false1 or through the breaking of a     
promise1 and this is always unlawful4   
,no one ought to deceive the enemy in   
this way1 for there are certain rights  
of war and covenants1 which ought to be 
observed even among enemies1 as ,ambrose
 states 7,de ,officiis i74  ,secondly1 a
 man may be deceived by what we say or  
do1 because we do not declare our       
purpose or meaning to him4 ,now we are  

not always bound to do this1 since even 
in the ,sacred ,doctrine many things    
have to be concealed1 especially from   
unbelievers1 lest they deride it1       
according to ,matt4 #g3f3 ,give not that
 which is holy1 to dogs4 ,wherefore much
 more ought the plan of campaign to be  
hidden from the enemy4 ,for this reason 
among other things that a soldier has to
 learn is the art of concealing his     
purpose lest it come to the enemy's     
knowledge1 as stated in the ,book on    
,strategy 99,stratagematum i1 #a by     
,frontinus4 ,such like concealment is   
what is meant by an ambush which may be 
lawfully employed in a just war4  ,nor  
can these ambushes be properly called   
deceptions1 nor are they contrary to    
justice or to a well-ordered will4 ,for 
a man would have an inordinate will if  
he were unwilling that others should    
hide anything from him4  ,this suffices 
for the ,replies to the ,objections4    
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1  
,art4 #d  ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to   

,fight on ,holy ,days8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem unlawful to fight on holy
 days4 ,for holy days are instituted    
that we may give our time to the things 
of ,god4 ,hence they are included in the
 keeping of the ,sabbath prescribed ,ex4
 #bj3h3 for sabbath is interpreted rest4
 ,but wars are full of unrest4          
,therefore by no means is it lawful to  
fight on holy days4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 certain persons are reproached 7,isa4  
#eh3c7 because on fast-days they exacted
 what was owing to them1 were guilty of 
strife1 and of smiting with the fist4   
,much more1 therefore1 is it unlawful to
 fight on holy days4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 no ill deed should be done to 
avoid temporal harm4 ,but fighting on a 
holy day seems in itself to be an ill   
deed4 ,therefore no one should fight on 
a holy day even through the need of     
avoiding temporal harm4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,mac4      
#b3da73 ,the ,jews rightly determined 4 
4 4 saying3 ,whosoever shall come up    

against us to fight on the ,sabbath-day1
 we will fight against him4  ,i answer  
that1 ,the observance of holy days is no
 hindrance to those things which are    
ordained to man's safety1 even that of  
his body4 ,hence ,our ,lord argued with 
the ,jews1 saying 7,john #g3bc73 ,are   
you angry at ,me because ,i have healed 
the whole man on the ,sabbath-day8      
,hence physicians may lawfully attend to
 their patients on holy days4 ,now there
 is much more reason for safeguarding   
the common weal 7whereby many are saved 
from being slain1 and innumerable evils 
both temporal and spiritual prevented71 
than the bodily safety of an individual4
 ,therefore1 for the purpose of         
safeguarding the common weal of the     
faithful1 it is lawful to carry on a war
 on holy days1 provided there be need   
for doing so3 because it would be to    
tempt ,god1 if notwithstanding such a   
need1 one were to choose to refrain from
 fighting4  ,however1 as soon as the    
need ceases1 it is no longer lawful to  

fight on a holy day1 for the reasons    
given3 wherefore this suffices for the  
,replies to the ,objections4            
,,question #da  ,,of ,,strife 7,in ,two 
,articles7 99,strife here denotes       
fighting between individuals  ,we must  
now consider strife1 under which head   
there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether strife is a sin8  7#b7 ,whether
 it is a daughter of anger8   ,,first   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,strife ,is ,always a ,sin8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
strife is not always a sin4 ,for strife 
seems a kind of contention3 hence       
,isidore says 7,etym4 x7 that the word  
rixosus quarrelsome is derived from the 
snarling rictu of a dog1 because the    
quarrelsome man is ever ready to        
contradict2 he delights in brawling1 and
 provokes contention4 ,now contention is
 not always a sin4 ,neither1 therefore1 
is strife4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is   
related 7,gen4 #bf3ba7 that the servants
 of ,isaac digged another well1 and for 

that they quarrelled likewise4 ,now it  
is not credible that the household of   
,isaac quarrelled publicly1 without     
being reproved by him1 supposing it were
 a sin4 ,therefore strife is not a sin4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 strife seems to be a
 war between individuals4 ,but war is   
not always sinful4 ,therefore strife is 
not always a sin4  ,on the contrary1    
,strifes 99,the ,douay version has      
'quarrels' are reckoned among the works 
of the flesh 7,gal4 #e3bj71 and they who
 do such things shall not obtain the    
kingdom of ,god4 ,therefore strifes are 
not only sinful1 but they are even      
mortal sins4  ,i answer that1 ,while    
contention implies a contradiction of   
words1 strife denotes a certain         
contradiction of deeds4 ,wherefore a    
gloss on ,gal4 #e3bj says that strifes  
are when persons strike one another     
through anger4 ,hence strife is a kind  
of private war1 because it takes place  
between private persons1 being declared 
not by public authority1 but rather by  

an inordinate will4 ,therefore strife is
 always sinful4 ,in fact it is a mortal 
sin in the man who attacks another      
unjustly1 for it is not without mortal  
sin that one inflicts harm on another   
even if the deed be done by the hands4  
,but in him who defends himself1 it may 
be without sin1 or it may sometimes     
involve a venial sin1 or sometimes a    
mortal sin2 and this depends on his     
intention and on his manner of defending
 himself4 ,for if his sole intention be 
to withstand the injury done to him1 and
 he defend himself with due moderation1 
it is no sin1 and one cannot say        
properly that there is strife on his    
part4 ,but if1 on the other hand1 his   
self-defense be inspired by vengeance   
and hatred1 it is always a sin4 ,it is a
 venial sin1 if a slight movement of    
hatred or vengeance obtrude itself1 or  
if he does not much exceed moderation in
 defending himself3 but it is a mortal  
sin if he makes for his assailant with  
the fixed intention of killing him1 or  

inflicting grievous harm on him4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,strife is not just the same 
as contention3 and there are three      
things in the passage quoted from       
,isidore1 which express the inordinate  
nature of strife4 ,first1 the           
quarrelsome man is always ready to      
fight1 and this is conveyed by the      
words1 ever ready to contradict1 that is
 to say1 whether the other man says or  
does well or ill4 ,secondly1 he delights
 in quarrelling itself1 and so the      
passage proceeds1 and delights in       
brawling4 ,thirdly1 he provokes others  
to quarrel1 wherefore it goes on1 and   
provokes contention4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,the sense of the text is not that the  
servants of ,isaac quarrelled1 but that 
the inhabitants of that country         
quarrelled with them3 wherefore these   
sinned1 and not the servants of ,isaac1 
who bore the calumny 99,cf4 ,gen4       
#bf3bj4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in order for 
a war to be just it must be declared by 
authority of the governing power1 as    

stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a72 whereas 
strife proceeds from a private feeling  
of anger or hatred4 ,for if the servants
 of a sovereign or judge1 in virtue of  
their public authority1 attack certain  
men and these defend themselves1 it is  
not the former who are said to be guilty
 of strife1 but those who resist the    
public authority4 ,hence it is not the  
assailants in this case who are guilty  
of strife and commit sin1 but those who 
defend themselves inordinately4         
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #da1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,strife ,is a        
,daughter of ,anger8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that strife is not a        
daughter of anger4 ,for it is written   
7,james #d3a73 ,whence are wars and     
contentions8 ,are they not 4 4 4 from   
your concupiscences1 which war in your  
members8 ,but anger is not in the       
concupiscible faculty4 ,therefore strife
 is a daughter1 not of anger1 but of    
concupiscence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it  
is written 7,prov4 #bh3be73 ,he that    

boasteth and puffeth up himself1        
stirreth up quarrels4 ,now strife is    
apparently the same as quarrel4         
,therefore it seems that strife is a    
daughter of pride or vainglory which    
makes a man boast and puff himself up4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written       
7,prov4 #ah3f73 ,the lips of a fool     
intermeddle with strife4 ,now folly     
differs from anger1 for it is opposed1  
not to meekness1 but to wisdom or       
prudence4 ,therefore strife is not a    
daughter of anger4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 
it is written 7,prov4 #aj3ab73 ,hatred  
stirreth up strifes4 ,but hatred arises 
from envy1 according to ,gregory        
7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag74 ,therefore strife  
is not a daughter of anger1 but of envy4
  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 it is written     
7,prov4 #ag3ai73 ,he that studieth      
discords1 soweth ,vulg43 'loveth'       
quarrels4 ,but discord is a daughter of 
vainglory1 as stated above 7,q4 #cg1 ,a4
 #b74 ,therefore strife is also4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4    

xxxi1 #ag7 that anger gives rise to     
strife2 and it is written 7,prov4       
#ae3ah2 #bi3bb73 ,a passionate man      
stirreth up strifes4  ,i answer that1   
,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 strife       
denotes an antagonism extending to      
deeds1 when one man designs to harm     
another4 ,now there are two ways in     
which one man may intend to harm        
another4 ,in one way it is as though he 
intended absolutely the other's hurt1   
which in this case is the outcome of    
hatred1 for the intention of hatred is  
directed to the hurt of one's enemy     
either openly or secretly4 ,in another  
way a man intends to hurt another who   
knows and withstands his intention4     
,this is what we mean by strife1 and    
belongs properly to anger which is the  
desire of vengeance3 for the angry man  
is not content to hurt secretly the     
object of his anger1 he even wishes him 
to feel the hurt and know that what he  
suffers is in revenge for what he has   
done1 as may be seen from what has been 

said above about the passion of anger   
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,a4 #f1 ad #b74      
,therefore1 properly speaking1 strife   
arises from anger4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as
 stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,,aa4  
#a1 #b71 all the irascible passions     
arise from those of the concupiscible   
faculty1 so that whatever is the        
immediate outcome of anger1 arises also 
from concupiscence as from its first    
root4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,boasting and   
puffing up of self which are the result 
of anger or vainglory1 are not the      
direct but the occasional cause of      
quarrels or strife1 because1 when a man 
resents another being preferred to him1 
his anger is aroused1 and then his anger
 results in quarrel and strife4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,anger1 as stated above       
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #c7 hinders the  
judgment of the reason1 so that it bears
 a likeness to folly4 ,hence they have a
 common effect1 since it is due to a    
defect in the reason that a man designs 
to hurt another inordinately4  ,reply   

,obj4 #d3 ,although strife sometimes    
arises from hatred1 it is not the proper
 effect thereof1 because when one man   
hates another it is beside his intention
 to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open  
manner1 since sometimes he seeks to hurt
 him secretly4 ,when1 however1 he sees  
himself prevailing1 he endeavors to harm
 him with strife and quarrel4 ,but to   
hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper   
effect of anger1 for the reason given   
above4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,strifes give  
rise to hatred and discord in the hearts
 of those who are guilty of strife1 and 
so he that studies1 i4e41 intends to sow
 discord among others1 causes them to   
quarrel among themselves4 ,even so any  
sin may command the act of another sin1 
by directing it to its own end4 ,this   
does not1 however1 prove that strife is 
the daughter of vainglory properly and  
directly4   ,,question #db  ,,of        
,,sedition 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider sedition1 under which 
head there are two points of inquiry3   

7#a7 ,whether it is a special sin8  7#b7
 ,whether it is a mortal sin8   ,,first 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,sedition ,is a ,special ,sin  
,distinct from ,other ,sins8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that sedition is not
 a special sin distinct from other sins4
 ,for1 according to ,isidore 7,etym4 x71
 a seditious man is one who sows dissent
 among minds1 and begets discord4 ,now1 
by provoking the commission of a sin1 a 
man sins by no other kind of sin than   
that which he provoked4 ,therefore it   
seems that sedition is not a special sin
 distinct from discord4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 sedition denotes a kind of    
division4 ,now schism takes its name    
from scission1 as stated above 7,q4 #ci1
 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore1 seemingly1 the sin
 of sedition is not distinct from that  
of schism4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every   
special sin that is distinct from other 
sins1 is either a capital vice1 or      
arises from some capital vice4 ,now     
sedition is reckoned neither among the  

capital vices1 nor among those vices    
which arise from them1 as appears from  
,moral4 xxxi1 #de1 where both kinds of  
vice are enumerated4 ,therefore sedition
 is not a special sin1 distinct from    
other sins4  ,on the contrary1          
,seditions are mentioned as distinct    
from other sins 7#b ,cor4 #ab3bj74  ,i  
answer that1 ,sedition is a special sin1
 having something in common with war and
 strife1 and differing somewhat from    
them4 ,it has something in common with  
them1 in so far as it implies a certain 
antagonism1 and it differs from them in 
two points4 ,first1 because war and     
strife denote actual aggression on      
either side1 whereas sedition may be    
said to denote either actual aggression1
 or the preparation for such aggression4
 ,hence a gloss on #b ,cor4 #ab3bj says 
that seditions are tumults tending to   
fight1 when1 to wit1 a number of people 
make preparations with the intention of 
fighting4 ,secondly1 they differ in that
 war is1 properly speaking1 carried on  

against external foes1 being as it were 
between one people and another1 whereas 
strife is between one individual and    
another1 or between few people on one   
side and few on the other side1 while   
sedition1 in its proper sense1 is       
between mutually dissentient parts of   
one people1 as when one part of the     
state rises in tumult against another   
part4 ,wherefore1 since sedition is     
opposed to a special kind of good1      
namely the unity and peace of a people1 
it is a special kind of sin4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,a seditious man is one who   
incites others to sedition1 and since   
sedition denotes a kind of discord1 it  
follows that a seditious man is one who 
creates discord1 not of any kind1 but   
between the parts of a multitude4 ,and  
the sin of sedition is not only in him  
who sows discord1 but also in those who 
dissent from one another inordinately4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sedition differs from 
schism in two respects4 ,first1 because 
schism is opposed to the spiritual unity

 of the multitude1 viz4 ecclesiastical  
unity1 whereas sedition is contrary to  
the temporal or secular unity of the    
multitude1 for instance of a city or    
kingdom4 ,secondly1 schism does not     
imply any preparation for a material    
fight as sedition does1 but only for a  
spiritual dissent4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,sedition1 like schism1 is contained    
under discord1 since each is a kind of  
discord1 not between individuals1 but   
between the parts of a multitude4       
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,sedition ,is ,always
 a ,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem that sedition is not always a
 mortal sin4 ,for sedition denotes a    
tumult tending to fight1 according to   
the gloss quoted above 7,a4 #a74 ,but   
fighting is not always a mortal sin1    
indeed it is sometimes just and lawful1 
as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a74 ,much
 more1 therefore1 can sedition be       
without a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 sedition is a kind of discord1

 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,now  
discord can be without mortal sin1 and  
sometimes without any sin at all4       
,therefore sedition can be also4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 it is praiseworthy to     
deliver a multitude from a tyrannical   
rule4 ,yet this cannot easily be done   
without some dissension in the          
multitude1 if one part of the multitude 
seeks to retain the tyrant1 while the   
rest strive to dethrone him4 ,therefore 
there can be sedition without mortal    
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle   
forbids seditions together with other   
things that are mortal sins 7#b ,cor4   
#ab3bj74  ,i answer that1 ,as stated    
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b71 sedition is      
contrary to the unity of the multitude1 
viz4 the people of a city or kingdom4   
,now ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ii1
 #ba7 that wise men understand the word 
people to designate not any crowd of    
persons1 but the assembly of those who  
are united together in fellowship       
recognized by law and for the common    

good4 ,wherefore it is evident that the 
unity to which sedition is opposed is   
the unity of law and common good3 whence
 it follows manifestly that sedition is 
opposed to justice and the common good4 
,therefore by reason of its genus it is 
a mortal sin1 and its gravity will be   
all the greater according as the common 
good which it assails surpasses the     
private good which is assailed by       
strife4  ,accordingly the sin of        
sedition is first and chiefly in its    
authors1 who sin most grievously2 and   
secondly it is in those who are led by  
them to disturb the common good4 ,those1
 however1 who defend the common good1   
and withstand the seditious party1 are  
not themselves seditious1 even as       
neither is a man to be called           
quarrelsome because he defends himself1 
as stated above 7,q4 #da1 ,a4 #a74      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is lawful to fight1
 provided it be for the common good1 as 
stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a74 ,but    
sedition runs counter to the common good

 of the multitude1 so that it is always 
a mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,discord
 from what is not evidently good1 may be
 without sin1 but discord from what is  
evidently good1 cannot be without sin3  
and sedition is discord of this kind1   
for it is contrary to the unity of the  
multitude1 which is a manifest good4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a tyrannical          
government is not just1 because it is   
directed1 not to the common good1 but to
 the private good of the ruler1 as the  
,philosopher states 7,polit4 iii1 #e2   
,ethic4 viii1 #aj74 ,consequently there 
is no sedition in disturbing a          
government of this kind1 unless indeed  
the tyrant's rule be disturbed so       
inordinately1 that his subjects suffer  
greater harm from the consequent        
disturbance than from the tyrant's      
government4 ,indeed it is the tyrant    
rather that is guilty of sedition1 since
 he encourages discord and sedition     
among his subjects1 that he may lord    
over them more securely2 for this is    

tyranny1 being conducive to the private 
good of the ruler1 and to the injury of 
the multitude4   ,,question #dc  ,,of   
,,scandal 7,in ,eight ,articles7  ,it   
remains for us to consider the vices    
which are opposed to beneficence1 among 
which some come under the head of       
injustice1 those1 to wit1 whereby one   
harms one's neighbor unjustly4 ,but     
scandal seems to be specially opposed to
 charity4 ,accordingly we must here     
consider scandal1 under which head there
 are eight points of inquiry3  7#a7     
,what is scandal8  7#b7 ,whether scandal
 is a sin8  7#c7 ,whether it is a       
special sin8  7#d7 ,whether it is a     
mortal sin8  7#e7 ,whether the perfect  
can be scandalized8  7#f7 ,whether they 
can give scandal8  7#g7 ,whether        
spiritual goods are to be foregone on   
account of scandal8  7#h7 ,whether      
temporal things are to be foregone on   
account of scandal8   ,,first ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,scandal ,is ,fittingly ,defined ,as    

,being ,something ,less ,rightly ,said  
or ,done ,that ,occasions ,spiritual    
,downfall8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that scandal is unfittingly defined
 as something less rightly said or done 
that occasions spiritual downfall4 ,for 
scandal is a sin as we shall state      
further on 7,a4 #b74 ,now1 according to 
,augustine 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #bg71 
a sin is a word1 deed1 or desire        
contrary to the law of ,god4 ,therefore 
the definition given above is           
insufficient1 since it omits thought or 
desire4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 since among
 virtuous or right acts one is more     
virtuous or more right than another1    
that one alone which has perfect        
rectitude would not seem to be a less   
right one4 ,if1 therefore1 scandal is   
something less rightly said or done1 it 
follows that every virtuous act except  
the best of all1 is a scandal4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 an occasion is an         
accidental cause4 ,but nothing          
accidental should enter a definition1   

because it does not specify the thing   
defined4 ,therefore it is unfitting1 in 
defining scandal1 to say that it is an  
occasion4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whatever 
a man does may be the occasion of       
another's spiritual downfall1 because   
accidental causes are indeterminate4    
,consequently1 if scandal is something  
that occasions another's spiritual      
downfall1 any deed or word can be a     
scandal3 and this seems unreasonable4   
,obj4 #e3 ,further1 a man occasions his 
neighbor's spiritual downfall when he   
offends or weakens him4 ,now scandal is 
condivided with offense and weakness1   
for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ad3ba73   
,it is good not to eat flesh1 and not to
 drink wine1 nor anything whereby thy   
brother is offended or scandalized1 or  
weakened4 ,therefore the aforesaid      
definition of scandal is unfitting4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,jerome in expounding    
,matt4 #ae3ab1 ,dost thou know that the 
,pharisees1 when they heard this word1  
etc4 says3 ,when we read ',whosoever    

shall scandalize1' the sense is         
',whosoever shall1 by deed or word1     
occasion another's spiritual downfall4' 
,i answer that1 ,as ,jerome observes the
 ,greek skandalon may be rendered       
offense1 downfall1 or a stumbling       
against something4 ,for when a body1    
while moving along a path1 meets with an
 obstacle1 it may happen to stumble     
against it1 and be disposed to fall     
down3 such an obstacle is a skandalon4  
,in like manner1 while going along the  
spiritual way1 a man may be disposed to 
a spiritual downfall by another's word  
or deed1 in so far1 to wit1 as one man  
by his injunction1 inducement or        
example1 moves another to sin2 and this 
is scandal properly so called4  ,now    
nothing by its very nature disposes a   
man to spiritual downfall1 except that  
which has some lack of rectitude1 since 
what is perfectly right1 secures man    
against a fall1 instead of conducing to 
his downfall4 ,scandal is1 therefore1   
fittingly defined as something less     

rightly done or said1 that occasions    
another's spiritual downfall4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,the thought or desire of evil
 lies hidden in the heart1 wherefore it 
does not suggest itself to another man  
as an obstacle conducing to his         
spiritual downfall3 hence it cannot come
 under the head of scandal4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,a thing is said to be less   
right1 not because something else       
surpasses it in rectitude1 but because  
it has some lack of rectitude1 either   
through being evil in itself1 such as   
sin1 or through having an appearance of 
evil4 ,thus1 for instance1 if a man were
 to sit at meat in the idol's temple 7#a
 ,cor4 #h3aj71 though this is not sinful
 in itself1 provided it be done with no 
evil intention1 yet1 since it has a     
certain appearance of evil1 and a       
semblance of worshipping the idol1 it   
might occasion another man's spiritual  
downfall4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7#a  
,thess4 #e3bb73 ,from all appearance of 
evil refrain yourselves4 ,scandal is    

therefore fittingly described as        
something done less rightly1 so as to   
comprise both whatever is sinful in     
itself1 and all that has an appearance  
of evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated   
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ge1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c2  
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hj1 ,a4 #a71 nothing can  
be a sufficient cause of a man's        
spiritual downfall1 which is sin1 save  
his own will4 ,wherefore another man's  
words or deeds can only be an imperfect 
cause1 conducing somewhat to that       
downfall4 ,for this reason scandal is   
said to afford not a cause1 but an      
occasion1 which is an imperfect1 and not
 always an accidental cause4 ,nor is    
there any reason why certain definitions
 should not make mention of things that 
are accidental1 since what is accidental
 to one1 may be proper to something     
else3 thus the accidental cause is      
mentioned in the definition of chance   
7,phys4 ii1 #e74  ,reply ,obj4 #d3      
,another's words or deed may be the     
cause of another's sin in two ways1     

directly and accidentally4 ,directly1   
when a man either intends1 by his evil  
word or deed1 to lead another man into  
sin1 or1 if he does not so intend1 when 
his deed is of such a nature as to lead 
another into sin3 for instance1 when a  
man publicly commits a sin or does      
something that has an appearance of sin4
 ,in this case he that does such an act 
does1 properly speaking1 afford an      
occasion of another's spiritual         
downfall1 wherefore his act is called   
active scandal4 ,one man's word or deed 
is the accidental cause of another's    
sin1 when he neither intends to lead him
 into sin1 nor does what is of a nature 
to lead him into sin1 and yet this other
 one1 through being ill-disposed1 is led
 into sin1 for instance1 into envy of   
another's good1 and then he who does    
this righteous act1 does not1 so far as 
he is concerned1 afford an occasion of  
the other's downfall1 but it is this    
other one who takes the occasion        
according to ,rom4 #g3h3 ,sin taking    

occasion by the commandment wrought in  
me all manner of concupiscence4         
,wherefore this is passive1 without     
active scandal1 since he that acts      
rightly does not1 for his own part1     
afford the occasion of the other's      
downfall4 ,sometimes therefore it       
happens that there is active scandal in 
the one together with passive scandal in
 the other1 as when one commits a sin   
being induced thereto by another2       
sometimes there is active without       
passive scandal1 for instance when one1 
by word or deed1 provokes another to    
sin1 and the latter does not consent2   
and sometimes there is passive without  
active scandal1 as we have already said4
  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,weakness denotes    
proneness to scandal2 while offense     
signifies resentment against the person 
who commits a sin1 which resentment may 
be sometimes without spiritual downfall2
 and scandal is the stumbling that      
results in downfall4   ,,second         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #b  

,whether ,scandal ,is a ,sin8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
scandal is not a sin4 ,for sins do not  
occur from necessity1 since all sin is  
voluntary1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #gd1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,now it is written 
7,matt4 #ah3g73 ,it must needs be that  
scandals come4 ,therefore scandal is not
 a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no sin     
arises from a sense of dutifulness1     
because a good tree cannot bring forth  
evil fruit 7,matt4 #g3ah74 ,but scandal 
may come from a sense of dutifulness1   
for ,our ,lord said to ,peter 7,matt4   
#af3bc73 ,thou art a scandal unto ,me1  
in reference to which words ,jerome says
 that the ,apostle's error was due to   
his sense of dutifulness1 and such is   
never inspired by the devil4 ,therefore 
scandal is not always a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 scandal denotes a stumbling4  
,but he that stumbles does not always   
fall4 ,therefore scandal1 which is a    
spiritual fall1 can be without sin4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,scandal is something    

less rightly said or done4 ,now anything
 that lacks rectitude is a sin4         
,therefore scandal is always with sin4  
,i answer that1 ,as already said 7,a4   
#a1 ad #d71 scandal is of two kinds1    
passive scandal in the person           
scandalized1 and active scandal in the  
person who gives scandal1 and so        
occasions a spiritual downfall4         
,accordingly passive scandal is always a
 sin in the person scandalized2 for he  
is not scandalized except in so far as  
he succumbs to a spiritual downfall1 and
 that is a sin4  ,yet there can be      
passive scandal1 without sin on the part
 of the person whose action has         
occasioned the scandal1 as for instance1
 when a person is scandalized at        
another's good deed4 ,in like manner    
active scandal is always a sin in the   
person who gives scandal1 since either  
what he does is a sin1 or if it only    
have the appearance of sin1 it should   
always be left undone out of that love  
for our neighbor which binds each one to

 be solicitous for his neighbor's       
spiritual welfare2 so that if he persist
 in doing it he acts against charity4   
,yet there can be active scandal without
 sin on the part of the person          
scandalized1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad
 #d74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words1   
,it must needs be that scandals come1   
are to be understood to convey1 not the 
absolute1 but the conditional necessity 
of scandal2 in which sense it is        
necessary that whatever ,god foresees or
 foretells must happen1 provided it be  
taken conjointly with such              
foreknowledge1 as explained in the      
,first ,part 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ac1 ad #c2  
,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #f1 ad #b74  ,or we may say
 that the necessity of scandals         
occurring is a necessity of end1 because
 they are useful in order that they 4 4 
4 who are reproved may be made manifest 
7#a ,cor4 #aa3ai74  ,or scandals must   
needs occur1 seeing the condition of man
 who fails to shield himself from sin4  
,thus a physician on seeing a man       

partaking of unsuitable food might say  
that such a man must needs injure his   
health1 which is to be understood on the
 condition that he does not change his  
diet4 ,in like manner it must needs be  
that scandals come1 so long as men fail 
to change their evil mode of living4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in that passage       
scandal denotes any kind of hindrance3  
for ,peter wished to hinder ,our ,lord's
 ,passion out of a sense of dutifulness 
towards ,christ4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,no  
man stumbles spiritually1 without being 
kept back somewhat from advancing in    
,god's way1 and that is at least a      
venial sin4   ,,third ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,scandal ,is a ,special ,sin8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
scandal is not a special sin4 ,for      
scandal is something said or done less  
rightly4 ,but this applies to every kind
 of sin4 ,therefore every sin is a      
scandal1 and consequently1 scandal is   
not a special sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 

every special kind of sin1 or every     
special kind of injustice1 may be found 
separately from other kinds1 as stated  
in ,ethic4 v1 #c1 #e4 ,but scandal is   
not to be found separately from other   
sins4 ,therefore it is not a special    
kind of sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every 
special sin is constituted by something 
which specifies the moral act4 ,but the 
notion of scandal consists in its being 
something done in the presence of       
others3 and the fact of a sin being     
committed openly1 though it is an       
aggravating circumstance1 does not seem 
to constitute the species of a sin4     
,therefore scandal is not a special sin4
  ,on the contrary1 ,a special virtue   
has a special sin opposed to it4 ,but   
scandal is opposed to a special virtue1 
viz4 charity4 ,for it is written 7,rom4 
#ad3ae73 ,if1 because of thy meat1 thy  
brother be grieved1 thou walkest not now
 according to charity4 ,therefore       
scandal is a special sin4  ,i answer    
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 scandal

 is twofold1 active and passive4        
,passive scandal cannot be a special    
sin1 because through another's word or  
deed a man may fall into any kind of    
sin3 and the fact that a man takes      
occasion to sin from another's word or  
deed1 does not constitute a special kind
 of sin1 because it does not imply a    
special deformity in opposition to a    
special virtue4  ,on the other hand1    
active scandal may be understood in two 
ways1 directly and accidentally4 ,the   
scandal is accidental when it is beside 
the agent's intention1 as when a man    
does not intend1 by his inordinate deed 
or word1 to occasion another's spiritual
 downfall1 but merely to satisfy his own
 will4 ,in such a case even active      
scandal is not a special sin1 because a 
species is not constituted by that which
 is accidental4  ,active scandal is     
direct when a man intends1 by his       
inordinate word or deed1 to draw another
 into sin1 and then it becomes a special
 kind of sin on account of the intention

 of a special kind of end1 because moral
 actions take their species from their  
end1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1  
,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f74 ,hence1 
just as theft and murder are special    
kinds of sin1 on account of their       
denoting the intention of doing a       
special injury to one's neighbor3 so    
too1 scandal is a special kind of sin1  
because thereby a man intends a special 
harm to his neighbor1 and it is directly
 opposed to fraternal correction1       
whereby a man intends the removal of a  
special kind of harm4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,any sin may be the matter of active    
scandal1 but it may derive the formal   
aspect of a special sin from the end    
intended1 as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,active scandal can be found       
separate from other sins1 as when a man 
scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which
 is not a sin in itself1 but has an     
appearance of evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,scandal does not derive the species of 
a special sin from the circumstance in  

question1 but from the intention of the 
end1 as stated above4   ,,fourth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,scandal ,is a ,mortal ,sin8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
scandal is a mortal sin4 ,for every sin 
that is contrary to charity is a mortal 
sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #ab2 
,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #c74 ,but scandal is       
contrary to charity1 as stated above    
7,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,therefore scandal is a 
mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no sin1
 save mortal sin1 deserves the          
punishment of eternal damnation4 ,but   
scandal deserves the punishment of      
eternal damnation1 according to ,matt4  
#ah3f3 ,he that shall scandalize one of 
these little ones1 that believe in ,me1 
it were better for him that a mill-stone
 should be hanged about his neck1 and   
that he should be drowned in the depth  
of the sea4 ,for1 as ,jerome says on    
this passage1 it is much better to      
receive a brief punishment for a fault1 
than to await everlasting torments4     

,therefore scandal is a mortal sin4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every sin committed 
against ,god is a mortal sin1 because   
mortal sin alone turns man away from    
,god4 ,now scandal is a sin against     
,god1 for the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4   
#h3ab73 ,when you wound the weak        
conscience of the brethren 99,vulg43    
',when you sin thus against the brethren
 and wound their weak conscience'1 you  
sin against ,christ4 ,therefore scandal 
is always a mortal sin4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it may be a venial sin to    
lead a person into venial sin3 and yet  
this would be to give scandal4          
,therefore scandal may be a venial sin4 
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4   
#a71 scandal denotes a stumbling whereby
 a person is disposed to a spiritual    
downfall4 ,consequently passive scandal 
may sometimes be a venial sin1 when it  
consists in a stumbling and nothing     
more2 for instance1 when a person is    
disturbed by a movement of venial sin   
occasioned by another's inordinate word 

or deed3 while sometimes it is a mortal 
sin1 when the stumbling results in a    
downfall1 for instance1 when a person   
goes so far as to commit a mortal sin   
through another's inordinate word or    
deed4  ,active scandal1 if it be        
accidental1 may sometimes be a venial   
sin2 for instance1 when1 through a      
slight indiscretion1 a person either    
commits a venial sin1 or does something 
that is not a sin in itself1 but has    
some appearance of evil4 ,on the other  
hand1 it is sometimes a mortal sin1     
either because a person commits a mortal
 sin1 or because he has such contempt   
for his neighbor's spiritual welfare    
that he declines1 for the sake of       
procuring it1 to forego doing what he   
wishes to do4 ,but in the case of active
 direct scandal1 as when a person       
intends to lead another into sin1 if he 
intends to lead him into mortal sin1 his
 own sin will be mortal2 and in like    
manner if he intends by committing a    
mortal sin himself1 to lead another into

 venial sin2 whereas if he intends1 by  
committing a venial sin1 to lead another
 into venial sin1 there will be a venial
 sin of scandal4  ,and this suffices for
 the ,replies to the ,objections4       
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1   
,art4 #e  ,whether ,passive ,scandal    
,may ,happen ,even to the ,perfect8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
passive scandal may happen even to the  
perfect4 ,for ,christ was supremely     
perfect3 and yet ,he said to ,peter     
7,matt4 #af3bc73 ,thou art a scandal to 
,me4 ,much more therefore can other     
perfect men suffer scandal4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 scandal denotes an obstacle   
which is put in a person's spiritual    
way4 ,now even perfect men can be       
hindered in their progress along the    
spiritual way1 according to #a ,thess4  
#b3ah3 ,we would have come to you1 ,i   
,paul indeed1 once and again2 but ,satan
 hath hindered us4 ,therefore even      
perfect men can suffer scandal4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 even perfect men are      

liable to venial sins1 according to #a  
,john #a3h3 ,if we say that we have no  
sin1 we deceive ourselves4 ,now passive 
scandal is not always a mortal sin1 but 
is sometimes venial1 as stated above    
7,a4 #d74 ,therefore passive scandal may
 be found in perfect men4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,jerome1 in commenting on     
,matt4 #ah3f1 ,he that shall scandalize 
one of these little ones1 says3 ,observe
 that it is the little one that is      
scandalized1 for the elders do not take 
scandal4  ,i answer that1 ,passive      
scandal implies that the mind of the    
person who takes scandal is unsettled in
 its adherence to good4 ,now no man can 
be unsettled1 who adheres firmly to     
something immovable4 ,the elders1 i4e4  
the perfect1 adhere to ,god alone1      
,whose goodness is unchangeable1 for    
though they adhere to their superiors1  
they do so only in so far as these      
adhere to ,christ1 according to #a ,cor4
 #d3af3 ,be ye followers of me1 as ,i   
also am of ,christ4 ,wherefore1 however 

much others may appear to them to       
conduct themselves ill in word or deed1 
they themselves do not stray from their 
righteousness1 according to ,ps4 #abd3a3
 ,they that trust in the ,lord shall be 
as ,mount ,sion3 he shall not be moved  
for ever that dwelleth in ,jerusalem4   
,therefore scandal is not found in those
 who adhere to ,god perfectly by love1  
according to ,ps4 #aah3afe3 ,much peace 
have they that love ,thy law1 and to    
them there is no stumbling-block        
7scandalum74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as      
stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #b71 in this   
passage1 scandal is used in a broad     
sense1 to denote any kind of hindrance4 
,hence ,our ,lord said to ,peter3 ,thou 
art a scandal to ,me1 because he was    
endeavoring to weaken ,our ,lord's      
purpose of undergoing ,his ,passion4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,perfect men may be    
hindered in the performance of external 
actions4 ,but they are not hindered by  
the words or deeds of others1 from      
tending to ,god in the internal acts of 

the will1 according to ,rom4 #h3ch1 #ci3
 ,neither death1 nor life 4 4 4 shall be
 able to separate us from the love of   
,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,perfect men    
sometimes fall into venial sins through 
the weakness of the flesh2 but they are 
not scandalized 7taking scandal in its  
true sense71 by the words or deeds of   
others1 although there can be an        
approach to scandal in them1 according  
to ,ps4 #gb3b3 ,my feet were almost     
moved4   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,active     
,scandal ,can ,be ,found in the         
,perfect8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that active scandal can be found in the
 perfect4 ,for passion is the effect of 
action4 ,now some are scandalized       
passively by the words or deeds of the  
perfect1 according to ,matt4 #ae3ab3    
,dost thou know that the ,pharisees1    
when they heard this word1 were         
scandalized8 ,therefore active scandal  
can be found in the perfect4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 ,peter1 after receiving the   

,holy ,ghost1 was in the state of the   
perfect4 ,yet afterwards he scandalized 
the gentiles3 for it is written 7,gal4  
#b3ad73 ,when ,i saw that they walked   
not uprightly unto the truth of the     
,gospel1 ,i said to ,cephas1 i4e4       
,peter1 before them all3 ,if thou being 
a ,jew1 livest after the manner of the  
gentiles1 and not as the ,jews do1 how  
dost thou compel the gentiles to live as
 do the ,jews8 ,therefore active scandal
 can be in the perfect4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 active scandal is sometimes a 
venial sin4 ,but venial sins may be in  
perfect men4 ,therefore active scandal  
may be in perfect men4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,active scandal is more       
opposed to perfection1 than passive     
scandal4 ,but passive scandal cannot be 
in the perfect4 ,much less1 therefore1  
can active scandal be in them4  ,i      
answer that1 ,active scandal1 properly  
so called1 occurs when a man says or    
does a thing which in itself is of a    
nature to occasion another's spiritual  

downfall1 and that is only when what he 
says or does is inordinate4 ,now it     
belongs to the perfect to direct all    
their actions according to the rule of  
reason1 as stated in #a ,cor4 #ad3dj3   
,let all things be done decently and    
according to order2 and they are careful
 to do this in those matters chiefly    
wherein not only would they do wrong1   
but would also be to others an occasion 
of wrongdoing4 ,and if indeed they fail 
in this moderation in such words or     
deeds as come to the knowledge of       
others1 this has its origin in human    
weakness wherein they fall short of     
perfection4 ,yet they do not fall short 
so far as to stray far from the order of
 reason1 but only a little and in some  
slight matter3 and this is not so grave 
that anyone can reasonably take         
therefrom an occasion for committing    
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,passive scandal 
is always due to some active scandal2   
yet this active scandal is not always in
 another1 but in the very person who is 

scandalized1 because1 to wit1 he        
scandalizes himself4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,in the opinion of ,augustine 7,ep4     
xxviii1 xl1 lxxxii7 and of ,paul also1  
,peter sinned and was to be blamed1 in  
withdrawing from the gentiles in order  
to avoid the scandal of the ,jews1      
because he did this somewhat            
imprudently1 so that the gentiles who   
had been converted to the faith were    
scandalized4 ,nevertheless ,peter's     
action was not so grave a sin as to give
 others sufficient ground for scandal4  
,hence they were guilty of passive      
scandal1 while there was no active      
scandal in ,peter4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,the venial sins of the perfect consist 
chiefly in sudden movements1 which being
 hidden cannot give scandal4 ,if1       
however1 they commit any venial sins    
even in their external words or deeds1  
these are so slight as to be            
insufficient in themselves to give      
scandal4   ,,seventh ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  

,spiritual ,goods ,should ,be ,foregone 
on ,account of ,scandal8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that spiritual goods    
ought to be foregone on account of      
scandal4 ,for ,augustine 7,contra ,ep4  
,parmen4 iii1 #b7 teaches that          
punishment for sin should cease1 when   
the peril of schism is feared4 ,but     
punishment of sins is a spiritual good1 
since it is an act of justice4          
,therefore a spiritual good is to be    
foregone on account of scandal4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 the ,sacred ,doctrine is a
 most spiritual thing4 ,yet one ought to
 desist therefrom on account of scandal1
 according to ,matt4 #g3f3 ,give not    
that which is holy to dogs1 neither cast
 ye your pearls before swine lest 4 4 4 
turning upon you1 they tear you4        
,therefore a spiritual good should be   
foregone on account of scandal4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 since fraternal correction
 is an act of charity1 it is a spiritual
 good4 ,yet sometimes it is omitted out 
of charity1 in order to avoid giving    

scandal to others1 as ,augustine        
observes 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i1 #i74        
,therefore a spiritual good should be   
foregone on account of scandal4  ,obj4  
#d3 ,further1 ,jerome 99,hugh de ,s4    
,cher41 ,in ,matth4 xviii2 in ,luc4     
xvii1 #b says that in order to avoid    
scandal we should forego whatever it is 
possible to omit without prejudice to   
the threefold truth1 i4e4 the truth of  
life1 of justice and of doctrine4 ,now  
the observance of the counsels1 and the 
bestowal of alms may often be omitted   
without prejudice to the aforesaid      
threefold truth1 else whoever omitted   
them would always be guilty of sin1 and 
yet such things are the greatest of     
spiritual works4 ,therefore spiritual   
works should be omitted on account of   
scandal4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the       
avoidance of any sin is a spiritual     
good1 since any sin brings spiritual    
harm to the sinner4 ,now it seems that  
one ought sometimes to commit a venial  
sin in order to avoid scandalizing one's

 neighbor1 for instance1 when by sinning
 venially1 one would prevent someone    
else from committing a mortal sin3      
because one is bound to hinder the      
damnation of one's neighbor as much as  
one can without prejudice to one's own  
salvation1 which is not precluded by a  
venial sin4 ,therefore one ought to     
forego a spiritual good in order to     
avoid scandal4  ,on the contrary1       
,gregory says 7,hom4 ,super ,ezech4     
vii73 ,if people are scandalized at the 
truth1 it is better to allow the birth  
of scandal1 than to abandon the truth4  
,now spiritual goods belong1 above all  
others1 to the truth4 ,therefore        
spiritual goods are not to be foregone  
on account of scandal4  ,i answer that1 
,whereas scandal is twofold1 active and 
passive1 the present question does not  
apply to active scandal1 for since      
active scandal is something said or done
 less rightly1 nothing ought to be done 
that implies active scandal4 ,the       
question does1 however1 apply to passive

 scandal1 and accordingly we have to see
 what ought to be foregone in order to  
avoid scandal4 ,now a distinction must  
be made in spiritual goods4 ,for some of
 them are necessary for salvation1 and  
cannot be foregone without mortal sin3  
and it is evident that no man ought to  
commit a mortal sin1 in order to prevent
 another from sinning1 because according
 to the order of charity1 a man ought to
 love his own spiritual welfare more    
than another's4 ,therefore one ought not
 to forego that which is necessary for  
salvation1 in order to avoid giving     
scandal4  ,again a distinction seems    
necessary among spiritual things which  
are not necessary for salvation3 because
 the scandal which arises from such     
things sometimes proceeds from malice1  
for instance when a man wishes to hinder
 those spiritual goods by stirring up   
scandal4 ,this is the scandal of the    
,pharisees1 who were scandalized at ,our
 ,lord's teaching3 and ,our ,lord       
teaches 7,matt4 #ae3ad7 that we ought to

 treat such like scandal with contempt4 
,sometimes scandal proceeds from        
weakness or ignorance1 and such is the  
scandal of little ones4 ,in order to    
avoid this kind of scandal1 spiritual   
goods ought to be either concealed1 or  
sometimes even deferred 7if this can be 
done without incurring immediate        
danger71 until the matter being         
explained the scandal cease4 ,if1       
however1 the scandal continue after the 
matter has been explained1 it would seem
 to be due to malice1 and then it would 
no longer be right to forego that       
spiritual good in order to avoid such   
like scandal4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the 
infliction of punishment it is not the  
punishment itself that is the end in    
view1 but its medicinal properties in   
checking sin2 wherefore punishment      
partakes of the nature of justice1 in so
 far as it checks sin4 ,but if it is    
evident that the infliction of          
punishment will result in more numerous 
and more grievous sins being committed1 

the infliction of punishment will no    
longer be a part of justice4 ,it is in  
this sense that ,augustine is speaking1 
when1 to wit1 the excommunication of a  
few threatens to bring about the danger 
of a schism1 for in that case it would  
be contrary to the truth of justice to  
pronounce excommunication4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,with regard to a man's doctrine   
two points must be considered1 namely1  
the truth which is taught1 and the act  
of teaching4 ,the first of these is     
necessary for salvation1 to wit1 that he
 whose duty it is to teach should not   
teach what is contrary to the truth1 and
 that he should teach the truth         
according to the requirements of times  
and persons3 wherefore on no account    
ought he to suppress the truth and teach
 error in order to avoid any scandal    
that might ensue4 ,but the act itself of
 teaching is one of the spiritual       
almsdeeds1 as stated above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4
 #b71 and so the same is to be said of  
it as of the other works of mercy1 of   

which we shall speak further on 7ad #d74
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4
 #cc1 ,a4 #a71 fraternal correction aims
 at the correction of a brother1        
wherefore it is to be reckoned among    
spiritual goods in so far as this end   
can be obtained1 which is not the case  
if the brother be scandalized through   
being corrected4 ,and so1 if the        
correction be omitted in order to avoid 
scandal1 no spiritual good is foregone4 
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the truth of life1 of 
doctrine1 and of justice comprises not  
only whatever is necessary for          
salvation1 but also whatever is a means 
of obtaining salvation more perfectly1  
according to #a ,cor4 #ab3ca3 ,be       
zealous for the better gifts4 ,wherefore
 neither the counsels nor even the works
 of mercy are to be altogether omitted  
in order to avoid scandal2 but sometimes
 they should be concealed or deferred1  
on account of the scandal of the little 
ones1 as stated above4 ,sometimes1      
however1 the observance of the counsels 

and the fulfilment of the works of mercy
 are necessary for salvation4 ,this may 
be seen in the case of those who have   
vowed to keep the counsels1 and of those
 whose duty it is to relieve the wants  
of others1 either in temporal matters   
7as by feeding the hungry71 or in       
spiritual matters 7as by instructing the
 ignorant71 whether such duties arise   
from their being enjoined as in the case
 of prelates1 or from the need on the   
part of the person in want2 and then the
 same applies to these things as to     
others that are necessary for salvation4
  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,some have said that 
one ought to commit a venial sin in     
order to avoid scandal4 ,but this       
implies a contradiction1 since if it    
ought to be done1 it is no longer evil  
or sinful1 for a sin cannot be a matter 
of choice4 ,it may happen however that1 
on account of some circumstance1        
something is not a venial sin1 though it
 would be were it not for that          
circumstance3 thus an idle word is a    

venial sin1 when it is uttered          
uselessly2 yet if it be uttered for a   
reasonable cause1 it is neither idle nor
 sinful4 ,and though venial sin does not
 deprive a man of grace which is his    
means of salvation1 yet1 in so far as it
 disposes him to mortal sin1 it tends to
 the loss of salvation4   ,,eighth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #h  
,whether ,temporal ,goods ,should ,be   
,foregone on ,account of ,scandal8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
temporal goods should be foregone on    
account of scandal4 ,for we ought to    
love our neighbor's spiritual welfare   
which is hindered by scandal1 more than 
any temporal goods whatever4 ,but we    
forego what we love less for the sake of
 what we love more4 ,therefore we should
 forego temporal goods in order to avoid
 scandalizing our neighbor4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 according to ,jerome's rule   
99,cf4 ,a4 #g1 ,obj4 #d1 whatever can be
 foregone without prejudice to the      
threefold truth1 should be omitted in   

order to avoid scandal4 ,now temporal   
goods can be foregone without prejudice 
to the threefold truth4 ,therefore they 
should be foregone in order to avoid    
scandal4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no        
temporal good is more necessary than    
food4 ,but we ought to forego taking    
food on account of scandal1 according to
 ,rom4 #ad3ae3 ,destroy not him with thy
 meat for whom ,christ died4 ,much more 
therefore should all other temporal     
goods be foregone on account of scandal4
  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the most fitting  
way of safeguarding and recovering      
temporal goods is the court of justice4 
,but it is unlawful to have recourse to 
justice1 especially if scandal ensues3  
for it is written 7,matt4 #e3dj73 ,if a 
man will contend with thee in judgment1 
and take away thy coat1 let go thy cloak
 also unto him2 and 7#a ,cor4 #f3g73    
,already indeed there is plainly a fault
 among you1 that you have lawsuits one  
with another4 ,why do you not rather    
take wrong8 why do you not rather suffer

 yourselves to be defrauded8 ,therefore 
it seems that we ought to forego        
temporal goods on account of scandal4   
,obj4 #e3 ,further1 we ought1 seemingly1
 to forego least of all those temporal  
goods which are connected with spiritual
 goods3 and yet we ought to forego them 
on account of scandal4 ,for the ,apostle
 while sowing spiritual things did not  
accept a temporal stipend lest he should
 give any hindrance to the ,gospel of   
,christ as we read #a ,cor4 #i3ab4 ,for 
a like reason the ,church does not      
demand tithes in certain countries1 in  
order to avoid scandal4 ,much more1     
therefore1 ought we to forego other     
temporal goods in order to avoid        
scandal4  ,on the contrary1 ,blessed    
,thomas of ,canterbury demanded the     
restitution of ,church property1        
notwithstanding that the king took      
scandal from his doing so4  ,i answer   
that1 ,a distinction must be made in    
temporal goods3 for either they are     
ours1 or they are consigned to us to    

take care of them for someone else2 thus
 the goods of the ,church are consigned 
to prelates1 and the goods of the       
community are entrusted to all such     
persons as have authority over the      
common weal4 ,in this latter case the   
care of such things 7as of things held  
in deposit7 devolves of necessity on    
those persons to whom they are          
entrusted1 wherefore1 even as other     
things that are necessary for salvation1
 they are not to be foregone on account 
of scandal4 ,on the other hand1 as      
regards those temporalities of which we 
have the dominion1 sometimes1 on account
 of scandal1 we are bound to forego     
them1 and sometimes we are not so bound1
 whether we forego them by giving them  
up1 if we have them in our possession1  
or by omitting to claim them1 if they   
are in the possession of others4 ,for if
 the scandal arise therefrom through the
 ignorance or weakness of others 7in    
which case1 as stated above1 ,a4 #g1 it 
is scandal of the little ones7 we must  

either forego such temporalities        
altogether1 or the scandal must be      
abated by some other means1 namely1 by  
some kind of admonition4 ,hence         
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte i1 #bj73 ,thou shouldst give so  
as to injure neither thyself nor        
another1 as much as thou canst lend1 and
 if thou refusest what is asked1 thou   
must yet be just to him1 indeed thou    
wilt give him something better than he  
asks1 if thou reprove him that asks     
unjustly4 ,sometimes1 however1 scandal  
arises from malice4 ,this is scandal of 
the ,pharisees3 and we ought not to     
forego temporal goods for the sake of   
those who stir up scandals of this kind1
 for this would both be harmful to the  
common good1 since it would give wicked 
men an opportunity of plunder1 and would
 be injurious to the plunderers         
themselves1 who would remain in sin as  
long as they were in possession of      
another's property4 ,hence ,gregory says
 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ac73 ,sometimes we     

ought to suffer those who rob us of our 
temporalities1 while sometimes we should
 resist them1 as far as equity allows1  
in the hope not only that we may        
safeguard our property1 but also lest   
those who take what is not theirs may   
lose themselves4  ,this suffices for the
 ,reply to the ,first ,objection4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if it were permissible
 for wicked men to rob other people of  
their property1 this would tend to the  
detriment of the truth of life and      
justice4 ,therefore we are not always   
bound to forego our temporal goods in   
order to avoid scandal4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,the ,apostle had no intention of   
counselling total abstinence from food  
on account of scandal1 because our      
welfare requires that we should take    
food3 but he intended to counsel        
abstinence from a particular kind of    
food1 in order to avoid scandal1        
according to #a ,cor4 #h3ac3 ,i will    
never eat flesh1 lest ,i should         
scandalize my brother4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3

 ,according to ,augustine 7,de ,serm4   
,dom4 in ,monte i1 #ai7 this precept of 
,our ,lord is to be understood of the   
preparedness of the mind1 namely1 that  
man should be prepared1 if it be        
expedient1 to suffer being harmed or    
defrauded1 rather than go to law4 ,but  
sometimes it is not expedient1 as stated
 above 7ad #b74 ,the same applies to the
 saying of the ,apostle4  ,reply ,obj4  
#e3 ,the scandal which the ,apostle     
avoided1 arose from an error of the     
gentiles who were not used to this      
payment4 ,hence it behooved him to      
forego it for the time being1 so that   
they might be taught first of all that  
such a payment was a duty4 ,for a like  
reason the ,church refrains from        
demanding tithes in those countries     
where it is not customary to pay them4  
,,question #dd  ,,of ,,the ,,precepts   
,,of ,,charity 7,in ,eight ,articles7   
,we must now consider the ,precepts of  
,charity1 under which there are eight   
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       

precepts should be given about charity8 
7#b7 ,whether there should be one or    
two8  7#c7 ,whether two suffice8  7#d7  
,whether it is fittingly prescribed that
 we should love ,god1 with thy whole    
heart8  7#e7 ,whether it is fittingly   
added3 ,with thy whole mind1 etc48  7#f7
 ,whether it is possible to fulfil this 
precept in this life8  7#g7 ,of the     
precept3 ,thou shalt love thy neighbor  
as thyself2  7#h7 ,whether the order of 
charity is included in the precept8     
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,any ,precept ,should
 ,be ,given ,about ,charity8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that no precept     
should be given about charity4 ,for     
charity imposes the mode on all acts of 
virtue1 since it is the form of the     
virtues as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4   
#h71 while the precepts are about the   
virtues themselves4 ,now1 according to  
the common saying1 the mode is not      
included in the precept4 ,therefore no  
precepts should be given about charity4 

,obj4 #b3 ,further1 charity1 which is   
poured forth in our hearts by the ,holy 
,ghost 7,rom4 #e3e71 makes us free1     
since where the ,spirit of the ,lord is1
 there is liberty 7#b ,cor4 #c3ag74 ,now
 the obligation that arises from a      
precept is opposed to liberty1 since it 
imposes a necessity4 ,therefore no      
precept should be given about charity4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity is the      
foremost among all the virtues1 to which
 the precepts are directed1 as shown    
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4    
#ajj1 ,a4 #i74 ,if1 therefore1 any      
precepts were given about charity1 they 
should have a place among the chief     
precepts which are those of the         
decalogue4 ,but they have no place      
there4 ,therefore no precepts should be 
given about charity4  ,on the contrary1 
,whatever ,god requires of us is        
included in a precept4 ,now ,god        
requires that man should love ,him1     
according to ,deut4 #aj3ab4 ,therefore  
it behooved precepts to be given about  

the love of charity1 which is the love  
of ,god4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated    
above 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#ii1 ,a4 #a71 a precept implies the     
notion of something due4 ,hence a thing 
is a matter of precept1 in so far as it 
is something due4 ,now a thing is due in
 two ways1 for its own sake1 and for the
 sake of something else4 ,in every      
affair1 it is the end that is due for   
its own sake1 because it has the        
character of a good for its own sake3   
while that which is directed to the end 
is due for the sake of something else3  
thus for a physician1 it is due for its 
own sake1 that he should heal1 while it 
is due for the sake of something else   
that he should give a medicine in order 
to heal4 ,now the end of the spiritual  
life is that man be united to ,god1 and 
this union is effected by charity1 while
 all things pertaining to the spiritual 
life are ordained to this union1 as to  
their end4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7#a 
,tim4 #a3e73 ,the end of the commandment

 is charity from a pure heart1 and a    
good conscience1 and an unfeigned faith4
 ,for all the virtues1 about whose acts 
the precepts are given1 are directed    
either to the freeing of the heart from 
the whirl of the passions--such are the 
virtues that regulate the passions--or  
at least to the possession of a good    
conscience--such are the virtues that   
regulate operations--or to the having of
 a right faith--such are those which    
pertain to the worship of ,god3 and     
these three things are required of man  
that he may love ,god4 ,for an impure   
heart is withdrawn from loving ,god1 on 
account of the passion that inclines it 
to earthly things2 an evil conscience   
gives man a horror for ,god's justice1  
through fear of ,his punishments2 and an
 untrue faith draws man's affections to 
an untrue representation of ,god1 and   
separates him from the truth of ,god4   
,now in every genus that which is for   
its own sake takes precedence of that   
which is for the sake of another1       

wherefore the greatest precept is that  
of charity1 as stated in ,matt4 #bb3ci4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above       
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,a4 #aj7 when we    
were treating of the commandments1 the  
mode of love does not come under those  
precepts which are about the other acts 
of virtue3 for instance1 this precept1  
,honor thy father and thy mother1 does  
not prescribe that this should be done  
out of charity4 ,the act of love does1  
however1 fall under special precepts4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the obligation of a   
precept is not opposed to liberty1      
except in one whose mind is averted from
 that which is prescribed1 as may be    
seen in those who keep the precepts     
through fear alone4 ,but the precept of 
love cannot be fulfilled save of one's  
own will1 wherefore it is not opposed to
 charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all the    
precepts of the decalogue are directed  
to the love of ,god and of our neighbor3
 and therefore the precepts of charity  
had not to be enumerated among the      

precepts of the decalogue1 since they   
are included in all of them4   ,,second 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,there ,should ,have ,been     
,given ,two ,precepts of ,charity8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there
 should not have been given two precepts
 of charity4 ,for the precepts of the   
,law are directed to virtue1 as stated  
above 7,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #c74 ,now charity  
is one virtue1 as shown above 7,q4 #cc1 
,a4 #e74 ,therefore only one precept of 
charity should have been given4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 as ,augustine says 7,de   
,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bb1 #bg71 charity  
loves none but ,god in our neighbor4    
,now we are sufficiently directed to    
love ,god by the precept1 ,thou shalt   
love the ,lord thy ,god4 ,therefore     
there was no need to add the precept    
about loving our neighbor4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 different sins are opposed to 
different precepts4 ,but it is not a sin
 to put aside the love of our neighbor1 
provided we put not aside the love of   

,god2 indeed1 it is written 7,luke      
#ae3bf73 ,if any man come to ,me1 and   
hate not his father1 and mother 4 4 4 he
 cannot be ,my disciple4 ,therefore the 
precept of the love of ,god is not      
distinct from the precept of the love of
 our neighbor4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the 
,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3h73 ,he that   
loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the  
,law4 ,but a law is not fulfilled unless
 all its precepts be observed4          
,therefore all the precepts are included
 in the love of our neighbor3 and       
consequently the one precept of the love
 of our neighbor suffices4 ,therefore   
there should not be two precepts of     
charity4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is      
written 7#a ,john #d3ba73 ,this         
commandment we have from ,god1 that he  
who loveth ,god1 love also his brother4 
,i answer that1 ,as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #id1 ,a4 
#b7 when we were treating of the        
commandments1 the precepts are to the   
,law what propositions are to           

speculative sciences1 for in these      
latter1 the conclusions are virtually   
contained in the first principles4      
,hence whoever knows the principles as  
to their entire virtual extent has no   
need to have the conclusions put        
separately before him4 ,since1 however1 
some who know the principles are unable 
to consider all that is virtually       
contained therein1 it is necessary1 for 
their sake1 that scientific conclusions 
should be traced to their principles4   
,now in practical matters wherein the   
precepts of the ,law direct us1 the end 
has the character of principle1 as      
stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #g1 ad #b2   
,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a73 and the love of
 ,god is the end to which the love of   
our neighbor is directed4 ,therefore it 
behooved us to receive precepts not only
 of the love of ,god but also of the    
love of our neighbor1 on account of     
those who are less intelligent1 who do  
not easily understand that one of these 
precepts is included in the other4      

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although charity is   
one virtue1 yet it has two acts1 one of 
which is directed to the other as to its
 end4 ,now precepts are given about acts
 of virtue1 and so there had to be      
several precepts of charity4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,god is loved in our neighbor1
 as the end is loved in that which is   
directed to the end2 and yet there was  
need for an explicit precept about both1
 for the reason given above4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,the means derive their       
goodness from their relation to the end1
 and accordingly aversion from the means
 derives its malice from the same source
 and from no other4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3   
,love of our neighbor includes love of  
,god1 as the end is included in the     
means1 and vice versa3 and yet it       
behooved each precept to be given       
explicitly1 for the reason given above4 
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,two ,precepts of    
,charity ,suffice8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that two precepts of charity 

do not suffice4 ,for precepts are given 
about acts of virtue4 ,now acts are     
distinguished by their objects4 ,since1 
then1 man is bound to love four things  
out of charity1 namely1 ,god1 himself1  
his neighbor and his own body1 as shown 
above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #ab2 ,q4 #bf71 it   
seems that there ought to be four       
precepts of charity1 so that two are not
 sufficient4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 love  
is not the only act of charity1 but also
 joy1 peace and beneficence4 ,but       
precepts should be given about the acts 
of the virtues4 ,therefore two precepts 
of charity do not suffice4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 virtue consists not only in   
doing good but also in avoiding evil4   
,now we are led by the positive precepts
 to do good1 and by the negative        
precepts to avoid evil4 ,therefore there
 ought to have been not only positive1  
but also negative precepts about        
charity2 and so two precepts of charity 
are not sufficient4  ,on the contrary1  
,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #bb3dj73 ,on    

these two commandments dependeth the    
whole ,law and the prophets4  ,i answer 
that1 ,charity1 as stated above 7,q4    
#bc1 ,a4 #a71 is a kind of friendship4  
,now friendship is between one person   
and another1 wherefore ,gregory says    
7,hom4 in ,ev4 xvii73 ,charity is not   
possible between less than two3 and it  
has been explained how one may love     
oneself out of charity 7,q4 #be1 ,a4    
#d74 ,now since good is the object of   
dilection and love1 and since good is   
either an end or a means1 it is fitting 
that there should be two precepts of    
charity1 one whereby we are induced to  
love ,god as our end1 and another       
whereby we are led to love our neighbor 
for ,god's sake1 as for the sake of our 
end4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine   
says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bc71     
though four things are to be loved out  
of charity1 there was no need of a      
precept as regards the second and       
fourth1 i4e4 love of oneself and of     
one's own body4 ,for however much a man 

may stray from the truth1 the love of   
himself and of his own body always      
remains in him4 ,and yet the mode of    
this love had to be prescribed to man1  
namely1 that he should love himself and 
his own body in an ordinate manner1 and 
this is done by his loving ,god and his 
neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated  
above 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #bi1 ,a4    
#c71 the other acts of charity result   
from the act of love as effects from    
their cause4 ,hence the precepts of love
 virtually include the precepts about   
the other acts4 ,and yet we find that1  
for the sake of the laggards1 special   
precepts were given about each          
act--about joy 7,phil4 #d3d73 ,rejoice  
in the ,lord always--about peace 7,heb4 
#ab3ad73 ,follow peace with all         
men--about beneficence 7,gal4 #f3aj73   
,whilst we have time1 let us work good  
to all men--and ,holy ,writ contains    
precepts about each of the parts of     
beneficence1 as may be seen by anyone   
who considers the matter carefully4     

,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to do good is more    
than to avoid evil1 and therefore the   
positive precepts virtually include the 
negative precepts4 ,nevertheless we find
 explicit precepts against the vices    
contrary to charity3 for1 against hatred
 it is written 7,lev4 #ab3ag73 ,thou    
shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart2
 against sloth 7,ecclus4 #f3bf73 ,be not
 grieved with her bands2 against envy   
7,gal4 #e3bf73 ,let us not be made      
desirous of vainglory1 provoking one    
another1 envying one another2 against   
discord 7#a ,cor4 #a3aj73 ,that you all 
speak the same thing1 and that there be 
no schisms among you2 and against       
scandal 7,rom4 #ad3ac73 ,that you put   
not a stumbling-block or a scandal in   
your brother's way4   ,,fourth ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,it ,is ,fittingly ,commanded ,that ,man
 ,should ,love ,god with ,his ,whole    
,heart8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that it is unfittingly commanded that   
man should love ,god with his whole     

heart4 ,for the mode of a virtuous act  
is not a matter of precept1 as shown    
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1
 ,a4 #i74 ,now the words with thy whole 
heart signify the mode of the love of   
,god4 ,therefore it is unfittingly      
commanded that man should love ,god with
 his whole heart4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
,a thing is whole and perfect when it   
lacks nothing 7,phys4 iii1 #f74 ,if     
therefore it is a matter of precept that
 ,god be loved with the whole heart1    
whoever does something not pertaining to
 the love of ,god1 acts counter to the  
precept1 and consequently sins mortally4
 ,now a venial sin does not pertain to  
the love of ,god4 ,therefore a venial   
sin is a mortal sin1 which is absurd4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to love ,god with   
one's whole heart belongs to perfection1
 since according to the ,philosopher    
7,phys4 iii1 text4 #fd71 to be whole is 
to be perfect4 ,but that which belongs  
to perfection is not a matter of        
precept1 but a matter of counsel4       

,therefore we ought not to be commanded 
to love ,god with our whole heart4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4    
#f3e73 ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy   
,god with thy whole heart4  ,i answer   
that1 ,since precepts are given about   
acts of virtue1 an act is a matter of   
precept according as it is an act of    
virtue4 ,now it is requisite for an act 
of virtue that not only should it fall  
on its own matter1 but also that it     
should be endued with its due           
circumstances1 whereby it is adapted to 
that matter4 ,but ,god is to be loved as
 the last end1 to which all things are  
to be referred4 ,therefore some kind of 
totality was to be indicated in         
connection with the precept of the love 
of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the         
commandment that prescribes an act of   
virtue does not prescribe the mode which
 that virtue derives from another and   
higher virtue1 but it does prescribe the
 mode which belongs to its own proper   
virtue1 and this mode is signified in   

the words with thy whole heart4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,to love ,god with one's whole
 heart has a twofold signification4     
,first1 actually1 so that a man's whole 
heart be always actually directed to    
,god3 this is the perfection of heaven4 
,secondly1 in the sense that a man's    
whole heart be habitually directed to   
,god1 so that it consent to nothing     
contrary to the love of ,god1 and this  
is the perfection of the way4 ,venial   
sin is not contrary to this latter      
perfection1 because it does not destroy 
the habit of charity1 since it does not 
tend to a contrary object1 but merely   
hinders the use of charity4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,that perfection of charity to
 which the counsels are directed1 is    
between the two perfections mentioned in
 the preceding reply3 and it consists in
 man renouncing1 as much as possible1   
temporal things1 even such as are       
lawful1 because they occupy the mind and
 hinder the actual movement of the heart
 towards ,god4   ,,fifth ,,article      

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #e  ,whether  
to the ,words1 ,thou ,shalt ,love the   
,lord ,thy ,god with ,thy ,whole ,heart1
 ,it ,was ,fitting to ,add and with ,thy
 ,whole ,soul1 and with ,thy ,whole     
,strength8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that it was unfitting to the words1
 ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy ,god1   
with thy whole heart1 to add1 and with  
thy whole soul1 and with thy whole      
strength 7,deut4 #f3e74 ,for heart does 
not mean here a part of the body1 since 
to love ,god is not a bodily action3 and
 therefore heart is to be taken here in 
a spiritual sense4 ,now the heart       
understood spiritually is either the    
soul itself or part of the soul4        
,therefore it is superfluous to mention 
both heart and soul4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 a man's strength whether      
spiritual or corporal depends on the    
heart4 ,therefore after the words1 ,thou
 shalt love the ,lord thy ,god with thy 
whole heart1 it was unnecessary to add1 
with all thy strength4  ,obj4 #c3       

,further1 in ,matt4 #bb3cg we read3     
,with all thy mind1 which words do not  
occur here4 ,therefore it seems that    
this precept is unfittingly worded in   
,deut4 #f4  ,on the contrary stands the 
authority of ,scripture4  ,i answer     
that1 ,this precept is differently      
worded in various places3 for1 as we    
said in the first objection1 in ,deut4  
#f three points are mentioned3 with thy 
whole heart1 and with thy whole soul1   
and with thy whole strength4 ,in ,matt4 
#bb we find two of these mentioned1 viz4
 with thy whole heart and with thy whole
 soul1 while with thy whole strength is 
omitted1 but with thy whole mind is     
added4 ,yet in ,mark #ab we find all    
four1 viz4 with thy whole heart1 and    
with thy whole soul1 and with thy whole 
mind1 and with thy whole force which is 
the same as strength4 ,moreover1 these  
four are indicated in ,luke #aj1 where  
in place of strength or force we read   
with all thy might4 99,st4 ,thomas is   
explaining the ,latin text which reads  

ex tota fortitudine tua 7,deut471 ex    
tota virtue tua 7,mk471 and ex omnibus  
viribus tuis 7,luke71 although the      
,greek in all three cases has ex holes  
tes ischyos1 which the ,douay renders   
with thy whole strength4  ,accordingly  
these four have to be explained1 since  
the fact that one of them is omitted    
here or there is due to one implying    
another4 ,we must therefore observe that
 love is an act of the will which is    
here denoted by the heart1 because just 
as the bodily heart is the principle of 
all the movements of the body1 so too   
the will1 especially as regards the     
intention of the last end which is the  
object of charity1 is the principle of  
all the movements of the soul4 ,now     
there are three principles of action    
that are moved by the will1 namely1 the 
intellect which is signified by the     
mind1 the lower appetitive power1       
signified by the soul2 and the exterior 
executive power signified by strength1  
force or might4 ,accordingly we are     

commanded to direct our whole intention 
to ,god1 and this is signified by the   
words with thy whole heart2 to submit   
our intellect to ,god1 and this is      
expressed in the words with thy whole   
mind2 to regulate our appetite according
 to ,god1 in the words with thy whole   
soul2 and to obey ,god in our external  
actions1 and this is to love ,god with  
our whole strength1 force or might4     
,chrysostom 99,the quotation is from an 
anonymous author's unfinished work      
7,opus imperf4 ,hom4 xlii1 in ,matth47  
which is included in ,chrysostom's      
works1 on the other hand1 takes heart   
and soul in the contrary sense2 and     
,augustine 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bb7
 refers heart to the thought1 soul to   
the manner of life1 and mind to the     
intellect4 ,again some explain with thy 
whole heart as denoting the intellect1  
with thy whole soul as signifying the   
will1 with thy mind as pointing to the  
memory4 ,and again1 according to        
,gregory of ,nyssa 7,de ,hom4 ,opif4    

viii71 heart signifies the vegetative   
soul1 soul the sensitive1 and mind the  
intellective soul1 because our          
nourishment1 sensation1 and             
understanding ought all to be referred  
by us to ,god4  ,this suffices for the  
,replies to the ,objections4   ,,sixth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #f  
,whether ,it ,is ,possible in ,this     
,life to ,fulfil ,this ,precept of the  
,love of ,god8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that in this life it is possible  
to fulfil this precept of the love of   
,god4 ,for according to ,jerome         
99,pelagius1 ,exposit4 ,cath4 ,fid4     
accursed is he who says that ,cod has   
commanded anything impossible4 ,but ,god
 gave this commandment1 as is clear from
 ,deut4 #f3e4 ,therefore it is possible 
to fulfil this precept in this life4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever does not    
fulfil a precept sins mortally1 since   
according to ,ambrose 7,de ,parad4 viii7
 sin is nothing else than a             
transgression of the ,divine ,law1 and  

disobedience of the heavenly            
commandments4 ,if therefore this precept
 cannot be fulfilled by wayfarers1 it   
follows that in this life no man can be 
without mortal sin1 and this is against 
the saying of the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4    
#a3h73 7,who also7 will confirm you unto
 the end without crime1 and 7#a ,tim4   
#c3aj73 ,let them minister1 having no   
crime4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 precepts are
 given in order to direct man in the way
 of salvation1 according to ,ps4 #ah3i3 
,the commandment of the ,lord is        
lightsome1 enlightening the eyes4 ,now  
it is useless to direct anyone to what  
is impossible4 ,therefore it is not     
impossible to fulfill this precept in   
this life4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine
 says 7,de ,perfect4 ,justit4 viii73 ,in
 the fulness of heavenly charity this   
precept will be fulfilled3 ,thou shalt  
love the ,lord thy ,god1 etc4 ,for as   
long as any carnal concupiscence        
remains1 that can be restrained by      
continence1 man cannot love ,god with   

all his heart4  ,i answer that1 ,a      
precept can be fulfilled in two ways2   
perfectly1 and imperfectly4 ,a precept  
is fulfilled perfectly1 when the end    
intended by the author of the precept is
 reached2 yet it is fulfilled1          
imperfectly however1 when although the  
end intended by its author is not       
reached1 nevertheless the order to that 
end is not departed from4 ,thus if the  
commander of an army order his soldiers 
to fight1 his command will be perfectly 
obeyed by those who fight and conquer   
the foe1 which is the commander's       
intention2 yet it is fulfilled1 albeit  
imperfectly1 by those who fight without 
gaining the victory1 provided they do   
nothing contrary to military discipline4
 ,now ,god intends by this precept that 
man should be entirely united to ,him1  
and this will be realized in heaven1    
when ,god will be all in all1 according 
to #a ,cor4 #ae3bh4 ,hence this precept 
will be observed fully and perfectly in 
heaven2 yet it is fulfilled1 though     

imperfectly1 on the way4 ,nevertheless  
on the way one man will fulfil it more  
perfectly than another1 and so much the 
more1 as he approaches by some kind of  
likeness to the perfection of heaven4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument proves  
that the precept can be fulfilled after 
a fashion on the way1 but not perfectly4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even as the soldier 
who fights legitimately without         
conquering is not blamed nor deserves to
 be punished for this1 so too he that   
does not fulfil this precept on the way1
 but does nothing against the love of   
,god1 does not sin mortally4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de      
,perfect4 ,justit4 viii71 why should not
 this perfection be prescribed to man1  
although no man attains it in this life8
 ,for one cannot run straight unless one
 knows whither to run4 ,and how would   
one know this if no precept pointed it  
out4   ,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #g  ,whether the ,precept
 of ,love of ,our ,neighbor ,is         

,fittingly ,expressed8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that the precept of the  
love of our neighbor is unfittingly     
expressed4 ,for the love of charity     
extends to all men1 even to our enemies1
 as may be seen in ,matt4 #e3dd4 ,but   
the word neighbor denotes a kind of     
nighness which does not seem to exist   
towards all men4 ,therefore it seems    
that this precept is unfittingly        
expressed4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1         
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
ix1 #h7 the origin of our friendly      
relations with others lies in our       
relation to ourselves1 whence it seems  
to follow that love of self is the      
origin of one's love for one's neighbor4
 ,now the principle is greater than that
 which results from it4 ,therefore man  
ought not to love his neighbor as       
himself4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man loves 
himself1 but not his neighbor1          
naturally4 ,therefore it is unfitting   
that he should be commanded to love his 
neighbor as himself4  ,on the contrary1 

,it is written 7,matt4 #bb3ci73 ,the    
second commandment is like to this3     
,thou shalt love thy neighbor as        
thyself4  ,i answer that1 ,this precept 
is fittingly expressed1 for it indicates
 both the reason for loving and the mode
 of love4 ,the reason for loving is     
indicated in the word neighbor1 because 
the reason why we ought to love others  
out of charity is because they are nigh 
to us1 both as to the natural image of  
,god1 and as to the capacity for glory4 
,nor does it matter whether we say      
neighbor1 or brother according to #a    
,john #d3ba1 or friend1 according to    
,lev4 #ai3ah1 because all these words   
express the same affinity4  ,the mode of
 love is indicated in the words as      
thyself4 ,this does not mean that a man 
must love his neighbor equally as       
himself1 but in like manner as himself1 
and this in three ways4 ,first1 as      
regards the end1 namely1 that he should 
love his neighbor for ,god's sake1 even 
as he loves himself for ,god's sake1 so 

that his love for his neighbor is a holy
 love4 ,secondly1 as regards the rule of
 love1 namely1 that a man should not    
give way to his neighbor in evil1 but   
only in good things1 even as he ought to
 gratify his will in good things alone1 
so that his love for his neighbor may be
 a righteous love4 ,thirdly1 as regards 
the reason for loving1 namely1 that a   
man should love his neighbor1 not for   
his own profit1 or pleasure1 but in the 
sense of wishing his neighbor well1 even
 as he wishes himself well1 so that his 
love for his neighbor may be a true     
love3 since when a man loves his        
neighbor for his own profit or pleasure1
 he does not love his neighbor truly1   
but loves himself4  ,this suffices for  
the ,replies to the ,objections4        
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1  
,art4 #h  ,whether the ,order of        
,charity ,is ,included in the ,precept8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
order of charity is not included in the 
precept4 ,for whoever transgresses a    

precept does a wrong4 ,but if man loves 
some one as much as he ought1 and loves 
any other man more1 he wrongs no man4   
,therefore he does not transgress the   
precept4 ,therefore the order of charity
 is not included in the precept4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 whatever is a matter of   
precept is sufficiently delivered to us 
in ,holy ,writ4 ,now the order of       
charity which was given above 7,q4 #bf7 
is nowhere indicated in ,holy ,writ4    
,therefore it is not included in the    
precept4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 order     
implies some kind of distinction4 ,but  
the love of our neighbor is prescribed  
without any distinction1 in the words1  
,thou shalt love thy neighbor as        
thyself4 ,therefore the order of charity
 is not included in the precept4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,whatever ,god works in us
 by ,his grace1 ,he teaches us first of 
all by ,his ,law1 according to ,jer4    
#ca3cc3 ,i will give ,my ,law in their  
heart 99,vulg43 'in their bowels1 and ,i
 will write it in their heart'4 ,now    

,god causes in us the order of charity1 
according to ,cant4 #b3d3 ,he set in    
order charity in me4 ,therefore the     
order of charity comes under the precept
 of the ,law4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,a4 #d1 ad #a71 the mode  
which is essential to an act of virtue  
comes under the precept which prescribes
 that virtuous act4 ,now the order of   
charity is essential to the virtue1     
since it is based on the proportion of  
love to the thing beloved1 as shown     
above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #ab2 ,q4 #bf1 ,,aa4 
#a1 #b74 ,it is therefore evident that  
the order of charity must come under the
 precept4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a man      
gratifies more the person he loves more1
 so that if he loved less one whom he   
ought to love more1 he would wish to    
gratify more one whom he ought to       
gratify less1 and so he would do an     
injustice to the one he ought to love   
more4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the order of   
those four things we have to love out of
 charity is expressed in ,holy ,writ4   

,for when we are commanded to love ,god 
with our whole heart1 we are given to   
understand that we must love ,him above 
all things4 ,when we are commanded to   
love our neighbor as ourselves1 the love
 of self is set before love of our      
neighbor4 ,in like manner where we are  
commanded 7#a ,john #c3af7 to lay down  
our souls1 i4e4 the life of our bodies1 
for the brethren1 we are given to       
understand that a man ought to love his 
neighbor more than his own body2 and    
again when we are commanded 7,gal4      
#f3aj7 to work good 4 4 4 especially to 
those who are of the household of the   
faith1 and when a man is blamed 7#a     
,tim4 #e3h7 if he have not care of his  
own1 and especially of those of his     
house1 it means that we ought to love   
most those of our neighbors who are more
 virtuous or more closely united to us4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it follows from the   
very words1 ,thou shalt love thy        
neighbor that those who are nearer to us
 are to be loved more4   ,,question #de 

,,of ,,the ,,gift ,,of ,,wisdom 7,in    
,six ,articles7  ,we must now consider  
the gift of wisdom which corresponds to 
charity2 and firstly1 wisdom itself1    
secondly1 the opposite vice4 ,under the 
first head there are six points of      
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether wisdom should be
 reckoned among the gifts of the ,holy  
,ghost8  7#b7 ,what is its subject8     
7#c7 ,whether wisdom is only speculative
 or also practical8  7#d7 ,whether the  
wisdom that is a gift is compatible with
 mortal sin8  7#e7 ,whether it is in all
 those who have sanctifying grace8  7#f7
 ,which beatitude corresponds to it8    
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,wisdom ,should ,be  
,reckoned ,among the ,gifts of the ,holy
 ,ghost8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that wisdom ought not to be reckoned    
among the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4    
,for the gifts are more perfect than the
 virtues1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#fh1 ,a4 #h74 ,now virtue is directed to
 the good alone1 wherefore ,augustine   

says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ai7 that no  
man makes bad use of the virtues4 ,much 
more therefore are the gifts of the     
,holy ,ghost directed to the good alone4
 ,but wisdom is directed to evil also1  
for it is written 7,james #c3ae7 that a 
certain wisdom is earthly1 sensual1     
devilish4 ,therefore wisdom should not  
be reckoned among the gifts of the ,holy
 ,ghost4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according 
to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ad7     
wisdom is the knowledge of ,divine      
things4 ,now that knowledge of ,divine  
things which man can acquire by his     
natural endowments1 belongs to the      
wisdom which is an intellectual virtue1 
while the supernatural knowledge of     
,divine things belongs to faith which is
 a theological virtue1 as explained     
above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #e2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1
 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore wisdom should be   
called a virtue rather than a gift4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written 7,job 
#bh3bh73 ,behold the fear of the ,lord1 
that is wisdom1 and to depart from evil1

 that is understanding4 ,and in this    
passage according to the rendering of   
the ,septuagint which ,augustine follows
 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ad2 xiv1 #a7 we read3
 ,behold piety1 that is wisdom4 ,now    
both fear and piety are gifts of the    
,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore wisdom should  
not be reckoned among the gifts of the  
,holy ,ghost1 as though it were distinct
 from the others4  ,on the contrary1 ,it
 is written 7,isa4 #aa3b73 ,the ,spirit 
of the ,lord shall rest upon ,him2 the  
spirit of wisdom and of understanding4  
,i answer that1 ,according to the       
,philosopher 7,metaph4 i3 #b71 it       
belongs to wisdom to consider the       
highest cause4 ,by means of that cause  
we are able to form a most certain      
judgment about other causes1 and        
according thereto all things should be  
set in order4 ,now the highest cause may
 be understood in two ways1 either      
simply or in some particular genus4     
,accordingly he that knows the highest  
cause in any particular genus1 and by   

its means is able to judge and set in   
order all the things that belong to that
 genus1 is said to be wise in that      
genus1 for instance in medicine or      
architecture1 according to #a ,cor4     
#c3aj3 ,as a wise architect1 ,i have    
laid a foundation4 ,on the other hand1  
he who knows the cause that is simply   
the highest1 which is ,god1 is said to  
be wise simply1 because he is able to   
judge and set in order all things       
according to ,divine rules4  ,now man   
obtains this judgment through the ,holy 
,ghost1 according to #a ,cor4 #b3ae3    
,the spiritual man judgeth all things1  
because as stated in the same chapter   
7#a ,cor4 #b3aj71 the ,spirit searcheth 
all things1 yea the deep things of ,god4
 ,wherefore it is evident that wisdom is
 a gift of the ,holy ,ghost4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,a thing is said to be good in
 two senses3 first in the sense that it 
is truly good and simply perfect1       
secondly1 by a kind of likeness1 being  
perfect in wickedness2 thus we speak of 

a good or a perfect thief1 as the       
,philosopher observes 7,metaph4 v1 text4
 #ba74 ,and just as with regard to those
 things which are truly good1 we find a 
highest cause1 namely the sovereign good
 which is the last end1 by knowing      
which1 man is said to be truly wise1 so 
too in evil things something is to be   
found to which all others are to be     
referred as to a last end1 by knowing   
which1 man is said to be wise unto evil 
doing1 according to ,jer4 #d3bb3 ,they  
are wise to do evils1 but to do good    
they have no knowledge4 ,now whoever    
turns away from his due end1 must needs 
fix on some undue end1 since every agent
 acts for an end4 ,wherefore1 if he     
fixes his end in external earthly       
things1 his wisdom is called earthly1 if
 in the goods of the body1 it is called 
sensual wisdom1 if in some excellence1  
it is called devilish wisdom because it 
imitates the devil's pride1 of which it 
is written 7,job #da3be73 ,he is king   
over all the children of pride4  ,reply 

,obj4 #b3 ,the wisdom which is called a 
gift of the ,holy ,ghost1 differs from  
that which is an acquired intellectual  
virtue1 for the latter is attained by   
human effort1 whereas the latter is     
descending from above 7,james #c3ae74   
,in like manner it differs from faith1  
since faith assents to the ,divine truth
 in itself1 whereas it belongs to the   
gift of wisdom to judge according to the
 ,divine truth4 ,hence the gift of      
wisdom presupposes faith1 because a man 
judges well what he knows 7,ethic4 i1   
#c74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as piety   
which pertains to the worship of ,god is
 a manifestation of faith1 in so far as 
we make profession of faith by          
worshipping ,god1 so too1 piety         
manifests wisdom4 ,for this reason piety
 is stated to be wisdom1 and so is fear1
 for the same reason1 because if a man  
fear and worship ,god1 this shows that  
he has a right judgment about ,divine   
things4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #de1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,wisdom ,is 

in the ,intellect ,as ,its ,subject8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
wisdom is not in the intellect as its   
subject4 ,for ,augustine says 7,ep4 cxx7
 that wisdom is the charity of ,god4    
,now charity is in the will as its      
subject1 and not in the intellect1 as   
stated above 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #a74         
,therefore wisdom is not in the         
intellect as its subject4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 it is written 7,ecclus4       
#f3bc73 ,the wisdom of doctrine is      
according to her name1 for wisdom       
7sapientia7 may be described as         
sweet-tasting science 7sapida scientia71
 and this would seem to regard the      
appetite1 to which it belongs to taste  
spiritual pleasure or sweetness4        
,therefore wisdom is in the appetite    
rather than in the intellect4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 the intellective power is    
sufficiently perfected by the gift of   
understanding4 ,now it is superfluous to
 require two things where one suffices  
for the purpose4 ,therefore wisdom is   

not in the intellect4  ,on the contrary1
 ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii1 #di7 that   
wisdom is contrary to folly4 ,but folly 
is in the intellect4 ,therefore wisdom  
is also4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated    
above 7,a4 #a71 wisdom denotes a certain
 rectitude of judgment according to the 
,eternal ,law4 ,now rectitude of        
judgment is twofold3 first1 on account  
of perfect use of reason1 secondly1 on  
account of a certain connaturality with 
the matter about which one has to judge4
 ,thus1 about matters of chastity1 a man
 after inquiring with his reason forms a
 right judgment1 if he has learnt the   
science of morals1 while he who has the 
habit of chastity judges of such matters
 by a kind of connaturality4            
,accordingly it belongs to the wisdom   
that is an intellectual virtue to       
pronounce right judgment about ,divine  
things after reason has made its        
inquiry1 but it belongs to wisdom as a  
gift of the ,holy ,ghost to judge aright
 about them on account of connaturality 

with them3 thus ,dionysius says 7,div4  
,nom4 ii7 that ,hierotheus is perfect in
 ,divine things1 for he not only learns1
 but is patient of1 ,divine things4     
,now this sympathy or connaturality for 
,divine things is the result of charity1
 which unites us to ,god1 according to  
#a ,cor4 #f3ag3 ,he who is joined to the
 ,lord1 is one spirit4 ,consequently    
wisdom which is a gift1 has its cause in
 the will1 which cause is charity1 but  
it has its essence in the intellect1    
whose act is to judge aright1 as stated 
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #a74       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking 
of wisdom as to its cause1 whence also  
wisdom 7sapientia7 takes its name1 in so
 far as it denotes a certain sweetness  
7saporem74 ,hence the ,reply to the     
,second ,objection is evident1 that is  
if this be the true meaning of the text 
quoted4 ,for1 apparently this is not the
 case1 because such an exposition of the
 text would only fit the ,latin word for
 wisdom1 whereas it does not apply to   

the ,greek and perhaps not in other     
languages4 ,hence it would seem that in 
the text quoted wisdom stands for the   
renown of doctrine1 for which it is     
praised by all4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the  
intellect exercises a twofold act1      
perception and judgment4 ,the gift of   
understanding regards the former2 the   
gift of wisdom regards the latter       
according to the ,divine ideas1 the gift
 of knowledge1 according to human ideas4
   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1
 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,wisdom ,is ,merely 
,speculative1 or ,practical ,also8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
wisdom is not practical but merely      
speculative4 ,for the gift of wisdom is 
more excellent than the wisdom which is 
an intellectual virtue4 ,but wisdom1 as 
an intellectual virtue1 is merely       
speculative4 ,much more therefore is    
wisdom1 as a gift1 speculative and not  
practical4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the     
practical intellect is about matters of 
operation which are contingent4 ,but    

wisdom is about ,divine things which are
 eternal and necessary4 ,therefore      
wisdom cannot be practical4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 vi1    
#cg7 that in contemplation we seek the  
,beginning which is ,god1 but in action 
we labor under a mighty bundle of wants4
 ,now wisdom regards the vision of      
,divine things1 in which there is no    
toiling under a load1 since according to
 ,wis4 #h3af1 her conversation hath no  
bitterness1 nor her company any         
tediousness4 ,therefore wisdom is merely
 contemplative1 and not practical or    
active4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is       
written 7,col4 #d3e73 ,walk with wisdom 
towards them that are without4 ,now this
 pertains to action4 ,therefore wisdom  
is not merely speculative1 but also     
practical4  ,i answer that1 ,as         
,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ad71  
the higher part of the reason is the    
province of wisdom1 while the lower part
 is the domain of knowledge4 ,now the   
higher reason according to the same     

authority 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #g7 is intent
 on the consideration and consultation  
of the heavenly1 i4e4 ,divine1 types    
99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #i2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #gd1 ,a4 #g2 it considers them1 in so  
far as it contemplates ,divine things in
 themselves1 and it consults them1 in so
 far as it judges of human acts by      
,divine things1 and directs human acts  
according to ,divine rules4             
,accordingly wisdom as a gift1 is not   
merely speculative but also practical4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the higher a virtue   
is1 the greater the number of things to 
which it extends1 as stated in ,de      
,causis1 prop4 x1 xvii4 ,wherefore from 
the very fact that wisdom as a gift is  
more excellent than wisdom as an        
intellectual virtue1 since it attains to
 ,god more intimately by a kind of union
 of the soul with ,him1 it is able to   
direct us not only in contemplation but 
also in action4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3       
,divine things are indeed necessary and 
eternal in themselves1 yet they are the 

rules of the contingent things which are
 the subject-matter of human actions4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a thing is considered 
in itself before being compared with    
something else4 ,wherefore to wisdom    
belongs first of all contemplation which
 is the vision of the ,beginning1 and   
afterwards the direction of human acts  
according to the ,divine rules4 ,nor    
from the direction of wisdom does there 
result any bitterness or toil in human  
acts2 on the contrary the result of     
wisdom is to make the bitter sweet1 and 
labor a rest4   ,,fourth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,wisdom ,can ,be ,without ,grace1 and   
with ,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that wisdom can be without   
grace and with mortal sin4 ,for saints  
glory chiefly in such things as are     
incompatible with mortal sin1 according 
to #b ,cor4 #a3ab3 ,our glory is this1  
the testimony of our conscience4 ,now   
one ought not to glory in one's wisdom1 
according to ,jer4 #i3bc3 ,let not the  

wise man glory in his wisdom4 ,therefore
 wisdom can be without grace and with   
mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 wisdom 
denotes knowledge of ,divine things1 as 
stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now one in      
mortal sin may have knowledge of the    
,divine truth1 according to ,rom4 #a3ah3
 7,those men that7 detain the truth of  
,god in injustice4 ,therefore wisdom is 
compatible with mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4   
xv1 #ah7 while speaking of charity3     
,nothing surpasses this gift of ,god1 it
 is this alone that divides the children
 of the eternal kingdom from the        
children of eternal perdition4 ,but     
wisdom is distinct from charity4        
,therefore it does not divide the       
children of the kingdom from the        
children of perdition4 ,therefore it is 
compatible with mortal sin4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,it is written 7,wis4 #a3d73  
,wisdom will not enter into a malicious 
soul1 nor dwell in a body subject to    
sins4  ,i answer that1 ,the wisdom which

 is a gift of the ,holy ,ghost1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #a71 enables us to    
judge aright of ,divine things1 or of   
other things according to ,divine rules1
 by reason of a certain connaturalness  
or union with ,divine things1 which is  
the effect of charity1 as stated above  
7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #e74 ,hence the   
wisdom of which we are speaking         
presupposes charity4 ,now charity is    
incompatible with mortal sin1 as shown  
above 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #ab74 ,therefore it 
follows that the wisdom of which we are 
speaking cannot be together with mortal 
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words are 
to be understood as referring to worldly
 wisdom1 or to wisdom in ,divine things 
acquired through human reasons4 ,in such
 wisdom the saints do not glory1        
according to ,prov4 #cj3b3 ,the wisdom  
of men is not with ,me3 ,but they do    
glory in ,divine wisdom according to #a 
,cor4 #a3cj3 7,who7 of ,god is made unto
 us wisdom4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this     
argument considers1 not the wisdom of   

which we speak but that which is        
acquired by the study and research of   
reason1 and is compatible with mortal   
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although wisdom 
is distinct from charity1 it presupposes
 it1 and for that very reason divides   
the children of perdition from the      
children of the kingdom4   ,,fifth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #e  
,whether ,wisdom ,is in ,all ,who ,have 
,grace8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that wisdom is not in all who have      
grace4 ,for it is more to have wisdom   
than to hear wisdom4 ,now it is only for
 the perfect to hear wisdom1 according  
to #a ,cor4 #b3f3 ,we speak wisdom among
 the perfect4 ,since then not all who   
have grace are perfect1 it seems that   
much less all who have grace have       
wisdom4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,the wise  
man sets things in order1 as the        
,philosopher states 7,metaph4 i1 #b73   
and it is written 7,james #c3ag7 that   
the wise man judges without             
dissimulation 99,vulg43 ',the wisdom    

that is from above 4 4 4 is 4 4 4       
without judging1 without dissimulation'4
 ,now it is not for all that have grace1
 to judge1 or put others in order1 but  
only for those in authority4 ,therefore 
wisdom is not in all that have grace4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,wisdom is a remedy 
against folly1 as ,gregory says 7,moral4
 ii1 #di74 ,now many that have grace are
 naturally foolish1 for instance madmen 
who are baptized or those who without   
being guilty of mortal sin have become  
insane4 ,therefore wisdom is not in all 
that have grace4  ,on the contrary1     
,whoever is without mortal sin1 is      
beloved of ,god2 since he has charity1  
whereby he loves ,god1 and ,god loves   
them that love ,him 7,prov4 #h3ag74 ,now
 it is written 7,wis4 #g3bh7 that ,god  
loveth none but him that dwelleth with  
wisdom4 ,therefore wisdom is in all     
those who have charity and are without  
mortal sin4  ,i answer that1 ,the wisdom
 of which we are speaking1 as stated    
above 7,a4 #d71 denotes a certain       

rectitude of judgment in the            
contemplation and consultation of       
,divine things1 and as to both of these 
men obtain various degrees of wisdom    
through union with ,divine things4 ,for 
the measure of right judgment attained  
by some1 whether in the contemplation of
 ,divine things or in directing human   
affairs according to ,divine rules1 is  
no more than suffices for their         
salvation4 ,this measure is wanting to  
none who is without mortal sin through  
having sanctifying grace1 since if      
nature does not fail in necessaries1    
much less does grace fail3 wherefore it 
is written 7#a ,john #b3bg73 7,his7     
unction teacheth you of all things4     
,some1 however1 receive a higher degree 
of the gift of wisdom1 both as to the   
contemplation of ,divine things 7by both
 knowing more exalted mysteries and     
being able to impart this knowledge to  
others7 and as to the direction of human
 affairs according to ,divine rules 7by 
being able to direct not only themselves

 but also others according to those     
rules74 ,this degree of wisdom is not   
common to all that have sanctifying     
grace1 but belongs rather to the        
gratuitous graces1 which the ,holy      
,ghost dispenses as ,he will1 according 
to #a ,cor4 #ab3h3 ,to one indeed by the
 ,spirit is given the word of wisdom1   
etc4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle    
speaks there of wisdom1 as extending to 
the hidden mysteries of ,divine things1 
as indeed he says himself 7#b ,cor4     
#a3g73 ,we speak the wisdom of ,god in a
 mystery1 a wisdom which is hidden4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although it belongs to
 those alone who are in authority to    
direct and judge other men1 yet every   
man is competent to direct and judge his
 own actions1 as ,dionysius declares    
7,ep4 ad ,demophil474  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,baptized idiots1 like little children1 
have the habit of wisdom1 which is a    
gift of the ,holy ,ghost1 but they have 
not the act1 on account of the bodily   
impediment which hinders the use of     

reason in them4   ,,sixth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
the ,seventh ,beatitude ,corresponds to 
the ,gift of ,wisdom8  ,objection #a3   
,it seems that the seventh beatitude    
does not correspond to the gift of      
wisdom4 ,for the seventh beatitude is3  
,blessed are the peacemakers1 for they  
shall be called the children of ,god4   
,now both these things belong to        
charity3 since of peace it is written   
7,ps4 #aah3afe73 ,much peace have they  
that love ,thy law1 and1 as the ,apostle
 says 7,rom4 #e3e71 the charity of ,god 
is poured forth in our hearts by the    
,holy ,ghost ,who is given to us1 and   
,who is the ,spirit of adoption of sons1
 whereby we cry3 ,abba ,father 7,rom4   
#h3ae74 ,therefore the seventh beatitude
 ought to be ascribed to charity rather 
than to wisdom4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a  
thing is declared by its proximate      
effect rather than by its remote effect4
 ,now the proximate effect of wisdom    
seems to be charity1 according to ,wis4 

#g3bg3 ,through nations she conveyeth   
herself into holy souls2 she maketh the 
friends of ,god and prophets3 whereas   
peace and the adoption of sons seem to  
be remote effects1 since they result    
from charity1 as stated above 7,q4 #bi1 
,a4 #c74 ,therefore the beatitude       
corresponding to wisdom should be       
determined in respect of the love of    
charity rather than in respect of peace4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written     
7,james #c3ag73 ,the wisdom1 that is    
from above1 first indeed is chaste1 then
 peaceable1 modest1 easy to be          
persuaded1 consenting to the good1 full 
of mercy and good fruits1 judging       
without dissimulation 99,vulg43 'without
 judging1 without dissimulation'4       
,therefore the beatitude corresponding  
to wisdom should not refer to peace     
rather than to the other effects of     
heavenly wisdom4  ,on the contrary1     
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte i1 #d7 that wisdom is becoming to
 peacemakers1 in whom there is no       

movement of rebellion1 but only         
obedience to reason4  ,i answer that1   
,the seventh beatitude is fittingly     
ascribed to the gift of wisdom1 both as 
to the merit and as to the reward4 ,the 
merit is denoted in the words1 ,blessed 
are the peacemakers4 ,now a peacemaker  
is one who makes peace1 either in       
himself1 or in others3 and in both cases
 this is the result of setting in due   
order those things in which peace is    
established1 for peace is the           
tranquillity of order1 according to     
,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ac74   
,now it belongs to wisdom to set things 
in order1 as the ,philosopher declares  
7,metaph4 i1 #b71 wherefore             
peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to  
wisdom4 ,the reward is expressed in the 
words1 they shall be called the children
 of ,god4 ,now men are called the       
children of ,god in so far as they      
participate in the likeness of the      
only-begotten and natural ,son of ,god1 
according to ,rom4 #h3bi1 ,whom ,he     

foreknew 4 4 4 to be made conformable to
 the image of ,his ,son1 ,who is ,wisdom
 ,begotten4 ,hence by participating in  
the gift of wisdom1 man attains to the  
sonship of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it  
belongs to charity to be at peace1 but  
it belongs to wisdom to make peace by   
setting things in order4 ,likewise the  
,holy ,ghost is called the ,spirit of   
adoption in so far as we receive from   
,him the likeness of the natural ,son1  
,who is the ,begotten ,wisdom4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,these words refer to the     
,uncreated ,wisdom1 which in the first  
place unites itself to us by the gift of
 charity1 and consequently reveals to us
 the mysteries the knowledge of which is
 infused wisdom4 ,hence1 the infused    
wisdom which is a gift1 is not the cause
 but the effect of charity4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c7 it  
belongs to wisdom1 as a gift1 not only  
to contemplate ,divine things1 but also 
to regulate human acts4 ,now the first  
thing to be effected in this direction  

of human acts is the removal of evils   
opposed to wisdom3 wherefore fear is    
said to be the beginning of wisdom1     
because it makes us shun evil1 while the
 last thing is like an end1 whereby all 
things are reduced to their right order2
 and it is this that constitutes peace4 
,hence ,james said with reason that the 
wisdom that is from above 7and this is  
the gift of the ,holy ,ghost7 first     
indeed is chaste1 because it avoids the 
corruption of sin1 and then peaceable1  
wherein lies the ultimate effect of     
wisdom1 for which reason peace is       
numbered among the beatitudes4 ,as to   
the things that follow1 they declare in 
becoming order the means whereby wisdom 
leads to peace4 ,for when a man1 by     
chastity1 avoids the corruption of sin1 
the first thing he has to do is1 as far 
as he can1 to be moderate in all things1
 and in this respect wisdom is said to  
be modest4 ,secondly1 in those matters  
in which he is not sufficient by        
himself1 he should be guided by the     

advice of others1 and as to this we are 
told further that wisdom is easy to be  
persuaded4 ,these two are conditions    
required that man may be at peace with  
himself4 ,but in order that man may be  
at peace with others it is furthermore  
required1 first that he should not be   
opposed to their good2 this is what is  
meant by consenting to the good4        
,secondly1 that he should bring to his  
neighbor's deficiencies1 sympathy in his
 heart1 and succor in his actions1 and  
this is denoted by the words full of    
mercy and good fruits4 ,thirdly1 he     
should strive in all charity to correct 
the sins of others1 and this is         
indicated by the words judging without  
dissimulation 99,vulg43 ',the wisdom    
that is from above 4 4 4 is 4 4 4       
without judging1 without dissimulation'1
 lest he should purpose to sate his     
hatred under cover of correction4       
,,question #df  ,,of ,,folly ,,which    
,,is ,,opposed ,,to ,,wisdom 7,in ,three
 ,articles7  ,we must now consider folly

 which is opposed to wisdom2 and under  
this head there are three points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether folly is        
contrary to wisdom8  7#b7 ,whether folly
 is a sin8  7#c7 ,to which capital sin  
is it reducible8   ,,first ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,folly ,is ,contrary to ,wisdom8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that folly
 is not contrary to wisdom4 ,for        
seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed  
to wisdom4 ,but folly does not seem to  
be the same as unwisdom1 for the latter 
is apparently about ,divine things      
alone1 whereas folly is about both      
,divine and human things4 ,therefore    
folly is not contrary to wisdom4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 one contrary is not the   
way to arrive at the other4 ,but folly  
is the way to arrive at wisdom1 for it  
is written 7#a ,cor4 #c3ah73 ,if any man
 among you seem to be wise in this      
world1 let him become a fool1 that he   
may be wise4 ,therefore folly is not    
opposed to wisdom4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 

one contrary is not the cause of the    
other4 ,but wisdom is the cause of      
folly2 for it is written 7,jer4 #aj3ad73
 ,every man is become a fool for        
knowledge1 and wisdom is a kind of      
knowledge4 ,moreover1 it is written     
7,isa4 #dg3aj73 ,thy wisdom and thy     
knowledge1 this hath deceived thee4 ,now
 it belongs to folly to be deceived4    
,therefore folly is not contrary to     
wisdom4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,isidore   
says 7,etym4 x1 under the letter ,s7    
that a fool is one whom shame does not  
incite to sorrow1 and who is unconcerned
 when he is injured4 ,but this pertains 
to spiritual wisdom1 according to       
,gregory 7,moral4 x1 #di74 ,therefore   
folly is not opposed to wisdom4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii1   
#bf7 that the gift of wisdom is given as
 a remedy against folly4  ,i answer     
that1 ,stultitia 7,folly7 seems to take 
its name from stupor2 wherefore ,isidore
 says 7loc4 cit473 ,a fool is one who   
through dullness 7stuporem7 remains     

unmoved4 ,and folly differs from        
fatuity1 according to the same authority
 7,etym4 x71 in that folly implies      
apathy in the heart and dullness in the 
senses1 while fatuity denotes entire    
privation of the spiritual sense4       
,therefore folly is fittingly opposed to
 wisdom4  ,for sapiens 7wise7 as        
,isidore says 7,etym4 x7 is so named    
from sapor 7savor71 because just as the 
taste is quick to distinguish between   
savors of meats1 so is a wise man in    
discerning things and causes4 ,wherefore
 it is manifest that folly is opposed to
 wisdom as its contrary1 while fatuity  
is opposed to it as a pure negation3    
since the fatuous man lacks the sense of
 judgment1 while the fool has the sense1
 though dulled1 whereas the wise man has
 the sense acute and penetrating4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to ,isidore 
7,etym4 x71 unwisdom is contrary to     
wisdom because it lacks the savor of    
discretion and sense2 so that unwisdom  
is seemingly the same as folly4 ,yet a  

man would appear to be a fool chiefly   
through some deficiency in the verdict  
of that judgment1 which is according to 
the highest cause1 for if a man fails in
 judgment about some trivial matter1 he 
is not for that reason called a fool4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as there is an   
evil wisdom1 as stated above 7,q4 #de1  
,a4 #a1 ad #a71 called worldly wisdom1  
because it takes for the highest cause  
and last end some worldly good1 so too  
there is a good folly opposed to this   
evil wisdom1 whereby man despises       
worldly things3 and it is of this folly 
that the ,apostle speaks4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,it is the wisdom of the world that 
deceives and makes us foolish in ,god's 
sight1 as is evident from the ,apostle's
 words 7#a ,cor4 #c3ai74  ,reply ,obj4  
#d3 ,to be unconcerned when one is      
injured is sometimes due to the fact    
that one has no taste for worldly       
things1 but only for heavenly things4   
,hence this belongs not to worldly but  
to ,divine wisdom1 as ,gregory declares 

7,moral4 x1 #di74 ,sometimes however it 
is the result of a man's being simply   
stupid about everything1 as may be seen 
in idiots1 who do not discern what is   
injurious to them1 and this belongs to  
folly simply4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,folly ,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that folly is not a sin4 ,for
 no sin arises in us from nature4 ,but  
some are fools naturally4 ,therefore    
folly is not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 ,every sin is voluntary1 according to  
,augustine 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xiv74 ,but
 folly is not voluntary4 ,therefore it  
is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every
 sin is contrary to a ,divine precept4  
,but folly is not contrary to any       
precept4 ,therefore folly is not a sin4 
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4
 #a3cb73 ,the prosperity of fools shall 
destroy them4 ,but no man is destroyed  
save for sin4 ,therefore folly is a sin4
  ,i answer that1 ,folly1 as stated     
above 7,a4 #a71 denotes dullness of     

sense in judging1 and chiefly as regards
 the highest cause1 which is the last   
end and the sovereign good4 ,now a man  
may in this respect contract dullness in
 judgment in two ways4 ,first1 from a   
natural indisposition1 as in the case of
 idiots1 and such like folly is no sin4 
,secondly1 by plunging his sense into   
earthly things1 whereby his sense is    
rendered incapable of perceiving ,divine
 things1 according to #a ,cor4 #b3ad1   
,the sensual man perceiveth not these   
things that are of the ,spirit of ,god1 
even as sweet things have no savor for a
 man whose taste is infected with an    
evil humor3 and such like folly is a    
sin4  ,this suffices for the ,reply to  
the ,first ,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,though no man wishes to be a fool1 yet
 he wishes those things of which folly  
is a consequence1 viz4 to withdraw his  
sense from spiritual things and to      
plunge it into earthly things4 ,the same
 thing happens in regard to other sins2 
for the lustful man desires pleasure1   

without which there is no sin1 although 
he does not desire sin simply1 for he   
would wish to enjoy the pleasure without
 sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,folly is       
opposed to the precepts about the       
contemplation of truth1 of which we have
 spoken above 7,q4 #af7 when we were    
treating of knowledge and understanding4
   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1
 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,folly ,is a        
,daughter of ,lust8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that folly is not a daughter 
of lust4 ,for ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1   
#de7 enumerates the daughters of lust1  
among which however he makes no mention 
of folly4 ,therefore folly does not     
proceed from lust4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #c3ai73 ,the
 wisdom of this world is foolishness    
with ,god4 ,now1 according to ,gregory  
7,moral4 x1 #bi7 the wisdom of this     
world consists in covering the heart    
with crafty devices2 and this savors of 
duplicity4 ,therefore folly is a        
daughter of duplicity rather than of    

lust4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 anger        
especially is the cause of fury and     
madness in some persons2 and this       
pertains to folly4 ,therefore folly     
arises from anger rather than from lust4
  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written      
7,prov4 #g3bb73 ,immediately he         
followeth her1 i4e4 the harlot 4 4 4 not
 knowing that he is drawn like a fool to
 bonds4  ,i answer that1 ,as already    
stated 7,a4 #b71 folly1 in so far as it 
is a sin1 is caused by the spiritual    
sense being dulled1 so as to be         
incapable of judging spiritual things4  
,now man's sense is plunged into earthly
 things chiefly by lust1 which is about 
the greatest of pleasures2 and these    
absorb the mind more than any others4   
,therefore the folly which is a sin1    
arises chiefly from lust4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,it is part of folly that a man     
should have a distaste for ,god and ,his
 gifts4 ,hence ,gregory mentions two    
daughters of lust1 pertaining to folly1 
namely1 hatred of ,god and despair of   

the life to come2 thus he divides folly 
into two parts as it were4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,these words of the ,apostle are to
 be understood1 not causally but        
essentially1 because1 to wit1 worldly   
wisdom itself is folly with ,god4 ,hence
 it does not follow that whatever       
belongs to worldly wisdom1 is a cause of
 this folly4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,anger by
 reason of its keenness1 as stated above
 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dh1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 #d71  
produces a great change in the nature of
 the body1 wherefore it conduces very   
much to the folly which results from a  
bodily impediment4 ,on the other hand   
the folly which is caused by a spiritual
 impediment1 viz4 by the mind being     
plunged into earthly things1 arises     
chiefly from lust1 as stated above4     
,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,cardinal        
,,virtues 7,,qq4 #dg-agj7   ,,question  
#dg  ,,of ,,prudence1 ,,considered ,,in 
,,itself 7,in ,sixteen ,articles7       
,after treating of the theological      
virtues1 we must in due sequence        

consider the cardinal virtues4 ,in the  
first place we shall consider prudence  
in itself2 secondly1 its parts2 thirdly1
 the corresponding gift2 fourthly1 the  
contrary vices2 fifthly1 the precepts   
concerning prudence4  ,under the first  
head there are sixteen points of        
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether prudence is in  
the will or in the reason8  7#b7 ,if in 
the reason1 whether it is only in the   
practical1 or also in the speculative   
reason8  7#c7 ,whether it takes         
cognizance of singulars8  7#d7 ,whether 
it is virtue8  7#e7 ,whether it is a    
special virtue8  7#f7 ,whether it       
appoints the end to the moral virtues8  
7#g7 ,whether it fixes the mean in the  
moral virtues8  7#h7 ,whether its proper
 act is command8  7#i7 ,whether         
solicitude or watchfulness belongs to   
prudence8  7#aj7 ,whether prudence      
extends to the governing of many8  7#aa7
 ,whether the prudence which regards    
private good is the same in species as  
that which regards the common good8     

7#ab7 ,whether prudence is in subjects1 
or only in their rulers8  7#ac7 ,whether
 prudence is in the wicked8  7#ad7      
,whether prudence is in all good men8   
7#ae7 ,whether prudence is in us        
naturally8  7#af7 ,whether prudence is  
lost by forgetfulness8   ,,first        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,prudence ,is in the ,cognitive
 or in the ,appetitive ,faculty8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
prudence is not in the cognitive but in 
the appetitive faculty4 ,for ,augustine 
says 7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4 xv73 ,prudence 
is love choosing wisely between the     
things that help and those that hinder4 
,now love is not in the cognitive1 but  
in the appetitive faculty4 ,therefore   
prudence is in the appetitive faculty4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as appears from the 
foregoing definition it belongs to      
prudence to choose wisely4 ,but choice  
is an act of the appetitive faculty1 as 
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #a74
 ,therefore prudence is not in the      

cognitive but in the appetitive faculty4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher  
says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 that in art it is 
better to err voluntarily than          
involuntarily1 whereas in the case of   
prudence1 as of the virtues1 it is      
worse4 ,now the moral virtues1 of which 
he is treating there1 are in the        
appetitive faculty1 whereas art is in   
the reason4 ,therefore prudence is in   
the appetitive rather than in the       
rational faculty4  ,on the contrary1    
,augustine says 7,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4     
#fa73 ,prudence is the knowledge of what
 to seek and what to avoid4  ,i answer  
that1 ,as ,isidore says 7,etym4 x73 ,a  
prudent man is one who sees as it were  
from afar1 for his sight is keen1 and he
 foresees the event of uncertainties4   
,now sight belongs not to the appetitive
 but to the cognitive faculty4          
,wherefore it is manifest that prudence 
belongs directly to the cognitive1 and  
not to the sensitive faculty1 because by
 the latter we know nothing but what is 

within reach and offers itself to the   
senses3 while to obtain knowledge of the
 future from knowledge of the present or
 past1 which pertains to prudence1      
belongs properly to the reason1 because 
this is done by a process of comparison4
 ,it follows therefore that prudence1   
properly speaking1 is in the reason4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,i1  
,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #d7 the will moves all the 
faculties to their acts4 ,now the first 
act of the appetitive faculty is love1  
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,,aa4
 #a1 #b74 ,accordingly prudence is said 
to be love1 not indeed essentially1 but 
in so far as love moves to the act of   
prudence4 ,wherefore ,augustine goes on 
to say that prudence is love discerning 
aright that which helps from that which 
hinders us in tending to ,god4 ,now love
 is said to discern because it moves the
 reason to discern4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,the prudent man considers things afar  
off1 in so far as they tend to be a help
 or a hindrance to that which has to be 

done at the present time4 ,hence it is  
clear that those things which prudence  
considers stand in relation to this     
other1 as in relation to the end4 ,now  
of those things that are directed to the
 end there is counsel in the reason1 and
 choice in the appetite1 of which two1  
counsel belongs more properly to        
prudence1 since the ,philosopher states 
7,ethic4 vi1 #e1 #g1 #i7 that a prudent 
man takes good counsel4 ,but as choice  
presupposes counsel1 since it is the    
desire for what has been already        
counselled 7,ethic4 iii1 #b71 it follows
 that choice can also be ascribed to    
prudence indirectly1 in so far1 to wit1 
as prudence directs the choice by means 
of counsel4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the worth
 of prudence consists not in thought    
merely1 but in its application to       
action1 which is the end of the         
practical reason4 ,wherefore if any     
defect occur in this1 it is most        
contrary to prudence1 since1 the end    
being of most import in everything1 it  

follows that a defect which touches the 
end is the worst of all4 ,hence the     
,philosopher goes on to say 7,ethic4 vi1
 #e7 that prudence is something more    
than a merely rational habit1 such as   
art is1 since1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #d7 it includes           
application to action1 which application
 is an act of the will4   ,,second      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,prudence ,belongs to the      
,practical ,reason ,alone or ,also to   
the ,speculative ,reason8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that prudence belongs
 not only to the practical1 but also to 
the speculative reason4 ,for it is      
written 7,prov4 #aj3bc73 ,wisdom is     
prudence to a man4 ,now wisdom consists 
chiefly in contemplation4 ,therefore    
prudence does also4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #bd73    
,prudence is concerned with the quest of
 truth1 and fills us with the desire of 
fuller knowledge4 ,now this belongs to  
the speculative reason4 ,therefore      

prudence resides also in the speculative
 reason4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the       
,philosopher assigns art and prudence to
 the same part of the soul 7,ethic4 vi1 
#a74 ,now art may be not only practical 
but also speculative1 as in the case of 
the liberal arts4 ,therefore prudence   
also is both practical and speculative4 
,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says
 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 that prudence is right
 reason applied to action4 ,now this    
belongs to none but the practical       
reason4 ,therefore prudence is in the   
practical reason only4  ,i answer that1 
,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
vi1 #e7 a prudent man is one who is     
capable of taking good counsel4 ,now    
counsel is about things that we have to 
do in relation to some end3 and the     
reason that deals with things to be done
 for an end is the practical reason4    
,hence it is evident that prudence      
resides only in the practical reason4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#de1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c71 wisdom considers the

 absolutely highest cause3 so that the  
consideration of the highest cause in   
any particular genus belongs to wisdom  
in that genus4 ,now in the genus of     
human acts the highest cause is the     
common end of all human life1 and it is 
this end that prudence intends4 ,for the
 ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 that
 just as he who reasons well for the    
realization of a particular end1 such as
 victory1 is said to be prudent1 not    
absolutely1 but in a particular genus1  
namely warfare1 so he that reasons well 
with regard to right conduct as a whole1
 is said to be prudent absolutely4      
,wherefore it is clear that prudence is 
wisdom about human affairs3 but not     
wisdom absolutely1 because it is not    
about the absolutely highest cause1 for 
it is about human good1 and this is not 
the best thing of all4 ,and so it is    
stated significantly that prudence is   
wisdom for man1 but not wisdom          
absolutely4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,ambrose1 
and ,tully also 7,de ,invent4 ii1 #ec7  

take the word prudence in a broad sense 
for any human knowledge1 whether        
speculative or practical4 ,and yet it   
may also be replied that the act itself 
of the speculative reason1 in so far as 
it is voluntary1 is a matter of choice  
and counsel as to its exercise2 and     
consequently comes under the direction  
of prudence4 ,on the other hand1 as     
regards its specification in relation to
 its object which is the necessary true1
 it comes under neither counsel nor     
prudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every      
application of right reason in the work 
of production belongs to art3 but to    
prudence belongs only the application of
 right reason in matters of counsel1    
which are those wherein there is no     
fixed way of obtaining the end1 as      
stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #c4 ,since then1 
the speculative reason makes things such
 as syllogisms1 propositions and the    
like1 wherein the process follows       
certain and fixed rules1 consequently in
 respect of such things it is possible  

to have the essentials of art1 but not  
of prudence2 and so we find such a thing
 as a speculative art1 but not a        
speculative prudence4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,prudence ,takes ,cognizance of
 ,singulars8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that prudence does not take        
cognizance of singulars4 ,for prudence  
is in the reason1 as stated above 7,,aa4
 #a1 #b74 ,but reason deals with        
universals1 according to ,phys4 i1 #e4  
,therefore prudence does not take       
cognizance except of universals4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 singulars are infinite in 
number4 ,but the reason cannot          
comprehend an infinite number of things4
 ,therefore prudence which is right     
reason1 is not about singulars4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 particulars are known by  
the senses4 ,but prudence is not in a   
sense1 for many persons who have keen   
outward senses are devoid of prudence4  
,therefore prudence does not take       
cognizance of singulars4  ,on the       

contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 vi1 #g7 that prudence does not 
deal with universals only1 but needs to 
take cognizance of singulars also4  ,i  
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a1  
ad #c71 to prudence belongs not only the
 consideration of the reason1 but also  
the application to action1 which is the 
end of the practical reason4 ,but no man
 can conveniently apply one thing to    
another1 unless he knows both the thing 
to be applied1 and the thing to which it
 has to be applied4 ,now actions are in 
singular matters3 and so it is necessary
 for the prudent man to know both the   
universal principles of reason1 and the 
singulars about which actions are       
concerned4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reason    
first and chiefly is concerned with     
universals1 and yet it is able to apply 
universal rules to particular cases3    
hence the conclusions of syllogisms are 
not only universal1 but also particular1
 because the intellect by a kind of     
reflection extends to matter1 as stated 

in ,de ,anima iii4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it
 is because the infinite number of      
singulars cannot be comprehended by     
human reason1 that our counsels are     
uncertain 7,wis4 #i3ad74 ,nevertheless  
experience reduces the infinity of      
singulars to a certain finite number    
which occur as a general rule1 and the  
knowledge of these suffices for human   
prudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the     
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #h71     
prudence does not reside in the external
 senses whereby we know sensible        
objects1 but in the interior sense1     
which is perfected by memory and        
experience so as to judge promptly of   
particular cases4 ,this does not mean   
however that prudence is in the interior
 sense as in its principal subject1 for 
it is chiefly in the reason1 yet by a   
kind of application it extends to this  
sense4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,prudence   
,is a ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that prudence is not a virtue4    

,for ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1
 #ac7 that prudence is the science of   
what to desire and what to avoid4 ,now  
science is condivided with virtue1 as   
appears in the ,predicaments 7vi74      
,therefore prudence is not a virtue4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no virtue  
of a virtue3 but there is a virtue of   
art1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4
 vi1 #e73 wherefore art is not a virtue4
 ,now there is prudence in art1 for it  
is written 7#b ,paralip4 ii1 #ad7       
concerning ,hiram1 that he knew to grave
 all sort of graving1 and to devise     
ingeniously 7prudenter7 all that there  
may be need of in the work4 ,therefore  
prudence is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 no virtue can be immoderate4  
,but prudence is immoderate1 else it    
would be useless to say 7,prov4 #bc3d73 
,set bounds to thy prudence4 ,therefore 
prudence is not a virtue4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,gregory states 7,moral4 ii1  
#di7 that prudence1 temperance1         
fortitude and justice are four virtues4 

,i answer that1 ,as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ef1 ,a4 
#a7 when we were treating of virtues in 
general1 virtue is that which makes its 
possessor good1 and his work good       
likewise4 ,now good may be understood in
 a twofold sense3 first1 materially1 for
 the thing that is good1 secondly1      
formally1 under the aspect of good4     
,good1 under the aspect of good1 is the 
object of the appetitive power4 ,hence  
if any habits rectify the consideration 
of reason1 without regarding the        
rectitude of the appetite1 they have    
less of the nature of a virtue since    
they direct man to good materially1 that
 is to say1 to the thing which is good1 
but without considering it under the    
aspect of good4 ,on the other hand those
 virtues which regard the rectitude of  
the appetite1 have more of the nature of
 virtue1 because they consider the good 
not only materially1 but also formally1 
in other words1 they consider that which
 is good under the aspect of good4  ,now

 it belongs to prudence1 as stated above
 7,a4 #a1 ad #c2 ,a4 #c7 to apply right 
reason to action1 and this is not done  
without a right appetite4 ,hence        
prudence has the nature of virtue not   
only as the other intellectual virtues  
have it1 but also as the moral virtues  
have it1 among which virtues it is      
enumerated4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine
 there takes science in the broad sense 
for any kind of right reason4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,the ,philosopher says that   
there is a virtue of art1 because art   
does not require rectitude of the       
appetite2 wherefore in order that a man 
may make right use of his art1 he needs 
to have a virtue which will rectify his 
appetite4 ,prudence however has nothing 
to do with the matter of art1 because   
art is both directed to a particular    
end1 and has fixed means of obtaining   
that end4 ,and yet1 by a kind of        
comparison1 a man may be said to act    
prudently in matters of art4 ,moreover  
in certain arts1 on account of the      

uncertainty of the means for obtaining  
the end1 there is need for counsel1 as  
for instance in the arts of medicine and
 navigation1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1  
#c4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this saying of   
the wise man does not mean that prudence
 itself should be moderate1 but that    
moderation must be imposed on other     
things according to prudence4   ,,fifth 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #e  
,whether ,prudence ,is a ,special       
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that prudence is not a special virtue4  
,for no special virtue is included in   
the definition of virtue in general1    
since virtue is defined 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7
 an elective habit that follows a mean  
appointed by reason in relation to      
ourselves1 even as a wise man decides4  
,now right reason is reason in          
accordance with prudence1 as stated in  
,ethic4 vi1 #ac4 ,therefore prudence is 
not a special virtue4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4
 vi1 #ac7 that the effect of moral      

virtue is right action as regards the   
end1 and that of prudence1 right action 
as regards the means4 ,now in every     
virtue certain things have to be done as
 means to the end4 ,therefore prudence  
is in every virtue1 and consequently is 
not a special virtue4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 a special virtue has a special
 object4 ,but prudence has not a special
 object1 for it is right reason applied 
to action 7,ethic4 vi1 #e72 and all     
works of virtue are actions4 ,therefore 
prudence is not a special virtue4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,it is distinct from and  
numbered among the other virtues1 for it
 is written 7,wis4 #h3g73 ,she teacheth 
temperance and prudence1 justice and    
fortitude4  ,i answer that1 ,since acts 
and habits take their species from their
 objects1 as shown above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#a1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ed1   
,a4 #b71 any habit that has a           
corresponding special object1 distinct  
from other objects1 must needs be a     
special habit1 and if it be a good      

habit1 it must be a special virtue4 ,now
 an object is called special1 not merely
 according to the consideration of its  
matter1 but rather according to its     
formal aspect1 as explained above       
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a74      
,because one and the same thing is the  
subject matter of the acts of different 
habits1 and also of different powers1   
according to its different formal       
aspects4 ,now a yet greater difference  
of object is requisite for a difference 
of powers than for a difference of      
habits1 since several habits are found  
in the same power1 as stated above      
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #a74             
,consequently any difference in the     
aspect of an object1 that requires a    
difference of powers1 will a fortiori   
require a difference of habits4         
,accordingly we must say that since     
prudence is in the reason1 as stated    
above 7,a4 #b71 it is differentiated    
from the other intellectual virtues by a
 material difference of objects4        

,wisdom1    knowledge and understanding 
are about necessary things1 whereas art 
and prudence are about contingent       
things1 art being concerned with things 
made1 that is1 with things produced in  
external matter1 such as a house1 a     
knife and so forth2 and prudence1 being 
concerned with things done1 that is1    
with things that have their being in the
 doer himself1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #d74 ,on the other hand   
prudence is differentiated from the     
moral virtues according to a formal     
aspect distinctive of powers1 i4e4 the  
intellective power1 wherein is prudence1
 and the appetitive power1 wherein is   
moral virtue4 ,hence it is evident that 
prudence is a special virtue1 distinct  
from all other virtues4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,this is not a definition of virtue 
in general1 but of moral virtue1 the    
definition of which fittingly includes  
an intellectual virtue1 viz41 prudence1 
which has the same matter in common with
 moral virtue2 because1 just as the     

subject of moral virtue is something    
that partakes of reason1 so moral virtue
 has the aspect of virtue1 in so far as 
it partakes of intellectual virtue4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument proves  
that prudence helps all the virtues1 and
 works in all of them2 but this does not
 suffice to prove that it is not a      
special virtue2 for nothing prevents a  
certain genus from containing a species 
which is operative in every other       
species of that same genus1 even as the 
sun has an influence over all bodies4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,things done are indeed
 the matter of prudence1 in so far as   
they are the object of reason1 that is1 
considered as true3 but they are the    
matter of the moral virtues1 in so far  
as they are the object of the appetitive
 power1 that is1 considered as good4    
,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1   
,art4 #f  ,whether ,prudence ,appoints  
the ,end to ,moral ,virtues8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that prudence       
appoints the end to moral virtues4      

,since prudence is in the reason1 while 
moral virtue is in the appetite1 it     
seems that prudence stands in relation  
to moral virtue1 as reason to the       
appetite4 ,now reason appoints the end  
to the appetitive power4 ,therefore     
prudence appoints the end to the moral  
virtues4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man       
surpasses irrational beings by his      
reason1 but he has other things in      
common with them4 ,accordingly the other
 parts of man are in relation to his    
reason1 what man is in relation to      
irrational creatures4 ,now man is the   
end of irrational creatures1 according  
to ,polit4 i1 #c4 ,therefore all the    
other parts of man are directed to      
reason as to their end4 ,but prudence is
 right reason applied to action1 as     
stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore all   
actions are directed to prudence as     
their end4 ,therefore prudence appoints 
the end to all moral virtues4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 it belongs to the virtue1    
art1 or power that is concerned about   

the end1 to command the virtues or arts 
that are concerned about the means4 ,now
 prudence disposes of the other moral   
virtues1 and commands them4 ,therefore  
it appoints their end to them4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 vi1 #ab7 that moral virtue     
ensures the rectitude of the intention  
of the end1 while prudence ensures the  
rectitude of the means4 ,therefore it   
does not belong to prudence to appoint  
the end to moral virtues1 but only to   
regulate the means4  ,i answer that1    
,the end of moral virtues is human good4
 ,now the good of the human soul is to  
be in accord with reason1 as ,dionysius 
declares 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,wherefore   
the ends of moral virtue must of        
necessity pre-exist in the reason4      
,now1 just as1 in the speculative       
reason1 there are certain things        
naturally known1 about which is         
understanding1 and certain things of    
which we obtain knowledge through them1 
viz4 conclusions1 about which is        

science1 so in the practical reason1    
certain things pre-exist1 as naturally  
known principles1 and such are the ends 
of the moral virtues1 since the end is  
in practical matters what principles are
 in speculative matters1 as stated above
 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #g1 ad #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#ac1 ,a4 #c72 while certain things are  
in the practical reason by way of       
conclusions1 and such are the means     
which we gather from the ends           
themselves4 ,about these is prudence1   
which applies universal principles to   
the particular conclusions of practical 
matters4 ,consequently it does not      
belong to prudence to appoint the end to
 moral virtues1 but only to regulate the
 means4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,natural      
reason known by the name of synderesis  
appoints the end to moral virtues1 as   
stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #ab73 but
 prudence does not do this for the      
reason given above4  ,this suffices for 
the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the end concerns the  

moral virtues1 not as though they       
appointed the end1 but because they tend
 to the end which is appointed by       
natural reason4 ,in this they are helped
 by prudence1 which prepares the way for
 them1 by disposing the means4 ,hence it
 follows that prudence is more excellent
 than the moral virtues1 and moves them3
 yet synderesis moves prudence1 just as 
the understanding of principles moves   
science4   ,,seventh ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,it ,belongs to ,prudence to ,find the  
,mean in ,moral ,virtues8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that it does not     
belong to prudence to find the mean in  
moral virtues4 ,for the achievement of  
the mean is the end of moral virtues4   
,but prudence does not appoint the end  
to moral virtues1 as shown above 7,a4   
#f74 ,therefore it does not find the    
mean in them4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that 
which of itself has being1 would seem to
 have no cause1 but its very being is   
its cause1 since a thing is said to have

 being by reason of its cause4 ,now to  
follow the mean belongs to moral virtue 
by reason of itself1 as part of its     
definition1 as shown above 7,a4 #e1     
,obj4 #a74 ,therefore prudence does not 
cause the mean in moral virtues4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 prudence works after the  
manner of reason4 ,but moral virtue     
tends to the mean after the manner of   
nature1 because1 as ,tully states 7,de  
,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1 #ec71 virtue is a   
habit like a second nature in accord    
with reason4 ,therefore prudence does   
not appoint the mean to moral virtues4  
,on the contrary1 ,in the foregoing     
definition of moral virtue 7,a4 #e1     
,obj4 #a7 it is stated that it follows a
 mean appointed by reason 4 4 4 even as 
a wise man decides4  ,i answer that1    
,the proper end of each moral virtue    
consists precisely in conformity with   
right reason4 ,for temperance intends   
that man should not stray from reason   
for the sake of his concupiscences2     
fortitude1 that he should not stray from

 the right judgment of reason through   
fear or daring4 ,moreover this end is   
appointed to man according to natural   
reason1 since natural reason dictates to
 each one that he should act according  
to reason4  ,but it belongs to the      
ruling of prudence to decide in what    
manner and by what means man shall      
obtain the mean of reason in his deeds4 
,for though the attainment of the mean  
is the end of a moral virtue1 yet this  
mean is found by the right disposition  
of these things that are directed to the
 end4  ,this suffices for the ,reply to 
the ,first ,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,just as a natural agent makes form to 
be in matter1 yet does not make that    
which is essential to the form to belong
 to it1 so too1 prudence appoints the   
mean in passions and operations1 and yet
 does not make the searching of the mean
 to belong to virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,moral virtue after the manner of nature
 intends to attain the mean4 ,since1    
however1 the mean as such is not found  

in all matters after the same manner1 it
 follows that the inclination of nature 
which ever works in the same manner1    
does not suffice for this purpose1 and  
so the ruling of prudence is required4  
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1  
,art4 #h  ,whether ,command ,is the     
,chief ,act of ,prudence8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that command is not  
the chief act of prudence4 ,for command 
regards the good to be ensued4 ,now     
,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #i7 states  
that it is an act of prudence to avoid  
ambushes4 ,therefore command is not the 
chief act of prudence4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4
 vi1 #e7 that the prudent man takes good
 counsel4 ,now to take counsel and to   
command seem to be different acts1 as   
appears from what has been said above   
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore  
command is not the chief act of         
prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it seems 
to belong to the will to command and to 
rule1 since the will has the end for its

 object1 and moves the other powers of  
the soul4 ,now prudence is not in the   
will1 but in the reason4 ,therefore     
command is not an act of prudence4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says    
7,ethic4 vi1 #aj7 that prudence         
commands4  ,i answer that1 ,prudence is 
right reason applied to action1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,hence that which
 is the chief act of reason in regard to
 action must needs be the chief act of  
prudence4 ,now there are three such     
acts4 ,the first is to take counsel1    
which belongs to discovery1 for counsel 
is an act of inquiry1 as stated above   
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #a74 ,the second 
act is to judge of what one has         
discovered1 and this is an act of the   
speculative reason4 ,but the practical  
reason1 which is directed to action1    
goes further1 and its third act is to   
command1 which act consists in applying 
to action the things counselled and     
judged4 ,and since this act approaches  
nearer to the end of the practical      

reason1 it follows that it is the chief 
act of the practical reason1 and        
consequently of prudence4  ,in          
confirmation of this we find that the   
perfection of art consists in judging   
and not in commanding3 wherefore he who 
sins voluntarily against his craft is   
reputed a better craftsman than he who  
does so involuntarily1 because the      
former seems to do so from right        
judgment1 and the latter from a         
defective judgment4 ,on the other hand  
it is the reverse in prudence1 as stated
 in ,ethic4 vi1 #e1 for it is more      
imprudent to sin voluntarily1 since this
 is to be lacking in the chief act of   
prudence1 viz4 command1 than to sin     
involuntarily4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the   
act of command extends both to the      
ensuing of good and to the avoidance of 
evil4 ,nevertheless ,augustine ascribes 
the avoidance of ambushes to prudence1  
not as its chief act1 but as an act of  
prudence that does not continue in      
heaven4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good counsel 

is required in order that the good      
things discovered may be applied to     
action3 wherefore command belongs to    
prudence which takes good counsel4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,simply to move belongs
 to the will3 but command denotes motion
 together with a kind of ordering1      
wherefore it is an act of the reason1 as
 stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,a4    
#a74   ,,ninth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 
#dg1 ,art4 #i  ,whether ,solicitude     
,belongs to ,prudence8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that solicitude does not 
belong to prudence4 ,for solicitude     
implies disquiet1 wherefore ,isidore    
says 7,etym4 x7 that a solicitous man is
 a restless man4 ,now motion belongs    
chiefly to the appetitive power3        
wherefore solicitude does also4 ,but    
prudence is not in the appetitive power1
 but in the reason1 as stated above 7,a4
 #a74 ,therefore solicitude does not    
belong to prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 the certainty of truth seems opposed to
 solicitude1 wherefore it is related 7#a

 ,kings #i3bj7 that ,samuel said to     
,saul3 ,as for the asses which were lost
 three days ago1 be not solicitous1     
because they are found4 ,now the        
certainty of truth belongs to prudence1 
since it is an intellectual virtue4     
,therefore solicitude is in opposition  
to prudence rather than belonging to it4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher  
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 the magnanimous   
man is slow and leisurely4 ,now slowness
 is contrary to solicitude4 ,since then 
prudence is not opposed to magnanimity1 
for good is not opposed to good1 as     
stated in the ,predicaments 7viii7 it   
would seem that solicitude does not     
belong to prudence4  ,on the contrary1  
,it is written 7#a ,pet4 #d3g73 ,be     
prudent 4 4 4 and watch in prayers4 ,but
 watchfulness is the same as solicitude4
 ,therefore solicitude belongs to       
prudence4  ,i answer that1 ,according to
 ,isidore 7,etym4 x71 a man is said to  
be solicitous through being shrewd      
7solers7 and alert 7citus71 in so far as

 a man through a certain shrewdness of  
mind is on the alert to do whatever has 
to be done4 ,now this belongs to        
prudence1 whose chief act is a command  
about what has been already counselled  
and judged in matters of action4 ,hence 
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #i7  
that one should be quick in carrying out
 the counsel taken1 but slow in taking  
counsel4 ,hence it is that solicitude   
belongs properly to prudence1 and for   
this reason ,augustine says 7,de ,morib4
 ,eccl4 xxiv7 that prudence keeps most  
careful watch and ward1 lest by degrees 
we be deceived unawares by evil counsel4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,movement belongs to 
the appetitive power as to the principle
 of movement1 in accordance however1    
with the direction and command of       
reason1 wherein solicitude consists4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to the      
,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #c71 equal     
certainty should not be sought in all   
things1 but in each matter according to 
its proper mode4 ,and since the matter  

of prudence is the contingent singulars 
about which are human actions1 the      
certainty of prudence cannot be so great
 as to be devoid of all solicitude4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the magnanimous man is
 said to be slow and leisurely not      
because he is solicitous about nothing1 
but because he is not over-solicitous   
about many things1 and is trustful in   
matters where he ought to have trust1   
and is not over-solicitous about them3  
for over-much fear and distrust are the 
cause of over-solicitude1 since fear    
makes us take counsel1 as stated above  
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #b7 when we were 
treating of the passion of fear4        
,,tenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1   
,art4 #aj  ,whether ,solicitude ,belongs
 to ,prudence8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that prudence does not extend to  
the governing of many1 but only to the  
government of oneself4 ,for the         
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that  
virtue directed to the common good is   
justice4 ,but prudence differs from     

justice4 ,therefore prudence is not     
directed to the common good4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 he seems to be prudent1 who   
seeks and does good for himself4 ,now   
those who seek the common good often    
neglect their own4 ,therefore they are  
not prudent4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
prudence is specifically distinct from  
temperance and fortitude4 ,but          
temperance and fortitude seem to be     
related only to a man's own good4       
,therefore the same applies to prudence4
  ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said     
7,matt4 #bd3de73 ,who1 thinkest thou1 is
 a faithful and prudent ,douay3 'wise'  
servant whom his lord hath appointed    
over his family8  ,i answer that1       
,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
vi1 #h7 some have held that prudence    
does not extend to the common good1 but 
only to the good of the individual1 and 
this because they thought that man is   
not bound to seek other than his own    
good4 ,but this opinion is opposed to   
charity1 which seeketh not her own 7#a  

,cor4 #ac3e73 wherefore the ,apostle    
says of himself 7#a ,cor4 #aj3cc73 ,not 
seeking that which is profitable to     
myself1 but to many1 that they may be   
saved4 ,moreover it is contrary to right
 reason1 which judges the common good to
 be better than the good of the         
individual4  ,accordingly1 since it     
belongs to prudence rightly to counsel1 
judge1 and command concerning the means 
of obtaining a due end1 it is evident   
that prudence regards not only the      
private good of the individual1 but also
 the common good of the multitude4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is   
speaking there of moral virtue4 ,now    
just as every moral virtue that is      
directed to the common good is called   
legal justice1 so the prudence that is  
directed to the common good is called   
political prudence1 for the latter      
stands in the same relation to legal    
justice1 as prudence simply so called to
 moral virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he    
that seeks the good of the many1 seeks  

in consequence his own good1 for two    
reasons4 ,first1 because the individual 
good is impossible without the common   
good of the family1 state1 or kingdom4  
,hence ,valerius ,maximus says 99,fact4 
et ,dict4 ,memor4 iv1 #f of the ancient 
,romans that they would rather be poor  
in a rich empire than rich in a poor    
empire4 ,secondly1 because1 since man is
 a part of the home and state1 he must  
needs consider what is good for him by  
being prudent about the good of the     
many4 ,for the good disposition of parts
 depends on their relation to the whole2
 thus ,augustine says 7,confess4 iii1   
#h7 that any part which does not        
harmonize with its whole1 is offensive4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even temperance and   
fortitude can be directed to the common 
good1 hence there are precepts of law   
concerning them as stated in ,ethic4 v1 
#a3 more so1 however1 prudence and      
justice1 since these belong to the      
rational faculty which directly regards 
the universal1 just as the sensitive    

part regards singulars4   ,,eleventh    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #aa 
,whether ,prudence ,about ,one's ,own   
,good ,is ,specifically the ,same ,as   
,that ,which ,extends to the ,common    
,good8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that   
prudence about one's own good is the    
same specifically as that which extends 
to the common good4 ,for the            
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #h7 that 
political prudence1 and prudence are the
 same habit1 yet their essence is not   
the same4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the      
,philosopher says 7,polit4 iii1 #b7 that
 virtue is the same in a good man and in
 a good ruler4 ,now political prudence  
is chiefly in the ruler1 in whom it is  
architectonic1 as it were4 ,since then  
prudence is a virtue of a good man1 it  
seems that prudence and political       
prudence are the same habit4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 a habit is not diversified in 
species or essence by things which are  
subordinate to one another4 ,but the    
particular good1 which belongs to       

prudence simply so called1 is           
subordinate to the common good1 which   
belongs to political prudence4          
,therefore prudence and political       
prudence differ neither specifically nor
 essentially4  ,on the contrary1        
,political prudence1 which is directed  
to the common good of the state1        
domestic economy which is of such things
 as relate to the common good of the    
household or family1 and monastic       
economy which is concerned with things  
affecting the good of one person1 are   
all distinct sciences4 ,therefore in    
like manner there are different kinds of
 prudence1 corresponding to the above   
differences of matter4  ,i answer that1 
,as stated above 7,a4 #e2 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4  
#b1 ad #a71 the species of habits differ
 according to the difference of object  
considered in its formal aspect4 ,now   
the formal aspect of all things directed
 to the end1 is taken from the end      
itself1 as shown above 7,i-,,ii1        
,prolog42 ,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #a71 wherefore  

the species of habits differ by their   
relation to different ends4 ,again the  
individual good1 the good of the family1
 and the good of the city and kingdom   
are different ends4 ,wherefore there    
must needs be different species of      
prudence corresponding to these         
different ends1 so that one is prudence 
simply so called1 which is directed to  
one's own good2 another1 domestic       
prudence which is directed to the common
 good of the home2 and a third1         
political prudence1 which is directed to
 the common good of the state or        
kingdom4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the         
,philosopher means1 not that political  
prudence is substantially the same habit
 as any kind of prudence1 but that it is
 the same as the prudence which is      
directed to the common good4 ,this is   
called prudence in respect of the common
 notion of prudence1 i4e4 as being right
 reason applied to action1 while it is  
called political1 as being directed to  
the common good4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as  

the ,philosopher declares 7,polit4 iii1 
#b71 it belongs to a good man to be able
 to rule well and to obey well1         
wherefore the virtue of a good man      
includes also that of a good ruler4 ,yet
 the virtue of the ruler and of the     
subject differs specifically1 even as   
the virtue of a man and of a woman1 as  
stated by the same authority 7,polit4   
iii1 #b74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even       
different ends1 one of which is         
subordinate to the other1 diversify the 
species of a habit1 thus for instance1  
habits directed to riding1 soldiering1  
and civic life1 differ specifically     
although their ends are subordinate to  
one another4 ,in like manner1 though the
 good of the individual is subordinate  
to the good of the many1 that does not  
prevent this difference from making the 
habits differ specifically2 but it      
follows that the habit which is directed
 to the last end is above the other     
habits and commands them4   ,,twelfth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #ab 

,whether ,prudence ,is in ,subjects1 or 
,only in ,their ,rulers8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that prudence is not in 
subjects but only in their rulers4 ,for 
the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 iii1 #b7 
that prudence alone is the virtue proper
 to a ruler1 while other virtues are    
common to subjects and rulers1 and the  
prudence of the subject is not a virtue 
but a true opinion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 it is stated in ,polit4 i1 #e that a   
slave is not competent to take counsel4 
,but prudence makes a man take good     
counsel 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74 ,therefore    
prudence is not befitting slaves or     
subjects4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 prudence 
exercises command1 as stated above 7,a4 
#h74 ,but command is not in the         
competency of slaves or subjects but    
only of rulers4 ,therefore prudence is  
not in subjects but only in rulers4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says   
7,ethic4 vi1 #h7 that there are two     
kinds of political prudence1 one of     
which is legislative and belongs to     

rulers1 while the other retains the     
common name political1 and is about     
individual actions4 ,now it belongs also
 to subjects to perform these individual
 actions4 ,therefore prudence is not    
only in rulers but also in subjects4  ,i
 answer that1 ,prudence is in the       
reason4 ,now ruling and governing belong
 properly to the reason2 and therefore  
it is proper to a man to reason and be  
prudent in so far as he has a share in  
ruling and governing4 ,but it is evident
 that the subject as subject1 and the   
slave as slave1 are not competent to    
rule and govern1 but rather to be ruled 
and governed4 ,therefore prudence is not
 the virtue of a slave as slave1 nor of 
a subject as subject4  ,since1 however1 
every man1 for as much as he is         
rational1 has a share in ruling         
according to the judgment of reason1 he 
is proportionately competent to have    
prudence4 ,wherefore it is manifest that
 prudence is in the ruler after the     
manner of a mastercraft 7,ethic4 vi1    

#h71 but in the subjects1 after the     
manner of a handicraft4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,the saying of the ,philosopher is  
to be understood strictly1 namely1 that 
prudence is not the virtue of a subject 
as such4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a slave is  
not capable of taking counsel1 in so far
 as he is a slave 7for thus he is the   
instrument of his master71 but he does  
take counsel in so far as he is a       
rational animal4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,by  
prudence a man commands not only others1
 but also himself1 in so far as the     
reason is said to command the lower     
powers4   ,,thirteenth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #ac  ,whether 
,prudence ,can ,be in ,sinners8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there
 can be prudence in sinners4 ,for our   
,lord said 7,luke #af3h73 ,the children 
of this world are more prudent ,douay3  
'wiser' in their generation than the    
children of light4 ,now the children of 
this world are sinners4 ,therefore there
 be prudence in sinners4  ,obj4 #b3     

,further1 faith is a more excellent     
virtue than prudence4 ,but there can be 
faith in sinners4 ,therefore there can  
be prudence also4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
according to ,ethic4 vi1 #g1 we say that
 to be of good counsel is the work of   
prudent man especially4 ,now many       
sinners can take good counsel4          
,therefore sinners can have prudence4   
,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher     
declares 7,ethic4 vi1 #ab7 that it is   
impossible for a man be prudent unless  
he be good4 ,now no sinner is a good    
man4 ,therefore no sinner is prudent4   
,i answer that1 ,prudence is threefold4 
,there is a false prudence1 which takes 
its name from its likeness to true      
prudence4 ,for since a prudent man is   
one who disposes well of the things that
 have to be done for a good end1 whoever
 disposes well of such things as are    
fitting for an evil end1 has false      
prudence1 in far as that which he takes 
for an end1 is good1 not in truth but in
 appearance4 ,thus man is called a good 

robber1 and in this way may speak of a  
prudent robber1 by way of similarity1   
because he devises fitting ways of      
committing robbery4 ,this is the        
prudence of which the ,apostle says     
7,rom4 #h3f73 ,the prudence ,douay3     
'wisdom' of the flesh is death1 because1
 to wit1 it places its ultimate end in  
the pleasures of the flesh4  ,the second
 prudence is indeed true prudence1      
because it devises fitting ways of      
obtaining a good end2 and yet it is     
imperfect1 from a twofold source4       
,first1 because the good which it takes 
for an end1 is not the common end of all
 human life1 but of some particular     
affair2 thus when a man devises fitting 
ways of conducting business or of       
sailing a ship1 he is called a prudent  
businessman1 or a prudent sailor2       
secondly1 because he fails in the chief 
act of prudence1 as when a man takes    
counsel aright1 and forms a good        
judgment1 even about things concerning  
life as a whole1 but fails to make an   

effective command4  ,the third prudence 
is both true and perfect1 for it takes  
counsel1 judges and commands aright in  
respect of the good end of man's whole  
life3 and this alone is prudence simply 
so-called1 and cannot be in sinners1    
whereas the first prudence is in sinners
 alone1 while imperfect prudence is     
common to good and wicked men1          
especially that which is imperfect      
through being directed to a particular  
end1 since that which is imperfect on   
account of a failing in the chief act1  
is only in the wicked4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,this saying of our ,lord is to be     
understood of the first prudence1       
wherefore it is not said that they are  
prudent absolutely1 but that they are   
prudent in their generation4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,the nature of faith consists 
not in conformity with the appetite for 
certain right actions1 but in knowledge 
alone4 ,on the other hand prudence      
implies a relation to a right appetite4 
,first because its principles are the   

ends in matters of action2 and of such  
ends one forms a right estimate through 
the habits of moral virtue1 which       
rectify the appetite3 wherefore without 
the moral virtues there is no prudence1 
as shown above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4   
#e72 secondly because prudence commands 
right actions1 which does not happen    
unless the appetite be right4 ,wherefore
 though faith on account of its object  
is more excellent than prudence1 yet    
prudence1 by its very nature1 is more   
opposed to sin1 which arises from a     
disorder of the appetite4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,sinners can take good counsel for  
an evil end1 or for some particular     
good1 but they do not perfectly take    
good counsel for the end of their whole 
life1 since they do not carry that      
counsel into effect4 ,hence they lack   
prudence which is directed to the good  
only2 and yet in them1 according to the 
,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #ab7 there is 
cleverness1 99deinotike i4e4 natural    
diligence which may be directed to both 

good and evil2 or cunning1 99panourgia  
which is directed only to evil1 and     
which we have stated above1 to be false 
prudence or prudence of the flesh4      
,,fourteenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4   
#dg1 ,art4 #ad  ,whether ,prudence ,is  
in ,all ,who ,have ,grace8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that prudence is not 
in all who have grace4 ,prudence        
requires diligence1 that one may foresee
 aright what has to be done4 ,but many  
who have grace have not this diligence4 
,therefore not all who have grace have  
prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a prudent
 man is one who takes good counsel1 as  
stated above 7,a4 #h1 ,obj4 #b2 ,a4 #ac1
 ,obj4 #c74 ,yet many have grace who do 
not take good counsel1 and need to be   
guided by the counsel of others4        
,therefore not all who have grace1 have 
prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the      
,philosopher says 7,topic4 iii1 #b7 that
 young people are not obviously prudent4
 ,yet many young people have grace4     
,therefore prudence is not to be found  

in all who have grace4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,no man has grace unless he be
 virtuous4 ,now no man can be virtuous  
without prudence1 for ,gregory says     
7,moral4 ii1 #df7 that the other virtues
 cannot be virtues at all unless they   
effect prudently what they desire to    
accomplish4 ,therefore all who have     
grace have prudence4  ,i answer that1   
,the virtues must needs be connected    
together1 so that whoever has one has   
all1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 
,a4 #a74 ,now  whoever has grace has    
charity1 so that he must needs have all 
the other virtues1 and hence1 since     
prudence is a virtue1 as shown above    
7,a4 #d71 he must1 of necessity1 have   
prudence also4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,diligence is twofold3 one is merely    
sufficient with regard to things        
necessary for salvation2 and such       
diligence is given to all who have      
grace1 whom ,his unction teacheth of all
 things 7#a ,john #b3bg74 ,there is also
 another diligence which is more than   

sufficient1 whereby a man is able to    
make provision both for himself and for 
others1 not only in matters necessary   
for salvation1 but also in all things   
relating to human life2 and such        
diligence as this is not in all who have
 grace4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who    
require to be guided by the counsel of  
others1 are able1 if they have grace1 to
 take counsel for themselves in this    
point at least1 that they require the   
counsel of others and can discern good  
from evil counsel4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,acquired prudence is caused by the     
exercise of acts1 wherefore its         
acquisition demands experience and time 
7,ethic4 ii1 #a71 hence it cannot be in 
the young1 neither in habit nor in act4 
,on the other hand gratuitous prudence  
is caused by divine infusion4           
,wherefore1 in children who have been   
baptized but have not come to the use of
 reason1 there is prudence as to habit  
but not as to act1 even as in idiots2   
whereas in those who have come to the   

use of reason1 it is also as to act1    
with regard to things necessary for     
salvation4 ,this by practice merits     
increase1 until it becomes perfect1 even
 as the other virtues4 ,hence the       
,apostle says 7,heb4 #e3ad7 that strong 
meat is for the perfect1 for them who by
 custom have their senses exercised to  
the discerning of good and evil4        
,,fifteenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    
#dg1 ,art4 #ae  ,whether ,prudence ,is  
in ,us by ,nature8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that prudence is in us by    
nature4 ,the ,philosopher says that     
things connected with prudence seem to  
be natural1 namely synesis1 gnome       
99synesis and gnome1 ,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#eg1 ,a4 #f and the like1 but not those 
which are connected with speculative    
wisdom4 ,now things belonging to the    
same genus have the same kind of origin4
 ,therefore prudence also is in us from 
nature4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the changes
 of age are according to nature4 ,now   
prudence results from age1 according to 

,job #ab3ab3 ,in the ancient is wisdom1 
and in length of days prudence4         
,therefore prudence is natural4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 prudence is more          
consistent with human nature than with  
that of dumb animals4 ,now there are    
instances of a certain natural prudence 
in dumb animals1 according to the       
,philosopher 7,de ,hist4 ,anim4 viii1   
#a74 ,therefore prudence is natural4    
,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says
 7,ethic4 ii1 #a7 that intellectual     
virtue is both originated and fostered  
by teaching2 it therefore demands       
experience and time4 ,now prudence is an
 intellectual virtue1 as stated above   
7,a4 #d74 ,therefore prudence is in us1 
not by nature1 but by teaching and      
experience4  ,i answer that1 ,as shown  
above 7,a4 #c71 prudence includes       
knowledge both of universals1 and of the
 singular matters of action to which    
prudence applies the universal          
principles4 ,accordingly1 as regards the
 knowledge of universals1 the same is to

 be said of prudence as of speculative  
science1 because the primary universal  
principles of either are known          
naturally1 as shown above 7,a4 #f73     
except that the common principles of    
prudence are more connatural to man2 for
 as the ,philosopher remarks 7,ethic4 x1
 #g7 the life which is according to the 
speculative reason is better than that  
which is according to man3 whereas the  
secondary universal principles1 whether 
of the speculative or of the practical  
reason1 are not inherited from nature1  
but are acquired by discovery through   
experience1 or through teaching4  ,on   
the other hand1 as regards the knowledge
 of particulars which are the matter of 
action1 we must make a further          
distinction1 because this matter of     
action is either an end or the means to 
an end4 ,now the right ends of human    
life are fixed2 wherefore there can be a
 natural inclination in respect of these
 ends2 thus it has been stated above    
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #fc1 ,a4 

#a7 that some1 from a natural           
inclination1 have certain virtues       
whereby they are inclined to right ends2
 and consequently they also have        
naturally a right judgment about such   
like ends4  ,but the means to the end1  
in human concerns1 far from being fixed1
 are of manifold variety according to   
the variety of persons and affairs4     
,wherefore since the inclination of     
nature is ever to something fixed1 the  
knowledge of those means cannot be in   
man naturally1 although1 by reason of   
his natural disposition1 one man has a  
greater aptitude than another in        
discerning them1 just as it happens with
 regard to the conclusions of           
speculative sciences4 ,since then       
prudence is not about the ends1 but     
about the means1 as stated above 7,a4   
#f2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #e71 it       
follows that prudence is not from       
nature4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the          
,philosopher is speaking there of things
 relating to prudence1 in so far as they

 are directed to ends4 ,wherefore he had
 said before 7,ethic4 vi1 #e1 #aa7 that 
they are the principles of the ou heneka
 99,literally1 'for the sake of which'  
7are the means71 namely1 the end2 and so
 he does not mention euboulia among     
them1 because it takes counsel about the
 means4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,prudence is  
rather in the old1 not only because     
their natural disposition calms the     
movement of the sensitive passions1 but 
also because of their long experience4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even in dumb animals  
there are fixed ways of obtaining an    
end1 wherefore we observe that all the  
animals of a same species act in like   
manner4 ,but this is impossible in man1 
on account of his reason1 which takes   
cognizance of universals1 and           
consequently extends to an infinity of  
singulars4   ,,sixteenth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #af  ,whether 
,prudence ,can ,be ,lost ,through       
,forgetfulness8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that prudence can be lost    

through forgetfulness4 ,for since       
science is about necessary things1 it is
 more certain than prudence which is    
about contingent matters of action4 ,but
 science is lost by forgetfulness4 ,much
 more therefore is prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 as the ,philosopher says      
7,ethic4 ii1 #c7 the same things1 but by
 a contrary process1 engender and       
corrupt virtue4 ,now the engendering of 
prudence requires experience which is   
made up of many memories1 as he states  
at the beginning of his ,metaphysics 7i1
 #a74 ,therefore since forgetfulness is 
contrary to memory1 it seems that       
prudence can be lost through            
forgetfulness4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
there is no prudence without knowledge  
of universals4 ,but knowledge of        
universals can be lost through          
forgetfulness4 ,therefore prudence can  
also4  ,on the contrary1 ,the           
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 that 
forgetfulness is possible to art but not
 to prudence4  ,i answer that1          

,forgetfulness regards knowledge only1  
wherefore one can forget art and        
science1 so as to lose them altogether1 
because they belong to the reason4 ,but 
prudence consists not in knowledge      
alone1 but also in an act of the        
appetite1 because as stated above 7,a4  
#h71 its principal act is one of        
command1 whereby a man applies the      
knowledge he has1 to the purpose of     
appetition and operation4 ,hence        
prudence is not taken away directly by  
forgetfulness1 but rather is corrupted  
by the passions4 ,for the ,philosopher  
says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 that pleasure and 
sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence3
 wherefore it is written 7,dan4 #ac3ef73
 ,beauty hath deceived thee1 and lust   
hath subverted thy heart1 and 7,ex4     
#bc3h73 ,neither shalt thou take bribes 
which blind even the prudent ,douay3    
'wise'4  ,nevertheless forgetfulness may
 hinder prudence1 in so far as the      
latter's command depends on knowledge   
which may be forgotten4  ,reply ,obj4   

#a3 ,science is in the reason only3     
hence the comparison fails1 as stated   
above 99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1 ,a4 #a4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the experience        
required by prudence results not from   
memory alone1 but also from the practice
 of commanding aright4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,prudence consists chiefly1 not in the 
knowledge of universals1 but in applying
 them to action1 as stated above 7,a4   
#c74 ,wherefore forgetting the knowledge
 of universals does not destroy the     
principal part of prudence1 but hinders 
it somewhat1 as stated above4           
,,question #dh  ,,of ,,the ,,parts ,,of 
,,prudence 7,in ,one ,article7  ,we must
 now consider the parts of prudence1    
under which head there are four points  
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,which are the parts  
of prudence8  7#b7 ,of its integral     
parts2  7#c7 ,of its subjective parts2  
7#d7 ,of its potential parts4           
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4     
,whether ,three ,parts of ,prudence ,are
 ,fittingly ,assigned8  ,objection #a3  

,it would seem that the parts of        
prudence are assigned unfittingly4      
,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1 #ec7    
assigns three parts of prudence1 namely1
 memory1 understanding and foresight4   
,macrobius 7,in ,somn4 ,scip4 i7        
following the opinion of ,plotinus      
ascribes to prudence six parts1 namely1 
reasoning1 understanding1               
circumspection1 foresight1 docility and 
caution4 ,aristotle says 7,ethic4 vi1   
#i1 #aj1 #aa7 that good counsel1 synesis
 and gnome belong to prudence4 ,again   
under the head of prudence he mentions  
conjecture1 shrewdness1 sense and       
understanding4 ,and another ,greek      
philosopher 99,andronicus2 ,cf4 ,q4 #hj1
 ,obj4 #d says that ten things are      
connected with prudence1 namely1 good   
counsel1 shrewdness1 foresight1         
regnative 99,regnativa1 military1       
political and domestic prudence1        
dialectics1 rhetoric and physics4       
,therefore it seems that one or the     
other enumeration is either excessive or

 deficient4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1        
prudence is specifically distinct from  
science4 ,but politics1 economics1      
logic1 rhetoric1 physics are sciences4  
,therefore they are not parts of        
prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the parts
 do not exceed the whole4 ,now the      
intellective memory or intelligence1    
reason1 sense and docility1 belong not  
only to prudence but also to all the    
cognitive habits4 ,therefore they should
 not be set down as parts of prudence4  
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 just as counselling1
 judging and commanding are acts of the 
practical reason1 so also is using1 as  
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a74
 ,therefore1 just as eubulia which      
refers to counsel1 is connected with    
prudence1 and synesis and gnome which   
refer to judgment1 so also ought        
something to have been assigned         
corresponding to use4  ,obj4 #e3        
,further1 solicitude pertains to        
prudence1 as stated above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 
#i74 ,therefore solicitude also should  

have been mentioned among the parts of  
prudence4  ,i answer that1 ,parts are of
 three kinds1 namely1 integral1 as wall1
 roof1 and foundations are parts of a   
house2 subjective1 as ox and lion are   
parts of animal2 and potential1 as the  
nutritive and sensitive powers are parts
 of the soul4 ,accordingly1 parts can be
 assigned to a virtue in three ways4    
,first1 in likeness to integral parts1  
so that the things which need to concur 
for the perfect act of a virtue1 are    
called the parts of that virtue4 ,in    
this way1 out of all the things         
mentioned above1 eight may be taken as  
parts of prudence1 namely1 the six      
assigned by ,macrobius2 with the        
addition of a seventh1 viz4 memory      
mentioned by ,tully2 and eustochia or   
shrewdness mentioned by ,aristotle4 ,for
 the sense of prudence is also called   
understanding3 wherefore the            
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #aa73 ,of
 such things one needs to have the      
sense1 and this is understanding4 ,of   

these eight1 five belong to prudence as 
a cognitive virtue1 namely1 memory1     
reasoning1 understanding1 docility and  
shrewdness3 while the three others      
belong thereto1 as commanding and       
applying knowledge to action1 namely1   
foresight1 circumspection and caution4  
,the reason of their difference is seen 
from the fact that three things may be  
observed in reference to knowledge4 ,in 
the first place1 knowledge itself1      
which1 if it be of the past1 is called  
memory1 if of the present1 whether      
contingent or necessary1 is called      
understanding or intelligence4          
,secondly1 the acquiring of knowledge1  
which is caused either by teaching1 to  
which pertains docility1 or by          
discovery1 and to this belongs to       
eustochia1 i4e4 a happy conjecture1 of  
which shrewdness is a part1 which is a  
quick conjecture of the middle term1 as 
stated in ,poster4 i1 #i4 ,thirdly1 the 
use of knowledge1 in as much as we      
proceed from things known to knowledge  

or judgment of other things1 and this   
belongs to reasoning4 ,and the reason1  
in order to command aright1 requires to 
have three conditions4 ,first1 to order 
that which is befitting the end1 and    
this belongs to foresight2 secondly1 to 
attend to the circumstances of the      
matter in hand1 and this belongs to     
circumspection2 thirdly1 to avoid       
obstacles1 and this belongs to caution4 
,the subjective parts of a virtue are   
its various species4 ,in this way the   
parts of prudence1 if we take them      
properly1 are the prudence whereby a man
 rules himself1 and the prudence whereby
 a man governs a multitude1 which differ
 specifically as stated above 7,q4 #dg1 
,a4 #aa74 ,again1 the prudence whereby a
 multitude is governed1 is divided into 
various species according to the various
 kinds of multitude4 ,there is the      
multitude which is united together for  
some particular purpose2 thus an army is
 gathered together to fight1 and the    
prudence that governs this is called    

military4 ,there is also the multitude  
that is united together for the whole of
 life2 such is the multitude of a home  
or family1 and this is ruled by domestic
 prudence3 and such again is the        
multitude of a city or kingdom1 the     
ruling principle of which is regnative  
prudence in the ruler1 and political    
prudence1 simply so called1 in the      
subjects4  ,if1 however1 prudence be    
taken in a wide sense1 as including also
 speculative knowledge1 as stated above 
7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b7 then its parts 
include dialectics1 rhetoric and        
physics1 according to three methods of  
prudence in the sciences4 ,the first of 
these is the attaining of science by    
demonstration1 which belongs to physics 
7if physics be understood to comprise   
all demonstrative sciences74 ,the second
 method is to arrive at an opinion      
through probable premises1 and this     
belongs to dialectics4 ,the third method
 is to employ conjectures in order to   
induce a certain suspicion1 or to       

persuade somewhat1 and this belongs to  
rhetoric4 ,it may be said1 however1 that
 these three belong also to prudence    
properly so called1 since it argues     
sometimes from necessary premises1      
sometimes from probabilities1 and       
sometimes from conjectures4  ,the       
potential parts of a virtue are the     
virtues connected with it1 which are    
directed to certain secondary acts or   
matters1 not having1 as it were1 the    
whole power of the principal virtue4 ,in
 this way the parts of prudence are good
 counsel1 which concerns counsel1       
synesis1 which concerns judgment in     
matters of ordinary occurrence1 and     
gnome1 which concerns judgment in       
matters of exception to the law3 while  
prudence is about the chief act1 viz4   
that of commanding4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,the various enumerations differ1 either
 because different kinds of parts are   
assigned1 or because that which is      
mentioned in one enumeration includes   
several mentioned in another            

enumeration4 ,thus ,tully includes      
caution and circumspection under        
foresight1 and reasoning1 docility and  
shrewdness under understanding4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,here domestic and civic      
prudence are not to be taken as         
sciences1 but as kinds of prudence4 ,as 
to the other three1 the reply may be    
gathered from what has been said4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all these things are  
reckoned parts of prudence1 not by      
taking them altogether1 but in so far as
 they are connected with things         
pertaining to prudence4  ,reply ,obj4   
#d3 ,right command and right use always 
go together1 because the reason's       
command is followed by obedience on the 
part of the lower powers1 which pertain 
to use4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,solicitude is
 included under foresight4   ,,question 
#di  ,,of ,,each ,,quasi-,,integral     
,,part ,,of ,,prudence 7,in ,eight      
,articles7  ,we must now consider each  
quasi-integral part of prudence1 and    
under this head there are eight points  

of inquiry3  7#a7 ,memory2  7#b7        
,understanding or ,intelligence2  7#c7  
,docility2  7#d7 ,shrewdness2  7#e7     
,reason2  7#f7 ,foresight2  7#g7        
,circumspection2  7#h7 ,caution4        
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,memory ,is a ,part  
of ,prudence8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that memory is not a part of       
prudence4 ,for memory1 as the           
,philosopher proves 7,de ,memor4 et     
,remin4 i71 is in the sensitive part of 
the soul3 whereas prudence is in the    
rational part 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74         
,therefore memory is not a part of      
prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prudence 
is acquired and perfected by experience1
 whereas memory is in us from nature4   
,therefore memory is not a part of      
prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 memory   
regards the past1 whereas prudence      
regards future matters of action1 about 
which counsel is concerned1 as stated in
 ,ethic4 vi1 #b1 #g4 ,therefore memory  
is not a part of prudence4  ,on the     

contrary1 ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4   
ii1 #ec7 places memory among the parts  
of prudence4  ,i answer that1 ,prudence 
regards contingent matters of action1 as
 stated above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #e74 ,now in
 such like matters a man can be         
directed1 not by those things that are  
simply and necessarily true1 but by     
those which occur in the majority of    
cases3 because principles must be       
proportionate to their conclusions1 and 
like must be concluded from like        
7,ethic4 vi 99,anal4 ,post4 i4 #cb74    
,but we need experience to discover what
 is true in the majority of cases3      
wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4
 ii1 #a7 that intellectual virtue is    
engendered and fostered by experience   
and time4 ,now experience is the result 
of many memories as stated in ,metaph4  
i1 #a1 and therefore prudence requires  
the memory of many things4 ,hence memory
 is fittingly accounted a part of       
prudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated  
above 7,q4 #dg1 ,,aa4 #c1 #f71 prudence 

applies universal knowledge to          
particulars which are objects of sense3 
hence many things belonging to the      
sensitive faculties are requisite for   
prudence1 and memory is one of them4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as aptitude for  
prudence is in our nature1 while its    
perfection comes through practice or    
grace1 so too1 as ,tully says in his    
,rhetoric 99,ad ,herenn4 de ,arte ,rhet4
 iii1 #af1 #bd1 memory not only arises  
from nature1 but is also aided by art   
and diligence4  ,there are four things  
whereby a man perfects his memory4      
,first1 when a man wishes to remember a 
thing1 he should take some suitable yet 
somewhat unwonted illustration of it1   
since the unwonted strikes us more1 and 
so makes a greater and stronger         
impression on the mind2 the mind2 and   
this explains why we remember better    
what we saw when we were children4 ,now 
the reason for the necessity of finding 
these illustrations or images1 is that  
simple and spiritual impressions easily 

slip from the mind1 unless they be tied 
as it were to some corporeal image1     
because human knowledge has a greater   
hold on sensible objects4 ,for this     
reason memory is assigned to the        
sensitive part of the soul4 ,secondly1  
whatever a man wishes to retain in his  
memory he must carefully consider and   
set in order1 so that he may pass easily
 from one memory to another4 ,hence the 
,philosopher says 7,de ,memor4 et       
,remin4 ii73 ,sometimes a place brings  
memories back to us3 the reason being   
that we pass quickly from the one to the
 other4 ,thirdly1 we must be anxious and
 earnest about the things we wish to    
remember1 because the more a thing is   
impressed on the mind1 the less it is   
liable to slip out of it4 ,wherefore    
,tully says in his ,rhetoric 99,ad      
,herenn4 de ,arte ,rhet4 iii4 that      
anxiety preserves the figures of images 
entire4 ,fourthly1 we should often      
reflect on the things we wish to        
remember4 ,hence the ,philosopher says  

7,de ,memoria i7 that reflection        
preserves memories1 because as he       
remarks 7,de ,memoria ii7 custom is a   
second nature3 wherefore when we reflect
 on a thing frequently1 we quickly call 
it to mind1 through passing from one    
thing to another by a kind of natural   
order4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it behooves us
 to argue1 as it were1 about the future 
from the past2 wherefore memory of the  
past is necessary in order to take good 
counsel for the future4   ,,second      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,understanding99 ,is a ,part of
 ,prudence8 99,otherwise intuition2     
,aristotle's word is nous  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that understanding is
 not a part of prudence4 ,when two      
things are members of a division1 one is
 not part of the other4 ,but            
intellectual virtue is divided into     
understanding and prudence1 according to
 ,ethic4 vi1 #c4 ,therefore             
understanding should not be reckoned a  
part of prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  

understanding is numbered among the     
gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1 and          
corresponds to faith1 as stated above   
7,q4 #h1 ,,aa4 #a1 #h74 ,but prudence is
 a virtue other than faith1 as is clear 
from what has been said above 7,q4 #d1  
,a4 #h2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #b74      
,therefore understanding does not       
pertain to prudence4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 prudence is about singular    
matters of action 7,ethic4 vi1 #g73     
whereas understanding takes cognizance  
of universal and immaterial objects 7,de
 ,anima iii1 #d74 ,therefore            
understanding is not a part of prudence4
  ,on the contrary1 ,tully 99,de        
,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1 #ec accounts        
intelligence a part of prudence1 and    
,macrobius 99,in ,somn4 ,scip4 i1 #h    
mentions understanding1 which comes to  
the same4  ,i answer that1              
,understanding denotes here1 not the    
intellectual power1 but the right       
estimate about some final principle1    
which is taken as self-evident3 thus we 

are said to understand the first        
principles of demonstrations4 ,now every
 deduction of reason proceeds from      
certain statements which are taken as   
primary3 wherefore every process of     
reasoning must needs proceed from some  
understanding4 ,therefore since prudence
 is right reason applied to action1 the 
whole process of prudence must needs    
have its source in understanding4 ,hence
 it is that understanding is reckoned a 
part of prudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the
 reasoning of prudence terminates1 as in
 a conclusion1 in the particular matter 
of action1 to which1 as stated above    
7,q4 #dg1 ,,aa4 #c1 #f71 it applies the 
knowledge of some universal principle4  
,now a singular conclusion is argued    
from a universal and a singular         
proposition4 ,wherefore the reasoning of
 prudence must proceed from a twofold   
understanding4 ,the one is cognizant of 
universals1 and this belongs to the     
understanding which is an intellectual  
virtue1 whereby we know naturally not   

only speculative principles1 but also   
practical universal principles1 such as 
,one should do evil to no man1 as shown 
above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #f74 ,the other     
understanding1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 
#aa1 is cognizant of an extreme1 i4e4 of
 some primary singular and contingent   
practical matter1 viz4 the minor        
premiss1 which must needs be singular in
 the syllogism of prudence1 as stated   
above 7,q4 #dg1 ,,aa4 #c1 #f74 ,now this
 primary singular is some singular end1 
as stated in the same place4 ,wherefore 
the understanding which is a part of    
prudence is a right estimate of some    
particular end4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the  
understanding which is a gift of the    
,holy ,ghost1 is a quick insight into   
divine things1 as shown above 7,q4 #h1  
,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,it is in another sense  
that it is accounted a part of prudence1
 as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the
 right estimate about a particular end  
is called both understanding1 in so far 
as its object is a principle1 and sense1

 in so far as its object is a           
particular4 ,this is what the           
,philosopher means when he says 7,ethic4
 v1 #aa73 ,of such things we need to    
have the sense1 and this is             
understanding4 ,but this is to be       
understood as referring1 not to the     
particular sense whereby we know proper 
sensibles1 but to the interior sense1   
whereby we judge of a particular4       
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,docility ,should ,be
 ,accounted a ,part of ,prudence8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
docility should not be accounted a part 
of prudence4 ,for that which is a       
necessary condition of every            
intellectual virtue1 should not be      
appropriated to one of them4 ,but       
docility is requisite for every         
intellectual virtue4 ,therefore it      
should not be accounted a part of       
prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that     
which pertains to a human virtue is in  
our power1 since it is for things that  

are in our power that we are praised or 
blamed4 ,now it is not in our power to  
be docile1 for this is befitting to some
 through their natural disposition4     
,therefore it is not a part of prudence4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 docility is in the
 disciple3 whereas prudence1 since it   
makes precepts1 seems rather to belong  
to teachers1 who are also called        
preceptors4 ,therefore docility is not a
 part of prudence4  ,on the contrary1   
,macrobius 99,in ,somn4 ,scip4 i1 #h    
following the opinion of ,plotinus      
places docility among the parts of      
prudence4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated   
above 7,a4 #b1 ad #a2 ,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #c7  
prudence is concerned with particular   
matters of action1 and since such       
matters are of infinite variety1 no one 
man can consider them all sufficiently2 
nor can this be done quickly1 for it    
requires length of time4 ,hence in      
matters of prudence man stands in very  
great need of being taught by others1   
especially by old folk who have acquired

 a sane understanding of the ends in    
practical matters4 ,wherefore the       
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #aa73 ,it
 is right to pay no less attention to   
the undemonstrated assertions and       
opinions of such persons as are         
experienced1 older than we are1 and     
prudent1 than to their demonstrations1  
for their experience gives them an      
insight into principles4 ,thus it is    
written 7,prov4 #c3e73 ,lean not on thy 
own prudence1 and 7,ecclus4 #f3ce73     
,stand in the multitude of the ancients 
7i4e4 the old men71 that are wise1 and  
join thyself from thy heart to their    
wisdom4 ,now it is a mark of docility to
 be ready to be taught3 and consequently
 docility is fittingly reckoned a part  
of prudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although
 docility is useful for every           
intellectual virtue1 yet it belongs to  
prudence chiefly1 for the reason given  
above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man has a     
natural aptitude for docility even as   
for other things connected with         

prudence4 ,yet his own efforts count for
 much towards the attainment of perfect 
docility3 and he must carefully1        
frequently and reverently apply his mind
 to the teachings of the learned1       
neither neglecting them through         
laziness1 nor despising them through    
pride4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,by prudence   
man makes precepts not only for others1 
but also for himself1 as stated above   
7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #ab1 ad #c74 ,hence as    
stated 7,ethic4 vi1 #aa71 even in       
subjects1 there is place for prudence2  
to which docility pertains4 ,and yet    
even the learned should be docile in    
some respects1 since no man is          
altogether self-sufficient in matters of
 prudence1 as stated above4   ,,fourth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,shrewdness ,is ,part of       
,prudence8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that shrewdness is not a part of   
prudence4 ,for shrewdness consists in   
easily finding the middle term for      
demonstrations1 as stated in ,poster4 i1

 #cd4 ,now the reasoning of prudence is 
not a demonstration since it deals with 
contingencies4 ,therefore shrewdness    
does not pertain to prudence4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 good counsel pertains to     
prudence according to ,ethic4 vi1 #e1   
#g1 #i4 ,now there is no place in good  
counsel for shrewdness 99,ethic4 vi1 #i2
 ,poster4 i1 #cd which is a kind of     
eustochia1 i4e4 a happy conjecture3 for 
the latter is unreasoning and rapid1    
whereas counsel needs to be slow1 as    
stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #i4 ,therefore    
shrewdness should not be accounted a    
part of prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
shrewdness as stated above 7,q4 #dh7 is 
a happy conjecture4 ,now it belongs to  
rhetoricians to make use of conjectures4
 ,therefore shrewdness belongs to       
rhetoric rather than to prudence4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 x73 
,a solicitous man is one who is shrewd  
and alert 7solers citus74 ,but          
solicitude belongs to prudence1 as      
stated above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #i74         

,therefore shrewdness does also4  ,i    
answer that1 ,prudence consists in a    
right estimate about matters of action4 
,now a right estimate or opinion is     
acquired in two ways1 both in practical 
and in speculative matters1 first by    
discovering it oneself1 secondly by     
learning it from others4 ,now just as   
docility consists in a man being well   
disposed to acquire a right opinion from
 another man1 so shrewdness is an apt   
disposition to acquire a right estimate 
by oneself1 yet so that shrewdness be   
taken for eustochia1 of which it is a   
part4 ,for eustochia is a happy         
conjecture about any matter1 while      
shrewdness is an easy and rapid         
conjecture in finding the middle term   
7,poster4 i1 #cd74 ,nevertheless the    
philosopher 99,andronicus2 ,cf4 ,q4 #dh1
 ,obj4 #a who calls shrewdness a part of
 prudence1 takes it for eustochia1 in   
general1 hence he says3 ,shrewdness is a
 habit whereby congruities are          
discovered rapidly4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   

,shrewdness is concerned with the       
discovery of the middle term not only in
 demonstrative1 but also in practical   
syllogisms1 as1 for instance1 when two  
men are seen to be friends they are     
reckoned to be enemies of a third one1  
as the ,philosopher says 7,poster4 i1   
#cd74 ,in this way shrewdness belongs to
 prudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the       
,philosopher adduces the true reason    
7,ethic4 vi1 #i7 to prove that euboulia1
 i4e4 good counsel1 is not eustochia1   
which is commended for grasping quickly 
what should be done4 ,now a man may take
 good counsel1 though he be long and    
slow in so doing1 and yet this does not 
discount the utility of a happy         
conjecture in taking good counsel3      
indeed it is sometimes a necessity1     
when1 for instance1 something has to be 
done without warning4 ,it is for this   
reason that shrewdness is fittingly     
reckoned a part of prudence4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,rhetoric also reasons about  
practical matters1 wherefore nothing    

hinders the same thing belonging both to
 rhetoric and prudence4 ,nevertheless1  
conjecture is taken here not only in the
 sense in which it is employed by       
rhetoricians1 but also as applicable to 
all matters whatsoever wherein man is   
said to conjecture the truth4   ,,fifth 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #e  
,whether ,reason ,should ,be ,reckoned a
 ,part of ,prudence8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that reason should not be   
reckoned a part of prudence4 ,for the   
subject of an accident is not a part    
thereof4 ,but prudence is in the reason 
as its subject 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74        
,therefore reason should not be reckoned
 a part of prudence4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 that which is common to many1 
should not be reckoned a part of any one
 of them2 or if it be so reckoned1 it   
should be reckoned a part of that one to
 which it chiefly belongs4 ,now reason  
is necessary in all the intellectual    
virtues1 and chiefly in wisdom and      
science1 which employ a demonstrative   

reason4 ,therefore reason should not be 
reckoned a part of prudence  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 reason as a power does not    
differ essentially from the             
intelligence1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4  
#gi1 ,a4 #h74 ,if therefore intelligence
 be reckoned a part of prudence1 it is  
superfluous to add reason4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,macrobius 99,in ,somn4 ,scip4
 i1 following the opinion of ,plotinus1 
numbers reason among the parts of       
prudence4  ,i answer that1 ,the work of 
prudence is to take good counsel1 as    
stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #g4 ,now counsel  
is a research proceeding from certain   
things to others4 ,but this is the work 
of reason4 ,wherefore it is requisite   
for prudence that man should be an apt  
reasoner4 ,and since the things required
 for the perfection of prudence are     
called requisite or quasi-integral parts
 of prudence1 it follows that reason    
should be numbered among these parts4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reason denotes here1  
not the power of reason1 but its good   

use4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the certitude of
 reason comes from the intellect4 ,yet  
the need of reason is from a defect in  
the intellect1 since those things in    
which the intellective power is in full 
vigor1 have no need for reason1 for they
 comprehend the truth by their simple   
insight1 as do ,god and the angels4 ,on 
the other hand particular matters of    
action1 wherein prudence guides1 are    
very far from the condition of things   
intelligible1 and so much the farther1  
as they are less certain and fixed4     
,thus matters of art1 though they are   
singular1 are nevertheless more fixed   
and certain1 wherefore in many of them  
there is no room for counsel on account 
of their certitude1 as stated in ,ethic4
 iii1 #c4 ,hence1 although in certain   
other intellectual virtues reason is    
more certain than in prudence1 yet      
prudence above all requires that man be 
an apt reasoner1 so that he may rightly 
apply universals to particulars1 which  
latter are various and uncertain4       

,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although intelligence 
and reason are not different powers1 yet
 they are named after different acts4   
,for intelligence takes its name from   
being an intimate penetration of the    
truth 99,cf4 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,a4 #a1 
while reason is so called from being    
inquisitive and discursive4 ,hence each 
is accounted a part of reason as        
explained above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #dg1 ,a4   
#b1 #c74   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #di1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,foresight99
 ,should ,be ,accounted a ,part of      
,prudence8 99,providentia1 which may be 
translated either providence or         
foresight4  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that foresight should not be       
accounted a part of prudence4 ,for      
nothing is part of itself4 ,now         
foresight seems to be the same as       
prudence1 because according to ,isidore 
7,etym4 x71 a prudent man is one who    
sees from afar 7porro videns73 and this 
is also the derivation of providentia   
7foresight71 according to ,boethius 7,de

 ,consol4 v74 ,therefore foresight is   
not a part of prudence4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 prudence is only practical1   
whereas foresight may be also           
speculative1 because seeing1 whence we  
have the word to foresee1 has more to do
 with speculation than operation4       
,therefore foresight is not a part of   
prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the chief
 act of prudence is to command1 while   
its secondary act is to judge and to    
take counsel4 ,but none of these seems  
to be properly implied by foresight4    
,therefore foresight is not part of     
prudence4  ,on the contrary stands the  
authority of ,tully and ,macrobius1 who 
number foresight among the parts of     
prudence1 as stated above 7,q4 #dh74  ,i
 answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #dg1
 ,a4 #a1 ad #b1 ,,aa4 #f1 #ac71 prudence
 is properly about the means to an end1 
and its proper work is to set them in   
due order to the end4 ,and although     
certain things are necessary for an end1
 which are subject to divine providence1

 yet nothing is subject to human        
providence except the contingent matters
 of actions which can be done by man for
 an end4 ,now the past has become a kind
 of necessity1 since what has been done 
cannot be undone4 ,in like manner1 the  
present as such1 has a kind of          
necessity1 since it is necessary that   
,socrates sit1 so long as he sits4      
,consequently1 future contingents1 in so
 far as they can be directed by man to  
the end of human life1 are the matter of
 prudence3 and each of these things is  
implied in the word foresight1 for it   
implies the notion of something distant1
 to which that which occurs in the      
present has to be directed4 ,therefore  
foresight is part of prudence4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,whenever many things are     
requisite for a unity1 one of them must 
needs be the principal to which all the 
others are subordinate4 ,hence in every 
whole one part must be formal and       
predominant1 whence the whole has unity4
 ,accordingly foresight is the principal

 of all the parts of prudence1 since    
whatever else is required for prudence1 
is necessary precisely that some        
particular thing may be rightly directed
 to its end4 ,hence it is that the very 
name of prudence is taken from foresight
 7providentia7 as from its principal    
part4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,speculation is 
about universal and necessary things1   
which1 in themselves1 are not distant1  
since they are everywhere and always1   
though they are distant from us1 in so  
far as we fail to know them4 ,hence     
foresight does not apply properly to    
speculative1 but only to practical      
matters4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,right order 
to an end which is included in the      
notion of foresight1 contains rectitude 
of counsel1 judgment and command1       
without which no right order to the end 
is possible4   ,,seventh ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,circumspection ,can ,be a ,part of     
,prudence8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that circumspection cannot be a    

part of prudence4 ,for circumspection   
seems to signify looking at one's       
surroundings4 ,but these are of infinite
 number1 and cannot be considered by the
 reason wherein is prudence4 ,therefore 
circumspection should not be reckoned a 
part of prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
circumstances seem to be the concern of 
moral virtues rather than of prudence4  
,but circumspection seems to denote     
nothing but attention to circumstances4 
,therefore circumspection apparently    
belongs to the moral virtues rather than
 to prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1      
whoever can see things afar off can much
 more see things that are near4 ,now    
foresight enables a man to look on      
distant things4 ,therefore there is no  
need to account circumspection a part of
 prudence in addition to foresight4  ,on
 the contrary stands the authority of   
,macrobius1 quoted above 7,q4 #dh74  ,i 
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #f71 
it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct
 something aright to an end2 and this is

 not done aright unless both the end be 
good1 and the means good and suitable4  
,since1 however1 prudence1 as stated    
above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #c7 is about        
singular matters of action1 which       
contain many combinations of            
circumstances1 it happens that a thing  
is good in itself and suitable to the   
end1 and nevertheless becomes evil or   
unsuitable to the end1 by reason of some
 combination of circumstances4 ,thus to 
show signs of love to someone seems1    
considered in itself1 to be a fitting   
way to arouse love in his heart1 yet if 
pride or suspicion of flattery arise in 
his heart1 it will no longer be a means 
suitable to the end4 ,hence the need of 
circumspection in prudence1 viz4 of     
comparing the means with the            
circumstances4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,though
 the number of possible circumstances be
 infinite1 the number of actual         
circumstances is not2 and the judgment  
of reason in matters of action is       
influenced by things which are few in   

number4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,circumstances
 are the concern of prudence1 because   
prudence has to fix them2 on the other  
hand they are the concern of moral      
virtues1 in so far as moral virtues are 
perfected by the fixing of              
circumstances4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just  
as it belongs to foresight to look on   
that which is by its nature suitable to 
an end1 so it belongs to circumspection 
to consider whether it be suitable to   
the end in view of the circumstances4   
,now each of these presents a difficulty
 of its own1 and therefore each is      
reckoned a distinct part of prudence4   
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1  
,art4 #h  ,whether ,caution ,should ,be 
,reckoned a ,part of ,prudence8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
caution should not be reckoned a part of
 prudence4 ,for when no evil is         
possible1 no caution is required4 ,now  
no man makes evil use of virtue1 as     
,augustine declares 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1
 #ai74 ,therefore caution does not      

belong to prudence which directs the    
virtues4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to foresee
 good and to avoid evil belong to the   
same faculty1 just as the same art gives
 health and cures ill-health4 ,now it   
belongs to foresight to foresee good1   
and consequently1 also to avoid evil4   
,therefore caution should not be        
accounted a part of prudence1 distinct  
from foresight4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no 
prudent man strives for the impossible4 
,but no man can take precautions against
 all possible evils4 ,therefore caution 
does not belong to prudence4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,eph4     
#e3ae73 ,see how you walk cautiously    
,douay3 'circumspectly'4  ,i answer     
that1 ,the things with which prudence is
 concerned1 are contingent matters of   
action1 wherein1 even as false is found 
with true1 so is evil mingled with good1
 on account of the great variety of     
these matters of action1 wherein good is
 often hindered by evil1 and evil has   
the appearance of good4 ,wherefore      

prudence needs caution1 so that we may  
have such a grasp of good as to avoid   
evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,caution is     
required in moral acts1 that we may be  
on our guard1 not against acts of       
virtue1 but against the hindrance of    
acts of virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is
 the same in idea1 to ensue good and to 
avoid the opposite evil1 but the        
avoidance of outward hindrances is      
different in idea4 ,hence caution       
differs from foresight1 although they   
both belong to the one virtue of        
prudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,of the     
evils which man has to avoid1 some are  
of frequent occurrence2 the like can be 
grasped by reason1 and against them     
caution is directed1 either that they   
may be avoided altogether1 or that they 
may do less harm4 ,others there are that
 occur rarely and by chance1 and these1 
since they are infinite in number1      
cannot be grasped by reason1 nor is man 
able to take precautions against them1  
although by exercising prudence he is   

able to prepare against all the         
surprises of chance1 so as to suffer    
less harm thereby4   ,,question #ej     
,,of ,,the ,,subjective ,,parts ,,of    
,,prudence 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we   
must1 in due sequence1 consider the     
subjective parts of prudence4 ,and since
 we have already spoken of the prudence 
with which a man rules himself 7,q4 #dg1
 seqq471 it remains for us to discuss   
the species of prudence whereby a       
multitude is governed4 ,under this head 
there are four points of inquiry3  7#a7 
,whether a species of prudence is       
regnative8  7#b7 ,whether political and 
7#c7 domestic economy are species of    
prudence8  7#d7 ,whether military       
prudence is8   ,,first ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #a  ,whether a
 ,species of ,prudence ,is ,regnative8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
regnative should not be reckoned a      
species of prudence4 ,for regnative     
prudence is directed to the preservation
 of justice1 since according to ,ethic4 

v1 #f the prince is the guardian of     
justice4 ,therefore regnative prudence  
belongs to justice rather than to       
prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according
 to the ,philosopher 7,polit4 iii1 #e7 a
 kingdom 7regnum7 is one of six species 
of government4 ,but no species of       
prudence is ascribed to the other five  
forms of government1 which are          
aristocracy1 polity1 also called        
timocracy 99,cf4 ,ethic4 viii1 #aj1     
tyranny1 oligarchy and democracy4       
,therefore neither should a regnative   
species be ascribed to a kingdom4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 lawgiving belongs not    
only to kings1 but also to certain      
others placed in authority1 and even to 
the people1 according to ,isidore       
7,etym4 v74 ,now the ,philosopher       
7,ethic4 vi1 #h7 reckons a part of      
prudence to be legislative4 ,therefore  
it is not becoming to substitute        
regnative prudence in its place4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says    
7,polit4 iii1 #aa7 that prudence is a   

virtue which is proper to the prince4   
,therefore a special kind of prudence is
 regnative4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,q4 #dg1 ,,aa4 #h1 #aj71 it      
belongs to prudence to govern and       
command1 so that wherever in human acts 
we find a special kind of governance and
 command1 there must be a special kind  
of prudence4 ,now it is evident that    
there is a special and perfect kind of  
governance in one who has to govern not 
only himself but also the perfect       
community of a city or kingdom2 because 
a government is the more perfect        
according as it is more universal1      
extends to more matters1 and attains a  
higher end4 ,hence prudence in its      
special and most perfect sense1 belongs 
to a king who is charged with the       
government of a city or kingdom3 for    
which reason a species of prudence is   
reckoned to be regnative4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,all matters connected with moral   
virtue belong to prudence as their      
guide1 wherefore right reason in accord 

with prudence is included in the        
definition of moral virtue1 as stated   
above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #e1 ad #a2 ,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b1 ad #d74 ,for this      
reason also the execution of justice in 
so far as it is directed to the common  
good1 which is part of the kingly       
office1 needs the guidance of prudence4 
,hence these two virtues--prudence and  
justice--belong most properly to a king1
 according to ,jer4 #bc3e3 ,a king shall
 reign and shall be wise1 and shall     
execute justice and judgment in the     
earth4 ,since1 however1 direction       
belongs rather to the king1 and         
execution to his subjects1 regnative    
prudence is reckoned a species of       
prudence which is directive1 rather than
 to justice which is executive4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,a kingdom is the best of all 
governments1 as stated in ,ethic4 viii1 
#aj3 wherefore the species of prudence  
should be denominated rather from a     
kingdom1 yet so as to comprehend under  
regnative all other rightful forms of   

government1 but not perverse forms which
 are opposed to virtue1 and which1      
accordingly1 do not pertain to prudence4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,philosopher    
names regnative prudence after the      
principal act of a king which is to make
 laws1 and although this applies to the 
other forms of government1 this is only 
in so far as they have a share of kingly
 government4   ,,second ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,political ,prudence ,is ,fittingly     
,accounted a ,part of ,prudence8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
political prudence is not fittingly     
accounted a part of prudence4 ,for      
regnative is a part of political        
prudence1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but
 a part should not be reckoned a species
 with the whole4 ,therefore political   
prudence should not be reckoned a part  
of prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the   
species of habits are distinguished by  
their various objects4 ,now what the    
ruler has to command is the same as what

 the subject has to execute4 ,therefore 
political prudence as regards the       
subjects1 should not be reckoned a      
species of prudence distinct from       
regnative prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 each subject is an individual person4  
,now each individual person can direct  
himself sufficiently by prudence        
commonly so called4 ,therefore there is 
no need of a special kind of prudence   
called political4  ,on the contrary1    
,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #h7 
that of the prudence which is concerned 
with the state one kind is a            
master-prudence and is called           
legislative2 another kind bears the     
common name political1 and deals with   
individuals4  ,i answer that1 ,a slave  
is moved by his master1 and a subject by
 his ruler1 by command1 but otherwise   
than as irrational and inanimate beings 
are set in motion by their movers4 ,for 
irrational and inanimate beings are     
moved only by others and do not put     
themselves in motion1 since they have no

 free-will whereby to be masters of     
their own actions1 wherefore the        
rectitude of their government is not in 
their power but in the power of their   
movers4 ,on the other hand1 men who are 
slaves or subjects in any sense1 are    
moved by the commands of others in such 
a way that they move themselves by their
 free-will2 wherefore some kind of      
rectitude of government is required in  
them1 so that they may direct themselves
 in obeying their superiors2 and to this
 belongs that species of prudence which 
is called political4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,as stated above1 regnative is the most 
perfect species of prudence1 wherefore  
the prudence of subjects1 which falls   
short of regnative prudence1 retains the
 common name of political prudence1 even
 as in logic a convertible term which   
does not denote the essence of a thing  
retains the name of proper4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,a different aspect of the    
object diversifies the species of a     
habit1 as stated above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4    

#e74 ,now the same actions are          
considered by the king1 but under a more
 general aspect1 as by his subjects who 
obey3 since many obey one king in       
various departments4 ,hence regnative   
prudence is compared to this political  
prudence of which we are speaking1 as   
mastercraft to handicraft4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,man directs himself by prudence   
commonly so called1 in relation to his  
own good1 but by political prudence1 of 
which we speak1 he directs himself in   
relation to the common good4   ,,third  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #c  
,whether a ,part of ,prudence ,should   
,be ,reckoned to ,be ,domestic8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
domestic should not be reckoned a part  
of prudence4 ,for1 according to the     
,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 prudence  
is directed to a good life in general3  
whereas domestic prudence is directed to
 a particular end1 viz4 wealth1         
according to ,ethic4 i1 #a4 ,therefore a
 species of prudence is not domestic4   

,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated above 7,q4
 #dg1 ,a4 #ac7 prudence is only in good 
people4 ,but domestic prudence may be   
also in wicked people1 since many       
sinners are provident in governing their
 household4 ,therefore domestic prudence
 should not be reckoned a species of    
prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as  
in a kingdom there is a ruler and       
subject1 so also is there in a          
household4 ,if therefore domestic like  
political is a species of prudence1     
there should be a paternal corresponding
 to regnative prudence4 ,now there is no
 such prudence4 ,therefore neither      
should domestic prudence be accounted a 
species of prudence4  ,on the contrary1 
,the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 vi1   
#h7 that there are various kinds of     
prudence in the government of a         
multitude1 one of which is domestic1    
another legislative1 and another        
political4  ,i answer that1 ,different  
aspects of an object1 in respect of     
universality and particularity1 or of   

totality and partiality1 diversify arts 
and virtues2 and in respect of such     
diversity one act of virtue is principal
 as compared with another4 ,now it is   
evident that a household is a mean      
between the individual and the city or  
kingdom1 since just as the individual is
 part of the household1 so is the       
household part of the city or kingdom4  
,and therefore1 just as prudence        
commonly so called which governs the    
individual1 is distinct from political  
prudence1 so must domestic prudence be  
distinct from both4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,riches are compared to domestic        
prudence1 not as its last end1 but as   
its instrument1 as stated in ,polit4 i1 
#c4 ,on the other hand1 the end of      
political prudence is a good life in    
general as regards the conduct of the   
household4 ,in ,ethic4 i1 #a the        
,philosopher speaks of riches as the end
 of political prudence1 by way of       
example and in accordance with the      
opinion of many4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some

 sinners may be provident in certain    
matters of detail concerning the        
disposition of their household1 but not 
in regard to a good life in general as  
regards the conduct of the household1   
for which above all a virtuous life is  
required4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the father 
has in his household an authority like  
that of a king1 as stated in ,ethic4    
viii1 #aj1 but he has not the full power
 of a king1 wherefore paternal          
government is not reckoned a distinct   
species of prudence1 like regnative     
prudence4   ,,fourth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,military ,prudence ,should ,be         
,reckoned a ,part of ,prudence8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
military prudence should not be reckoned
 a part of prudence4 ,for prudence is   
distinct from art1 according to ,ethic4 
vi1 #c4 ,now military prudence seems to 
be the art of warfare1 according to the 
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #h74         
,therefore military prudence should not 

be accounted a species of prudence4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as military    
business is contained under political   
affairs1 so too are many other matters1 
such as those of tradesmen1 craftsmen1  
and so forth4 ,but there are no species 
of prudence corresponding to other      
affairs in the state4 ,neither therefore
 should any be assigned to military     
business4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the      
soldiers' bravery counts for a great    
deal in warfare4 ,therefore military    
prudence pertains to fortitude rather   
than to prudence4  ,on the contrary1 ,it
 is written 7,prov4 #bd3f73 ,war is     
managed by due ordering1 and there shall
 be safety where there are many         
counsels4 ,now it belongs to prudence to
 take counsel4 ,therefore there is great
 need in warfare for that species of    
prudence which is called military4  ,i  
answer that1 ,whatever things are done  
according to art or reason1 should be   
made to conform to those which are in   
accordance with nature1 and are         

established by the ,divine ,reason4 ,now
 nature has a twofold tendency3 first1  
to govern each thing in itself1         
secondly1 to withstand outward          
assailants and corruptives3 and for this
 reason she has provided animals not    
only with the concupiscible faculty1    
whereby they are moved to that which is 
conducive to their well-being1 but also 
with the irascible power1 whereby the   
animal withstands an assailant4         
,therefore in those things also which   
are in accordance with reason1 there    
should be not only political prudence1  
which disposes in a suitable manner such
 things as belong to the common good1   
but also a military prudence1 whereby   
hostile attacks are repelled4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,military prudence may be an  
art1 in so far as it has certain rules  
for the right use of certain external   
things1 such as arms and horses1 but in 
so far as it is directed to the common  
good1 it belongs rather to prudence4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,other matters in the  

state are directed to the profit of     
individuals1 whereas the business of    
soldiering is directed to the service   
belongs to fortitude1 but the direction1
 protection of the entire common good4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the execution of      
military service belongs to fortitude1  
but the direction1 especially in so far 
as it concerns the commander-in-chief1  
belongs to prudence4   ,,question #ea   
,,of ,,the ,,virtues ,,which ,,are      
,,connected ,,with ,,prudence 7,in ,four
 ,articles7  ,in due sequence1 we must  
consider the virtues that are connected 
with prudence1 and which are its        
quasi-potential parts4 ,under this head 
there are four points of inquiry3  7#a7 
,whether euboulia is a virtue8  7#b7    
,whether it is a special virtue1        
distinct from prudence8  7#c7 ,whether  
synesis is a special virtue8  7#d7      
,whether gnome is a special virtue8     
99,these three ,greek words may be      
rendered as the faculties of            
deliberating well 7euboulia71 of judging

 well according to common law 7synesis71
 and of judging well according to       
general law 7gnome71 respectively4      
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,euboulia ,is a      
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that euboulia is not a virtue4 ,for1    
according to ,augustine 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4
 ii1 #ah1 #ai7 no man makes evil use of 
virtue4 ,now some make evil use of      
euboulia or good counsel1 either through
 devising crafty counsels in order to   
achieve evil ends1 or through committing
 sin in order that they may achieve good
 ends1 as those who rob that they may   
give alms4 ,therefore euboulia is not a 
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue is a
 perfection1 according to ,phys4 vii4   
,but euboulia is concerned with counsel1
 which implies doubt and research1 and  
these are marks of imperfection4        
,therefore euboulia is not a virtue4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 virtues are         
connected with one another1 as stated   
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe74 ,now euboulia 

is not connected with the other virtues1
 since many sinners take good-counsel1  
and many godly men are slow in taking   
counsel4 ,therefore euboulia is not a   
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,according to
 the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #i7      
euboulia is a right counselling4 ,now   
the perfection of virtue consists in    
right reason4 ,therefore euboulia is a  
virtue4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #d7 the nature of a 
human virtue consists in making a human 
act good4 ,now among the acts of man1 it
 is proper to him to take counsel1 since
 this denotes a research of the reason  
about the actions he has to perform and 
whereof human life consists1 for the    
speculative life is above man1 as stated
 in ,ethic4 x4 ,but euboulia signifies  
goodness of counsel1 for it is derived  
from the eu1 good1 and boule1 counsel1  
being a good counsel or rather a        
disposition to take good counsel4 ,hence
 it is evident that euboulia is a human 
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there is no  

good counsel either in deliberating for 
an evil end1 or in discovering evil     
means for attaining a good end1 even as 
in speculative matters1 there is no good
 reasoning either in coming to a false  
conclusion1 or in coming to a true      
conclusion from false premisses through 
employing an unsuitable middle term4    
,hence both the aforesaid processes are 
contrary to euboulia1 as the            
,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 vi1 #i74 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although virtue is    
essentially a perfection1 it does not   
follow that whatever is the matter of a 
virtue implies perfection4 ,for man     
needs to be perfected by virtues in all 
his parts1 and this not only as regards 
the acts of reason1 of which counsel is 
one1 but also as regards the passions of
 the sensitive appetite1 which are still
 more imperfect4  ,it may also be       
replied that human virtue is a          
perfection according to the mode of man1
 who is unable by simple insight to     
comprehend with certainty the truth of  

things1 especially in matters of action 
which are contingent4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,in no sinner as such is euboulia to be 
found3 since all sin is contrary to     
taking good counsel4 ,for good counsel  
requires not only the discovery or      
devising of fit means for the end1 but  
also other circumstances4 ,such are     
suitable time1 so that one be neither   
too slow nor too quick in taking        
counsel1 and the mode of taking counsel1
 so that one be firm in the counsel     
taken1 and other like due circumstances1
 which sinners fail to observe when they
 sin4 ,on the other hand1 every virtuous
 man takes good counsel in those things 
which are directed to the end of virtue1
 although perhaps he does not take good 
counsel in other particular matters1 for
 instance in matters of trade1 or       
warfare1 or the like4   ,,second        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,euboulia ,is a ,special       
,virtue1 ,distinct from ,prudence8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      

euboulia is not a distinct virtue from  
prudence4 ,for1 according to the        
,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #e71 the      
prudent man is1 seemingly1 one who takes
 good counsel4 ,now this belongs to     
euboulia as stated above4 ,therefore    
euboulia is not distinct from prudence4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 human acts to which 
human virtues are directed1 are         
specified chiefly by their end1 as      
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2  
,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f74 ,now euboulia   
and prudence are directed to the same   
end1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #i1 not   
indeed to some particular end1 but to   
the common end of all life4 ,therefore  
euboulia is not a distinct virtue from  
prudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in       
speculative sciences1 research and      
decision belong to the same science4    
,therefore in like manner these belong  
to the same virtue in practical matters4
 ,now research belongs to euboulia1     
while decision belongs to prudence4     
,there euboulia is not a distinct virtue

 from prudence4  ,on the contrary1      
,prudence is preceptive1 according to   
,ethic4 vi1 #aj4 ,but this does not     
apply to euboulia4 ,therefore euboulia  
is a distinct virtue from prudence4  ,i 
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 
virtue is properly directed to an act   
which it renders good2 and consequently 
virtues must differ according to        
different acts1 especially when there is
 a different kind of goodness in the    
acts4 ,for1 if various acts contained   
the same kind of goodness1 they would   
belong to the same virtue3 thus the     
goodness of love1 desire and joy depends
 on the same1 wherefore all these belong
 to the same virtue of charity4  ,now   
acts of the reason that are ordained to 
action are diverse1 nor have they the   
same kind of goodness3 since it is owing
 to different causes that a man acquires
 good counsel1 good judgment1 or good   
command1 inasmuch as these are sometimes
 separated from one another4            
,consequently euboulia which makes man  

take good counsel must needs be a       
distinct virtue from prudence1 which    
makes man command well4 ,and since      
counsel is directed to command as to    
that which is principal1 so euboulia is 
directed to prudence as to a principal  
virtue1 without which it would be no    
virtue at all1 even as neither are the  
moral virtues without prudence1 nor the 
other virtues without charity4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs to prudence to    
take good counsel by commanding it1 to  
euboulia by eliciting it4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,different acts are directed in     
different degrees to the one end which  
is a good life in general 99,ethic4 vi1 
#e3 for counsel comes first1 judgment   
follows1 and command comes last4 ,the   
last named has an immediate relation to 
the last end3 whereas the other two acts
 are related thereto remotely4          
,nevertheless these have certain        
proximate ends of their own1 the end of 
counsel being the discovery of what has 
to be done1 and the end of judgment1    

certainty4 ,hence this proves not that  
euboulia is not a distinct virtue from  
prudence1 but that it is subordinate    
thereto1 as a secondary to a principal  
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even in      
speculative matters the rational science
 of dialectics1 which is directed to    
research and discovery1 is distinct from
 demonstrative science1 which decides   
the truth4   ,,third ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,synesis ,is a ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that synesis is not a    
virtue4 ,virtues are not in us by       
nature1 according to ,ethic4 ii1 #a4    
,but synesis is natural to some1 as the 
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 vi1 #aa74  
,therefore synesis is not a virtue4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated in the    
same book 7#aj71 synesis is nothing but 
a faculty of judging4 ,but judgment     
without command can be even in the      
wicked4 ,since then virtue is only in   
the good1 it seems that synesis is not a
 virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there is  

never a defective command1 unless there 
be a defective judgment1 at least in a  
particular matter of action2 for it is  
in this that every wicked man errs4 ,if 
therefore synesis be reckoned a virtue  
directed to good judgment1 it seems that
 there is no need for any other virtue  
directed to good command3 and           
consequently prudence would be          
superfluous1 which is not reasonable4   
,therefore synesis is not a virtue4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,judgment is more perfect
 than counsel4 ,but euboulia1 or good   
counsel1 is a virtue4 ,much more1       
therefore1 is synesis a virtue1 as being
 good judgment4  ,i answer that1 synesis
 signifies a right judgment1 not indeed 
about speculative matters1 but about    
particular practical matters1 about     
which also is prudence4 ,hence in ,greek
 some1 in respect of synesis are said to
 be synetoi1 i4e4 persons of sense1 or  
eusynetoi1 i4e4 men of good sense1 just 
as on the other hand1 those who lack    
this virtue are called asynetoi1 i4e4   

senseless4  ,now1 different acts which  
cannot be ascribed to the same cause1   
must correspond to different virtues4   
,and it is evident that goodness of     
counsel and goodness of judgment are not
 reducible to the same cause1 for many  
can take good counsel1 without having   
good sense so as to judge well4 ,even   
so1 in speculative matters some are good
 at research1 through their reason being
 quick at arguing from one thing to     
another 7which seems to be due to a     
disposition of their power of           
imagination1 which has a facility in    
forming phantasms71 and yet such persons
 sometimes lack good judgment 7and this 
is due to a defect in the intellect     
arising chiefly from a defective        
disposition of the common sense which   
fails to judge aright74 ,hence there is 
need1 besides euboulia1 for another     
virtue1 which judges well1 and this is  
called synesis4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,right
 judgment consists in the cognitive     
power apprehending a thing just as it is

 in reality1 and this is due to the     
right disposition of the apprehensive   
power4 ,thus if a mirror be well        
disposed the forms of bodies are        
reflected in it just as they are1       
whereas if it be ill disposed1 the      
images therein appear distorted and     
misshapen4 ,now that the cognitive power
 be well disposed to receive things just
 as they are in reality1 is radically   
due to nature1 but1 as to its           
consummation1 is due to practice or to a
 gift of grace1 and this in two ways4   
,first directly1 on the part of the     
cognitive power itself1 for instance1   
because it is imbued1 not with          
distorted1 but with true and correct    
ideas3 this belongs to synesis which in 
this respect is a special virtue4       
,secondly indirectly1 through the good  
disposition of the appetitive power1 the
 result being that one judges well of   
the objects of appetite3 and thus a good
 judgment of virtue results from the    
habits of moral virtue2 but this        

judgment is about the ends1 whereas     
synesis is rather about the means4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in wicked men there   
may be right judgment of a universal    
principle1 but their judgment is always 
corrupt in the particular matter of     
action1 as stated above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4   
#ac74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sometimes after
 judging aright we delay to execute or  
execute negligently or inordinately4    
,hence after the virtue which judges    
aright there is a further need of a     
final and principal virtue1 which       
commands aright1 and this is prudence4  
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1  
,art4 #d  ,whether ,gnome ,is a ,special
 ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that gnome is not a special virtue     
distinct from synesis4 ,for a man is    
said1 in respect of synesis1 to have    
good judgment4 ,now no man can be said  
to have good judgment1 unless he judge  
aright in all things4 ,therefore synesis
 extends to all matters of judgment1 and
 consequently there is no other virtue  

of good judgment called gnome4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 judgment is midway between
 counsel and precept4 ,now there is only
 one virtue of good counsel1 viz4       
euboulia1 and only one virtue of good   
command1 viz4 prudence4 ,therefore there
 is only one virtue of good judgment1   
viz4 synesis4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 rare 
occurrences wherein there is need to    
depart from the common law1 seem for the
 most part to happen by chance1 and with
 such things reason is not concerned1 as
 stated in ,phys4 ii1 #e4 ,now all the  
intellectual virtues depend on right    
reason4 ,therefore there is no          
intellectual virtue about such matters4 
,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher     
concludes 7,ethic4 vi1 #aa7 that gnome  
is a special virtue4  ,i answer that    
cognitive habits differ according to    
higher and lower principles3 thus in    
speculative matters wisdom considers    
higher principles than science does1 and
 consequently is distinguished from it2 
and so must it be also in practical     

matters4 ,now it is evident that what is
 beside the order of a lower principle  
or cause1 is sometimes reducible to the 
order of a higher principle2 thus       
monstrous births of animals are beside  
the order of the active seminal force1  
and yet they come under the order of a  
higher principle1 namely1 of a heavenly 
body1 or higher still1 of ,divine       
,providence4 ,hence by considering the  
active seminal force one could not      
pronounce a sure judgment on such       
monstrosities1 and yet this is possible 
if we consider ,divine ,providence4     
,now it happens sometimes that something
 has to be done which is not covered by 
the common rules of actions1 for        
instance in the case of the enemy of    
one's country1 when it would be wrong to
 give him back his deposit1 or in other 
similar cases4 ,hence it is necessary to
 judge of such matters according to     
higher principles than the common laws1 
according to which synesis judges3 and  
corresponding to such higher principles 

it is necessary to have a higher virtue 
of judgment1 which is called gnome1 and 
which denotes a certain discrimination  
in judgment4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,synesis 
judges rightly about all actions that   
are covered by the common rules3 but    
certain things have to be judged beside 
these common rules1 as stated above4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,judgment about a thing
 should be formed from the proper       
principles thereof1 whereas research is 
made by employing also common           
principles4 ,wherefore also in          
speculative matters1 dialectics which   
aims at research proceeds from common   
principles2 while demonstration which   
tends to judgment1 proceeds from proper 
principles4 ,hence euboulia to which the
 research of counsel belongs is one for 
all1 but not so synesis whose act is    
judicial4 ,command considers in all     
matters the one aspect of good1         
wherefore prudence also is only one4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it belongs to ,divine 
,providence alone to consider all things

 that may happen beside the common      
course4 ,on the other hand1 among men1  
he who is most discerning can judge a   
greater number of such things by his    
reason3 this belongs to gnome1 which    
denotes a certain discrimination in     
judgment4   ,,question #eb  ,,of ,,the  
,,gift ,,of ,,counsel 7,in ,four        
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
gift of counsel which corresponds to    
prudence4 ,under this head there are    
four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether  
counsel should be reckoned among the    
seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost8  7#b7  
,whether the gift of counsel corresponds
 to prudence8  7#c7 ,whether the gift of
 counsel remains in heaven8  7#d7       
,whether the fifth beatitude1 ,blessed  
are the merciful1 etc4 corresponds to   
the gift of counsel8   ,,first ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eb1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,counsel ,should ,be ,reckoned ,among   
the ,gifts of the ,holy ,ghost8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
counsel should not be reckoned among the

 gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,the gifts  
of the ,holy ,ghost are given as a help 
to the virtues1 according to ,gregory   
7,moral4 ii1 #di74 ,now for the purpose 
of taking counsel1 man is sufficiently  
perfected by the virtue of prudence1 or 
even of euboulia1 as is evident from    
what has been said 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #a1 ad 
#b2 ,q4 #ea1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore  
counsel should not be reckoned among the
 gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 the difference between the    
seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost and the 
gratuitous graces seems to be that the  
latter are not given to all1 but are    
divided among various people1 whereas   
the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are given 
to all who have the ,holy ,ghost4 ,but  
counsel seems to be one of those things 
which are given by the ,holy ,ghost     
specially to certain persons1 according 
to #a ,macc4 #b3fe3 ,behold 4 4 4 your  
brother ,simon is a man of counsel4     
,therefore counsel should be numbered   
among the gratuitous graces rather than 

among the seven gifts of the ,holy      
,ghost4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is      
written 7,rom4 #h3ad73 ,whosoever are   
led by the ,spirit of ,god1 they are the
 sons of ,god4 ,but counselling is not  
consistent with being led by another4   
,since then the gifts of the ,holy      
,ghost are most befitting the children  
of ,god1 who have received the spirit of
 adoption of sons1 it would seem that   
counsel should not be numbered among the
 gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,it is written 7,isa4 #aa3b73 
7,the ,spirit of the ,lord7 shall rest  
upon him 4 4 4 the spirit of counsel1   
and of fortitude4  ,i answer that1 ,as  
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #a71
 the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are      
dispositions whereby the soul is        
rendered amenable to the motion of the  
,holy ,ghost4 ,now ,god moves everything
 according to the mode of the thing     
moved3 thus ,he moves the corporeal     
creature through time and place1 and the
 spiritual creature through time1 but   

not through place1 as ,augustine        
declares 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #bj1 #bb74
 ,again1 it is proper to the rational   
creature to be moved through the        
research of reason to perform any       
particular action1 and this research is 
called counsel4 ,hence the ,holy ,ghost 
is said to move the rational creature by
 way of counsel1 wherefore counsel is   
reckoned among the gifts of the ,holy   
,ghost4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,prudence or  
euboulia1 whether acquired or infused1  
directs man in the research of counsel  
according to principles that the reason 
can grasp2 hence prudence or euboulia   
makes man take good counsel either for  
himself or for another4 ,since1 however1
 human reason is unable to grasp the    
singular and contingent things which may
 occur1 the result is that the thoughts 
of mortal men are fearful1 and our      
counsels uncertain 7,wis4 #i3ad74 ,hence
 in the research of counsel1 man        
requires to be directed by ,god who     
comprehends all things3 and this is done

 through the gift of counsel1 whereby   
man is directed as though counseled by  
,god1 just as1 in human affairs1 those  
who are unable to take counsel for      
themselves1 seek counsel from those who 
are wiser4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that a man
 be of such good counsel as to counsel  
others1 may be due to a gratuitous      
grace2 but that a man be counselled by  
,god as to what he ought to do in       
matters necessary for salvation is      
common to all holy persons4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,the children of ,god are     
moved by the ,holy ,ghost according to  
their mode1 without prejudice to their  
free-will which is the faculty of will  
and reason 99,sent4 iii1 ,d1 #bd4       
,accordingly the gift of counsel is     
befitting the children of ,god in so far
 as the reason is instructed by the     
,holy ,ghost about what we have to do4  
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eb1  
,art4 #b  ,whether the ,gift of ,counsel
 ,corresponds to the ,virtue of         
,prudence8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    

seem that the gift of counsel does not  
fittingly correspond to the virtue of   
prudence4 ,for the highest point of that
 which is underneath touches that which 
is above1 as ,dionysius observes 7,div4 
,nom4 vii71 even as a man comes into    
contact with the angel in respect of his
 intellect4 ,now cardinal virtues are   
inferior to the gifts1 as stated above  
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #h74 ,since1     
then1 counsel is the first and lowest   
act of prudence1 while command is its   
highest act1 and judgment comes between1
 it seems that the gift corresponding to
 prudence is not counsel1 but rather a  
gift of judgment or command4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 one gift suffices to help one 
virtue1 since the higher a thing is the 
more one it is1 as proved in ,de        
,causis4 ,now prudence is helped by the 
gift of knowledge1 which is not only    
speculative but also practical1 as shown
 above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore the 
gift of counsel does not correspond to  
the virtue of prudence4  ,obj4 #c3      

,further1 it belongs properly to        
prudence to direct1 as stated above 7,q4
 #dg1 ,a4 #h74 ,but it belongs to the   
gift of counsel that man should be      
directed by ,god1 as stated above 7,a4  
#a74 ,therefore the gift of counsel does
 not correspond to the virtue of        
prudence4  ,on the contrary1 ,the gift  
of counsel is about what has to be done 
for the sake of the end4 ,now prudence  
is about the same matter4 ,therefore    
they correspond to one another4  ,i     
answer that1 ,a lower principle of      
movement is helped chiefly1 and is      
perfected through being moved by a      
higher principle of movement1 as a body 
through being moved by a spirit4 ,now it
 is evident that the rectitude of human 
reason is compared to the ,divine       
,reason1 as a lower motive principle to 
a higher3 for the ,eternal ,reason is   
the supreme rule of all human rectitude4
 ,consequently prudence1 which denotes  
rectitude of reason1 is chiefly         
perfected and helped through being ruled

 and moved by the ,holy ,ghost1 and this
 belongs to the gift of counsel1 as     
stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore the   
gift of counsel corresponds to prudence1
 as helping and perfecting it4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,to judge and command belongs 
not to the thing moved1 but to the      
mover4 ,wherefore1 since in the gifts of
 the ,holy ,ghost1 the position of the  
human mind is of one moved rather than  
of a mover1 as stated above 7,a4 #a2    
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #a71 it follows   
that it would be unfitting to call the  
gift corresponding to prudence by the   
name of command or judgment rather than 
of counsel whereby it is possible to    
signify that the counselled mind is     
moved by another counselling it4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,the gift of knowledge does  
not directly correspond to prudence1    
since it deals with speculative matters3
 yet by a kind of extension it helps it4
 ,on the other hand the gift of counsel 
corresponds to prudence directly1       
because it is concerned about the same  

things4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the mover    
that is moved1 moves through being      
moved4 ,hence the human mind1 from the  
very fact that it is directed by the    
,holy ,ghost1 is enabled to direct      
itself and others4   ,,third ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eb1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
the ,gift of ,counsel ,remains in       
,heaven8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that the gift of counsel does not remain
 in heaven4 ,for counsel is about what  
has to be done for the sake of an end4  
,but in heaven nothing will have to be  
done for the sake of an end1 since there
 man possesses the last end4 ,therefore 
the gift of counsel is not in heaven4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 counsel implies     
doubt1 for it is absurd to take counsel 
in matters that are evident1 as the     
,philosopher observes 7,ethic4 iii1 #c74
 ,now all doubt will cease in heaven4   
,therefore there is no counsel in       
heaven4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the saints 
in heaven are most conformed to ,god1   
according to #a ,john #c3b1 ,when ,he   

shall appear1 we shall be like to ,him4 
,but counsel is not becoming to ,god1   
according to ,rom4 #aa3cd1 ,who hath    
been ,his counsellor8 ,therefore neither
 to the saints in heaven is the gift of 
counsel becoming4  ,on the contrary1    
,gregory says 7,moral4 xvii1 #ab73 ,when
 either the guilt or the righteousness  
of each nation is brought into the      
debate of the heavenly ,court1 the      
guardian of that nation is said to have 
won in the conflict1 or not to have won4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 
#b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #a71 the gifts
 of the ,holy ,ghost are connected with 
the motion of the rational creature by  
,god4 ,now we must observe two points   
concerning the motion of the human mind 
by ,god4 ,first1 that the disposition of
 that which is moved1 differs while it  
is being moved from its disposition when
 it is in the term of movement4 ,indeed 
if the mover is the principle of the    
movement alone1 when the movement       
ceases1 the action of the mover ceases  

as regards the thing moved1 since it has
 already reached the term of movement1  
even as a house1 after it is built1     
ceases being built by the builder4 ,on  
the other hand1 when the mover is cause 
not only of the movement1 but also of   
the form to which the movement tends1   
then the action of the mover does not   
cease even after the form has been      
attained3 thus the sun lightens the air 
even after it is lightened4 ,in this    
way1 then1 ,god causes in us virtue and 
knowledge1 not only when we first       
acquire them1 but also as long as we    
persevere in them3 and it is thus that  
,god causes in the blessed a knowledge  
of what is to be done1 not as though    
they were ignorant1 but by continuing   
that knowledge in them4  ,nevertheless  
there are things which the blessed1     
whether angels or men1 do not know3 such
 things are not essential to            
blessedness1 but concern the government 
of things according to ,divine          
,providence4 ,as regards these1 we must 

make a further observation1 namely1 that
 ,god moves the mind of the blessed in  
one way1 and the mind of the wayfarer1  
in another4 ,for ,god moves the mind of 
the wayfarer in matters of action1 by   
soothing the pre-existing anxiety of    
doubt2 whereas there is simple nescience
 in the mind of the blessed as regards  
the things they do not know4 ,from this 
nescience the angel's mind is cleansed1 
according to ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4  
vii71 nor does there precede in them any
 research of doubt1 for they simply turn
 to ,god2 and this is to take counsel of
 ,god1 for as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad 
lit4 v1 #ai7 the angels take counsel of 
,god about things beneath them3         
wherefore the instruction which they    
receive from ,god in such matters is    
called counsel4  ,accordingly the gift  
of counsel is in the blessed1 in so far 
as ,god preserves in them the knowledge 
that they have1 and enlightens them in  
their nescience of what has to be done4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even in the blessed   

there are acts directed to an end1 or   
resulting1 as it were1 from their       
attainment of the end1 such as the acts 
of praising ,god1 or of helping on      
others to the end which they themselves 
have attained1 for example the          
ministrations of the angels1 and the    
prayers of the saints4 ,in this respect 
the gift of counsel finds a place in    
them4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,doubt belongs  
to counsel according to the present     
state of life1 but not to that counsel  
which takes place in heaven4 ,even so   
neither have the theological virtues    
quite the same acts in heaven as on the 
way thither4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,counsel 
is in ,god1 not as receiving but as     
giving it3 and the saints in heaven are 
conformed to ,god1 as receivers to the  
source whence they receive4   ,,fourth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eb1 ,art4 #d  
,whether the ,fifth ,beatitude1 ,which  
,is ,that of ,mercy1 ,corresponds to the
 ,gift of ,counsel8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that the fifth beatitude1    

which is that of mercy1 does not        
correspond to the gift of counsel4 ,for 
all the beatitudes are acts of virtue1  
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,a4  
#a74 ,now we are directed by counsel in 
all acts of virtue4 ,therefore the fifth
 beatitude does not correspond more than
 any other to counsel4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 precepts are given about      
matters necessary for salvation1 while  
counsel is given about matters which are
 not necessary for salvation4 ,now mercy
 is necessary for salvation1 according  
to ,james #b3ac1 ,judgment without mercy
 to him that hath not done mercy4 ,on   
the other hand poverty is not necessary 
for salvation1 but belongs to the life  
of perfection1 according to ,matt4      
#ai3ba4 ,therefore the beatitude of     
poverty corresponds to the gift of      
counsel1 rather than to the beatitude of
 mercy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the fruits 
result from the beatitudes1 for they    
denote a certain spiritual delight      
resulting from perfect acts of virtue4  

,now none of the fruits correspond to   
the gift of counsel1 as appears from    
,gal4 #e3bb1 #bc4 ,therefore neither    
does the beatitude of mercy correspond  
to the gift of counsel4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4   
,dom4 iv73 ,counsel is befitting the    
merciful1 because the one remedy is to  
be delivered from evils so great1 to    
pardon1 and to give4  ,i answer that1   
,counsel is properly about things useful
 for an end4 ,hence such things as are  
of most use for an end1 should above all
 correspond to the gift of counsel4 ,now
 such is mercy1 according to #a ,tim4   
#d3h1 ,godliness 99,pietas1 whence our  
,english word pity1 which is the same as
 mercy2 see note on ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cj1 
,a4 #a is profitable to all things4     
,therefore the beatitude of mercy       
specially corresponds to the gift of    
counsel1 not as eliciting but as        
directing mercy4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3      
,although counsel directs in all the    
acts of virtue1 it does so in a special 

way in works of mercy1 for the reason   
given above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,counsel 
considered as a gift of the ,holy ,ghost
 guides us in all matters that are      
directed to the end of eternal life     
whether they be necessary for salvation 
or not1 and yet not every work of mercy 
is necessary for salvation4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,fruit denotes something      
ultimate4 ,now the ultimate in practical
 matters consists not in knowledge but  
in an action which is the end4 ,hence   
nothing pertaining to practical         
knowledge is numbered among the fruits1 
but only such things as pertain to      
action1 in which practical knowledge is 
the guide4 ,among these we find goodness
 and benignity which correspond to      
mercy4   ,,question #ec  ,,of           
,,imprudence 7,in ,six ,articles7  ,we  
must now consider the vices opposed to  
prudence4 ,for ,augustine says 7,contra 
,julian4 iv1 #c73 ,there are vices      
opposed to every virtue1 not only vices 
that are in manifest opposition to      

virtue1 as temerity is opposed to       
prudence1 but also vices which have a   
kind of kinship and not a true but a    
spurious likeness to virtue2 thus in    
opposition to prudence we have          
craftiness4  ,accordingly we must       
consider first of all those vices which 
are in evident opposition to prudence1  
those namely which are due to a defect  
either of prudence or of those things   
which are requisite for prudence1 and   
secondly those vices which have a false 
resemblance to prudence1 those namely   
which are due to abuse of the things    
required for prudence4 ,and since       
solicitude pertains to prudence1 the    
first of these considerations will be   
twofold3 7#a7 ,of imprudence2 7#b7 ,of  
negligence which is opposed to          
solicitude4  ,under the first head there
 are six points of inquiry3  7#a7       
,concerning imprudence1 whether it is a 
sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is a special sin8
  7#c7 ,of precipitation or temerity2   
7#d7 ,of thoughtlessness2  7#e7 ,of     

inconstancy2  7#f7 ,concerning the      
origin of these vices4   ,,first        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,imprudence ,is a ,sin8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
imprudence is not a sin4 ,for every sin 
is voluntary1 according to ,augustine   
99,de ,vera ,relig4 xiv2 whereas        
imprudence is not voluntary1 since no   
man wishes to be imprudent4 ,therefore  
imprudence is not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 none but original sin comes to
 man with his birth4 ,but imprudence    
comes to man with his birth1 wherefore  
the young are imprudent2 and yet it is  
not original sin which is opposed to    
original justice4 ,therefore imprudence 
is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every
 sin is taken away by repentance4 ,but  
imprudence is not taken away by         
repentance4 ,therefore imprudence is not
 a sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,the         
spiritual treasure of grace is not taken
 away save by sin4 ,but it is taken away
 by imprudence1 according to ,prov4     

#ba3bj1 ,there is a treasure to be      
desired1 and oil in the dwelling of the 
just1 and the imprudent ,douay3         
'foolish' man shall spend it4 ,therefore
 imprudence is a sin4  ,i answer that1  
,imprudence may be taken in two ways1   
first1 as a privation1 secondly1 as a   
contrary4 ,properly speaking it is not  
taken as a negation1 so as merely to    
signify the absence of prudence1 for    
this can be without any sin4 ,taken as a
 privation1 imprudence denotes lack of  
that prudence which a man can and ought 
to have1 and in this sense imprudence is
 a sin by reason of a man's negligence  
in striving to have prudence4           
,imprudence is taken as a contrary1 in  
so far as the movement or act of reason 
is in opposition to prudence3 for       
instance1 whereas the right reason of   
prudence acts by taking counsel1 the    
imprudent man despises counsel1 and the 
same applies to the other conditions    
which require consideration in the act  
of prudence4 ,in this way imprudence is 

a sin in respect of prudence considered 
under its proper aspect1 since it is not
 possible for a man to act against      
prudence1 except by infringing the rules
 on which the right reason of prudence  
depends4 ,wherefore1 if this should     
happen through aversion from the ,divine
 ,law1 it will be a mortal sin1 as when 
a man acts precipitately through        
contempt and rejection of the ,divine   
teaching3 whereas if he act beside the  
,law and without contempt1 and without  
detriment to things necessary for       
salvation1 it will be a venial sin4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,no man desires the    
deformity of imprudence1 but the rash   
man wills the act of imprudence1 because
 he wishes to act precipitately4 ,hence 
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7  
that he who sins willingly against      
prudence is less to be commended4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument takes   
imprudence in the negative sense4 ,it   
must be observed however that lack of   
prudence or of any other virtue is      

included in the lack of original justice
 which perfected the entire soul4       
,accordingly all such lack of virtue may
 be ascribed to original sin4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,repentance restores infused  
prudence1 and thus the lack of this     
prudence ceases2 but acquired prudence  
is not restored as to the habit1        
although the contrary act is taken away1
 wherein properly speaking the sin of   
imprudence consists4   ,,second         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,imprudence ,is a ,special     
,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that imprudence is not a special sin4   
,for whoever sins1 acts against right   
reason1 i4e4 against prudence4 ,but     
imprudence consists in acting against   
prudence1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74     
,therefore imprudence is not a special  
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prudence is   
more akin to moral action than knowledge
 is4 ,but ignorance which is opposed to 
knowledge1 is reckoned one of the       
general causes of sin4 ,much more       

therefore should imprudence be reckoned 
among those causes4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 sin consists in the corruption of the  
circumstances of virtue1 wherefore      
,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that   
evil results from each single defect4   
,now many things are requisite for      
prudence2 for instance1 reason1         
intelligence1 docility1 and so on1 as   
stated above 7,,qq4 #dh1 #di74          
,therefore there are many species of    
imprudence1 so that it is not a special 
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,imprudence is  
opposed to prudence1 as stated above    
7,a4 #a74 ,now prudence is a special    
virtue4 ,therefore imprudence too is one
 special vice4  ,i answer that1 ,a vice 
or sin may be styled general in two     
ways2 first1 absolutely1 because1 to    
wit1 it is general in respect of all    
sins2 secondly1 because it is general in
 respect of certain vices1 which are its
 species4 ,in the first way1 a vice may 
be said to be general on two counts3    
first1 essentially1 because it is       

predicated of all sins3 and in this way 
imprudence is not a general sin1 as     
neither is prudence a general virtue3   
since it is concerned with special acts1
 namely the very acts of reason3        
secondly1 by participation2 and in this 
way imprudence is a general sin3 for1   
just as all the virtues have a share of 
prudence1 in so far as it directs them1 
so have all vices and sins a share of   
imprudence1 because no sin can occur1   
without some defect in an act of the    
directing reason1 which defect belongs  
to imprudence4  ,if1 on the other hand1 
a sin be called general1 not simply but 
in some particular genus1 that is1 as   
containing several species of sin1 then 
imprudence is a general sin4 ,for it    
contains various species in three ways4 
,first1 by opposition to the various    
subjective parts of prudence1 for just  
as we distinguish the prudence that     
guides the individual1 from other kinds 
that govern communities1 as stated above
 7,q4 #dh2 ,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #g71 so also we 

distinguish various kinds of imprudence4
 ,secondly1 in respect of the           
quasi-potential parts of prudence1 which
 are virtues connected with it1 and     
correspond to the several acts of       
reason4 ,thus1 by defect of counsel to  
which euboulia corresponds1             
precipitation or temerity is a species  
of imprudence2 by defect of judgment1 to
 which synesis 7judging well according  
to common law7 and gnome 7judging well  
according to general law7 refer1 there  
is thoughtlessness2 while inconstancy   
and negligence correspond to the command
 which is the proper act of prudence4   
,thirdly1 this may be taken by          
opposition to those things which are    
requisite for prudence1 which are the   
quasi-integral parts of prudence4 ,since
 however all these things are intended  
for the direction of the aforesaid three
 acts of reason1 it follows that all the
 opposite defects are reducible to the  
four parts mentioned above4 ,thus       
incautiousness and incircumspection are 

included in thoughtlessness2 lack of    
docility1 memory1 or reason is referable
 to precipitation2 improvidence1 lack of
 intelligence and of shrewdness1 belong 
to negligence and inconstancy4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,this argument considers      
generality by participation4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,since knowledge is further   
removed from morality than prudence is1 
according to their respective proper    
natures1 it follows that ignorance has  
the nature of mortal sin1 not of itself1
 but on account either of a preceding   
negligence1 or of the consequent result1
 and for this reason it is reckoned one 
of the general causes of sin4 ,on the   
other hand imprudence1 by its very      
nature1 denotes a moral vice2 and for   
this reason it can be called a special  
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when various    
circumstances are corrupted for the same
 motive1 the species of sin is not      
multiplied3 thus it is the same species 
of sin to take what is not one's own1   
where one ought not1 and when one ought 

not4 ,if1 however1 there be various     
motives1 there are various species3 for 
instance1 if one man were to take       
another's property from where he ought  
not1 so as to wrong a sacred place1 this
 would constitute the species called    
sacrilege1 while if another were to take
 another's property when he ought not1  
merely through the lust of possession1  
this would be a case of simple avarice4 
,hence the lack of those things which   
are requisite for prudence1 does not    
constitute a diversity of species1      
except in so far as they are directed to
 different acts of reason1 as stated    
above4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #c  ,whether             
,precipitation ,is a ,sin ,included in  
,imprudence8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that precipitation is not a sin    
included in imprudence4 ,imprudence is  
opposed to the virtue of prudence2      
whereas precipitation is opposed to the 
gift of counsel1 according to ,gregory1 
who says 7,moral4 ii1 #di7 that the gift

 of counsel is given as a remedy to     
precipitation4 ,therefore precipitation 
is not a sin contained under imprudence4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 precipitation     
seemingly pertains to rashness4 ,now    
rashness implies presumption1 which     
pertains to pride4 ,therefore           
precipitation is not a vice contained   
under imprudence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
precipitation seems to denote inordinate
 haste4 ,now sin happens in counselling 
not only through being over hasty but   
also through being over slow1 so that   
the opportunity for action passes by1   
and through corruption of other         
circumstances1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 
#i4 ,therefore there is no reason for   
reckoning precipitation as a sin        
contained under imprudence1 rather than 
slowness1 or something else of the kind 
pertaining to inordinate counsel4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4    
#d3ai73 ,the way of the wicked is       
darksome1 they know not where they fall4
 ,now the darksome ways of ungodliness  

belong to imprudence4 ,therefore        
imprudence leads a man to fall or to be 
precipitate4  ,i answer that1           
,precipitation is ascribed              
metaphorically to acts of the soul1 by  
way of similitude to bodily movement4   
,now a thing is said to be precipitated 
as regards bodily movement1 when it is  
brought down from above by the impulse  
either of its own movement or of        
another's1 and not in orderly fashion by
 degrees4 ,now the summit of the soul is
 the reason1 and the base is reached in 
the action performed by the body2 while 
the steps that intervene by which one   
ought to descend in orderly fashion are 
memory of the past1 intelligence of the 
present1 shrewdness in considering the  
future outcome1 reasoning which compares
 one thing with another1 docility in    
accepting the opinions of others4 ,he   
that takes counsel descends by these    
steps in due order1 whereas if a man is 
rushed into action by the impulse of his
 will or of a passion1 without taking   

these steps1 it will be a case of       
precipitation4 ,since then inordinate   
counsel pertains to imprudence1 it is   
evident that the vice of precipitation  
is contained under imprudence4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,rectitude of counsel belongs 
to the gift of counsel and to the virtue
 of prudence2 albeit in different ways1 
as stated above 7,q4 #eb1 ,a4 #b71 and  
consequently precipitation is opposed to
 both4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,things are    
said to be done rashly when they are not
 directed by reason3 and this may happen
 in two ways2 first through the impulse 
of the will or of a passion1 secondly   
through contempt of the directing rule2 
and this is what is meant by rashness   
properly speaking1 wherefore it appears 
to proceed from that root of pride1     
which refuses to submit to another's    
ruling4 ,but precipitation refers to    
both1 so that rashness is contained     
under precipitation1 although           
precipitation refers rather to the      
first4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,many things   

have to be considered in the research of
 reason2 hence the ,philosopher declares
 7,ethic4 vi1 #i7 that one should be    
slow in taking counsel4 ,hence          
precipitation is more directly opposed  
to rectitude of counsel than over       
slowness is1 for the latter bears a     
certain likeness to right counsel4      
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1  
,art4 #d  ,whether ,thoughtlessness ,is 
a ,special ,sin ,included in            
,imprudence8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that thoughtlessness is not a      
special sin included in imprudence4 ,for
 the ,divine law does not incite us to  
any sin1 according to ,ps4 #ah3h1 ,the  
law of the ,lord is unspotted2 and yet  
it incites us to be thoughtless1        
according to ,matt4 #aj3ai1 ,take no    
thought how or what to speak4 ,therefore
 thoughtlessness is not a sin4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 whoever takes counsel must
 needs give thought to many things4 ,now
 precipitation is due to a defect of    
counsel and therefore to a defect of    

thought4 ,therefore precipitation is    
contained under thoughtlessness3 and    
consequently thoughtlessness is not a   
special sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
prudence consists in acts of the        
practical reason1 viz4 counsel1 judgment
 about what has been counselled1 and    
command 99,cf4 ,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #h4 ,now    
thought precedes all these acts1 since  
it belongs also to the speculative      
intellect4 ,therefore thoughtlessness is
 not a special sin contained under      
imprudence4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
written 7,prov4 #d3be73 ,let thy eyes   
look straight on1 and let thine eye-lids
 go before thy steps4 ,now this pertains
 to prudence1 while the contrary        
pertains to thoughtlessness4 ,therefore 
thoughtlessness is a special sin        
contained under imprudence4  ,i answer  
that1 ,thought signifies the act of the 
intellect in considering the truth about
 something4 ,now just as research       
belongs to the reason1 so judgment      
belongs to the intellect4 ,wherefore in 

speculative matters a demonstrative     
science is said to exercise judgment1 in
 so far as it judges the truth of the   
results of research by tracing those    
results back to the first indemonstrable
 principles4 ,hence thought pertains    
chiefly to judgment2 and consequently   
the lack of right judgment belongs to   
the vice of thoughtlessness1 in so far1 
to wit1 as one fails to judge rightly   
through contempt or neglect of those    
things on which a right judgment        
depends4 ,it is therefore evident that  
thoughtlessness is a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,our ,lord did not forbid us to take
 thought1 when we have the opportunity1 
about what we ought to do or say1 but1  
in the words quoted1 ,he encourages ,his
 disciples1 so that when they had no    
opportunity of taking thought1 either   
through lack of knowledge or through a  
sudden call1 they should trust in the   
guidance of ,god alone1 because as we   
know not what to do1 we can only turn   
our eyes to ,god1 according to #b       

,paral4 #bj3ab3 else if man1 instead of 
doing what he can1 were to be content   
with awaiting ,god's assistance1 he     
would seem to tempt ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,all thought about those things of  
which counsel takes cognizance1 is      
directed to the formation of a right    
judgment1 wherefore this thought is     
perfected in judgment4 ,consequently    
thoughtlessness is above all opposed to 
the rectitude of judgment4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,thoughtlessness is to be taken    
here in relation to a determinate       
matter1 namely1 that of human action1   
wherein more things have to be thought  
about for the purpose of right judgment1
 than in speculative matters1 because   
actions are about singulars4   ,,fifth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #e  
,whether ,inconstancy ,is a ,vice       
,contained ,under ,imprudence8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
inconstancy is not a vice contained     
under imprudence4 ,for inconstancy      
consists seemingly in a lack of         

perseverance in matters of difficulty4  
,but perseverance in difficult matters  
belongs to fortitude4 ,therefore        
inconstancy is opposed to fortitude     
rather than to prudence4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 it is written 7,james #c3af73 
,where jealousy ,douay3 'envy' and      
contention are1 there are inconstancy   
and every evil work4 ,but jealousy      
pertains to envy4 ,therefore inconstancy
 pertains not to imprudence but to envy4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a man would seem  
to be inconstant who fails to persevere 
in what he has proposed to do4 ,now this
 is a mark of incontinency in           
pleasurable matters1 and of effeminacy  
or squeamishness in unpleasant matters1 
according to ,ethic4 vii1 #a4 ,therefore
 inconstancy does not pertain to        
imprudence4  ,on the contrary1 ,it      
belongs to prudence to prefer the       
greater good to the lesser4 ,therefore  
to forsake the greater good belongs to  
imprudence4 ,now this is inconstancy4   
,therefore inconstancy belongs to       

imprudence4  ,i answer that1            
,inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a  
definite good purpose4 ,now the origin  
of this withdrawal is in the appetite1  
for a man does not withdraw from a      
previous good purpose1 except on account
 of something being inordinately        
pleasing to him3 nor is this withdrawal 
completed except through a defect of    
reason1 which is deceived in rejecting  
what before it had rightly accepted4    
,and since it can resist the impulse of 
the passions1 if it fail to do this1 it 
is due to its own weakness in not       
standing to the good purpose it has     
conceived2 hence inconstancy1 as to its 
completion1 is due to a defect in the   
reason4 ,now just as all rectitude of   
the practical reason belongs in some    
degree to prudence1 so all lack of that 
rectitude belongs to imprudence4        
,consequently inconstancy1 as to its    
completion1 belongs to imprudence4 ,and 
just as precipitation is due to a defect
 in the act of counsel1 and             

thoughtlessness to a defect in the act  
of judgment1 so inconstancy arises from 
a defect in the act of command4 ,for a  
man is stated to be inconstant because  
his reason fails in commanding what has 
been counselled and judged4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,the good of prudence is      
shared by all the moral virtues1 and    
accordingly perseverance in good belongs
 to all moral virtues1 chiefly1 however1
 to fortitude1 which suffers a greater  
impulse to the contrary4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,envy and anger1 which are the      
source of contention1 cause inconstancy 
on the part of the appetite1 to which   
power the origin of inconstancy is due1 
as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3      
,continency and perseverance seem to be 
not in the appetitive power1 but in the 
reason4 ,for the continent man suffers  
evil concupiscences1 and the persevering
 man suffers grievous sorrows 7which    
points to a defect in the appetitive    
power72 but reason stands firm1 in the  
continent man1 against concupiscence1   

and in the persevering man1 against     
sorrow4 ,hence continency and           
perseverance seem to be species of      
constancy which pertains to reason2 and 
to this power inconstancy pertains also4
   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1
 ,art4 #f  ,whether the ,aforesaid      
,vices ,arise from ,lust8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that the aforesaid   
vices do not arise from lust4 ,for      
inconstancy arises from envy1 as stated 
above 7,a4 #e1 ad #b74 ,but envy is a   
distinct vice from lust4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 it is written 7,james #a3h73  
,a double-minded man is inconstant in   
all his ways4 ,now duplicity does not   
seem to pertain to lust1 but rather to  
deceitfulness1 which is a daughter of   
covetousness1 according to ,gregory     
7,moral4 xxxi1 #de74 ,therefore the     
aforesaid vices do not arise from lust4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the aforesaid vices 
are connected with some defect of       
reason4 ,now spiritual vices are more   
akin to the reason than carnal vices4   

,therefore the aforesaid vices arise    
from spiritual vices rather than from   
carnal vices4  ,on the contrary1        
,gregory declares 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7   
that the aforesaid vices arise from     
lust4  ,i answer that1 ,as the          
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7    
pleasure above all corrupts the estimate
 of prudence1 and chiefly sexual        
pleasure which absorbs the mind1 and    
draws it to sensible delight4 ,now the  
perfection of prudence and of every     
intellectual virtue consists in         
abstraction from sensible objects4      
,wherefore1 since the aforesaid vices   
involve a defect of prudence and of the 
practical reason1 as stated above 7,,aa4
 #b1 #e71 it follows that they arise    
chiefly from lust4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,envy and anger cause inconstancy by    
drawing away the reason to something    
else2 whereas lust causes inconstancy by
 destroying the judgment of reason      
entirely4 ,hence the ,philosopher says  
7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that the man who is   

incontinent through anger listens to    
reason1 yet not perfectly1 whereas he   
who is incontinent through lust does not
 listen to it at all4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,duplicity also is something resulting  
from lust1 just as inconstancy is1 if by
 duplicity we understand fluctuation of 
the mind from one thing to another4     
,hence ,terence says 7,eunuch4 act #a1  
sc4 #a7 that love leads to war1 and     
likewise to peace and truce4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,carnal vices destroy the     
judgment of reason so much the more as  
they lead us away from reason4          
,,question #ed  ,,of ,,negligence 7,in  
,three ,articles7  ,we must now consider
 negligence1 under which head there are 
three points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether 
negligence is a special sin8  7#b7 ,to  
which virtue is it opposed8  7#c7       
,whether negligence is a mortal sin8    
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,negligence ,is a    
,special ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that negligence is not a special  

sin4 ,for negligence is opposed to      
diligence4 ,but diligence is required in
 every virtue4 ,therefore negligence is 
not a special sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
that which is common to every sin is not
 a special sin4 ,now negligence is      
common to every sin1 because he who sins
 neglects that which withdraws him from 
sin1 and he who perseveres in sin       
neglects to be contrite for his sin4    
,therefore negligence is not a special  
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every special 
sin has a determinate matter4 ,but      
negligence seems to have no determinate 
matter3 since it is neither about evil  
or indifferent things 7for no man is    
accused of negligence if he omit them71 
nor about good things1 for if these be  
done negligently1 they are no longer    
good4 ,therefore it seems that          
negligence is not a special vice4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,sins committed through   
negligence1 are distinguished from those
 which are committed through contempt4  
,i answer that1 ,negligence denotes lack

 of due solicitude4 ,now every lack of a
 due act is sinful3 wherefore it is     
evident that negligence is a sin1 and   
that it must needs have the character of
 a special sin according as solicitude  
is the act of a special virtue4 ,for    
certain sins are special through being  
about a special matter1 as lust is about
 sexual matters1 while some vices are   
special on account of their having a    
special kind of act which extends to all
 kinds of matter1 and such are all vices
 affecting an act of reason1 since every
 act of reason extends to any kind of   
moral matter4 ,since then solicitude is 
a special act of reason1 as stated above
 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #i71 it follows that     
negligence1 which denotes lack of       
solicitude1 is a special sin4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,diligence seems to be the    
same as solicitude1 because the more we 
love 7diligimus7 a thing the more       
solicitous are we about it4 ,hence      
diligence1 no less than solicitude1 is  
required for every virtue1 in so far as 

due acts of reason are requisite for    
every virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in     
every sin there must needs be a defect  
affecting an act of reason1 for instance
 a defect in counsel or the like4 ,hence
 just as precipitation is a special sin 
on account of a special act of reason   
which is omitted1 namely counsel1       
although it may be found in any kind of 
sin2 so negligence is a special sin on  
account of the lack of a special act of 
reason1 namely solicitude1 although it  
is found more or less in all sins4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,properly speaking the 
matter of negligence is a good that one 
ought to do1 not that it is a good when 
it is done negligently1 but because on  
account of negligence it incurs a lack  
of goodness1 whether a due act be       
entirely omitted through lack of        
solicitude1 or some due circumstance be 
omitted4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,negligence
 ,is ,opposed to ,prudence8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that negligence is   

not opposed to prudence4 ,for negligence
 seems to be the same as idleness or    
laziness1 which belongs to sloth1       
according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1    
#de74 ,now sloth is not opposed to      
prudence1 but to charity1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore     
negligence is not opposed to prudence4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every sin of        
omission seems to be due to negligence4 
,but sins of omission are not opposed to
 prudence1 but to the executive moral   
virtues4 ,therefore negligence is not   
opposed to prudence4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 imprudence relates to some act
 of reason4 ,but negligence does not    
imply a defect of counsel1 for that is  
precipitation1 nor a defect of judgment1
 since that is thoughtlessness1 nor a   
defect of command1 because that is      
inconstancy4 ,therefore negligence does 
not pertain to imprudence4  ,obj4 #d3   
,further1 it is written 7,eccles4       
#g3ai73 ,he that feareth ,god1          
neglecteth nothing4 ,but every sin is   

excluded by the opposite virtue4        
,therefore negligence is opposed to fear
 rather than to prudence4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4      
#bj3g73 ,a babbler and a fool           
7imprudens7 will regard no time4 ,now   
this is due to negligence4 ,therefore   
negligence is opposed to prudence4  ,i  
answer that1 ,negligence is directly    
opposed to solicitude4 ,now solicitude  
pertains to the reason1 and rectitude of
 solicitude to prudence4 ,hence1 on the 
other hand1 negligence pertains to      
imprudence4 ,this appears from its very 
name1 because1 as ,isidore observes     
7,etym4 x7 a negligent man is one who   
fails to choose 7nec eligens73 and the  
right choice of the means belongs to    
prudence4 ,therefore negligence pertains
 to imprudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3       
,negligence is a defect in the internal 
act1 to which choice also belongs3      
whereas idleness and laziness denote    
slowness of execution1 yet so that      
idleness denotes slowness in setting    

about the execution1 while laziness     
denotes remissness in the execution     
itself4 ,hence it is becoming that      
laziness should arise from sloth1 which 
is an oppressive sorrow1 i4e4 hindering1
 the mind from action 99,cf4 ,q4 #ce1   
,a4 #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #h4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,omission regards the  
external act1 for it consists in failing
 to perform an act which is due4 ,hence 
it is opposed to justice1 and is an     
effect of negligence1 even as the       
execution of a just deed is the effect  
of right reason4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3      
,negligence regards the act of command1 
which solicitude also regards4 ,yet the 
negligent man fails in regard to this   
act otherwise than the inconstant man3  
for the inconstant man fails in         
commanding1 being hindered as it were1  
by something1 whereas the negligent man 
fails through lack of a prompt will4    
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the fear of ,god helps
 us to avoid all sins1 because according
 to ,prov4 #ae3bg1 by the fear of the   

,lord everyone declineth from evil4     
,hence fear makes us avoid negligence1  
yet not as though negligence were       
directly opposed to fear1 but because   
fear incites man to acts of reason4     
,wherefore also it has been stated above
 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #b7 when we were
 treating of the passions1 that fear    
makes us take counsel4   ,,third        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,negligence ,can ,be a ,mortal 
,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that negligence cannot be a mortal sin4 
,for a gloss of ,gregory 99,moral4 ix4  
#cd on ,job #i3bh1 ,i feared all my     
works1 etc4 says that too little love of
 ,god aggravates the former1 viz4       
negligence4 ,but wherever there is      
mortal sin1 the love of ,god is done    
away with altogether4 ,therefore        
negligence is not a mortal sin4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 a gloss on ,ecclus4 #g3cd1
 ,for thy negligences purify thyself    
with a few1 says3 ,though the offering  
be small it cleanses the negligences of 

many sins4 ,now this would not be1 if   
negligence were a mortal sin4 ,therefore
 negligence is not a mortal sin4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 under the law certain     
sacrifices were prescribed for mortal   
sins1 as appears from the book of       
,leviticus4 ,yet no sacrifice was       
prescribed for negligence4 ,therefore   
negligence is not a mortal sin4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4       
#ai3af73 ,he that neglecteth his own    
life ,vulg43 'way' shall die4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #c71
 negligence arises out of a certain     
remissness of the will1 the result being
 a lack of solicitude on the part of the
 reason in commanding what it should    
command1 or as it should command4       
,accordingly negligence may happen to be
 a mortal sin in two ways4 ,first on the
 part of that which is omitted through  
negligence4 ,if this be either an act or
 a circumstance necessary for salvation1
 it will be a mortal sin4 ,secondly on  
the part of the cause3 for if the will  

be so remiss about ,divine things1 as to
 fall away altogether from the charity  
of ,god1 such negligence is a mortal    
sin1 and this is the case chiefly when  
negligence is due to contempt4  ,but if 
negligence consists in the omission of  
an act or circumstance that is not      
necessary for salvation1 it is not a    
mortal but a venial sin1 provided the   
negligence arise1 not from contempt1 but
 from some lack of fervor1 to which     
venial sin is an occasional obstacle4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man may be said to    
love ,god less in two ways4 ,first      
through lack of the fervor of charity1  
and this causes the negligence that is a
 venial sin3 secondly through lack of   
charity itself1 in which sense we say   
that a man loves ,god less when he loves
 ,him with a merely natural love2 and   
this causes the negligence that is a    
mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according
 to the same authority 7gloss71 a small 
offering made with a humble mind and out
 of pure love1 cleanses man not only    

from venial but also from mortal sin4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when negligence       
consists in the omission of that which  
is necessary for salvation1 it is drawn 
to the other more manifest genus of sin4
 ,because those sins that consist of    
inward actions1 are more hidden1        
wherefore no special sacrifices were    
prescribed for them in the ,law1 since  
the offering of sacrifices was a kind of
 public confession of sin1 whereas      
hidden sins should not be confessed in  
public4   ,,question #ee  ,,of ,,vices  
,,opposed ,,to ,,prudence ,,by ,,way    
,,of ,,resemblance 7,in ,eight          
,articles7  ,we must now consider those 
vices opposed to prudence1 which have a 
resemblance thereto4 ,under this head   
there are eight points of inquiry3  7#a7
 ,whether prudence of the flesh is a    
sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is a mortal sin8 
7#c7 ,whether craftiness is a special   
sin8  7#d7 ,of guile2  7#e7 ,of fraud2  
7#f7 ,of solicitude about temporal      
things2  7#g7 ,of solicitude about the  

future2  7#h7 ,of the origin of these   
vices4   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,prudence of
 the ,flesh ,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that prudence of the     
flesh is not a sin4 ,for prudence is    
more excellent than the other moral     
virtues1 since it governs them all4 ,but
 no justice or temperance is sinful4    
,neither therefore is any prudence a    
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is not a   
sin to act prudently for an end which it
 is lawful to love4 ,but it is lawful to
 love the flesh1 for no man ever hated  
his own flesh 7,eph4 #e3bi74 ,therefore 
prudence of the flesh is not a sin4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as man is      
tempted by the flesh1 so too is he      
tempted by the world and the devil4 ,but
 no prudence of the world1 or of the    
devil is accounted a sin4 ,therefore    
neither should any prudence of the flesh
 be accounted among sins4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,no man is an enemy to ,god   
save for wickedness according to ,wis4  

#ad3i1 ,to ,god the wicked and his      
wickedness are hateful alike4 ,now it is
 written 7,rom4 #h3g73 ,the prudence    
,vulg43 'wisdom' of the flesh is an     
enemy to ,god4 ,therefore prudence of   
the flesh is a sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as
 stated above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #ac71       
prudence regards things which are       
directed to the end of life as a whole4 
,hence prudence of the flesh signifies  
properly the prudence of a man who looks
 upon carnal goods as the last end of   
his life4 ,now it is evident that this  
is a sin1 because it involves a disorder
 in man with respect to his last end1   
which does not consist in the goods of  
the body1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#b1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore prudence of the 
flesh is a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3       
,justice and temperance include in their
 very nature that which ranks them among
 the virtues1 viz4 equality and the     
curbing of concupiscence2 hence they are
 never taken in a bad sense4 ,on the    
other hand prudence is so called from   

foreseeing 7providendo71 as stated above
 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #di1 ,a4 #f71    
which can extend to evil things also4   
,therefore1 although prudence is taken  
simply in a good sense1 yet1 if         
something be added1 it may be taken in a
 bad sense3 and it is thus that prudence
 of the flesh is said to be a sin4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the flesh is on       
account of the soul1 as matter is on    
account of the form1 and the instrument 
on account of the principal agent4      
,hence the flesh is loved lawfully1 if  
it be directed to the good of the soul  
as its end4 ,if1 however1 a man place   
his last end in a good of the flesh1 his
 love will be inordinate and unlawful1  
and it is thus that the prudence of the 
flesh is directed to the love of the    
flesh4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the devil     
tempts us1 not through the good of the  
appetible object1 but by way of         
suggestion4 ,wherefore1 since prudence  
implies direction to some appetible end1
 we do not speak of prudence of the     

devil1 as of a prudence directed to some
 evil end1 which is the aspect under    
which the world and the flesh tempt us1 
in so far as worldly or carnal goods are
 proposed to our appetite4 ,hence we    
speak of carnal and again of worldly    
prudence1 according to ,luke #af3h1 ,the
 children of this world are more prudent
 ,douay3 'wiser' in their generation1   
etc4 ,the ,apostle includes all in the  
prudence of the flesh1 because we covet 
the external things of the world on     
account of the flesh4  ,we may also     
reply that since prudence is in a       
certain sense called wisdom1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a71 we may  
distinguish a threefold prudence        
corresponding to the three kinds of     
temptation4 ,hence it is written 7,james
 #c3ae7 that there is a wisdom which is 
earthly1 sensual and devilish1 as       
explained above 7,q4 #de1 ,a4 #a1 ad    
#a71 when we were treating of wisdom4   
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,prudence of the     

,flesh ,is a ,mortal ,sin8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that prudence of the 
flesh is a mortal sin4 ,for it is a     
mortal sin to rebel against the ,divine 
law1 since this implies contempt of     
,god4 ,now the prudence ,douay3 'wisdom'
 of the flesh 4 4 4 is not subject to   
the law of ,god 7,rom4 #h3g74 ,therefore
 prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every sin against   
the ,holy ,ghost is a mortal sin4 ,now  
prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin 
against the ,holy ,ghost1 for it cannot 
be subject to the law of ,god 7,rom4    
#h3g71 and so it seems to be an         
unpardonable sin1 which is proper to the
 sin against the ,holy ,ghost4          
,therefore prudence of the flesh is a   
mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the    
greatest evil is opposed to the greatest
 good1 as stated in ,ethic4 viii1 #aj4  
,now prudence of the flesh is opposed to
 that prudence which is the chief of the
 moral virtues4 ,therefore prudence of  
the flesh is chief among mortal sins1 so

 that it is itself a mortal sin4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,that which diminishes a  
sin has not of itself the nature of a   
mortal sin4 ,now the thoughtful quest of
 things pertaining to the care of the   
flesh1 which seems to pertain to carnal 
prudence1 diminishes sin 99,cf4 ,prov4  
#f3cj4 ,therefore prudence of the flesh 
has not of itself the nature of a mortal
 sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 
7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a2 ,a4 #ac71 a man
 is said to be prudent in two ways4     
,first1 simply1 i4e4 in relation to the 
end of life as a whole4 ,secondly1      
relatively1 i4e4 in relation to some    
particular end2 thus a man is said to be
 prudent in business or something else  
of the kind4 ,accordingly if prudence of
 the flesh be taken as corresponding to 
prudence in its absolute signification1 
so that a man place the last end of his 
whole life in the care of the flesh1 it 
is a mortal sin1 because he turns away  
from ,god by so doing1 since he cannot  
have several last ends1 as stated above 

7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #e74  ,if1 on the 
other hand1 prudence of the flesh be    
taken as corresponding to particular    
prudence1 it is a venial sin4 ,for it   
happens sometimes that a man has an     
inordinate affection for some pleasure  
of the flesh1 without turning away from 
,god by a mortal sin2 in which case he  
does not place the end of his whole life
 in carnal pleasure4 ,to apply oneself  
to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin 
and pertains to prudence of the flesh4  
,but if a man actually refers the care  
of the flesh to a good end1 as when one 
is careful about one's food in order to 
sustain one's body1 this is no longer   
prudence of the flesh1 because then one 
uses the care of the flesh as a means to
 an end4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle
 is speaking of that carnal prudence    
whereby a man places the end of his     
whole life in the goods of the flesh1   
and this is a mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,prudence of the flesh does not     
imply a sin against the ,holy ,ghost4   

,for when it is stated that it cannot be
 subject to the law of ,god1 this does  
not mean that he who has prudence of the
 flesh1 cannot be converted and submit  
to the law of ,god1 but that carnal     
prudence itself cannot be subject to    
,god's law1 even as neither can         
injustice be just1 nor heat cold1       
although that which is hot may become   
cold4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every sin is   
opposed to prudence1 just as prudence is
 shared by every virtue4 ,but it does   
not follow that every sin opposed to    
prudence is most grave1 but only when it
 is opposed to prudence in some very    
grave matter4   ,,third ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,craftiness ,is a ,special ,sin8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
craftiness is not a special sin4 ,for   
the words of ,holy ,writ do not induce  
anyone to sin2 and yet they induce us to
 be crafty1 according to ,prov4 #a3d1   
,to give craftiness ,douay3 'subtlety'  
to little ones4 ,therefore craftiness is

 not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is  
written 7,prov4 #ac3af73 ,the crafty    
,douay3 'prudent' man doth all things   
with counsel4 ,therefore1 he does so    
either for a good or for an evil end4   
,if for a good end1 there is no sin     
seemingly1 and if for an evil end1 it   
would seem to pertain to carnal or      
worldly prudence4 ,therefore craftiness 
is not a special sin distinct from      
prudence of the flesh4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 ,gregory expounding the words 
of ,job #ab1 ,the simplicity of the just
 man is laughed to scorn1 says 7,moral4 
x1 #bi73 ,the wisdom of this world is to
 hide one's thoughts by artifice1 to    
conceal one's meaning by words1 to      
represent error as truth1 to make out   
the truth to be false1 and further on he
 adds3 ,this prudence is acquired by the
 young1 it is learnt at a price by      
children4 ,now the above things seem to 
belong to craftiness4 ,therefore        
craftiness is not distinct from carnal  
or worldly prudence1 and consequently it

 seems not to be a special sin4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 
#d3b73 ,we renounce the hidden things of
 dishonesty1 not walking in craftiness1 
nor adulterating the word of ,god4      
,therefore craftiness is a sin4  ,i     
answer that1 ,prudence is right reason  
applied to action1 just as science is   
right reason applied to knowledge4 ,in  
speculative matters one may sin against 
rectitude of knowledge in two ways3 in  
one way when the reason is led to a     
false conclusion that appears to be     
true2 in another way when the reason    
proceeds from false premises1 that      
appear to be true1 either to a true or  
to a false conclusion4 ,even so a sin   
may be against prudence1 through having 
some resemblance thereto1 in two ways4  
,first1 when the purpose of the reason  
is directed to an end which is good not 
in truth but in appearance1 and this    
pertains to prudence of the flesh2      
secondly1 when1 in order to obtain a    
certain end1 whether good or evil1 a man

 uses means that are not true but       
fictitious and counterfeit1 and this    
belongs to the sin of craftiness4 ,this 
is consequently a sin opposed to        
prudence1 and distinct from prudence of 
the flesh4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as        
,augustine observes 7,contra ,julian4   
iv1 #c7 just as prudence is sometimes   
improperly taken in a bad sense1 so is  
craftiness sometimes taken in a good    
sense1 and this on account of their     
mutual resemblance4 ,properly speaking1 
however1 craftiness is taken in a bad   
sense1 as the ,philosopher states in    
,ethic4 vi1 #ab4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,craftiness can take counsel both for a 
good end and for an evil end3 nor should
 a good end be pursued by means that are
 false and counterfeit but by such as   
are true4 ,hence craftiness is a sin if 
it be directed to a good end4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,under worldly prudence       
,gregory included everything that can   
pertain to false prudence1 so that it   
comprises craftiness also4   ,,fourth   

,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,guile ,is a ,sin ,pertaining  
to ,craftiness8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that guile is not a sin      
pertaining to craftiness4 ,for sin1     
especially mortal1 has no place in      
perfect men4 ,yet a certain guile is to 
be found in them1 according to #b ,cor4 
#ab3af1 ,being crafty ,i caught you by  
guile4 ,therefore guile is not always a 
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 guile seems to
 pertain chiefly to the tongue1         
according to ,ps4 #e3aa1 ,they dealt    
deceitfully with their tongues4 ,now    
craftiness like prudence is in the very 
act of reason4 ,therefore guile does not
 pertain to craftiness4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 it is written 7,prov4 #ab3bj73
 ,guile ,douay3 ',deceit' is in the     
heart of them that think evil things4   
,but the thought of evil things does not
 always pertain to craftiness4          
,therefore guile does not seem to belong
 to craftiness4  ,on the contrary1      
,craftiness aims at lying in wait1      

according to ,eph4 #d3ad1 ,by cunning   
craftiness by which they lie in wait to 
deceive3 and guile aims at this also4   
,therefore guile pertains to craftiness4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 
#c71 it belongs to craftiness to adopt  
ways that are not true but counterfeit  
and apparently true1 in order to attain 
some end either good or evil4 ,now the  
adopting of such ways may be subjected  
to a twofold consideration2 first1 as   
regards the process of thinking them    
out1 and this belongs properly to       
craftiness1 even as thinking out right  
ways to a due end belongs to prudence4  
,secondly the adopting of such like ways
 may be considered with regard to their 
actual execution1 and in this way it    
belongs to guile4 ,hence guile denotes a
 certain execution of craftiness1 and   
accordingly belongs thereto4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,just as craftiness is taken  
properly in a bad sense1 and improperly 
in a good sense1 so too is guile which  
is the execution of craftiness4  ,reply 

,obj4 #b3 ,the execution of craftiness  
with the purpose of deceiving1 is       
effected first and foremost by words1   
which hold the chief place among those  
signs whereby a man signifies something 
to another man1 as ,augustine states    
7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #c71 hence    
guile is ascribed chiefly to speech4    
,yet guile may happen also in deeds1    
according to ,ps4 #ajd3be1 ,and to deal 
deceitfully with his servants4 ,guile is
 also in the heart1 according to        
,ecclus4 #ai3bc1 ,his interior is full  
of deceit1 but this is to devise        
deceits1 according to ,ps4 #cg3ac3 ,they
 studied deceits all the day long4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whoever purposes to do
 some evil deed1 must needs devise      
certain ways of attaining his purpose1  
and for the most part he devises        
deceitful ways1 whereby the more easily 
to obtain his end4 ,nevertheless it     
happens sometimes that evil is done     
openly and by violence without          
craftiness and guile2 but as this is    

more difficult1 it is of less frequent  
occurrence4   ,,fifth ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #e  ,whether  
,fraud ,pertains to ,craftiness8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fraud
 does not pertain to craftiness4 ,for a 
man does not deserve praise if he allows
 himself to be deceived1 which is the   
object of craftiness2 and yet a man     
deserves praise for allowing himself to 
be defrauded1 according to #a ,cor4     
#f3a1 ,why do you not rather suffer     
yourselves to be defrauded8 ,therefore  
fraud does not belong to craftiness4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fraud seems to      
consist in unlawfully taking or         
receiving external things1 for it is    
written 7,acts #e3a7 that a certain man 
named ,ananias with ,saphira his wife1  
sold a piece of land1 and by fraud kept 
back part of the price of the land4 ,now
 it pertains to injustice or            
illiberality to take possession of or   
retain external things unjustly4        
,therefore fraud does not belong to     

craftiness which is opposed to prudence4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no man employs    
craftiness against himself4 ,but the    
frauds of some are against themselves1  
for it is written 7,prov4 #a3ah7        
concerning some that they practice      
frauds ,douay3 'deceits' against their  
own souls4 ,therefore fraud does not    
belong to craftiness4  ,on the contrary1
 ,the object of fraud is to deceive1    
according to ,job #ac3i1 ,shall he be   
deceived as a man1 with your fraudulent 
,douay3 'deceitful' dealings8 ,now      
craftiness is directed to the same      
object4 ,therefore fraud pertains to    
craftiness4  ,i answer that1 ,just as   
guile consists in the execution of      
craftiness1 so also does fraud4 ,but    
they seem to differ in the fact that    
guile belongs in general to the         
execution of craftiness1 whether this be
 effected by words1 or by deeds1 whereas
 fraud belongs more properly to the     
execution of craftiness by deeds4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle does not 

counsel the faithful to be deceived in  
their knowledge1 but to bear patiently  
the effect of being deceived1 and to    
endure wrongs inflicted on them by      
fraud4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the execution 
of craftiness may be carried out by     
another vice1 just as the execution of  
prudence by the virtues3 and accordingly
 nothing hinders fraud from pertaining  
to covetousness or illiberality4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,those who commit frauds1 do 
not design anything against themselves  
or their own souls2 it is through ,god's
 just judgment that what they plot      
against others1 recoils on themselves1  
according to ,ps4 #g3af1 ,he is fallen  
into the hole he made4   ,,sixth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #f  
,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to ,be         
,solicitous ,about ,temporal ,matters8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem lawful to 
be solicitous about temporal matters4   
,because a superior should be solicitous
 for his subjects1 according to ,rom4   
#ab3h1 ,he that ruleth1 with solicitude4

 ,now according to the ,divine ordering1
 man is placed over temporal things1    
according to ,ps4 #h3h1 ,thou hast      
subjected all things under his feet1    
etc4 ,therefore man should be solicitous
 about temporal things4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 everyone is solicitous about  
the end for which he works4 ,now it is  
lawful for a man to work for the        
temporal things whereby he sustains     
life1 wherefore the ,apostle says 7#b   
,thess4 #c3aj73 ,if any man will not    
work1 neither let him eat4 ,therefore it
 is lawful to be solicitous about       
temporal things4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
solicitude about works of mercy is      
praiseworthy1 according to #b ,tim4     
#a3ag1 ,when he was come to ,rome1 he   
carefully sought me4 ,now solicitude    
about temporal things is sometimes      
connected with works of mercy2 for      
instance1 when a man is solicitous to   
watch over the interests of orphans and 
poor persons4 ,therefore solicitude     
about temporal things is not unlawful4  

,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said       
7,matt4 #f3ca73 ,be not solicitous 4 4 4
 saying1 ,what shall we eat1 or what    
shall we drink1 or wherewith shall we be
 clothed8 ,and yet such things are very 
necessary4  ,i answer that1 ,solicitude 
denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain   
something4 ,now it is evident that the  
endeavor is more earnest when there is  
fear of failure1 so that there is less  
solicitude when success is assured4     
,accordingly solicitude about temporal  
things may be unlawful in three ways4   
,first on the part of the object of     
solicitude2 that is1 if we seek temporal
 things as an end4 ,hence ,augustine    
says 7,de ,operibus ,monach4 xxvi73     
,when ,our ,lord said3 ',be not         
solicitous1 ' etc4 4 4 4 ,he intended to
 forbid them either to make such things 
their end1 or for the sake of these     
things to do whatever they were         
commanded to do in preaching the        
,gospel4 ,secondly1 solicitude about    
temporal things may be unlawful1 through

 too much earnestness in endeavoring to 
obtain temporal things1 the result being
 that a man is drawn away from spiritual
 things which ought to be the chief     
object of his search1 wherefore it is   
written 7,matt4 #ac3bb7 that the care of
 this world 4 4 4 chokes up the word4   
,thirdly1 through over much fear1 when1 
to wit1 a man fears to lack necessary   
things if he do what he ought to do4    
,now our ,lord gives three motives for  
laying aside this fear4 ,first1 on      
account of the yet greater favors       
bestowed by ,god on man1 independently  
of his solicitude1 viz4 his body and    
soul 7,matt4 #f3bf72 secondly1 on       
account of the care with which ,god     
watches over animals and plants without 
the assistance of man1 according to the 
requirements of their nature2 thirdly1  
because of ,divine providence1 through  
ignorance of which the gentiles are     
solicitous in seeking temporal goods    
before all others4 ,consequently ,he    
concludes that we should be solicitous  

most of all about spiritual goods1      
hoping that temporal goods also may be  
granted us according to our needs1 if we
 do what we ought to do4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,temporal goods are subjected to man
 that he may use them according to his  
needs1 not that he may place his end in 
them and be over solicitous about them4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the solicitude of a   
man who gains his bread by bodily labor 
is not superfluous but proportionate2   
hence ,jerome says on ,matt4 #f3ca1 ,be 
not solicitous1 that labor is necessary1
 but solicitude must be banished1 namely
 superfluous solicitude which unsettles 
the mind4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the     
works of mercy solicitude about temporal
 things is directed to charity as its   
end1 wherefore it is not unlawful1      
unless it be superfluous4   ,,seventh   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #g  
,whether ,we ,should ,be ,solicitous    
,about the ,future8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that we should be solicitous 
about the future4 ,for it is written    

7,prov4 #f3f-h73 ,go to the ant1 ,o     
sluggard1 and consider her ways and     
learn wisdom2 which1 although she hath  
no guide1 nor master 4 4 4 provideth her
 meat for herself in the summer1 and    
gathereth her food in the harvest4 ,now 
this is to be solicitous about the      
future4 ,therefore solicitude about the 
future is praiseworthy4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 solicitude pertains to        
prudence4 ,but prudence is chiefly about
 the future1 since its principal part is
 foresight of future things1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #f1 ad #a74         
,therefore it is virtuous to be         
solicitous about the future4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 whoever puts something by that
 he may keep it for the morrow1 is      
solicitous about the future4 ,now we    
read 7,john #ab3f7 that ,christ had a   
bag for keeping things in1 which ,judas 
carried1 and 7,acts #d3cd-cg7 that the  
,apostles kept the price of the land1   
which had been laid at their feet4      
,therefore it is lawful to be solicitous

 about the future4  ,on the contrary1   
,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #f3cd73 ,be not 
4 4 4 solicitous for tomorrow2 where    
tomorrow stands for the future1 as      
,jerome says in his commentary on this  
passage4  ,i answer that1 ,no work can  
be virtuous1 unless it be vested with   
its due circumstances1 and among these  
is the due time1 according to ,eccles4  
#h3f1 ,there is a time and opportunity  
for every business2 which applies not   
only to external deeds but also to      
internal solicitude4 ,for every time has
 its own fitting proper solicitude2 thus
 solicitude about the crops belongs to  
the summer time1 and solicitude about   
the vintage to the time of autumn4      
,accordingly if a man were solicitous   
about the vintage during the summer1 he 
would be needlessly forestalling the    
solicitude belonging to a future time4  
,hence ,our ,lord forbids such like     
excessive solicitude1 saying3 ,be 4 4 4 
not solicitous for tomorrow1 wherefore  
,he adds1 for the morrow will be        

solicitous for itself1 that is to say1  
the morrow will have its own solicitude1
 which will be burden enough for the    
soul4 ,this is what ,he means by adding3
 ,sufficient for the day is the evil    
thereof1 namely1 the burden of          
solicitude4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ant  
is solicitous at a befitting time1 and  
it is this that is proposed for our     
example4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,due         
foresight of the future belongs to      
prudence4 ,but it would be an inordinate
 foresight or solicitude about the      
future1 if a man were to seek temporal  
things1 to which the terms past and     
future apply1 as ends1 or if he were to 
seek them in excess of the needs of the 
present life1 or if he were to forestall
 the time for solicitude4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4     
,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ag71 when we see a 
servant of ,god taking thought lest he  
lack these needful things1 we must not  
judge him to be solicitous for the      
morrow1 since even ,our ,lord deigned   

for our example to have a purse1 and we 
read in the ,acts of the ,apostles that 
they procured the necessary means of    
livelihood in view of the future on     
account of a threatened famine4 ,hence  
,our ,lord does not condemn those who   
according to human custom1 provide      
themselves with such things1 but those  
who oppose themselves to ,god for the   
sake of these things4   ,,eighth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #h  
,whether ,these ,vices ,arise from      
,covetousness8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that these vices do not arise from
 covetousness4 ,as stated above 7,q4    
#dc1 ,a4 #f7 lust is the chief cause of 
lack of rectitude in the reason4 ,now   
these vices are opposed to right reason1
 i4e4 to prudence4 ,therefore they arise
 chiefly from lust2 especially since the
 ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #f7    
that ,venus is full of guile and her    
girdle is many colored and that he who  
is incontinent in desire acts with      
cunning4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 these     

vices bear a certain resemblance to     
prudence1 as stated above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 
#ac74 ,now1 since prudence is in the    
reason1 the more spiritual vices seem to
 be more akin thereto1 such as pride and
 vainglory4 ,therefore the aforesaid    
vices seem to arise from pride rather   
than from covetousness4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 men make use of stratagems not
 only in laying hold of other people's  
goods1 but also in plotting murders1 the
 former of which pertains to            
covetousness1 and the latter to anger4  
,now the use of stratagems pertains to  
craftiness1 guile1 and fraud4 ,therefore
 the aforesaid vices arise not only from
 covetousness1 but also from anger4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1  
#de7 states that fraud is a daughter of 
covetousness4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,a4 #c2 ,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #ac71
 carnal prudence and craftiness1 as well
 as guile and fraud1 bear a certain     
resemblance to prudence in some kind of 
use of the reason4 ,now among all the   

moral virtues it is justice wherein the 
use of right reason appears chiefly1 for
 justice is in the rational appetite4   
,hence the undue use of reason appears  
chiefly in the vices opposed to justice1
 the chief of which is covetousness4    
,therefore the aforesaid vices arise    
chiefly from covetousness4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,on account of the vehemence of    
pleasure and of concupiscence1 lust     
entirely suppresses the reason from     
exercising its act3 whereas in the      
aforesaid vices there is some use of    
reason1 albeit inordinate4 ,hence these 
vices do not arise directly from lust4  
,when the ,philosopher says that ,venus 
is full of guile1 he is referring to a  
certain resemblance1 in so far as she   
carries man away suddenly1 just as he is
 moved in deceitful actions1 yet not by 
means of craftiness but rather by the   
vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure2
 wherefore he adds that ,venus doth     
cozen the wits of the wisest man 99,cf4 
,iliad xiv1 #bad-bag4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 

,to do anything by stratagem seems to be
 due to pusillanimity3 because a        
magnanimous man wishes to act openly1 as
 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c74
 ,wherefore1 as pride resembles or apes 
magnanimity1 it follows that the        
aforesaid vices which make use of fraud 
and guile1 do not arise directly from   
pride1 but rather from covetousness1    
which seeks its own profit and sets     
little by excellence4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,anger's movement is sudden1 hence it   
acts with precipitation1 and without    
counsel1 contrary to the use of the     
aforesaid vices1 though these use       
counsel inordinately4 ,that men use     
stratagems in plotting murders1 arises  
not from anger but rather from hatred1  
because the angry man desires to harm   
manifestly1 as the ,philosopher states  
7,rhet4 ii1 #b1 #c7 99,cf4 ,ethic4 vii1 
#f4   ,,question #ef  ,,of ,,the        
,,precepts ,,relating ,,to ,,prudence   
7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we must now      
consider the precepts relating to       

prudence1 under which head there are two
 points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,the precepts 
of prudence2  7#b7 ,the precepts        
relating to the opposite vices4         
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ef1   
,art4 #a  ,whether the ,precepts of the 
,decalogue ,should ,have ,included a    
,precept of ,prudence8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that the precepts of the 
decalogue should have included a precept
 of prudence4 ,for the chief precepts   
should include a precept of the chief   
virtue4 ,now the chief precepts are     
those of the decalogue4 ,since then     
prudence is the chief of the moral      
virtues1 it seems that the precepts of  
the decalogue should have included a    
precept of prudence4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 the teaching of the ,gospel   
contains the ,law especially with regard
 to the precepts of the decalogue4 ,now 
the teaching of the ,gospel contains a  
precept of prudence 7,matt4 #aj3af73 ,be
 ye 4 4 4 prudent ,douay3 'wise' as     
serpents4 ,therefore the precepts of the

 decalogue should have included a       
precept of prudence4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 the other lessons of the ,old 
,testament are directed to the precepts 
of the decalogue3 wherefore it is       
written 7,malach4 #d3d73 ,remember the  
law of ,moses ,my servant1 which ,i     
commanded him in ,horeb4 ,now the other 
lessons of the ,old ,testament include  
precepts of prudence2 for instance      
7,prov4 #c3e73 ,lean not upon thy own   
prudence2 and further on 7,prov4 #d3be73
 ,let thine eyelids go before thy steps4
 ,therefore the ,law also should have   
contained a precept of prudence1        
especially among the precepts of the    
decalogue4  ,the contrary however       
appears to anyone who goes through the  
precepts of the decalogue4  ,i answer   
that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#ajj1 ,a4 #c2 ,a4 #e1 ad #a7 when we    
were treating of precepts1 the          
commandments of the decalogue being     
given to the whole people1 are a matter 
of common knowledge to all1 as coming   

under the purview of natural reason4    
,now foremost among the things dictated 
by natural reason are the ends of human 
life1 which are to the practical order  
what naturally known principles are to  
the speculative order1 as shown above   
7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #f74 ,now prudence is not 
about the end1 but about the means1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #f74 ,hence  
it was not fitting that the precepts of 
the decalogue should include a precept  
relating directly to prudence4 ,and yet 
all the precepts of the decalogue are   
related to prudence1 in so far as it    
directs all virtuous acts4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,although prudence is simply       
foremost among all the moral virtues1   
yet justice1 more than any other virtue1
 regards its object under the aspect of 
something due1 which is a necessary     
condition for a precept1 as stated above
 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1    
,,aa4 #a1 #e74 ,hence it behooved the   
chief precepts of the ,law1 which are   
those of the decalogue1 to refer to     

justice rather than to prudence4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,the teaching of the ,gospel 
is the doctrine of perfection4          
,therefore it needed to instruct man    
perfectly in all matters relating to    
right conduct1 whether ends or means3   
wherefore it behooved the ,gospel       
teaching to contain precepts also of    
prudence4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as the
 rest of the teaching of the ,old       
,testament is directed to the precepts  
of the decalogue as its end1 so it      
behooved man to be instructed by the    
subsequent lessons of the ,old          
,testament about the act of prudence    
which is directed to the means4         
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ef1  
,art4 #b  ,whether the ,prohibitive     
,precepts ,relating to the ,vices       
,opposed to ,prudence ,are ,fittingly   
,propounded in the ,old ,law8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
prohibitive precepts relating to the    
vices opposed to prudence are           
unfittingly propounded in the ,old ,law4

 ,for such vices as imprudence and its  
parts which are directly opposed to     
prudence are not less opposed thereto1  
than those which bear a certain         
resemblance to prudence1 such as        
craftiness and vices connected with it4 
,now the latter vices are forbidden in  
the ,law3 for it is written 7,lev4      
#ai3ac73 ,thou shalt not calumniate thy 
neighbor1 and 7,deut4 #be3ac73 ,thou    
shalt not have divers weights in thy    
bag1 a greater and a less4 ,therefore   
there should have also been prohibitive 
precepts about the vices directly       
opposed to prudence4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 there is room for fraud in    
other things than in buying and selling4
 ,therefore the ,law unfittingly forbade
 fraud solely in buying and selling4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there is the same   
reason for prescribing an act of virtue 
as for prohibiting the act of a contrary
 vice4 ,but acts of prudence are not    
prescribed in the ,law4 ,therefore      
neither should any contrary vices have  

been forbidden in the ,law4  ,the       
contrary1 however1 appears from the     
precepts of the ,law which are quoted in
 the first objection4  ,i answer that1  
,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 justice1     
above all1 regards the aspect of        
something due1 which is a necessary     
condition for a precept1 because justice
 tends to render that which is due to   
another1 as we shall state further on   
7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b74 ,now craftiness1 as  
to its execution1 is committed chiefly  
in matters of justice1 as stated above  
7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #h73 and so it was fitting
 that the ,law should contain precepts  
forbidding the execution of craftiness1 
in so far as this pertains to injustice1
 as when a man uses guile and fraud in  
calumniating another or in stealing his 
goods4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those vices   
that are manifestly opposed to prudence1
 do not pertain to injustice in the same
 way as the execution of craftiness1 and
 so they are not forbidden in the ,law1 
as fraud and guile are1 which latter    

pertain to injustice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,all guile and fraud committed in       
matters of injustice1 can be understood 
to be forbidden in the prohibition of   
calumny 7,lev4 #ai3ac74 ,yet fraud and  
guile are wont to be practiced chiefly  
in buying and selling1 according to     
,ecclus4 #bf3bh1 ,a huckster shall not  
be justified from the sins of the lips3 
and it is for this reason that the ,law 
contained a special precept forbidding  
fraudulent buying and selling4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,all the precepts of the ,law 
that relate to acts of justice pertain  
to the execution of prudence1 even as   
the precepts prohibitive of stealing1   
calumny and fraudulent selling pertain  
to the execution of craftiness4         
,,question #eg  ,,of ,,right 7,in ,four 
,articles7  ,after considering prudence 
we must in due sequence consider        
justice1 the consideration of which will
 be fourfold3  7#a7 ,of justice2  7#b7  
,of its parts2  7#c7 ,of the            
corresponding gift2  7#d7 ,of the       

precepts relating to justice4  ,four    
points will have to be considered about 
justice3 7#a7 ,right2 7#b7 ,justice     
itself2 7#c7 ,injustice2 7#d7 ,judgment4
  ,under the first head there are four  
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether right 
is the object of justice8  7#b7 ,whether
 right is fittingly divided into natural
 and positive right8  7#c7 ,whether the 
right of nations is the same as natural 
right8  7#d7 ,whether right of dominion 
and paternal right are distinct species8
   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1
 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,right ,is the      
,object of ,justice8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that right is not the object
 of justice4 ,for the jurist ,celsus    
says 99,digest4 i1 #a2 ,de ,just4 et    
,jure #a that right is the art of       
goodness and equality4 ,now art is not  
the object of justice1 but is by itself 
an intellectual virtue4 ,therefore right
 is not the object of justice4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 ,law1 according to        
,isidore 7,etym4 v1 #c71 is a kind of   

right4 ,now law is the object not of    
justice but of prudence1 wherefore the  
,philosopher 99,ethic4 vi1 #h reckons   
legislative as one of the parts of      
prudence4 ,therefore right is not the   
object of justice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
justice1 before all1 subjects man to    
,god3 for ,augustine says 7,de ,moribus 
,eccl4 xv7 that justice is love serving 
,god alone1 and consequently governing  
aright all things subject to man4 ,now  
right 7jus7 does not pertain to ,divine 
things1 but only to human affairs1 for  
,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #b7 that fas is
 the ,divine law1 and jus1 the human    
law4 ,therefore right is not the object 
of justice4  ,on the contrary1 ,isidore 
says 7,etym4 v1 #b7 that jus 7right7 is 
so called because it is just4 ,now the  
just is the object of justice1 for the  
,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 v1 #a7   
that all are agreed in giving the name  
of justice to the habit which makes men 
capable of doing just actions4  ,i      
answer that1 ,it is proper to justice1  

as compared with the other virtues1 to  
direct man in his relations with others3
 because it denotes a kind of equality1 
as its very name implies2 indeed we are 
wont to say that things are adjusted    
when they are made equal1 for equality  
is in reference of one thing to some    
other4 ,on the other hand the other     
virtues perfect man in those matters    
only which befit him in relation to     
himself4 ,accordingly that which is     
right in the works of the other virtues1
 and to which the intention of the      
virtue tends as to its proper object1   
depends on its relation to the agent    
only1 whereas the right in a work of    
justice1 besides its relation to the    
agent1 is set up by its relation to     
others4 ,because a man's work is said to
 be just when it is related to some     
other by way of some kind of equality1  
for instance the payment of the wage due
 for a service rendered4 ,and so a thing
 is said to be just1 as having the      
rectitude of justice1 when it is the    

term of an act of justice1 without      
taking into account the way in which it 
is done by the agent3 whereas in the    
other virtues nothing is declared to be 
right unless it is done in a certain way
 by the agent4 ,for this reason justice 
has its own special proper object over  
and above the other virtues1 and this   
object is called the just1 which is the 
same as right4 ,hence it is evident that
 right is the object of justice4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,it is usual for words to be 
distorted from their original           
signification so as to mean something   
else3 thus the word medicine was first  
employed to signify a remedy used for   
curing a sick person1 and then it was   
drawn to signify the art by which this  
is done4 ,in like manner the word jus   
7right7 was first of all used to denote 
the just thing itself1 but afterwards it
 was transferred to designate the art   
whereby it is known what is just1 and   
further to denote the place where       
justice is administered1 thus a man is  

said to appear in jure 99,in ,english we
 speak of a court of law1 a barrister at
 law1 etc41 and yet further1 we say even
 that a man1 who has the office of      
exercising justice1 administers the jus 
even if his sentence be unjust4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,just as there pre-exists in  
the mind of the craftsman an expression 
of the things to be made externally by  
his craft1 which expression is called   
the rule of his craft1 so too there     
pre-exists in the mind an expression of 
the particular just work which the      
reason determines1 and which is a kind  
of rule of prudence4 ,if this rule be   
expressed in writing it is called a law1
 which according to ,isidore 7,etym4 v1 
#a7 is a written decree3 and so law is  
not the same as right1 but an expression
 of right4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since     
justice implies equality1 and since we  
cannot offer ,god an equal return1 it   
follows that we cannot make ,him a      
perfectly just repayment4 ,for this     
reason the ,divine law is not properly  

called jus but fas1 because1 to wit1    
,god is satisfied if we accomplish what 
we can4 ,nevertheless justice tends to  
make man repay ,god as much as he can1  
by subjecting his mind to ,him entirely4
   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    
#eg1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,right ,is      
,fittingly ,divided into ,natural ,right
 and ,positive ,right8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that right is not        
fittingly divided into natural right and
 positive right4 ,for that which is     
natural is unchangeable1 and is the same
 for all4 ,now nothing of the kind is to
 be found in human affairs1 since all   
the rules of human right fail in certain
 cases1 nor do they obtain force        
everywhere4 ,therefore there is no such 
thing as natural right4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 a thing is called positive    
when it proceeds from the human will4   
,but a thing is not just1 simply because
 it proceeds from the human will1 else a
 man's will could not be unjust4 ,since 
then the just and the right are the     

same1 it seems that there is no positive
 right4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,divine    
right is not natural right1 since it    
transcends human nature4 ,in like       
manner1 neither is it positive right1   
since it is based not on human1 but on  
,divine authority4 ,therefore right is  
unfittingly divided into natural and    
positive4  ,on the contrary1 ,the       
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #g7 that  
political justice is partly natural and 
partly legal1 i4e4 established by law4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4   
#a7 the right or the just is a work that
 is adjusted to another person according
 to some kind of equality4 ,now a thing 
can be adjusted to a man in two ways3   
first by its very nature1 as when a man 
gives so much that he may receive equal 
value in return1 and this is called     
natural right4 ,in another way a thing  
is adjusted or commensurated to another 
person1 by agreement1 or by common      
consent1 when1 to wit1 a man deems      
himself satisfied1 if he receive so     

much4 ,this can be done in two ways3    
first by private agreement1 as that     
which is confirmed by an agreement      
between private individuals2 secondly1  
by public agreement1 as when the whole  
community agrees that something should  
be deemed as though it were adjusted and
 commensurated to another person1 or    
when this is decreed by the prince who  
is placed over the people1 and acts in  
its stead1 and this is called positive  
right4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that which is 
natural to one whose nature is          
unchangeable1 must needs be such always 
and everywhere4 ,but man's nature is    
changeable1 wherefore that which is     
natural to man may sometimes fail4 ,thus
 the restitution of a deposit to the    
depositor is in accordance with natural 
equality1 and if human nature were      
always right1 this would always have to 
be observed2 but since it happens       
sometimes that man's will is unrighteous
 there are cases in which a deposit     
should not be restored1 lest a man of   

unrighteous will make evil use of the   
thing deposited3 as when a madman or an 
enemy of the common weal demands the    
return of his weapons4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,the human will can1 by common         
agreement1 make a thing to be just      
provided it be not1 of itself1 contrary 
to natural justice1 and it is in such   
matters that positive right has its     
place4 ,hence the ,philosopher says     
7,ethic4 v1 #g7 that in the case of the 
legal just1 it does not matter in the   
first instance whether it takes one form
 or another1 it only matters when once  
it is laid down4 ,if1 however1 a thing  
is1 of itself1 contrary to natural      
right1 the human will cannot make it    
just1 for instance by decreeing that it 
is lawful to steal or to commit         
adultery4 ,hence it is written 7,isa4   
#aj3a73 ,woe to them that make wicked   
laws4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,divine    
right is that which is promulgated by   
,god4 ,such things are partly those that
 are naturally just1 yet their justice  

is hidden to man1 and partly are made   
just by ,god's decree4 ,hence also      
,divine right may be divided in respect 
of these two things1 even as human right
 is4 ,for the ,divine law commands      
certain things because they are good1   
and forbids others1 because they are    
evil1 while others are good because they
 are prescribed1 and others evil because
 they are forbidden4   ,,third ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
the ,right of ,nations ,is the ,same ,as
 the ,natural ,right8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that the right of nations
 is the same as the natural right4 ,for 
all men do not agree save in that which 
is natural to them4 ,now all men agree  
in the right of nations2 since the      
jurist 99,ulpian3 ,digest4 i1 #a2 ,de   
,just4 et ,jure i the right of nations  
is that which is in use among all       
nations4 ,therefore the right of nations
 is the natural right4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 slavery among men is natural1 
for some are naturally slaves according 

to the ,philosopher 7,polit4 i1 #b74    
,now slavery belongs to the right of    
nations1 as ,isidore states 7,etym4 v1  
#d74 ,therefore the right of nations is 
a natural right4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
right as stated above 7,a4 #b7 is       
divided into natural and positive4 ,now 
the right of nations is not a positive  
right1 since all nations never agreed to
 decree anything by common agreement4   
,therefore the right of nations is a    
natural right4  ,on the contrary1       
,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #d7 that right 
is either natural1 or civil1 or right of
 nations1 and consequently the right of 
nations is distinct from natural right4 
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4   
#b71 the natural right or just is that  
which by its very nature is adjusted to 
or commensurate with another person4    
,now this may happen in two ways2 first1
 according as it is considered          
absolutely3 thus a male by his very     
nature is commensurate with the female  
to beget offspring by her1 and a parent 

is commensurate with the offspring to   
nourish it4 ,secondly a thing is        
naturally commensurate with another     
person1 not according as it is          
considered absolutely1 but according to 
something resultant from it1 for        
instance the possession of property4    
,for if a particular piece of land be   
considered absolutely1 it contains no   
reason why it should belong to one man  
more than to another1 but if it be      
considered in respect of its            
adaptability to cultivation1 and the    
unmolested use of the land1 it has a    
certain commensuration to be the        
property of one and not of another man1 
as the ,philosopher shows 7,polit4 ii1  
#b74  ,now it belongs not only to man   
but also to other animals to apprehend a
 thing absolutely3 wherefore the right  
which we call natural1 is common to us  
and other animals according to the first
 kind of commensuration4 ,but the right 
of nations falls short of natural right 
in this sense1 as the jurist 99,digest4 

i1 #a2 ,de ,just4 et ,jure i says       
because the latter is common to all     
animals1 while the former is common to  
men only4 ,on the other hand to consider
 a thing by comparing it with what      
results from it1 is proper to reason1   
wherefore this same is natural to man in
 respect of natural reason which        
dictates it4 ,hence the jurist ,gaius   
says 7,digest4 i1 #a2 ,de ,just4 et     
,jure i1 #i73 whatever natural reason   
decrees among all men1 is observed by   
all equally1 and is called the right of 
nations4 ,this suffices for the ,reply  
to the ,first ,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,considered absolutely1 the fact    
that this particular man should be a    
slave rather than another man1 is based1
 not on natural reason1 but on some     
resultant utility1 in that it is useful 
to this man to be ruled by a wiser man1 
and to the latter to be helped by the   
former1 as the ,philosopher states      
7,polit4 i1 #b74 ,wherefore slavery     
which belongs to the right of nations is

 natural in the second way1 but not in  
the first4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since     
natural reason dictates matters which   
are according to the right of nations1  
as implying a proximate equality1 it    
follows that they need no special       
institution1 for they are instituted by 
natural reason itself1 as stated by the 
authority quoted above4   ,,fourth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,paternal ,right and ,right of 
,dominion ,should ,be ,distinguished ,as
 ,special ,species8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that paternal right and right
 of dominion should not be distinguished
 as special species4 ,for it belongs to 
justice to render to each one what is   
his1 as ,ambrose states 7,de ,offic4 i1 
#bd74 ,now right is the object of       
justice1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74      
,therefore right belongs to each one    
equally2 and we ought not to distinguish
 the rights of fathers and masters as   
distinct species4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
the law is an expression of what is     

just1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b74  
,now a law looks to the common good of a
 city or kingdom1 as stated above       
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b71 but not to  
the private good of an individual or    
even of one household4 ,therefore there 
is no need for a special right of       
dominion or paternal right1 since the   
master and the father pertain to a      
household1 as stated in ,polit4 i1 #b4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there are many other
 differences of degrees among men1 for  
instance some are soldiers1 some are    
priests1 some are princes4 ,therefore   
some special kind of right should be    
allotted to them4  ,on the contrary1    
,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #f7       
distinguishes right of dominion1        
paternal right and so on as species     
distinct from civil right4  ,i answer   
that1 ,right or just depends on         
commensuration with another person4 ,now
 another has a twofold signification4   
,first1 it may denote something that is 
other simply1 as that which is          

altogether distinct2 as1 for example1   
two men neither of whom is subject to   
the other1 and both of whom are subjects
 of the ruler of the state2 and between 
these according to the ,philosopher     
7,ethic4 v1 #f7 there is the just       
simply4 ,secondly a thing is said to be 
other from something else1 not simply1  
but as belonging in some way to that    
something else3 and in this way1 as     
regards human affairs1 a son belongs to 
his father1 since he is part of him     
somewhat1 as stated in ,ethic4 viii1    
#ab1 and a slave belongs to his master1 
because he is his instrument1 as stated 
in ,polit4 i1 #b 99,cf4 ,ethic4 viii1   
#aa4 ,hence a father is not compared to 
his son as to another simply1 and so    
between them there is not the just      
simply1 but a kind of just1 called      
paternal4 ,in like manner neither is    
there the just simply1 between master   
and servant1 but that which is called   
dominative4 ,a wife1 though she is      
something belonging to the husband1     

since she stands related to him as to   
her own body1 as the ,apostle declares  
7,eph4 #e3bh71 is nevertheless more     
distinct from her husband1 than a son   
from his father1 or a slave from his    
master3 for she is received into a kind 
of social life1 that of matrimony1      
wherefore according to the ,philosopher 
7,ethic4 v1 #f7 there is more scope for 
justice between husband and wife than   
between father and son1 or master and   
slave1 because1 as husband and wife have
 an immediate relation to the community 
of the household1 as stated in ,polit4  
i1 #b1 #e1 it follows that between them 
there is domestic justice rather than   
civic4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs to 
justice to render to each one his right1
 the distinction between individuals    
being presupposed3 for if a man gives   
himself his due1 this is not strictly   
called just4 ,and since what belongs to 
the son is his father's1 and what       
belongs to the slave is his master's1 it
 follows that properly speaking there is

 not justice of father to son1 or of    
master to slave4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a   
son1 as such1 belongs to his father1 and
 a slave1 as such1 belongs to his       
master2 yet each1 considered as a man1  
is something having separate existence  
and distinct from others4 ,hence in so  
far as each of them is a man1 there is  
justice towards them in a way3 and for  
this reason too there are certain laws  
regulating the relations of father to   
his son1 and of a master to his slave2  
but in so far as each is something      
belonging to another1 the perfect idea  
of right or just is wanting to them4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all other differences 
between one person and another in a     
state1 have an immediate relation to the
 community of the state and to its      
ruler1 wherefore there is just towards  
them in the perfect sense of justice4   
,this just however is distinguished     
according to various offices1 hence when
 we speak of military1 or magisterial1  
or priestly right1 it is not as though  

such rights fell short of the simply    
right1 as when we speak of paternal     
right1 or right of dominion1 but for the
 reason that something proper is due to 
each class of person in respect of his  
particular office4   ,,question #eh     
,,of ,,justice 7,in ,twelve ,articles7  
,we must now consider justice4 ,under   
this head there are twelve points of    
inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is justice8  7#b7  
,whether justice is always towards      
another8  7#c7 ,whether it is a virtue8 
7#d7 ,whether it is in the will as its  
subject8  7#e7 ,whether it is a general 
virtue8  7#f7 ,whether1 as a general    
virtue1 it is essentially the same as   
every virtue8  7#g7 ,whether there is a 
particular justice8  7#h7 ,whether      
particular justice has a matter of its  
own8  7#i7 ,whether it is about         
passions1 or about operations only8     
7#aj7 ,whether the mean of justice is   
the real mean8  7#aa7 ,whether the act  
of justice is to render to everyone his 
own8  7#ab7 ,whether justice is the     

chief of the moral virtues8   ,,first   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,justice ,is ,fittingly        
,defined ,as ,being the ,perpetual and  
,constant ,will to ,render to ,each ,one
 ,his ,right8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that lawyers have unfittingly      
defined justice as being the perpetual  
and constant will to render to each one 
his right 99,digest4 i1 #a2 ,de ,just4  
et ,jure #aj4 ,for1 according to the    
,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #a71 justice is
 a habit which makes a man capable of   
doing what is just1 and of being just in
 action and in intention4 ,now will     
denotes a power1 or also an act4        
,therefore justice is unfittingly       
defined as being a will4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 rectitude of the will is not  
the will2 else if the will were its own 
rectitude1 it would follow that no will 
is unrighteous4 ,yet1 according to      
,anselm 7,de ,veritate xii71 justice is 
rectitude4 ,therefore justice is not the
 will4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no will is  

perpetual save ,god's4 ,if therefore    
justice is a perpetual will1 in ,god    
alone will there be justice4  ,obj4 #d3 
,further1 whatever is perpetual is      
constant1 since it is unchangeable4     
,therefore it is needless in defining   
justice1 to say that it is both         
perpetual and constant4  ,obj4 #e3      
,further1 it belongs to the sovereign to
 give each one his right4 ,therefore1 if
 justice gives each one his right1 it   
follows that it is in none but the      
sovereign3 which is absurd4  ,obj4 #f3  
,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,moribus 
,eccl4 xv7 that justice is love serving 
,god alone4 ,therefore it does not      
render to each one his right4  ,i answer
 that1 ,the aforesaid definition of     
justice is fitting if understood aright4
 ,for since every virtue is a habit that
 is the principle of a good act1 a      
virtue must needs be defined by means of
 the good act bearing on the matter     
proper to that virtue4 ,now the proper  
matter of justice consists of those     

things that belong to our intercourse   
with other men1 as shall be shown       
further on 7,a4 #b74 ,hence the act of  
justice in relation to its proper matter
 and object is indicated in the words1  
,rendering to each one his right1 since1
 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 x71 a man is  
said to be just because he respects the 
rights 7jus7 of others4  ,now in order  
that an act bearing upon any matter     
whatever be virtuous1 it requires to be 
voluntary1 stable1 and firm1 because the
 ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #d7 that
 in order for an act to be virtuous it  
needs first of all to be done knowingly1
 secondly to be done by choice1 and for 
a due end1 thirdly to be done immovably4
 ,now the first of these is included in 
the second1 since what is done through  
ignorance is involuntary 7,ethic4 iii1  
#a74 ,hence the definition of justice   
mentions first the will1 in order to    
show that the act of justice must be    
voluntary2 and mention is made          
afterwards of its constancy and         

perpetuity in order to indicate the     
firmness of the act4  ,accordingly1 this
 is a complete definition of justice2   
save that the act is mentioned instead  
of the habit1 which takes its species   
from that act1 because habit implies    
relation to act4 ,and if anyone would   
reduce it to the proper form of a       
definition1 he might say that justice is
 a habit whereby a man renders to each  
one his due by a constant and perpetual 
will3 and this is about the same        
definition as that given by the         
,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #e7 who says   
that justice is a habit whereby a man is
 said to be capable of doing just       
actions in accordance with his choice4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,will here denotes the 
act1 not the power3 and it is customary 
among writers to define habits by their 
acts3 thus ,augustine says 7,tract4 in  
,joan4 xl7 that faith is to believe what
 one sees not4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3        
,justice is the same as rectitude1 not  
essentially but causally2 for it is a   

habit which rectifies the deed and the  
will4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will may be
 called perpetual in two ways4 ,first on
 the part of the will's act which       
endures for ever1 and thus ,god's will  
alone is perpetual4 ,secondly on the    
part of the subject1 because1 to wit1 a 
man wills to do a certain thing always1 
and this is a necessary condition of    
justice4 ,for it does not satisfy the   
conditions of justice that one wish to  
observe justice in some particular      
matter for the time being1 because one  
could scarcely find a man willing to act
 unjustly in every case2 and it is      
requisite that one should have the will 
to observe justice at all times and in  
all cases4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since     
perpetual does not imply perpetuity of  
the act of the will1 it is not          
superfluous to add constant3 for while  
the perpetual will denotes the purpose  
of observing justice always1 constant   
signifies a firm perseverance in this   
purpose4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a judge     

renders to each one what belongs to him1
 by way of command and direction1       
because a judge is the personification  
of justice1 and the sovereign is its    
guardian 7,ethic4 v1 #d74 ,on the other 
hand1 the subjects render to each one   
what belongs to him1 by way of          
execution4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,just as   
love of ,god includes love of our       
neighbor1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 
#a71 so too the service of ,god includes
 rendering to each one his due4         
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,justice ,is ,always 
,towards ,another8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that justice is not always   
towards another4 ,for the ,apostle says 
7,rom4 #c3bb7 that the justice of ,god  
is by faith of ,jesus ,christ4 ,now     
faith does not concern the dealings of  
one man with another4 ,neither therefore
 does justice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1     
according to ,augustine 7,de ,moribus   
,eccl4 xv71 it belongs to justice that  
man should direct to the service of ,god

 his authority over the things that are 
subject to him4 ,now the sensitive      
appetite is subject to man1 according to
 ,gen4 #d3g1 where it is written3 ,the  
lust thereof1 viz4 of sin1 shall be     
under thee1 and thou shalt have dominion
 over it4 ,therefore it belongs to      
justice to have dominion over one's own 
appetite3 so that justice is towards    
oneself4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the       
justice of ,god is eternal4 ,but nothing
 else is co-eternal with ,god4          
,therefore justice is not essentially   
towards another4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1   
man's dealings with himself need to be  
rectified no less than his dealings with
 another4 ,now man's dealings are       
rectified by justice1 according to      
,prov4 #aa3e1 ,the justice of the       
upright shall make his way prosperous4  
,therefore justice is about our dealings
 not only with others1 but also with    
ourselves4  ,on the contrary1 ,tully    
says 7,de ,officiis i1 #g7 that the     
object of justice is to keep men        

together in society and mutual          
intercourse4 ,now this implies          
relationship of one man to another4     
,therefore justice is concerned only    
about our dealings with others4  ,i     
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 
,a4 #a7 since justice by its name       
implies equality1 it denotes essentially
 relation to another1 for a thing is    
equal1 not to itself1 but to another4   
,and forasmuch as it belongs to justice 
to rectify human acts1 as stated above  
7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,a4
 #a7 this otherness which justice       
demands must needs be between beings    
capable of action4 ,now actions belong  
to supposits 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #b 
and wholes and1 properly speaking1 not  
to parts and forms or powers1 for we do 
not say properly that the hand strikes1 
but a man with his hand1 nor that heat  
makes a thing hot1 but fire by heat1    
although such expressions may be        
employed metaphorically4 ,hence1 justice
 properly speaking demands a distinction

 of supposits1 and consequently is only 
in one man towards another4             
,nevertheless in one and the same man we
 may speak metaphorically of his various
 principles of action such as the       
reason1 the irascible1 and the          
concupiscible1 as though they were so   
many agents3 so that metaphorically in  
one and the same man there is said to be
 justice in so far as the reason        
commands the irascible and              
concupiscible1 and these obey reason2   
and in general in so far as to each part
 of man is ascribed what is becoming to 
it4 ,hence the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 
#aa7 calls this metaphorical justice4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the justice which     
faith works in us1 is that whereby the  
ungodly is justified3 it consists in the
 due coordination of the parts of the   
soul1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4     
#aac1 ,a4 #a7 where we were treating of 
the justification of the ungodly4 ,now  
this belongs to metaphorical justice1   
which may be found even in a man who    

lives all by himself4  ,this suffices   
for the ,reply to the ,second           
,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god's    
justice is from eternity in respect of  
the eternal will and purpose 7and it is 
chiefly in this that justice consists72 
although it is not eternal as regards   
its effect1 since nothing is co-eternal 
with ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,man's     
dealings with himself are sufficiently  
rectified by the rectification of the   
passions by the other moral virtues4    
,but his dealings with others need a    
special rectification1 not only in      
relation to the agent1 but also in      
relation to the person to whom they are 
directed4 ,hence about such dealings    
there is a special virtue1 and this is  
justice4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,justice ,is
 a ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that justice is not a virtue4 ,for 
it is written 7,luke #ag3aj73 ,when you 
shall have done all these things that   
are commanded you1 say3 ,we are         

unprofitable servants2 we have done that
 which we ought to do4 ,now it is not   
unprofitable to do a virtuous deed3 for 
,ambrose says 7,de ,officiis ii1 #f73   
,we look to a profit that is estimated  
not by pecuniary gain but by the        
acquisition of godliness4 ,therefore to 
do what one ought to do1 is not a       
virtuous deed4 ,and yet it is an act of 
justice4 ,therefore justice is not a    
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which 
is done of necessity1 is not            
meritorious4 ,but to render to a man    
what belongs to him1 as justice         
requires1 is of necessity4 ,therefore it
 is not meritorious4 ,yet it is by      
virtuous actions that we gain merit4    
,therefore justice is not a virtue4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every moral virtue  
is about matters of action4 ,now those  
things which are wrought externally are 
not things concerning behavior but      
concerning handicraft1 according to the 
,philosopher 7,metaph4 ix7 99,didot ed41
 viii1 #h4 ,therefore since it belongs  

to justice to produce externally a deed 
that is just in itself1 it seems that   
justice is not a moral virtue4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii1    
#di7 that the entire structure of good  
works is built on four virtues1 viz4    
temperance1 prudence1 fortitude and     
justice4  ,i answer that1 ,a human      
virtue is one which renders a human act 
and man himself good 99,ethic4 ii1 #f1  
and this can be applied to justice4 ,for
 a man's act is made good through       
attaining the rule of reason1 which is  
the rule whereby human acts are         
regulated4 ,hence1 since justice        
regulates human operations1 it is       
evident that it renders man's operations
 good1 and1 as ,tully declares 7,de     
,officiis i1 #g71 good men are so called
 chiefly from their justice1 wherefore1 
as he says again 7,de ,officiis i1 #g7  
the luster of virtue appears above all  
in justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when a   
man does what he ought1 he brings no    
gain to the person to whom he does what 

he ought1 but only abstains from doing  
him a harm4 ,he does however profit     
himself1 in so far as he does what he   
ought1 spontaneously and readily1 and   
this is to act virtuously4 ,hence it is 
written 7,wis4 #h3g7 that ,divine wisdom
 teacheth temperance1 and prudence1 and 
justice1 and fortitude1 which are such  
things as men 7i4e4 virtuous men7 can   
have nothing more profitable in life4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,necessity is twofold4 
,one arises from constraint1 and this   
removes merit1 since it runs counter to 
the will4 ,the other arises from the    
obligation of a command1 or from the    
necessity of obtaining an end1 when1 to 
wit1 a man is unable to achieve the end 
of virtue without doing some particular 
thing4 ,the latter necessity does not   
remove merit1 when a man does           
voluntarily that which is necessary in  
this way4 ,it does however exclude the  
credit of supererogation1 according to  
#a ,cor4 #i3af1 ,if ,i preach the       
,gospel1 it is no glory to me1 for a    

necessity lieth upon me4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,justice is concerned about external
 things1 not by making them1 which      
pertains to art1 but by using them in   
our dealings with other men4   ,,fourth 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,justice ,is in the ,will ,as  
,its ,subject8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that justice is not in the will as
 its subject4 ,for justice is sometimes 
called truth4 ,but truth is not in the  
will1 but in the intellect4 ,therefore  
justice is not in the will as its       
subject4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 justice is
 about our dealings with others4 ,now it
 belongs to the reason to direct one    
thing in relation to another4 ,therefore
 justice is not in the will as its      
subject but in the reason4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 justice is not an intellectual
 virtue1 since it is not directed to    
knowledge2 wherefore it follows that it 
is a moral virtue4 ,now the subject of  
moral virtue is the faculty which is    
rational by participation1 viz4 the     

irascible and the concupiscible1 as the 
,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 
,therefore justice is not in the will as
 its subject1 but in the irascible and  
concupiscible4  ,on the contrary1       
,anselm says 7,de ,verit4 xii7 that     
justice is rectitude of the will        
observed for its own sake4  ,i answer   
that1 ,the subject of a virtue is the   
power whose act that virtue aims at     
rectifying4 ,now justice does not aim at
 directing an act of the cognitive      
power1 for we are not said to be just   
through knowing something aright4 ,hence
 the subject of justice is not the      
intellect or reason which is a cognitive
 power4 ,but since we are said to be    
just through doing something aright1 and
 because the proximate principle of     
action is the appetitive power1 justice 
must needs be in some appetitive power  
as its subject4  ,now the appetite is   
twofold2 namely1 the will which is in   
the reason and the sensitive appetite   
which follows on sensitive apprehension1

 and is divided into the irascible and  
the concupiscible1 as stated in the     
,first ,part 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b74 ,again  
the act of rendering his due to each man
 cannot proceed from the sensitive      
appetite1 because sensitive apprehension
 does not go so far as to be able to    
consider the relation of one thing to   
another2 but this is proper to the      
reason4 ,therefore justice cannot be in 
the irascible or concupiscible as its   
subject1 but only in the will3 hence the
 ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 defines   
justice by an act of the will1 as may be
 seen above 7,a4 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,since the will is the rational         
appetite1 when the rectitude of the     
reason which is called truth is         
imprinted on the will on account of its 
nighness to the reason1 this imprint    
retains the name of truth2 and hence it 
is that justice sometimes goes by the   
name of truth4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the   
will is borne towards its object        
consequently on the apprehension of     

reason3 wherefore1 since the reason     
directs one thing in relation to        
another1 the will can will one thing in 
relation to another1 and this belongs to
 justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not only   
the irascible and concupiscible parts   
are rational by participation1 but the  
entire appetitive faculty1 as stated in 
,ethic4 i1 #ac1 because all appetite is 
subject to reason4 ,now the will is     
contained in the appetitive faculty1    
wherefore it can be the subject of moral
 virtue4   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #e  ,whether ,justice ,is
 a ,general ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that justice is not a       
general virtue4 ,for justice is         
specified with the other virtues1       
according to ,wis4 #h3g1 ,she teacheth  
temperance and prudence1 and justice1   
and fortitude4 ,now the general is not  
specified or reckoned together with the 
species contained under the same        
general4 ,therefore justice is not a    
general virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as 

justice is accounted a cardinal virtue1 
so are temperance and fortitude4 ,now   
neither temperance nor fortitude is     
reckoned to be a general virtue4        
,therefore neither should justice in any
 way be reckoned a general virtue4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 justice is always   
towards others1 as stated above 7,a4    
#b74 ,but a sin committed against one's 
neighbor cannot be a general sin1       
because it is condivided with sin       
committed against oneself4 ,therefore   
neither is justice a general virtue4    
,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says
 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that justice is every  
virtue4  ,i answer that1 ,justice1 as   
stated above 7,a4 #b7 directs man in his
 relations with other men4 ,now this may
 happen in two ways3 first as regards   
his relation with individuals1 secondly 
as regards his relations with others in 
general1 in so far as a man who serves a
 community1 serves all those who are    
included in that community4 ,accordingly
 justice in its proper acceptation can  

be directed to another in both these    
senses4 ,now it is evident that all who 
are included in a community1 stand in   
relation to that community as parts to a
 whole2 while a part1 as such1 belongs  
to a whole1 so that whatever is the good
 of a part can be directed to the good  
of the whole4 ,it follows therefore that
 the good of any virtue1 whether such   
virtue direct man in relation to        
himself1 or in relation to certain other
 individual persons1 is referable to the
 common good1 to which justice directs3 
so that all acts of virtue can pertain  
to justice1 in so far as it directs man 
to the common good4 ,it is in this sense
 that justice is called a general       
virtue4 ,and since it belongs to the law
 to direct to the common good1 as stated
 above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b71 it   
follows that the justice which is in    
this way styled general1 is called legal
 justice1 because thereby man is in     
harmony with the law which directs the  
acts of all the virtues to the common   

good4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,justice is     
specified or enumerated with the other  
virtues1 not as a general but as a      
special virtue1 as we shall state       
further on 7,,aa4 #g1 #ab74  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,temperance and fortitude are 
in the sensitive appetite1 viz4 in the  
concupiscible and irascible4 ,now these 
powers are appetitive of certain        
particular goods1 even as the senses are
 cognitive of particulars4 ,on the other
 hand justice is in the intellective    
appetite as its subject1 which can have 
the universal good as its object1       
knowledge whereof belongs to the        
intellect4 ,hence justice can be a      
general virtue rather than temperance or
 fortitude4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,things   
referable to oneself are referable to   
another1 especially in regard to the    
common good4 ,wherefore legal justice1  
in so far as it directs to the common   
good1 may be called a general virtue3   
and in like manner injustice may be     
called a general sin2 hence it is       

written 7#a ,john #c3d7 that all sin is 
iniquity4   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,justice1  
,as a ,general ,virtue1 ,is ,essentially
 the ,same ,as ,all ,virtue8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that justice1 as a  
general virtue1 is essentially the same 
as all virtue4 ,for the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that virtue and    
legal justice are the same as all       
virtue1 but differ in their mode of     
being4 ,now things that differ merely in
 their mode of being or logically do not
 differ essentially4 ,therefore justice 
is essentially the same as every virtue4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every virtue that 
is not essentially the same as all      
virtue is a part of virtue4 ,now the    
aforesaid justice1 according to the     
,philosopher 7,ethic4 v4 #a7 is not a   
part but the whole of virtue4 ,therefore
 the aforesaid justice is essentially   
the same as all virtue4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 the essence of a virtue does  
not change through that virtue directing

 its act to some higher end even as the 
habit of temperance remains essentially 
the same even though its act be directed
 to a ,divine good4 ,now it belongs to  
legal justice that the acts of all the  
virtues are directed to a higher end1   
namely the common good of the multitude1
 which transcends the good of one single
 individual4 ,therefore it seems that   
legal justice is essentially all virtue4
  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 every good of a   
part can be directed to the good of the 
whole1 so that if it be not thus        
directed it would seem without use or   
purpose4 ,but that which is in          
accordance with virtue cannot be so4    
,therefore it seems that there can be no
 act of any virtue1 that does not belong
 to general justice1 which directs to   
the common good2 and so it seems that   
general justice is essentially the same 
as all virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,the  
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that  
many are able to be virtuous in matters 
affecting themselves1 but are unable to 

be virtuous in matters relating to      
others1 and 7,polit4 iii1 #b7 that the  
virtue of the good man is not strictly  
the same as the virtue of the good      
citizen4 ,now the virtue of a good      
citizen is general justice1 whereby a   
man is directed to the common good4     
,therefore general justice is not the   
same as virtue in general1 and it is    
possible to have one without the other4 
,i answer that1 ,a thing is said to be  
general in two ways4 ,first1 by         
predication3 thus animal is general in  
relation to man and horse and the like3 
and in this sense that which is general 
must needs be essentially the same as   
the things in relation to which it is   
general1 for the reason that the genus  
belongs to the essence of the species1  
and forms part of its definition4       
,secondly a thing is said to be general 
virtually2 thus a universal cause is    
general in relation to all its effects1 
the sun1 for instance1 in relation to   
all bodies that are illumined1 or       

transmuted by its power2 and in this    
sense there is no need for that which is
 general to be essentially the same as  
those things in relation to which it is 
general1 since cause and effect are not 
essentially the same4 ,now it is in the 
latter sense that1 according to what has
 been said 7,a4 #e71 legal justice is   
said to be a general virtue1 in as much1
 to wit1 as it directs the acts of the  
other virtues to its own end1 and this  
is to move all the other virtues by its 
command2 for just as charity may be     
called a general virtue in so far as it 
directs the acts of all the virtues to  
the ,divine good1 so too is legal       
justice1 in so far as it directs the    
acts of all the virtues to the common   
good4 ,accordingly1 just as charity     
which regards the ,divine good as its   
proper object1 is a special virtue in   
respect of its essence1 so too legal    
justice is a special virtue in respect  
of its essence1 in so far as it regards 
the common good as its proper object4   

,and thus it is in the sovereign        
principally and by way of a mastercraft1
 while it is secondarily and            
administratively in his subjects4       
,however the name of legal justice can  
be given to every virtue1 in so far as  
every virtue is directed to the common  
good by the aforesaid legal justice1    
which though special essentially is     
nevertheless virtually general4         
,speaking in this way1 legal justice is 
essentially the same as all virtue1 but 
differs therefrom logically3 and it is  
in this sense that the ,philosopher     
speaks4  ,wherefore the ,replies to the 
,first and ,second ,objections are      
manifest4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this       
argument again takes legal justice for  
the virtue commanded by legal justice4  
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,every virtue strictly 
speaking directs its act to that        
virtue's proper end3 that it should     
happen to be directed to a further end  
either always or sometimes1 does not    
belong to that virtue considered        

strictly1 for it needs some higher      
virtue to direct it to that end4        
,consequently there must be one supreme 
virtue essentially distinct from every  
other virtue1 which directs all the     
virtues to the common good2 and this    
virtue is legal justice4   ,,seventh    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #g  
,whether ,there ,is a ,particular       
,besides a ,general ,justice8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there
 is not a particular besides a general  
justice4 ,for there is nothing          
superfluous in the virtues1 as neither  
is there in nature4 ,now general justice
 directs man sufficiently in all his    
relations with other men4 ,therefore    
there is no need for a particular       
justice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the       
species of a virtue does not vary       
according to one and many4 ,but legal   
justice directs one man to another in   
matters relating to the multitude1 as   
shown above 7,,aa4 #e1 #f74 ,therefore  
there is not another species of justice 

directing one man to another in matters 
relating to the individual4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 between the individual and the
 general public stands the household    
community4 ,consequently1 if in addition
 to general justice there is a          
particular justice corresponding to the 
individual1 for the same reason there   
should be a domestic justice directing  
man to the common good of a household3  
and yet this is not the case4 ,therefore
 neither should there be a particular   
besides a legal justice4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,chrysostom in his commentary 
on ,matt4 #e3f1 ,blessed are they that  
hunger and thirst after justice1 says   
7,hom4 xv in ,matth473 ,by justice ,he  
signifies either the general virtue1 or 
the particular virtue which is opposed  
to covetousness4  ,i answer that1 ,as   
stated above 7,a4 #f71 legal justice is 
not essentially the same as every       
virtue1 and besides legal justice which 
directs man immediately to the common   
good1 there is a need for other virtues 

to direct him immediately in matters    
relating to particular goods3 and these 
virtues may be relative to himself or to
 another individual person4             
,accordingly1 just as in addition to    
legal justice there is a need for       
particular virtues to direct man in     
relation to himself1 such as temperance 
and fortitude1 so too besides legal     
justice there is need for particular    
justice to direct man in his relations  
to other individuals4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,legal justice does indeed direct man   
sufficiently in his relations towards   
others4 ,as regards the common good it  
does so immediately1 but as to the good 
of the individual1 it does so mediately4
 ,wherefore there is need for particular
 justice to direct a man immediately to 
the good of another individual4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,the common good of the realm 
and the particular good of the          
individual differ not only in respect of
 the many and the few1 but also under a 
formal aspect4 ,for the aspect of the   

common good differs from the aspect of  
the individual good1 even as the aspect 
of whole differs from that of part4     
,wherefore the ,philosopher says        
7,polit4 i1 #a7 that they are wrong who 
maintain that the ,state and the home   
and the like differ only as many and few
 and not specifically4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,the household community1 according to 
the ,philosopher 7,polit4 i1 #b71       
differs in respect of a threefold       
fellowship2 namely of husband and wife1 
father and son1 master and slave1 in    
each of which one person is1 as it were1
 part of the other4 ,wherefore between  
such persons there is not justice       
simply1 but a species of justice1 viz4  
domestic justice1 as stated in ,ethic4  
v1 #f4   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #h  ,whether ,particular 
,justice ,has a ,special ,matter8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
particular justice has no special       
matter4 ,because a gloss on ,gen4 #b3ad1
 ,the fourth river is ,euphrates1 says3 

,euphrates signifies 'fruitful'2 nor is 
it stated through what country it flows1
 because justice pertains to all the    
parts of the soul4 ,now this would not  
be the case1 if justice had a special   
matter1 since every special matter      
belongs to a special power4 ,therefore  
particular justice has no special       
matter4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine 
says 7,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #fa7 that the  
soul has four virtues whereby1 in this  
life1 it lives spiritually1 viz4        
temperance1 prudence1 fortitude and     
justice2 and he says that the fourth is 
justice1 which pervades all the virtues4
 ,therefore particular justice1 which is
 one of the four cardinal virtues1 has  
no special matter4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
justice directs man sufficiently in     
matters relating to others4 ,now a man  
can be directed to others in all matters
 relating to this life4 ,therefore the  
matter of justice is general and not    
special4  ,on the contrary1 ,the        
,philosopher reckons 7,ethic4 v1 #b7    

particular justice to be specially about
 those things which belong to social    
life4  ,i answer that1 ,whatever can be 
rectified by reason is the matter of    
moral virtue1 for this is defined in    
reference to right reason1 according to 
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,now 
the reason can rectify not only the     
internal passions of the soul1 but also 
external actions1 and also those        
external things of which man can make   
use4 ,and yet it is in respect of       
external actions and external things by 
means of which men can communicate with 
one another1 that the relation of one   
man to another is to be considered2     
whereas it is in respect of internal    
passions that we consider man's         
rectitude in himself4 ,consequently1    
since justice is directed to others1 it 
is not about the entire matter of moral 
virtue1 but only about external actions 
and things1 under a certain special     
aspect of the object1 in so far as one  
man is related to another through them4 

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is true that       
justice belongs essentially to one part 
of the soul1 where it resides as in its 
subject2 and this is the will which     
moves by its command all the other parts
 of the soul2 and accordingly justice   
belongs to all the parts of the soul1   
not directly but by a kind of diffusion4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above     
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 the   
cardinal virtues may be taken in two    
ways3 first as special virtues1 each    
having a determinate matter2 secondly1  
as certain general modes of virtue4 ,in 
this latter sense ,augustine speaks in  
the passage quoted3 for he says that    
prudence is knowledge of what we should 
seek and avoid1 temperance is the curb  
on the lust for fleeting pleasures1     
fortitude is strength of mind in bearing
 with passing trials1 justice is the    
love of ,god and our neighbor which     
pervades the other virtues1 that is to  
say1 is the common principle of the     
entire order between one man and        

another4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a man's     
internal passions which are a part of   
moral matter1 are not in themselves     
directed to another man1 which belongs  
to the specific nature of justice2 yet  
their effects1 i4e4 external actions1   
are capable of being directed to another
 man4 ,consequently it does not follow  
that the matter of justice is general4  
,,ninth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1   
,art4 #i  ,whether ,justice ,is ,about  
the ,passions8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that justice is about the         
passions4 ,for the ,philosopher says    
7,ethic4 ii1 #c7 that moral virtue is   
about pleasure and pain4 ,now pleasure  
or delight1 and pain are passions1 as   
stated above 99,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d2
 ,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #a when  
we were treating of the passions4       
,therefore justice1 being a moral       
virtue1 is about the passions4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 justice is the means of   
rectifying a man's operations in        
relation to another man4 ,now such like 

operations cannot be rectified unless   
the passions be rectified1 because it is
 owing to disorder of the passions that 
there is disorder in the aforesaid      
operations3 thus sexual lust leads to   
adultery1 and overmuch love of money    
leads to theft4 ,therefore justice must 
needs be about the passions4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 even as particular justice is 
towards another person so is legal      
justice4 ,now legal justice is about the
 passions1 else it would not extend to  
all the virtues1 some of which are      
evidently about the passions4 ,therefore
 justice is about the passions4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that justice is about   
operations4  ,i answer that1 ,the true  
answer to this question may be gathered 
from a twofold source4 ,first from the  
subject of justice1 i4e4 from the will1 
whose movements or acts are not         
passions1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#bb1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #d71 for it is
 only the sensitive appetite whose      

movements are called passions4 ,hence   
justice is not about the passions1 as   
are temperance and fortitude1 which are 
in the irascible and concupiscible      
parts4 ,secondly1 on he part of the     
matter1 because justice is about man's  
relations with another1 and we are not  
directed immediately to another by the  
internal passions4 ,therefore justice is
 not about the passions4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,not every moral virtue is about    
pleasure and pain as its proper matter1 
since fortitude is about fear and       
daring3 but every moral virtue is       
directed to pleasure and pain1 as to    
ends to be acquired1 for1 as the        
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #aa71   
pleasure and pain are the principal end 
in respect of which we say that this is 
an evil1 and that a good3 and in this   
way too they belong to justice1 since a 
man is not just unless he rejoice in    
just actions 7,ethic4 i1 #h74  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,external operations are as it
 were between external things1 which are

 their matter1 and internal passions1   
which are their origin4 ,now it happens 
sometimes that there is a defect in one 
of these1 without there being a defect  
in the other4 ,thus a man may steal     
another's property1 not through the     
desire to have the thing1 but through   
the will to hurt the man2 or vice versa1
 a man may covet another's property     
without wishing to steal it4            
,accordingly the directing of operations
 in so far as they tend towards external
 things1 belongs to justice1 but in so  
far as they arise from the passions1 it 
belongs to the other moral virtues which
 are about the passions4 ,hence justice 
hinders theft of another's property1 in 
so far as stealing is contrary to the   
equality that should be maintained in   
external things1 while liberality       
hinders it as resulting from an         
immoderate desire for wealth4 ,since1   
however1 external operations take their 
species1 not from the internal passions 
but from external things as being their 

objects1 it follows that1 external      
operations are essentially the matter of
 justice rather than of the other moral 
virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the common  
good is the end of each individual      
member of a community1 just as the good 
of the whole is the end of each part4   
,on the other hand the good of one      
individual is not the end of another    
individual3 wherefore legal justice     
which is directed to the common good1 is
 more capable of extending to the       
internal passions whereby man is        
disposed in some way or other in        
himself1 than particular justice which  
is directed to the good of another      
individual3 although legal justice      
extends chiefly to other virtues in the 
point of their external operations1 in  
so far1 to wit1 as the law commands us  
to perform the actions of a courageous  
person 4 4 4 the actions of a temperate 
person 4 4 4 and the actions of a gentle
 person 7,ethic4 v1 #e74   ,,tenth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #aj 

,whether the ,mean of ,justice ,is the  
,real ,mean8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that the mean of justice is not the
 real mean4 ,for the generic nature     
remains entire in each species4 ,now    
moral virtue is defined 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7
 to be an elective habit which observes 
the mean fixed1 in our regard1 by       
reason4 ,therefore justice observes the 
rational and not the real mean4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 in things that are good   
simply1 there is neither excess nor     
defect1 and consequently neither is     
there a mean2 as is clearly the case    
with the virtues1 according to ,ethic4  
ii1 #f4 ,now justice is about things    
that are good simply1 as stated in      
,ethic4 v4 ,therefore justice does not  
observe the real mean4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 the reason why the other      
virtues are said to observe the rational
 and not the real mean1 is because in   
their case the mean varies according to 
different persons1 since what is too    
much for one is too little for another  

7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,now this is also the 
case in justice3 for one who strikes a  
prince does not receive the same        
punishment as one who strikes a private 
individual4 ,therefore justice also     
observes1 not the real1 but the rational
 mean4  ,on the contrary1 ,the          
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f2 v1   
#d7 that the mean of justice is to be   
taken according to arithmetical         
proportion1 so that it is the real mean4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 
#i2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #d71 the other
 moral virtues are chiefly concerned    
with the passions1 the regulation of    
which is gauged entirely by a comparison
 with the very man who is the subject of
 those passions1 in so far as his anger 
and desire are vested with their various
 due circumstances4 ,hence the mean in  
such like virtues is measured not by the
 proportion of one thing to another1 but
 merely by comparison with the virtuous 
man himself1 so that with them the mean 
is only that which is fixed by reason in

 our regard4  ,on the other hand1 the   
matter of justice is external operation1
 in so far as an operation or the thing 
used in that operation is duly          
proportionate to another person1        
wherefore the mean of justice consists  
in a certain proportion of equality     
between the external thing and the      
external person4 ,now equality is the   
real mean between greater and less1 as  
stated in ,metaph4 x 99,didot ed41 ix1  
#e2 ,cf4 ,ethic4 v1 #d3 wherefore       
justice observes the real mean4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,this real mean is also the   
rational mean1 wherefore justice        
satisfies the conditions of a moral     
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,we may speak 
of a thing being good simply in two     
ways4 ,first a thing may be good in     
every way3 thus the virtues are good2   
and there is neither mean nor extremes  
in things that are good simply in this  
sense4 ,secondly a thing is said to be  
good simply through being good          
absolutely i4e4 in its nature1 although 

it may become evil through being abused4
 ,such are riches and honors2 and in the
 like it is possible to find excess1    
deficiency and mean1 as regards men who 
can use them well or ill3 and it is in  
this sense that justice is about things 
that are good simply4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,the injury inflicted bears a different 
proportion to a prince from that which  
it bears to a private person3 wherefore 
each injury requires to be equalized by 
vengeance in a different way3 and this  
implies a real and not merely a rational
 diversity4   ,,eleventh ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #aa  ,whether 
the ,act of ,justice ,is to ,render to  
,each ,one ,his ,own8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that the act of justice  
is not to render to each one his own4   
,for ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #i7    
ascribes to justice the act of succoring
 the needy4 ,now in succoring the needy 
we give them what is not theirs but     
ours4 ,therefore the act of justice does
 not consist in rendering to each one   

his own4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,tully    
says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #g7 that           
beneficence which we may call kindness  
or liberality1 belongs to justice4 ,now 
it pertains to liberality to give to    
another of one's own1 not of what is    
his4 ,therefore the act of justice does 
not consist in rendering to each one his
 own4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it belongs to
 justice not only to distribute things  
duly1 but also to repress injurious     
actions1 such as murder1 adultery and so
 forth4 ,but the rendering to each one  
of what is his seems to belong solely to
 the distribution of things4 ,therefore 
the act of justice is not sufficiently  
described by saying that it consists in 
rendering to each one his own4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1 
#bd73 ,it is justice that renders to    
each one what is his1 and claims not    
another's property2 it disregards its   
own profit in order to preserve the     
common equity4  ,i answer that1 ,as     
stated above 7,,aa4 #h1 #aj71 the matter

 of justice is an external operation in 
so far as either it or the thing we use 
by it is made proportionate to some     
other person to whom we are related by  
justice4 ,now each man's own is that    
which is due to him according to        
equality of proportion4 ,therefore the  
proper act of justice is nothing else   
than to render to each one his own4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since justice is a    
cardinal virtue1 other secondary        
virtues1 such as mercy1 liberality and  
the like are connected with it1 as we   
shall state further on 7,q4 #hj1 ,a4    
#a74 ,wherefore to succor the needy1    
which belongs to mercy or pity1 and to  
be liberally beneficent1 which pertains 
to liberality1 are by a kind of         
reduction ascribed to justice as to     
their principal virtue4  ,this suffices 
for the ,reply to the ,second           
,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the   
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 v1 #d71 in 
matters of justice1 the name of profit  
is extended to whatever is excessive1   

and whatever is deficient is called     
loss4 ,the reason for this is that      
justice is first of all and more        
commonly exercised in voluntary         
interchanges of things1 such as buying  
and selling1 wherein those expressions  
are properly employed2 and yet they are 
transferred to all other matters of     
justice4 ,the same applies to the       
rendering to each one of what is his    
own4   ,,twelfth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #ab  ,whether ,justice   
,stands ,foremost ,among ,all ,moral    
,virtues8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that justice does not stand foremost   
among all the moral virtues4 ,because it
 belongs to justice to render to each   
one what is his1 whereas it belongs to  
liberality to give of one's own1 and    
this is more virtuous4 ,therefore       
liberality is a greater virtue than     
justice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing is
 adorned by a less excellent thing than 
itself4 ,now magnanimity is the ornament
 both of justice and of all the virtues1

 according to ,ethic4 iv1 #c4 ,therefore
 magnanimity is more excellent than     
justice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 virtue is 
about that which is difficult and good1 
as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #c4 ,but       
fortitude is about more difficult things
 than justice is1 since it is about     
dangers of death1 according to ,ethic4  
iii1 #f4 ,therefore fortitude is more   
excellent than justice4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,tully says 7,de ,offic4 i1   
#g73 ,justice is the most resplendent of
 the virtues1 and gives its name to a   
good man4  ,i answer that1 ,if we speak 
of legal justice1 it is evident that it 
stands foremost among all the moral     
virtues1 for as much as the common good 
transcends the individual good of one   
person4 ,in this sense the ,philosopher 
declares 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that the most  
excellent of the virtues would seem to  
be justice1 and more glorious than      
either the evening or the morning star4 
,but1 even if we speak of particular    
justice1 it excels the other moral      

virtues for two reasons4 ,the first     
reason may be taken from the subject1   
because justice is in the more excellent
 part of the soul1 viz4 the rational    
appetite or will1 whereas the other     
moral virtues are in the sensitive      
appetite1 whereunto appertain the       
passions which are the matter of the    
other moral virtues4 ,the second reason 
is taken from the object1 because the   
other virtues are commendable in respect
 of the sole good of the virtuous person
 himself1 whereas justice is            
praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous 
person being well disposed towards      
another1 so that justice is somewhat the
 good of another person1 as stated in   
,ethic4 v1 #a4 ,hence the ,philosopher  
says 7,rhet4 i1 #i73 ,the greatest      
virtues must needs be those which are   
most profitable to other persons1       
because virtue is a faculty of doing    
good to others4 ,for this reason the    
greatest honors are accorded the brave  
and the just1 since bravery is useful to

 others in warfare1 and justice is      
useful to others both in warfare and in 
time of peace4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,although the liberal man gives of his  
own1 yet he does so in so far as he     
takes into consideration the good of his
 own virtue1 while the just man gives to
 another what is his1 through           
consideration of the common good4       
,moreover justice is observed towards   
all1 whereas liberality cannot extend to
 all4 ,again liberality which gives of a
 man's own is based on justice1 whereby 
one renders to each man what is his4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when magnanimity is   
added to justice it increases the       
latter's goodness2 and yet without      
justice it would not even be a virtue4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although fortitude is 
about the most difficult things1 it is  
not about the best1 for it is only      
useful in warfare1 whereas justice is   
useful both in war and in peace1 as     
stated above4   ,,question #ei  ,,of    
,,injustice 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we  

must now consider injustice1 under which
 head there are four points of inquiry3 
7#a7 ,whether injustice is a special    
vice8  7#b7 ,whether it is proper to the
 unjust man to do unjust deeds8  7#c7   
,whether one can suffer injustice       
willingly8  7#d7 ,whether injustice is a
 mortal sin according to its genus8     
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,injustice ,is a     
,special ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that injustice is not a      
special vice4 ,for it is written 7#a    
,john #c3d73 ,all sin is iniquity       
99,vulg43 ',whosoever committeth sin1   
committeth also iniquity2 and sin is    
iniquity'4 ,now iniquity would seem to  
be the same as injustice1 because       
justice is a kind of equality1 so that  
injustice is apparently the same as     
inequality or iniquity4 ,therefore      
injustice is not a special sin4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 no special sin is contrary
 to all the virtues4 ,but injustice is  
contrary to all the virtues3 for as     

regards adultery it is opposed to       
chastity1 as regards murder it is       
opposed to meekness1 and in like manner 
as regards the other sins4 ,therefore   
injustice is not a special sin4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 injustice is opposed to   
justice which is in the will4 ,but every
 sin is in the will1 as ,augustine      
declares 7,de ,duabus ,anim4 x74        
,therefore injustice is not a special   
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,injustice is   
contrary to justice4 ,but justice is a  
special virtue4 ,therefore injustice is 
a special vice4  ,i answer that1        
,injustice is twofold4 ,first there is  
illegal injustice which is opposed to   
legal justice3 and this is essentially a
 special vice1 in so far as it regards a
 special object1 namely the common good 
which it contemns2 and yet it is a      
general vice1 as regards the intention1 
since contempt of the common good may   
lead to all kinds of sin4 ,thus too all 
vices1 as being repugnant to the common 
good1 have the character of injustice1  

as though they arose from injustice1 in 
accord with what has been said above    
about justice 7,q4 #eh1 ,,aa4 #e1 #f74  
,secondly we speak of injustice in      
reference to an inequality between one  
person and another1 when one man wishes 
to have more goods1 riches for example1 
or honors1 and less evils1 such as toil 
and losses1 and thus injustice has a    
special matter and is a particular vice 
opposed to particular justice4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,even as legal justice is     
referred to human common good1 so       
,divine justice is referred to the      
,divine good1 to which all sin is       
repugnant1 and in this sense all sin is 
said to be iniquity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,even particular justice is indirectly  
opposed to all the virtues2 in so far1  
to wit1 as even external acts pertain   
both to justice and to the other moral  
virtues1 although in different ways as  
stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #i1 ad #b74  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will1 like the    
reason1 extends to all moral matters1   

i4e4 passions and those external        
operations that relate to another       
person4 ,on the other hand justice      
perfects the will solely in the point of
 its extending to operations that relate
 to another3 and the same applies to    
injustice4   ,,second ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #b  ,whether a
 ,man ,is ,called ,unjust ,through      
,doing an ,unjust ,thing8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that a man is called 
unjust through doing an unjust thing4   
,for habits are specified by their      
objects1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#ed1 ,a4 #b74 ,now the proper object of 
justice is the just1 and the proper     
object of injustice is the unjust4      
,therefore a man should be called just  
through doing a just thing1 and unjust  
through doing an unjust thing4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher declares 
7,ethic4 v1 #i7 that they hold a false  
opinion who maintain that it is in a    
man's power to do suddenly an unjust    
thing1 and that a just man is no less   

capable of doing what is unjust than an 
unjust man4 ,but this opinion would not 
be false unless it were proper to the   
unjust man to do what is unjust4        
,therefore a man is to be deemed unjust 
from the fact that he does an unjust    
thing4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every virtue
 bears the same relation to its proper  
act1 and the same applies to the        
contrary vices4 ,but whoever does what  
is intemperate1 is said to be           
intemperate4 ,therefore whoever does an 
unjust thing1 is said to be unjust4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says   
7,ethic4 v1 #f7 that a man may do an    
unjust thing without being unjust4  ,i  
answer that1 ,even as the object of     
justice is something equal in external  
things1 so too the object of injustice  
is something unequal1 through more or   
less being assigned to some person than 
is due to him4 ,to this object the habit
 of injustice is compared by means of   
its proper act which is called an       
injustice4 ,accordingly it may happen in

 two ways that a man who does an unjust 
thing1 is not unjust3 first1 on account 
of a lack of correspondence between the 
operation and its proper object4 ,for   
the operation takes its species and name
 from its direct and not from its       
indirect object3 and in things directed 
to an end the direct is that which is   
intended1 and the indirect is what is   
beside the intention4 ,hence if a man do
 that which is unjust1 without intending
 to do an unjust thing1 for instance if 
he do it through ignorance1 being       
unaware that it is unjust1 properly     
speaking he does an unjust thing1 not   
directly1 but only indirectly1 and1 as  
it were1 doing materially that which is 
unjust3 hence such an operation is not  
called an injustice4 ,secondly1 this may
 happen on account of a lack of         
proportion between the operation and the
 habit4 ,for an injustice may sometimes 
arise from a passion1 for instance1     
anger or desire1 and sometimes from     
choice1 for instance when the injustice 

itself is the direct object of one's    
complacency4 ,in the latter case        
properly speaking it arises from a      
habit1 because whenever a man has a     
habit1 whatever befits that habit is1 of
 itself1 pleasant to him4 ,accordingly1 
to do what is unjust intentionally and  
by choice is proper to the unjust man1  
in which sense the unjust man is one who
 has the habit of injustice3 but a man  
may do what is unjust1 unintentionally  
or through passion1 without having the  
habit of injustice4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a
 habit is specified by its object in its
 direct and formal acceptation1 not in  
its material and indirect acceptation4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not easy for any
 man to do an unjust thing from choice1 
as though it were pleasing for its own  
sake and not for the sake of something  
else3 this is proper to one who has the 
habit1 as the ,philosopher declares     
7,ethic4 v1 #i74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the 
object of temperance is not something   
established externally1 as is the object

 of justice3 the object of temperance1  
i4e4 the temperate thing1 depends       
entirely on proportion to the man       
himself4 ,consequently what is          
accidental and unintentional cannot be  
said to be temperate either materially  
or formally4 ,in like manner neither can
 it be called intemperate3 and in this  
respect there is dissimilarity between  
justice and the other moral virtues2 but
 as regards the proportion between      
operation and habit1 there is similarity
 in all respects4   ,,third ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,we ,can ,suffer ,injustice ,willingly8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one  
can suffer injustice willingly4 ,for    
injustice is inequality1 as stated above
 7,a4 #b74 ,now a man by injuring       
himself1 departs from equality1 even as 
by injuring another4 ,therefore a man   
can do an injustice to himself1 even as 
to another4 ,but whoever does himself an
 injustice1 does so involuntarily4      
,therefore a man can voluntarily suffer 

injustice especially if it be inflicted 
by himself4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no man 
is punished by the civil law1 except for
 having committed some injustice4 ,now  
suicides were formerly punished         
according to the law of the state by    
being deprived of an honorable burial1  
as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 v1
 #aa74 ,therefore a man can do himself  
an injustice1 and consequently it may   
happen that a man suffers injustice     
voluntarily4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no man
 does an injustice save to one who      
suffers that injustice4 ,but it may     
happen that a man does an injustice to  
one who wishes it1 for instance if he   
sell him a thing for more than it is    
worth4 ,therefore a man may happen to   
suffer an injustice voluntarily4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,to suffer an injustice   
and to do an injustice are contraries4  
,now no man does an injustice against   
his will4 ,therefore on the other hand  
no man suffers an injustice except      
against his will4  ,i answer that1      

,action by its very nature proceeds from
 an agent1 whereas passion as such is   
from another3 wherefore the same thing  
in the same respect cannot be both agent
 and patient1 as stated in ,phys4 iii1  
#a2 viii1 #e4 ,now the proper principle 
of action in man is the will1 wherefore 
man does properly and essentially what  
he does voluntarily1 and on the other   
hand a man suffers properly what he     
suffers against his will1 since in so   
far as he is willing1 he is a principle 
in himself1 and so1 considered thus1 he 
is active rather than passive4          
,accordingly we must conclude that      
properly and strictly speaking no man   
can do an injustice except voluntarily1 
nor suffer an injustice save            
involuntarily2 but that accidentally and
 materially so to speak1 it is possible 
for that which is unjust in itself      
either to be done involuntarily 7as when
 a man does anything unintentionally71  
or to be suffered voluntarily 7as when a
 man voluntarily gives to another more  

than he owes him74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,when one man gives voluntarily to      
another that which he does not owe him1 
he causes neither injustice nor         
inequality4 ,for a man's ownership      
depends on his will1 so there is no     
disproportion if he forfeit something of
 his own free-will1 either by his own or
 by another's action4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,an individual person may be considered 
in two ways4 ,first1 with regard to     
himself2 and thus1 if he inflict an     
injury on himself1 it may come under the
 head of some other kind of sin1        
intemperance for instance or imprudence1
 but not injustice2 because injustice no
 less than justice1 is always referred  
to another person4 ,secondly1 this or   
that man may be considered as belonging 
to the ,state as part thereof1 or as    
belonging to ,god1 as ,his creature and 
image2 and thus a man who kills himself1
 does an injury not indeed to himself1  
but to the ,state and to ,god4          
,wherefore he is punished in accordance 

with both ,divine and human law1 even as
 the ,apostle declares in respect of the
 fornicator 7#a ,cor4 #c3ag73 ,if any   
man violate the temple of ,god1 him     
shall ,god destroy4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,suffering is the effect of external    
action4 ,now in the point of doing and  
suffering injustice1 the material       
element is that which is done           
externally1 considered in itself1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #b71 and the formal   
and essential element is on the part of 
the will of agent and patient1 as stated
 above 7,a4 #b74 ,accordingly we must   
reply that injustice suffered by one man
 and injustice done by another man      
always accompany one another1 in the    
material sense4 ,but if we speak in the 
formal sense a man can do an injustice  
with the intention of doing an          
injustice1 and yet the other man does   
not suffer an injustice1 because he     
suffers voluntarily2 and on the other   
hand a man can suffer an injustice if he
 suffer an injustice against his will1  

while the man who does the injury       
unknowingly1 does an injustice1 not     
formally but only materially4   ,,fourth
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #d 
,whether ,whoever ,does an ,injustice   
,sins ,mortally8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem that not everyone who does an
 injustice sins mortally4 ,for venial   
sin is opposed to mortal sin4 ,now it is
 sometimes a venial sin to do an injury3
 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1  
#h7 in reference to those who act       
unjustly3 ,whatever they do not merely  
in ignorance but through ignorance is a 
venial matter4 ,therefore not everyone  
that does an injustice sins mortally4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 he who does an      
injustice in a small matter1 departs but
 slightly from the mean4 ,now this seems
 to be insignificant and should be      
accounted among the least of evils1 as  
the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 ii1  
#i74 ,therefore not everyone that does  
an injustice sins mortally4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 charity is the mother of all  

the virtues 99,peter ,lombard1 ,sent4   
iii1 ,d4 #bc1 and it is through being   
contrary thereto that a sin is called   
mortal4 ,but not all the sins contrary  
to the other virtues are mortal4        
,therefore neither is it always a mortal
 sin to do an injustice4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,whatever is contrary to the  
law of ,god is a mortal sin4 ,now       
whoever does an injustice does that     
which is contrary to the law of ,god1   
since it amounts either to theft1 or to 
adultery1 or to murder1 or to something 
of the kind1 as will be shown further on
 7,q4 #fd1 seqq474 ,therefore whoever   
does an injustice sins mortally4  ,i    
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #e71 when we were treating 
of the distinction of sins1 a mortal sin
 is one that is contrary to charity     
which gives life to the soul4 ,now every
 injury inflicted on another person is  
of itself contrary to charity1 which    
moves us to will the good of another4   
,and so since injustice always consists 

in an injury inflicted on another       
person1 it is evident that to do an     
injustice is a mortal sin according to  
its genus4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this      
saying of the ,philosopher is to be     
understood as referring to ignorance of 
fact1 which he calls ignorance of       
particular circumstances 99,ethic4 iii1 
#a1 and which deserves pardon1 and not  
to ignorance of the law which does not  
excuse3 and he who does an injustice    
through ignorance1 does no injustice    
except accidentally1 as stated above    
7,a4 #b7  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he who does 
an injustice in small matters falls     
short of the perfection of an unjust    
deed1 in so far as what he does may be  
deemed not altogether contrary to the   
will of the person who suffers          
therefrom3 for instance1 if a man take  
an apple or some such thing from another
 man1 in which case it is probable that 
the latter is not hurt or displeased4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sins which are    
contrary to the other virtues are not   

always hurtful to another person1 but   
imply a disorder affecting human        
passions2 hence there is no comparison4 
,,question #fj  ,,of ,,judgment 7,in    
,six ,articles7  ,in due sequence we    
must consider judgment1 under which head
 there are six points of inquiry3  7#a7 
,whether judgment is an act of justice8 
7#b7 ,whether it is lawful to judge8    
7#c7 ,whether judgment should be based  
on suspicions8  7#d7 ,whether doubts    
should be interpreted favorably8  7#e7  
,whether judgment should always be given
 according to the written law8  7#f7    
,whether judgment is perverted by being 
usurped8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,judgment   
,is an ,act of ,justice8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that judgment is not an 
act of justice4 ,the ,philosopher says  
7,ethic4 i1 #c7 that everyone judges    
well of what he knows1 so that judgment 
would seem to belong to the cognitive   
faculty4 ,now the cognitive faculty is  
perfected by prudence4 ,therefore       

judgment belongs to prudence rather than
 to justice1 which is in the will1 as   
stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #d74  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a     
,cor4 #b3ae73 ,the spiritual man judgeth
 all things4 ,now man is made spiritual 
chiefly by the virtue of charity1 which 
is poured forth in our hearts by the    
,holy ,ghost ,who is given to us 7,rom4 
#e3e74 ,therefore judgment belongs to   
charity rather than to justice4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 it belongs to every virtue
 to judge aright of its proper matter1  
because the virtuous man is the rule and
 measure in everything1 according to the
 ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #d74        
,therefore judgment does not belong to  
justice any more than to the other moral
 virtues4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 judgment 
would seem to belong only to judges4    
,but the act of justice is to be found  
in every just man4 ,since then judges   
are not the only just men1 it seems that
 judgment is not the proper act of      
justice4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is      

written 7,ps4 #ic3ae73 ,until justice be
 turned into judgment4  ,i answer that1 
,judgment properly denotes the act of a 
judge as such4 ,now a judge 7judex7 is  
so called because he asserts the right  
7jus dicens7 and right is the object of 
justice1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4  
#a74 ,consequently the original meaning 
of the word judgment is a statement or  
decision of the just or right4 ,now to  
decide rightly about virtuous deeds     
proceeds1 properly speaking1 from the   
virtuous habit2 thus a chaste person    
decides rightly about matters relating  
to chastity4 ,therefore judgment1 which 
denotes a right decision about what is  
just1 belongs properly to justice4 ,for 
this reason the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 v1 #d7 that men have recourse  
to a judge as to one who is the         
personification of justice4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,the word judgment1 from its  
original meaning of a right decision    
about what is just1 has been extended to
 signify a right decision in any matter 

whether speculative or practical4 ,now a
 right judgment in any matter requires  
two things4 ,the first is the virtue    
itself that pronounces judgment3 and in 
this way1 judgment is an act of reason1 
because it belongs to the reason to     
pronounce or define4 ,the other is the  
disposition of the one who judges1 on   
which depends his aptness for judging   
aright4 ,in this way1 in matters of     
justice1 judgment proceeds from justice1
 even as in matters of fortitude1 it    
proceeds from fortitude4 ,accordingly   
judgment is an act of justice in so far 
as justice inclines one to judge aright1
 and of prudence in so far as prudence  
pronounces judgment3 wherefore synesis  
which belongs to prudence is said to    
judge rightly1 as stated above 7,q4 #ea1
 ,a4 #c74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the        
spiritual man1 by reason of the habit of
 charity1 has an inclination to judge   
aright of all things according to the   
,divine rules2 and it is in conformity  
with these that he pronounces judgment  

through the gift of wisdom3 even as the 
just man pronounces judgment through the
 virtue of prudence conformably with the
 ruling of the law4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the other virtues regulate man in      
himself1 whereas justice regulates man  
in his dealings with others1 as shown   
above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b74 ,now man is    
master in things concerning himself1 but
 not in matters relating to others4     
,consequently where the other virtues   
are in question1 there is no need for   
judgment other than that of a virtuous  
man1 taking judgment in its broader     
sense1 as explained above 7ad #a74 ,but 
in matters of justice1 there is further 
need for the judgment of a superior1 who
 is able to reprove both1 and to put his
 hand between both 99,job #i3cc4 ,hence 
judgment belongs more specifically to   
justice than to any other virtue4       
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,justice is in the     
sovereign as a master-virtue 99,cf4 ,q4 
#eh1 ,a4 #f1 commanding and prescribing 
what is just2 while it is in the        

subjects as an executive and            
administrative virtue4 ,hence judgment1 
which denotes a decision of what is     
just1 belongs to justice1 considered as 
existing chiefly in one who has         
authority4   ,,second ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful to ,judge8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem unlawful to judge4   
,for nothing is punished except what is 
unlawful4 ,now those who judge are      
threatened with punishment1 which those 
who judge not will escape1 according to 
,matt4 #g3a1 ,judge not1 and ye shall   
not be judged4 ,therefore it is unlawful
 to judge4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is   
written 7,rom4 #ad3d73 ,who art thou    
that judgest another man's servant8 ,to 
his own lord he standeth or falleth4    
,now ,god is the ,lord of all4          
,therefore to no man is it lawful to    
judge4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no man is   
sinless1 according to #a ,john #a3h1 ,if
 we say that we have no sin1 we deceive 
ourselves4 ,now it is unlawful for a    

sinner to judge1 according to ,rom4     
#b3a1 ,thou art inexcusable1 ,o man1    
whosoever thou art1 that judgest2 for   
wherein thou judgest another1 thou      
condemnest thyself1 for thou dost the   
same things which thou judgest4         
,therefore to no man is it lawful to    
judge4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written
 7,deut4 #af3ah73 ,thou shalt appoint   
judges and magistrates in all thy gates 
4 4 4 that they may judge the people    
with just judgment4  ,i answer that1    
,judgment is lawful in so far as it is  
an act of justice4 ,now it follows from 
what has been stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad  
#a1 #c7 that three conditions are       
requisite for a judgment to be an act of
 justice3 first1 that it proceed from   
the inclination of justice2 secondly1   
that it come from one who is in         
authority2 thirdly1 that it be          
pronounced according to the right ruling
 of prudence4 ,if any one of these be   
lacking1 the judgment will be faulty and
 unlawful4 ,first1 when it is contrary  

to the rectitude of justice1 and then it
 is called perverted or unjust3         
secondly1 when a man judges about       
matters wherein he has no authority1 and
 this is called judgment by usurpation3 
thirdly1 when the reason lacks          
certainty1 as when a man1 without any   
solid motive1 forms a judgment on some  
doubtful or hidden matter1 and then it  
is called judgment by suspicion or rash 
judgment4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in these   
words our ,lord forbids rash judgment   
which is about the inward intention1 or 
other uncertain things1 as ,augustine   
states 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1  
#ah74 ,or else ,he forbids judgment     
about ,divine things1 which we ought not
 to judge1 but simply believe1 since    
they are above us1 as ,hilary declares  
in his commentary on ,matt4 #e4 ,or     
again according to ,chrysostom 99,hom4  
xvii in ,matth4 in the ,opus            
,imperfectum falsely ascribed to ,st4   
,john ,chrysostom1 ,he forbids the      
judgment which proceeds not from        

benevolence but from bitterness of      
heart4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a judge is    
appointed as ,god's servant2 wherefore  
it is written 7,deut4 #a3af73 ,judge    
that which is just1 and further on      
7,deut4 #a3ag71 because it is the       
judgment of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,those who stand guilty of grievous sins
 should not judge those who are guilty  
of the same or lesser sins1 as          
,chrysostom 99,hom4 xxiv says on the    
words of ,matt4 #g3a1 ,judge not4 ,above
 all does this hold when such sins are  
public1 because there would be an       
occasion of scandal arising in the      
hearts of others4 ,if however they are  
not public but hidden1 and there be an  
urgent necessity for the judge to       
pronounce judgment1 because it is his   
duty1 he can reprove or judge with      
humility and fear4 ,hence ,augustine    
says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1    
#ai73 ,if we find that we are guilty of 
the same sin as another man1 we should  
groan together with him1 and invite him 

to strive against it together with us4  
,and yet it is not through acting thus  
that a man condemns himself so as to    
deserve to be condemned once again1 but 
when1 in condemning another1 he shows   
himself to be equally deserving of      
condemnation on account of another or a 
like sin4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,it ,is    
,unlawful to ,form a ,judgment from     
,suspicions8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that it is not unlawful to form a  
judgment from suspicions4 ,for suspicion
 is seemingly an uncertain opinion about
 an evil1 wherefore the ,philosopher    
states 7,ethic4 vi1 #c7 that suspicion  
is about both the true and the false4   
,now it is impossible to have any but an
 uncertain opinion about contingent     
singulars4 ,since then human judgment is
 about human acts1 which are about      
singular and contingent matters1 it     
seems that no judgment would be lawful1 
if it were not lawful to judge from     
suspicions4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a man  

does his neighbor an injury by judging  
him unlawfully4 ,but an evil suspicion  
consists in nothing more than a man's   
opinion1 and consequently does not seem 
to pertain to the injury of another man4
 ,therefore judgment based on suspicion 
is not unlawful4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if
 it is unlawful1 it must needs be       
reducible to an injustice1 since        
judgment is an act of justice1 as stated
 above 7,a4 #a74 ,now an injustice is   
always a mortal sin according to its    
genus1 as stated above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4    
#d74 ,therefore a judgment based on     
suspicion would always be a mortal sin1 
if it were unlawful4 ,but this is false1
 because we cannot avoid suspicions1    
according to a gloss of ,augustine      
7,tract4 xc in ,joan47 on #a ,cor4 #d3e1
 ,judge not before the time4 ,therefore 
a judgment based on suspicion would seem
 not to be unlawful4  ,on the contrary1 
,chrysostom 99,hom4 xvii in ,matth4 in  
the ,opus ,imperfectum falsely ascribed 
to ,st4 ,john ,chrysostom in comment on 

the words of ,matt4 #g3a1 ,judge not1   
etc41 says3 ,by this commandment our    
,lord does not forbid ,christians to    
reprove others from kindly motives1 but 
that ,christian should despise          
,christian by boasting his own          
righteousness1 by hating and condemning 
others for the most part on mere        
suspicion4  ,i answer that1 ,as ,tully  
says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii71 suspicion
 denotes evil thinking based on slight  
indications1 and this is due to three   
causes4 ,first1 from a man being evil in
 himself1 and from this very fact1 as   
though conscious of his own wickedness1 
he is prone to think evil of others1    
according to ,eccles4 #aj3c1 ,the fool  
when he walketh in the way1 whereas he  
himself is a fool1 esteemeth all men    
fools4 ,secondly1 this is due to a man  
being ill-disposed towards another3 for 
when a man hates or despises another1 or
 is angry with or envious of him1 he is 
led by slight indications to think evil 
of him1 because everyone easily believes

 what he desires4 ,thirdly1 this is due 
to long experience3 wherefore the       
,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #ac7 that 
old people are very suspicious1 for they
 have often experienced the faults of   
others4 ,the first two causes of        
suspicion evidently connote perversity  
of the affections1 while the third      
diminishes the nature of suspicion1 in  
as much as experience leads to certainty
 which is contrary to the nature of     
suspicion4 ,consequently suspicion      
denotes a certain amount of vice1 and   
the further it goes1 the more vicious it
 is4  ,now there are three degrees of   
suspicion4 ,the first degree is when a  
man begins to doubt of another's        
goodness from slight indications4 ,this 
is a venial and a light sin2 for it     
belongs to human temptation without     
which no man can go through this life1  
according to a gloss on #a ,cor4 #d3e1  
,judge not before the time4 ,the second 
degree is when a man1 from slight       
indications1 esteems another man's      

wickedness as certain4 ,this is a mortal
 sin1 if it be about a grave matter1    
since it cannot be without contempt of  
one's neighbor4 ,hence the same gloss   
goes on to say3 ,if then we cannot avoid
 suspicions1 because we are human1 we   
must nevertheless restrain our judgment1
 and refrain from forming a definite and
 fixed opinion4 ,the third degree is    
when a judge goes so far as to condemn a
 man on suspicion3 this pertains        
directly to injustice1 and consequently 
is a mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some
 kind of certainty is found in human    
acts1 not indeed the certainty of a     
demonstration1 but such as is befitting 
the matter in point1 for instance when a
 thing is proved by suitable witnesses4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,from the very fact    
that a man thinks evil of another       
without sufficient cause1 he despises   
him unduly1 and therefore does him an   
injury4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since justice
 and injustice are about external       
operations1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1   

,,aa4 #h1 #aj1 #aa2 ,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #a1 ad 
#c71 the judgment of suspicion pertains 
directly to injustice when it is        
betrayed by external action1 and then it
 is a mortal sin1 as stated above4 ,the 
internal judgment pertains to justice1  
in so far as it is related to the       
external judgment1 even as the internal 
to the external act1 for instance as    
desire is related to fornication1 or    
anger to murder4   ,,fourth ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,doubts ,should ,be ,interpreted for the
 ,best8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that doubts should not be interpreted   
for the best4 ,because we should judge  
from what happens for the most part4    
,but it happens for the most part that  
evil is done1 since the number of fools 
is infinite 7,eccles4 #a3ae71 for the   
imagination and thought of man's heart  
are prone to evil from his youth 7,gen4 
#h3ba74 ,therefore doubts should be     
interpreted for the worst rather than   
for the best4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      

,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1
 #bg7 that he leads a godly and just    
life who is sound in his estimate of    
things1 and turns neither to this side  
nor to that4 ,now he who interprets a   
doubtful point for the best1 turns to   
one side4 ,therefore this should not be 
done4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man should   
love his neighbor as himself4 ,now with 
regard to himself1 a man should         
interpret doubtful matters for the      
worst1 according to ,job #i3bh1 ,i      
feared all my works4 ,therefore it seems
 that doubtful matters affecting one's  
neighbor should be interpreted for the  
worst4  ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on   
,rom4 #ad3c1 ,he that eateth not1 let   
him not judge him that eateth1 says3    
,doubts should be interpreted in the    
best sense4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,a4 #c1 ad #b71 from the very    
fact that a man thinks ill of another   
without sufficient cause1 he injures and
 despises him4 ,now no man ought to     
despise or in any way injure another man

 without urgent cause3 and1             
consequently1 unless we have evident    
indications of a person's wickedness1 we
 ought to deem him good1 by interpreting
 for the best whatever is doubtful about
 him4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he who         
interprets doubtful matters for the     
best1 may happen to be deceived more    
often than not2 yet it is better to err 
frequently through thinking well of a   
wicked man1 than to err less frequently 
through having an evil opinion of a good
 man1 because in the latter case an     
injury is inflicted1 but not in the     
former4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is one    
thing to judge of things and another to 
judge of men4 ,for when we judge of     
things1 there is no question of the good
 or evil of the thing about which we are
 judging1 since it will take no harm no 
matter what kind of judgment we form    
about it2 but there is question of the  
good of the person who judges1 if he    
judge truly1 and of his evil if he judge
 falsely because the true is the good of

 the intellect1 and the false is its    
evil1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #b1      
wherefore everyone should strive to make
 his judgment accord with things as they
 are4 ,on the other hand when we judge  
of men1 the good and evil in our        
judgment is considered chiefly on the   
part of the person about whom judgment  
is being formed2 for he is deemed worthy
 of honor from the very fact that he is 
judged to be good1 and deserving of     
contempt if he is judged to be evil4    
,for this reason we ought1 in this kind 
of judgment1 to aim at judging a man    
good1 unless there is evident proof of  
the contrary4 ,and though we may judge  
falsely1 our judgment in thinking well  
of another pertains to our good feeling 
and not to the evil of the intellect1   
even as neither does it pertain to the  
intellect's perfection to know the truth
 of contingent singulars in themselves4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one may interpret     
something for the worst or for the best 
in two ways4 ,first1 by a kind of       

supposition2 and thus1 when we have to  
apply a remedy to some evil1 whether our
 own or another's1 in order for the     
remedy to be applied with greater       
certainty of a cure1 it is expedient to 
take the worst for granted1 since if a  
remedy be efficacious against a worse   
evil1 much more is it efficacious       
against a lesser evil4 ,secondly we may 
interpret something for the best or for 
the worst1 by deciding or determining1  
and in this case when judging of things 
we should try to interpret each thing   
according as it is1 and when judging of 
persons1 to interpret things for the    
best as stated above4   ,,fifth         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #e  
,whether ,we ,should ,always ,judge     
,according to the ,written ,law8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that we   
ought not always to judge according to  
the written law4 ,for we ought always to
 avoid judging unjustly4 ,but written   
laws sometimes contain injustice1       
according to ,isa4 #aj3a1 ,woe to them  

that make wicked laws1 and when they    
write1 write injustice4 ,therefore we   
ought not always to judge according to  
the written law4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
judgment has to be formed about         
individual happenings4 ,but no written  
law can cover each and every individual 
happening1 as the ,philosopher declares 
7,ethic4 v1 #aj74 ,therefore it seems   
that we are not always bound to judge   
according to the written law4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 a law is written in order    
that the lawgiver's intention may be    
made clear4 ,but it happens sometimes   
that even if the lawgiver himself were  
present he would judge otherwise4       
,therefore we ought not always to judge 
according to the written law4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,vera    
,relig4 xxxi73 ,in these earthly laws1  
though men judge about them when they   
are making them1 when once they are     
established and passed1 the judges may  
judge no longer of them1 but according  
to them4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated    

above 7,a4 #a71 judgment is nothing else
 but a decision or determination of what
 is just4 ,now a thing becomes just in  
two ways3 first by the very nature of   
the case1 and this is called natural    
right1 secondly by some agreement       
between men1 and this is called positive
 right1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4   
#b74 ,now laws are written for the      
purpose of manifesting both these       
rights1 but in different ways4 ,for the 
written law does indeed contain natural 
right1 but it does not establish it1 for
 the latter derives its force1 not from 
the law but from nature3 whereas the    
written law both contains positive      
right1 and establishes it by giving it  
force of authority4  ,hence it is       
necessary to judge according to the     
written law1 else judgment would fall   
short either of the natural or of the   
positive right4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just 
as the written law does not give force  
to the natural right1 so neither can it 
diminish or annul its force1 because    

neither can man's will change nature4   
,hence if the written law contains      
anything contrary to the natural right1 
it is unjust and has no binding force4  
,for positive right has no place except 
where it matters not1 according to the  
natural right1 whether a thing be done  
in one way or in another2 as stated     
above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74         
,wherefore such documents are to be     
called1 not laws1 but rather corruptions
 of law1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#ie1 ,a4 #b73 and consequently judgment 
should not be delivered according to    
them4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even as unjust 
laws by their very nature are1 either   
always or for the most part1 contrary to
 the natural right1 so too laws that are
 rightly established1 fail in some      
cases1 when if they were observed they  
would be contrary to the natural right4 
,wherefore in such cases judgment should
 be delivered1 not according to the     
letter of the law1 but according to     
equity which the lawgiver has in view4  

,hence the jurist says 99,digest4 i1 #c2
 ,de leg4 senatusque consult4 #be3 ,by  
no reason of law1 or favor of equity1 is
 it allowable for us to interpret       
harshly1 and render burdensome1 those   
useful measures which have been enacted 
for the welfare of man4 ,in such cases  
even the lawgiver himself would decide  
otherwise2 and if he had foreseen the   
case1 he might have provided for it by  
law4  ,this suffices for the ,reply to  
the ,third ,objection4   ,,sixth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #f  
,whether ,judgment ,is ,rendered        
,perverse by ,being ,usurped8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
judgment is not rendered perverse by    
being usurped4 ,for justice is rectitude
 in matters of action4 ,now truth is not
 impaired1 no matter who tells it1 but  
it may suffer from the person who ought 
to accept it4 ,therefore again justice  
loses nothing1 no matter who declares   
what is just1 and this is what is meant 
by judgment4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it    

belongs to judgment to punish sins4 ,now
 it is related to the praise of some    
that they punished sins without having  
authority over those whom they punished2
 such as ,moses in slaying the ,egyptian
 7,ex4 #b3ab71 and ,phinees the son of  
,eleazar in slaying ,zambri the son of  
,salu 7,num4 #be3g-ad71 and it was      
reputed to him unto justice 7,ps4       
#aje3ca74 ,therefore usurpation of      
judgment pertains not to injustice4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 spiritual power is  
distinct from temporal4 ,now prelates   
having spiritual power sometimes        
interfere in matters concerning the     
secular power4 ,therefore usurped       
judgment is not unlawful4  ,obj4 #d3    
,further1 even as the judge requires    
authority in order to judge aright1 so  
also does he need justice and knowledge1
 as shown above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a1 #c2 ,a4 
#b74 ,but a judgment is not described as
 unjust1 if he who judges lacks the     
habit of justice or the knowledge of the
 law4 ,neither therefore is it always   

unjust to judge by usurpation1 i4e4     
without authority4  ,on the contrary1   
,it is written 7,rom4 #ad3d73 ,who art  
thou that judgest another man's servant8
  ,i answer that1 ,since judgment should
 be pronounced according to the written 
law1 as stated above 7,a4 #e71 he that  
pronounces judgment1 interprets1 in a   
way1 the letter of the law1 by applying 
it to some particular case4 ,now since  
it belongs to the same authority to     
interpret and to make a law1 just as a  
law cannot be made save by public       
authority1 so neither can a judgment be 
pronounced except by public authority1  
which extends over those who are subject
 to the community4 ,wherefore even as it
 would be unjust for one man to force   
another to observe a law that was not   
approved by public authority1 so too it 
is unjust1 if a man compels another to  
submit to a judgment that is pronounced 
by other than the public authority4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when the truth is     
declared there is no obligation to      

accept it1 and each one is free to      
receive it or not1 as he wishes4 ,on the
 other hand judgment implies an         
obligation1 wherefore it is unjust for  
anyone to be judged by one who has no   
public authority4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3     
,moses seems to have slain the ,egyptian
 by authority received as it were1 by   
divine inspiration2 this seems to follow
 from ,acts #g3bd1 #be1 where it is said
 that striking the ,egyptian 4 4 4 he   
thought that his brethren understood    
that ,god by his hand would save ,israel
 ,vulg43 'them'4 ,or it may be replied  
that ,moses slew the ,egyptian in order 
to defend the man who was unjustly      
attacked1 without himself exceeding the 
limits of a blameless defence4          
,wherefore ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1
 #cf7 that whoever does not ward off a  
blow from a fellow man when he can1 is  
as much in fault as the striker2 and he 
quotes the example of ,moses4 ,again we 
may reply with ,augustine 7,,qq4 ,exod4 
qu4 #b7 99,cf4 ,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #gj

 that just as the soil gives proof of   
its fertility by producing useless herbs
 before the useful seeds have grown1 so 
this deed of ,moses was sinful although 
it gave a sign of great fertility1 in so
 far1 to wit1 as it was a sign of the   
power whereby he was to deliver his     
people4  ,with regard to ,phinees the   
reply is that he did this out of zeal   
for ,god by ,divine inspiration2 or     
because though not as yet high-priest1  
he was nevertheless the high-priest's   
son1 and this judgment was his concern  
as of the other judges1 to whom this was
 commanded 99,ex4 #bb3bj2 ,lev4 #bj2    
,deut4 #ac1 #ag4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the 
secular power is subject to the         
spiritual1 even as the body is subject  
to the soul4 ,consequently the judgment 
is not usurped if the spiritual         
authority interferes in those temporal  
matters that are subject to the         
spiritual authority or which have been  
committed to the spiritual by the       
temporal authority4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3   

,the habits of knowledge and justice are
 perfections of the individual1 and     
consequently their absence does not make
 a judgment to be usurped1 as in the    
absence of public authority which gives 
a judgment its coercive force4          
,,question #fa  ,,of ,,the ,,parts ,,of 
,,justice 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider the parts of justice2 
7#a7 the subjective parts1 which are the
 species of justice1 i4e4 distributive  
and commutative justice2 7#b7 the       
quasi-integral parts2 7#c7 the          
quasi-potential parts1 i4e4 the virtues 
connected with justice4 ,the first      
consideration will be twofold3 7#a7 ,the
 parts of justice2 7#b7 their opposite  
vices4 ,and since restitution would seem
 to be an act of commutative justice1 we
 must consider 7#a7 the distinction     
between commutative and distributive    
justice2 7#b7 restitution4  ,under the  
first head there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether there are two   
species of justice1 viz4 distributive   

and commutative8  7#b7 ,whether in      
either case the mean is take in the same
 way8  7#c7 ,whether their matter is    
uniform or manifold8  7#d7 ,whether in  
any of these species the just is the    
same as counter-passion8   ,,first      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,two ,species of ,justice ,are 
,suitably ,assigned1 ,viz4 ,commutative 
and ,distributive8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that the two species of      
justice are unsuitably assigned1 viz4   
distributive and commutative4 ,that     
which is hurtful to the many cannot be a
 species of justice1 since justice is   
directed to the common good4 ,now it is 
hurtful to the common good of the many1 
if the goods of the community are       
distributed among many1 both because the
 goods of the community would be        
exhausted1 and because the morals of men
 would be corrupted4 ,for ,tully says   
7,de ,offic4 ii1 #ae73 ,he who receives 
becomes worse1 and the more ready to    
expect that he will receive again4      

,therefore distribution does not belong 
to any species of justice4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 the act of justice is to      
render to each one what is his own1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b74 ,but    
when things are distributed1 a man does 
not receive what was his1 but becomes   
possessed of something which belonged to
 the community4 ,therefore this does not
 pertain to justice4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 justice is not only in the    
sovereign1 but also in the subject1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #f74 ,but it 
belongs exclusively to the sovereign to 
distribute4 ,therefore distribution does
 not always belong to justice4  ,obj4   
#d3 ,further1 ,distributive justice     
regards common goods 7,ethic4 v1 #d74   
,now matters regarding the community    
pertain to legal justice4 ,therefore    
distributive justice is a part1 not of  
particular1 but of legal justice4  ,obj4
 #e3 ,further1 unity or multitude do not
 change the species of a virtue4 ,now   
commutative justice consists in         

rendering something to one person1 while
 distributive justice consists in giving
 something to many4 ,therefore they are 
not different species of justice4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher assigns 
two parts to justice and says 7,ethic4  
v1 #b7 that one directs distributions1  
the other1 commutations4  ,i answer     
that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,,aa4  
#g1 #h71 particular justice is directed 
to the private individual1 who is       
compared to the community as a part to  
the whole4 ,now a twofold order may be  
considered in relation to a part4 ,in   
the first place there is the order of   
one part to another1 to which           
corresponds the order of one private    
individual to another4 ,this order is   
directed by commutative justice1 which  
is concerned about the mutual dealings  
between two persons4 ,in the second     
place there is the order of the whole   
towards the parts1 to which corresponds 
the order of that which belongs to the  
community in relation to each single    

person4 ,this order is directed by      
distributive justice1 which distributes 
common goods proportionately4 ,hence    
there are two species of justice1       
distributive and commutative4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,just as a private individual 
is praised for moderation in his bounty1
 and blamed for excess therein1 so too  
ought moderation to be observed in the  
distribution of common goods1 wherein   
distributive justice directs4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,even as part and whole are   
somewhat the same1 so too that which    
pertains to the whole1 pertains somewhat
 to the part also3 so that when the     
goods of the community are distributed  
among a number of individuals each one  
receives that which1 in a way1 is his   
own4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the act of      
distributing the goods of the community1
 belongs to none but those who exercise 
authority over those goods2 and yet     
distributive justice is also in the     
subjects to whom those goods are        
distributed in so far as they are       

contented by a just distribution4       
,moreover distribution of common goods  
is sometimes made not to the state but  
to the members of a family1 and such    
distribution can be made by authority of
 a private individual4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3
 ,movement takes its species from the   
term whereunto4 ,hence it belongs to    
legal justice to direct to the common   
good those matters which concern private
 individuals3 whereas on the contrary it
 belongs to particular justice to direct
 the common good to particular          
individuals by way of distribution4     
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,distributive and      
commutative justice differ not only in  
respect of unity and multitude1 but also
 in respect of different kinds of due3  
because common property is due to an    
individual in one way1 and his personal 
property in another way4   ,,second     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #b  
,whether the ,mean ,is to ,be ,observed 
in the ,same ,way in ,distributive ,as  
in ,commutative ,justice8  ,objection   

#a3 ,it would seem that the mean in     
distributive justice is to be observed  
in the same way as in commutative       
justice4 ,for each of these is a kind of
 particular justice1 as stated above    
7,a4 #a74 ,now the mean is taken in the 
same way in all the parts of temperance 
or fortitude4 ,therefore the mean should
 also be observed in the same way in    
both distributive and commutative       
justice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the form  
of a moral virtue consists in observing 
the mean which is determined in         
accordance with reason4 ,since1 then1   
one virtue has one form1 it seems that  
the mean for both should be the same4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in order to observe 
the mean in distributive justice we have
 to consider the various deserts of     
persons4 ,now a person's deserts are    
considered also in commutative justice1 
for instance1 in punishments2 thus a man
 who strikes a prince is punished more  
than one who strikes a private          
individual4 ,therefore the mean is      

observed in the same way in both kinds  
of justice4  ,on the contrary1 ,the     
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #c1 #d7   
that the mean in distributive justice is
 observed according to geometrical      
proportion1 whereas in commutative      
justice it follows arithmetical         
proportion4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,a4 #a71 in distributive justice 
something is given to a private         
individual1 in so far as what belongs to
 the whole is due to the part1 and in a 
quantity that is proportionate to the   
importance of the position of that part 
in respect of the whole4 ,consequently  
in distributive justice a person        
receives all the more of the common     
goods1 according as he holds a more     
prominent position in the community4    
,this prominence in an aristocratic     
community is gauged according to virtue1
 in an oligarchy according to wealth1 in
 a democracy according to liberty1 and  
in various ways according to various    
forms of community4 ,hence in           

distributive justice the mean is        
observed1 not according to equality     
between thing and thing1 but according  
to proportion between things and        
persons3 in such a way that even as one 
person surpasses another1 so that which 
is given to one person surpasses that   
which is allotted to another4 ,hence the
 ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #c1 #d7  
that the mean in the latter case follows
 geometrical proportion1 wherein        
equality depends not on quantity but on 
proportion4 ,for example we say that #f 
is to #d as #c is to #b1 because in     
either case the proportion equals #a2   
since the greater number is the sum of  
the lesser plus its half3 whereas the   
equality of excess is not one of        
quantity1 because #f exceeds #d by #b1  
while #c exceeds #b by #a4  ,on the     
other hand in commutations something is 
paid to an individual on account of     
something of his that has been received1
 as may be seen chiefly in selling and  
buying1 where the notion of commutation 

is found primarily4 ,hence it is        
necessary to equalize thing with thing1 
so that the one person should pay back  
to the other just so much as he has     
become richer out of that which belonged
 to the other4 ,the result of this will 
be equality according to the            
arithmetical mean which is gauged       
according to equal excess in quantity4  
,thus #e is the mean between #f and #d1 
since it exceeds the latter and is      
exceeded by the former1 by #a4          
,accordingly if1 at the start1 both     
persons have #e1 and one of them        
receives #a out of the other's          
belongings1 the one that is the         
receiver1 will have #f1 and the other   
will be left with #d3 and so there will 
be justice if both be brought back to   
the mean1 #a being taken from him that  
has #f1 and given to him that has #d1   
for then both will have #e which is the 
mean4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the other   
moral virtues the rational1 not the real
 mean1 is to be followed3 but justice   

follows the real mean2 wherefore the    
mean1 in justice1 depends on the        
diversity of things4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,equality is the general form of        
justice1 wherein distributive and       
commutative justice agree3 but in one we
 find equality of geometrical           
proportion1 whereas in the other we find
 equality of arithmetical proportion4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in actions and        
passions a person's station affects the 
quantity of a thing3 for it is a greater
 injury to strike a prince than a       
private person4 ,hence in distributive  
justice a person's station is considered
 in itself1 whereas in commutative      
justice it is considered in so far as it
 causes a diversity of things4   ,,third
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #c 
,whether ,there ,is a ,different ,matter
 for ,both ,kinds of ,justice8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there
 is not a different matter for both     
kinds of justice4 ,diversity of matter  
causes diversity of virtue1 as in the   

case of fortitude and temperance4       
,therefore1 if distributive and         
commutative justice have different      
matters1 it would seem that they are not
 comprised under the same virtue1 viz4  
justice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the       
distribution that has to do with        
distributive justice is one of wealth or
 of honors1 or of whatever can be       
distributed among the members of the    
community 7,ethic4 v1 #b71 which very   
things are the subject matter of        
commutations between one person and     
another1 and this belongs to commutative
 justice4 ,therefore the matters of     
distributive and commutative justice are
 not distinct4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if  
the matter of distributive justice      
differs from that of commutative        
justice1 for the reason that they differ
 specifically1 where there is no        
specific difference1 there ought to be  
no diversity of matter4 ,now the        
,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #b7 reckons    
commutative justice as one species1 and 

yet this has many kinds of matter4      
,therefore the matter of these species  
of justice is1 seemingly1 not of many   
kinds4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is stated 
in ,ethic4 v1 #b that one kind of       
justice directs distributions1 and      
another commutations4  ,i answer that1  
,as stated above 7,q4 #ea1 ,,aa4 #h1    
#aj71 justice is about certain external 
operations1 namely distribution and     
commutation4 ,these consist in the use  
of certain externals1 whether things1   
persons or even works3 of things1 as    
when one man takes from or restores to  
another that which is his2 of persons1  
as when a man does an injury to the very
 person of another1 for instance by     
striking or insulting him1 or even by   
showing respect for him2 and of works1  
as when a man justly exacts a work of   
another1 or does a work for him4        
,accordingly1 if we take for the matter 
of each kind of justice the things      
themselves of which the operations are  
the use1 the matter of distributive and 

commutative justice is the same1 since  
things can be distributed out of the    
common property to individuals1 and be  
the subject of commutation between one  
person and another2 and again there is a
 certain distribution and payment of    
laborious works4  ,if1 however1 we take 
for the matter of both kinds of justice 
the principal actions themselves1       
whereby we make use of persons1 things1 
and works1 there is then a difference of
 matter between them4 ,for distributive 
justice directs distributions1 while    
commutative justice directs commutations
 that can take place between two        
persons4 ,of these some are involuntary1
 some voluntary4 ,they are involuntary  
when anyone uses another man's chattel1 
person1 or work against his will1 and   
this may be done secretly by fraud1 or  
openly by violence4 ,in either case the 
offence may be committed against the    
other man's chattel or person1 or       
against a person connected with him4 ,if
 the offence is against his chattel and 

this be taken secretly1 it is called    
theft1 if openly1 it is called robbery4 
,if it be against another man's person1 
it may affect either the very substance 
of his person1 or his dignity4 ,if it be
 against the substance of his person1 a 
man is injured secretly if he is        
treacherously slain1 struck or poisoned1
 and openly1 if he is publicly slain1   
imprisoned1 struck or maimed4 ,if it be 
against his personal dignity1 a man is  
injured secretly by false witness1      
detractions and so forth1 whereby he is 
deprived of his good name1 and openly1  
by being accused in a court of law1 or  
by public insult4 ,if it be against a   
personal connection1 a man is injured in
 the person of his wife1 secretly 7for  
the most part7 by adultery1 in the      
person of his slave1 if the latter be   
induced to leave his master3 which      
things can also be done openly4 ,the    
same applies to other personal          
connections1 and whatever injury may be 
committed against the principal1 may be 

committed against them also4 ,adultery1 
however1 and inducing a slave to leave  
his master are properly injuries against
 the person2 yet the latter1 since a    
slave is his master's chattel1 is       
referred to theft4 ,voluntary           
commutations are when a man voluntarily 
transfers his chattel to another person4
 ,and if he transfer it simply so that  
the recipient incurs no debt1 as in the 
case of gifts1 it is an act1 not of     
justice but of liberality4 ,a voluntary 
transfer belongs to justice in so far as
 it includes the notion of debt1 and    
this may occur in many ways4 ,first when
 one man simply transfers his thing to  
another in exchange for another thing1  
as happens in selling and buying4       
,secondly when a man transfers his thing
 to another1 that the latter may have   
the use of it with the obligation of    
returning it to its owner4 ,if he grant 
the use of a thing gratuitously1 it is  
called usufruct in things that bear     
fruit2 and simply borrowing on loan in  

things that bear no fruit1 such as      
money1 pottery1 etc42 but if not even   
the use is granted gratis1 it is called 
letting or hiring4 ,thirdly1 a man      
transfers his thing with the intention  
of recovering it1 not for the purpose of
 its use1 but that it may be kept safe1 
as in a deposit1 or under some          
obligation1 as when a man pledges his   
property1 or when one man stands        
security for another4 ,in all these     
actions1 whether voluntary or           
involuntary1 the mean is taken in the   
same way according to the equality of   
repayment4 ,hence all these actions     
belong to the one same species of       
justice1 namely commutative justice4    
,and this suffices for the ,replies to  
the ,objections4   ,,fourth ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
the ,just ,is ,absolutely the ,same ,as 
,retaliation8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that the just is absolutely the    
same as retaliation4 ,for the judgment  
of ,god is absolutely just4 ,now the    

judgment of ,god is such that a man has 
to suffer in proportion with his deeds1 
according to ,matt4 #g3b3 ,with what    
measure you judge1 you shall be judged3 
and with what measure you mete1 it shall
 be measured to you again4 ,therefore   
the just is absolutely the same as      
retaliation4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in    
either kind of justice something is     
given to someone according to a kind of 
equality4 ,in distributive justice this 
equality regards personal dignity1 which
 would seem to depend chiefly on what a 
person has done for the good of the     
community2 while in commutative justice 
it regards the thing in which a person  
has suffered loss4 ,now in respect of   
either equality there is retaliation in 
respect of the deed committed4          
,therefore it would seem that the just  
is absolutely the same as retaliation4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the chief argument  
against retaliation is based on the     
difference between the voluntary and the
 involuntary2 for he who does an injury 

involuntarily is less severely punished4
 ,now voluntary and involuntary taken in
 relation to ourselves1 do not diversify
 the mean of justice since this is the  
real mean and does not depend on us4    
,therefore it would seem that the just  
is absolutely the same as retaliation4  
,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher     
proves 7,ethic4 v1 #e7 that the just is 
not always the same as retaliation4  ,i 
answer that1 ,retaliation 7contrapassum7
 denotes equal passion repaid for       
previous action2 and the expression     
applies most properly to injurious      
passions and actions1 whereby a man     
harms the person of his neighbor2 for   
instance if a man strike1 that he be    
struck back4 ,this kind of just is laid 
down in the ,law 7,ex4 #ba3bc1 #bd73 ,he
 shall render life for life1 eye for    
eye1 etc4 ,and since also to take away  
what belongs to another is to do an     
unjust thing1 it follows that secondly  
retaliation consists in this also1 that 
whosoever causes loss to another1 should

 suffer loss in his belongings4 ,this   
just loss is also found in the ,law     
7,ex4 #bb3a73 ,if any man steal an ox or
 a sheep1 and kill or sell it1 he shall 
restore five oxen for one ox and four   
sheep for one sheep4 ,thirdly           
retaliation is transferred to voluntary 
commutations1 where action and passion  
are on both sides1 although             
voluntariness detracts from the nature  
of passion1 as stated above 7,q4 #ei1   
,a4 #c74  ,in all these cases1 however1 
repayment must be made on a basis of    
equality according to the requirements  
of commutative justice1 namely that the 
meed of passion be equal to the action4 
,now there would not always be equality 
if passion were in the same species as  
the action4 ,because1 in the first      
place1 when a person injures the person 
of one who is greater1 the action       
surpasses any passion of the same       
species that he might undergo1 wherefore
 he that strikes a prince1 is not only  
struck back1 but is much more severely  

punished4 ,in like manner when a man    
despoils another of his property against
 the latter's will1 the action surpasses
 the passion if he be merely deprived of
 that thing1 because the man who caused 
another's loss1 himself would lose      
nothing1 and so he is punished by making
 restitution several times over1 because
 not only did he injure a private       
individual1 but also the common weal1   
the security of whose protection he has 
infringed4 ,nor again would there be    
equality of passion in voluntary        
commutations1 were one always to        
exchange one's chattel for another      
man's1 because it might happen that the 
other man's chattel is much greater than
 our own3 so that it becomes necessary  
to equalize passion and action in       
commutations according to a certain     
proportionate commensuration1 for which 
purpose money was invented4 ,hence      
retaliation is in accordance with       
commutative justice3 but there is no    
place for it in distributive justice1   

because in distributive justice we do   
not consider the equality between thing 
and thing or between passion and action 
7whence the expression contrapassum71   
but according to proportion between     
things and persons1 as stated above 7,a4
 #b74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this form of   
the ,divine judgment is in accordance   
with the conditions of commutative      
justice1 in so far as rewards are       
apportioned to merits1 and punishments  
to sins4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when a man  
who has served the community is paid for
 his services1 this is to be referred to
 commutative1 not distributive1 justice4
 ,because distributive justice considers
 the equality1 not between the thing    
received and the thing done1 but between
 the thing received by one person and   
the thing received by another according 
to the respective conditions of those   
persons4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when the    
injurious action is voluntary1 the      
injury is aggravated and consequently is
 considered as a greater thing4 ,hence  

it requires a greater punishment in     
repayment1 by reason of a difference1   
not on our part1 but on the part of the 
thing4   ,,question #fb  ,,of           
,,restitution 7,in ,eight ,articles7    
,we must now consider restitution1 under
 which head there are eight points of   
inquiry3  7#a7 ,of what is it an act8   
7#b7 ,whether it is always of necessity 
for salvation to restore what one has   
taken away8  7#c7 ,whether it is        
necessary to restore more than has been 
taken away8  7#d7 ,whether it is        
necessary to restore what one has not   
taken away8  7#e7 ,whether it is        
necessary to make restitution to the    
person from whom something has been     
taken8  7#f7 ,whether the person who has
 taken something away is bound to       
restore it8  7#g7 ,whether any other    
person is bound to restitution8  7#h7   
,whether one is bound to restore at     
once8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #fb1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,restitution   
,is an ,act of ,commutative ,justice8   

,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
restitution is not an act of commutative
 justice4 ,for justice regards the      
notion of what is due4 ,now one may     
restore1 even as one may give1 that     
which is not due4 ,therefore restitution
 is not the act of any part of justice4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which has      
passed away and is no more cannot be    
restored4 ,now justice and injustice are
 about certain actions and passions1    
which are unenduring and transitory4    
,therefore restitution would not seem to
 be the act of a part of justice4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 restitution is repayment 
of something taken away4 ,now something 
may be taken away from a man not only in
 commutation1 but also in distribution1 
as when1 in distributing1 one gives a   
man less than his due4 ,therefore       
restitution is not more an act of       
commutative than of distributive        
justice4  ,on the contrary1 ,restitution
 is opposed to taking away4 ,now it is  
an act of commutative injustice to take 

away what belongs to another4 ,therefore
 to restore it is an act of that justice
 which directs commutations4  ,i answer 
that1 ,to restore is seemingly the same 
as to reinstate a person in the         
possession or dominion of his thing1 so 
that in restitution we consider the     
equality of justice attending the       
payment of one thing for another1 and   
this belongs to commutative justice4    
,hence restitution is an act of         
commutative justice1 occasioned by one  
person having what belongs to another1  
either with his consent1 for instance on
 loan or deposit1 or against his will1  
as in robbery or theft4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,that which is not due to another is
 not his properly speaking1 although it 
may have been his at some time3         
wherefore it is a mere gift rather than 
a restitution1 when anyone renders to   
another what is not due to him4 ,it is  
however somewhat like a restitution1    
since the thing itself is materially the
 same2 yet it is not the same in respect

 of the formal aspect of justice1 which 
considers that thing as belonging to    
this particular man3 and so it is not   
restitution properly so called4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,in so far as the word        
restitution denotes something done over 
again1 it implies identity of object4   
,hence it would seem originally to have 
applied chiefly to external things1     
which can pass from one person to       
another1 since they remain the same both
 substantially and in respect of the    
right of dominion4 ,but1 even as the    
term commutation has passed from such   
like things to those actions and        
passions which confer reverence or      
injury1 harm or profit on another       
person1 so too the term restitution is  
applied1 to things which though they be 
transitory in reality1 yet remain in    
their effect2 whether this touch his    
body1 as when the body is hurt by being 
struck1 or his reputation1 as when a man
 remains defamed or dishonored by       
injurious words4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3      

,compensation is made by the distributor
 to the man to whom less was given than 
his due1 by comparison of thing with    
thing1 when the latter receives so much 
the more according as he received less  
than his due3 and consequently it       
pertains to commutative justice4        
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,restitution of ,what
 ,has ,been ,taken ,away ,is ,necessary 
for ,salvation8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that it is not necessary to  
restore what has been taken away4 ,for  
that which is impossible is not         
necessary for salvation4 ,but sometimes 
it is impossible to restore what has    
been taken1 as when a man has taken limb
 or life4 ,therefore it does not seem   
necessary for salvation to restore what 
one has taken from another4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 the commission of a sin is not
 necessary for salvation1 for then a man
 would be in a dilemma4 ,but sometimes  
it is impossible1 without sin1 to       
restore what has been taken1 as when one

 has taken away another's good name by  
telling the truth4 ,therefore it is not 
necessary for salvation to restore what 
one has taken from another4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 what is done cannot be undone4
 ,now sometimes a man loses his personal
 honor by being unjustly insulted4      
,therefore that which has been taken    
from him cannot be restored to him3 so  
that it is not necessary for salvation  
to restore what one has taken4  ,obj4   
#d3 ,further1 to prevent a person from  
obtaining a good thing is seemingly the 
same as to take it away from him1 since 
to lack little is almost the same as to 
lack nothing at all1 as the ,philosopher
 says 7,phys4 ii1 #e74 ,now when anyone 
prevents a man from obtaining a benefice
 or the like1 seemingly he is not bound 
to restore the benefice1 since this     
would be sometimes impossible4          
,therefore it is not necessary for      
salvation to restore what one has taken4
  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says     
7,ep4 ad ,maced4 cxliii73 ,unless a man 

restore what he has purloined1 his sin  
is not forgiven4  ,i answer that1       
,restitution as stated above 7,a4 #a7 is
 an act of commutative justice1 and this
 demands a certain equality4 ,wherefore 
restitution denotes the return of the   
thing unjustly taken2 since it is by    
giving it back that equality is         
reestablished4 ,if1 however1 it be taken
 away justly1 there will be equality1   
and so there will be no need for        
restitution1 for justice consists in    
equality4 ,since therefore the          
safeguarding of justice is necessary for
 salvation1 it follows that it is       
necessary for salvation to restore what 
has been taken unjustly4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,when it is impossible to repay the 
equivalent1 it suffices to repay what   
one can1 as in the case of honor due to 
,god and our parents1 as the            
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 viii1 #ad74
 ,wherefore when that which has been    
taken cannot be restored in equivalent1 
compensation should be made as far as   

possible3 for instance if one man has   
deprived another of a limb1 he must make
 compensation either in money or in     
honor1 the condition of either party    
being duly considered according to the  
judgment of a good man4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,there are three ways in which one  
may take away another's good name4      
,first1 by saying what is true1 and this
 justly1 as when a man reveals another's
 sin1 while observing the right order of
 so doing1 and then he is not bound to  
restitution4 ,secondly1 by saying what  
is untrue and unjustly1 and then he is  
bound to restore that man's good name1  
by confessing that he told an untruth4  
,thirdly1 by saying what is true1 but   
unjustly1 as when a man reveals         
another's sin contrarily to the right   
order of so doing1 and then he is bound 
to restore his good name as far as he   
can1 and yet without telling an untruth2
 for instance by saying that he spoke   
ill1 or that he defamed him unjustly2 or
 if he be unable to restore his good    

name1 he must compensate him otherwise1 
the same as in other cases1 as stated   
above 7ad #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the   
action of the man who has defamed       
another cannot be undone1 but it is     
possible1 by showing him deference1 to  
undo its effect1 viz4 the lowering of   
the other man's personal dignity in the 
opinion of other men4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 
,there are several ways of preventing a 
man from obtaining a benefice4 ,first1  
justly3 for instance1 if having in view 
the honor of ,god or the good of the    
,church1 one procures its being         
conferred on a more worthy subject1 and 
then there is no obligation whatever to 
make restitution or compensation4       
,secondly1 unjustly1 if the intention is
 to injure the person whom one hinders1 
through hatred1 revenge or the like4 ,in
 this case1 if before the benefice has  
been definitely assigned to anyone1 one 
prevents its being conferred on a worthy
 subject by counseling that it be not   
conferred on him1 one is bound to make  

some compensation1 after taking account 
of the circumstances of persons and     
things according to the judgment of a   
prudent person3 but one is not bound in 
equivalent1 because that man had not    
obtained the benefice and might have    
been prevented in many ways from        
obtaining it4 ,if1 on the other hand1   
the benefice had already been assigned  
to a certain person1 and someone1 for   
some undue cause procures its           
revocation1 it is the same as though he 
had deprived a man of what he already   
possessed1 and consequently he would be 
bound to compensation in equivalent1 in 
proportion1 however1 to his means4      
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,it ,suffices to     
,restore the ,exact ,amount ,taken8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is
 not sufficient to restore the exact    
amount taken4 ,for it is written 7,ex4  
#bb3a73 ,if a man shall steal an ox or a
 sheep and kill or sell it1 he shall    
restore five oxen for one ox1 and four  

sheep for one sheep4 ,now everyone is   
bound to keep the commandments of the   
,divine law4 ,therefore a thief is bound
 to restore four- or fivefold4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 ,what things soever were  
written1 were written for our learning  
7,rom4 #ae3d74 ,now ,zachaeus said      
7,luke #ai3h7 to our ,lord3 ,if ,i have 
wronged any man of any thing1 ,i restore
 him fourfold4 ,therefore a man is bound
 to restore several times over the      
amount he has taken unjustly4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 no one can be unjustly       
deprived of what he is not bound to     
give4 ,now a judge justly deprives a    
thief of more than the amount of his    
theft1 under the head of damages4       
,therefore a man is bound to pay it1 and
 consequently it is not sufficient to   
restore the exact amount4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,restitution re-establishes   
equality where an unjust taking has     
caused inequality4 ,now equality is     
restored by repaying the exact amount   
taken4 ,therefore there is no obligation

 to restore more than the exact amount  
taken4  ,i answer that1 ,when a man     
takes another's thing unjustly1 two     
things must be considered4 ,one is the  
inequality on the part of the thing1    
which inequality is sometimes void of   
injustice1 as is the case in loans4 ,the
 other is the sin of injustice1 which is
 consistent with equality on the part of
 the thing1 as when a person intends to 
use violence but fails4  ,as regards the
 first1 the remedy is applied by making 
restitution1 since thereby equality is  
re-established2 and for this it is      
enough that a man restore just so much  
as he has belonging to another4 ,but as 
regards the sin1 the remedy is applied  
by punishment1 the infliction of which  
belongs to the judge3 and so1 until a   
man is condemned by the judge1 he is not
 bound to restore more than he took1 but
 when once he is condemned1 he is bound 
to pay the penalty4  ,hence it is clear 
how to answer the ,first ,objection3    
because this law fixes the punishment to

 be inflicted by the judge4 ,nor is this
 commandment to be kept now1 because    
since the coming of ,christ no man is   
bound to keep the judicial precepts1 as 
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,a4    
#c74 ,nevertheless the same might be    
determined by human law1 and then the   
same answer would apply4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,zachaeus said this being willing to
 do more than he was bound to do2 hence 
he had said already3 ,behold 4 4 4 the  
half of my goods ,i give to the poor4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,by condemning the man 
justly1 the judge can exact more by way 
of damages2 and yet this was not due    
before the sentence4   ,,fourth         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #d  
,whether a ,man ,is ,bound to ,restore  
,what ,he ,has ,not ,taken8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that a man is bound  
to restore what he has not taken4 ,for  
he that has inflicted a loss on a man is
 bound to remove that loss4 ,now it     
happens sometimes that the loss         
sustained is greater than the thing     

taken3 for instance1 if you dig up a    
man's seeds1 you inflict on the sower a 
loss equal to the coming harvest1 and   
thus you would seem to be bound to make 
restitution accordingly4 ,therefore a   
man is bound to restore what he has not 
taken4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 he who      
retains his creditor's money beyond the 
stated time1 would seem to occasion his 
loss of all his possible profits from   
that money1 and yet he does not really  
take them4 ,therefore it seems that a   
man is bound to restore what he did not 
take4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 human justice
 is derived from ,divine justice4 ,now a
 man is bound to restore to ,god more   
than he has received from ,him1         
according to ,matt4 #be3bf1 ,thou       
knewest that ,i reap where ,i sow not1  
and gather where ,i have not strewed4   
,therefore it is just that one should   
restore to a man also1 something that   
one has not taken4  ,on the contrary1   
,restitution belongs to justice1 because
 it re-establishes equality4 ,but if one

 were to restore what one did not take1 
there would not be equality4 ,therefore 
it is not just to make such a           
restitution4  ,i answer that1 ,whoever  
brings a loss upon another person1      
seemingly1 takes from him the amount of 
the loss1 since1 according to the       
,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #d7 loss is so 
called from a man having less99 than his
 due4 99,the derivation is more apparent
 in ,english than in ,latin1 where      
damnum stands for loss1 and minus for   
less4 ,aristotle merely says that to    
have more than your own is called gain1 
and to have less than you started with  
is called loss4 ,therefore a man is     
bound to make restitution according to  
the loss he has brought upon another4   
,now a man suffers a loss in two ways4  
,first1 by being deprived of what he    
actually has2 and a loss of this kind is
 always to be made good by repayment in 
equivalent3 for instance if a man       
damnifies another by destroying his     
house he is bound to pay him the value  

of the house4 ,secondly1 a man may      
damnify another by preventing him from  
obtaining what he was on the way to     
obtain4 ,a loss of this kind need not be
 made good in equivalent2 because to    
have a thing virtually is less than to  
have it actually1 and to be on the way  
to obtain a thing is to have it merely  
virtually or potentially1 and so were he
 to be indemnified by receiving the     
thing actually1 he would be paid1 not   
the exact value taken from him1 but     
more1 and this is not necessary for     
salvation1 as stated above4 ,however he 
is bound to make some compensation1     
according to the condition of persons   
and things4  ,from this we see how to   
answer the ,first and ,second           
,objections3 because the sower of the   
seed in the field1 has the harvest1 not 
actually but only virtually4 ,in like   
manner he that has money has the profit 
not yet actually but only virtually3 and
 both may be hindered in many ways4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god requires nothing  

from us but what ,he ,himself has sown  
in us4 ,hence this saying is to be      
understood as expressing either the     
shameful thought of the lazy servant1   
who deemed that he had received nothing 
from the other1 or the fact that ,god   
expects from us the fruit of ,his gifts1
 which fruit is from ,him and from us1  
although the gifts themselves are from  
,god without us4   ,,fifth ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #e  ,whether  
,restitution ,must ,always ,be ,made to 
the ,person from ,whom a ,thing ,has    
,been ,taken8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that restitution need not always be
 made to the person from whom a thing   
has been taken4 ,for it is not lawful to
 injure anyone4 ,now it would sometimes 
be injurious to the man himself1 or to  
others1 were one to restore to him what 
has been taken from him2 if1 for        
instance1 one were to return a madman   
his sword4 ,therefore restitution need  
not always be made to the person from   
whom a thing has been taken4  ,obj4 #b3 

,further1 if a man has given a thing    
unlawfully1 he does not deserve to      
recover it4 ,now sometimes a man gives  
unlawfully that which another accepts   
unlawfully1 as in the case of the giver 
and receiver who are guilty of simony4  
,therefore it is not always necessary to
 make restitution to the person from    
whom one has taken something4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 no man is bound to do what is
 impossible4 ,now it is sometimes       
impossible to make restitution to the   
person from whom a thing has been taken1
 either because he is dead1 or because  
he is too far away1 or because he is    
unknown to us4 ,therefore restitution   
need not always be made to the person   
from whom a thing has been taken4  ,obj4
 #d3 ,further1 we owe more compensation 
to one from whom we have received a     
greater favor4 ,now we have received    
greater favors from others 7our parents 
for instance7 than from a lender or     
depositor4 ,therefore sometimes we ought
 to succor some other person rather than

 make restitution to one from whom we   
have taken something4  ,obj4 #e3        
,further1 it is useless to restore a    
thing which reverts to the restorer by  
being restored4 ,now if a prelate has   
unjustly taken something from the       
,church and makes restitution to the    
,church1 it reverts into his hands1     
since he is the guardian of the         
,church's property4 ,therefore he ought 
not to restore to the ,church from whom 
he has taken3 and so restitution should 
not always be made to the person from   
whom something has been taken away4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4    
#ac3g73 ,render 4 4 4 to all men their  
dues2 tribute to whom tribute is due1   
custom to whom custom4  ,i answer that1 
,restitution re-establishes the equality
 of commutative justice1 which equality 
consists in the equalizing of thing to  
thing1 as stated above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #eh1
 ,a4 #aj74 ,now this equalizing of      
things is impossible1 unless he that has
 less than his due receive what is      

lacking to him3 and for this to be done1
 restitution must be made to the person 
from whom a thing has been taken4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when the thing to be  
restored appears to be grievously       
injurious to the person to whom it is to
 be restored1 or to some other1 it      
should not be restored to him there and 
then1 because restitution is directed to
 the good of the person to whom it is   
made1 since all possessions come under  
the head of the useful4 ,yet he who     
retains another's property must not     
appropriate it1 but must either reserve 
it1 that he may restore it at a fitting 
time1 or hand it over to another to keep
 it more securely4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a 
person may give a thing unlawfully in   
two ways4 ,first through the giving     
itself being illicit and against the    
law1 as is the case when a man gives a  
thing simoniacally4 ,such a man deserves
 to lose what he gave1 wherefore        
restitution should not be made to him3  
and1 since the receiver acted against   

the law in receiving1 he must not retain
 the price1 but must use it for some    
pious object4 ,secondly a man gives     
unlawfully1 through giving for an       
unlawful purpose1 albeit the giving     
itself is not unlawful1 as when a woman 
receives payment for fornication3       
wherefore she may keep what she has     
received4 ,if1 however1 she has extorted
 overmuch by fraud or deceit1 she would 
be bound to restitution4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,if the person to whom restitution  
is due is unknown altogether1           
restitution must be made as far as      
possible1 for instance by giving an alms
 for his spiritual welfare 7whether he  
be dead or living73 but not without     
previously making a careful inquiry     
about his person4 ,if the person to whom
 restitution is due be dead1 restitution
 should be made to his heir1 who is     
looked upon as one with him4 ,if he be  
very far away1 what is due to him should
 be sent to him1 especially if it be of 
great value and can easily be sent3 else

 it should be deposited in a safe place 
to be kept for him1 and the owner should
 be advised of the fact4  ,reply ,obj4  
#d3 ,a man is bound1 out of his own     
property1 to succor his parents1 or     
those from whom he has received greater 
benefits2 but he ought not to compensate
 a benefactor out of what belongs to    
others2 and he would be doing this if he
 were to compensate one with what is due
 to another4 ,exception must be made in 
cases of extreme need1 for then he could
 and should even take what belongs to   
another in order to succor a parent4    
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,there are three ways  
in which a prelate can rob the ,church  
of her property4 ,first by laying hands 
on ,church property which is committed1 
not to him but to another2 for instance1
 if a bishop appropriates the property  
of the chapter4 ,in such a case it is   
clear that he is bound to restitution1  
by handing it over to those who are its 
lawful owners4 ,secondly by transferring
 to another person 7for instance a      

relative or a friend7 ,church property  
committed to himself3 in which case he  
must make restitution to the ,church1   
and have it under his own care1 so as to
 hand it over to his successor4         
,thirdly1 a prelate may lay hands on    
,church property1 merely in intention1  
when1 to wit1 he begins to have a mind  
to hold it as his own and not in the    
name of the ,church3 in which case he   
must make restitution by renouncing his 
intention4   ,,sixth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,he ,that ,has ,taken a ,thing ,is      
,always ,bound to ,restitution8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that he   
who has taken a thing is not always     
bound to restore it4 ,restitution       
re-establishes the equality of justice1 
by taking away from him that has more   
and giving to him that has less4 ,now it
 happens sometimes that he who has taken
 that which belongs to another1 no      
longer has it1 through its having passed
 into another's hands4 ,therefore it    

should be restored1 not by the person   
that took it1 but by the one that has   
it4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no man is bound
 to reveal his own crime4 ,but by making
 restitution a man would sometimes      
reveal his crime1 as in the case of     
theft4 ,therefore he that has taken a   
thing is not always bound to            
restitution4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the   
same thing should not be restored       
several times4 ,now sometimes several   
persons take a thing at the same time1  
and one of them restores it in its      
entirety4 ,therefore he that takes a    
thing is not always bound to            
restitution4  ,on the contrary1 ,he that
 has sinned is bound to satisfaction4   
,now restitution belongs to             
satisfaction4 ,therefore he that has    
taken a thing is bound to restore it4   
,i answer that1 ,with regard to a man   
who has taken another's property1 two   
points must be considered3 the thing    
taken1 and the taking4 ,by reason of the
 thing taken1 he is bound to restore it 

as long as he has it in his possession1 
since the thing that he has in addition 
to what is his1 should be taken away    
from him1 and given to him who lacks it 
according to the form of commutative    
justice4 ,on the other hand1 the taking 
of the thing that is another's property1
 may be threefold4 ,for sometimes it is 
injurious1 i4e4 against the will of the 
owner1 as in theft and robbery3 in which
 case the thief is bound to restitution 
not only by reason of the thing1 but    
also by reason of the injurious action1 
even though the thing is no longer in   
his possession4 ,for just as a man who  
strikes another1 though he gain nothing 
thereby1 is bound to compensate the     
injured person1 so too he that is guilty
 of theft or robbery1 is bound to make  
compensation for the loss incurred1     
although he be no better off2 and in    
addition he must be punished for the    
injustice committed4 ,secondly1 a man   
takes another's property for his own    
profit but without committing an injury1

 i4e4 with the consent of the owner1 as 
in the case of a loan3 and then1 the    
taker is bound to restitution1 not only 
by reason of the thing1 but also by     
reason of the taking1 even if he has    
lost the thing3 for he is bound to      
compensate the person who has done him a
 favor1 and he would not be doing so if 
the latter were to lose thereby4        
,thirdly1 a man takes another's property
 without injury to the latter or profit 
to himself1 as in the case of a deposit2
 wherefore he that takes a thing thus1  
incurs no obligation on account of the  
taking1 in fact by taking he grants a   
favor2 but he is bound to restitution on
 account of the thing taken4            
,consequently if this thing be taken    
from him without any fault on his part1 
he is not bound to restitution1 although
 he would be1 if he were to lose the    
thing through a grievous fault on his   
part4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the chief end  
of restitution is1 not that he who has  
more than his due may cease to have it1 

but that he who has less than his due   
may be compensated4 ,wherefore there is 
no place for restitution in those things
 which one man may receive from another 
without loss to the latter1 as when a   
person takes a light from another's     
candle4 ,consequently although he that  
has taken something from another1 may   
have ceased to have what he took1       
through having transferred it to        
another1 yet since that other is        
deprived of what is his1 both are bound 
to restitution1 he that took the thing1 
on account of the injurious taking1 and 
he that has it1 on account of the thing4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although a man is   
not bound to reveal his crime to other  
men1 yet is he bound to reveal it to    
,god in confession2 and so he may make  
restitution of another's property       
through the priest to whom he confesses4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since restitution is
 chiefly directed to the compensation   
for the loss incurred by the person from
 whom a thing has been taken unjustly1  

it stands to reason that when he has    
received sufficient compensation from   
one1 the others are not bound to any    
further restitution in his regard3      
rather ought they to refund the person  
who has made restitution1 who1          
nevertheless1 may excuse them from so   
doing4   ,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #g  ,whether ,restitution
 ,is ,binding on ,those ,who ,have ,not 
,taken8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that restitution is not binding on those
 who have not taken4 ,for restitution is
 a punishment of the taker4 ,now none   
should be punished except the one who   
sinned4 ,therefore none are bound to    
restitution save the one who has taken4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 justice does not    
bind one to increase another's property4
 ,now if restitution were binding not   
only on the man who takes a thing but   
also on all those who cooperate with him
 in any way whatever1 the person from   
whom the thing was taken would be the   
gainer1 both because he would receive   

restitution many times over1 and because
 sometimes a person cooperates towards a
 thing being taken away from someone1   
without its being taken away in effect4 
,therefore the others are not bound to  
restitution4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no man
 is bound to expose himself to danger1  
in order to safeguard another's         
property4 ,now sometimes a man would    
expose himself to the danger of death1  
were he to betray a thief1 or withstand 
him4 ,therefore one is not bound to     
restitution1 through not betraying or   
withstanding a thief4  ,on the contrary1
 ,it is written 7,rom4 #a3cb73 ,they who
 do such things are worthy of death1 and
 not only they that do them1 but also   
they that consent to them that do them4 
,therefore in like manner they that     
consent are bound to restitution4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #f71 
a person is bound to restitution not    
only on account of someone else's       
property which he has taken1 but also on
 account of the injurious taking4 ,hence

 whoever is cause of an unjust taking is
 bound to restitution4 ,this happens in 
two ways1 directly and indirectly4      
,directly1 when a man induces another to
 take1 and this in three ways4 ,first1  
on the part of the taking1 by moving a  
man to take1 either by express command1 
counsel1 or consent1 or by praising a   
man for his courage in thieving4        
,secondly1 on the part of the taker1 by 
giving him shelter or any other kind of 
assistance4 ,thirdly1 on the part of the
 thing taken1 by taking part in the     
theft or robbery1 as a fellow evil-doer4
 ,indirectly1 when a man does not       
prevent another from evil-doing         
7provided he be able and bound to       
prevent him71 either by omitting the    
command or counsel which would hinder   
him from thieving or robbing1 or by     
omitting to do what would have hindered 
him1 or by sheltering him after the     
deed4 ,all these are expressed as       
follows3  ,by command1 by counsel1 by   
consent1 by flattery1 by receiving1 by  

participation1 by silence1 by not       
preventing1 by not denouncing4  ,it must
 be observed1 however1 that in five of  
these cases the cooperator is always    
bound to restitution4 ,first1 in the    
case of command3 because he that        
commands is the chief mover1 wherefore  
he is bound to restitution principally4 
,secondly1 in the case of consent2      
namely of one without whose consent the 
robbery cannot take place4 ,thirdly1 in 
the case of receiving2 when1 to wit1 a  
man is a receiver of thieves1 and gives 
them assistance4 ,fourthly1 in the case 
of participation2 when a man takes part 
in the theft and in the booty4 ,fifthly1
 he who does not prevent the theft1     
whereas he is bound to do so2 for       
instance1 persons in authority who are  
bound to safeguard justice on earth1 are
 bound to restitution1 if by their      
neglect thieves prosper1 because their  
salary is given to them in payment of   
their preserving justice here below4    
,in the other cases mentioned above1 a  

man is not always bound to restitution3 
because counsel and flattery are not    
always the efficacious cause of robbery4
 ,hence the counsellor or flatterer is  
bound to restitution1 only when it may  
be judged with probability that the     
unjust taking resulted from such causes4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not only is he bound
 to restitution who commits the sin1 but
 also he who is in any way cause of the 
sin1 whether by counselling1 or by      
commanding1 or in any other way         
whatever4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he is bound
 chiefly to restitution1 who is the     
principal in the deed2 first of all1 the
 commander2 secondly1 the executor1 and 
in due sequence1 the others3 yet so     
that1 if one of them make restitution1  
another is not bound to make restitution
 to the same person4 ,yet those who are 
principals in the deed1 and who took    
possession of the thing1 are bound to   
compensate those who have already made  
restitution4 ,when a man commands an    
unjust taking that does not follow1 no  

restitution has to be made1 since its   
end is chiefly to restore the property  
of the person who has been unjustly     
injured4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that     
fails to denounce a thief or does not   
withstand or reprehend him is not always
 bound to restitution1 but only when he 
is obliged1 in virtue of his office1 to 
do so3 as in the case of earthly princes
 who do not incur any great danger      
thereby2 for they are invested with     
public authority1 in order that they may
 maintain justice4   ,,eighth ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #h  ,whether a
 ,man ,is ,bound to ,immediate          
,restitution1 or ,may ,he ,put ,it ,off8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a  
man is not bound to immediate           
restitution1 and can lawfully delay to  
restore4 ,for affirmative precepts do   
not bind for always4 ,now the necessity 
of making restitution is binding through
 an affirmative precept4 ,therefore a   
man is not bound to immediate           
restitution4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no man

 is bound to do what is impossible4 ,but
 it is sometimes impossible to make     
restitution at once4 ,therefore no man  
is bound to immediate restitution4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 restitution is an   
act of virtue1 viz4 of justice4 ,now    
time is one of the circumstances        
requisite for virtuous acts4 ,since then
 the other circumstances are not        
determinate for acts of virtue1 but are 
determinable according to the dictate of
 prudence1 it seems that neither in     
restitution is there any fixed time1 so 
that a man be bound to restore at once4 
,on the contrary1 ,all matters of       
restitution seem to come under one head4
 ,now a man who hires the services of a 
wage-earner1 must not delay             
compensation1 as appears from ,lev4     
#ai3ac1 ,the wages of him that hath been
 hired by thee shall not abide with thee
 until the morning4 ,therefore neither  
is it lawful1 in other cases of         
restitution1 to delay1 and restitution  
should be made at once4  ,i answer that1

 ,even as it is a sin against justice to
 take another's property1 so also is it 
to withhold it1 since1 to withhold the  
property of another against the owner's 
will1 is to deprive him of the use of   
what belongs to him1 and to do him an   
injury4 ,now it is clear that it is     
wrong to remain in sin even for a short 
time2 and one is bound to renounce one's
 sin at once1 according to ,ecclus4     
#ba3b1 ,flee from sin as from the face  
of a serpent4 ,consequently one is bound
 to immediate restitution1 if possible1 
or to ask for a respite from the person 
who is empowered to grant the use of the
 thing4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the 
precept about the making of restitution 
is affirmative in form1 it implies a    
negative precept forbidding us to       
withhold another's property4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,when one is unable to restore
 at once1 this very inability excuses   
one from immediate restitution3 even as 
a person is altogether excused from     
making restitution if he is altogether  

unable to make it4 ,he is1 however1     
bound either himself or through another 
to ask the person to whom he owes       
compensation to grant him a remission or
 a respite4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whenever 
the omission of a circumstance is       
contrary to virtue that circumstance    
must be looked upon as determinate1 and 
we are bound to observe it3 and since   
delay of restitution involves a sin of  
unjust detention which is opposed to    
just detention1 it stands to reason that
 the time is determinate in the point of
 restitution being immediate4           
,,question #fc  ,,of ,,respect ,,of     
,,persons 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider the vices opposed to  
the aforesaid parts of justice4 ,first  
we shall consider respect of persons    
which is opposed to distributive        
justice2 secondly we shall consider the 
vices opposed to commutative justice4   
,under the first head there are four    
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
respect of persons is a sin8  7#b7      

,whether it takes place in the          
dispensation of spiritualities8  7#c7   
,whether it takes place in showing      
honor8  7#d7 ,whether it takes place in 
judicial sentences8   ,,first ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,respect of ,persons ,is a ,sin8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
respect of persons is not a sin4 ,for   
the word person includes a reference to 
personal dignity 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #bi1 ,a4
 #c1 ad #b4 ,now it belongs to          
distributive justice to consider        
personal dignity4 ,therefore respect of 
persons is not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 in human affairs persons are  
of more importance than things1 since   
things are for the benefit of persons   
and not conversely4 ,but respect of     
things is not a sin4 ,much less1        
therefore1 is respect of persons4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 no injustice or sin can  
be in ,god4 ,yet ,god seems to respect  
persons1 since of two men circumstanced 
alike ,he sometimes upraises one by     

grace1 and leaves the other in sin1     
according to ,matt4 #bd3dj3 ,two shall  
be in a bed ,vulg43 'field' 99',bed' is 
the reading of ,luke #ag3cd1 one shall  
be taken1 and one shall be left4        
,therefore respect of persons is not a  
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,nothing but sin
 is forbidden in the ,divine law4 ,now  
respect of persons is forbidden1 ,deut4 
#a3ag3 ,neither shall you respect any   
man's person4 ,therefore respect of     
persons is a sin4  ,i answer that1      
,respect of persons is opposed to       
distributive justice4 ,for the equality 
of distributive justice consists in     
allotting various things to various     
persons in proportion to their personal 
dignity4 ,accordingly1 if one considers 
that personal property by reason of     
which the thing allotted to a particular
 person is due to him1 this is respect  
not of the person but of the cause4     
,hence a gloss on ,eph4 #f3i1 ,there is 
no respect of persons with ,god ,vulg43 
',him'1 says that a just judge regards  

causes1 not persons4 ,for instance if   
you promote a man to a professorship on 
account of his having sufficient        
knowledge1 you consider the due cause1  
not the person2 but if1 in conferring   
something on someone1 you consider in   
him not the fact that what you give him 
is proportionate or due to him1 but the 
fact that he is this particular man     
7e4g4 ,peter or ,martin71 then there is 
respect of the person1 since you give   
him something not for some cause that   
renders him worthy of it1 but simply    
because he is this person4 ,and any     
circumstance that does not amount to a  
reason why this man be worthy of this   
gift1 is to be referred to his person3  
for instance if a man promote someone to
 a prelacy or a professorship1 because  
he is rich or because he is a relative  
of his1 it is respect of persons4 ,it   
may happen1 however1 that a circumstance
 of person makes a man worthy as regards
 one thing1 but not as regards another3 
thus consanguinity makes a man worthy to

 be appointed heir to an estate1 but not
 to be chosen for a position of         
ecclesiastical authority3 wherefore     
consideration of the same circumstance  
of person will amount to respect of     
persons in one matter and not in        
another4 ,it follows1 accordingly1 that 
respect of persons is opposed to        
distributive justice in that it fails to
 observe due proportion4 ,now nothing   
but sin is opposed to virtue3 and       
therefore respect of persons is a sin4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in distributive       
justice we consider those circumstances 
of a person which result in dignity or  
right1 whereas in respect of persons we 
consider circumstances that do not so   
result4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,persons are  
rendered proportionate to and worthy of 
things which are distributed among them1
 by reason of certain things pertaining 
to circumstances of person1 wherefore   
such conditions ought to be considered  
as the proper cause4 ,but when we       
consider the persons themselves1 that   

which is not a cause is considered as   
though it were2 and so it is clear that 
although persons are more worthy1       
absolutely speaking1 yet they are not   
more worthy in this regard4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,there is a twofold giving4   
,one belongs to justice1 and occurs when
 we give a man his due3 in such like    
givings respect of persons takes place4 
,the other giving belongs to liberality1
 when one gives gratis that which is not
 a man's due3 such is the bestowal of   
the gifts of grace1 whereby sinners are 
chosen by ,god4 ,in such a giving there 
is no place for respect of persons1     
because anyone may1 without injustice1  
give of his own as much as he will1 and 
to whom he will1 according to ,matt4    
#bj3ad1 #ae1 ,is it not lawful for me to
 do what ,i will8 4 4 4 ,take what is   
thine1 and go thy way4   ,,second       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,respect of ,persons ,takes    
,place in the ,dispensation of          
,spiritual ,goods8  ,objection #a3 ,it  

would seem that respect of persons does 
not take place in the dispensation of   
spiritual goods4 ,for it would seem to  
savor of respect of persons if a man    
confers ecclesiastical dignity or       
benefice on account of consanguinity1   
since consanguinity is not a cause      
whereby a man is rendered worthy of an  
ecclesiastical benefice4 ,yet this      
apparently is not a sin1 for            
ecclesiastical prelates are wont to do  
so4 ,therefore the sin of respect of    
persons does not take place in the      
conferring of spiritual goods4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 to give preference to a   
rich man rather than to a poor man seems
 to pertain to respect of persons1      
according to ,james #b3b1 #c4           
,nevertheless dispensations to marry    
within forbidden degrees are more       
readily granted to the rich and powerful
 than to others4 ,therefore the sin of  
respect of persons seems not to take    
place in the dispensation of spiritual  
goods4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to

 jurists 99,cap4 ,cum dilectus4 it      
suffices to choose a good man1 and it is
 not requisite that one choose the      
better man4 ,but it would seem to savor 
of respect of persons to choose one who 
is less good for a higher position4     
,therefore respect of persons is not a  
sin in spiritual matters4  ,obj4 #d3    
,further1 according to the law of the   
,church 7,cap4 ,cum dilectus47 the      
person to be chosen should be a member  
of the flock4 ,now this would seem to   
imply respect of persons1 since         
sometimes more competent persons would  
be found elsewhere4 ,therefore respect  
of persons is not a sin in spiritual    
matters4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is      
written 7,james #b3a73 ,have not the    
faith of our ,lord ,jesus ,christ 4 4 4 
with respect of persons4 ,on these words
 a gloss of ,augustine says3 ,who is    
there that would tolerate the promotion 
of a rich man to a position of honor in 
the ,church1 to the exclusion of a poor 
man more learned and holier8            

99,augustine1 ,ep4 ad ,hieron4 clxvii4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4   
#a71 respect of persons is a sin1 in so 
far as it is contrary to justice4 ,now  
the graver the matter in which justice  
is transgressed1 the more grievous the  
sin3 so that1 spiritual things being of 
greater import than temporal1 respect of
 persons is a more grievous sin in      
dispensing spiritualities than in       
dispensing temporalities4 ,and since it 
is respect of persons when something is 
allotted to a person out of proportion  
to his deserts1 it must be observed that
 a person's worthiness may be considered
 in two ways4 ,first1 simply and        
absolutely3 and in this way the man who 
abounds the more in the spiritual gifts 
of grace is the more worthy4 ,secondly1 
in relation to the common good2 for it  
happens at times that the less holy and 
less learned man may conduce more to the
 common good1 on account of worldly     
authority or activity1 or something of  
the kind4 ,and since the dispensation of

 spiritualities is directed chiefly to  
the common good1 according to #a ,cor4  
#ab3g1 ,the manifestation of the ,spirit
 is given to every man unto profit1 it  
follows that in the dispensation of     
spiritualities the simply less good are 
sometimes preferred to the better1      
without respect of persons1 just as ,god
 sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on 
the less worthy4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we  
must make a distinction with regard to a
 prelate's kinsfolk3 for sometimes they 
are less worthy1 both absolutely        
speaking1 and in relation to the common 
good3 and then if they are preferred to 
the more worthy1 there is a sin of      
respect of persons in the dispensation  
of spiritual goods1 whereof the         
ecclesiastical superior is not the      
owner1 with power to give them away as  
he will1 but the dispenser1 according to
 #a ,cor4 #d3a1 ,let a man so account of
 us as of the ministers of ,christ1 and 
the dispensers of the mysteries of ,god4
 ,sometimes however the prelate's       

kinsfolk are as worthy as others1 and   
then without respect of persons he can  
lawfully give preference to his kindred 
since there is at least this advantage1 
that he can trust the more in their     
being of one mind with him in conducting
 the business of the ,church4 ,yet he   
would have to forego so doing for fear  
of scandal1 if anyone might take an     
example from him and give the goods of  
the ,church to their kindred without    
regard to their deserts4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,dispensations for contracting      
marriage came into use for the purpose  
of strengthening treaties of peace3 and 
this is more necessary for the common   
good in relation to persons of standing1
 so that there is no respect of persons 
in granting dispensations more readily  
to such persons4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in  
order that an election be not rebutted  
in a court of law1 it suffices to elect 
a good man1 nor is it necessary to elect
 the better man1 because otherwise every
 election might have a flaw4 ,but as    

regards the conscience of an elector1 it
 is necessary to elect one who is       
better1 either absolutely speaking1 or  
in relation to the common good4 ,for if 
it is possible to have one who is more  
competent for a post1 and yet another be
 preferred1 it is necessary to have some
 cause for this4 ,if this cause have    
anything to do with the matter in point1
 he who is elected will1 in this        
respect1 be more competent2 and if that 
which is taken for cause have nothing to
 do with the matter1 it will clearly be 
respect of persons4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3   
,the man who is taken from among the    
members of a particular ,church1 is     
generally speaking more useful as       
regards the common good1 since he loves 
more the ,church wherein he was brought 
up4 ,for this reason it was commanded   
7,deut4 #ag3ae73 ,thou mayest not make a
 man of another nation king1 who is not 
thy brother4   ,,third ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,respect of ,persons ,takes ,place in   

,showing ,honor and ,respect8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
respect of persons does not take place  
in showing honor and respect4 ,for honor
 is apparently nothing else than        
reverence shown to a person in          
recognition of his virtue1 as the       
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 i1 #e74    
,now prelates and princes should be     
honored although they be wicked1 even as
 our parents1 of whom it is written     
7,ex4 #bj3ab73 ,honor thy father and thy
 mother4 ,again masters1 though they be 
wicked1 should be honored by their      
servants1 according to #a ,tim4 #f3a3   
,whoever are servants under the yoke1   
let them count their masters worthy of  
all honor4 ,therefore it seems that it  
is not a sin to respect persons in      
showing honor4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it  
is commanded 7,lev4 #ai3cb73 ,rise up   
before the hoary head1 and1 honor the   
person of the aged man4 ,but this seems 
to savor of respect of persons1 since   
sometimes old men are not virtuous2     

according to ,dan4 #ac3e3 ,iniquity came
 out from the ancients of the people    
99,vulg43 ',iniquity came out of        
,babylon from the ancient judges1 that  
seemed to govern the people4'4          
,therefore it is not a sin to respect   
persons in showing honor4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 on the words of ,james #b3a1  
,have not the faith 4 4 4 with respect  
of persons1 a gloss of ,augustine 99,ep4
 ad ,hieron4 clxvii4 says3 ,if the      
saying of ,james1 ',if there shall come 
into your assembly a man having a golden
 ring1' etc41 refer to our daily        
meetings1 who sins not here1 if however 
he sin at all8 ,yet it is respect of    
persons to honor the rich for their     
riches1 for ,gregory says in a homily   
7xxviii in ,evang473 ,our pride is      
blunted1 since in men we honor1 not the 
nature wherein they are made to ,god's  
image1 but wealth1 so that1 wealth not  
being a due cause of honor1 this will   
savor of respect of persons4 ,therefore 
it is not a sin to respect persons in   

showing honor4  ,on the contrary1 ,a    
gloss on ,james #b3a1 says3 ,whoever    
honors the rich for their riches1 sins1 
and in like manner1 if a man be honored 
for other causes that do not render him 
worthy of honor4 ,now this savors of    
respect of persons4 ,therefore it is a  
sin to respect persons in showing honor4
  ,i answer that1 ,to honor a person is 
to recognize him as having virtue1      
wherefore virtue alone is the due cause 
of a person being honored4 ,now it is to
 be observed that a person may be       
honored not only for his own virtue1 but
 also for another's3 thus princes and   
prelates1 although they be wicked1 are  
honored as standing in ,god's place1 and
 as representing the community over     
which they are placed1 according to     
,prov4 #bf3h1 ,as he that casteth a     
stone into the heap of ,mercury1 so is  
he that giveth honor to a fool4 ,for1   
since the gentiles ascribed the keeping 
of accounts to ,mercury1 the heap of    
,mercury signifies the casting up of an 

account1 when a merchant sometimes      
substitutes a pebble 99,lapillus or     
calculus whence the ,english word       
'calculate' for one hundred marks4 ,so  
too1 is a fool honored if he stand in   
,god's place or represent the whole     
community3 and in the same way parents  
and masters should be honored1 on       
account of their having a share of the  
dignity of ,god ,who is the ,father and 
,lord of all4 ,the aged should be       
honored1 because old age is a sign of   
virtue1 though this sign fail at times3 
wherefore1 according to ,wis4 #d3h1 #i1 
venerable old age is not that of long   
time1 nor counted by the number of      
years2 but the understanding of a man is
 gray hairs1 and a spotless life is old 
age4 ,the rich ought to be honored by   
reason of their occupying a higher      
position in the community3 but if they  
be honored merely for their wealth1 it  
will be the sin of respect of persons4  
,hence the ,replies to the ,objections  
are clear4   ,,fourth ,,article         

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
the ,sin of ,respect of ,persons ,takes 
,place in ,judicial ,sentences8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
sin of respect of persons does not take 
place in judicial sentences4 ,for       
respect of persons is opposed to        
distributive justice1 as stated above   
7,a4 #a73 whereas judicial sentences    
seem to pertain chiefly to commutative  
justice4 ,therefore respect of persons  
does not take place in judicial         
sentences4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1         
penalties are inflicted according to a  
sentence4 ,now it is not a sin to       
respect persons in pronouncing          
penalties1 since a heavier punishment is
 inflicted on one who injures the person
 of a prince than on one who injures the
 person of others4 ,therefore respect of
 persons does not take place in judicial
 sentences4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is  
written 7,ecclus4 #d3aj73 ,in judging be
 merciful to the fatherless4 ,but this  
seems to imply respect of the person of 

the needy4 ,therefore in judicial       
sentences respect of persons is not a   
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written  
7,prov4 #ah3e73 ,it is not good to      
accept the person in judgment 99,vulg43 
',it is not good to accept the person of
 the wicked1 to decline from the truth  
of judgment4'4  ,i answer that1 ,as     
stated above 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #a71 judgment
 is an act of justice1 in as much as the
 judge restores to the equality of      
justice1 those things which may cause an
 opposite inequality4 ,now respect of   
persons involves a certain inequality1  
in so far as something is allotted to a 
person out of that proportion to him in 
which the equality of justice consists4 
,wherefore it is evident that judgment  
is rendered corrupt by respect of       
persons4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a judgment  
may be looked at in two ways4 ,first1 in
 view of the thing judged1 and in this  
way judgment is common to commutative   
and distributive justice3 because it may
 be decided by judgment how some common 

good is to be distributed among many1   
and how one person is to restore to     
another what he has taken from him4     
,secondly1 it may be considered in view 
of the form of judgment1 in as much as1 
even in commutative justice1 the judge  
takes from one and gives to another1 and
 this belongs to distributive justice4  
,in this way respect of persons may take
 place in any judgment4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,when a person is more severely     
punished on account of a crime committed
 against a greater person1 there is no  
respect of persons1 because the very    
difference of persons causes1 in that   
case1 a diversity of things1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #aj1 ad #c2 ,q4 #fa1
 ,a4 #b1 ad #c74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in  
pronouncing judgment one ought to succor
 the needy as far as possible1 yet      
without prejudice to justice3 else the  
saying of ,ex4 #bc3c would apply3       
,neither shalt thou favor a poor man in 
judgment4   ,,question #fd  ,,of        
,,murder 7,in ,eight ,articles7  ,in due

 sequence we must consider the vices    
opposed to commutative justice4 ,we must
 consider 7#a7 those sins that are      
committed in relation to involuntary    
commutations2 7#b7 those that are       
committed with regard to voluntary      
commutations4 ,sins are committed in    
relation to involuntary commutations by 
doing an injury to one's neighbor       
against his will3 and this can be done  
in two ways1 namely by deed or by word4 
,by deed when one's neighbor is injured 
either in his own person1 or in a person
 connected with him1 or in his          
possessions4  ,we must therefore        
consider these points in due order1 and 
in the first place we shall consider    
murder whereby a man inflicts the       
greatest injury on his neighbor4 ,under 
this head there are eight points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether it is a sin to  
kill dumb animals or even plants8  7#b7 
,whether it is lawful to kill a sinner8 
7#c7 ,whether this is lawful to a       
private individual1 or to a public      

person only8  7#d7 ,whether this is     
lawful to a cleric8  7#e7 ,whether it is
 lawful to kill oneself8  7#f7 ,whether 
it is lawful to kill a just man8  7#g7  
,whether it is lawful to kill a man in  
self-defense8  7#h7 ,whether accidental 
homicide is a mortal sin8   ,,first     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,it ,is ,unlawful to ,kill ,any
 ,living ,thing8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem unlawful to kill any living  
thing4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4    
#ac3b73 ,they that resist the ordinance 
of ,god purchase to themselves damnation
 99,vulg43 ',he that resisteth the      
power1 resisteth the ordinance of ,god3 
and they that resist1 purchase          
themselves damnation4'4 ,now ,divine    
providence has ordained that all living 
things should be preserved1 according to
 ,ps4 #adf3h1 #i1 ,who maketh grass to  
grow on the mountains 4 4 4 ,who giveth 
to beasts their food4 ,therefore it     
seems unlawful to take the life of any  
living thing4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      

murder is a sin because it deprives a   
man of life4 ,now life is common to all 
animals and plants4 ,hence for the same 
reason it is apparently a sin to slay   
dumb animals and plants4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 in the ,divine law a special  
punishment is not appointed save for a  
sin4 ,now a special punishment had to be
 inflicted1 according to the ,divine    
law1 on one who killed another man's ox 
or sheep 7,ex4 #bb3a74 ,therefore the   
slaying of dumb animals is a sin4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4
 ,dei i1 #bj73 ,when we hear it said1   
',thou shalt not kill1' we do not take  
it as referring to trees1 for they have 
no sense1 nor to irrational animals1    
because they have no fellowship with us4
 ,hence it follows that the words1      
',thou shalt not kill' refer to the     
killing of a man4  ,i answer that1      
,there is no sin in using a thing for   
the purpose for which it is4 ,now the   
order of things is such that the        
imperfect are for the perfect1 even as  

in the process of generation nature     
proceeds from imperfection to           
perfection4 ,hence it is that just as in
 the generation of a man there is first 
a living thing1 then an animal1 and     
lastly a man1 so too things1 like the   
plants1 which merely have life1 are all 
alike for animals1 and all animals are  
for man4 ,wherefore it is not unlawful  
if man use plants for the good of       
animals1 and animals for the good of    
man1 as the ,philosopher states 7,polit4
 i1 #c74  ,now the most necessary use   
would seem to consist in the fact that  
animals use plants1 and men use animals1
 for food1 and this cannot be done      
unless these be deprived of life3       
wherefore it is lawful both to take life
 from plants for the use of animals1 and
 from animals for the use of men4 ,in   
fact this is in keeping with the        
commandment of ,god ,himself3 for it is 
written 7,gen4 #a3bi1 #cj73 ,behold ,i  
have given you every herb 4 4 4 and all 
trees 4 4 4 to be your meat1 and to all 

beasts of the earth3 and again 7,gen4   
#i3c73 ,everything that moveth and      
liveth shall be meat to you4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,according to the ,divine     
ordinance the life of animals and plants
 is preserved not for themselves but for
 man4 ,hence1 as ,augustine says 7,de   
,civ4 ,dei i1 #bj71 by a most just      
ordinance of the ,creator1 both their   
life and their death are subject to our 
use4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,dumb animals and
 plants are devoid of the life of reason
 whereby to set themselves in motion2   
they are moved1 as it were by another1  
by a kind of natural impulse1 a sign of 
which is that they are naturally        
enslaved and accommodated to the uses of
 others4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that     
kills another's ox1 sins1 not through   
killing the ox1 but through injuring    
another man in his property4 ,wherefore 
this is not a species of the sin of     
murder but of the sin of theft or       
robbery4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,it ,is    

,lawful to ,kill ,sinners8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem unlawful to kill men 
who have sinned4 ,for our ,lord in the  
parable 7,matt4 #ac7 forbade the        
uprooting of the cockle which denotes   
wicked men according to a gloss4 ,now   
whatever is forbidden by ,god is a sin4 
,therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 human justice is  
conformed to ,divine justice4 ,now      
according to ,divine justice sinners are
 kept back for repentance1 according to 
,ezech4 #cc3aa1 ,i desire not the death 
of the wicked1 but that the wicked turn 
from his way and live4 ,therefore it    
seems altogether unjust to kill sinners4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is not lawful1 
for any good end whatever1 to do that   
which is evil in itself1 according to   
,augustine 7,contra ,mendac4 vii7 and   
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,now 
to kill a man is evil in itself1 since  
we are bound to have charity towards all
 men1 and we wish our friends to live   
and to exist1 according to ,ethic4 ix1  

#d4 ,therefore it is nowise lawful to   
kill a man who has sinned4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,it is written 7,ex4 #bb3ah73 
,wizards thou shalt not suffer to live2 
and 7,ps4 #ajj3h73 ,in the morning ,i   
put to death all the wicked of the land4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 
#a71 it is lawful to kill dumb animals1 
in so far as they are naturally directed
 to man's use1 as the imperfect is      
directed to the perfect4 ,now every part
 is directed to the whole1 as imperfect 
to perfect1 wherefore every part is     
naturally for the sake of the whole4    
,for this reason we observe that if the 
health of the whole body demands the    
excision of a member1 through its being 
decayed or infectious to the other      
members1 it will be both praiseworthy   
and advantageous to have it cut away4   
,now every individual person is compared
 to the whole community1 as part to     
whole4 ,therefore if a man be dangerous 
and infectious to the community1 on     
account of some sin1 it is praiseworthy 

and advantageous that he be killed in   
order to safeguard the common good1     
since a little leaven corrupteth the    
whole lump 7#a ,cor4 #e3f74  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,our ,lord commanded them to  
forbear from uprooting the cockle in    
order to spare the wheat1 i4e4 the good4
 ,this occurs when the wicked cannot be 
slain without the good being killed with
 them1 either because the wicked lie    
hidden among the good1 or because they  
have many followers1 so that they cannot
 be killed without danger to the good1  
as ,augustine says 7,contra ,parmen4    
iii1 #b74 ,wherefore our ,lord teaches  
that we should rather allow the wicked  
to live1 and that vengeance is to be    
delayed until the last judgment1 rather 
than that the good be put to death      
together with the wicked4 ,when1        
however1 the good incur no danger1 but  
rather are protected and saved by the   
slaying of the wicked1 then the latter  
may be lawfully put to death4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,according to the order of    

,his wisdom1 ,god sometimes slays       
sinners forthwith in order to deliver   
the good1 whereas sometimes ,he allows  
them time to repent1 according as ,he   
knows what is expedient for ,his elect4 
,this also does human justice imitate   
according to its powers2 for it puts to 
death those who are dangerous to others1
 while it allows time for repentance to 
those who sin without grievously harming
 others4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,by sinning  
man departs from the order of reason1   
and consequently falls away from the    
dignity of his manhood1 in so far as he 
is naturally free1 and exists for       
himself1 and he falls into the slavish  
state of the beasts1 by being disposed  
of according as he is useful to others4 
,this is expressed in ,ps4 #dh3ba3 ,man1
 when he was in honor1 did not          
understand2 he hath been compared to    
senseless beasts1 and made like to them1
 and ,prov4 #aa3bi3 ,the fool shall     
serve the wise4 ,hence1 although it be  
evil in itself to kill a man so long as 

he preserve his dignity1 yet it may be  
good to kill a man who has sinned1 even 
as it is to kill a beast4 ,for a bad man
 is worse than a beast1 and is more     
harmful1 as the ,philosopher states     
7,polit4 i1 #a and ,ethic4 vii1 #f74    
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful for a
 ,private ,individual to ,kill a ,man   
,who ,has ,sinned8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem lawful for a private         
individual to kill a man who has sinned4
 ,for nothing unlawful is commanded in  
the ,divine law4 ,yet1 on account of the
 sin of the molten calf1 ,moses         
commanded 7,ex4 #cb3bg73 ,let every man 
kill his brother1 and friend1 and       
neighbor4 ,therefore it is lawful for   
private individuals to kill a sinner4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated above 7,a4
 #b1 ad #c71 man1 on account of sin1 is 
compared to the beasts4 ,now it is      
lawful for any private individual to    
kill a wild beast1 especially if it be  
harmful4 ,therefore for the same reason1

 it is lawful for any private individual
 to kill a man who has sinned4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 a man1 though a private   
individual1 deserves praise for doing   
what is useful for the common good4 ,now
 the slaying of evildoers is useful for 
the common good1 as stated above 7,a4   
#b74 ,therefore it is deserving of      
praise if even private individuals kill 
evil-doers4  ,on the contrary1          
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i7      
99,can4 ,quicumque percutit1 caus4      
xxiii1 qu4 #h3 ,a man who1 without      
exercising public authority1 kills an   
evil-doer1 shall be judged guilty of    
murder1 and all the more1 since he has  
dared to usurp a power which ,god has   
not given him4  ,i answer that1 ,as     
stated above 7,a4 #b71 it is lawful to  
kill an evildoer in so far as it is     
directed to the welfare of the whole    
community1 so that it belongs to him    
alone who has charge of the community's 
welfare4 ,thus it belongs to a physician
 to cut off a decayed limb1 when he has 

been entrusted with the care of the     
health of the whole body4 ,now the care 
of the common good is entrusted to      
persons of rank having public authority3
 wherefore they alone1 and not private  
individuals1 can lawfully put evildoers 
to death4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the person 
by whose authority a thing is done      
really does the thing as ,dionysius     
declares 7,coel4 ,hier4 iii74 ,hence    
according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei 
i1 #ba71 ,he slays not who owes his     
service to one who commands him1 even as
 a sword is merely the instrument to him
 that wields it4 ,wherefore those who1  
at the ,lord's command1 slew their      
neighbors and friends1 would seem not to
 have done this themselves1 but rather  
,he by whose authority they acted thus3 
just as a soldier slays the foe by the  
authority of his sovereign1 and the     
executioner slays the robber by the     
authority of the judge4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,a beast is by nature distinct from 
man1 wherefore in the case of a wild    

beast there is no need for an authority 
to kill it2 whereas1 in the case of     
domestic animals1 such authority is     
required1 not for their sake1 but on    
account of the owner's loss4 ,on the    
other hand a man who has sinned is not  
by nature distinct from good men2 hence 
a public authority is requisite in order
 to condemn him to death for the common 
good4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is lawful   
for any private individual to do        
anything for the common good1 provided  
it harm nobody3 but if it be harmful to 
some other1 it cannot be done1 except by
 virtue of the judgment of the person to
 whom it pertains to decide what is to  
be taken from the parts for the welfare 
of the whole4   ,,fourth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful for ,clerics to ,kill   
,evil-doers8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem lawful for clerics to kill         
evil-doers4 ,for clerics especially     
should fulfil the precept of the        
,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #d3af73 ,be ye       

followers of me as ,i also am of        
,christ1 whereby we are called upon to  
imitate ,god and ,his saints4 ,now the  
very ,god whom we worship puts evildoers
 to death1 according to ,ps4 #ace3aj1   
,who smote ,egypt with their firstborn4 
,again ,moses made the ,levites slay    
twenty-three thousand men on account of 
the worship of the calf 7,ex4 #cb71 the 
priest ,phinees slew the ,israelite who 
went in to the woman of ,madian 7,num4  
#be71 ,samuel killed ,agag king of      
,amalec 7#a ,kings #ae71 ,elias slew the
 priests of ,baal 7#c ,kings #ah71      
,mathathias killed the man who went up  
to the altar to sacrifice 7#a ,mac4 #b72
 and1 in the ,new ,testament1 ,peter    
killed ,ananias and ,saphira 7,acts #e74
 ,therefore it seems that even clerics  
may kill evil-doers4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 spiritual power is greater    
than the secular and is more united to  
,god4 ,now the secular power as ,god's  
minister lawfully puts evil-doers to    
death1 according to ,rom4 #ac3d4 ,much  

more therefore may clerics1 who are     
,god's ministers and have spiritual     
power1 put evil-doers to death4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 whosoever lawfully accepts
 an office1 may lawfully exercise the   
functions of that office4 ,now it       
belongs to the princely office to slay  
evildoers1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74    
,therefore those clerics who are earthly
 princes may lawfully slay malefactors4 
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a    
,tim4 #c3b1 #c73 ,it behooveth 4 4 4 a  
bishop to be without crime 99,vulg43    
'blameless4' ',without crime' is the    
reading in ,tit4 #a3g 4 4 4 not given to
 wine1 no striker4  ,i answer that1 ,it 
is unlawful for clerics to kill1 for two
 reasons4 ,first1 because they are      
chosen for the ministry of the altar1   
whereon is represented the ,passion of  
,christ slain ,who1 when ,he was struck 
did not strike ,vulg43 ',when ,he       
suffered1 ,he threatened not' 7#a ,pet4 
#b3bc74 ,therefore it becomes not       
clerics to strike or kill3 for ministers

 should imitate their master1 according 
to ,ecclus4 #aj3b1 ,as the judge of the 
people is himself1 so also are his      
ministers4 ,the other reason is because 
clerics are entrusted with the ministry 
of the ,new ,law1 wherein no punishment 
of death or of bodily maiming is        
appointed3 wherefore they should abstain
 from such things in order that they may
 be fitting ministers of the ,new       
,testament4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god works
 in all things without exception        
whatever is right1 yet in each one      
according to its mode4 ,wherefore       
everyone should imitate ,god in that    
which is specially becoming to him4     
,hence1 though ,god slays evildoers even
 corporally1 it does not follow that all
 should imitate ,him in this4 ,as       
regards ,peter1 he did not put ,ananias 
and ,saphira to death by his own        
authority or with his own hand1 but     
published their death sentence          
pronounced by ,god4 ,the ,priests or    
,levites of the ,old ,testament were the

 ministers of the ,old ,law1 which      
appointed corporal penalties1 so that it
 was fitting for them to slay with their
 own hands4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the      
ministry of clerics is concerned with   
better things than corporal slayings1   
namely with things pertaining to        
spiritual welfare1 and so it is not     
fitting for them to meddle with minor   
matters4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3              
,ecclesiastical prelates accept the     
office of earthly princes1 not that they
 may inflict capital punishment         
themselves1 but that this may be carried
 into effect by others in virtue of     
their authority4   ,,fifth ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #e  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful to ,kill ,oneself8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem lawful for
 a man to kill himself4 ,for murder is a
 sin in so far as it is contrary to     
justice4 ,but no man can do an injustice
 to himself1 as is proved in ,ethic4 v1 
#aa4 ,therefore no man sins by killing  
himself4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is     

lawful1 for one who exercises public    
authority1 to kill evil-doers4 ,now he  
who exercises public authority is       
sometimes an evil-doer4 ,therefore he   
may lawfully kill himself4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 it is lawful for a man to     
suffer spontaneously a lesser danger    
that he may avoid a greater3 thus it is 
lawful for a man to cut off a decayed   
limb even from himself1 that he may save
 his whole body4 ,now sometimes a man1  
by killing himself1 avoids a greater    
evil1 for example an unhappy life1 or   
the shame of sin4 ,therefore a man may  
kill himself4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1      
,samson killed himself1 as related in   
,judges #af1 and yet he is numbered     
among the saints 7,heb4 #aa74 ,therefore
 it is lawful for a man to kill himself4
  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 it is related 7#b 
,mac4 #ad3db7 that a certain ,razias    
killed himself1 choosing to die nobly   
rather than to fall into the hands of   
the wicked1 and to suffer abuses        
unbecoming his noble birth4 ,now nothing

 that is done nobly and bravely is      
unlawful4 ,therefore suicide is not     
unlawful4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i1 #bj73 ,hence it 
follows that the words ',thou shalt not 
kill' refer to the killing of a man--not
 another man2 therefore1 not even       
thyself4 ,for he who kills himself1     
kills nothing else than a man4  ,i      
answer that1 ,it is altogether unlawful 
to kill oneself1 for three reasons4     
,first1 because everything naturally    
loves itself1 the result being that     
everything naturally keeps itself in    
being1 and resists corruptions so far as
 it can4 ,wherefore suicide is contrary 
to the inclination of nature1 and to    
charity whereby every man should love   
himself4 ,hence suicide is always a     
mortal sin1 as being contrary to the    
natural law and to charity4 ,secondly1  
because every part1 as such1 belongs to 
the whole4 ,now every man is part of the
 community1 and so1 as such1 he belongs 
to the community4 ,hence by killing     

himself he injures the community1 as the
 ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 v1 #aa74
 ,thirdly1 because life is ,god's gift  
to man1 and is subject to ,his power1   
,who kills and makes to live4 ,hence    
whoever takes his own life1 sins against
 ,god1 even as he who kills another's   
slave1 sins against that slave's master1
 and as he who usurps to himself        
judgment of a matter not entrusted to   
him4 ,for it belongs to ,god alone to   
pronounce sentence of death and life1   
according to ,deut4 #cb3ci1 ,i will kill
 and ,i will make to live4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,murder is a sin1 not only because 
it is contrary to justice1 but also     
because it is opposed to charity which a
 man should have towards himself3 in    
this respect suicide is a sin in        
relation to oneself4 ,in relation to the
 community and to ,god1 it is sinful1 by
 reason also of its opposition to       
justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one who     
exercises public authority may lawfully 
put to death an evil-doer1 since he can 

pass judgment on him4 ,but no man is    
judge of himself4 ,wherefore it is not  
lawful for one who exercises public     
authority to put himself to death for   
any sin whatever3 although he may       
lawfully commit himself to the judgment 
of others4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man is    
made master of himself through his      
free-will3 wherefore he can lawfully    
dispose of himself as to those matters  
which pertain to this life which is     
ruled by man's free-will4 ,but the      
passage from this life to another and   
happier one is subject not to man's     
free-will but to the power of ,god4     
,hence it is not lawful for man to take 
his own life that he may pass to a      
happier life1 nor that he may escape any
 unhappiness whatsoever of the present  
life1 because the ultimate and most     
fearsome evil of this life is death1 as 
the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 iii1   
#f74 ,therefore to bring death upon     
oneself in order to escape the other    
afflictions of this life1 is to adopt a 

greater evil in order to avoid a lesser4
 ,in like manner it is unlawful to take 
one's own life on account of one's      
having committed a sin1 both because by 
so doing one does oneself a very great  
injury1 by depriving oneself of the time
 needful for repentance1 and because it 
is not lawful to slay an evildoer except
 by the sentence of the public          
authority4 ,again it is unlawful for a  
woman to kill herself lest she be       
violated1 because she ought not to      
commit on herself the very great sin of 
suicide1 to avoid the lesser sin of     
another4 ,for she commits no sin in     
being violated by force1 provided she   
does not consent1 since without consent 
of the mind there is no stain on the    
body1 as the ,blessed ,lucy declared4   
,now it is evident that fornication and 
adultery are less grievous sins than    
taking a man's1 especially one's own1   
life3 since the latter is most grievous1
 because one injures oneself1 to whom   
one owes the greatest love4 ,moreover it

 is most dangerous since no time is left
 wherein to expiate it by repentance4   
,again it is not lawful for anyone to   
take his own life for fear he should    
consent to sin1 because evil must not be
 done that good may come 7,rom4 #c3h7 or
 that evil may be avoided especially if 
the evil be of small account and an     
uncertain event1 for it is uncertain    
whether one will at some future time    
consent to a sin1 since ,god is able to 
deliver man from sin under any          
temptation whatever4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3  
,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i1  
#ba71 not even ,samson is to be excused 
that he crushed himself together with   
his enemies under the ruins of the      
house1 except the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who had
 wrought many wonders through him1 had  
secretly commanded him to do this4 ,he  
assigns the same reason in the case of  
certain holy women1 who at the time of  
persecution took their own lives1 and   
who are commemorated by the ,church4    
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,it belongs to         

fortitude that a man does not shrink    
from being slain by another1 for the    
sake of the good of virtue1 and that he 
may avoid sin4 ,but that a man take his 
own life in order to avoid penal evils  
has indeed an appearance of fortitude   
7for which reason some1 among whom was  
,razias1 have killed themselves thinking
 to act from fortitude71 yet it is not  
true fortitude1 but rather a weakness of
 soul unable to bear penal evils1 as the
 ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #g7 and     
,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei #bb1 #bc7    
declare4   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,it ,is     
,lawful to ,kill the ,innocent8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in   
some cases it is lawful to kill the     
innocent4 ,the fear of ,god is never    
manifested by sin1 since on the contrary
 the fear of the ,lord driveth out sin  
7,ecclus4 #a3bg74 ,now ,abraham was     
commended in that he feared the ,lord1  
since he was willing to slay his        
innocent son4 ,therefore one may1       

without sin1 kill an innocent person4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 among those sins    
that are committed against one's        
neighbor1 the more grievous seem to be  
those whereby a more grievous injury is 
inflicted on the person sinned against4 
,now to be killed is a greater injury to
 a sinful than to an innocent person1   
because the latter1 by death1 passes    
forthwith from the unhappiness of this  
life to the glory of heaven4 ,since then
 it is lawful in certain cases to kill a
 sinful man1 much more is it lawful to  
slay an innocent or a righteous person4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is done in     
keeping with the order of justice is not
 a sin4 ,but sometimes a man is forced1 
according to the order of justice1 to   
slay an innocent person3 for instance1  
when a judge1 who is bound to judge     
according to the evidence1 condemns to  
death a man whom he knows to be innocent
 but who is convicted by false          
witnesses2 and again the executioner1   
who in obedience to the judge puts to   

death the man who has been unjustly     
sentenced4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
written 7,ex4 #bc3g73 ,the innocent and 
just person thou shalt not put to death4
  ,i answer that1 ,an individual man may
 be considered in two ways3 first1 in   
himself2 secondly1 in relation to       
something else4 ,if we consider a man in
 himself1 it is unlawful to kill any    
man1 since in every man though he be    
sinful1 we ought to love the nature     
which ,god has made1 and which is       
destroyed by slaying him4 ,nevertheless1
 as stated above 7,a4 #b7 the slaying of
 a sinner becomes lawful in relation to 
the common good1 which is corrupted by  
sin4 ,on the other hand the life of     
righteous men preserves and forwards the
 common good1 since they are the chief  
part of the community4 ,therefore it is 
in no way lawful to slay the innocent4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god is ,lord of death 
and life1 for by ,his decree both the   
sinful and the righteous die4 ,hence he 
who at ,god's command kills an innocent 

man does not sin1 as neither does ,god  
,whose behest he executes3 indeed his   
obedience to ,god's commands is a proof 
that he fears ,him4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,in weighing the gravity of a sin we    
must consider the essential rather than 
the accidental4 ,wherefore he who kills 
a just man1 sins more grievously than he
 who slays a sinful man3 first1 because 
he injures one whom he should love more1
 and so acts more in opposition to      
charity3 secondly1 because he inflicts  
an injury on a man who is less deserving
 of one1 and so acts more in opposition 
to justice3 thirdly1 because he deprives
 the community of a greater good3       
fourthly1 because he despises ,god more1
 according to ,luke #aj3af1 ,he that    
despiseth you despiseth ,me4 ,on the    
other hand it is accidental to the      
slaying that the just man whose life is 
taken be received by ,god into glory4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if the judge knows    
that a man who has been convicted by    
false witnesses1 is innocent he must1   

like ,daniel1 examine the witnesses with
 great care1 so as to find a motive for 
acquitting the innocent3 but if he      
cannot do this he should remit him for  
judgment by a higher tribunal4 ,if even 
this is impossible1 he does not sin if  
he pronounce sentence in accordance with
 the evidence1 for it is not he that    
puts the innocent man to death1 but they
 who stated him to be guilty4 ,he that  
carries out the sentence of the judge   
who has condemned an innocent man1 if   
the sentence contains an inexcusable    
error1 he should not obey1 else there   
would be an excuse for the executions of
 the martyrs3 if however it contain no  
manifest injustice1 he does not sin by  
carrying out the sentence1 because he   
has no right to discuss the judgment of 
his superior2 nor is it he who slays the
 innocent man1 but the judge whose      
minister he is4   ,,seventh ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful to ,kill a ,man in      
,self-defense8  ,objection #a3 ,it would

 seem that nobody may lawfully kill a   
man in self-defense4 ,for ,augustine    
says to ,publicola 7,ep4 xlvii73 ,i do  
not agree with the opinion that one may 
kill a man lest one be killed by him2   
unless one be a soldier1 exercise a     
public office1 so that one does it not  
for oneself but for others1 having the  
power to do so1 provided it be in       
keeping with one's person4 ,now he who  
kills a man in self-defense1 kills him  
lest he be killed by him4 ,therefore    
this would seem to be unlawful4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 he says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4  
i1 #e73 ,how are they free from sin in  
sight of ,divine providence1 who are    
guilty of taking a man's life for the   
sake of these contemptible things8 ,now 
among contemptible things he reckons    
those which men may forfeit unwillingly1
 as appears from the context 7,de ,lib4 
,arb4 i1 #e73 and the chief of these is 
the life of the body4 ,therefore it is  
unlawful for any man to take another's  
life for the sake of the life of his own

 body4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,pope       
,nicolas 99,nicolas ,i1 ,dist4 #a1 can4 
,de his clericis says in the ,decretals3
 ,concerning the clerics about whom you 
have consulted ,us1 those1 namely1 who  
have killed a pagan in self-defense1 as 
to whether1 after making amends by      
repenting1 they may return to their     
former state1 or rise to a higher       
degree2 know that in no case is it      
lawful for them to kill any man under   
any circumstances whatever4 ,now clerics
 and laymen are alike bound to observe  
the moral precepts4 ,therefore neither  
is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone  
in self-defense4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1   
murder is a more grievous sin than      
fornication or adultery4 ,now nobody may
 lawfully commit simple fornication or  
adultery or any other mortal sin in     
order to save his own life2 since the   
spiritual life is to be preferred to the
 life of the body4 ,therefore no man may
 lawfully take another's life in        
self-defense in order to save his own   

life4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if the tree  
be evil1 so is the fruit1 according to  
,matt4 #g3ag4 ,now self-defense itself  
seems to be unlawful1 according to ,rom4
 #ab3ai3 ,not defending ,douay3         
'revenging' yourselves1 my dearly       
beloved4 ,therefore its result1 which is
 the slaying of a man1 is also unlawful4
  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ex4
 #bb3b73 ,if a thief be found breaking  
into a house or undermining it1 and be  
wounded so as to die2 he that slew him  
shall not be guilty of blood4 ,now it is
 much more lawful to defend one's life  
than one's house4 ,therefore neither is 
a man guilty of murder if he kill       
another in defense of his own life4  ,i 
answer that1 ,nothing hinders one act   
from having two effects1 only one of    
which is intended1 while the other is   
beside the intention4 ,now moral acts   
take their species according to what is 
intended1 and not according to what is  
beside the intention1 since this is     
accidental as explained above 7,q4 #dc1 

,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #a74      
,accordingly the act of self-defense may
 have two effects1 one is the saving of 
one's life1 the other is the slaying of 
the aggressor4 ,therefore this act1     
since one's intention is to save one's  
own life1 is not unlawful1 seeing that  
it is natural to everything to keep     
itself in being1 as far as possible4    
,and yet1 though proceeding from a good 
intention1 an act may be rendered       
unlawful1 if it be out of proportion to 
the end4 ,wherefore if a man1 in        
self-defense1 uses more than necessary  
violence1 it will be unlawful3 whereas  
if he repel force with moderation his   
defense will be lawful1 because         
according to the jurists 99,cap4        
,significasti1 ,de ,homicid4 volunt4 vel
 casual41 it is lawful to repel force by
 force1 provided one does not exceed the
 limits of a blameless defense4 ,nor is 
it necessary for salvation that a man   
omit the act of moderate self-defense in
 order to avoid killing the other man1  

since one is bound to take more care of 
one's own life than of another's4 ,but  
as it is unlawful to take a man's life1 
except for the public authority acting  
for the common good1 as stated above    
7,a4 #c71 it is not lawful for a man to 
intend killing a man in self-defense1   
except for such as have public          
authority1 who while intending to kill a
 man in self-defense1 refer this to the 
public good1 as in the case of a soldier
 fighting against the foe1 and in the   
minister of the judge struggling with   
robbers1 although even these sin if they
 be moved by private animosity4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,the words quoted from        
,augustine refer to the case when one   
man intends to kill another to save     
himself from death4 ,the passage quoted 
in the ,second ,objection is to be      
understood in the same sense4 ,hence he 
says pointedly1 for the sake of these   
things1 whereby he indicates the        
intention4 ,this suffices for the ,reply
 to the ,second ,objection4  ,reply     

,obj4 #c3 ,irregularity results from the
 act though sinless of taking a man's   
life1 as appears in the case of a judge 
who justly condemns a man to death4 ,for
 this reason a cleric1 though he kill a 
man in self-defense1 is irregular1      
albeit he intends not to kill him1 but  
to defend himself4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3    
,the act of fornication or adultery is  
not necessarily directed to the         
preservation of one's own life1 as is   
the act whence sometimes results the    
taking of a man's life4  ,reply ,obj4   
#e3 ,the defense forbidden in this      
passage is that which comes from        
revengeful spite4 ,hence a gloss says3  
,not defending yourselves--that is1 not 
striking your enemy back4   ,,eighth    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #h  
,whether ,one ,is ,guilty of ,murder    
,through ,killing ,someone by ,chance8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one  
is guilty of murder through killing     
someone by chance4 ,for we read 7,gen4  
#d3bc1 #bd7 that ,lamech slew a man in  

mistake for a wild beast 99,the text of 
the ,bible does not say so1 but this was
 the ,jewish traditional commentary on  
,gen4 #d3bc1 and that he was accounted  
guilty of murder4 ,therefore one incurs 
the guilt of murder through killing a   
man by chance4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it  
is written 7,ex4 #ba3bb73 ,if 4 4 4 one 
strike a woman with child1 and she      
miscarry indeed 4 4 4 if her death ensue
 thereupon1 he shall render life for    
life4 ,yet this may happen without any  
intention of causing her death4         
,therefore one is guilty of murder      
through killing someone by chance4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,decretals      
99,dist4 #a contain several canons      
prescribing penalties for unintentional 
homicide4 ,now penalty is not due save  
for guilt4 ,therefore he who kills a man
 by chance1 incurs the guilt of murder4 
,on the contrary1 ,augustine says to    
,publicola 7,ep4 xlvii73 ,when we do a  
thing for a good and lawful purpose1 if 
thereby we unintentionally cause harm to

 anyone1 it should by no means be       
imputed to us4 ,now it sometimes happens
 by chance that a person is killed as a 
result of something done for a good     
purpose4 ,therefore the person who did  
it is not accounted guilty4  ,i answer  
that1 ,according to the ,philosopher    
7,phys4 ii1 #f7 chance is a cause that  
acts beside one's intention4 ,hence     
chance happenings1 strictly speaking1   
are neither intended nor voluntary4 ,and
 since every sin is voluntary1 according
 to ,augustine 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xiv7  
it follows that chance happenings1 as   
such1 are not sins4  ,nevertheless it   
happens that what is not actually and   
directly voluntary and intended1 is     
voluntary and intended accidentally1    
according as that which removes an      
obstacle is called an accidental cause4 
,wherefore he who does not remove       
something whence homicide results       
whereas he ought to remove it1 is in a  
sense guilty of voluntary homicide4     
,this happens in two ways3 first when a 

man causes another's death through      
occupying himself with unlawful things  
which he ought to avoid3 secondly1 when 
he does not take sufficient care4       
,hence1 according to jurists1 if a man  
pursue a lawful occupation and take due 
care1 the result being that a person    
loses his life1 he is not guilty of that
 person's death3 whereas if he be       
occupied with something unlawful1 or    
even with something lawful1 but without 
due care1 he does not escape being      
guilty of murder1 if his action results 
in someone's death4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,lamech did not take sufficient care to 
avoid taking a man's life3 and so he was
 not excused from being guilty of       
homicide4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he that    
strikes a woman with child does         
something unlawful3 wherefore if there  
results the death either of the woman or
 of the animated fetus1 he will not be  
excused from homicide1 especially seeing
 that death is the natural result of    
such a blow4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3          

,according to the canons a penalty is   
inflicted on those who cause death      
unintentionally1 through doing something
 unlawful1 or failing to take sufficient
 care4   ,,question #fe  ,,of ,,other   
,,injuries ,,committed ,,on ,,the       
,,person 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we must
 now consider other sinful injuries     
committed on the person4 ,under this    
head there are four points of inquiry3  
7#a7 ,the mutilation of members2  7#b7  
,blows2  7#c7 ,imprisonment2  7#d7      
,whether the sins that consist in       
inflicting such like injuries are       
aggravated through being perpetrated on 
persons connected with others8   ,,first
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #a 
,whether in ,some ,cases ,it ,may ,be   
,lawful to ,maim ,anyone8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that in no case can  
it be lawful to maim anyone4 ,for       
,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iv1   
#bj7 that sin consists in departing from
 what is according to nature1 towards   
that which is contrary to nature4 ,now  

according to nature it is appointed by  
,god that a man's body should be entire 
in its members1 and it is contrary to   
nature that it should be deprived of a  
member4 ,therefore it seems that it is  
always a sin to maim a person4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 as the whole soul is to   
the whole body1 so are the parts of the 
soul to the parts of the body 7,de      
,anima ii1 #a74 ,but it is unlawful to  
deprive a man of his soul by killing    
him1 except by public authority4        
,therefore neither is it lawful to maim 
anyone1 except perhaps by public        
authority4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the     
welfare of the soul is to be preferred  
to the welfare of the body4 ,now it is  
not lawful for a man to maim himself for
 the sake of the soul's welfare3 since  
the council of ,nicea 99,p4 ,i1 sect4   
#d1 can4 i punished those who castrated 
themselves that they might preserve     
chastity4 ,therefore it is not lawful   
for any other reason to maim a person4  
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ex4  

#ba3bd73 ,eye for eye1 tooth for tooth1 
hand for hand1 foot for foot4  ,i answer
 that1 ,since a member is part of the   
whole human body1 it is for the sake of 
the whole1 as the imperfect for the     
perfect4 ,hence a member of the human   
body is to be disposed of according as  
it is expedient for the body4 ,now a    
member of the human body is of itself   
useful to the good of the whole body1   
yet1 accidentally it may happen to be   
hurtful1 as when a decayed member is a  
source of corruption to the whole body4 
,accordingly so long as a member is     
healthy and retains its natural         
disposition1 it cannot be cut off       
without injury to the whole body4 ,but  
as the whole of man is directed as to   
his end to the whole of the community of
 which he is a part1 as stated above    
7,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #fd1 ,,aa4 #b1    
#e71 it may happen that although the    
removal of a member may be detrimental  
to the whole body1 it may nevertheless  
be directed to the good of the          

community1 in so far as it is applied to
 a person as a punishment for the       
purpose of restraining sin4 ,hence just 
as by public authority a person is      
lawfully deprived of life altogether on 
account of certain more heinous sins1 so
 is he deprived of a member on account  
of certain lesser sins4 ,but this is not
 lawful for a private individual1 even  
with the consent of the owner of the    
member1 because this would involve an   
injury to the community1 to whom the man
 and all his parts belong4 ,if1 however1
 the member be decayed and therefore a  
source of corruption to the whole body1 
then it is lawful with the consent of   
the owner of the member1 to cut away the
 member for the welfare of the whole    
body1 since each one is entrusted with  
the care of his own welfare4 ,the same  
applies if it be done with the consent  
of the person whose business it is to   
care for the welfare of the person who  
has a decayed member3 otherwise it is   
altogether unlawful to maim anyone4     

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing prevents that 
which is contrary to a particular nature
 from being in harmony with universal   
nature3 thus death and corruption1 in   
the physical order1 are contrary to the 
particular nature of the thing          
corrupted1 although they are in keeping 
with universal nature4 ,in like manner  
to maim anyone1 though contrary to the  
particular nature of the body of the    
person maimed1 is nevertheless in       
keeping with natural reason in relation 
to the common good4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,the life of the entire man is not      
directed to something belonging to man2 
on the contrary whatever belongs to man 
is directed to his life4 ,hence in no   
case does it pertain to a person to take
 anyone's life1 except to the public    
authority to whom is entrusted the      
procuring of the common good4 ,but the  
removal of a member can be directed to  
the good of one man1 and consequently in
 certain cases can pertain to him4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a member should not be

 removed for the sake of the bodily     
health of the whole1 unless otherwise   
nothing can be done to further the good 
of the whole4 ,now it is always possible
 to further one's spiritual welfare     
otherwise than by cutting off a member1 
because sin is always subject to the    
will3 and consequently in no case is it 
allowable to maim oneself1 even to avoid
 any sin whatever4 ,hence ,chrysostom1  
in his exposition on ,matt4 #ai3ab      
7,hom4 lxii in ,matth471 ,there are     
eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs
 for the kingdom of heaven1 says3 ,not  
by maiming themselves1 but by destroying
 evil thoughts1 for a man is accursed   
who maims himself1 since they are       
murderers who do such things4 ,and      
further on he says3 ,nor is lust tamed  
thereby1 on the contrary it becomes more
 importunate1 for the seed springs in us
 from other sources1 and chiefly from an
 incontinent purpose and a careless     
mind3 and temptation is curbed not so   
much by cutting off a member as by      

curbing one's thoughts4   ,,second      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,it ,is ,lawful for ,parents to
 ,strike ,their ,children1 or ,masters  
,their ,slaves8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem unlawful for parents to      
strike their children1 or masters their 
slaves4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,eph4   
#f3d73 ,you1 fathers1 provoke not your  
children to anger2 and further on 7,eph4
 #i3f73 ,and you1 masters1 do the same  
thing to your slaves ,vulg43 'to them'  
forbearing threatenings4 ,now some are  
provoked to anger by blows1 and become  
more troublesome when threatened4       
,therefore neither should parents strike
 their children1 nor masters their      
slaves4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the        
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #i7 that a
 father's words are admonitory and not  
coercive4 ,now blows are a kind of      
coercion4 ,therefore it is unlawful for 
parents to strike their children4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 everyone is allowed to   
impart correction1 for this belongs to  

the spiritual almsdeeds1 as stated above
 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #b74 ,if1 therefore1 it  
is lawful for parents to strike their   
children for the sake of correction1 for
 the same reason it will be lawful for  
any person to strike anyone1 which is   
clearly false4 ,therefore the same      
conclusion follows4  ,on the contrary1  
,it is written 7,prov4 #ac3bd73 ,he that
 spareth the rod hateth his son1 and    
further on 7,prov4 #bc3ac73 ,withhold   
not correction from a child1 for if thou
 strike him with the rod1 he shall not  
die4 ,thou shalt beat him with the rod1 
and deliver his soul from hell4 ,again  
it is written 7,ecclus4 #cc3bh73        
,torture and fetters are for a malicious
 slave4  ,i answer that1 ,harm is done a
 body by striking it1 yet not so as when
 it is maimed3 since maiming destroys   
the body's integrity1 while a blow      
merely affects the sense with pain1     
wherefore it causes much less harm than 
cutting off a member4 ,now it is        
unlawful to do a person a harm1 except  

by way of punishment in the cause of    
justice4 ,again1 no man justly punishes 
another1 except one who is subject to   
his jurisdiction4 ,therefore it is not  
lawful for a man to strike another1     
unless he have some power over the one  
whom he strikes4 ,and since the child is
 subject to the power of the parent1 and
 the slave to the power of his master1 a
 parent can lawfully strike his child1  
and a master his slave that instruction 
may be enforced by correction4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,since anger is a desire for  
vengeance1 it is aroused chiefly when a 
man deems himself unjustly injured1 as  
the ,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii74    
,hence when parents are forbidden to    
provoke their children to anger1 they   
are not prohibited from striking their  
children for the purpose of correction1 
but from inflicting blows on them       
without moderation4 ,the command that   
masters should forbear from threatening 
their slaves may be understood in two   
ways4 ,first that they should be slow to

 threaten1 and this pertains to the     
moderation of correction2 secondly1 that
 they should not always carry out their 
threats1 that is that they should       
sometimes by a merciful forgiveness     
temper the judgment whereby they        
threatened punishment4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,the greater power should exercise the 
greater coercion4 ,now just as a city is
 a perfect community1 so the governor of
 a city has perfect coercive power3     
wherefore he can inflict irreparable    
punishments such as death and           
mutilation4 ,on the other hand the      
father and the master who preside over  
the family household1 which is an       
imperfect community1 have imperfect     
coercive power1 which is exercised by   
inflicting lesser punishments1 for      
instance by blows1 which do not inflict 
irreparable harm4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it 
is lawful for anyone to impart          
correction to a willing subject4 ,but to
 impart it to an unwilling subject      
belongs to those only who have charge   

over him4 ,to this pertains chastisement
 by blows4   ,,third ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful to ,imprison a ,man8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem unlawful  
to imprison a man4 ,an act which deals  
with undue matter is evil in its genus1 
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4  
#b74 ,now man1 having a free-will1 is   
undue matter for imprisonment which is  
inconsistent with free-will4 ,therefore 
it is unlawful to imprison a man4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 human justice should be  
ruled by ,divine justice4 ,now according
 to ,ecclus4 #ae3ad1 ,god left man in   
the hand of his own counsel4 ,therefore 
it seems that a man ought not to be     
coerced by chains or prisons4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 no man should be forcibly    
prevented except from doing an evil     
deed2 and any man can lawfully prevent  
another from doing this4 ,if1 therefore1
 it were lawful to imprison a man1 in   
order to restrain him from evil deeds1  
it would be lawful for anyone to put a  

man in prison2 and this is clearly      
false4 ,therefore the same conclusion   
follows4  ,on the contrary1 ,we read in 
,lev4 #bd that a man was imprisoned for 
the sin of blasphemy4  ,i answer that1  
,in the goods of the body three things  
may be considered in due order4 ,first1 
the substantial integrity of the body1  
and this is injured by death or maiming4
 ,secondly1 pleasure or rest of the     
senses1 and to this striking or anything
 causing a sense of pain is opposed4    
,thirdly1 the movement or use of the    
members1 and this is hindered by binding
 or imprisoning or any kind of          
detention4  ,therefore it is unlawful to
 imprison or in any way detain a man1   
unless it be done according to the order
 of justice1 either in punishment1 or as
 a measure of precaution against some   
evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a man who      
abuses the power entrusted to him       
deserves to lose it1 and therefore when 
a man by sinning abuses the free use of 
his members1 he becomes a fitting matter

 for imprisonment4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,according to the order of ,his wisdom  
,god sometimes restrains a sinner from  
accomplishing a sin1 according to ,job  
#e3ab3 ,who bringeth to nought the      
designs of the malignant1 so that their 
hand cannot accomplish what they had    
begun1 while sometimes ,he allows them  
to do what they will4 ,in like manner1  
according to human justice1 men are     
imprisoned1 not for every sin but for   
certain ones4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is  
lawful for anyone to restrain a man for 
a time from doing some unlawful deed    
there and then3 as when a man prevents  
another from throwing himself over a    
precipice1 or from striking another4    
,but to him alone who has the right of  
disposing in general of the actions and 
of the life of another does it belong   
primarily to imprison or fetter1 because
 by so doing he hinders him from doing  
not only evil but also good deeds4      
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1  
,art4 #d  ,whether the ,sin ,is         

,aggravated by the ,fact ,that the      
,aforesaid ,injuries ,are ,perpetrated  
on ,those ,who ,are ,connected with     
,others8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that the sin is not aggravated by the   
fact that the aforesaid injuries are    
perpetrated on those who are connected  
with others4 ,such like injuries take   
their sinful character from inflicting  
an injury on another against his will4  
,now the evil inflicted on a man's own  
person is more against his will than    
that which is inflicted on a person     
connected with him4 ,therefore an injury
 inflicted on a person connected with   
another is less grievous4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 ,holy ,writ reproves those    
especially who do injuries to orphans   
and widows3 hence it is written         
7,ecclus4 #ce3ag73 ,he will not despise 
the prayers of the fatherless1 nor the  
widow when she poureth out her          
complaint4 ,now the widow and the orphan
 are not connected with other persons4  
,therefore the sin is not aggravated    

through an injury being inflicted on one
 who is connected with others4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 the person who is         
connected has a will of his own just as 
the principal person has1 so that       
something may be voluntary for him and  
yet against the will of the principal   
person1 as in the case of adultery which
 pleases the woman but not the husband4 
,now these injuries are sinful in so far
 as they consist in an involuntary      
commutation4 ,therefore such like       
injuries are of a less sinful nature4   
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4
 #bh3cb7 as though indicating an        
aggravating circumstance3 ,thy sons and 
thy daughters shall be given to another 
people1 thy eyes looking on 99,vulg43   
',may thy sons and thy daughters be     
given1' etc44  ,i answer that1 ,other   
things being equal1 an injury is a more 
grievous sin according as it affects    
more persons2 and hence it is that it is
 a more grievous sin to strike or injure
 a person in authority than a private   

individual1 because it conduces to the  
injury of the whole community1 as stated
 above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #i74 ,now 
when an injury is inflicted on one who  
is connected in any way with another1   
that injury affects two persons1 so     
that1 other things being equal1 the sin 
is aggravated by this very fact4 ,it may
 happen1 however1 that in view of       
certain circumstances1 a sin committed  
against one who is not connected with   
any other person1 is more grievous1 on  
account of either the dignity of the    
person1 or the greatness of the injury4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,an injury inflicted on
 a person connected with others is less 
harmful to the persons with whom he is  
connected1 than if it were perpetrated  
immediately on them1 and from this point
 of view it is a less grievous sin4 ,but
 all that belongs to the injury of the  
person with whom he is connected1 is    
added to the sin of which a man is      
guilty through injuring the other one in
 himself4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,injuries   

done to widows and orphans are more     
insisted upon both through being more   
opposed to mercy1 and because the same  
injury done to such persons is more     
grievous to them since they have no one 
to turn to for relief4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,the fact that the wife voluntarily    
consents to the adultery1 lessens the   
sin and injury1 so far as the woman is  
concerned1 for it would be more         
grievous1 if the adulterer oppressed her
 by violence4 ,but this does not remove 
the injury as affecting her husband1    
since the wife hath not power of her own
 body2 but the husband 7#a ,cor4 #g3d74 
,the same applies to similar cases4 ,of 
adultery1 however1 as it is opposed not 
only to justice but also to chastity1 we
 shall speak in the treatise on         
,temperance 7,q4 #aed1 ,a4 #h74         
,,question #ff  ,,of ,,theft ,,and      
,,robbery 7,in ,nine ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider the sins opposed to   
justice1 whereby a man injures his      
neighbor in his belongings2 namely theft

 and robbery4  ,under this head there   
are nine points of inquiry3  7#a7       
,whether it is natural to man to possess
 external things8  7#b7 ,whether it is  
lawful for a man to possess something as
 his own8  7#c7 ,whether theft is the   
secret taking of another's property8    
7#d7 ,whether robbery is a species of   
sin distinct from theft8  7#e7 ,whether 
every theft is a sin8  7#f7 ,whether    
theft is a mortal sin8  7#g7 ,whether it
 is lawful to thieve in a case of       
necessity8  7#h7 ,whether every robbery 
is a mortal sin8  7#i7 ,whether robbery 
is a more grievous sin than theft8      
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,it ,is ,natural for 
,man to ,possess ,external ,things8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is
 not natural for man to possess external
 things4 ,for no man should ascribe to  
himself that which is ,god's4 ,now the  
dominion over all creatures is proper to
 ,god1 according to ,ps4 #bc3a1 ,the    
earth is the ,lord's1 etc4 ,therefore it

 is not natural for man to possess      
external things4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
,basil in expounding the words of the   
rich man 7,luke #ab3ah71 ,i will gather 
all things that are grown to me1 and my 
goods1 says 99,hom4 in ,luc4 xii1 #ah3  
,tell me3 which are thine8 where did you
 take them from and bring them into     
being8 ,now whatever man possesses      
naturally1 he can fittingly call his    
own4 ,therefore man does not naturally  
possess external things4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 according to ,ambrose 7,de    
,trin4 i 99,de ,fide1 ad ,gratianum1 i1 
#a7 dominion denotes power4 ,but man has
 no power over external things1 since he
 can work no change in their nature4    
,therefore the possession of external   
things is not natural to man4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #h3h73   
,thou hast subjected all things under   
his feet4  ,i answer that1 ,external    
things can be considered in two ways4   
,first1 as regards their nature1 and    
this is not subject to the power of man1

 but only to the power of ,god ,whose   
mere will all things obey4 ,secondly1 as
 regards their use1 and in this way1 man
 has a natural dominion over external   
things1 because1 by his reason and will1
 he is able to use them for his own     
profit1 as they were made on his        
account3 for the imperfect is always for
 the sake of the perfect1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #a74 ,it is by this 
argument that the ,philosopher proves   
7,polit4 i1 #c7 that the possession of  
external things is natural to man4      
,moreover1 this natural dominion of man 
over other creatures1 which is competent
 to man in respect of his reason wherein
 ,god's image resides1 is shown forth in
 man's creation 7,gen4 #a3bf7 by the    
words3 ,let us make man to our image and
 likeness3 and let him have dominion    
over the fishes of the sea1 etc4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,god has sovereign dominion  
over all things3 and ,he1 according to  
,his providence1 directed certain things
 to the sustenance of man's body4 ,for  

this reason man has a natural dominion  
over things1 as regards the power to    
make use of them4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the
 rich man is reproved for deeming       
external things to belong to him        
principally1 as though he had not       
received them from another1 namely from 
,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument  
considers the dominion over external    
things as regards their nature4 ,such a 
dominion belongs to ,god alone1 as      
stated above4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful for a ,man to ,possess a
 ,thing ,as ,his ,own8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem unlawful for a man to    
possess a thing as his own4 ,for        
whatever is contrary to the natural law 
is unlawful4 ,now according to the      
natural law all things are common       
property3 and the possession of property
 is contrary to this community of goods4
 ,therefore it is unlawful for any man  
to appropriate any external thing to    
himself4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,basil in 

expounding the words of the rich man    
quoted above 7,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #b71 says3  
,the rich who deem as their own property
 the common goods they have seized upon1
 are like to those who by going         
beforehand to the play prevent others   
from coming1 and appropriate to         
themselves what is intended for common  
use4 ,now it would be unlawful to       
prevent others from obtaining possession
 of common goods4 ,therefore it is      
unlawful to appropriate to oneself what 
belongs to the community4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 ,ambrose says 99,serm4 lxiv1  
de temp41 and his words are quoted in   
the ,decretals 99,dist4 xlvii41 ,can4   
,sicut hi43 ,let no man call his own    
that which is common property3 and by   
common he means external things1 as is  
clear from the context4 ,therefore it   
seems unlawful for a man to appropriate 
an external thing to himself4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,haeres41
 haer4 #dj73 ,the ',apostolici' are     
those who with extreme arrogance have   

given themselves that name1 because they
 do not admit into their communion      
persons who are married or possess      
anything of their own1 such as both     
monks and clerics who in considerable   
number are to be found in the ,catholic 
,church4 ,now the reason why these      
people are heretics was because severing
 themselves from the ,church1 they think
 that those who enjoy the use of the    
above things1 which they themselves     
lack1 have no hope of salvation4        
,therefore it is erroneous to maintain  
that it is unlawful for a man to possess
 property4  ,i answer that1 ,two things 
are competent to man in respect of      
exterior things4 ,one is the power to   
procure and dispense them1 and in this  
regard it is lawful for man to possess  
property4 ,moreover this is necessary to
 human life for three reasons4 ,first   
because every man is more careful to    
procure what is for himself alone than  
that which is common to many or to all3 
since each one would shirk the labor and

 leave to another that which concerns   
the community1 as happens where there is
 a great number of servants4 ,secondly1 
because human affairs are conducted in  
more orderly fashion if each man is     
charged with taking care of some        
particular thing himself1 whereas there 
would be confusion if everyone had to   
look after any one thing                
indeterminately4 ,thirdly1 because a    
more peaceful state is ensured to man if
 each one is contented with his own4    
,hence it is to be observed that        
quarrels arise more frequently where    
there is no division of the things      
possessed4  ,the second thing that is   
competent to man with regard to external
 things is their use4 ,in this respect  
man ought to possess external things1   
not as his own1 but as common1 so that1 
to wit1 he is ready to communicate them 
to others in their need4 ,hence the     
,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #f3ag1 #ah73    
,charge the rich of this world 4 4 4 to 
give easily1 to communicate to others1  

etc4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,community of    
goods is ascribed to the natural law1   
not that the natural law dictates that  
all things should be possessed in common
 and that nothing should be possessed as
 one's own3 but because the division of 
possessions is not according to the     
natural law1 but rather arose from human
 agreement which belongs to positive    
law1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,,aa4 #b1
 #c74 ,hence the ownership of           
possessions is not contrary to the      
natural law1 but an addition thereto    
devised by human reason4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,a man would not act unlawfully if  
by going beforehand to the play he      
prepared the way for others3 but he acts
 unlawfully if by so doing he hinders   
others from going4 ,in like manner a    
rich man does not act unlawfully if he  
anticipates someone in taking possession
 of something which at first was common 
property1 and gives others a share3 but 
he sins if he excludes others           
indiscriminately from using it4 ,hence  

,basil says 7,hom4 in ,luc4 xii1 #ah73  
,why are you rich while another is poor1
 unless it be that you may have the     
merit of a good stewardship1 and he the 
reward of patience8  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,when ,ambrose says3 ,let no man call   
his own that which is common1 he is     
speaking of ownership as regards use1   
wherefore he adds3 ,he who spends too   
much is a robber4   ,,third ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
the ,essence of ,theft ,consists in     
,taking ,another's ,thing ,secretly8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is
 not essential to theft to take         
another's thing secretly4 ,for that     
which diminishes a sin1 does not1       
apparently1 belong to the essence of a  
sin4 ,now to sin secretly tends to      
diminish a sin1 just as1 on the         
contrary1 it is written as indicating an
 aggravating circumstance of the sin of 
some 7,isa4 #c3i73 ,they have proclaimed
 abroad their sin as ,sodom1 and they   
have not hid it4 ,therefore it is not   

essential to theft that it should       
consist in taking another's thing       
secretly4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,ambrose 
says 99,serm4 lxiv1 de temp41 ,a4 #b1   
,obj4 #c1 ,can4 ,sicut hi43 and his     
words are embodied in the ,decretals    
99,dist4 xlvii3 ,it is no less a crime  
to take from him that has1 than to      
refuse to succor the needy when you can 
and are well off4 ,therefore just as    
theft consists in taking another's      
thing1 so does it consist in keeping it 
back4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a man may    
take by stealth from another1 even that 
which is his own1 for instance a thing  
that he has deposited with another1 or  
that has been taken away from him       
unjustly4 ,therefore it is not essential
 to theft that it should consist in     
taking another's thing secretly4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 x73 
,fur 7thief7 is derived from furvus and 
so from fuscus 7dark71 because he takes 
advantage of the night4  ,i answer that1
 ,three things combine together to      

constitute theft4 ,the first belongs to 
theft as being contrary to justice1     
which gives to each one that which is   
his1 so that it belongs to theft to take
 possession of what is another's4 ,the  
second thing belongs to theft as        
distinct from those sins which are      
committed against the person1 such as   
murder and adultery1 and in this respect
 it belongs to theft to be about a thing
 possessed3 for if a man takes what is  
another's not as a possession but as a  
part 7for instance1 if he amputates a   
limb71 or as a person connected with him
 7for instance1 if he carry off his     
daughter or his wife71 it is not        
strictly speaking a case of theft4 ,the 
third difference is that which completes
 the nature of theft1 and consists in a 
thing being taken secretly3 and in this 
respect it belongs properly to theft    
that it consists in taking another's    
thing secretly4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3       
,secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin1 as
 when a man employs secrecy in order to 

commit a sin1 for instance in fraud and 
guile4 ,in this way it does not diminish
 sin1 but constitutes a species of sin3 
and thus it is in theft4 ,in another way
 secrecy is merely a circumstance of    
sin1 and thus it diminishes sin1 both   
because it is a sign of shame1 and      
because it removes scandal4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,to keep back what is due to  
another1 inflicts the same kind of      
injury as taking a thing unjustly3      
wherefore an unjust detention is        
included in an unjust taking4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,nothing prevents that which  
belongs to one person simply1 from      
belonging to another in some respect3   
thus a deposit belongs simply to the    
depositor1 but with regard to its       
custody it is the depositary's1 and the 
thing stolen is the thief's1 not simply1
 but as regards its custody4   ,,fourth 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,theft and ,robbery ,are ,sins 
of ,different ,species8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that theft and robbery   

are not sins of different species4 ,for 
theft and robbery differ as secret and  
manifest3 because theft is taking       
something secretly1 while robbery is to 
take something violently and openly4    
,now in the other kinds of sins1 the    
secret and the manifest do not differ   
specifically4 ,therefore theft and      
robbery are not different species of    
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 moral actions 
take their species from the end1 as     
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2  
,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f74 ,now theft and robbery
 are directed to the same end1 viz4 the 
possession of another's property4       
,therefore they do not differ           
specifically4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just 
as a thing is taken by force for the    
sake of possession1 so is a woman taken 
by force for pleasure3 wherefore        
,isidore says 7,etym4 x7 that he who    
commits a rape is called a corrupter1   
and the victim of the rape is said to be
 corrupted4 ,now it is a case of rape   
whether the woman be carried off        

publicly or secretly4 ,therefore the    
thing appropriated is said to be taken  
by force1 whether it be done secretly or
 publicly4 ,therefore theft and robbery 
do not differ4  ,on the contrary1 ,the  
,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #b7            
distinguishes theft from robbery1 and   
states that theft is done in secret1 but
 that robbery is done openly4  ,i answer
 that1 ,theft and robbery are vices     
contrary to justice1 in as much as one  
man does another an injustice4 ,now no  
man suffers an injustice willingly1 as  
stated in ,ethic4 v1 #i4 ,wherefore     
theft and robbery derive their sinful   
nature1 through the taking being        
involuntary on the part of the person   
from whom something is taken4 ,now the  
involuntary is twofold1 namely1 through 
violence and through ignorance1 as      
stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #a4 ,therefore   
the sinful aspect of robbery differs    
from that of theft3 and consequently    
they differ specifically4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,in the other kinds of sin the      

sinful nature is not derived from       
something involuntary1 as in the sins   
opposed to justice3 and so where there  
is a different kind of involuntary1     
there is a different species of sin4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the remote end of     
robbery and theft is the same4 ,but this
 is not enough for identity of species1 
because there is a difference of        
proximate ends1 since the robber wishes 
to take a thing by his own power1 but   
the thief1 by cunning4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,the robbery of a woman cannot be      
secret on the part of the woman who is  
taken3 wherefore even if it be secret as
 regards the others from whom she is    
taken1 the nature of robbery remains on 
the part of the woman to whom violence  
is done4   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #e  ,whether ,theft ,is  
,always a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that theft is not always a   
sin4 ,for no sin is commanded by ,god1  
since it is written 7,ecclus4 #ae3ba73  
,he hath commanded no man to do         

wickedly4 ,yet we find that ,god        
commanded theft1 for it is written 7,ex4
 #ab3ce1 #cf73 ,and the children of     
,israel did as the ,lord had commanded  
,moses ,vulg43 'as ,moses had           
commanded'4 4 4 and they stripped the   
,egyptians4 ,therefore theft is not     
always a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if a 
man finds a thing that is not his and   
takes it1 he seems to commit a theft1   
for he takes another's property4 ,yet   
this seems lawful according to natural  
equity1 as the jurists hold4 99,see loc4
 cit4 in ,reply4 ,therefore it seems    
that theft is not always a sin4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 he that takes what is his 
own does not seem to sin1 because he    
does not act against justice1 since he  
does not destroy its equality4 ,yet a   
man commits a theft even if he secretly 
take his own property that is detained  
by or in the safe-keeping of another4   
,therefore it seems that theft is not   
always a sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is 
written 7,ex4 #bj3ae73 ,thou shalt not  

steal4  ,i answer that1 ,if anyone      
consider what is meant by theft1 he will
 find that it is sinful on two counts4  
,first1 because of its opposition to    
justice1 which gives to each one what is
 his1 so that for this reason theft is  
contrary to justice1 through being a    
taking of what belongs to another4      
,secondly1 because of the guile or fraud
 committed by the thief1 by laying hands
 on another's property secretly and     
cunningly4 ,wherefore it is evident that
 every theft is a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,it is no theft for a man to take      
another's property either secretly or   
openly by order of a judge who has      
commanded him to do so1 because it      
becomes his due by the very fact that it
 is adjudicated to him by the sentence  
of the court4 ,hence still less was it a
 theft for the ,israelites to take away 
the spoils of the ,egyptians at the     
command of the ,lord1 ,who ordered this 
to be done on account of the            
ill-treatment accorded to them by the   

,egyptians without any cause3 wherefore 
it is written significantly 7,wis4      
#aj3ai73 ,the just took the spoils of   
the wicked4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,with     
regard to treasure-trove a distinction  
must be made4 ,for some there are that  
were never in anyone's possession1 for  
instance precious stones and jewels1    
found on the seashore1 and such the     
finder is allowed to keep 99,dig4 ,i1   
viii1 ,de divis4 rerum3 ,inst4 ,,ii1 i1 
,de rerum divis44 ,the same applies to  
treasure hidden underground long since  
and belonging to no man1 except that    
according to civil law the finder is    
bound to give half to the owner of the  
land1 if the treasure trove be in the   
land of another person 99,inst4 ,,ii1 i1
 #ci3 ,cod4 ,x1 xv1 ,de ,thesauris4     
,hence in the parable of the ,gospel    
7,matt4 #ac3dd7 it is said of the finder
 of the treasure hidden in a field that 
he bought the field1 as though he       
purposed thus to acquire the right of   
possessing the whole treasure4 ,on the  

other ,land the treasure-trove may be   
nearly in someone's possession3 and then
 if anyone take it with the intention1  
not of keeping it but of returning it to
 the owner who does not look upon such  
things as unappropriated1 he is not     
guilty of theft4 ,in like manner if the 
thing found appears to be               
unappropriated1 and if the finder       
believes it to be so1 although he keep  
it1 he does not commit a theft 99,inst4 
,,ii1 i1 #dg4 ,in any other case the sin
 of theft is committed 99,dig4 ,,xli1 i1
 ,de acquirend4 rerum dominio1 #i3      
,inst4 ,,ii1 i1 #dh3 wherefore          
,augustine says in a homily 7,serm4     
clxxviii2 ,de ,verb4 ,apost473 ,if thou 
hast found a thing and not returned it1 
thou hast stolen it 7,dig4 xiv1 #e1 can4
 ,si quid invenisti74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,he who by stealth takes his own        
property which is deposited with another
 man burdens the depositary1 who is     
bound either to restitution1 or to prove
 himself innocent4 ,hence he is clearly 

guilty of sin1 and is bound to ease the 
depositary of his burden4 ,on the other 
hand he who1 by stealth1 takes his own  
property1 if this be unjustly detained  
by another1 he sins indeed2 yet not     
because he burdens the retainer1 and so 
he is not bound to restitution or       
compensation3 but he sins against       
general justice by disregarding the     
order of justice and usurping judgment  
concerning his own property4 ,hence he  
must make satisfaction to ,god and      
endeavor to allay whatever scandal he   
may have given his neighbor by acting   
this way4   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,theft ,is 
a ,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that theft is not a mortal   
sin4 ,for it is written 7,prov4 #f3cj73 
,the fault is not so great when a man   
hath stolen4 ,but every mortal sin is a 
great fault4 ,therefore theft is not a  
mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 mortal 
sin deserves to be punished with death4 
,but in the ,law theft is punished not  

by death but by indemnity1 according to 
,ex4 #bb3a1 ,if any man steal an ox or a
 sheep 4 4 4 he shall restore have oxen 
for one ox1 and four sheep for one      
sheep4 ,therefore theft is not a mortal 
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 theft can be  
committed in small even as in great     
things4 ,but it seems unreasonable for a
 man to be punished with eternal death  
for the theft of a small thing such as a
 needle or a quill4 ,therefore theft is 
not a mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,no
 man is condemned by the ,divine        
judgment save for a mortal sin4 ,yet a  
man is condemned for theft1 according to
 ,zech4 #e3c1 ,this is the curse that   
goeth forth over the face of the earth2 
for every thief shall be judged as is   
there written4 ,therefore theft is a    
mortal sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#gb1 ,a4 #e71 a mortal sin is one that  
is contrary to charity as the spiritual 
life of the soul4 ,now charity consists 
principally in the love of ,god1 and    

secondarily in the love of our neighbor1
 which is shown in our wishing and doing
 him well4 ,but theft is a means of     
doing harm to our neighbor in his       
belongings2 and if men were to rob one  
another habitually1 human society would 
be undone4 ,therefore theft1 as being   
opposed to charity1 is a mortal sin4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the statement that    
theft is not a great fault is in view of
 two cases4 ,first1 when a person is led
 to thieve through necessity4 ,this     
necessity diminishes or entirely removes
 sin1 as we shall show further on 7,a4  
#g74 ,hence the text continues3 ,for he 
stealeth to fill his hungry soul4       
,secondly1 theft is stated not to be a  
great fault in comparison with the guilt
 of adultery1 which is punished with    
death4 ,hence the text goes on to say of
 the thief that if he be taken1 he shall
 restore sevenfold 4 4 4 but he that is 
an adulterer 4 4 4 shall destroy his own
 soul4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the           
punishments of this life are medicinal  

rather than retributive4 ,for           
retribution is reserved to the ,divine  
judgment which is pronounced against    
sinners according to truth 7,rom4 #b3b74
 ,wherefore1 according to the judgment  
of the present life the death punishment
 is inflicted1 not for every mortal sin1
 but only for such as inflict an        
irreparable harm1 or again for such as  
contain some horrible deformity4 ,hence 
according to the present judgment the   
pain of death is not inflicted for theft
 which does not inflict an irreparable  
harm1 except when it is aggravated by   
some grave circumstance1 as in the case 
of sacrilege which is the theft of a    
sacred thing1 of peculation1 which is   
theft of common property1 as ,augustine 
states 7,tract4 #a1 ,super ,joan471 and 
of kidnaping which is stealing a man1   
for which the pain of death is inflicted
 7,ex4 #ba3af74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3       
,reason accounts as nothing that which  
is little3 so that a man does not       
consider himself injured in very little 

matters3 and the person who takes such  
things can presume that this is not     
against the will of the owner4 ,and if a
 person take such like very little      
things1 he may be proportionately       
excused from mortal sin4 ,yet if his    
intention is to rob and injure his      
neighbor1 there may be a mortal sin even
 in these very little things1 even as   
there may be through consent in a mere  
thought4   ,,seventh ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful to ,steal ,through      
,stress of ,need8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem unlawful to steal through    
stress of need4 ,for penance is not     
imposed except on one who has sinned4   
,now it is stated 7,extra1 ,de furtis1  
,cap4 ,si quis73 ,if anyone1 through    
stress of hunger or nakedness1 steal    
food1 clothing or beast1 he shall do    
penance for three weeks4 ,therefore it  
is not lawful to steal through stress of
 need4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the         
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 that 

there are some actions whose very name  
implies wickedness1 and among these he  
reckons theft4 ,now that which is wicked
 in itself may not be done for a good   
end4 ,therefore a man cannot lawfully   
steal in order to remedy a need4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 a man should love his     
neighbor as himself4 ,now1 according to 
,augustine 7,contra ,mendac4 vii71 it is
 unlawful to steal in order to succor   
one's neighbor by giving him an alms4   
,therefore neither is it lawful to steal
 in order to remedy one's own needs4    
,on the contrary1 ,in cases of need all 
things are common property1 so that     
there would seem to be no sin in taking 
another's property1 for need has made it
 common4  ,i answer that1 ,things which 
are of human right cannot derogate from 
natural right or ,divine right4 ,now    
according to the natural order          
established by ,divine ,providence1     
inferior things are ordained for the    
purpose of succoring man's needs by     
their means4 ,wherefore the division and

 appropriation of things which are based
 on human law1 do not preclude the fact 
that man's needs have to be remedied by 
means of these very things4 ,hence      
whatever certain people have in         
superabundance is due1 by natural law1  
to the purpose of succoring the poor4   
,for this reason ,ambrose 99,loc4 cit41 
,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #c says1 and his words are
 embodied in the ,decretals 7,dist4     
xlvii1 can4 ,sicut ii73 ,it is the      
hungry man's bread that you withhold1   
the naked man's cloak that you store    
away1 the money that you bury in the    
earth is the price of the poor man's    
ransom and freedom4  ,since1 however1   
there are many who are in need1 while it
 is impossible for all to be succored by
 means of the same thing1 each one is   
entrusted with the stewardship of his   
own things1 so that out of them he may  
come to the aid of those who are in     
need4 ,nevertheless1 if the need be so  
manifest and urgent1 that it is evident 
that the present need must be remedied  

by whatever means be at hand 7for       
instance when a person is in some       
imminent danger1 and there is no other  
possible remedy71 then it is lawful for 
a man to succor his own need by means of
 another's property1 by taking it either
 openly or secretly3 nor is this        
properly speaking theft or robbery4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this decretal         
considers cases where there is no urgent
 need4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not     
theft1 properly speaking1 to take       
secretly and use another's property in a
 case of extreme need3 because that     
which he takes for the support of his   
life becomes his own property by reason 
of that need4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in a   
case of a like need a man may also take 
secretly another's property in order to 
succor his neighbor in need4   ,,eighth 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #h  
,whether ,robbery ,may ,be ,committed   
,without ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that robbery may be committed     
without sin4 ,for spoils are taken by   

violence1 and this seems to belong to   
the essence of robbery1 according to    
what has been said 7,a4 #d74 ,now it is 
lawful to take spoils from the enemy2   
for ,ambrose says 7,de ,patriarch4 #d   
99,de ,abraham i1 #c73 ,when the        
conqueror has taken possession of the   
spoils1 military discipline demands that
 all should be reserved for the         
sovereign1 in order1 to wit1 that he may
 distribute them4 ,therefore in certain 
cases robbery is lawful4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 it is lawful to take from a   
man what is not his4 ,now the things    
which unbelievers have are not theirs1  
for ,augustine says 7,ep4 ad ,vincent4  
,donat4 xciii473 ,you falsely call      
things your own1 for you do not possess 
them justly1 and according to the laws  
of earthly kings you are commanded to   
forfeit them4 ,therefore it seems that  
one may lawfully rob unbelievers4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 earthly princes violently
 extort many things from their subjects3
 and this seems to savor of robbery4    

,now it would seem a grievous matter to 
say that they sin in acting thus1 for in
 that case nearly every prince would be 
damned4 ,therefore in some cases robbery
 is lawful4  ,on the contrary1 ,whatever
 is taken lawfully may be offered to    
,god in sacrifice and oblation4 ,now    
this cannot be done with the proceeds of
 robbery1 according to ,isa4 #fa3h1 ,i  
am the ,lord that love judgment1 and    
hate robbery in a holocaust4 ,therefore 
it is not lawful to take anything by    
robbery4  ,i answer that1 ,robbery      
implies a certain violence and coercion 
employed in taking unjustly from a man  
that which is his4 ,now in human society
 no man can exercise coercion except    
through public authority3 and1          
consequently1 if a private individual   
not having public authority takes       
another's property by violence1 he acts 
unlawfully and commits a robbery1 as    
burglars do4 ,as regards princes1 the   
public power is entrusted to them that  
they may be the guardians of justice3   

hence it is unlawful for them to use    
violence or coercion1 save within the   
bounds of justice--either by fighting   
against the enemy1 or against the       
citizens1 by punishing evil-doers3 and  
whatever is taken by violence of this   
kind is not the spoils of robbery1 since
 it is not contrary to justice4 ,on the 
other hand to take other people's       
property violently and against justice1 
in the exercise of public authority1 is 
to act unlawfully and to be guilty of   
robbery2 and whoever does so is bound to
 restitution4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a      
distinction must be made in the matter  
of spoils4 ,for if they who take spoils 
from the enemy1 are waging a just war1  
such things as they seize in the war    
become their own property4 ,this is no  
robbery1 so that they are not bound to  
restitution4 ,nevertheless even they who
 are engaged in a just war may sin in   
taking spoils through cupidity arising  
from an evil intention1 if1 to wit1 they
 fight chiefly not for justice but for  

spoil4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4 
,dom4 xix2 ,serm4 lxxxii7 that it is a  
sin to fight for booty4 ,if1 however1   
those who take the spoil1 are waging an 
unjust war1 they are guilty of robbery1 
and are bound to restitution4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,unbelievers possess their    
goods unjustly in so far as they are    
ordered by the laws of earthly princes  
to forfeit those goods4 ,hence these may
 be taken violently from them1 not by   
private but by public authority4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,it is no robbery if princes 
exact from their subjects that which is 
due to them for the safe-guarding of the
 common good1 even if they use violence 
in so doing3 but if they extort         
something unduly by means of violence1  
it is robbery even as burglary is4      
,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei  
iv1 #d73 ,if justice be disregarded1    
what is a king but a mighty robber8     
since what is a robber but a little     
king8 ,and it is written 7,ezech4       
#bb3bg73 ,her princes in the midst of   

her1 are like wolves ravening the prey4 
,wherefore they are bound to            
restitution1 just as robbers are1 and by
 so much do they sin more grievously    
than robbers1 as their actions are      
fraught with greater and more universal 
danger to public justice whose wardens  
they are4   ,,ninth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #i  ,whether ,theft ,is 
a ,more ,grievous ,sin ,than ,robbery8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that theft
 is a more grievous sin than robbery4   
,for theft adds fraud and guile to the  
taking of another's property3 and these 
things are not found in robbery4 ,now   
fraud and guile are sinful in           
themselves1 as stated above 7,q4 #ee1   
,,aa4 #d1 #e74 ,therefore theft is a    
more grievous sin than robbery4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 shame is fear about a     
wicked deed1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv1   
#i4 ,now men are more ashamed of theft  
than of robbery4 ,therefore theft is    
more wicked than robbery4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 the more persons a sin injures

 the more grievous it would seem to be4 
,now the great and the lowly may be     
injured by theft3 whereas only the weak 
can be injured by robbery1 since it is  
possible to use violence towards them4  
,therefore the sin of theft seems to be 
more grievous than the sin of robbery4  
,on the contrary1 ,according to the laws
 robbery is more severely punished than 
theft4  ,i answer that1 ,robbery and    
theft are sinful1 as stated above 7,,aa4
 #d1 #f71 on account of the             
involuntariness on the part of the      
person from whom something is taken3 yet
 so that in theft the involuntariness is
 due to ignorance1 whereas in robbery it
 is due to violence4 ,now a thing is    
more involuntary through violence than  
through ignorance1 because violence is  
more directly opposed to the will than  
ignorance4 ,therefore robbery is a more 
grievous sin than theft4 ,there is also 
another reason1 since robbery not only  
inflicts a loss on a person in his      
things1 but also conduces to the        

ignominy and injury of his person1 and  
this is of graver import than fraud or  
guile which belong to theft4 ,hence the 
,reply to the ,first ,objection is      
evident4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,men who     
adhere to sensible things think more of 
external strength which is evidenced in 
robbery1 than of internal virtue which  
is forfeit through sin3 wherefore they  
are less ashamed of robbery than of     
theft4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although more 
persons may be injured by theft than by 
robbery1 yet more grievous injuries may 
be inflicted by robbery than by theft3  
for which reason also robbery is more   
odious4   ,,question #fg  ,,of ,,the    
,,injustice ,,of ,a ,,judge1 ,,in       
,,judging 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider those vices opposed to
 commutative justice1 that consist in   
words injurious to our neighbors4 ,we   
shall consider 7#a7 those which are     
connected with judicial proceedings1 and
 7#b7 injurious words uttered           
extra-judicially4  ,under the first head

 five points occur for our              
consideration3 7#a7 ,the injustice of a 
judge in judging2 7#b7 ,the injustice of
 the prosecutor in accusing2 7#c7 ,the  
injustice of the defendant in defending 
himself2 7#d7 ,the injustice of the     
witnesses in giving evidence2 7#e7 ,the 
injustice of the advocate in defending4 
,under the first head there are four    
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether a man 
can justly judge one who is not his     
subject8  7#b7 ,whether it is lawful for
 a judge1 on account of the evidence1 to
 deliver judgment in opposition to the  
truth which is known to him8  7#c7      
,whether a judge can justly sentence a  
man who is not accused8  7#d7 ,whether  
he can justly remit the punishment8     
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fg1   
,art4 #a  ,whether a ,man ,can ,justly  
,judge ,one ,who ,is ,not ,subject to   
,his ,jurisdiction8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that a man can justly judge  
one who is not subject to his           
jurisdiction4 ,for it is stated 7,dan4  

#ac7 that ,daniel sentenced the ancients
 who were convicted of bearing false    
witness4 ,but these ancients were not   
subject to ,daniel2 indeed they were    
judges of the people4 ,therefore a man  
may lawfully judge one that is not      
subject to his jurisdiction4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 ,christ was no man's subject1 
indeed ,he was ,king of kings and ,lord 
of lords 7,apoc4 #ai3af74 ,yet ,he      
submitted to the judgment of a man4     
,therefore it seems that a man may      
lawfully judge one that is not subject  
to his jurisdiction4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 according to the law 99,cap4  
,licet ratione1 de ,foro ,comp4 a man is
 tried in this or that court according  
to his kind of offense4 ,now sometimes  
the defendant is not the subject of the 
man whose business it is to judge in    
that particular place1 for instance when
 the defendant belongs to another       
diocese or is exempt4 ,therefore it     
seems that a man may judge one that is  
not his subject4  ,on the contrary1     

,gregory 99,regist4 xi1 epist4 #fd in   
commenting on ,deut4 #bc3be1 ,if thou go
 into thy friend's corn1 etc4 says3     
,thou mayest not put the sickle of      
judgment to the corn that is entrusted  
to another4  ,i answer that1 ,a judge's 
sentence is like a particular law       
regarding some particular fact4         
,wherefore just as a general law should 
have coercive power1 as the ,philosopher
 states 7,ethic4 x1 #i71 so too the     
sentence of a judge should have coercive
 power1 whereby either party is         
compelled to comply with the judge's    
sentence2 else the judgment would be of 
no effect4 ,now coercive power is not   
exercised in human affairs1 save by     
those who hold public authority3 and    
those who have this authority are       
accounted the superiors of those over   
whom they preside whether by ordinary or
 by delegated authority4 ,hence it is   
evident that no man can judge others    
than his subjects and this in virtue    
either of delegated or of ordinary      

authority4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in judging
 those ancients ,daniel exercised an    
authority delegated to him by ,divine   
instinct4 ,this is indicated where it is
 said 7,dan4 #ac3de7 that the ,lord     
raised up the 4 4 4 spirit of a young   
boy4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in human affairs
 a man may submit of his own accord to  
the judgment of others although these be
 not his superiors1 an example of which 
is when parties agree to a settlement by
 arbitrators4 ,wherefore it is necessary
 that the arbitrator should be upheld by
 a penalty1 since the arbitrators       
through not exercising authority in the 
case1 have not of themselves full power 
of coercion4 ,accordingly in this way   
did ,christ of his own accord submit to 
human judgment3 and thus too did ,pope  
,leo 99,leo ,,iv submit to the judgment 
of the emperor 99,can4 ,nos si          
incompetenter1 caus4 ii1 qu4 #g4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,the bishop of the           
defendant's diocese becomes the latter's
 superior as regards the fault          

committed1 even though he be exempt3    
unless perchance the defendant offend in
 a matter exempt from the bishop's      
authority1 for instance in administering
 the property of an exempt monastery4   
,but if an exempt person commits a      
theft1 or a murder or the like1 he may  
be justly condemned by the ordinary4    
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fg1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful for a
 ,judge to ,pronounce ,judgment ,against
 the ,truth ,that ,he ,knows1 on        
,account of ,evidence to the ,contrary8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem unlawful  
for a judge to pronounce judgment       
against the truth that he knows1 on     
account of evidence to the contrary4    
,for it is written 7,deut4 #ag3i73 ,thou
 shalt come to the priests of the       
,levitical race1 and to the judge that  
shall be at that time2 and thou shalt   
ask of them1 and they shall show thee   
the truth of the judgment4 ,now         
sometimes certain things are alleged    
against the truth1 as when something is 

proved by means of false witnesses4     
,therefore it is unlawful for a judge to
 pronounce judgment according to what is
 alleged and proved in opposition to the
 truth which he knows4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 in pronouncing judgment a man 
should conform to the ,divine judgment1 
since it is the judgment of ,god 7,deut4
 #a3ag74 ,now the judgment of ,god is   
according to the truth 7,rom4 #b3b71 and
 it was foretold of ,christ 7,isa4      
#aa3c1 #d73 ,he shall not judge         
according to the sight of the eyes1 nor 
reprove according to the hearing of the 
ears4 ,but ,he shall judge the poor with
 justice1 and shall reprove with equity 
for the meek of the earth4 ,therefore   
the judge ought not to pronounce        
judgment according to the evidence      
before him if it be contrary to what he 
knows himself4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the 
reason why evidence is required in a    
court of law1 is that the judge may have
 a faithful record of the truth of the  
matter1 wherefore in matters of common  

knowledge there is no need of judicial  
procedure1 according to #a ,tim4 #e3bd1 
,some men's sins are manifest1 going    
before to judgment4 ,consequently1 if   
the judge by his personal knowledge is  
aware of the truth1 he should pay no    
heed to the evidence1 but should        
pronounce sentence according to the     
truth which he knows4  ,obj4 #d3        
,further1 the word conscience denotes   
application of knowledge to a matter of 
action as stated in the ,first ,part    
7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #ac74 ,now it is a sin to 
act contrary to one's knowledge4        
,therefore a judge sins if he pronounces
 sentence according to the evidence but 
against his conscience of the truth4    
,on the contrary1 ,augustine 99,ambrose1
 ,super ,ps4 #aah1 serm4 #bj says in his
 commentary on the ,psalter3 ,a good    
judge does nothing according to his     
private opinion but pronounces sentence 
according to the law and the right4 ,now
 this is to pronounce judgment according
 to what is alleged and proved in court4

 ,therefore a judge ought to pronounce  
judgment in accordance with these       
things1 and not according to his private
 opinion4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated   
above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #fj1 ,,aa4 #b1 #f7 it
 is the duty of a judge to pronounce    
judgment in as much as he exercises     
public authority1 wherefore his judgment
 should be based on information acquired
 by him1 not from his knowledge as a    
private individual1 but from what he    
knows as a public person4 ,now the      
latter knowledge comes to him both in   
general and in particular--in general   
through the public laws1 whether ,divine
 or human1 and he should admit no       
evidence that conflicts therewith--in   
some particular matter1 through         
documents and witnesses1 and other legal
 means of information1 which in         
pronouncing his sentence1 he ought to   
follow rather than the information he   
has acquired as a private individual4   
,and yet this same information may be of
 use to him1 so that he can more        

rigorously sift the evidence brought    
forward1 and discover its weak points4  
,if1 however1 he is unable to reject    
that evidence juridically1 he must1 as  
stated above1 follow it in pronouncing  
sentence4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the reason 
why1 in the passage quoted1 it is stated
 that the judges should first of all be 
asked their reasons1 is to make it clear
 that the judges ought to judge the     
truth in accordance with the evidence4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to judge belongs to   
,god in virtue of ,his own power3       
wherefore ,his judgment is based on the 
truth which ,he ,himself knows1 and not 
on knowledge imparted by others3 the    
same is to be said of ,christ1 ,who is  
true ,god and true man3 whereas other   
judges do not judge in virtue of their  
own power1 so that there is no          
comparison4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the      
,apostle refers to the case where       
something is well known not to the judge
 alone1 but both to him and to others1  
so that the guilty party can by no means

 deny his guilt 7as in the case of      
notorious criminals71 and is convicted  
at once from the evidence of the fact4  
,if1 on the other hand1 it be well known
 to the judge1 but not to others1 or to 
others1 but not to the judge1 then it is
 necessary for the judge to sift the    
evidence4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in matters 
touching his own person1 a man must form
 his conscience from his own knowledge1 
but in matters concerning the public    
authority1 he must form his conscience  
in accordance with the knowledge        
attainable in the public judicial       
procedure4   ,,third ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #c  ,whether a
 ,judge ,may ,condemn a ,man ,who ,is   
,not ,accused8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that a judge may pass sentence on 
a man who is not accused4 ,for human    
justice is derived from ,divine justice4
 ,now ,god judges the sinner even though
 there be no accuser4 ,therefore it     
seems that a man may pass sentence of   
condemnation on a man even though there 

be no accuser4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an  
accuser is required in judicial         
procedure in order that he may relate   
the crime to the judge4 ,now sometimes  
the crime may come to the judge's       
knowledge otherwise than by accusation2 
for instance1 by denunciation1 or by    
evil report1 or through the judge       
himself being an eye-witness4 ,therefore
 a judge may condemn a man without there
 being an accuser4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
the deeds of holy persons are related in
 ,holy ,writ1 as models of human        
conduct4 ,now ,daniel was at the same   
time the accuser and the judge of the   
wicked ancients 7,dan4 #ac74 ,therefore 
it is not contrary to justice for a man 
to condemn anyone as judge while being  
at the same time his accuser4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,ambrose in his commentary on 
#a ,cor4 #e3b1 expounding the ,apostle's
 sentence on the fornicator1 says that a
 judge should not condemn without an    
accuser1 since our ,lord did not banish 
,judas1 who was a thief1 yet was not    

accused4  ,i answer that1 ,a judge is an
 interpreter of justice4 ,wherefore1 as 
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #d71  
men have recourse to a judge as to one  
who is the personification of justice4  
,now1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b71
 justice is not between a man and       
himself but between one man and another4
 ,hence a judge must needs judge between
 two parties1 which is the case when one
 is the prosecutor1 and the other the   
defendant4 ,therefore in criminal cases 
the judge cannot sentence a man unless  
the latter has an accuser1 according to 
,acts #be3af3 ,it is not the custom of  
the ,romans to condemn any man1 before  
that he who is accused have his accusers
 present1 and have liberty to make his  
answer1 to clear himself of the crimes  
of which he is accused4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,god1 in judging man1 takes the     
sinner's conscience as his accuser1     
according to ,rom4 #b3ae1 ,their        
thoughts between themselves accusing1 or
 also defending one another2 or again1  

,he takes the evidence of the fact as   
regards the deed itself1 according to   
,gen4 #d3aj1 ,the voice of thy brother's
 blood crieth to ,me from the earth4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,public disgrace takes 
the place of an accuser4 ,hence a gloss 
on ,gen4 #d3aj1 ,the voice of thy       
brother's blood1 etc4 says3 ,there is no
 need of an accuser when the crime      
committed is notorious4 ,in a case of   
denunciation1 as stated above 7,q4 #cc1 
,a4 #g71 the amendment1 not the         
punishment1 of the sinner is intended3  
wherefore when a man is denounced for a 
sin1 nothing is done against him1 but   
for him1 so that no accuser is required4
 ,the punishment that is inflicted is on
 account of his rebellion against the   
,church1 and since this rebellion is    
manifest1 it stands instead of an       
accuser4 ,the fact that the judge       
himself was an eye-witness1 does not    
authorize him to proceed to pass        
sentence1 except according to the order 
of judicial procedure4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3

 ,god1 in judging man1 proceeds from    
,his own knowledge of the truth1 whereas
 man does not1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74
 ,hence a man cannot be accuser1 witness
 and judge at the same time1 as ,god is4
 ,daniel was at once accuser and judge1 
because he was the executor of the      
sentence of ,god1 by whose instinct he  
was moved1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad  
#a74   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #fg1 ,art4 #d  ,whether the ,judge ,can
 ,lawfully ,remit the ,punishment8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
judge can lawfully remit the punishment4
 ,for it is written 7,james #b3ac73     
,judgment without mercy shall be done to
 him that hath not done mercy4 ,now no  
man is punished for not doing what he   
cannot do lawfully4 ,therefore any judge
 can lawfully do mercy by remitting the 
punishment4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 human  
judgment should imitate the ,divine     
judgment4 ,now ,god remits the          
punishment to sinners1 because ,he      
desires not the death of the sinner1    

according to ,ezech4 #ah3bc4 ,therefore 
a human judge also may lawfully remit   
the punishment to one who repents4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is lawful for    
anyone to do what is profitable to some 
one and harmful to none4 ,now the       
remission of his punishment profits the 
guilty man and harms nobody4 ,therefore 
the judge can lawfully loose a guilty   
man from his punishment4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #ac3h1 
#i7 concerning anyone who would persuade
 a man to serve strange gods3 ,neither  
let thy eye spare him to pity and       
conceal him1 but thou shalt presently   
put him to death3 and of the murderer it
 is written 7,deut4 #ai3ab1 #ac73 ,he   
shall die4 ,thou shalt not pity him4  ,i
 answer that1 ,as may be gathered from  
what has been said 7,,aa4 #b1 #c71 with 
regard to the question in point1 two    
things may be observed in connection    
with a judge4 ,one is that he has to    
judge between accuser and defendant1    
while the other is that he pronounces   

the judicial sentence1 in virtue of his 
power1 not as a private individual but  
as a public person4 ,accordingly on two 
counts a judge is hindered from loosing 
a guilty person from his punishment4    
,first on the part of the accuser1 whose
 right it sometimes is that the guilty  
party should be punished--for instance  
on account of some injury committed     
against the accuser--because it is not  
in the power of a judge to remit such   
punishment1 since every judge is bound  
to give each man his right4 ,secondly1  
he finds a hindrance on the part of the 
commonwealth1 whose power he exercises1 
and to whose good it belongs that       
evil-doers should be punished4          
,nevertheless in this respect there is a
 difference between judges of lower     
degree and the supreme judge1 i4e4 the  
sovereign1 to whom the entire public    
authority is entrusted4 ,for the        
inferior judge has no power to exempt a 
guilty man from punishment against the  
laws imposed on him by his superior4    

,wherefore ,augustine in commenting on  
,john #ai3aa1 ,thou shouldst not have   
any power against ,me1 says 7,tract4    
cxvi in ,joan473 ,the power which ,god  
gave ,pilate was such that he was under 
the power of ,caesar1 so that he was by 
no means free to acquit the person      
accused4 ,on the other hand the         
sovereign who has full authority in the 
commonwealth1 can lawfully remit the    
punishment to a guilty person1 provided 
the injured party consent to the        
remission1 and that this do not seem    
detrimental to the public good4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,there is a place for the     
judge's mercy in matters that are left  
to the judge's discretion1 because in   
like matters a good man is slow to      
punish as the ,philosopher states       
7,ethic4 v1 #aj74 ,but in matters that  
are determined in accordance with       
,divine or human laws1 it is not left to
 him to show mercy4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,god has supreme power of judging1 and  
it concerns ,him whatever is done       

sinfully against anyone4 ,therefore ,he 
is free to remit the punishment1        
especially since punishment is due to   
sin chiefly because it is done against  
,him4 ,he does not1 however1 remit the  
punishment1 except in so far as it      
becomes ,his goodness1 which is the     
source of all laws4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,if the judge were to remit punishment  
inordinately1 he would inflict an injury
 on the community1 for whose good it    
behooves ill-deeds to be punished1 in   
order that men may avoid sin4 ,hence the
 text1 after appointing the punishment  
of the seducer1 adds 7,deut4 #ac3aa73   
,that all ,israel hearing may fear1 and 
may do no more anything like this4 ,he  
would also inflict harm on the injured  
person2 who is compensated by having his
 honor restored in the punishment of the
 man who has injured him4   ,,question  
#fh  ,,of ,,matters ,,concerning        
,,unjust ,,accusation 7,in ,four        
,articles7  ,we must now consider       
matters pertaining to unjust accusation4

 ,under this head there are four points 
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether a man is     
bound to accuse8  7#b7 ,whether the     
accusation should be made in writing8   
7#c7 ,how is an accusation vitiated8    
7#d7 ,how should those be punished who  
have accused a man wrongfully8   ,,first
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #a 
,whether a ,man ,is ,bound to ,accuse8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a man
 is not bound to accuse4 ,for no man is 
excused on account of sin from          
fulfilling a ,divine precept1 since he  
would thus profit by his sin4 ,yet on   
account of sin some are disqualified    
from accusing1 such as those who are    
excommunicate or of evil fame1 or who   
are accused of grievous crimes and are  
not yet proved to be innocent 99#a ,tim4
 #a3e4 ,therefore a man is not bound by 
a ,divine precept to accuse4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 every duty depends on charity 
which is the end of the precept 99,can4 
,definimus1 caus4 iv1 qu4 #a2 caus4 vi1 
qu4 #a3 wherefore it is written 7,rom4  

#ac3h73 ,owe no man anything1 but to    
love one another4 ,now that which       
belongs to charity is a duty that man   
owes to all both of high and of low     
degree1 both superiors and inferiors4   
,since therefore subjects should not    
accuse their superiors1 nor persons of  
lower degree1 those of a higher degree1 
as shown in several chapters 7,decret4  
,,ii1 qu4 vii71 it seems that it is no  
man's duty to accuse4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 no man is bound to act against
 the fidelity which he owes his friend2 
because he ought not to do to another   
what he would not have others do to him4
 ,now to accuse anyone is sometimes     
contrary to the fidelity that one owes a
 friend2 for it is written 7,prov4      
#aa3ac73 ,he that walketh deceitfully1  
revealeth secrets2 but he that is       
faithful1 concealeth the thing committed
 to him by his friend4 ,therefore a man 
is not bound to accuse4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is written 7,lev4 #e3a73  
,if any one sin1 and hear the voice of  

one swearing1 and is a witness either   
because he himself hath seen1 or is     
privy to it3 if he do not utter it1 he  
shall bear his iniquity4  ,i answer     
that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #cc1 ,,aa4  
#f1 #g2 ,q4 #fg1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b71 the    
difference between denunciation and     
accusation is that in denunciation we   
aim at a brother's amendment1 whereas in
 accusation we intend the punishment of 
his crime4 ,now the punishments of this 
life are sought1 not for their own sake1
 because this is not the final time of  
retribution1 but in their character of  
medicine1 conducing either to the       
amendment of the sinner1 or to the good 
of the commonwealth whose calm is       
ensured by the punishment of evil-doers4
 ,the former of these is intended in    
denunciation1 as stated1 whereas the    
second regards properly accusation4     
,hence in the case of a crime that      
conduces to the injury of the           
commonwealth1 a man is bound to         
accusation1 provided he can offer       

sufficient proof1 since it is the       
accuser's duty to prove3 as1 for        
example1 when anyone's sin conduces to  
the bodily or spiritual corruption of   
the community4 ,if1 however1 the sin be 
not such as to affect the community1 or 
if he cannot offer sufficient proof1 a  
man is not bound to attempt to accuse1  
since no man is bound to do what he     
cannot duly accomplish4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,nothing prevents a man being       
debarred by sin from doing what men are 
under an obligation to do3 for instance 
from meriting eternal life1 and from    
receiving the sacraments of the ,church4
 ,nor does a man profit by this3 indeed 
it is a most grievous fault to fail to  
do what one is bound to do1 since       
virtuous acts are perfections of man4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,subjects are debarred 
from accusing their superiors1 if it is 
not the affection of charity but their  
own wickedness that leads them to defame
 and disparage the conduct of their     
superiors 99,append4 ,grat4 ad can4     

,sunt nonnulli1 caus4 ii1 qu4 #g--or    
again if the subject who wishes to      
accuse his superior is himself guilty of
 crime 99,decret4 ,,ii1 qu4 vii1 can4   
,praesumunt44 ,otherwise1 provided they 
be in other respects qualified to       
accuse1 it is lawful for subjects to    
accuse their superiors out of charity4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is contrary to     
fidelity to make known secrets to the   
injury of a person2 but not if they be  
revealed for the good of the community1 
which should always be preferred to a   
private good4 ,hence it is unlawful to  
receive any secret in detriment to the  
common good3 and yet a thing is scarcely
 a secret when there are sufficient     
witnesses to prove it4   ,,second       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,it ,is ,necessary for the     
,accusation to ,be ,made in ,writing8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem           
unnecessary for the accusation to be    
made in writing4 ,for writing was       
devised as an aid to the human memory of

 the past4 ,but an accusation is made in
 the present4 ,therefore the accusation 
needs not to be made in writing4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 it is laid down 7,decret4 
,,ii1 qu4 viii1 can4 ,per scripta7 that 
no man may accuse or be accused in his  
absence4 ,now writing seems to be useful
 in the fact that it is a means of      
notifying something to one who is       
absent1 as ,augustine declares 7,de     
,trin4 x1 #a74 ,therefore the accusation
 need not be in writing3 and all the    
more that the canon declares that no    
accusation in writing should be         
accepted4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a man's  
crime is made known by denunciation1    
even as by accusation4 ,now writing is  
unnecessary in denunciation4 ,therefore 
it is seemingly unnecessary in          
accusation4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
laid down 7,decret4 ,,ii1 qu4 viii1 can4
 ,accusatorum7 that the role of accuser 
must never be sanctioned without the    
accusation be in writing4  ,i answer    
that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #fg1 ,a4    

#c71 when the process in a criminal case
 goes by way of accusation1 the accuser 
is in the position of a party1 so that  
the judge stands between the accuser and
 the accused for the purpose of the     
trial of justice1 wherein it behooves   
one to proceed on certainties1 as far as
 possible4 ,since however verbal        
utterances are apt to escape one's      
memory1 the judge would be unable to    
know for certain what had been said and 
with what qualifications1 when he comes 
to pronounce sentence1 unless it were   
drawn up in writing4 ,hence it has with 
reason been established that the        
accusation1 as well as other parts of   
the judicial procedure1 should be put   
into writing4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,words  
are so many and so various that it is   
difficult to remember each one4 ,a proof
 of this is the fact that if a number of
 people who have heard the same words be
 asked what was said1 they will not     
agree in repeating them1 even after a   
short time4 ,and since a slight         

difference of words changes the sense1  
even though the judge's sentence may    
have to be pronounced soon afterwards1  
the certainty of judgment requires that 
the accusation be drawn up in writing4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,writing is needed not 
only on account of the absence of the   
person who has something to notify1 or  
of the person to whom something is      
notified1 but also on account of the    
delay of time as stated above 7ad #a74  
,hence when the canon says1 ,let no     
accusation be accepted in writing it    
refers to the sending of an accusation  
by one who is absent3 but it does not   
exclude the necessity of writing when   
the accuser is present4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,the denouncer does not bind himself
 to give proofs3 wherefore he is not    
punished if he is unable to prove4 ,for 
this reason writing is unnecessary in a 
denunciation3 and it suffices that the  
denunciation be made verbally to the    
,church1 who will proceed1 in virtue of 
her office1 to the correction of the    

brother4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #c  ,whether an          
,accusation ,is ,rendered ,unjust by    
,calumny1 ,collusion or ,evasion8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an   
accusation is not rendered unjust by    
calumny1 collusion or evasion4 ,for     
according to ,decret4 ,,ii1 qu4 iii     
99,append4 ,grat4 ad can4 ,si quem      
poenituerit41 calumny consists in       
falsely charging a person with a crime4 
,now sometimes one man falsely accuses  
another of a crime through ignorance of 
fact which excuses him4 ,therefore it   
seems that an accusation is not always  
rendered unjust through being           
slanderous4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is  
stated by the same authority that       
collusion consists in hiding the truth  
about a crime4 ,but seemingly this is   
not unlawful1 because one is not bound  
to disclose every crime1 as stated above
 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #cc1 ,a4 #g74 ,therefore  
it seems that an accusation is not      
rendered unjust by collusion4  ,obj4 #c3

 ,further1 it is stated by the same     
authority that evasion consists in      
withdrawing altogether from an          
accusation4 ,but this can be done       
without injustice3 for it is stated     
there also3 ,if a man repent of having  
made a wicked accusation and            
inscription99 in a matter which he      
cannot prove1 and come to an            
understanding with the innocent party   
whom he has accused1 let them acquit one
 another4 99,the accuser was bound by   
,roman ,law to endorse 7se inscribere7  
the writ of accusation4 ,the effect of  
this endorsement or inscription was that
 the accuser bound himself1 if he failed
 to prove the accusation1 to suffer the 
same punishment as the accused would    
have to suffer if proved guilty4        
,therefore evasion does not render an   
accusation unjust4  ,on the contrary1   
,it is stated by the same authority3    
,the rashness of accusers shows itself  
in three ways4 ,for they are guilty     
either of calumny1 or of collusion1 or  

of evasion4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,a4 #a71 accusation is ordered   
for the common good which it aims at    
procuring by means of knowledge of the  
crime4 ,now no man ought to injure a    
person unjustly1 in order to promote the
 common good4 ,wherefore a man may sin  
in two ways when making an accusation3  
first through acting unjustly against   
the accused1 by charging him falsely    
with the commission of a crime1 i4e4 by 
calumniating him2 secondly1 on the part 
of the commonwealth1 whose good is      
intended chiefly in an accusation1 when 
anyone with wicked intent hinders a sin 
being punished4 ,this again happens in  
two ways3 first by having recourse to   
fraud in making the accusation4 ,this   
belongs to collusion 7prevaricatio7 for 
he that is guilty of collusion is like  
one who rides astraddle 7varicator71    
because he helps the other party1 and   
betrays his own side 99,append4 ,grat4  
ad can4 ,si quem poenituerit44 ,secondly
 by withdrawing altogether from the     

accusation4 ,this is evasion            
7tergiversatio7 for by desisting from   
what he had begun he seems to turn his  
back 7tergum vertere74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,a man ought not to proceed to accuse  
except of what he is quite certain      
about1 wherein ignorance of fact has no 
place4 ,yet he who falsely charges      
another with a crime is not a           
calumniator unless he gives utterance to
 false accusations out of malice4 ,for  
it happens sometimes that a man through 
levity of mind proceeds to accuse       
someone1 because he believes too readily
 what he hears1 and this pertains to    
rashness2 while1 on the other hand      
sometimes a man is led to make an       
accusation on account of an error for   
which he is not to blame4 ,all these    
things must be weighed according to the 
judge's prudence1 lest he should declare
 a man to have been guilty of calumny1  
who through levity of mind or an error  
for which he is not to be blamed has    
uttered a false accusation4  ,reply     

,obj4 #b3 ,not everyone who hides the   
truth about a crime is guilty of        
collusion1 but only he who deceitfully  
hides the matter about which he makes   
the accusation1 by collusion with the   
defendant1 dissembling his proofs1 and  
admitting false excuses4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,evasion consists in withdrawing    
altogether from the accusation1 by      
renouncing the intention of accusing1   
not anyhow1 but inordinately4 ,there are
 two ways1 however1 in which a man may  
rightly desist from accusing without    
committing a sin--in one way1 in the    
very process of accusation1 if it come  
to his knowledge that the matter of his 
accusation is false1 and then by mutual 
consent the accuser and the defendant   
acquit one another--in another way1 if  
the accusation be quashed by the        
sovereign to whom belongs the care of   
the common good1 which it is intended to
 procure by the accusation4   ,,fourth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #d  
,whether an ,accuser ,who ,fails to     

,prove ,his ,indictment ,is ,bound to   
the ,punishment of ,retaliation8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
accuser who fails to prove his          
indictment is not bound to the          
punishment of retaliation4 ,for         
sometimes a man is led by a just error  
to make an accusation1 in which case the
 judge acquit the accuser1 as stated in 
,decret4 ,,ii1 qu4 iii4 99,append4      
,grat41 ad can4 ,si quem poenituerit4   
,therefore the accuser who fails to     
prove his indictment is not bound to the
 punishment of retaliation4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 if the punishment of          
retaliation ought to be inflicted on one
 who has accused unjustly1 this will be 
on account of the injury he has done to 
someone--but not on account of any      
injury done to the person of the        
accused1 for in that case the sovereign 
could not remit this punishment1 nor on 
account of an injury to the             
commonwealth1 because then the accused  
could not acquit him4 ,therefore the    

punishment of retaliation is not due to 
one who has failed to prove his         
accusation4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the one
 same sin does not deserve a twofold    
punishment1 according to ,nahum #a3i    
99,septuagint version3 ,god shall not   
judge the same thing a second time4 ,but
 he who fails to prove his accusation1  
incurs the punishment due to defamation 
99,can4 ,infames1 caus4 vi1 qu4 #a1     
which punishment even the ,pope         
seemingly cannot remit1 according to a  
statement of ,pope ,gelasius 99,callist4
 ,i1 ,epist4 ad omn4 ,gall4 episc43     
,although we are able to save souls by  
,penance1 we are unable to remove the   
defamation4 ,therefore he is not bound  
to suffer the punishment of retaliation4
  ,on the contrary1 ,pope ,hadrian ,i   
says 7,cap4 lii73 ,he that fails to     
prove his accusation1 must himself      
suffer the punishment which his         
accusation inferred4  ,i answer that1   
,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 in a case1   
where the procedure is by way of        

accusation1 the accuser holds the       
position of a party aiming at the       
punishment of the accused4 ,now the duty
 of the judge is to establish the       
equality of justice between them3 and   
the equality of justice requires that a 
man should himself suffer whatever harm 
he has intended to be inflicted on      
another1 according to ,ex4 #ba3bd1 ,eye 
for eye1 tooth for tooth4 ,consequently 
it is just that he who by accusing a man
 has put him in danger of being punished
 severely1 should himself suffer a like 
punishment4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #e7       
justice does not always require         
counterpassion1 because it matters      
considerably whether a man injures      
another voluntarily or not4 ,voluntary  
injury deserves punishment1 involuntary 
deserves forgiveness4 ,hence when the   
judge becomes aware that a man has made 
a false accusation1 not with a mind to  
do harm1 but involuntarily through      
ignorance or a just error1 he does not  

impose the punishment of retaliation4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he who accuses        
wrongfully sins both against the person 
of the accused and against the          
commonwealth2 wherefore he is punished  
on both counts4 ,this is the meaning of 
what is written 7,deut4 #ai3ah-bj73 ,and
 when after most diligent inquisition1  
they shall find that the false witness  
hath told a lie against his brother3    
they shall render to him as he meant to 
do to his brother1 and this refers to   
the injury done to the person3 and      
afterwards1 referring to the injury done
 to the commonwealth1 the text          
continues3 ,and thou shalt take away the
 evil out of the midst of thee1 that    
others hearing may fear1 and may not    
dare to do such things4 ,specially1     
however1 does he injure the person of   
the accused1 if he accuse him falsely4  
,wherefore the accused1 if innocent1 may
 condone the injury done to himself1    
particularly if the accusation were made
 not calumniously but out of levity of  

mind4 ,but if the accuser desist from   
accusing an innocent man1 through       
collusion with the latter's adversary1  
he inflicts an injury on the            
commonwealth3 and this cannot be        
condoned by the accused1 although it can
 be remitted by the sovereign1 who has  
charge of the commonwealth4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,the accuser deserves the     
punishment of retaliation in            
compensation for the harm he attempts to
 inflict on his neighbor3 but the       
punishment of disgrace is due to him for
 his wickedness in accusing another man 
calumniously4 ,sometimes the sovereign  
remits the punishment1 and not the      
disgrace1 and sometimes he removes the  
disgrace also3 wherefore the ,pope also 
can remove this disgrace4 ,when ,pope   
,gelasius says3 ,we cannot remove the   
disgrace1 he may mean either the        
disgrace attaching to the deed 7infamia 
facti71 or that sometimes it is not     
expedient to remove it1 or again he may 
be referring to the disgrace inflicted  

by the civil judge1 as ,gratian states  
7,callist4 ,i1 ,epist4 ad omn4 ,gall4   
episc474   ,,question #fi  ,,of ,,sins  
,,committed ,,against ,,justice ,,on    
,,the ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,defendant 7,in
 ,four ,articles7  ,we must now consider
 those sins which are committed against 
justice on the part of the defendant4   
,under this head there are four points  
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether it is a      
mortal sin to deny the truth which would
 lead to one's condemnation8  7#b7      
,whether it is lawful to defend oneself 
with calumnies8  7#c7 ,whether it is    
lawful to escape condemnation by        
appealing8  7#d7 ,whether it is lawful  
for one who has been condemned to defend
 himself by violence if he be able to do
 so8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 
#fi1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,one ,can1      
,without a ,mortal ,sin1 ,deny the      
,truth ,which ,would ,lead to ,one's    
,condemnation8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem one can1 without a mortal sin1    
deny the truth which would lead to one's

 condemnation4 ,for ,chrysostom says    
7,hom4 xxxi super ,ep4 ad ,heb473 ,i do 
not say that you should lay bare your   
guilt publicly1 nor accuse yourself     
before others4 ,now if the accused were 
to confess the truth in court1 he would 
lay bare his guilt and be his own       
accuser4 ,therefore he is not bound to  
tell the truth3 and so he does not sin  
mortally if he tell a lie in court4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as it is an    
officious lie when one tells a lie in   
order to rescue another man from death1 
so is it an officious lie when one tells
 a lie in order to free oneself from    
death1 since one is more bound towards  
oneself than towards another4 ,now an   
officious lie is considered not a mortal
 but a venial sin4 ,therefore if the    
accused denies the truth in court1 in   
order to escape death1 he does not sin  
mortally4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every    
mortal sin is contrary to charity1 as   
stated above 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #ab74 ,but   
that the accused lie by denying himself 

to be guilty of the crime laid to his   
charge is not contrary to charity1      
neither as regards the love we owe ,god1
 nor as to the love due to our neighbor4
 ,therefore such a lie is not a mortal  
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,whatever is    
opposed to the glory of ,god is a mortal
 sin1 because we are bound by precept to
 do all to the glory of ,god 7#a ,cor4  
#aj3ca74 ,now it is to the glory of ,god
 that the accused confess that which is 
alleged against him1 as appears from the
 words of ,josue to ,achan1 ,my son1    
give glory to the ,lord ,god of ,israel1
 and confess and tell me what thou hast 
done1 hide it not 7,joshua #g3ai74      
,therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in 
order to cover one's guilt4  ,i answer  
that1 ,whoever acts against the due     
order of justice1 sins mortally1 as     
stated above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #d74 ,now it 
belongs to the order of justice that a  
man should obey his superior in those   
matters to which the rights of his      
authority extend4 ,again1 the judge1 as 

stated above 7,q4 #fg1 ,a4 #a71 is the  
superior in relation to the person whom 
he judges4 ,therefore the accused is in 
duty bound to tell the judge the truth  
which the latter exacts from him        
according to the form of law4 ,hence if 
he refuse to tell the truth which he is 
under obligation to tell1 or if he      
mendaciously deny it1 he sins mortally4 
,if1 on the other hand1 the judge asks  
of him that which he cannot ask in      
accordance with the order of justice1   
the accused is not bound to satisfy him1
 and he may lawfully escape by appealing
 or otherwise3 but it is not lawful for 
him to lie4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when a   
man is examined by the judge according  
to the order of justice1 he does not lay
 bare his own guilt1 but his guilt is   
unmasked by another1 since the          
obligation of answering is imposed on   
him by one whom he is bound to obey4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to lie1 with injury to
 another person1 in order to rescue a   
man from death is not a purely officious

 lie1 for it has an admixture of the    
pernicious lie3 and when a man lies in  
court in order to exculpate himself1 he 
does an injury to one whom he is bound  
to obey1 since he refuses him his due1  
namely an avowal of the truth4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,he who lies in court by      
denying his guilt1 acts both against the
 love of ,god to whom judgment belongs1 
and against the love of his neighbor1   
and this not only as regards the judge1 
to whom he refuses his due1 but also as 
regards his accuser1 who is punished if 
he fail to prove his accusation4 ,hence 
it is written 7,ps4 #adj3d73 ,incline   
not my heart to evil words1 to make     
excuses in sins3 on which words a gloss 
says3 ,shameless men are wont by lying  
to deny their guilt when they have been 
found out4 ,and ,gregory in expounding  
,job #ca3cc1 ,if as a man ,i have hid my
 sin1 says 7,moral4 xxii1 #ae73 ,it is a
 common vice of mankind to sin in       
secret1 by lying to hide the sin that   
has been committed1 and when convicted  

to aggravate the sin by defending       
oneself4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #fi1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,it ,is    
,lawful for the ,accused to ,defend     
,himself with ,calumnies8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem lawful for the       
accused to defend himself with          
calumnies4 ,because1 according to civil 
law 7,cod4 ,,ii1 iv1 ,de transact4 #ah71
 when a man is on trial for his life it 
is lawful for him to bribe his          
adversary4 ,now this is done chiefly by 
defending oneself with calumnies4       
,therefore the accused who is on trial  
for his life does not sin if he defend  
himself with calumnies4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 an accuser who is guilty of   
collusion with the accused1 is          
punishable by law 7,decret4 ,,ii1 qu4   
iii1 can4 ,si quem poenit474 ,yet no    
punishment is imposed on the accused for
 collusion with the accuser4 ,therefore 
it would seem lawful for the accused to 
defend himself with calumnies4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 it is written 7,prov4     

#ad3af73 ,a wise man feareth and        
declineth from evil1 the fool leapeth   
over and is confident4 ,now what is done
 wisely is no sin4 ,therefore no matter 
how a man declines from evil1 he does   
not sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,in criminal
 cases an oath has to be taken against  
calumnious allegations 7,extra1 ,de     
juramento calumniae1 cap4 ,inhaerentes73
 and this would not be the case if it   
were lawful to defend oneself with      
calumnies4 ,therefore it is not lawful  
for the accused to defend himself with  
calumnies4  ,i answer that1 ,it is one  
thing to withhold the truth1 and another
 to utter a falsehood4 ,the former is   
lawful sometimes1 for a man is not bound
 to divulge all truth1 but only such as 
the judge can and must require of him   
according to the order of justice2 as1  
for instance1 when the accused is       
already disgraced through the commission
 of some crime1 or certain indications  
of his guilt have already been          
discovered1 or again when his guilt is  

already more or less proven4 ,on the    
other hand it is never lawful to make a 
false declaration4  ,as regards what he 
may do lawfully1 a man can employ either
 lawful means1 and such as are adapted  
to the end in view1 which belongs to    
prudence2 or he can use unlawful means1 
unsuitable to the proposed end1 and this
 belongs to craftiness1 which is        
exercised by fraud and guile1 as shown  
above 7,q4 #ee1 ,,aa4 #c1 seqq474 ,his  
conduct in the former case is           
praiseworthy1 in the latter sinful4     
,accordingly it is lawful for the       
accused to defend himself by withholding
 the truth that he is not bound to avow1
 by suitable means1 for instance by not 
answering such questions as he is not   
bound to answer4 ,this is not to defend 
himself with calumnies1 but to escape   
prudently4 ,but it is unlawful for him1 
either to utter a falsehood1 or to      
withhold a truth that he is bound to    
avow1 or to employ guile or fraud1      
because fraud and guile have the force  

of a lie1 and so to use them would be to
 defend oneself with calumnies4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,human laws leave many things 
unpunished1 which according to the      
,divine judgment are sins1 as1 for      
example1 simple fornication2 because    
human law does not exact perfect virtue 
from man1 for such virtue belongs to few
 and cannot be found in so great a      
number of people as human law has to    
direct4 ,that a man is sometimes        
unwilling to commit a sin in order to   
escape from the death of the body1 the  
danger of which threatens the accused   
who is on trial for his life1 is an act 
of perfect virtue1 since death is the   
most fearful of all temporal things     
7,ethic4 iii1 #f74 ,wherefore if the    
accused1 who is on trial for his life1  
bribes his adversary1 he sins indeed by 
inducing him to do what is unlawful1 yet
 the civil law does not punish this sin1
 and in this sense it is said to be     
lawful4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if the       
accuser is guilty of collusion with the 

accused and the latter is guilty1 he    
incurs punishment1 and so it is evident 
that he sins4 ,wherefore1 since it is a 
sin to induce a man to sin1 or to take  
part in a sin in any way--for the       
,apostle says 7,rom4 #a3cb71 that they 4
 4 4 are worthy of death 4 4 4 that     
consent to those who sin--it is evident 
that the accused also sins if he is     
guilty of collusion with his adversary4 
,nevertheless according to human laws no
 punishment is inflicted on him1 for the
 reason given above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,the wise man hides himself not by      
slandering others but by exercising     
prudence4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #fi1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,it ,is    
,lawful for the ,accused to ,escape     
,judgment by ,appealing8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem unlawful for the accused
 to escape judgment by appealing4 ,the  
,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3a73 ,let every 
soul be subject to the higher powers4   
,now the accused by appealing refuses to
 be subject to a higher power1 viz4 the 

judge4 ,therefore he commits a sin4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ordinary authority  
is more binding than that which we      
choose for ourselves4 ,now according to 
the ,decretals 7,,ii1 qu4 vi1 cap4 ,a   
judicibus7 it is unlawful to appeal from
 the judges chosen by common consent4   
,much less therefore is it lawful to    
appeal from ordinary judges4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 whatever is lawful once is    
always lawful4 ,but it is not lawful to 
appeal after the tenth day 99,can4      
,anteriorum1 caus4 ii1 qu4 #f1 nor a    
third time on the same point 99,can4 ,si
 autem1 caus4 ii1 qu4 #f4 ,therefore it 
would seem that an appeal is unlawful in
 itself4  ,on the contrary1 ,paul       
appealed to ,caesar 7,acts #be74  ,i    
answer that1 ,there are two motives for 
which a man appeals4 ,first through     
confidence in the justice of his cause1 
seeing that he is unjustly oppressed by 
the judge1 and then it is lawful for him
 to appeal1 because this is a prudent   
means of escape4 ,hence it is laid down 

7,decret4 ,,ii1 qu4 vi1 can4 ,omnis     
oppressus73 ,all those who are oppressed
 are free1 if they so wish1 to appeal to
 the judgment of the priests1 and no man
 may stand in their way4 ,secondly1 a   
man appeals in order to cause a delay1  
lest a just sentence be pronounced      
against him4 ,this is to defend oneself 
calumniously1 and is unlawful as stated 
above 7,a4 #b74 ,for he inflicts an     
injury both on the judge1 whom he       
hinders in the exercise of his office1  
and on his adversary1 whose justice he  
disturbs as far as he is able4 ,hence it
 is laid down 7,,ii1 qu4 vi1 can4       
,omnino puniendus73 ,without doubt a man
 should be punished if his appeal be    
declared unjust4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a   
man should submit to the lower authority
 in so far as the latter observes the   
order of the higher authority4 ,if the  
lower authority departs from the order  
of the higher1 we ought not to submit to
 it1 for instance if the proconsul order
 one thing and the emperor another1     

according to a gloss on ,rom4 #ac3b4    
,now when a judge oppresses anyone      
unjustly1 in this respect he departs    
from the order of the higher authority1 
whereby he is obliged to judge justly4  
,hence it is lawful for a man who is    
oppressed unjustly1 to have recourse to 
the authority of the higher power1 by   
appealing either before or after        
sentence has been pronounced4 ,and since
 it is to be presumed that there is no  
rectitude where true faith is lacking1  
it is unlawful for a ,catholic to appeal
 to an unbelieving judge1 according to  
,decret4 ,,ii1 qu4 vi1 can4 ,catholicus3
 ,the ,catholic who appeals to the      
decision of a judge of another faith    
shall be excommunicated1 whether his    
case be just or unjust4 ,hence the      
,apostle also rebuked those who went to 
law before unbelievers 7#a ,cor4 #f3f74 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is due to a man's  
own fault or neglect that1 of his own   
accord1 he submits to the judgment of   
one in whose justice he has no          

confidence4 ,moreover it would seem to  
point to levity of mind for a man not to
 abide by what he has once approved of4 
,hence it is with reason that the law   
refuses us the faculty of appealing from
 the decision of judges of our own      
choice1 who have no power save by virtue
 of the consent of the litigants4 ,on   
the other hand the authority of an      
ordinary judge depends1 not on the      
consent of those who are subject to his 
judgment1 but on the authority of the   
king or prince who appointed him4       
,hence1 as a remedy against his unjust  
oppression1 the law allows one to have  
recourse to appeal1 so that even if the 
judge be at the same time ordinary and  
chosen by the litigants1 it is lawful to
 appeal from his decision1 since        
seemingly his ordinary authority        
occasioned his being chosen as          
arbitrator4 ,nor is it to be imputed as 
a fault to the man who consented to his 
being arbitrator1 without adverting to  
the fact that he was appointed ordinary 

judge by the prince4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,the equity of the law so guards the    
interests of the one party that the     
other is not oppressed4 ,thus it allows 
ten days for appeal to be made1 this    
being considered sufficient time for    
deliberating on the expediency of an    
appeal4 ,if on the other hand there were
 no fixed time limit for appealing1 the 
certainty of judgment would ever be in  
suspense1 so that the other party would 
suffer an injury4 ,the reason why it is 
not allowed to appeal a third time on   
the same point1 is that it is not       
probable that the judges would fail to  
judge justly so many times4   ,,fourth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,art4 #d  
,whether a ,man ,who ,is ,condemned to  
,death ,may ,lawfully ,defend ,himself  
,if ,he ,can8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that a man who is condemned to     
death may lawfully defend himself if he 
can4 ,for it is always lawful to do that
 to which nature inclines us1 as being  
of natural right1 so to speak4 ,now1 to 

resist corruption is an inclination of  
nature not only in men and animals but  
also in things devoid of sense4         
,therefore if he can do so1 the accused1
 after condemnation1 may lawfully resist
 being put to death4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 just as a man1 by resistance1 
escapes the death to which he has been  
condemned1 so does he by flight4 ,now it
 is lawful seemingly to escape death by 
flight1 according to ,ecclus4 #i3ah1    
,keep thee far from the man that hath   
power to kill and not to quicken 99,the 
words in the brackets are not in the    
,vulgate4 ,therefore it is also lawful  
for the accused to resist4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 it is written 7,prov4 #bd3aa73
 ,deliver them that are led to death3   
and those that are drawn to death       
forbear not to deliver4 ,now a man is   
under greater obligation to himself than
 to another4 ,therefore it is lawful for
 a condemned man to defend himself from 
being put to death4  ,on the contrary1  
,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3b73 ,he   

that resisteth the power1 resisteth the 
ordinance of ,god3 and they that resist1
 purchase to themselves damnation4 ,now 
a condemned man1 by defending himself1  
resists the power in the point of its   
being ordained by ,god for the          
punishment of evil-doers1 and for the   
praise of the good 99#a ,pet4 #b3ad4    
,therefore he sins in defending himself4
  ,i answer that1 ,a man may be         
condemned to death in two ways4 ,first  
justly1 and then it is not lawful for   
the condemned to defend himself1 because
 it is lawful for the judge to combat   
his resistance by force1 so that on his 
part the fight is unjust1 and           
consequently without any doubt he sins4 
,secondly a man is condemned unjustly3  
and such a sentence is like the violence
 of robbers1 according to ,ezech4       
#bb3ba1 ,her princes in the midst of her
 are like wolves ravening the prey to   
shed blood4 ,wherefore even as it is    
lawful to resist robbers1 so is it      
lawful1 in a like case1 to resist wicked

 princes2 except perhaps in order to    
avoid scandal1 whence some grave        
disturbance might be feared to arise4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reason was given to   
man that he might ensue those things to 
which his nature inclines1 not in all   
cases1 but in accordance with the order 
of reason4 ,hence not all self-defense  
is lawful1 but only such as is          
accomplished with due moderation4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when a man is         
condemned to death1 he has not to kill  
himself1 but to suffer death3 wherefore 
he is not bound to do anything from     
which death would result1 such as to    
stay in the place whence he would be led
 to execution4 ,but he may not resist   
those who lead him to death1 in order   
that he may not suffer what is just for 
him to suffer4 ,even so1 if a man were  
condemned to die of hunger1 he does not 
sin if he partakes of food brought to   
him secretly1 because to refrain from   
taking it would be to kill himself4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this saying of the    

wise man does not direct that one should
 deliver a man from death in opposition 
to the order of justice3 wherefore      
neither should a man deliver himself    
from death by resisting against justice4
   ,,question #gj  ,,of ,,injustice     
,,with ,,regard ,,to ,,the ,,person ,,of
 ,,the ,,witness 7,in ,four ,articles7  
,we must now consider injustice with    
regard to the person of the witness4    
,under this head there are four points  
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether a man is     
bound to give evidence8  7#b7 ,whether  
the evidence of two or three witnesses  
suffices8  7#c7 ,whether a man's        
evidence may be rejected without any    
fault on his part8  7#d7 ,whether it is 
a mortal sin to bear false witness8     
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1   
,art4 #a  ,whether a ,man ,is ,bound to 
,give ,evidence8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem that a man is not bound to   
give evidence4 ,augustine says 7,,qq4   
,gen4 #a3bf7 99,cf4 ,contra ,faust4     
xxii1 #cc1 #cd1 that when ,abraham said 

of his wife 7,gen4 #bj3b71 ,she is my   
sister1 he wished the truth to be       
concealed and not a lie be told4 ,now1  
by hiding the truth a man abstains from 
giving evidence4 ,therefore a man is not
 bound to give evidence4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 no man is bound to act        
deceitfully4 ,now it is written 7,prov4 
#aa3ac73 ,he that walketh deceitfully   
revealeth secrets1 but he that is       
faithful concealeth the thing committed 
to him by his friend4 ,therefore a man  
is not always bound to give evidence1   
especially on matters committed to him  
as a secret by a friend4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 clerics and priests1 more than
 others1 are bound to those things that 
are necessary for salvation4 ,yet       
clerics and priests are forbidden to    
give evidence when a man is on trial for
 his life4 ,therefore it is not         
necessary for salvation to give         
evidence4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 
99,can4 ,quisquis1 caus4 xi1 qu4 #c1    
cap4 ,falsidicus2 cf4 ,isidore1         

,sentent4 iii1 #ee says3 ,both he who   
conceals the truth and he who tells a   
lie are guilty1 the former because he is
 unwilling to do good1 the latter       
because he desires to hurt4  ,i answer  
that1 ,we must make a distinction in the
 matter of giving evidence3 because     
sometimes a certain man's evidence is   
necessary1 and sometimes not4 ,if the   
necessary evidence is that of a man     
subject to a superior whom1 in matters  
pertaining to justice1 he is bound to   
obey1 without doubt he is bound to give 
evidence on those points which are      
required of him in accordance with the  
order of justice1 for instance on       
manifest things or when ill-report has  
preceded4 ,if however he is required to 
give evidence on other points1 for      
instance secret matters1 and those of   
which no ill-report has preceded1 he is 
not bound to give evidence4 ,on the     
other hand1 if his evidence be required 
by authority of a superior whom he is   
bound to obey1 we must make a           

distinction3 because if his evidence is 
required in order to deliver a man from 
an unjust death or any other penalty1 or
 from false defamation1 or some loss1 in
 such cases he is bound to give         
evidence4 ,even if his evidence is not  
demanded1 he is bound to do what he can 
to declare the truth to someone who may 
profit thereby4 ,for it is written 7,ps4
 #ha3d73 ,rescue the poor1 and deliver  
the needy from the hand of the sinner2  
and 7,prov4 #bd3aa73 ,deliver them that 
are led to death2 and 7,rom4 #a3cb73    
,they are worthy of death1 not only they
 that do them1 but they also that       
consent to them that do them1 on which  
words a gloss says3 ,to be silent when  
one can disprove is to consent4 ,in     
matters pertaining to a man's           
condemnation1 one is not bound to give  
evidence1 except when one is constrained
 by a superior in accordance with the   
order of justice2 since if the truth of 
such a matter be concealed1 no          
particular injury is inflicted on       

anyone4 ,or1 if some danger threatens   
the accuser1 it matters not since he    
risked the danger of his own accord3    
whereas it is different with the        
accused1 who incurs the danger against  
his will4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine  
is speaking of concealment of the truth 
in a case when a man is not compelled by
 his superior's authority to declare the
 truth1 and when such concealment is not
 specially injurious to any person4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man should by no    
means give evidence on matters secretly 
committed to him in confession1 because 
he knows such things1 not as man but as 
,god's minister3 and the sacrament is   
more binding than any human precept4    
,but as regards matters committed to man
 in some other way under secrecy1 we    
must make a distinction4 ,sometimes they
 are of such a nature that one is bound 
to make them known as soon as they come 
to our knowledge1 for instance if they  
conduce to the spiritual or corporal    
corruption of the community1 or to some 

grave personal injury1 in short any like
 matter that a man is bound to make     
known either by giving evidence or by   
denouncing it4 ,against such a duty a   
man cannot be obliged to act on the plea
 that the matter is committed to him    
under secrecy1 for he would break the   
faith he owes to another4 ,on the other 
hand sometimes they are such as one is  
not bound to make known1 so that one may
 be under obligation not to do so on    
account of their being committed to one 
under secrecy4 ,in such a case one is by
 no means bound to make them known1 even
 if the superior should command2 because
 to keep faith is of natural right1 and 
a man cannot be commanded to do what is 
contrary to natural right4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,it is unbecoming for ministers of 
the altar to slay a man or to cooperate 
in his slaying1 as stated above 7,q4    
#fd1 ,a4 #d72 hence according to the    
order of justice they cannot be         
compelled to give evidence when a man is
 on trial for his life4   ,,second      

,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #b  
,whether the ,evidence of ,two or ,three
 ,persons ,suffices8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that the evidence of two or 
three persons is not sufficient4 ,for   
judgment requires certitude4 ,now       
certitude of the truth is not obtained  
by the assertions of two or three       
witnesses1 for we read that ,naboth was 
unjustly condemned on the evidence of   
two witnesses 7#c ,kings #ba74          
,therefore the evidence of two or three 
witnesses does not suffice4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 in order for evidence to be   
credible it must agree4 ,but frequently 
the evidence of two or three disagrees  
in some point4 ,therefore it is of no   
use for proving the truth in court4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is laid down     
7,decret4 ,,ii1 qu4 iv1 can4 ,praesul473
 ,a bishop shall not be condemned save  
on the evidence of seventy-two          
witnesses2 nor a cardinal priest of the 
,roman ,church1 unless there be         
sixty-four witnesses4 ,nor a cardinal   

deacon of the ,roman ,church1 unless    
there be twenty-seven witnesses2 nor a  
subdeacon1 an acolyte1 an exorcist1 a   
reader or a doorkeeper without seven    
witnesses4 ,now the sin of one who is of
 higher dignity is more grievous1 and   
consequently should be treated more     
severely4 ,therefore neither is the     
evidence of two or three witnesses      
sufficient for the condemnation of other
 persons4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is     
written 7,deut4 #ag3f73 ,by the mouth of
 two or three witnesses shall he die    
that is to be slain1 and further on     
7,deut4 #ai3ae73 ,in the mouth of two or
 three witnesses every word shall stand4
  ,i answer that1 ,according to the     
,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #c71 we must   
not expect to find certitude equally in 
every matter4 ,for in human acts1 on    
which judgments are passed and evidence 
required1 it is impossible to have      
demonstrative certitude1 because they   
are about things contingent and         
variable4 ,hence the certitude of       

probability suffices1 such as may reach 
the truth in the greater number of      
cases1 although it fail in the minority4
 ,now it is probable that the assertion 
of several witnesses contains the truth 
rather than the assertion of one3 and   
since the accused is the only one who   
denies1 while several witness affirm the
 same as the prosecutor1 it is          
reasonably established both by ,divine  
and by human law1 that the assertion of 
several witnesses should be upheld4 ,now
 all multitude is comprised of three    
elements1 the beginning1 the middle and 
the end4 ,wherefore1 according to the   
,philosopher 7,de ,coelo i1 #a71 we     
reckon 'all' and 'whole' to consist of  
three parts4 ,now we have a triple      
voucher when two agree with the         
prosecutor3 hence two witnesses are     
required2 or for the sake of greater    
certitude three1 which is the perfect   
number4 ,wherefore it is written        
7,eccles4 #d3ab73 ,a threefold cord is  
not easily broken3 and ,augustine1      

commenting on ,john #h3ag1 ,the         
testimony of two men is true1 says      
7,tract4 xxxvi7 that there is here a    
mystery by which we are given to        
understand that ,trinity wherein is     
perpetual stability of truth4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,no matter how great a number 
of witnesses may be determined1 the     
evidence might sometimes be unjust1     
since is written 7,ex4 #bc3b73 ,thou    
shalt not follow the multitude to do    
evil4 ,and yet the fact that in so many 
it is not possible to have certitude    
without fear of error1 is no reason why 
we should reject the certitude which can
 probably be had through two or three   
witnesses1 as stated above4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,if the witnesses disagree in 
certain principal circumstances which   
change the substance of the fact1 for   
instance in time1 place1 or persons1    
which are chiefly in question1 their    
evidence is of no weight1 because if    
they disagree in such things1 each one  
would seem to be giving distinct        

evidence and to be speaking of different
 facts4 ,for instance1 one say that a   
certain thing happened at such and such 
a time or place1 while another says it  
happened at another time or place1 they 
seem not to be speaking of the same     
event4 ,the evidence is not weakened if 
one witness says that he does not       
remember1 while the other attests to a  
determinate time or place4 ,and if on   
such points as these the witness for    
prosecution and defense disagree        
altogether1 and if they be equal in     
number on either side1 and of equal     
standing1 the accused should have the   
benefit of the doubt1 because the judge 
ought to be more inclined to acquit than
 to condemn1 except perhaps in favorable
 suits1 such as a pleading for liberty  
and the like4 ,if1 however1 the         
witnesses for the same side disagree1   
the judge ought to use his own          
discretion in discerning which side to  
favor1 by considering either the number 
of witnesses1 or their standing1 or the 

favorableness of the suit1 or the nature
 of the business and of the evidence4   
,much more ought the evidence of one    
witness to be rejected if he contradict 
himself when questioned about what he   
has seen and about what he knows2 not1  
however1 if he contradict himself when  
questioned about matters of opinion and 
report1 since he may be moved to answer 
differently according to the different  
things he has seen and heard4  ,on the  
other hand if there be discrepancy of   
evidence in circumstances not touching  
the substance of the fact1 for instance1
 whether the weather were cloudy or     
fine1 whether the house were painted or 
not1 or such like matters1 such         
discrepancy does not weaken the         
evidence1 because men are not wont to   
take much notice of such things1        
wherefore they easily forget them4      
,indeed1 a discrepancy of this kind     
renders the evidence more credible1 as  
,chrysostom states 7,hom4 i in ,matth471
 because if the witnesses agreed in     

every point1 even in the minutest of    
details1 they would seem to have        
conspired together to say the same      
thing3 but this must be left to the     
prudent discernment of the judge4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this passage refers   
specially to the bishops1 priests1      
deacons and clerics of the ,roman       
,church1 on account of its dignity3 and 
this for three reasons4 ,first because  
in that ,church those men ought to be   
promoted whose sanctity makes their     
evidence of more weight than that of    
many witnesses4 ,secondly1 because those
 who have to judge other men1 often have
 many opponents on account of their     
justice1 wherefore those who give       
evidence against them should not be     
believed indiscriminately1 unless they  
be very numerous4 ,thirdly1 because the 
condemnation of any one of them would   
detract in public opinion from the      
dignity and authority of that ,church1 a
 result which would be more fraught with
 danger than if one were to tolerate a  

sinner in that same ,church1 unless he  
were very notorious and manifest1 so    
that a grave scandal would arise if he  
were tolerated4   ,,third ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #c  ,whether a
 ,man's ,evidence ,can ,be ,rejected    
,without ,any ,fault of ,his8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a    
man's evidence ought not to be rejected 
except on account of some fault4 ,for it
 is inflicted as a penalty on some that 
their evidence is inadmissible1 as in   
the case of those who are branded with  
infamy4 ,now a penalty must not be      
inflicted save for a fault4 ,therefore  
it would seem that no man's evidence    
ought to be rejected save on account of 
a fault4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,good is  
to be presumed of every one1 unless the 
contrary appear 99,cap4 ,dudum1 de      
,praesumpt44 ,now it pertains to a man's
 goodness that he should give true      
evidence4 ,since therefore there can be 
no proof of the contrary1 unless there  
be some fault of his1 it would seem that

 no man's evidence should be rejected   
save for some fault4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 no man is rendered unfit for  
things necessary for salvation except by
 some sin4 ,but it is necessary for     
salvation to give true evidence1 as     
stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore no man
 should be excluded from giving evidence
 save for some fault4  ,on the contrary1
 ,gregory says 7,regist4 xiii1 #dd73 ,as
 to the bishop who is said to have been 
accused by his servants1 you are to know
 that they should by no means have been 
heard3 which words are embodied in the  
,decretals 7,,ii1 qu4 #a1 can4          
,imprimis74  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,a4 #b71 the authority of        
evidence is not infallible but probable2
 and consequently the evidence for one  
side is weakened by whatever strengthens
 the probability of the other4 ,now the 
reliability of a person's evidence is   
weakened1 sometimes indeed on account of
 some fault of his1 as in the case of   
unbelievers and persons of evil repute1 

as well as those who are guilty of a    
public crime and who are not allowed    
even to accuse2 sometimes1 without any  
fault on his part1 and this owing either
 to a defect in the reason1 as in the   
case of children1 imbeciles and women1  
or to personal feeling1 as in the case  
of enemies1 or persons united by family 
or household ties1 or again owing to    
some external condition1 as in the case 
of poor people1 slaves1 and those who   
are under authority1 concerning whom it 
is to be presumed that they might easily
 be induced to give evidence against the
 truth4  ,thus it is manifest that a    
person's evidence may be rejected either
 with or without some fault of his4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if a person is        
disqualified from giving evidence this  
is done as a precaution against false   
evidence rather than as a punishment4   
,hence the argument does not prove4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good is to be presumed
 of everyone unless the contrary appear1
 provided this does not threaten injury 

to another3 because1 in that case1 one  
ought to be careful not to believe      
everyone readily1 according to #a ,john 
#d3a3 ,believe not every spirit4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,to give evidence is         
necessary for salvation1 provided the   
witness be competent1 and the order of  
justice observed4 ,hence nothing hinders
 certain persons being excused from     
giving evidence1 if they be considered  
unfit according to law4   ,,fourth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,it ,is ,always a ,mortal ,sin 
to ,give ,false ,evidence8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that it is not always
 a mortal sin to give false evidence4   
,for a person may happen to give false  
evidence1 through ignorance of fact4    
,now such ignorance excuses from mortal 
sin4 ,therefore the giving of false     
evidence is not always a mortal sin4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a lie that benefits 
someone and hurts no man is officious1  
and this is not a mortal sin4 ,now      
sometimes a lie of this kind occurs in  

false evidence1 as when a person gives  
false evidence in order to save a man   
from death1 or from an unjust sentence  
which threatens him through other false 
witnesses or a perverse judge4          
,therefore in such cases it is not a    
mortal sin to give false evidence4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a witness is        
required to take an oath in order that  
he may fear to commit a mortal sin of   
perjury4 ,but this would not be         
necessary1 if it were already a mortal  
sin to give false evidence4 ,therefore  
the giving of false evidence is not     
always mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1   
,it is written 7,prov4 #ai3e73 ,a false 
witness shall not be unpunished4  ,i    
answer that1 ,false evidence has a      
threefold deformity4 ,the first is owing
 to perjury1 since witnesses are        
admitted only on oath and on this count 
it is always a mortal sin4 ,secondly1   
owing to the violation of justice1 and  
on this account it is a mortal sin      
generically1 even as any kind of        

injustice4 ,hence the prohibition of    
false evidence by the precept of the    
decalogue is expressed in this form when
 it is said 7,ex4 #bj3af71 ,thou shalt  
not bear false witness against thy      
neighbor4 ,for one does nothing against 
a man by preventing him from doing      
someone an injury1 but only by taking   
away his justice4 ,thirdly1 owing to the
 falsehood itself1 by reason of which   
every lie is a sin3 on this account1 the
 giving of false evidence is not always 
a mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in     
giving evidence a man ought not to      
affirm as certain1 as though he knew it1
 that about which he is not certain2 and
 he should confess his doubt in doubtful
 terms1 and that which he is certain    
about1 in terms of certainty4 ,owing    
however to the frailty of the human     
memory1 a man sometimes thinks he is    
certain about something that is not     
true2 and then if after thinking over   
the matter with due care he deems       
himself certain about that false thing1 

he does not sin mortally if he asserts  
it1 because the evidence which he gives 
is not directly and intentionally1 but  
accidentally contrary to what he        
intends4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an unjust   
judgment is not a judgment1 wherefore   
the false evidence given in an unjust   
judgment1 in order to prevent injustice 
is not a mortal sin by virtue of the    
judgment1 but only by reason of the oath
 violated4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,men abhor 
chiefly those sins that are against     
,god1 as being most grievous2 and among 
them is perjury3 whereas they do not    
abhor so much sins against their        
neighbor4 ,consequently1 for the greater
 certitude of evidence1 the witness is  
required to take a oath4   ,,question   
#ga  ,,of ,,injustice ,,in ,,judgment   
,,on ,,the ,,part ,,of ,,counsel 7,in   
,four ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
the injustice which takes place in      
judgment on the part of counsel1 and    
under this head there are four points of
 inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether an advocate is 

bound to defend the suits of the poor8  
7#b7 ,whether certain persons should be 
prohibited from exercising the office of
 advocate8  7#c7 ,whether an advocate   
sins by defending an unjust cause8  7#d7
 ,whether he sins if he accept a fee for
 defending a suit8   ,,first ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
an ,advocate ,is ,bound to ,defend the  
,suits of the ,poor8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that an advocate is bound to
 defend the suits of the poor4 ,for it  
is written 7,ex4 #bc3e73 ,if thou see   
the ass of him that hateth thee lie     
underneath his burden1 thou shalt not   
pass by1 but shall lift him up with him4
 ,now no less a danger threatens the    
poor man whose suit is being unjustly   
prejudiced1 than if his ass were to lie 
underneath its burden4 ,therefore an    
advocate is bound to defend the suits of
 the poor4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory
 says in a homily 7ix in ,evang473 ,let 
him that hath understanding beware lest 
he withhold his knowledge2 let him that 

hath abundance of wealth watch lest he  
slacken his merciful bounty2 let him who
 is a servant to art share his skill    
with his neighbor2 let him who has an   
opportunity of speaking with the wealthy
 plead the cause of the poor3 for the   
slightest gift you have received will be
 reputed a talent4 ,now every man is    
bound1 not to hide but faithfully to    
dispense the talent committed to him2 as
 evidenced by the punishment inflicted  
on the servant who hid his talent       
7,matt4 #be3cj74 ,therefore an advocate 
is bound to plead for the poor4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 the precept about         
performing works of mercy1 being        
affirmative1 is binding according to    
time and place1 and this is chiefly in  
cases of need4 ,now it seems to be a    
case of need when the suit of a poor man
 is being prejudiced4 ,therefore it     
seems that in such a case an advocate is
 bound to defend the poor man's suit4   
,on the contrary1 ,he that lacks food is
 no less in need than he that lacks an  

advocate4 ,yet he that is able to give  
food is not always bound to feed the    
needy4 ,therefore neither is an advocate
 always bound to defend the suits of the
 poor4  ,i answer that1 ,since defense  
of the poor man's suit belongs to the   
works of mercy1 the answer to this      
inquiry is the same as the one given    
above with regard to the other works of 
mercy 7,q4 #cb1 ,,aa4 #e1 #i74 ,now no  
man is sufficient to bestow a work of   
mercy on all those who need it4         
,wherefore1 as ,augustine says 7,de     
,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bh71 since one     
cannot do good to all1 we ought to      
consider those chiefly who by reason of 
place1 time1 or any other circumstance1 
by a kind of chance are more closely    
united to us4 ,he says by reason of     
place1 because one is not bound to      
search throughout the world for the     
needy that one may succor them2 and it  
suffices to do works of mercy to those  
one meets with4 ,hence it is written    
7,ex4 #bc3d73 ,if thou meet thy enemy's 

ass going astray1 bring it back to him4 
,he says also by reason of time1 because
 one is not bound to provide for the    
future needs of others1 and it suffices 
to succor present needs4 ,hence it is   
written 7#a ,john #c3ag73 ,he that 4 4 4
 shall see his brother in need1 and     
shall put up his bowels from him1 how   
doth the charity of ,god abide in him8  
,lastly he says1 or any other           
circumstance1 because one ought to show 
kindness to those especially who are by 
any tie whatever united to us1 according
 to #a ,tim4 #e3h1 ,if any man have not 
care of his own1 and especially of those
 of his house1 he hath denied the faith 
and is worse than an infidel4  ,it may  
happen however that these circumstances 
concur1 and then we have to consider    
whether this particular man stands in   
such a need that it is not easy to see  
how he can be succored otherwise1 and   
then one is bound to bestow the work of 
mercy on him4 ,if1 however1 it is easy  
to see how he can be otherwise succored1

 either by himself1 or by some other    
person still more closely united to him1
 or in a better position to help him1   
one is not bound so strictly to help the
 one in need that it would be a sin not 
to do so3 although it would be          
praiseworthy to do so where one is not  
bound to4 ,therefore an advocate is not 
always bound to defend the suits of the 
poor1 but only when the aforesaid       
circumstances concur1 else he would have
 to put aside all other business1 and   
occupy himself entirely in defending the
 suits of poor people4 ,the same applies
 to a physician with regard to          
attendance on the sick4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,so long as the ass lies under the  
burden1 there is no means of help in    
this case1 unless those who are passing 
along come to the man's aid1 and        
therefore they are bound to help4 ,but  
they would not be so bound if help were 
possible from another quarter4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,a man is bound to make good  
use of the talent bestowed on him1      

according to the opportunities afforded 
by time1 place1 and other circumstances1
 as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not
 every need is such that it is one's    
duty to remedy it1 but only such as we  
have stated above4   ,,second ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,it ,is ,fitting ,that the ,law ,should 
,debar ,certain ,persons from the       
,office of ,advocate8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem unfitting for the law to 
debar certain persons from the office of
 advocate4 ,for no man should be        
debarred from doing works of mercy4 ,now
 it belongs to the works of mercy to    
defend a man's suit1 as stated above    
7,a4 #a74 ,therefore no man should be   
debarred from this office4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 contrary causes have not1     
seemingly1 the same effect4 ,now to be  
busy with ,divine things and to be busy 
about sin are contrary to one another4  
,therefore it is unfitting that some    
should be debarred from the office of   
advocate1 on account of religion1 as    

monks and clerics1 while others are     
debarred on account of sin1 as persons  
of ill-repute and heretics4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 a man should love his neighbor
 as himself4 ,now it is a duty of love  
for an advocate to plead a person's     
cause4 ,therefore it is unfitting that  
certain persons should be debarred from 
pleading the cause of others1 while they
 are allowed to advocate their own      
cause4  ,on the contrary1 ,according to 
,decret4 ,,iii1 qu4 vii1 can4 ,infames1 
many persons are debarred from the      
office of advocate4  ,i answer that1 ,in
 two ways a person is debarred from     
performing a certain act3 first because 
it is impossible to him1 secondly       
because it is unbecoming to him3 but1   
whereas the man to whom a certain act is
 impossible1 is absolutely debarred from
 performing it1 he to whom an act is    
unbecoming is not debarred altogether1  
since necessity may do away with its    
unbecomingness4 ,accordingly some are   
debarred from the office of advocate    

because it is impossible to them through
 lack of sense--either interior1 as in  
the case of madmen and minors--or       
exterior1 as in the case of the deaf and
 dumb4 ,for an advocate needs to have   
both interior skill so that he may be   
able to prove the justice of the cause  
he defends1 and also speech and hearing1
 that he may speak and hear what is said
 to him4 ,consequently those who are    
defective in these points1 are          
altogether debarred from being advocates
 either in their own or in another's    
cause4 ,the becomingness of exercising  
this office is removed in two ways4     
,first1 through a man being engaged in  
higher things4 ,wherefore it is         
unfitting that monks or priests should  
be advocates in any cause whatever1 or  
that clerics should plead in a secular  
court1 because such persons are engaged 
in ,divine things4 ,secondly1 on account
 of some personal defect1 either of body
 7for instance a blind man whose        
attendance in a court of justice would  

be unbecoming7 or of soul1 for it ill   
becomes one who has disdained to be just
 himself1 to plead for the justice of   
another4 ,wherefore it is unbecoming    
that persons of ill repute1 unbelievers1
 and those who have been convicted of   
grievous crimes should be advocates4    
,nevertheless this unbecomingness is    
outweighed by necessity3 and for this   
reason such persons can plead either    
their own cause or that of persons      
closely connected with them4 ,moreover1 
clerics can be advocates in the cause of
 their own church1 and monks in the     
cause of their own monastery1 if the    
abbot direct them to do so4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,certain persons are sometimes
 debarred by unbecomingness1 and others 
by inability from performing works of   
mercy3 for not all the works of mercy   
are becoming to all persons3 thus it ill
 becomes a fool to give counsel1 or the 
ignorant to teach4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,just as virtue is destroyed by too much
 and too little1 so does a person become

 incompetent by more and less4 ,for this
 reason some1 like religious and        
clerics1 are debarred from pleading in  
causes1 because they are above such an  
office2 and others because they are less
 than competent to exercise it1 such as 
persons of ill-repute and unbelievers4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the necessity of      
pleading the causes of others is not so 
pressing as the necessity of pleading   
one's own cause1 because others are able
 to help themselves otherwise3 hence the
 comparison fails4   ,,third ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
an ,advocate ,sins by ,defending an     
,unjust ,cause8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that an advocate does not sin
 by defending an unjust cause4 ,for just
 as a physician proves his skill by     
healing a desperate disease1 so does an 
advocate prove his skill1 if he can     
defend an unjust cause4 ,now a physician
 is praised if he heals a desperate     
malady4 ,therefore an advocate also     
commits no sin1 but ought to be praised1

 if he defends an unjust cause4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 it is always lawful to    
desist from committing a sin4 ,yet an   
advocate is punished if he throws up his
 brief 7,decret4 ,,ii1 qu4 iii1 can4 ,si
 quem poenit474 ,therefore an advocate  
does not sin by defending an unjust     
cause1 when once he has undertaken its  
defense4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it would  
seem to be a greater sin for an advocate
 to use unjust means in defense of a    
just cause 7e4g4 by producing false     
witnesses1 or alleging false laws71 than
 to defend an unjust cause1 since the   
former is a sin against the form1 the   
latter against the matter of justice4   
,yet it is seemingly lawful for an      
advocate to make use of such underhand  
means1 even as it is lawful for a       
soldier to lay ambushes in a battle4    
,therefore it would seem that an        
advocate does not sin by defending an   
unjust cause4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is 
said 7#b ,paralip4 #ai3b73 ,thou helpest
 the ungodly 4 4 4 and therefore thou   

didst deserve 4 4 4 the wrath of the    
,lord4 ,now an advocate by defending an 
unjust cause1 helps the ungodly4        
,therefore he sins and deserves the     
wrath of the ,lord4  ,i answer that1 ,it
 is unlawful to cooperate in an evil    
deed1 by counseling1 helping1 or in any 
way consenting1 because to counsel or   
assist an action is1 in a way1 to do it1
 and the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #a3cb7    
that they 4 4 4 are worthy of death1 not
 only they that do a sin1 but they also 
that consent to them that do it4 ,hence 
it was stated above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #g71  
that all such are bound to restitution4 
,now it is evident that an advocate     
provides both assistance and counsel to 
the party for whom he pleads4           
,wherefore1 if knowingly he defends an  
unjust cause1 without doubt he sins     
grievously1 and is bound to restitution 
of the loss unjustly incurred by the    
other party by reason of the assistance 
he has provided4 ,if1 however1 he       
defends an unjust cause unknowingly1    

thinking it just1 he is to be excused   
according to the measure in which       
ignorance is excusable4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,the physician injures no man by    
undertaking to heal a desperate malady1 
whereas the advocate who accepts service
 in an unjust cause1 unjustly injures   
the party against whom he pleads        
unjustly4 ,hence the comparison fails4  
,for though he may seem to deserve      
praise for showing skill in his art1    
nevertheless he sins by reason of       
injustice in his will1 since he abuses  
his art for an evil end4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,if an advocate believes from the   
outset that the cause is just1 and      
discovers afterwards while the case is  
proceeding that it is unjust1 he ought  
not to throw up his brief in such a way 
as to help the other side1 or so as to  
reveal the secrets of his client to the 
other party4 ,but he can and must give  
up the case1 or induce his client to    
give way1 or make some compromise       
without prejudice to the opposing party4

  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4
 #dj1 ,a4 #c71 it is lawful for a       
soldier1 or a general to lay ambushes in
 a just war1 by prudently concealing    
what he has a mind to do1 but not by    
means of fraudulent falsehoods1 since we
 should keep faith even with a foe1 as  
,tully says 7,de offic4 iii1 #bi74      
,hence it is lawful for an advocate1 in 
defending his case1 prudently to conceal
 whatever might hinder its happy issue1 
but it is unlawful for him to employ any
 kind of falsehood4   ,,fourth ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,it ,is ,lawful for an ,advocate to     
,take a ,fee for ,pleading8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem unlawful for an      
advocate to take a fee for pleading4    
,works of mercy should not be done with 
a view to human remuneration1 according 
to ,luke #ad3ab1 ,when thou makest a    
dinner or a supper1 call not thy friends
 4 4 4 nor thy neighbors who are rich3  
lest perhaps they also invite thee      
again1 and a recompense be made to thee4

 ,now it is a work of mercy to plead    
another's cause1 as stated above 7,a4   
#a74 ,therefore it is not lawful for an 
advocate to take payment in money for   
pleading4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 spiritual
 things are not to be bartered with     
temporal things4 ,but pleading a        
person's cause seems to be a spiritual  
good since it consists in using one's   
knowledge of law4 ,therefore it is not  
lawful for an advocate to take a fee for
 pleading4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as 
the person of the advocate concurs      
towards the pronouncement of the        
verdict1 so do the persons of the judge 
and of the witness4 ,now1 according to  
,augustine 7,ep4 cliii ad ,macedon471   
the judge should not sell a just        
sentence1 nor the witness true evidence4
 ,therefore neither can an advocate sell
 a just pleading4  ,on the contrary1    
,augustine says 7,ep4 cliii ad          
,macedon47 that an advocate may lawfully
 sell his pleading1 and a lawyer his    
advice4  ,i answer that1 ,a man may     

justly receive payment for granting what
 he is not bound to grant4 ,now it is   
evident that an advocate is not always  
bound to consent to plead1 or to give   
advice in other people's causes4        
,wherefore1 if he sell his pleading or  
advice1 he does not act against justice4
 ,the same applies to the physician who 
attends on a sick person to heal him1   
and to all like persons2 provided1      
however1 they take a moderate fee1 with 
due consideration for persons1 for the  
matter in hand1 for the labor entailed1 
and for the custom of the country4 ,if1 
however1 they wickedly extort an        
immoderate fee1 they sin against        
justice4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,ep4   
cliii ad ,macedon47 that it is customary
 to demand from them restitution of what
 they have extorted by a wicked excess1 
but not what has been given to them in  
accordance with a commendable custom4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man is not bound to do
 gratuitously whatever he can do from   
motives of mercy3 else no man could     

lawfully sell anything1 since anything  
may be given from motives of mercy4 ,but
 when a man does give a thing out of    
mercy1 he should seek1 not a human1 but 
a ,divine reward4 ,in like manner an    
advocate1 when he mercifully pleads the 
cause of a poor man1 should have in view
 not a human but a ,divine meed2 and yet
 he is not always bound to give his     
services gratuitously4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,though knowledge of law is something  
spiritual1 the use of that knowledge is 
accomplished by the work of the body3   
hence it is lawful to take money in     
payment of that use1 else no craftsman  
would be allowed to make profit by his  
art4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the judge and   
witnesses are common to either party1   
since the judge is bound to pronounce a 
just verdict1 and the witness to give   
true evidence4 ,now justice and truth do
 not incline to one side rather than to 
the other3 and consequently judges      
receive out of the public funds a fixed 
pay for their labor2 and witnesses      

receive their expenses 7not as payment  
for giving evidence1 but as a fee for   
their labor7 either from both parties or
 from the party by whom they are        
adduced1 because no man serveth as a    
soldier at any time at his own charge   
99,vulg43 ',who serveth as a soldier1'  
7#a ,cor4 #i3g74 ,on the other hand an  
advocate defends one party only1 and so 
he may lawfully accept fee from the     
party he assists4   ,,question #gb  ,,of
 ,,reviling 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we  
must now consider injuries inflicted by 
words uttered extrajudicially4 ,we shall
 consider 7#a7 reviling1 7#b7           
backbiting1 7#c7 tale bearing1 7#d7     
derision1 7#e7 cursing4  ,under the     
first head there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is reviling8  7#b7 
,whether every reviling is a mortal sin8
  7#c7 ,whether one ought to check      
revilers8  7#d7 ,of the origin of       
reviling4   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,reviling  
,consists in ,words8  ,objection #a3 ,it

 would seem that reviling does not      
consist in words4 ,reviling implies some
 injury inflicted on one's neighbor1    
since it is a kind of injustice4 ,but   
words seem to inflict no injury on one's
 neighbor1 either in his person1 or in  
his belongings4 ,therefore reviling does
 not consist in words4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 reviling seems to imply       
dishonor4 ,but a man can be dishonored  
or slighted by deeds more than by words4
 ,therefore it seems that reviling      
consists1 not in words but in deeds4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a dishonor inflicted
 by words is called a railing or a      
taunt4 ,but reviling seems to differ    
from railing or taunt4 ,therefore       
reviling does not consist in words4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,nothing1 save words1 is 
perceived by the hearing4 ,now reviling 
is perceived by the hearing according to
 ,jer4 #bj3aj1 ,i heard reviling ,douay3
 'contumelies' on every side4 ,therefore
 reviling consists in words4  ,i answer 
that1 ,reviling denotes the dishonoring 

of a person1 and this happens in two    
ways3 for since honor results from      
excellence1 one person dishonors        
another1 first1 by depriving him of the 
excellence for which he is honored4     
,this is done by sins of deed1 whereof  
we have spoken above 7,q4 #fd1 seqq474  
,secondly1 when a man publishes         
something against another's honor1 thus 
bringing it to the knowledge of the     
latter and of other men4 ,this reviling 
properly so called1 and is done by some 
kind of signs4 ,now1 according to       
,augustine 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1    
#c71 compared with words all other signs
 are very few1 for words have obtained  
the chief place among men for the       
purpose of expressing whatever the mind 
conceives4 ,hence reviling1 properly    
speaking1 consists in words3 wherefore1 
,isidore says 7,etym4 x7 that a reviler 
7contumeliosus7 is hasty and bursts out 
7tumet7 in injurious words4 ,since1     
however1 things are also signified by   
deeds1 which on this account have the   

same significance as words1 it follows  
that reviling in a wider sense extends  
also to deeds4 ,wherefore a gloss on    
,rom4 #a3cj1 contumelious1 proud1 says3 
,the contumelious are those who by word 
or deed revile and shame others4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,our words1 if we consider   
them in their essence1 i4e4 as audible  
sounds1 injure no man1 except perhaps by
 jarring of the ear1 as when a person   
speaks too loud4 ,but1 considered as    
signs conveying something to the        
knowledge of others1 they may do many   
kinds of harm4 ,such is the harm done to
 a man to the detriment of his honor1 or
 of the respect due to him from others4 
,hence the reviling is greater if one   
man reproach another in the presence of 
many3 and yet there may still be        
reviling if he reproach him by himself1 
in so far as the speaker acts unjustly  
against the respect due to the hearer4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one man slights       
another by deeds in so far as such deeds
 cause or signify that which is against 

that other man's honor4 ,in the former  
case it is not a matter of reviling but 
of some other kind of injustice1 of     
which we have spoken above 7,,qq4 #fd1  
#fe1 #ff73 where as in the latter case  
there is reviling1 in so far as deeds   
have the significant force of words4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,railing and taunts    
consist in words1 even as reviling1     
because by all of them a man's faults   
are exposed to the detriment of his     
honor4 ,such faults are of three kinds4 
,first1 there is the fault of guilt1    
which is exposed by reviling words4     
,secondly1 there is the fault of both   
guilt and punishment1 which is exposed  
by taunts 7convicium71 because vice is  
commonly spoken of in connection with   
not only the soul but also the body4    
,hence if one man says spitefully to    
another that he is blind1 he taunts but 
does not revile him3 whereas if one man 
calls another a thief1 he not only      
taunts but also reviles him4 ,thirdly1 a
 man reproaches another for his         

inferiority or indigence1 so as to      
lessen the honor due to him for any kind
 of excellence4 ,this is done by        
upbraiding words1 and properly speaking1
 occurs when one spitefully reminds a   
man that one has succored him when he   
was in need4 ,hence it is written       
7,ecclus4 #bj3ae73 ,he will give a few  
things and upbraid much4 ,nevertheless  
these terms are sometimes employed one  
for the other4   ,,second ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,reviling or ,railing ,is a ,mortal     
,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that reviling or railing is not a mortal
 sin4 ,for no mortal sin is an act of   
virtue4 ,now railing is the act of a    
virtue1 viz4 of wittiness 7eutrapelia7  
99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #e to which
 it pertains to rail well1 according to 
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #h74      
,therefore railing or reviling is not a 
mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 mortal 
sin is not to be found in perfect men2  
and yet these sometimes give utterance  

to railing or reviling4 ,thus the       
,apostle says 7,gal4 #c3a73 ,o senseless
 ,galatians61 and our ,lord said 7,luke 
#bd3be73 ,o foolish and slow of heart to
 believe6 ,therefore railing or reviling
 is not a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 although that which is a      
venial sin by reason of its genus may   
become mortal1 that which is mortal by  
reason of its genus cannot become       
venial1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#hh1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f74 ,hence if by reason 
of its genus it were a mortal sin to    
give utterance to railing or reviling1  
it would follow that it is always a     
mortal sin4 ,but this is apparently     
untrue1 as may be seen in the case of   
one who utters a reviling word          
indeliberately or through slight anger4 
,therefore reviling or railing is not a 
mortal sin1 by reason of its genus4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,nothing but mortal sin  
deserves the eternal punishment of hell4
 ,now railing or reviling deserves the  
punishment of hell1 according to ,matt4 

#e3bb1 ,whosoever shall say to his      
brother 4 4 4 ,thou fool1 shall be in   
danger of hell fire4 ,therefore railing 
or reviling is a mortal sin4  ,i answer 
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 words  
are injurious to other persons1 not as  
sounds1 but as signs1 and this          
signification depends on the speaker's  
inward intention4 ,hence1 in sins of    
word1 it seems that we ought to consider
 with what intention the words are      
uttered4 ,since then railing or reviling
 essentially denotes a dishonoring1 if  
the intention of the utterer is to      
dishonor the other man1 this is properly
 and essentially to give utterance to   
railing or reviling3 and this is a      
mortal sin no less than theft or        
robbery1 since a man loves his honor no 
less than his possessions4 ,if1 on the  
other hand1 a man says to another a     
railing or reviling word1 yet with the  
intention1 not of dishonoring him1 but  
rather perhaps of correcting him or with
 some like purpose1 he utters a railing 

or reviling not formally and            
essentially1 but accidentally and       
materially1 in so far to wit as he says 
that which might be a railing or        
reviling4 ,hence this may be sometimes a
 venial sin1 and sometimes without any  
sin at all4 ,nevertheless there is need 
of discretion in such matters1 and one  
should use such words with moderation1  
because the railing might be so grave   
that being uttered inconsiderately it   
might dishonor the person against whom  
it is uttered4 ,in such a case a man    
might commit a mortal sin1 even though  
he did not intend to dishonor the other 
man3 just as were a man incautiously to 
injure grievously another by striking   
him in fun1 he would not be without     
blame4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs to 
wittiness to utter some slight mockery1 
not with intent to dishonor or pain the 
person who is the object of the mockery1
 but rather with intent to please and   
amuse3 and this may be without sin1 if  
the due circumstances be observed4 ,on  

the other hand if a man does not shrink 
from inflicting pain on the object of   
his witty mockery1 so long as he makes  
others laugh1 this is sinful1 as stated 
in the passage quoted4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,just as it is lawful to strike a      
person1 or damnify him in his belongings
 for the purpose of correction1 so too1 
for the purpose of correction1 may one  
say a mocking word to a person whom one 
has to correct4 ,it is thus that our    
,lord called the disciples foolish1 and 
the ,apostle called the ,galatians      
senseless4 ,yet1 as ,augustine says 7,de
 ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ai71 seldom
 and only when it is very necessary     
should we have recourse to invectives1  
and then so as to urge ,god's service1  
not our own4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since   
the sin of railing or reviling depends  
on the intention of the utterer1 it may 
happen to be a venial sin1 if it be a   
slight railing that does not inflict    
much dishonor on a man1 and be uttered  
through lightness of heart or some      

slight anger1 without the fixed purpose 
of dishonoring him1 for instance when   
one intends by such a word to give but  
little pain4   ,,third ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,one ,ought to ,suffer ,oneself to ,be  
,reviled8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that one ought not to suffer oneself to
 be reviled4 ,for he that suffers       
himself to be reviled1 encourages the   
reviler4 ,but one ought not to do this4 
,therefore one ought not to suffer      
oneself to be reviled1 but rather reply 
to the reviler4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one
 ought to love oneself more than        
another4 ,now one ought not to suffer   
another to be reviled1 wherefore it is  
written 7,prov4 #bf3aj73 ,he that       
putteth a fool to silence appeaseth     
anger4 ,therefore neither should one    
suffer oneself to be reviled4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 a man is not allowed to      
revenge himself1 for it is said3        
,vengeance belongeth to ,me1 ,i will    
repay 99,heb4 #aj3cj4 ,now by submitting

 to be reviled a man revenges himself1  
according to ,chrysostom 7,hom4 xxii1 in
 ,ep4 ad ,rom473 ,if thou wilt be       
revenged1 be silent2 thou hast dealt him
 a fatal blow4 ,therefore one ought not 
by silence to submit to reviling words1 
but rather answer back4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #cg3ac73 
,they that sought evils to me spoke vain
 things1 and afterwards 7,ps4 #cg3ad7 he
 says3 ,but ,i as a deaf man1 heard not2
 and as a dumb man not opening his      
mouth4  ,i answer that1 ,just as we need
 patience in things done against us1 so 
do we need it in those said against us4 
,now the precepts of patience in those  
things done against us refer to the     
preparedness of the mind1 according to  
,augustine's 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte
 i1 #ai7 exposition on our ,lord's      
precept1 ,if one strike thee on thy     
right cheek1 turn to him also the other 
99,the words as quoted by ,st4 ,thomas  
are a blending of ,matt4 #e3ci and ,luke
 #f3bi3 that is to say1 a man ought to  

be prepared to do so if necessary4 ,but 
he is not always bound to do this       
actually3 since not even did our ,lord  
do so1 for when ,he received a blow1 ,he
 said3 ,why strikest thou ,me8 7,john   
#ah3bc74 ,consequently the same applies 
to the reviling words that are said     
against us4 ,for we are bound to hold   
our minds prepared to submit to be      
reviled1 if it should be expedient4     
,nevertheless it sometimes behooves us  
to withstand against being reviled1 and 
this chiefly for two reasons4 ,first1   
for the good of the reviler2 namely1    
that his daring may be checked1 and that
 he may not repeat the attempt1         
according to ,prov4 #bf3e1 ,answer a    
fool according to his folly1 lest he    
imagine himself to be wise4 ,secondly1  
for the good of many who would be       
prevented from progressing in virtue on 
account of our being reviled4 ,hence    
,gregory says 7,hom4 ix1 ,super         
,ezech473 ,those who are so placed that 
their life should be an example to      

others1 ought1 if possible1 to silence  
their detractors1 lest their preaching  
be not heard by those who could have    
heard it1 and they continue their evil  
conduct through contempt of a good life4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the daring of the   
railing reviler should be checked with  
moderation1 i4e4 as a duty of charity1  
and not through lust for one's own      
honor4 ,hence it is written 7,prov4     
#bf3d73 ,answer not a fool according to 
his folly1 lest thou be like him4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when one man prevents 
another from being reviled there is not 
the danger of lust for one's own honor  
as there is when a man defends himself  
from being reviled3 indeed rather would 
it seem to proceed from a sense of      
charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it would be 
an act of revenge to keep silence with  
the intention of provoking the reviler  
to anger1 but it would be praiseworthy  
to be silent1 in order to give place to 
anger4 ,hence it is written 7,ecclus4   
#h3d73 ,strive not with a man that is   

full of tongue1 and heap not wood upon  
his fire4   ,,fourth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,reviling ,arises from ,anger8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
reviling does not arise from anger4 ,for
 it is written 7,prov4 #aa3b73 ,where   
pride is1 there shall also be reviling  
,douay3 'reproach'4 ,but anger is a vice
 distinct from pride4 ,therefore        
reviling does not arise from anger4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written       
7,prov4 #bj3c73 ,all fools are meddling 
with revilings ,douay3 'reproaches'4    
,now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom1 
as stated above 7,q4 #df1 ,a4 #a72      
whereas anger is opposed to meekness4   
,therefore reviling does not arise from 
anger4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no sin is   
diminished by its cause4 ,but the sin of
 reviling is diminished if one gives    
vent to it through anger3 for it is a   
more grievous sin to revile out of      
hatred than out of anger4 ,therefore    
reviling does not arise from anger4  ,on

 the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4   
xxxi1 #de7 that anger gives rise to     
revilings4  ,i answer that1 ,while one  
sin may arise from various causes1 it is
 nevertheless said to have its source   
chiefly in that one from which it is    
wont to arise most frequently1 through  
being closely connected with its end4   
,now reviling is closely connected with 
anger's end1 which is revenge3 since the
 easiest way for the angry man to take  
revenge on another is to revile him4    
,therefore reviling arises chiefly from 
anger4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reviling is   
not directed to the end of pride which  
is excellency4 ,hence reviling does not 
arise directly from pride4 ,nevertheless
 pride disposes a man to revile1 in so  
far as those who think themselves to    
excel1 are more prone to despise others 
and inflict injuries on them1 because   
they are more easily angered1 through   
deeming it an affront to themselves     
whenever anything is done against their 
will4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to   

the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 anger
 listens imperfectly to reason3         
wherefore an angry man suffers a defect 
of reason1 and in this he is like the   
foolish man4 ,hence reviling arises from
 folly on account of the latter's       
kinship with anger4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,according to the ,philosopher 7,rhet4  
ii1 #d7 an angry man seeks an open      
offense1 but he who hates does not worry
 about this4 ,hence reviling which      
denotes a manifest injury belongs to    
anger rather than to hatred4            
,,question #gc  ,,of ,,backbiting 99,or 
detraction 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we   
must now consider backbiting1 under     
which head there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is backbiting8     
7#b7 ,whether it is a mortal sin8  7#c7 
,of its comparison with other sins2     
7#d7 ,whether it is a sin to listen to  
backbiting8   ,,first ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,backbiting ,is ,suitably ,defined ,as  
the ,blackening of ,another's ,character

 by ,secret ,words8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that backbiting is not as    
defined by some 99,albert the ,great1   
,sum4 ,theol4 ,,ii1 cxvii41 the         
blackening of another's good name by    
words uttered in secret4 ,for secretly  
and openly are circumstances that do not
 constitute the species of a sin1       
because it is accidental to a sin that  
it be known by many or by few4 ,now that
 which does not constitute the species  
of a sin1 does not belong to its        
essence1 and should not be included in  
its definition4 ,therefore it does not  
belong to the essence of backbiting that
 it should be done by secret words4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the notion of a good
 name implies something known to the    
public4 ,if1 therefore1 a person's good 
name is blackened by backbiting1 this   
cannot be done by secret words1 but by  
words uttered openly4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 to detract is to subtract1 or 
to diminish something already existing4 
,but sometimes a man's good name is     

blackened1 even without subtracting from
 the truth3 for instance1 when one      
reveals the crimes which a man has in   
truth committed4 ,therefore not every   
blackening of a good name is backbiting4
  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written      
7,eccles4 #aj3aa73 ,if a serpent bite in
 silence1 he is nothing better that     
backbiteth4  ,i answer that1 ,just as   
one man injures another by deed in two  
ways--openly1 as by robbery or by doing 
him any kind of violence--and secretly1 
as by theft1 or by a crafty blow1 so    
again one man injures another by words  
in two ways--in one way1 openly1 and    
this is done by reviling him1 as stated 
above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #a7--;and in another
 way secretly1 and this is done by      
backbiting4 ,now from the fact that one 
man openly utters words against another 
man1 he would appear to think little of 
him1 so that for this reason he         
dishonors him1 so that reviling is      
detrimental to the honor of the person  
reviled4 ,on the other hand1 he that    

speaks against another secretly1 seems  
to respect rather than slight him1 so   
that he injures directly1 not his honor 
but his good name1 in so far as by      
uttering such words secretly1 he1 for   
his own part1 causes his hearers to have
 a bad opinion of the person against    
whom he speaks4 ,for the backbiter      
apparently intends and aims at being    
believed4 ,it is therefore evident that 
backbiting differs from reviling in two 
points3 first1 in the way in which the  
words are uttered1 the reviler speaking 
openly against someone1 and the         
backbiter secretly2 secondly1 as to the 
end in view1 i4e4 as regards the injury 
inflicted1 the reviler injuring a man's 
honor1 the backbiter injuring his good  
name4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in involuntary 
commutations1 to which are reduced all  
injuries inflicted on our neighbor1     
whether by word or by deed1 the kind of 
sin is differentiated by the            
circumstances secretly and openly1      
because involuntariness itself is       

diversified by violence and by          
ignorance1 as stated above 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4
 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,,aa4 #e1 #h74    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the words of a        
backbiter are said to be secret1 not    
altogether1 but in relation to the      
person of whom they are said1 because   
they are uttered in his absence and     
without his knowledge4 ,on the other    
hand1 the reviler speaks against a man  
to his face4 ,wherefore if a man speaks 
ill of another in the presence of       
several1 it is a case of backbiting if  
he be absent1 but of reviling if he     
alone be present3 although if a man     
speak ill of an absent person to one man
 alone1 he destroys his good name not   
altogether but partly4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,a man is said to backbite 7detrahere7 
another1 not because he detracts from   
the truth1 but because he lessens his   
good name4 ,this is done sometimes      
directly1 sometimes indirectly4         
,directly1 in four ways3 first1 by      
saying that which is false about him2   

secondly1 by stating his sin to be      
greater than it is2 thirdly1 by         
revealing something unknown about him2  
fourthly1 by ascribing his good deeds to
 a bad intention4 ,indirectly1 this is  
done either by gainsaying his good1 or  
by maliciously concealing it1 or by     
diminishing it4   ,,second ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,backbiting ,is a ,mortal ,sin8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
backbiting is not a mortal sin4 ,for no 
act of virtue is a mortal sin4 ,now1 to 
reveal an unknown sin1 which pertains to
 backbiting1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad
 #c71 is an act of the virtue of        
charity1 whereby a man denounces his    
brother's sin in order that he may      
amend3 or else it is an act of justice1 
whereby a man accuses his brother4      
,therefore backbiting is not a mortal   
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a gloss on    
,prov4 #bd3ba1 ,have nothing to do with 
detractors1 says3 ,the whole human race 
is in peril from this vice4 ,but no     

mortal sin is to be found in the whole  
of mankind1 since many refrain from     
mortal sin3 whereas they are venial sins
 that are found in all4 ,therefore      
backbiting is a venial sin4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 ,augustine in a homily on the 
,fire of ,purgatory 99,serm4 civ in the 
appendix to ,st4 ,augustine's work      
reckons it a slight sin to speak ill    
without hesitation or forethought4 ,but 
this pertains to backbiting4 ,therefore 
backbiting is a venial sin4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #a3cj73 
,backbiters1 hateful to ,god1 which     
epithet1 according to a gloss1 is       
inserted1 lest it be deemed a slight sin
 because it consists in words4  ,i      
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 
,a4 #b71 sins of word should be judged  
chiefly from the intention of the       
speaker4 ,now backbiting by its very    
nature aims at blackening a man's good  
name4 ,wherefore1 properly speaking1 to 
backbite is to speak ill of an absent   
person in order to blacken his good     

name4 ,now it is a very grave matter to 
blacken a man's good name1 because of   
all temporal things a man's good name   
seems the most precious1 since for lack 
of it he is hindered from doing many    
things well4 ,for this reason it is     
written 7,ecclus4 #da3ae73 ,take care of
 a good name1 for this shall continue   
with thee1 more than a thousand         
treasures precious and great4 ,therefore
 backbiting1 properly speaking1 is a    
mortal sin4 ,nevertheless it happens    
sometimes that a man utters words1      
whereby someone's good name is          
tarnished1 and yet he does not intend   
this1 but something else4 ,this is not  
backbiting strictly and formally        
speaking1 but only materially and       
accidentally as it were4 ,and if such   
defamatory words be uttered for the sake
 of some necessary good1 and with       
attention to the due circumstances1 it  
is not a sin and cannot be called       
backbiting4 ,but if they be uttered out 
of lightness of heart or for some       

unnecessary motive1 it is not a mortal  
sin1 unless perchance the spoken word be
 of such a grave nature1 as to cause a  
notable injury to a man's good name1    
especially in matters pertaining to his 
moral character1 because from the very  
nature of the words this would be a     
mortal sin4 ,and one is bound to restore
 a man his good name1 no less than any  
other thing one has taken from him1 in  
the manner stated above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4   
#b7 when we were treating of            
restitution4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as      
stated above1 it is not backbiting to   
reveal a man's hidden sin in order that 
he may mend1 whether one denounce it1 or
 accuse him for the good of public      
justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this gloss  
does not assert that backbiting is to be
 found throughout the whole of mankind1 
but almost1 both because the number of  
fools is infinite1 99,eccles4 #a3ae and 
few are they that walk in the way of    
salvation1 99,cf4 ,matt4 #g3ad and      
because there are few or none at all who

 do not at times speak from lightness of
 heart1 so as to injure someone's good  
name at least slightly1 for it is       
written 7,james #c3b73 ,if any man      
offend not in word1 the same is a       
perfect man4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3          
,augustine is referring to the case when
 a man utters a slight evil about       
someone1 not intending to injure him1   
but through lightness of heart or a slip
 of the tongue4   ,,third ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,backbiting ,is the ,gravest of ,all    
,sins ,committed ,against ,one's        
,neighbor8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that backbiting is the gravest of  
all sins committed against one's        
neighbor4 ,because a gloss on ,ps4      
#ajh3d1 ,instead of making me a return  
of love they detracted me1 a gloss says3
 ,those who detract ,christ in ,his     
members and slay the souls of future    
believers are more guilty than those who
 killed the flesh that was soon to rise 
again4 ,from this it seems to follow    

that backbiting is by so much a graver  
sin than murder1 as it is a graver      
matter to kill the soul than to kill the
 body4 ,now murder is the gravest of the
 other sins that are committed against  
one's neighbor4 ,therefore backbiting is
 absolutely the gravest of all4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 backbiting is apparently a
 graver sin than reviling1 because a man
 can withstand reviling1 but not a      
secret backbiting4 ,now backbiting is   
seemingly a graver sin than adultery1   
because adultery unites two persons in  
one flesh1 whereas reviling severs      
utterly those who were united4          
,therefore backbiting is more grievous  
than adultery3 and yet of all other sins
 a man commits against his neighbor1    
adultery is most grave4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 reviling arises from anger1   
while backbiting arises from envy1      
according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1    
#de74 ,but envy is a graver sin than    
anger4 ,therefore backbiting is a graver
 sin than reviling2 and so the same     

conclusion follows as before4  ,obj4 #d3
 ,further1 the gravity of a sin is      
measured by the gravity of the defect   
that it causes4 ,now backbiting causes a
 most grievous defect1 viz4 blindness of
 mind4 ,for ,gregory says 7,regist4 xi1 
,ep4 #b73 ,what else do backbiters but  
blow on the dust and stir up the dirt   
into their eyes1 so that the more they  
breathe of detraction1 the less they see
 of the truth8 ,therefore backbiting is 
the most grievous sin committed against 
one's neighbor4  ,on the contrary1 ,it  
is more grievous to sin by deed than by 
word4 ,but backbiting is a sin of word1 
while adultery1 murder1 and theft are   
sins of deed4 ,therefore backbiting is  
not graver than the other sins committed
 against one's neighbor4  ,i answer     
that1 ,the essential gravity of sins    
committed against one's neighbor must be
 weighed by the injury they inflict on  
him1 since it is thence that they derive
 their sinful nature4 ,now the greater  
the good taken away1 the greater the    

injury4 ,and while man's good is        
threefold1 namely the good of his soul1 
the good of his body1 and the good of   
external things2 the good of the soul1  
which is the greatest of all1 cannot be 
taken from him by another save as an    
occasional cause1 for instance by an    
evil persuasion1 which does not induce  
necessity4 ,on the other hand the two   
latter goods1 viz4 of the body and of   
external things1 can be taken away by   
violence4 ,since1 however1 the goods of 
the body excel the goods of external    
things1 those sins which injure a man's 
body are more grievous than those which 
injure his external things4             
,consequently1 among other sins         
committed against one's neighbor1 murder
 is the most grievous1 since it deprives
 man of the life which he already       
possesses3 after this comes adultery1   
which is contrary to the right order of 
human generation1 whereby man enters    
upon life4 ,in the last place come      
external goods1 among which a man's good

 name takes precedence of wealth because
 it is more akin to spiritual goods1    
wherefore it is written 7,prov4 #bb3a73 
,a good name is better than great       
riches4 ,therefore backbiting according 
to its genus is a more grievous sin than
 theft1 but is less grievous than murder
 or adultery4 ,nevertheless the order   
may differ by reason of aggravating or  
extenuating circumstances4  ,the        
accidental gravity of a sin is to be    
considered in relation to the sinner1   
who sins more grievously1 if he sins    
deliberately than if he sins through    
weakness or carelessness4 ,in this      
respect sins of word have a certain     
levity1 in so far as they are apt to    
occur through a slip of the tongue1 and 
without much forethought4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,those who detract ,christ by       
hindering the faith of ,his members1    
disparage ,his ,godhead1 which is the   
foundation of our faith4 ,wherefore this
 is not simple backbiting but blasphemy4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,reviling is a more  

grievous sin than backbiting1 in as much
 as it implies greater contempt of one's
 neighbor3 even as robbery is a graver  
sin than theft1 as stated above 7,q4    
#ff1 ,a4 #i74 ,yet reviling is not a    
more grievous sin than adultery4 ,for   
the gravity of adultery is measured1 not
 from its being a union of bodies1 but  
from being a disorder in human          
generation4 ,moreover the reviler is not
 the sufficient cause of unfriendliness 
in another man1 but is only the         
occasional cause of division among those
 who were united1 in so far1 to wit1 as 
by declaring the evils of another1 he   
for his own part severs that man from   
the friendship of other men1 though they
 are not forced by his words to do so4  
,accordingly a backbiter is a murderer  
occasionally1 since by his words he     
gives another man an occasion for hating
 or despising his neighbor4 ,for this   
reason it is stated in the ,epistle of  
,clement 99,ad ,jacob4 ,ep4 i that      
backbiters are murderers1 i4e4          

occasionally2 because he that hateth his
 brother is a murderer 7#a ,john #c3ae74
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,anger seeks openly  
to be avenged1 as the ,philosopher      
states 7,rhet4 ii1 #b73 wherefore       
backbiting which takes place in secret1 
is not the daughter of anger1 as        
reviling is1 but rather of envy1 which  
strives by any means to lessen one's    
neighbor's glory4 ,nor does it follow   
from this that backbiting is more       
grievous than reviling3 since a lesser  
vice can give rise to a greater sin1    
just as anger gives birth to murder and 
blasphemy4 ,for the origin of a sin     
depends on its inclination to an end1   
i4e4 on the thing to which the sin      
turns1 whereas the gravity of a sin     
depends on what it turns away from4     
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since a man rejoiceth 
in the sentence of his mouth 7,prov4    
#ae3bc71 it follows that a backbiter    
more and more loves and believes what he
 says1 and consequently more and more   
hates his neighbor1 and thus his        

knowledge of the truth becomes less and 
less4 ,this effect however may also     
result from other sins pertaining to    
hate of one's neighbor4   ,,fourth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,it ,is a ,grave ,sin for the  
,listener to ,suffer the ,backbiter8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
listener who suffers a backbiter does   
not sin grievously4 ,for a man is not   
under greater obligations to others than
 to himself4 ,but it is praiseworthy for
 a man to suffer his own backbiters3 for
 ,gregory says 7,hom4 ix1 super ,ezech73
 ,just as we ought not to incite the    
tongue of backbiters1 lest they perish1 
so ought we to suffer them with         
equanimity when they have been incited  
by their own wickedness1 in order that  
our merit may be the greater4 ,therefore
 a man does not sin if he does not      
withstand those who backbite others4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written       
7,ecclus4 #d3cj73 ,in no wise speak     
against the truth4 ,now sometimes a     

person tells the truth while backbiting1
 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74       
,therefore it seems that one is not     
always bound to withstand a backbiter4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no man should hinder
 what is profitable to others4 ,now     
backbiting is often profitable to those 
who are backbitten3 for ,pope ,pius     
99,st4 ,pius ,i says 99,append4 ,grat4  
ad can4 ,oves1 caus4 vi1 qu4 #a3 ,not   
unfrequently backbiting is directed     
against good persons1 with the result   
that those who have been unduly exalted 
through the flattery of their kindred1  
or the favor of others1 are humbled by  
backbiting4 ,therefore one ought not to 
withstand backbiters4  ,on the contrary1
 ,jerome says 7,ep4 ad ,nepot4 lii73    
,take care not to have an itching       
tongue1 nor tingling ears1 that is1     
neither detract others nor listen to    
backbiters4  ,i answer that1 ,according 
to the ,apostle 7,rom4 #a3cb71 they are 
worthy of death 4 4 4 not only they that
 commit sins1 but they also that consent

 to them that do them4 ,now this happens
 in two ways4 ,first1 directly1 when1 to
 wit1 one man induces another to sin1 or
 when the sin is pleasing to him3       
secondly1 indirectly1 that is1 if he    
does not withstand him when he might do 
so1 and this happens sometimes1 not     
because the sin is pleasing to him1 but 
on account of some human fear4          
,accordingly we must say that if a man  
listens to backbiting without resisting 
it1 he seems to consent to the          
backbiter1 so that he becomes a         
participator in his sin4 ,and if he     
induces him to backbite1 or at least if 
the detraction be pleasing to him on    
account of his hatred of the person     
detracted1 he sins no less than the     
detractor1 and sometimes more4          
,wherefore ,bernard says 7,de ,consid4  
ii1 #ac73 ,it is difficult to say which 
is the more to be condemned3 the        
backbiter or he that listens to         
backbiting4 ,if however the sin is not  
pleasing to him1 and he fails to        

withstand the backbiter1 through fear1  
negligence1 or even shame1 he sins      
indeed1 but much less than the          
backbiter1 and1 as a rule venially4     
,sometimes too this may be a mortal sin1
 either because it is his official duty 
to correct the backbiter1 or by reason  
of some consequent danger2 or on account
 of the radical reason for which human  
fear may sometimes be a mortal sin1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c74  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,no man hears himself         
backbitten1 because when a man is spoken
 evil of in his hearing1 it is not      
backbiting1 properly speaking1 but      
reviling1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad   
#b74 ,yet it is possible for the        
detractions uttered against a person to 
come to his knowledge through others    
telling him1 and then it is left to his 
discretion whether he will suffer their 
detriment to his good name1 unless this 
endanger the good of others1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore his 
patience may deserve commendation for as

 much as he suffers patiently being     
detracted himself4 ,but it is not left  
to his discretion to permit an injury to
 be done to another's good name1 hence  
he is accounted guilty if he fails to   
resist when he can1 for the same reason 
whereby a man is bound to raise another 
man's ass lying underneath his burden1  
as commanded in ,deut4 #ba3d 99,ex4     
#bc3e4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one ought not 
always to withstand a backbiter by      
endeavoring to convince him of          
falsehood1 especially if one knows that 
he is speaking the truth3 rather ought  
one to reprove him with words1 for that 
he sins in backbiting his brother1 or at
 least by our pained demeanor show him  
that we are displeased with his         
backbiting1 because according to ,prov4 
#be3bc1 the north wind driveth away     
rain1 as doth a sad countenance a       
backbiting tongue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,the profit one derives from being      
backbitten is due1 not to the intention 
of the backbiter1 but to the ordinance  

of ,god ,who produces good out of every 
evil4 ,hence we should none the less    
withstand backbiters1 just as those who 
rob or oppress others1 even though the  
oppressed and the robbed may gain merit 
by patience4   ,,question #gd  ,,of     
,,tale-,,bearing 99,susurratio1 i4e4    
whispering 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider tale-bearing3 under   
which head there are two points of      
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether tale-bearing is 
a sin distinct from backbiting8  7#b7   
,which of the two is the more grievous8 
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,tale-bearing ,is a  
,sin ,distinct from ,backbiting8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from 
backbiting4 ,isidore says 7,etym4 x73   
,the susurro 7tale-bearer7 takes his    
name from the sound of his speech1 for  
he speaks disparagingly not to the face 
but into the ear4 ,but to speak of      
another disparagingly belongs to        
backbiting4 ,therefore tale-bearing is  

not a distinct sin from backbiting4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,lev4
 #ai3af73 ,thou shalt not be an informer
 ,douay3 'a detractor' nor a tale-bearer
 ,douay3 'whisperer' among the people4  
,but an informer is apparently the same 
as a backbiter4 ,therefore neither does 
tale-bearing differ from backbiting4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written       
7,ecclus4 #bh3ae73 ,the tale-bearer     
,douay3 'whisperer' and the             
double-tongued is accursed4 ,but a      
double-tongued man is apparently the    
same as a backbiter1 because a backbiter
 speaks with a double tongue1 with one  
in your absence1 with another in your   
presence4 ,therefore a tale-bearer is   
the same as a backbiter4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,a gloss on ,rom4 #a3bi1 #cj1 
,tale-bearers1 backbiters ,douay3       
'whisperers1 detractors' says3          
,tale-bearers sow discord among friends2
 backbiters deny or disparage others'   
good points4  ,i answer that1 ,the      
tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in  

matter1 and also in form or mode of     
speaking1 since they both speak evil    
secretly of their neighbor3 and for this
 reason these terms are sometimes used  
one for the other4 ,hence a gloss on    
,ecclus4 #e3af1 ,be not called a        
tale-bearer ,douay3 'whisperer' says3   
i4e4 a backbiter4 ,they differ however  
in end1 because the backbiter intends to
 blacken his neighbor's good name1      
wherefore he brings forward those evils 
especially about his neighbor which are 
likely to defame him1 or at least to    
depreciate his good name3 whereas a     
tale-bearer intends to sever friendship1
 as appears from the gloss quoted above 
and from the saying of ,prov4 #bf3bj1   
,where the tale-bearer is taken away1   
contentions shall cease4 ,hence it is   
that a tale-bearer speaks such ill about
 his neighbors as may stir his hearer's 
mind against them1 according to ,ecclus4
 #bh3aa1 ,a sinful man will trouble his 
friends1 and bring in debate in the     
midst of them that are at peace4  ,reply

 ,obj4 #a3 ,a tale-bearer is called a   
backbiter in so far as he speaks ill of 
another2 yet he differs from a backbiter
 since he intends not to speak ill as   
such1 but to say anything that may stir 
one man against another1 though it be   
good simply1 and yet has a semblance of 
evil through being unpleasant to the    
hearer4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an informer  
differs from a tale-bearer and a        
backbiter1 for an informer is one who   
charges others publicly with crimes1    
either by accusing or by railing them1  
which does not apply to a backbiter or  
tale-bearer4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a       
double-tongued person is properly       
speaking a tale-bearer4 ,for since      
friendship is between two1 the          
tale-bearer strives to sever friendship 
on both sides4 ,hence he employs a      
double tongue towards two persons1 by   
speaking ill of one to the other3       
wherefore it is written 7,ecclus4       
#bh3ae73 ,the tale-bearer ,douay3       
'whisperer' and the double-tongued is   

accursed1 and then it is added1 for he  
hath troubled many that were peace4     
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,backbiting ,is a    
,graver ,sin ,than ,tale-bearing8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
backbiting is a graver sin than         
tale-bearing4 ,for sins of word consist 
in speaking evil4 ,now a backbiter      
speaks of his neighbor things that are  
evil simply1 for such things lead to the
 loss or depreciation of his good name3 
whereas a tale-bearer is only intent on 
saying what is apparently evil1 because 
to wit they are unpleasant to the       
hearer4 ,therefore backbiting is a      
graver sin than tale-bearing4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 he that deprives a man of his
 good name1 deprives him not merely of  
one friend1 but of many1 because        
everyone is minded to scorn the         
friendship of a person with a bad name4 
,hence it is reproached against a       
certain individual 99,king ,josaphat 7#b
 ,paralip4 #ai3b73 ,thou art joined in  

friendship with them that hate the      
,lord4 ,but tale-bearing deprives one of
 only one friend4 ,therefore backbiting 
is a graver sin than tale-bearing4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written       
7,james #d3aa73 ,he that backbiteth     
,douay3 'detracteth' his brother 4 4 4  
detracteth the law1 and consequently    
,god the giver of the law4 ,wherefore   
the sin of backbiting seems to be a sin 
against ,god1 which is most grievous1 as
 stated above 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #c74 ,on the other hand   
the sin of tale-bearing is against one's
 neighbor4 ,therefore the sin of        
backbiting is graver than the sin of    
tale-bearing4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is 
written 7,ecclus4 #e3ag73 ,an evil mark 
of disgrace is upon the double-tongued2 
but to the tale-bearer ,douay3          
'whisperer' hatred1 and enmity1 and     
reproach4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated   
above 7,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#gc1 ,a4 #h71 sins against one's        
neighbor are the more grievous1         

according as they inflict a greater     
injury on him3 and an injury is so much 
the greater1 according to the greatness 
of the good which it takes away4 ,now of
 all one's external goods a friend takes
 the first place1 since no man can live 
without friends1 as the ,philosopher    
declares 7,ethic4 viii1 #a74 ,hence it  
is written 7,ecclus4 #f3ae73 ,nothing   
can be compared to a faithful friend4   
,again1 a man's good name whereof       
backbiting deprives him1 is most        
necessary to him that he may be fitted  
for friendship4 ,therefore tale-bearing 
is a greater sin than backbiting or even
 reviling1 because a friend is better   
than honor1 and to be loved is better   
than to be honored1 according to the    
,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii74  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,the species and gravity of a 
sin depend on the end rather than on the
 material object1 wherefore1 by reason  
of its end1 tale-bearing is worse than  
backbiting1 although sometimes the      
backbiter says worse things4  ,reply    

,obj4 #b3 ,a good name is a disposition 
for friendship1 and a bad name is a     
disposition for enmity4 ,but a          
disposition falls short of the thing for
 which it disposes4 ,hence to do        
anything that leads to a disposition for
 enmity is a less grievous sin than to  
do what conduces directly to enmity4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that backbites his 
brother1 seems to detract the law1 in so
 far as he despises the precept of love 
for one's neighbor3 while he that       
strives to sever friendship seems to act
 more directly against this precept4    
,hence the latter sin is more specially 
against ,god1 because ,god is charity   
7#a ,john #d3af71 and for this reason it
 is written 7,prov4 #f3af73 ,six things 
there are1 which the ,lord hateth1 and  
the seventh ,his soul detesteth1 and the
 seventh is he 7,prov4 #f3ai7 that      
soweth discord among brethren4          
,,question #ge  ,,of ,,derision 99,or   
mockery 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we must  
now speak of derision1 under which head 

there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether derision is a special sin      
distinct from the other sins whereby    
one's neighbor is injured by words8     
7#b7 ,whether derision is a mortal sin8 
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ge1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,derision ,is a      
,special ,sin ,distinct from ,those     
,already ,mentioned8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that derision is not a      
special sin distinct from those         
mentioned above4 ,for laughing to scorn 
is apparently the same as derision4 ,but
 laughing to scorn pertains to reviling4
 ,therefore derision would seem not to  
differ from reviling4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 no man is derided except for  
something reprehensible which puts him  
to shame4 ,now such are sins2 and if    
they be imputed to a person publicly1 it
 is a case of reviling1 if privately1 it
 amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing4 
,therefore derision is not distinct from
 the foregoing vices4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 sins of this kind are         

distinguished by the injury they inflict
 on one's neighbor4 ,now the injury     
inflicted on a man by derision affects  
either his honor1 or his good name1 or  
is detrimental to his friendship4       
,therefore derision is not a sin        
distinct from the foregoing4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,derision is done in jest1    
wherefore it is described as making fun4
 ,now all the foregoing are done        
seriously and not in jest4 ,therefore   
derision differs from all of them4  ,i  
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 
,a4 #b71 sins of word should be weighed 
chiefly by the intention of the speaker1
 wherefore these sins are differentiated
 according to the various intentions of 
those who speak against another4 ,now   
just as the railer intends to injure the
 honor of the person he rails1 the      
backbiter to depreciate a good name1 and
 the tale-bearer to destroy friendship1 
so too the derider intends to shame the 
person he derides4 ,and since this end  
is distinct from the others1 it follows 

that the sin of derision is distinct    
from the foregoing sins4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,laughing to scorn and derision     
agree as to the end but differ in mode1 
because derision is done with the mouth1
 i4e4 by words and laughter1 while      
laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling  
the nose1 as a gloss says on ,ps4 #b3d1 
,he that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh 
at them3 and such a distinction does not
 differentiate the species4 ,yet they   
both differ from reviling1 as being     
shamed differs from being dishonored3   
for to be ashamed is to fear dishonor1  
as ,damascene states 7,de ,fide ,orth4  
ii1 #ae74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,for doing a
 virtuous deed a man deserves both      
respect and a good name in the eyes of  
others1 and in his own eyes the glory of
 a good conscience1 according to #b     
,cor4 #a3ab1 ,our glory is this1 the    
testimony of our conscience4 ,hence1 on 
the other hand1 for doing a             
reprehensible1 i4e4 a vicious action1 a 
man forfeits his honor and good name in 

the eyes of others--and for this purpose
 the reviler and the backbiter speak of 
another person--while in his own eyes1  
he loses the glory of his conscience    
through being confused and ashamed at   
reprehensible deeds being imputed to    
him--and for this purpose the derider   
speaks ill of him4 ,it is accordingly   
evident that derision agrees with the   
foregoing vices as to the matter but    
differs as to the end4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,a secure and calm conscience is a     
great good1 according to ,prov4 #ae3ae1 
,a secure mind is like a continual      
feast4 ,wherefore he that disturbs      
another's conscience by confounding him 
inflicts a special injury on him3 hence 
derision is a special kind of sin4      
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ge1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,derision ,can ,be a 
,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that derision cannot be a mortal   
sin4 ,every mortal sin is contrary to   
charity4 ,but derision does not seem    
contrary to charity1 for sometimes it   

takes place in jest among friends1      
wherefore it is known as making fun4    
,therefore derision cannot be a mortal  
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the greatest  
derision would appear to be that which  
is done as an injury to ,god4 ,but      
derision is not always a mortal sin when
 it tends to the injury of ,god3 else it
 would be a mortal sin to relapse into a
 venial sin of which one has repented4  
,for ,isidore says 7,de ,sum4 ,bon4 ii1 
#af7 that he who continues to do what he
 has repented of1 is a derider and not a
 penitent4 ,it would likewise follow    
that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin1     
because1 according to ,gregory 7,moral4 
xxxi1 #ae7 the ostrich signifies the    
hypocrite1 who derides the horse1 i4e4  
the just man1 and his rider1 i4e4 ,god4 
,therefore derision is not a mortal sin4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 reviling and      
backbiting seem to be graver sins than  
derision1 because it is more to do a    
thing seriously than in jest4 ,but not  
all backbiting or reviling is a mortal  

sin4 ,much less therefore is derision a 
mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
written 7,prov4 #c3cd73 ,he derideth    
,vulg43 'shall scorn' the scorners4 ,but
 ,god's derision is eternal punishment  
for mortal sin1 as appears from the     
words of ,ps4 #b3d1 ,he that dwelleth in
 heaven shall laugh at them4 ,therefore 
derision is a mortal sin4  ,i answer    
that1 ,the object of derision is always 
some evil or defect4 ,now when an evil  
is great1 it is taken1 not in jest1 but 
seriously3 consequently if it is taken  
in jest or turned to ridicule 7whence   
the terms 'derision' and 'jesting'71    
this is because it is considered to be  
slight4 ,now an evil may be considered  
to be slight in two ways3 first1 in     
itself1 secondly1 in relation to the    
person4 ,when anyone makes game or fun  
of another's evil or defect1 because it 
is a slight evil in itself1 this is a   
venial sin by reason of its genus4 ,on  
the other hand this defect may be       
considered as a slight evil in relation 

to the person1 just as we are wont to   
think little of the defects of children 
and imbeciles3 and then to make game or 
fun of a person1 is to scorn him        
altogether1 and to think him so         
despicable that his misfortune troubles 
us not one whit1 but is held as an      
object of derision4 ,in this way        
derision is a mortal sin1 and more      
grievous than reviling1 which is also   
done openly3 because the reviler would  
seem to take another's evil seriously2  
whereas the derider does so in fun1 and 
so would seem the more to despise and   
dishonor the other man4 ,wherefore1 in  
this sense1 derision is a grievous sin1 
and all the more grievous according as a
 greater respect is due to the person   
derided4  ,consequently it is an        
exceedingly grievous sin to deride ,god 
and the things of ,god1 according to    
,isa4 #cg3bc1 ,whom hast thou           
reproached1 and whom hast thou          
blasphemed1 and against whom hast thou  
exalted thy voice8 and he replies3      

,against the ,holy ,one of ,israel4 ,in 
the second place comes derision of one's
 parents1 wherefore it is written       
7,prov4 #cj3ag73 ,the eye that mocketh  
at his father1 and that despiseth the   
labor of his mother in bearing him1 let 
the ravens of the brooks pick it out1   
and the young eagles eat it4 ,further1  
the derision of good persons is         
grievous1 because honor is the reward of
 virtue1 and against this it is written 
7,job #ab3d73 ,the simplicity of the    
just man is laughed to scorn4 ,such like
 derision does very much harm3 because  
it turns men away from good deeds1      
according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xx1 #ad71
 ,who when they perceive any good points
 appearing in the acts of others1       
directly pluck them up with the hand of 
a mischievous reviling4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,jesting implies nothing contrary to
 charity in relation to the person with 
whom one jests1 but it may imply        
something against charity in relation to
 the person who is the object of the    

jest1 on account of contempt1 as stated 
above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,neither he    
that relapses into a sin of which he has
 repented1 nor a hypocrite1 derides ,god
 explicitly1 but implicitly1 in so far  
as either's behavior is like a          
derider's4 ,nor is it true that to      
commit a venial sin is to relapse or    
dissimulate altogether1 but only        
dispositively and imperfectly4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,derision considered in itself
 is less grievous than backbiting or    
reviling1 because it does not imply     
contempt1 but jest4 ,sometimes however  
it includes greater contempt than       
reviling does1 as stated above1 and then
 it is a grave sin4   ,,question #gf    
,,of ,,cursing 7,in ,four ,articles7    
,we must now consider cursing4 ,under   
this head there are four points of      
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether one may lawfully
 curse another8  7#b7 ,whether one may  
lawfully curse an irrational creature8  
7#c7 ,whether cursing is a mortal sin8  
7#d7 ,of its comparison with other sins4

   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gf1
 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to  
,curse ,anyone8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem unlawful to curse anyone4    
,for it is unlawful to disregard the    
command of the ,apostle in whom ,christ 
spoke1 according to #b ,cor4 #ac3c4 ,now
 he commanded 7,rom4 #ab3ad71 ,bless and
 curse not4 ,therefore it is not lawful 
to curse anyone4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
all are bound to bless ,god1 according  
to ,dan4 #c3hb1 ,o ye sons of men1 bless
 the ,lord4 ,now the same mouth cannot  
both bless ,god and curse man1 as proved
 in the third chapter of ,james4        
,therefore no man may lawfully curse    
another man4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 he    
that curses another would seem to wish  
him some evil either of fault or of     
punishment1 since a curse appears to be 
a kind of imprecation4 ,but it is not   
lawful to wish ill to anyone1 indeed we 
are bound to pray that all may be       
delivered from evil4 ,therefore it is   
unlawful for any man to curse4  ,obj4   

#d3 ,further1 the devil exceeds all in  
malice on account of his obstinacy4 ,but
 it is not lawful to curse the devil1 as
 neither is it lawful to curse oneself2 
for it is written 7,ecclus4 #ba3cj73    
,while the ungodly curseth the devil1 he
 curseth his own soul4 ,much less       
therefore is it lawful to curse a man4  
,obj4 #e3 ,further1 a gloss on ,num4    
#bc3h1 ,how shall ,i curse whom ,god    
hath not cursed8 says3 ,there cannot be 
a just cause for cursing a sinner if one
 be ignorant of his sentiments4 ,now one
 man cannot know another man's          
sentiments1 nor whether he is cursed by 
,god4 ,therefore no man may lawfully    
curse another4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is
 written 7,deut4 #bg3bf73 ,cursed be he 
that abideth not in the words of this   
law4 ,moreover ,eliseus cursed the      
little boys who mocked him 7#d ,kings   
#b3bd74  ,i answer that1 ,to curse      
7maledicere7 is the same as to speak ill
 7malum dicere74 ,now speaking has a    
threefold relation to the thing spoken4 

,first1 by way of assertion1 as when a  
thing is expressed in the indicative    
mood3 in this way maledicere signifies  
simply to tell someone of another's     
evil1 and this pertains to backbiting1  
wherefore tellers of evil 7maledici7 are
 sometimes called backbiters4 ,secondly1
 speaking is related to the thing       
spoken1 by way of cause1 and this       
belongs to ,god first and foremost1     
since ,he made all things by ,his word1 
according to ,ps4 #cb3i1 ,he spoke and  
they were made2 while secondarily it    
belongs to man1 who1 by his word1       
commands others and thus moves them to  
do something3 it is for this purpose    
that we employ verbs in the imperative  
mood4 ,thirdly1 speaking is related to  
the thing spoken by expressing the      
sentiments of one who desires that which
 is expressed in words2 and for this    
purpose we employ the verb in the       
optative mood4  ,accordingly we may omit
 the first kind of evil speaking which  
is by way of simple assertion of evil1  

and consider the other two kinds4 ,and  
here we must observe that to do         
something and to will it are consequent 
on one another in the matter of goodness
 and wickedness1 as shown above         
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #c74 ,hence in   
these two ways of evil speaking1 by way 
of command and by way of desire1 there  
is the same aspect of lawfulness and    
unlawfulness1 for if a man commands or  
desires another's evil1 as evil1 being  
intent on the evil itself1 then evil    
speaking will be unlawful in both ways1 
and this is what is meant by cursing4   
,on the other hand if a man commands or 
desires another's evil under the aspect 
of good1 it is lawful2 and it may be    
called cursing1 not strictly speaking1  
but accidentally1 because the chief     
intention of the speaker is directed not
 to evil but to good4  ,now evil may be 
spoken1 by commanding or desiring it1   
under the aspect of a twofold good4     
,sometimes under the aspect of just1 and
 thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom

 he condemns to a just penalty3 thus too
 the ,church curses by pronouncing      
anathema4 ,in the same way the prophets 
in the ,scriptures sometimes call down  
evils on sinners1 as though conforming  
their will to ,divine justice1 although 
such like imprecation may be taken by   
way of foretelling4 ,sometimes evil is  
spoken under the aspect of useful1 as   
when one wishes a sinner to suffer      
sickness or hindrance of some kind1     
either that he may himself reform1 or at
 least that he may cease from harming   
others4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle 
forbids cursing strictly so called with 
an evil intent3 and the same answer     
applies to the ,second ,objection4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to wish another man   
evil under the aspect of good1 is not   
opposed to the sentiment whereby one    
wishes him good simply1 in fact rather  
is it in conformity therewith4  ,reply  
,obj4 #d3 ,in the devil both nature and 
guilt must be considered4 ,his nature   
indeed is good and is from ,god nor is  

it lawful to curse it4 ,on the other    
hand his guilt is deserving of being    
cursed1 according to ,job #c3h1 ,let    
them curse it who curse the day4 ,yet   
when a sinner curses the devil on       
account of his guilt1 for the same      
reason he judges himself worthy of being
 cursed2 and in this sense he is said to
 curse his own soul4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3  
,although the sinner's sentiments cannot
 be perceived in themselves1 they can be
 perceived through some manifest sin1   
which has to be punished4 ,likewise     
although it is not possible to know whom
 ,god curses in respect of final        
reprobation1 it is possible to know who 
is accursed of ,god in respect of being 
guilty of present sin4   ,,second       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to ,curse an   
,irrational ,creature8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that it is unlawful to   
curse an irrational creature4 ,cursing  
would seem to be lawful chiefly in its  
relation to punishment4 ,now irrational 

creatures are not competent subjects    
either of guilt or of punishment4       
,therefore it is unlawful to curse them4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in an irrational  
creature there is nothing but the nature
 which ,god made4 ,but it is unlawful to
 curse this even in the devil1 as stated
 above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore it is nowise
 lawful to curse an irrational creature4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 irrational        
creatures are either stable1 as bodies1 
or transient1 as the seasons4 ,now1     
according to ,gregory 7,moral4 iv1 #b71 
it is useless to curse what does not    
exist1 and wicked to curse what exists4 
,therefore it is nowise lawful to curse 
an irrational creature4  ,on the        
contrary1 our ,lord cursed the fig tree1
 as related in ,matt4 #ba3ai2 and ,job  
cursed his day1 according to ,job #c3a4 
,i answer that1 ,benediction and        
malediction1 properly speaking1 regard  
things to which good or evil may happen1
 viz4 rational creatures3 while good and
 evil are said to happen to irrational  

creatures in relation to the rational   
creature for whose sake they are4 ,now  
they are related to the rational        
creature in several ways4 ,first by way 
of ministration1 in so far as irrational
 creatures minister to the needs of man4
 ,in this sense the ,lord said to man   
7,gen4 #c3ag73 ,cursed is the earth in  
thy work1 so that its barrenness would  
be a punishment to man4 ,thus also      
,david cursed the mountains of ,gelboe1 
according to ,gregory's expounding      
7,moral4 iv1 #c74 ,again the irrational 
creature is related to the rational     
creature by way of signification3 and   
thus our ,lord cursed the fig tree in   
signification of ,judea4 ,thirdly1 the  
irrational creature is related to       
rational creatures as something         
containing them1 namely by way of time  
or place3 and thus ,job cursed the day  
of his birth1 on account of the original
 sin which he contracted in birth1 and  
on account of the consequent penalties4 
,in this sense also we may understand   

,david to have cursed the mountains of  
,gelboe1 as we read in #b ,kings #a3ba1 
namely on account of the people         
slaughtered there4  ,but to curse       
irrational beings1 considered as        
creatures of ,god1 is a sin of          
blasphemy2 while to curse them          
considered in themselves is idle and    
vain and consequently unlawful4  ,from  
this the ,replies to the objections may 
easily be gathered4   ,,third ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,cursing ,is a ,mortal ,sin8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that cursing is not 
a mortal sin4 ,for ,augustine in a      
homily on the ,fire of ,purgatory       
99,serm4 civ in the appendix of ,st4    
,augustine's works reckons cursing among
 slight sins4 ,but such sins are venial4
 ,therefore cursing is not a mortal but 
a venial ,sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that
 which proceeds from a slight movement  
of the mind does not seem to be         
generically a mortal sin4 ,but cursing  
sometimes arises from a slight movement4

 ,therefore cursing is not a mortal sin4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 evil deeds are    
worse than evil words4 ,but evil deeds  
are not always mortal sins4 ,much less  
therefore is cursing a mortal sin4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,nothing save mortal sin  
excludes one from the kingdom of ,god4  
,but cursing excludes from the kingdom  
of ,god1 according to #a ,cor4 #f3aj1   
,nor cursers ,douay3 'railers'1 nor     
extortioners shall possess the kingdom  
of ,god4 ,therefore cursing is a mortal 
sin4  ,i answer that1 ,the evil words of
 which we are speaking now are those    
whereby evil is uttered against someone 
by way of command or desire4 ,now to    
wish evil to another man1 or to conduce 
to that evil by commanding it1 is1 of   
its very nature1 contrary to charity    
whereby we love our neighbor by desiring
 his good4 ,consequently it is a mortal 
sin1 according to its genus1 and so much
 the graver1 as the person whom we curse
 has a greater claim on our love and    
respect4 ,hence it is written 7,lev4    

#bj3i73 ,he that curseth his father1 or 
mother1 dying let him die4  ,it may     
happen however that the word uttered in 
cursing is a venial sin either through  
the slightness of the evil invoked on   
another in cursing him1 or on account of
 the sentiments of the person who utters
 the curse2 because he may say such     
words through some slight movement1 or  
in jest1 or without deliberation1 and   
sins of word should be weighed chiefly  
with regard to the speaker's intention1 
as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #b74      
,from this the ,replies to the          
,objections may be easily gathered4     
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gf1  
,art4 #d  ,whether ,cursing ,is a       
,graver ,sin ,than ,backbiting8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
cursing is a graver sin than backbiting4
 ,cursing would seem to be a kind of    
blasphemy1 as implied in the canonical  
epistle of ,jude 7verse #i7 where it is 
said that when ,michael the archangel1  
disputing with the devil1 contended     

about the body of ,moses1 he durst not  
bring against him the judgment of       
blasphemy ,douay3 'railing speech'1     
where blasphemy stands for cursing1     
according to a gloss4 ,now blasphemy is 
a graver sin than backbiting4 ,therefore
 cursing is a graver sin than           
backbiting4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 murder 
is more grievous than backbiting1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #c74 ,but    
cursing is on a par with the sin of     
murder2 for ,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xix1
 super ,matth473 ,when thou sayest3     
',curse him down with his house1 away   
with everything1' you are no better than
 a murderer4 ,therefore cursing is      
graver than backbiting4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 to cause a thing is more than 
to signify it4 ,but the curser causes   
evil by commanding it1 whereas the      
backbiter merely signifies an evil      
already existing4 ,therefore the curser 
sins more grievously than the backbiter4
  ,on the contrary1 ,it is impossible to
 do well in backbiting1 whereas cursing 

may be either a good or an evil deed1 as
 appears from what has been said 7,a4   
#a74 ,therefore backbiting is graver    
than cursing4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4
 #e71 evil is twofold1 evil of fault1   
and evil of punishment2 and of the two1 
evil of fault is the worse 7,i1 ,q4 #dh1
 ,a4 #f74 ,hence to speak evil of fault 
is worse than to speak evil of          
punishment1 provided the mode of        
speaking be the same4 ,accordingly it   
belongs to the reviler1 the tale-bearer1
 the backbiter and the derider to speak 
evil of fault1 whereas it belongs to the
 evil-speaker1 as we understand it here1
 to speak evil of punishment1 and not   
evil of fault except under the aspect of
 punishment4 ,but the mode of speaking  
is not the same1 for in the case of the 
four vices mentioned above1 evil of     
fault is spoken by way of assertion1    
whereas in the case of cursing evil of  
punishment is spoken1 either by causing 
it in the form of a command1 or by      

wishing it4 ,now the utterance itself of
 a person's fault is a sin1 in as much  
as it inflicts an injury on one's       
neighbor1 and it is more grievous to    
inflict an injury1 than to wish to      
inflict it1 other things being equal4   
,hence backbiting considered in its     
generic aspect is a graver sin than the 
cursing which expresses a mere desire2  
while the cursing which is expressed by 
way of command1 since it has the aspect 
of a cause1 will be more or less        
grievous than backbiting1 according as  
it inflicts an injury more or less grave
 than the blackening of a man's good    
name4 ,moreover this must be taken as   
applying to these vices considered in   
their essential aspects3 for other      
accidental points might be taken into   
consideration1 which would aggravate or 
extenuate the aforesaid vices4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,to curse a creature1 as such1
 reflects on ,god1 and thus accidentally
 it has the character of blasphemy2 not 
so if one curse a creature on account of

 its fault3 and the same applies to     
backbiting4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated
 above 7,a4 #c71 cursing1 in one way1   
includes the desire for evil1 where if  
the curser desire the evil of another's 
violent death1 he does not differ1 in   
desire1 from a murderer1 but he differs 
from him in so far as the external act  
adds something to the act of the will4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument         
considers cursing by way of command4    
,,question #gg  ,,of ,,cheating1 ,,which
 ,,is ,,committed ,,in ,,buying ,,and   
,,selling 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider those sins which      
relate to voluntary commutations4       
,first1 we shall consider cheating1     
which is committed in buying and        
selling3 secondly1 we shall consider    
usury1 which occurs in loans4 ,in       
connection with the other voluntary     
commutations no special kind of sin is  
to be found distinct from rapine and    
theft4  ,under the first head there are 
four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,of unjust

 sales as regards the price2 namely1    
whether it is lawful to sell a thing for
 more than its worth8  7#b7 ,of unjust  
sales on the part of the thing sold2    
7#c7 ,whether the seller is bound to    
reveal a fault in the thing sold8  7#d7 
,whether it is lawful in trading to sell
 a thing at a higher price than was paid
 for it8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,it ,is     
,lawful to ,sell a ,thing for ,more     
,than ,its ,worth8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that it is lawful to sell a  
thing for more than its worth4 ,in the  
commutations of human life1 civil laws  
determine that which is just4 ,now      
according to these laws it is just for  
buyer and seller to deceive one another 
7,cod4 ,,iv1 xliv1 ,de ,rescind4 ,vend4 
#h1 #ae73 and this occurs by the seller 
selling a thing for more than its worth1
 and the buyer buying a thing for less  
than its worth4 ,therefore it is lawful 
to sell a thing for more than its worth4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is     

common to all would seem to be natural  
and not sinful4 ,now ,augustine relates 
that the saying of a certain jester was 
accepted by all1 ,you wish to buy for a 
song and to sell at a premium1 which    
agrees with the saying of ,prov4 #bj3ad1
 ,it is naught1 it is naught1 saith     
every buyer3 and when he is gone away1  
then he will boast4 ,therefore it is    
lawful to sell a thing for more than its
 worth4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it does not
 seem unlawful if that which honesty    
demands be done by mutual agreement4    
,now1 according to the ,philosopher     
7,ethic4 viii1 #ac71 in the friendship  
which is based on utility1 the amount of
 the recompense for a favor received    
should depend on the utility accruing to
 the receiver3 and this utility         
sometimes is worth more than the thing  
given1 for instance if the receiver be  
in great need of that thing1 whether for
 the purpose of avoiding a danger1 or of
 deriving some particular benefit4      
,therefore1 in contracts of buying and  

selling1 it is lawful to give a thing in
 return for more than its worth4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4    
#g3ab73 ,all things 4 4 4 whatsoever you
 would that men should do to you1 do you
 also to them4 ,but no man wishes to buy
 a thing for more than its worth4       
,therefore no man should sell a thing to
 another man for more than its worth4   
,i answer that1 ,it is altogether sinful
 to have recourse to deceit in order to 
sell a thing for more than its just     
price1 because this is to deceive one's 
neighbor so as to injure him4 ,hence    
,tully says 7,de ,offic4 iii1 #ae73     
,contracts should be entirely free from 
double-dealing3 the seller must not     
impose upon the bidder1 nor the buyer   
upon one that bids against him4  ,but1  
apart from fraud1 we may speak of buying
 and selling in two ways4 ,first1 as    
considered in themselves1 and from this 
point of view1 buying and selling seem  
to be established for the common        
advantage of both parties1 one of whom  

requires that which belongs to the      
other1 and vice versa1 as the           
,philosopher states 7,polit4 i1 #c74    
,now whatever is established for the    
common advantage1 should not be more of 
a burden to one party than to another1  
and consequently all contracts between  
them should observe equality of thing   
and thing4 ,again1 the quality of a     
thing that comes into human use is      
measured by the price given for it1 for 
which purpose money was invented1 as    
stated in ,ethic4 v1 #e4 ,therefore if  
either the price exceed the quantity of 
the thing's worth1 or1 conversely1 the  
thing exceed the price1 there is no     
longer the equality of justice3 and     
consequently1 to sell a thing for more  
than its worth1 or to buy it for less   
than its worth1 is in itself unjust and 
unlawful4  ,secondly we may speak of    
buying and selling1 considered as       
accidentally tending to the advantage of
 one party1 and to the disadvantage of  
the other3 for instance1 when a man has 

great need of a certain thing1 while    
another man will suffer if he be without
 it4 ,in such a case the just price will
 depend not only on the thing sold1 but 
on the loss which the sale brings on the
 seller4 ,and thus it will be lawful to 
sell a thing for more than it is worth  
in itself1 though the price paid be not 
more than it is worth to the owner4 ,yet
 if the one man derive a great advantage
 by becoming possessed of the other     
man's property1 and the seller be not at
 a loss through being without that      
thing1 the latter ought not to raise the
 price1 because the advantage accruing  
to the buyer1 is not due to the seller1 
but to a circumstance affecting the     
buyer4 ,now no man should sell what is  
not his1 though he may charge for the   
loss he suffers4  ,on the other hand if 
a man find that he derives great        
advantage from something he has bought1 
he may1 of his own accord1 pay the      
seller something over and above3 and    
this pertains to his honesty4  ,reply   

,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #if1 ,a4 #b7 human law is given to the 
people among whom there are many lacking
 virtue1 and it is not given to the     
virtuous alone4 ,hence human law was    
unable to forbid all that is contrary to
 virtue2 and it suffices for it to      
prohibit whatever is destructive of     
human intercourse1 while it treats other
 matters as though they were lawful1 not
 by approving of them1 but by not       
punishing them4 ,accordingly1 if without
 employing deceit the seller disposes of
 his goods for more than their worth1 or
 the buyer obtain them for less than    
their worth1 the law looks upon this as 
licit1 and provides no punishment for so
 doing1 unless the excess be too great1 
because then even human law demands     
restitution to be made1 for instance if 
a man be deceived in regard to more than
 half the amount of the just price of a 
thing 99,cod4 ,,iv1 xliv1 ,de ,rescind4 
,vend4 #b1 #h4  ,on the other hand the  
,divine law leaves nothing unpunished   

that is contrary to virtue4 ,hence1     
according to the ,divine law1 it is     
reckoned unlawful if the equality of    
justice be not observed in buying and   
selling3 and he who has received more   
than he ought must make compensation to 
him that has suffered loss1 if the loss 
be considerable4 ,i add this condition1 
because the just price of things is not 
fixed with mathematical precision1 but  
depends on a kind of estimate1 so that a
 slight addition or subtraction would   
not seem to destroy the equality of     
justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as          
,augustine says this jester1 either by  
looking into himself or by his          
experience of others1 thought that all  
men are inclined to wish to buy for a   
song and sell at a premium4 ,but since  
in reality this is wicked1 it is in     
every man's power to acquire that       
justice whereby he may resist and       
overcome this inclination4 ,and then he 
gives the example of a man who gave the 
just price for a book to a man who      

through ignorance asked a low price for 
it4 ,hence it is evident that this      
common desire is not from nature but    
from vice1 wherefore it is common to    
many who walk along the broad road of   
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in commutative  
justice we consider chiefly real        
equality4 ,on the other hand1 in        
friendship based on utility we consider 
equality of usefulness1 so that the     
recompense should depend on the         
usefulness accruing1 whereas in buying  
it should be equal to the thing bought4 
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1  
,art4 #b  ,whether a ,sale ,is ,rendered
 ,unlawful ,through a ,fault in the     
,thing ,sold8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that a sale is not rendered unjust 
and unlawful through a fault in the     
thing sold4 ,for less account should be 
taken of the other parts of a thing than
 of what belongs to its substance4 ,yet 
the sale of a thing does not seem to be 
rendered unlawful through a fault in its
 substance3 for instance1 if a man sell 

instead of the real metal1 silver or    
gold produced by some chemical process1 
which is adapted to all the human uses  
for which silver and gold are necessary1
 for instance in the making of vessels  
and the like4 ,much less therefore will 
it be an unlawful sale if the thing be  
defective in other ways4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 any fault in the thing1       
affecting the quantity1 would seem      
chiefly to be opposed to justice which  
consists in equality4 ,now quantity is  
known by being measured3 and the        
measures of things that come into human 
use are not fixed1 but in some places   
are greater1 in others less1 as the     
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 v1 #g74    
,therefore just as it is impossible to  
avoid defects on the part of the thing  
sold1 it seems that a sale is not       
rendered unlawful through the thing sold
 being defective4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
the thing sold is rendered defective by 
lacking a fitting quality4 ,but in order
 to know the quality of a thing1 much   

knowledge is required that is lacking in
 most buyers4 ,therefore a sale is not  
rendered unlawful by a fault 7in the    
thing sold74  ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose
 says 7,de ,offic4 iii1 #aa73 ,it is    
manifestly a rule of justice that a good
 man should not depart from the truth1  
nor inflict an unjust injury on anyone1 
nor have any connection with fraud4  ,i 
answer that1 ,a threefold fault may be  
found pertaining to the thing which is  
sold4 ,one1 in respect of the thing's   
substance3 and if the seller be aware of
 a fault in the thing he is selling1 he 
is guilty of a fraudulent sale1 so that 
the sale is rendered unlawful4 ,hence we
 find it written against certain people 
7,isa4 #a3bb71 ,thy silver is turned    
into dross1 thy wine is mingled with    
water3 because that which is mixed is   
defective in its substance4  ,another   
defect is in respect of quantity which  
is known by being measured3 wherefore if
 anyone knowingly make use of a faulty  
measure in selling1 he is guilty of     

fraud1 and the sale is illicit4 ,hence  
it is written 7,deut4 #be3ac1 #ad73     
,thou shalt not have divers weights in  
thy bag1 a greater and a less3 neither  
shall there be in thy house a greater   
bushel and a less1 and further on       
7,deut4 #be3af73 ,for the ,lord 4 4 4   
abhorreth him that doth these things1   
and ,he hateth all injustice4  ,a third 
defect is on the part of the quality1   
for instance1 if a man sell an unhealthy
 animal as being a healthy one3 and if  
anyone do this knowingly he is guilty of
 a fraudulent sale1 and the sale1 in    
consequence1 is illicit4  ,in all these 
cases not only is the man guilty of a   
fraudulent sale1 but he is also bound to
 restitution4 ,but if any of the        
foregoing defects be in the thing sold1 
and he knows nothing about this1 the    
seller does not sin1 because he does    
that which is unjust materially1 nor is 
his deed unjust1 as shown above 7,q4    
#ei1 ,a4 #b74 ,nevertheless he is bound 
to compensate the buyer1 when the defect

 comes to his knowledge4 ,moreover what 
has been said of the seller applies     
equally to the buyer4 ,for sometimes it 
happens that the seller thinks his goods
 to be specifically of lower value1 as  
when a man sells gold instead of copper1
 and then if the buyer be aware of this1
 he buys it unjustly and is bound to    
restitution3 and the same applies to a  
defect in quantity as to a defect in    
quality4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gold and    
silver are costly not only on account of
 the usefulness of the vessels and other
 like things made from them1 but also on
 account of the excellence and purity of
 their substance4 ,hence if the gold or 
silver produced by alchemists has not   
the true specific nature of gold and    
silver1 the sale thereof is fraudulent  
and unjust1 especially as real gold and 
silver can produce certain results by   
their natural action1 which the         
counterfeit gold and silver of          
alchemists cannot produce4 ,thus the    
true metal has the property of making   

people joyful1 and is helpful           
medicinally against certain maladies4   
,moreover real gold can be employed more
 frequently1 and lasts longer in its    
condition of purity than counterfeit    
gold4 ,if however real gold were to be  
produced by alchemy1 it would not be    
unlawful to sell it for the genuine     
article1 for nothing prevents art from  
employing certain natural causes for the
 production of natural and true effects1
 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #h7
 of things produced by the art of the   
demons4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the measures 
of salable commodities must needs be    
different in different places1 on       
account of the difference of supply3    
because where there is greater          
abundance1 the measures are wont to be  
larger4 ,however in each place those who
 govern the state must determine the    
just measures of things salable1 with   
due consideration for the conditions of 
place and time4 ,hence it is not lawful 
to disregard such measures as are       

established by public authority or      
custom4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine
 says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #af7 the price
 of things salable does not depend on   
their degree of nature1 since at times a
 horse fetches a higher price than a    
slave2 but it depends on their          
usefulness to man4 ,hence it is not     
necessary for the seller or buyer to be 
cognizant of the hidden qualities of the
 thing sold1 but only of such as render 
the thing adapted to man's use1 for     
instance1 that the horse be strong1 run 
well and so forth4 ,such qualities the  
seller and buyer can easily discover4   
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1   
,art4 #c  ,whether the ,seller ,is      
,bound to ,state the ,defects of the    
,thing ,sold8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that the seller is not bound to    
state the defects of the thing sold4    
,since the seller does not bind the     
buyer to buy1 he would seem to leave it 
to him to judge of the goods offered for
 sale4 ,now judgment about a thing and  

knowledge of that thing belong to the   
same person4 ,therefore it does not seem
 imputable to the seller if the buyer be
 deceived in his judgment1 and be       
hurried into buying a thing without     
carefully inquiring into its condition4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it seems foolish for
 anyone to do what prevents him carrying
 out his work4 ,but if a man states the 
defects of the goods he has for sale1 he
 prevents their sale3 wherefore ,tully  
7,de ,offic4 iii1 #ac7 pictures a man as
 saying3 ,could anything be more absurd 
than for a public crier1 instructed by  
the owner1 to cry3 ',i offer this       
unhealthy horse for sale8' ,therefore   
the seller is not bound to state the    
defects of the thing sold4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 man needs more to know the    
road of virtue than to know the faults  
of things offered for sale4 ,now one is 
not bound to offer advice to all or to  
tell them the truth about matters       
pertaining to virtue1 though one should 
not tell anyone what is false4 ,much    

less therefore is a seller bound to tell
 the faults of what he offers for sale1 
as though he were counseling the buyer4 
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if one were bound to
 tell the faults of what one offers for 
sale1 this would only be in order to    
lower the price4 ,now sometimes the     
price would be lowered for some other   
reason1 without any defect in the thing 
sold3 for instance1 if the seller carry 
wheat to a place where wheat fetches a  
high price1 knowing that many will come 
after him carrying wheat2 because if the
 buyers knew this they would give a     
lower price4 ,but apparently the seller 
need not give the buyer this            
information4 ,therefore1 in like manner1
 neither need he tell him the faults of 
the goods he is selling4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4    
iii1 #aj73 ,in all contracts the defects
 of the salable commodity must be       
stated2 and unless the seller make them 
known1 although the buyer has already   
acquired a right to them1 the contract  

is voided on account of the fraudulent  
action4  ,i answer that1 ,it is always  
unlawful to give anyone an occasion of  
danger or loss1 although a man need not 
always give another the help or counsel 
which would be for his advantage in any 
way2 but only in certain fixed cases1   
for instance when someone is subject to 
him1 or when he is the only one who can 
assist him4 ,now the seller who offers  
goods for sale1 gives the buyer an      
occasion of loss or danger1 by the very 
fact that he offers him defective goods1
 if such defect may occasion loss or    
danger to the buyer--loss1 if1 by reason
 of this defect1 the goods are of less  
value1 and he takes nothing off the     
price on that account--danger1 if this  
defect either hinder the use of the     
goods or render it hurtful1 for         
instance1 if a man sells a lame for a   
fleet horse1 a tottering house for a    
safe one1 rotten or poisonous food for  
wholesome4 ,wherefore if such like      
defects be hidden1 and the seller does  

not make them known1 the sale will be   
illicit and fraudulent1 and the seller  
will be bound to compensation for the   
loss incurred4  ,on the other hand1 if  
the defect be manifest1 for instance if 
a horse have but one eye1 or if the     
goods though useless to the buyer1 be   
useful to someone else1 provided the    
seller take as much as he ought from the
 price1 he is not bound to state the    
defect of the goods1 since perhaps on   
account of that defect the buyer might  
want him to allow a greater rebate than 
he need4 ,wherefore the seller may look 
to his own indemnity1 by withholding the
 defect of the goods4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,judgment cannot be pronounced save on  
what is manifest3 for a man judges of   
what he knows 7,ethic4 i1 #c74 ,hence if
 the defects of the goods offered for   
sale be hidden1 judgment of them is not 
sufficiently left with the buyer unless 
such defects be made known to him4 ,the 
case would be different if the defects  
were manifest4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there 

is no need to publish beforehand by the 
public crier the defects of the goods   
one is offering for sale1 because if he 
were to begin by announcing its defects1
 the bidders would be frightened to buy1
 through ignorance of other qualities   
that might render the thing good and    
serviceable4 ,such defect ought to be   
stated to each individual that offers to
 buy3 and then he will be able to       
compare the various points one with the 
other1 the good with the bad3 for       
nothing prevents that which is defective
 in one respect being useful in many    
others4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although a   
man is not bound strictly speaking to   
tell everyone the truth about matters   
pertaining to virtue1 yet he is so bound
 in a case when1 unless he tells the    
truth1 his conduct would endanger       
another man in detriment to virtue3 and 
so it is in this case4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3
 ,the defect in a thing makes it of less
 value now than it seems to be3 but in  
the case cited1 the goods are expected  

to be of less value at a future time1 on
 account of the arrival of other        
merchants1 which was not foreseen by the
 buyers4 ,wherefore the seller1 since he
 sells his goods at the price actually  
offered him1 does not seem to act       
contrary to justice through not stating 
what is going to happen4 ,if however he 
were to do so1 or if he lowered his     
price1 it would be exceedingly virtuous 
on his part3 although he does not seem  
to be bound to do this as a debt of     
justice4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #d  ,whether1 in        
,trading1 ,it ,is ,lawful to ,sell a    
,thing at a ,higher ,price ,than ,what  
,was ,paid for ,it8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that it is not lawful1 in    
trading1 to sell a thing for a higher   
price than we paid for it4 ,for         
,chrysostom 99,hom4 xxxviii in the ,opus
 ,imperfectum1 falsely ascribed to ,st4 
,john ,chrysostom says on ,matt4 #ba3ab3
 ,he that buys a thing in order that he 
may sell it1 entire and unchanged1 at a 

profit1 is the trader who is cast out of
 ,god's temple4 ,cassiodorus speaks in  
the same sense in his commentary on ,ps4
 #gj3ae1 ,because ,i have not known     
learning1 or trading according to       
another version 99,the ,septuagint3     
,what is trade1 says he1 but buying at a
 cheap price with the purpose of        
retailing at a higher price8 and he     
adds3 ,such were the tradesmen whom ,our
 ,lord cast out of the temple4 ,now no  
man is cast out of the temple except for
 a sin4 ,therefore such like trading is 
sinful4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is      
contrary to justice to sell goods at a  
higher price than their worth1 or to buy
 them for less than their value1 as     
shown above 7,a4 #a74 ,now if you sell a
 thing for a higher price than you paid 
for it1 you must either have bought it  
for less than its value1 or sell it for 
more than its value4 ,therefore this    
cannot be done without sin4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 ,jerome says 7,ep4 ad ,nepot4 
lii73 ,shun1 as you would the plague1 a 

cleric who from being poor has become   
wealthy1 or who1 from being a nobody has
 become a celebrity4 ,now trading would 
net seem to be forbidden to clerics     
except on account of its sinfulness4    
,therefore it is a sin in trading1 to   
buy at a low price and to sell at a     
higher price4  ,on the contrary1        
,augustine commenting on ,ps4 #gj3ae1   
,because ,i have not known learning1    
99,cf4 ,obj4 #a says3 ,the greedy       
tradesman blasphemes over his losses2 he
 lies and perjures himself over the     
price of his wares4 ,but these are vices
 of the man1 not of the craft1 which can
 be exercised without these vices4      
,therefore trading is not in itself     
unlawful4  ,i answer that1 ,a tradesman 
is one whose business consists in the   
exchange of things4 ,according to the   
,philosopher 7,polit4 i1 #c71 exchange  
of things is twofold2 one1 natural as it
 were1 and necessary1 whereby one       
commodity is exchanged for another1 or  
money taken in exchange for a commodity1

 in order to satisfy the needs of life4 
,such like trading1 properly speaking1  
does not belong to tradesmen1 but rather
 to housekeepers or civil servants who  
have to provide the household or the    
state with the necessaries of life4 ,the
 other kind of exchange is either that  
of money for money1 or of any commodity 
for money1 not on account of the        
necessities of life1 but for profit1 and
 this kind of exchange1 properly        
speaking1 regards tradesmen1 according  
to the ,philosopher 7,polit4 i1 #c74    
,the former kind of exchange is         
commendable because it supplies a       
natural need3 but the latter is justly  
deserving of blame1 because1 considered 
in itself1 it satisfies the greed for   
gain1 which knows no limit and tends to 
infinity4 ,hence trading1 considered in 
itself1 has a certain debasement        
attaching thereto1 in so far as1 by its 
very nature1 it does not imply a        
virtuous or necessary end4 ,nevertheless
 gain which is the end of trading1      

though not implying1 by its nature1     
anything virtuous or necessary1 does    
not1 in itself1 connote anything sinful 
or contrary to virtue3 wherefore nothing
 prevents gain from being directed to   
some necessary or even virtuous end1 and
 thus trading becomes lawful4 ,thus1 for
 instance1 a man may intend the moderate
 gain which he seeks to acquire by      
trading for the upkeep of his household1
 or for the assistance of the needy3 or 
again1 a man may take to trade for some 
public advantage1 for instance1 lest his
 country lack the necessaries of life1  
and seek gain1 not as an end1 but as    
payment for his labor4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,the saying of ,chrysostom refers to   
the trading which seeks gain as a last  
end4 ,this is especially the case where 
a man sells something at a higher price 
without its undergoing any change4 ,for 
if he sells at a higher price something 
that has changed for the better1 he     
would seem to receive the reward of his 
labor4 ,nevertheless the gain itself may

 be lawfully intended1 not as a last    
end1 but for the sake of some other end 
which is necessary or virtuous1 as      
stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not    
everyone that sells at a higher price   
than he bought is a tradesman1 but only 
he who buys that he may sell at a       
profit4 ,if1 on the contrary1 he buys   
not for sale but for possession1 and    
afterwards1 for some reason wishes to   
sell1 it is not a trade transaction even
 if he sell at a profit4 ,for he may    
lawfully do this1 either because he has 
bettered the thing1 or because the value
 of the thing has changed with the      
change of place or time1 or on account  
of the danger he incurs in transferring 
the thing from one place to another1 or 
again in having it carried by another4  
,in this sense neither buying nor       
selling is unjust4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,clerics should abstain not only from   
things that are evil in themselves1 but 
even from those that have an appearance 
of evil4 ,this happens in trading1 both 

because it is directed to worldly gain1 
which clerics should despise1 and       
because trading is open to so many      
vices1 since a merchant is hardly free  
from sins of the lips 99',a merchant is 
hardly free from negligence1 and a      
huckster shall not be justified from the
 sins of the lips' 7,ecclus4 #bf3bh74   
,there is also another reason1 because  
trading engages the mind too much with  
worldly cares1 and consequently         
withdraws it from spiritual cares2      
wherefore the ,apostle says 7#b ,tim4   
#b3d73 ,no man being a soldier to ,god  
entangleth himself with secular         
businesses4 ,nevertheless it is lawful  
for clerics to engage in the first      
mentioned kind of exchange1 which is    
directed to supply the necessaries of   
life1 either by buying or by selling4   
,,question #gh  ,,of ,,the ,,sin ,,of   
,,usury 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we must 
now consider the sin of usury1 which is 
committed in loans3 and under this head 
there are four points of inquiry3  7#a7 

,whether it is a sin to take money as a 
price for money lent1 which is to       
receive usury8  7#b7 ,whether it is     
lawful to lend money for any other kind 
of consideration1 by way of payment for 
the loan8  7#c7 ,whether a man is bound 
to restore just gains derived from money
 taken in usury8  7#d7 ,whether it is   
lawful to borrow money under a condition
 of usury8   ,,first ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,it ,is a ,sin to ,take ,usury for      
,money ,lent8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that it is not a sin to take usury 
for money lent4 ,for no man sins through
 following the example of ,christ4 ,but 
,our ,lord said of ,himself 7,luke      
#ai3bc73 ,at ,my coming ,i might have   
exacted it1 i4e4 the money lent1 with   
usury4 ,therefore it is not a sin to    
take usury for lending money4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 according to ,ps4 #ah3h1 ,the
 law of the ,lord is unspotted1 because1
 to wit1 it forbids sin4 ,now usury of a
 kind is allowed in the ,divine law1    

according to ,deut4 #bc3ai1 #bj3 ,thou  
shalt not fenerate to thy brother money1
 nor corn1 nor any other thing1 but to  
the stranger3 nay more1 it is even      
promised as a reward for the observance 
of the ,law1 according to ,deut4 #bh3ab3
 ,thou shalt fenerate99 to many nations1
 and shalt not borrow of any one4       
99,faeneraberis--',thou shalt lend upon 
usury4' ,the ,douay version has simply  
'lend4' ,the objection lays stress on   
the word faeneraberis3 hence the        
necessity of rendering it by 'fenerate4'
 ,therefore it is not a sin to take     
usury4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in human    
affairs justice is determined by civil  
laws4 ,now civil law allows usury to be 
taken4 ,therefore it seems to be lawful4
  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the counsels are  
not binding under sin4 ,but1 among other
 counsels we find 7,luke #f3ce73 ,lend1 
hoping for nothing thereby4 ,therefore  
it is not a sin to take usury4  ,obj4   
#e3 ,further1 it does not seem to be in 
itself sinful to accept a price for     

doing what one is not bound to do4 ,but 
one who has money is not bound in every 
case to lend it to his neighbor4        
,therefore it is lawful for him         
sometimes to accept a price for lending 
it4  ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 silver made    
into coins does not differ specifically 
from silver made into a vessel4 ,but it 
is lawful to accept a price for the loan
 of a silver vessel4 ,therefore it is   
also lawful to accept a price for the   
loan of a silver coin4 ,therefore usury 
is not in itself a sin4  ,obj4 #g3      
,further1 anyone may lawfully accept a  
thing which its owner freely gives him4 
,now he who accepts the loan1 freely    
gives the usury4 ,therefore he who lends
 may lawfully take the usury4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,it is written 7,ex4 #bb3be73 
,if thou lend money to any of thy people
 that is poor1 that dwelleth with thee1 
thou shalt not be hard upon them as an  
extortioner1 nor oppress them with      
usuries4  ,i answer that1 ,to take usury
 for money lent is unjust in itself1    

because this is to sell what does not   
exist1 and this evidently leads to      
inequality which is contrary to justice4
 ,in order to make this evident1 we must
 observe that there are certain things  
the use of which consists in their      
consumption3 thus we consume wine when  
we use it for drink and we consume wheat
 when we use it for food4 ,wherefore in 
such like things the use of the thing   
must not be reckoned apart from the     
thing itself1 and whoever is granted the
 use of the thing1 is granted the thing 
itself and for this reason1 to lend     
things of this kind is to transfer the  
ownership4 ,accordingly if a man wanted 
to sell wine separately from the use of 
the wine1 he would be selling the same  
thing twice1 or he would be selling what
 does not exist1 wherefore he would     
evidently commit a sin of injustice4 ,in
 like manner he commits an injustice who
 lends wine or wheat1 and asks for      
double payment1 viz4 one1 the return of 
the thing in equal measure1 the other1  

the price of the use1 which is called   
usury4  ,on the other hand1 there are   
things the use of which does not consist
 in their consumption3 thus to use a    
house is to dwell in it1 not to destroy 
it4 ,wherefore in such things both may  
be granted3 for instance1 one man may   
hand over to another the ownership of   
his house while reserving to himself the
 use of it for a time1 or vice versa1 he
 may grant the use of the house1 while  
retaining the ownership4 ,for this      
reason a man may lawfully make a charge 
for the use of his house1 and1 besides  
this1 revendicate the house from the    
person to whom he has granted its use1  
as happens in renting and letting a     
house4  ,now money1 according to the    
,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #e2 ,polit4 i1 
#c7 was invented chiefly for the purpose
 of exchange3 and consequently the      
proper and principal use of money is its
 consumption or alienation whereby it is
 sunk in exchange4 ,hence it is by its  
very nature unlawful to take payment for

 the use of money lent1 which payment is
 known as usury3 and just as a man is   
bound to restore other ill-gotten goods1
 so is he bound to restore the money    
which he has taken in usury4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,in this passage usury must be
 taken figuratively for the increase of 
spiritual goods which ,god exacts from  
us1 for ,he wishes us ever to advance in
 the goods which we receive from ,him3  
and this is for our own profit not for  
,his4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,jews were 
forbidden to take usury from their      
brethren1 i4e4 from other ,jews4 ,by    
this we are given to understand that to 
take usury from any man is evil simply1 
because we ought to treat every man as  
our neighbor and brother1 especially in 
the state of the ,gospel1 whereto all   
are called4 ,hence it is said without   
any distinction in ,ps4 #ad3e3 ,he that 
hath not put out his money to usury1 and
 7,ezech4 #ah3h73 ,who hath not taken   
usury 99,vulg43 ',if a man 4 4 4 hath   
not lent upon money1 nor taken any      

increase 4 4 4 he is just4'4 ,they were 
permitted1 however1 to take usury from  
foreigners1 not as though it were       
lawful1 but in order to avoid a greater 
evil1 lest1 to wit1 through avarice to  
which they were prone according to ,isa4
 #ef3aa1 they should take usury from the
 ,jews who were worshippers of ,god4    
,where we find it promised to them as a 
reward1 ,thou shalt fenerate to many    
nations1 etc41 fenerating is to be taken
 in a broad sense for lending1 as in    
,ecclus4 #bi3aj1 where we read3 ,many   
have refused to fenerate1 not out of    
wickedness1 i4e4 they would not lend4   
,accordingly the ,jews are promised in  
reward an abundance of wealth1 so that  
they would be able to lend to others4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,human laws leave      
certain things unpunished1 on account of
 the condition of those who are         
imperfect1 and who would be deprived of 
many advantages1 if all sins were       
strictly forbidden and punishments      
appointed for them4 ,wherefore human law

 has permitted usury1 not that it looks 
upon usury as harmonizing with justice1 
but lest the advantage of many should be
 hindered4 ,hence it is that in civil   
law 99,inst4 ,,ii1 iv1 de ,usufructu it 
is stated that those things according to
 natural reason and civil law which are 
consumed by being used1 do not admit of 
usufruct1 and that the senate did not   
7nor could it7 appoint a usufruct to    
such things1 but established a          
quasi-usufruct1 namely by permitting    
usury4 ,moreover the ,philosopher1 led  
by natural reason1 says 7,polit4 i1 #c7 
that to make money by usury is          
exceedingly unnatural4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3
 ,a man is not always bound to lend1 and
 for this reason it is placed among the 
counsels4 ,yet it is a matter of precept
 not to seek profit by lending3 although
 it may be called a matter of counsel in
 comparison with the maxims of the      
,pharisees1 who deemed some kinds of    
usury to be lawful1 just as love of     
one's enemies is a matter of counsel4   

,or again1 ,he speaks here not of the   
hope of usurious gain1 but of the hope  
which is put in man4 ,for we ought not  
to lend or do any good deed through hope
 in man1 but only through hope in ,god4 
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,he that is not bound  
to lend1 may accept repayment for what  
he has done1 but he must not exact more4
 ,now he is repaid according to equality
 of justice if he is repaid as much as  
he lent4 ,wherefore if he exacts more   
for the usufruct of a thing which has no
 other use but the consumption of its   
substance1 he exacts a price of         
something non-existent3 and so his      
exaction is unjust4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3   
,the principal use of a silver vessel is
 not its consumption1 and so one may    
lawfully sell its use while retaining   
one's ownership of it4 ,on the other    
hand the principal use of silver money  
is sinking it in exchange1 so that it is
 not lawful to sell its use and at the  
same time expect the restitution of the 
amount lent4 ,it must be observed1      

however1 that the secondary use of      
silver vessels may be an exchange1 and  
such use may not be lawfully sold4 ,in  
like manner there may be some secondary 
use of silver money2 for instance1 a man
 might lend coins for show1 or to be    
used as security4  ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,he 
who gives usury does not give it        
voluntarily simply1 but under a certain 
necessity1 in so far as he needs to     
borrow money which the owner is         
unwilling to lend without usury4        
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gh1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to   
,ask for ,any ,other ,kind of           
,consideration for ,money ,lent8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one  
may ask for some other kind of          
consideration for money lent4 ,for      
everyone may lawfully seek to indemnify 
himself4 ,now sometimes a man suffers   
loss through lending money4 ,therefore  
he may lawfully ask for or even exact   
something else besides the money lent4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated in ,ethic4

 v1 #e1 one is in duty bound by a point 
of honor1 to repay anyone who has done  
us a favor4 ,now to lend money to one   
who is in straits is to do him a favor  
for which he should be grateful4        
,therefore the recipient of a loan1 is  
bound by a natural debt to repay        
something4 ,now it does not seem        
unlawful to bind oneself to an          
obligation of the natural law4          
,therefore it is not unlawful1 in       
lending money to anyone1 to demand some 
sort of compensation as condition of the
 loan4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as     
there is real remuneration1 so is there 
verbal remuneration1 and remuneration by
 service1 as a gloss says on ,isa4      
#cc3ae1 ,blessed is he that shaketh his 
hands from all bribes 99,vulg43 ',which 
of you shall dwell with everlasting     
burnings8 4 4 4 ,he that shaketh his    
hands from all bribes4'4 ,now it is     
lawful to accept service or praise from 
one to whom one has lent money4         
,therefore in like manner it is lawful  

to accept any other kind of             
remuneration4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1      
seemingly the relation of gift to gift  
is the same as of loan to loan4 ,but it 
is lawful to accept money for money     
given4 ,therefore it is lawful to accept
 repayment by loan in return for a loan 
granted4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the       
lender1 by transferring his ownership of
 a sum of money removes the money       
further from himself than he who        
entrusts it to a merchant or craftsman4 
,now it is lawful to receive interest   
for money entrusted to a merchant or    
craftsman4 ,therefore it is also lawful 
to receive interest for money lent4     
,obj4 #f3 ,further1 a man may accept a  
pledge for money lent1 the use of which 
pledge he might sell for a price3 as    
when a man mortgages his land or the    
house wherein he dwells4 ,therefore it  
is lawful to receive interest for money 
lent4  ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 it sometimes 
happens that a man raises the price of  
his goods under guise of loan1 or buys  

another's goods at a low figure2 or     
raises his price through delay in being 
paid1 and lowers his price that he may  
be paid the sooner4 ,now in all these   
cases there seems to be payment for a   
loan of money3 nor does it appear to be 
manifestly illicit4 ,therefore it seems 
to be lawful to expect or exact some    
consideration for money lent4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,among other conditions       
requisite in a just man it is stated    
7,ezech4 #ah3ag7 that he hath not taken 
usury and increase4  ,i answer that1    
,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
iv1 #a71 a thing is reckoned as money if
 its value can be measured by money4    
,consequently1 just as it is a sin      
against justice1 to take money1 by tacit
 or express agreement1 in return for    
lending money or anything else that is  
consumed by being used1 so also is it a 
like sin1 by tacit or express agreement 
to receive anything whose price can be  
measured by money4 ,yet there would be  
no sin in receiving something of the    

kind1 not as exacting it1 nor yet as    
though it were due on account of some   
agreement tacit or expressed1 but as a  
gratuity3 since1 even before lending the
 money1 one could accept a gratuity1 nor
 is one in a worse condition through    
lending4  ,on the other hand it is      
lawful to exact compensation for a loan1
 in respect of such things as are not   
appreciated by a measure of money1 for  
instance1 benevolence1 and love for the 
lender1 and so forth4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,a lender may without sin enter an      
agreement with the borrower for         
compensation for the loss he incurs of  
something he ought to have1 for this is 
not to sell the use of money but to     
avoid a loss4 ,it may also happen that  
the borrower avoids a greater loss than 
the lender incurs1 wherefore the        
borrower may repay the lender with what 
he has gained4 ,but the lender cannot   
enter an agreement for compensation1    
through the fact that he makes no profit
 out of his money3 because he must not  

sell that which he has not yet and may  
be prevented in many ways from having4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,repayment for a favor 
may be made in two ways4 ,in one way1 as
 a debt of justice2 and to such a debt a
 man may be bound by a fixed contract2  
and its amount is measured according to 
the favor received4 ,wherefore the      
borrower of money or any such thing the 
use of which is its consumption is not  
bound to repay more than he received in 
loan3 and consequently it is against    
justice if he be obliged to pay back    
more4 ,in another way a man's obligation
 to repayment for favor received is     
based on a debt of friendship1 and the  
nature of this debt depends more on the 
feeling with which the favor was        
conferred than on the greatness of the  
favor itself4 ,this debt does not carry 
with it a civil obligation1 involving a 
kind of necessity that would exclude the
 spontaneous nature of such a repayment4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if a man were1 in   
return for money lent1 as though there  

had been an agreement tacit or          
expressed1 to expect or exact repayment 
in the shape of some remuneration of    
service or words1 it would be the same  
as if he expected or exacted some real  
remuneration1 because both can be priced
 at a money value1 as may be seen in the
 case of those who offer for hire the   
labor which they exercise by work or by 
tongue4 ,if on the other hand the       
remuneration by service or words be     
given not as an obligation1 but as a    
favor1 which is not to be appreciated at
 a money value1 it is lawful to take1   
exact1 and expect it4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 
,money cannot be sold for a greater sum 
than the amount lent1 which has to be   
paid back3 nor should the loan be made  
with a demand or expectation of aught   
else but of a feeling of benevolence    
which cannot be priced at a pecuniary   
value1 and which can be the basis of a  
spontaneous loan4 ,now the obligation to
 lend in return at some future time is  
repugnant to such a feeling1 because    

again an obligation of this kind has its
 pecuniary value4 ,consequently it is   
lawful for the lender to borrow         
something else at the same time1 but it 
is unlawful for him to bind the borrower
 to grant him a loan at some future     
time4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,he who lends   
money transfers the ownership of the    
money to the borrower4 ,hence the       
borrower holds the money at his own risk
 and is bound to pay it all back3       
wherefore the lender must not exact     
more4 ,on the other hand he that        
entrusts his money to a merchant or     
craftsman so as to form a kind of       
society1 does not transfer the ownership
 of his money to them1 for it remains   
his1 so that at his risk the merchant   
speculates with it1 or the craftsman    
uses it for his craft1 and consequently 
he may lawfully demand as something     
belonging to him1 part of the profits   
derived from his money4  ,reply ,obj4   
#f3 ,if a man in return for money lent  
to him pledges something that can be    

valued at a price1 the lender must allow
 for the use of that thing towards the  
repayment of the loan4 ,else if he      
wishes the gratuitous use of that thing 
in addition to repayment1 it is the same
 as if he took money for lending1 and   
that is usury1 unless perhaps it were   
such a thing as friends are wont to lend
 to one another gratis1 as in the case  
of the loan of a book4  ,reply ,obj4 #g3
 ,if a man wish to sell his goods at a  
higher price than that which is just1 so
 that he may wait for the buyer to pay1 
it is manifestly a case of usury3       
because this waiting for the payment of 
the price has the character of a loan1  
so that whatever he demands beyond the  
just price in consideration of this     
delay1 is like a price for a loan1 which
 pertains to usury4 ,in like manner if a
 buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower   
price than what is just1 for the reason 
that he pays for the goods before they  
can be delivered1 it is a sin of usury2 
because again this anticipated payment  

of money has the character of a loan1   
the price of which is the rebate on the 
just price of the goods sold4 ,on the   
other hand if a man wishes to allow a   
rebate on the just price in order that  
he may have his money sooner1 he is not 
guilty of the sin of usury4   ,,third   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #c  
,whether a ,man ,is ,bound to ,restore  
,whatever ,profits ,he ,has ,made ,out  
of ,money ,gotten by ,usury8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that a man is bound 
to restore whatever profits he has made 
out of money gotten by usury4 ,for the  
,apostle says 7,rom4 #aa3af73 ,if the   
root be holy1 so are the branches4      
,therefore likewise if the root be      
rotten so are the branches4 ,but the    
root was infected with usury4 ,therefore
 whatever profit is made therefrom is   
infected with usury4 ,therefore he is   
bound to restore it4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 it is laid down 7,extra1 ,de  
,usuris1 in the ,decretal3 ',cum tu     
sicut asseris'73 ,property accruing from

 usury must be sold1 and the price      
repaid to the persons from whom the     
usury was extorted4 ,therefore1         
likewise1 whatever else is acquired from
 usurious money must be restored4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 that which a man buys    
with the proceeds of usury is due to him
 by reason of the money he paid for it4 
,therefore he has no more right to the  
thing purchased than to the money he    
paid4 ,but he was bound to restore the  
money gained through usury4 ,therefore  
he is also bound to restore what he     
acquired with it4  ,on the contrary1 ,a 
man may lawfully hold what he has       
lawfully acquired4 ,now that which is   
acquired by the proceeds of usury is    
sometimes lawfully acquired4 ,therefore 
it may be lawfully retained4  ,i answer 
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 there  
are certain things whose use is their   
consumption1 and which do not admit of  
usufruct1 according to law 7ibid41 ad   
#c74 ,wherefore if such like things be  
extorted by means of usury1 for instance

 money1 wheat1 wine and so forth1 the   
lender is not bound to restore more than
 he received 7since what is acquired by 
such things is the fruit not of the     
thing but of human industry71 unless    
indeed the other party by losing some of
 his own goods be injured through the   
lender retaining them3 for then he is   
bound to make good the loss4  ,on the   
other hand1 there are certain things    
whose use is not their consumption3 such
 things admit of usufruct1 for instance 
house or land property and so forth4    
,wherefore if a man has by usury        
extorted from another his house or land1
 he is bound to restore not only the    
house or land but also the fruits       
accruing to him therefrom1 since they   
are the fruits of things owned by       
another man and consequently are due to 
him4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the root has not
 only the character of matter1 as money 
made by usury has2 but has also somewhat
 the character of an active cause1 in so
 far as it administers nourishment4     

,hence the comparison fails4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,property acquired  
from usury does not belong to the person
 who paid usury1 but to the person who  
bought it4 ,yet he that paid usury has a
 certain claim on that property just as 
he has on the other goods of the usurer4
 ,hence it is not prescribed that such  
property should be assigned to the      
persons who paid usury1 since the       
property is perhaps worth more than what
 they paid in usury1 but it is commanded
 that the property be sold1 and the     
price be restored1 of course according  
to the amount taken in usury4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,the proceeds of money taken  
in usury are due to the person who      
acquired them not by reason of the      
usurious money as instrumental cause1   
but on account of his own industry as   
principal cause4 ,wherefore he has more 
right to the goods acquired with        
usurious money than to the usurious     
money itself4   ,,fourth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  

,it ,is ,lawful to ,borrow ,money ,under
 a ,condition of ,usury8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that it is not lawful to
 borrow money under a condition of      
usury4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4    
#a3cb7 that they are worthy of death 4 4
 4 not only they that do these sins1 but
 they also that consent to them that do 
them4 ,now he that borrows money under a
 condition of usury consents in the sin 
of the usurer1 and gives him an occasion
 of sin4 ,therefore he sins also4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 for no temporal advantage
 ought one to give another an occasion  
of committing a sin3 for this pertains  
to active scandal1 which is always      
sinful1 as stated above 7,q4 #dc1 ,a4   
#b74 ,now he that seeks to borrow from a
 usurer gives him an occasion of sin4   
,therefore he is not to be excused on   
account of any temporal advantage4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it seems no less    
necessary sometimes to deposit one's    
money with a usurer than to borrow from 
him4 ,now it seems altogether unlawful  

to deposit one's money with a usurer1   
even as it would be unlawful to deposit 
one's sword with a madman1 a maiden with
 a libertine1 or food with a glutton4   
,neither therefore is it lawful to      
borrow from a usurer4  ,on the contrary1
 ,he that suffers injury does not sin1  
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
v1 #aa71 wherefore justice is not a mean
 between two vices1 as stated in the    
same book 7ch4 #e74 ,now a usurer sins  
by doing an injury to the person who    
borrows from him under a condition of   
usury4 ,therefore he that accepts a loan
 under a condition of usury does not    
sin4  ,i answer that1 ,it is by no means
 lawful to induce a man to sin1 yet it  
is lawful to make use of another's sin  
for a good end1 since even ,god uses all
 sin for some good1 since ,he draws some
 good from every evil as stated in the  
,enchiridion 7xi74 ,hence when          
,publicola asked whether it were lawful 
to make use of an oath taken by a man   
swearing by false gods 7which is a      

manifest sin1 for he gives ,divine honor
 to them7 ,augustine 7,ep4 xlvii7       
answered that he who uses1 not for a bad
 but for a good purpose1 the oath of a  
man that swears by false gods1 is a     
party1 not to his sin of swearing by    
demons1 but to his good compact whereby 
he kept his word4 ,if however he were to
 induce him to swear by false gods1 he  
would sin4  ,accordingly we must also   
answer to the question in point that it 
is by no means lawful to induce a man to
 lend under a condition of usury3 yet it
 is lawful to borrow for usury from a   
man who is ready to do so and is a      
usurer by profession2 provided the      
borrower have a good end in view1 such  
as the relief of his own or another's   
need4 ,thus too it is lawful for a man  
who has fallen among thieves to point   
out his property to them 7which they sin
 in taking7 in order to save his life1  
after the example of the ten men who    
said to ,ismahel 7,jer4 #da3h73 ,kill us
 not3 for we have stores in the field4  

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he who borrows for    
usury does not consent to the usurer's  
sin but makes use of it4 ,nor is it the 
usurer's acceptance of usury that       
pleases him1 but his lending1 which is  
good4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he who borrows 
for usury gives the usurer an occasion1 
not for taking usury1 but for lending2  
it is the usurer who finds an occasion  
of sin in the malice of his heart4      
,hence there is passive scandal on his  
part1 while there is no active scandal  
on the part of the person who seeks to  
borrow4 ,nor is this passive scandal a  
reason why the other person should      
desist from borrowing if he is in need1 
since this passive scandal arises not   
from weakness or ignorance but from     
malice4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if one were  
to entrust one's money to a usurer      
lacking other means of practising usury2
 or with the intention of making a      
greater profit from his money by reason 
of the usury1 one would be giving a     
sinner matter for sin1 so that one would

 be a participator in his guilt4 ,if1 on
 the other hand1 the usurer to whom one 
entrusts one's money has other means of 
practising usury1 there is no sin in    
entrusting it to him that it may be in  
safer keeping1 since this is to use a   
sinner for a good purpose4   ,,question 
#gi  ,,of ,,the ,,quasi-,,integral      
,,parts ,,of ,,justice 7,in ,four       
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
quasi-integral parts of justice1 which  
are to do good1 and to decline from     
evil1 and the opposite vices4 ,under    
this head there are four points of      
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether these two are   
parts of justice8  7#b7 ,whether        
transgression is a special sin8  7#c7   
,whether omission is a special sin8     
7#d7 ,of the comparison between omission
 and transgression4   ,,first ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
to ,decline from ,evil and to ,do ,good 
,are ,parts of ,justice8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that to decline from    
evil and to do good are not parts of    

justice4 ,for it belongs to every virtue
 to perform a good deed and to avoid an 
evil one4 ,but parts do not exceed the  
whole4 ,therefore to decline from evil  
and to do good should not be reckoned   
parts of justice1 which is a special    
kind of virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a  
gloss on ,ps4 #cc3ae1 ,turn away from   
evil and do good1 says3 ,the former1    
i4e4 to turn away from evil1 avoids sin1
 the latter1 i4e4 to do good1 deserves  
the life and the palm4 ,but any part of 
a virtue deserves the life and the palm4
 ,therefore to decline from evil is not 
a part of justice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
things that are so related that one     
implies the other1 are not mutually     
distinct as parts of a whole4 ,now      
declining from evil is implied in doing 
good3 since no one does evil and good at
 the same time4 ,therefore declining    
from evil and doing good are not parts  
of justice4  ,on the contrary1          
,augustine 7,de ,correp4 et ,grat4 i7   
declares that declining from evil and   

doing good belong to the justice of the 
law4  ,i answer that1 ,if we speak of   
good and evil in general1 it belongs to 
every virtue to do good and to avoid    
evil3 and in this sense they cannot be  
reckoned parts of justice1 except       
justice be taken in the sense of all    
virtue 99,cf4 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #e4 ,and yet 
even if justice be taken in this sense  
it regards a certain special aspect of  
good2 namely1 the good as due in respect
 of ,divine or human law4  ,on the other
 hand justice considered as a special   
virtue regards good as due to one's     
neighbor4 ,and in this sense it belongs 
to special justice to do good considered
 as due to one's neighbor1 and to avoid 
the opposite evil1 that1 namely1 which  
is hurtful to one's neighbor2 while it  
belongs to general justice to do good in
 relation to the community or in        
relation to ,god1 and to avoid the      
opposite evil4  ,now these two are said 
to be quasi-integral parts of general or
 of special justice1 because each is    

required for the perfect act of justice4
 ,for it belongs to justice to establish
 equality in our relations with others1 
as shown above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b73 and it
 pertains to the same cause to establish
 and to preserve that which it has      
established4 ,now a person establishes  
the equality of justice by doing good1  
i4e4 by rendering to another his due3   
and he preserves the already established
 equality of justice by declining from  
evil1 that is by inflicting no injury on
 his neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,good  
and evil are here considered under a    
special aspect1 by which they are       
appropriated to justice4 ,the reason why
 these two are reckoned parts of justice
 under a special aspect of good and     
evil1 while they are not reckoned parts 
of any other moral virtue1 is that the  
other moral virtues are concerned with  
the passions wherein to do good is to   
observe the mean1 which is the same as  
to avoid the extremes as evils3 so that 
doing good and avoiding evil come to the

 same1 with regard to the other virtues4
 ,on the other hand justice is concerned
 with operations and external things1   
wherein to establish equality is one    
thing1 and not to disturb the equality  
established is another4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,to decline from evil1 considered as
 a part of justice1 does not denote a   
pure negation1 viz4 not to do evil2 for 
this does not deserve the palm1 but only
 avoids the punishment4 ,but it implies 
a movement of the will in repudiating   
evil1 as the very term decline shows4   
,this is meritorious2 especially when a 
person resists against an instigation to
 do evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,doing good 
is the completive act of justice1 and   
the principal part1 so to speak1        
thereof4 ,declining from evil is a more 
imperfect act1 and a secondary part of  
that virtue4 ,hence it is a material    
part1 so to speak1 thereof1 and a       
necessary condition of the formal and   
completive part4   ,,second ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  

,transgression ,is a ,special ,sin8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
transgression is not a special sin4 ,for
 no species is included in the          
definition of its genus4 ,now           
transgression is included in the        
definition of sin2 because ,ambrose says
 7,de ,parad4 viii7 that sin is a       
transgression of the ,divine law4       
,therefore transgression is not a       
species of sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no 
species is more comprehensive than its  
genus4 ,but transgression is more       
comprehensive than sin1 because sin is a
 word1 deed or desire against the law of
 ,god1 according to ,augustine 7,contra 
,faust4 xxii1 #bg71 while transgression 
is also against nature1 or custom4      
,therefore transgression is not a       
species of sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no 
species contains all the parts into     
which its genus is divided4 ,now the sin
 of transgression extends to all the    
capital vices1 as well as to sins of    
thought1 word and deed4 ,therefore      

transgression is not a special sin4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,it is opposed to a      
special virtue1 namely justice4  ,i     
answer that1 ,the term transgression is 
derived from bodily movement and applied
 to moral actions4 ,now a person is said
 to transgress in bodily movement1 when 
he steps 7graditur7 beyond 7trans7 a    
fixed boundary--and it is a negative    
precept that fixes the boundary that man
 must not exceed in his moral actions4  
,wherefore to transgress1 properly      
speaking1 is to act against a negative  
precept4  ,now materially considered    
this may be common to all the species of
 sin1 because man transgresses a ,divine
 precept by any species of mortal sin4  
,but if we consider it formally1 namely 
under its special aspect of an act      
against a negative precept1 it is a     
special sin in two ways4 ,first1 in so  
far as it is opposed to those kinds of  
sin that are opposed to the other       
virtues3 for just as it belongs properly
 to legal justice to consider a precept 

as binding1 so it belongs properly to a 
transgression to consider a precept as  
an object of contempt4 ,secondly1 in so 
far as it is distinct from omission     
which is opposed to an affirmative      
precept4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even as     
legal justice is all virtue 7,q4 #eh1   
,a4 #e7 as regards its subject and      
matter1 so legal injustice is materially
 all sin4 ,it is in this way that       
,ambrose defined sin1 considering it    
from the point of view of legal         
injustice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the       
natural inclination concerns the        
precepts of the natural law4 ,again1 a  
laudable custom has the force of a      
precept2 since as ,augustine says in an 
epistle on the ,fast of the ,sabbath    
7,ep4 xxxvi71 a custom of ,god's people 
should be looked upon as law4 ,hence    
both sin and transgression may be       
against a laudable custom and against a 
natural inclination4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,all these species of sin may include   
transgression1 if we consider them not  

under their proper aspects1 but under a 
special aspect1 as stated above4 ,the   
sin of omission1 however1 is altogether 
distinct from the sin of transgression4 
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,omission ,is a      
,special ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that omission is not a special    
sin4 ,for every sin is either original  
or actual4 ,now omission is not original
 sin1 for it is not contracted through  
origin2 nor is it actual sin1 for it may
 be altogether without act1 as stated   
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #e7 when we
 were treating of sins in general4      
,therefore omission is not a special    
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every sin is  
voluntary4 ,now omission sometimes is   
not voluntary but necessary1 as when a  
woman is violated after taking a vow of 
virginity1 or when one lose that which  
one is under an obligation to restore1  
or when a priest is bound to say ,mass1 
and is prevented from doing so4         
,therefore omission is not always a sin4

  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is possible to 
fix the time when any special sin       
begins4 ,but this is not possible in the
 case of omission1 since one is not     
altered by not doing a thing1 no matter 
when the omission occurs1 and yet the   
omission is not always sinful4          
,therefore omission is not a special    
sin4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 every special 
sin is opposed to a special virtue4 ,but
 it is not possible to assign any       
special virtue to which omission is     
opposed1 both because the good of any   
virtue can be omitted1 and because      
justice to which it would seem more     
particularly opposed1 always requires an
 act1 even in declining from evil1 as   
stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b71 while     
omission may be altogether without act4 
,therefore omission is not a special    
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written  
7,james #d3ag73 ,to him 4 4 4 who       
knoweth to do good and doth it not1 to  
him it is sin4  ,i answer that1 omission
 signifies the non-fulfilment of a good1

 not indeed of any good1 but of a good  
that is due4 ,now good under the aspect 
of due belongs properly to justice2 to  
legal justice1 if the thing due depends 
on ,divine or human law2 to special     
justice1 if the due is something in     
relation to one's neighbor4 ,wherefore1 
in the same way as justice is a special 
virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,,aa4 
#f1 #g71 omission is a special sin      
distinct from the sins which are opposed
 to the other virtues2 and just as doing
 good1 which is the opposite of omitting
 it1 is a special part of justice1      
distinct from avoiding evil1 to which   
transgression is opposed1 so too is     
omission distinct from transgression4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,omission is not       
original but actual sin1 not as though  
it had some act essential to it1 but for
 as much as the negation of an act is   
reduced to the genus of act1 and in this
 sense non-action is a kind of action1  
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,a4  
#f1 ad #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,omission1

 as stated above1 is only of such good  
as is due and to which one is bound4    
,now no man is bound to the impossible3 
wherefore no man sins by omission1 if he
 does not do what he cannot4            
,accordingly she who is violated after  
vowing virginity1 is guilty of an       
omission1 not through not having        
virginity1 but through not repenting of 
her past sin1 or through not doing what 
she can to fulfil her vow by observing  
continence4 ,again a priest is not bound
 to say ,mass1 except he have a suitable
 opportunity1 and if this be lacking1   
there is no omission4 ,and in like      
manner1 a person is bound to            
restitution1 supposing he has the       
wherewithal2 if he has not and cannot   
have it1 he is not guilty of an         
omission1 provided he does what he can4 
,the same applies to other similar      
cases4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as the   
sin of transgression is opposed to      
negative precepts which regard the      
avoidance of evil1 so the sin of        

omission is opposed to affirmative      
precepts1 which regard the doing of     
good4 ,now affirmative precepts bind not
 for always1 but for a fixed time1 and  
at that time the sin of omission begins4
 ,but it may happen that then one is    
unable to do what one ought1 and if this
 inability is without any fault on his  
part1 he does not omit his duty1 as     
stated above 7ad #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1  
,a4 #e74 ,on the other hand if this     
inability is due to some previous fault 
of his 7for instance1 if a man gets     
drunk at night1 and cannot get up for   
matins1 as he ought to71 some say that  
the sin of omission begins when he      
engages in an action that is illicit and
 incompatible with the act to which he  
is bound4 ,but this does not seem to be 
true1 for supposing one were to rouse   
him by violence and that he went to     
matins1 he would not omit to go1 so     
that1 evidently1 the previous           
drunkenness was not an omission1 but the
 cause of an omission4 ,consequently1 we

 must say that the omission begins to be
 imputed to him as a sin1 when the time 
comes for the action2 and yet this is on
 account of a preceding cause by reason 
of which the subsequent omission becomes
 voluntary4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,omission 
is directly opposed to justice1 as      
stated above2 because it is a           
non-fulfilment of a good of virtue1 but 
only under the aspect of due1 which     
pertains to justice4 ,now more is       
required for an act to be virtuous and  
meritorious than for it to be sinful and
 demeritorious1 because good results    
from an entire cause1 whereas evil      
arises from each single defect          
99,dionysius1 ,de ,div4 ,nom4 iv4       
,wherefore the merit of justice requires
 an act1 whereas an omission does not4  
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1  
,art4 #d  ,whether a ,sin of ,omission  
,is ,more ,grievous ,than a ,sin of     
,transgression8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that a sin of omission is    
more grievous than a sin of             

transgression4 ,for delictum would seem 
to signify the same as derelictum       
99,augustine1 ,,qq4 in ,levit41 qu4 xx1 
and therefore is seemingly the same as  
an omission4 ,but delictum denotes a    
more grievous offence than              
transgression1 because it deserves more 
expiation as appears from ,lev4 #e4     
,therefore the sin of omission is more  
grievous than the sin of transgression4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the greater evil is 
opposed to the greater good1 as the     
,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 viii1    
#aj74 ,now to do good is a more         
excellent part of justice1 than to      
decline from evil1 to which             
transgression is opposed1 as stated     
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,therefore       
omission is a graver sin than           
transgression4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sins
 of transgression may be either venial  
or mortal4 ,but sins of omission seem to
 be always mortal1 since they are       
opposed to an affirmative precept4      
,therefore omission would seem to be a  

graver sin than transgression4  ,obj4   
#d3 ,further1 the pain of loss which    
consists in being deprived of seeing    
,god and is inflicted for the sin of    
omission1 is a greater punishment than  
the pain of sense1 which is inflicted   
for the sin of transgression1 as        
,chrysostom states 7,hom4 xxiii super   
,matth474 ,now punishment is            
proportionate to fault4 ,therefore the  
sin of omission is graver than the sin  
of transgression4  ,on the contrary1 ,it
 is easier to refrain from evil deeds   
than to accomplish good deeds4          
,therefore it is a graver sin not to    
refrain from an evil deed1 i4e4 to      
transgress1 than not to accomplish a    
good deed1 which is to omit4  ,i answer 
that1 ,the gravity of a sin depends on  
its remoteness from virtue4 ,now        
contrariety is the greatest remoteness1 
according to ,metaph4 x 99,didot4 ed4   
ix1 #d4 ,wherefore a thing is further   
removed from its contrary than from its 
simple negation2 thus black is further  

removed from white than not-white is1   
since every black is not-white1 but not 
conversely4 ,now it is evident that     
transgression is contrary to an act of  
virtue1 while omission denotes the      
negation thereof3 for instance it is a  
sin of omission1 if one fail to give    
one's parents due reverence1 while it is
 a sin of transgression to revile them  
or injure them in any way4 ,hence it is 
evident that1 simply and absolutely     
speaking1 transgression is a graver sin 
than omission1 although a particular    
omission may be graver than a particular
 transgression4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3       
,delictum in its widest sense denotes   
any kind of omission2 but sometimes it  
is taken strictly for the omission of   
something concerning ,god1 or for a     
man's intentional and as it were        
contemptuous dereliction of duty3 and   
then it has a certain gravity1 for which
 reason it demands a greater expiation4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the opposite of doing 
good is both not doing good1 which is an

 omission1 and doing evil1 which is a   
transgression3 but the first is opposed 
by contradiction1 the second by         
contrariety1 which implies greater      
remoteness3 wherefore transgression is  
the more grievous sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,just as omission is opposed to        
affirmative precepts1 so is             
transgression opposed to negative       
precepts3 wherefore both1 strictly      
speaking1 have the character of mortal  
sin4 ,transgression and omission1       
however1 may be taken broadly for any   
infringement of an affirmative or       
negative precept1 disposing to the      
opposite of such precept3 and so taking 
both in a broad sense they may be venial
 sins4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,to the sin of 
transgression there correspond both the 
pain of loss on account of the aversion 
from ,god1 and the pain of sense1 on    
account of the inordinate conversion to 
a mutable good4 ,in like manner omission
 deserves not only the pain of loss1 but
 also the pain of sense1 according to   

,matt4 #g3ai1 ,every tree that bringeth 
not forth good fruit shall be cut down1 
and shall be cast into the fire2 and    
this on account of the root from which  
it grows1 although it does not          
necessarily imply conversion to any     
mutable good4   ,,question #hj  ,,of    
,,the ,,potential ,,parts ,,of ,,justice
 7,in ,one ,article7  ,we must now      
consider the potential parts of justice1
 namely the virtues annexed thereto2    
under which head there are two points of
 consideration3  7#a7 ,what virtues are 
annexed to justice8  7#b7 ,the          
individual virtues annexed to justice4  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hj1 ,art4     
,whether the ,virtues ,annexed to       
,justice ,are ,suitably ,enumerated8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
virtues annexed to justice are          
unsuitably enumerated4 ,tully 99,de     
,invent4 ii1 #ec reckons six1 viz4      
religion1 piety1 gratitude1 revenge1    
observance1 truth4 ,now revenge is      
seemingly a species of commutative      

justice whereby revenge is taken for    
injuries inflicted1 as stated above 7,q4
 #fa1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore it should not 
be reckoned among the virtues annexed to
 justice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1          
,macrobius 7,super ,somn4 ,scip4 i1 #h7 
reckons seven1 viz4 innocence1          
friendship1 concord1 piety1 religion1   
affection1 humanity1 several of which   
are omitted by ,tully4 ,therefore the   
virtues annexed to justice would seem to
 be insufficiently enumerated4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 others reckon five parts  
of justice1 viz4 obedience in respect of
 one's superiors1 discipline with regard
 to inferiors1 equity as regards equals1
 fidelity and truthfulness towards all2 
and of these truthfulness alone is      
mentioned by ,tully4 ,therefore he would
 seem to have enumerated insufficiently 
the virtues annexed to justice4  ,obj4  
#d3 ,further1 the peripatetic           
,andronicus 99,de ,affectibus reckons   
nine parts annexed to justice viz4      
liberality1 kindliness1 revenge1        

commonsense1 99eugnomosyne piety1       
gratitude1 holiness1 just exchange and  
just lawgiving2 and of all these it is  
evident that ,tully mentions none but   
revenge4 ,therefore he would appear to  
have made an incomplete enumeration4    
,obj4 #e3 ,further1 ,aristotle 7,ethic4 
v1 #aj7 mentions epieikeia as being     
annexed to justice3 and yet seemingly it
 is not included in any of the foregoing
 enumerations4 ,therefore the virtues   
annexed to justice are insufficiently   
enumerated4  ,i answer that1 ,two points
 must be observed about the virtues     
annexed to a principal virtue4 ,the     
first is that these virtues have        
something in common with the principal  
virtue2 and the second is that in some  
respect they fall short of the          
perfection of that virtue4 ,accordingly 
since justice is of one man to another  
as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b71 all  
the virtues that are directed to another
 person may by reason of this common    
aspect be annexed to justice4 ,now the  

essential character of justice consists 
in rendering to another his due         
according to equality1 as stated above  
7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #aa74 ,wherefore in two   
ways may a virtue directed to another   
person fall short of the perfection of  
justice3 first1 by falling short of the 
aspect of equality2 secondly1 by falling
 short of the aspect of due4 ,for       
certain virtues there are which render  
another his due1 but are unable to      
render the equal due4 ,in the first     
place1 whatever man renders to ,god is  
due1 yet it cannot be equal1 as though  
man rendered to ,god as much as he owes 
,him1 according to ,ps4 #aae3ab1 ,what  
shall ,i render to the ,lord for all the
 things that ,he hath rendered to me8   
,in this respect religion is annexed to 
justice since1 according to ,tully 7,de 
invent4 ii1 #ec71 it consists in        
offering service and ceremonial rites or
 worship to some superior nature that   
men call divine4 ,secondly1 it is not   
possible to make to one's parents an    

equal return of what one owes to them1  
as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4   
viii1 #ad72 and thus piety is annexed to
 justice1 for thereby1 as ,tully says   
7,de invent4 ii1 #ec71 a man renders    
service and constant deference to his   
kindred and the well-wishers of his     
country4 ,thirdly1 according to the     
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #c71 man is   
unable to offer an equal meed for       
virtue1 and thus observance is annexed  
to justice1 consisting according to     
,tully 7,de invent4 ii1 #ec7 in the     
deference and honor rendered to those   
who excel in worth4  ,a falling short of
 the just due may be considered in      
respect of a twofold due1 moral or      
legal3 wherefore the ,philosopher       
7,ethic4 viii1 #ac7 assigns a           
corresponding twofold just4 ,the legal  
due is that which one is bound to render
 by reason of a legal obligation2 and   
this due is chiefly the concern of      
justice1 which is the principal virtue4 
,on the other hand1 the moral due is    

that to which one is bound in respect of
 the rectitude of virtue3 and since a   
due implies necessity1 this kind of due 
has two degrees4 ,for one due is so     
necessary that without it moral         
rectitude cannot be ensured3 and this   
has more of the character of due4       
,moreover this due may be considered    
from the point of view of the debtor1   
and in this way it pertains to this kind
 of due that a man represent himself to 
others just as he is1 both in word and  
deed4 ,wherefore to justice is annexed  
truth1 whereby1 as ,tully says 7,de     
invent4 ii1 #ec71 present1 past and     
future things are told without          
perversion4 ,it may also be considered  
from the point of view of the person to 
whom it is due1 by comparing the reward 
he receives with what he has            
done--sometimes in good things2 and then
 annexed to justice we have gratitude   
which consists in recollecting the      
friendship and kindliness shown by      
others1 and in desiring to pay them     

back1 as ,tully states 7,de invent4 ii1 
#ec7--;and sometimes in evil things1 and
 then to justice is annexed revenge1    
whereby1 as ,tully states 7,de invent4  
ii1 #ec71 we resist force1 injury or    
anything obscure99 by taking vengeance  
or by self-defense4 99,st4 ,thomas read 
obscurum1 and explains it as meaning    
derogatory1 infra ,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 #b4     
,cicero1 however1 wrote obfuturum1 i4e4 
hurtful4  ,there is another due that is 
necessary in the sense that it conduces 
to greater rectitude1 although without  
it rectitude may be ensured4 ,this due  
is the concern of liberality1 affability
 or friendship1 or the like1 all of     
which ,tully omits in the aforesaid     
enumeration because there is little of  
the nature of anything due in them4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the revenge taken by  
authority of a public power1 in         
accordance with a judge's sentence1     
belongs to commutative justice3 whereas 
the revenge which a man takes on his own
 initiative1 though not against the law1

 or which a man seeks to obtain from a  
judge1 belongs to the virtue annexed to 
justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,macrobius   
appears to have considered the two      
integral parts of justice1 namely1      
declining from evil1 to which innocence 
belongs1 and doing good1 to which the   
six others belong4 ,of these1 two would 
seem to regard relations between equals1
 namely1 friendship in the external     
conduct and concord internally2 two     
regard our relations toward superiors1  
namely1 piety to parents1 and religion  
to ,god2 while two regard our relations 
towards inferiors1 namely1              
condescension1 in so far as their good  
pleases us1 and humanity1 whereby we    
help them in their needs4 ,for ,isidore 
says 7,etym4 x7 that a man is said to be
 humane1 through having a feeling of    
love and pity towards men3 this gives   
its name to humanity whereby we uphold  
one another4 ,in this sense friendship  
is understood as directing our external 
conduct towards others1 from which point

 of view the ,philosopher treats of it  
in ,ethic4 iv1 #f4 ,friendship may also 
be taken as regarding properly the      
affections1 and as the ,philosopher     
describes it in ,ethic4 viii and ix4 ,in
 this sense three things pertain to     
friendship1 namely1 benevolence which is
 here called affection2 concord1 and    
beneficence which is here called        
humanity4 ,these three1 however1 are    
omitted by ,tully1 because1 as stated   
above1 they have little of the nature of
 a due4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,obedience is 
included in observance1 which ,tully    
mentions1 because both reverential honor
 and obedience are due to persons who   
excel4 ,faithfulness whereby a man's    
acts agree with his words 99,cicero1 ,de
 ,repub4 iv1 ,de ,offic4 i1 #g1 is      
contained in truthfulness as to the     
observance of one's promises3 yet       
truthfulness covers a wider ground1 as  
we shall state further on 7,q4 #aji1    
,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,discipline is not due as
 a necessary duty1 because one is under 

no obligation to an inferior as such1   
although a superior may be under an     
obligation to watch over his inferiors1 
according to ,matt4 #bd3de1 ,a faithful 
and wise servant1 whom his lord hath    
appointed over his family3 and for this 
reason it is omitted by ,tully4 ,it may1
 however1 be included in humanity       
mentioned by ,macrobius2 and equity     
under epieikeia or under friendship4    
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this enumeration      
contains some belonging to true justice4
 ,to particular justice belongs justice 
of exchange1 which he describes as the  
habit of observing equality in          
commutations4 ,to legal justice1 as     
regards things to be observed by all1 he
 ascribes legislative justice1 which he 
describes as the science of political   
commutations relating to the community4 
,as regards things which have to be done
 in particular cases beside the general 
laws1 he mentions common sense or good  
judgment199 which is our guide in such  
like matters1 as stated above 7,q4 #ea1 

,a4 #d7 in the treatise on prudence3    
wherefore he says that it is a voluntary
 justification1 because by his own free 
will man observes what is just according
 to his judgment and not according to   
the written law4 99,st4 ,thomas         
indicates the ,greek derivation3        
eugnomosyne quasi 'bona gnome4' ,these  
two are ascribed to prudence as their   
director1 and to justice as their       
executor4 ,eusebeia 7piety7 means good  
worship and consequently is the same as 
religion1 wherefore he says that it is  
the science of the service of ,god 7he  
speaks after the manner of ,socrates who
 said that 'all the virtues are         
sciences'7 99,aristotle1 ,ethic4 vi1    
#ac3 and holiness comes to the same1 as 
we shall state further on 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 
#h74 ,eucharistia 7gratitude7 means good
 thanksgiving1 and is mentioned by      
,macrobius3 wherefore ,isidore says     
7,etym4 x7 that a kind man is one who is
 ready of his own accord to do good1 and
 is of gentle speech3 and ,andronicus   

too says that kindliness is a habit of  
voluntary beneficence4 ,liberality would
 seem to pertain to humanity4  ,reply   
,obj4 #e3 ,epieikeia is annexed1 not to 
particular but to legal justice1 and    
apparently is the same as that which    
goes by the name of eugnomosyne 7common 
sense74   ,,question #ha  ,,of          
,,religion 7,in ,eight ,articles7  ,we  
must now consider each of the foregoing 
virtues1 in so far as our present scope 
demands4 ,we shall consider 7#a7        
religion1 7#b7 piety1 7#c7 observance1  
7#d7 gratitude1 7#e7 revenge1 7#f7      
truth1 7#g7 friendship1 7#h7 liberality1
 7#i7 epieikeia4 ,of the other virtues  
that have been mentioned we have spoken 
partly in the treatise on charity1 viz4 
of concord and the like1 and partly in  
this treatise on justice1 for instance1 
of right commutations and of innocence4 
,of legislative justice we spoke in the 
treatise on prudence4  ,religion offers 
a threefold consideration3 7#a7         
,religion considered in itself2 7#b7 its

 acts2 7#c7 the opposite vices4  ,under 
the first head there are eight points of
 inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether religion       
regards only our relation to ,god8  7#b7
 ,whether religion is a virtue8  7#c7   
,whether religion is one virtue8  7#d7  
,whether religion is a special virtue8  
7#e7 ,whether religion is a theological 
virtue8  7#f7 ,whether religion should  
be preferred to the other moral virtues8
  7#g7 ,whether religion has any        
external actions8  7#h7 ,whether        
religion is the same as holiness8       
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,religion ,directs   
,man to ,god ,alone8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that religion does not      
direct man to ,god alone4 ,it is written
 7,james #a3bg73 ,religion clean and    
undefiled before ,god and the ,father is
 this1 to visit the fatherless and      
widows in their tribulation1 and to keep
 oneself unspotted from this world4 ,now
 to visit the fatherless and widows     
indicates an order between oneself and  

one's neighbor1 and to keep oneself     
unspotted from this world belongs to the
 order of a man within himself4         
,therefore religion does not imply order
 to ,god alone4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1    
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #a7  
that since in speaking ,latin not only  
unlettered but even most cultured       
persons ere wont to speak of religion as
 being exhibited1 to our human kindred  
and relations as also to those who are  
linked with us by any kind of tie1 that 
term does not escape ambiguity when it  
is a question of ,divine worship1 so    
that we be able to say without          
hesitation that religion is nothing else
 but the worship of ,god4 ,therefore    
religion signifies a relation not only  
to ,god but also to our kindred4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 seemingly latria pertains 
to religion4 ,now latria signifies      
servitude1 as ,augustine states 7,de    
,civ4 ,dei x1 #a74 ,and we are bound to 
serve not only ,god1 but also our       
neighbor1 according to ,gal4 #e3ac1 ,by 

charity of the spirit serve one another4
 ,therefore religion includes a relation
 to one's neighbor also4  ,obj4 #d3     
,further1 worship belongs to religion4  
,now man is said to worship not only    
,god1 but also his neighbor1 according  
to the saying of ,cato 99,dionysius     
,cato1 ,breves ,sententiae1 ,worship thy
 parents4 ,therefore religion directs us
 also to our neighbor1 and not only to  
,god4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 all those who
 are in the state of grace are subject  
to ,god4 ,yet not all who are in a state
 of grace are called religious1 but only
 those who bind themselves by certain   
vows and observances1 and to obedience  
to certain men4 ,therefore religion     
seemingly does not denote a relation of 
subjection of man to ,god4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,tully says 7,rhet4 ii1 #ec7  
that religion consists in offering      
service and ceremonial rites to a       
superior nature that men call divine4   
,i answer that1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4
 x71 according to ,cicero1 a man is said

 to be religious from religio1 because  
he often ponders over1 and1 as it were1 
reads again 7relegit71 the things which 
pertain to the worship of ,god1 so that 
religion would seem to take its name    
from reading over those things which    
belong to ,divine worship because we    
ought frequently to ponder over such    
things in our hearts1 according to      
,prov4 #c3f1 ,in all thy ways think on  
,him4 ,according to ,augustine 7,de     
,civ4 ,dei x1 #c7 it may also take its  
name from the fact that we ought to seek
 ,god again1 whom we had lost by our    
neglect 99,st4 ,augustine plays on the  
words reeligere1 i4e4 to choose over    
again1 and negligere1 to neglect or     
despise44 ,or again1 religion may be    
derived from religare 7to bind          
together71 wherefore ,augustine says    
7,de ,vera ,relig4 #ee73 ,may religion  
bind us to the one ,almighty ,god4      
,however1 whether religion take its name
 from frequent reading1 or from a       
repeated choice of what has been lost   

through negligence1 or from being a     
bond1 it denotes properly a relation to 
,god4 ,for it is ,he to ,whom we ought  
to be bound as to our unfailing         
principle2 to ,whom also our choice     
should be resolutely directed as to our 
last end2 and ,whom we lose when we     
neglect ,him by sin1 and should recover 
by believing in ,him and confessing our 
faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,religion has  
two kinds of acts4 ,some are its proper 
and immediate acts1 which it elicits1   
and by which man is directed to ,god    
alone1 for instance1 sacrifice1         
adoration and the like4 ,but it has     
other acts1 which it produces through   
the medium of the virtues which it      
commands1 directing them to the honor of
 ,god1 because the virtue which is      
concerned with the end1 commands the    
virtues which are concerned with the    
means4 ,accordingly to visit the        
fatherless and widows in their          
tribulation is an act of religion as    
commanding1 and an act of mercy as      

eliciting2 and to keep oneself unspotted
 from this world is an act of religion  
as commanding1 but of temperance or of  
some similar virtue as eliciting4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,religion is referred  
to those things one exhibits to one's   
human kindred1 if we take the term      
religion in a broad sense1 but not if we
 take it in its proper sense4 ,hence1   
shortly before the passage quoted1      
,augustine says3 ,in a stricter sense   
religion seems to denote1 not any kind  
of worship1 but the worship of ,god4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since servant implies 
relation to a lord1 wherever there is a 
special kind of lordship there must     
needs be a special kind of service4 ,now
 it is evident that lordship belongs to 
,god in a special and singular way1     
because ,he made all things1 and has    
supreme dominion over all4 ,consequently
 a special kind of service is due to    
,him1 which is known as latria in       
,greek2 and therefore it belongs to     
religion4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,we are said

 to worship those whom we honor1 and to 
cultivate 99,in the ,latin the same word
 colere stands for worship and cultivate
 a man's memory or presence3 we even    
speak of cultivating things that are    
beneath us1 thus a farmer 7agricola7 is 
one who cultivates the land1 and an     
inhabitant 7incola7 is one who          
cultivates the place where he dwells4   
,since1 however1 special honor is due to
 ,god as the first principle of all     
things1 to ,him also is due a special   
kind of worship1 which in ,greek is     
,eusebeia or ,theosebeia1 as ,augustine 
states 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #a74  ,reply  
,obj4 #e3 ,although the name religious  
may be given to all in general who      
worship ,god1 yet in a special way      
religious are those who consecrate their
 whole life to the ,divine worship1 by  
withdrawing from human affairs4 ,thus   
also the term contemplative is applied1 
not to those who contemplate1 but to    
those who give up their whole lives to  
contemplation4 ,such men subject        

themselves to man1 not for man's sake   
but for ,god's sake1 according to the   
word of the ,apostle 7,gal4 #d3ad71 ,you
 4 4 4 received me as an angel of ,god1 
even as ,christ ,jesus4   ,,second      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,religion ,is a ,virtue8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
religion is not a virtue4 ,seemingly it 
belongs to religion to pay reverence to 
,god4 ,but reverence is an act of fear  
which is a gift1 as stated above 7,q4   
#ai1 ,a4 #i74 ,therefore religion is not
 a virtue but a gift4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 every virtue is a free        
exercise of the will1 wherefore it is   
described as an elective or voluntary   
habit 99,ethic4 ii1 #f4 ,now1 as stated 
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c7 latria belongs to 
religion1 and latria denotes a kind of  
servitude4 ,therefore religion is not a 
virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according  
to ,ethic4 ii1 #a1 aptitude for virtue  
is in us by nature1 wherefore things    
pertaining to virtue belong to the      

dictate of natural reason4 ,now1 it     
belongs to religion to offer ceremonial 
worship to the ,godhead 99,cf4 ,a4 #a1  
and ceremonial matters1 as stated above 
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b2 ,q4   
#aja71 do not belong to the dictate of  
natural reason4 ,therefore religion is  
not a virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is 
enumerated with the other virtues1 as   
appears from what has been said above   
7,q4 #hj74  ,i answer that1 ,as stated  
above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#ee1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d7 a virtue is that     
which makes its possessor good1 and his 
act good likewise1 wherefore we must    
needs say that every good act belongs to
 a virtue4 ,now it is evident that to   
render anyone his due has the aspect of 
good1 since by rendering a person his   
due1 one becomes suitably proportioned  
to him1 through being ordered to him in 
a becoming manner4 ,but order comes     
under the aspect of good1 just as mode  
and species1 according to ,augustine    
7,de ,nat4 ,boni iii74 ,since then it   

belongs to religion to pay due honor to 
someone1 namely1 to ,god1 it is evident 
that religion is a virtue4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,to pay reverence to ,god is an act
 of the gift of fear4 ,now it belongs to
 religion to do certain things through  
reverence for ,god4 ,hence it follows1  
not that religion is the same as the    
gift of fear1 but that it is referred   
thereto as to something more excellent2 
for the gifts are more excellent than   
the moral virtues1 as stated above 7,q4 
#i1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4
 #h74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even a slave   
can voluntarily do his duty by his      
master1 and so he makes a virtue of     
necessity 99,jerome1 ,ep4 liv1 ad       
,furiam41 by doing his duty voluntarily4
 ,in like manner1 to render due service 
to ,god may be an act of virtue1 in so  
far as man does so voluntarily4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,it belongs to the dictate of 
natural reason that man should do       
something through reverence for ,god4   
,but that he should do this or that     

determinate thing does not belong to the
 dictate of natural reason1 but is      
established by ,divine or human law4    
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,religion ,is ,one   
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that religion is not one virtue4        
,religion directs us to ,god1 as stated 
above 7,a4 #a74 ,now in ,god there are  
three ,persons2 and also many           
attributes1 which differ at least       
logically from one another4 ,now a      
logical difference in the object        
suffices for a difference of virtue1 as 
stated above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74  
,therefore religion is not one virtue4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 of one virtue there 
is seemingly one act1 since habits are  
distinguished by their acts4 ,now there 
are many acts of religion1 for instance 
to worship1 to serve1 to vow1 to pray1  
to sacrifice and many such like4        
,therefore religion is not one virtue4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 adoration belongs to
 religion4 ,now adoration is paid to    

images under one aspect1 and under      
another aspect to ,god ,himself4 ,since1
 then1 a difference of aspect           
distinguishes virtues1 it would seem    
that religion is not one virtue4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,eph4     
#d3e73 ,one ,god ,vulg43 ',lord'1 one   
faith4 ,now true religion professes     
faith in one ,god4 ,therefore religion  
is one virtue4  ,i answer that1 ,as     
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b1 
ad #a71 habits are differentiated       
according to a different aspect of the  
object4 ,now it belongs to religion to  
show reverence to one ,god under one    
aspect1 namely1 as the first principle  
of the creation and government of       
things4 ,wherefore ,he ,himself says    
7,malach4 #a3f73 ,if 4 4 4 ,i be a      
father1 where is ,my honor8 ,for it     
belongs to a father to beget and to     
govern4 ,therefore it is evident that   
religion is one virtue4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,the three ,divine ,persons are the 
one principle of the creation and       

government of things1 wherefore they are
 served by one religion4 ,the different 
aspects of the attributes concur under  
the aspect of first principle1 because  
,god produces all things1 and governs   
them by the wisdom1 will and power of   
,his goodness4 ,wherefore religion is   
one virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by the   
one same act man both serves and        
worships ,god1 for worship regards the  
excellence of ,god1 to ,whom reverence  
is due3 while service regards the       
subjection of man who1 by his condition1
 is under an obligation of showing      
reverence to ,god4 ,to these two belong 
all acts ascribed to religion1 because1 
by them all1 man bears witness to the   
,divine excellence and to his own       
subjection to ,god1 either by offering  
something to ,god1 or by assuming       
something ,divine4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,the worship of religion is paid to     
images1 not as considered in themselves1
 nor as things1 but as images leading us
 to ,god incarnate4 ,now movement to an 

image as image does not stop at the     
image1 but goes on to the thing it      
represents4 ,hence neither latria nor   
the virtue of religion is differentiated
 by the fact that religious worship is  
paid to the images of ,christ4          
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1  
,art4 #d  ,whether ,religion ,is a      
,special ,virtue1 ,distinct from the    
,others8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that religion is not a special virtue   
distinct from the others4 ,augustine    
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #f73 ,any action
 whereby we are united to ,god in holy  
fellowship1 is a true sacrifice4 ,but   
sacrifice belongs to religion4          
,therefore every virtuous deed belongs  
to religion2 and consequently religion  
is not a special virtue4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4   
#aj3ca73 ,do all to the glory of ,god4  
,now it belongs to religion to do       
anything in reverence of ,god1 as stated
 above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b2 ,a4 #b74         
,therefore religion is not a special    

virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the charity
 whereby we love ,god is not distinct   
from the charity whereby we love our    
neighbor4 ,but according to ,ethic4     
viii1 #h to be honored is almost to be  
loved4 ,therefore the religion whereby  
we honor ,god is not a special virtue   
distinct from observance1 or dulia1 or  
piety whereby we honor our neighbor4    
,therefore religion is not a special    
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is       
reckoned a part of justice1 distinct    
from the other parts4  ,i answer that1  
,since virtue is directed to the good1  
wherever there is a special aspect of   
good1 there must be a special virtue4   
,now the good to which religion is      
directed1 is to give due honor to ,god4 
,again1 honor is due to someone under   
the aspect of excellence3 and to ,god a 
singular excellence is competent1 since 
,he infinitely surpasses all things and 
exceeds them in every way4 ,wherefore to
 ,him is special honor due3 even as in  
human affairs we see that different     

honor is due to different personal      
excellences1 one kind of honor to a     
father1 another to the king1 and so on4 
,hence it is evident that religion is a 
special virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,every
 virtuous deed is said to be a          
sacrifice1 in so far as it is done out  
of reverence of ,god4 ,hence this does  
not prove that religion is a general    
virtue1 but that it commands all other  
virtues1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad    
#a74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,every deed1 in  
so far as it is done in ,god's honor1   
belongs to religion1 not as eliciting   
but as commanding3 those belong to      
religion as eliciting which pertain to  
the reverence of ,god by reason of their
 specific character4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,the object of love is the good1 but the
 object of honor and reverence is       
something excellent4 ,now ,god's        
goodness is communicated to the         
creature1 but the excellence of ,his    
goodness is not4 ,hence the charity     
whereby ,god is loved is not distinct   

from the charity whereby our neighbor is
 loved2 whereas the religion whereby    
,god is honored1 is distinct from the   
virtues whereby we honor our neighbor4  
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1   
,art4 #e  ,whether ,religion ,is a      
,theological ,virtue8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that religion is a       
theological virtue4 ,augustine says     
7,enchiridion iii7 that ,god is         
worshiped by faith1 hope and charity1   
which are theological virtues4 ,now it  
belongs to religion to pay worship to   
,god4 ,therefore religion is a          
theological virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 a theological virtue is one that has   
,god for its object4 ,now religion has  
,god for its object1 since it directs us
 to ,god alone1 as stated above 7,a4    
#a74 ,therefore religion is a           
theological virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 every virtue is either theological1 or 
intellectual1 or moral1 as is clear from
 what has been said 7,i-,,ii1 ,,qq4 #eg1
 #eh1 #fb74 ,now it is evident that     

religion is not an intellectual virtue1 
because its perfection does not depend  
on the consideration of truth3 nor is it
 a moral virtue1 which consists properly
 in observing the mean between too much 
and too little1 for one cannot worship  
,god too much1 according to ,ecclus4    
#dc3cc1 ,blessing the ,lord1 exalt ,him 
as much as you can2 for ,he is above all
 praise4 ,therefore it remains that it  
is a theological virtue4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,it is reckoned a part of     
justice which is a moral virtue4  ,i    
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #d7  
religion pays due worship to ,god4      
,hence two things are to be considered  
in religion3 first that which it offers 
to ,god1 viz4 worship1 and this is by   
way of matter and object in religion2   
secondly1 that to which something is    
offered1 viz4 ,god1 to ,whom worship is 
paid4 ,and yet the acts whereby ,god is 
worshiped do not reach out to ,god      
himself1 as when we believe ,god we     
reach out to ,him by believing2 for     

which reason it was stated 7,q4 #a1     
,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #d7 that ,god is the      
object of faith1 not only because we    
believe in a ,god1 but because we       
believe ,god4  ,now due worship is paid 
to ,god1 in so far as certain acts      
whereby ,god is worshiped1 such as the  
offering of sacrifices and so forth1 are
 done out of reverence for ,god4 ,hence 
it is evident that ,god is related to   
religion not as matter or object1 but as
 end3 and consequently religion is not a
 theological virtue whose object is the 
last end1 but a moral virtue which is   
properly about things referred to the   
end4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the power or    
virtue whose action deals with an end1  
moves by its command the power or virtue
 whose action deals with matters        
directed to that end4 ,now the          
theological virtues1 faith1 hope and    
charity have an act in reference to ,god
 as their proper object3 wherefore1 by  
their command1 they cause the act of    
religion1 which performs certain deeds  

directed to ,god3 and so ,augustine says
 that ,god is worshiped by faith1 hope  
and charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,religion
 directs man to ,god not as its object  
but as its end4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3       
,religion is neither a theological nor  
an intellectual1 but a moral virtue1    
since it is a part of justice1 and      
observes a mean1 not in the passions1   
but in actions directed to ,god1 by     
establishing a kind of equality in them4
 ,and when ,i say equality1 ,i do not   
mean absolute equality1 because it is   
not possible to pay ,god as much as we  
owe ,him1 but equality in consideration 
of man's ability and ,god's acceptance4 
,and it is possible to have too much in 
matters pertaining to the ,divine       
worship1 not as regards the circumstance
 of quantity1 but as regards other      
circumstances1 as when ,divine worship  
is paid to whom it is not due1 or when  
it is not due1 or unduly in respect of  
some other circumstance4   ,,sixth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #f  

,whether ,religion ,should ,be          
,preferred to the ,other ,moral         
,virtues8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that religion should not be preferred  
to the other moral virtues4 ,the        
perfection of a moral virtue consists in
 its observing the mean1 as stated in   
,ethic4 ii1 #f4 ,but religion fails to  
observe the mean of justice1 since it   
does not render an absolute equal to    
,god4 ,therefore religion is not more   
excellent than the other moral virtues4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is offered by  
one man to another is the more          
praiseworthy1 according as the person it
 is offered to is in greater need3      
wherefore it is written 7,isa4 #eg3g73  
,deal thy bread to the hungry4 ,but ,god
 needs nothing that we can offer ,him1  
according to ,ps4 #ae3b1 ,i have said3  
,thou art my ,god1 for ,thou hast no    
need of my goods4 ,therefore religion   
would seem less praiseworthy than the   
other virtues whereby man's needs are   
relieved4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the      

greater the obligation to do a thing1   
the less praise does it deserve1        
according to #a ,cor4 #i3af1 ,if ,i     
preach the ,gospel1 it is no glory to   
me3 a necessity lieth upon me4 ,now the 
more a thing is due1 the greater the    
obligation of paying it4 ,since1 then1  
what is paid to ,god by man is in the   
highest degree due to ,him1 it would    
seem that religion is less praiseworthy 
than the other human virtues4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,the precepts pertaining to   
religion are given precedence 7,ex4 #bj7
 as being of greatest importance4 ,now  
the order of precepts is proportionate  
to the order of virtues1 since the      
precepts of the ,law prescribe acts of  
virtue4 ,therefore religion is the chief
 of the moral virtues4  ,i answer that1 
,whatever is directed to an end takes   
its goodness from being ordered to that 
end2 so that the nearer it is to the end
 the better it is4 ,now moral virtues1  
as stated above 7,a4 #e2 ,q4 #d1 ,a4    
#g71 are about matters that are ordered 

to ,god as their end4 ,and religion     
approaches nearer to ,god than the other
 moral virtues1 in so far as its actions
 are directly and immediately ordered to
 the honor of ,god4 ,hence religion     
excels among the moral virtues4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,virtue is praised because of 
the will1 not because of the ability3   
and therefore if a man fall short of    
equality which is the mean of justice1  
through lack of ability1 his virtue     
deserves no less praise1 provided there 
be no failing on the part of his will4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in offering a thing to
 a man on account of its usefulness to  
him1 the more needy the man the more    
praiseworthy the offering1 because it is
 more useful3 whereas we offer a thing  
to ,god not on account of its usefulness
 to ,him1 but for the sake of ,his      
glory1 and on account of its usefulness 
to us4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,where there is
 an obligation to do a thing it loses   
the luster of supererogation1 but not   
the merit of virtue1 provided it be done

 voluntarily4 ,hence the argument proves
 nothing4   ,,seventh ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,religion ,has an ,external ,act8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
religion has not an external act4 ,it is
 written 7,john #d3bd73 ,god is a       
spirit1 and they that adore ,him1 must  
adore ,him in spirit and in truth4 ,now 
external acts pertain1 not to the spirit
 but to the body4 ,therefore religion1  
to which adoration belongs1 has acts    
that are not external but internal4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the end of religion 
is to pay ,god reverence and honor4 ,now
 it would savor of irreverence towards a
 superior1 if one were to offer him that
 which properly belongs to his inferior4
 ,since then whatever man offers by     
bodily actions1 seems to be directed    
properly to the relief of human needs1  
or to the reverence of inferior         
creatures1 it would seem unbecoming to  
employ them in showing reverence to     
,god4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine   

7,de ,civ4 ,dei vi1 #aj7 commends       
,seneca for finding fault with those who
 offered to idols those things that are 
wont to be offered to men1 because1 to  
wit1 that which befits mortals is       
unbecoming to immortals4 ,but such      
things are much less becoming to the    
true ,god1 ,who is exalted above all    
gods 99,ps4 #id3c4 ,therefore it would  
seem wrong to worship ,god with bodily  
actions4 ,therefore religion has no     
bodily actions4  ,on the contrary1 ,it  
is written 7,ps4 #hc3c73 ,my heart and  
my flesh have rejoiced in the living    
,god4 ,now just as internal actions     
belong to the heart1 so do external     
actions belong to the members of the    
flesh4 ,therefore it seems that ,god    
ought to be worshiped not only by       
internal but also by external actions4  
,i answer that1 ,we pay ,god honor and  
reverence1 not for ,his sake 7because   
,he is of ,himself full of glory to     
which no creature can add anything71 but
 for our own sake1 because by the very  

fact that we revere and honor ,god1 our 
mind is subjected to ,him2 wherein its  
perfection consists1 since a thing is   
perfected by being subjected to its     
superior1 for instance the body is      
perfected by being quickened by the     
soul1 and the air by being enlightened  
by the sun4 ,now the human mind1 in     
order to be united to ,god1 needs to be 
guided by the sensible world1 since     
invisible things 4 4 4 are clearly seen1
 being understood by the things that are
 made1 as the ,apostle says 7,rom4      
#a3bj74 ,wherefore in the ,divine       
worship it is necessary to make use of  
corporeal things1 that man's mind may be
 aroused thereby1 as by signs1 to the   
spiritual acts by means of which he is  
united to ,god4 ,therefore the internal 
acts of religion take precedence of the 
others and belong to religion           
essentially1 while its external acts are
 secondary1 and subordinate to the      
internal acts4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our   
,lord is speaking of that which is most 

important and directly intended in the  
worship of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,these external things are offered to   
,god1 not as though ,he stood in need of
 them1 according to ,ps4 #di3ac1 ,shall 
,i eat the flesh of bullocks8 or shall  
,i drink the blood of goats8 but as     
signs of the internal and spiritual     
works1 which are of themselves          
acceptable to ,god4 ,hence ,augustine   
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #e73 ,the       
visible sacrifice is the sacrament or   
sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,idolaters are         
ridiculed for offering to idols things  
pertaining to men1 not as signs arousing
 them to certain spiritual things1 but  
as though they were of themselves       
acceptable to the idols2 and still more 
because they were foolish and wicked4   
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1  
,art4 #h  ,whether ,religion ,is the    
,same ,as ,sanctity8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that religion is not the    
same as sanctity4 ,religion is a special

 virtue1 as stated above 7,a4 #d73      
whereas sanctity is a general virtue1   
because it makes us faithful1 and fulfil
 our just obligations to ,god1 according
 to ,andronicus 99,de ,affectibus4      
,therefore sanctity is not the same as  
religion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sanctity 
seems to denote a kind of purity4 ,for  
,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 xii7 that  
sanctity is free from all uncleanness1  
and is perfect and altogether unspotted 
purity4 ,now purity would seem above all
 to pertain to temperance which repels  
bodily uncleanness4 ,since then religion
 belongs to justice1 it would seem that 
sanctity is not the same as religion4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things that are     
opposite members of a division are not  
identified with one another4 ,but in an 
enumeration given above 7,q4 #hj1 ad #d7
 of the parts of justice1 sanctity is   
reckoned as distinct from religion4     
,therefore sanctity is not the same as  
religion4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is     
written 7,luke #a3gd1 #ge73 ,that 4 4 4 

we may serve ,him 4 4 4 in holiness and 
justice4 ,now1 to serve ,god belongs to 
religion1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad   
#c2 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,therefore religion 
is the same as sanctity4  ,i answer     
that1 ,the word sanctity seems to have  
two significations4 ,in one way it      
denotes purity2 and this signification  
fits in with the ,greek1 for hagios     
means unsoiled4 ,in another way it      
denotes firmness1 wherefore in olden    
times the term sancta was applied to    
such things as were upheld by law and   
were not to be violated4 ,hence a thing 
is said to be sacred 7sancitum7 when it 
is ratified by law4 ,again1 in ,latin1  
this word sanctus may be connected with 
purity1 if it be resolved into sanguine 
tinctus1 since1 in olden times1 those   
who wished to be purified were sprinkled
 with the victim's blood1 according to  
,isidore 7,etym4 x74 ,in either case the
 signification requires sanctity to be  
ascribed to those things that are       
applied to the ,divine worship2 so that 

not only men1 but also the temple1      
vessels and such like things are said to
 be sanctified through being applied to 
the worship of ,god4 ,for purity is     
necessary in order that the mind be     
applied to ,god1 since the human mind is
 soiled by contact with inferior things1
 even as all things depreciate by       
admixture with baser things1 for        
instance1 silver by being mixed with    
lead4 ,now in order for the mind to be  
united to the ,supreme ,being it must be
 withdrawn from inferior things3 and    
hence it is that without purity the mind
 cannot be applied to ,god4 ,wherefore  
it is written 7,heb4 #ab3ad73 ,follow   
peace with all men1 and holiness1       
without which no man shall see ,god4    
,again1 firmness is required for the    
mind to be applied to ,god1 for it is   
applied to ,him as its last end and     
first beginning1 and such things must   
needs be most immovable4 ,hence the     
,apostle said 7,rom4 #h3ch1 #ci73 ,i am 
sure that neither death1 nor life 4 4 4 

shall separate me 99,vulg43 'shall be   
able to separate us' from the love of   
,god4  ,accordingly1 it is by sanctity  
that the human mind applies itself and  
its acts to ,god3 so that it differs    
from religion not essentially but only  
logically4 ,for it takes the name of    
religion according as it gives ,god due 
service in matters pertaining specially 
to the ,divine worship1 such as         
sacrifices1 oblations1 and so forth2    
while it is called sanctity1 according  
as man refers to ,god not only these but
 also the works of the other virtues1 or
 according as man by means of certain   
good works disposes himself to the      
worship of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3      
,sanctity is a special virtue according 
to its essence2 and in this respect it  
is in a way identified with religion4   
,but it has a certain generality1 in so 
far as by its command it directs the    
acts of all the virtues to the ,divine  
good1 even as legal justice is said to  
be a general virtue1 in so far as it    

directs the acts of all the virtues to  
the common good4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,temperance practices purity1 yet not so
 as to have the character of sanctity   
unless it be referred to ,god4 ,hence of
 virginity itself ,augustine says 7,de  
,virgin4 viii7 that it is honored not   
for what it is1 but for being           
consecrated to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,sanctity differs from religion as      
explained above1 not really but         
logically4   ,,question #hb  ,,of       
,,devotion 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we   
must now consider the acts of religion4 
,first1 we shall consider the interior  
acts1 which1 as stated above1 are its   
principal acts2 secondly1 we shall      
consider its exterior acts1 which are   
secondary4 ,the interior acts of        
religion are seemingly devotion and     
prayer4 ,accordingly we shall treat     
first of devotion1 and afterwards of    
prayer4  ,under the first head there are
 four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether 
devotion is a special act8  7#b7        

,whether it is an act of religion8  7#c7
 ,of the cause of devotion8  7#d7 ,of   
its effect8   ,,first ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,devotion ,is a ,special ,act8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
devotion is not a special act4 ,that    
which qualifies other acts is seemingly 
not a special act4 ,now devotion seems  
to qualify other acts1 for it is written
 7#b ,paralip4 #bi3ca73 ,all the        
multitude offered victims1 and praises1 
and holocausts with a devout mind4      
,therefore devotion is not a special    
act4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no special    
kind of act is common to various genera 
of acts4 ,but devotion is common to     
various genera of acts1 namely1 corporal
 and spiritual acts3 for a person is    
said to meditate devoutly and to        
genuflect devoutly4 ,therefore devotion 
is not a special act4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 every special act belongs     
either to an appetitive or to a         
cognitive virtue or power4 ,but devotion

 belongs to neither1 as may be seen by  
going through the various species of    
acts of either faculty1 as enumerated   
above 7,i1 ,,qq4 #gh1 seqq42 ,i-,,ii1   
,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore devotion is
 not a special act4  ,on the contrary1  
,merits are acquired by acts as stated  
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ba1 ,,aa4 #cd74    
,but devotion has a special reason for  
merit4 ,therefore devotion is a special 
act4  ,i answer that1 ,devotion is      
derived from devote 99,the ,latin       
devovere means to vow2 wherefore those  
persons are said to be devout who1 in a 
way1 devote themselves to ,god1 so as to
 subject themselves wholly to ,him4     
,hence in olden times among the heathens
 a devotee was one who vowed to his     
idols to suffer death for the safety of 
his army1 as ,livy relates of the two   
,decii 7,decad4 ,i1 viii1 #i2 x1 #bh74  
,hence devotion is apparently nothing   
else but the will to give oneself       
readily to things concerning the service
 of ,god4 ,wherefore it is written 7,ex4

 #ce3bj1 #ba7 that the multitude of the 
children of ,israel 4 4 4 offered       
first-fruits to the ,lord with a most   
ready and devout mind4 ,now it is       
evident that the will to do readily what
 concerns the service of ,god is a      
special kind of act4 ,therefore devotion
 is a special act of the will4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,the mover prescribes the mode
 of the movement of the thing moved4    
,now the will moves the other powers of 
the soul to their acts1 and the will1 in
 so far as it regards the end1 moves    
both itself and whatever is directed to 
the end1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#i1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore1 since devotion 
is an act of the will whereby a man     
offers himself for the service of ,god  
,who is the last end1 it follows that   
devotion prescribes the mode to human   
acts1 whether they be acts of the will  
itself about things directed to the end1
 or acts of the other powers that are   
moved by the will4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,devotion is to be found in various     

genera of acts1 not as a species of     
those genera1 but as the motion of the  
mover is found virtually in the         
movements of the things moved4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,devotion is an act of the    
appetitive part of the soul1 and is a   
movement of the will1 as stated above4  
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hb1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,devotion ,is an ,act
 of ,religion8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that devotion is not an act of    
religion4 ,devotion1 as stated above    
7,a4 #a71 consists in giving oneself up 
to ,god4 ,but this is done chiefly by   
charity1 since according to ,dionysius  
7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 the ,divine love       
produces ecstasy1 for it takes the lover
 away from himself and gives him to the 
beloved4 ,therefore devotion is an act  
of charity rather than of religion4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 charity precedes    
religion2 and devotion seems to precede 
charity2 since1 in the ,scriptures1     
charity is represented by fire1 while   
devotion is signified by fatness which  

is the material of fire 99,cant4 #h3f2  
,ps4 #eb3f4 ,therefore devotion is not  
an act of religion4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 by religion man is directed to ,god    
alone1 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4    
#a74 ,but devotion is directed also to  
men2 for we speak of people being devout
 to certain holy men1 and subjects are  
said to be devoted to their masters2    
thus ,pope ,leo says 99,serm4 viii1 ,de 
,pass4 ,dom4 that the ,jews out of      
devotion to the ,roman laws1 said3 ,we  
have no king but ,caesar4 ,therefore    
devotion is not an act of religion4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,devotion is derived from
 devovere1 as stated 7,a4 #a74 ,but a   
vow is an act of religion4 ,therefore   
devotion is also an act of religion4  ,i
 answer that1 ,it belongs to the same   
virtue1 to will to do something1 and to 
have the will ready to do it1 because   
both acts have the same object4 ,for    
this reason the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 v1 #a73 ,it is justice whereby 
men both will end do just actions4 ,now 

it is evident that to do what pertains  
to the worship or service of ,god1      
belongs properly to religion1 as stated 
above 7,q4 #ha74 ,wherefore it belongs  
to that virtue to have the will ready to
 do such things1 and this is to be      
devout4 ,hence it is evident that       
devotion is an act of religion4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs immediately to    
charity that man should give himself to 
,god1 adhering to ,him by a union of the
 spirit2 but it belongs immediately to  
religion1 and1 through the medium of    
religion1 to charity which is the       
principle of religion1 that man should  
give himself to ,god for certain works  
of ,divine worship4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,bodily fatness is produced by the      
natural heat in the process of          
digestion1 and at the same time the     
natural heat thrives1 as it were1 on    
this fatness4 ,in like manner charity   
both causes devotion 7inasmuch as love  
makes one ready to serve one's friend7  
and feeds on devotion4 ,even so all     

friendship is safeguarded and increased 
by the practice and consideration of    
friendly deeds4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3       
,devotion to ,god's holy ones1 dead or  
living1 does not terminate in them1 but 
passes on to ,god1 in so far as we honor
 ,god in ,his servants4 ,but the        
devotion of subjects to their temporal  
masters is of another kind1 just as     
service of a temporal master differs    
from the service of ,god4   ,,third     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,contemplation or ,meditation  
,is the ,cause of ,devotion8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that contemplation  
or meditation is not the cause of       
devotion4 ,no cause hinders its effect4 
,but subtle considerations about        
abstract matters are often a hindrance  
to devotion4 ,therefore contemplation or
 meditation is not the cause of         
devotion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if       
contemplation were the proper and       
essential cause of devotion1 the higher 
objects of contemplation would arouse   

greater devotion4 ,but the contrary is  
the case3 since frequently we are urged 
to greater devotion by considering      
,christ's ,passion and other mysteries  
of ,his humanity than by considering the
 greatness of ,his ,godhead4 ,therefore 
contemplation is not the proper cause of
 devotion4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if      
contemplation were the proper cause of  
devotion1 it would follow that those who
 are most apt for contemplation1 are    
also most apt for devotion4 ,yet the    
contrary is to be noticed1 for devotion 
is frequently found in men of simplicity
 and members of the female sex1 who are 
defective in contemplation4 ,therefore  
contemplation is not the proper cause of
 devotion4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
written 7,ps4 #ch3d73 ,in my meditation 
a fire shall flame out4 ,but spiritual  
fire causes devotion4 ,therefore        
meditation is the cause of devotion4  ,i
 answer that1 ,the extrinsic and chief  
cause of devotion is ,god1 of ,whom     
,ambrose1 commenting on ,luke #i3ee1    

says that ,god calls whom ,he deigns to 
call1 and whom ,he wills ,he makes      
religious3 the profane ,samaritans1 had 
,he so willed1 ,he would have made      
devout4 ,but the intrinsic cause on our 
part must needs be meditation or        
contemplation4 ,for it was stated above 
7,a4 #a7 that devotion is an act of the 
will to the effect that man surrenders  
himself readily to the service of ,god4 
,now every act of the will proceeds from
 some consideration1 since the object of
 the will is a good understood4         
,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4  
ix1 #ab2 xv1 #bc7 that the will arises  
from the intelligence4 ,consequently    
meditation must needs be the cause of   
devotion1 in so far as through          
meditation man conceives the thought of 
surrendering himself to ,god's service4 
,indeed a twofold consideration leads   
him thereto4 ,the one is the            
consideration of ,god's goodness and    
loving kindness1 according to ,ps4      
#gb3bh1 ,it is good for me to adhere to 

my ,god1 to put my hope in the ,lord    
,god3 and this consideration wakens love
 99,dilectio1 the interior act of       
charity2 cf4 ,q4 #bg which is the       
proximate cause of devotion4 ,the other 
consideration is that of man's own      
shortcomings1 on account of which he    
needs to lean on ,god1 according to ,ps4
 #abj3a1 #b1 ,i have lifted up my eyes  
to the mountains1 from whence help shall
 come to me3 my help is from the ,lord1 
,who made heaven and earth2 and this    
consideration shuts out presumption     
whereby man is hindered from submitting 
to ,god1 because he leans on ,his       
strength4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the        
consideration of such things as are of a
 nature to awaken our love 99,ibid4 of  
,god1 causes devotion2 whereas the      
consideration of foreign matters that   
distract the mind from such things is a 
hindrance to devotion4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,matters concerning the ,godhead are1  
in themselves1 the strongest incentive  
to love 99,ibid4 and consequently to    

devotion1 because ,god is supremely     
lovable4 ,yet such is the weakness of   
the human mind that it needs a guiding  
hand1 not only to the knowledge1 but    
also to the love of ,divine things by   
means of certain sensible objects known 
to us4 ,chief among these is the        
humanity of ,christ1 according to the   
words of the ,preface 99,preface for    
,christmastide1 that through knowing    
,god visibly1 we may be caught up to the
 love of things invisible4 ,wherefore   
matters relating to ,christ's humanity  
are the chief incentive to devotion1    
leading us thither as a guiding hand1   
although devotion itself has for its    
object matters concerning the ,godhead4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,science and anything  
else conducive to greatness1 is to man  
an occasion of self-confidence1 so that 
he does not wholly surrender himself to 
,god4 ,the result is that such like     
things sometimes occasion a hindrance to
 devotion2 while in simple souls and    
women devotion abounds by repressing    

pride4 ,if1 however1 a man perfectly    
submits to ,god his science or any other
 perfection1 by this very fact his      
devotion is increased4   ,,fourth       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,joy ,is an ,effect of         
,devotion8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that joy is not an effect of       
devotion4 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad  
#b71 ,christ's ,passion is the chief    
incentive to devotion4 ,but the         
consideration thereof causes an         
affliction of the soul1 according to    
,lam4 #c3ai1 ,remember my poverty 4 4 4 
the wormwood and the gall1 which refers 
to the ,passion1 and afterwards 7,lam4  
#c3bj7 it is said3 ,i will be mindful   
and remember1 and my soul shall languish
 within me4 ,therefore delight or joy is
 not the effect of devotion4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 devotion consists chiefly in  
an interior sacrifice of the spirit4    
,but it is written 7,ps4 #ej3ai73 ,a    
sacrifice to ,god is an afflicted       
spirit4 ,therefore affliction is the    

effect of devotion rather than gladness 
or joy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory of
 ,nyssa says 7,de ,homine xii7 99,orat4 
funebr4 de ,placilla ,imp4 that just as 
laughter proceeds from joy1 so tears and
 groans are signs of sorrow4 ,but       
devotion makes some people shed tears4  
,therefore gladness or joy is not the   
effect of devotion4  ,on the contrary1  
,we say in the ,collect 99,thursday     
after fourth ,sunday of ,lent3 ,that we 
who are punished by fasting may be      
comforted by a holy devotion4  ,i answer
 that1 ,the direct and principal effect 
of devotion is the spiritual joy of the 
mind1 though sorrow is its secondary and
 indirect effect4 ,for it has been      
stated 7,a4 #c7 that devotion is caused 
by a twofold consideration3 chiefly by  
the consideration of ,god's goodness1   
because this consideration belongs to   
the term1 as it were1 of the movement of
 the will in surrendering itself to     
,god1 and the direct result of this     
consideration is joy1 according to ,ps4 

#gf3d1 ,i remembered ,god1 and was      
delighted2 but accidentally this        
consideration causes a certain sorrow in
 those who do not yet enjoy ,god fully1 
according to ,ps4 #da3c1 ,my soul hath  
thirsted after the strong living ,god1  
and afterwards it is said 7,ps4 #da3d73 
,my tears have been my bread1 etc4      
,secondarily devotion is caused as      
stated 7,a4 #c71 by the consideration of
 one's own failings2 for this           
consideration regards the term from     
which man withdraws by the movement of  
his devout will1 in that he trusts not  
in himself1 but subjects himself to     
,god4 ,this consideration has an        
opposite tendency to the first3 for it  
is of a nature to cause sorrow directly 
7when one thinks over one's own         
failings71 and joy accidentally1 namely1
 through hope of the ,divine assistance4
 ,it is accordingly evident that the    
first and direct effect of devotion is  
joy1 while the secondary and accidental 
effect is that sorrow which is according

 to ,god 99#b ,cor4 #g3aj4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,in the consideration of ,christ's 
,passion there is something that causes 
sorrow1 namely1 the human defect1 the   
removal of which made it necessary for  
,christ to suffer 99,luke #bd3be2 and   
there is something that causes joy1     
namely1 ,god's loving-kindness to us in 
giving us such a deliverance4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,the spirit which on the one  
hand is afflicted on account of the     
defects of the present life1 on the     
other hand is rejoiced1 by the          
consideration of ,god's goodness1 and by
 the hope of the ,divine help4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,tears are caused not only    
through sorrow1 but also through a      
certain tenderness of the affections1   
especially when one considers something 
that gives joy mixed with pain4 ,thus   
men are wont to shed tears through a    
sentiment of piety1 when they recover   
their children or dear friends1 whom    
they thought to have lost4 ,in this way 
tears arise from devotion4   ,,question 

#hc  ,,of ,,prayer 7,in ,seventeen      
,articles7  ,we must now consider       
prayer1 under which head there are      
seventeen points of inquiry3  7#a7      
,whether prayer is an act of the        
appetitive or of the cognitive power8   
7#b7 ,whether it is fitting to pray to  
,god8  7#c7 ,whether prayer is an act of
 religion8  7#d7 ,whether we ought to   
pray to ,god alone8  7#e7 ,whether we   
ought to ask for something definite when
 we pray8  7#f7 ,whether we ought to ask
 for temporal things when we pray8  7#g7
 ,whether we ought to pray for others8  
7#h7 ,whether we ought to pray for our  
enemies8  7#i7 ,of the seven petitions  
of the ,lord's ,prayer2  7#aj7 ,whether 
prayer is proper to the rational        
creature8  7#aa7 ,whether the saints in 
heaven pray for us8  7#ab7 ,whether     
prayer should be vocal8  7#ac7 ,whether 
attention is requisite in prayer8  7#ad7
 ,whether prayer should last a long     
time8  7#ae7 ,whether prayer is         
meritorious8 99,art4 #af  7#af7 ,whether

 sinners impetrate anything from ,god by
 praying8 99,art4 #ae  7#ag7 of the     
different kinds of prayer4   ,,first    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,prayer ,is an ,act of the     
,appetitive ,power8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that prayer is an act of the 
appetitive power4 ,it belongs to prayer 
to be heard4 ,now it is the desire that 
is heard by ,god1 according to ,ps4     
#i3ch1 ,the ,lord hath heard the desire 
of the poor4 ,therefore prayer is       
desire4 ,but desire is an act of the    
appetitive power3 and therefore prayer  
is also4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius
 says 7,div4 ,nom4 iii73 ,it is useful  
to begin everything with prayer1 because
 thereby we surrender ourselves to ,god 
and unite ourselves to ,him4 ,now union 
with ,god is effected by love which     
belongs to the appetitive power4        
,therefore prayer belongs to the        
appetitive power4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
the ,philosopher states 7,de ,anima iii1
 #f7 that there are two operations of   

the intellective part4 ,of these the    
first is the understanding of           
indivisibles1 by which operation we     
apprehend what a thing is3 while the    
second is synthesis and analysis1       
whereby we apprehend that a thing is or 
is not4 ,to these a third may be added1 
namely1 reasoning1 whereby we proceed   
from the known to the unknown4 ,now     
prayer is not reducible to any of these 
operations4 ,therefore it is an         
operation1 not of the intellective1 but 
of the appetitive power4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 x7 that 
to pray is to speak4 ,now speech belongs
 to the intellect4 ,therefore prayer is 
an act1 not of the appetitive1 but of   
the intellective power4  ,i answer that1
 ,according to ,cassiodorus 99,comment4 
in ,ps4 #ch3ac prayer 7oratio7 is spoken
 reason 7oris ratio74 ,now the          
speculative and practical reason differ 
in this1 that the speculative merely    
apprehends its object1 whereas the      
practical reason not only apprehends but

 causes4 ,now one thing is the cause of 
another in two ways3 first perfectly1   
when it necessitates its effect1 and    
this happens when the effect is wholly  
subject to the power of the cause2      
secondly imperfectly1 by merely         
disposing to the effect1 for the reason 
that the effect is not wholly subject to
 the power of the cause4 ,accordingly in
 this way the reason is cause of certain
 things in two ways3 first1 by imposing 
necessity2 and in this way it belongs to
 reason1 to command not only the lower  
powers and the members of the body1 but 
also human subjects1 which indeed is    
done by commanding2 secondly1 by leading
 up to the effect1 and1 in a way1       
disposing to it1 and in this sense the  
reason asks for something to be done by 
things not subject to it1 whether they  
be its equals or its superiors4 ,now    
both of these1 namely1 to command and to
 ask or beseech1 imply a certain        
ordering1 seeing that man proposes      
something to be effected by something   

else1 wherefore they pertain to the     
reason to which it belongs to set in    
order4 ,for this reason the ,philosopher
 says 7,ethic4 i1 #ac7 that the reason  
exhorts us to do what is best4  ,now in 
the present instance we are speaking of 
prayer 99,this last paragraph refers to 
the ,latin word oratio 7prayer7 which   
originally signified a speech1 being    
derived in the first instance from os1  
oris 7the mouth74 as signifying a       
beseeching or petition1 in which sense  
,augustine 99,rabanus1 ,de ,univ4 vi1   
#ad3 says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom47 that prayer
 is a petition1 and ,damascene states   
7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #bd7 that to pray
 is to ask becoming things of ,god4     
,accordingly it is evident that prayer1 
as we speak of it now1 is an act of     
reason4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,lord is 
said to hear the desire of the poor1    
either because desire is the cause of   
their petition1 since a petition is like
 the interpreter of a desire1 or in     
order to show how speedily they are     

heard1 since no sooner do the poor      
desire something than ,god hears them   
before they put up a prayer1 according  
to the saying of ,isa4 #fe3bd1 ,and it  
shall come to pass1 that before they    
call1 ,i will hear4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #d2  
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c71 the    
will moves the reason to its end3       
wherefore nothing hinders the act of    
reason1 under the motion of the will1   
from tending to an end such as charity  
which is union with ,god4 ,now prayer   
tends to ,god through being moved by the
 will of charity1 as it were1 and this  
in two ways4 ,first1 on the part of the 
object of our petition1 because when we 
pray we ought principally to ask to be  
united to ,god1 according to ,ps4 #bf3d1
 ,one thing ,i have asked of the ,lord1 
this will ,i seek after1 that ,i may    
dwell in the house of the ,lord all the 
days of my life4 ,secondly1 on the part 
of the petitioner1 who ought to approach
 the person whom he petitions1 either   

locally1 as when he petitions a man1 or 
mentally1 as when he petitions ,god4    
,hence ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iii7
 that when we call upon ,god in our     
prayers1 we unveil our mind in ,his     
presence3 and in the same sense         
,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1  
#bd7 that prayer is the raising up of   
the mind to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,these three acts belong to the         
speculative reason1 but to the practical
 reason it belongs in addition to cause 
something by way of command or of       
petition1 as stated above4   ,,second   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,it ,is ,becoming to ,pray8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is
 unbecoming to pray4 ,prayer seems to be
 necessary in order that we may make our
 needs known to the person to whom we   
pray4 ,but according to ,matt4 #f3cb1   
,your ,father knoweth that you have need
 of all these things4 ,therefore it is  
not becoming to pray to ,god4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 by prayer we bend the mind of

 the person to whom we pray1 so that he 
may do what is asked of him4 ,but ,god's
 mind is unchangeable and inflexible1   
according to #a ,kings #ae3bi1 ,but the 
,triumpher in ,israel will not spare1   
and will not be moved to repentance4    
,therefore it is not fitting that we    
should pray to ,god4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 it is more liberal to give to 
one that asks not1 than to one who asks 
because1 according to ,seneca 7,de      
,benefic4 ii1 #a71 nothing is bought    
more dearly than what is bought with    
prayers4 ,but ,god is supremely liberal4
 ,therefore it would seem unbecoming to 
pray to ,god4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is 
written 7,luke #ah3a73 ,we ought always 
to pray1 and not to faint4  ,i answer   
that1 ,among the ancients there was a   
threefold error concerning prayer4 ,some
 held that human affairs are not ruled  
by ,divine providence2 whence it would  
follow that it is useless to pray and to
 worship ,god at all3 of these it is    
written 7,malach4 #c3ad73 ,you have     

said3 ,he laboreth in vain that serveth 
,god4 ,another opinion held that all    
things1 even in human affairs1 happen of
 necessity1 whether by reason of the    
unchangeableness of ,divine providence1 
or through the compelling influence of  
the stars1 or on account of the         
connection of causes3 and this opinion  
also excluded the utility of prayer4    
,there was a third opinion of those who 
held that human affairs are indeed ruled
 by ,divine providence1 and that they do
 not happen of necessity2 yet they      
deemed the disposition of ,divine       
providence to be changeable1 and that it
 is changed by prayers and other things 
pertaining to the worship of ,god4 ,all 
these opinions were disproved in the    
,first ,part 7,q4 #ai1 ,,aa4 #g1 #h2 ,q4
 #bb1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d2 ,q4 #aae1 ,a4 #f2   
,q4 #aaf74 ,wherefore it behooves us so 
to account for the utility of prayer as 
neither to impose necessity on human    
affairs subject to ,divine providence1  
nor to imply changeableness on the part 

of the ,divine disposition4  ,in order  
to throw light on this question we must 
consider that ,divine providence        
disposes not only what effects shall    
take place1 but also from what causes   
and in what order these effects shall   
proceed4 ,now among other causes human  
acts are the causes of certain effects4 
,wherefore it must be that men do       
certain actions1 not that thereby they  
may change the ,divine disposition1 but 
that by those actions they may achieve  
certain effects according to the order  
of the ,divine disposition3 and the same
 is to be said of natural causes4 ,and  
so is it with regard to prayer4 ,for we 
pray not that we may change the ,divine 
disposition1 but that we may impetrate  
that which ,god has disposed to be      
fulfilled by our prayers1 in other words
 that by asking1 men may deserve to     
receive what ,almighty ,god from        
eternity has disposed to give1 as       
,gregory says 7,dial4 i1 #h74  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,we need to pray to ,god1 not 

in order to make known to ,him our needs
 or desires but that we ourselves may be
 reminded of the necessity of having    
recourse to ,god's help in these        
matters4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated   
above1 our motive in praying is1 not    
that we may change the ,divine          
disposition1 but that1 by our prayers1  
we may obtain what ,god has appointed4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god bestows many      
things on us out of ,his liberality1    
even without our asking for them3 but   
that ,he wishes to bestow certain things
 on us at our asking1 is for the sake of
 our good1 namely1 that we may acquire  
confidence in having recourse to ,god1  
and that we may recognize in ,him the   
,author of our goods4 ,hence ,chrysostom
 says 99,implicitly 7,hom4 ii1 de       
,orat42 ,hom4 xxx in ,genes42 ,cf4      
,caten4 ,aur4 on ,luke #ah73 ,think what
 happiness is granted thee1 what honor  
bestowed on thee1 when thou conversest  
with ,god in prayer1 when thou talkest  
with ,christ1 when thou askest what thou

 wilt1 whatever thou desirest4   ,,third
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #c 
,whether ,prayer ,is an ,act of         
,religion8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that prayer is not an act of       
religion4 ,since religion is a part of  
justice1 it resides in the will as in   
its subject4 ,but prayer belongs to the 
intellective part1 as stated above 7,a4 
#a74 ,therefore prayer seems to be an   
act1 not of religion1 but of the gift of
 understanding whereby the mind ascends 
to ,god4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the act of
 latria falls under a necessity of      
precept4 ,but prayer does not seem to   
come under a necessity of precept1 but  
to come from the mere will1 since it is 
nothing else than a petition for what we
 will4 ,therefore prayer seemingly is   
not an act of religion4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 it seems to belong to religion
 that one offers worship and ceremonial 
rites to the ,godhead 99,cicero1 ,rhet4 
ii1 #ec4 ,but prayer seems not to offer 
anything to ,god1 but to ask to obtain  

something from ,him4 ,therefore prayer  
is not an act of religion4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #adj3b73 
,let my prayer be directed as incense in
 ,thy sight3 and a gloss on the passage 
says that it was to signify this that   
under the ,old ,law incense was said to 
be offered for a sweet smell to the     
,lord4 ,now this belongs to religion4   
,therefore prayer is an act of religion4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 
#ha1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d71 it belongs properly 
to religion to show honor to ,god1      
wherefore all those things through which
 reverence is shown to ,god1 belong to  
religion4 ,now man shows reverence to   
,god by means of prayer1 in so far as he
 subjects himself to ,him1 and by       
praying confesses that he needs ,him as 
the ,author of his goods4 ,hence it is  
evident that prayer is properly an act  
of religion4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the will
 moves the other powers of the soul to  
its end1 as stated above 7,q4 #hb1 ,a4  
#a1 ad #a71 and therefore religion1     

which is in the will1 directs the acts  
of the other powers to the reverence of 
,god4 ,now among the other powers of the
 soul the intellect is the highest1 and 
the nearest to the will2 and            
consequently after devotion which       
belongs to the will1 prayer which       
belongs to the intellective part is the 
chief of the acts of religion1 since by 
it religion directs man's intellect to  
,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is a matter 
of precept not only that we should ask  
for what we desire1 but also that we    
should desire aright4 ,but to desire    
comes under a precept of charity1       
whereas to ask comes under a precept of 
religion1 which precept is expressed in 
,matt4 #g3g1 where it is said3 ,ask and 
ye shall receive 99,vulg43 ',ask and it 
shall be given you4'4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,by praying man surrenders his mind to  
,god1 since he subjects it to ,him with 
reverence and1 so to speak1 presents it 
to ,him1 as appears from the words of   
,dionysius quoted above 7,a4 #a1 ,obj4  

#b74 ,wherefore just as the human mind  
excels exterior things1 whether bodily  
members1 or those external things that  
are employed for ,god's service1 so too1
 prayer surpasses other acts of         
religion4   ,,fourth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
,we ,ought to ,pray to ,god ,alone8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that we   
ought to pray to ,god alone4 ,prayer is 
an act of religion1 as stated above 7,a4
 #c74 ,but ,god alone is to be worshiped
 by religion4 ,therefore we should pray 
to ,god alone4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it  
is useless to pray to one who is        
ignorant of the prayer4 ,but it belongs 
to ,god alone to know one's prayer1 both
 because frequently prayer is uttered by
 an interior act which ,god alone knows1
 rather than by words1 according to the 
saying of the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4        
#ad3ae71 ,i will pray with the spirit1  
,i will pray also with the              
understanding3 and again because1 as    
,augustine says 7,de ,cura pro mortuis  

xiii7 the dead1 even the saints1 know   
not what the living1 even their own     
children1 are doing4 ,therefore we ought
 to pray to ,god alone4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 if we pray to any of the      
saints1 this is only because they are   
united to ,god4 ,now some yet living in 
this world1 or even some who are in     
,purgatory1 are closely united to ,god  
by grace1 and yet we do not pray to     
them4 ,therefore neither should we pray 
to the saints who are in ,paradise4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,it is written 7,job     
#e3a71 ,call 4 4 4 if there be any that 
will answer thee1 and turn to some of   
the saints4  ,i answer that1 ,prayer is 
offered to a person in two ways3 first1 
as to be fulfilled by him1 secondly1 as 
to be obtained through him4 ,in the     
first way we offer prayer to ,god alone1
 since all our prayers ought to be      
directed to the acquisition of grace and
 glory1 which ,god alone gives1         
according to ,ps4 #hc3ab1 ,the ,lord    
will give grace and glory4 ,but in the  

second way we pray to the saints1       
whether angels or men1 not that ,god may
 through them know our petitions1 but   
that our prayers may be effective       
through their prayers and merits4 ,hence
 it is written 7,apoc4 #h3d7 that the   
smoke of the incense1 namely the prayers
 of the saints ascended up before ,god4 
,this is also clear from the very style 
employed by the ,church in praying3     
since we beseech the ,blessed ,trinity  
to have mercy on us1 while we ask any of
 the saints to pray for us4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,to ,him alone do we offer    
religious worship when praying1 from    
,whom we seek to obtain what we pray    
for1 because by so doing we confess that
 ,he is the ,author of our goods3 but   
not to those whom we call upon as our   
advocates in ,god's presence4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,the dead1 if we consider     
their natural condition1 do not know    
what takes place in this world1         
especially the interior movements of the
 heart4 ,nevertheless1 according to     

,gregory 7,moral4 xii1 #ba71 whatever it
 is fitting the blessed should know     
about what happens to us1 even as       
regards the interior movements of the   
heart1 is made known to them in the     
,word3 and it is most becoming to their 
exalted position that they should know  
the petitions we make to them by word or
 thought2 and consequently the petitions
 which we raise to them are known to    
them through ,divine manifestation4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those who are in this 
world or in ,purgatory1 do not yet enjoy
 the vision of the ,word1 so as to be   
able to know what we think or say4      
,wherefore we do not seek their         
assistance by praying to them1 but ask  
it of the living by speaking to them4   
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1   
,art4 #e  ,whether ,we ,ought to ,ask   
for ,something ,definite ,when ,we      
,pray8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that we ought not to ask for anything   
definite when we pray to ,god4          
,according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide     

,orth4 iii1 #bd71 to pray is to ask     
becoming things of ,god2 wherefore it is
 useless to pray for what is            
inexpedient1 according to ,james #d3c1  
,you ask1 and receive not3 because you  
ask amiss4 ,now according to ,rom4      
#h3bf1 we know not what we should pray  
for as we ought4 ,therefore we ought not
 to ask for anything definite when we   
pray4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those who ask
 another person for something definite  
strive to incline his will to do what   
they wish themselves4 ,but we ought not 
to endeavor to make ,god will what we   
will2 on the contrary1 we ought to      
strive to will what ,he wills1 according
 to a gloss on ,ps4 #cb3a1 ,rejoice in  
the ,lord1 ,o ye just4 ,therefore we    
ought not to ask ,god for anything      
definite when we pray4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 evil things are not to be     
sought from ,god2 and as to good things1
 ,god ,himself invites us to take them4 
,now it is useless to ask a person to   
give you what he invites you to take4   

,therefore we ought not to ask ,god for 
anything definite in our prayers4  ,on  
the contrary1 our ,lord 7,matt4 #f and  
,luke #aa7 taught ,his disciples to ask 
definitely for those things which are   
contained in the petitions of the       
,lord's ,prayer4  ,i answer that1       
,according to ,valerius ,maximus        
99,fact4 et ,dict4 ,memor4 vii1 #b1     
,socrates deemed that we should ask the 
immortal gods for nothing else but that 
they should grant us good things1       
because they at any rate know what is   
good for each one whereas when we pray  
we frequently ask for what it had been  
better for us not to obtain4 ,this      
opinion is true to a certain extent1 as 
to those things which may have an evil  
result1 and which man may use ill or    
well1 such as riches1 by which1 as      
stated by the same authority 7,fact4 et 
,dict4 ,memor4 vii1 #b71 many have come 
to an evil end2 honors1 which have      
ruined many2 power1 of which we         
frequently witness the unhappy results2 

splendid marriages1 which sometimes     
bring about the total wreck of a family4
 ,nevertheless there are certain goods  
which man cannot ill use1 because they  
cannot have an evil result4 ,such are   
those which are the object of beatitude 
and whereby we merit it3 and these the  
saints seek absolutely when they pray1  
as in ,ps4 #gi3d1 ,show us ,thy face1   
and we shall be saved1 and again in ,ps4
 #aah3ce1 ,lead me into the path of ,thy
 commandments4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,although man cannot by himself know    
what he ought to pray for1 the ,spirit1 
as stated in the same passage1 helpeth  
our infirmity1 since by inspiring us    
with holy desires1 ,he makes us ask for 
what is right4 ,hence our ,lord said    
7,john #d3bd7 that true adorers must    
adore 4 4 4 in spirit and in truth4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when in our prayers we
 ask for things concerning our          
salvation1 we conform our will to       
,god's1 of ,whom it is written 7#a ,tim4
 #b3d7 that ,he will have all men to be 

saved4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god so invites
 us to take good things1 that we may    
approach to them not by the steps of the
 body1 but by pious desires and devout  
prayers4   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,man ,ought 
to ,ask ,god for ,temporal ,things ,when
 ,he ,prays8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that man ought not to ask ,god for 
temporal things when he prays4 ,we seek 
what we ask for in prayer4 ,but we      
should not seek for temporal things1 for
 it is written 7,matt4 #f3cc73 ,seek ye 
4 4 4 first the kingdom of ,god1 and    
,his justice3 and all these things shall
 be added unto you1 that is to say1     
temporal things1 which1 says ,he1 we are
 not to seek1 but they will be added to 
what we seek4 ,therefore temporal things
 are not to be asked of ,god in prayer4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no one asks save for
 that which he is solicitous about4 ,now
 we ought not to have solicitude for    
temporal things1 according to the saying
 of ,matt4 #f3be1 ,be not solicitous for

 your life1 what you shall eat4         
,therefore we ought not to ask for      
temporal things when we pray4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 by prayer our mind should be 
raised up to ,god4 ,but by asking for   
temporal things1 it descends to things  
beneath it1 against the saying of the   
,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #d3ah71 ,while we    
look not at the things which are seen1  
but at the things which are not seen4   
,for the things which are seen are      
temporal1 but the things which are not  
seen are eternal4 ,therefore man ought  
not to ask ,god for temporal things when
 he prays4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 man     
ought not to ask of ,god other than good
 and useful things4 ,but sometimes      
temporal things1 when we have them1 are 
harmful1 not only in a spiritual sense1 
but also in a material sense4 ,therefore
 we should not ask ,god for them in our 
prayers4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is      
written 7,prov4 #cj3h73 ,give me only   
the necessaries of life4  ,i answer     
that1 ,as ,augustine says 7ad ,probam1  

de orando ,deum1 ,ep4 cxxx1 #ab73 ,it is
 lawful to pray for what it is lawful to
 desire4 ,now it is lawful to desire    
temporal things1 not indeed principally1
 by placing our end therein1 but as     
helps whereby we are assisted in tending
 towards beatitude1 in so far1 to wit1  
as they are the means of supporting the 
life of the body1 and are of service to 
us as instruments in performing acts of 
virtue1 as also the ,philosopher states 
7,ethic4 i1 #h74 ,augustine too says the
 same to ,proba 7ad ,probam1 de orando  
,deum1 ,ep4 cxxx1 #f1 #g7 when he states
 that it is not unbecoming for anyone to
 desire enough for a livelihood1 and no 
more2 for this sufficiency is desired1  
not for its own sake1 but for the       
welfare of the body1 or that we should  
desire to be clothed in a way befitting 
one's station1 so as not to be out of   
keeping with those among whom we have to
 live4 ,accordingly we ought to pray    
that we may keep these things if we have
 them1 and if we have them not1 that we 

may gain possession of them4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,we should seek temporal      
things not in the first but in the      
second place4 ,hence ,augustine says    
7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #af73   
,when ,he says that this 7i4e4 the      
kingdom of ,god7 is to be sought first1 
,he implies that the other 7i4e4        
temporal goods7 is to be sought         
afterwards1 not in time but in          
importance1 this as being our good1 the 
other as our need4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,not all solicitude about temporal      
things is forbidden1 but that which is  
superfluous and inordinate1 as stated   
above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #f74  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,when our mind is intent on temporal
 things in order that it may rest in    
them1 it remains immersed therein2 but  
when it is intent on them in relation to
 the acquisition of beatitude1 it is not
 lowered by them1 but raises them to a  
higher level4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,from   
the very fact that we ask for temporal  
things not as the principal object of   

our petition1 but as subordinate to     
something else1 we ask ,god for them in 
the sense that they may be granted to us
 in so far as they are expedient for    
salvation4   ,,seventh ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #g  ,whether  
,we ,ought to ,pray for ,others8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that we   
ought not to pray for others4 ,in       
praying we ought to conform to the      
pattern given by our ,lord4 ,now in the 
,lord's ,prayer we make petitions for   
ourselves1 not for others2 thus we say3 
,give us this day our daily bread1 etc4 
,therefore we should not pray for       
others4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prayer is  
offered that it may be heard4 ,now one  
of the conditions required for prayer   
that it may be heard is that one pray   
for oneself1 wherefore ,augustine in    
commenting on ,john #af3bc1 ,if you ask 
the ,father anything in ,my name ,he    
will give it you1 says 7,tract4 cii73   
,everyone is heard when he prays for    
himself1 not when he prays for all2     

wherefore ,he does not say simply ',he  
will give it1' but ',he will give it    
you4' ,therefore it would seem that we  
ought not to pray for others1 but only  
for ourselves4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we  
are forbidden to pray for others1 if    
they are wicked1 according to ,jer4     
#g3af1 ,therefore do not then pray for  
this people 4 4 4 and do not withstand  
,me1 for ,i will not hear thee4 ,on the 
other hand we are not bound to pray for 
the good1 since they are heard when they
 pray for themselves4 ,therefore it     
would seem that we ought not to pray for
 others4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is      
written 7,james #e3af73 ,pray one for   
another1 that you may be saved4  ,i     
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #f71 
when we pray we ought to ask for what we
 ought to desire4 ,now we ought to      
desire good things not only for         
ourselves1 but also for others3 for this
 is essential to the love which we owe  
to our neighbor1 as stated above 7,q4   
#be1 ,,aa4 #a1 #ab2 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4

 #ca1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore charity       
requires us to pray for others4 ,hence  
,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xiv in ,matth47 
99,opus ,imperfectum1 falsely ascribed  
to ,st4 ,john ,chrysostom3 ,necessity   
binds us to pray for ourselves1         
fraternal charity urges us to pray for  
others3 and the prayer that fraternal   
charity proffers is sweeter to ,god than
 that which is the outcome of necessity4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,cyprian says    
7,de orat4 ,dom471 ,we say ',our        
,father' and not ',my ,father1' ',give  
us' and not ',give me1' because the     
,master of unity did not wish us to pray
 privately1 that is for ourselves alone1
 for ,he wished each one to pray for    
all1 even as ,he ,himself bore all in   
one4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is a         
condition of prayer that one pray for   
oneself3 not as though it were necessary
 in order that prayer be meritorious1   
but as being necessary in order that    
prayer may not fail in its effect of    
impetration4 ,for it sometimes happens  

that we pray for another with piety and 
perseverance1 and ask for things        
relating to his salvation1 and yet it is
 not granted on account of some obstacle
 on the part of the person we are       
praying for1 according to ,jer4 #ae3a1  
,if ,moses and ,samuel shall stand      
before ,me1 ,my soul is not towards this
 people4 ,and yet the prayer will be    
meritorious for the person who prays    
thus out of charity1 according to ,ps4  
#cd3ac1 ,my prayer shall be turned into 
my bosom1 i4e4 though it profit them    
not1 ,i am not deprived of my reward1 as
 the gloss expounds it4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,we ought to pray even for sinners1 
that they may be converted1 and for the 
just that they may persevere and advance
 in holiness4 ,yet those who pray are   
heard not for all sinners but for some3 
since they are heard for the            
predestined1 but not for those who are  
foreknown to death2 even as the         
correction whereby we correct the       
brethren1 has an effect in the          

predestined but not in the reprobate1   
according to ,eccles4 #g3ad1 ,no man can
 correct whom ,god hath despised4 ,hence
 it is written 7#a ,john #e3af73 ,he    
that knoweth his brother to sin a sin   
which is not to death1 let him ask1 and 
life shall be given to him1 who sinneth 
not to death4 ,now just as the benefit  
of correction must not be refused to any
 man so long as he lives here below1    
because we cannot distinguish the       
predestined from the reprobate1 as      
,augustine says 7,de ,correp4 et ,grat4 
xv71 so too no man should be denied the 
help of prayer4  ,we ought also to pray 
for the just for three reasons3 ,first1 
because the prayers of a multitude are  
more easily heard1 wherefore a gloss on 
,rom4 #ae3cj1 ,help me in your prayers1 
says3 ,the ,apostle rightly tells the   
lesser brethren to pray for him1 for    
many lesser ones1 if they be united     
together in one mind1 become great1 and 
it is impossible for the prayers of a   
multitude not to obtain that which is   

possible to be obtained by prayer4      
,secondly1 that many may thank ,god for 
the graces conferred on the just1 which 
graces conduce to the profit of many1   
according to the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4     
#a3aa74 ,thirdly1 that the more perfect 
may not wax proud1 seeing that they find
 that they need the prayers of the less 
perfect4   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #h  ,whether ,we ,ought 
to ,pray for ,our ,enemies8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that we ought not to 
pray for our enemies4 ,according to     
,rom4 #ae3d1 what things soever were    
written1 were written for our learning4 
,now ,holy ,writ contains many          
imprecations against enemies2 thus it is
 written 7,ps4 #f3aa73 ,let all my      
enemies be ashamed and be 4 4 4         
troubled1 let them be ashamed and be    
troubled very speedily 99,vulg43 ',let  
them be turned back and be ashamed4'4   
,therefore we too should pray against   
rather than for our enemies4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 to be revenged on one's       

enemies is harmful to them4 ,but holy   
men seek vengeance of their enemies     
according to ,apoc4 #f3aj1 ,how long 4 4
 4 dost ,thou not 4 4 4 revenge our     
blood on them that dwell on earth8      
,wherefore they rejoice in being        
revenged on their enemies1 according to 
,ps4 #eg3aa1 ,the just shall rejoice    
when he shall see the revenge4          
,therefore we should not pray for our   
enemies1 but against them4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 man's deed should not be      
contrary to his prayer4 ,now sometimes  
men lawfully attack their enemies1 else 
all wars would be unlawful1 which is    
opposed to what we have said above 7,q4 
#dj1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore we should not  
pray for our enemies4  ,on the contrary1
 ,it is written 7,matt4 #e3dd73 ,pray   
for them that persecute and calumniate  
you4  ,i answer that1 ,to pray for      
another is an act of charity1 as stated 
above 7,a4 #g74 ,wherefore we are bound 
to pray for our enemies in the same     
manner as we are bound to love them4    

,now it was explained above in the      
treatise on charity 7,q4 #be1 ,,aa4 #h1 
#i71 how we are bound to love our       
enemies1 namely1 that we must love in   
them their nature1 not their sin1 and   
that to love our enemies in general is a
 matter of precept1 while to love them  
in the individual is not a matter of    
precept1 except in the preparedness of  
the mind1 so that a man must be prepared
 to love his enemy even in the          
individual and to help him in a case of 
necessity1 or if his enemy should beg   
his forgiveness4 ,but to love one's     
enemies absolutely in the individual1   
and to assist them1 is an act of        
perfection4  ,in like manner it is a    
matter of obligation that we should not 
exclude our enemies from the general    
prayers which we offer up for others3   
but it is a matter of perfection1 and   
not of obligation1 to pray for them     
individually1 except in certain special 
cases4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the           
imprecations contained in ,holy ,writ   

may be understood in four ways4 ,first1 
according to the custom of the prophets 
to foretell the future under the veil of
 an imprecation1 as ,augustine states   
99,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #ba4    
,secondly1 in the sense that certain    
temporal evils are sometimes inflicted  
by ,god on the wicked for their         
correction4 ,thirdly1 because they are  
understood to be pronounced1 not against
 the men themselves1 but against the    
kingdom of sin1 with the purpose1 to    
wit1 of destroying sin by the correction
 of men4 ,fourthly1 by way of conformity
 of our will to the ,divine justice with
 regard to the damnation of those who   
are obstinate in sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,as ,augustine states in the same book  
7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #bb71 the
 martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of 
the kingdom of sin1 because they        
suffered so much while it reigned3 or as
 he says again 7,,qq4 ,vet4 et ,nov4    
,test4 lxviii71 their prayer for        
vengeance is expressed not in words but 

in their minds1 even as the blood of    
,abel cried from the earth4 ,they       
rejoice in vengeance not for its own    
sake1 but for the sake of ,divine       
justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is lawful
 to attack one's enemies1 that they may 
be restrained from sin3 and this is for 
their own good and for the good of      
others4 ,consequently it is even lawful 
in praying to ask that temporal evils be
 inflicted on our enemies in order that 
they may mend their ways4 ,thus prayer  
and deed will not be contrary to one    
another4   ,,ninth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #i  ,whether the ,seven  
,petitions of the ,lord's ,prayer ,are  
,fittingly ,assigned8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that the seven petitions 
of the ,lord's ,prayer are not fittingly
 assigned4 ,it is useless to ask for    
that to be hallowed which is always     
holy4 ,but the name of ,god is always   
holy1 according to ,luke #a3di1 ,holy is
 ,his name4 ,again1 ,his kingdom is     
everlasting1 according to ,ps4 #add3ac1 

,thy kingdom is a kingdom of all ages4  
,again1 ,god's will is always fulfilled1
 according to ,isa #df3aj1 ,all ,my will
 shall be done4 ,therefore it is useless
 to ask for the name of ,god to be      
hallowed1 for ,his kingdom to come1 and 
for ,his will to be done4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 one must withdraw from evil   
before attaining good4 ,therefore it    
seems unfitting for the petitions       
relating to the attainment of good to be
 set forth before those relating to the 
removal of evil4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
one asks for a thing that it may be     
given to one4 ,now the chief gift of    
,god is the ,holy ,ghost1 and those     
gifts that we receive through ,him4     
,therefore the petitions seem to be     
unfittingly assigned1 since they do not 
correspond to the gifts of the ,holy    
,ghost4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 according  
to ,luke1 only five petitions are       
mentioned in the ,lord's ,prayer1 as    
appears from the eleventh chapter4      
,therefore it was superfluous for       

,matthew to mention seven4  ,obj4 #e3   
,further1 it seems useless to seek to   
win the benevolence of one who          
forestalls us by his benevolence4 ,now  
,god forestalls us by ,his benevolence1 
since ,he first hath loved us 7 #a ,john
 #d3ai74 ,therefore it is useless to    
preface the petitions with the words our
 ,father ,who art in heaven1 which seem 
to indicate a desire to win ,god's      
benevolence4  ,on the contrary1 ,the    
authority of ,christ1 who composed this 
prayer1 suffices4  ,i answer that1 ,the 
,lord's ,prayer is most perfect1        
because1 as ,augustine says 7ad ,probam 
,ep4 cxxx1 #ab71 if we pray rightly and 
fittingly1 we can say nothing else but  
what is contained in this prayer of our 
,lord4 ,for since prayer interprets our 
desires1 as it were1 before ,god1 then  
alone is it right to ask for something  
in our prayers when it is right that we 
should desire it4 ,now in the ,lord's   
,prayer not only do we ask for all that 
we may rightly desire1 but also in the  

order wherein we ought to desire them1  
so that this prayer not only teaches us 
to ask1 but also directs all our        
affections4 ,thus it is evident that the
 first thing to be the object of our    
desire is the end1 and afterwards       
whatever is directed to the end4 ,now   
our end is ,god towards ,whom our       
affections tend in two ways3 first1 by  
our willing the glory of ,god1 secondly1
 by willing to enjoy ,his glory4 ,the   
first belongs to the love whereby we    
love ,god in ,himself1 while the second 
belongs to the love whereby we love     
ourselves in ,god4 ,wherefore the first 
petition is expressed thus3 ,hallowed be
 ,thy name1 and the second thus3 ,thy   
kingdom come1 by which we ask to come to
 the glory of ,his kingdom4  ,to this   
same end a thing directs us in two ways3
 in one way1 by its very nature1 in     
another way1 accidentally4 ,of its very 
nature the good which is useful for an  
end directs us to that end4 ,now a thing
 is useful in two ways to that end which

 is beatitude3 in one way1 directly and 
principally1 according to the merit     
whereby we merit beatitude by obeying   
,god1 and in this respect we ask3 ,thy  
will be done on earth as it is in       
heaven2 in another way instrumentally1  
and as it were helping us to merit1 and 
in this respect we say3 ,give us this   
day our daily bread1 whether we         
understand this of the sacramental      
,bread1 the daily use of which is       
profitable to man1 and in which all the 
other sacraments are contained1 or of   
the bread of the body1 so that it       
denotes all sufficiency of food1 as     
,augustine says 7ad ,probam1 ,ep4 cxxx1 
#aa71 since the ,eucharist is the chief 
sacrament1 and bread is the chief food3 
thus in the ,gospel of ,matthew we read1
 supersubstantial1 i4e4 principal1 as   
,jerome expounds it4  ,we are directed  
to beatitude accidentally by the removal
 of obstacles4 ,now there are three     
obstacles to our attainment of          
beatitude4 ,first1 there is sin1 which  

directly excludes a man from the        
kingdom1 according to #a ,cor4 #f3i1    
#aj1 ,neither fornicators1 nor          
idolaters1 etc41 shall possess the      
kingdom of ,god2 and to this refer the  
words1 ,forgive us our trespasses4      
,secondly1 there is temptation which    
hinders us from keeping ,god's will1 and
 to this we refer when we say3 ,and lead
 us not into temptation1 whereby we do  
not ask not to be tempted1 but not to be
 conquered by temptation1 which is to be
 led into temptation4 ,thirdly1 there is
 the present penal state which is a kind
 of obstacle to a sufficiency of life1  
and to this we refer in the words1      
,deliver us from evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4  
in ,monte ii1 #e71 when we say1         
,hallowed be ,thy name1 we do not mean  
that ,god's name is not holy1 but we ask
 that men may treat it as a holy thing1 
and this pertains to the diffusion of   
,god's glory among men4 ,when we say1   
,thy kingdom come1 we do not imply that 

,god is not reigning now1 but we excite 
in ourselves the desire for that        
kingdom1 that it may come to us1 and    
that we may reign therein1 as ,augustine
 says 7ad ,probam1 ,ep4 cxxx1 #aa74 ,the
 words1 ,thy will be done rightly       
signify1 ',may ,thy commandments be     
obeyed' on earth as in heaven1 i4e4 by  
men as well as by angels 7,de ,serm4    
,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #f74 ,hence these   
three petitions will be perfectly       
fulfilled in the life to come2 while the
 other four1 according to ,augustine    
7,enchiridion cxv71 belong to the needs 
of the present life4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,since prayer is the interpreter of     
desire1 the order of the petitions      
corresponds with the order1 not of      
execution1 but of desire or intention1  
where the end precedes the things that  
are directed to the end1 and attainment 
of good precedes removal of evil4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,augustine 7,de ,serm4 
,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #aa7 adapts the     
seven petitions to the gifts and        

beatitudes4 ,he says3 ,if it is fear of 
,god whereby blessed are the poor in    
spirit1 let us ask that ,god's name be  
hallowed among men with a chaste fear4  
,if it is piety whereby blessed are the 
meek1 let us ask that ,his kingdom may  
come1 so that we become meek and no     
longer resist ,him4 ,if it is knowledge 
whereby blessed are they that mourn1 let
 us pray that ,his will be done1 for    
thus we shall mourn no more4 ,if it is  
fortitude whereby blessed ere they that 
hunger1 let us pray that our daily bread
 be given to us4 ,if it is counsel      
whereby blessed are the merciful1 let us
 forgive the trespasses of others that  
our own may be forgiven4 ,if it is      
understanding whereby blessed are the   
pure in heart1 let us pray lest we have 
a double heart by seeking after worldly 
things which ere the occasion of our    
temptations4 ,if it is wisdom whereby   
blessed are the peacemakers for they    
shall be called the children of ,god1   
let us pray to be delivered from evil3  

for if we be delivered we shall by that 
very fact become the free children of   
,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,according to   
,augustine 7,enchiridion cxvi71 ,luke   
included not seven but five petitions in
 the ,lord's ,prayer1 for by omitting   
it1 he shows that the third petition is 
a kind of repetition of the two that    
precede1 and thus helps us to understand
 it2 because1 to wit1 the will of ,god  
tends chiefly to this--that we come to  
the knowledge of ,his holiness and to   
reign together with ,him4 ,again the    
last petition mentioned by ,matthew1    
,deliver us from evil1 is omitted by    
,luke1 so that each one may know himself
 to be delivered from evil if he be not 
led into temptation4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3  
,prayer is offered up to ,god1 not that 
we may bend ,him1 but that we may excite
 in ourselves the confidence to ask3    
which confidence is excited in us       
chiefly by the consideration of ,his    
charity in our regard1 whereby he wills 
our good--wherefore we say3 ,our        

,father2 and of ,his excellence1 whereby
 ,he is able to fulfil it--wherefore we 
say3 ,who art in heaven4   ,,tenth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #aj 
,whether ,prayer ,is ,proper to the     
,rational ,creature8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that prayer is not proper to
 the rational creature4 ,asking and     
receiving apparently belong to the same 
subject4 ,but receiving is becoming also
 to uncreated ,persons1 viz4 the ,son   
and ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore it is      
competent to them to pray3 for the ,son 
said 7,john #ad3af73 ,i will ask ,my    
,vulg43 'the' ,father1 and the ,apostle 
says of the ,holy ,ghost 7,rom4 #h3bf73 
,the ,spirit 4 4 4 asketh for us4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,angels are above rational         
creatures1 since they are intellectual  
substances4 ,now prayer is becoming to  
the angels1 wherefore we read in the    
,ps4 #if3g3 ,adore ,him1 all you ,his   
angels4 ,therefore prayer is not proper 
to the rational creature4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 the same subject is fitted to 

pray as is fitted to call upon ,god1    
since this consists chiefly in prayer4  
,but dumb animals are fitted to call    
upon ,god1 according to ,ps4 #adf3i1    
,who giveth to beasts their food and to 
the young ravens that call upon ,him4   
,therefore prayer is not proper to the  
rational creatures4  ,on the contrary1  
,prayer is an act of reason1 as stated  
above 7,a4 #a74 ,but the rational       
creature is so called from his reason4  
,therefore prayer is proper to the      
rational creature4  ,i answer that1 ,as 
stated above 7,a4 #a7 prayer is an act  
of reason1 and consists in beseeching a 
superior2 just as command is an act of  
reason1 whereby an inferior is directed 
to something4 ,accordingly prayer is    
properly competent to one to whom it is 
competent to have reason1 and a superior
 whom he may beseech4 ,now nothing is   
above the ,divine ,persons2 and dumb    
animals are devoid of reason4 ,therefore
 prayer is unbecoming both the ,divine  
,persons and dumb animals1 and it is    

proper to the rational creature4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,receiving belongs to the    
,divine ,persons in respect of their    
nature1 whereas prayer belongs to one   
who receives through grace4 ,the ,son is
 said to ask or pray in respect of ,his 
assumed1 i4e4 ,his human1 nature and not
 in respect of ,his ,godhead3 and the   
,holy ,ghost is said to ask1 because ,he
 makes us ask4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as    
stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4
 #h71 intellect and reason are not      
distinct powers in us3 but they differ  
as the perfect from the imperfect4      
,hence intellectual creatures which are 
the angels are distinct from rational   
creatures1 and sometimes are included   
under them4 ,in this sense prayer is    
said to be proper to the rational       
creature4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the young  
ravens are said to call upon ,god1 on   
account of the natural desire whereby   
all things1 each in its own way1 desire 
to attain the ,divine goodness4 ,thus   
too dumb animals are said to obey ,god1 

on account of the natural instinct      
whereby they are moved by ,god4         
,,eleventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1
 ,art4 #aa  ,whether the ,saints in     
,heaven ,pray for ,us8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that the saints in heaven
 do not pray for us4 ,a man's action is 
more meritorious for himself than for   
others4 ,but the saints in heaven do not
 merit for themselves1 neither do they  
pray for themselves1 since they are     
already established in the term4        
,neither therefore do they pray for us4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the saints conform  
their will to ,god perfectly1 so that   
they will only what ,god wills4 ,now    
what ,god wills is always fulfilled4    
,therefore it would be useless for the  
saints to pray for us4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 just as the saints in heaven  
are above1 so are those in ,purgatory1  
for they can no longer sin4 ,now those  
in ,purgatory do not pray for us1 on the
 contrary we pray for them4 ,therefore  
neither do the saints in heaven pray for

 us4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if the saints 
in heaven pray for us1 the prayers of   
the higher saints would be more         
efficacious2 and so we ought not to     
implore the help of the lower saints'   
prayers but only of those of the higher 
saints4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the soul of
 ,peter is not ,peter4 ,if therefore the
 souls of the saints pray for us1 so    
long as they are separated from their   
bodies1 we ought not to call upon ,saint
 ,peter1 but on his soul1 to pray for   
us3 yet the ,church does the contrary4  
,the saints therefore do not pray for   
us1 at least before the resurrection4   
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#b    
,macc4 #ae3ad73 ,this is 4 4 4 he that  
prayeth much for the people1 and for all
 the holy city1 ,jeremias the prophet of
 ,god4  ,i answer that1 ,as ,jerome says
 7,cont4 ,vigilant4 #f71 the error of   
,vigilantius consisted in saying that   
while we live1 we can pray one for      
another2 but that after we are dead1    
none of our prayers for others can be   

heard1 seeing that not even the martyrs'
 prayers are granted when they pray for 
their blood to be avenged4 ,but this is 
absolutely false1 because1 since prayers
 offered for others proceed from        
charity1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #g1 #h71
 the greater the charity of the saints  
in heaven1 the more they pray for       
wayfarers1 since the latter can be      
helped by prayers3 and the more closely 
they are united to ,god1 the more are   
their prayers efficacious3 for the      
,divine order is such that lower beings 
receive an overflow of the excellence of
 the higher1 even as the air receives   
the brightness of the sun4 ,wherefore it
 is said of ,christ 7,heb4 #g3be73      
,going to ,god by ,his own power 4 4 4  
to make intercession for us 99,vulg43   
',he is able to save for ever them that 
come to ,god by ,him1 always living to  
make intercession for us4'4 ,hence      
,jerome says 7,cont4 ,vigilant4 #f73 ,if
 the apostles and martyrs while yet in  
the body and having to be solicitous for

 themselves1 can pray for others1 how   
much more now that they have the crown  
of victory and triumph4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,the saints in heaven1 since they   
are blessed1 have no lack of bliss1 save
 that of the body's glory1 and for this 
they pray4 ,but they pray for us who    
lack the ultimate perfection of bliss3  
and their prayers are efficacious in    
impetrating through their previous      
merits and through ,god's acceptance4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the saints impetrate  
what ever ,god wishes to take place     
through their prayers3 and they pray for
 that which they deem will be granted   
through their prayers according to      
,god's will4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those   
who are in ,purgatory though they are   
above us on account of their            
impeccability1 yet they are below us as 
to the pains which they suffer3 and in  
this respect they are not in a condition
 to pray1 but rather in a condition that
 requires us to pray for them4  ,reply  
,obj4 #d3 ,it is ,god's will that       

inferior beings should be helped by all 
those that are above them1 wherefore we 
ought to pray not only to the higher but
 also to the lower saints2 else we      
should have to implore the mercy of ,god
 alone4 ,nevertheless it happens        
sometime that prayers addressed to a    
saint of lower degree are more          
efficacious1 either because he is       
implored with greater devotion1 or      
because ,god wishes to make known his   
sanctity4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,it is      
because the saints while living merited 
to pray for us1 that we invoke them     
under the names by which they were known
 in this life1 and by which they are    
better known to us3 and also in order to
 indicate our belief in the             
resurrection1 according to the saying of
 ,ex4 #c3f1 ,i am the ,god of ,abraham1 
etc4   ,,twelfth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #ab  ,whether ,prayer    
,should ,be ,vocal8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that prayer ought not to be  
vocal4 ,as stated above 7,a4 #d71 prayer

 is addressed chiefly to ,god4 ,now ,god
 knows the language of the heart4       
,therefore it is useless to employ vocal
 prayer4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prayer    
should lift man's mind to ,god1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,but      
words1 like other sensible objects1     
prevent man from ascending to ,god by   
contemplation4 ,therefore we should not 
use words in our prayers4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 prayer should be offered to   
,god in secret1 according to ,matt4     
#f3f1 ,but thou1 when thou shalt pray1  
enter into thy chamber1 and having shut 
the door1 pray to thy ,father in secret4
 ,but prayer loses its secrecy by being 
expressed vocally4 ,therefore prayer    
should not be vocal4  ,on the contrary1 
,it is written 7,ps4 #ada3b73 ,i cried  
to the ,lord with my voice1 with my     
voice ,i made supplication to the ,lord4
  ,i answer that1 ,prayer is twofold1   
common and individual4 ,common prayer is
 that which is offered to ,god by the   
ministers of the ,church representing   

the body of the faithful3 wherefore such
 like prayer should come to the         
knowledge of the whole people for whom  
it is offered3 and this would not be    
possible unless it were vocal prayer4   
,therefore it is reasonably ordained    
that the ministers of the ,church should
 say these prayers even in a loud voice1
 so that they may come to the knowledge 
of all4  ,on the other hand individual  
prayer is that which is offered by any  
single person1 whether he pray for      
himself or for others2 and it is not    
essential to such a prayer as this that 
it be vocal4 ,and yet the voice is      
employed in such like prayers for three 
reasons4 ,first1 in order to excite     
interior devotion1 whereby the mind of  
the person praying is raised to ,god1   
because by means of external signs1     
whether of words or of deeds1 the human 
mind is moved as regards apprehension1  
and consequently also as regards the    
affections4 ,hence ,augustine says 7ad  
,probam4 ,ep4 cxxx1 #i7 that by means of

 words and other signs we arouse        
ourselves more effectively to an        
increase of holy desires4 ,hence then   
alone should we use words and such like 
signs when they help to excite the mind 
internally4 ,but if they distract or in 
any way impede the mind we should       
abstain from them2 and this happens     
chiefly to those whose mind is          
sufficiently prepared for devotion      
without having recourse to those signs4 
,wherefore the ,psalmist 7,ps4 #bf3h7   
said3 ,my heart hath said to ,thee3 ',my
 face hath sought ,thee1' and we read of
 ,anna 7#a ,kings #a3ac7 that she spoke 
in her heart4 ,secondly1 the voice is   
used in praying as though to pay a debt1
 so that man may serve ,god with all    
that he has from ,god1 that is to say1  
not only with his mind1 but also with   
his body3 and this applies to prayer    
considered especially as satisfactory4  
,hence it is written 7,osee #ad3c73     
,take away all iniquity1 and receive the
 good3 and we will render the calves of 

our lips4 ,thirdly1 we have recourse to 
vocal prayer1 through a certain overflow
 from the soul into the body1 through   
excess of feeling1 according to ,ps4    
#ae3i1 ,my heart hath been glad1 and my 
tongue hath rejoiced4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,vocal prayer is employed1 not in order 
to tell ,god something ,he does not     
know1 but in order to lift up the mind  
of the person praying or of other       
persons to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,words about other matters distract the 
mind and hinder the devotion of those   
who pray3 but words signifying some     
object of devotion lift up the mind1    
especially one that is less devout4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,chrysostom says   
99,hom4 xiii in the ,opus ,imperfectum  
falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,john          
,chrysostom1 ,our ,lord forbids one to  
pray in presence of others in order that
 one may be seen by others4 ,hence when 
you pray1 do nothing strange to draw    
men's attention1 either by shouting so  
as to be heard by others1 or by openly  

striking the heart1 or extending the    
hands1 so as to be seen by many4 ,and   
yet1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,serm4
 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #c71 it is not     
wrong to be seen by men1 but to do this 
or that in order to be seen by men4     
,,thirteenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4   
#hc1 ,art4 #ac  ,whether ,attention ,is 
a ,necessary ,condition of ,prayer8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
attention is a necessary condition of   
prayer4 ,it is written 7,john #d3bd73   
,god is a spirit1 and they that adore   
,him must adore ,him in spirit and in   
truth4 ,but prayer is not in spirit     
unless it be attentive4 ,therefore      
attention is a necessary condition of   
prayer4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prayer is  
the ascent of the mind to ,god          
99,damascene1 ,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #bd4
 ,but the mind does not ascend to ,god  
if the prayer is inattentive4 ,therefore
 attention is a necessary condition of  
prayer4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is a    
necessary condition of prayer that it   

should be altogether sinless4 ,now if a 
man allows his mind to wander while     
praying he is not free of sin1 for he   
seems to make light of ,god2 even as if 
he were to speak to another man without 
attending to what he was saying4 ,hence 
,basil says 99,de ,constit4 ,monach4 i  
that the ,divine assistance is to be    
implored1 not lightly1 nor with a mind  
wandering hither and thither3 because he
 that prays thus not only will not      
obtain what he asks1 nay rather will he 
provoke ,god to anger4 ,therefore it    
would seem a necessary condition of     
prayer that it should be attentive4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,even holy men sometimes 
suffer from a wandering of the mind when
 they pray1 according to ,ps4 #ci3ac1   
,my heart hath forsaken me4  ,i answer  
that1 ,this question applies chiefly to 
vocal prayer4 ,accordingly we must      
observe that a thing is necessary in two
 ways4 ,first1 a thing is necessary     
because thereby the end is better       
obtained3 and thus attention is         

absolutely necessary for prayer4        
,secondly1 a thing is said to be        
necessary when without it something     
cannot obtain its effect4 ,now the      
effect of prayer is threefold4 ,the     
first is an effect which is common to   
all acts quickened by charity1 and this 
is merit4 ,in order to realize this     
effect1 it is not necessary that prayer 
should be attentive throughout2 because 
the force of the original intention with
 which one sets about praying renders   
the whole prayer meritorious1 as is the 
case with other meritorious acts4 ,the  
second effect of prayer is proper       
thereto1 and consists in impetration3   
and again the original intention1 to    
which ,god looks chiefly1 suffices to   
obtain this effect4 ,but if the original
 intention is lacking1 prayer lacks both
 merit and impetration3 because1 as     
,gregory 99,hugh ,st4 ,victor1 ,expos4  
in ,reg4 ,s4 ,aug4 iii says1 ,god hears 
not the prayer of those who pay no      
attention to their prayer4 ,the third   

effect of prayer is that which it       
produces at once2 this is the spiritual 
refreshment of the mind1 and for this   
effect attention is a necessary         
condition3 wherefore it is written 7#a  
,cor4 #ad3ad73 ,if ,i pray in a tongue 4
 4 4 my understanding is without fruit4 
,it must be observed1 however1 that     
there are three kinds of attention that 
can be brought to vocal prayer3 one     
which attends to the words1 lest we say 
them wrong1 another which attends to the
 sense of the words1 and a third1 which 
attends to the end of prayer1 namely1   
,god1 and to the thing we are praying   
for4 ,that last kind of attention is    
most necessary1 and even idiots are     
capable of it4 ,moreover this attention1
 whereby the mind is fixed on ,god1 is  
sometimes so strong that the mind       
forgets all other things1 as ,hugh of   
,st4 ,victor states 99,de ,modo ,orandi 
ii4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to pray in spirit
 and in truth is to set about praying   
through the instigation of the ,spirit1 

even though afterwards the mind wander  
through weakness4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the
 human mind is unable to remain aloft   
for long on account of the weakness of  
nature1 because human weakness weighs   
down the soul to the level of inferior  
things3 and hence it is that when1 while
 praying1 the mind ascends to ,god by   
contemplation1 of a sudden it wanders   
off through weakness4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,purposely to allow one's mind to wander
 in prayer is sinful and hinders the    
prayer from having fruit4 ,it is against
 this that ,augustine says in his ,rule 
7,ep4 ccxi73 ,when you pray ,god with   
psalms and hymns1 let your mind attend  
to that which your lips pronounce4 ,but 
to wander in mind unintentionally does  
not deprive prayer of its fruit4 ,hence 
,basil says 7,de ,constit4 ,monach4 i73 
,if you are so truly weakened by sin    
that you are unable to pray attentively1
 strive as much as you can to curb      
yourself1 and ,god will pardon you1     
seeing that you are unable to stand in  

,his presence in a becoming manner1 not 
through negligence but through frailty4 
,,fourteenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4   
#hc1 ,art4 #ad  ,whether ,prayer ,should
 ,last a ,long ,time8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that prayer should not be
 continual4 ,it is written 7,matt4      
#f3g73 ,when you are praying1 speak not 
much4 ,now one who prays a long time    
needs to speak much1 especially if his  
be vocal prayer4 ,therefore prayer      
should not last a long time4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 prayer expresses the desire4  
,now a desire is all the holier         
according as it is centered on one      
thing1 according to ,ps4 #bf3d1 ,one    
thing ,i have asked of the ,lord1 this  
will ,i seek after4 ,therefore the      
shorter prayer is1 the more is it       
acceptable to ,god4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 it seems to be wrong to transgress the 
limits fixed by ,god1 especially in     
matters concerning ,divine worship1     
according to ,ex4 #ai3ba3 ,charge the   
people1 lest they should have a mind to 

pass the limits to see the ,lord1 and a 
very great multitude of them should     
perish4 ,but ,god has fixed for us the  
limits of prayer by instituting the     
,lord's ,prayer 7,matt4 #f74 ,therefore 
it is not right to prolong our prayer   
beyond its limits4  ,obj4 #d3 ,on the   
contrary1 ,it would seem that we ought  
to pray continually4 ,for our ,lord said
 7,luke #ah3a73 ,we ought always to     
pray1 and not to faint3 and it is       
written 7#a ,thess4 #e3ag73 ,pray       
without ceasing4  ,i answer that1 ,we   
may speak about prayer in two ways3     
first1 by considering it in itself2     
secondly1 by considering it in its      
cause4 ,the cause of prayer is the      
desire of charity1 from which prayer    
ought to arise3 and this desire ought to
 be in us continually1 either actually  
or virtually1 for the virtue of this    
desire remains in whatever we do out of 
charity2 and we ought to do all things  
to the glory of ,god 7#a ,cor4 #aj3ca74 
,from this point of view prayer ought to

 be continual3 wherefore ,augustine says
 7ad ,probam1 ,ep4 cxxx1 #i73 ,faith1   
hope and charity are by themselves a    
prayer of continual longing4 ,but       
prayer1 considered in itself1 cannot be 
continual1 because we have to be busy   
about other works1 and1 as ,augustine   
says 7ad ,probam4 ,ep4 cxxx1 #i71 we    
pray to ,god with our lips at certain   
intervals and seasons1 in order to      
admonish ourselves by means of such like
 signs1 to take note of the amount of   
our progress in that desire1 and to     
arouse ourselves more eagerly to an     
increase thereof4 ,now the quantity of a
 thing should be commensurate with its  
end1 for instance the quantity of the   
dose should be commensurate with health4
 ,and so it is becoming that prayer     
should last long enough to arouse the   
fervor of the interior desire3 and when 
it exceeds this measure1 so that it     
cannot be continued any longer without  
causing weariness1 it should be         
discontinued4 ,wherefore ,augustine says

 7ad ,probam4 ,ep4 cxxx73 ,it is said   
that the brethren in ,egypt make        
frequent but very short prayers1 rapid  
ejaculations1 as it were1 lest that     
vigilant and erect attention which is so
 necessary in prayer slacken and        
languish1 through the strain being      
prolonged4 ,by so doing they make it    
sufficiently clear not only that this   
attention must not be forced if we are  
unable to keep it up1 but also that if  
we are able to continue1 it should not  
be broken off too soon4 ,and just as we 
must judge of this in private prayers by
 considering the attention of the person
 praying1 so too1 in public prayers we  
must judge of it by considering the     
devotion of the people4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,as ,augustine says 7ad ,probam4    
,ep4 cxxx71 to pray with many words is  
not the same as to pray long2 to speak  
long is one thing1 to be devout long is 
another4 ,for it is written that our    
,lord passed the whole night in prayer1 
and that ,he 'prayed the longer' in     

order to set us an example4 ,further on 
he says3 ,when praying say little1 yet  
pray much so long as your attention is  
fervent4 ,for to say much in prayer is  
to discuss your need in too many words3 
whereas to pray much is to knock at the 
door of ,him we pray1 by the continuous 
and devout clamor of the heart4 ,indeed 
this business is frequently done with   
groans rather than with words1 with     
tears rather than with speech4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,length of prayer consists1   
not in praying for many things1 but in  
the affections persisting in the desire 
of one thing4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,our    
,lord instituted this prayer1 not that  
we might use no other words when we     
pray1 but that in our prayers we might  
have none but these things in view1 no  
matter how we express them or think of  
them4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,one may pray   
continually1 either through having a    
continual desire1 as stated above2 or   
through praying at certain fixed times1 
though interruptedly2 or by reason of   

the effect1 whether in the person who   
prays--because he remains more devout   
even after praying1 or in some other    
person--as when by his kindness a man   
incites another to pray for him1 even   
after he himself has ceased praying4    
,,fifteenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    
#hc1 ,art4 #ae  ,whether ,prayer ,is    
,meritorious8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that prayer is not meritorious4    
,all merit proceeds from grace4 ,but    
prayer precedes grace1 since even grace 
is obtained by means of prayer according
 to ,luke #aa3ac1 7,how much more7 will 
your ,father from heaven give the good  
,spirit to them that ask ,him6          
,therefore prayer is not a meritorious  
act4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if prayer     
merits anything1 this would seem to be  
chiefly that which is besought in       
prayer4 ,yet it does not always merit   
this1 because even the saints' prayers  
are frequently not heard2 thus ,paul was
 not heard when he besought the sting of
 the flesh to be removed from him4      

,therefore prayer is not a meritorious  
act4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 prayer is     
based chiefly on faith1 according to    
,james #a3f1 ,but let him ask in faith1 
nothing wavering4 ,now faith is not     
sufficient for merit1 as instanced in   
those who have lifeless faith4          
,therefore prayer is not a meritorious  
act4  ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on the 
words of ,ps4 #cd3ac1 ,my prayer shall  
be turned into my bosom1 explains them  
as meaning1 if my prayer does not profit
 them1 yet shall not ,i be deprived of  
my reward4 ,now reward is not due save  
to merit4 ,therefore prayer is          
meritorious4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated
 above 7,a4 #ac7 prayer1 besides causing
 spiritual consolation at the time of   
praying1 has a twofold efficacy in      
respect of a future effect1 namely1     
efficacy in meriting and efficacy in    
impetrating4 ,now prayer1 like any other
 virtuous act1 is efficacious in        
meriting1 because it proceeds from      
charity as its root1 the proper object  

of which is the eternal good that we    
merit to enjoy4 ,yet prayer proceeds    
from charity through the medium of      
religion1 of which prayer is an act1 as 
stated above 7,a4 #c71 and with the     
concurrence of other virtues requisite  
for the goodness of prayer1 viz4        
humility and faith4 ,for the offering of
 prayer itself to ,god belongs to       
religion1 while the desire for the thing
 that we pray to be accomplished belongs
 to charity4 ,faith is necessary in     
reference to ,god to ,whom we pray2 that
 is1 we need to believe that we can     
obtain from ,him what we seek4 ,humility
 is necessary on the part of the person 
praying1 because he recognizes his      
neediness4 ,devotion too is necessary3  
but this belongs to religion1 for it is 
its first act and a necessary condition 
of all its secondary acts1 as stated    
above 7,q4 #hb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74  ,as to  
its efficacy in impetrating1 prayer     
derives this from the grace of ,god to  
,whom we pray1 and ,who instigates us to

 pray4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de  
,verb4 ,dom41 ,serm4 cv1 #a73 ,he would 
not urge us to ask1 unless ,he were     
willing to give2 and ,chrysostom 99,cf4 
,catena ,aurea of ,st4 ,thomas on ,luke 
#ah4 ,the words as quoted are not to be 
found in the words of ,chrysostom says3 
,he never refuses to grant our prayers1 
since in ,his loving-kindness ,he urged 
us not to faint in praying4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,neither prayer nor any other 
virtuous act is meritorious without     
sanctifying grace4 ,and yet even that   
prayer which impetrates sanctifying     
grace proceeds from some grace1 as from 
a gratuitous gift1 since the very act of
 praying is a gift of ,god1 as          
,augustine states 7,de ,persever4       
xxiii74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sometimes the
 merit of prayer regards chiefly        
something distinct from the object of   
one's petition4 ,for the chief object of
 merit is beatitude1 whereas the direct 
object of the petition of prayer extends
 sometimes to certain other things1 as  

stated above 7,,aa4 #f1 #g74            
,accordingly if this other thing that we
 ask for ourselves be not useful for our
 beatitude1 we do not merit it2 and     
sometimes by asking for and desiring    
such things we lose merit for instance  
if we ask of ,god the accomplishment of 
some sin1 which would be an impious     
prayer4 ,and sometimes it is not        
necessary for salvation1 nor yet        
manifestly contrary thereto2 and then   
although he who prays may merit eternal 
life by praying1 yet he does not merit  
to obtain what he asks for4 ,hence      
,augustine says 7,liber4 ,sentent4      
,prosperi sent4 ccxii73 ,he who         
faithfully prays ,god for the           
necessaries of this life1 is both       
mercifully heard1 and mercifully not    
heard4 ,for the physician knows better  
than the sick man what is good for the  
disease4 ,for this reason1 too1 ,paul   
was not heard when he prayed for the    
removal of the sting in his flesh1      
because this was not expedient4 ,if1    

however1 we pray for something that is  
useful for our beatitude1 through being 
conducive to salvation1 we merit it not 
only by praying1 but also by doing other
 good deeds3 therefore without any doubt
 we receive what we ask for1 yet when we
 ought to receive it3 since certain     
things are not denied us1 but are       
deferred that they may be granted at a  
suitable time1 according to ,augustine  
7,tract4 cii in ,joan473 and again this 
may be hindered if we persevere not in  
asking for it4 ,wherefore ,basil says   
7,de ,constit4 ,monast4 i73 ,the reason 
why sometimes thou hast asked and not   
received1 is because thou hast asked    
amiss1 either inconsistently1 or        
lightly1 or because thou hast asked for 
what was not good for thee1 or because  
thou hast ceased asking4 ,since1        
however1 a man cannot condignly merit   
eternal life for another1 as stated     
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,a4 #f71 it   
follows that sometimes one cannot       
condignly merit for another things that 

pertain to eternal life4 ,for this      
reason we are not always heard when we  
pray for others1 as stated above 7,a4   
#g1 ad #b1 #c74 ,hence it is that four  
conditions are laid down2 namely1 to    
ask--for ourselves--things necessary for
 salvation--piously--perseveringly2 when
 all these four concur1 we always obtain
 what we ask for4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,prayer depends chiefly on faith1 not   
for its efficacy in meriting1 because   
thus it depends chiefly on charity1 but 
for its efficacy in impetrating1 because
 it is through faith that man comes to  
know of ,god's omnipotence and mercy1   
which are the source whence prayer      
impetrates what it asks for4            
,,sixteenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    
#hc1 ,art4 #af  ,whether ,sinners       
,impetrate ,anything from ,god by ,their
 ,prayers8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that sinners impetrate nothing from
 ,god by their prayers4 ,it is written  
7,john #i3ca73 ,we know that ,god doth  
not hear sinners2 and this agrees with  

the saying of ,prov4 #bh3i1 ,he that    
turneth away his ears from hearing the  
law1 his prayer shall be an abomination4
 ,now an abominable prayer impetrates   
nothing from ,god4 ,therefore sinners   
impetrate nothing from ,god4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 the just impetrate from ,god  
what they merit1 as stated above 7,a4   
#ae1 ad #b74 ,but sinners cannot merit  
anything since they lack grace and      
charity which is the power of godliness1
 according to a gloss on #b ,tim4 #c3e1 
,having an appearance indeed of         
godliness1 but denying the power        
thereof4 and so their prayer is impious1
 and yet piety is required in order that
 prayer may be impetrative1 as stated   
above 7,a4 #ae1 ad #b74 ,therefore      
sinners impetrate nothing by their      
prayers4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1           
,chrysostom 99,hom4 xiv in the ,opus    
,imperfectum falsely ascribed to ,st4   
,john ,chrysostom says3 ,the ,father is 
unwilling to hear the prayer which the  
,son has not inspired4 ,now in the      

prayer inspired by ,christ we say3      
,forgive us our trespasses as we forgive
 them that trespass against us3 and     
sinners do not fulfil this4 ,therefore  
either they lie in saying this1 and so  
are unworthy to be heard1 or1 if they do
 not say it1 they are not heard1 because
 they do not observe the form of prayer 
instituted by ,christ4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,tract4 xliv1
 super ,joan473 ,if ,god were not to    
hear sinners1 the publican would have   
vainly said3 ,lord1 be merciful to me a 
sinner2 and ,chrysostom 99,hom4 xviii of
 the same ,opus ,imperfectum says3      
,everyone that asketh shall receive1    
that is to say whether he be righteous  
or sinful4  ,i answer that1 ,in the     
sinner1 two things are to be considered3
 his nature which ,god loves1 and the   
sin which ,he hates4 ,accordingly when a
 sinner prays for something as sinner1  
i4e4 in accordance with a sinful desire1
 ,god hears him not through mercy but   
sometimes through vengeance when ,he    

allows the sinner to fall yet deeper    
into sin4 ,for ,god refuses in mercy    
what ,he grants in anger1 as ,augustine 
declares 7,tract4 lxxiii in ,joan474 ,on
 the other hand ,god hears the sinner's 
prayer if it proceed from a good natural
 desire1 not out of justice1 because the
 sinner does not merit to be heard1 but 
out of pure mercy 99,cf4 ,a4 #ae1 ad #a1
 provided however he fulfil the four    
conditions given above1 namely1 that he 
beseech for himself things necessary for
 salvation1 piously and perseveringly4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine states  
7,tract4 xliv super ,joan471 these words
 were spoken by the blind man before    
being anointed1 i4e4 perfectly          
enlightened1 and consequently lack      
authority4 ,and yet there is truth in   
the saying if it refers to a sinner as  
such1 in which sense also the sinner's  
prayer is said to be an abomination4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there can be no       
godliness in the sinner's prayer as     
though his prayer were quickened by a   

habit of virtue3 and yet his prayer may 
be godly in so far as he asks for       
something pertaining to godliness4 ,even
 so a man who has not the habit of      
justice is able to will something just1 
as stated above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #b74 ,and 
though his prayer is not meritorious1 it
 can be impetrative1 because merit      
depends on justice1 whereas impetration 
rests on grace4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as   
stated above 7,a4 #g1 ad #a7 the ,lord's
 ,prayer is pronounced in the common    
person of the whole ,church3 and so if  
anyone say the ,lord's ,prayer while    
unwilling to forgive his neighbor's     
trespasses1 he lies not1 although his   
words do not apply to him personally3   
for they are true as referred to the    
person of the ,church1 from which he is 
excluded by merit1 and consequently he  
is deprived of the fruit of his prayer4 
,sometimes1 however1 a sinner is        
prepared to forgive those who have      
trespassed against him1 wherefore his   
prayers are heard1 according to ,ecclus4

 #bh3b1 ,forgive thy neighbor if he hath
 hurt thee1 and then shall thy sins be  
forgiven to thee when thou prayest4     
,,seventeenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4  
#hc1 ,art4 #ag  ,whether the ,parts of  
,prayer ,are ,fittingly ,described ,as  
,supplications1 ,prayers1               
,intercessions1 and ,thanksgivings8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
parts of prayer are unfittingly         
described as supplications1 prayers1    
intercessions1 and thanksgivings4       
,supplication would seem to be a kind of
 adjuration4 ,yet1 according to ,origen 
7,super ,matth4 ,tract4 xxxv71 a man who
 wishes to live according to the gospel 
need not adjure another1 for if it be   
unlawful to swear1 it is also unlawful  
to adjure4 ,therefore supplication is   
unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to        
,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #bd71 
to pray is to ask becoming things of    
,god4 ,therefore it is unfitting to     
distinguish prayers from intercessions4 

,obj4 #c3 ,further1 thanksgivings regard
 the past1 while the others regard the  
future4 ,but the past precedes the      
future4 ,therefore thanksgivings are    
unfittingly placed after the others4    
,on the contrary1 suffices the authority
 of the ,apostle 7#a ,tim4 #b3a74  ,i   
answer that1 ,three conditions are      
requisite for prayer4 ,first1 that the  
person who prays should approach ,god   
,whom he prays3 this is signified in the
 word prayer1 because prayer is the     
raising up of one's mind to ,god4 ,the  
second is that there should be a        
petition1 and this is signified in the  
word intercession4 ,in this case        
sometimes one asks for something        
definite1 and then some say it is       
intercession properly so called1 or we  
may ask for some thing indefinitely1 for
 instance to be helped by ,god1 or we   
may simply indicate a fact1 as in ,john 
#aa3c1 ,behold1 he whom ,thou lovest is 
sick1 and then they call it insinuation4
 ,the third condition is the reason for 

impetrating what we ask for3 and this   
either on the part of ,god1 or on the   
part of the person who asks4 ,the reason
 of impetration on the part of ,god is  
,his sanctity1 on account of which we   
ask to be heard1 according to ,dan4     
#i3ag1 #ah1 ,for ,thy own sake1 incline1
 ,o ,god1 ,thy ear2 and to this pertains
 supplication 7obsecratio7 which means a
 pleading through sacred things1 as when
 we say1 ,through ,thy nativity1 deliver
 us1 ,o ,lord4 ,the reason for          
impetration on the part of the person   
who asks is thanksgiving2 since through 
giving thanks for benefits received we  
merit to receive yet greater benefits1  
as we say in the collect 99,ember       
,friday in ,september and ,postcommunion
 of the common of a ,confessor ,bishop4 
,hence a gloss on #a ,tim4 #b3a says    
that in the ,mass1 the consecration is  
preceded by supplication1 in which      
certain sacred things are called to     
mind2 that prayers are in the           
consecration itself1 in which especially

 the mind should be raised up to ,god2  
and that intercessions are in the       
petitions that follow1 and thanksgivings
 at the end4  ,we may notice these four 
things in several of the ,church's      
collects4 ,thus in the collect of       
,trinity ,sunday the words1 ,almighty   
eternal ,god belong to the offering up  
of prayer to ,god2 the words1 ,who hast 
given to ,thy servants1 etc4 belong to  
thanksgiving2 the words1 grant1 we      
beseech ,thee1 belong to intercession2  
and the words at the end1 ,through ,our 
,lord1 etc4 belong to supplication4  ,in
 the ,conferences of the ,fathers 7ix1  
cap4 #aa1 seqq47 we read3 ,supplication 
is bewailing one's sins2 prayer is      
vowing something to ,god2 intercession  
is praying for others2 thanksgiving is  
offered by the mind to ,god in ineffable
 ecstasy4 ,the first explanation1       
however1 is the better4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,supplication is an adjuration not  
for the purpose of compelling1 for this 
is forbidden1 but in order to implore   

mercy4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,prayer in the 
general sense includes all the things   
mentioned here2 but when distinguished  
from the others it denotes properly the 
ascent to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,among
 things that are diverse the past       
precedes the future2 but the one and    
same thing is future before it is past4 
,hence thanksgiving for other benefits  
precedes intercession3 but one and the  
same benefit is first sought1 and       
finally1 when it has been received1 we  
give thanks for it4 ,intercession is    
preceded by prayer whereby we approach  
,him of ,whom we ask3 and prayer is     
preceded by supplication1 whereby       
through the consideration of ,god's     
goodness we dare approach ,him4         
,,question #hd  ,,of ,,adoration 7,in   
,three ,articles7  ,in due sequence we  
must consider the external acts of      
latria1 and in the first place1         
adoration whereby one uses one's body to
 reverence ,god2 secondly1 those acts   
whereby some external thing is offered  

to ,god2 thirdly1 those acts whereby    
something belonging to ,god is assumed4 
,under the first head there are three   
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
adoration is an act of latria8  7#b7    
,whether adoration denotes an internal  
or an external act8  7#c7 ,whether      
adoration requires a definite place8    
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,adoration ,is an    
,act of ,latria or ,religion8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
adoration is not an act of latria or    
religion4 ,the worship of religion is   
due to ,god alone4 ,but adoration is not
 due to ,god alone3 since we read 7,gen4
 #ah3b7 that ,abraham adored the angels2
 and 7#c ,kings #a3bc7 that the prophet 
,nathan1 when he was come in to king    
,david1 worshiped him bowing down to the
 ground4 ,therefore adoration is not an 
act of religion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
the worship of religion is due to ,god  
as the object of beatitude1 according to
 ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #c73     

whereas adoration is due to ,him by     
reason of ,his majesty1 since a gloss on
 ,ps4 #bh3b1 ,adore ye the ,lord in ,his
 holy court1 says3 ,we pass from these  
courts into the court where we adore    
,his majesty4 ,therefore adoration is   
not an act of latria4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 the worship of one same       
religion is due to the three ,persons4  
,but we do not adore the three ,persons 
with one adoration1 for we genuflect at 
each separate invocation of ,them 99,at 
the adoration of the ,cross1 on ,good   
,friday4 ,therefore adoration is nol an 
act of latria4  ,on the contrary1 are   
the words quoted ,matt4 #d3aj3 ,the     
,lord thy ,god shalt thou adore and ,him
 only shalt thou serve4  ,i answer that1
 ,adoration is directed to the reverence
 of the person adored4 ,now it is       
evident from what we have said 7,q4 #ha1
 ,,aa4 #b1 #d7 that it is proper to     
religion to show reverence to ,god4     
,hence the adoration whereby we adore   
,god is an act of religion4  ,reply     

,obj4 #a3 ,reverence is due to ,god on  
account of ,his excellence1 which is    
communicated to certain creatures not in
 equal measure1 but according to a      
measure of proportion2 and so the       
reverence which we pay to ,god1 and     
which belongs to latria1 differs from   
the reverence which we pay to certain   
excellent creatures2 this belongs to    
dulia1 and we shall speak of it further 
on 7,q4 #ajc74 ,and since external      
actions are signs of internal reverence1
 certain external tokens significative  
of reverence are offered to creatures of
 excellence1 and among these tokens the 
chief is adoration3 yet there is one    
thing which is offered to ,god alone1   
and that is sacrifice4 ,hence ,augustine
 says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #d73 ,many     
tokens of ,divine worship are employed  
in doing honor to men1 either through   
excessive humility1 or through          
pernicious flattery2 yet so that those  
to whom these honors are given are      
recognized as being men to whom we owe  

esteem and reverence and even adoration 
if they be far above us4 ,but who ever  
thought it his duty to sacrifice to any 
other than one whom he either knew or   
deemed or pretended to be a ,god8       
,accordingly it was with the reverence  
due to an excellent creature that       
,nathan adored ,david2 while it was the 
reverence due to ,god with which        
,mardochai refused to adore ,aman       
fearing lest he should transfer the     
honor of his ,god to a man 7,esther     
#ac3ad74  ,again with the reverence due 
to an excellent creature ,abraham adored
 the angels1 as did also ,josue 7,jos4  
#e3ae73 though we may understand them to
 have adored1 with the adoration of     
latria1 ,god ,who appeared and spoke to 
them in the guise of an angel4 ,it was  
with the reverence due to ,god that     
,john was forbidden to adore the angel  
7,apoc4 #bb3i71 both to indicate the    
dignity which he had acquired through   
,christ1 whereby man is made equal to an
 angel3 wherefore the same text goes on3

 ,i am thy fellow-servant and of thy    
brethren2 as also to exclude any        
occasion of idolatry1 wherefore the text
 continues3 ,adore ,god4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,every ,divine excellency is        
included in ,his majesty3 to which it   
pertains that we should be made happy in
 ,him as in the sovereign good4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,since there is one excellence
 of the three ,divine ,persons1 one     
honor and reverence is due to them and  
consequently one adoration4 ,it is to   
represent this that where it is related 
7,gen4 #ah3b7 that three men appeared to
 ,abraham1 we are told that he addressed
 one1 saying3 ,lord1 if ,i have found   
favor in thy sight1 etc4 ,the triple    
genuflection represents the ,trinity of 
,persons1 not a difference of adoration4
   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    
#hd1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,adoration      
,denotes an ,action of the ,body8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
adoration does not denote an act of the 
body4 ,it is written 7,john #d3bc73 ,the

 true adorers shall adore the ,father in
 spirit and in truth4 ,now what is done 
in spirit has nothing to do with an act 
of the body4 ,therefore adoration does  
not denote an act of the body4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 the word adoration is     
taken from oratio 7prayer74 ,but prayer 
consists chiefly in an interior act1    
according to #a ,cor4 #ad3ae1 ,i will   
pray with the spirit1 ,i will pray also 
with the understanding4 ,therefore      
adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual   
act4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 acts of the   
body pertain to sensible knowledge3     
whereas we approach ,god not by bodily  
but by spiritual sense4 ,therefore      
adoration does not denote an act of the 
body4  ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on    
,ex4 #bj3e1 ,thou shalt not adore them1 
nor serve them1 says3 ,thou shalt       
neither worship them in mind1 nor adore 
them outwardly4  ,i answer that1 ,as    
,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iv1   
#ab71 since we are composed of a twofold
 nature1 intellectual and sensible1 we  

offer ,god a twofold adoration2 namely1 
a spiritual adoration1 consisting in the
 internal devotion of the mind2 and a   
bodily adoration1 which consists in an  
exterior humbling of the body4 ,and     
since in all acts of latria that which  
is without is referred to that which is 
within as being of greater import1 it   
follows that exterior adoration is      
offered on account of interior          
adoration1 in other words we exhibit    
signs of humility in our bodies in order
 to incite our affections to submit to  
,god1 since it is connatural to us to   
proceed from the sensible to the        
intelligible4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even   
bodily adoration is done in spirit1 in  
so far as it proceeds from and is       
directed to spiritual devotion4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,just as prayer is primarily  
in the mind1 and secondarily expressed  
in words1 as stated above 7,q4 #hc1 ,a4 
#ab71 so too adoration consists chiefly 
in an interior reverence of ,god1 but   
secondarily in certain bodily signs of  

humility2 thus when we genuflect we     
signify our weakness in comparison with 
,god1 and when we prostrate ourselves we
 profess that we are nothing of         
ourselves4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,though we 
cannot reach ,god with the senses1 our  
mind is urged by sensible signs to      
approach ,god4   ,,third ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,adoration ,requires a ,definite ,place8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
adoration does not require a definite   
place4 ,it is written 7,john #d3ba73    
,the hour cometh1 when you shall neither
 on this mountain1 nor in ,jerusalem1   
adore the ,father2 and the same reason  
seems to apply to other places4         
,therefore a definite place is not      
necessary for adoration4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 exterior adoration is directed
 to interior adoration4 ,but interior   
adoration is shown to ,god as existing  
everywhere4 ,therefore exterior         
adoration does not require a definite   
place4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same    

,god is adored in the ,new as in the    
,old ,testament4 ,now in the ,old       
,testament they adored towards the west1
 because the door of the ,tabernacle    
looked to the east 7,ex4 #bf3ah seqq474 
,therefore for the same reason we ought 
now to adore towards the west1 if any   
definite place be requisite for         
adoration4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
written 7,isa4 #ef3g73 ,my house shall  
be called the house of prayer1 which    
words are also quoted 7,john #b3af74  ,i
 answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71
 the chief part of adoration is the     
internal devotion of the mind1 while the
 secondary part is something external   
pertaining to bodily signs4 ,now the    
mind internally apprehends ,god as not  
comprised in a place2 while bodily signs
 must of necessity be in some definite  
place and position4 ,hence a definite   
place is required for adoration1 not    
chiefly1 as though it were essential    
thereto1 but by reason of a certain     
fittingness1 like other bodily signs4   

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by these words our    
,lord foretold the cessation of         
adoration1 both according to the rite of
 the ,jews who adored in ,jerusalem1 and
 according to the rite of the           
,samaritans who adored on ,mount        
,garizim4 ,for both these rites ceased  
with the advent of the spiritual truth  
of the ,gospel1 according to which a    
sacrifice is offered to ,god in every   
place1 as stated in ,malach4 #a3aa4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a definite place is   
chosen for adoration1 not on account of 
,god ,who is adored1 as though ,he were 
enclosed in a place1 but on account of  
the adorers2 and this for three reasons4
 ,first1 because the place is           
consecrated1 so that those who pray     
there conceive a greater devotion and   
are more likely to be heard1 as may be  
seen in the prayer of ,solomon 7#c      
,kings #h74 ,secondly1 on account of the
 sacred mysteries and other signs of    
holiness contained therein4 ,thirdly1 on
 account of the concourse of many       

adorers1 by reason of which their prayer
 is more likely to be heard1 according  
to ,matt4 #ah3bj1 ,where there are two  
or three gathered together in ,my name1 
there am ,i in the midst of them4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is a certain    
fittingness in adoring towards the east4
 ,first1 because the ,divine majesty is 
indicated in the movement of the heavens
 which is from the east4 ,secondly1     
because ,paradise was situated in the   
east according to the ,septuagint       
version of ,gen4 #b3h1 and so we signify
 our desire to return to ,paradise4     
,thirdly1 on account of ,christ ,who is 
the light of the world 99,john #h3ab2   
#i3e1 and is called the ,orient 7,zech4 
#f3ab72 ,who mounteth above the heaven  
of heavens to the east 7,ps4 #fg3cd71   
and is expected to come from the east1  
according to ,matt4 #bd3bg1 ,as         
lightning cometh out of the east1 and   
appeareth even into the west2 so shall  
also the coming of the ,son of ,man be4 
,,question #he  ,,of ,,sacrifice 7,in   

,four ,articles7  ,in due sequence we   
must consider those acts whereby        
external things are offered to ,god4    
,these give rise to a twofold           
consideration3 7#a7 ,of things given to 
,god by the faithful2 7#b7 ,of vows1    
whereby something is promised to ,him4  
,under the first head we shall consider 
sacrifices1 oblations1 first-fruits1 and
 tithes4 ,about sacrifices there are    
four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether  
offering a sacrifice to ,god is of the  
law of nature8  7#b7 ,whether sacrifice 
should be offered to ,god alone8  7#c7  
,whether the offering of a sacrifice is 
a special act of virtue8  7#d7 ,whether 
all are bound to offer sacrifice8       
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,offering a          
,sacrifice to ,god ,is of the ,law of   
,nature8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that offering a sacrifice to ,god is not
 of the natural law4 ,things that are of
 the natural law are common among all   
men4 ,yet this is not the case with     

sacrifices3 for we read of some1 e4g4   
,melchisedech 7,gen4 #ad3ah71 offering  
bread and wine in sacrifice1 and of     
certain animals being offered by some1  
and others by others4 ,therefore the    
offering of sacrifices is not of the    
natural law4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 things
 that are of the natural law were       
observed by all just men4 ,yet we do not
 read that ,isaac offered sacrifice2 nor
 that ,adam did so1 of whom nevertheless
 it is written 7,wis4 #aj3b7 that wisdom
 brought him out of his sin4 ,therefore 
the offering of sacrifice is not of the 
natural law4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #e1  
#ai7 that sacrifices are offered in     
signification of something4 ,now words  
which are chief among signs1 as he again
 says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #c71    
signify1 not by nature but by           
convention1 according to the            
,philosopher 7,peri ,herm4 i1 #b74      
,therefore sacrifices are not of the    
natural law4  ,on the contrary1 ,at all 

times and among all nations there has   
always been the offering of sacrifices4 
,now that which is observed by all is   
seemingly natural4 ,therefore the       
offering of sacrifices is of the natural
 law4  ,i answer that1 ,natural reason  
tells man that he is subject to a higher
 being1 on account of the defects which 
he perceives in himself1 and in which he
 needs help and direction from someone  
above him3 and whatever this superior   
being may be1 it is known to all under  
the name of ,god4 ,now just as in       
natural things the lower are naturally  
subject to the higher1 so too it is a   
dictate of natural reason in accordance 
with man's natural inclination that he  
should tender submission and honor1     
according to his mode1 to that which is 
above man4 ,now the mode befitting to   
man is that he should employ sensible   
signs in order to signify anything1     
because he derives his knowledge from   
sensibles4 ,hence it is a dictate of    
natural reason that man should use      

certain sensibles1 by offering them to  
,god in sign of the subjection and honor
 due to ,him1 like those who make       
certain offerings to their lord in      
recognition of his authority4 ,now this 
is what we mean by a sacrifice1 and     
consequently the offering of sacrifice  
is of the natural law4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,a4
 #b71 certain things belong generically 
to the natural law1 while their         
determination belongs to the positive   
law2 thus the natural law requires that 
evildoers should be punished2 but that  
this or that punishment should be       
inflicted on them is a matter determined
 by ,god or by man4 ,in like manner the 
offering of sacrifice belongs           
generically to the natural law1 and     
consequently all are agreed on this     
point1 but the determination of         
sacrifices is established by ,god or by 
man1 and this is the reason for their   
difference4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,adam1    
,isaac and other just men offered       

sacrifice to ,god in a manner befitting 
the times in which they lived1 according
 to ,gregory1 who says 7,moral4 iv1 #c7 
that in olden times original sin was    
remitted through the offering of        
sacrifices4 ,nor does ,scripture mention
 all the sacrifices of the just1 but    
only those that have something special  
connected with them4 ,perhaps the reason
 why we read of no sacrifice being      
offered by ,adam may be that1 as the    
origin of sin is ascribed to him1 the   
origin of sanctification ought not to be
 represented as typified in him4 ,isaac 
was a type of ,christ1 being himself    
offered in sacrifice2 and so there was  
no need that he should be represented as
 offering a sacrifice4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,it is natural to man to express his   
ideas by signs1 but the determination of
 those signs depends on man's pleasure4 
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,sacrifice ,should   
,be ,offered to ,god ,alone8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that sacrifice      

should not be offered to the most high  
,god alone4 ,since sacrifice ought to be
 offered to ,god1 it would seem that it 
ought to be offered to all such as are  
partakers of the ,godhead4 ,now holy men
 are made partakers of the ,divine      
nature1    according to #b ,pet4 #a3d2  
wherefore of them is it written 7,ps4   
#ha3f73 ,i have said1 ,you are gods3 and
 angels too are called sons of ,god1    
according to ,job #a3f4 ,thus sacrifice 
should be offered to all these4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 the greater a person is   
the greater the honor due to him from   
man4 ,now the angels and saints are far 
greater than any earthly princes3 and   
yet the subjects of the latter pay them 
much greater honor1 by prostrating      
before them1 and offering them gifts1   
than is implied by offering an animal or
 any other thing in sacrifice4 ,much    
more therefore may one offer sacrifice  
to the angels and saints4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 temples and altars are raised 
for the offering of sacrifices4 ,yet    

temples and altars are raised to angels 
and saints4 ,therefore sacrifices also  
may be offered to them4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is written 7,ex4 #bb3bj73 
,he that sacrificeth to gods shall be   
put to death1 save only to the ,lord4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4   
#a71 a sacrifice is offered in order    
that something may be represented4 ,now 
the sacrifice that is offered outwardly 
represents the inward spiritual         
sacrifice1 whereby the soul offers      
itself to ,god according to ,ps4 #ej3ai1
 ,a sacrifice to ,god is an afflicted   
spirit1 since1 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1
 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #b71 the outward  
acts of religion are directed to the    
inward acts4 ,again the soul offers     
itself in sacrifice to ,god as its      
beginning by creation1 and its end by   
beatification3 and according to the true
 faith ,god alone is the creator of our 
souls1 as stated in the ,first ,part    
7,,qq4 #ij1 ,a4 #c2 #aah1 ,a4 #b71 while
 in ,him alone the beatitude of our soul

 consists1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #a1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #b1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #c1    
,,aa4 #a1 #g1 #h74 ,wherefore just as to
 ,god alone ought we to offer spiritual 
sacrifice1 so too ought we to offer     
outward sacrifices to ,him alone3 even  
so in our prayers and praises we proffer
 significant words to ,him to ,whom in  
our hearts we offer the things which we 
designate thereby1 as ,augustine states 
7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #ai74 ,moreover we   
find that in every country the people   
are wont to show the sovereign ruler    
some special sign of honor1 and that if 
this be shown to anyone else1 it is a   
crime of high-treason4 ,therefore1 in   
the ,divine law1 the death punishment is
 assigned to those who offer ,divine    
honor to another than ,god4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,the name of the ,godhead is  
communicated to certain ones1 not       
equally with ,god1 but by participation2
 hence neither is equal honor due to    
them4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the offering of
 a sacrifice is measured not by the     

value of the animal killed1 but by its  
signification1 for it is done in honor  
of the sovereign ,ruler of the whole    
universe4 ,wherefore1 as ,augustine says
 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #ai71 the demons    
rejoice1 not in the stench of corpses1  
but in receiving divine honors4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4
 ,dei viii1 #ai71 we do not raise       
temples and priesthoods to the martyrs1 
because not they but their ,god is our  
,god4 ,wherefore the priest says not3 ,i
 offer sacrifice to thee1 ,peter or     
,paul4 ,but we give thanks to ,god for  
their triumphs1 and urge ourselves to   
imitate them4   ,,third ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
the ,offering of ,sacrifice ,is a       
,special ,act of ,virtue8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that the offering of 
sacrifice is not a special act of       
virtue4 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei 
x1 #f73 ,a true sacrifice is any work   
done that we may cleave to ,god in holy 
fellowship4 ,but not every good work is 

a special act of some definite virtue4  
,therefore the offering of sacrifice is 
not a special act of a definite virtue4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the mortification of
 the body by fasting belongs to         
abstinence1 by continence belongs to    
chastity1 by martyrdom belongs to       
fortitude4 ,now all these things seem to
 be comprised in the offering of        
sacrifice1 according to ,rom4 #ab3a1    
,present your bodies a living sacrifice4
 ,again the ,apostle says 7,heb4        
#ac3af73 ,do not forget to do good and  
to impart1 for by such sacrifices ,god's
 favor is obtained4 ,now it belongs to  
charity1 mercy and liberality to do good
 and to impart4 ,therefore the offering 
of sacrifice is not a special act of a  
definite virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a 
sacrifice is apparently anything offered
 to ,god4 ,now many things are offered  
to ,god1 such as devotion1 prayer1      
tithes1 first-fruits1 oblations1 and    
holocausts4 ,therefore sacrifice does   
not appear to be a special act of a     

definite virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,the
 law contains special precepts about    
sacrifices1 as appears from the         
beginning of ,leviticus4  ,i answer     
that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#ah1 ,,aa4 #f1 #g71 where an act of one 
virtue is directed to the end of another
 virtue it partakes somewhat of its     
species2 thus when a man thieves in     
order to commit fornication1 his theft  
assumes1 in a sense1 the deformity of   
fornication1 so that even though it were
 not a sin otherwise1 it would be a sin 
from the very fact that it was directed 
to fornication4 ,accordingly1 sacrifice 
is a special act deserving of praise in 
that it is done out of reverence for    
,god2 and for this reason it belongs to 
a definite virtue1 viz4 religion4 ,but  
it happens that the acts of the other   
virtues are directed to the reverence of
 ,god1 as when a man gives alms of his  
own things for ,god's sake1 or when a   
man subjects his own body to some       
affliction out of reverence for ,god2   

and in this way the acts also of other  
virtues may be called sacrifices4 ,on   
the other hand there are acts that are  
not deserving of praise save through    
being done out of reverence for ,god3   
such acts are properly called           
sacrifices1 and belong to the virtue of 
religion4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the very   
fact that we wish to cling to ,god in a 
spiritual fellowship pertains to        
reverence for ,god3 and consequently the
 act of any virtue assumes the character
 of a sacrifice through being done in   
order that we may cling to ,god in holy 
fellowship4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man's    
good is threefold4 ,there is first his  
soul's good which is offered to ,god in 
a certain inward sacrifice by devotion1 
prayer and other like interior acts3 and
 this is the principal sacrifice4 ,the  
second is his body's good1 which is1 so 
to speak1 offered to ,god in martyrdom1 
and abstinence or continency4 ,the third
 is the good which consists of external 
things3 and of these we offer a         

sacrifice to ,god1 directly when we     
offer our possession to ,god            
immediately1 and indirectly when we     
share them with our neighbor for ,god's 
sake4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a sacrifice1   
properly speaking1 requires that        
something be done to the thing which is 
offered to ,god1 for instance animals   
were slain and burnt1 the bread is      
broken1 eaten1 blessed4 ,the very word  
signifies this1 since sacrifice is so   
called because a man does something     
sacred 7facit sacrum74 ,on the other    
hand an oblation is properly the        
offering of something to ,god even if   
nothing be done thereto1 thus we speak  
of offering money or bread at the altar1
 and yet nothing is done to them4 ,hence
 every sacrifice is an oblation1 but not
 conversely4 ,first-fruits are          
oblations1 because they were offered to 
,god1 according to ,deut4 #bf1 but they 
are not a sacrifice1 because nothing    
sacred was done to them4 ,tithes1       
however1 are neither a sacrifice nor an 

oblation1 properly speaking1 because    
they are not offered immediately to     
,god1 but to the ministers of ,divine   
worship4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,all ,are  
,bound to ,offer ,sacrifices8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all  
are not bound to offer sacrifices4 ,the 
,apostle says 7,rom4 #c3ai73 ,what      
things soever the ,law speaketh1 it     
speaketh to them that are in the ,law4  
,now the law of sacrifices was not given
 to all1 but only to the ,hebrew people4
 ,therefore all are not bound to offer  
sacrifices4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1        
sacrifices are offered to ,god in order 
to signify something4 ,but not everyone 
is capable of understanding these       
significations4 ,therefore not all are  
bound to offer sacrifices4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 priests 99,sacerdotes3 ,those 
who give or administer sacred things    
7sacra dantes73 cf4 #a ,cor4 #d3a are so
 called because they offer sacrifice to 
,god4 ,but all are not priests4         

,therefore not all are bound to offer   
sacrifices4  ,on the contrary1 ,the     
offering of sacrifices of is of the     
natural law1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74  
,now all are bound to do that which is  
of the natural law4 ,therefore all are  
bound to offer sacrifice to ,god4  ,i   
answer that1 ,sacrifice is twofold1 as  
stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,the first and   
principal is the inward sacrifice1 which
 all are bound to offer1 since all are  
obliged to offer to ,god a devout mind4 
,the other is the outward sacrifice1 and
 this again is twofold4 ,there is a     
sacrifice which is deserving of praise  
merely through being offered to ,god in 
protestation of our subjection to ,god3 
and the obligation of offering this     
sacrifice was not the same for those    
under the ,new or the ,old ,law1 as for 
those who were not under the ,law4 ,for 
those who are under the ,law are bound  
to offer certain definite sacrifices    
according to the precepts of the ,law1  
whereas those who were not under the    

,law were bound to perform certain      
outward actions in ,god's honor1 as     
became those among whom they dwelt1 but 
not definitely to this or that action4  
,the other outward sacrifice is when the
 outward actions of the other virtues   
are performed out of reverence for ,god2
 some of which are a matter of precept2 
and to these all are bound1 while others
 are works of supererogation1 and to    
these all are not bound4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,all were not bound to offer those  
particular sacrifices which were        
prescribed in the ,law3 but they were   
bound to some sacrifices inward or      
outward1 as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,though all do not know explicitly  
the power of the sacrifices1 they know  
it implicitly1 even as they have        
implicit faith1 as stated above 7,q4 #b1
 ,,aa4 #f1 #g74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the  
priests offer those sacrifices which are
 specially directed to the ,divine      
worship1 not only for themselves but    
also for others4 ,but there are other   

sacrifices1 which anyone can offer to   
,god for himself as explained above     
7,,aa4 #b1 #c74   ,,question #hf  ,,of  
,,oblations ,,and ,,first-,,fruits 7,in 
,four ,articles7  ,we must next consider
 oblations and first-fruits4 ,under this
 head there are four points of inquiry3 
7#a7 ,whether any oblations are         
necessary as a matter of precept8  7#b7 
,to whom are oblations due8  7#c7 of    
what things they should be made8  7#d7  
,in particular1 as to first-fruits1     
whether men are bound to offer them8    
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hf1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,men ,are ,under a   
,necessity of ,precept to ,make         
,oblations8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that men are not bound by precept  
to make oblations4 ,men are not bound1  
at the time of the ,gospel1 to observe  
the ceremonial precepts of the ,old     
,law1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4     
#ajc1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,now the offering  
of oblations is one of the ceremonial   
precepts of the ,old ,law1 since it is  

written 7,ex4 #bc3ad73 ,three times     
every year you shall celebrate feasts   
with ,me1 and further on 7,ex4 #bc3ae73 
,thou shalt not appear empty before ,me4
 ,therefore men are not now under a     
necessity of precept to make oblations4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 before they are     
made1 oblations depend on man's will1 as
 appears from our ,lord's saying 7,matt4
 #e3bc71 ,if 4 4 4 thou offer thy gift  
at the altar1 as though this were left  
to the choice of the offerer3 and when  
once oblations have been made1 there is 
no way of offering them again4          
,therefore in no way is a man under a   
necessity of precept to make oblations4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if anyone is bound  
to give a certain thing to the ,church1 
and fails to give it1 he can be         
compelled to do so by being deprived of 
the ,church's sacraments4 ,but it would 
seem unlawful to refuse the sacraments  
of the ,church to those who refuse to   
make oblations according to a decree of 
the sixth council 99,can4 ,trullan1     

xxiii1 quoted ,i1 qu4 i1 can4 ,nullus3  
,let none who dispense ,holy ,communion 
exact anything of the recipient1 and if 
they exact anything let them be deposed4
 ,therefore it is not necessary that men
 should make oblations4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,gregory says 99,gregory      
,,vii2 ,concil4 ,roman4 v1 can4 xii3    
,let every ,christian take care that he 
offer something to ,god at the          
celebration of ,mass4  ,i answer that1  
,as stated above 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #c1 ad   
#c71 the term oblation is common to all 
things offered for the ,divine worship1 
so that if a thing be offered to be     
destroyed in worship of ,god1 as though 
it were being made into something holy1 
it is both an oblation and a sacrifice4 
,wherefore it is written 7,ex4 #bi3ah73 
,thou shalt offer the whole ram for a   
burnt-offering upon the altar2 it is an 
oblation to the ,lord1 a most sweet     
savor of the victim of the ,lord2 and   
7,lev4 #b3a73 ,when anyone shall offer  
an oblation of sacrifice to the ,lord1  

his offering shall be of fine flour4    
,if1 on the other hand1 it be offered   
with a view to its remaining entire and 
being deputed to the worship of ,god or 
to the use of ,his ministers1 it will be
 an oblation and not a sacrifice4       
,accordingly it is essential to         
oblations of this kind that they be     
offered voluntarily1 according to ,ex4  
#be3b1 of every man that offereth of his
 own accord you shall take them4        
,nevertheless it may happen in four ways
 that one is bound to make oblations4   
,first1 on account of a previous        
agreement3 as when a person is granted a
 portion of ,church land1 that he may   
make certain oblations at fixed times1  
although this has the character of rent4
 ,secondly1 by reason of a previous     
assignment or promise2 as when a man    
offers a gift among the living1 or by   
will bequeaths to the ,church something 
whether movable or immovable to be      
delivered at some future time4 ,thirdly1
 on account of the need of the ,church1 

for instance if her ministers were      
without means of support4 ,fourthly1 on 
account of custom2 for the faithful are 
bound at certain solemn feasts to make  
certain customary oblations4 ,in the    
last two cases1 however1 the oblation   
remains voluntary1 as regards1 to wit1  
the quantity or kind of the thing       
offered4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,under the   
,new ,law men are not bound to make     
oblations on account of legal           
solemnities1 as stated in ,exodus1 but  
on account of certain other reasons1 as 
stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some   
are bound to make oblations1 both before
 making them1 as in the first1 third1   
and fourth cases1 and after they have   
made them by assignment or promise3 for 
they are bound to offer in reality that 
which has been already offered to the   
,church by way of assignment4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,those who do not make the    
oblations they are bound to make may be 
punished by being deprived of the       
sacraments1 not by the priest himself to

 whom the oblations should be made1 lest
 he seem to exact1 something for        
bestowing the sacraments1 but by someone
 superior to him4   ,,second ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hf1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,oblations ,are ,due to ,priests ,alone8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
oblations are not due to priests alone4 
,for chief among oblations would seem to
 be those that are deputed to the       
sacrifices of victims4 ,now whatever is 
given to the poor is called a victim in 
,scripture according to ,heb4 #ac3af1   
,do not forget to do good and to impart1
 for by such victims ,douay3            
'sacrifices' ,god's favor is obtained4  
,much more therefore are oblations due  
to the poor4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in    
many parishes monks have a share in the 
oblations4 ,now the case of clerics is  
distinct from the case of monks1 as     
,jerome states 99,ep4 xiv1 ad ,heliod44 
,therefore oblations art not due to     
priests alone4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 lay 
people with the consent of the ,church  

buy oblations such as loaves and so     
forth1 and they do so for no other      
reason than that they may make use      
thereof themselves4 ,therefore oblations
 may have reference to the laity4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,a canon of ,pope ,damasus
 99,damasus ,i quoted ,x1 qu4 i 99,can4 
,hanc consuetudinem1 says3 ,none but the
 priests whom day by day we see serving 
the ,lord may eat and drink of the      
oblations which are offered within the  
precincts of the ,holy ,church3 because 
in the ,old ,testament the ,lord forbade
 the children of ,israel to eat the     
sacred loaves1 with the exception of    
,aaron and his sons 7,lev4 #bd3h1 #i74  
,i answer that1 ,the priest is appointed
 mediator and stands1 so to speak1      
between the people and ,god1 as we read 
of ,moses 7,deut4 #e3e71 wherefore it   
belongs to him to set forth the ,divine 
teachings and sacraments before the     
people2 and besides to offer to the     
,lord things appertaining to the people1
 their prayers1 for instance1 their     

sacrifices and oblations4 ,thus the     
,apostle says 7,heb4 #e3a73 ,every high 
priest taken from among men is ordained 
for men in the things that appertain to 
,god1 that he may offer up gifts and    
sacrifices for sins4 ,hence the         
oblations which the people offer to ,god
 concern the priests1 not only as       
regards their turning them to their own 
use1 but also as regards the faithful   
dispensation thereof1 by spending them  
partly on things appertaining to the    
,divine worship1 partly on things       
touching their own livelihood 7since    
they that serve the altar partake with  
the altar1 according to #a ,cor4 #i3ac71
 and partly for the good of the poor1   
who1 as far as possible1 should be      
supported from the possessions of the   
,church3 for our ,lord had a purse for  
the use of the poor1 as ,jerome observes
 on ,matt4 #ag3bf1 ,that we may not     
scandalize them4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3      
,whatever is given to the poor is not a 
sacrifice properly speaking2 yet it is  

called a sacrifice in so far as it is   
given to them for ,god's sake4 ,in like 
manner1 and for the same reason1 it can 
be called an oblation1 though not       
properly speaking1 since it is not given
 immediately to ,god4 ,oblations        
properly so called fall to the use of   
the poor1 not by the dispensation of the
 offerers1 but by the dispensation of   
the priests4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,monks or
 other religious may receive oblations  
under three counts4 ,first1 as poor1    
either by the dispensation of the       
priests1 or by ordination of the        
,church2 secondly1 through being        
ministers of the altar1 and then they   
can accept oblations that are freely    
offered2 thirdly1 if the parishes belong
 to them1 and they can accept oblations1
 having a right to them as rectors of   
the ,church4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3          
,oblations when once they are           
consecrated1 such as sacred vessels and 
vestments1 cannot be granted to the use 
of the laity3 and this is the meaning of

 the words of ,pope ,damasus4 ,but those
 which are unconsecrated may be allowed 
to the use of layfolk by permission of  
the priests1 whether by way of gift or  
by way of sale4   ,,third ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hf1 ,art4 #c  ,whether a
 ,man ,may ,make ,oblations of ,whatever
 ,he ,lawfully ,possesses8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that a man may not   
make oblations of whatever he lawfully  
possesses4 ,according to human law      
99,dig4 xii1 v1 de ,condict4 ob4 turp4  
vel iniust4 caus4 #d the whore's is a   
shameful trade in what she does but not 
in what she takes1 and consequently what
 she takes she possesses lawfully4 ,yet 
it is not lawful for her to make an     
oblation with her gains1 according to   
,deut4 #bc3ah1 ,thou shalt not offer the
 hire of a strumpet 4 4 4 in the house  
of the ,lord thy ,god4 ,therefore it is 
not lawful to make an oblation of       
whatever one possesses lawfully4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 in the same passage it is 
forbidden to offer the price of a dog in

 the house of ,god4 ,but it is evident  
that a man possesses lawfully the price 
of a dog he has lawfully sold4          
,therefore it is not lawful to make an  
oblation of whatever we possess         
lawfully4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is    
written 7,malachi #a3h73 ,if you offer  
the lame and the sick1 is it not evil8  
,yet an animal though lame or sick is a 
lawful possession4 ,therefore it would  
seem that not of every lawful possession
 may one make an oblation4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4 #c3i73 
,honor the ,lord with thy substance4    
,now whatever a man possesses lawfully  
belongs to his substance4 ,therefore he 
may make oblations of whatever he       
possesses lawfully4  ,i answer that1 ,as
 ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom4      
,serm4 cxiii71 shouldst thou plunder one
 weaker than thyself and give some of   
the spoil to the judge1 if he should    
pronounce in thy favor1 such is the     
force of justice that even thou wouldst 
not be pleased with him3 and if this    

should not please thee1 neither does it 
please thy ,god4 ,hence it is written   
7,ecclus4 #cd3ba73 ,the offering of him 
that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully  
gotten is stained4 ,therefore it is     
evident that an oblation must not be    
made of things unjustly acquired or     
possessed4 ,in the ,old ,law1 however1  
wherein the figure was predominant1     
certain things were reckoned unclean on 
account of their signification1 and it  
was forbidden to offer them4 ,but in the
 ,new ,law all ,god's creatures are     
looked upon as clean1 as stated in      
,titus #a3ae3 and consequently anything 
that is lawfully possessed1 considered  
in itself1 may be offered in oblation4  
,but it may happen accidentally that one
 may not make an oblation of what one   
possesses lawfully2 for instance if it  
be detrimental to another person1 as in 
the case of a son who offers to ,god the
 means of supporting his father 7which  
our ,lord condemns1 ,matt4 #ae3e71 or if
 it give rise to scandal or contempt1 or

 the like4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the    
,old ,law it was forbidden to make an   
offering of the hire of a strumpet on   
account of its uncleanness1 and in the  
,new ,law1 on account of scandal1 lest  
the ,church seem to favor sin if she    
accept oblations from the profits of    
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to the
 ,law1 a dog was deemed an unclean      
animal4 ,yet other unclean animals were 
redeemed and their price could be       
offered1 according to ,lev4 #bg3bg1 ,if 
it be an unclean animal1 he that        
offereth it shall redeem it4 ,but a dog 
was neither offered nor redeemed1 both  
because idolaters used dogs in          
sacrifices to their idols1 and because  
they signify robbery1 the proceeds of   
which cannot be offered in oblation4    
,however1 this prohibition ceased under 
the ,new ,law4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the   
oblation of a blind or lame animal was  
declared unlawful for three reasons4    
,first1 on account of the purpose for   
which it was offered1 wherefore it is   

written 7,malach4 #a3h73 ,if you offer  
the blind in sacrifice1 is it not evil8 
and it behooved sacrifices to be without
 blemish4 ,secondly1 on account of      
contempt1 wherefore the same text goes  
on 7,malach4 #a3ab73 ,you have profaned 
,my name1 in that you say3 ,the table of
 the ,lord is defiled and that which is 
laid thereupon is contemptible4         
,thirdly1 on account of a previous vow1 
whereby a man has bound himself to offer
 without blemish whatever he has vowed3 
hence the same text says further on     
7,malach4 #a3ad73 ,cursed is the        
deceitful man that hath in his flock a  
male1 and making a vow offereth in      
sacrifice that which is feeble to the   
,lord4 ,the same reasons avail still in 
the ,new ,law1 but when they do not     
apply the unlawfulness ceases4          
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hf1  
,art4 #d  ,whether ,men ,are ,bound to  
,pay ,first-fruits8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that men are not bound to pay
 first-fruits4 ,after giving the law of 

the first-born the text continues 7,ex4 
#ac3i73 ,it shall be as a sign in thy   
hand1 so that1 apparently1 it is a      
ceremonial precept4 ,but ceremonial     
precepts are not to be observed in the  
,new ,law4 ,neither therefore ought     
first-fruits to be paid4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 first-fruits were offered to  
the ,lord for a special favor conferred 
on that people1 wherefore it is written 
7,deut4 #bf3b1 #c73 ,thou shalt take the
 first of all thy fruits 4 4 4 and thou 
shalt go to the priest that shall be in 
those days1 and say to him3 ,i profess  
this day before the ,lord thy ,god1 that
 ,i am come into the land1 for which ,he
 swore to our fathers1 that ,he would   
give it us4 ,therefore other nations are
 not bound to pay first-fruits4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,that which one is bound to do      
should be something definite4 ,but      
neither in the ,new ,law nor in the ,old
 do we find mention of a definite amount
 of first-fruits4 ,therefore one is not 
bound of necessity to pay them4  ,on the

 contrary1 ,it is laid down 7#af1 qu4   
vii1 can4 ,decimas73 ,we confirm the    
right of priests to tithes and          
first-fruits1 and everybody must pay    
them4  ,i answer that1 ,first-fruits are
 a kind of oblation1 because they are   
offered to ,god with a certain          
profession 7,deut4 #bf72 where the same 
passage continues3 ,the priest taking   
the basket containing the first-fruits  
from the hand of him that bringeth the  
first-fruits1 shall set it before the   
altar of the ,lord thy ,god1 and further
 on 7,deut4 #bf3aj7 he is commanded to  
say3 ,therefore now ,i offer the        
first-fruits of the land1 which the     
,lord hath given me4 ,now the           
first-fruits were offered for a special 
reason1 namely1 in recognition of the   
divine favor1 as though man acknowledged
 that he had received the fruits of the 
earth from ,god1 and that he ought to   
offer something to ,god in return1      
according to #a ,paral #bi3ad1 ,we have 
given ,thee what we received of ,thy    

hand4 ,and since what we offer ,god     
ought to be something special1 hence it 
is that man was commanded to offer ,god 
his first-fruits1 as being a special    
part of the fruits of the earth3 and    
since a priest is ordained for the      
people in the things that appertain to  
,god 7,heb4 #e3a71 the first-fruits     
offered by the people were granted to   
the priest's use4 ,wherefore it is      
written 7,num4 #ah3h73 ,the ,lord said  
to ,aaron3 ,behold ,i have given thee   
the charge of ,my first-fruits4 ,now it 
is a point of natural law that man      
should make an offering in ,god's honor 
out of the things he has received from  
,god1 but that the offering should be   
made to any particular person1 or out of
 his first-fruits1 or in such or such a 
quantity1 was indeed determined in the  
,old ,law by divine command2 but in the 
,new ,law it is fixed by the declaration
 of the ,church1 in virtue of which men 
are bound to pay first-fruits according 
to the custom of their country and the  

needs of the ,church's ministers4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ceremonial        
observances were properly speaking signs
 of the future1 and consequently they   
ceased when the foreshadowed truth was  
actually present4 ,but the offering of  
first-fruits was for a sign of a past   
favor1 whence arises the duty of        
acknowledgment in accordance with the   
dictate of natural reason4 ,hence taken 
in a general sense this obligation      
remains4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,first-fruits
 were offered in the ,old ,law1 not only
 on account of the favor of the promised
 land given by ,god1 but also on account
 of the favor of the fruits of the      
earth1 which were given by ,god4 ,hence 
it is written 7,deut4 #bf3aj73 ,i offer 
the first-fruits of the land which the  
,lord hath given me1 which second motive
 is common among all people4 ,we may    
also reply that just as ,god granted the
 land of promise to the ,jews by a      
special favor1 so by a general favor ,he
 bestowed the lordship of the earth on  

the whole of mankind1 according to ,ps4 
#aac3bd1 ,the earth ,he has given to the
 children of men4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as 
,jerome says 99,comment4 in ,ezech4     
#de3ac1 #ad2 cf4 ,cap4 ,decimam1 de     
,decim4 ,primit4 et ,oblat43 ,according 
to the tradition of the ancients the    
custom arose for those who had most to  
give the priests a fortieth part1 and   
those who had least1 one sixtieth1 in   
lieu of first-fruits4 ,hence it would   
seem that first-fruits should vary      
between these limits according to the   
custom of one's country4 ,and it was    
reasonable that the amount of           
first-fruits should not be fixed by law1
 since1 as stated above1 first-fruits   
are offered by way of oblation1 a       
condition of which is that it should be 
voluntary4   ,,question #hg  ,,of       
,,tithes 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,next we
 must consider tithes1 under which head 
there are four points of inquiry3  7#a7 
,whether men are bound by precept to pay
 tithes8  7#b7 ,of what things ought    

tithes to be paid8  7#c7 ,to whom ought 
they to be paid8  7#d7 ,who ought to pay
 tithes8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,men ,are   
,bound to ,pay ,tithes ,under a         
,necessity of ,precept8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that men are not bound by
 precept to pay tithes4 ,the commandment
 to pay tithes is contained in the ,old 
,law 7,lev4 #bg3cj71 ,all tithes of the 
land1 whether of corn or of the fruits  
of trees1 are the ,lord's1 and further  
on 7,lev4 #bg3cb73 ,of all the tithes of
 oxen and sheep and goats1 that pass    
under the shepherd's rod1 every tenth   
that cometh shall be sanctified to the  
,lord4 ,this cannot be reckoned among   
the moral precepts1 because natural     
reason does not dictate that one ought  
to give a tenth part1 rather than a     
ninth or eleventh4 ,therefore it is     
either a judicial or a ceremonial       
precept4 ,now1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ajd1 ,a4 #c71   
during the time of grace men are hound  

neither to the ceremonial nor to the    
judicial precepts of the ,old ,law4     
,therefore men are not bound now to pay 
tithes4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 during the 
time of grace men are bound only to     
those things which were commanded by    
,christ through the ,apostles1 according
 to ,matt4 #bh3bj1 ,teaching them to    
observe all things whatsoever ,i have   
commanded you2 and ,paul says 7,acts    
#bj3bg73 ,i have not spared to declare  
unto you all the counsel of ,god4 ,now  
neither in the teaching of ,christ nor  
in that of the apostles is there any    
mention of the paying of tithes3 for the
 saying of our ,lord about tithes       
7,matt4 #bc3bc71 ,these things you ought
 to have done seems to refer to the past
 time of legal observance3 thus ,hilary 
says 7,super ,matth4 can4 xxiv73 ,the   
tithing of herbs1 which was useful in   
foreshadowing the future1 was not to be 
omitted4 ,therefore during the time of  
grace men are not bound to pay tithes4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 during the time of  

grace1 men are not more bound to the    
legal observances than before the ,law4 
,but before the ,law tithes were given1 
by reason not of a precept but of a vow4
 ,for we read 7,gen4 #bh3bj1 #bb7 that  
,jacob made a vow saying3 ,if ,god shall
 be with me1 and shall keep me in the   
way by which ,i walk 4 4 4 of all the   
things that ,thou shalt give to me1 ,i  
will offer tithes to ,thee4 ,neither1   
therefore1 during the time of grace are 
men bound to pay tithes4  ,obj4 #d3     
,further1 in the ,old ,law men were     
bound to pay three kinds of tithe4 ,for 
it is written 7,num4 #ah3bc1 #bd73 ,the 
sons of ,levi 4 4 4 shall 4 4 4 be      
content with the oblation of tithes1    
which ,i have separated for their uses  
and necessities4 ,again1 there were     
other tithes of which we read 7,deut4   
#ad3bb1 #bc73 ,every year thou shalt set
 aside the tithes of all thy fruits1    
that the earth bringeth forth year by   
year2 and thou shalt eat before the     
,lord thy ,god in the place which ,he   

shall choose4 ,and there were yet other 
tithes1 of which it is written 7,deut4  
#ad3bh73 ,the third year thou shalt     
separate another tithe of all things    
that grow to thee at that time1 and     
shalt lay it up within thy gates4 ,and  
the ,levite that hath no other part nor 
possession with thee1 and the stranger1 
and the fatherless1 and the widow1 that 
are within thy gates1 shall 4 4 4 eat   
and be filled4 ,now during the time of  
grace men are not bound to pay the      
second and third tithes4 ,neither       
therefore are they bound to pay the     
first4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 a debt that 
is due without any time being fixed for 
its payment1 must be paid at once under 
pain of sin4 ,accordingly if during the 
time of grace men are bound1 under      
necessity of precept1 to pay tithes in  
those countries where tithes are not    
paid1 they would all be in a state of   
mortal sin1 and so would also be the    
ministers of the ,church for            
dissembling4 ,but this seems            

unreasonable4 ,therefore during the time
 of grace men are not bound under       
necessity of precept to pay tithes4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,augustine 99,append4    
,serm4 cclxxcii1 whose words are quoted 
#af1 qu4 i 99,can4 ,decimae1 says3 ,it  
is a duty to pay tithes1 and whoever    
refuses to pay them takes what belongs  
to another4  ,i answer that1 ,in the    
,old ,law tithes were paid for the      
sustenance of the ministers of ,god4    
,hence it is written 7,malach4 #c3aj73  
,bring all the tithes into ,my ,vulg43  
'the' store-house that there may be meat
 in ,my house4 ,hence the precept about 
the paying of tithes was partly moral   
and instilled in the natural reason2 and
 partly judicial1 deriving its force    
from its divine institution4 ,because   
natural reason dictates that the people 
should administer the necessaries of    
life to those who minister the divine   
worship for the welfare of the whole    
people even as it is the people's duty  
to provide a livelihood for their rulers

 and soldiers and so forth4 ,hence the  
,apostle proves this from human custom1 
saying 7#a ,cor4 #i3g73 ,who serveth as 
a soldier at any time at his own charge8
 ,who planteth a vineyard and eateth not
 of the fruit thereof8 ,but the fixing  
of the proportion to be offered to the  
ministers of divine worship does not    
belong to the natural law1 but was      
determined by divine institution1 in    
accordance with the condition of that   
people to whom the law was being given4 
,for they were divided into twelve      
tribes1 and the twelfth tribe1 namely   
that of ,levi1 was engaged exclusively  
in the divine ministry and had no       
possessions whence to derive a          
livelihood3 and so it was becomingly    
ordained that the remaining eleven      
tribes should give one-tenth part of    
their revenues to the ,levites 99,num4  
#ah3ba that the latter might live       
respectably2 and also because some1     
through negligence1 would disregard this
 precept4 ,hence1 so far as the tenth   

part was fixed1 the precept was         
judicial1 since all institutions        
established among this people for the   
special purpose of preserving equality  
among men1 in accordance with this      
people's condition1 are called judicial 
precepts4 ,nevertheless by way of       
consequence these institutions          
foreshadowed something in the future1   
even as everything else connected with  
them1 according to #a ,cor4 #ab1 ,all   
these things happened to them in figure4
 ,in this respect they had something in 
common with the ceremonial precepts1    
which were instituted chiefly that they 
might be signs of the future4 ,hence the
 precept about paying tithes            
foreshadowed something in the future4   
,for ten is1 in a way1 the perfect      
number 7being the first numerical limit1
 since the figures do not go beyond ten 
but begin over again from one71 and     
therefore he that gave a tenth1 which is
 the sign of perfection1 reserving the  
nine other parts for himself1           

acknowledged by a sign that imperfection
 was his part1 and that the perfection  
which was to come through ,christ was to
 be hoped for from ,god4 ,yet this      
proves it to be1 not a ceremonial but a 
judicial precept1 as stated above4      
,there is this difference between the   
ceremonial and judicial precepts of the 
,law1 as we stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#ajd1 ,a4 #c71 that it is unlawful to   
observe the ceremonial precepts at the  
time of the ,new ,law1 whereas there is 
no sin in keeping the judicial precepts 
during the time of grace although they  
are not binding4 ,indeed they are bound 
to be observed by some1 if they be      
ordained by the authority of those who  
have power to make laws4 ,thus it was a 
judicial precept of the ,old ,law that  
he who stole a sheep should restore four
 sheep 7,ex4 #bb3a71 and if any king    
were to order this to be done his       
subjects would be bound to obey4 ,in    
like manner during the time of the ,new 
,law the authority of the ,church has   

established the payment of tithe2 thus  
showing a certain kindliness1 lest the  
people of the ,new ,law should give less
 to the ministers of the ,new ,testament
 than did the people of the ,old ,law to
 the ministers of the ,old ,testament2  
for the people of the ,new ,law are     
under greater obligations1 according to 
,matt4 #e3bj1 ,unless your justice      
abound more than that of the ,scribes   
and ,pharisees1 you shall not enter into
 the kingdom of heaven1 and1 moreover1  
the ministers of the ,new ,testament are
 of greater dignity than the ministers  
of the ,old ,testament1 as the ,apostle 
shows 7#b ,cor4 #c3g1 #h74  ,accordingly
 it is evident that man's obligation to 
pay tithes arises partly from natural   
law1 partly from the institution of the 
,church2 who1 nevertheless1 in          
consideration of the requirements of    
time and persons might ordain the       
payment of some other proportion4  ,this
 suffices for the ,reply to the ,first  
,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the      

precept about paying tithes1 in so far  
as it was a moral precept1 was given in 
the ,gospel by our ,lord when ,he said  
7,matt4 #aj3aj7 99,the words as quoted  
are from ,luke #aj3g3 ,matthew has      
'meat' instead of 'hire'3 ,the workman  
is worthy of his hire1 and the ,apostle 
says the same 7#a ,cor4 #i3d seqq474    
,but the fixing of the particular       
proportion is left to the ordinance of  
the ,church4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,before  
the time of the ,old ,law the ministry  
of the divine worship was not entrusted 
to any particular person2 although it is
 stated that the first-born were        
priests1 and that they received a double
 portion4 ,for this very reason no      
particular portion was directed to be   
given to the ministers of the divine    
worship3 but when they met with one1    
each man of his own accord gave him what
 he deemed right4 ,thus ,abraham by a   
kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes  
to ,melchisedech1 the priest of the     
,most ,high ,god1 according to ,gen4    

#ad3bj1 and again ,jacob made a vow to  
give tithes 99,gen4 #bh3bj1 although he 
appears to have vowed to do so1 not by  
paying them to ministers1 but for the   
purpose of the divine worship1 for      
instance for the fulfilling of          
sacrifices1 hence he said significantly3
 ,i will offer tithes to ,thee4  ,reply 
,obj4 #d3 ,the second kind of tithe1    
which was reserved for the offering of  
sacrifices1 has no place in the ,new    
,law1 since the legal victims had       
ceased4 ,but the third kind of tithe    
which they had to eat with the poor1 is 
increased in the ,new ,law1 for our     
,lord commanded us to give to the poor  
not merely the tenth part1 but all our  
surplus1 according to ,luke #aa3da3     
,that which remaineth1 give alms4       
,moreover the tithes that are given to  
the ministers of the ,church should be  
dispensed by them for the use of the    
poor4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the ministers  
of the ,church ought to be more         
solicitous for the increase of spiritual

 goods in the people1 than for the      
amassing of temporal goods3 and hence   
the ,apostle was unwilling to make use  
of the right given him by the ,lord of  
receiving his livelihood from those to  
whom he preached the ,gospel1 lest he   
should occasion a hindrance to the      
,gospel of ,christ 99#a ,cor4 #i3ab4    
,nor did they sin who did not contribute
 to his upkeep1 else the ,apostle would 
not have omitted to reprove them4 ,in   
like manner the ministers of the ,church
 rightly refrain from demanding the     
,church's tithes1 when they could not   
demand them without scandal1 on account 
of their having fallen into desuetude1  
or for some other reason4 ,nevertheless 
those who do not give tithes in places  
where the ,church does not demand them  
are not in a state of damnation1 unless 
they be obstinate1 and unwilling to pay 
even if tithes were demanded of them4   
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,men ,are ,bound to  
,pay ,tithes of ,all ,things8           

,objection #a3 ,it would seem that men  
are not bound to give tithes of all     
things4 ,the paying of tithes seems to  
be an institution of the ,old ,law4 ,now
 the ,old ,law contains no precept about
 personal tithes1 viz4 those that are   
payable on property acquired by one's   
own act1 for instance by commerce or    
soldiering4 ,therefore no man is bound  
to pay tithes on such things4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 it is not right to make      
oblations of that which is ill-gotten1  
as stated above 7,q4 #hf1 ,a4 #c74 ,now 
oblations1 being offered to ,god        
immediately1 seem to be more closely    
connected with the divine worship than  
tithes which are offered to the         
ministers4 ,therefore neither should    
tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the last chapter 
of ,leviticus 7#cj1 #cb7 the precept of 
paying tithes refers only to corn1      
fruits of trees and animals that pass   
under the shepherd's rod4 ,but man      
derives a revenue from other smaller    

things1 such as the herbs that grow in  
his garden and so forth4 ,therefore     
neither on these things is a man bound  
to pay tithes4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 man 
cannot pay except what is in his power4 
,now a man does not always remain in    
possession of all his profit from land  
and stock1 since sometimes he loses them
 by theft or robbery2 sometimes they are
 transferred to another person by sale2 
sometimes they are due to some other    
person1 thus taxes are due to princes1  
and wages due to workmen4 ,therefore one
 ought not to pay tithes on such like   
things4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is       
written 7,gen4 #bh3bb73 ,of all things  
that ,thou shalt give to me1 ,i will    
offer tithes to ,thee4  ,i answer that1 
,in judging about a thing we should look
 to its principle4 ,now the principle of
 the payment of tithes is the debt      
whereby carnal things are due to those  
who sow spiritual things1 according to  
the saying of the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4    
#i3aa71 ,if we have sown unto you       

spiritual things1 is it a great matter  
if we reap your carnal things8 thus     
implying that on the contrary it is no  
great matter if we reap your carnal     
things 99,the phrase in the brackets is 
omitted in the ,leonine edition4 ,for   
this debt is the principle on which is  
based the commandment of the ,church    
about the payment of tithes4 ,now       
whatever man possesses comes under the  
designation of carnal things4 ,therefore
 tithes must be paid on whatever one    
possesses4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in        
accordance with the condition of that   
people there was a special reason why   
the ,old ,law did not include a precept 
about personal tithes2 because1 to wit1 
all the other tribes had certain        
possessions wherewith they were able to 
provide a sufficient livelihood for the 
,levites who had no possessions1 but    
were not forbidden to make a profit out 
of other lawful occupations as the other
 ,jews did4 ,on the other hand the      
people of the ,new ,law are spread      

abroad throughout the world1 and many of
 them have no possessions1 but live by  
trade1 and these would contribute       
nothing to the support of ,god's        
ministers if they did not pay tithes on 
their trade profits4 ,moreover the      
ministers of the ,new ,law are more     
strictly forbidden to occupy themselves 
in money-making trades1 according to #b 
,tim4 #b3d1 ,no man being a soldier to  
,god1 entangleth himself with secular   
business4 ,wherefore in the ,new ,law   
men are bound to pay personal tithes1   
according to the custom of their country
 and the needs of the ministers3 hence  
,augustine1 whose words are quoted #af1 
qu4 #a1 cap4 ,decimae1 says 99,append4  
,serm4 cclxxvii3 ,tithes must be paid on
 the profits of soldiering1 trade or    
craft4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,things are    
ill-gotten in two ways4 ,first1 because 
the getting itself was unjust3 such1 for
 instance1 are things gotten by robbery1
 theft or usury3 and these a man is     
bound to restore1 and not to pay tithes 

on them4 ,if1 however1 a field be bought
 with the profits of usury1 the usurer  
is bound to pay tithes on the produce1  
because the latter is not gotten        
usuriously but given by ,god4 ,on the   
other hand certain things are said to be
 ill-gotten1 because they are gotten of 
a shameful cause1 for instance of       
whoredom or stage-playing1 and the like4
 ,such things a man is not bound to     
restore1 and consequently he is bound to
 pay tithes on them in the same way as  
other personal tithes4 ,nevertheless the
 ,church must not accept the tithe so   
long as those persons remain in sin1    
lest she appear to have a share in their
 sins3 but when they have done penance1 
tithes may be accepted from them on     
these things4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,things 
directed to an end must be judged       
according to their fittingness to the   
end4 ,now the payment of tithes is due  
not for its own sake1 but for the sake  
of the ministers1 to whose dignity it is
 unbecoming that they should demand     

minute things with careful exactitude1  
for this is reckoned sinful according to
 the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #b74     
,hence the ,old ,law did not order the  
payment of tithes on such like minute   
things1 but left it to the judgment of  
those who are willing to pay1 because   
minute things are counted as nothing4   
,wherefore the ,pharisees who claimed   
for themselves the perfect justice of   
the ,law1 paid tithes even on these     
minute things3 nor are they reproved by 
our ,lord on that account1 but only     
because they despised greater1 i4e4     
spiritual1 precepts2 and rather did ,he 
show them to be deserving of praise in  
this particular1 when ,he said 7,matt4  
#bc3bc73 ,these things you ought to have
 done1 i4e4 during the time of the ,law1
 according to ,chrysostom's 99,hom4 xliv
 in the ,opus ,imperfectum falsely      
ascribed to ,st4 ,john ,chrysostom      
commentary4 ,this also seems to denote  
fittingness rather than obligation4     
,therefore now too men are not bound to 

pay tithes on such minute things1 except
 perhaps by reason of the custom of     
one's country4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a man 
is not bound to pay tithes on what he   
has lost by theft or robbery1 before he 
recovers his property3 unless he has    
incurred the loss through his own fault 
or neglect1 because the ,church ought   
not to be the loser on that account4 ,if
 he sell wheat that has not been tithed1
 the ,church can command the tithes due 
to her1 both from the buyer who has a   
thing due to the ,church1 and from the  
seller1 because so far as he is         
concerned he has defrauded the ,church3 
yet if one pays1 the other is not bound4
 ,tithes are due on the fruits of the   
earth1 in so far as these fruits are the
 gift of ,god4 ,wherefore tithes do not 
come under a tax1 nor are they subject  
to workmen's wages4 ,hence it is not    
right to deduct one's taxes and the     
wages paid to workmen1 before paying    
tithes3 but tithes must be paid before  
anything else on one's entire produce4  

,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1   
,art4 #d  ,whether ,tithes ,should ,be  
,paid to the ,clergy8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that tithes should not be
 paid to the clergy4 ,tithes were paid  
to the ,levites in the ,old ,testament1 
because they had no portion in the      
people's possessions1 according to ,num4
 #ah3bc1 #bd4 ,but in the ,new          
,testament the clergy have possessions  
not only ecclesiastical1 but sometimes  
also patrimonial3 moreover they receive 
first-fruits1 and oblations for the     
living and the dead4 ,therefore it is   
unnecessary to pay tithes to them4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it sometimes happens
 that a man dwells in one parish1 and   
farms in another2 or a shepherd may take
 his flock within the bounds of one     
parish during one part of the year1 and 
within the bounds of another parish     
during the other part of the year2 or he
 may have his sheepfold in one parish1  
and graze the sheep in another4 ,now in 
all these and similar cases it seems    

impossible to decide to which clergy the
 tithes ought to be paid4 ,therefore it 
would seem that no fixed tithe ought to 
be paid to the clergy4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 it is the general custom in   
certain countries for the soldiers to   
hold the tithes from the ,church in fee2
 and certain religious receive tithes4  
,therefore seemingly tithes are not due 
only to those of the clergy who have    
care of souls4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is
 written 7,num4 #ah3ba73 ,i have given  
to the sons of ,levi all the tithes of  
,israel for a possession1 for the       
ministry wherewith they serve ,me in the
 ,tabernacle4 ,now the clergy are the   
successors of the sons of ,levi in the  
,new ,testament4 ,therefore tithes are  
due to the clergy alone4  ,i answer     
that1 ,two things have to be considered 
with regard to tithes3 namely1 the right
 to receive tithes1 and the things given
 in the name of tithes4 ,the right to   
receive tithes is a spiritual thing1 for
 it arises from the debt in virtue of   

which the ministers of the altar have a 
right to the expenses of their ministry1
 and temporal things are due to those   
who sow spiritual things4 ,this debt    
concerns none but the clergy who have   
care of souls1 and so they alone are    
competent to have this right4  ,on the  
other hand the things given in the name 
of tithes are material1 wherefore they  
may come to be used by anyone1 and thus 
it is that they fall into the hands of  
the laity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the    
,old ,law1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad  
#d71 special tithes were earmarked for  
the assistance of the poor4 ,but in the 
,new ,law the tithes are given to the   
clergy1 not only for their own support1 
but also that the clergy may use them in
 assisting the poor4 ,hence they are not
 unnecessary2 indeed ,church property1  
oblations and first-fruits as well as   
tithes are all necessary for this same  
purpose4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,personal    
tithes are due to the church in whose   
parish a man dwells1 while predial      

tithes seem more reasonably to belong to
 the church within whose bounds the land
 is situated4 ,the law1 however1        
prescribes that in this matter a custom 
that has obtained for a long time must  
be observed 99,cap4 ,cum sint1 and ,cap4
 ,ad apostolicae1 de ,decimis1 etc44    
,the shepherd who grazes his flock at   
different seasons in two parishes1      
should pay tithe proportionately to both
 churches4 ,and since the fruit of the  
flock is derived from the pasture1 the  
tithe of the flock is due to the church 
in whose lands the flock grazes1 rather 
than to the church on whose land the    
fold is situated4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,just as the ,church can hand over to a 
layman the things she receives under the
 title of tithe1 so too can she allow   
him to receive tithes that are yet to be
 paid1 the right of receiving being     
reserved to the ministers of the        
,church4 ,the motive may be either the  
need of the ,church1 as when tithes are 
due to certain soldiers through being   

granted to them in fee by the ,church1  
or it may be the succoring of the poor2 
thus certain tithes have been granted by
 way of alms to certain lay religious1  
or to those that have no care of souls4 
,some religious1 however1 are competent 
to receive tithes1 because they have    
care of souls4   ,,fourth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  
the ,clergy ,also ,are ,bound to ,pay   
,tithes8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that clerics also are bound to pay      
tithes4 ,by common law 99,cap4 ,cum     
homines1 de ,decimis1 etc4 the parish   
church should receive the tithes on the 
lands which are in its territory4 ,now  
it happens sometimes that the clergy    
have certain lands of their own on the  
territory of some parish church1 or that
 one church has ecclesiastical property 
on the territory of another4 ,therefore 
it would seem that the clergy are bound 
to pay predial tithes4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 some religious are clerics2   
and yet they are bound to pay tithes to 

churches on account of the lands which  
they cultivate even with their own hands
 99,cap4 ,ex parte1 and ,cap4 ,nuper44  
,therefore it would seem that the clergy
 are not immune from the payment of     
tithes4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the     
eighteenth chapter of ,numbers 7#bf1    
#bh71 it is prescribed not only that the
 ,levites should receive tithes from the
 people1 but also that they should      
themselves pay tithes to the            
high-priest4 ,therefore the clergy are  
bound to pay tithes to the ,sovereign   
,pontiff1 no less than the laity are    
bound to pay tithes to the clergy4      
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 tithes should serve 
not only for the support of the clergy1 
but also for the assistance of the poor4
 ,therefore1 if the clergy are exempt   
from paying tithes1 so too are the poor4
 ,yet the latter is not true4 ,therefore
 the former is false4  ,on the contrary1
 ,a decretal of ,pope ,paschal          
99,paschal ,,ii says3 ,it is a new form 
of exaction when the clergy demand      

tithes from the clergy 99,cap4 ,novum   
genus1 de ,decimis1 etc44  ,i answer    
that1 ,the cause of giving cannot be the
 cause of receiving1 as neither can the 
cause of action be the cause of passion2
 yet it happens that one and the same   
person is giver and receiver1 even as   
agent and patient1 on account of        
different causes and from different     
points of view4 ,now tithes are due to  
the clergy as being ministers of the    
altar and sowers of spiritual things    
among the people4 ,wherefore those      
members of the clergy as such1 i4e4 as  
having ecclesiastical property1 are not 
bound to pay tithes2 whereas from some  
other cause through holding property in 
their own right1 either by inheriting it
 from their kindred1 or by purchase1 or 
in any other similar manner1 they are   
bound to the payment of tithes4  ,hence 
the ,reply to the ,first ,objection is  
clear1 because the clergy like anyone   
else are bound to pay tithes on their   
own lands to the parish church1 even    

though they be the clergy of that same  
church1 because to possess a thing as   
one's private property is not the same  
as possessing it in common4 ,but church 
lands are not tithable1 even though they
 be within the boundaries of another    
parish4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,religious who
 are clerics1 if they have care of      
souls1 and dispense spiritual things to 
the people1 are not bound to pay tithes1
 but they may receive them4 ,another    
reason applies to other religious1 who  
though clerics do not dispense spiritual
 things to the people2 for according to 
the ordinary law they are bound to pay  
tithes1 but they are somewhat exempt by 
reason of various concessions granted by
 the ,apostolic ,see 99,cap4 ,ex        
multiplici1 ,ex parte1 and ,ad          
audientiam1 de ,decimis1 etc44  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,in the ,old ,law first-fruits
 were due to the priests1 and tithes to 
the ,levites2 and since the ,levites    
were below the priests1 the ,lord       
commanded that the former should pay the

 high-priest the tenth part of the tenth
 99,num4 #ah3bf instead of first-fruits3
 wherefore for the same reason the      
clergy are bound now to pay tithes to   
the ,sovereign ,pontiff1 if he demanded 
them4 ,for natural reason dictates that 
he who has charge of the common estate  
of a multitude should be provided with  
all goods1 so that he may be able to    
carry out whatever is necessary for the 
common welfare4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3       
,tithes should be employed for the      
assistance of the poor1 through the     
dispensation of the clergy4 ,hence the  
poor have no reason for accepting       
tithes1 but they are bound to pay them4 
,,question #hh  ,,of ,,vows 7,in ,twelve
 ,articles7  ,we must now consider vows1
 whereby something is promised to ,god4 
,under this head there are twelve points
 of inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is a vow8  7#b7
 ,what is the matter of a vow8  7#c7 ,of
 the obligation of vows2  7#d7 ,of the  
use of taking vows2  7#e7 ,of what      
virtue is it an act8  7#f7 ,whether it  

is more meritorious to do a thing from a
 vow1 than without a vow8  7#g7 ,of the 
solemnizing of a vow2  7#h7 ,whether    
those who are under another's power can 
take vows8  7#i7 ,whether children may  
be bound by vow to enter religion8      
7#aj7 ,whether a vow is subject to      
dispensation or commutation8  7#aa7     
,whether a dispensation can be granted  
in a solemn vow of continence8  7#ab7   
,whether the authority of a superior is 
required in a dispensation from a vow8  
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1   
,art4 #a  ,whether a ,vow ,consists in a
 ,mere ,purpose of the ,will8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a vow
 consists in nothing but a purpose of   
the will4 ,according to some 99,william 
of ,auxerre1 ,sum4 ,aur4 ,,iii1 xxviii1 
qu4 #a2 ,albertus ,magnus1 ,sent4 iv1   
,d1 #ch1 a vow is a conception of a good
 purpose after a firm deliberation of   
the mind1 whereby a man binds himself   
before ,god to do or not to do a certain
 thing4 ,but the conception of a good   

purpose and so forth1 may consist in a  
mere movement of the will4 ,therefore a 
vow consists in a mere purpose of the   
will4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the very word
 vow seems to be derived from voluntas  
7will71 for one is said to do a thing   
proprio voto 7by one's own vow7 when one
 does it voluntarily4 ,now to purpose is
 an act of the will1 while to promise is
 an act of the reason4 ,therefore a vow 
consists in a mere act of the will4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 our ,lord said      
7,luke #i3fb73 ,no man putting his hand 
to the plough1 and looking back1 is fit 
for the kingdom of ,god4 ,now from the  
very fact that a man has a purpose of   
doing good1 he puts his hand to the     
plough4 ,consequently1 if he look back  
by desisting from his good purpose1 he  
is not fit for the kingdom of ,god4     
,therefore by a mere good purpose a man 
is bound before ,god1 even without      
making a promise2 and consequently it   
would seem that a vow consists in a mere
 purpose of the will4  ,on the contrary1

 ,it is written 7,eccles4 #e3c73 ,if    
thou hast vowed anything to ,god1 defer 
not to pay it1 for an unfaithful and    
foolish promise displeaseth ,him4       
,therefore to vow is to promise1 and a  
vow is a promise4  ,i answer that1 ,a   
vow denotes a binding to do or omit some
 particular thing4 ,now one man binds   
himself to another by means of a        
promise1 which is an act of the reason  
to which faculty it belongs to direct4  
,for just as a man by commanding or     
praying1 directs1 in a fashion1 what    
others are to do for him1 so by         
promising he directs what he himself is 
to do for another4 ,now a promise       
between man and man can only be         
expressed in words or any other outward 
signs2 whereas a promise can be made to 
,god by the mere inward thought1 since  
according to #a ,kings #af3g1 ,man seeth
 those things that appear1 but the ,lord
 beholdeth the heart4 ,yet we express   
words outwardly sometimes1 either to    
arouse ourselves1 as was stated above   

with regard to prayer 7,q4 #hc1 ,a4     
#ab71 or to call others to witness1 so  
that one may refrain from breaking the  
vow1 not only through fear of ,god1 but 
also through respect of men4 ,now a     
promise is the outcome from a purpose of
 doing something3 and a purpose         
presupposes deliberation1 since it is   
the act of a deliberate will4           
,accordingly three things are essential 
to a vow3 the first is deliberation2 the
 second is a purpose of the will2 and   
the third is a promise1 wherein is      
completed the nature of a vow4          
,sometimes1 however1 two other things   
are added as a sort of confirmation of  
the vow1 namely1 pronouncement by word  
of mouth1 according to ,ps4 #fe3ac1 ,i  
will pay ,thee my vows which my lips    
have uttered2 and the witnessing of     
others4 ,hence the ,master says 7,sent4 
iv1 ,d1 #ch7 that a vow is the          
witnessing of a spontaneous promise and 
ought to be made to ,god and about      
things relating to ,god3 although the   

witnessing may strictly refer to the    
inward protestation4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,the conceiving of a good purpose is not
 confirmed by the deliberation of the   
mind1 unless the deliberation lead to a 
promise4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man's will  
moves the reason to promise something   
relating to things subject to his will1 
and a vow takes its name from the will  
forasmuch as it proceeds from the will  
as first mover4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he   
that puts his hand to the plough does   
something already2 while he that merely 
purposes to do something does nothing so
 far4 ,when1 however1 he promises1 he   
already sets about doing1 although he   
does not yet fulfil his promise3 even   
so1 he that puts his hand to the plough 
does not plough yet1 nevertheless he    
stretches out his hand for the purpose  
of ploughing4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #b  ,whether a
 ,vow ,should ,always ,be ,about a      
,better ,good8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that a vow need not be always     

about a better good4 ,a greater good is 
one that pertains to supererogation4    
,but vows are not only about matters of 
supererogation1 but also about matters  
of salvation3 thus in ,baptism men vow  
to renounce the devil and his pomps1 and
 to keep the faith1 as a gloss observes 
on ,ps4 #ge3ab1 ,vow ye1 and pay to the 
,lord your ,god2 and ,jacob vowed 7,gen4
 #bh3ba7 that the ,lord should be his   
,god4 ,now this above all is necessary  
for salvation4 ,therefore vows are not  
only about a better good4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 ,jephte is included among the 
saints 7,heb4 #aa3cb74 ,yet he killed   
his innocent daughter on account of his 
vow 7,judges #aa74 ,since1 then1 the    
slaying of an innocent person is not a  
better good1 but is in itself unlawful1 
it seems that a vow may be made not only
 about a better good1 but also about    
something unlawful4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 things that tend to be harmful to the  
person1 or that are quite useless1 do   
not come under the head of a better     

good4 ,yet sometimes vows are made about
 immoderate vigils or fasts which tend  
to injure the person3 and sometimes vows
 are about indifferent matters and such 
as are useful to no purpose4 ,therefore 
a vow is not always about a better good4
  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written      
7,deut4 #bc3bb73 ,if thou wilt not      
promise thou shalt be without sin4  ,i  
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 
a vow is a promise made to ,god4 ,now a 
promise is about something that one does
 voluntarily for someone else3 since it 
would be not a promise but a threat to  
say that one would do something against 
someone4 ,in like manner it would be    
futile to promise anyone something      
unacceptable to him4 ,wherefore1 as     
every sin is against ,god1 and since no 
work is acceptable to ,god unless it be 
virtuous1 it follows that nothing       
unlawful or indifferent1 but only some  
act of virtue1 should be the matter of a
 vow4 ,but as a vow denotes a voluntary 
promise1 while necessity excludes       

voluntariness1 whatever is absolutely   
necessary1 whether to be or not to be1  
can nowise be the matter of a vow4 ,for 
it would be foolish to vow that one     
would die or that one would not fly4    
,on the other hand1 if a thing be       
necessary1 not absolutely but on the    
supposition of an end--for instance if  
salvation be unattainable without it--it
 may be the matter of a vow in so far as
 it is done voluntarily1 but not in so  
far as there is a necessity for doing   
it4 ,but that which is not necessary1   
neither absolutely1 nor on the          
supposition of an end1 is altogether    
voluntary1 and therefore is most        
properly the matter of a vow4 ,and this 
is said to be a greater good in         
comparison with that which is           
universally necessary for salvation4    
,therefore1 properly speaking1 a vow is 
said to be about a better good4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,renouncing the devil's pomps 
and keeping the faith of ,christ are the
 matter of baptismal vows1 in so far as 

these things are done voluntarily1      
although they are necessary for         
salvation4 ,the same answer applies to  
,jacob's vow3 although it may also be   
explained that ,jacob vowed that he     
would have the ,lord for his ,god1 by   
giving ,him a special form of worship to
 which he was not bound1 for instance by
 offering tithes and so forth as        
mentioned further on in the same        
passage4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,certain     
things are good1 whatever be their      
result2 such are acts of virtue1 and    
these can be1 absolutely speaking1 the  
matter of a vow3 some are evil1 whatever
 their result may be2 as those things   
which are sins in themselves1 and these 
can nowise be the matter of a vow3 while
 some1 considered in themselves1 are    
good1 and as such may be the matter of a
 vow1 yet they may have an evil result1 
in which case the vow must not be kept4 
,it was thus with the vow of ,jephte1   
who as related in ,judges #aa3cj1 #ca1  
made a vow to the ,lord1 saying3 ,if    

,thou wilt deliver the children of      
,ammon into my hands1 whosoever shall   
first come forth out of the doors of my 
house1 and shall meet me when ,i return 
in peace 4 4 4 the same will ,i offer a 
holocaust to the ,lord4 ,for this could 
have an evil result if1 as indeed       
happened1 he were to be met by some     
animal which it would be unlawful to    
sacrifice1 such as an ass or a human    
being4 ,hence ,jerome says 99,implicitly
 #a ,contra ,jovin43 ,comment4 in       
,micheam vi1 viii3 ,comment4 in ,jerem4 
vii4 ,the quotation is from ,peter      
,comestor1 ,hist4 ,scholast43 ,in vowing
 he was foolish1 through lack of        
discretion1 and in keeping his vow he   
was wicked4 ,yet it is premised 7,judges
 #aa3bi7 that the ,spirit of the ,lord  
came upon him1 because his faith and    
devotion1 which moved him to make that  
vow1 were from the ,holy ,ghost2 and for
 this reason he is reckoned among the   
saints1 as also by reason of the victory
 which he obtained1 and because it is   

probable that he repented of his sinful 
deed1 which nevertheless foreshadowed   
something good4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the  
mortification of one's own body1 for    
instance by vigils and fasting1 is not  
acceptable to ,god except in so far as  
it is an act of virtue2 and this depends
 on its being done with due discretion1 
namely1 that concupiscence be curbed    
without overburdening nature4 ,on this  
condition such things may be the matter 
of a vow4 ,hence the ,apostle after     
saying 7,rom4 #ab3a71 ,present your     
bodies a living sacrifice1 holy1        
pleasing to ,god1 adds1 your reasonable 
service4 ,since1 however1 man is easily 
mistaken in judging of matters          
concerning himself1 such vows as these  
are more fittingly kept or disregarded  
according to the judgment of a superior1
 yet so that1 should a man find that    
without doubt he is seriously burdened  
by keeping such a vow1 and should he be 
unable to appeal to his superior1 he    
ought not to keep it4 ,as to vows about 

vain and useless things they should be  
ridiculed rather than kept4   ,,third   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,all ,vows ,are ,binding8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that vows 
are not all binding4 ,for man needs     
things that are done by another1 more   
than ,god does1 since ,he has no need   
for our goods 7,ps4 #ae3b74 ,now        
according to the prescription of human  
laws 99,dig4 ,l4 xii1 de pollicitat41 i 
a simple promise made to a man is not   
binding2 and this seems to be prescribed
 on account of the changeableness of the
 human will4 ,much less binding         
therefore is a simple promise made to   
,god1 which we call a vow4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 no one is bound to do what is 
impossible4 ,now sometimes that which a 
man has vowed becomes impossible to him1
 either because it depends on another's 
decision1 as when1 for instance1 a man  
vows to enter a monastery1 the monks of 
which refuse to receive him3 or on      
account of some defect arising1 for     

instance when a woman vows virginity1   
and afterwards is deflowered2 or when a 
man vows to give a sum of money1 and    
afterwards loses it4 ,therefore a vow is
 not always binding4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 if a man is bound to pay      
something1 he must do so at once4 ,but a
 man is not bound to pay his vow at     
once1 especially if it be taken under a 
condition to be fulfilled in the future4
 ,therefore a vow is not always binding4
  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written      
7,eccles4 #e3c1 #d73 ,whatsoever thou   
hast vowed1 pay it2 and it is much      
better not to vow1 than after a vow not 
to perform the things promised4  ,i     
answer that1 ,for one to be accounted   
faithful one must keep one's promises4  
,wherefore1 according to ,augustine     
99,ep4 xxxii1 #b3 ,de ,mendac4 xx faith 
takes its name from a man's deed        
agreeing with his word 99,fides 4 4 4   
fiunt dicta4 ,cicero gives the same     
etymology 7,de ,offic4 i1 #g74 ,now man 
ought to be faithful to ,god above all1 

both on account of ,god's sovereignty1  
and on account of the favors he has     
received from ,god4 ,hence man is       
obliged before all to fulfill the vows  
he has made to ,god1 since this is part 
of the fidelity he owes to ,god4 ,on the
 other hand1 the breaking of a vow is a 
kind of infidelity4 ,wherefore ,solomon 
gives the reason why vows should be paid
 to ,god1 because an unfaithful 4 4 4   
promise displeaseth ,him 99,eccles4     
#e3c4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,honesty demands
 that a man should keep any promise he  
makes to another man1 and this          
obligation is based on the natural law4 
,but for a man to be under a civil      
obligation through a promise he has     
made1 other conditions are requisite4   
,and although ,god needs not our goods1 
we are under a very great obligation to 
,him3 so that a vow made to ,him is most
 binding4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if that    
which a man has vowed becomes impossible
 to him through any cause whatsoever1 he
 must do what he can1 so that he have at

 least a will ready to do what he can4  
,hence if a man has vowed to enter a    
monastery1 he must endeavor to the best 
of his power to be received there4 ,and 
if his intention was chiefly to bind    
himself to enter the religious life1 so 
that1 in consequence1 he chose this     
particular form of religious life1 or   
this place1 as being most agreeable to  
him1 he is bound1 should he be unable to
 be received there1 to enter the        
religious life elsewhere4 ,but if his   
principal intention is to bind himself  
to this particular kind of religious    
life1 or to this particular place1      
because the one or the other pleases him
 in some special way1 he is not bound to
 enter another religious house1 if they 
are unwilling to receive him into this  
particular one4 ,on the other hand1 if  
he be rendered incapable of fulfilling  
his vow through his own fault1 he is    
bound over and above to do penance for  
his past fault3 thus if a woman has     
vowed virginity and is afterwards       

violated1 she is bound not only to      
observe what is in her power1 namely1   
perpetual continency1 but also to repent
 of what she has lost by sinning4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the obligation of a   
vow is caused by our own will and       
intention1 wherefore it is written      
7,deut4 #bc3bc73 ,that which is once    
gone out of thy lips1 thou shalt        
observe1 and shalt do as thou hast      
promised to the ,lord thy ,god1 and hast
 spoken with thy own will and with thy  
own mouth4 ,wherefore if in taking a    
vow1 it is one's intention and will to  
bind oneself to fulfil it at once1 one  
is bound to fulfil it immediately4 ,but 
if one intend to fulfil it at a certain 
time1 or under a certain condition1 one 
is not bound to immediate fulfilment4   
,and yet one ought not to delay longer  
than one intended to bind oneself1 for  
it is written 7,deut4 #bc3ba73 ,when    
thou hast made a vow to the ,lord thy   
,god thou shalt not delay to pay it3    
because the ,lord thy ,god will require 

it2 and if thou delay1 it shall be      
imputed to thee for a sin4   ,,fourth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,it ,is ,expedient to ,take    
,vows8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that it is not expedient to take vows4  
,it is not expedient to anyone to       
deprive himself of the good that ,god   
has given him4 ,now one of the greatest 
goods that ,god has given man is liberty
 whereof he seems to be deprived by the 
necessity implicated in a vow4          
,therefore it would seem inexpedient for
 man to take vows4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
no one should expose himself to danger4 
,but whoever takes a vow exposes himself
 to danger1 since that which1 before    
taking a vow1 he could omit without     
danger1 becomes a source of danger to   
him if he should not fulfil it after    
taking the vow4 ,hence ,augustine says  
7,ep4 cxxvii1 ad ,arment4 et ,paulin473 
,since thou hast vowed1 thou hast bound 
thyself1 thou canst not do otherwise4   
,if thou dost not what thou hast vowed  

thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have   
been hadst thou not vowed4 ,for then    
thou wouldst have been less great1 not  
less good3 whereas now if thou breakest 
faith with ,god 7which ,god forbid7 thou
 art the more unhappy1 as thou wouldst  
have been happier1 hadst thou kept thy  
vow4 ,therefore it is not expedient to  
take vows4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the     
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #d3af73 ,be ye  
followers of me1 as ,i also am of       
,christ4 ,but we do not read that either
 ,christ or the ,apostles took any vows4
 ,therefore it would seem inexpedient to
 take vows4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
written 7,ps4 #ge3ab73 ,vow ye and pay  
to the ,lord your ,god4  ,i answer that1
 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 a vow 
is a promise made to ,god4 ,now one     
makes a promise to a man under one      
aspect1 and to ,god under another4      
,because we promise something to a man  
for his own profit2 since it profits him
 that we should be of service to him1   
and that we should at first assure him  

of the future fulfilment of that        
service3 whereas we make promises to    
,god not for ,his but for our own       
profit4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,ep4    
cxxvii1 ad ,arment4 et ,paulin473 ,he is
 a kind and not a needy exactor1 for he 
does not grow rich on our payments1 but 
makes those who pay ,him grow rich in   
,him4 ,and just as what we give ,god is 
useful not to ,him but to us1 since what
 is given ,him is added to the giver1 as
 ,augustine says 7,ep4 cxxvii1 ad       
,arment4 et ,paulin471 so also a promise
 whereby we vow something to ,god1 does 
not conduce to ,his profit1 nor does ,he
 need to be assured by us1 but it       
conduces to our profit1 in so far as by 
vowing we fix our wills immovably on    
that which it is expedient to do4 ,hence
 it is expedient to take vows4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,even as one's liberty is not 
lessened by one being unable to sin1 so1
 too1 the necessity resulting from a    
will firmly fixed to good does not      
lessen the liberty1 as instanced in ,god

 and the blessed4 ,such is the necessity
 implied by a vow1 bearing a certain    
resemblance to the confirmation of the  
blessed4 ,hence1 ,augustine says 7,ep4  
cxxvii1 ad ,arment4 et ,paulin47 that   
happy is the necessity that compels us  
to do the better things4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,when danger arises from the deed   
itself1 this deed is not expedient1 for 
instance that one cross a river by a    
tottering bridge3 but if the danger     
arise through man's failure in the deed1
 the latter does not cease to be        
expedient3 thus it is expedient to mount
 on horseback1 though there be the      
danger of a fall from the horse3 else it
 would behoove one to desist from all   
good things1 that may become dangerous  
accidentally4 ,wherefore it is written  
7,eccles4 #aa3d73 ,he that observeth the
 wind shall not sow1 and he that        
considereth the clouds shall never reap4
 ,now a man incurs danger1 not from the 
vow itself1 but from his fault1 when he 
changes his mind by breaking his vow4   

,hence1 ,augustine says 7,ep4 cxxvii1 ad
 ,arment4 et ,paulin473 ,repent not of  
thy vow3 thou shouldst rather rejoice   
that thou canst no longer do what thou  
mightest lawfully have done to thy      
detriment4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it was    
incompetent for ,christ1 by ,his very   
nature1 to take a vow1 both because ,he 
was ,god1 and because1 as man1 ,his will
 was firmly fixed on the good1 since ,he
 was a comprehensor4 ,by a kind of      
similitude1 however1 ,he is represented 
as saying 7,ps4 #ba3bf73 ,i will pay my 
vows in the sight of them that fear     
,him1 when ,he is speaking of ,his body1
 which is the ,church4  ,the apostles   
are understood to have vowed things     
pertaining to the state of perfection   
when they left all things and followed  
,christ4   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #e  ,whether a ,vow ,is  
an ,act of ,latria or ,religion8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a vow
 is not an act of latria or religion4   
,every act of virtue is matter for a    

vow4 ,now it would seem to pertain to   
the same virtue to promise a thing and  
to do it4 ,therefore a vow pertains to  
any virtue and not to religion          
especially4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1        
according to ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ii1   
#ec7 it belongs to religion to offer    
,god worship and ceremonial rites4 ,but 
he who takes a vow does not yet offer   
something to ,god1 but only promises it4
 ,therefore1 a vow is not an act of     
religion4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 religious
 worship should be offered to none but  
,god4 ,but a vow is made not only to    
,god1 but also to the saints and to     
one's superiors1 to whom religious vow  
obedience when they make their          
profession4 ,therefore1 a vow is not an 
act of religion4  ,on the contrary1 ,it 
is written 7,isa4 #ai3ba73 7,the        
,egyptians7 shall worship ,him with     
sacrifices and offerings and they shall 
make vows to the ,lord1 and perform     
them4 ,now1 the worship of ,god is      
properly the act of religion or latria4 

,therefore1 a vow is an act of latria or
 religion4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated  
above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a71 every   
act of virtue belongs to religion or    
latria by way of command1 in so far as  
it is directed to the reverence of ,god 
which is the proper end of latria4 ,now 
the direction of other actions to their 
end belongs to the commanding virtue1   
not to those which are commanded4       
,therefore the direction of the acts of 
any virtue to the service of ,god is the
 proper act of latria4  ,now1 it is     
evident from what has been said above   
7,,aa4 #a1 #b7 that a vow is a promise  
made to ,god1 and that a promise is     
nothing else than a directing of the    
thing promised to the person to whom the
 promise is made4 ,hence a vow is a     
directing of the thing vowed to the     
worship or service of ,god4 ,and thus it
 is clear that to take a vow is properly
 an act of latria or religion4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,the matter of a vow is       
sometimes the act of another virtue1 as1

 for instance1 keeping the fast or      
observing continency2 while sometimes it
 is an act of religion1 as offering a   
sacrifice or praying4 ,but promising    
either of them to ,god belongs to       
religion1 for the reason given above4   
,hence it is evident that some vows     
belong to religion by reason only of the
 promise made to ,god1 which is the     
essence of a vow1 while others belong   
thereto by reason also of the thing     
promised1 which is the matter of the    
vow4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he who promises 
something gives it already in as far as 
he binds himself to give it3 even as a  
thing is said to be made when its cause 
is made1 because the effect is contained
 virtually in its cause4 ,this is why we
 thank not only a giver1 but also one   
who promises to give4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,a vow is made to ,god alone1 whereas a 
promise may be made to a man also3 and  
this very promise of good1 which is made
 to a man1 may be the matter of a vow1  
and in so far as it is a virtuous act4  

,this is how we are to understand vows  
whereby we vow something to the saints  
or to one's superiors3 so that the      
promise made to the saints or to one's  
superiors is the matter of the vow1 in  
so far as one vows to ,god to fulfil    
what one has promised to the saints or  
one's superiors4   ,,sixth ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,it ,is ,more ,praiseworthy and         
,meritorious to ,do ,something in       
,fulfilment of a ,vow1 ,than ,without a 
,vow8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that it is more praiseworthy and        
meritorious to do a thing without a vow 
than in fulfilment of a vow4 ,prosper   
says 7,de ,vita ,contempl4 ii73 ,we     
should abstain or fast without putting  
ourselves under the necessity of        
fasting1 lest that which we are free to 
do be done without devotion and         
unwillingly4 ,now he who vows to fast   
puts himself under the necessity of     
fasting4 ,therefore it would be better  
for him to fast without taking the vow4 

,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says   
7#b ,cor4 #i3g73 ,everyone as he hath   
determined in his heart1 not with       
sadness1 or of necessity3 for ,god      
loveth a cheerful giver4 ,now some      
fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed3
 and this seems to be due to the        
necessity arising from the vow1 for     
necessity is a cause of sorrow according
 to ,metaph4 v 99,ed4 ,did4 iv1 #e4     
,therefore1 it is better to do something
 without a vow1 than in fulfilment of a 
vow4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a vow is      
necessary for the purpose of fixing the 
will on that which is vowed1 as stated  
above 7,a4 #d74 ,but the will cannot be 
more fixed on a thing than when it      
actually does that thing4 ,therefore it 
is no better to do a thing in fulfilment
 of a vow than without a vow4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,a gloss on the words of ,ps4 
#ge3ab1 ,vow ye and pay1    says3 ,vows 
are counseled to the will4 ,but a       
counsel is about none but a better good4
 ,therefore it is better to do a deed in

 fulfilment of a vow than without a vow3
 since he that does it without a vow    
fulfils only one counsel1 viz4 the      
counsel to do it1 whereas he that does  
it with a vow1 fulfils two counsels1    
viz4 the counsel to vow and the counsel 
to do it4  ,i answer that1 ,for three   
reasons it is better and more           
meritorious to do one and the same deed 
with a vow than without4 ,first1 because
 to vow1 as stated above 7,a4 #e7 is an 
act of religion which is the chief of   
the moral virtues4 ,now the more        
excellent the virtue the better and more
 meritorious the deed4 ,wherefore the   
act of an inferior virtue is the better 
and more meritorious for being commanded
 by a superior virtue1 whose act it     
becomes through being commanded by it1  
just as the act of faith or hope is     
better if it be commanded by charity4   
,hence the works of the other moral     
virtues 7for instance1 fasting1 which is
 an act of abstinence2 and being        
continent1 which is an act of chastity7 

are better and more meritorious1 if they
 be done in fulfilment of a vow1 since  
thus they belong to the divine worship1 
being like sacrifices to ,god4          
,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,virg4  
viii7 that not even is virginity        
honorable as such1 but only when it is  
consecrated to ,god1 and cherished by   
godly continence4  ,secondly1 because he
 that vows something and does it1       
subjects himself to ,god more than he   
that only does it2 for he subjects      
himself to ,god not only as to the act1 
but also as to the power1 since in      
future he cannot do something else4     
,even so he gives more who gives the    
tree with its fruit1 than he that gives 
the fruit only1 as ,anselm 99,eadmer    
observes 7,de ,simil4 viii74 ,for this  
reason1 we thank even those who promise1
 as stated above 7,a4 #e1 ad #b74       
,thirdly1 because a vow fixes the will  
on the good immovably and to do anything
 of a will that is fixed on the good    
belongs to the perfection of virtue1    

according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
ii1 #d71 just as to sin with an         
obstinate mind aggravates the sin1 and  
is called a sin against the ,holy       
,ghost1 as stated above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4   
#b74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passage     
quoted should be understood as referring
 to necessity of coercion which causes  
an act to be involuntary and excludes   
devotion4 ,hence he says pointedly3     
,lest that which we are free to do be   
done without devotion and unwillingly4  
,on the other hand the necessity        
resulting from a vow is caused by the   
immobility of the will1 wherefore it    
strengthens the will and increases      
devotion4 ,hence the argument does not  
conclude4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according  
to the ,philosopher1 necessity of       
coercion1 in so far as it is opposed to 
the will1 causes sorrow4 ,but the       
necessity resulting from a vow1 in those
 who are well disposed1 in so far as it 
strengthens the will1 causes not sorrow 
but joy4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,ep4 ad

 ,arment4 et ,paulin4 cxxcii73 ,repent  
not of thy vow3 thou shouldst rather    
rejoice that thou canst no longer do    
what thou mightest lawfully have done to
 thy detriment4 ,if1 however1 the very  
deed1 considered in itself1 were to     
become disagreeable and involuntary     
after one has taken the vow1 the will to
 fulfil it remaining withal1 it is still
 more meritorious than if it were done  
without the vow1 since the fulfilment of
 a vow is an act of religion which is a 
greater virtue than abstinence1 of which
 fasting is an act4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,he who does something without having   
vowed it has an immovable will as       
regards the individual deed which he    
does and at the time when he does it2   
but his will does not remain altogether 
fixed for the time to come1 as does the 
will of one who makes a vow3 for the    
latter has bound his will to do         
something1 both before he did that      
particular deed1 and perchance to do it 
many times4   ,,seventh ,,article       

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #g  ,whether a
 ,vow ,is ,solemnized by the ,reception 
of ,holy ,orders1 and by the ,profession
 of a ,certain ,rule8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that a vow is not        
solemnized by the reception of holy     
orders and by the profession of a       
certain rule4 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71
 a vow is a promise made to ,god4 ,now  
external actions pertaining to solemnity
 seem to be directed1 not to ,god1 but  
to men4 ,therefore they are related to  
vows accidentally3 and consequently a   
solemnization of this kind is not a     
proper circumstance of a vow4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 whatever belongs to the      
condition of a thing1 would seem to be  
applicable to all in which that thing is
 found4 ,now many things may be the     
subject of a vow1 which have no         
connection either with holy orders1 or  
to any particular rule3 as when a man   
vows a pilgrimage1 or something of the  
kind4 ,therefore the solemnization that 
takes place in the reception of holy    

orders or in the profession of a certain
 rule does not belong to the condition  
of a vow4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a solemn 
vow seems to be the same as a public    
vow4 ,now many other vows may be made in
 public besides that which is pronounced
 in receiving holy orders or in         
professing a certain rule2 which latter1
 moreover1 may be made in private4      
,therefore not only these vows are      
solemn4  ,on the contrary1 ,these vows  
alone are an impediment to the contract 
of marriage1 and annul marriage if it be
 contracted1 which is the effect of a   
solemn vow1 as we shall state further on
 in the ,third ,part of this work       
99,suppl41 ,q4 #ec1 ,a4 #b4  ,i answer  
that1 ,the manner in which a thing is   
solemnized depends on its nature        
7conditio73 thus when a man takes up    
arms he solemnizes the fact in one way1 
namely1 with a certain display of horses
 and arms and a concourse of soldiers1  
while a marriage is solemnized in       
another way1 namely1 the array of the   

bridegroom and bride and the gathering  
of their kindred4 ,now a vow is a       
promise made to ,god3 wherefore1 the    
solemnization of a vow consists in      
something spiritual pertaining to ,god2 
i4e4 in some spiritual blessing or      
consecration which1 in accordance with  
the institution of the apostles1 is     
given when a man makes profession of    
observing a certain rule1 in the second 
degree after the reception of holy      
orders1 as ,dionysius states 7,eccl4    
,hier4 vi74 ,the reason of this is that 
solemnization is not wont to be         
employed1 save when a man gives himself 
up entirely to some particular thing4   
,for the nuptial solemnization takes    
place only when the marriage is         
celebrated1 and when the bride and      
bridegroom mutually deliver the power   
over their bodies to one another4 ,in   
like manner a vow is solemnized when a  
man devotes himself to the divine       
ministry by receiving holy orders1 or   
embraces the state of perfection by     

renouncing the world and his own will by
 the profession of a certain rule4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this kind of          
solemnization regards not only men but  
also ,god in so far as it is accompanied
 by a spiritual consecration or         
blessing1 of which ,god is the author1  
though man is the minister1 according to
 ,num4 #f3bg1 ,they shall invoke ,my    
name upon the children of ,israel1 and  
,i will bless them4 ,hence a solemn vow 
is more binding with ,god than a simple 
vow1 and he who breaks a solemn vow sins
 more grievously4 ,when it is said that 
a simple vow is no less binding than a  
solemn vow1 this refers to the fact that
 the transgressor of either commits a   
mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not
 customary to solemnize particular acts1
 but the embracing of a new state1 as we
 have said above4 ,hence when a man vows
 particular deeds1 such as a pilgrimage1
 or some special fast1 such a vow is not
 competent to be solemnized1 but only   
such as the vow whereby a man entirely  

devotes himself to the divine ministry  
or service3 and yet many particular     
works are included under this vow as    
under a universal4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,through being pronounced in public vows
 may have a certain human solemnity1 but
 not a spiritual and divine solemnity1  
as the aforesaid vows have1 even when   
they are pronounced before a few        
persons4 ,hence the publicity of a vow  
differs from its solemnization4         
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1  
,art4 #h  ,whether ,those ,who ,are     
,subject to ,another's ,power ,are      
,hindered from ,taking ,vows8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that those
 who are subject to another's power are 
not hindered from taking vows4 ,the     
lesser bond is surpassed by the greater4
 ,now the obligation of one man subject 
to another is a lesser bond than a vow  
whereby one is under an obligation to   
,god4 ,therefore those who are subject  
to another's power are not hindered from
 taking vows4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      

children are under their parents' power4
 ,yet children may make religious       
profession even without the consent of  
their parents4 ,therefore one is not    
hindered from taking vows1 through being
 subject to another's power4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 to do is more than to promise4
 ,but religious who are under the power 
of their superiors can do certain things
 such as to say some psalms1 or abstain 
from certain things4 ,much more         
therefore seemingly can they promise    
such things to ,god by means of vows4   
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whoever does what he
 cannot do lawfully sins4 ,but subjects 
do not sin by taking vows1 since nowhere
 do we find this forbidden4 ,therefore  
it would seem that they can lawfully    
take vows4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
commanded 7,num4 #cj3d-f7 that if a     
woman vow any thing 4 4 4 being in her  
father's house1 and yet but a girl in   
age1 she is not bound by the vow1 unless
 her father consent3 and the same is    
said there 7,num4 #cj3g-i7 of the woman 

that has a husband4 ,therefore in like  
manner other persons that are subject to
 another's power cannot bind themselves 
by vow4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,a4 #a71 a vow is a promise made 
to ,god4 ,now no man can firmly bind    
himself by a promise to do what is in   
another's power1 but only to that which 
is entirely in his own power4 ,now      
whoever is subject to another1 as to the
 matter wherein he is subject to him1 it
 does not lie in his power to do as he  
will1 but it depends on the will of the 
other4 ,and therefore without the       
consent of his superior he cannot bind  
himself firmly by a vow in those matters
 wherein he is subject to another4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing but what is   
virtuous can be the subject of a promise
 made to ,god1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74
 ,now it is contrary to virtue for a man
 to offer to ,god that which belongs to 
another1 as stated above 7,q4 #hf1 ,a4  
#c74 ,hence the conditions necessary for
 a vow are not altogether ensured1 when 

a man who is under another's power vows 
that which is in that other's power1    
except under the condition that he whose
 power it concerns does not gainsay it4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as soon as a man comes
 of age1 if he be a freeman he is in his
 own power in all matters concerning his
 person1 for instance with regard to    
binding himself by vow to enter         
religion1 or with regard to contracting 
marriage4 ,but he is not in his own     
power as regards the arrangements of the
 household1 so that in these matters he 
cannot vow anything that shall be valid 
without the consent of his father4  ,a  
slave1 through being in his master's    
power1 even as regards his personal     
deeds1 cannot bind himself by vow to    
enter religion1 since this would        
withdraw him from his master's service4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a religious is subject
 to his superior as to his actions      
connected with his profession of his    
rule4 ,wherefore even though one may be 
able to do something now and then1 when 

one is not being occupied with other    
things by one's superior1 yet since     
there is no time when his superior      
cannot occupy him with something1 no vow
 of a religious stands without the      
consent of his superior1 as neither does
 the vow of a girl while in 7her        
father's7 house without his consent2 nor
 of a wife1 without the consent of her  
husband4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although the
 vow of one who is subject to another's 
power does not stand without the consent
 of the one to whom he is subject1 he   
does not sin by vowing2 because his vow 
is understood to contain the requisite  
condition1 providing1 namely1 that his  
superior approve or do not gainsay it4  
,,ninth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1   
,art4 #i  ,whether ,children ,can ,bind 
,themselves by ,vow to ,enter ,religion8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
children cannot bind themselves by vow  
to enter religion4 ,since a vow requires
 deliberation of the mind1 it is fitting
 that those alone should vow who have   

the use of reason4 ,but this is lacking 
in children just as in imbeciles and    
madmen4 ,therefore just as imbeciles and
 madmen cannot bind themselves to       
anything by vow1 so neither1 seemingly1 
can children bind themselves by vow to  
enter religion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1    
that which can be validly done by one   
cannot be annulled by another4 ,now a   
vow to enter religion made by a boy or  
girl before the age of puberty can be   
revoked by the parents or guardian 7#bj1
 qu4 ii1 cap4 ,puella74 ,therefore it   
seems that a boy or girl cannot validly 
make a vow before the age of fourteen4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to the    
rule of ,blessed ,benedict 99,ch4 #eh   
and a statute of ,innocent ,,iv1 a      
year's probation is granted to those who
 enter religion1 so that probation may  
precede the obligation of the vow4      
,therefore it seems unlawful1 before the
 year of probation1 for children to be  
bound by vow to enter religion4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,that which is not done      

aright is invalid without being annulled
 by anyone4 ,but the vow pronounced by a
 maiden1 even before attaining the age  
of puberty1 is valid1 unless it be      
annulled by her parents within a year   
7#bj1 qu4 ii1 cap4 ,puella74 ,therefore 
even before attaining to puberty        
children can lawfully and validly be    
bound by a vow to enter religion4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as may be gathered from   
what has been said above 7,a4 #g71 vows 
are of two kinds1 simple and solemn4    
,and since1 as stated in the same       
article1 the solemnization of a vow     
consists in a spiritual blessing and    
consecration bestowed through the       
ministry of the ,church1 it follows that
 it comes under the ,church's           
dispensation4 ,now a simple vow takes   
its efficacy from the deliberation of   
the mind1 whereby one intends to put    
oneself under an obligation4 ,that such 
an obligation be of no force may happen 
in two ways4 ,first1 through defect of  
reason1 as in madmen and imbeciles1 who 

cannot bind themselves by vow so long as
 they remain in a state of madness or   
imbecility4 ,secondly1 through the maker
 of a vow being subject to another's    
power1 as stated above 7,a4 #h74 ,now   
these two circumstances concur in       
children before the age of puberty1     
because in most instances they are      
lacking in reason1 and besides are      
naturally under the care of their       
parents1 or guardians in place of their 
parents3 wherefore in both events their 
vows are without force4 ,it happens1    
however1 through a natural disposition  
which is not subject to human laws1 that
 the use of reason is accelerated in    
some1 albeit few1 who on this account   
are said to be capable of guile3 and yet
 they are not1 for this reason1 exempt  
in any way from the care of their       
parents2 for this care is subject to    
human law1 which takes into account that
 which is of most frequent occurrence4  
,accordingly we must say that boys or   
girls who have not reached the years of 

puberty and have not attained the use of
 reason can nowise bind themselves to   
anything by vow4 ,if1 however1 they     
attain the use of reason1 before        
reaching the years of puberty1 they can 
for their own part1 bind themselves by  
vow2 but their vows can be annulled by  
their parents1 under whose care they are
 still subject4  ,yet no matter how much
 they be capable of guile before the    
years of puberty1 they cannot be bound  
by a solemn religious vow1 on account of
 the ,church's decree 99,sext4 ,decret4 
cap4 ,is qui1 de ,reg4 et transeunt4 ad 
,relig4 which considers the majority of 
cases4 ,but after the years of puberty  
have been reached1 they can bind        
themselves by religious vows1 simple or 
solemn1 without the consent of their    
parents4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this        
argument avails in the case of children 
who have not yet reached the use of     
reason3 for their vows then are invalid1
 as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the
 vows of persons subject to another's   

power contain an implied condition1     
namely1 that they be not annulled by the
 superior4 ,this condition renders them 
licit and valid if it be fulfilled1 as  
stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this   
argument avails in the case of solemn   
vows which are taken in profession4     
,,tenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1   
,art4 #aj  ,whether ,vows ,admit of     
,dispensation8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that vows are not subject to      
dispensation4 ,it is less to have a vow 
commuted than to be dispensed from      
keeping it4 ,but a vow cannot be        
commuted1 according to ,lev4 #bg3i1 #aj1
 ,a beast that may be sacrificed to the 
,lord1 if anyone shall vow1 shall be    
holy1 and cannot be changed1 neither a  
better for a worse1 nor a worse for a   
better4 ,much less1 therefore1 do vows  
admit of dispensation4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 no man can grant a            
dispensation in matters concerning the  
natural law and in the ,divine precepts1
 especially those of the ,first ,table1 

since these aim directly at the love of 
,god1 which is the last end of the      
precepts4 ,now the fulfilment of a vow  
is a matter of the natural law1 and is  
commanded by the ,divine law1 as shown  
above 7,a4 #c71 and belongs to the      
precepts of the ,first ,table since it  
is an act of religion4 ,therefore vows  
do not admit of dispensation4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 the obligation of a vow is   
based on the fidelity which a man owes  
to ,god1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,but 
no man can dispense in such a matter as 
this4 ,neither1 therefore1 can any one  
grant a dispensation from a vow4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,that which proceeds from 
the common will of many has apparently  
greater stability than that which       
proceeds from the individual will of    
some one person4 ,now the law which     
derives its force from the common will  
admits of dispensation by a man4        
,therefore it seems that vows also admit
 of dispensation by a man4  ,i answer   
that1 ,the dispensation from a vow is to

 be taken in the same sense as a        
dispensation given in the observance of 
a law because1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #if1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #d71 a   
law is made with an eye to that which is
 good in the majority of instances4 ,but
 since in certain cases this is not     
good1 there is need for someone to      
decide that in that particular case the 
law is not to be observed4 ,this is     
properly speaking to dispense in the    
law3 for a dispensation would seem to   
denote a commensurate distribution or   
application of some common thing to     
those that are contained under it1 in   
the same way as a person is said to     
dispense food to a household4  ,in like 
manner a person who takes a vow makes a 
law for himself as it were1 and binds   
himself to do something which in itself 
and in the majority of cases is a good4 
,but it may happen that in some         
particular case this is simply evil1 or 
useless1 or a hindrance to a greater    
good3 and this is essentially contrary  

to that which is the matter of a vow1 as
 is clear from what has been said above 
7,a4 #b74 ,therefore it is necessary1 in
 such a case1 to decide that the vow is 
not to be observed4 ,and if it be       
decided absolutely that a particular vow
 is not to be observed1 this is called a
 dispensation from that vow2 but if some
 other obligation be imposed in lieu of 
that which was to have been observed1   
the vow is said to be commuted4 ,hence  
it is less to commute a vow than to     
dispense from a vow3 both1 however1 are 
in the power of the ,church4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,an animal that could be      
lawfully sacrificed was deemed holy from
 the very moment that it was the subject
 of a vow1 being1 as it were1 dedicated 
to the worship of ,god3 and for this    
reason it could not be changed3 even so 
neither may one now exchange for        
something better1 or worse1 that which  
one has vowed1 if it be already         
consecrated1 e4g4 a chalice or a house4 
,on the other hand1 an animal that could

 not be sacrificed1 through not being   
the lawful matter of a sacrifice1 could 
and had to be bought back1 as the law   
requires4 ,even so1 vows can be commuted
 now1 if no consecration has intervened4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even as man is bound
 by natural law and ,divine precept to  
fulfil his vow1 so1 too1 is he bound    
under the same heads to obey the law or 
commands of his superiors4 ,and yet when
 he is dispensed from keeping a human   
law1 this does not involve disobedience 
to that human law1 for this would be    
contrary to the natural law and the     
,divine command2 but it amounts to      
this--that what was law is not law in   
this particular case4 ,even so1 when a  
superior grants a dispensation1 that    
which was contained under a vow is by   
his authority no longer so contained1 in
 so far as he decides that in this case 
such and such a thing is not fitting    
matter for a vow4 ,consequently when an 
ecclesiastical superior dispenses       
someone from a vow1 he does not dispense

 him from keeping a precept of the      
natural or of the ,divine law1 but he   
pronounces a decision on a matter to    
which a man had bound himself of his own
 accord1 and of which he was unable to  
consider every circumstance4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,the fidelity we owe to ,god  
does not require that we fulfil that    
which it would be wrong or useless to   
vow1 or which would be an obstacle to   
the greater good whereunto the          
dispensation from that vow would        
conduce4 ,hence the dispensation from a 
vow is not contrary to the fidelity due 
to ,god4   ,,eleventh ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #aa  ,whether 
,it ,is ,possible to ,be ,dispensed from
 a ,solemn ,vow of ,continency8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is
 possible to be dispensed from a solemn 
vow of continency4 ,as stated above1 one
 reason for granting a dispensation from
 a vow is if it be an obstacle to a     
greater good4 ,but a vow of continency1 
even though it be solemn1 may be an     

obstacle to a greater good1 since the   
common good is more ,god-like than the  
good of an individual4 ,now one man's   
continency may be an obstacle to the    
good of the whole community1 for        
instance1 in the case where1 if certain 
persons who have vowed continency were  
to marry1 the peace of their country    
might be procured4 ,therefore it seems  
that it is possible to be dispensed even
 from a solemn vow of continency4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 religion is a more       
excellent virtue than chastity4 ,now if 
a man vows an act of religion1 e4g4 to  
offer sacrifice to ,god he can be       
dispensed from that vow4 ,much more1    
therefore1 can he be dispensed from the 
vow of continency which is about an act 
of chastity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just  
as the observance of a vow of abstinence
 may be a source of danger to the       
person1 so too may be the observance of 
a vow of continency4 ,now one who takes 
a vow of abstinence can be dispensed    
from that vow if it prove a source of   

danger to his body4 ,therefore for the  
same reason one may be dispensed from a 
vow of continency4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 
just as the vow of continency is part of
 the religious profession1 whereby the  
vow is solemnized1 so also are the vows 
of poverty and obedience4 ,but it is    
possible to be dispensed from the vows  
of poverty and obedience1 as in the case
 of those who are appointed bishops     
after making profession4 ,therefore it  
seems that it is possible to be         
dispensed from a solemn vow of          
continency4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
written 7,ecclus4 #bf3bj73 ,no price is 
worthy of a continent soul4  ,further1  
7,extra1 ,de ,statu ,monach47 at the end
 of the ,decretal1 ,cum ad ,monasterium1
 it is stated that the renouncing of    
property1 like the keeping of chastity1 
is so bound up with the monastic rule1  
that not even the ,sovereign ,pontiff   
can disperse from its observance4  ,i   
answer that1 ,three things may be       
considered in a solemn vow of           

continency3 first1 the matter of the    
vow1 namely1 continency2 secondly1 the  
perpetuity of the vow1 namely1 when a   
person binds himself by vow to the      
perpetual observance of chastity3       
thirdly1 the solemnity of the vow4      
,accordingly1 some 99,william of        
,auxerre1 ,sum4 ,aur4 ,,iii4 vii4 #a1   
qu4 #e say that the solemn vow cannot be
 a matter of dispensation1 on account of
 the continency itself for which no     
worthy price can be found1 as is stated 
by the authority quoted above4 ,the     
reason for this is assigned by some to  
the fact that by continency man         
overcomes a foe within himself1 or to   
the fact that by continency man is      
perfectly conformed to ,christ in       
respect of purity of both body and soul4
 ,but this reason does not seem to be   
cogent since the goods of the soul1 such
 as contemplation and prayer1 far       
surpass the goods of the body and still 
more conform us to ,god1 and yet one may
 be dispensed from a vow of prayer or   

contemplation4 ,therefore1 continency   
itself absolutely considered seems no   
reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot
 be a matter of dispensation2 especially
 seeing that the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4     
#g3cd7 exhorts us to be continent on    
account of contemplation1 when he says  
that the unmarried woman 4 4 4 thinketh 
on the things of ,god ,vulg43 'the      
,lord'1 and since the end is of more    
account than the means4  ,consequently  
others 99,albertus ,magnus1 ,sent4 iv1  
,d1 #ch find the reason for this in the 
perpetuity and universality of this vow4
 ,for they assert that the vow of       
continency cannot be canceled1 save by  
something altogether contrary thereto1  
which is never lawful in any vow4 ,but  
this is evidently false1 because just as
 the practice of carnal intercourse is  
contrary to continency1 so is eating    
flesh or drinking wine contrary to      
abstinence from such things1 and yet    
these latter vows may be a matter for   
dispensation4  ,for this reason others  

99,innocent ,,iv1 on the above decretal 
maintain that one may be dispensed even 
from a solemn vow of continency1 for the
 sake of some common good or common     
need1 as in the case of the example     
given above 7,obj4 #a71 of a country    
being restored to peace through a       
certain marriage to be contracted4 ,yet 
since the ,decretal quoted says         
explicitly that not even the ,sovereign 
,pontiff can dispense a monk from       
keeping chastity1 it follows seemingly1 
that we must maintain that1 as stated   
above 7,a4 #aj1 ad #a2 cf4 ,lev4 #bg3i1 
#aj1 #bh71 whatsoever has once been     
sanctified to the ,lord cannot be put to
 any other use4 ,for no ecclesiastical  
prelate can make that which is          
sanctified to lose its consecration1 not
 even though it be something inanimate1 
for instance a consecrated chalice to be
 not consecrated1 so long as it remains 
entire4 ,much less1 therefore1 can a    
prelate make a man that is consecrated  
to ,god cease to be consecrated1 so long

 as he lives4 ,now the solemnity of a   
vow consists in a kind of consecration  
or blessing of the person who takes the 
vow1 as stated above 7,a4 #g74 ,hence no
 prelate of the ,church can make a man1 
who has pronounced a solemn vow1 to be  
quit of that to which he was            
consecrated1 e4g4 one who is a priest1  
to be a priest no more1 although a      
prelate may1 for some particular reason1
 inhibit him from exercising his order4 
,in like manner the ,pope cannot make a 
man who has made his religious          
profession cease to be a religious1     
although certain jurists have ignorantly
 held the contrary4  ,we must therefore 
consider whether continency is          
essentially bound up with the purpose   
for which the vow is solemnized4        
,because if not1 the solemnity of the   
consecration can remain without the     
obligation of continency1 but not if    
continency is essentially bound up with 
that for which the vow is solemnized4   
,now the obligation of observing        

continency is connected with ,holy      
,orders1 not essentially but by the     
institution of the ,church2 wherefore it
 seems that the ,church can grant a     
dispensation from the vow of continency 
solemnized by the reception of ,holy    
,orders4 ,on the other hand the         
obligation of observing continency is an
 essential condition of the religious   
state1 whereby a man renounces the world
 and binds himself wholly to ,god's     
service1 for this is incompatible with  
matrimony1 in which state a man is under
 the obligation of taking to himself a  
wife1 of begetting children1 of looking 
after his household1 and of procuring   
whatever is necessary for these         
purposes4 ,wherefore the ,apostle says  
7#a ,cor4 #g3cc7 that he that is with a 
wife1 is solicitous for the things of   
the world1 how he may please his wife2  
and he is divided4 ,hence the monk takes
 his name from unity 99,the ,greek monos
 in contrast with this division4 ,for   
this reason the ,church cannot dispense 

from a vow solemnized by the religious  
profession2 and the reason assigned by  
the ,decretal is because chastity is    
bound up with the monastic rule4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,perils occasioned by human  
affairs should be obviated by human     
means1 not by turning divine things to a
 human use4 ,now a professed religious  
is dead to the world and lives to ,god1 
and so he must not be called back to the
 human life on the pretext of any human 
contingency4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a vow of
 temporal continency can be a matter of 
dispensation1 as also a vow of temporal 
prayer or of temporal abstinence4 ,but  
the fact that no dispensation can be    
granted from a vow of continency        
solemnized by profession is due1 not to 
its being an act of chastity1 but       
because through the religious profession
 it is already an act of religion4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,food is directly      
ordered to the upkeep of the person1    
therefore abstinence from food may be a 
direct source of danger to the person3  

and so on this count a vow of abstinence
 is a matter of dispensation4 ,on the   
other hand sexual intercourse is        
directly ordered to the upkeep not of   
the person but of the species1 wherefore
 to abstain from such intercourse by    
continency does not endanger the person4
 ,and if indeed accidentally it prove a 
source of danger to the person1 this    
danger may be obviated by some other    
means1 for instance by abstinence1 or   
other corporal remedies4  ,reply ,obj4  
#d3 ,a religious who is made a bishop is
 no more absolved from his vow of       
poverty than from his vow of continency1
 since he must have nothing of his own  
and must hold himself as being the      
dispenser of the common goods of the    
,church4 ,in like manner neither is he  
dispensed from his vow of obedience2 it 
is an accident that he is not bound to  
obey if he have no superior2 just as the
 abbot of a monastery1 who nevertheless 
is not dispensed from his vow of        
obedience4  ,the passage of             

,ecclesiasticus1 which is put forward in
 the contrary sense1 should be taken as 
meaning that neither fruitfulness of the
 of the flesh nor any bodily good is to 
be compared with continency1 which is   
reckoned one of the goods of the soul1  
as ,augustine declares 7,de ,sanct4     
,virg4 viii74 ,wherefore it is said     
pointedly of a continent soul1 not of a 
continent body4   ,,twelfth ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #ab  ,whether 
the ,authority of a ,prelate ,is        
,required for the ,commutation or the   
,dispensation of a ,vow8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that the authority of a 
prelate is not required for the         
commutation or dispensation of a vow4 ,a
 person may enter religion without the  
authority of a superior prelate4 ,now by
 entering religion one is absolved from 
the vows he made in the world1 even from
 the vow of making a pilgrimage to the  
,holy ,land 99,cap4 ,scripturae1 de     
,voto et ,voti redempt44 ,therefore the 
commutation or dispensation of a vow is 

possible without the authority of a     
superior prelate4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
to dispense anyone from a vow seems to  
consist in deciding in what             
circumstances he need not keep that vow4
 ,but if the prelate is at fault in his 
decision1 the person who took the vow   
does not seem to be absolved from his   
vow1 since no prelate can grant a       
dispensation contrary to the divine     
precept about keeping one's vows1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #aj1 ad #b2 ,a4 #aa74 
,likewise1 when anyone rightly          
determines of his own authority that in 
his case a vow is not to be kept1 he    
would seem not to be bound2 since a vow 
need not be kept if it have an evil     
result 7,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,therefore the  
,authority of a prelate is not required 
that one may be dispensed from a vow4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it belongs to a  
prelate's power to grant dispensations  
from vows1 on the same count it is      
competent to all prelates1 but it does  
not belong to all to dispense from every

 vow4 ,therefore it does not belong to  
the power of a prelate to dispense from 
vows4  ,on the contrary1 ,a vow binds   
one to do something1 even as a law does4
 ,now the superior's authority is       
requisite for a dispensation from a     
precept of the law1 as stated above     
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #ig1 ,a4 
#d74 ,therefore it is likewise required 
in a dispensation from a vow4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 
a vow is a promise made to ,god about   
something acceptable to ,him4 ,now if   
you promise something to anyone it      
depends on his decision whether he      
accept what you promise4 ,again in the  
,church a prelate stands in ,god's      
place4 ,therefore a commutation or      
dispensation of vows requires the       
authority of a prelate who in ,god's    
stead declares what is acceptable to    
,god1 according to #b ,cor4 #b3aj3 ,for 
,i 4 4 4 have pardoned 4 4 4 for your   
sakes 4 4 4 in the person of ,christ4   
,and he says significantly for your     

sakes1 since whenever we ask a prelate  
for a dispensation we should do so to   
honor ,christ in ,whose person he       
dispenses1 or to promote the interests  
of the ,church which is ,his ,body4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all other vows are    
about some particular works1 whereas by 
the religious life a man consecrates his
 whole life to ,god's service4 ,now the 
particular is included in the universal1
 wherefore a ,decretal 99,cap4          
,scripturae1 de ,voto et ,voti redempt4 
says that a man is not deemed a         
vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal   
service for the perpetual service of    
religion4 ,and yet a man who enters     
religion is not bound to fulfil the     
vows1 whether of fasting or of praying  
or the like1 which he made when in the  
world1 because by entering religion he  
dies to his former life1 and it is      
unsuitable to the religious life that   
each one should have his own            
observances1 and because the burden of  
religion is onerous enough without      

requiring the addition of other burdens4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some have held that 
prelates can dispense from vows at their
 will1 for the reason that every vow    
supposes as a condition that the        
superior prelate be willing2 thus it was
 stated above 7,a4 #h7 that the vow of a
 subject1 e4g4 of a slave or a son1     
supposes this condition1 if the father  
or master consent1 or does not dissent4 
,and thus a subject might break his vow 
without any remorse of conscience1      
whenever his superior tells him to4     
,but this opinion is based on a false   
supposition3 because a spiritual prelate
 being1 not a master1 but a dispenser1  
his power is given unto edification1 not
 for destruction 7#b ,cor4 #aj3h71 and  
consequently1 just as he cannot command 
that which is in itself displeasing to  
,god1 namely1 sin1 so neither can he    
forbid what is in itself pleasing to    
,god1 namely1 works of virtue4          
,therefore absolutely speaking man can  
vow them4 ,but it does belong to a      

prelate to decide what is the more      
virtuous and the more acceptable to     
,god4 ,consequently in matters          
presenting no difficulty1 the prelate's 
dispensation would not excuse one from  
sin3 for instance1 if a prelate were to 
dispense a person from a vow to enter   
the religious life1 without any apparent
 cause to prevent him from fulfilling   
his vow4 ,but if some cause were to     
appear1 giving rise1 at least1 to doubt1
 he could hold to the prelate's decision
 whether of commutation or of           
dispensation4 ,he could not1 however1   
follow his own judgment in the matter1  
because he does not stand in the place  
of ,god2 except perhaps in the case when
 the thing he has vowed is clearly      
unlawful1 and he is unable to have      
recourse to the prelate4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,since the ,sovereign ,pontiff holds
 the place of ,christ throughout the    
whole ,church1 he exercises absolute    
power of dispensing from all vows that  
admit of dispensation4 ,to other and    

inferior prelates is the power committed
 of dispensing from those vows that are 
commonly made and frequently require    
dispensation1 in order that men may     
easily have recourse to someone2 such   
are the vows of pilgrimage 7,cap4 de    
,peregin41 de ,voto et ,voti redempt471 
fasting and the like1 and of pilgrimage 
to the ,holy ,land1 are reserved to the 
,sovereign ,pontiff 99,cap4 ,ex multa4  
,,question #hi  ,,of ,,oaths 7,,ten     
,,articles7  ,we must now consider those
 external acts of religion1 whereby     
something ,divine is taken by man3 and  
this is either a sacrament or the ,name 
of ,god4 ,the place for treating of the 
taking of a sacrament will be in the    
,third ,part of this work3 of the taking
 of ,god's ,name we shall treat now4    
,the ,name of ,god is taken by man in   
three ways4 ,first1 by way oath in order
 to confirm one's own assertion3        
secondly1 by way of adjuration as an    
inducement to others3 thirdly1 by way of
 invocation for the purpose of prayer or

 praise4 ,accordingly we must first     
treat of oaths3 and under this head     
there are ten points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,what is an oath8  7#b7 ,whether it is  
lawful8  7#c7 ,what are the accompanying
 conditions of an oath8  7#d7 ,of what  
virtue is it an act8  7#e7 ,whether     
oaths are desirable1 and to be employed 
frequently as something useful and good8
  7#f7 ,whether it is lawful to swear by
 a creature8  7#g7 ,whether an oath is  
binding8  7#h7 ,which is more binding1  
an oath or a vow8  7#i7 ,whether an oath
 is subject to dispensation8  7#aj7 ,who
 may lawfully swear1 and when8   ,,first
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #a 
,whether to ,swear ,is to ,call ,god to 
,witness8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that to swear is not to call ,god to   
witness4 ,whoever invokes the authority 
of ,holy ,writ calls ,god to witness1   
since it is ,his word that ,holy ,writ  
contains4 ,therefore1 if to swear is to 
call ,god to witness1 whoever invoked   
the authority of ,holy ,writ would      

swear4 ,but this is false4 ,therefore   
the antecedent is false also4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 one does not pay anything to 
a person by calling him to witness4 ,but
 he who swears by ,god pays something to
 ,him for it is written 7,matt4 #e3cc73 
,thou shall pay ,douay3 'perform' thy   
oaths to the ,lord2 and ,augustine says 
99,serm4 clxxx that to swear 7jurare7 is
 to pay the right 7jus reddere7 of truth
 to ,god4 ,therefore to swear is not to 
call ,god to witness4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 the duties of a judge differ  
from the duties of a witness1 as shown  
above 7,,qq4 #fg1 #gj74 ,now sometimes a
 man1 by swearing1 implores the ,divine 
judgment1 according to ,ps4 #g3e1 ,if ,i
 have rendered to them that repaid me   
evils1 let me deservedly fall empty     
before my enemies4 ,therefore to swear  
is not to call ,god to witness4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,augustine says in a sermon  
on perjury 7,serm4 clxxx73 ,when a man  
says3 ',by ,god1' what else does he mean
 but that ,god is his witness8  ,i      

answer that1 ,as the ,apostle says      
7,heb4 #f3af71 oaths are taken for the  
purpose of confirmation4 ,now           
speculative propositions receive        
confirmation from reason1 which proceeds
 from principles known naturally and    
infallibly true4 ,but particular        
contingent facts regarding man cannot be
 confirmed by a necessary reason1       
wherefore propositions regarding such   
things are wont to be confirmed by      
witnesses4 ,now a human witness does not
 suffice to confirm such matters for two
 reasons4 ,first1 on account of man's   
lack of truth1 for many give way to     
lying1 according to ,ps4 #af3aj1 ,their 
mouth hath spoken lies ,vulg43          
'proudly'4 ,secondly1 on account of his 
lack of knowledge1 since he can know    
neither the future1 nor secret thoughts1
 nor distant things3 and yet men speak  
about such things1 and our everyday life
 requires that we should have some      
certitude about them4 ,hence the need to
 have recourse to a ,divine witness1 for

 neither can ,god lie1 nor is anything  
hidden from ,him4 ,now to call ,god to  
witness is named jurare 7to swear7      
because it is established as though it  
were a principle of law 7jure7 that what
 a man asserts under the invocation of  
,god as ,his witness should be accepted 
as true4 ,now sometimes ,god is called  
to witness when we assert present or    
past events1 and this is termed a       
declaratory oath2 while sometimes ,god  
is called to witness in confirmation of 
something future1 and this is termed a  
promissory oath4 ,but oaths are not     
employed in order to substantiate       
necessary matters1 and such as come     
under the investigation of reason2 for  
it would seem absurd in a scientific    
discussion to wish to prove one's point 
by an oath4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is one
 thing to employ a ,divine witness      
already given1 as when one adduces the  
authority of ,holy ,scripture2 and      
another to implore ,god to bear witness1
 as in an oath4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man

 is said to pay his oaths to ,god       
because he performs what he swears to   
do1 or because1 from the very fact that 
he calls upon ,god to witness1 he       
recognizes ,him as possessing universal 
knowledge and unerring truth4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,a person is called to give   
witness1 in order that he may make known
 the truth about what is alleged4 ,now  
there are two ways in which ,god makes  
known whether the alleged facts are true
 or not4 ,in one way ,he reveals the    
truth simply1 either by inward          
inspiration1 or by unveiling the facts1 
namely1 by making public what was       
hitherto secret3 in another way by      
punishing the lying witness1 and then   
,he is at once judge and witness1 since 
by punishing the liar ,he makes known   
his lie4 ,hence oaths are of two kinds3 
one is a simple contestation of ,god1 as
 when a man says ,god is my witness1 or1
 ,i speak before ,god1 or1 ,by ,god1    
which has the same meaning1 as          
,augustine states 99,see argument ,on   

the contrary2 the other is by cursing1  
and consists in a man binding himself or
 something of his to punishment if what 
is alleged be not true4   ,,second      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to ,swear8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is
 not lawful to swear4 ,nothing forbidden
 in the ,divine ,law is lawful4 ,now    
swearing is forbidden 7,matt4 #e3cd71   
,but ,i say to you not to swear at all2 
and 7,james #e3ab71 ,above all things1  
my brethren1 swear not4 ,therefore      
swearing is unlawful4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 whatever comes from an evil   
seems to be unlawful1 because according 
to ,matt4 #g3ah1 neither can an evil    
tree bring forth good fruit4 ,now       
swearing comes from an evil1 for it is  
written 7,matt4 #e3cg73 ,but let your   
speech be3 ,yea1 yea3 ,no1 no4 ,and that
 which is over and above these is of    
evil4 ,therefore swearing is apparently 
unlawful4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to seek a
 sign of ,divine ,providence is to tempt

 ,god1 and this is altogether unlawful1 
according to ,deut4 #f3af1 ,thou shalt  
not tempt the ,lord thy ,god4 ,now he   
that swears seems to seek a sign of     
,divine ,providence1 since he asks ,god 
to bear witness1 and this must be by    
some evident effect4 ,therefore it seems
 that swearing is altogether unlawful4  
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4
 #f3ac73 ,thou shalt fear the ,lord thy 
,god 4 4 4 and shalt swear by ,his name4
  ,i answer that1 ,nothing prevents a   
thing being good in itself1 and yet     
becoming a source of evil to one who    
makes use thereof unbecomingly3 thus to 
receive the ,eucharist is good1 and yet 
he that receives it unworthily1 eateth  
and drinketh judgment to himself 7#a    
,cor4 #aa3bi74 ,accordingly in answer to
 the question in point it must be stated
 that an oath is in itself lawful and   
commendable4 ,this is proved from its   
origin and from its end4 ,from its      
origin1 because swearing owes its       
introduction to the faith whereby man   

believes that ,god possesses unerring   
truth and universal knowledge and       
foresight of all things3 and from its   
end1 since oaths are employed in order  
to justify men1 and to put an end to    
controversy 7,heb4 #f3af74  ,yet an oath
 becomes a source of evil to him that   
makes evil use of it1 that is who       
employs it without necessity and due    
caution4 ,for if a man calls ,god as    
witness1 for some trifling reason1 it   
would seemingly prove him to have but   
little reverence for ,god1 since he     
would not treat even a good man in this 
manner4 ,moreover1 he is in danger of   
committing perjury1 because man easily  
offends in words1 according to ,james   
#c3b1 ,if any man offend not in word1   
the same is a perfect man4 ,wherefore it
 is written 7,ecclus4 #bc3i73 ,let not  
thy mouth be accustomed to swearing1 for
 in it there are many falls4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,jerome1 commenting on ,matt4 
#e3cd1 says3 ,observe that our ,saviour 
forbade us to swear1 not by ,god1 but by

 heaven and earth4 ,for it is known that
 the ,jews have this most evil custom of
 swearing by the elements4 ,yet this    
answer does not suffice1 because ,james 
adds1 nor by any other oath4 ,wherefore 
we must reply that1 as ,augustine states
 7,de ,mendacio xv71 when the ,apostle  
employs an oath in his epistles1 he     
shows how we are to understand the      
saying1 ',i say to you1 not to swear at 
all'2 lest1 to wit1 swearing lead us to 
swear easily and from swearing easily1  
we contract the habit1 and1 from        
swearing habitually1 we fall into       
perjury4 ,hence we find that he swore   
only when writing1 because thought      
brings caution and avoids hasty words4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to          
,augustine 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte  
i4 #ag73 ,if you have to swear1 note    
that the necessity arises from the      
infirmity of those whom you convince1   
which infirmity is indeed an evil4      
,accordingly ,he did not say3 ',that    
which is over and above is evil1' but   

'is of evil4' ,for you do no evil2 since
 you make good use of swearing1 by      
persuading another to a useful purpose3 
yet it 'comes of the evil' of the person
 by whose infirmity you are forced to   
swear4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he who swears 
tempts not ,god1 because it is not      
without usefulness and necessity that he
 implores the ,divine assistance4       
,moreover1 he does not expose himself to
 danger1 if ,god be unwilling to bear   
witness there and then3 for ,he         
certainly will bear witness at some     
future time1 when ,he will bring to     
light the hidden things of darkness1 and
 will make manifest the counsels of     
hearts 7#a ,cor4 #d3e74 ,and this       
witness will be lacking to none who     
swears1 neither for nor against him4    
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,three ,accompanying 
,conditions of an ,oath ,are ,suitably  
,assigned1 ,namely1 ,justice1 ,judgment1
 and ,truth8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that justice1 judgment and truth   

are unsuitably assigned as the          
conditions accompanying an oath4 ,things
 should not be enumerated as diverse1 if
 one of them includes the other4 ,now of
 these three1 one includes another1     
since truth is a part of justice1       
according to ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4
 ii1 #ec73 and judgment is an act of    
justice1 as stated above 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4  
#a74 ,therefore the three accompanying  
conditions of an oath are unsuitably    
assigned4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 many     
other things are required for an oath1  
namely1 devotion1 and faith whereby we  
believe that ,god knows all things and  
cannot lie4 ,therefore the accompanying 
conditions of an oath are insufficiently
 enumerated4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 these 
three are requisite in man's every deed3
 since he ought to do nothing contrary  
to justice and truth1 or without        
judgment1 according to #a ,tim4 #e3ba1  
,do nothing without prejudice1 i4e4     
without previous judgment 99,vulg43     
',observe these things without          

prejudice1 doing nothing by declining to
 either side4'4 ,therefore these three  
should not be associated with an oath   
any more than with other human actions4 
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,jer4 
#d3b73 ,thou shalt swear3 ,as the ,lord 
liveth1 in truth1 and in judgment1 and  
in justice3 which words ,jerome         
expounds1 saying3 ,observe that an oath 
must be accompanied by these conditions1
 truth1 judgment and justice4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 an    
oath is not good except for one who     
makes good use of it4 ,now two          
conditions are required for the good use
 of an oath4 ,first1 that one swear1 not
 for frivolous1 but for urgent reasons1 
and with discretion2 and this requires  
judgment or discretion on the part of   
the person who swears4 ,secondly1 as    
regards the point to be confirmed by    
oath1 that it be neither false1 nor     
unlawful1 and this requires both truth1 
so that one employ an oath in order to  
confirm what is true1 and justice1 so   

that one confirm what is lawful4 ,a rash
 oath lacks judgment1 a false oath lacks
 truth1 and a wicked or unlawful oath   
lacks justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,judgment does not signify here the     
execution of justice1 but the judgment  
of discretion1 as stated above4 ,nor is 
truth here to be taken for the part of  
justice1 but for a condition of speech4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,devotion1 faith and   
like conditions requisite for the right 
manner of swearing are implied by       
judgment3 for the other two regard the  
things sworn to as stated above4 ,we    
might also reply that justice regards   
the reason for swearing4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,there is great danger in swearing1 
both on account of the greatness of ,god
 ,who is called upon to bear witness1   
and on account of the frailty of the    
human tongue1 the words of which are    
confirmed by oath4 ,hence these         
conditions are more requisite for an    
oath than for other human actions4      
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1  

,art4 #d  ,whether an ,oath ,is an ,act 
of ,religion1 or ,latria8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that an oath is not  
an act of religion1 or latria4 ,acts of 
religion are about holy and divine      
things4 ,but oaths are employed in      
connection with human disputes1 as the  
,apostle declares 7,heb4 #f3af74        
,therefore swearing is not an act of    
religion or latria4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 it belongs to religion to give worship 
to ,god1 as ,tully says 7,de ,invent4   
,rhet4 ii1 #ec74 ,but he who swears     
offers nothing to ,god1 but calls ,god  
to be his witness4 ,therefore swearing  
is not an act of religion or latria4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the end of religion 
or latria is to show reverence to ,god4 
,but the end of an oath is not this1 but
 rather the confirmation of some        
assertion4 ,therefore swearing is not an
 act of religion4  ,on the contrary1 ,it
 is written 7,deut4 #f3ac73 ,thou shalt 
fear the ,lord thy ,god1 and shalt serve
 ,him only1 and thou shalt swear by ,his

 name4 ,now he speaks there of the      
servitude of religion4 ,therefore       
swearing is an act of religion4  ,i     
answer that1 ,as appears from what has  
been said above 7,a4 #a71 he that swears
 calls ,god to witness in confirmation  
of what he says4 ,now nothing is        
confirmed save by what is more certain  
and more powerful4 ,therefore in the    
very fact that a man swears by ,god1 he 
acknowledges ,god to be more powerful1  
by reason of ,his unfailing truth and   
,his universal knowledge2 and thus in a 
way he shows reverence to ,god4 ,for    
this reason the ,apostle says 7,heb4    
#f3af7 that men swear by one greater    
than themselves1 and ,jerome commenting 
on ,matt4 #e3cd1 says that he who swears
 either reveres or loves the person by  
whom he swears4 ,the ,philosopher1 too1 
states 7,metaph4 i1 #c7 that to swear is
 to give very great honor4 ,now to show 
reverence to ,god belongs to religion or
 latria4 ,wherefore it is evident that  
an oath is an act of religion or latria4

  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,two things may be   
observed in an oath4 ,the witness       
adduced1 and this is ,divine3 and the   
thing witnessed to1 or that which makes 
it necessary to call the witness1 and   
this is human4 ,accordingly an oath     
belongs to religion by reason of the    
former1 and not of the latter4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,in the very fact that a man  
takes ,god as witness by way of an oath1
 he acknowledges ,him to be greater3 and
 this pertains to the reverence and     
honor of ,god1 so that he offers        
something to ,god1 namely1 reverence and
 honor4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whatsoever we
 do1 we should do it in honor of ,god3  
wherefore there is no hindrance1 if by  
intending to assure a man1 we show      
reverence to ,god4 ,for we ought so to  
perform our actions in ,god's honor that
 they may conduce to our neighbor's     
good1 since ,god also works for ,his own
 glory and for our good4   ,,fifth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #e  
,whether ,oaths ,are ,desirable and to  

,be ,used ,frequently ,as ,something    
,useful and ,good8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that oaths are desirable and 
to be used frequently as something      
useful and good4 ,just as a vow is an   
act of religion1 so is an oath4 ,now it 
is commendable and more meritorious to  
do a thing by vow1 because a vow is an  
act of religion1 as stated above 7,q4   
#hh1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore for the same   
reason1 to do or say a thing with an    
oath is more commendable1 and           
consequently oaths are desirable as     
being good essentially4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 ,jerome1 commenting on ,matt4 
#e3cd1 says that he who swears either   
reveres or loves the person by whom he  
swears4 ,now reverence and love of ,god 
are desirable as something good         
essentially4 ,therefore swearing is     
also4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 swearing is  
directed to the purpose of confirming or
 assuring4 ,but it is a good thing for a
 man to confirm his assertion4          
,therefore an oath is desirable as a    

good thing4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
written 7,ecclus4 #bc3ab73 ,a man that  
sweareth much shall be filled with      
iniquity3 and ,augustine says 7,de      
,mendacio xv7 that the ,lord forbade    
swearing1 in order that for your own    
part you might not be fond of it1 and   
take pleasure in seeking occasions of   
swearing1 as though it were a good      
thing4  ,i answer that1 ,whatever is    
required merely as a remedy for an      
infirmity or a defect1 is not reckoned  
among those things that are desirable   
for their own sake1 but among those that
 are necessary3 this is clear in the    
case of medicine which is required as a 
remedy for sickness4 ,now an oath is    
required as a remedy to a defect1       
namely1 some man's lack of belief in    
another man4 ,wherefore an oath is not  
to be reckoned among those things that  
are desirable for their own sake1 but   
among those that are necessary for this 
life2 and such things are used unduly   
whenever they are used outside the      

bounds of necessity4 ,for this reason   
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte i1 #ag73 ,he who understands that
 swearing is not to be held as a good   
thing1 i4e4 desirable for its own sake1 
restrains himself as far as he can from 
uttering oaths1 unless there be urgent  
need4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there is no    
parity between a vow and an oath3       
because by a vow we direct something to 
the honor of ,god1 so that for this very
 reason a vow is an act of religion4 ,on
 the other hand1 in an oath reverence   
for the name of ,god is taken in        
confirmation of a promise4 ,hence what  
is confirmed by oath does not1 for this 
reason1 become an act of religion1 since
 moral acts take their species from the 
end4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he who swears   
does indeed make use of his reverence or
 love for the person by whom he swears3 
he does not1 however1 direct his oath to
 the reverence or love of that person1  
but to something else that is necessary 
for the present life4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 

,even as a medicine is useful for       
healing1 and yet1 the stronger it is1   
the greater harm it does if it be taken 
unduly1 so too an oath is useful indeed 
as a means of confirmation1 yet the     
greater the reverence it demands the    
more dangerous it is1 unless it be      
employed aright2 for1 as it is written  
7,ecclus4 #bc3ac71 if he make it void1  
i4e4 if he deceive his brother1 his sin 
shall be upon him3 and if he dissemble  
it1 by swearing falsely1 and with       
dissimulation1 he offendeth double1     
7because1 to wit1 pretended equity is a 
twofold iniquity1 as ,augustine         
99,enarr4 in ,ps4 lxiii1 #g declares73  
and if he swear in vain1 i4e4 without   
due cause and necessity1 he shall not be
 justified4   ,,sixth ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful to ,swear by ,creatures8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it 
is not lawful to swear by creatures4 ,it
 is written 7,matt4 #e3cd-cf73 ,i say to
 you not to swear at all1 neither by    

heaven 4 4 4 nor by the earth 4 4 4 nor 
by ,jerusalem 4 4 4 nor by thy head3 and
 ,jerome1 expounding these words1 says3 
,observe that the ,saviour does not     
forbid swearing by ,god1 but by heaven  
and earth1 etc4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1    
punishment is not due save for a fault4 
,now a punishment is appointed for one  
who swears by creatures3 for it is      
written 7#bb1 qu4 i1 can4 ,clericum73   
,if a cleric swears by creatures he must
 be very severely rebuked3 and if he    
shall persist in this vicious habit we  
wish that he be excommunicated4         
,therefore it is unlawful to swear by   
creatures4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an oath 
is an act of religion1 as stated above  
7,a4 #d74 ,but religious worship is not 
due to any creature1 according to ,rom4 
#a3bc1 #be4 ,therefore it is not lawful 
to swear by a creature4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,joseph swore by the health of
 ,pharaoh 7,gen4 #db3af74 ,moreover it  
is customary to swear by the ,gospel1 by
 relics1 and by the saints4  ,i answer  

that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c71 
there are two kinds of oath4 ,one is    
uttered as a simple contestation or     
calling ,god as witness3 and this kind  
of oath1 like faith1 is based on ,god's 
truth4 ,now faith is essentially and    
chiefly about ,god ,who is the very     
truth1 and secondarily about creatures  
in which ,god's truth is reflected1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a74 ,in like 
manner an oath is chiefly referred to   
,god ,whose testimony is invoked2 and   
secondarily an appeal by oath is made to
 certain creatures considered1 not in   
themselves1 but as reflecting the       
,divine truth4 ,thus we swear by the    
,gospel1 i4e4 by ,god ,whose truth is   
made known in the ,gospel2 and by the   
saints who believed this truth and kept 
it4  ,the other way of swearing is by   
cursing and in this kind of oath a      
creature is adduced that the judgment of
 ,god may be wrought therein4 ,thus a   
man is wont to swear by his head1 or by 
his son1 or by some other thing that he 

loves1 even as the ,apostle swore 7#b   
,cor4 #a3bc71 saying3 ,i call ,god to   
witness upon my soul4  ,as to ,joseph's 
oath by the health of ,pharaoh this may 
be understood in both ways3 either by   
way of a curse1 as though he pledged    
,pharao's health to ,god2 or by way of  
contestation1 as though he appealed to  
the truth of ,god's justice which the   
princes of the earth are appointed to   
execute4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our ,lord   
forbade us to swear by creatures so as  
to give them the reverence due to ,god4 
,hence ,jerome adds that the ,jews1     
through swearing by the angels and the  
like1 worshipped creatures with a       
,divine honor4  ,in the same sense a    
cleric is punished1 according to the    
canons 7#bb1 qu4 i1 can4 ,clericum1     
,obj4 #b71 for swearing by a creature1  
for this savors of the blasphemy of     
unbelief4 ,hence in the next chapter1 it
 is said3 ,if any one swears by ,god's  
hair or head1 or otherwise utter        
blasphemy against ,god1 and he be in    

ecclesiastical orders1 let him be       
degraded4  ,this suffices for the ,reply
 to the ,second ,objection4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,religious worship is shown to
 one whose testimony is invoked by oath3
 hence the prohibition 7,ex4 #bc3ac73   
,by the name of strange gods you shall  
not swear4 ,but religious worship is not
 given to creatures employed in an oath 
in the ways mentioned above4   ,,seventh
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #g 
,whether an ,oath ,has a ,binding       
,force8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that an oath has no binding force4 ,an  
oath is employed in order to confirm the
 truth of an assertion4 ,but when a     
person makes an assertion about the     
future his assertion is true1 though it 
may not be verified4 ,thus ,paul lied   
not 7#b ,cor4 #a3ae1 seqq47 though he   
went not to ,corinth1 as he had said he 
would 7#a ,cor4 #af3e74 ,therefore it   
seems that an oath is not binding4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue is not       
contrary to virtue 7,categ4 viii1 #bb74 

,now an oath is an act of virtue1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,but it would    
sometimes be contrary to virtue1 or an  
obstacle thereto1 if one were to fulfil 
what one has sworn to do3 for instance1 
if one were to swear to commit a sin1 or
 to desist from some virtuous action4   
,therefore an oath is not always        
binding4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sometimes 
a man is compelled against his will to  
promise something under oath4 ,now1 such
 a person is loosed by the ,roman       
,pontiffs from the bond of his oath     
7,extra1 ,de ,jurejur41 cap4 ,verum in  
ea quaest41 etc474 ,therefore an oath is
 not always binding4  ,obj4 #d3         
,further1 no person can be under two    
opposite obligations4 ,yet sometimes the
 person who swears and the person to    
whom he swears have opposite intentions4
 ,therefore an oath cannot always be    
binding4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is      
written 7,matt4 #e3cc73 ,thou shalt     
perform thy oaths to the ,lord4  ,i     
answer that1 ,an obligation implies     

something to be done or omitted2 so that
 apparently it regards neither the      
declaratory oath 7which is about        
something present or past71 nor such    
oaths as are about something to be      
effected by some other cause 7as1 for   
example1 if one were to swear that it   
would rain tomorrow71 but only such as  
are about things to be done by the      
person who swears4  ,now just as a      
declaratory oath1 which is about the    
future or the present1 should contain   
the truth1 so too ought the oath which  
is about something to be done by us in  
the future4 ,yet there is a difference3 
since1 in the oath that is about the    
past or present1 this obligation        
affects1 not the thing that already has 
been or is1 but the action of the       
swearer1 in the point of his swearing to
 what is or was already true2 whereas1  
on the contrary1 in the oath that is    
made about something to be done by us1  
the obligation falls on the thing       
guaranteed by oath4 ,for a man is bound 

to make true what he has sworn1 else his
 oath lacks truth4  ,now if this thing  
be such as not to be in his power1 his  
oath is lacking in judgment of          
discretion3 unless perchance what was   
possible when he swore become impossible
 to him through some mishap1 as when a  
man swore to pay a sum of money1 which  
is subsequently taken from him by force 
or theft4 ,for then he would seem to be 
excused from fulfilling his oath1       
although he is bound to do what he can1 
as1 in fact1 we have already stated with
 regard to the obligation of a vow 7,q4 
#hh1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,if1 on the other  
hand1 it be something that he can do1   
but ought not to1 either because it is  
essentially evil1 or because it is a    
hindrance to a good1 then his oath is   
lacking in justice3 wherefore an oath   
must not be kept when it involves a sin 
or a hindrance to good4 ,for in either  
case its result is evil 99,cf4 ,bede1   
,homil4 xix1 in ,decoll4 ,s4 ,joan4     
,bapt4  ,accordingly we must conclude   

that whoever swears to do something is  
bound to do what he can for the         
fulfilment of truth2 provided always    
that the other two accompanying         
conditions be present1 namely1 judgment 
and justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is   
not the same with a simple assertion1   
and with an oath wherein ,god is called 
to witness3 because it suffices for the 
truth of an assertion1 that a person say
 what he proposes to do1 since it is    
already true in its cause1 namely1 the  
purpose of the doer4 ,but an oath should
 not be employed1 save in a matter about
 which one is firmly certain3 and1      
consequently1 if a man employ an oath1  
he is bound1 as far as he can1 to make  
true what he has sworn1 through         
reverence of the ,divine witness        
invoked1 unless it leads to an evil     
result1 as stated4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an
 oath may lead to an evil result in two 
ways4 ,first1 because from the very     
outset it has an evil result1 either    
through being evil of its very nature   

7as1 if a man were to swear to commit   
adultery71 or through being a hindrance 
to a greater good1 as if a man were to  
swear not to enter religion1 or not to  
become a cleric1 or that he would not   
accept a prelacy1 supposing it would be 
expedient for him to accept1 or in      
similar cases4 ,for oaths of this kind  
are unlawful from the outset3 yet with a
 difference3 because if a man swear to  
commit a sin1 he sinned in swearing1 and
 sins in keeping his oath3 whereas if a 
man swear not to perform a greater good1
 which he is not bound to do withal1 he 
sins indeed in swearing 7through placing
 an obstacle to the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who  
is the inspirer of good purposes71 yet  
he does not sin in keeping his oath1    
though he does much better if he does   
not keep it4  ,secondly1 an oath leads  
to an evil result through some new and  
unforeseen emergency4 ,an instance is   
the oath of ,herod1 who swore to the    
damsel1 who danced before him1 that he  
would give her what she would ask of    

him4 ,for this oath could be lawful from
 the outset1 supposing it to have the   
requisite conditions1 namely1 that the  
damsel asked what it was right to grant1
 but the fulfilment of the oath was     
unlawful4 ,hence ,ambrose says 7,de     
,officiis i1 #ej73 ,sometimes it is     
wrong to fulfil a promise1 and to keep  
an oath2 as ,herod1 who granted the     
slaying of ,john1 rather than refuse    
what he had promised4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,there is a twofold obligation in the   
oath which a man takes under compulsion3
 one1 whereby he is beholden to the     
person to whom he promises something2   
and this obligation is cancelled by the 
compulsion1 because he that used force  
deserves that the promise made to him   
should not be kept4 ,the other is an    
obligation whereby a man is beholden to 
,god1 in virtue of which he is bound to 
fulfil what he has promised in ,his     
name4 ,this obligation is not removed in
 the tribunal of conscience1 because    
that man ought rather to suffer temporal

 loss1 than violate his oath4 ,he can1  
however1 seek in a court of justice to  
recover what he has paid1 or denounce   
the matter to his superior even if he   
has sworn to the contrary1 because such 
an oath would lead to evil results since
 it would be contrary to public justice4
 ,the ,roman ,pontiffs1 in absolving men
 from oaths of this kind1 did not       
pronounce such oaths to be unbinding1   
but relaxed the obligation for some just
 cause4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,when the     
intention of the swearer is not the same
 as the intention of the person to whom 
he swears1 if this be due to the        
swearer's guile1 he must keep his oath  
in accordance with the sound            
understanding of the person to whom the 
oath is made4 ,hence ,isidore says 7,de 
,summo ,bono ii1 #ca73 ,however artful a
 man may be in wording his oath1 ,god   
,who witnesses his conscience accepts   
his oath as understood by the person to 
whom it is made4 ,and that this refers  
to the deceitful oath is clear from what

 follows3 ,he is doubly guilty who both 
takes ,god's name in vain1 and tricks   
his neighbor by guile4 ,if1 however1 the
 swearer uses no guile1 he is bound in  
accordance with his own intention4      
,wherefore ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxvi1 
#g73 ,the human ear takes such like     
words in their natural outward sense1   
but the ,divine judgment interprets them
 according to our inward intention4     
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1  
,art4 #h  ,whether an ,oath ,is ,more   
,binding ,than a ,vow8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that an oath is more     
binding than a vow4 ,a vow is a simple  
promise3 whereas an oath includes1      
besides a promise1 an appeal to ,god as 
witness4 ,therefore an oath is more     
binding than a vow4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 the weaker is wont to be confirmed by  
the stronger4 ,now a vow is sometimes   
confirmed by an oath4 ,therefore an oath
 is stronger than a vow4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 the obligation of a vow arises
 from the deliberation of the mind1 a   

stated above 7,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #a72 while   
the obligation of an oath results from  
the truth of ,god ,whose testimony is   
invoked4 ,since therefore ,god's truth  
is something greater than human         
deliberation1 it seems that the         
obligation of an oath is greater than   
that of a vow4  ,on the contrary1 ,a vow
 binds one to ,god while an oath        
sometimes binds one to man4 ,now one is 
more bound to ,god than to man4         
,therefore a vow is more binding than an
 oath4  ,i answer that1 ,the obligation 
both of vow and of an oath arises from  
something ,divine2 but in different     
ways4 ,for the obligation of a vow      
arises from the fidelity we owe ,god1   
which binds us to fulfil our promises to
 ,him4 ,on the other hand1 the          
obligation of an oath arises from the   
reverence we owe ,him which binds us to 
make true what we promise in ,his name4 
,now every act of infidelity includes an
 irreverence1 but not conversely1       
because the infidelity of a subject to  

his lord would seem to be the greatest  
irreverence4 ,hence a vow by its very   
nature is more binding than an oath4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a vow is not any kind 
of promise1 but a promise made to ,god2 
and to be unfaithful to ,god is most    
grievous4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an oath is 
added to a vow not because it is more   
stable1 but because greater stability   
results from two immutable things       
99,heb4 #f3ah4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3        
,deliberation of the mind gives a vow   
its stability1 on the part of the person
 who takes the vow3 but it has a greater
 cause of stability on the part of ,god1
 to ,whom the vow is offered4   ,,ninth 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #i  
,whether ,anyone ,can ,dispense from an 
,oath8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that no one can dispense from an oath4  
,just as truth is required for a        
declaratory oath1 which is about the    
past or the present1 so too is it       
required for a promissory oath1 which is
 about the future4 ,now no one can      

dispense a man from swearing to the     
truth about present or past things4     
,therefore neither can anyone dispense a
 man from making truth that which he has
 promised by oath to do in the future4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a promissory oath is
 used for the benefit of the person to  
whom the promise is made4 ,but1         
apparently1 he cannot release the other 
from his oath1 since it would be        
contrary to the reverence of ,god4 ,much
 less therefore can a dispensation from 
this oath be granted by anyone4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 any bishop can grant a    
dispensation from a vow1 except certain 
vows reserved to the ,pope alone1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #ab1 ad #c74 
,therefore in like manner1 if an oath   
admits of dispensation1 any bishop can  
dispense from an oath4 ,and yet         
seemingly this is to be against the law 
99,caus4 ,,xv1 qu4 #f1 can4             
,auctoritatem1 seqq43 ,cap4 ,si vero1 de
 ,jurejurando4 ,therefore it would seem 
that an oath does not admit of          

dispensation4  ,on the contrary1 ,a vow 
is more binding than an oath1 as stated 
above 7,a4 #h74 ,but a vow admits of    
dispensation and therefore an oath does 
also4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 
7,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #aj71 the necessity of a  
dispensation both from the law and from 
a vow arises from the fact that         
something which is useful and morally   
good in itself and considered in        
general1 may be morally evil and hurtful
 in respect of some particular          
emergency3 and such a case comes under  
neither law nor vow4 ,now anything      
morally evil or hurtful is incompatible 
with the matter of an oath3 for if it be
 morally evil it is opposed to justice1 
and if it be hurtful it is contrary to  
judgment4 ,therefore an oath likewise   
admits of dispensation4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,a dispensation from an oath does   
not imply a permission to do anything   
against the oath3 for this is           
impossible1 since the keeping of an oath
 comes under a ,divine precept1 which   

does not admit of dispensation3 but it  
implies that what hitherto came under an
 oath no longer comes under it1 as not  
being due matter for an oath1 just as we
 have said with regard to vows 7,q4 #hh1
 ,a4 #aj1 ad #b74 ,now the matter of a  
declaratory oath1 which is about        
something past or present1 has already  
acquired a certain necessity1 and has   
become unchangeable1 wherefore the      
dispensation will regard not the matter 
but the act itself of the oath3 so that 
such a dispensation would be directly   
contrary to the ,divine precept4 ,on the
 other hand1 the matter of a promissory 
oath is something future1 which admits  
of change1 so that1 to wit1 in certain  
emergencies1 it may be unlawful or      
hurtful1 and consequently undue matter  
for an oath4 ,therefore a promissory    
oath admits of dispensation1 since such 
dispensation regards the matter of an   
oath1 and is not contrary to the ,divine
 precept about the keeping of oaths4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one man may promise   

something under oath to another in two  
ways4 ,first1 when he promises something
 for his benefit3 for instance1 if he   
promise to serve him1 or to give him    
money3 and from such a promise he can be
 released by the person to whom he made 
it3 for he is understood to have already
 kept his promise to him when he acts   
towards him according to his will4      
,secondly1 one man promises another     
something pertaining to ,god's honor or 
to the benefit of others3 for instance1 
if a man promise another under oath that
 he will enter religion1 or perform some
 act of kindness4 ,in this case the     
person to whom the promise is made      
cannot release him that made the        
promise1 because it was made principally
 not to him but to ,god3 unless         
perchance it included some condition1   
for instance1 provided he give his      
consent or some such like condition4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sometimes that which  
is made the matter of a promissory oath 
is manifestly opposed to justice1 either

 because it is a sin1 as when a man     
swears to commit a murder1 or because it
 is an obstacle to a greater good1 as   
when a man swears not to enter religion3
 and such an oath requires no           
dispensation4 ,but in the former case a 
man is bound not to keep such an oath1  
while in the latter it is lawful for him
 to keep or not to keep the oath1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #g1 ad #b74 ,sometimes
 what is promised on oath is doubtfully 
right or wrong1 useful or harmful1      
either in itself or under the           
circumstance4 ,in this case any bishop  
can dispense4 ,sometimes1 however1 that 
which is promised under oath is         
manifestly lawful and beneficial4 ,an   
oath of this kind seemingly admits not  
of dispensation but of commutation1 when
 there occurs something better to be    
done for the common good1 in which case 
the matter would seem to belong chiefly 
to the power of the ,pope1 who has      
charge over the whole ,church2 and even 
of absolute relaxation1 for this too    

belongs in general to the ,pope in all  
matters regarding the administration of 
things ecclesiastical4 ,thus it is      
competent to any man to cancel an oath  
made by one of his subjects in matters  
that come under his authority3 for      
instance1 a father may annul his        
daughter's oath1 and a husband his      
wife's 7,num4 #cj3f1 seqq471 as stated  
above with regard to vows 7,q4 #hh1     
,,aa4 #h1 #i74   ,,tenth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #aj  ,whether 
an ,oath ,is ,voided by a ,condition of 
,person or ,time8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that an oath is not voided by
 a condition of person or time4 ,an     
oath1 according to the ,apostle 7,heb4  
#f3af71 is employed for the purpose of  
confirmation4 ,now it is competent to   
anyone to confirm his assertion1 and at 
any time4 ,therefore it would seem that 
an oath is not voided by a condition of 
person or time4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to 
swear by ,god is more than to swear by  
the ,gospels3 wherefore ,chrysostom     

99,hom4 xliv in the ,opus ,imperfectum  
falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,john          
,chrysostom says3 ,if there is a reason 
for swearing1 it seems a small thing to 
swear by ,god1 but a great thing to     
swear by the ,gospels4 ,to those who    
think thus1 it must be said3 ,nonsense6 
the ,scriptures were made for ,god's    
sake1 not ,god for the sake of the      
,scriptures4 ,now men of all conditions 
and at all times are wont to swear by   
,god4 ,much more1 therefore1 is it      
lawful to swear by the ,gospels4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 the same effect does not  
proceed from contrary causes1 since     
contrary causes produce contrary        
effects4 ,now some are debarred from    
swearing on account of some personal    
defect2 children1 for instance1 before  
the age of fourteen1 and persons who    
have already committed perjury4         
,therefore it would seem that a person  
ought not to be debarred from swearing  
either on account of his dignity1 as    
clerics1 or on account of the solemnity 

of the time4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 in    
this world no living man is equal in    
dignity to an angel3 for it is written  
7,matt4 #aa3aa7 that he that is the     
lesser in the kingdom of heaven is      
greater than he1 namely than ,john the  
,baptist1 while yet living4 ,now an     
angel is competent to swear1 for it is  
written 7,apoc4 #aj3f7 that the angel   
swore by ,him that liveth for ever and  
ever4 ,therefore no man ought to be     
excused from swearing1 on account of his
 dignity4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is     
stated 7,,ii1 qu4 v1 can4 ,si quis      
presbyter73 ,let a priest be examined   
'by his sacred consecration1' instead of
 being put on his oath3 and 7#bb1 qu4 v1
 can4 ,nullus73 ,let no one in          
ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on  
the ,holy ,gospels to a layman4  ,i     
answer that1 ,two things are to be      
considered in an oath4 ,one is on the   
part of ,god1 whose testimony is        
invoked1 and in this respect we should  
hold an oath in the greatest reverence4 

,for this reason children before the age
 of puberty are debarred from taking    
oaths 99,caus4 ,,xxii1 qu4 #e1 can4     
,parvuli1 and are not called upon to    
swear1 because they have not yet        
attained the perfect use of reason1 so  
as to be able to take a oath with due   
reverence4 ,perjurers also are debarred 
from taking an oath1 because it is      
presumed from their antecedents that    
they will not treat an oath with the    
reverence due to it4 ,for this same     
reason1 in order that oaths might be    
treated with due reverence the law says 
7#bb1 qu4 v1 can4 ,honestum73 ,it is    
becoming that he who ventures to swear  
on holy things should do so fasting1    
with all propriety and fear of ,god4    
,the other thing to be considered is on 
the part of the man1 whose assertion is 
confirmed by oath4 ,for a man's         
assertion needs no confirmation save    
because there is a doubt about it4 ,now 
it derogates from a person's dignity    
that one should doubt about the truth of

 what he says1 wherefore it becomes not 
persons of great dignity to swear4 ,for 
this reason the law says 7,,ii1 qu4 v1  
can4 ,si quis presbyter7 that priests   
should not swear for trifling reasons4  
,nevertheless it is lawful for them to  
swear if there be need for it1 or if    
great good may result therefrom4        
,especially is this the case in         
spiritual affairs1 when moreover it is  
becoming that they should take oath on  
days of solemnity1 since they ought then
 to devote themselves to spiritual      
matters4 ,nor should they on such       
occasions take oaths temporal matters1  
except perhaps in cases grave necessity4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some are unable to  
confirm their own assertions on account 
of their own defect3 and some there are 
whose words should be so certain that   
they need no confirmation4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,the greater the thing sworn by1   
the holier and the more binding is the  
oath1 considered in itself1 as          
,augustine states 7,ad ,public41 ,ep4   

xlvii73 and accordingly it is a graver  
matter to swear by ,god than the        
,gospels4 ,yet the contrary may be the  
case on account of the manner of        
swearing for instance1 an oath by the   
,gospels might be taken with            
deliberation and solemnity1 and an oath 
by ,god frivolously and without         
deliberation4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nothing
 prevents the same thing from arising   
out of contrary causes1 by way of       
superabundance and defect4 ,it is in    
this way that some are debarred from    
swearing1 through being of so great     
authority that it is unbecoming for them
 to swear2 while others are of such     
little authority that their oaths have  
no standing4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the     
angel's oath is adduced not on account  
of any defect in the angel1 as though   
one ought not to credit his mere word1  
but in order to show that the statement 
made issues from ,god's infallible      
disposition4 ,thus too ,god is sometimes
 spoken of by ,scripture as swearing1 in

 order to express the immutability of   
,his word1 as the ,apostle declares     
7,heb4 #f3ag74   ,,question #ij  ,,of   
,,the ,,taking ,,of ,,god',s ,,name ,,by
 ,,way ,,of ,,adjuration 7,in ,three    
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
taking of ,god's name by way of         
adjuration3 under which head there are  
three points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether 
it is lawful to adjure a man8  7#b7     
,whether it is lawful to adjure the     
demons8  7#c7 ,whether it is lawful to  
adjure irrational creatures8   ,,first  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to ,adjure a   
,man8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that it is not lawful to adjure a man4  
,origen says 7,tract4 xxxv super        
,matth473 ,i deem that a man who wishes 
to live according to the ,gospel should 
not adjure another man4 ,for if1        
according to the ,gospel mandate of     
,christ1 it be unlawful to swear1 it is 
evident that neither is it lawful to    
adjure3 and consequently it is manifest 

that the high-priest unlawfully adjured 
,jesus by the living ,god4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 whoever adjures a man1 compels
 him after a fashion4 ,but it is        
unlawful to compel a man against his    
will4 ,therefore seemingly it is also   
unlawful to adjure a man4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 to adjure is to induce a      
person to swear4 ,now it belongs to     
man's superior to induce him to swear1  
for the superior imposes an oath on his 
subject4 ,therefore subjects cannot     
adjure their superiors4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,even when we pray ,god we    
implore ,him by certain holy things3 and
 the ,apostle too besought the faithful 
by the mercy of ,god 7,rom4 #ab3a73 and 
this seems to be a kind of adjuration4  
,therefore it is lawful to adjure4  ,i  
answer that1 ,a man who utters a        
promissory oath1 swearing by his        
reverence for the ,divine name1 which he
 invokes in confirmation of his promise1
 binds himself to do what he has        
undertaken1 and so orders himself       

unchangeably to do a certain thing4 ,now
 just as a man can order himself to do a
 certain thing1 so too can he order     
others1 by beseeching his superiors1 or 
by commanding his inferiors1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #hc1 ,a4 #a74 ,accordingly   
when either of these orderings is       
confirmed by something ,divine it is an 
adjuration4 ,yet there is this          
difference between them1 that man is    
master of his own actions but not of    
those of others2 wherefore he can put   
himself under an obligation by invoking 
the ,divine name1 whereas he cannot put 
others under such an obligation unless  
they be his subjects1 whom he can compel
 on the strength of the oath they have  
taken4  ,therefore1 if a man by invoking
 the name of ,god1 or any holy thing1   
intends by this adjuration to put one   
who is not his subject under an         
obligation to do a certain thing1 in the
 same way as he would bind himself by   
oath1 such an adjuration is unlawful1   
because he usurps over another a power  

which he has not4 ,but superiors may    
bind their inferiors by this kind of    
adjuration1 if there be need for it4    
,if1 however1 he merely intend1 through 
reverence of the ,divine name or of some
 holy thing1 to obtain something from   
the other man without putting him under 
any obligation1 such an adjuration may  
be lawfully employed in respect of      
anyone4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,origen is    
speaking of an adjuration whereby a man 
intends to put another under an         
obligation1 in the same way as he would 
bind himself by oath3 for thus did the  
high-priest presume to adjure our ,lord 
,jesus ,christ 99,matt4 #bf3fc4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,this argument considers the  
adjuration which imposes an obligation4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to adjure is not to   
induce a man to swear1 but to employ    
terms resembling an oath in order to    
provoke another to do a certain thing4  
,moreover1 we adjure ,god in one way and
 man in another2 because when we adjure 
a man we intend to alter his will by    

appealing to his reverence for a holy   
thing3 and we cannot have such an       
intention in respect of ,god ,whose will
 is immutable4 ,if we obtain something  
from ,god through ,his eternal will1 it 
is due1 not to our merits1 but to ,his  
goodness4   ,,second ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful to ,adjure the ,demons8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem unlawful  
to adjure the demons4 ,origen says      
7,tract4 xxxv1 super ,matth473 ,to      
adjure the demons is not accordance with
 the power given by our ,saviour3 for   
this is a ,jewish practice4 ,now rather 
than imitate the rites of the ,jews1 we 
should use the power given by ,christ4  
,therefore it is not lawful to adjure   
the demons4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 many   
make use of necromantic incantations    
when invoking the demons by something   
,divine3 and this is an adjuration4     
,therefore1 if it be lawful to adjure   
the demons1 it is lawful to make use of 
necromantic incantations1 which is      

evidently false4 ,therefore the         
antecedent is false also4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 whoever adjures a person1 by  
that very fact associates himself with  
him4 ,now it is not lawful to have      
fellowship with the demons1 according to
 #a ,cor4 #aj3bj1 ,i would not that you 
should be made partakers with devils4   
,therefore it is not lawful to adjure   
the demons4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   
written 7,mk4 #af3ag73 ,in ,my name they
 shall cast out devils4 ,now to induce  
anyone to do a certain thing for the    
sake of ,god's name is to adjure4       
,therefore it is lawful to adjure the   
demons4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated in  
the preceding article1 there are two    
ways of adjuring3 one by way of prayer  
or inducement through reverence of some 
holy thing3 the other by way of         
compulsion4 ,in the first way it is not 
lawful to adjure the demons because such
 a way seems to savor of benevolence or 
friendship1 which it is unlawful to bear
 towards the demons4 ,as to the second  

kind of adjuration1 which is by         
compulsion1 we may lawfully use it for  
some purposes1 and not for others4 ,for 
during the course of this life the      
demons are our adversaries3 and their   
actions are not subject to our disposal 
but to that of ,god and the holy angels1
 because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4
 iii1 #d71 the rebel spirit is ruled by 
the just spirit4 ,accordingly we may    
repulse the demons1 as being our        
enemies1 by adjuring them through the   
power of ,god's name1 lest they do us   
harm of soul or body1 in accord with the
 ,divine power given by ,christ1 as     
recorded by ,luke #aj3ai3 ,behold1 ,i   
have given you power to tread upon      
serpents and scorpions1 and upon all the
 power of the enemy3 and nothing shall  
hurt you4  ,it is not1 however1 lawful  
to adjure them for the purpose of       
learning something from them1 or of     
obtaining something through them1 for   
this would amount to holding fellowship 
with them3 except perhaps when certain  

holy men1 by special instinct or ,divine
 revelation1 make use of the demons'    
actions in order to obtain certain      
results3 thus we read of the ,blessed   
,james 99the ,greater2 cf4 ,apocrypha1  
,n4,t41 ,hist4 ,certam4 ,apost4 vi1 #ai 
that he caused ,hermogenes to be brought
 to him1 by the instrumentality of the  
demons4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,origen is    
speaking of adjuration made1 not        
authoritatively by way of compulsion1   
but rather by way of a friendly appeal4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,necromancers adjure   
and invoke the demons in order to obtain
 or learn something from them3 and this 
is unlawful1 as stated above4 ,wherefore
 ,chrysostom1 commenting on our ,lord's 
words to the unclean spirit 7,mk4       
#a3be71 ,speak no more1 and go out of   
the man1 says3 ,a salutary teaching is  
given us here1 lest we believe the      
demons1 however much they speak the     
truth4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument 
considers the adjuration whereby the    
demon's help is besought in doing or    

learning something3 for this savors of  
fellowship with them4 ,on the other     
hand1 to repulse the demons by adjuring 
them1 is to sever oneself from their    
fellowship4   ,,third ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,it ,is ,lawful to ,adjure an           
,irrational ,creature8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem unlawful to adjure an    
irrational creature4 ,an adjuration     
consists of spoken words4 ,but it is    
useless to speak to one that understands
 not1 such as an irrational creature4   
,therefore it is vain and unlawful to   
adjure an irrational creature4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 seemingly wherever        
adjuration is admissible1 swearing is   
also admissible4 ,but swearing is not   
consistent with an irrational creature4 
,therefore it would seem unlawful to    
employ adjuration towards one4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 there are two ways of     
adjuring1 as explained above 7,,aa4 #a1 
#b74 ,one is by way of appeal2 and this 
cannot be employed towards irrational   

creatures1 since they are not masters of
 their own actions4 ,the other kind of  
adjuration is by way of compulsion3 and1
 seemingly1 neither is it lawful to use 
this towards them1 because we have not  
the power to command irrational         
creatures1 but only ,he of ,whom it was 
said 7,matt4 #h3bg73 ,for the winds and 
the sea obey ,him4 ,therefore in no way1
 apparently1 is it lawful to adjure     
irrational creatures4  ,on the contrary1
 ,simon and ,jude are related to have   
adjured dragons and to have commanded   
them to withdraw into the desert4       
99,from the apocryphal ,historiae       
,certam4 ,apost4 vi4 #ai4  ,i answer    
that1 ,irrational creatures are directed
 to their own actions by some other     
agent4 ,now the action of what is       
directed and moved is also the action of
 the director and mover3 thus the       
movement of the arrow is an operation of
 the archer4 ,wherefore the operation of
 the irrational creature is ascribed not
 only to it1 but also and chiefly to    

,god1 ,who disposes the movements of all
 things4 ,it is also ascribed to the    
devil1 who1 by ,god's permission1 makes 
use of irrational creatures in order to 
inflict harm on man4  ,accordingly the  
adjuration of an irrational creature may
 be of two kinds4 ,first1 so that the   
adjuration is referred to the irrational
 creature in itself3 and in this way it 
would be vain to adjure an irrational   
creature4 ,secondly1 so that it be      
referred to the director and mover of   
the irrational creature1 and in this    
sense a creature of this kind may be    
adjured in two ways4 ,first1 by way of  
appeal made to ,god1 and this relates to
 those who work miracles by calling on  
,god3 secondly1 by way of compulsion1   
which relates to the devil1 who uses the
 irrational creature for our harm4 ,this
 is the kind of adjuration used in the  
exorcisms of the ,church1 whereby the   
power of the demons is expelled from an 
irrational creature4 ,but it is not     
lawful to adjure the demons by          

beseeching them to help us4  ,this      
suffices for the ,replies to the        
,objections4   ,,question #ia  ,,of     
,,taking ,,the ,,divine ,,name ,,for    
,,the ,,purpose ,,of ,,invoking ,,it    
,,by ,,means ,,of ,,praise 7,in ,two    
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
taking of the ,divine name for the      
purpose of invoking it by prayer or     
praise4 ,of prayer we have already      
spoken 7,q4 #hc74 ,wherefore we must    
speak now of praise4 ,under this head   
there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether ,god should be praised with the
 lips8  7#b7 ,whether ,god should be    
praised with song8   ,,first ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,god ,should ,be ,praised with the      
,lips8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that ,god should not be praised with the
 lips4 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4  
#a1 #ab73 ,the best of men ere accorded 
not praise1 but something greater4 ,but 
,god transcends the very best of all    
things4 ,therefore ,god ought to be     

given1 not praise1 but something greater
 than praise3 wherefore ,he is said     
7,ecclus4 #dc3cc7 to be above all       
praise4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 divine     
praise is part of divine worship1 for it
 is an act of religion4 ,now ,god is    
worshiped with the mind rather than with
 the lips3 wherefore our ,lord quoted   
against certain ones the words of ,isa4 
#bi3ac1 ,this people 4 4 4 honors       
,vulg43 'glorifies' ,me with their lips1
 but their heart is far from ,me4       
,therefore the praise of ,god lies in   
the heart rather than on the lips4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 men are praised with
 the lips that they may be encouraged to
 do better3 since just as being praised 
makes the wicked proud1 so does it      
incite the good to better things4       
,wherefore it is written 7,prov4        
#bg3ba73 ,as silver is tried in the     
fining-pot 4 4 4 so a man is tried by   
the mouth of him that praiseth4 ,but    
,god is not incited to better things by 
man's words1 both because ,he is        

unchangeable1 and because ,he is        
supremely good1 and it is not possible  
for ,him to grow better4 ,therefore ,god
 should not be praised with the lips4   
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4  
#fb3f73 ,my mouth shall praise ,thee    
with joyful lips4  ,i answer that1 ,we  
use words1 in speaking to ,god1 for one 
reason1 and in speaking to man1 for     
another reason4 ,for when speaking to   
man we use words in order to tell him   
our thoughts which are unknown to him4  
,wherefore we praise a man with our     
lips1 in order that he or others may    
learn that we have a good opinion of    
him3 so that in consequence we may      
incite him to yet better things2 and    
that we may induce others1 who hear him 
praised1 to think well of him1 to       
reverence him1 and to imitate him4 ,on  
the other hand we employ words1 in      
speaking to ,god1 not indeed to make    
known our thoughts to ,him ,who is the  
searcher of hearts1 but that we may     
bring ourselves and our hearers to      

reverence ,him4  ,consequently we need  
to praise ,god with our lips1 not indeed
 for ,his sake1 but for our own sake2   
since by praising ,him our devotion is  
aroused towards ,him1 according to ,ps4 
#di3bc3 ,the sacrifice of praise shall  
glorify ,me1 and there is the way by    
which ,i will show him the salvation of 
,god4 ,and forasmuch as man1 by praising
 ,god1 ascends in his affections to     
,god1 by so much is he withdrawn from   
things opposed to ,god1 according to    
,isa4 #dh3i1 ,for ,my praise ,i will    
bridle thee lest thou shouldst perish4  
,the praise of the lips is also         
profitable to others by inciting their  
affections towards ,god1 wherefore it is
 written 7,ps4 #cc3b73 ,his praise shall
 always be in my mouth1 and farther on3 
,let the meek hear and rejoice4 ,o      
magnify the ,lord with me4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,we may speak of ,god in two ways4 
,first1 with regard to ,his essence2 and
 thus1 since ,he is incomprehensible and
 ineffable1 ,he is above all praise4 ,in

 this respect we owe ,him reverence and 
the honor of latria2 wherefore ,ps4     
#fd3b is rendered by ,jerome in his     
,psalter 99,translated from the ,hebrew3
 ,praise to ,thee is speechless1 ,o     
,god1 as regards the first1 and as to   
the second1 ,a vow shall be paid to     
,thee4 ,secondly1 we may speak of ,god  
as to ,his effects which are ordained   
for our good4 ,in this respect we owe   
,him praise2 wherefore it is written    
7,isa4 #fc3g73 ,i will remember the     
tender mercies of the ,lord1 the praise 
of the ,lord for all the things that the
 ,lord hath bestowed upon us4 ,again1   
,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 #a73 ,thou 
wilt find that all the sacred hymns1    
i4e4 divine praises of the sacred       
writers1 are directed respectively to   
the ,blessed ,processions of the        
,thearchy1 i4e4 of the ,godhead1 showing
 forth and praising the names of ,god4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it profits one nothing
 to praise with the lips if one praise  
not with the heart4 ,for the heart      

speaks ,god's praises when it fervently 
recalls the glorious things of ,his     
works 99,cf4 ,ecclus4 #ag3g1 #h4 ,yet   
the outward praise of the lips avails to
 arouse the inward fervor of those who  
praise1 and to incite others to praise  
,god1 as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,we praise ,god1 not for ,his benefit1 
but for ours as stated4   ,,second      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,god ,should ,be ,praised with 
,song8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that ,god should not be praised with    
song4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,col4     
#c3af73 ,teaching and admonishing one   
another in psalms1 hymns and spiritual  
canticles4 ,now we should employ nothing
 in the divine worship1 save what is    
delivered to us on the authority of     
,scripture4 ,therefore it would seem    
that1 in praising ,god1 we should       
employ1 not corporal but spiritual      
canticles4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,jerome 
in his commentary on ,eph4 #e3ai1       
,singing and making melody in your      

hearts to the ,lord1 says3 ,listen1     
young men whose duty it is to recite the
 office in church3 ,god is to be sung   
not with the voice but with the heart4  
,nor should you1 like play-actors1 ease 
your throat and jaws with medicaments1  
and make the church resound with        
theatrical measures and airs4 ,therefore
 ,god should not be praised with song4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the praise of ,god  
is competent to little and great1       
according to ,apoc4 #ad1 ,give praise to
 our ,god1 all ye ,his servants2 and you
 that fear ,him1 little and great4 ,but 
the great1 who are in the church1 ought 
not to sing3 for ,gregory says 7,regist4
 iv1 ep4 #dd73 ,i hereby ordain that in 
this ,see the ministers of the sacred   
altar must not sing 7,cf4 ,decret41     
dist4 xcii41 cap4 ,in sancta ,romana    
,ecclesia74 ,therefore singing is       
unsuitable to the divine praises4  ,obj4
 #d3 ,further1 in the ,old ,law ,god was
 praised with musical instruments and   
human song1 according to ,ps4 #cb3b1 #c3

 ,give praise to the ,lord on the harp1 
sing to ,him with the psaltery1 the     
instrument of ten strings4 ,sing to ,him
 a new canticle4 ,but the ,church does  
not make use of musical instruments such
 as harps and psalteries1 in the divine 
praises1 for fear of seeming to imitate 
the ,jews4 ,therefore in like manner    
neither should song be used in the      
divine praises4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the
 praise of the heart is more important  
than the praise of the lips4 ,but the   
praise of the heart is hindered by      
singing1 both because the attention of  
the singers is distracted from the      
consideration of what they are singing1 
so long as they give all their attention
 to the chant1 and because others are   
less able to understand the things that 
are sung than if they were recited      
without chant4 ,therefore chants should 
not be employed in the divine praises4  
,on the contrary1 ,blessed ,ambrose     
established singing in the ,church of   
,milan1 as ,augustine relates 7,confess4

 ix74  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 
7,a4 #a71 the praise of the voice is    
necessary in order to arouse man's      
devotion towards ,god4 ,wherefore       
whatever is useful in conducing to this 
result is becomingly adopted in the     
divine praises4 ,now it is evident that 
the human soul is moved in various ways 
according to various melodies of sound1 
as the ,philosopher state 7,polit4 viii1
 #e71 and also ,boethius 7,de ,musica1  
prologue74 ,hence the use of music in   
the divine praises is a salutary        
institution1 that the souls of the      
faint-hearted may be the more incited to
 devotion4 ,wherefore ,augustine say    
7,confess4 x1 #cc73 ,i am inclined to   
approve of the usage of singing in the  
church1 that so by the delight of the   
ears the faint-hearted may rise to the  
feeling of devotion3 and he says of     
himself 7,confess4 ix1 #f73 ,i wept in  
,thy hymns and canticles1 touched to the
 quick by the voices of ,thy            
sweet-attuned ,church4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3

 ,the name of spiritual canticle may be 
given not only to those that are sung   
inwardly in spirit1 but also to those   
that are sung outwardly with the lips1  
inasmuch as such like canticles arouse  
spiritual devotion4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,jerome does not absolutely condemn     
singing1 but reproves those who sing    
theatrically in church not in order to  
arouse devotion1 but in order to show   
off1 or to provoke pleasure4 ,hence     
,augustine says 7,confess4 x1 #cc73     
,when it befalls me to be more moved by 
the voice than by the words sung1 ,i    
confess to have sinned penally1 and then
 had rather not hear the singer4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,to arouse men to devotion by
 teaching and preaching is a more       
excellent way than by singing4          
,wherefore deacons and prelates1 whom it
 becomes to incite men's minds towards  
,god by means of preaching and teaching1
 ought not to be instant in singing1    
lest thereby they be withdrawn from     
greater things4 ,hence ,gregory says    

7,regist4 iv1 ep4 #dd73 ,it is a most   
discreditable custom for those who have 
been raised to the diaconate to serve as
 choristers1 for it behooves them to    
give their whole time to the duty of    
preaching and to taking charge of the   
alms4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as the         
,philosopher says 7,polit4 viii1 #f71   
,teaching should not be accompanied with
 a flute or any artificial instrument   
such as the harp or anything else of    
this kind3 but only with such things as 
make good hearers4 ,for such like       
musical instruments move the soul to    
pleasure rather than create a good      
disposition within it4 ,in the ,old     
,testament instruments of this          
description were employed1 both because 
the people were more coarse and         
carnal--so that they needed to be       
aroused by such instruments as also by  
earthly promises--and because these     
material instruments were figures of    
something else4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the  
soul is distracted from that which is   

sung by a chant that is employed for the
 purpose of giving pleasure4 ,but if the
 singer chant for the sake of devotion1 
he pays more attention to what he says1 
both because he lingers more thereon1   
and because1 as ,augustine remarks      
7,confess4 x1 #cc71 each affection of   
our spirit1 according to its variety1   
has its own appropriate measure in the  
voice1 and singing1 by some hidden      
correspondence wherewith it is stirred4 
,the same applies to the hearers1 for   
even if some of them understand not what
 is sung1 yet they understand why it is 
sung1 namely1 for ,god's glory3 and this
 is enough to arouse their devotion4    
,,question #ib  ,,of ,,superstition     
7,,two ,,articles7  ,in due sequence we 
must consider the vices that are opposed
 to religion4 ,first we shall consider  
those which agree with religion in      
giving worship to ,god2 secondly1 we    
shall treat of those vices which are    
manifestly contrary to religion1 through
 showing contempt of those things that  

pertain to the worship of ,god4 ,the    
former come under the head of           
superstition1 the latter under that of  
irreligion4 ,accordingly we must        
consider in the first place1            
superstition and its parts1 and         
afterwards irreligion and its parts4    
,under the first head there are two     
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
superstition is a vice opposed to       
religion8  7#b7 ,whether it has several 
parts or species8   ,,first ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ib1 ,art4 #a  ,whether  
,superstition ,is a ,vice ,contrary to  
,religion8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that superstition is not a vice    
contrary to religion4 ,one contrary is  
not included in the definition of the   
other4 ,but religion is included in the 
definition of superstition3 for the     
latter is defined as being immoderate   
observance of religion1 according to a  
gloss on ,col4 #b3bc1 ,which things have
 indeed a show of wisdom in             
superstition4 ,therefore superstition is

 not a vice contrary to religion4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 x73
 ,cicero 99,de ,natura ,deorum ii1 #bh  
states that the superstitious were so   
called because they spent the day in    
praying and offering sacrifices that    
their children might survive            
7superstites7 them4 ,but this may be    
done even in accordance with true       
religious worship4 ,therefore           
superstition is not a vice opposed to   
religion4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1          
superstition seems to denote an excess4 
,but religion admits of no excess1      
since1 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #e1
 ad #c71 there is no possibility of     
rendering to ,god1 by religion1 the     
equal of what we owe ,him4 ,therefore   
superstition is not a vice contrary to  
religion4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 
says 7,de ,decem ,chord4 ,serm4 ix73    
,thou strikest the first chord in the   
worship of one ,god1 and the beast of   
superstition hath fallen4 ,now the      
worship of one ,god belongs to religion4

 ,therefore superstition is contrary to 
religion4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated   
above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #e71 religion is a  
moral virtue4 ,now every moral virtue   
observes a mean1 as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore a
 twofold vice is opposed to a moral     
virtue2 one by way of excess1 the other 
by way of deficiency4 ,again1 the mean  
of virtue may be exceeded1 not only with
 regard to the circumstance called how  
much1 but also with regard to other     
circumstances3 so that1 in certain      
virtues such as magnanimity and         
magnificence2 vice exceeds the mean of  
virtue1 not through tending to something
 greater than the virtue1 but possibly  
to something less1 and yet it goes      
beyond the mean of virtue1 through doing
 something to whom it ought not1 or when
 it ought not1 and in like manner as    
regards other circumstances1 as the     
,philosopher shows 7,ethic4 iv1 #a1 #b1 
#c74  ,accordingly superstition is a    
vice contrary to religion by excess1 not

 that it offers more to the divine      
worship than true religion1 but because 
it offers divine worship either to whom 
it ought not1 or in a manner it ought   
not4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as we speak
 metaphorically of good among evil      
things--thus we speak of a good         
thief--so too sometimes the names of the
 virtues are employed by transposition  
in an evil sense4 ,thus prudence is     
sometimes used instead of cunning1      
according to ,luke #af3h1 ,the children 
of this world are more prudent ,douay3  
'wiser' in their generation than the    
children of light4 ,it is in this way   
that superstition is described as       
religion4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the        
etymology of a word differs from its    
meaning4 ,for its etymology depends on  
what it is taken from for the purpose of
 signification3 whereas its meaning     
depends on the thing to which it is     
applied for the purpose of signifying   
it4 ,now these things differ sometimes3 
for lapis 7a stone7 takes its name from 

hurting the foot 7laedere pedem71 but   
this is not its meaning1 else iron1     
since it hurts the foot1 would be a     
stone4 ,in like manner it does not      
follow that superstition means that from
 which the word is derived4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,religion does not admit of   
excess1 in respect of absolute quantity1
 but it does admit of excess in respect 
of proportionate quantity1 in so far1 to
 wit1 as something may be done in divine
 worship that ought not to be done4     
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ib1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,there ,are ,various 
,species of ,superstition8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that there are not   
various species of superstition4        
,according to the ,philosopher 7,topic4 
i1 #ac71 if one contrary includes many  
kinds1 so does the other4 ,now religion1
 to which superstition is contrary1 does
 not include various species2 but all   
its acts belong to the one species4     
,therefore neither has superstition     
various species4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   

opposites relate to one same thing4 ,but
 religion1 to which superstition is     
opposed1 relates to those things whereby
 we are directed to ,god1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore     
superstition1 which is opposed to       
religion1 is not specified according to 
divinations of human occurrences1 or by 
the observances of certain human        
actions4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a gloss on
 ,col4 #b3bc1 ,which things have 4 4 4 a
 show of wisdom in superstition1 adds3  
that is to say in a hypocritical        
religion4 ,therefore hypocrisy should be
 reckoned a species of superstition4    
,on the contrary1 ,augustine assigns the
 various species of superstition 7,de   
,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #bj74  ,i answer   
that1 ,as stated above1 sins against    
religion consist in going beyond the    
mean of virtue in respect of certain    
circumstances 7,a4 #a74 ,for as we have 
stated 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #i71 not  
every diversity of corrupt circumstances
 differentiates the species of a sin1   

but only that which is referred to      
diverse objects1 for diverse ends3 since
 it is in this respect that moral acts  
are diversified specifically1 as stated 
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ah1
 ,,aa4 #b1 #f74  ,accordingly the       
species of superstition are             
differentiated1 first on the part of the
 mode1 secondly on the part of the      
object4 ,for the divine worship may be  
given either to whom it ought to be     
given1 namely1 to the true ,god1 but in 
an undue mode1 and this is the first    
species of superstition2 or to whom it  
ought not to be given1 namely1 to any   
creature whatsoever1 and this is another
 genus of superstition1 divided into    
many species in respect of the various  
ends of divine worship4 ,for the end of 
divine worship is in the first place to 
give reverence to ,god1 and in this     
respect the first species of this genus 
is idolatry1 which unduly gives divine  
honor to a creature4 ,the second end of 
religion is that man may be taught by   

,god ,whom he worships2 and to this must
 be referred divinatory superstition1   
which consults the demons through       
compacts made with them1 whether tacit  
or explicit4 ,thirdly1 the end of divine
 worship is a certain direction of human
 acts according to the precepts of ,god 
the object of that worship3 and to this 
must be referred the superstition of    
certain observances4  ,augustine alludes
 to these three 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4   
ii1 #bj71 where he says that anything   
invented by man for making and          
worshipping idols is superstitious1 and 
this refers to the first species4 ,then 
he goes on to say1 or any agreement or  
covenant made with the demons for the   
purpose of consultation and of compact  
by tokens1 which refers to the second   
species2 and a little further on he     
adds3 ,to this kind belong all sorts of 
amulets and such like1 and this refers  
to the third species4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71   
good results from a cause that is one   

and entire1 whereas evil arises from    
each single defect4 ,wherefore several  
vices are opposed to one virtue1 as     
stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #e74 
,the saying of the ,philosopher is true 
of opposites wherein there is the same  
reason of multiplicity4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,divinations and certain observances
 come under the head of superstition1 in
 so far as they depend on certain       
actions of the demons3 and thus they    
pertain to compacts made with them4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hypocritical religion 
is taken here for religion as applied to
 human observances1 as the gloss goes on
 to explain4 ,wherefore this            
hypocritical religion is nothing else   
than worship given to ,god in an undue  
mode3 as1 for instance1 if a man were1  
in the time of grace1 to wish to worship
 ,god according to the rite of the ,old 
,law4 ,it is of religion taken in this  
sense that the gloss speaks literally4  
,,question #ic  ,,of ,,superstition     
,,consisting ,,in ,,undue ,,worship ,,of

 ,,the ,,true ,,god 7,in ,two ,articles7
  ,we must now consider the species of  
superstition4 ,we shall treat 7#a7 ,of  
the superstition which consists in      
giving undue worship to the true ,god2  
7#b7 ,of the superstition of idolatry2  
7#c7 of divinatory superstition2 7#d7 of
 the superstition of observances4       
,under the first head there are two     
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether there 
can be anything pernicious in the       
worship of the true ,god8  7#b7 ,whether
 there can be anything superfluous      
therein8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,there ,can 
,be ,anything ,pernicious in the        
,worship of the ,true ,god8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that there cannot be 
anything pernicious in the worship of   
the true ,god4 ,it is written 7,joel    
#b3cb73 ,everyone that shall call upon  
the name of the ,lord shall be saved4   
,now whoever worships ,god calls upon   
,his name4 ,therefore all worship of    
,god is conducive to salvation1 and     

consequently none is pernicious4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 it is the same ,god that  
is worshiped by the just in any age of  
the world4 ,now before the giving of the
 ,law the just worshiped ,god in        
whatever manner they pleased1 without   
committing mortal sin3 wherefore ,jacob 
bound himself by his own vow to a       
special kind of worship1 as related in  
,genesis #bh4 ,therefore now also no    
worship of ,god is pernicious4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 nothing pernicious is     
tolerated in the ,church4 ,yet the      
,church tolerates various rites of      
divine worship3 wherefore ,gregory1     
replying to ,augustine1 bishop of the   
,english 7,regist4 xi1 ep4 #fd71 who    
stated that there existed in the        
churches various customs in the         
celebration of ,mass1 wrote3 ,i wish you
 to choose carefully whatever you find  
likely to be most pleasing to ,god1     
whether in the ,roman territory1 or in  
the land of the ,gauls1 or in any part  
of the ,church4 ,therefore no way of    

worshiping ,god is pernicious4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,augustine 99,jerome 7,ep4    
lxxv1 ad ,aug47 ,see ,opp4 ,august4 ,ep4
 lxxxii in a letter to ,jerome 7and the 
words are quoted in a gloss on ,gal4    
#b3ad7 says that after the ,gospel truth
 had been preached the legal observances
 became deadly1 and yet these           
observances belonged to the worship of  
,god4 ,therefore there can be something 
deadly in the divine worship4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as ,augustine states 7,cont4    
,mendac4 xiv71 a most pernicious lie is 
that which is uttered in matters        
pertaining to ,christian religion4 ,now 
it is a lie if one signify outwardly    
that which is contrary to the truth4    
,but just as a thing is signified by    
word1 so it is by deed3 and it is in    
this signification by deed that the     
outward worship of religion consists1 as
 shown above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #g74         
,consequently1 if anything false is     
signified by outward worship1 this      
worship will be pernicious4  ,now this  

happens in two ways4 ,in the first      
place1 it happens on the part of the    
thing signified1 through the worship    
signifying something discordant         
therefrom3 and in this way1 at the time 
of the ,new ,law1 the mysteries of      
,christ being already accomplished1 it  
is pernicious to make use of the        
ceremonies of the ,old ,law whereby the 
mysteries of ,christ were foreshadowed  
as things to come3 just as it would be  
pernicious for anyone to declare that   
,christ has yet to suffer4 ,in the      
second place1 falsehood in outward      
worship occurs on the part of the       
worshiper1 and especially in common     
worship which is offered by ministers   
impersonating the whole ,church4 ,for   
even as he would be guilty of falsehood 
who would1 in the name of another       
person1 proffer things that are not     
committed to him1 so too does a man     
incur the guilt of falsehood who1 on the
 part of the ,church1 gives worship to  
,god contrary to the manner established 

by the ,church or divine authority1 and 
according to ecclesiastical custom4     
,hence ,ambrose 99,comment4 in #a ad#a  
,cor4 #aa3bg1 quoted in the gloss of    
,peter ,lombard says3 ,he is unworthy   
who celebrates the mystery otherwise    
than ,christ delivered it4 ,for this    
reason1 too1 a gloss on ,col4 #b3bc says
 that superstition is the use of human  
observances under the name of religion4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since ,god is truth1  
to invoke ,god is to worship ,him in    
spirit and truth1 according to ,john    
#d3bc4 ,hence a worship that contains   
falsehood1 is inconsistent with a       
salutary calling upon ,god4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,before the time of the ,law  
the just were instructed by an inward   
instinct as to the way of worshiping    
,god1 and others followed them4 ,but    
afterwards men were instructed by       
outward precepts about this matter1 and 
it is wicked to disobey them4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,the various customs of the   
,church in the divine worship are in no 

way contrary to the truth3 wherefore we 
must observe them1 and to disregard them
 is unlawful4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,there ,can ,be ,any ,excess in the     
,worship of ,god8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that there cannot be excess  
in the worship of ,god4 ,it is written  
7,ecclus4 #dc3cb73 ,glorify the ,lord as
 much as ever you can1 for ,he will yet 
far exceed4 ,now the divine worship is  
directed to the glorification of ,god4  
,therefore there can be no excess in it4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 outward worship is
 a profession of inward worship1 whereby
 ,god is worshiped with faith1 hope1 and
 charity1 as ,augustine says            
7,enchiridion iii74 ,now there can be no
 excess in faith1 hope1 and charity4    
,neither1 therefore1 can there be in the
 worship of ,god4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
to worship ,god consists in offering to 
,him what we have received from ,him4   
,but we have received all our goods from
 ,god4 ,therefore if we do all that we  

possibly can for ,god's honor1 there    
will be no excess in the divine worship4
  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de
 ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #ah7 that the good
 and true ,christian rejects also       
superstitious fancies from ,holy ,writ4 
,but ,holy ,writ teaches us to worship  
,god4 ,therefore there can be           
superstition by reason of excess even in
 the worship of ,god4  ,i answer that1  
,a thing is said to be in excess in two 
ways4 ,first1 with regard to absolute   
quantity1 and in this way there cannot  
be excess in the worship of ,god1       
because whatever man does is less than  
he owes ,god4 ,secondly1 a thing is in  
excess with regard to quantity of       
proportion1 through not being           
proportionate to its end4 ,now the end  
of divine worship is that man may give  
glory to ,god1 and submit to ,him in    
mind and body4 ,consequently1 whatever a
 man may do conducing to ,god's glory1  
and subjecting his mind to ,god1 and his
 body1 too1 by a moderate curbing of the

 concupiscences1 is not excessive in the
 divine worship1 provided it be in      
accordance with the commandments of ,god
 and of the ,church1 and in keeping with
 the customs of those among whom he     
lives4  ,on the other hand if that which
 is done be1 in itself1 not conducive to
 ,god's glory1 nor raise man's mind to  
,god1 nor curb inordinate concupiscence1
 or again if it be not in accordance    
with the commandments of ,god and of the
 ,church1 or if it be contrary to the   
general custom--which1 according to     
,augustine 99,ad ,casulan4 ,ep4 xxxvi1  
has the force of law--all this must be  
reckoned excessive and superstitious1   
because consisting1 as it does1 of mere 
externals1 it has no connection with the
 internal worship of ,god4 ,hence       
,augustine 7,de ,vera ,relig4 iii7      
quotes the words of ,luke #ag3ba1 ,the  
kingdom of ,god is within you1 against  
the superstitious1 those1 to wit1 who   
pay more attention to externals4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,the glorification of ,god   

implies that what is done is done for   
,god's glory3 and this excludes the     
excess denoted by superstition4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,faith1 hope and charity      
subject the mind to ,god1 so that there 
can be nothing excessive in them4 ,it is
 different with external acts1 which    
sometimes have no connection with these 
virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this        
argument considers excess by way of     
absolute quantity4   ,,question #id     
,,of ,,idolatry 7,in ,four ,articles7   
,we must now consider idolatry3 under   
which head there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether idolatry is a   
species of superstition8  7#b7 ,whether 
it is a sin8  7#c7 ,whether it is the   
gravest sin8  7#d7 ,of the cause of this
 sin4   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #id1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,idolatry ,is  
,rightly ,reckoned a ,species of        
,superstition8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that idolatry is not rightly      
reckoned a species of superstition4     
,just as heretics are unbelievers1 so   

are idolaters4 ,but heresy is a species 
of unbelief1 as stated above 7,q4 #aa1  
,a4 #a74 ,therefore idolatry is also a  
species of unbelief and not of          
superstition4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      
latria pertains to the virtue of        
religion to which superstition is       
opposed4 ,but latria1 apparently1 is    
univocally applied to idolatry and to   
that which belongs to the true religion4
 ,for just as we speak univocally of the
 desire of false happiness1 and of the  
desire of true happiness1 so too1       
seemingly1 we speak univocally of the   
worship of false gods1 which is called  
idolatry1 and of the worship of the true
 ,god1 which is the latria of true      
religion4 ,therefore idolatry is not a  
species of superstition4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 that which is nothing cannot  
be the species of any genus4 ,but       
idolatry1 apparently1 is nothing3 for   
the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #h3d73 ,we  
know that an idol is nothing in the     
world1 and further on 7#a ,cor4 #aj3ai73

 ,what then8 ,do ,i say that what is    
offered in sacrifice to idols is        
anything8 ,or that the idol is anything8
 implying an answer in the negative4    
,now offering things to idols belongs   
properly to idolatry4 ,therefore since  
idolatry is like to nothing1 it cannot  
be a species of superstition4  ,obj4 #d3
 ,further1 it belongs to superstition to
 give divine honor to whom that honor is
 not due4 ,now divine honor is undue to 
idols1 just as it is undue to other     
creatures1 wherefore certain people are 
reproached 7,rom4 #a3be7 for that they  
worshipped and served the creature      
rather than the ,creator4 ,therefore    
this species of superstition is         
unfittingly called idolatry1 and should 
rather be named worship of creatures4   
,on the contrary1 ,it is related 7,acts 
#ag3af7 that when ,paul awaited ,silas  
and ,timothy at ,athens1 his spirit was 
stirred within him seeing the whole city
 given to idolatry1 and further on      
7,acts #ag3bb7 he says3 ,ye men of      

,athens1 ,i perceive that in all things 
you are too superstitious4 ,therefore   
idolatry belongs to superstition4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ib1 
,a4 #b71 it belongs to superstition to  
exceed the due mode of divine worship1  
and this is done chiefly when divine    
worship is given to whom it should not  
be given4 ,now it should be given to the
 most high uncreated ,god alone1 as     
stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a7 when we  
were treating of religion4 ,therefore it
 is superstition to give worship to any 
creature whatsoever4  ,now just as this 
divine worship was given to sensible    
creatures by means of sensible signs1   
such as sacrifices1 games1 and the like1
 so too was it given to a creature      
represented by some sensible form or    
shape1 which is called an idol4 ,yet    
divine worship was given to idols in    
various ways4 ,for some1 by means of a  
nefarious art1 constructed images which 
produced certain effects by the power of
 the demons3 wherefore they deemed that 

the images themselves contained         
something ,god-like1 and consequently   
that divine worship was due to them4    
,this was the opinion of ,hermes        
,trismegistus 99,de ,natura ,deorum1 ad 
,asclep41 as ,augustine states 7,de     
,civ4 ,dei viii1 #bc73 while others gave
 divine worship not to the images1 but  
to the creatures represented thereby4   
,the ,apostle alludes to both of these  
7,rom4 #a3bc1 #be74 ,for1 as regards the
 former1 he says3 ,they changed the     
glory of the incorruptible ,god into the
 likeness of the image of a corruptible 
man1 and of birds1 and of four-footed   
beasts1 and of creeping things1 and of  
the latter he says3 ,who worshipped and 
served the creature rather than the     
,creator4  ,these latter were of three  
ways of thinking4 ,for some deemed      
certain men to have been gods1 whom they
 worshipped in the images of those men3 
for instance1 ,jupiter1 ,mercury1 and so
 forth4 ,others again deemed the whole  
world to be one god1 not by reason of   

its material substance1 but by reason of
 its soul1 which they believed to be    
,god1 for they held ,god to be nothing  
else than a soul governing the world by 
movement and reason3 even as a man is   
said to be wise in respect not of his   
body but of his soul4 ,hence they       
thought that divine worship ought to be 
given to the whole world and to all its 
parts1 heaven1 air1 water1 and to all   
such things3 and to these they referred 
the names of their gods1 as ,varro      
asserted1 and ,augustine relates 7,de   
,civ4 ,dei vii1 #e74 ,lastly1 others1   
namely1 the ,platonists1 said that there
 is one supreme god1 the cause of all   
things4 ,after him they placed certain  
spiritual substances created by the     
supreme god4 ,these they called gods1 on
 account of their having a share of the 
godhead2 but we call them angels4 ,after
 these they placed the souls of the     
heavenly bodies1 and beneath these the  
demons which they stated to be certain  
animal denizens of the air1 and beneath 

these again they placed human souls1    
which they believed to be taken up into 
the fellowship of the gods or of the    
demons by reason of the merit of their  
virtue4 ,to all these they gave divine  
worship1 as ,augustine relates 7,de ,civ
 4 4 ,dei xviii1 #ad74  ,the last two   
opinions were held to belong to natural 
theology which the philosophers gathered
 from their study of the world and      
taught in the schools3 while the other1 
relating to the worship of men1 was said
 to belong to mythical theology which   
was wont to be represented on the stage 
according to the fancies of poets4 ,the 
remaining opinion relating to images was
 held to belong to civil theology1 which
 was celebrated by the pontiffs in the  
temples 99,de ,civ4 ,dei vi1 #e4  ,now  
all these come under the head of the    
superstition of idolatry4 ,wherefore    
,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4   
ii1 #bj73 ,anything invented by man for 
making and worshipping idols1 or for    
giving ,divine worship to a creature or 

any part of a creature1 is              
superstitious4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just  
as religion is not faith1 but a         
confession of faith by outward signs1 so
 superstition is a confession of        
unbelief by external worship4 ,such a   
confession is signified by the term     
idolatry1 but not by the term heresy1   
which only means a false opinion4       
,therefore heresy is a species of       
unbelief1 but idolatry is a species of  
superstition4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the    
term latria may be taken in two senses4 
,in one sense it may denote a human act 
pertaining to the worship of ,god3 and  
then its signification remains the same1
 to whomsoever it be shown1 because1 in 
this sense1 the thing to which it is    
shown is not included in its definition4
 ,taken thus latria is applied          
univocally1 whether to true religion or 
to idolatry1 just as the payment of a   
tax is univocally the same1 whether it  
is paid to the true or to a false king4 
,in another sense latria denotes the    

same as religion1 and then1 since it is 
a virtue1 it is essential thereto that  
divine worship be given to whom it ought
 to be given2 and in this way latria is 
applied equivocally to the latria of    
true religion1 and to idolatry3 just as 
prudence is applied equivocally to the  
prudence that is a virtue1 and to that  
which is carnal4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the 
saying of the ,apostle that an idol is  
nothing in the world means that those   
images which were called idols1 were not
 animated1 or possessed of a divine     
power1 as ,hermes maintained1 as though 
they were composed of spirit and body4  
,in the same sense we must understand   
the saying that what is offered in      
sacrifice to idols is not anything1     
because by being thus sacrificed the    
sacrificial flesh acquired neither      
sanctification1 as the ,gentiles        
thought1 nor uncleanness1 as the ,jews  
held4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,it was owing to
 the general custom among the ,gentiles 
of worshipping any kind of creature     

under the form of images that the term  
idolatry was used to signify any worship
 of a creature1 even without the use of 
images4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #id1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,idolatry   
,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that idolatry is not a sin4        
,nothing is a sin that the true faith   
employs in worshipping ,god4 ,now the   
true faith employs images for the divine
 worship3 since both in the ,tabernacle 
were there images of the cherubim1 as   
related in ,ex4 #be1 and in the ,church 
are images set up which the faithful    
worship4 ,therefore idolatry1 whereby   
idols are worshipped1 is not a sin4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 reverence should be 
paid to every superior4 ,but the angels 
and the souls of the blessed are our    
superiors4 ,therefore it will be no sin 
to pay them reverence by worship1 of    
sacrifices or the like4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 the most high ,god should be  
honored with an inward worship1         
according to ,john #d3bd1 ,god 4 4 4    

they must adore 4 4 4 in spirit and in  
truth3 and ,augustine says 7,enchiridion
 iii71 that ,god is worshipped by faith1
 hope and charity4 ,now a man may happen
 to worship idols outwardly1 and yet not
 wander from the true faith inwardly4   
,therefore it seems that we may worship 
idols outwardly without prejudice to the
 divine worship4  ,on the contrary1 ,it 
is written 7,ex4 #bj3e73 ,thou shalt not
 adore them1 i4e4 outwardly1 nor serve  
them1 i4e4 inwardly1 as a gloss explains
 it3 and it is a question of graven     
things and images4 ,therefore it is a   
sin to worship idols whether outwardly  
or inwardly4  ,i answer that1 ,there has
 been a twofold error in this matter4   
,for some 99,the ,school of ,plato have 
thought that to offer sacrifices and    
other things pertaining to latria1 not  
only to ,god but also to the others     
aforesaid1 is due and good in itself1   
since they held that divine honor should
 be paid to every superior nature1 as   
being nearer to ,god4 ,but this is      

unreasonable4 ,for though we ought to   
revere all superiors1 yet the same      
reverence is not due to them all3 and   
something special is due to the most    
high ,god ,who excels all in a singular 
manner3 and this is the worship of      
latria4  ,nor can it be said1 as some   
have maintained1 that these visible     
sacrifices are fitting with regard to   
other gods1 and that to the most high   
,god1 as being better than those others1
 better sacrifices1 namely1 the service 
of a pure mind1 should be offered       
99,augustine1 as quoted below4 ,the     
reason is that1 as ,augustine says 7,de 
,civ4 ,dei x1 #ai71 external sacrifices 
are signs of internal1 just as audible  
words are signs of things4 ,wherefore1  
just as by prayer and praise we utter   
significant words to ,him1 and offer to 
,him in our hearts the things they      
signify1 so too in our sacrifices we    
ought to realize that we should offer a 
visible sacrifice to no other than to   
,him ,whose invisible sacrifice we      

ourselves should be in our hearts4      
,others held that the outward worship of
 latria should be given to idols1 not as
 though it were something good or       
fitting in itself1 but as being in      
harmony with the general custom4 ,thus  
,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei vi1 #aj7     
quotes ,seneca as saying3 ,we shall     
adore1 says he1 in such a way as to     
remember that our worship is in         
accordance with custom rather than with 
the reality3 and 7,de ,vera ,relig4 v7  
,augustine says that we must not seek   
religion from the philosophers1 who     
accepted the same things for sacred1 as 
did the people2 and gave utterance in   
the schools to various and contrary     
opinions about the nature of their gods1
 and the sovereign good4 ,this error was
 embraced also by certain heretics      
99,the ,helcesaitae1 who affirmed that  
it is not wrong for one who is seized in
 time of persecution to worship idols   
outwardly so long as he keeps the faith 
in his heart4  ,but this is evidently   

false4 ,for since outward worship is a  
sign of the inward worship1 just as it  
is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary  
of what one holds inwardly of the true  
faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to
 pay outward worship to anything counter
 to the sentiments of one's heart4      
,wherefore ,augustine condemns ,seneca  
7,de ,civ4 ,dei vi1 #aj7 in that his    
worship of idols was so much the more   
infamous forasmuch as the things he did 
dishonestly were so done by him that the
 people believed him to act honestly4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,neither in the        
,tabernacle or ,temple of the ,old ,law1
 nor again now in the ,church are images
 set up that the worship of latria may  
be paid to them1 but for the purpose of 
signification1 in order that belief in  
the excellence of angels and saints may 
be impressed and confirmed in the mind  
of man4 ,it is different with the image 
of ,christ1 to which latria is due on   
account of ,his ,divinity1 as we shall  
state in the ,third ,part 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 

#c74  ,the ,replies to the ,second and  
,third ,objections are evident from what
 has been said above4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #c  
,whether ,idolatry ,is the ,gravest of  
,sins8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that idolatry is not the gravest of     
sins4 ,the worst is opposed to the best 
7,ethic4 viii1 #aj74 ,but interior      
worship1 which consists of faith1 hope  
and charity1 is better than external    
worship4 ,therefore unbelief1 despair   
and hatred of ,god1 which are opposed to
 internal worship1 are graver sins than 
idolatry1 which is opposed to external  
worship4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the more a
 sin is against ,god the more grievous  
it is4 ,now1 seemingly1 a man acts more 
directly against ,god by blaspheming1 or
 denying the faith1 than by giving      
,god's worship to another1 which        
pertains to idolatry4 ,therefore        
blasphemy and denial of the faith are   
more grievous sins than idolatry4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 it seems that lesser     

evils are punished with greater evils4  
,but the sin of idolatry was punished   
with the sin against nature1 as stated  
in ,rom4 #a3bf4 ,therefore the sin      
against nature is a graver sin than     
idolatry4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1          
,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xx1    
#e73 ,neither do we say that you1 viz4  
the ,manichees1 are pagans1 or a sect of
 pagans1 but that you bear a certain    
likeness to them since you worship many 
gods3 and yet you are much worse than   
they are1 for they worship things that  
exist1 but should not be worshiped as   
gods1 whereas you worship things that   
exist not at all4 ,therefore the vice of
 heretical depravity is more grievous   
than idolatry4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 a   
gloss of ,jerome on ,gal4 #d3i1 ,how    
turn you again to the weak and needy    
elements8 says3 ,the observance of the  
,law1 to which they were then addicted1 
was a sin almost equal to the worship of
 idols1 to which they had been given    
before their conversion4 ,therefore     

idolatry is not the most grievous sin4  
,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on the saying
 of ,lev4 #ae3be1 about the uncleanness 
of a woman suffering from an issue of   
blood1 says3 ,every sin is an           
uncleanness of the soul1 but especially 
idolatry4  ,i answer that1 ,the gravity 
of a sin may be considered in two ways4 
,first1 on the part of the sin itself1  
and thus idolatry is the most grievous  
sin4 ,for just as the most heinous crime
 in an earthly commonwealth would seem  
to be for a man to give royal honor to  
another than the true king1 since1 so   
far as he is concerned1 he disturbs the 
whole order of the commonwealth1 so1 in 
sins that are committed against ,god1   
which indeed are the greater sins1 the  
greatest of all seems to be for a man to
 give ,god's honor to a creature1 since1
 so far as he is concerned1 he sets up  
another ,god in the world1 and lessens  
the divine sovereignty4 ,secondly1 the  
gravity of a sin may be considered on   
the part of the sinner4 ,thus the sin of

 one that sins knowingly is said to be  
graver than the sin of one that sins    
through ignorance3 and in this way      
nothing hinders heretics1 if they       
knowingly corrupt the faith which they  
have received1 from sinning more        
grievously than idolaters who sin       
through ignorance4 ,furthermore other   
sins may be more grievous on account of 
greater contempt on the part of the     
sinner4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,idolatry     
presupposes internal unbelief1 and to   
this it adds undue worship4 ,but in a   
case of external idolatry without       
internal unbelief1 there is an          
additional sin of falsehood1 as stated  
above 7,a4 #b74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3       
,idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy1
 inasmuch as it deprives ,god of the    
singleness of ,his dominion and denies  
the faith by deeds4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,since it is essential to punishment    
that it be against the will1 a sin      
whereby another sin is punished needs to
 be more manifest1 in order that it may 

make the man more hateful to himself and
 to others2 but it need not be a more   
grievous sin3 and in this way the sin   
against nature is less grievous than the
 sin of idolatry4 ,but since it is more 
manifest1 it is assigned as a fitting   
punishment of the sin of idolatry1 in   
order that1 as by idolatry man abuses   
the order of the divine honor1 so by the
 sin against nature he may suffer       
confusion from the abuse of his own     
nature4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,even as to   
the genus of the sin1 the ,manichean    
heresy is more grievous than the sin of 
other idolaters1 because it is more     
derogatory to the divine honor1 since   
they set up two gods in opposition to   
one another1 and hold many vain and     
fabulous fancies about ,god4 ,it is     
different with other heretics1 who      
confess their belief in one ,god and    
worship ,him alone4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3   
,the observance of the ,law during the  
time of grace is not quite equal to     
idolatry as to the genus of the sin1 but

 almost equal1 because both are species 
of pestiferous superstition4   ,,fourth 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #d  
,whether the ,cause of ,idolatry ,was on
 the ,part of ,man8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that the cause of idolatry   
was not on the part of man4 ,in man     
there is nothing but either nature1     
virtue1 or guilt4 ,but the cause of     
idolatry could not be on the part of    
man's nature1 since rather does man's   
natural reason dictate that there is one
 ,god1 and that divine worship should   
not be paid to the dead or to inanimate 
beings4 ,likewise1 neither could        
idolatry have its cause in man on the   
part of virtue1 since a good tree cannot
 bring forth evil fruit1 according to   
,matt4 #g3ah3 nor again could it be on  
the part of guilt1 because1 according to
 ,wis4 #ad3bg1 the worship of abominable
 idols is the cause and the beginning   
and end of all evil4 ,therefore idolatry
 has no cause on the part of man4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 those things which have a

 cause in man are found among men at all
 times4 ,now idolatry was not always1   
but is stated 99,peter ,comestor1 ,hist4
 ,genes4 xxxvii1 xl to have been        
originated either by ,nimrod1 who is    
related to have forced men to worship   
fire1 or by ,ninus1 who caused the      
statue of his father ,bel to be         
worshiped4 ,among the ,greeks1 as       
related by ,isidore 7,etym4 viii1 #aa71 
,prometheus was the first to set up     
statues of men3 and the ,jews say that  
,ismael was the first to make idols of  
clay4 ,moreover1 idolatry ceased to a   
great extent in the sixth age4          
,therefore idolatry had no cause on the 
part of man4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxi1    
#f73 ,it was not possible to learn1 for 
the first time1 except from their 7i4e4 
the demons'7 teaching1 what each of them
 desired or disliked1 and by what name  
to invite or compel him3 so as to give  
birth to the magic arts and their       
professors3 and the same observation    

seems to apply to idolatry4 ,therefore  
idolatry had no cause on the part of    
man4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written  
7,wis4 #ad3ad73 ,by the vanity of men   
they1 i4e4 idols1 came into the world4  
,i answer that1 ,idolatry had a twofold 
cause4 ,one was a dispositive cause2    
this was on the part of man1 and in     
three ways4 ,first1 on account of his   
inordinate affections1 forasmuch as he  
gave other men divine honor1 through    
either loving or revering them too much4
 ,this cause is assigned 7,wis4 #ad3ae73
 ,a father being afflicted with bitter  
grief1 made to himself the image of his 
son1 who was quickly taken away3 and him
 who then had died as a man he began to 
worship as a god4 ,the same passage goes
 on to say 7,wis4 #ad3ba7 that men      
serving either their affection1 or their
 kings1 gave the incommunicable name    
,vulg43 'names'1 i4e4 of the ,godhead1  
to stones and wood4 ,secondly1 because  
man takes a natural pleasure in         
representations1 as the ,philosopher    

observes 7,poet4 iv71 wherefore as soon 
as the uncultured man saw human images  
skillfully fashioned by the diligence of
 the craftsman1 he gave them divine     
worship2 hence it is written 7,wis4     
#ac3aa-ag73 ,if an artist1 a carpenter1 
hath cut down a tree1 proper for his    
use1 in the wood 4 4 4 and by the skill 
of his art fashioneth it1 and maketh it 
like the image of a man 4 4 4 and then  
maketh prayer to it1 inquiring          
concerning his substance1 and his       
children1 or his marriage4 ,thirdly1 on 
account of their ignorance of the true  
,god1 inasmuch as through failing to    
consider ,his excellence men gave divine
 worship to certain creatures1 on       
account of their beauty or power1       
wherefore it is written 7,wis4 #ac3a1   
#b73 ,all men 4 4 4 neither by attending
 to the works have acknowledged who was 
the workman1 but have imagined either   
the fire1 or the wind1 or the swift air1
 or the circle of the stars1 or the     
great water1 or the sun and the moon1 to

 be the gods that rule the world4  ,the 
other cause of idolatry was completive1 
and this was on the part of the demons1 
who offered themselves to be worshipped 
by men1 by giving answers in the idols1 
and doing things which to men seemed    
marvelous4 ,hence it is written 7,ps4   
#ie3e73 ,all the gods of the ,gentiles  
are devils4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the      
dispositive cause of idolatry was1 on   
the part of man1 a defect of nature1    
either through ignorance in his         
intellect1 or disorder in his           
affections1 as stated above2 and this   
pertains to guilt4 ,again1 idolatry is  
stated to be the cause1 beginning and   
end of all sin1 because there is no kind
 of sin that idolatry does not produce  
at some time1 either through leading    
expressly to that sin by causing it1 or 
through being an occasion thereof1      
either as a beginning or as an end1 in  
so far as certain sins were employed in 
the worship of idols2 such as homicides1
 mutilations1 and so forth4             

,nevertheless certain sins may precede  
idolatry and dispose man thereto4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there was no idolatry 
in the first age1 owing to the recent   
remembrance of the creation of the      
world1 so that man still retained in his
 mind the knowledge of one ,god4 ,in the
 sixth age idolatry was banished by the 
doctrine and power of ,christ1 who      
triumphed over the devil4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,this argument considers the        
consummative cause of idolatry4         
,,question #ie  ,,of ,,superstition ,,in
 ,,divinations 7,in ,eight ,articles7   
,we must now consider superstition in   
divinations1 under which head there are 
eight points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether 
divination is a sin8  7#b7 ,whether it  
is a species of superstition8  7#c7 ,of 
the species of divination2  7#d7 ,of    
divination by means of demons2  7#e7 ,of
 divination by the stars2  7#f7 ,of     
divination by dreams2  7#g7 ,of         
divination by auguries and like         
observances2  7#h7 ,of divination by    

lots4   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #ie1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,divination ,is
 a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that divination is not a sin4           
,divination is derived from something   
divine3 and things that are divine      
pertain to holiness rather than to sin4 
,therefore it seems that divination is  
not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1         
,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #a73
 ,who dares to say that learning is an  
evil8 and again3 ,i could nowise admit  
that intelligence can be an evil4 ,but  
some arts are divinatory1 as the        
,philosopher states 7,de ,memor4 i73 and
 divination itself would seem to pertain
 to a certain intelligence of the truth4
 ,therefore it seems that divination is 
not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there is
 no natural inclination to evil2 because
 nature inclines only to its like4 ,but 
men by natural inclination seek to      
foreknow future events2 and this belongs
 to divination4 ,therefore divination is
 not a sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is   

written 7,deut4 #ah3aj1 #aa73 ,neither  
let there be found among you 4 4 4 any  
one that consulteth pythonic spirits1 or
 fortune tellers3 and it is stated in   
the ,decretals 7#bf1 qu4 v1 can4 ,qui   
divinationes73 ,those who seek for      
divinations shall be liable to a penance
 of five years' duration1 according to  
the fixed grades of penance4  ,i answer 
that1 ,divination denotes a foretelling 
of the future4 ,the future may be       
foreknown in two ways3 first in its     
causes1 secondly in itself4 ,now the    
causes of the future are threefold3 for 
some produce their effects1 of necessity
 and always2 and such like future       
effects can be foreknown and foretold   
with certainty1 from considering their  
causes1 even as astrologers foretell a  
coming eclipse4 ,other causes produce   
their effects1 not of necessity and     
always1 but for the most part1 yet they 
rarely fail3 and from such like causes  
their future effects can be foreknown1  
not indeed with certainty1 but by a kind

 of conjecture1 even as astrologers by  
considering the stars can foreknow and  
foretell things concerning rains and    
droughts1 and physicians1 concerning    
health and death4 ,again1 other causes1 
considered in themselves1 are           
indifferent2 and this is chiefly the    
case in the rational powers1 which stand
 in relation to opposites1 according to 
the ,philosopher 99,metaph4 viii1 #b1   
#e1 #h4 ,such like effects1 as also     
those which ensue from natural causes by
 chance and in the minority of          
instances1 cannot be foreknown from a   
consideration of their causes1 because  
these causes have no determinate        
inclination to produce these effects4   
,consequently such like effects cannot  
be foreknown unless they be considered  
in themselves4 ,now man cannot consider 
these effects in themselves except when 
they are present1 as when he sees       
,socrates running or walking3 the       
consideration of such things in         
themselves before they occur is proper  

to ,god1 ,who alone in ,his eternity    
sees the future as though it were       
present1 as stated in the ,first ,part  
7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ac2 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 
#hf1 ,a4 #d74 ,hence it is written      
7,isa4 #da3bc73 ,show the things that   
are to come hereafter1 and we shall know
 that ye are gods4 ,therefore if anyone 
presume to foreknow or foretell such    
like future things by any means         
whatever1 except by divine revelation1  
he manifestly usurps what belongs to    
,god4 ,it is for this reason that       
certain men are called divines3         
wherefore ,isidore says 7,etym4 viii1   
#i73 ,they are called divines1 as though
 they were full of ,god4 ,for they      
pretend to be filled with the ,godhead1 
and by a deceitful fraud they forecast  
the future to men4  ,accordingly it is  
not called divination1 if a man         
foretells things that happen of         
necessity1 or in the majority of        
instances1 for the like can be foreknown
 by human reason3 nor again if anyone   

knows other contingent future things1   
through divine revelation3 for then he  
does not divine1 i4e4 cause something   
divine1 but rather receives something   
divine4 ,then only is a man said to     
divine1 when he usurps to himself1 in an
 undue manner1 the foretelling of future
 events3 and this is manifestly a sin4  
,consequently divination is always a    
sin2 and for this reason ,jerome says in
 his commentary on ,mic4 #c3i1 seqq4    
that divination is always taken in an   
evil sense4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3           
,divination takes its name not from a   
rightly ordered share of something      
divine1 but from an undue usurpation    
thereof1 as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,there are certain arts for the     
foreknowledge of future events that     
occur of necessity or frequently1 and   
these do not pertain to divination4 ,but
 there are no true arts or sciences for 
the knowledge of other future events1   
but only vain inventions of the devil's 
deceit1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4   

,dei xxi1 #h74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man   
has a natural inclination to know the   
future by human means1 but not by the   
undue means of divination4   ,,second   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #b  
,whether ,divination ,is a ,species of  
,superstition8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that divination is not a species  
of superstition4 ,the same thing cannot 
be a species of diverse genera4 ,now    
divination is apparently a species of   
curiosity1 according to ,augustine 7,de 
,vera ,relig4 xxxviii7 99,cf4 ,de       
,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #bc1 #bd2 ,de      
,divin4 ,daem4 #c4 ,therefore it is not1
 seemingly1 a species of superstition4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as religion is 
due worship1 so is superstition undue   
worship4 ,but divination does not seem  
to pertain to undue worship4 ,therefore 
it does not pertain to superstition4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 superstition is     
opposed to religion4 ,but in true       
religion nothing is to be found         
corresponding as a contrary to          

divination4 ,therefore divination is not
 a species of superstition4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,origen says in his ,peri     
,archon 99,the quotation is from his    
sixteenth homily on the ,book of        
,numbers3 ,there is an operation of the 
demons in the administering of          
foreknowledge1 comprised1 seemingly1    
under the head of certain arts exercised
 by those who have enslaved themselves  
to the demons1 by means of lots1 omens1 
or the observance of shadows4 ,i doubt  
not that all these things are done by   
the operation of the demons4 ,now1      
according to ,augustine 7,de ,doctr4    
,christ4 ii1 #bj1 #bc71 whatever results
 from fellowship between demons and men 
is superstitious4 ,therefore divination 
is a species of superstition4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,,qq4  
#ib1 #id71 superstition denotes undue   
divine worship4 ,now a thing pertains to
 the worship of ,god in two ways3 in one
 way1 it is something offered to ,god2  
as a sacrifice1 an oblation1 or         

something of the kind3 in another way1  
it is something divine that is assumed1 
as stated above with regard to an oath  
7,q4 #hi1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b74 ,wherefore    
superstition includes not only          
idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons1
 but also recourse to the help of the   
demons for the purpose of doing or      
knowing something4 ,but all divination  
results from the demons' operation1     
either because the demons are expressly 
invoked that the future may be made     
known1 or because the demons thrust     
themselves into futile searchings of the
 future1 in order to entangle men's     
minds with vain conceits4 ,of this kind 
of vanity it is written 7,ps4 #ci3e73   
,who hath not regard to vanities and    
lying follies4 ,now it is vain to seek  
knowledge of the future1 when one tries 
to get it from a source whence it cannot
 be foreknown4 ,therefore it is manifest
 that divination is a species of        
superstition4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3         
,divination is a kind of curiosity with 

regard to the end in view1 which is     
foreknowledge of the future2 but it is a
 kind of superstition as regards the    
mode of operation4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,this kind of divination pertains to the
 worship of the demons1 inasmuch as one 
enters into a compact1 tacit or express 
with the demons4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in  
the ,new ,law man's mind is restrained  
from solicitude about temporal things3  
wherefore the ,new ,law contains no     
institution for the foreknowledge of    
future events in temporal matters4 ,on  
the other hand in the ,old ,law1 which  
contained earthly promises1 there were  
consultations about the future in       
connection with religious matters4      
,hence where it is written 7,isa4       
#h3ai73 ,and when they shall say to you3
 ,seek of pythons and of diviners1 who  
mutter in their enchantments1 it is     
added by way of answer3 ,should not the 
people seek of their ,god1 a vision for 
the living and the dead8 99,vulg43 'seek
 of their ,god1 for the living of the   

dead8'  ,in the ,new ,testament1        
however1 there were some possessed of   
the spirit of prophecy1 who foretold    
many things about future events4        
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,we ,ought to        
,distinguish ,several ,species of       
,divination8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that we should not distinguish     
several species of divination4 ,where   
the formality of sin is the same1 there 
are not seemingly several species of    
sin4 ,now there is one formality of sin 
in all divinations1 since they consist  
in entering into compact with the demons
 in order to know the future4 ,therefore
 there are not several species of       
divination4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a human
 act takes its species from its end1 as 
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2  
,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f74 ,but all divination is
 directed to one end1 namely1 the       
foretelling of the future4 ,therefore   
all divinations are of one species4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 signs do not vary   

the species of a sin1 for whether one   
detracts by word1 writing or gestures1  
it is the same species of sin4 ,now     
divinations seem to differ merely       
according to the various signs whence   
the foreknowledge of the future is      
derived4 ,therefore there are not       
several species of divination4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,isidore enumerates various   
species of divination 7,etym4 viii1 #i74
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 
#b71 all divinations seek to acquire    
foreknowledge of future events1 by means
 of some counsel and help of a demon1   
who is either expressly called upon to  
give his help1 or else thrusts himself  
in secretly1 in order to foretell       
certain future things unknown to men1   
but known to him in such manners as have
 been explained in the ,first ,part 7,q4
 #eg1 ,a4 #c74 ,when demons are         
expressly invoked1 they are wont to     
foretell the future in many ways4       
,sometimes they offer themselves to     
human sight and hearing by mock         

apparitions in order to foretell the    
future3 and this species is called      
prestigiation because man's eyes are    
blindfolded 7praestringuntur74          
,sometimes they make use of dreams1 and 
this is called divination by dreams3    
sometimes they employ apparitions or    
utterances of the dead1 and this species
 is called necromancy1 for as ,isidore  
observes 7,etym4 viii7 in ,greek1 nekron
 means dead1 and manteia divination1    
because after certain incantations and  
the sprinkling of blood1 the dead seem  
to come to life1 to divine and to answer
 questions4 ,sometimes they foretell the
 future through living men1 as in the   
case of those who are possessed3 this is
 divination by pythons1 of whom ,isidore
 says that pythons are so called from   
,pythius ,apollo1 who was said to be the
 inventor of divination4 ,sometimes they
 foretell the future by means of shapes 
or signs which appear in inanimate      
beings4 ,if these signs appear in some  
earthly body such as wood1 iron or      

polished stone1 it is called geomancy1  
if in water hydromancy1 if in the air   
aeromancy1 if in fire pyromancy1 if in  
the entrails of animals sacrificed on   
the altars of demons1 aruspicy4  ,the   
divination which is practiced without   
express invocation of the demons is of  
two kinds4 ,the first is when1 with a   
view to obtain knowledge of the future1 
we take observations in the disposition 
of certain things4 ,if one endeavor to  
know the future by observing the        
position and movements of the stars1    
this belongs to astrologers1 who are    
also called genethliacs1 because they   
take note of the days on which people   
are born4 ,if one observe the movements 
and cries of birds or of any animals1 or
 the sneezing of men1 or the sudden     
movements of limbs1 this belongs in     
general to augury1 which is so called   
from the chattering of birds 7avium     
garritu71 just as auspice is derived    
from watching birds 7avium inspectione74
 ,these are chiefly wont to be observed 

in birds1 the former by the ear1 the    
latter by the eye4 ,if1 however1 these  
observations have for their object men's
 words uttered unintentionally1 which   
someone twist so as to apply to the     
future that he wishes to foreknow1 then 
it is called an omen3 and as ,valerius  
,maximus 99,de ,dict4 ,fact4 ,memor4 i1 
#e remarks1 the observing of omens has a
 touch of religion mingled with it1 for 
it is believed to be founded not on a   
chance movement1 but on divine          
providence4 ,it was thus that when the  
,romans were deliberating whether they  
would change their position1 a centurion
 happened to exclaim at the time3       
',standard-bearer1 fix the banner1 we   
had best stand here'3 and on hearing    
these words they took them as an omen1  
and abandoned their intention of        
advancing further4 ,if1 however1 the    
observation regards the dispositions1   
that occur to the eye1 of figures in    
certain bodies1 there will be another   
species of divination3 for the          

divination that is taken from observing 
the lines of the hand is called         
chiromancy1 i4e4 divination of the hand 
7because cheir is the ,greek for hand73 
while the divination which is taken from
 signs appearing in the shoulder-blades 
of an animal is called spatulamancy4    
,to this second species of divination1  
which is without express invocation of  
the demons1 belongs that which is       
practiced by observing certain things   
done seriously by men in the research of
 the occult1 whether by drawing lots1   
which is called geomancy2 or by         
observing the shapes resulting from     
molten lead poured into water2 or by    
observing which of several sheets of    
paper1 with or without writing upon     
them1 a person may happen to draw2 or by
 holding out several unequal sticks and 
noting who takes the greater or the     
lesser1 or by throwing dice1 and        
observing who throws the highest score2 
or by observing what catches the eye    
when one opens a book1 all of which are 

named sortilege4  ,accordingly it is    
clear that there are three kinds of     
divination4 ,the first is when the      
demons are invoked openly1 this comes   
under the head of necromancy2 the second
 is merely an observation of the        
disposition or movement of some other   
being1 and this belongs to augury2 while
 the third consists in doing something  
in order to discover the occult2 and    
this belongs to sortilege4 ,under each  
of these many others are contained1 as  
explained above4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in  
all the aforesaid there is the same     
general1 but not the same special1      
character of sin3 for it is much more   
grievous to invoke the demons than to do
 things that deserve the demons'        
interference4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3         
,knowledge of the future or of the      
occult is the ultimate end whence       
divination takes its general formality4 
,but the various species are            
distinguished by their proper objects or
 matters1 according as the knowledge of 

the occult is sought in various things4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the things observed by
 diviners are considered by them1 not as
 signs expressing what they already     
know1 as happens in detraction1 but as  
principles of knowledge4 ,now it is     
evident that diversity of principles    
diversifies the species1 even in        
demonstrative sciences4   ,,fourth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,divination ,practiced by      
,invoking the ,demons ,is ,unlawful8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
divination practiced by invoking the    
demons is not unlawful4 ,christ did     
nothing unlawful1 according to #a ,pet4 
#b3bb1 ,who did no sin4 ,yet our ,lord  
asked the demon3 ,what is thy name8 and 
the latter replied3 ,my name is ,legion1
 for we are many 7,mk4 #e3i74 ,therefore
 it seems lawful to question the demons 
about the occult4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
the souls of the saints do not encourage
 those who ask unlawfully4 ,yet ,samuel 
appeared to ,saul when the latter       

inquired of the woman that had a        
divining spirit1 concerning the issue of
 the coming war 7#a ,kings #bh3h1 sqq474
 ,therefore the divination that consists
 in questioning demons is not unlawful4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it seems lawful to  
seek the truth from one who knows1 if it
 be useful to know it4 ,but it is       
sometimes useful to know what is hidden 
from us1 and can be known through the   
demons1 as in the discovery of thefts4  
,therefore divination by questioning    
demons is not unlawful4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #ah3aj1
 #aa73 ,neither let there there be found
 among you 4 4 4 anyone that consulteth 
soothsayers 4 4 4 nor 4 4 4 that        
consulteth pythonic spirits4  ,i answer 
that1 ,all divination by invoking demons
 is unlawful for two reasons4 ,the first
 is gathered from the principle of      
divination1 which is a compact made     
expressly with a demon by the very fact 
of invoking him4 ,this is altogether    
unlawful2 wherefore it is written       

against certain persons 7,isa4 #bh3ae73 
,you have said3 ,we have entered into a 
league with death1 and we have made a   
covenant with hell4 ,and still more     
grievous would it be if sacrifice were  
offered or reverence paid to the demon  
invoked4 ,the second reason is gathered 
from the result4 ,for the demon who     
intends man's perdition endeavors1 by   
his answers1 even though he sometimes   
tells the truth1 to accustom men to     
believe him1 and so to lead him on to   
something prejudicial to the salvation  
of mankind4 ,hence ,athanasius1         
commenting on the words of ,luke #d3ce1 
,he rebuked him1 saying3 ,hold thy      
peace1 says3 ,although the demon        
confessed the truth1 ,christ put a stop 
to his speech1 lest together with the   
truth he should publish his wickedness  
and accustom us to care little for such 
things1 however much he may seem to     
speak the truth4 ,for it is wicked1     
while we have the divine ,scriptures1 to
 seek knowledge from the demons4  ,reply

 ,obj4 #a3 ,according to ,bede's        
commentary on ,luke #h3cj1 ,our ,lord   
inquired1 not through ignorance1 but in 
order that the disease1 which he        
tolerated1 being made public1 the power 
of the ,healer might shine forth more   
graciously4 ,now it is one thing to     
question a demon who comes to us of his 
own accord 7and it is lawful to do so at
 times for the good of others1          
especially when he can be compelled1 by 
the power of ,god1 to tell the truth7   
and another to invoke a demon in order  
to gain from him knowledge of things    
hidden from us4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3       
,according to ,augustine 7,ad ,simplic4 
ii1 #c71 there is nothing absurd in     
believing that the spirit of the just   
man1 being about to smite the king with 
the divine sentence1 was permitted to   
appear to him1 not by the sway of magic 
art or power1 but by some occult        
dispensation of which neither the witch 
nor ,saul was aware4 ,or else the spirit
 of ,samuel was not in reality aroused  

from his rest1 but some phantom or mock 
apparition formed by the machinations of
 the devil1 and styled by ,scripture    
under the name of ,samuel1 just as the  
images of things are wont to be called  
by the names of those things4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,no temporal utility can      
compare with the harm to spiritual      
health that results from the research of
 the unknown by invoking the demon4     
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1   
,art4 #e  ,whether ,divination by the   
,stars ,is ,unlawful8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that divination by the   
stars is not unlawful4 ,it is lawful to 
foretell effects by observing their     
causes3 thus a physician foretells death
 from the disposition of the disease4   
,now the heavenly bodies are the cause  
of what takes place in the world1       
according to ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4    
iv74 ,therefore divination by the stars 
is not unlawful4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
human science originates from           
experiments1 according to the           

,philosopher 7,metaph4 i1 #a74 ,now it  
has been discovered through many        
experiments that the observation of the 
stars is a means whereby some future    
events may be known beforehand4         
,therefore it would seem not unlawful to
 make use of this kind of divination4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 divination is       
declared to be unlawful in so far as it 
is based on a compact made with the     
demons4 ,but divination by the stars    
contains nothing of the kind1 but merely
 an observation of ,god's creatures4    
,therefore it would seem that this      
species of divination is not unlawful4  
,on the contrary1 ,augustine says       
7,confess4 iv1 #c73 ,those astrologers  
whom they call mathematicians1 ,i       
consulted without scruple2 because they 
seemed to use no sacrifice1 nor to pray 
to any spirit for their divinations     
which art1 however1 ,christian and true 
piety rejects and condemns4  ,i answer  
that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71  
the operation of the demon thrusts      

itself into those divinations which are 
based on false and vain opinions1 in    
order that man's mind may become        
entangled in vanity and falsehood4 ,now 
one makes use of a vain and false       
opinion if1 by observing the stars1 one 
desires to foreknow the future that     
cannot be forecast by their means4      
,wherefore we must consider what things 
can be foreknown by observing the stars3
 and it is evident that those things    
which happen of necessity can be        
foreknown by this means3 even so        
astrologers forecast a future eclipse4  
,however1 with regard to the            
foreknowledge of future events acquired 
by observing the stars there have been  
various opinions4 ,for some have stated 
that the stars signify rather than cause
 the things foretold by means of their  
observation4 ,but this is an            
unreasonable statement3 since every     
corporeal sign is either the effect of  
that for which it stands 7thus smoke    
signifies fire whereby it is caused71 or

 it proceeds from the same cause1 so    
that by signifying the cause1 in        
consequence it signifies the effect     
7thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of  
fair weather1 in so far as its cause is 
the cause of fair weather74 ,now it     
cannot be said that the dispositions and
 movements of the heavenly bodies are   
the effect of future events2 nor again  
can they be ascribed to some common     
higher cause of a corporeal nature1     
although they are referable to a common 
higher cause1 which is divine           
providence4 ,on the contrary the        
appointment of the movements and        
positions of the heavenly bodies by     
divine providence is on a different     
principle from the appointment of the   
occurrence of future contingencies1     
because the former are appointed on a   
principle of necessity1 so that they    
always occur in the same way1 whereas   
the latter are appointed on a principle 
of contingency1 so that the manner of   
their occurrence is variable4           

,consequently it is impossible to       
acquire foreknowledge of the future from
 an observation of the stars1 except in 
so far as effects can be foreknown from 
their causes4  ,now two kinds of effects
 escape the causality of heavenly       
bodies4 ,in the first place all effects 
that occur accidentally1 whether in     
human affairs or in the natural order1  
since1 as it is proved in ,metaph4 vi   
99,ed4 ,did4 v1 #c1 an accidental being 
has no cause1 least of all a natural    
cause1 such as is the power of a        
heavenly body1 because what occurs      
accidentally1 neither is a being        
properly speaking1 nor is one--for      
instance1 that an earthquake occur when 
a stone falls1 or that a treasure be    
discovered when a man digs a grave--for 
these and like occurrences are not one  
thing1 but are simply several things4   
,whereas the operation of nature has    
always some one thing for its term1 just
 as it proceeds from some one principle1
 which is the form of a natural thing4  

,in the second place1 acts of the       
free-will1 which is the faculty of will 
and reason1 escape the causality of     
heavenly bodies4 ,for the intellect or  
reason is not a body1 nor the act of a  
bodily organ1 and consequently neither  
is the will1 since it is in the reason1 
as the ,philosopher shows 7,de ,anima   
iii1 #d1 #i74 ,now no body can make an  
impression on an incorporeal body4      
,wherefore it is impossible for heavenly
 bodies to make a direct impression on  
the intellect and will3 for this would  
be to deny the difference between       
intellect and sense1 with which position
 ,aristotle reproaches 7,de ,anima iii1 
#c7 those who held that such is the will
 of man1 as is the day which the father 
of men and of gods1 i4e4 the sun or the 
heavens1 brings on 99,odyssey xviii1    
#ace4  ,hence the heavenly bodies cannot
 be the direct cause of the free-will's 
operations4 ,nevertheless they can be a 
dispositive cause of an inclination to  
those operations1 in so far as they make

 an impression on the human body1 and   
consequently on the sensitive powers    
which are acts of bodily organs having  
an inclination for human acts4 ,since1  
however1 the sensitive powers obey      
reason1 as the ,philosopher shows 7,de  
,anima iii1 #aa2 ,ethic4 i1 #ac71 this  
does not impose any necessity on the    
free-will1 and man is able1 by his      
reason1 to act counter to the           
inclination of the heavenly bodies4     
,accordingly if anyone take observation 
of the stars in order to foreknow casual
 or fortuitous future events1 or to know
 with certitude future human actions1   
his conduct is based on a false and vain
 opinion2 and so the operation of the   
demon introduces itself therein1        
wherefore it will be a superstitious and
 unlawful divination4 ,on the other hand
 if one were to apply the observation of
 the stars in order to foreknow those   
future things that are caused by        
heavenly bodies1 for instance1 drought  
or rain and so forth1 it will be neither

 an unlawful nor a superstitious        
divination4  ,wherefore the ,reply to   
the ,first ,objection is evident4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that astrologers not  
unfrequently forecast the truth by      
observing the stars may be explained in 
two ways4 ,first1 because a great number
 of men follow their bodily passions1 so
 that their actions are for the most    
part disposed in accordance with the    
inclination of the heavenly bodies3     
while there are few1 namely1 the wise   
alone1 who moderate these inclinations  
by their reason4 ,the result is that    
astrologers in many cases foretell the  
truth1 especially in public occurrences 
which depend on the multitude4          
,secondly1 because of the interference  
of the demons4 ,hence ,augustine says   
7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #ag73 ,when          
astrologers tell the truth1 it must be  
allowed that this is due to an instinct 
that1 unknown to man1 lies hidden in his
 mind4 ,and since this happens through  
the action of unclean and lying spirits 

who desire to deceive man for they are  
permitted to know certain things about  
temporal affairs4 ,wherefore he         
concludes3 ,thus a good ,christian      
should beware of astrologers1 and of all
 impious diviners1 especially of those  
who tell the truth1 lest his soul become
 the dupe of the demons and by making a 
compact of of partnership with them     
enmesh itself in their fellowship4      
,this suffices for the ,reply to the    
,third ,objection4   ,,sixth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #f  ,whether  
,divination by ,dreams ,is ,unlawful8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
divination by dreams is not unlawful4   
,it is not unlawful to make use of      
divine instruction4 ,now men are        
instructed by ,god in dreams1 for it is 
written 7,job #cc3ae1 #af73 ,by a dream 
in a vision by night1 when deep sleep   
falleth upon men1 and they are sleeping 
in their beds1 then ,he1 ,god to wit1   
openeth the ears of men1 and teaching   
instructeth them in what they are to    

learn4 ,therefore it is not unlawful to 
make use of divination by dreams4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 those who interpret      
dreams1 properly speaking1 make use of  
divination by dreams4 ,now we read of   
holy men interpreting dreams3 thus      
,joseph interpreted the dreams of       
,pharaoh's butler and of his chief baker
 7,gen4 #dj71 and ,daniel interpreted   
the dream of the king of ,babylon 7,dan4
 #b1 #d74 ,therefore divination by      
dreams is not unlawful4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 it is unreasonable to deny the
 common experiences of men4 ,now it is  
the experience of all that dreams are   
significative of the future4 ,therefore 
it is useless to deny the efficacy of   
dreams for the purpose of divination1   
and it is lawful to listen to them4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4   
#ah3aj73 ,neither let there be found    
among you any one that 4 4 4 observeth  
dreams4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,,aa4 #b1 #f71 divination is     
superstitious and unlawful when it is   

based on a false opinion4 ,wherefore we 
must consider what is true in the matter
 of foreknowing the future from dreams4 
,now dreams are sometimes the cause of  
future occurrences2 for instance1 when a
 person's mind becomes anxious through  
what it has seen in a dream and is      
thereby led to do something or avoid    
something3 while sometimes dreams are   
signs of future happenings1 in so far as
 they are referable to some common cause
 of both dreams and future occurrences1 
and in this way the future is frequently
 known from dreams4 ,we must1 then1     
consider what is the cause of dreams1   
and whether it can be the cause of      
future occurrences1 or be cognizant of  
them4  ,accordingly it is to be observed
 that the cause of dreams is sometimes  
in us and sometimes outside us4 ,the    
inward cause of dreams is twofold3 one  
regards the soul1 in so far as those    
things which have occupied a man's      
thoughts and affections while awake     
recur to his imagination while asleep4  

,a such like cause of dreams is not a   
cause of future occurrences1 so that    
dreams of this kind are related         
accidentally to future occurrences1 and 
if at any time they concur it will be by
 chance4 ,but sometimes the inward cause
 of dreams regards the body3 because the
 inward disposition of the body leads to
 the formation of a movement in the     
imagination consistent with that        
disposition2 thus a man in whom there is
 abundance of cold humors dreams that he
 is in the water or snow3 and for this  
reason physicians say that we should    
take note of dreams in order to discover
 internal dispositions4  ,in like manner
 the outward cause of dreams is twofold1
 corporal and spiritual4 ,it is corporal
 in so far as the sleeper's imagination 
is affected either by the surrounding   
air1 or through an impression of a      
heavenly body1 so that certain images   
appear to the sleeper1 in keeping with  
the disposition of the heavenly bodies4 
,the spiritual cause is sometimes       

referable to ,god1 ,who reveals certain 
things to men in their dreams by the    
ministry of the angels1 according ,num4 
#ab3f1 ,if there be among you a prophet 
of the ,lord1 ,i will appear to him in a
 vision1 or ,i will speak to him in a   
dream4 ,sometimes1 however1 it is due to
 the action of the demons that certain  
images appear to persons in their sleep1
 and by this means they1 at times1      
reveal certain future things to those   
who have entered into an unlawful       
compact with them4  ,accordingly we must
 say that there is no unlawful          
divination in making use of dreams for  
the foreknowledge of the future1 so long
 as those dreams are due to divine      
revelation1 or to some natural cause    
inward or outward1 and so far as the    
efficacy of that cause extends4 ,but it 
will be an unlawful and superstitious   
divination if it be caused by a         
revelation of the demons1 with whom a   
compact has been made1 whether explicit1
 through their being invoked for the    

purpose1 or implicit1 through the       
divination extending beyond its possible
 limits4  ,this suffices for the        
,replies to the ,objections4   ,,seventh
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #g 
,whether ,divination by ,auguries1      
,omens1 and by ,like ,observations of   
,external ,things ,is ,unlawful8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
divination by auguries1 omens1 and by   
like observations of external things is 
not unlawful4 ,if it were unlawful holy 
men would not make use thereof4 ,now we 
read of ,joseph that he paid attention  
to auguries1 for it is related 7,gen4   
#dd3e7 that ,joseph's steward said3 ,the
 cup which you have stolen is that in   
which my lord drinketh and in which he  
is wont to divine 7augurari73 and he    
himself afterwards said to his brethren 
7,gen4 #dd3ae73 ,know you not that there
 is no one like me in the science of    
divining8 ,therefore it is not unlawful 
to make use of this kind of divination4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 birds naturally know

 certain things regarding future        
occurrences of the seasons1 according to
 ,jer4 #h3g1 ,the kite in the air hath  
known her time2 the turtle1 the swallow1
 and the stork have observed the time of
 their coming4 ,now natural knowledge is
 infallible and comes from ,god4        
,therefore it seems not unlawful to make
 use of the birds' knowledge in order to
 know the future1 and this is divination
 by augury4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gedeon
 is numbered among the saints 7,heb4    
#aa3cb74 ,yet ,gedeon made use of an    
omen1 when he listened to the relation  
and interpreting of a dream 7,judges    
#g3ae73 and ,eliezer1 ,abraham's        
servant1 acted in like manner 7,gen4    
#bd74 ,therefore it seems that this kind
 of divination is not unlawful4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4       
#ah3aj73 ,neither let there be found    
among you anyone 4 4 4 that observeth   
omens4  ,i answer that1 ,the movements  
or cries of birds1 and whatever         
dispositions one may consider in such   

things1 are manifestly not the cause of 
future events3 wherefore the future     
cannot be known therefrom as from its   
cause4 ,it follows therefore that if    
anything future can be known from them1 
it will be because the causes from which
 they proceed are also the causes of    
future occurrences or are cognizant of  
them4 ,now the cause of dumb animals'   
actions is a certain instinct whereby   
they are inclined by a natural movement1
 for they are not masters of their      
actions4 ,this instinct may proceed from
 a twofold cause4 ,in the first place it
 may be due to a bodily cause4 ,for     
since dumb animals have naught but a    
sensitive soul1 every power of which is 
the act of a bodily organ1 their soul is
 subject to the disposition of          
surrounding bodies1 and primarily to    
that of the heavenly bodies4 ,hence     
nothing prevents some of their actions  
from being signs of the future1 in so   
far as they are conformed to the        
dispositions of the heavenly bodies and 

of the surrounding air1 to which certain
 future events are due4 ,yet in this    
matter we must observe two things3      
first1 that such observations must not  
be applied to the foreknowledge of      
future things other than those which can
 be foreknown from the movements of     
heavenly bodies1 as stated above 7,,aa4 
#e1 #f73 secondly1 that they be not     
applied to other matters than those     
which in some way may have reference to 
these animals 7since they acquire       
through the heavenly bodies a certain   
natural knowledge and instinct about    
things necessary for their life--such as
 changes resulting from rain and wind   
and so forth74  ,in the second place1   
this instinct is produced by a spiritual
 cause1 namely1 either by ,god1 as may  
be seen in the dove that descended upon 
,christ1 the raven that fed ,elias1 and 
the whale that swallowed and vomited    
,jonas1 or by demons1 who make use of   
these actions of dumb animals in order  
to entangle our minds with vain         

opinions4 ,this seems to be true of all 
such like things2 except omens1 because 
human words which are taken for an omen 
are not subject to the disposition of   
the stars1 yet are they ordered         
according to divine providence and      
sometimes according to the action of the
 demons4  ,accordingly we must say that 
all such like divinations are           
superstitious and unlawful1 if they be  
extended beyond the limits set according
 to the order of nature or of divine    
providence4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according
 to ,augustine 99,,qq4 in ,genes41 qu4  
cxlv1 when ,joseph said that there was  
no one like him in the science of       
divining1 he spoke in joke and not      
seriously1 referring perhaps to the     
common opinion about him3 in this sense 
also spoke his steward4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,the passage quoted refers to the   
knowledge that birds have about things  
concerning them2 and in order to know   
these things it is not unlawful to      
observe their cries and movements3 thus 

from the frequent cawing of crows one   
might say that it will rain soon4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,gedeon listened to the
 recital and interpretation of a dream1 
seeing therein an omen1 ordered by      
divine providence for his instruction4  
,in like manner ,eliezer listened to the
 damsel's words1 having previously      
prayed to ,god4   ,,eighth ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #h  ,whether  
,divination by ,drawing ,lots ,is       
,unlawful8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that divination by drawing lots is 
not unlawful1 because a gloss of        
,augustine on ,ps4 #cj3af1 ,my lots are 
in ,thy hands1 says3 ,it is not wrong to
 cast lots1 for it is a means of        
ascertaining the divine will when a man 
is in doubt4  ,obj4 #b3 ,there is1      
seemingly1 nothing unlawful in the      
observances which the ,scriptures relate
 as being practiced by holy men4 ,now   
both in the ,old and in the ,new        
,testament we find holy men practicing  
the casting of lots4 ,for it is related 

7,jos4 #g3ad1 sqq47 that ,josue1 at the 
,lord's command1 pronounced sentence by 
lot on ,achan who had stolen of the     
anathema4 ,again ,saul1 by drawing lots1
 found that his son ,jonathan had eaten 
honey 7#a ,kings #ad3eh1 sqq473 ,jonas1 
when fleeing from the face of the ,lord1
 was discovered and thrown into the sea 
7,jonah #a3g1 sqq473 ,zacharias was     
chosen by lot to offer incense 7,luke   
#a3i73 and the apostles by drawing lots 
elected ,matthias to the apostleship    
7,acts #a3bf74 ,therefore it would seem 
that divination by lots is not unlawful4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fighting with the 
fists1 or monomachy1 i4e4 single combat 
as it is called1 and trial by fire and  
water1 which are called popular trials1 
seem to come under the head of          
sortilege1 because something unknown is 
sought by their means4 ,yet these       
practices seem to be lawful1 because    
,david is related to have engaged in    
single combat with the ,philistine 7#a  
,kings #ag3cb1 sqq474 ,therefore it     

would seem that divination by lot is not
 unlawful4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
written in the ,decretals 7,,xxvi1 qu4  
v1 can4 ,sortes73 ,we decree that the   
casting of lots1 by which means you make
 up your mind in all your undertakings1 
and which the ,fathers have condemned1  
is nothing but divination and           
witchcraft4 ,for which reason we wish   
them to be condemned altogether1 and    
henceforth not to be mentioned among    
,christians1 and we forbid the practice 
thereof under pain of anathema4  ,i     
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 
sortilege consists1 properly speaking1  
in doing something1 that by observing   
the result one may come to the knowledge
 of something unknown4 ,if by casting   
lots one seeks to know what is to be    
given to whom1 whether it be a          
possession1 an honor1 a dignity1 a      
punishment1 or some action or other1 it 
is called sortilege of allotment2 if one
 seeks to know what ought to be done1 it
 is called sortilege of consultation2 if

 one seeks to know what is going to     
happen1 it is called sortilege of       
divination4 ,now the actions of man that
 are required for sortilege and their   
results are not subject to the          
dispositions of the stars4 ,wherefore if
 anyone practicing sortilege is so      
minded as though the human acts         
requisite for sortilege depended for    
their result on the dispositions of the 
stars1 his opinion is vain and false1   
and consequently is not free from the   
interference of the demons1 so that a   
divination of this kind is superstitious
 and unlawful4  ,apart from this cause1 
however1 the result of sortilegious acts
 must needs be ascribed to chance1 or to
 some directing spiritual cause4 ,if we 
ascribe it to chance1 and this can only 
take place in sortilege of allotment1 it
 does not seem to imply any vice other  
than vanity1 as in the case of persons  
who1 being unable to agree upon the     
division of something or other1 are     
willing to draw lots for its division1  

thus leaving to chance what portion each
 is to receive4  ,if1 on the other hand1
 the decision by lot be left to a       
spiritual cause1 it is sometimes        
ascribed to demons4 ,thus we read       
7,ezech4 #ba3ba7 that the king of       
,babylon stood in the highway1 at the   
head of two ways1 seeking divination1   
shuffling arrows2 he inquired of the    
idols1 and consulted entrails3 sortilege
 of this kind is unlawful1 and forbidden
 by the canons4  ,sometimes1 however1   
the decision is left to ,god1 according 
to ,prov4 #af3cc1 ,lots are cast into   
the lap1 but they are disposed of by the
 ,lord3 sortilege of this kind is not   
wrong in itself1 as ,augustine declares 
99,enarr4 ii in ,ps4 xxx1 serm4 #b2 cf4 
,obj4#a4  ,yet this may happen to be    
sinful in four ways4 ,first1 if one have
 recourse to lots without any necessity3
 for this would seem to amount to       
tempting ,god4 ,hence ,ambrose1         
commenting on the words of ,luke #a3h1  
says3 ,he that is chosen by lot is not  

bound by the judgment of men4 ,secondly1
 if even in a case of necessity one were
 to have recourse to lots without       
reverence4 ,hence1 on the ,acts of the  
,apostles1 ,bede says 7,super ,act4     
,apost4 i73 ,but if anyone1 compelled by
 necessity1 thinks that he ought1 after 
the apostles' example1 to consult ,god  
by casting lots1 let him take note that 
the apostles themselves did not do so1  
except after calling together the       
assembly of the brethren and pouring    
forth prayer to ,god4 ,thirdly1 if the  
,divine oracles be misapplied to earthly
 business4 ,hence ,augustine says 7ad   
inquisit4 ,januar4 ii2 ,ep4 lv73 ,those 
who tell fortunes from the ,gospel      
pages1 though it is to be hoped that    
they do so rather than have recourse to 
consulting the demons1 yet does this    
custom also displease me1 that anyone   
should wish to apply the ,divine oracles
 to worldly matters and to the vain     
things of this life4 ,fourthly1 if      
anyone resort to the drawing of lots in 

ecclesiastical elections1 which should  
be carried out by the inspiration of the
 ,holy ,ghost4 ,wherefore1 as ,bede says
 7,super ,act4 ,apost4 i73 ,before      
,pentecost the ordination of ,matthias  
was decided by lot1 because as yet the  
fulness of the ,holy ,ghost was not yet 
poured forth into the ,church3 whereas  
the same deacons were ordained not by   
lot but by the choice of the disciples4 
,it is different with earthly honors1   
which are directed to the disposal of   
earthly things3 in elections of this    
kind men frequently have recourse to    
lots1 even as in the distribution of    
earthly possessions4  ,if1 however1     
there be urgent necessity it is lawful  
to seek the divine judgment by casting  
lots1 provided due reverence be         
observed4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,ep4  
ad ,honor4 ccxxviii71 ,if1 at a time of 
persecution1 the ministers of ,god do   
not agree as to which of them is to     
remain at his post lest all should flee1
 and which of them is to flee1 lest all 

die and the ,church be forsaken1 should 
there be no other means of coming to an 
agreement1 so far as ,i can see1 they   
must be chosen by lot4 ,again he says   
7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 xxviii73 ,if thou 
aboundest in that which it behooves thee
 to give to him who hath not1 and which 
cannot be given to two2 should two come 
to you1 neither of whom surpasses the   
other either in need or in some claim on
 thee1 thou couldst not act more justly 
than in choosing by lot to whom thou    
shalt give that which thou canst not    
give to both4  ,this suffices for the   
,reply to the ,first and ,second        
,objections4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the     
trial by hot iron or boiling water is   
directed to the investigation of        
someone's hidden sin1 by means of       
something done by a man1 and in this it 
agrees with the drawing of lots4 ,but in
 so far as a miraculous result is       
expected from ,god1 it surpasses the    
common generality of sortilege4 ,hence  
this kind of trial is rendered unlawful1

 both because it is directed to the     
judgment of the occult1 which is        
reserved to the divine judgment1 and    
because such like trials are not        
sanctioned by divine authority4 ,hence  
we read in a decree of ,pope ,stephen ,v
 99,,ii1 qu4 v41 can4 ,consuluist i3    
,the sacred canons do not approve of    
extorting a confession from anyone by   
means of the trial by hot iron or       
boiling water1 and no one must presume1 
by a superstitious innovation1 to       
practice what is not sanctioned by the  
teaching of the holy fathers4 ,for it is
 allowable that public crimes should be 
judged by our authority1 after the      
culprit has made spontaneous confession1
 or when witnesses have been approved1  
with due regard to the fear of ,god2 but
 hidden and unknown crimes must be left 
to ,him ,who alone knows the hearts of  
the children of men4 ,the same would    
seem to apply to the law concerning     
duels1 save that it approaches nearer to
 the common kind of sortilege1 since no 

miraculous effect is expected thereupon1
 unless the combatants be very unequal  
in strength or skill4   ,,question #if  
,,of ,,superstition ,,in ,,observances  
7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we must now     
consider superstition in observances1   
under which head there are four points  
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,of observances for   
acquiring knowledge1 which are          
prescribed by the magic art2  7#b7 ,of  
observances for causing alterations in  
certain bodies2  7#c7 ,of observances   
practiced in fortune-telling2  7#d7 ,of 
wearing sacred words at the neck4       
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1   
,art4 #a  ,whether ,it ,be ,unlawful to 
,practice the ,observances of the ,magic
 ,art8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that it is not unlawful to practice the 
observances of the magic art4 ,a thing  
is said to be unlawful in two ways4     
,first1 by reason of the genus of the   
deed1 as murder and theft3 secondly1    
through being directed to an evil end1  
as when a person gives an alms for the  

sake of vainglory4 ,now the observances 
of the magic art are not evil as to the 
genus of the deed1 for they consist in  
certain fasts and prayers to ,god2      
moreover1 they are directed to a good   
end1 namely1 the acquisition of science4
 ,therefore it is not unlawful to       
practice these observances4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 it is written 7,dan4 #a3ag7   
that to the children who abstained1 ,god
 gave knowledge1 and understanding in   
every book1 and wisdom4 ,now the        
observances of the magic art consist in 
certain fasts and abstinences4          
,therefore it seems that this art       
achieves its results through ,god3 and  
consequently it is not unlawful to      
practice it4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
seemingly1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the
 reason why it is wrong to inquire of   
the demons concerning the future is     
because they have no knowledge of it1   
this knowledge being proper to ,god4    
,yet the demons know scientific truths3 
because sciences are about things       

necessary and invariable1 and such      
things are subject to human knowledge1  
and much more to the knowledge of       
demons1 who are of keener intellect1 as 
,augustine says 99,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #ag2
 ,de ,divin4 ,daemon4 #c1 #d4 ,therefore
 it seems to be no sin to practice the  
magic art1 even though it achieve its   
result through the demons4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #ah3aj1
 #aa73 ,neither let there be found among
 you 4 4 4 anyone 4 4 4 that seeketh the
 truth from the dead3 which search      
relies on the demons' help4 ,now through
 the observances of the magic art1      
knowledge of the truth is sought by     
means of certain signs agreed upon by   
compact with the demons 99,augustine1   
,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #bj2 see above 
,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #b4 ,therefore it is       
unlawful to practice the notary art4  ,i
 answer that1 ,the magic art is both    
unlawful and futile4 ,it is unlawful1   
because the means it employs for        
acquiring knowledge have not in         

themselves the power to cause science1  
consisting as they do in gazing certain 
shapes1 and muttering certain strange   
words1 and so forth4 ,wherefore this art
 does not make use of these things as   
causes1 but as signs2 not however as    
signs instituted by ,god1 as are the    
sacramental signs4 ,it follows1         
therefore1 that they are empty signs1   
and consequently a kind of agreement or 
covenant made with the demons for the   
purpose of consultation and of compact  
by tokens 99,ibid44 ,wherefore the magic
 art is to be absolutely repudiated and 
avoided by ,christians1 even as other   
arts of vain and noxious superstition1  
as ,augustine declares 7,de ,doctr4     
,christ4 ii1 #bc74 ,this art is also    
useless for the acquisition of science4 
,for since it is not intended by means  
of this art to acquire science in a     
manner connatural to man1 namely1 by    
discovery and instruction1 the          
consequence is that this effect is      
expected either from ,god or from the   

demons4 ,now it is certain that some    
have received wisdom and science infused
 into them by ,god1 as related of       
,solomon 7#c ,kings #c and #b ,paralip4 
#a74 ,moreover1 our ,lord said to ,his  
disciples 7,luke #ba3ae73 ,i will give  
you a mouth and wisdom1 which all your  
adversaries shall not be able to resist 
and gainsay4 ,however1 this gift is not 
granted to all1 or in connection with   
any particular observance1 but according
 to the will of the ,holy ,ghost1 as    
stated in #a ,cor4 #ab3h1 ,to one indeed
 by the ,spirit is given the word of    
wisdom1 to another the word of          
knowledge1 according to the same        
,spirit1 and afterwards it is said 7#a  
,cor4 #ab3aa73 ,all these things one and
 the same ,spirit worketh1 dividing to  
everyone according as ,he will4 ,on the 
other hand it does not belong to the    
demons to enlighten the intellect1 as   
stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aji1   
,a4 #c74 ,now the acquisition of        
knowledge and wisdom is effected by the 

enlightening of the intellect1 wherefore
 never did anyone acquire knowledge by  
means of the demons4 ,hence ,augustine  
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #i73 ,porphyry  
confesses that the intellectual soul is 
in no way cleansed by theurgic          
inventions1 i4e4 the operations of the  
demons1 so as to be fitted to see its   
,god1 and discern what is true1 such as 
are all scientific conclusions4 ,the    
demons may1 however1 be able by speaking
 to men to express in words certain     
teachings of the sciences1 but this is  
not what is sought by means of magic4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is a good thing to 
acquire knowledge1 but it is not good to
 acquire it by undue means1 and it is to
 this end that the magic art tends4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the abstinence of     
these children was not in accordance    
with a vain observance of the notary    
art1 but according to the authority of  
the divine law1 for they refused to be  
defiled by the meat of ,gentiles4 ,hence
 as a reward for their obedience they   

received knowledge from ,god1 according 
to ,ps4 #aah3ajj1 ,i have had           
understanding above the ancients1       
because ,i have sought ,thy             
commandments4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to seek
 knowledge of the future from the demons
 is a sin not only because they are     
ignorant of the future1 but also on     
account of the fellowship entered into  
with them1 which also applies to the    
case in point4   ,,second ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,observances ,directed to the           
,alteration of ,bodies1 ,as for the     
,purpose of ,acquiring ,health or the   
,like1 ,are ,unlawful8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that observances directed
 to the alteration of bodies1 as for the
 purpose of acquiring health1 or the    
like1 are lawful4 ,it is lawful to make 
use of the natural forces of bodies in  
order to produce their proper effects4  
,now in the physical order things have  
certain occult forces1 the reason of    
which man is unable to assign2 for      

instance that the magnet attracts iron1 
and many like instances1 all of which   
,augustine enumerates 7,de ,civ4 ,dei   
xxi1 #e1 #g74 ,therefore it would seem  
lawful to employ such like forces for   
the alteration of bodies4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 artificial bodies are subject 
to the heavenly bodies1 just as natural 
bodies are4 ,now natural bodies acquire 
certain occult forces resulting from    
their species through the influence of  
the heavenly bodies4 ,therefore         
artificial bodies1 e4g4 images1 also    
acquire from the heavenly bodies a      
certain occult force for the production 
of certain effects4 ,therefore it is not
 unlawful to make use of them and of    
such like things4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
the demons too are able to alter bodies 
in many ways1 as ,augustine states 7,de 
,trin4 iii1 #h1 #i74 ,but their power is
 from ,god4 ,therefore it is lawful to  
make use of their power for the purpose 
of producing these alterations4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 

,christ4 ii1 #bj7 that to superstition  
belong the experiments of magic arts1   
amulets and nostrums condemned by the   
medical faculty1 consisting either of   
incantations or of certain cyphers which
 they call characters1 or of any kind of
 thing worn or fastened on4  ,i answer  
that1 ,in things done for the purpose of
 producing some bodily effect we must   
consider whether they seem able to      
produce that effect naturally3 for if so
 it will not be unlawful to do so1 since
 it is lawful to employ natural causes  
in order to produce their proper        
effects4 ,but1 if they seem unable to   
produce those effects naturally1 it     
follows that they are employed for the  
purpose of producing those effects1 not 
as causes but only as signs1 so that    
they come under the head of compact by  
tokens entered into with the demons     
99,augustine1 ,de ,doctr4 ,christ42 see 
above ,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #b4 ,wherefore       
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxi1    
#f73 ,the demons are allured by means of

 creatures1 which were made1 not by     
them1 but by ,god4 ,they are enticed by 
various objects differing according to  
the various things in which they        
delight1 not as animals by meat1 but as 
spirits by signs1 such as are to each   
one's liking1 by means of various kinds 
of stones1 herbs1 trees1 animals1 songs 
and rites4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there is  
nothing superstitious or unlawful in    
employing natural things simply for the 
purpose of causing certain effects such 
as they are thought to have the natural 
power of producing4 ,but if in addition 
there be employed certain characters1   
words1 or any other vain observances    
which clearly have no efficacy by       
nature1 it will be superstitious and    
unlawful4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the natural
 forces of natural bodies result from   
their substantial forms which they      
acquire through the influence of        
heavenly bodies2 wherefore through this 
same influence they acquire certain     
active forces4 ,on the other hand the   

forms of artificial bodies result from  
the conception of the craftsman2 and    
since they are nothing else but         
composition1 order and shape1 as stated 
in ,phys4 i1 #e1 they cannot have a     
natural active force4 ,consequently1 no 
force accrues to them from the influence
 of heavenly bodies1 in so far as they  
are artificial1 but only in respect of  
their natural matter4 ,hence it is      
false1 what ,porphyry held1 according to
 ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #aa71    
that by herbs1 stones1 animals1 certain 
particular sounds1 words1 shapes and    
devices1 or again by certain movements  
of the stars observed in the course of  
the heavens it is possible for men to   
fashion on earth forces capable of      
carrying into effect the various        
dispositions of the stars1 as though the
 results of the magic arts were to be   
ascribed to the power of the heavenly   
bodies4 ,in fact as ,augustine adds 7,de
 ,civ4 ,dei x1 #aa71 all these things   
are to be ascribed to the demons1 who   

delude the souls that are subject to    
them4  ,wherefore those images called   
astronomical also derive their efficacy 
from the actions of the demons3 a sign  
of this is that it is requisite to      
inscribe certain characters on them     
which do not conduce to any effect      
naturally1 since shape is not a         
principle of natural action4 ,yet       
astronomical images differ from         
necromantic images in this1 that the    
latter include certain explicit         
invocations and trickery1 wherefore they
 come under the head of explicit        
agreements made with the demons3 whereas
 in the other images there are tacit    
agreements by means of tokens in certain
 shapes or characters4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,it belongs to the domain of the divine
 majesty1 to ,whom the demons are       
subject1 that ,god should employ them to
 whatever purpose ,he will4 ,but man has
 not been entrusted with power over the 
demons1 to employ them to whatsoever    
purpose he will2 on the contrary1 it is 

appointed that he should wage war       
against the demons4 ,hence in no way is 
it lawful for man to make use of the    
demons' help by compacts either tacit or
 express4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #c  ,whether            
,observances ,directed to the ,purpose  
of ,fortune-telling ,are ,unlawful8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
observances directed to the purpose of  
fortune-telling are not unlawful4       
,sickness is one of the misfortunes that
 occur to man4 ,now sickness in man is  
preceded by certain symptoms1 which the 
physician observes4 ,therefore it seems 
not unlawful to observe such like signs4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is unreasonable
 to deny that which nearly everybody    
experiences4 ,now nearly everyone       
experiences that certain times1 or      
places1 hearing of certain words        
meetings of men or animals1 uncanny or  
ungainly actions1 are presages of good  
or evil to come4 ,therefore it seems not
 unlawful to observe these things4      

,obj4 #c3 ,further1 human actions and   
occurrences are disposed by divine      
providence in a certain order3 and this 
order seems to require that precedent   
events should be signs of subsequent    
occurrences3 wherefore1 according to the
 ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #aj3f71 the things  
that happened to the fathers of old are 
signs of those that take place in our   
time4 ,now it is not unlawful to observe
 the order that proceeds from divine    
providence4 ,therefore it is seemingly  
not unlawful to observe these presages4 
,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de  
,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #bj7 that a        
thousand vain observances are comprised 
under the head of compacts entered into 
with the demons3 for instance1 the      
twitching of a limb2 a stone1 a dog1 or 
a boy coming between friends walking    
together2 kicking the door-post when    
anyone passes in front of one's house2  
to go back to bed if you happen to      
sneeze while putting on your shoes2 to  
return home if you trip when going      

forth2 when the rats have gnawed a hole 
in your clothes1 to fear superstitiously
 a future evil rather than to regret the
 actual damage4  ,i answer that1 ,men   
attend to all these observances1 not as 
causes but as signs of future events1   
good or evil4 ,nor do they observe them 
as signs given by ,god1 since these     
signs are brought forward1 not on divine
 authority1 but rather by human vanity  
with the cooperation of the malice of   
the demons1 who strive to entangle men's
 minds with such like trifles4          
,accordingly it is evident that all     
these observances are superstitious and 
unlawful3 they are apparently remains of
 idolatry1 which authorized the         
observance of auguries1 of lucky and    
unlucky days which is allied to         
divination by the stars1 in respect of  
which one day is differentiated from    
another3 except that these observances  
are devoid of reason and art1 wherefore 
they are yet more vain and              
superstitious4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the   

causes of sickness are seated in us1 and
 they produce certain signs of sickness 
to come1 which physicians lawfully      
observe4 ,wherefore it is not unlawful  
to consider a presage of future events  
as proceeding from its cause2 as when a 
slave fears a flogging when he sees his 
master's anger4 ,possibly the same might
 be said if one were to fear for child  
lest it take harm from the evil eye1 of 
which we have spoken in the ,first ,part
 7,q4 #aag1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,but this   
does not apply to this kind of          
observances4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that men
 have at first experienced a certain    
degree of truth in these observances is 
due to chance4 ,but afterwards when a   
man begins to entangle his mind with    
observances of this kind1 many things   
occur in connection with them through   
the trickery of the demons1 so that men1
 through being entangled in these       
observances1 become yet more curious1   
and more and more embroiled in the      
manifold snares of a pernicious error1  

as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4
 ii1 #bc74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,among the 
,jewish people of whom ,christ was to be
 born1 not only words but also deeds    
were prophetic1 as ,augustine states    
7,contra ,faust4 iv1 #b2 xxii1 #bd74    
,wherefore it is lawful to apply those  
deeds to our instruction1 as signs given
 by ,god4 ,not all things1 however1 that
 occur through divine providence are    
ordered so as to be signs of the future4
 ,hence the argument does not prove4    
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1  
,art4 #d  ,whether ,it ,is ,unlawful to 
,wear ,divine ,words at the ,neck8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is
 not unlawful to wear divine words at   
the neck4 ,divine words are no less     
efficacious when written than when      
uttered4 ,but it is lawful to utter     
sacred words for the purpose of         
producing certain effects2 7for         
instance1 in order to heal the sick71   
such as the ,our ,father or the ,hail   
,mary1 or in any way whatever to call on

 the ,lord's name1 according to ,mk4    
#af3ag1 #ah1 ,in ,my name they shall    
cast out devils1 they shall speak with  
new tongues1 they shall take up         
serpents4 ,therefore it seems to be     
lawful to wear sacred words at one's    
neck1 as a remedy for sickness or for   
any kind of distress4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 sacred words are no less      
efficacious on the human body than on   
the bodies of serpents and other        
animals4 ,now certain incantations are  
efficacious in checking serpents1 or in 
healing certain other animals3 wherefore
 it is written 7,ps4 #eg3e73 ,their     
madness is according to the likeness of 
a serpent1 like the deaf asp that       
stoppeth her ears1 which will not hear  
the voice of the charmers1 nor of the   
wizard that charmeth wisely4 ,therefore 
it is lawful to wear sacred words as a  
remedy for men4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1    
,god's word is no less holy than the    
relics of the saints2 wherefore         
,augustine says 7,lib4 ,l4 ,hom4 xxvi7  

that ,god's word is of no less account  
than the ,body of ,christ4 ,now it is   
lawful for one to wear the relics of the
 saints at one's neck1 or to carry them 
about one in any way for the purpose of 
self-protection4 ,therefore it is       
equally lawful to have recourse to the  
words of ,holy ,writ1 whether uttered or
 written1 for one's protection4  ,obj4  
#d3 ,on the other hand1 ,chrysostom says
 7,hom4 xliii in ,matth47 99,cf4 the    
,opus ,imperfectum in ,matthaeum1 among 
,st4 ,chrysostom's works1 and falsely   
ascribed to him3 ,some wear round their 
necks a passage in writing from the     
,gospel4 ,yet is not the ,gospel read in
 church and heard by all every day8 ,how
 then1 if it does a man no good to have 
the ,gospels in his ears1 will he find  
salvation by wearing them round his     
neck8 ,moreover1 where is the power of  
the ,gospel8 ,in the shapes of the      
letters or in the understanding of the  
sense8 ,if in the shapes1 you do well to
 wear them round your neck2 if in the   

understanding1 you will then do better  
to bear them in your heart than to wear 
them round your neck4  ,i answer that1  
,in every incantation or wearing of     
written words1 two points seem to demand
 caution4 ,the first is the thing said  
or written1 because if it is connected  
with invocation of the demons it is     
clearly superstitious and unlawful4 ,in 
like manner it seems that one should    
beware lest it contain strange words1   
for fear that they conceal something    
unlawful4 ,hence ,chrysostom says 99,cf4
 the ,opus ,imperfectum in ,matthaeum1  
among ,st4 ,chrysostom's works1 falsely 
ascribed to him that many now after the 
example of the ,pharisees who enlarged  
their fringes1 invent and write ,hebrew 
names of angels1 and fasten them to     
their persons4 ,such things seem        
fearsome to those who do not understand 
them4 ,again1 one should take care lest 
it contain anything false1 because in   
that case also the effect could not be  
ascribed to ,god1 ,who does not bear    

witness to a falsehood4  ,in the second 
place1 one should beware lest besides   
the sacred words it contain something   
vain1 for instance certain written      
characters1 except the sign of the      
,cross2 or if hope be placed in the     
manner of writing or fastening1 or in   
any like vanity1 having no connection   
with reverence for ,god1 because this   
would be pronounced superstitious3      
otherwise1 however1 it is lawful4 ,hence
 it is written in the ,decretals        
7,,xxvi1 qu4 v1 cap4 ,non liceat        
,christianis73 ,in blending together    
medicinal herbs1 it is not lawful to    
make use of observances or incantations1
 other than the divine symbol1 or the   
,lord's ,prayer1 so as to give honor to 
none but ,god the ,creator of all4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is indeed lawful to
 pronounce divine words1 or to invoke   
the divine name1 if one do so with a    
mind to honor ,god alone1 from ,whom the
 result is expected3 but it is unlawful 
if it be done in connection with any    

vain observance4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even
 in the case of incantations of serpents
 or any animals whatever1 if the mind   
attend exclusively to the sacred words  
and to the divine power1 it will not be 
unlawful4 ,such like incantations1      
however1 often include unlawful         
observances1 and rely on the demons for 
their result1 especially in the case of 
serpents1 because the serpent was the   
first instrument employed by the devil  
in order to deceive man4 ,hence a gloss 
on the passage quoted says3 ,note that  
,scripture does not commend everything  
whence it draws its comparisons1 as in  
the case of the unjust judge who        
scarcely heard the widow's request4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the same applies to   
the wearing of relics1 for if they be   
worn out of confidence in ,god1 and in  
the saints whose relics they are1 it    
will not be unlawful4 ,but if account   
were taken in this matter of some vain  
circumstance 7for instance that the     
casket be three-cornered1 or the like1  

having no bearing on the reverence due  
to ,god and the saints71 it would be    
superstitious and unlawful4  ,reply     
,obj4 #d3 ,chrysostom is speaking of the
 case in which more attention is paid   
the written characters than to the      
understanding of the words4   ,,question
 #ig  ,,of ,,the ,,temptation ,,of ,,god
 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we must now    
consider the vices that are opposed to  
religion1 through lack of religion1 and 
which are manifestly contrary thereto1  
so that they come under the head of     
irreligion4 ,such are the vices which   
pertain to contempt or irreverence for  
,god and holy things4 ,accordingly we   
shall consider3 7#a7 ,vices pertaining  
directly to irreverence for ,god2 7#b7  
,vices pertaining to irreverence for    
holy things4 ,with regard to the first  
we shall consider the temptation whereby
 ,god is tempted1 and perjury1 whereby  
,god's name is taken with irreverence4  
,under the first head there are four    
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,in what the   

temptation of ,god consists2  7#b7      
,whether it is a sin8  7#c7 ,to what    
virtue it is opposed2  7#d7 ,of its     
comparison with other vices4   ,,first  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #a  
,whether the ,temptation of ,god        
,consists in ,certain ,deeds1 ,wherein  
the ,expected ,result ,is ,ascribed to  
the ,power of ,god ,alone8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that the temptation  
of ,god does not consist in certain     
deeds wherein the result is expected    
from the power of ,god alone4 ,just as  
,god is tempted by man so is man tempted
 by ,god1 man1 and demons4 ,but when man
 is tempted the result is not always    
expected from his power4 ,therefore     
neither is ,god tempted when the result 
is expected from ,his power alone4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all those who work  
miracles by invoking the divine name    
look for an effect due to ,god's power  
alone4 ,therefore1 if the temptation of 
,god consisted in such like deeds1 all  
who work miracles would tempt ,god4     

,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it seems to belong  
to man's perfection that he should put  
aside human aids and put his hope in    
,god alone4 ,hence ,ambrose1 commenting 
on ,luke #i3c1 ,take nothing for your   
journey1 etc4 says3 ,the ,gospel precept
 points out what is required of him that
 announces the kingdom of ,god1 namely1 
that he should not depend on worldly    
assistance1 and that1 taking assurance  
from his faith1 he should hold himself  
to be the more able to provide for      
himself1 the less he seeks these things4
 ,and the ,blessed ,agatha said3 ,i have
 never treated my body with bodily      
medicine1 ,i have my ,lord ,jesus       
,christ1 ,who restores all things by    
,his mere word4 99,office of ,st4       
,agatha1 eighth ,responsory 7,dominican 
,breviary74 ,but the temptation of ,god 
does not consist in anything pertaining 
to perfection4 ,therefore the temptation
 of ,god does not consist in such like  
deeds1 wherein the help of ,god alone is
 expected4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine

 says 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #cf73      
,christ who gave proof of ,god's power  
by teaching and reproving openly1 yet   
not allowing the rage of ,his enemies to
 prevail against ,him1 nevertheless by  
fleeing and hiding1 instructed human    
weakness1 lest it should dare to tempt  
,god when it has to strive to escape    
from that which it needs to avoid4 ,from
 this it would seem that the temptation 
of ,god consists in omitting to do what 
one can in order to escape from danger1 
and relying on the assistance of ,god   
alone4  ,i answer that1 ,properly       
speaking1 to tempt is to test the person
 tempted4 ,now we put a person to the   
test by words or by deeds4 ,by words1   
that we may find out whether he knows   
what we ask1 or whether he can and will 
grant it3 by deeds1 when1 by what we do1
 we probe another's prudence1 will or   
power4 ,either of these may happen in   
two ways4 ,first1 openly1 as when one   
declares oneself a tempter3 thus ,samson
 7,judges #ad3ab7 proposed a riddle to  

the ,philistines in order to tempt them4
 ,in the second place it may be done    
with cunning and by stealth1 as the     
,pharisees tempted ,christ1 as we read  
in ,matt4 #bb3ae1 sqq4 ,again this is   
sometimes done explicitly1 as when      
anyone intends1 by word or deed1 to put 
some person to the test2 and sometimes  
implicitly1 when1 to wit1 though he does
 not intend to test a person1 yet that  
which he does or says can seemingly have
 no other purpose than putting him to a 
test4  ,accordingly1 man tempts ,god    
sometimes by words1 sometimes by deeds4 
,now we speak with ,god in words when we
 pray4 ,hence a man tempts ,god         
explicitly in his prayers when he asks  
something of ,god with the intention of 
probing ,god's knowledge1 power or will4
 ,he tempts ,god explicitly by deeds    
when he intends1 by whatever he does1 to
 experiment on ,god's power1 good will  
or wisdom4 ,but ,he will tempt ,god     
implicitly1 if1 though he does not      
intend to make an experiment on ,god1   

yet he asks for or does something which 
has no other use than to prove ,god's   
power1 goodness or knowledge4 ,thus when
 a man wishes his horse to gallop in    
order to escape from the enemy1 this is 
not giving the horse a trial3 but if he 
make the horse gallop with out any      
useful purpose1 it seems to be nothing  
else than a trial of the horse's speed2 
and the same applies to all other       
things4 ,accordingly when a man in his  
prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the
 divine assistance for some urgent or   
useful motive1 this is not to tempt     
,god3 for it is written 7#b ,paralip    
#bj3ab73 ,as we know not what to do1 we 
can only turn our eyes to ,thee4 ,but if
 this be done without any useful or     
urgent motive1 this is to tempt ,god    
implicitly4 ,wherefore a gloss on ,deut4
 #f3af1 ,thou shalt not tempt the ,lord 
thy ,god1 says3 ,a man tempts ,god1 if  
having the means at hand1 without reason
 he chooses a dangerous course1 trying  
whether he can be delivered by ,god4    

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man also is sometimes 
tempted by means of deeds1 to test his  
ability or knowledge or will to uphold  
or oppose those same deeds4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,when saints work miracles by 
their prayers1 they are moved by a      
motive of necessity or usefulness to ask
 for that which is an effect of the     
divine power4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the    
preachers of ,god's kingdom dispense    
with temporal aids1 so as to be freer to
 give their time to the word of ,god3   
wherefore if they depend on ,god alone1 
it does not follow that they tempt ,god4
 ,but if they were to neglect human     
assistance without any useful or urgent 
motive1 they would be tempting ,god4    
,hence ,augustine 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1
 #cf7 says that ,paul fled1 not through 
ceasing to believe in ,god1 but lest he 
should tempt ,god1 were he not to flee  
when he had the means of flight4 ,the   
,blessed ,agatha had experience of      
,god's kindness towards her1 so that    
either she did not suffer such sickness 

as required bodily medicine1 or else she
 felt herself suddenly cured by ,god4   
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ig1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,it ,is a ,sin to    
,tempt ,god8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that it is not a sin to tempt ,god4
 ,for ,god has not commanded sin4 ,yet  
,he has commanded men to try1 which is  
the same as to tempt1 ,him3 for it is   
written 7,malach4 #c3aj73 ,bring all the
 tithes into the storehouse1 that there 
may be meat in ,my house2 and try ,me in
 this1 saith the ,lord1 if ,i open not  
unto you the flood-gates of heaven4     
,therefore it seems not to be a sin to  
tempt ,god4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a man  
is tempted not only in order to test his
 knowledge and his power1 but also to   
try his goodness or his will4 ,now it is
 lawful to test the divine goodness or  
will1 for it is written 7,ps4 #cc3i73 ,o
 taste and see that the ,lord is sweet1 
and 7,rom4 #ab3b73 ,that you may prove  
what is the good1 and the acceptable1   
and the perfect will of ,god4 ,therefore

 it is not a sin to tempt ,god4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 ,scripture never blames a 
man for ceasing from sin1 but rather for
 committing a sin4 ,now ,achaz is blamed
 because when the ,lord said3 ,ask thee 
a sign of the ,lord thy ,god1 he        
replied3 ,i will not ask1 and ,i will   
not tempt the ,lord1 and then it was    
said to him3 ,is it a small thing for   
you to be grievous to men1 that you are 
grievous to my ,god also8 7,isa4        
#g3aa-ac74 ,and we read of ,abraham     
7,gen4 #ae3h7 that he said to the ,lord3
 ,whereby may ,i know that ,i shall     
possess it8 namely1 the land which ,god 
had promised him4 ,again ,gedeon asked  
,god for a sign of the victory promised 
to him 7,judges #f3cf1 sqq474 ,yet they 
were not blamed for so doing4 ,therefore
 it is not a sin to tempt ,god4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,it is forbidden in ,god's   
,law1 for it is written 7,deut4 #f3aj73 
,thou shalt not tempt the ,lord thy     
,god4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 
7,a4 #a71 to tempt a person is to put   

him to a test4 ,now one never tests that
 of which one is certain4 ,wherefore all
 temptation proceeds from some ignorance
 or doubt1 either in the tempter 7as    
when one tests a thing in order to know 
its qualities71 or in others 7as when   
one tests a thing in order to prove it  
to others71 and in this latter way ,god 
is said to tempt us4 ,now it is a sin to
 be ignorant of or to doubt that which  
pertains to ,god's perfection4          
,wherefore it is evident that it is a   
sin to tempt ,god in order that the     
tempter himself may know ,god's power4  
,on the other hand1 if one were to test 
that which pertains to the divine       
perfection1 not in order to know it     
oneself1 but to prove it to others3 this
 is not tempting ,god1 provided there be
 just motive of urgency1 or a pious     
motive of usefulness1 and other         
requisite conditions4 ,for thus did the 
apostles ask the ,lord that signs might 
be wrought in the name of ,jesus        
,christ1 as related in ,acts #d3cj1 in  

order1 to wit1 that ,christ's power     
might be made manifest to unbelievers4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the paying of tithes  
was prescribed in the ,law1 as stated   
above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence there   
was a motive of urgency to pay it1      
through the obligation of the ,law1 and 
also a motive of usefulness1 as stated  
in the text quoted--that there may be   
meat in ,god's house3 wherefore they did
 not tempt ,god by paying tithes4 ,the  
words that follow1 and try ,me1 are not 
to be understood causally1 as though    
they had to pay tithes in order to try  
if ,god would open the flood-gates of   
heaven1 but consecutively1 because1 to  
wit1 if they paid tithes1 they would    
prove by experience the favors which    
,god would shower upon them4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,there is a twofold knowledge 
of ,god's goodness or will4 ,one is     
speculative and as to this it is not    
lawful to doubt or to prove whether     
,god's will be good1 or whether ,god is 
sweet4 ,the other knowledge of ,god's   

will or goodness is effective or        
experimental and thereby a man          
experiences in himself the taste of     
,god's sweetness1 and complacency in    
,god's will1 as ,dionysius says of      
,hierotheos 7,div4 ,nom4 ii7 that he    
learnt divine things through experience 
of them4 ,it is in this way that we are 
told to prove ,god's will1 and to taste 
,his sweetness4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god  
wished to give a sign to ,achaz1 not for
 him alone1 but for the instruction of  
the whole people4 ,hence he was reproved
 because1 by refusing to ask a sign1 he 
was an obstacle to the common welfare4  
,nor would he have tempted ,god by      
asking1 both because he would have asked
 through ,god commanding him to do so1  
and because it was a matter relating to 
the common good4 ,abraham asked for a   
sign through the divine instinct1 and so
 he did not sin4 ,gedeon seems to have  
asked a sign through weakness of faith1 
wherefore he is not to be excused from  
sin1 as a gloss observes3 just as       

,zachary sinned in saying to the angel  
7,luke #a3ah73 ,whereby shall ,i know   
this8 so that he was punished for his   
unbelief4  ,it must be observed1        
however1 that there are two ways of     
asking ,god for a sign3 first in order  
to test ,god's power or the truth of    
,his word1 and this of its very nature  
pertains to the temptation of ,god4     
,secondly1 in order to be instructed as 
to what is ,god's pleasure in some      
particular matter2 and this nowise comes
 under the head of temptation of ,god4  
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ig1   
,art4 #c  ,whether ,temptation of ,god  
,is ,opposed to the ,virtue of          
,religion8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that the temptation of ,god is not 
opposed to the virtue of religion4 ,the 
temptation of ,god is sinful1 because a 
man doubts ,god1 as stated above 7,a4   
#b74 ,now doubt about ,god comes under  
the head of unbelief1 which is opposed  
to faith4 ,therefore temptation of ,god 
is opposed to faith rather than to      

religion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is    
written 7,ecclus4 #ah3bc73 ,before      
prayer prepare thy soul1 and be not as a
 man that tempteth ,god4 ,such a man1   
that is1 who tempts ,god1 says the      
interlinear gloss1 prays for what ,god  
taught him to pray for1 yet does not    
what ,god has commanded him to do4 ,now 
this pertains to imprudence which is    
opposed to hope4 ,therefore it seems    
that temptation of ,god is a sin opposed
 to hope4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a gloss  
on ,ps4 #gg3ah1 ,and they tempted ,god  
in their hearts1 says that to tempt ,god
 is to pray to ,him deceitfully1 with   
simplicity in our words and wickedness  
in our hearts4 ,now deceit is opposed to
 the virtue of truth4 ,therefore        
temptation of ,god is opposed1 not to   
religion1 but to truth4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,according to the gloss quoted
 above to tempt ,god is to pray to ,him 
inordinately4 ,now to pray to ,god      
becomingly is an act of religion as     
stated above 7,q4 #hc1 ,a4 #ae74        

,therefore to tempt ,god is a sin       
opposed to religion4  ,i answer that1   
,as clearly shown above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4   
#e71 the end of religion is to pay      
reverence to ,god4 ,wherefore whatever  
pertains directly to irreverence for    
,god is opposed to religion4 ,now it is 
evident that to tempt a person pertains 
to irreverence for him3 since no one    
presumes to tempt one of whose          
excellence he is sure4 ,hence it is     
manifest that to tempt ,god is a sin    
opposed to religion4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #g71 it  
belongs to religion to declare one's    
faith by certain signs indicative of    
reverence towards ,god4 ,consequently it
 belongs to irreligion that1 through    
doubtful faith1 a man does things       
indicative of irreverence towards ,god4 
,to tempt ,god is one of these2         
wherefore it is a species of irreligion4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he that prepares not
 his soul before prayer by forgiving    
those against whom he has anything1 or  

in some other way disposing himself to  
devotion1 does not do what he can to be 
heard by ,god1 wherefore he tempts ,god 
implicitly as it were4 ,and though this 
implicit temptation would seem to arise 
from presumption or indiscretion1 yet   
the very fact that a man behaves        
presumptuously and without due care in  
matters relating to ,god implies        
irreverence towards ,him4 ,for it is    
written 7#a ,pet4 #e3f73 ,be you humbled
 4 4 4 under the mighty hand of ,god1   
and 7#b ,tim4 #b3ae73 ,carefully study  
to present thyself approved unto ,god4  
,therefore also this kind of temptation 
is a species of irreligion4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,a man is said to pray        
deceitfully1 not in relation to ,god1   
,who knows the secrets of the heart1 but
 in relation to man4 ,wherefore deceit  
is accidental to the temptation of ,god1
 and consequently it does not follow    
that to tempt ,god is directly opposed  
to the truth4   ,,fourth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #d  ,whether  

the ,temptation of ,god ,is a ,graver   
,sin ,than ,superstition8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that the temptation  
of ,god is a graver sin than            
superstition4 ,the greater sin receives 
the greater punishment4 ,now the sin of 
tempting ,god was more severely punished
 in the ,jews than was the sin of       
idolatry2 and yet the latter is the     
chief form of superstition3 since for   
the sin of idolatry three thousand men  
of their number were slain1 as related  
in ,ex4 #cb3bh 99,septuagint version4   
,the ,vulgate has twenty-three          
thousand41 whereas for the sin of       
temptation they all without exception   
perished in the desert1 and entered not 
into the land of promise1 according to  
,ps4 #id3i1 ,your fathers tempted ,me1  
and further on1 so ,i swore in ,my wrath
 that they should not enter into ,my    
rest4 ,therefore to tempt ,god is a     
graver sin than superstition4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 the more a sin is opposed to 
virtue the graver it would seem to be4  

,now irreligion1 of which the temptation
 of ,god is a species1 is more opposed  
to the virtue of religion1 than         
superstition which bears some likeness  
to religion4 ,therefore to tempt ,god is
 a graver sin than superstition4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 it seems to be a greater  
sin to behave disrespectfully to one's  
parents1 than to pay others the respect 
we owe to our parents4 ,now ,god should 
be honored by us as the ,father of all  
7,malach4 #a3f74 ,therefore1 temptation 
of ,god whereby we behave irreverently  
to ,god1 seems to be a greater sin than 
idolatry1 whereby we give to a creature 
the honor we owe to ,god4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,a gloss on ,deut4 #ag3b1     
,when there shall be found among you1   
etc4 says3 ,the ,law detests error and  
idolatry above all3 for it is a very    
great sin to give to a creature the     
honor that belongs to the ,creator4  ,i 
answer that1 ,among sins opposed to     
religion1 the more grievous is that     
which is the more opposed to the        

reverence due to ,god4 ,now it is less  
opposed to this reverence that one      
should doubt the divine excellence than 
that one should hold the contrary for   
certain4 ,for just as a man is more of  
an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his 
error1 than if he doubt the truth of    
faith1 so1 too1 a man acts more against 
the reverence due to ,god1 if by his    
deeds he professes an error contrary to 
the divine excellence1 than if he       
expresses a doubt4 ,now the             
superstitious man professes an error1 as
 shown above 7,q4 #id1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a71  
whereas he who tempts ,god by words or  
deeds expresses a doubt of the divine   
excellence1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74   
,therefore the sin of superstition is   
graver than the sin of tempting ,god4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sin of idolatry   
was not punished in the above manner1 as
 though it were a sufficient punishment2
 because a more severe punishment was   
reserved in the future for that sin1 for
 it is written 7,ex4 #cb3cd73 ,and ,i1  

in the day of revenge1 will visit this  
sin also of theirs4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,superstition bears a likeness to       
religion1 as regards the material act   
which it pays just as religion does4    
,but1 as regards the end1 it is more    
contrary to religion than the temptation
 of ,god1 since it implies greater      
irreverence for ,god1 as stated4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,it belongs essentially to   
the divine excellence that it is        
singular and incommunicable4            
,consequently to give divine reverence  
to another is the same as to do a thing 
opposed to the divine excellence4 ,there
 is no comparison with the honor due to 
our parents1 which can without sin be   
given to others4   ,,question #ih  ,,of 
,,perjury 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider perjury3 under which  
head there are four points of inquiry3  
7#a7 ,whether falsehood is necessary for
 perjury8  7#b7 ,whether perjury is     
always a sin8  7#c7 ,whether it is      
always a mortal sin8  7#d7 ,whether it  

is a sin to enjoin an oath on a         
perjurer8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,it ,is    
,necessary for ,perjury ,that the       
,statement ,confirmed on ,oath ,be      
,false8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that it is not necessary for perjury    
that the statement confirmed on oath be 
false4 ,as stated above 7,q4 #hi1 ,a4   
#c71 an oath should be accompanied by   
judgment and justice no less than by    
truth4 ,since therefore perjury is      
incurred through lack of truth1 it is   
incurred likewise through lack of       
judgment1 as when one swears            
indiscreetly1 and through lack of       
justice1 as when one swears to something
 unjust4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which
 confirms is more weighty than the thing
 confirmed thereby3 thus in a syllogism 
the premises are more weighty than the  
conclusion4 ,now in an oath a man's     
statement is confirmed by calling on the
 name of ,god4 ,therefore perjury seems 
to consist in swearing by false gods    

rather than in a lack of truth in the   
human statement which is confirmed on   
oath4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine   
says 7,de ,verb4 ,apost4 ,jacobi2 ,serm4
 clxxx73 ,men swear falsely both in     
deceiving others and when they are      
deceived themselves2 and he gives three 
examples4 ,the first is3 ,supposing a   
man to swear1 thinking that what he     
swears to is true1 whereas it is false2 
the second is3 ,take the instance of    
another who knows the statement to be   
false1 and swears to it as though it    
were true2 and the third is3 ,take      
another1 who thinks his statement false1
 and swears to its being true1 while    
perhaps it is true1 of whom he says     
afterwards that he is a perjurer4       
,therefore one may be a perjurer while  
swearing to the truth4 ,therefore       
falsehood is not necessary for perjury4 
,on the contrary1 ,perjury is defined a 
falsehood confirmed by oath 99,hugh of  
,st4 ,victor1 ,sum4 ,sent4 iv1 #e4  ,i  
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ib1 

,a4 #b71 moral acts take their species  
from their end4 ,now the end of an oath 
is the confirmation of a human          
assertion4 ,to this confirmation        
falsehood is opposed3 since an assertion
 is confirmed by being firmly shown to  
be true2 and this cannot happen to that 
which is false4 ,hence falsehood        
directly annuls the end of an oath3 and 
for this reason1 that perversity in     
swearing1 which is called perjury1 takes
 its species chiefly from falsehood4    
,consequently falsehood is essential to 
perjury4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,jerome  
says on ,jer4 #d3b1 whichever of these  
three be lacking1 there is perjury1 but 
in different order4 ,for first and      
chiefly perjury consists in a lack of   
truth1 for the reason stated in the     
,article4 ,secondly1 there is perjury   
when justice is lacking1 for in whatever
 way a man swears to that which is      
unlawful1 for this very reason he is    
guilty of falsehood1 since he is under  
an obligation to do the contrary4       

,thirdly1 there is perjury when judgment
 is lacking1 since by the very fact that
 a man swears indiscreetly1 he incurs   
the danger of lapsing into falsehood4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in syllogisms the     
premises are of greater weight1 since   
they are in the position of active      
principle1 as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #c3  
whereas in moral matters the end is of  
greater importance than the active      
principle4 ,hence though it is a        
perverse oath when a man swears to the  
truth by false gods1 yet perjury takes  
its name from that kind of perversity in
 an oath1 that deprives the oath of its 
end1 by swearing what is false4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,moral acts proceed from the  
will1 whose object is the apprehended   
good4 ,wherefore if the false be        
apprehended as true1 it will be         
materially false1 but formally true1 as 
related to the will4 ,if something false
 be apprehended as false1 it will be    
false both materially and formally4 ,if 
that which is true be apprehended as    

false1 it will be materially true1 and  
formally false4 ,hence in each of these 
cases the conditions required for       
perjury are to be found in some way1 on 
account of some measure of falsehood4   
,since1 however1 that which is formal in
 anything is of greater importance than 
that which is material1 he that swears  
to a falsehood thinking it true is not  
so much of a perjurer as he that swears 
to the truth thinking it false4 ,for    
,augustine says 7,de ,verb4 ,apost4     
,jacobi2 ,serm4 clxxx73 ,it depends how 
the assertion proceeds from the mind1   
for the tongue is not guilty except the 
mind be guilty4   ,,second ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #b  ,whether  
,all ,perjury ,is ,sinful8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that not all perjury 
is sinful4 ,whoever does not fulfil what
 he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a
 perjurer4 ,yet sometimes a man swears  
he will do something unlawful 7adultery1
 for instance1 or murder73 and if he    
does it1 he commits a sin4 ,if therefore

 he would commit a sin even if he did it
 not1 it would follow that he is        
perplexed4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no man  
sins by doing what is best4 ,yet        
sometimes by committing a perjury one   
does what is best3 as when a man swears 
not to enter religion1 or not to do some
 kind of virtuous deed4 ,therefore not  
all perjury is sinful4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 he that swears to do another's
 will would seem to be guilty of perjury
 unless he do it4 ,yet it may happen    
sometimes that he sins not1 if he do not
 the man's will3 for instance1 if the   
latter order him to do something too    
hard and unbearable4 ,therefore         
seemingly not all perjury is sinful4    
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a promissory oath   
extends to future1 just as a declaratory
 oath extends to past and present       
things4 ,now the obligation of an oath  
may be removed by some future           
occurrence3 thus a state may swear to   
fulfil some obligation1 and afterwards  
other citizens come on the scene who did

 not take the oath2 or a canon may swear
 to keep the statutes of a certain      
church1 and afterwards new statutes are 
made4 ,therefore seemingly he that      
breaks an oath does not sin4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4   
,apost4 ,jacobi2 ,serm4 cxxx71 in       
speaking of perjury3 ,see how you should
 detest this horrible beast and         
exterminate it from all human business4 
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#hi1 ,a4 #a71 to swear is to call ,god  
as witness4 ,now it is an irreverence to
 ,god to call ,him to witness to a      
falsehood1 because by so doing one      
implies either that ,god ignores the    
truth or that ,he is willing to bear    
witness to a falsehood4 ,therefore      
perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to  
religion1 to which it belongs to show   
reverence to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he
 that swears to do what is unlawful is  
thereby guilty of perjury through lack  
of justice3 though1 if he fails to keep 
his oath1 he is not guilty of perjury in

 this respect1 since that which he swore
 to do was not a fit matter of an oath4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a person who swears   
not to enter religion1 or not to give an
 alms1 or the like1 is guilty of perjury
 through lack of judgment4 ,hence when  
he does that which is best it is not an 
act of perjury1 but contrary thereto3   
for the contrary of that which he is    
doing could not be a matter of an oath4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when one man swears or
 promises to do another's will1 there is
 to be understood this requisite        
condition--that the thing commanded be  
lawful and virtuous1 and not unbearable 
or immoderate4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,an    
oath is a personal act1 and so when a   
man becomes a citizen of a state1 he is 
not bound1 as by oath1 to fulfil        
whatever the state has sworn to do4 ,yet
 he is bound by a kind of fidelity1 the 
nature of which obligation is that he   
should take his share of the state's    
burdens if he takes a share of its      
goods4  ,the canon who swears to keep   

the statutes that have force in some    
particular college is not bound by his  
oath to keep any that may be made in the
 future1 unless he intends to bind      
himself to keep all1 past and future4   
,nevertheless he is bound to keep them  
by virtue of the statutes themselves1   
since they are possessed of coercive    
force1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#if1 ,a4 #d74   ,,third ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
,all ,perjury ,is a ,mortal ,sin8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not  
all perjury is a mortal sin4 ,it is laid
 down 7,extra1 ,de ,jurejur41 cap4      
,verum73 ,referring to the question     
whether an oath is binding on those who 
have taken one in order to safeguard    
their life and possessions1 we have no  
other mind than that which our          
predecessors the ,roman ,pontiffs are   
known to have had1 and who absolved such
 persons from the obligations of their  
oath4 ,henceforth1 that discretion may  
be observed1 and in order to avoid      

occasions of perjury1 let them not be   
told expressly not to keep their oath3  
but if they should not keep it1 they are
 not for this reason to be punished as  
for a mortal sin4 ,therefore not all    
perjury is a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b4     
,further1 as ,chrysostom 99,hom4 xliv in
 the ,opus ,imperfectum on ,st4         
,matthew1 falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,john
 ,chrysostom says1 it is a greater thing
 to swear by ,god than by the ,gospels4 
,now it is not always a mortal sin to   
swear by ,god to something false2 for   
instance1 if we were to employ such an  
oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue  
in the course of an ordinary            
conversation4 ,therefore neither is it  
always a mortal sin to break an oath    
that has been taken solemnly on the     
,gospels4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according
 to the ,law a man incurs infamy through
 committing perjury 7,,vi1 qu4 i1 cap4  
,infames74 ,now it would seem that      
infamy is not incurred through any kind 
of perjury1 as it is prescribed in the  

case of a declaratory oath violated by  
perjury 99,cap4 ,cum dilectus1 de ,ord4 
,cognit44 ,therefore1 seemingly1 not all
 perjury is a mortal sin4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,every sin that is contrary to
 a divine precept is a mortal sin4 ,now 
perjury is contrary to a divine precept1
 for it is written 7,lev4 #ai3ab73 ,thou
 shalt not swear falsely by ,my name4   
,therefore it is a mortal sin4  ,i      
answer that1 ,according to the teaching 
of the ,philosopher 7,poster4 i1 #b71   
that which causes a thing to be such is 
yet more so4 ,now we know that an action
 which is1 by reason of its very nature1
 a venial sin1 or even a good action1 is
 a mortal sin if it be done out of      
contempt of ,god4 ,wherefore any action 
that of its nature1 implies contempt of 
,god is a mortal sin4 ,now perjury1 of  
its very nature implies contempt of     
,god1 since1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71  
the reason why it is sinful is because  
it is an act of irreverence towards     
,god4 ,therefore it is manifest that    

perjury1 of its very nature1 is a mortal
 sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above
 7,q4 #hi1 ,a4 #g1 ad #c71 coercion does
 not deprive a promissory oath of its   
binding force1 as regards that which can
 be done lawfully4 ,wherefore he who    
fails to fulfil an oath which he took   
under coercion is guilty of perjury and 
sins mortally4 ,nevertheless the        
,sovereign ,pontiff can1 by his         
authority1 absolve a man from an        
obligation even of an oath1 especially  
if the latter should have been coerced  
into taking the oath through such fear  
as may overcome a high-principled man4  
,when1 however1 it is said that these   
persons are not to be punished as for a 
mortal sin1 this does not mean that they
 are not guilty of mortal sin1 but that 
a lesser punishment is to be inflicted  
on them4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he that     
swears falsely in fun is nonetheless    
irreverent to ,god1 indeed1 in a way1 he
 is more so1 and consequently is not    
excused from mortal sin4 ,he that swears

 falsely by a slip of tongue1 if he     
adverts to the fact that he is swearing1
 and that he is swearing to something   
false1 is not excused from mortal sin1  
as neither is he excused from contempt  
of ,god4 ,if1 however1 he does not      
advert to this1 he would seem to have no
 intention of swearing1 and consequently
 is excused from the sin of perjury4    
,it is1 however1 a more grievous sin to 
swear solemnly by the ,gospels1 than to 
swear by ,god in ordinary conversation1 
both on account of scandal and on       
account of the greater deliberation4    
,but if we consider them equally in     
comparison with one another1 it is more 
grievous to commit perjury in swearing  
by ,god than in swearing by the         
,gospels4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not every  
sin makes a man infamous in the eye of  
the law4 ,wherefore1 if a man who has   
sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be  
not infamous in the eye of the law1 but 
only when he has been so declared by    
sentence in a court of law1 it does not 

follow that he has not sinned mortally4 
,the reason why the law attaches infamy 
rather to one who breaks a promissory   
oath taken solemnly is that he still has
 it in his power after he has sworn to  
substantiate his oath1 which is not the 
case in a declaratory oath4   ,,fourth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #d  
,whether ,he ,sins ,who ,demands an     
,oath of a ,perjurer8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that he who demands an   
oath of a perjurer commits a sin4       
,either he knows that he swears truly1  
or he knows that he swears falsely4 ,if 
he knows him to swear truly1 it is      
useless for him to demand an oath3 and  
if he believes him to swear falsely1 for
 his own part he leads him into sin4    
,therefore nowise seemingly should one  
enjoin an oath on another person4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 to receive an oath from a
 person is less than to impose an oath  
on him4 ,now it would seem unlawful to  
receive an oath from a person1          
especially if he swear falsely1 because 

he would then seem to consent in his    
sin4 ,much less therefore would it seem 
lawful to impose an oath on one who     
swears falsely4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it 
is written 7,lev4 #e3a73 ,if anyone sin1
 and hear the voice of one swearing     
falsely 99',falsely' is not in the      
,vulgate1 and is a witness either       
because he himself hath seen1 or is     
privy to it3 if he do not utter it1 he  
shall bear his iniquity4 ,hence it would
 seem that when a man knows another to  
be swearing falsely1 he is bound to     
denounce him4 ,therefore it is not      
lawful to demand an oath of such a man4 
,obj4 #d3 ,on the other hand1 ,just as  
it is a sin to swear falsely so is it to
 swear by false gods4 ,yet it is lawful 
to take advantage of an oath of one who 
has sworn by false gods1 as ,augustine  
says 7ad ,public4 ,ep4 xlvii74          
,therefore it is lawful to demand an    
oath from one who swears falsely4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as regards a person who   
demands an oath from another1 a         

distinction would seem to be necessary4 
,for either he demands the oath on his  
own account and of his own accord1 or he
 demands it on account of the exigencies
 of a duty imposed on him4 ,if a man    
demands an oath on his own account as a 
private individual1 we must make a      
distinction1 as does ,augustine 7de     
,perjuriis4 serm4 clxxx73 ,for if he    
knows not that the man will swear       
falsely1 and says to him accordingly3   
',swear to me' in order that he may be  
credited1 there is no sin3 yet it is a  
human temptation 7because1 to wit1 it   
proceeds from his weakness in doubting  
whether the man will speak the truth74  
,this is the evil whereof ,our ,lord    
says 7,matt4 #e3cg73 ,that which is over
 and above these1 is of evil4 ,but if he
 knows the man to have done so1 i4e4 the
 contrary of what he swears to1 and yet 
forces him to swear1 he is a murderer3  
for the other destroys himself by his   
perjury1 but it is he who urged the hand
 of the slayer4  ,if1 on the other hand1

 a man demands an oath as a public      
person1 in accordance with the          
requirements of the law1 on the         
requisition of a third person3 he does  
not seem to be at fault1 if he demands  
an oath of a person1 whether he knows   
that he will swear falsely or truly1    
because seemingly it is not he that     
exacts the oath but the person at whose 
instance he demands it4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,this argument avails in the case of
 one who demands an oath on his own     
account4 ,yet he does not always know   
that the other will swear truly or      
falsely1 for at times he has doubts     
about the fact1 and believes he will    
swear truly4 ,in such a case he exacts  
an oath in order that he may be more    
certain4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as          
,augustine says 7ad ,public4 serm4      
xlvii71 though we are forbidden to      
swear1 ,i do not remember ever to have  
read in the ,holy ,scriptures that we   
must not accept oaths from others4      
,hence he that accepts an oath does not 

sin1 except perchance when of his own   
accord he forces another to swear1      
knowing that he will swear falsely4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says    
7,,qq4 ,super ,lev1 qu4 i71 ,moses in   
the passage quoted did not state to whom
 one man had to denounce another's      
perjury3 wherefore it must be understood
 that the matter had to be denounced to 
those who would do the perjurer good    
rather than harm4 ,again1 neither did he
 state in what order the denunciation   
was to be made3 wherefore seemingly the 
,gospel order should be followed1 if the
 sin of perjury should be hidden1       
especially when it does not tend to     
another person's injury3 because if it  
did1 the ,gospel order would not apply  
to the case1 as stated above 7,q4 #cc1  
,a4 #g2 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 
#d3 ,it is lawful to make use of an evil
 for the sake of good1 as ,god does1 but
 it is not lawful to lead anyone to do  
evil4 ,consequently it is lawful to     
accept the oath of one who is ready to  

swear by false gods1 but it is not      
lawful to induce him to swear by false  
gods4 ,yet it seems to be different in  
the case of one who swears falsely by   
the true ,god1 because an oath of this  
kind lacks the good of faith1 which a   
man makes use of in the oath of one who 
swears truly by false gods1 as          
,augustine says 7ad ,public4 ,ep4       
xlvii74 ,hence when a man swears falsely
 by the true ,god his oath seems to lack
 any good that one may use lawfully4    
,,question #ii  ,,of ,,sacrilege 7,in   
,four ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
the vices which pertain to irreligion1  
whereby sacred things are treated with  
irreverence4 ,we shall consider 7#a7    
,sacrilege2 7#b7 ,simony4  ,under the   
first head there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is sacrilege8  7#b7
 ,whether it is a special sin8  7#c7 ,of
 the species of sacrilege2  7#d7 ,of the
 punishment of sacrilege4   ,,first     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #a  
,whether ,sacrilege ,is the ,violation  

of a ,sacred ,thing8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that sacrilege is not the   
violation of a sacred thing4 ,it is     
stated 7,,xvii1 qu4 iv 99,append4       
,gratian1 on can4 ,si quis suadente73   
,they are guilty of sacrilege who       
disagree about the sovereign's decision1
 and doubt whether the person chosen by 
the sovereign be worthy of honor4 ,now  
this seems to have no connection with   
anything sacred4 ,therefore sacrilege   
does not denote the violation of        
something sacred4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
it is stated further on 99,append4      
,gratian1 on can4 ,constituit4 that if  
any man shall allow the ,jews to hold   
public offices1 he must be              
excommunicated as being guilty of       
sacrilege4 ,yet public offices have     
nothing to do with anything sacred4     
,therefore it seems that sacrilege does 
not denote the violation of a sacred    
thing4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god's power
 is greater than man's4 ,now sacred     
things receive their sacred character   

from ,god4 ,therefore they cannot be    
violated by man3 and so a sacrilege     
would not seem to be the violation of a 
sacred thing4  ,on the contrary1        
,isidore says 7,etym4 x7 that a man is  
said to be sacrilegious because he      
selects1 i4e4 steals1 sacred things4  ,i
 answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ha1
 ,a4 #e2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #d71 a  
thing is called sacred through being    
deputed to the divine worship4 ,now just
 as a thing acquires an aspect of good  
through being deputed to a good end1 so 
does a thing assume a divine character  
through being deputed to the divine     
worship1 and thus a certain reverence is
 due to it1 which reverence is referred 
to ,god4 ,therefore whatever pertains to
 irreverence for sacred things is an    
injury to ,god1 and comes under the head
 of sacrilege4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
i1 #b7 the common good of the nation is 
a divine thing1 wherefore in olden times
 the rulers of a commonwealth were      

called divines1 as being the ministers  
of divine providence1 according to ,wis4
 #f3e1 ,being ministers of ,his kingdom1
 you have not judged rightly4 ,hence by 
an extension of the term1 whatever      
savors of irreverence for the sovereign1
 such as disputing his judgment1 and    
questioning whether one ought to follow 
it1 is called sacrilege by a kind of    
likeness4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,christians 
are sanctified by faith and the         
sacraments of ,christ1 according to #a  
,cor4 #f3aa1 ,but you are washed1 but   
you are sanctified4 ,wherefore it is    
written 7#a ,pet4 #b3i73 ,you are a     
chosen generation1 a kingly priesthood1 
a holy nation1 a purchased people4      
,therefore any injury inflicted on the  
,christian people1 for instance that    
unbelievers should be put in authority  
over it1 is an irreverence for a sacred 
thing1 and is reasonably called a       
sacrilege4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,violation 
here means any kind of irreverence or   
dishonor4 ,now as honor is in the person

 who honors and not in the one who is   
honored 7,ethic4 i1 #e71 so again       
irreverence is in the person who behaves
 irreverently even though he do no harm 
to the object of his irreverence4       
,hence1 so far he is concerned1 he      
violates the sacred thing1 though the   
latter be not violated in itself4       
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1  
,art4 #b  ,whether ,sacrilege ,is a     
,special ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that sacrilege is not a special   
sin4 ,it is stated 7,,xvii1 qu4 iv7     
,they are guilty of sacrilege who       
through ignorance sin against the       
sanctity of the law1 violate and defile 
it by their negligence4 ,but this is    
done in every sin1 because sin is a     
word1 deed or desire contrary to the law
 of ,god1 according to ,augustine       
7,contra ,faust4 xxi1 #bg74 ,therefore  
sacrilege is a general sin4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 no special sin is comprised   
under different kinds of sin4 ,now      
sacrilege is comprised under different  

kinds of sin1 for instance under murder1
 if one kill a priest under lust1 as the
 violation of a consecrate virgin1 or of
 any woman in a sacred place under      
theft1 if one steal a sacred thing4     
,therefore sacrilege is not a special   
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every special 
sin is to found apart from other sins as
 the ,philosopher states1 in speaking of
 special justice 7,ethic4 v1 #aa74 ,but1
 seemingly1 sacrilege is not to be found
 apart from other sins2 for it is       
sometimes united to theft1 sometimes to 
murder1 as stated in the preceding      
objection4 ,therefore it is not a       
special sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,that   
which is opposed to a special virtue is 
a special sin4 ,but sacrilege is opposed
 to a special virtue1 namely religion1  
to which it belongs to reverence ,god   
and divine things4 ,therefore sacrilege 
is a special sin4  ,i answer that1      
,wherever we find a special aspect of   
deformity1 there must needs be a special
 sin2 because the species of a thing is 

derived chiefly from its formal aspect1 
and not from its matter or subject4 ,now
 in sacrilege we find a special aspect  
of deformity1 namely1 the violation of a
 sacred thing by treating it            
irreverently4 ,hence it is a special    
sin4  ,moreover1 it is opposed to       
religion4 ,for according to ,damascene  
7,de ,fide ,orth4 iv1 #c71 ,when the    
purple has been made into a royal robe1 
we pay it honor and homage1 and if      
anyone dishonor it he is condemned to   
death1 as acting against the king3 and  
in the same way if a man violate a      
sacred thing1 by so doing his behavior  
is contrary to the reverence due to ,god
 and consequently he is guilty of       
irreligion4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those are
 said to sin against the sanctity of the
 divine law who assail ,god's law1 as   
heretics and blasphemers do4 ,these are 
guilty of unbelief1 through not         
believing in ,god2 and of sacrilege1    
through perverting the words of the     
divine law4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing  

prevents one specific kind of sin being 
found in various generic kinds of sin1  
inasmuch as various sins are directed to
 the end of one sin1 just as happens in 
the case of virtues commanded by one    
virtue4 ,in this way1 by whatever kind  
of sin a man acts counter to reverence  
due to sacred things1 he commits a      
sacrilege formally2 although his act    
contains various kinds of sin           
materially4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sacrilege
 is sometimes found apart from other    
sins1 through its act having no other   
deformity than the violation of a sacred
 thing3 for instance1 if a judge were to
 take a person from a sacred place1 for 
he might lawfully have taken him from   
elsewhere4   ,,third ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #c  ,whether  
the ,species of ,sacrilege ,are         
,distinguished ,according to the ,sacred
 ,things8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that the species of sacrilege are not  
distinguished according to the sacred   
things4 ,material diversity does not    

differentiate species1 if the formal    
aspect remains the same4 ,now there     
would seem to be the same formal aspect 
of sin in all violations of sacred      
things1 and that the only difference is 
one of matter4 ,therefore the species of
 sacrilege are not distinguished        
thereby4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it does   
not seem possible that things belonging 
to the same species should at the same  
time differ specifically4 ,now murder1  
theft1 and unlawful intercourse1 are    
different species of sin4 ,therefore    
they cannot belong to the one same      
species of sacrilege3 and consequently  
it seems that the species of sacrilege  
are distinguished in accordance with the
 species of other sins1 and not         
according to the various sacred things4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 among sacred things 
sacred persons are reckoned4 ,if1       
therefore1 one species of sacrilege     
arises from the violation of a sacred   
person1 it would follow that every sin  
committed by a sacred person is a       

sacrilege1 since every sin violates the 
person of the sinner4 ,therefore the    
species of sacrilege are not reckoned   
according to the sacred things4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,acts and habits are         
distinguished by their objects4 ,now the
 sacred thing is the object of          
sacrilege1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74    
,therefore the species of sacrilege are 
distinguished according to the sacred   
things4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,a4 #a71 the sin of sacrilege    
consists in the irreverent treatment of 
a sacred thing4 ,now reverence is due to
 a sacred thing by reason of its        
holiness3 and consequently the species  
of sacrilege must needs be distinguished
 according to the different aspects of  
sanctity in the sacred things which are 
treated irreverently3 for the greater   
the holiness ascribed to the sacred     
thing that is sinned against1 the more  
grievous the sacrilege4  ,now holiness  
is ascribed1 not only to sacred persons1
 namely1 those who are consecrated to   

the divine worship1 but also to sacred  
places and to certain other sacred      
things4 ,and the holiness of a place is 
directed to the holiness of man1 who    
worships ,god in a holy place4 ,for it  
is written 7#b ,macc4 #e3ai73 ,god did  
not choose the people for the place's   
sake1 but the place for the people's    
sake4 ,hence sacrilege committed against
 a sacred person is a graver sin than   
that which is committed against a sacred
 place4 ,yet in either species there are
 various degrees of sacrilege1 according
 to differences of sacred persons and   
places4  ,in like manner the third      
species of sacrilege1 which is committed
 against other sacred things1 has       
various degrees1 according to the       
differences of sacred things4 ,among    
these the highest place belongs to the  
sacraments whereby man is sanctified3   
chief of which is the sacrament of the  
,eucharist1 for it contains ,christ     
,himself4 ,wherefore the sacrilege that 
is committed against this sacrament is  

the gravest of all4 ,the second place1  
after the sacraments1 belongs to the    
vessels consecrated for the             
administration of the sacraments2 also  
sacred images1 and the relics of the    
saints1 wherein the very persons of the 
saints1 so to speak1 are reverenced and 
honored4 ,after these come things       
connected with the apparel of the       
,church and its ministers2 and those    
things1 whether movable or immovable1   
that are deputed to the upkeep of the   
ministers4 ,and whoever sins against any
 one of the aforesaid incurs the crime  
of sacrilege4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there  
is not the same aspect of holiness in   
all the aforesaid3 wherefore the        
diversity of sacred things is not only a
 material1 but also a formal difference4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing hinders two 
things from belonging to one species in 
one respect1 and to different species in
 another respect4 ,thus ,socrates and   
,plato belong to the one species1       
animal1 but differ in the species       

colored thing1 if one be white and the  
other black4 ,in like manner it is      
possible for two sins to differ         
specifically as to their material acts1 
and to belong to the same species as    
regards the one formal aspect of        
sacrilege3 for instance1 the violation  
of a nun by blows or by copulation4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every sin committed by
 a sacred person is a sacrilege         
materially and accidentally as it were4 
,hence ,jerome 99,the quotation is from 
,st4 ,bernard1 ,de ,consideration4 ii1  
#ac says that a trifle on a priest's    
lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy4 ,but
 formally and properly speaking a sin   
committed by a sacred person is a       
sacrilege only when it is committed     
against his holiness1 for instance if a 
virgin consecrated to ,god be guilty of 
fornication3 and the same is to be said 
of other instances4   ,,fourth ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
the ,punishment of ,sacrilege ,should   
,be ,pecuniary8  ,objection #a3 ,it     

would seem that the punishment of       
sacrilege should not be pecuniary4 ,a   
pecuniary punishment is not wont to be  
inflicted for a criminal fault4 ,but    
sacrilege is a criminal fault1 wherefore
 it is punished by capital sentence     
according to civil law 99,dig4 xlviii1  
#ac2 ,cod4 i1 #c1 de ,episc4 et         
,cleric44 ,therefore sacrilege should   
not be awarded a pecuniary punishment4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the same sin should 
not receive a double punishment1        
according to ,nahum #a3i1 ,there shall  
not rise a double affliction4 ,but      
sacrilege is punished with              
excommunication2 major excommunication1 
for violating a sacred person1 and for  
burning or destroying a church1 and     
minor excommunication for other         
sacrileges4 ,therefore sacrilege should 
not be awarded a pecuniary punishment4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle says   
7#a ,thess4 #b3e73 ,neither have we     
taken an occasion of covetousness4 ,but 
it seems to involve an occasion of      

covetousness that a pecuniary punishment
 should be exacted for the violation of 
a sacred thing4 ,therefore this does not
 seem to be a fitting punishment of     
sacrilege4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
written 99,,xvii1 qu4 iv1 can4 ,si quis 
contumax3 ,if anyone contumaciously or  
arrogantly take away by force an escaped
 slave from the confines of a church he 
shall pay nine hundred soldi3 and again 
further on 7,,xvii1 qu4 iv1 can4        
,quisquis inventus1 can4 #ba73 ,whoever 
is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay  
thirty pounds of tried purest silver4   
,i answer that1 ,in the award of        
punishments two points must be          
considered4 ,first equality1 in order   
that the punishment may be just1 and    
that by what things a man sinneth by the
 same 4 4 4 he may be tormented 7,wis4  
#aa3ag74 ,in this respect the fitting   
punishment of one guilty of sacrilege1  
since he has done an injury to a sacred 
thing1 is excommunication 99,append4    
,gratian4 on can4 ,si quis contumax1    

quoted above whereby sacred things are  
withheld from him4 ,the second point to 
be considered is utility4 ,for          
punishments are inflicted as medicines1 
that men being deterred thereby may     
desist from sin4 ,now it would seem that
 the sacrilegious man1 who reverences   
not sacred things1 is not sufficiently  
deterred from sinning by sacred things  
being withheld from him1 since he has no
 care for them4 ,wherefore according to 
human laws he is sentenced to capital   
punishment1 and according to the        
statutes of the ,church1 which does not 
inflict the death of the body1 a        
pecuniary punishment is inflicted1 in   
order that men may be deterred from     
sacrilege1 at least by temporal         
punishments4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the     
,church inflicts not the death of the   
body1 but excommunication in its stead4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when one punishment is
 not sufficient to deter a man from sin1
 a double punishment must be inflicted4 
,wherefore it was necessary to inflict  

some kind of temporal punishment in     
addition to the punishment of           
excommunication1 in order to coerce     
those who despise spiritual things4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if money were exacted 
without a reasonable cause1 this would  
seem to involve an occasion of          
covetousness4 ,but when it is exacted   
for the purpose of man's correction1 it 
has a manifest utility1 and consequently
 involves no occasion of avarice4       
,,question #ajj  ,,on ,,simony 7,in ,six
 ,articles7  ,we must now consider      
simony1 under which head there are six  
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is       
simony8  7#b7 ,whether it is lawful to  
accept money for the sacraments8  7#c7  
,whether it is lawful to accept money   
for spiritual actions8  7#d7 ,whether it
 is lawful to sell things connected with
 spirituals8  7#e7 ,whether real        
remuneration alone makes a man guilty of
 simony1 or also oral remuneration or   
remuneration by service8  7#f7 ,of the  
punishment of simony4   ,,first         

,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,simony ,is an ,intentional    
,will to ,buy or ,sell ,something       
,spiritual or ,connected with a         
,spiritual ,thing8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that simony is not an express
 will to buy or sell something spiritual
 or connected with a spiritual thing4   
,simony is heresy1 since it is written  
7,i1 qu4 i 99,can4 ,eos qui per         
pecunias73 ,the impious heresy of       
,macedonius and of those who with him   
impugned the ,holy ,ghost1 is more      
endurable than that of those who are    
guilty of simony3 since the former in   
their ravings maintained that the ,holy 
,spirit of ,father and ,son is a        
creature and the slave of ,god1 whereas 
the latter make the same ,holy ,spirit  
to be their own slave4 ,for every master
 sells what he has just as he wills1    
whether it be his slave or any other of 
his possessions4 ,but unbelief1 like    
faith1 is an act not of the will but of 
the intellect1 as shown above 7,q4 #aj1 

,a4 #b74 ,therefore simony should not be
 defined as an act of the will4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 to sin intentionally is to
 sin through malice1 and this is to sin 
against the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore1 if
 simony is an intentional will to sin1  
it would seem that it is always a sin   
against the ,holy ,ghost4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 nothing is more spiritual than
 the kingdom of heaven4 ,but it is      
lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven3 for
 ,gregory says in a homily 7v1 in ,ev473
 ,the kingdom of heaven is worth as much
 as you possess4 ,therefore simony does 
not consist in a will to buy something  
spiritual4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 simony  
takes its name from ,simon the magician1
 of whom we read 7,acts #h3ah1 #ai7 that
 he offered the apostles money that he  
might buy a spiritual power1 in order1  
to wit1 that on whomsoever he imposed   
his hand they might receive the ,holy   
,ghost4 ,but we do not read that he     
wished to sell anything4 ,therefore     
simony is not the will to sell a        

spiritual thing4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1   
there are many other voluntary          
commutations besides buying and selling1
 such as exchange and transaction 99,a  
kind of legal compromise--,oxford       
,dictionary4 ,therefore it would seem   
that simony is defined insufficiently4  
,obj4 #f3 ,further1 anything connected  
with spiritual things is itself         
spiritual4 ,therefore it is superfluous 
to add or connected with spiritual      
things4  ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 according  
to some1 the ,pope cannot commit simony3
 yet he can buy or sell something       
spiritual4 ,therefore simony is not the 
will to buy or sell something spiritual 
or connected with a spiritual thing4    
,on the contrary1 ,gregory ,,vii says   
7,regist4 99,caus4 ,i1 qu4 i1 can4      
,presbyter1 qu4 iii1 can4 ,altare73     
,none of the faithful is ignorant that  
buying or selling altars1 tithes1 or the
 ,holy ,ghost is the heresy of simony4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #b7 an act is    

evil generically when it bears on undue 
matter4 ,now a spiritual thing is undue 
matter for buying and selling for three 
reasons4 ,first1 because a spiritual    
thing cannot be appraised at any earthly
 price1 even as it is said concerning   
wisdom 7,prov4 #c3ae71 she is more      
precious than all riches1 and all things
 that are desired1 are not to be        
compared with her3 and for this reason  
,peter1 in condemning the wickedness of 
,simon in its very source1 said 7,acts  
#h3bj73 ,keep thy money to thyself to   
perish with thee1 because thou hast     
thought that the gift of ,god may be    
purchased with money4  ,secondly1       
because a thing cannot be due matter for
 sale if the vendor is not the owner    
thereof1 as appears from the authority  
quoted 7,obj4 #a74 ,now ecclesiastical  
superiors are not owners1 but dispensers
 of spiritual things1 according to #a   
,cor4 #d3a1 ,let a man so account of us 
as of the ministers of ,christ1 and the 
dispensers of the ministers of ,god4    

,thirdly1 because sale is opposed to the
 source of spiritual things1 since they 
flow from the gratuitous will of ,god4  
,wherefore ,our ,lord said 7,matt4      
#aj3h73 ,freely have you received1      
freely give4  ,therefore by buying or   
selling a spiritual thing1 a man treats 
,god and divine things with irreverence1
 and consequently commits a sin of      
irreligion4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as  
religion consists in a kind of          
protestation of faith1 without1         
sometimes1 faith being in one's heart1  
so too the vices opposed to religion    
include a certain protestation of       
unbelief without1 sometimes1 unbelief   
being in the mind4 ,accordingly simony  
is said to be a heresy1 as regards the  
outward protestation1 since by selling a
 gift of the ,holy ,ghost a man         
declares1 in a way1 that he is the owner
 of a spiritual gift2 and this is       
heretical4 ,it must1 however1 be        
observed that ,simon ,magus1 besides    
wishing the apostles to sell him a grace

 of the ,holy ,ghost for money1 said    
that the world was not created by ,god1 
but by some heavenly power1 as ,isidore 
states 7,etym4 viii1 #e73 and so for    
this reason simoniacs are reckoned with 
other heretics1 as appears from         
,augustine's book on heretics4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4
 #d71 justice1 with all its parts1 and  
consequently all the opposite vices1 is 
in the will as its subject4 ,hence      
simony is fittingly defined from its    
relation to the will4 ,this act is      
furthermore described as express1 in    
order to signify that it proceeds from  
choice1 which takes the principal part  
in virtue and vice4 ,nor does everyone  
sin against the ,holy ,ghost that sins  
from choice1 but only he who chooses sin
 through contempt of those things       
whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from
 sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #a74
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the kingdom of      
heaven is said to be bought when a man  
gives what he has for ,god's sake4 ,but 

this is to employ the term buying in a  
wide sense1 and as synonymous with      
merit3 nor does it reach to the perfect 
signification of buying1 both because   
neither the sufferings of this time1 nor
 any gift or deed of ours1 are worthy to
 be compared with the glory to come1    
that shall be revealed in us 7,rom4     
#h3ah71 and because merit consists      
chiefly1 not in an outward gift1 action 
or passion1 but in an inward affection4 
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,simon the magician    
wished to buy a spiritual power in order
 that afterwards he might sell it4 ,for 
it is written 7,i1 qu4 iii 99,can4      
,salvator71 that ,simon the magician    
wished to buy the gift of the ,holy     
,ghost1 in order that he might make     
money by selling the signs to be wrought
 by him4 ,hence those who sell spiritual
 things are likened in intention to     
,simon the magician3 while those who    
wish to buy them are likened to him in  
act4 ,those who sell them imitate1 in   
act1 ,giezi the disciple of ,eliseus1 of

 whom we read 7#d ,kings #e3bj-bd7 that 
he received money from the leper who was
 healed3 wherefore the sellers of       
spiritual things may be called not only 
simoniacs but also giezites4  ,reply    
,obj4 #e3 ,the terms buying and selling 
cover all kinds of non-gratuitous       
contracts4 ,wherefore it is impossible  
for the exchange or agency of prebends  
or ecclesiastical benefices to be made  
by authority of the parties concerned   
without danger of committing simony1 as 
laid down by law 99,cap4 ,quaesitum1 de 
rerum ,permutat42 cap4 ,super1 de       
,transact44 ,nevertheless the superior1 
in virtue of his office1 can cause these
 exchanges to be made for useful or     
necessary reasons4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3    
,even as the soul lives by itself1 while
 the body lives through being united to 
the soul2 so1 too1 certain things are   
spiritual by themselves1 such as the    
sacraments and the like1 while others   
are called spiritual1 through adhering  
to those others4 ,hence 7,i1 qu4 iii1   

cap4 ,siquis objecerit7 it is stated    
that spiritual things do not progress   
without corporal things1 even as the    
soul has no bodily life without the     
body4  ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,the ,pope can  
be guilty of the vice of simony1 like   
any other man1 since the higher a man's 
position the more grievous is his sin4  
,for although the possessions of the    
,church belong to him as dispenser in   
chief1 they are not his as master and   
owner4 ,therefore1 were he to accept    
money from the income of any church in  
exchange for a spiritual thing1 he would
 not escape being guilty of the vice of 
simony4 ,in like manner he might commit 
simony by accepting from a layman moneys
 not belonging to the goods of the      
,church4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,it ,is   
,always ,unlawful to ,give ,money for   
the ,sacraments8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem that it is not always        
unlawful to give money for the          
sacraments4 ,baptism is the door of the 

sacraments1 as we shall state in the    
,third ,part 7,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #gc1 
,a4 #c74 ,but seemingly it is lawful in 
certain cases to give money for         
,baptism1 for instance if a priest were 
unwilling to baptize a dying child      
without being paid4 ,therefore it is not
 always unlawful to buy or sell the     
sacraments4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the    
greatest of the sacraments is the       
,eucharist1 which is consecrated in the 
,mass4 ,but some priests receive a      
prebend or money for singing masses4    
,much more therefore is it lawful to buy
 or sell the other sacraments4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 the sacrament of ,penance 
is a necessary sacrament consisting     
chiefly in the absolution4 ,but some    
persons demand money when absolving from
 excommunication4 ,therefore it is not  
always unlawful to buy or sell a        
sacrament4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 custom  
makes that which otherwise were sinful  
to be not sinful2 thus ,augustine says  
7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #dg7 that it was 

no crime to have several wives1 so long 
as it was the custom4 ,now it is the    
custom in some places to give something 
in the consecration of bishops1         
blessings of abbots1 ordinations of the 
clergy1 in exchange for the chrism1 holy
 oil1 and so forth4 ,therefore it would 
seem that it is not unlawful4  ,obj4 #e3
 ,further1 it happens sometimes that    
someone maliciously hinders a person    
from obtaining a bishopric or some like 
dignity4 ,but it is lawful for a man to 
make good his grievance4 ,therefore it  
is lawful1 seemingly1 in such a case to 
give money for a bishopric or a like    
ecclesiastical dignity4  ,obj4 #f3      
,further1 marriage is a sacrament4 ,but 
sometimes money is given for marriage4  
,therefore it is lawful to sell a       
sacrament4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
written 7,i1 qu4 i 99,can4 ,qui per     
pecunias73 ,whosoever shall consecrate  
anyone for money1 let him be cut off    
from the priesthood4  ,i answer that1   
,the sacraments of the ,new ,law are of 

all things most spiritual1 inasmuch as  
they are the cause of spiritual grace1  
on which no price can be set1 and which 
is essentially incompatible with a      
non-gratuitous giving4 ,now the         
sacraments are dispensed through the    
ministers of the ,church1 whom the      
people are bound to support1 according  
to the words of the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4  
#i3ac71 ,know you not1 that they who    
work in the holy place1 eat the things  
that are of the holy place2 and they    
that serve the altar1 partake with the  
altar8  ,accordingly we must answer that
 to receive money for the spiritual     
grace of the sacraments1 is the sin of  
simony1 which cannot be excused by any  
custom whatever1 since custom does not  
prevail over natural or divine law      
99,cap4 ,cum tanto1 de ,consuetud42 cf4 
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #c4 ,now by money 
we are to understand anything that has a
 pecuniary value1 as the ,philosopher   
states 7,ethic4 iv1 #a74 ,on the other  
hand1 to receive anything for the       

support of those who administer the     
sacraments1 in accordance with the      
statutes of the ,church and approved    
customs1 is not simony1 nor is it a sin4
 ,for it is received not as a price of  
goods1 but as a payment for their need4 
,hence a gloss of ,augustine on #a ,tim4
 #e3ag1 ,let the priests that rule well1
 says3 ,they should look to the people  
for a supply to their need1 but to the  
,lord for the reward of their ministry4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in a case of necessity
 anyone may baptize4 ,and since nowise  
ought one to sin1 if the priest be      
unwilling to baptize without being paid1
 one must act as though there were no   
priest available for the baptism4 ,hence
 the person who is in charge of the     
child can1 in such a case1 lawfully     
baptize it1 or cause it to be baptized  
by anyone else4 ,he could1 however1     
lawfully buy the water from the priest1 
because it is merely a bodily element4  
,but if it were an adult in danger of   
death that wished to be baptized1 and   

the priest were unwilling to baptize him
 without being paid1 he ought1 if       
possible1 to be baptized by someone     
else4 ,and if he is unable to have      
recourse to another1 he must by no means
 pay a price for ,baptism1 and should   
rather die without being baptized1      
because for him the baptism of desire   
would supply the lack of the sacrament4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the priest receives   
money1 not as the price for consecrating
 the ,eucharist1 or for singing the     
,mass 7for this would be simoniacal71   
but as payment for his livelihood1 as   
stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the    
money exacted of the person absolved is 
not the price of his absolution 7for    
this would be simoniacal71 but a        
punishment of a past crime for which he 
was excommunicated4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3   
,as stated above1 custom does not       
prevail over natural or divine law      
whereby simony is forbidden4 ,wherefore 
the custom1 if such there be1 of        
demanding anything as the price of a    

spiritual thing1 with the intention of  
buying or selling it1 is manifestly     
simoniacal1 especially when the demand  
is made of a person unwilling to pay4   
,but if the demand be made in payment of
 a stipend recognized by custom it is   
not simoniacal1 provided there be no    
intention of buying or selling1 but only
 of doing what is customary1 and        
especially if the demand be acceded to  
voluntarily4 ,in all these cases1       
however1 one must beware of anything    
having an appearance of simony or       
avarice1 according to the saying of the 
,apostle 7#a ,thess4 #e3bb71 ,from all  
appearance of evil restrain yourselves4 
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,it would be simoniacal
 to buy off the opposition of one's     
rivals1 before acquiring the right to a 
bishopric or any dignity or prebend1 by 
election1 appointment or presentation1  
since this would be to use money as a   
means of obtaining a spiritual thing4   
,but it is lawful to use money as a     
means of removing unjust opposition1    

after one has already acquired that     
right4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,some          
99,innocent ,,iv on ,cap4 ,cum in       
,ecclesia1 de ,simonia say that it is   
lawful to give money for ,matrimony     
because no grace is conferred thereby4  
,but this is not altogether true1 as we 
shall state in the ,third ,part of the  
work 99 ,supp41 ,q4 #db1 ,a4 #c4        
,wherefore we must reply that ,matrimony
 is not only a sacrament of the ,church1
 but also an office of nature4          
,consequently it is lawful to give money
 for ,matrimony considered as an office 
of nature1 but unlawful if it be        
considered as a sacrament of the        
,church4 ,hence1 according to the law   
99,cap4 ,cum in ,ecclesia1 de ,simonia1 
it is forbidden to demand anything for  
the ,nuptial ,blessing4   ,,third       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #c 
,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to ,give and   
,receive ,money for ,spiritual ,actions8
  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that it is   
lawful to give and receive money for    

spiritual actions4 ,the use of prophecy 
is a spiritual action4 ,but something   
used to be given of old for the use of  
prophecy1 as appears from #a ,kings     
#i3g1 #h1 and #c ,kings #ad3c4          
,therefore it would seem that it is     
lawful to give and receive money for a  
spiritual action4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
prayer1 preaching1 divine praise1 are   
most spiritual actions4 ,now money is   
given to holy persons in order to obtain
 the assistance of their prayers1       
according to ,luke #af3i1 ,make unto you
 friends of the mammon of iniquity4 ,to 
preachers also1 who sow spiritual       
things1 temporal things are due         
according to the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4     
#i3ad74 ,moreover1 something is given to
 those who celebrate the divine praises 
in the ecclesiastical office1 and make  
processions3 and sometimes an annual    
income is assigned to them4 ,therefore  
it is lawful to receive something for   
spiritual actions4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
science is no less spiritual than power4

 ,now it is lawful to receive money for 
the use of science3 thus a lawyer may   
sell his just advocacy1 a physician his 
advice for health1 and a master the     
exercise of his teaching4 ,therefore in 
like manner it would seem lawful for a  
prelate to receive something for the use
 of his spiritual power1 for instance1  
for correction1 dispensation1 and so    
forth4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 religion is 
the state of spiritual perfection4 ,now 
in certain monasteries something is     
demanded from those who are received    
there4 ,therefore it is lawful to demand
 something for spiritual things4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,it is stated 7,i1 qu4 i  
99,can4 ,quidquid invisibilis73 ,it is  
absolutely forbidden to make a charge   
for what is acquired by the consolation 
of invisible grace1 whether by demanding
 a price or by seeking any kind of      
return whatever4 ,now all these         
spiritual things are acquired through an
 invisible grace4 ,therefore it is not  
lawful to charge a price or return for  

them4  ,i answer that1 ,just as the     
sacraments are called spiritual1 because
 they confer a spiritual grace1 so1 too1
 certain other things are called        
spiritual1 because they flow from       
spiritual grace and dispose thereto4    
,and yet these things are obtainable    
through the ministry of men1 according  
to #a ,cor4 #i3g1 ,who serveth as a     
soldier at any time at his own charges8 
,who feedeth the flock1 and eateth not  
of the milk of the flock8 ,hence it is  
simoniacal to sell or buy that which is 
spiritual in such like actions2 but to  
receive or give something for the       
support of those who minister spiritual 
things in accordance with the statutes  
of the ,church and approved customs is  
lawful1 yet in such wise that there be  
no intention of buying or selling1 and  
that no pressure be brought to bear on  
those who are unwilling to give1 by     
withholding spiritual things that ought 
to be administered1 for then there would
 be an appearance of simony4 ,but after 

the spiritual things have been freely   
bestowed1 then the statutory and        
customary offerings and other dues may  
be exacted from those who are unwilling 
but able to pay1 if the superior        
authorize this to be done4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,as ,jerome says in his commentary 
on ,mic4 #c3i1 certain gifts were freely
 offered to the good prophets1 for their
 livelihood1 but not as a price for the 
exercise of their gift of prophecy4     
,wicked prophets1 however1 abused this  
exercise by demanding payment for it4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who give alms to
 the poor in order to obtain from them  
the assistance of their prayers do not  
give with the intent of buying their    
prayers2 but by their gratuitous        
beneficence inspire the poor with the   
mind to pray for them freely and out of 
charity4 ,temporal things are due to the
 preacher as means for his support1 not 
as a price of the words he preaches4    
,hence a gloss on #a ,tim4 #e3aa1 ,let  
the priests that rule well1 says3 ,their

 need allows them to receive the        
wherewithal to live1 charity demands    
that this should be given to them3 yet  
the ,gospel is not for sale1 nor is a   
livelihood the object of preaching3 for 
if they sell it for this purpose1 they  
sell a great thing for a contemptible   
price4 ,in like manner temporal things  
are given to those who praise ,god by   
celebrating the divine office whether   
for the living or for the dead1 not as a
 price but as a means of livelihood2 and
 the same purpose is fulfilled when alms
 are received for making processions in 
funerals4 ,yet it is simoniacal to do   
such things by contract1 or with the    
intention of buying or selling4 ,hence  
it would be an unlawful ordinance if it 
were decreed in any church that no      
procession would take place at a funeral
 unless a certain sum of money were     
paid1 because such an ordinance would   
preclude the free granting of pious     
offices to any person4 ,the ordinance   
would be more in keeping with the law1  

if it were decreed that this honor would
 be accorded to all who gave a certain  
alms1 because this would not preclude   
its being granted to others4 ,moreover1 
the former ordinance has the appearance 
of an exaction1 whereas the latter bears
 a likeness to a gratuitous             
remuneration4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a      
person to whom a spiritual power is     
entrusted is bound by virtue of his     
office to exercise the power entrusted  
to him in dispensing spiritual things4  
,moreover1 he receives a statutory      
payment from the funds of the ,church as
 a means of livelihood4 ,therefore1 if  
he were to accept anything for the      
exercise of his spiritual power1 this   
would imply1 not a hiring of his labor  
7which he is bound to give1 as a duty   
arising out of the office he has        
accepted71 but a sale of the very use of
 a spiritual grace4 ,for this reason it 
is unlawful for him to receive anything 
for any dispensing whatever1 or for     
allowing someone else to take his duty1 

or for correcting his subjects1 or for  
omitting to correct them4 ,on the other 
hand it is lawful for him to receive    
procurations1 when he visits his        
subjects1 not as a price for correcting 
them1 but as a means of livelihood4 ,he 
that is possessed of science1 without   
having taken upon himself the obligation
 of using it for the benefit of others  
can lawfully receive a price for his    
learning or advice1 since this is not a 
sale of truth or science1 but a hiring  
of labor4 ,if1 on the other hand1 he be 
so bound by virtue of his office1 this  
would amount to a sale of the truth1 and
 consequently he would sin grievously4  
,for instance1 those who in certain     
churches are appointed to instruct the  
clerics of that church and other poor   
persons1 and are in receipt of an       
ecclesiastical benefice for so doing1   
are not allowed to receive anything in  
return1 either for teaching1 or for     
celebrating or omitting any feasts4     
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,it is unlawful to     

exact or receive anything as price for  
entering a monastery3 but1 in the case  
of small monasteries1 that are unable to
 support so many persons1 it is lawful1 
while entrance to the monastery is free1
 to accept something for the support of 
those who are about to be received into 
the monastery1 if its revenues are      
insufficient4 ,in like manner it is     
lawful to be easier in admitting to a   
monastery a person who has proved his   
regard for that monastery by the        
generosity of his alms3 just as1 on the 
other hand1 it is lawful to incite a    
person's regard for a monastery by means
 of temporal benefits1 in order that he 
may thereby be induced to enter the     
monastery2 although it is unlawful to   
agree to give or receive something for  
entrance into a monastery 7,i1 qu4 ii1  
cap4 ,quam pio74   ,,fourth ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,it ,is ,lawful to ,receive ,money for  
,things ,annexed to ,spiritual ,things8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem lawful to 

receive money for things annexed to     
spiritual things4 ,seemingly all        
temporal things are annexed to spiritual
 things1 since temporal things ought to 
be sought for the sake of spiritual     
things4 ,if1 therefore1 it is unlawful  
to sell what is annexed to spiritual    
things1 it will be unlawful to sell     
anything temporal1 and this is clearly  
false4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing     
would seem to be more annexed to        
spiritual things than consecrated       
vessels4 ,yet it is lawful to sell a    
chalice for the ransom of prisoners1    
according to ,ambrose 7,de ,offic4 ii1  
#bh74 ,therefore it is lawful to sell   
things annexed to spiritual things4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things annexed to   
spiritual things include right of       
burial1 right of patronage1 and1        
according to ancient writers1 right of  
the first-born 7because before the ,lord
 the first-born exercised the priestly  
office71 and the right to receive       
tithes4 ,now ,abraham bought from       

,ephron a double cave for a             
burying-place 7,gen4 #bc3h1 sqq471 and  
,jacob bought from ,esau the right of   
the first-born 7,gen4 #be3ca1 sqq474    
,again the right of patronage is        
transferred with the property sold1 and 
is granted in fee4 ,tithes are granted  
to certain soldiers1 and can be         
redeemed4 ,prelates also at times retain
 for themselves the revenues of prebends
 of which they have the presentation1   
although a prebend is something annexed 
to a spiritual thing4 ,therefore it is  
lawful to sell things annexed to        
spiritual things4  ,on the contrary1    
,pope ,paschal 99,paschal ,,ii says 7cf4
 ,i1 qu4 iii1 cap4 ,si quis objecerit73 
,whoever sells one of two such things1  
that the one is unproductive without the
 other1 leaves neither unsold4          
,wherefore let no person sell a church1 
or a prebend1 or anything               
ecclesiastical4  ,i answer that1 ,a     
thing may be annexed to spiritual things
 in two ways4 ,first1 as being dependent

 on spiritual things4 ,thus to have     
ecclesiastical benefices is said to be  
annexed to spiritual things1 because it 
is not competent save to those who hold 
a clerical office4 ,hence such things   
can by no means exist apart from        
spiritual things4 ,consequently it is   
altogether unlawful to sell such things1
 because the sale thereof implies the   
sale of things spiritual4 ,other things 
are annexed to spiritual things through 
being directed thereto1 for instance the
 right of patronage1 which is directed  
to the presentation of clerics to       
ecclesiastical benefices2 and sacred    
vessels1 which are directed to the use  
of the sacraments4 ,wherefore such      
things as these do not presuppose       
spiritual things1 but precede them in   
the order of time4 ,hence in a way they 
can be sold1 but not as annexed to      
spiritual things4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all
 things temporal are annexed to         
spiritual things1 as to their end1      
wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal 

things1 but their relation to spiritual 
things cannot be the matter of a lawful 
sale4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sacred vessels 
also are annexed to spiritual things as 
to their end1 wherefore their           
consecration cannot be sold4 ,yet their 
material can be sold for the needs of   
the ,church or of the poor provided they
 first be broken1 after prayer has been 
said over them1 since when once broken1 
they are considered to be no longer     
sacred vessels but mere metal3 so that  
if like vessels were to be made out of  
the same material they would have to be 
consecrated again4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we
 have no authority for supposing that   
the double cave which ,abraham bought   
for a burial place was consecrated for  
that purpose3 wherefore ,abraham could  
lawfully buy that site to be used for   
burial1 in order to turn it into a      
sepulchre3 even so it would be lawful   
now to buy an ordinary field as a site  
for a cemetery or even a church4        
,nevertheless because even among the    

,gentiles burial places are looked upon 
as religious1 if ,ephron intended to    
accept the price as payment for a burial
 place1 he sinned in selling1 though    
,abraham did not sin in buying1 because 
he intended merely to buy an ordinary   
plot of ground4 ,even now1 it is lawful 
in a case of necessity to sell or buy   
land on which there has previously been 
a church1 as we have also said with     
regard to sacred vessels 7,reply ,obj4  
#b74 ,or again1 ,abraham is to be       
excused because he thus freed himself of
 a grievance4 ,for although ,ephron     
offered him the burial place for        
nothing1 ,abraham deemed that he could  
not accept it gratis without prejudice  
to himself4  ,the right of the          
first-born was due to ,jacob by reason  
of ,god's choice1 according to ,malach4 
#a3b1 #c1 ,i have loved ,jacob1 but have
 hated ,esau4 ,wherefore ,esau sinned by
 selling his birthright1 yet ,jacob     
sinned not in buying1 because he is     
understood to have freed himself of his 

grievance4  ,the right of patronage     
cannot be the matter of a direct sale1  
nor can it be granted in fee1 but is    
transferred with the property sold or   
granted4  ,the spiritual right of       
receiving tithes is not granted to      
layfolk1 but merely the temporal        
commodities which are granted in the    
name of tithe1 as stated above 7,q4 #hg1
 ,a4 #c74  ,with regard to the granting 
of benefices it must1 however1 be       
observed1 that it is not unlawful for a 
bishop1 before presenting a person to a 
benefice1 to decide1 for some reason1 to
 retain part of the revenues of the     
benefice in question1 and to spend it on
 some pious object4 ,but1 on the other  
hand1 if he were to require part of the 
revenues of that benefice to be given to
 him by the beneficiary1 it would be the
 same as though he demanded payment from
 him1 and he would not escape the guilt 
of simony4   ,,fifth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
,it ,is ,lawful to ,grant ,spiritual    

,things in ,return for an ,equivalent of
 ,service1 or for an ,oral              
,remuneration8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that it is lawful to grant        
spiritual things in return for an       
equivalent of service1 or an oral       
remuneration4 ,gregory says 7,regist4   
iii1 ep4 #ah73 ,it is right that those  
who serve the interests of the ,church  
should be rewarded4 ,now an equivalent  
of service denotes serving the interests
 of the ,church4 ,therefore it seems    
lawful to confer ecclesiastical         
benefices for services received4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 to confer an              
ecclesiastical benefice for service     
received seems to indicate a carnal     
intention1 no less than to do so on     
account of kinship4 ,yet the latter     
seemingly is not simoniacal since it    
implies no buying or selling4 ,therefore
 neither is the former simoniacal4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is done  
only at another's request would seem to 
be done gratis3 so that apparently it   

does not involve simony1 which consists 
in buying or selling4 ,now oral         
remuneration denotes the conferring of  
an ecclesiastical benefice at some      
person's request4 ,therefore this is not
 simoniacal4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1       
hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in   
order that they may receive human       
praise1 which seems to imply oral       
remuneration3 and yet hypocrites are not
 said to be guilty of simony4 ,therefore
 oral remuneration does not entail      
simony4  ,on the contrary1 ,pope ,urban 
99,urban ,,ii1 ,ep4 xvii ad ,lucium     
says3 ,whoever grants or acquires       
ecclesiastical things1 not for the      
purpose for which they were instituted  
but for his own profit1 in consideration
 of an oral remuneration or of an       
equivalent in service rendered or money 
received1 is guilty of simony4  ,i      
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 
the term money denotes anything that can
 have a pecuniary value4 ,now it is     
evident that a man's service is directed

 to some kind of usefulness1 which has a
 pecuniary value1 wherefore servants are
 hired for a money wage4 ,therefore to  
grant a spiritual thing for a service   
rendered or to be rendered is the same  
as to grant it for the money1 received  
or promised1 at which that service could
 be valued4 ,likewise1 to grant a       
person's request for the bestowal of a  
temporary favor is directed to some kind
 of usefulness which has a pecuniary    
value4 ,wherefore just as a man         
contracts the guilt of simony by        
accepting money or any external thing   
which comes under the head of real      
remuneration1 so too does he contract   
it1 by receiving oral remuneration or an
 equivalent in service rendered4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,if a cleric renders a       
prelate a lawful service1 directed to   
spiritual things 7e4g4 to the good of   
the ,church1 or benefit of her          
ministers71 he becomes worthy of an     
ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the
 devotion that led him to render the    

service1 as he would by reason of any   
other good deed4 ,hence this is not a   
case of remuneration for service        
rendered1 such as ,gregory has in mind4 
,but if the service be unlawful1 or     
directed to carnal things 7e4g4 a       
service rendered to the prelate for the 
profit of his kindred1 or the increase  
of his patrimony1 or the like71 it will 
be a case of remuneration for service   
rendered1 and this will be simony4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the bestowal of a     
spiritual thing gratis on a person by   
reason of kinship or of any carnal      
affection is unlawful and carnal1 but   
not simoniacal3 since nothing is        
received in return1 wherefore it does   
not imply a contract of buying and      
selling1 on which simony is based4 ,but 
to present a person to an ecclesiastical
 benefice with the understanding or     
intention that he provide for one's     
kindred from the revenue is manifest    
simony4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,oral         
remuneration denotes either praise that 

pertains to human favor1 which has its  
price1 or a request whereby man's favor 
is obtained or the contrary avoided4    
,hence if one intend this chiefly one   
commits simony4 ,now to grant a request 
made for an unworthy person implies1    
seemingly1 that this is one's chief     
intention wherefore the deed itself is  
simoniacal4 ,but if the request be made 
for a worthy person1 the deed itself is 
not simoniacal1 because it is based on a
 worthy cause1 on account of which a    
spiritual thing is granted to the person
 for whom the request is made4          
,nevertheless there may be simony in the
 intention1 if one look1 not to the     
worthiness of the person1 but to human  
favor4 ,if1 however1 a person asks for  
himself1 that he may obtain the cure of 
souls1 his very presumption renders him 
unworthy1 and so his request is made for
 an unworthy person4 ,but1 if one be in 
need1 one may lawfully seek for oneself 
an ecclesiastical benefice without the  
cure of souls4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a     

hypocrite does not give a spiritual     
thing for the sake of praise1 he only   
makes a show of it1 and under false     
pretenses stealthily purloins rather    
than buys human praise3 so that         
seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of
 simony4   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,those ,who
 ,are ,guilty of ,simony ,are ,fittingly
 ,punished by ,being ,deprived of ,what 
,they ,have ,acquired by ,simony8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that those
 who are guilty of simony are not       
fittingly punished by being deprived of 
what they have acquired by simony4      
,simony is committed by acquiring       
spiritual things in return for a        
remuneration4 ,now certain spiritual    
things cannot be lost when once         
acquired1 such as all characters that   
are imprinted by a consecration4        
,therefore it is not a fitting          
punishment for a person to be deprived  
of what he has acquired simoniacally4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it sometimes happens

 that one who has obtained the          
episcopate by simony commands a subject 
of his to receive orders from him3 and  
apparently the subject should obey1 so  
long as the ,church tolerates him4 ,yet 
no one ought to receive from him that   
has not the power to give4 ,therefore a 
bishop does not lose his episcopal      
power1 if he has acquired it by simony4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no one should be    
punished for what was done without his  
knowledge and consent1 since punishment 
is due for sin which is voluntary1 as   
was shown above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,,aa4
 #a1 #b2 ,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #g74 ,now it      
happens sometimes that a person acquires
 something spiritual1 which others have 
procured for him without his knowledge  
and consent4 ,therefore he should not be
 punished by being deprived of what has 
been bestowed on him4  ,obj4 #d3        
,further1 no one should profit by his   
own sin4 ,yet1 if a person who has      
acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by  
simony1 were to restore what he has     

received1 this would sometimes turn to  
the profit of those who had a share in  
his simony2 for instance1 when a prelate
 and his entire chapter have consented  
to the simony4 ,therefore that which has
 been acquired by simony ought not      
always to be restored4  ,obj4 #e3       
,further1 sometimes a person obtains    
admission to a monastery by simony1 and 
there takes the solemn vow of           
profession4 ,but no one should be freed 
from the obligation of a vow on account 
of a fault he has committed4 ,therefore 
he should not be expelled from the      
monastic state which he has acquired by 
simony4  ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 in this    
world external punishment is not        
inflicted for the internal movements of 
the heart1 whereof ,god alone is the    
judge4 ,now simony is committed in the  
mere intention or will1 wherefore it is 
defined in reference to the will1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,therefore
 a person should not always be deprived 
of what he has acquired by simony4      

,obj4 #g3 ,further1 to be promoted to   
greater dignity is much less than to    
retain that which one has already       
received4 ,now sometimes those who are  
guilty of simony are1 by dispensation1  
promoted to greater dignity4 ,therefore 
they should not always be deprived of   
what they have received4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,it is written 7,i1 qu4 i1    
cap4 ,si quis ,episcopus73 ,he that has 
been ordained shall profit nothing from 
his ordination or promotion that he has 
acquired by the bargain1 but shall      
forfeit the dignity or cure that he has 
acquired with his money4  ,i answer     
that1 ,no one can lawfully retain that  
which he has acquired against the       
owner's will4 ,for instance1 if a       
steward were to give some of his lord's 
property to a person1 against his lord's
 will and orders1 the recipient could   
not lawfully retain what he received4   
,now ,our ,lord1 ,whose stewards and    
ministers are the prelates of churches1 
ordered spiritual things to be given    

gratis1 according to ,matt4 #aj3h1      
,freely have you received1 freely give4 
,wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual 
things in return for a remuneration     
cannot lawfully retain them4 ,moreover1 
those who are guilty of simony1 by      
either selling or buying spiritual      
things1 as well as those who act as     
go-between1 are sentenced to other      
punishments1 namely1 infamy and         
deposition1 if they be clerics1 and     
excommunication if they be laymen1 as   
stated qu4 i1 cap4 ,si quis ,episcopus  
99,qu4 iii1 can4 ,si quis praebendas4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he that has received a
 sacred ,order simoniacally1 receives   
the character of the ,order on account  
of the efficacy of the sacrament3 but he
 does not receive the grace nor the     
exercise of the ,order1 because he has  
received the character by stealth as it 
were1 and against the will of the       
,supreme ,lord4 ,wherefore he is        
suspended1 by virtue of the law1 both as
 regards himself1 namely1 that he should

 not busy himself about exercising his  
,order1 and as regards others1 namely1  
that no one may communicate with him in 
the exercise of his ,order1 whether his 
sin be public or secret4 ,nor may he    
reclaim the money which he basely gave1 
although the other party unjustly       
retains it4  ,again1 a man who is guilty
 of simony1 through having conferred    
,orders simoniacally1 or through having 
simoniacally granted or received a      
benefice1 or through having been a      
go-between in a simoniacal transaction1 
if he has done so publicly1 is suspended
 by virtue of the law1 as regards both  
himself and others2 but if he has acted 
in secret he is suspended by virtue of  
the law1 as regards himself alone1 and  
not as regards others4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,one ought not to receive ,orders from 
a bishop one knows to have been promoted
 simoniacally1 either on account of his 
command or for fear of his              
excommunication3 and such as receive    
,orders from him do not receive the     

exercise of their ,orders1 even though  
they are ignorant of his being guilty of
 simony2 and they need to receive a     
dispensation4 ,some1 however1 maintain  
that one ought to receive ,orders in    
obedience to his command unless one can 
prove him to be guilty of simony1 but   
that one ought not to exercise the      
,order without a dispensation4 ,but this
 is an unreasonable statement1 because  
no one should obey a man to the extent  
of communicating with him in an unlawful
 action4 ,now he that is1 by virtue of  
the law1 suspended as regards both      
himself and others1 confers ,orders     
unlawfully3 wherefore no one should     
communicate with him1 by receiving      
,orders from him for any cause whatever4
 ,if1 however1 one be not certain on the
 point1 one ought not to give credence  
to another's sin1 and so one ought with 
a good conscience to receive ,orders    
from him4 ,and if the bishop has been   
guilty of simony otherwise than by a    
simoniacal promotion1 and the fact be a 

secret1 one can receive ,orders from him
 because he is not suspended as regards 
others1 but only as regards himself1 as 
stated above 7ad #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,to be deprived of what one has received
 is not only the punishment of a sin1   
but is also sometimes the effect of     
acquiring unjustly1 as when one buys a  
thing of a person who cannot sell it4   
,wherefore if a man1 knowingly and      
spontaneously1 receives ,orders or an   
ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally1   
not only is he deprived of what he has  
received1 by forfeiting the exercise of 
his order1 and resigning the benefice   
and the fruits acquired therefrom1 but  
also in addition to this he is punished 
by being marked with infamy4 ,moreover1 
he is bound to restore not only the     
fruit actually acquired1 but also such  
as could have been acquired by a careful
 possessor 7which1 however1 is to be    
understood of the net fruits1 allowance 
being made for expenses incurred on     
account of the fruits71 excepting those 

fruits that have been expended for the  
good of the ,church4  ,on the other     
hand1 if a man's promotion be procured  
simoniacally by others1 without his     
knowledge and consent1 he forfeits the  
exercise of his ,order1 and is bound to 
resign the benefice obtained together   
with fruits still extant2 but he is not 
bound to restore the fruits which he has
 consumed1 since he possessed them in   
good faith4 ,exception must be made in  
the case when his promotion has been    
deceitfully procured by an enemy of his2
 or when he expressly opposes the       
transaction1 for then he is not bound to
 resign1 unless subsequently he agree to
 the transaction1 by paying what was    
promised4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,money1     
property1 or fruits simoniacally        
received1 must be restored to the       
,church that has incurred loss by their 
transfer1 notwithstanding the fact that 
the prelate or a member of the chapter  
of that church was at fault1 since      
others ought not to be the losers by his

 sin3 in suchwise1 however1 that1 as far
 as possible1 the guilty parties be not 
the gainers4 ,but if the prelate and the
 entire chapter be at fault1 restitution
 must be made1 with the consent of      
superior authority1 either to the poor  
or to some other church4  ,reply ,obj4  
#e3 ,if there are any persons who have  
been simoniacally admitted into a       
monastery1 they must quit3 and if the   
simony was committed with their         
knowledge since the holding of the      
,general ,council 99,fourth ,lateran    
,council1 ,a4,d4 #abae1 held by         
,innocent ,,iii1 they must be expelled  
from their monastery without hope of    
return1 and do perpetual penance under a
 stricter rule1 or in some house of the 
same order1 if a stricter one be not    
found4 ,if1 however1 this took place    
before the ,council1 they must be placed
 in other houses of the same order4 ,if 
this cannot be done1 they must be       
received into monasteries of the same   
order1 by way of compensation1 lest they

 wander about the world1 but they must  
not be admitted to their former rank1   
and must be assigned a lower place4  ,on
 the other hand1 if they were received  
simoniacally1 without their knowledge1  
whether before or after the ,council1   
then after quitting they may be received
 again1 their rank being changed as     
stated4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,in ,god's    
sight the mere will makes a man guilty  
of simony2 but as regards the external  
ecclesiastical punishment he is not     
punished as a simoniac1 by being obliged
 to resign1 but is bound to repent of   
his evil intention4  ,reply ,obj4 #g3   
,the ,pope alone can grant a            
dispensation to one who has knowingly   
received a benefice 7simoniacally74 ,in 
other cases the bishop also can         
dispense1 provided the beneficiary first
 of all renounce what he has received   
simoniacally1 so that he will receive   
either the lesser dispensation allowing 
him to communicate with the laity1 or a 
greater dispensation1 allowing him after

 doing penance to retain his order in   
some other ,church2 or again a greater  
dispensation1 allowing him to remain in 
the same ,church1 but in minor orders2  
or a full dispensation allowing him to  
exercise even the major orders in the   
same ,church1 but not to accept a       
prelacy4   ,,question #aja  ,,of ,,piety
 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,after religion 
we must consider piety1 the             
consideration of which will render the  
opposite vices manifest4 ,accordingly   
four points of inquiry arise with regard
 to piety3  7#a7 ,to whom does piety    
extend8  7#b7 ,what does piety make one 
offer a person8  7#c7 ,whether piety is 
a special virtue8  7#d7 ,whether the    
duties of piety should be omitted for   
the sake of religion8   ,,first         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aja1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,piety ,extends to ,particular 
,human ,individuals8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 seems that piety does not extend to    
particular human individuals4 ,for      
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x7 that 

piety denotes1 properly speaking1 the   
worship of ,god1 which the ,greeks      
designate by the term eusebeia4 ,but the
 worship of ,god does not denote        
relation to man1 but only to ,god4      
,therefore piety does not extend        
definitely to certain human individuals4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory says     
7,moral4 i73 ,piety1 on her day1        
provides a banquet1 because she fills   
the inmost recesses of the heart with   
works of mercy4 ,now the works of mercy 
are to be done to all1 according to     
,augustine 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i74    
,therefore piety does not extend        
definitely to certain special persons4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in human affairs    
there are many other mutual relations   
besides those of kindred and            
citizenship1 as the ,philosopher states 
7,ethic4 viii1 #aa1 #ab71 and on each of
 them is founded a kind of friendship1  
which would seem to be the virtue of    
piety1 according to a gloss on #b ,tim4 
#c3e1 ,having an appearance indeed of   

piety ,douay3 'godliness'4 ,therefore   
piety extends not only to one's kindred 
and fellow-citizens4  ,on the contrary1 
,tully says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7    
that it is by piety that we do our duty 
towards our kindred and well-wishers of 
our country and render them faithful    
service4  ,i answer that1 ,man becomes a
 debtor to other men in various ways1   
according to their various excellence   
and the various benefits received from  
them4 ,on both counts ,god holds first  
place1 for ,he is supremely excellent1  
and is for us the first principle of    
being and government4 ,in the second    
place1 the principles of our being and  
government are our parents and our      
country1 that have given us birth and   
nourishment4 ,consequently man is debtor
 chiefly to his parents and his country1
 after ,god4 ,wherefore just as it      
belongs to religion to give worship to  
,god1 so does it belong to piety1 in the
 second place1 to give worship to one's 
parents and one's country4  ,the worship

 due to our parents includes the worship
 given to all our kindred1 since our    
kinsfolk are those who descend from the 
same parents1 according to the          
,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #ab74 ,the  
worship given to our country includes   
homage to all our fellow-citizens and to
 all the friends of our country4        
,therefore piety extends chiefly to     
these4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the greater   
includes the lesser3 wherefore the      
worship due to ,god includes the worship
 due to our parents as a particular4    
,hence it is written 7,malach4 #a3f73   
,if ,i be a father1 where is ,my honor8 
,consequently the term piety extends    
also to the divine worship4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4
 ,dei x71 the term piety is often used  
in connection with works of mercy1 in   
the language of the common people2 the  
reason for which ,i consider to be the  
fact that ,god ,himself has declared    
that these works are more pleasing to   
,him than sacrifices4 ,this custom has  

led to the application of the word      
'pious' to ,god ,himself4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,the relations of a man with his    
kindred and fellow-citizens are more    
referable to the principles of his being
 than other relations3 wherefore the    
term piety is more applicable to them4  
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aja1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,piety ,provides     
,support for ,our ,parents8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it seems that piety does not       
provide support for our parents4 ,for1  
seemingly1 the precept of the decalogue1
 ,honor thy father and mother1 belongs  
to piety4 ,but this prescribes only the 
giving of honor4 ,therefore it does not 
belong to piety to provide support for  
one's parents4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a   
man is bound to lay up for those whom he
 is bound to support4 ,now according to 
the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #ab3ad71 neither 
ought the children to lay up for the    
parents4 ,therefore piety does not      
oblige them to support their parents4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 piety extends not   

only to one's parents1 but also to other
 kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens1  
as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but one is   
not bound to support all one's kindred  
and fellow-citizens4 ,therefore neither 
is one bound to support one's parents4  
,on the contrary1 our ,lord 7,matt4     
#ae3c-f7 reproved the ,pharisees for    
hindering children from supporting their
 parents4  ,i answer that1 ,we owe      
something to our parents in two ways3   
that is to say1 both essentially1 and   
accidentally4 ,we owe them essentially  
that which is due to a father as such3  
and since he is his son's superior      
through being the principle of his      
being1 the latter owes him reverence and
 service4 ,accidentally1 that is due to 
a father1 which it befits him to receive
 in respect of something accidental to  
him1 for instance1 if he be ill1 it is  
fitting that his children should visit  
him and see to his cure2 if he be poor1 
it is fitting that they should support  
him2 and so on in like instance1 all of 

which come under the head of service    
due4 ,hence ,tully says 7,de ,invent4   
,rhet4 ii7 that piety gives both duty   
and homage3 duty referring to service1  
and homage to reverence or honor1       
because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4  
,dei x71 we are said to give homage to  
those whose memory or presence we honor4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to our    
,lord's interpretation 7,matt4 #ae3c-f7 
the honor due to our parents includes   
whatever support we owe them2 and the   
reason for this is that support is given
 to one's father because it is due to   
him as to one greater4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,since a father stands in the relation 
of principle1 and his son in the        
relation of that which is from a        
principle1 it is essentially fitting for
 a father to support his son3 and       
consequently he is bound to support him 
not only for a time1 but for all his    
life1 and this is to lay by4 ,on the    
other hand1 for the son to bestow       
something on his father is accidental1  

arising from some momentary necessity1  
wherein he is bound to support him1 but 
not to lay by as for a long time        
beforehand1 because naturally parents   
are not the successors of their         
children1 but children of their parents4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,tully says 7,de 
,invent4 ,rhet4 ii71 we offer homage and
 duty to all our kindred and to the     
well-wishers of our country2 not1       
however1 equally to all1 but chiefly to 
our parents1 and to others according to 
our means and their personal claims4    
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aja1  
,art4 #c  ,whether ,piety ,is a ,special
 ,virtue ,distinct from ,other ,virtues8
  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that piety is
 not a special virtue distinct from     
other virtues4 ,for the giving of       
service and homage to anyone proceeds   
from love4 ,but it belongs to piety4    
,therefore piety is not a distinct      
virtue from charity4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 it is proper to religion to   
give worship to ,god4 ,but piety also   

gives worship to ,god1 according to     
,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x74          
,therefore piety is not distinct from   
religion4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 piety1   
whereby we give our country worship and 
duty1 seems to be the same as legal     
justice1 which looks to the common good4
 ,but legal justice is a general virtue1
 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
v1 #a1 #b74 ,therefore piety is not a   
special virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,it  
is accounted by ,tully 7,de ,invent4    
,rhet4 ii7 as a part of justice4  ,i    
answer that1 ,a special virtue is one   
that regards an object under a special  
aspect4 ,since1 then1 the nature of     
justice consists in rendering another   
person his due1 wherever there is a     
special aspect of something due to a    
person1 there is a special virtue4 ,now 
a thing is indebted in a special way to 
that which is its connatural principle  
of being and government4 ,and piety     
regards this principle1 inasmuch as it  
pays duty and homage to our parents and 

country1 and to those who are related   
thereto4 ,therefore piety is a special  
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as      
religion is a protestation of faith1    
hope and charity1 whereby man is        
primarily directed to ,god1 so again    
piety is a protestation of the charity  
we bear towards our parents and country4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god is the principle
 of our being and government in a far   
more excellent manner than one's father 
or country4 ,hence religion1 which gives
 worship to ,god1 is a distinct virtue  
from piety1 which pays homage to our    
parents and country4 ,but things        
relating to creatures are transferred to
 ,god as the summit of excellence and   
causality1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4    
,nom4 i73 wherefore1 by way of          
excellence1 piety designates the worship
 of ,god1 even as ,god1 by way of       
excellence1 is called ,our ,father4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,piety extends to our  
country in so far as the latter is for  
us a principle of being3 but legal      

justice regards the good of our country1
 considered as the common good3         
wherefore legal justice has more of the 
character of a general virtue than piety
 has4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #aja1 ,art4 #d  ,whether the ,duties
 of ,piety ,towards ,one's ,parents     
,should ,be ,omitted for the ,sake of   
,religion8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems    
that the duties of piety towards one's  
parents should be omitted for the sake  
of religion4 ,for ,our ,lord said 7,luke
 #ad3bf73 ,if any man come to ,me1 and  
hate not his father1 and mother1 and    
wife1 and children1 and brethren1 and   
sisters1 yea and his own life also1 he  
cannot be ,my disciple4 ,hence it is    
said in praise of ,james and ,john      
7,matt4 #d3bb7 that they left their nets
 and father1 and followed ,christ4      
,again it is said in praise of the      
,levites 7,deut4 #cc3i73 ,who hath said 
to his father1 and to his mother3 ,i do 
not know you2 and to his brethren3 ,i   
know you not2 and their own children    

they have not known4 ,these have kept   
,thy word4 ,now a man who knows not his 
parents and other kinsmen1 or who even  
hates them1 must needs omit the duties  
of piety4 ,therefore the duties of piety
 should be omitted for the sake of      
religion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is    
written 7,luke #i3ei1 #fj7 that in      
answer to him who said3 ,suffer me first
 to go and bury my father1 ,our ,lord   
replied3 ,let the dead bury their dead3 
but go thou1 and preach the kingdom of  
,god4 ,now the latter pertains to       
religion1 while it is a duty of piety to
 bury one's father4 ,therefore a duty of
 piety should be omitted for the sake of
 religion4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god is 
called ,our ,father by excellence4 ,now 
just as we worship our parents by paying
 them the duties of piety so do we      
worship ,god by religion4 ,therefore the
 duties of piety should be omitted for  
the sake of the worship of religion4    
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 religious are bound 
by a vow which they may not break to    

fulfil the observances of religion4 ,now
 in accordance with those observances   
they are hindered from supporting their 
parents1 both on the score of poverty1  
since they have nothing of their own1   
and on the score of obedience1 since    
they may not leave the cloister without 
the permission of their superior4       
,therefore the duties of piety towards  
one's parents should be omitted for the 
sake of religion4  ,on the contrary1    
,our ,lord reproved the ,pharisees      
7,matt4 #ae3c-f7 who taught that for the
 sake of religion one ought to refrain  
from paying one's parents the honor we  
owe them4  ,i answer that1 ,religion and
 piety are two virtues4 ,now no virtue  
is opposed to another virtue1 since     
according to the ,philosopher1 in his   
book on the ,categories 7,cap4 ,de      
oppos471 good is not opposed to good4   
,therefore it is impossible that        
religion and piety mutually hinder one  
another1 so that the act of one be      
excluded by the act of the other4 ,now1 

as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #g1 ,a4   
#b2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #c71 the act of every  
virtue is limited by the circumstances  
due thereto1 and if it overstep them it 
will be an act no longer of virtue but  
of vice4 ,hence it belongs to piety to  
pay duty and homage to one's parents    
according to the due mode4 ,but it is   
not the due mode that man should tend to
 worship his father rather than ,god1   
but1 as ,ambrose says on ,luke #ab3eb1  
the piety of divine religion takes      
precedence of the claims of kindred4    
,accordingly1 if the worship of one's   
parents take one away from the worship  
of ,god it would no longer be an act of 
piety to pay worship to one's parents to
 the prejudice of ,god4 ,hence ,jerome  
says 7,ep4 ad ,heliod473 ,though thou   
trample upon thy father1 though thou    
spurn thy mother1 turn not aside1 but   
with dry eyes hasten to the standard of 
the cross2 it is the highest degree of  
piety to be cruel in this matter4       
,therefore in such a case the duties of 

piety towards one's parents should be   
omitted for the sake of the worship     
religion gives to ,god4 ,if1 however1 by
 paying the services due to our parents1
 we are not withdrawn from the service  
of ,god1 then will it be an act of      
piety1 and there will be no need to set 
piety aside for the sake of religion4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gregory expounding    
this saying of our ,lord says 7,hom4    
xxxvii in ,ev47 that when we find our   
parents to be a hindrance in our way to 
,god1 we must ignore them by hating and 
fleeing from them4 ,for if our parents  
incite us to sin1 and withdraw us from  
the service of ,god1 we must1 as regards
 this point1 abandon and hate them4 ,it 
is in this sense that the ,levites are  
said to have not known their kindred1   
because they obeyed the ,lord's command1
 and spared not the idolaters 7,ex4     
#cb74 ,james and ,john are praised for  
leaving their parents and following our 
,lord1 not that their father incited    
them to evil1 but because they deemed it

 possible for him to find another means 
of livelihood1 if they followed ,christ4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,our ,lord forbade   
the disciple to bury his father because1
 according to ,chrysostom 7,hom4 xxviii 
in ,matth471 ,our ,lord by so doing     
saved him from many evils1 such as the  
sorrows and worries and other things    
that one anticipates under these        
circumstances4 ,for after the burial the
 will had to be read1 the estate had to 
be divided1 and so forth3 but chiefly1  
because there were others who could see 
to the funeral4 ,or1 according to       
,cyril's commentary on ,luke #i1 this   
disciple's request was1 not that he     
might bury a dead father1 but that he   
might support a yet living father in the
 latter's old age1 until at length he   
should bury him4 ,this is what ,our     
,lord did not grant1 because there were 
others1 bound by the duties of kindred1 
to take care of him4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,whatever we give our parents out of    
piety is referred by us to ,god2 just as

 other works of mercy which we perform  
with regard to any of our neighbors are 
offered to ,god1 according to ,matt4    
#be3dj3 ,as long as you did it to one of
 4 4 4 ,my least 4 4 4 you did it to    
,me4 ,accordingly1 if our carnal parents
 stand in need of our assistance1 so    
that they have no other means of        
support1 provided they incite us to     
nothing against ,god1 we must not       
abandon them for the sake of religion4  
,but if we cannot devote ourselves to   
their service without sin1 or if they   
can be supported without our assistance1
 it is lawful to forego their service1  
so as to give more time to religion4    
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,we must speak         
differently of one who is yet in the    
world1 and of one who has made his      
profession in religion4 ,for he that is 
in the world1 if he has parents unable  
to find support without him1 he must not
 leave them and enter religion1 because 
he would be breaking the commandment    
prescribing the honoring of parents4    

,some say1 however1 that even then he   
might abandon them1 and leave them in   
,god's care4 ,but this1 considered      
aright1 would be to tempt ,god3 since1  
while having human means at hand1 he    
would be exposing his parents to danger1
 in the hope of ,god's assistance4 ,on  
the other hand1 if the parents can find 
means of livelihood without him1 it is  
lawful for him to abandon them and enter
 religion1 because children are not     
bound to support their parents except in
 cases of necessity1 as stated above4   
,he that has already made his profession
 in religion is deemed to be already    
dead to the world3 wherefore he ought   
not1 under pretext of supporting his    
parents1 to leave the cloister where he 
is buried with ,christ1 and busy himself
 once more with worldly affairs4        
,nevertheless he is bound1 saving his   
obedience to his superiors1 and his     
religious state withal1 to make points  
efforts for his parents' support4       
,,question #ajb  ,,of ,,observance1     

,,considered ,,in ,,itself1 ,,and ,,of  
,,its ,,parts 7,in ,three ,articles7    
,we must now consider observance and its
 parts1 the considerations of which will
 manifest the contrary vices4  ,under   
the head of observance there are three  
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
observance is a special virtue1 distinct
 from other virtues8  7#b7 ,what does   
observance offer8  7#c7 ,of its         
comparison with piety4   ,,first        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,observance ,is a ,special     
,virtue1 ,distinct from ,other ,virtues8
  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that         
observance is not a special virtue1     
distinct from other virtues4 ,for       
virtues are distinguished by their      
objects4 ,but the object of observance  
is not distinct from the object of      
piety3 for ,tully says 7,de ,invent4    
,rhet4 ii7 that it is by observance that
 we pay worship and honor to those who  
excel in some kind of dignity4 ,but     
worship and honor are paid also by piety

 to our parents1 who excel in dignity4  
,therefore observance is not a distinct 
virtue from piety4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
just as honor and worship are due to    
those that are in a position of dignity1
 so also are they due to those who excel
 in science and virtue4 ,but there is no
 special virtue whereby we pay honor and
 worship to those who excel in science  
and virtue4 ,therefore observance1      
whereby we pay worship and honor to     
those who excel in dignity1 is not a    
special virtue distinct from other      
virtues4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we have   
many duties towards those who are in a  
position of dignity1 the fulfilment of  
which is required by law1 according to  
,rom4 #ac3g1 ,render 4 4 4 to all men   
their dues3 tribute to whom tribute is  
due1 etc4 ,now the fulfilment of the    
requirements of the law belongs to legal
 justice1 or even to special justice4   
,therefore observance is not by itself a
 special virtue distinct from other     
virtues4  ,on the contrary1 ,tully 7,de 

,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 reckons observance  
along with the other parts of justice1  
which are special virtues4  ,i answer   
that1 ,as explained above 7,q4 #aja1    
,,aa4 #a1 #c2 ,q4 #hj71 according to the
 various excellences of those persons to
 whom something is due1 there must needs
 be a corresponding distinction of      
virtues in a descending order4 ,now just
 as a carnal father partakes of the     
character of principle in a particular  
way1 which character is found in ,god in
 a universal way1 so too a person who1  
in some way1 exercises providence in one
 respect1 partakes of the character of  
father in a particular way1 since a     
father is the principle of generation1  
of education1 of learning and of        
whatever pertains to the perfection of  
human life3 while a person who is in a  
position of dignity is as a principle of
 government with regard to certain      
things3 for instance1 the governor of a 
state in civil matters1 the commander of
 an army in matters of warfare1 a       

professor in matters of learning1 and so
 forth4 ,hence it is that all such      
persons are designated as fathers1 on   
account of their being charged with like
 cares3 thus the servants of ,naaman    
said to him 7#d ,kings #e3ac73 ,father1 
if the prophet had bid thee do some     
great thing1 etc4  ,therefore1 just as1 
in a manner1 beneath religion1 whereby  
worship is given to ,god1 we find piety1
 whereby we worship our parents2 so     
under piety we find observance1 whereby 
worship and honor are paid to persons in
 positions of dignity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,as stated above 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #c1 ad 
#b71 religion goes by the name of piety 
by way of supereminence1 although piety 
properly so called is distinct from     
religion2 and in the same way piety can 
be called observance by way of          
excellence1 although observance properly
 speaking is distinct from piety4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by the very fact of   
being in a position of dignity a man not
 only excels as regards his position1   

but also has a certain power of         
governing subjects1 wherefore it is     
fitting that he should be considered as 
a principle inasmuch as he is the       
governor of others4 ,on the other hand1 
the fact that a man has perfection of   
science and virtue does not give him the
 character of a principle in relation to
 others1 but merely a certain excellence
 in himself4 ,wherefore a special virtue
 is appointed for the payment of worship
 and honor to persons in positions of   
dignity4 ,yet1 forasmuch as science1    
virtue and all like things render a man 
fit for positions of dignity1 the       
respect which is paid to anyone on      
account of any excellence whatever      
belongs to the same virtue4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,it belongs to special        
justice1 properly speaking1 to pay the  
equivalent to those to whom we owe      
anything4 ,now this cannot be done to   
the virtuous1 and to those who make good
 use of their position of dignity1 as   
neither can it be done to ,god1 nor to  

our parents4 ,consequently these matters
 belong to an annexed virtue1 and not to
 special justice1 which is a principal  
virtue4  ,legal justice extends to the  
acts of all the virtues1 as stated above
 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #f74   ,,second ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #b  ,whether
 ,it ,belongs to ,observance to ,pay    
,worship and ,honor to ,those ,who ,are 
in ,positions of ,dignity8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it seems that it does not belong to
 observance to pay worship and honor to 
persons in positions of dignity4 ,for   
according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei 
x71 we are said to worship those persons
 whom we hold in honor1 so that worship 
and honor would seem to be the same4    
,therefore it is unfitting to define    
observance as paying worship and honor  
to persons in positions of dignity4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it belongs to       
justice that we pay what we owe3        
wherefore this belongs to observance    
also1 since it is a part of justice4    
,now we do not owe worship and honor to 

all persons in positions of dignity1 but
 only to those who are placed over us4  
,therefore observance is unfittingly    
defined as giving worship and honor to  
all4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 not only do we
 owe honor to persons of dignity who are
 placed over us2 we owe them also fear  
and a certain payment of remuneration1  
according to ,rom4 #ac3g1 ,render 4 4 4 
to all men their dues2 tribute to whom  
tribute is due2 custom to whom custom2  
fear to whom fear2 honor to whom honor4 
,moreover1 we owe them reverence and    
subjection1 according to ,heb4 #ac3ag1  
,obey your prelates1 and be subject to  
them4 ,therefore observance is not      
fittingly defined as paying worship and 
honor4  ,on the contrary1 ,tully says   
7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that it is by  
observance that we pay worship and honor
 to those who excel in some kind of     
dignity4  ,i answer that1 ,it belongs to
 persons in positions of dignity to     
govern subjects4 ,now to govern is to   
move certain ones to their due end3 thus

 a sailor governs his ship by steering  
it to port4 ,but every mover has a      
certain excellence and power over that  
which is moved4 ,wherefore1 a person in 
a position of dignity is an object of   
twofold consideration3 first1 in so far 
as he obtains excellence of position1   
together with a certain power over      
subjects3 secondly1 as regards the      
exercise of his government4 ,in respect 
of his excellence there is due to him   
honor1 which is the recognition of some 
kind of excellence2 and in respect of   
the exercise of his government1 there is
 due to him worship1 consisting in      
rendering him service1 by obeying his   
commands1 and by repaying him1 according
 to one's faculty1 for the benefits we  
received from him4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,worship includes not only honor1 but   
also whatever other suitable actions are
 connected with the relations between   
man and man4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as      
stated above 7,q4 #hj71 debt is twofold4
 ,one is legal debt1 to pay which man is

 compelled by law2 and thus man owes    
honor and worship to those persons in   
positions of dignity who are placed over
 him4 ,the other is moral debt1 which is
 due by reason of a certain honesty3 it 
is in this way that we owe worship and  
honor to persons in positions of dignity
 even though we be not their subjects4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,honor is due to the   
excellence of persons in positions of   
dignity1 on account of their higher     
rank3 while fear is due to them on      
account of their power to use           
compulsion3 and to the exercise of their
 government there is due both obedience1
 whereby subjects are moved at the      
command of their superiors1 and         
tributes1 which are a repayment of their
 labor4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,observance
 ,is a ,greater ,virtue ,than ,piety8   
,objection #a3 ,it seems that observance
 is a greater virtue than piety4 ,for   
the prince to whom worship is paid by   
observance is compared to a father who  

is worshiped by piety1 as a universal to
 a particular governor2 because the     
household which a father governs is part
 of the state which is governed by the  
prince4 ,now a universal power is       
greater1 and inferiors are more subject 
thereto4 ,therefore observance is a     
greater virtue than piety4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 persons in positions of       
dignity take care of the common good4   
,now our kindred pertain to the private 
good1 which we ought to set aside for   
the common good3 wherefore it is        
praiseworthy to expose oneself to the   
danger of death for the sake of the     
common good4 ,therefore observance1     
whereby worship is paid to persons in   
positions of dignity1 is a greater      
virtue than piety1 which pays worship to
 one's kindred4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further     
honor and reverence are due to the      
virtuous in the first place after ,god4 
,now honor and reverence are paid to the
 virtuous by the virtue of observance1  
as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74        

,therefore observance takes the first   
place after religion4  ,on the contrary1
 ,the precepts of the ,law prescribe    
acts of virtue4 ,now1 immediately after 
the precepts of religion1 which belong  
to the first table1 follows the precept 
of honoring our parents which refers to 
piety4 ,therefore piety follows         
immediately after religion in the order 
of excellence4  ,i answer that1         
,something may be paid to persons in    
positions of dignity in two ways4       
,first1 in relation to the common good1 
as when one serves them in the          
administration of the affairs of the    
state4 ,this no longer belongs to       
observance1 but to piety1 which pays    
worship not only to one's father but    
also to one's fatherland4 ,secondly1    
that which is paid to persons in        
positions of dignity refers specially to
 their personal usefulness or renown1   
and this belongs properly to observance1
 as distinct from piety4 ,therefore in  
comparing observance with piety we must 

needs take into consideration the       
different relations in which other      
persons stand to ourselves1 which       
relations both virtues regard4 ,now it  
is evident that the persons of our      
parents and of our kindred are more     
substantially akin to us than persons in
 positions of dignity1 since birth and  
education1 which originate in the       
father1 belong more to one's substance  
than external government1 the principle 
of which is seated in those who are in  
positions of dignity4 ,for this reason  
piety takes precedence of observance1   
inasmuch as it pays worship to persons  
more akin to us1 and to whom we are more
 strictly bound4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the 
prince is compared to the father as a   
universal to a particular power1 as     
regards external government1 but not as 
regards the father being a principle of 
generation3 for in this way the father  
should be compared with the divine power
 from which all things derive their     
being4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in so far as  

persons in positions of dignity are     
related to the common good1 their       
worship does not pertain to observance1 
but to piety1 as stated above4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,the rendering of honor or    
worship should be proportionate to the  
person to whom it is paid not only as   
considered in himself1 but also as      
compared to those who pay them4         
,wherefore1 though virtuous persons1    
considered in themselves1 are more      
worthy of honor than the persons of     
one's parents1 yet children are under a 
greater obligation1 on account of the   
benefits they have received from their  
parents and their natural kinship with  
them1 to pay worship and honor to their 
parents than to virtuous persons who are
 not of their kindred4   ,,question #ajc
  ,,of ,,dulia 7,in ,four ,articles7    
,we must now consider the parts of      
observance4 ,we shall consider 7#a7     
dulia1 whereby we pay honor and other   
things pertaining thereto to those who  
are in a higher position2 7#b7          

obedience1 whereby we obey their        
commands4  ,under the first head there  
are four points of inquiry3  7#a7       
,whether honor is a spiritual or a      
corporal thing8  7#b7 ,whether honor is 
due to those only who are in a higher   
position8  7#c7 ,whether dulia1 which   
pays honor and worship to those who are 
above us1 is a special virtue1 distinct 
from latria8  7#d7 ,whether it contains 
several species8   ,,first ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,honor ,denotes ,something ,corporal8   
,objection #a3 ,it seems that honor does
 not denote something corporal4 ,for    
honor is showing reverence in           
acknowledgment of virtue1 as may be     
gathered from the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
i1 #e74 ,now showing reverence is       
something spiritual1 since to revere is 
an act of fear1 as stated above 7,q4    
#ha1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a74 ,therefore honor is
 something spiritual4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 according to the ,philosopher 
7,ethic4 iv1 #c71 honor is the reward of

 virtue4 ,now1 since virtue consists    
chiefly of spiritual things1 its reward 
is not something corporal1 for the      
reward is more excellent than the merit4
 ,therefore honor does not consist of   
corporal things4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
honor is distinct from praise1 as also  
from glory4 ,now praise and glory       
consist of external things4 ,therefore  
honor consists of things internal and   
spiritual4  ,on the contrary1 ,jerome in
 his exposition of #a ,tim4 #e3c1 ,honor
 widows that are widows indeed1 and 7#a 
,tim4 #e3ag71 let the priests that rule 
well be esteemed worthy of double honor 
etc4 says 7,ep4 ad ,ageruch473 ,honor   
here stands either for almsgiving or for
 remuneration4 ,now both of these       
pertain to corporal things4 ,therefore  
honor consists of corporal things4  ,i  
answer that1 ,honor denotes a witnessing
 to a person's excellence4 ,therefore   
men who wish to be honored seek a       
witnessing to their excellence1         
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  

i1 #e2 viii1 #h74 ,now witness is borne 
either before ,god or before man4       
,before ,god1 ,who is the searcher of   
hearts1 the witness of one's conscience 
suffices4 wherefore honor1 so far as    
,god is concerned1 may consist of the   
mere internal movement of the heart1 for
 instance when a man acknowledges either
 ,god's excellence or another man's     
excellence before ,god4 ,but1 as regards
 men1 one cannot bear witness1 save by  
means of signs1 either by words1 as when
 one proclaims another's excellence by  
word of mouth1 or by deeds1 for instance
 by bowing1 saluting1 and so forth1 or  
by external things1 as by offering      
gifts1 erecting statues1 and the like4  
,accordingly honor consists of signs1   
external and corporal4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,reverence is not the same as honor3   
but on the one hand it is the primary   
motive for showing honor1 in so far as  
one man honors another out of the       
reverence he has for him2 and on the    
other hand1 it is the end of honor1 in  

so far as a person is honored in order  
that he may be held in reverence by     
others4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to 
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #c71 honor
 is not a sufficient reward of virtue3  
yet nothing in human and corporal things
 can be greater than honor1 since these 
corporal things themselves are employed 
as signs in acknowledgment of excelling 
virtue4 ,it is1 however1 due to the good
 and the beautiful1 that they may be    
made known1 according to ,matt4 #e3ae1  
,neither do men light a candle1 and put 
it under a bushel1 but upon a           
candlestick1 that it may shine to all   
that are in the house4 ,in this sense   
honor is said to be the reward of       
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,praise is    
distinguished from honor in two ways4   
,first1 because praise consists only of 
verbal signs1 whereas honor consists of 
any external signs1 so that praise is   
included in honor4 ,secondly1 because by
 paying honor to a person we bear       
witness to a person's excelling goodness

 absolutely1 whereas by praising him we 
bear witness to his goodness in         
reference to an end3 thus we praise one 
that works well for an end4 ,on the     
other hand1 honor is given even to the  
best1 which is not referred to an end1  
but has already arrived at the end1     
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
i1 #e74  ,glory is the effect of honor  
and praise1 since the result of our     
bearing witness to a person's goodness  
is that his goodness becomes clear to   
the knowledge of many4 ,the word glory  
signifies this1 for glory is the same as
 kleria1 wherefore a gloss of ,augustine
 on ,rom4 #af3bg observes that glory is 
clear knowledge together with praise4   
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajc1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,honor ,is ,properly 
,due to ,those ,who ,are ,above ,us8    
,objection #a3 ,it seems that honor is  
not properly due to those who are above 
us4 ,for an angel is above any human    
wayfarer1 according to ,matt4 #aa3aa1   
,he that is lesser in the kingdom of    

heaven is greater than ,john the        
,baptist4 ,yet an angel forbade ,john   
when the latter wished to honor him     
7,apoc4 #bb3aj74 ,therefore honor is not
 due to those who are above us4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 honor is due to a person  
in acknowledgment of his virtue1 as     
stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #c74 
,but sometimes those who are above us   
are not virtuous4 ,therefore honor is   
not due to them1 as neither is it due to
 the demons1 who nevertheless are above 
us in the order of nature4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 the ,apostle says 7,rom4      
#ab3aj73 ,with honor preventing one     
another1 and we read 7#a ,pet4 #b3ag73  
,honor all men4 ,but this would not be  
so if honor were due to those alone who 
are above us4 ,therefore honor is not   
due properly to those who are above us4 
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is written 7,tob4
 #a3af7 that ,tobias had ten talents of 
silver of that which he had been honored
 by the king3 and we read 7,esther      
#f3aa7 that ,assuerus honored           

,mardochaeus1 and ordered it to be      
proclaimed in his presence3 ,this honor 
is he worthy of whom the king hath a    
mind to honor4 ,therefore honor is paid 
to those also who are beneath us1 and it
 seems1 in consequence1 that honor is   
not due properly to those who are above 
us4  ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher
 says 7,ethic4 i1 #ab7 that honor is due
 to the best4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,a4 #a71 honor is nothing 
but an acknowledgment of a person's     
excelling goodness4 ,now a person's     
excellence may be considered1 not only  
in relation to those who honor him1 in  
the point of his being more excellent   
than they1 but also in itself1 or in    
relation to other persons1 and in this  
way honor is always due to a person1 on 
account of some excellence or           
superiority4  ,for the person honored   
has no need to be more excellent than   
those who honor him2 it may suffice for 
him to be more excellent than some      
others1 or again he may be more         

excellent than those who honor him in   
some respect and not simply4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,the angel forbade ,john to   
pay him1 not any kind of honor1 but the 
honor of adoration and latria1 which is 
due to ,god4 ,or again1 he forbade him  
to pay the honor of dulia1 in order to  
indicate the dignity of ,john himself1  
for which ,christ equaled him to the    
angels according to the hope of glory of
 the children of ,god3 wherefore he     
refused to be honored by him as though  
he were superior to him4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,a wicked superior is honored for   
the excellence1 not of his virtue but of
 his dignity1 as being ,god's minister1 
and because the honor paid to him is    
paid to the whole community over which  
he presides4 ,as for the demons1 they   
are wicked beyond recall1 and should be 
looked upon as enemies1 rather than     
treated with honor4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,in every man is to be found something  
that makes it possible to deem him      
better than ourselves1 according to     

,phil4 #b3c1 ,in humility1 let each     
esteem others better than themselves1   
and thus1 too1 we should all be on the  
alert to do honor to one another4       
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,private individuals   
are sometimes honored by kings1 not that
 they are above them in the order of    
dignity but on account of some          
excellence of their virtue3 and in this 
way ,tobias and ,mardochaeus were       
honored by kings4   ,,third ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,dulia ,is a ,special ,virtue ,distinct 
from ,latria8  ,objection #a4 ,it seems 
that dulia is not a special virtue      
distinct from latria4 ,for a gloss on   
,ps4 #g3a1 ,o ,lord my ,god1 in ,thee   
have ,i put my trust1 says3 ,lord of all
 by ,his power1 to ,whom dulia is due2  
,god by creation1 to ,whom we owe       
latria4 ,now the virtue directed to ,god
 as ,lord is not distinct from that     
which is directed to ,him as ,god4      
,therefore dulia is not a distinct      
virtue from latria4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1

 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
viii1 #h71 to be loved is like being    
honored4 ,now the charity with which we 
love ,god is the same as that whereby we
 love our neighbor4 ,therefore dulia    
whereby we honor our neighbor is not a  
distinct virtue from latria with which  
we honor ,god4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the 
movement whereby one is moved towards an
 image is the same as the movement      
whereby one is moved towards the thing  
represented by the image4 ,now by dulia 
we honor a man as being made to the     
image of ,god4 ,for it is written of the
 wicked 7,wis4 #b3bb1 #bc7 that they    
esteemed not the honor of holy souls1   
for ,god created man incorruptible1 and 
to the image of ,his own likeness ,he   
made him4 ,therefore dulia is not a     
distinct virtue from latria whereby ,god
 is honored4  ,on the contrary1         
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x71 that
 the homage due to man1 of which the    
,apostle spoke when he commanded        
servants to obey their masters and which

 in ,greek is called dulia1 is distinct 
from latria which denotes the homage    
that consists in the worship of ,god4   
,i answer that1 ,according to what has  
been stated above 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #c71   
where there are different aspects of    
that which is due1 there must needs be  
different virtues to render those dues4 
,now servitude is due to ,god and to man
 under different aspects3 even as       
lordship is competent to ,god and to man
 under different aspects4 ,for ,god has 
absolute and paramount lordship over the
 creature wholly and singly1 which is   
entirely subject to ,his power3 whereas 
man partakes of a certain likeness to   
the divine lordship1 forasmuch as he    
exercises a particular power over some  
man or creature4 ,wherefore dulia1 which
 pays due service to a human lord1 is a 
distinct virtue from latria1 which pays 
due service to the lordship of ,god4 ,it
 is1 moreover1 a species of observance1 
because by observance we honor all those
 who excel in dignity1 while dulia      

properly speaking is the reverence of   
servants for their master1 dulia being  
the ,greek for servitude4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,just as religion is called piety by
 way of excellence1 inasmuch as ,god is 
our ,father by way of excellence1 so    
again latria is called dulia by way of  
excellence1 inasmuch as ,god is our     
,lord by way of excellence4 ,now the    
creature does not partake of the power  
to create by reason of which latria is  
due to ,god3 and so this gloss drew a   
distinction1 by ascribing latria to ,god
 in respect of creation1 which is not   
communicated to a creature1 but dulia in
 respect of lordship1 which is          
communicated to a creature4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,the reason why we love our   
neighbor is ,god1 since that which we   
love in our neighbor through charity is 
,god alone4 ,wherefore the charity with 
which we love ,god is the same as that  
with which we love our neighbor4 ,yet   
there are other friendships distinct    
from charity1 in respect of the other   

reasons for which a man is loved4 ,in   
like manner1 since there is one reason  
for serving ,god and another for serving
 man1 and for honoring the one or the   
other1 latria and dulia are not the same
 virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,movement    
towards an image as such is referred to 
the thing represented by the image3 yet 
not every movement towards an image is  
referred to the image as such1 and      
consequently sometimes the movement to  
the image differs specifically from the 
movement to the thing4 ,accordingly we  
must reply that the honor or subjection 
of dulia regards some dignity of a man  
absolutely4 ,for though1 in respect of  
that dignity1 man is made to the image  
or likeness of ,god1 yet in showing     
reverence to a person1 one does not     
always refer this to ,god actually4  ,or
 we may reply that the movement towards 
an image is1 after a fashion1 towards   
the thing1 yet the movement towards the 
thing need not be towards its image4    
,wherefore reverence paid to a person as

 the image of ,god redounds somewhat to 
,god3 and yet this differs from the     
reverence that is paid to ,god ,himself1
 for this in no way refers to ,his      
image4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,dulia ,has
 ,various ,species8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
seems that dulia has various species4   
,for by dulia we show honor to our      
neighbor4 ,now different neighbors are  
honored under different aspects1 for    
instance king1 father and master1 as the
 ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ix1 #b74  
,since this difference of aspect in the 
object differentiates the species of    
virtue1 it seems that dulia is divided  
into specifically different virtues4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the mean differs    
specifically from the extremes1 as pale 
differs from white and black4 ,now      
hyperdulia is apparently a mean between 
latria and dulia3 for it is shown       
towards creatures having a special      
affinity to ,god1 for instance to the   
,blessed ,virgin as being the mother of 

,god4 ,therefore it seems that there are
 different species of dulia1 one being  
simply dulia1 the other hyperdulia4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as in the      
rational creature we find the image of  
,god1 for which reason it is honored1 so
 too in the irrational creature we find 
the trace of ,god4 ,now the aspect of   
likeness denoted by an image differs    
from the aspect conveyed by a trace4    
,therefore we must distinguish a        
corresponding difference of dulia3 and  
all the more since honor is shown to    
certain irrational creatures1 as1 for   
instance1 to the wood of the ,holy      
,cross4  ,on the contrary1 ,dulia is    
condivided with latria4 ,but latria is  
not divided into different species4     
,neither therefore is dulia4  ,i answer 
that1 ,dulia may be taken in two ways4  
,in one way it may be taken in a wide   
sense as denoting reverence paid to     
anyone on account of any kind of        
excellence1 and thus it comprises piety 
and observance1 and any similar virtue  

whereby reverence is shown towards a    
man4 ,taken in this sense it will have  
parts differing specifically from one   
another4 ,in another way it may be taken
 in a strict sense as denoting the      
reverence of a servant for his lord1 for
 dulia signifies servitude1 as stated   
above 7,a4 #c74 ,taken in this sense it 
is not divided into different species1  
but is one of the species of observance1
 mentioned by ,tully 7,de ,invent4      
,rhet4 ii71 for the reason that a       
servant reveres his lord under one      
aspect1 a soldier his commanding officer
 under another1 the disciple his master 
under another1 and so on in similar     
cases4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument 
takes dulia in a wide sense4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,hyperdulia is the highest    
species of dulia taken in a wide sense1 
since the greatest reverence is that    
which is due to a man by reason of his  
having an affinity to ,god4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,man owes neither subjection  
nor honor to an irrational creature     

considered in itself1 indeed all such   
creatures are naturally subject to man4 
,as to the ,cross of ,christ1 the honor 
we pay to it is the same as that which  
we pay to ,christ1 just as the king's   
robe receives the same honor as the king
 himself1 according to ,damascene 7,de  
,fide ,orth4 iv74   ,,question #ajd     
,,of ,,obedience 7,in ,six ,articles7   
,we must now consider obedience1 under  
which head there are six points of      
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether one man is bound
 to obey another8  7#b7 ,whether        
obedience is a special virtue8  7#c7 ,of
 its comparison with other virtues2     
7#d7 ,whether ,god must be obeyed in all
 things8  7#e7 ,whether subjects are    
bound to obey their superiors in all    
things8  7#f7 ,whether the faithful are 
bound to obey the secular power8        
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,one ,man ,is ,bound 
to ,obey ,another8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
seems that one man is not bound to obey 
another4 ,for nothing should be done    

contrary to the divine ordinance4 ,now  
,god has so ordered that man is ruled by
 his own counsel1 according to ,ecclus4 
#ae3ad1 ,god made man from the          
beginning1 and left him in the hand of  
his own counsel4 ,therefore one man is  
not bound to obey another4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 if one man were bound to obey 
another1 he would have to look upon the 
will of the person commanding him1 as   
being his rule of conduct4 ,now ,god's  
will alone1 which is always right1 is a 
rule of human conduct4 ,therefore man is
 bound to obey none but ,god4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 the more gratuitous the      
service the more is it acceptable4 ,now 
what a man does out of duty is not      
gratuitous4 ,therefore if a man were    
bound in duty to obey others in doing   
good deeds1 for this very reason his    
good deeds would be rendered less       
acceptable through being done out of    
obedience4 ,therefore one man is not    
bound to obey another4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,it is prescribed 7,heb4      

#ac3ag73 ,obey your prelates and be     
subject to them4  ,i answer that1 ,just 
as the actions of natural things proceed
 from natural powers1 so do human       
actions proceed from the human will4 ,in
 natural things it behooved the higher  
to move the lower to their actions by   
the excellence of the natural power     
bestowed on them by ,god3 and so in     
human affairs also the higher must move 
the lower by their will in virtue of a  
divinely established authority4 ,now to 
move by reason and will is to command4  
,wherefore just as in virtue of the     
divinely established natural order the  
lower natural things need to be subject 
to the movement of the higher1 so too in
 human affairs1 in virtue of the order  
of natural and divine law1 inferiors are
 bound to obey their superiors4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,god left man in the hand of  
his own counsel1 not as though it were  
lawful to him to do whatever he will1   
but because1 unlike irrational          
creatures1 he is not compelled by       

natural necessity to do what he ought to
 do1 but is left the free choice        
proceeding from his own counsel4 ,and   
just as he has to proceed on his own    
counsel in doing other things1 so too   
has he in the point of obeying his      
superiors4 ,for ,gregory says 7,moral4  
xxxv71 ,when we humbly give way to      
another's voice1 we overcome ourselves  
in our own hearts4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,the will of ,god is the first rule     
whereby all rational wills are          
regulated3 and to this rule one will    
approaches more than another1 according 
to a divinely appointed order4 ,hence   
the will of the one man who issues a    
command may be as a second rule to the  
will of this other man who obeys him4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a thing may be deemed 
gratuitous in two ways4 ,in one way on  
the part of the deed itself1 because1 to
 wit1 one is not bound to do it2 in     
another way1 on the part of the doer1   
because he does it of his own free will4
 ,now a deed is rendered virtuous1      

praiseworthy and meritorious1 chiefly   
according as it proceeds from the will4 
,wherefore although obedience be a duty1
 if one obey with a prompt will1 one's  
merit is not for that reason diminished1
 especially before ,god1 ,who sees not  
only the outward deed1 but also the     
inward will4   ,,second ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q1 #ajd1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,obedience ,is a ,special ,virtue8      
,objection #a3 ,it seems that obedience 
is not a special virtue4 ,for           
disobedience is contrary to obedience4  
,but disobedience is a general sin1     
because ,ambrose says 7,de ,parad4 viii7
 that sin is to disobey the divine law4 
,therefore obedience is not a special   
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every      
special virtue is either theological or 
moral4 ,but obedience is not a          
theological virtue1 since it is not     
comprised under faith1 hope or charity4 
,nor is it a moral virtue1 since it does
 not hold the mean between excess and   
deficiency1 for the more obedient one is

 the more is one praised4 ,therefore    
obedience is not a special virtue4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory says       
7,moral4 xxxv7 that obedience is the    
more meritorious and praiseworthy1 the  
less it holds its own4 ,but every       
special virtue is the more to be praised
 the more it holds its own1 since virtue
 requires a man to exercise his will and
 choice1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #d4   
,therefore obedience is not a special   
virtue4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 virtues    
differ in species according to their    
objects4 ,now the object of obedience   
would seem to be the command of a       
superior1 of which1 apparently1 there   
are as many kinds as there are degrees  
of superiority4 ,therefore obedience is 
a general virtue1 comprising many       
special virtues4  ,on the contrary1     
obedience is reckoned by some to be a   
part of justice1 as stated above 7,q4   
#hj74  ,i answer that1 ,a special virtue
 is assigned to all good deeds that have
 a special reason of praise3 for it     

belongs properly to virtue to render a  
deed good4 ,now obedience to a superior 
is due in accordance with the divinely  
established order of things1 as shown   
above 7,a4 #a71 and therefore it is a   
good1 since good consists in mode1      
species and order1 as ,augustine states 
7,de ,natura ,boni iii7 99,cf4 ,first   
,part1 ,q4 #e1 ,a4 #e4 ,again1 this act 
has a special aspect of praiseworthiness
 by reason of its object4 ,for while    
subjects have many obligations towards  
their superiors1 this one1 that they are
 bound to obey their commands1 stands   
out as special among the rest4          
,wherefore obedience is a special       
virtue1 and its specific object is a    
command tacit or express1 because the   
superior's will1 however it become      
known1 is a tacit precept1 and a man's  
obedience seems to be all the more      
prompt1 forasmuch as by obeying he      
forestalls the express command as soon  
as he understands his superior's will4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing prevents the  

one same material object from admitting 
two special aspects to which two special
 virtues correspond3 thus a soldier1 by 
defending his king's fortress1 fulfils  
both an act of fortitude1 by facing the 
danger of death for a good end1 and an  
act of justice1 by rendering due service
 to his lord4 ,accordingly the aspect of
 precept1 which obedience considers1    
occurs in acts of all virtues1 but not  
in all acts of virtue1 since not all    
acts of virtue are a matter of precept1 
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1 ,a4  
#c74 ,moreover1 certain things are      
sometimes a matter of precept1 and      
pertain to no other virtue1 such things 
for instance as are not evil except     
because they are forbidden4 ,wherefore1 
if obedience be taken in its proper     
sense1 as considering formally and      
intentionally the aspect of precept1 it 
will be a special virtue1 and           
disobedience a special sin3 because in  
this way it is requisite for obedience  
that one perform an act of justice or of

 some other virtue with the intention of
 fulfilling a precept2 and for          
disobedience that one treat the precept 
with actual contempt4 ,on the other     
hand1 if obedience be taken in a wide   
sense for the performance of any action 
that may be a matter of precept1 and    
disobedience for the omission of that   
action through any intention whatever1  
then obedience will be a general virtue1
 and disobedience a general sin4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,obedience is not a          
theological virtue1 for its direct      
object is not ,god1 but the precept of  
any superior1 whether expressed or      
inferred1 namely1 a simple word of the  
superior1 indicating his will1 and which
 the obedient subject obeys promptly1   
according to ,titus #c3a1 ,admonish them
 to be subject to princes1 and to obey  
at a word1 etc4  ,it is1 however1 a     
moral virtue1 since it is a part of     
justice1 and it observes the mean       
between excess and deficiency4 ,excess  
thereof is measured in respect1 not of  

quantity1 but of other circumstances1 in
 so far as a man obeys either whom he   
ought not1 or in matters wherein he     
ought not to obey1 as we have stated    
above regarding religion 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4  
#b74 ,we may also reply that as in      
justice1 excess is in the person who    
retains another's property1 and         
deficiency in the person who does not   
receive his due1 according to the       
,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #d71 so too    
obedience observes the mean between     
excess on the part of him who fails to  
pay due obedience to his superior1 since
 he exceeds in fulfilling his own will1 
and deficiency on the part of the       
superior1 who does not receive          
obedience4 ,wherefore in this way       
obedience will be a mean between two    
forms of wickedness1 as was stated above
 concerning justice 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #aj74 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,obedience1 like every 
virtue1 requires the will to be prompt  
towards its proper object1 but not      
towards that which is repugnant to it4  

,now the proper object of obedience is a
 precept1 and this proceeds from        
another's will4 ,wherefore obedience    
makes a man's will prompt in fulfilling 
the will of another1 the maker1 namely1 
of the precept4 ,if that which is       
prescribed to him is willed by him for  
its own sake apart from its being       
prescribed1 as happens in agreeable     
matters1 he tends towards it at once by 
his own will and seems to comply1 not on
 account of the precept1 but on account 
of his own will4 ,but if that which is  
prescribed is nowise willed for its own 
sake1 but1 considered in itself1        
repugnant to his own will1 as happens in
 disagreeable matters1 then it is quite 
evident that it is not fulfilled except 
on account of the precept4 ,hence       
,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxv7 that       
obedience perishes or diminishes when it
 holds its own in agreeable matters1    
because1 to wit1 one's own will seems to
 tend principally1 not to the           
accomplishment of the precept1 but to   

the fulfilment of one's own desire2 but 
that it increases in disagreeable or    
difficult matters1 because there one's  
own will tends to nothing beside the    
precept4 ,yet this must be understood as
 regards outward appearances3 for1 on   
the other hand1 according to the        
judgment of ,god1 ,who searches the     
heart1 it may happen that even in       
agreeable matters obedience1 while      
holding its own1 is nonetheless         
praiseworthy1 provided the will of him  
that obeys tend no less devotedly 99,cf4
 ,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #b to the fulfilment of   
the precept4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3          
,reverence regards directly the person  
that excels3 wherefore it admits a      
various species according to the various
 aspects of excellence4 ,obedience1 on  
the other hand1 regards the precept of  
the person that excels1 and therefore   
admits of only one aspect4 ,and since   
obedience is due to a person's precept  
on account of reverence to him1 it      
follows that obedience to a man is of   

one species1 though the causes from     
which it proceeds differ specifically4  
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1  
,art4 #c  ,whether ,obedience ,is the   
,greatest of the ,virtues8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it seems that obedience is the     
greatest of the virtues4 ,for it is     
written 7#a ,kings #ae3bb73 ,obedience  
is better than sacrifices4 ,now the     
offering of sacrifices belongs to       
religion1 which is the greatest of all  
moral virtues1 as shown above 7,q4 #ha1 
,a4 #f74 ,therefore obedience is the    
greatest of all virtues4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxv7  
that obedience is the only virtue that  
ingrafts virtues in the soul and        
protects them when ingrafted4 ,now the  
cause is greater than the effect4       
,therefore obedience is greater than all
 the virtues4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1      
,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxv7 that evil  
should never be done out of obedience3  
yet sometimes for the sake of obedience 
we should lay aside the good we are     

doing4 ,now one does not lay aside a    
thing except for something better4      
,therefore obedience1 for whose sake the
 good of other virtues is set aside1 is 
better than other virtues4  ,on the     
contrary1 obedience deserves praise     
because it proceeds from charity3 for   
,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxv7 that       
obedience should be practiced1 not out  
of servile fear1 but from a sense of    
charity1 not through fear of punishment1
 but through love of justice4 ,therefore
 charity is a greater virtue than       
obedience4  ,i answer that1 ,just as sin
 consists in man contemning ,god and    
adhering to mutable things1 so the merit
 of a virtuous act consists in man      
contemning created goods and adhering to
 ,god as his end4 ,now the end is       
greater than that which is directed to  
the end4 ,therefore if a man contemns   
created goods in order that he may      
adhere to ,god1 his virtue derives      
greater praise from his adhering to ,god
 than from his contemning earthly       

things4 ,and so those1 namely the       
theological1 virtues whereby he adheres 
to ,god in ,himself1 are greater than   
the moral virtues1 whereby he holds in  
contempt some earthly thing in order to 
adhere to ,god4  ,among the moral       
virtues1 the greater the thing which a  
man contemns that he may adhere to ,god1
 the greater the virtue4 ,now there are 
three kinds of human goods that man may 
contemn for ,god's sake4 ,the lowest of 
these are external goods1 the goods of  
the body take the middle place1 and the 
highest are the goods of the soul2 and  
among these the chief1 in a way1 is the 
will1 in so far as1 by his will1 man    
makes use of all other goods4           
,therefore1 properly speaking1 the      
virtue of obedience1 whereby we contemn 
our own will for ,god's sake1 is more   
praiseworthy than the other moral       
virtues1 which contemn other goods for  
the sake of ,god4  ,hence ,gregory says 
7,moral4 xxxv7 that obedience is rightly
 preferred to sacrifices1 because by    

sacrifices another's body is slain      
whereas by obedience we slay our own    
will4 ,wherefore even any other acts of 
virtue are meritorious before ,god      
through being performed out of obedience
 to ,god's will4 ,for were one to suffer
 even martyrdom1 or to give all one's   
goods to the poor1 unless one directed  
these things to the fulfilment of the   
divine will1 which pertains directly to 
obedience1 they could not be            
meritorious3 as neither would they be if
 they were done without charity1 which  
cannot exist apart from obedience4 ,for 
it is written 7#a ,john #b3d1 #e73 ,he  
who saith that he knoweth ,god1 and     
keepeth not ,his commandments1 is a liar
 4 4 4 but he that keepeth ,his word1 in
 him in very deed the charity of ,god is
 perfected3 and this because friends    
have the same likes and dislikes4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,obedience proceeds    
from reverence1 which pays worship and  
honor to a superior1 and in this respect
 it is contained under different        

virtues1 although considered in itself1 
as regarding the aspect of precept1 it  
is one special virtue4 ,accordingly1 in 
so far as it proceeds from reverence for
 a superior1 it is contained1 in a way1 
under observance2 while in so far as it 
proceeds from reverence for one's       
parents1 it is contained under piety2   
and in so far as it proceeds from       
reverence for ,god1 it comes under      
religion1 and pertains to devotion1     
which is the principal act of religion4 
,wherefore from this point of view it is
 more praiseworthy to obey ,god than to 
offer sacrifice1 as well as because1 in 
a sacrifice we slay another's body1     
whereas by obedience we slay our own    
will1 as ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxv74  
,as to the special case in which ,samuel
 spoke1 it would have been better for   
,saul to obey ,god than to offer in     
sacrifice the fat animals of the        
,amalekites against the commandment of  
,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all acts of    
virtue1 in so far as they come under a  

precept1 belong to obedience4 ,wherefore
 according as acts of virtue act        
causally or dispositively towards their 
generation and preservation1 obedience  
is said to ingraft and protect all      
virtues4 ,and yet it does not follow    
that obedience takes precedence of all  
virtues absolutely1 for two reasons4    
,first1 because though an act of virtue 
come under a precept1 one may           
nevertheless perform that act of virtue 
without considering the aspect of       
precept4 ,consequently1 if there be any 
virtue1 whose object is naturally prior 
to the precept1 that virtue is said to  
be naturally prior to obedience4 ,such a
 virtue is faith1 whereby we come to    
know the sublime nature of divine       
authority1 by reason of which the power 
to command is competent to ,god4        
,secondly1 because infusion of grace and
 virtues may precede1 even in point of  
time1 all virtuous acts3 and in this way
 obedience is not prior to all virtues1 
neither in point of time nor by nature4 

,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there are two kinds of
 good4 ,there is that to which we are   
bound of necessity1 for instance to love
 ,god1 and so forth3 and by no means may
 such a good be set aside on account of 
obedience4 ,but there is another good to
 which man is not bound of necessity1   
and this good we ought sometimes to set 
aside for the sake of obedience to which
 we are bound of necessity1 since we    
ought not to do good by falling into    
sin4 ,yet as ,gregory remarks 7,moral4  
xxxv71 he who forbids his subjects any  
single good1 must needs allow them many 
others1 lest the souls of those who obey
 perish utterly from starvation1 through
 being deprived of every good4 ,thus the
 loss of one good may be compensated by 
obedience and other goods4   ,,fourth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #d 
,whether ,god ,ought to ,be ,obeyed in  
,all ,things8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems 
that ,god need not be obeyed in all     
things4 ,for it is written 7,matt4      
#i3cj1 #ca7 that our ,lord after healing

 the two blind men commanded them1      
saying3 ,see that no man know this4 ,but
 they going out spread ,his fame abroad 
in all that country4 ,yet they are not  
blamed for so doing4 ,therefore it seems
 that we are not bound to obey ,god in  
all things4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no one 
is bound to do anything contrary to     
virtue4 ,now we find that ,god commanded
 certain things contrary to virtue3 thus
 ,he commanded ,abraham to slay his     
innocent son 7,gen4 #bb72 and the ,jews 
to steal the property of the ,egyptians 
7,ex4 #aa71 which things are contrary to
 justice2 and ,osee to take to himself a
 woman who was an adulteress 7,osee #c71
 and this is contrary to chastity4      
,therefore ,god is not to be obeyed in  
all things4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whoever
 obeys ,god conforms his will to the    
divine will even as to the thing willed4
 ,but we are not bound in all things to 
conform our will to the divine will as  
to the thing willed1 as stated above    
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #aj74 ,therefore 

man is not bound to obey ,god in all    
things4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is       
written 7,ex4 #bd3g73 ,all things that  
the ,lord hath spoken we will do1 and we
 will be obedient4  ,i answer that1 ,as 
stated above 7,a4 #a71 he who obeys is  
moved by the command of the person he   
obeys1 just as natural things are moved 
by their motive causes4 ,now just a ,god
 is the first mover of all things that  
are moved naturally1 so too is ,he the  
first mover of all wills1 as shown above
 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore  
just as all natural things are subject  
to the divine motion by a natural       
necessity so too all wills1 by a kind of
 necessity of justice1 are bound to obey
 the divine command4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,our ,lord in telling the blind men to  
conceal the miracle had no intention of 
binding them with the force of a divine 
precept1 but1 as ,gregory says 7,moral4 
xix71 gave an example to ,his servants  
who follow ,him that they might wish to 
hide their virtue and yet that it should

 be proclaimed against their will1 in   
order that others might profit by their 
example4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even as ,god
 does nothing contrary to nature 7since 
the nature of a thing is what ,god does 
therein1 according to a gloss on ,rom4  
#aa71 and yet does certain things       
contrary to the wonted course of nature2
 so to ,god can command nothing contrary
 to virtue since virtue and rectitude of
 human will consist chiefly in          
conformity with ,god's will and         
obedience to ,his command1 although it  
be contrary to the wonted mode of       
virtue4 ,accordingly1 then1 the command 
given to ,abraham to slay his innocent  
son was not contrary to justice1 since  
,god is the author of life and death4   
,nor again was it contrary to justice   
that ,he commanded the ,jews to take    
things belonging to the ,egyptians1     
because all things are ,his1 and ,he    
gives them to whom ,he will4 ,nor was it
 contrary to chastity that ,osee was    
commanded to take an adulteress1 because

 ,god ,himself is the ordainer of human 
generation1 and the right manner of     
intercourse with woman is that which ,he
 appoints4 ,hence it is evident that the
 persons aforesaid did not sin1 either  
by obeying ,god or by willing to obey   
,him4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,though man is  
not always bound to will what ,god      
wills1 yet he is always bound to will   
what ,god wills him to will4 ,this comes
 to man's knowledge chiefly through     
,god's command1 wherefore man is bound  
to obey ,god's commands in all things4  
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1  
,art4 #e  ,whether ,subjects ,are ,bound
 to ,obey ,their ,superiors in ,all     
,things8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that 
subjects are bound to obey their        
superiors in all things4 ,for the       
,apostle says 7,col4 #c3bj73 ,children1 
obey your parents in all things1 and    
farther on 7,col4 #c3bb73 ,servants1    
obey in all things your masters         
according to the flesh4 ,therefore in   
like manner other subjects are bound to 

obey their superiors in all things4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 superiors stand     
between ,god and their subjects1        
according to ,deut4 #e3e1 ,i was the    
mediator and stood between the ,lord and
 you at that time1 to show you ,his     
words4 ,now there is no going from      
extreme to extreme1 except through that 
which stands between4 ,therefore the    
commands of a superior must be esteemed 
the commands of ,god1 wherefore the     
,apostle says 7,gal4 #d3ad73 ,you 4 4 4 
received me as an angel of ,god1 even as
 ,christ ,jesus and 7#a ,thess4 #b3ac73 
,when you had received of us the word of
 the hearing of ,god1 you received it1  
not as the word of men1 but1 as it is   
indeed1 the word of ,god4 ,therefore as 
man is bound to obey ,god in all things1
 so is he bound to obey his superiors4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as religious in
 making their profession take vows of   
chastity and poverty1 so do they also   
vow obedience4 ,now a religious is bound
 to observe chastity and poverty in all 

things4 ,therefore he is also bound to  
obey in all things4  ,on the contrary1  
,it is written 7,acts #e3bi73 ,we ought 
to obey ,god rather than men4 ,now      
sometimes the things commanded by a     
superior are against ,god4 ,therefore   
superiors are not to be obeyed in all   
things4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,,aa4 #a1 #d71 he who obeys is   
moved at the bidding of the person who  
commands him1 by a certain necessity of 
justice1 even as a natural thing is     
moved through the power of its mover by 
a natural necessity4 ,that a natural    
thing be not moved by its mover1 may    
happen in two ways4 ,first1 on account  
of a hindrance arising from the stronger
 power of some other mover2 thus wood is
 not burnt by fire if a stronger force  
of water intervene4 ,secondly1 through  
lack of order in the movable with regard
 to its mover1 since1 though it is      
subject to the latter's action in one   
respect1 yet it is not subject thereto  
in every respect4 ,thus1 a humor is     

sometimes subject to the action of heat1
 as regards being heated1 but not as    
regards being dried up or consumed4 ,in 
like manner there are two reasons1 for  
which a subject may not be bound to obey
 his superior in all things4 ,first on  
account of the command of a higher      
power4 ,for as a gloss says on ,rom4    
#ac3b1 ,they that resist ,vulg43 ',he   
that resisteth' the power1 resist the   
ordinance of ,god 7cf4 ,st4 ,augustine1 
,de ,verb4 ,dom4 viii74 ,if a           
commissioner issue an order1 are you to 
comply1 if it is contrary to the bidding
 of the proconsul8 ,again if the        
proconsul command one thing1 and the    
emperor another1 will you hesitate to   
disregard the former and serve the      
latter8 ,therefore if the emperor       
commands one thing and ,god another1 you
 must disregard the former and obey     
,god4 ,secondly1 a subject is not bound 
to obey his superior if the latter      
command him to do something wherein he  
is not subject to him4 ,for ,seneca says

 7,de ,beneficiis iii73 ,it is wrong to 
suppose that slavery falls upon the     
whole man3 for the better part of him is
 excepted4 ,his body is subjected and   
assigned to his master but his soul is  
his own4 ,consequently in matters       
touching the internal movement of the   
will man is not bound to obey his       
fellow-man1 but ,god alone4             
,nevertheless man is bound to obey his  
fellow-man in things that have to be    
done externally by means of the body3   
and yet1 since by nature all men are    
equal1 he is not bound to obey another  
man in matters touching the nature of   
the body1 for instance in those relating
 to the support of his body or the      
begetting of his children4 ,wherefore   
servants are not bound to obey their    
masters1 nor children their parents1 in 
the question of contracting marriage or 
of remaining in the state of virginity  
or the like4 ,but in matters concerning 
the disposal of actions and human       
affairs1 a subject is bound to obey his 

superior within the sphere of his       
authority2 for instance a soldier must  
obey his general in matters relating to 
war1 a servant his master in matters    
touching the execution of the duties of 
his service1 a son his father in matters
 relating to the conduct of his life and
 the care of the household2 and so      
forth4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when the      
,apostle says in all things1 he refers  
to matters within the sphere of a       
father's or master's authority4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,man is subject to ,god simply
 as regards all things1 both internal   
and external1 wherefore he is bound to  
obey ,him in all things4 ,on the other  
hand1 inferiors are not subject to their
 superiors in all things1 but only in   
certain things and in a particular way1 
in respect of which the superior stands 
between ,god and his subjects1 whereas  
in respect of other matters the subject 
is immediately under ,god1 by ,whom he  
is taught either by the natural or by   
the written law4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3      

,religious profess obedience as to the  
regular mode of life1 in respect of     
which they are subject to their         
superiors3 wherefore they are bound to  
obey in those matters only which may    
belong to the regular mode of life1 and 
this obedience suffices for salvation4  
,if they be willing to obey even in     
other matters1 this will belong to the  
superabundance of perfection2 provided1 
however1 such things be not contrary to 
,god or to the rule they profess1 for   
obedience in this case would be         
unlawful4  ,accordingly we may          
distinguish a threefold obedience2 one1 
sufficient for salvation1 and consisting
 in obeying when one is bound to obey3  
secondly1 perfect obedience1 which obeys
 in all things lawful3 thirdly1         
indiscreet obedience1 which obeys even  
in matters unlawful4   ,,sixth ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #f  ,whether
 ,christians ,are ,bound to ,obey the   
,secular ,powers8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
seems that ,christians are not bound to 

obey the secular power4 ,for a gloss on 
,matt4 #ag3be1 ,then the children are   
free1 says3 ,if in every kingdom the    
children of the king who holds sway over
 that kingdom are free1 then the        
children of that ,king1 under ,whose    
sway are all kingdoms1 should be free in
 every kingdom4 ,now ,christians1 by    
their faith in ,christ1 are made        
children of ,god1 according to ,john    
#a3ab3 ,he gave them power to be made   
the sons of ,god1 to them that believe  
in ,his name4 ,therefore they are not   
bound to obey the secular power4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 it is written 7,rom4      
#g3d73 ,you 4 4 4 are become dead to the
 law by the body of ,christ1 and the law
 mentioned here is the divine law of the
 ,old ,testament4 ,now human law whereby
 men are subject to the secular power is
 of less account than the divine law of 
the ,old ,testament4 ,much more1        
therefore1 since they have become       
members of ,christ's body1 are men freed
 from the law of subjection1 whereby    

they were under the power of secular    
princes4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 men are   
not bound to obey robbers1 who oppress  
them with violence4 ,now1 ,augustine    
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei iv73 ,without      
justice1 what else is a kingdom but a   
huge robbery8 ,since therefore the      
authority of secular princes is         
frequently exercised with injustice1 or 
owes its origin to some unjust          
usurpation1 it seems that ,christians   
ought not to obey secular princes4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,titus    
#c3a73 ,admonish them to be subject to  
princes and powers1 and 7#a ,pet4 #b3ac1
 #ad73 ,be ye subject 4 4 4 to every    
human creature for ,god's sake3 whether 
it be to the king as excelling1 or to   
governors as sent by him4  ,i answer    
that1 ,faith in ,christ is the origin   
and cause of justice1 according to ,rom4
 #c3bb1 ,the justice of ,god by faith of
 ,jesus ,christ3 wherefore faith in     
,christ does not void the order of      
justice1 but strengthens it4 ,now the   

order of justice requires that subjects 
obey their superiors1 else the stability
 of human affairs would cease4 ,hence   
faith in ,christ does not excuse the    
faithful from the obligation of obeying 
secular princes4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as  
stated above 7,a4 #e71 subjection       
whereby one man is bound to another     
regards the body2 not the soul1 which   
retains its liberty4 ,now1 in this state
 of life we are freed by the grace of   
,christ from defects of the soul1 but   
not from defects of the body1 as the    
,apostle declares by saying of himself  
7,rom4 #g3bc7 that in his mind he served
 the law of ,god1 but in his flesh the  
law of sin4 ,wherefore those that are   
made children of ,god by grace are free 
from the spiritual bondage of sin1 but  
not from the bodily bondage1 whereby    
they are held bound to earthly masters1 
as a gloss observes on #a ,tim4 #f3a1   
,whosoever are servants under the yoke1 
etc4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,old ,law   
was a figure of the ,new ,testament1 and

 therefore it had to cease on the advent
 of truth4 ,and the comparison with     
human law does not stand because thereby
 one man is subject to another4 ,yet man
 is bound by divine law to obey his     
fellow-man4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man is   
bound to obey secular princes in so far 
as this is required by order of justice4
 ,wherefore if the prince's authority is
 not just but usurped1 or if he commands
 what is unjust1 his subjects are not   
bound to obey him1 except perhaps       
accidentally1 in order to avoid scandal 
or danger4   ,,question #aje  ,,of      
,,disobedience 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we
 must now consider disobedience1 under  
which head there are two points of      
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether it is a mortal  
sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is the most      
grievous of sins8   ,,first ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,disobedience ,is a ,mortal ,sin8       
,objection #a3 ,it seems that           
disobedience is not a mortal sin4 ,for  
every sin is a disobedience1 as appears 

from ,ambrose's definition given above  
7,q4 #ajd1 ,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #a74 ,therefore
 if disobedience were a mortal sin1     
every sin would be mortal4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxi7  
that disobedience is born of vainglory4 
,but vainglory is not a mortal sin4     
,neither therefore is disobedience4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a person is said to 
be disobedient when he does not fulfil a
 superior's command4 ,but superiors     
often issue so many commands that it is 
seldom1 if ever1 possible to fulfil     
them4 ,therefore if disobedience were a 
mortal sin1 it would follow that man    
cannot avoid mortal sin1 which is       
absurd4 ,wherefore disobedience is not a
 mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,the sin
 of disobedience to parents is reckoned 
7,rom4 #a3cj2 #b ,tim4 #c3b7 among other
 mortal sins4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #ab2 ,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,a4 
#a71 a mortal sin is one that is        
contrary to charity which is the cause  

of spiritual life4 ,now by charity we   
love ,god and our neighbor4 ,the charity
 of ,god requires that we obey ,his     
commandments1 as stated above 7,q4 #bd1 
,a4 #ab74 ,therefore to be disobedient  
to the commandments of ,god is a mortal 
sin1 because it is contrary to the love 
of ,god4  ,again1 the commandments of   
,god contain the precept of obedience to
 superiors4 ,wherefore also disobedience
 to the commands of a superior is a     
mortal sin1 as being contrary to the    
love of ,god1 according to ,rom4 #ac3b1 
,he that resisteth the power1 resisteth 
the ordinance of ,god4 ,it is also      
contrary to the love of our neighbor1 as
 it withdraws from the superior who is  
our neighbor the obedience that is his  
due4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the definition  
given by ,ambrose refers to mortal sin1 
which has the character of perfect sin4 
,venial sin is not disobedience1 because
 it is not contrary to a precept1 but   
beside it4 ,nor again is every mortal   
sin disobedience1 properly and          

essentially1 but only when one contemns 
a precept1 since moral acts take their  
species from the end4 ,and when a thing 
is done contrary to a precept1 not in   
contempt of the precept1 but with some  
other purpose1 it is not a sin of       
disobedience except materially1 and     
belongs formally to another species of  
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,vainglory       
desires display of excellence4 ,and     
since it seems to point to a certain    
excellence that one be not subject to   
another's command1 it follows that      
disobedience arises from vainglory4 ,but
 there is nothing to hinder mortal sin  
from arising out of venial sin1 since   
venial sin is a disposition to mortal4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,no one is bound to do 
the impossible3 wherefore if a superior 
makes a heap of precepts and lays them  
upon his subjects1 so that they are     
unable to fulfil them1 they are excused 
from sin4 ,wherefore superiors should   
refrain from making a multitude of      
precepts4   ,,second ,,article          

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,disobedience ,is the ,most ,grievous of
 ,sins8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that  
disobedience is the most grievous of    
sins4 ,for it is written 7#a ,kings     
#ae3bc73 ,it is like the sin of         
witchcraft to rebel1 and like the crime 
of idolatry to refuse to obey4 ,but     
idolatry is the most grievous of sins1  
as stated above 7,q4 #id1 ,a4 #c74      
,therefore disobedience is the most     
grievous of sins4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
the sin against the ,holy ,ghost is one 
that removes the obstacles of sin1 as   
stated above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #b74 ,now    
disobedience makes a man contemn a      
precept which1 more than anything1      
prevents a man from sinning4 ,therefore 
disobedience is a sin against the ,holy 
,ghost1 and consequently is the most    
grievous of sins4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #e3ai7 that by 
the disobedience of one man1 many were  
made sinners4 ,now the cause is         
seemingly greater than its effect4      

,therefore disobedience seems to be a   
more grievous sin than the others that  
are caused thereby4  ,on the contrary1  
,contempt of the commander is a more    
grievous sin than contempt of his       
command4 ,now some sins are against the 
very person of the commander1 such as   
blasphemy and murder4 ,therefore        
disobedience is not the most grievous of
 sins4  ,i answer that1 ,not every      
disobedience is equally a sin3 for one  
disobedience may be greater than        
another1 in two ways4 ,first1 on the    
part of the superior commanding1 since1 
although a man should take every care to
 obey each superior1 yet it is a greater
 duty to obey a higher than a lower     
authority1 in sign of which the command 
of a lower authority is set aside if it 
be contrary to the command of a higher  
authority4 ,consequently the higher the 
person who commands1 the more grievous  
is it to disobey him3 so that it is more
 grievous to disobey ,god than man4     
,secondly1 on the part of the things    

commanded4 ,for the person commanding   
does not equally desire the fulfilment  
of all his commands3 since every such   
person desires above all the end1 and   
that which is nearest to the end4       
,wherefore disobedience is the more     
grievous1 according as the unfulfilled  
commandment is more in the intention of 
the person commanding4 ,as to the       
commandments of ,god1 it is evident that
 the greater the good commanded1 the    
more grievous the disobedience of that  
commandment1 because since ,god's will  
is essentially directed to the good1 the
 greater the good the more does ,god    
wish it to be fulfilled4 ,consequently  
he that disobeys the commandment of the 
love of ,god sins more grievously than  
one who disobeys the commandment of the 
love of our neighbor4 ,on the other     
hand1 man's will is not always directed 
to the greater good3 hence1 when we are 
bound by a mere precept of man1 a sin is
 more grievous1 not through setting     
aside a greater good1 but through       

setting aside that which is more in the 
intention of the person commanding4     
,accordingly the various degrees of     
disobedience must correspond with the   
various degrees of precepts3 because the
 disobedience in which there is contempt
 of ,god's precept1 from the very nature
 of disobedience is more grievous than a
 sin committed against a man1 apart from
 the latter being a disobedience to     
,god4 ,and ,i say this because whoever  
sins against his neighbor acts also     
against ,god's commandment4 ,and if the 
divine precept be contemned in a yet    
graver matter1 the sin is still more    
grievous4 ,the disobedience that        
contains contempt of a man's precept is 
less grievous than the sin which        
contemns the man who made the precept1  
because reverence for the person        
commanding should give rise to reverence
 for his command4 ,in like manner a sin 
that directly involves contempt of ,god1
 such as blasphemy1 or the like1 is more
 grievous 7even if we mentally separate 

the disobedience from the sin7 than     
would be a sin involving contempt of    
,god's commandment alone4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,this comparison of ,samuel is one1 
not of equality but of likeness1 because
 disobedience redounds to the contempt  
of ,god just as idolatry does1 though   
the latter does so more4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,not every disobedience is sin      
against the ,holy ,ghost1 but only that 
which obstinacy is added3 for it is not 
the contempt of any obstacle to sin that
 constitutes sin against the ,holy      
,ghost1 else the contempt of any good   
would be a sin against the ,holy ,ghost1
 since any good may hinder a man from   
committing sin4 ,the sin against the    
,holy ,ghost consists in the contempt of
 those goods which lead directly to     
repentance and the remission of sins4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the first sin of our  
first parent1 from which sin was        
transmitted to all men1 was not         
disobedience considered as a special    
sin1 but pride1 from which then man     

proceeded to disobey4 ,hence the        
,apostle in these words seems to take   
disobedience in its relation to every   
sin4   ,,question #ajf  ,,of            
,,thankfulness ,,or ,,gratitude 7,in    
,six ,articles7  ,we must now consider  
thankfulness or gratitude1 and          
ingratitude4 ,concerning thankfulness   
there are six points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether thankfulness is a special      
virtue distinct from other virtues8     
7#b7 ,who owes more thanks to ,god1 the 
innocent or the penitent8  7#c7 ,whether
 man is always bound to give thanks for 
human favors8  7#d7 ,whether            
thanksgiving should be deferred8  7#e7  
,whether thanksgiving should be measured
 according to the favor received or the 
disposition of the giver8  7#f7 ,whether
 one ought to pay back more than one has
 received8   ,,first ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,thankfulness ,is a ,special ,virtue1   
,distinct from ,other ,virtues8         
,objection #a3 ,it seems that           

thankfulness is not a special virtue1   
distinct from other virtues4 ,for we    
have received the greatest benefits from
 ,god1 and from our parents4 ,now the   
honor which we pay to ,god in return    
belongs to the virtue of religion1 and  
the honor with which we repay our       
parents belongs to the virtue of piety4 
,therefore thankfulness or gratitude is 
not distinct from the other virtues4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 proportionate       
repayment belongs to commutative        
justice1 according to the ,philosopher  
7,ethic4 v1 #d74 ,now the purpose of    
giving thanks is repayment 7,ethic4 #e1 
#d74 ,therefore thanksgiving1 which     
belongs to gratitude1 is an act of      
justice4 ,therefore gratitude is not a  
special virtue1 distinct from other     
virtues4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1           
acknowledgment of favor received is     
requisite for the preservation of       
friendship1 according to the            
,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #ac2 ix1    
#a74 ,now friendship is associated with 

all the virtues1 since they are the     
reason for which man is loved4          
,therefore thankfulness or gratitude1 to
 which it belongs to repay favors       
received1 is not a special virtue4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,tully reckons            
thankfulness a special part of justice  
7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii74  ,i answer    
that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#fj1 ,a4 #c71 the nature of the debt to 
be paid must needs vary according to    
various causes giving rise to the debt1 
yet so that the greater always includes 
the lesser4 ,now the cause of debt is   
found primarily and chiefly in ,god1 in 
that ,he is the first principle of all  
our goods3 secondarily it is found in   
our father1 because he is the proximate 
principle of our begetting and          
upbringing3 thirdly it is found in the  
person that excels in dignity1 from whom
 general favors proceed2 fourthly it is 
found in a benefactor1 from whom we have
 received particular and private favors1
 on account of which we are under       

particular obligation to him4           
,accordingly1 since what we owe ,god1 or
 our father1 or a person excelling in   
dignity1 is not the same as what we owe 
a benefactor from whom we have received 
some particular favor1 it follows that  
after religion1 whereby we pay ,god due 
worship1 and piety1 whereby we worship  
our parents1 and observance1 whereby we 
worship persons excelling in dignity1   
there is thankfulness or gratitude1     
whereby we give thanks to our           
benefactors4 ,and it is distinct from   
the foregoing virtues1 just as each of  
these is distinct from the one that     
precedes1 as falling short thereof4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as religion is   
superexcelling piety1 so is it excelling
 thankfulness or gratitude3 wherefore   
giving thanks to ,god was reckoned above
 7,q4 #hc1 ,a4 #ag7 among things        
pertaining to religion4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,proportionate repayment belongs to 
commutative justice1 when it answers to 
the legal due2 for instance when it is  

contracted that so much be paid for so  
much4 ,but the repayment that belongs to
 the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude
 answers to the moral debt1 and is paid 
spontaneously4 ,hence thanksgiving is   
less thankful when compelled1 as ,seneca
 observes 7,de ,beneficiis iii74  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,since true friendship is    
based on virtue1 whatever there is      
contrary to virtue in a friend is an    
obstacle to friendship1 and whatever in 
him is virtuous is an incentive to      
friendship4 ,in this way friendship is  
preserved by repayment of favors1       
although repayment of favors belongs    
specially to the virtue of gratitude4   
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 
,art4 #b  ,whether the ,innocent ,is    
,more ,bound to ,give ,thanks to ,god   
,than the ,penitent8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 seems that the innocent is more bound  
to give thanks to ,god than the         
penitent4 ,for the greater the gift one 
has received from ,god1 the more one is 
bound to give ,him thanks4 ,now the gift

 of innocence is greater than that of   
justice restored4 ,therefore it seems   
that the innocent is more bound to give 
thanks to ,god than the penitent4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 a man owes love to his   
benefactor just as he owes him          
gratitude4 ,now ,augustine says         
7,confess4 ii73 ,what man1 weighing his 
own infirmity1 would dare to ascribe his
 purity and innocence to his own        
strength2 that so he should love ,thee  
the less1 as if he had less needed ,thy 
mercy1 whereby ,thou remittest sins to  
those that turn to ,thee8 ,and farther  
on he says3 ,and for this let him love  
,thee as much1 yea and more1 since by   
,whom he sees me to have been recovered 
from such deep torpor of sin1 by ,him he
 sees himself to have been from the like
 torpor of sin preserved4 ,therefore the
 innocent is also more bound to give    
thanks than the penitent4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 the more a gratuitous favor is
 continuous1 the greater the            
thanksgiving due for it4 ,now the favor 

of divine grace is more continuous in   
the innocent than in the penitent4 ,for 
,augustine says 7,confess4 iii73 ,to    
,thy grace ,i ascribe it1 and to ,thy   
mercy1 that ,thou hast melted away my   
sins as it were ice4 ,to ,thy grace ,i  
ascribe also whatsoever ,i have not done
 of evil2 for what might ,i not have    
done8 4 4 4 ,yea1 all ,i confess to have
 been forgiven me1 both what evils ,i   
committed by my own wilfulness1 and what
 by ,thy guidance committed not4        
,therefore the innocent is more bound to
 give thanks than the penitent4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,it is written 7,luke #g3dc73
 ,to whom more is forgiven1 he loveth   
more 99,vulg43 ',to whom less is        
forgiven1 he loveth less' ,luke #g3dg4  
,therefore for the same reason he is    
bound to greater thanksgiving4  ,i      
answer that1 ,thanksgiving 7gratiarum   
actio7 in the recipient corresponds to  
the favor 7gratia7 of the giver3 so that
 when there is greater favor on the part
 of the giver1 greater thanks are due on

 the part of the recipient4 ,now a favor
 is something bestowed gratis3 wherefore
 on the part of the giver the favor may 
be greater on two counts4 ,first1 owing 
to the quantity of the thing given3 and 
in this way the innocent owes greater   
thanksgiving1 because he receives a     
greater gift from ,god1 also1 absolutely
 speaking1 a more continuous gift1 other
 things being equal4 ,secondly1 a favor 
may be said to be greater1 because it is
 given more gratuitously2 and in this   
sense the penitent is more bound to give
 thanks than the innocent1 because what 
he receives from ,god is more           
gratuitously given3 since1 whereas he   
was deserving of punishment1 he has     
received grace4 ,wherefore1 although the
 gift bestowed on the innocent is1      
considered absolutely1 greater1 yet the 
gift bestowed on the penitent is greater
 in relation to him3 even as a small    
gift bestowed on a poor man is greater  
to him than a great gift is to a rich   
man4 ,and since actions are about       

singulars1 in matters of action1 we have
 to take note of what is such here and  
now1 rather than of what is such        
absolutely1 as the ,philosopher observes
 7,ethic4 iii7 in treating of the       
voluntary and the involuntary4  ,this   
suffices for the ,replies to the        
,objections4   ,,third ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
a ,man ,is ,bound to ,give ,thanks to   
,every ,benefactor8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
seems that a man is not bound to give   
thanks to every benefactor4 ,for a man  
may benefit himself just as he may harm 
himself1 according to ,ecclus4 #ad3e1   
,he that is evil to himself1 to whom    
will he be good8 ,but a man cannot thank
 himself1 since thanksgiving seems to   
pass from one person to another4        
,therefore thanksgiving is not due to   
every benefactor4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
gratitude is a repayment of an act of   
grace4 ,but some favors are granted     
without grace1 and are rudely1 slowly   
and grudgingly given4 ,therefore        

gratitude is not always due to a        
benefactor4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no     
thanks are due to one who works for his 
own profit4 ,but sometimes people bestow
 favors for their own profit4 ,therefore
 thanks are not due to them4  ,obj4 #d3 
,further1 no thanks are due to a slave1 
for all that he is belongs to his       
master4 ,yet sometimes a slave does a   
good turn to his master4 ,therefore     
gratitude is not due to every           
benefactor4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 no one 
is bound to do what he cannot do        
equitably and advantageously4 ,now it   
happens at times that the benefactor is 
very well off1 and it would be of no    
advantage to him to be repaid for a     
favor he has bestowed4 ,again it happens
 sometimes that the benefactor from     
being virtuous has become wicked1 so    
that it would not seem equitable to     
repay him4 ,also the recipient of a     
favor may be a poor man1 and is quite   
unable to repay4 ,therefore seemingly a 
man is not always bound to repayment for

 favors received4  ,obj4 #f3 ,further1  
no one is bound to do for another what  
is inexpedient and hurtful to him4 ,now 
sometimes it happens that repayment of a
 favor would be hurtful or useless to   
the person repaid4 ,therefore favors are
 not always to be repaid by gratitude4  
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a    
,thess4 #e3ah73 ,in all things give     
thanks4  ,i answer that1 ,every effect  
turns naturally to its cause2 wherefore 
,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i7 that    
,god turns all things to ,himself       
because ,he is the cause of all3 for the
 effect must needs always be directed to
 the end of the agent4 ,now it is       
evident that a benefactor1 as such1 is  
cause of the beneficiary4 ,hence the    
natural order requires that he who has  
received a favor should1 by repaying the
 favor1 turn to his benefactor according
 to the mode of each4 ,and1 as stated   
above with regard to a father 7,q4 #ca1 
,a4 #c2 ,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #b71 a man owes   
his benefactor1 as such1 honor and      

reverence1 since the latter stands to   
him in the relation of principle2 but   
accidentally he owes him assistance or  
support1 if he need it4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,in the words of ,seneca 7#a ,benef4
 v71 just as a man is liberal who gives 
not to himself but to others1 and       
gracious who forgives not himself but   
others1 and merciful who is moved1 not  
by his own misfortunes but by another's1
 so too1 no man confers a favor on      
himself1 he is but following the bent of
 his nature1 which moves him to resist  
what hurts him1 and to seek what is     
profitable4 ,wherefore in things that   
one does for oneself1 there is no place 
for gratitude or ingratitude1 since a   
man cannot deny himself a thing except  
by keeping it4 ,nevertheless things     
which are properly spoken of in relation
 to others are spoken of metaphorically 
in relation to oneself1 as the          
,philosopher states regarding justice   
7,ethic4 v1 #aa71 in so far1 to wit1 as 
the various parts of man are considered 

as though they were various persons4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is the mark of a   
happy disposition to see good rather    
than evil4 ,wherefore if someone has    
conferred a favor1 not as he ought to   
have conferred it1 the recipient should 
not for that reason withhold his thanks4
 ,yet he owes less thanks1 than if the  
favor had been conferred duly1 since in 
fact the favor is less1 for1 as ,seneca 
remarks 7,de ,benef4 ii47 promptness    
enhances1 delay discounts a favor4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,seneca observes   
7,de ,benef4 vi71 it matters much       
whether a person does a kindness to us  
for his own sake1 or for ours1 or for   
both his and ours4 ,he that considers   
himself only1 and benefits because      
cannot otherwise benefit himself1 seems 
to me like a man who seeks fodder for   
his cattle4 ,and farther on3 ,if he has 
done it for me in common with himself1  
having both of us in his mind1 ,i am    
ungrateful and not merely unjust1 unless
 ,i rejoice that what was profitable to 

him is profitable to me also4 ,it is the
 height of malevolence to refuse to     
recognize a kindness1 unless the giver  
has been the loser thereby4  ,reply     
,obj4 #d3 ,as ,seneca observes 7,de     
,benef4 iii71 when a slave does what is 
wont to be demanded of a slave1 it is   
part of his service3 when he does more  
than a slave is bound to do1 it is a    
favor3 for as soon as he does anything  
from a motive of friendship1 if indeed  
that be his motive1 it is no longer     
called service4 ,wherefore gratitude is 
due even to a slave1 when he does more  
than his duty4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a poor
 man is certainly not ungrateful if he  
does what he can4 ,for since kindness   
depends on the heart rather than on the 
deed1 so too gratitude depends chiefly  
the heart4 ,hence ,seneca says 7,de     
,benef4 ii73 ,who receives a favor      
gratefully1 has already begun to pay it 
back3 and that we are grateful for      
favors received should be shown by the  
outpourings of the heart1 not only in   

his hearing but everywhere4 ,from this  
it is evident that however well off a   
man may be1 it is possible to thank him 
for his kindness by showing him         
reverence and honor4 ,wherefore the     
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 viii1 #ad73  
,he that abounds should be repaid with  
honor1 he that is in want should be     
repaid with money3 and ,seneca writes   
7,de ,benef4 vi73 ,there are many ways  
of repaying those who are well off1     
whatever we happen to owe them2 such as 
good advice1 frequent fellowship1       
affable and pleasant conversation       
without flattery4 ,therefore there is no
 need for a man to desire neediness or  
distress in his benefactor before       
repaying his kindness1 because1 as      
,seneca says 7,de ,benef4 vi71 it were  
inhuman to desire this in one from whom 
you have received no favor2 how much    
more so to desire it in one whose       
kindness has made you his debtor6  ,if1 
however1 the benefactor has lapsed from 
virtue1 nevertheless he should be repaid

 according to his state1 that he may    
return to virtue if possible4 ,but if he
 be so wicked as to be incurable1 then  
his heart has changed1 and consequently 
no repayment is due for his kindness1 as
 heretofore4 ,and yet1 as far as it     
possible without sin1 the kindness he   
has shown should be held in memory1 as  
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #c74 
,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,as stated in the      
preceding reply1 repayment of a favor   
depends chiefly on the affection of the 
heart3 wherefore repayment should be    
made in such a way as to prove most     
beneficial4 ,if1 however1 through the   
benefactor's carelessness it prove      
detrimental to him1 this is not imputed 
to the person who repays him1 as ,seneca
 observes 7,de ,benef4 vii73 ,it is my  
duty to repay1 and not to keep back and 
safeguard my repayment4   ,,fourth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #d 
,whether a ,man ,is ,bound to ,repay a  
,favor at ,once8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
seems that a man is bound to repay a    

favor at once4 ,for we are bound to     
restore at once what we owe1 unless the 
term be fixed4 ,now there is no term    
prescribed for the repayment of favors1 
and yet this repayment is a duty1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore a man 
is bound to repay a favor at once4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a good action would 
seem to be all the more praiseworthy    
according as it is done with greater    
earnestness4 ,now earnestness seems to  
make a man do his duty without any      
delay4 ,therefore it is apparently more 
praiseworthy to repay a favor at once4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,seneca says 7,de   
,benef4 ii7 that it is proper to a      
benefactor to act freely and quickly4   
,now repayment ought to equal the favor 
received4 ,therefore it should be done  
at once4  ,on the contrary1 ,seneca says
 7,de ,benef4 iv73 ,he that hastens to  
repay1 is animated with a sense1 not of 
gratitude but of indebtedness4  ,i      
answer that1 ,just as in conferring a   
favor two things are to be considered1  

namely1 the affection of the heart and  
the gift1 so also must these things be  
considered in repaying the favor4 ,as   
regards the affection of the heart1     
repayment should be made at once1       
wherefore ,seneca says 7,de ,benef4 ii73
 ,do you wish to repay a favor8 ,receive
 it graciously4 ,as regards the gift1   
one ought to wait until such a time as  
will be convenient to the benefactor4   
,in fact1 if instead of choosing a      
convenient time1 one wished to repay at 
once1 favor for favor1 it would not seem
 to be a virtuous1 but a constrained    
repayment4 ,for1 as ,seneca observes    
7,de ,benef4 iv71 he that wishes to     
repay too soon1 is an unwilling debtor1 
and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a legal debt must be  
paid at once1 else the equality of      
justice would not be preserved1 if one  
kept another's property without his     
consent4 ,but a moral debt depends on   
the equity of the debtor3 and therefore 
it should be repaid in due time         

according as the rectitude of virtue    
demands4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,earnestness 
of the will is not virtuous unless it be
 regulated by reason2 wherefore it is   
not praiseworthy to forestall the proper
 time through earnestness4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,favors also should be conferred at
 a convenient time and one should no    
longer delay when the convenient time   
comes2 and the same is to be observed in
 repaying favors4   ,,fifth ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
in ,giving ,thanks ,we ,should ,look at 
the ,benefactor's ,disposition or at the
 ,deed8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that  
in repaying favors we should not look at
 the benefactor's disposition but at the
 deed4 ,for repayment is due to         
beneficence1 and beneficence consists in
 deeds1 as the word itself denotes4     
,therefore in repaying favors we should 
look at the deed4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
thanksgiving1 whereby we repay favors1  
is a part of justice4 ,but justice      
considers equality between giving and   

taking4 ,therefore also in repaying     
favors we should consider the deed      
rather than the disposition of the      
benefactor4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no one 
can consider what he does not know4 ,now
 ,god alone knows the interior          
disposition4 ,therefore it is impossible
 to repay a favor according to the      
benefactor's disposition4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,seneca says 7,de ,benef4 i73 
,we are sometimes under a greater       
obligation to one who has given little  
with a large heart1 and has bestowed a  
small favor1 yet willingly4  ,i answer  
that1 ,the repayment of a favor may     
belong to three virtues1 namely1        
justice1 gratitude and friendship4 ,it  
belongs to justice when the repayment   
has the character of a legal debt1 as in
 a loan and the like3 and in such cases 
repayment must be made according to the 
quantity received4  ,on the other hand1 
repayment of a favor belongs1 though in 
different ways1 to friendship and       
likewise to the virtue of gratitude when

 it has the character of a moral debt4  
,for in the repayment of friendship we  
have to consider the cause of           
friendship2 so that in the friendship   
that is based on the useful1 repayment  
should be made according to the         
usefulness accruing from the favor      
conferred1 and in the friendship based  
on virtue repayment should be made with 
regard for the choice or disposition of 
the giver1 since this is the chief      
requisite of virtue1 as stated in       
,ethic4 viii1 #ac4 ,and likewise1 since 
gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as 
it is bestowed gratis1 and this regards 
the disposition of the giver1 it follows
 again that repayment of a favor depends
 more on the disposition of the giver   
than on the effect4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,every moral act depends on the will4   
,hence a kindly action1 in so far as it 
is praiseworthy and is deserving of     
gratitude1 consists materially in the   
thing done1 but formally and chiefly in 
the will4 ,hence ,seneca says 7,de      

,benef4 i73 ,a kindly action consists   
not in deed or gift1 but in the         
disposition of the giver or doer4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,gratitude is a part of
 justice1 not indeed as a species is    
part of a genus1 but by a kind of       
reduction to the genus of justice1 as   
stated above 7,q4 #hj74 ,hence it does  
not follow that we shall find the same  
kind of debt in both virtues4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,god alone sees man's         
disposition in itself3 but in so far as 
it is shown by certain signs1 man also  
can know it4 ,it is thus that a         
benefactor's disposition is known by the
 way in which he does the kindly action1
 for instance through his doing it      
joyfully and readily4   ,,sixth         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #f 
,whether the ,repayment of ,gratitude   
,should ,surpass the ,favor ,received8  
,objection #a3 ,it seems that there is  
no need for the repayment of gratitude  
to surpass the favor received4 ,for it  
is not possible to make even equal      

repayment to some1 for instance1 one's  
parents1 as the ,philosopher states     
7,ethic4 viii1 #ad74 ,now virtue does   
not attempt the impossible4 ,therefore  
gratitude for a favor does not tend to  
something yet greater4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 if one person repays another  
more than he has received by his favor1 
by that very fact he gives him something
 his turn1 as it were4 ,but the latter  
owes him repayment for the favor which  
in his turn the former has conferred on 
him4 ,therefore he that first conferred 
a favor will be bound to a yet greater  
repayment1 and so on indefinitely4 ,now 
virtue does not strive at the           
indefinite1 since the indefinite removes
 the nature of good 7,metaph4 ii1 text4 
#h74 ,therefore repayment of gratitude  
should not surpass the favor received4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 justice consists in 
equality4 ,but more is excess of        
equality4 ,since therefore excess is    
sinful in every virtue1 it seems that to
 repay more than the favor received is  

sinful and opposed to justice4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 v1 #e73 ,we should repay those 
who are gracious to us1 by being        
gracious to them return1 and this is    
done by repaying more than we have      
received4 ,therefore gratitude should   
incline to do something greater4  ,i    
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #e71 
gratitude regards the favor received    
according the intention of the          
benefactor2 who seems be deserving of   
praise1 chiefly for having conferred the
 favor gratis without being bound to do 
so4 ,wherefore the beneficiary is under 
a moral obligation to bestow something  
gratis in return4 ,now he does not seem 
to bestow something gratis1 unless he   
exceeds the quantity of the favor       
received3 because so long as he repays  
less or an equivalent1 he would seem to 
do nothing gratis1 but only to return   
what he has received4 ,therefore        
gratitude always inclines1 as far as    
possible1 to pay back something more4   

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,a4  
#c1 ad #e2 ,a4 #e71 in repaying favors  
we must consider the disposition rather 
than the deed4 ,accordingly1 if we      
consider the effect of beneficence1     
which a son receives from his parents   
namely1 to be and to live1 the son      
cannot make an equal repayment1 as the  
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 viii1 #ad74
 ,but if we consider the will of the    
giver and of the repayer1 then it is    
possible for the son to pay back        
something greater to his father1 as     
,seneca declares 7,de ,benef4 iii74 ,if1
 however1 he were unable to do so1 the  
will to pay back would be sufficient for
 gratitude4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the debt 
of gratitude flows from charity1 which  
the more it is paid the more it is due1 
according to ,rom4 #ac3h1 ,owe no man   
anything1 but to love one another4      
,wherefore it is not unreasonable if the
 obligation of gratitude has no limit4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as in injustice1 which
 is a cardinal virtue1 we consider      

equality of things1 so in gratitude we  
consider equality of wills4 ,for while  
on the one hand the benefactor of his   
own free-will gave something he was not 
bound to give1 so on the other hand the 
beneficiary repays something over and   
above what he has received4   ,,question
 #ajg  ,,of ,,ingratitude 7,in ,four    
,articles7  ,we must now consider       
ingratitude1 under which head there are 
four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether  
ingratitude is always a sin8  7#b7      
,whether ingratitude is a special sin8  
7#c7 ,whether every act of ingratitude  
is a mortal sin8  7#d7 ,whether favors  
should be withdrawn from the ungrateful8
   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4     
#ajg1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,ingratitude   
,is ,always a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
seems that ingratitude is not always a  
sin4 ,for ,seneca says 7,de ,benef4 iii7
 that he who does not repay a favor is  
ungrateful4 ,but sometimes it is        
impossible to repay a favor without     
sinning1 for instance if one man has    

helped another to commit a sin4         
,therefore1 since it is not a sin to    
refrain from sinning1 it seems that     
ingratitude is not always a sin4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 every sin is in the power 
of the person who commits it3 because1  
according to ,augustine 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4
 iii2 ,retract4 i71 no man sins in what 
he cannot avoid4 ,now sometimes it is   
not in the power of the sinner to avoid 
ingratitude1 for instance when he has   
not the means of repaying4 ,again       
forgetfulness is not in our power1 and  
yet ,seneca declares 7,de ,benef4 iii7  
that to forget a kindness is the height 
of ingratitude4 ,therefore ingratitude  
is not always a sin4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 there would seem to be no     
repayment in being unwilling to owe     
anything1 according to the ,apostle     
7,rom4 #ac3h71 ,owe no man anything4    
,yet an unwilling debtor is ungrateful1 
as ,seneca declares 7,de ,benef4 iv74   
,therefore ingratitude is not always a  
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,ingratitude is 

reckoned among other sins 7#b ,tim4     
#c3b71 where it is written3 ,disobedient
 to parents1 ungrateful1 wicked4 etc4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#ajf1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a1 ,a4 #f7 a debt of  
gratitude is a moral debt required by   
virtue4 ,now a thing is a sin from the  
fact of its being contrary to virtue4   
,wherefore it is evident that every     
ingratitude is a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,gratitude regards a favor received3 and
 he that helps another to commit a sin  
does him not a favor but an injury3 and 
so no thanks are due to him1 except     
perhaps on account of his good will1    
supposing him to have been deceived1 and
 to have thought to help him in doing   
good1 whereas he helped him to sin4 ,in 
such a case the repayment due to him is 
not that he should be helped to commit a
 sin1 because this would be repaying not
 good but evil1 and this is contrary to 
gratitude4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,no man is 
excused from ingratitude through        
inability to repay1 for the very reason 

that the mere will suffices for the     
repayment of the debt of gratitude1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #f1 ad #a74 
,forgetfulness of a favor received      
amounts to ingratitude1 not indeed the  
forgetfulness that arises from a natural
 defect1 that is not subject to the     
will1 but that which arises from        
negligence4 ,for1 as ,seneca observes   
7,de ,benef4 iii71 when forgetfulness of
 favors lays hold of a man1 he has      
apparently given little thought to their
 repayment4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the debt 
of gratitude flows from the debt of     
love1 and from the latter no man should 
wish to be free4 ,hence that anyone     
should owe this debt unwillingly seems  
to arise from lack of love for his      
benefactor4   ,,second ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,ingratitude ,is a ,special ,sin8       
,objection #a3 ,it seems that           
ingratitude is not a special sin4 ,for  
whoever sins acts against ,god his      
sovereign benefactor4 ,but this pertains

 to ingratitude4 ,therefore ingratitude 
is not a special sin4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 no special sin is contained   
under different kinds of sin4 ,but one  
can be ungrateful by committing         
different kinds of sin1 for instance by 
calumny1 theft1 or something similar    
committed against a benefactor4         
,therefore ingratitude is not a special 
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,seneca writes
 7,de ,benef4 iii73 ,it is ungrateful to
 take no notice of a kindness1 it is    
ungrateful not to repay one1 but it is  
the height of ingratitude to forget it4 
,now these do not seem to belong to the 
same species of sin4 ,therefore         
ingratitude is not a special sin4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,ingratitude is opposed to
 gratitude or thankfulness1 which is a  
special virtue4 ,therefore it is a      
special sin4  ,i answer that1 ,every    
vice is denominated from a deficiency of
 virtue1 because deficiency is more     
opposed to virtue3 thus illiberality is 
more opposed to liberality than         

prodigality is4 ,now a vice may be      
opposed to the virtue of gratitude by   
way of excess1 for instance if one were 
to show gratitude for things for which  
gratitude is not due1 or sooner than it 
is due1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4  
#d74 ,but still more opposed to         
gratitude is the vice denoting          
deficiency of gratitude1 because the    
virtue of gratitude1 as stated above    
7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #f71 inclines to return  
something more4 ,wherefore ingratitude  
is properly denominated from being a    
deficiency of gratitude4 ,now every     
deficiency or privation takes its       
species from the opposite habit3 for    
blindness and deafness differ according 
to the difference of sight and hearing4 
,therefore just as gratitude or         
thankfulness is one special virtue1 so  
also is ingratitude one special sin4    
,it has1 however1 various degrees       
corresponding in their order to the     
things required for gratitude4 ,the     
first of these is to recognize the favor

 received1 the second to express one's  
appreciation and thanks1 and the third  
to repay the favor at a suitable place  
and time according to one's means4 ,and 
since what is last in the order of      
generation is first in the order of     
destruction1 it follows that the first  
degree of ingratitude is when a man     
fails to repay a favor1 the second when 
he declines to notice or indicate that  
he has received a favor1 while the third
 and supreme degree is when a man fails 
to recognize the reception of a favor1  
whether by forgetting it or in any other
 way4 ,moreover1 since opposite         
affirmation includes negation1 it       
follows that it belongs to the first    
degree of ingratitude to return evil for
 good1 to the second to find fault with 
a favor received1 and to the third to   
esteem kindness as though it were       
unkindness4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in every 
sin there is material ingratitude to    
,god1 inasmuch as a man does something  
that may pertain to ingratitude4 ,but   

formal ingratitude is when a favor is   
actually contemned1 and this is a       
special sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing 
hinders the formal aspect of some       
special sin from being found materially 
in several kinds of sin1 and in this way
 the aspect of ingratitude is to be     
found in many kinds of sin4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,these three are not different
 species but different degrees of one   
special sin4   ,,third ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,ingratitude ,is ,always a ,mortal ,sin8
  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that         
ingratitude is always a mortal sin4 ,for
 one ought to be grateful to ,god above 
all4 ,but one is not ungrateful to ,god 
by committing a venial sin3 else every  
man would be guilty of ingratitude4     
,therefore no ingratitude is a venial   
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a sin is      
mortal through being contrary to        
charity1 as stated above 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4  
#ab74 ,but ingratitude is contrary to   
charity1 since the debt of gratitude    

proceeds from that virtue1 as stated    
above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c2 ,a4 #f1 
ad #b74 ,therefore ingratitude is always
 a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
,seneca says 7,de ,benef4 ii73 ,between 
the giver and the receiver of a favor   
there is this law1 that the former      
should forthwith forget having given1   
and the latter should never forget      
having received4 ,now1 seemingly1 the   
reason why the giver should forget is   
that he may be unaware of the sin of the
 recipient1 should the latter prove     
ungrateful2 and there would be no       
necessity for that if ingratitude were a
 slight sin4 ,therefore ingratitude is  
always a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #d3 ,on the 
contrary1 ,no one should be put in the  
way of committing a mortal sin4 ,yet1   
according to ,seneca 7,de ,benef4 ii71  
sometimes it is necessary to deceive the
 person who receives assistance1 in     
order that he may receive without       
knowing from whom he has received4 ,but 
this would seem to put the recipient in 

the way of ingratitude4 ,therefore      
ingratitude is not always a mortal sin4 
,i answer that1 ,as appears from what we
 have said above 7,a4 #b71 a man may be 
ungrateful in two ways3 first1 by mere  
omission1 for instance by failing to    
recognize the favor received1 or to     
express his appreciation of it or to pay
 something in return1 and this is not   
always a mortal sin1 because1 as stated 
above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #f71 the debt of   
gratitude requires a man to make a      
liberal return1 which1 however1 he is   
not bound to do2 wherefore if he fail to
 do so1 he does not sin mortally4 ,it is
 nevertheless a venial sin1 because it  
arises either from some kind of         
negligence or from some disinclination  
to virtue in him4 ,and yet ingratitude  
of this kind may happen to be a mortal  
sin1 by reason either of inward         
contempt1 or of the kind of thing       
withheld1 this being needful to the     
benefactor1 either simply1 or in some   
case of necessity4  ,secondly1 a man may

 be ungrateful1 because he not only     
omits to pay the debt of gratitude1 but 
does the contrary4 ,this again is       
sometimes a mortal and sometimes a      
venial sin1 according to the kind of    
thing that is done4  ,it must be        
observed1 however1 that when ingratitude
 arises from a mortal sin1 it has the   
perfect character of ingratitude1 and   
when it arises from venial sin1 it has  
the imperfect character4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,by committing a venial sin one is  
not ungrateful to ,god to the extent of 
incurring the guilt of perfect          
ingratitude3 but there is something of  
ingratitude in a venial sin1 in so far  
as it removes a virtuous act of         
obedience to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,when ingratitude is a venial sin it is 
not contrary to1 but beside charity3    
since it does not destroy the habit of  
charity1 but excludes some act thereof4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,seneca also says 7,de 
,benef4 vii73 ,when we say that a man   
after conferring a favor should forget  

about it1 it is a mistake to suppose    
that we mean him to shake off the       
recollection of a thing so very         
praiseworthy4 ,when we say3 ,he must not
 remember it1 we mean that he must not  
publish it abroad and boast about it4   
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,he that is unaware of 
a favor conferred on him is not         
ungrateful1 if he fails to repay it1    
provided he be prepared to do so if he  
knew4 ,it is nevertheless commendable at
 times that the object of a favor should
 remain in ignorance of it1 both in     
order to avoid vainglory1 as when       
,blessed ,nicolas threw gold into a     
house secretly1 wishing to avoid        
popularity3 and because the kindness is 
all the greater through the benefactor  
wishing not to shame the person on whom 
he is conferring the favor4   ,,fourth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #d 
,whether ,favors ,should ,be ,withheld  
from the ,ungrateful8  ,objection #a3   
,it seems that favors should withheld   
from the ungrateful4 ,for it is written 

7,wis4 #af3bi73 ,the hope of the        
unthankful shall melt away as the       
winter's ice4 ,but this hope would not  
melt away unless favors were withheld   
from him4 ,therefore favors should be   
withheld from the ungrateful4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 no one should afford another 
an occasion of committing sin4 ,but the 
ungrateful in receiving a favor is given
 an occasion of ingratitude4 ,therefore 
favors should not be bestowed on the    
ungrateful4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,by    
what things a man sinneth1 by the same  
also he is tormented 7,wis4 #aa3ag74    
,now he that is ungrateful when he      
receives a favor sins against the favor4
 ,therefore he should be deprived of the
 favor4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is       
written 7,luke #f3ce7 that the ,highest 
4 4 4 is kind to the unthankful1 and to 
the evil4 ,now we should prove ourselves
 ,his children by imitating ,him 7,luke 
#f3cf74 ,therefore we should not        
withhold favors from the ungrateful4  ,i
 answer that1 ,there are two points to  

be considered with regard to an         
ungrateful person4 ,the first is what he
 deserves to suffer and thus it is      
certain that he deserves to be deprived 
of our favor4 ,the second is1 what ought
 his benefactor to do8 ,for in the first
 place he should not easily judge him to
 be ungrateful1 since1 as ,seneca       
remarks 7,de ,benef4 iii71 a man is     
often grateful although he repays not1  
because perhaps he has not the means or 
the opportunity of repaying4 ,secondly1 
he should be inclined to turn his       
ungratefulness into gratitude1 and if he
 does not achieve this by being kind to 
him once1 he may by being so a second   
time4 ,if1 however1 the more he repeats 
his favors1 the more ungrateful and evil
 the other becomes1 he should cease from
 bestowing his favors upon him4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,the passage quoted speaks of 
what the ungrateful man deserves to     
suffer4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he that      
bestows a favor on an ungrateful person 
affords him an occasion not of sin but  

of gratitude and love4 ,and if the      
recipient takes therefrom an occasion of
 ingratitude1 this is not to be imputed 
to the bestower4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he  
that bestows a favor must not at once   
act the part of a punisher of           
ingratitude1 but rather that of a kindly
 physician1 by healing the ingratitude  
with repeated favors4   ,,question #ajh 
,,of ,,vengeance 7,in ,four ,articles7  
,we must now consider vengeance1 under  
which head there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether vengeance is    
lawful8  7#b7 ,whether it is a special  
virtue8  7#c7 ,of the manner of taking  
vengeance2  7#d7 ,on whom should        
vengeance be taken8   ,,first ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,vengeance ,is ,lawful8  ,objection #a3 
,it seems that vengeance is not lawful4 
,for whoever usurps what is ,god's sins4
 ,but vengeance belongs to ,god1 for it 
is written 7,deut4 #cb3ce1 ,rom4        
#ab3ai73 ,revenge to ,me1 and ,i will   
repay4 ,therefore all vengeance is      

unlawful4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 he that  
takes vengeance on a man does not bear  
with him4 ,but we ought to bear with the
 wicked1 for a gloss on ,cant4 #b3b1 ,as
 the lily among the thorns1 says3 ,he is
 not a good man that cannot bear with a 
wicked one4 ,therefore we should not    
take vengeance on the wicked4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 vengeance is taken by        
inflicting punishment1 which is the     
cause of servile fear4 ,but the ,new    
,law is not a law of fear1 but of love1 
as ,augustine states 7,contra ,adamant4 
xvii74 ,therefore at least in the ,new  
,testament all vengeance is unlawful4   
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a man is said to    
avenge himself when he takes revenge for
 wrongs inflicted on himself4 ,but1     
seemingly1 it is unlawful even for a    
judge to punish those who have wronged  
him3 for ,chrysostom 99,cf4 ,opus       
,imperfectum1 ,hom4 v in ,matth41       
falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,chrysostom    
says3 ,let us learn after ,christ's     
example to bear our own wrongs with     

magnanimity1 yet not to suffer ,god's   
wrongs1 not even by listening to them4  
,therefore vengeance seems to be        
unlawful4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the sin  
of a multitude is more harmful than the 
sin of only one3 for it is written      
7,ecclus4 #bf3e-g73 ,of three things my 
heart hath been afraid 4 4 4 the        
accusation of a city1 and the gathering 
together of the people1 and a false     
calumny4 ,but vengeance should not be   
taken on the sin of a multitude1 for a  
gloss on ,matt4 #ac3bi1 #cj1 ,lest      
perhaps 4 4 4 you root up the wheat 4 4 
4 suffer both to grow1 says that a      
multitude should not be excommunicated1 
nor should the sovereign4 ,neither      
therefore is any other vengeance lawful4
  ,on the contrary1 ,we should look to  
,god for nothing save what is good and  
lawful4 ,but we are to look to ,god for 
vengeance on ,his enemies3 for it is    
written 7,luke #ah3g73 ,will not ,god   
revenge ,his elect who cry to ,him day  
and night8 as if to say3 ,he will       

indeed4 ,therefore vengeance is not     
essentially evil and unlawful4  ,i      
answer that1 ,vengeance consists in the 
infliction of a penal evil on one who   
has sinned4 ,accordingly1 in the matter 
of vengeance1 we must consider the mind 
of the avenger4 ,for if his intention is
 directed chiefly to the evil of the    
person on whom he takes vengeance and   
rests there1 then his vengeance is      
altogether unlawful3 because to take    
pleasure in another's evil belongs to   
hatred1 which is contrary to the charity
 whereby we are bound to love all men4  
,nor is it an excuse that he intends the
 evil of one who has unjustly inflicted 
evil on him1 as neither is a man excused
 for hating one that hates him3 for a   
man may not sin against another just    
because the latter has already sinned   
against him1 since this is to be        
overcome by evil1 which was forbidden by
 the ,apostle1 who says 7,rom4 #ab3ba73 
,be not overcome by evil1 but overcome  
evil by good4  ,if1 however1 the        

avenger's intention be directed chiefly 
to some good1 to be obtained by means of
 the punishment of the person who has   
sinned 7for instance that the sinner may
 amend1 or at least that he may be      
restrained and others be not disturbed1 
that justice may be upheld1 and ,god    
honored71 then vengeance may be lawful1 
provided other due circumstances be     
observed4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he who     
takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping
 with his rank and position does not    
usurp what belongs to ,god but makes use
 of the power granted him by ,god4 ,for 
it is written 7,rom4 #ac3d7 of the      
earthly prince that he is ,god's        
minister1 an avenger to execute wrath   
upon him that doeth evil4 ,if1 however1 
a man takes vengeance outside the order 
of divine appointment1 he usurps what is
 ,god's and therefore sins4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,the good bear with the wicked
 by enduring patiently1 and in due      
manner1 the wrongs they themselves      
receive from them3 but they do not bear 

with them as to endure the wrongs they  
inflict on ,god and their neighbor4 ,for
 ,chrysostom 99,cf4 ,opus ,imperfectum1 
,hom4 v in ,matth41 falsely ascribed to 
,st4 ,chrysostom says3 ,it is           
praiseworthy to be patient under our own
 wrongs1 but to overlook ,god's wrongs  
is most wicked4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the  
law of the ,gospel is the law of love1  
and therefore those who do good out of  
love1 and who alone properly belong to  
the ,gospel1 ought not to be terrorized 
by means of punishment1 but only those  
who are not moved by love to do good1   
and who1 though they belong to the      
,church outwardly1 do not belong to it  
in merit4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,sometimes a
 wrong done to a person reflects on ,god
 and the ,church3 and then it is the    
duty of that person to avenge the wrong4
 ,for example1 ,elias made fire descend 
on those who were come to seize him 7#d 
,kings #a72 likewise ,eliseus cursed the
 boys that mocked him 7#d ,kings #b72   
and ,pope ,sylverius excommunicated     

those who sent him into exile 7,,xxiii1 
,q4 iv1 ,cap4 ,guilisarius74 ,but in so 
far as the wrong inflicted on a man     
affects his person1 he should bear it   
patiently if this be expedient4 ,for    
these precepts of patience are to be    
understood as referring to preparedness 
of the mind1 as ,augustine states 7,de  
,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i74  ,reply ,obj4
 #e3 ,when the whole multitude sins1    
vengeance must be taken on them1 either 
in respect of the whole multitude--thus 
the ,egyptians were drowned in the ,red 
,sea while they were pursuing the       
children of ,israel 7,ex4 #ad71 and the 
people of ,sodom were entirely destroyed
 7,gen4 #ai7--or as regards part of the 
multitude1 as may be seen in the        
punishment of those who worshipped the  
calf4  ,sometimes1 however1 if there is 
hope of many making amends1 the severity
 of vengeance should be brought to bear 
on a few of the principals1 whose       
punishment fills the rest with fear2    
thus the ,lord 7,num4 #be7 commanded the

 princes of the people to be hanged for 
the sin of the multitude4  ,on the other
 hand1 if it is not the whole but only a
 part of the multitude that has sinned1 
then if the guilty can be separated from
 the innocent1 vengeance should be      
wrought on them3 provided1 however1 that
 this can be done without scandal to    
others2 else the multitude should be    
spared and severity foregone4 ,the same 
applies to the sovereign1 whom the      
multitude follow4 ,for his sin should be
 borne with1 if it cannot be punished   
without scandal to the multitude3 unless
 indeed his sin were such1 that it would
 do more harm to the multitude1 either  
spiritually or temporally1 than would   
the scandal that was feared to arise    
from his punishment4   ,,second         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,vengeance ,is a ,special      
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that 
vengeance is not a special and distinct 
virtue4 ,for just as the good are       
rewarded for their good deeds1 so are   

the wicked punished for their evil      
deeds4 ,now the rewarding of the good   
does not belong to a special virtue1 but
 is an act of commutative justice4      
,therefore in the same way vengeance    
should not be accounted a special       
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no
 need to appoint a special virtue for an
 act to which a man is sufficiently     
disposed by the other virtues4 ,now man 
is sufficiently disposed by the virtues 
of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil4    
,therefore vengeance should not be      
reckoned a special virtue4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 there is a special vice       
opposed to every special virtue4 ,but   
seemingly no special vice is opposed to 
vengeance4 ,therefore it is not a       
special virtue4  ,on the contrary1      
,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 reckons 
it a part of justice4  ,i answer that1  
,as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ii1
 #a71 aptitude to virtue is in us by    
nature1 but the complement of virtue is 
in us through habituation or some other 

cause4 ,hence it is evident that virtues
 perfect us so that we follow in due    
manner our natural inclinations1 which  
belong to the natural right4 ,wherefore 
to every definite natural inclination   
there corresponds a special virtue4 ,now
 there is a special inclination of      
nature to remove harm1 for which reason 
animals have the irascible power        
distinct from the concupiscible4 ,man   
resists harm by defending himself       
against wrongs1 lest they be inflicted  
on him1 or he avenges those which have  
already been inflicted on him1 with the 
intention1 not of harming1 but of       
removing the harm done4 ,and this       
belongs to vengeance1 for ,tully says   
7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that by        
vengeance we resist force1 or wrong1 and
 in general whatever is obscure         
99,obscurum4 ,cicero wrote obfuturum but
 the sense is the same as ,st4 ,thomas  
gives in the parenthesis 7i4e4          
derogatory71 either by self-defense or  
by avenging it4 ,therefore vengeance is 

a special virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3     
,just as repayment of a legal debt      
belongs to commutative justice1 and as  
repayment of a moral debt1 arising from 
the bestowal of a particular favor1     
belongs to the virtue of gratitude1 so  
too the punishment of sins1 so far as it
 is the concern of public justice1 is an
 act of commutative justice2 while so   
far as it is concerned in defending the 
rights of the individual by whom a wrong
 is resisted1 it belongs to the virtue  
of revenge4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fortitude
 disposes to vengeance by removing an   
obstacle thereto1 namely1 fear of an    
imminent danger4 ,zeal1 as denoting the 
fervor of love1 signifies the primary   
root of vengeance1 in so far as a man   
avenges the wrong done to ,god and his  
neighbor1 because charity makes him     
regard them as his own4 ,now every act  
of virtue proceeds from charity as its  
root1 since1 according to ,gregory      
7,hom4 xxvii in ,ev471 there are no     
green leaves on the bough of good works1

 unless charity be the root4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,two vices are opposed to     
vengeance3 one by way of excess1 namely1
 the sin of cruelty or brutality1 which 
exceeds the measure in punishing3 while 
the other is a vice by way of deficiency
 and consists in being remiss in        
punishing1 wherefore it is written      
7,prov4 #ac3bd73 ,he that spareth the   
rod hateth his son4 ,but the virtue of  
vengeance consists in observing the due 
measure of vengeance with regard to all 
the circumstances4   ,,third ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,vengeance ,should ,be ,wrought by      
,means of ,punishments ,customary ,among
 ,men8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that   
vengeance should not be wrought by means
 of punishments customary among men4    
,for to put a man to death is to uproot 
him4 ,but our ,lord forbade 7,matt4     
#ac3bi7 the uprooting of the cockle1    
whereby the children of the wicked one  
are signified4 ,therefore sinners should
 not be put to death4  ,obj4 #b3        

,further1 all who sin mortally seem to  
be deserving of the same punishment4    
,therefore if some who sin mortally are 
punished with death1 it seems that all  
such persons should be punished with    
death3 and this is evidently false4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to punish a man     
publicly for his sin seems to publish   
his sin3 and this would seem to have a  
harmful effect on the multitude1 since  
the example of sin is taken by them as  
an occasion for sin4 ,therefore it seems
 that the punishment of death should not
 be inflicted for a sin4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,these punishments are fixed  
by the divine law as appears from what  
we have said above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aje1  
,a4 #b74  ,i answer that1 ,vengeance is 
lawful and virtuous so far as it tends  
to the prevention of evil4 ,now some who
 are not influenced by motive of virtue 
are prevented from committing sin1      
through fear of losing those things     
which they love more than those they    
obtain by sinning1 else fear would be no

 restraint to sin4 ,consequently        
vengeance for sin should be taken by    
depriving a man of what he loves most4  
,now the things which man loves most are
 life1 bodily safety1 his own freedom1  
and external goods such as riches1 his  
country and his good name4 ,wherefore1  
according to ,augustine's reckoning 7,de
 ,civ4 ,dei xxi71 ,tully writes that the
 laws recognize eight kinds of          
punishment3 namely1 death1 whereby man  
is deprived of life2 stripes1           
retaliation1 or the loss of eye for eye1
 whereby man forfeits his bodily safety2
 slavery1 and imprisonment1 whereby he  
is deprived of freedom2 exile whereby he
 is banished from his country2 fines1   
whereby he is mulcted in his riches2    
ignominy1 whereby he loses his good     
name4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our ,lord      
forbids the uprooting of the cockle1    
when there is fear lest the wheat be    
uprooted together with it4 ,but         
sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by 
death1 not only without danger1 but even

 with great profit1 to the good4        
,wherefore in such a case the punishment
 of death may be inflicted on sinners4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all who sin mortally  
are deserving of eternal death1 as      
regards future retribution1 which is in 
accordance with the truth of the divine 
judgment4 ,but the punishments of this  
life are more of a medicinal character2 
wherefore the punishment of death is    
inflicted on those sins alone which     
conduce to the grave undoing of others4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the very fact that the
 punishment1 whether of death or of any 
kind that is fearsome to man1 is made   
known at the same time as the sin1 makes
 man's will avers to sin3 because the   
fear of punishment is greater than the  
enticement of the example of sin4       
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajh1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,vengeance ,should   
,be ,taken on ,those ,who ,have ,sinned 
,involuntarily8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
seems that vengeance should be taken on 
those who have sinned involuntarily4    

,for the will of one man does not follow
 from the will of another4 ,yet one man 
is punished for another1 according to   
,ex4 #bj3e1 ,i am 4 4 4 ,god 4 4 4      
jealous1 visiting the iniquity of the   
fathers upon the children1 unto the     
third and fourth generation4 ,thus for  
the sin of ,cham1 his son ,chanaan was  
cursed 7,gen4 #i3be7 and for the sin of 
,giezi1 his descendants were struck with
 leprosy 7#d ,kings #e74 ,again the     
blood of ,christ lays the descendants of
 the ,jews under the ban of punishment1 
for they said 7,matt4 #bg3be73 ,his     
blood be upon us and upon our children4 
,moreover we read 7,josue #g7 that the  
people of ,israel were delivered into   
the hands of their enemies for the sin  
of ,achan1 and that the same people were
 overthrown by the ,philistines on      
account of the sin of the sons of ,heli 
7#a ,kings #d74 ,therefore a person is  
to be punished without having deserved  
it voluntarily4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1    
nothing is voluntary except what is in a

 man's power4 ,but sometimes a man is   
punished for what is not in his power2  
thus a man is removed from the          
administration of the ,church on account
 of being infected with leprosy2 and a  
,church ceases to be an episcopal see on
 account of the depravity or evil of the
 people4 ,therefore vengeance is taken  
not only for voluntary sins4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 ignorance makes an act        
involuntary4 ,now vengeance is sometimes
 taken on the ignorant4 ,thus the       
children of the people of ,sodom1 though
 they were in invincible ignorance1     
perished with their parents 7,gen4 #ai74
 ,again1 for the sin of ,dathan and     
,abiron their children were swallowed up
 together with them 7,num #af74         
,moreover1 dumb animals1 which are      
devoid of reason1 were commanded to be  
slain on account of the sin of the      
,amalekites 7#a ,kings #ae74 ,therefore 
vengeance is sometimes taken on those   
who have deserved it involuntarily4     
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 compulsion is most  

opposed to voluntariness4 ,but a man    
does not escape the debt of punishment  
through being compelled by fear to      
commit a sin4 ,therefore vengeance is   
sometimes taken on those who have       
deserved it involuntarily4  ,obj4 #e3   
,further ,ambrose says on ,luke #e that 
the ship in which ,judas was1 was in    
distress2 wherefore ,peter1 who was calm
 in the security of his own merits1 was 
in distress about those of others4 ,but 
,peter did not will the sin of ,judas4  
,therefore a person is sometimes        
punished without having voluntarily     
deserved it4  ,on the contrary1         
,punishment is due to sin4 ,but every   
sin is voluntary according to ,augustine
 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii2 ,retract4 i74    
,therefore vengeance should be taken    
only on those who have deserved it      
voluntarily4  ,i answer that1           
,punishment may be considered in two    
ways4 ,first1 under the aspect of       
punishment1 and in this way punishment  
is not due save for sin1 because by     

means of punishment the equality of     
justice is restored1 in so far as he who
 by sinning has exceeded in following   
his own will suffers something that is  
contrary to this will4 ,wherefore1 since
 every sin is voluntary1 not excluding  
original sin1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a71 it follows that no one
 is punished in this way1 except for    
something done voluntarily4 ,secondly1  
punishment may be considered as a       
medicine1 not only healing the past sin1
 but also preserving from future sin1 or
 conducing to some good1 and in this way
 a person is sometimes punished without 
any fault of his own1 yet not without   
cause4  ,it must1 however1 be observed  
that a medicine never removes a greater 
good in order to promote a lesser2 thus 
the medicine of the body never blinds   
the eye1 in order to repair the heel3   
yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser   
things that it may be helpful in things 
of greater consequence4 ,and since      
spiritual goods are of the greatest     

consequence1 while temporal goods are   
least important1 sometimes a person is  
punished in his temporal goods without  
any fault of his own4 ,such are many of 
the punishments inflicted by ,god in    
this present life for our humiliation or
 probation4 ,but no one is punished in  
spiritual goods without any fault on his
 part1 neither in this nor in the future
 life1 because in the latter punishment 
is not medicinal1 but a result of       
spiritual condemnation4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,a man is never condemned to a      
spiritual punishment for another man's  
sin1 because spiritual punishment       
affects the soul1 in respect of which   
each man is master of himself4 ,but     
sometimes a man is condemned to         
punishment in temporal matters for the  
sin of another1 and this for three      
reasons4 ,first1 because one man may be 
the temporal goods of another1 and so he
 may be punished in punishment of the   
latter3 thus children1 as to the body1  
are a belonging of their father1 and    

slaves are a possession of their master4
 ,secondly1 when one person's sin is    
transmitted to another1 either by       
imitation1 as children copy the sins of 
their parents1 and slaves the sins of   
their masters1 so as to sin with greater
 daring2 or by way of merit1 as the     
sinful subjects merit a sinful superior1
 according to ,job #cd3cj1 ,who maketh a
 man that is a hypocrite to reign for   
the sins of the people8 ,hence the      
people of ,israel were punished for     
,david's sin in numbering the people 7#b
 ,kings #bd74 ,this may also happen     
through some kind of consent or         
connivance3 thus sometimes even the good
 are punished in temporal matters       
together with the wicked1 for not having
 condemned their sins1 as ,augustine    
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i1 #i74 ,thirdly1  
in order to mark the unity of human     
fellowship1 whereby one man is bound to 
be solicitous for another1 lest he sin2 
and in order to inculcate horror of sin1
 seeing that the punishment of one      

affects all1 as though all were one     
body1 as ,augustine says in speaking of 
the sin of ,achan 7,,qq4 sup4 ,josue    
viii74 ,the saying of the ,lord1        
,visiting the iniquity of the fathers   
upon the children unto the third and    
fourth generation1 seems to belong to   
mercy rather than to severity1 since ,he
 does not take vengeance forthwith1 but 
waits for some future time1 in order    
that the descendants at least may mend  
their ways2 yet should the wickedness of
 the descendants increase1 it becomes   
almost necessary to take vengeance on   
them4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine  
states 7,,qq4 sup4 ,josue viii71 human  
judgment should conform to the divine   
judgment1 when this is manifest1 and    
,god condemns men spiritually for their 
own sins4 ,but human judgment cannot be 
conformed to ,god's hidden judgments1   
whereby ,he punishes certain persons in 
temporal matters without any fault of   
theirs1 since man is unable to grasp the
 reasons of these judgments so as to    

know what is expedient for each         
individual4 ,wherefore according to     
human judgment a man should never be    
condemned without fault of his own to an
 inflictive punishment1 such as death1  
mutilation or flogging4 ,but a man may  
be condemned1 even according to human   
judgment1 to a punishment of forfeiture1
 even without any fault on his part1 but
 not without cause3 and this in three   
ways4  ,first1 through a person         
becoming1 without any fault of his1     
disqualified for having or acquiring a  
certain good3 thus for being infected   
with leprosy a man is removed from the  
administration of the ,church3 and for  
bigamy1 or through pronouncing a death  
sentence a man is hindered from         
receiving sacred orders4  ,secondly1    
because the particular good that he     
forfeits is not his own but common      
property3 thus that an episcopal see be 
attached to a certain church belongs to 
the good of the whole city1 and not only
 to the good of the clerics4  ,thirdly1 

because the good of one person may      
depend on the good of another3 thus in  
the crime of high treason a son loses   
his inheritance through the sin of his  
parent4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,by the       
judgment of ,god children are punished  
in temporal matters together with their 
parents1 both because they are a        
possession of their parents1 so that    
their parents are punished also in their
 person1 and because this is for their  
good lest1 should they be spared1 they  
might imitate the sins of their parents1
 and thus deserve to be punished still  
more severely4 ,vengeance is wrought on 
dumb animals and any other irrational   
creatures1 because in this way their    
owners are punished2 and also in horror 
of sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,an act done  
through compulsion of fear is not       
involuntary simply1 but has an admixture
 of voluntariness1 as stated above      
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,,aa4 #e1 #f74  ,reply
 ,obj4 #e3 ,the other apostles were     
distressed about the sin of ,judas1 in  

the same way as the multitude is        
punished for the sin of one1 in         
commendation of unity1 as state above   
7,reply ,obj4 #a1 #b74   ,,question #aji
  ,,of ,,truth 7,in ,four ,articles7    
,we must now consider truth and the     
vices opposed thereto4 ,concerning truth
 there are four points of inquiry3  7#a7
 ,whether truth is a virtue8  7#b7      
,whether it is a special virtue8  7#c7  
,whether it is a part of justice8  7#d7 
,whether it inclines to that which is   
less8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #aji1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,truth ,is a  
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that 
truth is not a virtue4 ,for the first of
 virtues is faith1 whose object is      
truth4 ,since then the object precedes  
the habit and the act1 it seems that    
truth is not a virtue1 but something    
prior to virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
iv1 #g71 it belongs to truth that a man 
should state things concerning himself  
to be neither more nor less than they   

are4 ,but this is not always            
praiseworthy--neither in good things1   
since according to ,prov4 #bg3b1 ,let   
another praise thee1 and not thy own    
mouth--nor even in evil things1 because 
it is written in condemnation of certain
 people 7,isa4 #c3i73 ,they have        
proclaimed abroad their sin as ,sodom1  
and they have not hid it4 ,therefore    
truth is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 every virtue is either        
theological1 or intellectual1 or moral4 
,now truth is not a theological virtue1 
because its object is not ,god but      
temporal things4 ,for ,tully says 7,de  
,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that by truth we    
faithfully represent things as they are1
 were1 or will be4 ,likewise it is not  
one of the intellectual virtues1 but    
their end4 ,nor again is it a moral     
virtue1 since it is not a mean between  
excess and deficiency1 for the more one 
tells the truth1 the better it is4      
,therefore truth is not a virtue4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher both in 

the ,second and in the ,fourth ,book of 
,ethics places truth among the other    
virtues4  ,i answer that1 ,truth can be 
taken in two ways4 ,first1 for that by  
reason of which a thing is said to be   
true1 and thus truth is not a virtue1   
but the object or end of a virtue3      
because1 taken in this way1 truth is not
 a habit1 which is the genus containing 
virtue1 but a certain equality between  
the understanding or sign and the thing 
understood or signified1 or again       
between a thing and its rule1 as stated 
in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a2   
,q4 #ba1 ,a4 #b74 ,secondly1 truth may  
stand for that by which a person says   
what is true1 in which sense one is said
 to be truthful4 ,this truth or         
truthfulness must needs be a virtue1    
because to say what is true is a good   
act3 and virtue is that which makes its 
possessor good1 and renders his action  
good4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument  
takes truth in the first sense4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,to state that which concerns 

oneself1 in so far as it is a statement 
of what is true1 is good generically4   
,yet this does not suffice for it to be 
an act of virtue1 since it is requisite 
for that purpose that it should also be 
clothed with the due circumstances1 and 
if these be not observed1 the act will  
be sinful4 ,accordingly it is sinful to 
praise oneself without due cause even   
for that which is true3 and it is also  
sinful to publish one's sin1 by praising
 oneself on that account1 or in any way 
proclaiming it uselessly4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,a person who says what is true1    
utters certain signs which are in       
conformity with things2 and such signs  
are either words1 or external actions1  
or any external thing4 ,now such kinds  
of things are the subject-matter of the 
moral virtues alone1 for the latter are 
concerned with the use of the external  
members1 in so far as this use is put   
into effect at the command of the will4 
,wherefore truth is neither a           
theological1 nor an intellectual1 but a 

moral virtue4 ,and it is a mean between 
excess and deficiency in two ways4      
,first1 on the part of the object1      
secondly1 on the part of the act4 ,on   
the part of the object1 because the true
 essentially denotes a kind of equality1
 and equal is a mean between more and   
less4 ,hence for the very reason that a 
man says what is true about himself1 he 
observes the mean between one that says 
more than the truth about himself1 and  
one that says less than the truth4 ,on  
the part of the act1 to observe the mean
 is to tell the truth1 when one ought1  
and as one ought4 ,excess consists in   
making known one's own affairs out of   
season1 and deficiency in hiding them   
when one ought to make them known4      
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,truth ,is a ,special
 ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that
 truth is not a special virtue4 ,for the
 true and the good are convertible4 ,now
 goodness is not a special virtue1 in   
fact every virtue is goodness1 because  

it makes its possessor good4 ,therefore 
truth is not a special virtue4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 to make known what belongs
 to oneself is an act of truth as we    
understand it here4 ,but this belongs to
 every virtue1 since every virtuous     
habit is made known by its own act4     
,therefore truth is not a special       
virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the truth  
of life is the truth whereby one lives  
aright1 and of which it is written      
7,isa4 #ch3c73 ,i beseech ,thee 4 4 4   
remember how ,i have walked before ,thee
 in truth1 and with a perfect heart4    
,now one lives aright by any virtue1 as 
follows from the definition of virtue   
given above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d74 
,therefore truth is not a special       
virtue4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 truth seems
 to be the same as simplicity1 since    
hypocrisy is opposed to both4 ,but      
simplicity is not a special virtue1     
since it rectifies the intention1 and   
that is required in every virtue4       
,therefore neither is truth a special   

virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is       
numbered together with other virtues    
7,ethic4 ii1 #g74  ,i answer that1 ,the 
nature of human virtue consists in      
making a man's deed good4 ,consequently 
whenever we find a special aspect of    
goodness in human acts1 it is necessary 
that man be disposed thereto by a       
special virtue4 ,and since according to 
,augustine 7,de ,nat4 ,boni iii7 good   
consists in order1 it follows that a    
special aspect of good will be found    
where there is a special order4 ,now    
there is a special order whereby our    
externals1 whether words or deeds1 are  
duly ordered in relation to some thing1 
as sign to thing signified3 and thereto 
man is perfected by the virtue of truth4
 ,wherefore it is evident that truth is 
a special virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the
 true and the good are convertible as to
 subject1 since every true thing is     
good1 and every good thing is true4 ,but
 considered logically1 they exceed one  
another1 even as the intellect and will 

exceed one another4 ,for the intellect  
understands the will and many things    
besides1 and the will desires things    
pertaining to the intellect1 and many   
others4 ,wherefore the true considered  
in its proper aspect as a perfection of 
the intellect is a particular good1     
since it is something appetible3 and in 
like manner the good considered in its  
proper aspect as the end of the appetite
 is something true1 since it is         
something intelligible4 ,therefore since
 virtue includes the aspect of goodness1
 it is possible for truth to be a       
special virtue1 just as the true is a   
special good2 yet it is not possible for
 goodness to be a special virtue1 since 
rather1 considered logically1 it is the 
genus of virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the 
habits of virtue and vice take their    
species from what is directly intended1 
and not from that which is accidental   
and beside the intention4 ,now that a   
man states that which concerns himself1 
belongs to the virtue of truth1 as      

something directly intended3 although it
 may belong to other virtues            
consequently and beside his principal   
intention4 ,for the brave man intends to
 act bravely3 and that he shows his     
fortitude by acting bravely is a        
consequence beside his principal        
intention4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the truth 
of life is the truth whereby a thing is 
true1 not whereby a person says what is 
true4 ,life like anything else is said  
to be true1 from the fact that it       
attains its rule and measure1 namely1   
the divine law2 since rectitude of life 
depends on conformity to that law4 ,this
 truth or rectitude is common to every  
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,simplicity is
 so called from its opposition to       
duplicity1 whereby1 to wit1 a man shows 
one thing outwardly while having another
 in his heart3 so that simplicity       
pertains to this virtue4 ,and it        
rectifies the intention1 not indeed     
directly 7since this belongs to every   
virtue71 but by excluding duplicity1    

whereby a man pretends one thing and    
intends another4   ,,third ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,truth ,is a ,part of ,justice8         
,objection #a3 ,it seems that truth is  
not a part of justice4 ,for it seems    
proper to justice to give another man   
his due4 ,but1 by telling the truth1 one
 does not seem to give another man his  
due1 as is the case in all the foregoing
 parts of justice4 ,therefore truth is  
not a part of justice4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 truth pertains to the         
intellect3 whereas justice is in the    
will1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #d74
 ,therefore truth is not a part of      
justice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according 
to ,jerome truth is threefold1 namely1  
truth of life1 truth of justice1 and    
truth of doctrine4 ,but none of these is
 a part of justice4 ,for truth of life  
comprises all virtues1 as stated above  
7,a4 #b1 ad #c73 truth of justice is the
 same as justice1 so that it is not one 
of its parts2 and truth of doctrine     

belongs rather to the intellectual      
virtues4 ,therefore truth is nowise a   
part of justice4  ,on the contrary1     
,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 reckons 
truth among the parts of justice4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #hj71
 a virtue is annexed to justice1 as     
secondary to a principal virtue1 through
 having something in common with        
justice1 while falling short from the   
perfect virtue thereof4 ,now the virtue 
of truth has two things in common with  
justice4 ,in the first place it is      
directed to another1 since the          
manifestation1 which we have stated to  
be an act of truth1 is directed to      
another1 inasmuch as one person         
manifests to another the things that    
concern himself4 ,in the second place1  
justice sets up a certain equality      
between things1 and this the virtue of  
truth does also1 for it equals signs to 
the things which concern man himself4   
,nevertheless it falls short of the     
proper aspect of justice1 as to the     

notion of debt3 for this virtue does not
 regard legal debt1 which justice       
considers1 but rather the moral debt1 in
 so far as1 out of equity1 one man owes 
another a manifestation of the truth4   
,therefore truth is a part of justice1  
being annexed thereto as a secondary    
virtue to its principal4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,since man is a social animal1 one  
man naturally owes another whatever is  
necessary for the preservation of human 
society4 ,now it would be impossible for
 men to live together1 unless they      
believed one another1 as declaring the  
truth one to another4 ,hence the virtue 
of truth does1 in a manner1 regard      
something as being due4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,truth1 as known1 belongs to the    
intellect4 ,but man1 by his own will1   
whereby he uses both habits and members1
 utters external signs in order to      
manifest the truth1 and in this way the 
manifestation of the truth is an act of 
the will4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the truth  
of which we are speaking now differs    

from the truth of life1 as stated in the
 preceding ,a4 #b1 ad #c4  ,we speak of 
the truth of justice in two ways4 ,in   
one way we refer to the fact that       
justice itself is a certain rectitude   
regulated according to the rule of the  
divine law2 and in this way the truth of
 justice differs from the truth of life1
 because by the truth of life a man     
lives aright in himself1 whereas by the 
truth of justice a man observes the     
rectitude of the law in those judgments 
which refer to another man3 and in this 
sense the truth of justice has nothing  
to do with the truth of which we speak  
now1 as neither has the truth of life4  
,in another way the truth of justice may
 be understood as referring to the fact 
that1 out of justice1 a man manifests   
the truth1 as for instance when a man   
confesses the truth1 or gives true      
evidence in a court of justice4 ,this   
truth is a particular act of justice1   
and does not pertain directly to this   
truth of which we are now speaking1     

because1 to wit1 in this manifestation  
of the truth a man's chief intention is 
to give another man his due4 ,hence the 
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #g7 in   
describing this virtue3 ,we are not     
speaking of one who is truthful in his  
agreements1 nor does this apply to      
matters in which justice or injustice is
 questioned4  ,the truth of doctrine    
consists in a certain manifestation of  
truths relating to science wherefore    
neither does this truth directly pertain
 to this virtue1 but only that truth    
whereby a man1 both in life and in      
speech1 shows himself to be such as he  
is1 and the things that concern him1 not
 other1 and neither greater nor less1   
than they are4 ,nevertheless since      
truths of science1 as known by us1 are  
something concerning us1 and pertain to 
this virtue1 in this sense the truth of 
doctrine may pertain to this virtue1 as 
well as any other kind of truth whereby 
a man manifests1 by word or deed1 what  
he knows4   ,,fourth ,,article          

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
the ,virtue of ,truth ,inclines ,rather 
to ,that ,which ,is ,less8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it seems that the virtue of truth  
does not incline to that which is less4 
,for as one incurs falsehood by saying  
more1 so does one by saying less3 thus  
it is no more false that four are five1 
than that four are three4 ,but every    
falsehood is in itself evil1 and to be  
avoided1 as the ,philosopher declares   
7,ethic4 iv1 #g74 ,therefore the virtue 
of truth does not incline to that which 
is less rather than to that which is    
greater4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that a    
virtue inclines to the one extreme      
rather than to the other1 is owing to   
the fact that the virtue's mean is      
nearer to the one extreme than to the   
other3 thus fortitude is nearer to      
daring than to timidity4 ,but the mean  
of truth is not nearer to one extreme   
than to the other2 because truth1 since 
it is a kind of equality1 holds to the  
exact mean4 ,therefore truth does not   

more incline to that which is less4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to forsake the truth
 for that which is less seems to amount 
to a denial of the truth1 since this is 
to subtract therefrom2 and to forsake   
the truth for that which is greater     
seems to amount to an addition thereto4 
,now to deny the truth is more repugnant
 to truth than to add something to it1  
because truth is incompatible with the  
denial of truth1 whereas it is          
compatible with addition4 ,therefore it 
seems that truth should incline to that 
which is greater rather than to that    
which is less4  ,on the contrary1 ,the  
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #g7 that 
by this virtue a man declines rather    
from the truth towards that which is    
less4  ,i answer that1 ,there are two   
ways of declining from the truth to that
 which is less4 ,first1 by affirming1 as
 when a man does not show the whole good
 that is in him1 for instance science1  
holiness and so forth4 ,this is done    
without prejudice to truth1 since the   

lesser is contained in the greater3 and 
in this way this virtue inclines to what
 is less4 ,for1 as the ,philosopher says
 7,ethic4 iv1 #g71 this seems to be more
 prudent because exaggerations give     
annoyance4 ,for those who represent     
themselves as being greater than they   
are1 are a source of annoyance to       
others1 since they seem to wish to      
surpass others3 whereas those who make  
less account of themselves are a source 
of pleasure1 since they seem to defer to
 others by their moderation4 ,hence the 
,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #ab3f73 ,though 
,i should have a mind to glory1 ,i shall
 not be foolish3 for ,i will say the    
truth4 ,but ,i forbear1 lest any man    
should think of me above that which he  
seeth in me or anything he heareth from 
me4  ,secondly1 one may incline to what 
is less by denying1 so as to say that   
what is in us is not4 ,in this way it   
does not belong to this virtue to       
incline to what is less1 because this   
would imply falsehood4 ,and yet this    

would be less repugnant to the truth1   
not indeed as regards the proper aspect 
of truth1 but as regards the aspect of  
prudence1 which should be safeguarded in
 all the virtues4 ,for since it is      
fraught with greater danger and is more 
annoying to others1 it is more repugnant
 to prudence to think or boast that one 
has what one has not1 than to think or  
say that one has not what one has4      
,this suffices for the ,replies to the  
,objections4   ,,question #aaj  ,,of    
,,the ,,vices ,,opposed ,,to ,,truth1   
,,and ,,first ,,of ,,lying 7,in ,four   
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
vices opposed to truth1 and 7#a7 lying3 
7#b7 dissimulation or hypocrisy3 7#c7   
boasting and the opposite vice4         
,concerning lying there are four points 
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether lying1 as    
containing falsehood1 is always opposed 
to truth8  7#b7 ,of the species of      
lying2  7#c7 ,whether lying is always a 
sin8  7#d7 ,whether it is always a      
mortal sin8   ,,first ,,article         

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,lying ,is ,always ,opposed to ,truth8  
,objection #a3 ,it seems that lying is  
not always opposed to truth4 ,for       
opposites are incompatible with one     
another4 ,but lying is compatible with  
truth1 since he that speaks the truth1  
thinking it to be false1 lies1 according
 to ,augustine 7,lib4 ,de ,mendac4 iii74
 ,therefore lying is not opposed to     
truth4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the virtue  
of truth applies not only to words but  
also to deeds1 since according to the   
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #g7 by this   
virtue one tells the truth both in one's
 speech and in one's life4 ,but lying   
applies only to words1 for ,augustine   
says 7,contra ,mend4 xii7 that a lie is 
a false signification by words4         
,accordingly1 it seems that lying is not
 directly opposed to the virtue of      
truth4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine  
says 7,lib4 ,de ,mendac4 iii7 that the  
liar's sin is the desire to deceive4    
,but this is not opposed to truth1 but  

rather to benevolence or justice4       
,therefore lying is not opposed to      
truth4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine    
says 7,contra ,mend4 x73 ,let no one    
doubt that it is a lie to tell a        
falsehood in order to deceive4          
,wherefore a false statement uttered    
with intent to deceive is a manifest    
lie4 ,but this is opposed to truth4     
,therefore lying is opposed to truth4   
,i answer that1 ,a moral act takes its  
species from two things1 its object1 and
 its end3 for the end is the object of  
the will1 which is the first mover in   
moral acts4 ,and the power moved by the 
will has its own object1 which is the   
proximate object of the voluntary act1  
and stands in relation to the will's act
 towards the end1 as material to formal1
 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1     
,,aa4 #f1 #g74  ,now it has been said   
above 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c7 that the
 virtue of truth--and consequently the  
opposite vices--regards a manifestation 
made by certain signs3 and this         

manifestation or statement is an act of 
reason comparing sign with the thing    
signified2 because every representation 
consists in comparison1 which is the    
proper act of the reason4 ,wherefore    
though dumb animals manifest something1 
yet they do not intend to manifest      
anything3 but they do something by      
natural instinct1 and a manifestation is
 the result4 ,but when this             
manifestation or statement is a moral   
act1 it must needs be voluntary1 and    
dependent on the intention of the will4 
,now the proper object of a             
manifestation or statement is the true  
or the false4 ,and the intention of a   
bad will may bear on two things3 one of 
which is that a falsehood may be told2  
while the other is the proper effect of 
a false statement1 namely1 that someone 
may be deceived4  ,accordingly if these 
three things concur1 namely1 falsehood  
of what is said1 the will to tell a     
falsehood1 and finally the intention to 
deceive1 then there is                  

falsehood--materially1 since what is    
said is false1 formally1 on account of  
the will to tell an untruth1 and        
effectively1 on account of the will to  
impart a falsehood4  ,however1 the      
essential notion of a lie is taken from 
formal falsehood1 from the fact namely1 
that a person intends to say what is    
false2 wherefore also the word mendacium
 7lie7 is derived from its being in     
opposition to the mind4 ,consequently if
 one says what is false1 thinking it to 
be true1 it is false materially1 but not
 formally1 because the falseness is     
beside the intention of the speaker so  
that it is not a perfect lie1 since what
 is beside the speaker's intention is   
accidental for which reason it cannot be
 a specific difference4 ,if1 on the     
other hand1 one utters falsehood        
formally1 through having the will to    
deceive1 even if what one says be true1 
yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and 
moral act1 it contains falseness        
essentially and truth accidentally1 and 

attains the specific nature of a lie4   
,that a person intends to cause another 
to have a false opinion1 by deceiving   
him1 does not belong to the species of  
lying1 but to perfection thereof1 even  
as in the physical order1 a thing       
acquires its species if it has its form1
 even though the form's effect be       
lacking2 for instance a heavy body which
 is held up aloft by force1 lest it come
 down in accordance with the exigency of
 its form4 ,therefore it is evident that
 lying is directly an formally opposed  
to the virtue of truth4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,we judge of a thing according to   
what is in it formally and essentially  
rather than according to what is in it  
materially and accidentally4 ,hence it  
is more in opposition to truth1         
considered as a moral virtue1 to tell   
the truth with the intention of telling 
a falsehood than to tell a falsehood    
with the intention of telling the truth4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says  
7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii71 words hold   

the chief place among other signs4 ,and 
so when it is said that a lie is a false
 signification by words1 the term words 
denotes every kind of sign4 ,wherefore  
if a person intended to signify         
something false by means of signs1 he   
would not be excused from lying4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,the desire to deceive       
belongs to the perfection of lying1 but 
not to its species1 as neither does any 
effect belong to the species of its     
cause4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,lies ,are 
,sufficiently ,divided into ,officious1 
,jocose1 and ,mischievous ,lies8        
,objection #a3 ,it seems that lies are  
not sufficiently divided into officious1
 jocose and mischievous lies4 ,for a    
division should be made according to    
that which pertains to a thing by reason
 of its nature1 as the ,philosopher     
states 7,metaph4 vii1 text4 #dc2 ,de    
,part4 ,animal i1 #c74 ,but seemingly   
the intention of the effect resulting   
from a moral act is something beside and

 accidental to the species of that act1 
so that an indefinite number of effects 
can result from one act4 ,now this      
division is made according to the       
intention of the effect3 for a jocose   
lie is told in order to make fun1 an    
officious lie for some useful purpose1  
and a mischievous lie in order to injure
 someone4 ,therefore lies are           
unfittingly divided in this way4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,contra       
,mendac4 xiv7 gives eight kinds of lies4
 ,the first is in religious doctrine2   
the second is a lie that profits no one 
and injures someone2 the third profits  
one party so as to injure another2 the  
fourth is told out of mere lust of lying
 and deceiving2 the fifth is told out of
 the desire to please2 the sixth injures
 no one1 and profits someone in saving  
his money2 the seventh injures no one   
and profits someone in saving him from  
death2 the eighth injures no one1 and   
profits someone in saving him from      
defilement of the body4 ,therefore it   

seems that the first division of lies is
 insufficient4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the 
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #g7 divides   
lying into boasting1 which exceeds the  
truth in speech1 and irony1 which falls 
short of the truth by saying something  
less3 and these two are not contained   
under any one of the kinds mentioned    
above4 ,therefore it seems that the     
aforesaid division of lies is           
inadequate4  ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss 
on ,ps4 #e3g1 ,thou wilt destroy all    
that speak a lie1 says that there are   
three kinds of lies2 for some are told  
for the wellbeing and convenience of    
someone2 and there is another kind of   
lie that is told in fun2 but the third  
kind of lie is told out of malice4 ,the 
first of these is called an officious   
lie1 the second a jocose lie1 the third 
a mischievous lie4 ,therefore lies are  
divided into these three kinds4  ,i     
answer that1 ,lies may be divided in    
three ways4 ,first1 with respect to     
their nature as lies3 and this is the   

proper and essential division of lying4 
,in this way1 according to the          
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #g71 lies are 
of two kinds1 namely1 the lie which goes
 beyond the truth1 and this belongs to  
boasting1 and the lie which stops short 
of the truth1 and this belongs to irony4
 ,this division is an essential division
 of lying itself1 because lying as such 
is opposed to truth1 as stated in the   
preceding ,article3 and truth is a kind 
of equality1 to which more and less are 
in essential opposition4  ,secondly1    
lies may be divided with respect to     
their nature as sins1 and with regard to
 those things that aggravate or diminish
 the sin of lying1 on the part of the   
end intended4 ,now the sin of lying is  
aggravated1 if by lying a person intends
 to injure another1 and this is called a
 mischievous lie1 while the sin of lying
 is diminished if it be directed to some
 good--either of pleasure and then it is
 a jocose lie1 or of usefulness1 and    
then we have the officious lie1 whereby 

it is intended to help another person1  
or to save him from being injured4 ,in  
this way lies are divided into the three
 kinds aforesaid4  ,thirdly1 lies are   
divided in a more general way1 with     
respect to their relation to some end1  
whether or not this increase or diminish
 their gravity3 and in this way the     
division comprises eight kinds1 as      
stated in the ,second ,objection4 ,here 
the first three kinds are contained     
under mischievous lies1 which are either
 against ,god1 and then we have the lie 
in religious doctrine1 or against man1  
and this either with the sole intention 
of injuring him1 and then it is the     
second kind of lie1 which profits no    
one1 and injures someone2 or with the   
intention of injuring one and at the    
same time profiting another1 and this is
 the third kind of lie1 which profits   
one1 and injures another4 ,of these the 
first is the most grievous1 because sins
 against ,god are always more grievous1 
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,a4  

#c73 and the second is more grievous    
than the third1 since the latter's      
gravity is diminished by the intention  
of profiting another4  ,after these     
three1 which aggravate the sin of lying1
 we have a fourth1 which has its own    
measure of gravity without addition or  
diminution2 and this is the lie which is
 told out of mere lust of lying and     
deceiving4 ,this proceeds from a habit1 
wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4
 iv1 #g7 that the liar1 when he lies    
from habit1 delights in lying4  ,the    
four kinds that follow lessen the       
gravity of the sin of lying4 ,for the   
fifth kind is the jocose lie1 which is  
told with a desire to please3 and the   
remaining three are comprised under the 
officious lie1 wherein something useful 
to another person is intended4 ,this    
usefulness regards either external      
things1 and then we have the sixth kind 
of lie1 which profits someone in saving 
his money2 or his body1 and this is the 
seventh kind1 which saves a man from    

death2 or the morality of his virtue1   
and this is the eighth kind1 which saves
 him from unlawful defilement of his    
body4  ,now it is evident that the      
greater the good intended1 the more is  
the sin of lying diminished in gravity4 
,wherefore a careful consideration of   
the matter will show that these various 
kinds of lies are enumerated in their   
order of gravity3 since the useful good 
is better than the pleasurable good1 and
 life of the body than money1 and virtue
 than the life of the body4  ,this      
suffices for the ,replies to the        
,objections4   ,,third ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,every ,lie ,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 
,it seems that not every lie is a sin4  
,for it is evident that the evangelists 
did not sin in the writing of the       
,gospel4 ,yet they seem to have told    
something false3 since their accounts of
 the words of ,christ and of others     
often differ from one another3 wherefore
 seemingly one of them must have given  

an untrue account4 ,therefore not every 
lie is a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no   
one is rewarded by ,god for sin4 ,but   
the midwives of ,egypt were rewarded by 
,god for a lie1 for it is stated that   
,god built them houses 7,ex4 #a3ba74    
,therefore a lie is not a sin4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 the deeds of holy men are 
related in ,sacred ,writ that they may  
be a model of human life4 ,but we read  
of certain very holy men that they lied4
 ,thus 7,gen4 #ab and #bj7 we are told  
that ,abraham said of his wife that she 
was his sister4 ,jacob also lied when he
 said that he was ,esau1 and yet he     
received a blessing 7,gen4 #bg3bg-bi74  
,again1 ,judith is commended 7,judith   
#ae3aj1 #aa7 although she lied to       
,holofernes4 ,therefore not every lie is
 a sin4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 one ought  
to choose the lesser evil in order to   
avoid the greater3 even so a physician  
cuts off a limb1 lest the whole body    
perish4 ,yet less harm is done by       
raising a false opinion in a person's   

mind1 than by someone slaying or being  
slain4 ,therefore a man may lawfully    
lie1 to save another from committing    
murder1 or another from being killed4   
,obj4 #e3 ,further1 it is a lie not to  
fulfill what one has promised4 ,yet one 
is not bound to keep all one's promises3
 for ,isidore says 7,synonym4 ii73      
,break your faith when you have promised
 ill4 ,therefore not every lie is a sin4
  ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 apparently a lie  
is a sin because thereby we deceive our 
neighbor3 wherefore ,augustine says     
7,lib4 ,de ,mend4 xxi73 ,whoever thinks 
that there is any kind of lie that is   
not a sin deceives himself shamefully1  
since he deems himself an honest man    
when he deceives others4 ,yet not every 
lie is a cause of deception1 since no   
one is deceived by a jocose lie2 seeing 
that lies of this kind are told1 not    
with the intention of being believed1   
but merely for the sake of giving       
pleasure4 ,hence again we find          
hyperbolical expressions in ,holy ,writ4

 ,therefore not every lie is a sin4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4 
#g3ad73 ,be not willing to make any     
manner of lie4  ,i answer that1 ,an     
action that is naturally evil in respect
 of its genus can by no means be good   
and lawful1 since in order for an action
 to be good it must be right in every   
respect3 because good results from a    
complete cause1 while evil results from 
any single defect1 as ,dionysius asserts
 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,now a lie is evil in
 respect of its genus1 since it is an   
action bearing on undue matter4 ,for as 
words are naturally signs of            
intellectual acts1 it is unnatural and  
undue for anyone to signify by words    
something that is not in his mind4      
,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4   
iv1 #g7 that lying is in itself evil and
 to be shunned1 while truthfulness is   
good and worthy of praise4 ,therefore   
every lie is a sin1 as also ,augustine  
declares 7,contra ,mend4 i74  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,it is unlawful to hold that  

any false assertion is contained either 
in the ,gospel or in any canonical      
,scripture1 or that the writers thereof 
have told untruths1 because faith would 
be deprived of its certitude which is   
based on the authority of ,holy ,writ4  
,that the words of certain people are   
variously reported in the ,gospel and   
other sacred writings does not          
constitute a lie4 ,hence ,augustine says
 7,de ,consens4 ,evang4 ii73 ,he that   
has the wit to understand that in order 
to know the truth it is necessary to get
 at the sense1 will conclude that he    
must not be the least troubled1 no      
matter by what words that sense is      
expressed4 ,hence it is evident1 as he  
adds 7,de ,consens4 ,evang4 ii71 that we
 must not judge that someone is lying1  
if several persons fail to describe in  
the same way and in the same words a    
thing which they remember to have seen  
or heard4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the        
midwives were rewarded1 not for their   
lie1 but for their fear of ,god1 and for

 their good-will1 which latter led them 
to tell a lie4 ,hence it is expressly   
stated 7,ex4 #b3ba73 ,and because the   
midwives feared ,god1 ,he built them    
houses4 ,but the subsequent lie was not 
meritorious4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in ,holy
 ,writ1 as ,augustine observes 7,lib4   
,de ,mend4 v71 the deeds of certain     
persons are related as examples of      
perfect virtue3 and we must not believe 
that such persons were liars4 ,if1      
however1 any of their statements appear 
to be untruthful1 we must understand    
such statements to have been figurative 
and prophetic4 ,hence ,augustine says   
7,lib4 ,de ,mend4 v73 ,we must believe  
that whatever is related of those who1  
in prophetical times1 are mentioned as  
being worthy of credit1 was done and    
said by them prophetically4 ,as to      
,abraham when he said that ,sara was his
 sister1 he wished to hide the truth1   
not to tell a lie1 for she is called his
 sister since she was the daughter of   
his father1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4      

,super4 ,gen4 xxvi2 ,contra ,mend4 x2   
,contra ,faust4 xxii74 ,wherefore       
,abraham himself said 7,gen4 #bj3ab73   
,she is truly my sister1 the daughter of
 my father1 and not the daughter of my  
mother1 being related to him on his     
father's side4 ,jacob's assertion that  
he was ,esau1 ,isaac's first-born1 was  
spoken in a mystical sense1 because1 to 
wit1 the latter's birthright was due to 
him by right3 and he made use of this   
mode of speech being moved by the spirit
 of prophecy1 in order to signify a     
mystery1 namely1 that the younger       
people1 i4e4 the ,gentiles1 should      
supplant the first-born1 i4e4 the ,jews4
  ,some1 however1 are commended in the  
,scriptures1 not on account of perfect  
virtue1 but for a certain virtuous      
disposition1 seeing that it was owing to
 some praiseworthy sentiment that they  
were moved to do certain undue things4  
,it is thus that ,judith is praised1 not
 for lying to ,holofernes1 but for her  
desire to save the people1 to which end 

she exposed herself to danger4 ,and yet 
one might also say that her words       
contain truth in some mystical sense4   
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a lie is sinful not   
only because it injures one's neighbor1 
but also on account of its              
inordinateness1 as stated above in this 
,article4 ,now it is not allowed to make
 use of anything inordinate in order to 
ward off injury or defects from another3
 as neither is it lawful to steal in    
order to give an alms1 except perhaps in
 a case of necessity when all things are
 common4 ,therefore it is not lawful to 
tell a lie in order to deliver another  
from any danger whatever4 ,nevertheless 
it is lawful to hide the truth          
prudently1 by keeping it back1 as       
,augustine says 7,contra ,mend4 x74     
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a man does not lie1 so
 long as he has a mind to do what he    
promises1 because he does not speak     
contrary to what he has in mind3 but if 
he does not keep his promise1 he seems  
to act without faith in changing his    

mind4 ,he may1 however1 be excused for  
two reasons4 ,first1 if he has promised 
something evidently unlawful1 because he
 sinned in promise1 and did well to     
change his mind4 ,secondly1 if          
circumstances have changed with regard  
to persons and the business in hand4    
,for1 as ,seneca states 7,de ,benef4    
iv71 for a man to be bound to keep a    
promise1 it is necessary for everything 
to remain unchanged3 otherwise neither  
did he lie in promising--since he       
promised what he had in his mind1 due   
circumstances being taken for           
granted--nor was he faithless in not    
keeping his promise1 because            
circumstances are no longer the same4   
,hence the ,apostle1 though he did not  
go to ,corinth1 whither he had promised 
to go 7#b ,cor4 #a71 did not lie1       
because obstacles had arisen which      
prevented him4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,an    
action may be considered in two ways4   
,first1 in itself1 secondly1 with regard
 to the agent4 ,accordingly a jocose    

lie1 from the very genus of the action1 
is of a nature to deceive2 although in  
the intention of the speaker it is not  
told to deceive1 nor does it deceive by 
the way it is told4 ,nor is there any   
similarity in the hyperbolical or any   
kind of figurative expressions1 with    
which we meet in ,holy ,writ3 because1  
as ,augustine says 7,lib4 ,de ,mend4 v71
 it is not a lie to do or say a thing   
figuratively3 because every statement   
must be referred to the thing stated3   
and when a thing is done or said        
figuratively1 it states what those to   
whom it is tendered understand it to    
signify4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,every    
,lie ,is a ,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3
 ,it seems that every lie is a mortal   
sin4 ,for it is written 7,ps4 #f3g73    
,thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie1
 and 7,wis4 #a3aa73 ,the mouth that     
belieth killeth the soul4 ,now mortal   
sin alone causes destruction and death  
of the soul4 ,therefore every lie is a  

mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1        
whatever is against a precept of the    
decalogue is a mortal sin4 ,now lying is
 against this precept of the decalogue3 
,thou shalt not bear false witness4     
,therefore every lie is a mortal sin4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de
 ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #cf73 ,every liar  
breaks his faith in lying1 since        
forsooth he wishes the person to whom he
 lies to have faith in him1 and yet he  
does not keep faith with him1 when he   
lies to him3 and whoever breaks his     
faith is guilty of iniquity4 ,now no one
 is said to break his faith or to be    
guilty of iniquity1 for a venial sin4   
,therefore no lie is a venial sin4      
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the eternal reward  
is not lost save for a mortal sin4 ,now1
 for a lie the eternal reward was lost1 
being exchanged for a temporal meed4    
,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 xviii7 that 
we learn from the reward of the midwives
 what the sin of lying deserves3 since  
the reward which they deserved for their

 kindness1 and which they might have    
received in eternal life1 dwindled into 
a temporal meed on account of the lie of
 which they were guilty4 ,therefore even
 an officious lie1 such as was that of  
the midwives1 which seemingly is the    
least of lies1 is a mortal sin4  ,obj4  
#e3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,lib4 ,de
 ,mend4 xvii7 that it is a precept of   
perfection1 not only not to lie at all1 
but not even to wish to lie4 ,now it is 
a mortal sin to act against a precept4  
,therefore every lie of the perfect is a
 mortal sin3 and consequently so also is
 a lie told by anyone else1 otherwise   
the perfect would be worse off than     
others4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine   
says on ,ps4 #e3g1 ,thou wilt destroy1  
etc43 ,there are two kinds of lie1 that 
are not grievously sinful yet are not   
devoid of sin1 when we lie either in    
joking1 or for the sake of our          
neighbor's good4 ,but every mortal sin  
is grievous4 ,therefore jocose and      
officious lies are not mortal sins4  ,i 

answer that1 ,a mortal sin is1 properly 
speaking1 one that is contrary to       
charity whereby the soul lives in union 
with ,god1 as stated above 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4
 #ab2 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #c74 ,now a lie may  
be contrary to charity in three ways3   
first1 in itself2 secondly1 in respect  
of the evil intended2 thirdly1          
accidentally4  ,a lie may be in itself  
contrary to charity by reason of its    
false signification4 ,for if this be    
about divine things1 it is contrary to  
the charity of ,god1 whose truth one    
hides or corrupts by such a lie2 so that
 a lie of this kind is opposed not only 
to the virtue of charity1 but also to   
the virtues of faith and religion3      
wherefore it is a most grievous and a   
mortal sin4 ,if1 however1 the false     
signification be about something the    
knowledge of which affects a man's good1
 for instance if it pertain to the      
perfection of science or to moral       
conduct1 a lie of this description      
inflicts an injury on one's neighbor1   

since it causes him to have a false     
opinion1 wherefore it is contrary to    
charity1 as regards the love of our     
neighbor1 and consequently is a mortal  
sin4 ,on the other hand1 if the false   
opinion engendered by the lie be about  
some matter the knowledge of which is of
 no consequence1 then the lie in        
question does no harm to one's neighbor2
 for instance1 if a person be deceived  
as to some contingent particulars that  
do not concern him4 ,wherefore a lie of 
this kind1 considered in itself1 is not 
a mortal sin4  ,as regards the end in   
view1 a lie may be contrary to charity1 
through being told with the purpose of  
injuring ,god1 and this is always a     
mortal sin1 for it is opposed to        
religion2 or in order to injure one's   
neighbor1 in his person1 his possessions
 or his good name1 and this also is a   
mortal sin1 since it is a mortal sin to 
injure one's neighbor1 and one sins     
mortally if one has merely the intention
 of committing a mortal sin4 ,but if the

 end intended be not contrary to        
charity1 neither will the lie1          
considered under this aspect1 be a      
mortal sin1 as in the case of a jocose  
lie1 where some little pleasure is      
intended1 or in an officious lie1 where 
the good also of one's neighbor is      
intended4 ,accidentally a lie may be    
contrary to charity by reason of scandal
 or any other injury resulting          
therefrom3 and thus again it will be a  
mortal sin1 for instance if a man were  
not deterred through scandal from lying 
publicly4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the        
passages quoted refer to the mischievous
 lie1 as a gloss explains the words of  
,ps4 #e3g1 ,thou wilt destroy all that  
speak a lie4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since   
all the precepts of the decalogue are   
directed to the love of ,god and our    
neighbor1 as stated above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 
#a1 ad #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,a4 #e1 ad
 #a71 a lie is contrary to a precept of 
the decalogue1 in so far as it is       
contrary to the love of ,god and our    

neighbor4 ,hence it is expressly        
forbidden to bear false witness against 
our neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even a 
venial sin can be called iniquity in a  
broad sense1 in so far as it is beside  
the equity of justice2 wherefore it is  
written 7#a ,john #c3d73 ,every sin is  
iniquity 99,vulg43 ',and sin is         
iniquity4'4 ,it is in this sense that   
,augustine is speaking4  ,reply ,obj4   
#d3 ,the lie of the midwives may be     
considered in two ways4 ,first as       
regards their feeling of kindliness     
towards the ,jews1 and their reverence  
and fear of ,god1 for which their       
virtuous disposition is commended4 ,for 
this an eternal reward is due4          
,wherefore ,jerome 7in his exposition of
 ,isa4 #fe3ba1 ',and they shall build   
houses'7 explains that ,god built them  
spiritual houses4 ,secondly1 it may be  
considered with regard to the external  
act of lying4 ,for thereby they could   
merit1 not indeed eternal reward1 but   
perhaps some temporal meed1 the         

deserving of which was not inconsistent 
with the deformity of their lie1 though 
this was inconsistent with their        
meriting an eternal reward4 ,it is in   
this sense that we must understand the  
words of ,gregory1 and not that they    
merited by that lie to lose the eternal 
reward as though they had already       
merited it by their preceding           
kindliness1 as the objection understands
 the words to mean4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3   
,some say that for the perfect every lie
 is a mortal sin4 ,but this assertion is
 unreasonable4 ,for no circumstance     
causes a sin to be infinitely more      
grievous unless it transfers it to      
another species4 ,now a circumstance of 
person does not transfer a sin to       
another species1 except perhaps by      
reason of something annexed to that     
person1 for instance if it be against   
his vow3 and this cannot apply to an    
officious or jocose lie4 ,wherefore an  
officious or a jocose lie is not a      
mortal sin in perfect men1 except       

perhaps accidentally on account of      
scandal4 ,we may take in this sense the 
saying of ,augustine that it is a       
precept of perfection not only not to   
lie at all1 but not even to wish to lie3
 although ,augustine says this not      
positively but dubiously1 for he begins 
by saying3 ,unless perhaps it is a      
precept1 etc4 ,nor does it matter that  
they are placed in a position to        
safeguard the truth3 because they are   
bound to safeguard the truth by virtue  
of their office in judging or teaching1 
and if they lie in these matters their  
lie will be a mortal sin3 but it does   
not follow that they sin mortally when  
they lie in other matters4   ,,question 
#aaa  ,,of ,,dissimulation ,,and        
,,hypocrisy 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,in  
due sequence we must consider           
dissimulation and hypocrisy4 ,under this
 head there are four points of inquiry3 
7#a7 ,whether all dissimulation is a    
sin8  7#b7 ,whether hypocrisy is        
dissimulation8  7#c7 ,whether it is     

opposed to truth8  7#d7 ,whether it is a
 mortal sin8   ,,first ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,all ,dissimulation ,is a ,sin8         
,objection #a3 ,it seems that not all   
dissimulation is a sin4 ,for it is      
written 7,luke #bd3bh7 that our ,lord   
pretended ,douay3 'made as though' he   
would go farther2 and ,ambrose in his   
book on the ,patriarchs 7,de ,abraham i7
 says of ,abraham that he spoke craftily
 to his servants1 when he said 7,gen4   
#bb3e73 ,i and the boy will go with     
speed as far as yonder1 and after we    
have worshipped1 will return to you4    
,now to pretend and to speak craftily   
savor of dissimulation3 and yet it is   
not to be said that there was sin in    
,christ or ,abraham4 ,therefore not all 
dissimulation is a sin4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 no sin is profitable4 ,but    
according to ,jerome1 in his commentary 
on ,gal4 #b3aa1 ,when ,peter ,vulg43    
',cephas' was come to ,antioch3--,the   
example of ,jehu1 king of ,israel1 who  

slew the priest of ,baal1 pretending    
that he desired to worship idols1 should
 teach us that dissimulation is useful  
and sometimes to be employed2 and ,david
 changed his countenance before ,achis1 
king of ,geth 7#a ,kings #ba3ac74       
,therefore not all dissimulation is a   
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 good is       
contrary to evil4 ,therefore if it is   
evil to simulate good1 it is good to    
simulate evil4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it  
is written in condemnation of certain   
people 7,isa4 #c3i73 ,they have         
proclaimed abroad their sin as ,sodom1  
and they have not hid it4 ,now it       
pertains to dissimulation to hide one's 
sin4 ,therefore it is reprehensible     
sometimes not to simulate4 ,but it is   
never reprehensible to avoid sin4       
,therefore dissimulation is not a sin4  
,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on ,isa4     
#af3ad1 ,in three years1 etc41 says3 ,of
 the two evils it is less to sin openly 
than to simulate holiness4 ,but to sin  
openly is always a sin4 ,therefore      

dissimulation is always a sin4  ,i      
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #aji1
 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a71 it belongs  
to the virtue of truth to show oneself  
outwardly by outward signs to be such as
 one is4 ,now outward signs are not only
 words1 but also deeds4 ,accordingly    
just as it is contrary to truth to      
signify by words something different    
from that which is in one's mind1 so    
also is it contrary to truth to employ  
signs of deeds or things to signify the 
contrary of what is in oneself1 and this
 is what is properly denoted by         
dissimulation4 ,consequently            
dissimulation is properly a lie told by 
the signs of outward deeds4 ,now it     
matters not whether one lie in word or  
in any other way1 as stated above 7,q4  
#aaj1 ,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #b74 ,wherefore1    
since every lie is a sin1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #c71 it follows    
that also all dissimulation is a sin4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says    
7,de ,,qq4 ,evang4 ii71 ,to pretend is  

not always a lie3 but only when the     
pretense has no signification1 then it  
is a lie4 ,when1 however1 our pretense  
refers to some signification1 there is  
no lie1 but a representation of the     
truth4 ,and he cites figures of speech  
as an example1 where a thing is         
pretended1 for we do not mean it to be  
taken literally but as a figure of      
something else that we wish to say4 ,in 
this way our ,lord pretended ,he would  
go farther1 because ,he acted as if     
wishing to go farther2 in order to      
signify something figuratively either   
because ,he was far from their faith1   
according to ,gregory 7,hom4 xxiii in   
,ev472 or1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,,qq4
 ,evang4 ii71 because1 as ,he was about 
to go farther away from them by         
ascending into heaven1 ,he was1 so to   
speak1 held back on earth by their      
hospitality4  ,abraham also spoke       
figuratively4 ,wherefore ,ambrose 7,de  
,abraham i7 says that ,abraham foretold 
what he knew not3 for he intended to    

return alone after sacrificing his son3 
but by his mouth the ,lord expressed    
what ,he was about to do4 ,it is evident
 therefore that neither dissembled4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,jerome employs the    
term simulation in a broad sense for any
 kind of pretense4 ,david's change of   
countenance was a figurative pretense1  
as a gloss observes in commenting on the
 title of ,ps4 #cc1 ,i will bless the   
,lord at all times4 ,there is no need to
 excuse ,jehu's dissimulation from sin  
or lie1 because he was a wicked man1    
since he departed not from the idolatry 
of ,jeroboam 7#d ,kings #aj3bi1 #ca74   
,and yet he is praised withal and       
received an earthly reward from ,god1   
not for his dissimulation1 but for his  
zeal in destroying the worship of ,baal4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some say that no one
 may pretend to be wicked1 because no   
one pretends to be wicked by doing good 
deeds1 and if he do evil deeds1 he is   
evil4 ,but this argument proves nothing4
 ,because a man might pretend to be     

evil1 by doing what is not evil in      
itself but has some appearance of evil3 
and nevertheless this dissimulation is  
evil1 both because it is a lie1 and     
because it gives scandal2 and although  
he is wicked on this account1 yet his   
wickedness is not the wickedness he     
simulates4 ,and because dissimulation is
 evil in itself1 its sinfulness is not  
derived from the thing simulated1       
whether this be good or evil4  ,reply   
,obj4 #d3 ,just as a man lies when he   
signifies by word that which he is not1 
yet lies not when he refrains from      
saying what he is1 for this is sometimes
 lawful2 so also does a man dissemble1  
when by outward signs of deeds or things
 he signifies that which he is not1 yet 
he dissembles not if he omits to signify
 what he is4 ,hence one may hide one's  
sin without being guilty of             
dissimulation4 ,it is thus that we must 
understand the saying of ,jerome on the 
words of ,isa4 #c3i1 that the second    
remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's 

sin1 lest1 to wit1 others be scandalized
 thereby4   ,,second ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,hypocrisy ,is the ,same ,as            
,dissimulation8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
seems that hypocrisy is not the same as 
dissimulation4 ,for dissimulation       
consists in lying by deeds4 ,but there  
may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly   
what one does inwardly1 according to    
,matt4 #f3b1 ,when thou dost an         
alms-deed sound not a trumpet before    
thee1 as the hypocrites do4 ,therefore  
hypocrisy is not the same as            
dissimulation4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1     
,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxi1 #g73 ,some 
there are who wear the habit of         
holiness1 yet are unable to attain the  
merit of perfection4 ,we must by no     
means deem these to have joined the     
ranks of the hypocrites1 since it is one
 thing to sin from weakness1 and another
 to sin from malice4 ,now those who wear
 the habit of holiness1 without         
attaining the merit of perfection1 are  

dissemblers1 since the outward habit    
signifies works of perfection4          
,therefore dissimulation is not the same
 as hypocrisy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
hypocrisy consists in the mere          
intention4 ,for our ,lord says of       
hypocrites 7,matt4 #bc3e7 that all their
 works they do for to be seen of men3   
and ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxi1 #g7    
that they never consider what it is that
 they do1 but how by their every action 
they may please men4 ,but dissimulation 
consists1 not in the mere intention1 but
 in the outward action3 wherefore a     
gloss on ,job #cf3ac1 ,dissemblers and  
crafty men prove the wrath of ,god1 says
 that the dissembler simulates one thing
 and does another3 he pretends chastity1
 and delights in lewdness1 he makes a   
show of poverty and fills his purse4    
,therefore hypocrisy is not the same as 
dissimulation4  ,on the contrary1       
,isidore says 7,etym4 x73 ',hypocrite'  
is a ,greek word corresponding to the   
,latin 'simulator1' for whereas he is   

evil within1 he shows himself outwardly 
as being good2 hypo denoting falsehood1 
and krisis1 judgment4  ,i answer that1  
,as ,isidore says 7,etym4 x71 the word  
hypocrite is derived from the appearance
 of those who come on to the stage with 
a disguised face1 by changing the color 
of their complexion1 so as to imitate   
the complexion of the person they       
simulate1 at one time under the guise of
 a man1 at another under the guise of a 
woman1 so as to deceive the people in   
their acting4 ,hence ,augustine says    
7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 ii7 that just as      
hypocrites by simulating other persons  
act the parts of those they are not     
7since he that acts the part of         
,agamemnon is not that man himself but  
pretends to be71 so too in the ,church  
and in every department of human life1  
whoever wishes to seem what he is not is
 a hypocrite3 for he pretends to be just
 without being so in reality4  ,we must 
conclude1 therefore1 that hypocrisy is  
dissimulation1 not1 however1 any form of

 dissimulation1 but only when one person
 simulates another1 as when a sinner    
simulates the person of a just man4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the outward deed is a 
natural sign of the intention4          
,accordingly when a man does good works 
pertaining by their genus to the service
 of ,god1 and seeks by their means to   
please1 not ,god but man1 he simulates a
 right intention which he has not4      
,wherefore ,gregory says 7,moral47 that 
hypocrites make ,god's interests        
subservient to worldly purposes1 since  
by making a show of saintly conduct they
 seek1 not to turn men to ,god1 but to  
draw to themselves the applause of their
 approval3 and so they make a lying     
pretense of having a good intention1    
which they have not1 although they do   
not pretend to do a good deed without   
doing it4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the habit  
of holiness1 for instance the religious 
or the clerical habit1 signifies a state
 whereby one is bound to perform works  
of perfection4 ,and so when a man puts  

on the habit of holiness1 with the      
intention of entering the state of      
perfection1 if he fail through weakness1
 he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite1 
because he is not bound to disclose his 
sin by laying aside the habit of        
holiness4 ,if1 however1 he were to put  
on the habit of holiness in order to    
make a show of righteousness1 he would  
be a hypocrite and a dissembler4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,in dissimulation1 as in a   
lie1 there are two things3 one by way of
 sign1 the other by way of thing        
signified4 ,accordingly the evil        
intention in hypocrisy is considered as 
a thing signified1 which does not tally 
with the sign3 and the outward words1 or
 deeds1 or any sensible objects are     
considered in every dissimulation and   
lie as a sign4   ,,third ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,hypocrisy ,is ,contrary to the ,virtue 
of ,truth8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems    
that hypocrisy is not contrary to the   
virtue of truth4 ,for in dissimulation  

or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing
 signified4 ,now with regard to neither 
of these does it seem to be opposed to  
any special virtue3 for a hypocrite     
simulates any virtue1 and by means of   
any virtuous deeds1 such as fasting1    
prayer and alms deeds1 as stated in     
,matt4 #f3a-ah4 ,therefore hypocrisy is 
not specially opposed to the virtue of  
truth4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all         
dissimulation seems to proceed from     
guile1 wherefore it is opposed to       
simplicity4 ,now guile is opposed to    
prudence as above stated 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4  
#d74 ,therefore1 hypocrisy which is     
dissimulation is not opposed to truth1  
but rather to prudence or simplicity4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the species of moral
 acts is taken from their end4 ,now the 
end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of  
gain or vainglory3 wherefore a gloss on 
,job #bg3h1 ,what is the hope of the    
hypocrite1 if through covetousness he   
take by violence1 says3 ,a hypocrite or1
 as the ,latin has it1 a dissimulator1  

is a covetous thief3 for through desire 
of being honored for holiness1 though   
guilty of wickedness1 he steals praise  
for a life which is not his4 99,the     
quotation is from ,st4 ,gregory's       
,moralia1 ,bk ,,xviii4 ,therefore since 
covetousness or vainglory is not        
directly opposed to truth1 it seems that
 neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation4 
,on the contrary1 ,all dissimulation is 
a lie1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now a 
lie is directly opposed to truth4       
,therefore dissimulation or hypocrisy is
 also4  ,i answer that1 ,according to   
the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 text4 #ac1   
#bd1 x71 contrariety is opposition as   
regards form1 i4e4 the specific form4   
,accordingly we must reply that         
dissimulation or hypocrisy may be       
opposed to a virtue in two ways1 in one 
way directly1 in another way indirectly4
 ,its direct opposition or contrariety  
is to be considered with regard to the  
very species of the act1 and this       
species depends on that act's proper    

object4 ,wherefore since hypocrisy is a 
kind of dissimulation1 whereby a man    
simulates a character which is not his1 
as stated in the preceding article1 it  
follows that it is directly opposed to  
truth whereby a man shows himself in    
life and speech to be what he is1 as    
stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #g4  ,the indirect
 opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy 
may be considered in relation to any    
accident1 for instance a remote end1 or 
an instrument of action1 or anything    
else of that kind4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,the hypocrite in simulating a virtue   
regards it as his end1 not in respect of
 its existence1 as though he wished to  
have it1 but in respect of appearance1  
since he wishes to seem to have it4     
,hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to  
that virtue1 but to truth1 inasmuch as  
he wishes to deceive men with regard to 
that virtue4 ,and he performs acts of   
that virtue1 not as intending them for  
their own sake1 but instrumentally1 as  
signs of that virtue1 wherefore his     

hypocrisy has not1 on that account1 a   
direct opposition to that virtue4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#ee1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d1 #e71 the vice        
directly opposed to prudence is cunning1
 to which it belongs to discover ways of
 achieving a purpose1 that are apparent 
and not real3 while it accomplishes that
 purpose1 by guile in words1 and by     
fraud in deeds3 and it stands in        
relation to prudence1 as guile and fraud
 to simplicity4 ,now guile and fraud are
 directed chiefly to deception1 and     
sometimes secondarily to injury4        
,wherefore it belongs directly to       
simplicity to guard oneself from        
deception1 and in this way the virtue of
 simplicity is the same as the virtue of
 truth as stated above 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4   
#b1 ad #d74 ,there is1 however1 a mere  
logical difference between them1 because
 by truth we mean the concordance       
between sign and thing signified1 while 
simplicity indicates that one does not  
tend to different things1 by intending  

one thing inwardly1 and pretending      
another outwardly4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,gain or glory is the remote end of the 
dissembler as also of the liar4 ,hence  
it does not take its species from this  
end1 but from the proximate end1 which  
is to show oneself other than one is4   
,wherefore it sometimes happens to a man
 to pretend great things of himself1 for
 no further purpose than the mere lust  
of hypocrisy1 as the ,philosopher says  
7,ethic4 iv1 #g71 and as also we have   
said above with regard to lying 7,q4    
#aaj1 ,a4 #b74   ,,fourth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,hypocrisy ,is ,always a ,mortal ,sin8  
,objection #a3 ,it seems that hypocrisy 
is always a mortal sin4 ,for ,jerome    
says on ,isa4 #af3ad3 ,of the two evils 
it is less to sin openly than to        
simulate holiness3 and a gloss on ,job  
#a3ba 99,st4 ,augustine1 on ,ps4 #fc3g1 
,as it hath pleased the ,lord1 etc41    
says that pretended justice is no       
justice1 but a twofold sin3 and again a 

gloss on ,lam4 #d3f1 ,the iniquity 4 4 4
 of my people is made greater than the  
sin of ,sodom1 says3 ,he deplores the   
sins of the soul that falls into        
hypocrisy1 which is a greater iniquity  
than the sin of ,sodom4 ,now the sins of
 ,sodom are mortal sin4 ,therefore      
hypocrisy is always a mortal sin4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4   
xxxi1 #h7 that hypocrites sin out of    
malice4 ,but this is most grievous1 for 
it pertains to the sin against the ,holy
 ,ghost4 ,therefore a hypocrite always  
sins mortally4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no  
one deserves the anger of ,god and      
exclusion from seeing ,god1 save on     
account of mortal sin4 ,now the anger of
 ,god is deserved through hypocrisy     
according to ,job #cf3ac1 ,dissemblers  
and crafty men prove the wrath of ,god3 
and the hypocrite is excluded from      
seeing ,god1 according to ,job #ac3af1  
,no hypocrite shall come before ,his    
presence4 ,therefore hypocrisy is always
 a mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1       

,hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is 
a kind of dissimulation4 ,but it is not 
always a mortal sin to lie by deed4     
,neither therefore is all hypocrisy a   
mortal sin4  ,further1 the intention of 
a hypocrite is to appear to be good4    
,but this is not contrary to charity4   
,therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a 
mortal sin4  ,further1 hypocrisy is born
 of vainglory1 as ,gregory says 7,moral4
 xxxi1 #ag74 ,but vainglory is not      
always a mortal sin4 ,neither therefore 
is hypocrisy4  ,i answer that1 ,there   
are two things in hypocrisy1 lack of    
holiness1 and simulation thereof4       
,accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a
 person whose intention is directed to  
both the above1 one1 namely1 who cares  
not to be holy but only to appear so1 in
 which sense ,sacred ,scripture is wont 
to use the term1 it is evident that     
hypocrisy is a mortal sin3 for no one is
 entirely deprived of holiness save     
through mortal sin4 ,but if by a        
hypocrite we mean one who intends to    

simulate holiness1 which he lacks       
through mortal sin1 then1 although he is
 in mortal sin1 whereby he is deprived  
of holiness1 yet1 in his case1 the      
dissimulation itself is not always a    
mortal sin1 but sometimes a venial sin4 
,this will depend on the end in view2   
for if this be contrary to the love of  
,god or of his neighbor1 it will be a   
mortal sin3 for instance if he were to  
simulate holiness in order to           
disseminate false doctrine1 or that he  
may obtain ecclesiastical preferment1   
though unworthy1 or that he may obtain  
any temporal good in which he fixes his 
end4 ,if1 however1 the end intended be  
not contrary to charity1 it will be a   
venial sin1 as for instance when a man  
takes pleasure in the pretense itself3  
of such a man it is said in ,ethic4 iv1 
#g that he would seem to be vain rather 
than evil2 for the same applies to      
simulation as to a lie4  ,it happens    
also sometimes that a man simulates the 
perfection of holiness which is not     

necessary for spiritual welfare4        
,simulation of this kind is neither a   
mortal sin always1 nor is it always     
associated with mortal sin4  ,this      
suffices for the ,replies to the        
,objections4   ,,question #aab  ,,of    
,,boasting 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider boasting and irony1   
which are parts of lying according to   
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #g74      
,under the first head1 namely1 boasting1
 there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7 
,to which virtue is it opposed8  7#b7   
,whether it is a mortal sin8   ,,first  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,boasting ,is ,opposed to the  
,virtue of ,truth8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
seems that boasting is not opposed to   
the virtue of truth4 ,for lying is      
opposed to truth4 ,but it is possible to
 boast even without lying1 as when a man
 makes a show of his own excellence4    
,thus it is written 7,esther #a3c1 #d7  
that ,assuerus made a great feast 4 4 4 
that he might show the riches of the    

glory and of his kingdom1 and the       
greatness and boasting of his power4    
,therefore boasting is not opposed to   
the virtue of truth4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 boasting is reckoned by       
,gregory 7,moral4 xxiii1 #d7 to be one  
of the four species of pride1 when1 to  
wit1 a man boasts of having what he has 
not4 ,hence it is written 7,jer4 #dh3bi1
 #cj73 ,we have heard the pride of      
,moab1 he is exceeding proud3 his       
haughtiness1 and his arrogancy1 and his 
pride1 and the loftiness of his heart4  
,i know1 saith the ,lord1 his boasting1 
and that the strength thereof is not    
according to it4 ,moreover1 ,gregory    
says 7,moral4 xxxi1 #g7 that boasting   
arises from vainglory4 ,now pride and   
vainglory are opposed to the virtue of  
humility4 ,therefore boasting is        
opposed1 not to truth1 but to humility4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 boasting seems to be
 occasioned by riches2 wherefore it is  
written 7,wis4 #e3h73 ,what hath pride  
profited us8 or what advantage hath the 

boasting of riches brought us8 ,now     
excess of riches seems to belong to the 
sin of covetousness1 which is opposed to
 justice or liberality4 ,therefore      
boasting is not opposed to truth4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says    
7,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iv1 #g71 that boasting 
is opposed to truth4  ,i answer that1   
,jactantia 7boasting7 seems properly to 
denote the uplifting of self by words3  
since if a man wishes to throw 7jactare7
 a thing far away1 he lifts it up high4 
,and to uplift oneself1 properly        
speaking1 is to talk of oneself above   
oneself 99,or 'tall-talking' as we      
should say in ,english4 ,this happens in
 two ways4 ,for sometimes a man speaks  
of himself1 not above what he is in     
himself1 but above that which he is     
esteemed by men to be3 and this the     
,apostle declines to do when he says 7#b
 ,cor4 #ab3f73 ,i forbear lest any man  
should think of me above that which he  
seeth in me1 or anything he heareth of  
me4 ,in another way a man uplifts       

himself in words1 by speaking of himself
 above that which he is in reality4 ,and
 since we should judge of things as they
 are in themselves1 rather than as      
others deem them to be1 it follows that 
boasting denotes more properly the      
uplifting of self above what one is in  
oneself1 than the uplifting of self     
above what others think of one3 although
 in either case it may be called        
boasting4 ,hence boasting properly so   
called is opposed to truth by way of    
excess4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument
 takes boasting as exceeding men's      
opinion4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the sin of  
boasting may be considered in two ways4 
,first1 with regard to the species of   
the act1 and thus it is opposed to      
truth2 as stated 7in the body of the    
article and ,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b74          
,secondly1 with regard to its cause1    
from which more frequently though not   
always it arises3 and thus it proceeds  
from pride as its inwardly moving and   
impelling cause4 ,for when a man is     

uplifted inwardly by arrogance1 it often
 results that outwardly he boasts of    
great things about himself2 though      
sometimes a man takes to boasting1 not  
from arrogance1 but from some kind of   
vanity1 and delights therein1 because he
 is a boaster by habit4 ,hence          
arrogance1 which is an uplifting of self
 above oneself1 is a kind of pride2 yet 
it is not the same as boasting1 but is  
very often its cause4 ,for this reason  
,gregory reckons boasting among the     
species of pride4 ,moreover1 the boaster
 frequently aims at obtaining glory     
through his boasting1 and so1 according 
to ,gregory1 it arises from vainglory   
considered as its end4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,wealth also causes boasting1 in two   
ways4 ,first1 as an occasional cause1   
inasmuch as a man prides himself on his 
riches4 ,hence 7,prov4 #h3ah7 riches are
 significantly described as proud       
,douay3 'glorious'4 ,secondly1 as being 
the end of boasting1 since according to 
,ethic4 iv1 #g1 some boast1 not only for

 the sake of glory1 but also for the    
sake of gain4 ,such people invent       
stories about themselves1 so as to make 
profit thereby2 for instance1 they      
pretend to be skilled in medicine1      
wisdom1 or divination4   ,,second       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,boasting ,is a ,mortal ,sin8  
,objection #a3 ,it seems that boasting  
is a mortal sin4 ,for it is written     
7,prov4 #bh3be73 ,he that boasteth1 and 
puffeth himself1 stirreth up quarrels4  
,now it is a mortal sin to stir up      
quarrels1 since ,god hates those that   
sow discord1 according to ,prov4 #f3ai4 
,therefore boasting is a mortal sin4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is         
forbidden in ,god's law is a mortal sin4
 ,now a gloss on ,ecclus4 #f3b1 ,extol  
not thyself in the thoughts of thy soul1
 says3 ,this is a prohibition of        
boasting and pride4 ,therefore boasting 
is a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
boasting is a kind of lie4 ,but it is   
neither an officious nor a jocose lie4  

,this is evident from the end of lying2 
for according to the ,philosopher       
7,ethic4 iv1 #g71 the boaster pretends  
to something greater than he is1        
sometimes for no further purpose1       
sometimes for the sake of glory or      
honor1 sometimes for the sake of money4 
,thus it is evident that it is neither  
an officious nor a jocose lie1 and      
consequently it must be a mischievous   
lie4 ,therefore seemingly it is always a
 mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1         
,boasting arises from vainglory1        
according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1    
#ag74 ,now vainglory is not always a    
mortal sin1 but is sometimes a venial   
sin which only the very perfect avoid4  
,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 viii1 #cj7  
that it belongs to the very perfect1 by 
outward deeds so to seek the glory of   
their author1 that they are not inwardly
 uplifted by the praise awarded them4   
,therefore boasting is not always a     
mortal sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #d71 a mortal sin  

is one that is contrary to charity4     
,accordingly boasting may be considered 
in two ways4 ,first1 in itself1 as a    
lie1 and thus it is sometimes a mortal1 
and sometimes a venial sin4 ,it will be 
a mortal sin when a man boasts of that  
which is contrary to ,god's glory--thus 
it is said in the person of the king of 
,tyre 7,ezech4 #bh3b73 ,thy heart is    
lifted up1 and thou hast said3 ,i am    
,god--or contrary to the love of our    
neighbor1 as when a man while boasting  
of himself breaks out into invectives   
against others1 as told of the ,pharisee
 who said 7,luke #ah3aa73 ,i am not as  
the rest of men1 extortioners1 unjust1  
adulterers1 as also is this publican4   
,sometimes it is a venial sin1 when1 to 
wit1 a man boasts of things that are    
against neither ,god nor his neighbor4  
,secondly1 it may be considered with    
regard to its cause1 namely1 pride1 or  
the desire of gain or of vainglory3 and 
then if it proceeds from pride or from  
such vainglory as is a mortal sin1 then 

the boasting will also be a mortal sin3 
otherwise it will be a venial sin4      
,sometimes1 however1 a man breaks out   
into boasting through desire of gain1   
and for this very reason he would seem  
to be aiming at the deception and injury
 of his neighbor3 wherefore boasting of 
this kind is more likely to be a mortal 
sin4 ,hence the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 iv1 #g7 that a man who boasts  
for the sake of gain1 is viler than one 
who boasts for the sake of glory or     
honor4 ,yet it is not always a mortal   
sin because the gain may be such as not 
to injure another man4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,to boast in order to stir quarrels is 
a mortal sin4 ,but it happens sometimes 
that boasts are the cause of quarrels1  
not intentionally but accidentally3 and 
consequently boasting will not be a     
mortal sin on that account4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,this gloss speaks of boasting
 as arising from pride that is a mortal 
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,boasting does   
not always involve a mischievous lie1   

but only where it is contrary to the    
love of ,god or our neighbor1 either in 
itself or in its cause4 ,that a man     
boast1 through mere pleasure in         
boasting1 is an inane thing to do1 as   
the ,philosopher remarks 7,ethic4 iv1   
#g73 wherefore it amounts to a jocose   
lie4 ,unless perchance he were to prefer
 this to the love of ,god1 so as to     
contemn ,god's commandments for the sake
 of boasting3 for then it would be      
against the charity of ,god1 in ,whom   
alone ought our mind to rest as in its  
last end4  ,to boast for the sake of    
glory or gain seems to involve an       
officious lie3 provided it be done      
without injury to others1 for then it   
would at once become a mischievous lie4 
,,question #aac  ,,irony99 7,in ,two    
,articles7 99,irony here must be given  
the signification of the ,greek eironia1
 whence it is derived3 dissimulation of 
one's own good points4  ,we must now    
consider irony1 under which head there  
are two points of inquiry3  7#a7        

,whether irony is a sin8  7#b7 ,of its  
comparison with boasting4   ,,first     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,irony ,is a ,sin8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it seems that irony1 which consists
 in belittling oneself1 is not a sin4   
,for no sin arises from one's being     
strengthened by ,god3 and yet this leads
 one to belittle oneself1 according to  
,prov4 #cj3a1 #b3 ,the vision which the 
man spoke1 with whom is ,god1 and who   
being strengthened by ,god1 abiding with
 him1 said1 ,i am the most foolish of   
men4 ,also it is written 7,amos #g3ad73 
,amos answered 4 4 4 ,i am not a        
prophet4 ,therefore irony1 whereby a man
 belittles himself in words1 is not a   
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory says 
in a letter to ,augustine1 bishop of the
 ,english 7,regist4 xii73 ,it is the    
mark of a well-disposed mind to         
acknowledge one's fault when one is not 
guilty4 ,but all sin is inconsistent    
with a well-disposed mind4 ,therefore   
irony is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1

 it is not a sin to shun pride4 ,but    
some belittle themselves in words1 so as
 to avoid pride1 according to the       
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #g74          
,therefore irony is not a sin4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4   
,apost41 ,serm4 xxix73 ,if thou liest on
 account of humility1 if thou wert not a
 sinner before lying1 thou hast become  
one by lying4  ,i answer that1 ,to speak
 so as to belittle oneself may occur in 
two ways4 ,first so as to safeguard     
truth1 as when a man conceals the       
greater things in himself1 but discovers
 and asserts lesser things of himself   
the presence of which in himself he     
perceives4 ,to belittle oneself in this 
way does not belong to irony1 nor is it 
a sin in respect of its genus1 except   
through corruption of one of its        
circumstances4 ,secondly1 a person      
belittles himself by forsaking the      
truth1 for instance by ascribing to     
himself something mean the existence of 
which in himself he does not perceive1  

or by denying something great of        
himself1 which nevertheless he perceives
 himself to possess3 this pertains to   
irony1 and is always a sin4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,there is a twofold wisdom and
 a twofold folly4 ,for there is a wisdom
 according to ,god1 which has human or  
worldly folly annexed to it1 according  
to #a ,cor4 #c3ah1 ,if any man among you
 seem to be wise in this world1 let him 
become a fool that he may be wise4 ,but 
there is another wisdom that is worldly1
 which as the same text goes on to say1 
is foolishness with ,god4 ,accordingly1 
he that is strengthened by ,god         
acknowledges himself to be most foolish 
in the estimation of men1 because1 to   
wit1 he despises human things1 which    
human wisdom seeks4 ,hence the text     
quoted continues1 and the wisdom of men 
is not with me1 and farther on1 and ,i  
have known the science of the saints    
99,vulg43 'and ,i have not known the    
science of the saints'4  ,it may also be
 replied that the wisdom of men is that 

which is acquired by human reason1 while
 the wisdom of the saints is that which 
is received by divine inspiration4      
,amos denied that he was a prophet by   
birth1 since1 to wit1 he was not of the 
race of prophets3 hence the text goes   
on1 nor am ,i the son of a prophet4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it belongs to a       
well-disposed mind that a man tend to   
perfect righteousness1 and consequently 
deem himself guilty1 not only if he fall
 short of common righteousness1 which is
 truly a sin1 but also if he fall short 
of perfect righteousness1 which         
sometimes is not a sin4 ,but he does not
 call sinful that which he does not     
acknowledge to be sinful3 which would be
 a lie of irony4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a   
man should not commit one sin in order  
to avoid another3 and so he ought not to
 lie in any way at all in order to avoid
 pride4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,tract4 
xliii in ,joan473 ,shun not arrogance so
 as to forsake truth3 and ,gregory says 
7,moral4 xxvi1 #c7 that it is a reckless

 humility that entangles itself with    
lies4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,irony ,is 
a ,less ,grievous ,sin ,than ,boasting8 
,objection #a3 ,it seems that irony is  
not a less grievous sin than boasting4  
,for each of them is a sin through      
forsaking truth1 which is a kind of     
equality4 ,but one does not forsake     
truth by exceeding it any more than by  
diminishing it4 ,therefore irony is not 
a less grievous sin than boasting4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to the    
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #g71 irony    
sometimes is boasting4 ,but boasting is 
not irony4 ,therefore irony is not a    
less grievous sin than boasting4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 it is written 7,prov4     
#bf3be73 ,when he shall speak low1 trust
 him not3 because there are seven       
mischiefs in his heart4 ,now it belongs 
to irony to speak low4 ,therefore it    
contains a manifold wickedness4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 iv1 #g73 ,those who speak with 

irony and belittle themselves are more  
gracious1 seemingly1 in their manners4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#aaj1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d71 one lie is more    
grievous than another1 sometimes on     
account of the matter which it is       
about--thus a lie about a matter of     
religious doctrine is most grievous--and
 sometimes on account of the motive for 
sinning2 thus a mischievous lie is more 
grievous than an officious or jocose    
lie4 ,now irony and boasting lie about  
the same matter1 either by words1 or by 
any other outward signs1 namely1 about  
matters affecting the person3 so that in
 this respect they are equal4  ,but for 
the most part boasting proceeds from a  
viler motive1 namely1 the desire of gain
 or honor3 whereas irony arises from a  
man's averseness1 albeit inordinate1 to 
be disagreeable to others by uplifting  
himself3 and in this respect the        
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #g7 that 
boasting is a more grievous sin than    
irony4  ,sometimes1 however1 it happens 

that a man belittles himself for some   
other motive1 for instance that he may  
deceive cunningly3 and then irony is    
more grievous4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this  
argument applies to irony and boasting1 
according as a lie is considered to be  
grievous in itself or on account of its 
matter3 for it has been said that in    
this way they are equal4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,excellence is twofold3 one is in   
temporal1 the other in spiritual things4
 ,now it happens at times that a person1
 by outward words or signs1 pretends to 
be lacking in external things1 for      
instance by wearing shabby clothes1 or  
by doing something of the kind1 and that
 he intends by so doing to make a show  
of some spiritual excellence4 ,thus our 
,lord said of certain men 7,matt4 #f3af7
 that they disfigure their faces that   
they may appear unto men to fast4       
,wherefore such persons are guilty of   
both vices1 irony and boasting1 although
 in different respects1 and for this    
reason they sin more grievously4 ,hence 

the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #g7  
that it is the practice of boasters both
 to make overmuch of themselves1 and to 
make very little of themselves3 and for 
the same reason it is related of        
,augustine that he was unwilling to     
possess clothes that were either too    
costly or too shabby1 because by both do
 men seek glory4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3      
,according to the words of ,ecclus4     
#ai3bc1 ,there is one that humbleth     
himself wickedly1 and his interior is   
full of deceit1 and it is in this sense 
that ,solomon speaks of the man who1    
through deceitful humility1 speaks low  
wickedly4   ,,question #aad  ,,of ,,the 
,,friendliness ,,which ,,is ,,called    
,,affability 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we  
must now consider the friendliness which
 is called affability1 and the opposite 
vices which are flattery and quarreling4
 ,concerning friendliness or affability1
 there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7 
,whether it is a special virtue8  7#b7  
,whether it is a part of justice8       

,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,friendliness ,is a  
,special ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
seems that friendliness is not a special
 virtue4 ,for the ,philosopher says     
7,ethic4 viii1 #c7 that the perfect     
friendship is that which is on account  
of virtue4 ,now any virtue is the cause 
of friendship3 since the good is lovable
 to all1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4    
,nom4 iv74 ,therefore friendliness is   
not a special virtue1 but a consequence 
of every virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #f7  
of this kind of friend that he takes    
everything in a right manner both from  
those he loves and from those who are   
not his friends4 ,now it seems to       
pertain to simulation that a person     
should show signs of friendship to those
 whom he loves not1 and this is         
incompatible with virtue4 ,therefore    
this kind of friendliness is not a      
virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 virtue     
observes the mean according as a wise   

man decides 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,now it is
 written 7,eccles4 #g3e73 ,the heart of 
the wise is where there is mourning1 and
 the heart of fools where there is      
mirth3 wherefore it belongs to a        
virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure
 7,ethic4 ii1 #i74 ,now this kind of    
friendship1 according to the            
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #f71 is       
essentially desirous of sharing         
pleasures1 but fears to give pain4      
,therefore this kind of friendliness is 
not a virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,the   
precepts of the law are about acts of   
virtue4 ,now it is written 7,ecclus4    
#d3g73 ,make thyself affable to the     
congregation of the poor4 ,therefore    
affability1 which is what we mean by    
friendship1 is a special virtue4  ,i    
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #aji1
 ,a4 #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c71     
since virtue is directed to good1       
wherever there is a special kind of     
good1 there must needs be a special kind
 of virtue4 ,now good consists in order1

 as stated above 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #b74    
,and it behooves man to be maintained in
 a becoming order towards other men as  
regards their mutual relations with one 
another1 in point of both deeds and     
words1 so that they behave towards one  
another in a becoming manner4 ,hence the
 need of a special virtue that maintains
 the becomingness of this order3 and    
this virtue is called friendliness4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher      
speaks of a twofold friendship in his   
,ethics4 ,one consists chiefly in the   
affection whereby one man loves another 
and may result from any virtue4 ,we have
 stated above1 in treating of charity   
7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a2 ,,qq4  
#be1 #bf71 what things belong to this   
kind of friendship4 ,but he mentions    
another friendliness1 which consists    
merely in outward words or deeds2 this  
has not the perfect nature of           
friendship1 but bears a certain likeness
 thereto1 in so far as a man behaves in 
a becoming manner towards those with    

whom he is in contact4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,every man is naturally every man's    
friend by a certain general love2 even  
so it is written 7,ecclus4 #ac3ai7 that 
every beast loveth its like4 ,this love 
is signified by signs of friendship1    
which we show outwardly by words or     
deeds1 even to those who are strangers  
or unknown to us4 ,hence there is no    
dissimulation in this3 because we do not
 show them signs of perfect friendship1 
for we do not treat strangers with the  
same intimacy as those who are united to
 us by special friendship4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,when it is said that the heart of 
the wise is where there is mourning it  
is not that he may bring sorrow to his  
neighbor1 for the ,apostle says 7,rom4  
#ad3ae73 ,if1 because of thy meat1 thy  
brother be grieved1 thou walkest not now
 according to charity3 but that he may  
bring consolation to the sorrowful1     
according to ,ecclus4 #g3ch1 ,be not    
wanting in comforting them that weep1   
and walk with them that mourn4 ,again1  

the heart of fools is where there is    
mirth1 not that they may gladden others1
 but that they may enjoy others'        
gladness4 ,accordingly1 it belongs to   
the wise man to share his pleasures with
 those among whom he dwells1 not lustful
 pleasures1 which virtue shuns1 but     
honest pleasures1 according to ,ps4     
#acb3a1 ,behold how good and how        
pleasant it is for brethren to dwell    
together in unity4  ,nevertheless1 as   
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #f71 
for the sake of some good that will     
result1 or in order to avoid some evil1 
the virtuous man will sometimes not     
shrink from bringing sorrow to those    
among whom he lives4 ,hence the ,apostle
 says 7#b ,cor4 #g3h73 ,although ,i made
 you sorrowful by my epistle1 ,i do not 
repent1 and further on 7#b ,cor4 #g3i71 
,i am glad2 not because you were made   
sorrowful1 but because you were made    
sorrowful unto repentance4 ,for this    
reason we should not show a cheerful    
face to those who are given to sin1 in  

order that we may please them1 lest we  
seem to consent to their sin1 and in a  
way encourage them to sin further4      
,hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #g3bf73  
,hast thou daughters8 ,have a care of   
their body1 and show not thy countenance
 gay towards them4   ,,second ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,this ,kind of ,friendship ,is a ,part  
of ,justice8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems  
that this kind of friendship is not a   
part of justice4 ,for justice consists  
in giving another man his due4 ,but this
 virtue does not consist in doing that1 
but in behaving agreeably towards those 
among whom we live4 ,therefore this     
virtue is not a part of justice4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 according to the          
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #f71 this     
virtue is concerned about the joys and  
sorrows of those who dwell in           
fellowship4 ,now it belongs to          
temperance to moderate the greatest     
pleasures1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #fj1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #c74         

,therefore this virtue is a part of     
temperance rather than of justice4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to give equal things
 to those who are unequal is contrary to
 justice1 as stated above 7,q4 #ei1     
,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,now1 according to the   
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #f71 this     
virtue treats in like manner known and  
unknown1 companions and strangers4      
,therefore this virtue rather than being
 a part of justice is opposed thereto4  
,on the contrary1 ,macrobius 7,de ,somno
 ,scip4 i7 accounts friendship a part of
 justice4  ,i answer that1 ,this virtue 
is a part of justice1 being annexed to  
it as to a principal virtue4 ,because in
 common with justice it is directed to  
another person1 even as justice is3 yet 
it falls short of the notion of justice1
 because it lacks the full aspect of    
debt1 whereby one man is bound to       
another1 either by legal debt1 which the
 law binds him to pay1 or by some debt  
arising out of a favor received4 ,for it
 regards merely a certain debt of       

equity1 namely1 that we behave          
pleasantly to those among whom we dwell1
 unless at times1 for some reason1 it be
 necessary to displease them for some   
good purpose4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as we  
have said above 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #c1 ad   
#a71 because man is a social animal he  
owes his fellow-man1 in equity1 the     
manifestation of truth without which    
human society could not last4 ,now as   
man could not live in society without   
truth1 so likewise1 not without joy1    
because1 as the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 viii71 no one could abide a day
 with the sad nor with the joyless4     
,therefore1 a certain natural equity    
obliges a man to live agreeably with his
 fellow-men2 unless some reason should  
oblige him to sadden them for their     
good4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it belongs to  
temperance to curb pleasures of the     
senses4 ,but this virtue regards the    
pleasures of fellowship1 which have     
their origin in the reason1 in so far as
 one man behaves becomingly towards     

another4 ,such pleasures need not to be 
curbed as though they were noisome4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this saying of the    
,philosopher does not mean that one     
ought to converse and behave in the same
 way with acquaintances and strangers1  
since1 as he says 7,ethic4 iv1 #f71 it  
is not fitting to please and displease  
intimate friends and strangers in the   
same way4 ,this likeness consists in    
this1 that we ought to behave towards   
all in a fitting manner4   ,,question   
#aae  ,,of ,,flattery 7,in ,two         
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue3  
7#a7 ,flattery1 and 7#b7 ,quarreling4   
,concerning flattery there are two      
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
flattery is a sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is 
a mortal sin8   ,,first ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aae1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,flattery ,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3   
,it seems that flattery is not a sin4   
,for flattery consists in words of      
praise offered to another in order to   

please him4 ,but it is not a sin to     
praise a person1 according to ,prov4    
#ca3bh1 ,her children rose up and called
 her blessed3 her husband1 and he       
praised her4 ,moreover1 there is no evil
 in wishing to please others1 according 
to #a ,cor4 #aj3cc1 ,i 4 4 4 in all     
things please all men4 ,therefore       
flattery is not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 evil is contrary to good1 and 
blame to praise4 ,but it is not a sin to
 blame evil4 ,neither1 then1 is it a sin
 to praise good1 which seems to belong  
to flattery4 ,therefore flattery is not 
a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 detraction  
is contrary to flattery4 ,wherefore     
,gregory says 7,moral4 xxii1 #e7 that   
detraction is a remedy against flattery4
 ,it must be observed1 says he1 that by 
the wonderful moderation of our ,ruler1 
we are often allowed to be rent by      
detractions but are uplifted by         
immoderate praise1 so that whom the     
voice of the flatterer upraises1 the    
tongue of the detractor may humble4 ,but

 detraction is an evil1 as stated above 
7,q4 #gc1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,therefore     
flattery is a good4  ,on the contrary1  
,a gloss on ,ezech4 #ac3ah1 ,woe to them
 that sew cushions under every elbow1   
says1 that is to say1 sweet flattery4   
,therefore flattery is a sin4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #aad1 ,a4  
#a1 ad #c71 although the friendship of  
which we have been speaking1 or         
affability1 intends chiefly the pleasure
 of those among whom one lives1 yet it  
does not fear to displease when it is a 
question of obtaining a certain good1 or
 of avoiding a certain evil4            
,accordingly1 if a man were to wish     
always to speak pleasantly to others1 he
 would exceed the mode of pleasing1 and 
would therefore sin by excess4 ,if he do
 this with the mere intention of        
pleasing he is said to be complaisant1  
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
iv1 #f73 whereas if he do it with the   
intention of making some gain out of it1
 he is called a flatterer or adulator4  

,as a rule1 however1 the term flattery  
is wont to be applied to all who wish to
 exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing  
others by words or deeds in their       
ordinary behavior towards their fellows4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,one may praise a    
person both well and ill1 according as  
one observes or omits the due           
circumstances4 ,for if while observing  
other due circumstances one were to wish
 to please a person by praising him1 in 
order thereby to console him1 or that he
 may strive to make progress in good1   
this will belong to the aforesaid virtue
 of friendship4 ,but it would belong to 
flattery1 if one wished to praise a     
person for things in which he ought not 
to be praised2 since perhaps they are   
evil1 according to ,ps4 #i3bd1 ,the     
sinner is praised in the desires of his 
soul2 or they may be uncertain1         
according to ,ecclus4 #bg3h1 ,praise not
 a man before he speaketh1 and again    
7,ecclus4 #aa3b71 ,praise not a man for 
his beauty2 or because there may be fear

 lest human praise should incite him to 
vainglory1 wherefore it is written1     
7,ecclus4 #aa3cj71 ,praise not any man  
before death4 ,again1 in like manner it 
is right to wish to please a man in     
order to foster charity1 so that he may 
make spiritual progress therein4 ,but it
 would be sinful to wish to please men  
for the sake of vainglory or gain1 or to
 please them in something evil1         
according to ,ps4 #eb3f1 ,god hath      
scattered the bones of them that please 
men1 and according to the words of the  
,apostle 7,gal4 #a3aj71 ,if ,i yet      
pleased men1 ,i should not be the       
servant of ,christ4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,even to blame evil is sinful1 if due   
circumstances be not observed2 and so   
too is it to praise good4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,nothing hinders two vices being    
contrary to one another4 ,wherefore even
 as detraction is evil1 so is flattery1 
which is contrary thereto as regards    
what is said1 but not directly as       
regards the end4 ,because flattery seeks

 to please the person flattered1 whereas
 the detractor seeks not the displeasure
 of the person defamed1 since at times  
he defames him in secret1 but seeks     
rather his defamation4   ,,second       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aae1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,flattery ,is a ,mortal ,sin8  
,objection #a3 ,it seems that flattery  
is a mortal sin4 ,for1 according to     
,augustine 7,enchiridion xii71 a thing  
is evil because it is harmful4 ,but     
flattery is most harmful1 according to  
,ps4 #i3bd1 ,for the sinner is praised  
in the desires of his soul1 and the     
unjust man is blessed4 ,the sinner hath 
provoked the ,lord4 ,wherefore ,jerome  
says 7,ep4 ad ,celant73 ,nothing so     
easily corrupts the human mind as       
flattery3 and a gloss on ,ps4 #fi3d1    
,let them be presently turned away      
blushing for shame that say to me3 ',tis
 well1 ',tis well1 says3 ,the tongue of 
the flatterer harms more than the sword 
of the persecutor4 ,therefore flattery  
is a most grievous sin4  ,obj4 #b3      

,further1 whoever does harm by words1   
harms himself no less than others3      
wherefore it is written 7,ps4 #cf3ae73  
,let their sword enter into their own   
hearts4 ,now he that flatters another   
induces him to sin mortally3 hence a    
gloss on ,ps4 #adj3e1 ,let not the oil  
of the sinner fatten my head1 says3 ,the
 false praise of the flatterer softens  
the mind by depriving it of the rigidity
 of truth and renders it susceptive of  
vice4 ,much more1 therefore1 does the   
flatterer sin in himself4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 it is written in the          
,decretals 7,d4 ,,xlvi1 ,cap4 #c73 ,the 
cleric who shall be found to spend his  
time in flattery and treachery shall be 
degraded from his office4 ,now such a   
punishment as this is not inflicted save
 for mortal sin4 ,therefore flattery is 
a mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1        
,augustine in a sermon on ,purgatory    
7xli1 de ,sanctis7 reckons among slight 
sins1 if one desire to flatter any      
person of higher standing1 whether of   

one's own choice1 or out of necessity4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#aab1 ,a4 #b71 a mortal sin is one that 
is contrary to charity4 ,now flattery is
 sometimes contrary to charity and      
sometimes not4 ,it is contrary to       
charity in three ways4 ,first1 by reason
 of the very matter1 as when one man    
praises another's sin3 for this is      
contrary to the love of ,god1 against   
,whose justice he speaks1 and contrary  
to the love of his neighbor1 whom he    
encourages to sin4 ,wherefore this is a 
mortal sin1 according to ,isa4 #e3bj4   
,woe to you that call evil good4        
,secondly1 by reason of the intention1  
as when one man flatters another1 so    
that by deceiving him he may injure him 
in body or in soul2 this is also a      
mortal sin1 and of this it is written   
7,prov4 #bg3f73 ,better are the wounds  
of a friend than the deceitful kisses of
 an enemy4 ,thirdly1 by way of occasion1
 as when the praise of a flatterer1 even
 without his intending it1 becomes to   

another an occasion of sin4 ,in this    
case it is necessary to consider1       
whether the occasion were given or      
taken1 and how grievous the consequent  
downfall1 as may be understood from what
 has been said above concerning scandal 
7,q4 #dc1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,if1 however1  
one man flatters another from the mere  
craving to please others1 or again in   
order to avoid some evil1 or to acquire 
something in a case of necessity1 this  
is not contrary to charity4             
,consequently it is not a mortal but a  
venial sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the      
passages quoted speak of the flatterer  
who praises another's sin4 ,flattery of 
this kind is said to harm more than the 
sword of the persecutor1 since it does  
harm to goods that are of greater       
consequence1 namely1 spiritual goods4   
,yet it does not harm so efficaciously1 
since the sword of the persecutor slays 
effectively1 being a sufficient cause of
 death2 whereas no one by flattering can
 be a sufficient cause of another's     

sinning1 as was shown above 7,q4 #dc1   
,a4 #a1 ad #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #h1
 ad #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hj1 ,a4 #a74      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument applies 
to one that flatters with the intention 
of doing harm3 for such a man harms     
himself more than others1 since he harms
 himself1 as the sufficient cause of    
sinning1 whereas he is only the         
occasional cause of the harm he does to 
others4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the passage  
quoted refers to the man who flatters   
another treacherously1 in order to      
deceive him4   ,,question #aaf  ,,of    
,,quarreling 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we  
must now consider quarreling2 concerning
 which there are two points of inquiry3 
7#a7 ,whether it is opposed to the      
virtue of friendship8  7#b7 ,of its     
comparison with flattery8   ,,first     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaf1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,quarreling ,is ,opposed to the
 ,virtue of ,friendship or ,affability8 
,objection #a3 ,it seems that quarreling
 is not opposed to the virtue of        

friendship or affability4 ,for          
quarreling seems to pertain to discord1 
just as contention does4 ,but discord is
 opposed to charity1 as stated above    
7,q4 #cg1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore quarreling
 is also4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is    
written 7,prov4 #bf3ba73 ,an angry man  
stirreth up strife4 ,now anger is       
opposed to meekness4 ,therefore strife  
or quarreling is also4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 it is written 7,james #d3a73  
,from whence are wars and quarrels      
,douay3 'contentions' among you8 ,are   
they not hence1 from your concupiscences
 which war in your members8 ,now it     
would seem contrary to temperance to    
follow one's concupiscences4 ,therefore 
it seems that quarreling is opposed not 
to friendship but to temperance4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher opposes 
quarreling to friendship 7,ethic4 iv1   
#f74  ,i answer that1 ,quarreling       
consists properly in words1 when1       
namely1 one person contradicts another's
 words4 ,now two things may be observed 

in this contradiction4 ,for sometimes   
contradiction arises on account of the  
person who speaks1 the contradictor     
refusing to consent with him from lack  
of that love which unites minds         
together1 and this seems to pertain to  
discord1 which is contrary to charity4  
,whereas at times contradiction arises  
by reason of the speaker being a person 
to whom someone does not fear to be     
disagreeable3 whence arises quarreling1 
which is opposed to the aforesaid       
friendship or affability1 to which it   
belongs to behave agreeably towards     
those among whom we dwell4 ,hence the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #f7 that 
those who are opposed to everything with
 the intent of being disagreeable1 and  
care for nobody1 are said to be peevish 
and quarrelsome4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3      
,contention pertains rather to the      
contradiction of discord1 while         
quarreling belongs to the contradiction 
which has the intention of displeasing4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the direct opposition 

of virtues to vices depends1 not on     
their causes1 since one vice may arise  
from many causes1 but on the species of 
their acts4 ,and although quarreling    
arises at times from anger1 it may arise
 from many other causes1 hence it does  
not follow that it is directly opposed  
to meekness4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,james   
speaks there of concupiscence considered
 as a general evil whence all vices     
arise4 ,thus1 a gloss on ,rom4 #g3g     
says3 ,the law is good1 since by        
forbidding concupiscence1 it forbids all
 evil4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #aaf1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,quarreling
 ,is a ,more ,grievous ,sin ,than       
,flattery8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems    
that quarreling is a less grievous sin  
than the contrary vice1 viz4 adulation  
or flattery4 ,for the more harm a sin   
does the more grievous it seems to be4  
,now flattery does more harm than       
quarreling1 for it is written 7,isa4    
#c3ab73 ,o ,my people1 they that call   
thee blessed1 the same deceive thee1 and

 destroy the way of thy steps4          
,therefore flattery is a more grievous  
sin than quarreling4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 there appears to be a certain 
amount of deceit in flattery1 since the 
flatterer says one thing1 and thinks    
another3 whereas the quarrelsome man is 
without deceit1 for he contradicts      
openly4 ,now he that sins deceitfully is
 a viler man1 according to the          
,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #f74         
,therefore flattery is a more grievous  
sin than quarreling4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 shame is fear of what is vile1
 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
iv1 #i74 ,but a man is more ashamed to  
be a flatterer than a quarreler4        
,therefore quarreling is a less grievous
 sin than flattery4  ,on the contrary1  
,the more a sin is inconsistent with the
 spiritual state1 the more it appears to
 be grievous4 ,now quarreling seems to  
be more inconsistent with the spiritual 
state3 for it is written 7#a ,tim4 #c3b1
 #c7 that it behooveth a bishop to be 4 

4 4 not quarrelsome2 and 7#b ,tim4      
#c3bd73 ,the servant of the ,lord must  
not wrangle4 ,therefore quarreling seems
 to be a more grievous sin than         
flattery4  ,i answer that1 ,we can speak
 of each of these sins in two ways4 ,in 
one way we may consider the species of  
either sin1 and thus the more a vice is 
at variance with the opposite virtue the
 more grievous it is4 ,now the virtue of
 friendship has a greater tendency to   
please than to displease3 and so the    
quarrelsome man1 who exceeds in giving  
displeasure sins more grievously than   
the adulator or flatterer1 who exceeds  
in giving pleasure4 ,in another way we  
may consider them as regards certain    
external motives1 and thus flattery is  
sometimes more grievous1 for instance   
when one intends by deception to acquire
 undue honor or gain3 while sometimes   
quarreling is more grievous2 for        
instance1 when one intends either to    
deny the truth1 or to hold up the       
speaker to contempt4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  

,just as the flatterer may do harm by   
deceiving secretly1 so the quarreler may
 do harm sometimes by assailing openly4 
,now1 other things being equal1 it is   
more grievous to harm a person openly1  
by violence as it were1 than secretly4  
,wherefore robbery is a more grievous   
sin than theft1 as stated above 7,q4    
#ff1 ,a4 #i74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in     
human acts1 the more grievous is not    
always the more vile4 ,for the          
comeliness of a man has its source in   
his reason3 wherefore the sins of the   
flesh1 whereby the flesh enslaves the   
reason1 are viler1 although spiritual   
sins are more grievous1 since they      
proceed from greater contempt4 ,in like 
manner1 sins that are committed through 
deceit are viler1 in so far as they seem
 to arise from a certain weakness1 and  
from a certain falseness of the reason1 
although sins that are committed openly 
proceed sometimes from a greater        
contempt4 ,hence flattery1 through being
 accompanied by deceit1 seems to be a   

viler sin2 while quarreling1 through    
proceeding from greater contempt1 is    
apparently more grievous4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,as stated in the objection1 shame  
regards the vileness of a sin2 wherefore
 a man is not always more ashamed of a  
more grievous sin1 but of a viler sin4  
,hence it is that a man is more ashamed 
of flattery than of quarreling1 although
 quarreling is more grievous4           
,,question #aag  ,,of ,,liberality 7,in 
,six ,articles7  ,we must now consider  
liberality and the opposite vices1      
namely1 covetousness and prodigality4   
,concerning liberality there are six    
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
liberality is a virtue8  7#b7 ,what is  
its matter8  7#c7 ,of its act2  7#d7    
,whether it pertains thereto to give    
rather than to take8  7#e7 ,whether     
liberality is a part of justice8  7#f7  
,of its comparison with other virtues4  
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aag1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,liberality ,is a    
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that 

liberality is not a virtue4 ,for no     
virtue is contrary to a natural         
inclination4 ,now it is a natural       
inclination for one to provide for      
oneself more than for others3 and yet it
 pertains to the liberal man to do the  
contrary1 since1 according to the       
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #a71 it is the
 mark of a liberal man not to look to   
himself1 so that he leaves for himself  
the lesser things4 ,therefore liberality
 is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
man sustains life by means of riches1   
and wealth contributes to happiness     
instrumentally1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 
#h4 ,since1 then1 every virtue is       
directed to happiness1 it seems that the
 liberal man is not virtuous1 for the   
,philosopher says of him 7,ethic4 iv1   
#a7 that he is inclined neither to      
receive nor to keep money1 but to give  
it away4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the       
virtues are connected with one another4 
,but liberality does not seem to be     
connected with the other virtues3 since 

many are virtuous who cannot be liberal1
 for they have nothing to give2 and many
 give or spend liberally who are not    
virtuous otherwise4 ,therefore          
liberality is not a virtue4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i7 
that the ,gospel contains many instances
 in which a just liberality is          
inculcated4 ,now in the ,gospel nothing 
is taught that does not pertain to      
virtue4 ,therefore liberality is a      
virtue4  ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine 
says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ai71 it      
belongs to virtue to use well the things
 that we can use ill4 ,now we may use   
both well and ill1 not only the things  
that are within us1 such as the powers  
and the passions of the soul1 but also  
those that are without1 such as the     
things of this world that are granted us
 for our livelihood4 ,wherefore since it
 belongs to liberality to use these     
things well1 it follows that liberality 
is a virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3          
,according to ,ambrose 7,serm4 lxiv de  

,temp47 and ,basil 7,hom4 in ,luc4 xii1 
#ah7 excess of riches is granted by ,god
 to some1 in order that they may obtain 
the merit of a good stewardship4 ,but it
 suffices for one man to have few       
things4 ,wherefore the liberal man      
commendably spends more on others than  
on himself4 ,nevertheless we are bound  
to be more provident for ourselves in   
spiritual goods1 in which each one is   
able to look after himself in the first 
place4 ,and yet it does not belong to   
the liberal man even in temporal things 
to attend so much to others as to lose  
sight of himself and those belonging to 
him4 ,wherefore ,ambrose says 7,de      
,offic4 i73 ,it is a commendable        
liberality not to neglect your relatives
 if you know them to be in want4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,it does not belong to a     
liberal man so to give away his riches  
that nothing is left for his own        
support1 nor the wherewithal to perform 
those acts of virtue whereby happiness  
is acquired4 ,hence the ,philosopher    

says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that the liberal  
man does not neglect his own1 wishing   
thus to be of help to certain people2   
and ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i7 that  
,our ,lord does not wish a man to pour  
out his riches all at once1 but to      
dispense them3 unless he do as ,eliseus 
did1 who slew his oxen and fed the poor1
 that he might not be bound by any      
household cares4 ,for this belongs to   
the state of perfection1 of which we    
shall speak farther on 7,q4 #ahd2 ,q4   
#ahf1 ,a4 #c74  ,it must be observed1   
however1 that the very act of giving    
away one's possessions liberally1 in so 
far as it is an act of virtue1 is       
directed to happiness4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 
#a71 those who spend much on            
intemperance are not liberal but        
prodigal2 and likewise whoever spends   
what he has for the sake of other sins4 
,hence ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i73   
,if you assist to rob others of their   
possessions1 your honesty is not to be  

commended1 nor is your liberality       
genuine if you give for the sake of     
boasting rather than of pity4 ,wherefore
 those who lack other virtues1 though   
they spend much on certain evil works1  
are not liberal4  ,again1 nothing       
hinders certain people from spending    
much on good uses1 without having the   
habit of liberality3 even as men perform
 works of other virtues1 before having  
the habit of virtue1 though not in the  
same way as virtuous people1 as stated  
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a74 ,in   
like manner nothing prevents a virtuous 
man from being liberal1 although he be  
poor4 ,hence the ,philosopher says      
7,ethic4 iv1 #a73 ,liberality is        
proportionate to a man's substance1 i4e4
 his means1 for it consists1 not in the 
quantity given1 but in the habit of the 
giver3 and ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i7
 that it is the heart that makes a gift 
rich or poor1 and gives things their    
value4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #aag1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,liberality

 ,is ,about ,money8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
seems that liberality is not about      
money4 ,for every moral virtue is about 
operations and passions4 ,now it is     
proper to justice to be about           
operations1 as stated in ,ethic4 v1 #a4 
,therefore1 since liberality is a moral 
virtue1 it seems that it is about       
passions and not about money4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 it belongs to a liberal man  
to make use of any kind of wealth4 ,now 
natural riches are more real than       
artificial riches1 according to the     
,philosopher 7,polit4 i1 #e1 #f74       
,therefore liberality is not chiefly    
about money4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
different virtues have different matter1
 since habits are distinguished by their
 objects4 ,but external things are the  
matter of distributive and commutative  
justice4 ,therefore they are not the    
matter of liberality4  ,on the contrary1
 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a7
 that liberality seems to be a mean in  
the matter of money4  ,i answer that1   

,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
iv1 #a7 it belongs to the liberal man to
 part with things4 ,hence liberality is 
also called open-handedness 7largitas71 
because that which is open does not     
withhold things but parts with them4    
,the term liberality seems also to      
allude to this1 since when a man quits  
hold of a thing he frees it 7liberat71  
so to speak1 from his keeping and       
ownership1 and shows his mind to be free
 of attachment thereto4 ,now those      
things which are the subject of a man's 
free-handedness towards others are the  
goods he possesses1 which are denoted by
 the term money4 ,therefore the proper  
matter of liberality is money4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad  
#c71 liberality depends not on the      
quantity given1 but on the heart of the 
giver4 ,now the heart of the giver is   
disposed according to the passions of   
love and desire1 and consequently those 
of pleasure and sorrow1 towards the     
things given4 ,hence the interior       

passions are the immediate matter of    
liberality1 while exterior money is the 
object of those same passions4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says in his    
book ,de ,disciplina ,christi 7,tract4  
de divers1 i71 everything whatsoever man
 has on earth1 and whatsoever he owns1  
goes by the name of pecunia 7money71    
because in olden times men's possessions
 consisted entirely of pecora 7flocks74 
,and the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 
#a73 ,we give the name of money to      
anything that can be valued in currency4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,justice establishes 
equality in external things1 but has    
nothing to do1 properly speaking1 with  
the regulation of internal passions3    
wherefore money is in one way the matter
 of liberality1 and in another way of   
justice4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #aag1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,using     
,money ,is the ,act of ,liberality8     
,objection #a3 ,it seems that using     
money is not the act of liberality4 ,for
 different virtues have different acts4 

,but using money is becoming to other   
virtues1 such as justice and            
magnificence4 ,therefore it is not the  
proper act of liberality4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 it belongs to a liberal man1  
not only to give but also to receive and
 keep4 ,but receiving and keeping do not
 seem to be connected with the use of   
money4 ,therefore using money seems to  
be unsuitably assigned as the proper act
 of liberality4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the
 use of money consists not only in      
giving it but also in spending it4 ,but 
the spending of money refers to the     
spender1 and consequently is not an act 
of liberality3 for ,seneca says 7,de    
,benef4 v73 ,a man is not liberal by    
giving to himself4 ,therefore not every 
use of money belongs to liberality4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says   
7,ethic4 iv1 #a73 ,in whatever matter a 
man is virtuous1 he will make the best  
use of that matter3 ,therefore he that  
has the virtue with regard to money will
 make the best use of riches4 ,now such 

is the liberal man4 ,therefore the good 
use of money is the act of liberality4  
,i answer that1 ,the species of an act  
is taken from its object1 as stated     
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #b74 ,now  
the object or matter of liberality is   
money and whatever has a money value1 as
 stated in the foregoing ,article 7ad   
#b74 ,and since every virtue is         
consistent with its object1 it follows  
that1 since liberality is a virtue1 its 
act is consistent with money4 ,now money
 comes under the head of useful goods1  
since all external goods are directed to
 man's use4 ,hence the proper act of    
liberality is making use of money or    
riches4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs to
 liberality to make good use of riches  
as such1 because riches are the proper  
matter of liberality4 ,on the other hand
 it belongs to justice to make use of   
riches under another aspect1 namely1    
that of debt1 in so far as an external  
thing is due to another4 ,and it belongs
 to magnificence to make use of riches  

under a special aspect1 in so far1 to   
wit1 as they are employed for the       
fulfilment of some great deed4 ,hence   
magnificence stands in relation to      
liberality as something in addition     
thereto1 as we shall explain farther on 
7,q4 #acd74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it       
belongs to a virtuous man not only to   
make good use of his matter or          
instrument1 but also to provide         
opportunities for that good use4 ,thus  
it belongs to a soldier's fortitude not 
only to wield his sword against the foe1
 but also to sharpen his sword and keep 
it in its sheath4 ,thus1 too1 it belongs
 to liberality not only to use money1   
but also to keep it in preparation and  
safety in order to make fitting use of  
it4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated 7,a4   
#b1 ad #a71 the internal passions       
whereby man is affected towards money   
are the proximate matter of liberality4 
,hence it belongs to liberality before  
all that a man should not be prevented  
from making any due use of money through

 an inordinate affection for it4 ,now   
there is a twofold use of money3 one    
consists in applying it to one's own    
use1 and would seem to come under the   
designation of costs or expenditure2    
while the other consists in devoting it 
to the use of others1 and comes under   
the head of gifts4 ,hence it belongs to 
liberality that one be not hindered by  
an immoderate love of money1 either from
 spending it becomingly1 or from making 
suitable gifts4 ,therefore liberality is
 concerned with giving and spending1    
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
iv1 #a74 ,the saying of ,seneca refers  
to liberality as regards giving3 for a  
man is not said to be liberal for the   
reason that he gives something to       
himself4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #aag1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,it       
,belongs to a ,liberal ,man ,chiefly to 
,give8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that it
 does not belong to a liberal man       
chiefly to give4 ,for liberality1 like  
all other moral virtues1 is regulated by

 prudence4 ,now it seems to belong very 
much to prudence that a man should keep 
his riches4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher 
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that those who    
have not earned money1 but have received
 the money earned by others1 spend it   
more liberally1 because they have not   
experienced the want of it4 ,therefore  
it seems that giving does not chiefly   
belong to the liberal man4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 no man is sorry for what he   
intends chiefly to do1 nor does he cease
 from doing it4 ,but a liberal man is   
sometimes sorry for what he has given1  
nor does he give to all1 as stated in   
,ethic4 iv1 #a4 ,therefore it does not  
belong chiefly to a liberal man to give4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in order to       
accomplish what he intends chiefly1 a   
man employs all the ways he can4 ,now a 
liberal man is not a beggar1 as the     
,philosopher observes 7,ethic4 iv1 #a72 
and yet by begging he might provide     
himself with the means of giving to     
others4 ,therefore it seems that he does

 not chiefly aim at giving4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 man is bound to look after    
himself rather than others4 ,but by     
spending he looks after himself1 whereas
 by giving he looks after others4       
,therefore it belongs to a liberal man  
to spend rather than to give4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that it belongs to a   
liberal man to surpass in giving4  ,i   
answer that1 ,it is proper to a liberal 
man to use money4 ,now the use of money 
consists in parting with it4 ,for the   
acquisition of money is like generation 
rather than use3 while the keeping of   
money1 in so far as it is directed to   
facilitate the use of money1 is like a  
habit4 ,now in parting with a thing--for
 instance1 when we throw something--the 
farther we put it away the greater the  
force 7virtus7 employed4 ,hence parting 
with money by giving it to others       
proceeds from a greater virtue than when
 we spend it on ourselves4 ,but it is   
proper to a virtue as such to tend to   

what is more perfect1 since virtue is a 
kind of perfection 7,phys4 vii1 text4   
#ag1 #ah74 ,therefore a liberal man is  
praised chiefly for giving4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs to prudence to    
keep money1 lest it be stolen or spent  
uselessly4 ,but to spend it usefully is 
not less but more prudent than to keep  
it usefully3 since more things have to  
be considered in money's use1 which is  
likened to movement1 than in its        
keeping1 which is likened to rest4 ,as  
to those who1 having received money that
 others have earned1 spend it more      
liberally1 through not having           
experienced the want of it1 if their    
inexperience is the sole cause of their 
liberal expenditure they have not the   
virtue of liberality4 ,sometimes1       
however1 this inexperience merely       
removes the impediment to liberality1 so
 that it makes them all the more ready  
to act liberally1 because1 not          
unfrequently1 the fear of want that     
results from the experience of want     

hinders those who have acquired money   
from using it up by acting with         
liberality2 as does likewise the love   
they have for it as being their own     
effect1 according to the ,philosopher   
7,ethic4 iv1 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as 
stated in this and the preceding        
,article1 it belongs to liberality to   
make fitting use of money1 and          
consequently to give it in a fitting    
manner1 since this is a use of money4   
,again1 every virtue is grieved by      
whatever is contrary to its act1 and    
avoids whatever hinders that act4 ,now  
two things are opposed to suitable      
giving2 namely1 not giving what ought   
suitably to be given1 and giving        
something unsuitably4 ,wherefore the    
liberal man is grieved at both3 but     
especially at the former1 since it is   
more opposed to his proper act4 ,for    
this reason1 too1 he does not give to   
all3 since his act would be hindered    
were he to give to everyone3 for he     
would not have the means of giving to   

those to whom it were fitting for him to
 give4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,giving and    
receiving are related to one another as 
action and passion4 ,now the same thing 
is not the principle of both action and 
passion4 ,hence1 since liberality is a  
principle of giving1 it does not belong 
to the liberal man to be ready to       
receive1 and still less to beg4 ,hence  
the verse3  ,in this world he that      
wishes to be pleasing to many ,should   
give often1 take seldom1 ask never4     
,but he makes provision in order to give
 certain things according as liberality 
requires2 such are the fruits of his own
 possessions1 for he is careful about   
realizing them that he may make a       
liberal use thereof4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3  
,to spend on oneself is an inclination  
of nature2 hence to spend money on      
others belongs properly to a virtue4    
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aag1  
,art4 #e  ,whether ,liberality ,is a    
,part of ,justice8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
seems that liberality is not a part of  

justice4 ,for justice regards that which
 is due4 ,now the more a thing is due   
the less liberally is it given4         
,therefore liberality is not a part of  
justice1 but is incompatible with it4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 justice is about    
operation as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 
#i2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c73    
whereas liberality is chiefly about the 
love and desire of money1 which are     
passions4 ,therefore liberality seems to
 belong to temperance rather than to    
justice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it belongs
 chiefly to liberality to give          
becomingly1 as stated 7,a4 #d74 ,but    
giving becomingly belongs to beneficence
 and mercy1 which pertain to charity1 as
 state above 7,,qq4 #cj1 #ca74          
,therefore liberality is a part of      
charity rather than of justice4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4   
i73 ,justice has to do with the         
fellowship of mankind4 ,for the notion  
of fellowship is divided into two parts1
 justice and beneficence1 also called   

liberality or kind-heartedness4         
,therefore liberality pertains to       
justice4  ,i answer that1 ,liberality is
 not a species of justice1 since justice
 pays another what is his whereas       
liberality gives another what is one's  
own4 ,there are1 however1 two points in 
which it agrees with justice3 first1    
that it is directed chiefly to another1 
as justice is2 secondly1 that it is     
concerned with external things1 and so  
is justice1 albeit under a different    
aspect1 a stated in this ,article and   
above 7,a4 #b1 ad #c74 ,hence it is that
 liberality is reckoned by some to be a 
part of justice1 being annexed thereto  
as to a principal virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,although liberality does not       
consider the legal due that justice     
considers1 it considers a certain moral 
due4 ,this due is based on a certain    
fittingness and not on an obligation3 so
 that it answers to the idea of due in  
the lowest degree4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,temperance is about concupiscence in   

pleasures of the body4 ,but the         
concupiscence and delight in money is   
not referable to the body but rather to 
the soul4 ,hence liberality does not    
properly pertain to temperance4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,the giving of beneficence and
 mercy proceeds from the fact that a man
 has a certain affection towards the    
person to whom he gives3 wherefore this 
giving belongs to charity or friendship4
 ,but the giving of liberality arises   
from a person being affected in a       
certain way towards money1 in that he   
desires it not nor loves it3 so that    
when it is fitting he gives it not only 
to his friends but also to those whom he
 knows not4 ,hence it belong not to     
charity1 but to justice1 which is about 
external things4   ,,sixth ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aag1 ,art4 #f  ,whether 
,liberality ,is the ,greatest of the    
,virtues8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that
 liberality is the greatest of the      
virtues4 ,for every virtue of man is a  
likeness to the divine goodness4 ,now   

man is likened chiefly by liberality to 
,god1 ,who giveth to all men abundantly1
 and upbraideth not 7,james #a3e74      
,therefore liberality is the greatest of
 the virtues4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      
according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 vi1 
#h71 in things that are great1 but not  
in bulk1 to be greatest is to be best4  
,now the nature of goodness seems to    
pertain mostly to liberality1 since the 
good is self-communicative1 according to
 ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,hence    
,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i7 that      
justice reclines to severity1 liberality
 to goodness4 ,therefore liberality is  
the greatest of virtues4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 men are honored and loved on  
account of virtue4 ,now ,boethius says  
7,de ,consol4 ii7 that bounty above all 
makes a man famous3 and the ,philosopher
 says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that among the   
virtuous the liberal are the most       
beloved4 ,therefore liberality is the   
greatest of virtues4  ,on the contrary1 
,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i7 that      

justice seems to be more excellent than 
liberality1 although liberality is more 
pleasing4 ,the ,philosopher also says   
7,rhet4 i1 #i7 that brave and just men  
are honored chiefly and1 after them1    
those who are liberal4  ,i answer that1 
,every virtue tends towards a good2     
wherefore the greater virtue is that    
which tends towards the greater good4   
,now liberality tends towards a good in 
two ways3 in one way1 primarily and of  
its own nature2 in another way1         
consequently4 ,primarily and of its very
 nature it tends to set in order one's  
own affection towards the possession and
 use of money4 ,in this way temperance1 
which moderates desires and pleasures   
relating to one's own body1 takes       
precedence of liberality3 and so do     
fortitude and justice1 which1 in a      
manner1 are directed to the common good1
 one in time of peace1 the other in time
 of war3 while all these are preceded by
 those virtues which are directed to the
 ,divine good4 ,for the ,divine good    

surpasses all manner of human good2 and 
among human goods the public good       
surpasses the good of the individual2   
and of the last named the good of the   
body surpasses those goods that consist 
of external things4 ,again1 liberality  
is ordained to a good consequently1 and 
in this way it is directed to all the   
aforesaid goods4 ,for by reason of his  
not being a lover of money1 it follows  
that a man readily makes use of it1     
whether for himself1 or for the good of 
others1 or for ,god's glory4 ,thus it   
derives a certain excellence from being 
useful in many ways4 ,since1 however1 we
 should judge of things according to    
that which is competent to them         
primarily and in respect of their       
nature1 rather than according to that   
which pertains to them4 ,consequently1  
it remains to be said that liberality is
 not the greatest of virtues4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,god's giving proceeds from   
,his love for those to whom ,he gives1  
not from ,his affection towards the     

things ,he gives1 wherefore it seems to 
pertain to charity1 the greatest of     
virtues1 rather than to liberality4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,every virtue shares   
the nature of goodness by giving forth  
its own act3 and the acts of certain    
other virtues are better than money     
which liberality gives forth4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,the friendship whereby a     
liberal man is beloved is not that which
 is based on virtue1 as though he were  
better than others1 but that which is   
based on utility1 because he is more    
useful in external goods1 which as a    
rule men desire above all others4 ,for  
the same reason he becomes famous4      
,,question #aah  ,,of ,,the ,,vices     
,,opposed ,,to ,,liberality1 ,,and ,,in 
,,the ,,first ,,place1 ,,of             
,,covetousness 7,in ,eight ,articles7   
,we must now consider the vices opposed 
to liberality3 and 7#a7 covetousness2   
7#b7 prodigality4  ,under the first head
 there are eight points of inquiry3     
7#a7 ,whether covetousness is a sin8    

7#b7 ,whether it is a special sin8  7#c7
 ,to which virtue it is opposed2  7#d7  
,whether it is a mortal sin8  7#e7      
,whether it is the most grievous of     
sins8  7#f7 ,whether it is a sin of the 
flesh or a spiritual sin8  7#g7 ,whether
 it is a capital vice8  7#h7 ,of its    
daughters4   ,,first ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,covetousness ,is a ,sin8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it seems that covetousness is not a
 sin4 ,for covetousness 7avaritia7      
denotes a certain greed for gold 7aeris 
aviditas7199 because1 to wit1 it        
consists in a desire for money1 under   
which all external goods may be         
comprised4 99,the ,latin for            
covetousness avaritia is derived from   
aveo to desire2 but the ,greek          
philargyria signifies literally love of 
money3 and it is to this that ,st4      
,thomas is alluding 7cf4 ,a4 #b1 ,obj4  
#b74 ,now it is not a sin to desire     
external goods3 since man desires them  
naturally1 both because they are        

naturally subject to man1 and because by
 their means man's life is sustained    
7for which reason they are spoken of as 
his substance74 ,therefore covetousness 
is not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every
 sin is against either ,god1 or one's   
neighbor1 or oneself1 as stated above   
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #d74 ,but        
covetousness is not1 properly speaking1 
a sin against ,god3 since it is opposed 
neither to religion nor to the          
theological virtues1 by which man is    
directed to ,god4 ,nor again is it a sin
 against oneself1 for this pertains     
properly to gluttony and lust1 of which 
the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #f3ah73 ,he 
that committeth fornication sinneth     
against his own body4 ,in like manner   
neither is it apparently a sin against  
one's neighbor1 since a man harms no one
 by keeping what is his own4 ,therefore 
covetousness is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 things that occur naturally   
are not sins4 ,now covetousness comes   
naturally to old age and every kind of  

defect1 according to the ,philosopher   
7,ethic4 iv1 #a74 ,therefore            
covetousness is not a sin4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,it is written 7,heb4 #ac3e73 
,let your manners be without            
covetousness1 contented with such things
 as you have4  ,i answer that1 ,in      
whatever things good consists in a due  
measure1 evil must of necessity ensue   
through excess or deficiency of that    
measure4 ,now in all things that are for
 an end1 the good consists in a certain 
measure3 since whatever is directed to  
an end must needs be commensurate with  
the end1 as1 for instance1 medicine is  
commensurate with health1 as the        
,philosopher observes 7,polit4 i1 #f74  
,external goods come under the head of  
things useful for an end1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #aag1 ,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#b1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence it must needs be    
that man's good in their respect        
consists in a certain measure1 in other 
words1 that man seeks1 according to a   
certain measure1 to have external       

riches1 in so far as they are necessary 
for him to live in keeping with his     
condition of life4 ,wherefore it will be
 a sin for him to exceed this measure1  
by wishing to acquire or keep them      
immoderately4 ,this is what is meant by 
covetousness1 which is defined as       
immoderate love of possessing4 ,it is   
therefore evident that covetousness is a
 sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is natural  
to man to desire external things as     
means to an end3 wherefore this desire  
is devoid of sin1 in so far as it is    
held in check by the rule taken from the
 nature of the end4 ,but covetousness   
exceeds this rule1 and therefore is a   
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,covetousness may
 signify immoderation about external    
things in two ways4 ,first1 so as to    
regard immediately the acquisition and  
keeping of such things1 when1 to wit1 a 
man acquires or keeps them more than is 
due4 ,in this way it is a sin directly  
against one's neighbor1 since one man   
cannot over-abound in external riches1  

without another man lacking them1 for   
temporal goods cannot be possessed by   
many at the same time4 ,secondly1 it may
 signify immoderation in the internal   
affection which a man has for riches    
when1 for instance1 a man loves them1   
desires them1 or delights in them1      
immoderately4 ,in this way by           
covetousness a man sins against himself1
 because it causes disorder in his      
affections1 though not in his body as do
 the sins of the flesh4  ,as a          
consequence1 however1 it is a sin       
against ,god1 just as all mortal sins1  
inasmuch as man contemns things eternal 
for the sake of temporal things4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,natural inclinations should 
be regulated according to reason1 which 
is the governing power in human nature4 
,hence though old people seek more      
greedily the aid of external things1    
just as everyone that is in need seeks  
to have his need supplied1 they are not 
excused from sin if they exceed this due
 measure of reason with regard to       

riches4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #b  ,whether            
,covetousness ,is a ,special ,sin8      
,objection #a3 ,it seems that           
covetousness is not a special sin4 ,for 
,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii73  
,covetousness1 which in ,greek is called
 philargyria1 applies not only to silver
 or money1 but also to anything that is 
desired immoderately4 ,now in every sin 
there is immoderate desire of something1
 because sin consists in turning away   
from the immutable good1 and adhering to
 mutable goods1 as stated above         
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f1 ,obj4 #c74   
,therefore covetousness is a general    
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to  
,isidore 7,etym4 x71 the covetous       
7avarus7 man is so called because he is 
greedy for brass 7avidus aeris71 i4e4   
money3 wherefore in ,greek covetousness 
is called philargyria1 i4e4 love of     
silver4 ,now silver1 which stands for   
money1 signifies all external goods the 
value of which can be measured by money1

 as stated above 7,q4 #aag1 ,a4 #b1 ad  
#b74 ,therefore covetousness is a desire
 for any external thing3 and            
consequently seems to be a general sin4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a gloss on ,rom4    
#g3g1 ,for ,i had not known             
concupiscence1 says3 ,the law is good1  
since by forbidding concupiscence1 it   
forbids all evil4 ,now the law seems to 
forbid especially the concupiscence of  
covetousness3 hence it is written 7,ex4 
#bj3ag73 ,thou shalt not covet thy      
neighbor's goods4 ,therefore the        
concupiscence of covetousness is all    
evil1 and so covetousness is a general  
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,covetousness is
 numbered together with other special   
sins 7,rom4 #a3bi71 where it is written3
 ,being filled with all iniquity1       
malice1 fornication1 covetousness       
,douay3 'avarice'1 etc4  ,i answer that1
 ,sins take their species from their    
objects1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#gb1 ,a4 #a74 ,now the object of a sin  
is the good towards which an inordinate 

appetite tends4 ,hence where there is a 
special aspect of good inordinately     
desired1 there is a special kind of sin4
 ,now the useful good differs in aspect 
from the delightful good4 ,and riches1  
as such1 come under the head of useful  
good1 since they are desired under the  
aspect of being useful to man4          
,consequently covetousness is a special 
sin1 forasmuch as it is an immoderate   
love of having possessions1 which are   
comprised under the name of money1      
whence covetousness 7avaritia7 is       
denominated4  ,since1 however1 the verb 
to have1 which seems to have been       
originally employed in connection with  
possessions whereof we are absolute     
masters1 is applied to many other things
 7thus a man is said to have health1 a  
wife1 clothes1 and so forth1 as stated  
in ,de ,praedicamentis71 consequently   
the term covetousness has been amplified
 to denote all immoderate desire for    
having anything whatever4 ,thus ,gregory
 says in a homily 7xvi in ,ev47 that    

covetousness is a desire not only for   
money1 but also for knowledge and high  
places1 when prominence is immoderately 
sought after4 ,in this way covetousness 
is not a special sin3 and in this sense 
,augustine speaks of covetousness in the
 passage quoted in the ,first           
,objection4 ,wherefore this suffices for
 the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all those external    
things that are subject to the uses of  
human life are comprised under the term 
money1 inasmuch as they have the aspect 
of useful good4 ,but there are certain  
external goods that can be obtained by  
money1 such as pleasures1 honors1 and so
 forth1 which are desirable under       
another aspect4 ,wherefore the desire   
for such things is not properly called  
covetousness1 in so far as it is a      
special vice4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this   
gloss speaks of the inordinate          
concupiscence for anything whatever4    
,for it is easy to understand that if it
 is forbidden to covet another's        

possessions it is also forbidden to     
covet those things that can be obtained 
by means of those possessions4   ,,third
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #c
  ,whether ,covetousness ,is ,opposed to
 ,liberality8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems 
that covetousness is not opposed to     
liberality4 ,for ,chrysostom1 commenting
 on ,matt4 #e3f1 ,blessed are they that 
hunger and thirst after justice1 says1  
7,hom4 xv in ,matth47 that there are two
 kinds of justice1 one general1 and the 
other special1 to which covetousness is 
opposed3 and the ,philosopher says the  
same 7,ethic4 v1 #b74 ,therefore        
covetousness is not opposed to          
liberality4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the sin
 of covetousness consists in a man's    
exceeding the measure in the things he  
possesses4 ,but this measure is         
appointed by justice4 ,therefore        
covetousness is directly opposed to     
justice and not to liberality4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 liberality is a virtue    
that observes the mean between two      

contrary vices1 as the ,philosopher     
states 7,ethic4 i1 #g2 iv1 #a74 ,but    
covetousness has no contrary and        
opposite sin1 according to the          
,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #a1 #b74       
,therefore covetousness is not opposed  
to liberality4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is
 written 7,eccles4 #e3i73 ,a covetous   
man shall not be satisfied with money1  
and he that loveth riches shall have no 
fruits from them4 ,now not to be        
satisfied with money and to love it     
inordinately are opposed to liberality1 
which observes the mean in the desire of
 riches4 ,therefore covetousness is     
opposed to liberality4  ,i answer that1 
,covetousness denotes immoderation with 
regard to riches in two ways4 ,first1   
immediately in respect of the           
acquisition and keeping of riches4 ,in  
this way a man obtains money beyond his 
due1 by stealing or retaining another's 
property4 ,this is opposed to justice1  
and in this sense covetousness is       
mentioned 7,ezech4 #bb3bg73 ,her princes

 in the midst of her are like wolves    
ravening the prey to shed blood 4 4 4   
and to run after gains through          
covetousness4 ,secondly1 it denotes     
immoderation in the interior affections 
for riches2 for instance1 when a man    
loves or desires riches too much1 or    
takes too much pleasure in them1 even if
 he be unwilling to steal4 ,in this way 
covetousness is opposed to liberality1  
which moderates these affections1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #aag1 ,a4 #b1 ad #c2  
,a4 #c1 ad #c2 ,a4 #f74 ,in this sense  
covetousness is spoken of 7#b ,cor4     
#i3e73 ,that they would 4 4 4 prepare   
this blessing before promised1 to be    
ready1 so as a blessing1 not as         
covetousness1 where a gloss observes3   
,lest they should regret what they had  
given1 and give but little4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,chrysostom and the           
,philosopher are speaking of            
covetousness in the first sense3        
covetousness in the second sense is     
called illiberality 99aneleutheria by   

the ,philosopher4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it 
belongs properly to justice to appoint  
the measure in the acquisition and      
keeping of riches from the point of view
 of legal due1 so that a man should     
neither take nor retain another's       
property4 ,but liberality appoints the  
measure of reason1 principally in the   
interior affections1 and consequently in
 the exterior taking and keeping of     
money1 and in the spending of the same1 
in so far as these proceed from the     
interior affection1 looking at the      
matter from the point of view not of the
 legal but of the moral debt1 which     
latter depends on the rule of reason4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,covetousness as       
opposed to justice has no opposite vice3
 since it consists in having more than  
one ought according to justice1 the     
contrary of which is to have less than  
one ought1 and this is not a sin but a  
punishment4 ,but covetousness as opposed
 to liberality has the vice of          
prodigality opposed to it4   ,,fourth   

,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #d 
,whether ,covetousness ,is ,always a    
,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems 
that covetousness is always a mortal    
sin4 ,for no one is worthy of death save
 for a mortal sin4 ,but men are worthy  
of death on account of covetousness4    
,for the ,apostle after saying 7,rom4   
#a3bi73 ,being filled with all iniquity 
4 4 4 fornication1 covetousness ,douay3 
'avarice'1 etc4 adds 7,rom4 #a3cb73     
,they who do such things are worthy of  
death4 ,therefore covetousness is a     
mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the    
least degree of covetousness is to hold 
to one's own inordinately4 ,but this    
seemingly is a mortal sin3 for ,basil   
says 7,serm4 super4 ,luc4 xii1 #ah73 ,it
 is the hungry man's bread that thou    
keepest back1 the naked man's cloak that
 thou hoardest1 the needy man's money   
that thou possessest1 hence thou        
despoilest as many as thou mightest     
succor4  ,now it is a mortal sin to do  
an injustice to another1 since it is    

contrary to the love of our neighbor4   
,much more therefore is all covetousness
 a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no  
one is struck with spiritual blindness  
save through a mortal sin1 for this     
deprives a man of the light of grace4   
,but1 according to ,chrysostom 99,hom4  
xv in the ,opus ,imperfectum1 falsely   
ascribed to ,st4 ,chrysostom1 ,lust for 
money brings darkness on the soul4      
,therefore covetousness1 which is lust  
for money1 is a mortal sin4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,a gloss on #a ,cor4 #c3ab1   
,if any man build upon this foundation1 
says 7cf4 ,st4 ,augustine1 ,de ,fide et 
,oper4 xvi7 that he builds wood1 hay1   
stubble1 who thinks in the things of the
 world1 how he may please the world1    
which pertains to the sin of            
covetousness4 ,now he that builds wood1 
hay1 stubble1 sins not mortally but     
venially1 for it is said of him that he 
shall be saved1 yet so as by fire4      
,therefore covetousness is some times a 
venial sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 

above 7,a4 #c7 covetousness is twofold4 
,in one way it is opposed to justice1   
and thus it is a mortal sin in respect  
of its genus4 ,for in this sense        
covetousness consists in the unjust     
taking or retaining of another's        
property1 and this belongs to theft or  
robbery1 which are mortal sins1 as      
stated above 7,q4 #ff1 ,,aa4 #f1 #h74   
,yet venial sin may occur in this kind  
of covetousness by reason of            
imperfection of the act1 as stated above
 7,q4 #ff1 ,a4 #f1 ad #c71 when we were 
treating of theft4  ,in another way     
covetousness may be taken as opposed to 
liberality3 in which sense it denotes   
inordinate love of riches4 ,accordingly 
if the love of riches becomes so great  
as to be preferred to charity1 in such  
wise that a man1 through love of riches1
 fear not to act counter to the love of 
,god and his neighbor1 covetousness will
 then be a mortal sin4 ,if1 on the other
 hand1 the inordinate nature of his love
 stops short of this1 so that although  

he love riches too much1 yet he does not
 prefer the love of them to the love of 
,god1 and is unwilling for the sake of  
riches to do anything in opposition to  
,god or his neighbor1 then covetousness 
is a venial sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3      
,covetousness is numbered together with 
mortal sins1 by reason of the aspect    
under which it is a mortal sin4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,basil is speaking of a case  
wherein a man is bound by a legal debt  
to give of his goods to the poor1 either
 through fear of their want or on       
account of his having too much4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,lust for riches1 properly    
speaking1 brings darkness on the soul1  
when it puts out the light of charity1  
by preferring the love of riches to the 
love of ,god4   ,,fifth ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
,covetousness ,is the ,greatest of      
,sins8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that   
covetousness is the greatest of sins4   
,for it is written 7,ecclus4 #aj3i73    
,nothing is more wicked than a covetous 

man1 and the text continues3 ,there is  
not a more wicked thing than to love    
money3 for such a one setteth even his  
own soul to sale4 ,tully also says 7,de 
,offic4 i1 under the heading1 ',true    
magnanimity is based chiefly on two     
things'73 ,nothing is so narrow or      
little minded as to love money4 ,but    
this pertains to covetousness4          
,therefore covetousness is the most     
grievous of sins4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
the more a sin is opposed to charity1   
the more grievous it is4 ,now           
covetousness is most opposed to charity3
 for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4    
#cf7 that greed is the bane of charity4 
,therefore covetousness is the greatest 
of sins4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the       
gravity of a sin is indicated by its    
being incurable3 wherefore the sin      
against the ,holy ,ghost is said to be  
most grievous1 because it is            
irremissible4 ,but covetousness is an   
incurable sin3 hence the ,philosopher   
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that old age and  

helplessness of any kind make men       
illiberal4 ,therefore covetousness is   
the most grievous of sins4  ,obj4 #d3   
,further1 the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #e3e7
 that covetousness is a serving of      
idols4 ,now idolatry is reckoned among  
the most grievous sins4 ,therefore      
covetousness is also4  ,on the contrary1
 ,adultery is a more grievous sin than  
theft1 according to ,prov4 #f3cj4 ,but  
theft pertains to covetousness4         
,therefore covetousness is not the most 
grievous of sins4  ,i answer that1      
,every sin1 from the very fact that it  
is an evil1 consists in the corruption  
or privation of some good3 while1 in so 
far as it is voluntary1 it consists in  
the desire of some good4 ,consequently  
the order of sins may be considered in  
two ways4 ,first1 on the part of the    
good that is despised or corrupted by   
sin1 and then the greater the good the  
graver the sin4 ,from this point of view
 a sin that is against ,god is most     
grievous2 after this comes a sin that is

 committed against a man's person1 and  
after this comes a sin against external 
things1 which are deputed to man's use1 
and this seems to belong to             
covetousness4 ,secondly1 the degrees of 
sin may be considered on the part of the
 good to which the human appetite is    
inordinately subjected2 and then the    
lesser the good1 the more deformed is   
the sin3 for it is more shameful to be  
subject to a lower than to a higher     
good4 ,now the good of external things  
is the lowest of human goods3 since it  
is less than the good of the body1 and  
this is less than the good of the soul1 
which is less than the ,divine good4    
,from this point of view the sin of     
covetousness1 whereby the human appetite
 is subjected even to external things1  
has in a way a greater deformity4       
,since1 however1 corruption or privation
 of good is the formal element in sin1  
while conversion to a mutable good is   
the material element1 the gravity of the
 sin is to be judged from the point of  

view of the good corrupted1 rather than 
from that of the good to which the      
appetite is subjected4 ,hence we must   
assert that covetousness is not simply  
the most grievous of sins4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,these authorities speak of        
covetousness on the part of the good to 
which the appetite is subjected4 ,hence 
7,ecclus4 #aj3aj7 it is given as a      
reason that the covetous man setteth his
 own soul to sale2 because1 to wit1 he  
exposes his soul--that is1 his life--to 
danger for the sake of money4 ,hence the
 text continues3 ,because while he      
liveth he hath cast away--that is1      
despised--his bowels1 in order to make  
money4 ,tully also adds that it is the  
mark of a narrow mind1 namely1 that one 
be willing to be subject to money4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine is taking   
greed generally1 in reference to any    
temporal good1 not in its special       
acceptation for covetousness3 because   
greed for any temporal good is the bane 
of charity1 inasmuch as a man turns away

 from the ,divine good through cleaving 
to a temporal good4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the sin against the ,holy ,ghost is    
incurable in one way1 covetousness in   
another4 ,for the sin against the ,holy 
,ghost is incurable by reason of        
contempt3 for instance1 because a man   
contemns ,god's mercy1 or ,his justice1 
or some one of those things whereby     
man's sins are healed3 wherefore        
incurability of this kind points to the 
greater gravity of the sin4 on the other
 hand1 covetousness is incurable on the 
part of a human defect2 a thing which   
human nature ever seeks to remedy1 since
 the more deficient one is the more one 
seeks relief from external things1 and  
consequently the more one gives way to  
covetousness4 ,hence incurability of    
this kind is an indication not of the   
sin being more grievous1 but of its     
being somewhat more dangerous4  ,reply  
,obj4 #d3 ,covetousness is compared to  
idolatry on account of a certain        
likeness that it bears to it3 because   

the covetous man1 like the idolater1    
subjects himself to an external         
creature1 though not in the same way4   
,for the idolater subjects himself to an
 external creature by paying it ,divine 
honor1 whereas the covetous man subjects
 himself to an external creature by     
desiring it immoderately for use1 not   
for worship4 ,hence it does not follow  
that covetousness is as grievous a sin  
as idolatry4   ,,sixth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #f  ,whether 
,covetousness ,is a ,spiritual ,sin8    
,objection #a3 ,it seems that           
covetousness is not a spiritual sin4    
,for spiritual sins seem to regard      
spiritual goods4 ,but the matter of     
covetousness is bodily goods1 namely1   
external riches4 ,therefore covetousness
 is not a spiritual sin4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 spiritual sin is condivided   
with sin of the flesh4 ,now covetousness
 is seemingly a sin of the flesh1 for it
 results from the corruption of the     
flesh1 as instanced in old people who1  

through corruption of carnal nature1    
fall into covetousness4 ,therefore      
covetousness is not a spiritual sin4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a sin of the flesh  
is one by which man's body is           
disordered1 according to the saying of  
the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #f3ah71 ,he that 
committeth fornication sinneth against  
his own body4 ,now covetousness disturbs
 man even in his body2 wherefore        
,chrysostom 7,hom4 xxix in ,matth47     
compares the covetous man to the man who
 was possessed by the devil 7,mk4 #e7   
and was troubled in body4 ,therefore    
covetousness seems not to be a spiritual
 sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory       
7,moral4 xxxi7 numbers covetousness     
among spiritual vices4  ,i answer that1 
,sins are seated chiefly in the         
affections3 and all the affections or   
passions of the soul have their term in 
pleasure and sorrow1 according to the   
,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #e74 ,now some
 pleasures are carnal and some          
spiritual4 ,carnal pleasures are those  

which are consummated in the carnal     
senses--for instance1 the pleasures of  
the table and sexual pleasures3 while   
spiritual pleasures are those which are 
consummated in the mere apprehension of 
the soul4 ,accordingly1 sins of the     
flesh are those which are consummated in
 carnal pleasures1 while spiritual sins 
are consummated in pleasures of the     
spirit without pleasure of the flesh4   
,such is covetousness3 for the covetous 
man takes pleasure in the consideration 
of himself as a possessor of riches4    
,therefore covetousness is a spiritual  
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,covetousness    
with regard to a bodily object seeks the
 pleasure1 not of the body but only of  
the soul1 forasmuch as a man takes      
pleasure in the fact that he possesses  
riches3 wherefore it is not a sin of the
 flesh4 ,nevertheless by reason of its  
object it is a mean between purely      
spiritual sins1 which seek spiritual    
pleasure in respect of spiritual objects
 7thus pride is about excellence71 and  

purely carnal sins1 which seek a purely 
bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily  
object4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,movement     
takes its species from the term whereto 
and not from the term wherefrom4 ,hence 
a vice of the flesh is so called from   
its tending to a pleasure of the flesh1 
and not from its originating in some    
defect of the flesh4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,chrysostom compares a covetous man to  
the man who was possessed by the devil1 
not that the former is troubled in the  
flesh in the same way as the latter1 but
 by way of contrast1 since while the    
possessed man1 of whom we read in ,mk4  
#e1 stripped himself1 the covetous man  
loads himself with an excess of riches4 
,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aah1
 ,art4 #g  ,whether ,covetousness ,is a 
,capital ,vice8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
seems that covetousness is not a capital
 vice4 ,for covetousness is opposed to  
liberality as the mean1 and to          
prodigality as extreme4 ,but neither is 
liberality a principal virtue1 nor      

prodigality a capital vice4 ,therefore  
covetousness also should not be reckoned
 a capital vice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as
 stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4  
#c1 #d71 those vices are called capital 
which have principal ends1 to which the 
ends of other vices are directed4 ,but  
this does not apply to covetousness3    
since riches have the aspect1 not of an 
end1 but rather of something directed to
 an end1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #e4    
,therefore covetousness is not a capital
 vice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory    
says 7,moral4 xv71 that covetousness    
arises sometimes from pride1 sometimes  
from fear4 ,for there are those who1    
when they think that they lack the      
needful for their expenses1 allow the   
mind to give way to covetousness4 ,and  
there are others who1 wishing to be     
thought more of1 are incited to greed   
for other people's property4 ,therefore 
covetousness arises from other vices    
instead of being a capital vice in      
respect of other vices4  ,on the        

contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi7       
reckons covetousness among the capital  
vices4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated in   
the ,second ,objection1 a capital vice  
is one which under the aspect of end    
gives rise to other vices3 because when 
an end is very desirable1 the result is 
that through desire thereof man sets    
about doing many things either good or  
evil4 ,now the most desirable end is    
happiness or felicity1 which is the last
 end of human life1 as stated above     
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,,aa4 #d1 #g1 #h73    
wherefore the more a thing is furnished 
with the conditions of happiness1 the   
more desirable it is4 ,also one of the  
conditions of happiness is that it be   
self-sufficing1 else it would not set   
man's appetite at rest1 as the last end 
does4 ,now riches give great promise of 
self-sufficiency1 as ,boethius says 7,de
 ,consol4 iii73 the reason of which1    
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
v1 #e71 is that we use money in token of
 taking possession of something1 and    

again it is written 7,eccles4 #aj3ai73  
,all things obey money4 ,therefore      
covetousness1 which is desire for money1
 is a capital vice4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,virtue is perfected in accordance with 
reason1 but vice is perfected in        
accordance with the inclination of the  
sensitive appetite4 ,now reason and     
sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly
 to the same genus1 and consequently it 
does not follow that principal vice is  
opposed to principal virtue4 ,wherefore1
 although liberality is not a principal 
virtue1 since it does not regard the    
principal good of the reason1 yet       
covetousness is a principal vice1       
because it regards money1 which occupies
 a principal place among sensible goods1
 for the reason given in the ,article4  
,on the other hand1 prodigality is not  
directed to an end that is desirable    
principally1 indeed it seems rather to  
result from a lack of reason4 ,hence the
 ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that
 a prodigal man is a fool rather than a 

knave4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is true    
that money is directed to something else
 as its end3 yet in so far as it is     
useful for obtaining all sensible       
things1 it contains1 in a way1 all      
things virtually4 ,hence it has a       
certain likeness to happiness1 as stated
 in the ,article4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,nothing prevents a capital vice from   
arising sometimes out of other vices1 as
 stated above 7,q4 #cf1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a2  
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #d71 provided that
 itself be frequently the source of     
others4   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #h  ,whether ,treachery1
 ,fraud1 ,falsehood1 ,perjury1          
,restlessness1 ,violence1 and           
,insensibility to ,mercy ,are ,daughters
 of ,covetousness8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
seems that the daughters of covetousness
 are not as commonly stated1 namely1    
treachery1 fraud1 falsehood1 perjury1   
restlessness1 violence1 and             
insensibility to mercy4 ,for            
covetousness is opposed to liberality1  

as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,now          
treachery1 fraud1 and falsehood are     
opposed to prudence1 perjury to         
religion1 restlessness to hope1 or to   
charity which rests in the beloved      
object1 violence to justice1            
insensibility to mercy4 ,therefore these
 vices have no connection with          
covetousness4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      
treachery1 fraud and falsehood seem to  
pertain to the same thing1 namely1 the  
deceiving of one's neighbor4 ,therefore 
they should not be reckoned as different
 daughters of covetousness4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 ,isidore 7,comment4 in ,deut47
 enumerates nine daughters of           
covetousness2 which are lying1 fraud1   
theft1 perjury1 greed of filthy lucre1  
false witnessing1 violence1 inhumanity1 
rapacity4 ,therefore the former         
reckoning of daughters is insufficient4 
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,philosopher    
7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 mentions many kinds of 
vices as belonging to covetousness which
 he calls illiberality1 for he speaks of

 those who are sparing1 tight-fisted1   
skinflints 99kyminopristes1 misers      
99kimbikes1 who do illiberal deeds1 and 
of those who batten on whoredom1        
usurers1 gamblers1 despoilers of the    
dead1 and robbers4 ,therefore it seems  
that the aforesaid enumeration is       
insufficient4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1      
tyrants use much violence against their 
subjects4 ,but the ,philosopher says    
7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that tyrants who       
destroy cities and despoil sacred places
 are not to be called illiberal1 i4e4   
covetous4 ,therefore violence should not
 be reckoned a daughter of covetousness4
  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4   
xxxi7 assigns to covetousness the       
daughters mentioned above4  ,i answer   
that1 ,the daughters of covetousness are
 the vices which arise therefrom1       
especially in respect of the desire of  
an end4 ,now since covetousness is      
excessive love of possessing riches1 it 
exceeds in two things4 ,for in the first
 place it exceeds in retaining1 and in  

this respect covetousness gives rise to 
insensibility to mercy1 because1 to wit1
 a man's heart is not softened by mercy 
to assist the needy with his riches     
99,see ,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #a4 ,in the second  
place it belongs to covetousness to     
exceed in receiving1 and in this respect
 covetousness may be considered in two  
ways4 ,first as in the thought          
7affectu74 ,in this way it gives rise to
 restlessness1 by hindering man with    
excessive anxiety and care1 for a       
covetous man shall not be satisfied with
 money 7,eccles4 #e3i74 ,secondly1 it   
may be considered in the execution      
7effectu74 ,in this way the covetous    
man1 in acquiring other people's goods1 
sometimes employs force1 which pertains 
to violence1 sometimes deceit1 and then 
if he has recourse to words1 it is      
falsehood1 if it be mere words1 perjury 
if he confirm his statement by oath2 if 
he has recourse to deeds1 and the deceit
 affects things1 we have fraud2 if      
persons1 then we have treachery1 as in  

the case of ,judas1 who betrayed ,christ
 through covetousness4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,there is no need for the daughters of 
a capital sin to belong to that same    
kind of vice3 because a sin of one kind 
allows of sins even of a different kind 
being directed to its end2 seeing that  
it is one thing for a sin to have       
daughters1 and another for it to have   
species4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,these three 
are distinguished as stated in the      
,article4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these nine 
are reducible to the seven aforesaid4   
,for lying and false witnessing are     
comprised under falsehood1 since false  
witnessing is a special kind of lie1    
just as theft is a special kind of      
fraud1 wherefore it is comprised under  
fraud2 and greed of filthy lucre belongs
 to restlessness2 rapacity is comprised 
under violence1 since it is a species   
thereof2 and inhumanity is the same as  
insensibility to mercy4  ,reply ,obj4   
#d3 ,the vices mentioned by ,aristotle  
are species rather than daughters of    

illiberality or covetousness4 ,for a man
 may be said to be illiberal or covetous
 through a defect in giving4 ,if he     
gives but little he is said to be       
sparing2 if nothing1 he is tightfisted3 
if he gives with great reluctance1 he is
 said to be kyminopristes 7skinflint71 a
 cumin-seller1 as it were1 because he   
makes a great fuss about things of      
little value4 ,sometimes a man is said  
to be illiberal or covetous1 through an 
excess in receiving1 and this in two    
ways4 ,in one way1 through making money 
by disgraceful means1 whether in        
performing shameful and servile works by
 means of illiberal practices1 or by    
acquiring more through sinful deeds1    
such as whoredom or the like1 or by     
making a profit where one ought to have 
given gratis1 as in the case of usury1  
or by laboring much to make little      
profit4 ,in another way1 in making money
 by unjust means1 whether by using      
violence on the living1 as robbers do1  
or by despoiling the dead1 or by preying

 on one's friends1 as gamblers do4      
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,just as liberality is 
about moderate sums of money1 so is     
illiberality4 ,wherefore tyrants who    
take great things by violence1 are said 
to be1 not illiberal1 but unjust4       
,,question #aai  ,,of ,,prodigality 7,in
 ,three ,articles7  ,we must now        
consider prodigality1 under which head  
there are three points of inquiry3  7#a7
 ,whether prodigality is opposite to    
covetousness8  7#b7 ,whether prodigality
 is a sin8  7#c7 ,whether it is a graver
 sin that covetousness8   ,,first       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aai1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,prodigality ,is ,opposite to  
,covetousness8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems
 that prodigality is not opposite to    
covetousness4 ,for opposites cannot be  
together in the same subject4 ,but some 
are at the same time prodigal and       
covetous4 ,therefore prodigality is not 
opposite to covetousness4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 opposites relate to one same  
thing4 ,but covetousness1 as opposed to 

liberality1 relates to certain passions 
whereby man is affected towards money3  
whereas prodigality does not seem to    
relate to any passions of the soul1     
since it is not affected towards money1 
or to anything else of the kind4        
,therefore prodigality is not opposite  
to covetousness4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
sin takes its species chiefly from its  
end1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 
,a4 #c74 ,now prodigality seems always  
to be directed to some unlawful end1 for
 the sake of which the prodigal         
squanders his goods4 ,especially is it  
directed to pleasures1 wherefore it is  
stated 7,luke #ae3ac7 of the prodigal   
son that he wasted his substance living 
riotously4 ,therefore it seems that     
prodigality is opposed to temperance and
 insensibility rather than to           
covetousness and liberality4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iv1 #a7 that           
prodigality is opposed to liberality1   
and illiberality1 to which we give here 

the name of covetousness4  ,i answer    
that1 ,in morals vices are opposed to   
one another and to virtue in respect of 
excess and deficiency4 ,now covetousness
 and prodigality differ variously in    
respect of excess and deficiency4 ,thus1
 as regards affection for riches1 the   
covetous man exceeds by loving them more
 than he ought1 while the prodigal is   
deficient1 by being less careful of them
 than he ought3 and as regards external 
action1 prodigality implies excess in   
giving1 but deficiency in retaining and 
acquiring1 while covetousness1 on the   
contrary1 denotes deficiency in giving1 
but excess in acquiring and retaining4  
,hence it is evident that prodigality is
 opposed to covetousness4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,nothing prevents opposites from    
being in the same subject in different  
respects4 ,for a thing is denominated   
more from what is in it principally4    
,now just as in liberality1 which       
observes the mean1 the principal thing  
is giving1 to which receiving and       

retaining are subordinate1 so1 too1     
covetousness and prodigality regard     
principally giving4 ,wherefore he who   
exceeds in giving is said to be         
prodigal1 while he who is deficient in  
giving is said to be covetous4 ,now it  
happens sometimes that a man is         
deficient in giving1 without exceeding  
in receiving1 as the ,philosopher       
observes 7,ethic4 iv1 #a74 ,and in like 
manner it happens sometimes that a man  
exceeds in giving1 and therefore is     
prodigal1 and yet at the same time      
exceeds in receiving4 ,this may be due  
either to some kind of necessity1 since 
while exceeding in giving he is lacking 
in goods of his own1 so that he is      
driven to acquire unduly1 and this      
pertains to covetousness2 or it may be  
due to inordinateness of the mind1 for  
he gives not for a good purpose1 but1 as
 though despising virtue1 cares not     
whence or how he receives4 ,wherefore he
 is prodigal and covetous in different  
respects4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,prodigality

 regards passions in respect of money1  
not as exceeding1 but as deficient in   
them4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the prodigal   
does not always exceed in giving for the
 sake of pleasures which are the matter 
of temperance1 but sometimes through    
being so disposed as not to care about  
riches1 and sometimes on account of     
something else4 ,more frequently1       
however1 he inclines to intemperance1   
both because through spending too much  
on other things he becomes fearless of  
spending on objects of pleasure1 to     
which the concupiscence of the flesh is 
more prone2 and because through taking  
no pleasure in virtuous goods1 he seeks 
for himself pleasures of the body4      
,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4   
iv1 #a7 that many a prodigal ends in    
becoming intemperate4   ,,second        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aai1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,prodigality ,is a ,sin8       
,objection #a3 ,it seems that           
prodigality is not a sin4 ,for the      
,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #f3aj73         

,covetousness ,douay3 'desire of money' 
is the root of all evils4 ,but it is not
 the root of prodigality1 since this is 
opposed to it4 ,therefore prodigality is
 not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the    
,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #f3ag1 #ah73    
,charge the rich of this world 4 4 4 to 
give easily1 to communicate to others4  
,now this is especially what prodigal   
persons do4 ,therefore prodigality is   
not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it      
belongs to prodigality to exceed in     
giving and to be deficient in solicitude
 about riches4 ,but this is most        
becoming to the perfect1 who fulfil the 
words of ,our ,lord 7,matt4 #f3cd71 ,be 
not 4 4 4 solicitous for tomorrow1 and  
7,matt4 #ai3ba71 ,sell all ,vulg43      
'what' thou hast1 and give to the poor4 
,therefore prodigality is not a sin4    
,on the contrary1 ,the prodigal son is  
held to blame for his prodigality4  ,i  
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 
the opposition between prodigality and  
covetousness is one of excess and       

deficiency2 either of which destroys the
 mean of virtue4 ,now a thing is vicious
 and sinful through corrupting the good 
of virtue4 ,hence it follows that       
prodigality is a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,some expound this saying of the        
,apostle as referring1 not to actual    
covetousness1 but to a kind of habitual 
covetousness1 which is the concupiscence
 of the fomes 99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1  
,a4 #c1 ad #b1 whence all sins arise4   
,others say that he is speaking of a    
general covetousness with regard to any 
kind of good3 and in this sense also it 
is evident that prodigality arises from 
covetousness2 since the prodigal seeks  
to acquire some temporal good           
inordinately1 namely1 to give pleasure  
to others1 or at least to satisfy his   
own will in giving4 ,but to one that    
reviews the passage correctly1 it is    
evident that the ,apostle is speaking   
literally of the desire of riches1 for  
he had said previously 7#a ,tim4 #f3i73 
,they that will become rich1 etc4 ,in   

this sense covetousness is said to be   
the root of all evils1 not that all     
evils always arise from covetousness1   
but because there is no evil that does  
not at some time arise from             
covetousness4 ,wherefore prodigality    
sometimes is born of covetousness1 as   
when a man is prodigal in going to great
 expense in order to curry favor with   
certain persons from whom he may receive
 riches4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,apostle
 bids the rich to be ready to give and  
communicate their riches1 according as  
they ought4 ,the prodigal does not do   
this3 since1 as the ,philosopher remarks
 7,ethic4 iv1 #a71 his giving is neither
 good1 nor for a good end1 nor according
 as it ought to be4 ,for sometimes they 
give much to those who ought to be poor1
 namely1 to buffoons and flatterers1    
whereas to the good they give nothing4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the excess in         
prodigality consists chiefly1 not in the
 total amount given1 but in the amount  
over and above what ought to be given4  

,hence sometimes the liberal man gives  
more than the prodigal man1 if it be    
necessary4 ,accordingly we must reply   
that those who give all their           
possessions with the intention of       
following ,christ1 and banish from their
 minds all solicitude for temporal      
things1 are not prodigal but perfectly  
liberal4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #aai1 ,art4 #c  ,whether            
,prodigality ,is a ,more ,grievous ,sin 
,than ,covetousness8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 seems that prodigality is a more       
grievous sin than covetousness4 ,for by 
covetousness a man injures his neighbor 
by not communicating his goods to him1  
whereas by prodigality a man injures    
himself1 because the ,philosopher says  
7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that the wasting of    
riches1 which are the means whereby a   
man lives1 is an undoing of his very    
being4 ,now he that injures himself sins
 more grievously1 according to ,ecclus4 
#ad3e1 ,he that is evil to himself1 to  
whom will he be good8 ,therefore        

prodigality is a more grievous sin than 
covetousness4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a    
disorder that is accompanied by a       
laudable circumstance is less sinful4   
,now the disorder of covetousness is    
sometimes accompanied by a laudable     
circumstance1 as in the case of those   
who are unwilling to spend their own1   
lest they be driven to accept from      
others3 whereas the disorder of         
prodigality is accompanied by a         
circumstance that calls for blame1      
inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality to   
those who are intemperate1 as the       
,philosopher observes 7,ethic4 iv1 #a74 
,therefore prodigality is a more        
grievous sin than covetousness4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 prudence is chief among   
the moral virtues1 as stated above 7,q4 
#ef1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1   
,a4 #b1 ad #a74 ,now prodigality is more
 opposed to prudence than covetousness  
is3 for it is written 7,prov4 #ba3bj73  
,there is a treasure to be desired1 and 
oil in the dwelling of the just2 and the

 foolish man shall spend it3 and the    
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #f7 that 
it is the mark of a fool to give too    
much and receive nothing4 ,therefore    
prodigality is a more grievous sin than 
covetousness4  ,on the contrary1 ,the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #f7 that 
the prodigal seems to be much better    
than the illiberal man4  ,i answer that1
 ,prodigality considered in itself is a 
less grievous sin than covetousness1 and
 this for three reasons4 ,first1 because
 covetousness differs more from the     
opposite virtue3 since giving1 wherein  
the prodigal exceeds1 belongs to        
liberality more than receiving or       
retaining1 wherein the covetous man     
exceeds4 ,secondly1 because the prodigal
 man is of use to the many to whom he   
gives1 while the covetous man is of use 
to no one1 not even to himself1 as      
stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #f4 ,thirdly1     
because prodigality is easily cured4    
,for not only is the prodigal on the way
 to old age1 which is opposed to        

prodigality1 but he is easily reduced to
 a state of want1 since much useless    
spending impoverishes him and makes him 
unable to exceed in giving4 ,moreover1  
prodigality is easily turned into virtue
 on account of its likeness thereto4 ,on
 the other hand1 the covetous man is not
 easily cured1 for the reason given     
above 7,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #e1 ad #c74  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,the difference between the  
prodigal and the covetous man is not    
that the former sins against himself and
 the latter against another4 ,for the   
prodigal sins against himself by        
spending that which is his1 and his     
means of support1 and against others by 
spending the wherewithal to help others4
 ,this applies chiefly to the clergy1   
who are the dispensers of the ,church's 
goods1 that belong to the poor whom they
 defraud by their prodigal expenditure4 
,in like manner the covetous man sins   
against others1 by being deficient in   
giving2 and he sins against himself1    
through deficiency in spending3         

wherefore it is written 7,eccles4 #f3b73
 ,a man to whom ,god hath given riches 4
 4 4 yet doth not give him the power to 
eat thereof4 ,nevertheless the prodigal 
man exceeds in this1 that he injures    
both himself and others yet so as to    
profit some2 whereas the covetous man   
profits neither others nor himself1     
since he does not even use his own goods
 for his own profit4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,in speaking of vices in general1 we    
judge of them according to their        
respective natures3 thus1 with regard to
 prodigality we note that it consumes   
riches to excess1 and with regard to    
covetousness that it retains them to    
excess4 ,that one spend too much for the
 sake of intemperance points already to 
several additional sins1 wherefore the  
prodigal of this kind is worse1 as      
stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #a4 ,that an      
illiberal or covetous man refrain from  
taking what belongs to others1 although 
this appears in itself to call for      
praise1 yet on account of the motive for

 which he does so it calls for blame1   
since he is unwilling to accept from    
others lest he be forced to give to     
others4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all vices are
 opposed to prudence1 even as all       
virtues are directed by prudence3       
wherefore if a vice be opposed to       
prudence alone1 for this very reason it 
is deemed less grievous4   ,,question   
#abj  ,,of ,,epikeia ,,or ,,equity 7,in 
,two ,articles7  ,we must now consider  
epikeia1 under which head there are two 
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
epikeia is a virtue8  7#b7 ,whether it  
is a part of justice8   ,,first         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abj1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,epikeia 99,epieikeia ,is a    
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that 
epikeia is not a virtue4 ,for no virtue 
does away with another virtue4 ,yet     
epikeia does away with another virtue1  
since it sets aside that which is just  
according to law1 and seemingly is      
opposed to severity4 ,therefore epikeia 
is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   

,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4      
xxxi73 ,with regard to these earthly    
laws1 although men pass judgment on them
 when they make them1 yet1 when once    
they are made and established1 the judge
 must pronounce judgment not on them but
 according to them4 ,but seemingly      
epikeia pronounces judgment on the law1 
when it deems that the law should not be
 observed in some particular case4      
,therefore epikeia is a vice rather than
 a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1         
apparently it belongs to epikeia to     
consider the intention of the lawgiver1 
as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 v1  
#aj74 ,but it belongs to the sovereign  
alone to interpret the intention of the 
lawgiver1 wherefore the ,emperor says in
 the ,codex of ,laws and ,constitutions1
 under ,law i3 ,it is fitting and lawful
 that ,we alone should interpret between
 equity and law4 ,therefore the act of  
epikeia is unlawful3 and consequently   
epikeia is not a virtue4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 

#aj7 states it to be a virtue4  ,i      
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #if1 ,a4 #f71 when we were treating 
of laws1 since human actions1 with which
 laws are concerned1 are composed of    
contingent singulars and are innumerable
 in their diversity1 it was not possible
 to lay down rules of law that would    
apply to every single case4 ,legislators
 in framing laws attend to what commonly
 happens3 although if the law be applied
 to certain cases it will frustrate the 
equality of justice and be injurious to 
the common good1 which the law has in   
view4 ,thus the law requires deposits to
 be restored1 because in the majority of
 cases this is just4 ,yet it happens    
sometimes to be injurious--for instance1
 if a madman were to put his sword in   
deposit1 and demand its delivery while  
in a state of madness1 or if a man were 
to seek the return of his deposit in    
order to fight against his country4 ,in 
these and like cases it is bad to follow
 the law1 and it is good to set aside   

the letter of the law and to follow the 
dictates of justice and the common good4
 ,this is the object of epikeia which we
 call equity4 ,therefore it is evident  
that epikeia is a virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,epikeia does not set aside that    
which is just in itself but that which  
is just as by law established4 ,nor is  
it opposed to severity1 which follows   
the letter of the law when it ought to  
be followed4 ,to follow the letter of   
the law when it ought not to be followed
 is sinful4 ,hence it is written in the 
,codex of ,laws and ,constitutions under
 ,law v3 ,without doubt he transgresses 
the law who by adhering to the letter of
 the law strives to defeat the intention
 of the lawgiver4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it 
would be passing judgment on a law to   
say that it was not well made2 but to   
say that the letter of the law is not to
 be observed in some particular case is 
passing judgment not on the law1 but on 
some particular contingency4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,interpretation is admissible 

in doubtful cases where it is not       
allowed to set aside the letter of the  
law without the interpretation of the   
sovereign4 ,but when the case is        
manifest there is need1 not of          
interpretation1 but of execution4       
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abj1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,epikeia ,is a ,part 
of ,justice8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems  
that epikeia is not a part of justice4  
,for1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #g71
 justice is twofold1 particular and     
legal4 ,now epikeia is not a part of    
particular justice1 since it extends to 
all virtues1 even as legal justice does4
 ,in like manner1 neither is it a part  
of legal justice1 since its operation is
 beside that which is established by    
law4 ,therefore it seems that epikeia is
 not a part of justice4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 a more principal virtue is not
 assigned as the part of a less         
principal virtue3 for it is to the      
cardinal virtue1 as being principal1    
that secondary virtues are assigned as  

parts4 ,now epikeia seems to be a more  
principal virtue than justice1 as       
implied by its name3 for it is derived  
from epi1 i4e4 above1 and dikaion1 i4e4 
just4 ,therefore epikeia is not a part  
of justice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it     
seems that epikeia is the same as       
modesty4 ,for where the ,apostle says   
7,phil4 #d3e71 ,let your modesty be     
known to all men1 the ,greek has        
epieikeia 99to epieikes4 ,now1 according
 to ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii71    
modesty is a part of temperance4        
,therefore epikeia is not a part of     
justice4  ,on the contrary1 ,the        
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #aj7 that 
epikeia is a kind of justice4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #dh71 a    
virtue has three kinds of parts1        
subjective1 integral1 and potential4 ,a 
subjective part is one of which the     
whole is predicated essentially1 and it 
is less than the whole4 ,this may happen
 in two ways4 ,for sometimes one thing  
is predicated of many in one common     

ratio1 as animal of horse and ox3 and   
sometimes one thing is predicated of    
many according to priority and          
posteriority1 as being of substance and 
accident4  ,accordingly1 epikeia is a   
part of justice taken in a general      
sense1 for it is a kind of justice1 as  
the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 v1     
#aj74 ,wherefore it is evident that     
epikeia is a subjective part of justice2
 and justice is predicated of it with   
priority to being predicated of legal   
justice1 since legal justice is subject 
to the direction of epikeia4 ,hence     
epikeia is by way of being a higher rule
 of human actions4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,epikeia corresponds properly to legal  
justice1 and in one way is contained    
under it1 and in another way exceeds it4
 ,for if legal justice denotes that     
which complies with the law1 whether as 
regards the letter of the law1 or as    
regards the intention of the lawgiver1  
which is of more account1 then epikeia  
is the more important part of legal     

justice4 ,but if legal justice denote   
merely that which complies with the law 
with regard to the letter1 then epikeia 
is a part not of legal justice but of   
justice in its general acceptation1 and 
is condivided with legal justice1 as    
exceeding it4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the 
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 v1 #aj71   
epikeia is better than a certain1       
namely1 legal1 justice1 which observes  
the letter of the law3 yet since it is  
itself a kind of justice1 it is not     
better than all justice4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,it belongs to epikeia to moderate  
something1 namely1 the observance of the
 letter of the law4 ,but modesty1 which 
is reckoned a part of temperance1       
moderates man's outward life--for       
instance1 in his deportment1 dress or   
the like4 ,possibly also the term       
epieikeia is applied in ,greek by a     
similitude to all kinds of moderation4  
,,question #aba  ,,of ,,piety 7,in ,two 
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
gift that corresponds to justice2       

namely1 piety4 ,under this head there   
are two points of inquiry3  7#a7        
,whether it is a gift of the ,holy      
,ghost8  7#b7 ,which of the beatitudes  
and fruits corresponds to it8   ,,first 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aba1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,piety ,is a ,gift8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it seems that piety is not a gift4
 ,for the gifts differ from the virtues1
 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 
#a74 ,but piety is a virtue1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore    
piety is not a gift4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 the gifts are more excellent  
than the virtues1 above all the moral   
virtues1 as above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4
 #h74 ,now among the parts of justice   
religion is greater than piety4         
,therefore if any part of justice is to 
be accounted a gift1 it seems that      
religion should be a gift rather than   
piety4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the gifts   
and their acts remain in heaven1 as     
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #f74
 ,but the act of piety cannot remain in 

heaven3 for ,gregory says 7,moral4 i7   
that piety fills the inmost recesses of 
the heart with works of mercy3 and so   
there will be no piety in heaven since  
there will be no unhappiness 99,cf4 ,q4 
#cj1 ,a4 #a4 ,therefore piety is not a  
gift4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is reckoned
 among the gifts in the eleventh chapter
 of ,isaias 7verse #b7 ,douay3 godliness
 99,pietas1 whence our ,english word    
pity1 which is the same as mercy4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #fi1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c71
 the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are      
habitual dispositions of the soul1      
rendering it amenable to the motion of  
the ,holy ,ghost4 ,now the ,holy ,ghost 
moves us to this effect among others1 of
 having a filial affection towards ,god1
 according to ,rom4 #h3ae1 ,you have    
received the spirit of adoption of sons1
 whereby we cry3 ,abba 7,father74 ,and  
since it belongs properly to piety to   
pay duty and worship to one's father1 it
 follows that piety1 whereby1 at the    

,holy ,ghost's instigation1 we pay      
worship and duty to ,god as our ,father1
 is a gift of the ,holy ,ghost4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,the piety that pays duty and 
worship to a father in the flesh is a   
virtue3 but the piety that is a gift    
pays this to ,god as ,father4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,to pay worship to ,god as    
,creator1 as religion does1 is more     
excellent than to pay worship to one's  
father in the flesh1 as the piety that  
is a virtue does4 ,but to pay worship to
 ,god as ,father is yet more excellent  
than to pay worship to ,god as ,creator 
and ,lord4 ,wherefore religion is       
greater than the virtue of piety3 while 
the gift of piety is greater than       
religion4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as by the  
virtue of piety man pays duty and       
worship not only to his father in the   
flesh1 but also to all his kindred on   
account of their being related to his   
father1 so by the gift of piety he pays 
worship and duty not only to ,god1 but  
also to all men on account of their     

relationship to ,god4 ,hence it belongs 
to piety to honor the saints1 and not to
 contradict the ,scriptures whether one 
understands them or not1 as ,augustine  
says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii74         
,consequently it also assists those who 
are in a state of unhappiness4 ,and     
although this act has no place in       
heaven1 especially after the ,day of    
,judgment1 yet piety will exercise its  
principal act1 which is to revere ,god  
with filial affection3 for it is then   
above all that this act will be         
fulfilled1 according to ,wis4 #e3e1     
,behold how they are numbered among the 
children of ,god4 ,the saints will also 
mutually honor one another4 ,now1       
however1 before the ,judgment ,day1 the 
saints have pity on those also who are  
living in this unhappy state4   ,,second
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aba1 ,art4 #b
  ,whether the ,second ,beatitude1      
,blessed ,are the ,meek1 ,corresponds to
 the ,gift of ,piety8  ,objection #a3   
,it seems that the second beatitude1    

,blessed are the meek1 does not         
correspond to the gift of piety4 ,for   
piety is the gift corresponding to      
justice1 to which rather belongs the    
fourth beatitude1 ,blessed are they that
 hunger and thirst after justice1 or the
 fifth beatitude1 ,blessed are the      
merciful1 since as stated above 7,a4 #a1
 ,obj4 #c71 the works of mercy belong to
 piety4 ,therefore the second beatitude 
does not pertain to the gift of piety4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the gift of piety is
 directed by the gift of knowledge1     
which is united to it in the enumeration
 of the gifts 7,isa4 #aa74 ,now         
direction and execution extend to the   
same matter4 ,since1 then1 the third    
beatitude1 ,blessed are they that mourn1
 corresponds to the gift of knowledge1  
it seems that the second beatitude      
corresponds to piety4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 the fruits correspond to the  
beatitudes and gifts1 as stated above   
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1 ,a4 #b74 ,now among  
the fruits1 goodness and benignity seem 

to agree with piety rather than         
mildness1 which pertains to meekness4   
,therefore the second beatitude does not
 correspond to the gift of piety4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de      
,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i73 ,piety is    
becoming to the meek4  ,i answer that1  
,in adapting the beatitudes to the gifts
 a twofold congruity may be observed4   
,one is according to the order in which 
they are given1 and ,augustine seems to 
have followed this3 wherefore he assigns
 the first beatitude to the lowest gift1
 namely1 fear1 and the second beatitude1
 ,blessed are the meek1 to piety1 and so
 on4 ,another congruity may be observed 
in keeping with the special nature of   
each gift and beatitude4 ,in this way   
one must adapt the beatitudes to the    
gifts according to their objects and    
acts3 and thus the fourth and fifth     
beatitudes would correspond to piety1   
rather than the second4 ,yet the second 
beatitude has a certain congruity with  
piety1 inasmuch as meekness removes the 

obstacles to acts of piety4  ,this      
suffices for the ,reply to the ,first   
,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,taking   
the beatitudes and gifts according to   
their proper natures1 the same beatitude
 must needs correspond to knowledge and 
piety3 but taking them according to     
their order1 different beatitudes       
correspond to them1 although a certain  
congruity may be observed1 as stated    
above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the fruits 
goodness and benignity may be directly  
ascribed to piety2 and mildness         
indirectly in so far as it removes      
obstacles to acts of piety1 as stated   
above4   ,,question #abb  ,,of ,,the    
,,precepts ,,of ,,justice 7,in ,six     
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
precepts of justice1 under which head   
there are six points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether the precepts of the decalogue  
are precepts of justice8  7#b7 ,of the  
first precept of the decalogue2  7#c7   
,of the second2  7#d7 ,of the third2    
7#e7 ,of the fourth2  7#f7 ,of the other

 six4   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #abb1 ,art4 #a  ,whether the ,precepts 
of the ,decalogue ,are ,precepts of     
,justice8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that
 the precepts of the decalogue are not  
precepts of justice4 ,for the intention 
of a lawgiver is to make the citizens   
virtuous in respect of every virtue1 as 
stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #a4 ,wherefore1   
according to ,ethic4 v1 #a1 the law     
prescribes about all acts of all        
virtues4 ,now the precepts of the       
decalogue are the first principles of   
the whole ,divine ,law4 ,therefore the  
precepts of the decalogue do not pertain
 to justice alone4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
it would seem that to justice belong    
especially the judicial precepts1 which 
are condivided with the moral precepts1 
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,a4  
#d74 ,but the precepts of the decalogue 
are moral precepts1 as stated above     
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore 
the precepts of the decalogue are not   
precepts of justice4  ,obj4 #c3         

,further1 the ,law contains chiefly     
precepts about acts of justice regarding
 the common good1 for instance about    
public officers and the like4 ,but there
 is no mention of these in the precepts 
of the decalogue4 ,therefore it seems   
that the precepts of the decalogue do   
not properly belong to justice4  ,obj4  
#d3 ,further1 the precepts of the       
decalogue are divided into two tables1  
corresponding to the love of ,god and   
the love of our neighbor1 both of which 
regard the virtue of charity4 ,therefore
 the precepts of the decalogue belong to
 charity rather than to justice4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,seemingly justice is the 
sole virtue whereby we are directed to  
another4 ,now we are directed to another
 by all the precepts of the decalogue1  
as is evident if one consider each of   
them4 ,therefore all the precepts of the
 decalogue pertain to justice4  ,i      
answer that1 ,the precepts of the       
decalogue are the first principles of   
the ,law3 and the natural reason assents

 to them at once1 as to principles that 
are most evident4 ,now it is altogether 
evident that the notion of duty1 which  
is essential to a precept1 appears in   
justice1 which is of one towards        
another4 ,because in those matters that 
relate to himself it would seem at a    
glance that man is master of himself1   
and that he may do as he likes3 whereas 
in matters that refer to another it     
appears manifestly that a man is under  
obligation to render to another that    
which is his due4 ,hence the precepts of
 the decalogue must needs pertain to    
justice4 ,wherefore the first three     
precepts are about acts of religion1    
which is the chief part of justice2 the 
fourth precept is about acts of piety1  
which is the second part of justice2 and
 the six remaining are about justice    
commonly so called1 which is observed   
among equals4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the    
intention of the law is to make all men 
virtuous1 but in a certain order1       
namely1 by first of all giving them     

precepts about those things where the   
notion of duty is most manifest1 as     
stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the    
judicial precepts are determinations of 
the moral precepts1 in so far as these  
are directed to one's neighbor1 just as 
the ceremonial precepts are             
determinations of the moral precepts in 
so far as these are directed to ,god4   
,hence neither precepts are contained in
 the decalogue3 and yet they are        
determinations of the precepts of the   
decalogue1 and therefore pertain to     
justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,things that 
concern the common good must needs be   
administered in different ways according
 to the difference of men4 ,hence they  
were to be given a place not among the  
precepts of the decalogue1 but among the
 judicial precepts4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3   
,the precepts of the decalogue pertain  
to charity as their end1 according to #a
 ,tim4 #a3e1 ,the end of the commandment
 is charity3 but they belong to justice1
 inasmuch as they refer immediately to  

acts of justice4   ,,second ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abb1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
the ,first ,precept of the ,decalogue   
,is ,fittingly ,expressed8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it seems that the first precept of 
the decalogue is unfittingly expressed4 
,for man is more bound to ,god than to  
his father in the flesh1 according to   
,heb4 #ab3i1 ,how much more shall we    
,vulg43 'shall we not much more' obey   
the ,father of spirits and live8 ,now   
the precept of piety1 whereby man honors
 his father1 is expressed affirmatively 
in these words3 ,honor thy father and   
thy mother4 ,much more1 therefore1      
should the first precept of religion1   
whereby all honor ,god1 be expressed    
affirmatively1 especially as affirmation
 is naturally prior to negation4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 the first precept of the  
decalogue pertains to religion1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now religion1   
since it is one virtue1 has one act4    
,yet in the first precept three acts are
 forbidden3 since we read first3 ,thou  

shalt not have strange gods before ,me2 
secondly1 ,thou shalt not make to       
thyself any graven thing2 and thirdly1  
,thou shalt not adore them nor serve    
them4 ,therefore the first precept is   
unfittingly expressed4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 ,augustine says 7,de decem    
chord4 ix7 that the first precept       
forbids the sin of superstition4 ,but   
there are many wicked superstitions     
besides idolatry1 as stated above 7,q4  
#ib1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore it was         
insufficient to forbid idolatry alone4  
,on the contrary1 stands the authority  
of ,scripture4  ,i answer that1 ,it     
pertains to law to make men good1       
wherefore it behooved the precepts of   
the ,law to be set in order according to
 the order of generation1 the order1 to 
wit1 of man's becoming good4 ,now two   
things must be observed in the order of 
generation4 ,the first is that the first
 part is the first thing to be          
established2 thus in the generation of  
an animal the first thing to be formed  

is the heart1 and in building a home the
 first thing to be set up is the        
foundation3 and in the goodness of the  
soul the first part is goodness of the  
will1 the result of which is that a man 
makes good use of every other goodness4 
,now the goodness of the will depends on
 its object1 which is its end4          
,wherefore since man was to be directed 
to virtue by means of the ,law1 the     
first thing necessary was1 as it were1  
to lay the foundation of religion1      
whereby man is duly directed to ,god1   
,who is the last end of man's will4     
,the second thing to be observed in the 
order of generation is that in the first
 place contraries and obstacles have to 
be removed4 ,thus the farmer first      
purifies the soil1 and afterwards sows  
his seed1 according to ,jer4 #d3c1      
,break up anew your fallow ground1 and  
sow not upon thorns4 ,hence it behooved 
man1 first of all to be instructed in   
religion1 so as to remove the obstacles 
to true religion4 ,now the chief        

obstacle to religion is for man to      
adhere to a false god1 according to     
,matt4 #f3bd1 ,you cannot serve ,god and
 mammon4 ,therefore in the first precept
 of the ,law the worship of false gods  
is excluded4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in point
 of fact there is one affirmative       
precept about religion1 namely3         
,remember that thou keep holy the       
,sabbath ,day4 ,still the negative      
precepts had to be given first1 so that 
by their means the obstacles to religion
 might be removed4 ,for though          
affirmation naturally precedes negation1
 yet in the process of generation1      
negation1 whereby obstacles are removed1
 comes first1 as stated in the ,article4
 ,especially is this true in matters    
concerning ,god1 where negation is      
preferable to affirmation1 on account of
 our insufficiency1 as ,dionysius       
observes 7,coel4 ,hier4 ii74  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,people worshiped strange gods
 in two ways4 ,for some served certain  
creatures as gods without having        

recourse to images4 ,hence ,varro says  
that for a long time the ancient ,romans
 worshiped gods without using images3   
and this worship is first forbidden by  
the words1 ,thou shalt not have strange 
gods4 ,among others the worship of false
 gods was observed by using certain     
images3 and so the very making of images
 was fittingly forbidden by the words1  
,thou shalt not make to thyself any     
graven thing1 as also the worship of    
those same images1 by the words1 ,thou  
shalt not adore them1 etc4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,all other kinds of superstition   
proceed from some compact1 tacit or     
explicit1 with the demons2 hence all are
 understood to be forbidden by the      
words1 ,thou shalt not have strange     
gods4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #abb1 ,art4 #c  ,whether the ,second   
,precept of the ,decalogue ,is          
,fittingly ,expressed8  ,objection #a3  
,it seems that the second precept of the
 decalogue is unfittingly expressed4    
,for this precept1 ,thou shalt not take 

the name of thy ,god in vain is thus    
explained by a gloss on ,ex4 #bj3g3     
,thou shalt not deem the ,son of ,god to
 be a creature1 so that it forbids an   
error against faith4 ,again1 a gloss on 
the words of ,deut4 #e3aa1 ,thou shalt  
not take the name of 4 4 4 thy ,god in  
vain1 adds1 i4e4 by giving the name of  
,god to wood or stone1 as though they   
forbade a false confession of faith1    
which1 like error1 is an act of         
unbelief4 ,now unbelief precedes        
superstition1 as faith precedes         
religion4 ,therefore this precept should
 have preceded the first1 whereby       
superstition is forbidden4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 the name of ,god is taken for 
many purposes--for instance1 those of   
praise1 of working miracles1 and        
generally speaking in conjunction with  
all we say or do1 according to ,col4    
#c3ag1 ,all whatsoever you do in word or
 in work 4 4 4 do ye in the name of the 
,lord4 ,therefore the precept forbidding
 the taking of ,god's name in vain seems

 to be more universal than the precept  
forbidding superstition1 and thus should
 have preceded it4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
a gloss on ,ex4 #bj3g expounds the      
precept1 ,thou shalt not take the name  
of 4 4 4 thy ,god in vain1 namely1 by   
swearing to nothing4 ,hence this precept
 would seem to forbid useless swearing1 
that is to say1 swearing without        
judgment4 ,but false swearing1 which is 
without truth1 and unjust swearing1     
which is without justice1 are much more 
grievous4 ,therefore this precept should
 rather have forbidden them4  ,obj4 #d3 
,further1 blasphemy or any word or deed 
that is an insult to ,god is much more  
grievous than perjury4 ,therefore       
blasphemy and other like sins should    
rather have been forbidden by this      
precept4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 ,god's    
names are many4 ,therefore it should not
 have been said indefinitely3 ,thou     
shalt not take the name of 4 4 4 thy    
,god in vain4  ,on the contrary1 stands 
the authority of ,scripture4  ,i answer 

that1 ,in one who is being instructed in
 virtue it is necessary to remove       
obstacles to true religion before       
establishing him in true religion4 ,now 
a thing is opposed to true religion in  
two ways4 ,first1 by excess1 when1 to   
wit1 that which belongs to religion is  
given to others than to whom it is due1 
and this pertains to superstition4      
,secondly1 by lack1 as it were1 of      
reverence1 when1 to wit1 ,god is        
contemned1 and this pertains to the vice
 of irreligion1 as stated above 7,q4    
#ig1 in the preamble1 and in the        
,article that follows74 ,now            
superstition hinders religion by        
preventing man from acknowledging ,god  
so as to worship ,him3 and when a man's 
mind is engrossed in some undue worship1
 he cannot at the same time give due    
worship to ,god1 according to ,isa4     
#bh3bj1 ,the bed is straitened1 so that 
one must fall out1 i4e4 either the true 
,god or a false god must fall out from  
man's heart1 and a short covering cannot

 cover both4 ,on the other hand1        
irreligion hinders religion by          
preventing man from honoring ,god after 
he has acknowledged ,him4 ,now one must 
first of all acknowledge ,god with a    
view to worship1 before honoring ,him we
 have acknowledged4  ,for this reason   
the precept forbidding superstition is  
placed before the second precept1 which 
forbids perjury that pertains to        
irreligion4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these    
expositions are mystical4 ,the literal  
explanation is that which is given      
,deut4 #e3aa3 ,thou shalt not take the  
name of 4 4 4 thy ,god in vain1 namely1 
by swearing on that which is not        
99,vulg43 'for he shall not be          
unpunished that taketh ,his name upon a 
vain thing'4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this    
precept does not forbid all taking of   
the name of ,god1 but properly the      
taking of ,god's name in confirmation of
 a man's word by way of an oath1 because
 men are wont to take ,god's name more  
frequently in this way4 ,nevertheless we

 may understand that in consequence all 
inordinate taking of the ,divine name is
 forbidden by this precept3 and it is in
 this sense that we are to take the     
explanation quoted in the ,first        
,objection4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to swear 
to nothing means to swear to that which 
is not4 ,this pertains to false         
swearing1 which is chiefly called       
perjury1 as stated above 7,q4 #ih1 ,a4  
#a1 ad #c74 ,for when a man swears to   
that which is false1 his swearing is    
vain in itself1 since it is not         
supported by the truth4 ,on the other   
hand1 when a man swears without         
judgment1 through levity1 if he swear to
 the truth1 there is no vanity on the   
part of the oath itself1 but only on the
 part of the swearer4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 
,just as when we instruct a man in some 
science1 we begin by putting before him 
certain general maxims1 even so the     
,law1 which forms man to virtue by      
instructing him in the precepts of the  
decalogue1 which are the first of all   

precepts1 gave expression1 by           
prohibition or by command1 to those     
things which are of most common         
occurrence in the course of human life4 
,hence the precepts of the decalogue    
include the prohibition of perjury1     
which is of more frequent occurrence    
than blasphemy1 since man does not fall 
so often into the latter sin4  ,reply   
,obj4 #e3 ,reverence is due to the      
,divine names on the part of the thing  
signified1 which is one1 and not on the 
part of the signifying words1 which are 
many4 ,hence it is expressed in the     
singular3 ,thou shalt not take the name 
of 4 4 4 thy ,god in vain3 since it     
matters not in which of ,god's names    
perjury is committed4   ,,fourth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abb1 ,art4 #d 
,whether the ,third ,precept of the     
,decalogue1 ,concerning the ,hallowing  
of the ,sabbath1 ,is ,fittingly         
,expressed8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems   
that the third precept of the decalogue1
 concerning the hallowing of the        

,sabbath1 is unfittingly expressed4 ,for
 this1 understood spiritually1 is a     
general precept3 since ,bede in         
commenting on ,luke #ac3ad1 ,the ruler  
of the synagogue being angry that ,he   
had healed on the ,sabbath1 says        
7,comment4 iv73 ,the ,law forbids1 not  
to heal man on the ,sabbath1 but to do  
servile works1 i4e4 to burden oneself   
with sin4 ,taken literally it is a      
ceremonial precept1 for it is written   
7,ex4 #ca3ac73 ,see that you keep ,my   
,sabbath3 because it is a sign between  
,me and you in your generations4 ,now   
the precepts of the decalogue are both  
spiritual and moral4 ,therefore it is   
unfittingly placed among the precepts of
 the decalogue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the
 ceremonial precepts of the ,law contain
 sacred things1 sacrifices1 sacraments  
and observances1 as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #d74 ,now sacred
 things comprised not only sacred days1 
but also sacred places and sacred       
vessels1 and so on4 ,moreover1 there    

were many sacred days other than the    
,sabbath4 ,therefore it was unfitting to
 omit all other ceremonial observances  
and to mention only that of the         
,sabbath4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whoever  
breaks a precept of the decalogue1 sins4
 ,but in the ,old ,law some who broke   
the observances of the ,sabbath did not 
sin--for instance1 those who circumcised
 their sons on the eighth day1 and the  
priests who worked in the temple on the 
,sabbath4 ,also ,elias 7#c ,kings #ai71 
who journeyed for forty days unto the   
mount of ,god1 ,horeb1 must have        
traveled on a ,sabbath3 the priests also
 who carried the ark of the ,lord for   
seven days1 as related in ,josue #g1    
must be understood to have carried it on
 a ,sabbath4 ,again it is written 7,luke
 #ac3ae73 ,doth not every one of you on 
the ,sabbath day loose his ox or his ass
 4 4 4 and lead them to water8          
,therefore it is unfittingly placed     
among the precepts of the decalogue4    
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the precepts of the 

decalogue have to be observed also under
 the ,new ,law4 ,yet in the ,new ,law   
this precept is not observed1 neither in
 the point of the ,sabbath day1 nor as  
to the ,lord's day1 on which men cook   
their food1 travel1 fish1 and do many   
like things4 ,therefore the precept of  
the observance of the ,sabbath is       
unfittingly expressed4  ,on the         
contrary1 stands the authority of       
,scripture4  ,i answer that1 ,the       
obstacles to true religion being removed
 by the first and second precepts of the
 decalogue1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1  
#c71 it remained for the third precept  
to be given whereby man is established  
in true religion4 ,now it belongs to    
religion to give worship to ,god3 and   
just as the ,divine scriptures teach the
 interior worship under the guise of    
certain corporal similitudes1 so is     
external worship given to ,god under the
 guise of sensible signs4 ,and since for
 the most part man is induced to pay    
interior worship1 consisting in prayer  

and devotion1 by the interior prompting 
of the ,holy ,ghost1 a precept of the   
,law as necessary respecting the        
exterior worship that consists in       
sensible signs4 ,now the precepts of the
 decalogue are1 so to speak1 first and  
common principles of the ,law1 and      
consequently the third precept of the   
decalogue describes the exterior worship
 of ,god as the sign of a universal boon
 that concerns all4 ,this universal boon
 was the work of the ,creation of the   
world1 from which work ,god is stated to
 have rested on the seventh day3 and    
sign of this we are commanded to keep   
holy seventh day--that is1 to set it    
aside as a day to be given to ,god4     
,hence after the precept about the      
hallowing of the ,sabbath the reason for
 it is given3 ,for in six days the ,lord
 made heaven and earth 4 4 4 and rested 
on the seventh day4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,the precept about hallowing the        
,sabbath1 understood literally1 is      
partly moral and partly ceremonial4 ,it 

is a moral precept in the point of      
commanding man to aside a certain time  
to be given to ,divine things4 ,for     
there is in man a natural inclination to
 set aside a certain time for each      
necessary thing1 such as refreshment of 
the body1 sleep1 and so forth4 ,hence   
according to the dictate of reason1 man 
sets aside a certain time for spiritual 
refreshment1 by which man's mind is     
refreshed in ,god4 ,and thus to have a  
certain time set aside for occupying    
oneself with ,divine things is the      
matter of a moral precept4 ,but1 in so  
far as this precept specializes the time
 as a sign representing the ,creation of
 the world1 it is a ceremonial precept4 
,again1 it is a ceremonial precept in   
its allegorical signification1 as       
representative of ,christ's rest in the 
tomb on the seventh day3 also in its    
moral signification1 as representing    
cessation from all sinful acts1 and the 
mind's rest in ,god1 in which sense1    
too1 it is a general precept4 ,again1 it

 is a ceremonial precept in its         
analogical signification1 as            
foreshadowing the enjoyment of ,god in  
heaven4 ,hence the precept about        
hallowing the ,sabbath is placed among  
the precepts of the decalogue1 as a     
moral1 but not as a ceremonial precept4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the other ceremonies  
of the ,law are signs of certain        
particular ,divine works3 but the       
observance of the ,sabbath is           
representative of a general boon1       
namely1 the production of all creatures4
 ,hence it was fitting that it should be
 placed among the general precepts of   
the decalogue1 rather than any other    
ceremonial precept of the ,law4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,two things are to be observed
 in the hallowing of the ,sabbath4 ,one 
of these is the end3 and this is that   
man occupy himself with ,divine things1 
and is signified in the words3 ,remember
 that thou keep holy the ,sabbath day4  
,for in the ,law those things are said  
to be holy which are applied to the     

,divine worship4 ,the other thing is    
cessation from work1 and is signified in
 the words 7,ex4 #bj3aa71 ,on the       
seventh day 4 4 4 thou shalt do no work4
 ,the kind of work meant appears from   
,lev4 #bc3c1 ,you shall do no servile   
work on that day 99,vulg43 ',you shall  
do no work on that day'4 ,now servile   
work is so called from servitude3 and   
servitude is threefold4 ,one1 whereby   
man is the servant of sin1 according to 
,john #h3cd1 ,whosoever committeth sin  
is the servant of sin1 and in this sense
 all sinful acts are servile4 ,another  
servitude is whereby one man serves     
another4 ,now one man serves another not
 with his mind but with his body1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #ajd1 ,,aa4 #e1 #f1 ad
 #a74 ,wherefore in this respect those  
works are called servile whereby one man
 serves another4 ,the third is the      
servitude of ,god2 and in this way the  
work of worship1 which pertains to the  
service of ,god1 may be called a servile
 work4 ,in this sense servile work is   

not forbidden on the ,sabbath day1      
because that would be contrary to the   
end of the ,sabbath observance3 since   
man abstains from other works on the    
,sabbath day in order that he may occupy
 himself with works connected with      
,god's service4 ,for this reason1       
according to ,john #g3bc1 a man         
99,vulg43 ',if a man1' etc4 receives    
circumcision on the ,sabbath day1 that  
the law of ,moses may not be broken3 and
 for this reason too we read 7,matt4    
#ab3e71 that on the ,sabbath days the   
priests in the temple break the         
,sabbath1 i4e4 do corporal works on the 
,sabbath1 and are without blame4        
,accordingly1 the priests in carrying   
the ark on the ,sabbath did not break   
the precept of the ,sabbath observance4 
,in like manner it is not contrary to   
the observance of the ,sabbath to       
exercise any spiritual act1 such as     
teaching by word or writing4 ,wherefore 
a gloss on ,num #bh says that smiths and
 like craftsmen rest on the ,sabbath    

day1 but the reader or teacher of the   
,divine law does not cease from his     
work4 ,yet he profanes not the ,sabbath1
 even as the priests in the temple break
 the ,sabbath1 and are without blame4   
,on the other hand1 those works that are
 called servile in the first or second  
way are contrary to the observance of   
the ,sabbath1 in so far as they hinder  
man from applying himself to ,divine    
things4 ,and since man is hindered from 
applying himself to ,divine things      
rather by sinful than by lawful albeit  
corporal works1 it follows that to sin  
on a feast day is more against this     
precept than to do some other but lawful
 bodily work4 ,hence ,augustine says    
7,de decem chord4 iii73 ,it would be    
better if the ,jew did some useful work 
on his farm than spent his time         
seditiously in the theatre3 and their   
womenfolk would do better to be making  
linen on the ,sabbath than to be dancing
 lewdly all day in their feasts of the  
new moon4 ,it is not1 however1 against  

this precept to sin venially on the     
,sabbath1 because venial sin does not   
destroy holiness4  ,again1 corporal     
works1 not pertaining to the spiritual  
worship of ,god1 are said to be servile 
in so far as they belong properly to    
servants2 while they are not said to be 
servile1 in so far as they are common to
 those who serve and those who are free4
 ,moreover1 everyone1 be he servant or  
free1 is bound to provide necessaries   
both for himself and for his neighbor1  
chiefly in respect of things pertaining 
to the well-being of the body1 according
 to ,prov4 #bd3aa1 ,deliver them that   
are led to death3 secondarily as regards
 avoiding damage to one's property1     
according to ,deut4 #bb3a1 ,thou shalt  
not pass by if thou seest thy brother's 
ox or his sheep go astray1 but thou     
shalt bring them back to thy brother4   
,hence a corporal work pertaining to the
 preservation of one's own bodily       
well-being does not profane the         
,sabbath3 for it is not against the     

observance of the ,sabbath to eat and do
 such things as preserve the health of  
the body4 ,for this reason the          
,machabees did not profane the ,sabbath 
when they fought in self-defense on the 
,sabbath day 7#a ,macc4 #b71 nor ,elias 
when he fled from the face of ,jezabel  
on the ,sabbath4 ,for this same reason  
our ,lord 7,matt4 #ab3c7 excused ,his   
disciples for plucking the ears of corn 
on account of the need which they       
suffered4 ,in like manner a bodily work 
that is directed to the bodily          
well-being of another is not contrary to
 the observance of the ,sabbath3        
wherefore it is written 7,john #g3bc73  
,are you angry at ,me because ,i have   
healed the whole man on the ,sabbath    
day8 ,and again1 a bodily work that is  
done to avoid an imminent damage to some
 external thing does not profane the    
,sabbath1 wherefore our ,lord says      
7,matt4 #ab3aa73 ,what man shall there  
be among you1 that hath one sheep1 and  
if the same fall into a pit on the      

,sabbath day1 will he not take hold on  
it and lift it up8  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in
 the ,new ,law the observance of the    
,lord's day took the place of the       
observance of the ,sabbath1 not by      
virtue of the precept but by the        
institution of the ,church and the      
custom of ,christian people4 ,for this  
observance is not figurative1 as was the
 observance of the ,sabbath in the ,old 
,law4 ,hence the prohibition to work on 
the ,lord's day is not so strict as on  
the ,sabbath3 and certain works are     
permitted on the ,lord's day which were 
forbidden on the ,sabbath1 such as the  
cooking of food and so forth4 ,and again
 in the ,new ,law1 dispensation is more 
easily granted than in the ,old1 in the 
matter of certain forbidden works1 on   
account of their necessity1 because the 
figure pertains to the protestation of  
truth1 which it is unlawful to omit even
 in small things2 while works1          
considered in themselves1 are changeable
 in point of place and time4   ,,fifth  

,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abb1 ,art4 #e 
,whether the ,fourth ,precept1 ,about   
,honoring ,one's ,parents1 ,is          
,fittingly ,expressed8  ,objection #a3  
,it seems that the fourth precept1 about
 honoring one's parents1 is unfittingly 
expressed4 ,for this is the precept     
pertaining to piety4 ,now1 just as piety
 is a part of justice1 so are           
observance1 gratitude1 and others of    
which we have spoken 7,,qq4 #aja1 #ajb1 
seq474 ,therefore it seems that there   
should not have been given a special    
precept of piety1 as none is given      
regarding the others4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 piety pays worship not only to
 one's parents1 but also to one's       
country1 and also to other blood        
kindred1 and to the well-wishers of our 
country1 as stated above 7,q4 #aja1     
,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore it was        
unfitting for this precept to mention   
only the honoring of one's father and   
mother4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we owe our 
parents not merely honor but also       

support4 ,therefore the mere honoring of
 one's parents is unfittingly           
prescribed4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1        
sometimes those who honor their parents 
die young1 and on the contrary those who
 honor them not live a long time4       
,therefore it was unfitting to          
supplement this precept with the        
promise1 ,that thou mayest be long-lived
 upon earth4  ,on the contrary1 stands  
the authority of ,scripture4  ,i answer 
that1 ,the precepts of the decalogue are
 directed to the love of ,god and of our
 neighbor4 ,now to our parents1 of all  
our neighbors1 we are under the greatest
 obligation4 ,hence1 immediately after  
the precepts directing us to ,god1 a    
place is given to the precept directing 
us to our parents1 who are the          
particular principle of our being1 just 
as ,god is the universal principle3 so  
that this precept has a certain affinity
 to the precepts of the ,first ,table4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#aja1 ,a4 #b71 piety directs us to pay  

the debt due to our parents1 a debt     
which is common to all4 ,hence1 since   
the precepts of the decalogue are       
general precepts1 they ought to contain 
some reference to piety rather than to  
the other parts of justice1 which regard
 some special debt4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,the debt to one's parents precedes the 
debt to one's kindred and country since 
it is because we are born of our parents
 that our kindred and country belong to 
us4 ,hence1 since the precepts of the   
decalogue are the first precepts of the 
,law1 they direct man to his parents    
rather than to his country and other    
kindred4 ,nevertheless this precept of  
honoring our parents is understood to   
command whatever concerns the payment of
 debt to any person1 as secondary matter
 included in the principal matter4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,reverential honor is  
due to one's parents as such1 whereas   
support and so forth are due to them    
accidentally1 for instance1 because they
 are in want1 in slavery1 or the like1  

as stated above 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #b74 ,and
 since that which belongs to a thing by 
nature precedes that which is           
accidental1 it follows that among the   
first precepts of the ,law1 which are   
the precepts of the decalogue1 there is 
a special precept of honoring our       
parents3 and this honor1 as a kind of   
principle1 is understood to comprise    
support and whatever else is due to our 
parents4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a long life 
is promised to those who honor their    
parents not only as to the life to come1
 but also as to the present life1       
according to the saying of the ,apostle 
7#a ,tim4 #d3h73 ,piety ,douay3         
'godliness' is profitable to all things1
 having promise of the life that now is 
and of that which is to come4 ,and with 
reason4 ,because the man who is grateful
 for a favor deserves1 with a certain   
congruity1 that the favor should be     
continued to him1 and he who is         
ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose 
it4 ,now we owe the favor of bodily life

 to our parents after ,god3 wherefore he
 that honors his parents deserves the   
prolongation of his life1 because he is 
grateful for that favor3 while he that  
honors not his parents deserves to be   
deprived of life because he is          
ungrateful for the favor4 ,however1     
present goods or evils are not the      
subject of merit or demerit except in so
 far as they are directed to a future   
reward1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#aad1 ,a4 #ab74 ,wherefore sometimes in 
accordance with the hidden design of the
 ,divine judgments1 which regard chiefly
 the future reward1 some1 who are       
dutiful to their parents1 are sooner    
deprived of life1 while others1 who are 
undutiful to their parents1 live longer4
   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4     
#abb1 ,art4 #f  ,whether the ,other ,six
 ,precepts of the ,decalogue ,are       
,fittingly ,expressed8  ,objection #a3  
,it seems that the other six precepts of
 the decalogue are unfittingly          
expressed4 ,for it is not sufficient for

 salvation that one refrain from        
injuring one's neighbor2 but it is      
required that one pay one's debts1      
according to ,rom4 #ac3g1 ,render 4 4 4 
to all men their dues4 ,now the last six
 precepts merely forbid one to injure   
one's neighbor4 ,therefore these        
precepts are unfittingly expressed4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 these precepts      
forbid murder1 adultery1 stealing and   
bearing false witness4 ,but many other  
injuries can be inflicted on one's      
neighbor1 as appears from those which   
have been specified above 7,,qq4 #gb1   
seq474 ,therefore it seems that the     
aforesaid precepts are unfittingly      
expressed4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1         
concupiscence may be taken in two ways4 
,first as denoting an act of the will1  
as in ,wis4 #f3ba1 ,the desire          
7concupiscentia7 of wisdom bringeth to  
the everlasting kingdom3 secondly1 as   
denoting an act of the sensuality1 as in
 ,james #d3a1 ,from whence are wars and 
contentions among you8 ,are they not 4 4

 4 from your concupiscences which war in
 your members8 ,now the concupiscence of
 the sensuality is not forbidden by a   
precept of the decalogue1 otherwise     
first movements would be mortal sins1 as
 they would be against a precept of the 
decalogue4 ,nor is the concupiscence of 
the will forbidden1 since it is included
 in every sin4 ,therefore it is         
unfitting for the precepts of the       
decalogue to include some that forbid   
concupiscence4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1     
murder is a more grievous sin than      
adultery or theft4 ,but there is no     
precept forbidding the desire of murder4
 ,therefore neither was it fitting to   
have precepts forbidding the desire of  
theft and of adultery4  ,on the         
contrary1 stands the authority of       
,scripture4  ,i answer that1 ,just as by
 the parts of justice a man pays that   
which is due to certain definite        
persons1 to whom he is bound for some   
special reason1 so too by justice       
properly so called he pays that which is

 due to all in general4 ,hence1 after   
the three precepts pertaining to        
religion1 whereby man pays what is due  
,god1 and after the fourth precept      
pertaining to piety1 whereby he pays    
what is due to his parents--which duty  
includes the paying of all that is due  
for any special reason--it was necessary
 in due sequence to give certain        
precepts pertaining to justice properly 
so called1 which pays to all            
indifferently what is due to them4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man is bound towards  
all persons in general to inflict injury
 on no one3 hence the negative precepts1
 which forbid the doing of those        
injuries that can be inflicted on one's 
neighbor1 had to be given a place1 as   
general precepts1 among the precepts of 
the decalogue4 ,on the other hand1 the  
duties we owe to our neighbor are paid  
in different ways to different people3  
hence it did not behoove to include     
affirmative precepts about those duties 
among the precepts of the decalogue4    

,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all other injuries    
that are inflicted on our neighbor are  
reducible to those that are forbidden by
 these precepts1 as taking precedence of
 others in point of generality and      
importance4 ,for all injuries that are  
inflicted on the person of our neighbor 
are understood to be forbidden under the
 head of murder as being the principal  
of all4 ,those that are inflicted on a  
person connected with one's neighbor1   
especially by way of lust1 are          
understood to be forbidden together with
 adultery3 those that come under the    
head of damage done to property are     
understood to be forbidden together with
 theft3 and those that are comprised    
under speech1 such as detractions1      
insults1 and so forth1 are understood to
 be forbidden together with the bearing 
of false witness1 which is more directly
 opposed to justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,the precepts forbidding concupiscence  
do not include the prohibition of first 
movements of concupiscence1 that do not 

go farther than the bounds of           
sensuality4 ,the direct object of their 
prohibition is the consent of the will1 
which is directed to deed or pleasure4  
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,murder in itself is an
 object not of concupiscence but of     
horror1 since it has not in itself the  
aspect of good4 ,on the other hand1     
adultery has the aspect of a certain    
kind of good1 i4e4 of something         
pleasurable1 and theft has an aspect of 
good1 i4e4 of something useful3 and good
 of its very nature has the aspect of   
something concupiscible4 ,hence the     
concupiscence of theft and adultery had 
to be forbidden by special precepts1 but
 not the concupiscence of murder4       
,,treatise ,,on ,,fortitude ,,and       
,,temperance 7,,qq4 #abc-agj7           
,,question #abc  ,,of ,,fortitude 7,in  
,twelve ,articles7  ,after considering  
justice we must in due sequence consider
 fortitude4 ,we must 7#a7 consider the  
virtue itself of fortitude2 7#b7 its    
parts2 7#c7 the gift corresponding      

thereto2 7#d7 the precepts that pertain 
to it4  ,concerning fortitude three     
things have to be considered3 7#a7      
,fortitude itself2 7#b7 its principal   
act1 viz4 martyrdom2 7#c7 the vices     
opposed to fortitude4  ,under the first 
head there are twelve points of inquiry3
  7#a7 ,whether fortitude is a virtue8  
7#b7 ,whether it is a special virtue8   
7#c7 ,whether fortitude is only about   
fear and daring8  7#d7 ,whether it is   
only about fear of death8  7#e7 ,whether
 it is only in warlike matters8  7#f7   
,whether endurance is its chief act8    
7#g7 ,whether its action is directed to 
its own good8  7#h7 ,whether it takes   
pleasure in its own action8  7#i7       
,whether fortitude deals chiefly with   
sudden occurrences8  7#aj7 ,whether it  
makes use of anger in its action8  7#aa7
 ,whether it is a cardinal virtue8      
7#ab7 ,of its comparison with the other 
cardinal virtues4   ,,first ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,fortitude ,is a ,virtue8  ,objection   

#a3 ,it seems that fortitude is not a   
virtue4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4
 #ab3i73 ,virtue is perfected in        
infirmity4 ,but fortitude is contrary to
 infirmity4 ,therefore fortitude is not 
a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if it is 
a virtue1 it is either theological1     
intellectual1 or moral4 ,now fortitude  
is not contained among the theological  
virtues1 nor among the intellectual     
virtues1 as may be gathered from what we
 have said above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 
#b2 ,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c74 ,neither1         
apparently1 is it contained among the   
moral virtues1 since according to the   
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #g1 #h73     
,some seem to be brave through          
ignorance2 or through experience1 as    
soldiers1 both of which cases seem to   
pertain to act rather than to moral     
virtue1 and some are called brave on    
account of certain passions2 for        
instance1 on account of fear of threats1
 or of dishonor1 or again on account of 
sorrow1 anger1 or hope4 ,but moral      

virtue does not act from passion but    
from choice1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1  
,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore fortitude  
is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
human virtue resides chiefly in the     
soul1 since it is a good quality of the 
mind1 as stated above 7,ethic4 iii1 #g1 
#h74 ,but fortitude1 seemingly1 resides 
in the body1 or at least results from   
the temperament of the body4 ,therefore 
it seems that fortitude is not a virtue4
  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,de     
,morib4 ,eccl4 xv1 xxi1 xxii7 numbers   
fortitude among the virtues4  ,i answer 
that1 ,according to the ,philosopher    
7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 virtue is that which   
makes its possessor good1 and renders   
his work good4 ,hence human virtue1 of  
which we are speaking now1 is that which
 makes a man good1 and renders his work 
good4 ,now man's good is to be in       
accordance with reason1 according to    
,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #bb74       
,wherefore it belongs to human virtue to
 make man good1 to make his work accord 

with reason4 ,this happens in three     
ways3 first1 by rectifying reason       
itself1 and this is done by the         
intellectual virtues2 secondly1 by      
establishing the rectitude of reason in 
human affairs1 and this belongs to      
justice2 thirdly1 by removing the       
obstacles to the establishment of this  
rectitude in human affairs4 ,now the    
human will is hindered in two ways from 
following the rectitude of reason4      
,first1 through being drawn by some     
object of pleasure to something other   
than what the rectitude of reason       
requires2 and this obstacle is removed  
by the virtue of temperance4 ,secondly1 
through the will being disinclined to   
follow that which is in accordance with 
reason1 on account of some difficulty   
that presents itself4 ,in order to      
remove this obstacle fortitude of the   
mind is requisite1 whereby to resist the
 aforesaid difficulty even as a man1 by 
fortitude of body1 overcomes and removes
 bodily obstacles4  ,hence it is evident

 that fortitude is a virtue1 in so far  
as it conforms man to reason4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,the virtue of the soul is    
perfected1 not in the infirmity of the  
soul1 but in the infirmity of the body1 
of which the ,apostle was speaking4 ,now
 it belongs to fortitude of the mind to 
bear bravely with infirmities of the    
flesh1 and this belongs to the virtue of
 patience or fortitude1 as also to      
acknowledge one's own infirmity1 and    
this belongs to the perfection that is  
called humility4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,sometimes a person performs the        
exterior act of a virtue without having 
the virtue1 and from some other cause   
than virtue4 ,hence the ,philosopher    
7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 mentions five ways in 
which people are said to be brave by way
 of resemblance1 through performing acts
 of fortitude without having the virtue4
 ,this may be done in three ways4       
,first1 because they tend to that which 
is difficult as though it were not      
difficult3 and this again happens in    

three ways1 for sometimes this is owing 
to ignorance1 through not perceiving the
 greatness of the danger2 sometimes it  
is owing to the fact that one is hopeful
 of overcoming dangers--when1 for       
instance1 one has often experienced     
escape from danger2 and sometimes this  
is owing to a certain science and art1  
as in the case of soldiers who1 through 
skill and practice in the use of arms1  
think little of the dangers of battle1  
as they reckon themselves capable of    
defending themselves against them2 thus 
,vegetius says 7,de ,re ,milit4 i71 ,no 
man fears to do what he is confident of 
having learned to do well4 ,secondly1 a 
man performs an act of fortitude without
 having the virtue1 through the impulse 
of a passion1 whether of sorrow that he 
wishes to cast off1 or again of anger4  
,thirdly1 through choice1 not indeed of 
a due end1 but of some temporal         
advantage to be obtained1 such as honor1
 pleasure1 or gain1 or of some          
disadvantage to be avoided1 such as     

blame1 pain1 or loss4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,the fortitude of the soul which is     
reckoned a virtue1 as explained in the  
,reply to the ,first ,objection1 is so  
called from its likeness to fortitude of
 the body4 ,nor is it inconsistent with 
the notion of virtue1 that a man should 
have a natural inclination to virtue by 
reason of his natural temperament1 as   
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #a74
   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    
#abc1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,fortitude ,is 
a ,special ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
seems that fortitude is not a special   
virtue4 ,for it is written 7,wis4 #g3g73
 ,she teacheth temperance1 and prudence1
 and justice1 and fortitude1 where the  
text has virtue for fortitude4 ,since   
then the term virtue is common to all   
virtues1 it seems that fortitude is a   
general virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1    
,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i73          
,fortitude is not lacking in courage1   
for alone she defends the honor of the  
virtues and guards their behests4 ,she  

it is that wages an inexorable war on   
all vice1 undeterred by toil1 brave in  
face of dangers1 steeled against        
pleasures1 unyielding to lusts1 avoiding
 covetousness as a deformity that       
weakens virtue2 and he says the same    
further on in connection with other     
vices4 ,now this cannot apply to any    
special virtue4 ,therefore fortitude is 
not a special virtue4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 fortitude would seem to derive
 its name from firmness4 ,but it belongs
 to every virtue to stand firm1 as      
stated in ,ethic4 ii4 ,therefore        
fortitude is a general virtue4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxii7       
numbers it among the other virtues4  ,i 
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #fa1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 the term        
fortitude can be taken in two ways4     
,first1 as simply denoting a certain    
firmness of mind1 and in this sense it  
is a general virtue1 or rather a        
condition of every virtue1 since as the 
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ii71 it is 

requisite for every virtue to act firmly
 and immovably4 ,secondly1 fortitude may
 be taken to denote firmness only in    
bearing and withstanding those things   
wherein it is most difficult to be firm1
 namely in certain grave dangers4       
,therefore ,tully says 7,rhet4 ii71 that
 fortitude is deliberate facing of      
dangers and bearing of toils4 ,in this  
sense fortitude is reckoned a special   
virtue1 because it has a special matter4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to the    
,philosopher 7,de ,coelo i1 #aaf7 the   
word virtue refers to the extreme limit 
of a power4 ,now a natural power is1 in 
one sense1 the power of resisting       
corruptions1 and in another sense is a  
principle of action1 as stated in       
,metaph4 v1 #ag4 ,and since this latter 
meaning is the more common1 the term    
virtue1 as denoting the extreme limit of
 such a power1 is a common term1 for    
virtue taken in a general sense is      
nothing else than a habit whereby one   
acts well4 ,but as denoting the extreme 

limit of power in the first sense1 which
 sense is more specific1 it is applied  
to a special virtue1 namely fortitude1  
to which it belongs to stand firm       
against all kinds of assaults4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,ambrose takes fortitude in a 
broad sense1 as denoting firmness of    
mind in face of assaults of all kinds4  
,nevertheless even as a special virtue  
with a determinate matter1 it helps to  
resist the assaults of all vices4 ,for  
he that can stand firm in things that   
are most difficult to bear1 is prepared1
 in consequence1 to resist those which  
are less difficult4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,this objection takes fortitude in the  
first sense4   ,,third ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,fortitude ,is ,about ,fear and ,daring8
  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that         
fortitude is not about fear and daring4 
,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 vii73 ,the  
fortitude of the just man is to overcome
 the flesh1 to withstand                
self-indulgence1 to quench the lusts of 

the present life4 ,therefore fortitude  
seems to be about pleasures rather than 
about fear and daring4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 ,tully says 7,de ,invent4     
,rhet4 ii71 that it belongs to fortitude
 to face dangers and to bear toil4 ,but 
this seemingly has nothing to do with   
the passions of fear and daring1 but    
rather with a man's toilsome deeds and  
external dangers4 ,therefore fortitude  
is not about fear and daring4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 not only daring1 but also    
hope1 is opposed to fear1 as stated     
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b7 
in the treatise on passions4 ,therefore 
fortitude should not be about daring any
 more than about hope4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iii1 #i7 that fortitude
 is about fear and daring4  ,i answer   
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 it     
belongs to the virtue of fortitude to   
remove any obstacle that withdraws the  
will from following the reason4 ,now to 
be withdrawn from something difficult   

belongs to the notion of fear1 which    
denotes withdrawal from an evil that    
entails difficulty1 as stated above     
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,,aa4 #c1 #e7 in the 
treatise on passions4 ,hence fortitude  
is chiefly about fear of difficult      
things1 which can withdraw the will from
 following the reason4 ,and it behooves 
one not only firmly to bear the assault 
of these difficulties by restraining    
fear1 but also moderately to withstand  
them1 when1 to wit1 it is necessary to  
dispel them altogether in order to free 
oneself therefrom for the future1 which 
seems to come under the notion of       
daring4 ,therefore fortitude is about   
fear and daring1 as curbing fear and    
moderating daring4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,gregory is speaking then of the        
fortitude of the just man1 as to its    
common relation to all virtues4 ,hence  
he first of all mentions matters        
pertaining to temperance1 as in the     
words quoted1 and then adds that which  
pertains properly to fortitude as a     

special virtue1 by saying3 ,to love the 
trials of this life for the sake of an  
eternal reward4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3       
,dangers and toils do not withdraw the  
will from the course of reason1 except  
in so far as they are an object of fear4
 ,hence fortitude needs to be           
immediately about fear and daring1 but  
mediately about dangers and toils1 these
 being the objects of those passions4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hope is opposed to    
fear on the part of the object1 for hope
 is of good1 fear of evil3 whereas      
daring is about the same object1 and is 
opposed to fear by way of approach and  
withdrawal1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1   
,q4 #de1 ,a4 #a74 ,and since fortitude  
properly regards those temporal evils   
that withdraw one from virtue1 as       
appears from ,tully's definition quoted 
in the ,second ,objection1 it follows   
that fortitude properly is about fear   
and daring and not about hope1 except in
 so far as it is connected with daring1 
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,a4  

#b74   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #abc1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,fortitude ,is
 ,only ,about ,dangers of ,death8       
,objection #a3 ,it seems that fortitude 
is not only about dangers of death4 ,for
 ,augustine says 7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4 xv7
 that fortitude is love bearing all     
things readily for the sake of the      
object beloved3 and 7,music4 vi7 he says
 that fortitude is the love which dreads
 no hardship1 not even death4 ,therefore
 fortitude is not only about danger of  
death1 but also about other afflictions4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all the passions  
of the soul need to be reduced to a mean
 by some virtue4 ,now there is no other 
virtue reducing fears to a mean4        
,therefore fortitude is not only about  
fear of death1 but also about other     
fears4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no virtue is
 about extremes4 ,but fear of death is  
about an extreme1 since it is the       
greatest of fears1 as stated in ,ethic4 
iii4 ,therefore the virtue of fortitude 
is not about fear of death4  ,on the    

contrary1 ,andronicus says that         
fortitude is a virtue of the irascible  
faculty that is not easily deterred by  
the fear of death4  ,i answer that1 ,as 
stated above 7,a4 #c71 it belongs to the
 virtue of fortitude to guard the will  
against being withdrawn from the good of
 reason through fear of bodily evil4    
,now it behooves one to hold firmly the 
good of reason against every evil       
whatsoever1 since no bodily good is     
equivalent to the good of the reason4   
,hence fortitude of soul must be that   
which binds the will firmly to the good 
of reason in face of the greatest evils3
 because he that stands firm against    
great things1 will in consequence stand 
firm against less things1 but not       
conversely4 ,moreover it belongs to the 
notion of virtue that it should regard  
something extreme3 and the most fearful 
of all bodily evils is death1 since it  
does away all bodily goods4 ,wherefore  
,augustine says 7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4     
xxii7 that the soul is shaken by its    

fellow body1 with fear of toil and pain1
 lest the body be stricken and harassed 
with fear of death lest it be done away 
and destroyed4 ,therefore the virtue of 
fortitude is about the fear of dangers  
of death4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,fortitude  
behaves well in bearing all manner of   
adversity3 yet a man is not reckoned    
brave simply through bearing any kind of
 adversity1 but only through bearing    
well even the greatest evils2 while     
through bearing others he is said to be 
brave in a restricted sense4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,since fear is born of love1  
any virtue that moderates the love of   
certain goods must in consequence       
moderate the fear of contrary evils3    
thus liberality1 which moderates the    
love of money1 as a consequence1        
moderates the fear of losing it1 and the
 same is the case with temperance and   
other virtues4 ,but to love one's own   
life is natural3 and hence the necessity
 of a special virtue modifying the fear 
of death4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in virtues 

the extreme consists in exceeding right 
reason3 wherefore to undergo the        
greatest dangers in accordance with     
reason is not contrary to virtue4       
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1  
,art4 #e  ,whether ,fortitude ,is       
,properly ,about ,dangers of ,death in  
,battle8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that 
fortitude is not properly about dangers 
of death in battle4 ,for martyrs above  
all are commended for their fortitude4  
,but martyrs are not commended in       
connection with battle4 ,therefore      
fortitude is not properly about dangers 
of death in battle4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i7 that     
fortitude is applicable both to warlike 
and to civil matters3 and ,tully 7,de   
,offic4 i71 under the heading1 ,that it 
pertains to fortitude to excel in battle
 rather than in civil life1 says3       
,although not a few think that the      
business of war is of greater importance
 than the affairs of civil life1 this   
opinion must be qualified3 and if we    

wish to judge the matter truly1 there   
are many things in civil life that are  
more important and more glorious than   
those connected with war4 ,now greater  
fortitude is about greater things4      
,therefore fortitude is not properly    
concerned with death in battle4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 war is directed to the    
preservation of a country's temporal    
peace3 for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4   
,dei xix7 that wars are waged in order  
to insure peace4 ,now it does not seem  
that one ought to expose oneself to the 
danger of death for the temporal peace  
of one's country1 since this same peace 
is the occasion of much license in      
morals4 ,therefore it seems that the    
virtue of fortitude is not about the    
danger of death in battle4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 iii7 that fortitude is chiefly 
about death in battle4  ,i answer that1 
,as stated above 7,a4 #d71 fortitude    
strengthens a man's mind against the    
greatest danger1 which is that of death4

 ,now fortitude is a virtue2 and it is  
essential to virtue ever to tend to     
good2 wherefore it is in order to pursue
 some good that man does not fly from   
the danger of death4 ,but the dangers of
 death arising out of sickness1 storms  
at sea1 attacks from robbers1 and the   
like1 do not seem to come on a man      
through his pursuing some good4 ,on the 
other hand1 the dangers of death which  
occur in battle come to man directly on 
account of some good1 because1 to wit1  
he is defending the common good by a    
just fight4 ,now a just fight is of two 
kinds4 ,first1 there is the general     
combat1 for instance1 of those who fight
 in battle2 secondly1 there is the      
private combat1 as when a judge or even 
private individual does not refrain from
 giving a just judgment through fear of 
the impending sword1 or any other danger
 though it threaten death4 ,hence it    
belongs to fortitude to strengthen the  
mind against dangers of death1 not only 
such as arise in a general battle1 but  

also such as occur in singular combat1  
which may be called by the general name 
of battle4 ,accordingly it must be      
granted that fortitude is properly about
 dangers of death occurring in battle4  
,moreover1 a brave man behaves well in  
face of danger of any other kind of     
death2 especially since man may be in   
danger of any kind of death on account  
of virtue3 thus may a man not fail to   
attend on a sick friend through fear of 
deadly infection1 or not refuse to      
undertake a journey with some godly     
object in view through fear of shipwreck
 or robbers4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,martyrs 
face the fight that is waged against    
their own person1 and this for the sake 
of the sovereign good which is ,god2    
wherefore their fortitude is praised    
above all4 ,nor is it outside the genus 
of fortitude that regards warlike       
actions1 for which reason they are said 
to have been valiant in battle4         
99,office of ,martyrs1 ex4 ,heb4 xi4    
#cd4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,personal and    

civil business is differentiated from   
the business of war that regards general
 wars4 ,however1 personal and civil     
affairs admit of dangers of death       
arising out of certain conflicts which  
are private wars1 and so with regard to 
these also there may be fortitude       
properly so called4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the peace of the state is good in      
itself1 nor does it become evil because 
certain persons make evil use of it4    
,for there are many others who make good
 use of it2 and many evils prevented by 
it1 such as murders and sacrileges1 are 
much greater than those which are       
occasioned by it1 and which belong      
chiefly to the sins of the flesh4       
,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1  
,art4 #f  ,whether ,endurance ,is the   
,chief ,act of ,fortitude8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it seems that endurance is not the 
chief act of fortitude4 ,for virtue is  
about the difficult and the good        
7,ethic4 ii1 #c74 ,now it is more       
difficult to attack than to endure4     

,therefore endurance is not the chief   
act of fortitude4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
to be able to act on another seems to   
argue greater power than not to be      
changed by another4 ,now to attack is to
 act on another1 and to endure is to    
persevere unchangeably4 ,since then     
fortitude denotes perfection of power1  
it seems that it belongs to fortitude to
 attack rather than to endure4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 one contrary is more      
distant from the other than its mere    
negation4 ,now to endure is merely not  
to fear1 whereas to attack denotes a    
movement contrary to that of fear1 since
 it implies pursuit4 ,since then        
fortitude above all withdraws the mind  
from fear1 it seems that it regards     
attack rather than endurance4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 iii1 #i7 that certain persons  
are said to be brave chiefly because    
they endure affliction4  ,i answer that1
 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 and         
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  

iii1 #i71 fortitude is more concerned to
 allay fear1 than to moderate daring4   
,for it is more difficult to allay fear 
than to moderate daring1 since the      
danger which is the object of daring and
 fear1 tends by its very nature to check
 daring1 but to increase fear4 ,now to  
attack belongs to fortitude in so far as
 the latter moderates daring1 whereas to
 endure follows the repression of fear4 
,therefore the principal act of         
fortitude is endurance1 that is to stand
 immovable in the midst of dangers      
rather than to attack them4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,endurance is more difficult  
than aggression1 for three reasons4     
,first1 because endurance seemingly     
implies that one is being attacked by a 
stronger person1 whereas aggression     
denotes that one is attacking as though 
one were the stronger party2 and it is  
more difficult to contend with a        
stronger than with a weaker4 ,secondly1 
because he that endures already feels   
the presence of danger1 whereas the     

aggressor looks upon danger as something
 to come2 and it is more difficult to be
 unmoved by the present than by the     
future4 ,thirdly1 because endurance     
implies length of time1 whereas         
aggression is consistent with sudden    
movements2 and it is more difficult to  
remain unmoved for a long time1 than to 
be moved suddenly to something arduous4 
,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4   
iii1 #h7 that some hurry to meet danger1
 yet fly when the danger is present2    
this is not the behavior of a brave man4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,endurance denotes   
indeed a passion of the body1 but an    
action of the soul cleaving most        
resolutely 7fortissime7 to good1 the    
result being that it does not yield to  
the threatening passion of the body4    
,now virtue concerns the soul rather    
than the body4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he    
that endures fears not1 though he is    
confronted with the cause of fear1      
whereas this cause is not present to the
 aggressor4   ,,seventh ,,article       

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1 ,art4 #g  ,whether 
the ,brave ,man ,acts for the ,sake of  
the ,good of ,his ,habit8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it seems that the brave man does   
not act for the sake of the good of his 
habit4 ,for in matters of action the    
end1 though first in intention1 is last 
in execution4 ,now the act of fortitude1
 in the order of execution1 follows the 
habit of fortitude4 ,therefore it is    
impossible for the brave man to act for 
the sake of the good of his habit4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de
 ,trin4 xiii73 ,we love virtues for the 
sake of happiness1 and yet some make    
bold to counsel us to be virtuous1      
namely by saying that we should desire  
virtue for its own sake1 without loving 
happiness4 ,if they succeed in their    
endeavor1 we shall surely cease to love 
virtue itself1 since we shall no longer 
love that for the sake of which alone we
 love virtue4 ,but fortitude is a       
virtue4 ,therefore the act of fortitude 
is directed not to fortitude but to     

happiness4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1         
,augustine says 7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4 xv7 
that fortitude is love ready to bear all
 things for ,god's sake4 ,now ,god is   
not the habit of fortitude1 but         
something better1 since the end must    
needs be better than what is directed to
 the end4 ,therefore the brave man does 
not act for the sake of the good of his 
habit4  ,on the contrary1 ,the          
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #g7 that
 to the brave man fortitude itself is a 
good3 and such is his end4  ,i answer   
that1 ,an end is twofold3 proximate and 
ultimate4 ,now the proximate end of     
every agent is to introduce a likeness  
of that agent's form into something     
else3 thus the end of fire in heating is
 to introduce the likeness of its heat  
into some passive matter1 and the end of
 the builder is to introduce into matter
 the likeness of his art4 ,whatever good
 ensues from this1 if it be intended1   
may be called the remote end of the     
agent4 ,now just as in things made1     

external matter is fashioned by art1 so 
in things done1 human deeds are         
fashioned by prudence4 ,accordingly we  
must conclude that the brave man intends
 as his proximate end to reproduce in   
action a likeness of his habit1 for he  
intends to act in accordance with his   
habit3 but his remote end is happiness  
or ,god4  ,this suffices for the        
,replies to the ,objections3 for the    
,first ,objection proceeds as though the
 very essence of a habit were its end1  
instead of the likeness of the habit in 
act1 as stated4 ,the other two          
objections consider the ultimate end4   
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1 
,art4 #h  ,whether the ,brave ,man      
,delights in ,his ,act8  ,objection #a3 
,it seems that the brave man delights in
 his act4 ,for delight is the unhindered
 action of a connatural habit 7,ethic4  
x1 #d1 #f1 #h74 ,now the brave deed     
proceeds from a habit which acts after  
the manner of nature4 ,therefore the    
brave man takes pleasure in his act4    

,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,ambrose1 commenting
 on ,gal4 #e3bb1 ,but the fruit of the  
,spirit is charity1 joy1 peace1 says    
that deeds of virtue are called fruits  
because they refresh man's mind with a  
holy and pure delight4 ,now the brave   
man performs acts of virtue4 ,therefore 
he takes pleasure in his act4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 the weaker is overcome by the
 stronger4 ,now the brave man has a     
stronger love for the good of virtue    
than for his own body1 which he exposes 
to the danger of death4 ,therefore the  
delight in the good of virtue banishes  
the pain of the body2 and consequently  
the brave man does all things with      
pleasure4  ,on the contrary1 ,the       
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #i7 that
 the brave man seems to have no delight 
in his act4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d1  
#e7 where we were treating of the       
passions1 pleasure is twofold2 one is   
bodily1 resulting from bodily contact1  
the other is spiritual1 resulting from  

an apprehension of the soul4 ,it is the 
latter which properly results from deeds
 of virtue1 since in them we consider   
the good of reason4 ,now the principal  
act of fortitude is to endure1 not only 
certain things that are unpleasant as   
apprehended by the soul--for instance1  
the loss of bodily life1 which the      
virtuous man loves not only as a natural
 good1 but also as being necessary for  
acts of virtue1 and things connected    
with them--but also to endure things    
unpleasant in respect of bodily contact1
 such as wounds and blows4 ,hence the   
brave man1 on one side1 has something   
that affords him delight1 namely as     
regards spiritual pleasure1 in the act  
itself of virtue and the end thereof3   
while1 on the other hand1 he has cause  
for both spiritual sorrow1 in the       
thought of losing his life1 and for     
bodily pain4 ,hence we read 7#b ,macc4  
#f3cj7 that ,eleazar said3 ,i suffer    
grievous pains in body3 but in soul am  
well content to suffer these things     

because ,i fear ,thee4  ,now the        
sensible pain of the body makes one     
insensible to the spiritual delight of  
virtue1 without the copious assistance  
of ,god's grace1 which has more strength
 to raise the soul to the ,divine things
 in which it delights1 than bodily pains
 have to afflict it4 ,thus the ,blessed 
,tiburtius1 while walking barefoot on   
the burning coal1 said that he felt as  
though he were walking on roses4  ,yet  
the virtue of fortitude prevents the    
reason from being entirely overcome by  
bodily pain4 ,and the delight of virtue 
overcomes spiritual sorrow1 inasmuch as 
a man prefers the good of virtue to the 
life of the body and to whatever        
appertains thereto4 ,hence the          
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #c2 iii1 
#i7 that it is not necessary for a brave
 man to delight so as to perceive his   
delight1 but it suffices for him not to 
be sad4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the vehemence
 of the action or passion of one power  
hinders the action of another power3    

wherefore the pain in his senses hinders
 the mind of the brave man from feeling 
delight in its proper operation4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,deeds of virtue are         
delightful chiefly on account of their  
end2 yet they can be painful by their   
nature1 and this is principally the case
 with fortitude4 ,hence the ,philosopher
 says 7,ethic4 iii1 #i7 that to perform 
deeds with pleasure does not happen in  
all virtues1 except in so far as one    
attains the end4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in  
the brave man spiritual sorrow is       
overcome by the delight of virtue4 ,yet 
since bodily pain is more sensible1 and 
the sensitive apprehension is more in   
evidence to man1 it follows that        
spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue 
fades away1 so to speak1 in the presence
 of great bodily pain4   ,,ninth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1 ,art4 #i 
,whether ,fortitude ,deals ,chiefly with
 ,sudden ,occurrences8  ,objection #a3  
,it seems that fortitude does not deal  
chiefly with sudden occurrences4 ,for it

 would seem that things occur suddenly  
when they are unforeseen4 ,but ,tully   
says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that      
fortitude is the deliberate facing of   
danger1 and bearing of toil4 ,therefore 
fortitude does not deal chiefly with    
sudden happenings4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i73 ,the     
brave man is not unmindful of what may  
be likely to happen2 he takes measures  
beforehand1 and looks out as from the   
conning-tower of his mind1 so as to     
encounter the future by his forethought1
 lest he should say afterwards3 ,this   
befell me because ,i did not think it   
could possibly happen4 ,but it is not   
possible to be prepared for the future  
in the case of sudden occurrences4      
,therefore the operation of fortitude is
 not concerned with sudden happenings4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 that the brave   
man is of good hope4 ,but hope looks    
forward to the future1 which is         
inconsistent with sudden occurrences4   

,therefore the operation of fortitude is
 not concerned with sudden happenings4  
,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says
 7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 that fortitude is    
chiefly about sudden dangers of death4  
,i answer that1 ,two things must be     
considered in the operation of          
fortitude4 ,one is in regard to its     
choice3 and thus fortitude is not about 
sudden occurrences3 because the brave   
man chooses to think beforehand of the  
dangers that may arise1 in order to be  
able to withstand them1 or to bear them 
more easily3 since according to ,gregory
 7,hom4 xxv in ,evang471 the blow that  
is foreseen strikes with less force1 and
 we are able more easily to bear earthly
 wrongs1 if we are forearmed with the   
shield of foreknowledge4 ,the other     
thing to be considered in the operation 
of fortitude regards the display of the 
virtuous habit3 and in this way         
fortitude is chiefly about sudden       
occurrences1 because according to the   
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 the habit

 of fortitude is displayed chiefly in   
sudden dangers3 since a habit works by  
way of nature4 ,wherefore if a person   
without forethought does that which     
pertains to virtue1 when necessity urges
 on account of some sudden danger1 this 
is a very strong proof that habitual    
fortitude is firmly seated in his mind4 
,yet is it possible for a person even   
without the habit of fortitude1 to      
prepare his mind against danger by long 
forethought3 in the same way as a brave 
man prepares himself when necessary4    
,this suffices for the ,replies to the  
,objections4   ,,tenth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1 ,art4 #aj  ,whether
 the ,brave ,man ,makes ,use of ,anger  
in ,his ,action8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
seems that the brave man does not use   
anger in his action4 ,for no one should 
employ as an instrument of his action   
that which he cannot use at will4 ,now  
man cannot use anger at will1 so as to  
take it up and lay it aside when he     
will4 ,for1 as the ,philosopher says    

7,de ,memoria ii71 when a bodily passion
 is in movement1 it does not rest at    
once just as one wishes4 ,therefore a   
brave man should not employ anger for   
his action4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if a   
man is competent to do a thing by       
himself1 he should not seek the         
assistance of something weaker and more 
imperfect4 ,now the reason is competent 
to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude1
 wherein anger is impotent3 wherefore   
,seneca says 7,de ,ira i73 ,reason by   
itself suffices not only to make us     
prepared for action but also to         
accomplish it4 ,in fact is there greater
 folly than for reason to seek help from
 anger8 the steadfast from the unstaid1 
the trusty from the untrustworthy1 the  
healthy from the sick8 ,therefore a     
brave man should not make use of anger4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as people are  
more earnest in doing deeds of fortitude
 on account of anger1 so are they on    
account of sorrow or desire2 wherefore  
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 

that wild beasts are incited to face    
danger through sorrow or pain1 and      
adulterous persons dare many things for 
the sake of desire4 ,now fortitude      
employs neither sorrow nor desire for   
its action4 ,therefore in like manner it
 should not employ anger4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 that anger helps the  
brave4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above
 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #b71 concerning 
anger and the other passions there was a
 difference of opinion between the      
,peripatetics and the ,stoics4 ,for the 
,stoics excluded anger and all other    
passions of the soul from the mind of a 
wise or good man3 whereas the           
,peripatetics1 of whom ,aristotle was   
the chief1 ascribed to virtuous men both
 anger and the other passions of the    
soul albeit modified by reason4 ,and    
possibly they differed not in reality   
but in their way of speaking4 ,for the  
,peripatetics1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #b71 gave the name of     

passions to all the movements of the    
sensitive appetite1 however they may    
comport themselves4 ,and since the      
sensitive appetite is moved by the      
command of reason1 so that it may       
cooperate by rendering action more      
prompt1 they held that virtuous persons 
should employ both anger and the other  
passions of the soul1 modified according
 to the dictate of reason4 ,on the other
 hand1 the ,stoics gave the name of     
passions to certain immoderate emotions 
of the sensitive appetite1 wherefore    
they called them sicknesses or diseases1
 and for this reason severed them       
altogether from virtue4  ,accordingly   
the brave man employs moderate anger for
 his action1 but not immoderate anger4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,anger that is         
moderated in accordance with reason is  
subject to the command of reason3 so    
that man uses it at his will1 which     
would not be the case were it           
immoderate4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,reason   
employs anger for its action1 not as    

seeking its assistance1 but because it  
uses the sensitive appetite as an       
instrument1 just as it uses the members 
of the body4 ,nor is it unbecoming for  
the instrument to be more imperfect than
 the principal agent1 even as the hammer
 is more imperfect than the smith4      
,moreover1 ,seneca was a follower of the
 ,stoics1 and the above words were aimed
 by him directly at ,aristotle4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,whereas fortitude1 as stated 
above 7,a4 #f71 has two acts1 namely    
endurance and aggression1 it employs    
anger1 not for the act of endurance1    
because the reason by itself performs   
this act1 but for the act of aggression1
 for which it employs anger rather than 
the other passions1 since it belongs to 
anger to strike at the cause of sorrow1 
so that it directly cooperates with     
fortitude in attacking4 ,on the other   
hand1 sorrow by its very nature gives   
way to the thing that hurts2 though     
accidentally it helps in aggression1    
either as being the cause of anger1 as  

stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #c71
 or as making a person expose himself to
 danger in order to escape from sorrow4 
,in like manner desire1 by its very     
nature1 tends to a pleasurable good1 to 
which it is directly contrary to        
withstand danger3 yet accidentally      
sometimes it helps one to attack1 in so 
far as one prefers to risk dangers      
rather than lack pleasure4 ,hence the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #e73 ,of
 all the cases in which fortitude arises
 from a passion1 the most natural is    
when a man is brave through anger1      
making his choice and acting for a      
purpose1 i4e4 for a due end2 this is    
true fortitude4   ,,eleventh ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1 ,art4 #aa  ,whether
 ,fortitude ,is a ,cardinal ,virtue8    
,objection #a3 ,it seems that fortitude 
is not a cardinal virtue4 ,for1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #aj71 anger is closely
 allied with fortitude4 ,now anger is   
not accounted a principal passion2 nor  
is daring which belongs to fortitude4   

,therefore neither should fortitude be  
reckoned a cardinal virtue4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 the object of virtue is good4 
,but the direct object of fortitude is  
not good1 but evil1 for it is endurance 
of evil and toil1 as ,tully says 7,de   
,invent4 ,rhet4 ii74 ,therefore         
fortitude is not a cardinal virtue4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the cardinal virtues
 are about those things upon which human
 life is chiefly occupied1 just as a    
door turns upon a hinge 7cardine74 ,but 
fortitude is about dangers of death     
which are of rare occurrence in human   
life4 ,therefore fortitude should not be
 reckoned a cardinal or principal       
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory     
7,moral4 xxii71 ,ambrose in his         
commentary on ,luke #f3bj1 and          
,augustine 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 xv71    
number fortitude among the four cardinal
 or principal virtues4  ,i answer that1 
,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1     
,,aa4 #c1 #d71 those virtues are said to
 be cardinal or principal which have a  

foremost claim to that which belongs to 
the virtues in common4 ,and among other 
conditions of virtue in general one is  
that it is stated to act steadfastly1   
according to ,ethic4 ii1 #d4 ,now       
fortitude above all lays claim to praise
 for steadfastness4 ,because he that    
stands firm is so much the more praised1
 as he is more strongly impelled to fall
 or recede4 ,now man is impelled to     
recede from that which is in accordance 
with reason1 both by the pleasing good  
and the displeasing evil4 ,but bodily   
pain impels him more strongly than      
pleasure4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4   
#hc1 qu4 #cf73 ,there is none that does 
not shun pain more than he desires      
pleasure4 ,for we perceive that even the
 most untamed beasts are deterred from  
the greatest pleasures by the fear of   
pain4 ,and among the pains of the mind  
and dangers those are mostly feared     
which lead to death1 and it is against  
them that the brave man stands firm4    
,therefore fortitude is a cardinal      

virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,daring and   
anger do not cooperate with fortitude in
 its act of endurance1 wherein its      
steadfastness is chiefly commended3 for 
it is by that act that the brave man    
curbs fear1 which is a principal        
passion1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#be1 ,a4 #d74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,virtue 
is directed to the good of reason which 
it behooves to safeguard against the    
onslaught of evils4 ,and fortitude is   
directed to evils of the body1 as       
contraries which it withstands1 and to  
the good of reason1 as the end1 which it
 intends to safeguard4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,though dangers of death are of rare   
occurrence1 yet the occasions of those  
dangers occur frequently1 since on      
account of justice which he pursues1 and
 also on account of other good deeds1   
man encounters mortal adversaries4      
,,twelfth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abc1
 ,art4 #ab  ,whether ,fortitude ,excels 
,among ,all ,other ,virtues8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it seems that fortitude excels    

among all other virtues4 ,for ,ambrose  
says 7,de ,offic4 i73 ,fortitude is     
higher1 so to speak1 than the rest4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue is about that
 which is difficult and good4 ,but      
fortitude is about most difficult       
things4 ,therefore it is the greatest of
 the virtues4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the  
person of a man is more excellent than  
his possessions4 ,but fortitude is about
 a man's person1 for it is this that a  
man exposes to the danger of death for  
the good of virtue3 whereas justice and 
the other moral virtues are about other 
and external things4 ,therefore         
fortitude is the chief of the moral     
virtues4  ,obj4 #d3 ,on the contrary1   
,tully says 7,de ,offic4 i73 ,justice is
 the most resplendent of the virtues and
 gives its name to a good man4  ,obj4   
#e3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says     
7,rhet4 i1 #ai73 ,those virtues must    
needs be greatest which are most        
profitable to others4 ,now liberality   
seems to be more useful than fortitude4 

,therefore it is a greater virtue4  ,i  
answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de   
,trin4 vi71 ,in things that are great1  
but not in bulk1 to be great is to be   
good3 wherefore the better a virtue the 
greater it is4 ,now reason's good is    
man's good1 according to ,dionysius     
7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 prudence1 since it is a
 perfection of reason1 has the good     
essentially3 while justice effects this 
good1 since it belongs to justice to    
establish the order of reason in all    
human affairs3 whereas the other virtues
 safeguard this good1 inasmuch as they  
moderate the passions1 lest they lead   
man away from reason's good4 ,as to the 
order of the latter1 fortitude holds the
 first place1 because fear of dangers of
 death has the greatest power to make   
man recede from the good of reason3 and 
after fortitude comes temperance1 since 
also pleasures of touch excel all others
 in hindering the good of reason4 ,now  
to be a thing essentially ranks before  
effecting it1 and the latter ranks      

before safeguarding it by removing      
obstacles thereto4 ,wherefore among the 
cardinal virtues1 prudence ranks first1 
justice second1 fortitude third1        
temperance fourth1 and after these the  
other virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,ambrose places fortitude before the    
other virtues1 in respect of a certain  
general utility1 inasmuch as it is      
useful both in warfare1 and in matters  
relating to civil or home life4 ,hence  
he begins by saying 7,de ,offic4 i73    
,now we come to treat of fortitude1     
which being higher so to speak than the 
others1 is applicable both to warlike   
and to civil matters4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,virtue essentially regards the good    
rather than the difficult4 ,hence the   
greatness of a virtue is measured       
according to its goodness rather than   
its difficulty4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a man
 does not expose his person to dangers  
of death except in order to safeguard   
justice3 wherefore the praise awarded to
 fortitude depends somewhat on justice4 

,hence ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i7    
that fortitude without justice is an    
occasion of injustice2 since the        
stronger a man is the more ready is he  
to oppress the weaker4  ,the ,fourth    
argument is granted4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3  
,liberality is useful in conferring     
certain particular favors3 whereas a    
certain general utility attaches to     
fortitude1 since it safeguards the whole
 order of justice4 ,hence the           
,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #i7 that   
just and brave men are most beloved1    
because they are most useful in war and 
peace4   ,,question #abd  ,,of          
,,martyrdom 7,in ,five ,articles7  ,we  
must now consider martyrdom1 under which
 head there are five points of inquiry3 
7#a7 ,whether martyrdom is an act of    
virtue8  7#b7 ,of what virtue is it the 
act8  7#c7 ,concerning the perfection of
 this act2  7#d7 ,the pain of martyrdom2
  7#e7 ,its cause4   ,,first ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abd1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,martyrdom ,is an ,act of ,virtue8      

,objection #a3 ,it seems that martyrdom 
is not an act of virtue4 ,for all acts  
of virtue are voluntary4 ,but martyrdom 
is sometimes not voluntary1 as in the   
case of the ,innocents who were slain   
for ,christ's sake1 and of whom ,hilary 
says 7,super ,matth4 i7 that they       
attained the ripe age of eternity       
through the glory of martyrdom4         
,therefore martyrdom is not an act of   
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing    
unlawful is an act of virtue4 ,now it is
 unlawful to kill oneself1 as stated    
above 7,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #e71 and yet        
martyrdom is achieved by so doing3 for  
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i7 that 
during persecution certain holy women1  
in order to escape from those who       
threatened their chastity1 threw        
themselves into a river1 and so ended   
their lives1 and their martyrdom is     
honored in the ,catholic ,church with   
most solemn veneration4 ,therefore      
martyrdom is not an act of virtue4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is praiseworthy  

to offer oneself to do an act of virtue4
 ,but it is not praiseworthy to court   
martyrdom1 rather would it seem to be   
presumptuous and rash4 ,therefore       
martyrdom is not an act of virtue4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,the reward of beatitude  
is not due save to acts of virtue4 ,now 
it is due to martyrdom1 since it is     
written 7,matt4 #e3aj73 ,blessed are    
they that suffer persecution for        
justice' sake1 for theirs is the kingdom
 of heaven4 ,therefore martyrdom is an  
act of virtue4  ,i answer that1 ,as     
stated above 7,q4 #abc1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c71  
it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in
 the good of reason4 ,now the good of   
reason consists in the truth as its     
proper object1 and in justice as its    
proper effect1 as shown above 7,q4 #aji1
 ,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #ab74 ,and 
martyrdom consists essentially in       
standing firmly to truth and justice    
against the assaults of persecution4    
,hence it is evident that martyrdom is  
an act of virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3     

,some have said that in the case of the 
,innocents the use of their free will   
was miraculously accelerated1 so that   
they suffered martyrdom even            
voluntarily4 ,since1 however1 ,scripture
 contains no proof of this1 it is better
 to say that these babes in being slain 
obtained by ,god's grace the glory of   
martyrdom which others acquire by their 
own will4 ,for the shedding of one's    
blood for ,christ's sake takes the place
 of ,baptism4 ,wherefore just as in the 
case of baptized children the merit of  
,christ is conducive to the acquisition 
of glory through the baptismal grace1 so
 in those who were slain for ,christ's  
sake the merit of ,christ's martyrdom is
 conducive to the acquisition of the    
martyr's palm4 ,hence ,augustine says in
 a sermon on the ,epiphany 7,de         
,diversis lxvi71 as though he were      
addressing them3 ,a man that does not   
believe that children are benefited by  
the baptism of ,christ will doubt of    
your being crowned in suffering for     

,christ4 ,you were not old enough to    
believe in ,christ's future sufferings1 
but you had a body wherein you could    
endure suffering of ,christ ,who was to 
suffer4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine    
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i7 that possibly   
the ,church was induced by certain      
credible witnesses of ,divine authority 
thus to honor the memory of those holy  
women 99,cf4 ,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the precepts of the   
,law are about acts of virtue4 ,now it  
has been stated 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 
#a1 ad #d7 that some of the precepts of 
the ,divine ,law are to be understood in
 reference to the preparation of the    
mind1 in the sense that man ought to be 
prepared to do such and such a thing1   
whenever expedient4 ,in the same way    
certain things belong to an act of      
virtue as regards the preparation of the
 mind1 so that in such and such a case a
 man should act according to reason4    
,and this observation would seem very   
much to the point in the case of        

martyrdom1 which consists in the right  
endurance of sufferings unjustly        
inflicted4 ,nor ought a man to give     
another an occasion of acting unjustly3 
yet if anyone act unjustly1 one ought to
 endure it in moderation4   ,,second    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abd1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,martyrdom ,is an ,act of      
,fortitude8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems   
that martyrdom is not an act of         
fortitude4 ,for the ,greek martyr       
signifies a witness4 ,now witness is    
borne to the faith of ,christ4 according
 to ,acts #a3h1 ,you shall be witnesses 
unto ,me1 etc4 and ,maximus says in a   
sermon3 ,the mother of martyrs is the   
,catholic faith which those glorious    
warriors have sealed with their blood4  
,therefore martyrdom is an act of faith 
rather than of fortitude4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 a praiseworthy act belongs    
chiefly to the virtue which inclines    
thereto1 is manifested thereby1 and     
without which the act avails nothing4   
,now charity is the chief incentive to  

martyrdom3 ,thus ,maximus says in a     
sermon3 ,the charity of ,christ is      
victorious in ,his martyrs4 ,again the  
greatest proof of charity lies in the   
act of martyrdom1 according to ,john    
#ae3ac1 ,greater love than this no man  
hath1 that a man lay down his life for  
his friends4 ,moreover without charity  
martyrdom avails nothing1 according to  
#a ,cor4 #ac3c1 ,if ,i should deliver my
 body to be burned1 and have not        
charity1 it profiteth me nothing4       
,therefore martyrdom is an act of       
charity rather than of fortitude4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says in a     
sermon on ,st4 ,cyprian3 ,it is easy to 
honor a martyr by singing his praises1  
but it is a great thing to imitate his  
faith and patience4 ,now that which     
calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous  
act1 is the virtue of which it is the   
act4 ,therefore martyrdom is an act of  
patience rather than of fortitude4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,cyprian says 7,ep4 ad    
,mart4 et ,conf4 ii73 ,blessed martyrs1 

with what praise shall ,i extol you8    
,most valiant warriors1 how shall ,i    
find words to proclaim the strength of  
your courage8 ,now a person is praised  
on account of the virtue whose act he   
performs4 ,therefore martyrdom is an act
 of fortitude4  ,i answer that1 ,as     
stated above 7,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #a1 seqq471 
it belongs to fortitude to strengthen   
man in the good of virtue1 especially   
against dangers1 and chiefly against    
dangers of death1 and most of all       
against those that occur in battle4 ,now
 it is evident that in martyrdom man is 
firmly strengthened in the good of      
virtue1 since he cleaves to faith and   
justice notwithstanding the threatening 
danger of death1 the imminence of which 
is moreover due to a kind of particular 
contest with his persecutors4 ,hence    
,cyprian says in a sermon 7,ep4 ad      
,mart4 et ,conf4 ii73 ,the crowd of     
onlookers wondered to see an unearthly  
battle1 and ,christ's servants fighting 
erect1 undaunted in speech1 with souls  

unmoved1 and strength divine4 ,wherefore
 it is evident that martyrdom is an act 
of fortitude2 for which reason the      
,church reads in the office of ,martyrs3
 ,they became valiant in battle 99,heb4 
#aa3cd4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,two things   
must be considered in the act of        
fortitude4 ,one is the good wherein the 
brave man is strengthened1 and this is  
the end of fortitude2 the other is the  
firmness itself1 whereby a man does not 
yield to the contraries that hinder him 
from achieving that good1 and in this   
consists the essence of fortitude4 ,now 
just as civic fortitude strengthens a   
man's mind in human justice1 for the    
safeguarding of which he braves the     
danger of death1 so gratuitous fortitude
 strengthens man's soul in the good of  
,divine justice1 which is through faith 
in ,christ ,jesus1 according to ,rom4   
#c3bb4 ,thus martyrdom is related to    
faith as the end in which one is        
strengthened1 but to fortitude as the   
eliciting habit4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      

,charity inclines one to the act of     
martyrdom1 as its first and chief motive
 cause1 being the virtue commanding it1 
whereas fortitude inclines thereto as   
being its proper motive cause1 being the
 virtue that elicits it4 ,hence         
martyrdom is an act of charity as       
commanding1 and of fortitude as         
eliciting4 ,for this reason also it     
manifests both virtues4 ,it is due to   
charity that it is meritorious1 like any
 other act of virtue3 and for this      
reason it avails not without charity4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#abc1 ,a4 #f71 the chief act of         
fortitude is endurance3 to this and not 
to its secondary act1 which is          
aggression1 martyrdom belongs4 ,and     
since patience serves fortitude on the  
part of its chief act1 viz4 endurance1  
hence it is that martyrs are also       
praised for their patience4   ,,third   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abd1 ,art4 #c 
,whether ,martyrdom ,is an ,act of the  
,greatest ,perfection8  ,objection #a3  

,it seems that martyrdom is not an act  
of the greatest perfection4 ,for        
seemingly that which is a matter of     
counsel and not of precept pertains to  
perfection1 because1 to wit1 it is not  
necessary for salvation4 ,but it would  
seem that martyrdom is necessary for    
salvation1 since the ,apostle says      
7,rom4 #aj3aj71 ,with the heart we      
believe unto justice1 but with the mouth
 confession is made unto salvation1 and 
it is written 7#a ,john #c3af71 that we 
ought to lay down our lives for the     
brethren4 ,therefore martyrdom does not 
pertain to perfection4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 it seems to point to greater  
perfection that a man give his soul to  
,god1 which is done by obedience1 than  
that he give ,god his body1 which is    
done by martyrdom3 wherefore ,gregory   
says 7,moral4 xxxv7 that obedience is   
preferable to all sacrifices4 ,therefore
 martyrdom is not an act of the greatest
 perfection4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it    
would seem better to do good to others  

than to maintain oneself in good1 since 
the good of the nation is better than   
the good of the individual1 according to
 the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #b74 ,now 
he that suffers martyrdom profits       
himself alone1 whereas he that teaches  
does good to many4 ,therefore the act of
 teaching and guiding subjects is more  
perfect than the act of martyrdom4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,augustine 7,de ,sanct4   
,virgin4 xlvi7 prefers martyrdom to     
virginity which pertains to perfection4 
,therefore martyrdom seems to belong to 
perfection in the highest degree4  ,i   
answer that1 ,we may speak of an act of 
virtue in two ways4 ,first1 with regard 
to the species of that act1 as compared 
to the virtue proximately eliciting it4 
,in this way martyrdom1 which consists  
in the due endurance of death1 cannot be
 the most perfect of virtuous acts1     
because endurance of death is not       
praiseworthy in itself1 but only in so  
far as it is directed to some good      
consisting in an act of virtue1 such as 

faith or the love of ,god1 so that this 
act of virtue being the end is better4  
,a virtuous act may be considered in    
another way1 in comparison with its     
first motive cause1 which is the love of
 charity1 and it is in this respect that
 an act comes to belong to the          
perfection of life1 since1 as the       
,apostle says 7,col4 #c3ad71 that       
charity 4 4 4 is the bond of perfection4
 ,now1 of all virtuous acts martyrdom is
 the greatest proof of the perfection of
 charity3 since a man's love for a thing
 is proved to be so much the greater1   
according as that which he despises for 
its sake is more dear to him1 or that   
which he chooses to suffer for its sake 
is more odious4 ,but it is evident that 
of all the goods of the present life man
 loves life itself most1 and on the     
other hand he hates death more than     
anything1 especially when it is         
accompanied by the pains of bodily      
torment1 from fear of which even dumb   
animals refrain from the greatest       

pleasures1 as ,augustine observes 7,,qq4
 #hc1 qu4 #cf74 ,and from this point of 
view it is clear that martyrdom is the  
most perfect of human acts in respect of
 its genus1 as being the sign of the    
greatest charity1 according to ,john    
#ae3ac3 ,greater love than this no man  
hath1 that a man lay down his life for  
his friends4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there is
 no act of perfection1 which is a matter
 of counsel1 but what in certain cases  
is a matter of precept1 as being        
necessary for salvation4 ,thus          
,augustine declares 7,de ,adult4        
,conjug4 xiii7 that a man is under the  
obligation of observing continency1     
through the absence or sickness of his  
wife4 ,hence it is not contrary to the  
perfection of martyrdom if in certain   
cases it be necessary for salvation1    
since there are cases when it is not    
necessary for salvation to suffer       
martyrdom2 thus we read of many holy    
martyrs who through zeal for the faith  
or brotherly love gave themselves up to 

martyrdom of their own accord4 ,as to   
these precepts1 they are to be          
understood as referring to the          
preparation of the mind4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,martyrdom embraces the highest     
possible degree of obedience1 namely    
obedience unto death2 thus we read of   
,christ 7,phil4 #b3h7 that ,he became   
obedient unto death4 ,hence it is       
evident that martyrdom is of itself more
 perfect than obedience considered      
absolutely4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this     
argument considers martyrdom according  
to the proper species of its act1 whence
 it derives no excellence over all other
 virtuous acts2 thus neither is         
fortitude more excellent than all       
virtues4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #abd1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,death ,is
 ,essential to ,martyrdom8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it seems that death is not         
essential to martyrdom4 ,for ,jerome    
says in a sermon on the ,assumption     
7,epist4 ad ,paul4 et ,eustoch473 ,i    
should say rightly that the ,mother of  

,god was both virgin and martyr1        
although she ended her days in peace3   
and ,gregory says 7,hom4 iii in         
,evang473 ,although persecution has     
ceased to offer the opportunity1 yet the
 peace we enjoy is not without its      
martyrdom1 since even if we no longer   
yield the life of the body to the sword1
 yet do we slay fleshly desires in the  
soul with the sword of the spirit4      
,therefore there can be martyrdom       
without suffering death4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 we read of certain women as   
commended for despising life for the    
sake of safeguarding the integrity of   
the flesh3 wherefore seemingly the      
integrity of chastity is preferable to  
the life of the body4 ,now sometimes the
 integrity of the flesh has been        
forfeited or has been threatened in     
confession of the ,christian faith1 as  
in the case of ,agnes and ,lucy4        
,therefore it seems that the name of    
martyr should be accorded to a woman who
 forfeits the integrity of the flesh for

 the sake of ,christ's faith1 rather    
than if she were to forfeit even the    
life of the body3 wherefore also ,lucy  
said3 ,if thou causest me to be violated
 against my will1 my chastity will gain 
me a twofold crown4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 martyrdom is an act of fortitude4 ,but 
it belongs to fortitude to brave not    
only death but also other hardships1 as 
,augustine declares 7,music4 vi74 ,now  
there are many other hardships besides  
death1 which one may suffer for         
,christ's faith1 namely imprisonment1   
exile1 being stripped of one's goods1 as
 mentioned in ,heb4 #aj3cd1 for which   
reason we celebrate the martyrdom of    
,pope ,saint ,marcellus1 notwithstanding
 that he died in prison4 ,therefore it  
is not essential to martyrdom that one  
suffer the pain of death4  ,obj4 #d3    
,further1 martyrdom is a meritorious    
act1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #a2 ,a4
 #c74 ,now it cannot be a meritorious   
act after death4 ,therefore it is before
 death2 and consequently death is not   

essential to martyrdom4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,maximus says in a sermon on  
the martyrs that in dying for the faith 
he conquers who would have been         
vanquished in living without faith4  ,i 
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 
a martyr is so called as being a witness
 to the ,christian faith1 which teaches 
us to despise things visible for the    
sake of things invisible1 as stated in  
,heb4 #aa4 ,accordingly it belongs to   
martyrdom that a man bear witness to the
 faith in showing by deed that he       
despises all things present1 in order to
 obtain invisible goods to come4 ,now so
 long as a man retains the life of the  
body he does not show by deed that he   
despises all things relating to the     
body4 ,for men are wont to despise both 
their kindred and all they possess1 and 
even to suffer bodily pain1 rather than 
lose life4 ,hence ,satan testified      
against ,job 7,job #b3d73 ,skin for     
skin1 and all that a man hath he will   
give for his soul ,douay3 'life' i4e4   

for the life of his body4 ,therefore the
 perfect notion of martyrdom requires   
that a man suffer death for ,christ's   
sake4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the authorities
 quoted1 and the like that one may meet 
with1 speak of martyrdom by way of      
similitude4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when a   
woman forfeits the integrity of the     
flesh1 or is condemned to forfeit it    
under pretext of the ,christian faith1  
it is not evident to men whether she    
suffers this for love of the ,christian 
faith1 or rather through contempt of    
chastity4 ,wherefore in the sight of men
 her testimony is not held to be        
sufficient1 and consequently this is not
 martyrdom properly speaking4 ,in the   
sight of ,god1 however1 ,who searcheth  
the heart1 this may be deemed worthy of 
a reward1 as ,lucy said4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #abc1 ,,aa4   
#d1 #e71 fortitude regards danger of    
death chiefly1 and other dangers        
consequently2 wherefore a person is not 
called a martyr merely for suffering    

imprisonment1 or exile1 or forfeiture of
 his wealth1 except in so far as these  
result in death4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the 
merit of martyrdom is not after death1  
but in the voluntary endurance of death1
 namely in the fact that a person       
willingly suffers being put to death4   
,it happens sometimes1 however1 that a  
man lives for some time after being     
mortally wounded for ,christ's sake1 or 
after suffering for the faith of ,christ
 any other kind of hardship inflicted by
 persecution and continued until death  
ensues4 ,the act of martyrdom is        
meritorious while a man is in this      
state1 and at the very time that he is  
suffering these hardships4   ,,fifth    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abd1 ,art4 #e 
,whether ,faith ,alone ,is the ,cause of
 ,martyrdom8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems  
that faith alone is the cause of        
martyrdom4 ,for it is written 7#a ,pet4 
#d3ae1 #af73 ,let none of you suffer as 
a murderer1 or a thief1 or a railer1 or 
a coveter of other men's things4 ,but if

 as a ,christian1 let him not be        
ashamed1 but let him glorify ,god in    
this name4 ,now a man is said to be a   
,christian because he holds the faith of
 ,christ4 ,therefore only faith in      
,christ gives the glory of martyrdom to 
those who suffer4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a
 martyr is a kind of witness4 ,but      
witness is borne to the truth alone4    
,now one is not called a martyr for     
bearing witness to any truth1 but only  
for witnessing to the ,divine truth1    
otherwise a man would be a martyr if he 
were to die for confessing a truth of   
geometry or some other speculative      
science1 which seems ridiculous4        
,therefore faith alone is the cause of  
martyrdom4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 those   
virtuous deeds would seem to be of most 
account which are directed to the common
 good1 since the good of the nation is  
better than the good of the individual1 
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
i1 #b74 ,if1 then1 some other good were 
the cause of martyrdom1 it would seem   

that before all those would be martyrs  
who die for the defense of their        
country4 ,yet this is not consistent    
with ,church observance1 for we do not  
celebrate the martyrdom of those who die
 in a just war4 ,therefore faith alone  
is the cause of martyrdom4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4 #e3aj73
 ,blessed are they that suffer          
persecution for justice' sake1 which    
pertains to martyrdom1 according to a   
gloss1 as well as ,jerome's commentary  
on this passage4 ,now not only faith but
 also the other virtues pertain to      
justice4 ,therefore other virtues can be
 the cause of martyrdom4  ,i answer     
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #d71 martyrs
 are so called as being witnesses1      
because by suffering in body unto death 
they bear witness to the truth2 not     
indeed to any truth1 but to the truth   
which is in accordance with godliness1  
and was made known to us by ,christ3    
wherefore ,christ's martyrs are ,his    
witnesses4 ,now this truth is the truth 

of faith4 ,wherefore the cause of all   
martyrdom is the truth of faith4  ,but  
the truth of faith includes not only    
inward belief1 but also outward         
profession1 which is expressed not only 
by words1 whereby one confesses the     
faith1 but also by deeds1 whereby a     
person shows that he has faith1         
according to ,james #b3ah1 ,i will show 
thee1 by works1 my faith4 ,hence it is  
written of certain people 7,titus       
#a3af73 ,they profess that they know    
,god but in their works they deny ,him4 
,thus all virtuous deeds1 inasmuch as   
they are referred to ,god1 are          
professions of the faith whereby we come
 to know that ,god requires these works 
of us1 and rewards us for them3 and in  
this way they can be the cause of       
martyrdom4 ,for this reason the ,church 
celebrates the martyrdom of ,blessed    
,john the ,baptist1 who suffered death1 
not for refusing to deny the faith1 but 
for reproving adultery4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,a ,christian is one who is         

,christ's4 ,now a person is said to be  
,christ's1 not only through having faith
 in ,christ1 but also because he is     
actuated to virtuous deeds by the       
,spirit of ,christ1 according to ,rom4  
#h3i1 ,if any man have not the ,spirit  
of ,christ1 he is none of ,his2 and     
again because in imitation of ,christ he
 is dead to sins1 according to ,gal4    
#e3bd1 ,they that are ,christ's have    
crucified their flesh with the vices and
 concupiscences4 ,hence to suffer as a  
,christian is not only to suffer in     
confession of the faith1 which is done  
by words1 but also to suffer for doing  
any good work1 or for avoiding any sin1 
for ,christ's sake1 because this all    
comes under the head of witnessing to   
the faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the truth 
of other sciences has no connection with
 the worship of the ,godhead3 hence it  
is not called truth according to        
godliness1 and consequently the         
confession thereof cannot be said to be 
the direct cause of martyrdom4 ,yet1    

since every lie is a sin1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71         
avoidance of a lie1 to whatever truth it
 may be contrary1 may be the cause of   
martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin    
against the ,divine ,law4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,the good of one's country is       
paramount among human goods3 yet the    
,divine good1 which is the proper cause 
of martyrdom1 is of more account than   
human good4 ,nevertheless1 since human  
good may become ,divine1 for instance   
when it is referred to ,god1 it follows 
that any human good in so far as it is  
referred to ,god1 may be the cause of   
martyrdom4   ,,question #abe  ,,of      
,,fear99 7,in ,four ,articles7 99 ,st4  
,thomas calls this vice indifferently   
'fear' or 'timidity4' ,the translation  
requires one to adhere to these terms on
 account of the connection with the     
passion of fear4 ,otherwise 'cowardice' 
would be a better rendering4  ,we must  
now consider the vices opposed to       
fortitude3 7#a7 ,fear2 7#b7             

,fearlessness2 7#c7 ,daring4  ,under the
 first head there are four points of    
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether fear is a sin8  
7#b7 ,whether it is opposed to          
fortitude8  7#c7 ,whether it is a mortal
 sin8  7#d7 ,whether it excuses from    
sin1 or diminishes it8   ,,first        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abe1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,fear ,is a ,sin8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it seems that fear is not a sin4   
,for fear is a passion1 as stated above 
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #db74    
,now we are neither praised nor blamed  
for passions1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii4  
,since then every sin is blameworthy1 it
 seems that fear is not a sin4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 nothing that is commanded 
in the ,divine ,law is a sin3 since the 
law of the ,lord is unspotted 7,ps4     
#ah3h74 ,yet fear is commanded in ,god's
 law1 for it is written 7,eph4 #f3e73   
,servants1 be obedient to them that are 
your lords according to the flesh1 with 
fear and trembling4 ,therefore fear is  
not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing 

that is naturally in man is a sin1 for  
sin is contrary to nature according to  
,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii74 ,now 
fear is natural to man3 wherefore the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #g7 that
 a man would be insane or insensible to 
pain1 if nothing1 not even earthquakes  
nor deluges1 inspired him with fear4    
,therefore fear is not a sin4  ,on the  
contrary1 our ,lord said 7,matt4        
#aj3bh73 ,fear ye not them that kill the
 body1 and it is written 7,ezech4 #b3f73
 ,fear not1 neither be thou afraid of   
their words4  ,i answer that1 ,a human  
act is said to be a sin on account of   
its being inordinate1 because the good  
of a human act consists in order1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4     
#aad1 ,a4 #a74 ,now this due order      
requires that the appetite be subject to
 the ruling of reason4 ,and reason      
dictates that certain things should be  
shunned and some sought after4 ,among   
things to be shunned1 it dictates that  
some are to be shunned more than others2

 and among things to be sought after1   
that some are to be sought after more   
than others4 ,moreover1 the more a good 
is to be sought after1 the more is the  
opposite evil to be shunned4 ,the result
 is that reason dictates that certain   
goods are to be sought after more than  
certain evils are to be avoided4        
,accordingly when the appetite shuns    
what the reason dictates that we should 
endure rather than forfeit others that  
we should rather seek for1 fear is      
inordinate and sinful4 ,on the other    
hand1 when the appetite fears so as to  
shun what reason requires to be shunned1
 the appetite is neither inordinate nor 
sinful4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,fear in its  
generic acceptation denotes avoidance in
 general4 ,hence in this way it does not
 include the notion of good or evil3 and
 the same applies to every other        
passion4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher    
says that passions call for neither     
praise nor blame1 because1 to wit1 we   
neither praise nor blame those who are  

angry or afraid1 but only those who     
behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate
 manner4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fear    
which the ,apostle inculcates is in     
accordance with reason1 namely that     
servants should fear lest they be       
lacking in the service they owe their   
masters4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,reason      
dictates that we should shun the evils  
that we cannot withstand1 and the       
endurance of which profits us nothing4  
,hence there is no sin in fearing them4 
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abe1 
,art4 #b  ,whether the ,sin of ,fear ,is
 ,contrary to ,fortitude8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it seems that the sin of fear is   
not contrary to fortitude3 because      
fortitude is about dangers of death1 as 
stated above 7,q4 #abc1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e74  
,but the sin of fear is not always      
connected with dangers of death1 for a  
gloss on ,ps4 #abg3a1 ,blessed are all  
they that fear the ,lord1 says that it  
is human fear whereby we dread to suffer
 carnal dangers1 or to lose worldly     

goods4 ,again a gloss on ,matt4 #bg3dd1 
,he prayed the third time1 saying the   
selfsame word1 says that evil fear is   
threefold1 fear of death1 fear of pain1 
and fear of contempt4 ,therefore the sin
 of fear is not contrary to fortitude4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the chief reason why
 a man is commended for fortitude is    
that he exposes himself to the danger of
 death4 ,now sometimes a man exposes    
himself to death through fear of slavery
 or shame4 ,thus ,augustine relates 7,de
 ,civ4 ,dei i7 that ,cato1 in order not 
to be ,caesar's slave1 gave himself up  
to death4 ,therefore the sin of fear    
bears a certain likeness to fortitude   
instead of being opposed thereto4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 all despair arises from  
fear4 ,but despair is opposed not to    
fortitude but to hope1 as stated above  
7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #a2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4 
#d74 ,neither therefore is the sin of   
fear opposed to fortitude4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1
 #g2 iii1 #g7 states that timidity is   

opposed to fortitude4  ,i answer that1  
,as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c2      
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1 ,a4 #a71 all fear     
arises from love2 since no one fears    
save what is contrary to something he   
loves4 ,now love is not confined to any 
particular kind of virtue or vice3 but  
ordinate love is included in every      
virtue1 since every virtuous man loves  
the good proper to his virtue2 while    
inordinate love is included in every    
sin1 because inordinate love gives use  
to inordinate desire4 ,hence in like    
manner inordinate fear is included in   
every sin2 thus the covetous man fears  
the loss of money1 the intemperate man  
the loss of pleasure1 and so on4 ,but   
the greatest fear of all is that which  
has the danger of death for its object1 
as we find proved in ,ethic4 iii1 #f4   
,wherefore the inordinateness of this   
fear is opposed to fortitude which      
regards dangers of death4 ,for this     
reason timidity is said to be           
antonomastically99 opposed to fortitude4

 99,antonomasia is the figure of speech 
whereby we substitute the general for   
the individual term2 e4g4 ,the          
,philosopher for ,aristotle3 and so     
timidity1 which is inordinate fear of   
any evil1 is employed to denote         
inordinate fear of the danger of death4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passages quoted   
refer to inordinate fear in its generic 
acceptation1 which can be opposed to    
various virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,human acts are estimated chiefly with  
reference to the end1 as stated above   
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4  
#f73 and it belongs to a brave man to   
expose himself to danger of death for   
the sake of a good4 ,but a man who      
exposes himself to danger of death in   
order to escape from slavery or         
hardships is overcome by fear1 which is 
contrary to fortitude4 ,hence the       
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #g71    
that to die in order to escape poverty1 
lust1 or something disagreeable is an   
act not of fortitude but of cowardice3  

for to shun hardships is a mark of      
effeminacy4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated
 above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,a4 #b71 fear 
is the beginning of despair even as hope
 is the beginning of daring4 ,wherefore1
 just as fortitude which employs daring 
in moderation presupposes hope1 so on   
the other hand despair proceeds from    
some kind of fear4 ,it does not follow1 
however1 that any kind of despair       
results from any kind of fear1 but that 
only from fear of the same kind4 ,now   
the despair that is opposed to hope is  
referred to another kind1 namely to     
,divine things2 whereas the fear that is
 opposed to fortitude regards dangers of
 death4 ,hence the argument does not    
prove4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #abe1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,fear ,is a
 ,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems
 that fear is not a mortal sin4 ,for1 as
 stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4    
#a71 fear is in the irascible faculty   
which is a part of the sensuality4 ,now 
there is none but venial sin in the     

sensuality1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1   
,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore fear is not
 a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1     
every mortal sin turns the heart wholly 
from ,god4 ,but fear does not this1 for 
a gloss on ,judges #g3c1 ,whosoever is  
fearful1 etc41 says that a man is       
fearful when he trembles at the very    
thought of conflict2 yet he is not so   
wholly terrified at heart1 but that he  
can rally and take courage4 ,therefore  
fear is not a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 mortal sin is a lapse not only
 from perfection but also from a        
precept4 ,but fear does not make one    
lapse from a precept1 but only from     
perfection2 for a gloss on ,deut4 #bj3h1
 ,what man is there that is fearful and 
fainthearted8 says3 ,we learn from this 
that no man can take up the profession  
of contemplation or spiritual warfare1  
if he still fears to be despoiled of    
earthly riches4 ,therefore fear is not a
 mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,for    
mortal sin alone is the pain of hell    

due3 and yet this is due to the fearful1
 according to ,apoc4 #ba3h1 ,but the    
fearful and unbelieving and the         
abominable1 etc41 shall have their      
portion in the pool burning with fire   
and brimstone which is the second death4
 ,therefore fear is a mortal sin4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 
fear is a sin through being inordinate1 
that is to say1 through shunning what   
ought not to be shunned according to    
reason4 ,now sometimes this             
inordinateness of fear is confined to   
the sensitive appetites1 without the    
accession of the rational appetite's    
consent3 and then it cannot be a mortal1
 but only a venial sin4 ,but sometimes  
this inordinateness of fear reaches to  
the rational appetite which is called   
the will1 which deliberately shuns      
something against the dictate of reason3
 and this inordinateness of fear is     
sometimes a mortal1 sometimes a venial  
sin4 ,for if a man through fear of the  
danger of death or of any other temporal

 evil is so disposed as to do what is   
forbidden1 or to omit what is commanded 
by the ,divine law1 such fear is a      
mortal sin3 otherwise it is a venial    
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument   
considers fear as confined to the       
sensuality4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this     
gloss also can be understood as         
referring to the fear that is confined  
within the sensuality4 ,or better still 
we may reply that a man is terrified    
with his whole heart when fear banishes 
his courage beyond remedy4 ,now even    
when fear is a mortal sin1 it may happen
 nevertheless that one is not so        
wilfully terrified that one cannot be   
persuaded to put fear aside3 thus       
sometimes a man sins mortally by        
consenting to concupiscence1 and is     
turned aside from accomplishing what he 
purposed doing4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this 
gloss speaks of the fear that turns man 
aside from a good that is necessary1 not
 for the fulfilment of a precept1 but   
for the perfection of a counsel4 ,such  

like fear is not a mortal sin1 but is   
sometimes venial3 and sometimes it is   
not a sin1 for instance when one has a  
reasonable cause for fear4   ,,fourth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abe1 ,art4 #d 
,whether ,fear ,excuses from ,sin8      
,objection #a3 ,it seems that fear does 
not excuse from sin4 ,for fear is a sin1
 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but sin does
 not excuse from sin1 rather does it    
aggravate it4 ,therefore fear does not  
excuse from sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if
 any fear excuses from sin1 most of all 
would this be true of the fear of death1
 to which1 as the saying is1 a          
courageous man is subject4 ,yet this    
fear1 seemingly1 is no excuse1 because1 
since death comes1 of necessity1 to all1
 it does not seem to be an object of    
fear4 ,therefore fear does not excuse   
from sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all fear 
is of evil1 either temporal or          
spiritual4 ,now fear of spiritual evil  
cannot excuse sin1 because instead of   
inducing one to sin1 it withdraws one   

from sin3 and fear of temporal evil does
 not excuse from sin1 because according 
to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #f71  
one should not fear poverty1 nor        
sickness1 nor anything that is not a    
result of one's own wickedness4         
,therefore it seems that in no sense    
does fear excuse from sin4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,it is stated in the          
,decretals 7,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,cap4           
,constat473 ,a man who has been forcibly
 and unwillingly ordained by heretics1  
has an ostensible excuse4  ,i answer    
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 fear is
 sinful in so far as it runs counter to 
the order of reason4 ,now reason judges 
certain evils to be shunned rather than 
others4 ,wherefore it is no sin not to  
shun what is less to be shunned in order
 to avoid what reason judges to be more 
avoided3 thus death of the body is more 
to be avoided than the loss of temporal 
goods4 ,hence a man would be excused    
from sin if through fear of death he    
were to promise or give something to a  

robber1 and yet he would be guilty of   
sin were he to give to sinners1 rather  
than to the good to whom he should give 
in preference4 ,on the other hand1 if   
through fear a man were to avoid evils  
which according to reason are less to be
 avoided1 and so incur evils which      
according to reason are more to be      
avoided1 he could not be wholly excused 
from sin1 because such like fear would  
be inordinate4 ,now the evils of the    
soul are more to be feared than the     
evils of the body1 and evils of the body
 more than evils of external things4    
,wherefore if one were to incur evils of
 the soul1 namely sins1 in order to     
avoid evils of the body1 such as blows  
or death1 or evils of external things1  
such as loss of money2 or if one were to
 endure evils of the body in order to   
avoid loss of money1 one would not be   
wholly excused from sin4 ,yet one's sin 
would be extenuated somewhat1 for what  
is done through fear is less voluntary1 
because when fear lays hold of a man he 

is under a certain necessity of doing a 
certain thing4 ,hence the ,philosopher  
7,ethic4 iii1 #a7 says that these things
 that are done through fear are not     
simply voluntary1 but a mixture of      
voluntary and involuntary4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,fear excuses1 not in the point of 
its sinfulness1 but in the point of its 
involuntariness4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,although death comes1 of necessity1 to 
all1 yet the shortening of temporal life
 is an evil and consequently an object  
of fear4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,according to
 the opinion of ,stoics1 who held       
temporal goods not to be man's goods1 it
 follows in consequence that temporal   
evils are not man's evils1 and that     
therefore they are nowise to be feared4 
,but according to ,augustine 7,de ,lib4 
,arb4 ii7 these temporal things are     
goods of the least account1 and this was
 also the opinion of the ,peripatetics4 
,hence their contraries are indeed to be
 feared2 but not so much that one ought 
for their sake to renounce that which is

 good according to virtue4   ,,question 
#abf  ,,of ,,fearlessness 7,in ,two     
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
vice of fearlessness3 under which head  
there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether it is a sin to be fearless8    
7#b7 ,whether it is opposed to          
fortitude8   ,,first ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abf1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,fearlessness ,is a ,sin8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it seems that fearlessness is not a
 sin4 ,for that which is reckoned to the
 praise of a just man is not a sin4 ,now
 it is written in praise of the just man
 7,prov4 #bh3a73 ,the just1 bold as a   
lion1 shall be without dread4 ,therefore
 it is not a sin to be without fear4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing is so       
fearful as death1 according to the      
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #f74 ,yet one
 ought not to fear even death1 according
 to ,matt4 #aj3bh1 ,fear ye not them    
that kill the body1 etc41 nor anything  
that can be inflicted by man1 according 
to ,isa4 #ea3ab1 ,who art thou1 that    

thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man8
 ,therefore it is not a sin to be       
fearless4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fear is  
born of love1 as stated above 7,q4 #abe1
 ,a4 #b74 ,now it belongs to the        
perfection of virtue to love nothing    
earthly1 since according to ,augustine  
7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv71 the love of ,god  
to the abasement of self makes us       
citizens of the heavenly city4          
,therefore it is seemingly not a sin to 
fear nothing earthly4  ,on the contrary1
 ,it is said of the unjust judge 7,luke 
#ah3b7 that he feared not ,god nor      
regarded man4  ,i answer that1 ,since   
fear is born of love1 we must seemingly 
judge alike of love and fear4 ,now it is
 here a question of that fear whereby   
one dreads temporal evils1 and which    
results from the love of temporal goods4
 ,and every man has it instilled in him 
by nature to love his own life and      
whatever is directed thereto2 and to do 
so in due measure1 that is1 to love     
these things not as placing his end     

therein1 but as things to be used for   
the sake of his last end4 ,hence it is  
contrary to the natural inclination1 and
 therefore a sin1 to fall short of      
loving them in due measure4             
,nevertheless1 one never lapses entirely
 from this love3 since what is natural  
cannot be wholly lost3 for which reason 
the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #e3bi73 ,no man
 ever hated his own flesh4 ,wherefore   
even those that slay themselves do so   
from love of their own flesh1 which they
 desire to free from present stress4    
,hence it may happen that a man fears   
death and other temporal evils less than
 he ought1 for the reason that he loves 
them99 less than he ought4 99,viz4 the  
contrary goods4 ,one would expect 'se'  
instead of 'ea4' ,we should then read3  
,for the reason that he loves himself   
less than he ought4 ,but that he fear   
none of these things cannot result from 
an entire lack of love1 but only from   
the fact that he thinks it impossible   
for him to be afflicted by the evils    

contrary to the goods he loves4 ,this is
 sometimes the result of pride of soul  
presuming on self and despising others1 
according to the saying of ,job #da3bd1 
#be3 ,he ,vulg43 'who' was made to fear 
no one1 he beholdeth every high thing3  
and sometimes it happens through a      
defect in the reason2 thus the          
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #g7 that
 the ,celts1 through lack of            
intelligence1 fear nothing4 99,a man    
would deserve to be called insane and   
senseless if there were nothing that he 
feared1 not even an earthquake nor a    
storm at sea1 as is said to be the case 
with the ,celts4 ,it is therefore       
evident that fearlessness is a vice1    
whether it result from lack of love1    
pride of soul1 or dullness of           
understanding3 yet the latter is excused
 from sin if it be invincible4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,the just man is praised for  
being without fear that withdraws him   
from good2 not that he is altogether    
fearless1 for it is written 7,ecclus4   

#a3bh73 ,he that is without fear cannot 
be justified4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,death  
and whatever else can be inflicted by   
mortal man are not to be feared so that 
they make us forsake justice3 but they  
are to be feared as hindering man in    
acts of virtue1 either as regards       
himself1 or as regards the progress he  
may cause in others4 ,hence it is       
written 7,prov4 #ad3af73 ,a wise man    
feareth and declineth from evil4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,temporal goods are to be    
despised as hindering us from loving and
 serving ,god1 and on the same score    
they are not to be feared2 wherefore it 
is written 7,ecclus4 #cd3af73 ,he that  
feareth the ,lord shall tremble at      
nothing4 ,but temporal goods are not to 
be despised1 in so far as they are      
helping us instrumentally to attain     
those things that pertain to ,divine    
fear and love4   ,,second ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abf1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,fearlessness ,is ,opposed to           
,fortitude8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems   

that fearlessness is not opposed to     
fortitude4 ,for we judge of habits by   
their acts4 ,now no act of fortitude is 
hindered by a man being fearless3 since 
if fear be removed1 one is both brave to
 endure1 and daring to attack4          
,therefore fearlessness is not opposed  
to fortitude4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      
fearlessness is a vice1 either through  
lack of due love1 or on account of      
pride1 or by reason of folly4 ,now lack 
of due love is opposed to charity1 pride
 is contrary to humility1 and folly to  
prudence or wisdom4 ,therefore the vice 
of fearlessness is not opposed to       
fortitude4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 vices   
are opposed to virtue and extremes to   
the mean4 ,but one mean has only one    
extreme on the one side4 ,since then    
fortitude has fear opposed to it on the 
one side and daring on the other1 it    
seems that fearlessness is not opposed  
thereto4  ,on the contrary1 ,the        
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii7 reckons      
fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude4

  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 
#abc1 ,a4 #c71 fortitude is concerned   
about fear and daring4 ,now every moral 
virtue observes the rational mean in the
 matter about which it is concerned4    
,hence it belongs to fortitude that man 
should moderate his fear according to   
reason1 namely that he should fear what 
he ought1 and when he ought1 and so     
forth4 ,now this mode of reason may be  
corrupted either by excess or by        
deficiency4 ,wherefore just as timidity 
is opposed to fortitude by excess of    
fear1 in so far as a man fears what he  
ought not1 and as he ought not1 so too  
fearlessness is opposed thereto by      
deficiency of fear1 in so far as a man  
fears not what he ought to fear4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,the act of fortitude is to  
endure death without fear1 and to be    
aggressive1 not anyhow1 but according to
 reason3 this the fearless man does not 
do4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fearlessness by  
its specific nature corrupts the mean of
 fortitude1 wherefore it is opposed to  

fortitude directly4 ,but in respect of  
its causes nothing hinders it from being
 opposed to other virtues4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,the vice of daring is opposed to  
fortitude by excess of daring1 and      
fearlessness by deficiency of fear4     
,fortitude imposes the mean on each     
passion4 ,hence there is nothing        
unreasonable in its having different    
extremes in different respects4         
,,question #abg  ,,of ,,daring99        
99,excessive daring or foolhardiness    
7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we must now      
consider daring2 and under this head    
there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether daring is a sin8  7#b7 ,whether
 it is opposed to fortitude8   ,,first  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abg1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,daring ,is a ,sin8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it seems that daring is not a sin4
 ,for it is written 7,job #ci3ba7       
concerning the horse1 by which according
 to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi7 the godly   
preacher is denoted1 that he goeth forth
 boldly to meet armed men 99,vulg43 'he 

pranceth boldly1 he goeth forth to meet 
armed men'4 ,but no vice redounds to a  
man's praise4 ,therefore it is not a sin
 to be daring4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1     
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
vi1 #i71 one should take counsel in     
thought1 and do quickly what has been   
counseled4 ,but daring helps this       
quickness in doing4 ,therefore daring is
 not sinful but praiseworthy4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 daring is a passion caused by
 hope1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#de1 ,a4 #b7 when we were treating of   
the passions4 ,but hope is accounted not
 a sin but a virtue4 ,neither therefore 
should daring be accounted a sin4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4  
#h3ah73 ,go not on the way with a bold  
man1 lest he burden thee with his evils4
 ,now no man's fellowship is to be      
avoided save on account of sin4         
,therefore daring is a sin4  ,i answer  
that1 ,daring1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ee71 is a        
passion4 ,now a passion is sometimes    

moderated according to reason1 and      
sometimes it lacks moderation1 either by
 excess or by deficiency1 and on this   
account the passion is sinful4 ,again1  
the names of the passions are sometimes 
employed in the sense of excess1 thus we
 speak of anger meaning not any but     
excessive anger1 in which case it is    
sinful1 and in the same way daring as   
implying excess is accounted a sin4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the daring spoken of  
there is that which is moderated by     
reason1 for in that sense it belongs to 
the virtue of fortitude4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,it is praiseworthy to act quickly  
after taking counsel1 which is an act of
 reason4 ,but to wish to act quickly    
before taking counsel is not            
praiseworthy but sinful2 for this would 
be to act rashly1 which is a vice       
contrary to prudence1 as stated above   
7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore daring    
which leads one to act quickly is so far
 praiseworthy as it is directed by      
reason4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some vices   

are unnamed1 and so also are some       
virtues1 as the ,philosopher remarks    
7,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iv1 #d1 #e1 #f74 ,hence
 the names of certain passions have to  
be applied to certain vices and virtues3
 and in order to designate vices we     
employ especially the names of those    
passions the object of which is an evil1
 as in the case of hatred1 fear1 anger  
and daring4 ,but hope and love have a   
good for this object1 and so we use them
 rather to designate virtues4   ,,second
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abg1 ,art4 #b
  ,whether ,daring ,is ,opposed to      
,fortitude8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems   
that daring is not opposed to fortitude4
 ,for excess of daring seems to result  
from presumption of mind4 ,but          
presumption pertains to pride which is  
opposed to humility4 ,therefore daring  
is opposed to humility rather than to   
fortitude4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 daring  
does not seem to call for blame1 except 
in so far as it results in harm either  
to the daring person who puts himself in

 danger inordinately1 or to others whom 
he attacks with daring1 or exposes to   
danger4 ,but this seemingly pertains to 
injustice4 ,therefore daring1 as        
designating a sin1 is opposed1 not to   
fortitude but to justice4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 fortitude is concerned about  
fear and daring1 as stated above 7,q4   
#abc1 ,a4 #c74 ,now since timidity is   
opposed to fortitude in respect of an   
excess of fear1 there is another vice   
opposed to timidity in respect of a lack
 of fear4 ,if then1 daring is opposed to
 fortitude1 in the point of excessive   
daring1 there will likewise be a vice   
opposed to it in the point of deficient 
daring4 ,but there is no such vice4     
,therefore neither should daring be     
accounted a vice in opposition to       
fortitude4  ,on the contrary1 ,the      
,philosopher in both the ,second and    
,third ,books of ,ethics accounts daring
 to be opposed to fortitude4  ,i answer 
that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #abf1 ,a4   
#b71 it belongs to a moral virtue to    

observe the rational mean in the matter 
about which it is concerned4 ,wherefore 
every vice that denotes lack of         
moderation in the matter of a moral     
virtue is opposed to that virtue1 as    
immoderate to moderate4 ,now daring1 in 
so far as it denotes a vice1 implies    
excess of passion1 and this excess goes 
by the name of daring4 ,wherefore it is 
evident that it is opposed to the virtue
 of fortitude which is concerned about  
fear and daring1 as stated above 7,q4   
#abb1 ,a4 #c74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,opposition between vice and virtue does
 not depend chiefly on the cause of the 
vice but on the vice's very species4    
,wherefore it is not necessary that     
daring be opposed to the same virtue as 
presumption which is its cause4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,just as the direct opposition
 of a vice does not depend on its cause1
 so neither does it depend on its       
effect4 ,now the harm done by daring is 
its effect4 ,wherefore neither does the 
opposition of daring depend on this4    

,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the movement of daring
 consists in a man taking the offensive 
against that which is in opposition to  
him3 and nature inclines him to do this 
except in so far as such inclination is 
hindered by the fear of receiving harm  
from that source4 ,hence the vice which 
exceeds in daring has no contrary       
deficiency1 save only timidity4 ,yet    
daring does not always accompany so     
great a lack of timidity1 for as the    
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #g71 the
 daring are precipitate and eager to    
meet danger1 yet fail when the danger is
 present1 namely through fear4          
,,question #abh  ,,of ,,the ,,parts ,,of
 ,,fortitude  ,we must now consider the 
parts of fortitude2 first we shall      
consider what are the parts of          
fortitude2 and secondly we shall treat  
of each part4   ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #abh1 ,art4  ,whether the ,parts of    
,fortitude ,are ,suitably ,assigned8    
,objection #a3 ,it seems that the parts 
of fortitude are unsuitably assigned4   

,for ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7    
assigns four parts to fortitude1 namely 
magnificence1 confidence1 patience1 and 
perseverance4 ,now magnificence seems to
 pertain to liberality2 since both are  
concerned about money1 and a magnificent
 man must needs be liberal1 as the      
,philosopher observes 7,ethic4 iv1 #b74 
,but liberality is a part of justice1 as
 stated above 7,q4 #aag1 ,a4 #e74       
,therefore magnificence should not be   
reckoned a part of fortitude4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 confidence is apparently the 
same as hope4 ,but hope does not seem to
 pertain to fortitude1 but is rather a  
virtue by itself4 ,therefore confidence 
should not be reckoned a part of        
fortitude4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1         
fortitude makes a man behave aright in  
face of danger4 ,but magnificence and   
confidence do not essentially imply any 
relation to danger4 ,therefore they are 
not suitably reckoned as parts of       
fortitude4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1         
according to ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4

 ii7 patience denotes endurance of      
hardships1 and he ascribes the same to  
fortitude4 ,therefore patience is the   
same as fortitude and not a part        
thereof4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 that which
 is a requisite to every virtue should  
not be reckoned a part of a special     
virtue4 ,but perseverance is required in
 every virtue3 for it is written 7,matt4
 #bd3ac73 ,he that shall persevere to   
the end he shall be saved4 ,therefore   
perseverance should not be accounted a  
part of fortitude4  ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 
,macrobius 7,de ,somn4 ,scip4 i7 reckons
 seven parts of fortitude1 namely       
magnanimity1 confidence1 security1      
magnificence1 constancy1 forbearance1   
stability4 ,andronicus also reckons     
seven virtues annexed to fortitude1 and 
these are1 courage1 strength of will1   
magnanimity1 manliness1 perseverance1   
magnificence4 ,therefore it seems that  
,tully's reckoning of the parts of      
fortitude is incomplete4  ,obj4 #g3     
,further1 ,aristotle 7,ethic4 iii7      

reckons five parts of fortitude4 ,the   
first is civic fortitude1 which produces
 brave deeds through fear of dishonor or
 punishment2 the second is military     
fortitude1 which produces brave deeds as
 a result of warlike art or experience2 
the third is the fortitude which        
produces brave deeds resulting from     
passion1 especially anger2 the fourth is
 the fortitude which makes a man act    
bravely through being accustomed to     
overcome2 the fifth is the fortitude    
which makes a man act bravely through   
being unaccustomed to danger4 ,now these
 kinds of fortitude are not comprised   
under any of the above enumerations4    
,therefore these enumerations of the    
parts of fortitude are unfitting4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #dh71
 a virtue can have three kinds of parts1
 subjective1 integral1 and potential4   
,but fortitude1 taken as a special      
virtue1 cannot have subjective parts1   
since it is not divided into several    
specifically distinct virtues1 for it is

 about a very special matter4  ,however1
 there are quasi-integral and potential 
parts assigned to it3 integral parts1   
with regard to those things the         
concurrence of which is requisite for an
 act of fortitude2 and potential parts1 
because what fortitude practices in face
 of the greatest hardships1 namely      
dangers of death1 certain other virtues 
practice in the matter of certain minor 
hardships and these virtues are annexed 
to fortitude as secondary virtues to the
 principal virtue4 ,as stated above 7,q4
 #abc1 ,,aa4 #c1 #f71 the act of        
fortitude is twofold1 aggression and    
endurance4 ,now two things are required 
for the act of aggression4 ,the first   
regards preparation of the mind1 and    
consists in one's having a mind ready   
for aggression4 ,in this respect ,tully 
mentions confidence1 of which he says   
7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that with this 
the mind is much assured and firmly     
hopeful in great and honorable          
undertakings4 ,the second regards the   

accomplishment of the deed1 and consists
 in not failing to accomplish what one  
has confidently begun4 ,in this respect 
,tully mentions magnificence1 which he  
describes as being the discussion and   
administration1 i4e4 accomplishment of  
great and lofty undertakings1 with a    
certain broad and noble purpose of mind1
 so as to combine execution with        
greatness of purpose4 ,accordingly if   
these two be confined to the proper     
matter of fortitude1 namely to dangers  
of death1 they will be quasi-integral   
parts thereof1 because without them     
there can be no fortitude2 whereas if   
they be referred to other matters       
involving less hardship1 they will be   
virtues specifically distinct from      
fortitude1 but annexed thereto as       
secondary virtues to principal3 thus    
magnificence is referred by the         
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv7 to great      
expenses1 and magnanimity1 which seems  
to be the same as confidence1 to great  
honors4 ,again1 two things are requisite

 for the other act of fortitude1 viz4   
endurance4 ,the first is that the mind  
be not broken by sorrow1 and fall away  
from its greatness1 by reason of the    
stress of threatening evil4 ,in this    
respect he mentions patience1 which he  
describes as the voluntary and prolonged
 endurance of arduous and difficult     
things for the sake of virtue or profit4
 ,the other is that by the prolonged    
suffering of hardships man be not       
wearied so as to lose courage1 according
 to ,heb4 #ab3c1 ,that you be not       
wearied1 fainting in your minds4 ,in    
this respect he mentions perseverance1  
which accordingly he describes as the   
fixed and continued persistence in a    
well considered purpose4 ,if these two  
be confined to the proper matter of     
fortitude1 they will be quasi-integral  
parts thereof2 but if they be referred  
to any kind of hardship they will be    
virtues distinct from fortitude1 yet    
annexed thereto as secondary to         
principal4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3            

,magnificence in the matter of          
liberality adds a certain greatness3    
this is connected with the notion of    
difficulty which is the object of the   
irascible faculty1 that is perfected    
chiefly by fortitude3 and to this       
virtue1 in this respect1 it belongs4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,hope whereby one      
confides in ,god is accounted a         
theological virtue1 as stated above 7,q4
 #ag1 ,a4 #e2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c74
 ,but by confidence which here is       
accounted a part of fortitude1 man hopes
 in himself1 yet under ,god withal4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to venture on anything
 great seems to involve danger1 since to
 fail in such things is very disastrous4
 ,wherefore although magnificence and   
confidence are referred to the          
accomplishment of or venturing on any   
other great things1 they have a certain 
connection with fortitude by reason of  
the imminent danger4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3  
,patience endures not only dangers of   
death1 with which fortitude is          

concerned1 without excessive sorrow1 but
 also any other hardships or dangers4   
,in this respect it is accounted a      
virtue annexed to fortitude3 but as     
referred to dangers of death1 it is an  
integral part thereof4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3
 ,perseverance as denoting persistence  
in a good deed unto the end1 may be a   
circumstance of every virtue1 but it is 
reckoned a part of fortitude in the     
sense stated in the body of the         
,article4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,macrobius  
reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by 
,tully1 namely confidence1 magnificence1
 forbearance1 which he puts in the place
 of patience1 and firmness1 which he    
substitutes for perseverance4 ,and he   
adds three1 two of which1 namely        
magnanimity and security1 are comprised 
by ,tully under the head of confidence4 
,but ,macrobius is more specific in his 
enumeration4 ,because confidence denotes
 a man's hope for great things3 and hope
 for anything presupposes an appetite   
stretching forth to great things by     

desire1 and this belongs to magnanimity4
 ,for it has been stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #b7 that hope presupposes 
love and desire of the thing hoped for4 
,a still better reply is that confidence
 pertains to the certitude of hope2     
while magnanimity refers to the         
magnitude of the thing hoped for4 ,now  
hope has no firmness unless its contrary
 be removed1 for sometimes one1 for     
one's own part1 would hope for          
something1 but hope is avoided on       
account of the obstacle of fear1 since  
fear is somewhat contrary to hope1 as   
stated above1 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #d1
 ad #a74 ,hence ,macrobius adds         
security1 which banishes fear4 ,he adds 
a third1 namely constancy1 which may be 
comprised under magnificence4 ,for in   
performing deeds of magnificence one    
needs to have a constant mind4 ,for this
 reason ,tully says that magnificence   
consists not only in accomplishing great
 things1 but also in discussing them    
generously in the mind4 ,constancy may  

also pertain to perseverance1 so that   
one may be called persevering through   
not desisting on account of delays1 and 
constant through not desisting on       
account of any other obstacles4  ,those 
that are mentioned by ,andronicus seem  
to amount to the same as the above4 ,for
 with ,tully and ,macrobius he mentions 
perseverance and magnificence1 and with 
,macrobius1 magnanimity4 ,strength of   
will is the same as patience or         
forbearance1 for he says that strength  
of will is a habit that makes one ready 
to attempt what ought to be attempted1  
and to endure what reason says should be
 endured--i4e4 good courage seems to be 
the same as assurance1 for he defines it
 as strength of soul in the             
accomplishment of its purpose4          
,manliness is apparently the same as    
confidence1 for he says that manliness  
is a habit of self-sufficiency in       
matters of virtue4 ,besides magnificence
 he mentions andragathia1 i4e4 manly    
goodness which we may render            

strenuousness4 ,for magnificence        
consists not only in being constant in  
the accomplishment of great deeds1 which
 belongs to constancy1 but also in      
bringing a certain manly prudence and   
solicitude to that accomplishment1 and  
this belongs to andragathia1            
strenuousness3 wherefore he says that   
andragathia is the virtue of a man1     
whereby he thinks out profitable works4 
,accordingly it is evident that all     
these parts may be reduced to the four  
principal parts mentioned by ,tully4    
,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,the five mentioned by 
,aristotle fall short of the true notion
 of virtue1 for though they concur in   
the act of fortitude1 they differ as to 
motive1 as stated above 7,q4 #abc1 ,a4  
#a1 ad #b72 wherefore they are not      
reckoned parts but modes of fortitude4  
,,question #abi  ,,of ,,magnanimity99   
99,not in the ordinary restricted sense 
but as explained by the author 7,in     
,eight ,articles7  ,we must now consider
 each of the parts of fortitude1        

including1 however1 the other parts     
under those mentioned by ,tully1 with   
the exception of confidence1 for which  
we shall substitute magnanimity1 of     
which ,aristotle treats4 ,accordingly we
 shall consider 7#a7 ,magnanimity2 7#b7 
,magnificence2 7#c7 ,patience2 7#d7     
,perseverance4 ,as regards the first we 
shall treat 7#a7 of magnanimity2 7#b7 of
 its contrary vices4 ,under the first   
head there are eight points of inquiry3 
7#a7 ,whether magnanimity is about      
honors8  7#b7 ,whether magnanimity is   
only about great honors8  7#c7 ,whether 
it is a virtue8  7#d7 ,whether it is a  
special virtue8  7#e7 ,whether it is a  
part of fortitude8  7#f7 ,of its        
relation to confidence2  7#g7 ,of its   
relation to assurance2  7#h7 ,of its    
relation to goods of fortune4   ,,first 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abi1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,magnanimity ,is ,about        
,honors8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that 
magnanimity is not about honors4 ,for   
magnanimity is in the irascible faculty1

 as its very name shows1 since          
magnanimity signifies greatness of mind1
 and mind denotes the irascible part1 as
 appears from ,de ,anima iii1 #db1 where
 the ,philosopher says that in the      
sensitive appetite are desire and mind1 
i4e4 the concupiscible and irascible    
parts4 ,but honor is a concupiscible    
good since it is the reward of virtue4  
,therefore it seems that magnanimity is 
not about honors4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
since magnanimity is a moral virtue1 it 
must needs be about either passions or  
operations4 ,now it is not about        
operations1 for then it would be a part 
of justice3 whence it follows that it is
 about passions4 ,but honor is not a    
passion4 ,therefore magnanimity is not  
about honors4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the  
nature of magnanimity seems to regard   
pursuit rather than avoidance1 for a man
 is said to be magnanimous because he   
tends to great things4 ,but the virtuous
 are praised not for desiring honors1   
but for shunning them4 ,therefore       

magnanimity is not about honors4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says    
7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that magnanimity is    
about honor and dishonor4  ,i answer    
that1 ,magnanimity by its very name     
denotes stretching forth of the mind to 
great things4 ,now virtue bears a       
relationship to two things1 first to the
 matter about which is the field of its 
activity1 secondly to its proper act1   
which consists in the right use of such 
matter4 ,and since a virtuous habit is  
denominated chiefly from its act1 a man 
is said to be magnanimous chiefly       
because he is minded to do some great   
act4 ,now an act may be called great in 
two ways3 in one way proportionately1 in
 another absolutely4 ,an act may be     
called great proportionately1 even if it
 consist in the use of some small or    
ordinary thing1 if1 for instance1 one   
make a very good use of it3 but an act  
is simply and absolutely great when it  
consists in the best use of the greatest
 thing4  ,the things which come into    

man's use are external things1 and among
 these honor is the greatest simply1    
both because it is the most akin to     
virtue1 since it is an attestation to a 
person's virtue1 as stated above 7,q4   
#ajc1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b72 and because it is  
offered to ,god and to the best2 and    
again because1 in order to obtain honor 
even as to avoid shame1 men set aside   
all other things4 ,now a man is said to 
be magnanimous in respect of things that
 are great absolutely and simply1 just  
as a man is said to be brave in respect 
of things that are difficult simply4 ,it
 follows therefore that magnanimity is  
about honors4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,good   
and evil absolutely considered regard   
the concupiscible faculty1 but in so far
 as the aspect of difficult is added1   
they belong to the irascible4 ,thus it  
is that magnanimity regards honor1      
inasmuch1 to wit1 as honor has the      
aspect of something great or difficult4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although honor is     
neither a passion nor an operation1 yet 

it is the object of a passion1 namely   
hope1 which tends to a difficult good4  
,wherefore magnanimity is immediately   
about the passions of hope1 and         
mediately about honor as the object of  
hope3 even so1 we have stated 7,q4 #abc1
 ,,aa4 #d1 #e7 with regard to fortitude 
that it is about dangers of death in so 
far as they are the object of fear and  
daring4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those are    
worthy of praise who despise riches in  
such a way as to do nothing unbecoming  
in order to obtain them1 nor have too   
great a desire for them4 ,if1 however1  
one were to despise honors so as not to 
care to do what is worthy of honor1 this
 would be deserving of blame4           
,accordingly magnanimity is about honors
 in the sense that a man strives to do  
what is deserving of honor1 yet not so  
as to think much of the honor accorded  
by man4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #abi1 ,art4 #b  ,whether            
,magnanimity ,is ,essentially ,about    
,great ,honors8  ,objection #a3 ,it     

seems that magnanimity is not           
essentially about great honors4 ,for the
 proper matter of magnanimity is honor1 
as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but great and
 little are accidental to honor4        
,therefore it is not essential to       
magnanimity to be about great honors4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as magnanimity 
is about honor1 so is meekness about    
anger4 ,but it is not essential to      
meekness to be about either great or    
little anger4 ,therefore neither is it  
essential to magnanimity to be about    
great honor4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 small 
honor is less aloof from great honor    
than is dishonor4 ,but magnanimity is   
well ordered in relation to dishonor1   
and consequently in relation to small   
honors also4 ,therefore it is not only  
about great honors4  ,on the contrary1  
,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #g7 
that magnanimity is about great honors4 
,i answer that1 ,according to the       
,philosopher 7,phys4 vii1 #ag1 #ah71    
virtue is a perfection1 and by this we  

are to understand the perfection of a   
power1 and that it regards the extreme  
limit of that power1 as stated in ,de   
,coelo i1 #aaf4 ,now the perfection of a
 power is not perceived in every        
operation of that power1 but in such    
operations as are great or difficult3   
for every power1 however imperfect1 can 
extend to ordinary and trifling         
operations4 ,hence it is essential to a 
virtue to be about the difficult and the
 good1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #c4     
,now the difficult and the good 7which  
amount to the same7 in an act of virtue 
may be considered from two points of    
view4 ,first1 from the point of view of 
reason1 in so far as it is difficult to 
find and establish the rational means in
 some particular matter3 and this       
difficulty is found only in the act of  
intellectual virtues1 and also of       
justice4 ,the other difficulty is on the
 part of the matter1 which may involve a
 certain opposition to the moderation of
 reason1 which moderation has to be     

applied thereto3 and this difficulty    
regards chiefly the other moral virtues1
 which are about the passions1 because  
the passions resist reason as ,dionysius
 states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #d74  ,now as  
regards the passions it is to be        
observed that the greatness of this     
power of resistance to reason arises    
chiefly in some cases from the passions 
themselves1 and in others from the      
things that are the objects of the      
passions4 ,the passions themselves have 
no great power of resistance1 unless    
they be violent1 because the sensitive  
appetite1 which is the seat of the      
passions1 is naturally subject to       
reason4 ,hence the resisting virtues    
that are about these passions regard    
only that which is great in such        
passions3 thus fortitude is about very  
great fear and daring2 temperance about 
the concupiscence of the greatest       
pleasures1 and likewise meekness about  
the greatest anger4 ,on the other hand1 
some passions have great power of       

resistance to reason arising from the   
external things themselves that are the 
objects of those passions3 such are the 
love or desire of money or of honor4    
,and for these it is necessary to have a
 virtue not only regarding that which is
 greatest in those passions1 but also   
about that which is ordinary or little3 
because things external1 though they be 
little1 are very desirable1 as being    
necessary for human life4 ,hence with   
regard to the desire of money there are 
two virtues1 one about ordinary or      
little sums of money1 namely liberality1
 and another about large sums of money1 
namely magnificence4  ,in like manner   
there are two virtues about honors1 one 
about ordinary honors4 ,this virtue has 
no name1 but is denominated by its      
extremes1 which are philotimia1 i4e4    
love of honor1 and aphilotimia1 i4e4    
without love of honor3 for sometimes a  
man is commended for loving honor1 and  
sometimes for not caring about it1 in so
 far1 to wit1 as both these things may  

be done in moderation4 ,but with regard 
to great honors there is magnanimity4   
,wherefore we must conclude that the    
proper matter of magnanimity is great   
honor1 and that a magnanimous man tends 
to such things as are deserving of      
honor4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,great and     
little are accidental to honor          
considered in itself3 but they make a   
great difference in their relation to   
reason1 the mode of which has to be     
observed in the use of honor1 for it is 
much more difficult to observe it in    
great than in little honors4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,in anger and other matters   
only that which is greatest presents any
 notable difficulty1 and about this     
alone is there any need of a virtue4 ,it
 is different with riches and honors    
which are things existing outside the   
soul4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that makes  
good use of great things is much more   
able to make good use of little things4 
,accordingly the magnanimous man looks  
upon great honors as a thing of which he

 is worthy1 or even little honors as    
something he deserves1 because1 to wit1 
man cannot sufficiently honor virtue    
which deserves to be honored by ,god4   
,hence he is not uplifted by great      
honors1 because he does not deem them   
above him2 rather does he despise them1 
and much more such as are ordinary or   
little4 ,in like manner he is not cast  
down by dishonor1 but despises it1 since
 he recognizes that he does not deserve 
it4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4  
#abi1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,magnanimity   
,is a ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems
 that magnanimity is not a virtue4 ,for 
every moral virtue observes the mean4   
,but magnanimity observes not the mean  
but the greater extreme3 because the    
magnanimous man deems himself worthy of 
the greatest things 7,ethic4 iv1 #c74   
,therefore magnanimity is not a virtue4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 he that has one     
virtue has them all1 as stated above    
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a74 ,but one may
 have a virtue without having           

magnanimity3 since the ,philosopher says
 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that whosoever is     
worthy of little things and deems       
himself worthy of them1 is temperate1   
but he is not magnanimous4 ,therefore   
magnanimity is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 ,virtue is a good quality of  
the mind1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#ee1 ,a4 #d74 ,but magnanimity implies  
certain dispositions of the body3 for   
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7  
of a magnanimous man that his gait is   
slow1 his voice deep1 and his utterance 
calm4 ,therefore magnanimity is not a   
virtue4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 no virtue  
is opposed to another virtue4 ,but      
magnanimity is opposed to humility1     
since the magnanimous deems himself     
worthy of great things1 and despises    
others1 according to ,ethic4 iv1 #c4    
,therefore magnanimity is not a virtue4 
,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the properties of   
every virtue are praiseworthy4 ,but     
magnanimity has certain properties that 
call for blame4 ,for1 in the first      

place1 the magnanimous is unmindful of  
favors2 secondly1 he is remiss and slow 
of action2 thirdly1 he employs irony    
99,cf4 ,q4 #aac towards many2 fourthly1 
he is unable to associate with others2  
fifthly1 because he holds to the barren 
things rather than to those that are    
fruitful4 ,therefore magnanimity is not 
a virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is     
written in praise of certain men 7#b    
,macc4 #ae3ah73 ,nicanor hearing of the 
valor of ,judas' companions1 and the    
greatness of courage 7animi             
magnitudinem7 with which they fought for
 their country1 was afraid to try the   
matter by the sword4 ,now1 only deeds of
 virtue are worthy of praise4 ,therefore
 magnanimity which consists in greatness
 of courage is a virtue4  ,i answer     
that1 ,the essence of human virtue      
consists in safeguarding the good of    
reason in human affairs1 for this is    
man's proper good4 ,now among external  
human things honors take precedence of  
all others1 as stated above 7,a4 #a2    

,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #c74    
,therefore magnanimity1 which observes  
the mode of reason in great honors1 is a
 virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the      
,philosopher again says 7,ethic4 iv1    
#c71 the magnanimous in point of        
quantity goes to extremes1 in so far as 
he tends to what is greatest1 but in the
 matter of becomingness1 he follows the 
mean1 because he tends to the greatest  
things according to reason1 for he deems
 himself worthy in accordance with his  
worth 7,ethic4 iv1 #c71 since his aims  
do not surpass his deserts4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,the mutual connection of the 
virtues does not apply to their acts1 as
 though every one were competent to     
practice the acts of all the virtues4   
,wherefore the act of magnanimity is not
 becoming to every virtuous man1 but    
only to great men4 ,on the other hand1  
as regards the principles of virtue1    
namely prudence and grace1 all virtues  
are connected together1 since their     
habits reside together in the soul1     

either in act or by way of a proximate  
disposition thereto4 ,thus it is        
possible for one to whom the act of     
magnanimity is not competent1 to have   
the habit of magnanimity1 whereby he is 
disposed to practice that act if it were
 competent to him according to his      
state4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the movements 
of the body are differentiated according
 to the different apprehensions and     
emotions of the soul4 ,and so it happens
 that to magnanimity there accrue       
certain fixed accidents by way of bodily
 movements4 ,for quickness of movement  
results from a man being intent on many 
things which he is in a hurry to        
accomplish1 whereas the magnanimous is  
intent only on great things2 these are  
few and require great attention1        
wherefore they call for slow movement4  
,likewise shrill and rapid speaking is  
chiefly competent to those who are quick
 to quarrel about anything1 and this    
becomes not the magnanimous who are busy
 only about great things4 ,and just as  

these dispositions of bodily movements  
are competent to the magnanimous man    
according to the mode of his emotions1  
so too in those who are naturally       
disposed to magnanimity these conditions
 are found naturally4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 
,there is in man something great which  
he possesses through the gift of ,god2  
and something defective which accrues to
 him through the weakness of nature4    
,accordingly magnanimity makes a man    
deem himself worthy of great things in  
consideration of the gifts he holds from
 ,god3 thus if his soul is endowed with 
great virtue1 magnanimity makes him tend
 to perfect works of virtue2 and the    
same is to be said of the use of any    
other good1 such as science or external 
fortune4 ,on the other hand1 humility   
makes a man think little of himself in  
consideration of his own deficiency1 and
 magnanimity makes him despise others in
 so far as they fall away from ,god's   
gifts3 since he does not think so much  
of others as to do anything wrong for   

their sake4 ,yet humility makes us honor
 others and esteem them better than     
ourselves1 in so far as we see some of  
,god's gifts in them4 ,hence it is      
written of the just man 7,ps4 #ad3d73   
,in his sight a vile person is contemned
 99,douay3 ',the malignant is brought to
 nothing1 but he glorifieth1' etc41     
which indicates the contempt of         
magnanimity1 but he honoreth them that  
fear the ,lord1 which points to the     
reverential bearing of humility4 ,it is 
therefore evident that magnanimity and  
humility are not contrary to one        
another1 although they seem to tend in  
contrary directions1 because they       
proceed according to different          
considerations4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,these
 properties in so far as they belong to 
a magnanimous man call not for blame1   
but for very great praise4 ,for in the  
first place1 when it is said that the   
magnanimous is not mindful of those from
 whom he has received favors1 this      
points to the fact that he takes no     

pleasure in accepting favors from others
 unless he repay them with yet greater  
favor2 this belongs to the perfection of
 gratitude1 in the act of which he      
wishes to excel1 even as in the acts of 
other virtues4 ,again1 in the second    
place1 it is said that he is remiss and 
slow of action1 not that he is lacking  
in doing what becomes him1 but because  
he does not busy himself with all kinds 
of works1 but only with great works1    
such as are becoming to him4 ,he is also
 said1 in the third place1 to employ    
irony1 not as opposed to truth1 and so  
as either to say of himself vile things 
that are not true1 or deny of himself   
great things that are true1 but because 
he does not disclose all his greatness1 
especially to the large number of those 
who are beneath him1 since1 as also the 
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c71 it  
belongs to a magnanimous man to be great
 towards persons of dignity and         
affluence1 and unassuming towards the   
middle class4 ,in the fourth place1 it  

is said that he cannot associate with   
others3 this means that he is not at    
home with others than his friends3      
because he altogether shuns flattery and
 hypocrisy1 which belong to littleness  
of mind4 ,but he associates with all1   
both great and little1 according as he  
ought1 as stated above 7ad #a74 ,it is  
also said1 fifthly1 that he prefers to  
have barren things1 not indeed any1 but 
good1 i4e4 virtuous2 for in all things  
he prefers the virtuous to the useful1  
as being greater3 since the useful is   
sought in order to supply a defect which
 is inconsistent with magnanimity4      
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abi1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,magnanimity ,is a   
,special ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
seems that magnanimity is not a special 
virtue4 ,for no special virtue is       
operative in every virtue4 ,but the     
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7    
that whatever is great in each virtue   
belongs to the magnanimous4 ,therefore  
magnanimity is not a special virtue4    

,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the acts of         
different virtues are not ascribed to   
any special virtue4 ,but the acts of    
different virtues are ascribed to the   
magnanimous man4 ,for it is stated in   
,ethic4 iv1 #c that it belongs to the   
magnanimous not to avoid reproof 7which 
is an act of prudence71 nor to act      
unjustly 7which is an act of justice71  
that he is ready to do favors 7which is 
an act of charity71 that he gives his   
services readily 7which is an act of    
liberality71 that he is truthful 7which 
is an act of truthfulness71 and that he 
is not given to complaining 7which is an
 act of patience74 ,therefore           
magnanimity is not a special virtue4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every virtue is a   
special ornament of the soul1 according 
to the saying of ,isa4 #fa3aj1 ,he hath 
clothed me with the garments of         
salvation1 and afterwards he adds1 and  
as a bride adorned with her jewels4 ,but
 magnanimity is the ornament of all the 
virtues1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv4       

,therefore magnanimity is a general     
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,the         
,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #g7           
distinguishes it from the other virtues4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 
#abc1 ,a4 #b71 it belongs to a special  
virtue to establish the mode of reason  
in a determinate matter4 ,now           
magnanimity establishes the mode of     
reason in a determinate matter1 namely  
honors1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b73 
and honor1 considered in itself1 is a   
special good1 and accordingly           
magnanimity considered in itself is a   
special virtue4  ,since1 however1 honor 
is the reward of every virtue1 as stated
 above 7,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b71 it    
follows that by reason of its matter it 
regards all the virtues4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,magnanimity is not about any kind  
of honor1 but great honor4 ,now1 as     
honor is due to virtue1 so great honor  
is due to a great deed of virtue4 ,hence
 it is that the magnanimous is intent on
 doing great deeds in every virtue1 in  

so far1 to wit1 as he tends to what is  
worthy of great honors4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,since the magnanimous tends to     
great things1 it follows that he tends  
chiefly to things that involve a certain
 excellence1 and shuns those that imply 
defect4 ,now it savors of excellence    
that a man is beneficent1 generous and  
grateful4 ,wherefore he shows himself   
ready to perform actions of this kind1  
but not as acts of the other virtues4   
,on the other hand1 it is a proof of    
defect1 that a man thinks so much of    
certain external goods or evils1 that   
for their sake he abandons and gives up 
justice or any virtue whatever4 ,again1 
all concealment of the truth indicates a
 defect1 since it seems to be the       
outcome of fear4 ,also that a man be    
given to complaining denotes a defect1  
because by so doing the mind seems to   
give way to external evils4 ,wherefore  
these and like things the magnanimous   
man avoids under a special aspect1      
inasmuch as they are contrary to his    

excellence or greatness4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,every virtue derives from its      
species a certain luster or adornment   
which is proper to each virtue3 but     
further adornment results from the very 
greatness of a virtuous deed1 through   
magnanimity which makes all virtues     
greater as stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #c4    
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abi1  
,art4 #e  ,whether ,magnanimity ,is a   
,part of ,fortitude8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 seems that magnanimity is not a part of
 fortitude4 ,for a thing is not a part  
of itself4 ,but magnanimity appears to  
be the same as fortitude4 ,for ,seneca  
says 7,de ,quat4 ,virtut473 ,if         
magnanimity1 which is also called       
fortitude1 be in thy soul1 thou shalt   
live in great assurance3 and ,tully says
 7,de ,offic4 i73 ,if a man is brave we 
expect him to be magnanimous1           
truth-loving1 and far removed from      
deception4 ,therefore magnanimity is not
 a part of fortitude4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 

#c7 says that a magnanimous man is not  
philokindynos1 that is1 a lover of      
danger4 ,but it belongs to a brave man  
to expose himself to danger4 ,therefore 
magnanimity has nothing in common with  
fortitude so as to be called a part     
thereof4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1           
magnanimity regards the great in things 
to be hoped for1 whereas fortitude      
regards the great in things to be feared
 or dared4 ,but good is of more import  
than evil4 ,therefore magnanimity is a  
more important virtue than fortitude4   
,therefore it is not a part thereof4    
,on the contrary1 ,macrobius 7,de ,somn4
 ,scip4 i7 and ,andronicus reckon       
magnanimity as a part of fortitude4  ,i 
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #c71 a principal virtue is 
one to which it belongs to establish a  
general mode of virtue in a principal   
matter4 ,now one of the general modes of
 virtue is firmness of mind1 because a  
firm standing is necessary in every     
virtue1 according to ,ethic4 ii4 ,and   

this is chiefly commended in those      
virtues that tend to something          
difficult1 in which it is most difficult
 to preserve firmness4 ,wherefore the   
more difficult it is to stand firm in   
some matter of difficulty1 the more     
principal is the virtue which makes the 
mind firm in that matter4  ,now it is   
more difficult to stand firm in dangers 
of death1 wherein fortitude confirms the
 mind1 than in hoping for or obtaining  
the greatest goods1 wherein the mind is 
confirmed by magnanimity1 for1 as man   
loves his life above all things1 so does
 he fly from dangers of death more than 
any others4 ,accordingly it is clear    
that magnanimity agrees with fortitude  
in confirming the mind about some       
difficult matter2 but it falls short    
thereof1 in that it confirms the mind   
about a matter wherein it is easier to  
stand firm4 ,hence magnanimity is       
reckoned a part of fortitude1 because it
 is annexed thereto as secondary to     
principal4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the    

,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a1 #c71  
to lack evil is looked upon as a good1  
wherefore not to be overcome by a       
grievous evil1 such as the danger of    
death1 is looked upon as though it were 
the obtaining of a great good1 the      
former belonging to fortitude1 and the  
latter to magnanimity3 in this sense    
fortitude and magnanimity may be        
considered as identical4 ,since1        
however1 there is a difference as       
regards the difficulty on the part of   
either of the aforesaid1 it follows that
 properly speaking magnanimity1         
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
ii1 #g71 is a distinct virtue from      
fortitude4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man is  
said to love danger when he exposes     
himself to all kinds of dangers1 which  
seems to be the mark of one who thinks  
many the same as great4 ,this is        
contrary to the nature of a magnanimous 
man1 for no one seemingly exposes       
himself to danger for the sake of a     
thing that he does not deem great4 ,but 

for things that are truly great1 a      
magnanimous man is most ready to expose 
himself to danger1 since he does        
something great in the act of fortitude1
 even as in the acts of the other       
virtues4 ,hence the ,philosopher says   
7,ethic4 ii1 #g7 that the magnanimous   
man is not mikrokindynos1 i4e4          
endangering himself for small things1   
but megalokindynos1 i4e4 endangering    
himself for great things4 ,and ,seneca  
says 7,de ,quat4 ,virtut473 ,thou wilt  
be magnanimous if thou neither seekest  
dangers like a rash man1 nor fearest    
them like a coward4 ,for nothing makes  
the soul a coward save the consciousness
 of a wicked life4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,evil as such is to be avoided3 and that
 one has to withstand it is accidental2 
in so far1 to wit1 as one has to suffer 
an evil in order to safeguard a good4   
,but good as such is to be desired1 and 
that one avoids it is only accidental1  
in so far1 to wit1 as it is deemed to   
surpass the ability of the one who      

desires it4 ,now that which is so       
essentially is always of more account   
than that which is so accidentally4     
,wherefore the difficult in evil things 
is always more opposed to firmness of   
mind than the difficult in good things4 
,hence the virtue of fortitude takes    
precedence of the virtue of magnanimity4
 ,for though good is simply of more     
import than evil1 evil is of more import
 in this particular respect4   ,,sixth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abi1 ,art4 #f 
,whether ,confidence ,belongs to        
,magnanimity8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems 
that confidence does not belong to      
magnanimity4 ,for a man may have        
assurance not only in himself1 but also 
in another1 according to #b ,cor4 #c3d1 
#e1 ,such confidence we have1 through   
,christ towards ,god1 not that we are   
sufficient to think anything of         
ourselves1 as of ourselves4 ,but this   
seems inconsistent with the idea of     
magnanimity4 ,therefore confidence does 
not belong to magnanimity4  ,obj4 #b3   

,further1 confidence seems to be opposed
 to fear1 according to ,isa4 #ab3b1 ,i  
will deal confidently and will not fear4
 ,but to be without fear seems more akin
 to fortitude4 ,therefore confidence    
also belongs to fortitude rather than to
 magnanimity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1      
reward is not due except to virtue4 ,but
 a reward is due to confidence1         
according to ,heb4 #c3f1 where it is    
said that we are the house of ,christ1  
if we hold fast the confidence and glory
 of hope unto the end4 ,therefore       
confidence is a virtue distinct from    
magnanimity3 and this is confirmed by   
the fact that ,macrobius enumerates it  
with magnanimity 7,in ,somn4 ,scip4 i74 
,on the contrary1 ,tully 7,de ,suv4     
,rhet4 ii7 seems to substitute          
confidence for magnanimity1 as stated   
above in the preceding ,question 7ad #f7
 and in the prologue to this4  ,i answer
 that1 ,confidence takes its name from  
fides 7faith73 and it belongs to faith  
to believe something and in somebody4   

,but confidence belongs to hope1        
according to ,job #aa3ah1 ,thou shalt   
have confidence1 hope being set before  
thee4 ,wherefore confidence apparently  
denotes chiefly that a man derives hope 
through believing the word of one who   
promises to help him4 ,since1 however1  
faith signifies also a strong opinion1  
and since one may come to have a strong 
opinion about something1 not only on    
account of another's statement1 but also
 on account of something we observe in  
another1 it follows that confidence may 
denote the hope of having something1    
which hope we conceive through observing
 something either in oneself--for       
instance1 through observing that he is  
healthy1 a man is confident that he will
 live long4 ,or in another1 for         
instance1 through observing that another
 is friendly to him and powerful1 a man 
is confident that he will receive help  
from him4  ,now it has been stated above
 7,a4 #a1 ad #b7 that magnanimity is    
chiefly about the hope of something     

difficult4 ,wherefore1 since confidence 
denotes a certain strength of hope      
arising from some observation which     
gives one a strong opinion that one will
 obtain a certain good1 it follows that 
confidence belongs to magnanimity4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the ,philosopher   
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c71 it belongs to the
 magnanimous to need nothing1 for need  
is a mark of the deficient4 ,but this is
 to be understood according to the mode 
of a man1 hence he adds or scarcely     
anything4 ,for it surpasses man to need 
nothing at all4 ,for every man needs1   
first1 the ,divine assistance1 secondly1
 even human assistance1 since man is    
naturally a social animal1 for he is not
 sufficient by himself to provide for   
his own life4 ,accordingly1 in so far as
 he needs others1 it belongs to a       
magnanimous man to have confidence in   
others1 for it is also a point of       
excellence in a man that he should have 
at hand those who are able to be of     
service to him4 ,and in so far as his   

own ability goes1 it belongs to a       
magnanimous man to be confident in      
himself4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated   
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4    
#dj1 ,a4 #d71 when we were treating of  
the passions1 hope is directly opposed  
to despair1 because the latter is about 
the same object1 namely good4 ,but as   
regards contrariety of objects it is    
opposed to fear1 because the latter's   
object is evil4 ,now confidence denotes 
a certain strength of hope1 wherefore it
 is opposed to fear even as hope is4    
,since1 however1 fortitude properly     
strengthens a man in respect of evil1   
and magnanimity in respect of the       
obtaining of good1 it follows that      
confidence belongs more properly to     
magnanimity than to fortitude4 ,yet     
because hope causes daring1 which       
belongs to fortitude1 it follows in     
consequence that confidence pertains to 
fortitude4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3            
,confidence1 as stated above1 denotes a 
certain mode of hope3 for confidence is 

hope strengthened by a strong opinion4  
,now the mode applied to an affection   
may call for commendation of the act1 so
 that it become meritorious1 yet it is  
not this that draws it to a species of  
virtue1 but its matter4 ,hence1 properly
 speaking1 confidence cannot denote a   
virtue1 though it may denote the        
conditions of a virtue4 ,for this reason
 it is reckoned among the parts of      
fortitude1 not as an annexed virtue1    
except as identified with magnanimity by
 ,tully 7,de ,suv4 ,rhet4 ii71 but as an
 integral part1 as stated in the        
preceding ,question4   ,,seventh        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abi1 ,art4 #g 
,whether ,security ,belongs to          
,magnanimity8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems 
that security does not belong to        
magnanimity4 ,for security1 as stated   
above 7,q4 #abh1 ad #f71 denotes freedom
 from the disturbance of fear4 ,but     
fortitude does this most effectively4   
,wherefore security is seemingly the    
same as fortitude4 ,but fortitude does  

not belong to magnanimity2 rather the   
reverse is the case4 ,neither therefore 
does security belong to magnanimity4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,isidore says       
7,etym4 x7 that a man is said to be     
secure because he is without care4 ,but 
this seems to be contrary to virtue1    
which has a care for honorable things1  
according to #b ,tim4 #b3ae1 ,carefully 
study to present thyself approved unto  
,god4 ,therefore security does not      
belong to magnanimity1 which does great 
things in all the virtues4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 virtue is not its own reward4 
,but security is accounted the reward of
 virtue1 according to ,job #aa3ad1 #ah1 
,if thou wilt put away from thee the    
iniquity that is in thy hand 4 4 4 being
 buried thou shalt sleep secure4        
,therefore security does not belong to  
magnanimity or to any other virtue1 as a
 part thereof4  ,on the contrary1 ,tully
 says 7,de ,offic4 i7 under the heading3
 ,magnanimity consists of two things1   
that it belongs to magnanimity to give  

way neither to a troubled mind1 nor to  
man1 nor to fortune4 ,but a man's       
security consists in this4 ,therefore   
security belongs to magnanimity4  ,i    
answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says  
7,rhet4 ii1 #e71 fear makes a man take  
counsel1 because1 to wit he takes care  
to avoid what he fears4 ,now security   
takes its name from the removal of this 
care1 of which fear is the cause3       
wherefore security denotes perfect      
freedom of the mind from fear1 just as  
confidence denotes strength of hope4    
,now1 as hope directly belongs to       
magnanimity1 so fear directly regards   
fortitude4 ,wherefore as confidence     
belongs immediately to magnanimity1 so  
security belongs immediately to         
fortitude4  ,it must be observed1       
however1 that as hope is the cause of   
daring1 so is fear the cause of despair1
 as stated above when we were treating  
of the passion 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,a4   
#b74 ,wherefore as confidence belongs   
indirectly to fortitude1 in so far as it

 makes use of daring1 so security       
belongs indirectly to magnanimity1 in so
 far as it banishes despair4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,fortitude is chiefly         
commended1 not because it banishes fear1
 which belongs to security1 but because 
it denotes a firmness of mind in the    
matter of the passion4 ,wherefore       
security is not the same as fortitude1  
but is a condition thereof4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,not all security is worthy of
 praise but only when one puts care     
aside1 as one ought1 and in things when 
one should not fear3 in this way it is a
 condition of fortitude and of          
magnanimity4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is
 in the virtues a certain likeness to1  
and participation of1 future happiness1 
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,,aa4 
#c1 #g74 ,hence nothing hinders a       
certain security from being a condition 
of a virtue1 although perfect security  
belongs to virtue's reward4   ,,eighth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #abi1 ,art4 #h 
,whether ,goods of ,fortune ,conduce to 

,magnanimity8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems 
that goods of fortune do not conduce to 
magnanimity4 ,for according to ,seneca  
7,de ,ira i3 ,de vita beata xvi73 virtue
 suffices for itself4 ,now magnanimity  
takes every virtue great1 as stated     
above 7,a4 #d1 ad #c74 ,therefore goods 
of fortune do not conduce to            
magnanimity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no    
virtuous man despises what is helpful to
 him4 ,but the magnanimous man despises 
whatever pertains to goods of fortune3  
for ,tully says 7,de ,offic4 i7 under   
the heading3 ,magnanimity consists of   
two things1 that a great soul is        
commended for despising external things4
 ,therefore a magnanimous man is not    
helped by goods of fortune4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 ,tully adds 7,de ,offic4 i7   
that it belongs to a great soul so to   
bear what seems troublesome1 as nowise  
to depart from his natural estate1 or   
from the dignity of a wise man4 ,and    
,aristotle says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that a 
magnanimous man does not grieve at      

misfortune4 ,now troubles and           
misfortunes are opposed to goods of     
fortune1 for every one grieves at the   
loss of what is helpful to him4         
,therefore external goods of fortune do 
not conduce to magnanimity4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that good fortune seems
 to conduce to magnanimity4  ,i answer  
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71        
magnanimity regards two things3 honor as
 its matter1 and the accomplishment of  
something great as its end4 ,now goods  
of fortune conduce to both these things4
 ,for since honor is conferred on the   
virtuous1 not only by the wise1 but also
 by the multitude who hold these goods  
of fortune in the highest esteem1 the   
result is that they show greater honor  
to those who possess goods of fortune4  
,likewise goods of fortune are useful   
organs or instruments of virtuous deeds3
 since we can easily accomplish things  
by means of riches1 power and friends4  
,hence it is evident that goods of      

fortune conduce to magnanimity4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,virtue is said to be         
sufficient for itself1 because it can be
 without even these external goods2 yet 
it needs them in order to act more      
expeditiously4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the   
magnanimous man despises external goods1
 inasmuch as he does not think them so  
great as to be bound to do anything     
unbecoming for their sake4 ,yet he does 
not despise them1 but that he esteems   
them useful for the accomplishment of   
virtuous deeds4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if a 
man does not think much of a thing1 he  
is neither very joyful at obtaining it1 
nor very grieved at losing it4          
,wherefore1 since the magnanimous man   
does not think much of external goods1  
that is goods of fortune1 he is neither 
much uplifted by them if he has them1   
nor much cast down by their loss4       
,,question #acj  ,,of ,,presumption 7,in
 ,two ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
the vices opposed to magnanimity2 and in
 the first place1 those that are opposed

 thereto by excess4 ,these are three1   
namely1 presumption1 ambition1 and      
vainglory4 ,secondly1 we shall consider 
pusillanimity which is opposed to it by 
way of deficiency4 ,under the first head
 there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7 
,whether presumption is a sin8  7#b7    
,whether it is opposed to magnanimity by
 excess8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #acj1 ,art4 #a  ,whether            
,presumption ,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3
 ,it seems that presumption is not a    
sin4 ,for the ,apostle says3 ,forgetting
 the things that are behind1 ,i stretch 
forth ,vulg43 'and stretching forth'    
myself to those that are before4 ,but it
 seems to savor of presumption that one 
should tend to what is above oneself4   
,therefore presumption is not a sin4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 i1 #g7 we should not      
listen to those who would persuade us to
 relish human things because we are men1
 or mortal things because we are mortal1
 but we should relish those that make us

 immortal3 and 7,metaph4 i7 that man    
should pursue divine things as far as   
possible4 ,now divine and immortal      
things are seemingly far above man4     
,since then presumption consists        
essentially in tending to what is above 
oneself1 it seems that presumption is   
something praiseworthy1 rather than a   
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle  
says 7#b ,cor4 #c3e73 ,not that we are  
sufficient to think anything of         
ourselves1 as of ourselves4 ,if then    
presumption1 by which one strives at    
that for which one is not sufficient1 be
 a sin1 it seems that man cannot        
lawfully even think of anything good3   
which is absurd4 ,therefore presumption 
is not a sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is 
written 7,ecclus4 #cg3c73 ,o wicked     
presumption1 whence camest thou8 and a  
gloss answers3 ,from a creature's evil  
will4 ,now all that comes of the root of
 an evil will is a sin4 ,therefore      
presumption is a sin4  ,i answer that1  
,since whatever is according to nature1 

is ordered by the ,divine ,reason1 which
 human reason ought to imitate1 whatever
 is done in accordance with human reason
 in opposition to the order established 
in general throughout natural things is 
vicious and sinful4 ,now it is          
established throughout all natural      
things1 that every action is            
commensurate with the power of the      
agent1 nor does any natural agent strive
 to do what exceeds its ability4 ,hence 
it is vicious and sinful1 as being      
contrary to the natural order1 that any 
one should assume to do what is above   
his power3 and this is what is meant by 
presumption1 as its very name shows4    
,wherefore it is evident that           
presumption is a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,a thing may be above the active power  
of a natural thing1 and yet not above   
the passive power of that same thing3   
thus the air is possessed of a passive  
power by reason of which it can be so   
changed as to obtain the action and     
movement of fire1 which surpass the     

active power of air4 ,thus too it would 
be sinful and presumptuous for a man    
while in a state of imperfect virtue to 
attempt the immediate accomplishment of 
what belongs to perfect virtue4 ,but it 
is not presumptuous or sinful for a man 
to endeavor to advance towards perfect  
virtue4 ,in this way the ,apostle       
stretched himself forth to the things   
that were before him1 namely continually
 advancing forward4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,divine and immortal things surpass man 
according to the order of nature4 ,yet  
man is possessed of a natural power1    
namely the intellect1 whereby he can be 
united to immortal and ,divine things4  
,in this respect the ,philosopher says  
that man ought to pursue immortal and   
divine things1 not that he should do    
what it becomes ,god to do1 but that he 
should be united to ,him in intellect   
and will4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the     
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #c71    
what we can do by the help of others we 
can do by ourselves in a sense4 ,hence  

since we can think and do good by the   
help of ,god1 this is not altogether    
above our ability4 ,hence it is not     
presumptuous for a man to attempt the   
accomplishment of a virtuous deed3 but  
it would be presumptuous if one were to 
make the attempt without confidence in  
,god's assistance4   ,,second ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acj1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,presumption ,is ,opposed to            
,magnanimity by ,excess8  ,objection #a3
 ,it seems that presumption is not      
opposed to magnanimity by excess4 ,for  
presumption is accounted a species of   
the sin against the ,holy ,ghost1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ba1 
,a4 #a74 ,but the sin against the ,holy 
,ghost is not opposed to magnanimity1   
but to charity4 ,neither therefore is   
presumption opposed to magnanimity4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it belongs to       
magnanimity that one should deem oneself
 worthy of great things4 ,but a man is  
said to be presumptuous even if he deem 
himself worthy of small things1 if they 

surpass his ability4 ,therefore         
presumption is not directly opposed to  
magnanimity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the   
magnanimous man looks upon external     
goods as little things4 ,now according  
to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #c71 on
 account of external fortune the        
presumptuous disdain and wrong others1  
because they deem external goods as     
something great4 ,therefore presumption 
is opposed to magnanimity1 not by       
excess1 but only by deficiency4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iv1 #c7 that the vain  
man1 i4e4 a vaporer or a wind-bag1 which
 with us denotes a presumptuous man1 is 
opposed to the magnanimous man by       
excess4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,q4 #abi1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a71        
magnanimity observes the means1 not as  
regards the quantity of that to which it
 tends1 but in proportion to our own    
ability3 for it does not tend to        
anything greater than is becoming to us4
  ,now the presumptuous man1 as regards 

that to which he tends1 does not exceed 
the magnanimous1 but sometimes falls far
 short of him3 but he does exceed in    
proportion to his own ability1 whereas  
the magnanimous man does not exceed his4
 ,it is in this way that presumption is 
opposed to magnanimity by excess4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is not every       
presumption that is accounted a sin     
against the ,holy ,ghost1 but that by   
which one contemns the ,divine justice  
through inordinate confidence in the    
,divine mercy4 ,the latter kind of      
presumption1 by reason of its matter1   
inasmuch1 to wit1 as it implies contempt
 of something ,divine1 is opposed to    
charity1 or rather to the gift of fear1 
whereby we revere ,god4 ,nevertheless1  
in so far as this contempt exceeds the  
proportion to one's own ability1 it can 
be opposed to magnanimity4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,presumption1 like magnanimity1    
seems to tend to something great4 ,for  
we are not1 as a rule1 wont to call a   
man presumptuous for going beyond his   

powers in something small4 ,if1 however1
 such a man be called presumptuous1 this
 kind of presumption is not opposed to  
magnanimity1 but to that virtue which is
 about ordinary honor1 as stated above  
7,q4 #abi1 ,a4 #b74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,no one attempts what is above his      
ability1 except in so far as he deems   
his ability greater than it is4 ,in this
 one may err in two ways4 ,first only as
 regards quantity1 as when a man thinks 
he has greater virtue1 or knowledge1 or 
the like1 than he has4 ,secondly1 as    
regards the kind of thing1 as when he   
thinks himself great1 and worthy of     
great things1 by reason of something    
that does not make him so1 for instance 
by reason of riches or goods of fortune4
 ,for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4
 iv1 #c71 those who have these things   
without virtue1 neither justly deem     
themselves worthy of great things1 nor  
are rightly called magnanimous4  ,again1
 the thing to which a man sometimes     
tends in excess of his ability1 is      

sometimes in very truth something great1
 simply as in the case of ,peter1 whose 
intent was to suffer for ,christ1 which 
has exceeded his power2 while sometimes 
it is something great1 not simply1 but  
only in the opinion of fools1 such as   
wearing costly clothes1 despising and   
wronging others4 ,this savors of an     
excess of magnanimity1 not in any truth1
 but in people's opinion4 ,hence ,seneca
 says 7,de ,quat4 ,virtut47 that when   
magnanimity exceeds its measure1 it     
makes a man high-handed1 proud1 haughty 
restless1 and bent on excelling in all  
things1 whether in words or in deeds1   
without any considerations of virtue4   
,thus it is evident that the            
presumptuous man sometimes falls short  
of the magnanimous in reality1 although 
in appearance he surpasses him4         
,,question #aca  ,,of ,,ambition 7,in   
,two ,articles7  ,we must now consider  
ambition3 and under this head there are 
two points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether it
 is a sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is opposed 

to magnanimity by excess8   ,,first     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aca1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,ambition ,is a ,sin8          
,objection #a3 ,it seems that ambition  
is not a sin4 ,for ambition denotes the 
desire of honor4 ,now honor is in itself
 a good thing1 and the greatest of      
external goods3 wherefore those who care
 not for honor are reproved4 ,therefore 
ambition is not a sin2 rather is it     
something deserving of praise1 in so far
 as a good is laudably desired4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 anyone may1 without sin1  
desire what is due to him as a reward4  
,now honor is the reward of virtue1 as  
the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 i1 #ab2
 iv1 #c2 viii1 #ad74 ,therefore ambition
 of honor is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 that which heartens a man to  
do good and disheartens him from doing  
evil1 is not a sin4 ,now honor heartens 
men to do good and to avoid evil2 thus  
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 
that with the bravest men1 cowards are  
held in dishonor1 and the brave in      

honor3 and ,tully says 7,de ,tusc4      
,quaest4 i7 that honor fosters the arts4
 ,therefore ambition is not a sin4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,cor4  
#ac3e7 that charity is not ambitious1   
seeketh not her own4 ,now nothing is    
contrary to charity1 except sin4        
,therefore ambition is a sin4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ajc1 ,,aa4
 #a1 #b71 honor denotes reverence shown 
to a person in witness of his           
excellence4 ,now two things have to be  
considered with regard to man's honor4  
,the first is that a man has not from   
himself the thing in which he excels1   
for this is1 as it were1 something      
,divine in him1 wherefore on this count 
honor is due principally1 not to him but
 to ,god4 ,the second point that calls  
for observation is that the thing in    
which man excels is given to him by     
,god1 that he may profit others thereby3
 wherefore a man ought so far to be     
pleased that others bear witness to his 
excellence1 as this enables him to      

profit others4  ,now the desire of honor
 may be inordinate in three ways4       
,first1 when a man desires recognition  
of an excellence which he has not3 this 
is to desire more than his share of     
honor4 ,secondly1 when a man desires    
honor for himself without referring it  
to ,god4 ,thirdly1 when a man's appetite
 rests in honor itself1 without         
referring it to the profit of others4   
,since then ambition denotes inordinate 
desire of honor1 it is evident that it  
is always a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the 
desire for good should be regulated     
according to reason1 and if it exceed   
this rule it will be sinful4 ,in this   
way it is sinful to desire honor in     
disaccord with the order of reason4 ,now
 those are reproved who care not for    
honor in accordance with reason's       
dictate that they should avoid what is  
contrary to honor4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,honor is not the reward of virtue1 as  
regards the virtuous man1 in this sense 
that he should seek for it as his       

reward3 since the reward he seeks is    
happiness1 which is the end of virtue4  
,but it is said to be the reward of     
virtue as regards others1 who have      
nothing greater than honor whereby to   
reward the virtuous2 which honor derives
 greatness from the very fact that it   
bears witness to virtue4 ,hence it is   
evident that it is not an adequate      
reward1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #c4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as some are      
heartened to do good and disheartened   
from doing evil1 by the desire of honor1
 if this be desired in due measure2 so1 
if it be desired inordinately1 it may   
become to man an occasion of doing many 
evil things1 as when a man cares not by 
what means he obtains honor4 ,wherefore 
,sallust says 7,catilin47 that the good 
as well as the wicked covet honors for  
themselves1 but the one1 i4e4 the good1 
go about it in the right way1 whereas   
the other1 i4e4 the wicked1 through lack
 of the good arts1 make use of deceit   
and falsehood4 ,yet they who1 merely for

 the sake of honor1 either do good or   
avoid evil1 are not virtuous1 according 
to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #h71  
where he says that they who do brave    
things for the sake of honor are not    
truly brave4   ,,second ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aca1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,ambition ,is ,opposed to ,magnanimity  
by ,excess8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems   
that ambition is not opposed to         
magnanimity by excess4 ,for one mean has
 only one extreme opposed to it on the  
one side4 ,now presumption is opposed to
 magnanimity by excess as stated above  
7,q4 #acj1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore ambition 
is not opposed to it by excess4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 magnanimity is about      
honors2 whereas ambition seems to regard
 positions of dignity3 for it is written
 7#b ,macc4 #d3g7 that ,jason           
ambitiously sought the high priesthood4 
,therefore ambition is not opposed to   
magnanimity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
ambition seems to regard outward show3  
for it is written 7,acts #be3bg7 that   

,agrippa and ,berenice 4 4 4 with great 
pomp 7ambitione7 4 4 4 had entered into 
the hall of audience 99',praetorium4'   
,the ,vulgate has 'auditorium1' but the 
meaning is the same1 and 7#b ,para4     
#af3ad7 that when ,asa died they burned 
spices and 4 4 4 ointments over his body
 with very great pomp 7ambitione74 ,but 
magnanimity is not about outward show4  
,therefore ambition is not opposed to   
magnanimity4  ,on the contrary1 ,tully  
says 7,de ,offic4 i7 that the more a man
 exceeds in magnanimity1 the more he    
desires himself alone to dominate       
others4 ,but this pertains to ambition4 
,therefore ambition denotes an excess of
 magnanimity4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,a4 #a71 ambition         
signifies inordinate love of honor4 ,now
 magnanimity is about honors and makes  
use of them in a becoming manner4       
,wherefore it is evident that ambition  
is opposed to magnanimity as the        
inordinate to that which is well        
ordered4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,magnanimity 

regards two things4 ,it regards one as  
its end1 in so far as it is some great  
deed that the magnanimous man attempts  
in proportion to his ability4 ,in this  
way presumption is opposed to           
magnanimity by excess3 because the      
presumptuous man attempts great deeds   
beyond his ability4 ,the other thing    
that magnanimity regards is its matter1 
viz4 honor1 of which it makes right use3
 and in this way ambition is opposed to 
magnanimity by excess4 ,nor is it       
impossible for one mean to be exceeded  
in various respects4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,honor is due to those who are in a     
position of dignity1 on account of a    
certain excellence of their estate3 and 
accordingly inordinate desire for       
positions of dignity pertains to        
ambition4 ,for if a man were to have an 
inordinate desire for a position of     
dignity1 not for the sake of honor1 but 
for the sake of a right use of a dignity
 exceeding his ability1 he would not be 
ambitious but presumptuous4  ,reply     

,obj4 #c3 ,the very solemnity of outward
 worship is a kind of honor1 wherefore  
in such cases honor is wont to be shown4
 ,this is signified by the words of     
,james #b3b1 #c3 ,if there shall come   
into your assembly a man having a golden
 ring1 in fine apparel 4 4 4 and you 4 4
 4 shall say to him3 ,sit thou here     
well1 etc4 ,wherefore ambition does not 
regard outward worship1 except in so far
 as this is a kind of honor4            
,,question #acb  ,,of ,,vainglory 7,in  
,five ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
vainglory3 under which head there are   
five points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether  
desire of glory is a sin8  7#b7 ,whether
 it is opposed to magnanimity8  7#c7    
,whether it is a mortal sin8  7#d7      
,whether it is a capital vice8  7#e7 ,of
 its daughters4   ,,first ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acb1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
the ,desire of ,glory ,is a ,sin8       
,objection #a3 ,it seems that the desire
 of glory is not a sin4 ,for no one sins
 in being likened to ,god3 in fact we   

are commanded 7,eph4 #e3a73 ,be ye 4 4 4
 followers of ,god1 as most dear        
children4 ,now by seeking glory man     
seems to imitate ,god1 ,who seeks glory 
from men3 wherefore it is written 7,isa4
 #dc3f1 #g73 ,bring ,my sons from afar1 
and ,my daughters from the ends of the  
earth4 ,and every one that calleth on   
,my name1 ,i have created him for ,my   
glory4 ,therefore the desire for glory  
is not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that 
which incites a man to do good is       
apparently not a sin4 ,now the desire of
 glory incites men to do good4 ,for     
,tully says 7,de ,tusc4 ,quaest4 i7 that
 glory inflames every man to strive his 
utmost3 and in ,holy ,writ glory is     
promised for good works1 according to   
,rom4 #b3g3 ,to them1 indeed1 who       
according to patience in good work 4 4 4
 glory and honor 99,vulg43 ',who will   
render to every man according to his    
works1 to them indeed who 4 4 4 seek    
glory and honor and incorruption1       
eternal life4'4 ,therefore the desire   

for glory is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 ,tully says 7,de ,invent4     
,rhet4 ii7 that glory is consistent good
 report about a person1 together with   
praise3 and this comes to the same as   
what ,augustine says 7,contra ,maximin4 
iii71 viz4 that glory is1 as it were1   
clear knowledge with praise4 ,now it is 
no sin to desire praiseworthy renown3   
indeed1 it seems itself to call for     
praise1 according to ,ecclus4 #da3ae1   
,take care of a good name1 and ,rom4    
#ab3ag1 ,providing good things not only 
in the sight of ,god1 but also in the   
sight of all men4 ,therefore the desire 
of vainglory is not a sin4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4    
,dei v73 ,he is better advised who      
acknowledges that even the love of      
praise is sinful4  ,i answer that1      
,glory signifies a certain clarity1     
wherefore ,augustine says 7,tract4      
lxxxii1 c1 cxiv in ,joan47 that to be   
glorified is the same as to be          
clarified4 ,now clarity and comeliness  

imply a certain display3 wherefore the  
word glory properly denotes the display 
of something as regards its seeming     
comely in the sight of men1 whether it  
be a bodily or a spiritual good4 ,since1
 however1 that which is clear simply can
 be seen by many1 and by those who are  
far away1 it follows that the word glory
 properly denotes that somebody's good  
is known and approved by many1 according
 to the saying of ,sallust 7,catilin47  
99,the quotation is from ,livy3 ,hist41 
,lib4 ,,xxii ,c1 #ci3 ,i must not boast 
while ,i am addressing one man4  ,but if
 we take the word glory in a broader    
sense1 it not only consists in the      
knowledge of many1 but also in the      
knowledge of few1 or of one1 or of      
oneself alone1 as when one considers    
one's own good as being worthy of       
praise4 ,now it is not a sin to know and
 approve one's own good3 for it is      
written 7#a ,cor4 #b3ab73 ,now we have  
received not the spirit of this world1  
but the ,spirit that is of ,god that we 

may know the things that are given us   
from ,god4 ,likewise it is not a sin to 
be willing to approve one's own good    
works3 for it is written 7,matt4 #e3af73
 ,let your light shine before men4      
,hence the desire for glory does not1 of
 itself1 denote a sin3 but the desire   
for empty or vain glory denotes a sin3  
for it is sinful to desire anything     
vain1 according to ,ps4 #d3c1 ,why do   
you love vanity1 and seek after lying8  
,now glory may be called vain in three  
ways4 ,first1 on the part of the thing  
for which one seeks glory3 as when a man
 seeks glory for that which is unworthy 
of glory1 for instance when he seeks it 
for something frail and perishable3     
secondly1 on the part of him from whom  
he seeks glory1 for instance a man whose
 judgment is uncertain3 thirdly1 on the 
part of the man himself who seeks glory1
 for that he does not refer the desire  
of his own glory to a due end1 such as  
,god's honor1 or the spiritual welfare  
of his neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as  

,augustine says on ,john #ac3ac1 ,you   
call ,me ,master and ,lord2 and you say 
well 7,tract4 lviii in ,joan473         
,self-complacency is fraught with danger
 of one who has to beware of pride4 ,but
 ,he ,who is above all1 however much ,he
 may praise ,himself1 does not uplift   
,himself4 ,for knowledge of ,god is our 
need1 not ,his3 nor does any man know   
,him unless he be taught of ,him ,who   
knows4 ,it is therefore evident that    
,god seeks glory1 not for ,his own sake1
 but for ours4 ,in like manner a man may
 rightly seek his own glory for the good
 of others1 according to ,matt4 #e3af1  
,that they may see your good works1 and 
glorify your ,father ,who is in heaven4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that which we receive 
from ,god is not vain but true glory3 it
 is this glory that is promised as a    
reward for good works1 and of which it  
is written 7#b ,cor4 #aj3ag1 #ah73 ,he  
that glorieth let him glory in the      
,lord1 for not he who commendeth himself
 is approved1 but he whom ,god          

commendeth4 ,it is true that some are   
heartened to do works of virtue1 through
 desire for human glory1 as also through
 the desire for other earthly goods4    
,yet he is not truly virtuous who does  
virtuous deeds for the sake of human    
glory1 as ,augustine proves 7,de ,civ4  
,dei v74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is       
requisite for man's perfection that he  
should know himself2 but not that he    
should be known by others1 wherefore it 
is not to be desired in itself4 ,it may1
 however1 be desired as being useful for
 something1 either in order that ,god   
may be glorified by men1 or that men may
 become better by reason of the good    
they know to be in another man1 or in   
order that man1 knowing by the testimony
 of others' praise the good which is in 
him1 may himself strive to persevere    
therein and to become better4 ,in this  
sense it is praiseworthy that a man     
should take care of his good name1 and  
that he should provide good things in   
the sight of ,god and men3 but not that 

he should take an empty pleasure in     
human praise4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acb1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,vainglory ,is ,opposed to ,magnanimity8
  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that         
vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity4
 ,for1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71        
vainglory consists in glorying in things
 that are not1 which pertains to        
falsehood2 or in earthly and perishable 
things1 which pertains to covetousness2 
or in the testimony of men1 whose       
judgment is uncertain1 which pertains to
 imprudence4 ,now these vices are not   
contrary to magnanimity4 ,therefore     
vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 vainglory is not1 
like pusillanimity1 opposed to          
magnanimity by way of deficiency1 for   
this seems inconsistent with vainglory4 
,nor is it opposed to it by way of      
excess1 for in this way presumption and 
ambition are opposed to magnanimity1 as 
stated above 7,q4 #acj1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4     
#aca1 ,a4 #b73 and these differ from    

vainglory4 ,therefore vainglory is not  
opposed to magnanimity4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 a gloss on ,phil4 #b3c1 ,let  
nothing be done through contention1     
neither by vainglory1 says3 ,some among 
them were given to dissension and       
restlessness1 contending with one       
another for the sake of vainglory4 ,but 
contention 99,cf4 ,q4 #ch is not opposed
 to magnanimity4 ,neither therefore is  
vainglory4  ,on the contrary1 ,tully    
says 7,de ,offic4 i7 under the heading1 
,magnanimity consists in two things3 ,we
 should beware of the desire for glory1 
since it enslaves the mind1 which a     
magnanimous man should ever strive to   
keep untrammeled4 ,therefore it is      
opposed to magnanimity4  ,i answer that1
 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #a1 ad 
#c71 glory is an effect of honor and    
praise3 because from the fact that a man
 is praised1 or shown any kind of       
reverence1 he acquires charity in the   
knowledge of others4 ,and since         
magnanimity is about honor1 as stated   

above 7,q4 #abi1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 it      
follows that it also is about glory3    
seeing that as a man uses honor         
moderately1 so too does he use glory in 
moderation4 ,wherefore inordinate desire
 of glory is directly opposed to        
magnanimity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to think
 so much of little things as to glory in
 them is itself opposed to magnanimity4 
,wherefore it is said of the magnanimous
 man 7,ethic4 iv7 that honor is of      
little account to him4 ,in like manner  
he thinks little of other things that   
are sought for honor's sake1 such as    
power and wealth4 ,likewise it is       
inconsistent with magnanimity to glory  
in things that are not2 wherefore it is 
said of the magnanimous man 7,ethic4 iv7
 that he cares more for truth than for  
opinion4 ,again it is incompatible with 
magnanimity for a man to glory in the   
testimony of human praise1 as though he 
deemed this something great2 wherefore  
it is said of the magnanimous man       
7,ethic4 iv71 that he cares not to be   

praised4 ,and so1 when a man looks upon 
little things as though they were great1
 nothing hinders this from being        
contrary to magnanimity1 as well as to  
other virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he    
that is desirous of vainglory does in   
truth fall short of being magnanimous1  
because he glories in what the          
magnanimous man thinks little of1 as    
stated in the preceding ,reply4 ,but if 
we consider his estimate1 he is opposed 
to the magnanimous man by way of excess1
 because the glory which he seeks is    
something great in his estimation1 and  
he tends thereto in excess of his       
deserts4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated   
above 7,q4 #abg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b71 the    
opposition of vices does not depend on  
their effects4 ,nevertheless contention1
 if done intentionally1 is opposed to   
magnanimity3 since no one contends save 
for what he deems great4 ,wherefore the 
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that 
the magnanimous man is not contentious1 
because nothing is great in his         

estimation4   ,,third ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acb1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,vainglory ,is a ,mortal ,sin8          
,objection #a3 ,it seems that vainglory 
is a mortal sin4 ,for nothing precludes 
the eternal reward except a mortal sin4 
,now vainglory precludes the eternal    
reward3 for it is written 7,matt4 #f3a73
 ,take heed1 that you do not give       
justice before men1 to be seen by them3 
otherwise you shall not have a reward of
 your ,father ,who is in heaven4        
,therefore vainglory is a mortal sin4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever appropriates
 to himself that which is proper to     
,god1 sins mortally4 ,now by desiring   
vainglory1 a man appropriates to himself
 that which is proper to ,god4 ,for it  
is written 7,isa4 #db3h73 ,i will not   
give ,my glory to another1 and 7#a ,tim4
 #a3ag73 ,to 4 4 4 the only ,god be     
honor and glory4 ,therefore vainglory is
 a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
apparently a sin is mortal if it be most
 dangerous and harmful4 ,now vainglory  

is a sin of this kind1 because a gloss  
of ,augustine on #a ,thess4 #b3d1 ,god1 
,who proveth our hearts1 says3 ,unless a
 man war against the love of human glory
 he does not perceive its baneful power1
 for though it be easy for anyone not to
 desire praise as long as one does not  
get it1 it is difficult not to take     
pleasure in it1 when it is given4       
,chrysostom also says 7,hom4 xix in     
,matth47 that vainglory enters secretly1
 and robs us insensibly of all our      
inward possessions4 ,therefore vainglory
 is a mortal sin4  ,on the contrary1    
,chrysostom says 99,hom4 xiii in the    
,opus ,imperfectum falsely ascribed to  
,st4 ,john ,chrysostom that while other 
vices find their abode in the servants  
of the devil1 vainglory finds a place   
even in the servants of ,christ4 ,yet in
 the latter there is no mortal sin4     
,therefore vainglory is not a mortal    
sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above  
7,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #ab2 ,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4
 #aab1 ,a4 #b71 a sin is mortal through 

being contrary to charity4 ,now the sin 
of vainglory1 considered in itself1 does
 not seem to be contrary to charity as  
regards the love of one's neighbor3 yet 
as regards the love of ,god it may be   
contrary to charity in two ways4 ,in one
 way1 by reason of the matter about     
which one glories3 for instance when one
 glories in something false that is     
opposed to the reverence we owe ,god1   
according to ,ezech4 #bh3b1 ,thy heart  
is lifted up1 and ,thou hast said3 ,i am
 ,god1 and #a ,cor4 #d3g1 ,what hast    
thou that thou hast not received8 ,and  
if thou hast received1 why dost thou    
glory1 as if thou hadst not received it8
 ,or again when a man prefers to ,god   
the temporal good in which he glories3  
for this is forbidden 7,jer4 #i3bc1     
#bd73 ,let not the wise man glory in his
 wisdom1 and let not the strong man     
glory in his strength1 and let not the  
rich man glory in his riches4 ,but let  
him that glorieth glory in this1 that he
 understandeth and knoweth ,me4 ,or     

again when a man prefers the testimony  
of man to ,god's2 thus it is written in 
reproval of certain people 7,john       
#ab3dc73 ,for they loved the glory of   
men more than the glory of ,god4  ,in   
another way vainglory may be contrary to
 charity1 on the part of the one who    
glories1 in that he refers his intention
 to glory as his last end3 so that he   
directs even virtuous deeds thereto1    
and1 in order to obtain it1 forbears not
 from doing even that which is against  
,god4 ,in this way it is a mortal sin4  
,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4   
,dei v1 #ad7 that this vice1 namely the 
love of human praise1 is so hostile to a
 godly faith1 if the heart desires glory
 more than it fears or loves ,god1 that 
our ,lord said 7,john #e3dd73 ,how can  
you believe1 who receive glory one from 
another1 and the glory which is from    
,god alone1 you do not seek8  ,if1      
however1 the love of human glory1 though
 it be vain1 be not inconsistent with   
charity1 neither as regards the matter  

gloried in1 nor as to the intention of  
him that seeks glory1 it is not a mortal
 but a venial sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,no
 man1 by sinning1 merits eternal life3  
wherefore a virtuous deed loses its     
power to merit eternal life1 if it be   
done for the sake of vainglory1 even    
though that vainglory be not a mortal   
sin4 ,on the other hand when a man loses
 the eternal reward simply through      
vainglory1 and not merely in respect of 
one act1 vainglory is a mortal sin4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not every man that is 
desirous of vainglory1 desires the      
excellence which belongs to ,god alone4 
,for the glory due to ,god alone differs
 from the glory due to a virtuous or    
rich man4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,vainglory  
is stated to be a dangerous sin1 not    
only on account of its gravity1 but also
 because it is a disposition to grave   
sins1 in so far as it renders man       
presumptuous and too self-confident3 and
 so it gradually disposes a man to lose 
his inward goods4   ,,fourth ,,article  

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acb1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,vainglory ,is a ,capital ,vice8        
,objection #a3 ,it seems that vainglory 
is not a capital vice4 ,for a vice that 
always arises from another vice is      
seemingly not capital4 ,but vainglory   
always arises from pride4 ,therefore    
vainglory is not a capital vice4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 honor would seem to take  
precedence of glory1 for this is its    
effect4 ,now ambition which is          
inordinate desire of honor is not a     
capital vice4 ,neither therefore is the 
desire of vainglory4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 a capital vice has a certain  
prominence4 ,but vainglory seems to have
 no prominence1 neither as a sin1       
because it is not always a mortal sin1  
nor considered as an appetible good1    
since human glory is apparently a frail 
thing1 and is something outside man     
himself4 ,therefore vainglory is not a  
capital vice4  ,on the contrary1        
,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi7 numbers         
vainglory among the seven capital vices4

  ,i answer that1 ,the capital vices are
 enumerated in two ways4 ,for some      
reckon pride as one of their number3 and
 these do not place vainglory among the 
capital vices4 ,gregory1 however        
7,moral4 xxxi71 reckons pride to be the 
queen of all the vices1 and vainglory1  
which is the immediate offspring of     
pride1 he reckons to be a capital vice3 
and not without reason4 ,for pride1 as  
we shall state farther on 7,q4 #aeb1    
,,aa4 #a1 #b71 denotes inordinate desire
 of excellence4 ,but whatever good one  
may desire1 one desires a certain       
perfection and excellence therefrom3    
wherefore the end of every vice is      
directed to the end of pride1 so that   
this vice seems to exercise a kind of   
causality over the other vices1 and     
ought not to be reckoned among the      
special sources of vice1 known as the   
capital vices4 ,now among the goods that
 are the means whereby man acquires     
honor1 glory seems to be the most       
conducive to that effect1 inasmuch as it

 denotes the manifestation of a man's   
goodness3 since good is naturally loved 
and honored by all4 ,wherefore1 just as 
by the glory which is in ,god's sight   
man acquires honor in ,divine things1 so
 too by the glory which is in the sight 
of man he acquires excellence in human  
things4 ,hence on account of its close  
connection with excellence1 which men   
desire above all1 it follows that it is 
most desirable4 ,and since many vices   
arise from the inordinate desire        
thereof1 it follows that vainglory is a 
capital vice4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is  
not impossible for a capital vice to    
arise from pride1 since as stated above 
7in the body of the ,article and        
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #b7 pride is the  
queen and mother of all the vices4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,praise and honor1 as  
stated above 7,a4 #b71 stand in relation
 to glory as the causes from which it   
proceeds1 so that glory is compared to  
them as their end4 ,for the reason why a
 man loves to be honored and praised is 

that he thinks thereby to acquire a     
certain renown in the knowledge of      
others4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,vainglory    
stands prominent under the aspect of    
desirability1 for the reason given      
above1 and this suffices for it to be   
reckoned a capital vice4 ,nor is it     
always necessary for a capital vice to  
be a mortal sin2 for mortal sin can     
arise from venial sin1 inasmuch as      
venial sin can dispose man thereto4     
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acb1  
,art4 #e  ,whether the ,daughters of    
,vainglory ,are ,suitably ,reckoned to  
,be ,disobedience1 ,boastfulness1       
,hypocrisy1 ,contention1 ,obstinacy1    
,discord1 and ,love of ,novelties8      
,objection #a3 ,it seems that the       
daughters of vainglory are unsuitably   
reckoned to be disobedience1            
boastfulness1 hypocrisy1 contention1    
obstinacy1 discord1 and eccentricity    
99,praesumptio novitatum1 literally     
'presumption of novelties'4 ,for        
according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxiii7   

boastfulness is numbered among the      
species of pride4 ,now pride does not   
arise from vainglory1 rather is it the  
other way about1 as ,gregory says       
7,moral4 xxxi74 ,therefore boastfulness 
should not be reckoned among the        
daughters of vainglory4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 contention and discord seem to
 be the outcome chiefly of anger4 ,but  
anger is a capital vice condivided with 
vainglory4 ,therefore it seems that they
 are not the daughters of vainglory4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,chrysostom says    
7,hom4 xix in ,matth47 that vainglory is
 always evil1 but especially in         
philanthropy1 i4e4 mercy4 ,and yet this 
is nothing new1 for it is an established
 custom among men4 ,therefore           
eccentricity should not be specially    
reckoned as a daughter of vainglory4    
,on the contrary1 stands the authority  
of ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi71 who there   
assigns the above daughters to          
vainglory4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated  
above 7,q4 #cd1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #d2

 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 the   
vices which by their very nature are    
such as to be directed to the end of a  
certain capital vice1 are called its    
daughters4 ,now the end of vainglory is 
the manifestation of one's own          
excellence1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1  
#d73 and to this end a man may tend in  
two ways4 ,in one way directly1 either  
by words1 and this is boasting1 or by   
deeds1 and then if they be true and call
 for astonishment1 it is love of        
novelties which men are wont to wonder  
at most2 but if they be false1 it is    
hypocrisy4 ,in another way a man strives
 to make known his excellence by showing
 that he is not inferior to another1 and
 this in four ways4 ,first1 as regards  
the intellect1 and thus we have         
obstinacy1 by which a man is too much   
attached to his own opinion1 being      
unwilling to believe one that is better4
 ,secondly1 as regards the will1 and    
then we have discord1 whereby a man is  
unwilling to give up his own will1 and  

agree with others4 ,thirdly1 as regards 
speech1 and then we have contention1    
whereby a man quarrels noisily with     
another4 ,fourthly as regards deeds1 and
 this is disobedience1 whereby a man    
refuses to carry out the command of his 
superiors4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated 
above 7,q4 #aab1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b71        
boasting is reckoned a kind of pride1 as
 regards its interior cause1 which is   
arrogance3 but outward boasting1        
according to ,ethic4 iv1 is directed    
sometimes to gain1 but more often to    
glory and honor1 and thus it is the     
result of vainglory4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,anger is not the cause of discord and  
contention1 except in conjunction with  
vainglory1 in that a man thinks it a    
glorious thing for him not to yield to  
the will and words of others4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,vainglory is reproved in     
connection with almsdeeds on account of 
the lack of charity apparent in one who 
prefers vainglory to the good of his    
neighbor1 seeing that he does the latter

 for the sake of the former4 ,but a man 
is not reproved for presuming to give   
alms as though this were something      
novel4   ,,question #acc  ,,of          
,,pusillanimity 7,in ,two ,articles7    
,we must now consider pusillanimity4    
,under this head there are two points of
 inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether pusillanimity  
is a sin8  7#b7 ,to what virtue is it   
opposed8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #acc1 ,art4 #a  ,whether            
,pusillanimity ,is a ,sin8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it seems that pusillanimity is not 
a sin4 ,for every sin makes a man evil1 
just as every virtue makes a man good4  
,but a fainthearted man is not evil1 as 
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c74 
,therefore pusillanimity is not a sin4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that a            
fainthearted man is especially one who  
is worthy of great goods1 yet does not  
deem himself worthy of them4 ,now no one
 is worthy of great goods except the    
virtuous1 since as the ,philosopher     

again says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c71 none but   
the virtuous are truly worthy of honor4 
,therefore the fainthearted are         
virtuous3 and consequently pusillanimity
 is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
,pride is the beginning of all sin      
7,ecclus4 #aj3ae74 ,but pusillanimity   
does not proceed from pride1 since the  
proud man sets himself above what he is1
 while the fainthearted man withdraws   
from the things he is worthy of4        
,therefore pusillanimity is not a sin4  
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that he who deems 
himself less worthy than he is1 is said 
to be fainthearted4 ,now sometimes holy 
men deem themselves less worthy than    
they are2 for instance1 ,moses and      
,jeremias1 who were worthy of the office
 ,god chose them for1 which they both   
humbly declined 7,ex4 #c3aa2 ,jer4      
#a3f74 ,therefore pusillanimity is not a
 sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,nothing in    
human conduct is to be avoided save sin4
 ,now pusillanimity is to be avoided3   

for it is written 7,col4 #c3ba73        
,fathers1 provoke not your children to  
indignation1 lest they be discouraged4  
,therefore pusillanimity is a sin4  ,i  
answer that1 ,whatever is contrary to a 
natural inclination is a sin1 because it
 is contrary to a law of nature4 ,now   
everything has a natural inclination to 
accomplish an action that is            
commensurate with its power3 as is      
evident in all natural things1 whether  
animate or inanimate4 ,now just as      
presumption makes a man exceed what is  
proportionate to his power1 by striving 
to do more than he can1 so pusillanimity
 makes a man fall short of what is      
proportionate to his power1 by refusing 
to tend to that which is commensurate   
thereto4 ,wherefore as presumption is a 
sin1 so is pusillanimity4 ,hence it is  
that the servant who buried in the earth
 the money he had received from his     
master1 and did not trade with it       
through fainthearted fear1 was punished 
by his master 7,matt4 #be2 ,luke #ai74  

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher calls
 those evil who injure their neighbor3  
and accordingly the fainthearted is said
 not to be evil1 because he injures no  
one1 save accidentally1 by omitting to  
do what might be profitable to others4  
,for ,gregory says 7,pastoral4 i7 that  
if they who demur to do good to their   
neighbor in preaching be judged         
strictly1 without doubt their guilt is  
proportionate to the good they might    
have done had they been less retiring4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing hinders a     
person who has a virtuous habit from    
sinning venially and without losing the 
habit1 or mortally and with loss of the 
habit of gratuitous virtue4 ,hence it is
 possible for a man1 by reason of the   
virtue which he has1 to be worthy of    
doing certain great things that are     
worthy of great honor1 and yet through  
not trying to make use of his virtue1 he
 sins sometimes venially1 sometimes     
mortally4  ,again it may be replied that
 the fainthearted is worthy of great    

things in proportion to his ability for 
virtue1 ability which he derives either 
from a good natural disposition1 or from
 science1 or from external fortune1 and 
if he fails to use those things for     
virtue1 he becomes guilty of            
pusillanimity4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even  
pusillanimity may in some way be the    
result of pride3 when1 to wit1 a man    
clings too much to his own opinion1     
whereby he thinks himself incompetent   
for those things for which he is        
competent4 ,hence it is written 7,prov4 
#bf3af73 ,the sluggard is wiser in his  
own conceit than seven men that speak   
sentences4 ,for nothing hinders him from
 depreciating himself in some things1   
and having a high opinion of himself in 
others4 ,wherefore ,gregory says        
7,pastoral4 i7 of ,moses that perchance 
he would have been proud1 had he        
undertaken the leadership of a numerous 
people without misgiving3 and again he  
would have been proud1 had he refused to
 obey the command of his ,creator4      

,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,moses and ,jeremias   
were worthy of the office to which they 
were appointed by ,god1 but their       
worthiness was of ,divine grace3 yet    
they1 considering the insufficiency of  
their own weakness1 demurred2 though not
 obstinately lest they should fall into 
pride4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #acc1 ,art4 #b  ,whether            
,pusillanimity ,is ,opposed to          
,magnanimity8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems 
that pusillanimity is not opposed to    
magnanimity4 ,for the ,philosopher says 
7,ethic41 #c7 that the fainthearted man 
knows not himself3 for he would desire  
the good things1 of which he is worthy1 
if he knew himself4 ,now ignorance of   
self seems opposed to prudence4         
,therefore pusillanimity is opposed to  
prudence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further our ,lord 
calls the servant wicked and slothful   
who through pusillanimity refused to    
make use of the money4 ,moreover the    
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that 
the fainthearted seem to be slothful4   

,now sloth is opposed to solicitude1    
which is an act of prudence1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #i74 ,therefore     
pusillanimity is not opposed to         
magnanimity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
pusillanimity seems to proceed from     
inordinate fear3 hence it is written    
7,isa4 #ce3d73 ,say to the fainthearted3
 ,take courage and fear not4 ,it also   
seems to proceed from inordinate anger1 
according to ,col4 #c3ba1 ,fathers1     
provoke not your children to            
indignation1 lest they be discouraged4  
,now inordinate fear is opposed to      
fortitude1 and inordinate anger to      
meekness4 ,therefore pusillanimity is   
not opposed to magnanimity4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 the vice that is in opposition
 to a particular virtue is the more     
grievous according as it is more unlike 
that virtue4 ,now pusillanimity is more 
unlike magnanimity than presumption is4 
,therefore if pusillanimity is opposed  
to magnanimity1 it follows that it is a 
more grievous sin than presumption3 yet 

this is contrary to the saying of       
,ecclus4 #cg3c1 ,o wicked presumption1  
whence camest thou8 ,therefore          
pusillanimity is not opposed to         
magnanimity4  ,on the contrary1         
,pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as
 greatness and littleness of soul1 as   
their very names denote4 ,now great and 
little are opposites4 ,therefore        
pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity4
  ,i answer that1 ,pusillanimity may be 
considered in three ways4 ,first1 in    
itself2 and thus it is evident that by  
its very nature it is opposed to        
magnanimity1 from which it differs as   
great and little differ in connection   
with the same subject4 ,for just as the 
magnanimous man tends to great things   
out of greatness of soul1 so the        
pusillanimous man shrinks from great    
things out of littleness of soul4       
,secondly1 it may be considered in      
reference to its cause1 which on the    
part of the intellect is ignorance of   
one's own qualification1 and on the part

 of the appetite is the fear of failure 
in what one falsely deems to exceed     
one's ability4 ,thirdly1 it may be      
considered in reference to its effect1  
which is to shrink from the great things
 of which one is worthy4 ,but1 as stated
 above 7,q4 #acb1 ,a4 #b1 ad #c71       
opposition between vice and virtue      
depends rather on their respective      
species than on their cause or effect4  
,hence pusillanimity is directly opposed
 to magnanimity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this
 argument considers pusillanimity as    
proceeding from a cause in the          
intellect4 ,yet it cannot be said       
properly that it is opposed to prudence1
 even in respect of its cause3 because  
ignorance of this kind does not proceed 
from indiscretion but from laziness in  
considering one's own ability1 according
 to ,ethic4 iv1 #c1 or in accomplishing 
what is within one's power4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,this argument considers      
pusillanimity from the point of view of 
its effect4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this     

argument considers the point of view of 
cause4 ,nor is the fear that causes     
pusillanimity always a fear of the      
dangers of death3 wherefore it does not 
follow from this standpoint that        
pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude4  
,as regards anger1 if we consider it    
under the aspect of its proper movement1
 whereby a man is roused to take        
vengeance1 it does not cause            
pusillanimity1 which disheartens the    
soul2 on the contrary1 it takes it away4
 ,if1 however1 we consider the causes of
 anger1 which are injuries inflicted    
whereby the soul of the man who suffers 
them is disheartened1 it conduces to    
pusillanimity4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3        
,according to its proper species        
pusillanimity is a graver sin than      
presumption1 since thereby a man        
withdraws from good things1 which is a  
very great evil according to ,ethic4 iv4
 ,presumption1 however1 is stated to be 
wicked on account of pride whence it    
proceeds4   ,,question #acd  ,,of       

,,magnificence 7,in ,four ,articles7    
,we must now consider magnificence and  
the vices opposed to it4 ,with regard to
 magnificence there are four points of  
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether magnificence is 
a virtue8  7#b7 ,whether it is a special
 virtue8  7#c7 ,what is its matter8     
7#d7 ,whether it is a part of fortitude8
   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4     
#acd1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,magnificence  
,is a ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems
 that magnificence is not a virtue4 ,for
 whoever has one virtue has all the     
virtues1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#fe1 ,a4 #a74 ,but one may have the     
other virtues without having            
magnificence3 because the ,philosopher  
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #b7 that not every    
liberal man is magnificent4 ,therefore  
magnificence is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 moral virtue observes the    
mean1 according to ,ethic4 ii1 #f4 ,but 
magnificence does not seemingly observe 
the mean1 for it exceeds liberality in  
greatness4 ,now great and little are    

opposed to one another as extremes1 the 
mean of which is equal1 as stated in    
,metaph4 x4 ,hence magnificence observes
 not the mean1 but the extreme4         
,therefore it is not a virtue4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 no virtue is opposed to a 
natural inclination1 but on the contrary
 perfects it1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajh1
 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #aag1 ,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #a74   
,now according to the ,philosopher      
7,ethic4 iv1 #b7 the magnificent man is 
not lavish towards himself3 and this is 
opposed to the natural inclination one  
has to look after oneself4 ,therefore   
magnificence is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #d3
 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher
 7,ethic4 vi1 #d7 act is right reason   
about things to be made4 ,now           
magnificence is about things to be made1
 as its very name denotes               
99,magnificence  magna facere--i4e4 to  
make great things4 ,therefore it is an  
act rather than a virtue4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,human virtue is a            
participation of ,divine power4 ,but    

magnificence 7virtutis7 belongs to      
,divine power1 according to ,ps4 #dg3ce3
 ,his magnificence and ,his power is in 
the clouds4 ,therefore magnificence is a
 virtue4  ,i answer that1 ,according to 
,de ,coelo i1 #af1 we speak of virtue in
 relation to the extreme limit of a     
thing's power1 not as regards the limit 
of deficiency1 but as regards the limit 
of excess1 the very nature of which     
denotes something great4 ,wherefore to  
do something great1 whence magnificence 
takes its name1 belongs properly to the 
very notion of virtue4 ,hence           
magnificence denotes a virtue4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,not every liberal man is     
magnificent as regards his actions1     
because he lacks the wherewithal to     
perform magnificent deeds4 ,nevertheless
 every liberal man has the habit of     
magnificence1 either actually or in     
respect of a proximate disposition      
thereto1 as explained above 7,q4 #abi1  
,a4 #c1 ad #b71 as also 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#fe1 ,a4 #a7 when we were treating of   

the connection of virtues4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,it is true that magnificence      
observes the extreme1 if we consider the
 quantity of the thing done3 yet it     
observes the mean1 if we consider the   
rule of reason1 which it neither falls  
short of nor exceeds1 as we have also   
said of magnanimity 7,q4 #abi1 ,a4 #c1  
ad #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it belongs to
 magnificence to do something great4    
,but that which regards a man's person  
is little in comparison with that which 
regards ,divine things1 or even the     
affairs of the community at large4      
,wherefore the magnificent man does not 
intend principally to be lavish towards 
himself1 not that he does not seek his  
own good1 but because to do so is not   
something great4 ,yet if anything       
regarding himself admits of greatness1  
the magnificent man accomplishes it     
magnificently3 for instance1 things that
 are done once1 such as a wedding1 or   
the like2 or things that are of a       
lasting nature2 thus it belongs to a    

magnificent man to provide himself with 
a suitable dwelling1 as stated in       
,ethic4 iv4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 there
 must needs be a virtue of act1 i4e4 a  
moral virtue1 whereby the appetite is   
inclined to make good use of the rule of
 act3 and this is what magnificence     
does4 ,hence it is not an act but a     
virtue4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #acd1 ,art4 #b  ,whether            
,magnificence ,is a ,special ,virtue8   
,objection #a3 ,it seems that           
magnificence is not a special virtue4   
,for magnificence would seem to consist 
in doing something great4 ,but it may   
belong to any virtue to do something    
great1 if the virtue be great3 as in the
 case of one who has a great virtue of  
temperance1 for he does a great work of 
temperance4 ,therefore1 magnificence is 
not a special virtue1 but denotes a     
perfect degree of any virtue4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 seemingly that which tends to
 a thing is the same as that which does 

it4 ,but it belongs to magnanimity to   
tend to something great1 as stated above
 7,q4 #abi1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore it
 belongs to magnanimity likewise to do  
something great4 ,therefore magnificence
 is not a special virtue distinct from  
magnanimity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1       
magnificence seems to belong to         
holiness1 for it is written 7,ex4       
#ae3aa73 ,magnificent ,douay3 'glorious'
 in holiness1 and 7,ps4 #ie3f73         
,holiness and magnificence ,douay3      
',majesty' in ,his sanctuary4 ,now      
holiness is the same as religion1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #h74         
,therefore magnificence is apparently   
the same as religion4 ,therefore it is  
not a special virtue1 distinct from the 
others4  ,on the contrary1 ,the         
,philosopher reckons it with other      
special virtues 7,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iv #b74
  ,i answer that1 ,it belongs to        
magnificence to do 7facere7 something   
great1 as its name implies 99           
magnificence  magna facere--i4e4 to make

 great things4 ,now facere may be taken 
in two ways1 in a strict sense1 and in a
 broad sense4 ,strictly facere means to 
work something in external matter1 for  
instance to make a house1 or something  
of the kind2 in a broad sense facere is 
employed to denote any action1 whether  
it passes into external matter1 as to   
burn or cut1 or remain in the agent1 as 
to understand or will4  ,accordingly if 
magnificence be taken to denote the     
doing of something great1 the doing     
7factio7 being understood in the strict 
sense1 it is then a special virtue4 ,for
 the work done is produced by act3 in   
the use of which it is possible to      
consider a special aspect of goodness1  
namely that the work produced 7factum7  
by the act is something great1 namely in
 quantity1 value1 or dignity1 and this  
is what magnificence does4 ,in this way 
magnificence is a special virtue4  ,if1 
on the other hand1 magnificence take its
 name from doing something great1 the   
doing 7facere7 being understood in a    

broad sense1 it is not a special virtue4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs to every 
perfect virtue to do something great in 
the genus of that virtue1 if doing      
7facere7 be taken in the broad sense1   
but not if it be taken strictly1 for    
this is proper to magnificence4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,it belongs to magnanimity not
 only to tend to something great1 but   
also to do great works in all the       
virtues1 either by making 7faciendo71 or
 by any kind of action1 as stated in    
,ethic4 iv1 #c3 yet so that magnanimity1
 in this respect1 regards the sole      
aspect of great1 while the other virtues
 which1 if they be perfect1 do something
 great1 direct their principal          
intention1 not to something great1 but  
to that which is proper to each virtue3 
and the greatness of the thing done is  
sometimes consequent upon the greatness 
of the virtue4  ,on the other hand1 it  
belongs to magnificence not only to do  
something great1 doing 7facere7 being   
taken in the strict sense1 but also to  

tend with the mind to the doing of great
 things4 ,hence ,tully says 7,de        
,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that magnificence is
 the discussing and administering of    
great and lofty undertakings1 with a    
certain broad and noble purpose of mind1
 discussion referring to the inward     
intention1 and administration to the    
outward accomplishment4 ,wherefore just 
as magnanimity intends something great  
in every matter1 it follows that        
magnificence does the same in every work
 that can be produced in external matter
 7factibili74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the    
intention of magnificence is the        
production of a great work4 ,now works  
done by men are directed to an end3 and 
no end of human works is so great as the
 honor of ,god3 wherefore magnificence  
does a great work especially in         
reference to the ,divine honor4         
,wherefore the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 iv1 #b7 that the most          
commendable expenditure is that which is
 directed to ,divine sacrifices3 and    

this is the chief object of             
magnificence4 ,for this reason          
magnificence is connected with holiness1
 since its chief effect is directed to  
religion or holiness4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acd1 ,art4 #c 
,whether the ,matter of ,magnificence   
,is ,great ,expenditure8  ,objection #a3
 ,it seems that the matter of           
magnificence is not great expenditure4  
,for there are not two virtues about the
 same matter4 ,but liberality is about  
expenditure1 as stated above 7,q4 #aag1 
,a4 #b74 ,therefore magnificence is not 
about expenditure4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
every magnificent man is liberal        
7,ethic4 iv1 #b74 ,but liberality is    
about gifts rather than about           
expenditure4 ,therefore magnificence    
also is not chiefly about expenditure1  
but about gifts4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it
 belongs to magnificence to produce an  
external work4 ,but not even great      
expenditure is always the means of      
producing an external work1 for instance

 when one spends much in sending        
presents4 ,therefore expenditure is not 
the proper matter of magnificence4      
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 only the rich are   
capable of great expenditure4 ,but the  
poor are able to possess all the        
virtues1 since the virtues do not       
necessarily require external fortune1   
but are sufficient for themselves1 as   
,seneca says 7,de ,ira i3 ,de vita beata
 xvi74 ,therefore magnificence is not   
about great expenditure4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 iv1 #b7 that magnificence does 
not extend1 like liberality1 to all     
transactions in money1 but only to      
expensive ones1 wherein it exceeds      
liberality in scale4 ,therefore it is   
only about great expenditure4  ,i answer
 that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 it    
belongs to magnificence to intend doing 
some great work4 ,now for the doing of a
 great work1 proportionate expenditure  
is necessary1 for great works cannot be 
produced without great expenditure4     

,hence it belongs to magnificence to    
spend much in order that some great work
 may be accomplished in becoming manner4
 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 iv1 #b7 that a magnificent man 
will produce a more magnificent work    
with equal1 i4e4 proportionate1         
expenditure4 ,now expenditure is the    
outlay of a sum of money2 and a man may 
be hindered from making that outlay if  
he love money too much4 ,hence the      
matter of magnificence may be said to be
 both this expenditure itself1 which the
 magnificent man uses to produce a great
 work1 and also the very money which he 
employs in going to great expense1 and  
as well as the love of money1 which love
 the magnificent man moderates1 lest he 
be hindered from spending much4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #abi1   
,a4 #b71 those virtues that are about   
external things experience a certain    
difficulty arising from the genus itself
 of the thing about which the virtue is 
concerned1 and another difficulty       

besides arising from the greatness of   
that same thing4 ,hence the need for two
 virtues1 concerned about money and its 
use2 namely1 liberality1 which regards  
the use of money in general1 and        
magnificence1 which regards that which  
is great in the use of money4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,the use of money regards the 
liberal man in one way and the          
magnificent man in another4 ,for it     
regards the liberal man1 inasmuch as it 
proceeds from an ordinate affection in  
respect of money2 wherefore all due use 
of money 7such as gifts and             
expenditure71 the obstacles to which are
 removed by a moderate love of money1   
belongs to liberality4 ,but the use of  
money regards the magnificent man in    
relation to some great work which has to
 be produced1 and this use is impossible
 without expenditure or outlay4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,the magnificent man also     
makes gifts of presents1 as stated in   
,ethic4 iv1 #b1 but not under the aspect
 of gift1 but rather under the aspect of

 expenditure directed to the production 
of some work1 for instance in order to  
honor someone1 or in order to do        
something which will reflect honor on   
the whole state3 as when he brings to   
effect what the whole state is striving 
for4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the chief act of
 virtue is the inward choice1 and a     
virtue may have this without outward    
fortune3 so that even a poor man may be 
magnificent4 ,but goods of fortune are  
requisite as instruments to the external
 acts of virtue3 and in this way a poor 
man cannot accomplish the outward act of
 magnificence in things that are great  
simply4 ,perhaps1 however1 he may be    
able to do so in things that are great  
by comparison to some particular work2  
which1 though little in itself1 can     
nevertheless be done magnificently in   
proportion to its genus3 for little and 
great are relative terms1 as the        
,philosopher says 7,de ,praedic4 ,cap4  
,ad aliquid474   ,,fourth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acd1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 

,magnificence ,is a ,part of ,fortitude8
  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that         
magnificence is not a part of fortitude4
 ,for magnificence agrees in matter with
 liberality1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74  
,but liberality is a part1 not of       
fortitude1 but of justice4 ,therefore   
magnificence is not a part of fortitude4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fortitude is about
 fear and darings4 ,but magnificence    
seems to have nothing to do with fear1  
but only with expenditure1 which is a   
kind of action4 ,therefore magnificence 
seems to pertain to justice1 which is   
about actions1 rather than to fortitude4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher  
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #b7 that the          
magnificent man is like the man of      
science4 ,now science has more in common
 with prudence than with fortitude4     
,therefore magnificence should not be   
reckoned a part of fortitude4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4   
ii7 and ,macrobius 7,de ,somn4 ,scip4 i7
 and ,andronicus reckon magnificence to 

be a part of fortitude4  ,i answer that1
 ,magnificence1 in so far as it is a    
special virtue1 cannot be reckoned a    
subjective part of fortitude1 since it  
does not agree with this virtue in the  
point of matter3 but it is reckoned a   
part thereof1 as being annexed to it as 
secondary to principal virtue4  ,in     
order for a virtue to be annexed to a   
principal virtue1 two things are        
necessary1 as stated above 7,q4 #hj74   
,the one is that the secondary virtue   
agree with the principal1 and the other 
is that in some respect it be exceeded  
thereby4 ,now magnificence agrees with  
fortitude in the point that as fortitude
 tends to something arduous and         
difficult1 so also does magnificence3   
wherefore seemingly it is seated1 like  
fortitude1 in the irascible4 ,yet       
magnificence falls short of fortitude1  
in that the arduous thing to which      
fortitude tends derives its difficulty  
from a danger that threatens the person1
 whereas the arduous thing to which     

magnificence tends1 derives its         
difficulty from the dispossession of    
one's property1 which is of much less   
account than danger to one's person4    
,wherefore magnificence is accounted a  
part of fortitude4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,justice regards operations in          
themselves1 as viewed under the aspect  
of something due3 but liberality and    
magnificence regard sumptuary operations
 as related to the passions of the soul1
 albeit in different ways4 ,for         
liberality regards expenditure in       
reference to the love and desire of     
money1 which are passions of the        
concupiscible faculty1 and do not hinder
 the liberal man from giving and        
spending3 so that this virtue is in the 
concupiscible4 ,on the other hand1      
magnificence regards expenditure in     
reference to hope1 by attaining to the  
difficulty1 not simply1 as magnanimity  
does1 but in a determinate matter1      
namely expenditure3 wherefore           
magnificence1 like magnanimity1 is      

apparently in the irascible part4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although magnificence 
does not agree with fortitude in matter1
 it agrees with it as the condition of  
its matter3 since it tends to something 
difficult in the matter of expenditure1 
even as fortitude tends to something    
difficult in the matter of fear4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,magnificence directs the use
 of art to something great1 as stated   
above and in the preceding ,article4    
,now art is in the reason4 ,wherefore it
 belongs to the magnificent man to use  
his reason by observing proportion of   
expenditure to the work he has in hand4 
,this is especially necessary on account
 of the greatness of both those things1 
since if he did not take careful        
thought1 he would incur the risk of a   
great loss4   ,,question #ace  ,,of     
,,meanness99 7,in ,two ,articles7       
99,parvificentia1 or doing mean things1 
just as magnificentia is doing great    
things4  ,we must now consider the vices
 opposed to magnificence3 under which   

head there are two points of inquiry3   
7#a7 ,whether meanness is a vice8  7#b7 
,of the vice opposed to it4   ,,first   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ace1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,meanness ,is a ,vice8         
,objection #a3 ,it seems that meanness  
is not a vice4 ,for just as vice        
moderates great things1 so does it      
moderate little things3 wherefore both  
the liberal and the magnificent do      
little things4 ,but magnificence is a   
virtue4 ,therefore likewise meanness is 
a virtue rather than a vice4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4
 iv1 #b7 that careful reckoning is mean4
 ,but careful reckoning is apparently   
praiseworthy1 since man's good is to be 
in accordance with reason1 as ,dionysius
 states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #d74 ,therefore
 meanness is not a vice4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4
 iv1 #b7 that a mean man is loth to     
spend money4 ,but this belongs to       
covetousness or illiberality4 ,therefore
 meanness is not a distinct vice from   

the others4  ,on the contrary1 ,the     
,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii7 accounts      
meanness a special vice opposed to      
magnificence4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2  
,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f71 moral acts take their 
species from their end1 wherefore in    
many cases they are denominated from    
that end4 ,accordingly a man is said to 
be mean 7parvificus7 because he intends 
to do something little 7parvum74 ,now   
according to the ,philosopher 7,de      
,praedic4 ,cap4 ,ad aliquid47 great and 
little are relative terms3 and when we  
say that a mean man intends to do       
something little1 this must be          
understood in relation to the kind of   
work he does4 ,this may be little or    
great in two ways3 in one way as regards
 the work itself to be done1 in another 
as regards the expense4 ,accordingly the
 magnificent man intends principally the
 greatness of his work1 and secondarily 
he intends the greatness of the expense1
 which he does not shirk1 so that he may

 produce a great work4 ,wherefore the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #d7 that 
the magnificent man with equal          
expenditure will produce a more         
magnificent result4 ,on the other hand1 
the mean man intends principally to     
spend little1 wherefore the ,philosopher
 says 7,ethic4 iv1 #b7 that he seeks how
 he may spend least4 ,as a result of    
this he intends to produce a little     
work1 that is1 he does not shrink from  
producing a little work1 so long as he  
spends little4 ,wherefore the           
,philosopher says that the mean man     
after going to great expense forfeits   
the good of the magnificent work1 for   
the trifle that he is unwilling to      
spend4 ,therefore it is evident that the
 mean man fails to observe the          
proportion that reason demands between  
expenditure and work4 ,now the essence  
of vice is that it consists in failing  
to do what is in accordance with reason4
 ,hence it is manifest that meanness is 
a vice4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtue       

moderates little things1 according to   
the rule of reason3 from which rule the 
mean man declines1 as stated in the     
,article4 ,for he is called mean1 not   
for moderating little things1 but for   
declining from the rule of reason in    
moderating great or little things3 hence
 meanness is a vice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1   
#e71 fear makes us take counsel3        
wherefore a mean man is careful in his  
reckonings1 because he has an inordinate
 fear of spending his goods1 even in    
things of the least account4 ,hence this
 is not praiseworthy1 but sinful and    
reprehensible1 because then a man does  
not regulate his affections according to
 reason1 but1 on the contrary1 makes use
 of his reason in pursuance of his      
inordinate affections4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,just as the magnificent man has this  
in common with the liberal man1 that he 
spends his money readily and with       
pleasure1 so too the mean man in common 
with the illiberal or covetous man is   

loth and slow to spend4 ,yet they differ
 in this1 that illiberality regards     
ordinary expenditure1 while meanness    
regards great expenditure1 which is a   
more difficult accomplishment3 wherefore
 meanness is less sinful than           
illiberality4 ,hence the ,philosopher   
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #b7 that although     
meanness and its contrary vice are      
sinful1 they do not bring shame on a    
man1 since neither do they harm one's   
neighbor1 nor are they very disgraceful4
   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    
#ace1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,there ,is a   
,vice ,opposed to ,meanness8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it seems that there is no vice    
opposed to meanness4 ,for great is      
opposed to little4 ,now1 magnificence is
 not a vice1 but a virtue4 ,therefore no
 vice is opposed to meanness4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 since meanness is a vice by  
deficiency1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 it
 seems that if any vice is opposed to   
meanness1 it would merely consist in    
excessive spending4 ,but those who spend

 much1 where they ought to spend little1
 spend little where they ought to spend 
much1 according to ,ethic4 iv1 #b1 and  
thus they have something of meanness4   
,therefore there is not a vice opposed  
to meanness4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 moral 
acts take their species from their end1 
as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now those who
 spend excessively1 do so in order to   
make a show of their wealth1 as stated  
in ,ethic4 iv1 #b4 ,but this belongs to 
vainglory1 which is opposed to          
magnanimity1 as stated above 7,q4 #aca1 
,a4 #b74 ,therefore no vice is opposed  
to meanness4  ,on the contrary1 stands  
the authority of the ,philosopher who   
7,ethic4 ii1 #h2 iv1 #b7 places         
magnificence as a mean between two      
opposite vices4  ,i answer that1 ,great 
is opposed to little4 ,also little and  
great are relative terms1 as stated     
above 7,a4 #a74 ,now just as expenditure
 may be little in comparison with the   
work1 so may it be great in comparison  
with the work in that it exceeds the    

proportion which reason requires to     
exist between expenditure and work4     
,hence it is manifest that the vice of  
meanness1 whereby a man intends to spend
 less than his work is worth1 and thus  
fails to observe due proportion between 
his expenditure and his work1 has a vice
 opposed to it1 whereby a man exceeds   
this same proportion1 by spending more  
than is proportionate to his work4 ,this
 vice is called in ,greek banausia1 so  
called from the ,greek baunos1 because1 
like the fire in the furnace1 it        
consumes everything4 ,it is also called 
apyrokalia1 i4e4 lacking good fire1     
since like fire it consumes all1 but not
 for a good purpose4 ,hence in ,latin it
 may be called consumptio 7waste74      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,magnificence is so    
called from the great work done1 but not
 from the expenditure being in excess of
 the work3 for this belongs to the vice 
which is opposed to meanness4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,to the one same vice there is
 opposed the virtue which observes the  

mean1 and a contrary vice4 ,accordingly1
 then1 the vice of waste is opposed to  
meanness in that it exceeds in          
expenditure the value of the work1 by   
spending much where it behooved to spend
 little4 ,but it is opposed to          
magnificence on the part of the great   
work1 which the magnificent man intends 
principally1 in so far as when it       
behooves to spend much1 it spends little
 or nothing4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3          
,wastefulness is opposed to meanness by 
the very species of its act1 since it   
exceeds the rule of reason1 whereas     
meanness falls short of it4 ,yet nothing
 hinders this from being directed to the
 end of another vice1 such as vainglory 
or any other4   ,,question #acf  ,,of   
,,patience 7,in ,five ,articles7  ,we   
must now consider patience4 ,under this 
head there are five points of inquiry3  
7#a7 ,whether patience is a virtue8     
7#b7 ,whether it is the greatest of the 
virtues8  7#c7 ,whether it can be had   
without grace8  7#d7 ,whether it is a   

part of fortitude8  7#e7 ,whether it is 
the same as longanimity8   ,,first      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acf1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,patience ,is a ,virtue8       
,objection #a3 ,it seems that patience  
is not a virtue4 ,for the virtues are   
most perfect in heaven1 as ,augustine   
says 7,de ,trin4 xiv74 ,yet patience is 
not there1 since no evils have to be    
borne there1 according to ,isa4 #di3aj  
and ,apoc4 #g3af1 ,they shall not hunger
 nor thirst1 neither shall the heat nor 
the sun strike them4 ,therefore patience
 is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
no virtue can be found in the wicked1   
since virtue it is that makes its       
possessor good4 ,yet patience is        
sometimes found in wicked men2 for      
instance1 in the covetous1 who bear many
 evils patiently that they may amass    
money1 according to ,eccles4 #e3af1 ,all
 the days of his life he eateth in      
darkness1 and in many cares1 and in     
misery and in sorrow4 ,therefore        
patience is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3    

,further1 the fruits differ from the    
virtues1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#gj1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,but patience is   
reckoned among the fruits 7,gal4 #e3bb74
 ,therefore patience is not a virtue4   
,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de  
,patientia i73 ,the virtue of the soul  
that is called patience1 is so great a  
gift of ,god1 that we even preach the   
patience of ,him who bestows it upon us4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 
#abc1 ,a4 #a71 the moral virtues are    
directed to the good1 inasmuch as they  
safeguard the good of reason against the
 impulse of the passions4 ,now among the
 passions sorrow is strong to hinder the
 good of reason1 according to #b ,cor4  
#g3aj1 ,the sorrow of the world worketh 
death1 and ,ecclus4 #cj3be1 ,sadness    
hath killed many1 and there is no profit
 in it4 ,hence the necessity for a      
virtue to safeguard the good of reason  
against sorrow1 lest reason give way to 
sorrow3 and this patience does4         
,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de         

,patientia ii73 ,a man's patience it is 
whereby he bears evil with an equal     
mind1 i4e4 without being disturbed by   
sorrow1 lest he abandon with an unequal 
mind the goods whereby he may advance to
 better things4 ,it is therefore evident
 that patience is a virtue4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,the moral virtues do not     
remain in heaven as regards the same act
 that they have on the way1 in relation1
 namely1 to the goods of the present    
life1 which will not remain in heaven3  
but they will remain in their relation  
to the end1 which will be in heaven4    
,thus justice will not be in heaven in  
relation to buying and selling and other
 matters pertaining to the present life1
 but it will remain in the point of     
being subject to ,god4 ,in like manner  
the act of patience1 in heaven1 will not
 consist in bearing things1 but in      
enjoying the goods to which we had      
aspired by suffering4 ,hence ,augustine 
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv7 that patience 
itself will not be in heaven1 since     

there is no need for it except where    
evils have to be borne3 yet that which  
we shall obtain by patience will be     
eternal4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as          
,augustine says 7,de ,patientia ii2 v7  
properly speaking those are patient who 
would rather bear evils without         
inflicting them1 than inflict them      
without bearing them4 ,as for those who 
bear evils that they may inflict evil1  
their patience is neither marvelous nor 
praiseworthy1 for it is no patience at  
all3 we may marvel at their hardness of 
heart1 but we must refuse to call them  
patient4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated   
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #a71 the   
very notion of fruit denotes pleasure4  
,and works of virtue afford pleasure in 
themselves1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #h4 
,now the names of the virtues are wont  
to be applied to their acts4 ,wherefore 
patience as a habit is a virtue1 but as 
to the pleasure which its act affords1  
it is reckoned a fruit1 especially in   
this1 that patience safeguards the mind 

from being overcome by sorrow4          
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acf1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,patience ,is the    
,greatest of the ,virtues8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it seems that patience is the      
greatest of the virtues4 ,for in every  
genus that which is perfect is the      
greatest4 ,now patience hath a perfect  
work 7,james #a3d74 ,therefore patience 
is the greatest of the virtues4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 all the virtues are       
directed to the good of the soul4 ,now  
this seems to belong chiefly to         
patience2 for it is written 7,luke      
#ba3ai73 ,in your patience you shall    
possess your souls4 ,therefore patience 
is the greatest of the virtues4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 seemingly that which is   
the safeguard and cause of other things 
is greater than they are4 ,but according
 to ,gregory 7,hom4 xxxv in ,evang47    
patience is the root and safeguard of   
all the virtues4 ,therefore patience is 
the greatest of the virtues4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,it is not reckoned among the 

four virtues which ,gregory 7,moral4    
xxii7 and ,augustine 7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4
 xv7 call principal4  ,i answer that1   
,virtues by their very nature are       
directed to good4 ,for it is virtue that
 makes its possessor good1 and renders  
the latter's work good 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74
 ,hence it follows that a virtue's      
superiority and preponderance over other
 virtues is the greater according as it 
inclines man to good more effectively   
and directly4 ,now those virtues which  
are effective of good1 incline a man    
more directly to good than those which  
are a check on the things which lead man
 away from good3 and just as among those
 that are effective of good1 the greater
 is that which establishes man in a     
greater good 7thus faith1 hope1 and     
charity are greater than prudence and   
justice72 so too among those that are a 
check on things that withdraw man from  
good1 the greater virtue is the one     
which is a check on a greater obstacle  
to good4 ,but dangers of death1 about   

which is fortitude1 and pleasures of    
touch1 with which temperance is         
concerned1 withdraw man from good more  
than any kind of hardship1 which is the 
object of patience4 ,therefore patience 
is not the greatest of the virtues1 but 
falls short1 not only of the theological
 virtues1 and of prudence and justice   
which directly establish man in good1   
but also of fortitude and temperance    
which withdraw him from greater         
obstacles to good4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,patience is said to have a perfect work
 in bearing hardships3 for these give   
rise first to sorrow1 which is moderated
 by patience2 secondly1 to anger1 which 
is moderated by meekness2 thirdly1 to   
hatred1 which charity removes2 fourthly1
 to unjust injury1 which justice        
forbids4 ,now that which removes the    
principle is the most perfect4  ,yet it 
does not follow1 if patience be more    
perfect in this respect1 that it is more
 perfect simply4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,possession denotes undisturbed         

ownership2 wherefore man is said to     
possess his soul by patience1 in so far 
as it removes by the root the passions  
that are evoked by hardships and disturb
 the soul4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,patience  
is said to be the root and safeguard of 
all the virtues1 not as though it caused
 and preserved them directly1 but merely
 because it removes their obstacles4    
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acf1  
,art4 #c  ,whether ,it ,is ,possible to 
,have ,patience ,without ,grace8        
,objection #a3 ,it seems that it is     
possible to have patience without grace4
 ,for the more his reason inclines to a 
thing1 the more is it possible for the  
rational creature to accomplish it4 ,now
 it is more reasonable to suffer evil   
for the sake of good than for the sake  
of evil4 ,yet some suffer evil for      
evil's sake1 by their own virtue and    
without the help of grace2 for          
,augustine says 7,de ,patientia iii7    
that men endure many toils and sorrows  
for the sake of the things they love    

sinfully4 ,much more1 therefore1 is it  
possible for man1 without the help of   
grace1 to bear evil for the sake of     
good1 and this is to be truly patient4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 some who are not in 
a state of grace have more abhorrence   
for sinful evils than for bodily evils3 
hence some heathens are related to have 
endured many hardships rather than      
betray their country or commit some     
other misdeed4 ,now this is to be truly 
patient4 ,therefore it seems that it is 
possible to have patience without the   
help of grace4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it  
is quite evident that some go through   
much trouble and pain in order to regain
 health of the body4 ,now the health of 
the soul is not less desirable than     
bodily health4 ,therefore in like manner
 one may1 without the help of grace1    
endure many evils for the health of the 
soul1 and this is to be truly patient4  
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4  
#fa3f73 ,from ,him1 i4e4 from ,god1 is  
my patience4  ,i answer that1 ,as       

,augustine says 7,de ,patientia iv71 the
 strength of desire helps a man to bear 
toil and pain3 and no one willingly     
undertakes to bear what is painful1 save
 for the sake of that which gives       
pleasure4 ,the reason of this is because
 sorrow and pain are of themselves      
displeasing to the soul1 wherefore it   
would never choose to suffer them for   
their own sake1 but only for the sake of
 an end4 ,hence it follows that the good
 for the sake of which one is willing to
 endure evils1 is more desired and loved
 than the good the privation of which   
causes the sorrow that we bear          
patiently4 ,now the fact that a man     
prefers the good of grace to all natural
 goods1 the loss of which may cause     
sorrow1 is to be referred to charity1   
which loves ,god above all things4      
,hence it is evident that patience1 as a
 virtue1 is caused by charity1 according
 to #a ,cor4 #ac3d1 ,charity is patient4
  ,but it is manifest that it is        
impossible to have charity save through 

grace1 according to ,rom4 #e3e1 ,the    
charity of ,god is poured forth in our  
hearts by the ,holy ,ghost ,who is given
 to us4 ,therefore it is clearly        
impossible to have patience without the 
help of grace4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the   
inclination of reason would prevail in  
human nature in the state of integrity4 
,but in corrupt nature the inclination  
of concupiscence prevails1 because it is
 dominant in man4 ,hence man is more    
prone to bear evils for the sake of     
goods in which the concupiscence        
delights here and now1 than to endure   
evils for the sake of goods to come1    
which are desired in accordance with    
reason3 and yet it is this that pertains
 to true patience4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,the good of a social virtue 99,cf4     
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #e is commensurate
 with human nature2 and consequently the
 human will can tend thereto without the
 help of sanctifying grace1 yet not     
without the help of ,god's grace 99,cf4 
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #b4 ,on the other

 hand1 the good of grace is             
supernatural1 wherefore man cannot tend 
thereto by a natural virtue4 ,hence the 
comparison fails4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,even the endurance of those evils which
 a man bears for the sake of his body's 
health1 proceeds from the love a man    
naturally has for his own flesh4 ,hence 
there is no comparison between this     
endurance and patience which proceeds   
from a supernatural love4   ,,fourth    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acf1 ,art4 #d 
,whether ,patience ,is a ,part of       
,fortitude8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems   
that patience is not a part of          
fortitude4 ,for a thing is not part of  
itself4 ,now patience is apparently the 
same as fortitude3 because1 as stated   
above 7,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #f71 the proper act
 of fortitude is to endure2 and this    
belongs also to patience4 ,for it is    
stated in the ,liber ,sententiarum      
,prosperi 99,the quotation is from ,st4 
,gregory1 ,hom4 xxxv in ,evang4 that    
patience consists in enduring evils     

inflicted by others4 ,therefore patience
 is not a part of fortitude4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 fortitude is about fear and   
daring1 as stated above 7,q4 #abc1 ,a4  
#c71 and thus it is in the irascible4   
,but patience seems to be about sorrow1 
and consequently would seem to be in the
 concupiscible4 ,therefore patience is  
not a part of fortitude but of          
temperance4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the    
whole cannot be without its part4       
,therefore if patience is a part of     
fortitude1 there can be no fortitude    
without patience4 ,yet sometimes a brave
 man does not endure evils patiently1   
but even attacks the person who inflicts
 the evil4 ,therefore patience is not a 
part of fortitude4  ,on the contrary1   
,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 reckons 
it a part of fortitude4  ,i answer that1
 ,patience is a quasi-potential part of 
fortitude1 because it is annexed thereto
 as secondary to principal virtue4 ,for 
it belongs to patience to suffer with an
 equal mind the evils inflicted by      

others1 as ,gregory says in a homily    
7xxxv in ,evang474 ,now of those evils  
that are inflicted by others1 foremost  
and most difficult to endure are those  
that are connected with the danger of   
death1 and about these evils fortitude  
is concerned4 ,hence it is clear that in
 this matter fortitude has the principal
 place1 and that it lays claim to that  
which is principal in this matter4      
,wherefore patience is annexed to       
fortitude as secondary to principal     
virtue1 for which reason ,prosper calls 
patience brave 7,sent4 #haa74  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs to fortitude to   
endure1 not anything indeed1 but that   
which is most difficult to endure1      
namely dangers of death3 whereas it may 
pertain to patience to endure any kind  
of evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the act of  
fortitude consists not only in holding  
fast to good against the fear of future 
dangers1 but also in not failing through
 sorrow or pain occasioned by things    
present2 and it is in the latter respect

 that patience is akin to fortitude4    
,yet fortitude is chiefly about fear1   
which of itself evokes flight which     
fortitude avoids2 while patience is     
chiefly about sorrow1 for a man is said 
to be patient1 not because he does not  
fly1 but because he behaves in a        
praiseworthy manner by suffering        
7patiendo7 things which hurt him here   
and now1 in such a way as not to be     
inordinately saddened by them4 ,hence   
fortitude is properly in the irascible1 
while patience is in the concupiscible  
faculty4  ,nor does this hinder patience
 from being a part of fortitude1 because
 the annexing of virtue to virtue does  
not regard the subject1 but the matter  
or the form4 ,nevertheless patience is  
not to be reckoned a part of temperance1
 although both are in the concupiscible1
 because temperance is only about those 
sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of
 touch1 such as arise through abstinence
 from pleasures of food and sex3 whereas
 patience is chiefly about sorrows      

inflicted by other persons4 ,moreover it
 belongs to temperance to control these 
sorrows besides their contrary          
pleasures3 whereas it belongs to        
patience that a man forsake not the good
 of virtue on account of such like      
sorrows1 however great they be4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,it may be granted that       
patience in a certain respect is an     
integral part of justice1 if we consider
 the fact that a man may patiently      
endure evils pertaining to dangers of   
death2 and it is from this point of view
 that the objection argues4 ,nor is it  
inconsistent with patience that a man   
should1 when necessary1 rise up against 
the man who inflicts evils on him2 for  
,chrysostom 99,homily v4 in the ,opus   
,imperfectum1 falsely ascribed to ,st4  
,john ,chrysostom says on ,matt4 #d3aj1 
,begone ,satan1 that it is praiseworthy 
to be patient under our own wrongs1 but 
to endure ,god's wrongs patiently is    
most wicked3 and ,augustine says in a   
letter to ,marcellinus 7,ep4 cxxxviii7  

that the precepts of patience are not   
opposed to the good of the commonwealth1
 since in order to ensure that good we  
fight against our enemies4 ,but in so   
far as patience regards all kinds of    
evils1 it is annexed to fortitude as    
secondary to principal virtue4   ,,fifth
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acf1 ,art4 #e
  ,whether ,patience ,is the ,same ,as  
,longanimity899 99,longsuffering4 ,it is
 necessary to preserve the ,latin word1 
on account of the comparison with       
magnanimity4  ,objection #a3 ,it seems  
that patience is the same as            
longanimity4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de  
,patientia i7 that we speak of patience 
in ,god1 not as though any evil made    
,him suffer1 but because ,he awaits the 
wicked1 that they may be converted4     
,wherefore it is written 7,ecclus4      
#e3d73 ,the ,most ,high is a patient    
rewarder4 ,therefore it seems that      
patience is the same as longanimity4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the same thing is   
not contrary to two things4 ,but        

impatience is contrary to longanimity1  
whereby one awaits a delay3 for one is  
said to be impatient of delay1 as of    
other evils4 ,therefore it seems that   
patience is the same as longanimity4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as time is a   
circumstance of wrongs endured1 so is   
place4 ,but no virtue is distinct from  
patience on the score of place4         
,therefore in like manner longanimity   
which takes count of time1 in so far as 
a person waits for a long time1 is not  
distinct from patience4  ,obj4 #d3 ,on  
the contrary1 a gloss 99,origen1        
,comment4 in ,ep4 ad ,rom4 ii on ,rom4  
#b3d1 ,or despisest thou the riches of  
,his goodness1 and patience1 and        
longsuffering8 says3 ,it seems that     
longanimity differs from patience1      
because those who offend from weakness  
rather than of set purpose are said to  
be borne with longanimity3 while those  
who take a deliberate delight in their  
crimes are said to be borne patiently4  
,i answer that1 ,just as by magnanimity 

a man has a mind to tend to great       
things1 so by longanimity a man has a   
mind to tend to something a long way    
off4 ,wherefore as magnanimity regards  
hope1 which tends to good1 rather than  
daring1 fear1 or sorrow1 which have evil
 as their object1 so also does          
longanimity4 ,hence longanimity has more
 in common with magnanimity than with   
patience4  ,nevertheless it may have    
something in common with patience1 for  
two reasons4 ,first1 because patience1  
like fortitude1 endures certain evils   
for the sake of good1 and if this good  
is awaited shortly1 endurance is easier3
 whereas if it be delayed a long time1  
it is more difficult4 ,secondly1 because
 the very delay of the good we hope for1
 is of a nature to cause sorrow1        
according to ,prov4 #ac3ab1 ,hope that  
is deferred afflicteth the soul4 ,hence 
there may be patience in bearing this   
trial1 as in enduring any other sorrows4
 ,accordingly longanimity and constancy 
are both comprised under patience1 in so

 far as both the delay of the hoped for 
good 7which regards longanimity7 and the
 toil which man endures in persistently 
accomplishing a good work 7which regards
 constancy7 may be considered under the 
one aspect of grievous evil4  ,for this 
reason ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7  
in defining patience1 says that patience
 is the voluntary and prolonged         
endurance of arduous and difficult      
things for the sake of virtue or profit4
 ,by saying arduous he refers to        
constancy in good2 when he says         
difficult he refers to the grievousness 
of evil1 which is the proper object of  
patience2 and by adding continued or    
long lasting1 he refers to longanimity1 
in so far as it has something in common 
with patience4  ,this suffices for the  
,replies to the ,first and ,second      
,objections4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that    
which is a long way off as to place1    
though distant from us1 is not simply   
distant from things in nature1 as that  
which is a long way off in point of     

time3 hence the comparison fails4       
,moreover1 what is remote as to place   
offers no difficulty save in the point  
of time1 since what is placed a long way
 from us is a long time coming to us4   
,we grant the fourth argument4 ,we must 
observe1 however1 that the reason for   
the difference assigned by this gloss is
 that it is hard to bear with those who 
sin through weakness1 merely because    
they persist a long time in evil1       
wherefore it is said that they are borne
 with longanimity3 whereas the very fact
 of sinning through pride seems to be   
unendurable2 for which reason those who 
sin through pride are stated to be borne
 with patience4   ,,question #acg  ,,of 
,,perseverance 7,in ,four ,articles7    
,we must now consider perseverance and  
the vices opposed to it4 ,under the head
 of perseverance there are four points  
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether perseverance 
is a virtue8  7#b7 ,whether it is a part
 of fortitude8  7#c7 ,of its relation to
 constancy2  7#d7 ,whether it needs the 

help of grace8   ,,first ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acg1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,perseverance ,is a ,virtue8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it seems that perseverance is not 
a virtue4 ,for1 according to the        
,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #g71         
continency is greater than perseverance4
 ,but continency is not a virtue1 as    
stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #i4 ,therefore    
perseverance is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 by virtue man lives aright1  
according to ,augustine 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4
 ii1 #ai74 ,now according to the same   
authority 7,de ,persever4 i71 no one can
 be said to have perseverance while     
living1 unless he persevere until death4
 ,therefore perseverance is not a       
virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is      
requisite of every virtue that one      
should persist unchangeably in the work 
of that virtue1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1
 #d4 ,but this is what we understand by 
perseverance3 for ,tully says 7,de      
,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that perseverance is
 the fixed and continued persistence in 

a well-considered purpose4 ,therefore   
perseverance is not a special virtue1   
but a condition of every virtue4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,andronicus 99,chrysippus3
 in ,de ,affect4 says that perseverance 
is a habit regarding things to which we 
ought to stand1 and those to which we   
ought not to stand1 as well as those    
that are indifferent4 ,now a habit that 
directs us to do something well1 or to  
omit something1 is a virtue4 ,therefore 
perseverance is a virtue4  ,i answer    
that1 ,according to the ,philosopher    
7,ethic4 ii1 #c71 virtue is about the   
difficult and the good2 and so where    
there is a special kind of difficulty or
 goodness1 there is a special virtue4   
,now a virtuous deed may involve        
goodness or difficulty on two counts4   
,first1 from the act's very species1    
which is considered in respect of the   
proper object of that act3 secondly1    
from the length of time1 since to       
persist long in something difficult     
involves a special difficulty4 ,hence to

 persist long in something good until it
 is accomplished belongs to a special   
virtue4  ,accordingly just as temperance
 and fortitude are special virtues1 for 
the reason that the one moderates       
pleasures of touch 7which is of itself a
 difficult thing71 while the other      
moderates fear and daring in connection 
with dangers of death 7which also is    
something difficult in itself71 so      
perseverance is a special virtue1 since 
it consists in enduring delays in the   
above or other virtuous deeds1 so far as
 necessity requires4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,the ,philosopher is taking perseverance
 there1 as it is found in one who bears 
those things which are most difficult to
 endure long4 ,now it is difficult to   
endure1 not good1 but evil4 ,and evils  
that involve danger of death1 for the   
most part are not endured for a long    
time1 because often they soon pass away3
 wherefore it is not on this account    
that perseverance has its chief title to
 praise4 ,among other evils foremost are

 those which are opposed to pleasures of
 touch1 because evils of this kind      
affect the necessaries of life3 such are
 the lack of food and the like1 which at
 times call for long endurance4 ,now it 
is not difficult to endure these things 
for a long time for one who grieves not 
much at them1 nor delights much in the  
contrary goods2 as in the case of the   
temperate man1 in whom these passions   
are not violent4 ,but they are most     
difficult to bear for one who is        
strongly affected by such things1       
through lacking the perfect virtue that 
moderates these passions4 ,wherefore if 
perseverance be taken in this sense it  
is not a perfect virtue1 but something  
imperfect in the genus of virtue4 ,on   
the other hand1 if we take perseverance 
as denoting long persistence in any kind
 of difficult good1 it is consistent in 
one who has even perfect virtue3 for    
even if it is less difficult for him to 
persist1 yet he persists in the more    
perfect good4 ,wherefore such like      

perseverance may be a virtue1 because   
virtue derives perfection from the      
aspect of good rather than from the     
aspect of difficulty4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,sometimes a virtue and its act go by   
the same name3 thus ,augustine says     
7,tract4 in ,joan4 lxxix73 ,faith is to 
believe without seeing4 ,yet it is      
possible to have a habit of virtue      
without performing the act3 thus a poor 
man has the habit of magnificence       
without exercising the act4 ,sometimes1 
however1 a person who has the habit1    
begins to perform the act1 yet does not 
accomplish it1 for instance a builder   
begins to build a house1 but does not   
complete it4 ,accordingly we must reply 
that the term perseverance is sometimes 
used to denote the habit whereby one    
chooses to persevere1 sometimes for the 
act of persevering3 and sometimes one   
who has the habit of perseverance       
chooses to persevere and begins to carry
 out his choice by persisting for a     
time1 yet completes not the act1 through

 not persisting to the end4 ,now the end
 is twofold3 one is the end of the work1
 the other is the end of human life4    
,properly speaking it belongs to        
perseverance to persevere to the end of 
the virtuous work1 for instance that a  
soldier persevere to the end of the     
fight1 and the magnificent man until his
 work be accomplished4 ,there are1      
however1 some virtues whose acts must   
endure throughout the whole of life1    
such as faith1 hope1 and charity1 since 
they regard the last end of the entire  
life of man4 ,wherefore as regards these
 which are the principal virtues1 the   
act of perseverance is not accomplished 
until the end of life4 ,it is in this   
sense that ,augustine speaks of         
perseverance as denoting the consummate 
act of perseverance4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,unchangeable persistence may belong to 
a virtue in two ways4 ,first1 on account
 of the intended end that is proper to  
that virtue2 and thus to persist in good
 for a long time until the end1 belongs 

to a special virtue called perseverance1
 which intends this as its special end4 
,secondly1 by reason of the relation of 
the habit to its subject3 and thus      
unchangeable persistence is consequent  
upon every virtue1 inasmuch as virtue is
 a quality difficult to change4         
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acg1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,perseverance ,is a  
,part of ,fortitude8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 seems that perseverance is not a part  
of fortitude4 ,for1 according to the    
,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #g71        
perseverance is about pains of touch4   
,but these belong to temperance4        
,therefore perseverance is a part of    
temperance rather than of fortitude4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every part of a     
moral virtue is about certain passions  
which that virtue moderates4 ,now       
perseverance does not imply moderation  
of the passions3 since the more violent 
the passions1 the more praiseworthy is  
it to persevere in accordance with      
reason4 ,therefore it seems that        

perseverance is a part not of a moral   
virtue1 but rather of prudence which    
perfects the reason4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,persev4 
i7 that no one can lose perseverance2   
whereas one can lose the other virtues4 
,therefore perseverance is greater than 
all the other virtues4 ,now a principal 
virtue is greater than its part4        
,therefore perseverance is not a part of
 a virtue1 but is itself a principal    
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,tully 7,de  
,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 reckons perseverance
 as a part of fortitude4  ,i answer     
that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #abc1 ,a4   
#b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 a  
principal virtue is one to which is     
principally ascribed something that lays
 claim to the praise of virtue1 inasmuch
 as it practices it in connection with  
its own matter1 wherein it is most      
difficult of accomplishment4 ,in        
accordance with this it has been stated 
7,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #b7 that fortitude is a  
principal virtue1 because it observes   

firmness in matters wherein it is most  
difficult to stand firm1 namely in      
dangers of death4 ,wherefore it follows 
of necessity that every virtue which has
 a title to praise for the firm         
endurance of something difficult must be
 annexed to fortitude as secondary to   
principal virtue4 ,now the endurance of 
difficulty arising from delay in        
accomplishing a good work gives         
perseverance its claim to praise3 nor is
 this so difficult as to endure dangers 
of death4 ,therefore perseverance is    
annexed to fortitude1 as secondary to   
principal virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the
 annexing of secondary to principal     
virtues depends not only on the matter  
99,cf4 ,q4 #acf1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b1 but also
 on the mode1 because in everything form
 is of more account than matter4        
,wherefore although1 as to matter1      
perseverance seems to have more in      
common with temperance than with        
fortitude1 yet1 in mode1 it has more in 
common with fortitude1 in the point of  

standing firm against the difficulty    
arising from length of time4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,the perseverance of which the
 ,philosopher speaks 7,ethic4 vii1 #d1  
#g7 does not moderate any passions1 but 
consists merely in a certain firmness of
 reason and will4 ,but perseverance1    
considered as a virtue1 moderates       
certain passions1 namely fear of        
weariness or failure on account of the  
delay4 ,hence this virtue1 like         
fortitude1 is in the irascible4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,augustine speaks there of    
perseverance1 as denoting1 not a        
virtuous habit1 but a virtuous act      
sustained to the end1 according to      
,matt4 #bd3ac1 ,he that shall persevere 
to the end1 he shall be saved4 ,hence it
 is incompatible with such like         
perseverance for it to be lost1 since it
 would no longer endure to the end4     
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acg4  
,art4 #c  ,whether ,constancy ,pertains 
to ,perseverance8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
seems that constancy does not pertain to

 perseverance4 ,for constancy pertains  
to patience1 as stated above 7,q4 #acg1 
,a4 #e73 and patience differs from      
perseverance4 ,therefore constancy does 
not pertain to perseverance4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 virtue is about the difficult 
and the good4 ,now it does not seem     
difficult to be constant in little      
works1 but only in great deeds1 which   
pertain to magnificence4 ,therefore     
constancy pertains to magnificence      
rather than to perseverance4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 if constancy pertained to     
perseverance1 it would seem nowise to   
differ from it1 since both denote a kind
 of unchangeableness4 ,yet they differ3 
for ,macrobius 7,in ,somn4 ,scip4 i7    
condivides constancy with firmness by   
which he indicates perseverance1 as     
stated above 7,q4 #abh1 ,a4 #f74        
,therefore constancy does not pertain to
 perseverance4  ,on the contrary1 ,one  
is said to be constant because one      
stands to a thing4 ,now it belongs to   
perseverance to stand to certain things1

 as appears from the definition given by
 ,andronicus4 ,therefore constancy      
belongs to perseverance4  ,i answer     
that1 ,perseverance and constancy agree 
as to end1 since it belongs to both to  
persist firmly in some good3 but they   
differ as to those things which make it 
difficult to persist in good4 ,because  
the virtue of perseverance properly     
makes man persist firmly in good1       
against the difficulty that arises from 
the very continuance of the act3 whereas
 constancy makes him persist firmly in  
good against difficulties arising from  
any other external hindrances4 ,hence   
perseverance takes precedence of        
constancy as a part of fortitude1       
because the difficulty arising from     
continuance of action is more intrinsic 
to the act of virtue than that which    
arises from external obstacles4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,external obstacles to        
persistence in good are especially those
 which cause sorrow4 ,now patience is   
about sorrow1 as stated above 7,q4 #acf1

 ,a4 #a74 ,hence constancy agrees with  
perseverance as to end3 while it agrees 
with patience as to those things which  
occasion difficulty4 ,now the end is of 
most account3 wherefore constancy       
pertains to perseverance rather than to 
patience4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is more 
difficult to persist in great deeds3 yet
 in little or ordinary deeds1 it is     
difficult to persist for any length of  
time1 if not on account of the greatness
 of the deed which magnificence         
considers1 yet from its very continuance
 which perseverance regards4 ,hence     
constancy may pertain to both4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,constancy pertains to        
perseverance in so far as it has        
something in common with it3 but it is  
not the same thing in the point of their
 difference1 as stated in the ,article4 
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #acg1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,perseverance ,needs 
the ,help of ,grace8 99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #aji1 ,a4 #aj  ,objection #a3 ,it seems
 that perseverance does not need the    

help of grace4 ,for perseverance is a   
virtue1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now  
according to ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4
 ii7 virtue acts after the manner of    
nature4 ,therefore the sole inclination 
of virtue suffices for perseverance4    
,therefore this does not need the help  
of grace4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the gift 
of ,christ's grace is greater than the  
harm brought upon us by ,adam1 as       
appears from ,rom4 #e3ae1 seqq4 ,now    
before sin man was so framed that he    
could persevere by means of what he had 
received1 as ,augustine says 7,de       
,correp4 et ,grat4 xi74 ,much more      
therefore can man1 after being repaired 
by the grace of ,christ1 persevere      
without the help of a further grace4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sinful deeds are    
sometimes more difficult than deeds of  
virtue3 hence it is said in the person  
of the wicked 7,wis4 #e3g73 ,we 4 4 4   
have walked through hard ways4 ,now some
 persevere in sinful deeds without the  
help of another4 ,therefore man can also

 persevere in deeds of virtue without   
the help of grace4  ,on the contrary1   
,augustine says 7,de ,persev4 i73 ,we   
hold that perseverance is a gift of     
,god1 whereby we persevere unto the end1
 in ,christ4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated
 above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b2 ,a4 #b1 ad #c71  
perseverance has a twofold              
signification4 ,first1 it denotes the   
habit of perseverance1 considered as a  
virtue4 ,in this way it needs the gift  
of habitual grace1 even as the other    
infused virtues4 ,secondly1 it may be   
taken to denote the act of perseverance 
enduring until death3 and in this sense 
it needs not only habitual grace1 but   
also the gratuitous help of ,god        
sustaining man in good until the end of 
life1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4     
#aji1 ,a4 #aj71 when we were treating of
 grace4 ,because1 since the free-will is
 changeable by its very nature1 which   
changeableness is not taken away from it
 by the habitual grace bestowed in the  
present life1 it is not in the power of 

the free-will1 albeit repaired by grace1
 to abide unchangeably in good1 though  
it is in its power to choose this3 for  
it is often in our power to choose yet  
not to accomplish4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,the virtue of perseverance1 so far as  
it is concerned1 inclines one to        
persevere3 yet since it is a habit1 and 
a habit is a thing one uses at will1 it 
does not follow that a person who has   
the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably
 until death4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as     
,augustine says 7,de ,correp4 et ,grat4 
xi71 it was given to the first man1 not 
to persevere1 but to be able to         
persevere of his free-will3 because then
 no corruption was in human nature to   
make perseverance difficult4 ,now1      
however1 by the grace of ,christ1 the   
predestined receive not only the        
possibility of persevering1 but         
perseverance itself4 ,wherefore the     
first man whom no man threatened1 of his
 own free-will rebelling against a      
threatening ,god1 forfeited so great a  

happiness and so great a facility of    
avoiding sin3 whereas these1 although   
the world rage against their constancy1 
have persevered in faith4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,man is able by himself to fall into
 sin1 but he cannot by himself arise    
from sin without the help of grace4     
,hence by falling into sin1 so far as he
 is concerned man makes himself to be   
persevering in sin1 unless he be        
delivered by ,god's grace4 ,on the other
 hand1 by doing good he does not make   
himself to be persevering in good1      
because he is able1 by himself1 to sin3 
wherefore he needs the help of grace for
 that end4   ,,question #ach  ,,of ,,the
 ,,vices ,,opposed ,,to ,,perseverance  
7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we must now      
consider the vices opposed to           
perseverance2 under which head there are
 two points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,of       
effeminacy2  7#b7 ,of pertinacity4      
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ach1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,effeminacy99 ,is    
,opposed to ,perseverance8 99           

,mollities1 literally softness          
,objection #a3 ,it seems that effeminacy
 is not opposed to perseverance4 ,for a 
gloss on #a ,cor4 #f3i1 #aj1 ,nor       
adulterers1 nor the effeminate1 nor     
liers with mankind1 expounds the text   
thus3 ,effeminate--i4e4 obscene1 given  
to unnatural vice4 ,but this is opposed 
to chastity4 ,therefore effeminacy is   
not a vice opposed to perseverance4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 vii1 #g7 that delicacy is 
a kind of effeminacy4 ,but to be        
delicate seems akin to intemperance4    
,therefore effeminacy is not opposed to 
perseverance but to temperance4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says     
7,ethic4 vii1 #g7 that the man who is   
fond of amusement is effeminate4 ,now   
immoderate fondness of amusement is     
opposed to eutrapelia1 which is the     
virtue about pleasures of play1 as      
stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #h4 ,therefore    
effeminacy is not opposed to            
perseverance4  ,on the contrary1 ,the   

,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #g7 that
 the persevering man is opposed to the  
effeminate4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,q4 #acg1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71         
perseverance is deserving of praise     
because thereby a man does not forsake a
 good on account of long endurance of   
difficulties and toils3 and it is       
directly opposed to this1 seemingly1 for
 a man to be ready to forsake a good on 
account of difficulties which he cannot 
endure4 ,this is what we understand by  
effeminacy1 because a thing is said to  
be soft if it readily yields to the     
touch4 ,now a thing is not declared to  
be soft through yielding to a heavy     
blow1 for walls yield to the            
battering-ram4 ,wherefore a man is not  
said to be effeminate if he yields to   
heavy blows4 ,hence the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 vii1 #g7 that it is no    
wonder1 if a person is overcome by      
strong and overwhelming pleasures or    
sorrows2 but he is to be pardoned if he 
struggles against them4 ,now it is      

evident that fear of danger is more     
impelling than the desire of pleasure3  
wherefore ,tully says 7,de ,offic4 i7   
under the heading ,true magnanimity     
consists of two things3 ,it is          
inconsistent for one who is not cast    
down by fear1 to be defeated by lust1 or
 who has proved himself unbeaten by     
toil1 to yield to pleasure4 ,moreover1  
pleasure itself is a stronger motive of 
attraction than sorrow1 for the lack of 
pleasure is a motive of withdrawal1     
since lack of pleasure is a pure        
privation4 ,wherefore1 according to the 
,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #g71 properly
 speaking an effeminate man is one who  
withdraws from good on account of sorrow
 caused by lack of pleasure1 yielding as
 it were to a weak motion4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,this effeminacy is caused in two  
ways4 ,in one way1 by custom3 for where 
a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures1 
it is more difficult for him to endure  
the lack of them4 ,in another way1 by   
natural disposition1 because1 to wit1   

his mind is less persevering through the
 frailty of his temperament4 ,this is   
how women are compared to men1 as the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #g73    
wherefore those who are passively       
sodomitical are said to be effeminate1  
being womanish themselves1 as it were4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,toil is opposed to    
bodily pleasure3 wherefore it is only   
toilsome things that are a hindrance to 
pleasures4 ,now the delicate are those  
who cannot endure toils1 nor anything   
that diminishes pleasure4 ,hence it is  
written 7,deut4 #bh3ef73 ,the tender and
 delicate woman1 that could not go upon 
the ground1 nor set down her foot for 4 
4 4 softness ,douay3 'niceness'4 ,thus  
delicacy is a kind of effeminacy4 ,but  
properly speaking effeminacy regards    
lack of pleasures1 while delicacy       
regards the cause that hinders pleasure1
 for instance toil or the like4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,in play two things may be    
considered4 ,in the first place there is
 the pleasure1 and thus inordinate      

fondness of play is opposed to          
eutrapelia4 ,secondly1 we may consider  
the relaxation or rest which is opposed 
to toil4 ,accordingly just as it belongs
 to effeminacy to be unable to endure   
toilsome things1 so too it belongs      
thereto to desire play or any other     
relaxation inordinately4   ,,second     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ach1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,pertinacity ,is ,opposed to   
,perseverance8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems
 that pertinacity is not opposed to     
perseverance4 ,for ,gregory says        
7,moral4 xxxi7 that pertinacity arises  
from vainglory4 ,but vainglory is not   
opposed to perseverance but to          
magnanimity1 as stated above 7,q4 #acb1 
,a4 #b74 ,therefore pertinacity is not  
opposed to perseverance4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 if it is opposed to           
perseverance1 this is so either by      
excess or by deficiency4 ,now it is not 
opposed by excess3 because the          
pertinacious also yield to certain      
pleasure and sorrow1 since according to 

the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #i7 they 
rejoice when they prevail1 and grieve   
when their opinions are rejected4 ,and  
if it be opposed by deficiency1 it will 
be the same as effeminacy1 which is     
clearly false4 ,therefore pertinacity is
 nowise opposed to perseverance4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 just as the persevering   
man persists in good against sorrow1 so 
too do the continent and the temperate  
against pleasures1 the brave against    
fear1 and the meek against anger4 ,but  
pertinacity is over-persistence in      
something4 ,therefore pertinacity is not
 opposed to perseverance more than to   
other virtues4  ,on the contrary1 ,tully
 says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that     
pertinacity is to perseverance as       
superstition is to religion4 ,but       
superstition is opposed to religion1 as 
stated above 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #a74         
,therefore pertinacity is opposed to    
perseverance4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
,isidore says 7,etym4 x7 a person is    
said to be pertinacious who holds on    

impudently1 as being utterly tenacious4 
,pervicacious has the same meaning1 for 
it signifies that a man perseveres in   
his purpose until he is victorious3 for 
the ancients called 'vicia' what we call
 victory4 ,these the ,philosopher       
7,ethic4 vii1 #i7 calls ischyrognomones1
 that is head-strong1 or idiognomones1  
that is self-opinionated1 because they  
abide by their opinions more than they  
should2 whereas the effeminate man does 
so less than he ought1 and the          
persevering man1 as he ought4 ,hence it 
is clear that perseverance is commended 
for observing the mean1 while           
pertinacity is reproved for exceeding   
the mean1 and effeminacy for falling    
short of it4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the     
reason why a man is too persistent in   
his own opinion1 is that he wishes by   
this means to make a show of his own    
excellence3 wherefore this is the result
 of vainglory as its cause4 ,now it has 
been stated above 7,q4 #abg1 ,a4 #b1 ad 
#a2 ,q4 #acc1 ,a4 #b71 that opposition  

of vices to virtues depends1 not on     
their cause1 but on their species4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the pertinacious man  
exceeds by persisting inordinately in   
something against many difficulties3 yet
 he takes a certain pleasure in the end1
 just as the brave and the persevering  
man4 ,since1 however1 this pleasure is  
sinful1 seeing that he desires it too   
much1 and shuns the contrary pain1 he is
 like the incontinent or effeminate man4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the other  
virtues persist against the onslaught of
 the passions1 they are not commended   
for persisting in the same way as       
perseverance is4 ,as to continence1 its 
claim to praise seems to lie rather in  
overcoming pleasures4 ,hence pertinacity
 is directly opposed to perseverance4   
,,question #aci  ,,of ,,the ,,gift ,,of 
,,fortitude 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we   
must next consider the gift             
corresponding to fortitude1 and this is 
the gift of fortitude4 ,under this head 
there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7  

,whether fortitude is a gift8  7#b7     
,which among the beatitudes and fruits  
correspond to it8   ,,first ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aci1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,fortitude ,is a ,gift8  ,objection #a3 
,it seems that fortitude is not a gift4 
,for the virtues differ from the gifts3 
and fortitude is a virtue4 ,therefore it
 should not be reckoned a gift4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 the acts of the gifts     
remain in heaven1 as stated above       
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #f74 ,but the act
 of fortitude does not remain in heaven3
 for ,gregory says 7,moral4 i7 that     
fortitude encourages the fainthearted   
against hardships1 which will be        
altogether absent from heaven4          
,therefore fortitude is not a gift4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de
 ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii7 that it is a sign 
of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from 
all the deadly pleasures of the passing 
show4 ,now noisome pleasures and        
delights are the concern of temperance  
rather than of fortitude4 ,therefore it 

seems that fortitude is not the gift    
corresponding to the virtue of          
fortitude4  ,on the contrary1 ,fortitude
 is reckoned among the other gifts of   
the ,holy ,ghost 7,isa4 #aa3b74  ,i     
answer that1 ,fortitude denotes a       
certain firmness of mind1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#fa1 ,a4 #c73 and this firmness of mind 
is required both in doing good and in   
enduring evil1 especially with regard to
 goods or evils that are difficult4 ,now
 man1 according to his proper and       
connatural mode1 is able to have this   
firmness in both these respects1 so as  
not to forsake the good on account of   
difficulties1 whether in accomplishing  
an arduous work1 or in enduring grievous
 evil4 ,in this sense fortitude denotes 
a special or general virtue1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #b74  ,yet         
furthermore man's mind is moved by the  
,holy ,ghost1 in order that he may      
attain the end of each work begun1 and  
avoid whatever perils may threaten4     

,this surpasses human nature3 for       
sometimes it is not in a man's power to 
attain the end of his work1 or to avoid 
evils or dangers1 since these may happen
 to overwhelm him in death4 ,but the    
,holy ,ghost works this in man1 by      
bringing him to everlasting life1 which 
is the end of all good deeds1 and the   
release from all perils4 ,a certain     
confidence of this is infused into the  
mind by the ,holy ,ghost ,who expels any
 fear of the contrary4 ,it is in this   
sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift 
of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for it has been   
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,,aa4   
#a1 #b7 that the gifts regard the motion
 of the mind by the ,holy ,ghost4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,fortitude1 as a       
virtue1 perfects the mind in the        
endurance of all perils whatever2 but it
 does not go so far as to give          
confidence of overcoming all dangers3   
this belongs to the fortitude that is a 
gift of the ,holy ,ghost4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,the gifts have not the same acts in

 heaven as on the way3 for they exercise
 acts in connection with the enjoyment  
of the end4 ,hence the act of fortitude 
there is to enjoy full security from    
toil and evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the   
gift of fortitude regards the virtue of 
fortitude not only because it consists  
in enduring dangers1 but also inasmuch  
as it consists in accomplishing any     
difficult work4 ,wherefore the gift of  
fortitude is directed by the gift of    
counsel1 which seems to be concerned    
chiefly with the greater goods4         
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aci1 
,art4 #b  ,whether the ,fourth          
,beatitude3 ,blessed ,are ,they ,that   
,hunger and ,thirst ,after ,justice1    
,corresponds to the ,gift of ,fortitude8
  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the     
fourth beatitude1 ,blessed are they that
 hunger and thirst after justice1 does  
not correspond to the gift of fortitude4
 ,for the gift of piety and not the gift
 of fortitude corresponds to the virtue 
of justice4 ,now hungering and thirsting

 after justice pertain to the act of    
justice4 ,therefore this beatitude      
corresponds to the gift of piety rather 
than to the gift of fortitude4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 hunger and thirst after   
justice imply a desire for good4 ,now   
this belongs properly to charity1 to    
which the gift of wisdom1 and not the   
gift of fortitude1 corresponds1 as      
stated above 7,q4 #de74 ,therefore this 
beatitude corresponds1 not to the gift  
of fortitude1 but to the gift of wisdom4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the fruits are    
consequent upon the beatitudes1 since   
delight is essential to beatitude1      
according to ,ethic4 i1 #h4 ,now the    
fruits1 apparently1 include none        
pertaining to fortitude4 ,therefore     
neither does any beatitude correspond to
 it4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 
7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i73         
,fortitude becomes the hungry and       
thirsty3 since those who desire to enjoy
 true goods1 and wish to avoid loving   
earthly and material things1 must toil4 

,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#aba1 ,a4 #b71 ,augustine makes the     
beatitudes correspond to the gifts      
according to the order in which they are
 set forth1 observing at the same time a
 certain fittingness between them4      
,wherefore he ascribes the fourth       
beatitude1 concerning the hunger and    
thirst for justice1 to the fourth gift1 
namely fortitude4  ,yet there is a      
certain congruity between them1 because1
 as stated 7,a4 #a71 fortitude is about 
difficult things4 ,now it is very       
difficult1 not merely to do virtuous    
deeds1 which receive the common         
designation of works of justice1 but    
furthermore to do them with an          
unsatiable desire1 which may be         
signified by hunger and thirst for      
justice4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as          
,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xv in ,matth471 
we may understand here not only         
particular1 but also universal justice1 
which is related to all virtuous deeds  
according to ,ethic4 v1 #a1 wherein     

whatever is hard is the object of that  
fortitude which is a gift4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,charity is the root of all the    
virtues and gifts1 as stated above 7,q4 
#bc1 ,a4 #h1 ad #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1   
,a4 #d1 ad #c74 ,hence whatever pertains
 to fortitude may also be referred to   
charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there are   
two of the fruits which correspond      
sufficiently to the gift of fortitude3  
namely1 patience1 which regards the     
enduring of evils3 and longanimity1     
which may regard the long delay and     
accomplishment of goods4   ,,question   
#adj  ,,of ,,the ,,precepts ,,of        
,,fortitude 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we   
must next consider the precepts of      
fortitude3  7#a7 ,the precepts of       
fortitude itself2  7#b7 ,the precepts of
 its parts4   ,,first ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adj1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
the ,precepts of ,fortitude ,are        
,suitably ,given in the ,divine ,law8   
,objection #a3 ,it seems that the       
precepts of fortitude are not suitably  

given in the ,divine ,law4 ,for the ,new
 ,law is more perfect than the ,old     
,law4 ,yet the ,old ,law contains       
precepts of fortitude 7,deut4 #bj74     
,therefore precepts of fortitude should 
have been given in the ,new ,law also4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 affirmative precepts
 are of greater import than negative    
precepts1 since the affirmative include 
the negative1 but not vice versa4       
,therefore it is unsuitable for the     
,divine ,law to contain none but        
negative precepts in prohibition of     
fear4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fortitude is 
one of the principal virtues1 as stated 
above 7,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#fa1 ,a4 #b74 ,now the precepts are     
directed to the virtues as to their end3
 wherefore they should be proportionate 
to them4 ,therefore the precepts of     
fortitude should have been placed among 
the precepts of the decalogue1 which are
 the chief precepts of the ,law4  ,on   
the contrary1 stands ,holy ,writ which  
contains these precepts4  ,i answer     

that1 ,precepts of law are directed to  
the end intended by the lawgiver4       
,wherefore precepts of law must needs be
 framed in various ways according to the
 various ends intended by lawgivers1 so 
that even in human affairs there are    
laws of democracies1 others of kingdoms1
 and others again of tyrannical         
governments4 ,now the end of the ,divine
 ,law is that man may adhere to ,god3   
wherefore the ,divine ,law contains     
precepts both of fortitude and of the   
other virtues1 with a view to directing 
the mind to ,god4 ,for this reason it is
 written 7,deut4 #bj3c1 #d73 ,fear ye   
them not3 because the ,lord your ,god is
 in the midst of you1 and will fight for
 you against your enemies4  ,as to human
 laws1 they are directed to certain     
earthly goods1 and among them we find   
precepts of fortitude according to the  
requirements of those goods4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,the ,old ,testament contained
 temporal promises1 while the promises  
of the ,new ,testament are spiritual and

 eternal1 according to ,augustine       
7,contra ,faust4 iv74 ,hence in the ,old
 ,law there was need for the people to  
be taught how to fight1 even in a bodily
 contest1 in order to obtain an earthly 
possession4 ,but in the ,new ,testament 
men were to be taught how to come to the
 possession of eternal life by fighting 
spiritually1 according to ,matt4 #aa3ab1
 ,the kingdom of heaven suffereth       
violence1 and the violent bear it away4 
,hence ,peter commands 7#a ,pet4 #e3h1  
#i73 ,your adversary the devil1 as a    
roaring lion1 goeth about1 seeking whom 
he may devour3 whom resist ye1 strong in
 faith1 as also ,james #d3g3 ,resist the
 devil1 and he will fly from you4       
,since1 however1 men while tending to   
spiritual goods may be withdrawn from   
them by corporal dangers1 precepts of   
fortitude had to be given even in the   
,new ,law1 that they might bravely      
endure temporal evils1 according to     
,matt4 #aj3bh1 ,fear ye not them that   
kill the body4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the   

law gives general directions in its     
precepts4 ,but the things that have to  
be done in cases of danger are not1 like
 the things to be avoided1 reducible to 
some common thing4 ,hence the precepts  
of fortitude are negative rather than   
affirmative4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as      
stated above 7,q4 #abb1 ,a4 #a71 the    
precepts of the decalogue are placed in 
the ,law1 as first principles1 which    
need to be known to all from the outset4
 ,wherefore the precepts of the         
decalogue had to be chiefly about those 
acts of justice in which the notion of  
duty is manifest1 and not about acts of 
fortitude1 because it is not so evident 
that it is a duty for a person not to   
fear dangers of death4   ,,second       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adj1 ,art4 #b 
,whether the ,precepts of the ,parts of 
,fortitude ,are ,suitably ,given in the 
,divine ,law8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems 
that the precept of the parts of        
fortitude are unsuitably given in the   
,divine ,law4 ,for just as patience and 

perseverance are parts of fortitude1 so 
also are magnificence1 magnanimity1 and 
confidence1 as stated above 7,q4 #abh74 
,now we find precepts of patience in the
 ,divine ,law1 as also of perseverance4 
,therefore there should also have been  
precepts of magnificence and            
magnanimity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1       
patience is a very necessary virtue1    
since it is the guardian of the other   
virtues1 as ,gregory says 7,hom4 in     
,evang4 xxxv74 ,now the other virtues   
are commanded absolutely4 ,therefore    
patience should not have been commanded 
merely1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4  
,dom4 in ,monte i71 as to the           
preparedness of the mind4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 patience and perseverance are 
parts of fortitude1 as stated above 7,q4
 #abh2 ,q4 #acf1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #acg1 ,a4  
#b74 ,now the precepts of fortitude are 
not affirmative but only negative1 as   
stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,therefore
 the precepts of patience and           
perseverance should have been negative  

and not affirmative4  ,the contrary1    
however1 follows from the way in which  
they are given by ,holy ,writ4  ,i      
answer that1 ,the ,divine ,law instructs
 man perfectly about such things as are 
necessary for right living4 ,now in     
order to live aright man needs not only 
the principal virtues1 but also the     
secondary and annexed virtues4          
,wherefore the ,divine ,law contains    
precepts not only about the acts of the 
principal virtues1 but also about the   
acts of the secondary and annexed       
virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,magnificence
 and magnanimity do not belong to the   
genus of fortitude1 except by reason of 
a certain excellence of greatness which 
they regard in their respective matters4
 ,now things pertaining to excellence   
come under the counsels of perfection   
rather than under precepts of           
obligation4 ,wherefore1 there was need  
of counsels1 rather than of precepts    
about magnificence and magnanimity4 ,on 
the other hand1 the hardships and toils 

of the present life pertain to patience 
and perseverance1 not by reason of any  
greatness observable in them1 but on    
account of the very nature of those     
virtues4 ,hence the need of precepts of 
patience and perseverance4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #b71 
although affirmative precepts are always
 binding1 they are not binding for      
always1 but according to place and time4
 ,wherefore just as the affirmative     
precepts about the other virtues are to 
be understood as to the preparedness of 
the mind1 in the sense that man be      
prepared to fulfil them when necessary1 
so too are the precepts of patience to  
be understood in the same way4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,fortitude1 as distinct from  
patience and perseverance1 is about the 
greatest dangers wherein one must       
proceed with caution2 nor is it         
necessary to determine what is to be    
done in particular4 ,on the other hand1 
patience and perseverance are about     
minor hardships and toils1 wherefore    

there is less danger in determining1    
especially in general1 what is to be    
done in such cases4   ,,question #ada   
,,of ,,temperance 7,in ,eight ,articles7
  ,in the next place we must consider   
temperance3 7#a7 ,temperance itself2    
7#b7 its parts2 7#c7 its precepts4 ,with
 regard to temperance we must consider  
7#a7 temperance itself2 7#b7 the        
contrary vices4  ,under the first head  
there are eight points of inquiry3  7#a7
 ,whether temperance is a virtue8  7#b7 
,whether it is a special virtue8  7#c7  
,whether it is only about desires and   
pleasures8  7#d7 ,whether it is only    
about pleasures of touch8  7#e7 ,whether
 it is about pleasures of taste1 as     
such1 or only as a kind of touch8  7#f7 
,what is the rule of temperance8  7#g7  
,whether it is a cardinal1 or principal1
 virtue8  7#h7 ,whether it is the       
greatest of virtues8   ,,first ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ada1 ,art4 #a  ,whether
 ,temperance ,is a ,virtue8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it seems that temperance is not a  

virtue4 ,for no virtue goes against the 
inclination of nature1 since there is in
 us a natural aptitude for virtue1 as   
stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #a4 ,now          
temperance withdraws us from pleasures  
to which nature inclines1 according to  
,ethic4 ii1 #c1 #h4 ,therefore          
temperance is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 virtues are connected with one
 another1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#fe1 ,a4 #a74 ,but some people have     
temperance without having the other     
virtues3 for we find many who are       
temperate1 and yet covetous or timid4   
,therefore temperance is not a virtue4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to every virtue     
there is a corresponding gift1 as       
appears from what we have said above    
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #d74 ,but        
seemingly no gift corresponds to        
temperance1 since all the gifts have    
been already ascribed to the other      
virtues 7,,qq4 #h1 #i1 #ai1 #de1 #eb1   
#ga1 #aci74 ,therefore temperance is not
 a virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine

 says 7,music4 vi1 #ae73 ,temperance is 
the name of a virtue4  ,i answer that1  
,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4 
#c71 it is essential to virtue to       
incline man to good4 ,now the good of   
man is to be in accordance with reason1 
as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74  
,hence human virtue is that which       
inclines man to something in accordance 
with reason4 ,now temperance evidently  
inclines man to this1 since its very    
name implies moderation or              
temperateness1 which reason causes4     
,therefore temperance is a virtue4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nature inclines       
everything to whatever is becoming to   
it4 ,wherefore man naturally desires    
pleasures that are becoming to him4     
,since1 however1 man as such is a       
rational being1 it follows that those   
pleasures are becoming to man which are 
in accordance with reason4 ,from such   
pleasures temperance does not withdraw  
him1 but from those which are contrary  
to reason4 ,wherefore it is clear that  

temperance is not contrary to the       
inclination of human nature1 but is in  
accord with it4 ,it is1 however1        
contrary to the inclination of the      
animal nature that is not subject to    
reason4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the          
temperance which fulfils the conditions 
of perfect virtue is not without        
prudence1 while this is lacking to all  
who are in sin4 ,hence those who lack   
other virtues1 through being subject to 
the opposite vices1 have not the        
temperance which is a virtue1 though    
they do acts of temperance from a       
certain natural disposition1 in so far  
as certain imperfect virtues are either 
natural to man1 as stated above         
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #a71 or acquired 
by habituation1 which virtues1 through  
lack of prudence1 are not perfected by  
reason1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#fe1 ,a4 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3         
,temperance also has a corresponding    
gift1 namely1 fear1 whereby man is      
withheld from the pleasures of the      

flesh1 according to ,ps4 #aah3abj3      
,pierce ,thou my flesh with ,thy fear4  
,the gift of fear has for its principal 
object ,god1 ,whom it avoids offending1 
and in this respect it corresponds to   
the virtue of hope1 as stated above 7,q4
 #ai1 ,a4 #i1 ad #a74 ,but it may have  
for its secondary object whatever a man 
shuns in order to avoid offending ,god4 
,now man stands in the greatest need of 
the fear of ,god in order to shun those 
things which are most seductive1 and    
these are the matter of temperance3     
wherefore the gift of fear corresponds  
to temperance also4   ,,second ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ada1 ,art4 #b  ,whether
 ,temperance ,is a ,special ,virtue8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
temperance is not a special virtue4 ,for
 ,augustine says 7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4 xv7
 that it belongs to temperance to       
preserve one's integrity and freedom    
from corruption for ,god's sake4 ,but   
this is common to every virtue4         
,therefore temperance is not a special  

virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,ambrose   
says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #db7 that what we  
observe and seek most in temperance is  
tranquillity of soul4 ,but this is      
common to every virtue4 ,therefore      
temperance is not a special virtue4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,tully says 7,de    
,offic4 i1 #bg7 that we cannot separate 
the beautiful from the virtuous1 and    
that whatever is just is beautiful4 ,now
 the beautiful is considered as proper  
to temperance1 according to the same    
authority 7,tully1 ,de ,offic4 i1 #bg74 
,therefore temperance is not a special  
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,the         
,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iii1 #aj7 
reckons it a special virtue4  ,i answer 
that1 ,it is customary in human speech  
to employ a common term in a restricted 
sense in order to designate the         
principal things to which that common   
term is applicable3 thus the word city  
is used antonomastically99 to designate 
,rome4 99,antonomasia is the figure of  
speech whereby we substitute the general

 for the individual term2 e4g4 ,the     
,philosopher for ,aristotle4            
,accordingly the word temperance has a  
twofold acceptation4 ,first1 in         
accordance with its common              
signification3 and thus temperance is   
not a special but a general virtue1     
because the word temperance signifies a 
certain temperateness or moderation1    
which reason appoints to human          
operations and passions3 and this is    
common to every moral virtue4 ,yet there
 is a logical difference between        
temperance and fortitude1 even if we    
take them both as general virtues3 since
 temperance withdraws man from things   
which seduce the appetite from obeying  
reason1 while fortitude incites him to  
endure or withstand those things on     
account of which he forsakes the good of
 reason4  ,on the other hand1 if we take
 temperance antonomastically1 as        
withholding the appetite from those     
things which are most seductive to man1 
it is a special virtue1 for thus it has1

 like fortitude1 a special matter4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man's appetite is     
corrupted chiefly by those things which 
seduce him into forsaking the rule of   
reason and ,divine law4 ,wherefore      
integrity1 which ,augustine ascribes to 
temperance1 can1 like the latter1 be    
taken in two ways3 first1 in a general  
sense1 and secondly in a sense of       
excellence4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the      
things about which temperance is        
concerned have a most disturbing effect 
on the soul1 for the reason that they   
are natural to man1 as we shall state   
further on 7,,aa4 #d1 #e74 ,hence       
tranquillity of soul is ascribed to     
temperance by way of excellence1        
although it is a common property of all 
the virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although
 beauty is becoming to every virtue1 it 
is ascribed to temperance1 by way of    
excellence1 for two reasons4 ,first1 in 
respect of the generic notion of        
temperance1 which consists in a certain 
moderate and fitting proportion1 and    

this is what we understand by beauty1 as
 attested by ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4    
iv74 ,secondly1 because the things from 
which temperance withholds us1 hold the 
lowest place in man1 and are becoming to
 him by reason of his animal nature1 as 
we shall state further on 7,,aa4 #d1 #e2
 ,q4 #adb1 ,a4 #d71 wherefore it is     
natural that such things should defile  
him4 ,in consequence beauty is a        
foremost attribute of temperance which  
above all hinders man from being        
defiled4 ,in like manner honesty        
99,honesty must be taken here in its    
broad sense as synonymous with moral    
goodness1 from the point of view of     
decorum is a special attribute of       
temperance3 for ,isidore says 7,etym4   
x73 ,an honest man is one who has no    
defilement1 for honesty means an        
honorable state4 ,this is most          
applicable to temperance1 which         
withstands the vices that bring most    
dishonor on man1 as we shall state      
further on 7,q4 #adb1 ,a4 #d74   ,,third

 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ada1 ,art4 #c
  ,whether ,temperance ,is ,only ,about 
,desires and ,pleasures8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that temperance is not  
only about desires and pleasures4 ,for  
,tully says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1    
#ed7 that temperance is reason's firm   
and moderate mastery of lust and other  
wanton emotions of the mind4 ,now all   
the passions of the soul are called     
emotions of the mind4 ,therefore it     
seems that temperance is not only about 
desires and pleasures4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 ,virtue is about the difficult
 and the good 99,ethic4 ii1 #c4 ,now it 
seems more difficult to temper fear1    
especially with regard to dangers of    
death1 than to moderate desires and     
pleasures1 which are despised on account
 of deadly pains and dangers1 according 
to ,augustine 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cf74     
,therefore it seems that the virtue of  
temperance is not chiefly about desires 
and pleasures4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
according to ,ambrose 7,de ,offic4 i1   

#dc7 the grace of moderation belongs to 
temperance3 and ,tully says 7,de ,offic4
 ii1 #bg7 that it is the concern of     
temperance to calm all disturbances of  
the mind and to enforce moderation4 ,now
 moderation is needed1 not only in      
desires and pleasures1 but also in      
external acts and whatever pertains to  
the exterior4 ,therefore temperance is  
not only about desires and pleasures4   
,on the contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym47
 99,the words quoted do not occur in the
 work referred to2 ,cf4 his ,de ,summo  
,bono xxxvii1 xlii1 and ,de ,different4 
ii1 #ci3 that it is temperance whereby  
lust and desire are kept under control4 
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#abc1 ,a4 #ab2 ,q4 #acf1 ,a4 #a71 it    
belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the
 good of reason against the passions    
that rebel against reason4 ,now the     
movement of the soul's passions is      
twofold1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4  
#bc1 ,a4 #b71 when we were treating of  
the passions3 the one1 whereby the      

sensitive appetite pursues sensible and 
bodily goods1 the other whereby it flies
 from sensible and bodily evils4  ,the  
first of these movements of the         
sensitive appetite rebels against reason
 chiefly by lack of moderation4 ,because
 sensible and bodily goods1 considered  
in their species1 are not in opposition 
to reason1 but are subject to it as     
instruments which reason employs in     
order to attain its proper end3 and that
 they are opposed to reason is owing to 
the fact that the sensitive appetite    
fails to tend towards them in accord    
with the mode of reason4 ,hence it      
belongs properly to moral virtue to     
moderate those passions which denote a  
pursuit of the good4  ,on the other     
hand1 the movement of the sensitive     
appetite in flying from sensible evil is
 mostly in opposition to reason1 not    
through being immoderate1 but chiefly in
 respect of its flight3 because1 when a 
man flies from sensible and bodily      
evils1 which sometimes accompany the    

good of reason1 the result is that he   
flies from the good of reason4 ,hence it
 belongs to moral virtue to make man    
while flying from evil to remain firm in
 the good of reason4  ,accordingly1 just
 as the virtue of fortitude1 which by   
its very nature bestows firmness1 is    
chiefly concerned with the passion1 viz4
 fear1 which regards flight from bodily 
evils1 and consequently with daring1    
which attacks the objects of fear in the
 hope of attaining some good1 so1 too1  
temperance1 which denotes a kind of     
moderation1 is chiefly concerned with   
those passions that tend towards        
sensible goods1 viz4 desire and         
pleasure1 and consequently with the     
sorrows that arise from the absence of  
those pleasures4 ,for just as daring    
presupposes objects of fear1 so too such
 like sorrow arises from the absence of 
the aforesaid pleasures4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 
,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a71
 when we were treating of the passions1 

those passions which pertain to         
avoidance of evil1 presuppose the       
passions pertaining to the pursuit of   
good2 and the passions of the irascible 
presuppose the passions of the          
concupiscible4 ,hence1 while temperance 
directly moderates the passions of the  
concupiscible which tend towards good1  
as a consequence1 it moderates all the  
other passions1 inasmuch as moderation  
of the passions that precede results in 
moderation of the passions that follow3 
since he that is not immoderate in      
desire is moderate in hope1 and grieves 
moderately for the absence of the things
 he desires4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,desire  
denotes an impulse of the appetite      
towards the object of pleasure and this 
impulse needs control1 which belongs to 
temperance4 ,on the other hand fear     
denotes a withdrawal of the mind from   
certain evils1 against which man needs  
firmness of mind1 which fortitude       
bestows4 ,hence temperance is properly  
about desires1 and fortitude about      

fears4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,external acts 
proceed from the internal passions of   
the soul3 wherefore their moderation    
depends on the moderation of the        
internal passions4   ,,fourth ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ada1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,temperance ,is ,only ,about ,desires   
and ,pleasures of ,touch8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that temperance is   
not only about desires and pleasures of 
touch4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,morib4
 ,eccl4 xix7 that the function of       
temperance is to control and quell the  
desires which draw us to the things     
which withdraw us from the laws of ,god 
and from the fruit of ,his goodness2 and
 a little further on he adds that it is 
the duty of temperance to spurn all     
bodily allurements and popular praise4  
,now we are withdrawn from ,god's laws  
not only by the desire for pleasures of 
touch1 but also by the desire for       
pleasures of the other senses1 for      
these1 too1 belong to the bodily        
allurements1 and again by the desire for

 riches or for worldly glory3 wherefore 
it is written 7#a ,tim4 #f3aj74 ,desire 
99,cupiditas1 which the ,douay version  
following the ,greek philargyria renders
 'desire of money' is the root of all   
evils4 ,therefore temperance is not only
 about desires of pleasures of touch4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that one who is   
worthy of small things and deems himself
 worthy of them is temperate1 but he is 
not magnificent4 ,now honors1 whether   
small or great1 of which he is speaking 
there1 are an object of pleasure1 not of
 touch1 but in the soul's apprehension4 
,therefore temperance is not only about 
desires for pleasures of touch4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 things that are of the    
same genus would seem to pertain to the 
matter of a particular virtue under one 
same aspect4 ,now all pleasures of sense
 are apparently of the same genus4      
,therefore they all equally belong to   
the matter of temperance4  ,obj4 #d3    
,further1 spiritual pleasures are       

greater than the pleasures of the body1 
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,a4  
#e7 in the treatise on the passions4    
,now sometimes men forsake ,god's laws  
and the state of virtue through desire  
for spiritual pleasures1 for instance1  
through curiosity in matters of         
knowledge3 wherefore the devil promised 
man knowledge1 saying 7,gen4 #c3e73 ,ye 
shall be as ,gods1 knowing good and     
evil4 ,therefore temperance is not only 
about pleasures of touch4  ,obj4 #e3    
,further1 if pleasures of touch were the
 proper matter of temperance1 it would  
follow that temperance is about all     
pleasures of touch4 ,but it is not about
 all1 for instance1 about those which   
occur in games4 ,therefore pleasures of 
touch are not the proper matter of      
temperance4  ,on the contrary1 ,the     
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj7    
that temperance is properly about       
desires of pleasures of touch4  ,i      
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 
temperance is about desires and         

pleasures in the same way as fortitude  
is about fear and daring4 ,now fortitude
 is about fear and daring with respect  
to the greatest evils whereby nature    
itself is dissolved2 and such are       
dangers of death4 ,wherefore in like    
manner temperance must needs be about   
desires for the greatest pleasures4 ,and
 since pleasure results from a natural  
operation1 it is so much the greater    
according as it results from a more     
natural operation4 ,now to animals the  
most natural operations are those which 
preserve the nature of the individual by
 means of meat and drink1 and the nature
 of the species by the union of the     
sexes4 ,hence temperance is properly    
about pleasures of meat and drink and   
sexual pleasures4 ,now these pleasures  
result from the sense of touch4         
,wherefore it follows that temperance is
 about pleasures of touch4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,in the passage quoted ,augustine  
apparently takes temperance1 not as a   
special virtue having a determinate     

matter1 but as concerned with the       
moderation of reason1 in any matter     
whatever3 and this is a general         
condition of every virtue4 ,however1 we 
may also reply that if a man can control
 the greatest pleasures1 much more can  
he control lesser ones4 ,wherefore it   
belongs chiefly and properly to         
temperance to moderate desires and      
pleasures of touch1 and secondarily     
other pleasures4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the 
,philosopher takes temperance as        
denoting moderation in external things1 
when1 to wit1 a man tends to that which 
is proportionate to him1 but not as     
denoting moderation in the soul's       
emotions1 which pertains to the virtue  
of temperance4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the   
pleasures of the other senses play a    
different part in man and in other      
animals4 ,for in other animals pleasures
 do not result from the other senses    
save in relation to sensibles of touch3 
thus the lion is pleased to see the     
stag1 or to hear its voice1 in relation 

to his food4 ,on the other hand man     
derives pleasure from the other senses1 
not only for this reason1 but also on   
account of the becomingness of the      
sensible object4 ,wherefore temperance  
is about the pleasures of the other     
senses1 in relation to pleasures of     
touch1 not principally but consequently3
 while in so far as the sensible objects
 of the other senses are pleasant on    
account of their becomingness1 as when a
 man is pleased at a well-harmonized    
sound1 this pleasure has nothing to do  
with the preservation of nature4 ,hence 
these passions are not of such          
importance that temperance can be       
referred to them antonomastically4      
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although spiritual    
pleasures are by their nature greater   
than bodily pleasures1 they are not so  
perceptible to the senses1 and          
consequently they do not so strongly    
affect the sensitive appetite1 against  
whose impulse the good of reason is     
safeguarded by moral virtue4 ,we may    

also reply that spiritual pleasures1    
strictly speaking1 are in accordance    
with reason1 wherefore they need no     
control1 save accidentally1 in so far as
 one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance  
to another greater and more binding4    
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,not all pleasures of  
touch regard the preservation of nature1
 and consequently it does not follow    
that temperance is about all pleasures  
of touch4   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ada1 ,art4 #e  ,whether           
,temperance ,is ,about the ,pleasures   
,proper to the ,taste8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that temperance is about 
pleasures proper to the taste4 ,for     
pleasures of the taste result from food 
and drink1 which are more necessary to  
man's life than sexual pleasures1 which 
regard the touch4 ,but according to what
 has been said 7,a4 #d71 temperance is  
about pleasures in things that are      
necessary to human life4 ,therefore     
temperance is about pleasures proper to 
the taste rather than about those proper

 to the touch4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1     
temperance is about the passions rather 
than about things themselves4 ,now1     
according to ,de ,anima ii1 #c1 the     
touch is the sense of food1 as regards  
the very substance of the food1 whereas 
savor which is the proper object of the 
taste1 is the pleasing quality of the   
food4 ,therefore temperance is about the
 taste rather than about the touch4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,ethic4
 vii1 #d1 #g3 temperance and            
intemperance are about the same things1 
and so are continence and incontinence1 
perseverance1 and effeminacy1 to which  
delicacy pertains4 ,now delicacy seems  
to regard the delight taken in savors   
which are the object of the taste4      
,therefore temperance is about pleasures
 proper to the taste4  ,on the contrary1
 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1   
#aj7 that seemingly temperance and      
intemperance have little if anything to 
do with the taste4  ,i answer that1 ,as 
stated above 7,a4 #d71 temperance is    

about the greatest pleasures1 which     
chiefly regard the preservation of human
 life either in the species or in the   
individual4 ,in these matters certain   
things are to be considered as principal
 and others as secondary4 ,the principal
 thing is the use itself of the         
necessary means1 of the woman who is    
necessary for the preservation of the   
species1 or of food and drink which are 
necessary for the preservation of the   
individual3 while the very use of these 
necessary things has a certain essential
 pleasure annexed thereto4  ,in regard  
to either use we consider as secondary  
whatever makes the use more pleasurable1
 such as beauty and adornment in woman1 
and a pleasing savor and likewise odor  
in food4 ,hence temperance is chiefly   
about the pleasure of touch1 that       
results essentially from the use of     
these necessary things1 which use is in 
all cases attained by the touch4        
,secondarily1 however1 temperance and   
intemperance are about pleasures of the 

taste1 smell1 or sight1 inasmuch as the 
sensible objects of these senses conduce
 to the pleasurable use of the necessary
 things that have relation to the touch4
 ,but since the taste is more akin to   
the touch than the other senses are1 it 
follows that temperance is more about   
the taste than about the other senses4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the use of food and   
the pleasure that essentially results   
therefrom pertain to the touch4 ,hence  
the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1   
#c7 that touch is the sense of food1 for
 food is hot or cold1 wet or dry4 ,to   
the taste belongs the discernment of    
savors1 which make the food pleasant to 
eat1 in so far as they are signs of its 
being suitable for nourishment4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,the pleasure resulting from  
savor is additional1 so to speak1       
whereas the pleasure of touch results   
essentially from the use of food and    
drink4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,delicacy      
regards principally the substance of the
 food1 but secondarily it regards its   

delicious savor and the way in which it 
is served4   ,,sixth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ada1 ,art4 #f  ,whether 
the ,rule of ,temperance ,depends on the
 ,need of the ,present ,life8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
rule of temperance does not depend on   
the needs of the present life4 ,for     
higher things are not regulated         
according to lower4 ,now1 as temperance 
is a virtue of the soul1 it is above the
 needs of the body4 ,therefore the rule 
of temperance does not depend on the    
needs of the body4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
whoever exceeds a rule sins4 ,therefore 
if the needs of the body were the rule  
of temperance1 it would be a sin against
 temperance to indulge in any other     
pleasure than those required by nature1 
which is content with very little4 ,but 
this would seem unreasonable4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 no one sins in observing a   
rule4 ,therefore if the need of the body
 were the rule of temperance1 there     
would be no sin in using any pleasure   

for the needs of the body1 for instance1
 for the sake of health4 ,but this is   
apparently false4 ,therefore the need of
 the body is not the rule of temperance4
  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de
 ,morib4 ,eccl4 xxi73 ,in both          
,testaments the temperate man finds     
confirmation of the rule forbidding him 
to love the things of this life1 or to  
deem any of them desirable for its own  
sake1 and commanding him to avail       
himself of those things with the        
moderation of a user not the attachment 
of a lover1 in so far as they are       
requisite for the needs of this life and
 of his station4  ,i answer that1 ,as   
stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #b2 
,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #ab71 the good of moral   
virtue consists chiefly in the order of 
reason3 because man's good is to be in  
accord with reason1 as ,dionysius       
asserts 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,now the      
principal order of reason is that by    
which it directs certain things towards 
their end1 and the good of reason       

consists chiefly in this order2 since   
good has the aspect of end1 and the end 
is the rule of whatever is directed to  
the end4 ,now all the pleasurable       
objects that are at man's disposal1 are 
directed to some necessity of this life 
as to their end4 ,wherefore temperance  
takes the need of this life1 as the rule
 of the pleasurable objects of which it 
makes use1 and uses them only for as    
much as the need of this life requires4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above1 the  
need of this life is regarded as a rule 
in so far as it is an end4 ,now it must 
be observed that sometimes the end of   
the worker differs from the end of the  
work1 thus it is clear that the end of  
building is a house1 whereas sometimes  
the end of the builder is profit4       
,accordingly the end and rule of        
temperance itself is happiness2 while   
the end and rule of the thing it makes  
use of is the need of human life1 to    
which whatever is useful for life is    
subordinate4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the need

 of human life may be taken in two ways4
 ,first1 it may be taken in the sense in
 which we apply the term necessary to   
that without which a thing cannot be at 
all2 thus food is necessary to an       
animal4 ,secondly1 it may be taken for  
something without which a thing cannot  
be becomingly4 ,now temperance regards  
not only the former of these needs1 but 
also the latter4 ,wherefore the         
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #aa7    
that the temperate man desires pleasant 
things for the sake of health1 or for   
the sake of a sound condition of body4  
,other things that are not necessary for
 this purpose may be divided into two   
classes4 ,for some are a hindrance to   
health and a sound condition of body2   
and these temperance makes not use of   
whatever1 for this would be a sin       
against temperance4 ,but others are not 
a hindrance to those things1 and these  
temperance uses moderately1 according to
 the demands of place and time1 and in  
keeping with those among whom one       

dwells4 ,hence the ,philosopher 7,ethic4
 iii1 #aa7 says that the temperate man  
also desires other pleasant things1     
those namely that are not necessary for 
health or a sound condition of body1 so 
long as they are not prejudicial to     
these things4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as     
stated 7ad #b71 temperance regards need 
according to the requirements of life1  
and this depends not only on the        
requirements of the body1 but also on   
the requirements of external things1    
such as riches and station1 and more    
still on the requirements of good       
conduct4 ,hence the ,philosopher adds   
7,ethic4 iii1 #aa7 that the temperate   
man makes use of pleasant things        
provided that not only they be not      
prejudicial to health and a sound bodily
 condition1 but also that they be not   
inconsistent with good1 i4e4 good       
conduct1 nor beyond his substance1 i4e4 
his means4 ,and ,augustine says 7,de    
,morib4 ,eccl4 xxi7 that the temperate  
man considers the need not only of this 

life but also of his station4           
,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ada1
 ,art4 #g  ,whether ,temperance ,is a   
,cardinal ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that temperance is not a     
cardinal virtue4 ,for the good of moral 
virtue depends on reason4 ,but          
temperance is about those things that   
are furthest removed from reason1 namely
 about pleasures common to us and the   
lower animals1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1
 #aj4 ,therefore temperance1 seemingly1 
is not a principal virtue4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 the greater the impetus the   
more difficult is it to control4 ,now   
anger1 which is controlled by meekness1 
seems to be more impetuous than desire1 
which is controlled by temperance4 ,for 
it is written 7,prov4 #bg3d73 ,anger    
hath no mercy1 nor fury when it breaketh
 forth2 and who can bear the violence   
7impetum7 of one provoked8 ,therefore   
meekness is a principal virtue rather   
than temperance4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
hope as a movement of the soul takes    

precedence of desire and concupiscence1 
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,a4  
#d74 ,but humility controls the         
presumption of immoderate hope4         
,therefore1 seemingly1 humility is a    
principal virtue rather than temperance 
which controls concupiscence4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,gregory reckons temperance   
among the principal virtues 7,moral4 ii1
 #di74  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above
 7,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #aa2 ,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #c71 a
 principal or cardinal virtue is so     
called because it has a foremost claim  
to praise on account of one of those    
things that are requisite for the notion
 of virtue in general4 ,now moderation1 
which is requisite in every virtue1     
deserves praise principally in pleasures
 of touch1 with which temperance is     
concerned1 both because these pleasures 
are most natural to us1 so that it is   
more difficult to abstain from them1 and
 to control the desire for them1 and    
because their objects are more necessary
 to the present life1 as stated above   

7,a4 #d74 ,for this reason temperance is
 reckoned a principal or cardinal       
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the longer   
the range of its operation1 the greater 
is the agent's power 7virtus7 shown to  
be3 wherefore the very fact that the    
reason is able to moderate desires and  
pleasures that are furthest removed from
 it1 proves the greatness of reason's   
power4 ,this is how temperance comes to 
be a principal virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,the impetuousness of anger is caused  
by an accident1 for instance1 a painful 
hurt2 wherefore it soon passes1 although
 its impetus be great4 ,on the other    
hand1 the impetuousness of the desire   
for pleasures of touch proceeds from a  
natural cause1 wherefore it is more     
lasting and more general1 and           
consequently its control regards a more 
principal virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the
 object of hope is higher than the      
object of desire1 wherefore hope is     
accounted the principal passion in the  
irascible4 ,but the objects of desires  

and pleasures of touch move the appetite
 with greater force1 since they are more
 natural4 ,therefore temperance1 which  
appoints the mean in such things1 is a  
principal virtue4   ,,eighth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ada1 ,art4 #h  ,whether 
,temperance ,is the ,greatest of the    
,virtues8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that temperance is the greatest of the 
virtues4 ,for ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4
 i1 #dc7 that what we observe and seek  
most in temperance is the safeguarding  
of what is honorable1 and the regard for
 what is beautiful4 ,now virtue deserves
 praise for being honorable and         
beautiful4 ,therefore temperance is the 
greatest of the virtues4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 the more difficult the deed   
the greater the virtue4 ,now it is more 
difficult to control desires and        
pleasures of touch than to regulate     
external actions1 the former pertaining 
to temperance and the latter to justice4
 ,therefore temperance is a greater     
virtue than justice4  ,obj4 #c3         

,further1 seemingly the more general a  
thing is1 the more necessary and the    
better it is4 ,now fortitude is about   
dangers of death which occur less       
frequently than pleasures of touch1 for 
these occur every day2 so that          
temperance is in more general use than  
fortitude4 ,therefore temperance is a   
more excellent virtue than fortitude4   
,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says
 7,rhet4 i1 #i7 that the greatest       
virtues are those which are most        
profitable to others1 for which reason  
we give the greatest honor to the brave 
and the just4  ,i answer that1 ,as the  
,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 i1 #b7   
the good of the many is more of the     
godlike than the good of the individual1
 wherefore the more a virtue regards the
 good of the many1 the better it is4    
,now justice and fortitude regard the   
good of the many more than temperance   
does1 since justice regards the         
relations between one man and another1  
while fortitude regards dangers of      

battle which are endured for the common 
weal3 whereas temperance moderates only 
the desires and pleasures which affect  
man himself4 ,hence it is evident that  
justice and fortitude are more excellent
 virtues than temperance3 while prudence
 and the theological virtues are more   
excellent still4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3      
,honor and beauty are especially        
ascribed to temperance1 not on account  
of the excellence of the good proper to 
temperance1 but on account of the       
disgrace of the contrary evil from which
 it withdraws us1 by moderating the     
pleasures common to us and the lower    
animals4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since virtue
 is about the difficult and the good1   
the excellence of a virtue is considered
 more under the aspect of good1 wherein 
justice excels1 than under the aspect of
 difficult1 wherein temperance excels4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which is general 
because it regards the many conduces    
more to the excellence of goodness than 
that which is general because it occurs 

frequently3 fortitude excels in the     
former way1 temperance in the latter4   
,hence fortitude is greater simply1     
although in some respects temperance may
 be described as greater not only than  
fortitude but also than justice4        
,,question #adb  ,,of ,,the ,,vices     
,,opposed ,,to ,,temperance 7,in ,four  
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
vices opposed to temperance4 ,under this
 head there are four points of inquiry3 
7#a7 ,whether insensibility is a sin8   
7#b7 ,whether intemperance is a childish
 sin8  7#c7 ,of the comparison between  
intemperance and timidity2  7#d7        
,whether intemperance is the most       
disgraceful of vices8   ,,first         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adb1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,insensibility ,is a ,vice8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
insensibility is not a vice4 ,for those 
are called insensible who are deficient 
with regard to pleasures of touch4 ,now 
seemingly it is praiseworthy and        
virtuous to be altogether deficient in  

such matters3 for it is written 7,dan4  
#aj3b1 #c73 ,in those days ,daniel      
mourned the days of three weeks1 ,i ate 
no desirable bread1 and neither flesh   
nor wine entered my mouth1 neither was  
,i anointed with ointment4 ,therefore   
insensibility is not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 man's good is to be in accord 
with reason1 according to ,dionysius    
7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,now abstinence from  
all pleasures of touch is most conducive
 to man's progress in the good of       
reason3 for it is written 7,dan4 #a3ag7 
that to the children who took pulse for 
their food 7,dan4 #a3ab71 ,god gave     
knowledge1 and understanding in every   
book and wisdom4 ,therefore             
insensibility1 which rejects these      
pleasures altogether1 is not sinful4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is a very
 effective means of avoiding sin would  
seem not to be sinful4 ,now the most    
effective remedy in avoiding sin is to  
shun pleasures1 and this pertains to    
insensibility4 ,for the ,philosopher    

says 7,ethic4 ii1 #i7 that if we deny   
ourselves pleasures we are less liable  
to sin4 ,therefore there is nothing     
vicious in insensibility4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,nothing save vice is opposed 
to virtue4 ,now insensibility is opposed
 to the virtue of temperance according  
to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #g2    
iii1 #aa74 ,therefore insensibility is a
 vice4  ,i answer that1 ,whatever is    
contrary to the natural order is        
vicious4 ,now nature has introduced     
pleasure into the operations that are   
necessary for man's life4 ,wherefore the
 natural order requires that man should 
make use of these pleasures1 in so far  
as they are necessary for man's         
well-being1 as regards the preservation 
either of the individual or of the      
species4 ,accordingly1 if anyone were to
 reject pleasure to the extent of       
omitting things that are necessary for  
nature's preservation1 he would sin1 as 
acting counter to the order of nature4  
,and this pertains to the vice of       

insensibility4  ,it must1 however1 be   
observed that it is sometimes           
praiseworthy1 and even necessary for the
 sake of an end1 to abstain from such   
pleasures as result from these          
operations4 ,thus1 for the sake of the  
body's health1 certain persons refrain  
from pleasures of meat1 drink1 and sex2 
as also for the fulfilment of certain   
engagements3 thus athletes and soldiers 
have to deny themselves many pleasures1 
in order to fulfil their respective     
duties4 ,in like manner penitents1 in   
order to recover health of soul1 have   
recourse to abstinence from pleasures1  
as a kind of diet1 and those who are    
desirous of giving themselves up to     
contemplation and ,divine things need   
much to refrain from carnal things4 ,nor
 do any of these things pertain to the  
vice of insensibility1 because they are 
in accord with right reason4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,daniel abstained thus from   
pleasures1 not through any horror of    
pleasure as though it were evil in      

itself1 but for some praiseworthy end1  
in order1 namely1 to adapt himself to   
the heights of contemplation by         
abstaining from pleasures of the body4  
,hence the text goes on to tell of the  
revelation that he received immediately 
afterwards4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since man
 cannot use his reason without his      
sensitive powers1 which need a bodily   
organ1 as stated in the ,first ,part    
7,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4 #g1 #h71 man needs to   
sustain his body in order that he may   
use his reason4 ,now the body is        
sustained by means of operations that   
afford pleasure3 wherefore the good of  
reason cannot be in a man if he abstain 
from all pleasures4 ,yet this need for  
using pleasures of the body will be     
greater or less1 according as man needs 
more or less the powers of his body in  
accomplishing the act of reason4        
,wherefore it is commendable for those  
who undertake the duty of giving        
themselves to contemplation1 and of     
imparting to others a spiritual good1 by

 a kind of spiritual procreation1 as it 
were1 to abstain from many pleasures1   
but not for those who are in duty bound 
to bodily occupations and carnal        
procreation4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in order
 to avoid sin1 pleasure must be shunned1
 not altogether1 but so that it is not  
sought more than necessity requires4    
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adb1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,intemperance ,is a  
,childish ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that intemperance is not a   
childish sin4 ,for ,jerome in commenting
 on ,matt4 #ah3c1 ,unless you be        
converted1 and become as little         
children1 says that a child persists not
 in anger1 is unmindful of injuries1    
takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful 
woman1 all of which is contrary to      
intemperance4 ,therefore intemperance is
 not a childish sin4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 children have none but natural
 desires4 ,now in respect of natural    
desires few sin by intemperance1        
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  

iii1 #aa74 ,therefore intemperance is   
not a childish sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 children should be fostered and        
nourished3 whereas concupiscence and    
pleasure1 about which intemperance is   
concerned1 are always to be thwarted and
 uprooted1 according to ,col4 #c3e1     
,mortify 4 4 4 your members upon the    
earth1 which are 4 4 4 concupiscence    
99,vulg43 'your members which are upon  
the earth1 fornication 4 4              
concupiscence'1 etc4 ,therefore         
intemperance is not a childish sin4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says   
7,ethic4 iii1 #ab7 that we apply the    
term intemperance99 to childish faults4 
99,akolasia which ,aristotle refers to  
kolazo to punish1 so that its original  
sense would be 'impunity' or            
'unrestraint4'  ,i answer that1 ,a thing
 is said to be childish for two reasons4
 ,first1 because it is becoming to      
children1 and the ,philosopher does not 
mean that the sin of intemperance is    
childish in this sense4 ,secondly4 by   

way of likeness1 and it is in this sense
 that sins of intemperance are said to  
be childish4 ,for the sin of            
intemperance is one of unchecked        
concupiscence1 which is likened to a    
child in three ways4 ,first1 as regards 
that which they both desire1 for like a 
child concupiscence desires something   
disgraceful4 ,this is because in human  
affairs a thing is beautiful according  
as it harmonizes with reason4 ,wherefore
 ,tully says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #bg7 under 
the heading ,comeliness is twofold1 that
 the beautiful is that which is in      
keeping with man's excellence in so far 
as his nature differs from other        
animals4 ,now a child does not attend to
 the order of reason2 and in like manner
 concupiscence does not listen to       
reason1 according to ,ethic4 vii1 #f4   
,secondly1 they are alike as to the     
result4 ,for a child1 if left to his own
 will1 becomes more self-willed3 hence  
it is written 7,ecclus4 #cj3h73 ,a horse
 not broken becometh stubborn1 and a    

child left to himself will become       
headstrong4 ,so1 too1 concupiscence1 if 
indulged1 gathers strength3 wherefore   
,augustine says 7,confess4 viii1 #e73   
,lust served became a custom1 and custom
 not resisted became necessity4         
,thirdly1 as to the remedy which is     
applied to both4 ,for a child is        
corrected by being restrained2 hence it 
is written 7,prov4 #bc3ac1 #ad73        
,withhold not correction from a child 4 
4 4 ,thou shalt beat him with a rod1 and
 deliver his soul from ,hell4 ,in like  
manner by resisting concupiscence we    
moderate it according to the demands of 
virtue4 ,augustine indicates this when  
he says 7,music4 vi1 #aa7 that if the   
mind be lifted up to spiritual things1  
and remain fixed thereon1 the impulse of
 custom1 i4e4 carnal concupiscence1 is  
broken1 and being suppressed is         
gradually weakened3 for it was stronger 
when we followed it1 and though not     
wholly destroyed1 it is certainly less  
strong when we curb it4 ,hence the      

,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #ab7    
that as a child ought to live according 
to the direction of his tutor1 so ought 
the concupiscible to accord with reason4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument takes 
the term childish as denoting what is   
observed in children4 ,it is not in this
 sense that the sin of intemperance is  
said to be childish1 but by way of      
likeness1 as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,a desire may be said to be natural
 in two ways4 ,first1 with regard to its
 genus1 and thus temperance and         
intemperance are about natural desires1 
since they are about desires of food and
 sex1 which are directed to the         
preservation of nature4 ,secondly1 a    
desire may be called natural with regard
 to the species of the thing that nature
 requires for its own preservation2 and 
in this way it does not happen often    
that one sins in the matter of natural  
desires1 for nature requires only that  
which supplies its need1 and there is no
 sin in desiring this1 save only where  

it is desired in excess as to quantity4 
,this is the only way in which sin can  
occur with regard to natural desires1   
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
iii1 #aa74  ,there are other things in  
respect of which sins frequently occur1 
and these are certain incentives to     
desire devised by human curiosity 99,cf4
 ,q4 #afg1 such as the nice 7curiosa7   
preparation of food1 or the adornment of
 women4 ,and though children do not     
affect these things much1 yet           
intemperance is called a childish sin   
for the reason given above4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,that which regards nature    
should be nourished and fostered in     
children1 but that which pertains to the
 lack of reason in them should not be   
fostered1 but corrected1 as stated      
above4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #adb1 ,art4 #c  ,whether            
,cowardice99 ,is a ,greater ,vice ,than 
,intemperance8 99,cf4 ,q4 #abe          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
cowardice is a greater vice than        

intemperance4 ,for a vice deserves      
reproach through being opposed to the   
good of virtue4 ,now cowardice is       
opposed to fortitude1 which is a more   
excellent virtue than temperance1 as    
stated above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ada1 ,a4 #h74
 ,therefore cowardice is a greater vice 
than intemperance4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
the greater the difficulty to be        
surmounted1 the less is a man to be     
reproached for failure1 wherefore the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #g7 that
 it is no wonder1 in fact it is         
pardonable1 if a man is mastered by     
strong and overwhelming pleasures or    
pains4 ,now seemingly it is more        
difficult to control pleasures than     
other passions2 hence it is stated in   
,ethic4 ii1 #c1 that it is more         
difficult to contend against pleasure   
than against anger1 which would seem to 
be stronger than fear4 ,therefore       
intemperance1 which is overcome by      
pleasure1 is a less grievous sin than   
cowardice1 which is overcome by fear4   

,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is essential to  
sin that it be voluntary4 ,now cowardice
 is more voluntary than intemperance1   
since no man desires to be intemperate1 
whereas some desire to avoid dangers of 
death1 which pertains to cowardice4     
,therefore cowardice is a more grievous 
sin than intemperance4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 iii1 #ab7 that intemperance    
seems more akin to voluntary action than
 cowardice4 ,therefore it is more       
sinful4  ,i answer that1 one may be     
compared with another in two ways4      
,first1 with regard to the matter or    
object2 secondly1 on the part of the man
 who sins3 and in both ways intemperance
 is a more grievous sin than cowardice4 
,first1 as regards the matter4 ,for     
cowardice shuns dangers of death1 to    
avoid which the principal motive is the 
necessity of preserving life4 ,on the   
other hand1 intemperance is about       
pleasures1 the desire of which is not so
 necessary for the preservation of life1

 because1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad   
#b71 intemperance is more about certain 
annexed pleasures or desires than about 
natural desires or pleasures4 ,now the  
more necessary the motive of sin the    
less grievous the sin4 ,wherefore       
intemperance is a more grievous vice    
than cowardice1 on the part of the      
object or motive matter4  ,in like      
manner again1 on the part of the man who
 sins1 and this for three reasons4      
,first1 because the more sound-minded a 
man is1 the more grievous his sin1      
wherefore sins are not imputed to those 
who are demented4 ,now grave fear and   
sorrow1 especially in dangers of death1 
stun the human mind1 but not so pleasure
 which is the motive of intemperance4   
,secondly1 because the more voluntary a 
sin the graver it is4 ,now intemperance 
has more of the voluntary in it than    
cowardice has1 and this for two reasons4
 ,the first is because actions done     
through fear have their origin in the   
compulsion of an external agent1 so that

 they are not simply voluntary but      
mixed1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #a1    
whereas actions done for the sake of    
pleasure are simply voluntary4 ,the     
second reason is because the actions of 
an intemperate man are more voluntary   
individually and less voluntary         
generically4 ,for no one would wish to  
be intemperate1 yet man is enticed by   
individual pleasures which make of him  
an intemperate man4 ,hence the most     
effective remedy against intemperance is
 not to dwell on the consideration of   
singulars4 ,it is the other way about in
 matters relating to cowardice3 because 
the particular action that imposes      
itself on a man is less voluntary1 for  
instance to cast aside his shield1 and  
the like1 whereas the general purpose is
 more voluntary1 for instance to save   
himself by flight4 ,now that which is   
more voluntary in the particular        
circumstances in which the act takes    
place1 is simply more voluntary4        
,wherefore intemperance1 being simply   

more voluntary than cowardice1 is a     
greater vice4 ,thirdly1 because it is   
easier to find a remedy for intemperance
 than for cowardice1 since pleasures of 
food and sex1 which are the matter of   
intemperance1 are of everyday           
occurrence1 and it is possible for man  
without danger by frequent practice in  
their regard to become temperate2       
whereas dangers of death are of rare    
occurrence1 and it is more dangerous for
 man to encounter them frequently in    
order to cease being a coward4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,the excellence of fortitude  
in comparison with temperance may be    
considered from two standpoints4 ,first1
 with regard to the end1 which has the  
aspect of good3 because fortitude is    
directed to the common good more than   
temperance is4 ,and from this point of  
view cowardice has a certain precedence 
over intemperance1 since by cowardice   
some people forsake the defense of the  
common good4 ,secondly1 with regard to  
the difficulty1 because it is more      

difficult to endure dangers of death    
than to refrain from any pleasures      
whatever3 and from this point of view   
there is no need for cowardice to take  
precedence of intemperance4 ,for just as
 it is a greater strength that does not 
succumb to a stronger force1 so on the  
other hand to be overcome by a stronger 
force is proof of a lesser vice1 and to 
succumb to a weaker force1 is the proof 
of a greater vice4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,love of self-preservation1 for the sake
 of which one shuns perils of death1 is 
much more connatural than any pleasures 
whatever of food and sex which are      
directed to the preservation of life4   
,hence it is more difficult to overcome 
the fear of dangers of death1 than the  
desire of pleasure in matters of food   
and sex3 although the latter is more    
difficult to resist than anger1 sorrow1 
and fear1 occasioned by certain other   
evils4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the voluntary1
 in cowardice1 depends rather on a      
general than on a particular            

consideration3 wherefore in such cases  
we have the voluntary not simply but in 
a restricted sense4   ,,fourth ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adb1 ,art4 #d  ,whether
 ,intemperance ,is the ,most            
,disgraceful of ,sins8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that intemperance is not 
the most disgraceful of sins4 ,as honor 
is due to virtue so is disgrace due to  
sin4 ,now some sins are more grievous   
than intemperance3 for instance murder1 
blasphemy1 and the like4 ,therefore     
intemperance is not the most disgraceful
 of sins4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those    
sins which are the more common are      
seemingly less disgraceful1 since men   
are less ashamed of them4 ,now sins of  
intemperance are most common1 because   
they are about things connected with the
 common use of human life1 and in which 
many happen to sin4 ,therefore sins of  
intemperance do not seem to be most     
disgraceful4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the   
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #f7     
temperance and intemperance are about   

human desires and pleasures4 ,now       
certain desires and pleasures are more  
shameful than human desires and         
pleasures2 such are brutal pleasures and
 those caused by disease as the         
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 vii1 #e74  
,therefore intemperance is not the most 
disgraceful of sins4  ,on the contrary1 
,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1    
#aj7 that intemperance is justly more   
deserving of reproach than other vices4 
,i answer that1 ,disgrace is seemingly  
opposed to honor and glory4 ,now honor  
is due to excellence1 as stated above   
7,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #a71 and glory denotes   
clarity 7,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c74      
,accordingly intemperance is most       
disgraceful for two reasons4 ,first1    
because it is most repugnant to human   
excellence1 since it is about pleasures 
common to us and the lower animals1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #ada1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c74  
,wherefore it is written 7,ps4 #dh3ba73 
,man1 when he was in honor1 did not     
understand3 he hath been compared to    

senseless beasts1 and made like to them4
 ,secondly1 because it is most repugnant
 to man's clarity or beauty2 inasmuch as
 the pleasures which are the matter of  
intemperance dim the light of reason    
from which all the clarity and beauty of
 virtue arises3 wherefore these         
pleasures are described as being most   
slavish4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,gregory 
says 99,moral4 xxxiii4 #ab the sins of  
the flesh1 which are comprised under the
 head of intemperance1 although less    
culpable1 are more disgraceful4 ,the    
reason is that culpability is measured  
by inordinateness in respect of the end1
 while disgrace regards shamefulness1   
which depends chiefly on the            
unbecomingness of the sin in respect of 
the sinner4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the      
commonness of a sin diminishes the      
shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in   
the opinion of men1 but not as regards  
the nature of the vices themselves4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when we say that      
intemperance is most disgraceful1 we    

mean in comparison with human vices1    
those1 namely1 that are connected with  
human passions which to a certain extent
 are in conformity with human nature4   
,but those vices which exceed the mode  
of human nature are still more          
disgraceful4 ,nevertheless such vices   
are apparently reducible to the genus of
 intemperance1 by way of excess3 for    
instance1 if a man delight in eating    
human flesh1 or in committing the       
unnatural vice4   ,,question #adc  ,,of 
,,the ,,parts ,,of ,,temperance1 ,,in   
,,general  ,we must now consider the    
parts of temperance3 we shall consider  
these same parts 7#a7 in general2 7#b7  
each of them in particular4   ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adc1 ,art4  ,whether the
 ,parts of ,temperance ,are ,rightly    
,assigned8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4   
ii1 #ed7 unbecomingly assigns the parts 
of temperance1 when he asserts them to  
be continence1 mildness1 and modesty4   
,for continence is reckoned to be       

distinct from virtue 7,ethic4 vii1 #a73 
whereas temperance is comprised under   
virtue4 ,therefore continence is not a  
part of temperance4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 mildness seemingly softens hatred or   
anger4 ,but temperance is not about     
these things1 but about pleasures of    
touch1 as stated above 7,q4 #ada1 ,a4   
#d74 ,therefore mildness is not a part  
of temperance4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
modesty concerns external action1       
wherefore the ,apostle says 7,phil4     
#d3e73 ,let your modesty be known to all
 men4 ,now external actions are the     
matter of justice1 as stated above 7,q4 
#eh1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore modesty is a   
part of justice rather than of          
temperance4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1        
,macrobius 7,in ,somn4 ,scip4 i1 #h7    
reckons many more parts of temperance3  
for he says that temperance results in  
modesty1 shamefacedness1 abstinence1    
chastity1 honesty1 moderation1          
lowliness1 sobriety1 purity4 ,andronicus
 also says 99,de ,affectibus that the   

companions of temperance are gravity1   
continence1 humility1 simplicity1       
refinement1 method1 contentment4        
99,per-se-sufficientiam which could be  
rendered self-sufficiency1 but for the  
fact that this is taken in a bad sense4 
,see ,q4 #afi1 ,a4 #a4 ,therefore it    
seems that ,tully insufficiently        
reckoned the parts of temperance4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,qq4    
#dh1 #abh71 a cardinal virtue may have  
three kinds of parts1 namely integral1  
subjective1 and potential4 ,the integral
 parts of a virtue are the conditions   
the concurrence of which are necessary  
for virtue3 and in this respect there   
are two integral parts of temperance1   
shamefacedness1 whereby one recoils from
 the disgrace that is contrary to       
temperance1 and honesty1 whereby one    
loves the beauty of temperance4 ,for1 as
 stated above 7,q4 #ada1 ,a4 #b1 ad #c71
 temperance more than any other virtue  
lays claim to a certain comeliness1 and 
the vices of intemperance excel others  

in disgrace4  ,the subjective parts of a
 virtue are its species3 and the species
 of a virtue have to be differentiated  
according to the difference of matter or
 object4 ,now temperance is about       
pleasures of touch1 which are of two    
kinds4 ,for some are directed to        
nourishment3 and in these as regards    
meat1 there is abstinence1 and as       
regards drink properly there is         
sobriety4 ,other pleasures are directed 
to the power of procreation1 and in     
these as regards the principal pleasure 
of the act itself of procreation1 there 
is chastity1 and as to the pleasures    
incidental to the act1 resulting1 for   
instance1 from kissing1 touching1 or    
fondling1 we have purity4  ,the         
potential parts of a principal virtue   
are called secondary virtues3 for while 
the principal virtue observes the mode  
in some principal matter1 these observe 
the mode in some other matter wherein   
moderation is not so difficult4 ,now it 
belongs to temperance to moderate       

pleasures of touch1 which are most      
difficult to moderate4 ,wherefore any   
virtue that is effective of moderation  
in some matter or other1 and restrains  
the appetite in its impulse towards     
something1 may be reckoned a part of    
temperance1 as a virtue annexed thereto4
  ,this happens in three ways3 first1 in
 the inward movements of the soul2      
secondly1 in the outward movements and  
actions of the body2 thirdly1 in outward
 things4 ,now besides the movement of   
concupiscence1 which temperance         
moderates and restrains1 we find in the 
soul three movements towards a          
particular object4 ,in the first place  
there is the movement of the will when  
stirred by the impulse of passion3 and  
this movement is restrained by          
continence1 the effect of which is that1
 although a man suffer immoderate       
concupiscences1 his will does not       
succumb to them4 ,another inward        
movement towards something is the       
movement of hope1 and of the resultant  

daring1 and this is moderated or        
restrained by humility4 ,the third      
movement is that of anger1 which tends  
towards revenge1 and this is restrained 
by meekness or mildness4  ,with regard  
to bodily movements and actions1        
moderation and restraint is the effect  
of modesty1 which1 according to         
,andronicus1 has three parts4 ,the first
 of these enables one to discern what to
 do and what not to do1 and to observe  
the right order1 and to persevere in    
what we do3 this he assigns to method4  
,the second is that a man observe       
decorum in what he does1 and this he    
ascribes to refinement4 ,the third has  
to do with the conversation or any other
 intercourse between a man and his      
friends1 and this is called gravity4    
,with regard to external things1 a      
twofold moderation has to be observed4  
,first1 we must not desire too many1 and
 to this ,macrobius assigns lowliness1  
and ,andronicus contentment2 secondly1  
we must not be too nice in our          

requirements1 and to this ,macrobius    
ascribes moderation1 ,andronicus        
simplicity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is    
true that continence differs from       
virtue1 just as imperfect differs from  
perfect1 as we shall state further on   
7,q4 #afe1 ,a4 #a72 and in this sense it
 is condivided with virtue4 ,yet it has 
something in common with temperance both
 as to matter1 since it is about        
pleasures of touch1 and as to mode1     
since it is a kind of restraint4 ,hence 
it is suitably assigned as a part of    
temperance4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,mildness 
or meekness is reckoned a part of       
temperance not because of a likeness of 
matter1 but because they agree as to the
 mode of restraint and moderation as    
stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the 
matter of external action justice       
considers what is due to another4       
,modesty does not consider this1 but    
only a certain moderation4 ,hence it is 
reckoned a part not of justice but of   
temperance4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,under    

modesty ,tully includes whatever        
pertains to the moderation of bodily    
movements and external things1 as well  
as the moderation of hope which we      
reckoned as pertaining to humility4     
,,question #add  ,,of ,,shamefacedness  
7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we must now     
consider the parts of temperance in     
particular3 and in the first place the  
integral parts1 which are shamefacedness
 and honesty4 ,with regard to           
shamefacedness there are four points of 
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether shamefacedness  
is a virtue8  7#b7 ,what is its object8 
7#c7 ,who are the cause of a man being  
ashamed8  7#d7 ,what kind of people are 
ashamed8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #add1 ,art4 #a  ,whether            
,shamefacedness ,is a ,virtue8          
,objection #a3 ,it seems that           
shamefacedness is a virtue4 ,for it is  
proper to a virtue to observe the mean  
as fixed by reason3 this is clear from  
the definition of virtue given in       
,ethic4 ii1 #f4 ,now shamefacedness     

observes the mean in this way1 as the   
,philosopher observes 7,ethic4 ii1 #g74 
,therefore shamefacedness is a virtue4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is         
praiseworthy is either a virtue or      
something connected with virtue4 ,now   
shamefacedness is praiseworthy4 ,but it 
is not part of a virtue4 ,for it is not 
a part of prudence1 since it is not in  
the reason but in the appetite2 nor is  
it a part of justice4 ,since            
shamefacedness implies a certain        
passion1 whereas justice is not about   
the passions2 nor again is it a part of 
fortitude1 because it belongs to        
fortitude to be persistent and          
aggressive1 while it belongs to         
shamefacedness to recoil from something2
 nor lastly is it a part of temperance1 
since the latter is about desires1      
whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear
 according as the ,philosopher states   
7,ethic4 iv1 #i7 and ,damascene 7,de    
,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ae74 ,hence it follows
 that shamefacedness is a virtue4  ,obj4

 #c3 ,further1 the honest and the       
virtuous are convertible according to   
,tully 7,de ,offic4 i1 #bg74 ,now       
shamefacedness is a part of honesty3 for
 ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #dc7 that
 shamefacedness is the companion and    
familiar of the restful mind1 averse to 
wantonness1 a stranger to any kind of   
excess1 the friend of sobriety and the  
support of what is honest1 a seeker     
after the beautiful4 ,therefore         
shamefacedness is a virtue4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 every vice is opposed to a    
virtue4 ,now certain vices are opposed  
to shamefacedness1 namely shamelessness 
and inordinate prudery4 ,therefore      
shamefacedness is a virtue4  ,obj4 #e3  
,further1 like acts beget like habits1  
according to ,ethic4 ii1 #a4 ,now       
shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy   
act2 wherefore from many such acts a    
habit results4 ,but a habit of          
praiseworthy deeds is a virtue1         
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
i1 #ab74 ,therefore shamefacedness is a 

virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,the         
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iv1  
#i7 that shamefacedness is not a virtue4
  ,i answer that1 ,virtue is taken in   
two ways1 in a strict sense and in a    
broad sense4 ,taken strictly virtue is a
 perfection1 as stated in ,phys4    vii1
 #ag1 #ah4 ,wherefore anything that is  
inconsistent with perfection1 though it 
be good1 falls short of the notion of   
virtue4 ,now shamefacedness is          
inconsistent with perfection1 because it
 is the fear of something base1 namely  
of that which is disgraceful4 ,hence    
,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1   
#ae7 that shamefacedness is fear of a   
base action4 ,now just as hope is about 
a possible and difficult good1 so is    
fear about a possible and arduous evil1 
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4  
#a2 ,q4 #da1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #db1 ,a4 #c71  
when we were treating of the passions4  
,but one who is perfect as to a virtuous
 habit1 does not apprehend that which   
would be disgraceful and base to do1 as 

being possible and arduous1 that is to  
say difficult for him to avoid2 nor does
 he actually do anything base1 so as to 
be in fear of disgrace4 ,therefore      
shamefacedness1 properly speaking1 is   
not a virtue1 since it falls short of   
the perfection of virtue4  ,taken1      
however1 in a broad sense virtue denotes
 whatever is good and praiseworthy in   
human acts or passions2 and in this way 
shamefacedness is sometimes called a    
virtue1 since it is a praiseworthy      
passion4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,observing   
the mean is not sufficient for the      
notion of virtue1 although it is one of 
the conditions included in virtue's     
definition3 but it is requisite1 in     
addition to this1 that it be an elective
 habit1 that is to say1 operating from  
choice4 ,now shamefacedness denotes1 not
 a habit but a passion1 nor does its    
movement result from choice1 but from an
 impulse of passion4 ,hence it falls    
short of the notion of virtue4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above1             

shamefacedness is fear of baseness and  
disgrace4 ,now it has been stated 7,q4  
#adb1 ,a4 #d7 that the vice of          
intemperance is most base and           
disgraceful4 ,wherefore shamefacedness  
pertains more to temperance than to any 
other virtue1 by reason of its motive   
cause1 which is a base action though not
 according to the species of the        
passion1 namely fear4 ,nevertheless in  
so far as the vices opposed to other    
virtues are base and disgraceful1       
shamefacedness may also pertain to other
 virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3             
,shamefacedness fosters honesty1 by     
removing that which is contrary thereto1
 but not so as to attain to the         
perfection of honesty4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3
 ,every defect causes a vice1 but not   
every good is sufficient for the notion 
of virtue4 ,consequently it does not    
follow that whatever is directly opposed
 to vice is a virtue1 although every    
vice is opposed to a virtue1 as regards 
its origin4 ,hence shamelessness1 in so 

far as it results from excessive love of
 disgraceful things1 is opposed to      
temperance4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,being    
frequently ashamed causes the habit of  
an acquired virtue whereby one avoids   
disgraceful things which are the object 
of shamefacedness1 without continuing to
 be ashamed in their regard3 although as
 a consequence of this acquired virtue1 
a man would be more ashamed1 if         
confronted with the matter of           
shamefacedness4   ,,second ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #add1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,shamefacedness ,is ,about a            
,disgraceful ,action8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that shamefacedness is   
not about a disgraceful action4 ,for the
 ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #i7 that
 shamefacedness is fear of disgrace4    
,now sometimes those who do nothing     
wrong suffer ignominy1 according to ,ps4
 #fg3h1 ,for thy sake ,i have borne     
reproach1 shame hath covered my face4   
,therefore shamefacedness is not        
properly about a disgraceful action4    

,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing apparently  
is disgraceful but what is sinful4 ,yet 
man is ashamed of things that are not   
sins1 for instance when he performs a   
menial occupation4 ,therefore it seems  
that shamefacedness is not properly     
about a disgraceful action4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 virtuous deeds are not        
disgraceful but most beautiful according
 to ,ethic4 i1 #h4 ,yet sometimes people
 are ashamed to do virtuous deeds1      
according to ,luke #i3bf1 ,he that shall
 be ashamed of ,me and ,my words1 of him
 the ,son of man shall be ashamed1 etc4 
,therefore shamefacedness is not about a
 disgraceful action4  ,obj4 #d3         
,further1 if shamefacedness were        
properly about a disgraceful action1 it 
would follow that the more disgraceful  
the action the more ashamed would one   
be4 ,yet sometimes a man is more ashamed
 of lesser sins1 while he glories in    
those which are most grievous1 according
 to ,ps4 #ea3c1 ,why dost thou glory in 
malice8 ,therefore shamefacedness is not

 properly about a disgraceful action4   
,on the contrary1 ,damascene 7,de ,fide 
,orth4 ii1 #ae7 and ,gregory of ,nyssa  
99,nemesius1 7,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xx7 say   
that shamefacedness is fear of doing a  
disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful    
deed done4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated  
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #da1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4    
#db1 ,a4 #c71 when we were treating of  
the passions1 fear is properly about an 
arduous evil1 one1 namely1 that is      
difficult to avoid4 ,now disgrace is    
twofold4 ,there is the disgrace inherent
 to vice1 which consists in the         
deformity of a voluntary act3 and this1 
properly speaking1 has not the character
 of an arduous evil4 ,for that which    
depends on the will alone does not      
appear to be arduous and above man's    
ability3 wherefore it is not apprehended
 as fearful1 and for this reason the    
,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that  
such evils are not a matter of fear4    
,the other kind of disgrace is penal so 
to speak1 and it consists in the        

reproach that attaches to a person1 just
 as the clarity of glory consists in a  
person being honored4 ,and since this   
reproach has the character of an arduous
 evil1 just as honor has the character  
of an arduous good1 shamefacedness1     
which is fear of disgrace1 regards first
 and foremost reproach or ignominy4 ,and
 since reproach is properly due to vice1
 as honor is due to virtue1 it follows  
that shamefacedness regards also the    
disgrace inherent to vice4 ,hence the   
,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that a
 man is less ashamed of those defects   
which are not the result of any fault of
 his own4  ,now shamefacedness regards  
fault in two ways4 ,in one way a man    
refrains from vicious acts through fear 
of reproach3 in another way a man while 
doing a disgraceful deed avoids the     
public eye through fear of reproach4 ,in
 the former case1 according to ,gregory 
of ,nyssa 7,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4   
xx71 we speak of a person blushing1 in  
the latter we say that he is ashamed4   

,hence he says that the man who is      
ashamed acts in secret1 but he who      
blushes fears to be disgraced4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,shamefacedness properly      
regards disgrace as due to sin which is 
a voluntary defect4 ,hence the          
,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #f7 that a
 man is more ashamed of those things of 
which he is the cause4 ,now the virtuous
 man despises the disgrace to which he  
is subject on account of virtue1 because
 he does not deserve it2 as the         
,philosopher says of the magnanimous    
7,ethic4 iv1 #c74 ,thus we find it said 
of the apostles 7,acts #e3da7 that they 
7the apostles7 went from the presence of
 the council1 rejoicing that they were  
accounted worthy to suffer reproach for 
the name of ,jesus4 ,it is owing to     
imperfection of virtue that a man is    
sometimes ashamed of the reproaches     
which he suffers on account of virtue1  
since the more virtuous a man is1 the   
more he despises external things1       
whether good or evil4 ,wherefore it is  

written 7,isa4 #ea3g73 ,fear ye not the 
reproach of men4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as  
stated above 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #c71 though  
honor is not really due save to virtue  
alone1 yet it regards a certain         
excellence3 and the same applies to     
reproach1 for though it is properly due 
to sin alone1 yet1 at least in man's    
opinion1 it regards any kind of defect4 
,hence a man is ashamed of poverty1     
disrepute1 servitude1 and the like4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,shamefacedness does   
not regard virtuous deeds as such4 ,yet 
it happens accidentally that a man is   
ashamed of them either because he looks 
upon them as vicious according to human 
opinion1 or because he is afraid of     
being marked as presumptuous or         
hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds4  
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,sometimes more        
grievous sins are less shameful1 either 
because they are less disgraceful1 as   
spiritual sins in comparison with sins  
of the flesh1 or because they connote a 
certain abundance of some temporal good2

 thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice
 than of daring1 of theft than of       
robbery1 on account of a semblance of   
power4 ,the same applies to other sins4 
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #add1  
,art4 #c  ,whether ,man ,is ,more       
,shamefaced of ,those ,who ,are ,more   
,closely ,connected with ,him8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man  
is not more shamefaced of those who are 
more closely connected with him4 ,for it
 is stated in ,rhet4 ii1 #f that men are
 more shamefaced of those from whom they
 desire approbation4 ,now men desire    
this especially from people of the      
better sort who are sometimes not       
connected with them4 ,therefore man is  
not more shamefaced of those who are    
more closely connected with him4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 seemingly those are more  
closely connected who perform like      
deeds4 ,now man is not made ashamed of  
his sin by those whom he knows to be    
guilty of the same sin1 because         
according to ,rhet4 ii1 #f1 a man does  

not forbid his neighbor what he does    
himself4 ,therefore he is not more      
shamefaced of those who are most closely
 connected with him4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 
ii1 #f7 that men take more shame from   
those who retail their information to   
many1 such as jokers and fable-tellers4 
,but those who are more closely         
connected with a man do not retail his  
vices4 ,therefore one should not take   
shame chiefly from them4  ,obj4 #d3     
,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 
ii1 #f7 that men are most liable to be  
made ashamed by those among whom they   
have done nothing amiss2 by those of    
whom they ask something for the first   
time2 by those whose friends they wish  
to become4 ,now these are less closely  
connected with us4 ,therefore man is not
 made most ashamed by those who are more
 closely united to him4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,it is stated in ,rhet4 ii1 #f
 that man is made most ashamed by those 
who are to be continually with him4  ,i 

answer that1 ,since reproach is opposed 
to honor1 just as honor denotes         
attestation to someone's excellence1    
especially the excellence which is      
according to virtue1 so too reproach1   
the fear of which is shamefacedness1    
denotes attestation to a person's       
defect1 especially that which results   
from sin4 ,hence the more weighty a     
person's attestation is considered to   
be1 the more does he make another person
 ashamed4 ,now a person's attestation   
may be considered as being more weighty1
 either because he is certain of the    
truth or because of its effect4         
,certitude of the truth attaches to a   
person's attestations for two reasons4  
,first on account of the rectitude of   
his judgement1 as in the case of wise   
and virtuous men1 by whom man is more   
desirous of being honored and by whom he
 is brought to a greater sense of shame4
 ,hence children and the lower animals  
inspire no one with shame1 by reason of 
their lack of judgment4 ,secondly1 on   

account of his knowledge of the matter  
attested1 because everyone judges well  
of what is known to him 99,ethic4 i1 #c4
 ,in this way we are more liable to be  
made ashamed by persons connected with  
us1 since they are better acquainted    
with our deeds3 whereas strangers and   
persons entirely unknown to us1 who are 
ignorant of what we do1 inspire us with 
no shame at all4  ,an attestation       
receives weight from its effect by      
reason of some advantage or harm        
resulting therefrom2 wherefore men are  
more desirous of being honored by those 
who can be of use to them1 and are more 
liable to be made ashamed by those who  
are able to do them some harm4 ,and for 
this reason again1 in a certain respect1
 persons connected with us make us more 
ashamed1 since we are to be continually 
in their society1 as though this        
entailed a continual harm to us3 whereas
 the harm that comes from strangers and 
passersby ceases almost at once4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,people of the better sort   

make us ashamed for the same reason as  
those who are more closely connected    
with us2 because just as the attestation
 of the better men carries more weight  
since they have a more universal        
knowledge of things1 and in their       
judgments hold fast to the truth3 so1   
too1 the attestation of those among whom
 we live is more cogent since they know 
more about our concerns in detail4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,we fear not the       
attestation of those who are connected  
with us in the likeness of sin1 because 
we do not think that they look upon our 
defect as disgraceful4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,tale-bearers make us ashamed on       
account of the harm they do by making   
many think ill of us4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 
,even those among whom we have done no  
wrong1 make us more ashamed1 on account 
of the harm that would follow1 because1 
to wit1 we should forfeit the good      
opinion they had of us3 and again       
because when contraries are put in      
juxtaposition their opposition seems    

greater1 so that when a man notices     
something disgraceful in one whom he    
esteemed good1 he apprehends it as being
 the more disgraceful4 ,the reason why  
we are made more ashamed by those of    
whom we ask something for the first     
time1 or whose friends we wish to be1 is
 that we fear to suffer some injury1 by 
being disappointed in our request1 or by
 failing to become their friends4       
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #add1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,even ,virtuous ,men 
,can ,be ,ashamed8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that even virtuous men can be
 ashamed4 ,for contraries have contrary 
effects4 ,now those who excel in        
wickedness are not ashamed1 according to
 ,jer4 #c3c1 ,thou hadst a harlot's     
forehead1 thou wouldst not blush4       
,therefore those who are virtuous are   
more inclined to be ashamed4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 
ii1 #f7 that men are ashamed not only of
 vice1 but also of the signs of evil3   
and this happens also in the virtuous4  

,therefore virtuous men can be ashamed4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 shamefacedness is   
fear of disgrace 99,ethic4 iv1 #i4 ,now 
virtuous people may happen to be        
ignominious1 for instance if they are   
slandered1 or if they suffer reproach   
undeservedly4 ,therefore a virtuous man 
can be ashamed4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1    
shamefacedness is a part of temperance1 
as stated above 7,q4 #adc74 ,now a part 
is not separated from its whole4 ,since 
then temperance is in a virtuous man1 it
 means that shamefacedness is also4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says   
7,ethic4 iv1 #i7 that a virtuous man is 
not shamefaced4  ,i answer that1 ,as    
stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b7             
shamefacedness is fear of some disgrace4
 ,now it may happen in two ways that an 
evil is not feared3 first1 because it is
 not reckoned an evil2 secondly because 
one reckons it impossible with regard to
 oneself1 or as not difficult to avoid4 
,accordingly shame may be lacking in a  
person in two ways4 ,first1 because the 

things that should make him ashamed are 
not deemed by him to be disgraceful2 and
 in this way those who are steeped in   
sin are without shame1 for instead of   
disapproving of their sins1 they boast  
of them4 ,secondly1 because they        
apprehend disgrace as impossible to     
themselves1 or as easy to avoid4 ,in    
this way the old and the virtuous are   
not shamefaced4 ,yet they are so        
disposed1 that if there were anything   
disgraceful in them they would be       
ashamed of it4 ,wherefore the           
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #i7 that 
shame is in the virtuous hypothetically4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,lack of shame occurs
 in the best and in the worst men       
through different causes1 as stated in  
the ,article4 ,in the average men it is 
found1 in so far as they have a certain 
love of good1 and yet are not altogether
 free from evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it  
belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not
 only vice1 but also whatever has the   
semblance of vice1 according to #a      

,thess4 #e3bb1 ,from all appearance of  
evil refrain yourselves4 ,the           
,philosopher1 too1 says 7,ethic4 iv1 #i7
 that the virtuous man should avoid not 
only what is really evil1 but also those
 things that are regarded as evil4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,a4  
#a1 ad #a7 the virtuous man despises    
ignominy and reproach1 as being things  
he does not deserve1 wherefore he is not
 much ashamed of them4 ,nevertheless1 to
 a certain extent1 shame1 like the other
 passions1 may forestall reason4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #d3 ,shamefacedness is a part of 
temperance1 not as though it entered    
into its essence1 but as a disposition  
to it3 wherefore ,ambrose says 7,de     
,offic4 i1 #dc7 that shamefacedness lays
 the first foundation of temperance1 by 
inspiring man with the horror of        
whatever is disgraceful4   ,,question   
#ade  ,,of ,,honesty99 7,in ,four       
,articles7 99,honesty must be taken here
 in its broad sense as synonymous with  
moral goodness1 from the point of view  

of decorum4  ,we must now consider      
honesty1 under which head there are four
 points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,the relation 
between the honest and the virtuous2    
7#b7 ,its relation with the beautiful   
99,as honesty here denotes moral        
goodness1 so beauty stands for moral    
beauty2  7#c7 ,its relation with the    
useful and the pleasant2  7#d7 ,whether 
honesty is a part of temperance8        
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ade1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,honesty ,is the     
,same ,as ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that honesty is not the same 
as virtue4 ,for ,tully says 7,de        
,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1 #ec7 that the honest
 is what is desired for its own sake4   
,now virtue is desired1 not for its own 
sake1 but for the sake of happiness1 for
 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #i7  
that happiness is the reward and the end
 of virtue4 ,therefore honesty is not   
the same as virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 according to ,isidore 7,etym4 x7       
honesty means an honorable state4 ,now  

honor is due to many things besides     
virtue1 since it is praise that is the  
proper due of virtue 7,ethic4 i1 #ab74  
,therefore honesty is not the same as   
virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the        
principal part of virtue is the interior
 choice1 as the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 viii1 #ac74 ,but honesty seems 
to pertain rather to exterior conduct1  
according to #a ,cor4 #ad3dj1 ,let all  
things be done decently 7honeste7 and   
according to order among you4 ,therefore
 honesty is not the same as virtue4     
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 honesty apparently  
consists in external wealth4 ,according 
to ,ecclus4 #aa3ad1 good things and     
evil1 life and death poverty and riches 
are from ,god 99,the words in brackets  
are omitted in the ,leonine edition4    
,for riches the ,vulgate has honestas4  
,but virtue does not consist in external
 wealth4 ,therefore honesty is not the  
same as virtue4  ,on the contrary1      
,tully 7,de ,offic4 i1 #e2 ,rhet4 ii1   
#ec7 divides honesty into the four      

principal virtues1 into which virtue is 
also divided4 ,therefore honesty is the 
same as virtue4  ,i answer that1 ,as    
,isidore says 7,etym4 x7 honesty means  
an honorable state1 wherefore a thing   
may be said to be honest through being  
worthy of honor4 ,now honor1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #add1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b71 is due 
to excellence3 and the excellence of a  
man is gauged chiefly according to his  
virtue1 as stated in ,phys4 vii1 #ag4   
,therefore1 properly speaking1 honesty  
refers to the same thing as virtue4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to the      
,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #g71 of those  
things that are desired for their own   
sake1 some are desired for their own    
sake alone1 and never for the sake of   
something else1 such as happiness which 
is the last end2 while some are desired1
 not only for their own sake1 inasmuch  
as they have an aspect of goodness in   
themselves1 even if no further good     
accrued to us through them1 but also for
 the sake of something else1 inasmuch as

 they are conducive to some more perfect
 good4 ,it is thus that the virtues are 
desirable for their own sake3 wherefore 
,tully says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1    
#eb7 that some things allure us by their
 own force1 and attract us by their own 
worth1 such as virtue1 truth1 knowledge4
 ,and this suffices to give a thing the 
character of honest4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,some of the things which are honored   
besides virtue are more excellent than  
virtue1 namely ,god and happiness1 and  
such like things are not so well known  
to us by experience as virtue which we  
practice day by day4 ,hence virtue has a
 greater claim to the name of honesty4  
,other things which are beneath virtue  
are honored1 in so far as they are a    
help to the practice of virtue1 such as 
rank1 power1 and riches 99,ethic4 i1 #h4
 ,for as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 
iv1 #c7 that these things are honored by
 some people1 but in truth it is only   
the good man who is worthy of honor4    
,now a man is good in respect of virtue4

 ,wherefore praise is due to virtue in  
so far as the latter is desirable for   
the sake of something else1 while honor 
is due to virtue for its own sake3 and  
it is thus that virtue has the character
 of honesty4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as we   
have stated honest denotes that to which
 honor is due4 ,now honor is an         
attestation to someone's excellence1 as 
stated above 7,q4 #ajc1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74  
,but one attests only to what one knows2
 and the internal choice is not made    
known save by external actions4         
,wherefore external conduct has the     
character of honesty1 in so far as it   
reflects internal rectitude4 ,for this  
reason honesty consists radically in the
 internal choice1 but its expression    
lies in the external conduct4  ,reply   
,obj4 #d3 ,it is because the excellence 
of wealth is commonly regarded as making
 a man deserving of honor1 that         
sometimes the name of honesty is given  
to external prosperity4   ,,second      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ade1 ,art4 #b 

,whether the ,honest ,is the ,same ,as  
the ,beautiful8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that the honest is not the   
same as the beautiful4 ,for the aspect  
of honest is derived from the appetite1 
since the honest is what is desirable   
for its own sake 99,cicero1 ,de ,invent4
 ,rhet4 ii1 #ec4 ,but the beautiful     
regards rather the faculty of vision to 
which it is pleasing4 ,therefore the    
beautiful is not the same as the honest4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 beauty requires a 
certain clarity1 which is characteristic
 of glory3 whereas the honest regards   
honor4 ,since then honor and glory      
differ1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajc1 ,a4  
#a1 ad #c71 it seems also that the      
honest and the beautiful differ4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 honesty is the same as    
virtue1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but a
 certain beauty is contrary to virtue1  
wherefore it is written 7,ezech4        
#af3ae73 ,trusting in thy beauty thou   
playest the harlot because of thy       
renown4 ,therefore the honest is not the

 same as the beautiful4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4  
#ab3bc1 #bd73 ,those that are our       
uncomely 7inhonesta7 parts1 have more   
abundant comeliness 7honestatem71 but   
our comely 7honesta7 parts have no need4
 ,now by uncomely parts he means the    
baser members1 and by comely parts the  
beautiful members4 ,therefore the honest
 and the beautiful are apparently the   
same4  ,i answer that1 ,as may be       
gathered from the words of ,dionysius   
7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 beauty or comeliness  
results from the concurrence of clarity 
and due proportion4 ,for he states that 
,god is said to be beautiful1 as being  
the cause of the harmony and clarity of 
the universe4 ,hence the beauty of the  
body consists in a man having his bodily
 limbs well proportioned1 together with 
a certain clarity of color4 ,in like    
manner spiritual beauty consists in a   
man's conduct or actions being well     
proportioned in respect of the spiritual
 clarity of reason4 ,now this is what is

 meant by honesty1 which we have stated 
7,a4 #a7 to be the same as virtue2 and  
it is virtue that moderates according to
 reason all that is connected with man4 
,wherefore honesty is the same as       
spiritual beauty4 ,hence ,augustine says
 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cj73 ,by honesty ,i   
mean intelligible beauty1 which we      
properly designate as spiritual1 and    
further on he adds that many things are 
beautiful to the eye1 which it would be 
hardly proper to call honest4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,the object that moves the    
appetite is an apprehended good4 ,now if
 a thing is perceived to be beautiful as
 soon as it is apprehended1 it is taken 
to be something becoming and good4      
,hence ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 
that the beautiful and the good are     
beloved by all4 ,wherefore the honest1  
inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty1
 is an object of desire1 and for this   
reason ,tully says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #e73 
,thou perceivest the form and the       
features1 so to speak1 of honesty2 and  

were it to be seen with the eye1 would1 
as ,plato declares1 arouse a wondrous   
love of wisdom4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as   
stated above 7,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c71 
glory is the effect of honor3 because   
through being honored or praised1 a     
person acquires clarity in the eyes of  
others4 ,wherefore1 just as the same    
thing makes a man honorable and         
glorious1 so is the same thing honest   
and beautiful4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this  
argument applies to the beauty of the   
body3 although it might be replied that 
to be proud of one's honesty is to play 
the harlot because of one's spiritual   
beauty1 according to ,ezech4 #bh3ag1    
,thy heart was lifted up with thy       
beauty1 thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy
 beauty4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #ade1 ,art4 #c  ,whether the ,honest
 ,differs from the ,useful and the      
,pleasant8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that the honest does not differ    
from the useful and the pleasant4 ,for  
the honest is what is desirable for its 

own sake 99,cicero1 ,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 
ii1 #ec4 ,now pleasure is desired for   
its own sake1 for it seems ridiculous to
 ask a man why he wishes to be pleased1 
as the ,philosopher remarks 7,ethic4 x1 
#b74 ,therefore the honest does not     
differ from the pleasant4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 riches are comprised under the
 head of useful good3 for ,tully says   
7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1 #eb73 ,there is
 a thing that attracts the desire not by
 any force of its own1 nor by its very  
nature1 but on account of its           
fruitfulness and utility3 and that is   
money4 ,now riches come under the head  
of honesty1 for it is written 7,ecclus4 
#aa3ad73 ,poverty and riches 7honestas7 
are from ,god1 and 7,ecclus4 #ac3b73 ,he
 shall take a burden upon him that hath 
fellowship with one more honorable1 i4e4
 richer1 than himself4 ,therefore the   
honest differs not from the useful4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,tully proves 7,de  
,offic4 ii1 #c7 that nothing can be     
useful unless it be honest3 and ,ambrose

 makes the same statement 7,de ,offic4  
ii1 #f74 ,therefore the useful differs  
not from the honest4  ,on the contrary1 
,augustine says 7,q4 #hc1 qu4 #cj73 ,the
 honest is that which is desirable for  
its own sake3 the useful implies        
reference to something else4  ,i answer 
that1 ,the honest concurs in the same   
subject with the useful and the         
pleasant1 but it differs from them in   
aspect4 ,for1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71 
a thing is said to be honest1 in so far 
as it has a certain beauty through being
 regulated by reason4 ,now whatever is  
regulated in accordance with reason is  
naturally becoming to man4 ,again1 it is
 natural for a thing to take pleasure in
 that which is becoming to it4          
,wherefore an honest thing is naturally 
pleasing to man3 and the ,philosopher   
proves this with regard to acts of      
virtue 7,ethic4 i1 #h74 ,yet not all    
that is pleasing is honest1 since a     
thing may be becoming according to the  
senses1 but not according to reason4 ,a 

pleasing thing of this kind is beside   
man's reason which perfects his nature4 
,even virtue itself1 which is           
essentially honest1 is referred to      
something else as its end namely        
happiness4 ,accordingly the honest the  
useful1 and the pleasant concur in the  
one subject4  ,nevertheless they differ 
in aspect4 ,for a thing is said to be   
honest as having a certain excellence   
deserving of honor on account of its    
spiritual beauty3 while it is said to be
 pleasing1 as bringing rest to desire1  
and useful1 as referred to something    
else4 ,the pleasant1 however1 extends to
 more things than the useful and the    
honest3 since whatever is useful and    
honest is pleasing in some respect1     
whereas the converse does not hold      
7,ethic4 ii1 #c74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a  
thing is said to be honest1 if it is    
desired for its own sake by the rational
 appetite1 which tends to that which is 
in accordance with reason3 while a thing
 is said to be pleasant if it is desired

 for its own sake by the sensitive      
appetite4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,riches are 
denominated honesty according of the    
opinion of the many who honor wealth3 or
 because they are intended to be the    
instruments of virtuous deeds1 as stated
 above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b74  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,tully and ,ambrose mean to say that
 nothing incompatible with honesty can  
be simply and truly useful1 since it    
follows that it is contrary to man's    
last end1 which is a good in accordance 
with reason2 although it may perhaps be 
useful in some respect1 with regard to a
 particular end4 ,but they do not mean  
to say that every useful thing as such  
may be classed among those that are     
honest4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #ade1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,honesty   
,should ,be ,reckoned a ,part of        
,temperance8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that honesty should not be reckoned
 a part of temperance4 ,for it is not   
possible for a thing to be part and     
whole in respect of one same thing4 ,now

 temperance is a part of honesty1       
according to ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4
 ii1 #ec74 ,therefore honesty is not a  
part of temperance4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 it is stated 7#c ,esdra #c3ba7 that    
wine 4 4 4 makes all thoughts honest4   
,but the use of wine1 especially in     
excess1 in which sense the passage      
quoted should seemingly be taken1       
pertains to intemperance rather than to 
temperance4 ,therefore honesty is not a 
part of temperance4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 the honest is that which is deserving  
of honor4 ,now it is the just and the   
brave who receive most honor1 according 
to the ,philosopher 7,rhet4 i1 #i74     
,therefore honesty pertains1 not to     
temperance1 but rather to justice and   
fortitude3 wherefore ,eleazar said as   
related in #b ,macc4 #f3bh3 ,i suffer an
 honorable 7honesta7 death1 for the most
 venerable and most holy laws4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,macrobius 99,in ,somn4 ,scip4
 i reckons honesty a part of temperance1
 and ,ambrose 7,de ,offic4 i1 #dc7      

ascribes honesty as pertaining          
especially to temperance4  ,i answer    
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 honesty
 is a kind of spiritual beauty4 ,now the
 disgraceful is opposed to the          
beautiful3 and opposites are most       
manifest of one another4 ,wherefore     
seemingly honesty belongs especially to 
temperance1 since the latter repels that
 which is most disgraceful and          
unbecoming to man1 namely animal lusts4 
,hence by its very name temperance is   
most significative of the good of reason
 to which it belongs to moderate and    
temper evil desires4 ,accordingly       
honesty1 as being ascribed for a special
 reason to temperance1 is reckoned as a 
part thereof1 not as a subjective part1 
nor as an annexed virtue1 but as an     
integral part or condition attaching    
thereto4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,temperance  
is accounted a subjective part of       
honesty taken in a wide sense3 it is not
 thus that the latter is reckoned a part
 of temperance4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when 

a man is intoxicated1 the wine makes his
 thoughts honest according to his own   
reckoning because he deems himself great
 and deserving of honor 99,cf4 ,q4 #adh1
 ,a4 #f4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,greater     
honor is due to justice and fortitude   
than to temperance1 because they excel  
in the point of a greater good3 yet     
greater honor is due to temperance1     
because the vices which it holds in     
check are the most deserving of         
reproach1 as stated above4 ,thus honesty
 is more to be ascribed to temperance   
according to the rule given by the      
,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #ab3bc7 when he says 
that our uncomely parts have more       
abundant comeliness1 which1 namely1     
destroys whatever is uncomely4          
,,question #adf  ,,of ,,abstinence 7,in 
,two ,articles7  ,we must now consider  
the subjective parts of temperance3     
first1 those which are about pleasures  
of food2 secondly1 those which are about
 pleasures of sex4 ,the first           
consideration will include abstinence1  

which is about meat and drink1 and      
sobriety1 which is specifically about   
drink4  ,with regard to abstinence three
 points have to be considered3 7#a7     
,abstinence itself2 7#b7 its act which  
is fasting2 7#c7 its opposite vice which
 is gluttony4 ,under the first head     
there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether abstinence is a virtue8  7#b7  
,whether it is a special virtue8        
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adf1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,abstinence ,is a    
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it seems that 
abstinence is not a virtue4 ,for the    
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #d3bj73 ,the    
kingdom of ,god is not in speech but in 
power 7virtute74 ,now the kingdom of    
,god does not consist in abstinence1 for
 the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ad3ag73 ,the 
kingdom of ,god is not meat and drink1  
where a gloss 99,cf4 ,st4 ,augustine1   
,,qq4 ,evang4 ii1 qu4 #aa observes that 
justice consists neither in abstaining  
nor in eating4 ,therefore abstinence is 
not a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      

,augustine says 7,confess4 x1 #aa7      
addressing himself to ,god3 ,this hast  
,thou taught me1 that ,i should set     
myself to take food as physic4 ,now it  
belongs not to virtue1 but to the       
medical art to regulate medicine4       
,therefore1 in like manner1 to regulate 
one's food1 which belongs to abstinence1
 is an act not of virtue but of art4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every virtue        
observes the mean1 as stated in ,ethic4 
ii1 #f1 #g4 ,but abstinence seemingly   
inclines not to the mean but to         
deficiency1 since it denotes            
retrenchment4 ,therefore abstinence is  
not a virtue4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 no   
virtue excludes another virtue4 ,but    
abstinence excludes patience3 for       
,gregory says 7,pastor4 iii1 #ai7 that  
impatience not unfrequently dislodges   
the abstainer's mind from its peaceful  
seclusion4 ,likewise he says 7,pastor4  
iii1 #ai7 that sometimes the sin of     
pride pierces the thoughts of the       
abstainer1 so that abstinence excludes  

humility4 ,therefore abstinence is not a
 virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is      
written 7#b ,pet4 #a3e1 #f73 ,join with 
your faith virtue1 and with virtue      
knowledge1 and with knowledge           
abstinence2 where abstinence is numbered
 among other virtues4 ,therefore        
abstinence is a virtue4  ,i answer that1
 ,abstinence by its very name denotes   
retrenchment of food4 ,hence the term   
abstinence may be taken in two ways4    
,first1 as denoting retrenchment of food
 absolutely1 and in this way it         
signifies neither a virtue nor a        
virtuous act1 but something indifferent4
 ,secondly1 it may be taken as regulated
 by reason1 and then it signifies either
 a virtuous habit or a virtuous act4    
,this is the meaning of ,peter's words  
quoted above1 where he says that we     
ought to join abstinence with knowledge1
 namely that in abstaining from food a  
man should act with due regard for those
 among whom he lives1 for his own       
person1 and for the requirements of     

health4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the use of   
and abstinence from food1 considered in 
themselves1 do not pertain to the       
kingdom of ,god1 since the ,apostle says
 7#a ,cor4 #h3h73 ,meat doth not commend
 us to ,god4 ,for neither1 if we eat not
 99,vulg43 ',neither if we eat 4 4 4 nor
 if we eat not'1 shall we have the less1
 nor if we eat1 shall we have the more1 
i4e4 spiritually4 ,nevertheless they    
both belong to the kingdom of ,god1 in  
so far as they are done reasonably      
through faith and love of ,god4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,the regulation of food1 in   
the point of quantity and quality1      
belongs to the art of medicine as       
regards the health of the body3 but in  
the point of internal affections with   
regard to the good of reason1 it belongs
 to abstinence4 ,hence ,augustine says  
7,,qq4 ,evang4 ii1 qu4 #aa73 ,it makes  
no difference whatever to virtue what or
 how much food a man takes1 so long as  
he does it with due regard for the      
people among whom he lives1 for his own 

person1 and for the requirements of his 
health3 but it matters how readily and  
uncomplainingly he does without food    
when bound by duty or necessity to      
abstain4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it belongs  
to temperance to bridle the pleasures   
which are too alluring to the soul1 just
 as it belongs to fortitude to          
strengthen the soul against fears that  
deter it from the good of reason4       
,wherefore1 just as fortitude is        
commended on account of a certain       
excess1 from which all the parts of     
fortitude take their name1 so temperance
 is commended for a kind of deficiency1 
from which all its parts are            
denominated4 ,hence abstinence1 since it
 is a part of temperance1 is named from 
deficiency1 and yet it observes the     
mean1 in so far as it is in accord with 
right reason4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,those  
vices result from abstinence in so far  
as it is not in accord with right       
reason4 ,for right reason makes one     
abstain as one ought1 i4e4 with gladness

 of heart1 and for the due end1 i4e4 for
 ,god's glory and not one's own4        
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adf1 
,art4 #a  ,whether ,abstinence ,is a    
,special ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that abstinence is not a     
special virtue4 ,for every virtue is    
praiseworthy by itself4 ,but abstinence 
is not praiseworthy by itself2 for      
,gregory says 7,pastor4 iii1 #ai7 that  
the virtue of abstinence is praised only
 on account of the other virtues4       
,therefore abstinence is not a special  
virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine 
99,fulgentius says 7,de ,fide ad ,pet4  
xlii7 that the saints abstain from meat 
and drink1 not that any creature of ,god
 is evil1 but merely in order to        
chastise the body4 ,now this belongs to 
chastity1 as its very name denotes4     
,therefore abstinence is not a special  
virtue distinct from chastity4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 as man should be content  
with moderate meat1 so should he be     
satisfied with moderate clothes1        

according to #a ,tim4 #f3h1 ,having     
food1 and wherewith to be covered1 with 
these we should be ,vulg43 'are'        
content4 ,now there is no special virtue
 in being content with moderate clothes4
 ,neither1 therefore1 is there in       
abstinence which moderates food4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,macrobius 99,in ,somn4   
,scip4 i1 #h reckons abstinence as a    
special part of temperance4  ,i answer  
that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #acf1 ,a4   
#a2 ,q4 #ada1 ,a4 #c7 moral virtue      
maintains the good of reason against the
 onslaught of the passions3 hence       
whenever we find a special motive why a 
passion departs from the good of reason1
 there is need of a special virtue4 ,now
 pleasures of the table are of a nature 
to withdraw man from the good of reason1
 both because they are so great1 and    
because food is necessary to man who    
needs it for the maintenance of life1   
which he desires above all other things4
 ,therefore abstinence is a special     
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtues are  

of necessity connected together1 as     
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a74
 ,wherefore one virtue receives help and
 commendation from another1 as justice  
from fortitude4 ,accordingly in this way
 the virtue of abstinence receives      
commendation on account of the other    
virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the body is 
chastised by means of abstinence1 not   
only against the allurements of lust1   
but also against those of gluttony3     
since by abstaining a man gains strength
 for overcoming the onslaughts of       
gluttony1 which increase in force the   
more he yields to them4 ,yet abstinence 
is not prevented from being a special   
virtue through being a help to chastity1
 since one virtue helps another4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,the use of clothing was     
devised by art1 whereas the use of food 
is from nature4 ,hence it is more       
necessary to have a special virtue for  
the moderation of food than for the     
moderation of clothing4   ,,question    
#adg  ,,of ,,fasting 7,in ,eight        

,articles7  ,we must now consider       
fasting3 under which head there are     
eight points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether 
fasting is an act of virtue8  7#b7 ,of  
what virtue is it the act8  7#c7        
,whether it is a matter of precept8     
7#d7 ,whether anyone is excused from    
fulfilling this precept8  7#e7 ,the time
 of fasting2  7#f7 ,whether it is       
requisite for fasting to eat but once8  
7#g7 ,the hour of eating for those who  
fast2  7#h7 ,the meats from which it is 
necessary to abstain4   ,,first         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adg1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,fasting ,is an ,act of        
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that fasting is not an act of virtue4   
,for every act of virtue is acceptable  
to ,god4 ,but fasting is not always     
acceptable to ,god1 according to ,isa4  
#eh3c1 ,why have we fasted and ,thou    
hast not regarded8 ,therefore fasting is
 not an act of virtue4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 no act of virtue forsakes the 
mean of virtue4 ,now fasting forsakes   

the mean of virtue1 which in the virtue 
of abstinence takes account of the      
necessity of supplying the needs of     
nature1 whereas by fasting something is 
retrenched therefrom3 else those who do 
not fast would not have the virtue of   
abstinence4 ,therefore fasting is not an
 act of virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1    
that which is competent to all1 both    
good and evil1 is not an act of virtue4 
,now such is fasting1 since every one is
 fasting before eating4 ,therefore      
fasting is not an act of virtue4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,it is reckoned together  
with other virtuous acts 7#b ,cor4 #f3e1
 #f7 where the ,apostle says3 ,in       
fasting1 in knowledge1 in chastity1 etc4
 ,vulg43 'in chastity1 in knowledge'4   
,i answer that1 ,an act is virtuous     
through being directed by reason to some
 virtuous 7honestum7 99,cf4 ,q4 #ade1   
,a4 #a good4 ,now this is consistent    
with fasting1 because fasting is        
practiced for a threefold purpose4      
,first1 in order to bridle the lusts of 

the flesh1 wherefore the ,apostle says  
7#b ,cor4 #f3e1 #f73 ,in fasting1 in    
chastity1 since fasting is the guardian 
of chastity4 ,for1 according to ,jerome 
99,contra ,jov4 ii4 ,venus is cold when 
,ceres and ,bacchus are not there1 that 
is to say1 lust is cooled by abstinence 
in meat and drink4 ,secondly1 we have   
recourse to fasting in order that the   
mind may arise more freely to the       
contemplation of heavenly things3 hence 
it is related 7,dan4 #aj7 of ,daniel    
that he received a revelation from ,god 
after fasting for three weeks4 ,thirdly1
 in order to satisfy for sins3 wherefore
 it is written 7,joel #b3ab73 ,be       
converted to ,me with all your heart1 in
 fasting and in weeping and in mourning4
 ,the same is declared by ,augustine in 
a sermon 7,de orat4 et ,jejun4 99,serm4 
lxxii 7ccxxx1 de ,tempore773 ,fasting   
cleanses the soul1 raises the mind1     
subjects one's flesh to the spirit1     
renders the heart contrite and humble1  
scatters the clouds of concupiscence1   

quenches the fire of lust1 kindles the  
true light of chastity4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,an act that is virtuous generically
 may be rendered vicious by its         
connection with certain circumstances4  
,hence the text goes on to say3 ,behold 
in the day of your fast your own will is
 founded1 and a little further on 7,isa4
 #eh3d73 ,you fast for debates and      
strife and strike with the fist         
wickedly4 ,these words are expounded by 
,gregory 7,pastor4 iii1 #ai7 as follows3
 ,the will indicates joy and the fist   
anger4 ,in vain then is the flesh       
restrained if the mind allowed to drift 
to inordinate movements be wrecked by   
vice4 ,and ,augustine says 7in the same 
sermon7 that fasting loves not many     
words1 deems wealth superfluous1 scorns 
pride1 commends humility1 helps man to  
perceive what is frail and paltry4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the mean of virtue is 
measured not according to quantity but  
according to right reason1 as stated in 
,ethic4 ii1 #f4 ,now reason judges it   

expedient1 on account of some special   
motive1 for a man to take less food than
 would be becoming to him under ordinary
 circumstances1 for instance in order to
 avoid sickness1 or in order to perform 
certain bodily works with greater ease3 
and much more does reason direct this to
 the avoidance of spiritual evils and   
the pursuit of spiritual goods4 ,yet    
reason does not retrench so much from   
one's food as to refuse nature its      
necessary support3 thus ,jerome says399 
,it matters not whether thou art a long 
or a short time in destroying thyself1  
since to afflict the body immoderately1 
whether by excessive lack of            
nourishment1 or by eating or sleeping   
too little1 is to offer a sacrifice of  
stolen goods4 99,the quotation is from  
the ,corpus of ,canon ,law 7,cap4 ,non  
mediocriter1 ,de ,consecrationibus1     
dist4 #e74 ,gratian there ascribes the  
quotation to ,st4 ,jerome1 but it is not
 to be found in the saint's works4 ,in  
like manner right reason does not       

retrench so much from a man's food as to
 render him incapable of fulfilling his 
duty4 ,hence ,jerome says 7in the same  
reference7 ,rational man forfeits his   
dignity1 if he sets fasting before      
chastity1 or night-watchings before the 
well-being of his senses4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,the fasting of nature1 in respect  
of which a man is said to be fasting    
until he partakes of food1 consists in a
 pure negation1 wherefore it cannot be  
reckoned a virtuous act4 ,such is only  
the fasting of one who abstains in some 
measure from food for a reasonable      
purpose4 ,hence the former is called    
natural fasting 7jejunium jejunii7      
99,literally the 'fast of fasting'3     
while the latter is called the faster's 
fast1 because he fasts for a purpose4   
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adg1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,fasting ,is an ,act 
of ,abstinence8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that fasting is not an act of
 abstinence4 ,for ,jerome 99,the        
quotation is from the ,ordinary ,gloss1 

where the reference is lacking          
commenting on ,matt4 #ag3bj1 ,this kind 
of devil says3 ,to fast is to abstain   
not only from food but also from all    
manner of lusts4 ,now this belongs to   
every virtue4 ,therefore fasting is not 
exclusively an act of abstinence4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory says in a       
,lenten ,homily 7xvi in ,evang47 that   
the ,lenten fast is a tithe of the whole
 year4 ,now paying tithes is an act of  
religion1 as stated above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 
#a74 ,therefore fasting is an act of    
religion and not of abstinence4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 abstinence is a part of   
temperance1 as stated above 7,,qq4 #adc1
 #adf1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,now temperance  
is condivided with fortitude1 to which  
it belongs to endure hardships1 and this
 seems very applicable to fasting4      
,therefore fasting is not an act of     
abstinence4  ,on the contrary1 ,isidore 
says 7,etym4 vi1 #ai7 that fasting is   
frugality of fare and abstinence from   
food4  ,i answer that1 ,habit and act   

have the same matter4 ,wherefore every  
virtuous act about some particular      
matter belongs to the virtue that       
appoints the mean in that matter4 ,now  
fasting is concerned with food1 wherein 
the mean is appointed by abstinence4    
,wherefore it is evident that fasting is
 an act of abstinence4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,properly speaking fasting consists in 
abstaining from food1 but speaking      
metaphorically it denotes abstinence    
from anything harmful1 and such         
especially is sin4  ,we may also reply  
that even properly speaking fasting is  
abstinence from all manner of lust1     
since1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a71 
an act ceases to be virtuous by the     
conjunction of any vice4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,nothing prevents the act of one    
virtue belonging to another virtue1 in  
so far as it is directed to the end of  
that virtue1 as explained above 7,q4    
#cb1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b2 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #c74   
,accordingly there is no reason why     
fasting should not be an act of         

religion1 or of chastity1 or of any     
other virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it     
belongs to fortitude as a special       
virtue1 to endure1 not any kind of      
hardship1 but only those connected with 
the danger of death4 ,to endure         
hardships resulting from privation of   
pleasure of touch1 belongs to temperance
 and its parts3 and such are the        
hardships of fasting4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adg1 ,art4 #c 
,whether ,fasting ,is a ,matter of      
,precept8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that fasting is not a matter of        
precept4 ,for precepts are not given    
about works of supererogation which are 
a matter of counsel4 ,now fasting is a  
work of supererogation3 else it would   
have to be equally observed at all      
places and times4 ,therefore fasting is 
not a matter of precept4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 whoever infringes a precept   
commits a mortal sin4 ,therefore if     
fasting were a matter of precept1 all   
who do not fast would sin mortally1 and 

a widespreading snare would be laid for 
men4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine    
says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #ag7 that the   
,wisdom of ,god having taken human      
nature1 and called us to a state of     
freedom1 instituted a few most salutary 
sacraments whereby the community of the 
,christian people1 that is1 of the free 
multitude1 should be bound together in  
subjection to one ,god4 ,now the liberty
 of the ,christian people seems to be   
hindered by a great number of           
observances no less than by a great     
number of sacraments4 ,for ,augustine   
says 7,ad inquis4 ,januar41 ,ep4 lv7    
that whereas ,god in ,his mercy wished  
our religion to be distinguished by its 
freedom and the evidence and small      
number of its solemn sacraments1 some   
people render it oppressive with slavish
 burdens4 ,therefore it seems that the  
,church should not have made fasting a  
matter of precept4  ,on the contrary1   
,jerome 7,ad ,lucin41 ,ep4 lxxi7        
speaking of fasting says3 ,let each     

province keep to its own practice1 and  
look upon the commands of the elders as 
though they were laws of the apostles4  
,therefore fasting is a matter of       
precept4  ,i answer that1 ,just as it   
belongs to the secular authority to make
 legal precepts which apply the natural 
law to matters of common weal in        
temporal affairs1 so it belongs to      
ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by
 statute those things that concern the  
common weal of the faithful in spiritual
 goods4  ,now it has been stated above  
7,a4 #a7 that fasting is useful as      
atoning for and preventing sin1 and as  
raising the mind to spiritual things4   
,and everyone is bound by the natural   
dictate of reason to practice fasting as
 far as it is necessary for these       
purposes4 ,wherefore fasting in general 
is a matter of precept of the natural   
law1 while the fixing of the time and   
manner of fasting as becoming and       
profitable to the ,christian people1 is 
a matter of precept of positive law     

established by ecclesiastical authority3
 the latter is the ,church fast1 the    
former is the fast prescribed by nature4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,fasting considered  
in itself denotes something not eligible
 but penal3 yet it becomes eligible in  
so far as it is useful to some end4     
,wherefore considered absolutely it is  
not binding under precept1 but it is    
binding under precept to each one that  
stands in need of such a remedy4 ,and   
since men1 for the most part1 need this 
remedy1 both because in many things we  
all offend 7,james #c3b71 and because   
the flesh lusteth against the spirit    
7,gal4 #e3ag71 it was fitting that the  
,church should appoint certain fasts to 
be kept by all in common4 ,in doing this
 the ,church does not make a precept of 
a matter of supererogation1 but         
particularizes in detail that which is  
of general obligation4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,those commandments which are given    
under the form of a general precept1 do 
not bind all persons in the same way1   

but subject to the requirements of the  
end intended by the lawgiver4 ,it will  
be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment
 through contempt of the lawgiver's     
authority1 or to disobey it in such a   
way as to frustrate the end intended by 
him3 but it is not a mortal sin if one  
fails to keep a commandment1 when there 
is a reasonable motive1 and especially  
if the lawgiver would not insist on its 
observance if he were present4 ,hence it
 is that not all1 who do not keep the   
fasts of the ,church1 sin mortally4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,augustine is speaking 
there of those things that are neither  
contained in the authorities of ,holy   
,scripture1 nor found among the         
ordinances of bishops in council1 nor   
sanctioned by the custom of the         
universal ,church4 ,on the other hand1  
the fasts that are of obligation are    
appointed by the councils of bishops and
 are sanctioned by the custom of the    
universal ,church4 ,nor are they opposed
 to the freedom of the faithful1 rather 

are they of use in hindering the slavery
 of sin1 which is opposed to spiritual  
freedom1 of which it is written 7,gal4  
#e3ac73 ,you1 brethren1 have been called
 unto liberty2 only make not liberty an 
occasion to the flesh4   ,,fourth       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adg1 ,art4 #d 
,whether ,all ,are ,bound to ,keep the  
,fasts of the ,church8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that all are bound to    
keep the fasts of the ,church4 ,for the 
commandments of the ,church are binding 
even as the commandments of ,god1       
according to ,luke #aj3af1 ,he that     
heareth you heareth ,me4 ,now all are   
bound to keep the commandments of ,god4 
,therefore in like manner all are bound 
to keep the fasts appointed by the      
,church4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 children  
especially are seemingly not exempt from
 fasting1 on account of their age3 for  
it is written 7,joel #b3ae73 ,sanctify a
 fast1 and further on 7,joel #b3af73    
,gather together the little ones1 and   
them that suck the breasts4 ,much more  

therefore are all others bound to keep  
the fasts4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1         
spiritual things should be preferred to 
temporal1 and necessary things to those 
that are not necessary4 ,now bodily     
works are directed to temporal gain2 and
 pilgrimages1 though directed to        
spiritual things1 are not a matter of   
necessity4 ,therefore1 since fasting is 
directed to a spiritual gain1 and is    
made a necessary thing by the           
commandment of the ,church1 it seems    
that the fasts of the ,church ought not 
to be omitted on account of a           
pilgrimage1 or bodily works4  ,obj4 #d3 
,further1 it is better to do a thing    
willingly than through necessity1 as    
stated in #b ,cor4 #i3g4 ,now the poor  
are wont to fast through necessity1     
owing to lack of food4 ,much more       
therefore ought they to fast willingly4 
,on the contrary1 ,it seems that no     
righteous man is bound to fast4 ,for the
 commandments of the ,church are not    
binding in opposition to ,christ's      

teaching4 ,but our ,lord said 7,luke    
#e3cd7 that the children of the         
bridegroom cannot fast whilst the       
bridegroom is with them 99,vulg43 ',can 
you make the children of the bridegroom 
fast1 whilst the bridegroom is with     
them8'4 ,now ,he is with all the        
righteous by dwelling in them in a      
special manner 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #h1 ,a4   
#c1 wherefore our ,lord said 7,matt4    
#bh3bj73 ,behold ,i am with you 4 4 4   
even to the consummation of the world4  
,therefore the righteous are not bound  
by the commandment of the ,church to    
fast4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ih1     
,,aa4 #b1 #f71 general precepts are     
framed according to the requirements of 
the many4 ,wherefore in making such     
precepts the lawgiver considers what    
happens generally and for the most part1
 and he does not intend the precept to  
be binding on a person in whom for some 
special reason there is something       
incompatible with observance of the     

precept4 ,yet discretion must be brought
 to bear on the point4 ,for if the      
reason be evident1 it is lawful for a   
man to use his own judgment in omitting 
to fulfil the precept1 especially if    
custom be in his favor1 or if it be     
difficult for him to have recourse to   
superior authority4 ,on the other hand1 
if the reason be doubtful1 one should   
have recourse to the superior who has   
power to grant a dispensation in such   
cases4 ,and this must be done in the    
fasts appointed by the ,church1 to which
 all are bound in general1 unless there 
be some special obstacle to this        
observance4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the      
commandments of ,god are precepts of the
 natural law1 which are1 of themselves1 
necessary for salvation4 ,but the       
commandments of the ,church are about   
matters which are necessary for         
salvation1 not of themselves1 but only  
through the ordinance of the ,church4   
,hence there may be certain obstacles on
 account of which certain persons are   

not bound to keep the fasts in question4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in children there is
 a most evident reason for not fasting1 
both on account of their natural        
weakness1 owing to which they need to   
take food frequently1 and not much at a 
time1 and because they need much        
nourishment owing to the demands of     
growth1 which results from the residuum 
of nourishment4 ,wherefore as long as   
the stage of growth lasts1 which as a   
rule lasts until they have completed the
 third period of seven years1 they are  
not bound to keep the ,church fasts3 and
 yet it is fitting that even during that
 time they should exercise themselves in
 fasting1 more or less1 in accordance   
with their age4 ,nevertheless when some 
great calamity threatens1 even children 
are commanded to fast1 in sign of more  
severe penance1 according to ,jonah     
#c3g1 ,let neither men nor beasts 4 4 4 
taste anything 4 4 4 nor drink water4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,apparently a          
distinction should be made with regard  

to pilgrims and working people4 ,for if 
the pilgrimage or laborious work can be 
conveniently deferred or lessened       
without detriment to the bodily health  
and such external conditions as are     
necessary for the upkeep of bodily or   
spiritual life1 there is no reason for  
omitting the fasts of the ,church4 ,but 
if one be under the necessity of        
starting on the pilgrimage at once1 and 
of making long stages1 or of doing much 
work1 either for one's bodily           
livelihood1 or for some need of the     
spiritual life1 and it be impossible at 
the same time to keep the fasts of the  
,church1 one is not bound to fast3      
because in ordering fasts the ,church   
would not seem to have intended to      
prevent other pious and more necessary  
undertakings4 ,nevertheless1 in such    
cases one ought seemingly1 to seek the  
superior's dispensation2 except perhaps 
when the above course is recognized by  
custom1 since when superiors are silent 
they would seem to consent4  ,reply     

,obj4 #d3 ,those poor who can provide   
themselves with sufficient for one meal 
are not excused1 on account of poverty1 
from keeping the fasts of the ,church4  
,on the other hand1 those would seem to 
be exempt who beg their food piecemeal1 
since they are unable at any one time to
 have a sufficiency of food4  ,reply    
,obj4 #e3 ,this saying of our ,lord may 
be expounded in three ways4 ,first1     
according to ,chrysostom 7,hom4 xxx in  
,matth471 who says that the disciples1  
who are called children of the          
bridegroom1 were as yet of a weakly     
disposition1 wherefore they are compared
 to an old garment4 ,hence while ,christ
 was with them in body they were to be  
fostered with kindness rather than      
drilled with the harshness of fasting4  
,according to this interpretation1 it is
 fitting that dispensations should be   
granted to the imperfect and to         
beginners1 rather than to the elders and
 the perfect1 according to a gloss on   
,ps4 #acj3b1 ,as a child that is weaned 

is towards his mother4 ,secondly1 we may
 say with ,jerome 99,bede1 ,comment4 in 
,luc4 v that our ,lord is speaking here 
of the fasts of the observances of the  
,old ,law4 ,wherefore our ,lord means to
 say that the apostles were not to be   
held back by the old observances1 since 
they were to be filled with the newness 
of grace4 ,thirdly1 according to        
,augustine 7,de ,consensu ,evang4 ii1   
#bg71 who states that fasting is of two 
kinds4 ,one pertains to those who are   
humbled by disquietude1 and this is not 
befitting perfect men1 for they are     
called children of the bridegroom2 hence
 when we read in ,luke3 ,the children of
 the bridegroom cannot fast 99,hom4     
xiii1 in ,matth41 we read in ,matt4     
#i3ae3 ,the children of the bridegroom  
cannot mourn 99,vulg43 ',can the        
children of the bridegroom mourn8'4 ,the
 other pertains to the mind that        
rejoices in adhering to spiritual       
things3 and this fasting is befitting   
the perfect4   ,,fifth ,,article        

,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adg1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
the ,times for the ,church ,fast ,are   
,fittingly ,ascribed8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that the times for the   
,church fast are unfittingly appointed4 
,for we read 7,matt4 #d7 that ,christ   
began to fast immediately after being   
baptized4 ,now we ought to imitate      
,christ1 according to #a ,cor4 #d3af1   
,be ye followers of me1 as ,i also am of
 ,christ4 ,therefore we ought to fast   
immediately after the ,epiphany when    
,christ's baptism is celebrated4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 it is unlawful in the ,new
 ,law to observe the ceremonies of the  
,old ,law4 ,now it belongs to the       
solemnities of the ,old ,law to fast in 
certain particular months3 for it is    
written 7,zech4 #h3ai73 ,the fast of the
 fourth month and the fast of the fifth1
 and the fast of the seventh1 and the   
fast of the tenth shall be to the house 
of ,judah1 joy and gladness and great   
solemnities4 ,therefore the fast of     
certain months1 which are called ,ember 

days1 are unfittingly kept in the       
,church4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according 
to ,augustine 7,de ,consensu ,evang4 ii1
 #bg71 just as there is a fast of       
sorrow1 so is there a fast of joy4 ,now 
it is most becoming that the faithful   
should rejoice spiritually in ,christ's 
,resurrection4 ,therefore during the    
five weeks which the ,church solemnizes 
on account of ,christ's ,resurrection1  
and on ,sundays which commemorate the   
,resurrection1 fasts ought to be        
appointed4  ,on the contrary1 stands the
 general custom of the ,church4  ,i     
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1
 #c71 fasting is directed to two things1
 the deletion of sin1 and the raising of
 the mind to heavenly things4 ,wherefore
 fasting ought to be appointed specially
 for those times1 when it behooves man  
to be cleansed from sin1 and the minds  
of the faithful to be raised to ,god by 
devotion3 and these things are          
particularly requisite before the feast 
of ,easter1 when sins are loosed by     

baptism1 which is solemnly conferred on 
,easter-eve1 on which day our ,lord's   
burial is commemorated1 because we are  
buried together with ,christ by baptism 
unto death 7,rom4 #f3d74 ,moreover at   
the ,easter festival the mind of man    
ought to be devoutly raised to the glory
 of eternity1 which ,christ restored by 
rising from the dead1 and so the ,church
 ordered a fast to be observed          
immediately before the ,paschal feast2  
and for the same reason1 on the eve of  
the chief festivals1 because it is then 
that one ought to make ready to keep the
 coming feast devoutly4 ,again it is the
 custom in the ,church for ,holy ,orders
 to be conferred every quarter of the   
year 7in sign whereof our ,lord fed four
 thousand men with seven loaves1 which  
signify the ,new ,testament year as     
,jerome says 99,comment4 in ,marc4      
viii73 and then both the ordainer1 and  
the candidates for ordination1 and even 
the whole people1 for whose good they   
are ordained1 need to fast in order to  

make themselves ready for the           
ordination4 ,hence it is related 7,luke 
#f3ab7 that before choosing ,his        
disciples our ,lord went out into a     
mountain to pray3 and ,ambrose          
99,exposit4 in ,luc4 commenting on these
 words says3 ,what shouldst thou do1    
when thou desirest to undertake some    
pious work1 since ,christ prayed before 
sending ,his apostles8  ,with regard to 
the forty day's fast1 according to      
,gregory 7,hom4 xvi in ,evang47 there   
are three reasons for the number4       
,first1 because the power of the        
,decalogue is accomplished in the four  
books of the ,holy ,gospels3 since forty
 is the product of ten multiplied by    
four4 ,or because we are composed of    
four elements in this mortal body       
through whose lusts we transgress the   
,lord's commandments which are delivered
 to us in the ,decalogue4 ,wherefore it 
is fitting we should punish that same   
body forty times4 ,or1 because1 just as 
under the ,law it was commanded that    

tithes should be paid of things1 so we  
strive to pay ,god a tithe of days1 for 
since a year is composed of three       
hundred and sixty-six days1 by punishing
 ourselves for thirty-six days 7namely1 
the fasting days during the six weeks of
 ,lent7 we pay ,god a tithe of our year4
 ,according to ,augustine 7,de ,doctr4  
,christ4 ii1 #af7 a fourth reason may be
 added4 ,for the ,creator is the        
,trinity1 ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy      
,ghost3 while the number three refers to
 the invisible creature1 since we are   
commanded to love ,god1 with our whole  
heart1 with our whole soul1 and with our
 whole mind3 and the number four refers 
to the visible creature1 by reason of   
heat1 cold1 wet and dry4 ,thus the      
number ten 99,ten is the sum of three1  
three1 and four signifies all things1   
and if this be multiplied by four which 
refers to the body whereby we make use  
of things1 we have the number forty4    
,each fast of the ,ember days is        
composed of three days1 on account of   

the number of months in each season3 or 
on account of the number of ,holy orders
 which are conferred at these times4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,christ needed not     
baptism for ,his own sake1 but in order 
to commend baptism to us4 ,wherefore it 
was competent for ,him to fast1 not     
before1 but after ,his baptism1 in order
 to invite us to fast before our        
baptism4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,church 
keeps the ,ember fasts1 neither at the  
very same time as the ,jews1 nor for the
 same reasons4 ,for they fasted in      
,july1 which is the fourth month from   
,april 7which they count as the first71 
because it was then that ,moses coming  
down from ,mount ,sinai broke the tables
 of the ,law 7,ex4 #cb71 and that1      
according to ,jer4 #ci3b1 the walls of  
the city were first broken through4 ,in 
the fifth month1 which we call ,august1 
they fasted because they were commanded 
not to go up on to the mountain1 when   
the people had rebelled on account of   
the spies 7,num4 #ad73 also in this     

month the temple of ,jerusalem was burnt
 down by ,nabuchodonosor 7,jer4 #eb7 and
 afterwards by ,titus4 ,in the seventh  
month which we call ,october1 ,godolias 
was slain1 and the remnants of the      
people were dispersed 7,jer4 #ea74 ,in  
the tenth month1 which we call ,january1
 the people who were with ,ezechiel in  
captivity heard of the destruction of   
the temple 7,ezech4 #d74  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,the fasting of joy proceeds from   
the instigation of the ,holy ,ghost ,who
 is the ,spirit of liberty1 wherefore   
this fasting should not be a matter of  
precept4 ,accordingly the fasts         
appointed by the commandment of the     
,church are rather fasts of sorrow which
 are inconsistent with days of joy4 ,for
 this reason fasting is not ordered by  
the ,church during the whole of the     
,paschal season1 nor on ,sundays3 and if
 anyone were to fast at these times in  
contradiction to the custom of          
,christian people1 which as ,augustine  
declares 7,ep4 xxxvi7 is to be          

considered as law1 or even through some 
erroneous opinion 7thus the ,manichees  
fast1 because they deem such fasting to 
be of obligation7--he would not be free 
from sin4 ,nevertheless fasting         
considered in itself is commendable at  
all times2 thus ,jerome wrote 7,ad      
,lucin41 ,ep4 lxxi73 ,would that we     
might fast always4   ,,sixth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adg1 ,art4 #f  ,whether 
,it ,is ,requisite for ,fasting ,that   
,one ,eat but ,once8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that it is not requisite for
 fasting that one eat but once4 ,for1 as
 stated above 7,a4 #b71 fasting is an   
act of the virtue of abstinence1 which  
observes due quantity of food not less  
than the number of meals4 ,now the      
quantity of food is not limited for     
those who fast4 ,therefore neither      
should the number of meals be limited4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,just as man is     
nourished by meat1 so is he by drink3   
wherefore drink breaks the fast1 and for
 this reason we cannot receive the      

,eucharist after drinking4 ,now we are  
not forbidden to drink at various hours 
of the day4 ,therefore those who fast   
should not be forbidden to eat several  
times4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 digestives  
are a kind of food3 and yet many take   
them on fasting days after eating4      
,therefore it is not essential to       
fasting to take only one meal4  ,on the 
contrary1 stands the common custom of   
the ,christian people4  ,i answer that1 
,fasting is instituted by the ,church in
 order to bridle concupiscence1 yet so  
as to safeguard nature4 ,now only one   
meal is seemingly sufficient for this   
purpose1 since thereby man is able to   
satisfy nature2 and yet he withdraws    
something from concupiscence by         
minimizing the number of meals4         
,therefore it is appointed by the       
,church1 in her moderation1 that those  
who fast should take one meal in the    
day4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it was not      
possible to fix the same quantity of    
food for all1 on account of the various 

bodily temperaments1 the result being   
that one person needs more1 and another 
less food3 whereas1 for the most part1  
all are able to satisfy nature by only  
one meal4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fasting is 
of two kinds 99,cf4 ,a4 #a1 ad #c4 ,one 
is the natural fast1 which is requisite 
for receiving the ,eucharist4 ,this is  
broken by any kind of drink1 even of    
water1 after which it is not lawful to  
receive the ,eucharist4 ,the fast of the
 ,church is another kind and is called  
the fasting of the faster1 and this is  
not broken save by such things as the   
,church intended to forbid in           
instituting the fast4 ,now the ,church  
does not intend to command abstinence   
from drink1 for this is taken more for  
bodily refreshment1 and digestion of the
 food consumed1 although it nourishes   
somewhat4 ,it is1 however1 possible to  
sin and lose the merit of fasting1 by   
partaking of too much drink3 as also by 
eating immoderately at one meal4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,although digestives nourish 

somewhat they are not taken chiefly for 
nourishment1 but for digestion4 ,hence  
one does not break one's fast by taking 
them or any other medicines1 unless one 
were to take digestives1 with a         
fraudulent intention1 in great quantity 
and by way of food4   ,,seventh         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adg1 ,art4 #g 
,whether the ,ninth ,hour ,is ,suitably 
,fixed for the ,faster's ,meal8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
ninth hour is not suitably fixed for the
 faster's meal4 ,for the state of the   
,new ,law is more perfect than the state
 of the ,old ,law4 ,now in the ,old     
,testament they fasted until evening1   
for it is written 7,lev4 #bc3cb73 ,it is
 a sabbath 4 4 4 you shall afflict your 
souls1 and then the text continues3     
,from evening until evening you shall   
celebrate your sabbaths4 ,much more     
therefore under the ,new ,testament     
should the fast be ordered until the    
evening4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the fast  
ordered by the ,church is binding on    

all4 ,but all are not able to know      
exactly the ninth hour4 ,therefore it   
seems that the fixing of the ninth hour 
should not form part of the commandment 
to fast4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fasting is
 an act of the virtue of abstinence1 as 
stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,now the mean of 
moral virtue does not apply in the same 
way to all1 since what is much for one  
is little for another1 as stated in     
,ethic4 ii1 #f4 ,therefore the ninth    
hour should not be fixed for those who  
fast4  ,on the contrary1 ,the ,council  
of ,chalons 99,the quotation is from the
 ,capitularies 7,cap4 #ci7 of ,theodulf1
 bishop of ,orleans 7#gfj-hba7 and is   
said to be found in the ,corpus ,juris1 
,cap4 ,solent1 dist4 #a1 ,de            
,consecratione says3 ,during ,lent those
 are by no means to be credited with    
fasting who eat before the celebration  
of the office of ,vespers1 which in the 
,lenten season is said after the ninth  
hour4 ,therefore we ought to fast until 
the ninth hour4  ,i answer that1 ,as    

stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #c1 #e71 fasting
 is directed to the deletion and        
prevention of sin4 ,hence it ought to   
add something to the common custom1 yet 
so as not to be a heavy burden to       
nature4 ,now the right and common custom
 is for men to eat about the sixth hour3
 both because digestion is seemingly    
finished 7the natural heat being        
withdrawn inwardly at night-time on     
account of the surrounding cold of the  
night71 and the humor spread about      
through the limbs 7to which result the  
heat of the day conduces until the sun  
has reached its zenith71 and again      
because it is then chiefly that the     
nature of the human body needs          
assistance against the external heat    
that is in the air1 lest the humors be  
parched within4 ,hence1 in order that   
those who fast may feel some pain in    
satisfaction for their sins1 the ninth  
hour is suitably fixed for their meal4  
,moreover1 this hour agrees with the    
mystery of ,christ's ,passion1 which was

 brought to a close at the ninth hour1  
when bowing ,his head1 ,he gave up the  
ghost 7,john #ai3cj73 because those who 
fast by punishing their flesh1 are      
conformed to the ,passion of ,christ1   
according to ,gal4 #e3bd1 ,they that are
 ,christ's1 have crucified their flesh  
with the vices and concupiscences4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the state of the ,old 
,testament is compared to the night1    
while the state of the ,new ,testament  
is compared to the day1 according to    
,rom4 #ac3ab1 ,the night is passed and  
the day is at hand4 ,therefore in the   
,old ,testament they fasted until night1
 but not in the ,new ,testament4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,fasting requires a fixed    
hour based1 not on a strict calculation1
 but on a rough estimate3 for it        
suffices that it be about the ninth     
hour1 and this is easy for anyone to    
ascertain4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a little  
more or a little less cannot do much    
harm4 ,now it is not a long space of    
time from the sixth hour at which men   

for the most part are wont to eat1 until
 the ninth hour1 which is fixed for     
those who fast4 ,wherefore the fixing of
 such a time cannot do much harm to     
anyone1 whatever his circumstances may  
be4 ,if however this were to prove a    
heavy burden to a man on account of     
sickness1 age1 or some similar reason1  
he should be dispensed from fasting1 or 
be allowed to forestall the hour by a   
little4   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #adg1 ,art4 #h  ,whether ,it ,is    
,fitting ,that ,those ,who ,fast ,should
 ,be ,bidden to ,abstain from ,flesh    
,meat1 ,eggs1 and ,milk ,foods8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem unfitting 
that those who fast should be bidden to 
abstain from flesh meat1 eggs1 and milk 
foods4 ,for it has been stated above    
7,a4 #f7 that fasting was instituted as 
a curb on the concupiscence of the      
flesh4 ,now concupiscence is kindled by 
drinking wine more than by eating flesh2
 according to ,prov4 #bj3a1 ,wine is a  
luxurious thing1 and ,eph4 #e3ah1 ,be   

not drunk with wine1 wherein is luxury4 
,since then those who fast are not      
forbidden to drink wine1 it seems that  
they should not be forbidden to eat     
flesh meat4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 some   
fish are as delectable to eat as the    
flesh of certain animals4 ,now          
concupiscence is desire of the          
delectable1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1   
,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore since      
fasting which was instituted in order to
 bridle concupiscence does not exclude  
the eating of fish1 neither should it   
exclude the eating of flesh meat4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 on certain fasting days  
people make use of eggs and cheese4     
,therefore one can likewise make use of 
them during the ,lenten fast4  ,on the  
contrary1 stands the common custom of   
the faithful4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,a4 #f71 fasting was      
instituted by the ,church in order to   
bridle the concupiscences of the flesh1 
which regard pleasures of touch in      
connection with food and sex4 ,wherefore

 the ,church forbade those who fast to  
partake of those foods which both afford
 most pleasure to the palate1 and       
besides are a very great incentive to   
lust4 ,such are the flesh of animals    
that take their rest on the earth1 and  
of those that breathe the air and their 
products1 such as milk from those that  
walk on the earth1 and eggs from birds4 
,for1 since such like animals are more  
like man in body1 they afford greater   
pleasure as food1 and greater           
nourishment to the human body1 so that  
from their consumption there results a  
greater surplus available for seminal   
matter1 which when abundant becomes a   
great incentive to lust4 ,hence the     
,church has bidden those who fast to    
abstain especially from these foods4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,three things concur in
 the act of procreation1 namely1 heat1  
spirit 99,cf4 ,p4 ,i41 ,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #a1
 ad #c1 and humor4 ,wine and other      
things that heat the body conduce       
especially to heat3 flatulent foods     

seemingly cooperate in the production of
 the vital spirit3 but it is chiefly the
 use of flesh meat which is most        
productive of nourishment1 that conduces
 to the production of humor4 ,now the   
alteration occasioned by heat1 and the  
increase in vital spirits are of short  
duration1 whereas the substance of the  
humor remains a long time4 ,hence those 
who fast are forbidden the use of flesh 
meat rather than of wine or vegetables  
which are flatulent foods4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,in the institution of fasting1 the
 ,church takes account of the more      
common occurrences4 ,now1 generally     
speaking1 eating flesh meat affords more
 pleasure than eating fish1 although    
this is not always the case4 ,hence the 
,church forbade those who fast to eat   
flesh meat1 rather than to eat fish4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,eggs and milk foods   
are forbidden to those who fast1 for as 
much as they originate from animals that
 provide us with flesh3 wherefore the   
prohibition of flesh meat takes         

precedence of the prohibition of eggs   
and milk foods4 ,again the ,lenten fast 
is the most solemn of all1 both because 
it is kept in imitation of ,christ1 and 
because it disposes us to celebrate     
devoutly the mysteries of our           
redemption4 ,for this reason the eating 
of flesh meat is forbidden in every     
fast1 while the ,lenten fast lays a     
general prohibition even on eggs and    
milk foods4 ,as to the use of the latter
 things in other fasts the custom varies
 among different people1 and each person
 is bound to conform to that custom     
which is in vogue with those among whom 
he is dwelling4 ,hence ,jerome says     
99,augustine1 ,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ah2 
cf4 ,de ,nat4 et ,grat4 lxvii3 ,let each
 province keep to its own practice1 and 
look upon the commands of the elders as 
though they were the laws of the        
apostles4   ,,question #adh  ,,of       
,,gluttony 7,in ,six ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider gluttony4 ,under this 
head there are six points of inquiry3   

7#a7 ,whether gluttony is a sin8  7#b7  
,whether it is a mortal sin8  7#c7      
,whether it is the greatest of sins8    
7#d7 ,its species2  7#e7 ,whether it is 
a capital sin8  7#f7 ,its daughters4    
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adh1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,gluttony ,is a ,sin8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
gluttony is not a sin4 ,for our ,lord   
said 7,matt4 #ae3aa73 ,not that which   
goeth into the mouth defileth a man4    
,now gluttony regards food which goes   
into a man4 ,therefore1 since every sin 
defiles a man1 it seems that gluttony is
 not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,no man
 sins in what he cannot avoid 99,ep4    
lxxi1 ad ,lucin44 ,now gluttony is      
immoderation in food2 and man cannot    
avoid this1 for ,gregory says 7,moral4  
xxx1 #ah73 ,since in eating pleasure and
 necessity go together1 we fail to      
discern between the call of necessity   
and the seduction of pleasure1 and      
,augustine says 7,confess4 x1 #ca73 ,who
 is it1 ,lord1 that does not eat a      

little more than necessary8 ,therefore  
gluttony is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 in every kind of sin the first
 movement is a sin4 ,but the first      
movement in taking food is not a sin1   
else hunger and thirst would be sinful4 
,therefore gluttony is not a sin4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4    
xxx1 #ah7 that unless we first tame the 
enemy dwelling within us1 namely our    
gluttonous appetite1 we have not even   
stood up to engage in the spiritual     
combat4 ,but man's inward enemy is sin4 
,therefore gluttony is a sin4  ,i answer
 that1 ,gluttony denotes1 not any desire
 of eating and drinking1 but an         
inordinate desire4 ,now desire is said  
to be inordinate through leaving the    
order of reason1 wherein the good of    
moral virtue consists3 and a thing is   
said to be a sin through being contrary 
to virtue4 ,wherefore it is evident that
 gluttony is a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,that which goes into man by way of     
food1 by reason of its substance and    

nature1 does not defile a man           
spiritually4 ,but the ,jews1 against    
whom our ,lord is speaking1 and the     
,manichees deemed certain foods to make 
a man unclean1 not on account of their  
signification1 but by reason of their   
nature 99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #f1
 ad #a4 ,it is the inordinate desire of 
food that defiles a man spiritually4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above1 the  
vice of gluttony does not regard the    
substance of food1 but in the desire    
thereof not being regulated by reason4  
,wherefore if a man exceed in quantity  
of food1 not from desire of food1 but   
through deeming it necessary to him1    
this pertains1 not to gluttony1 but to  
some kind of inexperience4 ,it is a case
 of gluttony only when a man knowingly  
exceeds the measure in eating1 from a   
desire for the pleasures of the palate4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the appetite is       
twofold4 ,there is the natural appetite1
 which belongs to the powers of the     
vegetal soul4 ,in these powers virtue   

and vice are impossible1 since they     
cannot be subject to reason2 wherefore  
the appetitive power is differentiated  
from the powers of secretion1 digestion1
 and excretion1 and to it hunger and    
thirst are to be referred4 ,besides this
 there is another1 the sensitive        
appetite1 and it is in the concupiscence
 of this appetite that the vice of      
gluttony consists4 ,hence the first     
movement of gluttony denotes            
inordinateness in the sensitive         
appetite1 and this is not without sin4  
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adh1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,gluttony ,is a      
,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin4 
,for every mortal sin is contrary to a  
precept of the ,decalogue3 and this1    
apparently1 does not apply to gluttony4 
,therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every mortal sin  
is contrary to charity1 as stated above 
7,q4 #acb1 ,a4 #c74 ,but gluttony is not
 opposed to charity1 neither as regards 

the love of ,god1 nor as regards the    
love of one's neighbor4 ,therefore      
gluttony is never a mortal sin4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 ,augustine says in a      
sermon on ,purgatory 99,cf4 ,append4 to 
,st4 ,augustine's works3 ,serm4 civ     
7xli1 de sanctis73 ,whenever a man takes
 more meat and drink than is necessary1 
he should know that this is one of the  
lesser sins4 ,but this pertains to      
gluttony4 ,therefore gluttony is        
accounted among the lesser1 that is to  
say venial1 sins4  ,obj4 #d3 ,on the    
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxx1   
#ah73 ,as long as the vice of gluttony  
has a hold on a man1 all that he has    
done valiantly is forfeited by him3 and 
as long as the belly is unrestrained1   
all virtue comes to naught4 ,but virtue 
is not done away save by mortal sin4    
,therefore gluttony is a mortal sin4  ,i
 answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71
 the vice of gluttony properly consists 
in inordinate concupiscence4 ,now the   
order of reason in regulating the       

concupiscence may be considered from two
 points of view4 ,first1 with regard to 
things directed to the end1 inasmuch as 
they may be incommensurate and          
consequently improportionate to the end2
 secondly1 with regard to the end       
itself1 inasmuch as concupiscence turns 
man away from his due end4 ,accordingly1
 if the inordinate concupiscence in     
gluttony be found to turn man away from 
the last end1 gluttony will be a mortal 
sin4 ,this is the case when he adheres  
to the pleasure of gluttony as his end1 
for the sake of which he contemns ,god1 
being ready to disobey ,god's           
commandments1 in order to obtain those  
pleasures4 ,on the other hand1 if the   
inordinate concupiscence in the vice of 
gluttony be found to affect only such   
things as are directed to the end1 for  
instance when a man has too great a     
desire for the pleasures of the palate1 
yet would not for their sake do anything
 contrary to ,god's law1 it is a venial 
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the vice of     

gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning
 man away from his last end3 and        
accordingly1 by a kind of reduction1 it 
is opposed to the precept of hallowing  
the sabbath1 which commands us to rest  
in our last end4 ,for mortal sins are   
not all directly opposed to the precepts
 of the ,decalogue1 but only those which
 contain injustice3 because the precepts
 of the ,decalogue pertain specially to 
justice and its parts1 as stated above  
7,q4 #abb1 ,a4 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,in so far as it turns man away from his
 last end1 gluttony is opposed to the   
love of ,god1 who is to be loved1 as our
 last end1 above all things3 and only in
 this respect is gluttony a mortal sin4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this saying of        
,augustine refers to gluttony as        
denoting inordinate concupiscence merely
 in regard of things directed to the    
end4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,gluttony is said
 to bring virtue to naught1 not so much 
on its own account1 as on account of the
 vices which arise from it4 ,for        

,gregory says 7,pastor4 iii1 #ai73 ,when
 the belly is distended by gluttony1 the
 virtues of the soul are destroyed by   
lust4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #adh1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,gluttony ,is 
the ,greatest of ,sins8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that gluttony is the     
greatest of sins4 ,for the grievousness 
of a sin is measured by the grievousness
 of the punishment4 ,now the sin of     
gluttony is most grievously punished1   
for ,chrysostom says 99,hom4 xiii in    
,matth43 ,gluttony turned ,adam out of  
,paradise1 gluttony it was that drew    
down the deluge at the time of ,noah4   
,according to ,ezech4 #af3di1 ,this was 
the iniquity of ,sodom1 thy sister 4 4 4
 fulness of bread1 etc4 ,therefore the  
sin of gluttony is the greatest of all4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in every genus the  
cause is the most powerful4 ,now        
gluttony is apparently the cause of     
other sins1 for a gloss on ,ps4 #ace3aj1
 ,who smote ,egypt with their           
first-born1 says3 ,lust1 concupiscence1 

pride are the first-born of gluttony4   
,therefore gluttony is the greatest of  
sins4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man should   
love himself in the first place after   
,god1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #d74
 ,now man1 by the vice of gluttony1     
inflicts an injury on himself3 for it is
 written 7,ecclus4 #cg3cd73 ,by         
surfeiting many have perished4          
,therefore gluttony is the greatest of  
sins1 at least excepting those that are 
against ,god4  ,on the contrary1 ,the   
sins of the flesh1 among which gluttony 
is reckoned1 are less culpable according
 to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxiii74  ,i      
answer that1 ,the gravity of a sin may  
be measured in three ways4 ,first and   
foremost it depends on the matter in    
which the sin is committed3 and in this 
way sins committed in connection with   
,divine things are the greatest4 ,from  
this point of view gluttony is not the  
greatest sin1 for it is about matters   
connected with the nourishment of the   
body4 ,secondly1 the gravity of a sin   

depends on the person who sins1 and from
 this point of view the sin of gluttony 
is diminished rather than aggravated1   
both on account of the necessity of     
taking food1 and on account of the      
difficulty of proper discretion and     
moderation in such matters4 ,thirdly1   
from the point of view of the result    
that follows1 and in this way gluttony  
has a certain gravity1 inasmuch as      
certain sins are occasioned thereby4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these punishments are 
to be referred to the vices that        
resulted from gluttony1 or to the root  
from which gluttony sprang1 rather than 
to gluttony itself4 ,for the first man  
was expelled from ,paradise on account  
of pride1 from which he went on to an   
act of gluttony3 while the deluge and   
the punishment of the people of ,sodom  
were inflicted for sins occasioned by   
gluttony4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this       
objection argues from the standpoint of 
the sins that result from gluttony4 ,nor
 is a cause necessarily more powerful1  

unless it be a direct cause3 and        
gluttony is not the direct cause but the
 accidental cause1 as it were1 and the  
occasion of other vices4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,the glutton intends1 not the harm  
to his body1 but the pleasure of eating3
 and if injury results to his body1 this
 is accidental4 ,hence this does not    
directly affect the gravity of gluttony1
 the guilt of which is nevertheless     
aggravated1 if a man incur some bodily  
injury through taking too much food4    
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adh1 
,art4 #d  ,whether the ,species of      
,gluttony ,are ,fittingly               
,distinguished8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
seems that the species of gluttony are  
unfittingly distinguished by ,gregory   
who says 7,moral4 xxx1 #ah73 ,the vice  
of gluttony tempts us in five ways4     
,sometimes it forestalls the hour of    
need2 sometimes it seeks costly meats2  
sometimes it requires the food to be    
daintily cooked2 sometimes it exceeds   
the measure of refreshment by taking too

 much2 sometimes we sin by the very heat
 of an immoderate appetite--which are   
contained in the following verse3       
,hastily1 sumptuously1 too much1        
greedily1 daintily4  ,for the above are 
distinguished according to diversity of 
circumstance4 ,now circumstances1 being 
the accidents of an act1 do not         
differentiate its species4 ,therefore   
the species of gluttony are not         
distinguished according to the          
aforesaid4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as time 
is a circumstance1 so is place4 ,if then
 gluttony admits of one species in      
respect of time1 it seems that there    
should likewise be others in respect of 
place and other circumstances4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 just as temperance        
observes due circumstances1 so do the   
other moral virtues4 ,now the species of
 the vices opposed to the other moral   
virtues are not distinguished according 
to various circumstances4 ,neither1     
therefore1 are the species of gluttony  
distinguished thus4  ,on the contrary1  

stands the authority of ,gregory quoted 
above4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above
 7,a4 #a71 gluttony denotes inordinate  
concupiscence in eating4 ,now two things
 are to be considered in eating1 namely 
the food we eat1 and the eating thereof4
 ,accordingly1 the inordinate           
concupiscence may be considered in two  
ways4 ,first1 with regard to the food   
consumed3 and thus1 as regards the      
substance or species of food a man seeks
 sumptuous--i4e4 costly food2 as regards
 its quality1 he seeks food prepared too
 nicely--i4e4 daintily2 and as regards  
quantity1 he exceeds by eating too much4
  ,secondly1 the inordinate             
concupiscence is considered as to the   
consumption of food3 either because one 
forestalls the proper time for eating1  
which is to eat hastily1 or one fails to
 observe the due manner of eating1 by   
eating greedily4  ,isidore 99,de ,summo 
,bon4 ii1 #db comprises the first and   
second under one heading1 when he says  
that the glutton exceeds in what he     

eats1 or in how much1 how or when he    
eats4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the corruption 
of various circumstances causes the     
various species of gluttony1 on account 
of the various motives1 by reason of    
which the species of moral things are   
differentiated4 ,for in him that seeks  
sumptuous food1 concupiscence is aroused
 by the very species of the food2 in him
 that forestalls the time concupiscence 
is disordered through impatience of     
delay1 and so forth4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,place and other circumstances include  
no special motive connected with eating1
 that can cause a different species of  
gluttony4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in all     
other vices1 whenever different         
circumstances correspond to different   
motives1 the difference of circumstances
 argues a specific difference of vice3  
but this does not apply to all          
circumstances1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #i74   ,,fifth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adh1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
,gluttony ,is a ,capital ,vice8         

,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
gluttony is not a capital vice4 ,for    
capital vices denote those whence1 under
 the aspect of final cause1 other vices 
originate4 ,now food1 which is the      
matter of gluttony1 has not the aspect  
of end1 since it is sought1 not for its 
own sake1 but for the body's            
nourishment4 ,therefore gluttony is not 
a capital vice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a  
capital vice would seem to have a       
certain pre-eminence in sinfulness4 ,but
 this does not apply to gluttony1 which1
 in respect of its genus1 is apparently 
the least of sins1 seeing that it is    
most akin to what is according to       
nature4 ,therefore gluttony is not a    
capital vice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sin  
results from a man forsaking the good of
 virtue on account of something useful  
to the present life1 or pleasing to the 
senses4 ,now as regards goods having the
 aspect of utility1 there is but one    
capital vice1 namely covetousness4      
,therefore1 seemingly1 there would be   

but one capital vice in respect of      
pleasures3 and this is lust1 which is a 
greater vice than gluttony1 and is about
 greater pleasures4 ,therefore gluttony 
is not a capital vice4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7  
reckons gluttony among the capital      
vices4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above
 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #c71 a capital  
vice denotes one from which1 considered 
as final cause1 i4e4 as having a most   
desirable end1 other vices originate3   
wherefore through desiring that end men 
are incited to sin in many ways4 ,now an
 end is rendered most desirable through 
having one of the conditions of         
happiness which is desirable by its very
 nature3 and pleasure is essential to   
happiness1 according to ,ethic4 i1 #h2  
x1 #c1 #g1 #h4 ,therefore the vice of   
gluttony1 being about pleasures of touch
 which stand foremost among other       
pleasures1 is fittingly reckoned among  
the capital vices4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it
 is true that food itself is directed to

 something as its end3 but since that   
end1 namely the sustaining of life1 is  
most desirable and whereas life cannot  
be sustained without food1 it follows   
that food too is most desirable3 indeed1
 nearly all the toil of man's life is   
directed thereto1 according to ,eccles4 
#f3g1 ,all the labor of man is for his  
mouth4 ,yet gluttony seems to be about  
pleasures of food rather than about food
 itself2 wherefore1 as ,augustine says  
7,de ,vera ,relig4 liii71 with such food
 as is good for the worthless body1 men 
desire to be fed1 wherein namely the    
pleasure consists1 rather than to be    
filled3 since the whole end of that     
desire is this--not to thirst and not to
 hunger4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in sin the  
end is ascertained with respect to the  
conversion1 while the gravity of sin is 
determined with regard to the aversion4 
,wherefore it does not follow that the  
capital sin which has the most desirable
 end surpasses the others in gravity4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which gives      

pleasure is desirable in itself3 and    
consequently corresponding to its       
diversity there are two capital vices1  
namely gluttony and lust4 ,on the other 
hand1 that which is useful is desirable1
 not in itself1 but as directed to      
something else3 wherefore seemingly in  
all useful things there is one aspect of
 desirability4 ,hence there is but one  
capital vice1 in respect of such things4
   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4     
#adh1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,five          
,daughters ,are ,fittingly ,assigned to 
,gluttony8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that five daughters are unfittingly
 assigned to gluttony1 to wit1 unseemly 
joy1 scurrility1 uncleanness1           
loquaciousness1 and dullness of mind as 
regards the understanding4 ,for unseemly
 joy results from every sin1 according  
to ,prov4 #b3ad1 ,who are glad when they
 have done evil1 and rejoice in most    
wicked things4 ,likewise dullness of    
mind is associated with every sin1      
according to ,prov4 #ad3bb1 ,they err   

that work evil4 ,therefore they are     
unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of 
gluttony4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the      
uncleanness which is particularly the   
result of gluttony would seem to be     
connected with vomiting1 according to   
,isa4 #bh3h1 ,all tables were full of   
vomit and filth4 ,but this seems to be  
not a sin but a punishment2 or even a   
useful thing that is a matter of        
counsel1 according to ,ecclus4 #ca3be1  
,if thou hast been forced to eat much1  
arise1 go out1 and vomit2 and it shall  
refresh thee4 ,therefore it should not  
be reckoned among the daughters of      
gluttony4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,isidore 
7,,qq4 in ,deut4 xvi7 reckons scurrility
 as a daughter of lust4 ,therefore it   
should not be reckoned among the        
daughters of gluttony4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7  
assigns these daughters to gluttony4  ,i
 answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4   
#a1 #b1 #c71 gluttony consists properly 
in an immoderate pleasure in eating and 

drinking4 ,wherefore those vices are    
reckoned among the daughters of         
gluttony1 which are the results of      
eating and drinking immoderately4 ,these
 may be accounted for either on the part
 of the soul or on the part of the body4
 ,on the part of the soul these results 
are of four kinds4 ,first1 as regards   
the reason1 whose keenness is dulled by 
immoderate meat and drink1 and in this  
respect we reckon as a daughter of      
gluttony1 dullness of sense in the      
understanding1 on account of the fumes  
of food disturbing the brain4 ,even so1 
on the other hand1 abstinence conduces  
to the penetrating power of wisdom1     
according to ,eccles4 #b3c1 ,i thought  
in my heart to withdraw my flesh from   
wine1 that ,i might turn my mind in     
wisdom4 ,secondly1 as regards the       
appetite1 which is disordered in many   
ways by immoderation in eating and      
drinking1 as though reason were fast    
asleep at the helm1 and in this respect 
unseemly joy is reckoned1 because all   

the other inordinate passions are       
directed to joy or sorrow1 as stated in 
,ethic4 ii1 #e4 ,to this we must refer  
the saying of #c ,esdr4 #c3bj1 that wine
 4 4 4 gives every one a confident and  
joyful mind4 ,thirdly1 as regards       
inordinate words1 and thus we have      
loquaciousness1 because as ,gregory says
 7,pastor4 iii1 #ai71 unless gluttons   
were carried away by immoderate speech1 
that rich man who is stated to have     
feasted sumptuously every day would not 
have been so tortured in his tongue4    
,fourthly1 as regards inordinate action1
 and in this way we have scurrility1    
i4e4 a kind of levity resulting from    
lack of reason1 which is unable not only
 to bridle the speech1 but also to      
restrain outward behavior4 ,hence a     
gloss on ,eph4 #e3d1 ,or foolish talking
 or scurrility1 says that fools call    
this geniality--i4e4 jocularity1 because
 it is wont to raise a laugh4 ,both of  
these1 however1 may be referred to the  
words which may happen to be sinful1    

either by reason of excess which belongs
 to loquaciousness1 or by reason of     
unbecomingness1 which belongs to        
scurrility4  ,on the part of the body1  
mention is made of uncleanness1 which   
may refer either to the inordinate      
emission of any kind of superfluities1  
or especially to the emission of the    
semen4 ,hence a gloss on ,eph4 #e3c1    
,but fornication and all uncleanness1   
says3 ,that is1 any kind of incontinence
 that has reference to lust4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,joy in the act or end of sin 
results from every sin1 especially the  
sin that proceeds from habit1 but the   
random riotous joy which is described as
 unseemly arises chiefly from immoderate
 partaking of meat or drink4 ,in like   
manner1 we reply that dullness of sense 
as regards matters of choice is common  
to all sin1 whereas dullness of sense in
 speculative matters arises chiefly from
 gluttony1 for the reason given above4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although it does one  
good to vomit after eating too much1 yet

 it is sinful to expose oneself to its  
necessity by immoderate meat or drink4  
,however1 it is no sin to procure       
vomiting as a remedy for sickness if the
 physician prescribes it4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,scurrility proceeds from the act of
 gluttony1 and not from the lustful act1
 but from the lustful will3 wherefore it
 may be referred to either vice4        
,,question #adi  ,,of ,,sobriety 7,in   
,four ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
sobriety and the contrary vice1 namely  
drunkenness4 ,as regards sobriety there 
are four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,what 
is the matter of sobriety8  7#b7        
,whether it is a special virtue8  7#c7  
,whether the use of wine is lawful8     
7#d7 ,to whom especially is sobriety    
becoming8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #adi1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,drink ,is
 the ,matter of ,sobriety8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that drink is not the
 matter proper to sobriety4 ,for it is  
written 7,rom4 #ab3c73 ,not to be more  
wise than it behooveth to be wise1 but  

to be wise unto sobriety4 ,therefore    
sobriety is also about wisdom1 and not  
only about drink4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
concerning the wisdom of ,god1 it is    
written 7,wis4 #h3g7 that she teacheth  
sobriety ,douay3 'temperance'1 and      
prudence1 and justice1 and fortitude1   
where sobriety stands for temperance4   
,now temperance is not only about drink1
 but also about meat and sexual matters4
 ,therefore sobriety is not only about  
drink4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sobriety    
would seem to take its name from measure
 99,bria1 a measure1 a cup2 ,cf4        
,facciolati and ,forcellini's ,lexicon4 
,now we ought to be guided by the       
measure in all things appertaining to   
us3 for it is written 7,titus #b3ab73   
,we should live soberly and justly and  
godly1 where a gloss remarks3 ,soberly1 
in ourselves2 and 7#a ,tim4 #b3i73      
,women 4 4 4 in decent apparel1 adorning
 themselves with modesty and sobriety4  
,consequently it would seem that        
sobriety regards not only the interior  

man1 but also things appertaining to    
external apparel4 ,therefore drink is   
not the matter proper to sobriety4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4  
#ca3cb73 ,wine taken with sobriety is   
equal life to men2 if thou drink it     
moderately1 thou shalt be sober4  ,i    
answer that1 ,when a virtue is          
denominated from some condition common  
to the virtues1 the matter specially    
belonging to it is that in which it is  
most difficult and most commendable to  
satisfy that condition of virtue3 thus  
fortitude is about dangers of death1 and
 temperance about pleasures of touch4   
,now sobriety takes its name from       
measure1 for a man is said to be sober  
because he observes the bria1 i4e4 the  
measure4 ,wherefore sobriety lays a     
special claim to that matter wherein the
 observance of the measure is most      
deserving of praise4 ,such matter is the
 drinking of intoxicants1 because the   
measured use thereof is most profitable1
 while immoderate excess therein is most

 harmful1 since it hinders the use of   
reason even more than excessive eating4 
,hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #ca3cg1  
#ch73 ,sober drinking is health to soul 
and body2 wine drunken with excess      
raiseth quarrels1 and wrath and many    
ruins4 ,for this reason sobriety is     
especially concerned with drink1 not any
 kind of drink1 but that which by reason
 of its volatility is liable to disturb 
the brain1 such as wine and all         
intoxicants4 ,nevertheless1 sobriety may
 be employed in a general sense so as to
 apply to any matter1 as stated above   
7,q4 #abc1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ada1 ,a4 #b7    
with regard to fortitude and temperance4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as the material
 wine intoxicates a man as to his body1 
so too1 speaking figuratively1 the      
consideration of wisdom is said to be an
 inebriating draught1 because it allures
 the mind by its delight1 according to  
,ps4 #bb3e1 ,my chalice which           
inebriateth me1 how goodly is it6 ,hence
 sobriety is applied by a kind of       

metaphor in speaking of the             
contemplation of wisdom4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,all the things that belong properly
 to temperance are necessary to the     
present life1 and their excess is       
harmful4 ,wherefore it behooves one to  
apply a measure in all such things4     
,this is the business of sobriety3 and  
for this reason sobriety is used to     
designate temperance4 ,yet slight excess
 is more harmful in drink than in other 
things1 wherefore sobriety is especially
 concerned with drink4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,although a measure is needful in all  
things1 sobriety is not properly        
employed in connection with all things1 
but only in those wherein there is most 
need for a measure4   ,,second ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adi1 ,art4 #b  ,whether
 ,sobriety ,is by ,itself a ,special    
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that sobriety is not by itself a special
 virtue4 ,for abstinence is concerned   
with both meat and drink4 ,now there is 
no special virtue about meat4 ,therefore

 neither is sobriety1 which is about    
drink1 a special virtue4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 abstinence and gluttony are   
about pleasures of touch as sensitive to
 food4 ,now meat and drink combine      
together to make food1 since an animal  
needs a combination of wet and dry      
nourishment4 ,therefore sobriety1 which 
is about drink1 is not a4 special       
virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as in 
things pertaining to nourishment1 drink 
is distinguished from meat1 so are there
 various kinds of meats and of drinks4  
,therefore if sobriety is by itself a   
special virtue1 seemingly there will be 
a special virtue corresponding to each  
different kind of meat or drink1 which  
is unreasonable4 ,therefore it would    
seem that sobriety is not a special     
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,macrobius   
99,in ,somno ,scip4 i1 #h reckons       
sobriety to be a special part of        
temperance4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,q4 #adf1 ,a4 #b71 it belongs to 
moral virtue to safeguard the good of   

reason against those things which may   
hinder it4 ,hence wherever we find a    
special hindrance to reason1 there must 
needs be a special virtue to remove it4 
,now intoxicating drink is a special    
kind of hindrance to the use of reason1 
inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its
 fumes4 ,wherefore in order to remove   
this hindrance to reason a special      
virtue1 which is sobriety1 is requisite4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,meat and drink are  
alike capable of hindering the good of  
reason1 by embroiling the reason with   
immoderate pleasure3 and in this respect
 abstinence is about both meat and drink
 alike4 ,but intoxicating drink is a    
special kind of hindrance1 as stated    
above1 wherefore it requires a special  
virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the virtue of
 abstinence is about meat and drink1    
considered1 not as food but as a        
hindrance to reason4 ,hence it does not 
follow that special kinds of virtue     
correspond to different kinds of food4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in all intoxicating   

drinks there is one kind of hindrance to
 the use of reason3 so that the         
difference of drinks bears an accidental
 relation to virtue4 ,hence this        
difference does not call for a          
difference of virtue4 ,the same applies 
to the difference of meats4   ,,third   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adi1 ,art4 #c 
,whether the ,use of ,wine ,is          
,altogether ,unlawful8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that the use of wine is  
altogether unlawful4 ,for without       
wisdom1 a man cannot be in the state of 
salvation3 since it is written 7,wis4   
#g3bh73 ,god loveth none but him that   
dwelleth with wisdom1 and further on    
7,wis4 #i3ai73 ,by wisdom they were     
healed1 whosoever have pleased ,thee1 ,o
 ,lord1 from the beginning4 ,now the use
 of wine is a hindrance to wisdom1 for  
it is written 7,eccles4 #b3c73 ,i       
thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh
 from wine1 that ,i might turn my mind  
to wisdom4 ,therefore wine-drinking is  
altogether unlawful4  ,obj4 #b3         

,further1 the ,apostle says 7,rom4      
#ad3ba73 ,it is good not to eat flesh1  
and not to drink wine1 nor anything     
whereby thy brother is offended or      
scandalized1 or made weak4 ,now it is   
sinful to forsake the good of virtue1 as
 likewise to scandalize one's brethren4 
,therefore it is unlawful to make use of
 wine4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,jerome says
 99,contra ,jovin4 i that after the     
deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned3  
but ,christ came in the last of the ages
 and brought back the end into line with
 the beginning4 ,therefore it seems     
unlawful to use wine under the          
,christian law4  ,on the contrary1 ,the 
,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #e3bc73 ,do not 
still drink water1 but use a little wine
 for thy stomach's sake1 and thy        
frequent infirmities2 and it is written 
7,ecclus4 #ca3cf73 ,wine drunken with   
moderation is the joy of the soul and   
the heart4  ,i answer that1 ,no meat or 
drink1 considered in itself1 is         
unlawful1 according to ,matt4 #ae3aa1   

,not that which goeth into the mouth    
defileth a man4 ,wherefore it is not    
unlawful to drink wine as such4 ,yet it 
may become unlawful accidentally4 ,this 
is sometimes owing to a circumstance on 
the part of the drinker1 either because 
he is easily the worse for taking wine1 
or because he is bound by a vow not to  
drink wine3 sometimes it results from   
the mode of drinking1 because to wit he 
exceeds the measure in drinking3 and    
sometimes it is on account of others who
 would be scandalized thereby4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,a man may have wisdom in two 
ways4 ,first1 in a general way1         
according as it is sufficient for       
salvation3 and in this way it is        
required1 in order to have wisdom1 not  
that a man abstain altogether from wine1
 but that he abstain from its immoderate
 use4 ,secondly1 a man may have wisdom  
in some degree of perfection3 and in    
this way1 in order to receive wisdom    
perfectly1 it is requisite for certain  
persons that they abstain altogether    

from wine1 and this depends on          
circumstances of certain persons and    
places4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,apostle 
does not declare simply that it is good 
to abstain from wine1 but that it is    
good in the case where this would give  
scandal to certain people4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,christ withdraws us from some     
things as being altogether unlawful1 and
 from others as being obstacles to      
perfection4 ,it is in the latter way    
that he withdraws some from the use of  
wine1 that they may aim at perfection1  
even as from riches and the like4       
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #adi1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,sobriety ,is ,more  
,requisite in ,persons of ,greater      
,standing8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that sobriety is more requisite in 
persons of greater standing4 ,for old   
age gives a man a certain standing2     
wherefore honor and reverence are due to
 the old1 according to ,lev4 #ai3cb1    
,rise up before the hoary head1 and     
honor the person of the aged man4 ,now  

the ,apostle declares that old men      
especially should be exhorted to        
sobriety1 according to ,titus #b3b1     
,that the aged man be sober4 ,therefore 
sobriety is most requisite in persons of
 standing4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a bishop
 has the highest degree in the ,church3 
and the ,apostle commands him to be     
sober1 according to #a ,tim4 #c3b1 ,it  
behooveth 4 4 4 a bishop to be          
blameless1 the husband of one wife1     
sober1 prudent1 etc4 ,therefore sobriety
 is chiefly required in persons of high 
standing4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sobriety 
denotes abstinence from wine4 ,now wine 
is forbidden to kings1 who hold the     
highest place in human affairs3 while it
 is allowed to those who are in a state 
of affliction1 according to ,prov4      
#ca3d1 ,give not wine to kings1 and     
further on 7,prov4 #ca3f71 ,give strong 
drink to them that are sad1 and wine to 
them that are grieved in mind4          
,therefore sobriety is more requisite in
 persons of standing4  ,on the contrary1

 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #c3aa73   
,the women in like manner1 chaste 4 4 4 
sober1 etc41 and 7,titus #b3f7 ,young   
men in like manner exhort that they be  
sober4  ,i answer that1 ,virtue includes
 relationship to two things1 to the     
contrary vices which it removes1 and to 
the end to which it leads4 ,accordingly 
a particular virtue is more requisite in
 certain persons for two reasons4       
,first1 because they are more prone to  
the concupiscences which need to be     
restrained by virtue1 and to the vices  
which are removed by virtue4 ,in this   
respect1 sobriety is most requisite in  
the young and in women1 because         
concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the
 young on account of the heat of youth1 
while in women there is not sufficient  
strength of mind to resist              
concupiscence4 ,hence1 according to     
,valerius ,maximus 99,dict4 ,fact4      
,memor4 ii1 #a among the ancient ,romans
 women drank no wine4 ,secondly1        
sobriety is more requisite in certain   

persons1 as being more necessary for the
 operations proper to them4 ,now        
immoderate use of wine is a notable     
obstacle to the use of reason3 wherefore
 sobriety is specially prescribed to the
 old1 in whom reason should be vigorous 
in instructing others3 to bishops and   
all ministers of the ,church1 who should
 fulfil their spiritual duties with a   
devout mind2 and to kings1 who should   
rule their subjects with wisdom4  ,this 
suffices for the ,replies to the        
,objections4   ,,question #aej  ,,of    
,,drunkenness 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we
 must now consider drunkenness4 ,under  
this head there are four points of      
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether drunkenness is a
 sin8  7#b7 ,whether it is a mortal sin8
  7#c7 ,whether it is the most grievous 
sin8  7#d7 ,whether it excuses from sin8
   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4     
#aej1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,drunkenness   
,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that drunkenness is not a sin4 ,for
 every sin has a corresponding contrary 

sin1 thus timidity is opposed to daring1
 and presumption to pusillanimity4 ,but 
no sin is opposed to drunkenness4       
,therefore drunkenness is not a sin4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every sin is        
voluntary 99,augustine1 ,de ,vera       
,relig4 xiv4 ,but no man wishes to be   
drunk1 since no man wishes to be        
deprived of the use of reason4          
,therefore drunkenness is not a sin4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whoever causes      
another to sin1 sins himself4           
,therefore1 if drunkenness were a sin1  
it would follow that it is a sin to ask 
a man to drink that which makes him     
drunk1 which would seem very hard4      
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 every sin calls for 
correction4 ,but correction is not      
applied to drunkards3 for ,gregory      
99,cf4 ,canon ,denique1 dist4 #d where  
,gratian refers to a letter of ,st4     
,gregory to ,st4 ,augustine of          
,canterbury says that we must forbear   
with their ways1 lest they become worse 
if they be compelled to give up the     

habit4 ,therefore drunkenness is not a  
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle   
says 7,rom4 #ac3ac73 ,not in rioting and
 drunkenness4  ,i answer that1          
,drunkenness may be understood in two   
ways4 ,first1 it may signify the defect 
itself of a man resulting from his      
drinking much wine1 the consequence     
being that he loses the use of reason4  
,in this sense drunkenness denotes not a
 sin1 but a penal defect resulting from 
a fault4 ,secondly1 drunkenness may     
denote the act by which a man incurs    
this defect4 ,this act may cause        
drunkenness in two ways4 ,in one way1   
through the wine being too strong1      
without the drinker being cognizant of  
this3 and in this way too1 drunkenness  
may occur without sin1 especially if it 
is not through his negligence1 and thus 
we believe that ,noah was made drunk as 
related in ,gen4 #i4 ,in another way    
drunkenness may result from inordinate  
concupiscence and use of wine3 in this  
way it is accounted a sin1 and is       

comprised under gluttony as a species   
under its genus4 ,for gluttony is       
divided into surfeiting ,douay3         
'rioting' and drunkenness1 which are    
forbidden by the ,apostle 7,rom4        
#ac3ac74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the      
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #aa71   
insensibility which is opposed to       
temperance is not very common1 so that  
like its species which are opposed to   
the species of intemperance it has no   
name4 ,hence the vice opposed to        
drunkenness is unnamed2 and yet if a man
 were knowingly to abstain from wine to 
the extent of molesting nature          
grievously1 he would not be free from   
sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this objection  
regards the resulting defect which is   
involuntary3 whereas immoderate use of  
wine is voluntary1 and it is in this    
that the sin consists4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,even as he that is drunk is excused if
 he knows not the strength of the wine1 
so too is he that invites another to    
drink excused from sin1 if he be unaware

 that the drinker is the kind of person 
to be made drunk by the drink offered4  
,but if ignorance be lacking neither is 
excused from sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3     
,sometimes the correction of a sinner is
 to be foregone1 as stated above 7,q4   
#cc1 ,a4 #f74 ,hence ,augustine says in 
a letter 7,ad ,aurel4 ,episc4 ,ep4      
xxii71 ,meseems1 such things are cured  
not by bitterness1 severity1 harshness1 
but by teaching rather than commanding1 
by advice rather than threats4 ,such is 
the course to be followed with the      
majority of sinners3 few are they whose 
sins should be treated with severity4   
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aej1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,drunkenness ,is a   
,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that drunkenness is not a mortal   
sin4 ,for ,augustine says in a sermon on
 ,purgatory 99,serm4 civ in the         
,appendix to ,st4 ,augustine's works    
that drunkenness if indulged in         
assiduously1 is a mortal sin4 ,now      
assiduity denotes a circumstance which  

does not change the species of a sin2 so
 that it cannot aggravate a sin         
infinitely1 and make a mortal sin of a  
venial sin1 as shown above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #hh1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore if drunkenness
 is not a mortal sin for some other     
reason1 neither is it for this4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 99,serm4  
civ in the ,appendix to ,st4            
,augustine's works3 ,whenever a man     
takes more meat and drink than is       
necessary1 he should know that this is  
one of the lesser sins4 ,now the lesser 
sins are called venial4 ,therefore      
drunkenness1 which is caused by         
immoderate drink1 is a venial sin4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no mortal sin should
 be committed on the score of medicine4 
,now some drink too much at the advice  
of the physician1 that they may be      
purged by vomiting2 and from this       
excessive drink drunkenness ensues4     
,therefore drunkenness is not a mortal  
sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,we read in the 
,canons of the apostles 7,can4 xli1     

xlii73 ,a bishop1 priest or deacon who  
is given to drunkenness or gambling1 or 
incites others thereto1 must either     
cease or be deposed2 a subdeacon1 reader
 or precentor who does these things must
 either give them up or be              
excommunicated2 the same applies to the 
laity4 ,now such punishments are not    
inflicted save for mortal sins4         
,therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin4 
,i answer that1 ,the sin of drunkenness1
 as stated in the foregoing ,article1   
consists in the immoderate use and      
concupiscence of wine4 ,now this may    
happen to a man in three ways4 ,first1  
so that he knows not the drink to be    
immoderate and intoxicating3 and then   
drunkenness may be without sin1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,secondly1 so    
that he perceives the drink to be       
immoderate1 but without knowing it to be
 intoxicating1 and then drunkenness may 
involve a venial sin4 ,thirdly1 it may  
happen that a man is well aware that the
 drink is immoderate and intoxicating1  

and yet he would rather be drunk than   
abstain from drink4 ,such a man is a    
drunkard properly speaking1 because     
morals take their species not from      
things that occur accidentally and      
beside the intention1 but from that     
which is directly intended4 ,in this way
 drunkenness is a mortal sin1 because   
then a man willingly and knowingly      
deprives himself of the use of reason1  
whereby he performs virtuous deeds and  
avoids sin1 and thus he sins mortally by
 running the risk of falling into sin4  
,for ,ambrose says 7,de ,patriarch4     
99,de ,abraham i473 ,we learn that we   
should shun drunkenness1 which prevents 
us from avoiding grievous sins4 ,for the
 things we avoid when sober1 we         
unknowingly commit through drunkenness4 
,therefore drunkenness1 properly        
speaking1 is a mortal sin4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,assiduity makes drunkenness a     
mortal sin1 not on account of the mere  
repetition of the act1 but because it is
 impossible for a man to become drunk   

assiduously1 without exposing himself to
 drunkenness knowingly and willingly1   
since he has many times experienced the 
strength of wine and his own liability  
to drunkenness4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to   
take more meat or drink than is         
necessary belongs to the vice of        
gluttony1 which is not always a mortal  
sin3 but knowingly to take too much     
drink to the point of being drunk1 is a 
mortal sin4 ,hence ,augustine says      
7,confess4 x1 #ca73 ,drunkenness is far 
from me3 ,thou wilt have mercy1 that it 
come not near me4 ,but full feeding     
sometimes hath crept upon ,thy servant4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#ada1 ,a4 #f71 meat and drink should be 
moderate in accordance with the demands 
of the body's health4 ,wherefore1 just  
as it happens sometimes that the meat   
and drink which are moderate for a      
healthy man are immoderate for a sick   
man1 so too it may happen conversely1   
that what is excessive for a healthy man
 is moderate for one that is ailing4 ,in

 this way when a man eats or drinks much
 at the physician's advice in order to  
provoke vomiting1 he is not to be deemed
 to have taken excessive meat or drink4 
,there is1 however1 no need for         
intoxicating drink in order to procure  
vomiting1 since this is caused by       
drinking lukewarm water3 wherefore this 
is no sufficient cause for excusing a   
man from drunkenness4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aej1 ,art4 #c 
,whether drunkenness is the gravest of  
sins8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that drunkenness is the gravest of sins4
 ,for ,chrysostom says 7,hom4 lviii in  
,matth47 that nothing gains the devil's 
favor so much as drunkenness and lust1  
the mother of all the vices4 ,and it is 
written in the ,decretals 7,dist4 xxxv1 
can4 ,ante omnia73 ,drunkenness1 more   
than anything else1 is to be avoided by 
the clergy1 for it foments and fosters  
all the vices4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 from
 the very fact that a thing excludes the
 good of reason1 it is a sin4 ,now this 

is especially the effect of drunkenness4
 ,therefore drunkenness is the greatest 
of sins4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the       
gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity
 of its punishment4 ,now seemingly      
drunkenness is punished most severely2  
for ,ambrose says 99,de ,elia et de     
,jejunio v that there would be no       
slavery1 were there no drunkards4       
,therefore drunkenness is the greatest  
of sins4  ,on the contrary1 ,according  
to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxiii1 #ab71      
spiritual vices are greater than carnal 
vices4 ,now drunkenness is one of the   
carnal vices4 ,therefore it is not the  
greatest of sins4  ,i answer that1 ,a   
thing is said to be evil because it     
removes a good4 ,wherefore the greater  
the good removed by an evil1 the graver 
the evil4 ,now it is evident that a     
,divine good is greater than a human    
good4 ,wherefore the sins that are      
directly against ,god are graver than   
the sin of drunkenness1 which is        
directly opposed to the good of human   

reason4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man is most  
prone to sins of intemperance1 because  
such like concupiscences and pleasures  
are connatural to us1 and for this      
reason these sins are said to find      
greatest favor with the devil1 not for  
being graver than other sins1 but       
because they occur more frequently among
 men4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the good of    
reason is hindered in two ways3 in one  
way by that which is contrary to reason1
 in another by that which takes away the
 use of reason4 ,now that which is      
contrary to reason has more the         
character of an evil1 than that which   
takes away the use of reason for a time1
 since the use of reason1 which is taken
 away by drunkenness1 may be either good
 or evil1 whereas the goods of virtue1  
which are taken away by things that are 
contrary to reason1 are always good4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,drunkenness was the   
occasional cause of slavery1 in so far  
as ,cham brought the curse of slavery on
 to his descendants1 for having laughed 

at his father when the latter was made  
drunk4 ,but slavery was not the direct  
punishment of drunkenness4   ,,fourth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aej1 ,art4 #d 
,whether ,drunkenness ,excuses from     
,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that drunkenness does not excuse from   
sin4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4
 iii1 #e7 that the drunkard deserves    
double punishment4 ,therefore           
drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of 
excusing from it4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
one sin does not excuse another1 but    
increases it4 ,now drunkenness is a sin4
 ,therefore it is not an excuse for sin4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher  
says 7,ethic4 vii1 #c7 that just as     
man's reason is tied by drunkenness1 so 
is it by concupiscence4 ,but            
concupiscence is not an excuse for sin3 
neither therefore is drunkenness4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,according to ,augustine  
7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #dc71 ,lot was to
 be excused from incest on account of   
drunkenness4  ,i answer that1 ,two      

things are to be observed in            
drunkenness1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71  
namely the resulting defect and the     
preceding act4 ,on the part of the      
resulting defect whereby the use of     
reason is fettered1 drunkenness may be  
an excuse for sin1 in so far as it      
causes an act to be involuntary through 
ignorance4 ,but on the part of the      
preceding act1 a distinction would seem 
necessary2 because1 if the drunkenness  
that results from that act be without   
sin1 the subsequent sin is entirely     
excused from fault1 as perhaps in the   
case of ,lot4 ,if1 however1 the         
preceding act was sinful1 the person is 
not altogether excused from the         
subsequent sin1 because the latter is   
rendered voluntary through the          
voluntariness of the preceding act1     
inasmuch as it was through doing        
something unlawful that he fell into the
 subsequent sin4 ,nevertheless1 the     
resulting sin is diminished1 even as the
 character of voluntariness is          

diminished4 ,wherefore ,augustine says  
7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #dd7 that ,lot's 
guilt is to be measured1 not by the     
incest1 but by his drunkenness4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher does not say
 that the drunkard deserves more severe 
punishment1 but that he deserves double 
punishment for his twofold sin4 ,or we  
may reply that he is speaking in view of
 the law of a certain ,pittacus1 who1 as
 stated in ,polit4 ii1 #i1 ordered those
 guilty of assault while drunk to be    
more severely punished than if they had 
been sober1 because they do wrong in    
more ways than one4 ,in this1 as        
,aristotle observes 7,polit4 ii1 #i71 he
 seems to have considered the advantage1
 namely of the prevention of wrong1     
rather than the leniency which one      
should have for drunkards1 seeing that  
they are not in possession of their     
faculties4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3            
,drunkenness may be an excuse for sin1  
not in the point of its being itself a  
sin1 but in the point of the defect that

 results from it1 as stated above4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,concupiscence does not
 altogether fetter the reason1 as       
drunkenness does1 unless perchance it be
 so vehement as to make a man insane4   
,yet the passion of concupiscence       
diminishes sin1 because it is less      
grievous to sin through weakness than   
through malice4   ,,question #aea  ,,of 
,,chastity 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we   
must next consider chastity3 7#a7 ,the  
virtue itself of chastity3 7#b7         
virginity1 which is a part of chastity3 
7#c7 lust1 which is the contrary vice4  
,under the first head there are four    
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether       
chastity is a virtue8  7#b7 ,whether it 
is a general virtue8  7#c7 ,whether it  
is a virtue distinct from abstinence8   
7#d7 ,of its relation to purity4        
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aea1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,chastity ,is a      
,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that chastity is not a virtue4 ,for here
 we are treating of virtues of the soul4

 ,but chastity1 seemingly1 belongs to   
the body3 for a person is said to be    
chaste because he behaves in a certain  
way as regards the use of certain parts 
of the body4 ,therefore chastity is not 
a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue is
 a voluntary habit1 as stated in ,ethic4
 ii1 #f4 ,but chastity1 apparently1 is  
not voluntary1 since it can be taken    
away by force from a woman to whom      
violence is done4 ,therefore it seems   
that chastity is not a virtue4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 there is no virtue in     
unbelievers4 ,yet some unbelievers are  
chaste4 ,therefore chastity is not a    
virtue4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the fruits 
are distinct from the virtues4 ,but     
chastity is reckoned among the fruits   
7,gal4 #e3bc74 ,therefore chastity is   
not a virtue4  ,on the contrary1        
,augustine says 7,de ,decem ,chord4     
99,serm4 ix de ,tempore73 ,whereas thou 
shouldst excel thy wife in virtue1 since
 chastity is a virtue1 thou yieldest to 
the first onslaught of lust1 while thou 

wishest thy wife to be victorious4  ,i  
answer that1 ,chastity takes its name   
from the fact that reason chastises     
concupiscence1 which1 like a child1     
needs curbing1 as the ,philosopher      
states 7,ethic4 iii1 #ab74 ,now the     
essence of human virtue consists in     
being something moderated by reason1 as 
shown above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #a74 
,therefore it is evident that chastity  
is a virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,chastity
 does indeed reside in the soul as its  
subject1 though its matter is in the    
body4 ,for it belongs to chastity that a
 man make moderate use of bodily members
 in accordance with the judgment of his 
reason and the choice of his will4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says    
7,de ,civ4 ,dei i1 #ah71 so long as her 
mind holds to its purpose1 whereby she  
has merited to be holy even in body1 not
 even the violence of another's lust can
 deprive her body of its holiness1 which
 is safeguarded by her persevering      
continency4 ,he also says 7,de ,civ4    

,dei i1 #ah7 that in the mind there is a
 virtue which is the companion of       
fortitude1 whereby it is resolved to    
suffer any evil whatsoever rather than  
consent to evil4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as  
,augustine says 7,contra ,julian4 iv1   
#c71 it is impossible to have any true  
virtue unless one be truly just2 nor is 
it possible to be just unless one live  
by faith4 ,whence he argues that in     
unbelievers there is neither true       
chastity1 nor any other virtue1 because1
 to wit1 they are not referred to the   
due end1 and as he adds 7,contra        
,julian4 iv1 #c7 virtues are            
distinguished from vices not by their   
functions1 i4e4 their acts1 but by their
 ends4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,chastity is a 
virtue in so far as it works in         
accordance with reason1 but in so far as
 it delights in its act1 it is reckoned 
among the fruits4   ,,second ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aea1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,chastity ,is a ,general ,virtue8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      

chastity is a general virtue4 ,for      
,augustine says 7,de ,mendacio xx7 that 
chastity of the mind is the well-ordered
 movement of the mind that does not     
prefer the lesser to the greater things4
 ,but this belongs to every virtue4     
,therefore chastity is a general virtue4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,chastity takes   
its name from chastisement 99,cf4 ,a4   
#a4 ,now every movement of the          
appetitive part should be chastised by  
reason4 ,since1 then1 every moral virtue
 curbs some movement of the appetite1 it
 seems that every moral virtue is       
chastity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 chastity 
is opposed to fornication4 ,but         
fornication seems to belong to every    
kind of sin3 for it is written 7,ps4    
#gb3bg73 ,thou shalt destroy ,vulg43    
'hast destroyed' all them that go       
awhoring from ,douay3 'are disloyal to' 
,thee4 ,therefore chastity is a general 
virtue4  ,on the contrary1 ,macrobius   
99,in ,somn4 ,scip4 i1 #h reckons it to 
be a part of temperance4  ,i answer     

that1 ,the word chastity is employed in 
two ways4 ,first1 properly2 and thus it 
is a special virtue having a special    
matter1 namely the concupiscences       
relating to venereal pleasures4         
,secondly1 the word chastity is employed
 metaphorically3 for just as a mingling 
of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure 
which is the proper matter of chastity  
and of lust its contrary vice1 so too   
the spiritual union of the mind with    
certain things conduces to a pleasure   
which is the matter of a spiritual      
chastity metaphorically speaking1 as    
well as of a spiritual fornication      
likewise metaphorically so called4 ,for 
if the human mind delight in the        
spiritual union with that to which it   
behooves it to be united1 namely ,god1  
and refrains from delighting in union   
with other things against the           
requirements of the order established by
 ,god1 this may be called a spiritual   
chastity1 according to #b ,cor4 #aa3b1  
,i have espoused you to one husband1    

that ,i may present you as a chaste     
virgin to ,christ4 ,if1 on the other    
hand1 the mind be united to any other   
things whatsoever1 against the          
prescription of the ,divine order1 it   
will be called spiritual fornication1   
according to ,jer4 #c3a1 ,but thou hast 
prostituted thyself to many lovers4     
,taking chastity in this sense1 it is a 
general virtue1 because every virtue    
withdraws the human mind from delighting
 in a union with unlawful things4       
,nevertheless1 the essence of this      
chastity consists principally in charity
 and the other theological virtues1     
whereby the human mind is united to     
,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument  
takes chastity in the metaphorical      
sense4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated     
above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #adb1 ,a4 #b71 the   
concupiscence of that which gives       
pleasure is especially likened to a     
child1 because the desire of pleasure is
 connatural to us1 especially of        
pleasures of touch which are directed to

 the maintenance of nature4 ,hence it is
 that if the concupiscence of such      
pleasures be fostered by consenting to  
it1 it will wax very strong1 as in the  
case of a child left to his own will4   
,wherefore the concupiscence of these   
pleasures stands in very great need of  
being chastised3 and consequently       
chastity is applied antonomastically to 
such like concupiscences1 even as       
fortitude is about those matters wherein
 we stand in the greatest need of       
strength of mind4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,this argument considers spiritual      
fornication metaphorically so called1   
which is opposed to spiritual chastity1 
as stated4   ,,third ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aea1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,chastity ,is a ,distinct ,virtue from  
,abstinence8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that chastity is not a distinct    
virtue from abstinence4 ,because where  
the matter is generically the same1 one 
virtue suffices4 ,now it would seem that
 things pertaining to the same sense are

 of one genus4 ,therefore1 since        
pleasures of the palate which are the   
matter of abstinence1 and venereal      
pleasures which are the matter of       
chastity1 pertain to the touch1 it seems
 that chastity is not a distinct virtue 
from abstinence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #ab7     
likens all vices of intemperance to     
childish sins1 which need chastising4   
,now chastity takes its name from       
chastisement of the contrary vices4     
,since then certain vices are bridled by
 abstinence1 it seems that abstinence is
 chastity4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the     
pleasures of the other senses are the   
concern of temperance in so far as they 
refer to pleasures of touch2 which are  
the matter of temperance4 ,now pleasures
 of the palate1 which are the matter of 
abstinence1 are directed to venereal    
pleasures1 which are the matter of      
chastity3 wherefore ,jerome says 99,ep4 
cxlvii ad ,amand4 ,cf4 ,gratian1 ,dist4 
xliv41 commenting on ,titus #a3g1 ,not  

given to wine1 no striker1 etc43 ,the   
belly and the organs of generation are  
neighbors1 that the neighborhood of the 
organs may indicate their complicity in 
vice4 ,therefore abstinence and chastity
 are not distinct virtues4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #f3e1 
#f7 reckons chastity together with      
fastings which pertain to abstinence4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#ada1 ,a4 #d71 temperance is properly   
about the concupiscences of the         
pleasures of touch3 so that where there 
are different kinds of pleasure1 there  
are different virtues comprised under   
temperance4 ,now pleasures are          
proportionate to the actions whose      
perfections they are1 as stated in      
,ethic4 ix1 #d1 #e3 and it is evident   
that actions connected with the use of  
food whereby the nature of the          
individual is maintained differ         
generically from actions connected with 
the use of matters venereal1 whereby the
 nature of the species is preserved4    

,therefore chastity1 which is about     
venereal pleasures1 is a distinct virtue
 from abstinence1 which is about        
pleasures of the palate4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,temperance is chiefly about        
pleasures of touch1 not as regards the  
sense's judgment concerning the objects 
of touch1 which judgment is of uniform  
character concerning all such objects1  
but as regards the use itself of those  
objects1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #aj4 
,now the uses of meats1 drinks1 and     
venereal matters differ in character4   
,wherefore there must needs be different
 virtues1 though they regard the one    
sense4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,venereal      
pleasures are more impetuous1 and are   
more oppressive on the reason than the  
pleasures of the palate3 and therefore  
they are in greater need of chastisement
 and restraint1 since if one consent to 
them this increases the force of        
concupiscence and weakens the strength  
of the mind4 ,hence ,augustine says     
7,soliloq4 i1 #aj73 ,i consider that    

nothing so casts down the manly mind    
from its heights as the fondling of     
women1 and those bodily contacts which  
belong to the married state4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,the pleasures of the other   
senses do not pertain to the maintenance
 of man's nature1 except in so far as   
they are directed to pleasures of touch4
 ,wherefore in the matter of such       
pleasures there is no other virtue      
comprised under temperance4 ,but the    
pleasures of the palate1 though directed
 somewhat to venereal pleasures1 are    
essentially directed to the preservation
 of man's life3 wherefore by their very 
nature they have a special virtue1      
although this virtue which is called    
abstinence directs its act to chastity  
as its end4   ,,fourth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aea1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,purity ,belongs ,especially to         
,chastity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that purity does not belong        
especially to chastity4 ,for ,augustine 
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i1 #ah7 that purity

 is a virtue of the soul4 ,therefore it 
is not something belonging to chastity1 
but is of itself a virtue distinct from 
chastity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 pudicitia
 7purity7 is derived from pudor1 which  
is equivalent to shame4 ,now shame1     
according to ,damascene 99,de ,fide     
,orth4 ii1 #ae1 is about a disgraceful  
act1 and this is common to all sinful   
acts4 ,therefore purity belongs no more 
to chastity than to the other virtues4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 iii1 #ab7 that every kind 
of intemperance is most deserving of    
reproach4 ,now it would seem to belong  
to purity to avoid all that is deserving
 of reproach4 ,therefore purity belongs 
to all the parts of temperance1 and not 
especially to chastity4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de          
,perseverantia xx73 ,we must give praise
 to purity1 that he who has ears to     
hear1 may put to none but a lawful use  
the organs intended for procreation4    
,now the use of these organs is the     

proper matter of chastity4 ,therefore   
purity belongs properly to chastity4  ,i
 answer that1 ,as stated above 7,obj4   
#b71 pudicitia 7purity7 takes its name  
from pudor1 which signifies shame4      
,hence purity must needs be properly    
about the things of which man is most   
ashamed4 ,now men are most ashamed of   
venereal acts1 as ,augustine remarks    
7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #ah71 so much so   
that even the conjugal act1 which is    
adorned by the honesty 99,cf4 ,q4 #ade  
of marriage1 is not devoid of shame3 and
 this because the movement of the organs
 of generation is not subject to the    
command of reason1 as are the movements 
of the other external members4 ,now man 
is ashamed not only of this sexual union
 but also of all the signs thereof1 as  
the ,philosopher observes 7,rhet4 ii1   
#f74 ,consequently purity regards       
venereal matters properly1 and          
especially the signs thereof1 such as   
impure looks1 kisses1 and touches4 ,and 
since the latter are more wont to be    

observed1 purity regards rather these   
external signs1 while chastity regards  
rather sexual union4 ,therefore purity  
is directed to chastity1 not as a virtue
 distinct therefrom1 but as expressing a
 circumstance of chastity4 ,nevertheless
 the one is sometimes used to designate 
the other4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine 
is here speaking of purity as           
designating chastity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,although every vice has a certain      
disgrace1 the vices of intemperance are 
especially disgraceful1 as stated above 
7,q4 #adb1 ,a4 #d74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,among the vices of intemperance1       
venereal sins are most deserving of     
reproach1 both on account of the        
insubordination of the genital organs1  
and because by these sins especially1   
the reason is absorbed4   ,,question    
#aeb  ,,of ,,virginity 7,in ,five       
,articles7  ,we must now consider       
virginity3 and under this head there are
 five points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,in what 
does virginity consist8  7#b7 ,whether  

it is lawful8  7#c7 ,whether it is a    
virtue8  7#d7 ,of its excellence in     
comparison with marriage2  7#e7 ,of its 
excellence in comparison with the other 
virtues4   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #aeb1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,virginity 
,consists in ,integrity of the ,flesh8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
virginity does not consist in integrity 
of the flesh4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de 
,nup4 et ,concup47 99,the quotation is  
from ,de ,sancta ,virgin4 xiii that     
virginity is the continual meditation on
 incorruption in a corruptible flesh4   
,but meditation does not concern the    
flesh4 ,therefore virginity is not      
situated in the flesh4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 virginity denotes a kind of   
purity4 ,now ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 
,dei i1 #ah7 that purity dwells in the  
soul4 ,therefore virginity is not       
incorruption of the flesh4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 the integrity of the flesh    
would seem to consist in the seal of    
virginal purity4 ,yet sometimes the seal

 is broken without loss of virginity4   
,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei i1 
#ah7 that those organs may be injured   
through being wounded by mischance4     
,physicians1 too1 sometimes do for the  
sake of health that which makes one     
shudder to see3 and a midwife has been  
known to destroy by touch the proof of  
virginity that she sought4 ,and he adds3
 ,nobody1 ,i think1 would be so foolish 
as to deem this maiden to have forfeited
 even bodily sanctity1 though she lost  
the integrity of that organ4 ,therefore 
virginity does not consist in           
incorruption of the flesh4  ,obj4 #d3   
,further1 corruption of the flesh       
consists chiefly in resolution of the   
semen3 and this may take place without  
copulation1 whether one be asleep or    
awake4 ,yet seemingly virginity is not  
lost without copulation3 for ,augustine 
says 7,de ,virgin4 xiii7 that virginal  
integrity and holy continency that      
refrains from all sexual intercourse is 
the portion of angels4 ,therefore       

virginity does not consist in           
incorruption of the flesh4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,virgin4 
viii7 that virginity is continence      
whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed1
 consecrated and observed in honor of   
the ,creator of both soul and flesh4  ,i
 answer that1 ,virginity takes its name 
apparently from viror 7freshness71 and  
just as a thing is described as fresh   
and retaining its freshness1 so long as 
it is not parched by excessive heat1 so 
too1 virginity denotes that the person  
possessed thereof is unseared by the    
heat of concupiscence which is          
experienced in achieving the greatest   
bodily pleasure which is that of sexual 
intercourse4 ,hence1 ,ambrose says 7,de 
,virgin4 i1 #e7 that virginal chastity  
is integrity free of pollution4  ,now   
venereal pleasures offer three points   
for consideration4 ,the first is on the 
part of the body1 viz4 the violation of 
the seal of virginity4 ,the second is   
the link between that which concerns the

 soul and that which concerns the body1 
and this is the resolution of the semen1
 causing sensible pleasure4 ,the third  
is entirely on the part of the soul1    
namely the purpose of attaining this    
pleasure4 ,of these three the first is  
accidental to the moral act1 which as   
such must be considered in reference to 
the soul4 ,the second stands in the     
relation of matter to the moral act1    
since the sensible passions are the     
matters of moral acts4 ,but the third   
stands in the position of form and      
complement1 because the essence of      
morality is perfected in that which     
concerns the reason4 ,since then        
virginity consists in freedom from the  
aforesaid corruption1 it follows that   
the integrity of the bodily organ is    
accidental to virginity2 while freedom  
from pleasure in resolution of the semen
 is related thereto materially2 and the 
purpose of perpetually abstaining from  
this pleasure is the formal and         
completive element in virginity4  ,reply

 ,obj4 #a3 ,this definition of          
,augustine's expresses directly that    
which is formal in virginity4 ,for      
meditation denotes reason's purpose2 and
 the addition perpetual does not imply  
that a virgin must always retain this   
meditation actually1 but that she should
 bear in mind the purpose of always     
persevering therein4 ,the material      
element is expressed indirectly by the  
words on incorruption in a corruptible  
body4 ,this is added to show the        
difficulty of virginity3 for if the     
flesh were incorruptible1 it would not  
be difficult to maintain a perpetual    
meditation on incorruption4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,it is true that purity1 as to
 its essence1 is in the soul2 but as to 
its matter1 it is in the body3 and it is
 the same with virginity4 ,wherefore    
,augustine says 7,de ,virgin4 viii7 that
 although virginity resides in the      
flesh1 and for this reason is a bodily  
quality1 yet it is a spiritual thing1   
which a holy continency fosters and     

preserves4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated 
above1 the integrity of a bodily organ  
is accidental to virginity1 in so far as
 a person1 through purposely abstaining 
from venereal pleasure1 retains the     
integrity of a bodily organ4 ,hence if  
the organ lose its integrity by chance  
in some other way1 this is no more      
prejudicial to virginity than being     
deprived of a hand or foot4  ,reply     
,obj4 #d3 ,pleasure resulting from      
resolution of semen may arise in two    
ways4 ,if this be the result of the     
mind's purpose1 it destroys virginity1  
whether copulation takes place or not4  
,augustine1 however1 mentions           
copulation1 because such like resolution
 is the ordinary and natural result     
thereof4 ,in another way this may happen
 beside the purpose of the mind1 either 
during sleep1 or through violence and   
without the mind's consent1 although the
 flesh derives pleasure from it1 or     
again through weakness of nature1 as in 
the case of those who are subject to a  

flow of semen4 ,in such cases virginity 
is not forfeit1 because such like       
pollution is not the result of impurity 
which excludes virginity4   ,,second    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeb1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,virginity ,is ,unlawful8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
virginity is unlawful4 ,for whatever is 
contrary to a precept of the natural law
 is unlawful4 ,now just as the words of 
,gen4 #b3af1 ,of every tree that is in  
paradise1 thou shalt eat1 indicate a    
precept of the natural law1 in reference
 to the preservation of the individual1 
so also the words of ,gen4 #a3bh1       
,increase and multiply1 and fill the    
earth1 express a precept of the natural 
law1 in reference to the preservation of
 the species4 ,therefore just as it     
would be a sin to abstain from all food1
 as this would be to act counter to the 
good of the individual1 so too it is a  
sin to abstain altogether from the act  
of procreation1 for this is to act      
against the good of the species4  ,obj4 

#b3 ,further1 whatever declines from the
 mean of virtue is apparently sinful4   
,now virginity declines from the mean of
 virtue1 since it abstains from all     
venereal pleasures3 for the ,philosopher
 says 7,ethic4 ii1 #b71 that he who     
revels in every pleasure1 and abstains  
from not even one1 is intemperate3 but  
he who refrains from all is loutish and 
insensible4 ,therefore virginity is     
something sinful4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
punishment is not due save for a vice4  
,now in olden times those were punished 
who led a celibate life1 as ,valerius   
,maximus asserts 99,dict4 ,fact4 ,mem4  
ii1 #i4 ,hence according to ,augustine  
7,de ,vera ,relig4 iii7 ,plato is said  
to have sacrificed to nature1 in order  
that he might atone for his perpetual   
continency as though it were a sin4     
,therefore virginity is a sin4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,no sin is a matter of direct 
counsel4 ,but virginity is a matter of  
direct counsel3 for it is written 7#a   
,cor4 #g3be73 ,concerning virgins ,i    

have no commandment of the ,lord3 but ,i
 give counsel4 ,therefore virginity is  
not an unlawful thing4  ,i answer that1 
,in human acts1 those are sinful which  
are against right reason4 ,now right    
reason requires that things directed to 
an end should be used in a measure      
proportionate to that end4 ,again1 man's
 good is threefold as stated in ,ethic4 
i1 #h2 one consisting in external       
things1 for instance riches2 another1   
consisting in bodily goods2 the third1  
consisting in the goods of the soul     
among which the goods of the            
contemplative life take precedence of   
the goods of the active life1 as the    
,philosopher shows 7,ethic4 x1 #g71 and 
as our ,lord declared 7,luke #aj3db71   
,mary hath chosen the better part4 ,of  
these goods those that are external are 
directed to those which belong to the   
body1 and those which belong to the body
 are directed to those which belong to  
the soul2 and furthermore those which   
belong to the active life are directed  

to those which belong to the life of    
contemplation4 ,accordingly1 right      
reason dictates that one use external   
goods in a measure proportionate to the 
body1 and in like manner as regards the 
rest4 ,wherefore if a man refrain from  
possessing certain things 7which        
otherwise it were good for him to       
possess71 for the sake of his body's    
good1 or of the contemplation of truth1 
this is not sinful1 but in accord with  
right reason4 ,in like manner if a man  
abstain from bodily pleasures1 in order 
more freely to give himself to the      
contemplation of truth1 this is in      
accordance with the rectitude of reason4
 ,now holy virginity refrains from all  
venereal pleasure in order more freely  
to have leisure for ,divine             
contemplation3 for the ,apostle says 7#a
 ,cor4 #g3cd73 ,the unmarried woman and 
the virgin thinketh on the things of the
 ,lord3 that she may be holy in both    
body and in spirit4 ,but she that is    
married thinketh on the things of the   

world1 how she may please her husband4  
,therefore it follows that virginity    
instead of being sinful is worthy of    
praise4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a precept    
implies a duty1 as stated above 7,q4    
#abb1 ,a4 #a74 ,now there are two kinds 
of duty4 ,there is the duty that has to 
be fulfilled by one person2 and a duty  
of this kind cannot be set aside without
 sin4 ,the other duty has to be         
fulfilled by the multitude1 and the     
fulfilment of this kind of duty is not  
binding on each one of the multitude4   
,for the multitude has many obligations 
which cannot be discharged by the       
individual2 but are fulfilled by one    
person doing this1 and another doing    
that4 ,accordingly the precept of       
natural law which binds man to eat must 
needs be fulfilled by each individual1  
otherwise the individual cannot be      
sustained4 ,on the other hand1 the      
precept of procreation regards the whole
 multitude of men1 which needs not only 
to multiply in body1 but also to advance

 spiritually4 ,wherefore sufficient     
provision is made for the human         
multitude1 if some betake themselves to 
carnal procreation1 while others        
abstaining from this betake themselves  
to the contemplation of ,divine things1 
for the beauty and welfare of the whole 
human race4 ,thus too in an army1 some  
take sentry duty1 others are            
standard-bearers1 and others fight with 
the sword3 yet all these things are     
necessary for the multitude1 although   
they cannot be done by one person4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the person who1 beside
 the dictate of right reason1 abstains  
from all pleasures through aversion1 as 
it were1 for pleasure as such1 is       
insensible as a country lout4 ,but a    
virgin does not refrain from every      
pleasure1 but only from that which is   
venereal3 and abstains therefrom        
according to right reason1 as stated    
above4 ,now the mean of virtue is fixed 
with reference1 not to quantity but to  
right reason1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1  

#f3 wherefore it is said of the         
magnanimous 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that in    
point of quantity he goes to the        
extreme1 but in point of becomingness he
 follows the mean4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,laws are framed according to what      
occurs more frequently4 ,now it seldom  
happened in olden times that anyone     
refrained from all venereal pleasure    
through love of the contemplation of    
truth3 as ,plato alone is related to    
have done4 ,hence it was not through    
thinking this a sin1 that he offered    
sacrifice1 but because he yielded to the
 false opinion of his fellow countrymen1
 as ,augustine remarks 7,de ,vera       
,relig4 iii74   ,,third ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeb1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,virginity ,is a ,virtue8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that virginity is not
 a virtue4 ,for no virtue is in us by   
nature1 as the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 ii1 #a74 ,now virginity is in  
us by nature1 since all are virgins when
 born4 ,therefore virginity is not a    

virtue4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever has
 one virtue has all virtues1 as stated  
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a74 ,yet  
some have other virtues without having  
virginity3 else1 since none can go to   
the heavenly kingdom without virtue1 no 
one could go there without virginity1   
which would involve the condemnation of 
marriage4 ,therefore virginity is not a 
virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every      
virtue is recovered by penance4 ,but    
virginity is not recovered by penance3  
wherefore ,jerome says 99,ep4 xxii ad   
,eustoch43 ,other things ,god can do1   
but ,he cannot restore the virgin after 
her downfall4 ,therefore seemingly      
virginity is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #d3   
,further1 no virtue is lost without sin4
 ,yet virginity is lost without sin1    
namely by marriage4 ,therefore virginity
 is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1  
virginity is condivided with widowhood  
and conjugal purity4 ,but neither of    
these is a virtue4 ,therefore virginity 
is not a virtue4  ,on the contrary1     

,ambrose says 7,de ,virgin4 i1 #c73     
,love of virginity moves us to say      
something about virginity1 lest by      
passing it over we should seem to cast a
 slight on what is a virtue of high     
degree4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,a4 #a71 the formal and          
completive element in virginity is the  
purpose of abstaining from venereal     
pleasure1 which purpose is rendered     
praiseworthy by its end1 in so far1 to  
wit1 as this is done in order to have   
leisure for ,divine things3 while the   
material element in virginity is        
integrity of the flesh free of all      
experience of venereal pleasure4 ,now it
 is manifest that where a good action   
has a special matter through having a   
special excellence1 there is a special  
kind of virtue3 for example1            
magnificence which is about great       
expenditure is for this reason a special
 virtue distinct from liberality1 which 
is about all uses of money in general4  
,now to keep oneself free from the      

experience of venereal pleasure has an  
excellence of its own deserving of      
greater praise than keeping oneself free
 from inordinate venereal pleasure4     
,wherefore virginity is a special virtue
 being related to chastity as           
magnificence to liberality4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,men have from their birth    
that which is material in virginity1    
namely integrity of the flesh and       
freedom from venereal experience4 ,but  
they have not that which is formal in   
virginity1 namely the purpose of        
safeguarding this integrity for ,god's  
sake1 which purpose gives virginity its 
character of virtue4 ,hence ,augustine  
says 7,de ,virgin4 xi73 ,nor do we      
praise virgins for being virgins1 but1  
because their virginity is consecrated  
to ,god by holy continency4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,virtues are connected        
together by reason of that which is     
formal in them1 namely charity1 or by   
reason of prudence1 as stated above 7,q4
 #abi1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b71 but not by reason

 of that which is material in them4 ,for
 nothing hinders a virtuous man from    
providing the matter of one virtue1 and 
not the matter of another virtue3 thus a
 poor man has the matter of temperance1 
but not that of magnificence4 ,it is in 
this way that one who has the other     
virtues lacks the matter of virginity1  
namely the aforesaid integrity of the   
flesh3 nevertheless he can have that    
which is formal in virginity1 his mind  
being so prepared that he has the       
purpose of safeguarding this same       
integrity of the flesh1 should it be    
fitting for him to do so3 even as a poor
 man may be so prepared in mind as to   
have the purpose of being magnificent in
 his expenditure1 were he in a position 
to do so3 or again as a prosperous man  
is so prepared in mind as to purpose    
bearing misfortune with equanimity3     
without which preparedness of the mind  
no man can be virtuous4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,virtue can be recovered by penance 
as regards that which is formal in      

virtue1 but not as to that which is     
material therein4 ,for if a magnificent 
man has squandered all his wealth he    
does not recover his riches by repenting
 of his sin4 ,in like manner a person   
who has lost virginity by sin1 recovers 
by repenting1 not the matter of         
virginity but the purpose of virginity4 
,as regards the matter of virginity     
there is that which can be miraculously 
restored by ,god1 namely the integrity  
of the organ1 which we hold to be       
accidental to virginity3 while there is 
something else which cannot be restored 
even by miracle1 to wit1 that one who   
has experienced venereal lust should    
cease to have had that experience4 ,for 
,god cannot make that which is done not 
to have been done1 as stated in the     
,first ,part 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #d74  ,reply 
,obj4 #d3 ,virginity as a virtue denotes
 the purpose1 confirmed by vow1 of      
observing perpetual integrity4 ,for     
,augustine says 7,de ,virgin4 viii7 that
 by virginity1 integrity of the flesh is

 vowed1 consecrated and observed in     
honor of the ,creator of both soul and  
flesh4 ,hence virginity1 as a virtue1 is
 never lost without sin4  ,reply ,obj4  
#e3 ,conjugal chastity is deserving of  
praise merely because it abstains from  
unlawful pleasures3 hence no excellence 
attaches to it above that of chastity in
 general4 ,widowhood1 however1 adds     
something to chastity in general2 but it
 does not attain to that which is       
perfect in this matter1 namely to entire
 freedom from venereal pleasure2        
virginity alone achieves this4          
,wherefore virginity alone is accounted 
a virtue above chastity1 even as        
magnificence is reckoned above          
liberality4   ,,fourth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeb1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,virginity ,is ,more ,excellent ,than   
,marriage8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that virginity is not more         
excellent than marriage4 ,for ,augustine
 says 7,de ,bono ,conjug4 xxi73         
,continence was equally meritorious in  

,john who remained unmarried and        
,abraham who begot children4 ,now a     
greater virtue has greater merit4       
,therefore virginity is not a greater   
virtue than conjugal chastity4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 the praise accorded a     
virtuous man depends on his virtue4 ,if1
 then1 virginity were preferable to     
conjugal continence1 it would seem to   
follow that every virgin is to be       
praised more than any married woman4    
,but this is untrue4 ,therefore         
virginity is not preferable to marriage4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the common good   
takes precedence of the private good1   
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
i1 #b74 ,now marriage is directed to the
 common good3 for ,augustine says 7,de  
,bono ,conjug4 xvi73 ,what food is to a 
man's wellbeing1 such is sexual         
intercourse to the welfare of the human 
race4 ,on the other hand1 virginity is  
ordered to the individual good1 namely  
in order to avoid what the ,apostle     
calls the tribulation of the flesh1 to  

which married people are subject 7#a    
,cor4 #g3bh74 ,therefore virginity is   
not greater than conjugal continence4   
,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de  
,virgin4 xix73 ,both solid reason and   
the authority of ,holy ,writ show that  
neither is marriage sinful1 nor is it to
 be equaled to the good of virginal     
continence or even to that of widowhood4
  ,i answer that1 ,according to ,jerome 
7,contra ,jovin4 i7 the error of        
,jovinian consisted in holding virginity
 not to be preferable to marriage4 ,this
 error is refuted above all by the      
example of ,christ ,who both chose a    
virgin for ,his mother1 and remained    
,himself a virgin1 and by the teaching  
of the ,apostle who 7#a ,cor4 #g7       
counsels virginity as the greater good4 
,it is also refuted by reason1 both     
because a ,divine good takes precedence 
of a human good1 and because the good of
 the soul is preferable to the good of  
the body1 and again because the good of 
the contemplative life is better than   

that of the active life4 ,now virginity 
is directed to the good of the soul in  
respect of the contemplative life1 which
 consists in thinking on the things of  
,god ,vulg43 'the ,lord'1 whereas       
marriage is directed to the good of the 
body1 namely the bodily increase of the 
human race1 and belongs to the active   
life1 since the man and woman who       
embrace the married life have to think  
on the things of the world1 as the      
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #g3cd74 ,without
 doubt therefore virginity is preferable
 to conjugal continence4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,merit is measured not only by the  
kind of action1 but still more by the   
mind of the agent4 ,now ,abraham had a  
mind so disposed1 that he was prepared  
to observe virginity1 if it were in     
keeping with the times for him to do so4
 ,wherefore in him conjugal continence  
was equally meritorious with the        
virginal continence of ,john1 as regards
 the essential reward1 but not as       
regards the accidental reward4 ,hence   

,augustine says 7,de ,bono ,conjug4 xxi7
 that both the celibacy of ,john and the
 marriage of ,abraham fought ,christ's  
battle in keeping with the difference of
 the times3 but ,john was continent even
 in deed1 whereas ,abraham was continent
 only in habit4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3       
,though virginity is better than        
conjugal continence1 a married person   
may be better than a virgin for two     
reasons4 ,first1 on the part of chastity
 itself2 if to wit1 the married person  
is more prepared in mind to observe     
virginity1 if it should be expedient1   
than the one who is actually a virgin4  
,hence ,augustine 7,de ,bono ,conjug4   
xxii7 charges the virgin to say3 ,i am  
no better than ,abraham1 although the   
chastity of celibacy is better than the 
chastity of marriage4 ,further on he    
gives the reason for this3 ,for what ,i 
do now1 he would have done better1 if it
 were fitting for him to do it then2 and
 what they did ,i would even do now if  
it behooved me now to do it4 ,secondly1 

because perhaps the person who is not a 
virgin has some more excellent virtue4  
,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,virgin4
 xliv73 ,whence does a virgin know the  
things that belong to the ,lord1 however
 solicitous she be about them1 if       
perchance on account of some mental     
fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom1
 whereas this woman to whom she         
delighted in preferring herself is      
already able to drink the chalice of the
 ,lord8  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the common   
good takes precedence of the private    
good1 if it be of the same genus3 but it
 may be that the private good is better 
generically4 ,it is thus that the       
virginity that is consecrated to ,god is
 preferable to carnal fruitfulness4     
,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,virgin4    
ix73 ,it must be confessed that the     
fruitfulness of the flesh1 even of those
 women who in these times seek naught   
else from marriage but children in order
 to make them servants of ,christ1      
cannot compensate for lost virginity4   

,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeb1  
,art4 #e  ,whether ,virginity ,is the   
,greatest of ,virtues8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that virginity is the    
greatest of virtues4 ,for ,cyprian says 
7,de ,virgin4 99,de ,habitu ,virg473 ,we
 address ourselves now to the virgins4  
,sublime is their glory1 but no less    
exalted is their vocation4 ,they are a  
flower of the ,church's sowing1 the     
pride and ornament of spiritual grace1  
the most honored portion of ,christ's   
flock4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a greater   
reward is due to the greater virtue4    
,now the greatest reward is due to      
virginity1 namely the hundredfold fruit1
 according to a gloss on ,matt4 #ac3bc4 
,therefore virginity is the greatest of 
the virtues4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the   
more a virtue conforms us to ,christ1   
the greater it is4 ,now virginity above 
all conforms us to ,christ2 for it is   
declared in the ,apocalypse 7#ad3d7 that
 virgins follow the ,lamb whithersoever 
,he goeth1 and 7,apoc4 #ad3c7 that they 

sing a new canticle1 which no other man 
could say4 ,therefore virginity is the  
greatest of the virtues4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,virgin4 
xlvi73 ,no one1 methinks1 would dare    
prefer virginity to martyrdom1 and 7,de 
,virgin4 xlv73 ,the authority of the    
,church informs the faithful in no      
uncertain manner1 so that they know in  
what place the martyrs and the holy     
virgins who have departed this life are 
commemorated in the ,sacrament of the   
,altar4 ,by this we are given to        
understand that martyrdom1 and also the 
monastic state1 are preferable to       
virginity4  ,i answer that1 ,a thing may
 excel all others in two ways4 ,first1  
in some particular genus3 and thus      
virginity is most excellent1 namely in  
the genus of chastity1 since it         
surpasses the chastity both of widowhood
 and of marriage4 ,and because          
comeliness is ascribed to chastity      
antonomastically1 it follows that       
surpassing beauty is ascribed to        

chastity4 ,wherefore ,ambrose says 7,de 
,virgin4 i1 #g73 ,can anyone esteem any 
beauty greater than a virgin's1 since   
she is beloved of her ,king1 approved by
 her ,judge1 dedicated to her ,lord1    
consecrated to her ,god8 ,secondly1 a   
thing may be most excellent simply1 and 
in this way virginity is not the most   
excellent of the virtues4 ,because the  
end always excels that which is directed
 to the end2 and the more effectively a 
thing is directed to the end1 the better
 it is4 ,now the end which renders      
virginity praiseworthy is that one may  
have leisure for ,divine things1 as     
stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,wherefore the   
theological virtues as well as the      
virtue of religion1 the acts of which   
consist in being occupied about ,divine 
things1 are preferable to virginity4    
,moreover1 martyrs work more mightily in
 order to cleave to ,god--since for this
 end they hold their own life in        
contempt2 and those who dwell in        
monasteries--since for this end they    

give up their own will and all that they
 may possess--than virgins who renounce 
venereal pleasure for that same purpose4
 ,therefore virginity is not simply the 
greatest of virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,virgins are the more honored portion of
 ,christ's flock1 and their glory more  
sublime in comparison with widows and   
married women4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the   
hundredfold fruit is ascribed to        
virginity1 according to ,jerome 99,ep4  
cxxiii ad ,ageruch41 on account of its  
superiority to widowhood1 to which the  
sixtyfold fruit is ascribed1 and to     
marriage1 to which is ascribed the      
thirtyfold fruit4 ,but according to     
,augustine 7,de ,,qq4 ,evang4 i1 #i71   
the hundredfold fruit is given to       
martyrs1 the sixtyfold to virgins1 and  
the thirtyfold to married persons4      
,wherefore it does not follow that      
virginity is simply the greatest of     
virtues1 but only in comparison with    
other degrees of chastity4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,virgins follow the ,lamb          

whithersoever ,he goeth1 because they   
imitate ,christ1 by integrity not only  
of the mind but also of the flesh1 as   
,augustine says 7,de ,virgin4 xxvii74   
,wherefore they follow the ,lamb in more
 ways1 but this does not imply that they
 follow more closely1 because other     
virtues make us cleave to ,god more     
closely by imitation of the mind4 ,the  
new hymn which virgins alone sing1 is   
their joy at having preserved integrity 
of the flesh4   ,,question #aec  ,,of   
,,lust 7,in ,five ,articles7  ,we must  
next consider the vice of lust which is 
opposed to chastity3 7#a7 ,lust in      
general2 7#b7 its species4 ,under the   
first head there are five points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is the matter of   
lust8  7#b7 ,whether all copulation is  
unlawful8  7#c7 ,whether lust is a      
mortal sin8  7#d7 ,whether lust is a    
capital vice8  7#e7 ,concerning its     
daughters4   ,,first ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aec1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
the ,matter of ,lust ,is ,only ,venereal

 ,desires and ,pleasures8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that the matter of   
lust is not only venereal desires and   
pleasures4 ,for ,augustine says         
7,confess4 ii1 #f7 that lust affects to 
be called surfeit and abundance4 ,but   
surfeit regards meat and drink1 while   
abundance refers to riches4 ,therefore  
lust is not properly about venereal     
desires and pleasures4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 it is written 7,prov4 #bj3a73 
,wine is a lustful ,douay3 'luxurious'  
thing4 ,now wine is connected with      
pleasure of meat and drink4 ,therefore  
these would seem to be the matter of    
lust4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 lust is      
defined as the desire of wanton pleasure
 99,alexander of ,hales1 ,summ4 ,theol4 
ii1 cxvli4 ,but wanton pleasure regards 
not only venereal matters but also many 
others4 ,therefore lust is not only     
about venereal desires and pleasures4   
,on the contrary1 ,to the lustful it is 
said 7,de ,vera ,relig4 iii 99,written  
by ,st4 ,augustine73 ,he that soweth in 

the flesh1 of the flesh shall reap      
corruption4 ,now the sowing of the flesh
 refers to venereal pleasures4          
,therefore these belong to lust4  ,i    
answer that1 ,as ,isidore says 7,etym4  
x71 a lustful man is one who is         
debauched with pleasures4 ,now venereal 
pleasures above all debauch a man's     
mind4 ,therefore lust is especially     
concerned with such like pleasures4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even as temperance    
chiefly and properly applies to         
pleasures of touch1 yet consequently and
 by a kind of likeness is referred to   
other matters1 so too1 lust applies     
chiefly to venereal pleasures1 which    
more than anything else work the        
greatest havoc in a man's mind1 yet     
secondarily it applies to any other     
matters pertaining to excess4 ,hence a  
gloss on ,gal4 #e3ai says lust is any   
kind of surfeit4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,wine
 is said to be a lustful thing1 either  
in the sense in which surfeit in any    
matter is ascribed to lust1 or because  

the use of too much wine affords an     
incentive to venereal pleasure4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,although wanton pleasure     
applies to other matters1 the name of   
lust has a special application to       
venereal pleasures1 to which also       
wantonness is specially applicable1 as  
,augustine remarks 7,de ,civ4 xiv1 #ae1 
#af74   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #aec1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,no        
,venereal ,act ,can ,be ,without ,sin8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no   
venereal act can be without sin4 ,for   
nothing but sin would seem to hinder    
virtue4 ,now every venereal act is a    
great hindrance to virtue4 ,for         
,augustine says 7,soliloq4 i1 #aj73 ,i  
consider that nothing so casts down the 
manly mind from its height as the       
fondling of a woman1 and those bodily   
contacts4 ,therefore1 seemingly1 no     
venereal act is without sin4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 any excess that makes one     
forsake the good of reason is sinful1   
because virtue is corrupted by excess   

and deficiency as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 
#b4 ,now in every venereal act there is 
excess of pleasure1 since it so absorbs 
the mind1 that it is incompatible with  
the act of understanding1 as the        
,philosopher observes 7,ethic4 vii1     
#aa72 and as ,jerome 99,origen1 ,hom4 vi
 in ,num42 ,cf4 ,jerome1 ,ep4 cxxiii ad 
,ageruch4 states1 rendered the hearts of
 the prophets1 for the moment1          
insensible to the spirit of prophecy4   
,therefore no venereal act can be       
without sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the   
cause is more powerful than its effect4 
,now original sin is transmitted to     
children by concupiscence1 without which
 no venereal act is possible1 as        
,augustine declares 7,de ,nup4 et       
,concup4 i1 #bd74 ,therefore no venereal
 act can be without sin4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,bono    
,conjug4 xxv73 ,this is a sufficient    
answer to heretics1 if only they will   
understand that no sin is committed in  
that which is against neither nature1   

nor morals1 nor a commandment3 and he   
refers to the act of sexual intercourse 
between the patriarchs of old and their 
several wives4 ,therefore not every     
venereal act is a sin4  ,i answer that1 
,a sin1 in human acts1 is that which is 
against the order of reason4 ,now the   
order of reason consists in its ordering
 everything to its end in a fitting     
manner4 ,wherefore it is no sin if one1 
by the dictate of reason1 makes use of  
certain things in a fitting manner and  
order for the end to which they are     
adapted1 provided this end be something 
truly good4 ,now just as the            
preservation of the bodily nature of one
 individual is a true good1 so1 too1 is 
the preservation of the nature of the   
human species a very great good4 ,and   
just as the use of food is directed to  
the preservation of life in the         
individual1 so is the use of venereal   
acts directed to the preservation of the
 whole human race4 ,hence ,augustine    
says 7,de ,bono ,conjug4 xvi73 ,what    

food is to a man's well being1 such is  
sexual intercourse to the welfare of the
 whole human race4 ,wherefore just as   
the use of food can be without sin1 if  
it be taken in due manner and order1 as 
required for the welfare of the body1 so
 also the use of venereal acts can be   
without sin1 provided they be performed 
in due manner and order1 in keeping with
 the end of human procreation4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,a thing may be a hindrance to
 virtue in two ways4 ,first1 as regards 
the ordinary degree of virtue1 and as to
 this nothing but sin is an obstacle to 
virtue4 ,secondly1 as regards the       
perfect degree of virtue1 and as to this
 virtue may be hindered by that which is
 not a sin1 but a lesser good4 ,in this 
way sexual intercourse casts down the   
mind not from virtue1 but from the      
height1 i4e4 the perfection of virtue4  
,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,bono       
,conjug4 viii73 ,just as that was good  
which ,martha did when busy about       
serving holy men1 yet better still that 

which ,mary did in hearing the word of  
,god3 so1 too1 we praise the good of    
,susanna's conjugal chastity1 yet we    
prefer the good of the widow ,anna1 and 
much more that of the ,virgin ,mary4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#aeb1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1  
,a4 #b71 the mean of virtue depends not 
on quantity but on conformity with right
 reason3 and consequently the exceeding 
pleasure attaching to a venereal act    
directed according to reason1 is not    
opposed to the mean of virtue4          
,moreover1 virtue is not concerned with 
the amount of pleasure experienced by   
the external sense1 as this depends on  
the disposition of the body2 what       
matters is how much the interior        
appetite is affected by that pleasure4  
,nor does it follow that the act in     
question is contrary to virtue1 from the
 fact that the free act of reason in    
considering spiritual things is         
incompatible with the aforesaid         
pleasure4 ,for it is not contrary to    

virtue1 if the act of reason be         
sometimes interrupted for something that
 is done in accordance with reason1 else
 it would be against virtue for a person
 to set himself to sleep4 ,that venereal
 concupiscence and pleasure are not     
subject to the command and moderation of
 reason1 is due to the punishment of the
 first sin1 inasmuch as the reason1 for 
rebelling against ,god1 deserved that   
its body should rebel against it1 as    
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiii1   
#ac74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine  
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiii1 #ac71 the    
child1 shackled with original sin1 is   
born of fleshly concupiscence 7which is 
not imputed as sin to the regenerate7 as
 of a daughter of sin4 ,hence it does   
not follow that the act in question is a
 sin1 but that it contains something    
penal resulting from the first sin4     
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aec1  
,art4 #c  ,whether the ,lust ,that ,is  
,about ,venereal ,acts ,can ,be a ,sin8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that lust 

about venereal acts cannot be a sin4    
,for the venereal act consists in the   
emission of semen which is the surplus  
from food1 according to the ,philosopher
 7,de ,gener4 ,anim4 i1 #ah74 ,but there
 is no sin attaching to the emission of 
other superfluities4 ,therefore neither 
can there be any sin in venereal acts4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 everyone can        
lawfully make what use he pleases of    
what is his4 ,but in the venereal act a 
man uses only what is his own1 except   
perhaps in adultery or rape4 ,therefore 
there can be no sin in venereal acts1   
and consequently lust is no sin4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 every sin has an opposite 
vice4 ,but1 seemingly1 no vice is       
opposed to lust4 ,therefore lust is not 
a sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,the cause is 
more powerful than its effect4 ,now wine
 is forbidden on account of lust1       
according to the saying of the ,apostle 
7,eph4 #e3ah71 ,be not drunk with wine  
wherein is lust ,douay3 'luxury'4       
,therefore lust is forbidden4  ,further1

 it is numbered among the works of the  
flesh3 ,gal4 #e3ai ,douay3 'luxury'4  ,i
 answer that1 ,the more necessary a     
thing is1 the more it behooves one to   
observe the order of reason in its      
regard2 wherefore the more sinful it    
becomes if the order of reason be       
forsaken4 ,now the use of venereal acts1
 as stated in the foregoing ,article1 is
 most necessary for the common good1    
namely the preservation of the human    
race4 ,wherefore there is the greatest  
necessity for observing the order of    
reason in this matter3 so that if       
anything be done in this connection     
against the dictate of reason's         
ordering1 it will be a sin4 ,now lust   
consists essentially in exceeding the   
order and mode of reason in the matter  
of venereal acts4 ,wherefore without any
 doubt lust is a sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,as the ,philosopher says in the same   
book 7,de ,gener4 ,anim4 i1 #ah71 the   
semen is a surplus that is needed4 ,for 
it is said to be superfluous1 because it

 is the residue from the action of the  
nutritive power1 yet it is needed for   
the work of the generative power4 ,but  
the other superfluities of the human    
body are such as not to be needed1 so   
that it matters not how they are        
emitted1 provided one observe the       
decencies of social life4 ,it is        
different with the emission of semen1   
which should be accomplished in a manner
 befitting the end for which it is      
needed4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the       
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #f3bj7 in       
speaking against lust1 ,you are bought  
with a great price3 glorify and bear    
,god in your body4 ,wherefore by        
inordinately using the body through lust
 a man wrongs ,god ,who is the ,supreme 
,lord of our body4 ,hence ,augustine    
says 7,de ,decem4 ,chord4 #aj 99,serm4  
ix 7xcvi de ,temp4773 ,god ,who thus    
governs ,his servants for their good1   
not for ,his1 made this order and       
commandment1 lest unlawful pleasures    
should destroy ,his temple which thou   

hast begun to be4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the
 opposite of lust is not found in many1 
since men are more inclined to pleasure4
 ,yet the contrary vice is comprised    
under insensibility1 and occurs in one  
who has such a dislike for sexual       
intercourse as not to pay the marriage  
debt4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #aec1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,lust ,is a
 ,capital ,vice8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
seems that lust is not a capital vice4  
,for lust is apparently the same as     
uncleanness1 according to a gloss on    
,eph4 #e3c 7,cf4 #b ,cor4 #ab3ba74 ,but 
uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony1  
according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1    
#de74 ,therefore lust is not a capital  
vice4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,isidore says
 7,de ,summo ,bono ii1 #ci7 that as     
pride of mind leads to the depravity of 
lust1 so does humility of mind safeguard
 the chastity of the flesh4 ,now it is  
seemingly contrary to the nature of a   
capital vice to arise from another vice4
 ,therefore lust is not a capital vice4 

,obj4 #c3 ,further1 lust is caused by   
despair1 according to ,eph4 #d3ai1 ,who 
despairing1 have given themselves up to 
lasciviousness4 ,but despair is not a   
capital vice2 indeed1 it is accounted a 
daughter of sloth1 as stated above 7,q4 
#ce1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b74 ,much less1        
therefore1 is lust a capital vice4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1   
#de7 places lust among the capital      
vices4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above
 7,q4 #adh1 ,a4 #e2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1   
,,aa4 #c1 #d71 a capital vice is one    
that has a very desirable end1 so that  
through desire for that end1 a man      
proceeds to commit many sins1 all of    
which are said to arise from that vice  
as from a principal vice4 ,now the end  
of lust is venereal pleasure1 which is  
very great4 ,wherefore this pleasure is 
very desirable as regards the sensitive 
appetite1 both on account of the        
intensity of the pleasure1 and because  
such like concupiscence is connatural to
 man4 ,therefore it is evident that lust

 is a capital vice4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,as stated above 7,q4 #adh1 ,a4 #f71    
according to some1 the uncleanness which
 is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a
 certain uncleanness of the body1 and   
thus the objection is not to the point4 
,if1 however1 it denote the uncleanness 
of lust1 we must reply that it is caused
 by gluttony materially--in so far as   
gluttony provides the bodily matter of  
lust--and not under the aspect of final 
cause1 in which respect chiefly the     
capital vices are said to be the cause  
of others4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated 
above 7,q4 #acb1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a71 when we
 were treating of vainglory1 pride is   
accounted the common mother of all sins1
 so that even the capital vices         
originate therefrom4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,certain persons refrain from lustful   
pleasures chiefly through hope of the   
glory to come1 which hope is removed by 
despair1 so that the latter is a cause  
of lust1 as removing an obstacle        
thereto1 not as its direct cause2       

whereas this is seemingly necessary for 
a capital vice4   ,,fifth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aec1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
the ,daughters of ,lust ,are ,fittingly 
,described8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that the daughters of lust are     
unfittingly reckoned to be blindness of 
mind1 thoughtlessness1 inconstancy1     
rashness1 self-love1 hatred of ,god1    
love of this world and abhorrence or    
despair of a future world4 ,for mental  
blindness1 thoughtlessness and rashness 
pertain to imprudence1 which is to be   
found in every sin1 even as prudence is 
in every virtue4 ,therefore they should 
not be reckoned especially as daughters 
of lust4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 constancy 
is reckoned a part of fortitude1 as     
stated above 7,q4 #abh1 ad #f2 ,q4 #acg1
 ,a4 #c74 ,but lust is contrary1 not to 
fortitude but to temperance4 ,therefore 
inconstancy is not a daughter of lust4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,self-love extending
 to the contempt of ,god is the origin  
of every sin1 as ,augustine says 7,de   

,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #bh74 ,therefore it     
should not be accounted a daughter of   
lust4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,isidore     
99,,qq4 in ,deut41 qu4 xvi mentions     
four1 namely1 obscene1 scurrilous1      
wanton and foolish talking4 ,there the  
aforesaid enumeration would seem to be  
superfluous4  ,on the contrary1 stands  
the authority of ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1
 #de74  ,i answer that1 ,when the lower 
powers are strongly moved towards their 
objects1 the result is that the higher  
powers are hindered and disordered in   
their acts4 ,now the effect of the vice 
of lust is that the lower appetite1     
namely the concupiscible1 is most       
vehemently intent on its object1 to wit1
 the object of pleasure1 on account of  
the vehemence of the pleasure4          
,consequently the higher powers1 namely 
the reason and the will1 are most       
grievously disordered by lust4  ,now the
 reason has four acts in matters of     
action4 ,first there is simple          
understanding1 which apprehends some end

 as good1 and this act is hindered by   
lust1 according to ,dan4 #ac3ef1 ,beauty
 hath deceived thee1 and lust hath      
perverted thy heart4 ,in this respect we
 have blindness of mind4 ,the second act
 is counsel about what is to be done for
 the sake of the end3 and this is also  
hindered by the concupiscence of lust4  
,hence ,terence says 7,eunuch41 act #a1 
sc4 #a71 speaking of lecherous love3    
,this thing admits of neither counsel   
nor moderation1 thou canst not control  
it by counseling4 ,in this respect there
 is rashness1 which denotes absence of  
counsel1 as stated above 7,q4 #ec1 ,a4  
#c74 ,the third act is judgment about   
the things to be done1 and this again is
 hindered by lust4 ,for it is said of   
the lustful old men 7,dan4 #ac3i73 ,they
 perverted their own mind 4 4 4 that    
they might not 4 4 4 remember just      
judgments4 ,in this respect there is    
thoughtlessness4 ,the fourth act is the 
reason's command about the thing to be  
done1 and this also is impeded by lust1 

in so far as through being carried away 
by concupiscence1 a man is hindered from
 doing what his reason ordered to be    
done4 ,to this inconstancy must be      
referred4 99,the sentence in brackets is
 omitted in the ,leonine edition4 ,hence
 ,terence says 7,eunuch41 act #a1 sc4   
#a7 of a man who declared that he would 
leave his mistress3 ,one little false   
tear will undo those words4  ,on the    
part of the will there results a twofold
 inordinate act4 ,one is the desire for 
the end1 to which we refer self-love1   
which regards the pleasure which a man  
desires inordinately1 while on the other
 hand there is hatred of ,god1 by reason
 of ,his forbidding the desired         
pleasure4 ,the other act is the desire  
for the things directed to the end4     
,with regard to this there is love of   
this world1 whose pleasures a man       
desires to enjoy1 while on the other    
hand there is despair of a future world1
 because through being held back by     
carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain 

spiritual pleasures1 since they are     
distasteful to him4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
vi1 #e71 intemperance is the chief      
corruptive of prudence3 wherefore the   
vices opposed to prudence arise chiefly 
from lust1 which is the principal       
species of intemperance4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,the constancy which is a part of   
fortitude regards hardships and objects 
of fear2 but constancy in refraining    
from pleasures pertains to continence   
which is a part of temperance1 as stated
 above 7,q4 #adc74 ,hence the           
inconstancy which is opposed thereto is 
to be reckoned a daughter of lust4      
,nevertheless even the first named      
inconstancy arises from lust1 inasmuch  
as the latter enfeebles a man's heart   
and renders it effeminate1 according to 
,osee #d3aa1 ,fornication and wine and  
drunkenness take away the heart ,douay3 
'understanding'4 ,vegetius1 too1 says   
7,de ,re ,milit4 iii7 that the less a   
man knows of the pleasures of life1 the 

less he fears death4 ,nor is there any  
need1 as we have repeatedly stated1 for 
the daughters of a capital vice to agree
 with it in matter 7cf4 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #d1
 ad #b2 ,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #h1 ad #a2 ,q4    
#adh1 ,a4 #f74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3        
,self-love in respect of any goods that 
a man desires for himself is the common 
origin of all sins2 but in the special  
point of desiring carnal pleasures for  
oneself1 it is reckoned a daughter of   
lust4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the sins       
mentioned by ,isidore are inordinate    
external acts1 pertaining in the main to
 speech2 wherein there is a fourfold    
inordinateness4 ,first1 on account of   
the matter1 and to this we refer obscene
 words3 for since out of the abundance  
of the heart the mouth speaketh 7,matt4 
#ab3cd71 the lustful man1 whose heart is
 full of lewd concupiscences1 readily   
breaks out into lewd words4 ,secondly1  
on account of the cause3 for1 since lust
 causes thoughtlessness and rashness1   
the result is that it makes a man speak 

without weighing or giving a thought to 
his words1 which are described as       
scurrilous4 ,thirdly1 on account of the 
end3 for since the lustful man seeks    
pleasure1 he directs his speech thereto1
 and so gives utterance to wanton words4
 ,fourthly1 on account of the sentiments
 expressed by his words1 for through    
causing blindness of mind1 lust perverts
 a man's sentiments1 and so he gives way
 to foolish talking1 for instance1 by   
expressing a preference for the         
pleasures he desires to anything else4  
,,question #aed  ,,of ,,the ,,parts ,,of
 ,,lust 7,in ,twelve ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider the parts of lust1    
under which head there are twelve points
 of inquiry3  7#a7 ,into what parts is  
lust divided8  7#b7 ,whether simple     
fornication is a mortal sin8  7#c7      
,whether it is the greatest of sins8    
7#d7 ,whether there is mortal sin in    
touches1 kisses and such like seduction8
  7#e7 ,whether nocturnal pollution is a
 mortal sin8  7#f7 ,of seduction2  7#g7 

,of rape2  7#h7 ,of adultery2  7#i7 ,of 
incest2  7#aj7 ,of sacrilege2  7#aa7 ,of
 the sin against nature2  7#ab7 ,of the 
order of gravity in the aforesaid sins4 
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,six ,species ,are   
,fittingly ,assigned to ,lust8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that six  
species are unfittingly assigned to     
lust1 namely1 simple fornication1       
adultery1 incest1 seduction1 rape1 and  
the unnatural vice4 ,for diversity of   
matter does not diversify the species4  
,now the aforesaid division is made with
 regard to diversity of matter1         
according as the woman with whom a man  
has intercourse is married or a virgin1 
or of some other condition4 ,therefore  
it seems that the species of lust are   
diversified in this way4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 seemingly the species of one  
vice are not differentiated by things   
that belong to another vice4 ,now       
adultery does not differ from simple    
fornication1 save in the point of a man 

having intercourse with one who is      
another's1 so that he commits an        
injustice4 ,therefore it seems that     
adultery should not be reckoned a       
species of lust4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
just as a man may happen to have        
intercourse with a woman who is bound to
 another man by marriage1 so may it     
happen that a man has intercourse with a
 woman who is bound to ,god by vow4     
,therefore sacrilege should be reckoned 
a species of lust1 even as adultery is4 
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a married man sins  
not only if he be with another woman1   
but also if he use his own wife         
inordinately4 ,but the latter sin is    
comprised under lust4 ,therefore it     
should be reckoned among the species    
thereof4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the       
,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #ab3ba73 ,lest  
again1 when ,i come1 ,god humble me     
among you1 and ,i mourn many of them    
that sinned before1 and have not done   
penance for the uncleanness and         
fornication and lasciviousness that they

 have committed4 ,therefore it seems    
that also uncleanness and lasciviousness
 should be reckoned species of lust1 as 
well as fornication4  ,obj4 #f3         
,further1 the thing divided is not to be
 reckoned among its parts4 ,but lust is 
reckoned together with the aforesaid3   
for it is written 7,gal4 #e3ai73 ,the   
works of the flesh are manifest1 which  
are fornication1 uncleanness1 immodesty1
 lust ,douay3 'luxury'4 ,therefore it   
seems that fornication is unfittingly   
reckoned a species of lust4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,the aforesaid division is    
given in the ,decretals #cf1 qu4 i      
99,append4 ,grat4 ad can4 ,lex illa4  ,i
 answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4     
#aec1 ,a4 #c71 the sin of lust consists 
in seeking venereal pleasure not in     
accordance with right reason4 ,this may 
happen in two ways4 ,first1 in respect  
of the matter wherein this pleasure is  
sought2 secondly1 when1 whereas there is
 due matter1 other due circumstances are
 not observed4 ,and since a             

circumstance1 as such1 does not specify 
a moral act1 whose species is derived   
from its object which is also its       
matter1 it follows that the species of  
lust must be assigned with respect to   
its matter or object4  ,now this same   
matter may be discordant with right     
reason in two ways4 ,first1 because it  
is inconsistent with the end of the     
venereal act4 ,in this way1 as hindering
 the begetting of children1 there is the
 vice against nature1 which attaches to 
every venereal act from which generation
 cannot follow2 and1 as hindering the   
due upbringing and advancement of the   
child when born1 there is simple        
fornication1 which is the union of an   
unmarried man with an unmarried woman4  
,secondly1 the matter wherein the       
venereal act is consummated may be      
discordant with right reason in relation
 to other persons2 and this in two ways4
 ,first1 with regard to the woman1 with 
whom a man has connection1 by reason of 
due honor not being paid to her2 and    

thus there is incest1 which consists in 
the misuse of a woman who is related by 
consanguinity or affinity4 ,secondly1   
with regard to the person under whose   
authority the woman is placed3 and if   
she be under the authority of a husband1
 it is adultery1 if under the authority 
of her father1 it is seduction1 in the  
absence of violence1 and rape if        
violence be employed4  ,these species   
are differentiated on the part of the   
woman rather than of the man1 because in
 the venereal act the woman is passive  
and is by way of matter1 whereas the man
 is by way of agent2 and it has been    
stated above 7,obj4 #a7 that the        
aforesaid species are assigned with     
regard to a difference of matter4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the aforesaid         
diversity of matter is connected with a 
formal difference of object1 which      
difference results from different modes 
of opposition to right reason1 as stated
 above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated    
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #g71       

nothing hinders the deformities of      
different vices concurring in the one   
act1 and in this way adultery is        
comprised under lust and injustice4 ,nor
 is this deformity of injustice         
altogether accidental to lust3 since the
 lust that obeys concupiscence so far as
 to lead to injustice1 is thereby shown 
to be more grievous4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,since a woman1 by vowing continence1   
contracts a spiritual marriage with     
,god1 the sacrilege that is committed in
 the violation of such a woman is a     
spiritual adultery4 ,in like manner1 the
 other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to 
lustful matter are reduced to other     
species of lust4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the 
sin of a husband with his wife is not   
connected with undue matter1 but with   
other circumstances1 which do not       
constitute the species of a moral act1  
as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4  
#b74  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,as a gloss says 
on this passage1 uncleanness stands for 
lust against nature1 while              

lasciviousness is a man's abuse of boys1
 wherefore it would appear to pertain to
 seduction4 ,we may also reply that     
lasciviousness relates to certain acts  
circumstantial to the venereal act1 for 
instance kisses1 touches1 and so forth4 
,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,according to a gloss  
on this passage lust there signifies any
 kind of excess4   ,,second ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,simple ,fornication ,is a ,mortal ,sin8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
simple fornication is not a mortal sin4 
,for things that come under the same    
head would seem to be on a par with one 
another4 ,now fornication comes under   
the same head as things that are not    
mortal sins3 for it is written 7,acts   
#ae3bi73 ,that you abstain from things  
sacrificed to idols1 and from blood1 and
 from things strangled1 and from        
fornication4 ,but there is not mortal   
sin in these observances1 according to  
#a ,tim4 #d3d1 ,nothing is rejected that
 is received with thanksgiving4         

,therefore fornication is not a mortal  
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no mortal sin 
is the matter of a ,divine precept4 ,but
 the ,lord commanded 7,osee #a3b73 ,go  
take thee a wife of fornications1 and   
have of her children of fornications4   
,therefore fornication is not a mortal  
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no mortal sin 
is mentioned in ,holy ,writ without     
disapprobation4 ,yet simple fornication 
is mentioned without disapprobation by  
,holy ,writ in connection with the      
patriarchs4 ,thus we read 7,gen4 #af3d7 
that ,abraham went in to his handmaid   
,agar2 and further on 7,gen4 #cj3e1 #i7 
that ,jacob went in to ,bala and ,zelpha
 the handmaids of his wives2 and again  
7,gen4 #ch3ah7 that ,juda was with      
,thamar whom he thought to be a harlot4 
,therefore simple fornication is not a  
mortal sin4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 every  
mortal sin is contrary to charity4 ,but 
simple fornication is not contrary to   
charity1 neither as regards the love of 
,god1 since it is not a sin directly    

against ,god1 nor as regards the love of
 our neighbor1 since thereby no one is  
injured4 ,therefore simple fornication  
is not a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #e3         
,further1 every mortal sin leads to     
eternal perdition4 ,but simple          
fornication has not this result3 because
 a gloss of ,ambrose 99,the quotation is
 from the ,gloss of ,peter ,lombard1 who
 refers it to ,st4 ,ambrose3 whereas it 
is from ,hilary the deacon on #a ,tim4  
#d3h1 ,godliness is profitable to all   
things1 says3 ,the whole of ,christian  
teaching is summed up in mercy and      
godliness3 if a man conforms to this1   
even though he gives way to the         
inconstancy of the flesh1 doubtless he  
will be punished1 but he will not       
perish4 ,therefore simple fornication is
 not a mortal sin4  ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 
,augustine says 7,de ,bono ,conjug4 xvi7
 that what food is to the well-being of 
the body1 such is sexual intercourse to 
the welfare of the human race4 ,but     
inordinate use of food is not always a  

mortal sin4 ,therefore neither is all   
inordinate sexual intercourse2 and this 
would seem to apply especially to simple
 fornication1 which is the least        
grievous of the aforesaid species4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,tob4     
#d3ac73 ,take heed to keep thyself 4 4 4
 from all fornication1 and beside thy   
wife never endure to know a crime4 ,now 
crime denotes a mortal sin4 ,therefore  
fornication and all intercourse with    
other than one's wife is a mortal sin4  
,further1 nothing but mortal sin debars 
a man from ,god's kingdom4 ,but         
fornication debars him1 as shown by the 
words of the ,apostle 7,gal4 #e3ba71 who
 after mentioning fornication and       
certain other vices1 adds3 ,they who do 
such things shall not obtain the kingdom
 of ,god4 ,therefore simple fornication 
is a mortal sin4  ,further1 it is       
written in the ,decretals 7,,xxii1 qu4  
i1 can4 ,praedicandum73 ,they should    
know that the same penance is to be     
enjoined for perjury as for adultery1   

fornication1 and wilful murder and other
 criminal offenses4 ,therefore simple   
fornication is a criminal or mortal sin4
  ,i answer that1 ,without any doubt we 
must hold simple fornication to be a    
mortal sin1 notwithstanding that a gloss
 99,st4 ,augustine1 ,,qq4 in ,deut41 qu4
 #cg on ,deut4 #bc3ag1 says3 ,this is a 
prohibition against going with whores1  
whose vileness is venial4 ,for instead  
of venial it should be venal1 since such
 is the wanton's trade4 ,in order to    
make this evident1 we must take note    
that every sin committed directly       
against human life is a mortal sin4 ,now
 simple fornication implies an          
inordinateness that tends to injure the 
life of the offspring to be born of this
 union4 ,for we find in all animals     
where the upbringing of the offspring   
needs care of both male and female1 that
 these come together not                
indeterminately1 but the male with a    
certain female1 whether one or several2 
such is the case with all birds3 while1 

on the other hand1 among those animals1 
where the female alone suffices for the 
offspring's upbringing1 the union is    
indeterminate1 as in the case of dogs   
and like animals4 ,now it is evident    
that the upbringing of a human child    
requires not only the mother's care for 
his nourishment1 but much more the care 
of his father as guide and guardian1 and
 under whom he progresses in goods both 
internal and external4 ,hence human     
nature rebels against an indeterminate  
union of the sexes and demands that a   
man should be united to a determinate   
woman and should abide with her a long  
time or even for a whole lifetime4      
,hence it is that in the human race the 
male has a natural solicitude for the   
certainty of offspring1 because on him  
devolves the upbringing of the child3   
and this certainly would cease if the   
union of sexes were indeterminate4      
,this union with a certain definite     
woman is called matrimony2 which for the
 above reason is said to belong to the  

natural law4 ,since1 however1 the union 
of the sexes is directed to the common  
good of the whole human race1 and common
 goods depend on the law for their      
determination1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b71 it follows that this 
union of man and woman1 which is called 
matrimony1 is determined by some law4   
,what this determination is for us will 
be stated in the ,third ,part of this   
work 7,suppl41 ,q4 #ej1 seqq471 where we
 shall treat of the sacrament of        
matrimony4 ,wherefore1 since fornication
 is an indeterminate union of the sexes1
 as something incompatible with         
matrimony1 it is opposed to the good of 
the child's upbringing1 and consequently
 it is a mortal sin4  ,nor does it      
matter if a man having knowledge of a   
woman by fornication1 make sufficient   
provision for the upbringing of the     
child3 because a matter that comes under
 the determination of the law is judged 
according to what happens in general1   
and not according to what may happen in 

a particular case4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,fornication is reckoned in conjunction 
with these things1 not as being on a par
 with them in sinfulness1 but because   
the matters mentioned there were equally
 liable to cause dispute between ,jews  
and ,gentiles1 and thus prevent them    
from agreeing unanimously4 ,for among   
the ,gentiles1 fornication was not      
deemed unlawful1 on account of the      
corruption of natural reason3 whereas   
the ,jews1 taught by the ,divine law1   
considered it to be unlawful4 ,the other
 things mentioned were loathsome to the 
,jews through custom introduced by the  
law into their daily life4 ,hence the   
,apostles forbade these things to the   
,gentiles1 not as though they were      
unlawful in themselves1 but because they
 were loathsome to the ,jews1 as stated 
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #d1 ad    
#c74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fornication is  
said to be a sin1 because it is contrary
 to right reason4 ,now man's reason is  
right1 in so far as it is ruled by the  

,divine ,will1 the first and supreme    
rule4 ,wherefore that which a man does  
by ,god's will and in obedience to ,his 
command1 is not contrary to right       
reason1 though it may seem contrary to  
the general order of reason3 even so1   
that which is done miraculously by the  
,divine power is not contrary to nature1
 though it be contrary to the usual     
course of nature4 ,therefore just as    
,abraham did not sin in being willing to
 slay his innocent son1 because he      
obeyed ,god1 although considered in     
itself it was contrary to right human   
reason in general1 so1 too1 ,osee sinned
 not in committing fornication by ,god's
 command4 ,nor should such a copulation 
be strictly called fornication1 though  
it be so called in reference to the     
general course of things4 ,hence        
,augustine says 7,confess4 iii1 #h73    
,when ,god commands a thing to be done  
against the customs or agreement of any 
people1 though it were never done by    
them heretofore1 it is to be done2 and  

afterwards he adds3 ,for as among the   
powers of human society1 the greater    
authority is obeyed in preference to the
 lesser1 so must ,god in preference to  
all4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,abraham and     
,jacob went in to their handmaidens with
 no purpose of fornication1 as we shall 
show further on when we treat of        
matrimony 7,suppl41 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #e1 ad 
#b74 ,as to ,juda there is no need to   
excuse him1 for he also caused ,joseph  
to be sold4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,simple   
fornication is contrary to the love of  
our neighbor1 because it is opposed to  
the good of the child to be born1 as we 
have shown1 since it is an act of       
generation accomplished in a manner     
disadvantageous to the future child4    
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a person1 who1 while  
given to works of piety1 yields to the  
inconstancy of the flesh1 is freed from 
eternal loss1 in so far as these works  
dispose him to receive the grace to     
repent1 and because by such works he    
makes satisfaction for his past         

inconstancy2 but not so as to be freed  
by pious works1 if he persist in carnal 
inconstancy impenitent until death4     
,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,one copulation may    
result in the begetting of a man1       
wherefore inordinate copulation1 which  
hinders the good of the future child1 is
 a mortal sin as to the very genus of   
the act1 and not only as to the         
inordinateness of concupiscence4 ,on the
 other hand1 one meal does not hinder   
the good of a man's whole life1         
wherefore the act of gluttony is not a  
mortal sin by reason of its genus4 ,it  
would1 however1 be a mortal sin1 if a   
man were knowingly to partake of a food 
which would alter the whole condition of
 his life1 as was the case with ,adam4  
,nor is it true that fornication is the 
least of the sins comprised under lust1 
for the marriage act that is done out of
 sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin4     
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1  
,art4 #c  ,whether ,fornication ,is the 
,most ,grievous of ,sins8  ,objection   

#a3 ,it would seem that fornication is  
the most grievous of sins4 ,for         
seemingly a sin is the more grievous    
according as it proceeds from a greater 
sensuous pleasure4 ,now the greatest    
sensuous pleasure is in fornication1 for
 a gloss on #a ,cor4 #g3i says that the 
flame of sensuous pleasure is most      
fierce in lust4 ,therefore it seems that
 fornication is the gravest of sins4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a sin is the more   
grievous that is committed against a    
person more closely united to the       
sinner3 thus he sins more grievously who
 strikes his father than one who strikes
 a stranger4 ,now according to #a ,cor4 
#f3ah1 ,he that committeth fornication  
sinneth against his own body1 which is  
most intimately connected with a man4   
,therefore it seems that fornication is 
the most grievous of sins4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 the greater a good is1 the    
graver would seem to be the sin         
committed against it4 ,now the sin of   
fornication is seemingly opposed to the 

good of the whole human race1 as appears
 from what was said in the foregoing    
,article4 ,it is also against ,christ1  
according to #a ,cor4 #f3ae1 ,shall ,i 4
 4 4 take the members of ,christ1 and   
make them the members of a harlot8      
,therefore fornication is the most      
grievous of sins4  ,on the contrary1    
,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxiii1 #ab7 that
 the sins of the flesh are less grievous
 than spiritual sins4  ,i answer that1  
,the gravity of a sin may be measured in
 two ways1 first with regard to the sin 
in itself1 secondly with regard to some 
accident4 ,the gravity of a sin is      
measured with regard to the sin itself1 
by reason of its species1 which is      
determined according to the good to     
which that sin is opposed4 ,now         
fornication is contrary to the good of  
the child to be born4 ,wherefore it is a
 graver sin1 as to its species1 than    
those sins which are contrary to        
external goods1 such as theft and the   
like2 while it is less grievous than    

those which are directly against ,god1  
and sins that are injurious to the life 
of one already born1 such as murder4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sensual pleasure  
that aggravates a sin is that which is  
in the inclination of the will4 ,but the
 sensual pleasure that is in the        
sensitive appetite1 lessens sin1 because
 a sin is the less grievous according as
 it is committed under the impulse of a 
greater passion4 ,it is in this way that
 the greatest sensual pleasure is in    
fornication4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de
 ,agone ,christiano 99,serm4 ccxciii2   
ccl de ,temp42 see ,appendix to ,st4    
,augustine's works7 that of all a       
,christian's conflicts1 the most        
difficult combats are those of chastity2
 wherein the fight is a daily one1 but  
victory rare3 and ,isidore declares 7,de
 ,summo ,bono ii1 #ci7 that mankind is  
subjected to the devil by carnal lust   
more than by anything else1 because1 to 
wit1 the vehemence of this passion is   
more difficult to overcome4  ,reply     

,obj4 #b3 ,the fornicator is said to sin
 against his own body1 not merely       
because the pleasure of fornication is  
consummated in the flesh1 which is also 
the case in gluttony1 but also because  
he acts against the good of his own body
 by an undue resolution and defilement  
thereof1 and an undue association with  
another4 ,nor does it follow from this  
that fornication is the most grievous   
sin1 because in man reason is of greater
 value than the body1 wherefore if there
 be a sin more opposed to reason1 it    
will be more grievous4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,the sin of fornication is contrary to 
the good of the human race1 in so far as
 it is prejudicial to the individual    
begetting of the one man that may be    
born4 ,now one who is already an actual 
member of the human species attains to  
the perfection of the species more than 
one who is a man potentially1 and from  
this point of view murder is a more     
grievous sin than fornication and every 
kind of lust1 through being more opposed

 to the good of the human species4      
,again1 a ,divine good is greater than  
the good of the human race3 and         
therefore those sins also that are      
against ,god are more grievous4         
,moreover1 fornication is a sin against 
,god1 not directly as though the        
fornicator intended to offend ,god1 but 
consequently1 in the same way as all    
mortal sins4 ,and just as the members of
 our body are ,christ's members1 so too1
 our spirit is one with ,christ1        
according to #a ,cor4 #f3ag1 ,he who is 
joined to the ,lord is one spirit4      
,wherefore also spiritual sins are more 
against ,christ than fornication is4    
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,there ,can ,be      
,mortal ,sin in ,touches and ,kisses8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there
 is no mortal sin in touches and kisses4
 ,for the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #e3c73   
,fornication and all uncleanness1 or    
covetousness1 let it not so much as be  
named among you1 as becometh saints1    

then he adds3 ,or obscenity 7which a    
gloss refers to kissing and fondling71  
or foolish talking 7as soft speeches71  
or scurrility 7which fools call         
geniality--i4e4 jocularity71 and        
afterwards he continues 7,eph4 #e3e73   
,for know ye this and understand that no
 fornicator1 or unclean1 or covetous    
person 7which is the serving of idols71 
hath inheritance in the kingdom of      
,christ and of ,god1 thus making no     
further mention of obscenity1 as neither
 of foolish talking or scurrility4      
,therefore these are not mortal sins4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fornication is      
stated to be a mortal sin as being      
prejudicial to the good of the future   
child's begetting and upbringing4 ,but  
these are not affected by kisses and    
touches or blandishments4 ,therefore    
there is no mortal sin in these4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 things that are mortal    
sins in themselves can never be good    
actions4 ,yet kisses1 touches1 and the  
like can be done sometimes without sin4 

,therefore they are not mortal sins in  
themselves4  ,on the contrary1 ,a       
lustful look is less than a touch1 a    
caress or a kiss4 ,but according to     
,matt4 #e3bh1 ,whosoever shall look on a
 woman to lust after her hath already   
committed adultery with her in his      
heart4 ,much more therefore are lustful 
kisses and other like things mortal     
sins4  ,further1 ,cyprian says 7,ad     
,pompon1 de ,virgin41 ,ep4 lxii71 ,by   
their very intercourse1 their           
blandishments1 their converse1 their    
embraces1 those who are associated in a 
sleep that knows neither honor nor      
shame1 acknowledge their disgrace and   
crime4 ,therefore by doing these things 
a man is guilty of a crime1 that is1 of 
mortal sin4  ,i answer that1 ,a thing is
 said to be a mortal sin in two ways4   
,first1 by reason of its species1 and in
 this way a kiss1 caress1 or touch does 
not1 of its very nature1 imply a mortal 
sin1 for it is possible to do such      
things without lustful pleasure1 either 

as being the custom of one's country1 or
 on account of some obligation or       
reasonable cause4 ,secondly1 a thing is 
said to be a mortal sin by reason of its
 cause3 thus he who gives an alms1 in   
order to lead someone into heresy1 sins 
mortally on account of his corrupt      
intention4 ,now it has been stated above
 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #h71 that it is 
a mortal sin not only to consent to the 
act1 but also to the delectation of a   
mortal sin4 ,wherefore since fornication
 is a mortal sin1 and much more so the  
other kinds of lust1 it follows that in 
such like sins not only consent to the  
act but also consent to the pleasure is 
a mortal sin4 ,consequently1 when these 
kisses and caresses are done for this   
delectation1 it follows that they are   
mortal sins1 and only in this way are   
they said to be lustful4 ,therefore in  
so far as they are lustful1 they are    
mortal sins4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the     
,apostle makes no further mention of    
these three because they are not sinful 

except as directed to those that he had 
mentioned before4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3     
,although kisses and touches do not by  
their very nature hinder the good of the
 human offspring1 they proceed from     
lust1 which is the source of this       
hindrance3 and on this account they are 
mortally sinful4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this
 argument proves that such things are   
not mortal sins in their species4       
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1  
,art4 #e  ,whether ,nocturnal ,pollution
 ,is a ,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that nocturnal pollution is 
a sin4 ,for the same things are the     
matter of merit and demerit4 ,now a man 
may merit while he sleeps1 as was the   
case with ,solomon1 who while asleep    
obtained the gift of wisdom from the    
,lord 7#c ,kings #c3b1 ,par4 #a74       
,therefore a man may demerit while      
asleep2 and thus nocturnal pollution    
would seem to be a sin4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 whoever has the use of reason 
can sin4 ,now a man has the use of      

reason while asleep1 since in our sleep 
we frequently discuss matters1 choose   
this rather than that1 consenting to one
 thing1 or dissenting to another4       
,therefore one may sin while asleep1 so 
that nocturnal pollution is not         
prevented by sleep from being a sin1    
seeing that it is a sin according to its
 genus4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is      
useless to reprove and instruct one who 
cannot act according to or against      
reason4 ,now man1 while asleep1 is      
instructed and reproved by ,god1        
according to ,job #cc3ae1 #af1 ,by a    
dream in a vision by night1 when deep   
sleep is wont to lay hold of men        
99,vulg43 ',when deep sleep falleth upon
 men4' ,st4 ,thomas is apparently       
quoting from memory1 as the passage is  
given correctly above1 ,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #f1 
,obj4 #a4 4 4 4 ,then ,he openeth the   
ears of men1 and teaching instructeth   
them in what they are to learn4         
,therefore a man1 while asleep1 can act 
according to or against his reason1 and 

this is to do good or sinful actions1   
and thus it seems that nocturnal        
pollution is a sin4  ,on the contrary1  
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1     
#ae73 ,when the same image that comes   
into the mind of a speaker presents     
itself to the mind of the sleeper1 so   
that the latter is unable to distinguish
 the imaginary from the real union of   
bodies1 the flesh is at once moved1 with
 the result that usually follows such   
motions2 and yet there is as little sin 
in this as there is in speaking and     
therefore thinking about such things    
while one is awake4  ,i answer that1    
,nocturnal pollution may be considered  
in two ways4 ,first1 in itself2 and thus
 it has not the character of a sin4 ,for
 every sin depends on the judgment of   
reason1 since even the first movement of
 the sensuality has nothing sinful in   
it1 except in so far as it can be       
suppressed by reason2 wherefore in the  
absence of reason's judgment1 there is  
no sin in it4 ,now during sleep reason  

has not a free judgment4 ,for there is  
no one who while sleeping does not      
regard some of the images formed by his 
imagination as though they were real1 as
 stated above in the ,first ,part 7,q4  
#hd1 ,a4 #h1 ad #b74 ,wherefore what a  
man does while he sleeps and is deprived
 of reason's judgment1 is not imputed to
 him as a sin1 as neither are the       
actions of a maniac or an imbecile4     
,secondly1 nocturnal pollution may be   
considered with reference to its cause4 
,this may be threefold4 ,one is a bodily
 cause4 ,for when there is excess of    
seminal humor in the body1 or when the  
humor is disintegrated either through   
overheating of the body or some other   
disturbance1 the sleeper dreams things  
that are connected with the discharge of
 this excessive or disintegrated humor3 
the same thing happens when nature is   
cumbered with other superfluities1 so   
that phantasms relating to the discharge
 of those superfluities are formed in   
the imagination4 ,accordingly if this   

excess of humor be due to a sinful cause
 7for instance excessive eating or      
drinking71 nocturnal pollution has the  
character of sin from its cause3 whereas
 if the excess or disintegration of     
these superfluities be not due to a     
sinful cause1 nocturnal pollution is not
 sinful1 neither in itself nor in its   
cause4  ,a second cause of nocturnal    
pollution is on the part of the soul and
 the inner man3 for instance when it    
happens to the sleeper on account of    
some previous thought4 ,for the thought 
which preceded while he was awake1 is   
sometimes purely speculative1 for       
instance when one thinks about the sins 
of the flesh for the purpose of         
discussion2 while sometimes it is       
accompanied by a certain emotion either 
of concupiscence or of abhorrence4 ,now 
nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise
 from thinking about carnal sins with   
concupiscence for such pleasures1       
because this leaves its trace and       
inclination in the soul1 so that the    

sleeper is more easily led in his       
imagination to consent to acts          
productive of pollution4 ,in this sense 
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #ac7  
that in so far as certain movements in  
some degree pass from the waking state  
to the state of sleep1 the dreams of    
good men are better than those of any   
other people3 and ,augustine says 7,gen4
 ad lit4 xii1 #ae7 that even during     
sleep1 the soul may have conspicuous    
merit on account of its good            
disposition4 ,thus it is evident that   
nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the
 part of its cause4 ,on the other hand1 
it may happen that nocturnal pollution  
ensues after thoughts about carnal acts1
 though they were speculative1 or       
accompanied by abhorrence1 and then it  
is not sinful1 neither in itself nor in 
its cause4  ,the third cause is         
spiritual and external2 for instance    
when by the work of a devil the         
sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as 
to induce the aforesaid result4         

,sometimes this is associated with a    
previous sin1 namely the neglect to     
guard against the wiles of the devil4   
,hence the words of the hymn at even3   
,our enemy repress1 that so our bodies  
no uncleanness know 99,translation ,w4  
,k4 ,blount4  ,on the other hand1 this  
may occur without any fault on man's    
part1 and through the wickedness of the 
devil alone4 ,thus we read in the       
,collationes ,patrum 7,coll4 xxii1 #f7  
of a man who was ever wont to suffer    
from nocturnal pollution on festivals1  
and that the devil brought this about in
 order to prevent him from receiving    
,holy ,communion4 ,hence it is manifest 
that nocturnal pollution is never a sin1
 but is sometimes the result of a       
previous sin4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,solomon
 did not merit to receive wisdom from   
,god while he was asleep4 ,he received  
it in token of his previous desire4 ,it 
is for this reason that his petition is 
stated to have been pleasing to ,god 7#c
 ,kings #c3aj71 as ,augustine observes  

7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ae74  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,the use of reason is more or less  
hindered in sleep1 according as the     
inner sensitive powers are more or less 
overcome by sleep1 on account of the    
violence or attenuation of the          
evaporations4 ,nevertheless it is always
 hindered somewhat1 so as to be unable  
to elicit a judgment altogether free1 as
 stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hd1   
,a4 #h1 ad #b74 ,therefore what it does 
then is not imputed to it as a sin4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,reason's apprehension 
is not hindered during sleep to the same
 extent as its judgment1 for this is    
accomplished by reason turning to       
sensible objects1 which are the first   
principles of human thought4 ,hence     
nothing hinders man's reason during     
sleep from apprehending anew something  
arising out of the traces left by his   
previous thoughts and phantasms         
presented to him1 or again through      
,divine revelation1 or the interference 
of a good or bad angel4   ,,sixth       

,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1 ,art4 #f 
,whether ,seduction ,should ,be         
,reckoned a ,species of ,lust8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
seduction should not be reckoned a      
species of lust4 ,for seduction denotes 
the unlawful violation of a virgin1     
according to the ,decretals 7,,xxxvi1   
qu4 #a7 99,append4 ,grat4 ad can4 ,lex  
illa4 ,but this may occur between an    
unmarried man and an unmarried woman1   
which pertains to fornication4          
,therefore seduction should not be      
reckoned a species of lust1 distinct    
from fornication4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
,ambrose says 7,de ,patriarch4 99,de    
,abraham i1 #d73 ,let no man be deluded 
by human laws3 all seduction is         
adultery4 ,now a species is not         
contained under another that is         
differentiated in opposition to it4     
,therefore since adultery is a species  
of lust1 it seems that seduction should 
not be reckoned a species of lust4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to do a person an   

injury would seem to pertain to         
injustice rather than to lust4 ,now the 
seducer does an injury to another1      
namely the violated maiden's father1 who
 can take the injury as personal to     
himself 99,gratian1 ad can4 ,lex illa1  
and sue the seducer for damages4        
,therefore seduction should not be      
reckoned a species of lust4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,seduction consists properly  
in the venereal act whereby a virgin is 
violated4 ,therefore1 since lust is     
properly about venereal actions1 it     
would seem that seduction is a species  
of lust4  ,i answer that1 ,when the     
matter of a vice has a special          
deformity1 we must reckon it to be a    
determinate species of that vice4 ,now  
lust is a sin concerned with venereal   
matter1 as stated above 7,q4 #aec1 ,a4  
#a74 ,and a special deformity attaches  
to the violation of a virgin who is     
under her father's care3 both on the    
part of the maid1 who through being     
violated without any previous compact of

 marriage is both hindered from         
contracting a lawful marriage and is put
 on the road to a wanton life from which
 she was withheld lest she should lose  
the seal of virginity3 and on the part  
of the father1 who is her guardian1     
according to ,ecclus4 #db3aa1 ,keep a   
sure watch over a shameless daughter1   
lest at any time she make thee become a 
laughing-stock to thy enemies4          
,therefore it is evident that seduction 
which denotes the unlawful violation of 
a virgin1 while still under the         
guardianship of her parents1 is a       
determinate species of lust4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,although a virgin is free    
from the bond of marriage1 she is not   
free from her father's power4 ,moreover1
 the seal of virginity is a special     
obstacle to the intercourse of          
fornication1 in that it should be       
removed by marriage only4 ,hence        
seduction is not simple fornication1    
since the latter is intercourse with    
harlots1 women1 namely1 who are no      

longer virgins1 as a gloss observes on  
#b ,cor4 #ab3 ,and have not done penance
 for the uncleanness and fornication1   
etc4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,ambrose here    
takes seduction in another sense1 as    
applicable in a general way to any sin  
of lust4 ,wherefore seduction1 in the   
words quoted1 signifies the intercourse 
between a married man and any woman     
other than his wife4 ,this is clear from
 his adding3 ,nor is it lawful for the  
husband to do what the wife may not4 ,in
 this sense1 too1 we are to understand  
the words of ,num4 #e3ac3 ,if ,vulg43   
',but' the adultery is secret1 and      
cannot be provided by witnesses1 because
 she was not found in adultery 7stupro74
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nothing prevents a  
sin from having a greater deformity     
through being united to another sin4    
,now the sin of lust obtains a greater  
deformity from the sin of injustice1    
because the concupiscence would seem to 
be more inordinate1 seeing that it      
refrains not from the pleasurable object

 so that it may avoid an injustice4 ,in 
fact a twofold injustice attaches to it4
 ,one is on the part of the virgin1 who1
 though not violated by force1 is       
nevertheless seduced1 and thus the      
seducer is bound to compensation4 ,hence
 it is written 7,ex4 #bb3af1 #ag73 ,if a
 man seduce a virgin not yet espoused1  
and lie with her1 he shall endow her and
 have her to wife4 ,if the maid's father
 will not give her to him1 he shall give
 money according to the dowry1 which    
virgins are wont to receive4 ,the other 
injury is done to the maid's father3    
wherefore the seducer is bound by the   
,law to a penalty in his regard4 ,for it
 is written 7,deut4 #bb3bh1 #bi73 ,if a 
man find a damsel that is a virgin1 who 
is not espoused1 and taking her1 lie    
with her1 and the matter come to        
judgment3 he that lay with her shall    
give to the father of the maid fifty    
sicles of silver1 and shall have her to 
wife1 and because he hath humbled her1  
he may not put her away all the days of 

his life3 and this1 lest he should prove
 to have married her in mockery1 as     
,augustine observes4 99,,qq4 in ,deut41 
qu4 xxxiv4   ,,seventh ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1 ,art4 #g  ,whether 
,rape ,is a ,species of ,lust1 ,distinct
 from ,seduction8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that rape is not a species of
 lust1 distinct from seduction4 ,for    
,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #bf7 that      
seduction 7stuprum71 or rape1 properly  
speaking1 is unlawful intercourse1 and  
takes its name from its causing         
corruption3 wherefore he that is guilty 
of rape is a seducer4 ,therefore it     
seems that rape should not be reckoned a
 species of lust distinct from          
seduction4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 rape1   
apparently1 implies violence4 ,for it is
 stated in the ,decretals 7,,xxxvi1 qu4 
#a 99,append4 ,grat4 ad can4 ,lex illa7 
that rape is committed when a maid is   
taken away by force from her father's   
house that after being violated she may 
be taken to wife4 ,but the employment of

 force is accidental to lust1 for this  
essentially regards the pleasure of     
intercourse4 ,therefore it seems that   
rape should not be reckoned a           
determinate species of lust4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 the sin of lust is curbed by  
marriage3 for it is written 7#a ,cor4   
#g3b73 ,for fear of fornication1 let    
every man have his own wife4 ,now rape  
is an obstacle to subsequent marriage1  
for it was enacted in the council of    
,meaux3 ,we decree that those who are   
guilty of rape1 or of abducting or      
seducing women1 should not have those   
women in marriage1 although they should 
have subsequently married them with the 
consent of their parents4 ,therefore    
rape is not a determinate species of    
lust distinct from seduction4  ,obj4 #d3
 ,further1 a man may have knowledge of  
his newly married wife without          
committing a sin of lust4 ,yet he may   
commit rape if he take her away by force
 from her parents' house1 and have      
carnal knowledge of her4 ,therefore rape

 should not be reckoned a determinate   
species of lust4  ,on the contrary1     
,rape is unlawful sexual intercourse1 as
 ,isidore states 7,etym4 v1 #bf74 ,but  
this pertains to the sin of lust4       
,therefore rape is a species of lust4   
,i answer that1 ,rape1 in the sense in  
which we speak of it now1 is a species  
of lust3 and sometimes it coincides with
 seduction2 sometimes there is rape     
without seduction1 and sometimes        
seduction without rape4  ,they coincide 
when a man employs force in order       
unlawfully to violate a virgin4 ,this   
force is employed sometimes both towards
 the virgin and towards her father2 and 
sometimes towards the father and not to 
the virgin1 for instance if she allows  
herself to be taken away by force from  
her father's house4 ,again1 the force   
employed in rape differs in another way1
 because sometimes a maid is taken away 
by force from her parents' house1 and is
 forcibly violated3 while sometimes1    
though taken away by force1 she is not  

forcibly violated1 but of her own       
consent1 whether by act of fornication  
or by the act of marriage3 for the      
conditions of rape remain no matter how 
force is employed4 ,there is rape       
without seduction if a man abduct a     
widow or one who is not a virgin4 ,hence
 ,pope ,symmachus says 99,ep4 v ad      
,caesarium2 ,cf4 can4 ,raptores xxxvi1  
qu4 #b1 ,we abhor abductors whether of  
widows or of virgins on account of the  
heinousness of their crime4  ,there is  
seduction without rape when a man1      
without employing force1 violates a     
virgin unlawfully4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,since rape frequently coincides with   
seduction1 the one is sometimes used to 
signify the other4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,the employment of force would seem to  
arise from the greatness of             
concupiscence1 the result being that a  
man does not fear to endanger himself by
 offering violence4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the rape of a maiden who is promised in
 marriage is to be judged differently   

from that of one who is not so promised4
 ,for one who is promised in marriage   
must be restored to her betrothed1 who  
has a right to her in virtue of their   
betrothal3 whereas one that is not      
promised to another must first of all be
 restored to her father's care1 and then
 the abductor may lawfully marry her    
with her parents' consent4 ,otherwise   
the marriage is unlawful1 since         
whosoever steals a thing he is bound to 
restore it4 ,nevertheless rape does not 
dissolve a marriage already contracted1 
although it is an impediment to its     
being contracted4 ,as to the decree of  
the council in question1 it was made in 
abhorrence of this crime1 and has been  
abrogated4 ,wherefore ,jerome 99,the    
quotation is from ,can4 ,tria4 xxxvi1   
qu4 #b declares the contrary3 ,three    
kinds of lawful marriage1 says he1 are  
mentioned in ,holy ,writ4 ,the first is 
that of a chaste maiden given away      
lawfully in her maidenhood to a man4    
,the second is when a man finds a maiden

 in the city1 and by force has carnal   
knowledge of her4 ,if the father be     
willing1 the man shall endow her        
according to the father's estimate1 and 
shall pay the price of her purity 99,cf4
 ,deut4 #bb3bc-bi4 ,the third is1 when  
the maiden is taken away from such a    
man1 and is given to another at the     
father's will4  ,we may also take this  
decree to refer to those who are        
promised to others in marriage1         
especially if the betrothal be expressed
 by words in the present tense4  ,reply 
,obj4 #d3 ,the man who is just married  
has1 in virtue of the betrothal1 a      
certain right in her3 wherefore1        
although he sins by using violence1 he  
is not guilty of the crime of rape4     
,hence ,pope ,gelasius says 99,can4 ,lex
 illa1 xxvii1 qu4 #b2 xxxvi1 qu4 #a3    
,this law of bygone rulers stated that  
rape was committed when a maiden1 with  
regard to whose marriage nothing had so 
far been decided1 was taken away by     
force4   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  

,q4 #aed1 ,art4 #h  ,whether ,adultery  
,is ,determinate ,species of ,lust1     
,distinct from the ,other ,species8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
adultery is not a determinate species of
 lust1 distinct from the other species4 
,for adultery takes its name from a man 
having intercourse with a woman who is  
not his own ad alteram1 according to a  
gloss 99,st4 ,augustine3 ,serm4 li1 #ac 
de ,divers4 lxiii on ,ex4 #bj3ad4 ,now a
 woman who is not one's own may be of   
various conditions1 namely either a     
virgin1 or under her father's care1 or a
 harlot1 or of any other description4   
,therefore it seems that adultery is not
 a species of lust distinct from the    
others4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,jerome    
says 99,contra ,jovin4 i3 ,it matters   
not for what reason a man behaves as one
 demented4 ,hence ,sixtus the           
,pythagorean says in his ,maxims3 ,he   
that is insatiable of his wife is an    
adulterer1 and in like manner one who is
 over enamored of any woman4 ,now every 

kind of lust includes a too ardent love4
 ,therefore adultery is in every kind of
 lust3 and consequently it should not be
 reckoned a species of lust4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 where there is the same kind  
of deformity1 there would seem to be the
 same species of sin4 ,now1 apparently1 
there is the same kind of deformity in  
seduction and adultery3 since in either 
case a woman is violated who is under   
another person's authority4 ,therefore  
adultery is not a determinate species of
 lust1 distinct from the others4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,pope ,leo 99,st4         
,augustine1 ,de ,bono ,conjug4 iv2 ,cf4 
,append4 ,grat4 ad can4 ,ille autem4    
xxxii1 qu4 #e says that adultery is     
sexual intercourse with another man or  
woman in contravention of the marriage  
compact1 whether through the impulse of 
one's own lust1 or with the consent of  
the other party4 ,now this implies a    
special deformity of lust4 ,therefore   
adultery is a determinate species of    
lust4  ,i answer that1 ,adultery1 as its

 name implies1 is access to another's   
marriage-bed 7ad alienum torum7 99,cf4  
,append4 ,gratian1 ad can4 ,ille autem4 
xxxii1 qu4 #a4 ,by so doing a man is    
guilty of a twofold offense against     
chastity and the good of human          
procreation4 ,first1 by accession to a  
woman who is not joined to him in       
marriage1 which is contrary to the good 
of the upbringing of his own children4  
,secondly1 by accession to a woman who  
is united to another in marriage1 and   
thus he hinders the good of another's   
children4 ,the same applies to the      
married woman who is corrupted by       
adultery4 ,wherefore it is written      
7,ecclus4 #bc3cb1 #cc73 ,every woman 4 4
 4 that leaveth her husband 4 4 4 shall 
be guilty of sin4 ,for first she hath   
been unfaithful to the law of the ,most 
,high 7since there it is commanded3     
,thou shalt not commit adultery72 and   
secondly1 she hath offended against her 
husband1 by making it uncertain that the
 children are his3 thirdly1 she hath    

fornicated in adultery1 and hath gotten 
children of another man1 which is       
contrary to the good of her offspring4  
,the first of these1 however1 is common 
to all mortal sins1 while the two others
 belong especially to the deformity of  
adultery4 ,hence it is manifest that    
adultery is a determinate species of    
lust1 through having a special deformity
 in venereal acts4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if
 a married man has intercourse with     
another woman1 his sin may be           
denominated either with regard to him1  
and thus it is always adultery1 since   
his action is contrary to the fidelity  
of marriage1 or with regard to the woman
 with whom he has intercourse2 and thus 
sometimes it is adultery1 as when a     
married man has intercourse with        
another's wife2 and sometimes it has the
 character of seduction1 or of some     
other sin1 according to various         
conditions affecting the woman with whom
 he has intercourse3 and it has been    
stated above 7,a4 #a7 that the species  

of lust correspond to the various       
conditions of women4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,matrimony is specially ordained for the
 good of human offspring1 as stated     
above 7,a4 #b74 ,but adultery is        
specially opposed to matrimony1 in the  
point of breaking the marriage faith    
which is due between husband and wife4  
,and since the man who is too ardent a  
lover of his wife acts counter to the   
good of marriage if he use her          
indecently1 although he be not          
unfaithful1 he may in a sense be called 
an adulterer2 and even more so than he  
that is too ardent a lover of another   
woman4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the wife is   
under her husband's authority1 as united
 to him in marriage3 whereas the maid is
 under her father's authority1 as one   
who is to be married by that authority4 
,hence the sin of adultery is contrary  
to the good of marriage in one way1 and 
the sin of seduction in another2        
wherefore they are reckoned to differ   
specifically4 ,of other matters         

concerning adultery we shall speak in   
the ,third ,part 99 ,cf4 ,suppl41 ,q4   
#ei1 ,a4 #c2 ,,qq4 #fj1 #fb1 when we    
treat of matrimony4   ,,ninth ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1 ,art4 #i  ,whether 
,incest ,is a ,determinate ,species of  
,lust8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that incest is not a determinate species
 of lust4 ,for incest 99 ,incestus is   
equivalent to in-castus  unchaste takes 
its name from being a privation of      
chastity4 ,but all kinds of lust are    
opposed to chastity4 ,therefore it seems
 that incest is not a species of lust1  
but is lust itself in general4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 it is stated in the       
,decretals 7,,xxxvi1 qu4 #a 99,cf4      
,append4 ,grat4 ad can4 ,lex illa7 that 
incest is intercourse between a man and 
a woman related by consanguinity or     
affinity4 ,now affinity differs from    
consanguinity4 ,therefore it is not one 
but several species of lust4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 that which does not1 of       
itself1 imply a deformity1 does not     

constitute a determinate species of     
vice4 ,but intercourse between those who
 are related by consanguinity or        
affinity does not1 of itself1 contain   
any deformity1 else it would never have 
been lawful4 ,therefore incest is not a 
determinate species of lust4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,the species of lust are      
distinguished according to the various  
conditions of women with whom a man has 
unlawful intercourse4 ,now incest       
implies a special condition on the part 
of the woman1 because it is unlawful    
intercourse with a woman related by     
consanguinity or affinity as stated     
7,obj4 #b74 ,therefore incest is a      
determinate species of lust4  ,i answer 
that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #f7   
wherever we find something incompatible 
with the right use of venereal actions1 
there must needs be a determinate       
species of lust4 ,now sexual intercourse
 with women related by consanguinity or 
affinity is unbecoming to venereal union
 on three counts4 ,first1 because man   

naturally owes a certain respect to his 
parents and therefore to his other blood
 relations1 who are descended in near   
degree from the same parents3 so much so
 indeed that among the ancients1 as     
,valerius ,maximus relates 99,dict4     
,fact4 ,memor4 ii1 #a1 it was not deemed
 right for a son to bathe with his      
father1 lest they should see one another
 naked4 ,now from what has been said    
7,q4 #adb1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #aea1 ,a4 #d71 it
 is evident that in venereal acts there 
is a certain shamefulness inconsistent  
with respect1 wherefore men are ashamed 
of them4 ,wherefore it is unseemly that 
such persons should be united in        
venereal intercourse4 ,this reason seems
 to be indicated 7,lev4 #ah3g7 where we 
read3 ,she is thy mother1 thou shalt not
 uncover her nakedness1 and the same is 
expressed further on with regard to     
others4  ,the second reason is because  
blood relations must needs live in close
 touch with one another4 ,wherefore if  
they were not debarred from venereal    

union1 opportunities of venereal        
intercourse would be very frequent and  
thus men's minds would be enervated by  
lust4 ,hence in the ,old ,law 99,lev4   
#ah the prohibition was apparently      
directed specially to those persons who 
must needs live together4  ,the third   
reason is1 because this would hinder a  
man from having many friends3 since     
through a man taking a stranger to wife1
 all his wife's relations are united to 
him by a special kind of friendship1 as 
though they were of the same blood as   
himself4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de
 ,civ4 ,dei xv1 #af73 ,the demands of   
charity are most perfectly satisfied by 
men uniting together in the bonds that  
the various ties of friendship require1 
so that they may live together in a     
useful and becoming amity2 nor should   
one man have many relationships in one1 
but each should have one4  ,aristotle   
adds another reason 7#b ,polit4 ii73 for
 since it is natural that a man should  
have a liking for a woman of his        

kindred1 if to this be added the love   
that has its origin in venereal         
intercourse1 his love would be too      
ardent and would become a very great    
incentive to lust3 and this is contrary 
to chastity4 ,hence it is evident that  
incest is a determinate species of lust4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,unlawful intercourse
 between persons related to one another 
would be most prejudicial to chastity1  
both on account of the opportunities it 
affords1 and because of the excessive   
ardor of love1 as stated in the         
,article4 ,wherefore the unlawful       
intercourse between such persons is     
called incest antonomastically4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,persons are related by       
affinity through one who is related by  
consanguinity3 and therefore since the  
one depends on the other1 consanguinity 
and affinity entail the same kind of    
unbecomingness4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there
 is something essentially unbecoming and
 contrary to natural reason in sexual   
intercourse between persons related by  

blood1 for instance between parents and 
children who are directly and           
immediately related to one another1     
since children naturally owe their      
parents honor4 ,hence the ,philosopher  
instances a horse 7,de ,animal4 ix1 #dg7
 which covered its own mother by mistake
 and threw itself over a precipice as   
though horrified at what it had done1   
because some animals even have a natural
 respect for those that have begotten   
them4 ,there is not the same essential  
unbecomingness attaching to other       
persons who are related to one another  
not directly but through their parents3 
and1 as to this1 becomingness or        
unbecomingness varies according to      
custom1 and human or ,divine law3       
because1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71      
sexual intercourse1 being directed to   
the common good1 is subject to law4     
,wherefore1 as ,augustine says 7,de     
,civ4 ,dei xv1 #af71 whereas the union  
of brothers and sisters goes back to    
olden times1 it became all the more     

worthy of condemnation when religion    
forbade it4   ,,tenth ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,sacrilege ,can ,be a ,species of ,lust8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
sacrilege cannot be a species of lust4  
,for the same species is not contained  
under different genera that are not     
subalternated to one another4 ,now      
sacrilege is a species of irreligion1 as
 stated above 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #b74        
,therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned 
a species of lust4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
the ,decretals 7,,xxxvi1 qu4 #a         
99,append4 ,grat4 ad can4 ,lex illa71 do
 not place sacrilege among other sins   
which are reckoned species of lust4     
,therefore it would seem not to be a    
species of lust4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
something derogatory to a sacred thing  
may be done by the other kinds of vice1 
as well as by lust4 ,but sacrilege is   
not reckoned a species of gluttony1 or  
of any other similar vice4 ,therefore   
neither should it be reckoned a species 

of lust4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine  
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xv1 #af7 that if it
 is wicked1 through covetousness1 to go 
beyond one's earthly bounds1 how much   
more wicked is it through venereal lust 
to transgress the bounds of morals6 ,now
 to go beyond one's earthly bounds in   
sacred matters is a sin of sacrilege4   
,therefore it is likewise a sin of      
sacrilege to overthrow the bounds of    
morals through venereal desire in sacred
 matters4 ,but venereal desire pertains 
to lust4 ,therefore sacrilege is a      
species of lust4  ,i answer that1 ,as   
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4   
#f1 #g71 the act of a virtue or vice1   
that is directed to the end of another  
virtue or vice1 assumes the latter's    
species3 thus1 theft committed for the  
sake of adultery1 passes into the       
species of adultery4 ,now it is evident 
that as ,augustine states 7,de ,virgin4 
#h71 the observance of chastity1 by     
being directed to the worship of ,god1  
becomes an act of religion1 as in the   

case of those who vow and keep chastity4
 ,wherefore it is manifest that lust    
also1 by violating something pertaining 
to the worship of ,god1 belongs to the  
species of sacrilege3 and in this way   
sacrilege may be accounted a species of 
lust4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,lust1 by being 
directed to another vice as its end1    
becomes a species of that vice3 and so a
 species of lust may be also a species  
of irreligion1 as of a higher genus4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the enumeration       
referred to1 includes those sins which  
are species of lust by their very       
nature3 whereas sacrilege is a species  
of lust in so far as it is directed to  
another vice as its end1 and may        
coincide with the various species of    
lust4 ,for unlawful intercourse between 
persons mutually united by spiritual    
relationship1 is a sacrilege after the  
manner of incest4 ,intercourse with a   
virgin consecrated to ,god1 inasmuch as 
she is the spouse of ,christ1 is        
sacrilege resembling adultery4 ,if the  

maiden be under her father's authority1 
it will be spiritual seduction2 and if  
force be employed it will be spiritual  
rape1 which kind of rape even the civil 
law punishes more severely than others4 
,thus the ,emperor ,justinian says      
99,cod4 i1 iii de ,episc4 et ,cler4 #e3 
,if any man dare1 ,i will not say to    
rape1 but even to tempt a consecrated   
virgin with a view to marriage1 he shall
 be liable to capital punishment4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sacrilege is committed
 on a consecrated thing4 ,now a         
consecrated thing is either a           
consecrated person1 who is desired for  
sexual intercourse1 and thus it is a    
kind of lust1 or it is desired for      
possession1 and thus it is a kind of    
injustice4 ,sacrilege may also come     
under the head of anger1 for instance1  
if through anger an injury be done to a 
consecrated person4 ,again1 one may     
commit a sacrilege by partaking         
gluttonously of sacred food4            
,nevertheless1 sacrilege is ascribed    

more specially to lust which is opposed 
to chastity for the observance of which 
certain persons are specially           
consecrated4   ,,eleventh ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1 ,art4 #aa  ,whether
 the ,unnatural ,vice ,is a ,species of 
,lust8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that the unnatural vice is not a species
 of lust4 ,for no mention of the vice   
against nature is made in the           
enumeration given above 7,a4 #a1 ,obj4  
#a74 ,therefore it is not a species of  
lust4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 lust is      
contrary to virtue2 and so it is        
comprised under vice4 ,but the unnatural
 vice is comprised not under vice1 but  
under bestiality1 according to the      
,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #e74         
,therefore the unnatural vice is not a  
species of lust4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
lust regards acts directed to human     
generation1 as stated above 7,q4 #aec1  
,a4 #b73 ,whereas the unnatural vice    
concerns acts from which generation     
cannot follow4 ,therefore the unnatural 

vice is not a species of lust4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,it is reckoned together with 
the other species of lust 7#b ,cor4     
#ab3ba7 where we read3 ,and have not    
done penance for the uncleanness1 and   
fornication1 and lasciviousness1 where a
 gloss says3 ,lasciviousness1 i4e41     
unnatural lust4  ,i answer that1 ,as    
stated above 7,,aa4 #f1 #i7 wherever    
there occurs a special kind of deformity
 whereby the venereal act is rendered   
unbecoming1 there is a determinate      
species of lust4 ,this may occur in two 
ways3 ,first1 through being contrary to 
right reason1 and this is common to all 
lustful vices2 secondly1 because1 in    
addition1 it is contrary to the natural 
order of the venereal act as becoming to
 the human race3 and this is called the 
unnatural vice4 ,this may happen in     
several ways4 ,first1 by procuring      
pollution1 without any copulation1 for  
the sake of venereal pleasure3 this     
pertains to the sin of uncleanness which
 some call effeminacy4 ,secondly1 by    

copulation with a thing of undue        
species1 and this is called bestiality4 
,thirdly1 by copulation with an undue   
sex1 male with male1 or female with     
female1 as the ,apostle states 7,rom4   
#a3bg73 and this is called the vice of  
sodomy4 ,fourthly1 by not observing the 
natural manner of copulation1 either as 
to undue means1 or as to other monstrous
 and bestial manners of copulation4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there we enumerated   
the species of lust that are not        
contrary to human nature3 wherefore the 
unnatural vice was omitted4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,bestiality differs from vice1
 for the latter is opposed to human     
virtue by a certain excess in the same  
matter as the virtue1 and therefore is  
reducible to the same genus4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,the lustful man intends not  
human generation but venereal pleasures4
 ,it is possible to have this without   
those acts from which human generation  
follows3 and it is that which is sought 
in the unnatural vice4   ,,twelfth      

,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aed1 ,art4 #ab
  ,whether the ,unnatural ,vice ,is the 
,greatest ,sin ,among the ,species of   
,lust8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that the unnatural vice is not the      
greatest sin among the species of lust4 
,for the more a sin is contrary to      
charity the graver it is4 ,now adultery1
 seduction and rape which are injurious 
to our neighbor are seemingly more      
contrary to the love of our neighbor1   
than unnatural sins1 by which no other  
person is injured4 ,therefore the       
unnatural sin is not the greatest among 
the species of lust4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 sins committed against ,god   
would seem to be the most grievous4 ,now
 sacrilege is committed directly against
 ,god1 since it is injurious to the     
,divine worship4 ,therefore sacrilege is
 a graver sin than the unnatural vice4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 seemingly1 a sin is 
all the more grievous according as we   
owe a greater love to the person against
 whom that sin is committed4 ,now the   

order of charity requires that a man    
love more those persons who are united  
to him--and such are those whom he      
defiles by incest--than persons who are 
not connected with him1 and whom in     
certain cases he defiles by the         
unnatural vice4 ,therefore incest is a  
graver sin than the unnatural vice4     
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if the unnatural    
vice is most grievous1 the more it is   
against nature the graver it would seem 
to be4 ,now the sin of uncleanness or   
effeminacy would seem to be most        
contrary to nature1 since it would seem 
especially in accord with nature that   
agent and patient should be distinct    
from one another4 ,hence it would follow
 that uncleanness is the gravest of     
unnatural vices4 ,but this is not true4 
,therefore unnatural vices are not the  
most grievous among sins of lust4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de      
adult4 conjug4 99,the quotation is from 
,cap4 ,adulterii xxxii1 qu4 #g4 ,cf4    
,augustine1 ,de ,bono ,conjugali1 viii47

 that of all these1 namely the sins     
belonging to lust1 that which is against
 nature is the worst4  ,i answer that1  
,in every genus1 worst of all is the    
corruption of the principle on which the
 rest depend4 ,now the principles of    
reason are those things that are        
according to nature1 because reason     
presupposes things as determined by     
nature1 before disposing of other things
 according as it is fitting4 ,this may  
be observed both in speculative and in  
practical matters4 ,wherefore just as in
 speculative matters the most grievous  
and shameful error is that which is     
about things the knowledge of which is  
naturally bestowed on man1 so in matters
 of action it is most grave and shameful
 to act against things as determined by 
nature4 ,therefore1 since by the        
unnatural vices man transgresses that   
which has been determined by nature with
 regard to the use of venereal actions1 
it follows that in this matter this sin 
is gravest of all4 ,after it comes      

incest1 which1 as stated above 7,a4 #i71
 is contrary to the natural respect     
which we owe persons related to us4     
,with regard to the other species of    
lust they imply a transgression merely  
of that which is determined by right    
reason1 on the presupposition1 however1 
of natural principles4 ,now it is more  
against reason to make use of the       
venereal act not only with prejudice to 
the future offspring1 but also so as to 
injure another person besides4          
,wherefore simple fornication1 which is 
committed without injustice to another  
person1 is the least grave among the    
species of lust4 ,then1 it is a greater 
injustice to have intercourse with a    
woman who is subject to another's       
authority as regards the act of         
generation1 than as regards merely her  
guardianship4 ,wherefore adultery is    
more grievous than seduction4 ,and both 
of these are aggravated by the use of   
violence4 ,hence rape of a virgin is    
graver than seduction1 and rape of a    

wife than adultery4 ,and all these are  
aggravated by coming under the head of  
sacrilege1 as stated above 7,a4 #aj1 ad 
#b74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as the     
ordering of right reason proceeds from  
man1 so the order of nature is from ,god
 ,himself3 wherefore in sins contrary to
 nature1 whereby the very order of      
nature is violated1 an injury is done to
 ,god1 the ,author of nature4 ,hence    
,augustine says 7,confess4 iii1 #h73    
,those foul offenses that are against   
nature should be everywhere and at all  
times detested and punished1 such as    
were those of the people of ,sodom1     
which should all nations commit1 they   
should all stand guilty of the same     
crime1 by the law of ,god which hath not
 so made men that they should so abuse  
one another4 ,for even that very        
intercourse which should be between ,god
 and us is violated1 when that same     
nature1 of which ,he is the ,author1 is 
polluted by the perversity of lust4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,vices against nature  

are also against ,god1 as stated above  
7ad #a71 and are so much more grievous  
than the depravity of sacrilege1 as the 
order impressed on human nature is prior
 to and more firm than any subsequently 
established order4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,the nature of the species is more      
intimately united to each individual1   
than any other individual is4 ,wherefore
 sins against the specific nature are   
more grievous4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3        
,gravity of a sin depends more on the   
abuse of a thing than on the omission of
 the right use4 ,wherefore among sins   
against nature1 the lowest place belongs
 to the sin of uncleanness1 which       
consists in the mere omission of        
copulation with another4 ,while the most
 grievous is the sin of bestiality1     
because use of the due species is not   
observed4 ,hence a gloss on ,gen4 #cg3b1
 ,he accused his brethren of a most     
wicked crime1 says that they copulated  
with cattle4 ,after this comes the sin  
of sodomy1 because use of the right sex 

is not observed4 ,lastly comes the sin  
of not observing the right manner of    
copulation1 which is more grievous if   
the abuse regards the vas than if it    
affects the manner of copulation in     
respect of other circumstances4         
,,question #aee  ,,of ,,continence 7,in 
,four ,articles7  ,we must next consider
 the potential parts of temperance3 7#a7
 continence2 7#b7 clemency2 7#c7        
modesty4 ,under the first head we must  
consider continence and incontinence4   
,with regard to continence there are    
four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether  
continence is a virtue8  7#b7 ,what is  
its matter8  7#c7 ,what is its subject8 
7#d7 ,of its comparison with temperance4
   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4     
#aee1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,continence ,is
 a ,virtue8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that continence is not a virtue4   
,for species and genus are not          
co-ordinate members of the same         
division4 ,but continence is            
co-ordinated with virtue1 according to  

the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #a1 #i74 
,therefore continence is not a virtue4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no one sins by using
 a virtue1 since1 according to          
,augustine 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ah1    
#ai71 a virtue is a thing that no one   
makes ill use of4 ,yet one may sin by   
containing oneself3 for instance1 if one
 desire to do a good1 and contain       
oneself from doing it4 ,therefore       
continence is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 no virtue withdraws man from  
that which is lawful1 but only from     
unlawful things3 for a gloss on ,gal4   
#e3bc1 ,faith1 modesty1 etc41 says that 
by continence a man refrains even from  
things that are lawful4 ,therefore      
continence is not a virtue4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,every praiseworthy habit     
would seem to be a virtue4 ,now such is 
continence1 for ,andronicus says 99,de  
,affectibus that continence is a habit  
unconquered by pleasure4 ,therefore     
continence is a virtue4  ,i answer that1
 ,the word continence is taken by       

various people in two ways4 ,for some   
understand continence to denote         
abstention from all venereal pleasure3  
thus the ,apostle joins continence to   
chastity 7,gal4 #e3bc74 ,in this sense  
perfect continence is virginity in the  
first place1 and widowhood in the       
second4 ,wherefore the same applies to  
continence understood thus1 as to       
virginity which we have stated above    
7,q4 #aeb1 ,a4 #c7 to be a virtue4      
,others1 however1 understand continence 
as signifying that whereby a man resists
 evil desires1 which in him are         
vehement4 ,in this sense the            
,philosopher takes continence 7,ethic4  
vii1 #g71 and thus also it is used in   
the ,conferences of the ,fathers        
7,collat4 xii1 #aj1 #aa74 ,in this way  
continence has something of the nature  
of a virtue1 in so far1 to wit1 as the  
reason stands firm in opposition to the 
passions1 lest it be led astray by them3
 yet it does not attain to the perfect  
nature of a moral virtue1 by which even 

the sensitive appetite is subject to    
reason so that vehement passions        
contrary to reason do not arise in the  
sensitive appetite4 ,hence the          
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #i7 that 
continence is not a virtue but a        
mixture1 inasmuch as it has something of
 virtue1 and somewhat falls short of    
virtue4  ,if1 however1 we take virtue in
 a broad sense1 for any principle of    
commendable actions1 we may say that    
continence is a virtue4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,the ,philosopher includes          
continence in the same division with    
virtue in so far as the former falls    
short of virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,properly speaking1 man is that which is
 according to reason4 ,wherefore from   
the very fact that a man holds 7tenet   
se7 to that which is in accord with     
reason1 he is said to contain himself4  
,now whatever pertains to perversion of 
reason is not according to reason4      
,hence he alone is truly said to be     
continent who stands to that which is in

 accord with right reason1 and not to   
that which is in accord with perverse   
reason4 ,now evil desires are opposed to
 right reason1 even as good desires are 
opposed to perverse reason4 ,wherefore  
he is properly and truly continent who  
holds to right reason1 by abstaining    
from evil desires1 and not he who holds 
to perverse reason1 by abstaining from  
good desires3 indeed1 the latter should 
rather be said to be obstinate in evil4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the gloss quoted takes
 continence in the first sense1 as      
denoting a perfect virtue1 which        
refrains not merely from unlawful goods1
 but also from certain lawful things    
that are lesser goods1 in order to give 
its whole attention to the more perfect 
goods4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #aee1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,desires   
for ,pleasures of ,touch ,are the       
,matter of ,continence8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that desires for         
pleasures of touch are not the matter of
 continence4 ,for ,ambrose says 7,de    

,offic4 i1 #df73 ,general decorum by its
 consistent form and the perfection of  
what is virtuous is restrained99 in its 
every action4 99,continentem according  
to ,st4 ,thomas' reading2 ,st4 ,ambrose 
wrote concinentem  harmonious4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 continence takes its name 
from a man standing for the good of     
right reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1  
ad #b74 ,now other passions lead men    
astray from right reason with greater   
vehemence than the desire for pleasures 
of touch3 for instance1 the fear of     
mortal dangers1 which stupefies a man1  
and anger which makes him behave like a 
madman1 as ,seneca remarks 99,de ,ira i1
 #a4 ,therefore continence does not     
properly regard the desires for         
pleasures of touch4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 ,tully says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1   
#ed73 ,it is continence that restrains  
cupidity with the guiding hand of       
counsel4 ,now cupidity is generally used
 to denote the desire for riches rather 
than the desire for pleasures of touch1 

according to #a ,tim4 #f3aj1 ,cupidity  
,douay3 ',the desire of money'          
7philargyria71 is the root of all evils4
 ,therefore continence is not properly  
about the desires for pleasures of      
touch4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 there are   
pleasures of touch not only in venereal 
matters but also in eating4 ,but        
continence is wont to be applied only to
 the use of venereal matters4 ,therefore
 the desire for pleasures of touch is   
not its proper matter4  ,obj4 #e3       
,further1 among pleasures of touch some 
are not human but bestial1 both as      
regards food--for instance1 the pleasure
 of eating human flesh2 and as regards  
venereal matters--for instance the abuse
 of animals or boys4 ,but continence is 
not about such like things1 as stated in
 ,ethic4 vii1 #e4 ,therefore desires for
 pleasures of touch are not the proper  
matter of continence4  ,on the contrary1
 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1   
#d7 that continence and incontinence are
 about the same things as temperance and

 intemperance4 ,now temperance and      
intemperance are about the desires for  
pleasures of touch1 as stated above 7,q4
 #ada1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore continence   
and incontinence are also about that    
same matter4  ,i answer that1           
,continence denotes1 by its very name1 a
 certain curbing1 in so far as a man    
contains himself from following his     
passions4 ,hence continence is properly 
said in reference to those passions     
which urge a man towards the pursuit of 
something1 wherein it is praiseworthy   
that reason should withhold man from    
pursuing3 whereas it is not properly    
about those passions1 such as fear and  
the like1 which denote some kind of     
withdrawal3 since in these it is        
praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing 
what reason dictates1 as stated above   
7,q4 #abc1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,now it is to 
be observed that natural inclinations   
are the principles of all supervening   
inclinations1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4  
#fj1 ,a4 #b74 ,wherefore the more they  

follow the inclination of nature1 the   
more strongly do the passions urge to   
the pursuance of an object4 ,now nature 
inclines chiefly to those things that   
are necessary to it1 whether for the    
maintenance of the individual1 such as  
food1 or for the maintenance of the     
species1 such as venereal acts1 the     
pleasures of which pertain to the touch4
 ,therefore continence and incontinence 
refer properly to desires for pleasures 
of touch4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as    
temperance may be used in a general     
sense in connection with any matter2 but
 is properly applied to that matter     
wherein it is best for man to be curbed3
 so1 too1 continence properly speaking  
regards that matter wherein it is best  
and most difficult to contain oneself1  
namely desires for pleasures of touch1  
and yet in a general sense and          
relatively may be applied to any other  
matter3 and in this sense ,ambrose      
speaks of continence4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,properly speaking we do not speak of   

continence in relation to fear1 but     
rather of firmness of mind which        
fortitude implies4 ,as to anger1 it is  
true that it begets an impulse to the   
pursuit of something1 but this impulse  
follows an apprehension of the soul--in 
so far as a man apprehends that someone 
has injured him--rather than an         
inclination of nature4 ,wherefore a man 
may be said to be continent of anger1   
relatively but not simply4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,external goods1 such as honors1   
riches and the like1 as the ,philosopher
 says 7,ethic4 vii1 #d71 seem to be     
objects of choice in themselves indeed1 
but not as being necessary for the      
maintenance of nature4 ,wherefore in    
reference to such things we speak of a  
person as being continent or            
incontinent1 not simply1 but relatively1
 by adding that they are continent or   
incontinent in regard to wealth1 or     
honor and so forth4 ,hence ,tully either
 understood continence in a general     
sense1 as including relative continence1

 or understood cupidity in a restricted 
sense as denoting desire for pleasures  
of touch4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,venereal   
pleasures are more vehement than        
pleasures of the palate3 wherefore we   
are wont to speak of continence and     
incontinence in reference to venereal   
matters rather than in reference to     
food2 although according to the         
,philosopher they are applicable to     
both4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,continence is a
 good of the human reason3 wherefore it 
regards those passions which can be     
connatural to man4 ,hence the           
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #e7 that
 if a man were to lay hold of a child   
with desire of eating him or of         
satisfying an unnatural passion whether 
he follow up his desire or not1 he is   
said to be continent 99,see ,a4 #d1 not 
absolutely1 but relatively4   ,,third   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aee1 ,art4 #c 
,whether the ,subject of ,continence ,is
 the ,concupiscible ,power8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that the subject of  

continence is the concupiscible power4  
,for the subject of a virtue should be  
proportionate to the virtue's matter4   
,now the matter of continence1 as stated
 7,a4 #b71 is desires for the pleasures 
of touch1 which pertain to the          
concupiscible power4 ,therefore         
continence is in the concupiscible      
power4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,opposites  
are referred to one same thing 99,categ4
 viii4 ,but incontinence is in the      
concupiscible1 whose passions overcome  
reason1 for ,andronicus says 99,de      
,affectibus that incontinence is the    
evil inclination of the concupiscible1  
by following which it chooses wicked    
pleasures in disobedience to reason4    
,therefore continence is likewise in the
 concupiscible4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the
 subject of a human virtue is either the
 reason1 or the appetitive power1 which 
is divided into the will1 the           
concupiscible and the irascible4 ,now   
continence is not in the reason1 for    
then it would be an intellectual virtue2

 nor is it in the will1 since continence
 is about the passions which are not in 
the will2 nor again is it in the        
irascible1 because it is not properly   
about the passions of the irascible1 as 
stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,therefore
 it follows that it is in the           
concupiscible4  ,on the contrary1 ,every
 virtue residing in a certain power     
removes the evil act of that power4 ,but
 continence does not remove the evil act
 of the concupiscible3 since the        
continent man has evil desires1         
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
vii1 #i74 ,therefore continence is not  
in the concupiscible power4  ,i answer  
that1 ,every virtue while residing in a 
subject1 makes that subject have a      
different disposition from that which it
 has while subjected to the opposite    
vice4 ,now the concupiscible has the    
same disposition in one who is continent
 and in one who is incontinent1 since in
 both of them it breaks out into        
vehement evil desires4 ,wherefore it is 

manifest that continence is not in the  
concupiscible as its subject4 ,again the
 reason has the same disposition in     
both1 since both the continent and the  
incontinent have right reason1 and each 
of them1 while undisturbed by passion1  
purposes not to follow his unlawful     
desires4 ,now the primary difference    
between them is to be found in their    
choice3 since the continent man1 though 
subject to vehement desires1 chooses not
 to follow them1 because of his reason2 
whereas the incontinent man chooses to  
follow them1 although his reason        
forbids4 ,hence continence must needs   
reside in that power of the soul1 whose 
act it is to choose2 and that is the    
will1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1
 ,a4 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,continence 
has for its matter the desires for      
pleasures of touch1 not as moderating   
them 7this belongs to temperance which  
is in the concupiscible71 but its       
business with them is to resist them4   
,for this reason it must be in another  

power1 since resistance is of one thing 
against another4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the 
will stands between reason and the      
concupiscible1 and may be moved by      
either4 ,in the continent man it is     
moved by the reason1 in the incontinent 
man it is moved by the concupiscible4   
,hence continence may be ascribed to the
 reason as to its first mover1 and      
incontinence to the concupiscible power3
 though both belong immediately to the  
will as their proper subject4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,although the passions are not
 in the will as their subject1 yet it is
 in the power of the will to resist     
them3 thus it is that the will of the   
continent man resists desires4          
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aee1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,continence ,is      
,better ,than ,temperance8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that continence is   
better than temperance4 ,for it is      
written 7,ecclus4 #bf3bj73 ,no price is 
worthy of a continent soul4 ,therefore  
no virtue can be equalled to continence4

  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the greater the   
reward a virtue merits1 the greater the 
virtue4 ,now continence apparently      
merits the greater reward2 for it is    
written 7#b ,tim4 #b3e73 ,he 4 4 4 is   
not crowned1 except he strive lawfully1 
and the continent man1 since he is      
subject to vehement evil desires1       
strives more than the temperate man1 in 
whom these things are not vehement4     
,therefore continence is a greater      
virtue than temperance4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 the will is a more excellent  
power than the concupiscible4 ,but      
continence is in the will1 whereas      
temperance is in the concupiscible1 as  
stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore       
continence is a greater virtue than     
temperance4  ,on the contrary1 ,tully   
7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1 #ed7 and       
,andronicus 99,de ,affectibus reckon    
continence to be annexed to temperance1 
as to a principal virtue4  ,i answer    
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71        
continence has a twofold signification4 

,in one way it denotes cessation from   
all venereal pleasures2 and if          
continence be taken in this sense1 it is
 greater than temperance considered     
absolutely1 as may be gathered from what
 we said above 7,q4 #aeb1 ,a4 #e7       
concerning the preeminence of virginity 
over chastity considered absolutely4 ,in
 another way continence may be taken as 
denoting the resistance of the reason to
 evil desires when they are vehement in 
a man3 and in this sense temperance is  
far greater than continence1 because the
 good of a virtue derives its praise    
from that which is in accord with       
reason4 ,now the good of reason         
flourishes more in the temperate man    
than in the continent man1 because in   
the former even the sensitive appetite  
is obedient to reason1 being tamed by   
reason so to speak1 whereas in the      
continent man the sensitive appetite    
strongly resists reason by its evil     
desires4 ,hence continence is compared  
to temperance1 as the imperfect to the  

perfect4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passage 
quoted may be understood in two ways4   
,first in reference to the sense in     
which continence denotes abstinence from
 all things venereal3 and thus it means 
that no price is worthy of a continent  
soul1 in the genus of chastity2 since   
not even the fruitfulness of the flesh  
which is the purpose of marriage is     
equalled to the continence of virginity 
or of widowhood1 as stated above 7,q4   
#aeb1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e74 ,secondly it may be
 understood in reference to the general 
sense in which continence denotes any   
abstinence from things unlawful3 and    
thus it means that no price is worthy of
 a continent soul1 because its value is 
not measured with gold or silver1 which 
are appreciable according to weight4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the strength or       
weakness of concupiscence may proceed   
from two causes4 ,for sometimes it is   
owing to a bodily cause3 because some   
people by their natural temperament are 
more prone to concupiscence than others2

 and again opportunities for pleasure   
which inflame the concupiscence are     
nearer to hand for some people than for 
others4 ,such like weakness of          
concupiscence diminishes merit1 whereas 
strength of concupiscence increases it4 
,on the other hand1 weakness or strength
 of concupiscence arises from a         
praiseworthy spiritual cause1 for       
instance the vehemence of charity1 or   
the strength of reason1 as in the case  
of a temperate man4 ,in this way        
weakness of concupiscence1 by reason of 
its cause1 increases merit1 whereas     
strength of concupiscence diminishes it4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will is more    
akin to the reason than the             
concupiscible power is4 ,wherefore the  
good of reason--on account of which     
virtue is praised by the very fact that 
it reaches not only to the will but also
 to the concupiscible power1 as happens 
in the temperate man--is shown to be    
greater than if it reach only to the    
will1 as in the case of one who is      

continent4   ,,question #aef  ,,of      
,,incontinence 7,in ,four ,articles7    
,we must now consider incontinence3 and 
under this head there are four points of
 inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether incontinence   
pertains to the soul or to the body8    
7#b7 ,whether incontinence is a sin8    
7#c7 ,the comparison between            
incontinence and intemperance2  7#d7    
,which is the worse1 incontinence in    
anger1 or incontinence in desire8       
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aef1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,incontinence        
,pertains to the ,soul or to the ,body8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
incontinence pertains not to the soul   
but to the body4 ,for sexual diversity  
comes not from the soul but from the    
body4 ,now sexual diversity causes      
diversity of incontinence3 for the      
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #e7 that
 women are not described either as      
continent or as incontinent4 ,therefore 
incontinence pertains not to the soul   
but to the body4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   

that which pertains to the soul does not
 result from the temperament of the     
body4 ,but incontinence results from the
 bodily temperament3 for the            
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #g7 that
 it is especially people of a quick or  
choleric and atrabilious temper whose   
incontinence is one of unbridled desire4
 ,therefore incontinence regards the    
body4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 victory      
concerns the victor rather than the     
vanquished4 ,now a man is said to be    
incontinent1 because the flesh lusteth  
against the spirit1 and overcomes it4   
,therefore incontinence pertains to the 
flesh rather than to the soul4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,man differs from beast       
chiefly as regards the soul4 ,now they  
differ in respect of continence and     
incontinence1 for we ascribe neither    
continence nor incontinence to the      
beasts1 as the ,philosopher states      
7,ethic4 vii1 #c74 ,therefore           
incontinence is chiefly on the part of  
the soul4  ,i answer that1 ,things are  

ascribed to their direct causes rather  
than to those which merely occasion     
them4 ,now that which is on the part of 
the body is merely an occasional cause  
of incontinence2 since it is owing to a 
bodily disposition that vehement        
passions can arise in the sensitive     
appetite which is a power of the organic
 body4 ,yet these passions1 however     
vehement they be1 are not the sufficient
 cause of incontinence1 but are merely  
the occasion thereof1 since1 so long as 
the use of reason remains1 man is always
 able to resist his passions4 ,if1      
however1 the passions gain such strength
 as to take away the use of reason      
altogether--as in the case of those who 
become insane through the vehemence of  
their passions--the essential conditions
 of continence or incontinence cease1   
because such people do not retain the   
judgment of reason1 which the continent 
man follows and the incontinent         
forsakes4 ,from this it follows that the
 direct cause of incontinence is on the 

part of the soul1 which fails to resist 
a passion by the reason4 ,this happens  
in two ways1 according to the           
,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #g73 first1  
when the soul yields to the passions1   
before the reason has given its counsel2
 and this is called unbridled           
incontinence or impetuosity3 secondly1  
when a man does not stand to what has   
been counselled1 through holding weakly 
to reason's judgment2 wherefore this    
kind of incontinence is called weakness4
 ,hence it is manifest that incontinence
 pertains chiefly to the soul4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,the human soul is the form of
 the body1 and has certain powers which 
make use of bodily organs4 ,the         
operations of these organs conduce      
somewhat to those operations of the soul
 which are accomplished without bodily  
instruments1 namely to the acts of the  
intellect and of the will1 in so far as 
the intellect receives from the senses1 
and the will is urged by passions of the
 sensitive appetite4 ,accordingly1 since

 woman1 as regards the body1 has a weak 
temperament1 the result is that for the 
most part1 whatever she holds to1 she   
holds to it weakly2 although in rare    
cases the opposite occurs1 according to 
,prov4 #ca3aj1 ,who shall find a valiant
 woman8 ,and since small and weak things
 are accounted as though they were not  
99,aristotle1 ,phys4 ii1 #e the         
,philosopher speaks of women as though  
they had not the firm judgment of       
reason1 although the contrary happens in
 some women4 ,hence he states that we do
 not describe women as being continent1 
because they are vacillating through    
being unstable of reason1 and are easily
 led so that they follow their passions 
readily4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is owing 
to the impulse of passion that a man at 
once follows his passion before his     
reason counsels him4 ,now the impulse of
 passion may arise either from its      
quickness1 as in bilious persons 99,cf4 
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,a4 #e1 or from its   
vehemence1 as in the melancholic1 who on

 account of their earthy temperament are
 most vehemently aroused4 ,even so1 on  
the other hand1 a man fails to stand to 
that which is counselled1 because he    
holds to it in weakly fashion by reason 
of the softness of his temperament1 as  
we have stated with regard to woman 7ad 
#a74 ,this is also the case with        
phlegmatic temperaments1 for the same   
reason as in women4 ,and these results  
are due to the fact that the bodily     
temperament is an occasional but not a  
sufficient cause of incontinence1 as    
stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the 
incontinent man concupiscence of the    
flesh overcomes the spirit1 not         
necessarily1 but through a certain      
negligence of the spirit in not         
resisting strongly4   ,,second ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aef1 ,art4 #b  ,whether
 ,incontinence ,is a ,sin8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that incontinence is 
not a sin4 ,for as ,augustine says 7,de 
,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ah73 ,no man sins in  
what he cannot avoid4 ,now no man can by

 himself avoid incontinence1 according  
to ,wis4 #h3ba1 ,i know ,vulg43 'knew'  
that ,i could not 4 4 4 be continent1   
except ,god gave it4 ,therefore         
incontinence is not a sin4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 apparently every sin          
originates in the reason4 ,but the      
judgment of reason is overcome in the   
incontinent man4 ,therefore incontinence
 is not a sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no  
one sins in loving ,god vehemently4 ,now
 a man becomes incontinent through the  
vehemence of divine love3 for ,dionysius
 says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that ,paul1      
through incontinence of divine love1    
exclaimed3 ,i live1 now not ,i 7,gal4   
#b3bj74 ,therefore incontinence is not a
 sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is numbered
 together with other sins 7#b ,tim4     
#c3c7 where it is written3 ,slanderers1 
incontinent1 unmerciful1 etc4 ,therefore
 incontinence is a sin4  ,i answer that1
 ,incontinence about a matter may be    
considered in two ways4 ,first it may be
 considered properly and simply3 and    

thus incontinence is about              
concupiscences of pleasures of touch1   
even as intemperance is1 as we have said
 in reference to continence 7,q4 #aee1  
,a4 #b74 ,in this way incontinence is a 
sin for two reasons3 first1 because the 
incontinent man goes astray from that   
which is in accord with reason2         
secondly1 because he plunges into       
shameful pleasures4 ,hence the          
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #d7 that
 incontinence is censurable not only    
because it is wrong--that is1 by        
straying from reason--but also because  
it is wicked--that is1 by following evil
 desires4 ,secondly1 incontinence about 
a matter is considered1                 
properly--inasmuch as it is a straying  
from reason--but not simply2 for        
instance when a man does not observe the
 mode of reason in his desire for honor1
 riches1 and so forth1 which seem to be 
good in themselves4 ,about such things  
there is incontinence1 not simply but   
relatively1 even as we have said above  

in reference to continence 7,q4 #aee1   
,a4 #b1 ad #c74 ,in this way            
incontinence is a sin1 not from the fact
 that one gives way to wicked desires1  
but because one fails to observe the    
mode of reason even in the desire for   
things that are of themselves desirable4
  ,thirdly1 incontinence is said to be  
about a matter1 not properly1 but       
metaphorically1 for instance about the  
desires for things of which one cannot  
make an evil use1 such as the desire for
 virtue4 ,a man may be said to be       
incontinent in these matters            
metaphorically1 because just as the     
incontinent man is entirely led by his  
evil desire1 even so is a man entirely  
led by his good desire which is in      
accord with reason4 ,such like          
incontinence is no sin1 but pertains to 
the perfection of virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,man can avoid sin and do good1 yet 
not without ,god's help1 according to   
,john #ae3e3 ,without ,me you can do    
nothing4 ,wherefore the fact that man   

needs ,god's help in order to be        
continent1 does not show incontinence to
 be no sin1 for1 as stated in ,ethic4   
iii1 #c1 what we can do by means of a   
friend we do1 in a way1 ourselves4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the judgment of reason
 is overcome in the incontinent man1 not
 necessarily1 for then he would commit  
no sin1 but through a certain negligence
 on account of his not standing firm in 
resisting the passion by holding to the 
judgment formed by his reason4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,this argument takes          
incontinence metaphorically and not     
properly4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #aef1 ,art4 #c  ,whether the       
,incontinent ,man ,sins ,more ,gravely  
,than the ,intemperate8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that the incontinent man 
sins more gravely than the intemperate4 
,for1 seemingly1 the more a man acts    
against his conscience1 the more gravely
 he sins1 according to ,luke #ab3dg1    
,that servant who knew the will of his  
lord 4 4 4 and did not 4 4 4 shall be   

beaten with many stripes4 ,now the      
incontinent man would seem to act       
against his conscience more than the    
intemperate because1 according to       
,ethic4 vii1 #c1 the incontinent man1   
though knowing how wicked are the things
 he desires1 nevertheless acts through  
passion1 whereas the intemperate man    
judges what he desires to be good4      
,therefore the incontinent man sins more
 gravely than the intemperate4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 apparently1 the graver a  
sin is1 the more incurable it is3       
wherefore the sins against the ,holy    
,ghost1 being most grave1 are declared  
to be unpardonable4 ,now the sin of     
incontinence would appear to be more    
incurable than the sin of intemperance4 
,for a person's sin is cured by         
admonishment and correction1 which      
seemingly are no good to the incontinent
 man1 since he knows he is doing wrong1 
and does wrong notwithstanding3 whereas 
it seems to the intemperate man that he 
is doing well1 so that it were good for 

him to be admonished4 ,therefore it     
would appear that the incontinent man   
sins more gravely than the intemperate4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more eagerly man
 sins1 the more grievous his sin4 ,now  
the incontinent sins more eagerly than  
the intemperate1 since the incontinent  
man has vehement passions and desires1  
which the intemperate man does not      
always have4 ,therefore the incontinent 
man sins more gravely than the          
intemperate4  ,on the contrary1         
,impenitence aggravates every sin3      
wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4   
,dom4 serm4 xi1 #ab1 #ac7 that          
impenitence is a sin against the ,holy  
,ghost4 ,now according to the           
,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #h7 the      
intemperate man is not inclined to be   
penitent1 for he holds on to his choice3
 but every incontinent man is inclined  
to repentance4 ,therefore the           
intemperate man sins more gravely than  
the incontinent4  ,i answer that1       
,according to ,augustine 99,de ,duab4   

,anim4 x1 xi sin is chiefly an act of   
the will1 because by the will we sin and
 live aright 99,retract4 i1 #i4         
,consequently where there is a greater  
inclination of the will to sin1 there is
 a graver sin4 ,now in the intemperate  
man1 the will is inclined to sin in     
virtue of its own choice1 which proceeds
 from a habit acquired through custom3  
whereas in the incontinent man1 the will
 is inclined to sin through a passion4  
,and since passion soon passes1 whereas 
a habit is a disposition difficult to   
remove1 the result is that the          
incontinent man repents at once1 as soon
 as the passion has passed2 but not so  
the intemperate man2 in fact he rejoices
 in having sinned1 because the sinful   
act has become connatural to him by     
reason of his habit4 ,wherefore in      
reference to such persons it is written 
7,prov4 #b3ad7 that they are glad when  
they have done evil1 and rejoice in most
 wicked things4 ,hence it follows that  
the intemperate man is much worse than  

the incontinent1 as also the            
,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 vii1 #g74
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,ignorance in the    
intellect sometimes precedes the        
inclination of the appetite and causes  
it1 and then the greater the ignorance1 
the more does it diminish or entirely   
excuse the sin1 in so far as it renders 
it involuntary4 ,on the other hand1     
ignorance in the reason sometimes       
follows the inclination of the appetite1
 and then such like ignorance1 the      
greater it is1 the graver the sin1      
because the inclination of the appetite 
is shown thereby to be greater4 ,now in 
both the incontinent and the intemperate
 man1 ignorance arises from the appetite
 being inclined to something1 either by 
passion1 as in the incontinent1 or by   
habit1 as in the intemperate4           
,nevertheless greater ignorance results 
thus in the intemperate than in the     
incontinent4 ,in one respect as regards 
duration1 since in the incontinent man  
this ignorance lasts only while the     

passion endures1 just as an attack of   
intermittent fever lasts as long as the 
humor is disturbed3 whereas the         
ignorance of the intemperate man endures
 without ceasing1 on account of the     
endurance of the habit1 wherefore it is 
likened to phthisis or any chronic      
disease1 as the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 vii1 #h74 ,in another respect  
the ignorance of the intemperate man is 
greater as regards the thing ignored4   
,for the ignorance of the incontinent   
man regards some particular detail of   
choice 7in so far as he deems that he   
must choose this particular thing now73 
whereas the intemperate man's ignorance 
is about the end itself1 inasmuch as he 
judges this thing good1 in order that he
 may follow his desires without being   
curbed4 ,hence the ,philosopher says    
7,ethic4 vii1 #g1 #h7 that the          
incontinent man is better than the      
intemperate1 because he retains the best
 principle 99,to beltiston1 e arche1    
'the best thing1 i4e4 the principle'1 to

 wit1 the right estimate of the end4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,mere knowledge does   
not suffice to cure the incontinent man1
 for he needs the inward assistance of  
grace which quenches concupiscence1     
besides the application of the external 
remedy of admonishment and correction1  
which induce him to begin to resist his 
desires1 so that concupiscence is       
weakened1 as stated above 7,q4 #adb1 ,a4
 #b74 ,by these same means the          
intemperate man can be cured4 ,but his  
curing is more difficult1 for two       
reasons4 ,the first is on the part of   
reason1 which is corrupt as regards the 
estimate of the last end1 which holds   
the same position as the principle in   
demonstrations4 ,now it is more         
difficult to bring back to the truth one
 who errs as to the principle2 and it is
 the same in practical matters with one 
who errs in regard to the end4 ,the     
other reason is on the part of the      
inclination of the appetite3 for in the 
intemperate man this proceeds from a    

habit1 which is difficult to remove1    
whereas the inclination of the          
incontinent man proceeds from a passion1
 which is more easily suppressed4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the eagerness of the  
will1 which increases a sin1 is greater 
in the intemperate man than in the      
incontinent1 as explained above4 ,but   
the eagerness of concupiscence in the   
sensitive appetite is sometimes greater 
in the incontinent man1 because he does 
not sin except through vehement         
concupiscence1 whereas the intemperate  
man sins even through slight            
concupiscence and sometimes forestalls  
it4 ,hence the ,philosopher says        
7,ethic4 vii1 #g7 that we blame more the
 intemperate man1 because he pursues    
pleasure without desiring it or with    
calm1 i4e4 slight desire4 ,for what     
would he have done if he had desired it 
with passion8   ,,fourth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aef1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
the ,incontinent in ,anger ,is ,worse   
,than the ,incontinent in ,desire8      

,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
incontinent in anger is worse than the  
incontinent in desire4 ,for the more    
difficult it is to resist the passion1  
the less grievous1 apparently is        
incontinence3 wherefore the ,philosopher
 says 7,ethic4 vii1 #g73 ,it is not     
wonderful1 indeed it is pardonable if a 
person is overcome by strong and        
overwhelming pleasures or pains4 ,now1  
as ,heraclitus says1 it is more         
difficult to resist desire than anger   
99,ethic4 ii4 #c4 ,therefore            
incontinence of desire is less grievous 
than incontinence of anger4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 one is altogether excused from
 sin if the passion be so vehement as to
 deprive one of the judgment of reason1 
as in the case of one who becomes       
demented through passion4 ,now he that  
is incontinent in anger retains more of 
the judgment of reason1 than one who is 
incontinent in desire3 since anger      
listens to reason somewhat1 but desire  
does not as the ,philosopher states     

7,ethic4 vii1 #f74 ,therefore the       
incontinent in anger is worse than the  
incontinent in desire4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 the more dangerous a sin the  
more grievous it is4 ,now incontinence  
of anger would seem to be more          
dangerous1 since it leads a man to a    
greater sin1 namely murder1 for this is 
a more grievous sin than adultery1 to   
which incontinence of desire leads4     
,therefore incontinence of anger is     
graver than incontinence of desire4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says   
7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that incontinence of  
anger is less disgraceful than          
incontinence of desire4  ,i answer that1
 ,the sin of incontinence may be        
considered in two ways4 ,first1 on the  
part of the passion which occasions the 
downfall of reason4 ,in this way        
incontinence of desire is worse than    
incontinence of anger1 because the      
movement of desire is more inordinate   
than the movement of anger4 ,there are  
four reasons for this1 and the          

,philosopher indicates them1 ,ethic4    
vii1 #f3 ,first1 because the movement of
 anger partakes somewhat of reason1     
since the angry man tends to avenge the 
injury done to him1 and reason dictates 
this in a certain degree4 ,yet he does  
not tend thereto perfectly1 because he  
does not intend the due mode of         
vengeance4 ,on the other hand1 the      
movement of desire is altogether in     
accord with sense and nowise in accord  
with reason4 ,secondly1 because the     
movement of anger results more from the 
bodily temperament owing to the         
quickness of the movement of the bile   
which tends to anger4 ,hence one who by 
bodily temperament is disposed to anger 
is more readily angry than one who is   
disposed to concupiscence is liable to  
be concupiscent3 wherefore also it      
happens more often that the children of 
those who are disposed to anger are     
themselves disposed to anger1 than that 
the children of those who are disposed  
to concupiscence are also disposed to   

concupiscence4 ,now that which results  
from the natural disposition of the body
 is deemed more deserving of pardon4    
,thirdly1 because anger seeks to work   
openly1 whereas concupiscence is fain to
 disguise itself and creeps in by       
stealth4 ,fourthly1 because he who is   
subject to concupiscence works with     
pleasure1 whereas the angry man works as
 though forced by a certain previous    
displeasure4  ,secondly1 the sin of     
incontinence may be considered with     
regard to the evil into which one falls 
through forsaking reason2 and thus      
incontinence of anger is1 for the most  
part1 more grievous1 because it leads to
 things that are harmful to one's       
neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is more 
difficult to resist pleasure            
perseveringly than anger1 because       
concupiscence is enduring4 ,but for the 
moment it is more difficult to resist   
anger1 on account of its impetuousness4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,concupiscence is      
stated to be without reason1 not as     

though it destroyed altogether the      
judgment of reason1 but because nowise  
does it follow the judgment of reason3  
and for this reason it is more          
disgraceful4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this    
argument considers incontinence with    
regard to its result4   ,,question #aeg 
,,of ,,clemency ,,and ,,meekness 7,in   
,four ,articles7  ,we must next consider
 clemency and meekness1 and the contrary
 vices4 ,concerning the virtues         
themselves there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether clemency and    
meekness are altogether identical8  7#b7
 ,whether each of them is a virtue8     
7#c7 ,whether each is a part of         
temperance8  7#d7 ,of their comparison  
with the other virtues4   ,,first       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeg1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,clemency and ,meekness ,are   
,absolutely the ,same8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that clemency and        
meekness are absolutely the same4 ,for  
meekness moderates anger1 according to  
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #e74 ,now 

anger is desire of vengeance            
99,aristotle1 ,rhet4 ii1 #b4 ,since1    
then1 clemency is leniency of a superior
 in inflicting punishment on an         
inferior1 as ,seneca states 7,de        
,clementia ii1 #c71 and vengeance is    
taken by means of punishment1 it would  
seem that clemency and meekness are the 
same4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,tully says  
7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1 #ed7 that      
clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is
 restrained by kindness when            
unreasonably provoked to hatred of a    
person1 so that apparently clemency     
moderates hatred4 ,now1 according to    
,augustine 99,ep4 ccxi1 hatred is caused
 by anger2 and this is the matter of    
meekness and clemency4 ,therefore       
seemingly clemency and meekness are     
absolutely the same4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 the same vice is not opposed  
to different virtues4 ,but the same     
vice1 namely cruelty1 is opposed to     
meekness and clemency4 ,therefore it    
seems that meekness and clemency are    

absolutely the same4  ,on the contrary1 
,according to the aforesaid definition  
of ,seneca 7,obj4 #a7 clemency is       
leniency of a superior towards an       
inferior3 whereas meekness is not merely
 of superior to inferior1 but of each to
 everyone4 ,therefore meekness and      
clemency are not absolutely the same4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated in ,ethic4   
ii1 #c1 a moral virtue is about passions
 and actions4 ,now internal passions are
 principles of external actions1 and are
 likewise obstacles thereto4 ,wherefore 
virtues that moderate passions1 to a    
certain extent1 concur towards the same 
effect as virtues that moderate actions1
 although they differ specifically4     
,thus it belongs properly to justice to 
restrain man from theft1 whereunto he is
 inclined by immoderate love or desire  
of money1 which is restrained by        
liberality2 so that liberality concurs  
with justice towards the effect1 which  
is abstention from theft4 ,this applies 
to the case in point2 because through   

the passion of anger a man is provoked  
to inflict a too severe punishment1     
while it belongs directly to clemency to
 mitigate punishment1 and this might be 
prevented by excessive anger4           
,consequently meekness1 in so far as it 
restrains the onslaught of anger1       
concurs with clemency towards the same  
effect2 yet they differ from one        
another1 inasmuch as clemency moderates 
external punishment1 while meekness     
properly mitigates the passion of anger4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,meekness regards    
properly the desire itself of vengeance2
 whereas clemency regards the punishment
 itself which is applied externally for 
the purpose of vengeance4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,man's affections incline to the    
moderation of things that are unpleasant
 to him in themselves4 ,now it results  
from one man loving another that he     
takes no pleasure in the latter's       
punishment in itself1 but only as       
directed to something else1 for instance
 justice1 or the correction of the      

person punished4 ,hence love makes one  
quick to mitigate punishment--and this  
pertains to clemency--while hatred is an
 obstacle to such mitigation4 ,for this 
reason ,tully says that the mind        
provoked to hatred that is to punish too
 severely1 is restrained by clemency1   
from inflicting too severe a punishment1
 so that clemency directly moderates not
 hatred but punishment4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,the vice of anger1 which denotes   
excess in the passion of anger1 is      
properly opposed to meekness1 which is  
directly concerned with the passion of  
anger2 while cruelty denotes excess in  
punishing4 ,wherefore ,seneca says 7,de 
,clementia ii1 #d7 that those are called
 cruel who have reason for punishing1   
but lack moderation in punishing4 ,those
 who delight in a man's punishment for  
its own sake may be called savage or    
brutal1 as though lacking the human     
feeling that leads one man to love      
another4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #aeg1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,both     

,clemency and ,meekness ,are ,virtues8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
neither clemency nor meekness is a      
virtue4 ,for no virtue is opposed to    
another virtue4 ,yet both of these are  
apparently opposed to severity1 which is
 a virtue4 ,therefore neither clemency  
nor meekness is a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 ,virtue is destroyed by excess
 and defect 99,ethic4 ii1 #b4 ,but both 
clemency and meekness consist in a      
certain decrease2 for clemency decreases
 punishment1 and meekness decreases     
anger4 ,therefore neither clemency nor  
meekness is a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 meekness or mildness is       
included 7,matt4 #e3d7 among the        
beatitudes1 and 7,gal4 #e3bc7 among the 
fruits4 ,now the virtues differ from the
 beatitudes and fruits4 ,therefore they 
are not comprised under virtue4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,seneca says 7,de ,clementia 
ii1 #e73 ,every good man is conspicuous 
for his clemency and meekness4 ,now it  
is virtue properly that belongs to a    

good man1 since virtue it is that makes 
its possessor good1 and renders his     
works good also 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74       
,therefore clemency and meekness are    
virtues4  ,i answer that1 ,the nature of
 moral virtue consists in the subjection
 of appetite to reason1 as the          
,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 
,now this is verified both in clemency  
and in meekness4 ,for clemency1 in      
mitigating punishment1 is guided by     
reason1 according to ,seneca 7,de       
,clementia ii1 #e71 and meekness1       
likewise1 moderates anger according to  
right reason1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv1  
#e4 ,wherefore it is manifest that both 
clemency and meekness are virtues4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,meekness is not       
directly opposed to severity2 for       
meekness is about anger4 ,on the other  
hand1 severity regards the external     
infliction of punishment1 so that       
accordingly it would seem rather to be  
opposed to clemency1 which also regards 
external punishing1 as stated above 7,a4

 #a74 ,yet they are not really opposed  
to one another1 since they are both     
according to right reason4 ,for severity
 is inflexible in the infliction of     
punishment when right reason requires   
it2 while clemency mitigates punishment 
also according to right reason1 when and
 where this is requisite4 ,wherefore    
they are not opposed to one another as  
they are not about the same thing4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to the      
,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #e71 the habit
 that observes the mean in anger is     
unnamed2 so that the virtue is          
denominated from the diminution of      
anger1 and is designated by the name of 
meekness4 ,for the virtue is more akin  
to diminution than to excess1 because it
 is more natural to man to desire       
vengeance for injuries done to him1 than
 to be lacking in that desire1 since    
scarcely anyone belittles an injury done
 to himself1 as ,sallust observes 99,cf4
 ,q4 #abj4 ,as to clemency1 it mitigates
 punishment1 not in respect of that     

which is according to right reason1 but 
as regards that which is according to   
common law1 which is the object of legal
 justice3 yet on account of some        
particular consideration1 it mitigates  
the punishment1 deciding1 as it were1   
that a man is not to be punished any    
further4 ,hence ,seneca says 7,de       
,clementia ii1 #a73 ,clemency grants    
this1 in the first place1 that those    
whom she sets free are declared immune  
from all further punishment2 and        
remission of punishment due amounts to a
 pardon4 ,wherefore it is clear that    
clemency is related to severity as      
equity the ,greek epieikeia 99,cf4 ,q4  
#abj to legal justice1 whereof severity 
is a part1 as regards the infliction of 
punishment in accordance with the law4  
,yet clemency differs from equity1 as we
 shall state further on 7,a4 #c1 ad #a74
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the beatitudes are  
acts of virtue3 while the fruits are    
delights in virtuous acts4 ,wherefore   
nothing hinders meekness being reckoned 

both virtue1 and beatitude and fruit4   
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeg1  
,art4 #c  ,whether the ,aforesaid       
,virtues ,are ,parts of ,temperance8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
aforesaid virtues are not parts of      
temperance4 ,for clemency mitigates     
punishment1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74   
,but the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #aj7  
ascribes this to equity1 which pertains 
to justice1 as stated above 7,q4 #abj1  
,a4 #b74 ,therefore seemingly clemency  
is not a part of temperance4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 temperance is concerned with  
concupiscences2 whereas meekness and    
clemency regard1 not concupiscences1 but
 anger and vengeance4 ,therefore they   
should not be reckoned parts of         
temperance4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,seneca
 says 7,de ,clementia ii1 #d73 ,a man   
may be said to be of unsound mind when  
he takes pleasure in cruelty4 ,now this 
is opposed to clemency and meekness4    
,since then an unsound mind is opposed  
to prudence1 it seems that clemency and 

meekness are parts of prudence rather   
than of temperance4  ,on the contrary1  
,seneca says 7,de ,clementia ii1 #c7    
that clemency is temperance of the soul 
in exercising the power of taking       
revenge4 ,tully also 7,de ,invent4      
,rhet4 ii1 #ed7 reckons clemency a part 
of temperance4  ,i answer that1 ,parts  
are assigned to the principal virtues1  
in so far as they imitate them in some  
secondary matter as to the mode whence  
the virtue derives its praise and       
likewise its name4 ,thus the mode and   
name of justice consist in a certain    
equality1 those of fortitude in a       
certain strength of mind1 those of      
temperance in a certain restraint1      
inasmuch as it restrains the most       
vehement concupiscences of the pleasures
 of touch4 ,now clemency and meekness   
likewise consist in a certain restraint1
 since clemency mitigates punishment1   
while meekness represses anger1 as      
stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore 
both clemency and meekness are annexed  

to temperance as principal virtue1 and  
accordingly are reckoned to be parts    
thereof4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,two points  
must be considered in the mitigation of 
punishment4 ,one is that punishment     
should be mitigated in accordance with  
the lawgiver's intention1 although not  
according to the letter of the law2 and 
in this respect it pertains to equity4  
,the other point is a certain moderation
 of a man's inward disposition1 so that 
he does not exercise his power of       
inflicting punishment4 ,this belongs    
properly to clemency1 wherefore ,seneca 
says 7,de ,clementia ii1 #c7 that it is 
temperance of the soul in exercising the
 power of taking revenge4 ,this         
moderation of soul comes from a certain 
sweetness of disposition1 whereby a man 
recoils from anything that may be       
painful to another4 ,wherefore ,seneca  
says 7,de ,clementia ii1 #c7 that       
clemency is a certain smoothness of the 
soul2 for1 on the other hand1 there     
would seem to be a certain roughness of 

soul in one who fears not to pain       
others4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the          
annexation of secondary to principal    
virtues depends on the mode of virtue1  
which is1 so to speak1 a kind of form of
 the virtue1 rather than on the matter4 
,now meekness and clemency agree with   
temperance in mode1 as stated above1    
though they agree not in matter4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,unsoundness is corruption of
 soundness4 ,now just as soundness of   
body is corrupted by the body lapsing   
from the condition due to the human     
species1 so unsoundness of mind is due  
to the mind lapsing from the disposition
 due to the human species4 ,this occurs 
both in respect of the reason1 as when a
 man loses the use of reason1 and in    
respect of the appetitive power1 as when
 a man loses that humane feeling whereby
 every man is naturally friendly towards
 all other men 7,ethic4 viii1 #a74 ,the 
unsoundness of mind that excludes the   
use of reason is opposed to prudence4   
,but that a man who takes pleasure in   

the punishment of others is said to be  
of unsound mind1 is because he seems on 
this account to be devoid of the humane 
feeling which gives rise to clemency4   
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeg1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,clemency and        
,meekness ,are the ,greatest ,virtues8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
clemency and meekness are the greatest  
virtues4 ,for virtue is deserving of    
praise chiefly because it directs man to
 happiness that consists in the         
knowledge of ,god4 ,now meekness above  
all directs man to the knowledge of     
,god3 for it is written 7,james #a3ba73 
,with meekness receive the ingrafted    
word1 and 7,ecclus4 #e3ac73 ,be meek to 
hear the word of ,god4 ,again1          
,dionysius says 7,ep4 viii ad           
,demophil47 that ,moses was deemed      
worthy of the ,divine apparition on     
account of his great meekness4          
,therefore meekness is the greatest of  
virtues4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 seemingly 
a virtue is all the greater according as

 it is more acceptable to ,god and men4 
,now meekness would appear to be most   
acceptable to ,god4 ,for it is written  
7,ecclus4 #a3cd1 #ce73 ,that which is   
agreeable to ,god is faith and meekness2
 wherefore ,christ expressly invites us 
to be meek like unto ,himself 7,matt4   
#aa3bi71 where ,he says3 ,learn of ,me1 
because ,i am meek and humble of heart2 
and ,hilary declares 99,comment4 in     
,matth4 iv1 #c that ,christ dwells in us
 by our meekness of soul4 ,again1 it is 
most acceptable to men2 wherefore it is 
written 7,ecclus4 #c3ai73 ,my son1 do   
thy works in meekness1 and thou shalt be
 beloved above the glory of men3 for    
which reason it is also declared 7,prov4
 #bj3bh7 that the ,king's throne is     
strengthened by clemency4 ,therefore    
meekness and clemency are the greatest  
of virtues4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1        
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte i1 #b7 that the meek are they who
 yield to reproaches1 and resist not    
evil1 but overcome evil by good4 ,now   

this seems to pertain to mercy or piety 
which would seem to be the greatest of  
virtues3 because a gloss of ,ambrose    
99,hilary the deacon on #a ,tim4 #d3h1  
,piety ,douay3 ',godliness' is          
profitable to all things1 observes that 
piety is the sum total of the ,christian
 religion4 ,therefore meekness and      
clemency are the greatest virtues4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,they are not reckoned as 
principal virtues1 but are annexed to   
another1 as to a principal1 virtue4  ,i 
answer that1 ,nothing prevents certain  
virtues from being greatest1 not indeed 
simply1 nor in every respect1 but in a  
particular genus4 ,it is impossible for 
clemency or meekness to be absolutely   
the greatest virtues1 since they owe    
their praise to the fact that they      
withdraw a man from evil1 by mitigating 
anger or punishment4 ,now it is more    
perfect to obtain good than to lack     
evil4 ,wherefore those virtues like     
faith1 hope1 charity1 and likewise      
prudence and justice1 which direct one  

to good simply1 are absolutely greater  
virtues than clemency and meekness4     
,yet nothing prevents clemency and      
meekness from having a certain          
restricted excellence among the virtues 
which resist evil inclinations4 ,for    
anger1 which is mitigated by meekness1  
is1 on account of its impetuousness1 a  
very great obstacle to man's free       
judgment of truth3 wherefore meekness   
above all makes a man self-possessed4   
,hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #aj3ca73 
,my son1 keep thy soul in meekness4 ,yet
 the concupiscences of the pleasures of 
touch are more shameful1 and harass more
 incessantly1 for which reason          
temperance is more rightly reckoned as a
 principal virtue4 as stated above 7,q4 
#ada1 ,a4 #g1 ad #b74 ,as to clemency1  
inasmuch as it mitigates punishment1 it 
would seem to approach nearest to       
charity1 the greatest of the virtues1   
since thereby we do good towards our    
neighbor1 and hinder his evil4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,meekness disposes man to the 

knowledge of ,god1 by removing an       
obstacle2 and this in two ways4 ,first1 
because it makes man self-possessed by  
mitigating his anger1 as stated above2  
secondly1 because it pertains to        
meekness that a man does not contradict 
the words of truth1 which many do       
through being disturbed by anger4       
,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 
,christ4 ii1 #g73 ,to be meek is not to 
contradict ,holy ,writ1 whether we      
understand it1 if it condemn our evil   
ways1 or understand it not1 as though we
 might know better and have a clearer   
insight of the truth4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,meekness and clemency make us          
acceptable to ,god and men1 in so far as
 they concur with charity1 the greatest 
of the virtues1 towards the same effect1
 namely the mitigation of our neighbor's
 evils4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,mercy and    
piety agree indeed with meekness and    
clemency by concurring towards the same 
effect1 namely the mitigation of our    
neighbor's evils4 ,nevertheless they    

differ as to motive4 ,for piety relieves
 a neighbor's evil through reverence for
 a superior1 for instance ,god or one's 
parents3 mercy relieves a neighbor's    
evil1 because this evil is displeasing  
to one1 in so far as one looks upon it  
as affecting oneself1 as stated above   
7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #b73 and this results from
 friendship which makes friends rejoice 
and grieve for the same things3 meekness
 does this1 by removing anger that urges
 to vengeance1 and clemency does this   
through leniency of soul1 in so far as  
it judges equitable that a person be no 
further punished4   ,,question #aeh     
,,of ,,anger 7,in ,eight ,articles7  ,we
 must next consider the contrary vices3 
7#a7 ,anger that is opposed to meekness2
 7#b7 ,cruelty that is opposed to       
clemency4 ,concerning anger there are   
eight points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether 
it is lawful to be angry8  7#b7 ,whether
 anger is a sin8  7#c7 ,whether it is a 
mortal sin8  7#d7 ,whether it is the    
most grievous of sins8  7#e7 ,of its    

species2  7#f7 ,whether anger is a      
capital vice8  7#g7 ,of its daughters2  
7#h7 ,whether it has a contrary vice8   
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeh1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to   
,be ,angry8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that it cannot be lawful to be     
angry4 ,for ,jerome in his exposition on
 ,matt4 #e3bb1 ,whosoever is angry with 
his brother1 etc4 says3 ,some codices   
add 'without cause4' ,however1 in the   
genuine codices the sentence is         
unqualified1 and anger is forbidden     
altogether4 ,therefore it is nowise     
lawful to be angry4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 according to ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4   
iv7 ,the soul's evil is to be without   
reason4 ,now anger is always without    
reason3 for the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that anger does not   
listen perfectly to reason2 and ,gregory
 says 7,moral4 v1 #de7 that when anger  
sunders the tranquil surface of the     
soul1 it mangles and rends it by its    
riot2 and ,cassian says 7,de ,inst4     

,caenob4 viii1 #f73 ,from whatever cause
 it arises1 the angry passion boils over
 and blinds the eye of the mind4        
,therefore it is always evil to be      
angry4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 anger is    
desire for vengeance 99,aristotle1      
,rhet4 ii1 #b according to a gloss on   
,lev4 #ai3ag1 ,thou shalt not hate thy  
brother in thy heart4 ,now it would seem
 unlawful to desire vengeance1 since    
this should be left to ,god1 according  
to ,deut4 #cb3ce1 ,revenge is ,mine4    
,therefore it would seem that to be     
angry is always an evil4  ,obj4 #d3     
,further1 all that makes us depart from 
likeness to ,god is evil4 ,now anger    
always makes us depart from likeness to 
,god1 since ,god judges with            
tranquillity according to ,wis4 #ab3ah4 
,therefore to be angry is always an     
evil4  ,on the contrary1 ,chrysostom    
99,hom4 xi in the ,opus ,imperfectum1   
falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,john          
,chrysostom says3 ,he that is angry     
without cause1 shall be in danger2 but  

he that is angry with cause1 shall not  
be in danger3 for without anger1        
teaching will be useless1 judgments     
unstable1 crimes unchecked4 ,therefore  
to be angry is not always an evil4  ,i  
answer that1 ,properly speaking anger is
 a passion of the sensitive appetite1   
and gives its name to the irascible     
power1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#df1 ,a4 #a7 when we were treating of   
the passions4 ,now with regard to the   
passions of the soul1 it is to be       
observed that evil may be found in them 
in two ways4 ,first by reason of the    
passion's very species1 which is derived
 from the passion's object4 ,thus envy1 
in respect of its species1 denotes an   
evil1 since it is displeasure at        
another's good1 and such displeasure is 
in itself contrary to reason3 wherefore1
 as the ,philosopher remarks 7,ethic4   
ii1 #f71 the very mention of envy       
denotes something evil4 ,now this does  
not apply to anger1 which is the desire 
for revenge1 since revenge may be       

desired both well and ill4 ,secondly1   
evil is found in a passion in respect of
 the passion's quantity1 that is in     
respect of its excess or deficiency2 and
 thus evil may be found in anger1 when1 
to wit1 one is angry1 more or less than 
right reason demands4 ,but if one is    
angry in accordance with right reason1  
one's anger is deserving of praise4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,stoics designated
 anger and all the other passions as    
emotions opposed to the order of reason2
 and accordingly they deemed anger and  
all other passions to be evil1 as stated
 above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #b7 when  
we were treating of the passions4 ,it is
 in this sense that ,jerome considers   
anger2 for he speaks of the anger       
whereby one is angry with one's         
neighbor1 with the intent of doing him a
 wrong4--,but1 according to the         
,peripatetics1 to whose opinion         
,augustine inclines 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 
#d71 anger and the other passions of the
 soul are movements of the sensitive    

appetite1 whether they be moderated or  
not1 according to reason3 and in this   
sense anger is not always evil4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,anger may stand in a twofold 
relation to reason4 ,first1             
antecedently2 in this way it withdraws  
reason from its rectitude1 and has      
therefore the character of evil4        
,secondly1 consequently1 inasmuch as the
 movement of the sensitive appetite is  
directed against vice and in accordance 
with reason1 this anger is good1 and is 
called zealous anger4 ,wherefore        
,gregory says 7,moral4 v1 #de73 ,we must
 beware lest1 when we use anger as an   
instrument of virtue1 it overrule the   
mind1 and go before it as its mistress1 
instead of following in reason's train1 
ever ready1 as its handmaid1 to obey4   
,this latter anger1 although it hinder  
somewhat the judgment of reason in the  
execution of the act1 does not destroy  
the rectitude of reason4 ,hence ,gregory
 says 7,moral4 v1 #de7 that zealous     
anger troubles the eye of reason1       

whereas sinful anger blinds it4 ,nor is 
it incompatible with virtue that the    
deliberation of reason be interrupted in
 the execution of what reason has       
deliberated3 since art also would be    
hindered in its act1 if it were to      
deliberate about what has to be done1   
while having to act4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,it is unlawful to desire vengeance     
considered as evil to the man who is to 
be punished1 but it is praiseworthy to  
desire vengeance as a corrective of vice
 and for the good of justice2 and to    
this the sensitive appetite can tend1 in
 so far as it is moved thereto by the   
reason3 and when revenge is taken in    
accordance with the order of judgment1  
it is ,god's work1 since he who has     
power to punish is ,god's minister1 as  
stated in ,rom4 #ac3d4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3
 ,we can and ought to be like to ,god in
 the desire for good2 but we cannot be  
altogether likened to ,him in the mode  
of our desire1 since in ,god there is no
 sensitive appetite1 as in us1 the      

movement of which has to obey reason4   
,wherefore ,gregory says 7,moral4 v1    
#de7 that anger is more firmly erect in 
withstanding vice1 when it bows to the  
command of reason4   ,,second ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeh1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,anger ,is a ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that anger is not a sin4 ,for
 we demerit by sinning4 ,but we do not  
demerit by the passions1 even as neither
 do we incur blame thereby1 as stated in
 ,ethic4 ii1 #e4 ,consequently no       
passion is a sin4 ,now anger is a       
passion as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#df1 ,a4 #a7 in the treatise on the     
passions4 ,therefore anger is not a sin4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in every sin there
 is conversion to some mutable good4    
,but in anger there is conversion not to
 a mutable good1 but to a person's evil4
 ,therefore anger is not a sin4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 ,no man sins in what he   
cannot avoid1 as ,augustine asserts     
99,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ah4 ,but man    
cannot avoid anger1 for a gloss on ,ps4 

#d3e1 ,be ye angry and sin not1 says3   
,the movement of anger is not in our    
power4 ,again1 the ,philosopher asserts 
7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that the angry man    
acts with displeasure4 ,now displeasure 
is contrary to the will4 ,therefore     
anger is not a sin4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1
 sin is contrary to nature1 according to
 ,damascene 99,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #d1  
#cj4 ,but it is not contrary to man's   
nature to be angry1 and it is the       
natural act of a power1 namely the      
irascible2 wherefore ,jerome says in a  
letter 99,ep4 xii ad ,anton4 ,monach4   
that to be angry is the property of man4
 ,therefore it is not a sin to be angry4
  ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says  
7,eph4 #d3ca73 ,let all indignation and 
anger 99,vulg43 ',anger and indignation'
 4 4 4 be put away from you4  ,i answer 
that1 ,anger1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 
is properly the name of a passion4 ,a   
passion of the sensitive appetite is    
good in so far as it is regulated by    
reason1 whereas it is evil if it set the

 order of reason aside4 ,now the order  
of reason1 in regard to anger1 may be   
considered in relation to two things4   
,first1 in relation to the appetible    
object to which anger tends1 and that is
 revenge4 ,wherefore if one desire      
revenge to be taken in accordance with  
the order of reason1 the desire of anger
 is praiseworthy1 and is called zealous 
anger 99,cf4 ,greg41 ,moral4 v1 #de4 ,on
 the other hand1 if one desire the      
taking of vengeance in any way whatever 
contrary to the order of reason1 for    
instance if he desire the punishment of 
one who has not deserved it1 or beyond  
his deserts1 or again contrary to the   
order prescribed by law1 or not for the 
due end1 namely the maintaining of      
justice and the correction of defaults1 
then the desire of anger will be sinful1
 and this is called sinful anger4       
,secondly1 the order of reason in regard
 to anger may be considered in relation 
to the mode of being angry1 namely that 
the movement of anger should not be     

immoderately fierce1 neither internally 
nor externally2 and if this condition be
 disregarded1 anger will not lack sin1  
even though just vengeance be desired4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since passion may be  
either regulated or not regulated by    
reason1 it follows that a passion       
considered absolutely does not include  
the notion of merit or demerit1 of      
praise or blame4 ,but as regulated by   
reason1 it may be something meritorious 
and deserving of praise2 while on the   
other hand1 as not regulated by reason1 
it may be demeritorious and blameworthy4
 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says       
7,ethic4 ii1 #e7 that it is he who is   
angry in a certain way1 that is praised 
or blamed4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the angry 
man desires the evil of another1 not for
 its own sake but for the sake of       
revenge1 towards which his appetite     
turns as to a mutable good4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,man is master of his actions 
through the judgment of his reason1     
wherefore as to the movements that      

forestall that judgment1 it is not in   
man's power to prevent them as a whole1 
i4e4 so that none of them arise1        
although his reason is able to check    
each one1 if it arise4 ,accordingly it  
is stated that the movement of anger is 
not in man's power1 to the extent namely
 that no such movement arise4 ,yet since
 this movement is somewhat in his power1
 it is not entirely sinless if it be    
inordinate4 ,the statement of the       
,philosopher that the angry man acts    
with displeasure1 means that he is      
displeased1 not with his being angry1   
but with the injury which he deems done 
to himself3 and through this displeasure
 he is moved to seek vengeance4  ,reply 
,obj4 #d3 ,the irascible power in man is
 naturally subject to his reason1       
wherefore its act is natural to man1 in 
so far as it is in accord with reason1  
and in so far as it is against reason1  
it is contrary to man's nature4         
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeh1  
,art4 #c  ,whether ,all ,anger ,is a    

,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that all anger is a mortal sin4    
,for it is written 7,job #e3b73 ,anger  
killeth the foolish man 99,vulg43       
',anger indeed killeth the foolish'1 and
 he speaks of the spiritual killing1    
whence mortal sin takes its name4       
,therefore all anger is a mortal sin4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing save mortal 
sin is deserving of eternal             
condemnation4 ,now anger deserves       
eternal condemnation2 for our ,lord said
 7,matt4 #e3bb73 ,whosoever is angry    
with his brother shall be in danger of  
the judgment3 and a gloss on this       
passage says that the three things      
mentioned there1 namely judgment1       
council1 and hell-fire1 signify in a    
pointed manner different abodes in the  
state of eternal damnation corresponding
 to various sins4 ,therefore anger is a 
mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1        
whatsoever is contrary to charity is a  
mortal sin4 ,now anger is of itself     
contrary to charity1 as ,jerome declares

 in his commentary on ,matt4 #e3bb1     
,whosoever is angry with his brother1   
etc4 where he says that this is contrary
 to the love of your neighbor4          
,therefore anger is a mortal sin4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,a gloss on ,ps4 #d3e1 ,be
 ye angry and sin not1 says3 ,anger is  
venial if it does not proceed to action4
  ,i answer that1 ,the movement of anger
 may be inordinate and sinful in two    
ways1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,first1 
on the part of the appetible object1 as 
when one desires unjust revenge2 and    
thus anger is a mortal sin in the point 
of its genus1 because it is contrary to 
charity and justice4 ,nevertheless such 
like anger may happen to be a venial sin
 by reason of the imperfection of the   
act4 ,this imperfection is considered   
either in relation to the subject       
desirous of vengeance1 as when the      
movement of anger forestalls the        
judgment of his reason2 or in relation  
to the desired object1 as when one      
desires to be avenged in a trifling     

matter1 which should be deemed of no    
account1 so that even if one proceeded  
to action1 it would not be a mortal sin1
 for instance by pulling a child        
slightly by the hair1 or by some other  
like action4 ,secondly1 the movement of 
anger may be inordinate in the mode of  
being angry1 for instance1 if one be too
 fiercely angry inwardly1 or if one     
exceed in the outward signs of anger4   
,in this way anger is not a mortal sin  
in the point of its genus2 yet it may   
happen to be a mortal sin1 for instance 
if through the fierceness of his anger a
 man fall away from the love of ,god and
 his neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it    
does not follow from the passage quoted 
that all anger is a mortal sin1 but that
 the foolish are killed spiritually by  
anger1 because1 through not checking the
 movement of anger by their reason1 they
 fall into mortal sins1 for instance by 
blaspheming ,god or by doing injury to  
their neighbor4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,our  
,lord said this of anger1 by way of     

addition to the words of the ,law3      
,whosoever shall kill shall be in danger
 of the judgment 7,matt4 #e3ba74        
,consequently our ,lord is speaking here
 of the movement of anger wherein a man 
desires the killing or any grave injury 
of his neighbor3 and should the consent 
of reason be given to this desire1      
without doubt it will be a mortal sin4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the case where     
anger is contrary to charity1 it is a   
mortal sin1 but it is not always so1 as 
appears from what we have said4         
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeh1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,anger ,is the ,most 
,grievous ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that anger is the most       
grievous sin4 ,for ,chrysostom says     
99,hom4 xlviii in ,joan4 that nothing is
 more repulsive than the look of an     
angry man1 and nothing uglier than a    
ruthless99 face1 and most of all than a 
cruel soul4 99,severo4 ,the correct text
 is ,si vero4 ,the translation would    
then run thus 4 4 4 and nothing uglier4 

,and if his face is ugly1 how much      
uglier is his soul64 ,therefore anger is
 the most grievous sin4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 the more hurtful a sin is1 the
 worse it would seem to be2 since1      
according to ,augustine 7,enchiridion   
xii71 a thing is said to be evil because
 it hurts4 ,now anger is most hurtful1  
because it deprives man of his reason1  
whereby he is master of himself2 for    
,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xlviii in       
,joan47 that anger differs in no way    
from madness2 it is a demon while it    
lasts1 indeed more troublesome than one 
harassed by a demon4 ,therefore anger is
 the most grievous sin4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 inward movements are judged   
according to their outward effects4 ,now
 the effect of anger is murder1 which is
 a most grievous sin4 ,therefore anger  
is a most grievous sin4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,anger is compared to hatred  
as the mote to the beam2 for ,augustine 
says in his ,rule 7,ep4 ccxi73 ,lest    
anger grow into hatred and a mote become

 a beam4 ,therefore anger is not the    
most grievous sin4  ,i answer that1 ,as 
stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 the        
inordinateness of anger is considered in
 a twofold respect1 namely with regard  
to an undue object1 and with regard to  
an undue mode of being angry4 ,as to the
 appetible object which it desires1     
anger would seem to be the least of     
sins1 for anger desires the evil of     
punishment for some person1 under the   
aspect of a good that is vengeance4     
,hence on the part of the evil which it 
desires the sin of anger agrees with    
those sins which desire the evil of our 
neighbor1 such as envy and hatred2 but  
while hatred desires absolutely         
another's evil as such1 and the envious 
man desires another's evil through      
desire of his own glory1 the angry man  
desires another's evil under the aspect 
of just revenge4 ,wherefore it is       
evident that hatred is more grievous    
than envy1 and envy than anger3 since it
 is worse to desire evil as an evil1    

than as a good2 and to desire evil as an
 external good such as honor or glory1  
than under the aspect of the rectitude  
of justice4 ,on the part of the good1   
under the aspect of which the angry man 
desires an evil1 anger concurs with the 
sin of concupiscence that tends to a    
good4 ,in this respect again1 absolutely
 speaking1 the sin of anger is          
apparently less grievous than that of   
concupiscence1 according as the good of 
justice1 which the angry man desires1 is
 better than the pleasurable or useful  
good which is desired by the subject of 
concupiscence4 ,wherefore the           
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #d7 that
 the incontinent in desire is more      
disgraceful than the incontinent in     
anger4  ,on the other hand1 as to the   
inordinateness which regards the mode of
 being angry1 anger would seem to have a
 certain pre-eminence on account of the 
strength and quickness of its movement1 
according to ,prov4 #bg3d1 ,anger hath  
no mercy1 nor fury when it breaketh     

forth3 and who can bear the violence of 
one provoked8 ,hence ,gregory says      
7,moral4 v1 #de73 ,the heart goaded by  
the pricks of anger is convulsed1 the   
body trembles1 the tongue entangles     
itself1 the face is inflamed1 the eyes  
are enraged and fail utterly to         
recognize those whom we know3 the tongue
 makes sounds indeed1 but there is no   
sense in its utterance4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,chrysostom is alluding to the      
repulsiveness of the outward gestures   
which result from the impetuousness of  
anger4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument 
considers the inordinate movement of    
anger1 that results from its            
impetuousness1 as stated above4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,murder results from hatred   
and envy no less than from anger3 yet   
anger is less grievous1 inasmuch as it  
considers the aspect of justice1 as     
stated above4   ,,fifth ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeh1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
the ,philosopher ,suitably ,assigns the 
,species of ,anger8  ,objection #a3 ,it 

would seem that the species of anger are
 unsuitably assigned by the ,philosopher
 7,ethic4 iv1 #e7 where he says that    
some angry persons are choleric1 some   
sullen1 and some ill-tempered or stern4 
,according to him1 a person is said to  
be sullen whose anger is appeased with  
difficulty and endures a long time4 ,but
 this apparently pertains to the        
circumstance of time4 ,therefore it     
seems that anger can be differentiated  
specifically in respect also of the     
other circumstances4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 he says 7,ethic4 iv1 #e7 that 
ill-tempered or stern persons are those 
whose anger is not appeased without     
revenge1 or punishment4 ,now this also  
pertains to the unquenchableness of     
anger4 ,therefore seemingly the         
ill-tempered is the same as bitterness4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 our ,lord mentions  
three degrees of anger1 when ,he says   
7,matt4 #e3bb73 ,whosoever is angry with
 his brother1 shall be in danger of the 
judgment3 and whosoever shall say to his

 brother1 ,raca1 shall be in danger of  
the council1 and whosoever shall say to 
his brother1 ,thou fool4 ,but these     
degrees are not referable to the        
aforesaid species4 ,therefore it seems  
that the above division of anger is not 
fitting4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of 
,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxi 
says there are three species of         
irascibility1 namely1 the anger which is
 called wrath 99,fellea1 i4e4 like gall4
 ,but in ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,a4 #h1 ,st4 
,thomas quoting the same authority has  
,cholos which we render 'wrath'1 and    
ill-will which is a disease of the mind1
 and rancour4 ,now these three seem to  
coincide with the three aforesaid4 ,for 
wrath he describes as having beginning  
and movement1 and the ,philosopher      
7,ethic4 iv1 #e7 ascribes this to       
choleric persons3 ill-will he describes 
as an anger that endures and grows old1 
and this the ,philosopher ascribes to   
sullenness2 while he describes rancour  
as reckoning the time for vengeance1    

which tallies with the ,philosopher's   
description of the ill-tempered4 ,the   
same division is given by ,damascene    
7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #af74 ,therefore  
the aforesaid division assigned by the  
,philosopher is not unfitting4  ,i      
answer that1 ,the aforesaid distinction 
may be referred either to the passion1  
or to the sin itself of anger4 ,we have 
already stated when treating of the     
passions 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,a4 #h7 how 
it is to be applied to the passion of   
anger4 ,and it would seem that this is  
chiefly what ,gregory of ,nyssa and     
,damascene had in view4 ,here1 however1 
we have to take the distinction of these
 species in its application to the sin  
of anger1 and as set down by the        
,philosopher4  ,for the inordinateness  
of anger may be considered in relation  
to two things4 ,first1 in relation to   
the origin of anger1 and this regards   
choleric persons1 who are angry too     
quickly and for any slight cause4       
,secondly1 in relation to the duration  

of anger1 for that anger endures too    
long2 and this may happen in two ways4  
,in one way1 because the cause of anger1
 to wit1 the inflicted injury1 remains  
too long in a man's memory1 the result  
being that it gives rise to a lasting   
displeasure1 wherefore he is grievous   
and sullen to himself4 ,in another way1 
it happens on the part of vengeance1    
which a man seeks with a stubborn       
desire3 this applies to ill-tempered or 
stern people1 who do not put aside their
 anger until they have inflicted        
punishment4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is not
 time1 but a man's propensity to anger1 
or his pertinacity in anger1 that is the
 chief point of consideration in the    
aforesaid species4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3    
,both sullen and ill-tempered people    
have a long-lasting anger1 but for      
different reasons4 ,for a sullen person 
has an abiding anger on account of an   
abiding displeasure1 which he holds     
locked in his breast2 and as he does not
 break forth into the outward signs of  

anger1 others cannot reason him out of  
it1 nor does he of his own accord lay   
aside his anger1 except his displeasure 
wear away with time and thus his anger  
cease4 ,on the other hand1 the anger of 
ill-tempered persons is long-lasting on 
account of their intense desire for     
revenge1 so that it does not wear out   
with time1 and can be quelled only by   
revenge4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the degrees 
of anger mentioned by our ,lord do not  
refer to the different species of anger1
 but correspond to the course of the    
human act 99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,a4  
#h1 ,obj4 #c4 ,for the first degree is  
an inward conception1 and in reference  
to this ,he says3 ,whosoever is angry   
with his brother4 ,the second degree is 
when the anger is manifested by outward 
signs1 even before it breaks out into   
effect2 and in reference to this ,he    
says3 ,whosoever shall say to his       
brother1 ,raca6 which is an angry       
exclamation4 ,the third degree is when  
the sin conceived inwardly breaks out   

into effect4 ,now the effect of anger is
 another's hurt under the aspect of     
revenge2 and the least of hurts is that 
which is done by a mere word2 wherefore 
in reference to this ,he says3          
,whosoever shall say to his brother     
,thou fool6 ,consequently it is clear   
that the second adds to the first1 and  
the third to both the others2 so that1  
if the first is a mortal sin1 in the    
case referred to by our ,lord1 as stated
 above 7,a4 #c1 ad #b71 much more so are
 the others4 ,wherefore some kind of    
condemnation is assigned as             
corresponding to each one of them4 ,in  
the first case judgment is assigned1 and
 this is the least severe1 for as       
,augustine says 99,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte
 i1 #i1 where judgment is to be         
delivered1 there is an opportunity for  
defense3 in the second case council is  
assigned1 whereby the judges deliberate 
together on the punishment to be        
inflicted3 to the third case is assigned
 hell-fire1 i4e4 decisive condemnation4 

,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeh1  
,art4 #f  ,whether ,anger ,should ,be   
,reckoned ,among the ,capital ,vices8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger
 should not be reckoned among the       
capital sins4 ,for anger is born of     
sorrow which is a capital vice known by 
the name of sloth4 ,therefore anger     
should not be reckoned a capital vice4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 hatred is a graver  
sin than anger4 ,therefore it should be 
reckoned a capital vice rather than     
anger4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a gloss on  
,prov4 #bi3bb1 ,an angry ,douay3        
'passionate' man provoketh quarrels1    
says3 ,anger is the door to all vices3  
if it be closed1 peace is ensured within
 to all the virtues2 if it be opened1   
the soul is armed for every crime4 ,now 
no capital vice is the origin of all    
sins1 but only of certain definite ones4
 ,therefore anger should not be reckoned
 among the capital vices4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7  
places anger among the capital vices4   

,i answer that1 ,as stated above        
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #c1 #d71 a       
capital vice is defined as one from     
which many vices arise4 ,now there are  
two reasons for which many vices can    
arise from anger4 ,the first is on the  
part of its object which has much of the
 aspect of desirability1 in so far as   
revenge is desired under the aspect of  
just or honest991 which is attractive by
 its excellence1 as stated above 7,a4   
#d74 99,honesty must be taken here in   
its broad sense as synonymous with moral
 goodness1 from the point of view of    
decorum2 ,cf4 ,q4 #ade1 ,a4 #a4 ,the    
second is on the part of its            
impetuosity1 whereby it precipitates the
 mind into all kinds of inordinate      
action4 ,therefore it is evident that   
anger is a capital vice4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,the sorrow whence anger arises is  
not1 for the most part1 the vice of     
sloth1 but the passion of sorrow1 which 
results from an injury inflicted4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4  

#aah1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #adh1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4     
#aec1 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #d71
 it belongs to the notion of a capital  
vice to have a most desirable end1 so   
that many sins are committed through the
 desire thereof4 ,now anger1 which      
desires evil under the aspect of good1  
has a more desirable end than hatred    
has1 since the latter desires evil under
 the aspect of evil3 wherefore anger is 
more a capital vice than hatred is4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,anger is stated to be 
the door to the vices accidentally1 that
 is by removing obstacles1 to wit by    
hindering the judgment of reason1       
whereby man is withdrawn from evil4 ,it 
is1 however1 directly the cause of      
certain special sins1 which are called  
its daughters4   ,,seventh ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeh1 ,art4 #g  ,whether 
,six ,daughters ,are ,fittingly         
,assigned to ,anger8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that six daughters are      
unfittingly assigned to anger1 namely   
quarreling1 swelling of the mind1       

contumely1 clamor1 indignation and      
blasphemy4 ,for blasphemy is reckoned by
 ,isidore 99,,qq4 in ,deut41 qu4 xvi to 
be a daughter of pride4 ,therefore it   
should not be accounted a daughter of   
anger4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 hatred is   
born of anger1 as ,augustine says in his
 rule 7,ep4 ccxi74 ,therefore it should 
be placed among the daughters of anger4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a swollen mind would
 seem to be the same as pride4 ,now     
pride is not the daughter of a vice1 but
 the mother of all vices1 as ,gregory   
states 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de74 ,therefore  
swelling of the mind should not be      
reckoned among the daughters of anger4  
,on the contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4     
xxxi1 #de7 assigns these daughters to   
anger4  ,i answer that1 ,anger may be   
considered in three ways4 ,first1 as    
consisting in thought1 and thus two     
vices arise from anger4 ,one is on the  
part of the person with whom a man is   
angry1 and whom he deems unworthy       
7indignum7 of acting thus towards him1  

and this is called indignation4 ,the    
other vice is on the part of the man    
himself1 in so far as he devises various
 means of vengeance1 and with such like 
thoughts fills his mind1 according to   
,job #ae3b1 ,will a wise man 4 4 4 fill 
his stomach with burning heat8 ,and thus
 we have swelling of the mind4          
,secondly1 anger may be considered1 as  
expressed in words3 and thus a twofold  
disorder arises from anger4 ,one is when
 a man manifests his anger in his manner
 of speech1 as stated above 7,a4 #e1 ad 
#c7 of the man who says to his brother1 
,raca3 and this refers to clamor1 which 
denotes disorderly and confused speech4 
,the other disorder is when a man breaks
 out into injurious words1 and if these 
be against ,god1 it is blasphemy1 if    
against one's neighbor1 it is contumely4
  ,thirdly1 anger may be considered as  
proceeding to deeds2 and thus anger     
gives rise to quarrels1 by which we are 
to understand all manner of injuries    
inflicted on one's neighbor through     

anger4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the blasphemy 
into which a man breaks out deliberately
 proceeds from pride1 whereby a man     
lifts himself up against ,god3 since1   
according to ,ecclus4 #aj3ad1 the       
beginning of the pride of man is to fall
 off from ,god1 i4e4 to fall away from  
reverence for ,him is the first part of 
pride 99,cf4 ,q4 #afb1 ,a4 #g1 ad #b2   
and this gives rise to blasphemy4 ,but  
the blasphemy into which a man breaks   
out through a disturbance of the mind1  
proceeds from anger4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,although hatred sometimes arises from  
anger1 it has a previous cause1 from    
which it arises more directly1 namely   
displeasure1 even as1 on the other hand1
 love is born of pleasure4 ,now through 
displeasure1 a man is moved sometimes to
 anger1 sometimes to hatred4 ,wherefore 
it was fitting to reckon that hatred    
arises from sloth rather than from      
anger4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,swelling of   
the mind is not taken here as identical 
with pride1 but for a certain effort or 

daring attempt to take vengeance2 and   
daring is a vice opposed to fortitude4  
,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeh1 
,art4 #h  ,whether ,there ,is a ,vice   
,opposed to ,anger ,resulting from ,lack
 of ,anger8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that there is not a vice opposed to
 anger1 resulting from lack of anger4   
,for no vice makes us like to ,god4 ,now
 by being entirely without anger1 a man 
becomes like to ,god1 ,who judges with  
tranquillity 7,wis4 #ab3ah74 ,therefore 
seemingly it is not a vice to be        
altogether without anger4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 it is not a vice to lack what 
is altogether useless4 ,but the movement
 of anger is useful for no purpose1 as  
,seneca proves in the book he wrote on  
anger 7,de ,ira i1 #i1 seqq474          
,therefore it seems that lack of anger  
is not a vice4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
according to ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4    
iv71 man's evil is to be without reason4
 ,now the judgment of reason remains    
unimpaired1 if all movement of anger be 

done away4 ,therefore no lack of anger  
amounts to a vice4  ,on the contrary1   
,chrysostom 99,hom4 xi in ,matth4 in the
 ,opus ,imperfectum1 falsely ascribed to
 ,st4 ,john ,chrysostom says3 ,he who is
 not angry1 whereas he has cause to be1 
sins4 ,for unreasonable patience is the 
hotbed of many vices1 it fosters        
negligence1 and incites not only the    
wicked but even the good to do wrong4   
,i answer that1 ,anger may be understood
 in two ways4 ,in one way1 as a simple  
movement of the will1 whereby one       
inflicts punishment1 not through        
passion1 but in virtue of a judgment of 
the reason3 and thus without doubt lack 
of anger is a sin4 ,this is the sense in
 which anger is taken in the saying of  
,chrysostom1 for he says 7,hom4 xi in   
,matth41 in the ,opus ,imperfectum1     
falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,john          
,chrysostom73 ,anger1 when it has a     
cause1 is not anger but judgment4 ,for  
anger1 properly speaking1 denotes a     
movement of passion3 and when a man is  

angry with reason1 his anger is no      
longer from passion3 wherefore he is    
said to judge1 not to be angry4 ,in     
another way anger is taken for a        
movement of the sensitive appetite1     
which is with passion resulting from a  
bodily transmutation4 ,this movement is 
a necessary sequel1 in man1 to the      
movement of his will1 since the lower   
appetite necessarily follows the        
movement of the higher appetite1 unless 
there be an obstacle4 ,hence the        
movement of anger in the sensitive      
appetite cannot be lacking altogether1  
unless the movement of the will be      
altogether lacking or weak4             
,consequently lack of the passion of    
anger is also a vice1 even as the lack  
of movement in the will directed to     
punishment by the judgment of reason4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he that is entirely   
without anger when he ought to be angry1
 imitates ,god as to lack of passion1   
but not as to ,god's punishing by       
judgment4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the passion

 of anger1 like all other movements of  
the sensitive appetite1 is useful1 as   
being conducive to the more prompt      
execution 99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,a4  
#c of reason's dictate3 else1 the       
sensitive appetite in man would be to no
 purpose1 whereas nature does nothing   
without purpose 99,aristotle1 ,de ,coelo
 i1 #d4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when a man   
acts inordinately1 the judgment of his  
reason is cause not only of the simple  
movement of the will but also of the    
passion in the sensitive appetite1 as   
stated above4 ,wherefore just as the    
removal of the effect is a sign that the
 cause is removed1 so the lack of anger 
is a sign that the judgment of reason is
 lacking4   ,,question #aei  ,,of       
,,cruelty 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we must
 now consider cruelty1 under which head 
there are two points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether cruelty is opposed to clemency8
  7#b7 ,of its comparison with savagery 
or brutality4   ,,first ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aei1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 

,cruelty ,is ,opposed to ,clemency8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
cruelty is not opposed to clemency4 ,for
 ,seneca says 7,de ,clementia ii1 #d7   
that those are said to be cruel who     
exceed in punishing1 which is contrary  
to justice4 ,now clemency is reckoned a 
part1 not of justice but of temperance4 
,therefore apparently cruelty is not    
opposed to clemency4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 it is written 7,jer4 #f3bc73  
,they are cruel1 and will have no mercy2
 so that cruelty would seem opposed to  
mercy4 ,now mercy is not the same as    
clemency1 as stated above 7,q4 #aeg1 ,a4
 #d1 ad #c74 ,therefore cruelty is not  
opposed to clemency4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 clemency is concerned with the
 infliction of punishment1 as stated    
above 7,q4 #aeg1 ,a4 #a73 whereas       
cruelty applies to the withdrawal of    
beneficence1 according to ,prov4 #aa3ag1
 ,but he that is cruel casteth off even 
his own kindred4 ,therefore cruelty is  
not opposed to clemency4  ,on the       

contrary1 ,seneca says 7,de ,clementia  
ii1 #d7 that the opposite of clemency is
 cruelty1 which is nothing else but     
hardness of heart in exacting           
punishment4  ,i answer that1 ,cruelty   
apparently takes its name from cruditas 
7rawness74 ,now just as things when     
cooked and prepared are wont to have an 
agreeable and sweet savor1 so when raw  
they have a disagreeable and bitter     
taste4 ,now it has been stated above    
7,q4 #aeg1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a2 ,a4 #d1 ad #c7
 that clemency denotes a certain        
smoothness or sweetness of soul1 whereby
 one is inclined to mitigate punishment4
 ,hence cruelty is directly opposed to  
clemency4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as it 
belongs to equity to mitigate punishment
 according to reason1 while the         
sweetness of soul which inclines one to 
this belongs to clemency3 so too1 excess
 in punishing1 as regards the external  
action1 belongs to injustice2 but as    
regards the hardness of heart1 which    
makes one ready to increase punishment1 

belongs to cruelty4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,mercy and clemency concur in this1 that
 both shun and recoil from another's    
unhappiness1 but in different ways4 ,for
 it belongs to mercy 99,cf4 ,q4 #cj1 ,a4
 #a to relieve another's unhappiness by 
a beneficent action1 while it belongs to
 clemency to mitigate another's         
unhappiness by the cessation of         
punishment4 ,and since cruelty denotes  
excess in exacting punishment1 it is    
more directly opposed to clemency than  
to mercy2 yet on account of the mutual  
likeness of these virtues1 cruelty is   
sometimes taken for mercilessness4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,cruelty is there taken
 for mercilessness1 which is lack of    
beneficence4 ,we may also reply that    
withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a
 punishment4   ,,second ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aei1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,cruelty ,differs from ,savagery or     
,brutality8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that cruelty differs not from      
savagery or brutality4 ,for seemingly   

one vice is opposed in one way to one   
virtue4 ,now both savagery and cruelty  
are opposed to clemency by way of       
excess4 ,therefore it would seem that   
savagery and cruelty are the same4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,isidore says       
7,etym4 x7 that severity is as it were  
savagery with verity1 because it holds  
to justice without attending to piety3  
so that savagery would seem to exclude  
that mitigation of punishment in        
delivering judgment which is demanded by
 piety4 ,now this has been stated to    
belong to cruelty 7,a4 #a1 ad #a74      
,therefore cruelty is the same as       
savagery4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as  
there is a vice opposed to a virtue by  
way of excess1 so is there a vice       
opposed to it by way of deficiency1     
which latter is opposed both to the     
virtue which is the mean1 and to the    
vice which is in excess4 ,now the same  
vice pertaining to deficiency is opposed
 to both cruelty and savagery1 namely   
remission or laxity4 ,for ,gregory says 

7,moral4 xx1 #e73 ,let there be love1   
but not that which enervates1 let there 
be severity1 but without fury1 let there
 be zeal without unseemly savagery1 let 
there be piety without undue clemency4  
,therefore savagery is the same as      
cruelty4  ,on the contrary1 ,seneca says
 7,de ,clementia ii1 #d7 that a man who 
is angry without being hurt1 or with one
 who has not offended him1 is not said  
to be cruel1 but to be brutal or savage4
  ,i answer that1 ,savagery and         
brutality take their names from a       
likeness to wild beasts which are also  
described as savage4 ,for animals of    
this kind attack man that they may feed 
on his body1 and not for some motive of 
justice the consideration of which      
belongs to reason alone4 ,wherefore1    
properly speaking1 brutality or savagery
 applies to those who in inflicting     
punishment have not in view a default of
 the person punished1 but merely the    
pleasure they derive from a man's       
torture4 ,consequently it is evident    

that it is comprised under bestiality3  
for such like pleasure is not human but 
bestial1 and resulting as it does either
 from evil custom1 or from a corrupt    
nature1 as do other bestial emotions4   
,on the other hand1 cruelty not only    
regards the default of the person       
punished1 but exceeds in the mode of    
punishing3 wherefore cruelty differs    
from savagery or brutality1 as human    
wickedness differs from bestiality1 as  
stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #e4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,clemency is a human virtue2       
wherefore directly opposed to it is     
cruelty which is a form of human        
wickedness4 ,but savagery or brutality  
is comprised under bestiality1 wherefore
 it is directly opposed not to clemency1
 but to a more excellent virtue1 which  
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #e7 calls
 heroic or god-like1 which according to 
us1 would seem to pertain to the gifts  
of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,consequently we   
may say that savagery is directly       
opposed to the gift of piety4  ,reply   

,obj4 #b3 ,a severe man is not said to  
be simply savage1 because this implies a
 vice2 but he is said to be savage as   
regards the truth1 on account of some   
likeness to savagery which is not       
inclined to mitigate punishment4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,remission of punishment is  
not a vice1 except it disregard the     
order of justice1 which requires a man  
to be punished on account of his        
offense1 and which cruelty exceeds4 ,on 
the other hand1 cruelty disregards this 
order altogether4 ,wherefore remission  
of punishment is opposed to cruelty1 but
 not to savagery4   ,,question #afj     
,,of ,,modesty 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we
 must now consider modesty3 and 7#a7    
,modesty in general2 7#b7 ,each of its  
species4 ,under the first head there are
 two points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether  
modesty is a part of temperance8  7#b7  
,what is the matter of modesty8         
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afj1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,modesty ,is a ,part 
of ,temperance8  ,objection #a3 ,it     

would seem that modesty is not a part of
 temperance4 ,for modesty is denominated
 from mode4 ,now mode is requisite in   
every virtue3 since virtue is directed  
to good2 and good1 according to         
,augustine 7,de ,nat4 ,boni #c71        
consists in mode1 species1 and order4   
,therefore modesty is a general virtue1 
and consequently should not be reckoned 
a part of temperance4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 temperance would seem to be   
deserving of praise chiefly on account  
of its moderation4 ,now this gives      
modesty its name4 ,therefore modesty is 
the same as temperance1 and not one of  
its parts4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 modesty 
would seem to regard the correction of  
our neighbor1 according to #b ,tim4     
#b3bd1 #be1 ,the servant of the ,lord   
must not wrangle1 but be mild towards   
all men 4 4 4 with modesty admonishing  
them that resist the truth4 ,now        
admonishing wrong-doers is an act of    
justice or of charity1 as stated above  
7,q4 #cc1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore seemingly 

modesty is a part of justice rather than
 of temperance4  ,on the contrary1      
,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1 #ed7    
reckons modesty as a part of temperance4
  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 
#ada1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #aeg1 ,a4 #c71        
temperance brings moderation into those 
things wherein it is most difficult to  
be moderate1 namely the concupiscences  
of pleasures of touch4 ,now whenever    
there is a special virtue about some    
matter of very great moment1 there must 
needs be another virtue about matters of
 lesser import3 because the life of man 
requires to be regulated by the virtues 
with regard to everything3 thus it was  
stated above 7,q4 #acd1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a71 
that while magnificence is about great  
expenditure1 there is need in addition  
for liberality1 which is concerned with 
ordinary expenditure4 ,hence there is   
need for a virtue to moderate other     
lesser matters where moderation is not  
so difficult4 ,this virtue is called    
modesty1 and is annexed to temperance as

 its principal4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when 
a name is common to many it is sometimes
 appropriated to those of the lowest    
rank2 thus the common name of angel is  
appropriated to the lowest order of     
angels4 ,in the same way1 mode which is 
observed by all virtues in common1 is   
specially appropriated to the virtue    
which prescribes the mode in the        
slightest things4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3     
,some things need tempering on account  
of their strength1 thus we temper strong
 wine4 ,but moderation is necessary in  
all things3 wherefore temperance is more
 concerned with strong passions1 and    
modesty about weaker passions4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,modesty is to be taken there 
for the general moderation which is     
necessary in all virtues4   ,,second    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afj1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,modesty ,is ,only ,about      
,outward ,actions8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that modesty is only about   
outward actions4 ,for the inward        
movements of the passions cannot be     

known to other persons4 ,yet the        
,apostle enjoins 7,phil4 #d3e73 ,let    
your modesty be known to all men4       
,therefore modesty is only about outward
 actions4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the      
virtues that are about the passions are 
distinguished from justice which is     
about operations4 ,now modesty is       
seemingly one virtue4 ,therefore1 if it 
be about outward works1 it will not be  
concerned with inward passions4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 no one same virtue is both
 about things pertaining to the         
appetite--which is proper to the moral  
virtues--and about things pertaining to 
knowledge--which is proper to the       
intellectual virtues--and again about   
things pertaining to the irascible and  
concupiscible faculties4 ,therefore1 if 
modesty be one virtue1 it cannot be     
about all these things4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,in all these things it is    
necessary to observe the mode whence    
modesty takes its name4 ,therefore      
modesty is about all of them4  ,i answer

 that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71       
modesty differs from temperance1 in that
 temperance moderates those matters     
where restraint is most difficult1 while
 modesty moderates those that present   
less difficulty4 ,authorities seem to   
have had various opinions about modesty4
 ,for wherever they found a special kind
 of good or a special difficulty of     
moderation1 they withdrew it from the   
province of modesty1 which they confined
 to lesser matters4 ,now it is clear to 
all that the restraint of pleasures of  
touch presents a special difficulty3    
wherefore all distinguished temperance  
from modesty4  ,in addition to this1    
moreover1 ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4   
ii1 #ed7 considered that there was a    
special kind of good in the moderation  
of punishment2 wherefore he severed     
clemency also from modesty1 and held    
modesty to be about the remaining       
ordinary matters that require           
moderation4 ,these seemingly are of four
 kinds4 ,one is the movement of the mind

 towards some excellence1 and this is   
moderated by humility4 ,the second is   
the desire of things pertaining to      
knowledge1 and this is moderated by     
studiousness which is opposed to        
curiosity4 ,the third regards bodily    
movements and actions1 which require to 
be done becomingly and honestly 99,cf4  
,q4 #ade1 ,a4 #a1 whether we act        
seriously or in play4 ,the fourth       
regards outward show1 for instance in   
dress and the like4  ,to some of these  
matters1 however1 other authorities     
appointed certain special virtues3 thus 
,andronicus 99,de ,affectibus mentions  
meekness1 simplicity1 humility1 and     
other kindred virtues1 of which we have 
spoken above 7,q4 #adc72 while          
,aristotle 7,ethic4 ii1 #g7 assigned    
eutrapelia to pleasures in games1 as    
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #e74
 ,all these are comprised under modesty 
as understood by ,tully2 and in this way
 modesty regards not only outward but   
also inward actions4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  

,the ,apostle speaks of modesty as      
regarding externals4 ,nevertheless the  
moderation of the inner man may be shown
 by certain outward signs4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,various virtues assigned by       
various authorities are comprised under 
modesty4 ,wherefore nothing prevents    
modesty from regarding matters which    
require different virtues4 ,yet there is
 not so great a difference between the  
various parts of modesty1 as there is   
between justice1 which is about         
operations1 and temperance1 which is    
about passions1 because in actions and  
passions that present no great          
difficulty on the part of the matter1   
but only on the part of moderation1     
there is but one virtue1 one namely for 
each kind of moderation4  ,wherefore the
 ,reply to the ,third ,objection also is
 clear4   ,,question #afa  ,,of         
,,humility 7,in ,six ,articles7  ,we    
must consider next the species of       
modesty3 7#a7 ,humility1 and pride which
 is opposed to it2 7#b7 ,studiousness1  

and its opposite1 ,curiosity2 7#c7      
,modesty as affecting words or deeds2   
7#d7 ,modesty as affecting outward      
attire4  ,concerning humility there are 
six points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether   
humility is a virtue8  7#b7 ,whether it 
resides in the appetite1 or in the      
judgment of reason8  7#c7 ,whether by   
humility one ought to subject oneself to
 all men8  7#d7 ,whether it is a part of
 modesty or temperance8  7#e7 ,of its   
comparison with the other virtues2  7#f7
 ,of the degrees of humility4   ,,first 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afa1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,humility ,is a ,virtue8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
humility is not a virtue4 ,for virtue   
conveys the notion of a good4 ,but      
humility conveys the notion of a penal  
evil1 according to ,ps4 #ajd3ah1 ,they  
humbled his feet in fetters4 ,therefore 
humility is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 virtue and vice are mutually  
opposed4 ,now humility seemingly denotes
 a vice1 for it is written 7,ecclus4    

#ai3bc73 ,there is one that humbleth    
himself wickedly4 ,therefore humility is
 not a virtue4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no  
virtue is opposed to another virtue4    
,but humility is apparently opposed to  
the virtue of magnanimity1 which aims at
 great things1 whereas humility shuns   
them4 ,therefore it would seem that     
humility is not a virtue4  ,obj4 #d3    
,further1 virtue is the disposition of  
that which is perfect 7,phys4 vii1 text4
 #ag74 ,but humility seemingly belongs  
to the imperfect3 wherefore it becomes  
not ,god to be humble1 since ,he can be 
subject to none4 ,therefore it seems    
that humility is not a virtue4  ,obj4   
#e3 ,further1 every moral virtue is     
about actions and passions1 according to
 ,ethic4 ii1 #c4 ,but humility is not   
reckoned by the ,philosopher among the  
virtues that are about passions1 nor is 
it comprised under justice which is     
about actions4 ,therefore it would seem 
not to be a virtue4  ,on the contrary1  
,origen commenting on ,luke #a3dh1 ,he  

hath regarded the humility of ,his      
handmaid1 says 7,hom4 viii in ,luc473   
,one of the virtues1 humility1 is       
particularly commended in ,holy ,writ2  
for our ,saviour said3 ',learn of ,me1  
because ,i am meek1 and humble of       
heart4'  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #b7 when we
 were treating of the passions1 the     
difficult good has something attractive 
to the appetite1 namely the aspect of   
good1 and likewise something repulsive  
to the appetite1 namely the difficulty  
of obtaining it4 ,in respect of the     
former there arises the movement of     
hope1 and in respect of the latter1 the 
movement of despair4 ,now it has been   
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #b7 
that for those appetitive movements     
which are a kind of impulse towards an  
object1 there is need of a moderating   
and restraining moral virtue1 while for 
those which are a kind of recoil1 there 
is need1 on the part of the appetite1 of
 a moral virtue to strengthen it and    

urge it on4 ,wherefore a twofold virtue 
is necessary with regard to the         
difficult good3 one1 to temper and      
restrain the mind1 lest it tend to high 
things immoderately2 and this belongs to
 the virtue of humility3 and another to 
strengthen the mind against despair1 and
 urge it on to the pursuit of great     
things according to right reason2 and   
this is magnanimity4 ,therefore it is   
evident that humility is a virtue4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,isidore observes  
7,etym4 x71 a humble man is so called   
because he is1 as it were1 humo acclinis
 99,literally1 bent to the ground1 i4e4 
inclined to the lowest place4 ,this may 
happen in two ways4 ,first1 through an  
extrinsic principle1 for instance when  
one is cast down by another1 and thus   
humility is a punishment4 ,secondly1    
through an intrinsic principle3 and this
 may be done sometimes well1 for        
instance when a man1 considering his own
 failings1 assumes the lowest place     
according to his mode3 thus ,abraham    

said to the ,lord 7,gen4 #ah3bg71 ,i    
will speak to my ,lord1 whereas ,i am   
dust and ashes4 ,in this way humility is
 a virtue4 ,sometimes1 however1 this may
 be ill-done1 for instance when man1 not
 understanding his honor1 compares      
himself to senseless beasts1 and becomes
 like to them 7,ps4 #dh3ac74  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,as stated 7ad #a71 humility1 
in so far as it is a virtue1 conveys the
 notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement
 to the lowest place4 ,now this is      
sometimes done merely as to outward     
signs and pretense3 wherefore this is   
false humility1 of which ,augustine says
 in a letter 7,ep4 cxlix7 that it is    
grievous pride1 since to wit1 it would  
seem to aim at excellence of glory4     
,sometimes1 however1 this is done by an 
inward movement of the soul1 and in this
 way1 properly speaking1 humility is    
reckoned a virtue1 because virtue does  
not consist in externals1 but chiefly in
 the inward choice of the mind1 as the  
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ii1 #e74   

,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,humility restrains the
 appetite from aiming at great things   
against right reason3 while magnanimity 
urges the mind to great things in accord
 with right reason4 ,hence it is clear  
that magnanimity is not opposed to      
humility3 indeed they concur in this1   
that each is according to right reason4 
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a thing is said to be 
perfect in two ways4 ,first absolutely2 
such a thing contains no defect1 neither
 in its nature nor in respect of        
anything else1 and thus ,god alone is   
perfect4 ,to ,him humility is fitting1  
not as regards ,his ,divine nature1 but 
only as regards ,his assumed nature4    
,secondly1 a thing may be said to be    
perfect in a restricted sense1 for      
instance in respect of its nature or    
state or time4 ,thus a virtuous man is  
perfect3 although in comparison with    
,god his perfection is found wanting1   
according to the word of ,isa4 #dj3ag1  
,all nations are before ,him as if they 
had no being at all4 ,in this way       

humility may be competent to every man4 
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the ,philosopher      
intended to treat of virtues as directed
 to civic life1 wherein the subjection  
of one man to another is defined        
according to the ordinance of the law1  
and consequently is a matter of legal   
justice4 ,but humility1 considered as a 
special virtue1 regards chiefly the     
subjection of man to ,god1 for ,whose   
sake he humbles himself by subjecting   
himself to others4   ,,second ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afa1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,humility ,has to ,do with the          
,appetite8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that humility concerns1 not the    
appetite but the judgment of reason4    
,because humility is opposed to pride4  
,now pride concerns things pertaining to
 knowledge3 for ,gregory says 7,moral4  
xxxiv1 #bb7 that pride1 when it extends 
outwardly to the body1 is first of all  
shown in the eyes3 wherefore it is      
written 7,ps4 #acj3a71 ,lord1 my heart  
is not exalted1 nor are my eyes lofty4  

,now eyes are the chief aids to         
knowledge4 ,therefore it would seem that
 humility is chiefly concerned with     
knowledge1 whereby one thinks little of 
oneself4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine
 says 7,de ,virginit4 xxxi7 that almost 
the whole of ,christian teaching is     
humility4 ,consequently nothing         
contained in ,christian teaching is     
incompatible with humility4 ,now        
,christian teaching admonishes us to    
seek the better things1 according to #a 
,cor4 #ab3ca1 ,be zealous for the better
 gifts4 ,therefore it belongs to        
humility to restrain not the desire of  
difficult things but the estimate       
thereof4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it belongs
 to the same virtue both to restrain    
excessive movement1 and to strengthen   
the soul against excessive withdrawal3  
thus fortitude both curbs daring and    
fortifies the soul against fear4 ,now it
 is magnanimity that strengthens the    
soul against the difficulties that occur
 in the pursuit of great things4        

,therefore if humility were to curb the 
desire of great things1 it would follow 
that humility is not a distinct virtue  
from magnanimity1 which is evidently    
false4 ,therefore humility is concerned1
 not with the desire but with the       
estimate of great things4  ,obj4 #d3    
,further1 ,andronicus 99,de ,affectibus 
assigns humility to outward show2 for he
 says that humility is the habit of     
avoiding excessive expenditure and      
parade4 ,therefore it is not concerned  
with the movement of the appetite4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de      
,poenit4 99,serm4 cccli7 that the humble
 man is one who chooses to be an abject 
in the house of the ,lord1 rather than  
to dwell in the tents of sinners4 ,but  
choice concerns the appetite4 ,therefore
 humility has to do with the appetite   
rather than with the estimative power4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4   
#a71 it belongs properly to humility1   
that a man restrain himself from being  
borne towards that which is above him4  

,for this purpose he must know his      
disproportion to that which surpasses   
his capacity4 ,hence knowledge of one's 
own deficiency belongs to humility1 as a
 rule guiding the appetite4             
,nevertheless humility is essentially in
 the appetite itself2 and consequently  
it must be said that humility1 properly 
speaking1 moderates the movement of the 
appetite4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,lofty eyes 
are a sign of pride1 inasmuch as it     
excludes respect and fear3 for fearing  
and respectful persons are especially   
wont to lower the eyes1 as though not   
daring to compare themselves with       
others4 ,but it does not follow from    
this that humility is essentially       
concerned with knowledge4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,it is contrary to humility to aim  
at greater things through confiding in  
one's own powers3 but to aim at greater 
things through confidence in ,god's     
help1 is not contrary to humility2      
especially since the more one subjects  
oneself to ,god1 the more is one exalted

 in ,god's sight4 ,hence ,augustine says
 7,de ,virginit4 xxxi73 ,it is one thing
 to raise oneself to ,god1 and another  
to raise oneself up against ,god4 ,he   
that abases himself before ,him1 him ,he
 raiseth up2 he that raises himself up  
against ,him1 him ,he casteth down4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in fortitude there is 
the same reason for restraining daring  
and for strengthening the soul against  
fear3 since the reason in both cases is 
that man should set the good of reason  
before dangers of death4 ,but the reason
 for restraining presumptuous hope which
 pertains to humility is not the same as
 the reason for strengthening the soul  
against despair4 ,because the reason for
 strengthening the soul against despair 
is the acquisition of one's proper good 
lest man1 by despair1 render himself    
unworthy of a good which was competent  
to him2 while the chief reason for      
suppressing presumptuous hope is based  
on divine reverence1 which shows that   
man ought not to ascribe to himself more

 than is competent to him according to  
the position in which ,god has placed   
him4 ,wherefore humility would seem to  
denote in the first place man's         
subjection to ,god2 and for this reason 
,augustine 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte  
i1 #d7 ascribes humility1 which he      
understands by poverty of spirit1 to the
 gift of fear whereby man reveres ,god4 
,hence it follows that the relation of  
fortitude to daring differs from that of
 humility to hope4 ,because fortitude   
uses daring more than it suppresses it3 
so that excess of daring is more like   
fortitude than lack of daring is4 ,on   
the other hand1 humility suppresses hope
 or confidence in self more than it uses
 it2 wherefore excessive self-confidence
 is more opposed to humility than lack  
of confidence is4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3     
,excess in outward expenditure and      
parade is wont to be done with a view of
 boasting1 which is suppressed by       
humility4 ,accordingly humility has to  
do1 in a secondary way1 with externals1 

as signs of the inward movement of the  
appetite4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #afa1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,one      
,ought1 by ,humility1 to ,subject       
,oneself to ,all ,men8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that one ought not1 by   
humility1 to subject oneself to all men4
 ,for1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #c71 
humility consists chiefly in man's      
subjection to ,god4 ,now one ought not  
to offer to a man that which is due to  
,god1 as is the case with all acts of   
religious worship4 ,therefore1 by       
humility1 one ought not to subject      
oneself to man4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1    
,augustine says 7,de ,nat4 et ,gratia   
xxxiv73 ,humility should take the part  
of truth1 not of falsehood4 ,now some   
men are of the highest rank1 who cannot1
 without falsehood1 subject themselves  
to their inferiors4 ,therefore one ought
 not1 by humility1 to subject oneself to
 all men4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further no one    
ought to do that which conduces to the  
detriment of another's spiritual        

welfare4 ,but if a man subject himself  
to another by humility1 this is         
detrimental to the person to whom he    
subjects himself2 for the latter might  
wax proud1 or despise the other4 ,hence 
,augustine says in his ,rule 7,ep4      
ccxi73 ,lest through excessive humility 
the superior lose his authority4        
,therefore a man ought not1 by humility1
 to subject himself to all4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,it is written 7,phil4 #b3c73 
,in humility1 let each esteem others    
better than themselves4  ,i answer that1
 ,we may consider two things in man1    
namely that which is ,god's1 and that   
which is man's4 ,whatever pertains to   
defect is man's3 but whatever pertains  
to man's welfare and perfection is      
,god's1 according to the saying of ,osee
 #ac3i1 ,destruction is thy own1 ,o     
,israel2 thy help is only in ,me4 ,now  
humility1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad   
#e2 ,a4 #b1 ad #c71 properly regards the
 reverence whereby man is subject to    
,god4 ,wherefore every man1 in respect  

of that which is his own1 ought to      
subject himself to every neighbor1 in   
respect of that which the latter has of 
,god's3 but humility does not require a 
man to subject what he has of ,god's to 
that which may seem to be ,god's in     
another4 ,for those who have a share of 
,god's gifts know that they have them1  
according to #a ,cor4 #b3ab3 ,that we   
may know the things that are given us   
from ,god4 ,wherefore without prejudice 
to humility they may set the gifts they 
have received from ,god above those that
 others appear to have received from    
,him2 thus the ,apostle says 7,eph4     
#c3e73 7,the mystery of ,christ7 was not
 known to the sons of men as it is now  
revealed to ,his holy apostles4 ,in like
 manner1 humility does not require a man
 to subject that which he has of his own
 to that which his neighbor has of      
man's3 otherwise each one would have to 
esteem himself a greater sinner than    
anyone else3 whereas the ,apostle says  
without prejudice to humility 7,gal4    

#b3ae73 ,we by nature are ,jews1 and not
 of the ,gentiles1 sinners4             
,nevertheless a man may esteem his      
neighbor to have some good which he     
lacks himself1 or himself to have some  
evil which another has not3 by reason of
 which1 he may subject himself to him   
with humility4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we    
must not only revere ,god in ,himself1  
but also that which is ,his in each one1
 although not with the same measure of  
reverence as we revere ,god4 ,wherefore 
we should subject ourselves with        
humility to all our neighbors for ,god's
 sake1 according to #a ,pet4 #b3ac1 ,be 
ye subject 4 4 4 to every human creature
 for ,god's sake2 but to ,god alone do  
we owe the worship of latria4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,if we set what our neighbor  
has of ,god's above that which we have  
of our own1 we cannot incur falsehood4  
,wherefore a gloss 99,st4 ,augustine1   
,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #ga on ,phil4 #b3c1  
,esteem others better than themselves1  
says3 ,we must not esteem by pretending 

to esteem2 but we should in truth think 
it possible for another person to have  
something that is hidden to us and      
whereby he is better than we are1       
although our own good whereby we are    
apparently better than he1 be not       
hidden4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,humility1    
like other virtues1 resides chiefly     
inwardly in the soul4 ,consequently a   
man1 by an inward act of the soul1 may  
subject himself to another1 without     
giving the other man an occasion of     
detriment to his spiritual welfare4     
,this is what ,augustine means in his   
,rule 7,ep4 ccxi73 ,with fear1 the      
superior should prostrate himself at    
your feet in the sight of ,god4 ,on the 
other hand1 due moderation must be      
observed in the outward acts of humility
 even as of other virtues1 lest they    
conduce to the detriment of others4 ,if1
 however1 a man does as he ought1 and   
others take therefrom an occasion of    
sin1 this is not imputed to the man who 
acts with humility2 since he does not   

give scandal1 although others take it4  
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afa1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,humility ,is a ,part
 of ,modesty or ,temperance8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that humility is not
 a part of modesty or temperance4 ,for  
humility regards chiefly the reverence  
whereby one is subject to ,god1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,now it belongs  
to a theological virtue to have ,god for
 its object4 ,therefore humility should 
be reckoned a theological virtue rather 
than a part of temperance or modesty4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 temperance is in the
 concupiscible1 whereas humility would  
seem to be in the irascible1 just as    
pride which is opposed to it1 and whose 
object is something difficult4          
,therefore apparently humility is not a 
part of temperance or modesty4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 humility and magnanimity  
are about the same object1 as stated    
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,but magnanimity 
is reckoned a part1 not of temperance   
but of fortitude1 as stated above 7,q4  

#abi1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore it would seem 
that humility is not a part of          
temperance or modesty4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,origen says 7,hom4 viii super
 ,luc473 ,if thou wilt hear the name of 
this virtue1 and what it was called by  
the philosophers1 know that humility    
which ,god regards is the same as what  
they called metriotes1 i4e4 measure or  
moderation4 ,now this evidently pertains
 to modesty or temperance4 ,therefore   
humility is a part of modesty or        
temperance4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,q4 #acg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a2 ,q4     
#aeg1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b71 in assigning parts
 to a virtue we consider chiefly the    
likeness that results from the mode of  
the virtue4 ,now the mode of temperance1
 whence it chiefly derives its praise1  
is the restraint or suppression of the  
impetuosity of a passion4 ,hence        
whatever virtues restrain or suppress1  
and the actions which moderate the      
impetuosity of the emotions1 are        
reckoned parts of temperance4 ,now just 

as meekness suppresses the movement of  
anger1 so does humility suppress the    
movement of hope1 which is the movement 
of a spirit aiming at great things4     
,wherefore1 like meekness1 humility is  
accounted a part of temperance4 ,for    
this reason the ,philosopher 7,ethic4   
iv1 #c7 says that a man who aims at     
small things in proportion to his mode  
is not magnanimous but temperate1 and   
such a man we may call humble4          
,moreover1 for the reason given above   
7,q4 #afj1 ,a4 #b71 among the various   
parts of temperance1 the one under which
 humility is comprised is modesty as    
understood by ,tully 7,de ,invent4      
,rhet4 ii1 #ed71 inasmuch as humility is
 nothing else than a moderation of      
spirit3 wherefore it is written 7#a     
,pet4 #c3d73 ,in the incorruptibility of
 a quiet and meek spirit4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,the theological virtues1 whose     
object is our last end1 which is the    
first principle in matters of appetite1 
are the causes of all the other virtues4

 ,hence the fact that humility is caused
 by reverence for ,god does not prevent 
it from being a part of modesty or      
temperance4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,parts are
 assigned to a principal virtue by      
reason of a sameness1 not of subject or 
matter1 but of formal mode1 as stated   
above 7,q4 #acg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a2 ,q4     
#aeg1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,consequently1    
although humility is in the irascible as
 its subject1 it is assigned as a part  
of modesty or temperance by reason of   
its mode4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although   
humility and magnanimity agree as to    
matter1 they differ as to mode1 by      
reason of which magnanimity is reckoned 
a part of fortitude1 and humility a part
 of temperance4   ,,fifth ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afa1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
,humility ,is the ,greatest of the      
,virtues8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that humility is the greatest of the   
virtues4 ,for ,chrysostom1 expounding   
the story of the ,pharisee and the      
publican 7,luke #ah71 says 99,eclog4    

hom4 vii de ,humil4 ,animi4 that if     
humility is such a fleet runner even    
when hampered by sin that it overtakes  
the justice that is the companion of    
pride1 whither will it not reach if you 
couple it with justice8 ,it will stand  
among the angels by the judgment seat of
 ,god4 ,hence it is clear that humility 
is set above justice4 ,now justice is   
either the most exalted of all the      
virtues1 or includes all virtues1       
according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4  
v1 #a74 ,therefore humility is the      
greatest of the virtues4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4   
,dom41 ,serm4 99,s4 #aj1 ,c4 #a73 ,are  
you thinking of raising the great fabric
 of spirituality8 ,attend first of all  
to the foundation of humility4 ,now this
 would seem to imply that humility is   
the foundation of all virtue4 ,therefore
 apparently it is greater than the other
 virtues4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the      
greater virtue deserves the greater     
reward4 ,now the greatest reward is due 

to humility1 since he that humbleth     
himself shall be exalted 7,luke #ad3aa74
 ,therefore humility is the greatest of 
virtues4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 according 
to ,augustine 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #af71  
,christ's whole life on earth was a     
lesson in moral conduct through the     
human nature which ,he assumed4 ,now ,he
 especially proposed ,his humility for  
our example1 saying 7,matt4 #aa3bi73    
,learn of ,me1 because ,i am meek and   
humble of heart4 ,moreover1 ,gregory    
says 7,pastor4 iii1 #a7 that the lesson 
proposed to us in the mystery of our    
redemption is the humility of ,god4     
,therefore humility would seem to be the
 greatest of virtues4  ,on the contrary1
 ,charity is set above all the virtues1 
according to ,col4 #c3ad1 ,above all 4 4
 4 things have charity4 ,therefore      
humility is not the greatest of virtues4
  ,i answer that1 ,the good of human    
virtue pertains to the order of reason3 
which order is considered chiefly in    
reference to the end3 wherefore the     

theological virtues are the greatest    
because they have the last end for their
 object4 ,secondarily1 however1 it is   
considered in reference to the ordering 
of the means to the end4 ,this          
ordinance1 as to its essence1 is in the 
reason itself from which it issues1 but 
by participation it is in the appetite  
ordered by the reason2 and this         
ordinance is the effect of justice1     
especially of legal justice4 ,now       
humility makes a man a good subject to  
ordinance of all kinds and in all       
matters2 while every other virtue has   
this effect in some special matter4     
,therefore after the theological        
virtues1 after the intellectual virtues 
which regard the reason itself1 and     
after justice1 especially legal justice1
 humility stands before all others4     
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,humility is not set   
before justice1 but before that justice 
which is coupled with pride1 and is no  
longer a virtue2 even so1 on the other  
hand1 sin is pardoned through humility3 

for it is said of the publican 7,luke   
#ah3ad7 that through the merit of his   
humility he went down into his house    
justified4 ,hence ,chrysostom says 99,de
 incompr4 ,nat4 ,dei1 ,hom4 v3 ,bring me
 a pair of two-horse chariots3 in the   
one harness pride with justice1 in the  
other sin with humility3 and you will   
see that sin outrunning justice wins not
 by its own strength1 but by that of    
humility3 while you will see the other  
pair beaten1 not by the weakness of     
justice1 but by the weight and size of  
pride4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as the   
orderly assembly of virtues is1 by      
reason of a certain likeness1 compared  
to a building1 so again that which is   
the first step in the acquisition of    
virtue is likened to the foundation1    
which is first laid before the rest of  
the building4 ,now the virtues are in   
truth infused by ,god4 ,wherefore the   
first step in the acquisition of virtue 
may be understood in two ways4 ,first by
 way of removing obstacles3 and thus    

humility holds the first place1 inasmuch
 as it expels pride1 which ,god         
resisteth1 and makes man submissive and 
ever open to receive the influx of      
,divine grace4 ,hence it is written     
7,james #d3f73 ,god resisteth the proud1
 and giveth grace to the humble4 ,in    
this sense humility is said to be the   
foundation of the spiritual edifice4    
,secondly1 a thing is first among       
virtues directly1 because it is the     
first step towards ,god4 ,now the first 
step towards ,god is by faith1 according
 to ,heb4 #aa3f1 ,he that cometh to ,god
 must believe4 ,in this sense faith is  
the foundation in a more excellent way  
than humility4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to him
 that despises earthly things1 heavenly 
things are promised3 thus heavenly      
treasures are promised to those who     
despise earthly riches1 according to    
,matt4 #f3ai1 #bj1 ,lay not up to       
yourselves treasures on earth 4 4 4 but 
lay up to yourselves treasures in       
heaven4 ,likewise heavenly consolations 

are promised to those who despise       
worldly joys1 according to ,matt4 #d3e1 
,blessed are they that mourn1 for they  
shall be comforted4 ,in the same way    
spiritual uplifting is promised to      
humility1 not that humility alone merits
 it1 but because it is proper to it to  
despise earthly uplifting4 ,wherefore   
,augustine says 7,de ,poenit4 99,serm4  
cccli73 ,think not that he who humbles  
himself remains for ever abased1 for it 
is written3 ',he shall be exalted4' ,and
 do not imagine that his exaltation in  
men's eyes is effected by bodily        
uplifting4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the reason
 why ,christ chiefly proposed humility  
to us1 was because it especially removes
 the obstacle to man's spiritual welfare
 consisting in man's aiming at heavenly 
and spiritual things1 in which he is    
hindered by striving to become great in 
earthly things4 ,hence our ,lord1 in    
order to remove an obstacle to our      
spiritual welfare1 showed by giving an  
example of humility1 that outward       

exaltation is to be despised4 ,thus     
humility is1 as it were1 a disposition  
to man's untrammeled access to spiritual
 and divine goods4 ,accordingly as      
perfection is greater than disposition1 
so charity1 and other virtues whereby   
man approaches ,god directly1 are       
greater than humility4   ,,sixth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afa1 ,art4 #f 
,whether ,twelve ,degrees of ,humility  
,are ,fittingly ,distinguished in the   
,rule of the ,blessed ,benedict8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
twelve degrees of humility that are set 
down in the ,rule of the ,blessed       
,benedict 99,st4 ,thomas gives these    
degrees in the reverse order to that    
followed by ,st4 ,benedict are          
unfittingly distinguished4 ,the first is
 to be humble not only in heart1 but    
also to show it in one's very person1   
one's eyes fixed on the ground2 the     
second is to speak few and sensible     
words1 and not to be loud of voice2 the 
third is not to be easily moved1 and    

disposed to laughter2 the fourth is to  
maintain silence until one is asked2 the
 fifth is to do nothing but to what one 
is exhorted by the common rule of the   
monastery2 the sixth is to believe and  
acknowledge oneself viler than all2 the 
seventh is to think oneself worthless   
and unprofitable for all purposes2 the  
eighth is to confess one's sin2 the     
ninth is to embrace patience by obeying 
under difficult and contrary            
circumstances2 the tenth is to subject  
oneself to a superior2 the eleventh is  
not to delight in fulfilling one's own  
desires2 the twelfth is to fear ,god and
 to be always mindful of everything that
 ,god has commanded4 ,for among these   
there are some things pertaining to the 
other virtues1 such as obedience and    
patience4 ,again there are some that    
seem to involve a false opinion--and    
this is inconsistent with any           
virtue--namely to declare oneself more  
despicable than all men1 and to confess 
and believe oneself to be in all ways   

worthless and unprofitable4 ,therefore  
these are unfittingly placed among the  
degrees of humility4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 humility proceeds from within 
to externals1 as do other virtues4      
,therefore in the aforesaid degrees1    
those which concern outward actions are 
unfittingly placed before those which   
pertain to inward actions4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 ,anselm 7,de ,simil4 ci1      
seqq47 gives seven degrees of humility1 
the first of which is to acknowledge    
oneself contemptible2 the second1 to    
grieve for this2 the third1 to confess  
it2 the fourth1 to convince others of   
this1 that is to wish them to believe   
it2 the fifth1 to bear patiently that   
this be said of us2 the sixth1 to suffer
 oneself to be treated with contempt2   
the seventh1 to love being thus treated4
 ,therefore the aforesaid degrees would 
seem to be too numerous4  ,obj4 #d3     
,further1 a gloss on ,matt4 #c3ae says3 
,perfect humility has three degrees4    
,the first is to subject ourselves to   

those who are above us1 and not to set  
ourselves above our equals3 this is     
sufficient4 ,the second is to submit to 
our equals1 and not to set ourselves    
before our inferiors2 this is called    
abundant humility4 ,the third degree is 
to subject ourselves to inferiors1 and  
in this is perfect righteousness4       
,therefore the aforesaid degrees would  
seem to be too numerous4  ,obj4 #e3     
,further1 ,augustine says 7,de          
,virginit4 xxxi73 ,the measure of       
humility is apportioned to each one     
according to his rank4 ,it is imperiled 
by pride1 for the greater a man is the  
more liable is he to be entrapped4 ,now 
the measure of a man's greatness cannot 
be fixed according to a definite number 
of degrees4 ,therefore it would seem    
that it is not possible to assign the   
aforesaid degrees to humility4  ,i      
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b7  
humility has essentially to do with the 
appetite1 in so far as a man restrains  
the impetuosity of his soul1 from       

tending inordinately to great things3   
yet its rule is in the cognitive        
faculty1 in that we should not deem     
ourselves to be above what we are4      
,also1 the principle and origin of both 
these things is the reverence we bear to
 ,god4 ,now the inward disposition of   
humility leads to certain outward signs 
in words1 deeds1 and gestures1 which    
manifest that which is hidden within1 as
 happens also with the other virtues4   
,for a man is known by his look1 and a  
wise man1 when thou meetest him1 by his 
countenance 7,ecclus4 #ai3bf74          
,wherefore the aforesaid degrees of     
humility include something regarding the
 root of humility1 namely the twelfth   
degree1 that a man fear ,god and bear   
all ,his commandments in mind4  ,again1 
they include certain things with regard 
to the appetite1 lest one aim           
inordinately at one's own excellence4   
,this is done in three ways4 ,first1 by 
not following one's own will1 and this  
pertains to the eleventh degree2        

secondly1 by regulating it according to 
one's superior judgment1 and this       
applies to the tenth degree2 thirdly1 by
 not being deterred from this on account
 of the difficulties and hardships that 
come in our way1 and this belongs to the
 ninth degree4  ,certain things also are
 included referring to the estimate a   
man forms in acknowledging his own      
deficiency1 and this in three ways4     
,first by acknowledging and avowing his 
own shortcomings2 this belongs to the   
eighth degree3 secondly1 by deeming     
oneself incapable of great things1 and  
this pertains to the seventh degree3    
thirdly1 that in this respect one should
 put others before oneself1 and this    
belongs to the sixth degree4  ,again1   
some things are included that refer to  
outward signs4 ,one of these regards    
deeds1 namely that in one's work one    
should not depart from the ordinary way2
 this applies to the fifth degree4 ,two 
others have reference to words1 namely  
that one should not be in a hurry to    

speak1 which pertains to the fourth     
degree1 and that one be not immoderate  
in speech1 which refers to the second4  
,the others have to do with outward     
gestures1 for instance in restraining   
haughty looks1 which regards the first1 
and in outwardly checking laughter and  
other signs of senseless mirth1 and this
 belongs to the third degree4  ,reply   
,obj4 #a3 ,it is possible1 without      
falsehood1 to deem and avow oneself the 
most despicable of men1 as regards the  
hidden faults which we acknowledge in   
ourselves1 and the hidden gifts of ,god 
which others have4 ,hence ,augustine    
says 7,de ,virginit4 lii73 ,bethink you 
that some persons are in some hidden way
 better than you1 although outwardly you
 are better than they4 ,again1 without  
falsehood one may avow and believe      
oneself in all ways unprofitable and    
useless in respect of one's own         
capability1 so as to refer all one's    
sufficiency to ,god1 according to #b    
,cor4 #c3e1 ,not that we are sufficient 

to think anything of ourselves as of    
ourselves3 but our sufficiency is from  
,god4 ,and there is nothing unbecoming  
in ascribing to humility those things   
that pertain to other virtues1 since1   
just as one vice arises from another1   
so1 by a natural sequence1 the act of   
one virtue proceeds from the act of     
another4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man arrives 
at humility in two ways4 ,first and     
chiefly by a gift of grace1 and in this 
way the inner man precedes the outward  
man4 ,the other way is by human effort1 
whereby he first of all restrains the   
outward man1 and afterwards succeeds in 
plucking out the inward root4 ,it is    
according to this order that the degrees
 of humility are here enumerated4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all the degrees       
mentioned by ,anselm are reducible to   
knowledge1 avowal1 and desire of one's  
own abasement4 ,for the first degree    
belongs to the knowledge of one's own   
deficiency2 but since it would be wrong 
for one to love one's own failings1 this

 is excluded by the second degree4 ,the 
third and fourth degrees regard the     
avowal of one's own deficiency2 namely  
that not merely one simply assert one's 
failing1 but that one convince another  
of it4 ,the other three degrees have to 
do with the appetite1 which seeks1 not  
outward excellence1 but outward         
abasement1 or bears it with equanimity1 
whether it consist of words or deeds4   
,for as ,gregory says 7,regist4 ii1 #aj1
 ,ep4 #cf71 there is nothing great in   
being humble towards those who treat us 
with regard1 for even worldly people do 
this3 but we should especially be humble
 towards those who make us suffer1 and  
this belongs to the fifth and sixth     
degrees3 or the appetite may even go so 
far as lovingly to embrace external     
abasement1 and this pertains to the     
seventh degree2 so that all these       
degrees are comprised under the sixth   
and seventh mentioned above4  ,reply    
,obj4 #d3 ,these degrees refer1 not to  
the thing itself1 namely the nature of  

humility1 but to the degrees among men1 
who are either of higher or lower or of 
equal degree4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,this   
argument also considers the degrees of  
humility not according to the nature of 
the thing1 in respect of which the      
aforesaid degrees are assigned1 but     
according to the various conditions of  
men4   ,,question #afb  ,,of ,,pride    
7,in ,eight ,articles7  ,we must next   
consider pride1 and 7#a7 pride in       
general2 7#b7 the first man's sin1 which
 we hold to have been pride4 ,under the 
first head there are eight points of    
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether pride is a sin8 
7#b7 ,whether it is a special vice8     
7#c7 ,wherein does it reside as in its  
subject8  7#d7 ,of its species2  7#e7   
,whether it is a mortal sin8  7#f7      
,whether it is the most grievous of all 
sins8  7#g7 ,of its relation to other   
sins2  7#h7 ,whether it should be       
reckoned a capital vice8   ,,first      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afb1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,pride ,is a ,sin8  ,objection 

#a3 ,it would seem that pride is not a  
sin4 ,for no sin is the object of ,god's
 promise4 ,for ,god's promises refer to 
what ,he will do2 and ,he is not the    
author of sin4 ,now pride is numbered   
among the ,divine promises3 for it is   
written 7,isa4 #fj3ae73 ,i will make    
thee to be an everlasting pride ,douay3 
'glory'1 a joy unto generation and      
generation4 ,therefore pride is not a   
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is not a   
sin to wish to be like unto ,god3 for   
every creature has a natural desire for 
this2 and especially does this become   
the rational creature which is made to  
,god's image and likeness4 ,now it is   
said in ,prosper's ,lib4 ,sent4 #bid1   
that pride is love of one's own         
excellence1 whereby one is likened to   
,god who is supremely excellent4 ,hence 
,augustine says 7,confess4 ii1 #f73     
,pride imitates exaltedness2 whereas    
,thou alone art ,god exalted over all4  
,therefore pride is not a sin4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 a sin is opposed not only 

to a virtue but also to a contrary vice1
 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ii1
 #h74 ,but no vice is found to be       
opposed to pride4 ,therefore pride is   
not a sin4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is    
written 7,tob4 #d3ad73 ,never suffer    
pride to reign in thy mind or in thy    
words4  ,i answer that1 ,pride          
7superbia7 is so called because a man   
thereby aims higher 7supra7 than he is2 
wherefore ,isidore says 7,etym4 x73 ,a  
man is said to be proud1 because he     
wishes to appear above 7super7 what he  
really is2 for he who wishes to overstep
 beyond what he is1 is proud4 ,now right
 reason requires that every man's will  
should tend to that which is            
proportionate to him4 ,therefore it is  
evident that pride denotes something    
opposed to right reason1 and this shows 
it to have the character of sin1 because
 according to ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4   
iv1 #d71 the soul's evil is to be       
opposed to reason4 ,therefore it is     
evident that pride is a sin4  ,reply    

,obj4 #a3 ,pride 7superbia7 may be      
understood in two ways4 ,first1 as      
overpassing 7supergreditur7 the rule of 
reason1 and in this sense we say that it
 is a sin4 ,secondly1 it may simply     
denominate super-abundance2 in which    
sense any super-abundant thing may be   
called pride3 and it is thus that ,god  
promises pride as significant of        
super-abundant good4 ,hence a gloss of  
,jerome on the same passage 7,isa4      
#fa3f7 says that there is a good and an 
evil pride2 or a sinful pride which ,god
 resists1 and a pride that denotes the  
glory which ,he bestows4  ,it may also  
be replied that pride there signifies   
abundance of those things in which men  
may take pride4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3       
,reason has the direction of those      
things for which man has a natural      
appetite2 so that if the appetite wander
 from the rule of reason1 whether by    
excess or by default1 it will be sinful1
 as is the case with the appetite for   
food which man desires naturally4 ,now  

pride is the appetite for excellence in 
excess of right reason4 ,wherefore      
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1    
#ac7 that pride is the desire for       
inordinate exaltation3 and hence it is  
that1 as he asserts 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1
 #ac2 xix1 #ab71 pride imitates ,god    
inordinately3 for it hath equality of   
fellowship under ,him1 and wishes to    
usurp ,his dominion over our            
fellow-creatures4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,pride is directly opposed to the virtue
 of humility1 which1 in a way1 is       
concerned about the same matter as      
magnanimity1 as stated above 7,q4 #afa1 
,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,hence the vice opposed 
to pride by default is akin to the vice 
of pusillanimity1 which is opposed by   
default to magnanimity4 ,for just as it 
belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind 
to great things against despair1 so it  
belongs to humility to withdraw the mind
 from the inordinate desire of great    
things against presumption4 ,now        
pusillanimity1 if we take it for a      

deficiency in pursuing great things1 is 
properly opposed to magnanimity by      
default2 but if we take it for the      
mind's attachment to things beneath what
 is becoming to a man1 it is opposed to 
humility by default2 since each proceeds
 from a smallness of mind4 ,in the same 
way1 on the other hand1 pride may be    
opposed by excess1 both to magnanimity  
and humility1 from different points of  
view3 to humility1 inasmuch as it scorns
 subjection1 to magnanimity1 inasmuch as
 it tends to great things inordinately4 
,since1 however1 pride implies a certain
 elation1 it is more directly opposed to
 humility1 even as pusillanimity1 which 
denotes littleness of soul in tending   
towards great things1 is more directly  
opposed to magnanimity4   ,,second      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afb1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,pride ,is a ,special ,sin8    
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pride
 is not a special sin4 ,for ,augustine  
says 7,de ,nat4 et ,grat4 xxix7 that you
 will find no sin that is not labelled  

pride2 and ,prosper says 7,de ,vita     
,contempl4 iii1 #b7 that without pride  
no sin is1 or was1 or ever will be      
possible4 ,therefore pride is a general 
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a gloss on    
,job #cc3ag1 ,that ,he may withdraw man 
from wickedness 99,vulg43 ',from the    
things that he is doing1 and may deliver
 him from pride'1 says that a man prides
 himself when he transgresses ,his      
commandments by sin4 ,now according to  
,ambrose 99,de ,parad4 viii1 every sin  
is a transgression of the ,divine law1  
and a disobedience of the heavenly      
commandments4 ,therefore every sin is   
pride4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every       
special sin is opposed to a special     
virtue4 ,but pride is opposed to all the
 virtues1 for ,gregory says 7,moral4    
xxxiv1 #bc73 ,pride is by no means      
content with the destruction of one     
virtue2 it raises itself up against all 
the powers of the soul1 and like an     
all-pervading and poisonous disease     
corrupts the whole body2 and ,isidore   

says 7,etym4 99,de ,summo ,bono ii1 #ch7
 that it is the downfall of all virtues4
 ,therefore pride is not a special sin4 
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 every special sin   
has a special matter4 ,now pride has a  
general matter1 for ,gregory says       
7,moral4 xxxiv1 #bc7 that one man is    
proud of his gold1 another of his       
eloquence3 one is elated by mean and    
earthly things1 another by sublime and  
heavenly virtues4 ,therefore pride is   
not a special but a general sin4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,nat4
 et ,grat4 xxix73 ,if he look into the  
question carefully1 he will find that1  
according to ,god's law1 pride is a very
 different sin from other vices4 ,now   
the genus is not different from its     
species4 ,therefore pride is not a      
general but a special sin4  ,i answer   
that1 ,the sin of pride may be          
considered in two ways4 ,first with     
regard to its proper species1 which it  
has under the aspect of its proper      
object4 ,in this way pride is a special 

sin1 because it has a special object3   
for it is inordinate desire of one's own
 excellence1 as stated 7,a4 #a1 ad #b74 
,secondly1 it may be considered as      
having a certain influence towards other
 sins4 ,in this way it has somewhat of a
 generic character1 inasmuch as all sins
 may arise from pride1 in two ways4     
,first directly1 through other sins     
being directed to the end of pride which
 is one's own excellence1 to which may  
be directed anything that is            
inordinately desired4 ,secondly1        
indirectly and accidentally as it were1 
that is by removing an obstacle1 since  
pride makes a man despise the ,divine   
law which hinders him from sinning1     
according to ,jer4 #b3bj1 ,thou hast    
broken ,my yoke1 thou hast burst ,my    
bands1 and thou saidst3 ,i will not     
serve4  ,it must1 however1 be observed  
that this generic character of pride    
admits of the possibility of all vices  
arising from pride sometimes1 but it    
does not imply that all vices originate 

from pride always4 ,for though one may  
break the commandments of the ,law by   
any kind of sin1 through contempt which 
pertains to pride1 yet one does not     
always break the ,divine commandments   
through contempt1 but sometimes through 
ignorance1 and sometimes through        
weakness3 and for this reason ,augustine
 says 7,de ,nat4 et ,grat4 xxix7 that   
many things are done amiss which are not
 done through pride4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,these words are introduced by          
,augustine into his book ,de ,nat4 et   
,grat41 not as being his own1 but as    
those of someone with whom he is        
arguing4 ,hence he subsequently         
disproves the assertion1 and shows that 
not all sins are committed through      
pride4 ,we might1 however1 reply that   
these authorities must be understood as 
referring to the outward effect of      
pride1 namely the breaking of the       
commandments1 which applies to every    
sin1 and not to the inward act of pride1
 namely contempt of the commandment4    

,for sin is committed1 not always       
through contempt1 but sometimes through 
ignorance1 sometimes through weakness1  
as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a   
man may sometimes commit a sin          
effectively1 but not affectively2 thus  
he who1 in ignorance1 slays his father1 
is a parricide effectively1 but not     
affectively1 since he did not intend it4
 ,accordingly he who breaks ,god's      
commandment is said to pride himself    
against ,god1 effectively always1 but   
not always affectively4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,a sin may destroy a virtue in two  
ways4 ,in one way by direct contrariety 
to a virtue1 and thus pride does not    
corrupt every virtue1 but only humility2
 even as every special sin destroys the 
special virtue opposed to it1 by acting 
counter thereto4 ,in another way a sin  
destroys a virtue1 by making ill use of 
that virtue3 and thus pride destroys    
every virtue1 in so far as it finds an  
occasion of pride in every virtue1 just 
as in everything else pertaining to     

excellence4 ,hence it does not follow   
that it is a general sin4  ,reply ,obj4 
#d3 ,pride regards a special aspect in  
its object1 which aspect may be found in
 various matters3 for it is inordinate  
love of one's excellence1 and excellence
 may be found in various things4        
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afb1  
,art4 #c  ,whether the ,subject of      
,pride ,is the ,irascible ,faculty8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
subject of pride is not the irascible   
faculty4 ,for ,gregory says 7,moral4    
xxiii1 #ag73 ,a swollen mind is an      
obstacle to truth1 for the swelling     
shuts out the light4 ,now the knowledge 
of truth pertains1 not to the irascible 
but to the rational faculty4 ,therefore 
pride is not in the irascible4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4    
xxiv1 #h7 that the proud observe other  
people's conduct not so as to set       
themselves beneath them with humility1  
but so as to set themselves above them  
with pride3 wherefore it would seem that

 pride originates in undue observation4 
,now observation pertains not to the    
irascible but to the rational faculty4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 pride seeks         
pre-eminence not only in sensible       
things1 but also in spiritual and       
intelligible things3 while it consists  
essentially in the contempt of ,god1    
according to ,ecclus4 #aj3ad1 ,the      
beginning of the pride of man is to fall
 off from ,god4 ,now the irascible1     
since it is a part of the sensitive     
appetite1 cannot extend to ,god and     
things intelligible4 ,therefore pride   
cannot be in the irascible4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 as stated in ,prosper's ,liber
 ,sententiarum1 sent4 #bid1 ,pride is   
love of one's own excellence4 ,but love 
is not in the irascible1 but in the     
concupiscible4 ,therefore pride is not  
in the irascible4  ,on the contrary1    
,gregory 7,moral4 ii1 #di7 opposes pride
 to the gift of fear4 ,now fear belongs 
to the irascible4 ,therefore pride is in
 the irascible4  ,i answer that1 ,the   

subject of any virtue or vice is to be  
ascertained from its proper object3 for 
the object of a habit or act cannot be  
other than the object of the power1     
which is the subject of both4 ,now the  
proper object of pride is something     
difficult1 for pride is the desire of   
one's own excellence1 as stated above   
7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,wherefore pride must   
needs pertain in some way to the        
irascible faculty4 ,now the irascible   
may be taken in two ways4 ,first in a   
strict sense1 and thus it is a part of  
the sensitive appetite1 even as anger1  
strictly speaking1 is a passion of the  
sensitive appetite4 ,secondly1 the      
irascible may be taken in a broader     
sense1 so as to belong also to the      
intellective appetite1 to which also    
anger is sometimes ascribed4 ,it is thus
 that we attribute anger to ,god and the
 angels1 not as a passion1 but as       
denoting the sentence of justice        
pronouncing judgment4 ,nevertheless the 
irascible understood in this broad sense

 is not distinct from the concupiscible 
power1 as stated above in the ,first    
,part 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4    
#hb1 ,a4 #e1 ad #a and #b74             
,consequently if the difficult thing    
which is the object of pride1 were      
merely some sensible object1 whereto the
 sensitive appetite might tend1 pride   
would have to be in the irascible which 
is part of the sensitive appetite4 ,but 
since the difficult thing which pride   
has in view is common both to sensible  
and to spiritual things1 we must needs  
say that the subject of pride is the    
irascible not only strictly so called1  
as a part of the sensitive appetite1 but
 also in its wider acceptation1 as      
applicable to the intellective appetite4
 ,wherefore pride is ascribed also to   
the demons4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,knowledge
 of truth is twofold4 ,one is purely    
speculative1 and pride hinders this     
indirectly by removing its cause4 ,for  
the proud man subjects not his intellect
 to ,god1 that he may receive the       

knowledge of truth from ,him1 according 
to ,matt4 #aa3be1 ,thou hast hid these  
things from the wise and the prudent1   
i4e4 from the proud1 who are wise and   
prudent in their own eyes1 and hast     
revealed them to little ones1 i4e4 to   
the humble4  ,nor does he deign to learn
 anything from man1 whereas it is       
written 7,ecclus4 #f3cd73 ,if thou wilt 
incline thy ear1 thou shalt receive     
instruction4 ,the other knowledge of    
truth is affective1 and this is directly
 hindered by pride1 because the proud1  
through delighting in their own         
excellence1 disdain the excellence of   
truth2 thus ,gregory says 7,moral4      
xxiii1 #ag7 that the proud1 although    
certain hidden truths be conveyed to    
their understanding1 cannot realize     
their sweetness3 and if they know of    
them they cannot relish them4 ,hence it 
is written 7,prov4 #aa3b73 ,where       
humility is there also is wisdom4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#afa1 ,,aa4 #b1 #f71 humility observes  

the rule of right reason whereby a man  
has true self-esteem4 ,now pride does   
not observe this rule of right reason1  
for he esteems himself greater than he  
is3 and this is the outcome of an       
inordinate desire for his own           
excellence1 since a man is ready to     
believe what he desires very much1 the  
result being that his appetite is borne 
towards things higher than what become  
him4 ,consequently whatsoever things    
lead a man to inordinate self-esteem    
lead him to pride3 and one of those is  
the observing of other people's         
failings1 just as1 on the other hand1 in
 the words of ,gregory 7,moral4 xxiii1  
#ag71 holy men1 by a like observation of
 other people's virtues1 set others     
above themselves4 ,accordingly the      
conclusion is not that pride is in the  
rational faculty1 but that one of its   
causes is in the reason4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,pride is in the irascible1 not only
 as a part of the sensitive appetite1   
but also as having a more general       

signification1 as stated above4  ,reply 
,obj4 #d3 ,according to ,augustine 7,de 
,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g1 #i71 love precedes  
all other emotions of the soul1 and is  
their cause1 wherefore it may be        
employed to denote any of the other     
emotions4 ,it is in this sense that     
pride is said to be love of one's own   
excellence1 inasmuch as love makes a man
 presume inordinately on his superiority
 over others1 and this belongs properly 
to pride4   ,,fourth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afb1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
the ,four ,species of ,pride ,are       
,fittingly ,assigned by ,gregory8       
,objection #a3 ,it seems that the four  
species of pride are unfittingly        
assigned by ,gregory1 who says 7,moral4 
xxiii1 #f73 ,there are four marks by    
which every kind of pride of the        
arrogant betrays itself2 either when    
they think that their good is from      
themselves1 or if they believe it to be 
from above1 yet they think that it is   
due to their own merits2 or when they   

boast of having what they have not1 or  
despise others and wish to appear the   
exclusive possessors of what they have4 
,for pride is a vice distinct from      
unbelief1 just as humility is a distinct
 virtue from faith4 ,now it pertains to 
unbelief1 if a man deem that he has not 
received his good from ,god1 or that he 
has the good of grace through his own   
merits4 ,therefore this should not be   
reckoned a species of pride4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 the same thing should not be  
reckoned a species of different genera4 
,now boasting is reckoned a species of  
lying1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4   
#b2 ,q4 #aab74 ,therefore it should not 
be accounted a species of pride4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 some other things         
apparently pertain to pride1 which are  
not mentioned here4 ,for ,jerome        
99,reference unknown says that nothing  
is so indicative of pride as to show    
oneself ungrateful3 and ,augustine says 
7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #ad7 that it       
belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a 

sin one has committed4 ,again1          
presumption whereby one aims at having  
what is above one1 would seem to have   
much to do with pride4 ,therefore the   
aforesaid division does not sufficiently
 account for the different species of   
pride4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 we find     
other divisions of pride4 ,for ,anselm  
99,eadmer1 ,de ,similit4 xxii1 seqq4    
divides the uplifting of pride1 saying  
that there is pride of will1 pride of   
speech1 end pride of deed4 ,bernard     
99,de ,grad4 ,humil4 et ,superb4 x1     
seqq4 also reckons twelve degrees of    
pride1 namely curiosity1 frivolity of   
mind1 senseless mirth1 boasting1        
singularity1 arrogance1 presumption1    
defense of one's sins1 deceitful        
confession1 rebelliousness1 license1    
sinful habit4 ,now these apparently are 
not comprised under the species         
mentioned by ,gregory4 ,therefore the   
latter would seem to be assigned        
unfittingly4  ,on the contrary1 ,the    
authority of ,gregory suffices4  ,i     

answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1
 #b1 #c71 pride denotes immoderate      
desire of one's own excellence1 a       
desire1 to wit1 that is not in accord   
with right reason4 ,now it must be      
observed that all excellence results    
from a good possessed4 ,such a good may 
be considered in three ways4 ,first1 in 
itself4 ,for it is evident that the     
greater the good that one has1 the      
greater the excellence that one derives 
from it4 ,hence when a man ascribes to  
himself a good greater than what he has1
 it follows that his appetite tends to  
his own excellence in a measure         
exceeding his competency3 and thus we   
have the third species of pride1 namely 
boasting of having what one has not4    
,secondly1 it may be considered with    
regard to its cause1 in so far as to    
have a thing of oneself is more         
excellent than to have it of another4   
,hence when a man esteems the good he   
has received of another as though he had
 it of himself1 the result is that his  

appetite is borne towards his own       
excellence immoderately4 ,now one is    
cause of one's own good in two ways1    
efficiently and meritoriously3 and thus 
we have the first two species of pride1 
namely when a man thinks he has from    
himself that which he has from ,god1 or 
when he believes that which he has      
received from above to be due to his own
 merits4  ,thirdly1 it may be considered
 with regard to the manner of having it1
 in so far as a man obtains greater     
excellence through possessing some good 
more excellently than other men2 the    
result again being that his appetite is 
borne inordinately towards his own      
excellence3 and thus we have the fourth 
species of pride1 which is when a man   
despises others and wishes to be        
singularly conspicuous4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,a true judgment may be destroyed in
 two ways4 ,first1 universally3 and thus
 in matters of faith1 a true judgment is
 destroyed by unbelief4 ,secondly1 in   
some particular matter of choice1 and   

unbelief does not do this4 ,thus a man  
who commits fornication1 judges that for
 the time being it is good for him to   
commit fornication2 yet he is not an    
unbeliever1 as he would be1 were he to  
say that universally fornication is     
good4 ,it is thus in the question in    
point3 for it pertains to unbelief to   
assert universally that there is a good 
which is not from ,god1 or that grace is
 given to men for their merits1 whereas1
 properly speaking1 it belongs to pride 
and not to unbelief1 through inordinate 
desire of one's own excellence1 to boast
 of one's goods as though one had them  
of oneself1 or of one's own merits4     
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,boasting is reckoned a
 species of lying1 as regards the       
outward act whereby a man falsely       
ascribes to himself what he has not3 but
 as regards the inward arrogance of the 
heart it is reckoned by ,gregory to be a
 species of pride4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,the ungrateful man ascribes to himself 
what he has from another3 wherefore the 

first two species of pride pertain to   
ingratitude4 ,to excuse oneself of a sin
 one has committed1 belongs to the third
 species1 since by so doing a man       
ascribes to himself the good of         
innocence which he has not4 ,to aim     
presumptuously at what is above one1    
would seem to belong chiefly to the     
fourth species1 which consists in       
wishing to be preferred to others4      
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the three mentioned by
 ,anselm correspond to the progress of  
any particular sin3 for it begins by    
being conceived in thought1 then is     
uttered in word1 and thirdly is         
accomplished in deed4  ,the twelve      
degrees mentioned by ,bernard are       
reckoned by way of opposition to the    
twelve degrees of humility1 of which we 
have spoken above 7,q4 #afa1 ,a4 #f74   
,for the first degree of humility is to 
be humble in heart1 and to show it in   
one's very person1 one's eyes fixed on  
the ground3 and to this is opposed      
curiosity1 which consists in looking    

around in all directions curiously and  
inordinately4 ,the second degree of     
humility is to speak few and sensible   
words1 and not to be loud of voice3 to  
this is opposed frivolity of mind1 by   
which a man is proud of speech4 ,the    
third degree of humility is not to be   
easily moved and disposed to laughter1  
to which is opposed senseless mirth4    
,the fourth degree of humility is to    
maintain silence until one is asked1 to 
which is opposed boasting4 ,the fifth   
degree of humility is to do nothing but 
to what one is exhorted by the common   
rule of the monastery1 to which is      
opposed singularity1 whereby a man      
wishes to seem more holy than others4   
,the sixth degree of humility is to     
believe and acknowledge oneself viler   
than all1 to which is opposed arrogance1
 whereby a man sets himself above       
others4 ,the seventh degree of humility 
is to think oneself worthless and       
unprofitable for all purposes1 to which 
is opposed presumption1 whereby a man   

thinks himself capable of things that   
are above him4 ,the eighth degree of    
humility is to confess one's sins1 to   
which is opposed defense of one's sins4 
,the ninth degree is to embrace patience
 by obeying under difficult and contrary
 circumstances1 to which is opposed     
deceitful confession1 whereby a man     
being unwilling to be punished for his  
sins confesses them deceitfully4 ,the   
tenth degree of humility is obedience1  
to which is opposed rebelliousness4 ,the
 eleventh degree of humility is not to  
delight in fulfilling one's own desires2
 to this is opposed license1 whereby a  
man delights in doing freely whatever he
 will4 ,the last degree of humility is  
fear of ,god3 to this is opposed the    
habit of sinning1 which implies contempt
 of ,god4  ,in these twelve degrees not 
only are the species of pride indicated1
 but also certain things that precede   
and follow them1 as we have stated above
 with regard to humility 7,q4 #afa1 ,a4 
#f74   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 

#afb1 ,art4 #e  ,whether ,pride ,is a   
,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that pride is not a mortal sin4    
,for a gloss on ,ps4 #g3d1 ,o ,lord my  
,god1 if ,i have done this thing1 says3 
,namely1 the universal sin which is     
pride4 ,therefore if pride were a mortal
 sin1 so would every sin be4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 every mortal sin is contrary  
to charity4 ,but pride is apparently not
 contrary to charity1 neither as to the 
love of ,god1 nor as to the love of     
one's neighbor1 because the excellence  
which1 by pride1 one desires            
inordinately1 is not always opposed to  
,god's honor1 or our neighbor's good4   
,therefore pride is not a mortal sin4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every mortal sin is 
opposed to virtue4 ,but pride is not    
opposed to virtue2 on the contrary1 it  
arises therefrom1 for as ,gregory says  
7,moral4 xxxiv1 #bc71 sometimes a man is
 elated by sublime and heavenly virtues4
 ,therefore pride is not a mortal sin4  
,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4

 xxxiv1 #bc7 that pride is a most       
evident sign of the reprobate1 and      
contrariwise1 humility of the elect4    
,but men do not become reprobate on     
account of venial sins4 ,therefore pride
 is not a venial but a mortal sin4  ,i  
answer that1 ,pride is opposed to       
humility4 ,now humility properly regards
 the subjection of man to ,god1 as      
stated above 7,q4 #afa1 ,a4 #a1 ad #e74 
,hence pride properly regards lack of   
this subjection1 in so far as a man     
raises himself above that which is      
appointed to him according to the       
,divine rule or measure1 against the    
saying of the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4        
#aj3ac71 ,but we will not glory beyond  
our measure2 but according to the       
measure of the rule which ,god hath     
measured to us4 ,wherefore it is written
 7,ecclus4 #aj3ad73 ,the beginning of   
the pride of man is to fall off from    
,god because1 to wit1 the root of pride 
is found to consist in man not being1 in
 some way1 subject to ,god and ,his     

rule4 ,now it is evident that not to be 
subject to ,god is of its very nature a 
mortal sin1 for this consists in turning
 away from ,god3 and consequently pride 
is1 of its genus1 a mortal sin4         
,nevertheless just as in other sins     
which are mortal by their genus 7for    
instance fornication and adultery7 there
 are certain motions that are venial by 
reason of their imperfection 7through   
forestalling the judgment of reason1 and
 being without its consent71 so too in  
the matter of pride it happens that     
certain motions of pride are venial     
sins1 when reason does not consent to   
them4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above
 7,a4 #b7 pride is a general sin1 not by
 its essence but by a kind of influence1
 in so far as all sins may have their   
origin in pride4 ,hence it does not     
follow that all sins are mortal1 but    
only such as arise from perfect pride1  
which we have stated to be a mortal sin4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,pride is always     
contrary to the love of ,god1 inasmuch  

as the proud man does not subject       
himself to the ,divine rule as he ought4
 ,sometimes it is also contrary to the  
love of our neighbor2 when1 namely1 a   
man sets himself inordinately above his 
neighbor3 and this again is a           
transgression of the ,divine rule1 which
 has established order among men1 so    
that one ought to be subject to another4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,pride arises from   
virtue1 not as from its direct cause1   
but as from an accidental cause1 in so  
far as a man makes a virtue an occasion 
for pride4 ,and nothing prevents one    
contrary from being the accidental cause
 of another1 as stated in ,phys4 viii1  
#a4 ,hence some are even proud of their 
humility4   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #afb1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,pride ,is
 the ,most ,grievous of ,sins8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pride
 is not the most grievous of sins4 ,for 
the more difficult a sin is to avoid1   
the less grievous it would seem to be4  
,now pride is most difficult to avoid2  

for ,augustine says in his ,rule 7,ep4  
ccxi71 ,other sins find their vent in   
the accomplishment of evil deeds1       
whereas pride lies in wait for good     
deeds to destroy them4 ,therefore pride 
is not the most grievous of sins4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 ,the greater evil is     
opposed to the greater good1 as the     
,philosopher asserts 7,ethic4 viii1     
#aj74 ,now humility to which pride is   
opposed is not the greatest of virtues1 
as stated above 7,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #e74      
,therefore the vices that are opposed to
 greater virtues1 such as unbelief1     
despair1 hatred of ,god1 murder1 and so 
forth1 are more grievous sins than      
pride4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the greater 
evil is not punished by a lesser evil4  
,but pride is sometimes punished by     
other sins according to ,rom4 #a3bh1    
where it is stated that on account of   
their pride of heart1 men of science    
were delivered to a reprobate sense1 to 
do those things which are not           
convenient4 ,therefore pride is not the 

most grievous of sins4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,a gloss on ,ps4 #aah3ea1 ,the
 proud did iniquitously1    says3 ,the  
greatest sin in man is pride4  ,i answer
 that1 ,two things are to be observed in
 sin1 conversion to a mutable good1 and 
this is the material part of sin2 and   
aversion from the immutable good1 and   
this gives sin its formal aspect and    
complement4 ,now on the part of the     
conversion1 there is no reason for pride
 being the greatest of sins1 because    
uplifting which pride covets            
inordinately1 is not essentially most   
incompatible with the good of virtue4   
,but on the part of the aversion1 pride 
has extreme gravity1 because in other   
sins man turns away from ,god1 either   
through ignorance or through weakness1  
or through desire for any other good    
whatever2 whereas pride denotes aversion
 from ,god simply through being         
unwilling to be subject to ,god and ,his
 rule4 ,hence ,boethius 99,cf4 ,cassian1
 de ,caenob4 ,inst4 xii1 #g says that   

while all vices flee from ,god1 pride   
alone withstands ,god2 for which reason 
it is specially stated 7,james #d3f7    
that ,god resisteth the proud4          
,wherefore aversion from ,god and ,his  
commandments1 which is a consequence as 
it were in other sins1 belongs to pride 
by its very nature1 for its act is the  
contempt of ,god4 ,and since that which 
belongs to a thing by its nature is     
always of greater weight than that which
 belongs to it through something else1  
it follows that pride is the most       
grievous of sins by its genus1 because  
it exceeds in aversion which is the     
formal complement of sin4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,a sin is difficult to avoid in two 
ways4 ,first1 on account of the violence
 of its onslaught2 thus anger is violent
 in its onslaught on account of its     
impetuosity2 and still more difficult is
 it to resist concupiscence1 on account 
of its connaturality1 as stated in      
,ethic4 ii1 #c1 #i4 ,a difficulty of    
this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the

 gravity of the sin2 because a man sins 
the more grievously1 according as he    
yields to a less impetuous temptation1  
as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 
#ab1 #ae74  ,secondly1 it is difficult  
to avoid a sin1 on account of its being 
hidden4 ,in this way it is difficult to 
avoid pride1 since it takes occasion    
even from good deeds1 as stated 7,a4 #e1
 ad #c74 ,hence ,augustine says         
pointedly that it lies in wait for good 
deeds2 and it is written 7,ps4 #ada3d73 
,in the way wherein ,i walked1 the proud
 99,cf4 ,ps4 #aci3f1 ',the proud have   
hidden a net for me4' ,vulg43 'they'    
have hidden a snare for me4 ,hence no   
very great gravity attaches to the      
movement of pride while creeping in     
secretly1 and before it is discovered by
 the judgment of reason3 but once       
discovered by reason1 it is easily      
avoided1 both by considering one's own  
infirmity1 according to ,ecclus4 #aj3i1 
,why is earth and ashes proud8 and by   
considering ,god's greatness1 according 

to ,job #ae3ac1 ,why doth thy spirit    
swell against ,god8 as well as by       
considering the imperfection of the     
goods on which man prides himself1      
according to ,isa4 #dj3f1 ,all flesh is 
grass1 and all the glory thereof as the 
flower of the field2 and farther on     
7,isa4 #fd3f71 all our justices are     
become like the rag of a menstruous     
woman4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,opposition    
between a vice and a virtue is inferred 
from the object1 which is considered on 
the part of conversion4 ,in this way    
pride has no claim to be the greatest of
 sins1 as neither has humility to be the
 greatest of virtues4 ,but it is the    
greatest on the part of aversion1 since 
it brings greatness upon other sins4    
,for unbelief1 by the very fact of its  
arising out of proud contempt1 is       
rendered more grievous than if it be the
 outcome of ignorance or weakness4 ,the 
same applies to despair and the like4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as in syllogisms 
that lead to an impossible conclusion   

one is sometimes convinced by being     
faced with a more evident absurdity1 so 
too1 in order to overcome their pride1  
,god punishes certain men by allowing   
them to fall into sins of the flesh1    
which though they be less grievous are  
more evidently shameful4 ,hence ,isidore
 says 7,de ,summo ,bono ii1 #ch7 that   
pride is the worst of all vices2 whether
 because it is appropriate to those who 
are of highest and foremost rank1 or    
because it originates from just and     
virtuous deeds1 so that its guilt is    
less perceptible4 ,on the other hand1   
carnal lust is apparent to all1 because 
from the outset it is of a shameful     
nature3 and yet1 under ,god's           
dispensation1 it is less grievous than  
pride4 ,for he who is in the clutches of
 pride and feels it not1 falls into the 
lusts of the flesh1 that being thus     
humbled he may rise from his abasement4 
,from this indeed the gravity of pride  
is made manifest4 ,for just as a wise   
physician1 in order to cure a worse     

disease1 allows the patient to contract 
one that is less dangerous1 so the sin  
of pride is shown to be more grievous by
 the very fact that1 as a remedy1 ,god  
allows men to fall into other sins4     
,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afb1
 ,art4 #g  ,whether ,pride ,is the      
,first ,sin of ,all8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that pride is not the first 
sin of all4 ,for the first is maintained
 in all that follows4 ,now pride does   
not accompany all sins1 nor is it the   
origin of all3 for ,augustine says 7,de 
,nat4 et ,grat4 xx7 that many things are
 done amiss which are not done with     
pride4 ,therefore pride is not the first
 sin of all4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is 
written 7,ecclus4 #aj3ad7 that the      
beginning of 4 4 4 pride is to fall off 
from ,god4 ,therefore falling away from 
,god precedes pride4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 the order of sins would seem  
to be according to the order of virtues4
 ,now1 not humility but faith is the    
first of all virtues4 ,therefore pride  

is not the first sin of all4  ,obj4 #d3 
,further1 it is written 7#b ,tim4       
#c3ac73 ,evil men and seducers shall    
grow worse and worse2 so that apparently
 man's beginning of wickedness is not   
the greatest of sins4 ,but pride is the 
greatest of sins as stated in the       
foregoing ,article4 ,therefore pride is 
not the first sin4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 
resemblance and pretense come after the 
reality4 ,now the ,philosopher says     
7,ethic4 iii1 #g7 that pride apes       
fortitude and daring4 ,therefore the    
vice of daring precedes the vice of     
pride4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written
 7,ecclus4 #aj3ae73 ,pride is the       
beginning of all sin4  ,i answer that1  
,the first thing in every genus is that 
which is essential4 ,now it has been    
stated above 7,a4 #f7 that aversion from
 ,god1 which is the formal complement of
 sin1 belongs to pride essentially1 and 
to other sins1 consequently4 ,hence it  
is that pride fulfils the conditions of 
a first thing1 and is the beginning of  

all sins1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#hd1 ,a4 #b71 when we were treating of  
the causes of sin on the part of the    
aversion which is the chief part of sin4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,pride is said to be 
the beginning of all sin1 not as though 
every sin originated from pride1 but    
because any kind of sin is naturally    
liable to arise from pride4  ,reply     
,obj4 #b3 ,to fall off from ,god is said
 to be the beginning of pride1 not as   
though it were a distinct sin from      
pride1 but as being the first part of   
pride4 ,for it has been said above 7,a4 
#e7 that pride regards chiefly          
subjection to ,god which it scorns1 and 
in consequence it scorns to be subject  
to a creature for ,god's sake4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,there is no need for the     
order of virtues to be the same as that 
of vices4 ,for vice is corruptive of    
virtue4 ,now that which is first to be  
generated is the last to be corrupted4  
,wherefore as faith is the first of     
virtues1 so unbelief is the last of     

sins1 to which sometimes man is led by  
other sins4 ,hence a gloss on ,ps4      
#acf3g1 ,rase it1 rase it1 even to the  
foundation thereof1 says that by heaping
 vice upon vice a man will lapse into   
unbelief1 and the ,apostle says 7#a     
,tim4 #a3ai7 that some rejecting a good 
conscience have made shipwreck          
concerning the faith4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 
,pride is said to be the most grievous  
of sins because that which gives sin its
 gravity is essential to pride4 ,hence  
pride is the cause of gravity in other  
sins4 ,accordingly previous to pride    
there may be certain less grievous sins 
that are committed through ignorance or 
weakness4 ,but among the grievous sins  
the first is pride1 as the cause whereby
 other sins are rendered more grievous4 
,and as that which is the first in      
causing sins is the last in the         
withdrawal from sin1 a gloss on ,ps4    
#ah3ac1 ,i shall be cleansed from the   
greatest sin1 says3 ,namely from the sin
 of pride1 which is the last in those   

who return to ,god1 and the first in    
those who withdraw from ,god4  ,reply   
,obj4 #e3 ,the ,philosopher associates  
pride with feigned fortitude1 not that  
it consists precisely in this1 but      
because man thinks he is more likely to 
be uplifted before men1 if he seem to be
 daring or brave4   ,,eighth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afb1 ,art4 #h  ,whether 
,pride ,should ,be ,reckoned a ,capital 
,vice8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that pride should be reckoned a capital 
vice1 since ,isidore 99,comment4 in     
,deut4 xvi and ,cassian 99,de ,inst4    
,caenob4 v1 #a3 ,collat4 v1 #b number   
pride among the capital vices4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 pride is apparently the   
same as vainglory1 since both covet     
excellence4 ,now vainglory is reckoned a
 capital vice4 ,therefore pride also    
should be reckoned a capital vice4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de
 ,virginit4 xxxi7 that pride begets     
envy1 nor is it ever without this       
companion4 ,now envy is reckoned a      

capital vice1 as stated above 7,q4 #cf1 
,a4 #d74 ,much more therefore is pride a
 capital vice4  ,on the contrary1       
,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #de7 does not   
include pride among the capital vices4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 
#b1 #e1 ad #a7 pride may be considered  
in two ways2 first in itself1 as being a
 special sin2 secondly1 as having a     
general influence towards all sins4 ,now
 the capital vices are said to be       
certain special sins from which many    
kinds of sin arise4 ,wherefore some1    
considering pride in the light of a     
special sin1 numbered it together with  
the other capital vices4 ,but ,gregory1 
taking into consideration its general   
influence towards all vices1 as         
explained above 7,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #c71 did 
not place it among the capital vices1   
but held it to be the queen and mother  
of all the vices4 ,hence he says        
7,moral4 xxxi1 #de73 ,pride1 the queen  
of vices1 when it has vanquished and    
captured the heart1 forthwith delivers  

it into the hands of its lieutenants the
 seven principal vices1 that they may   
despoil it and produce vices of all     
kinds4  ,this suffices for the ,reply to
 the ,first ,objection4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,pride is not the same as vainglory1
 but is the cause thereof3 for pride    
covets excellence inordinately3 while   
vainglory covets the outward show of    
excellence4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the fact 
that envy1 which is a capital vice1     
arises from pride1 does not prove that  
pride is a capital vice1 but that it is 
still more principal than the capital   
vices themselves4   ,,question #afc     
,,of ,,the ,,first ,,man',s ,,sin 7,in  
,four ,articles7  ,we must now consider 
the first man's sin which was pride3 and
 7#a7 his sin2 7#b7 its punishment2 7#c7
 the temptation whereby he was led to   
sin4  ,under the first head there are   
four points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether  
pride was the first man's first sin8    
7#b7 ,what the first man coveted by     
sinning8  7#c7 ,whether his sin was more

 grievous than all other sins8  7#d7    
,which sinned more grievously1 the man  
or the woman8   ,,first ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afc1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,pride ,was the ,first ,man's ,first    
,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem    
that pride was not the first man's first
 sin4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4     
#e3ai7 that by the disobedience of one  
man many were made sinners4 ,now the    
first man's first sin is the one by     
which all men were made sinners in the  
point of original sin4 ,therefore       
disobedience1 and not pride1 was the    
first man's first sin4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 ,ambrose says1 commenting on  
,luke #d3c1 ,and the devil said to ,him1
 that the devil in tempting ,christ     
observed the same order as in overcoming
 the first man4 ,now ,christ was first  
tempted to gluttony1 as appears from    
,matt4 #d3c1 where it was said to ,him3 
,if thou be the ,son of ,god1 command   
that these stones be made bread4        
,therefore the first man's first sin was

 not pride but gluttony4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 man sinned at the devil's     
suggestion4 ,now the devil in tempting  
man promised him knowledge 7,gen4 #c3e74
 ,therefore inordinateness in man was   
through the desire of knowledge1 which  
pertains to curiosity4 ,therefore       
curiosity1 and not pride1 was the first 
sin4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a gloss 99,st4
 ,augustine1 ,gen4 ad lit4 xi on #a     
,tim4 #b3ad1 ,the woman being seduced   
was in the transgression1 says3 ,the    
,apostle rightly calls this seduction1  
for they were persuaded to accept a     
falsehood as being true2 namely that    
,god had forbidden them to touch that   
tree1 because ,he knew that if they     
touched it1 they would be like gods1 as 
though ,he who made them men1 begrudged 
them the godhead 4 4 4 ,now it pertains 
to unbelief to believe such a thing4    
,therefore man's first sin was unbelief 
and not pride4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is
 written 7,ecclus4 #aj3ae73 ,pride is   
the beginning of all sin4 ,now man's    

first sin is the beginning of all sin1  
according to ,rom4 #e3ab1 ,by one man   
sin entered into this world4 ,therefore 
man's first sin was pride4  ,i answer   
that1 ,many movements may concur towards
 one sin1 and the character of sin      
attaches to that one in which           
inordinateness is first found4 ,and it  
is evident that inordinateness is in the
 inward movement of the soul before     
being in the outward act of the body2   
since1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4    
,dei i1 #ah71 the sanctity of the body  
is not forfeited so long as the sanctity
 of the soul remains4 ,also1 among the  
inward movements1 the appetite is moved 
towards the end before being moved      
towards that which is desired for the   
sake of the end2 and consequently man's 
first sin was where it was possible for 
his appetite to be directed to an       
inordinate end4 ,now man was so         
appointed in the state of innocence1    
that there was no rebellion of the flesh
 against the spirit4 ,wherefore it was  

not possible for the first              
inordinateness in the human appetite to 
result from his coveting a sensible     
good1 to which the concupiscence of the 
flesh tends against the order of reason4
 ,it remains therefore that the first   
inordinateness of the human appetite    
resulted from his coveting inordinately 
some spiritual good4 ,now he would not  
have coveted it inordinately1 by        
desiring it according to his measure as 
established by the ,divine rule4 ,hence 
it follows that man's first sin         
consisted in his coveting some spiritual
 good above his measure3 and this       
pertains to pride4 ,therefore it is     
evident that man's first sin was pride4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man's disobedience to 
the ,divine command was not willed by   
man for his own sake1 for this could not
 happen unless one presuppose           
inordinateness in his will4 ,it remains 
therefore that he willed it for the sake
 of something else4 ,now the first thing
 he coveted inordinately was his own    

excellence2 and consequently his        
disobedience was the result of his      
pride4 ,this agrees with the statement  
of ,augustine1 who says 7,ad ,oros      
99,dial4 ,,qq4 lxv1 qu4 #d7 that man    
puffed up with pride obeyed the         
serpent's prompting1 and scorned ,god's 
commands4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,gluttony   
also had a place in the sin of our first
 parents4 ,for it is written 7,gen4     
#c3f73 ,the woman saw that the tree was 
good to eat1 and fair to the eyes1 and  
delightful to behold1 and she took of   
the fruit thereof1 and did eat4 ,yet the
 very goodness and beauty of the fruit  
was not their first motive for sinning1 
but the persuasive words of the serpent1
 who said 7,gen4 #c3e73 ,your eyes shall
 be opened and you shall be as ,gods3   
and it was by coveting this that the    
woman fell into pride4 ,hence the sin of
 gluttony resulted from the sin of      
pride4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the desire for
 knowledge resulted in our first parents
 from their inordinate desire for       

excellence4 ,hence the serpent began by 
saying3 ,you shall be as ,gods1 and     
added3 ,knowing good and evil4  ,reply  
,obj4 #d3 ,according to ,augustine      
7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #cj71 the woman had  
not believed the serpent's statement    
that they were debarred by ,god from a  
good and useful thing1 were her mind not
 already filled with the love of her own
 power1 and a certain proud             
self-presumption4 ,this does not mean   
that pride preceded the promptings of   
the serpent1 but that as soon as the    
serpent had spoken his words of         
persuasion1 her mind was puffed up1 the 
result being that she believed the demon
 to have spoken truly4   ,,second       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afc1 ,art4 #b 
,whether the ,first ,man's ,pride       
,consisted in ,his ,coveting ,god's     
,likeness8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that the first man's pride did not 
consist in his coveting the ,divine     
likeness4 ,for no one sins by coveting  
that which is competent to him according

 to his nature4 ,now ,god's likeness is 
competent to man according to his       
nature3 for it is written 7,gen4 #a3bf73
 ,let us make man to our image and      
likeness4 ,therefore he did not sin by  
coveting ,god's likeness4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 it would seem that man coveted
 ,god's likeness in order that he might 
obtain knowledge of good and evil3 for  
this was the serpent's suggestion3 ,you 
shall be as ,gods knowing good and evil4
 ,now the desire of knowledge is natural
 to man1 according to the saying of the 
,philosopher at the beginning of his    
,metaphysics i1 #a3 ,all men naturally  
desire knowledge4 ,therefore he did not 
sin by coveting ,god's likeness4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 no wise man chooses the   
impossible4 ,now the first man was      
endowed with wisdom1 according to       
,ecclus4 #ag3e1 ,he filled them with the
 knowledge of understanding4 ,since then
 every sin consists in a deliberate act 
of the appetite1 namely choice1 it would
 seem that the first man did not sin by 

coveting something impossible4 ,but it  
is impossible for man to be like ,god1  
according to the saying of ,ex4 #ae3aa1 
,who is like to ,thee among the strong1 
,o ,lord8 ,therefore the first man did  
not sin by coveting ,god's likeness4    
,on the contrary1 ,augustine commenting 
on ,ps4 #fh3e 99,enarr4 in ,ps4 #fh1    
,then did ,i restore ,douay3 'pay' that 
which ,i took not away1 says3 ,adam and 
,eve wished to rob the ,godhead and they
 lost happiness4  ,i answer that1       
likeness is twofold4 ,one is a likeness 
of absolute equality 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ic1
 ,a4 #a3 and such a likeness to ,god our
 first parents did not covet1 since such
 a likeness to ,god is not conceivable  
to the mind1 especially of a wise man4  
,the other is a likeness of imitation1  
such as is possible for a creature in   
reference to ,god1 in so far as the     
creature participates somewhat of ,god's
 likeness according to its measure4 ,for
 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ix73 ,the 
same things are like and unlike to ,god2

 like1 according as they imitate ,him1  
as far as ,he can be imitated2 unlike1  
according as an effect falls short of   
its cause4 ,now every good existing in a
 creature is a participated likeness of 
the first good4  ,wherefore from the    
very fact that man coveted a spiritual  
good above his measure1 as stated in the
 foregoing ,article1 it follows that he 
coveted ,god's likeness inordinately4   
,it must1 however1 be observed that the 
proper object of the appetite is a thing
 not possessed4 ,now spiritual good1 in 
so far as the rational creature         
participates in the ,divine likeness1   
may be considered in reference to three 
things4 ,first1 as to natural being3 and
 this likeness was imprinted from the   
very outset of their creation1 both on  
man--of whom it is written 7,gen4 #a3bf7
 that ,god made man to ,his image and   
likeness--and on the angel1 of whom it  
is written 7,ezech4 #bh3ab73 ,thou wast 
the seal of resemblance4 ,secondly1 as  
to knowledge3 and this likeness was     

bestowed on the angel at his creation1  
wherefore immediately after the words   
just quoted1 ,thou wast the seal of     
resemblance1 we read3 ,full of wisdom4  
,but the first man1 at his creation1 had
 not yet received this likeness actually
 but only in potentiality4 ,thirdly1 as 
to the power of operation3 and neither  
angel nor man received this likeness    
actually at the very outset of his      
creation1 because to each there remained
 something to be done whereby to obtain 
happiness4  ,accordingly1 while both    
7namely the devil and the first man7    
coveted ,god's likeness inordinately1   
neither of them sinned by coveting a    
likeness of nature4 ,but the first man  
sinned chiefly by coveting ,god's       
likeness as regards knowledge of good   
and evil1 according to the serpent's    
instigation1 namely that by his own     
natural power he might decide what was  
good1 and what was evil for him to do2  
or again that he should of himself      
foreknow what good and what evil would  

befall him4 ,secondarily he sinned by   
coveting ,god's likeness as regards his 
own power of operation1 namely that by  
his own natural power he might act so as
 to obtain happiness4 ,hence ,augustine 
says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #cj7 that the   
woman's mind was filled with love of her
 own power4 ,on the other hand1 the     
devil sinned by coveting ,god's         
likeness1 as regards power4 ,wherefore  
,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #ac7 
that he wished to enjoy his own power   
rather than ,god's4 ,nevertheless both  
coveted somewhat to be equal to ,god1 in
 so far as each wished to rely on       
himself in contempt of the order of the 
,divine rule4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this   
argument considers the likeness of      
nature3 and man did not sin by coveting 
this1 as stated4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it  
is not a sin to covet ,god's likeness as
 to knowledge1 absolutely2 but to covet 
this likeness inordinately1 that is1    
above one's measure1 this is a sin4     
,hence ,augustine commenting on ,ps4    

#gj3ah1 ,o ,god1 who is like ,thee8     
says3 ,he who desires to be of himself1 
even as ,god is of no one1 wishes       
wickedly to be like ,god4 ,thus did the 
devil1 who was unwilling to be subject  
to ,him1 and man who refused to be1 as a
 servant1 bound by ,his command4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument considers the 
likeness of equality4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afc1 ,art4 #g 
,whether the ,sin of ,our ,first        
,parents ,was ,more ,grievous ,than     
,other ,sins8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that the sin of our first parents  
was more grievous than other sins4 ,for 
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1    
#ae73 ,great was the wickedness in      
sinning1 when it was so easy to avoid   
sin4 ,now it was very easy for our first
 parents to avoid sin1 because they had 
nothing within them urging them to sin4 
,therefore the sin of our first parents 
was more grievous than other sins4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 punishment is       
proportionate to guilt4 ,now the sin of 

our first parents was most severely     
punished1 since by it death entered into
 this world1 as the ,apostle says 7,rom4
 #e3ab74 ,therefore that sin was more   
grievous than other sins4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 the first in every genus is   
seemingly the greatest 7,metaph4 ii1 #d 
99,ed4 ,diel4 i1 #a74 ,now the sin of   
our first parents was the first among   
sins of men4 ,therefore it was the      
greatest4  ,on the contrary1 ,origen    
says 99,peri ,archon i1 #c3 ,i think    
that a man who stands on the highest    
step of perfection cannot fail or fall  
suddenly3 this can happen only by       
degrees and little by little4 ,now our  
first parents were established on the   
highest and perfect grade4 ,therefore   
their first sin was not the greatest of 
all sins4  ,i answer that1 ,there is a  
twofold gravity to be observed in sin4  
one results from the very species of the
 sin3 thus we say that adultery is a    
graver sin than simple fornication4 ,the
 other gravity of sin results from some 

circumstance of place1 person1 or time4 
,the former gravity is more essential to
 sin and is of greater moment3 hence a  
sin is said to be grave in respect of   
this gravity rather than of the other4  
,accordingly we must say that the first 
man's sin was not graver than all other 
sins of men1 as regards the species of  
the sin4 ,for though pride1 of its      
genus1 has a certain pre-eminence over  
other sins1 yet the pride whereby one   
denies or blasphemes ,god is greater    
than the pride whereby one covets ,god's
 likeness inordinately1 such as the     
pride of our first parents1 as stated   
7,a4 #b74  ,but if we consider the      
circumstances of the persons who sinned1
 that sin was most grave on account of  
the perfection of their state4 ,we must 
accordingly conclude that this sin was  
most grievous relatively but not simply4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument       
considers the gravity of sin as         
resulting from the person of the sinner4
  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the severity of the 

punishment awarded to that first sin    
corresponds to the magnitude of the sin1
 not as regards its species but as      
regards its being the first sin3 because
 it destroyed the innocence of our      
original state1 and by robbing it of    
innocence brought disorder upon the     
whole human nature4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,where things are directly subordinate1 
the first must needs be the greatest4   
,such is not the order among sins1 for  
one follows from another accidentally4  
,and thus it does not follow that the   
first sin is the greatest4   ,,fourth   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afc1 ,art4 #d 
,whether ,adam's ,sin ,was ,more        
,grievous ,than ,eve's8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that ,adam's sin was more
 grievous than ,eve's4 ,for it is       
written 7#a ,tim4 #b3ad73 ,adam was not 
seduced1 but the woman being seduced was
 in the transgression3 and so it would  
seem that the woman sinned through      
ignorance1 but the man through assured  
knowledge4 ,now the latter is the graver

 sin1 according to ,luke #ab3dg1 #dh1   
,that servant who knew the will of his  
lord 4 4 4 and did not according to his 
will1 shall be beaten with many stripes3
 but he that knew not1 and did things   
worthy of stripes1 shall be beaten with 
few stripes4 ,therefore ,adam's sin was 
more grievous than ,eve's4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,decem   
,chordis #c 99,serm4 ix2 xcvi de        
,temp473 ,if the man is the head1 he    
should live better1 and give an example 
of good deeds to his wife1 that she may 
imitate him4 ,now he who ought to do    
better1 sins more grievously1 if he     
commit a sin4 ,therefore ,adam sinned   
more grievously than ,eve4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 the sin against the ,holy     
,ghost would seem to be the most        
grievous4 ,now ,adam1 apparently1 sinned
 against the ,holy ,ghost1 because while
 sinning he relied on ,god's mercy      
99,cf4 ,q4 #ba1 ,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #c4 ,st4  
,thomas is evidently alluding to the    
words of ,peter ,lombard quoted there1  

and this pertains to the sin of         
presumption4 ,therefore it seems that   
,adam sinned more grievously than ,eve4 
,on the contrary1 ,punishment           
corresponds to guilt4 ,now the woman was
 more grievously punished than the man1 
as appears from ,gen4 #c4 ,therefore she
 sinned more grievously than the man4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated 7,a4 #c71 the
 gravity of a sin depends on the species
 rather than on a circumstance of that  
sin4 ,accordingly we must assert that1  
if we consider the condition attaching  
to these persons1 the man's sin is the  
more grievous1 because he was more      
perfect than the woman4  ,as regards the
 genus itself of the sin1 the sin of    
each is considered to be equal1 for each
 sinned by pride4 ,hence ,augustine says
 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #ce73 ,eve in       
excusing herself betrays disparity of   
sex1 though parity of pride4  ,but as   
regards the species of pride1 the woman 
sinned more grievously1 for three       
reasons4 ,first1 because she was more   

puffed up than the man4 ,for the woman  
believed in the serpent's persuasive    
words1 namely that ,god had forbidden   
them to eat of the tree1 lest they      
should become like to ,him2 so that in  
wishing to attain to ,god's likeness by 
eating of the forbidden fruit1 her pride
 rose to the height of desiring to      
obtain something against ,god's will4   
,on the other hand1 the man did not     
believe this to be true2 wherefore he   
did not wish to attain to ,god's        
likeness against ,god's will3 but his   
pride consisted in wishing to attain    
thereto by his own power4 ,secondly1 the
 woman not only herself sinned1 but     
suggested sin to the man2 wherefore she 
sinned against both ,god and her        
neighbor4 ,thirdly1 the man's sin was   
diminished by the fact that1 as         
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #db71
 he consented to the sin out of a       
certain friendly good-will1 on account  
of which a man sometimes will offend    
,god rather than make an enemy of his   

friend4 ,that he ought not to have done 
so is shown by the just issue of the    
,divine sentence4  ,it is therefore     
evident that the woman's sin was more   
grievous than the man's4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,the woman was deceived because she 
was first of all puffed up with pride4  
,wherefore her ignorance did not excuse1
 but aggravated her sin1 in so far as it
 was the cause of her being puffed up   
with still greater pride4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,this argument considers the        
circumstance of personal condition1 on  
account of which the man's sin was more 
grievous than the woman's4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,the man's reliance on ,god's mercy
 did not reach to contempt of ,god's    
justice1 wherein consists the sin       
against the ,holy ,ghost1 but as        
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi 99,de 
,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #aa71 it was due to the 
fact that1 having had no experience of  
,god's severity1 he thought the sin to  
be venial1 i4e4 easily forgiven 99,cf4  
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a4        

,,question #afd  ,,of ,,the             
,,punishments ,,of ,,the ,,first        
,,man',s ,,sin 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we
 must now consider the punishments of   
the first sin2 and under this head there
 are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,death1
 which is the common punishment2 7#b7   
the other particular punishments        
mentioned in ,genesis4   ,,first        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afd1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,death ,is the ,punishment of  
,our ,first ,parents' ,sin8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that death is not the
 punishment of our first parents' sin4  
,for that which is natural to man cannot
 be called a punishment of sin1 because 
sin does not perfect nature but vitiates
 it4 ,now death is natural to man3 and  
this is evident both from the fact that 
his body is composed of contraries1 and 
because mortal is included in the       
definition of man4 ,therefore death is  
not a punishment of our first parents'  
sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 death and     
other bodily defects are similarly found

 in man as well as in other animals1    
according to ,eccles4 #c3ai1 ,the death 
of man and of beasts is one1 and the    
condition of them both equal4 ,but in   
dumb animals death is not a punishment  
of sin4 ,therefore neither is it so in  
men4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the sin of our
 first parents was the sin of particular
 individuals3 whereas death affects the 
entire human nature4 ,therefore it would
 seem that it is not a punishment of our
 first parents' sin4  ,obj4 #d3         
,further1 all are equally descended from
 our first parents4 ,therefore if death 
were the punishment of our first        
parents' sin1 it would follow that all  
men would suffer death in equal measure4
 ,but this is clearly untrue1 since some
 die sooner1 and some more painfully1   
than others4 ,therefore death is not the
 punishment of the first sin4  ,obj4 #e3
 ,further1 the evil of punishment is    
from ,god1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #dh1
 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #di1 ,a4 #b74 ,but death1  
apparently1 is not from ,god3 for it is 

written 7,wis4 #a3ac73 ,god made not    
death4 ,therefore death is not the      
punishment of the first sin4  ,obj4 #f3 
,further1 seemingly1 punishments are not
 meritorious1 since merit is comprised  
under good1 and punishment under evil4  
,now death is sometimes meritorious1 as 
in the case of a martyr's death4        
,therefore it would seem that death is  
not a punishment4  ,obj4 #g3 ,further1  
punishment would seem to be painful4    
,but death apparently cannot be painful1
 since man does not feel it when he is  
dead1 and he cannot feel it when he is  
not dying4 ,therefore death is not a    
punishment of sin4  ,obj4 #h3 ,further1 
if death were a punishment of sin1 it   
would have followed sin immediately4    
,but this is not true1 for our first    
parents lived a long time after their   
sin 7,gen4 #e3e74 ,therefore1 seemingly1
 death is not a punishment of sin4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 
#e3ab73 ,by one man sin entered into    
this world1 and by sin death4  ,i answer

 that1 ,if any one1 on account of his   
fault1 be deprived of a favor bestowed  
on him the privation of that favor is a 
punishment of that fault4 ,now as we    
stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4
 #a2 ,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #a71 ,god bestowed    
this favor on man1 in his primitive     
state1 that as long as his mind was     
subject to ,god1 the lower powers of his
 soul would be subject to his rational  
mind1 and his body to his soul4 ,but    
inasmuch as through sin man's mind      
withdrew from subjection to ,god1 the   
result was that neither were his lower  
powers wholly subject to his reason1    
whence there followed so great a        
rebellion of the carnal appetite against
 the reason3 nor was the body wholly    
subject to the soul2 whence arose death 
and other bodily defects4 ,for life and 
soundness of body depend on the body    
being subject to the soul1 as the       
perfectible is subject to its           
perfection4 ,consequently1 on the other 
hand1 death1 sickness1 and all defects  

of the body are due to the lack of the  
body's subjection to the soul4  ,it is  
therefore evident that as the rebellion 
of the carnal appetite against the      
spirit is a punishment of our first     
parents' sin1 so also are death and all 
defects of the body4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,a thing is said to be natural if it    
proceeds from the principles of nature4 
,now the essential principles of nature 
are form and matter4 ,the form of man is
 his rational soul1 which is1 of itself1
 immortal3 wherefore death is not       
natural to man on the part of his form4 
,the matter of man is a body such as is 
composed of contraries1 of which        
corruptibility is a necessary           
consequence1 and in this respect death  
is natural to man4 ,now this condition  
attached to the nature of the human body
 results from a natural necessity1 since
 it was necessary for the human body to 
be the organ of touch1 and consequently 
a mean between objects of touch3 and    
this was impossible1 were it not        

composed of contraries1 as the          
,philosopher states 7,de ,anima ii1     
#aa74 ,on the other hand1 this condition
 is not attached to the adaptability of 
matter to form because1 if it were      
possible1 since the form is             
incorruptible1 its matter should rather 
be incorruptible4 ,in the same way a saw
 needs to be of iron1 this being        
suitable to its form and action1 so that
 its hardness may make it fit for       
cutting4 ,but that it be liable to rust 
is a necessary result of such a matter  
and is not according to the agent's     
choice2 for1 if the craftsman were able1
 of the iron he would make a saw that   
would not rust4 ,now ,god ,who is the   
author of man is all-powerful1 wherefore
 when ,he first made man1 ,he conferred 
on him the favor of being exempt from   
the necessity resulting from such a     
matter3 which favor1 however1 was       
withdrawn through the sin of our first  
parents4 ,accordingly death is both     
natural on account of a condition       

attaching to matter1 and penal on       
account of the loss of the ,divine favor
 preserving man from death 99,cf4       
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #f4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,this likeness of man to other      
animals regards a condition attaching to
 matter1 namely the body being composed 
of contraries4 ,but it does not regard  
the form1 for man's soul is immortal1   
whereas the souls of dumb animals are   
mortal4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,our first    
parents were made by ,god not only as   
particular individuals1 but also as     
principles of the whole human nature to 
be transmitted by them to their         
posterity1 together with the ,divine    
favor preserving them from death4 ,hence
 through their sin the entire human     
nature1 being deprived of that favor in 
their posterity1 incurred death4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #d3 ,a twofold defect arises from
 sin4 ,one is by way of a punishment    
appointed by a judge3 and such a defect 
should be equal in those to whom the sin
 pertains equally4 ,the other defect is 

that which results accidentally from    
this punishment2 for instance1 that one 
who has been deprived of his sight for a
 sin he has committed1 should fall down 
in the road4 ,such a defect is not      
proportionate to the sin1 nor does a    
human judge take it into account1 since 
he cannot foresee chance happenings4    
,accordingly1 the punishment appointed  
for the first sin and proportionately   
corresponding thereto1 was the          
withdrawal of the ,divine favor whereby 
the rectitude and integrity of human    
nature was maintained4 ,but the defects 
resulting from this withdrawal are death
 and other penalties of the present     
life4 ,wherefore these punishments need 
not be equal in those to whom the first 
sin equally appertains4 ,nevertheless1  
since ,god foreknows all future events1 
,divine providence has so disposed that 
these penalties are apportioned in      
different ways to various people4 ,this 
is not on account of any merits or      
demerits previous to this life1 as      

,origen held 99,peri ,archon ii1 #i3 for
 this is contrary to the words of ,rom4 
#i3aa1 ,when they 4 4 4 had not done any
 good or evil2 and also contrary to     
statements made in the ,first ,part 7,q4
 #ij1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #c71 namely 
that the soul is not created before the 
body3 but either in punishment of their 
parents' sins1 inasmuch as the child is 
something belonging to the father1      
wherefore parents are often punished in 
their children2 or again it is for a    
remedy intended for the spiritual       
welfare of the person who suffers these 
penalties1 to wit that he may thus be   
turned away from his sins1 or lest he   
take pride in his virtues1 and that he  
may be crowned for his patience4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #e3 ,death may be considered in  
two ways4 ,first1 as an evil of human   
nature1 and thus it is not of ,god1 but 
is a defect befalling man through his   
fault4 ,secondly1 as having an aspect of
 good1 namely as being a just           
punishment1 and thus it is from ,god4   

,wherefore ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1
 #ba7 that ,god is not the author of    
death1 except in so far as it is a      
punishment4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,as       
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiii1   
#e71 just as the wicked abuse not only  
evil but also good things1 so do the    
righteous make good use not only of good
 but also of evil things4 ,hence it is  
that both evil men make evil use of the 
law1 though the law is good1 while good 
men die well1 although death is an evil4
 ,wherefore inasmuch as holy men make   
good use of death1 their death is to    
them meritorious4  ,reply ,obj4 #g3     
,death may be considered in two ways4   
,first1 as the privation of life1 and   
thus death cannot be felt1 since it is  
the privation of sense and life4 ,in    
this way it involves not pain of sense  
but pain of loss4 ,secondly1 it may be  
considered as denoting the corruption   
which ends in the aforesaid privation4  
,now we may speak of corruption even as 
of generation in two ways3 in one way as

 being the term of alteration1 and thus 
in the first instant in which life      
departs1 death is said to be present4   
,in this way also death has no pain of  
sense4 ,in another way corruption may be
 taken as including the previous        
alteration3 thus a person is said to    
die1 when he is in motion towards death2
 just as a thing is said to be          
engendered1 while in motion towards the 
state of having been engendered3 and    
thus death may be painful4  ,reply ,obj4
 #h3 ,according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad 
lit4 99,de ,pecc4 ,mer4 et ,rem4 i1 #af4
 ,cf4 ,gen4 ad lit4 ii4 #cb71 although  
our first parents lived thereafter many 
years1 they began to die on the day when
 they heard the death-decree1 condemning
 them to decline to old age4   ,,second 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afd1 ,art4 #b 
,whether the ,particular ,punishments of
 ,our ,first ,parents ,are ,suitably    
,appointed in ,scripture8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that the particular  
punishments of our first parents are    

unsuitably appointed in ,scripture4 ,for
 that which would have occurred even    
without sin should not be described as a
 punishment for sin4 ,now seemingly     
there would have been pain in           
child-bearing1 even had there been no   
sin3 for the disposition of the female  
sex is such that offspring cannot be    
born without pain to the bearer4        
,likewise the subjection of woman to man
 results from the perfection of the     
male1 and the imperfection of the female
 sex4 ,again it belongs to the nature of
 the earth to bring forth thorns and    
thistles1 and this would have occurred  
even had there been no sin4 ,therefore  
these are unsuitable punishments of the 
first sin4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that    
which pertains to a person's dignity    
does not1 seemingly1 pertain to his     
punishment4 ,but the multiplying of     
conceptions pertains to a woman's       
dignity4 ,therefore it should not be    
described as the woman's punishment4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the punishment of   

our first parents' sin is transmitted to
 all1 as we have stated with regard to  
death 7,a4 #a74 ,but all women's        
conceptions are not multiplied1 nor does
 every man eat bread in the sweat of his
 face4 ,therefore these are not suitable
 punishments of the first sin4  ,obj4   
#d3 ,further1 the place of paradise was 
made for man4 ,now nothing in the order 
of things should be without purpose4    
,therefore it would seem that the       
exclusion of man from paradise was not a
 suitable punishment of man4  ,obj4 #e3 
,further1 this place of the earthly     
paradise is said to be naturally        
inaccessible4 ,therefore it was useless 
to put other obstacles in the way lest  
man should return thither1 to wit the   
cherubim1 and the flaming sword turning 
every way4  ,obj4 #f3 ,further1         
immediately after his sin man was       
subject to the necessity of dying1 so   
that he could not be restored to        
immortality by the beneficial tree of   
life4 ,therefore it was useless to      

forbid him to eat of the tree of life1  
as instanced by the words of ,gen4      
#c3bb3 ,see1 lest perhaps he 4 4 4 take 
4 4 4 of the tree of life 4 4 4 and live
 for ever4  ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 to mock 
the unhappy seems inconsistent with     
mercy and clemency1 which are most of   
all ascribed to ,god in ,scripture1     
according to ,ps4 #add3i1 ,his tender   
mercies are over all ,his works4        
,therefore ,god is unbecomingly         
described as mocking our first parents1 
already reduced through sin to unhappy  
straits1 in the words of ,gen4 #c3bb1   
,behold ,adam is become as one of ,us1  
knowing good and evil4  ,obj4 #h3       
,further1 clothes are necessary to man1 
like food1 according to #a ,tim4 #f3h1  
,having food1 and wherewith to be       
covered1 with these we are content4     
,therefore just as food was appointed to
 our first parents before their sin1 so 
also should clothing have been ascribed 
to them4 ,therefore after their sin it  
was unsuitable to say that ,god made for

 them garments of skin4  ,objection #i3 
,further1 the punishment inflicted for a
 sin should outweigh in evil the gain   
realized through the sin3 else the      
punishment would not deter one from     
sinning4 ,now through sin our first     
parents gained in this1 that their eyes 
were opened1 according to ,gen4 #c3g4   
,but this outweighs in good all the     
penal evils which are stated to have    
resulted from sin4 ,therefore the       
punishments resulting from our first    
parents' sin are unsuitably described4  
,on the contrary1 ,these punishments    
were appointed by ,god1 ,who does all   
things1 in number1 weight1 and measure  
99,vulg43 ',thou hast ordered all things
 in measure1 and number1 and weight4'   
7,wis4 #aa3ba74  ,i answer that1 ,as    
stated in the foregoing ,article1 on    
account of their sin1 our first parents 
were deprived of the ,divine favor1     
whereby the integrity of human nature   
was maintained in them1 and by the      
withdrawal of this favor human nature   

incurred penal defects4 ,hence they were
 punished in two ways4 ,in the first    
place by being deprived of that which   
was befitting the state of integrity1   
namely the place of the earthly         
paradise3 and this is indicated 7,gen4  
#c3bc7 where it is stated that ,god sent
 him out of the paradise of pleasure4   
,and since he was unable1 of himself1 to
 return to that state of original       
innocence1 it was fitting that obstacles
 should be placed against his recovering
 those things that were befitting his   
original state1 namely food 7lest he    
should take of the tree of life7 and    
place2 for ,god placed before 4 4 4     
paradise 4 4 4 ,cherubim1 and a flaming 
sword4 ,secondly1 they were punished by 
having appointed to them things         
befitting a nature bereft of the        
aforesaid favor3 and this as regards    
both the body and the soul4 ,with regard
 to the body1 to which pertains the     
distinction of sex1 one punishment was  
appointed to the woman and another to   

the man4 ,to the woman punishment was   
appointed in respect of two things on   
account of which she is united to the   
man2 and these are the begetting of     
children1 and community of works        
pertaining to family life4 ,as regards  
the begetting of children1 she was      
punished in two ways3 first in the      
weariness to which she is subject while 
carrying the child after conception1 and
 this is indicated in the words 7,gen4  
#c3af71 ,i will multiply thy sorrows1   
and thy conceptions2 secondly1 in the   
pain which she suffers in giving birth1 
and this is indicated by the words      
7,gen4 #c3af71 ,in sorrow shalt thou    
bring forth4 ,as regards family life she
 was punished by being subjected to her 
husband's authority1 and this is        
conveyed in the words 7,gen4 #c3af71    
,thou shalt be under thy husband's      
power4  ,now1 just as it belongs to the 
woman to be subject to her husband in   
matters relating to the family life1 so 
it belongs to the husband to provide the

 necessaries of that life4 ,in this     
respect he was punished in three ways4  
,first1 by the barrenness of the earth1 
in the words 7,gen4 #c3ag71 ,cursed is  
the earth in thy work4 ,secondly1 by the
 cares of his toil1 without which he    
does not win the fruits of the earth2   
hence the words 7,gen4 #c3ag71 ,with    
labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof   
all the days of thy life4 ,thirdly1 by  
the obstacles encountered by the tillers
 of the soil1 wherefore it is written   
7,gen4 #c3ah71 ,thorns and thistles     
shall it bring forth to thee4  ,likewise
 a triple punishment is ascribed to them
 on the part of the soul4 ,first1 by    
reason of the confusion they experienced
 at the rebellion of the flesh against  
the spirit2 hence it is written 7,gen4  
#c3g73 ,the eyes of them both were      
opened2 and 4 4 4 they perceived        
themselves to be naked4 ,secondly1 by   
the reproach for their sin1 indicated by
 the words 7,gen4 #c3bb71 ,behold ,adam 
is become as one of ,us4 ,thirdly1 by   

the reminder of their coming death1 when
 it was said to him 7,gen4 #c3ai73 ,dust
 thou art and into dust thou shalt      
return4 ,to this also pertains that ,god
 made them garments of skin1 as a sign  
of their mortality4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,in the state of innocence child-bearing
 would have been painless3 for          
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1    
#bf73 ,just as1 in giving birth1 the    
mother would then be relieved not by    
groans of pain1 but by the instigations 
of maturity1 so in bearing and          
conceiving the union of both sexes would
 be one not of lustful desire but of    
deliberate action 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ih1   
,a4 #b4  ,the subjection of the woman to
 her husband is to be understood as     
inflicted in punishment of the woman1   
not as to his headship 7since even      
before sin the man was the head and     
governor of the woman71 but as to her   
having now to obey her husband's will   
even against her own4  ,if man had not  
sinned1 the earth would have brought    

forth thorns and thistles to be the food
 of animals1 but not to punish man1     
because their growth would bring no     
labor or punishment for the tiller of   
the soil1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad  
lit4 iii1 #ah74 ,alcuin 99,interrog4 et 
,resp4 in ,gen4 lxxix1 however1 holds   
that1 before sin1 the earth brought     
forth no thorns and thistles1 whatever3 
but the former opinion is the better4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the multiplying of her
 conceptions was appointed as a         
punishment to the woman1 not on account 
of the begetting of children1 for this  
would have been the same even before    
sin1 but on account of the numerous     
sufferings to which the woman is        
subject1 through carrying her offspring 
after conception4 ,hence it is expressly
 stated3 ,i will multiply thy sorrows1  
and thy conceptions4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,these punishments affect all somewhat4 
,for any woman who conceives must needs 
suffer sorrows and bring forth her child
 with pain3 except the ,blessed ,virgin1

 who conceived without corruption1 and  
bore without pain 99,st4 ,bernard1      
,serm4 in ,dom4 inf4 oct4 ,assum4 ,b4   
,v4 ,m41 because her conceiving was not 
according to the law of nature1         
transmitted from our first parents4 ,and
 if a woman neither conceives nor bears1
 she suffers from the defect of         
barrenness1 which outweighs the         
aforesaid punishments4 ,likewise whoever
 tills the soil must needs eat his bread
 in the sweat of his brow3 while those  
who do not themselves work on the land1 
are busied with other labors1 for man is
 born to labor 7,job #e3g73 and thus    
they eat the bread for which others have
 labored in the sweat of their brow4    
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although the place of 
the earthly paradise avails not man for 
his use1 it avails him for a lesson2    
because he knows himself deprived of    
that place on account of sin1 and       
because by the things that have a bodily
 existence in that paradise1 he is      
instructed in things pertaining to the  

heavenly paradise1 the way to which is  
prepared for man by ,christ4  ,reply    
,obj4 #e3 ,apart from the mysteries of  
the spiritual interpretation1 this place
 would seem to be inaccessible1 chiefly 
on account of the extreme heat in the   
middle zone by reason of the nighness of
 the sun4 ,this is denoted by the       
flaming sword1 which is described as    
turning every way1 as being appropriate 
to the circular movement that causes    
this heat4 ,and since the movements of  
corporal creatures are set in order     
through the ministry of the angels1     
according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 iii1
 #d71 it was fitting that1 besides the  
sword turning every way1 there should be
 cherubim to keep the way of the tree of
 life4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad 
lit4 xi1 #dj73 ,it is to be believed    
that even in the visible paradise this  
was done by heavenly powers indeed1 so  
that there was a fiery guard set there  
by the ministry of angels4  ,reply ,obj4
 #f3 ,after sin1 if man had eaten of the

 tree of life1 he would not thereby have
 recovered immortality1 but by means of 
that beneficial food he might have      
prolonged his life4 ,hence in the words 
,and live for ever1 for ever signifies  
for a long time4 ,for it was not        
expedient for man to remain longer in   
the unhappiness of this life4  ,reply   
,obj4 #g3 ,according to ,augustine      
7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #ci71 these words of 
,god are not so much a mockery of our   
first parents as a deterrent to others1 
for whose benefit these things are      
written1 lest they be proud likewise1   
because ,adam not only failed to become 
that which he coveted to be1 but did not
 keep that to which he was made4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #h3 ,clothing is necessary to man
 in his present state of unhappiness for
 two reasons4 ,first1 to supply a       
deficiency in respect of external harm  
caused by1 for instance1 extreme heat or
 cold4 ,secondly1 to hide his ignominy  
and to cover the shame of those members 
wherein the rebellion of the flesh      

against the spirit is most manifest4    
,now these two motives do not apply to  
the primitive state4 because then man's 
body could not be hurt by any outward   
thing1 as stated in the ,first ,part    
7,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #b71 nor was there in     
man's body anything shameful that would 
bring confusion on him4 ,hence it is    
written 7,gen4 #b3bc73 ,and they were   
both naked1 to wit ,adam and his wife1  
and were not ashamed4 ,the same cannot  
be said of food1 which is necessary to  
entertain the natural heat1 and to      
sustain the body4  ,reply ,obj4 #i3 ,as 
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #ca71
 ,we must not imagine that our first    
parents were created with their eyes    
closed1 especially since it is stated   
that the woman saw that the tree was    
fair1 and good to eat4 ,accordingly the 
eyes of both were opened so that they   
saw and thought on things which had not 
occurred to their minds before1 this was
 a mutual concupiscence such as they had
 not hitherto4   ,,question #afe  ,,of  

,,our ,,first ,,parents' ,,temptation   
7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we must now      
consider our first parents' temptation1 
concerning which there are two points of
 inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether it was fitting 
for man to be tempted by the devil8     
7#b7 ,of the manner and order of that   
temptation4   ,,first ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afe1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,it ,was ,fitting for ,man to ,be       
,tempted by the ,devil8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that it was not fitting  
for man to be tempted by the devil4 ,for
 the same final punishment is appointed 
to the angels' sin and to man's1        
according to ,matt4 #be3da1 ,go ,vulg43 
',depart from ,me' you cursed into      
everlasting fire1 which was prepared for
 the devil and his angels4 ,now the     
angels' first sin did not follow a      
temptation from without4 ,therefore     
neither should man's first sin have     
resulted from an outward temptation4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god1 ,who foreknows
 the future1 knew that through the      

demon's temptation man would fall into  
sin1 and thus ,he knew full well that it
 was not expedient for man to be        
tempted4 ,therefore it would seem       
unfitting for ,god to allow him to be   
tempted4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it seems  
to savor of punishment that anyone      
should have an assailant1 just as on the
 other hand the cessation of an assault 
is akin to a reward4 ,now punishment    
should not precede fault4 ,therefore it 
was unfitting for man to be tempted     
before he sinned4  ,on the contrary1 ,it
 is written 7,ecclus4 #cd3aa73 ,he that 
hath not been tempted ,douay3 'tried'1  
what manner of things doth he know8  ,i 
answer that1 ,god's wisdom orders all   
things sweetly 7,wis4 #h3a71 inasmuch as
 ,his providence appoints to each one   
that which is befitting it according to 
its nature4 ,for as ,dionysius says     
7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 it belongs to         
providence not to destroy1 but to       
maintain1 nature4 ,now it is a condition
 attaching to human nature that one     

creature can be helped or impeded by    
another4 ,wherefore it was fitting that 
,god should both allow man in the state 
of innocence to be tempted by evil      
angels1 and should cause him to be      
helped by good angels4 ,and by a special
 favor of grace1 it was granted him that
 no creature outside himself could harm 
him against his own will1 whereby he was
 able even to resist the temptation of  
the demon4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,above the 
human nature there is another that      
admits of the possibility of the evil of
 fault3 but there is not above the      
angelic nature4 ,now only one that is   
already become evil through sin can     
tempt by leading another into evil4     
,hence it was fitting that by an evil   
angel man should be tempted to sin1 even
 as according to the order of nature he 
is moved forward to perfection by means 
of a good angel4 ,an angel could be     
perfected in good by something above    
him1 namely by ,god1 but he could not   
thus be led into sin1 because according 

to ,james #a3ac1 ,god is not a tempter  
of evils4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as    
,god knew that man1 through being       
tempted1 would fall into sin1 so too ,he
 knew that man was able1 by his free    
will1 to resist the tempter4 ,now the   
condition attaching to man's nature     
required that he should be left to his  
own will1 according to ,ecclus4 #ae3ad1 
,god left man in the hand of his own    
counsel4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,gen4  
ad lit4 xi1 #d73 ,it seems to me that   
man would have had no prospect of any   
special praise1 if he were able to lead 
a good life simply because there was    
none to persuade him to lead an evil    
life2 since both by nature he had the   
power1 and in his power he had the will1
 not to consent to the persuader4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an assault is penal if
 it be difficult to resist it3 but1 in  
the state of innocence1 man was able1   
without any difficulty1 to resist       
temptation4 ,consequently the tempter's 
assault was not a punishment to man4    

,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afe1 
,art4 #b  ,whether the ,manner and      
,order of the ,first ,temptation ,was   
,fitting8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that the manner and order of the first 
temptation was not fitting4 ,for just as
 in the order of nature the angel was   
above man1 so was the man above the     
woman4 ,now sin came upon man through an
 angel3 therefore in like manner it     
should have come upon the woman through 
the man2 in other words the woman should
 have been tempted by the man1 and not  
the other way about4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 the temptation of our first   
parents was by suggestion4 ,now the     
devil is able to make suggestions to man
 without making use of an outward       
sensible creature4 ,since then our first
 parents were endowed with a spiritual  
mind1 and adhered less to sensible than 
to intelligible things1 it would have   
been more fitting for man to be tempted 
with a merely spiritual1 instead of an  
outward1 temptation4  ,obj4 #c3         

,further1 one cannot fittingly suggest  
an evil except through some apparent    
good4 ,but many other animals have a    
greater appearance of good than the     
serpent has4 ,therefore man was         
unfittingly tempted by the devil through
 a serpent4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the    
serpent is an irrational animal4 ,now   
wisdom1 speech1 and punishment are not  
befitting an irrational animal4         
,therefore the serpent is unfittingly   
described 7,gen4 #c3a7 as more subtle   
than any of the beasts of the earth1 or 
as the most prudent of all beasts       
according to another version 99,the     
,septuagint3 and likewise is unfittingly
 stated to have spoken to the woman1 and
 to have been punished by ,god4  ,on the
 contrary1 ,that which is first in any  
genus should be proportionate to all    
that follow it in that genus4 ,now in   
every kind of sin we find the same order
 as in the first temptation4 ,for1      
according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xii1
 #ab71 it begins with the concupiscence 

of sin in the sensuality1 signified by  
the serpent2 extends to the lower       
reason1 by pleasure1 signified by the   
woman2 and reaches to the higher reason 
by consent in the sin1 signified by the 
man4 ,therefore the order of the first  
temptation was fitting4  ,i answer that1
 ,man is composed of a twofold nature1  
intellective and sensitive4 ,hence the  
devil1 in tempting man1 made use of a   
twofold incentive to sin3 one on the    
part of the intellect1 by promising the 
,divine likeness through the acquisition
 of knowledge which man naturally       
desires to have2 the other on the part  
of sense4 ,this he did by having        
recourse to those sensible things1 which
 are most akin to man1 partly by        
tempting the man through the woman who  
was akin to him in the same species2    
partly by tempting the woman through the
 serpent1 who was akin to them in the   
same genus2 partly by suggesting to them
 to eat of the forbidden fruit1 which   
was akin to them in the proximate genus4

  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the act of       
tempting the devil was by way of        
principal agent2 whereas the woman was  
employed as an instrument of temptation 
in bringing about the downfall of the   
man1 both because the woman was weaker  
than the man1 and consequently more     
liable to be deceived1 and because1 on  
account of her union with man1 the devil
 was able to deceive the man especially 
through her4 ,now there is no parity    
between principal agent and instrument1 
because the principal agent must exceed 
in power1 which is not requisite in the 
instrumental agent4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a
 suggestion whereby the devil suggests  
something to man spiritually1 shows the 
devil to have more power against man    
than outward suggestion has1 since by an
 inward suggestion1 at least1 man's     
imagination is changed by the devil     
99,cf4 ,first ,part1 ,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #c2   
whereas by an outward suggestion1 a     
change is wrought merely on an outward  
creature4 ,now the devil had a minimum  

of power against man before sin1        
wherefore he was unable to tempt him by 
inward suggestion1 but only by outward  
suggestion4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,according
 to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #c71  
we are not to suppose that the devil    
chose the serpent as his means of       
temptation2 but as he was possessed of  
the lust of deceit1 he could only do so 
by the animal he was allowed to use for 
that purpose4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3         
,according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 
xi1 #bi71 the serpent is described as   
most prudent or subtle1 on account of   
the cunning of the devil1 who wrought   
his wiles in it3 thus1 we speak of a    
prudent or cunning tongue1 because it is
 the instrument of a prudent or cunning 
man in advising something prudently or  
cunningly4 ,nor indeed 7,gen4 ad lit4   
xi1 #bh7 did the serpent understand the 
sounds which were conveyed through it to
 the woman2 nor again are we to believe 
that its soul was changed into a        
rational nature1 since not even men1 who

 are rational by nature1 know what they 
say when a demon speaks in them4        
,accordingly 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #bi7 the
 serpent spoke to man1 even as the ass  
on which ,balaam sat spoke to him1      
except that the former was the work of a
 devil1 whereas the latter was the work 
of an angel4 ,hence 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1  
#cf7 the serpent was not asked why it   
had done this1 because it had not done  
this in its own nature1 but the devil in
 it1 who was already condemned to       
everlasting fire on account of his sin3 
and the words addressed to the serpent  
were directed to him who wrought through
 the serpent4  ,moreover1 as again      
,augustine says 7,super ,gen4 contra    
,manich4 ii1 #ag1 #ah71 his1 that is1   
the devil's1 punishment mentioned here  
is that for which we must be on our     
guard against him1 not that which is    
reserved till the last judgment4 ,for   
when it was said to him3 ',thou art     
cursed among all cattle and beasts of   
the earth1' the cattle are set above    

him1 not in power1 but in the           
preservation of their nature1 since the 
cattle lost no heavenly bliss1 seeing   
that they never had it1 but they        
continue to live in the nature which    
they received4 ,it is also said to him3 
',upon thy breast and belly shalt thou  
creep1' according to another version    
99,the ,septuagint ,here the breast     
signifies pride1 because it is there    
that the impulse of the soul dominates1 
while the belly denotes carnal desire1  
because this part of the body is softest
 to the touch3 and on these he creeps to
 those whom he wishes to deceive4 ,the  
words1 ',earth shalt thou eat all the   
days of thy life' may be understood in  
two ways4 ,either ',those shall belong  
to thee1 whom thou shalt deceive by     
earthly lust1' namely sinners who are   
signified under the name of earth1 or a 
third kind of temptation1 namely        
curiosity1 is signified by these words3 
for to eat earth is to look into things 
deep and dark4 ,the putting of enmities 

between him and the woman means that we 
cannot be tempted by the devil1 except  
through that part of the soul which     
bears or reflects the likeness of a     
woman4 ,the seed of the devil is the    
temptation to evil1 the seed of the     
woman is the fruit of good works1       
whereby the temptation to evil is       
resisted4 ,wherefore the serpent lies in
 wait for the woman's heel1 that if at  
any time she fall away towards what is  
unlawful1 pleasure may seize hold of    
her3 and she watches his head that she  
may shut him out at the very outset of  
the evil temptation4   ,,question #aff  
,,of ,,studiousness 7,in ,two ,articles7
  ,we must next consider studiousness   
and its opposite1 curiosity4 ,concerning
 studiousness there are two points of   
inquiry3  7#a7 ,what is the matter of   
studiousness8  7#b7 ,whether it is a    
part of temperance8   ,,first ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aff1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
the ,proper ,matter of ,studiousness ,is
 ,knowledge8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  

seem that knowledge is not the proper   
matter of studiousness4 ,for a person is
 said to be studious because he applies 
study to certain things4 ,now a man     
ought to apply study to every matter1 in
 order to do aright what has to be done4
 ,therefore seemingly knowledge is not  
the special matter of studiousness4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 studiousness is     
opposed to curiosity4 ,now curiosity1   
which is derived from cura 7care71 may  
also refer to elegance of apparel and   
other such things1 which regard the     
body2 wherefore the ,apostle says 7,rom4
 #ac3ad73 ,make not provision 7curam7   
for the flesh in its concupiscences4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further it is written 7,jer4 
#f3ac73 ,from the least of them even to 
the greatest1 all study ,douay3 'are    
given to' covetousness4 ,now            
covetousness is not properly about      
knowledge1 but rather about the         
possession of wealth1 as stated above   
7,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore          
studiousness1 which is derived from     

study1 is not properly about knowledge4 
,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4
 #bg3aa73 ,study wisdom1 my son1 and    
make my heart joyful1 that thou mayest  
give an answer to him that reproacheth4 
,now study1 which is commended as a     
virtue1 is the same as that to which the
 ,law urges4 ,therefore studiousness is 
properly about knowledge4  ,i answer    
that1 ,properly speaking1 study denotes 
keen application of the mind to         
something4 ,now the mind is not applied 
to a thing except by knowing that thing4
 ,wherefore the mind's application to   
knowledge precedes its application to   
those things to which man is directed by
 his knowledge4 ,hence study regards    
knowledge in the first place1 and as a  
result it regards any other things the  
working of which requires to be directed
 by knowledge4 ,now the virtues lay     
claim to that matter about which they   
are first and foremost2 thus fortitude  
is concerned about dangers of death1 and
 temperance about pleasures of touch4   

,therefore studiousness is properly     
ascribed to knowledge4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,nothing can be done aright as regards 
other matters1 except in so far as is   
previously directed by the knowing      
reason4 ,hence studiousness1 to whatever
 matter it be applied1 has a prior      
regard for knowledge4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,man's mind is drawn1 on account of his 
affections1 towards the things for which
 he has an affection1 according to      
,matt4 #f3ba1 ,where thy treasure is1   
there is thy heart also4 ,and since man 
has special affection for those things  
which foster the flesh1 it follows that 
man's thoughts are concerned about      
things that foster his flesh1 so that   
man seeks to know how he may best       
sustain his body4 ,accordingly curiosity
 is accounted to be about things        
pertaining to the body by reason of     
things pertaining to knowledge4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,covetousness craves the      
acquisition of gain1 and for this it is 
very necessary to be skilled in earthly 

things4 ,accordingly studiousness is    
ascribed to things pertaining to        
covetousness4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aff1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,studiousness ,is a ,part of            
,temperance8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that studiousness is not a part of 
temperance4 ,for a man is said to be    
studious by reason of his studiousness4 
,now all virtuous persons without       
exception are called studious according 
to the ,philosopher1 who frequently     
employs the term studious 7spoudaios7 in
 this sense 7,ethic4 ix1 #d1 #h1 #i74   
99,in the same sense ,aristotle says in 
,ethic4 iii1 #b1 that every vicious     
person is ignorant of what he ought to  
do4 ,therefore studiousness is a general
 virtue1 and not a part of temperance4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 studiousness1 as    
stated 7,a4 #a71 pertains to knowledge4 
,but knowledge has no connection with   
the moral virtues which are in the      
appetitive part of the soul1 and        
pertains rather to the intellectual     

virtues which are in the cognitive part3
 wherefore solicitude is an act of      
prudence as stated above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4  
#i74 ,therefore studiousness is not a   
part of temperance4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 a virtue that is ascribed as part of a 
principal virtue resembles the latter as
 to mode4 ,now studiousness does not    
resemble temperance as to mode1 because 
temperance takes its name from being a  
kind of restraint1 wherefore it is more 
opposed to the vice that is in excess3  
whereas studiousness is denominated from
 being the application of the mind to   
something1 so that it would seem to be  
opposed to the vice that is in default1 
namely1 neglect of study1 rather than to
 the vice which is in excess1 namely    
curiosity4 wherefore1 on account of its 
resemblance to the latter1 ,isidore says
 7,etym4 x7 that a studious man is one  
who is curious to study4 ,therefore     
studiousness is not a part of           
temperance4  ,on the contrary1          
,augustine says 7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4     

#ba73 ,we are forbidden to be curious3  
and this is a great gift that temperance
 bestows4 ,now curiosity is prevented by
 moderate studiousness4 ,therefore      
studiousness is a part of temperance4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#ada1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d1 #e71 it belongs to  
temperance to moderate the movement of  
the appetite1 lest it tend excessively  
to that which is desired naturally4 ,now
 just as in respect of his corporeal    
nature man naturally desires the        
pleasures of food and sex1 so1 in       
respect of his soul1 he naturally       
desires to know something2 thus the     
,philosopher observes at the beginning  
of his ,metaphysics 7i1 #a73 ,all men   
have a natural desire for knowledge4    
,the moderation of this desire pertains 
to the virtue of studiousness2 wherefore
 it follows that studiousness is a      
potential part of temperance1 as a      
subordinate virtue annexed to a         
principal virtue4 ,moreover1 it is      
comprised under modesty for the reason  

given above 7,q4 #afj1 ,a4 #b74  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,prudence is the complement of
 all the moral virtues1 as stated in    
,ethic4 vi1 #ac4 ,consequently1 in so   
far as the knowledge of prudence        
pertains to all the virtues1 the term   
studiousness1 which properly regards    
knowledge1 is applied to all the        
virtues4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the act of a
 cognitive power is commanded by the    
appetitive power1 which moves all the   
powers1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4   
#i1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore knowledge       
regards a twofold good4 ,one is         
connected with the act of knowledge     
itself2 and this good pertains to the   
intellectual virtues1 and consists in   
man having a true estimate about each   
thing4 ,the other good pertains to the  
act of the appetitive power1 and        
consists in man's appetite being        
directed aright in applying the         
cognitive power in this or that way to  
this or that thing4 ,and this belongs to
 the virtue of seriousness4 ,wherefore  

it is reckoned among the moral virtues4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher   
says 7,ethic4 ii1 #ic7 in order to be   
virtuous we must avoid those things to  
which we are most naturally inclined4   
,hence it is that1 since nature inclines
 us chiefly to fear dangers of death1   
and to seek pleasures of the flesh1     
fortitude is chiefly commended for a    
certain steadfast perseverance against  
such dangers1 and temperance for a      
certain restraint from pleasures of the 
flesh4 ,but as regards knowledge1 man   
has contrary inclinations4 ,for on the  
part of the soul1 he is inclined to     
desire knowledge of things2 and so it   
behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy 
restraint on this desire1 lest he seek  
knowledge immoderately3 whereas on the  
part of his bodily nature1 man is       
inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking
 knowledge4 ,accordingly1 as regards the
 first inclination studiousness is a    
kind of restraint1 and it is in this    
sense that it is reckoned a part of     

temperance4 ,but as to the second       
inclination1 this virtue derives its    
praise from a certain keenness of       
interest in seeking knowledge of things2
 and from this it takes its name4 ,the  
former is more essential to this virtue 
than the latter3 since the desire to    
know directly regards knowledge1 to     
which studiousness is directed1 whereas 
the trouble of learning is an obstacle  
to knowledge1 wherefore it is regarded  
by this virtue indirectly1 as by that   
which removes an obstacle4   ,,question 
#afg  ,,of ,,curiosity 7,in ,two        
,articles7  ,we must next consider      
curiosity1 under which head there are   
two points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether   
the vice of curiosity can regard        
intellective knowledge8  7#b7 ,whether  
it is about sensitive knowledge8        
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afg1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,curiosity ,can ,be  
,about ,intellective ,knowledge8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
curiosity cannot be about intellective  

knowledge4 ,because1 according to the   
,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #f71 there can
 be no mean and extremes in things which
 are essentially good4 ,now intellective
 knowledge is essentially good3 because 
man's perfection would seem to consist  
in his intellect being reduced from     
potentiality to act1 and this is done by
 the knowledge of truth4 ,for ,dionysius
 says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the good of 
the human soul is to be in accordance   
with reason1 whose perfection consists  
in knowing the truth4 ,therefore the    
vice of curiosity cannot be about       
intellective knowledge4  ,obj4 #b3      
,further1 that which makes man like to  
,god1 and which he receives from ,god1  
cannot be an evil4 ,now all abundance of
 knowledge is from ,god1 according to   
,ecclus4 #a3a1 ,all wisdom is from the  
,lord ,god1 and ,wis4 #g3ag1 ,he hath   
given me the true knowledge of things   
that are1 to know the disposition of the
 whole world1 and the virtues of the    
elements1 etc4 ,again1 by knowing the   

truth man is likened to ,god1 since all 
things are naked and open to ,his eyes  
7,heb4 #d3ac71 and the ,lord is a ,god  
of all knowledge 7#a ,kings #b3c74      
,therefore however abundant knowledge of
 truth may be1 it is not evil but good4 
,now the desire of good is not sinful4  
,therefore the vice of curiosity cannot 
be about the intellective knowledge of  
truth4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the vice 
of curiosity can be about any kind of   
intellective knowledge1 it would be     
chiefly about the philosophical         
sciences4 ,but1 seemingly1 there is no  
sin in being intent on them3 for ,jerome
 says 7,super ,daniel #a3h73 ,those who 
refused to partake of the king's meat   
and wine1 lest they should be defiled1  
if they had considered the wisdom and   
teaching of the ,babylonians to be      
sinful1 would never have consented to   
learn that which was unlawful3 and      
,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4   
ii1 #dj7 that if the philosophers made  
any true statements1 we must claim them 

for our own use1 as from unjust         
possessors4 ,therefore curiosity about  
intellective knowledge cannot be sinful4
  ,on the contrary1 ,jerome 99,comment4 
in ,ep4 ad ,ephes4 iv1 #ag says3 ,is it 
not evident that a man who day and night
 wrestles with the dialectic art1 the   
student of natural science whose gaze   
pierces the heavens1 walks in vanity of 
understanding and darkness of mind8 ,now
 vanity of understanding and darkness of
 mind are sinful4 ,therefore curiosity  
about intellective sciences may be      
sinful4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,q4 #aff1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b7         
studiousness is directly1 not about     
knowledge itself1 but about the desire  
and study in the pursuit of knowledge4  
,now we must judge differently of the   
knowledge itself of truth1 and of the   
desire and study in the pursuit of the  
knowledge of truth4 ,for the knowledge  
of truth1 strictly speaking1 is good1   
but it may be evil accidentally1 by     
reason of some result1 either because   

one takes pride in knowing the truth1   
according to #a ,cor4 #h3a1 ,knowledge  
puffeth up1 or because one uses the     
knowledge of truth in order to sin4  ,on
 the other hand1 the desire or study in 
pursuing the knowledge of truth may be  
right or wrong4 ,first1 when one tends  
by his study to the knowledge of truth  
as having evil accidentally annexed to  
it1 for instance those who study to know
 the truth that they may take pride in  
their knowledge4 ,hence ,augustine says 
7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4 #ba73 ,some there   
are who forsaking virtue1 and ignorant  
of what ,god is1 and of the majesty of  
that nature which ever remains the same1
 imagine they are doing something great1
 if with surpassing curiosity and       
keenness they explore the whole mass of 
this body which we call the world4 ,so  
great a pride is thus begotten1 that one
 would think they dwelt in the very     
heavens about which they argue4 ,in like
 manner1 those who study to learn       
something in order to sin are engaged in

 a sinful study1 according to the saying
 of ,jer4 #i3e1 ,they have taught their 
tongue to speak lies1 they have labored 
to commit iniquity4  ,secondly1 there   
may be sin by reason of the appetite or 
study directed to the learning of truth 
being itself inordinate2 and this in    
four ways4 ,first1 when a man is        
withdrawn by a less profitable study    
from a study that is an obligation      
incumbent on him2 hence ,jerome says    
99,epist4 xxi ad ,damas3 ,we see priests
 forsaking the gospels and the prophets1
 reading stage-plays1 and singing the   
love songs of pastoral idylls4          
,secondly1 when a man studies to learn  
of one1 by whom it is unlawful to be    
taught1 as in the case of those who seek
 to know the future through the demons4 
,this is superstitious curiosity1 of    
which ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4
 #d73 ,maybe1 the philosophers were     
debarred from the faith by their sinful 
curiosity in seeking knowledge from the 
demons4  ,thirdly1 when a man desires to

 know the truth about creatures1 without
 referring his knowledge to its due end1
 namely1 the knowledge of ,god4 ,hence  
,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #bi7 
that in studying creatures1 we must not 
be moved by empty and perishable        
curiosity2 but we should ever mount     
towards immortal and abiding things4    
,fourthly1 when a man studies to know   
the truth above the capacity of his own 
intelligence1 since by so doing men     
easily fall into error3 wherefore it is 
written 7,ecclus4 #c3bb73 ,seek not the 
things that are too high for thee1 and  
search not into things above thy ability
 4 4 4 and in many of ,his works be not 
curious1 and further on 7,ecclus4       
#c3bf71 ,for 4 4 4 the suspicion of them
 hath deceived many1 and hath detained  
their minds in vanity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,man's good consists in the knowledge  
of truth2 yet man's sovereign good      
consists1 not in the knowledge of any   
truth1 but in the perfect knowledge of  
the sovereign truth1 as the ,philosopher

 states 7,ethic4 x1 #g1 #h74 ,hence     
there may be sin in the knowledge of    
certain truths1 in so far as the desire 
of such knowledge is not directed in due
 manner to the knowledge of the         
sovereign truth1 wherein supreme        
happiness consists4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,although this argument shows that the  
knowledge of truth is good in itself1   
this does not prevent a man from        
misusing the knowledge of truth for an  
evil purpose1 or from desiring the      
knowledge of truth inordinately1 since  
even the desire for good should be      
regulated in due manner4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,the study of philosophy is in      
itself lawful and commendable1 on       
account of the truth which the          
philosophers acquired through ,god      
revealing it to them1 as stated in ,rom4
 #a3ai4 ,since1 however1 certain        
philosophers misuse the truth in order  
to assail the faith1 the ,apostle says  
7,col4 #b3h73 ,beware lest any man cheat
 you by philosophy and vain deceit1     

according to the tradition of men 4 4 4 
and not according to ,christ3 and       
,dionysius says 7,ep4 vii ad ,polycarp47
 of certain philosophers that they make 
an unholy use of divine things against  
that which is divine1 and by divine     
wisdom strive to destroy the worship of 
,god4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #afg1 ,art4 #b  ,whether the ,vice  
of ,curiosity ,is ,about ,sensitive     
,knowledge8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that the vice of curiosity is not  
about sensitive knowledge4 ,for just as 
some things are known by the sense of   
sight1 so too are some things known by  
the senses of touch and taste4 ,now the 
vice concerned about objects of touch   
and taste is not curiosity but lust or  
gluttony4 ,therefore seemingly neither  
is the vice of curiosity about things   
known by the sight4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 curiosity would seem to refer to       
watching games2 wherefore ,augustine    
says 7,confess4 vi1 #h7 that when a fall
 occurred in the fight1 a mighty cry of 

the whole people struck him strongly1   
and overcome by curiosity ,alypius      
opened his eyes4 ,but it does not seem  
to be sinful to watch games1 because it 
gives pleasure on account of the        
representation1 wherein man takes a     
natural delight1 as the ,philosopher    
states 7,poet4 vi74 ,therefore the vice 
of curiosity is not about the knowledge 
of sensible objects4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 it would seem to pertain to   
curiosity to inquire into our neighbor's
 actions1 as ,bede observes 99,comment4 
in #a ,john #b3af4 ,now1 seemingly1 it  
is not a sin to inquire into the actions
 of others1 because according to        
,ecclus4 #ag3ab1 ,god gave to every one 
of them commandment concerning his      
neighbor4 ,therefore the vice of        
curiosity does not regard the knowledge 
of such like particular sensible        
objects4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine  
says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #ch7 that       
concupiscence of the eyes makes men     
curious4 ,now according to ,bede        

7,comment4 in #a ,john #b3af7           
concupiscence of the eyes refers not    
only to the learning of magic arts1 but 
also to sight-seeing1 and to the        
discovery and dispraise of our          
neighbor's faults1 and all these are    
particular objects of sense4 ,therefore 
since concupiscence of the eves is a    
sin1 even as concupiscence of the flesh 
and pride of life1 which are members of 
the same division 7#a ,john #b3af71 it  
seems that the vice of curiosity is     
about the knowledge of sensible things4 
,i answer that1 ,the knowledge of       
sensible things is directed to two      
things4 ,for in the first place1 both in
 man and in other animals1 it is        
directed to the upkeep of the body1     
because by knowledge of this kind1 man  
and other animals avoid what is harmful 
to them1 and seek those things that are 
necessary for the body's sustenance4 ,in
 the second place1 it is directed in a  
manner special to man1 to intellective  
knowledge1 whether speculative or       

practical4 ,accordingly to employ study 
for the purpose of knowing sensible     
things may be sinful in two ways4       
,first1 when the sensitive knowledge is 
not directed to something useful1 but   
turns man away from some useful         
consideration4 ,hence ,augustine says   
7,confess4 x1 #ce71 ,i go no more to see
 a dog coursing a hare in the circus2   
but in the open country1 if ,i happen to
 be passing1 that coursing haply will   
distract me from some weighty thought1  
and draw me after it 4 4 4 and unless   
,thou1 having made me see my weakness1  
didst speedily admonish me1 ,i become   
foolishly dull4 ,secondly1 when the     
knowledge of sensible things is directed
 to something harmful1 as looking on a  
woman is directed to lust3 even so the  
busy inquiry into other people's actions
 is directed to detraction4 ,on the     
other hand1 if one be ordinately intent 
on the knowledge of sensible things by  
reason of the necessity of sustaining   
nature1 or for the sake of the study of 

intelligible truth1 this studiousness   
about the knowledge of sensible things  
is virtuous4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,lust and
 gluttony are about pleasures arising   
from the use of objects of touch1       
whereas curiosity is about pleasures    
arising from the knowledge acquired     
through all the senses4 ,according to   
,augustine 7,confess4 x1 #ce7 it is     
called concupiscence of the eyes because
 the sight is the sense chiefly used for
 obtaining knowledge1 so that all       
sensible things are said to be seen1 and
 as he says further on3 ,by this it may 
more evidently be discerned wherein     
pleasure and wherein curiosity is the   
object of the senses2 for pleasure      
seeketh objects beautiful1 melodious1   
fragrant1 savory1 soft2 but curiosity1  
for trial's sake1 seeketh even the      
contraries of these1 not for the sake of
 suffering annoyance1 but out of the    
lust of experiment and knowledge4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sight-seeing becomes  
sinful1 when it renders a man prone to  

the vices of lust and cruelty on account
 of things he sees represented4 ,hence  
,chrysostom says 99,hom4 vi in ,matth4  
that such sights make men adulterers and
 shameless4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one may  
watch other people's actions or inquire 
into them1 with a good intent1 either   
for one's own good--that is in order to 
be encouraged to better deeds by the    
deeds of our neighbor--or for our       
neighbor's good--that is in order to    
correct him1 if he do anything wrong1   
according to the rule of charity and the
 duty of one's position4 ,this is       
praiseworthy1 according to ,heb4 #aj3bd1
 ,consider one another to provoke unto  
charity and to good works4 ,but to      
observe our neighbor's faults with the  
intention of looking down upon them1 or 
of detracting them1 or even with no     
further purpose than that of disturbing 
them1 is sinful3 hence it is written    
7,prov4 #bd3ae71 ,lie not in wait1 nor  
seek after wickedness in the house of   
the just1 nor spoil his rest4           

,,question #afh  ,,of ,,modesty ,,as    
,,consisting ,,in ,,the ,,outward       
,,movements ,,of ,,the ,,body 7,in ,four
 ,articles7  ,we must next consider     
modesty as consisting in the outward    
movements of the body1 and under this   
head there are four points of inquiry3  
7#a7 ,whether there can be virtue and   
vice in the outward movements of the    
body that are done seriously8  7#b7     
,whether there can be a virtue about    
playful actions8  7#c7 ,of the sin      
consisting in excess of play2  7#d7 ,of 
the sin consisting in lack of play4     
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afh1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,any ,virtue ,regards
 the ,outward ,movements of the ,body8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no   
virtue regards the outward movements of 
the body4 ,for every virtue pertains to 
the spiritual beauty of the soul1       
according to ,ps4 #dd3ad1 ,all the glory
 of the king's daughter is within1 and a
 gloss adds1 namely1 in the conscience4 
,now the movements of the body are not  

within1 but without4 ,therefore there   
can be no virtue about them4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 ,virtues are not in us by     
nature1 as the ,philosopher states      
7,ethic4 ii1 #a74 ,but outward bodily   
movements are in man by nature1 since it
 is by nature that some are quick1 and  
some slow of movement1 and the same     
applies to other differences of outward 
movements4 ,therefore there is no virtue
 about movements of this kind4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 every moral virtue is     
either about actions directed to another
 person1 as justice1 or about passions1 
as temperance and fortitude4 ,now       
outward bodily movements are not        
directed to another person1 nor are they
 passions4 ,therefore no virtue is      
connected with them4  ,obj4 #d3         
,further1 study should be applied to all
 works of virtue1 as stated above 7,q4  
#aff1 ,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #a2 ,a4 #b1 ad #a74 
,now it is censurable to apply study to 
the ordering of one's outward movements3
 for ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #ah73

 ,a becoming gait is one that reflects  
the carriage of authority1 has the tread
 of gravity1 and the foot-print of      
tranquillity3 yet so that there be      
neither study nor affectation1 but      
natural and artless movement4 ,therefore
 seemingly there is no virtue about the 
style of outward movements4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,the beauty of honesty 99,cf4 
,q4 #ade1 ,a4 #a pertains to virtue4    
,now the style of outward movements     
pertains to the beauty of honesty4 ,for 
,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #ah73 ,the
 sound of the voice and the gesture of  
the body are distasteful to me1 whether 
they be unduly soft and nerveless1 or   
coarse and boorish4 ,let nature be our  
model2 her reflection is gracefulness of
 conduct and beauty of honesty4         
,therefore there is a virtue about the  
style of outward movement4  ,i answer   
that1 ,moral virtue consists in the     
things pertaining to man being directed 
by his reason4 ,now it is manifest that 
the outward movements of man are        

dirigible by reason1 since the outward  
members are set in motion at the command
 of reason4 ,hence it is evident that   
there is a moral virtue concerned with  
the direction of these movements4  ,now 
the direction of these movements may be 
considered from a twofold standpoint4   
,first1 in respect of fittingness to the
 person2 secondly1 in respect of        
fittingness to externals1 whether       
persons1 business1 or place4 ,hence     
,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #ah73     
,beauty of conduct consists in becoming 
behavior towards others1 according to   
their sex and person1 and this regards  
the first4 ,as to the second1 he adds3  
,this is the best way to order our      
behavior1 this is the polish becoming to
 every action4  ,hence ,andronicus 99,de
 ,affectibus ascribes two things to     
these outward movements3 namely taste   
7ornatus7 which regards what is becoming
 to the person1 wherefore he says that  
it is the knowledge of what is becoming 
in movement and behavior2 and           

methodicalness 7bona ordinatio7 which   
regards what is becoming to the business
 in hand1 and to one's surroundings1    
wherefore he calls it the practical     
knowledge of separation1 i4e4 of the    
distinction of acts4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,outward movements are signs of the     
inward disposition1 according to        
,ecclus4 #ai3bg1 ,the attire of the     
body1 and the laughter of the teeth1 and
 the gait of the man1 show what he is2  
and ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #ah7  
that the habit of mind is seen in the   
gesture of the body1 and that the body's
 movement is an index of the soul4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although it is from   
natural disposition that a man is       
inclined to this or that style of       
outward movement1 nevertheless what is  
lacking to nature can be supplied by the
 efforts of reason4 ,hence ,ambrose says
 7,de ,offic4 i1 #ah73 ,let nature guide
 the movement3 and if nature fail in any
 respect1 surely effort will supply the 
defect4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated 7ad

 #a7 outward movements are indications  
of the inward disposition1 and this     
regards chiefly the passions of the     
soul4 ,wherefore ,ambrose says 7,de     
,offic4 i1 #ah7 that from these things1 
i4e4 the outward movements1 the man that
 lies hidden in our hearts is esteemed  
to be either frivolous1 or boastful1 or 
impure1 or on the other hand sedate1    
steady1 pure1 and free from blemish4 ,it
 is moreover from our outward movements 
that other men form their judgment about
 us1 according to ,ecclus4 #ai3bf1 ,a   
man is known by his look1 and a wise    
man1 when thou meetest him1 is known by 
his countenance4 ,hence moderation of   
outward movements is directed somewhat  
to other persons1 according to the      
saying of ,augustine in his ,rule 7,ep4 
ccxi71 ,in all your movements1 let      
nothing be done to offend the eye of    
another1 but only that which is becoming
 to the holiness of your state4         
,wherefore the moderation of outward    
movements may be reduced to two virtues1

 which the ,philosopher mentions in     
,ethic4 iv1 #f1 #g4 ,for1 in so far as  
by outward movements we are directed to 
other persons1 the moderation of our    
outward movements belongs to            
friendliness or affability 99,cf4 ,q4   
#aad1 ,a4 #a4 ,this regards pleasure or 
pain which may arise from words or deeds
 in reference to others with whom a man 
comes in contact4 ,and1 in so far as    
outward movements are signs of our      
inward disposition1 their moderation    
belongs to the virtue of truthfulness   
99,cf4 ,q4 #i1 whereby a man1 by word   
and deed1 shows himself to be such as he
 is inwardly4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,it is  
censurable to study the style of one's  
outward movements1 by having recourse to
 pretense in them1 so that they do not  
agree with one's inward disposition4    
,nevertheless it behooves one to study  
them1 so that if they be in any way     
inordinate1 this may be corrected4      
,hence ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1    
#ah73 ,let them be without artifice1 but

 not without correction4   ,,second     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afh1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,there ,can ,be a ,virtue      
,about ,games8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that there cannot be a virtue     
about games4 ,for ,ambrose says 7,de    
,offic4 i1 #bc73 ,our ,lord said3 ',woe 
to you who laugh1 for you shall weep4'  
,wherefore ,i consider that all1 and not
 only excessive1 games should be        
avoided4 ,now that which can be done    
virtuously is not to be avoided         
altogether4 ,therefore there cannot be a
 virtue about games4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 ,virtue is that which ,god    
forms in us1 without us1 as stated above
 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d74 ,now       
,chrysostom says 99,hom4 vi in ,matth43 
,it is not ,god1 but the devil1 that is 
the author of fun4 ,listen to what      
happened to those who played3 ',the     
people sat down to eat and drink1 and   
they rose up to play4' ,therefore there 
can be no virtue about games4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 the ,philosopher says        

7,ethic4 x1 #f7 that playful actions are
 not directed to something else4 ,but it
 is a requisite of virtue that the agent
 in choosing should direct his action to
 something else1 as the ,philosopher    
states 7,ethic4 ii1 #d74 ,therefore     
there can be no virtue about games4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,music4 
ii1 #ae73 ,i pray thee1 spare thyself at
 times3 for it becomes a wise man       
sometimes to relax the high pressure of 
his attention to work4 ,now this        
relaxation of the mind from work        
consists in playful words or deeds4     
,therefore it becomes a wise and        
virtuous man to have recourse to such   
things at times4 ,moreover the          
,philosopher 99,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iv1 #h   
assigns to games the virtue of          
eutrapelia1 which we may call           
pleasantness4  ,i answer that1 ,just as 
man needs bodily rest for the body's    
refreshment1 because he cannot always be
 at work1 since his power is finite and 
equal to a certain fixed amount of      

labor1 so too is it with his soul1 whose
 power is also finite and equal to a    
fixed amount of work4 ,consequently when
 he goes beyond his measure in a certain
 work1 he is oppressed and becomes      
weary1 and all the more since when the  
soul works1 the body is at work         
likewise1 in so far as the intellective 
soul employs forces that operate through
 bodily organs4 ,now sensible goods are 
connatural to man1 and therefore1 when  
the soul arises above sensibles1 through
 being intent on the operations of      
reason1 there results in consequence a  
certain weariness of soul1 whether the  
operations with which it is occupied be 
those of the practical or of the        
speculative reason4 ,yet this weariness 
is greater if the soul be occupied with 
the work of contemplation1 since thereby
 it is raised higher above sensible     
things2 although perhaps certain outward
 works of the practical reason entail a 
greater bodily labor4 ,in either case1  
however1 one man is more soul-wearied   

than another1 according as he is more   
intensely occupied with works of reason4
 ,now just as weariness of the body is  
dispelled by resting the body1 so       
weariness of the soul must needs be     
remedied by resting the soul3 and the   
soul's rest is pleasure1 as stated above
 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #ca1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,consequently1 the
 remedy for weariness of soul must needs
 consist in the application of some     
pleasure1 by slackening the tension of  
the reason's study4 ,thus in the        
,conferences of the ,fathers 7xxiv1     
#ba71 it is related of ,blessed ,john   
the ,evangelist1 that when some people  
were scandalized on finding him playing 
together with his disciples1 he is said 
to have told one of them who carried a  
bow to shoot an arrow4 ,and when the    
latter had done this several times1 he  
asked him whether he could do it        
indefinitely1 and the man answered that 
if he continued doing it1 the bow would 
break4 ,whence the ,blessed ,john drew  

the inference that in like manner man's 
mind would break if its tension were    
never relaxed4  ,now such like words or 
deeds wherein nothing further is sought 
than the soul's delight1 are called     
playful or humorous4 ,hence it is       
necessary at times to make use of them1 
in order to give rest1 as it were1 to   
the soul4 ,this is in agreement with the
 statement of the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 
iv1 #h7 that in the intercourse of this 
life there is a kind of rest that is    
associated with games3 and consequently 
it is sometimes necessary to make use of
 such things4  ,nevertheless it would   
seem that in this matter there are three
 points which require especial caution4 
,the first and chief is that the        
pleasure in question should not be      
sought in indecent or injurious deeds or
 words4 ,wherefore ,tully says 7,de     
,offic4 i1 #bi7 that one kind of joke is
 discourteous1 insolent1 scandalous1    
obscene4 ,another thing to be observed  
is that one lose not the balance of     

one's mind altogether4 ,hence ,ambrose  
says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #bj73 ,we should   
beware lest1 when we seek relaxation of 
mind1 we destroy all that harmony which 
is the concord of good works3 and ,tully
 says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #bi71 that1 just  
as we do not allow children to enjoy    
absolute freedom in their games1 but    
only that which is consistent with good 
behavior1 so our very fun should reflect
 something of an upright mind4 ,thirdly1
 we must be careful1 as in all other    
human actions1 to conform ourselves to  
persons1 time1 and place1 and take due  
account of other circumstances1 so that 
our fun befit the hour and the man1 as  
,tully says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #bi74  ,now 
these things are directed according to  
the rule of reason3 and a habit that    
operates according to reason is virtue4 
,therefore there can be a virtue about  
games4 ,the ,philosopher gives it the   
name of wittiness 7eutrapelia71 and a   
man is said to be pleasant through      
having a happy turn99 of mind1 whereby  

he gives his words and deeds a cheerful 
turn3 and inasmuch as this virtue       
restrains a man from immoderate fun1 it 
is comprised under modesty4             
99,eutrapelia is derived from trepein   
to turn4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated   
above1 fun should fit with business and 
persons2 wherefore ,tully says 7,de     
,invent4 ,rhet4 i1 #ag7 that when the   
audience is weary1 it will be useful for
 the speaker to try something novel or  
amusing1 provided that joking be not    
incompatible with the gravity of the    
subject4 ,now the sacred doctrine is    
concerned with things of the greatest   
moment1 according to ,prov4 #h3f1 ,hear1
 for ,i will speak of great things4     
,wherefore ,ambrose does not altogether 
exclude fun from human speech1 but from 
the sacred doctrine2 hence he begins by 
saying3 ,although jokes are at times    
fitting and pleasant1 nevertheless they 
are incompatible with the ecclesiastical
 rule2 since how can we have recourse to
 things which are not to be found in    

,holy ,writ8  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this    
saying of ,chrysostom refers to the     
inordinate use of fun1 especially by    
those who make the pleasure of games    
their end2 of whom it is written 7,wis4 
#ae3ab73 ,they have accounted our life a
 pastime4 ,against these ,tully says    
7,de ,offic4 i1 #bi73 ,we are so        
begotten by nature that we appear to be 
made not for play and fun1 but rather   
for hardships1 and for occupations of   
greater gravity and moment4  ,reply     
,obj4 #c3 ,playful actions themselves   
considered in their species are not     
directed to an end3 but the pleasure    
derived from such actions is directed to
 the recreation and rest of the soul1   
and accordingly if this be done with    
moderation1 it is lawful to make use of 
fun4 ,hence ,tully says 7,de ,offic4 i1 
#bi73 ,it is indeed lawful to make use  
of play and fun1 but in the same way as 
we have recourse to sleep and other     
kinds of rest1 then only when we have   
done our duty by grave and serious      

matters4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #afh1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,there ,can
 ,be ,sin in the ,excess of ,play8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there
 cannot be sin in the excess of play4   
,for that which is an excuse for sin is 
not held to be sinful4 ,now play is     
sometimes an excuse for sin1 for many   
things would be grave sins if they were 
done seriously1 whereas if they be done 
in fun1 are either no sin or but        
slightly sinful4 ,therefore it seems    
that there is no sin in excessive play4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all other vices are 
reducible to the seven capital vices1 as
 ,gregory states 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag74   
,but excess of play does not seem       
reducible to any of the capital vices4  
,therefore it would seem not to be a    
sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 comedians     
especially would seem to exceed in play1
 since they direct their whole life to  
playing4 ,therefore if excess of play   
were a sin1 all actors would be in a    
state of sin2 moreover all those who    

employ them1 as well as those who make  
them any payment1 would sin as          
accomplices of their sin4 ,but this     
would seem untrue2 for it is related in 
the ,lives of the ,fathers 7ii4 #af2    
viii4 #fc7 that is was revealed to the  
,blessed ,paphnutius that a certain     
jester would be with him in the life to 
come4  ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on    
,prov4 #ad3ac1 ,laughter shall be       
mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh 
hold of the end of joy1 remarks3 ,a     
mourning that will last for ever4 ,now  
there is inordinate laughter and        
inordinate joy in excessive play4       
,therefore there is mortal sin therein1 
since mortal sin alone is deserving of  
everlasting mourning4  ,i answer that1  
,in all things dirigible according to   
reason1 the excessive is that which goes
 beyond1 and the deficient is that which
 falls short of the rule of reason4 ,now
 it has been stated 7,a4 #b7 that       
playful or jesting words or deeds are   
dirigible according to reason4          

,wherefore excessive play is that which 
goes beyond the rule of reason3 and this
 happens in two ways4 ,first1 on account
 of the very species of the acts        
employed for the purpose of fun1 and    
this kind of jesting1 according to      
,tully 7,de ,offic4 i1 #bi71 is stated  
to be discourteous1 insolent1           
scandalous1 and obscene1 when to wit a  
man1 for the purpose of jesting1 employs
 indecent words or deeds1 or such as are
 injurious to his neighbor1 these being 
of themselves mortal sins4 ,and thus it 
is evident that excessive play is a     
mortal sin4  ,secondly1 there may be    
excess in play1 through lack of due     
circumstances3 for instance when people 
make use of fun at undue times or       
places1 or out of keeping with the      
matter in hand1 or persons4 ,this may be
 sometimes a mortal sin on account of   
the strong attachment to play1 when a   
man prefers the pleasure he derives     
therefrom to the love of ,god1 so as to 
be willing to disobey a commandment of  

,god or of the ,church rather than      
forego1 such like amusements4           
,sometimes1 however1 it is a venial sin1
 for instance where a man is not so     
attached to amusement as to be willing  
for its sake to do anything in          
disobedience to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,certain things are sinful on account of
 the intention alone1 because they are  
done in order to injure someone4 ,such  
an intention is excluded by their being 
done in fun1 the intention of which is  
to please1 not to injure3 in these cases
 fun excuses from sin1 or diminishes it4
 ,other things1 however1 are sins       
according to their species1 such as     
murder1 fornication1 and the like3 and  
fun is no excuse for these2 in fact they
 make fun scandalous and obscene4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,excessive play        
pertains to senseless mirth1 which      
,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag7 calls a    
daughter of gluttony4 ,wherefore it is  
written 7,ex4 #cb3f73 ,the people sat   
down to eat and drink1 and they rose up 

to play4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated   
7,a4 #b71 play is necessary for the     
intercourse of human life4 ,now whatever
 is useful to human intercourse may have
 a lawful employment ascribed to it4    
,wherefore the occupation of            
play-actors1 the object of which is to  
cheer the heart of man1 is not unlawful 
in itself2 nor are they in a state of   
sin provided that their playing be      
moderated1 namely that they use no      
unlawful words or deeds in order to     
amuse1 and that they do not introduce   
play into undue matters and seasons4    
,and although in human affairs1 they    
have no other occupation in reference to
 other men1 nevertheless in reference to
 themselves1 and to ,god1 they perform  
other actions both serious and virtuous1
 such as prayer and the moderation of   
their own passions and operations1 while
 sometimes they give alms to the poor4  
,wherefore those who maintain them in   
moderation do not sin but act justly1 by
 rewarding them for their services4 ,on 

the other hand1 if a man spends too much
 on such persons1 or maintains those    
comedians who practice unlawful mirth1  
he sins as encouraging them in their    
sin4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,tract4 c4 
in ,joan47 that to give one's property  
to comedians is a great sin1 not a      
virtue2 unless by chance some play-actor
 were in extreme need1 in which case one
 would have to assist him1 for ,ambrose 
says 7,de ,offic4 99,quoted in ,canon   
,pasce1 dist4 #hf73 ,feed him that dies 
of hunger2 for whenever thou canst save 
a man by feeding him1 if thou hast not  
fed him1 thou hast slain him4   ,,fourth
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afh1 ,art4 #d
  ,whether ,there ,is a ,sin in ,lack of
 ,mirth8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that there is no sin in lack of mirth4  
,for no sin is prescribed to a penitent4
 ,but ,augustine speaking of a penitent 
says 7,de ,vera et ,falsa ,poenit4 #ae7 
99,spurious3 ,let him refrain from games
 and the sights of the world1 if he     
wishes to obtain the grace of a full    

pardon4 ,therefore there is no sin in   
lack of mirth4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no  
sin is included in the praise given to  
holy men4 ,but some persons are praised 
for having refrained from mirth2 for it 
is written 7,jer4 #ae3ag73 ,i sat not in
 the assembly of jesters1 and 7,tobias  
#c3ag73 ,never have ,i joined myself    
with them that play2 neither have ,i    
made myself partaker with them that walk
 in lightness4 ,therefore there can be  
no sin in the lack of mirth4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 ,andronicus counts austerity  
to be one of the virtues1 and he        
describes it as a habit whereby a man   
neither gives nor receives the pleasures
 of conversation4 ,now this pertains to 
the lack of mirth4 ,therefore the lack  
of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful4
  ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher   
7,ethic4 ii1 #g2 iv1 #h7 reckons the    
lack of mirth to be a vice4  ,i answer  
that1 ,in human affairs whatever is     
against reason is a sin4 ,now it is     
against reason for a man to be          

burdensome to others1 by offering no    
pleasure to others1 and by hindering    
their enjoyment4 ,wherefore ,seneca     
99,martin of ,braga1 ,formula ,vitae    
,honestae3 cap4 ,de ,continentia says   
7,de ,quat4 ,virt41 cap4 ,de            
,continentia73 ,let your conduct be     
guided by wisdom so that no one will    
think you rude1 or despise you as a cad4
 ,now a man who is without mirth1 not   
only is lacking in playful speech1 but  
is also burdensome to others1 since he  
is deaf to the moderate mirth of others4
 ,consequently they are vicious1 and are
 said to be boorish or rude1 as the     
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 iv1 #h74   
,since1 however1 mirth is useful for the
 sake of the rest and pleasures it      
affords2 and since1 in human life1      
pleasure and rest are not in quest for  
their own sake1 but for the sake of     
operation1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #f1  
it follows that lack of mirth is less   
sinful than excess thereof4 ,hence the  
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #aj73 ,we

 should make few friends for the sake of
 pleasure1 since but little sweetness   
suffices to season life1 just as little 
salt suffices for our meat4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,mirth is forbidden the       
penitent because he is called upon to   
mourn for his sins4 ,nor does this imply
 a vice in default1 because this very   
diminishment of mirth in them is in     
accordance with reason4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,jeremias speaks there in accordance
 with the times1 the state of which     
required that man should mourn2         
wherefore he adds3 ,i sat alone1 because
 ,thou hast filled me with threats4 ,the
 words of ,tobias #c refer to excessive 
mirth2 and this is evident from his     
adding3 ,neither have ,i made myself    
partaker with them that walk in         
lightness4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,austerity1
 as a virtue1 does not exclude all      
pleasures1 but only such as are         
excessive and inordinate2 wherefore it  
would seem to pertain to affability1    
which the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #f7 

calls friendliness1 or eutrapelia1      
otherwise wittiness4 ,nevertheless he   
names and defines it thus in respect of 
its agreement with temperance1 to which 
it belongs to restrain pleasure4        
,,question #afi  ,,of ,,modesty ,,in    
,,the ,,outward ,,apparel 7,in ,two     
,articles7  ,we must now consider       
modesty as connected with the outward   
apparel1 and under this head there are  
two points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether   
there can be virtue and vice in         
connection with outward apparel8  7#b7  
,whether women sin mortally by excessive
 adornment8   ,,first ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afi1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,there ,can ,be ,virtue and ,vice in    
,connection with ,outward ,apparel8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there
 cannot be virtue and vice in connection
 with outward apparel4 ,for outward     
adornment does not belong to us by      
nature1 wherefore it varies according to
 different times and places4 ,hence     
,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4   

iii1 #ab7 that among the ancient ,romans
 it was scandalous for one to wear a    
cloak with sleeves and reaching to the  
ankles1 whereas now it is scandalous for
 anyone hailing from a reputable place  
to be without them4 ,now according to   
the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #a7 there 
is in us a natural aptitude for the     
virtues4 ,therefore there is no virtue  
or vice about such things4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 if there were virtue and vice 
in connection with outward attire1      
excess in this matter would be sinful4  
,now excess in outward attire is not    
apparently sinful1 since even the       
ministers of the altar use most precious
 vestments in the sacred ministry4      
,likewise it would seem not to be sinful
 to be lacking in this1 for it is said  
in praise of certain people 7,heb4      
#aa3cg73 ,they wandered about in        
sheepskins and in goatskins4 ,therefore 
it seems that there cannot be virtue and
 vice in this matter4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 every virtue is either        

theological1 or moral1 or intellectual4 
,now an intellectual virtue is not      
conversant with matter of this kind1    
since it is a perfection regarding the  
knowledge of truth4 ,nor is there a     
theological virtue connected therewith1 
since that has ,god for its object2 nor 
are any of the moral virtues enumerated 
by the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #g71   
connected with it4 ,therefore it seems  
that there cannot be virtue and vice in 
connection with this kind of attire4    
,on the contrary1 ,honesty 99,cf4 ,q4   
#ade pertains to virtue4 ,now a certain 
honesty is observed in the outward      
apparel2 for ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 
i1 #ai73 ,the body should be bedecked   
naturally and without affectation1 with 
simplicity1 with negligence rather than 
nicety1 not with costly and dazzling    
apparel1 but with ordinary clothes1 so  
that nothing be lacking to honesty and  
necessity1 yet nothing be added to      
increase its beauty4 ,therefore there   
can be virtue and vice in the outward   

attire4  ,i answer that1 ,it is not in  
the outward things themselves which man 
uses1 that there is vice1 but on the    
part of man who uses them immoderately4 
,this lack of moderation occurs in two  
ways4 ,first1 in comparison with the    
customs of those among whom one lives2  
wherefore ,augustine says 7,confess4    
iii1 #h73 ,those offenses which are     
contrary to the customs of men1 are to  
be avoided according to the customs     
generally prevailing1 so that a thing   
agreed upon and confirmed by custom or  
law of any city or nation may not be    
violated at the lawless pleasure of any1
 whether citizen or foreigner4 ,for any 
part1 which harmonizeth not with its    
whole1 is offensive4 ,secondly1 the lack
 of moderation in the use of these      
things may arise from the inordinate    
attachment of the user1 the result being
 that a man sometimes takes too much    
pleasure in using them1 either in       
accordance with the custom of those     
among whom he dwells or contrary to such

 custom4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de    
,doctr4 ,christ4 iii1 #ab73 ,we must    
avoid excessive pleasure in the use of  
things1 for it leads not only wickedly  
to abuse the customs of those among whom
 we dwell1 but frequently to exceed     
their bounds1 so that1 whereas it lay   
hidden1 while under the restraint of    
established morality1 it displays its   
deformity in a most lawless outbreak4   
,in point of excess1 this inordinate    
attachment occurs in three ways4 ,first 
when a man seeks glory from excessive   
attention to dress2 in so far as dress  
and such like things are a kind of      
ornament4 ,hence ,gregory says 7,hom4 xl
 in ,ev473 ,there are some who think    
that attention to finery and costly     
dress is no sin4 ,surely1 if this were  
no fault1 the word of ,god would not say
 so expressly that the rich man who was 
tortured in hell had been clothed in    
purple and fine linen4 ,no one1         
forsooth1 seeks costly apparel 7such1   
namely1 as exceeds his estate7 save for 

vainglory4 ,secondly1 when a man seeks  
sensuous pleasure from excessive        
attention to dress1 in so far as dress  
is directed to the body's comfort4      
,thirdly1 when a man is too solicitous  
99,cf4 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #f in his attention 
to outward apparel4  ,accordingly       
,andronicus 99,de ,affectibus reckons   
three virtues in connection with outward
 attire2 namely humility1 which excludes
 the seeking of glory1 wherefore he says
 that humility is the habit of avoiding 
excessive expenditure and parade2       
contentment 99,cf4 ,q4 #adc1 ,obj4 #d1  
which excludes the seeking of sensuous  
pleasure1 wherefore he says that        
contentedness is the habit that makes a 
man satisfied with what is suitable1 and
 enables him to determine what is       
becoming in his manner of life          
7according to the saying of the         
,apostle1 #a ,tim4 #f3h73 ,having food  
and wherewith to be covered1 with these 
let us be content2--and simplicity1     
which excludes excessive solicitude     

about such things1 wherefore he says    
that simplicity is a habit that makes a 
man contented with what he has4  ,in the
 point of deficiency there may be       
inordinate attachment in two ways4      
,first1 through a man's neglect to give 
the requisite study or trouble to the   
use of outward apparel4 ,wherefore the  
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #g7 that
 it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's
 cloak trail on the ground to avoid the 
trouble of lifting it up4 ,secondly1 by 
seeking glory from the very lack of     
attention to outward attire4 ,hence     
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte ii1 #ab7 that not only the glare 
and pomp of outward things1 but even    
dirt and the weeds of mourning may be a 
subject of ostentation1 all the more    
dangerous as being a decoy under the    
guise of ,god's service2 and the        
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #g7 that 
both excess and inordinate defect are a 
subject of ostentation4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,although outward attire does not   

come from nature1 it belongs to natural 
reason to moderate it2 so that we are   
naturally inclined to be the recipients 
of the virtue that moderates outward    
raiment4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who   
are placed in a position of dignity1 or 
again the ministers of the altar1 are   
attired in more costly apparel than     
others1 not for the sake of their own   
glory1 but to indicate the excellence of
 their office or of the ,divine worship3
 wherefore this is not sinful in them4  
,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4     
,christ4 iii1 #ab73 ,whoever uses       
outward things in such a way as to      
exceed the bounds observed by the good  
people among whom he dwells1 either     
signifies something by so doing1 or is  
guilty of sin1 inasmuch as he uses these
 things for sensual pleasure or         
ostentation4  ,likewise there may be sin
 on the part of deficiency3 although it 
is not always a sin to wear coarser     
clothes than other people4 ,for1 if this
 be done through ostentation or pride1  

in order to set oneself above others1 it
 is a sin of superstition2 whereas1 if  
this be done to tame the flesh1 or to   
humble the spirit1 it belongs to the    
virtue of temperance4 ,hence ,augustine 
says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 iii1 #ab73   
,whoever uses transitory things with    
greater restraint than is customary with
 those among whom he dwells1 is either  
temperate or superstitious4 ,especially1
 however1 is the use of coarse raiment  
befitting to those who by word and      
example urge others to repentance1 as   
did the prophets of whom the ,apostle is
 speaking in the passage quoted4        
,wherefore a gloss on ,matt4 #c3d1 says3
 ,he who preaches penance1 wears the    
garb of penance4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this
 outward apparel is an indication of    
man's estate2 wherefore excess1         
deficiency1 and mean therein1 are       
referable to the virtue of truthfulness1
 which the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #g7
 assigns to deeds and words1 which are  
indications of something connected with 

man's estate4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afi1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
the ,adornment of ,women ,is ,devoid of 
,mortal ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that the adornment of women is not 
devoid of mortal sin4 ,for whatever is  
contrary to a precept of the ,divine law
 is a mortal sin4 ,now the adornment of 
women is contrary to a precept of the   
,divine law2 for it is written 7#a ,pet4
 #c3c73 ,whose1 namely women's1         
adorning1 let it not be the outward     
plaiting of the hair1 or the wearing of 
gold1 or the putting on of apparel4     
,wherefore a gloss of ,cyprian says3    
,those who are clothed in silk and      
purple cannot sincerely put on ,christ3 
those who are bedecked with gold and    
pearls and trinkets have forfeited the  
adornments of mind and body4 ,now this  
is not done without a mortal sin4       
,therefore the adornment of women cannot
 be devoid of mortal sin4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 ,cyprian says 7,de ,habit4    
,virg473 ,i hold that not only virgins  

and widows1 but also wives and all women
 without exception1 should be admonished
 that nowise should they deface ,god's  
work and fabric1 the clay that ,he has  
fashioned1 with the aid of yellow       
pigments1 black powders or rouge1 or by 
applying any dye that alters the natural
 features4 ,and afterwards he adds3     
,they lay hands on ,god1 when they      
strive to reform what ,he has formed4   
,this is an assault on the ,divine      
handiwork1 a distortion of the truth4   
,thou shalt not be able to see ,god1    
having no longer the eyes that ,god     
made1 but those the devil has unmade2   
with him shalt thou burn on whose       
account thou art bedecked4 ,but this is 
not due except to mortal sin4 ,therefore
 the adornment of women is not devoid of
 mortal sin4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just  
as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear 
man's clothes1 so is it unbecoming for  
her to adorn herself inordinately4 ,now 
the former is a sin1 for it is written  
7,deut4 #bb3e73 ,a woman shall not be   

clothed with man's apparel1 neither     
shall a man use woman's apparel4        
,therefore it seems that also the       
excessive adornment of women is a mortal
 sin4  ,obj4 #d3 ,on the contrary1 ,if  
this were true it would seem that the   
makers of these means of adornment sin  
mortally4  ,i answer that1 ,as regards  
the adornment of women1 we must bear in 
mind the general statements made above  
7,a4 #a7 concerning outward apparel1 and
 also something special1 namely that a  
woman's apparel may incite men to lust1 
according to ,prov4 #g3aj1 ,behold a    
woman meeteth him in harlot's attire1   
prepared to deceive souls4              
,nevertheless a woman may use means to  
please her husband1 lest through        
despising her he fall into adultery4    
,hence it is written 7#a ,cor4 #g3cd7   
that the woman that is married thinketh 
on the things of the world1 how she may 
please her husband4 ,wherefore if a     
married woman adorn herself in order to 
please her husband she can do this      

without sin4  ,but those women who have 
no husband nor wish to have one1 or who 
are in a state of life inconsistent with
 marriage1 cannot without sin desire to 
give lustful pleasure to those men who  
see them1 because this is to incite them
 to sin4 ,and if indeed they adorn      
themselves with this intention of       
provoking others to lust1 they sin      
mortally2 whereas if they do so from    
frivolity1 or from vanity for the sake  
of ostentation1 it is not always mortal1
 but sometimes venial4 ,and the same    
applies to men in this respect4 ,hence  
,augustine says 7,ep4 ccxlv ad          
,possid473 ,i do not wish you to be     
hasty in forbidding the wearing of gold 
or costly attire except in the case of  
those who being neither married nor     
wishful to marry1 should think how they 
may please ,god3 whereas the others     
think on the things of the world1 either
 husbands how they may please their     
wives1 or wives how they may please     
their husbands1 except that it is       

unbecoming for women though married to  
uncover their hair1 since the ,apostle  
commands them to cover the head4 ,yet in
 this case some might be excused from   
sin1 when they do this not through      
vanity but on account of some contrary  
custom3 although such a custom is not to
 be commended4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as a  
gloss says on this passage1 ,the wives  
of those who were in distress despised  
their husbands1 and decked themselves   
that they might please other men3 and   
the ,apostle forbids this4 ,cyprian is  
speaking in the same sense2 yet he does 
not forbid married women to adorn       
themselves in order to please their     
husbands1 lest the latter be afforded an
 occasion of sin with other women4      
,hence the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4      
#b3i73 ,women 4 4 4 in ornate ,douay3   
'decent' apparel1 adorning themselves   
with modesty and sobriety1 not with     
plaited hair1 or gold1 or pearls1 or    
costly attire3 whence we are given to   
understand that women are not forbidden 

to adorn themselves soberly and         
moderately but to do so excessively1    
shamelessly1 and immodestly4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,cyprian is speaking of women 
painting themselves3 this is a kind of  
falsification1 which cannot be devoid of
 sin4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,ep4  
ccxlv ad ,possid473 ,to dye oneself with
 paints in order to have a rosier or a  
paler complexion is a lying counterfeit4
 ,i doubt whether even their husbands   
are willing to be deceived by it1 by    
whom alone 7i4e4 the husbands7 are they 
to be permitted1 but not ordered1 to    
adorn themselves4 ,however1 such        
painting does not always involve a      
mortal sin1 but only when it is done for
 the sake of sensuous pleasure or in    
contempt of ,god1 and it is to like     
cases that ,cyprian refers4  ,it must1  
however1 be observed that it is one     
thing to counterfeit a beauty one has   
not1 and another to hide a disfigurement
 arising from some cause such as        
sickness or the like4 ,for this is      

lawful1 since according to the ,apostle 
7#a ,cor4 #ab3bc71 such as we think to  
be the less honorable members of the    
body1 about these we put more abundant  
honor4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated in  
the foregoing ,article1 outward apparel 
should be consistent with the estate of 
the person1 according to the general    
custom4 ,hence it is in itself sinful   
for a woman to wear man's clothes1 or   
vice versa2 especially since this may be
 a cause of sensuous pleasure2 and it is
 expressly forbidden in the ,law 7,deut4
 #bb7 because the ,gentiles used to     
practice this change of attire for the  
purpose of idolatrous superstition4     
,nevertheless this may be done sometimes
 without sin on account of some         
necessity1 either in order to hide      
oneself from enemies1 or through lack of
 other clothes1 or for some similar     
motive4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in the case  
of an art directed to the production of 
goods which men cannot use without sin1 
it follows that the workmen sin in      

making such things1 as directly         
affording others an occasion of sin2 for
 instance1 if a man were to make idols  
or anything pertaining to idolatrous    
worship4 ,but in the case of an art the 
products of which may be employed by man
 either for a good or for an evil use1  
such as swords1 arrows1 and the like1   
the practice of such an art is not      
sinful4 ,these alone should be called   
arts2 wherefore ,chrysostom says 99,hom4
 xlix super ,matth43 ,the name of art   
should be applied to those only which   
contribute towards and produce          
necessaries and mainstays of life4 ,in  
the case of an art that produces things 
which for the most part some people put 
to an evil use1 although such arts are  
not unlawful in themselves1             
nevertheless1 according to the teaching 
of ,plato1 they should be extirpated    
from the ,state by the governing        
authority4 ,accordingly1 since women may
 lawfully adorn themselves1 whether to  
maintain the fitness of their estate1 or

 even by adding something thereto1 in   
order to please their husbands1 it      
follows that those who make such means  
of adornment do not sin in the practice 
of their art1 except perhaps by         
inventing means that are superfluous and
 fantastic4 ,hence ,chrysostom says     
7,super ,matth47 that even the          
shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand in
 need of restraint1 for they have lent  
their art to lust1 by abusing its needs1
 and debasing art by art4   ,,question  
#agj  ,,of ,,the ,,precepts ,,of        
,,temperance 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we  
must next consider the precepts of      
temperance3  7#a7 ,the precepts of      
temperance itself2  7#b7 ,the precepts  
of its parts4   ,,first ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agj1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
the ,precepts of ,temperance ,are       
,suitably ,given in the ,divine ,law8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
precepts of temperance are unsuitably   
given in the ,divine law4 ,because      
fortitude is a greater virtue than      

temperance1 as stated above 7,q4 #abc1  
,a4 #ab2 ,q4 #ada1 ,a4 #h2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 
#ff1 ,a4 #d74 ,now there is no precept  
of fortitude among the precepts of the  
decalogue1 which are the most important 
among the precepts of the ,law4         
,therefore it was unfitting to include  
among the precepts of the decalogue the 
prohibition of adultery1 which is       
contrary to temperance1 as stated above 
7,q4 #aed1 ,,aa4 #a1 #h74  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 temperance is not only about  
venereal matters1 but also about        
pleasures of meat and drink4 ,now the   
precepts of the decalogue include no    
prohibition of a vice pertaining to     
pleasures of meat and drink1 or to any  
other species of lust4 ,neither1        
therefore1 should they include a precept
 prohibiting adultery1 which pertains to
 venereal pleasure4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 in the lawgiver's intention inducement 
to virtue precedes the prohibition of   
vice1 since vices are forbidden in order
 that obstacles to virtue may be        

removed4 ,now the precepts of the       
decalogue are the most important in the 
,divine law4 ,therefore the precepts of 
the decalogue should have included an   
affirmative precept directly prescribing
 the virtue of temperance1 rather than a
 negative precept forbidding adultery   
which is directly opposed thereto4  ,on 
the contrary1 stands the authority of   
,scripture in the decalogue 7,ex4       
#bj3ad1 #ag74  ,i answer that1 ,as the  
,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #a3e71 the end  
of the commandment is charity1 which is 
enjoined upon us in the two precepts    
concerning the love of ,god and of our  
neighbor4 ,wherefore the decalogue      
contains those precepts which tend more 
directly to the love of ,god and of our 
neighbor4 ,now among the vices opposed  
to temperance1 adultery would seem most 
of all opposed to the love of our       
neighbor1 since thereby a man lays hold 
of another's property for his own use1  
by abusing his neighbor's wife4         
,wherefore the precepts of the decalogue

 include a special prohibition of       
adultery1 not only as committed in deed1
 but also as desired in thought4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,among the species of vices  
opposed to fortitude there is not one   
that is so directly opposed to the love 
of our neighbor as adultery1 which is a 
species of lust that is opposed to      
temperance4 ,and yet the vice of daring1
 which is opposed to fortitude1 is wont 
to be sometimes the cause of murder1    
which is forbidden by one of the        
precepts of the decalogue3 for it is    
written 7,ecclus4 #h3ah73 ,go not on the
 way with a bold man lest he burden thee
 with his evils4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,gluttony is not directly opposed to the
 love of our neighbor1 as adultery is4  
,nor indeed is any other species of     
lust1 for a father is not so wronged by 
the seduction of the virgin over whom he
 has no connubial right1 as is the      
husband by the adultery of his wife1 for
 he1 not the wife herself1 has power    
over her body 99#a ,cor4 #g3d4  ,reply  

,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #abb1   
,,aa4 #a1 #d7 the precepts of the       
decalogue are universal principles of   
the ,divine law2 hence they need to be  
common precepts4 ,now it was not        
possible to give any common affirmative 
precepts of temperance1 because the     
practice of temperance varies according 
to different times1 as ,augustine       
remarks 7,de ,bono ,conjug4 xv1 #g71 and
 according to different human laws and  
customs4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #agj1 ,art4 #b  ,whether the       
,precepts of the ,virtues ,annexed to   
,temperance ,are ,suitably ,given in the
 ,divine ,law8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that the precepts of the virtues  
annexed to temperance are unsuitably    
given in the ,divine law4 ,for the      
precepts of the ,decalogue1 as stated   
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c71 are certain      
universal principles of the whole       
,divine law4 ,now pride is the beginning
 of all sin1 according to ,ecclus4      
#aj3ae4 ,therefore among the precepts of

 the ,decalogue there should have been  
one forbidding pride4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 a place before all should have
 been given in the decalogue to those   
precepts by which men are especially    
induced to fulfil the ,law1 because     
these would seem to be the most         
important4 ,now since humility subjects 
man to ,god1 it would seem most of all  
to dispose man to the fulfilment of the 
,divine law2 wherefore obedience is     
accounted one of the degrees of         
humility1 as stated above 7,q4 #afa1 ,a4
 #f72 and the same apparently applies to
 meekness1 the effect of which is that a
 man does not contradict the ,divine    
,scriptures1 as ,augustine observes 7,de
 ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #g74 ,therefore it
 seems that the ,decalogue should have  
contained precepts of humility and      
meekness4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it was   
stated in the foregoing ,article that   
adultery is forbidden in the decalogue1 
because it is contrary to the love of   
our neighbor4 ,but inordinateness of    

outward movements1 which is contrary to 
modesty1 is opposed to neighborly love3 
wherefore ,augustine says in his ,rule  
7,ep4 ccxii73 ,in all your movements let
 nothing be done to offend the eye of   
any person whatever4 ,therefore it seems
 that this kind of inordinateness should
 also have been forbidden by a precept  
of the ,decalogue4  ,on the contrary1   
suffices the authority of ,scripture4   
,i answer that1 ,the virtues annexed to 
temperance may be considered in two     
ways3 first1 in themselves2 secondly1 in
 their effects4 ,considered in          
themselves they have no direct          
connection with the love of ,god or of  
our neighbor2 rather do they regard a   
certain moderation of things pertaining 
to man himself4 ,but considered in their
 effects1 they may regard the love of   
,god or of our neighbor3 and in this    
respect the decalogue contains precepts 
that relate to the prohibition of the   
effects of the vices opposed to the     
parts of temperance4 ,thus the effect of

 anger1 which is opposed to meekness1 is
 sometimes that a man goes on to commit 
murder 7and this is forbidden in the    
,decalogue71 and sometimes that he      
refuses due honor to his parents1 which 
may also be the result of pride1 which  
leads many to transgress the precepts of
 the first table4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3     
,pride is the beginning of sin1 but it  
lies hidden in the heart2 and its       
inordinateness is not perceived by all  
in common4 ,hence there was no place for
 its prohibition among the precepts of  
the ,decalogue1 which are like first    
self-evident principles4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,those precepts which are           
essentially an inducement to the        
observance of the ,law presuppose the   
,law to be already given1 wherefore they
 cannot be first precepts of the ,law so
 as to have a place in the ,decalogue4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,inordinate outward    
movement is not injurious to one's      
neighbor1 if we consider the species of 
the act1 as are murder1 adultery1 and   

theft1 which are forbidden in the       
decalogue2 but only as being signs of an
 inward inordinateness1 as stated above 
7,q4 #afh1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a1 #c74          
,,treatise ,,on ,,gratuitous ,,graces   
7,,qq4 #aga-ahb7   ,,question #aga  ,,of
 ,,prophecy 7,in ,six ,articles7  ,after
 treating individually of all the       
virtues and vices that pertain to men of
 all conditions and estates1 we must now
 consider those things which pertain    
especially to certain men4 ,now there is
 a triple difference between men as     
regards things connected with the soul's
 habits and acts4 ,first1 in reference  
to the various gratuitous graces1       
according to #a ,cor4 #ab3d1 #g3 ,there 
are diversities of graces 4 4 4 and to  
one 4 4 4 by the ,spirit is given the   
word of wisdom1 to another the word of  
knowledge1 etc4 ,another difference     
arises from the diversities of life1    
namely the active and the contemplative 
life1 which correspond to diverse       
purposes of operation1 wherefore it is  

stated 7#a ,cor4 #ab3d1 #g7 that there  
are diversities of operations4 ,for the 
purpose of operation in ,martha1 who was
 busy about much serving1 which pertains
 to the active life1 differed from the  
purpose of operation in ,mary1 who      
sitting 4 4 4 at the ,lord's feet1 heard
 ,his word 7,luke #aj3ci1 #dj71 which   
pertains to the contemplative life4 ,a  
third difference corresponds to the     
various duties and states of life1 as   
expressed in ,eph4 #d3aa1 ,and ,he gave 
some apostles2 and some prophets2 and   
other some evangelists2 and other some  
pastors and doctors3 and this pertains  
to diversity of ministries1 of which it 
is written 7#a ,cor4 #ab3e73 ,there are 
diversities of ministries4  ,with regard
 to gratuitous graces1 which are the    
first object to be considered1 it must  
be observed that some of them pertain to
 knowledge1 some to speech1 and some to 
operation4 ,now all things pertaining to
 knowledge may be comprised under       
prophecy1 since prophetic revelation    

extends not only to future events       
relating to man1 but also to things     
relating to ,god1 both as to those which
 are to be believed by all and are      
matters of faith1 and as to yet higher  
mysteries1 which concern the perfect and
 belong to wisdom4 ,again1 prophetic    
revelation is about things pertaining to
 spiritual substances1 by whom we are   
urged to good or evil2 this pertains to 
the discernment of spirits4 ,moreover it
 extends to the direction of human acts1
 and this pertains to knowledge1 as we  
shall explain further on 7,q4 #agg74    
,accordingly we must first of all       
consider prophecy1 and rapture which is 
a degree of prophecy4  ,prophecy admits 
of four heads of consideration3 7#a7 its
 essence2 7#b7 its cause2 7#c7 the mode 
of prophetic knowledge2 7#d7 the        
division of prophecy4  ,under the first 
head there are six points of inquiry3   
7#a7 ,whether prophecy pertains to      
knowledge8  7#b7 ,whether it is a habit8
  7#c7 ,whether it is only about future 

contingencies8  7#d7 ,whether a prophet 
knows all possible matters of prophecy8 
7#e7 ,whether a prophet distinguishes   
that which he perceives by the gift of  
,god1 from that which he perceives by   
his own spirit8  7#f7 ,whether anything 
false can be the matter of prophecy8    
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aga1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,prophecy ,pertains  
to ,knowledge8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that prophecy does not pertain to 
knowledge4 ,for it is written 7,ecclus4 
#dh3ad7 that after death the body of    
,eliseus prophesied1 and further on     
7,ecclus4 #di3ah7 it is said of ,joseph 
that his bones were visited1 and after  
death they prophesied4 ,now no knowledge
 remains in the body or in the bones    
after death4 ,therefore prophecy does   
not pertain to knowledge4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 it is written 7#a ,cor4       
#ad3c73 ,he that prophesieth1 speaketh  
to men unto edification4 ,now speech is 
not knowledge itself1 but its effect4   
,therefore it would seem that prophecy  

does not pertain to knowledge4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 every cognitive perfection
 excludes folly and madness4 ,yet both  
of these are consistent with prophecy2  
for it is written 7,osee #i3g73 ,know   
ye1 ,o ,israel1 that the prophet was    
foolish and mad 99,vulg43 'the spiritual
 man was mad'4 ,therefore prophecy is   
not a cognitive perfection4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 just as revelation regards the
 intellect1 so inspiration regards1     
apparently1 the affections1 since it    
denotes a kind of motion4 ,now prophecy 
is described as inspiration or          
revelation1 according to ,cassiodorus   
99,prolog4 super ,psalt4 i4 ,therefore  
it would seem that prophecy does not    
pertain to the intellect more than to   
the affections4  ,on the contrary1 ,it  
is written 7#a ,kings #i3i73 ,for he    
that is now called a prophet1 in time   
past was called a seer4 ,now sight      
pertains to knowledge4 ,therefore       
prophecy pertains to knowledge4  ,i     
answer that1 ,prophecy first and chiefly

 consists in knowledge1 because1 to wit1
 prophets know things that are far      
7procul7 removed from man's knowledge4  
,wherefore they may be said to take     
their name from phanos1 apparition1     
because things appear to them from afar4
 ,wherefore1 as ,isidore states 7,etym4 
vii1 #h71 in the ,old ,testament1 they  
were called ,seers1 because they saw    
what others saw not1 and surveyed things
 hidden in mystery4 ,hence among heathen
 nations they were known as vates1 on   
account of their power of mind 7vi      
mentis71    99,the ,latin vates is from 
the ,greek phates1 and may be rendered  
soothsayer 7ibid4 viii1 #g74  ,since1   
however1 it is written 7#a ,cor4 #ab3g73
 ,the manifestation of the ,spirit is   
given to every man unto profit1 and     
further on 7#a ,cor4 #ad3ab73 ,seek to  
abound unto the edification of the      
,church1 it follows that prophecy       
consists secondarily in speech1 in so   
far as the prophets declare for the     
instruction of others1 the things they  

know through being taught of ,god1      
according to the saying of ,isa4 #ba3aj1
 ,that which ,i have heard of the ,lord 
of hosts1 the ,god of ,israel1 ,i have  
declared unto you4 ,accordingly1 as     
,isidore says 7,etym4 viii1 #g71        
prophets may be described as praefatores
 7foretellers71 because they tell from  
afar 7porro fantur71 that is1 speak from
 a distance1 and foretell the truth     
about things to come4  ,now those things
 above human ken which are revealed by  
,god cannot be confirmed by human       
reason1 which they surpass as regards   
the operation of the ,divine power1     
according to ,mk4 #af3bj1 ,they 4 4 4   
preached everywhere1 the ,lord working  
withal and confirming the word with     
signs that followed4 ,hence1 thirdly1   
prophecy is concerned with the working  
of miracles1 as a kind of confirmation  
of the prophetic utterances4 ,wherefore 
it is written 7,deut4 #cd3aj1 #aa73     
,there arose no more a prophet in       
,israel like unto ,moses1 whom the ,lord

 knew face to face1 in all the signs and
 wonders4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these      
passages speak of prophecy in reference 
to the third point just mentioned1 which
 regards the proof of prophecy4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,the ,apostle is speaking     
there of the prophetic utterances4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those prophets who are
 described as foolish and mad are not   
true but false prophets1 of whom it is  
said 7,jer4 #c3af73 ,hearken not to the 
words of the prophets that prophesy to  
you1 and deceive you2 they speak a      
vision of their own heart1 and not out  
of the mouth of the ,lord1 and 7,ezech4 
#ac3c73 ,woe to the foolish prophets1   
that follow their own spirit1 and see   
nothing4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,it is       
requisite to prophecy that the intention
 of the mind be raised to the perception
 of ,divine things3 wherefore it is     
written 7,ezech4 #b3a73 ,son of man1    
stand upon thy feet1 and ,i will speak  
to thee4 ,this raising of the intention 
is brought about by the motion of the   

,holy ,ghost1 wherefore the text goes on
 to say3 ,and the ,spirit entered into  
me 4 4 4 and ,he set me upon my feet4   
,after the mind's intention has been    
raised to heavenly things1 it perceives 
the things of ,god2 hence the text      
continues3 ,and ,i heard ,him speaking  
to me4 ,accordingly inspiration is      
requisite for prophecy1 as regards the  
raising of the mind1 according to ,job  
#cb3h1 ,the inspiration of the ,almighty
 giveth understanding3 while revelation 
is necessary1 as regards the very       
perception of ,divine things1 whereby   
prophecy is completed2 by its means the 
veil of darkness and ignorance is       
removed1 according to ,job #ab3bb1 ,he  
discovereth great things out of         
darkness4   ,,second ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aga1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,prophecy ,is a ,habit8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that prophecy is a habit4
 ,for according to ,ethic4 ii1 #e1 there
 are three things in the soul1 power1   
passion1 and habit4 ,now prophecy is not

 a power1 for then it would be in all   
men1 since the powers of the soul are   
common to them4 ,again it is not a      
passion1 since the passions belong to   
the appetitive faculty1 as stated above 
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b72 whereas     
prophecy pertains principally to        
knowledge1 as stated in the foregoing   
,article4 ,therefore prophecy is a      
habit4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every       
perfection of the soul1 which is not    
always in act1 is a habit4 ,now prophecy
 is a perfection of the soul2 and it is 
not always in act1 else a prophet could 
not be described as asleep4 ,therefore  
seemingly prophecy is a habit4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 prophecy is reckoned among
 the gratuitous graces4 ,now grace is   
something in the soul1 after the manner 
of a habit1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1   
,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore prophecy  
is a habit4  ,on the contrary1 ,a habit 
is something whereby we act when we     
will1 as the ,commentator 99,averroes or
 ,ibn ,roshd1 #aabj-aaih says 7,de      

,anima iii74 ,but a man cannot make use 
of prophecy when he will1 as appears in 
the case of ,eliseus 7#d ,kings #c3ae71 
who on ,josaphat inquiring of him       
concerning the future1 and the spirit of
 prophecy failing him1 caused a minstrel
 to be brought to him1 that the spirit  
of prophecy might come down upon him    
through the praise of psalmody1 and fill
 his mind with things to come1 as       
,gregory observes 7,hom4 i super        
,ezech474 ,therefore prophecy is not a  
habit4  ,i answer that1 ,as the ,apostle
 says 7,eph4 #e3ac71 all that is made   
manifest is light1 because1 to wit1 just
 as the manifestation of the material   
sight takes place through material      
light1 so too the manifestation of      
intellectual sight takes place through  
intellectual light4 ,accordingly        
manifestation must be proportionate to  
the light by means of which it takes    
place1 even as an effect is             
proportionate to its cause4 ,since then 
prophecy pertains to a knowledge that   

surpasses natural reason1 as stated     
above 7,a4 #a71 it follows that prophecy
 requires an intellectual light         
surpassing the light of natural reason4 
,hence the saying of ,micah #g3h3 ,when 
,i sit in darkness1 the ,lord is my     
light4 ,now light may be in a subject in
 two ways3 first1 by way of an abiding  
form1 as material light is in the sun1  
and in fire2 secondly1 by way of a      
passion1 or passing impression1 as light
 is in the air4 ,now the prophetic light
 is not in the prophet's intellect by   
way of an abiding form1 else a prophet  
would always be able to prophesy1 which 
is clearly false4 ,for ,gregory says    
7,hom4 i super ,ezech473 ,sometimes the 
spirit of prophecy is lacking to the    
prophet1 nor is it always within the    
call of his mind1 yet so that in its    
absence he knows that its presence is   
due to a gift4 ,hence ,eliseus said of  
the ,sunamite woman 7#d ,kings #d3bg73  
,her soul is in anguish1 and the ,lord  
hath hid it from me1 and hath not told  

me4 ,the reason for this is that the    
intellectual light that is in a subject 
by way of an abiding and complete form1 
perfects the intellect chiefly to the   
effect of knowing the principle of the  
things manifested by that light2 thus by
 the light of the active intellect the  
intellect knows chiefly the first       
principles of all things known          
naturally4 ,now the principle of things 
pertaining to supernatural knowledge1   
which are manifested by prophecy1 is    
,god ,himself1 ,whom the prophets do not
 see in ,his essence1 although ,he is   
seen by the blessed in heaven1 in whom  
this light is by way of an abiding and  
complete form1 according to ,ps4 #ce3aj1
 ,in ,thy light we shall see light4  ,it
 follows therefore that the prophetic   
light is in the prophet's soul by way of
 a passion or transitory impression4    
,this is indicated ,ex4 #cc3bb3 ,when my
 glory shall pass1 ,i will set thee in a
 hole of the rock1 etc41 and #c ,kings  
#ai3aa3 ,go forth and stand upon the    

mount before the ,lord2 and behold the  
,lord passeth1 etc4 ,hence it is that   
even as the air is ever in need of a    
fresh enlightening1 so too the prophet's
 mind is always in need of a fresh      
revelation2 thus a disciple who has not 
yet acquired the principles of an art   
needs to have every detail explained to 
him4 ,wherefore it is written 7,isa4    
#a3d73 ,in the morning ,he wakeneth my  
ear1 so that ,i may hear ,him as a      
master4 ,this is also indicated by the  
very manner in which prophecies are     
uttered3 thus it is stated that the     
,lord spake to such and such a prophet1 
or that the word of the ,lord1 or the   
hand of the ,lord was made upon him4    
,but a habit is an abiding form4        
,wherefore it is evident that1 properly 
speaking1 prophecy is not a habit4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this division of the  
,philosopher's does not comprise        
absolutely all that is in the soul1 but 
only such as can be principles of moral 
actions1 which are done sometimes from  

passion1 sometimes from habit1 sometimes
 from mere power1 as in the case of     
those who perform an action from the    
judgment of their reason before having  
the habit of that action4  ,however1    
prophecy may be reduced to a passion1   
provided we understand passion to denote
 any kind of receiving1 in which sense  
the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1  
#d7 that to understand is1 in a way1 to 
be passive4 ,for just as1 in natural    
knowledge1 the possible intellect is    
passive to the light of the active      
intellect1 so too in prophetic knowledge
 the human intellect is passive to the  
enlightening of the ,divine light4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as in corporeal  
things1 when a passion ceases1 there    
remains a certain aptitude to a         
repetition of the passion--thus wood    
once ignited is more easily ignited     
again1 so too in the prophet's          
intellect1 after the actual             
enlightenment has ceased1 there remains 
an aptitude to be enlightened anew--thus

 when the mind has once been aroused to 
devotion1 it is more easily recalled to 
its former devotion4 ,hence ,augustine  
says 7,de orando ,deum4 ,ep4 cxxx1 #i7  
that our prayers need to be frequent1   
lest devotion be extinguished as soon as
 it is kindled4  ,we might1 however1    
reply that a person is called a prophet1
 even while his prophetic enlightenment 
ceases to be actual1 on account of his  
being deputed by ,god1 according to     
,jer4 #a3e1 ,and ,i made thee a prophet 
unto the nations4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3     
,every gift of grace raises man to      
something above human nature1 and this  
may happen in two ways4 ,first1 as to   
the substance of the act--for instance1 
the working of miracles1 and the        
knowledge of the uncertain and hidden   
things of ,divine wisdom--and for such  
acts man is not granted a habitual gift 
of grace4 ,secondly1 a thing is above   
human nature as to the mode but not the 
substance of the act--for instance to   
love ,god and to know ,him in the mirror

 of ,his creatures--and for this a      
habitual gift of grace is bestowed4     
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aga1  
,art4 #c  ,whether ,prophecy ,is ,only  
,about ,future ,contingencies8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
prophecy is only about future           
contingencies4 ,for ,cassiodorus says   
99,prol4 super ,psalt4 i that prophecy  
is a ,divine inspiration or revelation1 
announcing the issue of things with     
unchangeable truth4 ,now issues pertain 
to future contingencies4 ,therefore the 
prophetic revelation is about future    
contingencies alone4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 according to #a ,cor4 #ab1 the
 grace of prophecy is differentiated    
from wisdom and faith1 which are about  
,divine things2 and from the discernment
 of spirits1 which is about created     
spirits2 and from knowledge1 which is   
about human things4 ,now habits and acts
 are differentiated by their objects1 as
 stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4    
#b74 ,therefore it seems that the object

 of prophecy is not connected with any  
of the above4 ,therefore it follows that
 it is about future contingencies alone4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 difference of     
object causes difference of species1 as 
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b74
 ,therefore1 if one prophecy is about   
future contingencies1 and another about 
other things1 it would seem to follow   
that these are different species of     
prophecy4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory   
says 7,hom4 i super ,ezech47 that some  
prophecies are about the future1 for    
instance 7,isa4 #g3ad71 ',behold a      
virgin shall conceive1 and bear a son'2 
some are about the past1 as 7,gen4      
#a3a71 ',in the beginning ,god created  
heaven and earth'2 some are about the   
present1 as 7#a ,cor4 #ad3bd1 #be71 ,if 
all prophesy1 and there come in one that
 believeth not 4 4 4 the secrets of his 
heart are made manifest4 ,therefore     
prophecy is not about future            
contingencies alone4  ,i answer that1 ,a
 manifestation made by means of a       

certain light can extend to all those   
things that are subject to that light3  
thus the body's sight extends to all    
colors1 and the soul's natural knowledge
 extends to whatever is subject to the  
light of the active intellect4 ,now     
prophetic knowledge comes through a     
,divine light1 whereby it is possible to
 know all things both ,divine and human1
 both spiritual and corporeal2 and      
consequently the prophetic revelation   
extends to them all4 ,thus by the       
ministry of spirits a prophetic         
revelation concerning the perfections of
 ,god and the angels was made to ,isa4  
#f3a1 where it is written1 ,i saw the   
,lord sitting upon a throne high and    
elevated4 ,moreover his prophecy        
contains matters referring to natural   
bodies1 according to the words of ,isa4 
#dj3ab1 ,who hath measured the waters in
 the hollow of ,his hand1 etc4 ,it also 
contains matters relating to human      
conduct1 according to ,isa4 #eh3a1 ,deal
 thy bread to the hungry1 etc42 and     

besides this it contains things         
pertaining to future events1 according  
to ,isa4 #dg3i1 ,two things shall come  
upon thee suddenly in one day1          
barrenness and widowhood4  ,since1      
however1 prophecy is about things remote
 from our knowledge1 it must be observed
 that the more remote things are from   
our knowledge the more pertinent they   
are to prophecy4 ,of such things there  
are three degrees4 ,one degree comprises
 things remote from the knowledge1      
either sensitive or intellective1 of    
some particular man1 but not from the   
knowledge of all men2 thus a particular 
man knows by sense things present to him
 locally1 which another man does not    
know by human sense1 since they are     
removed from him4 ,thus ,eliseus knew   
prophetically what his disciple ,giezi  
had done in his absence 7#d ,kings      
#e3bf71 and in like manner the secret   
thoughts of one man are manifested      
prophetically to another1 according to  
#a ,cor4 #ad3be2 and again in this way  

what one man knows by demonstration may 
be revealed to another prophetically4   
,the second degree comprises those      
things which surpass the knowledge of   
all men without exception1 not that they
 are in themselves unknowable1 but on   
account of a defect in human knowledge2 
such as the mystery of the ,trinity1    
which was revealed by the ,seraphim     
saying3 ,holy1 ,holy1 ,holy1 etc4 7,isa4
 #f3c74  ,the last degree comprises     
things remote from the knowledge of all 
men1 through being in themselves        
unknowable2 such are future             
contingencies1 the truth of which is    
indeterminate4 ,and since that which is 
predicated universally and by its very  
nature1 takes precedence of that which  
is predicated in a limited and relative 
sense1 it follows that revelation of    
future events belongs most properly to  
prophecy1 and from this prophecy        
apparently takes its name4 ,hence       
,gregory says 7,hom4 i super ,ezech473  
,and since a prophet is so called       

because he foretells the future1 his    
name loses its significance when he     
speaks of the past or present4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,prophecy is there defined    
according to its proper signification2  
and it is in this sense that it is      
differentiated from the other gratuitous
 graces4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this is     
evident from what has just been said4   
,we might also reply that all those     
things that are the matter of prophecy  
have the common aspect of being         
unknowable to man except by ,divine     
revelation2 whereas those that are the  
matter of wisdom1 knowledge1 and the    
interpretation of speeches1 can be known
 by man through natural reason1 but are 
manifested in a higher way through the  
enlightening of the ,divine light4 ,as  
to faith1 although it is about things   
invisible to man1 it is not concerned   
with the knowledge of the things        
believed1 but with a man's certitude of 
assent to things known by others4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the formal element in 

prophetic knowledge is the ,divine      
light1 which being one1 gives unity of  
species to prophecy1 although the things
 prophetically manifested by the ,divine
 light are diverse4   ,,fourth ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aga1 ,art4 #d  ,whether
 by the ,divine ,revelation a ,prophet  
,knows ,all ,that ,can ,be ,known       
,prophetically8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that by the ,divine          
revelation a prophet knows all that can 
be known prophetically4 ,for it is      
written 7,amos #c3g73 ,the ,lord ,god   
doth nothing without revealing ,his     
secret to ,his servants the prophets4   
,now whatever is revealed prophetically 
is something done by ,god4 ,therefore   
there is not one of them but what is    
revealed to the prophet4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 ,god's works are perfect      
7,deut4 #cb3d74 ,now prophecy is a      
,divine revelation1 as stated above 7,a4
 #c74 ,therefore it is perfect2 and this
 would not be so unless all possible    
matters of prophecy were revealed       

prophetically1 since the perfect is that
 which lacks nothing 7,phys4 iii1 #f74  
,therefore all possible matters of      
prophecy are revealed to the prophet4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,divine light   
which causes prophecy is more powerful  
than the right of natural reason which  
is the cause of human science4 ,now a   
man who has acquired a science knows    
whatever pertains to that science2 thus 
a grammarian knows all matters of       
grammar4 ,therefore it would seem that a
 prophet knows all matters of prophecy4 
,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 i
 super ,ezech47 that sometimes the      
spirit of prophecy indicates the present
 to the prophet's mind and nowise the   
future2 and sometimes it points not to  
the present but to the future4          
,therefore the prophet does not know all
 matters of prophecy4  ,i answer that1  
,things which differ from one another   
need not exist simultaneously1 save by  
reason of some one thing in which they  
are connected and on which they depend3 

thus it has been stated above 7,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #fe1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b7 that all the     
virtues must needs exist simultaneously 
on account of prudence and charity4 ,now
 all the things that are known through  
some principle are connected in that    
principle and depend thereon4 ,hence he 
who knows a principle perfectly1 as     
regards all to which its virtue extends1
 knows at the same time all that can be 
known through that principle2 whereas if
 the common principle is unknown1 or    
known only in a general way1 it does not
 follow that one knows all those things 
at the same time1 but each of them has  
to be manifested by itself1 so that     
consequently some of them may be known1 
and some not4  ,now the principle of    
those things that are prophetically     
manifested by the ,divine light is the  
first truth1 which the prophets do not  
see in itself4 ,wherefore there is no   
need for their knowing all possible     
matters of prophecy2 but each one knows 
some of them according to the special   

revelation of this or that matter4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,lord reveals to  
the prophets all things that are        
necessary for the instruction of the    
faithful2 yet not all to every one1 but 
some to one1 and some to another4       
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,prophecy is by way of 
being something imperfect in the genus  
of ,divine revelation3 hence it is      
written 7#a ,cor4 #ac3h7 that prophecies
 shall be made void1 and that we        
prophesy in part1 i4e4 imperfectly4 ,the
 ,divine revelation will be brought to  
its perfection in heaven2 wherefore the 
same text continues 7#a ,cor4 #aac3aj73 
,when that which is perfect is come1    
that which is in part shall be done     
away4 ,consequently it does not follow  
that nothing is lacking to prophetic    
revelation1 but that it lacks none of   
those things to which prophecy is       
directed4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he who has 
a science knows the principles of that  
science1 whence whatever is pertinent to
 that science depends2 wherefore to have

 the habit of a science perfectly1 is to
 know whatever is pertinent to that     
science4 ,but ,god ,who is the principle
 of prophetic knowledge is not known in 
,himself through prophecy2 wherefore the
 comparison fails4   ,,fifth ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aga1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
the ,prophet ,always ,distinguishes     
,what ,he ,says by ,his ,own ,spirit    
from ,what ,he ,says by the ,prophetic  
,spirit8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that the prophet always distinguishes   
what he says by his own spirit from what
 he says by the prophetic spirit4 ,for  
,augustine states 7,confess4 vi1 #ac7   
that his mother said she could1 through 
a certain feeling1 which in words she   
could not express1 discern betwixt      
,divine revelations1 and the dreams of  
her own soul4 ,now prophecy is a ,divine
 revelation1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74  
,therefore the prophet always           
distinguishes what he says by the spirit
 of prophecy1 from what he says by his  
own spirit4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god   

commands nothing impossible1 as ,jerome 
99,pelagius4 ,ep4 xvi1 among the        
supposititious works of ,st4 ,jerome    
says4 ,now the prophets were commanded  
7,jer4 #bc3bh73 ,the prophet that hath a
 dream1 let him tell a dream2 and he    
that hath ,my word1 let him speak ,my   
word with truth4 ,therefore the prophet 
can distinguish what he has through the 
spirit of prophecy from what he sees    
otherwise4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the     
certitude resulting from a ,divine light
 is greater than that which results from
 the light of natural reason4 ,now he   
that has science1 by the light of       
natural reason knows for certain that he
 has it4 ,therefore he that has prophecy
 by a ,divine light is much more certain
 that he has it4  ,on the contrary1     
,gregory says 7,hom4 i super ,ezech473  
,it must be observed that sometimes the 
holy prophets1 when consulted1 utter    
certain things by their own spirit1     
through being much accustomed to        
prophesying1 and think they are speaking

 by the prophetic spirit4  ,i answer    
that1 ,the prophet's mind is instructed 
by ,god in two ways3 in one way by an   
express revelation1 in another way by a 
most mysterious instinct to which the   
human mind is subjected without knowing 
it1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4   
ii1 #ag74 ,accordingly the prophet has  
the greatest certitude about those      
things which he knows by an express     
revelation1 and he has it for certain   
that they are revealed to him by ,god2  
wherefore it is written 7,jer4 #bf3ae73 
,in truth the ,lord sent me to you1 to  
speak all these words in your hearing4  
,else1 were he not certain about this1  
the faith which relies on the utterances
 of the prophet would not be certain4 ,a
 sign of the prophet's certitude may be 
gathered from the fact that ,abraham    
being admonished in a prophetic vision1 
prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten 
son1 which he nowise would have done had
 he not been most certain of the ,divine
 revelation4  ,on the other hand1 his   

position with regard to the things he   
knows by instinct is sometimes such that
 he is unable to distinguish fully      
whether his thoughts are conceived of   
,divine instinct or of his own spirit4  
,and those things which we know by      
,divine instinct are not all manifested 
with prophetic certitude1 for this      
instinct is something imperfect in the  
genus of prophecy4 ,it is thus that we  
are to understand the saying of         
,gregory4 ,lest1 however1 this should   
lead to error1 they are very soon set   
aright by the ,holy ,ghost 99,for       
instance1 cf4 #b ,kings #g3c seqq41 and 
from ,him they hear the truth1 so that  
they reproach themselves for having said
 what was untrue1 as ,gregory adds      
7,hom4 i super ,ezech474  ,the arguments
 set down in the first place consider   
the revelation that is made by the      
prophetic spirit2 wherefore the answer  
to all the objections is clear4         
,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aga1  
,art4 #f  ,whether ,things ,known or    

,declared ,prophetically ,can ,be       
,false8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that things known or declared           
prophetically can be false4 ,for        
prophecy is about future contingencies1 
as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,now future   
contingencies may possibly not happen2  
else they would happen of necessity4    
,therefore the matter of prophecy can be
 false4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,isaias    
prophesied to ,ezechias saying 7,isa4   
#ch3a73 ,take order with thy house1 for 
thou shalt surely die1 and shalt not    
live1 and yet fifteen years were added  
to his life 7#d ,kings #bj3f74 ,again   
the ,lord said 7,jer4 #ah3g1 #h73 ,i    
will suddenly speak against a nation and
 against a kingdom1 to root out and to  
pull down and to destroy it4 ,if that   
nation against which ,i have spoken     
shall repent of their evil1 ,i also will
 repent of the evil that ,i have thought
 to do them4 ,this is instanced in the  
example of the ,ninevites1 according to 
,john #c3aj3 ,the ,lord ,vulg43 ',god'  

had mercy with regard to the evil which 
,he had said that ,he would do to them1 
and ,he did it not4 ,therefore the      
matter of prophecy can be false4  ,obj4 
#c3 ,further1 in a conditional          
proposition1 whenever the antecedent is 
absolutely necessary1 the consequent is 
absolutely necessary1 because the       
consequent of a conditional proposition 
stands in the same relation to the      
antecedent1 as the conclusion to the    
premises in a syllogism1 and a syllogism
 whose premises are necessary always    
leads to a necessary conclusion1 as we  
find proved in ,i ,poster4 #f4 ,but if  
the matter of a prophecy cannot be      
false1 the following conditional        
proposition must needs be true3 ,if a   
thing has been prophesied1 it will be4  
,now the antecedent of this conditional 
proposition is absolutely necessary1    
since it is about the past4 ,therefore  
the consequent is also necessary        
absolutely2 yet this is unfitting1 for  
then prophecy would not be about        

contingencies4 ,therefore it is untrue  
that the matter of prophecy cannot be   
false4  ,on the contrary1 ,cassiodorus  
says 99,prol4 in ,psalt4 i that prophecy
 is a ,divine inspiration or revelation1
 announcing the issue of things with    
invariable truth4 ,now the truth of     
prophecy would not be invariable1 if its
 matter could be false4 ,therefore      
nothing false can come under prophecy4  
,i answer that1 ,as may be gathered from
 what has been said 7,,aa4 #a1 #c1 #e71 
prophecy is a kind of knowledge         
impressed under the form of teaching on 
the prophet's intellect1 by ,divine     
revelation4 ,now the truth of knowledge 
is the same in disciple and teacher     
since the knowledge of the disciple is a
 likeness of the knowledge of the       
teacher1 even as in natural things the  
form of the thing generated is a        
likeness of the form of the generator4  
,jerome speaks in this sense when he    
says 99,comment4 in ,daniel ii1 #aj that
 prophecy is the seal of the ,divine    

foreknowledge4 ,consequently the same   
truth must needs be in prophetic        
knowledge and utterances1 as in the     
,divine knowledge1 under which nothing  
false can possibly come1 as stated in   
the ,first ,part 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #h74     
,therefore nothing false can come under 
prophecy4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated  
in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ac7  
the certitude of the ,divine            
foreknowledge does not exclude the      
contingency of future singular events1  
because that knowledge regards the      
future as present and already           
determinate to one thing4 ,wherefore    
prophecy also1 which is an impressed    
likeness or seal of the ,divine         
foreknowledge1 does not by its          
unchangeable truth exclude the          
contingency of future things4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,the ,divine foreknowledge    
regards future things in two ways4      
,first1 as they are in themselves1 in so
 far1 to wit1 as it sees them in their  
presentiality3 secondly1 as in their    

causes1 inasmuch as it sees the order of
 causes in relation to their effects4   
,and though future contingencies1       
considered as in themselves1 are        
determinate to one thing1 yet1          
considered as in their causes1 they are 
not so determined but that they can     
happen otherwise4 ,again1 though this   
twofold knowledge is always united in   
the ,divine intellect1 it is not always 
united in the prophetic revelation1     
because an imprint made by an active    
cause is not always on a par with the   
virtue of that cause4 ,hence sometimes  
the prophetic revelation is an imprinted
 likeness of the ,divine foreknowledge1 
in so far as the latter regards future  
contingencies in themselves3 and such   
things happen in the same way as        
foretold1 for example this saying of    
,isa4 #g3ad3 ,behold a virgin shall     
conceive4 ,sometimes1 however1 the      
prophetic revelation is an imprinted    
likeness of the ,divine foreknowledge as
 knowing the order of causes to effects2

 and then at times the event is         
otherwise than foretold4 ,yet the       
prophecy does not cover a falsehood1 for
 the meaning of the prophecy is that    
inferior causes1 whether they be natural
 causes or human acts1 are so disposed  
as to lead to such a result4 ,in this   
way we are to understand the saying of  
,isa4 #ch3a3 ,thou shalt die1 and not   
live2 in other words1 ,the disposition  
of thy body has a tendency to death3 and
 the saying of ,jonah #c3d1 ,yet forty  
days1 and ,nineveh shall be destroyed1  
that is to say1 ,its merits demand that 
it should be destroyed4 ,god is said to 
repent1 metaphorically1 inasmuch as ,he 
bears ,himself after the manner of one  
who repents1 by changing ,his sentence1 
although ,he changes not ,his counsel   
99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #g1 ad #b4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since the same truth  
of prophecy is the same as the truth of 
,divine foreknowledge1 as stated above1 
the conditional proposition3 ,if this   
was prophesied1 it will be1 is true in  

the same way as the proposition3 ,if    
this was foreknown1 it will be3 for in  
both cases it is impossible for the     
antecedent not to be4 ,hence the        
consequent is necessary1 considered1 not
 as something future in our regard1 but 
as being present to the ,divine         
foreknowledge1 as stated in the ,first  
,part 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ac1 ad #b74        
,,question #agb  ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of
 ,,prophecy 7,in ,six ,articles7  ,we   
must now consider the cause of prophecy4
 ,under this head there are six points  
of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether prophecy is  
natural8  7#b7 ,whether it is from ,god 
by means of the angels8  7#c7 ,whether a
 natural disposition is requisite for   
prophecy8  7#d7 ,whether a good life is 
requisite8  7#e7 ,whether any prophecy  
is from the demons8  7#f7 ,whether      
prophets of the demons ever tell what is
 true8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #agb1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,prophecy  
,can ,be ,natural8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that prophecy can be natural4

 ,for ,gregory says 7,dial4 iv1 #bf7    
that sometimes the mere strength of the 
soul is sufficiently cunning to foresee 
certain things3 and ,augustine says     
7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ac7 that the human 
soul1 according as it is withdrawn from 
the sense of the body1 is able to       
foresee the future 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #hf1  
,a4 #d1 ad #b4 ,now this pertains to    
prophecy4 ,therefore the soul can       
acquire prophecy naturally4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 the human soul's knowledge is 
more alert while one wakes than while   
one sleeps4 ,now some1 during sleep1    
naturally foresee the future1 as the    
,philosopher asserts 7,de ,somn4 et     
,vigil4 99,de ,divinat4 per ,somn4 ii1  
which is annexed to the work quoted74   
,much more therefore can a man naturally
 foreknow the future4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 man1 by his nature1 is more   
perfect than dumb animals4 ,yet some    
dumb animals have foreknowledge of      
future things that concern them4 ,thus  
ants foreknow the coming rains1 which is

 evident from their gathering grain into
 their nest before the rain commences2  
and in like manner fish foreknow a      
coming storm1 as may be gathered from   
their movements in avoiding places      
exposed to storm4 ,much more therefore  
can men foreknow the future that        
concerns themselves1 and of such things 
is prophecy4 ,therefore prophecy comes  
from nature4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is 
written 7,prov4 #bi3ah73 ,when prophecy 
shall fail1 the people shall be         
scattered abroad2 wherefore it is       
evident that prophecy is necessary for  
the stability of the human race4 ,now   
nature does not fail in necessaries     
99,aristotle1 ,de ,anima iii1 #i4       
,therefore it seems that prophecy is    
from nature4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is  
written 7#b ,pet4 #a3ba73 ,for prophecy 
came not by the will of man at any time1
 but the holy men of ,god spoke1        
inspired by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore
 prophecy comes not from nature1 but    
through the gift of the ,holy ,ghost4   

,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#aga1 ,a4 #f1 ad #b7 prophetic          
foreknowledge may regard future things  
in two ways3 in one way1 as they are in 
themselves2 in another way1 as they are 
in their causes4 ,now1 to foreknow      
future things1 as they are in           
themselves1 is proper to the ,divine    
intellect1 to ,whose eternity all things
 are present1 as stated in the ,first   
,part 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ac74 ,wherefore    
such like foreknowledge of the future   
cannot come from nature1 but from       
,divine revelation alone4 ,on the other 
hand1 future things can be foreknown in 
their causes with a natural knowledge   
even by man3 thus a physician foreknows 
future health or death in certain       
causes1 through previous experimental   
knowledge of the order of those causes  
to such effects4 ,such like knowledge of
 the future may be understood to be in a
 man by nature in two ways4 ,in one way 
that the soul1 from that which it holds1
 is able to foreknow the future1 and    

thus ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1
 #ac73 ,some have deemed the human soul 
to contain a certain power of           
divination4 ,this seems to be in accord 
with the opinion of ,plato 99,phaed4    
xxvii2 ,civit4 vi1 who held that our    
souls have knowledge of all things by   
participating in the ideas2 but that    
this knowledge is obscured in them by   
union with the body2 yet in some more1  
in others less1 according to a          
difference in bodily purity4 ,according 
to this it might be said that men1 whose
 souls are not much obscured through    
union with the body1 are able to        
foreknow such like future things by     
their own knowledge4 ,against this      
opinion ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4  
xii1 #ac73 ,how is it that the soul     
cannot always have this power of        
divination1 since it always wishes to   
have it8  ,since1 however1 it seems     
truer1 according to the opinion of      
,aristotle1 that the soul acquires      
knowledge from sensibles1 as stated in  

the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #f71 it  
is better to have recourse to another   
explanation1 and to hold that men have  
no such foreknowledge of the future1 but
 that they can acquire it by means of   
experience1 wherein they are helped by  
their natural disposition1 which depends
 on the perfection of a man's           
imaginative power1 and the clarity of   
his understanding4  ,nevertheless this  
latter foreknowledge of the future      
differs in two ways from the former1    
which comes through ,divine revelation4 
,first1 because the former can be about 
any events whatever1 and this           
infallibly2 whereas the latter          
foreknowledge1 which can be had         
naturally1 is about certain effects1 to 
which human experience may extend4      
,secondly1 because the former prophecy  
is according to the unchangeable truth  
99,q4 #aga1 ,a4 #c1 ,obj4 #a1 while the 
latter is not1 and can cover a          
falsehood4 ,now the former              
foreknowledge1 and not the latter1      

properly belongs to prophecy1 because1  
as stated above 7,q4 #aga1 ,a4 #c71     
prophetic knowledge is of things which  
naturally surpass human knowledge4      
,consequently we must say that prophecy 
strictly so called cannot be from       
nature1 but only from ,divine           
revelation4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when the 
soul is withdrawn from corporeal things1
 it becomes more adapted to receive the 
influence of spiritual substances 99,cf4
 ,i1 ,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b1 and also is
 more inclined to receive the subtle    
motions which take place in the human   
imagination through the impression of   
natural causes1 whereas it is hindered  
from receiving them while occupied with 
sensible things4 ,hence ,gregory says   
7,dial4 iv1 #bf7 that the soul1 at the  
approach of death1 foresees certain     
future things1 by reason of the subtlety
 of its nature1 inasmuch as it is       
receptive even of slight impressions4   
,or again1 it knows future things by a  
revelation of the angels2 but not by its

 own power1 because according to        
,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ac71 if 
this were so1 it would be able to       
foreknow the future whenever it willed1 
which is clearly false4  ,obj4 #b3      
,knowledge of the future by means of    
dreams1 comes either from the revelation
 of spiritual substances1 or from a     
corporeal cause1 as stated above 7,q4   
#ie1 ,a4 #f71 when we were treating of  
divination4 ,now both these causes are  
more applicable to a person while asleep
 than while awake1 because1 while awake1
 the soul is occupied with external     
sensibles1 so that it is less receptive 
of the subtle impressions either of     
spiritual substances1 or even of natural
 causes2 although as regards the        
perfection of judgment1 the reason is   
more alert in waking than in sleeping4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even dumb animals have
 no foreknowledge of future events1     
except as these are foreknown in their  
causes1 whereby their imagination is    
moved more than man's1 because man's    

imagination1 especially in waking1 is   
more disposed according to reason than  
according to the impression of natural  
causes4 ,yet reason effects much more   
amply in man1 that which the impression 
of natural causes effects in dumb       
animals2 and ,divine grace by inspiring 
the prophecy assists man still more4    
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the prophetic light   
extends even to the direction of human  
acts2 and in this way prophecy is       
requisite for the government of a       
people1 especially in relation to       
,divine worship2 since for this nature  
is not sufficient1 and grace is         
necessary4   ,,second ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agb1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,prophetic ,revelation ,comes ,through  
the ,angels8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that prophetic revelation does not 
come through the angels4 ,for it is     
written 7,wis4 #g3bg7 that ,divine      
wisdom conveyeth herself into holy      
souls1 and maketh the friends of ,god1  
and the prophets4 ,now wisdom makes the 

friends of ,god immediately4 ,therefore 
it also makes the prophets immediately1 
and not through the medium of the       
angels4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prophecy is
 reckoned among the gratuitous graces4  
,but the gratuitous graces are from the 
,holy ,ghost1 according to #a ,cor4     
#ab3d1 ,there are diversities of graces1
 but the same ,spirit4 ,therefore the   
prophetic revelation is not made by     
means of an angel4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
,cassiodorus 99,prol4 in ,psalt4 i says 
that prophecy is a ,divine revelation3  
whereas if it were conveyed by the      
angels1 it would be called an angelic   
revelation4 ,therefore prophecy is not  
bestowed by means of the angels4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4   
,hier4 iv73 ,our glorious fathers       
received ,divine visions by means of the
 heavenly powers2 and he is speaking    
there of prophetic visions4 ,therefore  
prophetic revelation is conveyed by     
means of the angels4  ,i answer that1   
,as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3a71    

,things that are of ,god are well       
ordered 99,vulg43 ',those that are1 are 
ordained of ,god4'4 ,now the ,divine    
ordering1 according to ,dionysius       
99,coel4 ,hier4 iv2 ,eccl4 ,hier4 v1 is 
such that the lowest things are directed
 by middle things4 ,now the angels hold 
a middle position between ,god and men1 
in that they have a greater share in the
 perfection of the ,divine goodness than
 men have4 ,wherefore the ,divine       
enlightenments and revelations are      
conveyed from ,god to men by the angels4
 ,now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by
 ,divine enlightenment and revelation4  
,therefore it is evident that it is     
conveyed by the angels4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,charity which makes man a friend of
 ,god1 is a perfection of the will1 in  
which ,god alone can form an impression2
 whereas prophecy is a perfection of the
 intellect1 in which an angel also can  
form an impression1 as stated in the    
,first ,part 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #a71        
wherefore the comparison fails between  

the two4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the         
gratuitous graces are ascribed to the   
,holy ,ghost as their first principle3  
yet ,he works grace of this kind in men 
by means of the angels4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,the work of the instrument is      
ascribed to the principal agent by whose
 power the instrument acts4 ,and since a
 minister is like an instrument1        
prophetic revelation1 which is conveyed 
by the ministry of the angels1 is said  
to be ,divine4   ,,third ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agb1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
a ,natural ,disposition ,is ,requisite  
for ,prophecy8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that a natural disposition is     
requisite for prophecy4 ,for prophecy is
 received by the prophet according to   
the disposition of the recipient1 since 
a gloss of ,jerome on ,amos #a3b1 ,the  
,lord will roar from ,sion1 says3       
,anyone who wishes to make a comparison 
naturally turns to those things of which
 he has experience1 and among which his 
life is spent4 ,for example1 sailors    

compare their enemies to the winds1 and 
their losses to a shipwreck4 ,in like   
manner ,amos1 who was a shepherd1 likens
 the fear of ,god to that which is      
inspired by the lion's roar4 ,now that  
which is received by a thing according  
to the mode of the recipient requires a 
natural disposition4 ,therefore prophecy
 requires a natural disposition4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 the considerations of     
prophecy are more lofty than those of   
acquired science4 ,now natural          
indisposition hinders the considerations
 of acquired science1 since many are    
prevented by natural indisposition from 
succeeding to grasp the speculations of 
science4 ,much more therefore is a      
natural disposition requisite for the   
contemplation of prophecy4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 natural indisposition is a    
much greater obstacle than an accidental
 impediment4 ,now the considerations of 
prophecy are hindered by an accidental  
occurrence4 ,for ,jerome says in his    
commentary on ,matthew 99,the quotation 

is from ,origen1 ,hom4 vi in ,num4 that 
at the time of the marriage act1 the    
presence of the ,holy ,ghost will not be
 vouchsafed1 even though it be a prophet
 that fulfils the duty of procreation4  
,much more therefore does a natural     
indisposition hinder prophecy2 and thus 
it would seem that a good natural       
disposition is requisite for prophecy4  
,on the contrary1 ,gregory says in a    
homily for ,pentecost 7xxx in ,ev473    
,he1 namely the ,holy ,ghost1 fills the 
boy harpist and makes him a ,psalmist2  
,he fills the herdsman plucking wild    
figs1 and makes him a prophet4          
,therefore prophecy requires no previous
 disposition1 but depends on the will   
alone of the ,holy ,ghost1 of ,whom it  
is written 7#a ,cor4 #ab3b73 ,all these 
things1 one and the same ,spirit        
worketh1 dividing to every one according
 as ,he will4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,a4 #a71 prophecy in its  
true and exact sense comes from ,divine 
inspiration2 while that which comes from

 a natural cause is not called prophecy 
except in a relative sense4 ,now we must
 observe that as ,god ,who is the       
universal efficient cause requires      
neither previous matter nor previous    
disposition of matter in ,his corporeal 
effects1 for ,he is able at the same    
instant to bring into being matter and  
disposition and form1 so neither does   
,he require a previous disposition in   
,his spiritual effects1 but is able to  
produce both the spiritual effect and at
 the same time the fitting disposition  
as requisite according to the order of  
nature4 ,more than this1 ,he is able at 
the same time1 by creation1 to produce  
the subject1 so as to dispose a soul for
 prophecy and give it the prophetic     
grace1 at the very instant of its       
creation4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it matters 
not to prophecy by what comparisons the 
thing prophesied is expressed2 and so   
the ,divine operation makes no change in
 a prophet in this respect4 ,yet if     
there be anything in him incompatible   

with prophecy1 it is removed by the     
,divine power4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the   
considerations of science proceed from a
 natural cause1 and nature cannot work  
without a previous disposition in       
matter4 ,this cannot be said of ,god    
,who is the cause of prophecy4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,a natural indisposition1 if  
not removed1 might be an obstacle to    
prophetic revelation1 for instance if a 
man were altogether deprived of the     
natural senses4 ,in the same way a man  
might be hindered from the act of       
prophesying by some very strong passion1
 whether of anger1 or of concupiscence  
as in coition1 or by any other passion4 
,but such a natural indisposition as    
this is removed by the ,divine power1   
which is the cause of prophecy4         
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agb1 
,art4 #d  ,whether a ,good ,life ,is    
,requisite for ,prophecy8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that a good life is  
requisite for prophecy4 ,for it is      
written 7,wis4 #g3bg7 that the wisdom of

 ,god through nations conveyeth herself 
into holy souls1 and maketh the friends 
of ,god1 and prophets4 ,now there can be
 no holiness without a good life and    
sanctifying grace4 ,therefore prophecy  
cannot be without a good life and       
sanctifying grace4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
secrets are not revealed save to a      
friend1 according to ,john #ae3ae1 ,but 
,i have called you friends1 because all 
things whatsoever ,i have heard of ,my  
,father1 ,i have made known to you4 ,now
 ,god reveals ,his secrets to the       
prophets 7,amos #c3g74 ,therefore it    
would seem that the prophets are the    
friends of ,god2 which is impossible    
without charity4 ,therefore seemingly   
prophecy cannot be without charity2 and 
charity is impossible without           
sanctifying grace4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
it is written 7,matt4 #g3ae73 ,beware of
 false prophets1 who come to you in the 
clothing of sheep1 but inwardly they are
 ravening wolves4 ,now all who are      
without grace are likened inwardly to a 

ravening wolf1 and consequently all such
 are false prophets4 ,therefore no man  
is a true prophet except he be good by  
grace4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the         
,philosopher says 7,de ,somn4 et ,vigil4
 99,cf4 ,de ,divinat4 per ,somn4 i1     
which is annexed to the work quoted7    
that if interpretation of dreams is from
 ,god1 it is unfitting for it to be     
bestowed on any but the best4 ,now it is
 evident that the gift of prophecy is   
from ,god4 ,therefore the gift of       
prophecy is vouchsafed only to the best 
men4  ,on the contrary1 ,to those who   
had said1 ,lord1 have we not prophesied 
in ,thy name8 this reply is made3 ,i    
never knew you 7,matt4 #g3bb1 #bc74 ,now
 the ,lord knoweth who are ,his 7#b     
,tim4 #b3ai74 ,therefore prophecy can be
 in those who are not ,god's by grace4  
,i answer that1 ,a good life may be     
considered from two points of view4     
,first1 with regard to its inward root1 
which is sanctifying grace4 ,secondly1  
with regard to the inward passions of   

the soul and the outward actions4 ,now  
sanctifying grace is given chiefly in   
order that man's soul may be united to  
,god by charity4 ,wherefore ,augustine  
says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ah73 ,a man is not
 transferred from the left side to the  
right1 unless he receive the ,holy      
,ghost1 by ,whom he is made a lover of  
,god and of his neighbor4 ,hence        
whatever can be without charity can be  
without sanctifying grace1 and          
consequently without goodness of life4  
,now prophecy can be without charity2   
and this is clear on two counts4 ,first1
 on account of their respective acts3   
for prophecy pertains to the intellect1 
whose act precedes the act of the will1 
which power is perfected by charity4    
,for this reason the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 
#ac7 reckons prophecy with other things 
pertinent to the intellect1 that can be 
had without charity4 ,secondly1 on      
account of their respective ends4 ,for  
prophecy like other gratuitous graces is
 given for the good of the ,church1     

according to #a ,cor4 #ab3g1 ,the       
manifestation of the ,spirit is given to
 every man unto profit2 and is not      
directly intended to unite man's        
affections to ,god1 which is the purpose
 of charity4 ,therefore prophecy can be 
without a good life1 as regards the     
first root of this goodness4  ,if1      
however1 we consider a good life1 with  
regard to the passions of the soul1 and 
external actions1 from this point of    
view an evil life is an obstacle to     
prophecy4 ,for prophecy requires the    
mind to be raised very high in order to 
contemplate spiritual things1 and this  
is hindered by strong passions1 and the 
inordinate pursuit of external things4  
,hence we read of the sons of the       
prophets 7#d ,kings #d3ch7 that they    
dwelt together with ,vulg43 'before'    
,eliseus1 leading a solitary life1 as it
 were1 lest worldly employment should be
 a hindrance to the gift of prophecy4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sometimes the gift of 
prophecy is given to a man both for the 

good of others1 and in order to         
enlighten his own mind2 and such are    
those whom ,divine wisdom1 conveying    
itself by sanctifying grace to their    
minds1 maketh the friends of ,god1 and  
prophets4 ,others1 however1 receive the 
gift of prophecy merely for the good of 
others4 ,hence ,jerome commenting on    
,matt4 #g3bb1 says3 ,sometimes          
prophesying1 the working of miracles1   
and the casting out of demons are       
accorded not to the merit of those who  
do these things1 but either to the      
invoking the name of ,christ1 or to the 
condemnation of those who invoke1 and   
for the good of those who see and hear4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,gregory 99,hom4 xxvii 
in ,ev4 expounding this passage 99,john 
#ae3ae says3 ,since we love the lofty   
things of heaven as soon as we hear     
them1 we know them as soon as we love   
them1 for to love is to know4           
,accordingly ,he had made all things    
known to them1 because having renounced 
earthly desires they were kindled by the

 torches of perfect love4 ,in this way  
the ,divine secrets are not always      
revealed to prophets4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,not all wicked men are ravening wolves1
 but only those whose purpose is to     
injure others4 ,for ,chrysostom says    
99,opus ,imperf4 in ,matth41 ,hom4 xix1 
among the works of ,st4 ,john           
,chrysostom1 and falsely ascribed to him
 that ,catholic teachers1 though they be
 sinners1 are called slaves of the      
flesh1 but never ravening wolves1       
because they do not purpose the         
destruction of ,christians4 ,and since  
prophecy is directed to the good of     
others1 it is manifest that such are    
false prophets1 because they are not    
sent for this purpose by ,god4  ,reply  
,obj4 #d3 ,god's gifts are not always   
bestowed on those who are simply the    
best1 but sometimes are vouchsafed to   
those who are best as regards the       
receiving of this or that gift4         
,accordingly ,god grants the gift of    
prophecy to those whom ,he judges best  

to give it to4   ,,fifth ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agb1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
,any ,prophecy ,comes from the ,demons8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no   
prophecy comes from the demons4 ,for    
prophecy is a ,divine revelation1       
according to ,cassiodorus 99,prol4 in   
,psalt4 i4 ,but that which is done by a 
demon is not ,divine4 ,therefore no     
prophecy can be from a demon4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 some kind of enlightenment is
 requisite for prophetic knowledge1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #aga1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c74  
,now the demons do not enlighten the    
human intellect1 as stated above in the 
,first ,part 7,q4 #aai1 ,a4 #c74        
,therefore no prophecy can come from the
 demons4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a sign is 
worthless if it betokens contraries4    
,now prophecy is a sign in confirmation 
of faith2 wherefore a gloss on ,rom4    
#ab3f1 ,either prophecy to be used      
according to the rule of faith1 says3   
,observe that in reckoning the graces1  
he begins with prophecy1 which is the   

first proof of the reasonableness of our
 faith2 since believers1 after receiving
 the ,spirit1 prophesied4 ,therefore    
prophecy cannot be bestowed by the      
demons4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is       
written 7#c ,kings #ah3ai73 ,gather unto
 me all ,israel unto mount ,carmel1 and 
the prophets of ,baal four hundred and  
fifty1 and the prophets of the grove    
four hundred1 who eat at ,jezebel's     
table4 ,now these were worshippers of   
demons4 ,therefore it would seem that   
there is also a prophecy from the       
demons4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,q4 #aga1 ,a4 #a71 prophecy      
denotes knowledge far removed from human
 knowledge4 ,now it is evident that an  
intellect of a higher order can know    
some things that are far removed from   
the knowledge of an inferior intellect4 
,again1 above the human intellect there 
is not only the ,divine intellect1 but  
also the intellects of good and bad     
angels according to the order of nature4
 ,hence the demons1 even by their       

natural knowledge1 know certain things  
remote from men's knowledge1 which they 
can reveal to men3 although those things
 which ,god alone knows are remote      
simply and most of all4  ,accordingly   
prophecy1 properly and simply1 is       
conveyed by ,divine revelations alone2  
yet the revelation which is made by the 
demons may be called prophecy in a      
restricted sense4 ,wherefore those men  
to whom something is revealed by the    
demons are styled in the ,scriptures as 
prophets1 not simply1 but with an       
addition1 for instance as false         
prophets1 or prophets of idols4 ,hence  
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1     
#ai73 ,when the evil spirit lays hold of
 a man for such purposes as these1      
namely visions1 he makes him either     
devilish1 or possessed1 or a false      
prophet4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,cassiodorus 
is here defining prophecy in its proper 
and simple acceptation4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,the demons reveal what they know to
 men1 not by enlightening the intellect1

 but by an imaginary vision1 or even by 
audible speech2 and in this way this    
prophecy differs from true prophecy4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the prophecy of the   
demons can be distinguished from ,divine
 prophecy by certain1 and even outward1 
signs4 ,hence ,chrysostom says 99,opus  
,imperf4 in ,matth41 ,hom4 xix1 falsely 
ascribed to ,st4 ,john ,chrysostom that 
some prophesy by the spirit of the      
devil1 such as diviners1 but they may be
 discerned by the fact that the devil   
sometimes utters what is false1 the     
,holy ,ghost never4 ,wherefore it is    
written 7,deut4 #ah3ba1 #bb73 ,if in    
silent thought thou answer3 ,how shall  
,i know the word that the ,lord hath    
spoken8 ,thou shalt have this sign3     
,whatsoever that same prophet           
foretelleth in the name of the ,lord1   
and it come not to pass1 that thing the 
,lord hath not spoken4   ,,sixth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agb1 ,art4 #f 
,whether the ,prophets of the ,demons   
,ever ,foretell the ,truth8  ,objection 

#a3 ,it would seem that the prophets of 
the demons never foretell the truth4    
,for ,ambrose 99,hilary the ,deacon     
7,ambrosiaster7 on #a ,cor4 #ab3c says  
that ,every truth1 by whomsoever spoken1
 is from the ,holy ,ghost4 ,now the     
prophets of the demons do not speak from
 the ,holy ,ghost1 because there is no  
concord between ,christ and ,belial     
99',what concord hath ,christ with      
,belial8' 7#b ,cor4 #f3ae74 ,therefore  
it would seem that they never foretell  
the truth4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as 
true prophets are inspired by the       
,spirit of truth1 so the prophets of the
 demons are inspired by the spirit of   
untruth1 according to #c ,kings #bb3bb1 
,i will go forth1 and be a lying spirit 
in the mouth of all his prophets4 ,now  
the prophets inspired by the ,holy      
,ghost never speak false1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore the
 prophets of the demons never speak     
truth4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is said  
of the devil 7,john #h3dd7 that when he 

speaketh a lie1 he speaketh of his own1 
for the devil is a liar1 and the father 
thereof1 i4e4 of lying4 ,now by         
inspiring his prophets1 the devil speaks
 only of his own1 for he is not         
appointed ,god's minister to declare the
 truth1 since light hath no fellowship  
with darkness 99,vulg43 ',what          
fellowship hath light with darkness8'   
7#b ,cor4 #f3ad74 ,therefore the        
prophets of the demons never foretell   
the truth4  ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss  
on ,num4 #bb3ad1 says that ,balaam was a
 diviner1 for he sometimes foreknew the 
future by help of the demons and the    
magic art4 ,now he foretold many true   
things1 for instance that which is to be
 found in ,num4 #bd3ag3 ,a star shall   
rise out of ,jacob1 and a scepter shall 
spring up from ,israel4 ,therefore even 
the prophets of the demons foretell the 
truth4  ,i answer that1 ,as the good is 
in relation to things1 so is the true in
 relation to knowledge4 ,now in things  
it is impossible to find one that is    

wholly devoid of good4 ,wherefore it is 
also impossible for any knowledge to be 
wholly false1 without some mixture of   
truth4 ,hence ,bede says 99,comment4 in 
,luc4 xvii1 #ab2 ,cf4 ,augustine1 ,,qq4 
,evang4 ii1 #dj that no teaching is so  
false that it never mingles truth with  
falsehood4 ,hence the teaching of the   
demons1 with which they instruct their  
prophets1 contains some truths whereby  
it is rendered acceptable4 ,for the     
intellect is led astray to falsehood by 
the semblance of truth1 even as the will
 is seduced to evil by the semblance of 
goodness4 ,wherefore ,chrysostom says   
99,opus ,imperf4 in ,matth41 ,hom4 xix1 
falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,john          
,chrysostom3 ,the devil is allowed      
sometimes to speak true things1 in order
 that his unwonted truthfulness may gain
 credit for his lie4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,the prophets of the demons do not      
always speak from the demons'           
revelation1 but sometimes by ,divine    
inspiration4 ,this was evidently the    

case with ,balaam1 of whom we read that 
the ,lord spoke to him 7,num4 #bb3ab71  
though he was a prophet of the demons1  
because ,god makes use even of the      
wicked for the profit of the good4      
,hence ,he foretells certain truths even
 by the demons' prophets1 both that the 
truth may be rendered more credible1    
since even its foes bear witness to it1 
and also in order that men1 by believing
 such men1 may be more easily led on to 
truth4 ,wherefore also the ,sibyls      
foretold many true things about ,christ4
  ,yet even when the demons' prophets   
are instructed by the demons1 they      
foretell the truth1 sometimes by virtue 
of their own nature1 the author of which
 is the ,holy ,ghost1 and sometimes by  
revelation of the good spirits1 as      
,augustine declares 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 
#ai73 so that even then this truth which
 the demons proclaim is from the ,holy  
,ghost4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a true       
prophet is always inspired by the       
,spirit of truth1 in ,whom there is no  

falsehood1 wherefore ,he never says what
 is not true2 whereas a false prophet is
 not always instructed by the spirit of 
untruth1 but sometimes even by the      
,spirit of truth4 ,even the very spirit 
of untruth sometimes declares true      
things1 sometimes false1 as stated      
above4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those things  
are called the demons' own1 which they  
have of themselves1 namely lies and     
sins2 while they have1 not of themselves
 but of ,god1 those things which belong 
to them by nature3 and it is by virtue  
of their own nature that they sometimes 
foretell the truth1 as stated above 7ad 
#a74 ,moreover ,god makes use of them to
 make known the truth which is to be    
accomplished through them1 by revealing 
,divine mysteries to them through the   
angels1 as already stated 7,gen4 ad lit4
 xii1 #ai2 ,i1 ,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a74
   ,,question #agc  ,,of ,,the ,,manner 
,,in ,,which ,,prophetic ,,knowledge    
,,is ,,conveyed 7,in ,four ,articles7   
,we must now consider the manner in     

which prophetic knowledge is conveyed1  
and under this head there are four      
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether the   
prophets see ,god's very essence8  7#b7 
,whether the prophetic revelation is    
effected by the infusion of certain     
species1 or by the infusion of ,divine  
light alone8  7#c7 ,whether prophetic   
revelation is always accompanied by     
abstraction from the sense8  7#d7       
,whether prophecy is always accompanied 
by knowledge of the things prophesied8  
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agc1  
,art4 #a  ,whether the ,prophets ,see   
the ,very ,essence of ,god8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that the prophets see
 the very essence of ,god1 for a gloss  
on ,isa4 #ch3a1 ,take order with thy    
house1 for thou shalt die and not live1 
says3 ,prophets can read in the book of 
,god's foreknowledge in which all things
 are written4 ,now ,god's foreknowledge 
is ,his very essence4 ,therefore        
prophets see ,god's very essence4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de     

,trin4 ix1 #g7 that in that eternal     
truth from which all temporal things are
 made1 we see with the mind's eye the   
type both of our being and of our       
actions4 ,now1 of all men1 prophets have
 the highest knowledge of ,divine       
things4 ,therefore they1 especially1 see
 the ,divine essence4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 future contingencies are      
foreknown by the prophets with          
unchangeable truth4 ,now future         
contingencies exist thus in ,god alone4 
,therefore the prophets see ,god        
,himself4  ,on the contrary1 ,the vision
 of the ,divine essence is not made void
 in heaven2 whereas prophecy is made    
void 7#a ,cor4 #ac3h74 ,therefore       
prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of 
the ,divine essence4  ,i answer that1   
,prophecy denotes ,divine knowledge as  
existing afar off4 ,wherefore it is said
 of the prophets 7,heb4 #aa3ac7 that    
they were beholding 4 4 4 afar off4 ,but
 those who are in heaven and in the     
state of bliss see1 not as from afar    

off1 but rather1 as it were1 from near  
at hand1 according to ,ps4 #aci3ad1 ,the
 upright shall dwell with ,thy          
countenance4 ,hence it is evident that  
prophetic knowledge differs from the    
perfect knowledge1 which we shall have  
in heaven1 so that it is distinguished  
therefrom as the imperfect from the     
perfect1 and when the latter comes the  
former is made void1 as appears from the
 words of the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4        
#ac3aj74  ,some1 however1 wishing to    
discriminate between prophetic knowledge
 and the knowledge of the blessed1 have 
maintained that the prophets see the    
very essence of ,god 7which they call   
the mirror of eternity7 99,cf4 ,de      
,veritate1 xii1 #f2 ,sent4 ,,ii1 ,d1    
,,xi1 part #b1 art4 #b1 ad #d1 not1     
however1 in the way in which it is the  
object of the blessed1 but as containing
 the types 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ae of future 
events4 ,but this is altogether         
impossible4 ,for ,god is the object of  
bliss in ,his very essence1 according to

 the saying of ,augustine 7,confess4 v1 
#d73 ,happy whoso knoweth ,thee1 though 
he know not these1 i4e4 creatures4 ,now 
it is not possible to see the types of  
creatures in the very essence of ,god   
without seeing ,it1 both because the    
,divine essence is ,itself the type of  
all things that are made--the ideal type
 adding nothing to the ,divine essence  
save only a relationship to the         
creature--and because knowledge of a    
thing in itself--and such is the        
knowledge of ,god as the object of      
heavenly bliss--precedes knowledge of   
that thing in its relation to something 
else--and such is the knowledge of ,god 
as containing the types of things4      
,consequently it is impossible for      
prophets to see ,god as containing the  
types of creatures1 and yet not as the  
object of bliss4 ,therefore we must     
conclude that the prophetic vision is   
not the vision of the very essence of   
,god1 and that the prophets do not see  
in the ,divine essence ,itself the      

things they do see1 but that they see   
them in certain images1 according as    
they are enlightened by the ,divine     
light4  ,wherefore ,dionysius 7,coel4   
,hier4 iv71 in speaking of prophetic    
visions1 says that the wise theologian  
calls that vision divine which is       
effected by images of things lacking a  
bodily form through the seer being rapt 
in divine things4 ,and these images     
illumined by the ,divine light have more
 of the nature of a mirror than the     
,divine essence3 since in a mirror      
images are formed from other things1 and
 this cannot be said of ,god4 ,yet the  
prophet's mind thus enlightened may be  
called a mirror1 in so far as a likeness
 of the truth of the ,divine            
foreknowledge is formed therein1 for    
which reason it is called the mirror of 
eternity1 as representing ,god's        
foreknowledge1 for ,god in ,his eternity
 sees all things as present before ,him1
 as stated above 7,q4 #agb1 ,a4 #a74    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the prophets are said 

to read the book of ,god's              
foreknowledge1 inasmuch as the truth is 
reflected from ,god's foreknowledge on  
the prophet's mind4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,man is said to see in the ,first ,truth
 the type of his existence1 in so far as
 the image of the ,first ,truth shines  
forth on man's mind1 so that he is able 
to know himself4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,from
 the very fact that future contingencies
 are in ,god according to unalterable   
truth1 it follows that ,god can impress 
a like knowledge on the prophet's mind  
without the prophet seeing ,god in ,his 
essence4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #agc1 ,art4 #b  ,whether1 in       
,prophetic ,revelation1 ,new ,species of
 ,things ,are ,impressed on the         
,prophet's ,mind1 or ,merely a ,new     
,light8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that in prophetic revelation no new     
species of things are impressed on the  
prophet's mind1 but only a new light4   
,for a gloss of ,jerome on ,amos #a3b   
says that prophets draw comparisons from

 things with which they are conversant4 
,but if prophetic vision were effected  
by means of species newly impressed1 the
 prophet's previous experience of things
 would be inoperative4 ,therefore no new
 species are impressed on the prophet's 
soul1 but only the prophetic light4     
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to        
,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #i71 it  
is not imaginative but intellective     
vision that makes the prophet2 wherefore
 it is declared 7,dan4 #aj3a7 that there
 is need of understanding in a vision4  
,now intellective vision1 as stated in  
the same book 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #f7 is
 not effected by means of images1 but by
 the very truth of things4 ,therefore it
 would seem that prophetic revelation is
 not effected by impressing species on  
the soul4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by the   
gift of prophecy the ,holy ,ghost endows
 man with something that surpasses the  
faculty of nature4 ,now man can by his  
natural faculties form all kinds of     
species of things4 ,therefore it would  

seem that in prophetic revelation no new
 species of things are impressed1 but   
merely an intellectual light4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,it is written 7,osee #ab3aj73
 ,i have multiplied their visions1 and  
,i have used similitudes1 by the        
ministry of the prophets4 ,now          
multiplicity of visions results1 not    
from a diversity of intellectual light1 
which is common to every prophetic      
vision1 but from a diversity of species1
 whence similitudes also result4        
,therefore it seems that in prophetic   
revelation new species of things are    
impressed1 and not merely an            
intellectual light4  ,i answer that1 ,as
 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1    
#i71 prophetic knowledge pertains most  
of all to the intellect4 ,now two things
 have to be considered in connection    
with the knowledge possessed by the     
human mind1 namely the acceptance or    
representation of things1 and the       
judgment of the things represented4 ,now
 things are represented to the human    

mind under the form of species3 and     
according to the order of nature1 they  
must be represented first to the senses1
 secondly to the imagination1 thirdly to
 the passive intellect1 and these are   
changed by the species derived from the 
phantasms1 which change results from the
 enlightening action of the active      
intellect4 ,now in the imagination there
 are the forms of sensible things not   
only as received from the senses1 but   
also transformed in various ways1 either
 on account of some bodily              
transformation 7as in the case of people
 who are asleep or out of their senses71
 or through the coordination of the     
phantasms1 at the command of reason1 for
 the purpose of understanding something4
 ,for just as the various arrangements  
of the letters of the alphabet convey   
various ideas to the understanding1 so  
the various coordinations of the        
phantasms produce various intelligible  
species of the intellect4  ,as to the   
judgment formed by the human mind1 it   

depends on the power of the intellectual
 light4  ,now the gift of prophecy      
confers on the human mind something     
which surpasses the natural faculty in  
both these respects1 namely as to the   
judgment which depends on the inflow of 
intellectual light1 and as to the       
acceptance or representation of things1 
which is effected by means of certain   
species4 ,human teaching may be likened 
to prophetic revelation in the second of
 these respects1 but not in the first4  
,for a man represents certain things to 
his disciple by signs of speech1 but he 
cannot enlighten him inwardly as ,god   
does4  ,but it is the first of these two
 that holds the chief place in prophecy1
 since judgment is the complement of    
knowledge4 ,wherefore if certain things 
are divinely represented to any man by  
means of imaginary likenesses1 as       
happened to ,pharaoh 7,gen4 #da3a-g7 and
 to ,nabuchodonosor 7,dan4 #d3a-b71 or  
even by bodily likenesses1 as happened  
to ,balthasar 7,dan4 #e3e71 such a man  

is not to be considered a prophet1      
unless his mind be enlightened for the  
purpose of judgment2 and such an        
apparition is something imperfect in the
 genus of prophecy4 ,wherefore some     
99,rabbi ,moyses1 ,doct4 ,perplex4 ,,ii1
 xxxvi have called this prophetic       
ecstasy1 and such is divination by      
dreams4 ,and yet a man will be a        
prophet1 if his intellect be enlightened
 merely for the purpose of judging of   
things seen in imagination by others1 as
 in the case of ,joseph who interpreted 
,pharaoh's dream4 ,but1 as ,augustine   
says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #i71 especially
 is he a prophet who excels in both     
respects1 so1 to wit1 as to see in      
spirit likenesses significant of things 
corporeal1 and understand them by the   
quickness of his intellect4  ,now       
sensible forms are divinely presented to
 the prophet's mind1 sometimes          
externally by means of the senses--thus 
,daniel saw the writing on the wall     
7,dan4 #e3be7--sometimes by means of    

imaginary forms1 either of exclusively  
,divine origin and not received through 
the senses 7for instance1 if images of  
colors were imprinted on the imagination
 of one blind from birth71 or divinely  
coordinated from those derived from the 
senses--thus ,jeremiah saw the boiling  
caldron 4 4 4 from the face of the north
 7,jer4 #a3ac7--or by the direct        
impression of intelligible species on   
the mind1 as in the case of those who   
receive infused scientific knowledge or 
wisdom1 such as ,solomon or the         
apostles4  ,but intellectual light is   
divinely imprinted on the human         
mind--sometimes for the purpose of      
judging of things seen by others1 as in 
the case of ,joseph1 quoted above1 and  
of the apostles whose understanding our 
,lord opened that they might understand 
the scriptures 7,luke #bd3de72 and to   
this pertains the interpretation of     
speeches--sometimes for the purpose of  
judging according to ,divine truth1 of  
the things which a man apprehends in the

 ordinary course of nature--sometimes   
for the purpose of discerning truthfully
 and efficaciously what is to be done1  
according to ,isa4 #fc3ad1 ,the ,spirit 
of the ,lord was their leader4  ,hence  
it is evident that prophetic revelation 
is conveyed sometimes by the mere       
infusion of light1 sometimes by         
imprinting species anew1 or by a new    
coordination of species4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,as stated above1 sometimes in      
prophetic revelation imaginary species  
previously derived from the senses are  
divinely coordinated so as to accord    
with the truth to be revealed1 and then 
previous experience is operative in the 
production of the images1 but not when  
they are impressed on the mind wholly   
from without4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3         
,intellectual vision is not effected by 
means of bodily and individual images1  
but by an intelligible image4 ,hence    
,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #aa7    
that the soul possesses a certain       
likeness of the species known to it4    

,sometimes this intelligible image is1  
in prophetic revelation1 imprinted      
immediately by ,god1 sometimes it       
results from pictures in the            
imagination1 by the aid of the prophetic
 light1 since a deeper truth is gathered
 from these pictures in the imagination 
by means of the enlightenment of the    
higher light4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is  
true that man is able by his natural    
powers to form all kinds of pictures in 
the imagination1 by simply considering  
these pictures1 but not so that they be 
directed to the representation of       
intelligible truths that surpass his    
intellect1 since for this purpose he    
needs the assistance of a supernatural  
light4   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #agc1 ,art4 #c  ,whether the        
,prophetic ,vision ,is ,always          
,accompanied by ,abstraction from the   
,senses8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that the prophetic vision is always     
accompanied by abstraction from the     
senses4 ,for it is written 7,num4       

#ab3f73 ,if there be among you a prophet
 of the ,lord1 ,i will appear to him in 
a vision1 or ,i will speak to him in a  
dream4 ,now a gloss says at the         
beginning of the ,psalter1 a vision that
 takes place by dreams and apparitions  
consists of things which seem to be said
 or done4 ,but when things seem to be   
said or done1 which are neither said nor
 done1 there is abstraction from the    
senses4 ,therefore prophecy is always   
accompanied by abstraction from the     
senses4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 when one   
power is very intent on its own         
operation1 other powers are drawn away  
from theirs2 thus men who are very      
intent on hearing something fail to see 
what takes place before them4 ,now in   
the prophetic vision the intellect is   
very much uplifted1 and intent on its   
act4 ,therefore it seems that the       
prophetic vision is always accompanied  
by abstraction from the senses4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 the same thing cannot1 at 
the same time1 tend in opposite         

directions4 ,now in the prophetic vision
 the mind tends to the acceptance of    
things from above1 and consequently it  
cannot at the same time tend to sensible
 objects4 ,therefore it would seem      
necessary for prophetic revelation to be
 always accompanied by abstraction from 
the senses4  ,obj4 #d3 ,on the contrary1
 ,it is written 7#a ,cor4 #ad3cb73 ,the 
spirits of the prophets are subject to  
the prophets4 ,now this were impossible 
if the prophet were not in possession of
 his faculties1 but abstracted from his 
senses4 ,therefore it would seem that   
prophetic vision is not accompanied by  
abstraction from the senses4  ,i answer 
that1 ,as stated in the foregoing       
,article1 the prophetic revelation takes
 place in four ways3 namely1 by the     
infusion of an intelligible light1 by   
the infusion of intelligible species1 by
 impression or coordination of pictures 
in the imagination1 and by the outward  
presentation of sensible images4 ,now it
 is evident that there is no abstraction

 from the senses1 when something is     
presented to the prophet's mind by means
 of sensible species--whether these be  
divinely formed for this special        
purpose1 as the bush shown to ,moses    
7,ex4 #c3b71 and the writing shown to   
,daniel 7,dan4 #e37--or whether they be 
produced by other causes2 yet so that   
they are ordained by ,divine providence 
to be prophetically significant of      
something1 as1 for instance1 the ,church
 was signified by the ark of ,noah4     
,again1 abstraction from the external   
senses is not rendered necessary when   
the prophet's mind is enlightened by an 
intellectual light1 or impressed with   
intelligible species1 since in us the   
perfect judgment of the intellect is    
effected by its turning to sensible     
objects1 which are the first principles 
of our knowledge1 as stated in the      
,first ,part 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #f74  ,when1 
however1 prophetic revelation is        
conveyed by images in the imagination1  
abstraction from the senses is necessary

 lest the things thus seen in           
imagination be taken for objects of     
external sensation4 ,yet this           
abstraction from the senses is sometimes
 complete1 so that a man perceives      
nothing with his senses2 and sometimes  
it is incomplete1 so that he perceives  
something with his senses1 yet does not 
fully discern the things he perceives   
outwardly from those he sees in         
imagination4 ,hence ,augustine says     
7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ab73 ,those images 
of bodies which are formed in the soul  
are seen just as bodily things          
themselves are seen by the body1 so that
 we see with our eyes one who is        
present1 and at the same time we see    
with the soul one who is absent1 as     
though we saw him with our eyes4  ,yet  
this abstraction from the senses takes  
place in the prophets without subverting
 the order of nature1 as is the case    
with those who are possessed or out of  
their senses2 but is due to some        
well-ordered cause4 ,this cause may be  

natural--for instance1 sleep--or        
spiritual--for instance1 the intenseness
 of the prophets' contemplation2 thus we
 read of ,peter 7,acts #aj3i7 that while
 he was praying in the supper-room      
99,vulg43 'the house-top' or            
'upper-chamber' he fell into an         
ecstasy--or he may be carried away by   
the ,divine power1 according to the     
saying of ,ezechiel #a3c3 ,the hand of  
the ,lord was upon him4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,the passage quoted refers to       
prophets in whom imaginary pictures were
 formed or coordinated1 either while    
asleep1 which is denoted by the word    
dream1 or while awake1 which is         
signified by the word vision4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,when the mind is intent1 in  
its act1 upon distant things which are  
far removed from the senses1 the        
intensity of its application leads to   
abstraction from the senses2 but when it
 is intent1 in its act1 upon the        
coordination of or judgment concerning  
objects of sense1 there is no need for  

abstraction from the senses4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,the movement of the prophetic
 mind results not from its own power1   
but from a power acting on it from      
above4 ,hence there is no abstraction   
from the senses when the prophet's mind 
is led to judge or coordinate matters   
relating to objects of sense1 but only  
when the mind is raised to the          
contemplation of certain more lofty     
things4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the spirit of
 the prophets is said to be subject to  
the prophets as regards the prophetic   
utterances to which the ,apostle refers 
in the words quoted2 because1 to wit1   
the prophets in declaring what they have
 seen speak their own mind1 and are not 
thrown off their mental balance1 like   
persons who are possessed1 as ,priscilla
 and ,montanus maintained4 ,but as      
regards the prophetic revelation itself1
 it would be more correct to say that   
the prophets are subject to the spirit  
of prophecy1 i4e4 to the prophetic gift4
   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    

#agc1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,prophets      
,always ,know the ,things ,which ,they  
,prophesy8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that the prophets always know the  
things which they prophesy4 ,for1 as    
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #i71
 those to whom signs were shown in      
spirit by means of the likenesses of    
bodily things1 had not the gift of      
prophecy1 unless the mind was brought   
into action1 so that those signs were   
also understood by them4 ,now what is   
understood cannot be unknown4 ,therefore
 the prophet is not ignorant of what he 
prophesies4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the    
light of prophecy surpasses the light of
 natural reason4 ,now one who possesses 
a science by his natural light1 is not  
ignorant of his scientific acquirements4
 ,therefore he who utters things by the 
prophetic light cannot ignore them4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 prophecy is directed
 for man's enlightenment2 wherefore it  
is written 7#b ,pet4 #a3ai73 ,we have   
the more firm prophetical word1         

whereunto you do well to attend1 as to a
 light that shineth in a dark place4    
,now nothing can enlighten others unless
 it be lightsome in itself4 ,therefore  
it would seem that the prophet is first 
enlightened so as to know what he       
declares to others4  ,on the contrary1  
,it is written 7,john #aa3ea73 ,and this
 he 7,caiphas7 spoke1 not of himself1   
but being the ,high ,priest of that     
year1 he prophesied that ,jesus should  
die for the nation1 etc4 ,now ,caiphas  
knew this not4 ,therefore not every     
prophet knows what he prophesies4  ,i   
answer that1 ,in prophetic revelation   
the prophet's mind is moved by the ,holy
 ,ghost1 as an instrument that is       
deficient in regard to the principal    
agent4 ,now the prophet's mind is moved 
not only to apprehend something1 but    
also to speak or to do something2       
sometimes indeed to all these three     
together1 sometimes to two1 sometimes to
 one only1 and in each case there may be
 a defect in the prophet's knowledge4   

,for when the prophet's mind is moved to
 think or apprehend a thing1 sometimes  
he is led merely to apprehend that      
thing1 and sometimes he is further led  
to know that it is divinely revealed to 
him4  ,again1 sometimes the prophet's   
mind is moved to speak something1 so    
that he understands what the ,holy      
,ghost means by the words he utters2    
like ,david who said 7#b ,kings #bc3b73 
,the ,spirit of the ,lord hath spoken by
 me2 while1 on the other hand1 sometimes
 the person whose mind is moved to utter
 certain words knows not what the ,holy 
,ghost means by them1 as was the case   
with ,caiphas 7,john #aa3ea74  ,again1  
when the ,holy ,ghost moves a man's mind
 to do something1 sometimes the latter  
understands the meaning of it1 like     
,jeremias who hid his loin-cloth in the 
,euphrates 7,jer4 #ac3a-aa72 while      
sometimes he does not understand        
it--thus the soldiers1 who divided      
,christ's garments1 understood not the  
meaning of what they did4  ,accordingly1

 when a man knows that he is being moved
 by the ,holy ,ghost to think something1
 or signify something by word or deed1  
this belongs properly to prophecy2      
whereas when he is moved1 without his   
knowing it1 this is not perfect         
prophecy1 but a prophetic instinct4     
,nevertheless it must be observed that  
since the prophet's mind is a defective 
instrument1 as stated above1 even true  
prophets know not all that the ,holy    
,ghost means by the things they see1 or 
speak1 or even do4  ,and this suffices  
for the ,replies to the ,objections1    
since the arguments given at the        
beginning refer to true prophets whose  
minds are perfectly enlightened from    
above4   ,,question #agd  ,,of ,,the    
,,division ,,of ,,prophecy 7,,six       
,,articles7  ,we must now consider the  
division of prophecy1 and under this    
head there are six points of inquiry3   
7#a7 ,the division of prophecy into its 
species2  7#b7 ,whether the more        
excellent prophecy is that which is     

without imaginative vision8  7#c7 ,the  
various degrees of prophecy2  7#d7      
,whether ,moses was the greatest of the 
prophets8  7#e7 ,whether a comprehensor 
can be a prophet8  7#f7 ,whether        
prophecy advanced in perfection as time 
went on8   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #agd1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,prophecy  
,is ,fittingly ,divided into the        
,prophecy of ,divine ,predestination1 of
 ,foreknowledge1 and of ,denunciation8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
prophecy is unfittingly divided         
according to a gloss on ,matt4 #a3bc1   
,behold a virgin shall be with child1   
where it is stated that one kind of     
prophecy proceeds from the ,divine      
predestination1 and must in all respects
 be accomplished so that its fulfillment
 is independent of our will1 for        
instance the one in question4 ,another  
prophecy proceeds from ,god's           
foreknowledge3 and into this our will   
enters4 ,and another prophecy is called 
denunciation1 which is significative of 

,god's disapproval4 ,for that which     
results from every prophecy should not  
be reckoned a part of prophecy4 ,now all
 prophecy is according to the ,divine   
foreknowledge1 since the prophets read  
in the book of foreknowledge1 as a gloss
 says on ,isa4 #ch3a4 ,therefore it     
would seem that prophecy according to   
foreknowledge should not be reckoned a  
species of prophecy4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 just as something is foretold 
in denunciation1 so is something        
foretold in promise1 and both of these  
are subject to alteration4 ,for it is   
written 7,jer4 #ah3g1 #h73 ,i will      
suddenly speak against a nation and     
against a kingdom1 to root out1 and to  
pull down1 and to destroy it4 ,if that  
nation against which ,i have spoken     
shall repent of their evil1 ,i also will
 repent--and this pertains to the       
prophecy of denunciation1 and afterwards
 the text continues in reference to the 
prophecy of promise 7,jer4 #ah3i1 #aj73 
,i will suddenly speak of a nation and  

of a kingdom1 to build up and plant it4 
,if it shall do evil in ,my sight 4 4 4 
,i will repent of the good that ,i have 
spoken to do unto it4 ,therefore as     
there is reckoned to be a prophecy of   
denunciation1 so should there be a      
prophecy of promise4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 vii1    
#h73 ,there are seven kinds of prophecy4
 ,the first is an ecstasy1 which is the 
transport of the mind3 thus ,peter saw a
 vessel descending from heaven with all 
manner of beasts therein4 ,the second   
kind is a vision1 as we read in ,isaias1
 who says 7,isa4 #f3a73 ',i saw the     
,lord sitting1' etc4 ,the third kind is 
a dream3 thus ,jacob in a dream1 saw a  
ladder4 ,the fourth kind is from the    
midst of a cloud3 thus ,god spake to    
,moses4 ,the fifth kind is a voice from 
heaven1 as that which called to ,abraham
 saying 7,gen4 #bb3aa73 ',lay not thy   
hand upon the boy4' ,the sixth kind is  
taking up a parable1 as in the example  
of ,balaam 7,num4 #bc3g2 #bd3ae74 ,the  

seventh kind is the fullness of the     
,holy ,ghost1 as in the case of nearly  
all the prophets4 ,further1 he mentions 
three kinds of vision2 one by the eyes  
of the body1 another by the soul's      
imagination1 a third by the eyes of the 
mind4 ,now these are not included in the
 aforesaid division4 ,therefore it is   
insufficient4  ,on the contrary1 stands 
the authority of ,jerome to whom the    
gloss above quoted is ascribed4  ,i     
answer that1 ,the species of moral      
habits and acts are distinguished       
according to their objects4 ,now the    
object of prophecy is something known by
 ,god and surpassing the faculty of man4
 ,wherefore1 according to the difference
 of such things1 prophecy is divided    
into various species1 as assigned above4
 ,now it has been stated above 7,q4 #ga1
 ,a4 #f1 ad #b7 that the future is      
contained in the ,divine knowledge in   
two ways4 ,first1 as in its cause3 and  
thus we have the prophecy of            
denunciation1 which is not always       

fulfilled4 but it foretells the relation
 of cause to effect1 which is sometimes 
hindered by some other occurrence       
supervening4 ,secondly1 ,god foreknows  
certain things in themselves--either as 
to be accomplished by ,himself1 and of  
such things is the prophecy of          
predestination1 since1 according to     
,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #cj71  
,god predestines things which are not in
 our power--or as to be accomplished    
through man's free-will1 and of such is 
the prophecy of foreknowledge4 ,this may
 regard either good or evil1 which does 
not apply to the prophecy of            
predestination1 since the latter regards
 good alone4 ,and since predestination  
is comprised under foreknowledge1 the   
gloss in the beginning of the ,psalter  
assigns only two species to prophecy1   
namely of foreknowledge1 and of         
denunciation4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3         
,foreknowledge1 properly speaking1      
denotes precognition of future events in
 themselves1 and in this sense it is    

reckoned a species of prophecy4 ,but in 
so far as it is used in connection with 
future events1 whether as in themselves1
 or as in their causes1 it is common to 
every species of prophecy4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,the prophecy of promise is        
included in the prophecy of             
denunciation1 because the aspect of     
truth is the same in both4 ,but it is   
denominated in preference from          
denunciation1 because ,god is more      
inclined to remit punishment than to    
withdraw promised blessings4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,isidore divides prophecy     
according to the manner of prophesying4 
,now we may distinguish the manner of   
prophesying--either according to man's  
cognitive powers1 which are sense1      
imagination1 and intellect1 and then we 
have the three kinds of vision mentioned
 both by him and by ,augustine 7,gen4 ad
 lit4 xii1 #f1 #g7--or according to the 
different ways in which the prophetic   
current is received4 ,thus as regards   
the enlightening of the intellect there 

is the fullness of the ,holy ,ghost     
which he mentions in the seventh place4 
,as to the imprinting of pictures on the
 imagination he mentions three1 namely  
dreams1 to which he gives the third     
place2 vision1 which occurs to the      
prophet while awake and regards any kind
 of ordinary object1 and this he puts in
 the second place2 and ecstasy1 which   
results from the mind being uplifted to 
certain lofty things1 and to this he    
assigns the first place4 ,as regards    
sensible signs he reckons three kinds of
 prophecy1 because a sensible sign      
is--either a corporeal thing offered    
externally to the sight1 such as a      
cloud1 which he mentions in the fourth  
place--or a voice sounding from without 
and conveyed to man's hearing--this he  
puts in the fifth place--or a voice     
proceeding from a man1 conveying        
something under a similitude1 and this  
pertains to the parable to which he     
assigns the sixth place4   ,,second     
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agd1 ,art4 #b 

,whether the ,prophecy ,which ,is       
,accompanied by ,intellective and       
,imaginative ,vision ,is ,more          
,excellent ,than ,that ,which ,is       
,accompanied by ,intellective ,vision   
,alone8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that the prophecy which has intellective
 and imaginative vision is more         
excellent than that which is accompanied
 by intellective vision alone4 ,for     
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #i73
 ,he is less a prophet1 who sees in     
spirit nothing but the signs            
representative of things1 by means of   
the images of things corporeal3 he is   
more a prophet1 who is merely endowed   
with the understanding of these signs2  
but most of all is he a prophet1 who    
excels in both ways1 and this refers to 
the prophet who has intellective        
together with imaginative vision4       
,therefore this kind of prophecy is more
 excellent4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the    
greater a thing's power is1 the greater 
the distance to which it extends4 ,now  

the prophetic light pertains chiefly to 
the mind1 as stated above 7,q4 #agc1 ,a4
 #b74 ,therefore apparently the prophecy
 that extends to the imagination is     
greater than that which is confined to  
the intellect4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1     
,jerome 7,prol4 in ,lib4 ,reg47         
distinguishes the prophets from the     
sacred writers4 ,now all those whom he  
calls prophets 7such as ,isaias1        
,jeremias1 and the like7 had            
intellective together with imaginative  
vision3 but not those whom he calls     
sacred writers1 as writing by the       
inspiration of the ,holy ,ghost 7such as
 ,job1 ,david1 ,solomon1 and the like74 
,therefore it would seem more proper to 
call prophets those who had intellective
 together with imaginative vision1 than 
those who had intellective vision alone4
  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,dionysius says   
7,coel4 ,hier4 i7 that it is impossible 
for the ,divine ray to shine on us1     
except as screened round about by the   
many-colored sacred veils4 ,now the     

prophetic revelation is conveyed by the 
infusion of the divine ray4 ,therefore  
it seems that it cannot be without the  
veils of phantasms4  ,on the contrary1  
,a gloss says at the beginning of the   
,psalter that the most excellent manner 
of prophecy is when a man prophesies by 
the mere inspiration of the ,holy       
,ghost1 apart from any outward          
assistance of deed1 word1 vision1 or    
dream4  ,i answer that1 ,the excellence 
of the means is measured chiefly by the 
end4 ,now the end of prophecy is the    
manifestation of a truth that surpasses 
the faculty of man4 ,wherefore the more 
effective this manifestation is1 the    
more excellent the prophecy4 ,but it is 
evident that the manifestation of divine
 truth by means of the bare             
contemplation of the truth itself1 is   
more effective than that which is       
conveyed under the similitude of        
corporeal things1 for it approaches     
nearer to the heavenly vision whereby   
the truth is seen in ,god's essence4    

,hence it follows that the prophecy     
whereby a supernatural truth is seen by 
intellectual vision1 is more excellent  
than that in which a supernatural truth 
is manifested by means of the           
similitudes of corporeal things in the  
vision of the imagination4  ,moreover   
the prophet's mind is shown thereby to  
be more lofty3 even as in human teaching
 the hearer1 who is able to grasp the   
bare intelligible truth the master      
propounds1 is shown to have a better    
understanding than one who needs to be  
taken by the hand and helped by means of
 examples taken from objects of sense4  
,hence it is said in commendation of    
,david's prophecy 7#b ,kings #bc3c73    
,the strong one of ,israel spoke to me1 
and further on 7#b ,kings #bc3d73 ,as   
the light of the morning1 when the sun  
riseth1 shineth in the morning without  
clouds4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when a       
particular supernatural truth has to be 
revealed by means of corporeal images1  
he that has both1 namely the            

intellectual light and the imaginary    
vision1 is more a prophet than he that  
has only one1 because his prophecy is   
more perfect2 and it is in this sense   
that ,augustine speaks as quoted above4 
,nevertheless the prophecy in which the 
bare intelligible truth is revealed is  
greater than all4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the
 same judgment does not apply to things 
that are sought for their own sake1 as  
to things sought for the sake of        
something else4 ,for in things sought   
for their own sake1 the agent's power is
 the more effective according as it     
extends to more numerous and more remote
 objects2 even so a physician is thought
 more of1 if he is able to heal more    
people1 and those who are further       
removed from health4 ,on the other hand1
 in things sought only for the sake of  
something else1 that agent would seem to
 have greater power1 who is able to     
achieve his purpose with fewer means and
 those nearest to hand3 thus more praise
 is awarded the physician who is able to

 heal a sick person by means of fewer   
and more gentle remedies4 ,now1 in the  
prophetic knowledge1 imaginary vision is
 required1 not for its own sake1 but on 
account of the manifestation of the     
intelligible truth4 ,wherefore prophecy 
is all the more excellent according as  
it needs it less4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the
 fact that a particular predicate is    
applicable to one thing and less        
properly to another1 does not prevent   
this latter from being simply better    
than the former3 thus the knowledge of  
the blessed is more excellent than the  
knowledge of the wayfarer1 although     
faith is more properly predicated of the
 latter knowledge1 because faith implies
 an imperfection of knowledge4 ,in like 
manner prophecy implies a certain       
obscurity1 and remoteness from the      
intelligible truth2 wherefore the name  
of prophet is more properly applied to  
those who see by imaginary vision4 ,and 
yet the more excellent prophecy is that 
which is conveyed by intellectual       

vision1 provided the same truth be      
revealed in either case4 ,if1 however1  
the intellectual light be divinely      
infused in a person1 not that he may    
know some supernatural things1 but that 
he may be able to judge1 with the       
certitude of divine truth1 of things    
that can be known by human reason1 such 
intellectual prophecy is beneath that   
which is conveyed by an imaginary vision
 leading to a supernatural truth4 ,it   
was this kind of prophecy that all those
 had who are included in the ranks of   
the prophets1 who moreover were called  
prophets for the special reason that    
they exercised the prophetic calling    
officially4 ,hence they spoke as ,god's 
representatives1 saying to the people3  
,thus saith the ,lord3 but not so the   
authors of the sacred writings1 several 
of whom treated more frequently of      
things that can be known by human       
reason1 not in ,god's name1 but in their
 own1 yet with the assistance of the    
,divine light withal4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 

,in the present life the enlightenment  
by the divine ray is not altogether     
without any veil of phantasms1 because  
according to his present state of life  
it is unnatural to man not to understand
 without a phantasm4 ,sometimes1        
however1 it is sufficient to have       
phantasms abstracted in the usual way   
from the senses without any imaginary   
vision divinely vouchsafed1 and thus    
prophetic vision is said to be without  
imaginary vision4   ,,third ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agd1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
the ,degrees of ,prophecy ,can ,be      
,distinguished ,according to the        
,imaginary ,vision8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that the degrees of prophecy 
cannot be distinguished according to the
 imaginary vision4 ,for the degrees of a
 thing bear relation to something that  
is on its own account1 not on account of
 something else4 ,now1 in prophecy1     
intellectual vision is sought on its own
 account1 and imaginary vision on       
account of something else1 as stated    

above 7,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,therefore it    
would seem that the degrees of prophecy 
are distinguished not according to      
imaginary1 but only according to        
intellectual1 vision4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 seemingly for one prophet     
there is one degree of prophecy4 ,now   
one prophet receives revelation through 
various imaginary visions4 ,therefore a 
difference of imaginary visions does not
 entail a difference of prophecy4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 according to a gloss     
99,cassiodorus1 super ,prolog4 ,hieron4 
in ,psalt41 prophecy consists of words1 
deeds1 dreams1 and visions4 ,therefore  
the degrees of prophecy should not be   
distinguished according to imaginary    
vision1 to which vision and dreams      
pertain1 rather than according to words 
and deeds4  ,on the contrary1 ,the      
medium differentiates the degrees of    
knowledge3 thus science based on direct 
99,propter quid proofs is more excellent
 than science based on indirect 99,quia 
premises or than opinion1 because it    

comes through a more excellent medium4  
,now imaginary vision is a kind of      
medium in prophetic knowledge4          
,therefore the degrees of prophecy      
should be distinguished according to    
imaginary vision4  ,i answer that1 ,as  
stated above 7,q4 #agc1 ,a4 #b71 the    
prophecy wherein1 by the intelligible   
light1 a supernatural truth is revealed 
through an imaginary vision1 holds the  
mean between the prophecy wherein a     
supernatural truth is revealed without  
imaginary vision1 and that wherein      
through the intelligible light and      
without an imaginary vision1 man is     
directed to know or do things pertaining
 to human conduct4 ,now knowledge is    
more proper to prophecy than is action2 
wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy 
is when a man1 by an inward instinct1 is
 moved to perform some outward action4  
,thus it is related of ,samson 7,judges 
#ae3ad7 that the ,spirit of the ,lord   
came strongly upon him1 and as the flax 
99,lina4 ,st4 ,thomas apparently read   

ligna 7'wood'7 is wont to be consumed at
 the approach of fire1 so the bands with
 which he was bound were broken and     
loosed4 ,the second degree of prophecy  
is when a man is enlightened by an      
inward light so as to know certain      
things1 which1 however1 do not go beyond
 the bounds of natural knowledge3 thus  
it is related of ,solomon 7#c ,kings    
#d3cb1 #cc7 that he spoke 4 4 4 parables
 4 4 4 and he treated about trees from  
the cedar that is in ,libanus unto the  
hyssop that cometh out of the wall1 and 
he discoursed of beasts and of fowls1   
and of creeping things and of fishes3   
and all of this came from divine        
inspiration1 for it was stated          
previously 7#c ,kings #d3bi73 ,god gave 
to ,solomon wisdom and understanding    
exceeding much4  ,nevertheless these two
 degrees are beneath prophecy properly  
so called1 because they do not attain to
 supernatural truth4 ,the prophecy      
wherein supernatural truth is manifested
 through imaginary vision is            

differentiated first according to the   
difference between dreams which occur   
during sleep1 and vision which occurs   
while one is awake4 ,the latter belongs 
to a higher degree of prophecy1 since   
the prophetic light that draws the soul 
away to supernatural things while it is 
awake and occupied with sensible things 
would seem to be stronger than that     
which finds a man's soul asleep and     
withdrawn from objects of sense4        
,secondly the degrees of this prophecy  
are differentiated according to the     
expressiveness of the imaginary signs   
whereby the intelligible truth is       
conveyed4 ,and since words are the most 
expressive signs of intelligible truth1 
it would seem to be a higher degree of  
prophecy when the prophet1 whether awake
 or asleep1 hears words expressive of an
 intelligible truth1 than when he sees  
things significative of truth1 for      
instance the seven full ears of corn    
signified seven years of plenty 7,gen4  
#da3bb1 #bf74 ,in such like signs       

prophecy would seem to be the more      
excellent1 according as the signs are   
more expressive1 for instance when      
,jeremias saw the burning of the city   
under the figure of a boiling cauldron  
7,jer4 #a3ac74 ,thirdly1 it is evidently
 a still higher degree of prophecy when 
a prophet not only sees signs of words  
or deeds1 but also1 either awake or     
asleep1 sees someone speaking or showing
 something to him1 since this proves the
 prophet's mind to have approached      
nearer to the cause of the revelation4  
,fourthly1 the height of a degree of    
prophecy may be measured according to   
the appearance of the person seen3 for  
it is a higher degree of prophecy1 if he
 who speaks or shows something to the   
waking or sleeping prophet be seen by   
him under the form of an angel1 than if 
he be seen by him under the form of man3
 and higher still is it1 if he be seen  
by the prophet whether asleep or awake1 
under the appearance of ,god1 according 
to ,isa4 #f3a1 ,i saw the ,lord sitting4

  ,but above all these degrees there is 
a third kind of prophecy1 wherein an    
intelligible and supernatural truth is  
shown without any imaginary vision4     
,however1 this goes beyond the bounds of
 prophecy properly so called1 as stated 
above 7,a4 #b1 ad #c72 and consequently 
the degrees of prophecy are properly    
distinguished according to imaginary    
vision4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we are unable
 to know how to distinguish the         
intellectual light1 except by means of  
imaginary or sensible signs4 ,hence the 
difference in the intellectual light is 
gathered from the difference in the     
things presented to the imagination4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#aga1 ,a4 #b71 prophecy is by way1 not  
of an abiding habit1 but of a transitory
 passion2 wherefore there is nothing    
inconsistent if one and the same        
prophet1 at different times1 receive    
various degrees of prophetic revelation4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the words and deeds 
mentioned there do not pertain to the   

prophetic revelation1 but to the        
announcement1 which is made according to
 the disposition of those to whom that  
which is revealed to the prophet is     
announced2 and this is done sometimes by
 words1 sometimes by deeds4 ,now this   
announcement1 and the working of        
miracles1 are something consequent upon 
prophecy1 as stated above 7,q4 #aga1 ,a4
 #a74   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #agd1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,moses ,was
 the ,greatest of the ,prophets8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
,moses was not the greatest of the      
prophets4 ,for a gloss at the beginning 
of the ,psalter says that ,david is     
called the prophet by way of excellence4
 ,therefore ,moses was not the greatest 
of all4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 greater    
miracles were wrought by ,josue1 who    
made the sun and moon to stand still    
7,josh4 #aj3ab-ad71 and by ,isaias1 who 
made the sun to turn back 7,isa4 #ch3h71
 than by ,moses1 who divided the ,red   
,sea 7,ex4 #ad3ba74 ,in like manner     

greater miracles were wrought by ,elias1
 of whom it is written 7,ecclus4 #dh3d1 
#e73 ,who can glory like to thee8 ,who  
raisedst up a dead man from below4      
,therefore ,moses was not the greatest  
of the prophets4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it
 is written 7,matt4 #aa3aa7 that there  
hath not risen1 among them that are born
 of women1 a greater than ,john the     
,baptist4 ,therefore ,moses was not     
greater than all the prophets4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4        
#cd3aj73 ,there arose no more a prophet 
in ,israel like unto ,moses4  ,i answer 
that1 ,although in some respect one or  
other of the prophets was greater than  
,moses1 yet ,moses was simply the       
greatest of all4 ,for1 as stated above  
7,a4 #c2 ,q4 #aga1 ,a4 #a71 in prophecy 
we may consider not only the knowledge1 
whether by intellectual or by imaginary 
vision1 but also the announcement and   
the confirmation by miracles4           
,accordingly ,moses was greater than the
 other prophets4 ,first1 as regards the 

intellectual vision1 since he saw ,god's
 very essence1 even as ,paul in his     
rapture did1 according to ,augustine    
7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #bg74 ,hence it is  
written 7,num4 #ab3h7 that he saw ,god  
plainly and not by riddles4 ,secondly1  
as regards the imaginary vision1 which  
he had at his call1 as it were1 for not 
only did he hear words1 but also saw one
 speaking to him under the form of ,god1
 and this not only while asleep1 but    
even when he was awake4 ,hence it is    
written 7,ex4 #cc3aa7 that the ,lord    
spoke to ,moses face to face1 as a man  
is wont to speak to his friend4         
,thirdly1 as regards the working of     
miracles which he wrought on a whole    
nation of unbelievers4 ,wherefore it is 
written 7,deut4 #cd3aj1 #aa73 ,there    
arose no more a prophet in ,israel like 
unto ,moses1 whom the ,lord knew face to
 face3 in all the signs and wonders1    
which ,he sent by him1 to do in the land
 of ,egypt to ,pharaoh1 and to all his  
servants1 and to his whole land4  ,reply

 ,obj4 #a3 ,the prophecy of ,david      
approaches near to the vision of ,moses1
 as regards the intellectual vision1    
because both received a revelation of   
intelligible and supernatural truth1    
without any imaginary vision4 ,yet the  
vision of ,moses was more excellent as  
regards the knowledge of the ,godhead2  
while ,david more fully knew and        
expressed the mysteries of ,christ's    
incarnation4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,these   
signs of the prophets mentioned were    
greater as to the substance of the thing
 done2 yet the miracles of ,moses were  
greater as regards the way in which they
 were done1 since they were wrought on a
 whole people4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,john  
belongs to the ,new ,testament1 whose   
ministers take precedence even of       
,moses1 since they are spectators of a  
fuller revelation1 as stated in #b ,cor4
 #c4   ,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 
#agd1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,there ,is a   
,degree of ,prophecy in the ,blessed8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there

 is a degree of prophecy in the blessed4
 ,for1 as stated above 7,a4 #d71 ,moses 
saw the ,divine essence1 and yet he is  
called a prophet4 ,therefore in like    
manner the blessed can be called        
prophets4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prophecy 
is a divine revelation4 ,now divine     
revelations are made even to the blessed
 angels4 ,therefore even blessed angels 
can be prophets4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
,christ was a comprehensor from the     
moment of ,his conception2 and yet ,he  
calls ,himself a prophet 7,matt4        
#ac3eg71 when ,he says3 ,a prophet is   
not without honor1 save in his own      
country4 ,therefore even comprehensors  
and the blessed can be called prophets4 
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is written of    
,samuel 7,ecclus4 #df3bc73 ,he lifted up
 his voice from the earth in prophecy to
 blot out the wickedness of the nation4 
,therefore other saints can likewise be 
called prophets after they have died4   
,on the contrary1 ,the prophetic word is
 compared 7#b ,pet4 #a3ai7 to a light   

that shineth in a dark place4 ,now there
 is no darkness in the blessed4         
,therefore they cannot be called        
prophets4  ,i answer that1 ,prophecy    
denotes vision of some supernatural     
truth as being far remote from us4 ,this
 happens in two ways4 ,first1 on the    
part of the knowledge itself1 because1  
to wit1 the supernatural truth is not   
known in itself1 but in some of its     
effects2 and this truth will be more    
remote if it be known by means of images
 of corporeal things1 than if it be     
known in its intelligible effects2 and  
such most of all is the prophetic       
vision1 which is conveyed by images and 
likenesses of corporeal things4         
,secondly1 vision is remote on the part 
of the seer1 because1 to wit1 he has not
 yet attained completely to his ultimate
 perfection1 according to #b ,cor4 #e3f1
 ,while we are in the body1 we are      
absent from the ,lord4  ,now in neither 
of these ways are the blessed remote2   
wherefore they cannot be called         

prophets4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this vision
 of ,moses was interrupted after the    
manner of a passion1 and was not        
permanent like the beatific vision1     
wherefore he was as yet a seer from     
afar4 ,for this reason his vision did   
not entirely lose the character of      
prophecy4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the divine 
revelation is made to the angels1 not as
 being far distant1 but as already      
wholly united to ,god2 wherefore their  
revelation has not the character of     
prophecy4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,christ was 
at the same time comprehensor and       
wayfarer 99,cf4 ,,iii1 ,,qq4 #i1 seqq44 
,consequently the notion of prophecy is 
not applicable to ,him as a             
comprehensor1 but only as a wayfarer4   
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,samuel had not yet    
attained to the state of blessedness4   
,wherefore although by ,god's will the  
soul itself of ,samuel foretold to ,saul
 the issue of the war as revealed to him
 by ,god1 this pertains to the nature of
 prophecy4 ,it is not the same with the 

saints who are now in heaven4 ,nor does 
it make any difference that this is     
stated to have been brought about by the
 demons' art1 because although the      
demons are unable to evoke the soul of a
 saint1 or to force it to do any        
particular thing1 this can be done by   
the power of ,god1 so that when the     
demon is consulted1 ,god ,himself       
declares the truth by ,his messenger3   
even as ,he gave a true answer by ,elias
 to the ,king's messengers who were sent
 to consult the god of ,accaron 7#d     
,kings #a74  ,it might also be replied  
99,the ,book of ,ecclesiasticus was not 
as yet declared by the ,church to be    
,canonical ,scripture2 ,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #hi1
 ,a4 #h1 ad #b that it was not the soul 
of ,samuel1 but a demon impersonating   
him2 and that the wise man calls him    
,samuel1 and describes his prediction as
 prophetic1 in accordance with the      
thoughts of ,saul and the bystanders who
 were of this opinion4   ,,sixth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agd1 ,art4 #f 

,whether the ,degrees of ,prophecy      
,change ,as ,time ,goes ,on8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that the degrees of 
prophecy change as time goes on4 ,for   
prophecy is directed to the knowledge of
 ,divine things1 as stated above 7,a4   
#b74 ,now according to ,gregory 7,hom4  
in ,ezech471 knowledge of ,god went on  
increasing as time went on4 ,therefore  
degrees of prophecy should be           
distinguished according to the process  
of time4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prophetic 
revelation is conveyed by ,god speaking 
to man2 while the prophets declared both
 in words and in writing the things     
revealed to them4 ,now it is written 7#a
 ,kings #c3a7 that before the time of   
,samuel the word of the ,lord was       
precious1 i4e4 rare2 and yet afterwards 
it was delivered to many4 ,in like      
manner the books of the prophets do not 
appear to have been written before the  
time of ,isaias1 to whom it was said    
7,isa4 #h3a73 ,take thee a great book   
and write in it with a man's pen1 after 

which many prophets wrote their         
prophecies4 ,therefore it would seem    
that in course of time the degree of    
prophecy made progress4  ,obj4 #c3      
,further1 our ,lord said 7,matt4        
#aa3ac73 ,the prophets and the law      
prophesied until ,john2 and afterwards  
the gift of prophecy was in ,christ's   
disciples in a much more excellent      
manner than in the prophets of old1     
according to ,eph4 #c3e1 ,in other      
generations the mystery of ,christ was  
not known to the sons of men1 as it is  
now revealed to ,his holy apostles and  
prophets in the ,spirit4 ,therefore it  
would seem that in course of time the   
degree of prophecy advanced4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #d71    
,moses was the greatest of the prophets1
 and yet he preceded the other prophets4
 ,therefore prophecy did not advance in 
degree as time went on4  ,i answer that1
 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 prophecy is 
directed to the knowledge of ,divine    
truth1 by the contemplation of which we 

are not only instructed in faith1 but   
also guided in our actions1 according to
 ,ps4 #db3c1 ,send forth ,thy light and 
,thy truth3 they have conducted me4 ,now
 our faith consists chiefly in two      
things3 first1 in the true knowledge of 
,god1 according to ,heb4 #aa3f1 ,he that
 cometh to ,god must believe that ,he   
is2 secondly1 in the mystery of         
,christ's incarnation1 according to     
,john #ad3a1 ,you believe in ,god1      
believe also in ,me4 ,accordingly1 if we
 speak of prophecy as directed to the   
,godhead as its end1 it progressed      
according to three divisions of time1   
namely before the law1 under the law1   
and under grace4 ,for before the law1   
,abraham and the other patriarchs were  
prophetically taught things pertinent to
 faith in the ,godhead4 ,hence they are 
called prophets1 according to ,ps4      
#ajd3ae1 ,do no evil to ,my prophets1   
which words are said especially on      
behalf of ,abraham and ,isaac4 ,under   
the ,law prophetic revelation of things 

pertinent to faith in the ,godhead was  
made in a yet more excellent way than   
hitherto1 because then not only certain 
special persons or families but the     
whole people had to be instructed in    
these matters4 ,hence the ,lord said to 
,moses 7,ex4 #f3b1 #c73 ,i am the ,lord 
that appeared to ,abraham1 to ,isaac1   
and to ,jacob1 by the name of ,god      
almighty1 and ,my name ,adonai ,i did   
not show to them2 because previously the
 patriarchs had been taught to believe  
in a general way in ,god1 one and       
,almighty1 while ,moses was more fully  
instructed in the simplicity of the     
,divine essence1 when it was said to him
 7,ex4 #c3ad73 ,i am ,who am2 and this  
name is signified by ,jews in the word  
,adonai on account of their veneration  
for that unspeakable name4 ,afterwards  
in the time of grace the mystery of the 
,trinity was revealed by the ,son of    
,god ,himself1 according to ,matt4      
#bh3ai3 ,going 4 4 4 teach ye all       
nations1 baptizing them in the name of  

the ,father1 and of the ,son1 and of the
 ,holy ,ghost4  ,in each state1 however1
 the most excellent revelation was that 
which was given first4 ,now the first   
revelation1 before the ,law1 was given  
to ,abraham1 for it was at that time    
that men began to stray from faith in   
one ,god by turning aside to idolatry1  
whereas hitherto no such revelation was 
necessary while all persevered in the   
worship of one ,god4 ,a less excellent  
revelation was made to ,isaac1 being    
founded on that which was made to       
,abraham4 ,wherefore it was said to him 
7,gen4 #bf3bd73 ,i am the ,god of       
,abraham thy father1 and in like manner 
to ,jacob 7,gen4 #bh3ac73 ,i am the ,god
 of ,abraham thy father1 and the ,god of
 ,isaac4 ,again in the state of the ,law
 the first revelation which was given to
 ,moses was more excellent1 and on this 
revelation all the other revelations to 
the prophets were founded4 ,and so1 too1
 in the time of grace the entire faith  
of the ,church is founded on the        

revelation vouchsafed to the apostles1  
concerning the faith in one ,god and    
three ,persons1 according to ,matt4     
#af3ah1 ,on this rock1 i4e4 of thy      
confession1 ,i will build ,my ,church4  
,as to the faith in ,christ's           
incarnation1 it is evident that the     
nearer men were to ,christ1 whether     
before or after ,him1 the more fully1   
for the most part1 were they instructed 
on this point1 and after ,him more fully
 than before1 as the ,apostle declares  
7,eph4 #c3e74  ,as regards the guidance 
of human acts1 the prophetic revelation 
varied not according to the course of   
time1 but according as circumstances    
required1 because as it is written      
7,prov4 #bi3ah71 ,when prophecy shall   
fail1 the people shall be scattered     
abroad4 ,wherefore at all times men were
 divinely instructed about what they    
were to do1 according as it was         
expedient for the spiritual welfare of  
the elect4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the saying
 of ,gregory is to be referred to the   

time before ,christ's incarnation1 as   
regards the knowledge of this mystery4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says    
7,de ,civ4 ,dei xviii1 #bg71 just as in 
the early days of the ,assyrian kingdom 
promises were made most explicitly to   
,abraham1 so at the outset of the       
western ,babylon1 which is ,rome1 and   
under its sway ,christ was to come1 in  
,whom were to be fulfilled the promises 
made through the prophetic oracles      
testifying in word and writing to that  
great event to come1 the promises1      
namely1 which were made to ,abraham4    
,for while prophets were scarcely ever  
lacking to the people of ,israel from   
the time that they began to have kings1 
it was exclusively for their benefit1   
not for that of the nations4 ,but when  
those prophetic writings were being set 
up with greater publicity1 which at some
 future time were to benefit the        
nations1 it was fitting to begin when   
this city1 ,rome to wit1 was being      
built1 which was to govern the nations4 

,the reason why it behooved that nation 
to have a number of prophets especially 
at the time of the kings1 was that then 
it was not over-ridden by other nations1
 but had its own king2 wherefore it     
behooved the people1 as enjoying        
liberty1 to have prophets to teach them 
what to do4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the      
prophets who foretold the coming of     
,christ could not continue further than 
,john1 who with his finger pointed to   
,christ actually present4 ,nevertheless 
as ,jerome says on this passage1 ,this  
does not mean that there were no more   
prophets after ,john4 ,for we read in   
the ,acts of the apostles that ,agabus  
and the four maidens1 daughters of      
,philip1 prophesied4 ,john1 too1 wrote a
 prophetic book about the end of the    
,church2 and at all times there have not
 been lacking persons having the spirit 
of prophecy1 not indeed for the         
declaration of any new doctrine of      
faith1 but for the direction of human   
acts4 ,thus ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4  

,dei v1 #bf7 that the emperor           
,theodosius sent to ,john who dwelt in  
the ,egyptian desert1 and whom he knew  
by his ever-increasing fame to be       
endowed with the prophetic spirit3 and  
from him he received a message assuring 
him of victory4   ,,question #age  ,,of 
,,rapture 7,in ,six ,articles7  ,we must
 now consider rapture4 ,under this head 
there are six points of inquiry3  7#a7  
,whether the soul of man is carried away
 to things divine8  7#b7 ,whether       
rapture pertains to the cognitive or to 
the appetitive power8  7#c7 ,whether    
,paul when in rapture saw the essence of
 ,god8  7#d7 ,whether he was withdrawn  
from his senses8  7#e7 ,whether1 when in
 that state1 his soul was wholly        
separated from his body8  7#f7 ,what did
 he know1 and what did he not know about
 this matter8   ,,first ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #age1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
the ,soul of ,man ,is ,carried ,away to 
,things ,divine8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem that the soul of man is not  

carried away to things divine4 ,for some
 define rapture as an uplifting by the  
power of a higher nature1 from that     
which is according to nature to that    
which is above nature 99,reference      
unknown2 ,cf4 ,de ,veritate xiii1 #a4   
,now it is in accordance with man's     
nature that he be uplifted to things    
divine2 for ,augustine says at the      
beginning of his ,confessions3 ,thou    
madest us1 ,lord1 for ,thyself1 and our 
heart is restless1 till it rest in      
,thee4 ,therefore man's soul is not     
carried away to things divine4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4    
,nom4 viii7 that ,god's justice is seen 
in this that ,he treats all things      
according to their mode and dignity4    
,but it is not in accordance with man's 
mode and worth that he be raised above  
what he is according to nature4         
,therefore it would seem that man's soul
 is not carried away to things divine4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 rapture denotes     
violence of some kind4 ,but ,god rules  

us not by violence or force1 as         
,damascene says 99,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1  
#cj4 ,therefore man's soul is not       
carried away to things divine4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4  
#ab3b73 ,i know a man in ,christ 4 4 4  
rapt even to the third heaven4 ,on which
 words a gloss says3 ,rapt1 that is to  
say1 uplifted contrary to nature4  ,i   
answer that1 ,rapture denotes violence  
of a kind as stated above 7,obj4 #c72   
and the violent is that which has its   
principle without1 and in which he that 
suffers violence concurs not at all     
7,ethic4 iii1 #a74 ,now everything      
concurs in that to which it tends in    
accordance with its proper inclination1 
whether voluntary or natural4 ,wherefore
 he who is carried away by some external
 agent1 must be carried to something    
different from that to which his        
inclination tends4 ,this difference     
arises in two ways3 in one way from the 
end of the inclination--for instance a  
stone1 which is naturally inclined to be

 borne downwards1 may be thrown upwards2
 in another way from the manner of      
tending--for instance a stone may be    
thrown downwards with greater velocity  
than consistent with its natural        
movement4  ,accordingly man's soul also 
is said to be carried away1 in a twofold
 manner1 to that which is contrary to   
its nature3 in one way1 as regards the  
term of transport--as when it is carried
 away to punishment1 according to ,ps4  
#di3bb1 ,lest ,he snatch you away1 and  
there be none to deliver you2 in another
 way1 as regards the manner connatural  
to man1 which is that he should         
understand the truth through sensible   
things4 ,hence when he is withdrawn from
 the apprehension of sensibles1 he is   
said to be carried away1 even though he 
be uplifted to things whereunto he is   
directed naturally3 provided this be not
 done intentionally1 as when a man      
betakes himself to sleep which is in    
accordance with nature1 wherefore sleep 
cannot be called rapture1 properly      

speaking4  ,this withdrawal1 whatever   
its term may be1 may arise from a       
threefold cause4 ,first1 from a bodily  
cause1 as happens to those who suffer   
abstraction from the senses through     
weakness3 secondly1 by the power of the 
demons1 as in those who are possessed3  
thirdly1 by the power of ,god4 ,in this 
last sense we are now speaking of       
rapture1 whereby a man is uplifted by   
the spirit of ,god to things            
supernatural1 and withdrawn from his    
senses1 according to ,ezech4 #h3c1 ,the 
spirit lifted me up between the earth   
and the heaven1 and brought me in the   
vision of ,god into ,jerusalem4  ,it    
must be observed1 however1 that         
sometimes a person is said to be carried
 away1 not only through being withdrawn 
from his senses1 but also through being 
withdrawn from the things to which he   
was attending1 as when a person's mind  
wanders contrary to his purpose4 ,but   
this is to use the expression in a less 
proper signification4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 

,it is natural to man to tend to divine 
things through the apprehension of      
things sensible1 according to ,rom4     
#a3bj1 ,the invisible things of ,god 4 4
 4 are clearly seen1 being understood by
 the things that are made4 ,but the     
mode1 whereby a man is uplifted to      
divine things and withdrawn from his    
senses1 is not natural to man4  ,reply  
,obj4 #b3 ,it belongs to man's mode and 
dignity that he be uplifted to divine   
things1 from the very fact that he is   
made to ,god's image4 ,and since a      
divine good infinitely surpasses the    
faculty of man in order to attain that  
good1 he needs the divine assistance    
which is bestowed on him in every gift  
of grace4 ,hence it is not contrary to  
nature1 but above the faculty of nature 
that man's mind be thus uplifted in     
rapture by ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the 
saying of ,damascene refers to those    
things which a man does by himself4 ,but
 as to those things which are beyond the
 scope of the free-will1 man needs to be

 uplifted by a stronger operation1 which
 in a certain respect may be called     
force if we consider the mode of        
operation1 but not if we consider its   
term to which man is directed both by   
nature and by his intention4   ,,second 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #age1 ,art4 #b 
,whether ,rapture ,pertains to the      
,cognitive ,rather ,than to the         
,appetitive ,power8  ,objection #a3 ,it 
would seem that rapture pertains to the 
appetitive rather than to the cognitive 
power4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4
 iv73 ,the ,divine love causes ecstasy4 
,now love pertains to the appetitive    
power4 ,therefore so does ecstasy or    
rapture4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory  
says 7,dial4 ii1 #c7 that he who fed the
 swine debased himself by a dissipated  
mind and an unclean life2 whereas       
,peter1 when the angel delivered him and
 carried him into ecstasy1 was not      
beside himself1 but above himself4 ,now 
the prodigal son sank into the depths by
 his appetite4 ,therefore in those also 

who are carried up into the heights it  
is the appetite that is affected4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 a gloss on ,ps4 #cj3a1   
,in ,thee1 ,o ,lord1 have ,i hoped1 let 
me never be confounded1 says in         
explaining the title 99,unto the end1 a 
psalm for ,david1 in an ecstasy3        
,ekstasis in ,greek signifies in ,latin 
excessus mentis1 an aberration of the   
mind4 ,this happens in two ways1 either 
through dread of earthly things or      
through the mind being rapt in heavenly 
things and forgetful of this lower      
world4 ,now dread of earthly things     
pertains to the appetite4 ,therefore    
rapture of the mind in heavenly things1 
being placed in opposition to this      
dread1 also pertains to the appetite4   
,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on ,ps4      
#aae3b1 ,i said in my excess3 ,every man
 is a liar1 says3 ,we speak of ecstasy1 
not when the mind wanders through fear1 
but when it is carried aloft on the     
wings of revelation4 ,now revelation    
pertains to the intellective power4     

,therefore ecstasy or rapture does also4
  ,i answer that1 ,we can speak of      
rapture in two ways4 ,first1 with regard
 to the term of rapture1 and thus1      
properly speaking1 rapture cannot       
pertain to the appetitive1 but only to  
the cognitive power4 ,for it was stated 
7,a4 #a7 that rapture is outside the    
inclination of the person who is rapt2  
whereas the movement of the appetitive  
power is an inclination to an appetible 
good4 ,wherefore1 properly speaking1 in 
desiring something1 a man is not rapt1  
but is moved by himself4  ,secondly1    
rapture may be considered with regard to
 its cause1 and thus it may have a cause
 on the part of the appetitive power4   
,for from the very fact that the        
appetite is strongly affected towards   
something1 it may happen1 owing to the  
violence of his affection1 that a man is
 carried away from everything else4     
,moreover1 it has an effect on the      
appetitive power1 when for instance a   
man delights in the things to which he  

is rapt4 ,hence the ,apostle said that  
he was rapt1 not only to the third      
heaven--which pertains to the           
contemplation of the intellect--but also
 into paradise1 which pertains to the   
appetite4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,rapture    
adds something to ecstasy4 ,for ecstasy 
means simply a going out of oneself by  
being placed outside one's proper order 
99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #c2 while  
rapture denotes a certain violence in   
addition4 ,accordingly ecstasy may      
pertain to the appetitive power1 as when
 a man's appetite tends to something    
outside him1 and in this sense          
,dionysius says that the ,divine love   
causes ecstasy1 inasmuch as it makes    
man's appetite tend to the object loved4
 ,hence he says afterwards that even    
,god ,himself1 the cause of all things1 
through the overflow of ,his loving     
goodness1 goes outside ,himself in ,his 
providence for all beings4 ,but even if 
this were said expressly of rapture1 it 
would merely signify that love is the   

cause of rapture4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3     
,there is a twofold appetite in man2 to 
wit1 the intellective appetite which is 
called the will1 and the sensitive      
appetite known as the sensuality4 ,now  
it is proper to man that his lower      
appetite be subject to the higher       
appetite1 and that the higher move the  
lower4 ,hence man may become outside    
himself as regards the appetite1 in two 
ways4 ,in one way1 when a man's         
intellective appetite tends wholly to   
divine things1 and takes no account of  
those things whereto the sensitive      
appetite inclines him2 thus ,dionysius  
says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that ,paul being  
in ecstasy through the vehemence of     
,divine love exclaimed3 ,i live1 now not
 ,i1 but ,christ liveth in me4  ,in     
another way1 when a man tends wholly to 
things pertaining to the lower appetite1
 and takes no account of his higher     
appetite4 ,it is thus that he who fed   
the swine debased himself2 and this     
latter kind of going out of oneself1 or 

being beside oneself1 is more akin than 
the former to the nature of rapture     
because the higher appetite is more     
proper to man4 ,hence when through the  
violence of his lower appetite a man is 
withdrawn from the movement of his      
higher appetite1 it is more a case of   
being withdrawn from that which is      
proper to him4 ,yet1 because there is no
 violence therein1 since the will is    
able to resist the passion1 it falls    
short of the true nature of rapture1    
unless perchance the passion be so      
strong that it takes away entirely the  
use of reason1 as happens to those who  
are mad with anger or love4  ,it must be
 observed1 however1 that both these     
excesses affecting the appetite may     
cause an excess in the cognitive power1 
either because the mind is carried away 
to certain intelligible objects1 through
 being drawn away from objects of sense1
 or because it is caught up into some   
imaginary vision or fanciful apparition4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as love is a   

movement of the appetite with regard to 
good1 so fear is a movement of the      
appetite with regard to evil4 ,wherefore
 either of them may equally cause an    
aberration of mind2 and all the more    
since fear arises from love1 as         
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g1
 #i74   ,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #age1 ,art4 #c  ,whether ,paul1 ,when  
in ,rapture1 ,saw the ,essence of ,god8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
,paul1 when in rapture1 did not see the 
essence of ,god4 ,for just as we read of
 ,paul that he was rapt to the third    
heaven1 so we read of ,peter 7,acts     
#aj3aj7 that there came upon him an     
ecstasy of mind4 ,now ,peter1 in his    
ecstasy1 saw not ,god's essence but an  
imaginary vision4 ,therefore it would   
seem that neither did ,paul see the     
essence of ,god4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1   
the vision of ,god is beatific4 ,but    
,paul1 in his rapture1 was not          
beatified2 else he would never have     
returned to the unhappiness of this     

life1 but his body would have been      
glorified by the overflow from his soul1
 as will happen to the saints after the 
resurrection1 and this clearly was not  
the case4 ,therefore ,paul when in      
rapture saw not the essence of ,god4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to #a     
,cor4 #ac3aj-ab1 faith and hope are     
incompatible with the vision of the     
,divine essence4 ,but ,paul when in this
 state had faith and hope4 ,therefore he
 saw not the essence of ,god4  ,obj4 #d3
 ,further1 as ,augustine states 7,gen4  
ad lit4 xii1 #f1 #g71 pictures of bodies
 are seen in the imaginary vision4 ,now 
,paul is stated 7#b ,cor4 #ab3b1 #d7 to 
have seen certain pictures in his       
rapture1 for instance of the third      
heaven and of paradise4 ,therefore he   
would seem to have been rapt to an      
imaginary vision rather than to the     
vision of the ,divine essence4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,augustine 7,ep4 ,,cxlvii1    
#ac2 ad ,paulin41 de videndo ,deum7     
concludes that possibly ,god's very     

substance was seen by some while yet in 
this life3 for instance by ,moses1 and  
by ,paul who in rapture heard           
unspeakable words1 which it is not      
granted unto man to utter4  ,i answer   
that1 ,some have said that ,paul1 when  
in rapture1 saw not the very essence of 
,god1 but a certain reflection of ,his  
clarity4 ,but ,augustine clearly comes  
to an opposite decision1 not only in his
 book 7,de videndo ,deum71 but also in  
,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #bh 7quoted in a     
gloss on #b ,cor4 #ab3b74 ,indeed the   
words themselves of the ,apostle        
indicate this4 ,for he says that he     
heard secret words1 which it is not     
granted unto man to utter3 and such     
would seem to be words pertaining to the
 vision of the blessed1 which transcends
 the state of the wayfarer1 according to
 ,isa4 #fd3d1 ,eye hath not seen1 ,o    
,god1 besides ,thee1 what things ,thou  
hast prepared for them that love ,vulg43
 'wait for' ,thee 99#a ,cor4 #b3i4      
,therefore it is more becoming to hold  

that he saw ,god in ,his essence4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man's mind is rapt by 
,god to the contemplation of divine     
truth in three ways4 ,first1 so that he 
contemplates it through certain         
imaginary pictures1 and such was the    
ecstasy that came upon ,peter4          
,secondly1 so that he contemplates the  
divine truth through its intelligible   
effects2 such was the ecstasy of ,david1
 who said 7,ps4 #aae3aa73 ,i said in my 
excess3 ,every man is a liar4 ,thirdly1 
so that he contemplates it in its       
essence4 ,such was the rapture of ,paul1
 as also of ,moses 99,cf4 ,q4 #agd1 ,a4 
#d2 and not without reason1 since as    
,moses was the first ,teacher of the    
,jews1 so was ,paul the first ,teacher  
of the gentiles 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 
#d4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,divine      
essence cannot be seen by a created     
intellect save through the light of     
glory1 of which it is written 7,ps4     
#ce3aj73 ,in ,thy light we shall see    
light4 ,but this light can be shared in 

two ways4 ,first by way of an abiding   
form1 and thus it beatifies the saints  
in heaven4 ,secondly1 by way of a       
transitory passion1 as stated above 7,q4
 #aga1 ,a4 #b7 of the light of prophecy2
 and in this way that light was in ,paul
 when he was in rapture4 ,hence this    
vision did not beatify him simply1 so as
 to overflow into his body1 but only in 
a restricted sense4 ,consequently this  
rapture pertains somewhat to prophecy4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since1 in his rapture1
 ,paul was beatified not as to the      
habit1 but only as to the act of the    
blessed1 it follows that he had not the 
act of faith at the same time1 although 
he had the habit4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in 
one way by the third heaven we may      
understand something corporeal1 and thus
 the third heaven denotes the empyrean  
99#a ,tim4 #b3g2 ,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,a4  
#aa1 ad #b1 which is described as the   
third1 in relation to the aerial and    
starry heavens1 or better still1 in     
relation to the aqueous and crystalline 

heavens4 ,moreover ,paul is stated to be
 rapt to the third heaven1 not as though
 his rapture consisted in the vision of 
something corporeal1 but because this   
place is appointed for the contemplation
 of the blessed4 ,hence the gloss on #b 
,cor4 #ab says that the third heaven is 
a spiritual heaven1 where the angels and
 the holy souls enjoy the contemplation 
of ,god3 and when ,paul says that he was
 rapt to this heaven he means that ,god 
showed him the life wherein ,he is to be
 seen forevermore4  ,in another way the 
third heaven may signify a supra-mundane
 vision4 ,such a vision may be called   
the third heaven in three ways4 ,first1 
according to the order of the cognitive 
powers4 ,in this way the first heaven   
would indicate a supramundane bodily    
vision1 conveyed through the senses2    
thus was seen the hand of one writing on
 the wall 7,dan4 #e3e72 the second      
heaven would be an imaginary vision such
 as ,isaias saw1 and ,john in the       
,apocalypse2 and the third heaven would 

denote an intellectual vision according 
to ,augustine's explanation 7,gen4 ad   
lit4 xii1 #bf1 #bh1 #cd74 ,secondly1 the
 third heaven may be taken according to 
the order of things knowable1 the first 
heaven being the knowledge of heavenly  
bodies1 the second the knowledge of     
heavenly spirits1 the third the         
knowledge of ,god ,himself4 ,thirdly1   
the third heaven may denote the         
contemplation of ,god according to the  
degrees of knowledge whereby ,god is    
seen4 ,the first of these degrees       
belongs to the angels of the lowest     
hierarchy 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 #a1  
the second to the angels of the middle  
hierarchy1 the third to the angels of   
the highest hierarchy1 according to the 
gloss on #b ,cor4 #ab4  ,and since the  
vision of ,god cannot be without        
delight1 he says that he was not only   
rapt to the third heaven by reason of   
his contemplation1 but also into        
,paradise by reason of the consequent   
delight4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1

 ,q4 #age1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,paul1    
,when in ,rapture1 ,was ,withdrawn from 
,his ,senses8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that ,paul1 when in rapture1 was   
not withdrawn from his senses4 ,for     
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1     
#bh73 ,why should we not believe that   
when so great an apostle1 the teacher of
 the gentiles1 was rapt to this most    
sublime vision1 ,god was willing to     
vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal 
life which is to take the place of the  
present life8 ,now in that future life  
after the resurrection the saints will  
see the ,divine essence without being   
withdrawn from the senses of the body4  
,therefore neither did such a withdrawal
 take place in ,paul4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 ,christ was truly a wayfarer1 
and also enjoyed an uninterrupted vision
 of the ,divine essence1 without1       
however1 being withdrawn from ,his      
senses4 ,therefore there was no need for
 ,paul to be withdrawn from his senses  
in order for him to see the essence of  

,god4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 after seeing 
,god in ,his essence1 ,paul remembered  
what he had seen in that vision2 hence  
he said 7#b ,cor4 #ab3d73 ,he heard     
secret words1 which it is not granted to
 man to utter4 ,now the memory belongs  
to the sensitive faculty according to   
the ,philosopher 7,de ,mem4 et ,remin4  
i74 ,therefore it seems that ,paul1     
while seeing the essence of ,god1 was   
not withdrawn from his senses4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4
 xii1 #bg73 ,unless a man in some way   
depart this life1 whether by going      
altogether out of his body or by turning
 away and withdrawing from his carnal   
senses1 so that he truly knows not as   
the ,apostle said1 whether he be in the 
body or out of the body1 he is not rapt 
and caught up into that vision499 99,the
 text of ,st4 ,augustine reads3 when he 
is rapt1 etc4  ,i answer that1 ,the     
,divine essence cannot be seen by man   
through any cognitive power other than  
the intellect4 ,now the human intellect 

does not turn to intelligible objects   
except by means of the phantasms 99,cf4 
,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g which it takes from 
the senses through the intelligible     
species2 and it is in considering these 
phantasms that the intellect judges of  
and coordinates sensible objects4 ,hence
 in any operation that requires         
abstraction of the intellect from       
phantasms1 there must be also withdrawal
 of the intellect from the senses4 ,now 
in the state of the wayfarer it is      
necessary for man's intellect1 if it see
 ,god's essence1 to be withdrawn from   
phantasms4 ,for ,god's essence cannot be
 seen by means of a phantasm1 nor indeed
 by any created intelligible species    
99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #b1 since ,god's
 essence infinitely transcends not only 
all bodies1 which are represented by    
phantasms1 but also all intelligible    
creatures4 ,now when man's intellect is 
uplifted to the sublime vision of ,god's
 essence1 it is necessary that his      
mind's whole attention should be        

summoned to that purpose in such a way  
that he understand naught else by       
phantasms1 and be absorbed entirely in  
,god4 ,therefore it is impossible for   
man while a wayfarer to see ,god in ,his
 essence without being withdrawn from   
his senses4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated
 above 7,a4 #c1 ,obj4 #b71 after the    
resurrection1 in the blessed who see    
,god in ,his essence1 there will be an  
overflow from the intellect to the lower
 powers and even to the body4 ,hence it 
is in keeping with the rule itself of   
the divine vision that the soul will    
turn towards phantasms and sensible     
objects4 ,but there is no such overflow 
in those who are raptured1 as stated    
7,a4 #c1 ,obj4 #b1 ad #b71 and          
consequently the comparison fails4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the intellect of      
,christ's soul was glorified by the     
habit of the light of glory1 whereby ,he
 saw the ,divine essence much more fully
 than an angel or a man4 ,he was1       
however1 a wayfarer on account of the   

passibility of ,his body1 in respect of 
which ,he was made a little lower than  
the angels 7,heb4 #b3i71 by             
dispensation1 and not on account of any 
defect on the part of ,his intellect4   
,hence there is no comparison between   
,him and other wayfarers4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,paul1 after seeing ,god in ,his    
essence1 remembered what he had known in
 that vision1 by means of certain       
intelligible species that remained in   
his intellect by way of habit2 even as  
in the absence of the sensible object1  
certain impressions remain in the soul  
which it recollects when it turns to the
 phantasms4 ,and so this was the        
knowledge that he was unable wholly to  
think over or express in words4         
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #age1  
,art4 #e  ,whether1 ,while in ,this     
,state1 ,paul's ,soul ,was ,wholly      
,separated from ,his ,body8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that1 while in this  
state1 ,paul's soul was wholly separated
 from his body4 ,for the ,apostle says  

7#b ,cor4 #e3f1 #g73 ,while we are in   
the body we are absent from the ,lord4  
,for we walk by faith1 and not by sight 
99,per speciem1 i4e4 by an intelligible 
species4 ,now1 while in that state1     
,paul was not absent from the ,lord1 for
 he saw ,him by a species1 as stated    
above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore he was not in
 the body4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a power 
of the soul cannot be uplifted above the
 soul's essence wherein it is rooted4   
,now in this rapture the intellect1     
which is a power of the soul1 was       
withdrawn from its bodily surroundings  
through being uplifted to divine        
contemplation4 ,much more therefore was 
the essence of the soul separated from  
the body4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the      
forces of the vegetative soul are more  
material than those of the sensitive    
soul4 ,now in order for him to be rapt  
to the vision of ,god1 it was necessary 
for him to be withdrawn from the forces 
of the sensitive soul1 as stated above  
7,a4 #d74 ,much more1 therefore1 was it 

necessary for him to be withdrawn from  
the forces of the vegetative soul4 ,now 
when these forces cease to operate1 the 
soul is no longer in any way united to  
the body4 ,therefore it would seem that 
in ,paul's rapture it was necessary for 
the soul to be wholly separated from the
 body4  ,on the contrary1 ,augustine    
says 7,ep4 ,,cxlvii1 #ac1 ad ,paulin42  
de videndo ,deum73 ,it is not incredible
 that this sublime revelation 7namely1  
that they should see ,god in ,his       
essence7 was vouchsafed certain saints1 
without their departing this life so    
completely as to leave nothing but a    
corpse for burial4 ,therefore it was not
 necessary for ,paul's soul1 when in    
rapture1 to be wholly separated from his
 body4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above
 7,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #a71 in the rapture of  
which we are speaking now1 man is       
uplifted by ,god's power1 from that     
which is according to nature to that    
which is above nature4 ,wherefore two   
things have to be considered3 first1    

what pertains to man according to       
nature2 secondly1 what has to be done by
 ,god in man above his nature4 ,now1    
since the soul is united to the body as 
its natural form1 it belongs to the soul
 to have a natural disposition to       
understand by turning to phantasms2 and 
this is not withdrawn by the divine     
power from the soul in rapture1 since   
its state undergoes no change1 as stated
 above 7,a4 #c1 ad #b1 #c74 ,yet1 this  
state remaining1 actual conversion to   
phantasms and sensible objects is       
withdrawn from the soul1 lest it be     
hindered from being uplifted to that    
which transcends all phantasms1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,therefore it was
 not necessary that his soul in rapture 
should be so separated from the body as 
to cease to be united thereto as its    
form2 and yet it was necessary for his  
intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms
 and the perception of sensible objects4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in this rapture     
,paul was absent from the ,lord as      

regards his state1 since he was still in
 the state of a wayfarer1 but not as    
regards the act by which he saw ,god by 
a species1 as stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad  
#b1 #c74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a faculty of
 the soul is not uplifted by the natural
 power above the mode becoming the      
essence of the soul2 but it can be      
uplifted by the divine power to         
something higher1 even as a body by the 
violence of a stronger power is lifted  
up above the place befitting it         
according to its specific nature4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the forces of the     
vegetative soul do not operate through  
the soul being intent thereon1 as do the
 sensitive forces1 but by way of nature4
 ,hence in the case of rapture there is 
no need for withdrawal from them1 as    
from the sensitive powers1 whose        
operations would lessen the intentness  
of the soul on intellective knowledge4  
,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #age1  
,art4 #f  ,did ,paul ,know ,whether ,his
 ,soul ,were ,separated from ,his ,body8

  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
,paul was not ignorant whether his soul 
were separated from his body4 ,for he   
says 7#b ,cor4 #ab3b73 ,i know a man in 
,christ rapt even to the third heaven4  
,now man denotes something composed of  
soul and body2 and rapture differs from 
death4 ,seemingly therefore he knew that
 his soul was not separated from his    
body by death1 which is the more        
probable seeing that this is the common 
opinion of the ,doctors4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 it appears from the same words
 of the ,apostle that he knew whither he
 was rapt1 since it was to the third    
heaven4 ,now this shows that he knew    
whether he was in the body or not1 for  
if he knew the third heaven to be       
something corporeal1 he must have known 
that his soul was not separated from his
 body1 since a corporeal thing cannot be
 an object of sight save through the    
body4 ,therefore it would seem that he  
was not ignorant whether his soul were  
separated from his body4  ,obj4 #c3     

,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4
 xii1 #bh7 that when in rapture1 he saw 
,god with the same vision as the saints 
see ,him in heaven4 ,now from the very  
fact that the saints see ,god1 they know
 whether their soul is separated from   
their body4 ,therefore ,paul too knew   
this4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 
7#b ,cor4 #ab3c73 ,whether in the body1 
or out of the body1 ,i know not1 ,god   
knoweth4  ,i answer that1 ,the true     
answer to this question must be gathered
 from the ,apostle's very words1 whereby
 he says he knew something1 namely that 
he was rapt even to the third heaven1   
and that something he knew not1 namely  
whether he were in the body or out of   
the body4 ,this may be understood in two
 ways4 ,first1 the words whether in the 
body or out of the body may refer not to
 the very being of the man who was rapt 
7as though he knew not whether his soul 
were in his body or not71 but to the    
mode of rapture1 so that he ignored     
whether his body besides his soul1 or1  

on the other hand1 his soul alone1 were 
rapt to the third heaven4 ,thus         
,ezechiel is stated 7,ezech4 #h3c7 to   
have been brought in the vision of ,god 
into ,jerusalem4 ,this was the          
explanation of a certain ,jew according 
to ,jerome 7,prolog4 super ,daniel471   
where he says that lastly our ,apostle  
7thus said the ,jew7 durst not assert   
that he was rapt in his body1 but said3 
',whether in the body or out of the     
body1 ,i know not4'  ,augustine1        
however1 disapproves of this explanation
 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #c seqq47 for this 
reason that the ,apostle states that he 
knew he was rapt even to the third      
heaven4 ,wherefore he knew it to be     
really the third heaven to which he was 
rapt1 and not an imaginary likeness of  
the third heaven3 otherwise if he gave  
the name of third heaven to an imaginary
 third heaven1 in the same way he might 
state that he was rapt in the body1     
meaning1 by body1 an image of his body1 
such as appears in one's dreams4 ,now if

 he knew it to be really the third      
heaven1 it follows that either he knew  
it to be something spiritual and        
incorporeal1 and then his body could not
 be rapt thither2 or he knew it to be   
something corporeal1 and then his soul  
could not be rapt thither without his   
body1 unless it were separated from his 
body4 ,consequently we must explain the 
matter otherwise1 by saying that the    
,apostle knew himself to be rapt both in
 soul and body1 but that he ignored how 
his soul stood in relation to his body1 
to wit1 whether it were accompanied by  
his body or not4  ,here we find a       
diversity of opinions4 ,for some say    
that the ,apostle knew his soul to be   
united to his body as its form1 but     
ignored whether it were abstracted from 
its senses1 or again whether it were    
abstracted from the operations of the   
vegetative soul4 ,but he could not but  
know that it was abstracted from the    
senses1 seeing that he knew himself to  
be rapt2 and as to his being abstracted 

from the operation of the vegetative    
soul1 this was not of such importance as
 to require him to be so careful in     
mentioning it4 ,it follows1 then1 that  
the ,apostle ignored whether his soul   
were united to his body as its form1 or 
separated from it by death4 ,some1      
however1 granting this say that the     
,apostle did not consider the matter    
while he was in rapture1 because he was 
wholly intent upon ,god1 but that       
afterwards he questioned the point1 when
 taking cognizance of what he had seen4 
,but this also is contrary to the       
,apostle's words1 for he there          
distinguishes between the past and what 
happened subsequently1 since he states  
that at the present time he knows that  
he was rapt fourteen years ago1 and that
 at the present time he knows not       
whether he was in the body or out of the
 body4  ,consequently we must assert    
that both before and after he ignored   
whether his soul were separated from his
 body4 ,wherefore ,augustine 7,gen4 ad  

lit4 xii1 #e71 after discussing the     
question at length1 concludes3 ,perhaps 
then we must infer that he ignored      
whether1 when he was rapt to the third  
heaven1 his soul was in his body 7in the
 same way as the soul is in the body1   
when we speak of a living body either of
 a waking or of a sleeping man1 or of   
one that is withdrawn from his bodily   
senses during ecstasy71 or whether his  
soul went out of his body altogether1 so
 that his body lay dead4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,sometimes by the figure of         
synecdoche a part of man1 especially the
 soul which is the principal part1      
denotes a man4 ,or again we might take  
this to mean that he whom he states to  
have been rapt was a man not at the time
 of his rapture1 but fourteen years     
afterwards3 for he says ,i know a man1  
not ,i know a rapt man4 ,again nothing  
hinders death brought about by ,god     
being called rapture2 and thus          
,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #c73
 ,if the ,apostle doubted the matter1   

who of us will dare to be certain about 
it8 ,wherefore those who have something 
to say on this subject speak with more  
conjecture than certainty4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,the ,apostle knew that either the 
heaven in question was something        
incorporeal1 or that he saw something   
incorporeal in that heaven2 yet this    
could be done by his intellect1 even    
without his soul being separated from   
his body4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,paul's     
vision1 while he was in rapture1 was    
like the vision of the blessed in one   
respect1 namely as to the thing seen2   
and1 unlike1 in another respect1 namely 
as to the mode of seeing1 because he saw
 not so perfectly as do the saints in   
heaven4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad
 lit4 xii1 #cf73 ,although1 when the    
,apostle was rapt from his carnal senses
 to the third heaven1 he lacked that    
full and perfect knowledge of things    
which is in the angels1 in that he knew 
not whether he was in the body1 or out  
of the body1 this will surely not be    

lacking after reunion with the body in  
the resurrection of the dead1 when this 
corruptible will put on incorruption4   
,,question #agf  ,,of ,,the ,,grace ,,of
 ,,tongues 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider those gratuitous      
graces that pertain to speech1 and 7#a7 
the grace of tongues2 7#b7 the grace of 
the word of wisdom and knowledge4 ,under
 the first head there are two points of 
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether by the grace of 
tongues a man acquires the knowledge of 
all languages8  7#b7 ,of the comparison 
between this gift and the grace of      
prophecy4   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #agf1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,those    
,who ,received the ,gift of ,tongues    
,spoke in ,every ,language8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it seems that those who received   
the gift of tongues did not speak in    
every language4 ,for that which is      
granted to certain persons by the divine
 power is the best of its kind3 thus our
 ,lord turned the water into good wine1 
as stated in ,john #b3aj4 ,now those who

 had the gift of tongues spoke better in
 their own language2 since a gloss on   
,heb4 #a1 says that it is not surprising
 that the epistle to the ,hebrews is    
more graceful in style than the other   
epistles1 since it is natural for a man 
to have more command over his own than  
over a strange language4 ,for the       
,apostle wrote the other epistles in a  
foreign1 namely the ,greek1 idiom2      
whereas he wrote this in the ,hebrew    
tongue4 ,therefore the apostles did not 
receive the knowledge of all languages  
by a gratuitous grace4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 nature does not employ many   
means where one is sufficient2 and much 
less does ,god ,whose work is more      
orderly than nature's4 ,now ,god could  
make ,his disciples to be understood by 
all1 while speaking one tongue3 hence a 
gloss on ,acts #b3f1 ,every man heard   
them speak in his own tongue1 says that 
they spoke in every tongue1 or speaking 
in their own1 namely the ,hebrew        
language1 were understood by all1 as    

though they spoke the language proper to
 each4 ,therefore it would seem that    
they had not the knowledge to speak in  
all languages4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all 
graces flow from ,christ to ,his body1  
which is the ,church1 according to ,john
 #a3af1 ,of ,his fullness we all have   
received4 ,now we do not read that      
,christ spoke more than one language1   
nor does each one of the faithful now   
speak save in one tongue4 ,therefore it 
would seem that ,christ's disciples did 
not receive the grace to the extent of  
speaking in all languages4  ,on the     
contrary1 ,it is written 7,acts #b3d7   
that they were all filled with the ,holy
 ,ghost1 and they began to speak with   
divers tongues1 according as the ,holy  
,ghost gave them to speak2 on which     
passage a gloss of ,gregory 99,hom4 xxx 
in ,ev4 says that the ,holy ,ghost      
appeared over the disciples under the   
form of fiery tongues1 and gave them the
 knowledge of all tongues4  ,i answer   
that1 ,christ's first disciples were    

chosen by ,him in order that they might 
disperse throughout the whole world1 and
 preach ,his faith everywhere1 according
 to ,matt4 #bh3ai1 ,going 4 4 4 teach ye
 all nations4 ,now it was not fitting   
that they who were being sent to teach  
others should need to be taught by      
others1 either as to how they should    
speak to other people1 or as to how they
 were to understand those who spoke to  
them2 and all the more seeing that those
 who were being sent were of one nation1
 that of ,judea1 according to ,isa4     
#bg3f1 ,when they shall rush out from   
,jacob 99,vulg43 ',when they shall rush 
in unto ,jacob1' etc4 4 4 4 they shall  
fill the face of the world with seed4   
,moreover those who were being sent were
 poor and powerless2 nor at the outset  
could they have easily found someone to 
interpret their words faithfully to     
others1 or to explain what others said  
to them1 especially as they were sent to
 unbelievers4 ,consequently it was      
necessary1 in this respect1 that ,god   

should provide them with the gift of    
tongues2 in order that1 as the diversity
 of tongues was brought upon the nations
 when they fell away to idolatry1       
according to ,gen4 #aa1 so when the     
nations were to be recalled to the      
worship of one ,god a remedy to this    
diversity might be applied by the gift  
of tongues4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as it is 
written 7#a ,cor4 #ab3g71 the           
manifestation of the ,spirit is given to
 every man unto profit2 and consequently
 both ,paul and the other apostles were 
divinely instructed in the languages of 
all nations sufficiently for the        
requirements of the teaching of the     
faith4 ,but as regards the grace and    
elegance of style which human art adds  
to a language1 the ,apostle was         
instructed in his own1 but not in a     
foreign tongue4 ,even so they were      
sufficiently instructed in wisdom and   
scientific knowledge1 as required for   
teaching the faith1 but not as to all   
things known by acquired science1 for   

instance the conclusions of arithmetic  
and geometry4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3         
,although either was possible1 namely   
that1 while speaking in one tongue they 
should be understood by all1 or that    
they should speak in all tongues1 it was
 more fitting that they should speak in 
all tongues1 because this pertained to  
the perfection of their knowledge1      
whereby they were able not only to      
speak1 but also to understand what was  
said by others4 ,whereas if their one   
language were intelligible to all1 this 
would either have been due to the       
knowledge of those who understood their 
speech1 or it would have amounted to an 
illusion1 since a man's words would have
 had a different sound in another's     
ears1 from that with which they were    
uttered4 ,hence a gloss says on ,acts   
#b3f that it was a greater miracle that 
they should speak all kinds of tongues2 
and ,paul says 7#a ,cor4 #ad3ah73 ,i    
thank my ,god ,i speak with all your    
tongues4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,christ in   

,his own person purposed preaching to   
only one nation1 namely the ,jews4      
,consequently1 although without any     
doubt ,he possessed most perfectly the  
knowledge of all languages1 there was no
 need for ,him to speak in every tongue4
 ,and therefore1 as ,augustine says     
7,tract4 xxxii in ,joan471 whereas even 
now the ,holy ,ghost is received1 yet no
 one speaks in the tongues of all       
nations1 because the ,church herself    
already speaks the languages of all     
nations3 since whoever is not in the    
,church1 receives not the ,holy ,ghost4 
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agf1 
,art4 #b  ,whether the ,gift of ,tongues
 ,is ,more ,excellent ,than the ,grace  
of ,prophecy8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that the gift of tongues is more   
excellent than the grace of prophecy4   
,for1 seemingly1 better things are      
proper to better persons1 according to  
the ,philosopher 7,topic4 iii1 #a74 ,now
 the gift of tongues is proper to the   
,new ,testament1 hence we sing in the   

sequence of ,pentecost 99,the sequence3 
,sancti ,spiritus adsit nobis gratia    
ascribed to ,king ,robert of ,france1   
the reputed author of the ,veni ,sancte 
,spiritus4 ,cf4 ,migne1 ,patr4 ,lat4    
tom4 ,,cxli3 ,on this day ,thou gavest  
,christ's apostles an unwonted gift1 a  
marvel to all time3 whereas prophecy is 
more pertinent to the ,old ,testament1  
according to ,heb4 #a3a1 ,god ,who at   
sundry times and in divers manners spoke
 in times past to the fathers by the    
prophets4 ,therefore it would seem that 
the gift of tongues is more excellent   
than the gift of prophecy4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 that whereby we are directed  
to ,god is seemingly more excellent than
 that whereby we are directed to men4   
,now1 by the gift of tongues1 man is    
directed to ,god1 whereas by prophecy he
 is directed to man2 for it is written  
7#a ,cor4 #ad3b1 #c73 ,he that speaketh 
in a tongue1 speaketh not unto men1 but 
unto ,god 4 4 4 but he that prophesieth1
 speaketh unto men unto edification4    

,therefore it would seem that the gift  
of tongues is more excellent than the   
gift of prophecy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
the gift of tongues abides like a habit 
in the person who has it1 and he can use
 it when he will2 wherefore it is       
written 7#a ,cor4 #ad3ah73 ,i thank my  
,god ,i speak with all your tongues4    
,but it is not so with the gift of      
prophecy1 as stated above 7,q4 #aga1 ,a4
 #b74 ,therefore the gift of tongues    
would seem to be more excellent than the
 gift of prophecy4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 
the interpretation of speeches would    
seem to be contained under prophecy1    
because the ,scriptures are expounded by
 the same ,spirit from ,whom they       
originated4 ,now the interpretation of  
speeches is placed after divers kinds of
 tongues 7#a ,cor4 #ab3aj74 ,therefore  
it seems that the gift of tongues is    
more excellent than the gift of         
prophecy1 particularly as regards a part
 of the latter4  ,on the contrary1 ,the 
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ad3e73 ,greater

 is he that prophesieth than he that    
speaketh with tongues4  ,i answer that1 
,the gift of prophecy surpasses the gift
 of tongues1 in three ways4 ,first1     
because the gift of tongues regards the 
utterance of certain words1 which       
signify an intelligible truth1 and this 
again is signified by the phantasms     
which appear in an imaginary vision2    
wherefore ,augustine compares 7,gen4 ad 
lit4 xii1 #h7 the gift of tongues to an 
imaginary vision4 ,on the other hand1 it
 has been stated above 7,q4 #agc1 ,a4   
#b7 that the gift of prophecy consists  
in the mind itself being enlightened so 
as to know an intelligible truth4       
,wherefore1 as the prophetic            
enlightenment is more excellent than the
 imaginary vision1 as stated above 7,q4 
#agd1 ,a4 #b71 so also is prophecy more 
excellent than the gift of tongues      
considered in itself4 ,secondly1 because
 the gift of prophecy regards the       
knowledge of things1 which is more      
excellent than the knowledge of words1  

to which the gift of tongues pertains4  
,thirdly1 because the gift of prophecy  
is more profitable4 ,the ,apostle proves
 this in three ways 7#a ,cor4 #ad72     
first1 because prophecy is more         
profitable to the edification of the    
,church1 for which purpose he that      
speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing1  
unless interpretation follow 7#a ,cor4  
#ad3d1 #e74 ,secondly1 as regards the   
speaker himself1 for if he be enabled to
 speak in divers tongues without        
understanding them1 which pertains to   
the gift of prophecy1 his own mind would
 not be edified 7#a ,cor4 #ad3g-ad74    
,thirdly1 as to unbelievers for whose   
especial benefit the gift of tongues    
seems to have been given2 since         
perchance they might think those who    
speak in tongues to be mad 7#a ,cor4    
#ad3bc71 for instance the ,jews deemed  
the apostles drunk when the latter spoke
 in various tongues 7,acts #b3ac73      
whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is 
convinced1 because the secrets of his   

heart are made manifest 7,acts #b3be74  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#agd1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a71 it belongs to the 
excellence of prophecy that a man is not
 only enlightened by an intelligible    
light1 but also that he should perceive 
an imaginary vision3 and so again it    
belongs to the perfection of the ,holy  
,ghost's operation1 not only to fill the
 mind with the prophetic light1 and the 
imagination with the imaginary vision1  
as happened in the ,old ,testament1 but 
also to endow the tongue with external  
erudition1 in the utterance of various  
signs of speech4 ,all this is done in   
the ,new ,testament1 according to #a    
,cor4 #ad3bf1 ,every one of you hath a  
psalm1 hath a doctrine1 hath a tongue1  
hath a revelation1 i4e4 a prophetic     
revelation4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by the   
gift of prophecy man is directed to ,god
 in his mind1 which is more excellent   
than being directed to ,him in his      
tongue4 ,he that speaketh in a tongue is
 said to speak not unto men1 i4e4 to    

men's understanding or profit1 but unto 
,god's understanding and praise4 ,on the
 other hand1 by prophecy a man is       
directed both to ,god and to man2       
wherefore it is the more perfect gift4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,prophetic revelation  
extends to the knowledge of all things  
supernatural2 wherefore from its very   
perfection it results that in this      
imperfect state of life it cannot be had
 perfectly by way of habit1 but only    
imperfectly by way of passion4 ,on the  
other hand1 the gift of tongues is      
confined to a certain particular        
knowledge1 namely of human words2       
wherefore it is not inconsistent with   
the imperfection of this life1 that it  
should be had perfectly and by way of   
habit4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the           
interpretation of speeches is reducible 
to the gift of prophecy1 inasmuch as the
 mind is enlightened so as to understand
 and explain any obscurities of speech  
arising either from a difficulty in the 
things signified1 or from the words     

uttered being unknown1 or from the      
figures of speech employed1 according to
 ,dan4 #e3af1 ,i have heard of thee1    
that thou canst interpret obscure       
things1 and resolve difficult things4   
,hence the interpretation of speeches is
 more excellent than the gift of        
tongues1 as appears from the saying of  
the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #ad3e71 ,greater 
is he that prophesieth than he that     
speaketh with tongues2 unless perhaps he
 interpret4 ,yet the interpretation of  
speeches is placed after the gift of    
tongues1 because the interpretation of  
speeches extends even to the            
interpretation of divers kinds of       
tongues4   ,,question #agg  ,,of ,,the  
,,gratuitous ,,grace ,,consisting ,,in  
,,words 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we must  
now consider the gratuitous grace that  
attaches to words2 of which the ,apostle
 says 7#a ,cor4 #ab3h73 ,to one 4 4 4 by
 the ,spirit is given the word of       
wisdom1 and to another the word of      
knowledge4 ,under this head there are   

two points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether   
any gratuitous grace attaches to words8 
7#b7 ,to whom is the grace becoming8    
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agg1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,any ,gratuitous     
,grace ,attaches to ,words8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that a gratuitous    
grace does not attach to words4 ,for    
grace is given for that which surpasses 
the faculty of nature4 ,but natural     
reason has devised the art of rhetoric  
whereby a man is able to speak so as to 
teach1 please1 and persuade1 as         
,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4   
iv1 #ab74 ,now this belongs to the grace
 of words4 ,therefore it would seem that
 the grace of words is not a gratuitous 
grace4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all grace   
pertains to the kingdom of ,god4 ,but   
the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #d3bj73 ,the
 kingdom of ,god is not in speech1 but  
in power4 ,therefore there is no        
gratuitous grace connected with words4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no grace is given   
through merit1 since if by grace1 it is 

not now of works 7,rom4 #aa3f74 ,but the
 word is sometimes given to a man on his
 merits4 ,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 xi1
 #ae7 in explanation of ,ps4 #aah3dc1   
,take not ,thou the word of truth       
utterly out of my mouth that the word of
 truth is that which ,almighty ,god     
gives to them that do it1 and takes away
 from them that do it not4 ,therefore it
 would seem that the gift of the word is
 not a gratuitous grace4  ,obj4 #d3     
,further1 it behooves man to declare in 
words things pertaining to the virtue of
 faith1 no less than those pertaining to
 the gift of wisdom or of knowledge4    
,therefore if the word of wisdom and the
 word of knowledge are reckoned         
gratuitous graces1 the word of faith    
should likewise be placed among the     
gratuitous graces4  ,on the contrary1   
,it is written 7,ecclus4 #f3e73 ,a      
gracious tongue in a good man shall     
abound ,vulg43 'aboundeth'4 ,now man's  
goodness is by grace4 ,therefore        
graciousness in words is also by grace4 

,i answer that1 ,the gratuitous graces  
are given for the profit of others1 as  
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,,aa4  
#a1 #d74 ,now the knowledge a man       
receives from ,god cannot be turned to  
another's profit1 except by means of    
speech4 ,and since the ,holy ,ghost does
 not fail in anything that pertains to  
the profit of the ,church1 ,he provides 
also the members of the ,church with    
speech2 to the effect that a man not    
only speaks so as to be understood by   
different people1 which pertains to the 
gift of tongues1 but also speaks with   
effect1 and this pertains to the grace  
of the word4  ,this happens in three    
ways4 ,first1 in order to instruct the  
intellect1 and this is the case when a  
man speaks so as to teach4 ,secondly1 in
 order to move the affections1 so that a
 man willingly hearkens to the word of  
,god4 ,this is the case when a man      
speaks so as to please his hearers1 not 
indeed with a view to his own favor1 but
 in order to draw them to listen to     

,god's word4 ,thirdly1 in order that men
 may love that which is signified by the
 word1 and desire to fulfill it1 and    
this is the case when a man so speaks as
 to sway his hearers4 ,in order to      
effect this the ,holy ,ghost makes use  
of the human tongue as of an instrument2
 but ,he it is ,who perfects the work   
within4 ,hence ,gregory says in a homily
 for ,pentecost 7,hom4 xxx in ,ev473    
,unless the ,holy ,ghost fill the hearts
 of the hearers1 in vain does the voice 
of the teacher resound in the ears of   
the body4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even as by 
a miracle ,god sometimes works in a more
 excellent way those things which nature
 also can work1 so too the ,holy ,ghost 
effects more excellently by the grace of
 words that which art can effect in a   
less efficient manner4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,the ,apostle is speaking there of the 
word that relies on human eloquence     
without the power of the ,holy ,ghost4  
,wherefore he says just before 7#a ,cor4
 #d3ai73 ,i 4 4 4 will know1 not the    

speech of them that are puffed up1 but  
the power3 and of himself he had already
 said 7#a ,cor4 #b3d73 ,my speech and my
 preaching was not in the persuasive    
words of human wisdom1 but in the       
showing of the spirit and power4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above1 the grace  
of the word is given to a man for the   
profit of others4 ,hence it is withdrawn
 sometimes through the fault of the     
hearer1 and sometimes through the fault 
of the speaker4 ,the good works of      
either of them do not merit this grace  
directly1 but only remove the obstacles 
thereto4 ,for sanctifying grace also is 
withdrawn on account of a person's      
fault1 and yet he does not merit it by  
his good works1 which1 however1 remove  
the obstacles to grace4  ,reply ,obj4   
#d3 ,as stated above1 the grace of the  
word is directed to the profit of       
others4 ,now if a man communicates his  
faith to others this is by the word of  
knowledge or of wisdom4 ,hence          
,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #a7    

that to know how faith may profit the   
godly and be defended against the       
ungodly1 is apparently what the ,apostle
 means by knowledge4 ,hence it was not  
necessary for him to mention the word of
 faith1 but it was sufficient for him to
 mention the word of knowledge and of   
wisdom4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #agg1 ,art4 #b  ,whether the ,grace 
of the ,word of ,wisdom and ,knowledge  
,is ,becoming to ,women8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that the grace of the   
word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming
 even to women4 ,for teaching is        
pertinent to this grace1 as stated in   
the foregoing ,article4 ,now it is      
becoming to a woman to teach2 for it is 
written 7,prov4 #d3c1 #d73 ,i was an    
only son in the sight of my mother1 and 
she taught me 99,vulg43 ',i was my      
father's son1 tender1 and as an only son
 in the sight of my mother4 ,and he     
taught me4'4 ,therefore this grace is   
becoming to women4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
the grace of prophecy is greater than   

the grace of the word1 even as the      
contemplation of truth is greater than  
its utterance4 ,but prophecy is granted 
to women1 as we read of ,deborah        
7,judges #d3d71 and of ,holda the       
prophetess1 the wife of ,sellum 7#d     
,kings #bb3ad71 and of the four         
daughters of ,philip 7,acts #ba3i74     
,moreover the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4   
#aa3e73 ,every woman praying or         
prophesying1 etc4 ,much more therefore  
would it seem that the grace of the word
 is becoming to a woman4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 it is written 7#a ,pet4       
#d3aj73 ,as every man hath received     
grace ministering the same one to       
another4 ,now some women receive the    
grace of wisdom and knowledge1 which    
they cannot minister to others except by
 the grace of the word4 ,therefore the  
grace of the word is becoming to women4 
,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a
 ,cor4 #ad3cd73 ,let women keep silence 
in the churches1 and 7#a ,tim4 #b3ab73  
,i suffer not a woman to teach4 ,now    

this pertains especially to the grace of
 the word4 ,therefore the grace of the  
word is not becoming to women4  ,i      
answer that1 ,speech may be employed in 
two ways3 in one way privately1 to one  
or a few1 in familiar conversation1 and 
in this respect the grace of the word   
may be becoming to women2 in another    
way1 publicly1 addressing oneself to the
 whole church1 and this is not permitted
 to women4 ,first and chiefly1 on       
account of the condition attaching to   
the female sex1 whereby woman should be 
subject to man1 as appears from ,gen4   
#c3af4 ,now teaching and persuading     
publicly in the church belong not to    
subjects but to the prelates 7although  
men who are subjects may do these things
 if they be so commissioned1 because    
their subjection is not a result of     
their natural sex1 as it is with women1 
but of some thing supervening by        
accident74 ,secondly1 lest men's minds  
be enticed to lust1 for it is written   
7,ecclus4 #i3aa73 ,her conversation     

burneth as fire4 ,thirdly1 because as a 
rule women are not perfected in wisdom1 
so as to be fit to be intrusted with    
public teaching4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the 
passage quoted speaks of private        
teaching whereby a father instructs his 
son4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the grace of    
prophecy consists in ,god enlightening  
the mind1 on the part of which there is 
no difference of sex among men1         
according to ,col4 #c3aj1 #aa1 ,putting 
on the new man1 him who is renewed unto 
knowledge1 according to the image of    
,him that created him1 where there is   
neither male nor female 99,vulg43       
',neither ,gentile nor ,jew1            
circumcision nor uncircumcision1        
,barbarian nor ,scythian1 bond nor      
free4' ,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,a4 #f1 ad #b  
footnote4 ,now the grace of the word    
pertains to the instruction of men among
 whom the difference of sex is found4   
,hence the comparison fails4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,the recipients of a divinely 
conferred grace administer it in        

different ways according to their       
various conditions4 ,hence women1 if    
they have the grace of wisdom or of     
knowledge1 can administer it by teaching
 privately but not publicly4            
,,question #agh  ,,of ,,the ,,grace ,,of
 ,,miracles 7,in ,two ,articles7  ,we   
must next consider the grace of         
miracles1 under which head there are two
 points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether there
 is a gratuitous grace of working       
miracles8  7#b7 ,to whom is it becoming8
   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4     
#agh1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,there ,is a   
,gratuitous ,grace of ,working          
,miracles8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that no gratuitous grace is        
directed to the working of miracles4    
,for every grace puts something in the  
one to whom it is given 7,cf4 ,i-,,ii1  
,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a74 ,now the working of   
miracles puts nothing in the soul of the
 man who receives it since miracles are 
wrought at the touch even of a dead     
body4 ,thus we read 7#d ,kings #ac3ba7  

that some 4 4 4 cast the body into the  
sepulchre of ,eliseus4 ,and when it had 
touched the bones of ,eliseus1 the man  
came to life1 and stood upon his feet4  
,therefore the working of miracles does 
not belong to a gratuitous grace4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 the gratuitous graces are
 from the ,holy ,ghost1 according to #a 
,cor4 #ab3d1 ,there are diversities of  
graces1 but the same ,spirit4 ,now the  
working of miracles is effected even by 
the unclean spirit1 according to ,matt4 
#bd3bd1 ,there shall arise false        
,christs and false prophets1 and shall  
show great signs and wonders4 ,therefore
 it would seem that the working of      
miracles does not belong to a gratuitous
 grace4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 miracles   
are divided into signs1 wonders or      
portents1 and virtues4 99,cf4 #b ,thess4
 #b3i1 where the ,douay version renders 
virtus by power4 ,the use of the word   
virtue in the sense of a miracle is now 
obsolete1 and the generic term miracle  
is elsewhere used in its stead3 ,cf4 #a 

,cor4 #ab3aj1 #bh2 ,heb4 #b3d2 ,acts    
#b3bb4 ,therefore it is unreasonable to 
reckon the working of miracles a        
gratuitous grace1 any more than the     
working of signs and wonders4  ,obj4 #d3
 ,further1 the miraculous restoring to  
health is done by the power of ,god4    
,therefore the grace of healing should  
not be distinguished from the working of
 miracles4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the     
working of miracles results from        
faith--either of the worker1 according  
to #a ,cor4 #ac3b1 ,if ,i should have   
all faith1 so that ,i could remove      
mountains1 or of other persons for whose
 sake miracles are wrought1 according to
 ,matt4 #ac3eh1 ,and ,he wrought not    
many miracles there1 because of their   
unbelief4 ,therefore1 if faith be       
reckoned a gratuitous grace1 it is      
superfluous to reckon in addition the   
working of signs as another gratuitous  
grace4  ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle 
7#a ,cor4 #ab3i1 #aj7 says that among   
other gratuitous graces1 to another is  

given the grace of healing 4 4 4 to     
another1 the working of miracles4  ,i   
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #agg1
 ,a4 #a71 the ,holy ,ghost provides     
sufficiently for the ,church in matters 
profitable unto salvation1 to which     
purpose the gratuitous graces are       
directed4 ,now just as the knowledge    
which a man receives from ,god needs to 
be brought to the knowledge of others   
through the gift of tongues and the     
grace of the word1 so too the word      
uttered needs to be confirmed in order  
that it be rendered credible4 ,this is  
done by the working of miracles1        
according to ,mk4 #af3bj1 ,and          
confirming the word with signs that     
followed3 and reasonably so4 ,for it is 
natural to man to arrive at the         
intelligible truth through its sensible 
effects4 ,wherefore just as man led by  
his natural reason is able to arrive at 
some knowledge of ,god through ,his     
natural effects1 so is he brought to a  
certain degree of supernatural knowledge

 of the objects of faith by certain     
supernatural effects which are called   
miracles4 ,therefore the working of     
miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as prophecy      
extends to whatever can be known        
supernaturally1 so the working of       
miracles extends to all things that can 
be done supernaturally2 the cause       
whereof is the divine omnipotence which 
cannot be communicated to any creature4 
,hence it is impossible for the         
principle of working miracles to be a   
quality abiding as a habit in the soul4 
,on the other hand1 just as the         
prophet's mind is moved by divine       
inspiration to know something           
supernaturally1 so too is it possible   
for the mind of the miracle worker to be
 moved to do something resulting in the 
miraculous effect which ,god causes by  
,his power4 ,sometimes this takes place 
after prayer1 as when ,peter raised to  
life the dead ,tabitha 7,acts #i3dj73   
sometimes without any previous prayer   

being expressed1 as when ,peter by      
upbraiding the lying ,ananias and       
,saphira delivered them to death 7,acts 
#e3d1 #i74 ,hence ,gregory says 7,dial4 
ii1 #cj7 that the saints work miracles1 
sometimes by authority1 sometimes by    
prayer4 ,in either case1 however1 ,god  
is the principal worker1 for ,he uses   
instrumentally either man's inward      
movement1 or his speech1 or some outward
 action1 or again the bodily contact of 
even a dead body4 ,thus when ,josue had 
said as though authoritatively 7,josh4  
#aj3ab73 ,move not1 ,o sun1 toward      
,gabaon1 it is said afterwards 7,josh4  
#aj3ad73 ,there was not before or after 
so long a day1 the ,lord obeying the    
voice of a man4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,our  
,lord is speaking there of the miracles 
to be wrought at the time of            
,antichrist1 of which the ,apostle says 
7#b ,thess4 #b3i7 that the coming of    
,antichrist will be according to the    
working of ,satan1 in all power1 and    
signs1 and lying wonders4 ,to quote the 

words of ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xx1 
#ai71 it is a matter of debate whether  
they are called signs and lying wonders1
 because he will deceive the senses of  
mortals by imaginary visions1 in that he
 will seem to do what he does not1 or   
because1 though they be real wonders1   
they will seduce into falsehood them    
that believe4 ,they are said to be real1
 because the things themselves will be  
real1 just as ,pharaoh's magicians made 
real frogs and real serpents2 but they  
will not be real miracles1 because they 
will be done by the power of natural    
causes1 as stated in the ,first ,part   
7,q4 #aad1 ,a4 #d72 whereas the working 
of miracles which is ascribed to a      
gratuitous grace1 is done by ,god's     
power for man's profit4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,two things may be considered in    
miracles4 ,one is that which is done3   
this is something surpassing the faculty
 of nature1 and in this respect miracles
 are called virtues4 ,the other thing is
 the purpose for which miracles are     

wrought1 namely the manifestation of    
something supernatural1 and in this     
respect they are commonly called signs3 
but on account of some excellence they  
receive the name of wonder or prodigy1  
as showing something from afar 7procul74
  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the grace of healing
 is mentioned separately1 because by its
 means a benefit1 namely bodily health1 
is conferred on man in addition to the  
common benefit bestowed in all miracles1
 namely the bringing of men to the      
knowledge of ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3    
,the working of miracles is ascribed to 
faith for two reasons4 ,first1 because  
it is directed to the confirmation of   
faith1 secondly1 because it proceeds    
from ,god's omnipotence on which faith  
relies4 ,nevertheless1 just as besides  
the grace of faith1 the grace of the    
word is necessary that people may be    
instructed in the faith1 so too is the  
grace of miracles necessary that people 
may be confirmed in their faith4        
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agh1 

,art4 #b  ,whether the ,wicked ,can     
,work ,miracles8  ,objection #a3 ,it    
would seem that the wicked cannot work  
miracles4 ,for miracles are wrought     
through prayer1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1
 ad #a74 ,now the prayer of a sinner is 
not granted1 according to ,john #i3ca1  
,we know that ,god doth not hear        
sinners1 and ,prov4 #bh3i1 ,he that     
turneth away his ear from hearing the   
law1 his prayer shall be an abomination4
 ,therefore it would seem that the      
wicked cannot work miracles4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 miracles are ascribed to      
faith1 according to ,matt4 #ag3ai1 ,if  
you have faith as a grain of mustard    
seed you shall say to this mountain3    
,remove from hence hither1 and it shall 
remove4 ,now faith without works is     
dead1 according to ,james #b3bj1 so     
that1 seemingly1 it is devoid of its    
proper operation4 ,therefore it would   
seem that the wicked1 since they do not 
good works1 cannot work miracles4  ,obj4
 #c3 ,further1 miracles are divine      

attestations1 according to ,heb4 #b3d1  
,god also bearing them witness by signs 
and wonders and divers miracles3        
wherefore in the ,church the            
canonization of certain persons is based
 on the attestation of miracles4 ,now   
,god cannot bear witness to a falsehood4
 ,therefore it would seem that wicked   
men cannot work miracles4  ,obj4 #d3    
,further1 the good are more closely     
united to ,god than the wicked4 ,but the
 good do not all work miracles4 ,much   
less therefore do the wicked4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4  
#ac3b73 ,if ,i should have all faith1 so
 that ,i could remove mountains1 and    
have not charity1 ,i am nothing4 ,now   
whosoever has not charity is wicked1    
because this gift alone of the ,holy    
,ghost distinguishes the children of the
 kingdom from the children of perdition1
 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1     
#ah74 ,therefore it would seem that even
 the wicked can work miracles4  ,i      
answer that1 ,some miracles are not true

 but imaginary deeds1 because they      
delude man by the appearance of that    
which is not2 while others are true     
deeds1 yet they have not the character  
of a true miracle1 because they are done
 by the power of some natural cause4    
,both of these can be done by the       
demons1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b74
  ,true miracles cannot be wrought save 
by the power of ,god1 because ,god works
 them for man's benefit1 and this in two
 ways3 in one way for the confirmation  
of truth declared1 in another way in    
proof of a person's holiness1 which ,god
 desires to propose as an example of    
virtue4 ,in the first way miracles can  
be wrought by any one who preaches the  
true faith and calls upon ,christ's     
name1 as even the wicked do sometimes4  
,in this way even the wicked can work   
miracles4 ,hence ,jerome commenting on  
,matt4 #g3bb1 ,have not we prophesied in
 ,thy name8 says3 ,sometimes            
prophesying1 the working of miracles1   
and the casting out of demons are       

accorded not to the merit of those who  
do these things1 but to the invoking of 
,christ's name1 that men may honor ,god1
 by invoking ,whom such great miracles  
are wrought4  ,in the second way        
miracles are not wrought except by the  
saints1 since it is in proof of their   
holiness that miracles are wrought      
during their lifetime or after death1   
either by themselves or by others4 ,for 
we read 7,acts #ai3aa1 #ab7 that ,god   
wrought by the hand of ,paul 4 4 4      
miracles and even there were brought    
from his body to the sick1 handkerchiefs
 4 4 4 and the diseases departed from   
them4 ,in this way indeed there is      
nothing to prevent a sinner from working
 miracles by invoking a saint2 but the  
miracle is ascribed not to him1 but to  
the one in proof of whose holiness such 
things are done4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as  
stated above 7,q4 #hc1 ,a4 #af7 when we 
were treating of prayer1 the prayer of  
impetration relies not on merit but on  
,god's mercy1 which extends even to the 

wicked1 wherefore the prayers even of   
sinners are sometimes granted by ,god4  
,hence ,augustine says 7,tract4 xliv in 
,joan47 that the blind man spoke these  
words before he was anointed1 that is1  
before he was perfectly enlightened2    
since ,god does hear sinners4 ,when it  
is said that the prayer of one who hears
 not the law is an abomination1 this    
must be understood so far as the        
sinner's merit is concerned2 yet it is  
sometimes granted1 either for the       
spiritual welfare of the one who        
prays--as the publican was heard 7,luke 
#ah3ad7--or for the good of others and  
for ,god's glory4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3     
,faith without works is said to be dead1
 as regards the believer1 who lives not1
 by faith1 with the life of grace4 ,but 
nothing hinders a living thing from     
working through a dead instrument1 as a 
man through a stick4 ,it is thus that   
,god works while employing              
instrumentally the faith of a sinner4   
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,miracles are always   

true witnesses to the purpose for which 
they are wrought4 ,hence wicked men who 
teach a false doctrine never work true  
miracles in confirmation of their       
teaching1 although sometimes they may do
 so in praise of ,christ's name which   
they invoke1 and by the power of the    
sacraments which they administer4 ,if   
they teach a true doctrine1 sometimes   
they work true miracles as confirming   
their teaching1 but not as an           
attestation of holiness4 ,hence         
,augustine says 7,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4     
#gi73 ,magicians work miracles in one   
way1 good ,christians in another1 wicked
 ,christians in another4 ,magicians by  
private compact with the demons1 good   
,christians by their manifest           
righteousness1 evil ,christians by the  
outward signs of righteousness4  ,reply 
,obj4 #d3 ,as ,augustine says 7,,qq4    
lxxxiii1 qu4 #gi71 the reason why these 
are not granted to all holy men is lest 
by a most baneful error the weak be     
deceived into thinking such deeds to    

imply greater gifts than the deeds of   
righteousness whereby eternal life is   
obtained4   ,,question #agi  ,,of ,,the 
,,division ,,of ,,life ,,into ,,active  
,,and ,,contemplative 7,in ,two         
,articles7  ,we must next consider      
active and contemplative life4 ,this    
consideration will be fourfold3 7#a7 ,of
 the division of life into active and   
contemplative2 7#b7 ,of the             
contemplative life2 7#c7 ,of the active 
life2 7#d7 ,of the comparison between   
the active and the contemplative life4  
,under the first head there are two     
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether life  
is fittingly divided into active and    
contemplative8  7#b7 ,whether this is an
 adequate division8   ,,first ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agi1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,life ,is ,fittingly ,divided into      
,active and ,contemplative8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that life is not     
fittingly divided into active and       
contemplative4 ,for the soul is the     
principle of life by its essence3 since 

the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1   
#d7 that in living things to live is to 
be4 ,now the soul is the principle of   
action and contemplation by its powers4 
,therefore it would seem that life is   
not fittingly divided into active and   
contemplative4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the 
division of that which comes afterwards 
is unfittingly applied to that which    
comes first4 ,now active and            
contemplative1 or speculative and       
practical1 are differences of the       
intellect 7,de ,anima iii1 #aj72 while  
to live comes before to understand1     
since to live comes first to living     
things through the vegetative soul1 as  
the ,philosopher states 7,de ,anima ii1 
#d74 ,therefore life is unfittingly     
divided into active and contemplative4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the word life       
implies movement1 according to          
,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 vi73 whereas    
contemplation consists rather in rest1  
according to ,wis4 #h3af3 ,when ,i enter
 into my house1 ,i shall repose myself  

with her4 ,therefore it would seem that 
life is unfittingly divided into active 
and contemplative4  ,on the contrary1   
,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv super ,ezech473
 ,there is a twofold life wherein       
,almighty ,god instructs us by ,his holy
 word1 the active life and the          
contemplative4  ,i answer that1         
,properly speaking1 those things are    
said to live whose movement or operation
 is from within themselves4 ,now that   
which is proper to a thing and to which 
it is most inclined is that which is    
most becoming to it from itself2        
wherefore every living thing gives proof
 of its life by that operation which is 
most proper to it1 and to which it is   
most inclined4 ,thus the life of plants 
is said to consist in nourishment and   
generation2 the life of animals in      
sensation and movement2 and the life of 
men in their understanding and acting   
according to reason4 ,wherefore also in 
men the life of every man would seem to 
be that wherein he delights most1 and on

 which he is most intent2 thus          
especially does he wish to associate    
with his friends 7,ethic4 ix1 #ab74     
,accordingly since certain men are      
especially intent on the contemplation  
of truth1 while others are especially   
intent on external actions1 it follows  
that man's life is fittingly divided    
into active and contemplative4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,each thing's proper form that
 makes it actually to be is properly    
that thing's principle of operation4    
,hence to live is1 in living things1 to 
be1 because living things through having
 being from their form1 act in such and 
such a way4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,life in  
general is not divided into active and  
contemplative1 but the life of man1 who 
derives his species from having an      
intellect1 wherefore the same division  
applies to intellect and human life4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is true that       
contemplation enjoys rest from external 
movements4 ,nevertheless to contemplate 
is itself a movement of the intellect1  

in so far as every operation is         
described as a movement2 in which sense 
the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1  
#g7 that sensation and understanding are
 movements of a kind1 in so far as      
movement is defined the act of a perfect
 thing4 ,in this way ,dionysius 7,div4  
,nom4 iv7 ascribes three movements to   
the soul in contemplation1 namely1      
straight1 circular1 and oblique 99,cf4  
,q4 #ahj1 ,a4 #f4   ,,second ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agi1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,life ,is ,adequately ,divided into     
,active and ,contemplative8  ,objection 
#a3 ,it would seem that life is not     
adequately divided into active and      
contemplative4 ,for the ,philosopher    
says 7,ethic4 i1 #e7 that there are     
three most prominent kinds of life1 the 
life of pleasure1 the civil which would 
seem to be the same as the active1 and  
the contemplative life4 ,therefore the  
division of life into active and        
contemplative would seem to be          
inadequate4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1        

,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #a1 #b1 
#c1 #ai7 mentions three kinds of life1  
namely the life of leisure which        
pertains to the contemplative1 the busy 
life which pertains to the active1 and a
 third composed of both4 ,therefore it  
would seem that life is inadequately    
divided into active and contemplative4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man's life is       
diversified according to the divers     
actions in which men are occupied4 ,now 
there are more than two occupations of  
human actions4 ,therefore it would seem 
that life should be divided into more   
kinds than the active and the           
contemplative4  ,on the contrary1 ,these
 two lives are signified by the two     
wives of ,jacob2 the active by ,lia1 and
 the contemplative by ,rachel3 and by   
the two hostesses of our ,lord2 the     
contemplative life by ,mary1 and the    
active life by ,martha1 as ,gregory     
declares 7,moral4 vi1 #cg 99,hom4 xiv in
 ,ezech474 ,now this signification would
 not be fitting if there were more than 

two lives4 ,therefore life is adequately
 divided into active and contemplative4 
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4   
#a1 ad #b71 this division applies to the
 human life as derived from the         
intellect4 ,now the intellect is divided
 into active and contemplative1 since   
the end of intellective knowledge is    
either the knowledge itself of truth1   
which pertains to the contemplative     
intellect1 or some external action1     
which pertains to the practical or      
active intellect4 ,therefore life too is
 adequately divided into active and     
contemplative4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the   
life of pleasure places its end in      
pleasures of the body1 which are common 
to us and dumb animals2 wherefore as the
 ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ,ethic4 i1  
#e71 it is the life of a beast4 ,hence  
it is not included in this division of  
the life of a man into active and       
contemplative4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a mean
 is a combination of extremes1 wherefore
 it is virtually contained in them1 as  

tepid in hot and cold1 and pale in white
 and black4 ,in like manner active and  
contemplative comprise that which is    
composed of both4 ,nevertheless as in   
every mixture one of the simples        
predominates1 so too in the mean state  
of life sometimes the contemplative1    
sometimes the active element1 abounds4  
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all the occupations of
 human actions1 if directed to the      
requirements of the present life in     
accord with right reason1 belong to the 
active life which provides for the      
necessities of the present life by means
 of well-ordered activity4 ,if1 on the  
other hand1 they minister to any        
concupiscence whatever1 they belong to  
the life of pleasure1 which is not      
comprised under the active life4 ,those 
human occupations that are directed to  
the consideration of truth belong to the
 contemplative life4   ,,question #ahj  
,,of ,,the ,,contemplative ,,life 7,in  
,eight ,articles7  ,we must now consider
 the contemplative life1 under which    

head there are eight points of inquiry3 
7#a7 ,whether the contemplative life    
pertains to the intellect only1 or also 
to the affections8  7#b7 ,whether the   
moral virtues pertain to the            
contemplative life8  7#c7 ,whether the  
contemplative life consists in one      
action or in several8  7#d7 ,whether the
 consideration of any truth whatever    
pertains to the contemplative life8     
7#e7 ,whether the contemplative life of 
man in this state can arise to the      
vision of ,god8  7#f7 ,of the movements 
of contemplation assigned by ,dionysius 
7,div4 ,nom4 iv72  7#g7 ,of the pleasure
 of contemplation2  7#h7 ,of the        
duration of contemplation4   ,,first    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahj1 ,art4 #a 
,whether the ,contemplative ,life ,has  
,nothing to ,do with the ,affections1   
and ,pertains ,wholly to the ,intellect8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the
 contemplative life has nothing to do   
with the affections and pertains wholly 
to the intellect4 ,for the ,philosopher 

says 7,metaph4 ii1 text4 #c 99,ed ,did4 
ia1 #a7 that the end of contemplation is
 truth4 ,now truth pertains wholly to   
the intellect4 ,therefore it would seem 
that the contemplative life wholly      
regards the intellect4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 vi1    
#cg2 ,hom4 xix in ,ezech47 that ,rachel1
 which is interpreted 'vision of the    
principle' 99,or rather1 ',one seeing   
the principle1' if derived from rah and 
irzn2 ,cf4 ,jerome1 ,de ,nom4 ,hebr41   
signifies the contemplative life4 ,now  
the vision of a principle belongs       
properly to the intellect4 ,therefore   
the contemplative life belongs properly 
to the intellect4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech47    
that it belongs to the contemplative    
life1 to rest from external action4 ,now
 the affective or appetitive power      
inclines to external actions4 ,therefore
 it would seem that the contemplative   
life has nothing to do with the         
appetitive power4  ,on the contrary1    

,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech47    
that the contemplative life is to cling 
with our whole mind to the love of ,god 
and our neighbor1 and to desire nothing 
beside our ,creator4 ,now desire and    
love pertain to the affective or        
appetitive power1 as stated above       
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #bf1 ,a4 
#b74 ,therefore the contemplative life  
has also something to do with the       
affective or appetitive power4  ,i      
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #agi1
 ,a4 #a7 theirs is said to be the       
contemplative who are chiefly intent on 
the contemplation of truth4 ,now        
intention is an act of the will1 as     
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #a71
 because intention is of the end which  
is the object of the will4 ,consequently
 the contemplative life1 as regards the 
essence of the action1 pertains to the  
intellect1 but as regards the motive    
cause of the exercise of that action it 
belongs to the will1 which moves all the
 other powers1 even the intellect1 to   

their actions1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 
#hb1 ,a4 #d2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74  
,now the appetitive power moves one to  
observe things either with the senses or
 with the intellect1 sometimes for love 
of the thing seen because1 as it is     
written 7,matt4 #f3ba71 where thy       
treasure is1 there is thy heart also1   
sometimes for love of the very knowledge
 that one acquires by observation4      
,wherefore ,gregory makes the           
contemplative life to consist in the    
love of ,god1 inasmuch as through loving
 ,god we are aflame to gaze on ,his     
beauty4 ,and since everyone delights    
when he obtains what he loves1 it       
follows that the contemplative life     
terminates in delight1 which is seated  
in the affective power1 the result being
 that love also becomes more intense4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,from the very fact    
that truth is the end of contemplation1 
it has the aspect of an appetible good1 
both lovable and delightful1 and in this
 respect it pertains to the appetitive  

power4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,we are urged  
to the vision of the first principle1   
namely ,god1 by the love thereof2       
wherefore ,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in   
,ezech47 that the contemplative life    
tramples on all cares and longs to see  
the face of its ,creator4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,the appetitive power moves not only
 the bodily members to perform external 
actions1 but also the intellect to      
practice the act of contemplation1 as   
stated above4   ,,second ,,article      
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahj1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
the ,moral ,virtues ,pertain to the     
,contemplative ,life8  ,objection #a3   
,it would seem that the moral virtues   
pertain to the contemplative life4 ,for 
,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech47    
that the contemplative life is to cling 
to the love of ,god and our neighbor    
with the whole mind4 ,now all the moral 
virtues1 since their acts are prescribed
 by the precepts of the ,law1 are       
reducible to the love of ,god and of our
 neighbor1 for love 4 4 4 is the        

fulfilling of the ,law 7,rom4 #ac3aj74  
,therefore it would seem that the moral 
virtues belong to the contemplative     
life4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the          
contemplative life is chiefly directed  
to the contemplation of ,god2 for       
,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech47    
that the mind tramples on all cares and 
longs to gaze on the face of its        
,creator4 ,now no one can accomplish    
this without cleanness of heart1 which  
is a result of moral virtue 99,cf4 ,q4  
#h1 ,a4 #g4 ,for it is written 7,matt4  
#e3h73 ,blessed are the clean of heart1 
for they shall see ,god3 and 7,heb4     
#ab3ad73 ,follow peace with all men1 and
 holiness1 without which no man shall   
see ,god4 ,therefore it would seem that 
the moral virtues pertain to the        
contemplative life4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 ,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech47   
that the contemplative life gives beauty
 to the soul1 wherefore it is signified 
by ,rachel1 of whom it is said 7,gen4   
#bi3ag7 that she was of a beautiful     

countenance4 ,now the beauty of the soul
 consists in the moral virtues1         
especially temperance1 as ,ambrose says 
7,de ,offic4 i1 #dc1 #de1 #df74         
,therefore it seems that the moral      
virtues pertain to the contemplative    
life4  ,on the contrary1 ,the moral     
virtues are directed to external        
actions4 ,now ,gregory says 7,moral4 vi 
99,hom4 xiv in ,ezech42 ,cf4 ,a4 #a1    
,obj4 #c7 that it belongs to the        
contemplative life to rest from external
 action4 ,therefore the moral virtues do
 not pertain to the contemplative life4 
,i answer that1 ,a thing may belong to  
the contemplative life in two ways1     
essentially or dispositively4 ,the moral
 virtues do not belong to the           
contemplative life essentially1 because 
the end of the contemplative life is the
 consideration of truth3 and as the     
,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ii1 #d71   
knowledge1 which pertains to the        
consideration of truth1 has little      
influence on the moral virtues3         

wherefore he declares 7,ethic4 x1 #h7   
that the moral virtues pertain to active
 but not to contemplative happiness4    
,on the other hand1 the moral virtues   
belong to the contemplative life        
dispositively4 ,for the act of          
contemplation1 wherein the contemplative
 life essentially consists1 is hindered 
both by the impetuosity of the passions 
which withdraw the soul's intention from
 intelligible to sensible things1 and by
 outward disturbances4 ,now the moral   
virtues curb the impetuosity of the     
passions1 and quell the disturbance of  
outward occupations4 ,hence moral       
virtues belong dispositively to the     
contemplative life4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the          
contemplative life has its motive cause 
on the part of the affections1 and in   
this respect the love of ,god and our   
neighbor is requisite to the            
contemplative life4 ,now motive causes  
do not enter into the essence of a      
thing1 but dispose and perfect it4      

,wherefore it does not follow that the  
moral virtues belong essentially to the 
contemplative life4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,holiness or cleanness of heart is      
caused by the virtues that are concerned
 with the passions which hinder the     
purity of the reason2 and peace is      
caused by justice which is about        
operations1 according to ,isa4 #cb3ag1  
,the work of justice shall be peace3    
since he who refrains from wronging     
others lessens the occasions of quarrels
 and disturbances4 ,hence the moral     
virtues dispose one to the contemplative
 life by causing peace and cleanness of 
heart4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,beauty1 as    
stated above 7,q4 #ade1 ,a4 #b71        
consists in a certain clarity and due   
proportion4 ,now each of these is found 
radically in the reason2 because both   
the light that makes beauty seen1 and   
the establishing of due proportion among
 things belong to reason4 ,hence since  
the contemplative life consists in an   
act of the reason1 there is beauty in it

 by its very nature and essence2        
wherefore it is written 7,wis4 #h3b7 of 
the contemplation of wisdom3 ,i became a
 lover of her beauty4  ,on the other    
hand1 beauty is in the moral virtues by 
participation1 in so far as they        
participate in the order of reason2 and 
especially is it in temperance1 which   
restrains the concupiscences which      
especially darken the light of reason4  
,hence it is that the virtue of chastity
 most of all makes man apt for          
contemplation1 since venereal pleasures 
most of all weigh the mind down to      
sensible objects1 as ,augustine says    
7,soliloq4 i1 #aj74   ,,third ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahj1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,there ,are ,various ,actions           
,pertaining to the ,contemplative ,life8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
there are various actions pertaining to 
the contemplative life4 ,for ,richard of
 ,st4 ,victor 99,de ,grat4 ,contempl4 i1
 #c1 #d distinguishes between           
contemplation1 meditation1    and       

cogitation4 ,yet all these apparently   
pertain to contemplation4 ,therefore it 
would seem that there are various       
actions pertaining to the contemplative 
life4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle 
says 7#b ,cor4 #c3ah73 ,but we 4 4 4    
beholding 7speculantes7 the glory of the
 ,lord with open face1 are transformed  
into the same clarity 99,vulg43 'into   
the same image from glory to glory4'4   
,now this belongs to the contemplative  
life4 ,therefore in addition to the     
three aforesaid1 vision 7speculatio7    
belongs to the contemplative life4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,bernard says 7,de  
,consid4 v1 #ad7 that the first and     
greatest contemplation is admiration of 
the ,majesty4 ,now according to         
,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ae7   
admiration is a kind of fear4 ,therefore
 it would seem that several acts are    
requisite for the contemplative life4   
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,prayer1 reading1   
and meditation 99,hugh of ,st4 ,victor1 
,alleg4 in ,n4,t4 iii1 #d are said to   

belong to the contemplative life4       
,again1 hearing belongs to the          
contemplative life3 since it is stated  
that ,mary 7by whom the contemplative   
life is signified7 sitting 4 4 4 at the 
,lord's feet1 heard ,his word 7,luke    
#aj3ci74 ,therefore it would seem that  
several acts are requisite for the      
contemplative life4  ,on the contrary1  
,life signifies here the operation on   
which a man is chiefly intent4          
,wherefore if there are several         
operations of the contemplative life1   
there will be1 not one1 but several     
contemplative lives4  ,i answer that1   
,we are now speaking of the             
contemplative life as applicable to man4
 ,now according to ,dionysius 7,div4    
,nom4 vii7 between man and angel there  
is this difference1 that an angel       
perceives the truth by simple           
apprehension1 whereas man arrives at the
 perception of a simple truth by a      
process from several premises4          
,accordingly1 then1 the contemplative   

life has one act wherein it is finally  
completed1 namely the contemplation of  
truth1 and from this act it derives its 
unity4 ,yet it has many acts whereby it 
arrives at this final act4 ,some of     
these pertain to the reception of       
principles1 from which it proceeds to   
the contemplation of truth2 others are  
concerned with deducing from the        
principles1 the truth1 the knowledge of 
which is sought2 and the last and       
crowning act is the contemplation itself
 of the truth4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3        
,according to ,richard of ,st4 ,victor  
cogitation would seem to regard the     
consideration of the many things from   
which a person intends to gather one    
simple truth4 ,hence cogitation may     
comprise not only the perceptions of the
 senses in taking cognizance of certain 
effects1 but also the imaginations4 ,and
 again the reason's discussion of the   
various signs or of anything that       
conduces to the truth in view3 although1
 according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4    

xiv1 #g71 cogitation may signify any    
actual operation of the intellect4      
,meditation would seem to be the process
 of reason from certain principles that 
lead to the contemplation of some truth3
 and consideration has the same meaning1
 according to ,bernard 7,de ,consid4 ii1
 #b71 although1 according to the        
,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 #a71 every 
operation of the intellect may be called
 consideration4 ,but contemplation      
regards the simple act of gazing on the 
truth2 wherefore ,richard says again    
7,de ,grat4 ,contempl4 i1 #d7 that      
contemplation is the soul's clear and   
free dwelling upon the object of its    
gaze2 meditation is the survey of the   
mind while occupied in searching for the
 truth3 and cogitation is the mind's    
glance which is prone to wander4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,according to a gloss 99,cf4 
,de ,trin4 xv1 #h of ,augustine on this 
passage1 beholding 7speculatio7 denotes 
seeing in a mirror 7speculo71 not from a
 watch-tower 7specula74 ,now to see a   

thing in a mirror is to see a cause in  
its effect wherein its likeness is      
reflected4 ,hence beholding would seem  
to be reducible to meditation4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,admiration is a kind of fear 
resulting from the apprehension of a    
thing that surpasses our faculties3     
hence it results from the contemplation 
of the sublime truth4 ,for it was stated
 above 7,a4 #a7 that contemplation      
terminates in the affections4  ,reply   
,obj4 #d3 ,man reaches the knowledge of 
truth in two ways4 ,first1 by means of  
things received from another4 ,in this  
way1 as regards the things he receives  
from ,god1 he needs prayer1 according to
 ,wis4 #g3g1 ,i called upon ,god1 and   
the spirit of wisdom came upon me3 while
 as regards the things he receives from 
man1 he needs hearing1 in so far as he  
receives from the spoken word1 and      
reading1 in so far as he receives from  
the tradition of ,holy ,writ4 ,secondly1
 he needs to apply himself by his       
personal study1 and thus he requires    

meditation4   ,,fourth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahj1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
the ,contemplative ,life ,consists in   
the ,mere ,contemplation of ,god1 or    
,also in the ,consideration of ,any     
,truth ,whatever8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that the contemplative life  
consists not only in the contemplation  
of ,god1 but also in the consideration  
of any truth4 ,for it is written 7,ps4  
#ach3ad73 ,wonderful are ,thy works1 and
 my soul knoweth right well4 ,now the   
knowledge of ,god's works is effected by
 any contemplation of the truth4        
,therefore it would seem that it        
pertains to the contemplative life to   
contemplate not only the divine truth1  
but also any other4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 ,bernard says 7,de ,consid4 v1 #ad7    
that contemplation consists in          
admiration first of ,god's majesty1     
secondly of ,his judgments1 thirdly of  
,his benefits1 fourthly of ,his         
promises4 ,now of these four the first  
alone regards the divine truth1 and the 

other three pertain to ,his effects4    
,therefore the contemplative life       
consists not only in the contemplation  
of the divine truth1 but also in the    
consideration of truth regarding the    
divine effects4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1    
,richard of ,st4 ,victor 99,de ,grat4   
,contempl4 i1 #f distinguishes six      
species of contemplation4 ,the first    
belongs to the imagination alone1 and   
consists in thinking of corporeal       
things4 ,the second is in the           
imagination guided by reason1 and       
consists in considering the order and   
disposition of sensible objects4 ,the   
third is in the reason based on the     
imagination2 when1 to wit1 from the     
consideration of the visible we rise to 
the invisible4 ,the fourth is in the    
reason and conducted by the reason1 when
 the mind is intent on things invisible 
of which the imagination has no         
cognizance4 ,the fifth is above the     
reason1 but not contrary to reason1 when
 by divine revelation we become         

cognizant of things that cannot be      
comprehended by the human reason4 ,the  
sixth is above reason and contrary to   
reason2 when1 to wit1 by the divine     
enlightening we know things that seem   
contrary to human reason1 such as the   
doctrine of the mystery of the ,trinity4
 ,now only the last of these would seem 
to pertain to the divine truth4         
,therefore the contemplation of truth   
regards not only the divine truth1 but  
also that which is considered in        
creatures4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 in the  
contemplative life the contemplation of 
truth is sought as being the perfection 
of man4 ,now any truth is a perfection  
of the human intellect4 ,therefore the  
contemplative life consists in the      
contemplation of any truth4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 vi1    
#cg7 that in contemplation we seek the  
principle which is ,god4  ,i answer     
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 a thing
 may belong to the contemplative life in
 two ways3 principally1 and secondarily1

 or dispositively4 ,that which belongs  
principally to the contemplative life is
 the contemplation of the divine truth1 
because this contemplation is the end of
 the whole human life4 ,hence ,augustine
 says 7,de ,trin4 i1 #h7 that the       
contemplation of ,god is promised us as 
being the goal of all our actions and   
the everlasting perfection of our joys4 
,this contemplation will be perfect in  
the life to come1 when we shall see ,god
 face to face1 wherefore it will make us
 perfectly happy3 whereas now the       
contemplation of the divine truth is    
competent to us imperfectly1 namely     
through a glass and in a dark manner 7#a
 ,cor4 #ac3ab74 ,hence it bestows on us 
a certain inchoate beatitude1 which     
begins now and will be continued in the 
life to come2 wherefore the ,philosopher
 7,ethic4 x1 #g7 places man's ultimate  
happiness in the contemplation of the   
supreme intelligible good4  ,since1     
however1 ,god's effects show us the way 
to the contemplation of ,god ,himself1  

according to ,rom4 #a3bj1 ,the invisible
 things of ,god 4 4 4 are clearly seen1 
being understood by the things that are 
made1 it follows that the contemplation 
of the divine effects also belongs to   
the contemplative life1 inasmuch as man 
is guided thereby to the knowledge of   
,god4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,vera 
,relig4 xxix7 that in the study of      
creatures we must not exercise an empty 
and futile curiosity1 but should make   
them the stepping-stone to things       
unperishable and everlasting4           
,accordingly it is clear from what has  
been said 7,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c7 that four  
things pertain1 in a certain order1 to  
the contemplative life2 first1 the moral
 virtues2 secondly1 other acts exclusive
 of contemplation2 thirdly1             
contemplation of the divine effects2    
fourthly1 the complement of all which is
 the contemplation of the divine truth  
itself4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,david sought 
the knowledge of ,god's works1 so that  
he might be led by them to ,god2        

wherefore he says elsewhere 7,ps4       
#adb3e1 #f73 ,i meditated on all ,thy   
works3 ,i meditated upon the works of   
,thy hands3 ,i stretched forth my hands 
to ,thee4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by         
considering the divine judgments man is 
guided to the consideration of the      
divine justice2 and by considering the  
divine benefits and promises1 man is led
 to the knowledge of ,god's mercy or    
goodness1 as by effects already         
manifested or yet to be vouchsafed4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these six denote the  
steps whereby we ascend by means of     
creatures to the contemplation of ,god4 
,for the first step consists in the mere
 consideration of sensible objects2 the 
second step consists in going forward   
from sensible to intelligible objects2  
the third step is to judge of sensible  
objects according to intelligible       
things2 the fourth is the absolute      
consideration of the intelligible       
objects to which one has attained by    
means of sensibles2 the fifth is the    

contemplation of those intelligible     
objects that are unattainable by means  
of sensibles1 but which the reason is   
able to grasp2 the sixth step is the    
consideration of such intelligible      
things as the reason can neither        
discover nor grasp1 which pertain to the
 sublime contemplation of divine truth1 
wherein contemplation is ultimately     
perfected4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the       
ultimate perfection of the human        
intellect is the divine truth3 and other
 truths perfect the intellect in        
relation to the divine truth4   ,,fifth 
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahj1 ,art4 #e 
,whether in the ,present ,state of ,life
 the ,contemplative ,life ,can ,reach to
 the ,vision of the ,divine ,essence8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in   
the present state of life the           
contemplative life can reach to the     
vision of the ,divine essence4 ,for1 as 
stated in ,gen4 #cb3cj1 ,jacob said3 ,i 
have seen ,god face to face1 and my soul
 has been saved4 ,now the vision of     

,god's face is the vision of the ,divine
 essence4 ,therefore it would seem that 
in the present life one may come1 by    
means of contemplation1 to see ,god in  
,his essence4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1      
,gregory says 7,moral4 vi1 #cg7 that    
contemplative men withdraw within       
themselves in order to explore spiritual
 things1 nor do they ever carry with    
them the shadows of things corporeal1 or
 if these follow them they prudently    
drive them away3 but being desirous of  
seeing the incomprehensible light1 they 
suppress all the images of their limited
 comprehension1 and through longing to  
reach what is above them1 they overcome 
that which they are4 ,now man is not    
hindered from seeing the ,divine        
essence1 which is the incomprehensible  
light1 save by the necessity of turning 
to corporeal phantasms4 ,therefore it   
would seem that the contemplation of the
 present life can extend to the vision  
of the incomprehensible light in its    
essence4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory  

says 7,dial4 ii1 #ce73 ,all creatures   
are small to the soul that sees its     
,creator3 wherefore when the man of     
,god1 the blessed ,benedict1 to wit1 saw
 a fiery globe in the tower and angels  
returning to heaven1 without doubt he   
could only see such things by the light 
of ,god4 ,now the blessed ,benedict was 
still in this life4 ,therefore the      
contemplation of the present life can   
extend to the vision of the essence of  
,god4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says  
7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech473 ,as long as we  
live in this mortal flesh1 no one       
reaches such a height of contemplation  
as to fix the eyes of his mind on the   
ray itself of incomprehensible light4   
,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says     
7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #bg71 no one seeing 
,god lives this mortal life wherein the 
bodily senses have their play3 and      
unless in some way he depart this life1 
whether by going altogether out of his  
body1 or by withdrawing from his carnal 
senses1 he is not caught up into that   

vision4 ,this has been carefully        
discussed above 7,q4 #age1 ,,aa4 #d1    
#e71 where we spoke of rapture1 and in  
the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #b71     
where we treated of the vision of ,god4 
,accordingly we must state that one may 
be in this life in two ways4 ,first1    
with regard to act1 that is to say by   
actually making use of the bodily       
senses1 and thus contemplation in the   
present life can nowise attain to the   
vision of ,god's essence4 ,secondly1 one
 may be in this life potentially and not
 with regard to act1 that is to say1    
when the soul is united to the mortal   
body as its form1 yet so as to make use 
neither of the bodily senses1 nor even  
of the imagination1 as happens in       
rapture2 and in this way the            
contemplation of the present life can   
attain to the vision of the ,divine     
essence4 ,consequently the highest      
degree of contemplation in the present  
life is that which ,paul had in rapture1
 whereby he was in a middle state       

between the present life and the life to
 come4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,dionysius 
says 7,ep4 i ad ,caium4 ,monach471 if   
anyone seeing ,god1 understood what he  
saw1 he saw not ,god ,himself1 but      
something belonging to ,god4 ,and       
,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech473   
,by no means is ,god seen now in ,his   
glory2 but the soul sees something of   
lower degree1 and is thereby refreshed  
so that afterwards it may attain to the 
glory of vision4 ,accordingly the words 
of ,jacob1 ,i saw ,god face to face do  
not imply that he saw ,god's essence1   
but that he saw some shape 99,cf4 ,i1   
,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #aa1 ad #a1 imaginary of   
course1 wherein ,god spoke to him4 ,or1 
since we know a man by his face1 by the 
face of ,god he signified his knowledge 
of ,him1 according to a gloss of        
,gregory on the same passage4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,in the present state of life 
human contemplation is impossible       
without phantasms1 because it is        
connatural to man to see the            

intelligible species in the phantasms1  
as the ,philosopher states 7,de ,anima  
iii1 #g74 ,yet intellectual knowledge   
does not consist in the phantasms       
themselves1 but in our contemplating in 
them the purity of the intelligible     
truth3 and this not only in natural     
knowledge1 but also in that which we    
obtain by revelation4 ,for ,dionysius   
says 7,coel4 ,hier4 i7 that the ,divine 
glory shows us the angelic hierarchies  
under certain symbolic figures1 and by  
its power we are brought back to the    
single ray of light1 i4e4 to the simple 
knowledge of the intelligible truth4 ,it
 is in this sense that we must          
understand the statement of ,gregory    
that contemplatives do not carry along  
with them the shadows of things         
corporeal1 since their contemplation is 
not fixed on them1 but on the           
consideration of the intelligible truth4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,by these words      
,gregory does not imply that the blessed
 ,benedict1 in that vision1 saw ,god in 

,his essence1 but he wishes to show that
 because all creatures are small to him 
that sees ,god1 it follows that all     
things can easily be seen through the   
enlightenment of the ,divine light4     
,wherefore he adds3 ,for however little 
he may see of the ,creator's light1 all 
created things become petty to him4     
,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahj1  
,art4 #f  ,whether the ,operation of    
,contemplation ,is ,fittingly ,divided  
into a ,threefold ,movement1 ,circular1 
,straight and ,oblique8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that the operation of    
contemplation is unfittingly divided    
into a threefold movement1 circular1    
straight1 and oblique 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 
,for contemplation pertains exclusively 
to rest1 according to ,wis4 #h3af1 ,when
 ,i go into my house1 ,i shall repose   
myself with her4 ,now movement is       
opposed to rest4 ,therefore the         
operations of the contemplative life    
should not be described as movements4   
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the action of the   

contemplative life pertains to the      
intellect1 whereby man is like the      
angels4 ,now ,dionysius describes these 
movements as being different in the     
angels from what they are in the soul4  
,for he says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the  
circular movement in the angel is       
according to his enlightenment by the   
beautiful and the good4 ,on the other   
hand1 he assigns the circular movement  
of the soul to several things3 the first
 of which is the withdrawal of the soul 
into itself from externals2 the second  
is a certain concentration of its       
powers1 whereby it is rendered free of  
error and of outward occupation2 and the
 third is union with those things that  
are above it4 ,again1 he describes      
differently their respective straight   
movements4 ,for he says that the        
straight movement of the angel is that  
by which he proceeds to the care of     
those things that are beneath him4 ,on  
the other hand1 he describes the        
straight movement of the soul as being  

twofold3 first1 its progress towards    
things that are near it2 secondly1 its  
uplifting from external things to simple
 contemplation4 ,further1 he assigns a  
different oblique movement to each4 ,for
 he assigns the oblique movement of the 
angels to the fact that while providing 
for those who have less they remain     
unchanged in relation to ,god3 whereas  
he assigns the oblique movement of the  
soul to the fact that the soul is       
enlightened in ,divine knowledge by     
reasoning and discoursing4 ,therefore it
 would seem that the operations of      
contemplation are unfittingly assigned  
according to the ways mentioned above4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,richard of ,st4    
,victor 7,de ,contempl4 i1 #e7 mentions 
many other different movements in       
likeness to the birds of the air4 ,for  
some of these rise at one time to a     
great height1 at another swoop down to  
earth1 and they do so repeatedly2 others
 fly now to the right1 now to the left  
again and again2 others go forwards or  

lag behind many times2 others fly in a  
circle now more now less extended2 and  
others remain suspended almost immovably
 in one place4 ,therefore it would seem 
that there are only three movements of  
contemplation4  ,on the contrary1 stands
 the authority of ,dionysius 7,div4     
,nom4 iv74  ,i answer that1 ,as stated  
above 7,q4 #aai1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c71 the    
operation of the intellect1 wherein     
contemplation essentially consists1 is  
called a movement1 in so far as movement
 is the act of a perfect thing1         
according to the ,philosopher 7,de      
,anima iii1 #a74 ,since1 however1 it is 
through sensible objects that we come to
 the knowledge of intelligible things1  
and since sensible operations do not    
take place without movement1 the result 
is that even intelligible operations are
 described as movements1 and are        
differentiated in likeness to various   
movements4 ,now of bodily movements1    
local movements are the most perfect and
 come first1 as proved in ,phys4 viii1  

#g2 wherefore the foremost among        
intelligible operations are described by
 being likened to them4 ,these movements
 are of three kinds2 for there is the   
circular movement1 by which a thing     
moves uniformly round one point as      
center1 another is the straight         
movement1 by which a thing goes from one
 point to another2 the third is oblique1
 being composed as it were of both the  
others4 ,consequently1 in intelligible  
operations1 that which is simply uniform
 is compared to circular movement2 the  
intelligible operation by which one     
proceeds from one point to another is   
compared to the straight movement2 while
 the intelligible operation which unites
 something of uniformity with progress  
to various points is compared to the    
oblique movement4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3     
,external bodily movements are opposed  
to the quiet of contemplation1 which    
consists in rest from outward           
occupations3 but the movements of       
intellectual operations belong to the   

quiet of contemplation4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,man is like the angels in intellect
 generically1 but the intellective power
 is much higher in the angel than in    
man4 ,consequently these movements must 
be ascribed to souls and angels in      
different ways1 according as they are   
differently related to uniformity4 ,for 
the angelic intellect has uniform       
knowledge in two respects4 ,first1      
because it does not acquire intelligible
 truth from the variety of composite    
objects2 secondly1 because it           
understands the truth of intelligible   
objects not discursively1 but by simple 
intuition4 ,on the other hand1 the      
intellect of the soul acquires          
intelligible truth from sensible        
objects1 and understands it by a certain
 discoursing of the reason4  ,wherefore 
,dionysius assigns the circular movement
 of the angels to the fact that their   
intuition of ,god is uniform and        
unceasing1 having neither beginning nor 
end3 even as a circular movement having 

neither beginning nor end is uniformly  
around the one same center4 ,but on the 
part of the soul1 ere it arrive at this 
uniformity1 its twofold lack of         
uniformity needs to be removed4 ,first1 
that which arises from the variety of   
external things3 this is removed by the 
soul withdrawing from externals1 and so 
the first thing he mentions regarding   
the circular movement of the soul is the
 soul's withdrawal into itself from     
external objects4 ,secondly1 another    
lack of uniformity requires to be       
removed from the soul1 and this is owing
 to the discoursing of reason4 ,this is 
done by directing all the soul's        
operations to the simple contemplation  
of the intelligible truth1 and this is  
indicated by his saying in the second   
place that the soul's intellectual      
powers must be uniformly concentrated1  
in other words that discoursing must be 
laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on 
the contemplation of the one simple     
truth4 ,in this operation of the soul   

there is no error1 even as there is     
clearly no error in the understanding of
 first principles which we know by      
simple intuition4 ,afterwards these two 
things being done1 he mentions thirdly  
the uniformity which is like that of the
 angels1 for then all things being laid 
aside1 the soul continues in the        
contemplation of ,god alone4 ,this he   
expresses by saying3 ,then being thus   
made uniform unitedly1 i4e4 conformably1
 by the union of its powers1 it is      
conducted to the good and the beautiful4
 ,the straight movement of the angel    
cannot apply to his proceeding from one 
thing to another by considering them1   
but only to the order of his providence1
 namely to the fact that the higher     
angel enlightens the lower angels       
through the angels that are             
intermediate4 ,he indicates this when he
 says3 ,the angel's movement takes a    
straight line when he proceeds to the   
care of things subject to him1 taking in
 his course whatever things are direct1 

i4e4 in keeping with the dispositions of
 the direct order4 ,whereas he ascribes 
the straight movement in the soul to the
 soul's proceeding from exterior        
sensibles to the knowledge of           
intelligible objects4 ,the oblique      
movement in the angels he describes as  
being composed of the straight and      
circular movements1 inasmuch as their   
care for those beneath them is in       
accordance with their contemplation of  
,god3 while the oblique movement in the 
soul he also declares to be partly      
straight and partly circular1 in so far 
as in reasoning it makes use of the     
light received from ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 
#c3 ,these varieties of movement that   
are taken from the distinction between  
above and below1 right and left1        
forwards and backwards1 and from varying
 circles1 are all comprised under either
 straight or oblique movement1 because  
they all denote discursions of reason4  
,for if the reason pass from the genus  
to the species1 or from the part to the 

whole1 it will be1 as he explains1 from 
above to below3 if from one opposite to 
another1 it will be from right to left2 
if from the cause to the effect1 it will
 be backwards and forwards2 if it be    
about accidents that surround a thing   
near at hand or far remote1 the movement
 will be circular4 ,the discoursing of  
reason from sensible to intelligible    
objects1 if it be according to the order
 of natural reason1 belongs to the      
straight movement2 but if it be         
according to the ,divine enlightenment1 
it will belong to the oblique movement  
as explained above 7ad #b74 ,that alone 
which he describes as immobility belongs
 to the circular movement4  ,wherefore  
it is evident that ,dionysius describes 
the movement of contemplation with much 
greater fulness and depth4   ,,seventh  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahj1 ,art4 #g 
,whether ,there ,is ,delight in         
,contemplation8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that there is no delight in  
contemplation4 ,for delight belongs to  

the appetitive power2 whereas           
contemplation resides chiefly in the    
intellect4 ,therefore it would seem that
 there is no delight in contemplation4  
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all strife and      
struggle is a hindrance to delight4 ,now
 there is strife and struggle in        
contemplation4 ,for ,gregory says 7,hom4
 xiv in ,ezech47 that when the soul     
strives to contemplate ,god1 it is in a 
state of struggle2 at one time it almost
 overcomes1 because by understanding and
 feeling it tastes something of the     
incomprehensible light1 and at another  
time it almost succumbs1 because even   
while tasting1 it fails4 ,therefore     
there is no delight in contemplation4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 delight is the      
result of a perfect operation1 as stated
 in ,ethic4 x1 #d4 ,now the             
contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect1
 according to #a ,cor4 #ac3ab1 ,we see  
now through a glass in a dark manner4   
,therefore seemingly there is no delight
 in the contemplative life4  ,obj4 #d3  

,further1 a lesion of the body is an    
obstacle to delight4 ,now contemplation 
causes a lesion of the body2 wherefore  
it is stated 7,gen4 #cb7 that after     
,jacob had said 7,gen4 #cb3cj71 ',i have
 seen ,god face to face' 4 4 4 he halted
 on his foot 7,gen4 #cb3ca7 4 4 4       
because he touched the sinew of his     
thigh and it shrank 7,gen4 #cb3cb74     
,therefore seemingly there is no delight
 in contemplation4  ,on the contrary1   
,it is written of the contemplation of  
wisdom 7,wis4 #h3af73 ,her conversation 
hath no bitterness1 nor her company any 
tediousness1 but joy and gladness3 and  
,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech47    
that the contemplative life is sweetness
 exceedingly lovable4  ,i answer that1  
,there may be delight in any particular 
contemplation in two ways4 ,first by    
reason of the operation itself 99,cf4   
,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,a4 #e1 because each   
individual delights in the operation    
which befits him according to his own   
nature or habit4 ,now contemplation of  

the truth befits a man according to his 
nature as a rational animal3 the result 
being that all men naturally desire to  
know1 so that consequently they delight 
in the knowledge of truth4 ,and more    
delightful still does this become to one
 who has the habit of wisdom and        
knowledge1 the result of which is that  
he contemplates without difficulty4     
,secondly1 contemplation may be         
delightful on the part of its object1 in
 so far as one contemplates that which  
one loves2 even as bodily vision gives  
pleasure1 not only because to see is    
pleasurable in itself1 but because one  
sees a person whom one loves4 ,since1   
then1 the contemplative life consists   
chiefly in the contemplation of ,god1 of
 which charity is the motive1 as stated 
above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b1 ad #a71 it follows 
that there is delight in the            
contemplative life1 not only by reason  
of the contemplation itself1 but also by
 reason of the ,divine love4  ,in both  
respects the delight thereof surpasses  

all human delight1 both because         
spiritual delight is greater than carnal
 pleasure1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #ca1 ,a4 #e71 when we were treating of 
the passions1 and because the love      
whereby ,god is loved out of charity    
surpasses all love4 ,hence it is written
 7,ps4 #cc3i73 ,o taste and see that the
 ,lord is sweet4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3      
,although the contemplative life        
consists chiefly in an act of the       
intellect1 it has its beginning in the  
appetite1 since it is through charity   
that one is urged to the contemplation  
of ,god4 ,and since the end corresponds 
to the beginning1 it follows that the   
term also and the end of the            
contemplative life has its being in the 
appetite1 since one delights in seeing  
the object loved1 and the very delight  
in the object seen arouses a yet greater
 love4 ,wherefore ,gregory says 7,hom4  
xiv in ,ezech47 that when we see one    
whom we love1 we are so aflame as to    
love him more4 ,and this is the ultimate

 perfection of the contemplative life1  
namely that the ,divine truth be not    
only seen but also loved4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,strife or struggle arising from the
 opposition of an external thing1       
hinders delight in that thing4 ,for a   
man delights not in a thing against     
which he strives3 but in that for which 
he strives2 when he has obtained it1    
other things being equal1 he delights   
yet more3 wherefore ,augustine says     
7,confess4 viii1 #c7 that the more peril
 there was in the battle1 the greater   
the joy in the triumph4 ,but there is no
 strife or struggle in contemplation on 
the part of the truth which we          
contemplate1 though there is on the part
 of our defective understanding and our 
corruptible body which drags us down to 
lower things1 according to ,wis4 #i3ae1 
,the corruptible body is a load upon the
 soul1 and the earthly habitation       
presseth down the mind that museth upon 
many things4 ,hence it is that when man 
attains to the contemplation of truth1  

he loves it yet more1 while he hates the
 more his own deficiency and the weight 
of his corruptible body1 so as to say   
with the ,apostle 7,rom4 #g3bd73        
,unhappy man that ,i am1 who shall      
deliver me from the body of this death8 
,wherefore ,gregory say 7,hom4 xiv in   
,ezech473 ,when ,god is once known by   
desire and understanding1 ,he withers   
all carnal pleasure in us4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,the contemplation of ,god in this 
life is imperfect in comparison with the
 contemplation in heaven2 and in like   
manner the delight of the wayfarer's    
contemplation is imperfect as compared  
with the delight of contemplation in    
heaven1 of which it is written 7,ps4    
#ce3i73 ,thou shalt make them drink of  
the torrent of ,thy pleasure4 ,yet1     
though the contemplation of ,divine     
things which is to be had by wayfarers  
is imperfect1 it is more delightful than
 all other contemplation however        
perfect1 on account of the excellence of
 that which is contemplated4 ,hence the 

,philosopher says 7,de ,part4 ,animal4  
i1 #e73 ,we may happen to have our own  
little theories about those sublime     
beings and godlike substances1 and      
though we grasp them but feebly1        
nevertheless so elevating is the        
knowledge that they give us more delight
 than any of those things that are round
 about us3 and ,gregory says in the same
 sense 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech473 ,the     
contemplative life is sweetness         
exceedingly lovable2 for it carries the 
soul away above itself1 it opens heaven 
and discovers the spiritual world to the
 eyes of the mind4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3    
,after contemplation ,jacob halted with 
one foot1 because we need to grow weak  
in the love of the world ere we wax     
strong in the love of ,god1 as ,gregory 
says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech474 ,thus when 
we have known the sweetness of ,god1 we 
have one foot sound while the other     
halts2 since every one who halts on one 
foot leans only on that foot which is   
sound4   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  

,q4 #ahj1 ,art4 #h  ,whether the        
,contemplative ,life ,is ,continuous8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
contemplative life is not continuous4   
,for the contemplative life consists    
essentially in things pertaining to the 
intellect4 ,now all the intellectual    
perfections of this life will be made   
void1 according to #a ,cor4 #ac3h1      
,whether prophecies shall be made void1 
or tongues shall cease1 or knowledge    
shall be destroyed4 ,therefore the      
contemplative life is made void4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 a man tastes the sweetness
 of contemplation by snatches and for a 
short time only3 wherefore ,augustine   
says 7,confess4 x1 #dj71 ,thou admittest
 me to a most unwonted affection in my  
inmost soul1 to a strange sweetness 4 4 
4 yet through my grievous weight ,i sink
 down again4 ,again1 ,gregory commenting
 on the words of ,job #d3ae1 ,when a    
spirit passed before me1 says 7,moral4  
v1 #cc73 ,the mind does not remain long 
at rest in the sweetness of inward      

contemplation1 for it is recalled to    
itself and beaten back by the very      
immensity of the light4 ,therefore the  
contemplative life is not continuous4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is not   
connatural to man cannot be continuous4 
,now the contemplative life1 according  
to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 x1 #g71 is 
better than the life which is according 
to man4 ,therefore seemingly the        
contemplative life is not continuous4   
,on the contrary1 our ,lord said 7,luke 
#aj3db73 ,mary hath chosen the best     
part1 which shall not be taken away from
 her1 since as ,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv 
in ,ezech471 the contemplative life     
begins here so that it may be perfected 
in our heavenly home4  ,i answer that1  
,a thing may be described as continuous 
in two ways3 first1 in regard to its    
nature2 secondly1 in regard to us4 ,it  
is evident that in regard to itself     
contemplative life is continuous for two
 reasons3 first1 because it is about    
incorruptible and unchangeable things2  

secondly1 because it has no contrary1   
for there is nothing contrary to the    
pleasure of contemplation1 as stated in 
,topic4 i1 #ac4 ,but even in our regard 
contemplative life is continuous--both  
because it is competent to us in respect
 of the incorruptible part of the soul1 
namely the intellect1 wherefore it can  
endure after this life--and because in  
the works of the contemplative life we  
work not with our bodies1 so that we are
 the more able to persevere in the works
 thereof1 as the ,philosopher observes  
7,ethic4 x1 #g74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the 
manner of contemplation is not the same 
here as in heaven3 yet the contemplative
 life is said to remain by reason of    
charity1 wherein it has both its        
beginning and its end4 ,gregory speaks  
in this sense 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech473   
,the contemplative life begins here1 so 
as to be perfected in our heavenly home1
 because the fire of love which begins  
to burn here is aflame with a yet       
greater love when we see ,him ,whom we  

love4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,no action can  
last long at its highest pitch4 ,now the
 highest point of contemplation is to   
reach the uniformity of ,divine         
contemplation1 according to ,dionysius  
99,cf4 ,coel4 ,hier4 iii1 and as we have
 stated above 7,a4 #f1 ad #b74 ,hence   
although contemplation cannot last long 
in this respect1 it can be of long      
duration as regards the other           
contemplative acts4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the ,philosopher declares the          
contemplative life to be above man1     
because it befits us so far as there is 
in us something divine 7,ethic4 x1 #g71 
namely the intellect1 which is          
incorruptible and impassible in itself1 
wherefore its act can endure longer4    
,,question #aha  ,,of ,,the ,,active    
,,life 7,in ,four ,articles7  ,we must  
now consider the active life1 under     
which head there are four points of     
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether all the works of
 the moral virtues pertain to the active
 life8  7#b7 ,whether prudence pertains 

to the active life8  7#c7 ,whether      
teaching pertains to the active life8   
7#d7 ,of the duration of the active     
life4   ,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4
 #aha1 ,art4 #a  ,whether ,all the      
,actions of the ,moral ,virtues ,pertain
 to the ,active ,life8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that the acts of the     
moral virtues do not all pertain to the 
active life4 ,for seemingly the active  
life regards only our relations with    
other persons3 hence ,gregory says      
7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech47 that the active  
life is to give bread to the hungry1 and
 after mentioning many things that      
regard our relations with other people  
he adds finally1 and to give to each and
 every one whatever he needs4 ,now we   
are directed in our relations to others1
 not by all the acts of moral virtues1  
but only by those of justice and its    
parts1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,,aa4  
#b1 #h2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c74
 ,therefore the acts of the moral       
virtues do not all pertain to the active

 life4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory    
says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech47 that ,lia   
who was blear-eyed but fruitful         
signifies the active life3 which being  
occupied with work1 sees less1 and yet  
since it urges one's neighbor both by   
word and example to its imitation it    
begets a numerous offspring of good     
deeds4 ,now this would seem to belong to
 charity1 whereby we love our neighbor1 
rather than to the moral virtues4       
,therefore seemingly the acts of moral  
virtue do not pertain to the active     
life4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as stated    
above 7,q4 #ahj1 ,a4 #b71 the moral     
virtues dispose one to the contemplative
 life4 ,now disposition and perfection  
belong to the same thing4 ,therefore it 
would seem that the moral virtues do not
 pertain to the active life4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,isidore says 7,de ,summo     
,bono iii1 #ae73 ,in the active life all
 vices must first of all be extirpated  
by the practice of good works1 in order 
that in the contemplative life the      

mind's eye being purified one may       
advance to the contemplation of the     
,divine light4 ,now all vices are not   
extirpated save by acts of the moral    
virtues4 ,therefore the acts of the     
moral virtues pertain to the active     
life4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 
7,q4 #agi1 ,a4 #a7 the active and the   
contemplative life differ according to  
the different occupations of men intent 
on different ends3 one of which         
occupations is the consideration of the 
truth2 and this is the end of the       
contemplative life1 while the other is  
external work to which the active life  
is directed4  ,now it is evident that   
the moral virtues are directed chiefly1 
not to the contemplation of truth but to
 operation4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher 
says 7,ethic4 ii1 #d7 that for virtue   
knowledge is of little or no avail4     
,hence it is clear that the moral       
virtues belong essentially to the active
 life2 for which reason the ,philosopher
 7,ethic4 x1 #h7 subordinates the moral 

virtues to active happiness4  ,reply    
,obj4 #a3 ,the chief of the moral       
virtues is justice by which one man is  
directed in his relations towards       
another1 as the ,philosopher proves     
7,ethic4 v1 #a74 ,hence the active life 
is described with reference to our      
relations with other people1 because it 
consists in these things1 not           
exclusively1 but principally4  ,reply   
,obj4 #b3 ,it is possible1 by the acts  
of all the moral virtues1 for one to    
direct one's neighbor to good by        
example3 and this is what ,gregory here 
ascribes to the active life4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,even as the virtue that is   
directed to the end of another virtue   
passes1 as it were1 into the species of 
the latter virtue1 so again when a man  
makes use of things pertaining to the   
active life1 merely as dispositions to  
contemplation1 such things are comprised
 under the contemplative life4 ,on the  
other hand1 when we practice the works  
of the moral virtues1 as being good in  

themselves1 and not as dispositions to  
the contemplative life1 the moral       
virtues belong to the active life4  ,it 
may also be replied1 however1 that the  
active life is a disposition to the     
contemplative life4   ,,second ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aha1 ,art4 #b  ,whether
 ,prudence ,pertains to the ,active     
,life8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that prudence does not pertain to the   
active life4 ,for just as the           
contemplative life belongs to the       
cognitive power1 so the active life     
belongs to the appetitive power4 ,now   
prudence belongs not to the appetitive  
but to the cognitive power4 ,therefore  
prudence does not belong to the active  
life4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory says
 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech47 that the active 
life being occupied with work1 sees     
less1 wherefore it is signified by ,lia 
who was blear-eyed4 ,but prudence       
requires clear eyes1 so that one may    
judge aright of what has to be done4    
,therefore it seems that prudence does  

not pertain to the active life4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 prudence stands between   
the moral and the intellectual virtues4 
,now just as the moral virtues belong to
 the active life1 as stated above 7,a4  
#a71 so do the intellectual virtues     
pertain to the contemplative life4      
,therefore it would seem that prudence  
pertains neither to the active nor to   
the contemplative life1 but to an       
intermediate kind of life1 of which     
,augustine makes mention 7,de ,civ4 ,dei
 xix1 #b1 #c1 #ai74  ,on the contrary1  
,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #h7  
that prudence pertains to active        
happiness1 to which the moral virtues   
belong4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 
,a4 #f71 if one thing be directed to    
another as its end1 it is drawn1        
especially in moral matters1 to the     
species of the thing to which it is     
directed3 for instance he who commits   
adultery that he may steal1 is a thief  
rather than an adulterer1 according to  

the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #b74 ,now  
it is evident that the knowledge of     
prudence is directed to the works of the
 moral virtues as its end1 since it is  
right reason applied to action 7,ethic4 
vi1 #e72 so that the ends of the moral  
virtues are the principles of prudence1 
as the ,philosopher says in the same    
book4 ,accordingly1 as it was stated    
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c7 that the moral    
virtues in one who directs them to the  
quiet of contemplation belong to the    
contemplative life1 so the knowledge of 
prudence1 which is of itself directed to
 the works of the moral virtues1 belongs
 directly to the active life1 provided  
we take prudence in its proper sense as 
the ,philosopher speaks of it4  ,if1    
however1 we take it in a more general   
sense1 as comprising any kind of human  
knowledge1 then prudence1 as regards a  
certain part thereof1 belongs to the    
contemplative life4 ,in this sense      
,tully 7,de ,offic4 i1 #e7 says that the
 man who is able most clearly and       

quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold
 his reasons1 is wont to be considered  
most prudent and wise4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,moral works take their species from   
their end1 as stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4
 #ah1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f71 wherefore the      
knowledge pertaining to the             
contemplative life is that which has its
 end in the very knowledge of truth2    
whereas the knowledge of prudence1      
through having its end in an act of the 
appetitive power1 belongs to the active 
life4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,external       
occupation makes a man see less in      
intelligible things1 which are separated
 from sensible objects with which the   
works of the active life are concerned4 
,nevertheless the external occupation of
 the active life enables a man to see   
more clearly in judging of what is to be
 done1 which belongs to prudence1 both  
on account of experience1 and on account
 of the mind's attention1 since brains  
avail when the mind is attentive as     
,sallust observes 99,bell4 ,catilin41   

,,li4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,prudence is    
said to be intermediate between the     
intellectual and the moral virtues      
because it resides in the same subject  
as the intellectual virtues1 and has    
absolutely the same matter as the moral 
virtues4 ,but this third kind of life is
 intermediate between the active and the
 contemplative life as regards the      
things about which it is occupied1      
because it is occupied sometimes with   
the contemplation of the truth1         
sometimes with eternal things4   ,,third
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #haa1 ,art4 #c
  ,whether ,teaching ,is a ,work of the 
,active or of the ,contemplative ,life8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
teaching is a work not of the active but
 of the contemplative life4 ,for        
,gregory says 7,hom4 v in ,ezech47 that 
the perfect who have been able to       
contemplate heavenly goods1 at least    
through a glass1 proclaim them to their 
brethren1 whose minds they inflame with 
love for their hidden beauty4 ,but this 

pertains to teaching4 ,therefore        
teaching is a work of the contemplative 
life4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 act and habit
 would seem to be referable to the same 
kind of life4 ,now teaching is an act of
 wisdom3 for the ,philosopher says      
7,metaph4 i1 #a7 that to be able to     
teach is an indication of knowledge4    
,therefore since wisdom or knowledge    
pertain to the contemplative life1 it   
would seem that teaching also belongs to
 the contemplative life4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 prayer1 no less than          
contemplation1 is an act of the         
contemplative life4 ,now prayer1 even   
when one prays for another1 belongs to  
the contemplative life4 ,therefore it   
would seem that it belongs also to the  
contemplative life to acquaint another1 
by teaching him1 of the truth we have   
meditated4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory  
says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech473 ,the active
 life is to give bread to the hungry1 to
 teach the ignorant the words of wisdom4
  ,i answer that1 ,the act of teaching  

has a twofold object4 ,for teaching is  
conveyed by speech1 and speech is the   
audible sign of the interior concept4   
,accordingly one object of teaching is  
the matter or object of the interior    
concept2 and as to this object teaching 
belongs sometimes to the active1        
sometimes to the contemplative life4 ,it
 belongs to the active life1 when a man 
conceives a truth inwardly1 so as to be 
directed thereby in his outward action2 
but it belongs to the contemplative life
 when a man conceives an intelligible   
truth1 in the consideration and love    
whereof he delights4 ,hence ,augustine  
says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom4 ,serm4 civ1 #a73 
,let them choose for themselves the     
better part1 namely the contemplative   
life1 let them be busy with the word1   
long for the sweetness of teaching1     
occupy themselves with salutary         
knowledge1 thus stating clearly that    
teaching belongs to the contemplative   
life4  ,the other object of teaching is 
on the part of the speech heard1 and    

thus the object of teaching is the      
hearer4 ,as to this object all doctrine 
belongs to the active life to which     
external actions pertain4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,the authority quoted speaks        
expressly of doctrine as to its matter1 
in so far as it is concerned with the   
consideration and love of truth4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,habit and act have a common 
object4 ,hence this argument clearly    
considers the matter of the interior    
concept4 ,for it pertains to the man    
having wisdom and knowledge to be able  
to teach1 in so far as he is able to    
express his interior concept in words1  
so as to bring another man to understand
 the truth4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he who   
prays for another does nothing towards  
the man for whom he prays1 but only     
towards ,god ,who is the intelligible   
truth2 whereas he who teaches another   
does something in his regard by external
 action4 ,hence the comparison fails4   
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aha1 
,art4 #d  ,whether the ,active ,life    

,remains ,after ,this ,life8  ,objection
 #a3 ,it would seem that the active life
 remains after this life4 ,for the acts 
of the moral virtues belong to the      
active life1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74  
,but the moral virtues endure after this
 life according to ,augustine 7,de      
,trin4 xiv1 #i74 ,therefore the active  
life remains after this life4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 teaching others belongs to   
the active life1 as stated above 7,a4   
#c74 ,but in the life to come when we   
shall be like the angels1 teaching will 
be possible3 even as apparently it is in
 the angels of whom one enlightens1     
cleanses1 and perfects 99,coel4 ,hier4  
iii1 viii another1 which refers to the  
receiving of knowledge1 according to    
,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii74         
,therefore it would seem that the active
 life remains after this life4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 the more lasting a thing  
is in itself1 the more is it able to    
endure after this life4 ,but the active 
life is seemingly more lasting in       

itself3 for ,gregory says 7,hom4 v in   
,ezech47 that we can remain fixed in the
 active life1 whereas we are nowise able
 to maintain an attentive mind in the   
contemplative life4 ,therefore the      
active life is much more able than the  
contemplative to endure after this life4
  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,hom4
 xiv in ,ezech473 ,the active life ends 
with this world1 but the contemplative  
life begins here1 to be perfected in our
 heavenly home4  ,i answer that1 ,as    
stated above 7,a4 #a71 the active life  
has its end in external actions3 and if 
these be referred to the quiet of       
contemplation1 for that very reason they
 belong to the contemplative life4 ,but 
in the future life of the blessed the   
occupation of external actions will     
cease1 and if there be any external     
actions at all1 these will be referred  
to contemplation as their end4 ,for1 as 
,augustine says at the end of ,de       
,civitate ,dei xxii1 #cj1 there we shall
 rest and we shall see1 we shall see and

 love1 we shall love and praise4 ,and he
 had said before 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxii1  
#cj7 that there ,god will be seen       
without end1 loved without wearying1    
praised without tiring3 such will be the
 occupation of all1 the common love1 the
 universal activity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,as stated above 7,q4 #acf1 ,a4 #a1 ad  
#a71 the moral virtues will remain not  
as to those actions which are about the 
means1 but as to the actions which are  
about the end4 ,such acts are those that
 conduce to the quiet of contemplation1 
which in the words quoted above         
,augustine denotes by rest1 and this    
rest excludes not only outward          
disturbances but also the inward        
disturbance of the passions4  ,reply    
,obj4 #b3 ,the contemplative life1 as   
stated above 7,q4 #ahj1 ,a4 #d71        
consists chiefly in the contemplation of
 ,god1 and as to this1 one angel does   
not teach another1 since according to   
,matt4 #ah3aj1 the little ones' angels1 
who belong to the lower order1 always   

see the face of the ,father2 and so1 in 
the life to come1 no man will teach     
another of ,god1 but we shall all see   
,him as ,he is 7#a ,john #c3b74 ,this is
 in keeping with the saying of ,jeremiah
 #ca3cd3 ,they shall teach no more every
 man his neighbor 4 4 4 saying3 ,know   
the ,lord3 for all shall know me1 from  
the least of them even to the greatest4 
,but as regards things pertaining to the
 dispensation of the mysteries of ,god1 
one angel teaches another by cleansing1 
enlightening1 and perfecting him3 and   
thus they have something of the active  
life so long as the world lasts1 from   
the fact that they are occupied in      
administering to the creatures below    
them4 ,this is signified by the fact    
that ,jacob saw angels ascending the    
ladder--which refers to                 
contemplation--and descending--which    
refers to action4 ,nevertheless1 as     
,gregory remarks 7,moral4 ii1 #c71 they 
do not wander abroad from the ,divine   
vision1 so as to be deprived of the joys

 of inward contemplation4 ,hence in them
 the active life does not differ from   
the contemplative life as it does in us 
for whom the works of the active life   
are a hindrance to contemplation4  ,nor 
is the likeness to the angels promised  
to us as regards the administering to   
lower creatures1 for this is competent  
to us not by reason of our natural      
order1 as it is to the angels1 but by   
reason of our seeing ,god4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,that the durability of the active 
life in the present state surpasses the 
durability of the contemplative life    
arises not from any property of either  
life considered in itself1 but from our 
own deficiency1 since we are withheld   
from the heights of contemplation by the
 weight of the body4 ,hence ,gregory    
adds 7,moral4 ii1 #c7 that the mind     
through its very weakness being repelled
 from that immense height recoils on    
itself4   ,,question #ahb  ,,of ,,the   
,,active ,,life ,,in ,,comparison ,,with
 ,,the ,,contemplative ,,life 7,in ,four

 ,articles7  ,we must now consider the  
active life in comparison with the      
contemplative life1 under which head    
there are four points of inquiry3  7#a7 
,which of them is of greater import or  
excellence8  7#b7 ,which of them has the
 greater merit8  7#c7 ,whether the      
contemplative life is hindered by the   
active life8  7#d7 ,of their order4     
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahb1  
,art4 #a  ,whether the ,active ,life ,is
 ,more ,excellent ,than the             
,contemplative8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that the active life is more 
excellent than the contemplative4 ,for  
that which belongs to better men would  
seem to be worthier and better1 as the  
,philosopher says 7,top4 iii1 #a74 ,now 
the active life belongs to persons of   
higher rank1 namely prelates1 who are   
placed in a position of honor and power2
 wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4   
,dei xix1 #ai7 that in our actions we   
must not love honor or power in this    
life4 ,therefore it would seem that the 

active life is more excellent than the  
contemplative4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in  
all habits and acts1 direction belongs  
to the more important2 thus the military
 art1 being the more important1 directs 
the art of the bridle-maker 99,ethic4 i1
 #a4 ,now it belongs to the active life 
to direct and command the contemplative1
 as appears from the words addressed to 
,moses 7,ex4 #ai3ba71 ,go down and      
charge the people1 lest they should have
 a mind to pass the fixed limits to see 
the ,lord4 ,therefore the active life is
 more excellent than the contemplative4 
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no man should be    
taken away from a greater thing in order
 to be occupied with lesser things3 for 
the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ab3ca73 ,be
 zealous for the better gifts4 ,now some
 are taken away from the state of the   
contemplative life to the occupations of
 the active life1 as in the case of     
those who are transferred to the state  
of prelacy4 ,therefore it would seem    
that the active life is more excellent  

than the contemplative4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,luke        
#aj3db73 ,mary hath chosen the best     
part1 which shall not be taken away from
 her4 ,now ,mary figures the            
contemplative life4 ,therefore the      
contemplative life is more excellent    
than the active4  ,i answer that1       
,nothing prevents certain things being  
more excellent in themselves1 whereas   
they are surpassed by another in some   
respect4 ,accordingly we must reply that
 the contemplative life is simply more  
excellent than the active3 and the      
,philosopher proves this by eight       
reasons 7,ethic4 x1 #g1 #h74 ,the first 
is1 because the contemplative life      
becomes man according to that which is  
best in him1 namely the intellect1 and  
according to its proper objects1 namely 
things intelligible2 whereas the active 
life is occupied with externals4 ,hence 
,rachael1 by whom the contemplative life
 is signified1 is interpreted the vision
 of the principle1 99,or rather1 ',one  

seeing the principle1' if derived from  
rah and irzn2 ,cf4 ,jerome1 ,de ,nom4   
,hebr4 whereas as ,gregory says 7,moral4
 vi1 #cg7 the active life is signified  
by ,lia who was blear-eyed4 ,the second 
reason is because the contemplative life
 can be more continuous1 although not as
 regards the highest degree of          
contemplation1 as stated above 7,q4     
#ahj1 ,a4 #h1 ad #b2 ,q4 #aha1 ,a4 #d1  
ad #c71 wherefore ,mary1 by whom the    
contemplative life is signified1 is     
described as sitting all the time at the
 ,lord's feet4 ,thirdly1 because the    
contemplative life is more delightful   
than the active2 wherefore ,augustine   
says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom4 ,serm4 ciii7 that
 ,martha was troubled1 but ,mary        
feasted4 ,fourthly1 because in the      
contemplative life man is more          
self-sufficient1 since he needs fewer   
things for that purpose2 wherefore it   
was said 7,luke #aj3da73 ,martha1       
,martha1 thou art careful and art       
troubled about many things4 ,fifthly1   

because the contemplative life is loved 
more for its own sake1 while the active 
life is directed to something else4     
,hence it is written 7,ps4 #cf3d73 ,one 
thing ,i have asked of the ,lord1 this  
will ,i seek after1 that ,i may dwell in
 the house of the ,lord all the days of 
my life1 that ,i may see the delight of 
the ,lord4 ,sixthly1 because the        
contemplative life consists in leisure  
and rest1 according to ,ps4 #de3aa1 ,be 
still and see that ,i am ,god4          
,seventhly1 because the contemplative   
life is according to ,divine things1    
whereas active life is according to     
human things2 wherefore ,augustine says 
7,de ,verb4 ,dom4 ,serm4 civ73 ',in the 
beginning was the ,word'3 to ,him was   
,mary hearkening3 ',the ,word was made  
flesh'3 ,him was ,martha serving4       
,eighthly1 because the contemplative    
life is according to that which is most 
proper to man1 namely his intellect2    
whereas in the works of the active life 
the lower powers also1 which are common 

to us and brutes1 have their part2      
wherefore 7,ps4 #ce3g7 after the words1 
,men and beasts ,thou wilt preserve1 ,o 
,lord1 that which is special to man is  
added 7,ps4 #ce3aj73 ,in ,thy light we  
shall see light4  ,our ,lord adds a     
ninth reason 7,luke #aj3db7 when ,he    
says3 ,mary hath chosen the best part1  
which shall not be taken away from her1 
which words ,augustine 7,de ,verb4 ,dom4
 ,serm4 ciii7 expounds thus3 ,not--,thou
 hast chosen badly but--,she has chosen 
better4 ,why better8 ,listen--because it
 shall not be taken away from her4 ,but 
the burden of necessity shall at length 
be taken from thee3 whereas the         
sweetness of truth is eternal4  ,yet in 
a restricted sense and in a particular  
case one should prefer the active life  
on account of the needs of the present  
life4 ,thus too the ,philosopher says   
7,topic4 iii1 #b73 ,it is better to be  
wise than to be rich1 yet for one who is
 in need1 it is better to be rich 4 4 4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not only the active   

life concerns prelates1 they should also
 excel in the contemplative life2 hence 
,gregory says 7,pastor4 ii1 #a73 ,a     
prelate should be foremost in action1   
more uplifted than others in            
contemplation4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the   
contemplative life consists in a certain
 liberty of mind4 ,for ,gregory says    
7,hom4 iii in ,ezech47 that the         
contemplative life obtains a certain    
freedom of mind1 for it thinks not of   
temporal but of eternal things4 ,and    
,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 v1 #b73    
,the soul of man must needs be more free
 while it continues to gaze on the      
,divine mind1 and less so when it stoops
 to bodily things4 ,wherefore it is     
evident that the active life does not   
directly command the contemplative life1
 but prescribes certain works of the    
active life as dispositions to the      
contemplative life2 which it accordingly
 serves rather than commands4 ,gregory  
refers to this when he says 7,hom4 iii  
in ,ezech47 that the active life is     

bondage1 whereas the contemplative life 
is freedom4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sometimes
 a man is called away from the          
contemplative life to the works of the  
active life1 on account of some         
necessity of the present life1 yet not  
so as to be compelled to forsake        
contemplation altogether4 ,hence        
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1    
#ai73 ,the love of truth seeks a holy   
leisure1 the demands of charity         
undertake an honest toil1 the work      
namely of the active life4 ,if no one   
imposes this burden upon us we must     
devote ourselves to the research and    
contemplation of truth1 but if it be    
imposed on us1 we must bear it because  
charity demands it of us4 ,yet even then
 we must not altogether forsake the     
delights of truth1 lest we deprive      
ourselves of its sweetness1 and this    
burden overwhelm us4 ,hence it is clear 
that when a person is called from the   
contemplative life to the active life1  
this is done by way not of subtraction  

but of addition4   ,,second ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahb1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
the ,active ,life ,is of ,greater ,merit
 ,than the ,contemplative8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that the active life 
is of greater merit than the            
contemplative4 ,for merit implies       
relation to meed2 and meed is due to    
labor1 according to #a ,cor4 #c3h1      
,every man shall receive his own reward 
according to his own labor4 ,now labor  
is ascribed to the active life1 and rest
 to the contemplative life2 for ,gregory
 says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech473 ,whosoever
 is converted to ,god must first of all 
sweat from labor1 i4e4 he must take     
,lia1 that afterwards he may rest in the
 embraces of ,rachel so as to see the   
principle4 ,therefore the active life is
 of greater merit than the              
contemplative4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the 
contemplative life is a beginning of the
 happiness to come2 wherefore ,augustine
 commenting on ,john #ba3bb1 ,so ,i will
 have him to remain till ,i come1 says  

7,tract4 cxxiv in ,joan473 ,this may be 
expressed more clearly3 ,let perfect    
works follow ,me conformed to the       
example of ,my passion1 and let         
contemplation begun here remain until ,i
 come1 that it may be perfected when ,i 
shall come4 ,and ,gregory says 7,hom4   
xiv in ,ezech47 that contemplation      
begins here1 so as to be perfected in   
our heavenly home4 ,now the life to come
 will be a state not of meriting but of 
receiving the reward of our merits4     
,therefore the contemplative life would 
seem to have less of the character of   
merit than the active1 but more of the  
character of reward4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 xii in   
,ezech47 that no sacrifice is more      
acceptable to ,god than zeal for souls4 
,now by the zeal for souls a man turns  
to the occupations of the active life4  
,therefore it would seem that the       
contemplative life is not of greater    
merit than the active4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 vi1    

#cg73 ,great are the merits of the      
active life1 but greater still those of 
the contemplative4  ,i answer that1 ,as 
stated above 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,a4    
#d71 the root of merit is charity2 and1 
while1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4    
#a71 charity consists in the love of    
,god and our neighbor1 the love of ,god 
is by itself more meritorious than the  
love of our neighbor1 as stated above   
7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #h74 ,wherefore that which
 pertains more directly to the love of  
,god is generically more meritorious    
than that which pertains directly to the
 love of our neighbor for ,god's sake4  
,now the contemplative life pertains    
directly and immediately to the love of 
,god2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4    
,dei xix1 #ai7 that the love of the     
,divine truth seeks a holy leisure1     
namely of the contemplative life1 for it
 is that truth above all which the      
contemplative life seeks1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #aha1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b74 ,on the
 other hand1 the active life is more    

directly concerned with the love of our 
neighbor1 because it is busy about much 
serving 7,luke #aj3dj74 ,wherefore the  
contemplative life is generically of    
greater merit than the active life4     
,this is moreover asserted by ,gregory  
7,hom4 iii in ,ezech473 ,the            
contemplative life surpasses in merit   
the active life1 because the latter     
labors under the stress of present work1
 by reason of the necessity of assisting
 our neighbor1 while the former with    
heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the 
coming rest1 i4e4 the contemplation of  
,god4  ,nevertheless it may happen that 
one man merits more by the works of the 
active life than another by the works of
 the contemplative life4 ,for instance  
through excess of ,divine love a man may
 now and then suffer separation from the
 sweetness of ,divine contemplation for 
the time being1 that ,god's will may be 
done and for ,his glory's sake4 ,thus   
the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #i3c73 ,i      
wished myself to be an anathema from    

,christ1 for my brethren2 which words   
,chrysostom expounds as follows 7,de    
,compunct4 i1 #g 99,ad ,demetr4 de      
,compunct4 ,cordis473 ,his mind was so  
steeped in the love of ,christ that1    
although he desired above all to be with
 ,christ1 he despised even this1 because
 thus he pleased ,christ4  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,external labor conduces to the     
increase of the accidental reward2 but  
the increase of merit with regard to the
 essential reward consists chiefly in   
charity1 whereof external labor borne   
for ,christ's sake is a sign4 ,yet a    
much more expressive sign thereof is    
shown when a man1 renouncing whatsoever 
pertains to this life1 delights to      
occupy himself entirely with ,divine    
contemplation4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the
 state of future happiness man has      
arrived at perfection1 wherefore there  
is no room for advancement by merit2 and
 if there were1 the merit would be more 
efficacious by reason of the greater    
charity4 ,but in the present life       

contemplation is not without some       
imperfection1 and can always become more
 perfect2 wherefore it does not remove  
the idea of merit1 but causes a yet     
greater merit on account of the practice
 of greater ,divine charity4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,a sacrifice is rendered to   
,god spiritually when something is      
offered to ,him2 and of all man's goods1
 ,god specially accepts that of the     
human soul when it is offered to ,him in
 sacrifice4 ,now a man ought to offer to
 ,god1 in the first place1 his soul1    
according to ,ecclus4 #cj3bd1 ,have pity
 on thy own soul1 pleasing ,god2 in the 
second place1 the souls of others1      
according to ,apoc4 #bb3ag1 ,he that    
heareth1 let him say3 ,come4 ,and the   
more closely a man unites his own or    
another's soul to ,god1 the more        
acceptable is his sacrifice to ,god2    
wherefore it is more acceptable to ,god 
that one apply one's own soul and the   
souls of others to contemplation than to
 action4 ,consequently the statement    

that no sacrifice is more acceptable to 
,god than zeal for souls1 does not mean 
that the merit of the active life is    
preferable to the merit of the          
contemplative life1 but that it is more 
meritorious to offer to ,god one's own  
soul and the souls of others1 than any  
other external gifts4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahb1 ,art4 #c 
,whether the ,contemplative ,life ,is   
,hindered by the ,active ,life8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
contemplative life is hindered by the   
active life4 ,for the contemplative life
 requires a certain stillness of mind1  
according to ,ps4 #de3aa1 ,be still1 and
 see that ,i am ,god2 whereas the active
 life involves restlessness1 according  
to ,luke #aj3da1 ,martha1 ,martha1 thou 
art careful and troubled about many     
things4 ,therefore the active life      
hinders the contemplative4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 clearness of vision is a      
requisite for the contemplative life4   
,now active life is a hindrance to clear

 vision2 for ,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in
 ,ezech47 that it is blear-eyed and     
fruitful1 because the active life1 being
 occupied with work1 sees less4         
,therefore the active life hinders the  
contemplative4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one 
contrary hinders the other4 ,now the    
active and the contemplative life are   
apparently contrary to one another1     
since the active life is busy about many
 things1 while the contemplative life   
attends to the contemplation of one2    
wherefore they differ in opposition to  
one another4 ,therefore it would seem   
that the contemplative life is hindered 
by the active4  ,on the contrary1       
,gregory says 7,moral4 vi1 #cg73 ,those 
who wish to hold the fortress of        
contemplation1 must first of all train  
in the camp of action4  ,i answer that1 
,the active life may be considered from 
two points of view4 ,first1 as regards  
the attention to and practice of        
external works3 and thus it is evident  
that the active life hinders the        

contemplative1 in so far as it is       
impossible for one to be busy with      
external action1 and at the same time   
give oneself to ,divine contemplation4  
,secondly1 active life may be considered
 as quieting and directing the internal 
passions of the soul2 and from this     
point of view the active life is a help 
to the contemplative1 since the latter  
is hindered by the inordinateness of the
 internal passions4 ,hence ,gregory says
 7,moral4 vi1 #cg73 ,those who wish to  
hold the fortress of contemplation must 
first of all train in the camp of       
action4 ,thus after careful study they  
will learn whether they no longer wrong 
their neighbor1 whether they bear with  
equanimity the wrongs their neighbors do
 to them1 whether their soul is neither 
overcome with joy in the presence of    
temporal goods1 nor cast down with too  
great a sorrow when those goods are     
withdrawn4 ,in this way they will know  
when they withdraw within themselves1 in
 order to explore spiritual things1     

whether they no longer carry with them  
the shadows of the things corporeal1 or1
 if these follow them1 whether they     
prudently drive them away4 ,hence the   
work of the active life conduces to the 
contemplative1 by quelling the interior 
passions which give rise to the         
phantasms whereby contemplation is      
hindered4  ,this suffices for the       
,replies to the ,objections2 for these  
arguments consider the occupation itself
 of external actions1 and not the effect
 which is the quelling of the passions4 
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahb1 
,art4 #d  ,whether the ,active ,life    
,precedes the ,contemplative8           
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
active life does not precede the        
contemplative4 ,for the contemplative   
life pertains directly to the love of   
,god2 while the active life pertains to 
the love of our neighbor4 ,now the love 
of ,god precedes the love of our        
neighbor1 since we love our neighbor for
 ,god's sake4 ,seemingly therefore the  

contemplative life also precedes the    
active life4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1       
,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv in ,ezech473   
,it should be observed that while a     
well-ordered life proceeds from action  
to contemplation1 sometimes it is useful
 for the soul to turn from the          
contemplative to the active life4       
,therefore the active is not simply     
prior to the contemplative4  ,obj4 #c3  
,further1 it would seem that there is   
not necessarily any order between things
 that are suitable to different         
subjects4 ,now the active and the       
contemplative life are suitable to      
different subjects2 for ,gregory says   
7,moral4 vi1 #cg73 ,often those who were
 able to contemplate ,god so long as    
they were undisturbed have fallen when  
pressed with occupation2 and frequently 
they who might live advantageously      
occupied with the service of their      
fellow-creatures are killed by the sword
 of their inaction4  ,i answer that1 ,a 
thing is said to precede in two ways4   

,first1 with regard to its nature2 and  
in this way the contemplative life      
precedes the active1 inasmuch as it     
applies itself to things which precede  
and are better than others1 wherefore it
 moves and directs the active life4 ,for
 the higher reason which is assigned to 
contemplation is compared to the lower  
reason which is assigned to action1 and 
the husband is compared to his wife1 who
 should be ruled by her husband1 as     
,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #c1 #g1
 #ab74  ,secondly1 a thing precedes with
 regard to us1 because it comes first in
 the order of generation4 ,in this way  
the active precedes the contemplative   
life1 because it disposes one to it1 as 
stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #aha1 ,a4 #a1 
ad #c72 and1 in the order of generation1
 disposition precedes form1 although the
 latter precedes simply and according to
 its nature4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the     
contemplative life is directed to the   
love of ,god1 not of any degree1 but to 
that which is perfect2 whereas the      

active life is necessary for any degree 
of the love of our neighbor4 ,hence     
,gregory says 7,hom4 iii in ,ezech473   
,without the contemplative life it is   
possible to enter the heavenly kingdom1 
provided one omit not the good actions  
we are able to do2 but we cannot enter  
therein without the active life1 if we  
neglect to do the good we can do4  ,from
 this it is also evident that the active
 precedes the contemplative life1 as    
that which is common to all precedes1 in
 the order of generation1 that which is 
proper to the perfect4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3
 ,progress from the active to the       
contemplative life is according to the  
order of generation2 whereas the return 
from the contemplative life to the      
active is according to the order of     
direction1 in so far as the active life 
is directed by the contemplative4 ,even 
thus habit is acquired by acts1 and by  
the acquired habit one acts yet more    
perfectly1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #g4 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that is prone to   

yield to his passions on account of his 
impulse to action is simply more apt for
 the active life by reason of his       
restless spirit4 ,hence ,gregory says   
7,moral4 vi1 #cg7 that there be some so 
restless that when they are free from   
labor they labor all the more1 because  
the more leisure they have for thought1 
the worse interior turmoil they have to 
bear4 ,others1 on the contrary1 have the
 mind naturally pure and restful1 so    
that they are apt for contemplation1 and
 if they were to apply themselves wholly
 to action1 this would be detrimental to
 them4 ,wherefore ,gregory says 7,moral4
 vi1 #cg7 that some are so slothful of  
mind that if they chance to have any    
hard work to do they give way at the    
very outset4 ,yet1 as he adds further   
on1 often 4 4 4 love stimulates slothful
 souls to work1 and fear restrains souls
 that are disturbed in contemplation4   
,consequently those who are more adapted
 to the active life can prepare         
themselves for the contemplative by the 

practice of the active life2 while none 
the less1 those who are more adapted to 
the contemplative life can take upon    
themselves the works of the active life1
 so as to become yet more apt for       
contemplation4   ,,treatise ,,on ,,the  
,,states ,,of ,,life 7,,qq4 #ahc-ahi7   
,,of ,,man',s ,,various ,,duties ,,and  
,,states ,,in ,,general 7,in ,four      
,articles7  ,we must next consider man's
 various states and duties4 ,we shall   
consider 7#a7 man's duties and states in
 general2 7#b7 the state of the perfect 
in particular4  ,under the first head   
there are four points of inquiry3  7#a7 
,what constitutes a state among men8    
7#b7 ,whether among men there should be 
various states and duties8  7#c7 ,of the
 diversity of duties2  7#d7 ,of the     
diversity of states4   ,,first ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahc1 ,art4 #a  ,whether
 the ,notion of a ,state ,denotes a     
,condition of ,freedom or ,servitude8   
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
notion of a state does not denote a     

condition of freedom or servitude4 ,for 
state takes its name from standing4 ,now
 a person is said to stand on account of
 his being upright2 and ,gregory says   
7,moral4 vii1 #ag73 ,to fall by speaking
 harmful words is to forfeit entirely   
the state of righteousness4 ,but a man  
acquires spiritual uprightness by       
submitting his will to ,god2 wherefore a
 gloss on ,ps4 #cb3a1 ,praise becometh  
the upright1 says3 ,the upright are     
those who direct their heart according  
to ,god's will4 ,therefore it would seem
 that obedience to the ,divine          
commandments suffices alone for the     
notion of a state4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
the word state seems to denote          
immobility according to #a ,cor4 #ae3dh1
 ,be ye steadfast 7stabiles7 and        
immovable2 wherefore ,gregory says      
7,hom4 xxi in ,ezech473 ,the stone is   
foursquare1 and is stable on all sides1 
if no disturbance will make it fall4    
,now it is virtue that enables us to act
 with immobility1 according to ,ethic4  

ii1 #d4 ,therefore it would seem that a 
state is acquired by every virtuous     
action4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the word   
state seems to indicate height of a     
kind2 because to stand is to be raised  
upwards4 ,now one man is made higher    
than another by various duties2 and in  
like manner men are raised upwards in   
various ways by various grades and      
orders4 ,therefore the mere difference  
of grades1 orders1 or duties suffices   
for a difference of states4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,it is thus laid down in the  
,decretals 7,,ii1 qu4 vi1 can4 ,si      
,quando73 ,whenever anyone intervene in 
a cause where life or state is at stake 
he must do so1 not by a proxy1 but in   
his own person2 and state here has      
reference to freedom or servitude4      
,therefore it would seem that nothing   
differentiates a man's state1 except    
that which refers to freedom or         
servitude4  ,i answer that1 ,state1     
properly speaking1 denotes a kind of    
position1 whereby a thing is disposed   

with a certain immobility in a manner   
according with its nature4 ,for it is   
natural to man that his head should be  
directed upwards1 his feet set firmly on
 the ground1 and his other intermediate 
members disposed in becoming order2 and 
this is not the case if he lie down1    
sit1 or recline1 but only when he stands
 upright3 nor again is he said to stand1
 if he move1 but only when he is still4 
,hence it is again that even in human   
acts1 a matter is said to have stability
 7statum7 in reference to its own       
disposition in the point of a certain   
immobility or restfulness4 ,consequently
 matters which easily change and are    
extrinsic to them do not constitute a   
state among men1 for instance that a man
 be rich or poor1 of high or low rank1  
and so forth4 ,wherefore in the civil   
law 99,dig4 ,i1 ,,ix1 ,de ,senatoribus  
7,lib4 ,cassius ff4 ,de ,senatoribus7 it
 is said that if a man be removed from  
the senate1 he is deprived of his       
dignity rather than of his state4 ,but  

that alone seemingly pertains to a man's
 state1 which regards an obligation     
binding his person1 in so far1 to wit1  
as a man is his own master or subject to
 another1 not indeed from any slight or 
unstable cause1 but from one that is    
firmly established2 and this is         
something pertaining to the nature of   
freedom or servitude4 ,therefore state  
properly regards freedom or servitude   
whether in spiritual or in civil        
matters4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,uprightness 
as such does not pertain to the notion  
of state1 except in so far as it is     
connatural to man with the addition of a
 certain restfulness4 ,hence other      
animals are said to stand without its   
being required that they should be      
upright2 nor again are men said to      
stand1 however upright their position   
be1 unless they be still4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,immobility does not suffice for the
 notion of state2 since even one who    
sits or lies down is still1 and yet he  
is not said to stand4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 

,duty implies relation to act2 while    
grades denote an order of superiority   
and inferiority4 ,but state requires    
immobility in that which regards a      
condition of the person himself4        
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahc1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,there ,should ,be   
,different ,duties or ,states in the    
,church8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem 
that there should not be different      
duties or states in the ,church4 ,for   
distinction is opposed to unity4 ,now   
the faithful of ,christ are called to   
unity according to ,john #ag3ba1 #bb3   
,that they 4 4 4 may be one in ,us 4 4 4
 as ,we also are one4 ,therefore there  
should not be a distinction of duties   
and states in the ,church4  ,obj4 #b3   
,further1 nature does not employ many   
means where one suffices4 ,but the      
working of grace is much more orderly   
than the working of nature4 ,therefore  
it were more fitting for things         
pertaining to the operations of grace to
 be administered by the same persons1 so

 that there would not be a distinction  
of duties and states in the ,church4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the good of the     
,church seemingly consists chiefly in   
peace1 according to ,ps4 #adg3c1 ,who   
hath placed peace in thy borders1 and #b
 ,cor4 #ac3aa1 ,have peace1 and the ,god
 of peace 4 4 4 shall be with you4 ,now 
distinction is a hindrance to peace1 for
 peace would seem to result from        
likeness1 according to ,ecclus4 #ac3ai1 
,every beast loveth its like1 while the 
,philosopher says 7,polit4 vii1 #e7 that
 a little difference causes dissension  
in a state4 ,therefore it would seem    
that there ought not to be a distinction
 of states and duties in the ,church4   
,on the contrary1 ,it is written in     
praise of the ,church 7,ps4 #dd3aj7 that
 she is surrounded with variety3 and a  
gloss on these words says that the      
,queen1 namely the ,church1 is bedecked 
with the teaching of the apostles1 the  
confession of martyrs1 the purity of    
virgins1 the sorrowings of penitents4   

,i answer that1 ,the difference of      
states and duties in the ,church regards
 three things4 ,in the first place it   
regards the perfection of the ,church4  
,for even as in the order of natural    
things1 perfection1 which in ,god is    
simple and uniform1 is not to be found  
in the created universe except in a     
multiform and manifold manner1 so too1  
the fulness of grace1 which is centered 
in ,christ as head1 flows forth to ,his 
members in various ways1 for the        
perfecting of the body of the ,church4  
,this is the meaning of the ,apostle's  
words 7,eph4 #d3aa1 #ab73 ,he gave some 
apostles1 and some prophets1 and other  
some evangelists1 and other some pastors
 and doctors for the perfecting of the  
saints4 ,secondly1 it regards the need  
of those actions which are necessary in 
the ,church4 ,for a diversity of actions
 requires a diversity of men appointed  
to them1 in order that all things may be
 accomplished without delay or          
confusion2 and this is indicated by the 

,apostle 7,rom4 #ab3d1 #e71 ,as in one  
body we have many members1 but all the  
members have not the same office1 so we 
being many are one body in ,christ4     
,thirdly1 this belongs to the dignity   
and beauty of the ,church1 which consist
 in a certain order2 wherefore it is    
written 7#c ,kings #aj3d1 #e7 that when 
the queen of ,saba saw all the wisdom of
 ,solomon 4 4 4 and the apartments of   
his servants1 and the order of his      
ministers 4 4 4 she had no longer any   
spirit in her4 ,hence the ,apostle says 
7#b ,tim4 #b3bj7 that in a great house  
there are not only vessels of gold and  
silver1 but also of wood and of earth4  
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the distinction of    
states and duties is not an obstacle to 
the unity of the ,church1 for this      
results from the unity of faith1        
charity1 and mutual service1 according  
to the saying of the ,apostle 7,eph4    
#d3af73 ,from whom the whole body being 
compacted1 namely by faith1 and fitly   
joined together1 namely by charity1 by  

what every joint supplieth1 namely by   
one man serving another4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,just as nature does not employ many
 means where one suffices1 so neither   
does it confine itself to one where many
 are required1 according to the saying  
of the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #ab3ag71 ,if  
the whole body were the eye1 where would
 be the hearing8 ,hence there was need  
in the ,church1 which is ,christ's body1
 for the members to be differentiated by
 various duties1 states1 and grades4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as in the natural
 body the various members are held      
together in unity by the power of the   
quickening spirit1 and are dissociated  
from one another as soon as that spirit 
departs1 so too in the ,church's body   
the peace of the various members is     
preserved by the power of the ,holy     
,spirit1 ,who quickens the body of the  
,church1 as stated in ,john #f3fd4      
,hence the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #d3c73  
,careful to keep the unity of the       
,spirit in the bond of peace4 ,now a man

 departs from this unity of spirit when 
he seeks his own2 just as in an earthly 
kingdom peace ceases when the citizens  
seek each man his own4 ,besides1 the    
peace both of mind and of an earthly    
commonwealth is the better preserved by 
a distinction of duties and states1     
since thereby the greater number have a 
share in public actions4 ,wherefore the 
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ab3bd1 #be7    
that ,god hath tempered 7the body7      
together that there might be no schism  
in the body1 but the members might be   
mutually careful one for another4       
,,third ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahc1  
,art4 #c  ,whether ,duties ,differ      
,according to ,their ,actions8          
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
duties do not differ according to their 
actions4 ,for there are infinite        
varieties of human acts both in         
spirituals and in temporals4 ,now there 
can be no certain distinction among     
things that are infinite in number4     
,therefore human duties cannot be       

differentiated according to a difference
 of acts4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the      
active and the contemplative life differ
 according to their acts1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #agi1 ,a4 #a74 ,but the      
distinction of duties seems to be other 
than the distinction of lives4          
,therefore duties do not differ         
according to their acts4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 even ecclesiastical orders1   
states1 and grades seemingly differ     
according to their acts4 ,if1 then1     
duties differ according to their acts it
 would seem that duties1 grades1 and    
states differ in the same way4 ,yet this
 is not true1 since they are divided    
into their respective parts in different
 ways4 ,therefore duties do not differ  
according to their acts4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 vi1 #ai7
 that officium 7duty7 takes its name    
from efficere 7to effect71 as though it 
were instead of efficium1 by the change 
of one letter for the sake of the sound4
 ,but effecting pertains to action4     

,therefore duties differ according to   
their acts4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,a4 #b71 difference among the    
members of the ,church is directed to   
three things3 perfection1 action1 and   
beauty2 and according to these three we 
may distinguish a threefold distinction 
among the faithful4 ,one1 with regard to
 perfection1 and thus we have the       
difference of states1 in reference to   
which some persons are more perfect than
 others4 ,another distinction regards   
action and this is the distinction of   
duties3 for persons are said to have    
various duties when they are appointed  
to various actions4 ,a third distinction
 regards the order of ecclesiastical    
beauty3 and thus we distinguish various 
grades according as in the same state or
 duty one person is above another4      
,hence according to a variant text      
99,the ,septuagint it is written 7,ps4  
#dg3d73 ,in her grades shall ,god be    
known4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the material  
diversity of human acts is infinite4 ,it

 is not thus that duties differ1 but by 
their formal diversity which results    
from diverse species of acts1 and in    
this way human acts are not infinite4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,life is predicated of 
a thing absolutely3 wherefore diversity 
of lives results from a diversity of    
acts which are becoming to man          
considered in himself4 ,but efficiency1 
whence we have the word office 7as      
stated above71 denotes action tending to
 something else according to ,metaph4   
ix1 text4 #af 99,ed4 ,did4 viii1 #h4    
,hence offices differ properly in       
respect of acts that are referred to    
other persons2 thus a teacher is said to
 have an office1 and so is a judge1 and 
so forth4 ,wherefore ,isidore says      
7,etym4 vi1 #ai7 that to have an office 
is to be officious1 i4e4 harmful to no  
one1 but to be useful to all4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,differences of state1 offices
 and grades are taken from different    
things1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74
 ,yet these three things may concur in  

the same subject3 thus when a person is 
appointed to a higher action1 he attains
 thereby both office and grade1 and     
sometimes1 besides this1 a state of     
perfection1 on account of the sublimity 
of the act1 as in the case of a bishop4 
,the ecclesiastical orders are          
particularly distinct according to      
divine offices4 ,for ,isidore says      
7,etym4 vi73 ,there are various kinds of
 offices2 but the foremost is that which
 relates to sacred and ,divine things4  
,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahc1 
,art4 #d  ,whether the ,difference of   
,states ,applies to ,those ,who ,are    
,beginning1 ,progressing1 or ,perfect8  
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
difference of states does not apply to  
those who are beginning1 progressing1 or
 perfect4 ,for diverse genera have      
diverse species and differences         
99,aristotle1 ,categ4 ii4 ,now this     
difference of beginning1 progress1 and  
perfection is applied to the degrees of 
charity1 as stated above 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4  

#i71 where we were treating of charity4 
,therefore it would seem that the       
differences of states should not be     
assigned in this manner4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71     
state regards a condition of servitude  
or freedom1 which apparently has no     
connection with the aforesaid difference
 of beginning1 progress1 and perfection4
 ,therefore it is unfitting to divide   
state in this way4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
the distinction of beginning1 progress1 
and perfection seems to refer to more   
and less1 and this seemingly implies the
 notion of grades4 ,but the distinction 
of grades differs from that of states1  
as we have said above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c74   
,therefore state is unfittingly divided 
according to beginning1 progress1 and   
perfection4  ,on the contrary1 ,gregory 
says 7,moral4 xxiv1 #aa73 ,there are    
three states of the converted1 the      
beginning1 the middle1 and the          
perfection2 and 7,hom4 xv in ,ezech473  
,other is the beginning of virtue1 other

 its progress1 and other still its      
perfection4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated 
above 7,a4 #a7 state regards freedom or 
servitude4 ,now in spiritual things     
there is a twofold servitude and a      
twofold freedom3 for there is the       
servitude of sin and the servitude of   
justice2 and there is likewise a twofold
 freedom1 from sin1 and from justice1 as
 appears from the words of the ,apostle 
7,rom4 #f3bj1 #bb71 ,when you were the  
servants of sin1 you were free men to   
justice 4 4 4 but now being made free   
from sin1 you are 4 4 4 become servants 
to ,god4  ,now the servitude of sin or  
justice consists in being inclined to   
evil by a habit of sin1 or inclined to  
good by a habit of justice3 and in like 
manner freedom from sin is not to be    
overcome by the inclination to sin1 and 
freedom from justice is not to be held  
back from evil for the love of justice4 
,nevertheless1 since man1 by his natural
 reason1 is inclined to justice1 while  
sin is contrary to natural reason1 it   

follows that freedom from sin is true   
freedom which is united to the servitude
 of justice1 since they both incline man
 to that which is becoming to him4 ,in  
like manner true servitude is the       
servitude of sin1 which is connected    
with freedom from justice1 because man  
is thereby hindered from attaining that 
which is proper to him4 ,that a man     
become the servant of justice or sin    
results from his efforts1 as the        
,apostle declares 7,rom4 #f3af73 ,to    
whom you yield yourselves servants to   
obey1 his servants you are whom you     
obey1 whether it be of sin unto death1  
or of obedience unto justice4 ,now in   
every human effort we can distinguish a 
beginning1 a middle1 and a term2 and    
consequently the state of spiritual     
servitude and freedom is differentiated 
according to these things1 namely1 the  
beginning--to which pertains the state  
of beginners--the middle1 to which      
pertains the state of the               
proficient--and the term1 to which      

belongs the state of the perfect4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,freedom from sin      
results from charity which is poured    
forth in our hearts by the ,holy ,ghost1
 ,who is given to us 7,rom4 #e3e74      
,hence it is written 7#b ,cor4 #c3ag73  
,where the ,spirit of the ,lord is1     
there is liberty4 ,wherefore the same   
division applies to charity as to the   
state of those who enjoy spiritual      
freedom4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,men are said
 to be beginners1 proficient1 and       
perfect 7so far as these terms indicate 
different states71 not in relation to   
any occupation whatever1 but in relation
 to such occupations as pertain to      
spiritual freedom or servitude1 as      
stated above 7,a4 #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,as already observed 7,a4 #c1 ad #c71  
nothing hinders grade and state from    
concurring in the same subject4 ,for    
even in earthly affairs those who are   
free1 not only belong to a different    
state from those who are in service1 but
 are also of a different grade4         

,,question #ahd  ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,of
 ,,perfection ,,in ,,general 7,in ,eight
 ,articles7  ,we must now consider those
 things that pertain to the state of    
perfection whereto the other states are 
directed4 ,for the consideration of     
offices in relation to other acts       
belongs to the legislator2 and in       
relation to the sacred ministry it comes
 under the consideration of orders of   
which we shall treat in the ,third ,part
 99,suppl41 ,q4 #cd4  ,concerning the   
state of the perfect1 a three-fold      
consideration presents itself3 7#a7 ,the
 state of perfection in general2 7#b7   
,things relating to the perfection of   
bishops2 7#c7 ,things relating to the   
perfection of religious4  ,under the    
first head there are eight points of    
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether perfection bears
 any relation to charity8  7#b7 ,whether
 one can be perfect in this life8  7#c7 
,whether the perfection of this life    
consists chiefly in observing the       
counsels or the commandments8  7#d7     

,whether whoever is perfect is in the   
state of perfection8  7#e7 ,whether     
especially prelates and religious are in
 the state of perfection8  7#f7 ,whether
 all prelates are in the state of       
perfection8  7#g7 ,which is the more    
perfect1 the episcopal or the religious 
state8  7#h7 ,the comparison between    
religious and parish priests and        
archdeacons4   ,,first ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahd1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
the ,perfection of the ,christian ,life 
,consists ,chiefly in ,charity8         
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the  
perfection of the ,christian life does  
not consist chiefly in charity4 ,for the
 ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ad3bj73 ,in   
malice be children1 but in sense be     
perfect4 ,but charity regards not the   
senses but the affections4 ,therefore it
 would seem that the perfection of the  
,christian life does not chiefly consist
 in charity4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is 
written 7,eph4 #f3ac73 ,take unto you   
the armor of ,god1 that you may be able 

to resist in the evil day1 and to stand 
in all things perfect2 and the text     
continues 7,eph4 #f3ad1 #af71 speaking  
of the armor of ,god3 ,stand therefore  
having your loins girt about with truth1
 and having on the breast-plate of      
justice 4 4 4 in all things taking the  
shield of faith4 ,therefore the         
perfection of the ,christian life       
consists not only in charity1 but also  
in other virtues4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  
virtues like other habits1 are specified
 by their acts4 ,now it is written      
7,james #a3d7 that patience hath a      
perfect work4 ,therefore seemingly the  
state of perfection consists more       
specially in patience4  ,on the         
contrary1 ,it is written 7,col4 #c3ad73 
,above all things have charity1 which is
 the bond of perfection1 because it     
binds1 as it were1 all the other virtues
 together in perfect unity4  ,i answer  
that1 ,a thing is said to be perfect in 
so far as it attains its proper end1    
which is the ultimate perfection        

thereof4 ,now it is charity that unites 
us to ,god1 ,who is the last end of the 
human mind1 since he that abideth in    
charity abideth in ,god1 and ,god in him
 7#a ,john #d3af74 ,therefore the       
perfection of the ,christian life       
consists radically in charity4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,the perfection of the human  
senses would seem to consist chiefly in 
their concurring together in the unity  
of truth1 according to #a ,cor4 #a3aj1  
,that you be perfect in the same mind   
7sensu71 and in the same judgment4 ,now 
this is effected by charity which       
operates consent in us men4 ,wherefore  
even the perfection of the senses       
consists radically in the perfection of 
charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man may be
 said to be perfect in two ways4 ,first1
 simply3 and this perfection regards    
that which belongs to a thing's nature1 
for instance an animal may be said to be
 perfect when it lacks nothing in the   
disposition of its members and in such  
things as are necessary for an animal's 

life4 ,secondly1 a thing is said to be  
perfect relatively3 and this perfection 
regards something connected with the    
thing externally1 such as whiteness or  
blackness or something of the kind4 ,now
 the ,christian life consists chiefly in
 charity whereby the soul is united to  
,god2 wherefore it is written 7#a ,john 
#c3ad73 ,he that loveth not abideth in  
death4 ,hence the perfection of the     
,christian life consists simply in      
charity1 but in the other virtues       
relatively4 ,and since that which is    
simply1 is paramount and greatest in    
comparison with other things1 it follows
 that the perfection of charity is      
paramount in relation to the perfection 
that regards the other virtues4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,patience is stated to have a 
perfect work in relation to charity1 in 
so far as it is an effect of the        
abundance of charity that a man bears   
hardships patiently1 according to ,rom4 
#h3ce1 ,who 4 4 4 shall separate us from
 the love of ,christ8 ,shall            

tribulation8 ,or distress8 etc4         
,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahd1 
,art4 #b  ,whether ,any ,one ,can ,be   
,perfect in ,this ,life8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that none can be perfect
 in this life4 ,for the ,apostle says   
7#a ,cor4 #ac3aj73 ,when that which is  
perfect is come1 that which is in part  
shall be done away4 ,now in this life   
that which is in part is not done away2 
for in this life faith and hope1 which  
are in part1 remain4 ,therefore none can
 be perfect in this life4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 ,the perfect is that which    
lacks nothing 7,phys4 iii1 #f74 ,now    
there is no one in this life who lacks  
nothing2 for it is written 7,james      
#c3b73 ,in many things we all offend2   
and 7,ps4 #ach3af73 ,thy eyes did see my
 imperfect being4 ,therefore none is    
perfect in this life4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 the perfection of the         
,christian life1 as stated 7,a4 #a71    
relates to charity1 which comprises the 
love of ,god and of our neighbor4 ,now1 

neither as to the love of ,god can one  
have perfect charity in this life1 since
 according to ,gregory 7,hom4 xiv in    
,ezech47 the furnace of love which      
begins to burn here1 will burn more     
fiercely when we see ,him ,whom we love2
 nor as to the love of our neighbor1    
since in this life we cannot love all   
our neighbors actually1 even though we  
love them habitually2 and habitual love 
is imperfect4 ,therefore it seems that  
no one can be perfect in this life4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,the ,divine law does not
 prescribe the impossible4 ,yet it      
prescribes perfection according to      
,matt4 #e3dh1 ,be you 4 4 4 perfect1 as 
also your heavenly ,father is perfect4  
,therefore seemingly one can be perfect 
in this life4  ,i answer that1 ,as      
stated above 7,a4 #a71 the perfection of
 the ,christian life consists in        
charity4 ,now perfection implies a      
certain universality because according  
to ,phys4 iii1 #f1 the perfect is that  
which lacks nothing4 ,hence we may      

consider a threefold perfection4 ,one is
 absolute1 and answers to a totality not
 only on the part of the lover1 but also
 on the part of the object loved1 so    
that ,god be loved as much as ,he is    
lovable4 ,such perfection as this is not
 possible to any creature1 but is       
competent to ,god alone1 in ,whom good  
is wholly and essentially4  ,another    
perfection answers to an absolute       
totality on the part of the lover1 so   
that the affective faculty always       
actually tends to ,god as much as it    
possibly can2 and such perfection as    
this is not possible so long as we are  
on the way1 but we shall have it in     
heaven4  ,the third perfection answers  
to a totality neither on the part of the
 object served1 nor on the part of the  
lover as regards his always actually    
tending to ,god1 but on the part of the 
lover as regards the removal of         
obstacles to the movement of love       
towards ,god1 in which sense ,augustine 
says 7,,qq4 ,,lxxxiii1 qu4 #cf7 that    

carnal desire is the bane of charity2 to
 have no carnal desires is the          
perfection of charity4 ,such perfection 
as this can be had in this life1 and in 
two ways4 ,first1 by the removal from   
man's affections of all that is contrary
 to charity1 such as mortal sin2 and    
there can be no charity apart from this 
perfection1 wherefore it is necessary   
for salvation4 ,secondly1 by the removal
 from man's affections not only of      
whatever is contrary to charity1 but    
also of whatever hinders the mind's     
affections from tending wholly to ,god4 
,charity is possible apart from this    
perfection1 for instance in those who   
are beginners and in those who are      
proficient4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the      
,apostle is speaking there of heavenly  
perfection which is not possible to     
those who are on the way4  ,reply ,obj4 
#b3 ,those who are perfect in this life 
are said to offend in many things with  
regard to venial sins1 which result from
 the weakness of the present life3 and  

in this respect they have an imperfect  
being in comparison with the perfection 
of heaven4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the    
conditions of the present life do not   
allow of a man always tending actually  
to ,god1 so neither does it allow of his
 tending actually to each individual    
neighbor2 but it suffices for him to    
tend to all in common and collectively1 
and to each individual habitually and   
according to the preparedness of his    
mind4 ,now in the love of our neighbor1 
as in the love of ,god we may observe a 
twofold perfection3 one without which   
charity is impossible1 and consisting in
 one's having in one's affections       
nothing that is contrary to the love of 
one's neighbor2 and another without     
which it is possible to have charity4   
,the latter perfection may be considered
 in three ways4 ,first1 as to the extent
 of love1 through a man loving not only 
his friends and acquaintances but also  
strangers and even his enemies1 for as  
,augustine says 7,enchiridion lxxiii7   

this is a mark of the perfect children  
of ,god4 ,secondly1 as to the intensity 
of love1 which is shown by the things   
which man despises for his neighbor's   
sake1 through his despising not only    
external goods for the sake of his      
neighbor1 but also bodily hardships and 
even death1 according to ,john #ae3ac1  
,greater love than this no man hath1    
that a man lay down his life for his    
friends4 ,thirdly1 as to the effect of  
love1 so that a man will surrender not  
only temporal but also spiritual goods  
and even himself1 for his neighbor's    
sake1 according to the words of the     
,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #ab3ae71 ,but ,i most
 gladly will spend and be spent myself  
for your souls4   ,,third ,,article     
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahd1 ,art4 #c  ,whether1
 in ,this ,life1 ,perfection ,consists  
in the ,observance of the ,commandments 
or of the ,counsels8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that1 in this life1         
perfection consists in the observance   
not of the commandments but of the      

counsels4 ,for our ,lord said 7,matt4   
#ai3ba73 ,if thou wilt be perfect1 go   
sell all ,vulg43 'what' thou hast1 and  
give to the poor 4 4 4 and come1 follow 
,me4 ,now this is a counsel4 ,therefore 
perfection regards the counsels and not 
the precepts4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all  
are bound to the observance of the      
commandments1 since this is necessary   
for salvation4 ,therefore1 if the       
perfection of the ,christian life       
consists in observing the commandments1 
it follows that perfection is necessary 
for salvation1 and that all are bound   
thereto2 and this is evidently false4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the perfection of   
the ,christian life is gauged according 
to charity1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74   
,now the perfection of charity1         
seemingly1 does not consist in the      
observance of the commandments1 since   
the perfection of charity is preceded   
both by its increase and by its         
beginning1 as ,augustine says 7,super   
,canonic4 ,joan4 ,tract4 ix74 ,but the  

beginning of charity cannot precede the 
observance of the commandments1 since   
according to ,john #ad3bc1 ,if any one  
love ,me1 he will keep ,my word4        
,therefore the perfection of life       
regards not the commandments but the    
counsels4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is     
written 7,deut4 #f3e73 ,thou shalt love 
the ,lord thy ,god with thy whole heart1
 and 7,lev4 #ai3ah73 ,thou shalt love   
thy neighbor ,vulg43 'friend' as        
thyself2 and these are the commandments 
of which our ,lord said 7,matt4 #bb3dj73
 ,on these two commandments dependeth   
the whole law and the prophets4 ,now the
 perfection of charity1 in respect of   
which the ,christian life is said to be 
perfect1 consists in our loving ,god    
with our whole heart1 and our neighbor  
as ourselves4 ,therefore it would seem  
that perfection consists in the         
observance of the precepts4  ,i answer  
that1 ,perfection is said to consist in 
a thing in two ways3 in one way1        
primarily and essentially2 in another1  

secondarily and accidentally4 ,primarily
 and essentially the perfection of the  
,christian life consists in charity1    
principally as to the love of ,god1     
secondarily as to the love of our       
neighbor1 both of which are the matter  
of the chief commandments of the ,divine
 law1 as stated above4 ,now the love of 
,god and of our neighbor is not         
commanded according to a measure1 so    
that what is in excess of the measure be
 a matter of counsel4 ,this is evident  
from the very form of the commandment1  
pointing1 as it does1 to perfection--for
 instance in the words1 ,thou shalt love
 the ,lord thy ,god with thy whole      
heart3 since the whole is the same as   
the perfect1 according to the           
,philosopher 7,phys4 iii1 #f71 and in   
the words1 ,thou shalt love thy neighbor
 as thyself1 since every one loves      
himself most4 ,the reason of this is    
that the end of the commandment is      
charity1 according to the ,apostle 7#a  
,tim4 #a3e72 and the end is not subject 

to a measure1 but only such things as   
are directed to the end1 as the         
,philosopher observes 7,polit4 i1 #c72  
thus a physician does not measure the   
amount of his healing1 but how much     
medicine or diet he shall employ for the
 purpose of healing4 ,consequently it is
 evident that perfection consists       
essentially in the observance of the    
commandments2 wherefore ,augustine says 
7,de ,perf4 ,justit4 viii73 ,why then   
should not this perfection be prescribed
 to man1 although no man has it in this 
life8  ,secondarily and instrumentally1 
however1 perfection consists in the     
observance of the counsels1 all of      
which1 like the commandments1 are       
directed to charity2 yet not in the same
 way4 ,for the commandments1 other than 
the precepts of charity1 are directed to
 the removal of things contrary to      
charity1 with which1 namely1 charity is 
incompatible1 whereas the counsels are  
directed to the removal of things that  
hinder the act of charity1 and yet are  

not contrary to charity1 such as        
marriage1 the occupation of worldly     
business1 and so forth4 ,hence          
,augustine says 7,enchiridion cxxi73    
,whatever things ,god commands1 for     
instance1 ',thou shalt not commit       
adultery1' and whatever are not         
commanded1 yet suggested by a special   
counsel1 for instance1 ',it is good for 
a man not to touch a woman1' are then   
done aright when they are referred to   
the love of ,god1 and of our neighbor   
for ,god's sake1 both in this world and 
in the world to come4 ,hence it is that 
in the ,conferences of the ,fathers     
7,coll4 i1 cap4 vii7 the abbot ,moses   
says3 ,fastings1 watchings1 meditating  
on the ,scriptures1 penury and loss of  
all one's wealth1 these are not         
perfection but means to perfection1     
since not in them does the school of    
perfection find its end1 but through    
them it achieves its end1 and he had    
already said that we endeavor to ascend 
by these steps to the perfection of     

charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in this     
saying of our ,lord something is        
indicated as being the way to perfection
 by the words1 ,go1 sell all thou hast1 
and give to the poor2 and something else
 is added wherein perfection consists1  
when ,he said1 ,and follow ,me4 ,hence  
,jerome in his commentary on ,matt4     
#ai3bg1 says that since it is not enough
 merely to leave1 ,peter added that     
which is perfect3 ',and have followed   
,thee'2 and ,ambrose1 commenting on     
,luke #e3bg1 ,follow ,me1 says3 ,he     
commands him to follow1 not with steps  
of the body1 but with devotion of the   
soul1 which is the effect of charity4   
,wherefore it is evident from the very  
way of speaking that the counsels are   
means of attaining to perfection1 since 
it is thus expressed3 ,if thou wilt be  
perfect1 go1 sell1 etc41 as though ,he  
said3 ,by so doing thou shalt accomplish
 this end4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as        
,augustine says 7,de ,perf4 ,justit4    
viii7 the perfection of charity is      

prescribed to man in this life1 because 
one runs not right unless one knows     
whither to run4 ,and how shall we know  
this if no commandment declares it to   
us8 ,and since that which is a matter of
 precept can be fulfilled variously1 one
 does not break a commandment through   
not fulfilling it in the best way1 but  
it is enough to fulfil it in any way    
whatever4 ,now the perfection of ,divine
 love is a matter of precept for all    
without exception1 so that even the     
perfection of heaven is not excepted    
from this precept1 as ,augustine says   
7,de ,perf4 ,justit4 viii 99,cf4 ,de    
,spir4 et ,lit4 ,,xxxvi71 and one       
escapes transgressing the precept1 in   
whatever measure one attains to the     
perfection of ,divine love4 ,the lowest 
degree of ,divine love is to love       
nothing more than ,god1 or contrary to  
,god1 or equally with ,god1 and whoever 
fails from this degree of perfection    
nowise fulfils the precept4 ,there is   
another degree of the ,divine love1     

which cannot be fulfilled so long as we 
are on the way1 as stated above 7,a4    
#b71 and it is evident that to fail from
 this is not to be a transgressor of the
 precept2 and in like manner one does   
not transgress the precept1 if one does 
not attain to the intermediate degrees  
of perfection1 provided one attain to   
the lowest4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as  
man has a certain perfection of his     
nature as soon as he is born1 which     
perfection belongs to the very essence  
of his species1 while there is another  
perfection which he acquires by growth1 
so again there is a perfection of       
charity which belongs to the very       
essence of charity1 namely that man love
 ,god above all things1 and love nothing
 contrary to ,god1 while there is       
another perfection of charity even in   
this life1 whereto a man attains by a   
kind of spiritual growth1 for instance  
when a man refrains even from lawful    
things1 in order more freely to give    
himself to the service of ,god4         

,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahd1 
,art4 #d  ,whether ,whoever ,is ,perfect
 ,is in the ,state of ,perfection8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
whoever is perfect is in the state of   
perfection4 ,for1 as stated above 7,a4  
#c1 ad #c71 just as bodily perfection is
 reached by bodily growth1 so spiritual 
perfection is acquired by spiritual     
growth4 ,now after bodily growth one is 
said to have reached the state of       
perfect age4 ,therefore seemingly also  
after spiritual growth1 when one has    
already reached spiritual perfection1   
one is in the state of perfection4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,phys4 
v1 #b1 movement from one contrary to    
another has the same aspect as movement 
from less to more4 ,now when a man is   
changed from sin to grace1 he is said to
 change his state1 in so far as the     
state of sin differs from the state of  
grace4 ,therefore it would seem that in 
the same manner1 when one progresses    
from a lesser to a greater grace1 so as 

to reach the perfect degree1 one is in  
the state of perfection4  ,obj4 #c3     
,further1 a man acquires a state by     
being freed from servitude4 ,but one is 
freed from the servitude of sin by      
charity1 because charity covereth all   
sins 7,prov4 #aj3ab74 ,now one is said  
to be perfect on account of charity1 as 
stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore1      
seemingly1 whoever has perfection1 for  
this very reason has the state of       
perfection4  ,on the contrary1 ,some are
 in the state of perfection1 who are    
wholly lacking in charity and grace1 for
 instance wicked bishops or religious4  
,therefore it would seem that on the    
other hand some have the perfection of  
life1 who nevertheless have not the     
state of perfection4  ,i answer that1   
,as stated above 7,q4 #ahc1 ,a4 #a71    
state properly regards a condition of   
freedom or servitude4 ,now spiritual    
freedom or servitude may be considered  
in man in two ways3 first1 with respect 
to his internal actions2 secondly1 with 

respect to his external actions4 ,and   
since according to #a ,kings #af3g1 man 
seeth those things that appear1 but the 
,lord beholdeth the heart1 it follows   
that with regard to man's internal      
disposition we consider his spiritual   
state in relation to the ,divine        
judgment1 while with regard to his      
external actions we consider man's      
spiritual state in relation to the      
,church4 ,it is in this latter sense    
that we are now speaking of states1     
namely in so far as the ,church derives 
a certain beauty from the variety of    
states 99,cf4 ,q4 #ahc1 ,a4 #b4  ,now it
 must be observed1 that so far as men   
are concerned1 in order that any one    
attain to a state of freedom or         
servitude there is required first of all
 an obligation or a release4 ,for the   
mere fact of serving someone does not   
make a man a slave1 since even the free 
serve1 according to ,gal4 #e3ac1 ,by    
charity of the spirit serve one another3
 nor again does the mere fact of ceasing

 to serve make a man free1 as in the    
case of a runaway slave2 but properly   
speaking a man is a slave if he be bound
 to serve1 and a man is free if he be   
released from service4 ,secondly1 it is 
required that the aforesaid obligation  
be imposed with a certain solemnity2    
even as a certain solemnity is observed 
in other matters which among men obtain 
a settlement in perpetuity4             
,accordingly1 properly speaking1 one is 
said to be in the state of perfection1  
not through having the act of perfect   
love1 but through binding himself in    
perpetuity and with a certain solemnity 
to those things that pertain to         
perfection4 ,moreover it happens that   
some persons bind themselves to that    
which they do not keep1 and some fulfil 
that to which they have not bound       
themselves1 as in the case of the two   
sons 7,matt4 #ba3bh1 #cj71 one of whom  
when his father said3 ,work in my       
vineyard1 answered3 ,i will not1 and    
afterwards 4 4 4 he went1 while the     

other answering said3 ,i go 4 4 4 and he
 went not4 ,wherefore nothing hinders   
some from being perfect without being in
 the state of perfection1 and some in   
the state of perfection without being   
perfect4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by bodily   
growth a man progresses in things       
pertaining to nature1 wherefore he      
attains to the state of nature2         
especially since what is according to   
nature is1 in a way1 unchangeable       
99,ethic4 v1 #g1 inasmuch as nature is  
determinate to one thing4 ,in like      
manner by inward spiritual growth a man 
reaches the state of perfection in      
relation to the ,divine judgment4 ,but  
as regards the distinctions of          
ecclesiastical states1 a man does not   
reach the state of perfection except by 
growth in respect of external actions4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument also    
regards the interior state4 ,yet when a 
man passes from sin to grace1 he passes 
from servitude to freedom2 and this does
 not result from a mere progress in     

grace1 except when a man binds himself  
to things pertaining to grace4  ,reply  
,obj4 #c3 ,again this argument considers
 the interior state4 ,nevertheless1     
although charity causes the change of   
condition from spiritual servitude to   
spiritual freedom1 an increase of       
charity has not the same effect4        
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahd1  
,art4 #e  ,whether ,religious and       
,prelates ,are in the ,state of         
,perfection8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that prelates and religious are not
 in the state of perfection4 ,for the   
state of perfection differs from the    
state of the beginners and the          
proficient4 ,now no class of men is     
specially assigned to the state of the  
proficient or of the beginners4         
,therefore it would seem that neither   
should any class of men be assigned to  
the state of perfection4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 the outward state should      
answer to the inward1 else one is guilty
 of lying1 which consists not only in   

false words1 but also in deceitful      
deeds1 according to ,ambrose in one of  
his sermons 7xxx de ,tempore74 ,now     
there are many prelates and religious   
who have not the inward perfection of   
charity4 ,therefore1 if all religious   
and prelates are in the state of        
perfection1 it would follow that all of 
them that are not perfect are in mortal 
sin1 as deceivers and liars4  ,obj4 #c3 
,further1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71     
perfection is measured according to     
charity4 ,now the most perfect charity  
would seem to be in the martyrs1        
according to ,john #ae3ac1 ,greater love
 than this no man hath1 that a man lay  
down his life for his friends3 and a    
gloss on ,heb4 #ab3d1 ,for you have not 
yet resisted unto blood1 says3 ,in this 
life no love is more perfect than that  
to which the holy martyrs attained1 who 
strove against sin even unto blood4     
,therefore it would seem that the state 
of perfection should be ascribed to the 
martyrs rather than to religious and    

bishops4  ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius  
7,eccl4 ,hier4 v7 ascribes perfection to
 bishops as being perfecters1 and       
7,eccl4 ,hier4 vi7 to religious 7whom he
 calls monks or therapeutai1 i4e4       
servants of ,god7 as being perfected4   
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4   
#d71 there is required for the state of 
perfection a perpetual obligation to    
things pertaining to perfection1        
together with a certain solemnity4 ,now 
both these conditions are competent to  
religious and bishops4 ,for religious   
bind themselves by vow to refrain from  
worldly affairs1 which they might       
lawfully use1 in order more freely to   
give themselves to ,god1 wherein        
consists the perfection of the present  
life4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,eccl4    
,hier4 vi71 speaking of religious3 ,some
 call them therapeutai1 i4e4 servants1  
on account of their rendering pure      
service and homage to ,god2 others call 
them monachoi 99i4e4 solitaries2 whence 
the ,english word 'monk'1 on account of 

the indivisible and single-minded life  
which by their being wrapped in1 i4e4   
contemplating1 indivisible things1      
unites them in a ,godlike union and a   
perfection beloved of ,god 99,cf4 ,q4   
#ahj1 ,a4 #f4 ,moreover1 the obligation 
in both cases is undertaken with a      
certain solemnity of profession and     
consecration2 wherefore ,dionysius adds 
7,eccl4 ,hier4 vi73 ,hence the holy     
legislation in bestowing perfect grace  
on them accords them a hallowing        
invocation4  ,in like manner bishops    
bind themselves to things pertaining to 
perfection when they take up the        
pastoral duty1 to which it belongs that 
a shepherd lay down his life for his    
sheep1 according to ,john #aj3ae4       
,wherefore the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4  
#f3ab73 ,thou 4 4 4 hast confessed a    
good confession before many witnesses1  
that is to say1 when he was ordained1 as
 a gloss says on this passage4 ,again1 a
 certain solemnity of consecration is   
employed together with the aforesaid    

profession1 according to #b ,tim4 #a3f3 
,stir up the grace of ,god which is in  
thee by the imposition of my hands1     
which the gloss ascribes to the grace of
 the episcopate4 ,and ,dionysius says   
7,eccl4 ,hier4 v7 that when the high    
priest1 i4e4 the bishop1 is ordained1 he
 receives on his head the most holy     
imposition of the sacred oracles1       
whereby it is signified that he is a    
participator in the whole and entire    
hierarchical power1 and that not only is
 he the enlightener in all things       
pertaining to his holy discourses and   
actions1 but that he also confers this  
on others4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,beginning 
and increase are sought not for their   
own sake1 but for the sake of           
perfection2 hence it is only to the     
state of perfection that some are       
admitted under certain obligations and  
with solemnity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those
 who enter the state of perfection do   
not profess to be perfect1 but to tend  
to perfection4 ,hence the ,apostle says 

7,phil4 #c3ab73 ,not as though ,i had   
already attained1 or were already       
perfect2 but ,i follow after1 if ,i may 
by any means apprehend3 and afterwards  
7,phil4 #c3ae73 ,let us therefore as    
many as are perfect1 be thus minded4    
,hence a man who takes up the state of  
perfection is not guilty of lying or    
deceit through not being perfect1 but   
through withdrawing his mind from the   
intention of reaching perfection4       
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,martyrdom is the most 
perfect act of charity4 ,but an act of  
perfection does not suffice to make the 
state of perfection1 as stated above    
7,a4 #d74   ,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1
 ,q4 #ahd1 ,art4 #f  ,whether ,all      
,ecclesiastical ,prelates ,are in the   
,state of ,perfection8  ,objection #a3  
,it would seem that all ecclesiastical  
prelates are in a state of perfection4  
,for ,jerome commenting on ,titus #a3e1 
,ordain 4 4 4 in every city1 etc4 says3 
,formerly priest was the same as bishop1
 and afterwards he adds3 ,just as       

priests know that by the custom of the  
,church they are subject to the one who 
is placed over them1 so too1 bishops    
should recognize that1 by custom rather 
than by the very ordinance of our ,lord1
 they are above the priests1 and are    
together the rightful governors of the  
,church4 ,now bishops are in the state  
of perfection4 ,therefore those priests 
also are who have the cure of souls4    
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as bishops     
together with their consecration receive
 the cure of souls1 so also do parish   
priests and archdeacons1 of whom a gloss
 on ,acts #f3c1 ,brethren1 look ye out 4
 4 4 seven men of good reputation1 says3
 ,the apostles decided here to appoint  
throughout the ,church seven deacons1   
who were to be of a higher degree1 and  
as it were the supports of that which is
 nearest to the altar4 ,therefore it    
would seem that these also are in the   
state of perfection4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 just as bishops are bound to  
lay down their life for their sheep1 so 

too are parish priests and archdeacons4 
,but this belongs to the perfection of  
charity1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad    
#c74 ,therefore it would seem that      
parish priests and archdeacons also are 
in the state of perfection4  ,on the    
contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,eccl4 ,hier4
 v73 ,the order of pontiffs is          
consummative and perfecting1 that of the
 priests is illuminative and            
light-giving1 that of the ministers is  
cleansing and discretive4 ,hence it is  
evident that perfection is ascribed to  
bishops only4  ,i answer that1 ,in      
priests and deacons having cure of souls
 two things may be considered1 namely   
their order and their cure4 ,their order
 is directed to some act in the ,divine 
offices4 ,wherefore it has been stated  
above 7,q4 #ahc1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c7 that the
 distinction of orders is comprised     
under the distinction of offices4 ,hence
 by receiving a certain order a man     
receives the power of exercising certain
 sacred acts1 but he is not bound on    

this account to things pertaining to    
perfection1 except in so far as in the  
,western ,church the receiving of a     
sacred order includes the taking of a   
vow of continence1 which is one of the  
things pertaining to perfection1 as we  
shall state further on 7,q4 #ahf1 ,a4   
#d74 ,therefore it is clear that from   
the fact that a man receives a sacred   
order a man is not placed simply in the 
state of perfection1 although inward    
perfection is required in order that one
 exercise such acts worthily4  ,in like 
manner1 neither are they placed in the  
state of perfection on the part of the  
cure which they take upon themselves4   
,for they are not bound by this very    
fact under the obligation of a perpetual
 vow to retain the cure of souls2 but   
they can surrender it--either by        
entering religion1 even without their   
bishop's permission 7cf4 ,decret4 xix1  
qu4 #b1 can4 ,duae sunt7--or again an   
archdeacon may with his bishop's        
permission resign his arch-deaconry or  

parish1 and accept a simple prebend     
without cure1 which would be nowise     
lawful1 if he were in the state of      
perfection2 for no man putting his hand 
to the plough and looking back is fit   
for the kingdom of ,god 7,luke #i3fb74  
,on the other hand bishops1 since they  
are in the state of perfection1 cannot  
abandon the episcopal cure1 save by the 
authority of the ,sovereign ,pontiff 7to
 whom alone it belongs also to dispense 
from perpetual vows71 and this for      
certain causes1 as we shall state       
further on 7,q4 #ahe1 ,a4 #d74          
,wherefore it is manifest that not all  
prelates are in the state of perfection1
 but only bishops4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we
 may speak of priest and bishop in two  
ways4 ,first1 with regard to the name3  
and thus formerly bishops and priests   
were not distinct4 ,for bishops are so  
called because they watch over others1  
as ,augustine observes 7,de ,civ4 ,dei  
xix1 #ai72 while the priests according  
to the ,greek are elders4 99,referring  

to the ,greek episkopos and presbyteros 
from which the ,english 'bishop' and    
'priest' are derived4 ,hence the        
,apostle employs the term priests in    
reference to both1 when he says 7#a     
,tim4 #e3ag73 ,let the priests that rule
 well be esteemed worthy of double      
honor2 and again he uses the term       
bishops in the same way1 wherefore      
addressing the priests of the ,church of
 ,ephesus he says 7,acts #bj3bh73 ,take 
heed to yourselves and to the whole     
flock1 wherein the ,holy ,ghost hath    
placed you bishops1 to rule the church  
of ,god4  ,but as regards the thing     
signified by these terms1 there was     
always a difference between them1 even  
at the time of the apostles4 ,this is   
clear on the authority of ,dionysius    
7,eccl4 ,hier4 v71 and of a gloss on    
,luke #aj3a1 ,after these things the    
,lord appointed1 etc4 which says3 ,just 
as the apostles were made bishops1 so   
the seventy-two disciples were made     
priests of the second order4            

,subsequently1 however1 in order to     
avoid schism1 it became necessary to    
distinguish even the terms1 by calling  
the higher ones bishops and the lower   
ones priests4 ,but to assert that       
priests nowise differ from bishops is   
reckoned by ,augustine among heretical  
doctrines 7,de ,heres4 liii71 where he  
says that the ,arians maintained that no
 distinction existed between a priest   
and a bishop4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,bishops
 have the chief cure of the sheep of    
their diocese1 while parish priests and 
archdeacons exercise an inferior        
ministry under the bishops4 ,hence a    
gloss on #a ,cor4 #ab3bh1 to one1 helps1
 to another1 governments 99,vulg43 ',god
 hath set some in the church 4 4 4      
helps1 governments1' etc41 says3 ,helps1
 namely assistants to those who are in  
authority1 as ,titus was to the         
,apostle1 or as archdeacons to the      
bishop2 governments1 namely persons of  
lesser authority1 such as priests who   
have to instruct the people3 and        

,dionysius says 7,eccl4 ,hier4 v7 that  
just as we see the whole hierarchy      
culminating in ,jesus1 so each office   
culminates in its respective godlike    
hierarch or bishop4 ,also it is said    
7,,xvi1 qu4 i1 can4 ,cunctis73 ,priests 
and deacons must all take care not to do
 anything without their bishop's        
permission4 ,wherefore it is evident    
that they stand in relation to their    
bishop as wardens or mayors to the king2
 and for this reason1 just as in earthly
 governments the king alone receives a  
solemn blessing1 while others are       
appointed by simple commission1 so too  
in the ,church the episcopal cure is    
conferred with the solemnity of         
consecration1 while the archdeacon or   
parish priest receives his cure by      
simple appointment2 although they are   
consecrated by receiving orders before  
having a cure4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as    
parish priests and archdeacons have not 
the chief cure1 but a certain ministry  
as committed to them by the bishop1 so  

the pastoral office does not belong to  
them in chief1 nor are they bound to lay
 down their life for the sheep1 except  
in so far as they have a share in their 
cure4 ,hence we should say that they    
have an office pertaining to perfection 
rather than that they attain the state  
of perfection4   ,,seventh ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahd1 ,art4 #g  ,whether 
the ,religious ,state ,is ,more ,perfect
 ,than ,that of ,prelates8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that the religious   
state is more perfect than that of      
prelates4 ,for our ,lord said 7,matt4   
#ai3ba73 ,if thou wilt be perfect1 go   
and sell all ,vulg43 'what' thou hast1  
and give to the poor2 and religious do  
this4 ,but bishops are not bound to do  
so2 for it is said 7,,xii1 qu4 i1 can4  
,episcopi de rebus73 ,bishops1 if they  
wish1 may bequeath to their heirs their 
personal or acquired property1 and      
whatever belongs to them personally4    
,therefore religious are in a more      
perfect state than bishops4  ,obj4 #b3  

,further1 perfection consists more      
especially in the love of ,god than in  
the love of our neighbor4 ,now the      
religious state is directly ordered to  
the love of ,god1 wherefore it takes its
 name from service and homage to ,god1  
as ,dionysius says 7,eccl4 ,hier4 vi72  
99,quoted above ,a4 #e whereas the      
bishop's state would seem to be ordered 
to the love of our neighbor1 of whose   
cure he is the warden1 and from this he 
takes his name1 as ,augustine observes  
7,de ,civ4 ,dei4 xix1 #ai74 ,therefore  
it would seem that the religious state  
is more perfect than that of bishops4   
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the religious state 
is directed to the contemplative life1  
which is more excellent than the active 
life to which the episcopal state is    
directed4 ,for ,gregory says 7,pastor4  
i1 #g7 that ,isaias wishing to be of    
profit to his neighbor by means of the  
active life desired the office of       
preaching1 whereas ,jeremias1 who was   
fain to hold fast to the love of his    

,creator1 exclaimed against being sent  
to preach4 ,therefore it would seem that
 the religious state is more perfect    
than the episcopal state4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,it is not lawful for anyone  
to pass from a more excellent to a less 
excellent state2 for this would be to   
look back 99,cf4 ,luke #i3fb4 ,yet a man
 may pass from the religious to the     
episcopal state1 for it is said         
7,,xviii1 qu4 i1 can4 ,statutum7 that   
the holy ordination makes a monk to be a
 bishop4 ,therefore the episcopal state 
is more perfect than the religious4  ,i 
answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,gen4 
ad lit4 xii1 #af71 the agent is ever    
more excellent than the patient4 ,now in
 the genus of perfection according to   
,dionysius 7,eccl4 ,hier4 v1 vi71       
bishops are in the position of          
perfecters1 whereas religious are in the
 position of being perfected2 the former
 of which pertains to action1 and the   
latter to passion4 ,whence it is evident
 that the state of perfection is more   

excellent in bishops than in religious4 
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,renunciation of one's 
possessions may be considered in two    
ways4 ,first1 as being actual3 and thus 
it is not essential1 but a means1 to    
perfection1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74   
,hence nothing hinders the state of     
perfection from being without           
renunciation of one's possessions1 and  
the same applies to other outward       
practices4 ,secondly1 it may be         
considered in relation to one's         
preparedness1 in the sense of being     
prepared to renounce or give away all3  
and this belongs directly to perfection4
 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,,qq4      
,evang4 ii1 qu4 #aa73 ,our ,lord shows  
that the children of wisdom understand  
righteousness to consist neither in     
eating nor in abstaining1 but in bearing
 want patiently4 ,wherefore the ,apostle
 says 7,phil4 #d3ab73 ,i know 4 4 4 both
 to abound and to suffer need4 ,now     
bishops especially are bound to despise 
all things for the honor of ,god and the

 spiritual welfare of their flock1 when 
it is necessary for them to do so1      
either by giving to the poor of their   
flock1 or by suffering with joy the     
being stripped of their own goods       
99,heb4 #aj3cd4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that 
bishops are busy about things pertaining
 to the love of their neighbor1 arises  
out of the abundance of their love of   
,god4 ,hence our ,lord asked ,peter     
first of all whether he loved ,him1 and 
afterwards committed the care of ,his   
flock to him4 ,and ,gregory says        
7,pastor4 i1 #e73 ,if the pastoral care 
is a proof of love1 he who refuses to   
feed ,god's flock1 though having the    
means to do so1 is convicted of not     
loving the supreme ,pastor4 ,and it is a
 sign of greater love if a man devotes  
himself to others for his friend's sake1
 than if he be willing only to serve his
 friend4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,gregory 
says 7,pastor4 ii1 #a71 a prelate should
 be foremost in action1 and more        
uplifted than others in contemplation1  

because it is incumbent on him to       
contemplate1 not only for his own sake1 
but also for the purpose of instructing 
others4 ,hence ,gregory applies 7,hom4 v
 in ,ezech47 the words of ,ps4 #add3g1  
,they shall publish the memory 4 4 4 of 
,thy sweetness1 to perfect men returning
 after their contemplation4   ,,eighth  
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahd1 ,art4 #h 
,whether ,parish ,priests and           
,archdeacons ,are ,more ,perfect ,than  
,religious8  ,objection #a3 ,it would   
seem that also parish priests and       
archdeacons are more perfect than       
religious4 ,for ,chrysostom says in his 
,dialogue 7,de ,sacerdot4 vi73 ,take for
 example a monk1 such as ,elias1 if ,i  
may exaggerate somewhat1 he is not to be
 compared with one who1 cast among the  
people and compelled to carry the sins  
of many1 remains firm and strong4 ,a    
little further on he says3 ,if ,i were  
given the choice1 where would ,i prefer 
to please1 in the priestly office1 or in
 the monastic solitude1 without         

hesitation ,i should choose the former4 
,again in the same book 7ch4 #e7 he     
says3 ,if you compare the toils of this 
project1 namely of the monastic life1   
with a well-employed priesthood1 you    
will find them as far distant from one  
another as a common citizen is from a   
king4 ,therefore it would seem that     
priests who have the cure of souls are  
more perfect than religious4  ,obj4 #b3 
,further1 ,augustine says 7ad ,valerium1
 ,ep4 xxi73 ,let thy religious prudence 
observe that in this life1 and          
especially at these times1 there is     
nothing so difficult1 so onerous1 so    
perilous as the office of bishop1       
priest1 or deacon2 while in ,god's sight
 there is no greater blessing1 if one   
engage in the fight as ordered by our   
,commander-in-chief4 ,therefore         
religious are not more perfect than     
priests or deacons4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 ,augustine says 7,ep4 lx1 ad ,aurel473 
,it would be most regrettable1 were we  
to exalt monks to such a disastrous     

degree of pride1 and deem the clergy    
deserving of such a grievous insult1 as 
to assert that 'a bad monk is a good    
clerk1' since sometimes even a good monk
 makes a bad clerk4 ,and a little before
 this he says that ,god's servants1 i4e4
 monks1 must not be allowed to think    
that they may easily be chosen for      
something better1 namely the clerical   
state1 if they should become worse      
thereby1 namely by leaving the monastic 
state4 ,therefore it would seem that    
those who are in the clerical state are 
more perfect than religious4  ,obj4 #d3 
,further1 it is not lawful to pass from 
a more perfect to a less perfect state4 
,yet it is lawful to pass from the      
monastic state to a priestly office with
 a cure attached1 as appears 7,,xvi1 qu4
 i1 can4 ,si quis monachus7 from a      
decree of ,pope ,gelasius1 who says3 ,if
 there be a monk1 who by the merit of   
his exemplary life is worthy of the     
priesthood1 and the abbot under whose   
authority he fights for ,christ his     

,king1 ask that he be made a priest1 the
 bishop shall take him and ordain him in
 such place as he shall choose fitting4 
,and ,jerome says 7,ad ,rustic4         
,monach41 ,ep4 cxxv73 ,in the monastery 
so live as to deserve to be a clerk4    
,therefore parish priests and           
archdeacons are more perfect than       
religious4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 bishops 
are in a more perfect state than        
religious1 as shown above 7,a4 #g74 ,but
 parish priests and archdeacons1 through
 having cure of souls1 are more like    
bishops than religious are4 ,therefore  
they are more perfect4  ,obj4 #f3       
,further1 virtue is concerned with the  
difficult and the good 7,ethic4 ii1 #c74
 ,now it is more difficult to lead a    
good life in the office of parish priest
 or archdeacon than in the religious    
state4 ,therefore parish priests and    
archdeacons have more perfect virtue    
than religious4  ,on the contrary1 ,it  
is stated 7,,xix1 qu4 ii1 cap4 ,duce73  
,if a man while governing the people in 

his church under the bishop and leading 
a secular life is inspired by the ,holy 
,ghost to desire to work out his        
salvation in a monastery or under some  
canonical rule1 since he is led by a    
private law1 there is no reason why he  
should be constrained by a public law4  
,now a man is not led by the law of the 
,holy ,ghost1 which is here called a    
private law1 except to something more   
perfect4 ,therefore it would seem that  
religious are more perfect than         
archdeacons or parish priests4  ,i      
answer that1 ,when we compare things in 
the point of super-eminence1 we look not
 at that in which they agree1 but at    
that wherein they differ4 ,now in parish
 priests and archdeacons three things   
may be considered1 their state1 their   
order1 and their office4 ,it belongs to 
their state that they are seculars1 to  
their order that they are priests or    
deacons1 to their office that they have 
the cure of souls committed to them4    
,accordingly1 if we compare these with  

one who is a religious by state1 a      
deacon or priest by order1 having the   
cure of souls by office1 as many monks  
and canons regular have1 this one will  
excel in the first point1 and in the    
other points he will be equal4 ,but if  
the latter differ from the former in    
state and office1 but agree in order1   
such as religious priests and deacons   
not having the cure of souls1 it is     
evident that the latter will be more    
excellent than the former in state1 less
 excellent in office1 and equal in      
order4  ,we must therefore consider     
which is the greater1 preeminence of    
state or of office2 and here1 seemingly1
 we should take note of two things1     
goodness and difficulty4 ,accordingly1  
if we make the comparison with a view to
 goodness1 the religious state surpasses
 the office of parish priest or         
archdeacon1 because a religious pledges 
his whole life to the quest of          
perfection1 whereas the parish priest or
 archdeacon does not pledge his whole   

life to the cure of souls1 as a bishop  
does1 nor is it competent to him1 as it 
is to a bishop1 to exercise the cure of 
souls in chief1 but only in certain     
particulars regarding the cure of souls 
committed to his charge1 as stated above
 7,a4 #f1 ad #b74 ,wherefore the        
comparison of their religious state with
 their office is like the comparisons of
 the universal with the particular1 and 
of a holocaust with a sacrifice which is
 less than a holocaust according to     
,gregory 7,hom4 xx in ,ezech474 ,hence  
it is said 7,,xix1 qu4 i1 can4 ,clerici 
qui monachorum473 ,clerics who wish to  
take the monastic vows through being    
desirous of a better life must be       
allowed by their bishops the free       
entrance into the monastery4  ,this     
comparison1 however1 must be considered 
as regarding the genus of the deed2 for 
as regards the charity of the doer it   
happens sometimes that a deed which is  
of less account in its genus is of      
greater merit if it be done out of      

greater charity4  ,on the other hand1 if
 we consider the difficulty of leading a
 good life in religion1 and in the      
office of one having the cure of souls1 
in this way it is more difficult to lead
 a good life together with the exercise 
of the cure of souls1 on account of     
outward dangers3 although the religious 
life is more difficult as regards the   
genus of the deed1 by reason of the     
strictness of religious observance4 ,if1
 however1 the religious is also without 
orders1 as in the case of religious lay 
brethren1 then it is evident that the   
pre-eminence of order excels in the     
point of dignity1 since by holy orders a
 man is appointed to the most august    
ministry of serving ,christ ,himself in 
the sacrament of the altar4 ,for this   
requires a greater inward holiness than 
that which is requisite for the         
religious state1 since as ,dionysius    
says 7,eccl4 ,hier4 vi7 the monastic    
order must follow the priestly orders1  
and ascend to ,divine things in         

imitation of them4 ,hence1 other things 
being equal1 a cleric who is in holy    
orders1 sins more grievously if he do   
something contrary to holiness than a   
religious who is not in holy orders3    
although a religious who is not in      
orders is bound to regular observance to
 which persons in holy orders are not   
bound4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we might      
answer briefly these quotations from    
,chrysostom by saying that he speaks not
 of a priest of lesser order who has the
 cure of souls1 but of a bishop1 who is 
called a high-priest2 and this agrees   
with the purpose of that book wherein he
 consoles himself and ,basil in that    
they were chosen to be bishops4 ,we may1
 however1 pass this over and reply that 
he speaks in view of the difficulty4    
,for he had already said3 ,when the     
pilot is surrounded by the stormy sea   
and is able to bring the ship safely out
 of the tempest1 then he deserves to be 
acknowledged by all as a perfect pilot2 
and afterwards he concludes1 as quoted1 

with regard to the monk1 who is not to  
be compared with one who1 cast among the
 people 4 4 4 remains firm2 and he gives
 the reason why1 because both in the    
calm and in the storm he piloted himself
 to safety4 ,this proves nothing more   
than that the state of one who has the  
cure of souls is fraught with more      
danger than the monastic state2 and to  
keep oneself innocent in face of a      
greater peril is proof of greater       
virtue4 on the other hand1 it also      
indicates greatness of virtue if a man  
avoid dangers by entering religion2     
hence he does not say that he would     
prefer the priestly office to the       
monastic solitude1 but that he would    
rather please in the former than in the 
latter1 since this is a proof of greater
 virtue4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this passage
 quoted from ,augustine also clearly    
refers to the question of difficulty    
which proves the greatness of virtue in 
those who lead a good life1 as stated   
above 7ad #a74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3        

,augustine there compares monks with    
clerics as regards the pre-eminence of  
order1 not as regards the distinction   
between religious and secular life4     
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,those who are taken   
from the religious state to receive the 
cure of souls1 being already in sacred  
orders1 attain to something they had not
 hitherto1 namely the office of the     
cure1 yet they do not put aside what    
they had already4 ,for it is said in the
 ,decretals 7,,xvi1 qu4 i1 can4 ,de     
,monachis73 ,with regard to those monks 
who after long residence in a monastery 
attain to the order of clerics1 we bid  
them not to lay aside their former      
purpose4  ,on the other hand1 parish    
priests and archdeacons1 when they enter
 religion1 resign their cure1 in order  
to enter the state of perfection4 ,this 
very fact shows the excellence of the   
religious life4 ,when religious who are 
not in orders are admitted to the       
clerical state and to the sacred orders1
 they are clearly promoted to something 

better1 as stated3 this is indicated by 
the very way in which ,jerome expresses 
himself3 ,so live in the monastery as to
 deserve to be a clerk4  ,reply ,obj4   
#e3 ,parish priests and archdeacons are 
more like bishops than religious are1 in
 a certain respect1 namely as regards   
the cure of souls which they have       
subordinately2 but as regards the       
obligation in perpetuity1 religious are 
more like a bishop1 as appears from what
 we have said above 7,,aa4 #e1 #f74     
,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,the difficulty that   
arises from the arduousness of the deed 
adds to the perfection of virtue2 but   
the difficulty that results from outward
 obstacles sometimes lessens the        
perfection of virtue--for instance1 when
 a man loves not virtue so much as to   
wish to avoid the obstacles to virtue1  
according to the saying of the ,apostle 
7#a ,cor4 #i3be71 ,everyone that        
striveth for the mastery refraineth     
himself from all things3 and sometimes  
it is a sign of perfect virtue--for     

instance1 when a man forsakes not       
virtue1 although he is hindered in the  
practice of virtue unawares or by some  
unavoidable cause4 ,in the religious    
state there is greater difficulty       
arising from the arduousness of deeds2  
whereas for those who in any way at all 
live in the world1 there is greater     
difficulty resulting from obstacles to  
virtue1 which obstacles the religious   
has had the foresight to avoid4         
,,question #ahe  ,,of ,,things          
,,pertaining ,,to ,,the ,,episcopal     
,,state 7,in ,eight ,articles7  ,we must
 now consider things pertaining to the  
episcopal state4 ,under this head there 
are eight points of inquiry3  7#a7      
,whether it is lawful to desire the     
office of a bishop8  7#b7 ,whether it is
 lawful to refuse the office of bishop  
definitively8  7#c7 ,whether the better 
man should be chosen for the episcopal  
office8  7#d7 ,whether a bishop may pass
 over to the religious state8  7#e7     
,whether he may lawfully abandon his    

subjects in a bodily manner8  7#f7      
,whether he can have anything of his    
own8  7#g7 ,whether he sins mortally by 
not distributing ecclesiastical goods to
 the poor8  7#h7 ,whether religious who 
are appointed to the episcopal office   
are bound to religious observances8     
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahe1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to   
,desire the ,office of a ,bishop8       
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is
 lawful to desire the office of a       
bishop4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4
 #c3a73 ,he that desires ,vulg43 ',if a 
man desire' the office of a bishop1 he  
desireth a good work4 ,now it is lawful 
and praiseworthy to desire a good work4 
,therefore it is even praiseworthy to   
desire the office of a bishop4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 the episcopal state is    
more perfect than the religious1 as we  
have said above 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #g74 ,but
 it is praiseworthy to desire to enter  
the religious state4 ,therefore it is   
also praiseworthy to desire promotion to

 the episcopal state4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 it is written 7,prov4 #aa3bf73
 ,he that hideth up corn shall be cursed
 among the people2 but a blessing upon  
the head of them that sell4 ,now a man  
who is apt1 both in manner of life and  
by knowledge1 for the episcopal office1 
would seem to hide up the spiritual     
corn1 if he shun the episcopal state1   
whereas by accepting the episcopal      
office he enters the state of a         
dispenser of spiritual corn4 ,therefore 
it would seem praiseworthy to desire the
 office of a bishop1 and blameworthy to 
refuse it4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the     
deeds of the saints related in ,holy    
,writ are set before us as an example1  
according to ,rom4 #ae3d1 ,what things  
soever were written1 were written for   
our learning4 ,now we read 7,isa4 #f3h7 
that ,isaias offered himself for the    
office of preacher1 which belongs       
chiefly to bishops4 ,therefore it would 
seem praiseworthy to desire the office  
of a bishop4  ,on the contrary1         

,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1    
#ai73 ,the higher place1 without which  
the people cannot be ruled1 though it be
 filled becomingly1 is unbecomingly     
desired4  ,i answer that1 ,three things 
may be considered in the episcopal      
office4 ,one is principal and final1    
namely the bishop's work1 whereby the   
good of our neighbor is intended1       
according to ,john #ba3ag1 ,feed ,my    
sheep4 ,another thing is the height of  
degree1 for a bishop is placed above    
others1 according to ,matt4 #bd3de1 ,a  
faithful and a wise servant1 whom his   
lord hath appointed over his family4    
,the third is something resulting from  
these1 namely reverence1 honor1 and a   
sufficiency of temporalities1 according 
to #a ,tim4 #e3ag1 ,let the priests that
 rule well be esteemed worthy of double 
honor4 ,accordingly1 to desire the      
episcopal office on account of these    
incidental goods is manifestly unlawful1
 and pertains to covetousness or        
ambition4 ,wherefore our ,lord said     

against the ,pharisees 7,matt4 #bc3f1   
#g73 ,they love the first places at     
feasts1 and the first chairs in the     
synagogues1 and salutations in the      
market-place1 and to be called by men1  
,rabbi4 ,as regards the second1 namely  
the height of degree1 it is presumptuous
 to desire the episcopal office4 ,hence 
our ,lord reproved ,his disciples for   
seeking precedence1 by saying to them   
7,matt4 #bj3be73 ,you know that the     
princes of the gentiles lord it over    
them4 ,here ,chrysostom says 7,hom4 lxv 
in ,matth47 that in these words ,he     
points out that it is heathenish to seek
 precedence2 and thus by comparing them 
to the gentiles ,he converted their     
impetuous soul4  ,on the other hand1 to 
desire to do good to one's neighbor is  
in itself praiseworthy1 and virtuous4   
,nevertheless1 since considered as an   
episcopal act it has the height of      
degree attached to it1 it would seem    
that1 unless there be manifest and      
urgent reason for it1 it would be       

presumptuous for any man to desire to be
 set over others in order to do them    
good4 ,thus ,gregory says 7,pastor4 i1  
#h7 that it was praiseworthy to seek the
 office of a bishop when it was certain 
to bring one into graver dangers4       
,wherefore it was not easy to find a    
person to accept this burden1 especially
 seeing that it is through the zeal of  
charity that one divinely instigated to 
do so1 according to ,gregory1 who says  
7,pastor4 i1 #g7 that ,isaias being     
desirous of profiting his neighbor1     
commendably desired the office of       
preacher4  ,nevertheless1 anyone may1   
without presumption1 desire to do such  
like works if he should happen to be in 
that office1 or to be worthy of doing   
them2 so that the object of his desire  
is the good work and not the precedence 
in dignity4 ,hence ,chrysostom99 says3  
,it is indeed good to desire a good     
work1 but to desire the primacy of honor
 is vanity4 ,for primacy seeks one that 
shuns it1 and abhors one that desires   

it4 99,the quotation is from the ,opus  
,imperfectum in ,matth4 7,hom4 xxxv71   
falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,john          
,chrysostom4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as      
,gregory says 7,pastor4 i1 #h71 when the
 ,apostle said this he who was set over 
the people was the first to be dragged  
to the torments of martyrdom1 so that   
there was nothing to be desired in the  
episcopal office1 save the good work4   
,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4   
,dei xix1 #ai7 that when the ,apostle   
said1 ',whoever desireth the office of  
bishop1 desireth a good work1' he wished
 to explain what the episcopacy is3 for 
it denotes work and not honor3 since    
skopos signifies 'watching4' ,wherefore 
if we like we may render episkopein by  
the ,latin superintendere 7to watch     
over73 thus a man may know himself to be
 no bishop if he loves to precede rather
 than to profit others4 ,for1 as he     
observed shortly before1 in our actions 
we should seek1 not honor nor power in  
this life1 since all things beneath the 

sun are vanity1 but the work itself     
which that honor or power enables us to 
do4 ,nevertheless1 as ,gregory says     
7,pastor4 i1 #h71 while praising the    
desire 7namely of the good work7 he     
forthwith turns this object of praise   
into one of fear1 when he adds3 ,it     
behooveth 4 4 4 a bishop to be          
blameless1 as though to say3 ,i praise  
what you seek1 but learn first what it  
is you seek4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there is
 no parity between the religious and the
 episcopal state1 for two reasons4      
,first1 because perfection of life is a 
prerequisite of the episcopal state1 as 
appears from our ,lord asking ,peter if 
he loved ,him more than the others1     
before committing the pastoral office to
 him1 whereas perfection is not a       
prerequisite of the religious state1    
since the latter is the way to          
perfection4 ,hence our ,lord did not say
 7,matt4 #ai3ba73 ,if thou art perfect1 
go1 sell all ,vulg43 'what' thou hast1  
but ,if thou wilt be perfect4 ,the      

reason for this difference is because1  
according to ,dionysius 7,eccl4 ,hier4  
vi71 perfection pertains actively to the
 bishop1 as the perfecter1 but to the   
monk passively as one who is perfected3 
and one needs to be perfect in order to 
bring others to perfection1 but not in  
order to be brought to perfection4 ,now 
it is presumptuous to think oneself     
perfect1 but it is not presumptuous to  
tend to perfection4 ,secondly1 because  
he who enters the religious state       
subjects himself to others for the sake 
of a spiritual profit1 and anyone may   
lawfully do this4 ,wherefore ,augustine 
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ai73 ,no man 
is debarred from striving for the       
knowledge of truth1 since this pertains 
to a praiseworthy ease4 ,on the other   
hand1 he who enters the episcopal state 
is raised up in order to watch over     
others1 and no man should seek to be    
raised thus1 according to ,heb4 #e3d1   
,neither doth any man take the honor to 
himself1 but he that is called by ,god3 

and ,chrysostom says3 ,to desire        
supremacy in the ,church is neither just
 nor useful4 ,for what wise man seeks of
 his own accord to submit to such       
servitude and peril1 as to have to      
render an account of the whole ,church8 
,none save him who fears not ,god's     
judgment1 and makes a secular abuse of  
his ecclesiastical authority1 by turning
 it to secular uses4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,the dispensing of spiritual corn is not
 to be carried on in an arbitrary       
fashion1 but chiefly according to the   
appointment and disposition of ,god1 and
 in the second place according to the   
appointment of the higher prelates1 in  
whose person it is said 7#a ,cor4 #d3a73
 ,let a man so account of us as of the  
ministers of ,christ1 and the dispensers
 of the mysteries of ,god4 ,wherefore a 
man is not deemed to hide spiritual corn
 if he avoids governing or correcting   
others1 and is not competent to do so1  
neither in virtue of his office nor of  
his superior's command2 thus alone is he

 deemed to hide it1 when he neglects to 
dispense it while under obligation to do
 so in virtue of his office1 or         
obstinately refuses to accept the office
 when it is imposed on him4 ,hence      
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1    
#ai73 ,the love of truth seeks a holy   
leisure1 the demands of charity         
undertake an honest labor4 ,if no one   
imposes this burden upon us1 we must    
devote ourselves to the research and    
contemplation of truth1 but if it be    
imposed on us1 we must bear it because  
charity demands it of us4  ,reply ,obj4 
#d3 ,as ,gregory says 7,pastor4 i1 #g71 
,isaias1 who wishing to be sent1 knew   
himself to be already cleansed by the   
live coal taken from the altar1 shows us
 that no one should dare uncleansed to  
approach the sacred ministry4 ,since1   
then1 it is very difficult for anyone to
 be able to know that he is cleansed1 it
 is safer to decline the office of      
preacher4   ,,second ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahe1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 

,it ,is ,lawful for a ,man to ,refuse   
,absolutely an ,appointment to the      
,episcopate8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that it is lawful to refuse        
absolutely an appointment to the        
episcopate4 ,for as ,gregory says       
7,pastor4 i1 #g71 ,isaias wishing to be 
of profit to his neighbor by means of   
the active life1 desired the office of  
preaching1 whereas ,jeremias who was    
fain to hold fast to the love of his    
,creator by contemplation exclaimed     
against being sent to preach4 ,now no   
man sins by being unwilling to forgo    
better things in order to adhere to     
things that are not so good4 ,since then
 the love of ,god surpasses the love of 
our neighbor1 and the contemplative life
 is preferable to the active1 as shown  
above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #b2
 ,q4 #ahb1 ,a4 #a7 it would seem that a 
man sins not if he refuse absolutely the
 episcopal office4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
as ,gregory says 7,pastor4 i1 #g71 it is
 very difficult for anyone to be able to

 know that he is cleansed3 nor should   
anyone uncleansed approach the sacred   
ministry4 ,therefore if a man perceives 
that he is not cleansed1 however        
urgently the episcopal office be        
enjoined him1 he ought not to accept it4
  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,jerome           
7,prologue1 super ,marc47 says that it  
is related of the ,blessed ,mark99 that 
after receiving the faith he cut off his
 thumb that he might be excluded from   
the priesthood4 99,this prologue was    
falsely ascribed to ,st4 ,jerome1 and   
the passage quoted refers1 not to ,st4  
,mark the ,evangelist1 but to a hermit  
of that name4 7,cf4 ,baronius1 ,anno    
,christi1 #de1 num4 ,,xliv7 ,likewise   
some take a vow never to accept a       
bishopric4 ,now to place an obstacle to 
a thing amounts to the same as refusing 
it altogether4 ,therefore it would seem 
that one may1 without sin1 refuse the   
episcopal office absolutely4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,ep4 xlviii  
ad ,eudox473 ,if ,mother ,church        

requires your service1 neither accept   
with greedy conceit1 nor refuse with    
fawning indolence2 and afterwards he    
adds3 ,nor prefer your ease to the needs
 of the ,church3 for if no good men were
 willing to assist her in her labor1 you
 would seek in vain how we could be born
 of her4  ,i answer that1 ,two things   
have to be considered in the acceptance 
of the episcopal office3 first1 what a  
man may fittingly desire according to   
his own will2 secondly1 what it behooves
 a man to do according to the will of   
another4 ,as regards his own will it    
becomes a man to look chiefly to his own
 spiritual welfare1 whereas that he look
 to the spiritual welfare of others     
becomes a man according to the          
appointment of another having authority1
 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,hence
 just as it is a mark of an inordinate  
will that a man of his own choice       
incline to be appointed to the          
government of others1 so too it         
indicates an inordinate will if a man   

definitively refuse the aforesaid office
 of government in direct opposition to  
the appointment of his superior3 and    
this for two reasons4  ,first1 because  
this is contrary to the love of our     
neighbor1 for whose good a man should   
offer himself according as place and    
time demand3 hence ,augustine says 7,de 
,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ai7 that the demands of
 charity undertake an honest labor4     
,secondly1 because this is contrary to  
humility1 whereby a man submits to his  
superior's commands3 hence ,gregory says
 7,pastor4 i1 #f73 ,in ,god's sight     
humility is genuine when it does not    
obstinately refuse to submit to what is 
usefully prescribed4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3  
,although simply and absolutely speaking
 the contemplative life is more         
excellent than the active1 and the love 
of ,god better than the love of our     
neighbor1 yet1 on the other hand1 the   
good of the many should be preferred to 
the good of the individual4 ,wherefore  
,augustine says in the passage quoted   

above3 ,nor prefer your own ease to the 
needs of the ,church1 and all the more  
since it belongs to the love of ,god    
that a man undertake the pastoral care  
of ,christ's sheep4 ,hence ,augustine1  
commenting on ,john #ba3ag1 ,feed ,my   
sheep1 says 7,tract4 cxxiii in ,joan473 
,be it the task of love to feed the     
,lord's flock1 even as it was the mark  
of fear to deny the ,shepherd4          
,moreover prelates are not transferred  
to the active life1 so as to forsake the
 contemplative2 wherefore ,augustine    
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ai7 that if  
the burden of the pastoral office be    
imposed1 we must not abandon the        
delights of truth1 which are derived    
from contemplation4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,no one is bound to obey his superior by
 doing what is unlawful1 as appears from
 what was said above concerning         
obedience 7,q4 #ajd1 ,a4 #e74           
,accordingly it may happen that he who  
is appointed to the office of prelate   
perceive something in himself on account

 of which it is unlawful for him to     
accept a prelacy4 ,but this obstacle may
 sometimes be removed by the very person
 who is appointed to the pastoral       
cure--for instance1 if he have a purpose
 to sin1 he may abandon it--and for this
 reason he is not excused from being    
bound to obey definitely the superior   
who has appointed him4 ,sometimes1      
however1 he is unable himself to remove 
the impediment that makes the pastoral  
office unlawful to him1 yet the prelate 
who appoints him can do so--for         
instance1 if he be irregular or         
excommunicate4 ,in such a case he ought 
to make known his defect to the prelate 
who has appointed him2 and if the latter
 be willing to remove the impediment1 he
 is bound humbly to obey4 ,hence when   
,moses had said 7,ex4 #d3aj73 ,i beseech
 thee1 ,lord1 ,i am not eloquent from   
yesterday1 and the day before1 the ,lord
 answered 7,ex4 #d3ab73 ,i will be in   
thy mouth1 and ,i will teach thee what  
thou shalt speak4 ,at other times the   

impediment cannot be removed1 neither by
 the person appointing nor by the one   
appointed--for instance1 if an          
archbishop be unable to dispense from an
 irregularity2 wherefore a subject1 if  
irregular1 would not be bound to obey   
him by accepting the episcopate or even 
sacred orders4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is 
not in itself necessary for salvation to
 accept the episcopal office1 but it    
becomes necessary by reason of the      
superior's command4 ,now one may        
lawfully place an obstacle to things    
thus necessary for salvation1 before the
 command is given2 else it would not be 
lawful to marry a second time1 lest one 
should thus incur an impediment to the  
episcopate or holy orders4 ,but this    
would not be lawful in things necessary 
for salvation4 ,hence the ,blessed ,mark
 did not act against a precept by       
cutting off his finger1 although it is  
credible that he did this by the        
instigation of the ,holy ,ghost1 without
 which it would be unlawful for anyone  

to lay hands on himself4 ,if a man take 
a vow not to accept the bishop's office1
 and by this intend to bind himself not 
even to accept it in obedience to his   
superior prelate1 his vow is unlawful2  
but if he intend to bind himself1 so far
 as it lies with him1 not to seek the   
episcopal office1 nor to accept it      
except under urgent necessity1 his vow  
is lawful1 because he vows to do what it
 becomes a man to do4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahe1 ,art4 #c 
,whether ,he ,that ,is ,appointed to the
 ,episcopate ,ought to ,be ,better ,than
 ,others8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem
 that one who is appointed to the       
episcopate ought to be better than      
others4 ,for our ,lord1 when about to   
commit the pastoral office to ,peter1   
asked him if he loved ,him more than the
 others4 ,now a man is the better       
through loving ,god the more4 ,therefore
 it would seem that one ought not to be 
appointed to the episcopal office except
 he be better than others4  ,obj4 #b3   

,further1 ,pope ,symmachus says 7can4   
,vilissimus ,i1 qu4 #a73 ,a man is of   
very little worth who though excelling  
in dignity1 excels not in knowledge and 
holiness4 ,now he who excels in         
knowledge and holiness is better4       
,therefore a man ought not to be        
appointed to the episcopate unless he be
 better than others4  ,obj4 #c3         
,further1 in every genus the lesser are 
governed by the greater1 as corporeal   
things are governed by things spiritual1
 and the lower bodies by the higher1 as 
,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #c74   
,now a bishop is appointed to govern    
others4 ,therefore he should be better  
than others4  ,on the contrary1 ,the    
,decretal 99,can4 ,cum dilectus1 de     
,electione says that it suffices to     
choose a good man1 nor is it necessary  
to choose the better man4  ,i answer    
that1 ,in designating a man for the     
episcopal office1 something has to be   
considered on the part of the person    
designate1 and something on the part of 

the designator4 ,for on the part of the 
designator1 whether by election or by   
appointment1 it is required that he     
choose such a one as will dispense the  
divine mysteries faithfully4 ,these     
should be dispensed for the good of the 
,church1 according to #a ,cor4 #ad3ab1  
,seek to abound unto the edifying of the
 ,church2 and the divine mysteries are  
not committed to men for their own meed1
 which they should await in the life to 
come4 ,consequently he who has to choose
 or appoint one for a bishop is not     
bound to take one who is best simply1   
i4e4 according to charity1 but one who  
is best for governing the ,church1 one  
namely who is able to instruct1 defend1 
and govern the ,church peacefully4      
,hence ,jerome1 commenting on ,titus    
#a3e1 says against certain persons that 
some seek to erect as pillars of the    
,church1 not those whom they know to be 
more useful to the ,church1 but those   
whom they love more1 or those by whose  
obsequiousness they have been cajoled or

 undone1 or for whom some person in     
authority has spoken1 and1 not to say   
worse than this1 have succeeded by means
 of gifts in being made clerics4  ,now  
this pertains to the respect of persons1
 which in such matters is a grave sin4  
,wherefore a gloss of ,augustine 99,ep4 
clxvii ad ,hieron4 on ,james #b3a1      
,brethren1 have not 4 4 4 with respect  
of persons1 says3 ,if this distinction  
of sitting and standing be referred to  
ecclesiastical honors1 we must not deem 
it a slight sin to 'have the faith of   
the ,lord of glory with respect of      
persons4' ,for who would suffer a rich  
man to be chosen for the ,church's seat 
of honor1 in despite of a poor man who  
is better instructed and holier8  ,on   
the part of the person appointed1 it is 
not required that he esteem himself     
better than others1 for this would be   
proud and presumptuous2 but it suffices 
that he perceive nothing in himself     
which would make it unlawful for him to 
take up the office of prelate4 ,hence   

although ,peter was asked by our ,lord  
if he loved ,him more than the others1  
he did not1 in his reply1 set himself   
before the others1 but answered simply  
that he loved ,christ4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3
 ,our ,lord knew that1 by ,his own      
bestowal1 ,peter was in other respects  
fitted to govern the ,church3 wherefore 
,he questioned him about his greater    
love1 to show that when we find a man   
otherwise fitted for the government of  
the ,church1 we must look chiefly to his
 pre-eminence in the love of ,god4      
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this statement refers 
to the pursuits of the man who is placed
 in authority4 ,for he should aim at    
showing himself to be more excellent    
than others in both knowledge and       
holiness4 ,wherefore ,gregory says      
7,pastor4 ii1 #a7 the occupations of a  
prelate ought to excel those of the     
people1 as much as the shepherd's life  
excels that of his flock4 ,but he is not
 to be blamed and looked upon as        
worthless if he excelled not before     

being raised to the prelacy4  ,reply    
,obj4 #c3 ,according to #a ,cor4 #ab3d  
seqq41 there are diversities of graces 4
 4 4 and 4 4 4 of ministries 4 4 4 and 4
 4 4 of operations4 ,hence nothing      
hinders one from being more fitted for  
the office of governing1 who does not   
excel in the grace of holiness4 ,it is  
otherwise in the government of the      
natural order1 where that which is      
higher in the natural order is for that 
very reason more fitted to dispose of   
those that are lower4   ,,fourth        
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahe1 ,art4 #d 
,whether a ,bishop ,may ,lawfully       
,forsake the ,episcopal ,cure1 in ,order
 to ,enter ,religion8  ,objection #a3   
,it seems that a bishop cannot lawfully 
forsake his episcopal cure in order to  
enter religion4 ,for no one can lawfully
 pass from a more perfect to a less     
perfect state2 since this is to look    
back1 which is condemned by the words of
 our ,lord 7,luke #i3fb71 ,no man       
putting his hand to the plough1 and     

looking back1 is fit for the kingdom of 
,god4 ,now the episcopal state is more  
perfect than the religious1 as shown    
above 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #g74 ,therefore    
just as it is unlawful to return to the 
world from the religious state1 so is it
 unlawful to pass from the episcopal to 
the religious state4  ,obj4 #b3         
,further1 the order of grace is more    
congruous than the order of nature4 ,now
 according to nature a thing is not     
moved in contrary directions2 thus if a 
stone be naturally moved downwards1 it  
cannot naturally return upwards from    
below4 ,but according to the order of   
grace it is lawful to pass from the     
religious to the episcopal state4       
,therefore it is not lawful to pass     
contrariwise from the episcopal to the  
religious state4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in
 the works of grace nothing should be   
inoperative4 ,now when once a man is    
consecrated bishop he retains in        
perpetuity the spiritual power of giving
 orders and doing like things that      

pertain to the episcopal office3 and    
this power would seemingly remain       
inoperative in one who gives up the     
episcopal cure4 ,therefore it would seem
 that a bishop may not forsake the      
episcopal cure and enter religion4  ,on 
the contrary1 ,no man is compelled to do
 what is in itself unlawful4 ,now those 
who seek to resign their episcopal cure 
are compelled to resign 7,extra1 de     
,renunt4 cap4 ,quidam74 ,therefore      
apparently it is not unlawful to give up
 the episcopal cure4  ,i answer that1   
,the perfection of the episcopal state  
consists in this that for love of ,god a
 man binds himself to work for the      
salvation of his neighbor1 wherefore he 
is bound to retain the pastoral cure so 
long as he is able to procure the       
spiritual welfare of the subjects       
entrusted to his care3 a matter which he
 must not neglect--neither for the sake 
of the quiet of divine contemplation1   
since the ,apostle1 on account of the   
needs of his subjects1 suffered         

patiently to be delayed even from the   
contemplation of the life to come1      
according to ,phil4 #a3bb-be1 ,what ,i  
shall choose ,i know not1 but ,i am     
straitened between two1 having a desire 
to be dissolved1 and to be with ,christ1
 a thing by far better4 ,but to abide   
still in the flesh is needful for you4  
,and having this confidence1 ,i know    
that ,i shall abide2 nor for the sake of
 avoiding any hardships or of acquiring 
any gain whatsoever1 because as it is   
written 7,john #aj3aa71 the good        
shepherd giveth his life for his sheep4 
,at times1 however1 it happens in       
several ways that a bishop is hindered  
from procuring the spiritual welfare of 
his subjects4 ,sometimes on account of  
his own defect1 either of conscience    
7for instance if he be guilty of murder 
or simony71 or of body 7for example if  
he be old or infirm71 or of irregularity
 arising1 for instance1 from bigamy4    
,sometimes he is hindered through some  
defect in his subjects1 whom he is      

unable to profit4 ,hence ,gregory says  
7,dial4 ii1 #c73 ,the wicked must be    
borne patiently1 when there are some    
good who can be succored1 but when there
 is no profit at all for the good1 it is
 sometimes useless to labor for the     
wicked4 ,wherefore the perfect when they
 find that they labor in vain are often 
minded to go elsewhere in order to labor
 with fruit4 ,sometimes again this      
hindrance arises on the part of others1 
as when scandal results from a certain  
person being in authority3 for the      
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #h3ac73 ,if meat
 scandalize my brother1 ,i will never   
eat flesh3 provided1 however1 the       
scandal is not caused by the wickedness 
of persons desirous of subverting the   
faith or the righteousness of the       
,church2 because the pastoral cure is   
not to be laid aside on account of      
scandal of this kind1 according to      
,matt4 #ae3ad1 ,let them alone1 those   
namely who were scandalized at the truth
 of ,christ's teaching1 they are blind1 

and leaders of the blind4  ,nevertheless
 just as a man takes upon himself the   
charge of authority at the appointment  
of a higher superior1 so too it behooves
 him to be subject to the latter's      
authority in laying aside the accepted  
charge for the reasons given above4     
,hence ,innocent ,,iii says 7,extra1 de 
,renunt41 cap4 ,nisi cum pridem73       
,though thou hast wings wherewith thou  
art anxious to fly away into solitude1  
they are so tied by the bonds of        
authority1 that thou art not free to fly
 without our permission4 ,for the ,pope 
alone can dispense from the perpetual   
vow1 by which a man binds himself to the
 care of his subjects1 when he took upon
 himself the episcopal office4  ,reply  
,obj4 #a3 ,the perfection of religious  
and that of bishops are regarded from   
different standpoints4 ,for it belongs  
to the perfection of a religious to     
occupy oneself in working out one's own 
salvation1 whereas it belongs to the    
perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself

 in working for the salvation of others4
 ,hence so long as a man can be useful  
to the salvation of his neighbor1 he    
would be going back1 if he wished to    
pass to the religious state1 to busy    
himself only with his own salvation1    
since he has bound himself to work not  
only for his own but also for others'   
salvation4 ,wherefore ,innocent ,,iii   
says in the ,decretal quoted above that 
it is more easily allowable for a monk  
to ascend to the episcopacy1 than for a 
bishop to descend to the monastic life4 
,if1 however1 he be unable to procure   
the salvation of others it is meet he   
should seek his own4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,on account of no obstacle should a man 
forego the work of his own salvation1   
which pertains to the religious state4  
,but there may be an obstacle to the    
procuring of another's salvation2       
wherefore a monk may be raised to the   
episcopal state wherein he is able also 
to work out his own salvation4 ,and a   
bishop1 if he be hindered from procuring

 the salvation of others1 may enter the 
religious life1 and may return to his   
bishopric should the obstacle cease1 for
 instance by the correction of his      
subjects1 cessation of the scandal1     
healing of his infirmity1 removal of his
 ignorance by sufficient instruction4   
,again1 if he owed his promotion to     
simony of which he was in ignorance1 and
 resigning his episcopate entered the   
religious life1 he can be reappointed to
 another bishopric 99,cap4 ,post        
translat41 de ,renunt44 ,on the other   
hand1 if a man be deposed from the      
episcopal office for some sin1 and      
confined in a monastery that he may do  
penance1 he cannot be reappointed to a  
bishopric4 ,hence it is stated 7,,vii1  
qu4 i1 can4 ,hoc nequaquam73 ,the holy  
synod orders that any man who has been  
degraded from the episcopal dignity to  
the monastic life and a place of        
repentance1 should by no means rise     
again to the episcopate4  ,reply ,obj4  
#c3 ,even in natural things power       

remains inactive on account of a        
supervening obstacle1 for instance the  
act of sight ceases through an          
affliction of the eye4 ,so neither is it
 unreasonable if1 through the occurrence
 of some obstacle from without1 the     
episcopal power remain without the      
exercise of its act4   ,,fifth ,,article
 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahe1 ,art4 #e  ,whether
 ,it ,is ,lawful for a ,bishop on       
,account of ,bodily ,persecution to     
,abandon the ,flock ,committed to ,his  
,care8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that it is unlawful for a bishop1 on    
account of some temporal persecution1 to
 withdraw his bodily presence from the  
flock committed to his care4 ,for our   
,lord said 7,john #aj3ab7 that he is a  
hireling and no true shepherd1 who seeth
 the wolf coming1 and leaveth the sheep 
and flieth3 and ,gregory says 7,hom4 xiv
 in ,ev47 that the wolf comes upon the  
sheep when any man by his injustice and 
robbery oppresses the faithful and the  
humble4 ,therefore if1 on account of the

 persecution of a tyrant1 a bishop      
withdraws his bodily presence from the  
flock entrusted to his care1 it would   
seem that he is a hireling and not a    
shepherd4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is    
written 7,prov4 #f3a73 ,my son1 if thou 
be surety for thy friend1 thou hast     
engaged fast thy hand to a stranger1 and
 afterwards 7,prov4 #f3c73 ,run about1  
make haste1 stir up thy friend4 ,gregory
 expounds these words and says 7,pastor4
 iii1 #d73 ,to be surety for a friend1  
is to vouch for his good conduct by     
engaging oneself to a stranger4 ,and    
whoever is put forward as an example to 
the lives of others1 is warned not only 
to watch but even to rouse his friend4  
,now he cannot do this if he withdraw   
his bodily presence from his flock4     
,therefore it would seem that a bishop  
should not on account of persecution    
withdraw his bodily presence from his   
flock4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it belongs  
to the perfection of the bishop's state 
that he devote himself to the care of   

his neighbor4 ,now it is unlawful for   
one who has professed the state of      
perfection to forsake altogether the    
things that pertain to perfection4      
,therefore it would seem unlawful for a 
bishop to withdraw his bodily presence  
from the execution of his office1 except
 perhaps for the purpose of devoting    
himself to works of perfection in a     
monastery4  ,on the contrary1 our ,lord 
commanded the apostles1 whose successors
 bishops are 7,matt4 #aj3bc73 ,when they
 shall persecute you in this city1 flee 
into another4  ,i answer that1 ,in any  
obligation the chief thing to be        
considered is the end of the obligation4
 ,now bishops bind themselves to fulfil 
the pastoral office for the sake of the 
salvation of their subjects4            
,consequently when the salvation of his 
subjects demands the personal presence  
of the pastor1 the pastor should not    
withdraw his personal presence from his 
flock1 neither for the sake of some     
temporal advantage1 nor even on account 

of some impending danger to his person1 
since the good shepherd is bound to lay 
down his life for his sheep4  ,on the   
other hand1 if the salvation of his     
subjects can be sufficiently provided   
for by another person in the absence of 
the pastor1 it is lawful for the pastor 
to withdraw his bodily presence from his
 flock1 either for the sake of some     
advantage to the ,church1 or on account 
of some danger to his person4 ,hence    
,augustine says 7,ep4 ccxxviii ad       
,honorat473 ,christ's servants may flee 
from one city to another1 when one of   
them is specially sought out by         
persecutors3 in order that the ,church  
be not abandoned by others who are not  
so sought for4 ,when1 however1 the same 
danger threatens all1 those who stand in
 need of others must not be abandoned by
 those whom they need4 ,for if it is    
dangerous for the helmsman to leave the 
ship when the sea is calm1 how much more
 so when it is stormy1 as ,pope         
,nicholas ,i says 7cf4 ,,vii1 qu4 i1    

can4 ,sciscitaris74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,to flee as a hireling is to prefer     
temporal advantage or one's bodily      
welfare to the spiritual welfare of     
one's neighbor4 ,hence ,gregory says    
7,hom4 xiv in ,ev473 ,a man cannot      
endanger himself for the sake of his    
sheep1 if he uses his authority over    
them not through love of them but for   
the sake of earthly gain3 wherefore he  
fears to stand in the way of danger lest
 he lose what he loves4 ,but he who1 in 
order to avoid danger1 leaves the flock 
without endangering the flock1 does not 
flee as a hireling4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,if he who is surety for another be     
unable to fulfil his engagement1 it     
suffices that he fulfil it through      
another4 ,hence if a superior is        
hindered from attending personally to   
the care of his subjects1 he fulfils his
 obligation if he do so through another4
  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when a man is       
appointed to a bishopric1 he embraces   
the state of perfection as regards one  

kind of perfection2 and if he be        
hindered from the practice thereof1 he  
is not bound to another kind of         
perfection1 so as to be obliged to enter
 the religious state4 ,yet he is under  
the obligation of retaining the         
intention of devoting himself to his    
neighbor's salvation1 should an         
opportunity offer1 and necessity require
 it of him4   ,,sixth ,,article         
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahe1 ,art4 #f  ,whether 
,it ,is ,lawful for a ,bishop to ,have  
,property of ,his ,own8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that it is not lawful for
 a bishop to have property of his own4  
,for our ,lord said 7,matt4 #ai3ba73 ,if
 thou wilt be perfect1 go sell all      
,vulg43 'what' thou hast1 and give to   
the poor 4 4 4 and come1 follow ,me2    
whence it would seem to follow that     
voluntary poverty is requisite for      
perfection4 ,now bishops are in the     
state of perfection4 ,therefore it would
 seem unlawful for them to possess      
anything as their own4  ,obj4 #b3       

,further1 bishops take the place of the 
apostles in the ,church1 according to a 
gloss on ,luke #aj3a4 ,now our ,lord    
commanded the apostles to possess       
nothing of their own1 according to      
,matt4 #aj3i1 ,do not possess gold1 nor 
silver1 nor money in your purses2       
wherefore ,peter said for himself and   
the other apostles 7,matt4 #ai3bg73     
,behold we have left all things and have
 followed ,thee4 ,therefore it would    
seem that bishops are bound to keep this
 command1 and to possess nothing of     
their own4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,jerome 
says 7,ep4 lii ad ,nepotian473 ,the     
,greek kleros denotes the ,latin sors4  
,hence clerics are so called either     
because they are of the ,lord's estate1 
or because the ,lord ,himself is the    
estate1 i4e4 portion of clerics4 ,now he
 that possesses the ,lord1 can have     
nothing besides ,god2 and if he have    
gold and silver1 possessions1 and       
chattels of all kinds1 with such a      
portion the ,lord does not vouchsafe to 

be his portion also4 ,therefore it would
 seem that not only bishops but even    
clerics should have nothing of their    
own4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is stated   
7,,xii1 qu4 i1 can4 ,episcopi de rebus73
 ,bishops1 if they wish1 may bequeath to
 their heirs their personal or acquired 
property1 and whatever belongs to them  
personally4  ,i answer that1 ,no one is 
bound to works of supererogation1 unless
 he binds himself specially thereto by  
vow4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,ep4 cxxvii
 ad ,paulin4 et ,arment473 ,since you   
have taken the vow1 you have already    
bound yourself1 you can no longer do    
otherwise4 ,before you were bound by the
 vow1 you were free to submit4 ,now it  
is evident that to live without         
possessing anything is a work of        
supererogation1 for it is a matter not  
of precept but of counsel4 ,wherefore   
our ,lord after saying to the young man3
 ,if thou wilt enter into life1 keep the
 commandments1 said afterwards by way of
 addition3 ,if thou wilt be perfect go  

sell all that thou hast1 and give to the
 poor 7,matt4 #ai3ag1 #ba74 ,bishops1   
however1 do not bind themselves at their
 ordination to live without possessions 
of their own2 nor indeed does the       
pastoral office1 to which they bind     
themselves1 make it necessary for them  
to live without anything of their own4  
,therefore bishops are not bound to live
 without possessions of their own4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,q4  
#ahd1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a7 the perfection of  
the ,christian life does not essentially
 consist in voluntary poverty1 but      
voluntary poverty conduces              
instrumentally to the perfection of     
life4 ,hence it does not follow that    
where there is greater poverty there is 
greater perfection2 indeed the highest  
perfection is compatible with great     
wealth1 since ,abraham1 to whom it was  
said 7,gen4 #ag3a73 ,walk before ,me and
 be perfect1 is stated to have been rich
 7,gen4 #ac3b74  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this 
saying of our ,lord can be understood in

 three ways4 ,first1 mystically1 that we
 should possess neither gold nor silver 
means that the preacher should not rely 
chiefly on temporal wisdom and          
eloquence2 thus ,jerome expounds the    
passage4  ,secondly1 according to       
,augustine's explanation 7,de ,consens4 
,ev4 ii1 #cj71 we are to understand that
 our ,lord said this not in command but 
in permission4 ,for he permitted them to
 go preaching without gold or silver or 
other means1 since they were to receive 
the means of livelihood from those to   
whom they preached2 wherefore ,he added3
 ,for the workman is worthy of his meat4
 ,and yet if anyone were to use his own 
means in preaching the ,gospel1 this    
would be a work of supererogation1 as   
,paul says in reference to himself 7#a  
,cor4 #i3ab1 #ae74  ,thirdly1 according 
to the exposition of ,chrysostom 99,hom4
 ii in ,rom4 xvi1 #c1 we are to         
understand that our ,lord laid these    
commands on ,his disciples in reference 
to the mission on which they were sent  

to preach to the ,jews1 so that they    
might be encouraged to trust in ,his    
power1 seeing that ,he provided for     
their wants without their having means  
of their own4 ,but it does not follow   
from this that they1 or their           
successors1 were obliged to preach the  
,gospel without having means of their   
own3 since we read of ,paul 7#b ,cor4   
#aa3h7 that he received wages of other  
churches for preaching to the           
,corinthians1 wherefore it is clear that
 he possessed something sent to him by  
others4 ,and it seems foolish to say    
that so many holy bishops as            
,athanasius1 ,ambrose1 and ,augustine   
would have disobeyed these commandments 
if they believed themselves bound to    
observe them4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every  
part is less than the whole4            
,accordingly a man has other portions   
together with ,god1 if he becomes less  
intent on things pertaining to ,god by  
occupying himself with things of the    
world4 ,now neither bishops nor clerics 

ought thus to possess means of their    
own1 that while busy with their own they
 neglect those that concern the worship 
of ,god4   ,,seventh ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahe1 ,art4 #g  ,whether 
,bishops ,sin ,mortally ,if ,they       
,distribute ,not to the ,poor the       
,ecclesiastical ,goods ,which ,accrue to
 ,them8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that bishops sin mortally if they       
distribute not to the poor the          
ecclesiastical goods which they acquire4
 ,for ,ambrose 99,basil1 ,serm4 lxiv1 de
 ,temp41 among the supposititious works 
of ,st4 ,jerome expounding ,luke #ab3af1
 ,the land of a certain 4 4 4 man       
brought forth plenty of fruits1 says3   
,let no man claim as his own that which 
he has taken and obtained by violence   
from the common property in excess of   
his requirements2 and afterwards he     
adds3 ,it is not less criminal to take  
from him who has1 than1 when you are    
able and have plenty to refuse him who  
has not4 ,now it is a mortal sin to take

 another's property by violence4        
,therefore bishops sin mortally if they 
give not to the poor that which they    
have in excess4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a  
gloss of ,jerome on ,isa4 #c3ad1 ,the   
spoil of the poor is in your house1 says
 that ecclesiastical goods belong to the
 poor4 ,now whoever keeps for himself or
 gives to others that which belongs to  
another1 sins mortally and is bound to  
restitution4 ,therefore if bishops keep 
for themselves1 or give to their        
relations or friends1 their surplus of  
ecclesiastical goods1 it would seem that
 they are bound to restitution4  ,obj4  
#c3 ,further1 much more may one take    
what is necessary for oneself from the  
goods of the ,church1 than accumulate a 
surplus therefrom4 ,yet ,jerome says in 
a letter to ,pope ,damasus 99,cf4 ,can4 
,clericos1 cause4 i1 qu4 #b2 ,can4      
,quoniam2 cause4 xvi1 qu4 #a2 ,regul4   
,monach4 iv1 among the supposititious   
works of ,st4 ,jerome3 ,it is right that
 those clerics who receive no goods from

 their parents and relations should be  
supported from the funds of the ,church4
 ,but those who have sufficient income  
from their parents and their own        
possessions1 if they take what belongs  
to the poor1 they commit and incur the  
guilt of sacrilege4 ,wherefore the      
,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #e3af73 ,if any 
of the faithful have widows1 let him    
minister to them1 and let not the       
,church be charged1 that there may be   
sufficient for them that are widows     
indeed4 ,much more therefore do bishops 
sin mortally if they give not to the    
poor the surplus of their ecclesiastical
 goods4  ,on the contrary1 ,many bishops
 do not give their surplus to the poor1 
but would seem commendably to lay it out
 so as to increase the revenue of the   
,church4  ,i answer that1 ,the same is  
not to be said of their own goods which 
bishops may possess1 and of             
ecclesiastical goods4 ,for they have    
real dominion over their own goods2     
wherefore from the very nature of the   

case they are not bound to give these   
things to others1 and may either keep   
them for themselves or bestow them on   
others at will4 ,nevertheless they may  
sin in this disposal by inordinate      
affection1 which leads them either to   
accumulate more than they should1 or not
 to assist others1 in accordance with   
the demands of charity2 yet they are not
 bound to restitution1 because such     
things are entrusted to their ownership4
  ,on the other hand1 they hold         
ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or   
trustees4 ,for ,augustine says 7,ep4    
clxxxv ad ,bonif473 ,if we possess      
privately what is enough for us1 other  
things belong not to us but to the poor1
 and we have the dispensing of them2 but
 we can claim ownership of them only by 
wicked theft4 ,now dispensing requires  
good faith1 according to #a ,cor4 #d3b1 
,here now it is required among the      
dispensers that a man be found faithful4
 ,moreover ecclesiastical goods are to  
be applied not only to the good of the  

poor1 but also to the divine worship and
 the needs of its ministers4 ,hence it  
is said 7,,xii1 qu4 ii1 can4 de         
reditibus73 ,of the ,church's revenues  
or the offerings of the faithful only   
one part is to be assigned to the       
bishop1 two parts are to be used by the 
priest1 under pain of suspension1 for   
the ecclesiastical fabric1 and for the  
benefit of the poor2 the remaining part 
is to be divided among the clergy       
according to their respective merits4   
,accordingly if the goods which are     
assigned to the use of the bishop are   
distinct from those which are appointed 
for the use of the poor1 or the         
ministers1 or for the ecclesiastical    
worship1 and if the bishop keeps back   
for himself part of that which should be
 given to the poor1 or to the ministers 
for their use1 or expended on the divine
 worship1 without doubt he is an        
unfaithful dispenser1 sins mortally1 and
 is bound to restitution4  ,but as      
regards those goods which are deputed to

 his private use1 the same apparently   
applies as to his own property1 namely  
that he sins through immoderate         
attachment thereto or use thereof1 if he
 exceeds moderation in what he keeps for
 himself1 and fails to assist others    
according to the demands of charity4    
,on the other hand1 if no distinction is
 made in the aforesaid goods1 their     
distribution is entrusted to his good   
faith2 and if he fail or exceed in a    
slight degree1 this may happen without  
prejudice to his good faith1 because in 
such matters a man cannot possibly      
decide precisely what ought to be done4 
,on the other hand1 if the excess be    
very great he cannot be ignorant of the 
fact2 consequently he would seem to be  
lacking in good faith1 and is guilty of 
mortal sin4 ,for it is written 7,matt4  
#bd3dh-ea7 that if that evil servant    
shall say in his heart3 ,my lord is long
 a-coming1 which shows contempt of      
,god's judgment1 and shall begin to     
strike his fellow-servants1 which is a  

sign of pride1 and shall eat and drink  
with drunkards1 which proceeds from     
lust1 the lord of that servant shall    
come in a day that he hopeth not 4 4 4  
and shall separate him1 namely from the 
fellowship of good men1 and appoint his 
portion with hypocrites1 namely in hell4
  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this saying of      
,ambrose refers to the administration   
not only of ecclesiastical things but   
also of any goods whatever from which a 
man is bound1 as a duty of charity1 to  
provide for those who are in need4 ,but 
it is not possible to state definitely  
when this need is such as to impose an  
obligation under pain of mortal sin1 as 
is the case in other points of detail   
that have to be considered in human     
acts3 for the decision in such matters  
is left to human prudence4  ,reply ,obj4
 #b3 ,as stated above the goods of the  
,church have to be employed not only for
 the use of the poor1 but also for other
 purposes4 ,hence if a bishop or cleric 
wish to deprive himself of that which is

 assigned to his own use1 and give it to
 his relations or others1 he sins not so
 long as he observes moderation1 so1 to 
wit1 that they cease to be in want      
without becoming the richer thereby4    
,hence ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 i1    
#cj73 ,it is a commendable liberality if
 you overlook not your kindred when you 
know them to be in want2 yet not so as  
to wish to make them rich with what you 
can give to the poor4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 
,the goods of churches should not all be
 given to the poor1 except in a case of 
necessity3 for then1 as ,ambrose says   
7,de ,offic4 ii1 #bh71 even the vessels 
consecrated to the divine worship are to
 be sold for the ransom of prisoners1   
and other needs of the poor4 ,in such a 
case of necessity a cleric would sin if 
he chose to maintain himself on the     
goods of the ,church1 always supposing  
him to have a patrimony of his own on   
which to support himself4  ,reply ,obj4 
#d3 ,the goods of the churches should be
 employed for the good of the poor4     

,consequently a man is to be commended  
if1 there being no present necessity for
 helping the poor1 he spends the surplus
 from the ,church revenue1 in buying    
property1 or lays it by for some future 
use connected with the ,church or the   
needs of the poor4 ,but if there be a   
pressing need for helping the poor1 to  
lay by for the future is a superfluous  
and inordinate saving1 and is forbidden 
by our ,lord ,who said 7,matt4 #f3cd73  
,be 4 4 4 not solicitous for the morrow4
   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4    
#ahe1 ,art4 #h  ,whether ,religious ,who
 ,are ,raised to the ,episcopate ,are   
,bound to ,religious ,observances8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
religious who are raised to the         
episcopate are not bound to religious   
observances4 ,for it is said 7,,xviii1  
qu4 i1 can4 ,statutum7 that a canonical 
election loosens a monk from the yoke   
imposed by the rule of the monastic     
profession1 and the holy ordination     
makes of a monk a bishop4 ,now the      

regular observances pertain to the yoke 
of the rule4 ,therefore religious who   
are appointed bishops are not bound to  
religious observances4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 he who ascends from a lower to
 a higher degree is seemingly not bound 
to those things which pertain to the    
lower degree3 thus it was stated above  
7,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #ab1 ad #a7 that a        
religious is not bound to keep the vows 
he made in the world4 ,but a religious  
who is appointed to the episcopate      
ascends to something greater1 as stated 
above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g74 ,therefore it  
would seem that a bishop is not bound to
 those things whereto he was bound in   
the state of religion4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 religious would seem to be    
bound above all to obedience1 and to    
live without property of their own4 ,but
 religious who are appointed bishops1   
are not bound to obey the superiors of  
their order1 since they are above them2 
nor apparently are they bound to        
poverty1 since according to the decree  

quoted above 7,obj4 #a7 when the holy   
ordination has made of a monk a bishop  
he enjoys the right1 as the lawful heir1
 of claiming his paternal inheritance4  
,moreover they are sometimes allowed to 
make a will4 ,much less therefore are   
they bound to other regular observances4
  ,on the contrary1 ,it is said in the  
,decretals 7,,xvi1 qu4 i1 can4 ,de      
,monachis73 ,with regard to those who   
after long residence in a monastery     
attain to the order of clerics1 we bid  
them not to lay aside their former      
purpose4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated    
above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b7 the religious     
state pertains to perfection1 as a way  
of tending to perfection1 while the     
episcopal state pertains to perfection1 
as a professorship of perfection4 ,hence
 the religious state is compared to the 
episcopal state1 as the school to the   
professorial chair1 and as disposition  
to perfection4 ,now the disposition is  
not voided at the advent of perfection1 
except as regards what perchance is     

incompatible with perfection1 whereas as
 to that wherein it is in accord with   
perfection1 it is confirmed the more4   
,thus when the scholar has become a     
professor it no longer becomes him to be
 a listener1 but it becomes him to read 
and meditate even more than before4     
,accordingly we must assert that if     
there be among religious observances any
 that instead of being an obstacle to   
the episcopal office1 are a safeguard of
 perfection1 such as continence1        
poverty1 and so forth1 a religious1 even
 after he has been made a bishop1       
remains bound to observe these1 and     
consequently to wear the habit of his   
order1 which is a sign of this          
obligation4  ,on the other hand1 a man  
is not bound to keep such religious     
observances as may be incompatible with 
the episcopal office1 for instance      
solitude1 silence1 and certain severe   
abstinences or watchings and such as    
would render him bodily unable to       
exercise the episcopal office4 ,for the 

rest he may dispense himself from them1 
according to the needs of his person or 
office1 and the manner of life of those 
among whom he dwells1 in the same way as
 religious superiors dispense themselves
 in such matters4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he 
who from being a monk becomes a bishop  
is loosened from the yoke of the        
monastic profession1 not in everything1 
but in those that are incompatible with 
the episcopal office1 as stated above4  
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the vows of those who 
are living in the world are compared to 
the vows of religion as the particular  
to the universal1 as stated above 7,q4  
#hh1 ,a4 #ab1 ad #a74 ,but the vows of  
religion are compared to the episcopal  
dignity as disposition to perfection4   
,now the particular is superfluous when 
one has the universal1 whereas the      
disposition is still necessary when     
perfection has been attained4  ,reply   
,obj4 #c3 ,it is accidental that        
religious who are bishops are not bound 
to obey the superiors of their order1   

because1 to wit1 they have ceased to be 
their subjects2 even as those same      
religious superiors4 ,nevertheless the  
obligation of the vow remains virtually1
 so that if any person be lawfully set  
above them1 they would be bound to obey 
them1 inasmuch as they are bound to obey
 both the statutes of their rule in the 
way mentioned above1 and their superiors
 if they have any4  ,as to property they
 can nowise have it4 ,for they claim    
their paternal inheritance not as their 
own1 but as due to the ,church4 ,hence  
it is added 7,,xviii1 qu4 i1 can4       
,statutum7 that after he has been       
ordained bishop at the altar to which he
 is consecrated and appointed according 
to the holy canons1 he must restore     
whatever he may acquire4  ,nor can he   
make any testament at all1 because he is
 entrusted with the sole administration 
of things ecclesiastical1 and this ends 
with his death1 after which a testament 
comes into force according to the       
,apostle 7,heb4 #i3ag74 ,if1 however1 by

 the ,pope's permission he make a will1 
he is not to be understood to bequeath  
property of his own1 but we are to      
understand that by apostolic authority  
the power of his administration has been
 prolonged so as to remain in force     
after his death4   ,,question #ahf  ,,of
 ,,those ,,things ,,in ,,which ,,the    
,,religious ,,state ,,properly          
,,consists 7,in ,ten ,articles7  ,we    
must now consider things pertaining to  
the religious state3 which consideration
 will be fourfold4 ,in the first place  
we shall consider those things in which 
the religious state consists chiefly2   
secondly1 those things which are        
lawfully befitting to religious2        
thirdly1 the different kinds of         
religious orders2 fourthly1 the entrance
 into the religious state4  ,under the  
first head there are ten points of      
inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether the religious   
state is perfect8  7#b7 ,whether        
religious are bound to all the counsels8
  7#c7 ,whether voluntary poverty is    

required for the religious state8  7#d7 
,whether continency is necessary8  7#e7 
,whether obedience is necessary8  7#f7  
,whether it is necessary that these     
should be the matter of a vow8  7#g7 ,of
 the sufficiency of these vows2  7#h7   
,of their comparison one with another2  
7#i7 ,whether a religious sins mortally 
whenever he transgresses a statute of   
his rule8  7#aj7 ,whether1 other things 
being equal1 a religious sins more      
grievously by the same kind of sin than 
a secular person8   ,,first ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahf1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,religion ,implies a ,state of          
,perfection8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that religion does not imply a     
state of perfection4 ,for that which is 
necessary for salvation does not        
seemingly pertain to perfection4 ,but   
religion is necessary for salvation1    
whether because thereby we are bound    
7religamur7 to the one almighty ,god1 as
 ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4     
#ee71 or because it takes its name from 

our returning 7religimus7 to ,god ,whom 
we had lost by neglecting ,him 99,cf4   
,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a1 according to ,augustine
 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #c74 ,therefore it  
would seem that religion does not denote
 the state of perfection4  ,obj4 #b3    
,further1 religion according to ,tully  
7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii1 #ec7 is that   
which offers worship and ceremony to the
 ,divine nature4 ,now the offering of   
worship and ceremony to ,god would seem 
to pertain to the ministry of holy      
orders rather than to the diversity of  
states1 as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4   
#b2 ,q4 #ahc1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore it    
would seem that religion does not denote
 the state of perfection4  ,obj4 #c3    
,further1 the state of perfection is    
distinct from the state of beginners and
 that of the proficient4 ,but in        
religion also some are beginners1 and   
some are proficient4 ,therefore religion
 does not denote the state of           
perfection4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1        
religion would seem a place of          

repentance2 for it is said in the       
,decrees 7,,vii1 qu4 i1 can4 ,hoc       
nequaquam73 ,the holy synod orders that 
any man who has been degraded from the  
episcopal dignity to the monastic life  
and a place of repentance1 should by no 
means rise again to the episcopate4 ,now
 a place of repentance is opposed to the
 state of perfection2 hence ,dionysius  
7,eccl4 ,hier4 vi7 places penitents in  
the lowest place1 namely among those who
 are to be cleansed4 ,therefore it would
 seem that religion is not the state of 
perfection4  ,on the contrary1 ,in the  
,conferences of the ,fathers 7,collat4  
i1 #g7 abbot ,moses speaking of         
religious says3 ,we must recognize that 
we have to undertake the hunger of      
fasting1 watchings1 bodily toil1        
privation1 reading1 and other acts of   
virtue1 in order by these degrees to    
mount to the perfection of charity4 ,now
 things pertaining to human acts are    
specified and denominated from the      
intention of the end4 ,therefore        

religious belong to the state of        
perfection4  ,moreover ,dionysius says  
7,eccl4 ,hier4 vi7 that those who are   
called servants of ,god1 by reason of   
their rendering pure service and        
subjection to ,god1 are united to the   
perfection beloved of ,him4  ,i answer  
that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ada1 ,a4   
#b7 that which is applicable to many    
things in common is ascribed            
antonomastically to that to which it is 
applicable by way of excellence4 ,thus  
the name of fortitude is claimed by the 
virtue which preserves the firmness of  
the mind in regard to most difficult    
things1 and the name of temperance1 by  
that virtue which tempers the greatest  
pleasures4 ,now religion as stated above
 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b2 ,a4 #c1 ad #b7 is a  
virtue whereby a man offers something to
 the service and worship of ,god4       
,wherefore those are called religious   
antonomastically1 who give themselves up
 entirely to the divine service1 as     
offering a holocaust to ,god4 ,hence    

,gregory says 7,hom4 xx in ,ezech473    
,some there are who keep nothing for    
themselves1 but sacrifice to almighty   
,god their tongue1 their senses1 their  
life1 and the property they possess4    
,now the perfection of man consists in  
adhering wholly to ,god1 as stated above
 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #b71 and in this sense  
religion denotes the state of           
perfection4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to offer 
something to the worship of ,god is     
necessary for salvation1 but to offer   
oneself wholly1 and one's possessions to
 the worship of ,god belongs to         
perfection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated
 above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a2 ,a4 #d1 
ad #a1 #b2 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #c7 when we were
 treating of the virtue of religion1    
religion has reference not only to the  
offering of sacrifices and other like   
things that are proper to religion1 but 
also to the acts of all the virtues     
which in so far as these are referred to
 ,god's service and honor become acts of
 religion4 ,accordingly if a man devotes

 his whole life to the divine service1  
his whole life belongs to religion1 and 
thus by reason of the religious life    
that they lead1 those who are in the    
state of perfection are called          
religious4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated 
above 7,q4 #ahd1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f7 religion 
denotes the state of perfection by      
reason of the end intended4 ,hence it   
does not follow that whoever is in the  
state of perfection is already perfect1 
but that he tends to perfection4 ,hence 
,origen commenting on ,matt4 #ai3ba1 ,if
 thou wilt be perfect1 etc41 says       
7,tract4 viii in ,matth47 that he who   
has exchanged riches for poverty in     
order to become perfect does not become 
perfect at the very moment of giving his
 goods to the poor2 but from that day   
the contemplation of ,god will begin to 
lead him to all the virtues4 ,thus all  
are not perfect in religion1 but some   
are beginners1 some proficient4  ,reply 
,obj4 #d3 ,the religious state was      
instituted chiefly that we might obtain 

perfection by means of certain          
exercises1 whereby the obstacles to     
perfect charity are removed4 ,by the    
removal of the obstacles of perfect     
charity1 much more are the occasions of 
sin cut off1 for sin destroys charity   
altogether4 ,wherefore since it belongs 
to penance to cut out the causes of sin1
 it follows that the religious state is 
a most fitting place for penance4 ,hence
 7,,xxxiii1 qu4 ii1 cap4 ,admonere7 a   
man who had killed his wife is counseled
 to enter a monastery which is described
 as better and lighter1 rather than to  
do public penance while remaining in the
 world4   ,,second ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 
,q4 #ahf1 ,art4 #b  ,whether ,every     
,religious ,is ,bound to ,keep ,all the 
,counsels8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem that every religious is bound to   
keep all the counsels4 ,for whoever     
professes a certain state of life is    
bound to observe whatever belongs to    
that state4 ,now each religious         
professes the state of perfection4      

,therefore every religious is bound to  
keep all the counsels that pertain to   
the state of perfection4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 xx in    
,ezech47 that he who renounces this     
world1 and does all the good he can1 is 
like one who has gone out of ,egypt and 
offers sacrifice in the wilderness4 ,now
 it belongs specially to religious to   
renounce the world4 ,therefore it       
belongs to them also to do all the good 
they can4 and so it would seem that each
 of them is bound to fulfil all the     
counsels4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it is 
not requisite for the state of          
perfection to fulfil all the counsels1  
it would seem enough to fulfil some of  
them4 ,but this is false1 since some who
 lead a secular life fulfil some of the 
counsels1 for instance those who observe
 continence4 ,therefore it would seem   
that every religious who is in the state
 of perfection is bound to fulfil       
whatever pertains to perfection3 and    
such are the counsels4  ,on the         

contrary1 one is not bound1 unless one  
bind oneself1 to do works of            
supererogation4 ,but every religious    
does not bind himself to keep all the   
counsels1 but to certain definite ones1 
some to some1 others to others4         
,therefore all are not bound to keep all
 of them4  ,i answer that1 ,a thing     
pertains to perfection in three ways4   
,first1 essentially1 and thus1 as stated
 above 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #c7 the perfect   
observance of the precepts of charity   
belongs to perfection4 ,secondly1 a     
thing belongs to perfection             
consequently3 such are those things that
 result from the perfection of charity1 
for instance to bless them that curse   
you 7,luke #f3bg71 and to keep counsels 
of a like kind1 which though they be    
binding as regards the preparedness of  
the mind1 so that one has to fulfil them
 when necessity requires2 yet are       
sometimes fulfilled1 without there being
 any necessity1 through superabundance  
of charity4 ,thirdly1 a thing belongs to

 perfection instrumentally and          
dispositively1 as poverty1 continence1  
abstinence1 and the like4  ,now it has  
been stated 7,a4 #a7 that the perfection
 of charity is the end of the religious 
state4 ,and the religious state is a    
school or exercise for the attainment of
 perfection1 which men strive to reach  
by various practices1 just as a         
physician may use various remedies in   
order to heal4 ,but it is evident that  
for him who works for an end it is not  
necessary that he should already have   
attained the end1 but it is requisite   
that he should by some means tend       
thereto4 ,hence he who enters the       
religious state is not bound to have    
perfect charity1 but he is bound to tend
 to this1 and use his endeavors to have 
perfect charity4  ,for the same reason  
he is not bound to fulfil those things  
that result from the perfection of      
charity1 although he is bound to intend 
to fulfil them3 against which intention 
he acts if he contemns them1 wherefore  

he sins not by omitting them but by     
contempt of them4  ,in like manner he is
 not bound to observe all the practices 
whereby perfection may be attained1 but 
only those which are definitely         
prescribed to him by the rule which he  
has professed4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he who
 enters religion does not make          
profession to be perfect1 but he        
professes to endeavor to attain         
perfection2 even as he who enters the   
schools does not profess to have        
knowledge1 but to study in order to     
acquire knowledge4 ,wherefore as        
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei viii1   
#b71 ,pythagoras was unwilling to       
profess to be a wise man1 but           
acknowledged himself1 a lover of wisdom4
 ,hence a religious does not violate his
 profession if he be not perfect1 but   
only if he despises to tend to          
perfection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as1 
though all are bound to love ,god with  
their whole heart1 yet there is a       
certain wholeness of perfection which   

cannot be omitted without sin1 and      
another wholeness which can be omitted  
without sin 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #b1 ad #c71  
provided there be no contempt1 as stated
 above 7ad #a71 so too1 all1 both       
religious and seculars1 are bound1 in a 
certain measure1 to do whatever good    
they can1 for to all without exception  
it is said 7,eccles4 #i3aj73 ,whatsoever
 thy hand is able to do1 do it          
earnestly4 ,yet there is a way of       
fulfilling this precept1 so as to avoid 
sin1 namely if one do what one can as   
required by the conditions of one's     
state of life3 provided there be no     
contempt of doing better things1 which  
contempt sets the mind against spiritual
 progress4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there are 
some counsels such that if they be      
omitted1 man's whole life would be taken
 up with secular business2 for instance 
if he have property of his own1 or enter
 the married state1 or do something of  
the kind that regards the essential vows
 of religion themselves2 wherefore      

religious are bound to keep all such    
like counsels4 ,other counsels there    
are1 however1 about certain particular  
better actions1 which can be omitted    
without one's life being taken up with  
secular actions2 wherefore there is no  
need for religious to be bound to fulfil
 all of them4   ,,third ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahf1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,poverty ,is ,required for ,religious   
,perfection8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that poverty is not required for   
religious perfection4 ,for that which it
 is unlawful to do does not apparently  
belong to the state of perfection4 ,but 
it would seem to be unlawful for a man  
to give up all he possesses2 since the  
,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #h3ab7 lays down the 
way in which the faithful are to give   
alms saying3 ,if the will be forward1 it
 is accepted according to that which a  
man hath1 i4e4 you should keep back what
 you need1 and afterwards he adds 7#b   
,cor4 #h3ac73 ,for ,i mean not that     
others should be eased1 and you         

burthened1 i4e4 with poverty1 according 
to a gloss4 ,moreover a gloss on #a     
,tim4 #f3h1 ,having food1 and wherewith 
to be covered1 says3 ,though we brought 
nothing1 and will carry nothing away1 we
 must not give up these temporal things 
altogether4 ,therefore it seems that    
voluntary poverty is not requisite for  
religious perfection4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 whosoever exposes himself to  
danger sins4 ,but he who renounces all  
he has and embraces voluntary poverty   
exposes himself to danger--not only     
spiritual1 according to ,prov4 #cj3i1   
,lest perhaps 4 4 4 being compelled by  
poverty1 ,i should steal and forswear   
the name of my ,god1 and ,ecclus4 #bg3a1
 ,through poverty many have sinned--but 
also corporal1 for it is written        
7,eccles4 #g3ac73 ,as wisdom is a       
defense1 so money is a defense1 and the 
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that 
the waste of property appears to be a   
sort of ruining of one's self1 since    
thereby man lives4 ,therefore it would  

seem that voluntary poverty is not      
requisite for the perfection of         
religious life4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1    
,virtue observes the mean1 as stated in 
,ethic4 ii1 #f4 ,but he who renounces   
all by voluntary poverty seems to go to 
the extreme rather than to observe the  
mean4 ,therefore he does not act        
virtuously3 and so this does not pertain
 to the perfection of life4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 the ultimate perfection of man
 consists in happiness4 ,now riches     
conduce to happiness2 for it is written 
7,ecclus4 #ca3h73 ,blessed is the rich  
man that is found without blemish1 and  
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #h7   
that riches contribute instrumentally to
 happiness4 ,therefore voluntary poverty
 is not requisite for religious         
perfection4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the    
episcopal state is more perfect than the
 religious state4 ,but bishops may have 
property1 as stated above 7,q4 #ahe1 ,a4
 #f74 ,therefore religious may also4    
,obj4 #f3 ,further1 almsgiving is a work

 most acceptable to ,god1 and as        
,chrysostom says 7,hom4 ix in ,ep4 ad   
,hebr47 is a most effective remedy in   
repentance4 ,now poverty excludes       
almsgiving4 ,therefore it would seem    
that poverty does not pertain to        
religious perfection4  ,on the contrary1
 ,gregory says 7,moral4 viii1 #bf73     
,there are some of the righteous who    
bracing themselves up to lay hold of the
 very height of perfection1 while they  
aim at higher objects within1 abandon   
all things without4 ,now1 as stated     
above1 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 it belongs       
properly to religious to brace          
themselves up in order to lay hold of   
the very height of perfection4          
,therefore it belongs to them to abandon
 all outward things by voluntary        
poverty4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated    
above 7,a4 #b71 the religious state is  
an exercise and a school for attaining  
to the perfection of charity4 ,for this 
it is necessary that a man wholly       
withdraw his affections from worldly    

things2 since ,augustine says 7,confess4
 x1 #bi71 speaking to ,god3 ,too little 
doth he love ,thee1 who loves anything  
with ,thee1 which he loveth not for     
,thee4 ,wherefore he says 7,,qq4        
lxxxiii1 qu4 #cf7 that greater charity  
means less cupidity1 perfect charity    
means no cupidity4 ,now the possession  
of worldly things draws a man's mind to 
the love of them3 hence ,augustine says 
7,ep4 xxxi ad ,paulin4 et ,theras47 that
 we are more firmly attached to earthly 
things when we have them than when we   
desire them3 since why did that young   
man go away sad1 save because he had    
great wealth8 ,for it is one thing not  
to wish to lay hold of what one has not1
 and another to renounce what one       
already has2 the former are rejected as 
foreign to us1 the latter are cut off as
 a limb4 ,and ,chrysostom says 7,hom4   
lxiii in ,matth47 that the possession of
 wealth kindles a greater flame and the 
desire for it becomes stronger4  ,hence 
it is that in the attainment of the     

perfection of charity the first         
foundation is voluntary poverty1 whereby
 a man lives without property of his    
own1 according to the saying of our     
,lord 7,matt4 #ai3ba71 ,if thou wilt be 
perfect1 go1 sell all ,vulg43 'what'    
thou hast1 and give to the poor 4 4 4   
and come1 follow ,me4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,as the gloss adds1 when the ,apostle   
said this 7namely 'not that you should  
be burthened1' i4e4 with poverty71 he   
did not mean that it were better not to 
give3 but he feared for the weak1 whom  
he admonished so to give as not to      
suffer privation4 ,hence in like manner 
the other gloss means not that it is    
unlawful to renounce all one's temporal 
goods1 but that this is not required of 
necessity4 ,wherefore ,ambrose says 7,de
 ,offic4 i1 #cj73 ,our ,lord does not   
wish1 namely does not command us to pour
 out our wealth all at once1 but to     
dispense it2 or perhaps to do as did    
,eliseus who slew his oxen1 and fed the 
poor with that which was his own so that

 no household care might hold him back4 
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he who renounces all  
his possessions for ,christ's sake      
exposes himself to no danger1 neither   
spiritual nor corporal4 ,for spiritual  
danger ensues from poverty when the     
latter is not voluntary2 because those  
who are unwillingly poor1 through the   
desire of money-getting1 fall into many 
sins1 according to #a ,tim4 #f3i1 ,they 
that will become rich1 fall into        
temptation and into the snare of the    
devil4 ,this attachment is put away by  
those who embrace voluntary poverty1 but
 it gathers strength in those who have  
wealth1 as stated above4 ,again bodily  
danger does not threaten those who1     
intent on following ,christ1 renounce   
all their possessions and entrust       
themselves to divine providence4 ,hence 
,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in    
,monte ii1 #ag73 ,those who seek first  
the kingdom of ,god and ,his justice are
 not weighed down by anxiety lest they  
lack what is necessary4  ,reply ,obj4   

#c3 ,according to the ,philosopher      
7,ethic4 ii1 #f71 the mean of virtue is 
taken according to right reason1 not    
according to the quantity of a thing4   
,consequently whatever may be done in   
accordance with right reason is not     
rendered sinful by the greatness of the 
quantity1 but all the more virtuous4 ,it
 would1 however1 be against right reason
 to throw away all one's possessions    
through intemperance1 or without any    
useful purpose2 whereas it is in        
accordance with right reason to renounce
 wealth in order to devote oneself to   
the contemplation of wisdom4 ,even      
certain philosophers are said to have   
done this2 for ,jerome says 7,ep4 xlviii
 ad ,paulin473 ,the famous ,theban1     
,crates1 once a very wealthy man1 when  
he was going to ,athens to study        
philosophy1 cast away a large amount of 
gold2 for he considered that he could   
not possess both gold and virtue at the 
same time4 ,much more therefore is it   
according to right reason for a man to  

renounce all he has1 in order perfectly 
to follow ,christ4 ,wherefore ,jerome   
says 7,ep4 cxxv ad ,rust4 ,monach473    
,poor thyself1 follow ,christ poor4     
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,happiness or felicity 
is twofold4 ,one is perfect1 to which we
 look forward in the life to come2 the  
other is imperfect1 in respect of which 
some are said to be happy in this life4 
,the happiness of this life is twofold1 
one is according to the active life1 the
 other according to the contemplative   
life1 as the ,philosopher asserts       
7,ethic4 x1 #g1 #h74 ,now wealth        
conduces instrumentally to the happiness
 of the active life which consists in   
external actions1 because as the        
,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #h7 we do 
many things by friends1 by riches1 by   
political influence1 as it were by      
instruments4 ,on the other hand1 it does
 not conduce to the happiness of the    
contemplative life1 rather is it an     
obstacle thereto1 inasmuch as the       
anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet  

of the soul1 which is most necessary to 
one who contemplates4 ,hence it is that 
the ,philosopher asserts 7,ethic4 x1 #h7
 that for actions many things are       
needed1 but the contemplative man needs 
no such things1 namely external goods1  
for his operation2 in fact they are     
obstacles to his contemplation4  ,man is
 directed to future happiness by        
charity2 and since voluntary poverty is 
an efficient exercise for the attaining 
of perfect charity1 it follows that it  
is of great avail in acquiring the      
happiness of heaven4 ,wherefore our     
,lord said 7,matt4 #ai3ba73 ,go1 sell   
all ,vulg43 'what' thou hast1 and give  
to the poor1 and thou shalt have        
treasure in heaven4 ,now riches once    
they are possessed are in themselves of 
a nature to hinder the perfection of    
charity1 especially by enticing and     
distracting the mind4 ,hence it is      
written 7,matt4 #ac3bb7 that the care of
 this world and the deceitfulness of    
riches choketh up the word of ,god1 for 

as ,gregory says 7,hom4 xv in ,ev47 by  
preventing the good desire from entering
 into the heart1 they destroy life at   
its very outset4 ,consequently it is    
difficult to safeguard charity amidst   
riches3 wherefore our ,lord said 7,matt4
 #ai3bc7 that a rich man shall hardly   
enter into the kingdom of heaven1 which 
we must understand as referring to one  
who actually has wealth1 since ,he says 
that this is impossible for him who     
places his affection in riches1         
according to the explanation of         
,chrysostom 7,hom4 lxiii in ,matth471   
for ,he adds 7,matt4 #ai3bd73 ,it is    
easier for a camel to pass through the  
eye of a needle1 than for a rich man to 
enter into the kingdom of heaven4 ,hence
 it is not said simply that the rich man
 is blessed1 but the rich man that is   
found without blemish1 and that hath not
 gone after gold1 and this because he   
has done a difficult thing1 wherefore   
the text continues 7,matt4 #ai3i73 ,who 
is he8 and we will praise him2 for he   

hath done wonderful things in his life1 
namely by not loving riches though      
placed in the midst of them4  ,reply    
,obj4 #e3 ,the episcopal state is not   
directed to the attainment of           
perfection1 but rather to the effect    
that1 in virtue of the perfection which 
he already has1 a man may govern others1
 by administering not only spiritual but
 also temporal things4 ,this belongs to 
the active life1 wherein many things    
occur that may be done by means of      
wealth as an instrument1 as stated 7ad  
#d74 ,wherefore it is not required of   
bishops1 who make profession of         
governing ,christ's flock1 that they    
have nothing of their own1 whereas it is
 required of religious who make         
profession of learning to obtain        
perfection4  ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,the      
renouncement of one's own wealth is     
compared to almsgiving as the universal 
to the particular1 and as the holocaust 
to the sacrifice4 ,hence ,gregory says  
7,hom4 xx in ,ezech47 that those who    

assist the needy with the things they   
possess1 by their good deeds offer      
sacrifice1 since they offer up something
 to ,god and keep back something for    
themselves2 whereas those who keep      
nothing for themselves offer a holocaust
 which is greater than a sacrifice4     
,wherefore ,jerome also says 7,contra   
,vigilant473 ,when you declare that     
those do better who retain the use of   
their possessions1 and dole out the     
fruits of their possessions to the poor1
 it is not ,i but the ,lord ,who answers
 you2 ,if thou wilt be perfect1 etc41   
and afterwards he goes on to say3 ,this 
man whom you praise belongs to the      
second and third degree1 and we too     
commend him3 provided we acknowledge the
 first as to be preferred to the second 
and third4 ,for this reason in order to 
exclude the error of ,vigilantius it is 
said 7,de ,eccl4 ,dogm4 xxxviii73 ,it is
 a good thing to give away one's goods  
by dispensing them to the poor3 it is   
better to give them away once for all   

with the intention of following the     
,lord1 and1 free of solicitude1 to be   
poor with ,christ4   ,,fourth ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahf1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,perpetual ,continence ,is ,required for
 ,religious ,perfection8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that perpetual          
continence is not required for religious
 perfection4 ,for all perfection of the 
,christian life began with ,christ's    
apostles4 ,now the apostles do not      
appear to have observed continence1 as  
evidenced by ,peter1 of whose           
mother-in-law we read ,matt4 #h3ad4     
,therefore it would seem that perpetual 
continence is not requisite for         
religious perfection4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 the first example of          
perfection is shown to us in the person 
of ,abraham1 to whom the ,lord said     
7,gen4 #ag3a73 ,walk before ,me1 and be 
perfect4 ,now the copy should not       
surpass the example4 ,therefore         
perpetual continence is not requisite   
for religious perfection4  ,obj4 #c3    

,further1 that which is required for    
religious perfection is to be found in  
every religious order4 ,now there are   
some religious who lead a married life4 
,therefore religious perfection does not
 require perpetual continence4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4  
#g3a73 ,let us cleanse ourselves from   
all defilement of the flesh and of the  
spirit1 perfecting sanctification in the
 fear of ,god4 ,now cleanness of flesh  
and spirit is safeguarded by continence1
 for it is said 7#a ,cor4 #g3cd73 ,the  
unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh 
on the things of the ,lord that she may 
be holy both in spirit and in body      
,vulg43 'both in body and in spirit'4   
,therefore religious perfection requires
 continence4  ,i answer that1 ,the      
religious state requires the removal of 
whatever hinders man from devoting      
himself entirely to ,god's service4 ,now
 the use of sexual union hinders the    
mind from giving itself wholly to the   
service of ,god1 and this for two       

reasons4 ,first1 on account of its      
vehement delectation1 which by frequent 
repetition increases concupiscence1 as  
also the ,philosopher observes 7,ethic4 
iii1 #ab73 and hence it is that the use 
of venery withdraws the mind from that  
perfect intentness on tending to ,god4  
,augustine expresses this when he says  
7,solil4 i1 #aj73 ,i consider that      
nothing so casts down the manly mind    
from its height as the fondling of      
women1 and those bodily contacts which  
belong to the married state4 ,secondly1 
because it involves man in solicitude   
for the control of his wife1 his        
children1 and his temporalities which   
serve for their upkeep4 ,hence the      
,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #g3cb1 #cc73 ,he
 that is without a wife is solicitous   
for the things that belong to the ,lord1
 how he may please ,god3 but he that is 
with a wife is solicitous for the things
 of the world1 how he may please his    
wife4  ,therefore perpetual continence1 
as well as voluntary poverty1 is        

requisite for religious perfection4     
,wherefore just as ,vigilantius was     
condemned for equaling riches to        
poverty1 so was ,jovinian condemned for 
equaling marriage to virginity4  ,reply 
,obj4 #a3 ,the perfection not only of   
poverty but also of continence was      
introduced by ,christ ,who said 7,matt4 
#ai3ab73 ,there are eunuchs who have    
made themselves eunuchs1 for the kingdom
 of heaven1 and then added3 ,he that can
 take1 let him take it4 ,and lest anyone
 should be deprived of the hope of      
attaining perfection1 he admitted to the
 state of perfection those even who were
 married4 ,now the husbands could not   
without committing an injustice forsake 
their wives1 whereas men could without  
injustice renounce riches4 ,wherefore   
,peter whom ,he found married1 ,he      
severed not from his wife1 while ,he    
withheld from marriage ,john who wished 
to marry 99,prolog4 in ,joan4 among the 
supposititious works of ,st4 ,jerome4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says    

7,de ,bono ,conjug4 xxii71 the chastity 
of celibacy is better than the chastity 
of marriage1 one of which ,abraham had  
in use1 both of them in habit4 ,for he  
lived chastely1 and he might have been  
chaste without marrying1 but it was not 
requisite then4 ,nevertheless if the    
patriarchs of old had perfection of mind
 together with wealth and marriage1     
which is a mark of the greatness of     
their virtue1 this is no reason why any 
weaker person should presume to have    
such great virtue that he can attain to 
perfection though rich and married2 as  
neither does a man unarmed presume to   
attack his enemy1 because ,samson slew  
many foes with the jaw-bone of an ass4  
,for those fathers1 had it been         
seasonable to observe continence and    
poverty1 would have been most careful to
 observe them4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,such  
ways of living as admit of the use of   
marriage are not the religious life     
simply and absolutely speaking1 but in a
 restricted sense1 in so far as they    

have a certain share in those things    
that belong to the religious state4     
,,fifth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahf1  
,art4 #e  ,whether ,obedience ,belongs  
to ,religious ,perfection8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that obedience does  
not belong to religious perfection4 ,for
 those things seemingly belong to       
religious perfection1 which are works of
 supererogation and are not binding upon
 all4 ,but all are bound to obey their  
superiors1 according to the saying of   
the ,apostle 7,heb4 #ac3ag71 ,obey your 
prelates1 and be subject to them4       
,therefore it would seem that obedience 
does not belong to religious perfection4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 obedience would   
seem to belong properly to those who    
have to be guided by the sense of       
others1 and such persons are lacking in 
discernment4 ,now the ,apostle says     
7,heb4 #e3ad7 that strong meat is for   
the perfect1 for them who by custom have
 their senses exercised to the          
discerning of good and evil4 ,therefore 

it would seem that obedience does not   
belong to the state of the perfect4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if obedience were   
requisite for religious perfection1 it  
would follow that it is befitting to all
 religious4 ,but it is not becoming to  
all2 since some religious lead a        
solitary life1 and have no superior whom
 they obey4 ,again religious superiors  
apparently are not bound to obedience4  
,therefore obedience would seem not to  
pertain to religious perfection4  ,obj4 
#d3 ,further1 if the vow of obedience   
were requisite for religion1 it would   
follow that religious are bound to obey 
their superiors in all things1 just as  
they are bound to abstain from all      
venery by their vow of continence4 ,but 
they are not bound to obey them in all  
things1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajd1 ,a4  
#e71 when we were treating of the virtue
 of obedience4 ,therefore the vow of    
obedience is not requisite for religion4
  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 those services are
 most acceptable to ,god which are done 

freely and not of necessity1 according  
to #b ,cor4 #i3g1 ,not with sadness or  
of necessity4 ,now that which is done   
out of obedience is done of necessity of
 precept4 ,therefore those good works   
are more deserving of praise which are  
done of one's own accord4 ,therefore the
 vow of obedience is unbecoming to      
religion whereby men seek to attain to  
that which is better4  ,on the contrary1
 ,religious perfection consists chiefly 
in the imitation of ,christ1 according  
to ,matt4 #ai3ba1 ,if thou wilt be      
perfect1 go sell all ,vulg43 'what' thou
 hast1 and give to the poor1 and follow 
,me4 ,now in ,christ obedience is       
commended above all according to ,phil4 
#b3h1 ,he became ,vulg43 'becoming'     
obedient unto death4 ,therefore         
seemingly obedience belongs to religious
 perfection4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated
 above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c7 the religious     
state is a school and exercise for      
tending to perfection4 ,now those who   
are being instructed or exercised in    

order to attain a certain end must needs
 follow the direction of someone under  
whose control they are instructed or    
exercised so as to attain that end as   
disciples under a master4 ,hence        
religious need to be placed under the   
instruction and command of someone as   
regards things pertaining to the        
religious life2 wherefore it is said    
7,,vii1 qu4 i1 can4 ,hoc nequaquam73    
,the monastic life denotes subjection   
and discipleship4 ,now one man is       
subjected to another's command and      
instruction by obedience3 and           
consequently obedience is requisite for 
religious perfection4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 
,to obey one's superiors in matters that
 are essential to virtue is not a work  
of supererogation1 but is common to all3
 whereas to obey in matters pertaining  
to the practice of perfection belongs   
properly to religious4 ,this latter     
obedience is compared to the former as  
the universal to the particular4 ,for   
those who live in the world1 keep       

something for themselves1 and offer     
something to ,god2 and in the latter    
respect they are under obedience to     
their superiors3 whereas those who live 
in religion give themselves wholly and  
their possessions to ,god1 as stated    
above 7,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,hence their      
obedience is universal4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4  
ii1 #a1 #b71 by performing actions we   
contract certain habits1 and when we    
have acquired the habit we are best able
 to perform the actions4 ,accordingly   
those who have not attained to          
perfection1 acquire perfection by       
obeying1 while those who have already   
acquired perfection are most ready to   
obey1 not as though they need to be     
directed to the acquisition of          
perfection1 but as maintaining          
themselves by this means in that which  
belongs to perfection4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3
 ,the subjection of religious is chiefly
 in reference to bishops1 who are       
compared to them as perfecters to       

perfected1 as ,dionysius states 7,eccl4 
,hier4 vi71 where he also says that the 
monastic order is subjected to the      
perfecting virtues of the bishops1 and  
is taught by their godlike              
enlightenment4 ,hence neither hermits   
nor religious superiors are exempt from 
obedience to bishops2 and if they be    
wholly or partly exempt from obedience  
to the bishop of the diocese1 they are  
nevertheless bound to obey the          
,sovereign ,pontiff1 not only in matters
 affecting all in common1 but also in   
those which pertain specially to        
religious discipline4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 
,the vow of obedience taken by          
religious1 extends to the disposition of
 a man's whole life1 and in this way it 
has a certain universality1 although it 
does not extend to all individual acts4 
,for some of these do not belong to     
religion1 through not being of those    
things that concern the love of ,god and
 of our neighbor1 such as rubbing one's 
beard1 lifting a stick from the ground  

and so forth1 which do not come under a 
vow nor under obedience2 and some are   
contrary to religion4 ,nor is there any 
comparison with continence whereby acts 
are excluded which are altogether       
contrary to religion4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 
,the necessity of coercion makes an act 
involuntary and consequently deprives it
 of the character of praise or merit2   
whereas the necessity which is          
consequent upon obedience is a necessity
 not of coercion but of a free will1    
inasmuch as a man is willing to obey1   
although perhaps he would not be willing
 to do the thing commanded considered in
 itself4 ,wherefore since by the vow of 
obedience a man lays himself under the  
necessity of doing for ,god's sake      
certain things that are not pleasing in 
themselves1 for this very reason that   
which he does is the more acceptable to 
,god1 though it be of less account1     
because man can give nothing greater to 
,god1 than by subjecting his will to    
another man's for ,god's sake4 ,hence in

 the ,conferences of the ,fathers       
7,coll4 xviii1 #g7 it is stated that the
 ,sarabaitae are the worst class of     
monks1 because through providing for    
their own needs without being subject to
 superiors1 they are free to do as they 
will2 and yet day and night they are    
more busily occupied in work than those 
who live in monasteries4   ,,sixth      
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahf1 ,art4 #f 
,whether ,it ,is ,requisite for         
,religious ,perfection ,that ,poverty1  
,continence1 and ,obedience ,should     
,come ,under a ,vow8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that it is not requisite for
 religious perfection that the three    
aforesaid1 namely poverty1 continence1  
and obedience1 should come under a vow4 
,for the school of perfection is founded
 on the principles laid down by our     
,lord4 ,now our ,lord in formulating    
perfection 7,matt4 #ai3ba7 said3 ,if    
thou wilt be perfect1 go1 sell all      
,vulg43 'what' thou hast1 and give to   
the poor1 without any mention of a vow4 

,therefore it would seem that a vow is  
not necessary for the school of         
religion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a vow is 
a promise made to ,god1 wherefore       
7,eccles4 #e3c7 the wise man after      
saying3 ,if thou hast vowed anything to 
,god1 defer not to pay it1 adds at once1
 for an unfaithful and foolish promise  
displeaseth ,him4 ,but when a thing is  
being actually given there is no need   
for a promise4 ,therefore it suffices   
for religious perfection that one keep  
poverty1 continence1 and obedience      
without4 vowing them4  ,obj4 #c3        
,further1 ,augustine says 7,ad          
,pollent41 de ,adult4 ,conjug4 i1 #ad73 
,the services we render are more        
pleasing when we might lawfully not     
render them1 yet do so out of love4 ,now
 it is lawful not to render a service   
which we have not vowed1 whereas it is  
unlawful if we have vowed to render it4 
,therefore seemingly it is more pleasing
 to ,god to keep poverty1 continence1   
and obedience without a vow4 ,therefore 

a vow is not requisite for religious    
perfection4  ,on the contrary1 ,in the  
,old ,law the ,nazareans were           
consecrated by vow according to ,num4   
#f3b1 ,when a man or woman shall make a 
vow to be sanctified and will consecrate
 themselves to the ,lord1 etc4 ,now     
these were a figure of those who attain 
the summit of perfection1 as a gloss    
99,cf4 ,moral4 ii of ,gregory states4   
,therefore a vow is requisite for       
religious perfection4  ,i answer that1  
,it belongs to religious to be in the   
state of perfection1 as shown above 7,q4
 #agd1 ,a4 #e74 ,now the state of       
perfection requires an obligation to    
whatever belongs to perfection3 and this
 obligation consists in binding oneself 
to ,god by means of a vow4 ,but it is   
evident from what has been said 7,,aa4  
#c1 #d1 #e7 that poverty1 continence1   
and obedience belong to the perfection  
of the ,christian life4 ,consequently   
the religious state requires that one be
 bound to these three by vow4 ,hence    

,gregory says 7,hom4 xx in ,ezech473    
,when a man vows to ,god all his        
possessions1 all his life1 all his      
knowledge1 it is a holocaust2 and       
afterwards he says that this refers to  
those who renounce the present world4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our ,lord declared    
that it belongs to the perfection of    
life that a man follow ,him1 not anyhow1
 but in such a way as not to turn back4 
,wherefore ,he says again 7,luke #i3fb73
 ,no man putting his hand to the plough1
 and looking back1 is fit for the       
kingdom of ,god4 ,and though some of    
,his disciples went back1 yet when our  
,lord asked 7,john #f3fh1 #fi71 ,will   
you also go away8 ,peter answered for   
the others3 ,lord1 to whom shall we go8 
,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,consensu   
,ev4 ii1 #ag7 that as ,matthew and ,mark
 relate1 ,peter and ,andrew followed    
,him after drawing their boats on to the
 beach1 not as though they purposed to  
return1 but as following ,him at ,his   
command4 ,now this unwavering following 

of ,christ is made fast by a vow3       
wherefore a vow is requisite for        
religious perfection4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,as ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii7 religious
 perfection requires that a man give his
 whole life to ,god4 ,but a man cannot  
actually give ,god his whole life1      
because that life taken as a whole is   
not simultaneous but successive4 ,hence 
a man cannot give his whole life to ,god
 otherwise than by the obligation of a  
vow4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,among other     
services that we can lawfully give1 is  
our liberty1 which is dearer to man than
 aught else4 ,consequently when a man of
 his own accord deprives himself by vow 
of the liberty of abstaining from things
 pertaining to ,god's service1 this is  
most acceptable to ,god4 ,hence         
,augustine says 7,ep4 cxxvii ad ,paulin4
 et ,arment473 ,repent not of thy vow2  
rejoice rather that thou canst no longer
 do lawfully1 what thou mightest have   
done lawfully but to thy own cost4      
,happy the obligation that compels to   

better things4   ,,seventh ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahf1 ,art4 #g  ,whether 
,it ,is ,right to ,say ,that ,religious 
,perfection ,consists in ,these ,three  
,vows8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
that it is not right to say that        
religious perfection consists in these  
three vows4 ,for the perfection of life 
consists of inward rather than of       
outward acts1 according to ,rom4 #ad3ag1
 ,the ,kingdom of ,god is not meat and  
drink1 but justice and peace and joy in 
the ,holy ,ghost4 ,now the religious vow
 binds a man to things belonging to     
perfection4 ,therefore vows of inward   
actions1 such as contemplation1 love of 
,god and our neighbor1 and so forth1    
should pertain to the religious state1  
rather than the vows of poverty1        
continence1 and obedience which refer to
 outward actions4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1  
the three aforesaid come under the      
religious vow1 in so far as they belong 
to the practice of tending to           
perfection4 ,but there are many other   

things that religious practice1 such as 
abstinence1 watchings1 and the like4    
,therefore it would seem that these     
three vows are incorrectly described as 
pertaining to the state of perfection4  
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by the vow of       
obedience a man is bound to do according
 to his superior's command whatever     
pertains to the practice of perfection4 
,therefore the vow of obedience suffices
 without the two other vows4  ,obj4 #d3 
,further1 external goods comprise not   
only riches but also honors4 ,therefore1
 if religious1 by the vow of poverty1   
renounce earthly riches1 there should be
 another vow whereby they may despise   
worldly honors4  ,on the contrary1 ,it  
is stated 7,extra1 de ,statu ,monach41  
cap4 ,cum ad monasterium7 that the      
keeping of chastity and the renouncing  
of property are affixed to the monastic 
rule4  ,i answer that1 ,the religious   
state may be considered in three ways4  
,first1 as being a practice of tending  
to the perfection of charity3 secondly1 

as quieting the human mind from outward 
solicitude1 according to #a ,cor4 #g3cb3
 ,i would have you to be without        
solicitude3 thirdly1 as a holocaust     
whereby a man offers himself and his    
possessions wholly to ,god2 and in      
corresponding manner the religious state
 is constituted by these three vows4    
,first1 as regards the practice of      
perfection a man is required to remove  
from himself whatever may hinder his    
affections from tending wholly to ,god1 
for it is in this that the perfection of
 charity consists4 ,such hindrances are 
of three kinds4 ,first1 the attachment  
to external goods1 which is removed by  
the vow of poverty2 secondly1 the       
concupiscence of sensible pleasures1    
chief among which are venereal          
pleasures1 and these are removed by the 
vow of continence2 thirdly1 the         
inordinateness of the human will1 and   
this is removed by the vow of obedience4
 ,in like manner the disquiet of worldly
 solicitude is aroused in man in        

reference especially to three things4   
,first1 as regards the dispensing of    
external things1 and this solicitude is 
removed from man by the vow of poverty2 
secondly1 as regards the control of wife
 and children1 which is cut away by the 
vow of continence2 thirdly1 as regards  
the disposal of one's own actions1 which
 is eliminated by the vow of obedience1 
whereby a man commits himself to the    
disposal of another4  ,again1 a         
holocaust is the offering to ,god of all
 that one has1 according to ,gregory    
7,hom4 xx in ,ezech474 ,now man has a   
threefold good1 according to the        
,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #h74 ,first1   
the good of external things1 which he   
wholly offers to ,god by the vow of     
voluntary poverty3 secondly1 the good of
 his own body1 and this good he offers  
to ,god especially by the vow of        
continence1 whereby he renounces the    
greatest bodily pleasures4 ,the third is
 the good of the soul1 which man wholly 
offers to ,god by the vow of obedience1 

whereby he offers ,god his own will by  
which he makes use of all the powers and
 habits of the soul4 ,therefore the     
religious state is fittingly constituted
 by the three vows4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the end      
whereunto the religious vow is directed 
is the perfection of charity1 since all 
the interior acts of virtue belong to   
charity as to their mother1 according to
 #a ,cor4 #ac3d1 ,charity is patient1 is
 kind1 etc4 ,hence the interior acts of 
virtue1 for instance humility1 patience1
 and so forth1 do not come under the    
religious vow1 but this is directed to  
them as its end4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all 
other religious observances are directed
 to the three aforesaid principal vows2 
for if any of them are ordained for the 
purpose of procuring a livelihood1 such 
as labor1 questing1 and so on1 they are 
to be referred to poverty2 for the      
safeguarding of which religious seek a  
livelihood by these means4 ,other       
observances whereby the body is         

chastised1 such as watching1 fasting1   
and the like1 are directly ordained for 
the observance of the vow of continence4
 ,and such religious observances as     
regard human actions whereby a man is   
directed to the end of religion1 namely 
the love of ,god and his neighbor 7such 
as reading1 prayer1 visiting the sick1  
and the like71 are comprised under the  
vow of obedience that applies to the    
will1 which directs its actions to the  
end according to the ordering of another
 person4 ,the distinction of habit      
belongs to all three vows1 as a sign of 
being bound by them3 wherefore the      
religious habit is given or blessed at  
the time of profession4  ,reply ,obj4   
#c3 ,by obedience a man offers to ,god  
his will1 to which though all human     
affairs are subject1 yet some are       
subject to it alone in a special manner1
 namely human actions1 since passions   
belong also to the sensitive appetite4  
,wherefore in order to restrain the     
passions of carnal pleasures and of     

external objects of appetite1 which     
hinder the perfection of life1 there was
 need for the vows of continence and    
poverty2 but for the ordering of one's  
own actions accordingly as the state of 
perfection requires1 there was need for 
the vow of obedience4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 
,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1  
#c71 strictly and truly speaking honor  
is not due save to virtue4 ,since1      
however1 external goods serve           
instrumentally for certain acts of      
virtue1 the consequence is that a       
certain honor is given to their         
excellence especially by the common     
people who acknowledge none but outward 
excellence4 ,therefore since religious  
tend to the perfection of virtue it     
becomes them not to renounce the honor  
which ,god and all holy men accord to   
virtue1 according to ,ps4 #ach3ag1 ,but 
to me ,thy friends1 ,o ,god1 are made   
exceedingly honorable4 ,on the other    
hand1 they renounce the honor that is   
given to outward excellence1 by the very

 fact that they withdraw from a worldly 
life3 hence no special vow is needed for
 this4   ,,eighth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #ahf1 ,art4 #h  ,whether the ,vow of
 ,obedience ,is the ,chief of the ,three
 ,religious ,vows8  ,objection #a3 ,it  
would seem that the vow of obedience is 
not the chief of the three religious    
vows4 ,for the perfection of the        
religious life was inaugurated by       
,christ4 ,now ,christ gave a special    
counsel of poverty2 whereas ,he is not  
stated to have given a special counsel  
of obedience4 ,therefore the vow of     
poverty is greater than the vow of      
obedience4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is   
written 7,ecclus4 #bf3bj7 that no price 
is worthy of a continent soul4 ,now the 
vow of that which is more worthy is     
itself more excellent4 ,therefore the   
vow of continence is more excellent than
 the vow of obedience4  ,obj4 #c3       
,further1 the greater a vow the more    
indispensable it would seem to be4 ,now 
the vows of poverty and continence are  

so inseparable from the monastic rule1  
that not even the ,sovereign ,pontiff   
can allow them to be broken1 according  
to a ,decretal 7,de ,statu ,monach41    
cap4 ,cum ad monasterium73 yet he can   
dispense a religious from obeying his   
superior4 ,therefore it would seem that 
the vow of obedience is less than the   
vow of poverty and continence4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxv1  
#ad73 ,obedience is rightly placed      
before victims1 since by victims        
another's flesh1 but by obedience one's 
own will1 is sacrificed4 ,now the       
religious vows are holocausts1 as stated
 above 7,,aa4 #a1 #c1 ad #f74 ,therefore
 the vow of obedience is the chief of   
all religious vows4  ,i answer that1    
,the vow of obedience is the chief of   
the three religious vows1 and this for  
three reasons4  ,first1 because by the  
vow of obedience man offers ,god        
something greater1 namely his own will2 
for this is of more account than his own
 body1 which he offers ,god by          

continence1 and than external things1   
which he offers ,god by the vow of      
poverty4 ,wherefore that which is done  
out of obedience is more acceptable to  
,god than that which is done of one's   
own will1 according to the saying of    
,jerome 7,ep4 cxxv ad ,rustic ,monach473
 ,my words are intended to teach you not
 to rely on your own judgment3 and a    
little further on he says3 ,you may not 
do what you will2 you must eat what you 
are bidden to eat1 you may possess as   
much as you receive1 clothe yourself    
with what is given to you4 ,hence       
fasting is not acceptable to ,god if it 
is done of one's own will1 according to 
,isa4 #eh3c1 ,behold in the day of your 
fast your own will is found4  ,secondly1
 because the vow of obedience includes  
the other vows1 but not vice versa3 for 
a religious1 though bound by vow to     
observe continence and poverty1 yet     
these also come under obedience1 as well
 as many other things besides the       
keeping of continence and poverty4      

,thirdly1 because the vow of obedience  
extends properly to those acts that are 
closely connected with the end of       
religion2 and the more closely a thing  
is connected with the end1 the better it
 is4  ,it follows from this that the vow
 of obedience is more essential to the  
religious life4 ,for if a man without   
taking a vow of obedience were to       
observe1 even by vow1 voluntary poverty 
and continence1 he would not therefore  
belong to the religious state1 which is 
to be preferred to virginity observed   
even by vow2 for ,augustine says 7,de   
,virgin4 xlvi73 ,no one1 methinks1 would
 prefer virginity to the monastic life4 
99,st4 ,augustine wrote not monasterio  
but martyrio--to martyrdom2 and ,st4    
,thomas quotes the passage correctly    
above1 ,q4 #abd1 ,a4 #c1 and ,q4 #aeb1  
,a4 #e4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the counsel  
of obedience was included in the very   
following of ,christ1 since to obey is  
to follow another's will4 ,consequently 
it is more pertinent to perfection than 

the vow of poverty1 because as ,jerome1 
commenting on ,matt4 #ai3bg1 ,behold we 
have left all things1 observes1 ,peter  
added that which is perfect when he     
said3 ,and have followed ,thee4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,the words quoted mean that   
continence is to be preferred1 not to   
all other acts of virtue1 but to        
conjugal chastity1 or to external riches
 of gold and silver which are measured  
by weight 99,pondere1 referring to the  
,latin ponderatio in the ,vulgate1 which
 the ,douay version renders price44 ,or 
again continence is taken in a general  
sense for abstinence from all evil1 as  
stated above 7,q4 #aee1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a74 
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,pope cannot      
dispense a religious from his vow of    
obedience so as to release him from     
obedience to every superior in matters  
relating to the perfection of life1 for 
he cannot exempt him from obedience to  
himself4 ,he can1 however1 exempt him   
from subjection to a lower superior1 but
 this is not to dispense him from his   

vow of obedience4   ,,ninth ,,article   
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahf1 ,art4 #i  ,whether 
a ,religious ,sins ,mortally ,whenever  
,he ,transgresses the ,things ,contained
 in ,his ,rule8  ,objection #a3 ,it     
would seem that a religious sins        
mortally whenever he transgresses the   
things contained in his rule4 ,for to   
break a vow is a sin worthy of          
condemnation1 as appears from #a ,tim4  
#e3aa1 #ab1 where the ,apostle says that
 widows who will marry have ,vulg43     
'having' damnation1 because they have   
made void their first faith4 ,but       
religious are bound to a rule by the    
vows of their profession4 ,therefore    
they sin mortally by transgressing the  
things contained in their rule4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 the rule is enjoined upon 
a religious in the same way as a law4   
,now he who transgresses a precept of   
law sins mortally4 ,therefore it would  
seem that a monk sins mortally if he    
transgresses the things contained in his
 rule4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 contempt    

involves a mortal sin4 ,now whoever     
repeatedly does what he ought not to do 
seems to sin from contempt4 ,therefore  
it would seem that a religious sins     
mortally by frequently transgressing the
 things contained in his rule4  ,on the 
contrary1 ,the religious state is safer 
than the secular state2 wherefore       
,gregory at the beginning of his ,morals
 99,epist4 ,missoria1 ad ,leand4 ,episc4
 i compares the secular life to the     
stormy sea1 and the religious life to   
the calm port4 ,but if every            
transgression of the things contained in
 his rule were to involve a religious in
 mortal sin1 the religious life would be
 fraught with danger of account of its  
multitude of observances4 ,therefore not
 every transgression of the things      
contained in the rule is a mortal sin4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4   
#a1 ad #a1 #b71 a thing is contained in 
the rule in two ways4 ,first1 as the end
 of the rule1 for instance things that  
pertain to the acts of the virtues2 and 

the transgression of these1 as regards  
those which come under a common precept1
 involves a mortal sin2 but as regards  
those which are not included in the     
common obligation of a precept1 the     
transgression thereof does not involve a
 mortal sin1 except by reason of        
contempt1 because1 as stated above 7,a4 
#b71 a religious is not bound to be     
perfect1 but to tend to perfection1 to  
which the contempt of perfection is     
opposed4  ,secondly1 a thing is         
contained in the rule through pertaining
 to the outward practice1 such as all   
external observances1 to some of which a
 religious is bound by the vow of his   
profession4 ,now the vow of profession  
regards chiefly the three things        
aforesaid1 namely poverty1 continence1  
and obedience1 while all others are     
directed to these4 ,consequently the    
transgression of these three involves a 
mortal sin1 while the transgression of  
the others does not involve a mortal    
sin1 except either by reason of contempt

 of the rule 7since this is directly    
contrary to the profession whereby a man
 vows to live according to the rule71 or
 by reason of a precept1 whether given  
orally by a superior1 or expressed in   
the rule1 since this would be to act    
contrary to the vow of obedience4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he who professes a    
rule does not vow to observe all the    
things contained in the rule1 but he    
vows the regular life which consists    
essentially in the three aforesaid      
things4 ,hence in certain religious     
orders precaution is taken to profess1  
not the rule1 but to live according to  
the rule1 i4e4 to tend to form one's    
conduct in accordance with the rule as a
 kind of model2 and this is set aside by
 contempt4 ,yet greater precaution is   
observed in some religious orders by    
professing obedience according to the   
rule1 so that only that which is        
contrary to a precept of the rule is    
contrary to the profession1 while the   
transgression or omission of other      

things binds only under pain of venial  
sin1 because1 as stated above 7,a4 #g1  
ad #b71 such things are dispositions to 
the chief vows4 ,and venial sin is a    
disposition to mortal1 as stated above  
7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #c71 inasmuch as 
it hinders those things whereby a man is
 disposed to keep the chief precepts of 
,christ's law1 namely the precepts of   
charity4  ,there is also a religious    
order1 that of the ,friars ,preachers1  
where such like transgressions or       
omissions do not1 by their very nature1 
involve sin1 either mortal or venial2   
but they bind one to suffer the         
punishment affixed thereto1 because it  
is in this way that they are bound to   
observe such things4 ,nevertheless they 
may sin venially or mortally through    
neglect1 concupiscence1 or contempt4    
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not all the contents  
of the law are set forth by way of      
precept2 for some are expressed under   
the form of ordinance or statute binding
 under pain of a fixed punishment4      

,accordingly1 just as in the civil law  
the transgression of a legal statute    
does not always render a man deserving  
of bodily death1 so neither in the law  
of the ,church does every ordinance or  
statute bind under mortal sin2 and the  
same applies to the statutes of the     
rule4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an action or   
transgression proceeds from contempt    
when a man's will refuses to submit to  
the ordinance of the law or rule1 and   
from this he proceeds to act against the
 law or rule4 ,on the other hand1 he    
does not sin from contempt1 but from    
some other cause1 when he is led to do  
something against the ordinance of the  
law or rule through some particular     
cause such as concupiscence or anger1   
even though he often repeat the same    
kind of sin through the same or some    
other cause4 ,thus ,augustine says 7,de 
,nat4 et ,grat4 xxix7 that not all sins 
are committed through proud contempt4   
,nevertheless the frequent repetition of
 a sin leads dispositively to contempt1 

according to the words of ,prov4 #ah3c1 
,the wicked man1 when he is come into   
the depth of sins1 contemneth4   ,,tenth
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahf1 ,art4   
#aj  ,whether a ,religious ,sins ,more  
,grievously ,than a ,secular by the     
,same ,kind of ,sin8  ,objection #a3 ,it
 would seem that a religious does not   
sin more grievously than a secular by   
the same kind of sin4 ,for it is written
 7#b ,paralip4 #cj3ah1 #ai73 ,the ,lord 
,who is good will show mercy to all them
 who with their whole heart seek the    
,lord the ,god of their fathers1 and    
will not impute it to them that they are
 not sanctified4 ,now religious         
apparently follow the ,lord the ,god of 
their fathers with their whole heart    
rather than seculars1 who partly give   
themselves and their possessions to ,god
 and reserve part for themselves1 as    
,gregory says 7,hom4 xx in ,ezech474    
,therefore it would seem that it is less
 imputed to them if they fall short     
somewhat of their sanctification4  ,obj4

 #b3 ,further1 ,god is less angered at a
 man's sins if he does some good deeds1 
according to #b ,paralip4 #ai3b1 #c1    
,thou helpest the ungodly1 and thou art 
joined in friendship with them that hate
 the ,lord1 and therefore thou didst    
deserve indeed the wrath of the ,lord3  
but good works are found in thee4 ,now  
religious do more good works than       
seculars4 ,therefore if they commit any 
sins1 ,god is less angry with them4     
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 this present life is
 not carried through without sin1       
according to ,james #c3b1 ,in many      
things we all offend4 ,therefore if the 
sins of religious were more grievous    
than those of seculars it would follow  
that religious are worse off than       
seculars3 and consequently it would not 
be a wholesome counsel to enter         
religion4  ,on the contrary1 ,the       
greater the evil the more it would seem 
to be deplored4 ,but seemingly the sins 
of those who are in the state of        
holiness and perfection are the most    

deplorable1 for it is written 7,jer4    
#bc3i73 ,my heart is broken within me1  
and afterwards 7,jer4 #bc3aa73 ,for the 
prophet and the priest are defiled2 and 
in ,my house ,i have found their        
wickedness4 ,therefore religious and    
others who are in the state of          
perfection1 other things being equal1   
sin more grievously4  ,i answer that1 ,a
 sin committed by a religious may be in 
three ways more grievous than a like sin
 committed by a secular4 ,first1 if it  
be against his religious vow2 for       
instance if he be guilty of fornication 
or theft1 because by fornication he acts
 against the vow of continence1 and by  
theft against the vow of poverty2 and   
not merely against a precept of the     
divine law4 ,secondly1 if he sin out of 
contempt1 because thereby he would seem 
to be the more ungrateful for the divine
 favors which have raised him to the    
state of perfection4 ,thus the ,apostle 
says 7,heb4 #aj3bi7 that the believer   
deserveth worse punishments who through 

contempt tramples under foot the ,son of
 ,god4 ,hence the ,lord complains 7,jer4
 #aa3ae73 ,what is the meaning that ,my 
beloved hath wrought much wickedness in 
,my house8 ,thirdly1 the sin of a       
religious may be greater on account of  
scandal1 because many take note of his  
manner of life3 wherefore it is written 
7,jer4 #bc3ad73 ,i have seen the        
likeness of adulterers1 and the way of  
lying in the ,prophets of ,jerusalem2   
and they strengthened the hands of the  
wicked1 that no man should return from  
his evil doings4  ,on the other hand1 if
 a religious1 not out of contempt1 but  
out of weakness or ignorance1 commit a  
sin that is not against the vow of his  
profession1 without giving scandal 7for 
instance if he commit it in secret7 he  
sins less grievously in the same kind of
 sin than a secular1 because his sin if 
slight is absorbed as it were by his    
many good works1 and if it be mortal1 he
 more easily recovers from it4 ,first1  
because he has a right intention towards

 ,god1 and though it be intercepted for 
the moment1 it is easily restored to its
 former object4 ,hence ,origen          
commenting on ,ps4 #cf3bd1 ,when he     
shall fall he shall not be bruised1 says
 7,hom4 iv in ,ps4 #cf73 ,the wicked    
man1 if he sin1 repents not1 and fails  
to make amends for his sin4 ,but the    
just man knows how to make amends and   
recover himself2 even as he who had     
said3 ',i know not the man1' shortly    
afterwards when the ,lord had looked on 
him1 knew to shed most bitter tears1 and
 he who from the roof had seen a woman  
and desired her knew to say3 ',i have   
sinned and done evil before ,thee4'     
,secondly1 he is assisted by his        
fellow-religious to rise again1         
according to ,eccles4 #d3aj1 ,if one    
fall he shall be supported by the other3
 woe to him that is alone1 for when he  
falleth he hath none to lift him up4    
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the words quoted refer
 to things done through weakness or     
ignorance1 but not to those that are    

done out of contempt4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 
,josaphat also1 to whom these words were
 addressed1 sinned not out of contempt1 
but out of a certain weakness of human  
affection4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the just  
sin not easily out of contempt2 but     
sometimes they fall into a sin through  
ignorance or weakness from which they   
easily arise4 ,if1 however1 they go so  
far as to sin out of contempt1 they     
become most wicked and incorrigible1    
according to the word of ,jer4 #b3bj3   
,thou hast broken ,my yoke1 thou hast   
burst ,my bands1 and thou hast said3 ',i
 will not serve4' ,for on every high    
hill and under every green tree thou    
didst prostitute thyself4 ,hence        
,augustine says 7,ep4 lxxviii ad ,pleb4 
,hippon473 ,from the time ,i began to   
serve ,god1 even as ,i scarcely found   
better men than those who made progress 
in monasteries1 so have ,i not found    
worse than those who in the monastery   
have fallen4   ,,question #ahg  ,,of    
,,those ,,things ,,that ,,are           

,,competent ,,to ,,religious 7,in ,six  
,articles7  ,we must now consider the   
things that are competent to religious2 
and under this head there are six points
 of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether it is lawful
 for them to teach1 preach1 and do like 
things8  7#b7 ,whether it is lawful for 
them to meddle in secular business8     
7#c7 ,whether they are bound to manual  
labor8  7#d7 ,whether it is lawful for  
them to live on alms8  7#e7 ,whether it 
is lawful for them to quest8  7#f7      
,whether it is lawful for them to wear  
coarser clothes than other persons8     
,,first ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahg1  
,art4 #a  ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful for  
,religious to ,teach1 ,preach1 and the  
,like8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
unlawful for religious to teach1 preach1
 and the like4 ,for it is said 7,,vii1  
qu4 i1 can4 ,hoc nequaquam7 in an       
ordinance of a synod of ,constantinople 
99,pseudosynod held by ,photius in the  
year #hgi3 ,the monastic life is one of 
subjection and discipleship1 not of     

teaching1 authority1 or pastoral care4  
,and ,jerome says 7ad ,ripar4 et        
,desider4 99,contra ,vigilant4 xvi73 ,a 
monk's duty is not to teach but to      
lament4 ,again ,pope ,leo 99,leo ,i1    
,ep4 cxx ad ,theodoret41 #f1 cf4 ,,xvi1 
qu4 i1 can4 ,adjicimus3 says ,let none  
dare to preach save the priests of the  
,lord1 be he monk or layman1 and no     
matter what knowledge he may boast of   
having4 ,now it is not lawful to exceed 
the bounds of one's office or transgress
 the ordinance of the ,church4          
,therefore seemingly it is unlawful for 
religious to teach1 preach1 and the     
like4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in an        
ordinance of the ,council of ,nicea 7cf4
 ,,xvi1 qu4 i1 can4 ,placuit7 it is laid
 down as follows3 ,it is our absolute   
and peremptory command addressed to all 
that monks shall not hear confessions   
except of one another1 as is right1 that
 they shall not bury the dead except    
those dwelling with them in the         
monastery1 or if by chance a brother    

happen to die while on a visit4 ,but    
just as the above belong to the duty of 
clerics1 so also do preaching and       
teaching4 ,therefore since the business 
of a monk differs from that of a cleric1
 as ,jerome says 7,ep4 xiv ad ,heliod471
 it would seem unlawful for religious to
 preach1 teach1 and the like4  ,obj4 #c3
 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,regist4 v1   
,ep4 #a73 ,no man can fulfil            
ecclesiastical duties1 and keep         
consistently to the monastic rule3 and  
this is quoted ,,xvi1 qu4 i1 can4 ,nemo 
potest4 ,now monks are bound to keep    
consistently to the monastic rule4      
,therefore it would seem that they      
cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties1    
whereof teaching and preaching are a    
part4 ,therefore seemingly it is        
unlawful for them to preach1 teach1 and 
do similar things4  ,on the contrary1   
,gregory is quoted 7,,xvi1 qu4 i1 can4  
,ex auctoritate7 as saying3 ,by         
authority of this decree framed in      
virtue of our apostolic power and the   

duty of our office1 be it lawful to monk
 priests who are configured to the      
apostles1 to preach1 baptize1 give      
communion1 pray for sinners1 impose     
penance1 and absolve from sin4  ,i      
answer that1 ,a thing is declared to be 
unlawful to a person in two ways4       
,first1 because there is something in   
him contrary to that which is declared  
unlawful to him3 thus to no man is it   
lawful to sin1 because each man has in  
himself reason and an obligation to     
,god's law1 to which things sin is      
contrary4 ,and in this way it is said to
 be unlawful for a person to preach1    
teach1 or do like things1 because there 
is in him something incompatible with   
these things1 either by reason of a     
precept--thus those who are irregular by
 ordinance of the ,church may not be    
raised to the sacred orders--or by      
reason of sin1 according to ,ps4 #di3af1
 ,but to the sinner ,god hath said3 ,why
 dost thou declare ,my justice8  ,in    
this way it is not unlawful for         

religious to preach1 teach1 and do like 
things1 both because they are bound     
neither by vow nor by precept of their  
rule to abstain from these things1 and  
because they are not rendered less apt  
for these things by any sin committed1  
but on the contrary they are the more   
apt through having taken upon themselves
 the practice of holiness4 ,for it is   
foolish to say that a man is rendered   
less fit for spiritual duties through   
advancing himself in holiness2 and      
consequently it is foolish to declare   
that the religious state is an obstacle 
to the fulfilment of such like duties4  
,this error is rejected by ,pope        
,boniface 99,boniface ,,iv for the      
reasons given above4 ,his words which   
are quoted 7,,xvi1 qu4 i1 can4 ,sunt4   
nonnulli7 are these3 ,there are some who
 without any dogmatic proof1 and with   
extreme daring1 inspired with a zeal    
rather of bitterness than of love1      
assert that monks though they be dead to
 the world and live to ,god1 are        

unworthy of the power of the priestly   
office1 and that they cannot confer     
penance1 nor christen1 nor absolve in   
virtue of the power divinely bestowed on
 them in the priestly office4 ,but they 
are altogether wrong4 ,he proves this   
first because it is not contrary to the 
rule2 thus he continues3 ,for neither   
did the ,blessed ,benedict the saintly  
teacher of monks forbid this in any way1
 nor is it forbidden in other rules4    
,secondly1 he refutes the above error   
from the usefulness of the monks1 when  
he adds at the end of the same chapter3 
,the more perfect a man is1 the more    
effective is he in these1 namely in     
spiritual works4  ,secondly1 a thing is 
said to be unlawful for a man1 not on   
account of there being in him something 
contrary thereto1 but because he lacks  
that which enables him to do it3 thus it
 is unlawful for a deacon to say mass1  
because he is not in priestly orders2   
and it is unlawful for a priest to      
deliver judgment because he lacks the   

episcopal authority4 ,here1 however1 a  
distinction must be made4 ,because those
 things which are a matter of an order1 
cannot be deputed to one who has not the
 order1 whereas matters of jurisdiction 
can be deputed to those who have not    
ordinary jurisdiction3 thus the delivery
 of a judgment is deputed by the bishop 
to a simple priest4 ,in this sense it is
 said to be unlawful for monks and other
 religious to preach1 teach1 and so     
forth1 because the religious state does 
not give them the power to do these     
things4 ,they can1 however1 do them if  
they receive orders1 or ordinary        
jurisdiction1 or if matters of          
jurisdiction be delegated to them4      
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it results from the   
words quoted that the fact of their     
being monks does not give monks the     
power to do these things1 yet it does   
not involve in them anything contrary to
 the performance of these acts4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,again1 this ordinance of the 
,council of ,nicea forbids monks to     

claim the power of exercising those acts
 on the ground of their being monks1 but
 it does not forbid those acts being    
delegated to them4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,these two things are incompatible1     
namely1 the ordinary cure of            
ecclesiastical duties1 and the          
observance of the monastic rule in a    
monastery4 ,but this does not prevent   
monks and other religious from being    
sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical  
duties through being deputed thereto by 
superiors having ordinary cure2         
especially members of religious orders  
that are especially instituted for that 
purpose1 as we shall say further on 7,q4
 #ahh1 ,a4 #d74   ,,second ,,article    
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahg1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,it ,is ,lawful for ,religious to       
,occupy ,themselves with ,secular       
,business8  ,objection #a3 ,it would    
seem unlawful for religious to occupy   
themselves with secular business4 ,for  
in the decree quoted above 7,a4 #a7 of  
,pope ,boniface it is said that the     

,blessed ,benedict bade them to be      
altogether free from secular business2  
and this is most explicitly prescribed  
by the apostolic doctrine and the       
teaching of all the ,fathers1 not only  
to religious1 but also to all the       
canonical clergy1    according to #b    
,tim4 #b3d1 ,no man being a soldier to  
,god1 entangleth himself with secular   
business4 ,now it is the duty of all    
religious to be soldiers of ,god4       
,therefore it is unlawful for them to   
occupy themselves with secular business4
  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 
7#a ,thess4 #d3aa73 ,that you use your  
endeavor to be quiet1 and that you do   
your own business1 which a gloss        
explains thus--by refraining from other 
people's affairs1 so as to be the better
 able to attend to the amendment of your
 own life4 ,now religious devote        
themselves in a special way to the      
amendment of their life4 ,therefore they
 should not occupy themselves with      
secular business4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1  

,jerome1 commenting on ,matt4 #aa3h1    
,behold they that are clothed in soft   
garments are in the houses of kings1    
says3 ,hence we gather that an austere  
life and severe preaching should avoid  
the palaces of kings and the mansions of
 the voluptuous4 ,but the needs of      
secular business induce men to frequent 
the palaces of kings4 ,therefore it is  
unlawful for religious to occupy        
themselves with secular business4  ,on  
the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 
#af3a73 ,i commend to you ,phoebe our   
,sister1 and further on 7,rom4 #af3b71  
that you assist her in whatsoever       
business she shall have need of you4  ,i
 answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4     
#ahf1 ,,aa4 #a1 #g1 ad #a71 the         
religious state is directed to the      
attainment of the perfection of charity1
 consisting principally in the love of  
,god and secondarily in the love of our 
neighbor4 ,consequently that which      
religious intend chiefly and for its own
 sake is to give themselves to ,god4    

,yet if their neighbor be in need1 they 
should attend to his affairs out of     
charity1 according to ,gal4 #f3b1 ,bear 
ye one another's burthens3 and so you   
shall fulfil the law of ,christ1 since  
through serving their neighbor for      
,god's sake1 they are obedient to the   
divine love4 ,hence it is written       
7,james #a3bg73 ,religion clean and     
undefiled before ,god and the ,father1  
is this3 to visit the fatherless and    
widows in their tribulation1 which      
means1 according to a gloss1 to assist  
the helpless in their time of need4  ,we
 must conclude therefore that it is     
unlawful for either monks or clerics to 
carry on secular business from motives  
of avarice2 but from motives of charity1
 and with their superior's permission1  
they may occupy themselves with due     
moderation in the administration and    
direction of secular business4          
,wherefore it is said in the ,decretals 
7,dist4 xxxviii1 can4 ,decrevit73 ,the  
holy synod decrees that henceforth no   

cleric shall buy property or occupy     
himself with secular business1 save with
 a view to the care of the fatherless1  
orphans1 or widows1 or when the bishop  
of the city commands him to take charge 
of the business connected with the      
,church4 ,and the same applies to       
religious as to clerics1 because they   
are both debarred from secular business 
on the same grounds1 as stated above4   
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,monks are forbidden to
 occupy themselves with secular business
 from motives of avarice1 but not from  
motives of charity4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3   
,to occupy oneself with secular business
 on account of another's need is not    
officiousness but charity4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,to haunt the palaces of kings from
 motives of pleasure1 glory1 or avarice 
is not becoming to religious1 but there 
is nothing unseemly in their visiting   
them from motives of piety4 ,hence it is
 written 7#d ,kings #d3ac73 ,hast thou  
any business1 and wilt thou that ,i     
speak to the king or to the general of  

the army8 ,likewise it becomes religious
 to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke
 and guide them1 even as ,john the      
,baptist rebuked ,herod1 as related in  
,matt4 #ad3d4   ,,third ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahg1 ,art4 #c  ,whether 
,religious ,are ,bound to ,manual       
,labor8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem  
that religious are bound to manual      
labor4 ,for religious are not exempt    
from the observance of precepts4 ,now   
manual labor is a matter of precept     
according to #a ,thess4 #d3aa1 ,work    
with your own hands as we commanded you2
 wherefore ,augustine says 7,de oper4   
,monach4 xxx73 ,but who can allow these 
insolent men1 namely religious that do  
no work1 of whom he is speaking there1  
who disregard the most salutary         
admonishment of the ,apostle1 not merely
 to be borne with as being weaker than  
others1 but even to preach as though    
they were holier than others4 ,therefore
 it would seem that religious are bound 
to manual labor4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a 

gloss 99,st4 ,augustine1 7,de oper4     
,monach4 xxi7 on #b ,thess4 #c3aj1 ,if  
any man will not work1 neither let him  
eat1 says3 ,some say that this command  
of the ,apostle refers to spiritual     
works1 and not to the bodily labor of   
the farmer or craftsman2 and further on3
 ,but it is useless for them to try to  
hide from themselves and from others the
 fact that they are unwilling not only  
to fulfil1 but even to understand the   
useful admonishments of charity2 and    
again3 ,he wishes ,god's servants to    
make a living by working with their     
bodies4 ,now religious especially are   
called servants of ,god1 because they   
give themselves entirely to the service 
of ,god1 as ,dionysius asserts 7,eccl4  
,hier4 vi74 ,therefore it would seem    
that they are bound to manual labor4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de
 oper4 ,monach4 xvii73 ,i would fain    
know how they would occupy themselves1  
who are unwilling to work with their    
body4 ,we occupy our time1 say they1    

with prayers1 psalms1 reading1 and the  
word of ,god4 ,yet these things are no  
excuse1 and he proves this1 as regards  
each in particular4 ,for in the first   
place1 as to prayer1 he says3 ,one      
prayer of the obedient man is sooner    
granted than ten thousand prayers of the
 contemptuous3 meaning that those are   
contemptuous and unworthy to be heard   
who work not with their hands4          
,secondly1 as to the divine praises he  
adds3 ,even while working with their    
hands they can easily sing hymns to     
,god4 ,thirdly1 with regard to reading1 
he goes on to say3 ,those who say they  
are occupied in reading1 do they not    
find there what the ,apostle commanded8 
,what sort of perverseness is this1 to  
wish to read but not to obey what one   
reads8 ,fourthly1 he adds in reference  
to preaching 99,cap4 xviii3 ,if one has 
to speak1 and is so busy that he cannot 
spare time for manual work1 can all in  
the monastery do this8 ,and since all   
cannot do this1 why should all make this

 a pretext for being exempt8 ,and even  
if all were able1 they should do so by  
turns1 not only so that the others may  
be occupied in other works1 but also    
because it suffices that one speak while
 many listen4 ,therefore it would seem  
that religious should not desist from   
manual labor on account of such like    
spiritual works to which they devote    
themselves4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a gloss
 on ,luke #ab3cc1 ,sell what you        
possess1 says3 ,not only give your      
clothes to the poor1 but sell what you  
possess1 that having once for all       
renounced all your possessions for the  
,lord's sake1 you may henceforth work   
with the labor of your hands1 so as to  
have wherewith to live or to give alms4 
,now it belongs properly to religious to
 renounce all they have4 ,therefore it  
would seem likewise to belong to them to
 live and give alms through the labor of
 their hands4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1      
religious especially would seem to be   
bound to imitate the life of the        

apostles1 since they profess the state  
of perfection4 ,now the apostles worked 
with their own hands1 according to #a   
,cor4 #d3ab3 ,we labor1 working with our
 own hands4 ,therefore it would seem    
that religious are bound to manual      
labor4  ,on the contrary1 ,those        
precepts that are commonly enjoined upon
 all are equally binding on religious   
and seculars4 ,but the precept of manual
 labor is enjoined upon all in common1  
as appears from #b ,thess4 #c3f1        
,withdraw yourselves from every brother 
walking disorderly1 etc4 7for by brother
 he signifies every ,christian1         
according to #a ,cor4 #g3ab1 ,if any    
brother have a wife that believeth not74
 ,now it is written in the same passage 
7#b ,thess4 #c3aj73 ,if any man will not
 work1 neither let him eat4 ,therefore  
religious are not bound to manual labor 
any more than seculars are4  ,i answer  
that1 ,manual labor is directed to four 
things4 ,first and principally to obtain
 food2 wherefore it was said to the     

first man 7,gen4 #c3ai73 ,in the sweat  
of thy face shalt thou eat bread1 and it
 is written 7,ps4 #abg3b73 ,for thou    
shalt eat the labors of thy hands4      
,secondly1 it is directed to the removal
 of idleness whence arise many evils2   
hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #cc3bh1   
#bi73 ,send thy slave to work1 that he  
be not idle1 for idleness hath taught   
much evil4 ,thirdly1 it is directed to  
the curbing of concupiscence1 inasmuch  
as it is a means of afflicting the body2
 hence it is written 7#b ,cor4 #f3e1    
#f73 ,in labors1 in watchings1 in       
fastings1 in chastity4 ,fourthly1 it is 
directed to almsgiving1 wherefore it is 
written 7,eph4 #d3bh73 ,he that stole1  
let him now steal no more2 but rather   
let him labor1 working with his hands   
the thing which is good1 that he may    
have something to give to him that      
suffereth need4 ,accordingly1 in so far 
as manual labor is directed to obtaining
 food1 it comes under a necessity of    
precept in so far as it is necessary for

 that end3 since that which is directed 
to an end derives its necessity from    
that end1 being1 in effect1 so far      
necessary as the end cannot be obtained 
without it4 ,consequently he who has no 
other means of livelihood is bound to   
work with his hands1 whatever his       
condition may be4 ,this is signified by 
the words of the ,apostle3 ,if any man  
will not work1 neither let him eat1 as  
though to say3 ,the necessity of manual 
labor is the necessity of meat4 ,so that
 if one could live without eating1 one  
would not be bound to work with one's   
hands4 ,the same applies to those who   
have no other lawful means of           
livelihood3 since a man is understood to
 be unable to do what he cannot do      
lawfully4 ,wherefore we find that the   
,apostle prescribed manual labor merely 
as a remedy for the sin of those who    
gained their livelihood by unlawful     
means4 ,for the ,apostle ordered manual 
labor first of all in order to avoid    
theft1 as appears from ,eph4 #d3bh1 ,he 

that stole1 let him now steal no more2  
but rather let him labor1 working with  
his hands4 ,secondly1 to avoid the      
coveting of others' property1 wherefore 
it is written 7#a ,thess4 #d3aa73 ,work 
with your own hands1 as we commanded    
you1 and that you walk honestly towards 
them that are without4 ,thirdly1 to     
avoid the discreditable pursuits whereby
 some seek a livelihood4 ,hence he says 
7#b ,thess4 #c3aj-ab73 ,when we were    
with you1 this we declared to you3 that 
if any man will not work1 neither let   
him eat4 ,for we have heard that there  
are some among you who walk disorderly1 
working not at all1 but curiously       
meddling 7namely1 as a gloss explains   
it1 who make a living by meddling in    
unlawful things74 ,now we charge them   
that are such1 and beseech them 4 4 4   
that working with silence1 they would   
eat their own bread4 ,hence ,jerome     
states 7,super epist4 ad ,galat4        
99,preface to ,bk4 ii of ,commentary7   
that the ,apostle said this not so much 

in his capacity of teacher as on account
 of the faults of the people4  ,it must1
 however1 be observed that under manual 
labor are comprised all those human     
occupations whereby man can lawfully    
gain a livelihood1 whether by using his 
hands1 his feet1 or his tongue4 ,for    
watchmen1 couriers1 and such like who   
live by their labor1 are understood to  
live by their handiwork3 because1 since 
the hand is the organ of organs 99,de   
,anima iii1 #h1 handiwork denotes all   
kinds of work1 whereby a man may        
lawfully gain a livelihood4  ,in so far 
as manual labor is directed to the      
removal of idleness1 or the affliction  
of the body1 it does not come under a   
necessity of precept if we consider it  
in itself1 since there are many other   
means besides manual labor of afflicting
 the body or of removing idleness3 for  
the flesh is afflicted by fastings and  
watchings1 and idleness is removed by   
meditation on the ,holy ,scriptures and 
by the divine praises4 ,hence a gloss on

 ,ps4 #aah3hb1 ,my eyes have failed for 
,thy word1 says3 ,he is not idle who    
meditates only on ,god's word2 nor is he
 who works abroad any better than he who
 devotes himself to the study of knowing
 the truth4 ,consequently for these     
reasons religious are not bound to      
manual labor1 as neither are seculars1  
except when they are so bound by the    
statutes of their order4 ,thus ,jerome  
says 7,ep4 cxxv ad ,rustic ,monach473   
,the ,egyptian monasteries are wont to  
admit none unless they work or labor1   
not so much for the necessities of life1
 as for the welfare of the soul1 lest it
 be led astray by wicked thoughts4 ,but 
in so far as manual labor is directed to
 almsgiving1 it does not come under the 
necessity of precept1 save perchance in 
some particular case1 when a man is     
under an obligation to give alms1 and   
has no other means of having the        
wherewithal to assist the poor3 for in  
such a case religious would be bound as 
well as seculars to do manual labor4    

,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this command of the   
,apostle is of natural law3 wherefore a 
gloss on #b ,thess4 #c3f1 ,that you     
withdraw yourselves from every brother  
walking disorderly1 says1 otherwise than
 the natural order requires1 and he is  
speaking of those who abstained from    
manual labor4 ,hence nature has provided
 man with hands instead of arms and     
clothes1 with which she has provided    
other animals1 in order that with his   
hands he may obtain these and all other 
necessaries4 ,hence it is clear that    
this precept1 even as all the precepts  
of the natural law1 is binding on both  
religious and seculars alike4 ,yet not  
everyone sins that works not with his   
hands1 because those precepts of the    
natural law which regard the good of the
 many are not binding on each           
individual1 but it suffices that one    
person apply himself to this business   
and another to that2 for instance1 that 
some be craftsmen1 others husbandmen1   
others judges1 and others teachers1 and 

so forth1 according to the words of the 
,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #ab3ag71 ,if the     
whole body were the eye1 where would be 
the hearing8 ,if the whole were the     
hearing1 where would be the smelling8   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this gloss is taken   
from ,augustine's ,de operibus          
,monachorum1 cap4 #ba1 where he speaks  
against certain monks who declared it to
 be unlawful for the servants of ,god to
 work with their hands1 on account of   
our ,lord's saying 7,matt4 #f3be73 ,be  
not solicitous for your life1 what you  
shall eat4 ,nevertheless his words do   
not imply that religious are bound to   
work with their hands1 if they have     
other means of livelihood4 ,this is     
clear from his adding3 ,he wishes the   
servants of ,god to make a living by    
working with their bodies4 ,now this    
does not apply to religious any more    
than to seculars1 which is evident for  
two reasons4 ,first1 on account of the  
way in which the ,apostle expresses     
himself1 by saying3 ,that you withdraw  

yourselves from every brother walking   
disorderly4 ,for he calls all           
,christians brothers1 since at that time
 religious orders were not as yet       
founded4 ,secondly1 because religious   
have no other obligations than what     
seculars have1 except as required by the
 rule they profess3 wherefore if their  
rule contain nothing about manual labor1
 religious are not otherwise bound to   
manual labor than seculars are4  ,reply 
,obj4 #c3 ,a man may devote himself in  
two ways to all the spiritual works     
mentioned by ,augustine in the passage  
quoted3 in one way with a view to the   
common good1 in another with a view to  
his private advantage4 ,accordingly     
those who devote themselves publicly to 
the aforesaid spiritual works are       
thereby exempt from manual labor for two
 reasons3 first1 because it behooves    
them to be occupied exclusively with    
such like works2 secondly1 because those
 who devote themselves to such works    
have a claim to be supported by those   

for whose advantage they work4  ,on the 
other hand1 those who devote themselves 
to such works not publicly but privately
 as it were1 ought not on that account  
to be exempt from manual labor1 nor have
 they a claim to be supported by the    
offerings of the faithful1 and it is of 
these that ,augustine is speaking4 ,for 
when he says3 ,they can sing hymns to   
,god even while working with their      
hands2 like the craftsmen who give      
tongue to fable telling without         
withdrawing their hands from their work1
 it is clear that he cannot refer to    
those who sing the canonical hours in   
the church1 but to those who tell psalms
 or hymns as private prayers4 ,likewise 
what he says of reading and prayer is to
 be referred to the private prayer and  
reading which even lay people do at     
times1 and not to those who perform     
public prayers in the church1 or give   
public lectures in the schools4 ,hence  
he does not say3 ,those who say they are
 occupied in teaching and instructing1  

but3 ,those who say they are occupied in
 reading4 ,again he speaks of that      
preaching which is addressed1 not       
publicly to the people1 but to one or a 
few in particular by way of private     
admonishment4 ,hence he says expressly3 
,if one has to speak4 ,for according to 
a gloss on #a ,cor4 #b3d1 ,speech is    
addressed privately1 preaching to many4 
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,those who despise all 
for ,god's sake are bound to work with  
their hands1 when they have no other    
means of livelihood1 or of almsgiving   
7should the case occur where almsgiving 
were a matter of precept71 but not      
otherwise1 as stated in the ,article4   
,it is in this sense that the gloss     
quoted is to be understood4  ,reply     
,obj4 #e3 ,that the apostles worked with
 their hands was sometimes a matter of  
necessity1 sometimes a work of          
supererogation4 ,it was of necessity    
when they failed to receive a livelihood
 from others4 ,hence a gloss on #a ,cor4
 #d3ab1 ,we labor1 working with our own 

hands1 adds1 because no man giveth to   
us4 ,it was supererogation1 as appears  
from #a ,cor4 #i3ab1 where the ,apostle 
says that he did not use the power he   
had of living by the ,gospel4 ,the      
,apostle had recourse to this           
supererogation for three motives4       
,first1 in order to deprive the false   
apostles of the pretext for preaching1  
for they preached merely for a temporal 
advantage2 hence he says 7#b ,cor4      
#aa3ab73 ,but what ,i do1 that ,i will  
do that ,i may cut off the occasion from
 them1 etc4 ,secondly1 in order to avoid
 burdening those to whom he preached2   
hence he says 7#b ,cor4 #ab3ac73 ,what  
is there that you have had less than the
 other churches1 but that ,i myself was 
not burthensome to you8 ,thirdly1 in    
order to give an example of work to the 
idle2 hence he says 7#b ,thess4 #c3h1   
#i73 ,we worked night and day 4 4 4 that
 we might give ourselves a pattern unto 
you1 to imitate us4 ,however1 the       
,apostle did not do this in places like 

,athens where he had facilities for     
preaching daily1 as ,augustine observes 
7,de oper4 ,monach4 xviii74 ,yet        
religious are not for this reason bound 
to imitate the ,apostle in this matter1 
since they are not bound to all works of
 supererogation3 wherefore neither did  
the other apostles work with their      
hands4   ,,fourth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1  
,q4 #ahg1 ,art4 #d  ,whether ,it ,is    
,lawful for ,religious to ,live on      
,alms8  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem   
unlawful for religious to live on alms4 
,for the ,apostle 7#a ,tim4 #e3af7      
forbids those widows who have other     
means of livelihood to live on the alms 
of the ,church1 so that the ,church may 
have sufficient for them that are widows
 indeed4 ,and ,jerome says to ,pope     
,damasus 99,cf4 ,cf4 ,can4 ,clericos1   
cause4 i1 qu4 #b2 ,can4 ,quoniam1 cause 
xvi1 qu4 #a2 ,regul4 ,monach4 iv among  
the supposititious works of ,st4 ,jerome
 that those who have sufficient income  
from their parents and their own        

possessions1 if they take what belongs  
to the poor they commit and incur the   
guilt of sacrilege1 and by the abuse of 
such things they eat and drink judgment 
to themselves4 ,now religious if they be
 able-bodied can support themselves by  
the work of their hands4 ,therefore it  
would seem that they sin if they consume
 the alms belonging to the poor4  ,obj4 
#b3 ,further1 to live at the expense of 
the faithful is the stipend appointed to
 those who preach the ,gospel in payment
 of their labor or work1 according to   
,matt4 #aj3aj3 ,the workman is worthy of
 his meat4 ,now it belongs not to       
religious to preach the ,gospel1 but    
chiefly to prelates who are pastors and 
teachers4 ,therefore religious cannot   
lawfully live on the alms of the        
faithful4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 religious
 are in the state of perfection4 ,but it
 is more perfect to give than to receive
 alms2 for it is written 7,acts #bj3ce73
 ,it is a more blessed thing to give1   
rather than to receive4 ,therefore they 

should not live on alms1 but rather     
should they give alms of their          
handiwork4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it      
belongs to religious to avoid obstacles 
to virtue and occasions of sin4 ,now the
 receiving of alms offers an occasion of
 sin1 and hinders an act of virtue2     
hence a gloss on #b ,thess4 #c3i1 ,that 
we might give ourselves a pattern unto  
you1 says3 ,he who through idleness eats
 often at another's table1 must needs   
flatter the one who feeds him4 ,it is   
also written 7,ex4 #bc3h73 ,neither     
shalt thou take bribes which 4 4 4 blind
 the wise1 and pervert the words of the 
just1 and 7,prov4 #bb3g73 ,the borrower 
is servant to him that lendeth4 ,this is
 contrary to religion1 wherefore a gloss
 on #b ,thess4 #c3i1 ,that we might give
 ourselves a pattern1 etc41 says1 our   
religion calls men to liberty4          
,therefore it would seem that religious 
should not live on alms4  ,obj4 #e3     
,further1 religious especially are bound
 to imitate the perfection of the       

apostles2 wherefore the ,apostle says   
7,phil4 #c3ae73 ,let us 4 4 4 as many as
 are perfect1 be thus minded4 ,but the  
,apostle was unwilling to live at the   
expense of the faithful1 either in order
 to cut off the occasion from the false 
apostles as he himself says 7#b ,cor4   
#aa3ab71 or to avoid giving scandal to  
the weak1 as appears from #a ,cor4      
#i3ab4 ,it would seem therefore that    
religious ought for the same reasons to 
refrain from living on alms4 ,hence     
,augustine says 7,de oper4 ,monach4     
#bh73 ,cut off the occasion of          
disgraceful marketing whereby you lower 
yourselves in the esteem of others1 and 
give scandal to the weak3 and show men  
that you seek not an easy livelihood in 
idleness1 but the kingdom of ,god by the
 narrow and strait way4  ,on the        
contrary1 ,gregory says 7,dial4 ii1 #a73
 ,the ,blessed ,benedict after leaving  
his home and parents dwelt for three    
years in a cave1 and while there lived  
on the food brought to him by a monk    

from ,rome4 ,nevertheless1 although he  
was able-bodied1 we do not read that he 
sought to live by the labor of his      
hands4 ,therefore religious may lawfully
 live on alms4  ,i answer that1 ,a man  
may lawfully live on what is his or due 
to him4 ,now that which is given out of 
liberality becomes the property of the  
person to whom it is given4 ,wherefore  
religious and clerics whose monasteries 
or churches have received from the      
munificence of princes or of any of the 
faithful any endowment whatsoever for   
their support1 can lawfully live on such
 endowment without working with their   
hands1 and yet without doubt they live  
on alms4 ,wherefore in like manner if   
religious receive movable goods from the
 faithful they can lawfully live on     
them4 ,for it is absurd to say that a   
person may accept an alms of some great 
property but not bread or some small sum
 of money4 ,nevertheless since these    
gifts would seem to be bestowed on      
religious in order that they may have   

more leisure for religious works1 in    
which the donors of temporal goods wish 
to have a share1 the use of such gifts  
would become unlawful for them if they  
abstained from religious works1 because 
in that case1 so far as they are        
concerned1 they would be thwarting the  
intention of those who bestowed those   
gifts4  ,a thing is due to a person in  
two ways4 ,first1 on account of         
necessity1 which makes all things       
common1 as ,ambrose 99,basil1 ,serm4 de 
,temp4 lxiv1 among the supposititious   
works of ,st4 ,ambrose asserts4         
,consequently if religious be in need   
they can lawfully live on alms4 ,such   
necessity may occur in three ways4      
,first1 through weakness of body1 the   
result being that they are unable to    
make a living by working with their     
hands4 ,secondly1 because that which    
they gain by their handiwork is         
insufficient for their livelihood3      
wherefore ,augustine says 7,de oper4    
,monach4 xvii7 that the good works of   

the faithful should not leave ,god's    
servants who work with their hands      
without a supply of necessaries1 that   
when the hour comes for them to nourish 
their souls1 so as to make it impossible
 for them to do these corporal works1   
they be not oppressed by want4 ,thirdly1
 because of the former mode of life of  
those who were unwont to work with their
 hands3 wherefore ,augustine says 7,de  
oper4 ,monach4 xxi7 that if they had in 
the world the wherewithal easily to     
support this life without working1 and  
gave it to the needy when they were     
converted to ,god1 we must credit their 
weakness and bear with it4 ,for those   
who have thus been delicately brought up
 are wont to be unable to bear the toil 
of bodily labor4  ,in another way a     
thing becomes due to a person through   
his affording others something whether  
temporal or spiritual1 according to #a  
,cor4 #i3aa1 ,if we have sown unto you  
spiritual things1 is it a great matter  
if we reap your carnal things8 ,and in  

this sense religious may live on alms as
 being due to them in four ways4 ,first1
 if they preach by the authority of the 
prelates4 ,secondly1 if they be         
ministers of the altar1 according to #a 
,cor4 #i3ac1 #ad1 ,they that serve the  
altar partake with the altar4 ,so also  
the lord ordained that they who preach  
the ,gospel should live by the ,gospel4 
,hence ,augustine says 7,de oper4       
,monach4 xxi73 ,if they be gospelers1 ,i
 allow1 they have 7a claim to live at   
the charge of the faithful73 if they be 
ministers of the altar and dispensers of
 the sacraments1 they need not insist on
 it1 but it is theirs by perfect right4 
,the reason for this is because the     
sacrament of the altar wherever it be   
offered is common to all the faithful4  
,thirdly1 if they devote themselves to  
the study of ,holy ,writ to the common  
profit of the whole ,church4 ,wherefore 
,jerome says 7,contra ,vigil4 xiii73 ,it
 is still the custom in ,judea1 not only
 among us but also among the ,hebrews1  

for those who meditate on the law of the
 ,lord day and night1 and have no other 
share on earth but ,god alone1 to be    
supported by the subscriptions of the   
synagogues and of the whole world4      
,fourthly1 if they have endowed the     
monastery with the goods they possessed1
 they may live on the alms given to the 
monastery4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de  
oper4 ,monach4 xxv7 that those who      
renouncing or distributing their means1 
whether ample or of any amount whatever1
 have desired with pious and salutary   
humility to be numbered among the poor  
of ,christ1 have a claim on the         
community and on brotherly love to      
receive a livelihood in return4 ,they   
are to be commended indeed if they work 
with their hands1 but if they be        
unwilling1 who will dare to force them8 
,nor does it matter1 as he goes on to   
say1 to which monasteries1 or in what   
place any one of them has bestowed his  
goods on his needy brethren2 for all    
,christians belong to one commonwealth4 

,on the other hand1 in the default of   
any necessity1 or of their affording any
 profit to others1 it is unlawful for   
religious to wish to live in idleness on
 the alms given to the poor4 ,hence     
,augustine says 7,de oper4 ,monach4     
xxii73 ,sometimes those who enter the   
profession of ,god's service come from a
 servile condition of life1 from tilling
 the soil or working at some trade or   
lowly occupation4 ,in their case it is  
not so clear whether they came with the 
purpose of serving ,god1 or of evading a
 life of want and toil with a view to   
being fed and clothed in idleness1 and  
furthermore to being honored by those by
 whom they were wont to be despised and 
downtrodden4 ,such persons surely cannot
 excuse themselves from work on the     
score of bodily weakness1 for their     
former mode of life is evidence against 
them4 ,and he adds further on 7,de oper4
 ,monach4 xxv73 ,if they be unwilling to
 work1 neither let them eat4 ,for if the
 rich humble themselves to piety1 it is 

not that the poor may be exalted to     
pride2 since it is altogether unseemly  
that in a life wherein senators become  
laborers1 laborers should become idle1  
and that where the lords of the manor   
have come after renouncing their ease1  
the serfs should live in comfort4       
,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these authorities must
 be understood as referring to cases of 
necessity1 that is to say1 when there is
 no other means of succoring the poor3  
for then they would be bound not only to
 refrain from accepting alms1 but also  
to give what they have for the support  
of the needy4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3         
,prelates are competent to preach in    
virtue of their office1 but religious   
may be competent to do so in virtue of  
delegation2 and thus when they work in  
the field of the ,lord1 they may make   
their living thereby1 according to #b   
,tim4 #b3f1 ,the husbandman that        
laboreth must first partake of the      
fruits1 which a gloss explains thus1    
that is to say1 the preacher1 who in the

 field of the ,church tills the hearts  
of his hearers with the plough of ,god's
 word4 ,those also who minister to the  
preachers may live on alms4 ,hence a    
gloss on ,rom4 #ae3bg1 ,if the ,gentiles
 have been made partakers of their      
spiritual things1 they ought also in    
carnal things to minister to them1 says1
 namely1 to the ,jews who sent preachers
 from ,jerusalem4 ,there are moreover   
other reasons for which a person has a  
claim to live at the charge of the      
faithful1 as stated above4  ,reply ,obj4
 #c3 ,other things being equal1 it is   
more perfect to give than to receive4   
,nevertheless to give or to give up all 
one's possessions for ,christ's sake1   
and to receive a little for one's       
livelihood is better than to give to the
 poor part by part1 as stated above 7,q4
 #ahf1 ,a4 #c1 ad #f74  ,reply ,obj4 #d3
 ,to receive gifts so as to increase    
one's wealth1 or to accept a livelihood 
from another without having a claim to  
it1 and without profit to others or     

being in need oneself1 affords an       
occasion of sin4 ,but this does not     
apply to religious1 as stated above4    
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,whenever there is     
evident necessity for religious living  
on alms without doing any manual work1  
as well as an evident profit to be      
derived by others1 it is not the weak   
who are scandalized1 but those who are  
full of malice like the ,pharisees1     
whose scandal our ,lord teaches us to   
despise 7,matt4 #ae3ab-ad74 ,if1        
however1 these motives of necessity and 
profit be lacking1 the weak might       
possibly be scandalized thereby2 and    
this should be avoided4 ,yet the same   
scandal might be occasioned through     
those who live in idleness on the common
 revenues4   ,,fifth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahg1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
,it ,is ,lawful for ,religious to ,beg8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem unlawful  
for religious to beg4 ,for ,augustine   
says 7,de oper4 ,monach4 xxviii73 ,the  
most cunning foe has scattered on all   

sides a great number of hypocrites      
wearing the monastic habit1 who go      
wandering about the country1 and        
afterwards he adds3 ,they all ask1 they 
all demand to be supported in their     
profitable penury1 or to be paid for a  
pretended holiness4 ,therefore it would 
seem that the life of mendicant         
religious is to be condemned4  ,obj4 #b3
 ,further1 it is written 7#a ,thess4    
#d3aa73 ,that you 4 4 4 work with your  
own hands as we commanded you1 and that 
you walk honestly towards them that are 
without3 and that you want nothing of   
any man's3 and a gloss on this passage  
says3 ,you must work and not be idle1   
because work is both honorable and a    
light to the unbeliever3 and you must   
not covet that which belongs to another 
and much less beg or take anything4     
,again a gloss 99,st4 ,augustine1 7,de  
oper4 ,monach4 iii7 on #b ,thess4 #c3aj1
 ,if any man will not work1 etc4 says3  
,he wishes the servants of ,god to work 
with the body1 so as to gain a          

livelihood1 and not be compelled by want
 to ask for necessaries4 ,now this is to
 beg4 ,therefore it would seem unlawful 
to beg while omitting to work with one's
 hands4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which 
is forbidden by law and contrary to     
justice1 is unbecoming to religious4    
,now begging is forbidden in the divine 
law2 for it is written 7,deut4 #ae3d73  
,there shall be no poor nor beggar among
 you1 and 7,ps4 #cf3be73 ,i have not    
seen the just forsaken1 nor his seed    
seeking bread4 ,moreover an able-bodied 
mendicant is punished by civil law1     
according to the law 7,,xi1 xxvi1 de    
,valid4 ,mendicant474 ,therefore it is  
unfitting for religious to beg4  ,obj4  
#d3 ,further1 ,shame is about that which
 is disgraceful1 as ,damascene says 7,de
 ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ae74 ,now ,ambrose   
says 7,de ,offic4 i1 #cj7 that to be    
ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth4 
,therefore it is disgraceful to beg3 and
 consequently this is unbecoming to     
religious4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1         

according to our ,lord's command it is  
especially becoming to preachers of the 
,gospel to live on alms1 as stated above
 7,a4 #d74 ,yet it is not becoming that 
they should beg1 since a gloss on #b    
,tim4 #b3f1 ,the husbandman1 that       
laboreth1 etc4 says3 ,the ,apostle      
wishes the gospeler to understand that  
to accept necessaries from those among  
whom he labors is not mendicancy but a  
right4 ,therefore it would seem         
unbecoming for religious to beg4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,it becomes religious to  
live in imitation of ,christ4 ,now      
,christ was a mendicant1 according to   
,ps4 #ci3ah1 ,but ,i am a beggar and    
poor2 where a gloss says3 ,christ said  
this of ,himself as bearing the 'form of
 a servant1' and further on3 ,a beggar  
is one who entreats another1 and a poor 
man is one who has not enough for       
himself4 ,again it is written 7,ps4     
#fi3f73 ,i am needy and poor2 where a   
gloss says3 ',needy1' that is a         
suppliant2 'and poor1' that is1 not     

having enough for myself1 because ,i    
have no worldly wealth4 ,and ,jerome    
says in a letter 99,reference unknown3  
,beware lest whereas thy ,lord1 i4e4    
,christ1 begged1 thou amass other       
people's wealth4 ,therefore it becomes  
religious to beg4  ,i answer that1 ,two 
things may be considered in reference to
 mendicancy4 ,the first is on the part  
of the act itself of begging1 which has 
a certain abasement attaching to it2    
since of all men those would seem most  
abased who are not only poor1 but are so
 needy that they have to receive their  
meat from others4 ,in this way some     
deserve praise for begging out of       
humility1 just as they abase themselves 
in other ways1 as being the most        
efficacious remedy against pride which  
they desire to quench either in         
themselves or in others by their        
example4 ,for just as a disease that    
arises from excessive heat is most      
efficaciously healed by things that     
excel in cold1 so proneness to pride is 

most efficaciously healed by those      
things which savor most of abasement4   
,hence it is said in the ,decretals     
7,,ii1 cap4 ,si quis semel1 de          
,paenitentia73 ,to condescend to the    
humblest duties1 and to devote oneself  
to the lowliest service is an exercise  
of humility2 for thus one is able to    
heal the disease of pride and human     
glory4 ,hence ,jerome praises ,fabiola  
7,ep4 lxxvii ad ocean47 for that she    
desired to receive alms1 having poured  
forth all her wealth for ,christ's sake4
 ,the ,blessed ,alexis acted in like    
manner1 for1 having renounced all his   
possessions for ,christ's sake he       
rejoiced in receiving alms even from his
 own servants4 ,it is also related of   
the ,blessed ,arsenius in the ,lives of 
the ,fathers 7v1 #f7 that he gave thanks
 because he was forced by necessity to  
ask for alms4 ,hence it is enjoined to  
some people as a penance for grievous   
sins to go on a pilgrimage begging4     
,since1 however1 humility like the other

 virtues should not be without          
discretion1 it behooves one to be       
discreet in becoming a mendicant for the
 purpose of humiliation1 lest a man     
thereby incur the mark of covetousness  
or of anything else unbecoming4         
,secondly1 mendicancy may be considered 
on the part of that which one gets by   
begging3 and thus a man may be led to   
beg by a twofold motive4 ,first1 by the 
desire to have wealth or meat without   
working for it1 and such like mendicancy
 is unlawful2 secondly1 by a motive of  
necessity or usefulness4 ,the motive is 
one of necessity if a man has no other  
means of livelihood save begging2 and it
 is a motive of usefulness if he wishes 
to accomplish something useful1 and is  
unable to do so without the alms of the 
faithful4 ,thus alms are besought for   
the building of a bridge1 or church1 or 
for any other work whatever that is     
conducive to the common good3 thus      
scholars may seek alms that they may    
devote themselves to the study of       

wisdom4 ,in this way mendicancy is      
lawful to religious no less than to     
seculars4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine  
is speaking there explicitly of those   
who beg from motives of covetousness4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the first gloss speaks
 of begging from motives of             
covetousness1 as appears from the words 
of the ,apostle2 while the second gloss 
speaks of those who without effecting   
any useful purpose1 beg their livelihood
 in order to live in idleness4 ,on the  
other hand1 he lives not idly who in any
 way lives usefully4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,this precept of the divine law does not
 forbid anyone to beg1 but it forbids   
the rich to be so stingy that some are  
compelled by necessity to beg4 ,the     
civil law imposes a penalty on          
able-bodied mendicants who beg from     
motives neither of utility nor of       
necessity4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,disgrace  
is twofold2 one arises from lack of     
honesty 99,cf4 ,q4 #ade1 ,a4 #a1 the    
other from an external defect1 thus it  

is disgraceful for a man to be sick or  
poor4 ,such like uncomeliness of        
mendicancy does not pertain to sin1 but 
it may pertain to humility1 as stated   
above4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,preachers have
 the right to be fed by those to whom   
they preach3 yet if they wish to seek   
this by begging so as to receive it as a
 free gift and not as a right this will 
be a mark of greater humility4   ,,sixth
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahg1 ,art4 #f
  ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful for          
,religious to ,wear ,coarser ,clothes   
,than ,others8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem unlawful for religious to wear    
coarser clothes than others4 ,for       
according to the ,apostle 7#a ,thess4   
#e3bb7 we ought to refrain from all     
appearance of evil4 ,now coarseness of  
clothes has an appearance of evil2 for  
our ,lord said 7,matt4 #g3ae73 ,beware  
of false prophets who come to you in the
 clothing of sheep3 and a gloss on      
,apoc4 #f3h1 ,behold a pale horse1 says3
 ,the devil finding that he cannot      

succeed1 neither by outward afflictions 
nor by manifest heresies1 sends in      
advance false brethren1 who under the   
guise of religion assume the            
characteristics of the black and red    
horses by corrupting the faith4         
,therefore it would seem that religious 
should not wear coarse clothes4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 ,jerome says 7,ep4 lii ad 
,nepotian473 ,avoid somber1 i4e4 black1 
equally with glittering apparel4 ,fine  
and coarse clothes are equally to be    
shunned1 for the one exhales pleasure1  
the other vainglory4 ,therefore1 since  
vainglory is a graver sin than the use  
of pleasure1 it would seem that         
religious who should aim at what is more
 perfect ought to avoid coarse rather   
than fine clothes4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 
religious should aim especially at doing
 works of penance4 ,now in works of     
penance we should use1 not outward signs
 of sorrow1 but rather signs of joy2 for
 our ,lord said 7,matt4 #f3af73 ,when   
you fast1 be not1 as the hypocrites1    

sad1 and afterwards ,he added3 ,but     
thou1 when thou fastest1 anoint thy head
 and wash thy face4 ,augustine          
commenting on these words 7,de ,serm4   
,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ab73 ,in this      
chapter we must observe that not only   
the glare and pomp of outward things1   
but even the weeds of mourning may be a 
subject of ostentation1 all the more    
dangerous as being a decoy under the    
guise of ,god's service4 ,therefore     
seemingly religious ought not to wear   
coarse clothes4  ,on the contrary1 ,the 
,apostle says 7,heb4 #aa3cg73 ,they     
wandered about in sheep-skins1 in       
goat-skins1 and a gloss adds--as ,elias 
and others4 ,moreover it is said in the 
,decretal ,,xxi1 qu4 iv1 can4 ,omnis    
jactantia3 ,if any persons be found to  
deride those who wear coarse and        
religious apparel they must be reproved4
 ,for in the early times all those who  
were consecrated to ,god went about in  
common and coarse apparel4  ,i answer   
that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4  

,christ4 iii1 #ab71 in all external     
things1 it is not the use but the       
intention of the user that is at fault4 
,in order to judge of this it is        
necessary to observe that coarse and    
homely apparel may be considered in two 
ways4 ,first1 as being a sign of a man's
 disposition or condition1 because      
according to ,ecclus4 #ai3bg1 the attire
 4 4 4 of the man shows what he is4 ,in 
this way coarseness of attire is        
sometimes a sign of sorrow3 wherefore   
those who are beset with sorrow are wont
 to wear coarser clothes1 just as on the
 other hand in times of festivity and   
joy they wear finer clothes4 ,hence     
penitents make use of coarse apparel1   
for example1 the king 7,jonah #c3f7 who 
was clothed with sack-cloth1 and ,achab 
7#c ,kings #ba3bg7 who put hair-cloth   
upon his flesh4 ,sometimes1 however1 it 
is a sign of the contempt of riches and 
worldly ostentation4 ,wherefore ,jerome 
says 7,ep4 cxxv ad ,rustico ,monach473  
,let your somber attire indicate your   

purity of mind1 your coarse robe prove  
your contempt of the world1 yet so that 
your mind be not inflated withal1 lest  
your speech belie your habit4 ,in both  
these ways it is becoming for religious 
to wear coarse attire1 since religion is
 a state of penance and of contempt of  
worldly glory4  ,but that a person wish 
to signify this to others arises from   
three motives4 ,first1 in order to      
humble himself3 for just as a man's mind
 is uplifted by fine clothes1 so is it  
humbled by lowly apparel4 ,hence        
speaking of ,achab who put hair-cloth on
 his flesh1 the ,lord said to ,elias3   
,hast thou not seen ,achab humbled      
before ,me8 7#c ,kings #ba3bi74         
,secondly1 in order to set an example to
 others2 wherefore a gloss on ,matt4    
#c3d1 7,john7 had his garments of       
camel's hair1 says3 ,he who preaches    
penance is clothed in the habit of      
penance4 ,thirdly1 on account of        
vainglory2 thus ,augustine says 7cf4    
,obj4 #c7 that even the weeds of        

mourning may be a subject of            
ostentation4  ,accordingly in the first 
two ways it is praiseworthy to wear     
humble apparel1 but in the third way it 
is sinful4  ,secondly1 coarse and homely
 attire may be considered as the result 
of covetousness or negligence1 and thus 
also it is sinful4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3    
,coarseness of attire has not of itself 
the appearance of evil1 indeed it has   
more the appearance of good1 namely of  
the contempt of worldly glory4 ,hence it
 is that wicked persons hide their      
wickedness under coarse clothing4 ,hence
 ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in   
,monte ii1 #bd7 that the sheep should   
not dislike their clothing for the      
reason that the wolves sometimes hide   
themselves under it4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,jerome is speaking there of the coarse 
attire that is worn on account of human 
glory4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,according to  
our ,lord's teaching men should do no   
deeds of holiness for the sake of show3 
and this is especially the case when one

 does something strange4 ,hence         
,chrysostom 99,hom4 xiii in ,matth4 in  
the ,opus ,imperfectum1 falsely ascribed
 to ,st4 ,john ,chrysostom says3 ,while 
praying a man should do nothing strange1
 so as to draw the gaze of others1      
either by shouting or striking his      
breast1 or casting up his hands1 because
 the very strangeness draws people's    
attention to him4 ,yet blame does not   
attach to all strange behavior that     
draws people's attention1 for it may be 
done well or ill4 ,hence ,augustine says
 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ab7   
that in the practice of the ,christian  
religion when a man draws attention to  
himself by unwonted squalor and         
shabbiness1 since he acts thus          
voluntarily and not of necessity1 we can
 gather from his other deeds whether his
 behavior is motivated by contempt of   
excessive dress or by affectation4      
,religious1 however1 would especially   
seem not to act thus from affectation1  
since they wear a coarse habit as a sign

 of their profession whereby they       
profess contempt of the world4          
,,question #ahh  ,,of ,,the ,,different 
,,kinds ,,of ,,religious ,,life 7,in    
,eight ,articles7  ,we must now consider
 the different kinds of religious life1 
and under this head there are eight     
points of inquiry3  7#a7 ,whether there 
are different kinds of religious life or
 only one8  7#b7 ,whether a religious   
order can be established for the works  
of the active life8  7#c7 ,whether a    
religious order can be directed to      
soldiering8  7#d7 ,whether a religious  
order can be established for preaching  
and the exercise of like works8  7#e7   
,whether a religious order can be       
established for the study of science8   
7#f7 ,whether a religious order that is 
directed to the contemplative life is   
more excellent than one that is directed
 to the active life8  7#g7 ,whether     
religious perfection is diminished by   
possessing something in common8  7#h7   
,whether the religious life of          

solitaries is to be preferred to the    
religious life of those who live in     
community8   ,,first ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahh1 ,art4 #a  ,whether 
,there ,is ,only ,one ,religious ,order8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that    
there is but one religious order4 ,for  
there can be no diversity in that which 
is possessed wholly and perfectly2      
wherefore there can be only one         
sovereign good1 as stated in the ,first 
,part 7,q4 #f1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 #d74 ,now  
as ,gregory says 7,hom4 xx in ,ezech471 
when a man vows to ,almighty ,god all   
that he has1 all his life1 all his      
knowledge1 it is a holocaust1 without   
which there is no religious life4       
,therefore it would seem that there are 
not many religious orders but only one4 
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 things which agree  
in essentials differ only accidentally4 
,now there is no religious order without
 the three essential vows of religion1  
as stated above 7,q4 #ahf1 ,,aa4 #f1    
#g74 ,therefore it would seem that      

religious orders differ not             
specifically1 but only accidentally4    
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the state of        
perfection is competent both to         
religious and to bishops1 as stated     
above 7,q4 #ahe1 ,,aa4 #e1 #g74 ,now the
 episcopate is not diversified          
specifically1 but is one wherever it may
 be2 wherefore ,jerome says 7,ep4 cxlvi 
ad ,evan473 ,wherever a bishop is1      
whether at ,rome1 or ,gubbio1 or        
,constantinople1 or ,reggio1 he has the 
same excellence1 the same priesthood4   
,therefore in like manner there is but  
one religious order4  ,obj4 #d3         
,further1 anything that may lead to     
confusion should be removed from the    
,church4 ,now it would seem that a      
diversity of religious orders might     
confuse the ,christian people1 as stated
 in the ,decretal de ,statu ,monach4 et 
,canon4 ,reg4 99,cap4 ,ne ,nimia1 de    
,relig4 ,dom44 ,therefore seemingly     
there ought not to be different         
religious orders4  ,on the contrary1 ,it

 is written 7,ps4 #dd3aj7 that it       
pertains to the adornment of the queen  
that she is surrounded with variety4  ,i
 answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4     
#ahf1 ,a1 #g2 ,q4 #ahg1 ,a4 #b71 the    
religious state is a training school    
wherein one aims by practice at the     
perfection of charity4 ,now there are   
various works of charity to which a man 
may devote himself2 and there are also  
various kinds of exercise4 ,wherefore   
religious orders may be differentiated  
in two ways4 ,first1 according to the   
different things to which they may be   
directed3 thus one may be directed to   
the lodging of pilgrims1 another to     
visiting or ransoming captives4         
,secondly1 there may be various         
religious orders according to the       
diversity of practices2 thus in one     
religious order the body is chastised by
 abstinence in food1 in another by the  
practice of manual labor1 scantiness of 
clothes1 or the like4  ,since1 however1 
the end imports most in every matter1   

99,arist41 ,topic4 vi #h religious      
orders differ more especially according 
to their various ends than according to 
their various practices4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,the obligation to devote oneself   
wholly to ,god's service is common to   
every religious order2 hence religious  
do not differ in this respect1 as though
 in one religious order a person        
retained some one thing of his own1 and 
in another order some other thing4 ,but 
the difference is in respect of the     
different things wherein one may serve  
,god1 and whereby a man may dispose     
himself to the service of ,god4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,the three essential vows of  
religion pertain to the practice of     
religion as principles to which all     
other matters are reduced1 as stated    
above 7,q4 #ahf1 ,a4 #g74 ,but there are
 various ways of disposing oneself to   
the observance of each of them4 ,for    
instance one disposes oneself to observe
 the vow of continence1 by solitude of  
place1 by abstinence1 by mutual         

fellowship1 and by many like means4     
,accordingly it is evident that the     
community of the essential vows is      
compatible with diversity of religious  
life1 both on account of the different  
dispositions and on account of the      
different ends1 as explained above4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in matters relating to
 perfection1 the bishop stands in the   
position of agent1 and the religious as 
passive1 as stated above 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 
#g74 ,now the agent1 even in natural    
things1 the higher it is1 is so much the
 more one1 whereas the things that are  
passive are various4 ,hence with reason 
the episcopal state is one1 while       
religious orders are many4  ,reply ,obj4
 #d3 ,confusion is opposed to           
distinction and order4 ,accordingly the 
multitude of religious orders would lead
 to confusion1 if different religious   
orders were directed to the same end and
 in the same way1 without necessity or  
utility4 ,wherefore to prevent this     
happening it has been wholesomely       

forbidden to establish a new religious  
order without the authority of the      
,sovereign ,pontiff4   ,,second         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahh1 ,art4 #b 
,whether a ,religious ,order ,should ,be
 ,established for the ,works of the     
,active ,life8  ,objection #a3 ,it would
 seem that no religious order should be 
established for the works of the active 
life4 ,for every religious order belongs
 to the state of perfection1 as stated  
above 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #ahf1 ,a4  
#a74 ,now the perfection of the         
religious state consists in the         
contemplation of divine things4 ,for    
,dionysius says 7,eccl4 ,hier4 vi7 that 
they are called servants of ,god by     
reason of their rendering pure service  
and subjection to ,god1 and on account  
of the indivisible and singular life    
which unites them by holy reflections1  
i4e4 contemplations1 on invisible       
things1 to the ,godlike unity and the   
perfection beloved of ,god4 ,therefore  
seemingly no religious order should be  

established for the works of the active 
life4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 seemingly the
 same judgment applies to canons regular
 as to monks1 according to ,extra1 ,de  
,postul41 cap4 ,ex parte2 and ,de ,statu
 ,monach41 cap4 ,quod ,dei timorem3 for 
it is stated that they are not          
considered to be separated from the     
fellowship of monks3 and the same would 
seem to apply to all other religious4   
,now the monastic rule was established  
for the purpose of the contemplative    
life2 wherefore ,jerome says 7,ep4 lviii
 ad ,paulin473 ,if you wish to be what  
you are called1 a monk1 i4e4 a solitary1
 what business have you in a city8 ,the 
same is found stated in ,extra1 ,de     
,renuntiatione1 cap4 ,nisi cum pridem2  
and ,de ,regular41 cap4 ,licet          
quibusdam4 ,therefore it would seem that
 every religious order is directed to   
the contemplative life1 and none to the 
active life4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the   
active life is concerned with the       
present world4 ,now all religious are   

said to renounce the world2 wherefore   
,gregory says 7,hom4 xx in ,ezech473 ,he
 who renounces this world1 and does all 
the good he can1 is like one who has    
gone out of ,egypt and offers sacrifice 
in the wilderness4 ,therefore it would  
seem that no religious order can be     
directed to the active life4  ,on the   
contrary1 ,it is written 7,james #a3bg73
 ,religion clean and undefiled before   
,god and the ,father1 is this3 to visit 
the fatherless and widows in their      
tribulation4 ,now this belongs to the   
active life4 ,therefore religious life  
can be fittingly directed to the active 
life4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 
7,a4 #a71 the religious state is        
directed to the perfection of charity1  
which extends to the love of ,god and of
 our neighbor4 ,now the contemplative   
life which seeks to devote itself to    
,god alone belongs directly to the love 
of ,god1 while the active life1 which   
ministers to our neighbor's needs1      
belongs directly to the love of one's   

neighbor4 ,and just as out of charity we
 love our neighbor for ,god's sake1 so  
the services we render our neighbor     
redound to ,god1 according to ,matt4    
#be3dj1 ,what you have done ,vulg43 ',as
 long as you did it' to one of these ,my
 least brethren1 you did it to ,me4     
,consequently those services which we   
render our neighbor1 in so far as we    
refer them to ,god1 are described as    
sacrifices1 according to ,heb4 #ac3af1  
,do not forget to do good and to impart1
 for by such sacrifices ,god's favor is 
obtained4 ,and since it belongs properly
 to religion to offer sacrifice to ,god1
 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a1 ad   
#a2 ,a4 #d1 ad #a71 it follows that     
certain religious orders are fittingly  
directed to the works of the active     
life4 ,wherefore in the ,conferences of 
the ,fathers 7,coll4 xiv1 #d7 the ,abbot
 ,nesteros in distinguishing the various
 aims of religious orders says3 ,some   
direct their intention exclusively to   
the hidden life of the desert and purity

 of heart2 some are occupied with the   
instruction of the brethren and the care
 of the monasteries2 while others       
delight in the service of the           
guesthouse1 i4e4 in hospitality4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #a3 ,service and subjection      
rendered to ,god are not precluded by   
the works of the active life1 whereby a 
man serves his neighbor for ,god's sake1
 as stated in the ,article4 ,nor do     
these works preclude singularity of     
life2 not that they involve man's living
 apart from his fellow-men1 but in the  
sense that each man individually devotes
 himself to things pertaining to the    
service of ,god2 and since religious    
occupy themselves with the works of the 
active life for ,god's sake1 it follows 
that their action results from their    
contemplation of divine things4 ,hence  
they are not entirely deprived of the   
fruit of the contemplative life4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,the same judgment applies to
 monks and to all other religious1 as   
regards things common to all religious  

orders3 for instance as regards their   
devoting themselves wholly to the divine
 service1 their observance of the       
essential vows of religion1 and their   
refraining from worldly business4 ,but  
it does not follow that this likeness   
extends to other things that are proper 
to the monastic profession1 and are     
directed especially to the contemplative
 life4 ,hence in the aforesaid          
,decretal1 ,de ,postulando1 it is not   
simply stated that the same judgment    
applies to canons regular as to monks1  
but that it applies in matters already  
mentioned1 namely that they are not to  
act as advocates in lawsuits4 ,again the
 ,decretal quoted1 ,de ,statu ,monach41 
after the statement that canons regular 
are not considered to be separated from 
the fellowship of monks1 goes on to say3
 ,nevertheless they obey an easier rule4
 ,hence it is evident that they are not 
bound to all that monks are bound4      
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a man may be in the   
world in two ways3 in one way by his    

bodily presence1 in another way by the  
bent of his mind4 ,hence our ,lord said 
to ,his disciples 7,john #ae3ai73 ,i    
have chosen you out of the world1 and   
yet speaking of them to ,his ,father ,he
 said 7,john #ag3aa73 ,these are in the 
world1 and ,i come to ,thee4 ,although1 
then1 religious who are occupied with   
the works of the active life are in the 
world as to the presence of the body1   
they are not in the world as regards    
their bent of mind1 because they are    
occupied with external things1 not as   
seeking anything of the world1 but      
merely for the sake of serving ,god3 for
 they 4 4 4 use this world1 as if they  
used it not1 to quote #a ,cor4 #g3ca4   
,hence 7,james #a3bg7 after it is stated
 that religion clean and undefiled 4 4 4
 is 4 4 4 to visit the fatherless and   
widows in their tribulation1 it is      
added1 and to keep one's self unspotted 
from this world1 namely to avoid being  
attached to worldly things4   ,,third   
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahh1 ,art4 #c 

,whether a ,religious ,order ,can ,be   
,directed to ,soldiering8  ,objection   
#a3 ,it would seem that no religious    
order can be directed to soldiering4    
,for all religious orders belong to the 
state of perfection4 ,now our ,lord said
 with reference to the perfection of    
,christian life 7,matt4 #e3ci73 ,i say  
to you not to resist evil2 but if one   
strike thee on the right cheek1 turn to 
him also the other1 which is            
inconsistent with the duties of a       
soldier4 ,therefore no religious order  
can be established for soldiering4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the bodily encounter
 of the battlefield is more grievous    
than the encounter in words that takes  
place between counsel at law4 ,yet      
religious are forbidden to plead at law1
 as appears from the ,decretal ,de      
,postulando quoted above 7,a4 #b1 ,obj4 
#b74 ,therefore it is much less seemly  
for a religious order to be established 
for soldiering4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the
 religious state is a state of penance1 

as we have said above 7,q4 #ahg1 ,a4    
#f74 ,now according to the code of laws 
soldiering is forbidden to penitents4   
,for it is said in the ,decretal ,de    
,poenit41 ,dist4 v1 cap4 #c3 ,it is     
altogether opposed to the rules of the  
,church1 to return to worldly soldiering
 after doing penance4 ,therefore it is  
unfitting for any religious order to be 
established for soldiering4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 no religious order may be     
established for an unjust object4 ,but  
as ,isidore says 7,etym4 xviii1 #a71 ,a 
just war is one that is waged by order  
of the emperor4 ,since then religious   
are private individuals1 it would seem  
unlawful for them to wage war2 and      
consequently no religious order may be  
established for this purpose4  ,on the  
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,ep4 clxxxix2
 ad ,bonifac471 ,beware of thinking that
 none of those can please ,god who      
handle war-like weapons4 ,of such was   
holy ,david to whom the ,lord gave great
 testimony4 ,now religious orders are   

established in order that men may please
 ,god4 ,therefore nothing hinders the   
establishing of a religious order for   
the purpose of soldiering4  ,i answer   
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 a      
religious order may be established not  
only for the works of the contemplative 
life1 but also for the works of the     
active life1 in so far as they are      
concerned in helping our neighbor and in
 the service of ,god1 but not in so far 
as they are directed to a worldly       
object4 ,now the occupation of          
soldiering may be directed to the       
assistance of our neighbor1 not only as 
regards private individuals1 but also as
 regards the defense of the whole       
commonwealth4 ,hence it is said of      
,judas ,machabeus 7#a ,macc4 #c3b1 #c7  
that he ,vulg43 'they' fought with      
cheerfulness the battle of ,israel1 and 
he got his people great honor4 ,it can  
also be directed to the upkeep of divine
 worship1 wherefore 7#a ,macc4 #c3ba7   
,judas is stated to have said3 ,we will 

fight for our lives and our laws1 and   
further on 7#a ,macc4 #ac3c7 ,simon     
said3 ,you know what great battles ,i   
and my brethren1 and the house of my    
father1 have fought for the laws and the
 sanctuary4  ,hence a religious order   
may be fittingly established for        
soldiering1 not indeed for any worldly  
purpose1 but for the defense of divine  
worship and public safety1 or also of   
the poor and oppressed1 according to    
,ps4 #ha3d3 ,rescue the poor1 and       
deliver the needy out of the hand of the
 sinner4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not to      
resist evil may be understood in two    
ways4 ,first1 in the sense of forgiving 
the wrong done to oneself1 and thus it  
may pertain to perfection1 when it is   
expedient to act thus for the spiritual 
welfare of others4 ,secondly1 in the    
sense of tolerating patiently the wrongs
 done to others3 and this pertains to   
imperfection1 or even to vice1 if one be
 able to resist the wrongdoer in a      
becoming manner4 ,hence ,ambrose says   

7,de ,offic4 i1 #bg73 ,the courage      
whereby a man in battle defends his     
country against barbarians1 or protects 
the weak at home1 or his friends against
 robbers is full of justice3 even so our
 ,lord says in the passage quoted       
99,luke #f3cj3 ,of him that taketh away 
thy goods1 ask them not again2 ,cf4     
,matt4 #e3dj1 4 4 4 thy goods1 ask them 
not again4 ,if1 however1 a man were not 
to demand the return of that which      
belongs to another1 he would sin if it  
were his business to do so3 for it is   
praiseworthy to give away one's own1 but
 not another's property4 ,and much less 
should the things of ,god be neglected1 
for as ,chrysostom 99,hom4 v in ,matth4 
in the ,opus ,imperfectum1 falsely      
ascribed to ,st4 ,john ,chrysostom says1
 it is most wicked to overlook the      
wrongs done to ,god4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3  
,it is inconsistent with any religious  
order to act as counsel at law for a    
worldly object1 but it is not           
inconsistent to do so at the orders of  

one's superior and in favor of one's    
monastery1 as stated in the same        
,decretal1 or for the defense of the    
poor and widows4 ,wherefore it is said  
in the ,decretals 7,dist4 lxxxviii1 cap4
 #a73 ,the holy synod has decreed that  
henceforth no cleric is to buy property 
or occupy himself with secular business1
 save with a view to the care of the    
fatherless 4 4 4 and widows4 ,likewise  
to be a soldier for the sake of some    
worldly object is contrary to all       
religious life1 but this does not apply 
to those who are soldiers for the sake  
of ,god's service4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,worldly soldiering is forbidden to     
penitents1 but the soldiering which is  
directed to the service of ,god is      
imposed as a penance on some people1 as 
in the case of those upon whom it is    
enjoined to take arms in defense of the 
,holy ,land4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the     
establishment of a religious order for  
the purpose of soldiering does not imply
 that the religious can wage war on     

their own authority2 but they can do so 
only on the authority of the sovereign  
or of the ,church4   ,,fourth ,,article 
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahh1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
a ,religious ,order ,can ,be            
,established for ,preaching or ,hearing 
,confessions8  ,objection #a3 ,it would 
seem that no religious order may be     
established for preaching1 or hearing   
confessions4 ,for it is said 7,,vii1 qu4
 i 99,cap4 ,hoc nequaquam2 ,cf4 ,q4     
#ahg1 ,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #a73 ,the monastic  
life is one of subjection and           
discipleship1 not of teaching1          
authority1 or pastoral care1 and the    
same apparently applies to religious4   
,now preaching and hearing confessions  
are the actions of a pastor and teacher4
 ,therefore a religious order should not
 be established for this purpose4  ,obj4
 #b3 ,further1 the purpose for which a  
religious order is established would    
seem to be something most proper to the 
religious life1 as stated above 7,a4    
#a74 ,now the aforesaid actions are not 

proper to religious but to bishops4     
,therefore a religious order should not 
be established for the purpose of such  
actions4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it seems  
unfitting that the authority to preach  
and hear confessions should be committed
 to an unlimited number of men2 and     
there is no fixed number of those who   
are received into a religious order4    
,therefore it is unfitting for a        
religious order to be established for   
the purpose of the aforesaid actions4   
,obj4 #d3 ,further1 preachers have a    
right to receive their livelihood from  
the faithful of ,christ1 according to #a
 ,cor4 #i4 ,if then the office of       
preaching be committed to a religious   
order established for that purpose1 it  
follows that the faithful of ,christ are
 bound to support an unlimited number of
 persons1 which would be a heavy burden 
on them4 ,therefore a religious order   
should not be established for the       
exercise of these actions4  ,obj4 #e3   
,further1 the organization of the       

,church should be in accordance with    
,christ's institution4 ,now ,christ sent
 first the twelve apostles to preach1 as
 related in ,luke #i1 and afterwards ,he
 sent the seventy-two disciples1 as     
stated in ,luke #aj4 ,moreover1         
according to the gloss of ,bede on ,and 
after these things 7,luke #aj3a71 the   
apostles are represented by the bishops1
 the seventy-two disciples by the lesser
 priests1 i4e4 the parish priests4      
,therefore in addition to bishops and   
parish priests1 no religious order      
should be established for the purpose of
 preaching and hearing confessions4  ,on
 the contrary1 ,in the ,conferences of  
the ,fathers 7,coll4 xiv1 #d71 ,abbot   
,nesteros1 speaking of the various kinds
 of religious orders1 says3 ,some       
choosing the care of the sick1 others   
devoting themselves to the relief of the
 afflicted and oppressed1 or applying   
themselves to teaching1 or giving alms  
to the poor1 have been most highly      
esteemed on account of their devotion   

and piety4 ,therefore just as a         
religious order may be established for  
the care of the sick1 so also may one be
 established for teaching the people by 
preaching and like works4  ,i answer    
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 it is  
fitting for a religious order to be     
established for the works of the active 
life1 in so far as they are directed to 
the good of our neighbor1 the service of
 ,god1 and the upkeep of divine worship4
 ,now the good of our neighbor is       
advanced by things pertaining to the    
spiritual welfare of the soul rather    
than by things pertaining to the        
supplying of bodily needs1 in proportion
 to the excellence of spiritual over    
corporal things4 ,hence it was stated   
above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #c7 that spiritual  
works of mercy surpass corporal works of
 mercy4 ,moreover this is more pertinent
 to the service of ,god1 to ,whom no    
sacrifice is more acceptable than zeal  
for souls1 as ,gregory says 7,hom4 xii  
in ,ezech474 ,furthermore1 it is a      

greater thing to employ spiritual arms  
in defending the faithful against the   
errors of heretics and the temptations  
of the devil1 than to protect the       
faithful by means of bodily weapons4    
,therefore it is most fitting for a     
religious order to be established for   
preaching and similar works pertaining  
to the salvation of souls4  ,reply ,obj4
 #a3 ,he who works by virtue of another1
 acts as an instrument4 ,and a minister 
is like an animated instrument1 as the  
,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #b 99,cf4 
,ethic4 viii1 #aa74 ,hence if a man     
preach or do something similar by the   
authority of his superiors1 he does not 
rise above the degree of discipleship or
 subjection1 which is competent to      
religious4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some      
religious orders are established for    
soldiering1 to wage war1 not indeed on  
their own authority1 but on that of the 
sovereign or of the ,church who are     
competent to wage war by virtue of their
 office1 as stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad    

#d74 ,in the same way certain religious 
orders are established for preaching and
 hearing confessions1 not indeed by     
their own authority1 but by the         
authority of the higher and lower       
superiors1 to whom these things belong  
by virtue of their office4 ,consequently
 to assist one's superiors in such a    
ministry is proper to a religious order 
of this kind4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,bishops
 do not allow these religious severally 
and indiscriminately to preach or hear  
confessions1 but according to the       
discretion of the religious superiors1  
or according to their own appointment4  
,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the faithful are not  
bound by law to contribute to the       
support of other than their ordinary    
prelates1 who receive the tithes and    
offerings of the faithful for that      
purpose1 as well as other ecclesiastical
 revenues4 ,but if some men are willing 
to minister to the faithful by          
exercising the aforesaid acts           
gratuitously1 and without demanding     

payment as of right1 the faithful are   
not burdened thereby because their      
temporal contributions can be liberally 
repaid by those men1 nor are they bound 
by law to contribute1 but by charity1   
and yet not so that they be burdened    
thereby and others eased1 as stated in  
#b ,cor4 #h3ac4 ,if1 however1 none be   
found to devote themselves gratuitously 
to services of this kind1 the ordinary  
prelate is bound1 if he cannot suffice  
by himself1 to seek other suitable      
persons and support them himself4       
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the seventy-two       
disciples are represented not only by   
the parish priests1 but by all those of 
lower order who in any way assist the   
bishops in their office4 ,for we do not 
read that our ,lord appointed the       
seventy-two disciples to certain fixed  
parishes1 but that ,he sent them two and
 two before ,his face into every city   
and place whither ,he ,himself was to   
come4 ,it was fitting1 however1 that in 
addition to the ordinary prelates others

 should be chosen for these duties on   
account of the multitude of the         
faithful1 and the difficulty of finding 
a sufficient number of persons to be    
appointed to each locality1 just as it  
was necessary to establish religious    
orders for military service1 on account 
of the secular princes being unable to  
cope with unbelievers in certain        
countries4   ,,fifth ,,article          
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahh1 ,art4 #e  ,whether 
a ,religious ,order ,should ,be         
,established for the ,purpose of ,study8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a  
religious order should not be           
established for the purpose of study4   
,for it is written 7,ps4 #gj3ae1 #af73  
,because ,i have not known letters      
,douay3 'learning'1 ,i will enter into  
the powers of the ,lord1 i4e4 ,christian
 virtue1 according to a gloss4 ,now the 
perfection of ,christian virtue1        
seemingly1 pertains especially to       
religious4 ,therefore it is not for them
 to apply themselves to the study of    

letters4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which
 is a source of dissent is unbecoming to
 religious1 who are gathered together in
 the unity of peace4 ,now study leads to
 dissent3 wherefore different schools of
 thought arose among the philosophers4  
,hence ,jerome 7,super ,epist4 ad ,tit4 
#a3e7 says3 ,before a diabolical        
instinct brought study into religion1   
and people said3 ,i am of ,paul1 ,i of  
,apollo1 ,i of ,cephas1 etc4 ,therefore 
it would seem that no religious order   
should be established for the purpose of
 study4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 those who  
profess the ,christian religion should  
profess nothing in common with the      
,gentiles4 ,now among the ,gentiles were
 some who professed philosophy1 and even
 now some secular persons are known as  
professors of certain sciences4         
,therefore the study of letters does not
 become religious4  ,on the contrary1   
,jerome 7,ep4 liii ad ,paulin47 urges   
him to acquire learning in the monastic 
state1 saying3 ,let us learn on earth   

those things the knowledge of which will
 remain in heaven1 and further on3      
,whatever you seek to know1 ,i will     
endeavor to know with you4  ,i answer   
that ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 religion
 may be ordained to the active and to   
the contemplative life4 ,now chief among
 the works of the active life are those 
which are directly ordained to the      
salvation of souls1 such as preaching   
and the like4 ,accordingly the study of 
letters is becoming to the religious    
life in three ways4 ,first1 as regards  
that which is proper to the             
contemplative life1 to which the study  
of letters helps in a twofold manner4   
,in one way by helping directly to      
contemplate1 namely by enlightening the 
intellect4 ,for the contemplative life  
of which we are now speaking is directed
 chiefly to the consideration of divine 
things1 as stated above 7,q4 #ahj1 ,a4  
#d71 to which consideration man is      
directed by study2 for which reason it  
is said in praise of the righteous 7,ps4

 #a3b7 that he shall meditate day and   
night on the law of the ,lord1 and      
7,ecclus4 #ci3a73 ,the wise man will    
seek out the wisdom of all the ancients1
 and will be occupied in the prophets4  
,in another way the study of letters is 
a help to the contemplative life        
indirectly1 by removing the obstacles to
 contemplation1 namely the errors which 
in the contemplation of divine things   
frequently beset those who are ignorant 
of the scriptures4 ,thus we read in the 
,conferences of the ,fathers 7,coll4 x1 
#c7 that the ,abbot ,serapion through   
simplicity fell into the error of the   
,anthropomorphites1 who thought that    
,god had a human shape4 ,hence ,gregory 
says 7,moral4 vi7 that some through     
seeking in contemplation more than they 
are able to grasp1 fall away into       
perverse doctrines1 and by failing to be
 the humble disciples of truth become   
the masters of error4 ,hence it is      
written 7,eccles4 #b3c73 ,i thought in  
my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine1

 that ,i might turn my mind to wisdom   
and might avoid folly4  ,secondly1 the  
study of letters is necessary in those  
religious orders that are founded for   
preaching and other like works2         
wherefore the ,apostle 7,titus #a3i71   
speaking of bishops to whose office     
these acts belong1 says3 ,embracing that
 faithful word which is according to    
doctrine1 that he may be able to exhort 
in sound doctrine and to convince the   
gainsayers4 ,nor does it matter that the
 apostles were sent to preach without   
having studied letters1 because1 as     
,jerome says 7,ep4 liii ad ,paulin471   
whatever others acquire by exercise and 
daily meditation in ,god's law1 was     
taught them by the ,holy ,ghost4        
,thirdly1 the study of letters is       
becoming to religious as regards that   
which is common to all religious orders4
 ,for it helps us to avoid the lusts of 
the flesh2 wherefore ,jerome says 7,ep4 
cxxv ad ,rust4 ,monach473 ,love the     
science of the ,scriptures and thou     

shalt have no love for carnal vice4 ,for
 it turns the mind away from lustful    
thoughts1 and tames the flesh on account
 of the toil that study entails         
according to ,ecclus4 #ca3a1 ,watching  
for riches99 consumeth the flesh4       
99,vigilia honestatis4 ,st4 ,thomas     
would seem to have taken honestas in the
 sense of virtue4 ,it also helps to     
remove the desire of riches1 wherefore  
it is written 7,wis4 #g3h73 ,i 4 4 4    
esteemed riches nothing in comparison   
with her1 and 7#a ,macc4 #ab3i73 ,we    
needed none of these things1 namely     
assistance from without1 having for our 
comfort the holy books that are in our  
hands4 ,it also helps to teach          
obedience1 wherefore ,augustine says    
7,de oper4 ,monach4 xvii73 ,what sort of
 perverseness is this1 to wish to read1 
but not to obey what one reads8 ,hence  
it is clearly fitting that a religious  
order be established for the study of   
letters4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this        
commentary of the gloss is an exposition

 of the ,old ,law of which the ,apostle 
says 7#b ,cor4 #c3f73 ,the letter       
killeth4 ,hence not to know letters is  
to disapprove of the circumcision of the
 letter and other carnal observances4   
,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,study is directed to  
knowledge which1 without charity1       
puffeth up1 and consequently leads to   
dissent1 according to ,prov4 #ac3aj1    
,among the proud there are always       
dissensions3 whereas1 with charity1 it  
edifieth and begets concord4 ,hence the 
,apostle after saying 7#a ,cor4 #a3e73  
,you are made rich 4 4 4 in all         
utterance and in all knowledge1 adds 7#a
 ,cor4 #a3aj73 ,that you all speak the  
same thing1 and that there be no schisms
 among you4 ,but ,jerome is not speaking
 here of the study of letters1 but of   
the study of dissensions which heretics 
and schismatics have brought into the   
,christian religion4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3  
,the philosophers professed the study of
 letters in the matter of secular       
learning3 whereas it becomes religious  

to devote themselves chiefly to the     
study of letters in reference to the    
doctrine that is according to godliness 
7,titus #a3a74 ,it becomes not          
religious1 whose whole life is devoted  
to the service of ,god1 to seek for     
other learning1 save in so far as it is 
referred to the sacred doctrine4 ,hence 
,augustine says at the end of ,de       
,musica vi1 #ag3 ,whilst we think that  
we should not overlook those whom       
heretics delude by the deceitful        
assurance of reason and knowledge1 we   
are slow to advance in the consideration
 of their methods4 ,yet we should not be
 praised for doing this1 were it not    
that many holy sons of their most loving
 mother the ,catholic ,church had done  
the same under the necessity of         
confounding heretics4   ,,sixth         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahh1 ,art4 #f 
,whether a ,religious ,order ,that ,is  
,devoted to the ,contemplative ,life ,is
 ,more ,excellent ,than on ,that ,is    
,given to the ,active ,life8  ,objection

 #a3 ,it would seem that a religious    
order which is devoted to the           
contemplative life is not more excellent
 than one which is given to the active  
life4 ,for it is said 7,extra1 de       
,regular4 et ,transeunt4 ad ,relig41    
cap4 ,licet71 quoting the words of      
,innocent ,,iii3 ,even as a greater good
 is preferred to a lesser1 so the common
 profit takes precedence of private     
profit3 and in this case teaching is    
rightly preferred to silence1           
responsibility to contemplation1 work to
 rest4 ,now the religious order which is
 directed to the greater good is better4
 ,therefore it would seem that those    
religious orders that are directed to   
the active life are more excellent than 
those which are directed to the         
contemplative life4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 every religious order is directed to   
the perfection of charity1 as stated    
above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,now a gloss on   
,heb4 #ab3d1 ,for you have not yet      
resisted unto blood1 says3 ,in this life

 there is no more perfect love than that
 to which the holy martyrs attained1 who
 fought against sin unto blood4 ,now to 
fight unto blood is becoming those      
religious who are directed to military  
service1 and yet this pertains to the   
active life4 ,therefore it would seem   
that religious orders of this kind are  
the most excellent4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 seemingly the stricter a religious     
order is1 the more excellent it is4 ,but
 there is no reason why certain         
religious orders directed to the active 
life should not be of stricter          
observance than those directed to the   
contemplative life4 ,therefore they are 
more excellent4  ,on the contrary1 our  
,lord said 7,luke #aj3db7 that the best 
part was ,mary's1 by whom the           
contemplative life is signified4  ,i    
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 
the difference between one religious    
order and another depends chiefly on the
 end1 and secondarily on the exercise4  
,and since one thing cannot be said to  

be more excellent than another save in  
respect of that in which it differs     
therefrom1 it follows that the          
excellence of one religious order over  
another depends chiefly on their ends1  
and secondarily on their respective     
exercises4 ,nevertheless each of these  
comparisons is considered in a different
 way4 ,for the comparison with respect  
to the end is absolute1 since the end is
 sought for its own sake2 whereas the   
comparison with respect to exercise is  
relative1 since exercise is sought not  
for its own sake1 but for the sake of   
the end4 ,hence a religious order is    
preferable to another1 if it be directed
 to an end that is absolutely more      
excellent either because it is a greater
 good or because it is directed to more 
goods4 ,if1 however1 the end be the     
same1 the excellence of one religious   
order over another depends secondarily1 
not on the amount of exercise1 but on   
the proportion of the exercise to the   
end in view4 ,wherefore in the          

,conferences of the ,fathers 7,coll4 ii1
 #b7 ,blessed ,antony is quoted1 as     
preferring discretion whereby a man     
moderates all his actions1 to fastings1 
watchings1 and all such observances4    
,accordingly we must say that the work  
of the active life is twofold4 one      
proceeds from the fulness of            
contemplation1 such as teaching and     
preaching4 ,wherefore ,gregory says     
7,hom4 v in ,ezech47 that the words of  
,ps4 #add3g1 ,they shall publish the    
memory of 4 4 4 ,thy sweetness1 refer to
 perfect men returning from their       
contemplation4 ,and this work is more   
excellent than simple contemplation4    
,for even as it is better to enlighten  
than merely to shine1 so is it better to
 give to others the fruits of one's     
contemplation than merely to            
contemplate4 ,the other work of the     
active life consists entirely in outward
 occupation1 for instance almsgiving1   
receiving guests1 and the like1 which   
are less excellent than the works of    

contemplation1 except in cases of       
necessity1 as stated above 7,q4 #ahb1   
,a4 #a74 ,accordingly the highest place 
in religious orders is held by those    
which are directed to teaching and      
preaching1 which1 moreover1 are nearest 
to the episcopal perfection1 even as in 
other things the end of that which is   
first is in conjunction with the        
beginning of that which is second1 as   
,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 vii74    
,the second place belongs to those which
 are directed to contemplation1 and the 
third to those which are occupied with  
external actions4  ,moreover1 in each of
 these degrees it may be noted that one 
religious order excels another through  
being directed to higher action in the  
same genus2 thus among the works of the 
active life it is better to ransom      
captives than to receive guests1 and    
among the works of the contemplative    
life prayer is better than study4 ,again
 one will excel another if it be        
directed to more of these actions than  

another1 or if it have statutes more    
adapted to the attainment of the end in 
view4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this ,decretal 
refers to the active life as directed to
 the salvation of souls4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,those religious orders that are    
established for the purpose of military 
service aim more directly at shedding   
the enemy's blood than at the shedding  
of their own1 which latter is more      
properly competent to martyrs4 ,yet     
there is no reason why religious of this
 description should not acquire the     
merit of martyrdom in certain cases1 and
 in this respect stand higher than other
 religious2 even as in some cases the   
works of the active life take precedence
 of contemplation4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3    
,strictness of observances1 as the      
,blessed ,antony remarks 7,conferences  
of the ,fathers2 ,coll4 ii1 #b71 is not 
the chief object of commendation in a   
religious order2 and it is written      
7,isa4 #eh3e73 ,is this such a fast as  
,i have chosen1 for a man to afflict his

 soul for a day8 ,nevertheless it is    
adopted in religious life as being      
necessary for taming the flesh1 which if
 done without discretion1 is liable to  
make us fail altogether1 as the ,blessed
 ,antony observes4 ,wherefore a         
religious order is not more excellent   
through having stricter observances1 but
 because its observances are directed by
 greater discretion to the end of       
religion4 ,thus the taming of the flesh 
is more efficaciously directed to       
continence by means of abstinence in    
meat and drink1 which pertain to hunger 
and thirst1 than by the privation of    
clothing1 which pertains to cold and    
nakedness1 or by bodily labor4          
,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahh1
 ,art4 #g  ,whether ,religious          
,perfection ,is ,diminished by          
,possessing ,something in ,common8      
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
religious perfection is diminished by   
possessing something in common4 ,for our
 ,lord said 7,matt4 #ai3ba73 ,if thou   

wilt be perfect1 go sell all ,vulg43    
'what' thou hast and give to the poor4  
,hence it is clear that to lack worldly 
wealth belongs to the perfection of     
,christian life4 ,now those who possess 
something in common do not lack worldly 
wealth4 ,therefore it would seem that   
they do not quite reach to the          
perfection of ,christian life4  ,obj4   
#b3 ,further1 the perfection of the     
counsels requires that one should be    
without worldly solicitude2 wherefore   
the ,apostle in giving the counsel of   
virginity said 7#a ,cor4 #g3cb73 ,i     
would have you to be without solicitude4
 ,now it belongs to the solicitude of   
the present life that certain people    
keep something to themselves for the    
morrow2 and this solicitude was         
forbidden ,his disciples by our ,lord   
7,matt4 #f3cd7 saying3 ,be not 4 4 4    
solicitous for tomorrow4 ,therefore it  
would seem that the perfection of       
,christian life is diminished by having 
something in common4  ,obj4 #c3         

,further1 possessions held in common    
belong in some way to each member of the
 community2 wherefore ,jerome 7,ep4 lx  
ad ,heliod4 ,episc47 says in reference  
to certain people3 ,they are richer in  
the monastery than they had been in the 
world2 though serving the poor ,christ  
they have wealth which they had not     
while serving the rich devil2 the       
,church rejects them now that they are  
rich1 who in the world were beggars4    
,but it is derogatory to religious      
perfection that one should possess      
wealth of one's own4 ,therefore it is   
also derogatory to religious perfection 
to possess anything in common4  ,obj4   
#d3 ,further1 ,gregory 7,dial4 iii1 #ad7
 relates of a very holy man named       
,isaac1 that when his disciples humbly  
signified that he should accept the     
possessions offered to him for the use  
of the monastery1 he being solicitous   
for the safeguarding of his poverty1    
held firmly to his opinion1 saying3 ,a  
monk who seeks earthly possessions is no

 monk at all3 and this refers to        
possessions held in common1 and which   
were offered him for the common use of  
the monastery4 ,therefore it would seem 
destructive of religious perfection to  
possess anything in common4  ,obj4 #e3  
,further1 our ,lord in prescribing      
religious perfection to ,his disciples1 
said 7,matt4 #aj3i1 #aj73 ,do not       
possess gold1 nor silver1 nor money in  
your purses1 nor script for your        
journey4 ,by these words1 as ,jerome    
says in his commentary1 ,he reproves    
those philosophers who are commonly     
called ,bactroperatae 99i4e4 staff and  
scrip bearers1 who as despising the     
world and valuing all things at naught  
carried their pantry about with them4   
,therefore it would seem derogatory to  
religious perfection that one should    
keep something whether for oneself or   
for the common use4  ,on the contrary1  
,prosper 99,julianus ,pomerius1 among   
the works of ,prosper says 7,de ,vita   
,contempl4 ix7 and his words are quoted 

7,,xii1 qu4 #a1 can4 ,expedit73 ,it is  
sufficiently clear both that for the    
sake of perfection one should renounce  
having anything of one's own1 and that  
the possession of revenues1 which are of
 course common property1 is no hindrance
 to the perfection of the ,church4  ,i  
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ahd1
 ,a4 #c1 ad #a2 ,q4 #ahe1 ,a4 #f1 ad    
#a71 perfection consists1 essentially1  
not in poverty1 but in following        
,christ1 according to the saying of     
,jerome 7,super ,matth4 xix1 #bg73      
,since it is not enough to leave all1   
,peter adds that which is perfect1      
namely1 ',we have followed ,thee1' while
 poverty is like an instrument or       
exercise for the attainment of          
perfection4 ,hence in the ,conferences  
of the ,fathers 7,coll4 i1 #g7 the abbot
 ,moses says3 ,fastings1 watchings1     
meditating on the ,scriptures1 poverty1 
and privation of all one's possessions  
are not perfection1 but means of        
perfection4  ,now the privation of one's

 possessions1 or poverty1 is a means of 
perfection1 inasmuch as by doing away   
with riches we remove certain obstacles 
to charity2 and these are chiefly three4
 ,the first is the cares which riches   
bring with them2 wherefore our ,lord    
said 7,matt4 #ac3bb73 ,that which was   
sown ,vulg43 ',he that received the     
seed' among thorns1 is he that heareth  
the word1 and the care of this world1   
and the deceitfulness of riches1 choketh
 up the word4 ,the second is the love of
 riches1 which increases with the       
possession of wealth2 wherefore ,jerome 
says 7,super ,matth4 xix1 #bc7 that     
since it is difficult to despise riches 
when we have them1 our ,lord did not    
say3 ',it is impossible for a rich man  
to enter the kingdom of heaven1' but3   
',it is difficult4' ,the third is       
vainglory or elation which results from 
riches1 according to ,ps4 #dh3g1 ,they  
that trust in their own strength1 and   
glory in the multitude of their riches4 
,accordingly the first of these three   

cannot be altogether separated from     
riches whether great or small4 ,for man 
must needs take a certain amount of care
 in acquiring or keeping external       
things4 ,but so long as external things 
are sought or possessed only in a small 
quantity1 and as much as is required for
 a mere livelihood1 such like care does 
not hinder one much2 and consequently is
 not inconsistent with the perfection of
 ,christian life4 ,for our ,lord did not
 forbid all care1 but only such as is   
excessive and hurtful2 wherefore        
,augustine1 commenting on ,matt4 #f3be1 
,be not solicitous for your life1 what  
you shall eat1 says 7,de ,serm4 in      
,monte 99,the words quoted are from ,de 
,operibus ,monach4 xxvi73 ,in saying    
this ,he does not forbid them to procure
 these things in so far as they needed  
them1 but to be intent on them1 and for 
their sake to do whatever they are      
bidden to do in preaching the ,gospel4  
,yet the possession of much wealth      
increases the weight of care1 which is a

 great distraction to man's mind and    
hinders him from giving himself wholly  
to ,god's service4 ,the other two1      
however1 namely the love of riches and  
taking pride or glorying in riches1     
result only from an abundance of wealth4
  ,nevertheless it makes a difference in
 this matter if riches1 whether abundant
 or moderate1 be possessed in private or
 in common4 ,for the care that one takes
 of one's own wealth1 pertains to love  
of self1 whereby a man loves himself in 
temporal matters2 whereas the care that 
is given to things held in common       
pertains to the love of charity which   
seeketh not her own1 but looks to the   
common good4 ,and since religion is     
directed to the perfection of charity1  
and charity is perfected in the love of 
,god extending to contempt of self      
99,augustine1 ,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #bh1  
it is contrary to religious perfection  
to possess anything in private4 ,but the
 care that is given to common goods may 
pertain to charity1 although it may     

prove an obstacle to some higher act of 
charity1 such as divine contemplation or
 the instructing of one's neighbor4     
,hence it is evident that to have       
excessive riches in common1 whether in  
movable or in immovable property1 is an 
obstacle to perfection1 though not      
absolutely incompatible with it2 while  
it is not an obstacle to religious      
perfection to have enough external      
things1 whether movables or immovables1 
as suffice for a livelihood1 if we      
consider poverty in relation to the     
common end of religious orders1 which is
 to devote oneself to the service of    
,god4 ,but if we consider poverty in    
relation to the special end of any      
religious order1 then this end being    
presupposed1 a greater or lesser degree 
of poverty is adapted to that religious 
order2 and each religious order will be 
the more perfect in respect of poverty1 
according as it professes a poverty more
 adapted to its end4 ,for it is evident 
that for the purpose of the outward and 

bodily works of the active life a man   
needs the assistance of outward things1 
whereas few are required for            
contemplation4 ,hence the ,philosopher  
says 7,ethic4 x1 #h7 that many things   
are needed for action1 and the more so1 
the greater and nobler the actions are4 
,but the contemplative man requires no  
such things for the exercise of his act3
 he needs only the necessaries2 other   
things are an obstacle to his           
contemplation4 ,accordingly it is clear 
that a religious order directed to the  
bodily actions of the active life1 such 
as soldiering or the lodging of guests1 
would be imperfect if it lacked common  
riches2 whereas those religious orders  
which are directed to the contemplative 
life are the more perfect1 according as 
the poverty they profess burdens them   
with less care for temporal things4 ,and
 the care of temporal things is so much 
a greater obstacle to religious life as 
the religious life requires a greater   
care of spiritual things4  ,now it is   

manifest that a religious order         
established for the purpose of          
contemplating and of giving to others   
the fruits of one's contemplation by    
teaching and preaching1 requires greater
 care of spiritual things than one that 
is established for contemplation only4  
,wherefore it becomes a religious order 
of this kind to embrace a poverty that  
burdens one with the least amount of    
care4 ,again it is clear that to keep   
what one has acquired at a fitting time 
for one's necessary use involves the    
least burden of care4 ,wherefore a      
threefold degree of poverty corresponds 
to the three aforesaid degrees of       
religious life4 ,for it is fitting that 
a religious order which is directed to  
the bodily actions of the active life   
should have an abundance of riches in   
common2 that the common possession of a 
religious order directed to             
contemplation should be more moderate1  
unless the said religious be bound1     
either themselves or through others1 to 

give hospitality or to assist the poor2 
and that those who aim at giving the    
fruits of their contemplation to others 
should have their life most exempt from 
external cares2 this being accomplished 
by their laying up the necessaries of   
life procured at a fitting time4 ,this1 
our ,lord1 the ,founder of poverty1     
taught by ,his example4 ,for ,he had a  
purse which ,he entrusted to ,judas1 and
 in which were kept the things that were
 offered to ,him1 as related in ,john   
#ab3f4  ,nor should it be argued that   
,jerome 7,super ,matth4 xvii1 #bf7 says3
 ,if anyone object that ,judas carried  
money in the purse1 we answer that ,he  
deemed it unlawful to spend the property
 of the poor on ,his own uses1    namely
 by paying the tax--because among those 
poor ,his disciples held a foremost     
place1 and the money in ,christ's purse 
was spent chiefly on their needs4 ,for  
it is stated 7,john #d3h7 that ,his     
disciples were gone into the city to buy
 meats1 and 7,john #ac3bi7 that the     

disciples thought1 because ,judas had   
the purse1 that ,jesus had said to him3 
,but those things which we have need of 
for the festival day1 or that he should 
give something to the poor4 ,from this  
it is evident that to keep money by1 or 
any other common property for the       
support of religious of the same order1 
or of any other poor1 is in accordance  
with the perfection which ,christ taught
 by ,his example4 ,moreover1 after the  
resurrection1 the disciples from whom   
all religious orders took their origin  
kept the price of the lands1 and        
distributed it according as each one had
 need 7,acts #d3cd1 #ce74  ,reply ,obj4 
#a3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #c1 
ad #a71 this saying of our ,lord does   
not mean that poverty itself is         
perfection1 but that it is the means of 
perfection4 ,indeed1 as shown above 7,q4
 #ahf1 ,a4 #h71 it is the least of the  
three chief means of perfection2 since  
the vow of continence excels the vow of 
poverty1 and the vow of obedience excels

 them both4 ,since1 however1 the means  
are sought not for their own sake1 but  
for the sake of the end1 a thing is     
better1 not for being a greater         
instrument1 but for being more adapted  
to the end4 ,thus a physician does not  
heal the more the more medicine he      
gives1 but the more the medicine is     
adapted to the disease4 ,accordingly it 
does not follow that a religious order  
is the more perfect1 according as the   
poverty it professes is more perfect1   
but according as its poverty is more    
adapted to the end both common and      
special4 ,granted even that the         
religious order which exceeds others in 
poverty be more perfect in so far as it 
is poorer1 this would not make it more  
perfect simply4 ,for possibly some other
 religious order might surpass it in    
matters relating to continence1 or      
obedience1 and thus be more perfect     
simply1 since to excel in better things 
is to be better simply4  ,reply ,obj4   
#b3 ,our ,lord's words 7,matt4 #f3cd71  

,be not solicitous for tomorrow1 do not 
mean that we are to keep nothing for the
 morrow2 for the ,blessed ,antony shows 
the danger of so doing1 in the          
,conferences of the ,fathers 7,coll4 ii1
 #b71 where he says3 ,it has been our   
experience that those who have attempted
 to practice the privation of all means 
of livelihood1 so as not to have the    
wherewithal to procure themselves food  
for one day1 have been deceived so      
unawares that they were unable to finish
 properly the work they had undertaken4 
,and1 as ,augustine says 7,de oper4     
,monach4 xxiii71 if this saying of our  
,lord1 ',be not solicitous for          
tomorrow1' means that we are to lay     
nothing by for the morrow1 those who    
shut themselves up for many days from   
the sight of men1 and apply their whole 
mind to a life of prayer1 will be unable
 to provide themselves with these       
things4 ,again he adds afterwards3 ,are 
we to suppose that the more holy they   
are1 the less do they resemble the      

birds8 ,and further on 7,de oper4       
,monach4 xxiv73 ,for if it be argued    
from the ,gospel that they should lay   
nothing by1 they answer rightly3 ,why   
then did our ,lord have a purse1 wherein
 ,he kept the money that was collected8 
,why1 in days long gone by1 when famine 
was imminent1 was grain sent to the holy
 fathers8 ,why did the apostles thus    
provide for the needs of the saints8    
,accordingly the saying3 ,be not        
solicitous for tomorrow1 according to   
,jerome 7,super ,matth47 is to be       
rendered thus3 ,it is enough that we    
think of the present2 the future being  
uncertain1 let us leave it to ,god3     
according to ,chrysostom 99,hom4 xvi in 
the ,opus ,imperfectum1 falsely ascribed
 to ,st4 ,john ,chrysostom1 ,it is      
enough to endure the toil for necessary 
things1 labor not in excess for         
unnecessary things3 according to        
,augustine 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte  
ii1 #ag73 ,when we do any good action1  
we should bear in mind not temporal     

things which are denoted by the morrow1 
but eternal things4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3   
,the saying of ,jerome applies where    
there are excessive riches1 possessed in
 private as it were1 or by the abuse of 
which even the individual members of a  
community wax proud and wanton4 ,but    
they do not apply to moderate wealth1   
set by for the common use1 merely as a  
means of livelihood of which each one   
stands in need4 ,for it amounts to the  
same that each one makes use of things  
pertaining to the necessaries of life1  
and that these things be set by for the 
common use4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,isaac    
refused to accept the offer of          
possessions1 because he feared lest this
 should lead him to have excessive      
wealth1 the abuse of which would be an  
obstacle to religious perfection4 ,hence
 ,gregory adds 7,dial4 iii1 #ad73 ,he   
was as afraid of forfeiting the security
 of his poverty1 as the rich miser is   
careful of his perishable wealth4 ,it is
 not1 however1 related that he refused  

to accept such things as are commonly   
necessary for the upkeep of life4       
,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the ,philosopher says 
7,polit4 i1 #e1 #f7 that bread1 wine1   
and the like are natural riches1 while  
money is artificial riches4 ,hence it is
 that certain philosophers declined to  
make use of money1 and employed other   
things1 living according to nature4     
,wherefore ,jerome shows by the words of
 our ,lord1 ,who equally forbade both1  
that it comes to the same to have money 
and to possess other things necessary   
for life4 ,and though our ,lord         
commanded those who were sent to preach 
not to carry these things on the way1   
,he did not forbid them to be possessed 
in common4 ,how these words of our ,lord
 should be understood has been shown    
above 7,q4 #ahe1 ,a4 #f ad #b2 ,i-,,ii1 
,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 #b1 ad #c74   ,,eighth    
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahh1 ,art4 #h 
,whether the ,religious ,life of ,those 
,who ,live in ,community ,is ,more      
,perfect ,than ,that of ,those ,who     

,lead a ,solitary ,life8  ,objection #a3
 ,it would seem that the religious life 
of those who live in community is more  
perfect than that of those who lead a   
solitary life4 ,for it is written       
7,eccles4 #d3i73 ,it is better 4 4 4    
that two should be together1 than one2  
for they have the advantage of their    
society4 ,therefore the religious life  
of those who live in community would    
seem to be more perfect4  ,obj4 #b3     
,further1 it is written 7,matt4 #ah3bj73
 ,where there are two or three gathered 
together in ,my name1 there am ,i in the
 midst of them4 ,but nothing can be     
better than the fellowship of ,christ4  
,therefore it would seem better to live 
in community than in solitude4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 the vow of obedience is   
more excellent than the other religious 
vows2 and humility is most acceptable to
 ,god4 ,now obedience and humility are  
better observed in company than in      
solitude2 for ,jerome says 7,ep4 cxxv ad
 ,rustic4 ,monach473 ,in solitude pride 

quickly takes man unawares1 he sleeps as
 much as he will1 he does what he likes2
 whereas when instructing one who lives 
in community1 he says3 ,you may not do  
what you will1 you must eat what you are
 bidden to eat1 you may possess so much 
as you receive1 you must obey one you   
prefer not to obey1 you must be a       
servant to your brethren1 you must fear 
the superior of the monastery as ,god1  
love him as a father4 ,therefore it     
would seem that the religious life of   
those who live in community is more     
perfect than that of those who lead a   
solitary life4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 our 
,lord said 7,luke #aa3cc73 ,no man      
lighteth a candle and putteth it in a   
hidden place1 nor under a bushel4 ,now  
those who lead a solitary life are      
seemingly in a hidden place1 and to be  
doing no good to any man4 ,therefore it 
would seem that their religious life is 
not more perfect4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1  
that which is in accord with man's      
nature is apparently more pertinent to  

the perfection of virtue4 ,but man is   
naturally a social animal1 as the       
,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #a74      
,therefore it would seem that to lead a 
solitary life is not more perfect than  
to lead a community life4  ,on the      
contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de oper4    
,monach4 xxiii7 that those are holier   
who keep themselves aloof from the      
approach of all1 and give their whole   
mind to a life of prayer4  ,i answer    
that1 ,solitude1 like poverty1 is not   
the essence of perfection1 but a means  
thereto4 ,hence in the ,conferences of  
the ,fathers 7,coll4 i1 #g7 the ,abbot  
,moses says that solitude1 even as      
fasting and other like things1 is a sure
 means of acquiring purity of heart4    
,now it is evident that solitude is a   
means adapted not to action but to      
contemplation1 according to ,osee #b3ad1
 ,i 4 4 4 will lead her into solitude   
,douay3 'the wilderness'2 and ,i will   
speak to her heart4 ,wherefore it is not
 suitable to those religious orders that

 are directed to the works whether      
corporal or spiritual of the active     
life2 except perhaps for a time1 after  
the example of ,christ1 ,who as ,luke   
relates 7#f3ab71 went out into a        
mountain to pray2 and ,he passed the    
whole night in the prayer of ,god4 ,on  
the other hand1 it is suitable to those 
religious orders that are directed to   
contemplation4  ,it must1 however1 be   
observed that what is solitary should be
 self-sufficing by itself4 ,now such a  
thing is one that lacks nothing1 and    
this belongs to the idea of a perfect   
thing 99,aristotle1 ,phys4 iii1 #f4     
,wherefore solitude befits the          
contemplative who has already attained  
to perfection4 ,this happens in two     
ways3 in one way by the gift only of    
,god1 as in the case of ,john the       
,baptist1 who was filled with the ,holy 
,ghost even from his mother's womb      
7,luke #a3aa71 so that he was in the    
desert even as a boy2 in another way by 
the practice of virtuous action1        

according to ,heb4 #e3ad3 ,strong meat  
is for the perfect2 for them who by     
custom have their senses exercised to   
the discerning of good and evil4  ,now  
man is assisted in this practice by the 
fellowship of others in two ways4       
,first1 as regards his intellect1 to the
 effect of his being instructed in that 
which he has to contemplate2 wherefore  
,jerome says 7ad ,rustic4 ,monach41 ,ep4
 cxxv73 ,it pleases me that you have the
 fellowship of holy men1 and teach not  
yourself4 ,secondly1 as regards the     
affections1 seeing that man's noisome   
affections are restrained by the example
 and reproof which he receives from     
others2 for as ,gregory says 7,moral4   
xxx1 #bc71 commenting on the words1 ,to 
whom ,i have given a house in the       
wilderness 7,job #ci3f71 ,what profits  
solitude of the body1 if solitude of the
 heart be lacking8 ,hence a social life 
is necessary for the practice of        
perfection4 ,now solitude befits those  
who are already perfect2 wherefore      

,jerome says 7ad ,rustic4 ,monach41 ,ep4
 cxxv73 ,far from condemning the        
solitary life1 we have often commended  
it4 ,but we wish the soldiers who pass  
from the monastic school to be such as  
not to be deterred by the hard noviciate
 of the desert1 and such as have given  
proof of their conduct for a            
considerable time4  ,accordingly1 just  
as that which is already perfect        
surpasses that which is being schooled  
in perfection1 so the life of the       
solitaries1 if duly practiced1 surpasses
 the community life4 ,but if it be      
undertaken without the aforesaid        
practice1 it is fraught with very great 
danger1 unless the grace of ,god supply 
that which others acquire by practice1  
as in the case of the ,blessed ,antony  
and the ,blessed ,benedict4  ,reply     
,obj4 #a3 ,solomon shows that two are   
better than one1 on account of the help 
which one affords the other either by   
lifting him up1 or by warming him1 i4e4 
giving him spiritual heat 7,eccles4     

#d3aj1 #aa74 ,but those who have already
 attained to perfection do not require  
this help4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according 
to #a ,john #d3af1 ,he that abideth in  
charity abideth in ,god and ,god in him4
 ,wherefore just as ,christ is in the   
midst of those who are united together  
in the fellowship of brotherly love1 so 
does ,he dwell in the heart of the man  
who devotes himself to divine           
contemplation through love of ,god4     
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,actual obedience is   
required of those who need to be        
schooled according to the direction of  
others in the attainment of perfection2 
but those who are already perfect are   
sufficiently led by the spirit of ,god  
so that they need not to obey others    
actually4 ,nevertheless they have       
obedience in the preparedness of the    
mind4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as ,augustine  
says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ai71 no one  
is forbidden to seek the knowledge of   
truth1 for this pertains to a           
praiseworthy leisure4 ,that a man be    

placed on a candlestick1 does not       
concern him but his superiors1 and if   
this burden is not placed on us1 as     
,augustine goes on to say 7,de ,civ4    
,dei xix1 #ai71 we must devote ourselves
 to the contemplation of truth1 for     
which purpose solitude is most helpful4 
,nevertheless1 those who lead a solitary
 life are most useful to mankind4       
,hence1 referring to them1 ,augustine   
says 7,de ,morib4 ,eccl4 xxxi73 ,they   
dwell in the most lonely places1 content
 to live on water and the bread that is 
brought to them from time to time1      
enjoying colloquy with ,god to whom they
 have adhered with a pure mind4 ,to some
 they seem to have renounced human      
intercourse more than is right3 but     
these understand not how much such men  
profit us by the spirit of their        
prayers1 what an example to us is the   
life of those whom we are forbidden to  
see in the body4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a   
man may lead a solitary life for two    
motives4 ,one is because he is unable1  

as it were1 to bear with human          
fellowship on account of his uncouthness
 of mind2 and this is beast-like4 ,the  
other is with a view to adhering wholly 
to divine things2 and this is           
superhuman4 ,hence the ,philosopher says
 7,polit4 i1 #a7 that he who associates 
not with others is either a beast or a  
god1 i4e4 a godly man4   ,,question #ahi
  ,,of ,,the ,,entrance ,,into          
,,religious ,,life 7,in ,ten ,articles7 
,we must now consider the entrance into 
religious life4 ,under this head there  
are ten points of inquiry3  7#a7        
,whether those who are not practiced in 
the observance of the commandments      
should enter religion8  7#b7 ,whether it
 is lawful for a person to be bound by  
vow to enter religion8  7#c7 ,whether   
those who are bound by vow to enter     
religion are bound to fulfil their vow8 
7#d7 ,whether those who vow to enter    
religion are bound to remain there in   
perpetuity8  7#e7 ,whether children     
should be received into religion8  7#f7 

,whether one should be withheld from    
entering religion through deference to  
one's parents8  7#g7 ,whether parish    
priests or archdeacons may enter        
religion8  7#h7 ,whether one may pass   
from one religious order to another8    
7#i7 ,whether one ought to induce others
 to enter religion8  7#aj7 ,whether     
serious deliberation with one's         
relations and friends is requisite for  
entrance into religion8   ,,first       
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahi1 ,art4 #a 
,whether ,those ,who ,are ,not          
,practiced in ,keeping the ,commandments
 ,should ,enter ,religion8  ,objection  
#a3 ,it would seem that none should     
enter religion but those who are        
practiced in the observance of the      
commandments4 ,for our ,lord gave the   
counsel of perfection to the young man  
who said that he had kept the           
commandments from his youth4 ,now all   
religious orders originate from ,christ4
 ,therefore it would seem that none     
should be allowed to enter religion but 

those who are practiced in the          
observance of the commandments4  ,obj4  
#b3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 xv in
 ,ezech41 and ,moral4 xxii73 ,no one    
comes suddenly to the summit2 but he    
must make a beginning of a good life in 
the smallest matters1 so as to          
accomplish great things4 ,now the great 
things are the counsels which pertain to
 the perfection of life1 while the      
lesser things are the commandments which
 belong to common righteousness4        
,therefore it would seem that one ought 
not to enter religion for the purpose of
 keeping the counsels1 unless one be    
already practiced in the observance of  
the precepts4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the  
religious state1 like the holy orders1  
has a place of eminence in the ,church4 
,now1 as ,gregory writes to the bishop  
,siagrius 99,regist4 ix1 ,ep4 #ajf1     
order should be observed in ascending to
 orders4 ,for he seeks a fall who       
aspires to mount to the summit by       
overpassing the steps4 99,the rest of   

the quotation is from ,regist4 v1 ,ep4  
#ec1 ad ,virgil4 ,episc44 ,for we are   
well aware that walls when built receive
 not the weight of the beams until the  
new fabric is rid of its moisture1 lest 
if they should be burdened with weight  
before they are seasoned they bring down
 the whole building 7,dist4 xlviii1 can4
 ,sicut neophytus74 ,therefore it would 
seem that one should not enter religion 
unless one be practiced in the          
observance of the precepts4  ,obj4 #d3  
,further1 a gloss on ,ps4 #acj3b1 ,as a 
child that is weaned is towards his     
mother1 says3 ,first we are conceived in
 the womb of ,mother ,church1 by being  
taught the rudiments of faith4 ,then we 
are nourished as it were in her womb1 by
 progressing in those same elements4    
,afterwards we are brought forth to the 
light by being regenerated in baptism4  
,then the ,church bears us as it were in
 her hands and feeds us with milk1 when 
after baptism we are instructed in good 
works and are nourished with the milk of

 simple doctrine while we progress2     
until having grown out of infancy we    
leave our mother's milk for a father's  
control1 that is to say1 we pass from   
simple doctrine1 by which we are taught 
the ,word made flesh1 to the ,word that 
was in the beginning with ,god4         
,afterwards it goes on to say3 ,for     
those who are just baptized on ,holy    
,saturday are borne in the hands of the 
,church as it were and fed with milk    
until ,pentecost1 during which time     
nothing arduous is prescribed1 no fasts1
 no rising at midnight4 ,afterwards they
 are confirmed by the ,paraclete        
,spirit1 and being weaned so to speak1  
begin to fast and keep other difficult  
observances4 ,many1 like the heretics   
and schismatics1 have perverted this    
order by being weaned before the time4  
,hence they have come to naught4 ,now   
this order is apparently perverted by   
those who enter religion1 or induce     
others to enter religion1 before they   
are practiced in the easier observance  

of the commandments4 ,therefore they    
would seem to be heretics or            
schismatics4  ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 one   
should proceed from that which precedes 
to that which follows after4 ,now the   
commandments precede the counsels1      
because they are more universal1 for the
 implication of the one by the other is 
not convertible 99,categor4 ix1 since   
whoever keeps the counsels keeps the    
commandments1 but the converse does not 
hold4 ,seeing then that the right order 
requires one to pass from that which    
comes first to that which comes after1  
it follows that one ought not to pass to
 the observance of the counsels in      
religion1 without being first of all    
practiced in the observance of the      
commandments4  ,on the contrary1        
,matthew the publican who was not       
practiced in the observance of the      
commandments was called by our ,lord to 
the observance of the counsels4 ,for it 
is stated 7,luke #e3bh7 that leaving all
 things he 4 4 4 followed ,him4         

,therefore it is not necessary for a    
person to be practiced in the observance
 of the commandments before passing to  
the perfection of the counsels4  ,i     
answer that1 ,as shown above 7,q4 #ahh1 
,a4 #a71 the religious state is a       
spiritual schooling for the attainment  
of the perfection of charity4 ,this is  
accomplished through the removal of the 
obstacles to perfect charity by         
religious observances2 and these        
obstacles are those things which attach 
man's affections to earthly things4 ,now
 the attachment of man's affections to  
earthly things is not only an obstacle  
to the perfection of charity1 but       
sometimes leads to the loss of charity1 
when through turning inordinately to    
temporal goods man turns away from the  
immutable good by sinning mortally4     
,hence it is evident that the           
observances of the religious state1     
while removing the obstacles to perfect 
charity1 remove also the occasions of   
sin3 for instance1 it is clear that     

fasting1 watching1 obedience1 and the   
like withdraw man from sins of gluttony 
and lust and all other manner of sins4  
,consequently it is right that not only 
those who are practiced in the          
observance of the commandments should   
enter religion in order to attain to yet
 greater perfection1 but also those who 
are not practiced1 in order the more    
easily to avoid sin and attain to       
perfection4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,jerome   
7,super ,matth4 xix1 #bj7 says3 ,the    
young man lies when he says3 ',all these
 have ,i kept from my youth4' ,for if he
 had fulfilled this commandment1 ',thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself1' why
 did he go away sad when he heard3 ,go1 
sell all thou hast and give to the poor8
 ,but this means that he lied as to the 
perfect observance of this commandment4 
,hence ,origen says 7,tract4 viii super 
,matth47 that it is written in the      
,gospel according to the ,hebrews that  
when our ,lord had said to him3 ',go1   
sell all thou hast1' the rich man began 

to scratch his head2 and that our ,lord 
said to him3 ,how sayest thou3 ,i have  
fulfilled the law and the prophets1     
seeing that it is written in the law3   
,thou shalt love thy neighbor as        
thyself8 ,behold many of thy brethren1  
children of ,abraham1 are clothed in    
filth1 and die of hunger1 whilst thy    
house is full of all manner of good     
things1 and nothing whatever hath passed
 thence to them4 ,and thus our ,lord    
reproves him saying3 ,if thou wilt be   
perfect1 go1 etc4 ,for it is impossible 
to fulfil the commandment which says1   
,thou shalt love thy neighbor as        
thyself1 and to be rich1 especially to  
have such great wealth4 ,this also      
refers to the perfect fulfilment of this
 precept4 ,on the other hand1 it is true
 that he kept the commandments          
imperfectly and in a general way4 ,for  
perfection consists chiefly in the      
observance of the precepts of charity1  
as stated above 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #c74     
,wherefore in order to show that the    

perfection of the counsels is useful    
both to the innocent and to sinners1 our
 ,lord called not only the innocent     
youth but also the sinner ,matthew4 ,yet
 ,matthew obeyed ,his call1 and the     
youth obeyed not1 because sinners are   
converted to the religious life more    
easily than those who presume on their  
innocency4 ,it is to the former that our
 ,lord says 7,matt4 #ba3ca73 ,the       
publicans and the harlots shall go into 
the kingdom of ,god before you4  ,reply 
,obj4 #b3 ,the highest and the lowest   
place can be taken in three ways4       
,first1 in reference to the same state  
and the same man2 and thus it is evident
 that no one comes to the summit        
suddenly1 since every man that lives    
aright1 progresses during the whole     
course of his life1 so as to arrive at  
the summit4 ,secondly1 in comparison    
with various states2 and thus he who    
desires to reach to a higher state need 
not begin from a lower state3 for       
instance1 if a man wish to be a cleric  

he need not first of all be practiced in
 the life of a layman4 ,thirdly1 in     
comparison with different persons2 and  
in this way it is clear that one man    
begins straightway not only from a      
higher state1 but even from a higher    
degree of holiness1 than the highest    
degree to which another man attains     
throughout his whole life4 ,hence       
,gregory says 7,dial4 ii1 #a73 ,all are 
agreed that the boy ,benedict began at a
 high degree of grace and perfection in 
his daily life4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as   
stated above 7,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #f7 the holy
 orders prerequire holiness1 whereas the
 religious state is a school for the    
attainment of holiness4 ,hence the      
burden of orders should be laid on the  
walls when these are already seasoned   
with holiness1 whereas the burden of    
religion seasons the walls1 i4e4 men1 by
 drawing out the damp of vice4  ,reply  
,obj4 #d3 ,it is manifest from the words
 of this gloss that it is chiefly a     
question of the order of doctrine1 in so

 far as one has to pass from easy matter
 to that which is more difficult4 ,hence
 it is clear from what follows that the 
statement that certain heretics and     
schismatics have perverted this order   
refers to the order of doctrine4 ,for it
 continues thus3 ,but he says that he   
has kept these things1 namely the       
aforesaid order1 binding himself by an  
oath 99,referring to the last words of  
the verse1 and taking retributio1 which 
,douay renders reward1 as meaning       
'punishment'4 ,thus ,i was humble not   
only in other things but also in        
knowledge1 for ',i was humbly minded'2  
because ,i was first of all fed with    
milk1 which is the ,word made flesh1 so 
that ,i grew up to partake of the bread 
of angels1 namely the ,word that is in  
the beginning with ,god4 ,the example   
which is given in proof1 of the newly   
baptized not being commanded to fast    
until ,pentecost1 shows that no         
difficult things are to be laid on them 
as an obligation before the ,holy ,ghost

 inspires them inwardly to take upon    
themselves difficult things of their own
 choice4 ,hence after ,pentecost and the
 receiving of the ,holy ,ghost the      
,church observes a fast4 ,now the ,holy 
,ghost1 according to ,ambrose 7,super   
,luc4 #a3ae71 is not confined to any    
particular age2 ,he ceases not when men 
die1 ,he is not excluded from the       
maternal womb4 ,gregory also in a homily
 for ,pentecost 7xxx in ,ev47 says3 ,he 
fills the boy harpist and makes him a   
psalmist3 ,he fills the boy abstainer   
and makes him a wise judge 99,dan4      
#a3h-ag1 and afterwards he adds3 ,no    
time is needed to learn whatsoever ,he  
will1 for ,he teaches the mind by the   
merest touch4 ,again it is written      
7,eccles4 #h3h71 ,it is not in man's    
power to stop the ,spirit1 and the      
,apostle admonishes us 7#a ,thess4      
#e3ai73 ,extinguish not the ,spirit1 and
 7,acts #g3ea7 it is said against       
certain persons3 ,you always resist the 
,holy ,ghost4  ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,there  

are certain chief precepts which are the
 ends1 so to say1 of the commandments   
and counsels4 ,these are the precepts of
 charity1 and the counsels are directed 
to them1 not that these precepts cannot 
be observed without keeping the         
counsels1 but that the keeping of the   
counsels conduces to the better         
observance of the precepts4 ,the other  
precepts are secondary and are directed 
to the precepts of charity2 in such a   
way that unless one observe them it is  
altogether impossible to keep the       
precepts of charity4 ,accordingly in the
 intention the perfect observance of the
 precepts of charity precedes the       
counsels1 and yet sometimes it follows  
them in point of time4 ,for such is the 
order of the end in relation to things  
directed to the end4 ,but the observance
 in a general way of the precepts of    
charity together with the other         
precepts1 is compared to the counsels as
 the common to the proper1 because one  
can observe the precepts without        

observing the counsels1 but not vice    
versa4 ,hence the common observance of  
the precepts precedes the counsels in   
the order of nature2 but it does not    
follow that it precedes them in point of
 time1 for a thing is not in the genus  
before being in one of the species4 ,but
 the observance of the precepts apart   
from the counsels is directed to the    
observance of the precepts together with
 the counsels2 as an imperfect to a     
perfect species1 even as the irrational 
to the rational animal4 ,now the perfect
 is naturally prior to the imperfect1   
since nature1 as ,boethius says 7,de    
,consol4 iii1 #aj71 begins with perfect 
things4 ,and yet it is not necessary for
 the precepts first of all to be        
observed without the counsels1 and      
afterwards with the counsels1 just as it
 is not necessary for one to be an ass  
before being a man1 or married before   
being a virgin4 ,in like manner it is   
not necessary for a person first of all 
to keep the commandments in the world   

before entering religion2 especially as 
the worldly life does not dispose one to
 religious perfection1 but is more an   
obstacle thereto4   ,,second ,,article  
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahi1 ,art4 #b  ,whether 
,one ,ought to ,be ,bound by ,vow to    
,enter ,religion8  ,objection #a3 ,it   
would seem that one ought not to be     
bound by vow to enter religion4 ,for in 
making his profession a man is bound by 
the religious vow4 ,now before          
profession a year of probation is       
allowed1 according to the rule of the   
,blessed ,benedict 7lviii7 and according
 to the decree of ,innocent ,,iv        
99,sext4 ,decret41 cap4 ,non solum41 de 
,regular4 et ,transeunt1 ad ,relig4 who 
moreover forbade anyone to be bound to  
the religious life by profession before 
completing the year of probation4       
,therefore it would seem that much less 
ought anyone while yet in the world to  
be bound by vow to enter religion4      
,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory says       
7,regist4 xi1 ,ep4 #ae73 ,jews should be

 persuaded to be converted1 not by      
compulsion but of their own free will   
7,dist4 xlv1 can4 ,de ,judaeis74 ,now   
one is compelled to fulfil what one has 
vowed4 ,therefore no one should be bound
 by vow to enter religion4  ,obj4 #c3   
,further1 no one should give another an 
occasion of falling2 wherefore it is    
written 7,ex4 #ba3cc1 #cd73 ,if a man   
open a pit 4 4 4 and an ox or an ass    
fall into it1 the owner of the pit shall
 pay the price of the beasts4 ,now      
through being bound by vow to enter     
religion it often happens that people   
fall into despair and various sins4     
,therefore it would seem that one ought 
not to be bound by vow to enter         
religion4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is     
written1 7,ps4 #ge3ab73 ,vow ye1 and pay
 to the ,lord your ,god2 and a gloss of 
,augustine says that some vows concern  
the individual1 such as vows of         
chastity1 virginity1 and the like4      
,consequently ,holy ,scripture invites  
us to vow these things4 ,but ,holy      

,scripture invites us only to that which
 is better4 ,therefore it is better to  
bind oneself by vow to enter religion4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#hh1 ,a4 #f71 when we were treating of  
vows1 one and the same work done in     
fulfilment of a vow is more praiseworthy
 than if it be done apart from a vow1   
both because to vow is an act of        
religion1 which has a certain           
pre-eminence among the virtues1 and     
because a vow strengthens a man's will  
to do good2 and just as a sin is more   
grievous through proceeding from a will 
obstinate in evil1 so a good work is the
 more praiseworthy through proceeding   
from a will confirmed in good by means  
of a vow4 ,therefore it is in itself    
praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to  
enter religion4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the  
religious vow is twofold4 ,one is the   
solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a
 brother in some other religious order4 
,this is called the profession1 and such
 a vow should be preceded by a year's   

probation1 as the objection proves4 ,the
 other is the simple vow which does not 
make a man a monk or a religious1 but   
only binds him to enter religion1 and   
such a vow need not be preceded by a    
year's probation4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the
 words quoted from ,gregory must be     
understood as referring to absolute     
violence4 ,but the compulsion arising   
from the obligation of a vow is not     
absolute necessity1 but a necessity of  
end1 because after such a vow one cannot
 attain to the end of salvation unless  
one fulfil that vow4 ,such a necessity  
is not to be avoided2 indeed1 as        
,augustine says 7,ep4 cxxvii ad         
,armentar4 et ,paulin471 happy is the   
necessity that compels us to better     
things4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the vow to   
enter religion is a strengthening of the
 will for better things1 and            
consequently1 considered in itself1     
instead of giving a man an occasion of  
falling1 withdraws him from it4 ,but if 
one who breaks a vow falls more         

grievously1 this does not derogate from 
the goodness of the vow1 as neither does
 it derogate from the goodness of       
,baptism that some sin more grievously  
after being baptized4   ,,third         
,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahi1 ,art4 #c 
,whether ,one ,who ,is ,bound by a ,vow 
to ,enter ,religion ,is ,under an       
,obligation of ,entering ,religion8     
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one  
who is bound by the vow to enter        
religion is not under an obligation of  
entering religion4 ,for it is said in   
the ,decretals 7,,xvii1 qu4 ii1 can4    
,consaldus73 ,consaldus1 a priest under 
pressure of sickness and emotional      
fervour1 promised to become a monk4 ,he 
did not1 however1 bind himself to a     
monastery or abbot2 nor did he commit   
his promise to writing1 but he renounced
 his benefice in the hands of a notary2 
and when he was restored to health he   
refused to become a monk4 ,and          
afterwards it is added3 ,we adjudge and 
by apostolic authority we command that  

the aforesaid priest be admitted to his 
benefice and sacred duties1 and that he 
be allowed to retain them in peace4 ,now
 this would not be if he were bound to  
enter religion4 ,therefore it would seem
 that one is not bound to keep one's vow
 of entering religion4  ,obj4 #b3       
,further1 no one is bound to do what is 
not in his power4 ,now it is not in a   
person's power to enter religion1 since 
this depends on the consent of those    
whom he wishes to join4 ,therefore it   
would seem that a man is not obliged to 
fulfil the vow by which he bound himself
 to enter religion4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1
 a less useful vow cannot remit a more  
useful one4 ,now the fulfilment of a vow
 to enter religion might hinder the     
fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross
 in defense of the ,holy ,land2 and the 
latter apparently is the more useful    
vow1 since thereby a man obtains the    
forgiveness of his sins4 ,therefore it  
would seem that the vow by which a man  
has bound himself to enter religion is  

not necessarily to be fulfilled4  ,on   
the contrary1 ,it is written 7,eccles4  
#e3c73 ,if thou hast vowed anything to  
,god1 defer not to pay it1 for an       
unfaithful and foolish promise          
displeaseth him2 and a gloss on ,ps4    
#ge3ab1 ,vow ye1 and pay to the ,lord   
your ,god1 says3 ,to vow depends on the 
will3 but after the vow has been taken  
the fulfilment is of obligation4  ,i    
answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #hh1 
,a4 #a71 when we were treating of vows1 
a vow is a promise made to ,god in      
matters concerning ,god4 ,now1 as       
,gregory says in a letter to ,boniface  
99,innoc4 ,i1 ,epist4 ii1 ,victricio    
,epo4 ,rotomag41 cap4 #ad2 ,cf4 can4    
,viduas3 cause4 xxvii1 qu4 #a3 ,if among
 men of good faith contracts are wont to
 be absolutely irrevocable1 how much    
more shall the breaking of this promise 
given to ,god be deserving of           
punishment6 ,therefore a man is under an
 obligation to fulfil what he has vowed1
 provided this be something pertaining  

to ,god4  ,now it is evident that       
entrance into religion pertains very    
much to ,god1 since thereby man devotes 
himself entirely to the divine service1 
as stated above 7,q4 #ahf1 ,a4 #a74     
,hence it follows that he who binds     
himself to enter religion is under an   
obligation to enter religion according  
as he intends to bind himself by his    
vow3 so that if he intend to bind       
himself absolutely1 he is obliged to    
enter as soon as he can1 through the    
cessation of a lawful impediment2       
whereas if he intend to bind himself to 
a certain fixed time1 or under a certain
 fixed condition1 he is bound to enter  
religion when the time comes or the     
condition is fulfilled4  ,reply ,obj4   
#a3 ,this priest had made1 not a solemn1
 but a simple vow4 ,hence he was not a  
monk in effect1 so as to be bound by law
 to dwell in a monastery and renounce   
his cure4 ,however1 in the court of     
conscience one ought to advise him to   
renounce all and enter religion4 ,hence 

7,extra1 ,de ,voto et ,voti             
,redemptione1 cap4 ,per tuas7 the       
,bishop of ,grenoble1 who had accepted  
the episcopate after vowing to enter    
religion1 without having fulfilled his  
vow1 is counseled that if he wish to    
heal his conscience he should renounce  
the government of his see and pay his   
vows to the ,most ,high4  ,reply ,obj4  
#b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #c1  
ad #b71 when we were treating of vows1  
he who has bound himself by vow to enter
 a certain religious order is bound to  
do what is in his power in order to be  
received in that order2 and if he intend
 to bind himself simply to enter the    
religious life1 if he be not admitted to
 one1 he is bound to go to another2     
whereas if he intend to bind himself    
only to one particular order1 he is     
bound only according to the measure of  
the obligation to which he has engaged  
himself4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the vow to  
enter religion being perpetual is       
greater than the vow of pilgrimage to   

the ,holy ,land1 which is a temporal    
vow2 and as ,alexander ,,iii says       
7,extra1 ,de ,voto et ,voti             
,redemptione1 cap4 ,scripturae71 he who 
exchanges a temporary service for the   
perpetual service of religion is in no  
way guilty of breaking his vow4         
,moreover it may be reasonably stated   
that also by entrance into religion a   
man obtains remission of all his sins4  
,for if by giving alms a man may        
forthwith satisfy for his sins1         
according to ,dan4 #d3bd1 ,redeem thou  
thy sins with alms1 much more does it   
suffice to satisfy for all his sins that
 a man devote himself wholly to the     
divine service by entering religion1 for
 this surpasses all manner of           
satisfaction1 even that of public       
penance1 according to the ,decretals    
7,,xxxiii1 qu4 i1 cap4 ,admonere7 just  
as a holocaust exceeds a sacrifice1 as  
,gregory declares 7,hom4 xx in ,ezech474
 ,hence we read in the ,lives of the    
,fathers 7vi1 #a7 that by entering      

religion one receives the same grace as 
by being baptized4 ,and yet even if one 
were not thereby absolved from all debt 
of punishment1 nevertheless the entrance
 into religion is more profitable than a
 pilgrimage to the ,holy ,land1 as      
regards the advancement in good1 which  
is preferable to absolution from        
punishment4   ,,fourth ,,article        
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahi1 ,art4 #d  ,whether 
,he ,who ,has ,vowed to ,enter ,religion
 ,is ,bound to ,remain in ,religion in  
,perpetuity8  ,objection #a3 ,it would  
seem that he who has vowed to enter     
religion1 is bound in perpetuity to     
remain in religion4 ,for it is better   
not to enter religion than to leave     
after entering1 according to #b ,pet4   
#b3ba1 ,it had been better for them not 
to have known the way of justice1 than  
after they have known it to turn back1  
and ,luke #i3fb1 ,no man putting his    
hand to the plough1 and looking back1 is
 fit for the kingdom of ,god4 ,but he   
who bound himself by the vow to enter   

religion1 is under the obligation to    
enter1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74        
,therefore he is also bound to remain   
for always4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1        
everyone is bound to avoid that which   
gives rise to scandal1 and is a bad     
example to others4 ,now by leaving after
 entering religion a man gives a bad    
example and is an occasion of scandal to
 others1 who are thereby withdrawn from 
entering or incited to leave4 ,therefore
 it seems that he who enters religion in
 order to fulfil a vow which he had     
previously taken1 is bound to remain    
evermore4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the vow  
to enter religion is accounted a        
perpetual vow3 wherefore it is preferred
 to temporal vows1 as stated above 7,a4 
#c1 ad #c2 ,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #ab1 ad #a74    
,but this would not be so if a person   
after vowing to enter religion were to  
enter with the intention of leaving4 ,it
 seems1 therefore1 that he who vows to  
enter religion is bound also to remain  
in perpetuity4  ,on the contrary1 ,the  

vow of religious profession1 for the    
reason that it binds a man to remain in 
religion for evermore1 has to be        
preceded by a year of probation2 whereas
 this is not required before the simple 
vow whereby a man binds himself to enter
 religion4 ,therefore it seems that he  
who vows to enter religion is not for   
that reason bound to remain there in    
perpetuity4  ,i answer that1 ,the       
obligation of a vow proceeds from the   
will3 because to vow is an act of the   
will according to ,augustine 99,gloss of
 ,peter ,lombard on ,ps4 #ge3ab4        
,consequently the obligation of a vow   
extends as far as the will and intention
 of the person who takes the vow4       
,accordingly if in vowing he intend to  
bind himself not only to enter religion1
 but also to remain there evermore1 he  
is bound to remain in perpetuity4 ,if1  
on the other hand1 he intend to bind    
himself to enter religion for the       
purpose of trial1 while retaining the   
freedom to remain or not remain1 it is  

clear that he is not bound to remain4   
,if1 however1 in vowing he thought      
merely of entering religion1 without    
thinking of being free to leave1 or of  
remaining in perpetuity1 it would seem  
that he is bound to enter religion      
according to the form prescribed by     
common law1 which is that those who     
enter should be given a year's          
probation4 ,wherefore he is not bound to
 remain for ever4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it 
is better to enter religion with the    
purpose of making a trial than not to   
enter at all1 because by so doing one   
disposes oneself to remain always4 ,nor 
is a person accounted to turn or to look
 back1 save when he omits to do that    
which he engaged to do3 else whoever    
does a good work for a time1 would be   
unfit for the kingdom of ,god1 unless he
 did it always1 which is evidently      
false4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man who has 
entered religion gives neither scandal  
nor bad example by leaving1 especially  
if he do so for a reasonable motive2 and

 if others are scandalized1 it will be  
passive scandal on their part1 and not  
active scandal on the part of the person
 leaving1 since in doing so1 he has done
 what was lawful1 and expedient on      
account of some reasonable motive1 such 
as sickness1 weakness1 and the like4    
,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he who enters with the
 purpose of leaving forthwith1 does not 
seem to fulfil his vow1 since this was  
not his intention in vowing4 ,hence he  
must change that purpose1 at least so as
 to wish to try whether it is good for  
him to remain in religion1 but he is not
 bound to remain for evermore4   ,,fifth
 ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahi1 ,art4 #e
  ,whether ,children ,should ,be        
,received in ,religion8  ,objection #a3 
,it would seem that children ought not  
to be received in religion4 ,because it 
is said 7,extra1 ,de ,regular4 et       
,transeunt4 ad ,relig41 cap4 ,nullus73  
,no one should be tonsured unless he be 
of legal age and willing4 ,but children1
 seemingly1 are not of legal age2 nor   

have they a will of their own1 not      
having perfect use of reason4 ,therefore
 it seems that they ought not to be     
received in religion4  ,obj4 #b3        
,further1 the state of religion would   
seem to be a state of repentance2       
wherefore religion is derived 99,cf4 ,q4
 #ha1 ,a4 #a from religare 7to bind7 or 
from re-eligere 7to choose again71 as   
,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #c   
99,cf4 ,de ,vera ,relig4 lv74 ,but      
repentance does not become children4    
,therefore it seems that they should not
 enter religion4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1   
the obligation of a vow is like that of 
an oath4 ,but children under the age of 
fourteen ought not to be bound by oath  
7,decret4 ,,xxii1 qu4 v1 cap4 ,pueri and
 cap4 ,honestum474 ,therefore it would  
seem that neither should they be bound  
by vow4  ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is      
seemingly unlawful to bind a person to  
an obligation that can be justly        
canceled4 ,now if any persons of unripe 
age bind themselves to religion1 they   

can be withdrawn by their parents or    
guardians4 ,for it is written in the    
,decretals 7,,xx1 qu4 ii1 can4 ,puella7 
that if a maid under twelve years of age
 shall take the sacred veil of her own  
accord1 her parents or guardians1 if    
they choose1 can at once declare the    
deed null and void4 ,it is therefore    
unlawful for children1 especially of    
unripe age1 to be admitted or bound to  
religion4  ,on the contrary1 our ,lord  
said 7,matt4 #ai3ad73 ,suffer the little
 children1 and forbid them not to come  
to ,me4 ,expounding these words ,origen 
says 7,tract4 vii in ,matth47 that the  
disciples of ,jesus before they have    
been taught the conditions of           
righteousness 99,cf4 ,matt4 #ai3af-cj1  
rebuke those who offer children and     
babes to ,christ3 but our ,lord urges   
,his disciples to stoop to the service  
of children4 ,we must therefore take    
note of this1 lest deeming ourselves to 
excel in wisdom we despise the ,church's
 little ones1 as though we were great1  

and forbid the children to come to      
,jesus4  ,i answer that1 ,as stated     
above 7,a4 #b1 ad #a71 the religious vow
 is twofold4 ,one is the simple vow     
consisting in a mere promise made to    
,god1 and proceeding from the interior  
deliberation of the mind4 ,such a vow   
derives its efficacy from the divine    
law4 ,nevertheless it may encounter a   
twofold obstacle4 ,first1 through lack  
of deliberation1 as in the case of the  
insane1 whose vows are not binding      
99,extra1 ,de ,regular4 et ,transeunt4  
ad ,relig41 cap4 ,sicut tenor4 ,the same
 applies to children who have not       
reached the required use of reason1 so  
as to be capable of guile1 which use    
boys attain1 as a rule1 at about the age
 of fourteen1 and girls at the age of   
twelve1 this being what is called the   
age of puberty1 although in some it     
comes earlier and in others it is       
delayed1 according to the various       
dispositions of nature4 ,secondly1 the  
efficacy of a simple vow encounters an  

obstacle1 if the person who makes a vow 
to ,god is not his own master2 for      
instance1 if a slave1 though having the 
use of reason1 vows to enter religion1  
or even is ordained1 without the        
knowledge of his master3 for his master 
can annul this1 as stated in the        
,decretals 7,dist4 ,,liv1 cap4 ,si      
servus74 ,and since boys and girls under
 the age of puberty are naturally in    
their father's power as regards the     
disposal of their manner of life1 their 
father may either cancel or approve     
their vow1 if it please him to do so1 as
 it is expressly said with regard to a  
woman 7,num4 #cj3d74  ,accordingly if   
before reaching the age of puberty a    
child makes a simple vow1 not yet having
 full use of reason1 he is not bound in 
virtue of the vow2 but if he has the use
 of reason before reaching the age of   
puberty1 he is bound1 so far as he is   
concerned1 by his vow2 yet this         
obligation may be removed by his        
father's authority1 under whose control 

he still remains1 because the ordinance 
of the law whereby one man is subject to
 another considers what happens in the  
majority of cases4 ,if1 however1 the    
child has passed the age of puberty1 his
 vow cannot be annulled by the authority
 of his parents2 though if he has not   
the full use of reason1 he would not be 
bound in the sight of ,god4  ,the other 
is the solemn vow which makes a man a   
monk or a religious4 ,such a vow is     
subject to the ordinance of the ,church1
 on account of the solemnity attached to
 it4 ,and since the ,church considers   
what happens in the majority of cases1 a
 profession made before the age of      
puberty1 however much the person who    
makes profession may have the use of    
reason1 or be capable of guile1 does not
 take effect so as to make him a        
religious 7,extra1 ,de ,regular41 etc4  
cap4 ,significatum est474               
,nevertheless1 although they cannot be  
professed before the age of puberty1    
they can1 with the consent of their     

parents1 be received into religion to be
 educated there3 thus it is related of  
,john the ,baptist 7,luke #a3hj7 that   
the child grew and was strengthened in  
spirit1 and was in the deserts4 ,hence1 
as ,gregory states 7,dial4 ii1 #c71 the 
,roman nobles began to give their sons  
to the blessed ,benedict to be nurtured 
for ,almighty ,god2 and this is most    
fitting1 according to ,lam4 #c3bg1 ,it  
is good for a man when he has borne the 
yoke from his youth4 ,it is for this    
reason that by common custom children   
are made to apply themselves to those   
duties or arts with which they are to   
pass their lives4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the
 legal age for receiving the tonsure and
 taking the solemn vow of religion is   
the age of puberty1 when a man is able  
to make use of his own will2 but before 
the age of puberty it is possible to    
have reached the lawful age to receive  
the tonsure and be educated in a        
religious house4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the 
religious state is chiefly directed to  

the attainment of perfection1 as stated 
above 7,q4 #ahf1 ,a4 #a1 ad #d72 and    
accordingly it is becoming to children1 
who are easily drawn to it4 ,but as a   
consequence it is called a state of     
repentance1 inasmuch as occasions of sin
 are removed by religious observances1  
as stated above 7,q4 #ahf1 ,a4 #a1 ad   
#d74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even as children
 are not bound to take oaths 7as the    
canon states71 so are they not bound to 
take vows4 ,if1 however1 they bind      
themselves by vow or oath to do         
something1 they are bound in ,god's     
sight1 if they have the use of reason1  
but they are not bound in the sight of  
the ,church before reaching the age of  
fourteen4  ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a woman who
 has not reached the age of puberty is  
not rebuked 7,num4 #cj3d7 for taking a  
vow without her parents' consent3 but   
the vow can be made void by her parents4
 ,hence it is evident that she does not 
sin in vowing4 ,but we are given to     
understand that she binds herself by    

vow1 so far as she may1 without         
prejudice to her parents' authority4    
,,sixth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahi1  
,art4 #f  ,whether ,one ,ought to ,be   
,withdrawn from ,entering ,religion     
,through ,deference to ,one's ,parents8 
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one  
ought to be withdrawn from entering     
religion through deference to one's     
parents4 ,for it is not lawful to omit  
that which is of obligation in order to 
do that which is optional4 ,now         
deference to one's parents comes under  
an obligation of the precept concerning 
the honoring of our parents 7,ex4       
#bj3ab72 wherefore the ,apostle says 7#a
 ,tim4 #e3d73 ,if any widow have        
children or grandchildren1 let her learn
 first to govern her own house1 and to  
make a return of duty to her parents4   
,but the entrance to religion is        
optional4 ,therefore it would seem that 
one ought not to omit deference to one's
 parents for the sake of entering       
religion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 seemingly

 the subjection of a son to his father  
is greater than that of a slave to his  
master1 since sonship is natural1 while 
slavery results from the curse of sin1  
as appears from ,gen4 #i3be4 ,now a     
slave cannot set aside the service of   
his master in order to enter religion or
 take holy orders1 as stated in the     
,decretals 7,dist4 ,,liv1 cap4 ,si      
servus74 ,much less therefore can a son 
set aside the deference due to his      
father in order to enter religion4      
,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a man is more       
indebted to his parents than to those to
 whom he owes money4 ,now persons who   
owe money to anyone cannot enter        
religion4 ,for ,gregory says 7,regist4  
viii1 ,ep4 #e7 that those who are       
engaged in trade must by no means be    
admitted into a monastery1 when they    
seek admittance1 unless first of all    
they withdraw from public business      
7,dist4 liii1 can4 ,legem474 ,therefore 
seemingly much less may children enter  
religion in despite of their duty to    

their parents4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is
 related 7,matt4 #d3bb7 that ,james and 
,john left their nets and father1 and   
followed our ,lord4 ,by this1 says      
,hilary 7,can4 iii in ,matth471 we learn
 that we who intend to follow ,christ   
are not bound by the cares of the       
secular life1 and by the ties of home4  
,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4   
#aja1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b7 when we were       
treating of piety1 parents as such have 
the character of a principle1 wherefore 
it is competent to them as such to have 
the care of their children4 ,hence it is
 unlawful for a person having children  
to enter religion so as altogether to   
set aside the care for their children1  
namely without providing for their      
education4 ,for it is written 7#a ,tim4 
#e3h7 that if any man have not care of  
his own 4 4 4 he hath denied the faith1 
and is worse than an infidel4           
,nevertheless it is accidentally        
competent to parents to be assisted by  
their children1 in so far1 to wit1 as   

they are placed in a condition of       
necessity4 ,consequently we must say    
that when their parents are in such need
 that they cannot fittingly be supported
 otherwise than by the help of their    
children1 these latter may not lawfully 
enter religion in despite of their duty 
to their parents4 ,if1 however1 the     
parents' necessity be not such as to    
stand in great need of their children's 
assistance1 the latter may1 in despite  
of the duty they owe their parents1     
enter religion even against their       
parents' command1 because after the age 
of puberty every freeman enjoys freedom 
in things concerning the ordering of his
 state of life1 especially in such as   
belong to the service of ,god1 and we   
should more obey the ,father of spirits 
that we may live 99',shall we not much  
more obey the ,father of ,spirits1 and  
live8'1 as says the ,apostle 7,heb4     
#ab3i71 than obey our parents4 ,hence as
 we read 7,matt4 #h3bb2 ,luke #i3fb7 our
 ,lord rebuked the disciple who was     

unwilling to follow him forthwith on    
account of his father's burial3 for     
there were others who could see to this1
 as ,chrysostom remarks 99,hom4 xxvii in
 ,matth44  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the        
commandment of honoring our parents     
extends not only to bodily but also to  
spiritual service1 and to the paying of 
deference4 ,hence even those who are in 
religion can fulfil the commandment of  
honoring their parents1 by praying for  
them and by revering and assisting them1
 as becomes religious1 since even those 
who live in the world honor their       
parents in different ways as befits     
their condition4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,since slavery was imposed in punishment
 of sin1 it follows that by slavery man 
forfeits something which otherwise he   
would be competent to have1 namely the  
free disposal of his person1 for a slave
 belongs wholly to his master           
99,aristotle1 ,polit4 i1 #b4 ,on the    
other hand1 the son1 through being      
subject to his father1 is not hindered  

from freely disposing of his person by  
transferring himself to the service of  
,god2 which is most conducive to man's  
good4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he who is under
 a certain fixed obligation cannot      
lawfully set it aside so long as he is  
able to fulfil it4 ,wherefore if a      
person is under an obligation to give an
 account to someone or to pay a certain 
fixed debt1 he cannot lawfully evade    
this obligation in order to enter       
religion4 ,if1 however1 he owes a sum of
 money1 and has not wherewithal to pay  
the debt1 he must do what he can1 namely
 by surrendering his goods to his       
creditor4 ,according to civil law       
99,cod4 ,,iv1 x1 de ,oblig4 et ,action1 
#ab money lays an obligation not on the 
person of a freeman1 but on his         
property1 because the person of a       
freeman is above all pecuniary          
consideration 99,dig4 ,l1 xvii1 de div4 
reg4 ,jur4 ant4 #ajf1 #agf4 ,hence1     
after surrendering his property1 he may 
lawfully enter religion1 nor is he bound

 to remain in the world in order to earn
 the means of paying the debt4  ,on the 
other hand1 he does not owe his father a
 special debt1 except as may arise in a 
case of necessity1 as stated above4     
,,seventh ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahi1
 ,art4 #g  ,whether ,parish ,priests    
,may ,lawfully ,enter ,religion8        
,objection #a3 ,it would seem that      
parish priests cannot lawfully enter    
religion4 ,for ,gregory says 7,past4    
iii1 #d7 that he who undertakes the cure
 of souls1 receives an awful warning in 
the words3 ',my son1 if thou be surety  
for thy friend1 thou hast engaged fast  
thy hand to a stranger' 7,prov4 #f3a72  
and he goes on to say1 because to be    
surety for a friend is to take charge of
 the soul of another on the surety of   
one's own behavior4 ,now he who is under
 an obligation to a man for a debt1     
cannot enter religion1 unless he pay    
what he owes1 if he can4 ,since then a  
priest is able to fulfil the cure of    
souls1 to which obligation he has       

pledged his soul1 it would seem unlawful
 for him to lay aside the cure of souls 
in order to enter religion4  ,obj4 #b3  
,further1 what is lawful to one is      
likewise lawful to all4 ,but if all     
priests having cure of souls were to    
enter religion1 the people would be left
 without a pastor's care1 which would be
 unfitting4 ,therefore it seems that    
parish priests cannot lawfully enter    
religion4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 chief    
among the acts to which religious orders
 are directed are those whereby a man   
gives to others the fruit of his        
contemplation4 ,now such acts are       
competent to parish priests and         
archdeacons1 whom it becomes by virtue  
of their office to preach and hear      
confessions4 ,therefore it would seem   
unlawful for a parish priest or         
archdeacon to pass over to religion4    
,on the contrary1 ,it is said in the    
,decretals 7,,xix1 qu4 ii1 cap4 ,duce   
sunt leges473 ,if a man1 while governing
 the people in his church under the     

bishop and leading a secular life1 is   
inspired by the ,holy ,ghost to desire  
to work out his salvation in a monastery
 or under some canonical rule1 even     
though his bishop withstand him1 we     
authorize him to go freely4  ,i answer  
that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad #c2  
,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #ab1 ad #a71 the obligation
 of a perpetual vow stands before every 
other obligation4 ,now it belongs       
properly to bishops and religious to be 
bound by perpetual vow to devote        
themselves to the divine service 99,cf4 
,q4 #ahd1 ,a4 #e1 while parish priests  
and archdeacons are not1 as bishops are1
 bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to 
retain the cure of souls4 ,wherefore    
bishops cannot lay aside their bishopric
 for any pretext whatever1 without the  
authority of the ,roman ,pontiff        
7,extra1 ,de ,regular4 et ,transeunt4 ad
 ,relig41 cap4 ,licet473 whereas        
archdeacons and parish priests are free 
to renounce in the hands of the bishop  
the cure entrusted to them1 without the 

,pope's special permission1 who alone   
can dispense from perpetual vows4       
,therefore it is evident that           
archdeacons and parish priests may      
lawfully enter religion4  ,reply ,obj4  
#a3 ,parish priests and archdeacons have
 bound themselves to the care of their  
subjects1 as long as they retain their  
archdeaconry or parish1 but they did not
 bind themselves to retain their        
archdeaconry or parish for ever4  ,reply
 ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,jerome says 7,contra    
,vigil473 ,although they1 namely        
religious1 are sorely smitten by thy    
poisonous tongue1 about whom you argue1 
saying2 ',if all shut themselves up and 
live in solitude1 who will go to church8
 who will convert worldlings8 who will  
be able to urge sinners to virtue8' ,if 
this holds true1 if all are fools with  
thee1 who can be wise8 ,nor will        
virginity be commendable1 for if all be 
virgins1 and none marry1 the human race 
will perish4 ,virtue is rare1 and is not
 desired by many4 ,it is therefore      

evident that this is a foolish alarm2   
thus might a man fear to draw water lest
 the river run dry4 99,st4 ,thomas gives
 no reply to the third objection1 which 
is sufficiently solved in the body of   
the article4   ,,eighth ,,article       
,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahi1 ,art4 #h  ,whether 
,it ,is ,lawful to ,pass from ,one      
,religious ,order to ,another8          
,objection #a3 ,it seems unlawful to    
pass from one religious order to        
another1 even a stricter one4 ,for the  
,apostle says 7,heb4 #aj3be73 ,not      
forsaking our assembly1 as some are     
accustomed2 and a gloss observes3 ,those
 namely who yield through fear of       
persecution1 or who presuming on        
themselves withdraw from the company of 
sinners or of the imperfect1 that they  
may appear to be righteous4 ,now those  
who pass from one religious order to    
another more perfect one would seem to  
do this4 ,therefore this is seemingly   
unlawful4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the      
profession of monks is stricter than    

that of canons regular 7,extra1 ,de     
,statu ,monach4 et ,canonic4 ,reg41 cap4
 ,quod ,dei timorem74 ,but it is        
unlawful for anyone to pass from the    
state of canon regular to the monastic  
state4 ,for it is said in the ,decretals
 7,,xix1 qu4 iii1 can4 ,mandamus73 ,we  
ordain and without any exception forbid 
any professed canon regular to become a 
monk1 unless 7which ,god forbid7 he have
 fallen into public sin4 ,therefore it  
would seem unlawful for anyone to pass  
from one religious order to another of  
higher rank4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a     
person is bound to fulfil what he has   
vowed1 as long as he is able lawfully to
 do so2 thus if a man has vowed to      
observe continence1 he is bound1 even   
after contracting marriage by words in  
the present tense1 to fulfil his vow so 
long as the marriage is not consummated1
 because he can fulfil the vow by       
entering religion4 ,therefore if a      
person may lawfully pass from one       
religious order to another1 he will be  

bound to do so if he vowed it previously
 while in the world4 ,but this would    
seem objectionable1 since in many cases 
it might give rise to scandal4          
,therefore a religious may not pass from
 one religious order to another stricter
 one4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is said in 
the ,decretals 7,,xx1 qu4 iv1 can4      
,virgines73 ,if sacred virgins design   
for the good of their soul to pass to   
another monastery on account of a       
stricter life1 and decide to remain     
there1 the holy synod allows them to do 
so3 and the same would seem to apply to 
any religious4 ,therefore one may       
lawfully pass from one religious order  
to another4  ,i answer that1 ,it is not 
commendable to pass from one religious  
order to another3 both because this     
frequently gives scandal to those who   
remain2 and because1 other things being 
equal1 it is easier to make progress in 
a religious order to which one is       
accustomed than in one to which one is  
not habituated4 ,hence in the           

,conferences of the ,fathers 7,coll4    
xiv1 #e7 ,abbot ,nesteros says3 ,it is  
best for each one that he should1       
according to the resolve he has made1   
hasten with the greatest zeal and care  
to reach the perfection of the work he  
has undertaken1 and nowise forsake the  
profession he has chosen4 ,and further  
on he adds 7cap4 #f7 by way of reason3  
,for it is impossible that one and the  
same man should excel in all the virtues
 at once1 since if he endeavor to       
practice them equally1 he will of       
necessity1 while trying to attain them  
all1 end in acquiring none of them      
perfectly3 because the various religious
 orders excel in respect of various     
works of virtue4  ,nevertheless one may 
commendably pass from one religious     
order to another for three reasons4     
,first1 through zeal for a more perfect 
religious life1 which excellence        
depends1 as stated above 7,q4 #ahh1 ,a4 
#f71 not merely on severity1 but chiefly
 on the end to which a religious order  

is directed1 and secondarily on the     
discretion whereby the observances are  
proportionate to the due end4 ,secondly1
 on account of a religious order falling
 away from the perfection it ought to   
have3 for instance1 if in a more severe 
religious order1 the religious begin to 
live less strictly1 it is commendable   
for one to pass even to a less severe   
religious order if the observance is    
better4 ,hence in the ,conferences of   
the ,fathers 7,coll4 xix1 #c1 #e1 #f7   
,abbot ,john says of himself that he had
 passed from the solitary life1 in which
 he was professed1 to a less severe     
life1 namely of those who lived in      
community1 because the hermetical life  
had fallen into decline and laxity4     
,thirdly1 on account of sickness or     
weakness1 the result of which sometimes 
is that one is unable to keep the       
ordinances of a more severe religious   
order1 though able to observe those of a
 less strict religion4  ,there is1      
however1 a difference in these three    

cases4 ,for in the first case one ought1
 on account of humility1 to seek        
permission3 yet this cannot be denied1  
provided it be certain that this other  
religion is more severe4 ,and if there  
be a probable doubt about this1 one     
should ask one's superior to decide     
7,extra1 ,de ,regular4 et ,transeunt4 ad
 ,relig41 cap4 ,licet474 ,in like manner
 the superior's decision should be      
sought in the second case4 ,in the third
 case it is also necessary to have a    
dispensation4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those  
who pass to a stricter religious order1 
do so not out of presumption that they  
may appear righteous1 but out of        
devotion1 that they may become more     
righteous4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,religious 
orders whether of monks or of canons    
regular are destined to the works of the
 contemplative life4 ,chief among these 
are those which are performed in the    
divine mysteries1 and these are the     
direct object of the orders of canons   
regular1 the members of which are       

essentially religious clerics4 ,on the  
other hand1 monastic religious are not  
essentially clerics1 according to the   
,decretals 7,,xvi1 qu4 i1 cap4 ,alia    
causa74 ,hence although monastic orders 
are more severe1 it would be lawful1    
supposing the members to be lay monks1  
to pass from the monastic order to an   
order of canons regular1 according to   
the statement of ,jerome 7,ep4 cxxv1 ad 
,rustic4 ,monach473 ,so live in the     
monastery as to deserve to become a     
cleric2 but not conversely1 as expressed
 in the ,decretal quoted 7,,xix1 qu4    
iii74 ,if1 however1 the monks be clerics
 devoting themselves to the sacred      
ministry1 they have this in common with 
canons regular coupled with greater     
severity1 and consequently it will be   
lawful to pass from an order of canons  
regular to a monastic order1 provided   
withal that one seek the superior's     
permission 7,,xix1 qu4 iii2 cap4        
,statuimus74  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the     
solemn vow whereby a person is bound to 

a less strict order1 is more binding    
than the simple vow whereby a person is 
bound to a stricter order4 ,for if after
 taking a simple vow a person were to be
 married1 his marriage would not be     
invalid1 as it would be after his taking
 a solemn vow4 ,consequently a person   
who is professed in a less severe order 
is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he  
has taken on entering a more severe     
order4   ,,ninth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1   
,q4 #ahi1 ,art4 #i  ,whether ,one ,ought
 to ,induce ,others to ,enter ,religion8
  ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no 
one ought to induce others to enter     
religion4 ,for the blessed ,benedict    
prescribes in his ,rule 7lviii7 that    
those who seek to enter religion must   
not easily be admitted1 but spirits must
 be tested whether they be of ,god2 and 
,cassian has the same instruction 7,de  
,inst4 ,caenob4 iv1 #c74 ,much less     
therefore is it lawful to induce anyone 
to enter religion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 
our ,lord said 7,matt4 #bc3ae73 ,woe to 

you 4 4 4 because you go round about the
 sea and the land to make one proselyte1
 and when he is made you make him the   
child of hell twofold more than         
yourselves4 ,now thus would seem to do  
those who induce persons to enter       
religion4 ,therefore this would seem    
blameworthy4  ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no one
 should induce another to do what is to 
his prejudice4 ,but those who are       
induced to enter religion1 sometimes    
take harm therefrom1 for sometimes they 
are under obligation to enter a stricter
 religion4 ,therefore it would not seem 
praiseworthy to induce others to enter  
religion4  ,on the contrary1 ,it is     
written 7,ex4 #bf3c1 seqq4 99,st4       
,thomas quotes the sense1 not the       
words73 ,let one curtain draw the other4
 ,therefore one man should draw another 
to ,god's service4  ,i answer that1     
,those who induce others to enter       
religion not only do not sin1 but merit 
a great reward4 ,for it is written      
7,james #e3bj73 ,he who causeth a sinner

 to be converted from the error of his  
way1 shall save his soul from death1 and
 shall cover a multitude of sins2 and   
7,dan4 #ab3c73 ,they that instruct many 
to justice shall be as stars for all    
eternity4  ,nevertheless such inducement
 may be affected by a threefold         
inordinateness4 ,first1 if one person   
force another by violence to enter      
religion3 and this is forbidden in the  
,decretals 7,,xx1 qu4 iii1 cap4         
,praesens74 ,secondly1 if one person    
persuade another simoniacally to enter  
religion1 by giving him presents3 and   
this is forbidden in the ,decretal 7,i1 
qu4 ii1 cap4 ,quam pio74 ,but this does 
not apply to the case where one provides
 a poor person with necessaries by      
educating him in the world for the      
religious life2 or when without any     
compact one gives a person little       
presents for the sake of good           
fellowship4 ,thirdly1 if one person     
entices another by lies3 for it is to be
 feared that the person thus enticed may

 turn back on finding himself deceived1 
and thus the last state of that man may 
become worse than the first 7,luke      
#aa3bf74  ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those who   
are induced to enter religion have still
 a time of probation wherein they make a
 trial of the hardships of religion1 so 
that they are not easily admitted to the
 religious life4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3      
,according to ,hilary 7,can4 xxiv in    
,matth47 this saying of our ,lord was a 
forecast of the wicked endeavors of the 
,jews1 after the preaching of ,christ1  
to draw ,gentiles or even ,christians to
 observe the ,jewish ritual1 thereby    
making them doubly children of hell1    
because1 to wit1 they were not forgiven 
the former sins which they committed    
while adherents of ,judaism1 and        
furthermore they incurred the guilt of  
,jewish perfidy2 and thus interpreted   
these words have nothing to do with the 
case in point4  ,according to ,jerome1  
however1 in his commentary on this      
passage of ,matthew1 the reference is to

 the ,jews even at the time when it was 
yet lawful to keep the legal            
observances1 in so far as he whom they  
converted to ,judaism from paganism1 was
 merely misled2 but when he saw the     
wickedness of his teachers1 he returned 
to his vomit1 and becoming a pagan      
deserved greater punishment for his     
treachery4 ,hence it is manifest that it
 is not blameworthy to draw others to   
the service of ,god or to the religious 
life1 but only when one gives a bad     
example to the person converted1 whence 
he becomes worse4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the
 lesser is included in the greater4     
,wherefore a person who is bound by vow 
or oath to enter a lesser order1 may be 
lawfully induced to enter a greater one1
 unless there be some special obstacle1 
such as ill-health1 or the hope of      
making greater progress in the lesser   
order4 ,on the other hand1 one who is   
bound by vow or oath to enter a greater 
order1 cannot be lawfully induced to    
enter a lesser order1 except for some   

special and evident motive1 and then    
with the superior's dispensation4       
,,tenth ,,article ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ahi1  
,art4 #aj  ,whether ,it ,is             
,praiseworthy to ,enter ,religion       
,without ,taking ,counsel of ,many1 and 
,previously ,deliberating for a ,long   
,time8  ,objection #a3 ,it would not    
seem praiseworthy to enter religion     
without taking counsel of many1 and     
previously deliberating for a long time4
 ,for it is written 7#a ,john #d3a73    
,believe not every spirit1 but try the  
spirits if they be of ,god4 ,now        
sometimes a man's purpose of entering   
religion is not of ,god1 since it often 
comes to naught through his leaving the 
religious life2 for it is written 7,acts
 #e3ch1 #ci73 ,if this counsel or this  
work be of ,god1 you cannot overthrow   
it4 ,therefore it would seem that one   
ought to make a searching inquiry before
 entering religion4  ,obj4 #b3 ,further1
 it is written 7,prov4 #be3i73 ,treat   
thy cause with thy friend4 ,now a man's 

cause would seem to be especially one   
that concerns a change in his state of  
life4 ,therefore seemingly one ought not
 to enter religion without discussing   
the matter with one's friends4  ,obj4   
#c3 ,further1 our ,lord 7,luke #ad3bh7  
in making a comparison with a man who   
has a mind to build a tower1 says that  
he doth first sit down and reckon the   
charges that are necessary1 whether he  
have wherewithal to finish it1 lest he  
become an object of mockery1 for that   
this man began to build and was not able
 to finish4 ,now the wherewithal to     
build the tower1 as ,augustine says     
7,ep4 ad ,laetum ccxliii71 is nothing   
less than that each one should renounce 
all his possessions4 ,yet it happens    
sometimes that many cannot do this1 nor 
keep other religious observances2 and in
 signification of this it is stated 7#a 
,kings #ag3ci7 that ,david could not    
walk in ,saul's armor1 for he was not   
used to it4 ,therefore it would seem    
that one ought not to enter religion    

without long deliberation beforehand and
 taking counsel of many4  ,on the       
contrary1 ,it is stated 7,matt4 #d3bj7  
that upon our ,lord's calling them1     
,peter and ,andrew immediately leaving  
their nets1 followed ,him4 ,here        
,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xiv in ,matth473
 ,such obedience as this does ,christ   
require of us1 that we delay not even   
for a moment4  ,i answer that1 ,long    
deliberation and the advice of many are 
required in great matters of doubt1 as  
the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #c72
 while advice is unnecessary in matters 
that are certain and fixed4 ,now with   
regard to entering religion three points
 may be considered4 ,first1 the entrance
 itself into religion1 considered by    
itself2 and thus it is certain that     
entrance into religion is a greater     
good1 and to doubt about this is to     
disparage ,christ ,who gave this        
counsel4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de    
,verb4 ,dom41 ,serm4 c1 #b73 ,the ,east1
 that is ,christ1 calleth thee1 and thou

 turnest to the ,west1 namely mortal and
 fallible man4 ,secondly1 the entrance  
into religion may be considered in      
relation to the strength of the person  
who intends to enter4 ,and here again   
there is no room for doubt about the    
entrance to religion1 since those who   
enter religion trust not to be able to  
stay by their own power1 but by the     
assistance of the divine power1         
according to ,isa4 #dj3ca1 ,they that   
hope in the ,lord shall renew their     
strength1 they shall take wings as      
eagles1 they shall run and not be weary1
 they shall walk and not faint4 ,yet if 
there be some special obstacle 7such as 
bodily weakness1 a burden of debts1 or  
the like7 in such cases a man must      
deliberate and take counsel with such as
 are likely to help and not hinder him4 
,hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #cg3ab73 
,treat with a man without religion      
concerning holiness 99,the ,douay       
version supplies the negative3 ',treat  
not 4 4 4 nor with 4 4 4'1 with an      

unjust man concerning justice1 meaning  
that one should not do so1 wherefore the
 text goes on 7,ecclus4 #cg3ad1 #ae71   
,give no heed to these in any matter of 
counsel1 but be continually with a holy 
man4 ,in these matters1 however1 one    
should not take long deliberation4      
,wherefore ,jerome says 7,ep4 and       
,paulin4 liii73 ,hasten1 ,i pray thee1  
cut off rather than loosen the rope that
 holds the boat to the shore4 ,thirdly1 
we may consider the way of entering     
religion1 and which order one ought to  
enter1 and about such matters also one  
may take counsel of those who will not  
stand in one's way4  ,reply ,obj4 #a3   
,the saying3 ,try the spirits1 if they  
be of ,god1 applies to matters admitting
 of doubt whether the spirits be of     
,god2 thus those who are already in     
religion may doubt whether he who offers
 himself to religion be led by the      
spirit of ,god1 or be moved by          
hypocrisy4 ,wherefore they must try the 
postulant whether he be moved by the    

divine spirit4 ,but for him who seeks to
 enter religion there can be no doubt   
but that the purpose of entering        
religion to which his heart has given   
birth is from the spirit of ,god1 for it
 is ,his spirit that leads man into the 
land of uprightness 7,ps4 #adb3aj74     
,nor does this prove that it is not of  
,god that some turn back2 since not all 
that is of ,god is incorruptible3 else  
corruptible creatures would not be of   
,god1 as the ,manicheans hold1 nor could
 some who have grace from ,god lose it1 
which is also heretical4 ,but ,god's    
counsel whereby ,he makes even things   
corruptible and changeable1 is          
imperishable according to ,isa4 #df3aj1 
,my counsel shall stand and all ,my will
 shall be done4 ,hence the purpose of   
entering religion needs not to be tried 
whether it be of ,god1 because it       
requires no further demonstration1 as a 
gloss says on #a ,thess4 #e3ba1 ,prove  
all things4  ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even as  
the flesh lusteth against the spirit    

7,gal4 #e3ag71 so too carnal friends    
often thwart our spiritual progress1    
according to ,mic4 #g3f1 ,a man's       
enemies are they of his own household4  
,wherefore ,cyril expounding ,luke      
#i3fa1 ,let me first take my leave of   
them that are at my house1 says 99,cf4  
,st4 ,thomas's ,catena ,aurea3 ,by      
asking first to take his leave of them  
that were at his house1 he shows he was 
somewhat of two minds4 ,for to          
communicate with his neighbors1 and     
consult those who are unwilling to      
relish righteousness1 is an indication  
of weakness and turning back4 ,hence he 
hears our ,lord say3 ',no man putting   
his hand to the plough1 and looking     
back1 is fit for the kingdom of ,god1'  
because he looks back who seeks delay in
 order to go home and confer with his   
kinsfolk4  ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the        
building of the tower signifies the     
perfection of ,christian life2 and the  
renunciation of one's possessions is the
 wherewithal to build this tower4 ,now  

no one doubts or deliberates about      
wishing to have the wherewithal1 or     
whether he is able to build the tower if
 he have the wherewithal1 but what does 
come under deliberation is whether one  
has the wherewithal4 ,again it need not 
be a matter of deliberation whether one 
ought to renounce all that one has1 or  
whether by so doing one may be able to  
attain to perfection2 whereas it is a   
matter of deliberation whether that     
which one is doing amounts to the       
renunciation of all that he has1 since  
unless he does renounce 7which is to    
have the wherewithal7 he cannot1 as the 
text goes on to state1 be ,christ's     
disciple1 and this is to build the      
tower4  ,the misgiving of those who     
hesitate as to whether they may be able 
to attain to perfection by entering     
religion is shown by many examples to be
 unreasonable4 ,hence ,augustine says   
7,confess4 viii1 #aa73 ,on that side    
whither ,i had set my face1 and whither 
,i trembled to go1 there appeared to me 

the chaste dignity of continency 4 4 4  
honestly alluring me to come and doubt  
not1 and stretching forth to receive and
 embrace me1 her holy hands full of     
multitudes of good examples4 ,there were
 so many young men and maidens here1 a  
multitude of youth and every age1 grave 
widows and aged virgins 4 4 4 ,and she  
smiled at me with a persuasive mockery  
as though to say3 ,canst not thou what  
these youths and these maidens can8 ,or 
can they either in themselves1 and not  
rather in the ,lord their ,god8 4 4 4   
,why standest thou in thyself1 and so   
standest not8 ,cast thyself upon ,him2  
fear not1 ,he will not withdraw ,himself
 that thou shouldst fall4 ,cast thyself 
fearlessly upon ,him3 ,he will receive  
and will heal thee4  ,the example quoted
 of ,david is not to the point1 because 
the arms of ,saul1 as a gloss on the    
passage observes1 are the sacraments of 
the ,law1 as being burdensome3 whereas  
religion is the sweet yoke of ,christ1  
for as ,gregory says 7,moral4 iv1 #cc71 

what burden does ,he lay on the         
shoulders of the mind1 ,who commands us 
to shun all troublesome desires1 ,who   
warns us to turn aside from the rough   
paths of this world8  ,to those indeed  
who take this sweet yoke upon themselves
 ,he promises the refreshment of the    
divine fruition and the eternal rest of 
their souls4  ,to which may ,he ,who    
made this promise bring us1 ,jesus      
,christ our ,lord1 ,who is over all     
things ,god blessed for ever4 ,amen4